Court Opinion

ID: 9562452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:29:24.585128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:21.544789
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur fully with the majority, I write separately to address Sweeting’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to place him under oath during the guilty plea hearing. Under OCGA § 15-1-3 (5), a trial court has the power to administer oaths “when it may be necessary.” However, there does not appear to be any specific legal requirement that a defendant be placed under oath during a guilty plea hearing.1 I nonetheless believe it is prudent for a trial court to administer an oath to a defendant during a plea hearing as it makes the record clearer that the defendant’s plea was voluntary.2 To the extent that we may infer a requirement that a defendant be sworn, I agree with the majority that Sweeting’s failure to interpose an objection constitutes waiver.3

 See Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.1 et seq.; Uniform State Court Rule 33.1 et seq.

 See, e.g., Jones v. State, 268 Ga. App. 101, 102 (1) (601 SE2d 469) (2004); Cantrell v. State, 210 Ga. App. 218, 221 (3) (435 SE2d 737) (1993).

 See Harrell v. State, 204 Ga. App. 738, 740 (4) (420 SE2d 631) (1992) (“ ‘Where a party, without objection, allows a witness to testify against him without first being sworn he cannot after conviction urge the failure of the witness to take the oath as a ground’ ” for reversal.). We note the anomaly here, which requires a defendant to object to his own testimony.