Court Opinion

ID: 9385704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 21:00:24.035476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.054704
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4395      Doc: 19         Filed: 04/06/2023    Pg: 1 of 4

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4395

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        JOHN PAUL OUTEN,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00147-LCB-1)

        Submitted: March 22, 2023                                         Decided: April 6, 2023

        Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney,
        Ashley E. Waid, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               John Paul Outen pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). * The district court determined that

        Outen was subject to a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence under the Armed Career

        Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because Outen had previously been convicted

        of at least three violent felonies, including multiple convictions for felony breaking and/or

        entering pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a) (2021). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The

        court sentenced Outen to 180 months’ imprisonment. Outen timely appealed.

               Outen’s sole assertion on appeal is that his North Carolina breaking and/or entering

        convictions cannot serve as predicate offenses under the ACCA because they do not qualify

        as “violent felon[ies].” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (providing 15-year mandatory minimum

        sentence for individual convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) with three prior convictions

        “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different

        from one another”). As relevant here, a “violent felony” under the ACCA is “any crime

        punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . is burglary” or one

        of several other enumerated crimes. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). “Whether an offense constitutes

        a violent felony under the ACCA is a question of law, and therefore we review it de novo.”

        United States v. Croft, 987 F.3d 93, 97 n.3 (4th Cir. 2021).

               *
                 Section 924(a)(2) was amended following Outen’s conviction and no longer
        provides the penalty for § 922(g) convictions. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub.
        L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022).

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               In analyzing whether a conviction under state law qualifies as “burglary” under the

        ACCA, “we compare the elements of the offense in question with the elements of burglary,

        under burglary’s generic definition.” United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 269 (4th Cir.

        2014). The generic definition of burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

        remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United

        States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). If the elements of the state offense are the same as or

        narrower than the generic definition, then a conviction under the state statute constitutes a

        predicate violent felony conviction under the ACCA. United States v. Dodge, 963 F.3d

        379, 382 (4th Cir. 2020).

               Outen argues that convictions under North Carolina’s breaking and/or entering

        statute cannot serve as ACCA predicates because the North Carolina statute’s elements are

        broader than those of generic burglary. However, as Outen acknowledges, in Mungro, we

        held that the North Carolina breaking and/or entering statute sweeps no more broadly than

        generic burglary as defined by the Supreme Court in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, and therefore

        a North Carolina breaking and/or entering conviction constitutes a violent felony under the

        ACCA. 754 F.3d at 272. Nevertheless, Outen argues that Mungro is not controlling here

        because it cannot be reconciled with two intervening Supreme Court decisions: United

        States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018), and Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016).

               In Dodge, we held that Mungro was still good law after Stitt and Mathis, rejecting

        Dodge’s argument that the North Carolina breaking and/or entering statute was too broad

        to constitute generic burglary for the purposes of the ACCA. Although we recognized that

        Mungro “could be read as being in tension with intervening Supreme Court reasoning,” we

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        ruled that Mungro was still binding, as it was not contradicted by any “directly applicable

        Supreme Court holding.” Dodge, 963 F.3d at 384-85.            Thus, Outen’s argument is

        foreclosed by our precedent.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the fact and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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