Court Opinion

ID: 9860842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:34:17.813761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:45.595466
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MANNING, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that the officer’s stop of the car was justified based on the traffic violation, there was no probable cause to search defendant’s car. The officer testified that he initially observed the defendant “twisting” in the front seat of the car, but was unable to see his hands at that point. The twisting movement was observed from the rear of the car. Once he approached the vehicle, he saw defendant “placing” a plastic bag underneath the armrest and between the front seat of the vehicle. It is important to note what the officer did not see in trying to determine if probable cause existed. The officer only saw a “few inches” of the bag. He did not testify that he observed the color or substance of the contents of the bag. He did not observe anything that appeared to be a weapon. He did not testify that based on his prior investigative experience he knew that marijuana was transported in clear plastic bags. He did not observe any crushed green leaves or leafy substance. He ordered the defendant out of the car, so there was no danger to the officer, nor did the officer so testify. I agree with the defendant that the presence of plastic in an automobile is insufficient to give a police officer probable cause. The search of a motor vehicle must be based on probable cause. (Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U.S. 42, 51, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 428, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981.) Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances known at the time that would give a reasonable person a belief that contraband was present. (People v. Penny (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 499, 502, 544 N.E.2d 1015.) The defendant in the case at bar was stopped for a minor traffic violation only. Thereafter, the officer observed two things, i.e., a twisting movement seen from behind and a plastic bag placed under an armrest. The totality of the circumstances is devoid of any connection to criminal behavior, in the absence of an observation of at least the color or nature of the substance contained in such a bag. (See, e.g., People v. Kelly (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 80, 394 N.E.2d 739.) The instant case is very similar to People v. Collins (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 253, 368 N.E.2d 1007, wherein that defendant was stopped for a minor traffic violation, the officer observed him lean forward and to the right, and then, after ordering defendant out of the car, observed a brown paper bag, opened it and discovered that its contents consisted of cannabis. While in Collins the discovery of the bag was subsequent to the ordering of defendant out of the car and here the plastic bag was seen before defendant was ordered out, the principle is the same. The defendant in Collins was ordered out of the car because the officer noted that he leaned forward. The defendant in the case at bar was ordered out of the car because he was observed “twisting” and the officer observed a few inches of plastic protruding from underneath an armrest. In neither case was there sufficient evidence to justify a search of the defendant’s automobile. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence that the defendant committed any other traffic violation that would have necessitated his detention and arrest, i.e., failure to possess a driver’s license, etc. The court, in ruling, determined that it need not consider the “manner in which the defendant moved or did not move.” The basis for the court’s denial of defendant’s motion was solely the fact that the officer saw defendant place a bag underneath the armrest, and he observed that the bag was plastic. While under more specific circumstances, i.e., observation of crushed, leafy substance, or even testimony by the officer that in the officer’s experience he has noted the use of plastic to transport cannabis, I would agree with the majority. However, in the case at bar, the record is woefully lacking for purposes of probable cause. The search was not justified by the totality of circumstances. (See generally New York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101 S. Ct. 2860.) I would reverse for the reason that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress is manifestly erroneous.