Court Opinion

ID: 9695375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:16:59.626637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:11.219639
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 74. {concurring). I concur in the court's mandate. I agree with the majority opinion that Olson's rezoning petition was approved, conditional upon his compliance with the ordinance that he challenges, when he filed his action.1 *404Olson's efforts to rezone his property were therefore, as the majority opinion states, "directly impacted by application of the ordinance when he filed his suit."2 I conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by resting its determination of ripeness on an erroneous standard of law. The circuit court's determination rested on its erroneous interpretation of the Dane County Board's decision to "rescind action" on Olson's zoning petition and to extend the petition's delayed effective date.3
¶ 75. I write separately to protest the majority opinion's conclusion that a circuit court's determination of ripeness is a legal conclusion and therefore reviewed by this court independently of the circuit court as a question of law.4 The majority opinion disregards clear Wisconsin precedent that the question whether an issue is ripe for judicial determination under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court.
¶ 76. I begin with Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982), "[t]he leading Wisconsin case on declaratory judgments."5 Loy held that the question whether a controversy is ripe for judicial determination under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the circuit court's discretion. The Loy court emphasized the importance of permitting a "trial judge . . . discretion to examine the controversy before him to determine the imminence of the controversy or the ripening of the dispute" and stated that the issue of *405ripeness is "exactly the area in which judicial discretion should be allowed to operate."6
¶ 77. In support of its decision, the Loy court adduced Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 61 (2d ed. 1941), the cited page of which explains that in declaratory judgment actions, "[wjhether the facts are ripe enough for determination is usually a matter confided to the discretion of the court." We also characterized the entire matter of justiciability (including ripeness)7 as "[t]he ultimate fact to be found by a circuit court in the exercise of its discretion."8
¶ 78. The Loy court used the standard language to describe this court's review of a circuit court's discretionary decision: "While, as in all discretionary acts of a court, reasonable persons may sometimes differ in the outcome, all that this court need find to sustain a discretionary act is that the trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, *406using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."9
¶ 79.' The majority opinion pays full-voiced tribute to the Loy decision in the body of the opinion yet renounces the decision in the whisper of a footnote. In its main text, the majority opinion properly identifies Loy as the leading Wisconsin case on declaratory judgments and relies upon Loy's seminal discussion of justiciability.10 In a footnote the majority opinion then laments that Loy "conflated the evaluation of the factors necessary to reach the merits of a declaratory judgment and the granting or denying of declaratory relief on the merits."11
¶ 80. Further on, the majority opinion silently overrules Loy's core holding that whether an issue is ripe for judicial determination under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the circuit court's discretion. The majority opinion now declares that the standard of review of the circuit court's determination that Olson's case was not ripe is the same as the standard of review of a decision to grant summary judgment: de novo.12
¶ 81. Nor is Loy the only decision silently overruled by the majority opinion in the present case. There are more.
¶ 82. In Wisconsin Education Association Council v. Wisconsin State Elections Board, 156 Wis. 2d 151, 456 N.W.2d 839 (1990) (hereinafter WEAC /), we re*407viewed under a discretionary standard the circuit court's determination of ripeness in a declaratory judgment action. The circuit court in WEAC I refused to address the plaintiffs "as-applied" constitutional challenge to a statute on the ground that the issues raised by the plaintiff were not ripe for determination.13 The court sustained the circuit court's decision, holding that "the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the case was not ripe for determination."14 We explained that "[o]ur review of the record persuades us that the circuit court reasonably concluded that the instant controversy was sufficiently contingent and uncertain so as to preclude declaratory relief."15
¶ 83. In Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, 2002 WI 108, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626, this court again reviewed under a discretionary standard the circuit court's determination of ripeness in a declaratory judgment action. The circuit court in Putnam granted Time Warner's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for declaratory judgment, having concluded that the controversy was not ripe for resolution because the plaintiffs amended complaint failed to allege a present harm.16
¶ 84. The issue presented for review in Putnam was whether "the circuit court erroneously exercise [d] its discretion when it concluded that the [plaintiffs] request for a declaration of rights and injunctive relief ... was not justiciable because the [plaintiff] failed *408to allege a present harm."17 In determining whether the circuit court had erroneously exercised its discretion in determining justiciabilty, the court applied the usual test for appellate review of a circuit court's exercise of discretion: "This court will uphold a discretionary act if the circuit court 'examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.' "18
¶ 85. In keeping with this standard for reviewing discretionary decisions of a circuit court, the Putnam court concluded that the circuit court had erroneously exercised its discretion because the circuit court had made an error of law: "Because the circuit court misapplied the governing law by dismissing the [plaintiffs] claims for declaratory relief on the basis that it did, we conclude that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion."19
¶ 86. Although not focused on the issue of ripeness, Wisconsin Education Association Council v. Wisconsin State Elections Board, 2000 WI App 89, 234 Wis. 2d 349, 610 N.W.2d 108 (hereinafter WEAC II), is also put in jeopardy by the majority opinion in the present case. In WEAC II, the court of appeals applied a discretionary standard when reviewing the circuit court's determination that an action for declaratory judgment presented a justiciable controversy. The court of appeals stated that "in a declaratory judgment action, if the trial court carefully examines all the facts of record in considering the four [components of the test *409for justiciability], and reasonably concludes that a controversy is justiciable, we must uphold that conclusion."20
¶ 87. Although the WEAC II court of appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment on the basis that the first two conditions of a justiciable controversy were unfulfilled as a matter of law,21 the standard of review set forth by the court of appeals expressly applied to all four conditions of justiciability, including ripeness.
¶ 88. The majority opinion finds support for its conclusion that de novo review is proper in case law from other jurisdictions.22 Case law from other states is merely of persuasive weight. Prior Wisconsin case law is precedent. The approach the majority opinion should be taking is to follow binding precedent of this court or to explain why it is deviating from precedent.
¶ 89. Applying the clear, binding precedent of this court and the court of appeals, I conclude that the question whether an issue is ripe for judicial determination under the Declaratory Judgments Act lies within the discretion of the circuit court and that this court should review the circuit court's decision to determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.
¶ 90. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 91. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 Majority op., ¶ 62.

 Id., ¶ 63.

 See Id., ¶¶ 48-62.

 Id., ¶¶ 37-39.

 Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., 2002 WI 108, ¶ 41, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 254.

 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).

 As the majority opinion states, majority op., ¶ 29, "ripeness" is the final factor in a list of four required for the controversy underlying an action for declaratory judgment to be justiciable. A controversy is justiciable under the Declaratory Judgments Act when each of the following conditions is met:
(1) a claim of right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it;
(2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief has a legal interest in the controversy — that is to say, a legally protectible interest; and
(4) the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial determination.
Majority op., ¶ 21.

 Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 410.

 Id. at 414-15. See also State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶ 30, 303 Wis. 2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24 (citing Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 414-15, as authority stating the standard of review for a circuit court's discretionary determination).

 Majority op., ¶ 29.

 Id., ¶ 32 n.5.

Id., ¶ 39.

 Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Wis. State Elections Bd. (WEAC I), 156 Wis. 2d 151, 154, 456 N.W.2d 839 (1990).

 Id at 154.

 Id. at 162.

 Putnam v. Time Warner, 2002 WI 108, ¶ 7, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626.

Id, ¶ 2.

 Id., ¶ 40 (quoting Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee County, 2001 WI 65, ¶ 36, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866).

 Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶ 52.

 Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Wis. State Elections Bd. (WEAC II), 2000 WI App 89, ¶ 9, 234 Wis. 2d 349, 610 N.W.2d 108 (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Id., ¶ 10.

 Majority op., ¶ 38.