Court Opinion

ID: 9604942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:43.151947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:30.868067
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
concurring, with whom DOOLIN, Chief Justice, HODGES and ALMA WILSON, Justices, join:
Although I concur with the majority opinion, it has failed to answer one of the questions squarely presented by the appellant, The Baptist General Convention of Oklahoma, d/b/a/, Miami Baptist Hospital. As the hospital puts it, the question now before this Court is whether 12 O.S.Supp. 1979 § 727 has retroactive, or prospective effect. The hospital argues that § 727 must be applied prospectively — the hospital is right. Apparently, because of the pending counter claim, the majority has left this issue somewhat hazy. Because, in my opinion, the prejudgment and postjudgment interest rates change at the effective date of each amendment to the rate setting statutes, and because both prejudgment and postjudgment interest rates have widely fluctuated since 1971,1 we should address this issue now.
THE INTEREST RATE ON ALL EXISTING JUDGMENTS IS CHANGED PROSPECTIVELY FROM THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTE AUTHORIZING THE RATE
The question of whether a state statute which changes the applicable rate of interest on judgments or verdicts should be applied retroactively, prospectively, or from the effective date of its modification has been a fruitful field for litigation.2 In several jurisdictions, in the absence of no clearly contrary legislative intent, amendments to interest statutes are applied prospectively. The majority, however, have espoused the view that because interest in tort actions is a statutory obligation, with the right to receive either prejudgment or postjudgment interest dependent on legislative prescription, interest rates on judgments in personal injury actions should reflect statutory changes which occur during the pendency of the obligation to pay the judgment. This rationale is premised on the notion that a claim for damages arising from a personal injury action is unliqui-dated in the sense that the defendant cannot know, prior to judgment, the precise amount he/she may be required to pay. Because claims for damages in tort actions are unliquidated, at common law interest *1100was not awarded as a part of damages.3 The more recent trend is a hybrid retrospective/prospective application of changes in the interest rate based on the effective date of the applicable rate-changing statute.
A.
IN THE PAST, INTEREST RATES HAVE BEEN BASED ON WHETHER THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INTEREST ON THE JUDGMENT IS A VESTED RIGHT OR MERELY A MINISTERIAL MATHEMATICAL MODE OF PROCEDURE.
There are four leading cases in Oklahoma which have discussed the problem of the rate of interest to be impressed on a judgment after the statute setting the rate has been amended: Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589, 594 (Okl.1985); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 63 (Okl.1976); Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okl.1973); and Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329, 346 (Okl.1970). These cases reached inconsistent results perhaps because Timmons and Sunray were eases arising from contract while Fields and Benson each involved actions for personal injuries.
In Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 713 P.2d 589 (Okl.1985), damages were awarded against the insurer for its bad faith refusal to pay a valid claim. One of the issues on appeal was whether the prejudgment and postjudgment interest rates in effect at the time of judgment could be varied by subsequent legislative amendments. The Timmons court held that the rate, until the date of payment, was the one in effect at the time of judgment because Royal Globe was vested with a constitutionally-shielded accrued or vested right in the adjudicated obligation.4 Timmons cited Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329, 346 (Okl.1970), for the proposition that subsequent changes in the statutory rate should not vary the rate of interest to be paid on a judgment.
On rehearing in Sunray, the question was raised concerning whether the post-judgment interest rate on a judgment for breach of a written contract was changed by a subsequent amendment to the rate-setting statute. The Sunray court held that the interest rate on the pre-existing judgment should not be changed, because to do so would apply the statute retrospectively. The court applied the rule that a statute should operate prospectively in the absence of clear legislative intent or contrary implication.5 Although this is an established rule of statutory construction, an exception for statutes involving modes of procedure is also recognized. An Oklahoma example is Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okl.1973).
Benson also focused on the application of 12 O.S. 1971 § 727, although prejudgment rather than postjudgment interest was involved. There the court found that the legislative intent expressed or implied by the language used required retrospective application of the interest rate.6 Benson adopted the rationale expressed in the leading postjudgment interest case, Foster v. Quigley, 179 A.2d 494-95 (R.I.1962),7 that interest on a judgment in an action for damages to person or property is not of the substance of the right of action but attaches to the judgment after the substantive right has been adjudicated. The Benson court noted the similarity to the imposition of costs, and held that the legislative directive to the trial court to add interest to *1101the judgment was merely a ministeral mode of procedure.8
The Timmons court, after finding there was a vested right in the amount of interest impressed upon an adjudicated obligation, distinguished Benson on the grounds that it failed to address the question of whether the challenged interest was a vested or accrued right. Nonetheless, Benson held that the addition of interest was a procedural duty of the trial court not a substantive right.
B.
BOTH PREJUDGMENT AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST IN ACTIONS FOR PERSONAL INJURIES ARE STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS
Other than the procedural/substantive distinction, whether to apply interest rate changes to pre-existing judgments was often analyzed in many older cases by determining whether interest on judgments was a matter of contract or an obligation imposed by statute. If, as in Benson, a court takes the latter view, then the rate is subject to later modification by statute.9 On the other hand, if the interest on a judgment is considered a contractual obligation, the rate is a vested obligation which cannot be subjected to later modification. The contractual view has fallen into disuse, and has been criticized because of the major differences between contracts and judgments.10 If we decide, as do the majority of jurisdictions, that interest on a judgment for damages to person or property is not a substantial right but exclusively an incident attached thereto by legislative fiat after the right has been adjudicated,11 neither enlarging nor impairing substantial rights, but rather prescribing the methods and procedures of enforcement,12 interest on the judgment can be changed at any time.13 Because at common law interest was not an element of damages recoverable on actions of tort for personal injuries,14 but is purely a creature of statute, a historical review is essential.
Arguments are often offered that the new interest rate should not apply to unsatisfied judgments entered before the effective date of the statutory change because a judgment is a contract or is in the nature of a contract with the rights and liabilities of the parties fixed at the time judgment is entered. The United States Supreme Court disposed of this argument almost a century ago in Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 162, 169-70, 13 S.Ct. 54, 56-57, 36 L.Ed. 925, 929 (1892). The Court, in its discussion of a New York statute similar to the one here, held that the right to interest on a judgment for personal injuries is a matter of legislative discretion not of contract pointing out the absence of essential characteristics of a contract — a meeting of the minds, consideration, mutuality, and assent of the parties. The Court discussed this issue at length:
“After the cause of action, whether a tort or a broken contract, not itself prescribing interest till payment, shall have been merged into a judgment, whether interest shall accrue upon the *1102judgment is a matter not of contract between the parties, but of legislative discretion, which is free, so far as the constitution of the United States is concerned, to provide for interest as a penalty or liquidated damages for the nonpayment of the judgment, or not to do so. When such provision is made by statute, the owner of the judgment is, of course, entitled to the interest so prescribed until payment is received, or until the state shall, in the exercise of its discretion, declare that such interest shall be changed or cease to accrue. Should the statutory damages for nonpayment of a judgment be determined by a state, either in whole or in part, the owner of a judgment will be entitled to receive and have a vested right in the damages which shall have accrued up to the date of the legislative change; but after that time his rights as to interest as damages are, as when he first obtained his judgment, just what the legislature chooses to declare. He has no contract whatever on the subject with the defendant in the judgment, and his right is to receive, and the defendant's obligation is to pay, as damages, just what the state chooses to prescribe.” (Emphasis supplied)
The right of a judgment creditor to interest on a judgment is a matter of legislative grace granted to compensate the judgment creditor for the damages sustained by nonpayment of the judgment. Here, just as the judgment creditor has no right to interest except that which is legislatively decreed, the judgment debtor has no right to a limitation of the interest rate to be applied in the future except for that ordered by the legislature. Should the legislature determine that it is prudent to raise or lower15 the interest rate from time to time either to compensate fairly judgment creditors, to conform with current economic standards, or to expedite litigation, the new rate should apply from the effective date of the change to all outstanding judgments.
This construction is a hybrid application because it is actually neither retrospective nor prospective. A retroactive application would apply the new rate to all outstanding judgments running from the date of the judgment even if it were entered before the effective date of the new rate. This construction is a prospective application of the new rate, e.g., the new rate applies after the effective date to all outstanding judgments — before that date interest accrues at the old rates.16 Where the language of a statute is plain and the meaning clear, the statute must be enforced as written.17 Here, the language of the statute contains no exception for actions accruing prior to the effective date of the statute.
Although there is arguably a valid rationale for differentiating between interest on contracts and interest on actions for damages, none of the Oklahoma interest statutes make such a distinction except when the rate of interest is specified in the contract. The Oklahoma statute, 12 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 727(A)(1), and its predecessors have always provided that if the rate of interest is specified in the contract, the rate is applicable to the judgment debt and that it will be so specified in the journal entry of judgment. Perhaps this is so because of the language of Morley construing a similar New York statute.18
*1103Nor do I find support in the Oklahoma Constitution19 for the proposition that prejudgment and postjudgment interest on an action for damages to person or property are vested rights because this Court held in Benson that interest calculation was procedural. Procedural changes affect the remedy rather than the right,20 and there is no vested right in any particular mode of procedure. In the absence of an expression of contrary intent, a procedural statute applies equally to all actions within its purview, those accruing both before and after the statutory enactment.21
Generally, because a constitution is not the beginning of law in the state, it assumes the existence of a well understood system of law which is to remain in force. Accordingly, a constitution is to be construed in the light of common law. The framers are presumed to have intended no change from nor innovation on the common law than appears from reasonable implication, or from an express declaration by the Constitutional framers themselves. In many jurisdictions the rule is that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed. Since 1910, the common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions, and the condition and wants of the people, has remained in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma. However, the rule that statutes in derogation are to be strictly construed is inapplicable to the laws of this state — they are to be construed liberally in order to achieve their objectives and to promote justice.22
Here, because the framers had the benefit of the New York statute and of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Morley, I must conclude that the right of the judgment creditor to receive, and the obligation of the judgment debtor to pay, interest upon a judgment does not rest in contract. Instead it is an obligation imposed by law with the right to receive interest entirely contingent upon legislative prescription. Because prejudgment and postjudgment interest are in the nature of statutory damages where the interest is not specifically provided by contractual agreement, a state without impairing the obligation of contracts or interfering with vested or accrued rights, may legislate to increase or reduce the rate of interest on judgments previously obtained in its courts.23
Regardless of the analysis used — substantive/procedural or contractual/statutory — the majority of jurisdictions allow the rates on pre-existing judgments to be changed as the new statutory rates become effective.24 The underlying policy for this *1104position was discussed in Shook & Fletcher Insulation v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir.1982). In Shook, as here, the applicable statute did not address specifically what interest rate should apply to judgments existing prior to an amendment of the statutory rate. The language of the Georgia Code § 57-108 (1980) was the same as the Oklahoma statute. It provided: “All judgments ... shall bear interest ... at the rate of twelve per cent per year.” The court interpreted this language literally, stating:
“The purpose for increasing the rate of interest accruing to judgments was to acknowledge an increase in interest rates in general and to bring the rate of interest on judgments into parity with other comparable market rates of interest. If the legal rate of interest for judgments remains significantly lower than the prevailing market rates of interest, then judgment-debtors would have a strong incentive to delay paying their judgments as long as possible in order to capitalize on this difference. Judgment-creditors, in turn, would increasingly be compelled to resort to levying, attachment, and other judicial remedies to enforce their judgments. This windfall to judgment-debtors and burden on judgment-creditors and the state courts are a state of affairs that Georgia could reasonably seek to avoid. These policy concerns apply with equal force for all judgments outstanding as of July 1, 1980, [the effective date of the amendment] as well as for new judgments entered after July 1, 1980”.25
The same result was reached in Noe v. Chicago, 56 I11.2d 346, 307 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1974). The Noe Court determined: that the new rate should apply prospectively to pre-existing judgments; that this application was not, in any sense, a retroactive application of the statute; and, that changing the interest rate on a judgment does not interfere with rights already accrued or vested.26 Another case in which this reasoning was adopted is McBride v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 193, 635 P.2d 178-79 (1981). In rebutting the argument that changing the rate after the date of judgment was a retroactive application of the statute, the McBride court said, “The statute at the time of the judgment provided for 6% interest; the 10% rate did not take effect until 14 December 1979 and was effective only after that date. It was not retroactive but prospective after the effective date of the statute.”27
In the final analysis, we need not find that the interest on the judgments for breach of an oral contract is merely procedural or that it is not contractual. The most appropriate construction is that the new rate is not a retrospective application of the statute interfering with vested or accrued rights but that it is, in fact, pro*1105spective from the effective date of the new rate. Shook, Noe, and McBride provide the proper prototype for finding that the interest rate of the amended statute varies the prejudgment and postjudgment rate prospectively from the effective date of each amendment.
The underlying rationale for awarding interest at all is to compensate the prevailing party for the expenses incurred in bringing an action, for the delay in receiving money damages, and for the loss of the use of the principal.28 In 1986, the Oklahoma Legislature included amendments to § 727 as a part of its popularly-denominated Tort Reform legislation.29 At the time of the amendment, judgments bore interest at the rate of 15% per annum even though the average treasury bill rate was 6.03% per year.30 The obvious legislative purpose expressed in § 727 was to link interest rates with changing economic conditions. The overriding legislative intent is the desirability of tying interest rates on judgments to rapidly fluctuating financial realities, and to avoid penalizing either the judgment debtor or the judgment creditor. Because the judgment debtor may invest the amount of the judgment at the contemporary cost of money pending appeal, neither of the parties suffer undue hardship rather, this procedure more fairly maintains the status quo. If the Court continues to cling to the Timmons doctrine, it will ignore the unmistakable legislative directive, and risk unraveling the legislature’s attempt to deal comprehensively with tort-related issues.
Generally, a case does not become final until the appeal or the right to appeal is exhausted.31 According to Walker v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 671 P.2d 672, 674 (Okl.1983), prejudgment interest should be calculated from September 21, 1973, (the date the suit was filed)32 until October 1, 1979, at 6%. After October 1, 1979, until the date of judgment, interest should run at the rate of 10% per annum. Thereafter, the accrued amount merged in the judgment and the interest continued to run on the entire amount at 12% per year until April 1, 1982. After that date, interest on the judgment should be figured at an annual rate of 15% until January 1, 1987.33 After January 1, 1987, the interest should run at 10.03%.34 If the judgment is not paid during 1987, then the interest on the judgment from January, 1988, should be calculated at an annual rate equal to the average United States Treasury Bill rate of the preceding calendar year plus four percentage points.35
APPENDIX A
Clear indicium of legislative intent to make prejudgment and postjudgment interest more responsive to the marketplace is reflected in the following comparisons (Thorndike Encyclopedia of Banking and Financial Tables, Ch. 1, p. 2-3 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1987)):
*1106Prime Rate Okla. Stat. Rate Low — High Pre and Post T-Bill Rate Projected Statutory Rate T-Bill +4%
1971 5.25% 6.75% 6.0% 10.0% 4.348% 8.348%
1972 5.0% 6.0% 6.0% 10.0% 4.071% 8.071%
1973 6.0% 10.0% 6.0% 10.0% 7.024% 11.024%
1974 8.75% 12.0% 6.0% 10.0% 7.873% 11.873%
1975 7.0% 10.5% 6.0% 10.0% 5.283% 9.283%
1976 6.25% 7.25% 6.0% 10.0% 4.296% 8.296%
1977 6.5% 7.5% 6.0% 10.0% 6.063% 10.063%
1978 6.0% 11.75% 6.0% 10.0% 9.122% 13.122%
1979 11.5% 15.75% 10.0% 12.0% 12.071% 16.071%
1980 11.0% 21.5% 10.0% 12.0% 15.681% 19.681%
1981 15.75 20.5% 10.0% 12.0% 10.926% 14.926%
1982 11.5% 17.0% 15% 8.013% 12.013%
1983 10.5% 11.5% 15% 8.960% 12.960%
1984 10.75% 12.75% 15% 8.90% 12.90%
1985 9.5% 10.75% 15% 7.49% 11.49%
1986 15% variable beg.
Jan. 9.5% 11-86 6.03%
Mar. 9%
Apr. 8.5% 10.03%
July 8.0%
1987
OPALA, Justice,
concurring in result.
For the reasons to be explained I cannot fully concur in today’s pronouncement nor in the court’s judgment.
I
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON NONTAX-ABILITY OF A PERSONAL INJURY AWARD
The transcript of proceedings reveals neither a mid-trial reference to the tax consequences of the plaintiffs’ recovery nor a request to instruct the jury on non-taxability of a personal injury award. The trial of this suit took place before our mandate in Middlebrook v. Imler, Tenny & Kugler, M.D.’s,1 There I counseled that the teaching of Liepelt2 be adopted for mandatory use in trials conducted after our mandate in Middlebrook,3 I do not today recede from that position.
II
WHEN A COUNTERCLAIM TENDERING ISSUES RELATED TO THE TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE LITIGATED IN THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM REMAINS UNDETERMINED, A DECISION UPON A PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A “JUDGMENT.”
The hospital correctly contends that the severance of its counterclaim for unpaid *1107medical bills from the plaintiffs’ tort claim constituted a barrier to the rendition of a judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiffs. This is so because by force of the provisions in 12 O.S. 1981 § 6814 no judgment may be pronounced until all of the issues between the parties have been resolved.5 When a counterclaim which tenders issues for resolution that are interrelated with the transaction or occurrence litigated in the plaintiffs claim remains undetermined, a decision on the plaintiffs claim alone cannot constitute a “judgment.”6
III
THE RATE OF POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST TO BE APPLIED TENDERS ISSUES WHICH MUST BE LITIGATED AFTER REMAND
Judicial determination of postjudgment interest rate to be applied and the computation of the total amount of interest that is due upon the judgment affirmed today are issues to be litigated after remand.7 I hence concur in the court’s abstention from reaching and settling these issues at this time.
I would direct that the trial court’s “judgment” — the decision here under review — be vacated rather than stayed. Because of its premature rendition in advance of the counterclaim’s determination, that judgment cannot presently stand. When all the issues raised by the hospital’s counterclaim have been resolved, the trial court may then reinstate its judgment on jury verdict for the plaintiff.

. See Appendix A.

. See Annot., "Retrospective Application and Effect of State Statute or Rule Allowing Interest or Changing Rate of Interest on Judgments or Verdicts,” 41 A.L.R. 4th 694 (1985), for citation of cases.

. Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 851 (1st Cir.1955), cert. den'd 350 U.S. 988, 76 S.Ct. 475, 100 L.Ed. 854 (1956); Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Okl.1984).

. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 713 P.2d 589, 594 (Okl.1985).

. Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329, 346 (Okl.1970).

. Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okl.1973).

. Most jurisdictions considering this question have adopted the Quigley doctrine. See Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F.Supp. 1365, 1391 (D.R.I.1977), for citation of Rhode Island post Foster v. Quigley cases.

. See also Battog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1969).

. McBride v. Superior Ct. of Maricopa County, 130 Ariz. 193, 635 P.2d 178-79 (1981).

. The criticism is that contracts create a right in one party and a duty in another, while a judgment does not personally compel the debtor to act. Also, unlike a contract, a judgment does not demand the free assent of the parties, and by way of enforcement, failure to fulfill a contractual obligation cannot lead to jail, while refusal to comply with a judgment can be so punished. See Note, "Creditors Remedies: Applying a Change in the Statutory Rate of Interest to Preexisting Judgments in Arizona,” 25 Ariz. L.Rev. 515, 520 (1983).

. Foster v. Quigley, 179 A.2d 494-95 (R.I.1962); see also Battog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 164 N.W.2d 19, 23 (1969).

. See Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F.Supp. 1365, 1391 (D.R.I.1977) for citation of Rhode Island post Foster v. Quigley cases.

. O’Brien v. Young, 47 Amer. R. 64, 95 N.Y. 428, 434 (App.1884).

. Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okl.1984); Batchelder v. Tweedie, 294 A.2d 443-44 (Me.1972); Cochran v. Boston, 211 Mass. 171, 97 N.E. 1100-01 (1912); Atlanta & B. Air Line Ry. v. Brown, 158 Ala. 607, 48 So. 73, 77 (1908).

. In Swanson v. Flynn, 75 N.D. 597, 31 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1948), the North Dakota Supreme Court approved the reduction of the rate of interest on judgments previously obtained finding no impairment of contract.

. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 294 Md. 267, 449 A.2d 406, 410 (1982).

. Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 652 P.2d 283, 285 (1982).

. New York Laws 1879, chap. 538, p. 598:
"§ 1. The rate of interest upon the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or things in action shall be six dollars upon one hundred dollars for one year, and after that rate for a greater or less sum, or for a longer or shorter time; but nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to in any way affect any contract or obligation made before the passage of this Act.”
New York Laws 1877, chap. 417, pp. 468, 477: "§ 1211. A judgment for a sum of money, rendered in a court of record, or not of record, or a judgment rendered in a court of record directing the payment of money, bears interest from the time when it is entered.”

. The Okla. Const, art. 5, § 54 provides:
‘The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by such statute, nor shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty incurred or proceedings begun by virtue of such repealed statute."

. Trinity Broadcasting Co. v. Leeco Oil Co., 692 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Okl.1984).

. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd. v. Central Okla. Master Conservancy Dist., 464 P.2d 748, 756 (Okl. 1969); Shelby-Downard Asphalt Co. v. Engart, 67 Okl. 237, 170 P. 708-09 (1918).

. Title 12 O.S.1981 § 2 provides:
‘The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object."
Title 25 O.S.1981 § 29 provides:
‘The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to the laws of this state, which are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and to promote justice.”
State v. Criqui, 105 Kan. 695, 185 P. 1063, 1065 (1919); see also I Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations," Ch. 4, p. 133 (8th ed. 1927).

. See Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okl.1973), followed in Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 63 (Okl.1976), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the statute to be procedural not affecting a substantive right clothed with the indicia of damages. Missouri & A.L. & M. Co. v. Sebastian County, 249 U.S. 170, 172, 39 S.Ct. 202, 63 L.Ed. 538, 542 (1919); Wyoming Natl. Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291 (1898).

. States which apply the amended statutory rate to pre-existing judgments include Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Ken*1104tucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Shook & Fletcher Insulation v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383, 1388 (11th Cir.1982); Southeastern Freight Lines v. Michelin Tire Corp, 279 S.C. 174, 303 S.E.2d 860-61 (1983); Baltimore v. Kelso Corp., 294 Md. 267, 449 A.2d 406, 409 (1982); Associated Developers, Inc. v. Brookings, 305 N.W.2d 848-49 (S.D.1981); Indiana Dept, of Revenue v. Glendale-Glenbrook Associates, 429 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ind.1981); Senn v. Commerce-Manchester Bank, 603 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Mo.1980); Ridge v. Ridge, 572 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Ky.1978); Noe v. Chicago, 56 Ill.2d 346, 307 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1974); Swanson v. Flynn, 75 N.D. 597, 31 N.W.2d 320, 323 (1948); People ex rel. Emigrant Industrial Sav. Bank v. Sexton, 284 N.Y. 57, 29 N.E.2d 469, 471 (1940); Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 54 Idaho 765, 37 P.2d 407, 412 (1934); Stanford v. Coram, 28 Mont. 288, 72 P. 655-56 (1903); Read v. Mississippi County, 69 Ark. 365, 63 S.W. 807-OS (1901) aff'd 188 U.S. 739, 23 S.Ct. 849, 47 L.Ed. 677 (1903); Wyoming Natl. Bank v. Brown, 7 Wyo. 494, 53 P. 291 (1898); Erskine Florida Properties, Inc. v. Hartwell, 451 So.2d 976 (Fla.App.1984); Ferris v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 96 Wis.2d 476, 292 N.W.2d 357, 361 (App.1980). See also Annot., "Retrospective Application and Effect of State Statute or Rule Allowing Interest or Changing Rate of Interest on Judgments or Verdicts,” 41 A.L.R. 4th 694 (1985).

. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co. v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp., 684 F.2d 1383, 1388-89 (11th Cir.1982).

. Noe v. Chicago, 56 Ill.2d 346, 307 N.E.2d 376, 379 (1974).

. McBride v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, see note 9, supra.

. Jersey City v. Zink, 133 N.J. Law 437, 44 A.2d 825, 828 (1945); Farmer v. Stubblefield, 297 Ky. 512, 180 S.W.2d 405 (Ky.1944); Saber v. Saber, 146 Mich.App. 108, 379 N.W.2d 478-79 (1986); McGraw v. Parsons, 142 Mich.App. 22, 369 N.W.2d 251, 254 (1985).

. See Act of June 24, 1986, ch. 315, 1986 Okla. Laws 1524.

. See note 1, supra.

. Ellison v. Gray, 702 P.2d 360, 367 (Okl.1985).

. Title 12 O.S.1971 § 727 provides in pertinent part:
"When a verdict for damages by reason of personal injuries is accepted by the trial court, the court in rendering judgment shall add interest on said verdict ... from the date the suit was commenced to date of verdict.”
Although this statute has been amended numerous times this provision has remained unchanged.

. Title 12 O.S.Supp.1982 § 727 provides in pertinent part:
"All judgments of Courts of record except the Workers’ Compensation Court shall bear interest at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per year, ...”

. Title 12 O.S.Supp.1986 § 727(B) provides: "B. For purposes of this section, interest shall be at an annual rate equal to the average United States Treasury Bill rate of the preceding calendar year as certified to the Administrative Director of the Courts by the State Treasurer on the first regular business day in January of each year, plus four percentage points.”

. Id.

. Okl., 713 P.2d 572, 587 (1986).

. Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 100 S.Ct. 755, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980).

.Middlebrook v. Imler, Tenny and Kugler, M.D.’s, supra note 1.

. The provisions of 12 O.S.1981 § 681 are:
"A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.”

. Hurley v. Hurley, 191 Okl. 194, 127 P.2d 147 (1942) and Methvin v. Methvin, 191 Okl. 177, 127 P.2d 186 (1942).

. Dennis v. Lathrop, 204 Okl. 684, 233 P.2d 969 (1951); Fowler v. City of Seminole, 196 Okl. 167, 163 P.2d 526 (1945) and Hutchison v. Wilson, 136 Okl. 67, 276 P. 198 (1929).

. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Edwards, Okl., 401 P.2d 303 (1961); First Baptist Church, Bristow v. Holloway, Okl., 402 P.2d 260, 262 (1965); Reardon v. McDougal, Okl., 524 P.2d 342, 344 (1974) and Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Williams, Okl., 639 P.2d 1222, 1227 (1982). See also, Gupton v. Western Kennel Club, 193 Okl. 462, 145 P.2d 179 (1944) and Baldwin v. Collins, Okl., 479 P.2d 567, 570 (1971).