Court Opinion

ID: 9710712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:16:02.835082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.344267
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
(dissenting).
¶ 70. Hard cases make bad law. This is a hard case because EE is a bad actor; he was convicted of child abuse of his children. Chances are high that under the proper procedures he would be found an unfit parent.
¶ 71. Nevertheless, EE, like all other parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, is entitled to due process. Due process is afforded to bad guys and good guys. That's our system. When we deviate from the requirements of due process, all parents are harmed.
¶ 72. Due process requires that before termination of parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear *204and convincing evidence that the parent is an unfit parent. In Wisconsin, the legislature requires a court to find a parent unfit on proof of a statutory ground. As I have stated previously, there may be situations when one of the statutory grounds for termination is met, but the facts do not justify a finding of parental unfitness.1 There's the problem.
¶ 73. The circuit court found the statutory ground was met, but the circuit court did not otherwise explicitly determine EE to be an unfit parent.2 The majority opinion and Justice Frosser's concurring opinion infer such an individualized finding of this parent's unfitness from the "use of a statutory scheme."3 Thus the majority opinion weakly concludes that "it is the cumulative effect of the determinations made at each of the previous steps that causes the finding under § 48.415(4) to amount to unfitness."4
¶ 74. No matter how you slice and dice the statutory scheme used in the present case, nowhere can be found a circuit court's finding of the parent's individualized unfitness, aside from a finding that a statutory ground has been met.
¶ 75. Like Justice Frosser, I too disavow judicial tampering with the TER statutes5 in an effort to save them from being unconstitutional. The majority opinion and Justice Frosser's concurring opinion present *205two such examples of tampering. The majority opinion infers unfitness when there has not been an explicit finding of unfitness aside from a finding of a statutory ground. Justice Prosser's concurring opinion would engraft a requirement that parents be allowéd to present "evidence relevant to the parent's prior failure to challenge an order denying placement or visitation rights" in order to ensure the constitutionality of the TPR scheme.6 PP was denied this opportunity under the current TPR scheme, and both the majority opinion and Justice Prosser's concurring opinion tinker with the TPR statutes in order to reach a constitutionally required individualized finding of unfitness.
¶ 76. As I explained in my concurrence in Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶¶ 54-62, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856, and as the instant case further demonstrates,7 the legislature should revisit the statutes to ensure the legitimacy and constitutionality of the process for terminating parental rights.8
¶ 77. With these comments, I join the dissent of Justice Louis B. Butler, Jr.
¶ 78. I am authorized to state that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. joins this dissent.

 Steven V. v. Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶ 54, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 Majority op., ¶ 32; Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 53.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 1, 35; Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶ 41-49, 53.

 Majority op., ¶ 32 (emphasis added); see also Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶ 41-49.

 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 36.

 Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 62.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 25 n.6, indicating other challenges to § 48.415(4) a parent may bring in the future.

 See Wis. Stat. § 13.83(1), 13.93(2)(d).