Court Opinion

ID: 9848068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:12:18.26841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:00.019836
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority’s decision that the plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action. I am persuaded that a cause of action should be recognized on a risk contribution theory. I write separately for two reasons.
First, I believe the majority unnecessarily confuses the issue of apportionment of damages by saying that the “jury will have to apply Wisconsin’s comparative negligence doctrine, sec. 895.045, Stats.,” swpra, p. 198. Because plaintiff need not prove that the defendant’s negligence or product caused her damage in order for the *205defendant to be liable, sec. 895.045 is not really applicable here except by analogy. The doctrine of comparative negligence encompassed in “sec. 895.045, Stats., has been construed from its beginning to apply only to camal negligence. . . .” Lovesee v. Allied Devel. Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 340, 343, 173 N.W.2d 196 (1970) (emphasis added). See also City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 653-55, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973) (products liability case). I believe the majority tries to fit apportionment of damages within the comparative negligence statute, even though the causal element is not an issue in this kind of case, because it wishes to use two concepts present in the doctrine of comparative negligence: jury apportionment of damages and jury consideration of the kind and character of the defendants’ conduct. Lovesee, supra, at 345.
Second, although I may not necessarily disagree with the discussion, I do not join the dictum concerning punitive damages. This issue is unnecessary for disposition of the case and was not briefed by the parties.