Court Opinion

ID: 9953970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 13:02:44.525372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:57.670172
License: Public Domain

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            ALBERTO RIOS v. COMMISSIONER
                  OF CORRECTION
                     (AC 46164)
                       Alvord, Elgo and Prescott, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes committed in
   2013, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the retroactive
   application to him of an amended administrative directive of the respon-
   dent, the Commissioner of Correction, violated the ex post facto clause
   of the federal constitution. The petitioner claimed that the amendment’s
   change in the calculation of risk reduction credit he could earn toward
   completion of his sentence resulted in a longer period of incarceration
   for him and a postponement of his parole eligibility date to a time
   later than had originally been projected. Under the statutorily (§ 18-98e)
   created risk reduction earned credits program, the respondent had the
   sole discretion to award up to five days of risk reduction credit per
   month toward the completion of eligible inmates’ sentences. Under the
   administrative directive in effect in 2013, the petitioner had been earning
   five days of risk reduction credit per month. In 2016, when the respon-
   dent amended the 2013 administrative directive to align the award of
   risk reduction credit with inmates’ overall risk classification levels, the
   petitioner began earning risk reduction credit at a rate of three days
   per month due to his risk classification. The petitioner filed a motion
   for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that he had earned approxi-
   mately 104 fewer risk reduction credits from the time that the 2016
   administrative directive was applied to him until the time of the habeas
   proceedings than he would have earned under the 2013 administrative
   directive. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition,
   arguing that, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (1)),
   the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the habeas petition
   and, alternatively, that, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (2), the peti-
   tioner had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The
   habeas court granted the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment,
   reasoning that the 2016 administrative directive was a law within the
   meaning of the ex post facto clause and that its retroactive application
   to the petitioner violated the ex post facto clause because it created
   a sufficient risk of prolonging his incarceration. The court rendered
   judgment denying the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granting the
   habeas petition, from which the respondent, on the granting of certifica-
   tion, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court improperly
   granted the petitioner’s motion for summary judgment and improperly
   denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition, as the
   2016 amended administrative directive did not constitute a law within
   the meaning of the ex post facto clause, and, thus, the petitioner failed to
   state a claim on which relief could be granted: whereas the constitutional
   prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes that
   disadvantage the offender affected by them, the 2016 administrative
   directive was not a law but an internal Department of Correction policy
   that the respondent adopted in his sole discretion, pursuant to § 18-98e
   (f), to determine the amount of risk reduction credit that inmates may
   earn according to their overall security risk level, as the adoption of
   the 2016 administrative directive was an Executive Branch function
   that was part of the respondent’s responsibility to oversee the internal
   management of the correctional system; moreover, although the peti-
   tioner correctly asserted that administrative regulations may implicate
   the ex post facto clause, the respondent did not adopt the 2016 adminis-
   trative directive in the exercise of authority delegated to him by the
   legislature to promulgate rules, which are subject to the notice and
   comment procedures under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act
   (§ 4-166 et seq.), as the 2016 administrative directive was not a regulation
   subject to legislative approval but was merely a notice regarding how
   the respondent chose to exercise his unilateral statutory discretion con-
   cerning risk reduction credit; furthermore, the petitioner’s failure to
   demonstrate that the 2016 administrative directive was a law within the
   meaning of the ex post facto clause meant that his claim was legally
   insufficient; accordingly, the habeas court improperly failed to grant
   the respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the habeas petition
   failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted pursuant to
   Practice Book § 23-29 (2).
     Argued November 6, 2023—officially released March 26, 2024

                           Procedural History

   Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland, where the petition was withdrawn in part;
thereafter, the court, Bhatt, J., denied the respondent’s
motion to dismiss, and granted the petitioner’s motion
for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon,
from which the respondent, on the granting of certifica-
tion, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.
  Edward Rowley, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, for the appellant (respondent).
  Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, for the appellee
(petitioner).
                          Opinion

   PRESCOTT, J. The present appeal concerns the deter-
mination of the habeas court that an amended adminis-
trative directive of the respondent, the Commissioner
of Correction, as applied to the petitioner, Alberto Rios,
violated the ex post facto clause of the United States
constitution. The amended administrative directive at
issue, which the habeas court concluded constituted a
law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause,
changed the calculation of credits an inmate may earn
under the risk reduction earned credits (RREC) pro-
gram. That program was created by General Statutes
§ 18-98e,1 and allows eligible inmates to earn a certain
amount of credit per month toward completion of their
sentences.
  The respondent appeals from the summary judgment
rendered by the habeas court granting the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner. The
respondent also appeals from the court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss, in which he asserted that the habeas
court lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner’s ex post
facto claim and that the petitioner failed to state a claim
upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted.
  On appeal, the respondent first claims that the court
improperly concluded that the amended administrative
directive at issue was subject to ex post facto scrutiny
because it constitutes a law within the meaning of that
clause. The respondent also argues, in the alternative,
that, even if the amended administrative directive were
subject to scrutiny under the ex post facto clause
because it constitutes a law within the meaning of that
clause, the court nonetheless improperly concluded
that the application of the amended administrative
directive to the petitioner violated the ex post facto
clause prohibition. We agree with the respondent’s first
argument and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the
habeas court.
   At the outset, we note that ‘‘[t]he ex post facto prohi-
bition forbids the Congress and the [s]tates to enact
any law which imposes a punishment for an act which
was not punishable at the time it was committed; or
imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’’
(Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28, 101 S. Ct. 960, 67
L. Ed. 2d 17 (1981).
   The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of the respondent’s
claims on appeal. The petitioner was convicted, in con-
nection with conduct occurring on April 22, 2013, of
assault in the first degree in violation of General Stat-
utes § 53a-59 (a) (1), assault in the second degree in
violation of General Statutes § 53a-60, and three counts
of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-63. On May 15, 2014, he was
sentenced to twenty years of incarceration, suspended
after fourteen years, followed by five years of probation.
    Pursuant to the RREC program created by § 18-98e,
the respondent has the discretion to award RREC to
eligible inmates, which credits count toward a comple-
tion of their sentences of up to a maximum of five days
per month for such things as good behavior, participa-
tion in eligible programs and activities, and obedience
to institutional rules. The administrative directive of
the Department of Correction (department) concerning
the earning of RREC that was in effect at the time
the petitioner committed the underlying offenses was
administrative directive 4.2A (2013 administrative
directive). Conn. Dept. of Correction, Administrative
Directive 4.2A (effective March 22, 2013). That adminis-
trative directive provided that risk reduction credit is
‘‘[t]ime awarded at the discretion of the [respondent]
or designee at the rate of five (5) days per month for
participation in programs or activities, good conduct
and obedience to departmental rules, unit and/or pro-
gram rules in accordance with RREC guidelines as
determined by the [respondent] or designee.’’ Adminis-
trative Directive 4.2A (3) (D) (effective March 22, 2013).
  Pursuant to the 2013 administrative directive, once an
incarcerated individual signs an offender accountability
plan and adheres to the rules and regulations, RREC is
calculated and awarded via the department’s computer
system at a rate of five days per month. The petitioner
earned RREC at the rate of five days per month under
the 2013 administrative directive.
   On February 1, 2016, the 2013 administrative directive
was amended. That amendment, which is reflected in
administrative directive 4.2A (2016 administrative
directive), provides that ‘‘[a]n inmate may earn RREC
at the rate of three (3) days per month as an Overall
Level 4 inmate, four (4) days per month as an Overall
Level 2 or 3 inmate and five (5) days per month as an
Overall Level 1 inmate or if the inmate is being super-
vised in the community on early release supervision
throughout the sentenced portion of the inmate’s incar-
ceration.’’ Conn. Dept. of Correction, Administrative
Directive 4.2A (6) (effective February 1, 2016).
   The petitioner had been earning five days of RREC
under the 2013 administrative directive. Under the 2016
administrative directive, the petitioner began earning
RREC at a rate of three days per month due to his risk
classification as an overall level 4 inmate. On February
1, 2018, the petitioner’s classification changed to an
overall level 3 inmate, thereby allowing him to earn
RREC at a rate of four days per month. The petitioner
earned approximately forty-six fewer days of RREC
than he would have received from March 1, 2016, to
February 1, 2018, if the 2013 administrative directive
had been applied to him during that time period. From
February 1, 2018, until the time of the habeas proceed-
ings, the petitioner earned approximately fifty-eight
fewer days of RREC pursuant to the 2016 administrative
directive.
   Accordingly, by virtue of the application of the 2016
administrative directive to the petitioner, he earned
approximately 104 fewer days of RREC from the time
the 2016 administrative directive was applied to him
until the time of the habeas proceedings than he other-
wise would have under the 2013 administrative direc-
tive. He will remain ineligible to earn five days of RREC
per month, which he had been earning pursuant to
the 2013 administrative directive, until and unless he
reaches the classification of an overall level 1 inmate.
   On December 21, 2020, the petitioner filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that ‘‘the retroactive
application of this [2016] administrative [directive] vio-
lates the prohibition against ex post facto laws con-
tained in the [United States] constitution because it
dictates a longer period of incarceration and postpones
his parole eligibility date to a date later than was origi-
nally projected.’’2 The petitioner filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment on March 25, 2022, arguing that no genu-
ine issue of material fact existed that the application
to him of the 2016 administrative directive violated the
ex post facto clause and that he was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.
   In response, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss
on April 29, 2022, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (1)
and (2), arguing that the undisputed facts do not support
the petitioner’s claim for relief and that, because those
undisputed facts demonstrate that the 2016 administra-
tive directive is not a law for purposes of the ex post
facto clause, the petitioner failed to state a claim upon
which habeas relief can be granted. The respondent
also argued that the habeas court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition.
    On December 20, 2022, the habeas court issued a
memorandum of decision granting the petitioner’s motion
for summary judgment and denying the respondent’s
motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the 2016
administrative directive is a law within the meaning of
the ex post facto clause and that the application of the
2016 administrative directive to the petitioner violated
the ex post facto clause because it was retroactively
applied to the petitioner to create a sufficient risk of
prolonging his incarceration. The court determined that
no genuine issue of material fact existed and that the
petitioner was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It therefore granted the petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment and denied the respondent’s motion to dis-
miss. The respondent subsequently filed a petition for
certification to appeal, which the habeas court granted.
This appeal followed.
  Our review of the respondent’s claims that the habeas
court improperly granted the petitioner’s motion for
summary judgment and denied the respondent’s motion
to dismiss are subject to plenary review. ‘‘On review
from the granting of a motion for summary judgment,
our task is to determine whether the court correctly
determined that the moving party was entitled, as a
matter of law, to summary judgment on the basis of
the absence of any genuine issues of material fact
requiring a trial. Because this inquiry requires a legal
determination, our review is plenary.’’ Lawrence v.
Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 759, 762,
9 A.3d 772 (2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 936, 17 A.3d
474 (2011); see also Practice Book § 23-37.
   Regarding the court’s denial of the respondent’s
motion to dismiss, Practice Book § 23-29 provides in
relevant part that ‘‘[t]he judicial authority may, at any
time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respon-
dent, dismiss the petition, or any count thereof, if it
determines that: (1) the court lacks jurisdiction; [or]
(2) the petition, or a count thereof, fails to state a claim
upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted . . . .’’
‘‘The conclusions reached by the trial court in its deci-
sion to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law,
subject to plenary review. . . . [When] the legal con-
clusions of the court are challenged, [the reviewing
court] must determine whether they are legally and
logically correct . . . and whether they find support in
the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) McMillion v. Commissioner of Correc-
tion, 151 Conn. App. 861, 869–70, 97 A.3d 32 (2014).
   We turn our attention to the ex post facto question
at the center of the motion for summary judgment and
the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the respondent argues,
among other things, that the habeas court improperly
concluded that the 2016 administrative directive consti-
tutes a law within the meaning of the ex post facto
clause. We agree.
   The following legal principles are relevant to our
resolution of the ex post facto claim raised by the
respondent. The constitution of the United States pro-
vides in article one, § 10, that ‘‘[n]o State shall . . .
pass any . . . ex post facto Law . . . .’’3 U.S. Const.,
art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The plain text of this clause clearly
states that the prohibition, which is named using the
Latin phrase for ‘‘after the fact,’’ applies only to laws.
‘‘The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and
the [s]tates to enact any law which imposes a punish-
ment for an act which was not punishable at the time
it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to
that then prescribed. . . . Through this prohibition,
the [f]ramers sought to assure that legislative [a]cts give
fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely
on their meaning until explicitly changed.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S. 28–29.
   In The Federalist, No. 44, James Madison opined that
‘‘ex-post-facto laws . . . are contrary to the first princi-
ples of the social compact, and to every principle of
sound legislation.’’ The Federalist, No. 44, p. 351 (J.
Hamilton ed. 1865). Alexander Hamilton reasoned in
The Federalist, No. 84, that prohibitions on ex post facto
laws were necessary by arguing that ‘‘[t]he creation of
crimes after the commission of the fact, or . . . punish-
ment for things which, when they were done, were
breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary impris-
onments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny.’’ The Federalist, No.
84, supra, p. 629.
   In the 1798 decision of Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798), the United States Supreme
Court observed that ‘‘[t]he prohibition against their
making any ex post facto laws was introduced for
greater caution, and very probably arose from the
knowledge, that the Parliament of Great Britain claimed
and exercised a power to pass such laws . . . inflicting
. . . punishment.’’ Id., 389. The court described four
categories of laws that violate the ex post facto clause:
(1) ‘‘[e]very law that makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action’’; (2) ‘‘[e]very law
that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed’’; (3) ‘‘[e]very law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed’’; and (4)
‘‘[e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offence,
in order to convict the offender.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Id., 390.
   ‘‘It is well established that the constitutional prohibi-
tion on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes
which disadvantage the offender affected by them.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Banks, 321
Conn. 821, 845, 146 A.3d 1 (2016). ‘‘[I]n an ex post
facto analysis, a court must first determine whether
the challenged law is a penal statute . . . .’’ Beasley v.
Commissioner of Correction, 50 Conn. App. 421, 431,
718 A.2d 487 (1998), aff’d, 249 Conn. 499, 733 A.2d 833
(1999); see also Abed v. Commissioner of Correction,
43 Conn. App. 176, 182, 682 A.2d 558 (‘‘[w]e have long
held that an act ex post facto relates to crimes only;
it is emphatically the making of an innocent action
criminal’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 937, 684 A.2d 707
(1996).
  In determining whether the court in the present case
improperly concluded that the 2016 administrative
directive constitutes a law within the meaning of the
ex post facto clause, we next examine § 18-98e, the
statute creating the RREC program and authorizing the
respondent, in his sole discretion, to award RREC up
to a maximum of five days per month, and the language
of the administrative directive at issue. Section 18-98e
(a) provides in relevant part that any person sentenced
to a term of imprisonment for eligible crimes ‘‘may be
eligible to earn risk reduction credit toward a reduction
of such person’s sentence, in an amount not to exceed
five days per month, at the discretion of the Commis-
sioner of Correction . . . .’’4 (Emphasis added.) The
petitioner does not challenge the application to him of
§ 18-98e but, rather, challenges the application to him
of the 2016 administrative directive, which was issued
unilaterally by the respondent pursuant to subsection
(f) of § 18-98e. That subsection provides in relevant
part that ‘‘[t]he commissioner shall adopt policies and
procedures to determine the amount of credit an inmate
may earn toward a reduction in his or her sentence and
to phase in the awarding of retroactive credit . . . .’’
General Statutes § 18-98e (f). Notably, according to § 18-
98e (f), the policies adopted by the respondent reflect
the RREC that an ‘‘inmate may earn’’; in other words,
RREC is not guaranteed and is awarded at the discretion
of the respondent.
   The 2016 administrative directive, a copy of which
was appended to the petitioner’s motion for summary
judgment, describes in paragraph 1 the general policy
of the RREC program in stating that RREC ‘‘may be
awarded or rescinded at any time prior to discharge at
the discretion of the Commissioner or designee in the
interest of public safety.’’ Administrative Directive 4.2A
(1) (effective February 1, 2016). Paragraph 4 of the 2016
administrative directive describes the general princi-
ples and guidelines underlying the 2016 amendment,
stating, ‘‘[t]he basic principles of RREC is for the
Department of Correction to provide an incentive to
inmates and have the ability to earn credit based on an
inmate’s overall risk level. Inmates who choose to be
in compliance and participate in available programs and
activities, coupled with good conduct and obedience
to departmental, unit and/or program rules shall earn
RREC as noted in this directive. Programs shall be
offered providing inmates with valuable tools to be
better prepared for reintegration into the community.
RREC could affect an inmate’s discharge date if in com-
pliance. However, refusal to participate in programs or
failure to abide by Departmental, Unit and/or Program
rules may result in the inmate not earning RREC, forfei-
ture of RREC and ineligibility to earn RREC. In addition,
RREC may be rescinded and/or an inmate may be
excluded from earning RREC at any time at the discre-
tion of the Commissioner or designee.’’ Administrative
Directive 4.2A (4) (effective February 1, 2016).
  Paragraph 6, which is titled ‘‘Credit Earned,’’ details
the number of days of RREC an inmate may earn per
month based on the overall risk classification level of
the inmate. Administrative Directive 4.2A (6) (effective
February 1, 2016). The final paragraph, entitled ‘‘Excep-
tions,’’ which provides that ‘‘[a]ny exceptions to the
procedures in this Administrative Directive shall require
the prior written approval of the [respondent]’’; Admin-
istrative Directive 4.2A (18) (effective February 1, 2016);
further demonstrates the amount of discretion that is
given to the respondent. The 2016 administrative direc-
tive states that it was approved by the respondent who
signed the directive.
   Also appended to the petitioner’s memorandum of
law in support of his motion for summary judgment is
a notice from the respondent, titled ‘‘RREC Notice to
Offender Population.’’ The notice states that ‘‘[e]ffective
February 1, 2016 the earning of Risk Reduction Earned
Credit (RREC) will be aligned with an [offender’s] over-
all risk [classification] level. Connecticut General Stat-
ute[s] Section 18-98e states that the earning of RREC
will be based on an offender’s adherence to their
offender accountability plan, for participation in eligible
programs and activities, and for good conduct and obe-
dience to institutional rules as designated by the
[respondent]. RREC shall be earned in the following
manner as long as an offender complies with their
offender accountability plan and follows all institutional
policies and procedures . . . .’’ The notice then details
the amount of maximum RREC that may be earned per
month based on an inmate’s overall risk level.
   It is undisputed that the 2016 administrative directive
is an internal policy within the department that was
issued and adopted by the respondent in his sole discre-
tion pursuant to § 18-98e (f) to determine the amount
of RREC inmates may earn. The 2016 administrative
directive is a discretionary internal policy that provides
inmates with notice detailing the respondent’s current
position regarding the rate at which inmates ‘‘may earn
RREC’’ according to the inmate’s overall security risk
level. It is not subject to approval by the legislature,
has not been promulgated as a regulation pursuant to
General Statutes § 4-168, and it does not grant by its
terms any entitlement of inmates to RREC. Nothing
in the 2016 administrative directive indicates that the
respondent cannot deviate from it.
   Our decisions in Beasley and Abed significantly bear
upon the petitioner’s ex post facto claim.5 In Beasley
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 50 Conn. App.
421, this court analyzed a claim that an administrative
directive promulgated by the respondent, which oper-
ated so as to restrict statutory good time eligibility for
inmates classified in administrative segregation, vio-
lated the ex post facto clause of the United States consti-
tution. This court rejected that claim. See id., 433.
   The petitioners in Beasley conceded that the decision
in Abed v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 43 Conn.
App. 176, controlled the resolution of the issue and, if
applied, would require their argument to fail, but they
argued that Abed should be reversed. Beasley v. Com-
missioner of Correction, supra, 50 Conn. App. 427. This
court concluded that Abed remained good law in Con-
necticut and rejected the petitioners’ ex post facto
claim. See id.
   In so doing, this court reasoned that, ‘‘[i]n Abed v.
Commissioner of Correction, supra, 43 Conn. App. 178
. . . the [respondent] had adopted a new directive that
authorized a segregated classification for prison gang
inmates who were considered a safety threat to other
inmates and to prison staff. Once classified in this man-
ner, the inmate became ineligible to earn statutory good
time pursuant to the directive. . . . The petitioner in
Abed, who had been incarcerated prior to the adoption
of this directive, challenged the directive on ex post
facto grounds. . . . Our Supreme Court has held that
an act ex post facto relates to crimes only; it is, emphati-
cally, the making of an innocent action criminal. . . .
There is nothing in [the Abed] directive . . . that
attempts to criminalize an otherwise lawful act. . . .
The ex post facto clause does not prevent prison admin-
istrators from adopting and enforcing reasonable regu-
lations that are consistent with prison administration,
safety and efficiency.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 427–28.
   In concluding that the habeas court properly deter-
mined that the directive did not violate the ex post facto
clause of the United States constitution, the court in
Beasley reasoned that, ‘‘as in Abed, the challenged direc-
tive was not a penal statute and cannot be said to be
punitive in nature. The habeas court found, and we
agree, that the purpose for the rule precluding inmates
from being eligible to earn statutory good time while
classified in administrative segregation was not to pun-
ish but to aid in controlling the inmate population. Pur-
suant to the commissioner’s authority, such administra-
tive rules are explicitly permitted.’’ Id., 432.
   Federal courts, and in particular the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that have con-
sidered similar ex post facto claims also have made
clear that administrative directives that are not subject
to legislative approval are not classified as laws for
purposes of the ex post facto clause. See U.S. Bank,
National Assn. v. Mamudi, 197 Conn. App. 31, 42, 231
A.3d 297 (in general, we look to federal courts for guid-
ance in resolving issues of federal law), cert. denied,
335 Conn. 921, 231 A.3d 1169 (2020). In Connelly v.
Lantz, 366 Fed. Appx. 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 562
U.S. 950, 131 S. Ct. 126, 178 L. Ed. 2d 247 (2010), the
Second Circuit rejected an inmate’s claim that the appli-
cation to him of an administrative directive of the
respondent concerning community release violated the
ex post facto clause by succinctly reasoning both that
he did not raise the issue in his complaint and that, ‘‘in
any event, the ex post facto clause does not apply to the
[d]epartment’s guidelines or administrative directives.’’
Id., 195.
   Similarly, in Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2001), in determining that there was no merit to a claim
that a change in New York’s parole procedures violated
the ex post facto clause, the Second Circuit reasoned
that the ex post facto clause ‘‘does not apply to guide-
lines that do not create mandatory rules for release but
are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in
the exercise of its discretion. . . . Such guidelines are
not laws within the meaning of the ex post facto clause.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 171; see also DiNapoli v. Northeast Regional Parole
Commission, 764 F.2d 143, 145–46 (2d Cir.) (federal
parole guidelines, promulgated to assist parole commis-
sion in its exercise of discretion and under which com-
mission remained free to recommend parole date above
or below guidelines while retaining discretion to revise
or modify guidelines at any time, did not constitute
laws within meaning of ex post facto clause), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S. Ct. 568, 88 L. Ed. 2d 553
(1985); see also Warren v. Baskerville, 233 F.3d 204,
207 (4th Cir. 2000) (‘‘change in an administrative policy
that was in effect at the time of [the underlying] offenses
does not run afoul of the prohibition against ex post
facto laws’’), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 831, 122 S. Ct. 76,
151 L. Ed. 2d 41 (2001); Pindle v. Poteat, 360 F. Supp.
2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (‘‘[m]ost courts of appeals
addressing the question have held that [p]arole [c]om-
mission guidelines, which simply provide guides for the
exercise of discretion, cannot be considered laws for
[the] purpose of the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause of the
Constitution’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
   The petitioner argues that ‘‘actions of administrative
agencies are not exempt from ex post facto scrutiny.’’
He cites Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150, 33 S. Ct. 220, 57
L. Ed. 458 (1913), for the principle that the ex post facto
clause is a restraint upon legislative power and has with
uniformity been regarded ‘‘as reaching every form in
which the legislative power of a [s]tate is exerted,
whether it be a constitution, a constitutional amend-
ment, an enactment of the legislature, a by-law or ordi-
nance of a municipal corporation, or a regulation or
order of some other instrumentality of the [s]tate exer-
cising delegated legislative authority.’’ Id., 162–63. The
Supreme Court in Ross determined that article one, § 10,
of the federal constitution6 does not apply to judicial
decisions because the ex post facto clause, ‘‘according
to the natural import of its terms, is a restraint upon
legislative power and concerns the making of laws, not
their construction by the courts’’; id., 161; and that ‘‘the
ruling here in question was by an instrumentality of the
[s]tate, but as its purpose was, not to prescribe a new
law for the future . . . it is quite plain that the ruling
was a judicial act and not an exercise of legislative
authority.’’ Id., 163.
  Ross does not bear the weight placed on it by the
petitioner because it involved a challenge to a judicial
decision rather than a legislative enactment. The court
in Ross was not asked to decide, nor did it decide,
whether an administrative directive that is not subject
to legislative approval constitutes an ex post facto law.
Additionally, the broad principle in Ross regarding the
applicability of the ex post facto clause to various forms
of delegated legislative authority does not alter our
conclusion.
   The description set forth by our Supreme Court in
Washington v. Commissioner of Correction, 287 Conn.
792, 950 A.2d 1220 (2008), of the separation of powers
within our criminal justice system is helpful to consider.
In Washington, our Supreme Court explained that,
‘‘[w]ith respect to our criminal justice system, we have
recognized that there are duties and responsibilities
that are dedicated to each of our three branches of
government. We have acknowledged the legislature’s
authority to define crimes and the appropriate penalties
for them. . . . We have recognized that the judicial
branch is charged with the responsibility of adjudicating
criminal charges and ultimately determining the sen-
tence of incarceration, if any, to be imposed. . . .
Finally, we have recognized the executive branch’s
responsibility of managing our correctional institutions,
parole system and the administration of prisoners’ sen-
tences, including transfers among facilities and the
application of sentence credits.’’ (Citations omitted.)
Id., 828. This description, coupled with the designation
in § 18-98e (f) to the respondent of the discretionary
authority to unilaterally adopt policies regarding RREC,
which policies are not subject to approval by the legisla-
ture, demonstrate that the respondent’s adoption of the
2016 administrative directive is an executive branch
function taken as part of his responsibility to oversee
the correctional system.
   Neither the petitioner nor the habeas court cited any
law on point, nor are we aware of any, establishing that
the 2016 administrative directive has the force or effect
of law because it involves an instrumentality of the
state exercising delegated legislative authority. Rather,
in support of his argument that the 2016 administrative
directive constitutes a law within the meaning of the
ex post facto clause, the petitioner cites cases wherein
courts have held that certain rules made by agencies
pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and therefore subject to
legislative approval, implicate the ex post facto clause.
  For example, he cites the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Rodri-
guez v. United States Parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170
(7th Cir. 1979), which concerned whether the ex post
facto clause was violated by the retroactive application
to a federal prisoner sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205
(b) (2) of an administrative regulation of the parole
commission that denied him any meaningful consider-
ation for parole. Id. In determining that the ex post facto
clause was applicable to the administrative regulation at
issue, the court reasoned: ‘‘The first part of this inquiry,
whether the regulation involved here is equivalent to a
statute for purposes of the [ex post facto] clause, need
not detain us long. When Congress has delegated to an
agency the authority to make a rule instead of making
the rule itself, the resulting administrative rule is an
extension of the statute for purposes of the clause.
What Congress cannot do directly, it cannot do by dele-
gation. . . . The [Parole Commission and Reorganiza-
tion] Act expressly authorizes the commission to adopt
rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out a
national parole policy. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (a) (1). Legisla-
tive rules adopted by the commission pursuant to statu-
tory power have the force and effect of law.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rodriguez
v. United States Parole Commission, supra, 173.
   That regulations adopted by an agency pursuant to
the rule-making authority delegated to it by Congress
may constitute a law for purposes of the ex post facto
clause is not dispositive in the present case, as the 2016
administrative directive is not a regulation subject to the
requirements of the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which
requires legislative approval before having the force
and effect of law.7 Rather, the 2016 administrative direc-
tive was created for the internal management of correc-
tional institutions and to provide inmates with notice
as to the respondent’s current policy on how he chooses
to exercise his statutory discretion to award RREC of
up to five days per month.
   Although the 2016 administrative directive is not an
administrative regulation subject to legislative approval,
the petitioner cites multiple cases involving the applica-
bility of the ex post facto clause to such administrative
regulations. For example, he argues that ‘‘[i]t does not
matter that it was an administrative directive, rather
than a statutory amendment, because case law estab-
lishes that administrative rules are not exempt from
[the] ex post facto clause protections.’’ He contends that
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 146 L.
Ed. 2d 236 (2000), ‘‘makes explicitly clear that adminis-
trative directives can be subject to ex post facto protec-
tions.’’ A careful reading of Garner undermines the
petitioner’s reliance on it.
  The inmate in Garner, following his escape from
prison while serving a life sentence for murder, commit-
ted another murder and thereafter was sentenced to a
second life term. Id., 247. He challenged on ex post
facto grounds the retroactive application to him of an
amendment to rule 475-3-.05 (2), which had been
adopted by Georgia’s State Board of Pardons and
Paroles in the exercise of its statutorily delegated authority
to determine the interval at which inmates serving life
sentences would be reconsidered for parole and which
lengthened the time interval between proceedings to
reconsider an inmate’s eligibility for parole after an
initial consideration had taken place following an
inmate’s having served seven years of incarceration.
Id., 246–49. The United States Supreme Court reversed
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit, which held that the retroactive
application of the change in the law was necessarily
an ex post facto violation, and remanded the case for
consideration of the relevant question of ‘‘whether the
amended Georgia [r]ule creates a significant risk of
prolonging [the inmate’s] incarceration.’’ Id., 251.
   Importantly, Garner does not state whether the rule
at issue in that case was subject to approval by the
Georgia legislature. As the habeas court in the present
case recognized in its decision, Garner contains ‘‘no
mention, let alone any discussion, of whether the ex
post facto clause is inapplicable to administrative regu-
lations.’’ (Emphasis in original.) We note that Garner’s
holding that, under certain circumstances, rules adopted
by a state’s Board of Pardons and Paroles can implicate
the ex post facto clause, does not inform our analysis
of whether, in the present case, the unilaterally adopted,
discretionary administrative directive of the respondent
implicates the ex post facto clause.
   We also are not persuaded by the habeas court’s
reliance on Secretary, Dept. of Public Safety & Correc-
tional Services v. Demby, 390 Md. 580, 890 A.2d 310
(2006), to support its conclusion that the 2016 adminis-
trative directive constitutes a law within the meaning
of the ex post facto clause. Demby concerned a chal-
lenge on ex post facto grounds by several inmates who
previously had been eligible for special project credits
for ‘‘double celling,’’ or, in other words, sharing a cell
with another prisoner, but were later precluded from
obtaining such credits pursuant to an amendment to a
regulation. Id., 584–90. In concluding that the ex post
facto clause was applicable to the amendment, the court
in Demby noted that ‘‘[t]he amendment in question here
is clearly a regulation pursuant to the definition of regu-
lation in the [Maryland] Administrative Procedure Act’’;
id., 606; and reasoned that, because the regulation was
not merely interpretive in nature but, rather, was sub-
stantive, it had ‘‘the force of law,’’ which ‘‘is evident in
the fact that the adoption of the amendments immedi-
ately prohibits various categories of inmates from
receiving special housing credits for double celling.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 608.
   Demby, however, is inapposite because it concerns
a regulation adopted pursuant to Maryland’s Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, and, as noted in Demby, ‘‘under
the Maryland APA, an agency’s organizational rules,
procedural rules, interpretive rules and statements of
policy all must go through the same procedures as
required for legislative rules.’’ (Emphasis omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 607 n.13. The adminis-
trative directive challenged in the present appeal is not
subject to such approval procedures.
   The petitioner also contends that ‘‘[w]hether an
agency regulation can be deemed legislative in nature
depends on whether the regulation imposes a substan-
tive rule, rather than merely providing interpretive guid-
ance.’’ He cites the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Smith v. Scott, 223
F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2000), for the principle that ‘‘an
agency regulation which is legislative in nature is encom-
passed by [the ex post facto clause] because a legislative
body cannot escape the [c]onstitutional constraints on
its power by delegating its lawmaking function to an
agency.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 1193–
94. The petitioner further contends, citing Prater v.
United States Parole Commission, 802 F.2d 948 (7th
Cir. 1986), that the constitutional prohibition against
ex post facto laws ‘‘applies to statutory changes and
also (we may assume) to changes in administrative
regulations that represent an exercise of delegated leg-
islative authority . . . .’’ Id., 953–54.
   The petitioner’s argument is consistent with the rea-
soning of the habeas court wherein it determined, citing
United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S. Ct. 217, 121 L. Ed. 2d 155
(1992), that the answer to the question of ‘‘under what
circumstances is an administrative directive subject to
the ex post facto clause’’ is dependent ‘‘on whether it
is a substantive or legislative rule as opposed to an
interpretive guide.’’ In Ellen, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that, ‘‘[w]hen
Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to
make a rule instead of making the rule itself, the
resulting administrative rule is an extension of the stat-
ute for purposes of the [ex post facto clause]. . . . The
reason for applying the [c]lause to such legislative rules
is straightforward: Congress should not be allowed to
do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. . . .
But when an agency promulgates an interpretive rule,
the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause is inapplicable. [I]nterpre-
tive rules simply state what the administrative agency
thinks the statute means, and only remind affected par-
ties of existing duties. . . . Unlike legislative rules,
which ha[ve] the force of law . . . interpretive rules
are statements of enforcement policy. They are . . .
merely guides, and not laws: guides may be discarded
where circumstances require; laws may not.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 465.
  In concluding that the manual at issue was not a law
within the meaning of the ex post facto clause, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that it did not ‘‘purport to [create new]
law or [impose new] rights or duties . . . and it was
not promulgated through the notice and comment
rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., through which all legislative
rules must pass.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 466. Employing similar reasoning,
the Seventh Circuit in Prater explained that ‘‘[t]he rule
against ex post facto laws applies to statutory changes
and also (we may assume) to changes in administrative
regulations that represent an exercise of delegated leg-
islative authority, as opposed to an interpretation of
legislation by an agency authorized to execute, not
make, laws. . . . The legislature should not be allowed
to do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly.
Thus if Congress authorizes an agency to make rules
governing procedure before the agency . . . and the
agency does so, the rules are as if made by Congress;
Congress could have made them, if it had had time.
But if the Justice Department issues guidelines for the
enforcement of a federal statute that it administers . . .
this is the performance of an interpretive function that
every law enforcement agency has; it is not the enact-
ment of a law. . . . If the law is unchanged and no
legislative regulations are promulgated, a mere change
in enforcement methods, priorities, or policies, written
or unwritten—a change within the scope of the execu-
tive branch’s discretion in enforcing the laws passed
by Congress—does not activate the prohibition against
ex post facto laws.’’ (Citations omitted.) Prater v.
United States Parole Commission, supra, 802 F.2d 953–
54.
   The Seventh Circuit in Prater reasoned that the guide-
lines at issue in that case ‘‘are interpretive rather than
legislative. They are not the exercise of delegated authority
(e.g., to make rules of procedure); they are statements
of enforcement policy. They are . . . merely guides,
and not laws: guides may be discarded where circum-
stances require; laws may not.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 954.
   The decision in Prater, which we are not obligated
to follow, is inconsistent with precedent in other circuit
courts of appeals including that of the Second Circuit.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the rubric underlying
Ellen and Prater is applicable in the present case, the
result would not change. The 2016 administrative direc-
tive was not adopted by the respondent in the exercise
of authority delegated to him by the legislature to pro-
mulgate rules subject to the notice and comment proce-
dures under the UAPA. It is not a regulation subject to
legislative approval; rather, it is merely a notice regard-
ing how the respondent chooses to exercise his unilat-
eral discretion to award RREC, if at all.
   For the foregoing reasons, we determine that the
court improperly determined that the 2016 administra-
tive directive fell within the ambit of the ex post facto
clause. On the basis of this legal determination, we
conclude that the petitioner was not entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law, and, thus, the court improperly
granted the motion for summary judgment.
   We now turn to the respondent’s claim that the court
improperly denied the motion to dismiss. The respon-
dent sought dismissal of the habeas petition on two
grounds: that the habeas court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the petition; see Practice Book § 23-
29 (1); and that the petitioner failed to state a claim
upon which habeas relief could be granted. See Practice
Book § 23-29 (2). In denying the motion to dismiss, the
court stated that ‘‘[t]his court has jurisdiction . . . .’’
The court, however, in denying the motion to dismiss,
also implicitly rejected the alternative ground on which
the respondent sought dismissal: the failure of the peti-
tion to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief
could be granted.
   We agree with the respondent that the court improp-
erly denied the motion to dismiss. The question arises,
however, as to whether the court properly should have
granted the motion to dismiss on the basis of subsection
(1) or (2) of Practice Book § 23-29. In adjudicating this
issue, we recognize that we have not always spoken
consistently concerning the subtle distinctions between
a habeas court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
the failure of a habeas petition to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
    As explained by our Supreme Court in Wolfork v.
Yale Medical Group, 335 Conn. 448, 239 A.3d 272 (2020),
‘‘[s]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of
a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented
by the action before it. . . . A court does not truly
lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to
entertain the action before it. . . . Once it is deter-
mined that a tribunal has authority or competence to
decide the class of cases to which the action belongs,
the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in
favor of entertaining the action.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 463.
   Although it is true that we have referred to a habeas
court as having a ‘‘limited’’ jurisdiction, the principles
articulated in Wolfork should apply with equal force in
habeas proceedings. ‘‘With respect to the habeas court’s
jurisdiction, [t]he scope of relief available through a
petition for habeas corpus is limited. In order to invoke
the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction in a habeas
action, a petitioner must allege that he is illegally con-
fined or has been deprived of his liberty. . . . In other
words, a petitioner must allege an interest sufficient to
give rise to habeas relief. . . . In order to . . . qualify
as a constitutionally protected liberty [interest] . . .
the interest must be one that is assured either by statute,
judicial decree, or regulation.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Green v. Commissioner
of Correction, 184 Conn. App. 76, 85, 194 A.3d 857, cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 933, 195 A.3d 383 (2018).
   ‘‘[T]he presence or absence of an affirmative, enforce-
able right is not relevant [however] . . . to the ex post
facto prohibition, which forbids the imposition of pun-
ishment more severe than the punishment assigned by
law when the act to be punished has occurred. Critical
to relief under the [e]x [p]ost [f]acto [c]lause is not an
individual’s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair
notice and governmental restraint when the legislature
increases punishment beyond what was prescribed
when the crime was consummated. . . . [T]he primary
focus of an ex post facto claim is the probability of
increased punishment. To establish a cognizable claim
under the ex post facto clause, therefore, a habeas
petitioner need only make a colorable showing that the
new law creates a genuine risk that he or she will be
incarcerated longer under that new law than under the
old law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Perez v. Commissioner of Correction, 326
Conn. 357, 375, 163 A.3d 597 (2017).
   Our jurisprudence has, at times, conflated the con-
cepts of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Our Supreme Court, however, held in In re Jose B., 303
Conn. 569, 34 A.3d 975 (2012), that ‘‘the failure to allege
an essential fact under a particular statute goes to the
legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the trial court.’’ Id., 579. The court
in In re Jose B. reasoned that ‘‘[t]his conclusion is con-
sistent with the rule that every presumption is to be
indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . is consistent with
the judicial policy preference to bring about a trial on
the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure
for the litigant his day in court . . . by allowing the
litigant, if possible, to amend the complaint to correct
the defect . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. That same presumption in favor of
jurisdiction applies equally to habeas courts. See, e.g.,
Stafford v. Commissioner of Correction, 207 Conn.
App. 85, 94, 261 A.3d 791 (2021) (it is well established
that, in determining whether court has subject matter
jurisdiction,everypresumptionfavoringjurisdictionshould
be indulged).
   In the present case, the petitioner alleges a violation
of the ex post facto clause, arguing that the 2016 admin-
istrative directive creates a genuine risk that he will be
incarcerated longer than he would have been under the
2013 administrative directive. His failure to demon-
strate that the administrative directive is a ‘‘law’’ within
the meaning of the ex post facto clause simply means
that he has not stated a claim upon which relief can
be granted. It does not alter the fact that habeas courts
have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate ex post
facto claims in which a petitioner asserts that punish-
ment for the offense he committed has increased as a
result of a subsequent change in the law.
   Because the ex post facto clause applies only to laws
and the 2016 administrative directive is not a law within
the meaning of the clause, the petitioner’s claim is legally
insufficient. Accordingly, the habeas court improperly
failed to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the petition failed, pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29
(2), to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief
could be granted.8
   The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
with direction to render judgment denying the petition-
er’s motion for summary judgment and granting the
respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
      Although the legislature has amended § 18-98e since the administrative
directive at issue took effect in 2016; see Public Acts 2018, No. 18-155, § 3;
that amendment is not relevant to this appeal. We therefore refer in this
opinion to the current revision of § 18-98e.
    2
      At the September 29, 2022 hearing on the motion for summary judgment
and motion to dismiss, the petitioner withdrew the second claim in his
petition, which challenged the calculation of his parole eligibility date by
the Board of Pardons and Paroles.
    3
      The constitution of the United States, article one, § 9, prohibits Congress
from passing ex post facto laws. ‘‘So much importance did the [C]onvention
attach to [the ex post facto prohibition], that it is found twice in the Constitu-
tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174,
195 n.9, 842 A.2d 567 (2004), quoting Weaver v. Graham, supra, 450 U.S.
28 n.8.
    4
      General Statutes § 18-98e (b) provides that ‘‘[a]n inmate may earn risk
reduction credit for adherence to the inmate’s offender accountability plan,
for participation in eligible programs and activities, and for good conduct
and obedience to institutional rules as designated by the commissioner,
provided (1) good conduct and obedience to institutional rules alone shall
not entitle an inmate to such credit, and (2) the commissioner or the commis-
sioner’s designee may, in his or her discretion, cause the loss of all or any
portion of such earned risk reduction credit for any act of misconduct or
insubordination or refusal to conform to recommended programs or activi-
ties or institutional rules occurring at any time during the service of the
sentence or for other good cause. If an inmate has not earned sufficient
risk reduction credit at the time the commissioner or the commissioner’s
designee orders the loss of all or a portion of earned credit, such loss shall
be deducted from any credit earned by such inmate in the future.’’
    5
      In Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 330 Conn. 462, 196 A.3d 789
(2018), our Supreme Court agreed with the claim of the petitioner in that
case that the retroactive application to him of a 2013 amendment to General
Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a violated the ex post facto clause. That
amendment eliminated, by virtue of his status as a violent offender, the
RREC awarded to him pursuant to § 18-98e from the calculation of his initial
parole eligibility date, thereby requiring him to complete 85 percent of his
definite sentence before becoming parole eligible. The court reasoned that
‘‘ ‘it is unconstitutional to apply a statute that alters, to the defendant’s
disadvantage, the terms under which eligibility for [parole] is calculated, if
that statute was enacted after the date of the underlying offense’ ’’; id.,
473; and further stated that ‘‘it cannot reasonably be argued that the 2013
amendment to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-125a (b) (2) does not
alter the calculation of when [the petitioner] is eligible for parole . . . . It
clearly does so by eliminating risk reduction credit from that calculation.
Indeed, the petitioner has consistently earned the maximum number of risk
reduction credits that were available to him, and the respondent has provided
no reason to believe either that the petitioner will be denied risk reduction
credit in the future or that any credit that he earns or already has earned
is likely to be revoked. In such circumstances, it strikes us as quite specula-
tive to conclude that the petitioner’s release date will not be adversely
affected by retroactively applying the 2013 amendment to him.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 478.
   Breton is not applicable to the present case. First, Breton involved a
statute governing parole eligibility, which pursuant to ‘‘firmly established’’
precedent is ‘‘part of the law annexed to the crime for ex post facto clause
purposes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 472. The present case,
however, involves an administrative directive that does not satisfy the prelim-
inary hurdle of being subject to the ex post facto clause prohibition because
it does not constitute a law within the meaning of that clause. Second,
in Breton, the 2013 statutory amendment undisputedly was being applied
retroactively to the petitioner, and our Supreme Court reasoned that such
retroactive application presented a significant risk that the petitioner’s
parole eligibility date would be adversely affected. In the present case,
however, the 2016 administrative directive does not revoke any RREC credits
that the petitioner already had earned pursuant to the 2013 administrative
directive and, as a result, the effect of the 2016 administrative directive on
the ultimate length of the petitioner’s sentence is less clear than the effect
of the statutory amendment on the parole eligibility date of the petitioner
in Breton. In any event, we do not address the issue of whether the applica-
tion of the 2016 administrative directive to the petitioner in the present case
created a significant risk of increasing the measure of punishment because
the preliminary hurdle that the administrative directive constitutes a law
within the meaning of the ex post facto clause has not been satisfied.
   6
     The constitution of the United States, article one, § 10, provides in rele-
vant part: ‘‘No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .’’
   7
     In Pierce v. Lantz, 113 Conn. App. 98, 965 A.2d 576, cert. denied, 293
Conn. 915, 979 A.2d 490 (2009), this court observed that ‘‘[a]dministrative
directives are created for the internal management of the correctional institu-
tions and are not regulations that are subject to the UAPA requirements.’’
Id., 104–105.
   8
     Additionally, because we conclude that the 2016 administrative directive
does not constitute a law within the meaning of the ex post facto clause,
we need not address the respondent’s additional claims that that directive
did not violate the ex post facto clause because it was not applied retroac-
tively, and, furthermore, it did not create a sufficient risk of increasing the
petitioner’s measure of punishment. See, e.g., State v. Banks, supra, 321
Conn. 846 n.10.