Court Opinion

ID: 9428332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:27.257001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:12.906977
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the opinion of the Court insofar as it holds that negligent conduct by persons acting under color of state law *555may be actionable under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Ante, at 534-535. I also agree with the majority that in cases involving claims of negligent deprivation of property without due process of law, the availability of an adequate postdeprivation cause of action for damages under state law may preclude a finding of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I part company with the majority, however, over its conclusion that there was an adequate state-law remedy available to respondent in this case. My disagreement with the majority is not because of any shortcomings in the Nebraska tort claims procedure.1 Rather, my problem is with the majority’s application of its legal analysis to the facts of this case.
It is significant, in my view, that respondent is a state prisoner whose access to information about his legal rights is necessarily limited by his confinement. Furthermore, there is no claim that either petitioners or any other officials informed respondent that he could seek redress for the alleged deprivation of his property by filing an action under the Nebraska tort claims procedure. This apparent failure takes *556on additional significance in light of the fact that respondent pursued his complaint about the missing hobby kit through the prison's grievance procedure.2 In cases such as this, I believe prison officials have an affirmative obligation to inform a prisoner who claims that he is aggrieved by official action about the remedies available under state law. If they fail to do so, then they should not be permitted to rely on the existence of such remedies as adequate alternatives to a § 1983 action for wrongful deprivation of property. Since these prison officials do not represent that respondent was informed about his rights under state law, I cannot join in the judgment of the Court in this case.
Thus, although I agree with much of the majority’s reasoning, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

 To be sure, the state remedies would not have afforded respondent all the relief that would have been available in a § 1983 action. See ante, at 543-544. I nonetheless agree with the majority that “they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.” Ante, at 544.

 In fact, the prison officials did not raise the issue of the availability of a state-law remedy in either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The issue was first presented in the petition for rehearing filed in the Court of Appeals.