Court Opinion

ID: 9453142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:04:11.277702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:31.863163
License: Public Domain

ADDENDUM TO OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
In a petition for rehearing filed by Newby, the court’s attention is directed to a factual misstatement and the conclusion based thereon in the foregoing opinion. It was there stated that Newby made no motion in the District Court to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial and that his appeal was based solely upon the ground of inadequacy of the jury verdict. We acknowledge that this statement was incorrect although the fact that such motions were made was discovered only upon a close re-examination of the numerous docket entries of the trial court. The stenographic transcript, then before us, of the proceedings below made no disclosure of such motions and the briefs filed in this court were strangely silent with respect thereto. In all fairness to counsel, however, we correct the error and we sincerely trust that he has suffered no professional embarrassment or undeserved criticism.
Despite the erroneous factual recital, we conclude that the result reached in the foregoing opinion should not be disturbed.
In Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 53 S.Ct. 252, 77 L.Ed. 439 (1933), the Court stated the rule to be applied in determining whether the District Court had erred in refusing to grant a new trial. “The rule that this Court will not review the action of a federal trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial for error of fact has been settled by a long and unbroken line of decisions; and has been frequently applied where the ground of the motion was that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive or were inadequate. The rule precludes likewise a review of such action by a Circuit Court of Appeals.” 287 U.S. 481, 53 S.Ct. 254 (footnotes omitted).
In DeFoe v. Duhl, 286 F.2d 205 (4 Cir. 1961), this court quoted with approval and adopted the Virginia rule as to when the jury’s determination of the amount of damages should be set aside. We quoted from Williams Paving Company v. *199Kreidl, 200 Va. 196, 104 S.E.2d 758, 764 (1958):
“ The determination of the quantum of damages in this character of action is peculiarly within the province of the jury, but its authority to fix the amount of damages is not arbitrary or unlimited. Yet if the amount awarded is not so out of proportion to the injury and loss suffered as to evince prejudice, partiality or corruption by the jury or show thát it was actuated by a mistaken view of the merits of the case, then the award should not be disturbed. * *
In DeFoe, plaintiff, who had suffered personal injuries in a fall, was awarded a jury verdict of $699.00. She appealed from the District Court’s refusal to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate. Plaintiff proved out-of-pocket medical expenses of $624.-30. However, there was a serious conflict in the medical testimony and several witnesses observed her walking up and down stairs the day after the accident. We held: “The verdict here is not so shockingly low in light of the conflicts in the testimony as to lead to the conclusion that it was based upon passion or prejudice or some misconception of the facts or of the law.” 286 F.2d at 207 (citations omitted).
In the instant case there was also a conflict as to the extent of Newby’s injuries. This is not a case where the jury returned a verdict for less than the amount established by undisputed evidence. See Devine v. Patteson, 242 F.2d 828 (6 Cir. 1957); Reisberg v. Walters, 111 F.2d 595 (6 Cir. 1940); Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463 (2 Cir. 1930). Where the amount of damages is in dispute, as in this case, it has been held that the appellate court should refrain from disturbing the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial. See Still v. Townsend, 311 F.2d 23, 25 (6 Cir. 1962). We conclude that the court below did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial and its judgment will not be disturbed.
In view of this court’s recognition of an incorrect understanding of a procedural fact and the reconsideration of its original decision upon being apprised of the error, it is unnecessary that the case be fully reheard.
The petition for rehearing will be denied.