Court Opinion

ID: 9399852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 17:04:31.251306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.296092
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

      IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0285
                                FILED 6-6-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             Nos. JD530951
                                   JS21138
               The Honorable Ashley V. Halvorson, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Jennifer L. Thorson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Law Office of Moriah Windsor, Chandler
By Moriah Burnett Windsor
Counsel for Appellee M.M.
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.
                        Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1           Erica M. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her son, M.M., born in August 2021, on
the grounds of chronic substance abuse and prior termination. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016).
Mother is the biological parent of six children, including M.M., who is the
youngest.1 Mother has a history of substance abuse. In August 2020, the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to another one of her
children, V.V., on the grounds of chronic substance abuse.

¶3             In August 2021, the Department of Child Safety received a
report that Mother, who was pregnant with M.M., had tested positive at a
clinic for fentanyl, methamphetamine, and methadone. Soon after, Mother
gave birth to M.M. Because of Mother’s substance abuse while pregnant,
M.M. was born substance-exposed and suffered withdrawal symptoms.

¶4            A few days later, a Department investigator visited Mother at
her home. The investigator found Mother’s home in unhealthy and
hazardous conditions. The Department then took custody of M.M. and
petitioned the juvenile court for dependency, alleging that M.M. was
dependent due to Mother’s neglect. In April 2022, the juvenile court found
M.M. dependent as to Mother and approved severance and adoption as a
case plan, noting a severance petition had already been filed.

¶5          The Department offered Mother services, including
substance-abuse testing, assessment and treatment, parent-aide services,
and supervised visitation. Mother stated that she was unwilling to

1     M.M.’s father is not a party to this appeal; his parental rights were
terminated.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.
                        Decision of the Court

participate in services if they lasted more than a month. In October 2021,
Mother was incarcerated. During her incarceration, she was offered
services and encouraged to participate in those services. While
incarcerated, she completed a parenting program and a rehabilitation and
reentry treatment program. She also requested visitation with M.M. and
participated in visits with him twice a month.

¶6            The Department’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights alleged chronic substance abuse and prior termination. At the
termination hearing, the Department’s case manager testified that Mother
would be unable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of her
substance abuse. He also testified that the Department had provided
Mother reunification services and that termination was in the child’s best
interests. Because of her substance abuse history, Mother would have to
“demonstrate at least six months to a year of sobriety” after she was
released from prison. Finally, he testified that M.M. was visiting Mother
twice a month in person, but M.M. missed some visits because they had
scheduling conflicts, M.M. was sick, and his placement was out of town.

¶7             Mother testified, on the other hand, that the Department had
caused some of the missed visits. The juvenile court found that the
Department had proved chronic substance abuse and prior termination as
a basis for termination of the parent-child relationship and that termination
was in the child’s best interests. It also found that the Department made
reasonable and diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services
and that additional services would be futile. It therefore terminated
Mother’s parental rights. Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See
Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8–235(A), 12–120.21(A)(1), –2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶8            Mother argues that the juvenile court erroneously terminated
her parental rights to M.M. because the Department failed to make diligent
efforts to provide reunification services—specifically visits with M.M.
Although Mother did not object in the juvenile court that the services
provided to her were not appropriate, Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t. of Econ.
Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79 ¶¶ 16–18 (App. 2014), in exercise of our
discretion, we will address the substance of Mother’s argument, Clemens v.
Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966).

¶9            A juvenile court’s termination determination is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43,
47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.
                        Decision of the Court

the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and
resolve disputed facts, Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334
¶ 4 (App. 2004), we will affirm a termination decision unless no reasonable
evidence supports it, Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 230 Ariz. 96, 100 ¶ 11 (App. 2012).

¶10             To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one statutory ground
under A.R.S. § 8–533 and by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8–533(B); Jennifer
S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). Termination of
parental rights on the grounds of chronic substance abuse and prior
termination requires that the court find that the Department made
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services to the parent. Jennifer G.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453 ¶ 12 (App. 2005); Mary Lou C.,
207 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 15.

¶11           Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide Mother with
reunification services. The Department makes reasonable efforts to provide
reunification services if it provides a parent with “the time and
opportunity” to participate in reunification services. Matter of Appeal in
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS–501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).
Here, the Department offered Mother substance-abuse testing, assessment
and treatment, parent-aide services, and supervised visitation. Mother
concedes that the Department provided most of these services to her. She
argues, however, that the Department failed to make a “concerted effort”
to ensure that the visitation between Mother and M.M. occurred twice a
month as scheduled. But Mother does not explain why, under the
circumstances, less than two monthly visits did not constitute a reasonable
effort to provide her with visitation. Nor does she explain why the
undisputed services provided and the visits that occurred do not constitute
reasonable efforts to provide her with reunification services. That a few
visits between Mother and M.M. did not occur does not negate the juvenile
court’s finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to provide
reunification services. Mother’s argument, thus, merely asks this court to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Williams v. King, 248 Ariz.
311, 317 ¶ 26 (App. 2020).

¶12           Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in finding
that termination served M.M.’s best interests. She contends that the juvenile
court erred in deviating from A.R.S. § 8–514(A), (B) in placing M.M. with
the foster family. But because Mother’s challenge to M.M.’s placement
comes after the termination of her parental rights, she no longer has

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           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.M.
                       Decision of the Court

standing to challenge M.M.’s placement in foster care. See In re O.M., 525
P.3d 286, 287–289 ¶¶ 2, 8–10 (Ariz. App. 2023) (“[O]nce the juvenile court
has terminated a person’s parental rights, that person lacks standing to
challenge the child’s placement.”). Thus, Mother has shown no error.

                                  CONCLUSION

¶13          For the reasons stated, we affirm.

                         AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                         FILED: AA

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