Court Opinion

ID: 9942663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 18:01:29.664738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:26.779178
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 21 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT J. ANDERSON,                             No.    23-15834

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:20-cv-02514-DMC

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O’MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of California
                   Dennis M. Cota, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 16, 2024**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BEA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Appellant Robert J. Anderson timely appeals the district court’s judgment,

which affirmed the final decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Commissioner”) denying Anderson’s application for Social

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Security Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act.

Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      We review de novo the district court’s judgment affirming the

Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits to “determine whether the

Commissioner’s decision (1) is free of legal error and (2) is supported by substantial

evidence.” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996)). The “substantial evidence” standard

requires only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting

Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). If the Commissioner’s

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, then those findings are

conclusive. Id. at 1152 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

      1. Substantial evidence supports the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)

finding at step two that Anderson’s mental impairments were non-severe because

this finding was consistent with notes from Anderson’s treating practitioners and

other evidence demonstrating mild limitations. To be severe, an impairment must

significantly limit a claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(c). Contrary to Anderson’s position, the ALJ explicitly considered and

cited Dr. Jerry Boriskin’s notes, which provided further support for the ALJ’s

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conclusion. Because even Dr. Boriskin’s notes support the ALJ’s finding that

Anderson’s mental impairment was non-severe, the ALJ’s finding was supported by

substantial evidence.

       2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step three that

Anderson’s impairments did not meet or equal any impairment in the “Listing of

Impairments” of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).   Anderson fails to explain how his impairments, even

collectively, would satisfy or be analogous to any impairment listed in the

regulations. Further, contrary to Anderson’s assertion, the ALJ explicitly considered

Dr. Julene Pena’s assessment of Anderson’s “extreme photophobia,” and explained

that other evidence of successful treatment and Anderson’s motorcycling

contradicted Dr. Pena’s conclusions. As a result, Anderson fails to identify any error

at step three.

       3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Anderson’s residual

functional capacity permitted him to do medium work with certain limitations. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c).        The ALJ explained that Anderson’s “statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of” his symptoms were not

consistent with other evidence in the record. Further, Anderson is incorrect to assert

that the “treating physician rule” applies in this case because he filed his application

after March 27, 2017. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 787, 789 (9th Cir. 2022).

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The ALJ appropriately discussed Dr. Pena’s letter, medical expert testimony, and

Anderson’s testimony that he rides his motorcycle—which exposes him to light and

dust—and concluded that Anderson could perform medium work with certain

limitations.

      4. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step five that Anderson

could adjust to jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. To

this point, Anderson argues that he “cannot do any other work.”            Anderson

essentially challenges the ALJ’s determination of residual functional capacity rather

than the ALJ’s use of a vocational expert’s testimony and the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines to find that Anderson was capable of making a successful adjustment to

other work. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding

that Anderson could perform medium work with certain limitations, so Anderson’s

argument fails.

      AFFIRMED.

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