Court Opinion

ID: 9711547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:34:10.366333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:05.824274
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). We granted leave to appeal limited to the issues (1) whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the rule of People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 608; 202 NW2d 278 (1972), concerning the use of unsupported assumptions of guilt of other crimes as a factor in imposing sentence; and (2) if the Court of Appeals properly applied the rule of Grimmett to the facts of this case, whether the Court should overrule or otherwise modify the rule of Grimmett.
Although I agree with the remand, I write to express my concern and partial disagreement with some of the conclusions drawn.
i
Initially, I agree that People v Grimmett, as read in conjunction with People v Lee, 391 Mich 618; 218 NW2d 655 (1974), and People v Walker, 428 Mich 261; 407 NW2d 367 (1987), allows a trial court to consider the existence of pending charges in sentencing a defendant for a wholly separate offense. In reading the literal language of the Grimmett majority, I see no specific restriction *457against a trial court’s consideration of such information. Further, this Court in People v Lee, supra at 636, accurately noted that there are no formal limitations on the contents of a presentence report; thus, accordingly, a trial judge cannot escape being apprised of a defendant’s "antecedents” as a matter of legislative course. See MCL 771.14; MSA 28.1144.
However, I feel it imperative to stress that the fine-line distinction between consideration of pending charges and the formation of independent assumptions of guilt, the focal point of Grimmett, must never be blurred or diminished. Despite the fact that presentence reports are purposefully very detailed compilations of the defendant’s prior and pending matters within the legal system, trial judges are steadfastly charged with the sometimes difficult responsibility of refraining from prejudgment, while, at the same time, dispensing thoroughly contemplated justice.1 Accordingly, as "unclarified,” Grimmett still disallows trial judges from assuming guilt as it relates to a defendant’s pending charges._
*458II
The aspect of my disagreement with Justice Boyle’s reasoning concerns what I believe to be taking the concept of "wide discretion” in imposing sentences one step too far. Although I do concur that a trial judge’s broad consideration at sentencing can include everything from pending charges to prior convictions, I cannot agree with Justice Boyle or the cited federal circuit court of appeals decisions which allow a trial judge to rely "on evidence of crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted.” See post, p 473, n 15.
Once the cloud of suspicion has been removed from a defendant as to a particular charge, the facts or circumstances surrounding such removal should not come before a subsequent sentencing trial court.2 In my view, there is no viable justification in support of inviting a defendant to engage in any kind of discussion or exchange concerning a prior exoneration of guilt. This expanded version of sentencing allocution, which, according to Justice Boyle, would require an additional and clearly belated rehashing of a matter which has been definitively resolved and disposed of, will not remove, or, in any way, diminish the eminent danger of precondemnation that would befall a defendant if this practice were allowed. The resur*459rection of a favorably resolved past accusation3 for the purpose of merely contemplating its existence would serve only to unfairly and unnecessarily prejudice a defendant with the probability of improperly drawn inferences of wrongful conduct.
Irrespective of the fact that a trial judge may be apprised of a defendant’s prior acquittal through a presentence report or in open court, there is a difference, no matter how inconsequential, between passive knowledge of a fact and active consideration of the same. There may not be a formal limit on what can be contained in a presentence report, "but there are limitations dictated by due process.” People v Lee, supra at 636. Fundamental fairness, consequently, must invasively dominate at least how the presentence information can be judicially utilized, to the extent that trial courts must be willing and able to wade through and separate that which may be factored into a sentencing decision and that which may not. In light of these particular due process considerations, I simply cannot give credence to the reasoning lie-hind my colleague’s condonation of a trial court being allowed to consider prior acquittals in sentencing.
m
In the interest of clarity, I express one final *460point. In People v Walker, supra, the Court discussed how a defendant could properly raise a challenge to the accuracy of information to be considered at sentencing. To that end, this Court adopted the following standard from the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed):
"In reaching its findings on all controverted issues [of fact which are relevant to the sentencing decision], the sentencing court should employ the preponderance of the evidence standard and may treat the contents of a verified presentence report as presumptively accurate, provided, however, that material factual allegations made in the presentence report and effectively challenged by the defendant should not be deemed to satisfy the government’s burden of persuasion unless reasonable verification of such information can be shown to have been made [by the person who prepared the presentence report] or adequate factual corroboration otherwise exists in the sentencing or trial record.” [Walker, supra at 267-268.]
Utilizing Walker, Justice Boyle appears to tread dangerously close to making the assurance that a defendant can seek redress from any trial court sentencing impropriety by challenging the accuracy of the information considered at sentencing. Specifically, this "challenge to the accuracy,” which, to my understanding, would likely occur when a defendant disputes whether a pending charge, as it appears in the presentence report, is actually pending against him, seems, as it stands now, a veiled attempt at providing a defendant with the chance to declare his innocence of a pending charge and, thus, dispel any "unsupported assumptions of guilt” a judge may be entertaining.
In my view, the reach of Walker extends only to provide the necessary safeguards for defendants in *461the event that a trial court considers pending charges in imposing sentence. These safeguards, however, do not extend to the situation arising when a trial court goes beyond mere consideration of the pending charges to formulate an independent finding of guilt with respect to such charges. As a practical matter, convicted defendants are at an enormous disadvantage, in terms of their own general credibility, at the sentencing stage of the proceedings. By that time, defendants are in no position to effectively challenge, in any way, a judge who has improperly forged ahead and inferred guilt as to charges pending against them. Above all, however, a challenge to the accuracy of a charge in no way equates with a challenge to the circumstantial guilt or innocence associated with a charge. Thus, I find it necessary to emphasize that a Grimmett error cannot be remedied under Walker. To the contrary, commission of a Grimmetttype error would still require reversal for re-sentencing. See Grimmett, supra at 608.
IV
In view of my findings stated above, I agree with Justice Brickley insofar as he would remand to the trial court for the judge to articulate reasons for imposing this sentence and to respond to defense challenges to the propriety of using certain information. Ante, p 446.1 disagree, however, with Justice Brickley’s observations in the balance of his opinion beginning with part iv for the reasons set forth above.

 Justice Boyle finds fault with the practical implementation of the rule "trial judges must refrain from prejudgment,” in that sentencing judges would be prevented from "inferring defendant’s guilt” as to pending charges about which the court has been either generally or specifically apprised. Post, p 475. Contrary to what might otherwise be believed, however, such "prevention” is precisely the result intended by this Court in Grimmett.
■ The phrase "infer[ences of] guilt,” found on p 475 of Justice Boyle’s opinion, can be used interchangeably with "assumptions of guilt.” As a matter of precedential law in this state, guilt may neither be “inferred” nor "assumed” by a trial judge with regard to pending charges, regardless of any evidence heard by that court pertaining to the charge, whether credible or incredible. Thus, her attempt to mitigate the perceived rigidity of the Grimmett rule by proposing that sentencing courts "articulate” any inferences drawn, encompasses within it precisely that which Grimmett disallows. Consequently, unless Justice Boyle’s intent is to overrule Grimmett altogether, the Grimmett rule, without exception, forbids unsupported assumptions of guilt, whether articulated or not.

 Trial judges should never be denied the "evidence of their senses” or "the reality of their conclusions.” Post, p 475. However, any well-reasoned resolution should clearly reflect the exercise of judicial restraint and circumspection. As noted by Justice Boyle, members of the judiciary pledge themselves to a standard of decision making which is considerably higher than that of a layman. Trial courts can never succumb to layman-like predilections toward those accused of crimes, i.e., mere accusation, despite a jury or bench-tried acquittal, equals wrongdoing or outright guilt. The inherent responsibility of a sentencing judge requires, at least, an unimpeachable approach to their appointed duty, especially when, as in this context, there is an inevitable tendency toward "inference” of any kind.

 Whether a prior acquittal is characterized as "a prior prosecution which does not result in a conviction,” post, p 474, or favorably resolved past accusation, there is an express difference between allowing a sentencing judge to consider a past conviction and allowing consideration of a past acquittal. The concern is not which court resolved the prior accusation, but how it was resolved. In the context of sentence imposition, a prior conviction represents an "unfavorably resolved past accusation,” so that a sentencing judge would have before it, not only an instant unfavorable resolution, but previous unfavorable resolutions as well. Whereas, if this Court were to allow prior acquittals to be considered in the same fashion, we would be operating on the judicially forbidden assumption that an accused person’s guilt should be assumed; vindication or acquittal merely represents prosecutorial inability.