Court Opinion

ID: 9586315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:22.257292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:05.612643
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I believe that Williams failed to sufficiently comply with the pleading requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3). OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) (D), (E) and (F) provide that an answer asserting a claim to property subject to forfeiture must set forth, inter alia, the “circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property;. . . [t]he specific provision of this Code section relied on in asserting that the property is not subject to forfeiture; . . . [and] [a]ll essential facts supporting each assertion.” (Emphasis supplied.) The issue before us is not whether Williams’ answer sufficiently alleged that she is the “legal” title holder, as the State concedes this fact in its complaint. The issue is whether her answer sufficiently alleges facts supporting her position that she is not a mere nominee or strawperson with regard to her ownership interest in the vehicle, as alleged in the State’s complaint.
The majority opinion erroneously states that “[Williams] asserts that she purchased the used 1984 four-door Deville Cadillac on January 29, 1994 from Dixie Auto Sales in Decatur, Georgia.” (Emphasis supplied.)
To the contrary, Williams’ answer artfully avoids addressing who purchased the vehicle and who actually paid for same as required by law. Williams simply alleged that she was the owner of the vehicle, that Rodney Bernard Gude has no interest in the vehicle (par. 6), that she was solely responsible for payment of the purchase money loan, and that she “acquired her interest” in the vehicle prior to the subject criminal act.
Williams attached to her answer, but did not incorporate therein, a copy of the tag registration showing the vehicle was placed in her name, and a certificate of title dated March 19, 1994, showing her as the owner and Dixie Auto Sales as the first lienholder. The lien was satisfied on March 2, 1995.
Williams does not allege that she actually paid for the vehicle with personal funds or that no funds therefor were provided by Rodney Bernard Gude. Neither did she attach the most significant documents related to such issues, i.e., the sales contract, the note, if any, copies of cancelled checks or receipts showing payment.
The fact that a vehicle is placed in her name on the title (as alleged by the State) does not establish the circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition and all essential facts supporting Williams’ claim, as required by law. Title may be placed in the name of anyone at the direction of the purchasing individual and would be in the case of a nominee.
In State v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 623, n. 1 (399 SE2d 88) *274(1990) this Court stated “[w]e take note that in addressing the issue of standing it may be appropriate in some circumstances for courts to look beyond a bare allegation of legal title to determine whether the formal holder of title is nothing more than a “strawman” designed to conceal the illegal affairs of others. People engaged in illegal activities often attempt to disguise their interests in property by placing title in someone else’s name. The criminal’s need to hide his ownership of property is especially acute when the property itself is used in the illegal activity. In such cases, proof of base legal title may not be sufficient to establish standing.” (Citations omitted.)
OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) (D), (E) and (F) was drafted to deal with this type of situation and that is why it specifically requires that one asserting a claim for such property allege the “circumstances of the claimant’s acquisition of the interest in the property . . . [and] [a]ll essential facts supporting each assertion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply denying the State’s allegations and citing applicable Code sections, without asserting all essential facts supporting each assertion, is not sufficient to satisfy the pleading requirements of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3). See State v. Alford, 264 Ga. 243, 245 (444 SE2d 76) (1994); see also Jackson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 437, 439 (461 SE2d 594) (1995). Proof of legal title is not sufficient to establish standing in the instant case because the title holder is accused of being a mere nominee or strawperson. State v. Jackson, supra.
The fact that Williams actually purchased the vehicle with her own funds and the means by which Williams obtained the funds to do so were essential facts supporting her claim of innocent ownership. As such, Williams’ answer failed to comply with OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) (D), (E) and (F). This failure frustrated the mandate of the statute which was particularized “so as to assure some degree of legitimacy to the claim and to elicit supportive factual information so as to expedite the proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Cannon, 214 Ga. App. 897, 898 (449 SE2d 519) (1994).
Although the majority argues that this information does not need to be addressed at the pleading stage, this argument is not supported by the express statutory language of OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (3) or the caselaw. “It is well established that the legislature may impose pleading requirements in special statutory proceedings in addition to those found in the Civil Practice Act and in such cases, the sufficiency of a pleading must be judged in light of the specific statutory requirements.” Alford, supra. Thus, under the facts of this case, the trial court properly found that Williams’ answer was deficient.
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling. I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Smith join in this dissent.
*275Decided June 27, 1996
Reconsideration denied July 12,1996.
J. Ellis Millsaps, for appellant.
Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Alberto C. Martinez, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Lance K. Hiltbrand, for appellee.