Court Opinion

ID: 9963101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 16:10:58.010034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:40.978048
License: Public Domain

J-A07043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TYLER PAUL SHELTON                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 28 MDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-08-CR-0000856-2015

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED: APRIL 24, 2024

       Appellant, Tyler P. Shelton, appeals from the order dated December 6,

2022, entered in the Bradford County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm the

order and deny Appellant’s application for appointment of substitute counsel.

       The relevant procedural history and facts are as follows: The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with 100 counts each of Rape of Child,

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with Child, Aggravated Indecent

Assault of Child, Indecent Assault, and Corruption of Minors; 40 counts of

Corruption of Minors; and 10 counts of Attempted Involuntary Deviate Sexual

Intercourse with Child. Appellant’s 12-year-old daughter was the victim.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of fifteen counts of corruption of minors. On

September 15, 2016, Appellant was sentenced to 75 to 360 months’

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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incarceration. Appellant filed a post sentence motion which was denied on

March 6, 2017. In his direct appeal to this Court, Appellant challenged the

admission of evidence in his trial. On September 7, 1017, this Court affirmed.

See Commonwealth v. Shelton, 170 A.3d 549 (Pa. Super. 2017).

       On December 7, 2018, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition

raising the two illegality of sentence claims at issues in this instant appeal. On

July 11, 2020, the court denied his PCRA petition without a hearing and gave

him twenty days to respond. Appellant filed a timely response that he had yet

to be appointed an attorney. The court appointed Attorney Jason Beardsley,

who inexplicably filed at least seven requests for an extension of time before

filing an amended PCRA petition in June 2022. On December 6, 2022,

Appellant’s PCRA petition was denied. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

This appeal followed. 1

       Appellant raises two issues for our review:

       1. Whether an illegal sentence was imposed upon Mr. Shelton
          when the sentencing court imposed consecutive sentences on
          fifteen counts of Corruption of Minors, graded as
          misdemeanors of the first degree, when the legislature has
          specified that when Corruption of Minors occurred as a course

____________________________________________

1  We note our extreme displeasure with the Commonwealth’s brief. An
appellee is required to file a brief that at minimum must contain a summary
of argument and the complete argument for appellee. Pa. R. App. P. 2112.
Although Appellee’s brief here contains heading for “Summary of Argument”
and “Argument,” the brief is a total of one-half page and does not contain any
citation to any caselaw whatsoever. We do not find the Commonwealth to
have set forth a sufficiently “complete argument” pursuant to Rule 2112 where
it addressed two issues in its argument section in a total of seven sentences.

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         of conduct the appropriate grading is a single felony of the third
         degree.

      2. Whether the PCRA Court erred in finding Mr. Shelton was
      ineligible for RRRI, and therefore received an illegal sentence.

Appellant’s Br. at 3.

      Initially, we note that Appellant, while represented by Attorney

Beardsley, filed a pro se application for the appointment of substitute counsel

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), on

January 30, 2023. By order of court dated September 15, 2023, Attorney

Beardsley was deemed withdrawn as counsel and Attorney Jordan Leonard

was appointed as appellate counsel. Instantly, Appellant’s counseled brief was

filed by Attorney Leonard, and thus Appellant’s application for appointment is

denied as moot.

      Appellant’s first issue is that he received an illegal sentence when the

sentencing court imposed consecutive sentences on fifteen counts of

corruption of minors, graded as first-degree misdemeanors, instead of a single

third-degree felony. Appellant’s Br. at 8. “A claim a petitioner is serving an

illegal sentence is cognizable under the PCRA, as long as the claim is raised in

a timely petition.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 993 (Pa. 2021).

The Commonwealth argues that Appellant’s claim, cognizable under the PCRA,

was not raised in Appellant’s petition or any amended petition and is therefore

waived. Appellee’s Br. at 2. Specifically, the Commonwealth asserts,

“Appellant raised only the issue of his RRRI eligibility in the PCRA filed on

December 7, 2018. . . . The PCRA court does not address the issue in its

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1925(a) opinion because it was not raised.” Id. While it is true that the PCRA

court does not mention or address any issue other than the RRRI eligibility,

Appellant properly raised his first illegal sentence claim in a timely petition.

Our review of the record reveals that Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition states

this in the argument section:

      I am eligible offender for RRRI under current law. Comm v.
      Robinson, 7 A.3d 868 (Pa. Super. 2010). No RRRI is an illegal
      sentence[.]

      15 counts of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(2)(1)(i) should carry the same as
      one count of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(2)(1)(ii) if crime alleged satisfies
      “course of conduct.” Comm v. Kelly, 102 A.3d 1025 (Pa. Super.
      2014)[.]

Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 12/7/18, at 8 (punctuation added). Thus, it

is facially clear that Appellant raised both issues in his PCRA petition.

      Had the Commonwealth properly briefed the issues, we would not have

to guess if the Commonwealth instead meant that Appellant failed to raise this

issue in his 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal, which

should result in waiver. On January 11, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant

to file a 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days or else the issues would

be waived. Appellant thereafter filed two (counseled) statements pursuant to

1925(b). The first was filed on February 6, 2023, and included only the RRRI

eligibility issue. The second was filed on February 10, 2023, and raised both

issues Appellant raises in his instant brief. Notably, neither 1925(b) statement

was filed within the twenty-one-day limit. The trial court, however, accepted

Appellant’s February 6, 2023, statement as timely and formulated its 1925(a)

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opinion in response to it, ignoring the additional issue raised in Appellant’s

February 10, 2023, statement. The record reflects that the trial court's order

directing Appellant to file a 1925(b) statement did not specify the address

where Appellant could mail his statement, as is required by Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(3)(iii). It would be inequitable to deem issues waived on appeal due

to the untimely filing of a 1925(b) statement where the trial court's order to

file the statement does not comport with the requirements of Rule 1925(b).

See Commonwealth v. Jones, 193 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Additionally, Appellant’s previous counsel, Attorney Beardsley, who filed both

1925(b) statements, was subsequently suspended from the practice of law

and imprisoned. “This Court has held that both the complete failure to file the

1925(b) statement and the untimely filing of a 1925(b) statement is per se

ineffectiveness because it is without reasonable basis designed to effectuate

the client's interest and waives all issues on appeal.” Commonwealth v.

Sanchez-Frometa, 256 A.3d 440, 442-443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quotation

marks, citations, and corrections omitted). “While these circumstances often

require a remand, where the trial court addresses the issues raised in an

untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, we need not remand but may address the

issues on their merits.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). For these

reasons, although the Commonwealth and trial court both declined to address

Appellant’s issue, we do not find it waived and will address the merits.

      Appellant’s first issue is an illegal sentence claim cognizable under the

PCRA. Moore, supra. It is well settled that a challenge to the legality of a

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sentence raises a question of law. Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029,

1033 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing this type of claim, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa. Super. 2013). “An illegal

sentence must be vacated[.]” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 197 A.3d 766, 769

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

       Appellant was convicted of fifteen counts of corruption of minors, a

misdemeanor offense. He was sentenced to five months’ to twenty-four

months incarceration on each count consecutively, for an aggregate term of

incarceration of 75 to 360 months, or thirty2 years’ maximum. His issue on

appeal is not that he should have been sentenced concurrently rather than

consecutively. Instead, he argues that fifteen counts of corruption of minors

constitutes a “course of conduct,” which should be graded as a felony

according to statute, and thus he should have been subject to the penalty for

a felony. Had he been sentenced to one felony of the third degree instead of

fifteen first-degree misdemeanors, his maximum sentence would have been

seven years. Appellant’s Br. at 15.

       The statute defining the offense of corruption of minors reads, in

pertinent part, as follows:

       (a) Offense defined.--
       (1) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of
       the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to
____________________________________________

2 Appellant argues in his brief that he was given a maximum sentence of 75

years. His maximum is 360 months, which equals 30 years, not 75 years.

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     corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who
     aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the
     commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages
     such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court,
     commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.
     (ii) Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any
     course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to
     sexual offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any
     minor less than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or
     encourages any such minor in the commission of an offense under
     Chapter 31 commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a) (emphasis added).

     A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be
     sentenced to imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed
     by the court and shall be not more than: (1) Five years in the case
     of a misdemeanor of the first degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1104.

     Except as provided in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714 (relating to sentences for
     second and subsequent offenses), a person who has been
     convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment as
     follows: . . . (3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a
     term which shall be fixed by the court at not more than seven
     years.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1103.

     Our research has revealed cases in which appellants convicted of a third-

degree felony charge of corruption of minors—by a course of conduct in

violation of Chapter 31—argue that a “course of conduct” was not established

and that their charge should have been graded as a first-degree misdemeanor.

Here, Appellant argues that a course of conduct was in fact established and

thus seeks to have his charges graded as a felony rather than as

misdemeanors. Accordingly, he argues, if we agree with him that a course of

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conduct was established, the fifteen misdemeanors should become a single

felony. We disagree.

      Even if we found that a course of conduct was established “in violation

of Chapter 31,” which for the reasons below, however, we do not, it is

unreasonable   to   suggest   that   any   number   of   corruption   of   minors

misdemeanors must merge into only one felony. Although misdemeanor

corruption of minors is a lesser included crime of felony corruption of minors,

it includes an additional element. Commonwealth v. Baker-Myers, 255

A.3d 223, 227 n.7 (Pa. 2021). It is more likely that if Appellant was convicted

of other Chapter 31 offenses establishing a “course of conduct,” he would have

been subject to a felony grading on each corruption of minors count, resulting

in a sentence much greater than the one he received.

      We find Baker-Myers to be instructive. In that case, the defendant was

charged with rape, sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, and indecent

assault, all Chapter 31 offenses. Id. at 225-26. He was also charged with

felony corruption of minors. Id. at 226. A jury convicted him of the corruption

of minors charge but acquitted him of the Chapter 31 offenses. Id. at 227.

The defendant argued that because he was acquitted of the Chapter 31

offenses and the felony corruption of minors statute includes the element “by

any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31,” his conviction could not

stand. Id. at 227. This Court vacated in part, holding that “course of conduct”

is an essential element of felony corruption of minors that the Commonwealth

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charged and prosecuted but failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at

224. Our Supreme Court agreed, stating,

       Although the Commonwealth is not required to formally charge or
       secure a conviction for a predicate Chapter 31 offense, where, as
       here, the jury is specifically instructed on the predicate offense or
       offenses pertaining to the corruption of minors charge, and the
       jury then renders an acquittal on all such predicates, a conviction
       for felony corruption of minors cannot stand.

Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d at 235.

       A similar argument was made in Commonwealth v. Panattieri, Nos.

257 MDA 2022, 258 MDA 2022, 2023 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2609, at *23

(Oct. 23, 2023).3 There, a defendant was charged with multiple counts of

indecent assault without consent, indecent assault of a person under thirteen,

indecent assault of a person under sixteen, and felony corruption of minors.

Id. at *1. He was convicted on all counts except for aggravated indecent

assault. Id. at *5. On appeal, he challenged the grading of the corruption of

minors conviction as a felony, asserting that the jury did not make a specific

factual finding as to course of conduct to support the enhanced grading. Id.

at *20, *23. We disagreed and found two key factors distinguished Baker-

Myers. First, unlike in Baker-Myers where the jury acquitted the defendant

of all Chapter 31 offenses, the defendant in Panattieri was acquitted of one

Chapter 31 offense but convicted on the others. Id. at *23.

____________________________________________

3 We note that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential

decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for
their persuasive value. We find guidance in the unpublished memorandum
cited supra and find it to be persuasive in this matter.

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      Second, “[t]he Baker-Myers Court noted that the jury instructions

were limited to the offenses charged.” Panattieri, at *24. In other words, the

Baker-Myers trial court specifically instructed the jury that in order to convict

on felony corruption of minors, it was required to find “any course of conduct

in violation of Chapter 31, relating to the other sexual offenses being rape,

sexual assault, indecent assault,” and yet the jury acquitted defendant of all

Chapter 31 violations. In contrast, the Panattieri trial court instructed the

jury that is must find, inter alia, that “the defendant engaged in the course of

conduct that constituted the following sexual offenses under the crimes code

of Pennsylvania. And here it’s alleged to be indecent assault and/or

aggravated indecent assault.” Id. at *25. The jury proceeded to convict

defendant of indecent assault, which “was not limited to one discrete incident,”

so we found that Baker-Myers is distinguishable. Id. at *27. Thus, we held

that a course of conduct was indeed established and the felony corruption of

minors conviction was properly graded. Id. at *29.

      With these principles in mind, we turn to Appellant’s convictions and the

jury instructions in the instant case. Here, Appellant was found guilty of fifteen

misdemeanor counts of corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(i), and

was acquitted of ten counts each of rape of child, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse, indecent assault, and attempted involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse, all Chapter 31 offenses. The Commonwealth withdrew all other

charges. Tr. Ct. Order, 6/27/16. To be clear, here, like the appellant in Baker-

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Myers whose felony corruption of minors conviction could not stand, Appellant

was acquitted of each Chapter 31 offense that was presented to the jury.

        As to the issues of jury instructions, “[w]ith respect to a charge of

corruption of minors as a third-degree felony, the trial court must instruct the

jury that the Commonwealth must prove that Appellant engaged in a ‘course

of conduct.’” Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 564 (Pa. Super.

2019). Here, the trial court’s charge to the jury defined corruption of minor as

this:

        To find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that
        each of the following three elements has been proven beyond
        reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant was eighteen years of
        age or older at the time of the incident giving rise to the charge.
        Second, that [victim] was under eighteen years of age at that
        time. And third, that the defendant attempted, or the defendant
        corrupted or attempted to corrupt the morals of [victim] by the
        following alleged conduct: he had the child uncover herself and
        show her, show him her intimate parts, and did have the child look
        at his intimate parts.

N.T., 6/24/16, at 114. These instructions clearly explain the elements of

misdemeanor corruption of minors, and the court thereafter specifically and

separately instructed the jury on each of the Chapter 31 offenses. Unlike in

Panattieri where the felony conviction was proper, the trial court here did

not instruct the jury regarding a “course of conduct.”

        Thus, because Appellant was acquitted of all Chapter 31 offenses, and

because the trial court did not instruct the jury as to course of conduct, a

critical element which distinguishes the felony version of corruption of minors

from the version graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, a sentence for

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corruption of minors graded as a third-degree felony cannot stand. We

conclude Appellant was properly sentenced on his misdemeanor corruption of

minors convictions and disagree that the convictions should have or even

could have been merged into a single felony.

      Appellant argues his acquittals under Chapter 31 should be considered

as an inconsistent verdict. Appellant’s Br. at 13. He states, “jury acquittals

should not be interpreted as specific factual findings arising from the evidence;

rather, an acquittal may merely show lenity on the jury’s behalf, or that the

verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part

of the jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (quoting Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d at 231).

The normal rule is that acquittals do not have dispositive effect, as an acquittal

may be due to an act of mercy. Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240,

1246 (Pa. 2014) (noting that “jury acquittals may not be interpreted as

specific factual findings with regard to the evidence, as an acquittal does not

definitively establish that the jury was not convinced of a defendant's guilt”).

However, Appellant fails to acknowledge a relevant exception to this principle:

when the fact-finder acquits of an offense where the commission of that

offense is an element of a separate crime, then the acquittal must be given

special effect. Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2005).

      Appellant cites the criminal information at “COUNT 5-CORRUPTION OF

MINORS-(MISDEMEANOR 1)” which alleged that he “namely, did have child

uncover and touch her intimate parts and did have her touch his intimate

parts.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 (citing Criminal Information at Count 5). Appellant

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submits that this language indicates that in order for the jury to have

convicted him of this count, that it necessarily found he violated Chapter 31

by a course of conduct. Id. We disagree with this argument for three reasons.

First, count 5 on its face alleges only misdemeanor corruption of minors.

Second, the language does not include “course of conduct” or the element of

“Chapter 31 violations.” Third, our precedents indicate that the language

relevant to this analysis is that which was charged to the jury, not that which

was in the indictment or information. Smith, supra; Panattieri, supra. We

acknowledged in Panattieri that Baker-Myers appeared to leave “open the

possibility that the Commonwealth could charge one count of felony corruption

of minors, without charging any other Chapter 31 offense.” But the

Commonwealth in Panattieri did charge the defendant with Chapter 31

offenses and he was convicted of at least one. Here, the Commonwealth also

charged Appellant with Chapter 31 offenses, and he was not convicted of any.

We find it appropriate to reiterate:

      Although the Commonwealth is not required to formally charge or
      secure a conviction for a predicate Chapter 31 offense, where, as
      here, the jury is specifically instructed on the predicate offense or
      offenses pertaining to the corruption of minors charge, and the
      jury then renders an acquittal on all such predicates, a conviction
      for felony corruption of minors cannot stand.

Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d at 235. Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim fails.

      Appellant’s second issue is that he received an illegal sentence when he

was denied the benefit of participating in Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive

(RRRI), a program for which he claims he was eligible. Appellant’s Br. at 17.

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      A challenge to a court's failure to impose an RRRI sentence
      implicates the legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v.
      Tobin, 2014 PA Super 61, 89 A.3d 663, 670 (Pa. Super. 2014).
      “It is legal error to fail to impose a[n] RRRI minimum on an eligible
      offender.” Id. Thus, as “statutory interpretation implicates a
      question of law, our scope of review is plenary and our standard
      of review is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Gerald, 2012 PA Super
      127, 47 A.3d 858, 859 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2016).

      The RRRI Act “seeks to create a program that ensures appropriate

punishment for persons who commit crimes, encourages inmate participation

in evidence-based programs that reduce the risks of future crime and ensures

the openness and accountability of the criminal justice process while ensuring

fairness to crime victims.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502. In pursuit of these goals, the

RRRI Act provides prisoners with “the opportunity ... to be considered for

parole at the expiration of their RRRI minimum sentence.” Commonwealth

v. Robinson, 7 A.3d 868, 872 (Pa. Super. 2010). The RRRI Act provides that

“[a]t the time of sentencing, the court shall make a determination whether

the defendant is an eligible offender.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(a). An eligible

offender is defined, inter alia, as a defendant who does not demonstrate a

history of present or past violent behavior. 61 Pa.C.S. § 4503(1). Here, during

the sentencing proceedings, the trial court did fulfil its statutory duty in stating

its determination on the record that Appellant was not RRRI eligible. N.T.,

9/15/16, at 5.

      The record reveals that the lower court has given two reasons for

denying Appellant relief on his RRRI claim. First, the lower court’s order

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denying Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition—which raised the RRRI issue for the

first time—dismissed the RRRI eligibility issue as waived because Appellant

did not raise the claim on direct appeal. Tr. Ct. Order, 7/11/20. Second, the

court’s 1925(a) opinion in response to the instant appeal states, “Here, the

acts described by the victim during her testimony are ‘present or past violent

behavior.’ Although the jury found Appellant not guilty of these crimes of

Rape, Indecent Assault, etc., the acts were described by the victim.” Tr. Ct.

Op. at 2. Appellant first questions if a burden of proof less than beyond a

reasonable doubt is sufficient when determining eligibility for RRRI. He then

asserts that even if the court could decide that sentencing factor under a lesser

burden of proof, it did not decide here that he exhibited “a history of” present

or past violent behavior. Appellant’s Br. at 22.

      We note that while Appellant failed to raise this claim in his direct

appeal, his claim that he was entitled to an RRRI sentence implicates the

legality of his sentence. Commonwealth v. Pardo, 35 A.3d 1222, 1230 (Pa.

Super. 2011), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 125 (Pa. 2012) (“This Court has

previously held that when a defendant challenges a trial court's disqualification

of his entry into the RRRI program, the issue is one of legality of the sentence

and is non-waivable.”). See Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (“[A] defendant's challenge relative to the failure to apply a RRRI

minimum [is] a non-waivable illegal sentencing claim.”). Thus, we find the

issues is not waived, however, the issue is moot.

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      The RRRI statute offers, as an incentive for completion of the program,

the opportunity for prisoners to be considered for parole at the expiration of

their RRRI minimum sentence. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4506. The RRRI minimum

sentence “shall be equal to three-fourths of the minimum sentence imposed

when the minimum sentence is three years or less [and] ... five-sixths of the

minimum sentence if the minimum sentence is greater than three years.” 61

Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(2). Here, Appellant was sentenced to 75 to 360 months.

N.T., 9/15/16, at 5. Assuming arguendo that Appellant was an RRRI eligible

offender, because his minimum sentence is greater than three years, his RRRI

minimum would have been five-sixths of his minimum, i.e., five-sixths of 75

months, which equals a minimum RRRI sentence of sixty-two and a half

months. Appellant’s minimum RRRI sentence would have expired in November

2021. Additionally, by December 2022, Appellant had served his minimum

sentence of 75 months. Appellant did not participate in the program and now

cannot be incentivized to receive early parole.

      The claim of mootness . . . stands on the predicate that a
      subsequent change in circumstances has eliminated the
      controversy so that the court lacks the ability to issue a
      meaningful order, that is, an order that can have any practical
      effect.

Burke ex rel. Burke v. Indep. Blue Cross, 103 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2014).

      Because Appellant has already served a sentence in excess of the

minimum sentence without the RRRI application, a determination of

Appellant’s RRRI eligibility “wouldn’t change one day in the amount of time

that he is sitting in prison on these charges” and therefore, the issue is moot.

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See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 280 A.3d 10, 2022 Pa. Super. Unpub.

LEXIS 1036 (Pa. Super. 2022).4 Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order Affirmed. Application for appointment of substitute counsel

Denied as Moot.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/24/2024

____________________________________________

4 See supra note 3.

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