Court Opinion

ID: 9950257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 17:00:58.42814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:17.912250
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 13 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUCILA BAPTISTE; FREDERICK                      No.    23-15392
RAMOS,
                                                D.C. No. 4:22-cv-02888-HSG
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

APPLE INC.,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                 Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

BURKE MINAHAN; et al.,                          No.    23-15775

                Plaintiffs-Appellants,          D.C. No. 4:22-cv-05652-YGR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
GOOGLE, LLC,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of California
                Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                     Argued and Submitted February 14, 2024
                            San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their complaints in two putative class

actions alleging that Apple, Inc. (in No. 23-15392) and Google, LLC (in No. 23-

15775) violated New York and Minnesota privacy statutes through the unlawful

retention of personally identifiable information. Plaintiffs are consumers who

reside in New York or Minnesota and rented videos from defendants. They allege

that defendants collected their information and continue to retain it. They argue

that defendants’ retention of that information violates the New York Video

Consumer Privacy Act and the Minnesota Video Privacy Law and that those

statutes provide a private right of action for the wrongful retention of personal

information. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review

dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Wilson v. Craver, 994 F.3d 1085, 1089

(9th Cir. 2021). We affirm.

      When construing state statutes, we apply state rules of statutory

interpretation. See Association des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v.

Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 945 (9th Cir. 2013). Under New York law, “a court’s

primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the

Legislature.” Walsh v. New York State Comptroller, 144 N.E.3d 953, 955 (N.Y.

                                          2
2019) (citation omitted). If the text is unambiguous, the court must give effect to

its plain meaning. Id. The same is true in Minnesota. See Swanson v. Brewster, 784

N.W.2d 264, 274 (Minn. 2010).

      The New York and Minnesota statutes prohibit the “wrongful disclosure of

video tape rental records.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 673; see Minn. Stat. § 325I.02.

The statutes also contain express remedial provisions that allow consumers to sue

any video provider who “knowingly discloses, to any person, personally

identifiable information.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 673(1); Minn. Stat. § 325I.02(1).

Section 675 of New York’s statute, titled “Civil liability,” states: “Any person

found to be in violation of this article shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer for

all actual damages sustained by such consumer as a result of the violation.” N.Y.

Gen. Bus. Law § 675(1). Minnesota’s statute similarly states: “The public and

private remedies in section 8.31 [listing legal violations which the attorney general

must investigate] apply to violations of section 325I.02.” Minn. Stat. § 325I.03.

      Both statutes also contain, in the same sections as the nondisclosure

provisions, non-retention provisions. These state that a person subject to the

nondisclosure section “shall destroy personally identifiable information as soon as

practicable, but no later than one year from the date the information is no longer

necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 673(5); Minn. Stat. § 325I.02(6).

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      Plaintiffs seize on the New York remedial provision, which imposes liability

on individuals “found to be in violation of this article,” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 675(1) (emphasis added), and analogous language in the Minnesota statute

stating that remedies are available to those aggrieved by “violations of section

325I.02,” Minn. Stat. § 325I.03 (emphasis added). They claim that because the

non-retention provisions fall within “this article” under the New York statute and

within “section 325I.02” under the Minnesota statute, the remedial provisions

create a private right of action for violations of the non-retention provisions.

      That argument overlooks that both non-disclosure provisions directly

reference separate statutory provisions that allow for civil liability and the recovery

of monetary damages. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 673(1) (“A video tape service

provider who knowingly discloses . . . personally identifiable information . . . shall

be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in section six hundred

seventy-five of this article.”); Minn. Stat. § 325I.02(1) (“[A] videotape service

provider or videotape seller who knowingly discloses personally identifiable

information . . . is liable to the consumer for the relief provided in section

325I.03.”). But the non-retention provisions of each statute are different: They lack

language that links them to the civil liability provisions. See N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 673(5); Minn. Stat. § 325I.02(6).

      This absence is meaningful because reading the non-retention provisions to

                                           4
create a private right of action would deprive the liability language in the

wrongful-disclosure provisions of any purpose. We thus decline to adopt plaintiffs’

interpretation because “[i]t is well settled that . . . [courts] must assume that the

Legislature did not deliberately place a phrase in the statute which was intended to

serve no purpose.” Rodriguez v. Perales, 657 N.E.2d 247, 249 (N.Y. 1995)

(citation omitted); see Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn.

1999) (“[N]o word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or

insignificant” when interpreting a statute.).

      Plaintiffs respond that adopting this interpretation of the statute creates

another surplusage problem: It leaves the words “this article,” N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 675, and “section 325I.02,” Minn. Stat. § 325.03, without meaning. But

“[p]articular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and structure

of the whole statutory scheme.” United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 652 (9th Cir.

2015) (citation omitted). And nothing in the statutory texts suggests that the state

legislatures intended to create a private right of action for retention. We therefore

decline to place undue weight on the phrases plaintiffs highlight and instead

employ “accepted principles of statutory construction to interpret . . . imperfectly

drafted statute[s].” Rodriguez v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am., LLC, 801 F.3d 1045, 1051

(9th Cir. 2015).

      Plaintiffs also point to the federal Video Privacy Protection Act, noting that

                                            5
its remedial provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c), appears directly after the

nondisclosure provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b), but before its non-retention

provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e). In New York and Minnesota, however, the

remedial provision appears after all provisions that lay out obligations, including

the non-retention provisions. Whatever structural inference might be drawn from

comparing the state and federal statutes is insufficient to overcome the textual

reality that the non-retention provisions of these statutes do not contain liability

language.

       Finally, we decline plaintiffs’ suggestion that we certify this question to the

highest courts of New York and Minnesota. “Certification is not to be ordered

lightly.” Bliss Sequoia Ins. & Risk Advisors, Inc. v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,

52 F.4th 417, 423 (9th Cir. 2022). As we have explained, this case presents a

straightforward issue of statutory interpretation. It does not warrant protracted

litigation in state court.

       Google’s motion for judicial notice (No. 23-15775 Dkt. No. 23) is

DENIED.

       AFFIRMED.

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