Court Opinion

ID: 9514424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:21.151964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:17.351085
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 34] I join the writing of Justice Sabers except for ¶¶ 27-30. I cannot agree that the trial court’s admission of the rape of the store clerk during the Box Elder robbery on June 21, 1995, “may have required reversal, but for the fact that here, Loftus, admitted his presence at the scene of both robberies.” There was no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in the admission of this evidence. It was properly admitted to show intent, and such admission was more probative than prejudicial.
[¶ 35] Loftus was charged with, and convicted of, attempted second-degree rape of the clerk in the Rapid City robbery on April 26, 1995. It was unclear as to Loftus’ intent when he ordered the clerk to remove her pants leg. He stated that it “would help him tie [her] up better.” However, the clerk testified that she believed Loftus was preparing to rape her. The trial court held that the rape at the Box Elder robbery was probative as to whether it was Loftus’ intent during the Rapid City robbery to rape the clerk or to merely tie her up.
[¶ 36] Attempted second-degree rape (SDCL 22-22-1(2)); SDCL 22-4-1 requires a specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator; that is, the specific intent to commit the crime of rape. State v. Hart, 1996 SD 17, ¶ 13, 544 N.W.2d 206, 209. We have previously held that in specific intent crimes, proof of similar acts may be admitted to carry that burden even if the defense to the charge is an outright denial. State v. White, 538 N.W.2d 237, 244 (S.D.1995); State v. *833Ondricek, 535 N.W.2d 872, 874 (S.D.1995); State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 19 (S.D.1989).
[¶ 37] Justice Sabers questions whether there was sufficient evidence to establish “this later, unproved, uncharged act.” Although SDCL 19-12-5 is commonly referred to as a “prior bad acts” rule, its actual language deals with “other ... aets.” There is no requirement that the “other act” result in a criminal charge. It does not have to be criminal or even wrongful. State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 816 (S.D.1983); State v. Wedemann, 339 N.W.2d 112, 115 (S.D.1983). Most recently in State v. Barber, 1996 SD 96, ¶ 29, 552 N.W.2d 817, 822, we dealt with the standard of proof required for admission of these other acts:
This Court has previously rejected the notion that bad acts testimony must meet any standards of credibility before it may be admitted into evidence. In State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D.1993), this Court stated:
In [State v.] Sieler [397 N.W.2d 89, 93 (S.D.1986)], we rejected adopting an additional requirement for admission of bad acts evidence under SDCL 19-12-5. The reliability of the evidence sought to be admitted is already an inherent part of the tests the court must perform. We decline to adopt an additional standard for a trial court to balance before deciding to admit or exclude prior bad acts.
Here the trial court made such a determination clearly resting, in part, upon the admission by Loftus that he was at the scene of the rape at the time it occurred.
[¶ 38] Given the fact that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admission of the evidence to establish intent, I would not address the alternative justification of identity which troubles Justice Sabers.
[¶ 39] I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER and Justice KONEN-KAMP join this special writing.