Court Opinion

ID: 9687004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:13:32.374683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:11.474417
License: Public Domain

Fitzgerald, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which holds that defendant has no "standing” to challenge the interception of the telephone call and its attendant consequences.
I can summarize my views in no better manner than in the words of Judge Donald Reisig of the 30th Judicial Circuit, the trial judge in the case, whose well-reasoned opinion, delivered from the bench, I adopt as my opinion in this cause.
Following is Judge Reisig’s opinion as delivered at the conclusion of the proceedings:
I think it is safe to say that the issues now framed before me at 3:12 this afternoon are significantly different than what issues were framed before the Court of Appeals and the issues as I thought they were going to be at 1:29 this afternoon.
Make no bones about it, Mr. Rasmusson [the prosecutor], since my secretary advised me yester*212day afternoon that you had filed the writ of superintending control, I had hoped that they would have granted that writ, that they would have stayed my hand, that they would have superimposed their decisional processes on mine. Why? Because I’m not a brave man. Let them do what must be done. "You can get rid of a hot potato, Reisig, because people are not going to understand complexities of the issues of this case regardless of how you decide it.”
I shy from pain. Most people do. There are many things that I have to do here that I would love to duck, and I hope you’ve given me an opportunity to duck them. But it is now 3:14 and we’ve not heard from the Court of Appeals and I cannot in conscience any longer run from carrying out my constitutional mandate to uphold the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of this state, the laws of the United States and the laws of this state, regardless of how my decision may not be understood.
Earlier you and I discoursed, Mr. Rasmusson, about the law.
Mr. Thomas More was a great figure of history and has become a great figure of literature. He fought King Henry and King Henry’s attempts to discard his wife. He lost his head for it.
In Robert Bolt’s play A Man For All Seasons,  Bolt discussed this issue of what is lawful and what is right and how things can be misunderstood in this context. The young man by the name of Rich, who historically as well as fictionally was the person who ultimately betrays Sir Thomas More by entering perjured testimony against More at More’s trial, leaves the scene of a discussion *213with More when he seeks an appointment from More, and as Rich leaves the scene, More’s son-in-law, Roper, says:
"Arrest him.
"Alice: Yes!
"More: For what?
"Alice: He’s dangerous!
"Rich: For libel; he’s a spy.
"Alice: He is! Arrest him!
"Margaret: Father, that man’s bad.
"More: There is no law against that.
"Roper: There is! God’s law!
"More: Then God can arrest him.
"Roper: Sophistication upon sophistication!
"More: No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know what’s legal not what’s right. And I’ll stick to what’s legal.”
No, I didn’t like that the first time I read it. I’m not so sure that I still do like it.
But let’s go on.
"Roper: Then you set man’s law above God’s!
"More: No, far below, but let me draw your attention to a fact — I’m not God, The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can’t navigate. I’m no voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh, there I’m a forester. I doubt if there’s a man alive who could follow me there, thank God * * *
"Alice: While you talk, he’s gone!
"More: And go he should, if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law!
"Roper: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!
"More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
"Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
"More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you — where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country’s planted *214thick with laws from coast to coast — man’s laws, not God’s — and if you cut them down — and you’re just the man to do it — d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.”
Counsel know that is what the rule of law is all about. The rule of law and constitutional and legal protections for criminal defendants are not designed to spring guilty people from jail cells, to turn murderers and rapists and, yes, drug pushers loose upon the street to wreak havoc with the innocent populace. They are there, those laws, and those constitutional mandates, to protect your and my rights, to protect them against an intolerant tyrannical sovereign, to protect them, to protect us against the petty, narrow-minded bureaucrat.
Their ambit is broad; their course is not always clear, their nuances, their wording, their syntax is often times confusing, and it takes a Philadelphia lawyer sometimes to find out their meaning. But when faced with a choice between moral aspects, where something can be said on either side — like More, Sir Thomas More — I have found in my life’s experience, that attempting to do that which is lawful generally will end up being also that which is right.
Defendant’s motion for rehearing is granted. The court considers the matter to have been fully submitted by counsel upon both their previous briefs and their oral presentations here today. I hope to be able to rule upon every issue raised hereon, not necessarily in the same logical fashion that I would if I were to write an opinion. But in light of my present schedule, such a written opinion could not follow in a timely fashion, and I believe it is essential, in the interests of all parties *215concerned here, that the matter be resolved by this court.
The record below contained in excess of 756 pages, continued what?—four, five days. The witness Louise Auslander was on the witness stand for what?—how long I’m unable to tell. But approximately 100 pages of testimony is my best estimate from looking at the transcript.
Through Mr. Rasmusson’s candid admission today, we do know that one crucial and essential part of her testimony was false. We know that she deliberately intercepted the phone call made into room 235.
Without again characterizing her testimony as perjurious, without getting into her motivations, which undoubtedly could well have been the highest minded in the world, it is the function of this court at this time to ascertain the legal consequences of her act of deliberately intercepting a phone call between persons who had not consented to such an interception. Any discussion of this topic must, first of all, be directed to the act known as § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, 47 USC 605.
That act indicates the concern of the Congress of the United States when it was adopted. In the findings made by the [Congress], the adoption of that act contained in § 801 of the act,  Congress said: "In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral *216communications may be authorized, to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications, and the use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings.”
The broad dictates of § 605, Federal Communications Act, were made clearly applicable to the states by the decision of Lee v Florida, 392 US 378; 88 S Ct 2096; 20 L Ed 2d 1166 (1968). Briefly reiterated here for the record, the facts of that situation were as follows:
"Upon trial in the Criminal Court of Record for Orange County, Florida, the defendants were convicted for violating the state lottery laws. During the trial, the prosecution was allowed to introduce in evidence recordings of the defendants’ telephone conversations, which had been obtained by state police officers by having a telephone connected to the party line of one of the defendants without his knowledge, in such a way as to permit continuous surreptitious surveillance and recording of all conversations on the line. The convictions were affirmed by the District Court of Appeals of Florida for the Fourth District. * * *
"On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. In an opinion by Stewart, J., expressing the view of six members of the court, it was held that (1) § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, which provides that no person not authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge the existence or contents of such intercepted communication to any person, was applicable to the states, (2) the conduct of the state police officers in the case at bar constituted an 'interception’ of the defendants’ communications within the meaning of § 605, and (3) the statute prohibited the admission in evidence in state as well as federal criminal prosecutions of communications that had been intercepted in violation of the statute.” 
In effect, the court overruled the case of *217Schwartz v Texas, 344 US 199; 73 S Ct 232; 97 L Ed 231 (1952), which had ruled to the contrary. It is clear to the court from this decision that if there has been an illegal interception of a conversation without the consent of the parties thereto, or the sender, as the act says, that that communication cannot be divulged in state proceedings. The Court, in making its decision, cited with approval the case of Nardone v United States, 302 US 379, 382; 58 S Ct 275; 82 L Ed 314 (1937).
"We nevertheless face the fact that the plain words of § 605 forbid anyone, unless authorized by the sender, to intercept a telephone message, and direct in equally clear language that ’no person’ shall divulge or publish the message or its substance to ’any person. ’ To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge the message.”
I repeat: "To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge the message.”
"The conclusion that the act forbids such testimony seems to us unshaken by the government’s arguments.
* * *
"Congress may have thought it less important that some offenders should go unwhipped of justice than that officers should resort to methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty. The same considerations may well have moved the Congress to adopt § 605 as evoked the guaranty against practices and procedures violative of privacy, embodied in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.”
No person, no person shall divulge even in a court of law. Congress may have deemed it more important that a guilty person go unwhipped by *218justice than that this type of activity should be engaged in. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that is a value judgment Congress can make. It is not for Judge Donald Reisig of the Ingham Circuit Court to say to the contrary regardless again of my personal proclivities, feelings or attitudes toward the entire topic of wiretapping or toward the entire topic of drug abuse. Those same policies underlie the whole principle, the whole foundation of the Safe Streets Crime Control Act of 1968 reported in 18 USC 2510.
There, upon the heels of the Katz decision, Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), Congress authorized wiretapping under very limited and prescribed circumstances and conditions where warrants were sought. Congress detailed the procedures, passed the act for only a limited period of time, prescribed, ordered the filing of reports.
Since this act, as counsel is well aware, there have been constant judicial opinions in recent years with reference to abuses thereof, both at the local level, failure to apply for wiretaps as well as the failure of the attorney general of the United States to properly authorize applications to judges for wiretaps. There is no avowed policy in this country that the private conversations and discourses of others can be deliberately overheard— the avowed policy to the contrary. The exceptions to that avowed policy are just that: they are exceptions and they are exceptions under extremely limited situations: (1) inadvertence, as we discussed at our last meeting, counsel, which is no longer an issue in this case, and (2) when there has been a properly authorized search warrant or wiretap warrant.
The same consideration I have mentioned up to *219this point with reference to Federal law, § 605 of the FCC Act, and 18 USC 2510, et seq., would also apply with application to the state law.
I firmly believe that under the Federal act that I referred to, that no state may make laws less stringent than the Federal regulations in this area. This is in keeping with all basic concepts of constitutional principle and of legislative pre-emption. It is imbued within our concept of twentieth century federalism.
The Michigan Legislature has declared the policy of this state in the Michigan act in no uncertain terms—I shouldn’t say no uncertain terms, there are many uncertain terms therein—but in no uncertain terms, at least on this aspect of the controversy, MCLA 750.539a through 750.539Í; MSA 28.807(1) through 28.807(9):
"Any person who uses or divulges any information which he knows or reasonably should know was obtained in violation of sections 539b, 539c or 539d is guilty of a felony.” MCLA 750.539e; MSA 28.807(5).
Section 539c punishes the person who willfully uses any device to eavesdrop upon the conversation of others, which is the applicable provision here.
Lee v Florida, supra, said the divulgence which is prohibited is not only a private divulgence, a divulgence within law enforcement circles, but the divulgence from the witness stand in the courts. The court cannot and will not be a party to a violation of these legislative mandates. This theory is the theory of the Wisconsin case that Mr. Stafford [defense counsel] has so aptly cited in his brief and which I adopt by reference here. 
*220Next the court turns to the issue again which I have previously ruled upon, as to whether or not under the provisions of 18 USC 2510, et seq., the defendant Warner is an aggrieved party under the definition of that Federal act. Since I last discoursed on this topic with counsel, I have reread the act. I can find a possible construction under which Representative Warner is an aggrieved party, or an aggrieved person.
The act reads, again I read from subsection 11, 18 USC 2510, " 'aggrieved person’ means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication — ’’and it is clear here that defendant Warner has not put himself in a position of admitting that he was a party to that intercepted telephone call, " — or a person against whom the interception was directed”.
The problem with that language is that, unfortunately what Congress really meant was where the police, either through a valid wiretap order which is not validly performed or through some other action, are specifically going after Reisig, let’s say, then Reisig would be an aggrieved person. But because of the very nature of this situation, it cannot be said that Mrs. Auslander, when she intercepted, was necessarily going after any defined or described person, except, I think it’s reasonable to say, that she did intend to intercept a conversation between somebody in room 235 and somebody else.
So, certainly, it could be argued that she, in her direct interception to somebody in that room, and maybe perhaps more specifically by way of dicta, to the person who occupied that room, under the Alderman decision, [Alderman v United States, 394 US 165; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969)] can it also be said from this that she directed her *221interception to anybody else who might be on the line? I think it is at least arguable; it is at least arguable. But we are still then confronted with the problem that we don’t know who else was on the line.
Basically it is my ruling that Representative Warner does not come under the clear congressional definition of an aggrieved person, as a person who can attack the tap directly. But we then must come to the other point of the dilemma, and that is: Is Representative Warner a person who may attack the search and seizure of room 235 itself? And this is where the law that Mr. Stafford and which counsel have all cited in their briefs — because it is very pertinent, from Jones [Jones v United States, 362 US 257; 80 S Ct 725; 4 L Ed 2d 697 (1960)] on down to today.
Earlier, during the hearing, I asked Mr. Stafford to repeat the citation, the case he was citing, because I had a case right in front of me, and it was the same case, Brown v United States [411 US 223; 93 S Ct 1565; 36 L Ed 2d 208 (1973)]. There the Burger Court ruled that an individual did not have standing, at least upon the record before that court. They found the defendant in that case met none of these elements.
In deciding this case, therefore, it is sufficient to hold that there is no standing to contest a search and seizure, where as here, the defendants (a) were not on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure. Representative Warner was on the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (b) had no proprietary or possessory interest in the premises. By this it means that if I own the home and the search is made thereof even when I am not there, I would have standing. And finally (c) where the defendants were not charged *222with an offense that includes as an essential element of the offense charged possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search and seizure.
For the purposes of attacking the search and seizure, Representative Warner clearly has standing under conditions (a) and (c).
We then turn to the question of the illegality of the search and seizure, the question of how the initial information was obtained. We go back to the interception. A willful, illegal interception was made. In and of itself, Representative Warner was not an aggrieved person to attack that interception. I already ruled that way under the Federal act. But that information was thereafter divulged. It was thereafter disclosed by Mrs. Auslander to a police officer, and that police officer divulged it to others, and eventually that testimony came into this courtroom, or lower courtroom. But for the illegal interception, there would have been no search and seizure. The interception was the direct cause, the proximate cause, a foreseeable cause of the ultimate search and seizure. But for the divulgence of this information to Officer Baylis, there would have been no Officer Baylis standing out in the hallway, no Officer Baylis knocking on the door, or the door opening, no Officer Baylis and other officers entering the room into the activities inside that room. But for the divulgence of this information in the lower court, Representative Warner would not be standing charged with this offense at this time.
By way of dicta, whether or not the original taint in this matter, the illegal interception could have been isolated or insulated, whether or not the primary illegality, counsel, could have been isolated by application for search warrant is perhaps *223hypothetical, and certainly is dicta to me. But I could much more readily accept that type of argument, a willful interception made by a curious woman who didn’t want prostitution to go on in her motel, or whatever might be intercepted. Perhaps divulgence at that time for the purposes of commencing judicial proceedings made the primary taint so attenuated that a valid search and seizure could have been made under a valid and legal search warrant. That the emergency here was not that type of an emergency which might be deemed if we were talking about kidnaping or a bank robbery or extortion or something of that nature.
Information was divulged that there were drugs in that room. Mrs. Witherspoon, I believe her name was, had been registered in that room for three or four days. There was no reason to believe that if a raid wasn’t made in 15 or 20 minutes that the drugs somehow would have dissipated. The law prefers a search warrant.
Searches made otherwise are exceptions to the mandates of the Constitution that there shall be search warrants. Many of the exceptions have eaten up the original rule, but it is still the preferred method.
I repeat again — and I believe in history — that the first year that the Michigan search warrant law of 1967 was on the books, when I was prosecutor of this county, I used it 33 times, and I never had one of those warrants attacked in a court of law — and we hit every time, too. We obtained evidence every time.
It is a well-known fact in this county that judges eat lunches. It is also a well-known fact where most of us eat, or at least where some of us eat most of the time. So that the unavailability of *224judges during a luncheon hour may be a practical problem; it may be a practical hurdle, but it could have been overcome.
Why? Why this theory of law? Why this congressional policy against wiretapping, bugging, electronic surveillance? Why is it so bad, particularly when we catch somebody who may be a criminal? Perhaps it is imbued within our culture, within our heritage that we like our privacy — for good or for evil.
I don’t think, unless one has ever been directly affected by this type of thing, followed, harassed, bugged, by forces of law or by forces of darkness, that one can probably really understand it. I know I can’t. I have said I would gladly give up some of my freedoms that I never exercised anyway for a little more lawful society, which might also mean a little less work. But that’s not the issue.
Katz v United States, which I cited earlier, protects, extends the protections of our Constitution to areas of privacy, broadly stated, to areas where we have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Eavesdropping, at common law, was a nuisance. Historically, to stand under the eaves of somebody else’s roof and to listen was an awesome offense for which you could be docked and punished and placed on bond. Over the years the laws have changed a little bit, and we assume because you had to walk across somebody else’s property you physically trespassed in order for this to be a crime.
But Boyd v United States [116 US 616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886)], and cases since that time —and that’s 1886 — have come out with the idea that it’s not a property interest here. A man doesn’t have to own or possess property in order to have protection, that one can be homeless, root*225less, and moneyless, and still be a citizen in a free society, still have all the rights of all those who are wealthy and moneyed and propertied.
Again it is not for me to say. These dictates of our Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, are something that I must overlook here so that we can get after the devil.
In my allusions, both to the devil now and in reference to Thomas More, I make no reference to the personage of your client, Mr. Stafford. I’m talking rhetorically only.
The very concepts embodied here in the Federal Communications Act, as Mr. Stafford has pointed out, Michigan long ago adopted this principle, this concept, that we shall exclude from the courts of law illegally obtained evidence regardless of how probative it is. It is said in the Alderman case, supra, on this principle on search and seizure.
But let me make this point also. We exclude regardless of whether it is probative or not to protect the rights of us all. But we also have exclusionary rules which exclude evidence because it is the easiest way to deal with how probative evidence might be. We exclude coercive confessions, yes, because we don’t want police agents, agents of the state, coercing people to get confessions. But also we know that those types of confessions are inherently unreliable.
I suggest we touch here upon the errant, unreliable taint and we are confronted with a record of some hundred pages, and we find that some months thereafter that that hundred pages of testimony is shaded by untruths or half truths.
If I have not concluded the standing issue, I find Representative Warner to have standing to attack the search and seizure of the motel room under *226the doctrine of Brown v United States, supra, and all the other supporting authority.
The primary taint of the illegal interception was not so attenuated as to free the search and seizure of that taint, that there never would have been a search and seizure of the room on that date but for the illegality.
One passing comment, conclusion to my ruling which I’m about to make, which is obvious to you all, leaves the issue of the defendant’s ultimate complicity in this matter something for speculation. I don’t know how he might personally feel about the matter, but perhaps put in his shoes I might well feel that I have lost my day in court.
Be that as it may, whether he be a Representative in the Legislature of the State of Michigan or the lowliest of our citizens, he is equally entitled to the protections of the rule of law. The consequences of this decision and of these events of some ten months ago is something which only he has any capacity to ascertain or to handle.
It is the order of this court, having granted rehearing, that my earlier decision, which has never been reduced to writing by order, based upon new facts is set aside, and I hereby order that the evidence seized in this matter as the result of the search on August 15, 1973, is suppressed. Having reviewed the record, this court finds no competent legal evidence exists or can be produced upon which the defendant Dale Warner can now be prosecuted. The information is quashed. An order may enter accordingly.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.
Levin, J.
Dale Warner is awaiting trial on charges related to the use and possession of nar*227cotics. The circuit judge granted a motion to suppress physical evidence derived from information obtained by intercepting a telephone conversation. The issue is whether the derived evidence should, pursuant to statute, be suppressed.
While the telephone conversation was intercepted by a private citizen, not acting for the police, the Federal statute makes willful interception of a telephone conversation unlawful. The prosecutor formally conceded that the interception was "not inadvertent”.
The statute provides that an "aggrieved person” may move to suppress evidence derived from an unlawful interception.
The Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether Warner was an aggrieved person; it ruled that the derived evidence, obtained when Warner was arrested as a result of further investigation by the police, is admissible because the police did not know that the telephone information had been unlawfully obtained.
The circuit judge reached the standing question. He declared that Warner was not an aggrieved person under the statute because he had not admitted that he was a party to the intercepted telephone conversation. He suppressed the evidence on the ground that Warner had standing to complain of the search and seizure, at the time of arrest, which yielded the derived evidence.
Warner did not testify at the evidentiary hearing.1 The standing question was, however, put in issue by the claim, supported by circumstantial *228evidence, of Warner’s counsel that he was an aggrieved party.
Warner’s standing as an aggrieved party could be established through evidence other than Warner’s testimony or admission. Contrary to a colleague’s conclusion that "there was no evidence that [Warner] was a party to that call”, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish prima facie that Warner was a party to the telephone conversation.
The circuit judge, having concluded that an admission by Warner was prerequisite, made no factual findings on the question whether Warner was an aggrieved person under the statute. On remand there should be further fact finding and the derived evidence should be suppressed if it is found that Warner was a party to the intercepted conversation.
I
Louise Auslander, a motel desk clerk and co-manager, received an outside telephone call from a man for room 235 shortly before noon. She testified that she overheard a female voice say "I’ve got drugs”. Auslander reported the conversation to the Lansing police. Sergeant Baylis arrived at 11:50 a.m. Auslander admitted Baylis to a room near room 235. Baylis observed Warner enter room 235 and then he positioned himself in the hallway in front of that room. After listening for about 15 minutes to the conversation emanating from that room, uniformed officers announced their presence and entered. Warner was observed holding narcotics paraphernalia, was arrested, and the paraphernalia, later proved to contain heroin, was seized.
At the preliminary examination Warner sought *229suppression of the seized evidence pursuant to the Federal2 and Michigan statutes.3 The statutes proscribe the "willful” interception of telephone communications.4 The district judge concluded that Auslander’s interception was inadvertent and therefore not willful. He denied the motion to suppress and bound Warner over to circuit court on the narcotics charges.
The circuit judge at first concluded that because the district judge had the advantage of seeing Auslander he should accept his conclusion that she was not purposefully attempting to overhear or intercept the conversation. On rehearing, Warner produced testimony tending to show that the interception was intentional, and then the prosecutor obtained further information which caused him formally to "concede that it was not inadvertent”.
Both the district judge and the circuit judge were of the opinion that the conversation following "I’ve got drugs” necessarily was willfully intercepted and, accordingly, Auslander did not testify on the record to the rest of the conversation. It appears, however, from the circuit judge’s opinion *230that the man’s response was "I’ll be there in 15 minutes”.5 It further appears from Baylis’ testimony that he was standing in the hallway for 15 minutes before he entered room 235 and arrested Warner at 12:20; Warner arrived at the motel shortly after noon, within 30 minutes of the intercepted telephone call which Auslander said came in shortly before noon.
Baylis testified that after reaching police headquarters at 12:50, he asked Warner why he was in the motel room and he responded "that he had had earlier conversation in the day” with the female occupant of the motel room about his taking her to visit her husband.
II
The Federal statute provides that an "aggrieved person” in any trial, hearing or proceeding in any state or Federal court may move to suppress the contents of an intercepted communication "or evidence derived” therefrom on the ground that the communication was unlawfully intercepted.6 The *231term aggrieved person is defined as "a party to any intercepted” communication.7
The circuit judge declared that Warner was not a party to the intercepted telephone conversation because "it is clear here that defendant Warner has not put himself in a position of admitting that he was a party to that intercepted telephone call”.
Warner’s counsel, in response to a question from the judge, said that "if you were to accept [the testimony of the people’s witnesses], I think they have shown a prima facie case that would make the defendant an aggrieved person under that statute”.8
*232It is manifest that Warner’s standing as an aggrieved person could be shown by evidence other than his own testimony asserting that he was the "male voice”. That he was the "male voice” could have been shown, for example, through the testimony of the "female voice” or Auslander or someone who was with Warner when he placed the call. His standing as an aggrieved person could also be established by circumstantial evidence without direct evidence or testimony.
The circuit judge erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Warner was not an aggrieved person because he had not admitted he was a party to the conversation.9
In United States v Banks, 374 F Supp 321, 328 (D SD, 1974),10 it was established that the FBI had unlawfully monitored telephone conversations and had heard the voices of various persons, including the voice of defendant Means or defendant Banks. In holding that both defendants had standing as "aggrieved persons”, the court said:
"This indication that Means could have been overheard, plus the fact that unidentified male voices (which could have been Means’) were heard by other FBI agents, both of which are unrefuted, support the *233Court’s conclusion that both defendants have standing in this case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The circumstantial evidence in this case established a prima facie case that Warner was an aggrieved person. Auslander testified that a man had telephoned room 235 and the female occupant of the room said "I’ve got drugs”. It appears from statements of counsel and the judge on the record that the man responded "I’ll be there in 15 minutes”. Even if it is thought that the portion of the intercepted conversation not formally of record may not be considered even for the purposes of the suppression motion (cf. United States v Banks, supra), there is the evidence that within 30 minutes of the statement "I’ve got drugs” Warner appeared at room 235 and his statement to Baylis that he had had a conversation with the occupant of the room earlier in the day. It would be reasonable to infer from the evidence of record that Warner was the "male voice”.
Surely if we were considering whether an accused could be convicted of making an obscene telephone call11 there would be no doubt that there is sufficient evidence to make a jury-submissible question on a showing that an unidentified man had made an obscene telephone call to a woman who, in an effort to trap her caller, invited him to meet her and telephoned the police, and within 30 minutes the accused arrived proximately within the time and at the place designated.
There was sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant a finding that Warner was a party to the telephone conversation. The question whether to draw the inference that he was a party to the conversation is initially for the trier of fact, not *234this Court. On remand the circuit judge should make findings of fact on this question.12
Blair Moody, Jr., J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 The motion to suppress was decided by the circuit court on the record made at the preliminary examination, supplemented on rehearing to support the contention that the interception was purposeful. It is unusual for the defendant to testify at the preliminary examination and it is therefore not surprising that Warner did not testify at the time.

 18 use 2510 et seq.

 MCLA 750.539 et seq.; MSA 28.807 et seq.
The Michigan statute parallels the Federal statute but does not provide explicitly regarding standing or suppression of evidence.

 "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who—
"(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;
"(c) willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection;
"shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 USC 2511(1).

 The Court of Appeals also observed that, based on what she overheard, Auslander had given Sgt. Baylis to understand that a drug transaction would take place within a matter of minutes at room 235.

 "Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that—
"(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted.” 18 USC 2518(10)(a).
The statute also provides:
"Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.” 18 USC 2515 (Emphasis supplied.)
*231In Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 175-176, fn 9; 89 S Ct 961; 22 L Ed 2d 176 (1969), reh den, 394 US 939; 89 S Ct 1177; 22 L Ed 2d 475 (1969), the Court declared that the legislative history of the act indicates that the term aggrieved person "should be construed in accordance with existent standing rules”.
The Supreme Court of California, in People v Martin, 45 Cal 2d 755, 760-761; 290 P2d 855, 857 (1955), allowed a codefendant to raise the search and seizure issue. This rule was reaffirmed in Kaplan v Superior Court of Orange County, 6 Cal 3d 150, 153; 98 Cal Rptr 649, 650; 491 P2d 1 (1971). Cf. United States v Valencia, 541 F2d 618 (CA 6, 1976). The American Law Institute, in its proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, has accepted the view that a motion to suppress things seized may be made by a codefendant who may himself be without standing. ALI, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure (Proposed Official Draft No 1,1972), § 290.1(5).

 Warner does not contend that he is a person "against whom the interception was directed”, nor is it necessary in the present posture of the case to consider whether a person who is not an actual speaker may be a party to a conversation.

 Contrast In the Matter of Berry, 521 F2d 179 (CA 10, 1975), cert den 423 US 928; 96 S Ct 276; 46 L Ed 2d 256 (1975), reh den 423 US 1039; 96 S Ct 577; 46 L Ed 2d 414 (1975), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant was not an aggrieved person because he had not claimed to be an aggrieved person and there was no evidence indicating the possibility of an illegal electronic surveillance. Similarly, see Sponick v Detroit Police Department, 49 Mich App 162, 197; 211 NW2d 674 (1973), where it was held that the defendants did not have standing because they did not allege that they were aggrieved persons and had not indicated "in any manner whatsoever just what evidence submitted against them was derived from illegal electronic surveillance”.
In United States v Ransom, 515 F2d 885 (CA 5, 1975), reh en banc den, 520 F2d 944 (CA 5, 1975), cert den, 424 US 944; 96 S Ct 1412; 47 *232L Ed 2d 349 (1976), reh den, 425 US 945; 96 S Ct 1687; 48 L Ed 2d 189 (1976); United States v Armocida, 515 F2d 29 (CA 3, 1975), cert den, 423 US 858; 96 S Ct 111; 46 L Ed 2d 84 (1975); and United States v Bynum, 513 F2d 533 (CA 2, 1975), cert den, 423 US 952; 96 S Ct 357; 46 L Ed 2d 277 (1975), cited by the people, it was established that the defendant was not a party to the conversation.

 Compare People v D’Angelo, 401 Mich 167; 257 NW2d 655 (1977), where this Court said "the defendant will not be required to admit the criminal act in order to raise the entrapment issue”.
See, also, Simmons v United States, 390 US 377, 393-394; 88 S Ct 967; 19 L Ed 2d 1247 (1968), where the United States Supreme Court said "[i]n these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another”.

 Subsequent decisions relating to this prosecution do not concern this issue and for that reason are not .cited.

 MCLA 750.540e; MSA 28.808(5).

 Because the circuit judge originally concluded that the derived evidence should not be suppressed if the interception was inadvertent and later decided to suppress the evidence on alternative grounds, the record was not fully developed. It would therefore be appropriate, in the exercise of the circuit judge’s informed discretion, to permit supplementation of the record regarding the whole conversation overheard by Auslander and by such additional evidence as either party may wish to present.