Court Opinion

ID: 9670594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:23:06.890324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:05.473619
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
I
I concur in the result. I write separately because although I agree with the majority that the DavisFrye1 test is applicable to the type of scientific evidence which was admitted and that this case must be remanded so that a proper foundation may be laid, I do not agree with the majority’s application of Davis-Frye nor its interpretation of Barbara-Tobey.2
A court applying Davis-Frye must determine whether both the technique and the underlying principle or theory have been "generally accepted” by members of the field.
"Resolving this issue involves focusing on the distinction between the validity of a technique and the validity of its underlying theory. One could accept, for instance, the validity of the premise underlying voice-print identification — voice uniqueness — but still reject the validity of the voiceprint technique. Similarly, the *26underlying psychological and physiological principles of polygraph evidence could be acknowledged without endorsing the proposition that a polygraph examiner can detect deception by means of the polygraph technique.
"A novel forensic technique, however, may involve either the new application of a well-established theory or the application of a new theory. In the latter case, the theory can be validated only empirically or inferentially, not deductively. In other words, the successful application of the technique proves the validity of the underlying theory or principle. In terms of the Frye test, if the technique is generally accepted, then the theory must be valid although not fully understood or explainable.”3
The court must also determine whether the technique is reliable. General acceptability and reliability are not synonymous. To equate general acceptance with reliability would present "an abandonment of Frye because the reliability of a scientific technique could be established notwithstanding its lack of general acceptance in the scientific community”.4 The probative value of scientific evidence is dependent upon its proven reliability. If a technique is not reliable, evidence derived from that technique is not relevant.5
The theory of serological electrophoresis is recognized in the scientific community and has been applied in a wide variety of situations.6 The concern herein is with whether application of this principle to genetic marker phenotyping of dried blood samples has achieved general scientific ac*27ceptance as a reliable identification technique, a concern which cannot be resolved on the present state of the record.
II
I would not interpret Barbara-Tobey as precluding the testimony of experts whose work is intimately connected with a particular scientific technique. Whether an expert witness is disinterested and impartial is one of the many elements to be weighed by the trial judge in deciding whether the expert is competent. Aside from this preliminary and limited inquiry, determination of interest and bias should be an issue for jury determination, no less so in the evaluation of expert witness testimony than with that of the testimony of any other witness.
I agree that the testimony of technicians alone may be an insufficient basis on which to conclude that general scientific recognition has been established. This Court’s evaluation of the record evidence in both Barbara and Tobey was that the testimony offered did not establish a clear consensus by the general scientific community. For example, in Barbara, fn 2 supra, p 358, "all submitted testimony was given by polygraph operators, polygraph teachers or others connected with the use of polygraphs”. This Court found that "acceptance by scientists rather than polygraph operators has not been general and widespread”. Id., p 376.
To construe Barbara-Tobey to require that the Davis-Frye foundation be established by one who is disinterested and impartial although otherwise competent is inconsistent with the rationale for the Davis-Frye rule which is that scientific expert testimony tends to carry undue weight in the *28minds of jurors. Once evidence of a new scientific technique has been properly admitted, the jury should be permitted to weigh the credibility, i.e., bias and interest, of the expert witness. The significance for the weight of the evidence of a financial interest in the outcome or of the prestige associated with the development of new procedures is a classic issue for jury resolution. A contrary view must be based upon the incorrect assumption that there exists a body of "pure” scientists whose work is divorced from such human considerations as personal prestige or economic gain.
Scientific advances may originate from altruistic or materialistic motives, or any combination thereof. These are issues relating to the probative value of the witnesses’ testimony, which for two centuries have been regarded as within the competence of jurors. Unless we are to conclude that jurors are somehow less capable of evaluating the bias and interest of those in the fields of science and technology than they are of assessing the weight and credibility of the testimony of physicians or engineers, there is no justification for the Barbara-Tobey limitation.
A broad reading of Barbara-Tobey also imposes an unnecessary barrier to the introduction of probative evidence, as illustrated by the present case. The key expert witness at trial was Mark Stolorow, then employed by the Michigan State Police as a forensic serologist. Mr. Stolorow is a co-developer of the technique and testified that he devoted approximately 90% of his work time to using the technique on bloodstain samples received at the State Police Crime Laboratory. Clearly, Mr. Stolorow appears to be a competent expert, yet strict application of Barbara-Tobey would foreclose his testimony. Impartiality and disinterestedness are *29issues to be considered in connection with competency or by the jury when evaluating record evidence. To go beyond this and require the testimony of "disinterested and impartial experts” as an additional Davis-Frye prerequisite is unnecessary.
Genetic marker phenotyping of bloodstains is a procedure only routinely used in police case work.7 It is not a procedure which is commonly used in other scientific communities because the need for the resultant information is not present. Whether the testimony of a forensic scientist meets the Davis-Frye requirement is a separate and distinct issue from whether a forensic scientist is a competent witness. To prevent the forensic scientists who develop and use a particular procedure from testifying is to needlessly limit the factfinder’s consideration of otherwise relevant and probative evidence.
Ill
Finally, as a separate consideration from the Davis-Frye issue,8 defendant claims that it was error to admit expert testimony of blood analysis which included defendant within the category of possible perpetrators. Defendant claims that such evidence was more prejudicial than probative because defendant was not specifically identified by such evidence.
The admission of such evidence is a relevancy question to be based on the facts of each case, i.e., whether, as interpreted, the results are relevant to the issues in dispute. If the evidence presented places the defendant in a class-of possible perpe*30trators which is too large to be probative, then the trial judge may properly exclude such evidence. However, if the evidence is probative, then claims of remoteness should be treated as a matter of weight for jury determination.
Cavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955); Frye v United States, 54 US App DC 46; 293 F 1013 (1923).

 People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352; 255 NW2d 171 (1977), and People v Tobey, 401 Mich 141; 257 NW2d 537 (1977).

 Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientiñc Evidence: Frye v United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum L Rev 1197,1212 (1980).

 Giannelli, p 1220.

 Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 Emory L J 833, 872 (1982).

 See, e.g., MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496. Shaw, Electrophoresis (New York: Academic, 1969); Carpenter, Immunology and Serology (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965); Ribeiro, Mitidieri & Alfonso, Paper Electrophoresis (New York: Elsevier, 1961).

 Jonakait, fn 5 supra, p 865.

 See Giannelli, fn 3 supra, pp 1226-1228.