Court Opinion

ID: 9819077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:15.438932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.107565
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: If section 1(D) (s) of the Adoption Act is applied as written, it cannot serve as the basis for terminating M.D.’s parental rights. Section 1(D)(s) of the Act and section l(D)(r), which precedes it, address the impact of parents’ incarceration on their present ability to fulfill their parental duties. Where a parent is incarcerated, he or she previously had little or no contact with the child or provided little or no support, and the term of confinement is so lengthy that the parent will not be able to discharge his parental responsibilities for a period in excess of two years, a finding of unfitness can be sought under section 1(D) (r) of the Adoption Act. Where the parent is faced with a shorter period of incarceration, section 1(D)(r) is inapplicable. If the incarcerated parent has been in jail or prison before, however, the cumulative effect of the multiple but shorter incarcerations may be as deleterious to the parent’s parenting abilities as a single long jail sentence. Repeated absences due to jail confinement are scarcely conducive to the exercise of child-rearing obligations. A parent who has been jailed again and again for less serious offenses may therefore be no more fit than a parent who has only been convicted once but for a more serious crime. The purpose of section 1(D) (s) is to address this situation. It recognizes that the length of a parent’s present prison term is not dispositive. It eliminates any disparity by treating chronic minor offenders the same as those who have offended less often but more seriously. Section l(D)(r) of the Act plainly requires the parent’s incarceration to occur while the child is alive. In eliminating the disparity between parents serving longer sentences and those serving multiple shorter sentences, section 1(D) (s) does not alter this requirement. As I have just indicated, the chief distinction between parents subject to section 1(D) (s) and those subject to section 1(D) (r) is simply the duration of their incarceration. Nothing in section 1(D) (s) gives the court additional authorization to look back and assess events which occurred before an individual even became a parent. Consider again what the statute actually says. Under section l(D)(s), the repeated incarceration must have prevented the parent from discharging his or her parental responsibilities. Until a child is born, however, there is no way for a parent’s conduct to interfere with his or her discharge of parental responsibilities because there are no such responsibilities to discharge. For purposes of evaluating fitness, the responsibilities of parenthood commence with a child’s birth. Before an individual actually has children, the only effect incarceration can have in terms of parenting is to handicap the individual’s ability to develop parental skills for use in the future. While I do not question that a person confined to jail or prison on a regular basis will have a more difficult time acquiring the life skills needed to be an effective parent, that is simply not the issue. In applying section 1(D)(s), we must look to the language employed by the legislature, and nothing in the language of the statute makes failure to develop parenting ability before the child was born a basis for a finding of lack of fitness now. What matters under the law is whether recurring confinement has had an adverse effect on the parent’s actual parenting activities since the child’s birth. For the foregoing reasons, I agree with M.D.’s contention that in order for repeated incarceration to have prevented the discharging of parental responsibilities within the meaning of section l(D)(s), that incarceration must have occurred during the child’s lifetime. In the case before us, M.D. had not been repeatedly incarcerated during his child’s life. He was only incarcerated once. As a result, section 1(D) (s) could not serve as the basis for terminating M.D.’s parental rights. I therefore believe that it was incumbent on this court to consider the additional question of whether M.D. was properly found unfit on the alternative ground that he failed to make reasonable progress pursuant to section 1(D) (m) of the Adoption Act. Accordingly, I dissent.