Court Opinion

ID: 9483904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:34:58.693547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:54.418530
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of the majority opinion except part 11(D), and as to that and the result, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
I suggest that the majority’s holding implicitly requires more specific findings of fact in sentencing determinations than are required for findings of guilt. Because a district court, absent a special request by a defendant, does not have to make specific findings of fact when determining guilt, we should not place a greater burden on a district court when determining a sentence.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(c) states that a district court shall make general findings of fact when determining guilt in a trial without a jury. The district court is only required to make specific findings of fact if the defendant so requests before the court makes its general finding. See Rule 23(c). If no such request is made, the district court has no obligation to make specific findings and we will affirm if sufficient evidence is in the record to support the district court’s determination. United States v. Bolles, 528 F.2d 1190, 1191 (4th Cir.1975). Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) should be considered analogous to the special request provision of Rule 23(c) with regard to a district court’s reliance on pre-sentence reports in determining a sentence. In United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir.1990), we stated that we found persuasive the holding that a pre-sentence report may serve as the sole factual basis for sentence determination. Under Rule 32(c)(3)(D) if a defendant objects to the factual accuracy of a presentence report before sentencing, the district court must make specific findings of fact before relying on the pre-sentence report or must state that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be considered in determining a sentence. See Rule 32(c)(3)(D); United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 3051, 120 L.Ed.2d 917 (1992).
Although Chambers did object to his pre-sentence report, the majority does not base its remand on this objection and the consequent operation of Rule 32(c)(3)(D). Instead, the remand is because “[W]e find no basis in the record for concluding that the district court considered the factors outlined in application note 3 in making this finding.” I believe that Rule 32(c)(3)(D) applies in this case and that the district court has fulfilled its obligation under Rule 32(c)(3)(D). Chambers objected to his pre-sentence report stating that he was not involved in five “drug houses”; that he did not know the whereabouts of the cocaine source; that he was not a “bag man”; that he was not “high ranking”; that he was not a “supervisor”; and that he was only “an individual who transported drugs and picked up money.” (JA 74950). After a hearing on these objections at which both Chambers’s counsel and the United States Attorney argued, the district court held that Chambers clearly was “at least a supervisor at some level,” (JA 730) within the conspiracy. The district court based this finding upon both argument of counsel and testimony at trial. Under Rule 32(c)(3)(D), this is adequate and is supported by sufficient evidence in the record. United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 665 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that district court substantially complied with Rule 32(c)(3)(D)(ii) by relying on evidence at trial and verdict of jury rather than facts objected to in pre-sentence report), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030, 109 S.Ct. 1164, 103 L.Ed.2d 222 (1989).
It is clear from the record that Chambers was a manager or supervisor within the conspiracy. Chambers was responsible for *1272opening Cozy’s each morning and making certain that the fire, which burned all year round for the purpose of disposing of drugs if a bust occurred, was started. Chambers also wore a beeper so that the people at Cozy’s could contact him if drugs were running low or they had too much money. Once contacted, Chambers would either bring drugs to the house, come to the house to collect the money, or both. Chambers kept Cozy’s supplied because he was one of only two people who had knowledge of and access to the “Stash House” where the supply of cocaine was kept. At the Stash House Chambers would cut and package large blocks of cocaine into small “25-eent bags.” * These facts and especially Chambers’s access to the Stash House indicates Chambers’s high ranking role in the conspiracy because only the trusted conspirators were allowed so to handle the cocaine. The evidence also indicates that Chambers played a similar role with regard to the gambling operation.
Based on the district court’s specific finding and the evidence in the record, I would affirm the district court’s sentence determination.

 A 25-cent bag sold for $25.