Court Opinion

ID: 9526812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:24:28.637112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:23.462688
License: Public Domain

*91Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
I respect my brethren’s adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine serves a good purpose in many cases, but this case is not of that class.
I believe that it does make a difference in the rationalization of the result reached whether we interpret the notice statute in light of Touhey v. City of Decatur, 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540 (1911), or Aaron v. City of Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 32 N. E. 2d 88 (1941). Under Touhey the basis of the city’s liability is statutory and the notice statute is to be strictly construed against the claimant. Under Aaron the city’s liability is common law created and the notice statute, being in derogation of the common law right of the claimant, is to be construed against limiting that liability. Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 237, 85 N. E. 2d 496 (1949) ; Milk Control Board v. Pursifull, 219 Ind. 396, 405, 38 N. E. 2d 246 (1941). Thereby, the stare decisis effect of City of Rushville v. Morrow, 54 Ind. App. 538, 101 N. E. 659 (1913), is eliminated by destruction of the basis on which its conclusion was reached.
In my view, in-as-mu,ch-as the city legal department is the mayor’s agent for litigation and the department through which he makes all investigations and decisions concerning payment, compromise, or denial of such claims, the complaint alleged service of written notice on the mayor, insofar as the judicially declared purpose of the statute is concerned. City of Gary v. Wilson, 103 Ind. App. 376, 380, 8 N. E. 2d 109 (1937). The statutory requirement that the notice be served on the mayor was substantially complied with. See Stone v. District of Columbia, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 32, 237 F. 2d 28 (1956).
Note. — Reported in 248 N. E. 2d 553.