Court Opinion

ID: 9948696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 18:17:13.923731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:45.926782
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   March 6, 2024
                                                                                   C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                              SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                   OF WEST VIRGINIA

In re R.L.

No. 23-111 (Preston County 22-JA-83)

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother L.K.1 appeals the Circuit Court of Preston County’s February 14, 2023,
order terminating her parental and custodial rights to R.L.,2 arguing that the court would not have
been required to terminate her rights if the child had been placed with a relative. Upon our review,
we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the
circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In July 2022, the DHS filed a petition alleging that petitioner’s parental rights to seven
older children were previously involuntarily terminated upon issues of substance abuse, housing
instability, unsanitary living conditions, and failure to provide appropriate prenatal care, among
other issues. In regard to R.L., the petition alleged that petitioner tested positive for amphetamine
upon admission to deliver the child and that medical personnel suspected she abused drugs while
in the hospital. Further, petitioner failed to obtain prenatal care for R.L. and was not participating
in a drug treatment program. During the preliminary hearing, the guardian informed the court that
petitioner’s mother and the child’s aunt “have filled out packets to be considered as potential
placements with the Department.” The court then required petitioner within two days to “provide
your counsel with a list of people that you would like to be considered as possible kinship

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Kristen D. Antolini. The West Virginia Department of
Human Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney
General Lee Niezgoda. Counsel Hilary M. Bright appears as the child’s guardian ad litem
(“guardian”).

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
       We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).

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placement” so that the list could be provided to the DHS in order to “do their due diligence to do
home studies.”

         The following month, the DHS filed a document summarizing their diligent efforts to
identify possible relative placements for the child. This included the two relatives that petitioner
identified at the preliminary hearing. However, at the adjudicatory hearing in December 2022, the
DHS explained that the aunt had been excluded from consideration for placement because
petitioner and the father were living at the aunt’s home address at the time the petition was filed
and were still using the aunt’s mailing address. The record also indicates that the DHS later
explained to the circuit court that placement with the maternal grandmother was inappropriate
because of her history with the parents and some of petitioner’s older children. According to the
DHS, the grandmother previously housed the parents and three older children and, “at one point .
. . kicked them out, [and] lock[ed] the door when it was below freezing temperatures,” resulting in
the parents and children being left in a vehicle.

       In December 2022, the court held an adjudicatory hearing. Petitioner failed to appear, but
was represented by counsel. Based on evidence of the prior involuntary termination of petitioner’s
parental rights to the older children, her continued drug abuse as demonstrated by failed screens,
and her refusal to submit to drug screens as ordered, the court adjudicated petitioner of abusing
and neglecting R.L.

         The court held a final dispositional hearing in February 2023. Petitioner again failed to
appear, though she was represented by counsel. Petitioner’s counsel indicated that she had not had
any contact with petitioner since the last hearing. The DHS presented testimony that petitioner had
not submitted to a drug screen since December 1, 2022. A Child Protective Services (“CPS”)
worker also testified to her attempts to contact petitioner, which were unsuccessful. According to
the CPS worker, she had not had contact with petitioner since the adjudicatory hearing. The CPS
worker also testified that petitioner had not inquired about the child, failed to provide any support
for the child, and had not admitted to having a substance abuse issue. Based on the evidence, the
court found that there was no reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the
conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future and that termination of her rights was necessary
for the child’s welfare. Accordingly, the court terminated petitioner’s parental and custodial
rights.3 It is from the dispositional order that petitioner appeals.

        On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner presents an entirely
speculative argument in which she assumes that, if the child had been placed with a relative, the
court would not have been required to terminate her parental and custodial rights. Petitioner’s
argument is predicated on her assertion that the DHS failed to comply with West Virginia Code §
49-4-601a, which provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a child is removed from his or her home,
placement preference is to be given to relatives or fictive kin of the child.” We find, however, that

       3
        The father’s parental rights were also terminated. The permanency plan for the child is
adoption in the current placement.

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the DHS’s compliance with this statute has no bearing on the circuit court’s findings upon which
termination was based.

       Regardless of the child’s placement, the evidence clearly demonstrated that there was no
reasonable likelihood that petitioner could correct the conditions of abuse and neglect and that
termination was necessary for the child’s welfare. According to West Virginia Code § 49-4-
604(c)(6), termination of parental and custodial rights is permitted upon such findings. Further, we
have explained that

               “[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the
       statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W. Va. Code [§
       49-4-604,] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive
       alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under W. Va.
       Code [§ 49-4-604(c)(6)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially
       corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980).

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). As the record shows, petitioner
was almost wholly noncompliant with the proceedings and services ordered, and on the few
occasions that petitioner complied with drug screens, she tested positive. Tellingly, petitioner
makes no attempt to challenge the court’s finding that she was incapable of remedying the
conditions of abuse and neglect at issue.

        In regard to the finding that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare, petitioner
simply speculates that had the child been placed with a relative, “the circuit court would have been
positioned to order a lesser restrictive alternative.” However, petitioner acknowledges that her
older children were in a relative placement, yet her rights to those children were also terminated.
Further, petitioner admits that she failed to raise this issue below, although she attempts to absolve
herself of this clear waiver by asserting that counsel “did not recognize the extent of the [DHS]’s
non-compliance with West Virginia Code § 49-4-601a until a review of the transcript from the
February 8, 2023[,] hearing, as well as a full review of the Appendix records.” This argument is
disingenuous, however, as West Virginia Code § 49-4-601a(4) requires the DHS to “file its
determinations [as to the willingness and suitability of potential relative placements] with the court
within 45 days from the filing of the petition alleging abuse or neglect of a child.” The petition in
this matter was filed on July 15, 2022, meaning that the DHS was required to file the relevant
determinations by August 29, 2022. If no such determinations were filed, petitioner would have
been aware of the deficiency after that deadline expired, not, as she claims on appeal, after
reviewing a transcript of a hearing held approximately six months after the deadline’s expiration.
Because petitioner failed to argue in the circuit court that the DHS did not comply with West
Virginia Code § 49-4-601a, we refuse to consider the merits of her argument on appeal. See Noble
v. W. Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 223 W. Va. 818, 821, 679 S.E.2d 650, 653 (2009) (“Our general
rule is that nonjurisdictional questions . . . raised for the first time on appeal, will not be
considered.” (citation omitted)).

        Finally, it is critical to note that the two relatives petitioner identified as potential
placements were deemed to be inappropriate by the DHS. Accordingly, the circuit court did not
err in declining to place the children in these homes against their best interests. See Syl. Pt. 3, In

                                                  3
re S.W., 233 W. Va. 91, 755 S.E.2d 8 (2014) (“In a contest involving the custody of an infant the
welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.” (citation
omitted)).

       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
February 14, 2023, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

ISSUED: March 6, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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