Court Opinion

ID: 9521326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:02:42.061948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:40.470369
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder. Unlike the majority, however, I would also uphold the determina-, tion that the defendant is eligible for the death penalty, and accordingly I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. Although the legislature apparently intended to omit domestic disputes from the scope of the home invasion statute, no mention was made during the legislative debates of entries made in violation of protective orders or other decrees barring a person’s presence in a home. After reviewing the legislative history of the home invasion provision, the appellate court in People v. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107 (1996), concluded: "It is apparent that the legislature did not intend for the home invasion statute to apply to cases of domestic violence involving married couples. It is unclear, however, whether the statute applies in cases where, as here, the parties are recently divorced and the defendant retains an ownership, but not a possessory, interest in the dwell-•__ » mg. The defendant’s entry in Moulton was made in violation of an order of protection. Like Moulton, the present appeal falls in the latter group of cases, in which the defendant retained an ownership interest, but not a possessory interest, in the subject property. Unlike the majority, I would conclude that a defendant who violates an order of protection by entering the subject premises has entered the dwelling of another, as prohibited by the home invasion statute. Entry of a residence made in violation of a court order is done without authority and, moreover, can represent as great a risk to the personal safety of the occupants as the unauthorized entry of a stranger’s home. I would therefore construe the home invasion statute as including within its scope an entry made in violation of an order of protection. This interpretation is consistent with the purposes of both the home invasion statute and the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (750 ILCS 60/101 through 401 (West 1996)). For these reasons, I believe that the defendant could be found eligible for the death penalty on the ground that the murder occurred in the course of his commission of home invasion. I would therefore consider in this appeal the remaining challenges raised by the defendant to his sentence of death.