Court Opinion

ID: 9939979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:13:35.56093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.472303
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                               OPINION
                                        No. 04-23-01078-CR

                                        David Gene BECKA,
                                             Appellant

                                                 v.

                                       The STATE of Texas,
                                             Appellee

                     From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2019CR1257
                        Honorable Andrew Wyatt Carruthers, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting:          Irene Rios, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 7, 2024

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

           Appellant David Gene Becka attempts to appeal the judgment of competency wherein the

trial court ordered, adjudged, and decreed Becka competent to stand trial following a jury trial. We

dismiss his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                           BACKGROUND

           Becka was indicted in January 2019 for a murder he allegedly committed in March 2018.

Beginning in October of 2020, based on an expert’s opinion and the parties’ and the trial court’s

agreement, Becka was initially determined incompetent to stand trial, and the trial court committed
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Becka to a competency restoration program. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.004,

46B.005(c), 46B.071(a)(2)(B), 46B.073(b)(2), (c). Following several extensions of the restoration

period for Becka’s commitment, the question regarding Becka’s competency arose again in

November 2023. On November 30, 2023, following a jury trial, the jury determined Becka’s

competency had been restored, and thus Becka was competent to stand trial. The trial court signed

a judgment in accordance with the jury’s finding, adjudging and decreeing Becka competent to

stand trial. See id. arts. 46B.113, 46B116. Becka filed his notice of appeal seeking to appeal the

jury’s finding of competency and the trial court’s order declaring him competent to stand trial.

       After Becka appealed, the State filed a motion to dismiss contending Becka could not

appeal the jury’s competency verdict and subsequent trial court order adjudging and declaring

Becka competent to stand trial absent a final conviction. Becka filed a response arguing he is not

appealing a preliminary determination of incompetency under article 46B.005 that is expressly

prohibited by article 46B.011, but rather he is appealing a final judgment declaring him competent

to stand trial under article 46B.113. See id. arts. 46B.005, 46B.011, 46B.113.

                                APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

       We have jurisdiction to consider an appeal by a criminal defendant only from a judgment

of conviction or where appellate jurisdiction has been expressly granted by law. See Ragston v.

State, 424 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“Jurisdiction must be expressly given to courts

of appeals in a statute.”); Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(explaining court of appeals erred when extending jurisdiction because no “statute or rule

preclud[ed]” appellant’s appeal, as “[t]he standard for determining jurisdiction is not whether the

appeal is precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law”); see also TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (“A defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under

the rules hereinafter prescribed[.]”); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2) (providing that a defendant “has

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the right of appeal under Code of Criminal Procedure article 44.02 and these rules”). A pretrial

judgment of competency that includes the trial court’s order adjudging and decreeing a defendant

competent to stand trial is neither a judgment of conviction nor an order made immediately

appealable by statute.

         Although Becka has been found competent to stand trial by a jury, Becka has not been

found guilty of an offense in this case and has failed to provide authority indicating his appeal is

authorized by law. See Ragston, 424 S.W.3d at 52; Abbott, 271 S.W.3d at 696–97.

         Accordingly, we dismiss Becka’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(f). We dismiss all pending motions as moot.

                                                           PER CURIAM

PUBLISH

1
  We note we are not dismissing this appeal according to article 46B.011 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
because, as Becka correctly argues, this article pertains to initial competency determinations made under article
46B.005 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.005, 46B.011.
However, Becka provides no authority granting defendants a right to appeal any subsequent determinations of
competency beyond the initial proceedings. But see Powell v. State, 487 S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016,
no pet.) (interpreting article 46B.103(d)(3) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to permit appeals of trial courts’
orders under subchapter E to the extent that similar orders in proceedings for civil commitment to a residential care
facility would be appealable—the judgment of commitment to a residential facility—to a court of appeals under
subtitle D, title 7 of the Health and Safety Code); Queen v. State, 212 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no
pet.) (concluding that “the legislature did not intend to allow interlocutory appeals from orders of temporary
commitment made after a[n initial] determination of incompetence but before a subchapter E proceeding”).

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