Court Opinion

ID: 9890524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 14:07:26.084438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:22.877989
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0267-ME

BRYAN SCOTT ALLEN                                                   APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM KENTON FAMILY COURT
v.               HONORABLE TERRI K. SCHOBORG, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 22-D-00534-001

VALERIE SUE EDER                                                      APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Appellant, Bryan Scott Allen (Allen), appeals from an

interpersonal protection order (IPO) entered on behalf of Appellee, Valerie Sue

Eder (Eder), by the Kenton Family Court. There was substantial evidence to

support the family court’s finding that Allen stalked Eder, and after our review, we
conclude that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that his behavior

amounted to an implicit threat. Therefore, we affirm the granting of the IPO.

             On December 28, 2022, Eder filed a petition for an IPO against Allen.

Based on the allegations in the petition, the family court granted a temporary IPO.

Following a continuance, the family court conducted hearings on the petition on

February 1 and February 9, 2023. The parties do not significantly disagree on the

testimony presented at the hearings.

             Eder and Allen were involved in a dating relationship from August

2021 until late July 2022. During this time, Allen was employed as the Chief of

the Villa Hills Police Department. Following a vacation to Europe in July 2022,

Eder informed Allen that she wanted to end the dating relationship. At Eder’s

request, they met twice to discuss her decision.

             The first meeting took place on July 22 in the parking lot of St. Pius

Church. While the meeting was generally amicable, it ended with Allen’s telling

Eder, “I will be highly offended if you change your passcode.” Eder thought that

this revelation was an odd thing for Allen to say. Consequently, she changed the

passcode to her garage as well as the locks to her front and garage doors.

             Their next meeting took place on August 21 at a Starbucks. The

meeting had been arranged by a common friend, Lauren Anderson, who had

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frequent contact with Allen at work. Eder again told Allen that the relationship

had ended, and she told him that he should move on to someone or something else.

             On September 26, Eder attended a soccer game in which her daughter

was playing at Scott High School. Allen arrived alone and sat in the bleachers in a

vantage point where he could watch Eder. However, Allen did not speak to Eder at

that time. Allen left the game at the same time as Eder. He remained in the

parking lot and attempted to text her. Eder did not respond to the messages. She

testified that she did not recall Allen’s ever attending any of her daughter’s soccer

games while they were dating.

             In October, Allen sent flowers to Eder’s home with a card that said,

                   Val, I have missed you and will always. There has
             been a hole in my heart since we separated. I miss you
             and always will. I wanted to give these to you because I
             knew they made you smile, and I loved your smile. I will
             always love you. I wish you well in everything you do.

 Eder blocked Allen’s number from her phone after receiving the flowers.

             On December 14, Eder received three text messages from an unknown

number. The text sent to Eder’s phone at 9:10 p.m. stated, “I saw you all sitting in

the living room this evening looked nice [sic]. I see you seeing a Dave Gooch and

he has spent a lot of nights there.” Eder responded with “?.” Almost immediately

thereafter, Eder received another message from that same number saying, “Your

house Dave spent the night last Friday.” Then another message was sent saying,

                                         -3-
“you were sitting on your couch tonight.” Eder was concerned about the messages

and suspected that Allen had sent them.

             She contacted the Kentucky State Police about the contacts. Detective

Joseph Filiatreau investigated the incident. During the investigation, Detective

Filiatreau discovered that the unknown phone number was associated with Allen’s

daughter. Upon questioning by Detective Filiatreau, Allen admitted that he had

used his daughter’s phone to text Eder.

             Allen also told Detective Filiatreau that he saw Eder and a man in a

car pulling out of Eder’s church. Allen wrote down the license plate number and

asked another police officer to run the plate and identify the owner of the vehicle.

That officer informed Allen that the vehicle was registered to David Gooch.

Detective Filiatreau testified that he believed that Allen’s actions were an improper

use of his police authority and that they constituted the offense of second-degree

official misconduct. Detective Filiatreau also testified that based on the content of

the text messages, Eder could reasonably believe that Allen had been watching her

on the night of December 14. However, he noted that Allen never made an

implicit or explicit threat against Eder. Eder testified that after Detective Filiatreau

informed her of Allen’s actions, she became very concerned for her safety.

             Following the second day of the hearing, the family court entered an

IPO against Allen restraining him from any contact with Eder for a period of three

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years. In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on February

16, 2023, the family court found that Allen’s actions met the definition of stalking

under KRS1 508.130. The Court further concluded that his actions amounted to an

explicit or implicit threat with the intent to place Eder in reasonable fear.

                Allen now appeals from the IPO. Additional facts will be set forth

below as necessary.

                As an appellate court, we review a family court’s issuance of an IPO

to determine “whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or . . . it abused

its discretion.” Holt v. Holt, 458 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Ky. App. 2015). In making

this determination, we must be mindful of the family court’s opportunity to assess

the credibility of the witnesses. CR2 52.01. Abuse of discretion occurs when a

trial court’s decision is “unreasonable, unfair, arbitrary or capricious.” Sewell v.

Sweet, 637 S.W.3d 330, 334 (Ky. App. 2021) (quoting Castle v. Castle, 567

S.W.3d 908, 915 (Ky. App. 2019)). More specifically, a court abuses the

discretion afforded it when “(1) its decision rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly

erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision . . . cannot be located within the range

of permissible decisions.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 n.11 (Ky.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -5-
2004) (revised). See also Buddenberg v. Buddenberg, 304 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Ky.

App. 2010).

              An IPO allows a victim of dating violence and abuse, a victim of

stalking or sexual assault (regardless of the presence of a past or current dating

relationship), or an adult on behalf of a minor victim to petition for protection

against a perpetrator. Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App.

2017) (citing KRS 456.030(1)). If the trial court “finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or stalking has occurred

and may again occur, the court may issue an interpersonal protective order[.]”

KRS 456.060(1) (emphasis added).

              Under KRS 456.010(8), “‘[s]talking’ refers to conduct prohibited as

stalking under KRS 508.140 or 508.150[.]” Stalking in the second degree, KRS

508.150(1), occurs when an individual intentionally:

              (a) Stalks another person; and

              (b) Makes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to
                  place that person in reasonable fear of:

                    1. Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.010;

                    2. Physical injury; or

                    3. Death.

KRS 508.130(1) defines stalking as meaning:

              (a) [T]o engage in an intentional course of conduct:

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                   1. Directed at a specific person or persons;

                   2. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, or
                      harasses the person or persons; and

                   3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.

             (b) The course of conduct shall be that which would
                 cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental
                 distress.

             “Course of conduct” means “a pattern of conduct composed of two (2)

or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” KRS 508.130(2).

                    To summarize, for an individual to be granted an
             IPO for stalking, he or she must at a minimum prove by a
             preponderance of the evidence that, an individual
             intentionally engaged in two or more acts directed at the
             victim that seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or
             harassed the victim, that served no legitimate purpose,
             and would have caused a reasonable person to suffer
             substantial mental distress, and that these acts may occur
             again. KRS 508.130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally,
             the individual must prove that there was an implicit or
             explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in
             reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or
             death. KRS 508.150.

Halloway, 532 S.W.3d at 162.

             In this case, Eder established that Allen’s conduct amounted to

stalking as defined in KRS 508.130. The initial two meetings, on July 22 and

August 21, were clearly consensual. However, Eder unambiguously told Allen

that their relationship was over and that she wanted no further contact with him.

Nevertheless, Allen showed up at the soccer game on September 26 -- even though

                                        -7-
he had never previously attended such games. Moreover, he positioned himself to

watch Eder during the game. He also followed Eder to the parking lot and

attempted to contact her when she left.

               In October, Eder sent flowers and a note to Allen’s house. In

December, he followed a vehicle in which Eder was a passenger and used his

connections as a police officer to obtain the driver’s name and registration. And

most significantly, on December 14, he anonymously texted Eder three times,

indicating that he had been watching her house and knew with whom she was

associating.

               Allen contends that there was no evidence that this contact amounted

to stalking because Eder was not aware of his involvement in the December 14

contacts until Detective Filiatreau so informed her sometime later. But his furtive

texts were clearly intended to convey the message to Eder that she was being

watched. The family court rejected Allen’s explanations of this incident and the

September and October contacts. The family court also noted that the December

14 texts strongly indicated that Allen had watched her house on more than one

occasion. Finally, the family court was persuaded by Eder’s testimony that she

was concerned by these contacts. And even though Eder did not know with

certainty that Allen was responsible for the December 14 incident, she suspected

him strongly enough to contact the Kentucky State Police.

                                          -8-
             Contrary to Allen’s argument, the statutory definition of stalking does

not require that the victim be placed in immediate fear. Rather, the definition

merely requires a showing that: (1) Allen intentionally engaged in two or more

acts directed at Eder; (2) he seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed

her; (3) his behavior served no legitimate purpose; (4) the acts would have caused

a reasonable person to suffer substantial, mental distress; and (5) that these actions

may occur again. Although the evidence was conflicting, we conclude there was

substantial evidence to support each of these elements.

             The more difficult question is whether there was sufficient evidence to

prove that Allen made an explicit or implicit threat to put Eder in reasonable fear

of sexual contact, physical injury, or death as required by KRS 508.150(1)(b). The

family court found that Allen’s actions amounted to an implicit threat, stating:

             The act of communicating with Eder to inform her that
             he was actively watching her home and monitoring her
             activities and demonstrating he had the capability of
             using his authority as a police officer to obtain
             information as to her associations was an implicit threat
             that caused Eder to fear for her safety.

We agree with the family court’s assessment.

             As found by the family court, Allen’s actions caused Eder significant

alarm and annoyance. His actions could be reasonably construed as harassing and

intimidating, and they are certainly troubling. Eder was justifiably afraid because

she did not know what Allen might do next. Indeed, she noted that Allen

                                         -9-
continued to engage in this conduct despite the risk to his own position as police

chief. Eder did not identify any prior words or conduct by Allen that would

indicate he may resort to violence. Nonetheless, Allen’s stalking actions were

deeply disturbing, and he clearly abused his authority as a police officer in order to

further his personal interests.

              Although it can be argued that this case presents a rather close call in

the murky struggle to define implicit, the facts were ably and meticulously set forth

by the trial court in its carefully crafted order. Its findings were clear, concrete,

and specific. Again, as noted earlier, our task on review is governed by the

standard set forth in Holt, 458 S.W.3d at 812; i.e., we must determine “whether the

court’s findings were clearly erroneous or . . . it abused its discretion.” There is no

scintilla of error on either ground. The findings of fact were explicit and

substantial, and the court acted correctly within its considerable range of

discretion.

              Therefore, the legal analysis as applied to those facts is our primary

focus. There is no question that Allen’s menacing and relentless pattern of conduct

met -- and indeed exceeded -- the elements of the stalking statute, KRS

508.130. The only question is whether his behavior constituted an explicit or an

implicit threat to Eder. The trial court found that the existence of an implicit threat

was a reasonable conclusion under the circumstances as it stated at the beginning

                                          -10-
of its order: “the Court found that by the nature of the conduct there was an

implicit threat of physical injury or sexual contact.”

                Implicit is defined3 as “capable of being understood from something

else though unexpressed . . . ; involved in the nature or essence of something

though not revealed, expressed, or developed . . . .” We cannot agree that it was

unreasonable or arbitrary for the trial court to conclude that Eder had a legitimate

basis to fear that she faced a realistic threat of the escalation of Allen’s behavior

into unwanted sexual contact from him. As the trial court noted in its findings,

they had been involved in an intimate dating relationship. He was blatantly

persistent in surveilling her house and her activities -- particularly with respect to

her new companion. As noted previously, he did not hesitate to abuse his position

as a police officer in order to obtain intimidating information about her. He did not

have to brandish a weapon for her to conclude that he posed a clear and ongoing

danger to her. The statute wisely anticipates such nuances in conduct by defining

the forbidden behavior to be either explicit or implicit.

                In analyzing Allen’s conduct and Eder’s reaction to it, the trial court

had the unique opportunity to assess their credibility. In so doing, it concluded as

follows:

                The act of communicating with Eder to inform her that
                he was actively watching her home and monitoring her

3
    Implicit, WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1985).

                                            -11-
             activities and demonstrating he had the capability of
             using his authority as a police officer to obtain
             information as to her associations was an implicit threat
             that caused Eder fear to her safety. A reasonable person
             would fear for their safety under the same circumstances.

              The purpose of an IPO is to protect one who is already a victim from

being victimized further as a result of conduct that already points to a dangerous

propensity on the part of a perpetrator. Our appellate role does not permit us to

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court -- especially in such a serious set

of circumstances.

             Therefore, we affirm the order of the Kenton Family Court entering an

IPO.

             DIXON, JUDGE, CONCURS.

             ECKERLE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.

ECKERLE, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Our General Assembly created interpersonal

protective orders (IPOs) to protect victims of dating violence who would not

otherwise be entitled to a traditional Domestic Violence Order (DVO). See

Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App. 2017) (citing KRS

456.030(1)). If the Trial Court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that

dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or stalking has occurred and may again

occur, the court may issue an interpersonal protective order[.]” KRS 456.060(1).

                                          -12-
              Under KRS 456.010(8), “‘[s]talking’ refers to conduct prohibited as

stalking under KRS 508.140 or 508.150.” Stalking in the second degree, KRS

508.150(1), requires that an individual intentionally,

              (a) Stalks another person; and

              (b) Makes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to
                  place that person in reasonable fear of:

                    1. Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.010;

                    2. Physical injury; or

                    3. Death.

              To grant an IPO, KRS 456.060(1) requires that the elements of

stalking be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond

reasonable doubt, as required for a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, when an

IPO is granted based upon stalking, there must be substantial evidence supporting

all of the elements under KRS 508.150(1). I fully agree with the majority that

Allen’s conduct in this case meets the definition of stalking set out in KRS

508.130(1).

              The more difficult question is whether there was sufficient evidence to

prove that Allen made an explicit or implicit threat to put Eder in reasonable fear

of sexual contact, physical injury, or death, as required by KRS 508.150(1)(b).

The Family Court found that Allen’s actions amounted to an implicit threat,

stating, “The act of communicating with Eder to inform her that he was actively

                                          -13-
watching her home and monitoring her activities and demonstrating he had the

capability of using his authority as a police officer to obtain information as to her

associations was an implicit threat that caused Eder to fear for her safety.” The

majority agrees with this analysis. I respectfully, and very reluctantly, disagree.

             There was no evidence in this case that Allen made an explicit threat

against Eder. I also agree with the majority that the word, “implicit” is properly

defined as “capable of being understood from something else though unexpressed

. . . ; involved in the nature or essence of something though not revealed,

expressed, or developed . . . .” However, KRS 508.150(1)(b) further requires that

the implicit threat be made with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of

sexual contact, physical injury, or death.

             In Holloway, supra, Holloway and Simmons were involved in a

dating relationship that ended in 2015. After the relationship ended, Holloway

alleged that Simmons repeatedly followed her to various public places with the

intent to start arguments with her. In addition, Simmons repeatedly sent harassing

and insulting text messages to Holloway and her friends. Based on this conduct,

Holloway was granted a DVO against Simmons. After Simmons was charged with

violation of the DVO, he sought an IPO against Holloway. Simmons alleged that

Holloway was following him to various public places with the intent either to force

him to leave or have him arrested for violation of the DVO. The trial court granted

                                         -14-
an IPO directing Holloway to remain at least 300 feet away from Simmons at all

times. Holloway, 532 S.W.3d at 160-61. On appeal, this Court reversed,

concluding that Holloway’s conduct could not be reasonably construed as an

implicit threat of physical harm against Simmons. Id. at 163.

             Other recent cases support this interpretation. In Taylor v. Fitzpatrick,

659 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. App. 2023), the family court renewed an IPO based on

allegations that the respondent followed the petitioner to various public places “in

order to intimidate me[.]” Id. at 749. This Court held that such conduct would not

constitute an implicit threat of physical injury. Id. Similarly, in Sewell v. Sweet,

637 S.W.3d 330 (Ky. App. 2021), we held that the family court’s finding that

stalking had occurred and was likely to occur again was not supported by

substantial evidence. Id. at 336. In that instance, the respondent followed the

petitioner to her workplace and other public places with the intent of starting

arguments, but there had been no threats, implicit or explicit, to support the victim

being in fear of physical injury. Id. And in Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112

(Ky. App. 2010), this Court considered the statutory definition of stalking under

the DVO statute. We concluded that a visit by respondent to petitioner’s

workplace did not constitute domestic violence sufficient to satisfy the definitions

of such contained within the statutes. Id. at 115.

                                         -15-
             I can find no meaningful distinction between Allen’s conduct in this

case and the conduct at issue in these other cases. I agree with the Family Court

and the majority that Allen’s actions caused Eder significant alarm and annoyance.

His actions could be reasonably construed as harassing and intimidating, and they

are certainly troubling. In no way can I endorse or justify his behavior. Eder was

justifiably afraid because she did not know what Allen might do next. Indeed, she

noted that Allen continued to engage in this conduct despite the risk to his own

position as Police Chief.

             However, Eder did not identify any prior words or conduct by Allen

that would indicate he may resort to violence. Allen’s stalking actions were deeply

disturbing, and, clearly, he abused his authority as a police officer to further his

personal interests. But at most, Allen’s actions indicate a high degree of

recklessness, as well as a willingness to continue this pattern of harassing and

intimidating behavior against Eder. Allen’s actions do not suggest that he may

escalate to violence against Eder. Furthermore, we cannot infer such an intent

from the fact that Allen was a police officer.

             Allen’s actions may warrant the entry of a restraining or no-contact

order as part of any separate criminal charges. However, the current statutory

language simply does not permit the granting of an IPO without at least an implicit

threat of sexual contact, physical injury, or death. Evidence of such a threat just

                                          -16-
does not exist under these facts. Therefore, I must conclude that the Family Court

clearly erred in finding that his actions amounted to an implicit threat of sexual

contact, physical injury, or death. Consequently, I would hold that the Family

Court abused its discretion by granting the IPO and I would vacate the IPO entered

in this case.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Scott A. Crosbie                          Nicholas D. Summe
 Dela C. Cummings                          Covington, Kentucky
 Lexington, Kentucky

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