Court Opinion

ID: 9703678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:04:25.804823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:42.043690
License: Public Domain

HESTER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in this case for two reasons. First, I believe Mr. and Mrs. K. lacked standing to proceed on their petition to terminate the parental rights of Diane S. Second, assuming arguendo, they did have standing, I believe the trial court erred in concluding that Mr. and Mrs. K. established by clear and convincing evidence that grounds to terminate did exist.
The tragedy of this case arises from the despair of an infertile couple and the subtle coercion of a young, poor, uneducated unwed mother and was fueled both by unwise *53legal maneuverings by counsel and a trial court which clearly failed to consider the effect of its rulings in this protracted battle for young Baby Boy S. For the reasons which follow, I would reverse the order terminating the parental rights of Diane S.
On May 8,1989, Diane S., age eighteen and unmarried, gave birth to Baby Boy S. at West Penn Hospital in Pittsburgh. Three months earlier, Diane had withdrawn from high school as a result of embarrassment due to her pregnancy. When Diane was discharged from the hospital following the baby’s birth, she and the baby went to New Arbor, a home for unwed mothers and their babies which is run by Ann Labish. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 7/20/89, at 114-15. Mrs. Labish had known Diane for approximately five years through Diane’s sister, Christina, who previously stayed at New Arbor. While at New Arbor, Diane was not permitted to consult with family or friends and was not permitted to make telephone calls. While she was permitted to receive telephone calls, this privilege also was limited. Id. at 11, 40, 56, 130-31.
Diane testified that she felt very frightened about the prospect of caring for her child without money and the support of her family. She testified that even if her family were able to support her, she desired a more positive environment for her child. Her father was uncommunicative and worked two jobs, and her mother was confined to Woodville. Moreover, her parents were not married to each other; the record was unclear whether they ever had been married. Id. at 26. Diane was aware that the social worker at West Penn Hospital had recommended that Diane locate some type of community or social support, and it appears that Diane went to New Arbor to obtain that support. Joanne Moerschbache, the social worker from West Penn, testified unequivocally that she did not have concerns about Diane’s ability to parent her child. Id. at 70. She stated that Diane displayed the skills necessary to meet the child’s needs. Id. at 79. Ms. Moerschbache further testified that her concern centered on Diane’s lack of community support. “It was identified that Diane’s family support system was not strong and that additional community *54supports could supplement the support system of her family that was lacking.” Id. at 71.
As noted previously, Diane’s stay at New Arbor could hardly be described as supportive. A reading of the testimony from the July 20, 1989 hearing reveals that subtle coercion was applied by Ann Labish to encourage Diane to consent to the adoption of her child. As previously noted, Diane testified to the severe limits placed on her communication with family and friends. The following testimony is most revealing concerning the coercion applied by Labish. “They started pressuring me saying you should do this, this is the right thing to do. They asked me if I was sure about it. I said, no; and I said I wanted to talk to my family, and I wasn’t allowed.” N.T., 7/20/89, at 40. Moreover, Ann Labish admitted that she threatened to call Children and Youth Services if Diane attempted to leave New Arbor with her baby. Id. at 154-58. When Diane displayed fear and uncertainty in caring for her infant, Ann Labish produced the perfect family to raise the child. In fact, the minute Diane told Ann Labish “she was thinking about placing the baby for adoption,” Labish indicated she had a family ready to adopt the child. Id. at 127-28. At 5:00 p.m. the next day, Labish read from the file she had concerning Mr. and Mrs. K. Diane indicated a desire to meet them, and Labish arranged a meeting at their home that evening. While at the home of Mr. and Mrs. K., Diane executed an eritrustment agreement prepared by counsel for Mr. and Mrs. K, by which she transferred custody of Baby Boy S. to Eugene and Pamela K. Diane was unrepresented by counsel at that time. Id. at 16. Diane left New Arbor the following day, May 19,1989, and Mr. and Mrs. K. took custody of eleven-day-old Baby Boy S.
Diane testified that she wavered in her decision to give her child up for adoption the very next day. She contacted a lawyer and made every attempt within her limited means to prepare for her son’s return. Diane was unable to live with her parents and wanted a better environment for her child. Therefore, she rented an apartment and enrolled in a six-month program at Cleveland Institute of Technology to obtain *55her G.E.D. and a diploma for learning word processing. Id. at 17-19.
On June 6, 1989, Mr. and Mrs. K. filed a report of intention to adopt Baby Boy S. Immediately above their signatures on that document appears the following statement:
We acknowledge that we have been advised or know and understand that the natural parent may revoke the consent to the adoption of this child until a court has entered a decree terminating the parental rights and, unless a decree terminating parental rights has been entered, the natural parent may revoke the consent until a court enters the final adoption decree.
Later that month, counsel informed Mr. and Mrs. K. that Diane was seeking the return of her son. On July 7, 1989, counsel for Diane presented a revocation of the entrustment agreement and consent to the adoption,1 followed by a petition for a citation to show cause why Baby Boy S. should not be returned to her, filed on July 11, 1989. This was but forty-seven days from the date of the entrustment agreement and well within the six-month statutory period. The orphan’s court scheduled a hearing for July 20, 1989. Mr. and Mrs. K. refused to return Baby Boy S. to Diane, and instead, their counsel filed a motion for a psychiatric evaluation of Diane, a petition to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, a motion for a home evaluation of Diane S., a petition for the involuntary termination of the parental rights of Diane S., and an answer to Diane’s request for return of Baby Boy S. It appears that the orphan’s court granted the motions for psychiatric evaluation and home evaluation of Diane in an off-the-record discussion in chambers after the hearing; however, the record reflects the filing of these orders on September 7, 1989.
Mr. and Mrs. K. also filed a complaint for custody of Baby Boy S., which was stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings in orphan’s court. Since the orphan’s court refused to *56rule upon Diane’s petition for a citation to show cause why Baby Boy S. should not be returned to his natural mother, Baby Boy S. has remained in the care and custody of Mr. and Mrs. K. Following the completion of the psychiatric and home evaluations of Diane, a conciliation was held on November 16, 1989. Thereafter, on December 5, 1989, the orphan’s court ordered the psychiatric evaluation of Bryan Lashley, Diane’s fiance, whom she subsequently married on February 14, 1990. N.T., 8/1/90, at 211. A second conciliation was held on March 7,1990. The petition to appoint a guardian ad litem for Baby Boy S. finally was granted by the orphan’s court on April 3, 1990. The child, however, remained in the home of Mr. and Mrs. K.
A hearing on the petition to terminate Diane’s parental rights was scheduled for June 12, 1990. Counsel for Mr. and Mrs. K. was unable to locate Diane for the purpose of personally serving notice of the June 12 hearing. Proof of service by publication was filed on June 1, 1990. Counsel for Diane requested a continuance which the court granted. Counsel located Diane in Raleigh, North Carolina, in July. On August 1, 9, and 10, 1990, a hearing was held on the petition to terminate Diane’s parental rights in Baby Boy S. The orphan’s court thereafter ordered counsel for the parties to file briefs. Finally, on August 8,1991, one year after the hearings held on the matter, the orphan’s court filed a decree nisi terminating Diane’s parental rights. Exceptions were filed and denied, and the court filed a final decree on October 4, 1991. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
[Mr. and Mrs. K.] lacked standing to seek involuntarily judicial termination of respondent’s rights in Baby Boy [SJ. The court erred in permitting [Mr. and Mrs. K.] to retain the child, and in denying [Diane’s] request that the child be returned to her during the proceedings, following her revocation of the entrustment agreement.
The court lacked sufficient, competent evidence in the record to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of [Diane S.] under 23 Pa.C.S. section 2511(a)(2).
*57The court erred in admitting evidence and testimony on behalf of [Mr. and Mrs. K.] and in rejecting evidence and testimony favorable to [Diane S.].
The procedures adopted in Pennsylvania for the involuntary termination of parental rights in “private adoption” cases do not provide birth parents with sufficient protection of their natural rights in their children, in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
As noted previously, I believe the issue of whether Mr. and Mrs. K. had standing to proceed on their petition to terminate the parental rights of Diane S. has merit. The orphan’s court’s sole reference to this issue is the following statement: “Throughout the entire period of the litigation, Baby Boy [S.] has remained in the care and custody of [Mr. and Mrs. K.], who have stood in loco parentis to him. By the terms of 23 Pa.C.S. 2512(a)(3), [Mr. and Mrs. K.] clearly satisfy the requirements necessary to vest this Court with jurisdiction.” Trial court opinion, 8/8/91, at 1. To address this issue, it is necessary to focus on the language of section 2512(a) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101 et seq. That section sets forth who may file a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights.
§ 2512. Petition for involuntary termination
(a) Who may file. — A petition to terminate parental rights with respect to a child under the age of 18 years may be filed by any of the following:
(1) Either parent when termination is sought with respect to the other parent.
(2) An agency.
(3) The individual having custody or standing in loco parentis to the child and who has filed a report required by section 2531 (relating to report of intention to adopt).
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(a). It is clear that neither subsection (1) or (2) apply instantly. As to subsection (3), we previously have held that custody, as that term is used in § 2512(a), refers to legal custody, not physical custody. In re Crystal D.R., 331 Pa.Super. 501, 480 A.2d 1146 (1984); In re Adoption *58of J.F., 392 Pa.Super. 39, 572 A.2d 223 (1990). Since Mr. and Mrs. K. did not have legal custody of Baby Boy S., it must be determined whether Mr. and Mrs. K. stood in loco parentis to Baby Boy S., within the meaning of the statute.
In In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., supra, we held that foster parents, who have been awarded custody of a child by an agency which has obtained legal custody of the child, do not have standing to petition to terminate the rights of the natural parents of the child. Recently, in In re Adoption of J.M.E., 416 Pa.Super. 110, 610 A.2d 995 (1992), we distinguished Crystal D.R., holding that the appellants in that case truly stood in loco parentis to the child. The significant factor for this court in J.M.E. was our examination of the intent of the child’s aunt, who had legal custody of the child, when placing the boy with the appellants. A review of the record made it clear that the placement of J.M.E. with the appellants was to be permanent, and they were to raise the child “until he’s grown.”
The majority cites J.M.E. to support its position that appellees in the instant case have standing. A reading of J.M.E. makes it clear, however, that the overriding factor in that case was that “all parties intended that [the child’s] placement with appellants would be permanent; indeed, the expectation clearly is that [appellants] are to be the only ‘parents’ [the child] would ever know.” Id., 416 Pa.Super. at 117, 610 A.2d at 999. In the present case, since Diane changed her mind about placing the child for adoption the day after she left New Arbor, and then withdrew the entrustment agreement, it is clear that the placement of Baby Boy S. was not intended to be permanent. Thus, our decision in J.M.E. offers no support for the majority’s position, and is, in fact, in direct conflict with it.
Baby Boy S. was never in appellees’ care permanently. While the orphan’s court suggests that appellant displayed only “second thoughts” and “whimsical parental behavior,” trial court opinion, 10/4/91, at 4, the record reveals that Diane was confused and uncertain about her decision to place her child for adoption from the start. I previously chronicled the *59subtle coercion applied by Ann Labish regarding this decision. Diane’s desire to regain custody of her son is manifested clearly by her actions from the day after she left New Arbor.
I am convinced by appellant’s argument that any right Mr. and Mrs. K. had in Baby Boy S. was acquired merely by the entrustment agreement which Diane revoked within forty-seven days of its execution. It is absolutely clear that the consent to an adoption as is contemplated by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711 may be revoked at any time prior to the entry of a final decree terminating parental rights or granting an adoption. Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 289 Pa.Super. 495, 433 A.2d 1363 (1981). I agree with appellant that any claim or entitlement that Mr. and Mrs. K. had in Baby Boy S. by virtue of the entrustment agreement terminated upon the revocation of that agreement. I disagree with appellees that there is any significance to the fact that they filed their report of intention to adopt before appellant revoked the entrustment agreement. I also disagree with appellees’ claim that the fact that Diane could revoke her consent to the adoption at any time prior to the entry of a valid decree is immaterial to the determination whether appellees had standing to petition for the termination of Diane’s parental rights. Appellees’ argument misses the point. They assert that the fact that appellees “stand in loco parentis to the child and have filed their Report of Intention to Adopt confers upon them standing to petition for the termination of [appellant’s] rights.” Appellees’ brief at 14. The revocation of the entrustment agreement terminated the possibility that appellees stood in loco parentis to the child. From the time of the revocation, appellees have not had any recognized legal relationship to the child.
I find guidance in K.N. v. Cades, 288 Pa.Super. 555, 432 A.2d 1010 (1981). A child was born to sixteen-year-old unwed J.N. Before the child’s birth, J.N. agreed to the private adoption of the child and signed a consent three days after the baby’s birth. Two months later, J.N. and her mother informed the intermediary that J.N. wanted her baby back. A week later, J.N. revoked her consent. After an evidentiary hearing, the lower court held that J.N. had revoked her *60consent to the adoption and ordered that the child be returned to her. The adoptive parents appealed to this court. One of the issues in that case concerned the settled law that consent to adoption may be withdrawn at any time before the entry of the final decree of adoption. Parenthetically, I observe that the orphan’s court in the instant case never made a specific finding on the revocation but chose to ignore it and proceed on the petitions advanced by appellees. We stated in Cades,
[W]e are aware that our decision — whatever it may be — will bring grief, either to appellants or the child’s mother. Nevertheless, nothing in this case suggests to us that appellants’ solution would be better than that dictated by the settled law. The relationship between parent and child should be broken only with the greatest reluctance. Here, we think it would be most unjust to hold the mother to her promise, as appellants would have us do. She was very young. She consented to give her child for adoption only in response to her parents’ urging. She received no outside or professional counseling to guide her in making so agonizing a decision. And she only made the decision after being assured that she had six months within which to change her mind and get her child back. We do not question appellants’ love for the child. However, they took the child knowing that the mother might change her mind.
Id., 288 Pa.Super. at 566, 432 A.2d at 1016. It is clear that Cades has striking similarities to the instant case. For example, appellant herein testified that she believed that even though she signed the entrustment agreement, she retained the right to change her mind. She stated she believed “she still [has] legal rights.” N.T., 7/20/89, at 15. Unfortunately, everyone ignored her attempts to enforce them. In fact, the one factor that stands out in this case is the unfortunate inaction by the lower court. I believe the delay in this case is the overriding factor which has made it so difficult for this court to do what it legally is required to do. However, we simply cannot allow the dilatory actions of the orphan’s court to erase this young mother’s right to her son.
*61The majority’s reliance upon Commonwealth ex rel. Grimes v. Yack, 289 Pa.Super. 495, 433 A.2d 1363 (1981), is misplaced. Our reference therein to alternative ways the adoptive parents could proceed was dicta and provides no precedent for the issue presented in the instant case. Similarly, I believe the majority’s reliance on In re Adoption of Michael J.C., 506 Pa. 517, 486 A.2d 371 (1984), both in relation to the issue of standing and to the merits, is misguided. First and foremost, whether the adoptive parents in Michael J.C. lacked standing to proceed with their petition to terminate the natural mother’s parental rights was not an issue raised before the court of common pleas or on appeal. The fact that the case proceeded can be viewed as nothing more than an acknowledgement that the court addressed only the issues raised by the parties, as indeed it should have done.
Moreover, the majority, in relying on Michael J.C., states that the appellant therein “demonstrated some undesirable personality traits which appellant herein does not ...” and then proceeds to ignore these very significant differences. The natural mother in Michael J.C. was physically abusive not only to her own mother but to children for whom she baby-sat. There also was evidence that indicated a pattern of illegal drug and alcohol abuse by the natural mother, resulting in her hospitalization for a drug overdose after consuming alcohol and “angel dust.” The natural mother therein also was treated at a mental hospital as a result of suicide threats, and she was diagnosed as drug dependent, alcohol dependent, and a depressive neurotic. There was testimony that her apartment was uninhabitable, with dog feces on the floor and walls covered by obscene language. I cannot agree that while appellant herein does not possess these same “undesirable personality traits ... the case analysis applied to both must be the same.” Majority opinion at 1359. It was these very significant, indeed horrific, personality traits that persuaded the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the natural mother’s parental rights should be terminated in Michael J.C. In this case, the only “pattern of conduct” that can be attributed to *62appellant is poverty and youth, which now has resulted in the system’s denial of her right to her child.
Donna Zaffey, the court-appointed psychologist who examined appellant and whose fees were paid by Mr. and Mrs. K., N.T., 8/1/90, at 6, clearly relied on appellant’s poverty in assessing Diane’s parenting skills. Dr. Zaffey described Diane as “a person whose development was limited, and who had come from an impoverished background with few cultural and educational experiences to stimulate growth and development.” Id. at 17. Mrs. K. on the other hand is thirty-eight years old, with a bachelor of arts degree and a master’s degree in reading, who taught school for fourteen years before leaving her job to stay home with Baby Boy S. Id. at 137-38. She and her husband, who also has a bachelor of arts degree and a master’s degree in education, live in a two-story, four bedroom house. Id. at 143.
The majority mischaracterizes Dr. Zaffey’s testimony concerning Diane’s intelligence by confusing emotional maturity and intellectual functioning. Zaffey reported that Diane had a measured IQ in the below-average range, but did not testify that Diane had the mental age of a twelve-year-old child, as the majority states. Dr. Zaffey testified, instead, that Diane’s emotional maturity corresponded to a twelve or thirteen-year-old adolescent, and this was based upon personality assessments. Id. at 64, 71-79. Such a distinction is critical, for the expert testimony was not that Diane had the intellectual capacity of a twelve-year-old, which is an objective determination based upon an IQ assessment. Rather, it was Zaffey’s subjective impression that Diane had the emotional maturity of a twelve or thirteen-year-old based upon a personality test. Id. at 72. Moreover, any potential for emotional growth required additional testing, which Dr. Zaffey did not administer. Id. at 78.
Finally, Dr. Zaffey’s assessments of Diane’s ability to parent focused not upon the minimal level of care required, but upon an optimum level of emotional and social advancement. In fact, Zaffey stated, “I feel that in looking at a child, that a child is owed the opportunity to develop maximally rather *63than minimally.” Id. at 106. When asked if Diane would ever have “sufficient ability to satisfy minimal physical and emotional requirements for a child if she were to raise him,” Dr. Zaffey replied, “I feel that she does not have the ability to raise the child in the best possible way.” Id. at 120 (emphasis added). I believe a fair reading of the record establishes that Dr. Zaffey weighed the advantages of age, wealth, and education against the disadvantages of youth, poverty, and lack of education, to make her recommendation that Diane could not provide for the needs of Baby Boy S. There simply is nothing in the record that establishes that Baby Boy S. would have been without essential parental care had he been returned to his natural mother when she initially sought his return. Compare In re Adoption of B.G.S., 418 Pa.Super. 588, 614 A.2d 1161 (885 and 1119 Pittsburgh, 1991) (filed August 17, 1992) (Trial court properly denied adoptive parents’ petition to terminate parental rights of nineteen-year-old unwed mother, who signed consent to adopt in hospital two days after baby’s birth, and who filed revocation of consent seven months later, because adoptive parents failed to prove that requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) were met).
The tragedy of this case is that the orphan’s court refused to rule upon appellant’s petition to remove her child from the home of Mr. and Mrs. K., and the boy, now three years old, remains there to this day. The orphan’s court had the opportunity as well as the obligation to remove the child from this home when the baby was only two months old. Instantly, matters were delayed at all times by the legal maneuverings of counsel for appellees, or the orphan’s court, with the exception of the two-month delay occasioned by appellant’s relocation to North Carolina and the concurrent move of her counsel’s law office.2 N.T., 8/1/90, at 236. Most troublesome is the lower court’s one year delay in filing its decree termi*64nating appellant’s parental rights from which this appeal is taken.
The expressed reasoning of the orphan’s court also is disturbing. In the original opinion the court states: “It is clear from the testimony that Diane S.’s lack of involvement with the baby is consistent with her own family experience.” The record unequivocally demonstrates that Diane’s lack of involvement with her son stems solely from the court’s own failure to recognize the mother’s revocation of the entrustment agreement. The judge then proceeded to use that court-created situation as a grounds for termination. In the supplemental opinion the court states: “Accordingly, the claim that the baby should have been removed from the K.’s home and care during the pendency of this action is mindless and typical of the shallow reasoning powers of the birth mother.” The court conveniently ignored the fact that the legislature preserved Diane’s right to revoke her entrustment agreement and that that right has been recognized by the Courts of Pennsylvania in K.N. v. Cades, supra. However, the mother’s continuing unsuccessful effort to exercise that right has been described by the court as “mindless” and “shallow” and then used as additional grounds for termination of her parental rights.
This case does not present a natural mother who exhibited repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal which caused her child to be without essential parental care, as the trial court concluded pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). It presents only a young, poor, unwed mother who was coerced into placing her child for adoption, and who became the victim of questionable legal maneuverings of counsel, a desperate, infertile couple, and a trial court wh: ' disregarded its duty to proceed in a timely way. Due to the trial court’s dilatory action, Baby Boy S. is now over three years old and knows no parents other than Mr. and Mrs. K. However, this court should not perpetuate the injustices already inflicted by affirming the trial court’s termination of appellant’s parental rights when there is no legal basis to do so.
*65Our reversal of that order would not necessarily place Baby Boy S. in appellant’s custody, as that determination is governed solely by the best interest of the child, a separate issue from whether clear and convincing evidence was presented to terminate appellant’s parental rights. There exists a wealth of services available to appellant and Baby Boy S. This court cannot turn its back on its duty to uphold the law, even when our sympathies for the parties and the child are drawn to the surface in such an agonizing way.
Thus, I would reverse and remand to the distinguished President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Paul R. Zavarella, with the request that he refer this matter to a judge other than the one involved in the within termination litigation.

. Both parties represent that the revocation of the entrustment agreement was presented to the court on July 7, 1989, however the record reflects the filing of this document on July 25, 1989.

. Contrary to the majority’s characterization of appellant’s move to North Carolina as being surreptitious, appellant testified that she tried to notify her attorney, and her attorney testified that he indeed did change his telephone number and move his law office to another location at that time. N.T., 8/1/90, at 236, 294-97.