Court Opinion

ID: 9370456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 18:00:45.538827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:20.397854
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11266    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 02/13/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11266
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       VARONDRIA T. WILLIAMS,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       THE GEO GROUP, INC.,
       The Geo Group, Inc.
       a Florida Corporation
       d.b.a. GEO Secure Services, LLC,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11266

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-81960-WM
                             ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Varondria Williams, an African-American female, appeals
       from the district court’s dismissal of her civil suit raising claims of
       discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
       42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla.
       Stat. § 760.01; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and a claim of intentional in-
       fliction of emotional distress under Florida law. On appeal, she first
       argues that the magistrate judge, consented to by the parties, 1

       1 Williams   also argues that the magistrate judge was without subject-matter
       jurisdiction or authority to decide her case. Specifically, she contends because
       she consented to having a magistrate judge decide her case, and Magistrate
       Judge Dave Lee Brannon was initially assigned to do so, her consent was re-
       quired again to reassign the case to Magistrate Judge William Matthewman
       upon Magistrate Judge Brannon’s passing. We conclude that this challenge
       fails, in part, because she consented to “a magistrate judge” in her notice of
       consent and did not object to Magistrate Judge Matthewman presiding over
       the case throughout the entirety of the district court proceedings or seek to
       withdraw her consent. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003) (holding
       that consent for a magistrate judge to preside over a case can be inferred from
       a party’s conduct during litigation). Accordingly, we conclude that the mag-
       istrate judge had the authority to enter a final judgment in the case because
       the parties consented. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
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       22-11266               Opinion of the Court                         3

       abused his discretion by failing to recuse himself and issuing dis-
       covery orders that unfairly prejudiced her. Second, she contends
       that the magistrate judge also abused his discretion by dismissing
       her suit with prejudice for discovery-procedure violations.
             For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                        I.
              We generally review a judge’s decision not to recuse himself
       for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223,
       1227 (11th Cir. 2004). However, if a party fails to invoke a federal
       recusal statute to the district court, we instead review for plain er-
       ror. Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents, 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th
       Cir. 1983). We also review denial of discovery requests for abuse
       of discretion. Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir.
       2014). We will generally not overturn discovery rulings unless a
       party can show that a district court’s ruling resulted in substantial
       harm to the appealing party’s case. Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1297. Un-
       der an abuse of discretion standard, we will leave a district court’s
       ruling undisturbed unless we find that the court made a clear error
       of judgment or applied the wrong standard. Id.
              There are two bases under which a district court judge may
       recuse himself from a proceeding. First, under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a
       judge must recuse himself when a party to a district court proceed-
       ing “files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before
       whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
       against him or in favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit must
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11266

       state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice
       exists. Id. To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must
       allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actu-
       ally exists. United States v. Serrano, 607 F.2d 1145, 1150 (5th Cir.
       1979). 2 The affidavit must be filed not less than ten days before the
       beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
       good cause must be shown for failure to file it within such time. §
       144.
               Second, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify
       himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reason-
       ably be questioned.” Under § 455(b)(1), a judge must recuse him-
       self when he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.
       Additionally, § 455(b)(4) provides that a judge shall disqualify him-
       self when “he, individually or as a fiduciary, . . . has a financial in-
       terest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the pro-
       ceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected
       by the outcome of the proceeding.”
              Generally, evidence to support a claim of judicial bias “must
       stem from extrajudicial sources.” Hamm, 708 F.2d at 651. “Under
       § 455, the standard is whether an objective, fully informed lay ob-
       server would entertain significant doubt about a judge’s impartial-
       ity.” Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). For

       2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit decided prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       22-11266                Opinion of the Court                          5

       example, we have excluded regular consumer transactions from
       the scope of “financial interest” under § 455(b)(4) and § 455(d)(4).
       See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Sasser, 127 F.3d 1296, 1297 (11th Cir.
       1997) (holding that a frequent flyer account results from a con-
       sumer transaction in the ordinary course of doing business with a
       common carrier and is, thus, not grounds for recusal); cf. Liljeberg
       v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 867 (1988) (hold-
       ing that a district judge violated § 455(b)(4) by failing to recuse him-
       self after learning that he was a member of the board of trustees of
       a university with an interest in the outcome of the proceedings be-
       fore him).
              Here, we conclude that the magistrate judge did not abuse
       his discretion by failing to recuse himself because Williams neither
       moved for him to do so, nor provided extrajudicial sources to
       demonstrate that he was biased. Next, she otherwise has not
       demonstrated how the magistrate judge abused his discretion in
       any of the discovery orders based on her admitted violations of the
       order setting discovery procedure in the case. Accordingly, we af-
       firm in this respect.
                                         II.
              We generally review a dismissal sanction under Federal
       Rules of Civil Procedure 37 and 41 and under the district court’s
       inherent powers for abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great Am.
       Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999); Eagle Hosp. Phy-
       sicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.
       2009).
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11266

              An appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when she does
       not plainly and prominently raise it. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
       Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). “To obtain reversal of
       a district court judgment that is based on multiple, independent
       grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground
       for the judgment against [her] is incorrect.” Id. at 680.
              If a plaintiff fails to comply with a court order, the district
       court may sua sponte dismiss the case. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd.
       v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). “While dis-
       missal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an
       order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally
       is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,
       837 (11th Cir. 1989).
              Rule 37 provides a district court with the power to impose
       sanctions against uncooperative litigants. Phipps v. Blakeny, 8 F.3d
       788, 790 (11th Cir. 1993). Sanctions under Rule 37 are intended to
       (1) compensate the court and other parties for the added expenses
       caused by discovery abuses, (2) compel discovery, (3) deter others
       from engaging in similar conduct, and (4) penalize the offending
       party or attorney. Wouters v. Martin County, 9 F.3d 924, 933 (11th
       Cir. 1993). A district court may also issue an order compelling a
       party’s participation in discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
              Rule 41(b) provides that, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute
       or to comply with [the Rules of Civil Procedure] or a court order,
       a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against
       it.” Despite the plain language of Rule 41(b) indicating that a
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       22-11266                Opinion of the Court                           7

       defendant may move for dismissal, a district court may sua sponte
       dismiss a case under the authority of either (1) Rule 41(b) or (2) the
       court’s inherent power to manage its docket. Betty K Agencies,
       432 F.3d at 1337.
              Here, we conclude that Williams fails to expressly challenge
       each of the three independent bases on which the magistrate judge
       relied upon to dismiss suit, and she has accordingly forfeited her
       claim. Further, even if we assume arguendo that such challenges
       are implicitly preserved, they still fail. To the extent that she argues
       that her procedural deficiencies did not merit a dismissal, she oth-
       erwise concedes that she did not attend her court-ordered deposi-
       tion, which is a sufficient justification for a judge to dismiss her case
       with prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm.
              AFFIRMED.