Court Opinion

ID: 9493697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:15:47.151283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:58.633541
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s interpretation of the pre-amendment version of the statute of limitations set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 1621. I dissent, in part, because I do not believe remand is necessary. It’s worth noting that the government conceded during oral argument that remand was unnecessary.
The majority remands to the district court to determine the date of the discovery of the offense. I believe the trial court’s findings of fact already establish the date of the discovery of the offense. See Findings of Fact #2 of the District Court’s Order of March 30, 1999 (“As a result of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigation initiated in 1988, Jimerson was arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine”); see also District Court’s Order of September 23, 1997, at page 8 (“The DEA launched its second criminal investigation of Jimerson in November 1988. This investigation resulted in Jimerson’s conviction and current imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute cocaine.”). Thus, November 1988 was when the “alleged offense was discovered” by the DEA. The forfeiture action was not filed until November 17, 1994, more than five years later, and is therefore time-barred under the pre-amendment version of 19 U.S.C. § 1921.
The majority also holds that the government is not precluded from arguing on remand that the statute was tolled during any “concealment or absence of the property.” I do not believe a remand is necessary to address that issue either.
The property at issue is real property. “[R]eal property ... by its very nature, can be neither moved nor concealed.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 52-53, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993). The government argues only that Jimerson “concealed” his oimership of the property, not the property itself. However, the statute clearly requires concealment of the property, not mere concealment of ownership.
In James Daniel Good, the Supreme Court addressed the amount of due process required before the government could seize real property, as opposed to personal property. Less process is required before the government can seize or seek forfeiture of personal property, such as a boat, work of art, etc., because that type of property can easily be concealed or removed from the country. The Supreme Court held that more process is required to seize real property, in part because it cannot be concealed or removed from the country. James Daniel Good, 510 U.S. at 52-53, 114 S.Ct. 492. The Supreme Court’s comments regarding concealment of real property in that context apply equally to the meaning of “concealment” within the statute of limitations.
I do not believe that § 1621 contemplates tolling for mere “concealment” of ownership. The statute’s reference to “concealment” should apply to real property only in the most unique circumstances, for example, where the residence constructed on the property against which the government initiates forfeiture proceedings is built underground. Cf. United States v. Four Tracts of Property, No. 96-6533, 1999 WL 357773, at *4 (6th Cir. May 19, 1999) {Four Tracts II) (holding that a period of concealment applied to property purchased by the claimant in his brother’s name, and where the residence constructed on the property was built underground).
*443For the reasons stated above, I dissent from that portion of Part III of the majority’s opinion that remands this ease for a determination of the date of discovery, and that allows the government to argue on remand that the statute was tolled by concealment of ownership of real property.