Court Opinion

ID: 9811890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:32:23.340808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:26.558088
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting. I can not concur in the opinion of the Court, because it is based upon what seems to me an erroneous principle of law. The opinion holds that it was error in the Court below to give the following instruction: “If the defendant permitted the brush and combustible material to accumulate on its road-bed, and a fire was communicated to the same by its engines, and burnt over the plaintiff’s land, then it would be negligence, and you would answer the first issue ‘Yes..’ ” It is admitted that this instruction would be correct if the defendant were a regular railroad company; but I fail to find any distinction either in principle or precedent. On the other hand, some authorities hold private railroads to a higher degree of responsibility than those that are *524public, on the ground that the latter have a public license to operate. I do not think that makes any difference. The principle of eminent domain is in no way concerned. The power of condemnation is given to railroad companies simply to enable them to acquire the lands necessary for their construction. They may acquire such lands by purchase; and it is evident that the law deems this the proper method to pursue, as it permits the condemnation of land only in the event of the ■ railroad company being unable to agree with the owners for its purchase. The Code, Sec. 1943. Moreover, by condemnation a railroad in this State can never acquire more than an easement in the land, while by deed or grant it may acquire any interest therein, including the absolute fee. Tire defendant is a corporation, but whether it had the chartered right to build a railroad is immaterial to this .question, as it entered upon the plaintiff’s- land admittedly under the contract set out in the record.
It is contended that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, inasmuch as it did not contract to keep- its road-bed clear. I am not aware of any statute requiring an ordinary railroad company to keep its track clear of combustible matter. It is held by the Courts with practical unanimity that a failure to do so is evidence; of negligence, or in certain cases may be negligence per se. This is simply one phase of the rule of the prudent man. Would a man of ordinary prudence, operating a railroad through his own land, permit the track to become so foul as to- be in constant danger of catching fire from coals dropping from the engine, when the probable result of such fire would be the loss of a large amount of valuable timber % Would a man of ordinary prudence pile up leaves and other combustible matter near Ms house and adjoining the place where hot aslies are habitually thrown out? Would he have the right to pile them away *525from his own house, but in a dangerous proximity to another’s house and ash-pile ?
The fact that the engine was properly equipped with a spark arrester has little or no bearing upon the question. Where the roadbed itself is covered with combustible matter,the danger is not. so much from the sparks that come out of the smoke-stack as it is from the live coals that drop from the ash pan. In such cases, the danger from the latter is much greater on account of the larger size of the coals and their greater capacity to retain and communicate heat. Of course they are not thrown as far as sparks, and in fact can not well get beyond the ditches. Ordinarily they fall between the rails, but, when the engine is rapidly rounding a curve, they may be thrown beyond the rails and down an embankment, if there happen to be one. This danger may be increased or lessened by use of the dampers at each end of the ash pan; but these dampers must necessarily be controlled to a great extent by the needs of the engines. The only safe way is to clean off the road-bed, and I see no reason why in this particular a lumber road should not be held to the same degree of care as an ordinary railroad. They both use the same dangerous agency, causing the same character of loss; and in both cases the danger can be avoided by the same means involving the cheapest labor and the simplest tools. A coal from one is as dangerous as a coal from the other, and a common hand with a rake or a hoe can clean off one as easily as he can the other. There may be some difference as to> the width of the right of way, but that does not affect the principle.
In the case at bar, the defendant was evidently in full possession of its track or roadway and ditches, which constituted its right of way. These, I think, it was required to keep clear of combustible matter. I do not think it could be required to clean up the land beyond its ditches, but at the same time it did not have the right to pile up combustible mat*526ter in such immediate proximity to its track as' to be in constant danger of being set on fire by its engine.
I can not find any case directly in point, nor is any cited by the Court. In Garrett v. Freeman, 50 N. C., 78, the defendant was held liable for damage caused by fire escaping from a log'; pile he was burning on his own land. Judge Pearson, speaking for the Court, says: “A prudent man would not permit a log pile to be mad© s’o near the fence (from three to five yards), with a dead pin© between the pile and fence, nor would he permit fire to be set to it without having the trash raked from around it.” In Robeson v. Morgan, 118 N. C., 991, it was held that tire plaintiff, although having no cause of action under The Code, might recover as kt common law for negligently permitting fire to escape. In 2 Shearman and Red. on Neg. it is said in section 688: “One who uses a steam engine on his own land ought to use the ordinary means for confining sparks, especially if he bums wood; and he is liable if, for want of such precautions, the sparks set fire to a neighbor’s property. He is also^ bound to use ordinary care to keep his own grounds in such condition that any fire set thereon by the engine shall not be communicated thence to adjacent premises.”
From reason and analogy, if not from direct authority, I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the Court.
Clark, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.