Court Opinion

ID: 9841445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 15:01:00.04301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:00.503575
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12886    Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 09/22/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12886
                          ____________________

       GEORGE WEIDNER, III,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-00673-JSS
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12886

       Before WILSON, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              George Weidner, III, appeals the district court’s affirmance
       of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) denial of his claim for
       disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security in-
       come (SSI) following the Appeals Council’s remand. He argues
       that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred on remand by re-
       considering a prior finding of Weidner’s residual functional capac-
       ity (RFC) after the prior decision had been vacated, in violation of
       the law-of-the-case doctrine and the mandate rule. After careful
       review and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
                                           I.
              On April 26, 2016, Weidner applied for DIB and SSI.
       Weidner alleged an onset date of February 1, 2016, for the follow-
       ing disabilities: back pain, loss of vision in left eye, pins in right
       hand, and depression. Disability examiners denied Weidner’s ap-
       plication initially and on reconsideration. Weidner then requested
       and received a hearing before an ALJ.
              Following the five-step process, 1 the ALJ found Weidner not
       disabled in a July 31, 2018, decision (the 2018 Decision). Relevant

       1 The SSA regulations provide five steps that the ALJ must follow when eval-

       uating a disability claim. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Rele-
       vant to this appeal, at step four, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC, which
       is the level of physical and mental work he can consistently perform despite
       his limitations. Id. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). At step five, the ALJ considers a
       claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine whether
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       22-12886                    Opinion of the Court                                  3

       to this appeal, the ALJ found Weidner has an RFC to perform sed-
       entary work2 but with additional limitations. Using that RFC and
       testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Weidner
       could not perform his past relevant work but could perform other
       jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
              Weidner then requested that the Appeals Council review
       the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council denied Weidner’s request
       for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Com-
       missioner. Weidner appealed to the district court. On appeal, the
       Commissioner moved—without opposition—to remand the case
       to the SSA so the ALJ could “obtain supplemental evidence from
       the vocational expert to clarify [Weidner’s] ability to perform other
       work in the national economy, take any further action to complete
       the administrative record, to oﬀer [Weidner] the opportunity for a
       hearing, and to issue a new decision.” The district court granted
       the motion with its order simply stating “REMANDED to the
       [Commissioner] for further administrative consideration.”

       he can still do past relevant work or adjust to other work.                      Id.
       §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(iv)-(v).
       2 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and oc-
       casionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools.
       Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain
       amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties.
       Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
       sedentary criteria are met.” Id. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a).
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       4                           Opinion of the Court                        22-12886

               On remand from the district court, the Appeals Council va-
       cated the 2018 Decision and remanded Weidner’s case back to an
       ALJ to obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert to
       clarify the effect of the assessed limitations on Weidner’s occupa-
       tional base. Because Weidner filed a subsequent claim for SSI on
       July 26, 2019, the Appeals Council found that the remanded claims
       and the new claim were duplicative. As a result, the Appeals Coun-
       cil consolidated Weidner’s 2016 claims for DIB and SSI with his
       subsequent July 2019 claim for SSI. The Appeals Council explained
       that the ALJ was to offer Weidner an opportunity for a hearing,
       take any action to complete the record, and issue a new decision.
       The ALJ held two hearings.
              On remand, the ALJ found Weidner not disabled in a De-
       cember 2, 2020, decision (the 2020 Decision). Relevant to this ap-
       peal, the ALJ found Weidner has an RFC to perform light work3
       but with additional limitations. Using that RFC and testimony
       from a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Weidner could

       3 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
       lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
       weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
       deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
       some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
       performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
       substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we deter-
       mine that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional
       limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods
       of time.” Id. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).
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       22-12886              Opinion of the Court                        5

       perform his past relevant work and perform other jobs existing in
       significant numbers in the national economy.
             Weidner did not request the Appeals Council review the
       ALJ’s decision nor did the Appeals Council review the case on its
       own. After sixty days, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision
       of the Commissioner. Weidner appealed to the district court,
       which affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Weidner timely appealed.
                                     II.
               This Court reviews de novo the legal principles on which
       the Commissioner’s decision is based. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
       Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007). Whether an ALJ has
       obeyed the remand order of an appellate court is a question of law
       that is reviewed de novo. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886
       (1989). Similarly, this court reviews the application of the law-of-
       the-case doctrine de novo. Mega Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Pieniozek,
       585 F.3d 1399, 1405 (11th Cir. 2009). Finally, whether a court com-
       plied with a mandate is an issue of law that this Court reviews de
       novo. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th
       Cir. 2018).
                                     III.
              Weidner argues that the ALJ should have followed the law-
       of-the-case doctrine and not reassessed his RFC from the 2018 De-
       cision. Weidner contends that the ALJ was required to follow the
       mandate and not relitigate any issue that the district court implic-
       itly decided.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12886

              Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, an appellate court’s find-
       ings of fact and conclusions of law “are generally binding in all sub-
       sequent proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later
       appeal.” This That & the Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., 439
       F.3d 1275, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The mandate rule,
       which is “a specific application” of the law-of-the-case doctrine,
       binds a lower court to execute the mandate of the higher court
       without further examination or variance. Albert, 906 F.3d at 1299.
       A court “may not alter, amend, or examine the mandate, or give
       any further relief or review, but must enter an order in strict com-
       pliance with the mandate.” Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1119
       (11th Cir. 1985).
                For these doctrines to apply, the earlier decision must still be
       extant. But vacated decisions “are officially gone. They have no
       legal effect whatever. They are void.” See United States v. Sigma
       Int’l, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (address-
       ing appellate opinions that had been vacated).
               Even assuming the law-of-the-case doctrine and mandate
       rule apply, the ALJ was free to reconsider Weidner’s RFC because
       the 2018 Decision was vacated. We have not decided whether
       these doctrines apply in social security cases, nor do we need to do
       so in Weidner’s case because the 2018 Decision was vacated. The
       district court order made no findings about how the ALJ erred in
       his determination on Weidner’s disability. Instead, the district
       court remanded the case on a motion from the Commissioner
       without making specific factual findings, including whether or not
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       22-12886               Opinion of the Court                          7

       the ALJ properly determined Weidner’s RFC. As a result, the Ap-
       peals Council had no factual findings in the remand order from
       which it could deviate. See Sullivan, 490 U.S. at 886 (“Deviation
       from the court’s remand order in the subsequent administrative
       proceedings is itself legal error, subject to reversal on further judi-
       cial review.”). Then the Appeals Council vacated the 2018 Deci-
       sion. And as a result of the vacatur, that decision lost its binding
       effect. Sigma Int’l, Inc., 300 F.3d at 1280. The sum result of these
       steps is that the ALJ was not required to abide by the prior RFC
       finding on remand.
               Additionally, the Appeals Council explained that Weidner
       filed a new SSI claim in 2019, and it consolidated that claim with
       his initial claims, which stemmed from the same disabilities. The
       SSA regulations allow an ALJ to consider any issues relating to the
       claim, whether or not they were raised in earlier administrative
       proceedings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.983(a), 416.1483(a). Considering
       the record before us, we conclude that the ALJ properly considered
       all the evidence from Weidner’s claims to determine that Weidner
       was not disabled.
              Thus, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
              AFFIRMED.