Court Opinion

ID: 9759527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:24.316476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.619703
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, Justice,
dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the other members of the panel, I would like to record my respectful dissent.
I agree with Relator Murry B. Cohen’s first contention that James Scott's petitions do not comply with TEX.ELEC.CODE ANN. § 141.062(a)(2) (Vernon 1986), which requires valid signatures in the number specified by the Code for a petition to be lawful. Section 141.063(2)(A) provides that a signature on a petition is valid if it includes the signer’s residence address. It is well established that the requirements of section 141.063 are mandatory and that a candidate must be in strict compliance with the Code. Gray v. Vance, 567 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1978, no writ) (orig. proceeding). Residence address is defined by section 1.005(17) of the Election Code as:
the street address and any apartment number ... and the city, state, and zip code that correspond to a person’s residence. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, to be valid, the signatures on Scott’s petitions must contain the street address, the city, the state, and the zip code. Exclusion of any of this information renders the signature invalid, because it does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements.
In the instant case only thirteen of Scott’s signatures contain the state of residence. Therefore, Scott has only thirteen valid signatures, which is far below the number required. It is Respondent’s duty to refuse to accept Scott’s application and petitions because they do not contain the minimum number of valid signatures. Because Respondent has failed to follow his statutory duties, I would order that he do so immediately.
It is well established that the requirements of the Election Code must be strictly construed and followed. In Jones v. Mather, 709 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (orig. proceeding), this court stated “[w]e must strictly construe the filing deadline to ensure compliance.” Similarly, in Wallace v. Howell, 707 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.1986), the court made it clear, over a strong dissent, that election statutes would be strictly con*369strued and enforced. In Gray, 567 S.W.2d at 17, the court held that the specific requirements at issue in this case were mandatory, and required strict compliance.
Accordingly, in the instant case, the requirements must be strictly construed and enforced by Respondent. His failure to do so requires that he be ORDERED to comply with his statutory duties.
I would grant leave to Relator to file his petition for writ of mandamus and grant his writ.