Court Opinion

ID: 9764334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:19:16.774761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.885952
License: Public Domain

OPINION
WARD, Justice.
This purported interlocutory appeal is from an order dated October 25, 1983, sustaining the plea of privilege filed by a third-party defendant, severing that third-party action and transferring the same to a district court in Harris County. A motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction has now been filed by the third-party defendant based on the terms of the 1983 Amendment to the General Venue Statute. We sustain the motion and dismiss the appeal.
*460The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The following events are noted. On July 29, 1982, the primary suit was brought in Midland County by Tiger Charter Corporation against Ramcon Corporation, Scott Moore and Louis Rochester for breach of a construction contract, breach of warranties, misrepresentation and fraud. It was not until July 22, 1983, that Ramcon Corporation and Scott Moore filed their third-party cross-action for contribution and indemnity against American Steel Building Company, Inc. American Steel was served with such cross-action on August 30, 1983. On September 12, 1983, American Steel Building Company, Inc. filed its plea of privilege as to the third-party cross-action praying that the cause as to it be transferred to Harris County, its county of residence. On September 19, 1983, Ramcon Corporation and Scott Moore filed their controverting plea stating that Article 1995 as amended on September 1, 1983, applied and that venue was proper in Midland County under various sections, particularly Section 4(b). That section provides that if venue is proper in the main action, then the court has venue on all cross-claims and third-party claims properly joined under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The venue of the main action was in Midland County. On September 30, 1983, American Steel filed its first amended plea of privilege and motion to transfer. The plea of privilege relied upon the terms of Article 1995 before its amendment, because it was in effect at the time American Steel was made a party by the third-party action filed against it. The motion to transfer was based on various other grounds. Hearing with live testimony was held on October 17, 1983, and as previously pointed out, the court entered an order sustaining the plea of privilege, severed out the third-party cross-action and transferred it to a district court in Harris County. The trial court filed the following conclusions of law:
1.This venue question is governed and must be determined by venue law and procedure, to-wit: Article 1995 TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. and T.R. C.P. Rule 86 as they existed prior to their amendment effective September 1, 1983.
2. Article 1995 Section 4 subparagraph (b) as amended effective September 1, 1983 is not applicable to this case.
3. The facts as stated above do not show that Cross-Plaintiff’s cause of action or a part thereof arose in Midland County and Cross-Plantiff [sic] has thus failed to carry its burden under Art. 1995(23) to show that venue exception applicable.
4. Art. 1995 TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. Section 1 as amended effective September 1, 1983 is not applicable to this case.
5. Cross-Defendant’s Plea of Privilege must be sustained, the Cross-Plaintiff having failed to carry its burden of proof to show that any venue exception under Art. 1995 as it existed prior to September 1, 1983 is applicable to this case.
Ramcon Corporation perfected its attempted appeal from the order by filing its appeal bond on October 25, 1983.
Section 3 of Amended Article 1995 (1983 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. ch. 385, sec. 3 at 2124-25) provides:
This act takes effect September 1, 1983, and shall not apply to pending appeals on venue questions. For the purposes of appeal on venue questions pending prior to September 1, 1983, the former law is continued in effect.
In the Original Proceeding in Mandamus in Graue-Haws, Inc. v. Fuller, 666 S.W.2d 238 (1984), this Court had occasion to construe the quoted part of the statute. There the hearing on the plea of privilege occurred after September 1, 1983, and the plea of privilege was overruled the trial court holding the September 1, 1983, amendment controlled the disposition of the plea of privilege. In that case, the plaintiff relied on the exceptions set forth in what originally was Section 23, Article 1995, as a basis for holding venue in Reeves County. That same wording was carried forward in *461the new amendment. Again, in that case, the relator argued that the language of the amendment did not make it applicable to venue matters pending on September 1, 1983. The majority of this Court disagreed and held that the legislature made only one exception to the applicability of the new statute when it stated that the act “shall not apply to pending appeals on venue questions.”
American Steel now files its motion to dismiss the present appeal for want of jurisdiction on the ground that Article 1995 and Rule 87, Tex.R.Civ.P., both as amended on September 1,1983, provide that no interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination of the venue question. In the Graue-Haws case, this Court also held that the trial court’s ruling on a plea of privilege shall be reviewed only when the final judgment reaches the Court.
Ramcon, in its response to the motion to dismiss the appeal, argues that it is faced with an untenable position should the interlocutory appeal be dismissed. Ramcon would not only be forced to abide by an order sustaining a plea of privilege which was incorrectly decided under the old statute, but would be faced with two trials. Section 4(d)(2) of the new statute provides as follows:
On appeal from trial on the merits, if venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error. In determining whether venue was or was not proper the appellate court shall consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits.
Ramcon argues that it is apparent that there is now uncorrected reversible error already present in the case and that the whole trial will be an exercise in futility, a result which was not intended by the legislature.
Ramcon further argues that since the trial court has decided the plea of privilege under the old statute, that fairness now dictates that this Court take appellate jurisdiction under the old statute and render its decision on the merits of the plea of privilege.
Regardless of any merits as to Ramcon’s position on the venue question, we do not reach those matters, as the question before us is one of our jurisdiction only. We hold that this was a purported appeal taken after September 1 and that no such interlocutory appeal is now permitted.
While this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction of the interlocutory order, it has now been given a much broader jurisdiction and power than before in mandamus. Article 1824 amended June 19, 1983, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. If Ramcon Corporation should now seek to proceed by application for mandamus, this Court will give such a proceeding serious consideration as it will concern a matter that should be resolved at the present time.