Court Opinion

ID: 9547035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:40:32.781415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:13.384470
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(concurring in result) .
The record in this case reflects a simple writ of mandate problem, which poses a question as to whether the Attorney General should be ordered to pay over funds *365appropriated to pay certain so-called “claims” against the State. No one questioned the merits of any of the claims. The pleadings on both sides assumed that the “claims” were legitimate, except for the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Had anyone questioned the merits of these petitions for compensation, this writer seriously doubts whether any of them judicially could have been declared legitimate claims against the State. It is my opinion that had there been such an attack, no court could have arrived at the conclusion that they were anything but requests for gifts of taxpayers’ money. One, for example, obviously was not a claim against the State, but was a claim against a county. Another was a claim for injuries to a boy while riding a bicycle on the sidewalk, and who fell against a cement abutment when weeds caught in his wheels. The Legislature appropriated $1,700 of a $4,666 claim for injuries, presumably to the boy’s face, but which was made up of the following items: Medical bills $66.00, future medical hills, $600, disfiguration, humiliation and embarrassment, $2,000, pain and stiffening, both mental and physical, $2,000. All this without benefit of judicial review or determination of the facts, and so far as this record is concerned, quite divorced from any protection afforded by an orderly judicial proceeding and normal cross-examination, as is pointed out in the main opinion. It would appear to this writer that these two “claims” are simply tagged as “claims,” when in reality they are simply requests for gifts of taxpayers’ money. It might be suggested that the public should be afforded minimum rights of due process as well as the individual. I point these things out, since I am convinced this case should be decided on procedtiral grounds, no one having attacked the merit of the “claims” and to suggest that the gratuitous and unnecessary language of the main opinion that “in order to justify approval and payment there must be at least some semblance of a valid claim or some relationship to the public interest or welfare on the basis of which some responsibility on behalf of the State could properly rest” hardly could be applicable to the appropriations made in this case. Any language in the main opinion concerning the merits of claims and the Legislature’s function with respect to processing them, including the unthinkability that it would make gifts, are not before us, but such language might imply, without pleading or proof, that the Legislature made no unwarranted appropriations here, and that the “claims” were real, legitimate and meritorious claims. I am convinced we should stick to the pleadings here and to the natural and necessary presumptions that flow therefrom, so far as the case is to be reviewed by us strictly on what is before us, — not what we think the Legislature thought or anything else dehors this record. This case in no way involves the question *366whether the petitions for compensation were "claims’’ or requests for "gifts," in the legal sense, so why even talk about it?
The petition alleged a filing of the claims with the Board in compliance with provisions of Art. VII, Sec. 13, Utah Constitution; that the Board considered and transmitted them to the Legislature with a recommendation that they be denied; that the Legislature approved them and appropriated moneys for their payment; that the law enjoined the Attorney General to pay the same upon obtaining releases, but that this official has refused to do it, thus exceeding his authority as Attorney General. There was no assertion or pleading that attacked the processing of the claims, and there were no constitutional issues raised incident to the pleaded facts and the answer thereto. The only question was whether, under existing legislation, and the procedure taken, the Attorney General should be required to pay. Constitutional issues anent the nature ¿nd extent of powers between two constitutional agencies, the Legislature and the Board, orally were interjected into this case after issue joined, hearing on the petition, and issuance of the writ of mandate.
It is axiomatic that constitutional law questions will not be convassed or adjudicated which are not made an issue by the pleadings and which are not reflected.in any segment of the record. None was issuable here. None of the provisions of Title 63, U.C.A.1953, having to do with the nature and extent of the functions of the Board of Examiners, was attacked as unconstitutional. Nor was any function of the Legislature questioned. None was briefed or argued in reference to the present appeal.
The petition stated facts which, if true, would show regularity in the filing and processing of the claims. No attack having' been made urging irregularity, there is nothing this court can do but presume regularity. A further presumption must be indulged in this court to the effect that, without meritorious attack on the Legislature’s disposition of the matter, its action was regular, consonant with and within the ambit of its authority. Therefore, there is nothing left but for this court to ignore any constitutional straw man set up, on matters dehors the record, arguments for or objections to which are rhetorical and interesting but inapropos. It follows that the trial court must be affirmed and the Attorney General must pay the claims from moneys appropriated to him for that purpose, upon obtaining the releases mentioned in the pleadings and the legislation.
Mandamus is rarely employed, and not designed to referee internecine conflicts between constitutional agencies of the State, without profound or serious reason. Generally, it is dedicated to the proposition that an official, failing to carry out a requirement imposed by law, must comply. That is all that the pleadings in this case ask, and from the record before us, and *367indulging the presumptions mentioned, there seems to be no escape from the conclusion that in this particular case the Attorney General should make delivery of the moneys appropriated.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the Legislature cannot make gifts unrelated to any real public purpose simply because an isolated individual is in need, is injured, or because an end result morally might be charitable and commendable. The public weal may justify assistance generally where the public generally is concerned and benefited, but a gift of public moneys simply because a written plea is advanced, labeled a “claim” against the State, historically and traditionally has been denounced.1
It seems obvious to this writer that the Board of Examiners was a creature of its constitutional parents,' who deliberately and with wisdom designed it to include the highest elected legal officer of the State. Also obvious, it seems, is that such officer was made a member of the Board to determine if a so-called “claim” really is one against the State, or whether it simply is a request for a gift inaccurately called a “claim,” or some other illegitimate petition for funds.
Furthermore, the decision of the Board, after it has “passed upon” a “claim” should .be overridden by the Legislature only upon .a clear showing that its action wholly was arbitrary and capricious. Any arbitrary and capricious action of either the Board or the Legislature itself in effectuating any action beyond its recognized functions would be subject to judicial review in an appropriate proceeding. All this, — and each case must stand alone, — to assure the citizen and taxpayer whose funds are held in trust for governmental purposes, will not be spoliated or denied of access, depending on the law and justice demonstrated in each individual case. To hold otherwise, the judiciary would be impotent in protecting the fundamental rights of those who embrace our tripartite system, and would render one branch helpless to close any Pandora’s Box through which could flow -“claims” that appeared legitimate on their faces, but which under the test of probative judicial machinery and the application of simple principles of due process, would be 'unmasked and shown to be false.
It may be suggested that in a case where processing a claim through the Board of Examiners on to the Legislature has not been accomplished substantially in compliance with statutory interdictions, or where the so-called “claim” proves abortive, the action of the Legislature in appropriating money to satisfy such “claim” would be subject to examination by the Ju.diciary with respect to merit and justici-ability, — a duty this court must accept, and *368which it has borne many times in determining the validity of legislation and its results. Included therein is the onus of determining whether an appropriation has or has not met constitutional requirements, and any proper implementation thereof.
Much of this concurring opinion is gratuitous, since I think the case decidable strictly on procedural grounds, hut I feel justified in indulging in it in the light of the fact that I think much of the main opinion is gratuitous, and I feel free, therefore, to address myself thereto.

. 42 Am.Jur. 756, Sec. 57, Public Funds.