Court Opinion

ID: 9372840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:02.964088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.050024
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ELIZABETH PARKER BARNES,                        DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0432-15-1013-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: February 14, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Elizabeth Parker Barnes, Vinton, Virginia, pro se.

           Mark R. Higgins, Norfolk, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal based on unacceptable performance pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     chapter 43. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the petition for review,
     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the Washington

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     Regional Office for further adjudication consistent with Santos v. National
     Aeronautics & Space Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant encumbered the position of Architect, GS -12. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 16 at 85-90. For the period ending October 31, 2013, the agency
     rated her performance as “needs improvement,” id. at 57. Thereafter, the agency
     found her work on a particular project to be unsatisfactory, id. at 68, 70, and
     advised her that her performance on certain of her objectives 2 needed
     improvement and that she would be placed on a performance improvement plan
     (PIP), id. at 70. At the end of January 2014, the appellant was on sick leave and
     then on other types of leave until she returned to duty on May 29, 2014, under a
     reasonable accommodation arrangement allowing her to telework 4 days a week,
     later reduced to 3 days a week. IAF, Tab 15 at 69. For the period November 1,
     2013 to August 15, 2014, but excluding the time she was on leave, the agency
     rated the appellant’s performance as failing in a number of her objectives. IAF,
     Tab 43 at 4-10.
¶3        On October 10, 2014, the appellant’s supervisor notified her that she was
     not performing her duties at an acceptable level and that she was being placed on
     a 60-day PIP to help her improve her performance. Id. at 24-33. The supervisor
     set forth six objectives in which he indicated that the appellant’s performance
     needed to improve; Technical Management, Responsibility/Accountability,
     Working Relationships, Communication, Be Aware, and Working Within the
     Project Management Best Practices as a Project Delivery Team Member . As to
     each, the supervisor set forth the observed issues with the appellant’s
     performance, and explained what she must do to improve. Id. The supervisor
     stated that he would meet with the appellant weekly to discuss her responsibilities

     2
        These “objectives” correspond to critical elements, as set forth in 5 C.F.R.
     § 432.103(b).
                                                                                        3

     under the listed objectives and to address deficiencies, that the meetings would be
     documented, that he would review the appellant’s work, “TEE-UP”/mock up
     drawings, work breakdown structures that would be used for listing task
     assignments as necessary, and that he would attend as many project team and
     individual meetings as possible to view her performance in various settings, id.
     at 32. On December 10, 2014, the agency advised the appellant that, although she
     had shown some improvement, she was still failing in the six objectives, and that
     the PIP would be extended until January 22, 2015. IAF, Tab 15 at 9 -12.
¶4        On January 22, 2015, the appellant’s supervisor proposed her removal for
     Failure during Performance Improvement Period; specifically, for failing in her
     objectives, with the exception of the Be Aware objective. IAF, Tab 12 at 82-90.
     After receiving the appellant’s written reply, id. at 64-71, the Deputy Division
     Chief requested clarification from the appellant’s supervisor on certain issues,
     after which the Deputy Division Chief provided to the appellant the information
     he had received along with a new notice of proposed removal, including an
     additional opportunity to reply, id. at 52-53. Thereafter, the Chief issued a letter
     of decision notifying the appellant that she was removed from her position, id. at
     39-43, 36.
¶5        The appellant challenged the action by filing a timely formal complaint of
     discrimination in which she alleged that the agency’s action was due to
     discrimination because of sex, age, and disability, as well as retaliation for prior
     equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity. Id. at 21-34. When 120 days had
     passed without a final decision by the agency, the appellant filed a Board appeal ,
     IAF, Tab 1, in which she argued that the PIP and her performance standards were
     invalid and renewed her affirmative defenses, id. at 6. She requested a hearing,
     id. at 2. During the processing of the appeal, the appellant added a claim that the
     agency’s action was also in retaliation for her protected whistleblowing activity.
     IAF, Tab 52 at 2.
                                                                                             4

¶6         Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an initial decision. 3             IAF,
     Tab 62, Initial Decision (ID). He first found that the appellant did not challenge
     the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)’s approval of the agency’s
     performance appraisal system and that therefore that matter was not at issue in the
     appeal. 4 ID at 4 n.4. The administrative judge next examined the appellant’s
     performance standards, IAF, Tab 16 at 58-62, finding that the agency proved by
     substantial evidence that they were valid in that they were neither impermissibly
     vague nor ambiguous, but rather reasonable and attainable, and that they were
     clearly communicated to the appellant, 5 ID at 4-10. The administrative judge then
     found that the agency proved by substantial evidence that the appellant was
     provided a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance. ID
     at 10-15.   Specifically, he found, considering the nature of the duties and
     responsibilities of the appellant’s position as an architect, that the 102 days she
     had between October 10, 2014 and January 20, 2015, was a reasonable amount of
     time in which to show sufficient improvement, that she worked under a detailed
     PIP, and that she was afforded considerable written feedback on her work and
     weekly meetings to provide assistance. ID at 15. The administrative judge then
     considered the appellant’s performance during the PIP. ID at 15-17. Relying on

     3
       The administrative judge found that the appellant filed her appeal after the issuance of
     a Final Agency Decision (FAD) on her EEO complaint. ID at 1 n. 1, 2. However, there
     is no indication that the agency issued a FAD. Rather, the appellant timely filed her
     appeal when the agency had not issued a FAD within 120 days.                     5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.154(b)(2). Any such error by the administrative judge, however, did not
     prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. Panter v. Department of the Air Force,
     22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
     4
       The agency did, however, submit evidence that OPM approved its performance
     appraisal system. IAF, Tab 12 at 7.
     5
       To the extent that the administrative judge considered in his analysis the validity of
     the appellant’s performance standards under the Be Aware objective, he need not have
     done so since the proposing official found that the appellant’s performance under t hat
     objective during the PIP was acceptable. IAF, Tab 12 at 89. However, any such error
     did not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282.
                                                                                          5

     what he considered the credible and probative testimony of the appellant’s
     supervisor, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to complete
     either of the two projects she was assigned during the PIP, and that she exhibited
     rude and impolite behavior toward other members of the architectural section. ID
     at 16.   The administrative judge concluded that the agency established by
     substantial evidence that the appellant’s performance in the five objectives was
     unacceptable. ID at 17. The administrative judge then addressed the appellant’s
     affirmative defenses. He found that she failed to establish her claims of disability
     discrimination, ID at 19-22, age or sex discrimination, ID at 23-25, retaliation for
     her protected EEO activity, ID at 25-29, and retaliation for protected
     whistleblowing activity, ID at 29-31.       Accordingly, the administrative judge
     affirmed the agency’s action. ID at 1, 31-32.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 4, the agency has filed a response, PFR File, Tab 5, and t he appellant
     has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 7.

                                           ANALYSIS
¶8         In her petition for review, the appellant has chosen to address her concerns
     with the initial decision by presenting “responses” to its individual paragraphs,
     beginning with paragraph 1 of the Analysis and Findings section and continuing
     through paragraph 110, which occurs partway through the administrative judge’s
     analysis of the appellant’s claim of discrimination based on age and sex. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 7-31. Some of these “responses” are simply disagreements with
     specific factual findings in the initial decision that have not been shown to be
     material to the disposition of the appeal. We have not addressed these and other
     such “responses” because they do not meet the Board’s criteria for granting a
     petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. However, in order to facilitate our
     analysis of the appellant’s petition for review, we have grouped some of her
     “responses” to the extent she has raised valid objections to the initial decision.
                                                                                         6

¶9         As noted, consistent with the Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos, 990 F.3d
      at 1360-63, we are remanding this appeal for further adjudication. In Santos, the
      court held for the first time that, in addition to the elements of a chapter 43 case
      set forth by the administrative judge, an agency must also show that the initiation
      of a PIP was justified by the appellant’s unacceptable performance before the
      PIP. Id. Prior to addressing the remand, we address the administrative judge’s
      findings on the elements of a chapter 43 appeal as they exist ed at the time of the
      initial decision, the findings regarding the appellant’s affirmative defenses, and
      the appellant’s arguments on review.

      The appellant failed to show that the administrative judge erred, under the law in
      effect at the time, in finding that the agency satisfied its burden to prove that the
      appellant’s performance was unacceptable.
¶10        At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
      in a performance-based action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43, an agency must
      establish by substantial evidence that: (1) OPM approved its performance
      appraisal system; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the performance
      standards and critical elements of her position; (3) the appellant’s performance
      standards are valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1); (4) the agency warned the
      appellant of the inadequacies of her performance during the appraisal period and
      gave her a reasonable opportunity to improve; and (5) the a ppellant’s
      performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element.         White v
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶ 5 (2013).          As set forth
      below, we affirm the administrative judge’s findings as to each of these elements.
¶11        On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
      the agency proved that her performance standards were valid, arguing that, during
      the PIP, she was required to perform the duties of “another position,” that of
      Design Team Leader (DTL) in addition to her normal duties as a Lead Design
      Architect (LDA).     PFR File, Tab 4 at 8-11, 13-14, 16, 21.          The appellant
      acknowledges, however, that this is not an argument she raised below. PFR File,
                                                                                         7

      Tab 7 at 6. In fact, she states that she was not aware, even at the hearing, that, in
      her view, her performance standards required her to combine the duties and
      responsibilities of the DTL and the LDA positions, and that it was not until she
      read the initial decision that “it occurred to [her] that it would be prudent to
      re-examine the actual performance criteria [her supervisor] had set out rather than
      just rely on his characterization of it in court.” Id. The Board generally will not
      consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a
      showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previou sly available
      despite the party’s due diligence.      Banks v. Department of the Air Force,
      4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). Because the appellant has not made such a showing,
      we have not considered this claim.
¶12         The Board will defer to managerial discretion in determining what agency
      employees must do to perform acceptably in their positions when, as here, the
      agency has shown that the performance standards, to the maximum extent
      feasible, permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of
      objective criteria related to the job in question and are reasonable, realistic,
      attainable, and clearly stated in writing. Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 29 (2010).       Agencies are entitled to use their managerial
      discretion in establishing the performance standards by which an employee’s
      performance is to be measured.          Thompson v. Department of the Navy,
      89 M.S.P.R. 188, ¶ 5 (2001).
¶13         In finding that the appellant’s performance standards were valid and
      properly communicated to her, the administrative judge relied upon the testimony
      of the appellant’s supervisor to the effect that all architects with the agency have
      the same performance elements and standards, that the PIP notified her
      specifically of what she had to do to bring her performance up to the required
      level and gave specific instructions for behaviors that would allow for successful
      performance, and that she appeared to understand the objectives when he
      discussed them with her.       Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) I (testimony of the
                                                                                           8

      appellant’s supervisor); ID at 10.      Our review of the performance standards
      supports the appellant’s supervisor’s testimony regarding their reasonableness
      and attainability. IAF, Tab 16 at 58-62. Beyond her mere disagreement with the
      administrative   judge’s   findings,   the   appellant   has   not   shown   that   the
      administrative judge erred in finding that the agency proved by substantial
      evidence that her performance standards were valid and fairly communicated to
      her.
¶14          The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency proved by substantial evidence that it afforded her a reasonable
      opportunity to improve her performance.          PFR File, Tab 4 at 20-22.           In
      determining whether an agency has afforded an employee a reasonable
      opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance, relevant factors include the
      nature of the duties and responsibilities of the employee’s position, the
      performance deficiencies involved, and the amount of time which is sufficient to
      provide the employee with an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance.
      Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32.
¶15          The appellant argues that her supervisor “sabotaged her projects as a pretext
      to give her a poor performance evaluation,” PFR File, Tab 4 at 20, and that she
      had no opportunity to improve before the evaluation and/or PIP meeting, id. at 16.
      However, the performance evaluation to which she refers predated the PIP by at
      least 60 days, IAF, Tab 43 at 4-10, and it therefore had no bearing on the
      reasonableness of the opportunity to improve that began on October 10, 2014. Id.
      at 24-33. 6   The appellant also contends that, at PIP meetings, her supervisor
      provided no guidance on how she should proceed. PFR File, Tab 4 at 20. Her
      supervisor, however, recalled that the appellant reacted negatively to his
      guidance. HCD I (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor). The appellant also
      challenges the administrative judge’s findings as to the roof project she was
      6
       This argument may, however, be relevant to the issues before the administrative judge
      on remand regarding the appellant’s pre-PIP performance.
                                                                                           9

      assigned during the PIP, arguing that she disagreed with her supervisor regarding
      what needed to be done, and that the disagreement caused friction between her
      coworkers and her. PFR File, Tab 4 at 21-22.
¶16         Here, the appellant’s initial 60-day PIP was extended for an additional 6
      weeks. IAF, Tab 15 at 9-12. During that lengthy time, the appellant’s supervisor
      provided her considerable written feedback, IAF, Tab 14, and met with her
      weekly to discuss her progress on her assigned tasks. The administrative judge
      considered the appellant’s claims, ID at 13-15, but found, based on the record as a
      whole, that the agency proved by substantial evidence that it afforded the
      appellant not only a reasonable amount of time (102 days) but also an otherwise
      reasonable opportunity to improve her performance, ID at 10-15.            Bearing in
      mind that the agency need only prove the elements of its case by substantial
      evidence, 7 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(1)(i), we find that the appellant’s mere
      disagreement with the administrative judge’s findings in this regard does not
      provide a basis for us to disturb them.
¶17         Next, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the
      agency proved by substantial evidence that her performance was unacceptable.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 23-28. For example, she alleges that details surrounding the
      “Ft. Gordon DFAC project 65% submittal” caused delays that were beyond her
      control.   However, the details she describes all occurred well before the PIP
      period. Id. She asserts that certain of her supervisor’s statements regarding her
      work assignments are “inaccurate” and claims that she completed them, but she
      has pointed to no evidence that supports her assertion. Id. at 28. The appellant
      also disputes the testimony of her supervisor that she exhibited rude and impolite
      behavior toward other members of the architectural section, arguing that he “did

      7
        Substantial evidence is defined as that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support a
      conclusion, even though other reasonable persons might disagree. It is a lower standard
      of proof than preponderant evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).
                                                                                      10

      nothing to stop [] co-workers from yelling in [her] face,” id., but, again, she has
      pointed to no evidence that supports her claim.
¶18        In finding that the agency proved by substantial evidence that the
      appellant’s performance was unacceptable under the five objectives during the
      PIP, as extended, the administrative judge correctly found that the substantial
      evidence standard does not require an agency to produce evidence that is more
      persuasive than that presented by the appellant.      Leonard v. Department of
      Defense, 82 M.S.P.R. 597, ¶ 5 (1999); ID at 17.         The administrative judge
      considered not only the testimony of the appellant’s supervisor, which he found
      credible and probative, HCD I (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor); ID
      at 15-17, but also the appellant’s testimony, which he found, in fact, confirmed
      many of the communication difficulties observed b y her supervisor and the fact
      that she was unable to resolve them, and that it also highlighted her inability to
      deal with changing deadlines or coordinate assignments with other team
      members, ID at 17. We have considered the appellant’s arguments on review, but
      discern no reason to weigh the evidence or substitute our assessment of the record
      evidence for that of the administrative judge.    Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
      judge’s findings when he considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health
      & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same); Haebe v. Department of
      Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board may
      overturn credibility determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons
      for doing so).    We find that the appellant’s mere disagreement with the
      administrative judge’s findings and credibility determinations does not warrant
      full review of the record by the Board.      Gager v. Department of Commerce,
      99 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 5 (2005); Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R. 129,
      133-34 (1980), review denied, 669 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
                                                                                               11

      The appellant did not show that the administrative judge erred in finding that she
      failed to establish her affirmative defenses.
¶19         Next, the appellant challenges on review the administrative judge’s findings
      that she failed to establish that her removal was due to discrimination based on
      disability, 8 under the theories of denial of reasonable accommodation and
      disparate treatment. PFR File, Tab 4 at 28-31. An appellant may establish a
      disability discrimination claim based on a failure to accommodate by showing
      that (1) she is a disabled person; (2) the action appealed was based on her
      disability; and (3) to the extent possible, there was a reason able accommodation
      under which she believes she could perform the essential duties of her position.
      Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 35 (2016),
      clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 23-24.
¶20         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that her original
      request to telework was unrelated to any issue of reasonable accommodation.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 28. The administrative judge further found, however, and the
      appellant does not dispute, that she did later request to telework as a reasonable
      accommodation for her disability, and that the agency granted her request, first
      allowing her to telework 4 days a week, although later reducing the number of
      days to 3, an arrangement that was in place for the duration of the PIP, as
      extended. ID at 19-21. For the same reason, the appellant’s claim, even if true,
      that the accommodation process took longer than usual, PFR File, Tab 4 at 25,
      does not establish error in the administrative judge’s findings and conclusion.
      The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s recitation of the
      testimony of the Head of the Civilian Personnel Office regarding the appellant’s

      8
        The nature of the appellant’s claimed disability is not addressed in the initial decision,
      ID at 17-23, or in any of the pleadings on review, PFR File, Tabs 4, 6 -7. Nonetheless,
      in her EEO complaint, which gave rise to this appeal, the appellant claimed mental
      disability, “Anxiety, [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder],” and physical disability,
      “illness.” IAF, Tab 31 at 20.
                                                                                         12

      request to be a leave donor recipient, and the resultant confusion and delay,
      acknowledged by the agency, resulting from its use of the appellant’s middle
      name as her last name. Id. at 29-30. The appellant does not suggest, however,
      that the matter remained unresolved during the PIP.          Id.   The appellant also
      disputes the administrative judge’s finding that telework was not typically
      permitted for architects, id. at 30, but, even if the appellant is correct in her
      assertion that telework was typically granted to architects on an ad -hoc basis, it
      does not advance her discrimination claim because the agency granted her
      requested reasonable accommodation, which was in effect during the pendency of
      the PIP. Beyond her mere disagreement, the appellant has not shown that the
      administrative judge erred in finding that, assuming the appellant is disabled, she
      failed to establish that her removal was based on a failure to accommodate. ID
      at 22-23.
¶21            The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that she did
      not establish her claim of disparate treatment based on disability.         Here, the
      appellant acknowledges that no other architects in the architectural section were
      removed during her tenure. Further, although she refers to a particular employee
      in an effort to show that “I was singled out for removal,” she does not suggest
      that that employee had performance issues or was otherwise similarly situated to
      her. PFR File, Tab 4 at 30-31; Davis v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 122,
      ¶ 16 (2013). Nor has the appellant shown that her disability was a motivating
      factor or but-for cause in her removal.          Forte v. Department of the Navy,
      123 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 33 (2016). Therefore, the appellant has failed to show that
      the administrative judge erred in finding that she did not establish her claim of
      disparate treatment based on her disability. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 40.
¶22            The appellant does not, on review, challenge with any spe cific claim of
      error the administrative judge’s finding that she failed to establish that the
      agency’s action was based on discrimination due to age or sex. PFR File, Tab 4
      at 31.     The administrative judge applied the burden-shifting analysis under
                                                                                           13

      McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), finding that
      the appellant’s anecdotal recollections 9 failed to show employment decisions
      personal to her that were based on her sex or age and that, based on the record as
      a whole, she failed to present evidence that similarly situated coworkers not in
      her protected class who suffered from failing performance were treated more
      favorably.   The administrative judge found no evidence that the decision to
      remove the appellant was motivated by animus toward her due to her age or sex,
      and that the agency’s explanation for the action, the appellant’s failure to meet
      her performance requirements, was not shown to be false or some façade to hide
      an improper motive. ID at 23-25. We find no reason to disturb the administrative
      judge’s decision, as it is consistent with our recent holding in Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 25 .
¶23         Finally, the appellant argues that certain evidence was available but was not
      presented due to the incompetence of her non-attorney representative, his
      unfamiliarity with her case, and his focus on irrelevant issues . PFR File, Tab 4
      at 6, Tab 7 at 5. The administrative judge marked proffered timely filed exhibits
      for identification, but stated that they “must be introduced at the hearing,” at
      which time he would rule on their admissibility. IAF, Tab 52. To the extent the
      appellant’s representative failed to introduce any such exhibits, an appellant is
      responsible for the errors of her chosen representative. Sofio v. Internal Revenue
      Service, 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 670 (1981).       The appellant appeals to the Board for
      consideration on the basis that she is now pro se on petition for review. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 4. While it is true that pro se appellants are not required to plead issues
      with the precision of an attorney in a judicial proceeding, Gilliam v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 91 M.S.P.R. 352, ¶ 7 (2002), the appellant in this case

      9
        For example, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s claims that she
      overheard her supervisor tell another employee that she was being selected to do certain
      work because she was “young and energetic,” that he thought younger people were
      more adept at learning a 3-D modeling program, and that the appellant was not often
      asked to socialize with other male engineers. ID at 24-25.
                                                                                          14

      was represented, initially by counsel, IAF, Tab 1, and th ereafter by a non-attorney
      representative, IAF, Tab 26, during the processing of her appeal, up to and
      including at the hearing.      In any event, the consideration afforded a pro se
      appellant does not extend to a less strict interpretation of the law. 10

      Remand is necessary to afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence and
      argument regarding whether the appellant’s placement on a PIP was proper.
¶24         As noted, during the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the
      United States Court for the Federal Circuit issued Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-63, in
      which it held that, in addition to the five elements of the agency’s case, as set
      forth above, the agency must also justify the initiation of a PIP by proving by
      substantial evidence that the employee’s performance was unacceptable prior to
      the PIP. The Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases,
      including this one, regardless of when the events took place. Lee v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.           Although the record in this case
      already contains evidence suggesting that the appellant’s performance prior to the
      initiation of the PIP was unacceptable, IAF, Tab 16 at 68, 70, Tab 43 at 4-10, we
      remand the appeal to give the parties the opportunity to present argument and
      additional evidence on whether the appellant’s performance during the period
      leading up to the PIP was unacceptable in one or more critical elements, see Lee,
      2022 MSPB 11, ¶¶ 15-17.         On remand, the administrative judge shall accept

      10
         With her petition, the appellant has submitted 70 additional pages of documents.
      PFR File, Tab 4 at 70-139. Some are not material, id. at 70-71, and others are not new,
      id. at 88-97. The Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first
      time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the
      record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service,
      3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). In addition, the Board generally will not grant a petition
      for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to
      warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. Russo v. Veterans
      Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). Absent any such showing by the
      appellant, we have not considered these documents. Other documents the appellant has
      submitted on review are part of the record below and do not therefore constitute new
      evidence, PFR File, Tab 4 at 73-80, 98-123, 125-39. Meier v. Department of the
      Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980).
                                                                                        15

      argument and evidence on this issue, and shall hold a supplemental hearing if
      appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.
¶25         The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent
      with Santos. See Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17. If the agency makes the additional
      showing required under Santos on remand, the administrative judge may
      incorporate in the remand initial decision his prior findings on the other elements
      of the agency’s case, and the appellant’s affirmative defenses, as modified herein
      to apply the proper standard. See id. However, regardless of whether the agency
      meets its burden, if the argument or evidence on remand regarding the appellant’s
      pre-PIP performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s
      affirmative defenses, the administrative judge should address such argument or
      evidence in the remand initial decision.     See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must
      identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve
      issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law
      and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                            ORDER
¶26         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order .

      FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.