Court Opinion

ID: 9747852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:38:54.410896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:27.724682
License: Public Domain

*250KELLER, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the majority’s holding that Appellant’s Manufacturing Methamphetamine conviction must be reversed for a new trial because of the erroneous jury instruction, I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s Part IV(B) conclusion that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s request for a lesser-included offense instruction as to Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine. The majority recognizes that KRS 506.010 creates liability for attempts to commit criminal offenses but holds that the trial court properly denied to give Appellant’s requested instruction because, even if the jury had concluded that Appellant lacked some of the equipment to manufacture methamphetamine, a person who possesses some, but not all, of the chemicals or equipment to manufacture methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine has not committed an offense prohibited by KRS 506.010. The majority’s ultimate holding appears to stem from three (3) conclusions: (1) KRS 506.010 liability for incomplete possession of the chemicals or equipment for methamphetamine manufacture would be “incongruous” with the General Assembly’s subsequent criminalization of Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor as a Class D felony under KRS 218A.1437; (2) Manufacturing Methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) is itself an attempt offense, and thus “the legislative intent in enacting KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) was to elevate what would otherwise support a conviction of a Class C felony under ■ KRS 506.010 to a Class B felony”;1 and (3) possession of some, but less than all, of the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a “substantial step” towards completion of the offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine. I disagree with the majority’s analysis, and I would hold that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s request for the lesser-included offense instruction. Accordingly, I dissent in part.
The General Assembly has provided that “[a] defendant may be convicted of an offense that is included in any offense with which he is formally charged,”2 and has explicitly stated that “[a]n offense is so included when ... [i]t consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein.”3 Although the majority opinion makes some provision for criminal attempt lesser-included offenses to Manufacturing Methamphetamine, it concludes that no attempt offense is committed under KRS 506.010 when a defendant with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine possesses some, but not all, of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. The majority’s reasoning in this regard — which boils down to a conclusion that the General Assembly must have intended to displace the applicability of KRS 506.010 as to Manufacturing Methamphetamine when it enacted KRS 218A.1432(l)(b), which authorizes a Class B felony penalty range for an inchoate crime — is directly contrary to Kentucky precedent to the effect that “[rjepeal by implication finds no fa*251vor within the courts”4 and that “[i]n the absence of a strong statutory indication to the contrary, an express statute will not be deemed to have been abrogated by implication.” 5 If the General Assembly wished to provide Class B felony penalties for a criminal attempt to actually manufacture methamphetamine, it could have done so either by: (1) adopting a different version of KRS 218A.1432(l)(a), i.e., one that read “[a] person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he knowingly and unlawfully manufactures or attempts to manufacture methamphetamine”;6 or (2) amending KRS 506.010 to provide a Class B felony penalty range for a criminal attempt to commit a violation of KRS 218A.1432.7 Instead, what the General Assembly did was simply prohibit the possession of all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine and provide a Class B felony penalty for the offense. As KRS 218A.1432 makes no explicit mention of KRS 506.010, one of the fundamental premises of statutory interpretation — i.e., that “it is the duty of the court to attempt to harmonize the interpretation so as to give effect to both sections or statutes, if possible”8 — should counsel hesitation before we unnecessarily limit the scope of KRS 506.010 liability. And, in harmonizing the enactments at issue, I would hold that KRS 506.010 authorizes Class C felony criminal liability for defendants who intend to manufacture methamphetamine and who undertake “substantial steps” towards manufacturing methamphetamine by knowingly accumulating materials necessary to do so, but who are apprehended before they can complete the KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) Manufacturing Methamphetamine offense by knowingly possessing all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.
Accordingly, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial in this case — where Appellant possessed not only six (6) boxes of Equate antihistamine tablets but also two (2) lithium batteries, six (6) cans of starting fluid, a glass vial, three (3) glass jars, a black cooking pot, a weighing scale, three (3) pieces of hose, a funnel, a spoon, and a cotton ball — the trial court should have permitted the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine by instructing it as to KRS 506.010(l)(b)’s “substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the *252crime”9 basis for Criminal Attempt liability. An instruction substantially similar to the following would have been appropriate:
INSTRUCTION NO_CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE
If you do not find the Defendant guilty under Instruction No. _, you will find him guilty of Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county on or about May 14, 1999, the Defendant possessed one or more, but not all, of the chemicals or some, but not all, of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine;
AND
B. That the Defendant did so knowingly and, in so doing, it was the Defendant’s intention to manufacture methamphetamine;
AND
C. That under the circumstances as he believed them to be, the Defendant’s actions constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
The majority’s first (and, presumably, primary) response to Appellant’s claim is its belief that to permit a jury to find Appellant guilty of a Class C felony under KRS 506.010 would be “incongruous” with the Class D felony penalty range the General Assembly has provided under KRS 218A.1437 for Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor. I would observe, however, that KRS 218A.1437 did not exist until three (3) years after Appellant’s crime, and, thus, as to the case at bar, this hypothetical incongruity relies on a “back to the future” analysis because, as the majority observes elsewhere in its opinion, KRS 218A.1437 “is not applicable to this case because it was created after the conduct for which Appellant was indicted occurred.”10 Further, given the litany of methamphetamine manufacturing equipment possessed by Appellant in this case, the actual facts presented diverge sharply from the hypothetical “Class C felony for a cotton ball, but Class D felony for methamphetamine precursor” concern that drives the majority’s analysis. Finally, the primary flaw in the majority’s “incongruity” analysis is that it fails to appreciate the factual findings necessary for KRS 506.010 liability. Simply stated, the hypothetical factual situations, i.e., mere possession of “a Mason jar, a wooden spoon or a cotton ball,”11 which the majority employs in an attempt to illustrate the inappropriateness of permitting a Class C penalty range for Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine, would not permit a reasonable doubt finding required by Paragraph *253(C) in the above draft instruction.12
In any event, I see nothing arbitrary or incongruous about the manner in which the General Assembly has attempted to tackle methamphetamine manufacturing in Kentucky. In recent years, the General Assembly has taken steps to address methamphetamine production and, in so doing, has created new criminal offenses that fit alternative contingencies and that were designed to allow law enforcement intervention prior to the actual production of methamphetamine. As I interpret the relevant statutes, in cases involving conduct committed after July 15, 2002, if the evidence supports the conclusions that: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed one or more of “the chemicals ... for the manufacture of methamphetamine,”13 (2) the chemicals possessed by the defendant include “a drug product or combination of drug products containing ephedrine, pseu-doephedrine, or pheynlpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers,” 14 and (3) the defendant possessed the chemical or chemicals “with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine,”15 the Commonwealth may prosecute the offender for any of (or all16) three (3) offenses — Manu-*254factoring Methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) (a Class B felony), Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine under KRS 506.010(l)(b) (a Class C felony); or Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor under KRS 218A.1432 (a Class D felony).17 Of course, a defendant can be convicted of only one of these offenses, because the latter two (2) are lesser-included offenses of the first.18
Considered together, these three (3) crimes operate to vary a methamphetamine offender’s punishment with his or her culpability. If it is determined that the defendant knowingly possessed all of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine and that he or she did so with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, then the appropriate crime is Manufacturing Methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(b), and the defendant faces a penalty range of between ten (10) and twenty (20) years. If it is determined that the defendant knowingly possessed some, but not all, of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, that he or she did so with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and that the defendant’s actions were a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in methamphetamine manufacture, then the appropriate crime is Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine, and the defendant faces a penalty range of between five (5) and ten (10) years. If, however, it is determined that the defendant knowingly possessed some, but not all, of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, that among the chemicals he or she knowingly possessed was one or more of the drug products defined in KRS 218A.1437(1), and that he or she did so with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine,19 but the factfinder does not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s actions constituted a substantial step towards completion of the offense, then the appropriate crime is Possession of a Metham*255phetamine Precursor under KRS 218A.1437, and the defendant would face a penalty range of between one (1) and five (5) years. Accordingly, it is the heightened culpability associated with a “substantial step” finding20 that distinguishes the Class C and D felony offenses. As such, Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine’s availability as a lesser-included offense is not only consistent with, but an important part of, the overall statutory scheme.
The majority opinion reviews some of the cases in which defendants in other jurisdictions have been prosecuted, under different statutory schemes, for lesser-included manufacturing methamphetamine offenses. However, given the relatively recent phenomenon of widespread prosecutions for manufacturing methamphetamine, the full scope of criminal attempt liability for methamphetamine offenses has yet to be decided — not just in this jurisdiction, but nationwide — because courts have examined evidentiary insufficiency claims in only a limited number of factual contexts. Although the majority correctly observes that no published opinion holds, on facts similar to the case at bar, that the evidence supported a verdict for criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, the fact is that no court has held otherwise, either. Thus, there is no persuasive authority for the majority’s suggestion that, as a matter of law, only the possession of all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine can constitute a “substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in” methamphetamine manufacture.
I recognize that my interpretation of KRS 506.010 liability lacks the convenience of the “bright line” adopted by the majority, and that, under my position, this Court would have to further define the scope of conduct prohibited as Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine in future cases. However, since this Court’s role is to interpret the law in individual cases before it, rather than attempting to occupy the field of Methamphetamine Manufacturing law in one fell swoop, I would wait for the appropriate cases to decide harder questions such as whether the evidence supports a “substantial step” finding if: (1) drug products identified in KRS 218A.1437(1) are the only chemicals or equipment for methamphetamine manufacture possessed by the defendant; or (2) if the defendant possesses substantially less methamphetamine manufacturing equipment than is present here. But, in the case at bar, which can be distinguished from much of the Missouri authority cited by the majority in that the Commonwealth introduced evidence in this case to prove that Appellant was familiar with methamphetamine manufacturing processes, I find the evidence more than sufficient to support a conclusion that Appellant’s possession of these items constituted a “substantial step” towards manufacturing methamphetamine.
In my view, the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s request for an instruction on Criminal Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine as a lesser-included offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine, and I would direct that, upon remand, the *256trial court should include the lesser-included offense in its jury instructions.

. Majority Opinion at 114 S.W.3d 226, 245 (2003).

. KRS 505.020(2). See also Official Commentary to KRS 505.020 (Banks/Baldwin 1974) ("[Subsection (2) ] provide[s] ... the circumstances under which conviction of an offense not expressly named in the charging instrument is appropriate.”).

.KRS 505.020(2)(b) (emphasis added).

. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Brock, Ky., 915 S.W.2d 751, 753 (1996).

. Board of Education of Hopkins County v. Brooks, Ky.App., 824 S.W.2d 431, 434 (1992).

. See KRS 218A.140(l)(a) (“No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a prescription for a controlled substance by knowingly misrepresenting to, or knowingly withholding information from, a practitioner.” (emphasis added)); KRS 218A.140(l)(b) ("No person shall procure or attempt to procure the administration of a controlled substance by knowingly misrepresenting to, or withholding information from, a practitioner.” (emphasis added)); KRS 218A.140(l)(c) ("No person shall obtain or attempt to obtain a controlled substance or procure or attempt to procure the administration of a controlled substance by the use of a false name or the giving of a false address.” (emphasis added)).

. See KRS 506.010(4)(a) ("A criminal attempt is a Class C felony when the crime attempted is a violation of KRS 521.020 or 521.050"). The majority opinion references this provision as indicative of the legislature’s intent to supplant KRS 506.010 with KRS 218A.1432(l)(b). See Majority Opinion, supra note 1 at 245 n.5. In my view, however, KRS 506.010(4)(a) evidences the contrary and illustrates how the General Assembly has empirically provided an enhanced penalty range for an attempt offense.

. Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 829 S.W.2d 942, 944 (1992).

.KRS 506.010:
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(1) A person is guilty of criminal attempt to commit a crime when, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he:
(b) Intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.
(2) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subsection (l)(b) unless it is an act or omission which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s intention to commit the crime which he is charged with attempting.

. Majority Opinion, 114 S.W.3d 226, 246 (2003)

. Id. at 243.

. See KRS 506.010(2); Commonwealth v. Prather, Ky., 690 S.W.2d 396, 397 ("[T]he substantial steps directed by the statute are overt acts ‘... which convincingly demonstrate a firm purpose to commit a crime, while allowing police intervention, based upon observation of such incriminating conduct, in order to prevent the crime when criminal attempt becomes apparent.' ”) (quoting State v. Woods, 48 Ohio St.2d 127, 357 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (1976)). Compare Commonwealth v. Prather, supra (evidence of reconnaissance and evidence demonstrating intent to follow through with robbery plan "convincingly demonstrated a firm purpose to commit a crime” and supported jury's verdict); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 45 S.W.3d 873 (2001) (verdict for attempted trafficking in a controlled substance supported, in part, by evidence that defendant approached vehicle and inquired as to what the occupant wanted, then went into a nearby building and, upon his return, discussed the size of a drug purchase).

. KRS 218A.1432(l)(b).

. KRS 218A.1437G).

. KRS 218A.1432(l)(b). I would observe that, instead of criminalizing the possession of precursor-containing drug products "with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine” the methamphetamine precursor statute reads "with the intent to use the drug product or combination of drug products as a precursor to methamphetamine or other controlled substance.” KRS 218A.1437(1). Although "precursor" itself is not defined in Kentucky’s Controlled Substances Act, "immediate precursor” is defined as "a substance which is the principal compound commonly used or produced primarily for use, and which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit manufacture.” KRS 218A.010(11). And, as such, in virtually all cases, a person who intends to use a drug product as a precursor to methamphetamine will necessarily intend to manufacture methamphetamine. Thus, under a prosecution for Manufacturing Methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(l)(a) or (b), either of which would require proof of possession of a precursor chemical, Unlawful Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor under KRS 218A.1437 will be a lesser-included offense because it can be "established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” KRS 505.020(2)(a). I would note, however, that the methamphetamine precursor statute criminalizes a broader range of activity than Manufacturing Methamphetamine because it prohibits possession of certain drug products "with the intent to use [them] as a precursor to methamphetamine or other controlled substance." KRS 218A.1437(1) (emphasis added).

.See KRS 505.020(1) ("When a single course of conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, he may be prosecuted for each offense.”). Thus, a Commonwealth Attorney could seek an indictment for all three (3) *254offenses, could proceed to trial upon all three (3) offenses as separate offenses.

.An instruction for this offense would be similar to the following:
INSTRUCTION NO_
POSSESSION OF A METHAMPHETAMINE PRECURSOR
You will find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Methamphetamine Precursor if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:
A. That in this county, on or about [date] [he or she] had in [his or her] possession a [drug product/combination of drug products] containing [ephedrine,] [pseu-doephedrine,] or [phenylpropanolamine,] [or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers];
AND
B. That [he or she] knew that the [drug product/combination of drug products] possessed by [him or her] contained [ephedrine,] [pseudoephedrine,] or [phe-nylpropanolamine,] [or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers];
AND
C.That [he or she] had the drug product or combination of drug products in his possession with the intent to use [if/them] as a precursor to [methamphetamine] [or other controlled substance.]
Trial courts must take special care to tailor an instruction such as this one, which presents multiple alternatives, to the evidence presented at trial in order to avoid the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict. See Commonwealth v. Whitmore, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 76, 80-81 (2003).

. See KRS 505.020(l)(b) ("He may not, however, be convicted of more than one (1) offense when ... [o]ne offense is included in the other[.]”).

. Technically, the jury's finding would be that the defendant possessed the drug product "with the intent to use [it] as a precursor to methamphetamine[.]” KRS 218A.1437(1); Draft instruction, supra note 17. But see supra note 15.

. See Commentary to KRS 506.010 (Banks/Baldwin 1974) ("[KRS 506.010(l)(a) & (b) ] emphasize that the principal purpose of requiring an act or omission to act for the offense of criminal attempt is to establish the existence and firmness of a defendant’s criminal intentions.”); Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I, § 5.01, cmt. 6(a) (A.L.I.1985) ("Whether a particular act is a substantial step is obviously a matter of degree.”).