Court Opinion

ID: 9562977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:35:39.725871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:39.254095
License: Public Domain

Nichols, Justice,
dissenting. I dissent from Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, as well as the judgment of affirmance.
Assuming, but not deciding that the creation of the State Bar of Georgia can withstand every attack made upon its constitutionality in this case, yet, at the time of the creation of the State Bar of Georgia all attorneys, duly licensed to practice law in this State, continued to be duly licensed until such time as they might have been suspended, disbarred, or otherwise had their licenses revoked.
Rule 1-501 provides: “License Fees — Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall pay to the State Bar of Georgia a license fee which shall be due on January 1 of each year and upon his failure to do so, such member shall be given notice by mail by January 15 that his license fee has not been received and, if he fails to pay the same by March 1, he shall be suspended until all such license fees for the current and prior years shall have been paid, whereupon he shall automatically be reinstated.” 219 Ga. 882.
The only logical interpretation of such rule is that some affirmative action must be taken before any suspension can result. Admittedly the appellant was duly licensed to practice *114law in this State at the time of the creation of the State Bar of Georgia, and the State Bar of Georgia, through its proper officers, having failed to take any affirmative action to suspend the appellant, it cannot be said that the practice of law by him for the three years next preceding his election as solicitor general (district attorney) was illegal.
I am authorized to state that Justice Frankum concurs in this dissent.