Court Opinion

ID: 9898214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:12.119805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:11.529838
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 BRANDON HENDERSON,                                      No. 84955-7-I

                    Appellant,                           DIVISION ONE

    v.                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 NORTHWEST YOUTH SERVICES,

                    Respondent.

         PENNELL, J.* — Brandon Henderson is a victim of childhood sexual abuse.

He filed a lawsuit against his abuser in 2018. In 2020, Mr. Henderson successfully

sued the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) for failing

to adequately monitor or supervise his foster care. During discovery in that case

he learned Northwest Youth Services (NWYS) also oversaw his foster care.

Mr. Henderson then sued NWYS in 2022, but the case was dismissed under the

statute of limitations pursuant a then-binding decision of Division Two of this court.

The Supreme Court recently reversed Division Two’s decision, holding that it had

interpreted the statute of limitations too narrowly. Wolf v. State, No. 101477-5

(Wash. Sept. 7, 2023), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1014775.pdf.

Mr. Henderson’s case is controlled by the recent Supreme Court decision.

        * The Honorable Rebecca Pennell is a Court of Appeals, Division Three, judge sitting in
Division One pursuant to CAR 21(a).
No. 84955-7-I

Because Mr. Henderson filed suit against NWYS within the statute of limitations as

interpreted by the Supreme Court, the order of dismissal is reversed.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

       On June 25, 2018, Mr. Henderson filed a lawsuit against Ernest Slattery for

childhood sexual abuse. The suit appears to have concluded with an agreed order

of dismissal.

       In April 2020, Mr. Henderson filed a second lawsuit, this time against DSHS.

In October 2020, Mr. Henderson received discovery documents from DSHS

showing DSHS had contracted with NWYS to manage Mr. Henderson’s foster

care. Before receiving this discovery, Henderson was unaware of NWYS’s

involvement. Mr. Henderson prevailed in his suit against DSHS after a bench trial.

       Mr. Henderson filed suit against NWYS on July 21, 2022. NWYS never

answered the complaint. Instead, NWYS moved for summary judgment based

on violation of the three-year statute of limitations set forth by RCW 4.16.340.

Mr. Henderson filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

       Relying on Division Two’s decision in Wolf v. State, 24 Wn. App. 2d 290,

519 P.3d 608 (2022), rev’d, No. 101477-5 (Wash. Sept. 7, 2023), the trial court

granted NWYS’s motion for summary judgment. The court did not act on

Mr. Henderson’s summary judgment motion.

       Mr. Henderson has filed a timely appeal of the summary judgment order.

       1 Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we present the facts in the light most

favorable to nonmoving party, Mr. Henderson.

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No. 84955-7-I

                                       ANALYSIS

       We review summary judgment orders de novo. Young v. Key Pharms., Inc.,

112 Wn.2d 216, 226, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). The question is whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a genuine

issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 225.

       The trial court granted NWYS’s motion for summary judgment under the

statute of limitations. The governing statute is RCW 4.16.340(1)(c), which provides

in relevant part, “All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct

brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of

childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced . . . [w]ithin three years of the time

the victim discovered that the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought.”

The time period for the commencement of an action based on childhood sexual

abuse is tolled until the child victim reaches 18 years of age. RCW 4.16.340(1).

       At the time of the trial court’s summary judgment decision, Division Two’s

decision in Wolf held that the triggering date for the three-year statute of limitations

under RCW 4.16.340(1)(c) is the date a victim of childhood sexual abuse discovers

a causal connection between an intentional act of abuse and the resulting injuries,

regardless of when the victim may later learn of a third party’s separate negligent

act related to that same sexual abuse. 24 Wn. App. 2d at 303-06. Because

Mr. Henderson learned of the causal connection between his abuse at the hand of

Mr. Slattery and his injuries more than three years before filing suit against NWYS,

the trial court found Wolf’s analysis supported dismissal under the statute of

limitations.

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No. 84955-7-I

       The Supreme Court granted review in Wolf and reversed the Court of

Appeals. The Supreme Court disagreed that the statute of limitations for a

negligence claim against a third party is triggered by the date the victim learned

they were injured by an intentional childhood sexual assault. Instead, “pursuant to

the plain language of RCW 4.16.340(1)(c), a negligence claim accrues when a

victim recognizes the connection between a third party’s wrongful conduct and the

victim’s resulting injury.” Wolf, slip op. at 16.

       The Supreme Court’s decision in Wolf controls the outcome of this appeal.

Mr. Henderson discovered the connection between his injuries and NWYS’s

alleged negligence in October 2020, during the discovery phase of his case against

DSHS. Mr. Henderson filed suit against NWYS less than three years later. This

was timely under RCW 4.16.340(1)(c). The trial court’s order of summary judgment

is therefore reversed.

       Because we reverse the order of summary judgment in favor of NWYS,

we need not address Mr. Henderson’s alternative arguments that NWYS waived

its statute of limitations defense or that the superior court erred by denying his

CR 56(f) motion.

       Apart from challenging NWYS’s summary judgment motion, Mr. Henderson

argues the trial court erroneously denied his summary judgment motion. Our

assessment of the record is that the trial court, after granting summary judgment

to NWYS, did not act on Mr. Henderson’s summary judgment motion. Accordingly,

there is no other decision for us to review. Whether or not Mr. Henderson is entitled

to summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law is an issue that may be

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No. 84955-7-I

decided by the trial court on remand. It is not something this court will review in the

first instance.

                                   CONCLUSION

       The order granting summary judgment in favor of NWYS is reversed.

This matter is remanded for further proceedings.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

                                           ______________________________

WE CONCUR:

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