Court Opinion

ID: 9521491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:06:17.130416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:50.507935
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I do not believe that sufficient evidence was presented at the hearing to justify the respondent’s involuntary admission under the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 911/2, par. 3 — 400). An individual is subject to involuntary admission if he is reasonably expected to inflict serious harm upon himself or another in the near future; or if he is unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to avoid seriously harming himself. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 91V2, par. 1 — 119.) The standard of proof is one of clear and convincing evidence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 911/2, par. 3 — 808; In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273. The evidence presented by the State simply did not justify the requisite findings for involuntary admission under the Mental Health Code. No evidence was presented of specific instances where the respondent had refused to take his prescribed medicine. Dr. Cristobal’s testimony that the respondent’s failure in the future to take his medicine could result in injury to himself or others was speculative. In fact, the respondent testified that he had not failed to take his medicine in the recent past and that he had no intention of not taking his medication in the future. Speculation that an individual might not take prescribed medication which could result in his harming himself or others does not satisfy the standard which requires the State to prove its case of involuntary admission by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence of specific instances in which the individual has failed to cooperate medically must be presented before the clear and convincing standard is met. People v. Nunn (1982), 108 Ill. App. 3d 169, 438 N.E.2d 1342; In re Fields (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 869, 377 N.E.2d 301. Evidence of a statement made by the respondent during his forced readmittance to the Mental Health Center indicating that he felt no need to take his medication was not a specific instance of his failure to take prescribed medication. Thus, there being only evidence of a speculative nature, the State did not prove the respondent’s need for hospitalization by clear and convincing evidence. The majority does not address itself to the remaining basis of the trial court decision, namely, that the respondent was unable to provide for his basic needs because he was uncertain of his future living arrangements. In clarifying this particular issue, I would add that this type of evidence does not in any way contribute to support the trial court’s determination of the need for hospitalizing the respondent. Therefore, for the reasons set forth above, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.