Court Opinion

ID: 9941228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 08:14:10.048154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:22.703481
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              ________________

                               NO. 09-21-00183-CV
                              ________________

                      KATHRYN M. DANNER, Appellant

                                         V.

                     GEORGE EARL DANNER, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

                    On Appeal from the 418th District Court
                         Montgomery County, Texas
                       Trial Cause No. 17-03-04143-CV
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether an award of a bank or

brokerage account, made pursuant to § 7.001 of the Texas Family Code, authorizes

an award of interest on the value of the account. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001;

Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.005. We hold that the trial court properly denied the

request for interest on the three accounts in question. We therefore affirm the trial

court’s decision.

                                         1
                                  I. Background

      Kathryn and George Danner were married in the early 1990s and sought a

divorce in 2017. The trial court granted the divorce and divided the parties’ marital

estate, awarding Kathryn part or all of three brokerage accounts. When George

appealed the trial court’s decision, we affirmed the lower court’s property division,

and our Supreme Court denied George’s petition for review. See Danner v. Danner,

No. 09-18-00385-CV, 2020 WL 6325725 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 29, 2020,

pet. denied). During the lengthy appellate process, 1 Kathryn was denied access to

the brokerage accounts awarded to her and, therefore, sought interest on the value of

those accounts. The trial court denied Kathryn’s request, concluding that the awards

of the accounts were not “money judgments.” Kathryn filed this appeal.

                               II. Standard of Review

      The outcome of this appeal hinges on the definition of a “money judgment”

that would accrue postjudgment interest. See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §§

301.002(a)(12), 304.005(a). Matters of statutory construction are reviewed on appeal

as questions of law under a de novo standard of review. See State v. Shumake, 199

S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).

      1
        The trial court signed the parties’ divorce decree on September 7, 2018, but
the appeal was not resolved until we issued our mandate on April 19, 2021.

                                         2
                                   III. Analysis

      The September 7, 2018, divorce decree awarded Kathryn two Merrill Lynch

investment accounts, with a combined value of $548,177.25, and the equivalent

value of $1,062,242.20 out of an Edward Jones retirement account. All three

accounts were kept invested in “numerous funds, stocks, bonds, and other assets”

that fluctuate in value. Each account was to be divided pursuant to the Decree and

as “more particularly defined in a Qualified Domestic Relations Order signed by the

Court.” The decree award included “interest, dividends, gains, or losses” on the

awards, but did not reflect the amounts of cash and/or securities contained in the

accounts in question.2 What, at first blush, appears to state a monetary award of

$1,062,242.20 out of the designated Edward Jones account was subsequently

clarified by an order of the court signed on May 13, 2021. That clarifying order

directed the Edward Jones account to be divided pursuant to the QDRO, signed on

May 13, 2021, awarding Kathryn 82.46 % of the Edward Jones account at issue. The

record is silent as to whether the court has signed a QDRO as to each of the Merrill

Lynch accounts which were awarded 100% to Kathryn. However, each of the three

      2
        Other documents in the appellate record show that in September of 2018,
when the trial court signed the parties’ divorce decree, the Merrill Lynch accounts
contained minimal cash deposits, but substantial equities, mutual funds, and
“alternative investments.”
                                          3
accounts were of the same nature in that they contained a mix of cash and securities,

most of which were securities, and they did not meet the definition of “money.”

      Kathryn contends that the two-and-one-half year delay in her access to these

accounts merits an award of postjudgment interest pursuant to the Texas Finance

Code. See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 304.005(a). George, conversely, contends that the

award of these accounts does not constitute a “money judgment” as that term is

contemplated by the cited statutory section.

      Because “every word excluded from a statute must . . . be presumed to have

been excluded for a purpose[,]” we presume that a statute permitting postjudgment

interest on a “money judgment” does not also allow postjudgment interest on a

judgment for something other than money. City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653

S.W.3d 176, 185 (Tex. 2022) (citation omitted). The Texas Finance Code defines a

money judgment as “a judgment for money.” Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 301.002(a)(12);

Long v. Castle Tex. Prod., Ltd. P’ship, 426 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Tex. 2014). Money is

defined as “a medium of exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or

foreign government.” Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(b)(24); Riverside Nat’l

Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. 1980). This definition distinguishes

money from securities, which are defined as including stocks, bonds, commercial

paper, and the like. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 4001.068(a). Therefore, we

conclude that a divorce decree granting an award further defined by a QDRO that

                                         4
divides an account containing a mix of investments and cash is not a money

judgment. Each of the three accounts were of the same nature in that they contained

a mix of cash and securities, most of which were securities, and they did not meet

the definition of “money” found in § 1.201(b)(24) of the Business and Commerce

Code. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 1.201(b)(24). The subsequent order of

the court clarified that the award in the Final Decree was not an award of money but

was a division of retirement accounts pursuant to a QDRO. For this reason, Kathryn

may not receive interest on the value, as of the date of divorce, of either the Merrill

Lynch accounts or the Edward Jones account awarded to her in the divorce decree.

      We overrule Kathryn’s three appellate points.

                                   IV. Conclusion

      Because we hold that the award of the two Merrill Lynch accounts and the

Edward Jones account did not constitute a money judgment pursuant to the Texas

Finance Code, we affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Kathryn’s request for

postjudgment interest on those accounts.

      George’s pending motion to dismiss the appeal presents the same arguments

presented in his brief. We deny that motion to dismiss the appeal.

                                           5
      AFFIRMED.

                                               JAY WRIGHT
                                                   Justice

Submitted on February 3, 2023
Opinion Delivered February 15, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Horton, JJ.

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