Court Opinion

ID: 9673949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:04.732438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.912526
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smedley,
joined by Justices Garwood and Wilson, dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the opinion and judgment of the majority which, by the extraordinary writ of mandamus, command the respondent, Commissioner of the General Land Office, to accept and file oil and gas leases executed by relators, as professed agents of the State under the Relinquishment Act, when co-respondents Brooks and McAlpine who, under reservation, have for a period of ninety-nine years the exclusive right to use the land for grazing and farming purposes, are not parties to the leases and have in no way acquiesced in their execution.
The opinion of the majority rather summarily disposes of the Land Commissioner’s contention that Brooks and McAlpine should have executed the leases, or at least should have joined in them, by classifying these owners of the reserved estate in the land as mere tenants, and by saying that tenants are not owners of the land or of the soil within the meaning of the Relinquishment Act. Such a decision ignores the primary purpose of the Act and one of the principal reasons for the decision upholding the Act as constitutional. Greene v. Robison, 117 Texas 516, 8 S. W. 2d 655.
In the beginning, it should be observed that the estate reserved for a period of ninety-nine years, being the exclusive right to use the land for grazing and farming purposes, is not a mere ordinary tenancy, but when reserved, as here, out of land sold by the State with reservation of the minerals and falling within the terms of the Relinquishment Act, is no mean estate, but is an estate not only of long duration but of importance, and *360is by reason of its very nature an estate entitled to the protection and benefits conferred by the Relinquishment Act.
It is to be remembered that the Act, as construed by the Greene case and in later decisions, does not release or relinquish to the owner of the land or of the soil fifteen-sixteenth or any other interest in the oil and gas in the land. Title to the oil and gas and all other minerals remains in the State under the reservation made by the State in the original sale of the land. It follows that the deeds of the land executed by Brooks, with reservation of the exclusive right to use the land for grazing and farming purposes for ninety-nine years, conveyed to his grantees nothing, or certainly when practically considered nothing, except the reversion after the expiration of the ninety-nine years. After the execution of the deeds title to the oil and gas and other minerals remained in the State and the full and exclusive right to use and enjoy the land or the surface or the soil for the only purposes for which such land is generally and ordinarily used, that is, grazing and farming, remained for ninety-nine years in the grantor Brooks.
The opinion of the majority quotes from Turner v. Cross, 83 Texas 218, 18 S. W. 578, 15 L. R. A. 262, a definition of the words “proprietor” and “owner” and uses the quotations for authority that one who is a lessee of land is not an owner. The opinion says nothing of what was decided in Turner v. Cross and nothing of the reasons for the decision. Neither the decision nor the reasons lend any support to the majority opinion’s disposition of the question here considered. In that case the statute under construction gave a right of action for damages for death caused by the negligence of the “proprietor” or “owner” of a railroad. The railroad was being operated by receivers. It was held that the receivers were neither “proprietors” nor “owners” because they were acting as officers of the court and were not in possession of the property “in their own rights”, but in a fiduciary capacity. The opinion goes on to say that while absolute and exclusive right is not always necessary to ownership, possession held in a fiduciary capacity does not constitute ownership. The clear implication of the opinion is that one who is in possession of property in his own right is, or may be considered, the owner of the property. In the case before us the exclusive right to possess and use the land for grazing and farming be-lings for ninety-nine years, by virtue of the reservations in the deeds, to co-respondents Brooks and McAlpine, and this right of exclusive possession is in their own right and is not possession held in a fiduciary character. The reasoning of the *361opinion in Turner v. Cross shows further that ownership of property may exist without absolute title.
The decision of the majority denies to co-respondents Brooks and McAlpine the benefits that the Relinquishment Act was intended to confer upon them and ignores and defeats one of the purposes of the Act, which not only is a primary purpose but, according to the construction given in the Greene case, had a part in saving the Act as constitutional.
The very first words of the Act, which are quoted and emphasized in the Greene case, are: “To promote the active cooperation of the owner of the soil.” Section 1, Ch. 81, Acts 2nd Called Session, 36th Legislature, p. 249. The history of the legislation with respect to these lands and the unsatisfactory conditions that existed by reason of the prior legislation, which resulted in the compromise represented by the Relinquishment Act, are discussed at some length in the opinion in the Greene case. That discussion includes reference to the antagonisms and conflicts that had arisen out of the “dural or double ownership of the land, the surface estate and the mineral estate”, and shows that one of the reasons, if not the principal reason, for the Relinquishment Act was to secure cooperation from the owner of the surface estate by affording him more adequate compensation for the invasion of his land and the interference with his use and enjoyment of the surface caused by exploration and development of the land for oil. As that compensation the Act provides for payments to the land owner of one-half (according to the construction given in the Greene case) of the bonus, royalty and rentals payable for and under the lease. Article 5379, Revised Civil Statutes.
Throughout the Act the words “owner of the land” and “owner of the soil” are used as meaning the same thing, and clearly they have reference to him who owns the surface estate as distinguished from the State which owns the mineral estate. And in the same way the opinion in the Greene case speaks of “owner of the land”, “owner of the soil” and “owner of the surface estate”. Such a use of these words is consistent with the reference generally made in the decisions and in the industry, where there has been a severance of the minerals, to two estates in the land, the surface estate and the mineral estate.
The Act itself and the opinion in the Greene case clearly show that the damages which the owner of the surface estate suffers and for which the Act gives him compensation arise from the *362taking, in the exploration and development of the land for oil, of a great part of the surface, which deprives the owner of the surface estate of the use and value of a part at least of what he owns. Conversion of land into an oil field often may destroy the full value of what belongs to the owner of the surface estate unless some benefits accrue to him from the development of the land for oil.
Co-respondents Brooks and McAlpine have for ninety-nine years the exclusive right to use the land for farming and grazing. The use of the land or the surface for exploration and development of oil would damage them in a substantial way by interfering with their use, and it is for damages thus suffered that the Relinquishment Act, as construed, gives compensation consisting of one-half of the bonus, rentals and royalties under an oil lease of the land. And yet the opinion of the majority means that Brooks and McAlpine are not entitled to the compensation or any part of it. It is given to relators who have no real or substantial right of possession until the expiration of ninety-nine years and who will not be damaged by the oil lessee’s use of the land. The opinion in its effect takes compensation from those who will be damaged and therefore are entitled to compensation and gives it to those who will not be damaged and are not entitled to compensation. The erroneous decision flows from a narrow interpretation of the word “owner” and from a failure to take into consideration one of the important purposes of the Act. The application for the writ of mandamus should be refused.
The ruling of the majority which compels the Commissioner of the General Land Office to approve and file an oil lease executed by the owner of an undivided interest in the land has not been discussed in this dissent. That question deserves very careful and serious consideration and it suggests many difficulties and complications. See “The Texas Relinquishment Act” by A.W. Walker, Jr., First Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, pp. 245, 290-294.
Associate Justice Garwood and Wilson join in this dissent.
Opinion delivered May 16, 1951.
Rehearing overruled July 25, 1951.