Court Opinion

ID: 9449257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 14:09:02.95796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.418272
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1462-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE MITCH PERRY, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 16-CR-001375

HUMBERTO RAMOS                                                         APPELLEE

                               OPINION
                       REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; EASTON AND KAREM, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: The Commonwealth of Kentucky appeals from an

order of the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing without prejudice the indictment of

Humberto Ramos. It argues that the circuit court exceeded its authority based on

the Separation of Powers doctrine of the Kentucky Constitution and the supportive

case law. After careful review, we conclude that the indictment was improperly

dismissed. We therefore reverse the order on appeal and remand the matter to the

circuit court.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On May 25, 2016, a Jefferson County grand jury indicted Humberto

Ramos on one count of escape in the second degree.1 Ramos was arraigned about

one week after the indictment and appeared before the circuit court for the final

time on September 1, 2016. Thereafter, it appears that Ramos was either in federal

custody or detained by immigration authorities, and could no longer be located

within the Commonwealth.

                On September 26, 2022, the Jefferson Circuit Court sua sponte placed

this matter on the docket for consideration of whether the indictment should be

dismissed because no action had been taken on it for about six years. The

Commonwealth argued against dismissal, noting that the delay in the proceedings

resulted solely from Ramos’ failure to appear. Additional hearings were conducted

through November 7, 2022, at which time the circuit court dismissed the

indictment without prejudice. In support of the order, the circuit court determined

that the years-long period of inactivity required the matter’s removal from the

docket. This appeal followed.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 520.030.

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                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “We review a circuit court’s decision to dismiss an indictment for an

abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Grider, 390 S.W.3d 803, 817 (Ky. App.

2012) (citation omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial

judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.” Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                        ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             The Commonwealth argues that the Jefferson Circuit Court erred in

dismissing the indictment over the Commonwealth’s objection. While

acknowledging the circuit court’s concern that this matter has been on the active

docket for several years, the Commonwealth argues that the delay results from

Ramos being unable or unwilling to appear and that this is not a proper basis for

dismissal. It contends that this Court has previously held that, based on the

Separation of Powers doctrine, Kentucky’s trial courts do not have the authority to

dismiss indictments over the Commonwealth’s objection before trial. Citing

Grider, 390 S.W.3d at 817-18, and related case law, the Commonwealth argues

that the Legislature has the constitutional authority to enact statutes governing

criminal offenses; the Executive branch may prosecute the accused; and the

Judiciary is vested with authority to adjudicate the criminal proceedings. Pursuant

to this scheme, the Commonwealth argues that a trial court may only dismiss an

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indictment in extraordinary circumstances such as insufficiency of the indictment

or prosecutorial misconduct. As these limited exceptions are not present in the

instant case, the Commonwealth argues that the circuit court exceeded its authority

in dismissing the indictment over the Commonwealth’s objection.

            A panel of this Court stated in Grider, supra, that:

                 The Kentucky Supreme Court has stated that the
            Kentucky Constitution provides for the separation of
            powers:

                           The power to define crimes and
                   establish the range of penalties for each
                   crime resides in the legislative branch. The
                   power to charge persons with crimes and to
                   prosecute those charges belongs to the
                   executive department, and by statute, is
                   exercised by the appropriate prosecuting
                   attorney. The power to conduct criminal
                   trials, to adjudicate guilt and to impose
                   sentences within the penalty range
                   prescribed by the legislature belongs to the
                   judicial department.

            Gibson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 686, 689-90 (Ky.
            2009). Further, “subject to rare exceptions usually
            related to a defendant's claim of a denial of the right to a
            speedy trial, the trial judge has no authority, absent
            consent of the Commonwealth’s attorney, to dismiss,
            amend, or file away before trial a prosecution based on a
            good indictment.” Gibson, 291 S.W.3d at 690 (internal
            quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

                   There are a variety of situations which may
                   result in a dismissal of a criminal case under
                   circumstances which, against the wishes of
                   the Commonwealth, preclude further

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                    adjudication and are, in effect, a dismissal
                    “with prejudice.” These include the
                    violations of the right to a speedy trial and
                    the mistrials that occur after jeopardy
                    attaches. In Commonwealth v. Baker, [11
                    S.W.3d 585, 590 (Ky. App. 2000)], our
                    Court of Appeals recognized that
                    “outrageous government conduct could taint
                    evidence irrevocably, or prejudice a
                    defendant’s case on the merits such that
                    notions of due process and fundamental
                    fairness would preclude reindictment.”

Grider, 390 S.W.3d at 817-18 (citation omitted).

             Thus, the circuit court has no authority to dismiss an indictment over

the Commonwealth’s objection prior to trial, absent a violation of the right to a

speedy trial, a mistrial that occurs after jeopardy attaches, outrageous

governmental conduct that irrevocably taints evidence or violates due process and

fundamental fairness, or other limited exceptions. Id.

             The question for our consideration, then, is whether one of these

exceptions is found in the present case. We conclude that no such exception is

present. While it is true that the matter has been languishing for six or seven years,

this delay cannot reasonably be said to violate Ramos’ right to a speedy trial as it is

Ramos who has absented himself from the proceedings. In addition, no mistrial

has occurred and no outrageous governmental conduct has been alleged. Finally,

none of the other exceptions are present, such as a faulty indictment or a defect in

the grand jury proceeding. As such, the general rule set out in Gibson is

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controlling: “the trial judge has no authority, absent consent of the

Commonwealth’s attorney, to dismiss, amend, or file away before trial a

prosecution based on a good indictment.” Gibson, 291 S.W.3d at 690 (emphasis in

original).

             Further, and as noted by the Commonwealth, in Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Ky. 2018), the Kentucky Supreme Court

addressed the means for handling fugitive cases so as not to overburden a trial

court’s docket. Kelly noted that the case management system allows for such cases

to be administratively closed, and subsequently reopened when a bench warrant

was served and the defendant was made to appear.

             We must also address Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)

13.03, which Kelly implicitly referenced. It states that,

             At least once each year trial courts shall review all
             pending criminal actions on their dockets. Notice shall
             be given to each attorney of record of every case in
             which no pretrial step has been taken within the last year,
             that the case will be dismissed in thirty days for want of
             prosecution except for good cause shown. The court
             shall enter an order dismissing without prejudice each
             case in which no answer or an insufficient answer to the
             notice is made. This rule shall not apply to cases where
             the trial court has issued an arrest warrant based on the
             defendant’s failure to appear in the case.

             RCr 13.03 is mandatory, although it is not universally utilized

throughout the Commonwealth. It directs courts to review their criminal dockets

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and consider dismissal of inactive criminal cases without prejudice. Permitting

dismissal without prejudice maintains the balance under the Separation of Powers

doctrine noted above. The courts could clear out old cases involving unexplained

delay, but the Commonwealth could still re-indict the defendant.

             Since no warrant was issued for Ramos’ arrest, RCr 13.03 required

the circuit court to give notice of an intent to dismiss and give the parties an

opportunity to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. Arguably, the

circuit court complied with this requirement.

             The circuit court having met this requirement, the burden then rested

with the Commonwealth to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The

circumstances of this case are that all delay has been due to the consequences of

the defendant’s actions, which made him unavailable for many years. These

circumstances first led to a delay in charging the defendant for an alleged escape,

followed by a separate delay in proceeding with the prosecution of the case. The

Commonwealth showed good cause.

                                   CONCLUSION

             A circuit court is vested with broad discretion in managing its own

docket. Smith v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Ky. App. 2016). That

discretion is not without limitation, however, and is subject to the court’s authority

set out in the Kentucky Constitution, Grider, supra, and RCr 13.03. Per Grider

                                          -7-
and English, we conclude that the Jefferson Circuit Court’s dismissal of the

indictment constitutes an abuse of discretion since none of the limited exceptions

are present, and the Commonwealth showed good cause why the indictment should

not be dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the order on appeal and remand the

matter to the Jefferson Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jason B. Moore
Special Assistant Attorney General
Louisville, Kentucky

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