Court Opinion

ID: 9409400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 00:00:36.445839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.178813
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/17/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                    FILED
                                                                             July 17, 2023
                                  No. 22-20363                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                    Clerk

   Daniel Arturo Garcia-Ascanio,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Spring Independent School District,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-1847
                   ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
          In this case involving the Uniformed Services Employment and
   Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA” or “the Act”), plaintiff Daniel
   Arturo Garcia-Ascanio (“Garcia”) appeals the district court’s entry of
   judgment, after a jury trial, in favor of defendant Spring Independent School
   District (“Spring ISD”). Garcia asserts that the district court gave the jury
   improper instructions and that the evidence was insufficient to support the
   jury’s verdict. He also contends that he is entitled to front pay and attorney’s
   fees in addition to compensatory damages because he was the “prevailing
   party.” We see no error. The jury instructions were not erroneous, and the
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118           Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 22-20363

   jury’s verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Garcia failed to properly
   raise his asserted errors in the district court and therefore did not preserve
   them for appeal, and, in any event, his arguments lack any basis in case law
   and are inconsistent with the text of USERRA.
                                          I.
          Spring ISD employed Garcia from August 2013 until July 2019, first
   as a teacher and later, beginning with the 2016 school year, as an Assistant
   Principal at Dueitt Middle School. During this time, Garcia was in the Army
   Reserve and took leave to fulfill his military duties.
          In November 2018, Garcia was called to a meeting with Dueitt
   Principal Eric Mullens and Spring ISD’s Assistant Superintendent for
   Middle Schools, Robert Lundin. Lundin testified that the meeting was to
   discuss Garcia’s professional judgment, complaints about him from parents,
   and other performance issues. Garcia recorded part of the meeting, during
   which Lundin asked Garcia how he would manage his work responsibilities
   with his military responsibilities so that he didn’t “screw over your
   colleagues because of your choices,” meaning his choice to serve in the Army
   Reserve. Lundin sent a memo to Garcia after the meeting that memorialized
   their discussion, including Lundin’s direction to Garcia that he needed to
   have a plan for ensuring that his military duties did not negatively affect his
   colleagues.
          After the meeting, Garcia felt his job was threatened, and he retained
   a lawyer who sent a letter to Spring ISD concerning his USERRA rights.
   Soon after, Garcia was reassigned from being the Assistant Principal
   overseeing eighth grade students to Assistant Principal overseeing seventh
   grade students, but his job responsibilities and duties otherwise remained the
   same. Parents continued to complain about Garcia. Pamela Farinas, who had
   replaced Lundin as Assistant Superintendent of Middle Schools, met with

                                           2
Case: 22-20363     Document: 00516823118           Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                    No. 22-20363

   Garcia in March 2019. The meeting did not go well, and Farinas sent Garcia
   a memorandum afterwards about his professionalism.
          Spring ISD eventually opened an investigation into allegations that
   Garcia had behaved improperly regarding student discipline involving illegal
   drugs. After concluding that Garcia had violated school policy and ethical
   standards, Spring ISD placed him on “home duty” in May 2019. That same
   month, the Spring ISD Board voted to propose nonrenewal of his contract at
   the end of the school year.
          Garcia sued, alleging violations of his rights under USERRA.
   Subsequently, the nonrenewal was rescinded and Spring ISD offered Garcia
   a one-year contract for the next school year at a different school. Garcia
   refused to sign the contract in part because he was concerned, based on
   language in the contract, that in doing so he would be admitting to the
   allegations against him—allegations that he denied and was concerned would
   negatively impact his military career.
          Garcia’s lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial.        The parties jointly
   submitted proposed jury instructions to the district court. The court and the
   parties then reviewed the joint submission on the record. After the jury
   instructions were complete, the district court sought any objections, and
   neither party objected.
          After deliberations, the jury answered, inter alia, Questions 1 through
   3 affirmatively, finding that Garcia’s military status and his engaging in
   USERRA-protected activity was a motivating factor in his constructive
   discharge. But the jury also answered Questions 4 and 5 affirmatively, finding
   that Spring ISD would have constructively discharged Garcia even if it had
   not taken his military services and protected activity into account.
          Both parties moved for entry of judgment. Garcia then moved for the
   court to disregard the jury’s answers to Questions 4 and 5, arguing for the

                                            3
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118           Page: 4    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 22-20363

   first time that the jury should not have been asked those questions because
   Spring ISD’s affirmative defense was not available in a constructive
   discharge context. The district court entered judgment for Spring ISD based
   on the jury’s answers to Questions 4 and 5, and Garcia appealed.
                                          II.
          “Our standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is
   governed by Rule 51 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 51 requires a party
   to object to jury instructions in order to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”
   Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., 660 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Such
   objections must be made in a timely fashion, meaning “before the instructions
   and arguments are delivered.” Id. at 845 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
   51(b)(2)) (emphasis added); Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(2)(A). Preserved
   objections are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Jimenez, 660 F.3d at 845.
          “Where a proper objection is not made, however, our review of a jury
   instruction challenge is limited to review for plain error.” Id. (citing Fed.
   R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2)). We “appl[y] the plain error standard of [Federal Rule
   of Criminal Procedure] 52(b) in civil cases,” Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
   Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1424 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), including to unpreserved
   jury instruction challenges. See Highlands Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
   Co., 27 F.3d 1027, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 1994). To satisfy plain-error review,
   Garcia must show that (1) there was an “error,” (2) that was “clear or
   obvious,” (3) that “affected [his] substantial rights,” and (4) that we should
   exercise our discretion to remedy the error because it “seriously affects the
   fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett v.
   United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (cleaned up).
          “Whether a party is a ‘prevailing party’ entitled to fees is a legal
   question that the court reviews de novo.” Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 213
   (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

                                          4
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118           Page: 5    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 22-20363

                                         III.
          “USERRA is a federal law that protects employees from being
   discriminated against by their employers because of their military service.”
   McIntosh v. Partridge, 540 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
   “USERRA’s anti-discrimination provision prohibits an employer from
   denying initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment,
   promotion, or any benefit of employment to a person on the basis of
   membership, application for membership, performance of service,
   application for service, or obligation of service.” Rogers v. City of San
   Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a)).
   Additionally, “an employer must not retaliate against a person by taking
   adverse employment action against that person because he or she has taken
   an action to enforce a protection afforded under USERRA.” Id. (citing
   § 4311(b)). Discrimination and retaliation prohibited by USERRA can take
   many forms. Garcia claims that he was constructively discharged by Spring
   ISD in violation of the Act. “If an employer makes service members’
   employment so intolerable that they feel forced to quit,” USERRA’s “clear
   prohibition against firing service members based on their military service”
   provides for a constructive discharge claim. See Carder v. Cont’l Airlines,
   Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 181–82 (5th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases).
          To establish a USERRA claim, a plaintiff must prove that his or her
   “membership, application for membership, service, application for service,
   or obligation for service in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the
   employer’s action.” Bradberry v. Jefferson Cnty., 732 F.3d 540, 547 (5th Cir.
   2013) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1)). The Act does not define “motivating
   factor,” but “[b]y referring to a ‘motivating factor,’ the statute does not
   textually suggest that military service be the sole factor.”         Id. at 545
   (emphasis added). Rather, to trigger liability, military status need only be
   “one of the reasons” for the employer’s prohibited action. Id. (citation

                                          5
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118           Page: 6    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 22-20363

   omitted). USERRA also provides employers with an affirmative statutory
   defense: An employer is not liable “if it ‘can prove that the action would
   have been taken in the absence of such [military status].’” Id. (quoting
   § 4311(c)(1)). “[T]he employer has the burden to prove the affirmative
   defense that it would have taken the action anyway.” Id. (citation omitted).
   This same burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims. See 38
   U.S.C. § 4311(c)(2). The Act also authorizes a court to award a prevailing
   plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees. See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(h)(2).
          On appeal, Garcia argues that the “mixed motive defense”—by
   which he means the employer’s affirmative defense that it would have taken
   the same action in the absence of an employee’s military status or protected
   activity—is “inapplicable” in a constructive discharge case because “there
   is an inherent disconnect between [the] mixed-motive defense and
   constructive discharge.” Thus, he asserts that the district court reversibly
   erred by instructing the jury on the defense and claims the jury should never
   have been asked Questions 4 and 5. This argument is meritless.
          Before addressing the merits, we must clarify our standard of review.
   See United States v. Suchowolski, 838 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 2016) (“It is well-
   established that our court, not the parties, determines the appropriate
   standard of review.”). Garcia asserts that his challenge to the district court’s
   jury instructions presents a “pure question of law” that we should review de
   novo. This is incorrect. Garcia did not properly object to the jury charge in
   the district court, and therefore, we would typically review his claim for plain
   error. Sapia v. Regency Motors of Metairie, Inc., 276 F.3d 747, 753 (5th Cir.
   2002) (“When the party challenging a jury instruction does not properly
   object as required by Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this
   Court applies the plain error standard of review.”) (footnote and citation
   omitted). Further, because Garcia admits in his brief that there is no case law
   supporting his position, he essentially concedes that he cannot satisfy plain-

                                          6
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118          Page: 7    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                    No. 22-20363

   error review. See United States v. Gonzalez, 792 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (explaining that “lack of binding authority is often dispositive in the plain-
   error context”); United States v. Bishop, 603 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (“An error is not plain unless the error is clear under current law.”)
   (quotation and citation omitted).
          In this case, however, not only did Garcia not properly object, but he
   jointly requested the very jury instructions that he now claims were
   erroneous. Though neither party referenced it, under the invited error
   doctrine, “[a] party cannot complain on appeal of errors which he himself
   induced the district court to commit.” McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Texas),
   N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 476 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). This doctrine
   applies to jury instructions and bars a claim of error on appeal “at least where
   it does not appear that a substantial miscarriage of justice would result from
   its application.” United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d 599, 606–
   07 (5th Cir. 1991). “We will not reverse on the basis of invited error, absent
   manifest injustice.” United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Lemaire, 712 F.2d 944, 949
   (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that doctrine does not require reversal “unless the
   error was so patent as to have seriously jeopardized the rights of the
   appellant”). Garcia has not even attempted to show a manifest injustice.
          Regardless, Garcia’s claim would fail under any standard of review
   because he cannot show an error. According to Garcia, USERRA’s mixed-
   motive defense is not applicable to a constructive discharge claim because
   “constructive discharge is formally effected by the employee’s decision, the
   employee’s intention, and the employee’s ultimate act,” and thus whether
   an employer had a mixed motive is not relevant because an employer cannot
   “intend” to constructively discharge an employee.              This argument
   fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the claim and its focus on the
   actions and motivations of the employer.

                                          7
Case: 22-20363         Document: 00516823118               Page: 8      Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                          No. 22-20363

           “A constructive discharge occurs when the employer makes working
   conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to
   resign.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “[I]f the employer deliberately makes an
   employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into
   an involuntary resignation, then the employer has encompassed a constructive
   discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved therein as if it had
   formally discharged the aggrieved employee.” Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan
   Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added). “The availability
   of such relief [prevents] an employer from circumventing the express
   purposes of USERRA by engaging in some intolerable form of
   harassment[.]” Carder, 636 F.3d at 182 (emphasis added).
           Garcia acknowledges, as he must, that USERRA provides employers
   with an affirmative defense, yet contends, without supporting authority, that
   we should disregard the statute here. But the text of USERRA clearly
   provides employers with a mixed-motive defense. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1)-
   (2). There is no carve-out for constructive discharge claims. Thus, it was
   not error for the district court to instruct the jury on the defense and it was
   proper for the jury to answer Questions 4 and 5.
           Finally, in a single paragraph of his brief, Garcia argues that even if his
   challenge to the jury instructions fails, he should still prevail because there
   was “no evidence to support the jury’s answer to Question 4 and 5.” First,
   Garcia forfeited this argument by failing to properly raise it in a Rule 50(a)
   motion before the district court.1 See Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc.,
   247 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a party that fails to make a
           _____________________
           1
             We also have doubts that this issue is adequately briefed on appeal, as Garcia fails
   to recite the standard of review applicable to sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges or
   provide any citations to the record or supporting authority. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8).

                                                 8
Case: 22-20363      Document: 00516823118          Page: 9    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                    No. 22-20363

   Rule 50(a) motion on an issue “waives both its right to file a renewed post-
   verdict Rule 50(b) motion and also its right to challenge the sufficiency of the
   evidence on that issue on appeal”) (footnote and citation omitted). In any
   event, Garcia’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim would fail under any
   standard of review because it is premised on his meritless argument that a
   mixed-motive defense is unavailable in the constructive discharge context,
   and because there was ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
                                         IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, Garcia has not shown that he was a
   “prevailing party” entitled to front pay or attorney’s fees. The district court
   correctly entered judgment in favor of Spring ISD.
          AFFIRMED.

                                          9