Court Opinion

ID: 9831750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:20:08.608467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.599465
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The appellant now complains of our statement that the court filed a statement of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. What we said about the statement of facts was based upon the statement contained in the face of the bill of exceptions itself and upon the statement contained in appellee’s brief, not heretofore replied to or denied by appellant. We think courts are in the habit of considering the statement of reputable attorneys in regard to a fact in the record, especially when not controverted. In the bill of exceptions approved by the court, it is stated:
“That on the trial of said case, after the court had announced its decision, plaintiff by its attorney, Fred J. Dudley, requested the court to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law. That thereafterwards, about the 23d day of March, 1925, plaintiff, by its attorney, Fred J. Dudley, again requested the court to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law. That thereafterwards, on the 10th day of April, 1925, plaintiff’s attorney, Fred J. Dudley, addressed and mailed to Hon. Wiley Bell, judge of this court, a letter, asking the said honorable judge whether or not he had as-yet filed his findings of- fact and conclusions of law, which letter was received by Hon. Wiley Bell, judge of this court. That this ease was tried in the February term,' 1925, of this court. That the February term of this court ended on the 5th of April, 1925. That the April term of this court began Monday April 6th, and said April 6th was the first day of said term. That the findings of fact and, conclusions of law were filed by the court on April 16, 1925, to which action of the court, in failing to file its findings of fact and conclusions of law within the time required by statute, plaintiff here and now excepts and here and now tenders this its bill of exception No. l,.and prays that the same be examined, approved, and signed by the court, which is accordingly done on this the 9th day of May, A. D. 1925, with the following qualifications, to wit: That the court had calculated that the last day for filing the findings of fact and conclusions of law was April 16th. All the statements made in the bill of exception are true. Wiley A. Bell, Judge County Court of Dallas County, Texas. George Sergeant, Defendant’s Attorney. Fred J. Dudley, Attorney for Plaintiff.”
If the findings and conclusions are not in the transcript as stated by the court, that “were filed by the court on April 16, 1925,” it is the fault of appellant alone, and this court will assume they contain a full and complete statement of all the facts proven which were accepted by counsel, and there is therefore nothing in appellant’s contention.
A very full statement of the facts of the case was filed, and no injury is shown to have been done appellant. If so, then appellant should have brought up the findings in the record, and cannot take advantage of his own omission. On the question of the failure of the court to file a statement of facts in this case, the-question is most fully and satisfactorily discussed in Railway Co. v. Stewart (Tex. Com. App.) 257 S. W. 526.
Appellant in his brief said:
“For the sake of brevity, we have grouped assignments of error 2, 3, 4, and 5, and will treat assignment No. 6 as a separate issue, stating the substance of the assignments of error so grouped as a proposition.”
It was in that way we treated the assignments. *636upon and contracted for, and is not such a contract that can be enforced. The insured therefore in such a case has the right to return such policy when it varies from that contracted for beforehand. The insurer’s refusal to correct it is tantamount to an involuntary cancellation by the insured.
*635The delivery of the insurance policy was for a premium higher than that agreed
*636The contract for the insurance was oral and entered into by competitive bidding with appellant with the knowledge of the fact that the lowest bidder would get the insurance. Appellant was the lowest bidder, for $370, approximately $100 lower than the.highest bidder, and thereupon appellee was awarded the insurance. The following day a Ford coupe was added to the list with $25 premium higher, or $395; when the policy was delivered the premium was $471, or $76.58 higher than the bid. So, after the appellee had made various attempts to get it corrected and failing, he returned the policy.
The appellant was to deliver a policy of insurance upon trucks for $395, but instead delivered a different policy with a different premium of $471.58. It was the delivery of a thing variant from the one contracted for, and the appellant, after breaching his contract in respect thereto, cannot collect the amount of premium demanded.
We have considered and passed on all appellant’s assignments and grounds set up in the motion for a rehearing, and find nothing presented that has not heretofore been considered and passed upon, and the motion is overruled.