Court Opinion

ID: 9787741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:23:37.132425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:00.135649
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, J.,
with whom EDMONDSON, C.J., joins, concurring in part/dissenting in part:
T1 I agree with some of the majority's statements of the law, and I concur in remanding the cause, but not for the reasons expressed by the majority. The dispositive question is whether tort claim jurisdiction belongs exclusively or concurrently in state or tribal court when a non-tribal member falls off a chair at a Cherokee casino. The answer depends on several factors.
2 Indian law does not afford a "one-size-fits-all" solution. Jurisdiction depends on: 1) the choice of court, if any, negotiated under the gaming compact; 2) the status quo in the absence of a designated court; and 3) whether the state has accepted jurisdiction under *470P.L. 280, as well as the existence and proficiency of a tribal court system.
T3 There are, based on the facts presented, at least three jurisdictional options: federal, state or tribal court. The dispositive question in this cause is not merely whether the District Court of Rogers County was intended to be a court of competent jurisdiction as that term is used in the Compact between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma. Beyond that is the more basic question-whether a tort claim asserted by a non-tribal member arising from events occurring at a tribal gaming enterprise on tribal land "belongs"1 exclusively or concurrently in state court, tribal court, or federal court.2
L.
THE CHOICE OF COURT, IF ANY, NEGOTIATED UNDER THE GAMING COMPACT.
14 Congress, through the enactment of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),3 made provisions for Tribes to negotiate gaming compacts with States for Class III gaming. Here, the Compact is based on the Model Tribal Gaming Compact found at 3A O.S. Supp.2004 § 281, a part of the State-Tribal Gaming Act.4 These statutes were enacted to allow the state to enter into a compact with other sovereign entities-the Oklahoma Tribes. Prior to the compact, they stood on equal footing-at least in relation to Class III gaming.
T5 The United States Constitution recognizes that Indian Tribes are to be treated on an equal level with the governments of foreign nations as well as the states. Art. 1, § 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "[the Congress shall have the power to ... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The Oklahoma Constitution recognizes that all tribal lands lying within Oklahoma boundaries shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.5
16 It has been consistently recognized that Indian Tribes possess the same com*471mon-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,6 and that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.7 Within the last month, Native American Distributing v. Seneca-Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir.2008) held that sovereign immunity extended to a corporate enterprise of the tribe. The 10th Circuit reiterated that suits against Indian Tribes are barred absent an express, clear waiver in writing by the tribe or by congressional.8
T7 Various treaties have recognized the status of tribal governments and their inherent jurisdiction over matters occurring within their boundaries.9 Even the controversial Treaty of New Echota signed by the officials of the United States Government and members of the Cherokee Nation on December 29, 1835, secured to the Cherokee Nation the right to govern themselves.10 The Oklahoma Legislature has also explicitly recognized the unique status of Indian Tribes,11 and created the joint committee on State-Tribal Rela*472tions to oversee agreements between the Tribes and the State.12
8 Congress allowed States and Tribes to include agreements of allocation of jurisdiction in gaming compacts.13 The Compact refers to "court of competent jurisdiction" in part 6 under the heading "TORT CLAIMS; PRIZE CLAIMS; LIMITED CONSENT TO SUIT." This provision of the compact relates to tort claims and it sets forth limitations of liability, requirements for asserting tort claims, procedures, ete. in a manner very similar to the Oklahoma's Governmental Tort Claims Act 14-an act allowing tort claims to be brought against the State.
9 Subsection C of part 6 of the Compact contains an agreement of the Tribe to consent to being sued for tort claims associated/arising out of its gaming operations. It provides in part:
Limited Consent to Suit for Tort Claims and Prize Claims. The tribe consents to suit against the enterprise in a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to a tort claim or prize claim if all requirements of paragraph 9 of subsection A or all requirements of paragraph 11 of subsection B of this Part have been met; provided that such consent shall be subject to the following additional conditions and limitations:. ...
Exactly like the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, were it not for this compact, no tort action could be asserted against the Tribe or a Tribal enterprise. Where it is to be asserted is another question altogether.
11 10 For whatever reason, this Compact, as the majority opinion correctly notes, did not include provisions for jurisdiction shifting. Some other state tribal compacts have clearly included such provisions.15 However, the *473Compact does provide in part 9 that: "[this compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction."
111 Although this is a novel question in Oklahoma, all of the other jurisdictions which have considered the issue have held that the Tribes have jurisdiction (some negotiated under the compact, some inherent).16 Gaming *474Corporation of America v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir.1996), involved a lawsuit between a tribal casino management company and a law firm representing the Ho-Chunk Nation. The 8th Circuit held, after examining IGRA's legislative history, that IGRA completely preempted state law. Even though the lawsuit was not a tort claim brought by a casino patron, the Court's discussion of IGRA is illuminating here. The lawsuit was brought in federal court but dismissed by the court and remanded to state court. In discussing the issue of jurisdiction over gaming-related lawsuits, the Dorsey Court noted that "[The legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to transfer any jurisdictional or regulatory power to the states by means of IGRA unless a tribe consented to such a transfer in a tribal-state compact." The Court also recognized that:
Congress thus left states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it, the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact. Tribal-state compacts are at the core of the scheme Congress developed to balance the interests of the federal government, the states, and the tribes. They are a creation of federal law, and IGRA prescribes 'the permissible scope of a Tribal-State compact.
1 12 It was within the parameters of IGRA for the parties to provide whether the state or tribal courts had jurisdiction over tort claims.17 However, they did not do so. Instead, it appears that the State and Tribe agreed to leave things status guo. If this is not what is meant by the provision stating that the "compact shall not alter tribal, federal or state civil adjudicatory or criminal jurisdiction," then the phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" as used in the Compact is at the very least, ambiguous and the Court should remand the matter for a consideration of parol evidence to determine the parties' true intent.18
HL.
THE STATUS QUO IN THE ABSENCE OF A DESIGNATED COURT.
13 In the absence of a jurisdiction-shifting agreement, the question becomes whether more than one court could assert jurisdiction over such disputes Although the majority opinion ignores them, other courts have addressed the issue of which court should assert jurisdiction. Perhaps the most striking decision comes from the United States Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987), a case involving a non-Indian insurer who sought a declaration in federal court that it had no duty to defend or indemnify an insured with respect to an incident which was the subject of suit against the insurer in tribal court. The Court deferred to the tribal court, allowing it the first opportunity to determine jurisdiction. In doing so, the Court noted that "Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty'”
1 14 The Court also recognized the signifi-canee of tribal courts. It said:
. We have repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government.... This policy reflects the fact that Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory ... to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty. The federal policy favoring tribal self-government operates even in areas where state control has not been affirmatively pre-empted by federal statute. '[Albsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action *475infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' ... Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government, ... and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development.... Although the criminal jurisdiction .of the tribal courts is subject to substantial federal limitation, ... their civil jurisdiction is not similarly restricted.... If state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government, the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal law.... Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, supra at pp. 975-76, 107 S.Ct. 971. (Citations omitted.).
[ 15 Other courts have recognized that the matter belongs foremost in Tribal Courts. For example, in Hatcher v. Harrah's NC Casino Company, LLC., 169 N.C.App. 151, 610 S.E.2d 210 (2005), the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed whether the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between a casino patron who alleged that he won a jackpot and the casino's management company. The compact between the Tribe and the State granted regulatory, eriminal jurisdiction to the State, but it did not expressly grant civil jurisdiction to the State with respect to the parties' dispute. The court concluded that the exercise of state court jurisdiction in the action would unduly infringe on the self-governance of the tribe.19 It held at pp. 213-214 that:
It is clear that the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians has policies and procedures in place to resolve disputes such as the one plaintiff presents in the case sub judice. Thus, for our courts to exercise jurisdiction in this case would plainly interfere with the powers of self-government conferred upon the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and exercised through the Cherokee Tribal Gaming Commission. [Jackson County v. ]Swayney, 319 N.C. [52] at 62, 352 S.E.2d [413] at 419 [(1987)] (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-88, 96 S.Ct. 943, 946-47, 47 L.Ed.2d 106, 112 (1976)). It would subject a dispute arising on the reservation between the casino and its patron to a forum other than the one the Indians have established for themselves. Id.
Whereas the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians has a greater interest in resolving patron disputes related to activities within the casino, and has policies and procedures for resolving such disputes, the interests of the Indians outweigh the interests of the state. Therefore, the exercise of state court jurisdiction in the present case would unduly infringe on the self-governance of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. For these reasons, we hold that our state courts must yield subject matter jurisdiction to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in the case sub judice and affirm the decision of the trial court.
1 16 A New Mexico case, Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (2002), dealt with the subject matter jurisdiction of state courts over a tort claim brought by a non-Indian against an Indian tribe for injuries suffered at the tribe's gaming facility. At the time of the alleged tort, there was no valid gaming compact in force. The Court held that trial courts of New Mexico lacked jurisdiction in the matter absent a valid agreement between the tribe and the state permitting the state court to hear the matter. Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 141 N.M. 269, 154 P.3d 644, 646-647 (2007), was decided after a valid gaming compact had been executed between the tribe and the state. The compact contained specific language concerning tort claims and jurisdiction.20 The Court held both that the compact *476created a concurrent state-tribal jurisdiction for personal injury tort claims, by agreement of the parties, and that IGRA permitted such a negotiation and outcome.
17 An earlier case, Diepenbrock v. Merkel, 33 Kan.App.2d 97, 103, 97 P.3d 1063 (2004), considered subject matter jurisdiction for a wrongful death action. The deceased died of a heart attack suffered on tribal land owned in fee by the tribe. The tribal gaming compact gave the tribe civil jurisdiction for tort matters relating to Class III gaming on their reservation. The Court spoke to the linchpin of the matter at p. 1067, as follows:
Perhaps the critical fact in this case is that all events surrounding Diepenbrock's cause of action occurred on tribal property.... The law recognizes a preference for tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction or deference to the tribal court over matters concerning their members and their territories. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe, 498 U.S. at 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112....
It would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation to govern themselves if jurisdiction did not reside in the tribal courts in this case. ...
18 In Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, 260 Conn. 46, 794 A.2d 498 (2002), the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction in a case involving a patron of a tribal casino who brought a negligence action against the tribe's employees seeking damages for personal injuries sustained at the casino. The Court held that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in state court and that the proper forum was the Mohegan Gaming Disputes Court. This result was reached after the Court considered the express language of the compact,21 the fact that the tribal constitution provided a forum and mechanism to redress the patron's injuries, and that IGRA permitted such a result.
19 IGRA recognizes the concept of concurrent state and tribal involvement in gaming.22 When one considers how the courts in North Carolina, New Mexico, Kansas, and Connecticut have addressed the issue, it becomes clear that the absence of a jurisdiction-shifting agreement is important. When a tribe complies with IGRA and has established the required court system or appropriate dispute resolution system, jurisdiction, as a matter of comity and potential for infringement of self-governance, belongs in tribal court.
1 20 The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether a tribal court has jurisdiction over claims resulting from the conduct of non-Indians coming onto tribal land to voluntarily participate in a gaming enterprise. Nevertheless, it has hinted that a tribal court could have inherent civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. For instance, in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001), the Court answered the question of whether a tribal court may assert jurisdiction over civil claims (including a § 1983 claim) against state officials who entered tribal land to execute a search warrant against a tribal member suspected of *477having violated state law outside of the reservation.
{21 The Nevada Court expressly noted that previously, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), the Court "assumed that where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes 'arising out of such activities presumably lies with the tribal courts." It also specifically limited its holding to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state officers enforeing state law, but left open the question of tribal court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.23 Nevada is not dispositive. Answering the question of whether a tribal court may be a court of general jurisdiction in which to resolve § 1988 claims does not also answer the question of whether a tribal court may resolve tort claims brought by nonmembers arising out of IGRA authorized gaming operations on tribal lands.
122 Likewise, Montana v. United States 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), involved the narrow issue of the power of a Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe. The Court agreed with a lower court holding that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe. It also agreed that if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such land, it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits. In deciding the case, the Court developed the Montana test which states that:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.... A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.
Montana did not discuss gaming or gaming enterprises, nor did it discuss what would satisfy either test-except for concluding that non-Indian hunters and fishermen on non-Indian fee land did not enter into any agreements or commercial dealings with the tribe, nor were hunting and fishing a threat to the Tribe's political or economic security so as to justify tribal regulation.
123 Finally, in Plains Commerce Bank v. Long, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2709, 171 L.Ed.2d 457 (2008), the Court again discussed the Montana test in a case involving a non-Indian bank and its sale of non-Indian land it owned within a tribal reservation. The Court determined that the Montana exception to asserting tribal jurisdiction did not apply because the land at issue had been owned by a non-Indian party for at least 50 years and its resale to another non-Indian could not possibly imperil the substance or welfare of the tribe. Plains held that Montana did not permit tribes to regulate the sale of non-Indian land, but that a tribe could *478regulate the conduct of non-members inside the reservation that implicates the tribe's sovereign interest. Clearly, Plains was written in the context of a non-Indian land dispute, and it does not mention IGRA or tribal gaming enterprises.
124 The Supreme Court has never addressed whether tribal gaming enterprises might satisfy the Montana test resulting in a tribal court having "inherent" authority to hear such disputes as the one involved here. It has, however, recognized that gaming enterprises can serve as a core, essential component of the economic security of a tribe. In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987), a case which sparked the enactment of the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court recognized that the bingo and card games conducted on the reservation and predominately played by non-Indians were a major source of employment for the Tribe, and the profits were the Tribe's sole source of income. In Cabazon, the Court held that "the State's interest in preventing the infiltration of the tribal bingo enterprises by organized erime did not justify state regulation of the tribal bingo enterprises in light of the compelling federal and tribal interests supporting them. State regulation would impermissibly infringe on tribal government, and this conclusion applies equally to the county's attempted regulation of the Cabazon card club."
125 Under the "Montana approach" the Tribe might make an evidentiary showing that the regulation of gaming, including the disposition of tort claims asserted against it, satisfies Montana. The Tribe needs to show that its gaming enterprises serve as a core, essential component of its economic security. Here, because the matter was decided on a motion to dismiss, there is no evidence in the record to support such a result. The Court should remand the matter so that the Tribe may, if it can, make an appropriate evidentia-ry showing before concluding as the majority has that "[iIn the present case, we find the Tribe has not met is burden of establishing that it falls within one of Montana's exceptions."
IIL.
WHETHER THE STATE HAS ACCEPTED JURISDICTION UNDER P.L. 280 AND THE EXISTENCE AND PROFICIENCY OF A TRIBAL COURT SYSTEM.
126 It is undisputed that Oklahoma was not a state which was allowed to assert civil jurisdiction over Indian Tribes in Oklahoma under Public Law 280. The majority finds that this is not an impediment to the assertion of jurisdiction over this dispute by the District Courts of Oklahoma. The majority refers to Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, 1994 OK 20, ¶ 12, 896 P.2d 503.
127 Lewis involved two tribal members who entered into a contract by which title to their home and land would pass to them on September 1, 1990. When they received a warranty deed conveying the surface rights only, they sued for specific performance and an accounting for all oil and gas revenues the Housing Authority had received since the date of the conveyance. The Authority objected to the jurisdiction of the district court.
128 One of the issues was whether Congress "ousted" state courts of concurrent jurisdiction to consider contract actions involving land transactions between Indian buyers and statutorily created Indian housing authorities of the state. I was a dissenter in Lewis and, as thoroughly explained by the dissent in which I joined, the issue in Lewis was not whether Oklahoma had been "ousted" from "concurrent" jurisdiction, but rather whether the transaction occurred within Indian Country. If it did not, the state clearly has jurisdiction. However, if it did occur in Indian Country, any jurisdiction held by the state must be as a direct result of federal congressional action or federal case law. Ultimately the dissent concluded that the transaction did not occur in Indian Country.
129 Nevertheless, Lewis remains the law in Oklahoma. It held that because Congress had not affirmatively ousted the state courts of their concurrent jurisdiction to entertain contract actions involving land transactions between Indian buyers and state-created In*479dian housing authorities, Oklahoma state courts had inherent concurrent jurisdiction. The Lewis Court determined that because Oklahoma did not take the appropriate steps to take jurisdiction under PL-280, the proper inquiry to be made must be focused on the congressional policy of fostering tribal autonomy in light of pertinent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
130 In Lewis, the Court looked at two factors to determine whether the State of Oklahoma had concurrent jurisdiction: 1) whether the litigation was explicitly withdrawn by Congress; and 2) whether it infringed upon tribal self-government. Even though Lewis involved a specifically prescribed and state created Indian Housing Authority, and this case involves a tribal gaming enterprise, the same factors could be applied here to determine whether the State of Oklahoma has concurrent jurisdiction. Congress did not explicitly withdraw such litigation from state courts. In this instance, Congress left it up to the States and Tribes to negotiate where the litigation would occur. Whether tort claim litigation infringes upon tribal self-government could depend upon whether the tribe has established an appropriate court system.24 The tribe should be given an opportunity to make a showing that the State's assertion of jurisdiction would in fact infringe upon self governance.
1 31 Here, the tradition of Cherokee courts is deeply rooted in the history of this State. The Cherokee Nation has had a functioning Supreme Court since 182325 and a written constitution since 1889. By the 1880s, it had built nine courthouses in Oklahoma,26 one of which holds the distinction of being the oldest governmental building in the State of Oklahoma.27 (In 1998, West Publishing Company published the Cherokee Nation Code Annotated.)
132 It is undisputed that Congress has vacillated in its treatment of Native Americans. They were not made citizens of the United States of America until June 2, 1924, and as late as 1914, the Fort Sill Apache (Chiricahua), were still prisoners of war. (Ironically, the last baby born in captivity, Mildred Cleghorn, grew up to be the Chairman of the Tribe.) ° Congress terminated the tribal court system through the Curtis Act of 1898, to clear the way for statehood, and it shifted most legal issues to the Federal Courts.28 However, in the mid-1950's Congress began a movement of restoration and it recognized that tribal government eannot truly function without tribal courts. In 2001, it established the Tribal Court Assistance Program designed to establish, improve, and expand the functionality of the tribal court system. It is estimated that tribal courts will receive $8,630,00 by the end of the 2008 fiscal year.29
133 The Oklahoma Legislature also recognizes the competency of tribal courts. Title 12 0.9$.2001 $ 728 provides:
*480A. This act affirms the power of the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma to issue standards for extending full faith and credit to the records and judicial proceedings of any court of any federally recognized Indian nation, tribe, band or political subdivision thereof, including courts of Indian offenses.
B. In issuing any such standard the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma may extend such recognition in whole or in part to such type or types of judgments of the tribal courts as it deems appropriate where tribal courts agree to grant reciprocity of judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma in such tribal courts.
This Court followed suit by adopting a district court rule for recognition of judicial proceedings in tribal court. |
134 The rule recognizes that judgments from tribal courts are entitled to full faith and credit in the same manner as a similar or comparable judgment of a sister state.30 Had this tort occurred at a race track in Hot Springs or a ski slope in Colorado, no one would expect that the lawsuit would be heard by the District Court of Rogers County. The same is true of tribal courts just as it is with sister states. A person going onto tribal land, entering into and participating in a tribal enterprise, should expect to bring the suit in the location of the sovereign-the Tribe, rather than in a state district court. It has been said that Tribal Sovereignty and Tribal jurisdiction have, from the beginning, been treated by the United States Government and the State of Oklahoma as a solid, intact mass-like a rock. This rock remains intact unless and until Congress decides to chip pieces of it away (which it has through various enactments) to grant jurisdiction to the federal or state courts. The majority, on the other hand, treats Tribal jurisdiction as having begun with nothing, to which Congress must add something in order to create jurisdiction. This, in my view, is wrong, and I would remand the matter to allow the Tribe to make a showing concerning whether the State's assertion of jurisdiction would infringe on it's self-governance.
CONCLUSION
1 35 The State's self-interest is served by entering into a compact with the Tribe.31 *481IGRA embodies the general goal of federal Indian policy: to allow tribal self-government with federal control.32 Before Class III gaming can be legal on Indian lands, the tribe and the state must have negotiated a compact which has been approved by the Secretary of the Interior.33 In other words, IGRA requires States and Tribes to negotiate regarding the scope of authorized gaming and the State's role in Indian gaming. As part of this process, IGRA allows States and Tribes to negotiate and to include jurisdiction-shifting provisions in the compact.34
1 36 If Congress had not considered tribal courts to have subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits which relate to or arise out of gaming and gaming enterprises, why would it have included a provision in IGRA which allowed Tribes and States to negotiate an allocation of jurisdiction to the states? Furthermore, the State of Oklahoma as well as this Court has recognized tribal courts as equivalent to those of a sister state; yet the implication of the majority opinion is that tribal courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction.
¶37 In Bittle v. Bahe, 2008 OK 10, ¶¶ 52-53, 192 P.3d 810, the Court held that the tribe had waived its sovereign immunity merely because it filed for and received a liquor license. The request of a license, it was said, constituted an express and knowing waiver of sovereign immunity. Yet here, the *482majority expresses concern that if non-tribal members voluntarily enter tribal land and choose to partake in a tribal gaming enterprise, they may somehow unknowingly waive their right to bring a tort suit into district court. Assuming that the state district court had jurisdiction to hear such disputes in the first place, the waiver certainly is not any less express or knowing than that which was held to be a waiver in Bittle.
38 The majority does not give proper consideration to the fact that tribal courts are courts of competent jurisdiction and fails to recognize that they may have both inherent authority and the authority under IGRA to decide tort claims which arise out of events occurring at a tribal casino. It is immaterial whether the plaintiff is a tribal member, member of another tribe, or a non-Indian, when he or she voluntary enters onto tribal land to do business with the Tribe. I cannot concur in the opinion. I would remand the matter to the trial court to: 1) consider the parties' true intent in leaving jurisdiction status quo and referring to "court of competent jurisdiction;" 2) allow the Tribe to attempt to make an appropriate evidentiary showing that its gaming enterprise serves a core, essential component of the economic security of the Tribe; and 3) allow the Tribe to attempt to make a showing that the State's assertion of jurisdiction would infringe on the Tribe's self-governance.

. Use of the word "belong" refers to jurisdiction, as in which Court (federal, state, or tribal) properly has subject maiter jurisdiction to decide the tort claim.

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) creates federal jurisdiction in some circumstances. It provides in pertinent part:
(7) (A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith,
(i) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph (3) that is in effect, and
(ifi) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the procedures prescribed under subparagraph (B)(vii).
(B) (i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A)) only after the close of the 180-day period beginning on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations under paragraph (3)(A).
(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A)), upon the introduction of evidence by an Indian tribe that-
(I) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into under paragraph (3), and
(II) the State did not respond to the request of the Indian tribe to negotiate such a compact or did not respond to such request in good faith, the burden of proof shall be upon the State to prove that the State has negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to conclude a Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities....
However, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1131, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the United States Supreme Court held that a state may not be sued in federal court for failure to negotiate in good faith.

. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., governs Indian gaming within the states.

. Title 3A O.S. Supp.2004 §§ 261-282.

. Art. 1, § 3 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides in pertinent part:
.The people inhabiting the State do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title in or to any unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian, tribe, or nation; and that until the title to any such public land shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the jurisdiction, disposal, and control of the United States....

. See also, C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 532 U.S. 411, 418, 121 S.Ct. 1589, 1594, 149 L.Ed.2d 623 (2001); Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, 498 U.S. 505, 509, 111 S.Ct. 905, 909, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978). Tribal Immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States. Hoover v. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma, 1999 OK 61, ¶ 5, 986 P.2d 516. Congress must 'unequivocally' express the abrogation of tribal immunity, and a tribe's waiver must be 'clear.' C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., supra. Common-law sovereign immunity possessed by an Indian tribe is necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877, 891, 106 S.Ct. 2305, 2313, 90 L.Ed.2d 881 (1986). Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game State of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2621, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977).

. C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, see note 6 supra; Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, see note 6, supra; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, see note 6, supra.

. C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, see note 6, supra; Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, see note 6, supra; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, see note 6, supra.

. For example, the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, signed on September 27, 1830 between the Choctaw tribe and the United States Government in which the tribe ceded land in Mississippi in exchange for land in Indian Territory provided in Article IV that "[the Government and people of the United States are hereby obligated to secure to the said Choctaw Nation of Red People the jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property that my be within their limits west, so that no Territory or state shall ever have a right to pass laws for the government of the Choctaw Nation of Red People and their descendants." Kappler, Charles (1904). "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties Vol. II, Treaties." (HTML). Government Printing Office. Retrieved on 10/23/2008.

. In the treaty, the Cherokee Nation ceded their lands east of the Mississippi in exchange for $5 million dollars and lands in Indian Territory. Article 5 of the Treaty of New Echota provides:
The United States hereby covenant and agree that the lands ceded to the Cherokee nation in the forgoing article shall, in no future time without their consent, be included within the territorial limits or jurisdiction of any State or Territory. But they shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have connected themselves with them: provided always that they shall not be inconsistent with the constitution of the United States and such acts of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians; and also, that they stall not be considered as extending to such citizens and army of the United States as may travel or reside in the Indian country by permission according to the laws and regulations established by the Government of the same.
Kappler, Charles (1904). "Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties Vol. II, Treaties." (HTML). Government Printing Office. Retrieved on 10/28/2008.

. Title 74 0.S$.2001 § 1221 provides in pertinent part:
A. The State of Oklahoma acknowledges federal recognition of Indian Tribes recognized by the Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
B. The State of Oklahoma recognizes the unique status of Indian Tribes within the federal government and shall work in a spirit of cooperation with all federally recognized Indi*472an Tribes in furtherance of federal policy for the benefit of both the State of Oklahoma and Tribal Governments.
C. 1. The Governor, or named designee, is authorized to negotiate and enter into cooperative agreements on behalf of this state with federally recognized Indian Tribal Governments within this state to address issues of mutual interest. Except as otherwise provided by this subsection, such agreements shall become effective upon approval by the Joint Commitiee on State-Tribal Relations....

. Title 74 0.$.2001 § 1222 provides in pertinent part:
A. There is hereby created the "Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations". The Committee shall be responsible for overseeing and approving agreements between tribal governments and the State of Oklahoma. The Committee shall consist of ten (10) members, to be appointed as follows:
1. Five members of the Senate to be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; and
2. Five members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives....

. Section 2710(d)(3)(C) of the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act provides:
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating i0o-
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity;
(ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;
(if) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity;
(iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities;
(v) remedies for breach of contract;
(vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and
(vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities.

. Title 51 0.$.2001 §§ 151 et seq.

. For example, in Kizis v. Morse Diesel International, 260 Conn. 46, 794 A.2d 498, 504 (2002), the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in discussing a compact between the State and the Mohegan Nation, quotes the compact. The Court recognizes that the compact explicitly places tort actions which occur on tribal land in the tribal court. The opinion provides in pertinent part:
... Section 3(g) of the gaming compact provides: "The Tribe shall establish, prior to the commencement of class III gaming, reasonable procedures for the disposition of tort claims arising from alleged injuries to patrons of its gaming facilities The Tribe shall not be deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity from suit with respect to such claims by virtue of any provision of this Compact, but may adopt a remedial system analogous to that available for similar claims arising against the State or such other remedial system as may be *473appropriate following consultation with the State gaming agency."
Pursuant to its obligation under the gaming compact, the Mohegan Tribal Council established, in the Constitution of the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Connecticut, a Gaming Disputes Court and a Gaming Disputes Court of Appeals. Mohegan Const., art. XI, § 2. These courts have jurisdiction over disputes "arising out of or in ... connection with" tribal gaming operations or the actions of the authority. Mohegan Const., art. XIII, § 2. The Mohegan constitution provides that "[tlhe Tribal Council shall establish by ordinance, the Gaming Disputes Court, which shall be composed of a Trial Branch and an Appellate Branch. Exclusive jurisdiction for the Tribe over disputes arising out of or in connection with the Gaming, the actions of the Tribal Gaming Authority, or contracts entered into by The Mohegan Tribe or the Tribal Gaming Authority in connection with Gaming, including without limitation, disputes arising between any person or entity and the Tribal Gaming Authority, including customers, employees, or any gaming manager operating under a gaming management agreement with the Tribal Gaming Authority, or any person or entity which may be in privity with such persons or entities as to Gaming matters shall be vested in the Gaming Disputes Court...." Mohegan Const., art. XIII, § 2. In addition, the tribe ordinance establishing the Gaming Disputes Court confers "exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases with respect to which the Tribe has conferred subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article XIII of the Mohegan Constitution." Ordinance No. 95-4 of the Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Conn., art. V, § 501.
The tribe enacted an ordinance ... establishing the Mohegan Torts Code, which contains a limited waiver of the tribe's sovereign immunity so that the Gaming Disputes Court may adjudicate liability for "(1) [injuries proximately caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority; (2) Injuries proximately caused by the condition of any property of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority provided*57 the claimant establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition; {and] (3) [injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of tribal security officers arising out of the performance of their duties during the course and within the scope of their employment." Ordinance No. 98-1, An Ordinance Amending Ordinance 96-2 Establishing* *505 The Mohegan Torts Code, § 3(c). The Mohegan Torts Code further provides that the ordinance does not immunize employees of the authority from individual liability, but that all disputes regarding employees that occur on the Mohegan "Gaming Enterprise Site shall be heard only in the Gaming Disputes Court." ... Ordinance No. 98-1, supra, § 6... ,
In Arizona, the Compact in Section 8 provides:
Nothing in this Compact is intended to change, revise or modify the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Tribe or of the State. Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to modify or limit existing federal jurisdiction over Indians and the Gaming Operations authorized under this Compact.
Section 13¢ addressed Tort Remedies for Patrons and it provides:
The Tribe shall establish written procedures for the disposition of tort claims arising from personal injury or property damage alleged to have been suffered by patrons and invitees of its Gaming Facilities and shall enact such Tribal law as is necessary to implement these procedures. The procedures shall include all time limits applicable to the disposition of the tort claim and a provision that, upon request, the patron or invitee, or the patron's or invitee's designated representative, shall be provided with a copy of the procedures as well as the name, address and telephone number of the Gaming Facility Operator and the mailing address and telephone number of the clerk of the Tribal court. The tribe shall not be deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity from suit with respect to such claims by establishing such procedures or by any provision of this Compact, but agrees not to assert such immunity as provided in subsection (d) of this Section.
In North Dakota, the Gaming Compact between the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and the State of North Dakota provides in subsection 6:
Any case in which a tribal member or an Indian non-member is a defendant shall be heard in tribal court. Any case in which a non-Indian is a defendant shall be heard in another court.
It is understood by the parties that the provisions of this paragraph are limited to civil cases arising from transactions related to or arising from gaming conducted in Dewey and Ziebach counties on the Cheyenne River Reservation pursuant to this compact. This provision shall not be construed to be a waiver of the sovereign immunity of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.

. Hatcher v. Harrah's NC Casino Company, LLC., 169 N.C.App. 151, 610 S.E.2d 210 (2005); Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (2002); Doe v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 141 N.M. 269, 154 P.3d 644, 646-647 (2007); Diepenbrock v. Merkel, 33 Kan.App.2d 97, 103, 97 P.3d 1063 (2004).

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C), see note 13, supra.

. Whether a contract is ambiguous and requires extrinsic evidence for clarification is a matter for the court to decide. Campbell v. Independent School District, 2003 OK 73 ¶ 16, 77 P.3d 1034; Pitco Production Co. v. Chaparral Energy, Inc., 2003 OK 5, ¶ 12, 63 P.3d 541; Lewis v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Oklahoma Housing Authority, 1994 OK 20 ¶ 25, 896 P.2d 503.

. See also, Bonnette v. Tunica-Biloxi Indians, 873 So.2d 1 (La.Ct.App.3 Cir.2003), which recognized that the Tribe retained jurisdiction of tort claims brought by patrons of casinos in a compact which provided that the "full territorial and subject matter jurisdiction" of the Tribe was preserved and that the Tribe would adopt procedures for disposition of tort claims. This conclusion was reached despite the compact also containing a provision which stated that the State and the Tribe had concurrent jurisdiction to fully "ensure the protection of the public," the Tribe, and the State.

. Section 8 of the Compact provides:
Protection of Visitors. The safety and protection of visitors to a Gaming Facility is a priority of the Tribe, and it is the purpose of this *476section to assure that any such persons who suffer bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise have an effective remedy for obtaining fair and just compensation. To that end, in this Section, and subject to its terms, the Tribe agrees to carry insurance that covers such injury or loss, agrees to a limited waiver of its immunity from suit, and agrees to proceed either in binding arbitration proceedings or in a court of competent jurisdiction, at the visitor's election, with respect to claims for bodily injury or property damage proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise. For purposes of this Section, any such claim may be brought in state district court, including claims arising on tribal land, unless it is finally determined by a state or federal court that IGRA does not permit the shifting of jurisdiction over visitors' personal injury suits to state court.

. See discussion note 15, supra.

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(5) provides:
Nothing in this subsection shall impair the right of an Indian tribe to regulate class III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the State, except to the extent that such regulation is inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the State laws and regulations made applicable by any Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe under paragraph (3) that is in effect.

. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). Footnote 2 of the opinion provides:
In National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 855-856, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985), we avoided the question whether tribes may generally adjudicate against nonmembers claims arising from on-reservation transactions, and we have never held that a tribal court had jurisdiction over a nonmember defendant. Typically, our cases have involved claims brought against tribal defendants. See, eg., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404, 137 L.Ed.2d 661 (1997), however, we assumed that "where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising out of such activities presumably lies in the tribal courts," without distinguishing between nonmember plaintiffs and nonmember defendants. See also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987). Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.

. One of the policies behind the Indian Regulatory Gaming Act is to promote self-sufficiency and self-governance. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2702 provides in pertinent part:
Declaration of policy
The purpose of this chapter is-
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments; ...
When a tribe has created the authority to facilitate and act as the governmental entity responsible for managing all aspects of the tribe's gaming enterprise, including the creation of a court system, then refusing to recognize this mechanism as an appropriate means of resolving tort disputes which arise out of gaming would also ignore the express policy declared in IGRA.

. Strickland, Rennard, "Fire and the Spirits, Cherokee Law from Clan to Court." pp. 73-75 University of Oklahoma Press (1975). The author notes that according to the Record Book of the Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation, the Court heard 21 cases in 1823.

. O'Dell, George, Professor of Anthropology, "Saline Courthouse," www.personal.utulsa.edu. Retrieved 10/30/08; "Cherokees Fund Restoration Project for Historic Courthouses," Native American Times, Retrieved 10/30/08.

. Davis, Kirby Lee, "These Walls: The Cherokee Nation Supreme Court Building in Oklahoma," Journal Record, August 8, 2008; McMa-han, Liz, "Cherokee Nation Supreme Court Building to Get Face Lift," Muskogee Phoenix, August 12, 2008.

. ICohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2005 ed. §, 1.07, pp. 98-99.

. The Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, "16.608 Tribal Court Assistance Program." http://www.cfda.gov. Retrieved 11/14/2008.

. Rules for the District Court of Oklahoma, Rule 30, 12 0.S.2001 Ch. 2, App. provides in pertinent part:
A. Standards
(1) "Tribal Court'" means any court or constitutionally established tribunal of any federally recognized Indian nation, tribe, pueblo, band, or Alaska Native village, duly established under federal law or tribal law, including Courts of Indian Offenses organized pursuant to Title 25, Part 11 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
(2) "Judicial Officer" means any judge, justice, magistrate or other officer duly seated and authorized under federal or tribal law to resolve disputes and enter tribal judgments in a tribal court.
(3) "Tribal Judgment" means any final written judgment, decree or order of a tribal court duly signed by a judicial officer and filed in a Tribal Court.
B. Recognition of Tribal Judgments-Full Faith and Credit
The district courts of the State of Oklahoma shall grant full faith and credit and cause to be enforced any tribal judgment where the tribal court that issued the judgment grants reciprocity to judgments of the courts of the State of Oklahoma, provided, a tribal court judgment shall receive no greater effect or full faith and credit under this rule than would a similar or comparable judgment of a sister state. (Emphasis added.)

. Title 3A O.S. Supp.2004 § 281(11A) provides in part:
The parties acknowledge and recognize that this Compact provides tribes with substantial exclusivity and, consistent with the goals of IGRA, special opportunities for tribal economic opportunity through gaming within the external boundaries of Oklahoma in respect to the covered games. In consideration thereof, so long as the state does not change its laws after the effective date of this Compact to permit the operation of any additional form of gaming by any such organization licensee, or change its laws to permit any additional electronic or machine gaming within Oklahoma, the tribe agrees to pay the following fees:
1. The tribe covenants and agrees to pay to the state a fee derived from covered game revenues calculated as set forth in paragraph 2 of this subsection. Such fee shall be paid no later than the twentieth day of the month for revenues received by the tribe in the preceding month; and
2. The fee shall be:
a. four percent (4%) of the first Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant bingo games,
*481b. five percent (5%) of the next Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) of adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant bingo games,
c. six percent (6%) of all subsequent adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of electronic amusement games, electronic bonanza-style bingo games and electronic instant bingo games, and
d. ten percent (10%) of the monthly net win of the common pool(s) or pot(s) from which prizes are paid for nonhouse-banked card games. The tribe is entitled to keep an amount equal to state payments from the common pool(s) or pot(s) as part of its cost of operating the games.
Payments of such fees shall be made to the Treasurer of the State of Oklahoma. Nothing herein shall require the allocation of such fees to particular state purposes, including, but not limited to, the actual costs of performing the state's regulatory responsibilities hereunder.

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2701 provides:
The Congress finds that-
(1) numerous Indian tribes have become engaged in or have licensed gaming activities on Indian lands as a means of generating tribal governmental revenue;
(2) Federal courts have held that section 81 of this title requires Secretarial review of management contracts dealing with Indian gaming, but does not provide standards for approval of such contracts;
(3) existing Federal law does not provide clear standards or regulations for the conduct of gaming on Indian lands;
(4) a principal goal of Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government; and
(5) Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity.
Title 25 U.S.C. § 2702 provides:
The purpose of this chapter is-
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710.

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) provides:
(C) Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating to- « '
(i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activi-
ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations;