Court Opinion

ID: 9796648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:01:31.018328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:53.390405
License: Public Domain

CARPENETI, Justice,
concurring and dissenting, with whom EASTAUGH, Justice, joins.
I agree with the opinion of the court that this case should be remanded for further proceedings before another judge. But I disagree as to how this result is reached. I write separately to set out (1) why Cook's peremptory challenge must be given effect *268and (2) why a new judge on remand-not this court-should decide all matters remaining in this case, including the fate of the motion to set aside the default.
1. The Superior Court Erroneously Denied Cook's Peremptory Challenge as Untimely.
Cook argues that the superior court erred when it dismissed his peremptory challenge as untimely. Litigants have a statutory right to peremptory disqualification of a judge under AS 22.20.022,1 and Alaska Civil Rule 42(c) controls the procedure and scope of such disqualification in civil cases.2 Because Cook filed his peremptory challenge in accord with the provisions of that rule, his challenge was proper.
Rule 42(c) provides: "[iJn an action pending in the Superior or District Courts, each side is entitled as a matter of right to a change of one judge and of one master."3 The timeliness provisions for a peremptory challenge are contained in subsection (8):
Timeliness. Failure to file a timely notice precludes change of judge as a matter of right. Notice of change of judge is timely if filed before the commencement of trial and within five days after notice that the case has been assigned to a specific judge. Where a party has been served or enters an action after the case has been assigned to a specific judge, a notice of change of judge shall also be timely if filed by the party before the commencement of trial and within five days after a party appears or files a pleading in the action.4
Cook's challenge falls under the second part of the rule, because he was "served ... after the case hald] been assigned to a specific judge." Cook was initially served on May 28, after Judge Cutler had been assigned to the case on May 27.5 As a result, Rule 42(c)(3) required Cook to file his challenge before trial and within five days of an appearance or filing in the action.6
The superior court ruled that Cook's motion was not timely because the normal time limits of Rule 42(c)(8) were not available when a party had not entered a timely response to the complaint. The superior court's interpretation reads Rule 42(c)@B)'s five-day window after an appearance or pleading as applying only to a timely appearance or pleading. The court said, "a party must timely enter an action in order to peremptorily challenge the judge within 5 days of that entry." The superior court did not cite to the rules or case law to support its interpretation of the rule,7 but relied upon the argument that bad policy would result from allowing peremptory challenges after a default judgment: "[I]t would encourage other litigants to default, await a ruling on the merits, and then challenge the judge and move to vacate the default."
*269Cook's peremptory challenge falls within the plain language of Rule 42(c)(8), because his challenge was filed before any trial was held in the case and on the same day as his first filing or appearance in the case. Moreover, allowing Cook to raise a peremptory challenge after entry of default does not promote bad policy. While the superior court was concerned that allowing a peremptory challenge after a default would encourage litigants to default, neither the superior court nor Rowland identified any possible advantage that might be gained by a party in allowing default to be taken against itself, and I can think of none.
Cook points to our decision in Staso v. State, Department of Transportation8 to support his position that allowing his peremptory challenge will not lead to abuse. In that case, we held that a party has the right to peremptorily challenge the judge in a new case filed after an identical case is dismissed, even if the party had exercised its peremptory challenge in the earlier, dismissed case.9 Despite the argument by the state that allowing such challenges would encourage judge shopping by parties who simply allowed their cases to be dismissed, we observed that other civil rules provided adequate sanctions against bad faith dismissal and refiling of cases. Specifically, we noted that the threat of sanctions as provided in the Civil Rules against a party who refiles a dismissed case "afford[s] courts. the tools necessary to deter litigants from judge shopping.10
Similar controls exist in the rules to protect against any theoretical abuse considered here. There are at least two ways in which the current rules would dissuade parties who might attempt, as the superior court feared, to sit by and allow a default, and then disqualify the judge.
First, parties who invite a default face the additional burden of successfully moving to set aside a default judgment before earning a trial on the merits with a different judge. A peremptory challenge entered after a default judgment would not automatically nullify that judgment.11 Instead, a defendant would have to proceed before a new judge with a motion to set aside a default judgment under the requirements contained in Civil Rule 60(b)).12 Setting aside a default judgment requires a defendant to show good cause, including a meritorious defense,13 as well as some form of mistake, fraud, new evidence, or excusable neglect.14 I can perceive no reason a defendant would purposefully allow a default to be taken against himself or herself when there is no advantage and the defendant would be required to make a positive showing to set aside the default.
Second, if for any reason a party were to invite a default in order to subsequently exercise a peremptory challenge, that party would be guilty of bad faith and would risk losing the motion to set aside the default for that reason. A plaintiff who can establish that a defendant has intentionally defaulted as a way to engage in judge shopping can argue that the default judgment should not be set aside because the defaulting party has acted in bad faith.15 In Melendrez v. Bode,16 *270we affirmed the denial of a motion to set aside because the defendant had acted in bad faith by attempting to avoid service and then failing to respond to the summons "claiming, incredibly, that he was unaware there was a suit pending against him." 17 We denied the motion to set aside primarily because of Me-lendrez's culpable behavior.18
In fact, in this case, Rowland has alleged that Cook acted in bad faith Rowland claims that Cook's failure to respond to the complaint in a timely fashion was the result of bad faith. Allowing. Cook to maintain his peremptory challenge would not defeat Rowland's right to claim that the- default should stand because Cook acted in bad faith.
In sum, Cook's peremptory challenge satisfied the language of Civil Rule 42(c)(8) because it was filed before any trial was held and at the same time that he appeared and filed a pleading in the case. Recognizing his peremptory challenge does not promote bad policy. Our case law provides sufficient deterrent against judge shopping.
2. The New Judge Should Decide All Remaining Matters, Including - Cook's Motion To Set Aside the Default Judgment.
Since the superior court erroneously denied Cook's peremptory challenge, decisions made by that court subsequent to the denial are void.19 The valid exercise of a peremptory challenge divests the challenged judge of authority to act in the case. As we stated in Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt,20
The only meaning that can be given to the requirement [in AS 22.20.022(a) ] that the matter be assigned "at once and without requiring proof" to another judge, is that when a timely and proper affidavit is filed the judge concerned is at once disqualified from acting as a judge in the particular action or proceeding. When [she is disqualified [slhe no longer possesses the qualities ... of power, capacity, fitness or competency to proceed further. In short, when a proper affidavit has been timely filed, the judge involved is without power or jurisdiction to take any further action in the proceeding.[21]
We have consistently followed this rule.22 No reason appears in this case to depart from it. Therefore, Cook's motion to set aside the default judgment should be remanded to the superior court for assignment to a new judge. That new judge should decide all matters arising after the peremptory challenge was made.
The decision that the challenge was timely does not invalidate the default judgment itself, which was entered by the superior court before Cook filed his peremptory challenge. Since the superior court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion to set aside the default judgment, Cook's appeal of that decision is moot. There is, therefore, no reason for this court to rule on any issue-including the pending motion to set aside the default-that is not properly before it. For this reason, I dissent from today's per curiam opinion to the extent it reaches the question of setting aside the default judgment. Instead, *271that matter should be resolved by the superi- or court on remand.

. AS 22.20.022(a) provides:
If a party or a party's attorney in a district court action or a superior court action, civil or criminal, files an affidavit alleging under oath the belief that a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained, the presiding district court or superior court judge, respectively, shall at once, and without requiring proof, assign the action to another judge....

. See Staso v. State, Dep't of Transp., 895 P.2d 988, 990 (Alaska 1995).

. Alaska R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1).

. Alaska R. Civ. P. 42(c)(3) (emphasis added).

. The superior court's own ruling implies that the second part of the rule applies. The superior court notes that Cook's challenge would be timely if filed within five days "of appearing or filing a pleading in the action."

. See Karen L. v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 953 P.2d 871, 879-80 (Alaska 1998) (permitting peremptory challenge filed by state along with its initial appearance almost three weeks after it had been served with summons, because second part of Rule 42(c)(3) applied as state had been served after judge had been assigned).

. There are no Alaska cases on point with regard to whether a peremptory challenge can be raised after a default, and cases from other jurisdictions are only minimally instructive. See State ex rel. Frohnmayer v. Low, 105 Or.App. 357, 804 P.2d 1217, 1218-19 (1991) (holding that challenge to judge after entry of default was not timely under Oregon rules which required affidavit be filed prior to final determination of cause or prior to ruling on petition or motion); Olsten Staffing Servs., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Servs., Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 600-01 (Wyo.1996) (holding that challenge to judge is permissible after entry of default, but might not extend to default judgment)}.

. 895 P.2d 988 (Alaska 1995).

. Id. at 992.

. Id.

. See generally Mundt v. Northwest Explorations, Inc., 963 P.2d 265, 270 (Alaska 1998) ("[Northwest's] recourse is to show the new judge that [the challenged judge] has already decided any issues that Mundt tries to reopen. The court can readily dismiss any attempt to relitigate issues as barred by the law of the case. ...").

. It is also possible that a defendant could move under Civil Rule 77(k) to have the new judge reconsider the previous judge's decision to grant the default judgment. However, such a maneuver would not easily provide a favorable result for the defendant. It is likely that the judge assigned following a peremptory disqualification would be reluctant to reconsider the decision to grant a default judgment by another judge, especially when there are specific provisions under which such a judgment can be set aside in Rule 60(b).

. Alaska R. Civ. P. 55(e); Wright v. Shorten, 964 P.2d 441, 445 (Alaska 1998).

." Alaska R. Civ. P. 60(b).

. Hertz v. Berzanske, 704 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska 1985) (directing a court to consider the culpability of defendant's conduct), superceded by statute on other grounds as noted in McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 407 n. 4 (Alaska 1996).

. 941 P.2d 1254 (Alaska 1997).

. Id. at 1258.

. Id.

. See Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570, 574 (Alaska 1969) ("In short, when a proper affidavit has been timely filed, the judge involved is without power or jurisdiction to take any further action in the proceeding."); see also McCracken v. State, 521 P.2d 499, 510 (Alaska 1974); Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 804 (Alaska 1970).

. 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969).

21. Id. at 574.

. For example, in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State for Use and Benefit of Consol. Constr. Co., 498 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1972), we stated that "[ulnder AS 22.20.022 the filing of a timely affidavit in compliance with the statute operates to bar the judge from proceeding any further in the matter other than transferring the case to another judge." Id. at 275. We concluded that "if petitioners' affidavit was timely filed, the judge involved is without power or jurisdiction to proceed further with the action." Id. In Dean v. Firor, 681 P.2d 321 (Alaska 1984), we stated that [tlhe effect of a peremptory disqualification of a master is that the master loses the capacity to proceed further." Id. at 325. See also Morgan v. State, 635 P.2d 472, 478-79 (Alaska 1981); Pope, 478 P.2d at 804.