Court Opinion

ID: 9387978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:08:09.089233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.626458
License: Public Domain

[J-2-2023]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                MIDDLE DISTRICT

     TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   :   No. 70 MAP 2022
                                                 :
                      Appellee                   :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                 :   Superior Court dated December 21,
                                                 :   2021 at No. 161 EDA 2021 Affirming
               v.                                :   the Judgment of Sentence of the
                                                 :   Chester County Court of Common
                                                 :   Pleas, Criminal Division, dated
 JOSEPH MELVIN ROLLINS,                          :   December 3, 2020 at No. CP-15-
                                                 :   CR-0003756-2019.
                      Appellant                  :
                                                 :   SUBMITTED: January 18, 2023

                                        OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY                                                 DECIDED: April 19, 2023

      In Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), this Court found Section

1543(b)(1.1)(i) of the Vehicle Code unconstitutionally vague in contravention of state and

federal due process principles because it failed to specify a maximum term of

imprisonment. We granted allowance of appeal in this case to determine whether another

subsection of that same statute, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), is unconstitutional for similarly

failing to specify a maximum term of imprisonment. We decline to find this provision

unconstitutional and therefore affirm the Superior Court’s order.

      We begin by recounting the language of Section 1543, as it is central to this case:

      (a) Offense defined. – Except as provided in subsection (b), any person
      who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this
      Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension, revocation or
      cancellation of the operating privilege and before the operating privilege has
been restored is guilty of a summary offense and shall, upon conviction or
adjudication of delinquency, be sentenced to pay a fine of $200.

(b) Certain offenses. –

      (1) The following shall apply:

             (i) A person who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or
             trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the person’s
             operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of
             acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a
             violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of
             alcohol or controlled substance) or the former section 3731,
             because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to
             suspension for refusal) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is
             suspended under section 1581 (relating to Driver’s License
             Compact) for an offense substantially similar to a violation of
             section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon a first
             conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be
             sentenced to pay a fine of $500 and to undergo imprisonment
             for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days.

             (ii) A second violation of this paragraph shall constitute a
             summary offense and, upon conviction of this paragraph, a
             person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to
             undergo imprisonment for not less than 90 days.

             (iii) A third or subsequent violation of this paragraph shall
             constitute a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon
             conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced
             to pay a fine of $2,500 and to undergo imprisonment for
             not less than six months.

             (1.1)(i) A person who has an amount of alcohol by weight in
             his blood that is equal to or greater than .02% at the time of
             testing or who at the time of testing has in his blood any
             amount of a Schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III
             controlled substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972
             (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug,
             Device and Cosmetic Act, or its metabolite or who refuses
             testing of blood or breath and who drives a motor vehicle on
             any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time
             when the person's operating privilege is suspended or
             revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated
             Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3802 or
             former section 3731 or because of a violation of section

                               [J-2-2023] - 2
                      1547(b)(1) or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended
                      under section 1581 for an offense substantially similar to a
                      violation of section 3802 or former section 3731 shall, upon a
                      first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be
                      sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo
                      imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
          We now turn to the background of the instant matter. On October 22, 2022,

Appellant Joseph Melvin Rollins proceeded to a stipulated trial and was ultimately

convicted of one count of violating Section 1543(b)(1)(iii). The trial court imposed a

sentence of six months to one year of imprisonment and a mandatory fine of $2,500.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant’s

attorney instead filed an Anders/Santiago 1 brief indicating there were no meritorious

issues to pursue on appeal. The trial court thereafter issued an opinion explaining it would

wait for the Superior Court to determine whether there were meritorious issues on appeal

before submitting an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4).

Before Appellant’s attorney filed the Anders/Santiago brief, this Court issued its decision

in Eid.

          There, Eid argued that Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i), recounted above, was

unconstitutionally vague in violation of state and federal due process principles for failing

to provide a clear statutory maximum term of imprisonment. Id. at 1041. We agreed. In

doing so, this Court declined the Commonwealth’s request to infer a maximum penalty or

a flat sentence based on various statutory provisions and our previous decision in

Commonwealth v. Bell, 645 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1994).            With respect to the former, we

1See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d
349 (Pa. 2009).

                                       [J-2-2023] - 3
disagreed with the Commonwealth that Section 6503(a) 2 of the Vehicle Code could be

used to infer a six month maximum penalty, as that provision only pertained to second or

subsequent violations of unrelated Vehicle Code violations. Eid, 249 A.3d at 1042. We

also rejected the Commonwealth’s assertion that Section 9756(c.1)(2) of the Sentencing

Code expressly sanctions the imposition of flat sentences for violations of the Vehicle

Code, explaining “[t]hat provision merely permits the imposition of a sentence of

imprisonment without parole where, among other things, ‘the maximum sentence of total

confinement imposed on one or more indictments to run consecutively or concurrently

total 90 days or less.’” Id. at 1043 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. 9756(c.1)(2)). We further noted

that provision “does not constitute a standalone exception to the general rule of minimum-

maximum sentencing applicable here.” Id. The minimum-maximum rule, set forth in

Section 9756(b)(1) of the Sentencing Code, provides that “the court shall impose a

minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the maximum

sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1).

      We further found the Commonwealth’s reliance on Bell unavailing.         In Bell, this

Court rejected a claim that the mandatory minimum sentencing statute for marijuana

trafficking was impermissibly vague in violation of state and federal due process

principles, finding the provision could be interpreted consistently with other statutes in

such a way to infer a maximum sentence for the offenses. Bell, 645 A.2d at 213. We

specifically addressed alleged inconsistencies between Section 7508(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) of the

Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(1)(ii)-(iii), and Section 113(f)(2) of the Controlled

Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Drug Act), 35 P.S. § 780-113(f)(2), in light of

2 This section states: “Every person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of any
of the following provisions shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $200 nor more
than $1,000 or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.
§ 6503(a).

                                      [J-2-2023] - 4
the maximum-minimum rule in Section 9756(b)(1) of the Sentencing Code. Id. at 214-15.

Section 7508(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) of the Crimes Code provided for a minimum term of three to five

years for violating certain clauses of Section 113(a) of the Drug Act, while Section

113(f)(2) of the Drug Act provided for a maximum term of five years for violating those

same clauses. Id. We concluded that Section 7508 and Section 113(f)(2) allowed for a

sentence of three to five years or a flat sentence of five years. Id. at 217. Our Court

recognized this result ran afoul of the maximum-minimum rule but explained that provision

is statutory rather than constitutional. The prefatory language in Section 7508, therefore,

carved out an exception to the minimum-maximum rule and did not require this Court to

disregard the term of imprisonment provided in Section 113(f)(2), as it could be

consistently applied with Section 7508. Id. We also found this approach most consistent

with the legislature’s intent to impose harsher minimum penalties for drug trafficking

offenses without raising constitutional concerns. Id.

       The Eid Court emphasized Bell has never been applied beyond the particular

mandatory sentencing scheme of the Drug Act. Eid, 249 A.3d at 1043. We further

explained that applying the Bell rationale in Eid would have required sheer speculation,

as the relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code did not contain any similar prefatory

language, making the general maximum-minimum rule applicable. We further opined:

       If we were to infer a statutory maximum of six months as the Commonwealth
       requests, however, then “not less than” necessarily would also mean “not
       more than” ninety days in order to comply with the general rule, in which
       case the limiting phrase would be superfluous. A similar problem would
       arise if we were to infer any maximum below six months, as it immediately
       would run counter to the general rule. Given the absence of a statutory
       hook by which to fashion a principled exception to the rule in that manner,
       that result would be particularly untenable.
Id. As a result, we ultimately concluded that the absence of a maximum term in Section

1543(b)(1.1)(i) of the Vehicle Code rendered the provision “unconstitutionally vague and

                                      [J-2-2023] - 5
inoperable for the time being.” Id. at 1044. Our Court left it to the legislature to remedy

this flaw either by “amending the statute to provide for a maximum term of imprisonment

or by expressly permitting flat sentences within a range not to exceed that maximum

sentence.” Id. 3

       Following Eid, Petitioner in the instant matter filed a merits brief alleging that

Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) was similarly unconstitutionally vague in violation of state and

federal due process principles.       The Superior Court unanimously affirmed in an

unpublished memorandum decision. See Commonwealth v. Rollins, 161 EDA 2021;

2021 WL 6051180 (Pa. Super. Dec. 21, 2021). The Superior Court found that although

the instant statute and the one at issue in Eid both contain the same “not less than”

language and fail to explicitly state a maximum term of imprisonment, the two are

distinguishable because they are graded differently. Id. at *2. The statute at issue in Eid

is graded as a summary offense, while the instant statute is graded as a misdemeanor of

the third degree. Id. The Superior Court found this difference in grading significant

because the Vehicle Code explicitly states: “Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses),

insofar as it relates to fines and imprisonment for convictions of summary offenses, is not

applicable to this title.” Id.   Because no such provision exists for misdemeanors, the

Superior Court applied the sentencing provisions set forth in the Crimes Code to infer a

maximum penalty of one year imprisonment. Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(8) (“A crime

is a misdemeanor of the third degree if it is so designated in this title or if a person

convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is

not more than one year.”)).          The Superior Court therefore concluded Section

1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally vague. Id.

3 The legislature has not yet amended the subsection of the statute declared
unconstitutional in Eid but has introduced legislation in an effort to cure this deficiency.

                                       [J-2-2023] - 6
         Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal. We granted review in this matter

to address the following issue: “Did the Superior Court err in finding that the absence of

a maximum term did not render the [driving under a suspended license] sentencing

provision under 75 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 1543(b)(1)(iii) unconstitutionally vague violating state and

federal due process provisions?” Commonwealth v. Rollins, 280 A.3d 861 (Pa. June 22,

2022) (per curiam).

         Appellant notes that the language in Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is “practically identical”

to the statute at issue in Eid and similarly fails to provide a maximum sentence.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant therefore claims our rationale in Eid for not inferring a

maximum sentence applies with equal force here. He specifically references the portion

of Eid in which this Court stated that inferring a statutory maximum of six months would

render the statute’s limiting phrase superfluous because, in order to comply with the

general minimum-maximum rule, the phrase “not less than” would also mean “not more

than.”    Id. at 14-15 (citing Eid, 249 A.3d at 1043).        Appellant agrees that Section

1543(b)(1)(iii) implies a mandatory minimum of six months. He notes, however, that if

this Court were to infer a maximum sentence of one year, the only sentence available

would be six months to one year, in which case the legislature could have merely said so

in the first place. Id. at 16. Absent clear direction from the legislature as to the maximum

sentence, Appellant asks us to find Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) unconstitutionally vague in

violation of due process. Id. at 17.

         Conversely,    the   Commonwealth        argues    Section   1543(b)(1)(iii)   is   not

unconstitutionally vague. Its argument largely tracks the rationale of the Superior Court.

The Commonwealth recognizes the instant provision and the provision in Eid are similar,

but maintains the critical difference comes down to grading of each offense.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. The subsection in Eid was graded as a summary offense,

                                         [J-2-2023] - 7
while the instant subsection is a misdemeanor of the third degree. Importantly, Section

6502(a) of the Vehicle Code states: “Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses), insofar

as it relates to fines and imprisonment for convictions of summary offenses, is not

applicable to this title.” Id. at 10 (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(c)). The Vehicle Code

therefore eliminates the Crimes Code penalties for summary violations and imposes its

own scheme. Id. at 10-11. The Commonwealth explains there is no similar statute in the

Vehicle Code pertaining to offenses graded as misdemeanors and/or felonies. Had the

legislature intended the parameters of Title 18 not apply to these offenses, it could have

so stated. Id. at 11. It follows that “unless otherwise stated within a specific offense, the

statutory maximum fine and period of imprisonment that is applicable for a Vehicle Code

misdemeanor or felony offense can be found in the Crimes Code.”                   Id.   The

Commonwealth then cites to several cases in which it argues our courts have applied the

general sentencing guidelines set forth in the Crimes Code to violations of the Vehicle

Code. Id. at 12-13. With this in mind, the Commonwealth maintains the Eid Court had

no way of inferring the maximum penalty applicable to Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i),

considering the statute failed to state one and the Vehicle Code explicitly states the

Crimes Code provisions do not apply, which is not the case herein. Id. at 13-14.

       Finally, the Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant’s argument that inferring a

one-year maximum would render the limiting language of the statute superfluous as it did

in Eid. It again underscores the difference in grading between the two statutes, explaining

the statutory language in Eid did not provide a clear indication of the legislature’s intent

and inferring the maximum proposed by the Commonwealth rendered the language

superfluous. The Commonwealth explains the maximum sentence in the instant statute

is well-defined and the legislature’s intent clear. The fact that inferring a maximum

sentence of one year allows for a single sentence does not, in and of itself, make the

                                       [J-2-2023] - 8
statute unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 15-16. Accordingly, the Commonwealth asks this

Court to affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

       We first note that legislative exactments are presumed constitutional, and the party

challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears a heavy burden of persuasion. Eid,

249 A.3d at 1041 (citing Commonwealth v. Mikulan, 470 A.2d 1339, 1340 (Pa. 1983)).

Accordingly, this Court “will not declare the provision unconstitutional ‘unless it clearly,

palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution; all doubts are to be resolved in favor of a

finding of constitutionality.’” Interest of: J.J.M., 265 A.3d 246, 263 (Pa. 2021) (citation

omitted). As explained in Eid:

       [T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the
       criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
       understand what conduct is prohibited in a manner that does not encourage
       arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
       352, 357 [ ] (1983). It is well-settled that vague sentencing provisions violate
       due process where they fail to provide offenders with fair notice of the
       consequences for a particular crime. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S.
       591, 596-96 [ ] (2015) (“The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes . .
       . appl[ies] not only to statutes defining elements of crimes, but also to
       statutes fixing sentences.” (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
       123 [ ] (1979)).

Eid, 249 A.3d at 1041.

       As detailed above, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) relevantly provides that a third or

subsequent conviction for driving with a suspended license constitutes a misdemeanor of

the third degree punishable by “a fine of $2,500 and [ ] imprisonment for a period of not

less than six months.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). As observed by

both parties, the statute provides a minimum sentence of six months but does not

explicitly indicate a maximum term of imprisonment. We nonetheless agree with the

Commonwealth that a maximum sentence of one year may be reasonably inferred and

therefore find Eid inapplicable to this specific provision of the Vehicle Code.

                                       [J-2-2023] - 9
         Unlike the statute at issue in Eid, the Vehicle Code classifies Section

1543(b)(1)(iii) as a misdemeanor of the third degree. As noted by the Commonwealth,

this distinction is determinative, as the Vehicle Code explicitly states that Title 18, as it

relates to fines and imprisonment for summary offenses, does not apply. See 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 6502(c). This is because the Vehicle Code provides an alternative sentencing scheme

for the summary offenses therein. Section 6502(a) specifically states:

        It is a summary offense for any person to violate any provision of this title
        unless the violation is by this title or other statute of this Commonwealth
        declared to be a misdemeanor or felony. Every person convicted of a
        summary offense for a violation of any of the provisions of this title for which
        another penalty is not provided shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $25.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(a). Absent a similar directive with respect to misdemeanors and

felonies, it is reasonable to infer that the general classification guidelines set forth in

Section 106 of the Crimes Code apply to such offenses in the Vehicle Code. In fact, it

would be more improbable that the legislature would create an alternative sentencing

scheme for misdemeanors and felonies as they are already clearly defined by the Crimes

Code.

        In the subsection related to “[c]lassification of offenses,” Section 106(b) states that

“[a] crime is a misdemeanor of the third degree if it is so designated in this title or if a

person convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of

which is not more than one year.” Section 106(e) goes on to explain “[a]n offense

hereafter defined by any statute other than this title shall be classified as provided in this

section.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(e). In light of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section

1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process principles, as a

maximum sentence may be inferred by applying the general guidelines set forth in the

Crimes Code. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the general rule that court’s

shall “impose a minimum sentence of confinement which shall not exceed one-half of the

                                        [J-2-2023] - 10
maximum sentence imposed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756. We recognize inferring a maximum

sentence of one year means the only permissible sentence for a conviction under this

provision is six months to one year of imprisonment and that, as a result, the “not less

than” language is not essential to a proper reading. This, in and of itself, does not

implicate constitutional vagueness concerns where it is possible to determine the

maximum based on other statutory provisions. 4,   5

       In sum, this Court concludes that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally

vague in violation of due process principles, as the maximum permissible term of

4 As recognized in Eid, our decision in Bell has not been applied beyond its particular
circumstances involving the Drug Act. We rely on Bell instantly only to the extent it
endorses interpreting a statutory provision consistently with other statutes in such a way
as to provide a maximum sentence for an offense where the provision itself is silent. Bell,
645 A.2d at 562.
5 In his concurring opinion, Justice Brobson agrees with our ultimate conclusion that
Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process
principles. He reaches this result, however, by applying our rules of statutory
construction. In his view, Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code, Section 106(b)(8)
of the Crimes Code, and Section 9756(b)(1) of the Judicial Code, when read together,
clearly set forth a singular permissible sentence of six months to one year of
imprisonment. There is therefore no need to “infer” a maximum. Concurring and
Dissenting Op., Brobson J., at 2. He further disagrees that Eid applies herein, as that
case concerned “purported superfluous statutory language[,]” whereas the “not less than”
language of the present statute “merely indicates that the [legislature] intended that a
violation of Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) of the Vehicle Code carry a minimum sentence of 6
months’ imprisonment[.]” Id. at 3. Justice Brobson’s statutory construction approach is
a reasonable alternative rationale to reach the same conclusion. However, we find Eid is
applicable and that the “not less than” language is superfluous. With respect to the first
point, we find it difficult to conclude Eid does not inform our analysis, as the statutory
language at issue in that case is practically identical to the statutory language at issue in
the instant case. We instead find the grading of the respective statutes to be
determinative. We similarly disagree that the “not less than” language merely indicates
the minimum possible sentence, as a plain reading implies it is not the only minimum
sentence available. The maximum becomes clear, however, when we look to the general
grading provision applicable to misdemeanors, as well as the general maximum-minimum
rule.

                                      [J-2-2023] - 11
imprisonment may be inferred by looking to Section 106 of the Crimes Code. We

therefore affirm the Superior Court’s order affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

   Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

   Justice Brobson files a concurring opinion.

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