Court Opinion

ID: 9574880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:09:15.033521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:18.450664
License: Public Domain

Parker, J.,
dissenting: I do not agree with the expression in the majority opinion that we think the sounder view is that the Tort Claims Act of this State should be strictly construed. The doctrine of strict application of statutes waiving sovereign immunity has been held in U. S. v. Aetna Gas. & S. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 94 L. Ed. 171 (1949) not applicable to the Federal Tort Claims Act. In that case Vinson, Chief Justice, said for the Court: “In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of Appeals, the Government relied upon the doctrine that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed. "We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo’s statement in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28: ‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. "We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’ ”
The purpose of our Tort Claims Act was to relieve the General Assembly from the judicial function of passing upon tort claims against the State, and was enacted pursuant to the current trend of legislative thought to waive the State’s immunity from suit. When the State has done so, I think the statute should not be strictly construed, but construed as expressed in the words of Cardozo, J., quoted by Chief Justice Vinson.
I agree with the trial judge that the findings of fact were insufficient to enable the lower court to determine the rights of the parties, and that the cause should be remanded to the Industrial Commission for further findings.