Court Opinion

ID: 9963455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:01:47.410731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:50.818515
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12279    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 04/25/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12279
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       STEVEN GARCIA,
                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00554-MSS-JSS-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12279

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Steven Garcia appeals his sentence of 24 months of impris-
       onment, arguing that it is both procedurally and substantively un-
       reasonable. We disagree. In both procedure and substance, Gar-
       cia’s sentence is eminently reasonable. So we affirm.
                                         I.

              Several years ago, Garcia was on supervised release after
       serving time for second-degree burglary. He was found with weap-
       ons and drugs, and he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession
       of a firearm. He served more time and was out on supervision
       when he again violated several of the conditions of his supervised
       release. He used drugs. He did not keep in touch with probation.
       He even moved without informing his probation officer. What
       prompted charges, though, was a chase. Police saw him speeding
       and attempted to pull him over. He fled at high speeds to avoid
       arrest. His supervised release was revoked. And he was haled to
       court to face a fresh sentence for violating the conditions of his re-
       lease. The district court imposed a sentence of 24 months of im-
       prisonment, varying upward from the guideline range of 8 to 14
       months. Believing that to be an unreasonable sentence, Garcia ap-
       pealed.
                                        II.

             The governing standard of review is unclear, but it does not
       matter. Typically, we review sentencing decisions for an abuse of
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       23-12279               Opinion of the Court                          3

       discretion. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir.
       2009). But when a defendant offered only general objections at sen-
       tencing, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Parks,
       823 F.3d 990, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2016).
              At sentencing, Garcia merely objected that the sentence was
       procedurally and substantively unreasonable, without specifying
       more. Our precedents make it unclear whether that sort of objec-
       tion is general or specific. United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299,
       1319–20 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom, J., concurring) (collecting
       cases). That means that we cannot be sure whether plain error or
       abuse of discretion governs here. No matter. Even under the latter,
       more defendant-friendly standard, Garcia still loses.
                                        III.

              “In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence on appeal,
       this court . . . follows a two-step process. We must first determine
       whether the sentence is procedurally reasonable, and then deter-
       mine whether it is substantively appropriate.” United States v.
       Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009).
                                         A.

              We will start with whether Garcia’s sentence is procedurally
       unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “lists seven factors that a sentenc-
       ing court must consider.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6
       (2007). “In assessing procedural reasonableness, a court’s failure to
       consider the [relevant] § 3553(a) factors constitutes significant pro-
       cedural error.” United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-12279

       Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). “[A] court’s consideration of an improper
       § 3553(a) factor is likewise erroneous.” Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) gov-
       erns sentencing after the revocation of supervision and lists the rel-
       evant Section 3553(a) factors to consider.
              Garcia argues that his sentence was procedurally unreason-
       able for two main reasons.
              First, Garcia says the district court failed to consider a rele-
       vant Section 3553(a) factor in sentencing him. What’s the alleged
       ignored factor? It is a Sentencing Commission policy statement
       providing that a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervision
       “should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust” for fail-
       ing to abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.
       U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. comment 3(b). Garcia says the district
       court did not base its sentence on a breach of trust. He is mistaken.
       Though the district court recognized “that the underlying crime
       was … not a real pretty one,” it noted that “the real reason for the
       upward variance is the total abscondment” from supervision. That
       statement of the “real reason” refers to Garcia’s breach of trust.
              Second, Garcia says that the district court considered an im-
       proper Section 3553(a) factor. Specifically, he says it considered the
       seriousness of his violation and the need for just punishment,
       which are not listed among the relevant Section 3553(a) factors in
       Section 3583. To start, it is not clear that those are improper factors.
       After all, the very policy statement Garcia points to permits consid-
       ering those factors “to a limited degree.” Id. Moreover, the district
       court did not focus on those factors. The district court focused on
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       23-12279               Opinion of the Court                          5

       “abscondment.” It emphasized that “Garcia was found in . . . a dan-
       gerous high speed and erratic chase … after total abscondment.”
       And therefore, the district court found that “the [Section] 3553 fac-
       tors, especially public safety . . . support this upward variance.” The
       district court did not focus on seriousness or just punishment, but
       rather the need to protect the public, which is listed among the Sec-
       tion 3553(a) factors that Section 3583(e) directs courts to consider.
             So we conclude that Garcia’s sentence is not procedurally
       unreasonable.
                                         B.

              We next consider whether Garcia’s sentence is substantively
       unreasonable. A district court imposes a substantively unreasona-
       ble sentence when it: “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
       factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight
       to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
       judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey,
       612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks
       omitted). We will vacate the defendant’s sentence only if “we are
       left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
       committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) fac-
       tors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reason-
       able sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190 (quota-
       tion marks omitted).
              Garcia argues that his sentence was substantively unreason-
       able for three main reasons, which somewhat mirror his proce-
       dural arguments.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                    23-12279

               First, Garcia says that the district court did not give sufficient
       weight to the policy statement discussed above, which directs dis-
       trict courts to base sentences imposed upon revocation of supervi-
       sion primarily on the defendant’s breach of trust. But, as explained
       above, the district court gave that statement great weight, if not
       explicitly. It said that “the real reason for the upward variance is the
       total abscondment” from supervision. That suggests that it based
       its sentence primarily on Garcia’s breach of trust.
              Second, Garcia says that the district court improperly af-
       forded significant weight to the seriousness of his underlying of-
       fense. Again, not so. As noted above, it is not clear that this factor
       is an improper one. More importantly, the district court didn’t fo-
       cus on it. Instead, it discussed the facts of his offense in considering
       “public safety,” which is a factor the statute directs district courts
       to consider.
              Third, Garcia says that the district court committed a clear
       error of judgment in imposing an upward variance. Not so. A dis-
       trict court has “considerable discretion” in determining whether
       the Section 3553(a) factors justify any variance. United States v.
       Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court noted
       that this was no ordinary revocation of supervision. After all, Gar-
       cia did not just violate the terms of his supervised release. Rather,
       he did so in a dangerous fashion: he fled from authorities, leading
       them on a high-speed chase. The district court was especially wor-
       ried about Garcia’s threat to public safety, beyond the normal dan-
       ger that typical post-revocation defendants pose. Faced with this
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       23-12279              Opinion of the Court                       7

       record, we cannot say that we have a “definite and firm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” Irey,
       612 F.3d at 1190.
                                      IV.

             Because it did not impose a procedurally or substantively
       unreasonable sentence, the district court is AFFIRMED.