Court Opinion

ID: 9582024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:21:37.423176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:24.166445
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As to the affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in this negligence case where plaintiffs did not base their claims upon strict liability but solely on negligence, I fully concur.
However, I cannot agree to the reasoning of the majority in Division 2 with reference to the law as to pre-trial orders. There has been no trial in this case and the pre-trial order does not in any way control. However, in this instance there has been no pre-trial order but *485merely a reference to the trial court specifically ruling that the complaint lay only in negligence. Both Milton Inn, Inc. v. Spiva, 138 Ga. App. 843 (1) (227 SE2d 525), and Goolsby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 881 (204 SE2d 789), cited by the majority, involve final judgments, one after a trial by jury and the other by the court sitting without a jury. In the case of Brumby v. Brooks, 140 Ga. App. 210, 211 (230 SE2d 359), also cited, wherein the statement is again made that the pre-trial order controls the subsequent trial, it is shown that it also involves a final judgment after a trial. The case of Pilkenton v. Eubanks, 139 Ga. App. 673 (1) (a) (229 SE2d 146), also involves a final judgment after trial. None of these cases is controlling here.
I concur with the majority only because the pleadings do not establish that plaintiffs were seeking judgment under the products liability law but were seeking damages by reason of the negligence of the various defendants. Under no circumstances can I agree that we are bound by the trial judge specifically ruling that the complaint lay only in negligence. However, looking at the pleadings it is clearly established that the complaint is only for negligence.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent to Division 2, although I concur in the judgment of affirmance.