Court Opinion

ID: 9774901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:37:40.582339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.543814
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The Majority Opinion states incorrectly, “[tjhere was nothing in the record before the trial judge to support the claim by Hubble that Johnson was his appointed defense counsel.”
On September 14, 1987, the day before Hubble signed the contract agreeing to pay Johnson, the Graves Circuit Court conducted a hearing in Hubble’s criminal case during which the Commonwealth Attorney, Richard Weisenberger, made the following statement:
“Your Honor, I have just talked with Mr. Johnson and he confirmed that he was appointed conflict counsel.” [Emphasis added.]
A transcript of this hearing is part of the record of this case, and the trial judge was aware of it when he entered summary judgment.
The Majority disregards the statement made by the Commonwealth Attorney as inadmissible hearsay. As an admission made by an opposing party, the statement over the phone to Mr. Weisenberger was not hearsay. It was admissible evidence. KRE 801 — A(3)(b)(l) states:
“A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is:
(1) The party’s own statement....”
The Majority Opinion asserts, mistakenly, that CR 56 requires that the transcript of the September 14 hearing be in the form of an affidavit to be considered on the motion for summary judgment. CR 56.03 states that a summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The Rule is interpreted broadly to mean that a judge may examine any evidentiary matter in the record in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate. It is illogical to disregard the transcript of a proceeding contained in the record, merely because it is not in affidavit form.
It was an abuse of discretion for the Lyon Circuit Court to grant summary judgment for appellee in light of this piece of evidence in the record creating a factual issue. Our Court should reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.
COMBS, Jv joins this dissent.