Court Opinion

ID: 9942731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 20:04:13.927888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:23.468233
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 P. v. Murdoch CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B319573

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. NA020621-02
         v.

CHARLES FRANKLIN
MURDOCH, JR.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.

      Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       Forty years ago, Charles Franklin Murdoch, Jr. and
Dino Dinardo robbed the Horseshoe Bar in Long Beach. During
the robbery, bar patron Robert Nantais was shot and killed.
In 1995 a jury convicted Murdoch of the first degree murder
of Nantais. In 2020 Murdoch petitioned for resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.6.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the
superior court denied Murdoch’s petition. On appeal, Murdoch
contends the court erred by relying on the facts summarized
in the opinion on direct appeal rather than the trial transcripts
themselves.
       We affirm because Murdoch’s counsel not only did not
object to the court’s consideration of the appellate opinion—
he essentially stipulated to it as a correct statement of what
happened. Moreover, in any event, the testimony at Murdoch’s
trial establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was—
at a minimum—a major participant in the underlying robbery
and burglary who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     Robert Nantais is shot and killed at the
       Horseshoe Bar2
       On May 17, 1983, Dino Dinardo and Murdoch “came across
each other” in Dinardo’s neighborhood. Dinardo had known

1    References to statutes are to the Penal Code. Effective
June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered section
1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2     We take our statement of facts from the testimony at
Murdoch’s trial. We previously granted Murdoch’s Request for
Judicial Notice attaching the reporters’ and clerk’s transcripts
from the trial.

                                2
Murdoch in the 1970s. Murdoch was with another person.3
Murdoch asked Dinardo if he wanted to make some money.
Dinardo asked how. Murdoch said something about “do[ing]
a job”; he said, “I know this place where we can make some
money,” and “we need your help.” Knowing Murdoch as he did,
Dinardo understood “it must have meant a hold-up or something
. . . or some type of thievery involved.” Dinardo asked, “[H]ow
[are] we going to do this,” and “they replied, well, with a gun, and
the one guy was going to carry a knife.” They said they needed
Dinardo to go in the front, and then when they had “everyone
covered,” to grab the cash out of the cash register. Murdoch
told Dinardo no one was going to get hurt.
         Dinardo, Murdoch, and the second man got into a car
driven by a third man. They drove to the alley behind the
Horseshoe Bar. Dinardo and the second man went into the bar
from the front and stood by a pinball machine. Murdoch entered
from the rear a minute or two later.4 Murdoch said, “Don’t
nobody move.” He said something like, “This is a stick-up
or a robbery.” “That was [Dinardo’s] cue to grab the money.”
“[R]ight after” that, Dinardo heard a gunshot.
         Dinardo was “pretty scared”; he jumped over the bar and
tried to get the cash register open. Dinardo finally got the cash
register open, took out the money, put it in his pockets, and went

3     This second man apparently never has been identified.
We’ll refer to him as the second man.
4     Dinardo testified Murdoch had a .22 caliber rifle in his
hands when he came into the bar. As discussed below, the jury
found the allegation that Murdoch personally used a firearm
in the commission of the crime not true.

                                 3
out the back door. Dinardo, Murdoch, and the other two men
split the money—approximately $200—four ways.
       Dyanne Spence was working at the Horseshoe Bar that
night as a bartender. Around 9:00 p.m. Spence was talking to
a man named Edward Snow. She “noticed movement” behind
Snow. She “glanced that way” and saw a rifle being pointed
toward Nantais. When asked at trial if she saw the man in
court who’d had the rifle, Spence answered, “[D]efinitely,”
and identified Murdoch. She said, “He has piercing dark eyes
and the frightening look.”
       After the rifle “went off,” Spence heard someone say,
“ ‘This is a robbery.’ ” According to Spence, Murdoch then pointed
the rifle at her and said, “ ‘Don’t look at me. I will blow your
f-ing head off.’ ” Murdoch was 13 or 14 feet from Spence. Snow
told Spence to put her hands on the bar and look at the floor.
Spence “[s]tarted to glance down but [she] looked directly
at Mr. Murdoch’s eyes because there was a rifle pointed
in [her] face.” Spence glanced to her right and saw a man
“being stabbed numerous times.”
       One of the men took cash from the register. After the men
left, Spence called the police. Paramedics arrived very quickly.
Spence gave police a description of the perpetrators. Spence said
the man with the rifle had “[d]ark piercing eyes”; he was wearing
a white t-shirt, a military-style cap, and military boots. “The
eyes were the main thing.” Spence told police the man who took
money from the cash register had “longish, stragglish blond hair.”
       Police showed Spence a number of photographs. She
was not able to identify anyone. She told them “it would help
if [she] saw a lineup or in person so [she] could look at his eyes
and movement.”
       Carol Halliburton was also in the Horseshoe Bar that
night. She was sitting at the bar with Nantais. She heard a

                                4
male voice say—“in a very controlling, loud manner”—“ ‘Don’t
look at me.’ ” Halliburton turned around to her right and
looked back. She saw a man holding a sawed-off rifle. Nantais
“was slumping over”; he whispered, “ ‘Call the ambulance.’ ”
       At trial, Halliburton testified Murdoch “look[ed] very
similar” to the man with the rifle. When asked in what way he
looked similar, Halliburton answered, “He has peculiar eyes,”
adding, “It’s just something you can’t forget.”
       James Hall was at the Horseshoe Bar that night as well.
At trial, Hall testified that trying to recall what happened that
night was “like trying to remember a bad dream.” Hall said
he’d noticed “a Latino looking person” on his right, and “he had
a small handgun,” “like a .38.” Hall was “blank on the rest of it.”
       Hall “woke up on the table” in the hospital. He suffered
“[t]wo stab wounds,” “[o]ne to the spine and one over to the
kidney area.” Hall’s arm also was wounded. When he woke up,
“[t]hey were sewing up [his] elbow.”
       When asked if he saw the man in the courtroom who’d
been to his right, Hall replied, “No. . . . The one I saw was more
light.” Hall attended a live line-up but was unable to make
an identification.
2.     Murdoch’s arrest, the charges, trial, and verdicts
       The case remained unsolved for more than a decade.
Some 11 years after the crimes were committed, authorities
finally acquired the technology to process latent fingerprints
found on the coin tray of the cash register at the bar. The prints
led authorities to Dinardo. Police arrested him in Berkeley in
June 1994. Dinardo admitted he’d been involved in the crimes.
Dinardo implicated Murdoch.
       After authorities arrested Murdoch, Spence attended
a live line-up in September 1994. She identified Murdoch.
Spence wrote, “ ‘I think it’s him. I’m not sure.’ ” At trial Spence

                                 5
explained, “I went right to him, knowing it was him, but I was
afraid.” At trial, the prosecutor stood behind Murdoch and
asked Spence, “[T]aking a look at the person I’m standing behind,
are you positive that this is the person that came into the bar on
May 17th, 1983, pointed a rifle at you, and shot Robert Nantais?”
Spence replied, “Beyond a shadow of a doubt.”
       The People charged Murdoch and Dinardo with the murder
of Nantais and the attempted murder of Hall. The People alleged
the defendants committed the murder while engaged in the
commission of burglary and robbery. The People also alleged
Murdoch personally used a firearm—a rifle—in the commission
of the murder, and a principal was armed with a firearm—
a rifle—in the commission of both the murder and the
attempted murder.
       Dinardo was tried first, convicted, and sentenced to
25 years to life. Dinardo later entered into an agreement
with the prosecution to testify truthfully at Murdoch’s trial in
exchange for a reduction of his offense to voluntary manslaughter
and a sentence of 12 years (11 years for the offense and one year
for the firearm enhancement).
       At trial, a coroner testified Nantais was shot on the right
side of his back. The bullet pierced his carotid artery and exited
through the left side of his neck. That gunshot wound was fatal.
       On December 28, 1995, a jury convicted Murdoch of both
the murder and the attempted murder. The jury found the
special circumstances true: that the murder was committed
while Murdoch was engaged in burglary and robbery. The
jury also found true the allegation that, in the commission
of the offense, a principal was armed. However, the jury
found not true the allegation that Murdoch had personally
used a firearm in the commission of the murder. The trial court
sentenced Murdoch to life without parole on the murder count,

                                6
plus one year for the principal armed enhancement, and to life
on the attempted murder count, to be served concurrently with
the murder sentence.
       On March 25, 1998, a different panel of this court
affirmed Murdoch’s conviction on the murder count but reversed
his conviction on the attempted murder count as barred by the
statute of limitations. (People v. Murdoch (Mar. 25, 1998,
B100877) [nonpub. opn.] (Murdoch I).)
3.     Murdoch’s petition for resentencing
       On September 18, 2020, Murdoch filed a petition for
resentencing. On a preprinted form, Murdoch checked boxes
stating the information had “allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder,” he’d been convicted at trial
of “1st or 2nd degree murder [under] the felony murder rule,”
and he “could not now be convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder
because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.” Murdoch also checked box 5 and all of its
subparts, stating he “could not now be convicted” under those
changes to the Penal Code because he was “not the actual killer,”
he “did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet, counsel, command,
induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree,” and he “was not a
major participant in the felony or [he] did not act with reckless
indifference to human life during the course of the crime or
felony.” In addition, Murdoch wrote in, “There is no evidence
in the record that I did any of the above acts,” and “My jury
on 12-28-95 specifically found me NOT GUILTY of P.C.
§ 12022.5(a).”
       Murdoch also checked box 7, stating, “There has been
a prior determination by a court or jury that I was not a major
participant and/or did not act with reckless indifference to human
life under Penal Code § 190.2(d). Therefore, I am entitled to be

                                7
re-sentenced pursuant to § 1170.95(d)(2).” Murdoch wrote in,
“Jury found me NOT GUILTY of the charged P.C. § 12022.5(a)
allegation.” Murdoch checked box 4 asking the court to appoint
counsel for him, adding, “Please do NOT appoint original counsel
Peacock to my case. Please appoint the Public Defender.”5
      The superior court appointed bar panel attorney Kieran
P. Brown to represent Murdoch. On November 10, 2020,
the prosecution filed its response to Murdoch’s petition. The
prosecution took its “statement of the case” from Murdoch I,
the opinion on direct appeal. The prosecution asserted the
court could “consider any evidence that is part of the ‘record of
conviction,’ ” including the information, the preliminary hearing
transcript, and the “appellate record and opinion affirming the
judgment,” citing People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 451.
      Brown apparently filed a reply to the prosecution’s
response but it is not part of the appellate record. Murdoch’s
appellate counsel sent a letter to the superior court dated
August 24, 2022, noting the record was incomplete and asking
the court to certify and transmit that document to the court
of appeal with copies to counsel. On September 1, 2022, a
deputy clerk for the superior court issued a certificate stating
the court file, courtroom, clerk’s office, and archives had
been searched and the documents “were not located.”
      After several continuances, the parties appeared before the
court on April 4, 2022. Murdoch was present. The court stated,

5     The Office of the Alternate Public Defender represented
Murdoch from at least December 1994 until July 14, 1995.
On that date, the Alternate Public Defender’s office declared
a conflict and the trial court appointed bar panel attorney
Stephen Peacock.

                                8
“My understanding is even though . . . a jury found the special
circumstance to be true in this matter, that I still have to have
an OSC under the current law.” The court continued, “I have
read the summary of the facts. I received a disk on Friday but I
was not here. So I guess I shouldn’t say I personally received it.”
The court said, “I haven’t reviewed the disk. My understanding
is it’s just the transcripts and the appellate opinion, but I have
read the People’s summary of the appellate opinion.”
        The court then asked Murdoch’s counsel, “Mr. Brown,
do you have any difference of opinion?” Counsel replied, “No,
Your Honor. It’s accurate.” Counsel continued, “It’s important
to note that . . . while the jury found the special circumstance
true, they found the personal use of a gun not true in this case,
but he was convicted and clearly was under felony murder.
So the issue is whether or not he is ineligible because he was
the actual killer or acted with reckless disregard, et cetera.”
        The prosecutor told the court the disk “that was provided
does contain the appellate opinion and the clerk’s records and the
reporter’s transcripts.” The prosecutor asked the court to “receive
the disk as Exhibit 1.” The prosecutor continued, “In terms of the
opinion, I would ask that the court only consider the procedural
history portion of that opinion.”
        The prosecutor argued Murdoch was the actual killer or,
in the alternative, “he is also guilty pursuant to felony murder
laws as they are constituted today.” The prosecutor stated
Spence identified Murdoch as the shooter. Spence testified, the
prosecutor said, that she saw Murdoch point a rifle at Nantais,
that he “personally shot” Nantais, and that he then announced
to everyone else present, “ ‘This is a robbery.’ ”
        The prosecutor noted Murdoch “came up with the idea to
do this particular robbery,” and he asked Dinardo if he wanted
to “ ‘make money by doing a job.’ ” The prosecutor concluded,

                                9
“So based on the strength of the evidence that is contained in the
clerk’s transcripts, Your Honor, and in the reporter’s transcripts
and in the procedural portion of the opinion, the prosecution
would ask that this court find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the petitioner is the actual killer of Mr. Nantais and . . . is not
entitled to resentencing pursuant to 1170.95.”
       Brown responded, “I would agree with what the record
shows as most of the testimony.” Brown noted witnesses were
unable to identify Murdoch in “pictures” they were shown
“shortly after the time of the murder.” However, Brown
also noted Spence identified Murdoch in a live lineup about
nine years later.
       Brown told the court Murdoch had “always maintained his
actual innocence.” Brown said he had “no independent evidence
to put on today.” He did have a “statement” that Murdoch
wanted him to read to the court. The prosecutor didn’t object
to Murdoch reading the statement himself, so he did. Murdoch
said he thought about Nantais and his family “and the other
folks involved in this case every day.” Murdoch told the court,
“I’m not guilty of this crime. I was wrongfully convicted. I didn’t
have anything to do with this.” Brown confirmed he had “no
other evidence to present at this point in time,” so he “rest[ed].”
       Citing the opinion on direct appeal, the court noted the
“not true” finding on the personal use of a firearm allegation.
The court stated it did not agree with “the conclusion . . . that . . .
the jury did not believe [Murdoch] shot the victim.” The court
said, “So I don’t find that is definitive that he wasn’t an actual
killer.” The court concluded, “So having reviewed the opinion”
and listened to counsel, “I find that there is enough evidence
in the court’s opinion to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant did, in fact, commit this murder.”

                                  10
                          DISCUSSION
1.     Section 1172.6
       “In Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the
felony-murder rule. It also created a path to relief for defendants
who had previously been convicted of murder on a felony-murder
theory but who could not have been convicted under the new law.
Resentencing is available under the new law if the defendant
neither killed nor intended to kill and was not ‘a major
participant in the underlying felony [who] acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[Penal Code] section 190.2’ (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (e); see id.,
§ 1172.6; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 3–4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).”
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703 (Strong). See People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 440, 448–449.)
       Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism by which a person
convicted of murder under the former law may be resentenced
if he could no longer be convicted of murder because of the
changes to section 188. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.
See generally People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 843; People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959–960.) Once a petitioner
establishes a prima facie case for relief and the superior court
issues an order to show cause, the matter proceeds to an
evidentiary hearing at which it is the prosecution’s burden to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing. (Strong, at pp. 708–709; People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.) If the court finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder notwithstanding the
amendments to sections 188 and 189, the petitioner is ineligible
for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, at pp. 708–709; Vargas,
at p. 951.)

                                 11
       In Senate Bill No. 775 (Senate Bill 775), our Legislature
amended the statute, effective January 1, 2022, to clarify what
evidence is admissible at the evidentiary hearing. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 551, § 2.) The Evidence Code governs the admission of
evidence at the hearing, “except that the court may consider
evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that
is admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court
may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Courts
have held that, “by allowing consideration of ‘ “the procedural
history” ’ in a prior appellate opinion, the Legislature intended
to prohibit consideration of ‘the factual summar[y]’ in a prior
appellate opinion.” (People v. Vance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706,
713 (Vance), citing People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 292.)
2.     The evidentiary hearing in this case
       The record here does not reflect if the superior court
ever expressly found Murdoch had made a prima facie showing
of eligibility for resentencing, or issued an order to show cause.
However, on the April 4 date, the court referred to “an OSC,”
heard from both sides, applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of proof, and made findings.
       Murdoch’s complaint on appeal is not that the court failed
to conduct an evidentiary hearing, but rather that the court
erred in considering only the prosecution’s summary of the facts
set forth in the opinion on direct appeal. While the prosecutor
had submitted a “disk” that contained the clerk’s and reporter’s
transcripts from Murdoch’s trial as well as the opinion on direct

                                12
appeal, the court said it hadn’t read them.6 Nor, apparently, had
the court read the appellate opinion—only “the summary of the
facts,” presumably referring to the prosecution’s November 2020
response to Murdoch’s petition. Plainly aware of the statute’s
terms as amended by Senate Bill 775, the prosecutor emphasized
she was asking the court “only [to] consider the procedural
history portion of that opinion.”
       But Murdoch did not object to the court’s consideration
of the facts in the appellate opinion. To the contrary, when
asked if he had “any difference of opinion” regarding “the People’s
summary of the appellate opinion,” Murdoch’s counsel replied,
“No, Your Honor. It’s accurate.” The important point, from
counsel’s perspective, was the jury’s “not true” finding on
the allegation that Murdoch had personally used a firearm.
       Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 706, is instructive. There,
“[a]t the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution requested judicial
notice of the record in the underlying case. The trial court did
not expressly rule on the request; however, it said it was relying
solely on the facts as stated in [the] opinion in the direct appeal.”
(Id. at p. 711.) The court denied the petition for resentencing,
finding the petitioner was the actual killer or a major participant
in the underlying burglary and acted with reckless indifference
to human life. (Ibid.)
       The appellate court affirmed. The court cited the “general
rule” that “if inadmissible evidence is admitted without objection,
it is substantial evidence; the failure to object forfeits its

6     While the prosecutor asked the court to “receive the disk
as Exhibit 1,” the record does not reflect the court admitted the
disk as evidence. It is not part of the record on appeal.

                                 13
admissibility.” (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, citing
Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) The court continued,
            “Our research has not revealed any legislative
            history explaining why the Legislature chose
            to make such an opinion inadmissible as
            evidence of the factual background of the case.
            Presumably, however, it was because the
            record itself is better evidence. . . . [¶] [There]
            are good reasons to make an appellate opinion
            inadmissible. However, they are not good
            reasons to preclude the trier of fact from
            considering an appellate opinion under any
            circumstances. For example, a petitioner
            who feels that an appellate opinion is accurate
            and complete may well prefer to offer it to
            the trial court, in lieu of the entire record,
            for convenience. Presumably that is why
            defense counsel did not object here.” (Vance,
            at pp. 713–714.)
      The Vance court concluded the petitioner had forfeited
any objection to the court’s consideration of the opinion on direct
appeal. (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 714.) The court also
applied a harmless error analysis (see People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836), noting petitioner could not “show that, if
the opinion had been excluded, he would have enjoyed a more
favorable result.” (Vance, at p. 714.) The court observed,
“Presumably, in that event, the trial court would have considered
the record of conviction[7]; the prosecution had done everything it

7    The hearing in this case took place on a Monday, April 4,
2022. The court noted the disk had been submitted the previous

                                14
could to get it to take judicial notice of the record. [The petitioner
had] never claimed that [the appellate] opinion misrepresented
or omitted any material part of the record.” (Ibid.)8
       Here, Murdoch’s counsel not only did not object to the
court’s consideration of the facts in the appellate opinion; he
expressly stated the prosecution’s summary of those facts was
“accurate.” On appeal, Murdoch has not identified anything
in the prosecution’s summary of the facts in the trial court—
or of anything in the statement of facts in Murdoch I—that
is inaccurate.
3.     In any event, the testimony at Murdoch’s trial
       establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that he
       is not entitled to relief
       a.     The jury’s “not true” finding on the personal use
              of a firearm allegation precludes the court from
              concluding Murdoch was the actual killer
       As noted, Spence insisted Murdoch was the man who
pointed a rifle at her. Dinardo also testified he saw Murdoch
with a rifle, both in the car and at the Horseshoe Bar.
Nevertheless, the jury found “not true” the allegation that
Murdoch had personally used a firearm in the commission of
the crimes, finding true only the “principal armed” allegation.

Friday, when the judge was not in court. Had Murdoch objected
to the court’s reliance on the prosecutor’s summary of the fact
discussion in the opinion on direct appeal, the court simply
could have put the evidentiary hearing over until it had had
an opportunity to read the approximately 1,700 pages of record.
8    The California Supreme Court denied review in Vance
on October 25, 2023 (S281865).

                                 15
       Courts—including, most recently, our colleagues in
Division Two—have held such a “not true” finding by a jury
precludes an evidentiary finding at a section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3) hearing that the petitioner used a weapon. (People v.
Arnold (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 376, 379, 385–386 [court erred
in finding defendant stabbed the victim after jury found not true
an allegation that defendant personally used a knife]; People
v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1007, 1020 [court erred
in finding defendant personally used a firearm during robbery
in contradiction to jury’s not-true finding on allegation
defendant personally used a firearm]; People v. Cooper (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 393, 397–398 [court erred in finding defendant
possessed and fired a gun in light of jury’s acquittal on felon
in possession count].) The Attorney General contends Cooper
is “inconsistent” with our Supreme Court’s opinion in Strong.
The Attorney General has not cited a single published case
adopting this view.
       However, we need not wade into this controversy. The
testimony at Murdoch’s trial establishes beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was a major participant in the burglary and
robbery of the Horseshoe Bar and he acted with reckless
indifference for human life.9

9      Having erroneously made a finding that Murdoch was the
actual killer, the court did not consider the alternative argument
that Murdoch was a major participant in the underlying felonies
and acted with reckless indifference for human life. We will not
disturb on appeal a ruling that itself is correct in law merely
because it as given for a wrong reason. (People v. Smithey (1999)
20 Cal.4th 936, 971–972; accord People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th
1, 50.)

                                16
       b.      Murdoch is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
       Resentencing is available under the new law if the
defendant neither killed nor intended to kill and was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as section 190.2, subdivision
(d) describes it. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.) In People
v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), and again in In re Scoggins (2020)
9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), our Supreme Court identified the
overlapping factors for assessing whether the defendant was a
major participant in an underlying serious felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life for purposes of section 190.2,
subdivision (d), and thus for section 189, subdivision (e)(3).
These three cases charted a “spectrum of culpability” set forth
in two opinions from the United States Supreme Court: Enmund
v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, and Tison v. Arizona (1987)
481 U.S. 137 (Tison).
       “[I]t is important to consider where the defendant’s conduct
falls on the ‘spectrum of culpability’ that Enmund and Tison
established. . . . On one end of the spectrum is Enmund, ‘the
minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental
state.’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 675.) At the other end
of the spectrum are the 19- and 20-year-old defendants in the
Tison case, who were major participants who acted with reckless
indifference to human life, even though neither of them shot
any murder victim. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 139–142, 158.)
The California Supreme Court has embraced these federal
decisions as “instructive.” (Scoggins, at p. 675.)
       In Banks the Supreme Court listed the following factors
to consider in determining whether the defendant was a major
participant in one of the specified felonies: “What role did the

                                17
defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led
to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in
supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the
defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of
the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the
other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene
of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual
murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a
particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after
lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
       Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and
an objective element. As to the subjective element, the defendant
must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner
in which the particular offense is committed, and he must
consciously disregard the significant risk of death his actions
create. As to the objective element, the risk of death must be
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard
of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
       In Scoggins the Supreme Court listed the following factors
to consider in determining whether the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life: “Did the defendant use or
know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many
weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically
present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to
restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration
of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and
the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or
her confederate’s propensity for violence or likelihood of using
lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize

                               18
the risks of violence during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9
Cal.5th at p. 677; see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–622.)
       The requirements for finding major participation and
reckless indifference to human life significantly overlap, for
the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder,
the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to
human life. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615; see People v.
Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1023.) No one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; see Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) “We analyze the totality of
circumstances” (Scoggins, at p. 677; see People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 592) to determine whether Murdoch
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       We apply the Banks/Clark/Scoggins factors to the
evidence here:
             i.    Major participant
       Role in planning. Murdoch planned the robbery, whether
alone or with the second man.10 Murdoch recruited Dinardo to
help, telling Dinardo he (Murdoch) knew a place where they could
“make some money.” According to Dinardo, “they”—apparently
referring to Murdoch and the second man—explained how the
event would go down: Dinardo was to go in the front of the bar

10    There is no indication Murdoch ever has identified the
second man. Of course, he had no obligation to do so. Murdoch
did, however, have a right to “offer new or additional evidence”
at the hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Murdoch has never
claimed that the second man was the shooter, that he didn’t know
the second man was armed, or that the second man misled him
about the nature of the enterprise. Murdoch told the court only
that he was innocent and had nothing to do with the crimes.

                              19
and then, when Murdoch and the second man had “everyone
covered,” to grab the cash.
       Supplying weapons. As we have said, the jury’s finding
on the personal use enhancement bars a conclusion that Murdoch
personally used a firearm. While Dinardo testified he saw
Murdoch with the rifle in the car, there is no evidence of where
the rifle came from or where the shooter—if the second man
was the shooter—got the murder weapon. And while someone
stabbed the second victim with a knife, there is no evidence as
to where that knife came from, other than Dinardo’s testimony
that “they” told him “the one guy was going to carry a knife.”
       Awareness of danger posed by nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of other participants. There
is no evidence as to whether Murdoch had committed crimes
with the second man or knew him to be dangerous.
       Defendant’s presence at the scene of killing, in a position
to facilitate or prevent the actual murder; role of defendant’s own
actions or inaction in the death. Murdoch was at the scene from
start to finish. Murdoch recruited Dinardo to come along, telling
him “we need your help.” Murdoch, the second man, and Dinardo
rode in the same car to the bar and parked in back. Shortly
after Dinardo and the second man entered the bar as planned,
Murdoch entered from the rear and said, “Don’t nobody move.”
There is no evidence Murdoch tried to restrain the shooter.
(See In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1012 (McDowell)
[defendant “was present at the scene of the shooting and had
an opportunity to restrain [shooter], or otherwise intervene
on [victim’s] behalf”]; People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
245, 273 (Montanez) [defendant’s “presence at the crime scene
afforded him the opportunity to observe additional facts showing
the crimes posed a serious risk of danger to” the victim].)

                                20
       Actions after the use of lethal force. After the shooter shot
Nantais and Dinardo got the cash out of the register, Murdoch
made no effort to check on Nantais, aid him, or summon help—
even anonymously. Instead, Murdoch returned to the waiting car
with the second man and Dinardo, later splitting the proceeds
with them and getting his $50 share.
             ii.   Reckless indifference to human life
       Use of guns or knowledge a gun would be used. When
Murdoch recruited Dinardo to help with the robbery, Dinardo
asked how they were going to do it and “they replied, well, with
a gun.”
       Number of weapons ultimately used. The perpetrator used
a rifle and a second perpetrator—the one who stabbed Hall—
used a knife. Hall testified he saw a person to his right with a
small handgun. The record doesn’t contain further information
about this second gun.
       Physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain
the crime. Again, Murdoch was present during the robbery
and the shooting. He could have tried to stop the shooter or
warn Nantais. The United States Supreme Court has “stressed
the importance of presence to culpability.” (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 619, citing Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.)
“ ‘[T]he defendant’s presence gives him an opportunity to act as
a restraining influence on murderous cohorts.’ ” (Clark, at p. 619.
See Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 282 [defendant “was
physically present at the crime scene and had an opportunity
to restrain his cohorts and aid the victims”]; People v. Nieber
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 478–479 [defendant present at
robbery; didn’t intervene to prevent murder]; McDowell, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014 [defendant “was present when the
violence ensued but took no steps to prevent it”].)

                                21
       Duration of interaction between perpetrators and victim.
The record does not reveal the precise amount of time that passed
from the moment Murdoch, the second man, and Dinardo arrived
at the bar and parked in the rear until they fled with the cash.
It was sufficient, however, for the three of them to go into the
bar, for Murdoch to say, “Don’t nobody move” and “This is a
stick-up or a robbery,” for the second man then to shoot Nantais,
for Dinardo then to jump over the bar, struggle to get the
cash register open, finally get it open and grab the cash,
and for the threesome then to leave the bar, return to the car,
and drive away. This sequence of events was not instantaneous
or fleeting.
       Defendant’s knowledge of confederate’s propensity for
violence or likelihood of using lethal force. Again, there is no
evidence on this point.
       Efforts, if any, to minimize risks of violence during the
felony. Murdoch made no such efforts. Again, Murdoch was
instrumental in the planning of the robbery and he was present
throughout the perpetration of the crime. There is no evidence
he did anything to intervene or dissuade the second man from
shooting Nantais. (Cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 678
[defendant, who remained at nearby gas station during
the course of the crime, “was not in a position to restrain”
the shooter]; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 807 [defendant
“did not see the shooting happen, did not have reason to know
it was going to happen, and could not do anything to stop” it];
In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1025–1026 [defendant
was “across the street” and “did not see or know if anyone was
shot or hurt”].) Murdoch had the opportunity to intervene.
He just chose not to.
       “If lethal force is not part of the plan, ‘absence from
the scene may significantly diminish culpability for death.’ ”

                               22
(McDowell, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 1012, quoting Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. 5.) “ ‘As a corollary, there may
be significantly greater culpability for accomplices who are
present.’ ” (McDowell, at p. 1012, quoting In re Loza (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 38, 50; accord, Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158.
Cf. In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 963–964 [defendant
was not “present at the scene when the shooting occurred”];
In re Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1008–1009 [defendant
helped plan robbery of drug dealer and called victim to set up
meeting, but was urinating in parking lot when two cohorts
crossed the street, went into the victim’s apartment, and
shot him; defendant didn’t even know victim had been killed
until later].)
       Taking all of these factors into consideration, we conclude
the evidence presented at Murdoch’s trial establishes beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was a major participant in the burglary
and robbery of the Horseshoe Bar and he acted with reckless
indifference for human life.
       c.     If the trial court failed to consider Murdoch’s age,
              any error was harmless
       Murdoch was about 11 weeks shy of his twenty-sixth
birthday when he committed the crimes in this case.11 Murdoch
contends he “was a youth offender” on the date of the offense
and the court “erred in not considering [his] age when evaluating
whether [he] acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
       On August 31, 2021, Division Three of the First District
Court of Appeal issued In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434.
In that case, the defendant was 16 at the time of the shooting.

11   As noted, the crimes took place on May 17, 1983. Murdoch
turned 26 on August 6, 1983.

                                23
The court, “ ‘upon consideration of the factors identified in
Clark[,] [supra, 63 Cal.4th 522,] together with Moore’s youth
at the time of his offenses,’ ” “found insufficient evidence that
Moore acted with reckless disregard to human life.” (People v.
Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 487 (Oliver).)
       Murdoch’s counsel didn’t cite Moore, nor did he mention
Murdoch’s age or ask the court to consider age. Putting aside
any issue of forfeiture, any failure by the trial court to consider
Murdoch’s age is harmless in any event. “Presumably, the
presumption of immaturity weakens as a defendant approaches
26. More importantly, . . . the case law discussing the differences
in brain development among youthful offenders (in contrast
to their adult counterparts) stress[es] two areas of divergence:
(1) their relative impulsivity; and (2) their vulnerability to peer
pressure. (See, e.g., Miller[ ] [v. Alabama (2012)] 567 U.S. [460,]
461.) There is no evidence in this case that [Murdoch’s] criminal
behavior was motivated by either of these two factors.” (Oliver,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 488–489.)
       As in Oliver, “we are not presented here with a situation
where a youthful offender was swept up in circumstances beyond
his or her control that led to an unintended death.” (Oliver,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) Murdoch and the second man
had a plan to rob the bar and they carried out their plan,
recruiting Dinardo to assist.

                                24
                          DISPOSITION
    We affirm the trial court’s order denying Charles Franklin
Murdoch, Jr.’s petition for resentencing.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                   EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

                              25