Court Opinion

ID: 9397783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:37.845276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.621286
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0623-MR

JOHNNY REVLETT                                                                   APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE
                           ACTION NO. 22-CI-00006

SCOTT JORDAN, WARDEN                                                               APPELLEE

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Johnny Revlett, pro se, appeals from the April 14, 2022,

Order of Dismissal entered by the Lyon Circuit Court dismissing his petition for

declaratory relief. We affirm.1

1
  We note there are numerous deficiencies in Johnny Revlett’s brief including the failure to
include a preservation statement of the issues raised on appeal, in violation of Kentucky Rules of
Appellate Procedure (RAP) 32(A). Due to the record’s relatively concise nature and the readily
evident issues on appeal, we exercise our discretion to ignore the deficiencies and review on the
merits. See RAP 31(H).
                                  BACKGROUND

             Revlett is an inmate at the Kentucky State Penitentiary (KSP) in

Eddyville, Kentucky. On July 2, 2021, he received a disciplinary write-up for a

physical altercation with another inmate. The write-up stated that the

“investigation determined, through witness interviews deemed reliable by

substantiated physical evidence, that [another inmate] and [Revlett] were in a

physical altercation on June 26th in the boiler room.” Write Up and Disciplinary

form at 1. On July 26, 2021, an investigative report was submitted which

concluded there was evidence to support a charge against Revlett for “[p]hysical

action resulting in injury to another inmate.” Write Up and Disciplinary form at 3.

A disciplinary hearing was held on August 10, 2021, after which Revlett was found

guilty and sanctioned to fifteen days of disciplinary segregation. Revlett filed an

appeal with Warden Scott Jordan, who upheld the finding on August 17, 2021.

             On February 7, 2022, Revlett filed a petition for a declaration of rights

with the Lyon Circuit Court asserting his due process rights were violated. The

primary argument asserted by Revlett in his petition and brief filed in this appeal is

that the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing was not sufficient to

establish he was involved in a physical altercation with another inmate. This,

coupled with his sentence of fifteen days in disciplinary segregation, deprived him

of a protected liberty interest. The circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to

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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f) on the basis Revlett failed to

“demonstrate that his segregation assignment constitutes a liberty interest to which

constitutional due process protections apply.” Order of Dismissal at 3. This

appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by CR

12.02(f) and presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Campbell v.

Ballard, 559 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Ky. App. 2018). The pleadings must be liberally

construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the allegations

contained in the complaint are taken as true. Id. at 870-71. And, the circuit court

should deny the motion to dismiss “unless it appears the pleading party would not

be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his

claim.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. App. 2002) (citation omitted).

             However, our standard of review requires us to recognize that

“[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the

full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Webb

v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974)). And, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not criminal

prosecutions; and punishment is imposed as warranted by the severity of the

offense in order to correct and control inmate behavior within the prison.”

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Conover v. Lawless, 540 S.W.3d 766, 768 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Ramirez v. Nietzel,

424 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Ky. 2014)). Accordingly, the standard of review in prison

disciplinary proceedings is highly deferential to prison administrators. Smith v.

O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky. App. 1997).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Kentucky courts have adopted the “some evidence” standard in the

course of reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings. Houston v. Fletcher, 193

S.W.3d 276, 278 (Ky. App. 2006). This form of review was set out by the United

States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution,

Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985); Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 358. In Houston, we

highlighted the U.S. Supreme Court’s directive:

             [T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some
             evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary
             board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met
             if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion
             of the administrative tribunal could be deduced . . . .”
             Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not
             require examination of the entire record, independent
             assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of
             the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether
             there is any evidence in the record that could support the
             conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.

Houston, 193 S.W.3d at 278 (quoting Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-56).

             We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal including the

prison Write Up and Investigation form and the Hearing/Appeal report. Clearly

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there was “some evidence” presented sufficient to establish that Revlett was

involved in a physical altercation with another inmate resulting in injury to said

inmate in violation of applicable Kentucky Correction Policies and Procedures.

Any arguments raised by Revlett regarding the sufficiency of evidence presented

during the disciplinary hearing are without merit.

             As concerns his due process arguments, Revlett has failed to

demonstrate that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. “In order to

prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a party must

establish (1) that he enjoyed a protected ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest within the

meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (2) that he was denied the process due

him under the circumstances.” Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Ky.

App. 2003) (citation omitted). “A protected liberty interest may arise from two

sources–the Due Process Clause itself and state law or regulations.” Id. “In

addition to the existence of language guiding or restricting the discretion of prison

officials, an inmate must now establish that the condition imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Id. at 750 (internal quotation marks and footnote citation omitted).

“[D]isciplinary segregation typically does not implicate a liberty interest protected

by the Due Process Clause itself because it is the sort of confinement an inmate can

reasonably anticipate receiving.” Id. at 749-50. Factors related to the duration or

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degree of restriction are relevant in determinations regarding whether restrictions

imposed are “atypical and significant.” Id. at 750 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). While these determinations involve factual issues, “the

ultimate issue of atypically is a legal issue subject to de novo review.” Id.

(footnote citation omitted).

             Revlett argues his punishment was atypical since his classification

level was increased, and consequently, he was subjected to more restrictive

confinement along with the curtailment of various privileges compared to what he

enjoyed at his previous classification level, resulting in a significant hardship. This

argument is also without merit. It has been expressly held that “inmates do not

have a constitutional right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a

particular institution.” Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d at 751 (footnote citation omitted).

And, “[s]imply because disciplinary segregation involves different physical

conditions and limited privileges does not mean that a prisoner maintains a liberty

interest in freedom from that form of segregation.” McMillen v. Kentucky Dep’t of

Corr., 233 S.W.3d 203, 205 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation omitted). Furthermore,

there is absolutely no evidence to establish that a duration of fifteen days in

disciplinary segregation constitutes a significant hardship. We also note that

Revlett failed to plead any other facts demonstrating the conditions of his

segregation “were more onerous, harsh or restrictive than those applicable to

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inmates normally assigned to disciplinary segregation.” Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d

at 751.

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of Dismissal of the

Lyon Circuit Court, dismissing Revlett’s Petition for Declaration of Rights.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Johnny Revlett, Pro Se                    Robert Chaney
Eddyville, Kentucky                       Frankfort, Kentucky

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