Court Opinion

ID: 9771209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:03.988119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:38:13.707508
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result reached. I personally do not agree with all of the reasoning expressed in Point I, the point involving waiver of trial by jury. See dissenting opinion, Dudley, Bolt v. State, CR-93-281 (Ark. October 11, 1993). However, the majority has decided this issue, and I now accept that decision. I write because of a concern I have with Point III, which involves an implied consent form. We have had a number of appeals involving these forms over the last decade, and some of the cases have demonstrated some confusion by the police about the advice to be given motorists who are arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Normally, the police are required to advise a motorist on three separate and distinct matters. These three are the detained motorist’s Miranda rights, a request that the detainee take a chemical test, and that the detainee can have a second chemical test at his own expense. I write this concurring opinion solely for the benefit of a prosecuting attorney, city attorney, or deputy prosecutor or deputy city attorney, or police instructor, who might wish to advise police about the forms. In many of the cases, the first thing that happens after a motorist is taken to the police station is the motorist is given a Miranda warning about his right against self-incrimination. The motorist is told that anything he says can and will be used against him, that he has a right to remain silent, and that he has a right to counsel. Shortly afterwards, an officer asks the motorist if he will take a chemical test of his blood, breath, or urine. Some motorists, having just heard their Miranda rights, choose to remain silent and ask for a lawyer before they take the test. See Wright v. State, 288 Ark. 209, 703 S.W.2d 850 (1986). The motorist may not understand the distinction between the Miranda warning against self-incrimination and consequences of the refusal to take a chemical test. They may not know they have already given an implied consent to the chemical test merely by operating an automobile, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-202 (Supp. 1993), or that enforcement of the implied consent law does not violate the provision against self-incrimination, Steele v. State, 284 Ark. 340, 681 S.W.2d 354 (1984), or that the failure to take the test can result in the loss of one’s driver’s license. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-205 (Supp. 1993). 868 S.W.2d 43 Doug Norwood, for appellant. Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee. . Thus, it would seem appropriate for the officer to first advise the motorist of his Miranda rights, and then to carefully tell the motorist that the chemical test is not protected under the Miranda warning and that the failure to take the chemical test will likely result in the loss of his driver’s license. It seems only fair for the officer to make the distinction clear. Under the statutes, the policeman must still give a third warning to the motorist. He must advise the motorist that he can have an additional chemical test at his own expense if he so chooses. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-204(e) (Supp. 1993). I concur in every respect with the majority opinion on this point in this case. I write this concurrence solely to set out the distinctness and separateness of the three warnings the police must give in conjunction with the implied consent to chemical test of motorists.