Court Opinion

ID: 9618770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:16:57.959073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:16.975045
License: Public Domain

SHEDD, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately simply to address the analysis employed by the IJ in evaluating Dankam’s credibility with respect to past persecution. Part IV.A. of the majority opinion accurately recounts the five reasons given by the IJ in support of his determination that Dankam lacked credibility regarding her alleged past persecution. Each of these five bases for the adverse credibility determination was premised on some alleged contradiction or inconsistency between Dankam’s testimony and other evidence she offered. As a general rule, inconsistencies and contradictions in an applicant’s testimony or documentary evidence amount to cogent reasons sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.2006). However, in this case, two of the bases for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination strike me as enhancing Dankam’s credibility, not undermining it.
Specifically, the IJ focused on inconsistencies between Dankam’s testimony and the testimony given by Messi regarding the length of her incarceration; i.e., Dan-kam claimed that her incarceration in 2000 lasted merely two days, while Messi asserted that she was incarcerated for “considerably more than two days.” J.A. 124. Also, the IJ pointed out that Dankam claimed she had not been raped in prison, despite her own medical documentation in*125dicating that she had symptoms consistent with rape.* In each of these instances, Dankam’s testimony is less sensational than the allegedly conflicting evidence: she claims that she was imprisoned for only two days, not more; she claims that she was subjected to inhumane conditions, not raped. In short, rather than bolstering her asylum claim by embellishing her story, Dankam’s testimony suggests a more plausible explanation by resisting the urge to exaggerate, even at the cost of possibly contradicting other evidence. Much like an out-of-court statement against one’s own interest implies an intrinsic reliability sufficient to justify its admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), Dankam’s statements, which had potentially adverse implications for her asylum claim, carry an inherent ring of truth. Thus, in my view, to the extent these two statements by Dankam were inconsistent with other evidence offered at the hearing, they actually support her credibility instead of detracting from it. In cases such as this, where inconsistencies seem to militate in favor of an applicant’s credibility, the IJ should explain why the inconsistencies render the applicant’s testimony incredible.
Nevertheless, the additional grounds espoused by the IJ, as well as the other evidence in the record, provide substantial evidentiary support for the adverse credibility determination with respect to past persecution. Moreover, my review of the record reveals no evidence that would compel a result contrary to the one reached by the IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it....”). Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

 I note that Dankam's testimony, which stated she had not been raped, did not actually contradict the medical document, which merely indicated that she "showed symptoms of rape....” J.A. 371 (emphasis added). Thus, I believe that characterizing Dankam’s testimony as inconsistent with the medical document is not necessarily accurate.