Court Opinion

ID: 9688745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:02:45.017524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:41.741201
License: Public Domain

*677SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 58. 0dissenting). These appeals present numerous issues and, on the basis of one or more of them, it is possible that the punitive damages award will fall.1 It also is possible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court, weaving policy considerations into the legal analysis, will interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) in a manner that precludes or reduces the punitive damages awarded in this case. If it does so, however, it should not embrace the majority's analysis lest it upend fundamental, well-settled principles underlying the essential difference between compensatory and punitive damages.
¶ 59. I write separately, therefore, to explain that Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3): (1) if deemed unambiguous, cannot mean what the majority claims; and (2) if deemed ambiguous, could mean what the majority claims but, consistent with the logic underlying the *678difference between compensatory and punitive damages, probably does not. Further, in light of Judge Fine's concurring opinion, I shall comment briefly on the importance of prosecuting corporate officers who try to hide their crimes behind corporate veils.
I. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(3)
¶ 60. Quite properly, the majority focuses on the words of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3): "The plaintiff may receive punitive damages if evidence is submitted showing that the defendant acted maliciously toward the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) Quite curiously, however, the majority, despite concluding "that the statute is not ambiguous," majority, ¶ 32, embarks on the kind of long, interpretive cruise generally reserved for judicial travelers viewing ambiguous statutes.
¶ 61. So, although portions of its analysis are helpful, the majority's statutory discussion, as a whole, is internally inconsistent, confusing and, ultimately, incorrect. Accordingly, if only to advance the discussion of what, no doubt, will call for supreme court review, let me try to re-align the analysis.
A. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(3) — Unambiguous?
¶ 62. The majority says Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) is unambiguous. But, in the midst of so much uncertainty in these appeals, perhaps the only certainty is this: if § 895.85(3) is unambiguous, it supports the plaintiffs. The analysis is simple and clear.
¶ 63. The statutory words at issue are: "or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." The statute says nothing about "harm" or "injury," inten*679tional or otherwise. And Wis JI — Criminal 1701.1 doesn't either; it elaborates: "A person acts in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff if the person acts with a purpose to disregard the plaintiffs rights, or is aware that his or her acts are practically certain to result in the plaintiffs rights being disregarded" (footnote omitted). In this case, the plaintiffs accept the unadorned statutory language; the defendants, and now the majority, do not.
¶ 64. The plaintiffs' premise is, in part, that "rights" under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) includes the right to a safe workplace. That part of their premise is unremarkable; the defendants do not dispute it. The plaintiffs' premise, however, also includes the understanding that, under the statute, their right to a safe workplace may be intentionally disregarded, such that punitive damages may be warranted, regardless of the defendants' intent to cause harm or injury. They explain:
Intent to cause physical injury is not necessary to intentionally disregard rights. This case is a perfect example, where there was a pattern of exposing workers to great risk by knowingly operating in unsafe conditions. Each time, workers' rights were disregarded, even if no injury occurred. When the decedents were killed, [Mitsubishi's] conduct exposed it to punitive damages under § 895.85(3). There is no basis to say that in a personal injury case, the statute requires an intent to cause physical injury when the statute contains no such distinction, and such intent has not been required in the cases previously decided under § 895.85(3), regardless of the liability theory.
*680(Emphasis added.)2 The defendants disagree; they contend that for the right to a safe workplace to be disregarded, harm or injury must be intended.
¶ 65. Clearly, if the statute is unambiguous, the defendants are wrong. Their position would require the addition of essential words: "with intent to cause harm or injury." The majority simply does not explain where it has located those missing words or how it can graft them to the statute. Thus, if the majority is correct in concluding that Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) is unambiguous, the plaintiffs' statutory argument prevails.
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.85(3) — Ambiguous?
¶ 66. If, as the defendants contend, "with intent to cause harm or injury" must be grafted to the statute, it could only be because "rights" is ambiguous and courts, interpreting far beyond the face of the statute, say it must be so. So let us consider that and, in doing so, let me try to locate the best theory I can to support the majority's view. And then let us see if the theory holds.
¶ 67. The majority relies on jury instructions and a note to one of them. Here, the majority finds some support (but not quite where the majority leans).
¶ 68. First, the majority points out that Note 2 to Wis JI — Civil 1707.1 declares that the statute "was *681clearly intended to be more narrow than the case law standard." But that does not advance the analysis of the parties' dispute. After all, no one is contending that the statute fails to do that. All agree that the statute has tightened the standard for establishing "intentional disregard." The issue, however, is whether, somehow, the intentional disregarding of "rights" necessarily includes the intent to cause harm or injury.
¶ 69. Second, and far more helpfully, the majority notes that Wxs JI — Civil 2001 defines "intent" in a way that carves away negligence by explaining that if a defendant's conduct "merely created a risk of some harm to someone, which may or may not have resulted, then (defendant)'s conduct was negligent as opposed to intentional." That, then, may set the foundation for the syllogism essential to the defendants' position: (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) requires an "intentional" act; (2) Wis JI — Civil 2001 provides that creating "risk," without intending "harm," is negligent, not intentional; and, therefore (3) the intentional disregarding of rights, under § 895.85(3), necessarily includes intending "harm."
¶ 70. So what's the problem? Well, in the first place, this is the only authority the majority can locate for its grafting. This single, tangentially-related jury instruction is, I think, a terribly thin thread from which to hang the full, framed portrait of punitive damages. And, in the second place, the majority's theory— interpretively adding "with intent to cause harm or injury" to the statute — makes little sense. To add these words is to obliterate the most fundamental difference between compensatory and punitive damages. Let's examine that.
¶ 71. The majority maintains that the evolution from the common law to the 1995 statute supports the *682defendants' position. But that begs the obvious question: If the legislature, in addition to tightening the standard, also wanted to require intended "harm" or "injury," why didn't it say so? Why didn't the legislature add the simple words, "with intent to cause harm or injury"? As the parties explained to this court, the legislative history does not answer. It seems, however, that law and logic do.
¶ 72. Law, addressing "harm" or "injury," enters the realm of compensatory damages, and does so regardless of intent. But law, addressing the "intentional disregarding of rights," see Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), points directly at a defendant's conduct. And where Wisconsin law provides the statutory potential for punitive damages to deter dangerous conduct, it does so with some regard for intent and the extent of the resulting harm or injury, but it also preserves the potential for punitive damages even in the absence of all but nominal harm or injury.3
¶ 73. Any possible doubt about that was recently erased in Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Tower Insurance Co., 2003 WI 46, 261 Wis. 2d 333, 661 N.W.2d 789. In Trinity, the supreme court reiterated:
The factors necessary for an award of punitive damages! 1 require a showing of: (1) evil intent deserving of punishment or of something in the nature of special ill-will; or (2) wanton disregard of duty; or (3) gross or outrageous conduct.
*683Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a state's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.
Id., ¶¶ 45-46 (citations omitted). The supreme court did not add any "with-intent-to-cause-harm-or-injury" element. The state's "legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition," id., ¶ 46, remain solidly in place regardless of whether a defendant intends harm or injury to result from the disregarding of rights.
¶ 74. Were this not enough, the supreme court, in Trinity, quoted, with approval, a punitive damages jury instruction that explicitly provides, "Punitive damages may be awarded, if you find that the defendant acted in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." Id., ¶ 45 n.5. It made no mention of intending harm or injury. The instruction then goes on to explain that "[pjunitive damages are not awarded to compensate the plaintiff for any loss he or she has sustained." Id. (emphasis added). Then, most definitively, the instruction absolutely separates the jury's determination of whether punitive damages should be awarded (regardless of intended harm of injury), from how much should be awarded (taking harm or injury — actual and potential — into consideration):
If you determine that punitive damages should be awarded, you may then award such sum as will accomplish the purpose of punishing or deterring wrongful conduct.
Factors you should consider in answering this question include:
1. The grievousness of the defendant's acts,
2. The potential damage which might have been *684done by such acts as well as the actual damage, and
3. The defendant's ability to pay ....
Id. (emphases added).
¶ 75. The message could not be more clear: (1) Punitive damages are intended to punish unlawful conduct and deter its repetition. Id., ¶ 46. (2) Punitive damages serve those purposes regardless of intended harm or injury. Id., ¶¶ 45-46. (3) Punitive damages may be awarded in recognition of "the potential damage which might have been done by such acts." Id., ¶ 45 n.5 (emphasis added). (4) The amount of punitive damages may increase if "actual damage" has resulted. Id.4
¶ 76. And indeed, how could it be otherwise? The separation between compensatory and punitive damages, and the potential for punitive damages even in the absence of intended harm or injury, are at the foundation of our common law. In 1763, in one of the seminal cases allowing punitive damages, Lord Chief Justice Sir *685Charles Pratt declared that juries have the "power to give damages for more than the injury received ... as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.E 1763) (emphases added).
¶ 77. Early American courts soon echoed the Wilkes principles. The New Jersey Supreme Court, for example, in 1791, approved a jury instruction that emphasized that, in determining punitive damages, the jury was "not to estimate the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example's sake, to prevent such offenses in [the] future." Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791) (first emphasis added). The Wilkes principles remain solid. Lest any doubt linger, the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that while compensatory damages flow from a jury's factual determinations of actual loss, punitive damages are "an expression of [the jury's] moral condemnation." Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
¶ 78. Thus, I conclude, the majority's attempt to graft a "with-intent-to-cause-harm-or-injury" element to Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3) violates the traditional distinction between compensatory and punitive damages — a distinction that removes "harm" or "injury" from a jury's initial determination of whether punitive damages are warranted and, under Wisconsin law, relegates the intent and extent of any harm or injury to the criteria affecting a jury's subsequent determination of how much should be awarded. See Trinity, 261 Wis. 2d 333, ¶ 45. From Wilkes to Trinity, from 1761 to 2003, the separation is certain; the grafting cannot hold.
*686C. The Bottom Line — Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3)— Unambiguous or Ambiguous
¶ 79. In short, whether simply following the course of what appears to be an unambiguous statute, or interpretively traveling through Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), we arrive at the same destination. The legislature did indeed tighten the standard for punitive damages; at the same time, however, the legislature maintained the critical distinction between compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, consistent with that distinction and the traditional, sound public policy it embodies, the statute preserves the potential for punitive damages in a case where a defendant intentionally disregards rights by creating an unsafe workplace, regardless of whether the defendant intended any harm or injury to result.
II. Corporate Responsibility
¶ 80. Judge Fine's concurring opinion could call for extensive, additional discussion. Here, however, I offer only a few thoughts.
¶ 81. Most helpfully, Judge Fine's comments can help courts shed the polemics often included in arguments about corporate responsibility. It is safe to say, I think, that corporations are neither as demonic nor angelic as their critics and apologists claim. And corporations, I think, do not fall neatly into any political category. After all, we all have seen corporate conduct liberals applaud as well as corporate misconduct conservatives condemn.
¶ 82. Corporations, I suspect, often are as good or bad, constructive or destructive, as the individuals directing their affairs. Some corporate leaders reach the *687right balance. Carefully attending to both community responsibility and shareholder return, they recognize that healthy communities are good for business, and good businesses help make healthy communities. Other corporate leaders, however, lose their way. They cut corners, carelessly cut jobs, give-in to greed, and break laws.
¶ 83. When that occurs, as Judge Fine points out, firing a shotgun at "the corporation" may wound the innocent. Thus, carefully aimed criminal prosecution of individual corporate officers becomes all the more important. Thorough investigation and tenacious prosecution can help protect our communities from criminals who would try to hide behind their corporate veils.5

 I mention this, at the outset, not to signal my opinion on any issue we have not yet addressed, but rather, to acknowledge that many substantial issues remain. I would hope, therefore, that if the supreme court embraces my understanding of Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), it will also address the constitutional challenge to the punitive damages award.

 I add emphasis to "where there was a pattern of exposing workers to great risk by knowingly operating in unsafe conditions" because the majority, in its factual summary, fails to acknowledge that this pattern was critical to the plaintiffs' proof. See majority, ¶ 34. Instead, the majority concentrates on the factual allegations relating to Mitsubishi's conduct on the fateful day. See id. The particulars of that day, however, comprised only the last chapter of the tragedy. Standing alone, the events of that final day constitute an incomplete account of the evidence the jury apparently found so compelling.

 See Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 393, 541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) ("Wisconsin does not allow punitive damages to be awarded in the absence of an award of actual damages."); Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 209 Wis. 2d 605, 626, 563 N.W.2d 154 (1997) (nominal damages will suffice if a legal right has been violated).

 Other recent Wisconsin decisions support the same proposition. See, e.g., Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 228 Wis. 2d 425, 454-55, 597 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1999) (without any reference to harm or injury, concludes that, under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), for purposes of summary judgment analysis, intentional disregard of plaintiffs' right to be free from hospital's improper lien can establish the basis for punitive damages claim); Allied Processors, Inc. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App 129, ¶ 38, 246 Wis. 2d 579, 629 N.W.2d 329 (without any reference to harm or injury, concludes that, under Wis. Stat. § 895.85(3), for purposes of measuring the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury's punitive damages verdict, intentional disregard of plaintiffs rights to disclosure of accurate insurance coverage information, proper evaluation of punitive damages claim, and proper claim settlement in order to prevent an excess verdict, can establish the basis for punitive damages award).

 For a discussion of the importance of criminal prosecution of individual, corporate officers, see Charles B. Schudson, et al., Nailing An Omelet to the Wall: Prosecuting Nursing Home Homicide, in CORPORATIONS as Criminals — Perspectives in Criminal JustiCe 6, 131, 134-36 (Ellen Hochstedler, ed., 1984).