Court Opinion

ID: 9765786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:19:22.442345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:15.691266
License: Public Domain

*574MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe that a proper reading of the applicable law compels this Court to answer the certified question presented here in the negative, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s erroneous conclusion that the certified question here can be answered in the affirmative.
The record reveals that Bradley and Lori Schorr are the named plaintiffs in a class action suit against Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. Like all plaintiffs in the case, the Schorrs financed their home with a loan from Countrywide. Once the Schorrs paid off the underlying loan in full, they demanded in writing that Countrywide cancel the security deed pursuant to the pre-2008 version of OCGA § 44-14-3, which is applicable to this case. Countrywide did not cancel the deed, so the Schorrs made a written demand for the cancellation of the deed and $500 in liquidated damages, again pursuant to the former version of OCGA § 44-14-3.1
Countrywide did not pay the liquidated damages, so, in February 2007, the Schorrs filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on behalf of the class of Countrywide customers whose security deeds had not been cancelled as required by the former version of OCGA § 44-14-3. However, while the Schorrs had made a written demand for liquidated damages pursuant to the statute prior to filing the lawsuit, the other members of the class had not. Countrywide filed a motion to *575dismiss the claims for the members of the class who had failed to make a written demand. The Schorrs then filed a motion to certify a question of state law to this Court (see Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. IV; OCGA § 15-2-9 (a)), and the trial court granted the motion, requesting that this Court answer the question whether the named plaintiffs in a class action may, pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-3, satisfy pre-suit written demand requirements for liquidated damages on behalf of putative class action members by the named plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the written demand requirement. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that a proper reading of the applicable law compels this Court to answer the question in the negative.
The analysis begins with this Court’s decision in Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256 (637 SE2d 4) (2006) (“Barnes II”), which the majority contends is controlling in this case. In Barnes II, a class of attorneys sued the City of Atlanta for a refund of occupational taxes that the City had unconstitutionally collected from them. Prior to filing the lawsuit, however, some of the class members had exhausted their administrative remedies by filing a claim with the City for a tax refund as required by OCGA § 48-5-380,2 whereas other class members had not filed the statutorily required pre-lawsuit refund claim with the City. In reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision, which held that the class members who had not satisfied the pre-lawsuit refund claim requirement must do so, this Court stated:
Although OCGA § 48-5-380 is applicable to [the suit of the class members who have not satisfied the pre-suit refund claim requirement], so too are those principles which apply generally in class actions, including that which permits a representative to act on behalf of an entire class. Where, as here, “exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition for suit, the satisfaction of this requirement by the class plaintiff normally will avoid the necessity for each class member to satisfy this requirement individually.” 2 Newberg on Class Actions § 5:15, p. 438 (4th ed. 2002). *576Decisions to the contrary, such as U. S. Xpress v. State of New Mexico, 136 P3d 999 (N.M. 2006), are “based on genuinely unique statutory requirements.” 2 Newberg, supra at 440. OCGA § 48-5-380, unlike certain tax refund statutes, neither prohibits utilization of a class action, nor expressly requires individual exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Dougherty, 29 P3d 862, 869 (B) (Ariz. 2001). Compare OCGA § 48-2-35 (c) (5) [(“An action for a refund pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection shall not be brought by the taxpayer on behalf of a class consisting of other taxpayers who are alleged to be similarly situated.”)].
Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 257-258 (1).
The majority claims that, because here, former OCGA § 44-14-3 neither expressly prohibits utilization of a class action, nor expressly requires individual exhaustion of the liquidated damages demand requirement, our holding in Barnes II dictates that the Schorrs’ satisfaction of the liquidated damages demand requirement in this case obviates the need for the putative class members to do the same. However, the majority completely ignores that a key factor that drove our decision in Barnes II was the fact that this Court had previously determined in a prior appeal in that case that the City could not constitutionally collect the tax that had been imposed on the plaintiff attorneys. See City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449 (1) (578 SE2d 110) (2003) (“Barnes I”). As we stated in Barnes II:
We have already determined that the City unconstitutionally regulated the practice of law. Barnes I, supra at 450 (1). Such a determination does not discriminate between those who individually demanded a refund “and those who did not. The [City] unconstitutionally collected taxes from all of these individuals.” (Emphasis in original.) Bailey v. State of North Carolina, [500 SE2d 54, 73-75 (V) (N.C. 1998)]. Limiting recovery only to those taxpayers with the foresight to have demanded a refund is “untenable in a case such as this, where the matter is of constitutional import and where, in practical consequence, the purpose of the [ordinance] was realized.” Bailey v. State of North Carolina, supra.
Id. at 259 (1). Thus, as this Court made clear from its decision in Barnes I, there was no dispute in Barnes II that the plaintiffs involved in the case were entitled to receive a refund of the illegally collected tax. Indeed, once this Court determined as a matter of law *577that the City’s collection of the occupational tax was unconstitutional, the City’s obligation to pay a tax refund to those plaintiffs from whom it had collected the occupational tax became clear, and the need for the City to receive early notice of its “potential” liability and the underlying constitutional issue through each plaintiff individually exhausting his or her administrative remedies was obviated. As we further stated in Barnes II,
the most important factor in applying the administrative exhaustion requirement to cases involving the constitutionality of taxes is the state or local government’s need for early notice of its potential liability. In this case, when the administrative claims were filed by the named plaintiffs, and certainly by the time the lawsuit was filed thereafter, the City was aware of a constitutional challenge to the validity of its occupation tax ordinance, and should have been fully aware of the number of attorneys who paid the tax.
Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 258 (1). Accordingly, because this Court had “already determined that the City unconstitutionally regulated the practice of law [by collecting the occupational tax,] Barnes I, supra at 450 (1)[,]” and because the City had already been given notice of, and had already litigated, the constitutional claim such that it was aware of its liability and the number of attorneys who had paid the unconstitutional tax, “[l]imiting recovery only to those taxpayers with the foresight to have demanded a refund [was] untenable . .. [particularly] where the matter [was] of constitutional import and where, in practical consequence, the purpose of the ordinance was realized.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 259 (l).3
Here, however, the same cannot be said. Contrary to the majority’s contentions, Barnes II does not support the proposition that the Schorrs may satisfy the liquidated damages demand requirement of former OCGA § 44-14-3 on behalf of the putative class members, as the instant case is fundamentally distinguishable from Barnes II. For one thing, the instant case does not involve the exhaustion of administrative remedies with respect to an unconstitutional tax, and the matter is not “of constitutional import.” Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 259 (1). Moreover, there is no prior decision of any court in this *578case that has predetermined the issue of Countrywide’s liability to the class of individuals who have paid off their loans and whose security deeds have not yet been canceled. To the contrary, liability in this case is still very much an open question, as liability cannot even arise under former OCGA § 44-14-3 until a borrower has satisfied the liquidated damages demand requirement of the statute. See former OCGA § 44-14-3 (c) (a lender “shall not be liable to the [borrower] unless and until a written demand for the liquidated damages is made”) (emphasis supplied). In this regard, unlike the situation in Barnes II where the City only needed to be placed on notice one time about a constitutional challenge that would affect all members of the class action, the notice given by the Schorrs to support their own claim against Countrywide in this case does nothing to inform Countrywide about the other claims that have not been properly raised by the members of the putative class and that cannot, as a matter of law, give rise to liability for Countrywide precisely because they have not been properly raised.
In this connection, the plain language of former OCGA § 44-14-3 reveals that the liquidated damages demand requirement contained therein is by no means a mere procedural hurdle that must be overcome, but is a substantive element that must be proven to establish any claim for liability against a lender who has failed to properly cancel a security deed. Again, “[u]pon the failure of the [lender] to transmit properly a legally sufficient satisfaction or cancellation as provided in this Code section, the [lender] shall, upon written demand, be liable to the [borrower] for the sum of $500.00 as liquidated damages . . . and the [lender] shall not be liable to the [borrower] unless and until a written demand for the liquidated damages is made.” (Emphasis supplied.) Former OCGA § 44-14-3 (c). Unlike the administrative procedure at issue in Barnes II, where the primary purpose of the procedure was to give notice to the city of a potential claim that may or may not have been viable, here, no claim exists at all “unless and until” the liquidated damages demand requirement is met. As this Court contemplated in Barnes II, such “unique statutory requirements” cannot be fulfilled by a named plaintiff on behalf of the putative class members. See Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 258 (1). In order to equate the liquidated damages demand requirement of former OCGA § 44-14-3 with the administrative procedure contained in OCGA § 48-5-380 (c), the majority must disregard the plain language of OCGA § 44-14-3, which this Court is expressly forbidden from doing. Telecom*USA v. Collins, 260 Ga. 362, 363 (1) (393 SE2d 235) (1990) (“[T]he ‘golden rule’ of statutory construction ... requires us to follow the literal language of [a] statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something *579else.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 448 (629 SE2d 252) (2006) (“[U]nder our system of separation of powers this Court does not have the authority to rewrite statutes.”). Indeed, unlike the administrative procedures of OCGA § 48-5-380 (c) that serve the primary purpose of providing “early notice [to a government entity] of its potential liability” (.Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 258 (1)), the Legislature has made the liquidated damages demand provision of former OCGA § 44-14-3 a substantive requirement for all plaintiffs to fulfill before a lender can be subjected to liability. Based on the “unique statutory requirements” of former OCGA § 44-14-3, the Schorrs cannot step into the shoes of the putative class members to fulfill the liquidated damages demand requirement of the statute. When an individual liquidated damages demand has not been filed in order to give rise to a specific plaintiffs claim, a claim simply cannot and does not exist. See former OCGA § 44-14-3. The certified question here must therefore be answered in the negative, and I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s erroneous conclusion otherwise.
Decided July 12, 2010.
Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Michael B. Terry, Frank M. Lowrey IV, Jason J. Carter, Charles A. Gower, Ben B. Philips, for appellants.
Hunton & Williams, Bryan A. Powell, Lawrence J. Bracken II, Jason M. Beach, for appellee.
King & Spalding, Dwight J. Davis, Barry Goheen, Jennifer D. Fease, amici curiae.

 The pre-2008 version of the statute provided in relevant part that:
(b) (1) Whenever the indebtedness secured by any instrument is paid in full, the grantee [i.e. the lender] or holder of the instrument, within 60 days of the date of the full payment, shall cause to be furnished to the clerk of the superior court of the county or counties in which the instrument is recorded a legally sufficient satisfaction or cancellation to authorize and direct the clerk or clerks to cancel the instrument of record. The grantee or holder shall further direct the clerk of the court to transmit to the grantor [i.e. the borrower] the original cancellation or satisfaction document at the grantor’s last known address as shown on the records of the grantee or holder.
(c) Upon the failure of the grantee or holder to transmit properly a legally sufficient satisfaction or cancellation as provided in this Code section, the grantee or holder shall, upon written demand, be liable to the grantor for the sum of $500.00 as liquidated damages and, in addition thereto, for such additional sums for any loss caused to the grantor plus reasonable attorney’s fees. The grantee or holder shall not be liable to the grantor if he or she demonstrates reasonable inability to comply with subsection (b) of this Code section; and the grantee or holder shall not be liable to the grantor unless and until a written demand for the liquidated damages is made. No other provision of this Code section shall be construed so as to affect the obligation of the grantee or holder to pay the liquidated damages provided for in this subsection.
(Emphasis supplied).

 The relevant portion of the statute states that
[a]ny taxpayer [who has filed a claim for a refund and] whose claim for refund is denied by the governing authority of the county or municipality or whose claim is not denied or approved by the governing authority within one year from the date of filing the claim shall have the right to bring an action for a refund in the superior court of the county in which the claim arises. No action or proceeding for the recovery of a refund shall be commenced before the expiration of one year from the date of filing the claim for refund unless the governing authority of the county or municipality renders a decision on the claim within the one-year period. No action or proceeding for the recovery of a refund shall be commenced after the expiration of one year from the date the claim is denied.. . .
OCGA § 48-5-380 (c).

 This Court used very specific language in Barnes II to address an “administrative exhaustion requirement [in a] case[ 3 involving the constitutionality of [a] tax[ ].” Barnes II, supra, 281 Ga. at 258 (1). The majority is taking the original meaning of Barnes II out of its intended context in order to expand the holding of that case to reach the fundamentally distinguishable matters involved here.