Court Opinion

ID: 9366243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 15:04:09.234724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.931037
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30514     Document: 00516429504          Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/11/2022

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                       August 11, 2022
                                   No. 21-30514                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Tracie T. Borel, on behalf of her minor children, AL and RB;
   Genevieve Dartez, on behalf of her great-grandchild, DD,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                       versus

   School Board Saint Martin Parish,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant,

                                       versus

   United States of America,

                                                            Intervenor—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                           USDC No: 6:65-CV-11314

   Before Higginbotham, Haynes, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Haynes, Circuit Judge:
          We again revisit this school desegregation case, which has been
   pending in federal court for over five decades. In this appeal, the St. Martin
   Parish School Board (the “School Board”) challenges the district court’s
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   (1) exercise of remedial jurisdiction over the case, (2) denial of its motion for
   unitary status, and (3) imposition of additional equitable relief. For the
   reasons set forth below, we conclude that the district court properly retained
   remedial jurisdiction over the action; we otherwise AFFIRM in part and
   REVERSE in part.

                                              I.

          Our earlier opinion, Thomas ex rel. D.M.T. v. School Board St. Martin
   Parish, 756 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2014), sets forth the full factual and procedural
   background of this case. Id. at 382–83. We discuss only the facts relevant to
   the current appeal here.
          In 1965, Plaintiffs-Appellees—students in the St. Martin Parish
   School District (the “District”)—filed a suit for injunctive relief under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the School Board was operating a segregated
   school system in violation of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
   The district court determined that the School Board had engaged in
   intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
   Fourteenth Amendment and ordered the parties to work together to
   implement a desegregation plan. After several years of remedial efforts, the
   district court issued an order (the “1974 Order”) enjoining the School Board
   from taking further discriminatory actions and moving the case to the inactive
   docket. The case remained there, undisturbed, for several decades.
          In 2009, the case became active again when it was reassigned to a new
   judge. The School Board moved to dismiss, arguing that jurisdiction had
   lapsed. The district court disagreed, determining that the 1974 Order did not
   resolve whether vestiges of past discrimination remained, and therefore the
   case was still alive. The School Board appealed, and we affirmed. Thomas,
   756 F.3d at 387. We concluded that the 1974 Order was not a final order
   dismissing the case, and we remanded to the district court to determine

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   whether “the vestiges of de jure segregation had been eliminated as far as
   practicable.” Id. at 387–88 (quotation omitted).
          On remand, the parties engaged in discovery related primarily to the
   six areas of operation relevant to unitary status, as identified by the Supreme
   Court in Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The parties
   engaged in settlement negotiations and subsequently entered into a series of
   consent orders, which were eventually consolidated into a superseding
   consent order reflecting the parties’ respective obligations. Under this order,
   the School Board agreed to “take affirmative action to disestablish all, if any,
   remaining vestiges of the former de jure segregated system and to eliminate
   all, if any, remaining effects of that prior dual school system to the extent
   practicable.” Under the district court’s supervision, the case marched on.
          Five years after we remanded to the district court, the School Board
   moved for a finding of unitary status in the remaining Green areas. Plaintiffs
   opposed, as did the United States as intervenor.           The district court
   conducted an evidentiary hearing and subsequently granted in part and
   denied in part the School Board’s motion. As relevant to this appeal, it
   (1) concluded that the School Board failed to achieve unitary status in the
   Green areas of student assignment, faculty assignment, and quality of
   education; and (2) ordered further equitable relief, including the closure of
   one school in the District, Catahoula Elementary School. The School Board
   timely appealed.
          A brief overview of the District is helpful in understanding the present
   dispute. The District educates over 7400 students and employs around 480
   faculty members across sixteen schools that are divided into four attendance
   zones. The zone relevant to this appeal, St. Martinville Zone, includes three
   elementary schools: Catahoula Elementary School, the Early Learning
   Center, and St. Martinville Primary. Catahoula Elementary School serves

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   students from Pre-K to 5th Grade. The Early Learning Center serves
   students from Pre-K to 1st Grade. Students at the Early Learning Center
   then matriculate to St. Martinville Primary, which serves students from 2nd
   Grade to 5th Grade.
          The parties agree that prior to 1965—the year the District’s students
   launched the initial litigation—Catahoula Elementary School was a “white
   school.” Its student body has continued to be virtually all-white ever since.
   By contrast, the Early Learning Center and St. Martinville Primary had
   student bodies consisting primarily of Black students. Since this court
   remanded the case in 2014, the School Board attempted to resolve the
   imbalance by implementing several transfer and STEM programs;
   nevertheless, the student body of Catahoula Elementary School, the Early
   Learning Center, and St. Martinville Primary remain racially imbalanced.

                                              II.

          We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1292(a)(1). See Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 843 F.3d 198, 200 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“In the school desegregation context, the courts of
   appeals routinely exercise appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) over
   orders . . . that impose a continuing supervisory function on the
   court. . . .[E]ach such injunction is appealable regardless of finality.”
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, the School Board
   challenges the district court’s ongoing ability to exercise remedial
   jurisdiction over this case. Thus, we review the district court’s exercise of
   remedial jurisdiction de novo. Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d
   192, 198 (5th Cir. 2000).
          In an ongoing institutional reform case like this one, jurisdiction
   extends to the “the correction of the constitutional infirmity.” Brumfield v.
   La. St. Bd. of Educ., 806 F.3d 289, 298 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).

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   A district court has the continuing ability to order affirmative relief to cure
   violations flowing from the original constitutional violation, Milliken v.
   Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977), and must retain jurisdiction over a school
   desegregation case until the vestiges of past segregation have been eliminated
   to the extent practicable, Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Madison Cnty., 517 F.3d 292,
   294 (5th Cir. 2008); accord Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d
   1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983) (explaining that until a school board “eliminate[s]
   ‘root and branch’ the system wide-effects” of past discrimination, a district
   court “must retain jurisdiction to ensure that the present effects of past
   segregation are completely removed”).
          Relatedly, a district court may also obtain remedial authority over
   litigation from a party’s voluntary entrance into a consent decree. See Smith
   v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., 906 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2018). As we have
   recognized, “[c]onsent decrees are hybrid creatures, part contract and part
   judicial decree”—they represent the “agreement of the parties” and
   subsequently “create[] the obligations” that the parties must abide by. Id.
   (quoting Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v.
   Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 521-22 (1986)). As such, we have held that a district
   court may “enforce desegregation obligations incorporated into a consent
   decree against a party that entered that decree.” Id.
          Guided by these principles, we are satisfied of the district court’s
   remedial jurisdiction in this case. The School Board’s main objection to the
   contrary is that the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated to the
   extent practicable—it argues that there is no causal connection between the
   pre-1965 dual-school system and any remaining racial imbalances present in
   the District.    In the absence of vestiges flowing from the original
   constitutional violation, the School Board urges that the district court lacks
   jurisdiction to order additional relief.

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          We disagree. The School Board’s position is fatally undermined by
   its own post-remand actions in this case. After we instructed the district
   court to determine whether “vestiges of de jure segregation remained,” the
   School Board did not argue for a lack of vestiges—instead, for five years, it
   engaged in extensive discovery, conceded that it was no longer “seeking a
   finding of unitary status” in student assignment, and entered into several
   consent orders contradicting this very argument. The School Board agreed
   to the binding effect of the consent order and voluntarily assumed the
   obligation to “provide educational programs and services without
   discriminating on the basis of race and in a manner that does not perpetuate
   or further racial segregation” and to take “remedial measures . . . to
   eliminate, to the extent practicable, the vestiges of the former segregated
   system in the District.”
          The School Board’s concessions and voluntary actions in the post-
   remand proceedings are fatal to its jurisdictional challenge in two ways. First,
   the School Board’s agreement to consent orders intended to eliminate
   vestiges, rather than contesting whether any vestiges exist leads us to the
   conclusion that facts support the remainder of such vestiges of segregation.
   Therefore, the district court may continue to issue relief to cure that
   constitutional violation. See Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282. Second, the School
   Board’s assumption of obligations under the superseding consent order
   confers remedial jurisdiction on the district court to enforce those
   obligations. See Smith, 906 F.3d at 334. In light of these two considerations,
   we hold that the district court properly exercised its continuing remedial
   jurisdiction over the case.

                                          III.

          Having concluded that the district court had jurisdiction, we now turn
   to the merits. The School Board first challenges the district court’s denial of

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   unitary status. Because a unitary determination is a factual finding, we review
   for clear error. Anderson, 517 F.3d at 296. A finding is clearly erroneous when
   “the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been committed” even if some evidence exists
   to support the finding. Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S.
   564, 573 (1985)).
            In the school desegregation context, the Supreme Court has
   instructed that the ultimate goal of litigation is to “transition to a unitary,
   nonracial system of public education.” See Green, 391 U.S. at 436. Because
   “‘unitary’ is not a precise concept,” Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487
   (1992), the Supreme Court has identified certain features of the school
   system that must be freed from racial discrimination before the desegregation
   process will be deemed successful: student assignment, faculty assignment,
   staff assignment, facilities and resources, transportation, and extracurricular
   activities, Green, 391 U.S. at 435. Other ancillary factors, such as quality of
   education, are also relevant. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 482–83. To achieve
   unitary status in each of these areas, a defendant district is required to
   demonstrate that it has (1) “complied in good faith with desegregation
   orders” for a period of at least three years and (2) “eliminated the vestiges
   of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable.” Anderson, 517 F.3d at
   297; see United States v. Fletcher ex rel. Fletcher, 882 F.3d 151, 157–60 (5th Cir.
   2018).
            The district court here determined that the School Board failed to
   achieve unitary status in three categories: student assignment, faculty
   assignment, and quality of education (including discipline and graduation
   pathways). We address each in turn.
            First, as to student assignment, the district court found that the
   School Board failed both requirements of the unitary test. At the vestiges

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   prong, the district court observed that the School Board did not meet its
   desegregation goals in several schools in the St. Martinville Zone, including
   Catahoula Elementary School, St. Martinville Primary, and the Early
   Learning Center—Catahoula Elementary School remained predominantly
   white, and consequently, St. Martinville Primary and the Early Learning
   Center remained predominantly Black. The district court found that these
   racial imbalances were vestiges of de jure segregation because Catahoula
   Elementary School was, prior to 1965, built in an all-white town for white
   students.
          We conclude that this finding was plausible in light of the record.
   We’ve previously recognized that, “during the de jure segregation era[,]
   schools were built to accommodate students by race in areas where
   population was predominantly of a single race.” United States v. Lawrence
   Cnty. Sch. Dist., 799 F.2d 1031, 1044 (5th Cir. 1986). As such, we’ve noted
   that because “persons normally gravitate toward[s] the schools that serve
   them, the intentional acts by” a school district “before desegregation” could
   insure “that the immediate communities around these schools would be of
   one race.” Id. Thus, if, as the district court found, the School Board here
   intentionally built Catahoula Elementary School in an all-white town during
   de jure segregation, “[t]he very demographic factors that [currently]
   separate residential areas by race” in the St. Martinville Zone “are in part a
   vestige of past segregative practices by the [School] Board.” Id. at 1043–44.
          At the evidentiary hearing, an expert witness testified that Catahoula
   Elementary School was historically an all-white school, has remained
   virtually all-white in the interim period, and therefore has been persistently
   racially identifiable. The district court gave credit to that testimony, and the
   School Board failed to present any countervailing evidence contradicting the
   District’s intent in selecting Catahoula Elementary School’s location. In the
   absence of such evidence, and because we must give substantial deference to

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   the district court’s factual findings, see Anderson, 517 F.3d at 296, we
   conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the
   remaining racial imbalances are vestiges of de jure segregation.
          We similarly find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the
   School Board failed at the compliance prong—this conclusion too is plausibly
   supported by the record. The parties agreed that the School Board’s efforts
   in eliminating racial imbalances in student assignment would be assessed by
   a plus or minus fifteen percentage point (+/- 15%) variance standard (as
   memorialized in the superseding consent order). This standard would assess
   whether the percentage of Black or white students enrolled in a particular
   school exceeded +/- 15% of the District-wide actual enrollment of Black
   students from that grade band (i.e., elementary school, middle school, high
   school). A school with enrollment demographics outside the variance would
   be considered a racially identifiable school. The undisputed objective data
   demonstrates that the School Board failed to satisfy that standard in several
   schools. Because the School Board failed at its own agreed-upon metric, the
   district court did not clearly err in finding a lack of compliance with the
   desegregation order.
          Second, as to faculty assignment, the district court similarly found
   that the School Board failed to remedy vestiges of de jure segregation and to
   demonstrate good-faith compliance with the superseding consent order. On
   the compliance prong, the district court noted the numerous ways in which
   the School Board’s efforts in the recruitment, hiring, and retention of Black
   teachers fell short of the requirements imposed by the superseding consent
   order: a decrease in the number of Black teachers at high schools in the
   District, a failure to recruit Black faculty from programs with diverse
   applicants, and a disregard for other potential recruitment methods of Black
   candidates. These findings were amply supported by testimony from expert
   witnesses and the District’s Supervisor of Human Capital. Accordingly, we

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   conclude that the district court did not clearly err in denying unitary status
   as to faculty assignment based on the School Board’s lack of “sustained good
   faith effort.” Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Stafford, 651 F.2d 1133,
   1140 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981).
          Finally, the district court found that the School Board failed to comply
   with its obligations regarding two subsets of the quality of education
   category—graduation pathways and student discipline. Because quality of
   education falls under the “ancillary factor” category, it does not present
   specific legal requirements. Instead, the School Board’s obligations to
   remove vestiges of segregation in graduation pathways and student discipline
   are governed by the superseding consent order. See Smith, 906 F.3d at 334.
          With regard to graduation pathways, the superseding consent order
   required the School Board to “take steps to eliminate and avoid, to the extent
   practicable, racial disparities in all diploma programs District-wide and to
   increase Black student enrollment in the most academically rigorous and
   college preparatory programs in its secondary schools.” But the School
   Board failed to do so—far fewer Black students selected the more
   academically challenging graduation pathways. Similarly, as to student
   discipline, the superseding consent order required the School Board to
   “administer[] student discipline in a fair and non-discriminatory manner”
   and to “ensure that students remain[ed] in the regular classroom
   environment to the greatest extent possible.” But the district court found
   that the School Board failed to resolve racial imbalances here as well—more
   Black students received punitive and exclusionary disciplinary methods than
   white students.
          We determine that the district court’s conclusions here were not
   clearly erroneous. In its thorough opinion, the district court enumerated the
   specific tasks that the School Board was required to undertake in order to

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   reduce racial disparities in graduation pathways and student discipline
   pursuant to the superseding consent order—yet, the record evidence flatly
   demonstrates that the School Board failed to take those actions. We must
   give substantial deference to the district court’s factual findings and
   credibility determinations. Having done so, we conclude that the district
   court’s determinations are substantially and plausibly supported by the
   record, and we see no reason to disturb them on appeal.
             To sum up, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
   determining that the School Board failed to achieve unitary status in student
   assignment, faculty assignment, and the quality of education. The denial of
   unitary status was, therefore, not clearly erroneous. We thus affirm that
   decision and remand for continuing oversight of the efforts to reach unitary
   status.

                                            IV.

             Having affirmed the district court’s decision regarding unitary status,
   we turn to the other decision opposed by the School Board:               closing
   Catahoula Elementary School.
             To start, we recognize that “[t]he fashioning of relief in a school
   desegregation case is an exercise of the district court’s discretion in creating
   an equitable remedy.” Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd. (Valley I), 646 F.2d 925,
   938 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). Accordingly, our review of desegregation
   remedies is limited to ascertaining whether the district court abused its
   discretion. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971);
   Valley v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd. (Valley II), 702 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1983).
   When determining “the validity of provisions in a desegregation plan,” we
   evaluate whether the imposed remedy is “reasonably related to the ultimate
   objective” of desegregation. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1983)

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   (quotation omitted); United States v. CRUCIAL, 722 F.2d 1182, 1189 (5th
   Cir. 1983).
           We have recognized “that the existence of a few racially homogenous
   schools within a school system is not per se offensive to the Constitution.”
   Valley II, 702 F.2d at 1226. But the Supreme Court has instructed us to give
   “close scrutiny” to predominantly one-race schools to ensure that “school
   assignments are not part of state-enforced segregation.” Swann, 402 U.S. at
   26. Accordingly, we have held that racially homogenous schools are not
   permissible “where reasonable alternatives may be implemented.” Valley II,
   702 F.2d at 1226. But we’ve also rejected the idea that a school board must
   implement “awkward, inconvenient, or even bizarre” measures where
   remaining racial imbalances are due to independent demographic forces.
   Hull v. Quitman Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, we’ve encouraged district
   courts to achieve the ultimate goal of desegregation through “reasonable,
   feasible, and workable” remedies, particularly in the later phases of court
   supervision. Davis, 721 F.2d at 1434 (quotation omitted); see Hull, 1 F.3d at
   1454.
           Balancing these considerations, we conclude that the district court
   erred in closing Catahoula Elementary School. Although we are mindful of
   the discretion afforded to the district court’s choice of equitable remedy,
   “school closures . . . as desegregation techniques require careful scrutiny.”
   CRUCIAL, 722 F.2d at 1189; see also Valley I, 646 F.2d at 940. Indeed, “[t]he
   closing of a facility built and maintained at the expense of local taxpayers is a
   harsh remedy, which should only be employed if absolutely necessary to
   achieve the goal of a unitary system after all other reasonable alternatives
   have been explored.” Valley I, 646 F.2d at 940. The district court’s closure
   of Catahoula Elementary School at this stage in the proceedings does not
   align with our precedent.

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          There’s no doubt that closing Catahoula Elementary School was a
   harsh remedy. At the evidentiary hearing, one witness testified generally that
   closing a school in a small community is a very traumatic experience and
   closing Catahoula Elementary School specifically would cause a loss to the
   entire community. Another witness posited that Catahoula Elementary
   School, along with the church, was one of the main pillars of the community.
   That witness observed that the school generally had positive performance
   scores and a lack of disciplinary issues.
          For several reasons, we doubt whether this extreme remedy was
   “absolutely necessary” to achieve desegregation. See Valley I, 646 F.2d at
   940.   First, Plaintiffs’ expert witness conceded that closing Catahoula
   Elementary School would not necessarily create immediate compliance with
   the +/- 15% variance. Indeed, even if every student currently at Catahoula
   Elementary School attended the Early Learning Center and St. Martinville
   Primary, the School Board would still have to implement other programs to
   establish compliance. Because closure would not immediately resolve racial
   imbalances, the district court should have considered other “[e]qually
   effective alternatives” before imposing the drastic remedy. See id. at 940–41.
          Such alternative solutions were available. The School Board’s expert
   witness proposed that the District could see greater desegregation results and
   immediate compliance with the +/- 15% variance by redrawing attendance
   zones and boundaries. But the district court did not order this equally, or
   perhaps, more effective alternative. In doing so, it ignored other potentially
   workable and feasible proposals, jumping ahead to the most extreme remedy.
   Such a decision contravenes our guidance. See Davis, 721 F.2d at 1434.
          Second, we’re not convinced that closure of Catahoula Elementary
   School was necessary to resolve the remaining racial imbalances—the plain
   statistics reflect that the School Board was making slow-but-steady progress

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   in the removal of vestiges of state-imposed segregation. For example, the
   School Board’s expert opined that more Black students were moving to the
   town of Catahoula—therefore, Catahoula Elementary School was likely to
   continue to naturally desegregate on its own. Additionally, in 2015, the
   district court ordered the School Board to create new student attendance
   zones.     These new zones accelerated the desegregation progress—the
   percentage of Black students in Catahoula Elementary School increased
   between 2015 and 2021, as did the percentage of white students in St.
   Martinville Primary and the Early Learning Center. Although the numbers
   fell outside the agreed-upon goal range, these statistics nevertheless indicate
   improvement without the extreme remedy of a school closure, five decades
   into the court’s supervision of this case.
            At bottom, we are left with the following conclusion: the district court
   abused its discretion in closing Catahoula Elementary School. We commend
   the district court for its continued efforts in overseeing the District’s
   desegregation. But the record demonstrates that progress has been made and
   progress can continue through the implementation of other reasonable,
   feasible, and workable remedies. Accordingly, we reverse the closing of
   Catahoula Elementary School and remand for consideration of other
   methods of addressing that concern.
            We therefore AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part; we
   REMAND this case in accordance with this opinion.

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