Court Opinion

ID: 9776762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:44:21.738494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:01.507302
License: Public Domain

STOREY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur. I agree that New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), should be applied retroactively. Contrary to the premise stated in the majority opinion however, I conclude that Belton did present a “clear break with the past” within the meaning of Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969). This is so despite the fact that Belton was not a complete reversal of position from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Before Belton, Chimel permitted evidence seized incident to arrest that was found on the defendant or within his immediate control — the so called “arms-reach” doctrine. The Court in Belton draws a bright line between the passenger compartment and the trunk regardless of the extent of control. Belton relaxes the restriction on auto searches incident to arrest by police officers. This lessened restriction on the authority of police officers is a “clear break with the past.”
Precisely because this break with the past was in favor of the discretion of law enforcement authorities, there is no difficulty in applying the rule of Belton retroactively. In United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975), the Supreme Court held that any judicial enlargement of the exclusionary rule would be given retroactive effect only when “the law enforcement officer had [reasonable] knowledge that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment” at the time of the search. When the restrictions on police searches are relaxed however, the policy of the exclusionary rule of deterring illegal police conduct no longer applies. Cf. Kemner v. State, 589 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In Kemner the rule of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), that the warrantless search of the defendant’s footlocker at the police station over an hour after his arrest was not incident to the arrest, was applied prospectively only because Chadwick further restricted police conduct and the police officers had no reason to know that their conduct was unconstitutional since it was not unlawful before Chadwick. Here, applying Belton, we are able to relax the restriction on police activity because the Supreme Court would no longer have the courts exclude evidence that formerly was inadmissible but which the Supreme Court no longer views as tainted by an unlawful search. There is no policy basis for not applying Belton retroactively. Moreover there are numerous federal cases that have applied Belton retroactively without discussing the issue of prospective application. See, e.g., United States v. Enriquez, 675 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Russell, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2909, 73 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1982); Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582 (3rd Cir.1981). Because these cases apply Belton retroactively without discussing the issue of prospective application, they are perhaps of some authority for the proposition that we need not decide that issue. I consider it to be the controlling issue to the validity of the search in this case however, because at oral argument the result under Belton was conceded by appellant.
Affirmed.