Court Opinion

ID: 9523630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:44:53.555184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:59.967682
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I write specially, probably to reassure myself, to point out what we do not hold.
The trial court was well within its authority to impose sanctions upon all of the defendants for their persistent disregard of the trial court’s clearly stated and repeated orders compelling discovery. Because of the conflict of interest, however, we hold that the sanction of default is too harsh and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
We do not hold that a trial court is obligated to ferret out conflicts of interest sua sponte. Ordinarily, a motion to disqualify the errant attorney or to withdraw is required. No such motion was made here. However, the conflict of interest was brought to the court’s attention by defendants’ attorney in his affidavit resisting sanctions for non-compliance with discovery orders, and more squarely by defendants’ new attorneys in their motions to reconsider the sanction of default.
There are, of course, a number of consequences that may flow from an attorney’s conflict of interest. These include professional discipline, disqualification from further representation in a case, reversal of a judgment, and an action for legal malpractice. See Annot., Propriety of Corporate Representation, 1 A.L.R.4th 1124; Annot., Attorney — Former Client, 52 A.L.R.2d 1243. In reversing the judgment, I do not believe we are imposing upon a trial court a duty to consider, on its own motion, the existence and effect of a conflict of interest when it decides which discovery sanction to impose. Only because the trial court was apprised of the conflict, did it abuse its discretion in disregarding the inherent and actual prejudice to defendants occasioned by the conflict.