Court Opinion

ID: 9925801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 01:00:40.936386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:36.577707
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40001       Document: 00517040210       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/22/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                              FILED
                                                                     January 22, 2024
                                  No. 23-40001
                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                              Clerk

   Emily Seago,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Martin O’Malley, Commissioner of Social Security,

                                              Defendant—Appellee.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 1:21-CV-136
                    ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
   Judges.
   Haynes, Circuit Judge:
            Emily Seago appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
   on her disability benefits claim. Seago argues Nancy Berryhill was unlawfully
   serving as acting Social Security Commissioner in July 2018 when she ratified
   the appointment of the Administrative Law Judge who later denied Seago’s
   claim.    For the reasons set forth below, we reject that argument and
   AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Case: 23-40001      Document: 00517040210             Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                       No. 23-40001

                                  I.     Background
          The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”)
   must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, in
   accordance with the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 42
   U.S.C. § 902(a)(1); see U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Designed to curb
   abuses of power and ensure public accountability in appointments, this cross-
   branch nomination and confirmation process is “among the significant
   structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.” Edmond v. United States,
   520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). But the process of filling offices that require a
   presidential nomination and Senate confirmation—called “PAS offices”—
   can take considerable time. N.L.R.B. v. SW General, Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 292–
   93 (2017). Congress has long recognized that vacancies in PAS offices could
   leave critical governmental duties unperformed for an extended period. Id.
   It has responded to that concern by allowing the President to authorize an
   individual to temporarily fill the position in an acting capacity, without
   Senate confirmation. Id.
          In 1998, Congress passed the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998
   (“FVRA”), which defines the circumstances under which an acting officer
   can serve in a PAS office without a presidential nomination or Senate
   confirmation. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-611 (1998) (codified at 5
   U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349e). Under FVRA § 3345, the “first assistant” generally
   serves as the acting officer in a vacant PAS office. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). The
   Deputy Commissioner of the SSA is the “first assistant” to the
   Commissioner of the SSA for FVRA purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 902(b)(4); see
   also 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1). At the end of his presidency, President Obama
   promulgated a new “Order of Succession” for the Commissioner of the SSA,
   under which the Deputy Commissioner for Operations (“DCO”) was first
   in line to serve as acting Commissioner in the event both the Commissioner

                                            2
Case: 23-40001        Document: 00517040210        Page: 3    Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                    No. 23-40001

   and Deputy Commissioner offices had been vacated. 81 Fed. Reg. 96337
   (Dec. 30, 2016).
           FVRA § 3346(a) limits the time allowed for acting service under
   § 3345:
           (a) Except in the case of a vacancy caused by sickness, the
           person serving as an acting officer as described under section
           3345 may serve in the office—
                 (1) for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the
                 vacancy occurs; or
                 (2) subject to subsection (b), once a first or second
                 nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate,
                 from the date of such nomination for the period that the
                 nomination is pending in the Senate.
   5 U.S.C. § 3346(a); see also id. §§ 3346(b) (imposing different time limitations
   when nominations are rejected, withdrawn, or returned), 3346(c) (adjusting
   time limitations when vacancy occurs during adjournment of Congress sine
   die).
           When President Trump assumed office in January 2017, the Deputy
   Commissioner of the SSA resigned, leaving the SSA Commissioner office
   empty. Nancy Berryhill, who was serving as SSA’s DCO at the time, began
   serving as Acting SSA Commissioner.          In November 2017, Berryhill’s
   eligibility to serve as Acting SSA Commissioner expired under the terms of
   the FVRA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3346(a)(1) (210-day cap for acting service absent
   a nomination), 3349a(b) (extending permissible period of acting service by 90
   days during periods of presidential transition). Berryhill stepped down as
   Acting SSA Commissioner in March 2018 and resumed her fulltime position
   as DCO. One month later, in April 2018, President Trump nominated
   Andrew Saul as SSA Commissioner, and Berryhill once again became Acting
   SSA Commissioner.

                                          3
Case: 23-40001         Document: 00517040210              Page: 4       Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                          No. 23-40001

           In July 2018, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC,1
   Berryhill—who was still serving as Acting SSA Commissioner—ratified the
   appointments of all SSA Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”). See Social
   Security Ruling 19-1p; Titles II and XVI: Effect of the Decision in Lucia v.
   Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) On Cases Pending at the
   Appeals Council, 84 Fed. Reg. 9582, 9583 (Mar. 15, 2019).                            Saul’s
   nomination for SSA Commissioner was still pending at the time.
           Emily Seago subsequently filed an application with the SSA for
   disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. An SSA
   ALJ denied her claim. Seago timely appealed to the SSA Appeals Council,
   which denied her request for review.
           Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Seago timely sought
   judicial review in federal district court. Seago and the government each
   moved for summary judgment. Seago argued, inter alia, that the time
   limitation on Berryhill’s acting service under § 3346(a) expired in November
   2017, and thus Berryhill could not have constitutionally ratified the SSA
   ALJs’ appointments in July 2018.                 The magistrate judge rejected that
   argument and recommended granting summary judgment for the
   government. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
   recommendation and then entered a final judgment on December 22, 2022.
   Seago timely appealed.

           _____________________
           1
             138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). In Lucia, the Supreme Court held that ALJs at the
   Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) were “Officers of the United States” who
   must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of department. Id. at 2053–
   55. “Like the SEC ALJs at issue in Lucia, SSA ALJs had [previously] been selected by
   lower level staff rather than appointed by the head of the agency,” which called all of their
   appointments into question after Lucia. Carr v. Saul, 593 U.S. 83, 86 (2021); see Exec.
   Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755, 32755 (July 13, 2018) (recognizing that “at least
   some” and “perhaps all” ALJs are subject to the Appointments Clause after Lucia).

                                                4
Case: 23-40001      Document: 00517040210              Page: 5   Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                        No. 23-40001

                    II.     Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
          Seago properly invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 42
   U.S.C. § 405(g).       We have jurisdiction over the district court’s final
   judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
          We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment and
   questions of statutory interpretation. Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. United
   States, 831 F.3d 268, 272 (5th Cir. 2016). In reviewing an appeal from a grant
   of summary judgment, we “view the facts in the light most favorable to the
   non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Deville v.
   Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Summary
   judgment is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
   the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 163.
                                 III.      Discussion
          The only issue on appeal is the construction of 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a).
   Seago argues that § 3346(a)(2) is solely a tolling provision. According to that
   interpretation, because § 3346(a)(1)’s 210-day limit on Berryhill’s acting
   service expired before President Trump nominated Saul, the FVRA required
   that the SSA Commissioner office remain vacant until the Senate voted on
   Saul’s nomination. Under her argument, Berryhill violated the FVRA when
   she resumed her position as Acting SSA Commissioner in April 2018, and
   she had no authority to appoint SSA ALJs in July 2018. According to Seago,
   this entitles her to a new hearing before a different, properly appointed
   adjudicator. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
          The government disagrees.           Under its view, the subsections of
   § 3346(a) can operate independently, or (a)(2) can toll (a)(1) if a nomination
   is submitted during the 210-day period. According to that view, Berryhill was
   authorized to begin a new period of acting service once Saul’s nomination

                                             5
Case: 23-40001         Document: 00517040210              Page: 6       Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                          No. 23-40001

   was pending in the Senate, and thus the ALJ who denied Seago’s benefits was
   properly appointed.
           The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have considered this same issue, and
   both unanimously concluded that § 3346(a)(2) can operate as either a tolling
   provision to § 3346(a)(1) or as an independent period of time during which
   an acting officer may serve.2 See Rush v. Kijakazi, 65 F.4th 114, 117 (4th Cir.
   2023), petition for cert. filed, 92 U.S.L.W. 3045 (Sept. 8, 2023) (No. 23-243);
   Dahle v. Kijakazi, 62 F.4th 424, 427 (8th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom.
   Dahle v. O’Malley, No. 23-173, 2024 WL 71921 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2024) (mem.).
   Based on our analysis of the statutory text and purpose, we agree with our
   sister circuits and conclude that Berryhill was lawfully serving as Acting SSA
   Commissioner under § 3346(a)(2) when she ratified the appointments of all
   SSA ALJs in July 2018.
               A. Statutory Text
           When addressing issues of statutory interpretation, our first step is
   determining whether the statutory text is “plain and unambiguous.” United
   States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). If so,
   we “enforce the statute’s plain meaning, unless absurd.” Trout Point Lodge,
   Ltd. v. Handshoe, 729 F.3d 481, 486 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
   Here, the text of the FVRA unambiguously indicates that an acting officer

           _____________________
           2
            The district courts that have considered this issue are split. Compare, e.g., Boller
   v. Comm’r, SSA, No. 421CV01001SDJCAN, 2022 WL 18586837, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12,
   2022) (noting “significant weight of authority from district courts across the country that
   have found that § 3346(a)(2) contains a spring back provision” (quotation omitted)), report
   and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-CV-1001-SDJ, 2023 WL 1765909 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
   2023) with Miller v. Comm’r, SSA, No. 4:21-CV-01007-O-BP, 2023 WL 3814551, at *7
   (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2023) (holding § 3346(a)(2) is solely a tolling provision) and Foster v.
   Comm’r, SSA, No. CV-22-00290-PHX-JAT, 2023 WL 2661608, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28,
   2023) (same).

                                                6
Case: 23-40001      Document: 00517040210             Page: 7   Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                       No. 23-40001

   may serve during either the § 3346(a)(1) period, or the § 3346(a)(2) period,
   or both. Thus, in this case, our inquiry “begins and . . . ends with the
   language of the statute.” See id.
           The text of § 3346(a) makes clear that its two subsections operate
   independently. As the government states, § 3346(a) “provides that an acting
   officer may serve pursuant to the FVRA during either or both of two discrete
   time periods.” The first period is “for no longer than 210 days beginning on
   the date the vacancy occurs.” See 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(1). The second period
   begins “once a first or second nomination for the office is submitted to the
   Senate” and extends “for the period that the nomination is pending in the
   Senate.” See id § 3346(a)(2).
           These separately defined timelines indicate that § 3346(a) provides
   for two independent periods of acting service. The use of the word “or” to
   separate the two subsections confirms that these two periods can operate
   independently. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141
   (2018) (explaining “or” is “almost always disjunctive”); Horne v. Flores, 557
   U.S. 433, 454 (2009) (“Use of the disjunctive ‘or’ makes it clear that each of
   the provision’s three grounds for relief is independently sufficient.”); Reiter
   v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (stating that Congress’s use of the
   word “or” indicates that one term should not be read to “modify” the
   other). Further, without any qualifiers, (a)(2)’s use of the word “once”
   indicates that acting service under that subsection begins “at the moment
   when” a nomination is submitted to the Senate—regardless of whether it falls
   within or outside of the 210-day period. See Once, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
   DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/once (last
   visited Dec. 4, 2023) (defining “once” as “at the moment when” or “as soon
   as”).

                                            7
Case: 23-40001         Document: 00517040210              Page: 8       Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                          No. 23-40001

           Our analysis is also influenced by what the statute does not include:
   there is nothing in the text that says—or, arguably, even suggests—service
   under § 3346(a)(1) excludes someone from also serving under § 3346(a)(2).
   If Congress had intended the expiration of an acting officer’s 210 days of
   service under (a)(1) to disqualify her from serving in an acting capacity
   pursuant to (a)(2), surely it would have said so, but it did not. Cf. Rotkiske v.
   Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (recognizing the “fundamental
   principle of statutory interpretation that absent provision[s] cannot be
   supplied by the courts” (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted)). Rather, the text makes clear an acting officer can serve
   under (a)(1), (a)(2), or both, depending on if and when the President makes a
   nomination.3
           Even Seago’s interpretation requires us to read § 3346(a) as inclusive.
   Seago purports to advocate for an exclusive reading of the statute, and yet
   she asserts that an acting officer may serve under both (a)(1) and (a)(2) if the
   President makes a nomination during the 210-day period.4 There is thus no

           _____________________
           3
              Seago argues that this inclusive construal renders the “or” in § 3346(a)
   surplusage. When used in its inclusive sense, “or” indicates “A or B or both.” See, e.g.,
   Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 2015). Courts have also found that “and” can
   mean “A or B or both.” See, e.g., Shaw v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 605 F.3d
   1250, 1254 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, “the inclusive sense of or overlaps with the
   several sense of and.” Id. at 1254 n.8. Embracing Seago’s usage of the surplusage canon
   in this context, then, would mean that “or” could never be inclusive because it could always
   be replaced by the several meaning of “and.” We therefore conclude that the surplusage
   canon does not determine the outcome in this case.
           4
             Seago argues that these two positions are not contradictory because “a person
   serves exclusively under §[ ]3346(a)(1) when they serve ‘for no longer than 210 days’” but
   “exclusively under §[ ]3346(a)(2) when a nomination occurs during the 210-day period.”
   Though creative, this argument is belied by the statutory text, which clearly states that the
   acting service period under § 3346(a)(2) runs “from the date of [a first or second]
   nomination.” 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a)(2). Accordingly, a person who began serving before a
   nomination occurred could not possibly have served “exclusively under §[ ]3346(a)(2).”

                                                8
Case: 23-40001         Document: 00517040210               Page: 9       Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                           No. 23-40001

   reasonable interpretation of § 3346(a) that would exclude an acting officer
   from serving under (a)(2) if she had already served under (a)(1)—and that
   means the statute is unambiguously inclusive. See In re Rogers, 513 F.3d 212,
   226 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating a statute is ambiguous only if it is “susceptible to
   more than one reasonable interpretation or more than one accepted
   meaning”).
           Seago also relies heavily on the word “serving” in the prefatory clause
   of § 3346(a), arguing the use of this present participle indicates that only
   people presently serving as acting officers may continue to serve once the
   President submits a nomination. But “serving” must be understood in the
   context of the phrase in which it appears: “serving as an acting officer as
   described under section 3345.” See 5 U.S.C. § 3346(a). As the government
   notes, this is an important clarification because there are other PAS office-
   specific statutes with alternative means for filling vacancies. See, e.g., 42
   U.S.C. § 902(b)(4) (delineating some circumstances under which the Deputy
   SSA Commissioner will serve as Acting SSA Commissioner). The broader
   statutory context is also relevant, as § 3346(a) “does not grant the power to
   serve, but places time restrictions on service under § 3345.” See Dahle, 62
   F.4th at 428; Rush, 65 F.4th at 122. Reading “serving” in its proper context,
   we therefore conclude that the phrase “serving as an acting officer as
   described under section 3345” does not limit service only to “presently
   serving” acting officers, but rather identifies the category of acting officers
   to which § 3346(a)’s time limitations apply.5

           _____________________
           5
              The Fourth and Eighth Circuits agreed that this interpretation is “logical” and
   “far more likely” than Seago’s alternate interpretation. See Dahle, 62 F.4th at 428; Rush,
   65 F.4th at 122. Even the district court in Miller—which Seago relies on heavily—did not
   find the emphasis on the present participle “serving” persuasive because “the use of the
   present tense is fairly read as a reference to those identified in § 3345 as qualified to serve
   in the acting capacity.” Miller, 2023 WL 3814551, at *5 n.12.

                                                 9
Case: 23-40001     Document: 00517040210            Page: 10   Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                     No. 23-40001

          Finally, contrary to Seago’s assertion, our conclusion that (a)(2) can
   toll (a)(1) or can provide an independent timeline for acting service is entirely
   consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. SW General, 580
   U.S. 288 (2017). The Supreme Court in SW General did not address the
   issue before us, nor did it say that § 3346(a)(2) is exclusively a tolling
   provision. See generally id.; see also Rush, 65 F.4th at 122 (“[FVRA §] 3346
   was not at issue in SW General; the case concerned § 3345(b)’s restrictions
   on acting service by nominees.”).
          We are therefore compelled by the plain statutory text to conclude
   that § 3346(a)(2) operates both as a tolling provision and as an independent
   period of acting service. As such, Berryhill lawfully assumed the role of
   Acting SSA Commissioner under § 3346(a)(2) upon Saul’s nomination,
   regardless of the fact that she had previously served in the same position
   under § 3346(a)(1).
              B. Statutory Purpose
          “[A] statute’s purpose may not override its plain language,” but it
   “may be a consideration that strongly supports a textual interpretation.”
   United States v. Rainey, 757 F.3d 234, 245 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up)
   (quoting Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9 (1999)). Such is the case
   here. Both parties agree that a core purpose of § 3346 is to incentivize timely
   presidential nominations. See SW General, 580 U.S. at 293–94 (describing
   history leading to enactment of FVRA). But a presidential nomination alone
   cannot fill a vacant PAS office; the Senate must act as well, and a long time
   can pass between a presidential nomination and senate confirmation. See SW
   General, 580 U.S. at 293–94. Indeed, Saul was not confirmed until more than
   a year after he was first nominated. See Political Appointee Tracker, P’ship
   Pub. Serv., https://ourpublicservice.org/performance-measures/political-

                                          10
Case: 23-40001      Document: 00517040210           Page: 11    Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                     No. 23-40001

   appointee-tracker/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2023) (noting Saul was confirmed on
   June 4, 2019).
          Under both parties’ interpretations of § 3346(a), there is a penalty
   imposed on the President for not making a nomination within the 210-day
   window: after the period in (a)(1) expires, the acting officer must step down,
   leaving the PAS office vacant. This presumably will incentivize the President
   to nominate someone before the expiration of the 210-day period. But the
   point of that penalty is to put pressure on the President—so why would the
   office remain vacant after the President submitted a nomination, even if
   belated? Although Congress certainly has the power to put that type of
   pressure, we should not assume it and there is no indication in the text or
   history of the statute that it intended to do so here.
          Seago’s interpretation of § 3346(a) would extend the penalty through
   the days, months, or years that passed before the Senate confirmed or
   rejected the nominee. This case in particular exemplifies how such a vacancy
   can have direct, widespread effects on everyday Americans: if the SSA
   Commissioner office had remained vacant between March 2018 and June
   2019, no one could have ratified the SSA ALJs’ appointments after Lucia,
   potentially resulting in millions of benefits applications going unconsidered.
   See     Hearings       And       Appeals,        Soc.       Sec.     Admin.,
   https://www.ssa.gov/appeals/about_us.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2023)
   (reporting that “[e]ach year, more than 1,500 [SSA] ALJs render over
   650,000 decisions at the hearing level”). That is an extreme penalty not
   suggested by the statutory language. Further, having already fulfilled his
   constitutional duty to nominate, the President would be powerless to
   intervene.
          Only the government’s interpretation of § 3346(a) motivates the
   President to submit timely nominations without punishing the American

                                          11
Case: 23-40001        Document: 00517040210                Page: 12      Date Filed: 01/22/2024

                                            No. 23-40001

   people—through the denial of vital public services—for the (frequent and
   lengthy) delays in the Senate confirmation process. Though unnecessary in
   light of the unambiguous statutory text, this alignment between the plain text
   and the statutory purpose “strongly supports” concluding that an acting
   officer may serve under either or both of the time periods delineated in
   § 3346(a). See Rainey, 757 F.3d at 245.6
                                      IV.      Conclusion
           For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 3346(a)(2) permitted
   Berryhill to resume her role as Acting SSA Commissioner upon Saul’s
   nomination in April 2018. As such, she was lawfully serving as Acting SSA
   Commissioner in July 2018 when she ratified the appointment of all SSA
   ALJs.       We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment for the government.

           _____________________
           6
             Both parties also rely on legislative history in support of their interpretations of
   the statute, but we are not permitted to look to legislative history where—as here—the
   statutory text is unambiguous. In re Rogers, 513 F.3d at 225–26.

                                                 12