Court Opinion

ID: 9848634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:47.536179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.206040
License: Public Domain

Owsley, J.,
dissenting: I think the majority opinion is a step backward in the unending search for improvement in the administration of justice and I must dissent.
K. S. A. 60-456, as construed by the majority opinion, permits an investigating police officer to testify that at the time he made his report he marked on the report under the title “Contributing Circumstances” that the plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way. Under the same heading and under the same circumstances he was permitted to testify in reference to the defendant, “None indicated.”
No reference was made to such conclusionary statements on direot examination by the plaintiff. Defendant, on cross-examination, after the officer refused to state any opinion as to the cause of the accident, was permitted over objections to submit to the jury what the report disclosed. For many years in this state that part of the report covering an officer’s statements as to acts of negligence and cause of an accident were denied admission on the ground they were hearsay and were conclusions. (Morlan v. Smith, 191 Kan. 218, 380 P. 2d 312.)
Nothing is said in the statute which can be construed to cover a police officer’s written report. The statute is aimed at inferences or opinions expressed by a witness while testifying. The rule stated in Morían has not been affected by K. S. A. 60-456.
Even if the statute applies to a police officer’s report, testimony repeating conclusionary statements therein remains inadmissible.
K. S. A. 60-456 (cl) provides that opinions are not objectionable because they embrace the ultimate issue in a trial if such opinions are “otherwise admissible.” The majority fails to consider the phrase, “otherwise admissible”, in its construction in the statute. The rules developed by the case law relating to expert opinions and expert testimony are still applicable. The rules stated in the following authorities must still be applied:
“Although an expert witness may not usurp the jury function of weighing the evidence and deciding what the facts are, the question of arriving at a reasonable factual conclusion from the evidence which is believed is quite *489another matter. This, too, is a jury function, but in technical or other matters requiring special knowledge, skill, experience, and the like, the jury or the judge trying the case may be quite at sea without the aid of those who understand the mysteries better than they of little or no experience in such matters.
‘If it may be said that there still exists a general rule to the effect that a witness may not express his opinion upon an ultimate issue of fact, it is obvious that the extensive relaxation of the rule turns it into what amounts to an expression by the courts of reluctance or reserve in the receipt of even expert opinion which would seem to substitute the witness for the jury or the judge in the final decision. On this basis what would seem to be confusion and conflict may be looked upon as reflecting a trend toward a common sense and not an arbitrary view. This common sense view is to receive the opinion testimony where it appears that the trier of the fact would be assisted rather than impeded in the solution of the ultimate problem.” (Gard, Jones on Evidence, Opinion Testimony, §14.28, p. 660.)
“The crucial consideration in determining whether expert testimony should be received is whether ‘. . . the subject of the inquiry is one of such common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness or whether, on the other hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.’ (People v. Cole, supra, 47 Cal. 2d 99, 103; Witkin, California Evidence, [2d ed. 1966] §409 p. 367). . . .” (Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 C. A. 2d 774, 783, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 29 A. L. R. 3d 538.)
“. . . [M]any courts which state that expert opinion testimony is not admissible to prove an ultimate fact in issue are merely applying the general rule excluding such testimony where there is no necessity for its admission, and in some cases this is demonstrated by the statement of the proposition that expert opinion testimony concerning an ultimate fact in issue should not be admitted unless its admission is demanded by the necessities of the case.” (31 Am. Jur. 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence, § 22, p. 519.)
Relating these rules to the provisions o£ the statute we should reach the following results in negligence cases:
(1) The opinions of an expert witness on the ultimate issues should be permitted only when necessary to an understanding of his expertise in the subject matter of his testimony.
(2) The testimony and opinions of an expert witness in a scientific field should not be permitted unless they aid the jury in its. determination of the ultimate facts.
(3) The testimony of an expert witness in a scientific field should not include his opinion on the ultimate issues when the testimony in his field of expertise permits a jury to determine ultimate issues with equal intelligence to that of the witness.
Applying these rules of law to the facts in this case, I am satisfied the statements made in the officer’s report as to the ultimate issues *490were inadmissible. In the first place, the opinions of the officer were not essential to the subject of his expert testimony. Furthermore, the jury could have reached an intelligent conclusion on the ultimate issues as readily as could the police officer. In my judgment the testimony of the police officer should have been limited to facts relating to speed, skid marks, position of the cars, contributing weather conditions, contributing road conditions, and like matters. I conclude the trial court erred in permitting the police officer to testify that his report disclosed the specific act of plaintiffs negligence and that it contributed to the accident, and to testify that the report disclosed the defendant was not guilty of any contributing acts of negligence.
Fontron and Prager, J. J., join in the foregoing dissent.