Court Opinion

ID: 9824919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:43:22.442962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:01.483509
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The principal defense in this case is that the insured committed suicide. There is a clause in the policy to the effect that if the insured shall commit suicide, whether sane or insane, the policy shall become void. The defendant on the trial pleaded this clause in bar of the action. The burden was on the defendant, to establish this fact, to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, and it is here insisted that the trial court committed error in refusing to charge affirmatively that the fact of suicide had been so established. The insured was found dead in his home on a Saturday in May, his body was stiff, and a gunshot wound was in his left side, ranging up and through the back. 1-Ie was lying on the floor, dressed in clean overalls and underclothes, and a small single barrel shotgun, recently fired, was near his body, partially between his feet; the front door was locked, and the window down, and the rear door was shut; there was an impress on the side of the bed near the body, as if some one had recently sat there, and lying on the bed were a knife, two loaded shells, and some tobacco; there was powder burns on the body. Every inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances surrounding the dead man would indicate that the deceased was shot with and by the gun found in the room and the entire absence of any evidence of any attack from another would lead to the conclusion that the deceased either intentionally or accidentally killed himself. On the outside of the room, on the front porch, under a hat, shown to be the hat of deceased, was a memorandum book of deceased in which was written, in deceased’s handwriting a note dated May 17th and addressed to J. A. Dennis, father of deceased, as follows:
“Dear farther an mother, I will write you all the last of my rezines Tell you all Earewell with the best off peace and hope to God this wont shock you all Por you know I am crazy and lost my mind But do ask you all to do better and as offten as you see Lizzie and my sweet baby teatch him Do good and to think off the way his Daddy Doing was rong. Papa you take my crop and make you something out off, if you can I will remain your boy.
“[Signed] L. B. Dennis.
“My coat is at Freeman Flowers store. Now Lizzie I want you to go back to you Pa.”
The coat was found as indicated. There was an entire absence of any motive shown for suicide, or that deceased was otherwise than in his right mind when last seen alive. His domestic and social environments were apparently pleasant and nothing was shown to indicate financial embarrassment. He was in good health and going about his daily-work in the usual way. The presumption of law is against suicide, and will stand and be decisive of the case until overcome by testimony which shall' outweigh the presumption. Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 100 Fed. 582, 40 C. C. A. 564, 49 L. R. A. 116. To overcome this presumption, where the evidence is circumstantial the party making the averment must prove it by facts which exclude every reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death. Lindahl v. Supreme Ct., I. O. F., 100 Minn. 87, 110 N. W. 358, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916, 117 Am. St. Rep. 666; Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Hairston, 108 Va. 832, 62 S. E. 1057, 128 Am. St. Rep. 989; Met. Life Ins. Co. v. Devault, 109 Va. 392, 63 S. E. 982, 17 Ann. Cas. 27.
At the common law suicide was a felony, and in Alabama is a crime involving- moral turpitude. The presumption is that a person is innocent of crime until his guilt is established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 Michie’s Digest, p. 119, § 182, and authorities there cited. This presumption of innocence remains until a jury is convinced from evidence of the guilt of the accused. Rogers v. State, 117 Ala. 192, 23 South. 82. This presumption of innocence is to be regarded as a matter of evidence, and to .be considered and weighed by the jury, until the other facts and circumstances in the case are sufficient to overturn it. Bryant v. State, 116 Ala. 445, 446, headnote, 23 South. 40. While the measure of proof necessary to overcome this presumption differs somewhat in civil and criminal eases, the one being as hereinabove stated and the other, “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the presumption as an evidentiary fact is the same in civil as in criminal cases, the rule being stated by Mr. Hughes in his work on evidence as follows:
“This presumption obtains in both civil and criminal cases; and when the question of guilt is raised either directly or indirectly.” Hughes on Ev. par. 8.
[11] A presumption of law which may be disputed establishes a prima facie fact, which can only be overturned by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury. Hughes on Ev. § 6; Maisel v. State, 81 South. 348;1 Roman, Trustee, v. Lentz, 177 Ala. 64-71, 58 South. 438; State v. Kelly, 22 N. D. 5, 132 N. W. 223, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 974; Re Cowdry, 77 Vt. 359.2 The cases of L. & N. Ry. v. Marbury L. Co., 125 Ala. 254, 28 South. 438, 50 L. R. A. 620, and A. G. S. Ry. v. Moody, 90 Ala. 46, 8 South. 57, dealt with mere presumptions of fact, indulged mainly for the purpose of putting the defendants to proof and compelling thorn to explain and show, with fair degree of certainty, that they had. performed their duty. Roman, Trustee, v. Lentz, supra.
[12,13] In determining whether the death of the insured was caused by suicide, there are many circumstances which are of weight. Among the things important to be considered are the presence or absence of motive (O’Connor v. Modern W. Q. A., 110 Minn. 18, 124 *646N. W. 454, 25 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1244); physical facts surrounding death (Johns v. N. W. Mutual R. A., 90 Wis. 332, 63 N. W. 276, 41 L. R. A. 587); habits and temperament of the insured, his domestic and social environment (Tackman v. B. of A. Yeoman, 132 Iowa, 64, 106 N. W. 350, 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 974), any statement evidencing an intention to commit the act, made previous to and near the time of death. But where there are facts from which the jury might draw an inference that the death of the insured was the result of an accident, or that his death may have been caused by other means, rather than that of suicide, the general charge should not be given. McMillan v. Aiken Ala. Supreme Ct., 87 South. 135, Nov. term 1920, 1 Div. 127; Ringeman v. Wiggs Bros., 146 Ala. 685, 40 South. 323; 3 Amerson v. Corona Coal Co., 194 Ala. 175, 69 South. 601. In the McMillan Case, supra, Mr. Justice Thomas, writing for the court, said: “The jury may draw such inferences from the facts proved as they believe reasonable.” In the McMillan Case, supra, Justice Thomas has gone to great pains to' collate and digest the decisions on this point, which we here adopt. Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, our court holds that where there is a scintilla of evidence from which a contrary inference might be drawn, the affirmative charge should not he given.
[14-16] The note written by the deceased prior to his death was important as evidence, being a declaration of intention on the part of deceased, but declarations of parties while evidence against them are not conclusive, but are to he considered along with all the other evidence in the case. The question was primarily one of fact for the jury, and the learned judge trying the ease properly so held. There was no motion for a new trial, and we are without power to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence.
We adhere to our former ruling as to the discretion of the court in allowing the filing of the amendment to the pleas. There is no rule better settled than that parties cannot be allowed to speculate in the trial of causes in the courts.
[17-19] The contention now made, that the plaintiff has failed to make out her case by reason of a failure to prove that defendant had been furnished proof of death and demanded payment before suit brought, and that the policy was the property of plaintiff, and that insured died while in good standing, is without merit: (1) Because the omission to make this proof, if such were not the case, was not brought to the attention of the trial court, as required by Circuit Court Rule 35, 175 Ala. xxi. (2) The contention was not made in brief on the original submission, and is waived. (3) Proof was made that the defendant denied liability on other grounds. Where this is the case, such denial and refusal to pay is a 'waiver of notice and proof of loss. Joyce on Ins. vol. 5, § 3373. (4) There was evidence tending to establish proof of death, demand, the ownership of the policy in plaintiff, and that insured was in good standing at the time of his death. We see no reason for changing the conclusions heretofore reached, and the ¿pplication for rehearing is overruled.

 60 Atl. 141, 3 .Ann. Cas. 70.

 Reported in full in the Southern Reporter; reported as a memorandum decision without opinion in Ala.