Court Opinion

ID: 9375633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 15:08:33.599079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.554521
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                       NO. 03-22-00626-CV

                                    A. S. and P. S., Appellants

                                                  v.

                Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

             FROM THE 459TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
                           NO. D-1-FM-20-000252,
           THE HONORABLE CLEVE WESTON DOTY, JUDGE PRESIDING

                                           OPINION

               Appellants A.S. (Mother) and P.S. (Father) appeal from the district court’s order

appointing P.T.S.     (Maternal Grandmother) the nonparent sole managing conservator of

sixteen-year-old M.R. (Son 2); ten-year-old R.S. (Son 3); and six-year-old J.S. (Son 4). 1 Mother

and Father each bring a single issue on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the district court’s findings that appointing Mother and Father as managing

conservators would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development.

We will reverse the district court’s order and remand for a new trial.

       1  Mother has an older child (Son 1) who was initially a child subject to this suit but who
became an adult before the case went to trial. Son 2 is Mother’s child with another man, while
Son 3 and Son 4 are Mother’s children with Father. For the children’s privacy, we refer to them
and their parents by their initials and by their familial relationships to each other, and we refer to
the children’s approximate ages at the time of trial rather than their actual birth dates. See Tex.
Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
                                        BACKGROUND

               This case began on December 30, 2019, when the Texas Department of Family

and Protective Services (the Department) received a report that Mother had taken Son 4 to a

hospital, suspecting that he might have been sexually abused by his uncle. According to the

Department’s removal affidavit, 2 the alleged abuse was ultimately “ruled out” by the

Department. However, during the investigation, the Department developed concerns that Mother

and Father “display a pattern of instability where they are unable to financially provide for their

children and provide appropriate housing.” These concerns were based on Mother’s and Father’s

“history [of] drug and alcohol abuse,” Mother’s previous history with the Department, 3 Mother

and Father “continu[ing] to reconcile” and “abuse drugs and alcohol which in turn causes an

unstable living environment for the children,” and Mother and Father not cooperating with the

Department or law enforcement during the investigation. Additionally, the Department was

concerned about Mother’s mental health.

               According to the initial status report filed with the district court, on January 10,

2020, Mother tested positive for marijuana and alcohol and Father tested positive for alcohol and

negative for drugs. The children were subsequently removed from Mother and Father. To

       2   A copy of the removal affidavit was not admitted into evidence during trial, and
because it was not admitted, we cannot consider the allegations contained within the affidavit in
our review of the evidence. See Tschirhart v. Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1994, no writ) (explaining that although “a court may take judicial notice of its own
records,” it “may not, however, take judicial notice of the truth of allegations in its records”).
We refer to the affidavit only to the extent necessary to understand the background of this case.
       3    According to the removal affidavit, between 2015 and 2018, there were multiple
reports of neglectful supervision of the children by Mother. Two of these reports were “ruled
out” and two were “administratively closed due to the allegations being refuted by a credible
source.” One report, based on Mother’s use of marijuana, was found “reason to believe.” Again,
however, the removal affidavit was not admitted into evidence, and no witness testified about
this history.
                                                2
obtain the return of the children, Mother and Father were required to participate in various

court-ordered services, including drug testing.

               Although the Department had initially sought termination of Mother’s and

Father’s parental rights, by the time of trial, the Department was instead seeking only the

appointment of Maternal Grandmother as permanent managing conservator. During the bench

trial, four witnesses testified: Phoebe Sosa, a Department conservatorship worker assigned to the

case; Garret Oliveira, the CASA volunteer assigned to the case; Mother; and Father. Maternal

Grandmother did not testify, and no documentary evidence or other exhibits were admitted.

               Sosa, who was assigned to the case in September 2021, testified that when the

case began in February 2020, the Department had concerns regarding Mother’s “instability,”

Mother’s and Father’s drug use, and “domestic violence between the two of them at that time.”

Sosa did not elaborate on the reasons for these concerns. Sosa recounted that at the beginning of

the case, Mother and Father were ordered to complete a psychological assessment and an

Outreach, Screening, Assessment, and Referral (OSAR), take parenting classes, and submit to

random drug testing.     During the first seven months of the case, Mother and Father each

submitted two out of seventeen requested drug tests, completed their psychological assessments,

and “started engaging in some therapy.”

               Sosa testified that in September 2020, “[d]ue to lack of engagement, especially

with the drug testing, and not fully getting involved with the services,” the Department requested

and obtained temporary managing conservatorship of the children, who were then “officially

placed” with Maternal Grandmother, even though the children had been living with her since the

case began.    Mother and Father were ordered to continue drug testing and follow all

recommendations from their psychological assessments, which included individual therapy and

                                                  3
parenting classes, couples’ counseling, and an OSAR. Mother was also ordered “to complete a

psychiatric evaluation and to get involved in the recovery community.”

                 Mother and Father submitted to the drug tests “on occasion”—Sosa “estimate[d]

that they were asked to drug test maybe around 56 times. And out of that number I believe they

went maybe four to five times.” According to Sosa, at the time of trial in August 2022, neither

Mother nor Father had taken a drug test in over a year, despite the Department requesting that

they do so “[b]etween 27 and 30 times” during that year. Father’s last known drug test, 4 in May

2021, was positive for cocaine, and the Department “had concerns of cocaine use throughout this

case” for Father and at the beginning of the case for Mother. However, Mother never tested

positive for cocaine, although Sosa testified that her “last couple of drug tests” were positive

for marijuana.

                 Regarding the other services, Mother completed individual therapy, parenting

classes, the psychiatric evaluation, and a 60-hour Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP). She did

not complete couples’ counseling. Father completed the psychological evaluation and one of

two requested OSARs.        He did not complete parenting classes, individual therapy, and

couples’ counseling.

                 Throughout the case, Mother had supervised visitation with the children. The

visits were to be supervised by Maternal Grandmother, although the Department had concerns

that Maternal Grandmother had not supervised all the visits. For Mother to obtain unsupervised

visitation, she needed “to complete two consecutive drug tests that were clean in a timely

manner,” which she admittedly never did.

       4  Sosa testified that she had arranged for Father to take a drug test the week before trial,
but she had not received any test results and did not know if Father had actually taken the test.
                                                 4
               Sosa testified that at the beginning of the case the parents did not have stable

housing, although she acknowledged that by the time of trial, they did. Sosa had visited their

home in the month before trial and recounted that it was a “very clean” two-bedroom apartment

with a living room. Sosa “didn’t see any visible safety hazards when [she] was there,” and Sosa

had confirmed that Mother had an “actual lease” on the apartment for a “full year,” through

either April or May 2023.

               Sosa explained that the Department “didn’t have any concerns for like the

physical space” of the apartment. Instead, the Department took issue with Mother continuing to

reside with Father because of the Department’s concern regarding domestic violence. Again, the

reasons for this concern were not explained. On cross-examination, Sosa acknowledged that the

Department had not received any referrals regarding domestic violence since the case began and

that she was not aware of the police responding to any calls of domestic violence at the

apartment.

               Throughout the case, the children had resided with Maternal Grandmother. Sosa

testified that she had visited the children frequently there and spoke with them often regarding

their feelings. According to Sosa, the children love their parents, “enjoy spending time with their

parents” and “feel safe with their parents,” but they “want to be with their grandmother.”

However, Sosa also testified that Maternal Grandmother “has struggled to maintain financial

stability” and that this was an ongoing concern for the Department. Another concern was that

the children had repeated absences from school while in Maternal Grandmother’s care, although

Sosa believed this concern had been addressed to the Department’s satisfaction. 5 Sosa explained

       5As a result of these and other issues with Maternal Grandmother, the attorney ad litem
for Son 4 expressed opposition at trial to Maternal Grandmother being appointed permanent
                                                5
that the children were “extremely bonded to their family,” and the Department did not want to

“break up this bond.” To help Maternal Grandmother financially, the Department had provided

her with “direct financial assistance for rent” and had contacted Casey Family Services, a local

community service organization, “to provide support to the family” moving forward. Sosa

believed that Maternal Grandmother “does her best to make sure that [the children are] safe,

“loves them and she cares for them very deeply,” and would not “ever willingly put them in an

unsafe situation.” She also believed that the children were “very happy” and “feel loved and

cared for” in their current placement. Sosa testified that the Department was asking for Maternal

Grandmother to be named permanent managing conservator of the children. When asked why

she believed that this was in the children’s best interest, Sosa testified,

        Again, the family—or the children want to be with their grandmother. They do
        love her. And unfortunately the concerns that the Department had regarding the
        parents were not fully alleviated throughout this case. And so because those
        safety concerns were not alleviated the Department does feel that the best place
        for the children is with their grandmother.

               CASA volunteer Oliveira testified that at the beginning of the case, CASA was

concerned with Mother’s and Father’s “physical and mental safety” and that at the time of trial,

Mother and Father had not alleviated those concerns. Oliveira did not elaborate on the nature of

these “safety” concerns. Oliveira also testified that CASA had no concerns with the current

placement and that he believed keeping the boys together and with family was in their best

interest.   Oliveira believed that the children were safe, happy, and healthy with Maternal

Grandmother. On the other hand, Oliveira acknowledged that CASA had not received any

managing conservator of Son 4 and wanted the case to remain open until more actions could be
taken to ensure that Maternal Grandmother would be a safe placement.
                                                   6
information that the boys were ever unsafe in Mother’s care. Oliveira also acknowledged that he

had never observed a visit between Mother and Father and the children, nor had he visited

their apartment.

               Mother testified that the case began when she was “staying in a shelter and [she]

would drop off [Son 4] every day to go to school at [Maternal Grandmother’s] house,” while

Mother went to work as a cashier at a gas station. One day when Mother picked up Son 4,

Maternal Grandmother “told [her] some things about [her] oldest brother” that led Mother to

suspect that he might have abused Son 4. Mother explained,

       So I confronted my family and this is how everything started. I confronted my
       family, asked them all what was the right thing to do. And, yes, a parent, as a
       mom I took [Son 4] to the hospital and this is how everything escalated. I got in
       bad terms with my family because of the decision—decision that I made of taking
       my baby to the hospital. And also nobody believed me and I guess that’s where
       they saw me being homeless, the marijuana use, the instability of my household
       and the kids.

Mother testified that she was asked to complete services because of that situation and that she

had completed most of the services. Mother explained that she completed both a psychological

and a psychiatric evaluation and was diagnosed with PTSD. However, copies of the evaluations

are not before us because they were not admitted into evidence. She completed parenting

classes, alcohol and narcotics (ANA) classes, and an intensive outpatient program. Mother also

participated in individual therapy, which included a protective parenting class.

               Mother acknowledged that she did not submit to most of the drug tests requested

by the Department but testified that this was because she felt “frustrated” and “harassed” by the

Department. She explained that “even though [she] cooperated” with the Department at the

                                                 7
beginning of the case by taking urine tests and testing negative for marijuana, 6 the Department

had made the case “more complicated” by requiring hair follicle tests as the case progressed.

This caused her to “kind of step[] back” and stop drug testing. Mother admitted that she uses

marijuana but testified that this was the “only drug” that she uses. Mother did not “think” she

would continue using marijuana if the children were returned to her because she would be

spending her free time with them and it would be “a whole different start.”

               Mother further testified that she had been licensed as an auto-insurance agent

since January 2022 and that at the time of trial, she had been at her current job for approximately

two months. Mother worked from 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m., six days a week. She currently

leased a two-bedroom duplex-style apartment with Father but was “working on [her] credit” so

that she “can buy a home” in the future. She described her apartment as a “decent place,” with a

balcony and “a back yard for the boys.” She added that the apartment was in a “really nice area”

that was “walking distance to the stores, to the school.” If the children were returned to her,

Mother planned on having them sleep in the bedrooms while she slept in the living room.

Mother acknowledged that the children were happy, healthy, and cared for by Maternal

Grandmother, but she believed the children would be happier with her, and she wanted full

custody of the children because “God gave [her] those kids and they’re [her] responsibility.”

Mother also wanted to prove to her children, her family, and herself that she was “a good mom.”

               Father testified that he lived with Mother and had been working at a taco

restaurant for five to seven months, while “doing home detailing” jobs after work. Before that,

Father was a carpet installer for seven years, and he testified that he had always supported his

       6   Mother tested negative for marijuana twice, although not on consecutive tests as
required by the Department.
                                                8
family financially. Regarding his court-ordered services, Father testified that he completed a

psychological evaluation, did his OSAR evaluation, and attended four individual therapy

sessions. However, Father did not complete the therapy sessions because the sessions required

him to attend over the phone during his work hours. Father also did not take classes on nurturing

parenting.    Father testified initially that he had “never consumed drugs,” although he

acknowledged on cross-examination that he had used cocaine on the one occasion when he had

tested positive for it. Father then testified, “But never again have I consumed drugs.” Father

testified that his “problem was alcoholism,” that he had left his job for two months to attend a

rehabilitation facility, that he had been released from the facility the day before trial, and that he

was “now more than clean” and “very free” of drugs and alcohol.               Father added that his

rehabilitation included an aftercare program that he would attend to remain sober.

               Mother testified that she and Father had been together for thirteen years, that

“[h]e’s been around all this time” taking care of the children, cooking for them, exercising with

them, “[b]uying them their shoes, their clothes, everything, pay[ing] for the bills, you know.

Everything.” Mother had observed “a lot of improvement” in Father since the case began and

described him as a “hard worker” and her “biggest support[er].” She believed that the children

loved both her and Father. Mother added that even her two children who were not Father’s

biological children “see him as a dad, too.”

               At the conclusion of trial, the district court stated that “both parents are obviously

very capable people” and that “[i]t’s unfortunate we are in this situation because we have two

parents holding steady jobs and there is a lot of good stuff here.” The district court added, “It’s

commendable that mom brought the kids to—or the younger kid to CPS because of suspected

abuse. That’s what we want parents to do.” The district court added, however, that the failure of

                                                  9
Mother and Father to take the requested drug tests “tells us that you don’t want anyone to know

what’s going on or that you may be on drugs or are still using drugs which then makes this

process a lot more challenging.” The district court concluded,

       And that really seems to be the main hold up and issue everybody has with what’s
       going on is the lack of the drug test, the clean drug test which is a serious issue.
       So we have to take that seriously. In fact we see every day what happens when
       folks do mix drugs with child raising. It does not go well. . . . So this is a
       challenging situation. Parental rights are important so I’m going take this
       under advisement.

The district court later issued its final decree of conservatorship. In its order, the district court

found that appointing Mother and Father as managing conservators of the children would not be

in the children’s best interest because doing so would significantly impair the children’s physical

health or emotional development.       The district court also found that appointing Maternal

Grandmother as nonparent sole managing conservator would be in the best interest of the

children and accordingly appointed her to that position. Mother and Father were appointed

possessory conservators. This appeal by each parent followed.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

               We review conservatorship determinations for abuse of discretion. In re J.A.J.,

243 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. 2007).         “As conservatorship determinations are ‘intensely fact

driven,’ the trial court is in the best position to ‘observe the demeanor and personalities of the

witnesses and can “feel” the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by merely

reading the record.’” In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Lenz v. Lenz,

79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002); Echols v. Olivarez, 85 S.W.3d 475, 477 (Tex. App.—Austin

                                                 10
2002, no pet.)). “The trial court’s judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the

record as a whole that the court has abused its discretion.” Id. (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie,

644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts ‘without

reference to any guiding rules or principles; or in other words, [when it acts] arbitrarily or

unreasonably.’”     Id. (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990)

(per curiam)).

                 Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, challenges to the legal and factual

sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error but instead are factors used to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587

(Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied).        Under this standard, an appellate court considers

whether the trial court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and, if so,

whether the trial court erred in its application of discretion. Id. at 588. “The traditional

sufficiency review comes into play with regard to the first question; however, the inquiry does

not end there.” Id. (citing Echols, 85 S.W.3d at 478). “The appellate court then proceeds to

determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision, that is, that

the court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.” Id. A trial court does not abuse its

discretion if there is some substantive, probative evidence to support its decision. Zeifman,

212 S.W.3d at 587; Echols, 85 S.W.3d at 477. Evidence is legally sufficient when it would

enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review and is factually

insufficient only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly

wrong and unjust. See Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588-89.

                                                11
                             THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION

               Because we are reviewing a conservatorship determination, we begin by

emphasizing the “rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint

managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.” Tex. Fam. Code § 153.131(b); see

also id. § 153.002 (“The best interest of the child shall always be the primary consideration of

the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and possession of and access to the

child.”). Therefore, “unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not

be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s

physical health or emotional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator

or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the child.” Id. § 153.131(a).

               “The presumption that the best interest of a child is served by awarding custody to

a natural parent is deeply embedded in Texas law.” Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164,

166 (Tex. 1990). The Legislature “codified that presumption by defining the procedure for

appointment of a nonparent as managing conservator.” Id. “Prior to 1987, the [Family Code]

provided that ‘[a] parent shall be appointed managing conservator of the child unless the court

finds that appointment of the parent would not be in the best interest of the child.’” Id. (quoting

former Tex. Fam. Code § 14.01(b)).         “In 1987, however, the legislature made clear the

paramount importance of the parental presumption by amending the statute” to require a more

specific finding that “‘appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of

the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or

emotional development.’” Id. (quoting former Tex. Fam. Code § 14.01(b) (current version at

Tex. Fam. Code 153.131(a) (emphasis added)). “[T]his amendment was viewed as a significant

change greatly strengthening the parental presumption:

                                                12
       ‘Thus, while there might be a lot of reasons appointment of a parent would not be
       in the best interest of the child, only one suffices to rebut the parental preference.
       This means that the fact that another contesting third party, for example, a
       grandparent, would be a better custodian of a child is not sufficient to rebut
       the parental presumption absent this impairment of physical health or
       emotional development.’”

Id. (quoting 89–1 State Bar Section Report—Family Law 27 (J. Sampson ed. 1989)); see also id.

at 166 n.3 (“‘[T]he evidence will have to be rather strong in showing some type of past physical

abuse or neglect.’”) (quoting Patricia A. Wicoff, Joint Managing Conservatorship, The New

Statute, State Bar of Texas Advanced Family Law Course P-22 (1987)); id. (“‘With regard to

impairment of emotional development, it would seem that very strong psychological or

psychiatric testimony would have to be offered as to the mental health of the parent [who is]

being denied conservatorship.’”) (quoting Wicoff, Joint Managing Conservatorship, The New

Statute, State Bar of Texas Advanced Family Law Course P-22).

               The statute thus “creates a strong presumption in favor of parental custody and

imposes a heavy burden on a nonparent.” Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167. “It is no longer

adequate to offer evidence that the nonparent would be a better custodian of the child.” Id.

Instead, “the nonparent must affirmatively prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

appointment of the parent as managing conservator would significantly impair the child, either

physically or emotionally.” Id. (emphasis added). “This statute thus requires the nonparent to

offer evidence of specific actions or omissions of the parent that demonstrate an award of

custody to the parent would result in physical or emotional harm to the child.” Id.; see also In re

F.N., 579 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2019) (op. denying pet.) (“The statute creates a parental

preference by placing the burden on the non-parent seeking conservatorship to establish that the

                                                13
parent’s appointment would result in significant impairment to the child. We have indicated that

such proof should include the acts or omissions of the parent demonstrating that result.”).

               “This link between the parent’s conduct and harm to the child may not be based

on evidence which merely raises a surmise or speculation of possible harm.” In re De La Pena,

999 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). “Instead, the evidence must support

the logical inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the parent will

probably harm the child.” In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet.

denied). The harm must be actual rather than “theoretical in nature.” Id. at 468. “A mere

potential threat, as opposed to evidence of actual harm to the child’s emotional development, is

insufficient to deny a natural [parent] the right to raise [their] own [child].” Id.

               “Acts or omissions that constitute significant impairment include, but are not

limited to, physical abuse, severe neglect, abandonment, drug or alcohol abuse, or immoral

behavior by the parent.” In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no

pet.). “Other considerations may include parental irresponsibility, a history of mental disorders

and suicidal thoughts, frequent moves, bad judgment, child abandonment, and an unstable,

disorganized, and chaotic lifestyle that has put and will continue to put the child at risk.” Id.

               Additionally, “[t]he material time to consider is the present, and evidence of past

conduct may not, by itself, be sufficient to show present unfitness.” Id.; see also Critz v. Critz,

297 S.W.3d 464, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (“Evidence of past misconduct is

not alone sufficient to show present unfitness.”). “While we are to determine the present fitness

of a parent, we recognize that an adult’s future conduct may be somewhat determined by recent

past conduct.” De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at 528. However, “[i]f the parent is presently a suitable

person to have custody, the fact that there was a time in the past when the parent would not have

                                                  14
been a proper person to have such custody is not controlling.” May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1992, writ denied); see also C.O. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam.

& Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00453-CV, 2022 WL 413374, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 11,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that “the evidence presented by the Department of

Mother’s misconduct—most of which occurred eighteen to twenty-six months before the

conclusion of the final hearing—[was] factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding

that appointment of Mother as managing conservator would significantly impair the children’s

physical health or emotional development.”)

              Finally, we recognize that when a parent and a nonparent are both seeking

managing conservatorship, “close calls” in an evidentiary review should be decided in favor of

the parent. See Lewelling, 796 S.W. 2d at 168; In re J.C., 346 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.); B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 469; In re S.W.H., 72 S.W.3d 772,

778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); In re M.W., 959 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 1997, writ denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, no writ);

see also R.H. v. D.A., No. 03-16-00442-CV, 2017 WL 875317, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 2,

2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.).

                                        DISCUSSION

              With the above principles in mind, we now consider the evidence presented in this

case, with the understanding that it was the Department’s burden to affirmatively prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that appointment of Mother and Father as managing conservators

would “significantly impair” their children, either physically or emotionally. See Lewelling,

796 S.W.2d at 167. The Department presented undisputed evidence that Mother used marijuana

while the case was pending and that Father, on at least one occasion while the case was pending,
                                               15
used cocaine. Moreover, Mother and Father refused to take drug tests on numerous occasions,

and it is well-established that a parent’s failure or refusal to take drug tests supports an inference

by the factfinder that the parent was using drugs. See, e.g., In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222

(Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied); In re C.A.B., 289 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no

pet.). The continued use of illegal drugs, particularly after a parent has been told by a court that

they need to stop using illegal drugs to obtain the return of their children, is some evidence that a

parent engaged in specific acts or omissions that demonstrate an award of custody to the parent

would result in physical or emotional harm to the child. See In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d at 497.

Accordingly, we conclude that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the district court’s

finding that appointment of Mother and Father as joint managing conservators would

significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development.

               On the other hand, we cannot conclude that the evidence in this case and on this

record was factually sufficient to support the district court’s finding, at least regarding Mother.

We neither minimize the importance of complying with Department requests to take drug tests

nor discount the evidentiary significance of the failure to take such tests. However, in this case,

Mother’s admitted marijuana use and failure to test was the only evidence the Department

presented that would support the district court’s finding that appointment of Mother as managing

conservator would “significantly impair” the physical health or emotional development of her

children. The Department did not present any direct evidence “linking” or connecting Mother’s

marijuana use with any actual or probable harm to her children. Although Mother tested positive

for marijuana when the case began and two times while the case was pending, the Department

never offered those drug test results into evidence, so the Department failed to show the amount

                                                 16
of marijuana that Mother used on the occasions when she tested positive. In fact, the Department

presented no documentary evidence at all. The Department also failed to present any evidence

that Mother used marijuana in a manner or under circumstances that harmed or threatened to

harm the children in any way. Without such evidence, we cannot conclude that any danger to the

children from Mother’s marijuana use rises above mere “suspicion or speculation of possible

harm.” See B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d at 467.

              We reach the same conclusion regarding the allegations of domestic violence.

Although caseworker Sosa testified that the Department was “concerned” about domestic

violence between Mother and Father, the nature of those concerns was not explained, and the

Department presented no evidence that any such domestic violence had occurred. 7             No

documentary evidence regarding possible or actual domestic violence was admitted, and Sosa

acknowledged that the Department had not received any referrals regarding domestic violence

since the case began and that she was not aware of the police responding to any calls of domestic

violence at the apartment. Without any evidence of domestic violence, we cannot conclude that

any danger to the children from such violence rises above mere “suspicion or speculation of

possible harm.” See id.

              Additionally, other than the missed drug tests (which we again emphasize was a

serious matter as reflected in the district court’s expression of concern), Mother completed most

of her court-ordered services, including individual therapy, parenting classes, the psychiatric

evaluation, and a 60-hour Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP). She did not complete couples’

counseling, but the Department presented no evidence as to why this service was necessary to the

       7  There were allegations in the removal affidavit suggesting possible domestic violence,
but again, the removal affidavit was not admitted into evidence and we thus cannot consider it.
See Tschirhart, 876 S.W.2d at 508–09.
                                               17
physical or emotional health of the children, particularly in the absence of any evidence of

domestic violence between Mother and Father. Moreover, at the time of trial, Mother was

employed and had stable housing. Sosa had visited the home in the month before trial and

recounted that it was a “very clean” two-bedroom apartment with a living room, and she “didn’t

see any visible safety hazards when [she] was there.” CASA had not received any information

that the boys were ever unsafe in Mother’s care, and Sosa testified that the children love and

“feel safe with their parents.”

               Finally, we observe that this case began not because Mother or Father were

suspected of abuse or neglect of the children but because Mother reported that her youngest child

might have been sexually abused by the child’s uncle. Mother made this report despite receiving

strong opposition from her family. As the district court observed, this was “commendable”

behavior by Mother and is “what we want parents to do.” Mother’s action in reporting the

possible abuse of her child is strong evidence contrary to the district court’s finding that

appointment of Mother as managing conservator would not be in the children’s best interest

because    doing    so   would    significantly   impair   the   children’s   physical   health   or

emotional development.

               In sum, the Department failed to present any direct evidence linking Mother’s

admitted marijuana use to any actual or probable harm to her children and further failed to

present any evidence of domestic violence between Mother and Father. The Department also

failed to present any documentary evidence at all in the case, including the removal affidavit, and

failed to present any testimony by Maternal Grandmother, the person who the Department had

sought to be appointed permanent managing conservator of the children. On the other hand,

Mother presented evidence that she had completed many of her court-ordered services, had taken

                                                  18
steps to achieve stability, including by finding employment and stable housing, and had acted as

a protective mother by reporting the possible abuse of her youngest child. On this record, we

conclude that the evidence supporting the district court’s finding that appointment of Mother as

managing conservator would not be in the children’s best interest because doing so would

significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development, although legally

sufficient, is factually insufficient in that it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the

evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d at 498; In re B.B.M., 291

S.W.3d at 471; see also T.E. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00067-CV,

2022 WL 3092885, at *9-10 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); C.O.,

2022 WL 413374, at *9.         Therefore, the district court’s decision to appoint Maternal

Grandmother as the children’s permanent managing conservator rather than at least one of their

natural parents was unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion.

               We sustain Mother’s sole issue on appeal. Because we are reversing the district

court’s order appointing Maternal Grandmother as the permanent managing conservator of the

children and remanding for an entirely new trial, we need not consider Father’s issue on appeal. 8

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

       8   On remand, if the Department seeks to have a nonparent appointed a managing
conservator of the children, the Department will again be required to overcome the parental
presumption as to both Mother and Father. See Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (“Under section 153.131 . . . a non-parent may not be
appointed a joint managing conservator without overcoming the presumption as to both parents);
see also Tex. Fam. Code 263.404(a).
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                                        CONCLUSION

               We reverse the district court’s decree of conservatorship and remand the case to

the district court for a new trial. Because this suit was tried as a child-protection case, the new

trial must be commenced within 180 days of this Court’s mandate. See Tex. R. App. P. 28.4(c).

On remand, the district court should consider the children’s and parties’ circumstances at that

time. See Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 542–43 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that “trial court must

be able to consider the changed circumstances” in its determination of conservatorship

on remand).

                                             __________________________________________
                                             Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Kelly

Reversed and Remanded

Filed: February 28, 2023

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