Court Opinion

ID: 9863151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:08:16.220243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:47:44.410593
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two separate reasons. First, by not remanding this cause to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Maryland v. Craig, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), the majority departs from our policy of reviewing “decisions” of the courts of appeals. Second, the majority departs from our proper role as a court of discretionary review and appoints itself “policy maker” for the State of Texas. For the following reasons, I would remand this cause to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Maryland v. Craig, supra.
I. DEPARTING FROM ESTABLISHED POLICY
Since 1981, when the intermediate appellate courts obtained jurisdiction over criminal cases, it has been our policy to limit our power of discretionary review to “decisions.” The policy of only reviewing “decisions” is not unique to this Court. The United States Supreme Court has employed the policy for many years and just recently remanded two cases for our consideration in light of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). See Richardson v. State, 1991 WL 99949 (Tex.Cr.App.1991, No. 68,934, delivered June 12, 1991) and Boggess v. State, 1991 WL 87597 (Tex.Cr.App.1991, No. 69,990, delivered May 29, 1991).
Recently Presiding Judge McCormick, who today speaks for the majority, recounted the history of this policy in Abdnor v. State, 808 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex.Cr.App.1991, McCormick, P.J., dissenting). Therein he recognized the policy had been criticized, but concluded that remanding a case to the court of appeals, for resolution of an issue not previously decided, was our policy and that we should not act contrary to “the policies we have imposed on ourselves.” Abdnor, 808 S.W.2d at 480. See and contrast Om v. State, 753 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (Onion, P.J., dissenting and referring to the policy as launching cases into “heavenly appellate orbit”).
We utilized the policy by remanding hundreds of cases to the courts of appeals to conduct a harmless error analysis in light of our decision in Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). We employed the policy most recently in Tate v. State, 811 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), where Judge Miller, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated:
We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to that court for reconsideration of appellant’s first point of error in light of Boyer, [v. State, 801 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).]1
At pg. 608.
Likewise, we remand a case to a court of appeals for reconsideration when the United States Supreme Court delivers a pertinent decision after the court of appeals has delivered its opinion. In State v. Wagner, 810 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), Presiding Judge McCormick remanded the cause to the court of appeals “for further consideration in light of” Michigan v. Sitz, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). At 208. See also King v. State, 800 S.W.2d 528 (Tex.Cr.App.1990).
The Court of Appeals delivered its opinion on January 17, 1990. The State filed *771its petition for discretionary review on March 27,1990. Appellant filed a response to the State’s petition on May 7, 1990. We granted the State’s petition on June 13, 1990. However, Maryland v. Craig, supra, was not decided until June 27, 1990. Therefore, the Court of Appeals acted without the benefit of the authority we now use to reverse its judgment.
Based on our established policy, we should remand this cause to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Maryland v. Craig, supra. I believe it is improper for a majority of this Court to rely on authority to reverse a “decision” of a court of appeals without first providing that court with an opportunity to resolve the issue by utilizing the same authority. However, if we are to depart from our established policy we should at least provide the bench and bar with an explanation. Unfortunately, the majority opinion is silent on the subject. Therefore, the reason for today’s departure from the policy we “imposed on ourselves” shall remain a mystery.
II. SELF-APPOINTED POLICY MAKER
Rather than remand this cause to the Court of Appeals the majority addresses the confrontation issue and concludes the trial court did not err by permitting the child witness to testify outside of appellant’s presence. I believe the majority not only departs from our proper role as a Court of discretionary review, it also appoints itself “policy maker” for the State of Texas in order to hold that the trial court did not err. For the following reasons, I believe that both the majority’s self-appointment and ultimate conclusion is misguided.
A. The Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-, fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
The majority and I are in general agreement concerning the Sixth Amendment’s provision of confrontation. Justice Scalia thoroughly discussed the Confrontation Clause in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). The Coy Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court’s judgment (which had affirmed Coy’s conviction for sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls) by holding the Sixth Amendment guarantees a face-to-face encounter between the witness and the accused.2
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness “may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts. He can now understand what sort of human being that man is.” [Citation omitted,] It is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person “to his face” than “behind his back.” In the former context, even if the lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly. The Confrontation Clause does not, of course, compel the witness to fix his eyes upon the defendant; he may studiously look elsewhere, but the trier of fact will draw its own conclusions. Thus the right to face-to-face confrontation serves much the same purpose as a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause that *772we have had more frequent occasion to discuss — the right to cross-examine the accuser; both “ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process.” [Citation omitted.] The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential “trauma” that allegedly justified the extraordinary procedure in the present case. That face-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.
Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802.
Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion agreeing the Confrontation Clause was violated, but adding “nothing in today’s decision necessarily dooms such efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses.” Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803 (O’Connor J., joined by White, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general rule of face-to-face confrontation in Maryland v. Craig, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). In Craig, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, succinctly stated the issue:
This case requires us to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television.
Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3160.
The Maryland statute permitted the fact-finder to receive, by one-way closed circuit television, the testimony of a child witness alleged to be the victim of child abuse, if the trial judge first determined that the courtroom testimony of the child victim would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress to the extent that the child could not reasonably communicate. The child in Craig was six years of age. Such a determination was made and the child witness, prosecutor and defense counsel left the courtroom. The child witness was examined and cross-examined in a separate room while a video monitor recorded and displayed the testimony to the judge, jury and defendant in the courtroom. The defendant remained in electronic communication with defense counsel.
Justice O’Connor noted:
We have never held, however, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses against them at trial. Indeed, in Coy v. Iowa, we expressly “le[ft] for another day ... the question whether any exceptions exist” to the “irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: ‘a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.’ ”
Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3163 [emphasis in original].
After noting the many “hearsay exceptions” recognized by the Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor opined:
[A] literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would “abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.” [Citation omitted.] Thus, in certain narrow circumstances, “competing interests, if ‘closely examined’ may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.” ...
In sum, our precedents establish that “the Confrontation Clause reflects a •preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,” [citation omitted] a preference that “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy necessities of the case,” [citation omitted].
That the face-to-face confrontation requirement is not absolute does not, of course, mean that it may easily be dispensed with. As suggested in Coy, our precedents confirm that a defendant’s right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimo*773ny is otherwise assured. [Citations omitted.]
Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3165.
Justice O’Connor then restated the issue: “The critical inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether use of the procedure is necessary to further an important state interest.” Id. at 3167. Justice O’Connor recognized “a significant majority of States has enacted statutes to protect child witnesses from the trauma of giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief in the importance of such public policy.” Id. at 3167. After discussing the legislative history and intent of the Maryland statute, Justice O’Connor and a majority of the Supreme Court refused to “second guess the considered judgment of the Maryland Legislature regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional trauma of testifying.” Id. at 3169.
In short, Coy stands for the general proposition that face-to-face confrontation between the witness and the accused is required under the Sixth Amendment. Craig provides an exception to the general rule when it is necessary to further an important state interest, as established by the legislature, namely, protecting the psychological well-being of child abuse victims.3
B. Is There A Sixth Amendment Exception?
All parties recognize there was no face-to-face confrontation between appellant and the child witness. Accordingly, the question is whether this case falls within the ambit of exception provided by Craig.

i. No Statutory Exception

The majority recognizes that any exception to the general rule of face-to-face confrontation would be found at art. 38.071 Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. As noted by the majority, the State relied upon Art. 38.071 in the case at bar. At 758.4 However, the majority correctly recognizes the statute does not permit a child witness in a murder case to testify outside the physical presence of the accused. At 765. Article 38.-071 provides:
Art. 38.071. Testimony of Child Who is Victim of Offense
Sec. 1. This article applies only to a proceeding in the prosecution of an offense defined by any of the following sections of the Penal Code ...
(1) Section 21.11 (Indecency with a Child);
(2) Section 22.011 (Sexual Assault);
(3) Section 22.02 (Aggravated Assault);
(4) Section 22.021 (Aggravated Sexual Assault);
(5) Section 22.04(b) (Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual);
(6) Section 22.04(c) (Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual), if the conduct is committed intentionally or knowingly;
(7) Section 25.02 (Incest^
(8) Section 25.06 (Solicitation of a Child), if the offense is a felony of the third degree; or
(9) Section 43.25 (Sexual Performance by a Child).
By its express terms, Art. 38.071 applies only to the enumerated offenses. Two things are readily apparent from Sec. 1: First, the Legislature obviously gave a great deal of time and consideration to *774which offenses should be included, and 2) Section 19.02 (Murder) was specifically omitted.
In Ex parte Mclver, 586 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held:
It is a well-known rule of statutory construction in this State and elsewhere that the express mention or enumeration of one person, thing, consequence, or class is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. [Citations omitted.] This rule has been pronounced a logical, sensible, and sound rule of statutory construction. [Citations omitted.]
Therefore, the Legislature, by not including murder in Section 1, expressly excluded that offense.
In Lyons v. State, 812 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), we were asked to determine if a trial court had the authority to fashion a sanction where the State had the video equipment required under Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 670K-1 note, Acts 1983, ch. 303, § 24 but did not to utilize the equipment pursuant to a policy of not videotaping individuals who consented to a breath test. In Lyons we recognized that the Legislature had provided a sanction for such a circumstance, if the State failed to videotape a person arrested for DWI, that failure was admissible at trial. The Lyons Court stated: “If the sanction in the statute proves ineffective to carry out the intent of the statute, it is the Legislature’s prerogative, not the courts’ prerogative, to add further sanctions.” At 340. Therefore, this Court is not authorized to judicially amend Art. 38.071 § 1 to include murder.

ii. No Hearsay Exception

The majority next attempts to find an exception within the Rules of Criminal Evidence. At 758. The Rules of Criminal Evidence provide twenty-seven separate exceptions to the prohibition of hearsay evidence; however, those exceptions do not cover the circumstances of the case at bar. In fact, this Court unanimously reversed two convictions recently where hearsay evidence was admitted without a recognized exception to the hearsay prohibition. See Deeb v. State, 815 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), and Meador v. State, 812 S.W.2d 330 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

Hi. A Public Policy Exception?

Failing to find either a statutory or evi-dentiary exception providing for less than face-to-face confrontation between the accused and a child witness in a murder case, the majority addresses the issue of public policy:
True, in Craig, the Supreme Court did talk in terms of the “State mak[ing] an adequate showing of necessity [such that] the state interest in protecting the child witness from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure_” — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. at 3169, 111 L.Ed.2d at 685. And we recognize that in Coy the Court intimated that exceptions to face-to-face confrontation “would ... be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy.” 487 U.S. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. at 2803. [footnote omitted] But we see no reason why an expression of this important public policy must necessarily be in the form of an act or statute. More importantly, we have found nothing in any pertinent opinion from this Court or from the Supreme Court that would permit only the Legislature to make this “public policy’’ determination on behalf of the State.
At 765.
This conclusion presents three distinct questions: a) Where should public policy be formulated? b) Who has the authority to establish public policy? and c) What is the public policy?
a. Traditional public policy formulation
Traditionally, legislative bodies have been considered the proper fora for the formulation of public policy. In that process, legislation is publicly introduced in the form of a bill. The bill is then assigned to a committee. The committee conducts public hearings on the proposed legislation to hear testimony from proponents and opponents of the legislation. The bill then *775goes to the floor of the legislative body for full debate and a record vote. This process provides an opportunity for every Texan to participate in the public policy debate, by either personally testifying before the committee or through the recorded vote of his/her duly elected representative.
On the other hand, the judiciary is ill-equipped to formulate public policy. Appellate judges deal with a particular set of facts and should constrain themselves to address only the legal issues raised in that factual scenario. Par from being accessible to the public, only lawyers have an opportunity to communicate with appellate judges and even their communication is limited to the particular case under submission. Their communication is highly structured in the form of appellate briefs and oral arguments which are limited to the appellate record and the particular grounds for review. Other than the briefs and oral arguments, appellate courts operate in a totally secret environment. In fact the secrecy is so guarded that it is a felony offense to prematurely reveal the result or content of a proposed or actual opinion to any person outside the confines of the particular appellate court. Sec. 39.03 Tex.Penal Code Ann.
In a democracy, public policy is better formulated in the bright light of legislative debate rather than behind the closed doors of an appellate conference room. The majority should exercise judicial restraint and leave the formulation of the State’s public policy to the Legislature.
b. Is there authority for an appellate court to establish public policy?
One should question whether an appellate court has the authority to establish public policy. The majority can find no precedent authorizing this Court to establish public policy. I believe the lack of precedent is sufficient reason not to enter into an area reserved for the Legislature, rather than authority for so doing.
The majority grabs the authority to establish public policy by holding: “We understand and readily accept that we are at liberty to interpret our Constitution as providing greater safeguards than those provided under the federal constitution.” At 764. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Unquestionably, we have the authority to interpret our Constitution; however, the authority to interpret our Constitution should not be transformed into the power to usurp the authority of the Legislature.
Article 2, § 1 of the Texas Constitution provides:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another, and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
I believe the majority violates the separation of powers doctrine by acting as 1) the Legislature by amending Art. 38.071; 2) as the Executive by ratifying the amendment; and 3) as the Judiciary by passing upon the constitutionality of the amendment. We should practice what we preach. See Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).
We should act in a slow, cautious and judicious manner consistent with our oath to preserve and protect our Constitution. We are not authorized to establish public policy; that function is constitutionally delegated to the Legislature.
c. Is it really public policy?
To determine public policy we should consider the actions of the recently completed Regular Session of the 72nd Legislature. Appellant was convicted on July 7, 1988. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on January 17, 1990. The 72nd Legislature convened, almost one year later, on January 8, 1991. The 72nd Legislature considered Senate Bill No. 1326 which pro*776posed amending Art. 38.071 to permit a child to testify outside of the presence of a defendant if the child witnessed a murder. However, the legislation did not pass, in fact it never even reached the House floor for debate.5
If the proposed amendment to Art. 38.-071 could not pass the Legislature how can the majority proclaim that its actions today are in response to “unquestionable” public policy? At 766. Under such reasoning, the mere introduction of a bill establishes public policy or, stated another way, inaction by the Legislature on proposed legislation establishes public policy for the State. If this were true, every piece of legislation that died during the 72nd Legislature established public policy for the State of Texas.
I believe the majority confuses public policy with “prosecutorial innovation.” At 765. A “prosecutorial innovation” which is neither statutorily permitted nor Constitutionally authorized is not public policy.
C. Necessity
A determination of public policy is only the threshold question. Craig has a second prong, a case-specific finding of necessity. Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3169. In the case at bar no expert testimony was offered in support of the State’s motion. However, two witnesses did testify: Alverez, an employee of the District Attorney’s Office, whose job it was to prepare child witnesses for trial; and Ramos, the child’s grandmother. At 759.
In Craig, the trial judge made a determination of necessity based upon expert testimony which substantiated that the child witness would suffer serious emotional distress to the extent the witness could not reasonably communicate. Craig, Id. at 3161.
The majority glosses over this prong by merely stating: “the trial court’s case-specific determination that a certain procedure akin to that used in Craig was needed to protect the child witness.” At 766. Additionally, the majority fails to address that portion of the Court of Appeals opinion stating:
It is true that in a supplemental transcript there is found “Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,” which instrument is undated and bears no file mark, although recorded in the minutes of the district court. The “findings of facts” are mere recitations of facts, listing appellant's objections and the State’s arguments. They do not involve the resolution of any factual dispute. [Emphasis added.] The “conclusions of law” are broad and general. The first states that the closed circuit system was necessary to further “the essential state interest in the protection of this child witness.” [Emphasis in original.] The “interest”is *777not otherwise identified. No statute is cited and no evidence is referred to as establishing such public policy. [Emphasis added.] The second conclusion is more of a finding of fact referring to “severe trauma” necessitating the use of television. The third conclusion merely states that the Coy requirements were met.
Gonzales, 784 S.W.2d at 728.
The Court of Appeals is correct. Such generalized findings and conclusions are insufficient under both Coy and Craig.
III. CONCLUSION
The record in this case discloses the brutal and senseless killing of a child. Clearly, this is an emotional case for all concerned and we, as appellate judges, are not insulated from our emotions by the cold appellate record. However, we must resist the urge to turn our heads and ignore the mandates of the United States Constitution. We are sworn to uphold that hallowed document and resist the temptation to give in to our emotional sense of justice. As Justice Scalia said in Coy: “It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.” Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2802.
For the foregoing reasons, I would follow the established policy of this Court and remand the cause to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Maryland v. Craig, supra. However, since the majority departs from that policy and addresses the merits, I would conclude that the actions of the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.6 Because the majority neither remands the case nor recognizes the violation, I respectfully lodge this dissent.

. All emphasis herein is supplied by author unless otherwise indicated.

. The majority specifically notes that the lead opinion in Coy received only four votes. At 760. Unfortunately, we cannot expect anything more from today’s United States Supreme Court. See, James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991). Additionally, the lead opinion in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), received just four votes but has been considered by this Court as authority when determining the constitutionality of Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071.

. The majority states: ”[W]e do not read Coy or Craig as mandating some sort of enabling statute for the trial court’s actions." At 766. I believe the majority's interpretation of Coy and Craig is erroneous because both cases addressed the constitutionality of enabling statutes. In Coy the State argued that the statute created a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma. 108 S.Ct. at 2803. In Craig Justice O’Connor specifically lists the statutory enactments oí the various states designed to protect the child witness in her search to find public policy. Craig 110 S.Ct. at 3167 nn. 2, 3 and 4. Also in Craig Justice O’Connor specifically declined to second guess the Maryland Legislature. 110 S.Ct. at 3169. Neither opinion suggests that a court could, on its own motion, admit non-confrontational testimony.

. Appellant’s sole point of error on direct appeal, with which the Court of Appeals agreed, was:
The trial court erred in allowing a child-witness to testify by means of closed circuit TV under TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.071 (testimony of child who is victim of offense).

. On the issue of legislative intent the majority states:
While we might find that Article 38.071 was not intended to cover the exact situation before us, that Article is a clear indication to us that the Legislature has recognized the importance of protecting the young from the turmoil associated with having to give testimony in a courtroom and because of such it has acted to eliminate or alleviate that trauma within the parameters of the Constitution.

******

Thus, Article 38.071 denotes a general legislative intent to protect the youth of this State from the trauma associated with testifying in a courtroom and this should be weighed as a factor in favor of upholding the trial court’s decision in the case before us, not as the Court of Appeals would have it, as a factor to be weighed against the trial court’s action.
At 765, n. 16.
If the Legislature’s intent is to protect a child witness from a generalized fear of the courtroom such an intent is unconstitutional and contrary to Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(1). In Craig, Justice O’Connor made it clear that before a child witness is permitted to testify outside of the presence of the defendant:
The trial court must also find that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant. [Citations omitted.] Denial of face-to-face confrontation is not needed to further the state interest in protecting the child witness from trauma unless it is the presence of the defendant that causes the trauma. In other words, if the state interest were merely the interest of protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial of face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because the child could be permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit with the defendant present.
Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3169.

. Because the Sixth Amendment has been violated there is no reason to determine the propriety of the trial court’s actions in light of the Texas Constitution.