Court Opinion

ID: 9787430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:16:25.444588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.832205
License: Public Domain

*338VOIGT, Justice,
dissenting.
[$49] I respectfully dissent.
[150] The State's Petition for Rehearing raises five issues:
1. The Court took judicial notice of partial or incomplete documents in arriving at the conclusion that Wyoming's legislative and executive branches have shirked their duties. The Court should consider the complete documents which demonstrate significant progress and appropriations for capital construction.
2. The Court's conclusion that seores of *... 90 or above for building condition, ... assure each facility achieves a rating of 'good' " is erroneous. The consequences of that finding are significant.
3. The ambiguous language of the opinion invites interpretation that the Court intended all buildings owned by school districts, regardless of use, achieve minimum MGT seores.
4. In connection with the directive by the Court for the Legislature to expend $568 million (in 1998 dollars) on capital construction programs, the Court's premise that the State of Wyoming has the design and construction industry infrastructure to accommodate such a directive is questionable, and the consequences of the directive on the cost of constructing educational facilities and the potential adverse impact on the quality of work to be performed appear not to have been considered.
5. The advisability of directing equal branches of Wyoming state government to adopt and implement specific policy pre-seriptions appears not to have been given the consideration it deserves.
I will direct my attention to the fifth issue because it should be dispositive of this case.
[151] Wyoming is far from alone in its historic reliance upon local property taxes for education funding. And Wyoming is far from alone in having had to come to grips with the resulting funding disparities By 1995, no less than thirty-three of the fifty states had addressed school finance in their state courts. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand. L.Rev. 101, 185-94 (1995). Commentators have recognized three "waves" of school finance litigation in the past several decades. Before 1978, plaintiffs emphasized the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. During the second wave, lasting approximately from 1973 to 1989, the focus of such cases shifted to the education and equal protection clauses of the various state constitutions. Finally, and continuing today, state court cases have centered on the education clauses of state constitutions. Jennifer L. Fogle, Note, Ab-beville County School District v. State: The Right to a Minimally Adequate Education in South Carolina, 51 S.C. L.Rev. 781, 789-90 (2000).
[152] The shift from federal to state constitutional analysis had its genesis in a United States Supreme Court case:
Predictably, citizens suffering from inadequate and inequitable education finance sought redress in the courts. While education finance questions have been litigated since at least 1912, the modern era of education finance begins in 1971 with Serrano v. Priest, [5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971)]. The California Supreme Court relied on both the federal and state constitutions in holding that California's property wealth-based finance scheme violated the respective equal protection clauses. The California Supreme Court's federal equal protection analysis regarding the Federal Constitution was negated, however, when the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues, [411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)] held that there is no fundamental right to education under the Federal Constitution.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rodri-gues was of great import. First and foremost, the Rodriguez opinion expressly consigned the question of education finance to the states. Second, the Rodriguez Court determined, five Justices to four, that education is not a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution for equal protection purposes. By finding that education is not a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution, yet simultaneously recogniz*339ing the critical importance of education and urging states to address the problems of education finance, the Court presented state courts that would subsequently hear education finance cases with a textbook opportunity to fulfill the ideals of the new judicial federalism.
Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discourse and the Tyranny of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Fi-mance, 60 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 281, 244-45 (1998) (footnotes omitted).1
[153] The importance of education to the citizens of Wyoming is reflected in the numerous references to public education in the Wyoming Constitution. Three sections are particularly pertinent to the present case. Wyo. Const. art. 1, entitled "Declaration of Rights," contains Section 28, entitled "Education," which reads as follows:
The right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and liberal arts.
In Wyo. Const. art. 7, which is devoted wholly to education, two sections bear directly on the issues at hand:
§ 1. Legislature to provide for public schools.
The legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow, and such other institutions as may be necessary.
§ 9. Taxation for schools. -
The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the income arising from the general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, free of charge; and in view of such provision so made, the legislature shall require that every child of sufficient physical and mental ability shall attend a public school during the period between six and eighteen years or a time equivalent to three years, unless educated by other means.
[T54] It is in the interpretation and application of these constitutional mandates that the separate branches of Wyoming's government now are at loggerheads. It may or may not be comforting to know that neither the legislature nor the courts are "at fault" for this conflict. It is the natural result of the litigation spawned by local property tax funding of a state's school system. This realization should, perhaps, help to tone down some of the public rhetoric directed toward the litigants and the courts.
[¥55] The process whereby courts determine the constitutionality of statutes is called "judicial review."2 Judicial review is now an accepted part of American jurisprudence, but that was not always the case.
Early constitutions preferred to give the lion's share of power to the legislature. In the light of American political history, this was only natural. The colonial governor- and the judiciary, to a certain extent-represented foreign domination. The assemblies, on the other hand, were the voice of local influentials. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1776 gave "supreme legisla*340tive power" to a single house of representatives. No upper house or governor's veto checked its power. Over the course of the years, however, the states became somewhat disillusioned with legislative supremacy. The governor was one beneficiary of this movement. Typically, he gained a longer term of office and the veto power (which the federal President had from the start). Judicial power, too, increased at the legislature's expense. Judicial power took the form called judicial review-review, through private litigation, of acts of other branches of government; with the right to declare these acts void, if, in the judges' opinion, they were unauthorized by the constitution. Judicial review fed on constitutional detail; the more clauses a constitution contained, especially clauses that did something more than merely set out the basic frame of government, the more potential occasions for the exercise of the power of review.
Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Low 106-07 (Simon and Schuster 1973) (footnote omitted).
[T56] The boundaries of judicial review are not universally recognized or well defined, at cither the state or the federal level. The following comments, though made about the United States Constitution, are equally applicable to the Wyoming Constitution:
The Framers, it is fair to say, failed to think through the power of judicial review and its ramifications for constitutional politics. * * *
* * * The Constitution, of course, is not self-interpreting and crucial principlee-such as judicial review, separation of powers, and federalism-are presupposed rather than spelled out. Moreover, in creating separate institutions that share specific and delegated powers, the Constitution amounts to a prescription for political struggle and an invitation for an ongoing debate about enduring constitutional principles.
II David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics 25 (W.W. Norton Co.1991). This struggle and debate began almost immediately after the constitutional convention as the fight over ratification was taken to the states. The following quotes, the first from Robert Yates, an opponent of the new constitution, and the second from Alexander Hamilton, a supporter of the new constitution, should help to place in historical perspective Wyoming's current controversy over the proper role of the judiciary:
Robert Yates:
"There is no authority that can remove [supreme court justices], and they cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself....
And in their decisions they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the constitution. The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal."
Alexander Hamilton:
"Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive, that in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend *341upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."
David M. O'Brien, supra, at 26.
[157] It is the interplay between judge and legislator-this constitutional separation of powers-that underlies the issues before this Court today. The general theme is clear: one branch of government should not exercise the powers of government belonging to another branch. That statement is clearly made in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.) The problem lies in the highlighted language: how do we determine what constitutional powers "properly belong" to one branch or another? In deciding where the line should be drawn between legislating, on the one hand, and judicial review, on the other, we should be mindful that differences of opinion have endured on this question for hundreds of years. Some cadre of judges in Wyoming did not create the concept of judicial review.
[158] As mentioned above, Wyoming is certainly not the first state to have faced this conflict in education finance litigation. It is not necessary to review every case across the nation where the separation of powers doctrine has been analyzed in the context of school finance reform.3 Suffice it to say that the focus of the debate is often on the "political question doctrine." The central thesis of the political question doctrine is that some issues are not "Jjusticiable;" that is, they are not capable of being determined by resort to legal principles in a court of law.
[159] The United States Supreme Court has identified several circumstances that indicate the existence of a non-justiciable political question:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).4 This Court has previously utilized these criteria to declare a lack of jurisdiction in the courts to determine a political question. State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 762-64 (Wyo.1972). We have also recognized the fine line that must be drawn to ensure the separation of powers when exercising judicial review: *342Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, 371 P.2d 409, 419 (Wyo.1962).
*341The disposition of the judicial branch of government has always been to serupu-lously refrain from encroaching in the slightest way into the legislative field of policy making where factual or economic factors require latitude of discretion. We will not and we do not substitute our opinions in such matters for the considered judgment of our lawmakers. Yet, we ourselves have a function to perform, a constitutional right, and the paramount duty to insist that the legislature [not improperly delegate its power].
*342[160] The process of determining whether an issue is a non-justiciable political question begins with an interpretation of the constitutional text to determine whether and to what extent the issue is "textually committed" to another branch of government. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228, 113 S.Ct. 732, 735, 122 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). In the case of the Wyoming Constitution, both Sections 1 and 9 of Article 7 clearly delegate the establishment, maintenance and funding of Wyoming's schools to the legislature. See Michael Heise, Schoolkhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, XXXIII Land & Water L.Rev. 281, 304 (1998).5 "These and other constitutional expressions should leave no doubt that the legislature has complete control of the state's school system in every respect[.]" Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 320 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 86, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 (1980).
[T61] The second cirenmstance found by the United States Supreme Court to involve a political question is the situation where there is "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. That is precisely the situation now before this Court. Wyo. Const. art. 7, § 1 requires the legislature to provide "a complete and uniform system of public instruction," with free elementary schools of "every needed kind and grade," and a university with such technical and professional departments "as the public good may require and the means of the state allow ...." (Emphasis added.) Wyo. Const. art. 7, $ 9 requires the legislature, by "taxation or otherwise," to create and maintain "a thorough and efficient" system of public schools, "adequate to the proper instruction of all youth...." (Emphasis added.) And finally, Wyo. Const. art. 1, $ 23 provides that Wyoming's citizens' right "to opportunities for education should have practical recognition." (Emphasis added.)
[162] These constitutional provisions do not provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards. It is not for this Court to create constitutional standards; we are only to discover ones that already exist. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 57-59 (R.I.1995); Abbeville County School Dist. v. State, 335 S.C. 58, 515 S.F.2d 535, 541-42 (1999) (Moore, J., dissenting); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71, 119-130 (1978) (Rosellini, J., dissenting). In enacting school finance statutes, "the legislature must be free to remedy parts of a problem, or to recognize degrees of a problem and to formulate solutions in the areas it determines to be more in need or more readily corrected than others." Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1026 (Colo.1982) (Erickson, J., specially concurring). If this Court "enacts" standards of its own, the legislature is deprived of the legislative discretion necessary to make the policy decisions assigned to it by the constitution.6 Furthermore, the attempt to "manage" school finance in the courts by the enforcement of amorphous phrases such as "thorough and efficient" only leads to unending litigation:
We point out one additional caveat: the absence of justiciable standards could engage the court in a morass comparable to the decades-long struggle of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that has attempted to define what constitutes the "thorough and efficient" education specified in that state's constitution. * * * [The New Jersey Su*343preme Court has struggled in its self-appointed role as overseer of education for more than twenty-one years, consuming significant funds, fees, time, effort, and court attention. The volume of litigation and the extent of judicial oversight provide a chilling example of the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the duties of a Legislature.
City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 59.
[163] Most certainly, the allocation of resources toward competing needs is a legislative, not a judicial, function. Yet, in 1995, this Court issued the following mandate:
Because education is one of the state's most important functions, lack of financial resources will not be an acceptable reason for failure to provide the best educational system. All other financial considerations must yield until education is funded. -
Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo.1995) (emphasis added). We have now repeated that mandate in the instant case. State v. Campbell County School Dist., 2001 WY 19, ¶ 138, 19 P.3d 518, 566 (Wyo.2001). There are several things wrong with this mandate. First, it is, pure and simple, judicial legislation. Second, "the best educational system" is not a standard that can be found anywhere in the constitution. Third, the spending dictates deprive the legislature of its right to identify and define "need," and of its right to balance competing societal interests. And finally, under Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 28, the right to education in Wyoming is to be given "practical recognition," which phrase does not suggest the extraordinary level of funding conceived by this Court.7 While we may, when appropriate, review legislation for constitutionality, we may not order the legislature to set a standard at a particular level nor may we order the legislature to determine a standard using a particular methodology. Davidson v. Sherman, 848 P.2d 1341, 1349 (Wyo.1993).
[164] "When a court concludes that an issue presents a nonjusticiable political question, it declines to address the merits of that issue." United States Dept. of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 457-58, 112 S.Ct. 1415, 1425, 118 L.Ed.2d 87 (1992).
In invoking the political question doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is of course very different from determining that specific [legislative] action does not violate the Constitution. 'That determination is a decision on the merits that reflects the exercise of judicial review, rather than the abstention from judicial review that would be appropriate in the case of a true political question.
Id. (emphasis in original and footnotes omitted). Stated otherwise, a court that invokes the political question doctrine does not tell the legislature, "this statute is constitutional;" rather, the statement made is "we decline to exercise the power of judicial review of this statute because the issue is non-justi-ciable." The result is the same in that the statute is not declared unconstitutional. See State ex rel. Schieck, 493 P.2d at 764 (court's refusal, based on political question doctrine, to review qualifications of person to serve in legislature does not mean the court has ruled on the qualification issue itself).
[165] The principle of stare decisis requires that I discuss at least briefly the history of education finance reform in Wyoming.8 There are four cases that deserve mention.9 In 1971, this Court relied on Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. *344907, 97 S.Ct. 2951, 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 (1977) and the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution to invalidate a proposed school district reorganization. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Wyo.1971). While recognizing the separation of powers doctrine, the court went on to suggest a detailed "possible method by which equal and uniform taxes can be accomplished for school purposes," even going so far as to retain jurisdiction over the case until the next legislative session. Id. at 1237. Two years later, in Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814, 816 (Wyo.1973), this Court onee again cited Serrano and the right to equal protection in rejecting Goshen County's school district reorganization plan because it would have resulted in grossly unequal property valuations between districts. Ironically, the power of judicial review was not mentioned by the majority, but by Justice Mclntyre in dissent, where he opined that, in accepting the state committee's reorganization plan, the court had made "a nullity of judicial review." Id. at 820 (Melntyre, J., dissenting).
[166] Wyoming's next school finance case noted that, since San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 LEd.2d 16 (1973), reliance on the equal protection clause of the federal constitution was no longer appropriate, so the court's equal protection analysis was done under the state constitution.10 Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d at 319. Though Washakie County School Dist. No. One, 606 P.2d at 317, rejected non-justiciability and the political question doctrine, it did so not through application of the Baker factors, which are relevant, but through the declaratory judgment analysis of a Wyoming state case, Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo.1974).11 The Brim-mer factors, focusing as they do on the "genuineness" of the controversy, and not on the constitutional separation of powers, are not well-suited for analysis of an issue under the political question doctrine.
[167] Fifteen years after Washakie County School Dist. No. One, this Court onee again rejected separation of powers concerns in finding the state's school finance scheme unconstitutional. Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 1264-65. This time, referring neither to Baker nor to Brimmer, this Court relied instead on a straightforward assertion of the right to judicial review:
"The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, sentences and sections of the [Wyoming] Constitution as necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be exercised even when such action serves as a check on the activities of another branch of government or when the court's view of the constitution is contrary to that of other branches, or even that of the public."
Campbell County School Dist., 907 P.2d at 1264-65 (emphasis in original) (quoting Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky.1989)).
[168] In authoring this dissent, I am not taking a position one way or the other on the constitutionality of the state's school funding system. Nor should anyone conclude from this dissent that I am against any particular level of school funding. The decision is not mine to make.
Although we may personally favor it, it is not this court's place to order the General Assembly to give education "high priority" in its budget allocations, any more than it is our place to set policy or prioritize the allocation of funds to other state programs. Members of the legislative branch represent the collective will of the citizens of *345Ohio, and the manner in which public schools are funded in this state is a fundamental policy decision that is within the power of its citizens to change. Under our system of government, decisions such as imposing new taxes, allocating public revenues to competing uses, and formulating educational standards are not within the judiciary's authority. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Rodri-gues, "the ultimate solutions [to perceived problems associated with school funding systems] must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them." Id., 411 U.S. at 59, 93 S.Ct. at 1310, 36 L.Ed.2d at 58.
DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193, 677 N.E.2d 733, 786 (1997) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
[T69] After concluding that the state's school finance system was unconstitutional in that it did not provide for a thorough and efficient system of schools, the. majority in DeRoiph made the following comment:
In reaching this conclusion, we dismiss as unfounded any suggestion that the problems presented by this case should be left for the General Assembly to resolve. This case involves questions of public or great general interest over which this court has jurisdiction.
Id. at 787 (emphasis added). The fallacy with this reasoning is that an issue's justicia-bility is not determined by its level of "public or great general interest." It might even be said that, the higher the level of public interest, the more likely the issue may involve political and policy decisions. It is in this arena that judges must be most careful:
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a statute or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then choose between his version of justice and abiding by the American form of government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To give in to temptation, this one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the American foundation. A judge has begun to rule where a legislator should.
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 1 (The Free Press 1990). The duty to follow the constitution by recognizing the separate realm of the legislature must outweigh the principle of "following precedent." The fact that this Court has previously ruled where it should not does not justify doing so again.
[T 70} The issues presented to this Court in the State's Petition for Rehearing are non-justiciable political questions that should be left to the legislature. The issues being political, rather than judicial, the remedies should also be political, rather than judicial. If the people do not believe that the legislature is providing a thorough and efficient public school system, their displeasure should be registered in the voting booth, not in the office of the clerk of court.

. Blanchard identifies this "new judicial federalism" as follows:
Proponents of the new judicial federalism envision vigorous state constitutional protection of individual rights implicating an increase in the scope of judicial power among state courts. The new judicial federalism requires that the sphere of state courts' influence expand to compensate for the perceived restraint exercised by the federal judiciary, causing state courts to enhance their review of legislative measures under a revitalized state constitution. The new judicial federalism has thus stirred the coals of an old problem-the legitimate extent of judicial review-in the (renewed) context of state constitutional jfurispru-dence.
Michael D. Blanchard, supra, 60 U. Pitt, LRev. at 232.

. 'The Courts become involved in executive or legislative functions only by virtue of judicial review." State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Div. v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 742 (Wyo.1983).

. See Peter Enrich, supra, 48 Vand. L.Rev. 101.

. School finance litigation has focused on the first two factors, and the discussion herein will also be so limited.

. Interestingly enough, though Heise accurately notes that the education clauses of the Wyoming Constitution are "directed expressly to the legislature," he states that it "would be premature" to conclude that this "language amounts to a textual commitment to the legislative branch for political question doctrine purposes...." Michael Heise, supra, XXXIII Land & Water L.Rev. at 304. His hesitancy appears to rest on the fact that courts have the power of judicial review. This circular reasoning simply avoids the Baker concepts. We know the power of judicial review exists; the question is whether it should be exercised.

. For a thorough and thoughiful discussion of the potential ramifications of judicial legislating in the area of school finance, see Michael Heise, supra, XXXIII Land & Water L. Rev. 281.

. There may be one more concern with this mandate. Social scientists continue to debate whether there is a connection between educational spending and educational equity. See Michael Heise, supra, XXXIII Land & Water L.Rev. at 291-93.

. The term "stare decisis" is a Latin phrase meaning "to stand by things decided." It refers to the "doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (7th ed.1999).

. Two others do not bear directly on the issues at hand. See Campbell County School Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275 (Wyo.2000) and Lincoln County School Dist. No. One v. State, 985 P.2d 964 (Wyo.1999).

. See the definition of the "new judicial federalism" in Michael D. Blanchard, supra, 60 U. Pitt. L.Rev. at 232.

. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2001) provides as follows:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.