Court Opinion

ID: 9894843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:10:10.060141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:51.048014
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1441-MR

JEFFERY DUTTON                                                    APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM POWELL CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE LISA HAYDEN WHISMAN, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CR-00035

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Jeffery Dutton appeals the order of the Powell Circuit Court

revoking his probation, entered November 2, 2022. Following a careful review of

the briefs, record, and applicable law, we affirm.
            BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               On June 9, 2021, Dutton pled guilty to being a convicted felon in

possession of a handgun1 and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment

probated for five years. Fifteen days later, on June 24, 2021, his probation officer

filed a violation of supervision report alleging that Dutton had been arrested for

misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and had not complied with his

obligation to report his arrest. Dutton subsequently tested positive for

methamphetamine. At the ensuing hearing, Dutton stipulated to the positive test,

and the court found him to be in violation of his supervision consistent with the

report. Dutton’s probation was partially revoked, and he was ordered to “enroll in

Comp Care IOP [intensive out-patient] and complete recommendations.”

               A second violation of supervision report was filed on September 15,

2021, stating that Dutton had been discharged from IOP on medical leave due to

his ongoing opioid pain treatment and concerns that intermittent delusional

thinking would preclude him from completing the program. Dutton stipulated he

had failed to complete IOP, and by agreement of the parties, his probation was

partially revoked and the IOP requirement removed.

               A third violation of supervision report was filed on February 9, 2022,

asserting that Dutton had tested positive for several controlled and illegal

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 527.040.

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substances. Dutton did not dispute the positive drug screens at his hearing but

requested that he be permitted to attend treatment in lieu of revocation. Partially

revoking his probation, the court ordered that he be remanded to custody until he

could be transferred to a long-term treatment program for a minimum of six

months.

             Dutton entered residential treatment on April 7, 2022; however, he

was discharged one day later and, as a result, a fourth violation of supervision

report was filed on April 21, 2022. Per the discharge summary, which was quoted

by the probation officer in his report, due to his “inability/unwillingness to

participate in the program[,]” Dutton was being medically discharged “until he can

get his medical concerns verified and get cleared by his physician to participate” in

long-term recovery. The provider explained that though Dutton complained that

pain in his legs prohibited him from fully participating in the program, staff had

observed a marked improvement in movement after he was informed of the

discharge. At the revocation hearing, citing his inability to walk, Dutton admitted

that he had not completed treatment. The parties agreed his probation would be

partially revoked until he could enter a facility equipped to meet his medical needs.

On June 23, 2022, Dutton was transferred to Mountain Recovery to begin

treatment.

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             On August 4, 2022, the violation of supervision report at issue herein

was filed alleging that Dutton had failed to complete treatment. The probation

officer stated that Dutton had been discharged from Mountain Recovery on July

22, 2022, purportedly due to a stroke – though Dutton’s medical records indicated

he was hospitalized for pneumonia – and that he had subsequently transferred to

Revive Recovery, a 30-day treatment facility. The probation officer further

reported that a nurse with Mountain Recovery “got the idea [Dutton] was

pretending to be sick” because he refused to get out of his wheelchair but was

observed walking “[u]nbeknownst to him.” At the revocation hearing on

November 2, 2022, the probation officer – the only witness – testified in

conformity with his report, adding that Dutton was observed playing cornhole

without his wheelchair by the staff at Mountain Recovery.

             Dutton argued that he was not in violation of his probation since his

discharge from Mountain Recovery was beyond his control and he was in

treatment at Revive. In support, he submitted records showing that he was seen by

the local hospital emergency department on July 19, 2022, for stroke-like

symptoms, including a facial droop, and that he was diagnosed and treated for

pneumonia over the ensuing week. He also introduced case notes and a discharge

summary from Mountain Recovery. The case notes indicate that while Mountain

Recovery initially discharged him only temporarily due to his hospitalization, it

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was later decided that “his medical needs outweigh[ed] his [substance use

disorder]” and that he would not be readmitted until he obtained further medical

treatment. The discharge summary explained that:

             Mr. Dutton seems to be having serious medical issues.
             At this moment he is admitted to [the hospital]. In our
             most recent treatment team meeting[, it] was decided that
             Mr. Dutton’s medical issues are hindering any attempts
             we have made to treat his [substance use disorder]. At
             this time the decision has been made to medically
             discharge Mr. Dutton.

             After arguments, the court expressed concerns that Dutton was

attending only a 30-day program and that, by his own admission, he had failed to

report his new address to his probation officer, noting that Dutton cannot be

supervised when his location is unknown. The court found the testimony

compelling that Dutton resisted physical accommodations but was conversely able

to engage in recreational activities, given his history and the assurance that

Mountain Recovery would be able to meet his medical needs. Additionally,

though acknowledging that Dutton was not at fault for becoming ill or being

hospitalized, the court concluded that since treatment ordinarily resumes after the

resolution of an ailment, his conduct prior thereto was the impetus to his discharge

from Mountain Recovery. Ultimately, the court entered an order finding that:

Dutton had violated the terms of his release by absconding from supervision and

failing to complete treatment; his failure to comply posed a significant risk to the

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community; and he could not be managed in the community. His probation was

revoked, and this appeal followed. Additional facts will be introduced as they

become relevant.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             To revoke probation, a court must determine by a preponderance of

the evidence that the probationer failed to comply with the conditions of

supervision, that said failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims or the

community, and that the probationer cannot be appropriately managed in the

community. KRS 439.3106(1). We review a court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014) (citing

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 292 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2009)). An abuse of discretion

occurs if the court’s decision was “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported

by sound legal principles.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d

941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             First, citing Keith v. Commonwealth, 689 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. App.

1985), Dutton argues that his probation could only be revoked if he willfully

violated its terms and, since he complied to the extent possible, the court abused its

discretion. In furtherance of this claim, Dutton contends that the court’s finding

that he was discharged due to his conduct was unfounded and that there was no

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evidence that Revive, which he entered on advice of counsel, could not

accommodate a six-month program. Likewise, Dutton asserts that there were no

facts or testimony to support that he absconded supervision when he believed his

probation officer was notified of his transfer by treatment center staff. Given the

totality of the circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion.

             Regardless of why Dutton left Mountain Recovery, Dutton admitted

that Revive was only a 30-day program and offered no evidence that it would, in

fact, accommodate the ordered six-month treatment. Though Dutton argues he

cannot be in violation because he, like the probationer in Keith, relied in good faith

on counsel’s advice, we are not persuaded. Keith’s terms of release required that

he voluntarily commit himself for psychiatric treatment and then report to

probation upon his release; however, unexpectedly, the hospital staff determined

commitment was not appropriate. Id. at 614. When Keith informed his counsel of

this development, he was advised to wait to report until everything was

“straightened out[.]” Id. Reversing the order revoking, a panel of this court noted

that Keith had in good faith relied on counsel’s advice that he was not required to

report. Id. at 615.

             Here, unlike Keith, there was no ambiguity in what was required of

Dutton when he was specifically ordered to complete a six-month program and,

therefore, it was not reasonable for him to rely on advice to enter only a 30-day

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program. Similarly, we reject the contention that Dutton’s reliance on the

treatment center to notify his probation officer of his transfer constitutes a defense

when he was the obligated party and the evidence demonstrates that his probation

officer was unaware of his location.

             Next, citing Helms v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Ky. App.

2015), Dutton argues that the barebones findings of the court that he posed a

significant risk to the community and could not be managed therein are

insufficient. Though in Helms we stated that a court “perfunctorily reciting the

statutory language in KRS 439.3106 is not enough[,]” we have repeatedly clarified

that all that is necessary is that the findings be supported by the record. Id.;

Kendrick v. Commonwealth, 664 S.W.3d 731, 734-35 (Ky. App. 2023); New v.

Commonwealth, 598 S.W.3d 88, 90-91 (Ky. App. 2019). Here, ample support

exists in that Dutton repeatedly violated the terms of his supervision by testing

positive for drugs on two occasions, being arrested on two occasions failing to

complete treatment that he had agreed to attend, being discharged by three

treatment providers, failing to report pertinent information to his probation officer

on three separate occasions, and failing to engage in a compliant treatment

program. Consequently, we find no error.

             Finally, Dutton contends that the court erred by not considering

graduated sanctions since he was not at fault for being discharged from Mountain

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Recovery, and failing to contact a probation officer is only a minor violation. We

do not agree. The court’s oral and written findings reflect its conclusion that

continued efforts to provide Dutton needed substance use treatment in the

community would be fruitless given his history of non-compliance. Furthermore,

“[n]othing in [KRS 439.3106] or in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it

requires the trial court to impose lesser sanctions prior to revoking probation.”

McClure v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Ky. App. 2015). Rather, the

Supreme Court has expressly held that revocation is within the discretion of the

court “provided that discretion is exercised consistent with statutory criteria.”

Andrews, 448 S.W.3d at 780. Because the court found that Dutton posed a

significant risk to the community and could not be managed therein, as required by

KRS 439.3106(1), and even assuming it did not consider graduated sanctions, the

court acted within its discretion in revoking probation.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Powell

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                          -9-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kayley V. Barnes          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Todd D. Ferguson
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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