Court Opinion

ID: 9541523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:26:14.808792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:09.849699
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OE
ABE, J.
The majority of the court holds that there is a conflict between Article II, § 7, and Article III, § 13.
Article II, § 7 reads: “Contested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such manner as shall be provided by law.” The pertinent portion of Article III, § 13 reads: “Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members....”
The majority court says: “We must resolve the apparent conflict between these two provisions before proceed*362ing further. Simply stated, the question presented is: should the courts or should the legislative body be the final arbiter of the dispute in the event of an election contest involving a legislative seat? We hold that the courts are required by the Hawaii Constitution to be the forum and the final arbiter in such disputes.”
It appears to me that the decision of the majority is in direct conflict with the concept of the American form of government where it is deemed that the three branches of government, that is, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary are independent and co-equal. This concept is recognized in the United States Constitution as well as the Constitution of the State of Hawaii wherein, respectively, the executive power1 is vested in the President of the United States of America and the Governor of the State of Hawaii; the legislative power2 is vested in the Congress of the United States and the legislature of the State of Hawaii; and the judicial power3 is vested in the United States Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, and in one supreme court, circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as the legislature may from time to time establish.
Thus, if there is a conflict to be resolved, it would appear to me that under the concept of independence and equality of the various branches of the government it must be deemed that Article III, § 13, which states that “Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members”, should prevail over Article II, § 7.
*363Further, I believe a study of the minutes of the Constitutional Convention indicates that this was the intent of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.4
However, for the determination of this case, I believe that it is not necessary for this court to decide whether there is a conflict between the two sections of the Constitution.
The House of Representatives by its independent action has declared plaintiff Akizaki to be one of the six duly *364elected representatives from the Fifteenth District and no action by this court in this case can undo what has been done by the House of Representatives.
The House of Representatives in the proper exercise of this constitutional power by a majority vote of its members declared plaintiff Akizaki one of the six duly elected members from the Fifteenth Representative District and seated him. I cannot agree with the majority that this provision merely gives the House of Representatives power “to ascertaining whether the Constitution has been complied with; that is, whether the parties have properly *365invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest under Art. II, Sec. 7____”
Courts in other jurisdictions have so interpreted similar provisions in other constitutions. Phillips v. Ericson, 248 Minn. 452, 80 N.W.2d 513 (1957); Beatty v. Myrick, 218 Ga. 629, 129 S.E.2d 764 (1963); Daley v. Morial, 205 So. 2d 213 (Ct. of Appeal La. 1967).
Now, the House of Representatives having acted in accordance with the authority granted to it by our Constitution, I believe it is improper, to say the least, for this court, by its decision in this case, to attempt to undo what the House of Representatives has done. I disagree with the majority court and I believe its decision definitely shows not only utter disrespect but lack of confidence in a coordinate branch of our government.
I do not say the matter of the election has become moot as contended by defendant Lieutenant Governor Gill. However, that issue once having been determined by the House of Representatives by seating Akizaki, this suit should not be used as a vehicle to unseat Akizaki and nullify the act of the House of Representatives. Of course, defendant Fong in a proper action may question the action of the House of Representatives in seating plaintiff Akizaki as one of the representatives from the Fifteenth Representative District, if such action of the House of Representatives denied him his rights under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Hawaii under Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968).
I believe that the decision of the majority court is setting a very dangerous precedent and will bring about disharmony, if not out-and-out animosity, between the legislative and judiciary branches of government.
Also, how is this court or any other court of Hawaii to enforce the decision of this court? Under the decision, how is plaintiff Akizaki to be denied his seat in the House *366of Representatives? Is the House of Representatives to be compelled to expel plaintiff Akizaki?
It should be noted that the House of Representatives was not a party to this suit. In effect, this decision, if enforceable, would nullify the action of the House of Representatives. Now assuming the proposition of the majority court that the constitutional power of the House of Representatives to judge elections and returns of its own members was limited to determine “whether the parties have properly invoked the jurisdiction of a competent court to judge the contest” is correct, can it not be argued that the House of Representatives in seating Akizaki had based its action on the judgment of the First Circuit Court? Therefore, though in the light of the majority decision the seating was founded on an erroneous decision of a trial court, was not the seating based on constitutional authority? Then, is the action of the House of Representatives subject to a collateral attack? That is, can this court by this appeal undo or nullify the act of the House of Representatives?
All these confusions would be eliminated if this appeal is denied on the grounds that the House of Representatives has acted in connection with this matter and defendant Fong’s relief would be through the institution of a proper suit to question the act of the House of Representatives.
Thus, I would dismiss the appeal.

 Art. II, U.S. Const. and Art. IV, Hawaii Const.

 Art. I, U.S. Const. and Art. III, Hawaii Const.

 Art. III, U.S. Const, and Art. V, Hawaii Const.

 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii, 1950, Vol. II (Committee of the Whole Debates) p. 190:
ASHFORD: May I ask a question of the chairman of the committee in regard to Section 14? Inasmuch as there is a provision in another section for the judging of elections, would the chairman of the committee feel that this is desirable to say, ‘Not withstanding any other provision of the Constitution’?
HEEN: I believe what the delegate just stated refers to some provision in the article on suffrage and elections which provides for contested elections by a court of competent jurisdiction. Mr. Chairman, I must state that that provision there gave the Committee on Style some concern and maybe that provision should be eliminated altogether. But, if it is going to be there, remain there, then the suggestion made by Delegate Ashford I think is in order. ‘Notwithstanding any other provision in this Constitution, each house shall be the judge of elections and returns and qualifications of its own members.’
CHAIRMAN: With the understanding that the Style Committee will reconcile any difference, will that be satisfactory to Delegate Ashford?
ASHFORD: Yes. In my opinion perhaps the exception — two exceptions should be written into the article on suffrage and elections, that is, with the exception of any constitutional convention or the legislature.
BRYAN: The last time that this question came. up,. I pointed out that it may not have been exactly pertinent. This covers cases where there is no contest. Judges of elections in the other case, covered under the article on suffrage and elections, there would have to be a contest before it could be determined.
CHAIRMAN: This only applies to the legislature; it does not apply to the executive officers of government that may be elected. Any further discussion? If not, the Chair will put the question.
ROBERTS: I’m not quite clear as to the disposition you are making of this. In Committee Proposal No. 8 on suffrage and elections, there is a sentence which reads, ‘Contested elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such manner as shall be provided by law.’ Unless you are going to make some exception in the case of constitutional convention elections and elections involving members of the legislature, those two sections are in con*364fliet. I think that the Committee on Style should be directed by this committee to resolve the conflict in some specific way, either change the article on suffrage and elections or make some provision in the present article with regard to that.
CHAIRMAN: This language is a common provision, that each house shall be the judge of the election returns and qualifications of its members. The section to which you have reference has to do with the contested election, which is a very different problem.
ROBERTS: Well, there may be a contest of election in connection with the legislature.
CHAIRMAN: Then the legislature is the sole judge.
ROBERTS: Well, unless you construe Section 5 to apply only to those areas other than the legislature and the constitutional convention elections, otherwise there is a conflict.
CORBETT: I don’t see how you can make the legislature judge in a contested election of its own members. It seems to me that the point in putting that section in suffrage and elections was to have a body entirely objective in its approach to the problem. You have a group of people sitting in judgment on each other, and it is going to make a very difficult situation. In a contested election where there are facts to go on, it is quite a different story.
CHAIRMAN: That’s a provision contained in our constitutional history from its very beginning. Whether or not a person is qualified to sit in the legislature each house determines; it’s a political question with which the courts cannot interfere.
Are you ready for the question? All those in favor signify by saying ‘aye.’ Contrary. Carried.
TAVARES: I now move that it is the sense of this Convention that any conflict in the article on suffrage and elections should be controlled insofar as inconsistent with the sections just adopted by this section.
CHAIRMAN: Is there a second?
C. RICE: I second the motion.
CHAIRMAN: You heard the motion. All those in favor signify by saying ‘aye.’ Contrary. Carried.