Court Opinion

ID: 9536029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:53:29.969911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:25.879673
License: Public Domain

DEITS, P. J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. However, I disagree with its conclusion that the *372trial court erred in admitting, under OEC 404(3),1 the “L” letters into evidence. I believe that when those letters are examined in the light of the concept of relevance, it becomes apparent that the trial court properly admitted them as evidence.
It is important to note at the outset that OEC 404(3) is an “inclusionary” rule of evidence that permits the admission of other acts evidence if it is relevant for a noncharacter purpose. State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 254, 855 P2d 621 (1993); State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 548, 725 P2d 312 (1986). “ ‘Relevancy is the key to the entire analysis of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts.’ ” Johns, 301 Or at 549 (quoting Krivosha, Lansworth & Pirsch, Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrojigs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 Neb L Rev 657, 662 (1981)).
OEC 401 sets forth the definition of relevant evidence:
“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
That standard establishes “a very low threshold that evidence must cross to be considered relevant.” State v. Stevens, 319 Or 573, 584, 879 P2d 162 (1994).
There is no question that other acts evidence may be relevant to establish that a defendant possessed the requisite intent for his or her currently charged crime. In general, courts liberally admit other acts evidence for that purpose:
“Intent or state of mind is often the most difficult element of a crime to prove because many crimes are unwitnessed and even if a witness is present, the witness can only surmise the actor’s state of mind. Wright and Graham *373assert that courts realize the prosecutor’s difficulty in proving mens rea, or criminal intent, and therefore courts very liberally admit prior crime evidence to prove mens rea. 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239 (1978). Conversely, this court and other courts have held that evidence of other crimes offered to prove identity is strictly limited to crimes committed ‘by the use of a novel means or in a particular manner’ so as to earmark the acts as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, to prove identity the prior acts must be a ‘signature’ crime. See State v. Manrique, 271 Or at 208; State v. Zimmerlee, 261 Or 49,53,492 P2d 795 (1972); McCormick, Evidence, supra. Such rigidity is not required when admitting prior acts to prove intent or lack of mistake.” Johns, 301 Or at 551 (emphasis supplied); see also State v. Painter, 113 Or App 337, 341, 833 P2d 303, rev den 314 Or 392 (1992).
When other acts evidence is offered to show intent, relevance is based on the premise that, if a defendant acted intentionally in one situation, a factfinder could reasonably infer that he or she acted intentionally in another, similar situation. Johns, 301 Or at 551. The degree of similarity between the events determines the existence, and strength, of that inference.
In Johns, the Supreme Court set forth five questions that must be answered affirmatively in order to conclude that a defendant’s other acts are sufficiently similar to his or her charged conduct so as to be considered relevant:
“‘(1) Does the present charged act require proof of intent?
“ ‘(2) Did the prior act require intent?
“ ‘(3) Was the victim in the prior act the same victim or in the same class as the victim in the present case?
“ ‘(4) Was the type of prior act the same or similar to the acts involved in the charged crime?
“ ‘(5) Were the physical elements of the prior act and the present act similar?’ ” State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 211, 785 P2d 350 (1990) (quoting Johns, 301 Or at 555-56).
The issue presented here is whether the events described in the “L” letters are sufficiently similar to defendant’s charged acts so that they can be said to be relevant to *374show defendant’s intent with respect to those acts. Defendant does not argue that the trial court should have excluded the “L” letters under OEC 403.2 Thus, we are not concerned with how probative the “L” letters are, but, instead, whether they meet the minimum requirements for relevance. Accordingly, the “L” letters are admissible if they describe events similar enough to defendant’s charged conduct to have “any tendency” to make the existence of the defendant’s intent with respect to the charged conduct more probable than it would be without the letters.
The majority concludes that the state failed to satisfy one of the five pertinent inquiries under Johns', specifically, it concludes that the state did not establish that the physical elements of the “L” incident are similar to those here. However, in its rigorous analysis of that Johns question, the majority appears to have lost sight of the underlying principle of relevance. The majority seems to give equal weight to identified differences and similarities regardless of their significance to the issue of defendant’s intent to sodomize “A.” As the Supreme Court explained in Pratt, however, the significance of identified similarities and differences must be considered in the light of the particular circumstances. Id. at 214. That is very much a case-by-case determination.
The majority states that the only material similarity between the two events is that “[defendant either used, or referred to, Playboy magazine in his interactions with both ‘L’ and A.’ ” 141 Or App at 369. It then sets out what it views to be the material dissimilarities:
“(1) Whereas defendant and A’ were strangers, the ‘L’ letters indicate that defendant at least knew, and was probably friendly with, ‘L’ and his parents.]] (2) Defendant sought out A’ through a series of uninvited contacts. There *375is no evidence of such unsolicited ‘seeking out’ of ‘L,’ whom defendant apparently knew. (3) Defendant engaged ‘A’ in conversations calculated to ingratiate defendant with ‘A,’ including references to ‘skipping school.’ There is no evidence of such conduct towards ‘L.’ (4) Defendant offered ‘A’ inducements, including karate lessons and a Playboy magazine, to come to his apartment. Although defendant showed ‘L’ a Playboy on at least one occasion, there is no evidence that he ever offered ‘L’ any inducements, including Playboy magazines to come to his apartment or elsewhere. (5) Defendant asked ‘L’ to have sex with him, but never mentioned sex to ‘A.’ (6) Defendant spoke with ‘L’ about homosexuality, but never mentioned homosexuality to ‘A.’ ” Id. at 369-70 (footnote omitted).
The majority ultimately concludes “that, at least to the extent that we can divine from the ‘L’ letters, the dissimilarities between the physical elements of the two incidents outweigh their similarities.” Id. at 370.
However, in my view, the majority’s conclusion is drawn from an improperly narrow perspective of defendant’s conduct as well as a failure to weigh the significance of the similarities and differences in defendant’s conduct in view of the particular circumstances. In the letter to “L’s” parents, defendant apologized for “trying to get [‘L’] to let [defendant] have sex with him.” From that statement, it is apparent that defendant was concerned with persuading, as opposed to forcing, “L” to have sex with him. It is also reasonable to infer that the other sexually inappropriate behavior described in the letter was designed to facilitate that event. Thus, the most significant aspect of defendant’s prior act, as described in the “L” letters, is that he used manipulative, as opposed to forceful, conduct designed to coax a minor male to have sex with him.
The majority fails to consider the essence of defendant’s prior conduct as described above. Instead, it focuses on details that are really immaterial and not entitled to much weight. For example, the majority’s observation that defendant appears to have been acquainted with “L” and not with “A” is immaterial. The fact that defendant appears to have been acquainted with “L” and not “A” has little bearing on the key issue here — whether the “L” letters have “any tendency” *376to show that defendant intended to sodomize “A.” It is apparent from the “L” letters that defendant desired to sodomize “L.” Although it appears, at least from what he says in the letter, that defendant was acquainted with “L,” there is no evidence that defendant was sexually attracted only to minor boys with whom he was acquainted. The fact that he was acquainted with “L” may have helped defendant to gain access to him. However, the issue is not how defendant made contact with his victims, but what he intended to do after making contact. Thus, defendant’s unfamiliarity with “A,” as opposed to his possible acquaintance with “L,” is immaterial.
Other differences identified by the majority are equally insignificant. The majority’s reliance on its belief that defendant “sought out” “A” and not “L” and attempted to “ingratiate” himself with “A” and not “L” is a red herring. If, as the majority believes, defendant was acquainted with “L,” then there would have been no need for defendant to seek out “L” or engage him in ingratiating conduct. Similarly, there would have been no need to offer “L” “any inducements” to come to defendant’s apartment. Admittedly, defendant did not expressly discuss sex and homosexuality with “A.” However, he did, during his last contact with “A,” broach a sexually explicit topic by offering to show “A” a Playboy magazine if “A” came to his apartment.
Finally, in partial defense of its conclusion, the majority states that defendant’s manipulative conduct in both instances was designed to achieve different goals:
“The ‘gravamen’ of the ‘L’ incident was explicit efforts, including the use of Playboy, to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity. The ‘gravamen’ of the ‘A’ incident was explicit efforts involving the use of certain inducements, including the prospect of seeing a Playboy, to persuade the child to come to defendant’s apartment. In the former, the Playboy was employed as an aid for seduction; in the latter, the Playboy was held out as an inducement, like the promise of free karate lessons, for the child to come to defendant’s apartment.” Id. at 370.
However, the majority’s conclusion with respect to defendant’s first assignment of error makes that perceived difference illusory. The majority concludes that the trial court *377properly denied defendant’s judgment of acquittal, because “there was evidence in this case from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s conduct [toward ‘A’] constituted a substantial step toward the commission of sodomy in the first degreeId. at 367 (emphasis supplied). Thus, under the majority’s own reasoning, defendant’s manipulative conduct here was directed at more than simply enticing “A” to come to his apartment. As in the “L” incident, defendant’s conduct here was designed to engage in sodomy with a minor male. When properly considered, all of the above differences identified by the majority are insignificant.
Conversely, when analyzed in the proper light, the physical elements of both events are sufficiently similar. The “L” letters indicate that defendant wanted to sodomize “L,” a minor male. They also describe defendant’s attempts to manipulate “L” to that end. Such manipulation included: (1) asking “L” if defendant could teach him about homosexuality; (2) showing “L” a Playboy, and (3) asking “L” if defendant could have sex with him. Here, defendant approached and initiated conversations with “A,” a minor male, four to five times at a bus stop. His conduct during those encounters was also manipulative: (1) discussing the possibility of “A” skipping school; (2) asking what activities that “A” would like to do that were forbidden by his parents; (3) giving “A” his address; (4) asking what sports “A” liked and, after discovering that “A” was interested in karate, offering free lessons at his apartment but only if “A” came alone; and (5) offering to show “A” a Playboy if he came to defendant’s apartment. Defendant’s conduct in both instances illustrates a very deliberate attempt to manipulate minor males to participate in sexually related activities. Although some minor differences exist, I believe that the physical elements of defendant’s prior conduct are sufficiently similar to those here to have some tendency to show his intent with respect to the charged crime. See Painter, 113 Or App at 339-41. Therefore, I believe that the majority incorrectly concludes that the “L” letters are not relevant and, accordingly, not admissible because the physical elements of the events are not sufficiently similar.
*378Contrary to the majority’s assertion, my conclusion does not “gut” the physical similarities requirement of the Johns analysis. I am not contending that, absent significant similarities between the two events, a prior act of sodomy or attempted sodomy of a child will always be relevant to show a defendant’s intent in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. As noted above, that is a case-by-case determination. I simply believe that, unlike with the instances of rape and murder in Pratt, the physical elements of the “L” incident and defendant’s charged conduct here are sufficiently similar so as to conclude that the “L” letters are relevant and admissible under OEC 404(3).
In summary, I believe that the majority takes an improperly narrow view of defendant’s conduct here and that described in the “L” letters. Then, under Johns, it isolates minute differences without reference to the underlying policy of relevance, fails to consider the significance of the differences under the particular circumstances, and determines that the “L” letters are inadmissible under OEC 404(3). In my view, when defendant’s conduct, here and illustrated by the “L” letters, is viewed in the proper perspective and analyzed in the light of relevance, it becomes evident that the trial court properly allowed the “L” letters into evidence. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 OEC 404(3) provides:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”