Court Opinion

ID: 9675311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:49:02.793922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.347517
License: Public Domain

HAMITER, Justice
(dissenting).
When the State of Louisiana transferred the land in dispute to the Board of Commissioners of the Grand Prairie Levee District, by a written instrument that was duly recorded in the Conveyance Records of Plaquemines Parish, title there-, to was vested absolutely in the transferee. Section 11 of Act 24 of 1898, LSA-R.S. 38:1001; State ex rel. Hodge v. Grace, 191 La. 15, 184 So. 527; Kemper v. Atchafalaya Basin Levee District, 214 La. 383, 37 So.2d 844. This being true, a divestiture of that absolute title could be accomplished by the Legislature only through a statute expressing an intention to that effect which is "clear and unmistakable in its terms-, free from and devoid of implication.” State ex rel. Hodge v. Grace [191 La. 15, 184 So. 534], supra. And “in the absence of such intention clearly expressed or evidenced therein this court should find that the Legislature had no such intention.” Kemper v. Atchafalaya Basin Levee District [214 La. 383, 37 So.2d 846], supra.
The important and primary question to' be determined herein, hence, is whether the Legislature has by statute expressed clearly and unmistakably an intention to divest the Grand Prairie Levee District of its absolute title to the disputed property and'vest it in the Orleans Levee District.
Contending that this question should be answered in the affirmative, the Orleans Levee District relies on Act No. 99 of 1924, Act No. 246 of 1928, LRS-R.S. 38:991 et seq. and Act No. 311 of 1942. Obviously, the first of these statutes does not support the contention. Therein, nothing is said about public lands. The 1924 act authorized the Orleans Levee District “ * * * to construct or cause to be constructed on the east bank of the Mississippi River in the Parish of Plaquemines a spill way or waste wier, or other works, so located and designed according to plans and specifications as shall have been approved by the State Board of Engineers and the Mississippi River Commission” ; it granted authority for acquiring “ * * * by purchase, donation or expropriation the lands or other property necessary for the construction of such works * * * ”; it required such Levee District, “ * * * as a condition precedent to removing any levees or taking possession of any property, to acquire by purchase or expropriation and to pay for all lands and property privately owned within the area covered by the proposed *325plan from the upper to the lower limits thereof and from the Mississippi River to the sea”; and it directed the State Board of Engineers “ * * * to cooperate with the said Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District in the preparation of the necessary plans and the construction of the necessary works, the cost thereof to be paid by the Orleans Levee District”. In other words, under the legislation, the State Board of Engineers were to design, locate, and supervise the1 building of, the spillway, and the Orleans Levee District would finance and cause its construction after acquiring and paying for all needed privately owned lands “within the area covered by the proposed plan” (“area”, according to Webster’s New International Dictionary, means a particular extent of surface), which plan would involve only the property lying within the spillway’s upper and lower limits and within its limits between the Mississippi River and the sea.
• Of course, the 1924 act also authorized and directed the Orleans Levee District to assume the entire bonded indebtedness of the Grand Prairie Levee. District. However, this is of no significance in determining the primary question under consideration. The assumption was provided for and consummated because at that time, according to the record, the only usable '(protected from the gulf’s storm waters and high tides) and taxable lands within the Grand Prairie Levee District lay between the then existing front levee and the “back levee” — the area which was to become the Bohemia Spillway; and being thereby deprived of all tax revenues the Grand Prairie Levee District was justly entitled to be relieved of its bonded indebtedness, to the retirement of which such revenues had been pledged.
Incidentally, as the majority opinion correctly points out, the land in dispute herein is not within the spillway. It lies approximately a mile east of the “back levee”- — the spillway’s eastern or seaward limit.
Neither does the 1928 statute indicate a clear intention of the Legislature to divest the absolute title of Grand Prairié Levee District. Therein, that district’s boundaries were redefined; private ' propr erty which could be taxed was provided for; and to it was conveyed all state owned land in the recreated area. No portion of the act contains words of divestiture or any language indicating that the Orleans Levee District was to' be the recipient of lands theretofore conveyed by absolute title 'to the Grand Prairie Levéé District!
With reference to Act 311 of 1942, which is principally relied on by the majority as divesting Grand Prairie , Levee District of its absolute ■ title and legislatively vesting it in the Orleans Levee District, Section 1-thereof recites: “Be it en*327acted by the Legislature of Louisiana, That the right, title, ownership and possession of the Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee - District to all public lands in the area of the Bohemia Spillway between Bohemia Plantation, above, and Cuselich Canal, below, and from the river to the sea * * * be now confirmed, quieted and acknowledged, it being recognized that said rights, ownership and possession came into existence when said Orleans Levee Board located and constructed said Bohemia Spillway in the year 1925.” (Italics mine.)
I cannot agree that this language discloses a clearly expressed and unmistakable intention of the Legislature to recognize and confirm the Orleans Levee District as the owner of all public lands in Plaque-mines Parish east of the Mississippi River lying between the river and the sea, including the disputed property which admittedly lies without, and is a mile distant from, the Bohemia Spillway.
In the first place the title to the 1942 act indicates that the public lands intended to be affected were those lying only within the spillway itself — that is, between the front and back levees. It recites: “To confirm and quiet the Board of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District in the ownership and control of all public lands in the Bohemia Spillway when it was constructed by said Levee Board in obedience to Act 99 of the Legislature of 1924.” And it may be recalled that the mentioned 1924 act authorized the Orleans Levee Board to acquire land “necessary for the construction of such works” and, in connection therewith, it required such board to pay for all privately owned lands “within the area covered by the proposed plan.” (Italics mine.)
In fact, the above quoted Section 1, considered along with the title (consideration of the title is permissible in determining legislative intent if the language of the statute is ambiguous, as here), can well and easily be similarly construed; for it specifically relates “to all public lands in the area of the Bohemia Spillway * * *.” True, following the reference to that particular extent of land surface are the words “between Bohemia Plantation, above, and Cuselich Canal, below, and from the river to the sea”. But this language could have been used in the sense of merely locating the spillway.
Moreover, it seems to me that if the Legislature had intended to confirm title in the1 Orleans Levee District to that vast area of land lying between the river and the sea (and by implication, incidentally, to divest Grand Prairie of its absolute title), references to the spillway lands and to Act 99 of 1924 would have been unimportant and unnecessary. The confirmation could have been effectively accomplished by omitting those references entirely.
*329Again, the sixth and seventh “Whereas” provisions of the 1942 legislation suggest that the confirmation of title was restricted to the spillway property. Thus, the former declared that “ * * * the said Orleans Levee Board did in obedience to said act agree to pay and has paid to the Grand Prairie Levee Board and to the East Bank Levee Board the entirety of their outstanding indebtedness * * * and was thereby entitled to and invested with all the rights, title and interest of each of said boards in the entire area of said spilhvay where the property was dedicated for said uses, * * And the latter stated: “ * * * said former rights of both of said two former levee boards accrued to and became the rights and property of said Orleans Levee Board, save that same were thereafter non-taxable and could not be alienated or sold, as same were intended for and dedicated to the purposes of said spilhvay and have been so used for the past sixteen years by the Orleans Levee Board, * * (Italics mine.)
Finally, if the interpretation placed on the 1942 act by the majority be correct (as I understand the majority opinion it holds that the statute granted to the Orleans Levee District title to all public Imds lying between the Mississippi River and the sea which are situated in the vicinity of the Bohemia Spillway) the Orleans Levee District, as a result of the legislation, now owns (in addition to the spillway land and the property in dispute) countless thousands of acres of land comprising that broad expanse of territory which had formerly belonged to the state and to several of its agencies (including a school district). I can conceive of no good reason for the Legislature making such a grant. Those many thousands of acres of public land (other than the spillway property) had no relationship whatsoever to the construction and operation of the Bohemia Spillway — a project which the legislation in question solely concerned.
My conclusion is, therefore, that the Legislature has not expressed clearly and unmistakably an intention to divest the Grand Prairie Levee District of the disputed property and to transfer it to the Orleans Levee District. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
I respectfully dissent.

. The record shows that the July 20th 1936 lease of Grand Prairie Levee District to Delta Development Co., Inc. covered a large acreage and included all of the lands owned by Grand Prairie in the Levee District. Subsequently, Delta Development Co., Inc. subleased a portion of the property covered by the lease to Gulf Kefining Company and the latter commenced drilling operations in 1938 which were apparently successful. In January of 1950, Delta Development Co., Inc. filed suit against the Plaque-mines Parish Police Jury, the governing 'body of Grand Prairie Levee; Dis1-' trict, and a judgment was rendered by the 25th Judicial District Court - decreeing that Delta’s lease of July 20th 1936 was still in full force and effect since production of oil in paying quantities had' been maintained from July -10th 1938. . ■ • ''..'..r;