Court Opinion

ID: 9895156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-05 07:10:39.28907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:24.564391
License: Public Domain

Affirmed as Modified and Memorandum Opinion filed November 2, 2023.

                                       In the

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00292-CV

                RICHARD AND LISA WIGINTON, Appellants

                                         V.

                TEXAS FAIR PLAN ASSOCIATION, Appellee

             On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1
                           Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 1112892

                 MEMORANDUM                      OPINION

      In this insurance-coverage case, a jury failed to find that the real property
owned by Richard and Lisa Wiginton suffered covered damage from Hurricane
Harvey. Pursuant to the verdict, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment but
ordered the parties to bear their own costs. On appeal, the Wigintons challenge the
trial court’s rulings striking a veniremember for cause and excluding documents
prepared by two of their witnesses. Their insurer, Texas Fair Plan Association
(TFPA), has cross-appealed, challenging the trial court’s failure to assess costs
against the Wigintons.

      The Wigintons failed to preserve their objection to the striking of a
veniremember, and we presume the omitted portions of the reporter’s record support
the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. On the other hand, TFPA is correct in arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion by assessing TFPA’s costs against it without
stating on the record why there was good cause to do so. Thus, we modify the
judgment to assess TFPA’s costs against the Wigintons, and as modified, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.

                    I. STRIKING A VENIREMEMBER FOR CAUSE

      In their first issue, the Wigintons assert that the trial court erred in striking
Veniremember No. 3 for cause as TFPA requested. The challenged veniremember
raised her hand when asked by the Wigintons’ attorney if she could be fair, but then
TFPA’s counsel asked the venire,

      Okay. Anybody on this side of the room feel like, under the facts,
      knowing this is a windstorm policy, there’s water in this house, there’s
      damage from water getting in the house, but just on those facts alone,
      just don’t think you can be fair under these circumstances or that you’re
      going to have a strongly-held conviction that the carrier is wrong?
Veniremember No. 3 both raised her hand and verbally agreed that those were her
feelings.

      After TFPA challenged her for cause, the Wigintons’ counsel called
Veniremember No. 3 back for individual questioning. The veniremember affirmed
that she did not believe she could be fair and did not feel she could follow the judge’s
instructions. When the Wigintons’ attorney pointed out that the veniremember had
raised her hand when asked earlier if she could be fair, she responded, “I probably
misunderstood your question.” The trial court then granted TFPA’s challenge for

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cause, and the Wigintons’ counsel did not object, apparently acquiescing in the
determination that cause was established. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28,
34 (Tex. 1998) (veniremember who affirmed that he could not be fair and objective
was disqualified as a matter of law).

      Given the absence of an objection to the ruling, we agree with TFPA that the
Wigintons failed to preserve this complaint for review. See Urista v. Bed, Bath, &
Beyond, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 591, 595–96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.) (op. on reh’g) (to preserve error, complaining party must object when the
challenge for cause is granted). We overrule the Wigintons’ first issue.

                            II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

      In their second issue, the Wigintons argue that the trial court erred in
excluding repair estimates prepared respectively by Ray Choate and by Richard
Gadrow. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
Fleming v. Wilson, 610 S.W.3d 18, 21 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). For the exclusion
of evidence to constitute reversible error, the complaining party must show not only
that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, but also that the erroneous ruling probably
caused the trial court to render an improper judgment. State v. Cent. Expressway
Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009). To analyze harm, we must review
the entire record. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 668 (Tex. 2018).

      We need not consider whether the trial court erred in excluding the challenged
material, because on this record, no harm can be shown. The partial reporter’s record
before us includes only transcripts of the hearings on certain pre-trial and post-
verdict motions; all proceedings that took place before the jury have been omitted.

      Under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant may request a partial
reporter’s record, but “must include in the request a statement of the points or issues

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to be presented on appeal and will then be limited to those points or issues.” TEX. R.
APP. P. 34.6(c)(1). 1 If the appellant complies with the rule, then “[t]he appellate court
must presume that the partial reporter’s record designated by the parties constitutes
the entire record for purposes of reviewing the stated points or issues.” TEX. R. APP.
P. 34.6(c)(4). Even a late-filed statement of issues will support the presumption,
absent some indication that the appellee was adversely affected by the delay. See
Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam). But if the
appellant entirely fails to submit a statement of the points or issues to be presented
on appeal, “we must presume that the omitted portions of the record are relevant and
would support the judgment.” Mason v. Our Lady Star of the Sea Catholic Church,
154 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

       On this partial record, we must presume that even if the trial erred in excluding
Choate’s and Gadrow’s documents, the exclusion was harmless. We overrule the
Wigintons’ second issue.

       1
          The statement of issues for appeal need not appear in that parties’ actual designation of
the partial reporter’s record, “as long as the statement is made in time for the other parties to
designate any additional relevant portions of the record and to prepare their appellate briefs.” Sw.
Galvanizing, Inc. v. Eagle Fabricators, Inc., 383 S.W.3d 677, 681 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (quoting Mason v. Our Lady Star of Sea Catholic Church, 154 S.W.3d 816,
819 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). For example, the sole issue in TFPA’s
cross-appeal—a challenge to the portion of the judgment requiring the parties to bear their own
costs—is identified in the judgment, which had been submitted by TFPA’s counsel with the
statement, “Agreed as to form and substance, except Defendant disagrees with the judgment
declining to award Defendant its costs.” By this statement, TFPA limited its appeal solely to the
issue of costs. After the partial reporter’s record designated by the Wigintons was filed, TFPA had
the reporter’s record supplemented to include a transcript of the oral hearing on TFPA’s motion
for entry of judgment, at which the trial court considered and ruled on the issue of costs. Thus,
TFPA’s sole appellate issue was identified and the reporter’s record on that issue is complete.

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                             III. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS

      In its cross-appeal, TFPA challenges only the assessment of costs. We review
the trial court’s assessment of costs for abuse of discretion. See Furr’s Supermarkets,
Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 376 (Tex. 2001).

      Under the general rule, “[t]he successful party to a suit shall recover of his
adversary all costs incurred therein, except where otherwise provided.” TEX. R. CIV.
P. 131. However, “[t]he court may, for good cause, to be stated on the record,
adjudge the costs otherwise than as provided by law or these rules.” TEX. R. CIV. P.
141. The trial court was therefore obliged to state on the record good cause for taxing
part of the costs against TFPA, the prevailing party. See Roberts v. Williamson, 111
S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003).

      The assessment of costs was discussed at the oral hearing on TFPA’s motion
for entry of judgment. We have reviewed the transcript of that hearing, and it shows
that the trial court did not state good cause for taxing part of the costs against TFPA.
Indeed, the Wigintons objected to the assessment of costs against them only on the
grounds that (a) the Wigintons were undeserving of sanctions, and (b) the
assessment of costs was not discussed at a pretrial hearing. See Furr’s Supermarkets,
53 S.W.3d at 378 (considering only the “good cause” arguments presented to the
trial court). But, as a matter of law, neither constitutes good cause for assessing costs
against the prevailing party. These are not valid objections, for Rule 131 is not a
sanction, and no pre-trial hearing on costs is required. Moreover, the Wigintons’
counsel subsequently filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law but
did not request a good-cause finding such as that required by Rule 141.

      Because the record contains no statement of good cause for taxing part of the
costs against the prevailing party, the trial court abused its discretion in doing so.

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See Trevino v. City of Pearland, 531 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We sustain TFPA’s issue.

                                        IV. CONCLUSION

         Having overruled the Wigintons’ issues and sustained TFPA’s sole issue, we
modify the judgment to assess costs against the Wigintons and in favor of TFPA as
Rule 131 requires. Thus, in accordance with the final bill of TFPA’s taxable court
costs as certified by the office of the county clerk, 2 we modify the trial court’s
judgment to award TFPA $15,588.77 in costs. As modified, we affirm the judgment.
See Furr’s Supermarkets, 53 S.W.3d at 376 (affirming the judgment as modified to
comply with Rule 131); Burton v. Guevara, No. 14-19-00758-CV, 2020 WL
2991542, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 4, 2020, no pet.) (same).

                                              /s/       Tracy Christopher
                                                        Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Jewell.

         2
             See Hatfield v. Solomon, 316 S.W.3d 50, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
pet.).

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