Court Opinion

ID: 9596666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:52:05.49897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:33.590848
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
In order to maintain his declaratory judgment action to challenge the Ashland ordinance, plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has standing, namely, that he is a “person * * * whose rights, status or other legal relations” are affected by the ordinance. ORS 28.020. Standing requires the allegation of a substantial interest in the matter in controversy. Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252 Or 440, 450 P2d 547 (1969).
The plaintiff’s only claim to such a substantial interest is that he is a resident of Ashland. As such, he asserts in his complaint, his “rights and liberties are subject to being deprived at any time” by the use of the ordinance.
This allegation is insufficient to establish standing in the plaintiff. Any resident of Ashland could make the same assertion. Plaintiff must show some injury, or threat of injury, more particular to himself. *191See also, Cummings Constr. v. School Dist. No. 9, 242 Or 106, 408 P2d 80 (1965); Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 333 P2d 741 (1958); Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 51-52 (2d ed 1941); Annotation, 10 ALR3d 727 et seq, Declaratory Belief—Criminal Statutes (1966).
*190* * The citizen-litigant must show more than that there may exist on the merits an infirmity in the disputed statute; he must prove an appreciable harm to himself ‘and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.’ * * *” Note: Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1490, 1509 (1967).
*191Plaintiff has not shown, nor alleged, that he is particularly subject to the ordinance, nor that he has been threatened by its application, nor that he suffers any other current, or prospective, injury from the use of the ordinance. Ho asserts only that he is a citizen, uncertain of the validity of the ordinance.
“It is fundamental to appellate jurisprudence that courts do not sit ‘to decide abstract, hypothetical, or contingent questions * * * or to decide any constitutional question in advance of the necessity for its decision # * ” Gortmaker v. Seaton, supra, 252 Or at 442, quoting Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 US 450, 461, 65 S Ct 1384, 89 L Ed 1725 (1945).
Plaintiff, in his brief, relies on cases where declaratory relief was employed to test the constitutionality of laws alleged to have a “chilling effect” on First Amendment, or other especially protected, rights. However, standing is- still required in such eases, and is .usually provided by the allegation of some past, or threatened, prosecution. See, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US 479, 85 S Ct 1116, 14 L Ed 2d 22 (1965); Comarco v. City of Orange, 111 NJ Super 400, 268 A2d 354 (1970), 116 NJ Super 531, 283 A2d 122 (1971); Balizer v. Shaver, 82 N Mex 347, 481 P2d 709 (1971).
■ Plaintiff has not cited to us, nor has my research disclosed, any case recognizing standing in the mere .allegation of residence within an area where an allegedly invalid law or ordinance is in force.
*192Standing is not a mere technicality, but a basic requisite for the exercise of the judicial function.
I am unable to reconcile our holding in the case at bar with the rule stated in Gortmaker v. Seaton, supra, requiring a showing of special standing.
The prevailing opinion cites a number of well known earlier Oregon cases, including, Anthony v. Veatch, 189 Or 462, 220 P2d 493, 221 P2d 575 (1950), appeal dismissed 340 US 923, 71 S Ct 499, 95 L Ed 667 (1951), Amer. F. of L. et al v. Bain et al, 165 Or 183, 106 P2d 544, 130 ALR 1278 (1940), Mult. Co. Fair Ass’n v. Langley, 140 Or 172, 13 P2d 354 (1932), and McKee v. Foster, 219 Or 322, 347 P2d 585 (1959), wherein our Supreme Court granted declaratory relief with reference to criminal statutes, as supporting the granting of declaratory relief in the case at bar.
An examination of these cases, however, will show (as the opinion properly points out) that the question of the existence or nonexistence of a justiciable controversy was apparently never raised by the defendant public officials. The same appears to be true as to the cases cited wherein declaratory relief was granted as to civil statutes, with the exception of Recall Bennett Com. v. Bennett et al., 196 Or 299, 249 P2d 479 (1952), in which the officials were only nominal parties.
Finally, this court has previously refused to entertain challenges to the constitutionality of criminal statutes by criminal defendants where such defendants were not in the class of persons with a bona fide standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes on the grounds asserted. See, State v. Schulman, 6 Or App 81, 485 P2d 1252, Sup Ct review denied *193(1971), and State v. Drummond, 6 Or App 558, 489 P2d 958 (1971).
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment below.