Court Opinion

ID: 9635493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:52:13.913023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:51.633048
License: Public Domain

POMEROY,
Justice, with whom WER-NICK, Justice joins,
dissenting.
I agree neither with the result announced by the majority nor the rationale by which it was reached.
I respectfully dissent.
My reasons for dissenting are as follows:
“In the trial of an action it is the duty of the presiding justice, at the close of the evidence, to present the case, in his charge to the jury, by pointing out clearly and concisely the precise issues in controversy and the rules of law applicable thereto . . . ‘He should do all such things as in his judgment will enable the jury to acquire a clear understanding of the law and the evidence to form a correct judgment. He is to see that no injustice is done.’ ”
Desmond v. Wilson, 143 Me. 262, 267, 60 A.2d 782, 785 (1948), quoting from York v. Railroad Co., 84 Me. 117, 24 A. 790 (1891); Wing v. Morse, Me., 300 A.2d 491, 502 (1973).
We are here confronted with a claim that the presiding justice in this criminal case failed to point out “clearly and concisely the precise issues in controversy and the rules of law applicable thereto” in that he misled the jury as to the requisite elements of “manslaughter” as a possible jury verdict. Thus, says appellant, the presiding justice has not seen to it “that no injustice is done.”
The opinion of the majority concludes that counsel for the defendant had not adequately saved this alleged error at the trial level, and it can be reviewed “solely on the basis of obvious error affecting the substantial rights of the defendant”.
I strongly disagree.
In my opinion the alleged error is properly before us and it was adequately preserved as required by Rule 30(b) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Generally when an objection is made to an instruction given by the court to the jury, the objection is raised either because the instruction is allegedly a misstatement of the applicable law or because the party does not believe it appropriate to instruct the jury on that legal point. In the case at bar, appellant’s objection was stated as follows:
“We object to the Court reading the statutory definition of manslaughter, which included a definition of voluntary manslaughter when the Court read it.”
For a full understanding of appellant’s complaint, the objection must be analyzed in the context of the circumstances.
Both the state and the appellant agreed that voluntary manslaughter was not an issue as there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the killing occurred in the heat of passion upon sudden and adequate provocation. Only moments before the objection in question was made, the court at side bar clearly indicated its awareness that neither side regarded voluntary manslaughter as an issue in the case.
Given this setting, it must have been clear to the trial justice that the reason for the objection was that he had read from the statute relating to voluntary manslaughter and had referred back to what he had earlier read immediately before he proceeded to say, “I will try to explain to you what that means.” By this objection, the trial justice was made aware that the appellant objected to the instruction because it was likely that the jury would be confused into believing that heat of passion upon sudden and adequate provocation was a necessary element of involuntary manslaughter.
The purpose of Rule 30(b) is to alert the court to alleged errors and provide it with an opportunity to correct errors, if any, during the trial. State v. Boisvert, Me., 236 A.2d 419 (1967). Realizing that the court was aware that voluntary manslaughter was not an issue, this objection was sufficient to alert the court to the alleged error. The purpose behind Rule 30(b) has been met. In my view the claim of error was properly saved.
*1214During the early morning hours of June 3, 1974, Roslyn Lewisohn received a fatal gunshot wound and the appellant received a gunshot wound. The previous evening, June 2, Mr. Lewisohn and the late Mrs. Lewisohn entertained guests in their home. After the departure of the guests, the appellant hitchhiked to a Portland restaurant and cocktail lounge. While he was there, he met several of his acquaintances whom he subsequently invited to his Cape Elizabeth home. This second group of guests remained at the Lewisohn home until approximately 2:00 a.m. on the morning of June 3.
After the departure of these visitors, various members of the household were awakened by loud requests from the appellant to assist him, in particular with the dishes. Mrs. Lewisohn, the testimony indicates, was the first to respond. Before either of the appellant’s daughters appeared, they heard a loud bang, apparently a gunshot, and breaking glass.
The younger of the two girls was the first to arrive in the kitchen.
There she observed her dying mother lying on the kitchen floor, bleeding profusely.
In the room with the dying mother was the distraught appellant, armed with a gun.
Before the older daughter reached the kitchen, the appellant shot himself.
The appellant was the only eyewitness to the acts resulting in Roslyn Lewisohn’s death.
The state bottomed its prosecution for unlawful homicide punishable as murder on the theory that appellant intentionally shot his wife and then attempted to commit suicide.
Lewisohn, testifying on his own behalf, posed a claim that the death of his wife resulted from accident. His testimony before the jury was to the effect that while he was sitting in the kitchen talking with his wife, he was in the process of cleaning what he assumed was his unloaded gun. The deceased at that time was doing the dishes. As he was cleaning it, the gun unexpectedly and accidently fired, and the bullet struck Mrs. Lewisohn.
He says he was overwhelmed by the tragedy of the occurrence.
For this reason, he shot himself in an unsuccessful suicide attempt.
The testimony at the trial referred to only two bullets having been fired. The evidence indicates that one bullet struck Mrs. Lewisohn, apparently exited through the kitchen window, and was never recovered. It was this bullet which the appellant stipulated caused her death. One bullet was discovered in a kitchen closet. It was this bullet which apparently caused appellant’s self-inflicted wound.
In that posture, if the jury was persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the state’s theory was correct, the verdict returned, i. e., “murder”, was legally justified.
When one kills a human being with the intention that death result from such action (in the absence of justification or excuse), such killing spells murder. State v. Chase, 149 Me. 80, 99 A.2d 71 (1953).
An unjustified and unexcusable homicide which results from conduct which is reckless and has a high potential for killing is likewise murder. State v. Lafferty, Me., 309 A.2d 647, 671 (1973) (Wernick, J., concurring).
With respect to the state’s position, the presiding justice was required to instruct the jury fully as to what was meant by unjustified; what was meant by unexcused; what was meant by intentional; what was meant by reckless conduct having a high potential for death.
All this he did.
Appellant’s version of the circumstances under which Mrs. Lewisohn was killed created the need for instructions as to the legal effect of the facts alleged, if such version were accepted by the jury or if the recitation of such facts created in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of murder. If appellant’s version of the circumstances surrounding the death was accepted, only one of two legal conclusions could result:
*1215(a) appellant is guilty of no crime because his wife’s death resulted from pure accident while he was doing a lawful act, i. e., cleaning a gun, and her death must be regarded in law as excusable homicide [State v. Ela, 136 Me. 303, 8 A.2d 589 (1939)];
(b) he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter because though the act of cleaning the gun was lawful, his conduct was in reckless disregard of the lives or safety of others, which recklessness was quite different in quality subjectively from that reckless conduct which can be an element of murder [State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Lafferty, supra at 671-72].
As this court pointed out in State v. Northup, supra at 498:
“The manner in which the jury finds that the killing was committed determines its unlawfulness (if it was unlawful) and the jury may find that it was unlawful because it was an unjustified and unexcused intentional killing or that it was unlawful because it was within the criminality category of proscribed involuntary killings. There is no crime until the State 'has proved one of the elements which makes the killing unlawful and the issue of how death was caused should be submitted to the jury with instruction as to the nature of both voluntary and involuntary homicides.”
(Emphasis in original.)
We note that at no time during his trial or in his brief or at oral argument before us has appellant claimed that the killing occurred while he, appellant, was “in the heat of passion.” It follows that no “voluntary manslaughter” issue was ever generated. No instruction as to the rules of law governing “voluntary manslaughter” was appropriate. State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 193 A.2d 1 (1963). The trial justice was aware at the time of trial that both the state and the appellant agreed that “voluntary manslaughter” was not an issue.
The rules of law governing what is traditionally referred to as “involuntary manslaughter” most certainly should have been given. The jury should have been instructed in clear terms that involuntary manslaughter, when viewed in the context of the claimed facts described by appellant, is a homicide which results from conduct which is neither a felony nor which has high death-producing potential. Rather, it is conduct properly characterized as “criminal negligence.” “Criminal negligence” is negligence of a higher degree than that required to establish liability in a civil suit. It is negligence which involves a reckless disregard for the lives or safety of others. State v. Ellis, Me., 325 A.2d 772 (1974). The reckless disregard for the lives or safety of others is different in quality subjectively from reckless conduct which, when viewed objectively, is considered in law to have the equivalent effect of a subjective intention to kill. State v. Lafferty, supra at 671-72, n.5. Reckless and wanton and willful conduct causing a homicide punishable as murder is regarded in law as such a serious disregard of the obligation to exercise reasonable care so as not to unreasonably endanger the lives or safety of others as to be tantamount to a subjective intention to kill and deserving the same punishment.
Unlike the situation in State v. Northup, supra, guilty of “involuntary manslaughter” was a viable choice of verdicts the jury could have reached on the evidence it has before it.
Instead of describing “involuntary manslaughter” either in terms above recited or equivalent language, the presiding justice paraphrased the language of former 17 M.R.S.A. § 2551, as follows:
“Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion or on sudden provocation without express or implied malice aforethought is guilty of manslaughter and shall be punished.”
He prefaced this reading by saying, “I will read you the definition of manslaughter.”
The reference statute to which the presiding justice alluded in his instructions to the jury described the elements of “voluntary manslaughter” which was never an issue in the case.
*1216Substantially later in his instructions to the jury, the presiding justice said:
“Manslaughter consists of what we call blameworthy culpable acts which result in someone else’s death, not as murder. Gross negligence will justify a manslaughter conviction if it involves a reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others. It is of a much higher degree of negligence than is required to prove _ . required to be proved of a civil case.”
However, he prefaced this instruction by saying, “And, so, now having read you the statute that defines manslaughter, I will read _ _ _ will try to explain to you what that means.”
The first reference to manslaughter in the instructions doubtless implanted in the jury’s mind the elements of voluntary manslaughter. It does so with words — “heat of passion, sudden provocation”- — having immediately identifiable colloquial meaning to the lay person. The next time manslaughter was mentioned, it was not in the abstract but rather with reference to the statute previously read. This could only serve to reinforce the jury’s original perception.
The gravamen of the fault which is found with the instruction is that the jury could properly have concluded the appellant was guilty of manslaughter, not murder, only if they found that at the time of the doing of the acts which brought about the death of Roslyn Lewisohn the appellant was “in the heat of passion on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought.” This would naturally result from the fact that the presiding justice read only that portion of 17 M.R.S.A. § 2551 which described “voluntary manslaughter” and completely omitted the statutory reference to manslaughter as defined by the common law, i. e., “involuntary manslaughter.” This is so even though he later undertook to discuss briefly the law of “involuntary manslaughter.” In view of the fact that it was never contended that appellant acted while “in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation,” a “murder” conviction could only result from the instruqtions given in the context of the claimed facts.
It follows, then, that the instructions given, when viewed as a whole, were so misleading as to be the equivalent of incorrect instructions on a vital point in the case. The instructions given were so fraught with potential for prejudice that the jury’s verdict cannot be considered “a true thing said” under appropriate instructions. Only a new trial can remedy the patent defect in the conduct of the trial.