Court Opinion

ID: 9439264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:28:44.498213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:15.911928
License: Public Domain

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I join the court’s opinion because I agree that the district court incorrectly *472denied the appellants’ motion to intervene on the ground of untimeliness. I write separately, however, 'to express my view that the district court will no doubt reach the same result on remand and I therefore question the “judicial efficiency” of remanding.
The court correctly sets forth the “four requirements for intervention [as of right] under Rule 24(a)(2): (1) timeliness; (2) a cognizable interest; (3) impairment of that interest; and (4) lack of adequate representation by existing parties.” See Majority Opinion at 3 (citing Williams & Humbert, Ltd. v. W. & H. Trade Marks, Ltd., 840 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir.1988)). The court also correctly concludes that under our precedent the appellants’ motion was timely. That conclusion does not by itself, however, necessitate a different result on remand because failure to satisfy any of the remaining three requirements is a sufficient ground for denying intervention. See SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 136 F.3d 153, 156 (D.C.Cir.1998).
The appellants tell us their :sole goal in seeking intervention is “to ensure that the appeal from [the district court’s] decision take place.” Plaintiffs’-Appellees’ Appendix 276. They also insist that the government’s decision not to pursue an appeal amply demonstrates their lack of adequate representation in this proceeding. I am not persuaded. In assessing whether a proposed intervenor’s interest is adequately represented by an existing party, a court must consider whether the proposed intervenor itself has a right to pursue whatever it claims it is inadequately represented in pursuing. If no such right exists, it cannot seriously be maintained that the proposed intervenor lacks adequate representation. In this case, I believe an evaluation of the adequacy of representation issue turns on whether the appellants could have pursued an appeal from the district court- order had .they been parties to the district court proceeding. If so, a court could conclude they lack adequate representation because the government’s decision not to pursue an appeal deprives them of recourse to which they would otherwise be entitled. If not, however, the government’s decision not to appeal has no impact on the adequacy of representation of the appellants inasmuch as they are left no worse off than if they had in. fact been parties to the litigation all along.
The dispositive question then becomes whether the appellants, could have taken an appeal from the district court order had they been parties before the district court ruled. In my view, they could not have done so. “The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to review district court actions is limited to ‘final orders.’ ” Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878, 880 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Section 1291 entitles a party to appeal “from a district court decision that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “ ‘[i]t is well settled that, as a general rule, a district court order remanding a case to an agency for significant further proceedings is not final,’ ” id. (quoting In re St. Charles Preservation Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C.Cir.1990); citing American Hawaii Cruises v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 1400, 1403 (D.C.Cir.1990)), unless the remand to the agency is for solely “ministerial” action. See id. at 881. In my view, the district court’s order here was not merely “ministerial” but rather left “significant further proceedings” for the agency. And the appellants have no right to appeal a non-final order.1 Accordingly, even if they *473get no representation in seeking to appeal the district court’s remand order, they cannot claim “inadequate” representation to take action they themselves could not take.

. The agency’s right to appeal such an order is based on the fact that if it were limited to *473an appeal only after remand proceedings, it would lose the opportunity to appeal in the event the decision to remand was in error. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1012 (D.C.Cir.1999) (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 330 (D.C.Cir.1989)), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1204, 120 S.Ct. 2197, 147 L.Ed.2d 233 (2000). But the appellants do not succeed to the agency's right to appeal which is unique to itself.