Court Opinion

ID: 9397920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 22:00:52.460318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.822123
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD
    HUSAYN (ISN #10016),

                    Petitioner,
    v.                               Civil Action No. 08-1360
                                     (EGS)
    LLOYD AUSTIN, et al.,

                    Respondents.

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

         Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Order

Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus. See generally Mot. for Order

Granting Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas Mot.”), ECF No. 488. 1

Petitioner claims that his continued detention at Guantanamo Bay

is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and invalid under the 2001

Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”). See generally

id. Respondents oppose, arguing that Petitioner may not invoke

Due Process Clause protections and that Petitioner’s detention

is lawful under the AUMF. See generally Resp’ts’ Opp’n, ECF No.

500.

         Upon careful consideration of Petitioner’s motion,

Respondents’ opposition, the reply thereto, the arguments of

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page
number of the filed document.
amici, 2 and the applicable law, and for the reasons explained

below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion.

    I.     Background

         Zayn Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, (“Petitioner”) was

born in Palestine and raised in Saudi Arabia. He has been

detained at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

(“Guantanamo”) since September of 2006, having been captured on

or about March 28, 2002 in Faisalabad, Pakistan and held at

various “secret black sites” until his transfer to Guantanamo.

His detention is based on Respondents’ allegation that he was

part of, and substantially supported, al Qaeda and associated

forces.

         The Court recently ruled that Petitioner’s continued

detention is authorized by the AUMF. See generally Husayn v.

Austin, No. 08-cv-1360, 2022 WL 2093067 (D.D.C. June 10, 2022).

The AUMF permits the President “to use all necessary and

appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or

persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided

the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or

harbored such organizations or persons.” Authorization for Use

of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224

(2001). In the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (“2012

2   The Court appreciates the analysis provided by the amici.

                                    2
NDAA”) Congress reaffirmed “the authority of the President to

use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the [AUMF],”

including “[d]etention under the law of war without trial until

the end of the hostilities authorized by the [AUMF].” National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-

81 § 1021(a), (b)(2), (c)(1), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562.

     “The AUMF authorizes detention for the duration of the

conflict between the United States and the Taliban and al

Qaeda.” Al-Alwi v. Trump, 901 F.3d 294, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2018);

see also Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

(citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004)(“The AUMF,

among other things, authorizes the Executive Branch to detain

for the duration of hostilities those individuals who are part

of al Qaeda or the Taliban.”)). “Neither [the AUMF nor the 2012

NDAA] places limits on the length of detention in an ongoing

conflict.” Id. at 297. “[T]he AUMF remains in force if

hostilities between the United States and the Taliban and al

Qaeda continue.” Id. (citing Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 552

(D.C. Cir. 2013)(“[T]he 2001 AUMF does not have a time limit,

and the Constitution allows the detention of enemy combatants

for the duration of hostilities.”)).

     Whether Petitioner’s continued detention “remains necessary

to protect against a significant security threat to the United

States”—as distinct from its legality under the AUMF and whether

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detention is consistent with Petitioner’s habeas rights—is

reviewed on a periodic basis by the Guantanamo Bay Periodic

Review Board (“PRB”). Ali v. Trump, 959 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir.

2020)(citing Exec. Order No. 15,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13, 277 (March

7, 2011)(establishing the Periodic Review Board). Respondent

represents that the result of Petitioner’s initial PRB review

was announced in September 2016, with the result being that he

was designated for continued detention. Resp’ts’ Opp’n, ECF No.

500 at 15. Since he was designated for continued detention at

that time, Petitioner is eligible for another full PRB review

every three years, see Exec. Order 13,567 at § 3(b), 76 Fed.

Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011); and for a file review every six

months, see id. § 3(c). Respondent represents that a subsequent

PRB was completed in April 2017 and another was ongoing as of

January 2018. Resp’ts’ Opp’n, ECF No. 500 at 15.

     In the most recently-completed review of Petitioner’s

detention in March 2020, the Periodic Review Board made the

following determination:

          The Periodic Review Board, by consensus,
          determined that continued law of war detention
          of the detainee remains necessary to protect
          against a continuing significant threat to the
          security of the United States.

          In making this determination, the Board
          considered that regardless of his claim that
          he was not a formal member of al Qaida, his
          past involvement in jihadist activity to
          include probably serving as one of Usama bin

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          Ladin’s most trusted facilitators and his
          admitted abilities as a long-term facilitator
          and fundraiser for extremist causes.

          Additionally, detainee’s lack of remorse for
          his   extensive    role    in   training   and
          facilitating large numbers of extremists,
          continued habit of viewing certain persons and
          countries as his enemies, and personal
          attributes   and   beliefs    that  make   him
          susceptible to reengagement.

See Periodic Review Board, Unclassified Summary of Final

Determination for ISN 10016 (Mar. 5, 2020),

https://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10016/SubsequentHear

ing1/200305_UPR_ISN10016_SH1_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PRB.pdf. 3

Additionally, another Subsequent Full Review began in 2021; a

hearing was held in July 2021 and the final determination has

not yet been posted. See Periodic Review Secretariat, Subsequent

Full Review for ISN 10016, https://www.prs.mil/Review-

Information/Subsequent-Full-Review/ (last visited May 26, 2023).

     On January 11, 2018, Petitioner and ten other detainees

jointly filed the instant motion. See Habeas Mot., ECF No. 488.

An identical motion was filed in each case, and Petitioners and

Respondents filed identical briefings in all cases. In August

2018, the motion was denied in one of the cases. See Ali v.

3 “The Court takes judicial notice of the
official government documents and other sources from
[DOD’s] government website as ‘sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.’” Humane Soc'y of United States v.
Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 386 F. Supp. 3d 34, 40
n.2 (D.D.C. 2019)(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)).

                                5
Trump, 317 F. Supp. 3d 480 (2018). That denial was affirmed by

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C.

Circuit”), see Ali, 959 F.3d 364; and the petition for the writ

of certiorari was denied, Ali v. Biden, 141 S.Ct. 2657 (2021).

  II.   Analysis

        A. Petitioner’s Detention Does Not Violate Due Process

     Petitioner argues that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the

Constitution applies at Guantanamo and places substantive

limitations on executive detention of the kind at issue here,

including a durational limitation that compels relief regardless

of the original basis for detention.” Habeas Mot., ECF No. 488

at 16. The D.C. Cir has rejected this same argument as

“sweep[ing] too far,” Ali v. Trump, 959 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir.

2020); providing the following guidance regarding the

applicability of Due Process Clause protections to Guantanamo

detainees:

          The Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v.
          Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171
          L.Ed.2d 41 (2008), unequivocally held that
          Guantanamo Bay detainees must be afforded
          those    procedures    necessary    to   ensure
          “meaningful review” of the lawfulness of their
          detention, id. at 783, 128 S.Ct. 2229. See
          Qassim, 927 F.3d at 524. In particular,
          detainees are constitutionally entitled to
          “those ‘procedural protections’ ” that are
          “necessary (i) to ‘rebut the factual basis for
          the Government's assertion that [the detainee]
          is an enemy combatant’; (ii) to give the
          prisoner    ‘a   meaningful    opportunity   to
          demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to

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          the erroneous application or interpretation of
          relevant law’; and (iii) to create a record
          that will support ‘meaningful review’” by
          federal courts. Id. at 528–529 (formatting
          modified) (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. at
          779, 783, 128 S.Ct. 2229).

          In    identifying     those     constitutional
          protections for detainees, the Supreme Court
          pointed both to the Constitution's guarantee
          of habeas corpus, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
          2 (commonly known as the Suspension Clause),
          and the Due Process Clause. Boumediene, 553
          U.S. at 771–792, 128 S.Ct. 2229; see Qassim,
          927 F.3d at 529.

          Circuit precedent has not yet comprehensively
          resolved which “constitutional procedural
          protections apply to the adjudication of
          detainee habeas corpus petitions,” and whether
          those “rights are housed” in the Due Process
          Clause, the Suspension Clause, or both.
          Qassim, 927 F.3d at 530. In this case, Ali has
          chosen not to ground any of his claims for
          procedural protections in the Suspension
          Clause. So that issue is not before us.
          Instead, Ali's main argument puts all of his
          eggs in one constitutional basket. He argues
          that the Due Process Clause's procedural and
          substantive requirements apply wholesale,
          without any qualifications, to habeas corpus
          petitions filed by all Guantanamo detainees.

Ali, 959 F.3d at 368. 4

4 Accordingly, the Court need not reach the parties’ arguments
regarding whether or not the Due Process Clause applies to
Guantanamo detainees. The Ali Court rejected “[tt]he district
court’s decision that the Due Process Clause is categorically
inapplicable to detainees at Guantanamo Bay . . . .” Ali, 959
F.3d at 368. And the D.C. Circuit has yet to decide whether the
Due Process Clause squarely applies to Guantanamo detainees,
recently determining that “deciding the applicability of the Due
Process Clause is unnecessary here, where, as explained below,
we find that the habeas procedures [Petitioner] received
actually satisfy what the Clause would require.” Al-Hela v.
Biden, 66 F.4th 217, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

                                7
     In rejecting the same due process argument made in the

instant motion, the D.C. Circuit stated:

          For starters, the argument is in substantial
          tension   with   the   Supreme   Court's   more
          calibrated approach in Boumediene, which tied
          the constitutional protections afforded to
          Guantanamo   Bay   detainees’   habeas   corpus
          proceedings to their role in vindicating the
          constitutional right to the Great Writ and the
          judicial role in checking Executive Branch
          overreach. See 553 U.S. at 798, 128 S.Ct. 2229
          (“[P]etitioners may invoke the fundamental
          procedural protections of habeas corpus.”);
          id. at 779–783, 793–795, 128 S.Ct. 2229. The
          court    stressed    that    the    scope    of
          constitutional protections must “turn on
          objective factors and practical concerns, not
          formalism.” Id. at 764, 128 S.Ct. 2229. Yet
          Ali argues for only a formal and unyielding
          line.

          Ali's argument that the Due Process Clause's
          substantive protections apply with full force
          to all detainees at Guantanamo Bay also runs
          crosswise with this court's decision in
          Kiyemba v. Obama, which held that, for
          Guantanamo   Bay   detainees,    the   claimed
          substantive due process right to release into
          the United States had no purchase because a
          noncitizen who seeks admission to the United
          States generally “may not do so under any
          claim of right.” 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C.
          Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded, 559 U.S.
          131, 130 S.Ct. 1235, 175 L.Ed.2d 1070,
          reinstated in relevant part, 605 F.3d 1046,
          1047– 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2010). That case refutes
          Ali's claim that the substantive protections
          of the Due Process Clause apply across the
          board to all Guantanamo Bay detainees. And Ali
          has abstained from pressing any more gradated
          or as-applied Due Process Clause argument
          here.

          In sum, Boumediene and Qassim teach that the

                                8
          determination    of    what    constitutional
          procedural     protections     govern     the
          adjudication of habeas corpus petitions from
          Guantanamo detainees should be analyzed on an
          issue-by issue basis, applying Boumediene’s
          functional approach. The type of sweeping and
          global application asserted by Ali fails to
          account for the unique context and balancing
          of interests that Boumediene requires when
          reviewing the detention of foreign nationals
          captured during ongoing hostilities.

Id. at 369.

     Accordingly, the Court will apply a functional approach

here. Petitioner argues that his “continuing detention violates

[his] fundamental due process rights” because “detention without

charge or trial of this length, which is still without

foreseeable end and potentially permanent, violates the Due

Process Clause’s durational limits on detention; under President

Trump’s animus-driven decree to prevent the release of any

detainee regardless of individual circumstances or bona fide

security assessments renders such prolonged detention arbitrary

and unlawfully punitive.” Habeas Mot., ECF No. 488 at 21. 5

5 The Court does not reach the argument that detention is not
justified by a preponderance of the evidence standard because
Petitioner’s habeas proceeding has not yet been conducted.
Habeas Mot., ECF No. 488 at 23-26. The deadline for Petitioner’s
traverse has been stayed pending Respondent’s production of
discovery requested by Petitioner. See, e.g., Minute Order (July
12, 2022). The Court notes, however, that the D.C. Circuit
recently ruled that the application of the preponderance of the
evidence standard in a Guantanamo habeas proceeding did not
violate due process. See Al-Hela, 66 F.4th 217. The Court also
need not address the argument regarding the two petitioners
approved for transfer. Id. at 26-30.

                                9
     The D.C. Circuit rejected both arguments in Ali. “Among

other things, the substantive component of the Due Process

Clause ‘bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions

regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement

them.’” Ali, 959 F.3d at 369 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504

U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992) (quoting

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed.

2d 100 (1990)). “But only government action that is ‘so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock

the contemporary conscience’ qualifies as arbitrary for the

purposes of substantive due process.” Id. at 369-370 (quoting

Estate of Phillips v. District of Columbia, 455 F.3d 397, 403

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 848 n.8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998))).

     As in Ali, here, Petitioner’s “detention is long because

the armed conflict out of which it arises has been long,

continuing to the present day.” Id. at 370; see also Husayn,

2022 WL 2093067 at *4-*6 (explaining that hostilities against al

Qaeda, and associated forces remain ongoing in Afghanistan and

elsewhere). Furthermore, the hostilities authorized by the AUMF

are ongoing. As indicated supra, this Court recently denied

another of Petitioner’s motions—Petitioner’s Motion for an Order

Requiring His Immediate Release and Repatriation—concluding that

                               10
Petitioner’s continued detention is authorized by the AUMF. See

id. at *2-*4.

     Petitioner’s claim that his detention is untethered to his

individual circumstances or a bona fide security assessment is

without merit. The information in the record indicates that the

PRB has specifically reviewed Petitioner’s detention “to

determine whether his continued detention remains necessary to

protect against a significant threat to the United States” four

times and that another Subsequent Full Review is in process at

this time. With regard to the most recently completed review,

the PRB determined that continued detention “remains necessary

to protect against a continuing significant threat to the United

States.” Periodic Review Board, Unclassified Summary of Final

Determination for ISN 10016 (Mar. 5, 2020),

https://www.prs.mil/Portals/60/Documents/ISN10016/SubsequentHear

ing1/200305_UPR_ISN10016_SH1_FINAL_DETERMINATION_PRB.pdf. In

reaching this conclusion, the PRB acknowledged Petitioner’s

claim that he was not a formal member of al Qaida, but

nonetheless concluded his continued detention necessary based on

“his past involvement in jihadist activity to include probably

serving as one of Usama bin Ladin’s most trusted facilitators

and his admitted abilities as a long-term facilitator and

fundraiser for extremist causes.” Id. The PRB also took into

consideration Petitioner’s “lack of remorse for his extensive

                               11
role in training and facilitating large numbers of extremists,

continued habit of viewing certain persons and countries as his

enemies, and personal attributes and beliefs that make him

susceptible to reengagement.” Id.

     B. The Court Rejects Petitioner’s Remaining Arguments

     Petitioner argues that “the Court should construe the AUMF

narrowly to limit the duration of Petitioners’ detention in

order to avoid the serious constitutional concerns that would be

raised by a statute that authorizes such non-criminal detention

potentially for the remainder of their lives.” Habeas Mot., ECF

No. 488 at 31. In Ali, the D.C. Circuit observed that “because

the specific constitutional claims that Ali presses have already

been considered and rejected by circuit precedent, there are no

constitutional rulings to be avoided.” Ali, 959 F.3d at 373.

Accordingly, this Court need not address whether the AUMF should

be construed to limit the duration of detentions.

     Petitioner also argues that “the Court should grant relief

because whatever traditional law-of-war detention authority may

have existed at the time of Petitioner’s capture and initial

detention has by now unraveled, 15 years after the fact.” Habeas

Mot., ECF No. 488 at 35. However, the Court rejected the

arguments Petitioner makes here in its decision on the motion

for immediate release. See generally Husayn, 2022 WL 2093067.

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     Petitioner’s final argument—that the Court should exercise

its broad, common law habeas authority to grant relief—ignores

the complex body of law that has developed to ensure that non-

citizens detained at Guantanamo have a “meaningful opportunity”

to contest their detention. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. Such

law includes binding circuit precedent, which of course, this

Court cannot disregard.

  III. Conclusion and Order

     For the reasons stated above, it is hereby

     ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Order Granting Writ of

Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 488, is DENIED.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          May 26, 2023

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