Court Opinion

ID: 9756210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:15:23.716748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:50.387529
License: Public Domain

Wachenfeld, J.
(concurring). [1,2] I agree with Mr. Justice Hehek that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to warrant referring this case to the jury for its determination. The chain across the driveway was inherently an innocuous instrumentality, employed for the legitimate purpose of precluding access by automobiles and placed in position only after notice had been given. It was not defective or substandard in any respect, and Mrs. Lokar was fully cognizant of its presence. Under these circumstances, I am unable to discover any basis for an inference of negligence.
In our society, the concept of fault still predominates and not every injury entails Lability. The church did not fail in its duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of Mrs. Lokar.
But despite the fact that I am in concert with the majority as to the lack of adequate proof, I am constrained to go further and to express my approval of Mr. Justice Jacobs’ views concerning the doctrine of charitable immunity. The forceful and sustained demands for its abolishment, emanating from almost every quarter, are a strong indication that its demise is well overdue. Even the charities themselves are by no means universally content with their pro*570tected status, and this uneasiness is reflected in the provisions of the policy here involved. It is common to specify that the insurer may not invoke the defense of immunitj'' without permission from the insured charity.
Whether or not the doctrine originally gained a foothold in this country through mistaken adherence to outmoded English precedent, it would seem that under modern conditions there is little theoretical or pragmatical justification for its continued recognition. The barrier of immunity has been lowered on many fronts. It is a fundamental principle of humane and civilized justice that a wrongful injury should not go unrequited when redress is possible. The development of a comparatively inexpensive and convenient method of spreading the risk has obviated the threat that recoveries against charities will seriously deplete their funds and thereby deprive the community at large of the benefits which they bestow.
Experience in other jurisdictions has already demonstrated that no calamitous social effects result from a dissolution of charitable immunity. An individual should not be forced to suffer the unmitigated and ofttimes crushing burden of injuries wrongfully inflicted merely to continue a judicially inspired immunity long since outdated by the impact of modern times.
In my view of the case,- any expression relating to the doctrine of charitable immunity is pure dictum, but this concurrence will serve to indicate the trend of my thoughts should it become an issue requiring decision.
Wacheneeld, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance — Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld and Burling — 4.
For reversal — Justices Jacobs and Weintratjb — -2.