Court Opinion

ID: 9964901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 13:08:54.968347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:47.212389
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1625.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1625
   CALDWELL, APPELLANT, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, APPELLEE; OHIO
              BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
         may be cited as Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No.
                                   2024-Ohio-1625.]
Workers’ compensation—When a workers’ compensation claimant perfects an
        appeal under R.C. 4123.512, subsequent expiration of R.C. 4123.52’s five-
        year continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim pending in a court
        to expire as a matter of law—Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the
        trial court.
     (No. 2023-0809—Submitted February 7, 2024—Decided May 1, 2024.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County,
                            No. 9-22-61, 2023-Ohio-1530.
                                 __________________
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

          KENNEDY, C.J.
          {¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District
Court of Appeals, we are tasked with clarifying the effect, or lack thereof, of the
Industrial Commission’s statutory jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims
on a party’s statutory right to appeal a commission decision that determines whether
an employee can participate in the workers’ compensation fund.
          {¶ 2} Appellant Brian Caldwell suffered a work-related injury while he was
employed with appellee, Whirlpool Corporation. After a successful initial workers’
compensation claim, Caldwell sought coverage for additional conditions a few
years later. In pursuing a claim for these additional conditions, Caldwell exhausted
his administrative hearings before the commission, to no avail. So he appealed to
a court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512. The trial court and the court of
appeals, in granting and affirming summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool,
determined that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law because a separate
statute, R.C. 4123.52, limited the commission’s continuing jurisdiction to five years
from the date of the last payment of compensation on Caldwell’s initial claim and
that five years had passed.
          {¶ 3} We come to a different conclusion. Based on the plain language of
the relevant workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’
compensation claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent
expiration of the commission’s five-year period of continuing jurisdiction under
R.C. 4123.52 does not cause the claim that is pending in court to expire as a matter
of law.
          {¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Third District and remand
the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

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                                January Term, 2024

                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                  A. Caldwell’s Workers’ Compensation Claims
       {¶ 5} In 2015, Caldwell, who at the time was an employee of Whirlpool,
was injured on the job. As a result, Caldwell filed a claim with appellant Bureau
of Workers’ Compensation for permanent-partial-disability compensation for the
condition of “right inguinal hernia.” A staff hearing officer of the Industrial
Commission awarded Caldwell compensation. Whirlpool, a self-insured employer,
made its last payment of compensation to Caldwell on January 11, 2017.
       {¶ 6} In December 2019, Caldwell sought coverage for the additional
conditions of “disc protrusions or bulges.” A series of administrative decisions
denying Caldwell’s claim for the additional conditions culminated in the
commission’s refusal to hear his appeal, thereby administratively denying Caldwell
the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for the additional
conditions.
                          B. The Trial-Court Proceedings
       {¶ 7} Around two months after receiving the commission’s decision,
Caldwell timely appealed from it by filing a complaint in the Marion County Court
of Common Pleas. He named as defendants the statutorily required parties, i.e., his
employer, Whirlpool; and Stephanie B. McCloud, who at the time was the
administrator of the bureau. See R.C. 4123.512(B). The trial-court proceedings
progressed, but on April 30, 2021, Caldwell voluntarily dismissed his action
without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).
       {¶ 8} Just under a year later, on April 20, 2022, Caldwell invoked R.C.
2305.19, the saving statute, to revive his action and refile his appeal in the court of
common pleas. Caldwell again named Whirlpool and McCloud as defendants and
again challenged the commission’s decision and argued that he was entitled to
participate in the workers’ compensation fund.

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       {¶ 9} Whirlpool responded with three simultaneous filings: (1) an affidavit
of Pamela Holland, the person responsible for managing Caldwell’s workers’
compensation claim, (2) a motion for summary judgment, and (3) an answer.
Relying on Holland’s affidavit, which explained that Caldwell received his last
compensation payment on January 11, 2017, Whirlpool’s answer and motion for
summary judgment argued that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law on
January 11, 2022, because R.C. 4123.52 limited the commission’s continuing
jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim to five years from the date of the last payment of
compensation.
       {¶ 10} Once briefing on the issue of summary judgment concluded, a
magistrate decided in favor of Whirlpool. Caldwell objected to the magistrate’s
decision, but the trial court found those objections unpersuasive and ultimately
granted summary judgment to Whirlpool. The trial court based its decision on the
continuing-jurisdiction time limit in R.C. 4123.52 and Chatfield v. Whirlpool
Corp., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-21-20, 2021-Ohio-4365, a recent Third District
opinion. According to the trial court, R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limit is a statute of
limitations and Chatfield requires a plaintiff “to not only file but prevail within the
five year limitation period.”
                          C. Caldwell’s Further Appeals
       {¶ 11} Caldwell appealed to the Third District. The Third District agreed
with the trial court and affirmed its judgment on the authority of Chatfield. It held
that “pursuant to * * * Chatfield, Caldwell’s claim had expired by operation of law
by January 11, 2022.” 2023-Ohio-1530, ¶ 13. It also rejected any notion that R.C.
2305.19, the saving statute, had any effect on the case, since that statute “does not
change the fact that this type of claim expires by operation of law after the five-
years allotted under the conditions set forth in R.C. 4123.52.” Id. at ¶ 14. Caldwell
appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to consider two propositions of
law:

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                                January Term, 2024

                [1.] The five-year limitation under R.C. 4123.52 does not
         apply to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal.
                [2.] The savings statute applies to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal
         and R.C. 4123.52 does not.

See 171 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2023-Ohio-2972, 215 N.E.3d 559. After we accepted
jurisdiction, the bureau, which had not actively participated in most of this
litigation, filed a motion to be realigned as an appellant, which this court granted,
see 171 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2023-Ohio-4016, 220 N.E.3d 839.
                           II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
                              A. Standard of Review
         {¶ 12} This court’s review of cases involving a grant of summary judgment
is de novo. Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio St.3d 193,
2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8. A court may grant summary judgment to a
party when “(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears
from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and
viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” Temple
v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), citing Civ.R.
56(C).
         {¶ 13} To resolve this case, we return to a familiar place: statutory
interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also review de
novo. State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152
Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14. “The intention of the
legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.” United States v.
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). Therefore, “[t]he question is not what did the

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general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did
enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of
the syllabus. So “[w]hen the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and
conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly
has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio-
1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply it as written, Summerville v. Forest Park,
128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18.
             B. Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes and Caselaw
         {¶ 14} We ultimately conclude that the statutory time limit on the
commission’s continuing jurisdiction did not cause Caldwell’s claim to expire as a
matter of law. But before we explain why, an examination of the relevant law is in
order.
                  1. Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes
         {¶ 15} We begin with a brief overview of three relevant workers’
compensation statutes.
         a. The administrative process for workers’ compensation claims
         {¶ 16} First we look at R.C. 4123.511, which outlines the administrative
procedure for workers’ compensation claims. If a claim is denied, a claimant may
pursue a multistep administrative-appeal process that culminates with an appeal to
the Industrial Commission. R.C. 4123.511(E). In those situations, the commission
determines whether it will hear the appeal. Id. If the commission declines to hear
the appeal, it issues an order to that effect. Id. Aside from some exceptions not
relevant here, a party may appeal such an order to a “court pursuant to [R.C.
4123.512] within sixty days after receipt of the order, subject to the limitations
contained in that section.” Id.
                             b. Appeals to a trial court
         {¶ 17} And so R.C. 4123.512 is the second relevant statute here. A party’s
filing of a notice of appeal (of a commission order declining to hear an appeal of a

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                                 January Term, 2024

claim denial) within 60 days in the appropriate court of common pleas “is the only
act required to perfect the appeal.” R.C. 4123.512(A). The primary issue for the
common pleas court to decide is whether the claimant has the right to participate or
continue to participate in the workers’ compensation fund. See R.C. 4123.512(F)
and (G). If the court or a jury finds that the claimant has a right to participate in the
fund, “the commission and the [bureau] administrator shall thereafter proceed in
the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision of the commission,
subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C. 4123.52].”                   R.C.
4123.512(G).
             c. The Industrial Commission’s continuing jurisdiction
        {¶ 18} This brings us to the third relevant statute, R.C. 4123.52, which
outlines the commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation
cases. R.C. 4123.52(A). As part of that continuing jurisdiction provided for in
R.C. 4123.52(A), the commission is allowed to make subsequent modifications or
changes to its former findings and orders. In cases in which a claimant has received
compensation from an initial successful claim and seeks additional compensation,
any “modification, change, finding, or award shall be made within five years from
the date of the last payment of compensation.” Id. As a brief aside, this quoted
language comes from the version of R.C. 4123.52(A) that was in effect at the time
Caldwell filed for additional compensation, see 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 123, but
regardless, we note that subsequent amendments to that statute have not altered the
language relevant to our discussion. Therefore, R.C. 4123.52(A) provides the
commission with five years of continuing jurisdiction over cases.
                                2. Relevant Caselaw
        {¶ 19} Our caselaw addressing a prior version of R.C. 4123.512 is helpful
to our analysis here. In Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d
70, 464 N.E.2d 133 (1984), we discussed workers’ compensation appeals under
former R.C. 4123.519, which was renumbered as R.C. 4123.512 in 1993,

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153 (effective Oct. 20,
1993). We explained that when a workers’ compensation claimant files a notice of
appeal in a court of common pleas, jurisdiction over the claim vests in that court.
Youghiogheny at 71. A few years later, we confirmed that a timely notice of appeal
satisfies R.C. 4123.519’s (now R.C. 4123.512’s) jurisdictional requirements.
Fisher v. Mayfield, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975 (1987), paragraph one of the
syllabus.
            C. Caldwell’s Court Action Did Not Expire as a Matter of Law
       {¶ 20} The answer to the issue presented here is a straightforward one—
Caldwell’s pending action in the trial court did not expire as a matter of law when
the case passed the five-year mark established in R.C. 4123.52. We come to this
conclusion for several reasons.
       {¶ 21} For starters, R.C. 4123.52 does not have any impact on workers’
compensation appeals in courts.       That statute is concerned solely with the
commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases. There is
no dispute that Caldwell’s claim for additional compensation in 2019 and the R.C.
4123.511 administrative proceedings that followed were well within the
commission’s continuing jurisdiction. And the dictates of R.C. 4123.52 do not
reach beyond those administrative proceedings.
       {¶ 22} R.C. 4123.512, on the other hand, governed Caldwell’s court case.
That statute took the baton from Caldwell’s administrative efforts, which were
regulated by R.C. 4123.511 and 4123.52, and passed it to the judiciary for a fresh
review in the form of a trial de novo. See Ferguson v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 265,
2017-Ohio-7844, 87 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 11 (explaining that a court handles an R.C.
4123.512 appeal as a trial de novo); see also Lincoln Properties, Inc. v. Goldslager,
18 Ohio St.2d 154, 159, 248 N.E.2d 57 (1969) (explaining that a trial de novo
essentially treats a case as if it were a new action—one that had not been tried
below).     And Caldwell’s timely notice of appeal vested the trial court with

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                                January Term, 2024

jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim. See R.C. 4123.512(A); Youghiogheny, 11 Ohio
St.3d at 71, 464 N.E.2d 133; Fisher, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975, paragraph
one of the syllabus. Therefore, Caldwell’s properly filed case proceeded in the trial
court under R.C. 4123.512, and R.C. 4123.52, which covers only administrative
matters, could not intrude on that judicial action.
       {¶ 23} It makes sense to focus on only R.C. 4123.512 when determining the
viability of a workers’ compensation appeal to a court, since the General Assembly
instructed that such an action is “subject to the limitations contained in [R.C.
4123.512],” and not any other section. R.C. 4123.511(E). Therefore, any other
alleged limitations, such as R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limitation, did not apply to
Caldwell’s appeal pending in court.
       {¶ 24} Division (G) of R.C. 4123.512 further supports our conclusion. That
division provides that when a claimant is successful in court, the commission and
bureau must “proceed in the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision
of the commission, subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C.
4123.52].” R.C. 4123.512(G). The phrase beginning with “as if” in essence rights
a wrong by allowing a claimant to participate in the fund for a condition for which
he had previously been denied the right to participate. And the phrase beginning
with “subject to” ensures that the commission can utilize its power to modify as set
forth in R.C. 4123.52. In a nutshell, R.C. 4123.512(G) provides a successful
claimant in court with the next steps in the workers’ compensation process by
requiring the commission and bureau to allow the claimant to participate in the
workers’ compensation fund for an additional condition while also permitting the
commission to make future modifications of the orders.
       {¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the expiration of R.C.
4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit did not cause Caldwell’s claim
pending in common pleas court to expire as a matter of law, and therefore, the lower

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courts’ finding of summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool on that basis was
improper.
                           D. The Saving Statute Is Irrelevant
          {¶ 26} Finally, R.C. 2305.19, the saving statute, is irrelevant to this case. It
is undisputed that Caldwell properly utilized the saving statute, and we have long
recognized that the saving statute applies to R.C. 4123.512 appeals, Lewis v.
Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 487 N.E.2d 285 (1985), syllabus (citing former R.C.
4123.519, which was subsequently renumbered as R.C. 4123.512). Because our
resolution of Caldwell’s first proposition of law decides this case, and because the
saving statute does not affect our decision, we need not address Caldwell’s second
proposition of law.
                                  III. CONCLUSION
          {¶ 27} Caldwell did all that was required of him under R.C. 4123.512 to
have his day in court. R.C. 4123.52, the statute that establishes the continuing
jurisdiction of the commission, in no way affects R.C. 4123.512 court proceedings
once they have been properly initiated. So, following the plain language of the
workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’ compensation
claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent expiration of R.C.
4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim that is
pending in a court to expire as a matter of law.
          {¶ 28} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of
Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
                                                                     Judgment reversed
                                                 and cause remanded to the trial court.
          FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ.,
concur.
                                  _________________

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                              January Term, 2024

       Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Chelsea F. Rubin, for appellant Brian
Caldwell.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Michael
J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney and Mathura J.
Sridharan, Deputy Solicitors General, and Natalie J. Tackett, Principal Assistant
Attorney General, for appellant Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.
       Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Mark S. Barnes, and Robert L. Solt IV, for
appellee.
       Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, Michael J. Hickey, and John
D. Hance IV, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce.
                              _________________

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