Court Opinion

ID: 9411408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 19:04:27.112845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:06.853765
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/26/23 Rueda v. ViacomCBS CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 GABRIEL RUEDA,                                                   B310123

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      BC611486)

 VIACOMCBS INC., f/k/a CBS
 CORPORATION, et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, David Sotelo, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded.
      Withers Bergman and Amman A. Khan for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
      Venable, Lee S. Brenner, Joshua M. Rosenberg, and
Michael C. Godino for Defendants and Respondents.
       This is an appeal from an order granting a Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.161 special motion to strike two causes of
action—for extortion and intentional infliction of emotional
distress—as alleged against defendants and respondents CBS
Corporation (CBS) and Showtime Network (Showtime)
(collectively, the CBS Defendants). The operative complaint
alleges the acts that form the bases for these causes of action
were committed by co-defendant Keith Davidson (Davidson), an
attorney, and other third parties, and assigns culpability to the
CBS Defendants under theories of vicarious liability. Plaintiff
and appellant Gabriel Rueda (Rueda) believes the trial court
wrongly concluded his extortion and emotional distress claims
arise from litigation-related activity protected by section 425.16,
the anti-SLAPP statute.2 In deciding whether Rueda is correct,
we consider whether Davidson’s alleged actions are illegal as a
matter of law and whether the challenged causes of action arise
from protected activity only by Davidson (or also from
unprotected activity allegedly undertaken by others).

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2
      We will elaborate, but the statute permits a defendant to
bring a special motion to strike claims that “aris[e] from” the
defendant’s protected activity, as defined in the statute.
(§ 425.16, subd. (b).) If the defendant shows the challenged claim
arises from protected activity, the court must grant the motion to
strike unless the plaintiff establishes “a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b).)

                                 2
                         I. BACKGROUND
       A.    The Facts as Pled in the Operative Complaint
       Rueda was an actor, a waiter, and a boxing fan. In 2014,
Rueda arranged for Leslie Moonves (Moonves), then President
and CEO of CBS and Showtime to meet with Freddie Roach
(Roach), then the trainer of boxer Emmanuel “Manny” Pacquiao
(Pacquiao), in hopes that the two would be able to negotiate a
boxing match between Pacquiao and Floyd Mayweather
(Mayweather).
       According to Rueda, Moonves told Rueda he would be
“taken care of financially” as a result of the introduction and paid
a finder’s fee of 2% on behalf of the CBS Defendants—if the fight
took place. Roach similarly told Rueda he was going to “make a
lot of money” and agreed Rueda would be paid a 2% finder’s fee if
the fight occurred.
       Rueda, Moonves, and Roach met in May 2014. Roach and
Moonves stated Rueda would be paid a finder’s fee if the fight
went forward.3 Based on Moonves and Roach’s representations,
Rueda told the media he was being paid a finder’s fee. Moonves
then told Rueda not to discuss any financial aspects of the fight
with the media, representing the negotiations were difficult and
financial disclosures could jeopardize them. Moonves again told
Rueda he would be paid a finder’s fee if the fight went forward.
       The Pacquiao-Mayweather fight took place in May 2015
and was jointly broadcast by Showtime and HBO. Gross
proceeds from the broadcast were reportedly in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, and Pacquiao is said to have earned more

3
     Roach also told Rueda that Pacquaio had specifically
authorized the finder’s fee.

                                 3
than $160 million. The CBS Defendants gave Rueda a plane
ticket to the fight in Las Vegas, one night’s free lodging, and
$10,000 to cover other expenses.
       A month after the fight, Rueda met with Moonves to
ascertain the amount due from the CBS Defendants, and the two
discussed the CBS Defendants’ earnings. Moonves told Rueda to
approach Roach and Pacquiao directly about their portion of the
finder’s fee and offered to facilitate those discussions.
       Approximately a week later, Rueda received a voicemail
from Keith Davidson (Davidson). When the two connected,
Davidson said he was a close friend of Roach and Pacquiao, as
well as Pacquiao’s former business manager. Davidson and
Rueda met in person at a coffee shop in the morning on June 25,
2015. Davidson asked Rueda what he wanted. Rueda explained
the agreement for the finder’s fee, and said he expected to see
Roach and Pacquiao’s financials from the fight. Davidson
disclaimed knowledge of the finder’s fee deal and indicated he did
not have information on earnings. Rueda said he could not give
Davidson a dollar figure without the financials. Davidson
became angry and aggressive, and revealed he was an attorney
for “Roach, Pacquiao and a few other powerful people.” Davidson
told Rueda he would call him in a few days.
       Several days later, Davidson and Rueda met again.
Davidson told Rueda he was going to accept a $50,000 cash
payment and was going to sign a general release for Moonves, the
CBS Defendants, Roach, and Pacquiao. Davidson told Rueda it
was not a negotiation, he had 48 hours to accept the offer, and if
he did not, he would lose his job as a waiter and “never work as
an actor in this town again.” He also said Rueda was dealing
with powerful people who did not care if he got hurt. Davidson

                                4
was “very aggressive” during the meeting, and three people who
overheard the conversation told Rueda they “wanted to call the
police.”
      Rueda telephoned the restaurant where he worked later
that day and learned Davidson had already contacted his
employer and accused him of blackmailing Moonves. Rueda’s
employer informed him he would be fired if the matter was not
resolved because Moonves was a very valuable client. Rueda
called Davidson and said he was going to tell Moonves about
Davidson’s conversations with Rueda and his employer.
Davidson told Rueda not to talk to anyone, and said there would
be “serious consequences” if Rueda did not take the money and
sign the release.
      Rueda did not accept Davidson’s offer. Over the following
weeks, Rueda was threatened and intimidated by members of
Roach’s gym. He was taunted at his workplace, followed at the
end of shifts, had his tires slashed, and was filmed without his
consent. One of Roach’s affiliates communicated to Rueda that
he had connections to Rueda’s other employers and would use
those to destroy Rueda’s career. Days later, Rueda was informed
he would no longer be working on a Marvel television show.
Rueda filed a police report regarding Davidson’s threats and
intimidation. When police officers contacted Davidson about the
investigation, Davidson admitted he contacted Rueda’s employer.

      B.    The First Round of Anti-SLAPP Motions
      Approximately eight months after Rueda met with
Davidson, he sued Pacquiao, Roach, Davidson, CBS, and
Showtime. Rueda alleged causes of action based on theories of
contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, extortion, and intentional

                                5
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The original complaint did
not allege the extortion or IIED causes of action as against the
CBS Defendants. Pacquiao and Davidson, against whom those
two causes of action were alleged, filed anti-SLAPP motions to
strike them. They contended Rueda’s extortion and IIED claims
arose from Davidson’s protected activity, namely, making a
settlement offer in anticipation of litigation.
       Rueda opposed the anti-SLAPP motions and submitted a
declaration in support of his opposition. In his declaration, he
asserted, among other things, that he was not aware Davidson
was an attorney until the end of their first in-person meeting.
       The trial court denied Pacquiao and Davidson’s anti-
SLAPP motions. This court affirmed, holding Pacquiao and
Davidson did not establish the extortion and IIED claims arose
from protected prelitigation activity. (Rueda v. Pacquiao (Oct.
11, 2018, B277840) [nonpub. opn.] (Rueda I).)

      C.    The Operative Complaint and Substitution of the CBS
            Defendants for Does Named in the Causes of Action at
            Issue
      Rueda filed his first amended complaint (the operative
complaint) in August 2016. In addition to alleging causes of
action against the named defendants, the operative complaint
included a handful of allegations related to “Doe” defendants. It
alleged the Doe defendants participated in the breaches and
misconduct alleged in the complaint, and that “each Doe
defendant was acting as an agent, joint venturer, an integrated
enterprise and/or alter ego for each of the other Defendants and
each w[as a] co-conspirator[ ] with respect to the acts and the
wrongful conduct alleged [in the complaint] so that each is

                                 6
responsible for the acts of the other in connection with the
conspiracy and in proximate connection with the other
Defendants.” The operative complaint amended the causes of
action for extortion and IIED to allege them against Doe
defendants as well.
      The cause of action for extortion alleged that Does 1-6 “and
goons from the Wildcard Gym . . . harassed, stalked, beset and
terrorized Rueda on behalf of Roach and Pacquiao,” and Rueda
and Pacquiao knew these individuals, i.e., their agents, would
meet with Rueda to make the above-described threats or take the
above-described actions. The substance of the IIED cause of
action alleged Roach, Pacquiao, Davidson, and the Doe
defendants’ outrageous conduct caused Rueda’s emotional
distress.
      In September 2019, Rueda amended the operative
complaint to substitute Showtime and CBS for Doe defendants
named in the extortion and IIED causes of action.

      D.     The CBS Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion
      Like Pacquiao and Davidson before them, the CBS
Defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion contending the extortion
and IIED claims arose from Davidson’s protected activity in
trying to settle Rueda’s claim. The CBS Defendants also argued
Rueda could not establish a probability of prevailing on the
merits of his claims. Among the evidence the CBS Defendants
submitted in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion was a
declaration from Davidson.

                                7
             1.   Davidson’s declaration
       Davidson declared that Nick Khan (Khan), Roach’s agent,
asked Davidson to meet with Rueda and see if he could settle
Rueda’s claims. Though Davidson only represented Roach, his
goal was to secure a global settlement for all parties.
       Davidson and Rueda met at a busy coffee shop on June 24,
2015. Unbeknownst to Rueda, Davidson had hired a private
investigator to make an audio recording of the meeting.4 At the
beginning of the meeting, Davidson informed Rueda he was
Roach’s attorney. Rueda then said he had a team “backing him,”
but he denied being represented by a lawyer. At the conclusion of
the conversation, Davidson told Rueda he would get back to him
in a day or two. After meeting with Rueda, Davidson called Khan
and told him, among other things, that litigation was likely.
       Davidson met Rueda again on June 29, 2015. Davidson
offered Rueda $50,000 to settle his claims. Rueda rejected that
offer and stated he would settle for 1% of $600 million. After the
meeting, Davidson called Khan and said he had been unable to
settle the case.
       Davidson called Craig Susser (Susser), the owner of the
restaurant where Rueda worked and someone Davidson had been
acquainted with for years. Davidson asked Susser if he had
information about Rueda’s demand for money for his role in
orchestrating the fight. Davidson denied telling Susser to fire
Rueda or implying that Rueda should be fired. He denied telling
Susser that Rueda blackmailed anyone.

4
      The audio recording was submitted in connection with the
anti-SLAPP motion.

                                8
       Davidson also denied making statements attributed to him
in Rueda’s declaration opposing Pacquiao’s anti-SLAPP motion in
2016 (many of which were reflected in allegations in the
operative complaint). According to Davidson, he did not threaten
Rueda and use a “stern voice,” he did not say Rueda would lose
his job as a waiter or never work as an actor in this town again,
he did not say he would use his connections to ensure Rueda
never acted again, he did not say Rueda was dealing with
powerful people who did not care if he were hurt, and there was
no discussion of physical harm of any kind. Davidson asserted he
knew nothing about anyone threatening Rueda, following or
mocking him, vandalizing his tires, or otherwise intimidating
him. He denied extorting or trying to extort Rueda.

            2.    Susser’s Declaration
      The CBS Defendants also submitted a declaration by
Susser. Susser asserted in pertinent part that he had been an
acquaintance of Davidson for years and knew he was a lawyer.
Davidson asked Susser what he knew about Rueda’s claim and
threat to sue people involved in the fight, including Moonves.
Davidson did not state or imply that Rueda was blackmailing
anyone or should be fired from his job. Davidson was
professional and did not make any threats.

      E.    Rueda’s Opposition
      Rueda opposed the CBS Defendants’ special motion to
strike. Rueda argued Davidson’s conduct at his first meeting
with Rueda was not the only conduct giving rise to the extortion
and IIED claims. He pointed to Davidson’s conduct at the second
meeting, plus the alleged stalking, harassment, and assault by

                                9
other co-conspirators and agents that came later, as bases for his
claim. Rueda asserted the activity could not be protected because
it was criminal in nature.
      Rueda submitted a declaration in which he asserted facts
regarding his meetings with Davidson and the subsequent acts
by third parties that largely mirrored the allegations in the
operative complaint but, in some respects, provided additional
details. For example, Rueda’s declaration identified Richie
Palmer (Palmer), a friend of Roach and Moonves, as one of the
individuals who threatened and harassed Rueda. It also
identified Palmer as the individual who also took steps to have
Rueda fired from his recurring acting role on the Marvel
television show. Rueda additionally asserted he had been
watched and stalked by a new neighbor after he relocated to
Colorado.

       F.    The CBS Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections
       The CBS Defendants objected to some of the evidence
submitted by Rueda. Objection numbers 25 and 26 challenged
different portions of Rueda’s declaration.
       Specifically, objection number 25 challenged a paragraph
from Rueda’s declaration in which he asserted Davidson told
Rueda he was connected and would use those connections to ruin
Rueda’s acting career. The paragraph also stated Davidson told
Rueda he was dealing with powerful people who did not care if he
was hurt and Davidson was so aggressive and threatening during
the second meeting that three bystanders said they wanted to
call the police. The CBS Defendants objected on the ground that
the statement that Davidson threatened to use his contacts to
ruin Rueda’s acting career contradicted Rueda’s prior allegation

                               10
that Davidson would arrange for his contacts to get more acting
roles for Rueda. The objection did not address the substance of
anything other than the first sentence of the paragraph.
       Objection number 26 addressed a paragraph in Rueda’s
declaration regarding Davidson’s call to Susser and Susser’s
subsequent conversation with Rueda. The CBS Defendants
objected that Rueda had no foundation or personal knowledge of
a conversation between Davidson and Susser. The objections did
not address Rueda’s subsequent conversation with Susser.

      G.    The Trial Court’s Ruling
      The trial court held a hearing, took the matter under
submission, and ultimately granted the anti-SLAPP motion.5 The
court sustained a number of evidentiary objections, including the
CBS Defendants’ objections 25 and 26. The court did not explain
the reason for its rulings on those objections.
      In denying the motion, the court found Davidson’s June 29
statements were made in anticipation of litigation. It concluded
Davidson had more than a reasonable basis to believe Rueda was
contemplating litigation when he made the statements. The

5
       During oral argument, when Rueda began to address
actionable conduct other than Davidson’s threats, counsel for the
other parties objected. Specifically, they objected to his reference
to being intimidated by members of the Wildcard Gym, to being
followed and physically intimidated, and to men coming into the
restaurant, arguing there was no evidence other than Rueda’s
speculation. The trial court reiterated its ruling on the
evidentiary objections.
       Rueda challenges certain of the evidentiary rulings on
appeal, but even if he is correct, none of the challenged rulings
affect our analysis.

                                 11
court further found Rueda had made several implied threats of
litigation at the June 24 meeting, at which Davidson revealed he
was an attorney representing Roach. By the second meeting, the
parties’ positions remained far apart and there was a threat of
litigation.
       The trial court also found Rueda had not demonstrated a
probability of success on the merits for the claims arising from
protected activity. The court concluded Davidsons’s statements
were protected by the litigation privilege, Rueda had not
demonstrated the CBS Defendants ratified or approved
Davidson’s conduct, the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, and amendments substituting the CBS defendants
for Doe defendants were time barred.

                         II. DISCUSSION
       Rueda’s principal contention—that the conduct addressed
in the CBS Defendants’ motion cannot constitute protected
activity because it was illegal as a matter of law—is unavailing.
In order for conduct to be illegal as a matter of law and thus
unprotected, the defendant must either concede the illegality or
the illegality must be established by uncontroverted evidence.
Neither is true here. The trial court accordingly did not err in
determining some allegations in the extortion and intentional
infliction of emotional distress causes of action should be stricken
under the anti-SLAPP statute. But the court’s ruling striking
those causes of action in their entirety was too broad. The CBS
Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion contended only that Davidson’s
conversations with Rueda and Susser constituted protected
activity; they did not argue the other conduct upon which those
causes of action are predicated was protected activity too.

                                 12
Instead, the CBS Defendants argued only that there is no
sufficient allegation they could be vicariously liable for this other
conduct allegedly engaged in by unnamed third parties. That,
however, is an argument concerning the merits of the claims that
must be resolved by some other procedural means.

       A.     The Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Standard of Review
       “[A] special motion to strike under section 425.16 involves a
two-step process. First, the moving defendant must make a
prima facie showing ‘that the act or acts of which the plaintiff
complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of
petition or free speech . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (City of Montebello v.
Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 (Montebello).) If the defendant
carries this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its
claims have at least “‘minimal merit.’” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 384-385 (Baral).)
       We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP
motion de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) We consider the
parties’ pleadings and affidavits describing the facts on which
liability or defenses are predicated. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); see
also San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State
University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76, 94.)

      B.    Davidson’s Alleged Conduct Is Not Illegal as a Matter
            of Law
      In this appeal, Rueda does not challenge the trial court’s
conclusion that Davidson’s actions—including his statements
during their coffee shop meetings—were undertaken in
anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under

                                 13
serious consideration. That point is accordingly waived. (Badie
v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie).)
We therefore address the only argument that Rueda does make in
this appeal: that Davidson’s statements to Rueda and the
subsequent conduct allegedly executing on Davidson’s threats
cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute because they
are criminally extortionate and illegal as a matter of law.6
       A party filing an anti-SLAPP motion satisfies the first
prong of the statute by making a prima facie showing the
plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” an act the defendant
performed in furtherance of the defendant’s right of petition or
free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78;
accord, Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 1062 [“A claim arises from
protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis
for the claim”].) “[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts
should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, at 1063; accord, Bonni
v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1015 [anti-
SLAPP analysis begins with a consideration of the elements of
each claim, “the actions alleged to establish those elements, and
whether those actions are protected”] (Bonni).)

6
      The CBS Defendants contend Rueda also forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it below. It is true that in the trial
court Rueda argued only sparingly that some or all of the alleged
conduct was illegal as a matter of law and therefore unprotected,
but we believe the point was adequately raised. We therefore
resolve the argument on the merits.

                                14
      “[W]here a defendant brings a motion to strike under
section 425.16 based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises
from activity . . . in furtherance of the defendant’s exercise of
protected speech or petition rights, but either the defendant
concedes, or the evidence conclusively establishes, that the
assertedly protected speech or petition activity was illegal as a
matter of law, the defendant is precluded from using the anti-
SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s action.” (Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 (Flatley); accord, Montebello, supra, 1
Cal.5th at 423-424.) In Flatley, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney defendant could not invoke the anti-SLAPP statute in
an action concerning a purported pre-litigation settlement
demand that amounted to criminal extortion as a matter of law.
(Flatley, supra, at 332.)
      A showing that conduct was illegal as a matter of law may
be made “either through defendant’s concession or by
uncontroverted and conclusive evidence.” (Flatley, supra, 39
Cal.4th at 320; see also Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna &
Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210.) Thus, if “a factual
dispute exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, it
cannot be resolved within the first step but must be raised by the
plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s burden to show a
probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Flatley, supra, at 316.)
      Here, the CBS Defendants do not concede the illegality of
Davidson’s conduct. The applicability of the Flatley exception
thus hinges on whether the uncontroverted evidence conclusively
shows Davidson’s conduct constituted criminal extortion as a
matter of law. We conclude it does not.
      The Penal Code defines extortion to include “the obtaining
of property or other consideration from another, with his or her

                                15
consent, . . . induced by a wrongful use of force or fear.” (Pen.
Code, § 518, subd. (a).) Fear, for purposes of extortion, “may be
induced” by five specified threats, including “a
threat . . . [¶] . . . To do an unlawful injury to the person or
property of the individual threatened or of a third person.” (Pen.
Code, § 519.) Here, the evidence does not conclusively establish
Davidson made such a threat: Rueda’s declaration asserts
Davidson did, but Davidson’s declaration denies the allegations
and asserts Davidson did not threaten Rueda at all. Because
there is no uncontroverted evidence establishing Davidson’s
conduct was illegal as a matter of law, the Flatley exception does
not apply.7 (E.g., Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
697, 712 [no uncontroverted evidence of illegality where the
defendant denied the allegation of engaging in allegedly unlawful
activities].)
       Rueda has not challenged the trial court’s determination
that he has no reasonable probability of prevailing on the claims
that arise from Davidson’s conduct that we have concluded, for
purposes of this appeal, is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute
(in that it is not illegal as a matter of law). We accordingly need
not analyze the issue; we can and do hold there was no error in
granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to those claims.

7
      Because Flatley does not apply based on the conflicting
state of the evidence in the record, none of the sustained
evidentiary objections Rueda challenges on appeal would alter
our analysis. Accordingly, we need not address Rueda’s
contention that the trial court erred by sustaining the CBS
Defendants’ evidentiary objections numbers 25 and 26.

                                16
      C.      Striking the Extortion and Intentional Infliction of
              Emotional Distress Claims in Their Entirety Was
              Error
       When an anti-SLAPP movant seeks to strike a cause of
action in its entirety, our Supreme Court has held a court should
analyze each separate claim for relief within the cause of action
to determine whether the acts are protected. (Bonni, supra, 11
Cal.5th at 1010-1011.) However, “[i]f a cause of action contains
multiple claims and a moving party fails to identify how the
speech or conduct underlying some of those claims is protected
activity, it will not carry its first-step burden as to those claims.”
(Id. at 1011; Pech v. Doniger (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 459.)
Only allegations of protected activity may be stricken under
section 425.16. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 396.)
       The CBS Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion argued Rueda’s
extortion and IIED causes of action arose from statements by
Davidson that constituted protected activity.8 The motion did not
argue the conduct allegedly undertaken by non-defendant third
parties was protected. On appeal, Rueda asserts the challenged
causes of action include claims for relief that are predicated only
on unprotected activity, namely, Davidson’s call to Susser and

8
      While the body of the statement of facts and the discussion
portion of the motion primarily addressed Davidson’s statements
to Rueda, the motion included footnotes that addressed the
pertinent facts and analysis as applied to Davidson’s statements
to Susser. It also asserted Rueda alleged the CBS Defendants
were liable for Davidson’s conduct, namely his statements to
Rueda during their second meeting and his statements to Susser.
The notice of motion also expressly referred to Davidson’s
statements to Susser as protected activity.

                                 17
the alleged harassment and intimidation by third parties. That
is half right, at least as the issue has been briefed.

            1.     The harassment and related conduct by third
                   parties
      The CBS Defendants did not contend in their motion below,
nor do they contend on appeal, that the third party conduct
alleged in the complaint (i.e., conduct of others besides the named
defendants)—specifically, the “pattern of harassment, assault,
stalking, mocking, tire slashing, career and job destruction”—
constitutes protected activity. Rueda contends this third party
conduct is unprotected by the anti-SLAPP statute and the CBS
Defendants have not demonstrated otherwise. We agree that this
alleged third party conduct is unprotected.
      Instead of arguing that the third party conduct is somehow
protected, the CBS Defendants’ argue these allegations were
properly stricken along with everything else in the challenged
causes of action because Rueda has not alleged the CBS
Defendants themselves participated in any assault, harassment,
or other bad act.9 They acknowledge Rueda’s vicarious liability

9
       The CBS Defendants also contend Rueda waived any
argument on this issue because Rueda’s opposition to the anti-
SLAPP motion did not ask the trial court to parse out what was
protected and unprotected activity nor present pertinent
authority or substantive argument. This is not entirely accurate.
While Rueda did not include a separate section in his briefing
addressing this topic, the argument was made in the introduction
to his opposition. That is not how it should be done, but we
conclude it was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. (E.g.,
Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Watkins (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1097,

                                18
allegations against them, but they contend the allegations should
be disregarded because they are conclusory.10 As a result, they
contend the claims were properly stricken in their entirety
against the CBS Defendants. In so arguing, the CBS Defendants
effectively contend the anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted
because the extortion and IIED causes of action fail to state
claims against them. This argument, which goes to the merits of
Rueda’s claims, is not an appropriate inquiry for the first step of
an anti-SLAPP analysis.
       “Arguments about the merits of the claims are irrelevant to
the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.” (Coretronic Corp. v.
Cozen O’Connor (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1388 (Coretronic);
see Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19
Cal.App.5th 203, 217 [“‘[t]he question is what is pled—not what
is proven’”].) Reviewing the pleadings and declarations, our task
on a prong one analysis is to “determine what conduct is actually
being challenged, not . . . whether the conduct is actionable.”

fn. 17; Summers v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 138,
143.)
10
      The CBS Defendants also contend Rueda forfeited the
argument that the operative complaint alleges they can be
vicariously liable for the alleged third party conduct. There was
no reason for Rueda to argue the point, however, because the
CBS Defendants did not substantively argue the insufficiency of
those allegations in their anti-SLAPP motion. Specifically, we
are not convinced a footnote in the motion asserting it was
unlikely Rueda contended the CBS Defendants were “goons from
the Wildcard gym” was sufficient to place the issue in dispute
(nor was a similar reference in the CBS Defendants’ trial court
reply).

                                19
(Coretronic, supra, at 1389.) Our sole inquiry is whether “the
defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted
liability . . . constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92; see Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at 1063 [liability-forming act must itself constitute
protected speech or petitioning].)
       If the CBS Defendants believed Rueda’s claims that they
were liable based on the acts of third parties were insufficiently
stated and wished to have them dismissed, they could have filed
a demurrer or other motion so arguing. They cannot circumvent
procedure by asking a court to excise portions of the complaint
they believe are insufficient via an anti-SLAPP motion. (Golden
Gate Land Holdings LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 82, 92 [defendant’s contention that allegations of
organization’s liability under relationship theories were
conclusory might demonstrate complaint was vulnerable to
demurrer but did not bear on analysis under first step of anti-
SLAPP analysis].)
       The CBS Defendants’ reliance on Contreras v. Dowling
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394 (Contreras) does not compel a different
result. In Contreras, a tenant sued a landlord’s attorney, alleging
the attorney conspired with the landlord to enter the rented
premises illegally. The attorney filed an anti-SLAPP motion,
arguing his conduct was protected because it involved
representing his clients. The court of appeal agreed, finding the
attorney’s actions constituted “communicative acts by an attorney
representing clients in pending or threatened litigation.” (Id. at
399.) In so holding, the Contreras court disregarded the
complaint’s aiding and abetting and conspiracy allegations
because they “d[id] not suffice to remove these acts from the

                                20
protection of the statute.” (Ibid.) Contreras is inapposite because
the allegations in the complaint there made it clear the attorney
had been sued for actions taken while representing a client, and
those actions were per se protected activity. Here, in contrast,
the only acts alleged against the CBS Defendants are that they
acted as agents, joint venturers, alter egos, and/or co-
conspirators. This is not protected activity, nor do the CBS
Defendants contend it is. The trial court therefore erred by
granting the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety.

             2.    Davidson’s call to Susser
       Rueda additionally contends Davidson’s call to Susser did
not constitute protected activity. He provides no legal analysis to
support the assertion, however. He cites only a footnote in Rueda
I that states Roach and Pacquiao (their anti-SLAPP motion was
involved in that appeal) did not contend the conduct was
protected activity. The CBS Defendants who brought the motion
currently before us, however, do argue the call constitutes anti-
SLAPP protected activity.
       Because the CBS Defendants argued Davidson’s call to
Susser was protected activity below and Rueda provides no
reasoned analysis in support of his contention that the call is in
fact unprotected, the argument is waived. (Badie, supra, 67
Cal.App.4th at 784-785; see also Golden Door Properties, LLC v.
Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [“issues not
addressed as error in a party’s opening brief with legal analysis
and citation to authority are forfeited”].)

                                21
                           DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order is reversed, and the cause is
remanded with directions to enter a new and different order
granting the CBS Defendants’ special motion to strike the eighth
and ninth causes of action (including the general allegations
incorporated therein) except insofar as those causes of action
include claims for vicarious liability based on the conduct of
“Wildcard Gym members,” Palmer, or other nonparties. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     MOOR, J.

     KIM, J.

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