Court Opinion

ID: 9765993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:28:14.363236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:18.224702
License: Public Domain

Clippobd, J.
(dissenting). There is much to commend the rule enunciated by the majority. It is characterized by the *129not inconsiderable virtues of convenience, simplicity, and certainty. However, in my respectful view it gives insufficient weight to a legislatively-declared policy of repose, and in application it may very well — as it plainly does in this and the companion ease of Moran v. Napolitano, et al., 71 N. J. 133 (1976) elevate judical efficiency at the expense of equity.
The Legislature has provided that personal injury claims must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action. N. J. S. A. 2A:14-2. This Court has hitherto accorded a measure of elasticity to that requirement in highly confined types of cases so as to avoid individual injustices. See Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N. J. 434, 449-51 (1960); see also Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N. J. 267 (1973) and cases collected therein. In doing so it has resorted to equitable doctrines, giving rise to the so-called “discovery” rule disallowing the bar of limitations when an action is begun more than two years following the occurrence for which suit is brought in those instances where discovery by plaintiff of the cause of action has been delayed beyond that two years. Today that rule is extended to include situations in which the actionable event is discovered within the two years but suit is started after that statutory period, despite the circumstance that a reasonable time remains for plaintiff to institute suit between that discovery and expiration of said two years, (ante at 126-127). Plaintiff now is afforded a full two years from the date of discovery unless defendant can establish1 peculiar or unusual prejudice resulting from the lapse of time between the expiration of two years after the actionable event and the date suit is started. Id. ante at 128. Substantially for the reasons so well expressed by *130Judge Morgan in her dissenting opinion below, 135 N. J. Super. 108, 113 (App. Div. 1975), I am unwilling to ignore the legislative direction simply to achieve a rule unencumbered by complications and unfettered by the nuances of other equitable considerations besides prejudice to a defendant.
Lopez instructs us that in cases where the event complained of is not discovered until after the statutory period has elapsed, plaintiff may nevertheless overcome the bar of the statute by satisfying a judge “conscious of the equitable nature of the issue before him” that he is “equitably entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule.” 62 N. J. at 275. Some of the factors bearing on that determination are “the nature of the alleged injury, the availability of witnesses and written evidence, the length of time that has elapsed since the alleged wrongdoing, whether the delay has been to any extent deliberate or intentional, whether the delay may be said to have peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the defendant.” Id. at 276. I perceive no reason at all why a judge should not, by resort to the same factors and with principles of equity as the essential guide, be able to determine at the same hearing whether the statutory period should be enlarged for a plaintiff who discovers the injury within the two years but permits the statutory period to run, just as it is for one who learns of the actionable event more than two years after its occurrence. As Judge Morgan observed, there is no suggestion that if the injured party learns of the injury and the possible claim at the eleventh hour, he is not equitably entitled to a reasonable time thereafter in which expeditiously to start suit; but he should not automatically be afforded the full two years (after discovery.
The task of resolving the “reasonableness” vel non of the time left for commencement of an action between the date of discovery and the expiration of the two years from the actionable occurrence does not strike me as an insurmountable difficulty for a trial judge already called upon to determine, under Lopez, the date of plaintiff’s discovery of the cause *131of action. Certainly the trial judge in this ease was not unduly perplexed, nor should he have been on these admitted facts.2 He identified the critical legal issues; made specific reference to the significant part that equitable considerations played in his determination; and concluded he had been shown “no good reason why” plaintiff should not be barred by the statute of limitations. Attuned to the possibility that a different state of facts might produce a different result, the trial judge observed: “I can conceive of circumstances when it might be appropriate to say all right, the period within which to bring the cause of action is so fehort that we set up another time table. That is not the case here.”
The majority acknowledges that earlier eases “intimate” that plaintiff should bring his suit expeditiously after discovery of the cause of action, see Fernandi v. Strully, supra, *13235 N. J. at 442; 451; Rothman v. Silber, 90 N. J. Super. 22, 36, 37-8 (App. Div.), certif. den., 46 N. J. 538 (1966) (concurring opinion of Gaulkin, S. J. A. D.); but it sees no justification for making vigilant prosecution of the claim a requirement. A couple of reasons come to mind immediately. A rulq'-compelling prompt commencement of an action minimizes, -'as it should, whatever gloss the judicial interpretive process brings to this legislative declaration whose intent, in the present context, is not entirely clear. At the same time it keeps faith with the fundamental notion adverted to by the dissenter below, but not elsewhere in this ease accorded much attention, that litigants should pursue their causes of action diligently. 135 N. J. Super, at 116. Giving these considerations emphasis at least equal to that accorded the majority’s single inquiry of whether defendant has been “peculiarly or unusually prejudiced” in this case, where clearly there was more than reasonable time for plaintiff to have instituted suit between discovery of the cause of action and expiration of two years after the actionable event, leads me to vote to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint.3
Justices Mountain and Scheeibeb authorize me to say that they join in this dissent.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Sullivan and Pashman and Judge Coneobd—4.
For reversal—Justices Mountain, Clieeoed and Schbeibee—3.

 While Lopez imposed upon the plaintiff who sought the indulgence of the discovery rule the burden of proving the absence of prejudice to a defendant^ 62 N. J. at 276, the majority now shifts to defendant the task of demonstrating that he has been “unusually or peculiarly prejudiced” by the delay, (ante at 128).

Judge Morgan’s factual recitation is set forth in 135 N. J. Super. at 113-14 as follows:
In the present case * * * plaintiff obtained actual knowledge of her injury, the cause thereof, the real possibility of a claim and the identity of a tortfeasor within four months of the date of the tort as recited in her complaint, leaving her approximately 19 months of the statutory period of limitations in which to start suit against them. In fact, she did start suit against the doctor within weeks after she learned what had happened. At no time during the pendency of that suit did she seek to add the present defendants as parties to that action although she knew or easily could have discovered their identity or attempt to start an independent action against those parties. Rather she pursued her claim against the doctor which resulted in a settlement in which she was paid $25,000. It was only after that settlement that the complaint initiating the present matter was filed, after the bar of statute, against those who she now contends were also tortfeasors. The delay was not the result of lack of knowledge concerning her injury, damages, the possible cause of action or the identity of the tortfeasors, the essential basis for invoking the relief provided by the discovery rule.
One might wonder, in light of the above, what further value remains to be extracted from this case. Exploration of the question at oral argument shed litttle light on the subject, and at this point it has-no particular significance, it being only a matter of my own idle speculation.

There is no merit to plaintiff’s alternative position which invokes the doctrine of a continuous course of treatment. See Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N. J. 58, 66 (1960). Plaintiff does not allege that the physician was the hospital’s agent nor is it claimed these defendants ratified the doctor’s acts.