Court Opinion

ID: 9653166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:40:05.47937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.720640
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur only in the result.
It is settled that at common law the prosecutor possessed unbridled discretion to nolle prosequi a case either before the jury is empaneled or after verdict but before sentencing. When discussing the derivation of federal rule 48(a) noted in the principal opinion, one court recently explained:
As a literal translation of nolle prosequi —“I am unwilling to prosecute” — makes clear, the primary purpose of the doctrine was to allow the government to cease active prosecution. At common law, and before Rule 48(a) was enacted, prosecution was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the prosecuting attorney at the early stages of the proceedings and a nolle prosequi could be entered at any time before the jury was empaneled. Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 19 L.Ed. 196 (1868).
However, as the case progressed, the prosecuting attorney lost the unilateral right to enter a nolle prosequi. After the jury was sworn and evidence heard, the defendant had the right to object to the entry of a nolle prosequi and the effect of the entry at that stage was a verdict of acquittal. United States v. Shoemaker, 27 F.Cas. 1066 (C.C.D.Ill. 1840) (No. 16,279). While the prosecutor’s unilateral power to enter a nolle prosequi apparently revived just after the verdict was returned, once a sentence had been handed down or final judgment entered, that unilateral right of the prosecutor was again extinguished. United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill.1945)
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1410-11 (N.D.Calif.1984). See generally F. Miller, Prosecution 307-09 (1969). It is generally recognized that absent a controlling statute or court rule the prosecutor retains the power he possessed at common law. See 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §§ 513-17. This Court apparently reaffirmed its adherence to the common law rule in State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 258 S.W.2d 590 (1953). The majority of jurisdictions, however, either *242through statute or court decision have altered the common law rule and now require leave of court, and perhaps consent of the defendant, after the jury has been empaneled. See Meyers v. Frazier, 319 S.E.2d 782, 792 n. 13 (W.Va.1984).
I agree with the principal opinion to the extent that it follows the lead of the majority of jurisdictions and modifies the common law rule. However, I disagree with the principal opinion’s discussion of the standard of judicial review of prosecutorial discretion. The principal opinion" unwisely suggests that the prosecutor must “demonstrate good cause” for the nolle prosequi and that the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the nolle prosequi. The better view, while not leaving the prosecutor unrestricted authority, is to give deference to the opinion of the prosecutor1 and not allow the trial court to deny the nolle prosequi unless the prosecutor is clearly abusing his or her discretion. The trial court should “enter the nolle prosequi absent a clear abuse of the prosecutor’s discretion. Only where the entry of the nolle prosequi is capricious or vexatiously repetitious will the court limit the prosecutor’s power.” People v. Bradley, 128 Ill.App.3d 372, 83 Ill.Dec. 701, 470 N.E.2d 1121, 1128 (1984) (citations omitted). See also State v. Abbati, 195 NJ.Super. 218, 478 A.2d 1212, 1215 (1984) (trial court reviews prosecutor’s decision for clear error of judgment). Such a standard of review contemplates that the prosecutor state the reason for the nolle prosequi, and a trial court that denies the request state the reasons why the prosecutor has acted beyond his or her discretion.
Under the federal rule, “[t]he principal object of the ‘leave of court’ requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant’s objection.” Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 81, 85 n. 15, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977). It would appear that the federal rule limits the district court in denying the request to cases where it is contrary to the manifest public interest. See United States v. Weber, 721 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1983). That the prosecutor believes the defendant innocent is not within itself a reason necessitating that leave of court be granted. In a federal case where the Assistant United States Attorney General sought to dismiss a charge after trial and sentencing because he believed the defendant innocent based upon new information (perhaps not admissible in court), the Ninth Circuit explained:
Existence of substantial reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant can and should be considered by the Executive in determining whether to initiate or continue a prosecution; it is the duty of the United States Attorney not simply to prosecute, but to do justice. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). In deciding whether to initiate or terminate a prosecution the prosecutor has access to and must take into consideration a wide range of information that may not be competent evidence at trial. No doubt this is part of the reason the prosecutor must be given wide latitude in making those decisions. Seeking dismissal because of the existence of such a reasonable doubt was not “clearly contrary to the manifest public interest.”

Id.

In the case at bar, the prosecutor’s apparent reason for the nolle prosequi was that he believed the defendant innocent of the underlying felony. One of the reasons for the prosecutor’s disbelieving defendant’s guilt was that defendant had passed *243the polygraph examination. While Missouri has not accepted polygraph results as proof of guilt, we would be closing our eyes to reality if we fail to recognize that for many years prosecutors have utilized polygraph results in arriving at their decision to prosecute.
In a country that has experienced the pains of the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, the Bruno Hauptman ease, and the Scopes trial, jury verdicts are not necessarily infallible and sacrosanct and justice demands that the added safeguard exercised by the prosecutor not be unnecessarily restricted.
The trial judge has the jurisdiction to err and I would therefore concur in the result of quashing the writ.
When reviewed on appeal, I would hope that the Court would use the more favored, more logical, and more fair and just standard of review herein set forth.

. In State v. Smith, supra, the Court noted that the prosecutor and not the trial judge was in a better position to know all the facts and the various policy considerations. State v. Smith, supra 258 S.W.2d at 594. It might be noted that until the revision of our criminal laws in 1977, the prosecutor could he charged with a misdemeanor if a nolle prosequi was entered pursuant to a corrupt agreement with the defendant or others. § 558.170, RSMo 1969. Arguably this suggests either unilateral or unrestricted authority in the prosecutor to the extent the statute was not violated.