Court Opinion

ID: 9844483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:03:27.315244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.838136
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion. I agree that where we consider the identical record which was considered by the trial court, being a written record without oral testimony, we have the same right that the trial court had to interpret the record. However, we will not reverse for a mere difference of opinion. We will only reverse where we find an abuse of discretion. In my opinion there was an abuse of discretion in this case.
We are not here dealing with a private individual lacking in knowledge with reference to the phase of the law which was under consideration as in the case of Gray v. Dillon, 97 Ariz. 16, 396 P.2d 251 (1964). We are here dealing with an insurance adjuster whose very livelinood is intimately associated with claims and with litigation arising out of claims, a person with special knowledge of the risks incident to the entry of the default as in Schering Corporation v. Cotlow, 94 Ariz. 365, 385 P.2d 234 (1963).
I do not agree that we can disregard the concept of excusable neglect in our decision in this case. It appears to me that the majority states, in effect, “if we apply the doctrine of excusable neglect, we must reverse the trial court. Here we apply the doctrine of the interpretation of ambiguous documents and concur in the discretion exercised by the trial court”. If the letters considered in the opinion were in fact couched in such language that the insurance carrier’s duty to answer was not clearly set forth then, in my opinion, there would have been excusable neglect in failing to file an answer at any earlier date. I am impressed with the fact that as a portion of the background in relation to the motion to set aside the default judgment there is an absence of any showing that the insurance adjuster first made inquiry of the plaintiffs’ attorney *441or that he first checked the official court records before he turned the file over to his attorney. The record reflects that the insurance adjuster took the file to the attorney for answer and that it was the attorney who made the inquiry by checking the records in the court house. From this statement of fact I can reach but one conclusion and that is that the insurance adjuster did not rely upon the letters from the plaintiffs’ attorney. He was just neglectful with reference to the file. The majority opinion indicates that the adjuster received the letter of October 1st but apparently mislaid it. This being so he neglected the file approximately 6 months in the face of that letter’s admonition that “unless you can come up with some figure different than the one you have submitted, it is suggested that you file an answer immediately”. If he did not receive the letter of 1 October, then he ignored his own letter of 21 September in which he acknowledged that the “matter has been dragging on for some time under an open extension to file an answer” concluding that he hoped he would “be hearing from you in the immediate future”. There is nothing in the disputed conference of November with reference to which the insurance adjuster stated in his affidavit that “after further discussion it was agreed that one more effort be made before the defendant should answer” which causes me to believe that the adjuster was continuing to rely on the 10 day written notice. It is noted that the majority opinion states that it is not critical of plaintiffs’ attorney for taking the default. To my mind, the record reflects neglect which is not excusable. I am not critical of an insurance company which seeks to make a settlement after suit before employing counsel. In my opinion, it is unrealistic to expect an attorney to file an answer which complies with the Rules of Civil Procedure when the file and the pleadings are brought to the attorney at the last moment. When an insurance company delays in the matter of employment of attorneys until the last moment or possibly as here, beyond the last moment, the insurance company takes a calculated risk. The award in this case is not one the circumstances of which “are such that it would be extremely unjust to enforce such a judgment”. Bateman v. McDonald, 94 Ariz. 327, 329, 385 P.2d 208, 210 (1963).
I would reverse the order of the trial court and I would reinstate the judgment.
Note: Judge James Duke Cameron having requested that he be relieved from the consideration of this matter, Judge John A. McGuire was called to sit in his stead and participate in the determination of this decision.