Court Opinion

ID: 9792749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:35:44.382444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.968027
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result summarized in the first paragraph of Justice Martone’s opinion (the “opinion”): When the legislature enacts “a statutory financing scheme for public education that is itself the cause of gross disparities in school facilities,” that scheme does not comply “with the ‘general and uniform’ requirement of Article XI, § 1 of the Arizona Constitution.” I thus join in Sections I through 11(B)(3) of the opinion.
I write separately for two reasons. First, I believe our constitution’s equal protection clause fully resolves this case. See Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 13. Second, I cannot agree with Section 11(B)(4), which characterizes and applies the general and uniform mandate of Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 1. I turn first to equal protection.
A. Equal Protection
As the opinion notes, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental federal constitutional right. Maj. op. at 237-238, 877 P.2d at 810-811 (citing 411 U.S. 1, 37, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1299, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973)). Building on that principle, in Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973), this court cited San Antonio to support its view that Arizona’s school financing system does not violate Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13, which provides in relevant part: “No law shall be enacted granting to any citizen [or] class of citizens ... privileges ... which, upon the same terms, shall not equally *244belong to all citizens—” A financing system “which has a rational and reasonable basis and which meets the educational mandate of our constitution1 should ... be upheld.” Id. at 90-91, 515 P.2d at 592-93 (emphasis added).
As Justice Martone correctly observes, the conclusion in San Antonio rested, in large part, on the fact that the federal constitution does not mention, let alone guarantee, the right to an education. When confronted with the federal equal protection challenge in San Antonio, the United States Supreme Court therefore analyzed the admittedly unequal and unbalanced Texas school financing system under the lenient rational basis test, instead of applying the strict scrutiny standard reserved for a fundamental right.
The Arizona Constitution, however, explicitly guarantees an education, providing that “State educational institutions shall be open to students of both sexes, and the instruction furnished shall be as nearly free as possible.” Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 6. This provision ensures access to kindergartens, common schools, and high schools as well as institutions such as the universities. See Carpio v. Tucson High Sch. Dist. No. 1, 111 Ariz. 127, 524 P.2d 948 (1974). Our constitution also compels the legislature to provide common schools that “shall be open to all pupils between the ages of six and twenty-one years.” Ariz. Const. art. 11, § 6.
Assuming our constitutional framers sought substance and not mere form, Arizona’s children have the right to receive a free, public, basic education through high school. ShofstaU, 110 Ariz. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592. Thus, there is no need to seek rights in the Arizona Constitution’s penumbra—specific guarantees establish “education as a fundamental right.” Id. (emphasis added). Having said this much, inexplicably, and without analysis, ShofstaU applied a rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the school financing scheme under Arizona’s equal protection clause.
Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly held, however, that courts must apply a strict scrutiny analysis to fundamental rights and uphold challenged laws only if the inequality resulting from their application is essential to serve a compelling state interest. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 40, 93 S.Ct. at 1300; see also Big D Const. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 163 Ariz. 560, 566, 789 P.2d 1061, 1067 (1990); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 79, 688 P.2d 961, 971 (1984) (“If [a] right is ‘fundamental,’ the strict scrutiny analysis must be applied ”) (emphasis added); Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen’s Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 556, 637 P.2d 1053, 1059 (1981) (same).
The state has cited no compelling state interest in a school financing scheme that inescapably creates gross disparities in capital facilities. Although we recognize a valid state interest in local or school district control of education, the state does not tell us why its financing scheme for capital facilities must necessarily hinge so heavily on the property wealth of the individual districts, without providing for equalization or adopting one of the many other methods available for preventing gross disparity. The state could hardly claim such a system is necessary in light of the methods it has adopted to equalize operating expenditures between school districts. The bottom line is simply this: the current method of financing capital facilities and equipment both ensures gross disparities and fails the strict scrutiny test. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (1971). Accepting, as I do, the idea that local control of education through local school districts is a compelling state interest, there is simply no reason that laws creating gross inequality in financing capital facilities between districts are necessary to achieve local control. Id. 96 Cal.Rptr. at 622, 487 P.2d at 1262.
We rejected Serrano in ShofstaU, not because we disagreed with the conclusion that our school financing system could not pass strict scrutiny but because we applied the rational basis analysis. Applying the proper strict scrutiny analysis, a financing scheme such as Arizona’s must fail. Id. 96 Cal.Rptr. *245at 615-21, 487 P.2d at 1255-60; see also Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457, 470-71 (1972); Jeffrey H. Schwartz, Public School Financing Cases: Interdistrict Inequalities and Wealth Discrimination, 14 Ariz.L.Rev. 88, 122 (1972); Ferdinand P. Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 Colum.L.Rev. 1355, 1401 (1971).
Thus, I join Justice Martone’s view “that Shofstall is not dispositive” on the equal protection question. Maj. op. at 237,877 P.2d at 811. I too “do not understand how the rational basis test can be used when a fundamental right has been implicated. If education is a fundamental right [as it is in our constitution and as we held in Shofstall ], the compelling state interest test (strict scrutiny) ought to apply.” Id. (citing Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 83, 688 P.2d at 975).
Unlike Justice Martone, however, I would take the final step and resolve this conundrum. Maj. op. at 237, 877 P.2d at 811.2 The existing statutory scheme for financing public school facilities—office and classroom space; libraries, gymnasia, and support facilities; text and library books; computer, laboratory, and other educational equipment— violates the equal protection clause of the Arizona Constitution. It grants to one group, students who live in affluent school districts, the privilege of access to public schools containing basic facilities and equipment, thus affording them an opportunity to obtain the minimum education that we recognized in Shofstall as their right. At the same time, it deprives another group, students residing in property-poor districts, of an equal opportunity by forcing them to use substandard facilities and equipment. As all concede, on this record there is no question that such a disparity in facilities and equipment exists.
This is not to say that equal protection requires the same education for each student, or that each school district must provide identical or equal facilities. It means only that the Arizona Constitution guarantees a basic right to educational opportunity—the right to be provided with the “opportunity to compete successfully in the economic marketplace, to develop as a citizen, and to become a self-reliant individual.” Schwartz, 14 ArizL.Rev. at 122; see also Shofstall, 110 Ariz. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592. Serrano makes it clear that the equal protection clause prevents a state from making the quality of a child’s basic educational opportunity a function of the wealth of the district in which the pupil resides. 96 CaLRptr. at 625, 487 P.2d at 1265.
I conclude that because the facilities financing scheme works a gross disparity in financing basic educational facilities and equipment, and is not necessary to serve the compelling state interest in preserving local control, it violates Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 13.
B. Resolving the Case Under the Education Article
The opinion prefers, however, to analyze this case under Ariz. Const, art. 11—the education article. I do not object to the routing, although I doubt its necessity. In my view, Shofstall did not decide the scope of our constitution’s education article. Shofstall was exclusively an equal protection case that decided two questions: first, whether the student plaintiffs were deprived of equal protection by the school financing plan, and second, whether the taxpayer plaintiffs were so deprived. 110 Ariz. at 89, 91, 515 P.2d at 591, 593. The briefs did not argue and the court evidently neither considered nor decided whether the financing system violated the general and uniform provisions of art. 11, § 1.
*246Thus, Shofstall’s discussion of art. 11, § 1 went to the nature of the fundamental right possessed by the student plaintiffs. The statement that the “present school laws do provide for a system which was statewide and uniform” was not made in the context of an article 11 analysis of the financing plan but only in the context that the “constitution does establish education as a fundamental right.” Id. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592.
Therefore, the meaning of the general and uniform clause of art. 11, § 1, as applied to financing schemes, is a question of first impression in Arizona. The legislature evidently saw this in the same light because, after Shofstall was decided, it immediately changed the financing scheme for operational expenses, adopting substantial equalization as the principle. 1974 Ariz.Sess.Laws, First Spec.Sess., ch. 3. It did not, however, apply this same system to school facilities, the question before us today.
Given this, I agree without hesitation with Justice Martone that the state must create and maintain a general and uniform school system. “Discretion is left to the legislature as to how it does so, but it must do so.” Maj. op. at 240, 877 P.2d at 813. Thus I conclude, as he does, that the state cannot delegate to school districts the responsibility to create a general and uniform school system. Indeed, article 11 requires the state legislature to enact laws providing “for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system.” Given this, it is not possible to agree with the dissent’s view that state financing of basic educational opportunity is mutually exclusive with local control. Diss. op. at 253, 877 P.2d at 826.
Thus, I share the view that independent of section 10, art. 11, § 1 prohibits the legislature from adopting a financing scheme such as the one presently in effect, which assures gross disparities in facilities, and requires instead that the legislature affirmatively enact a financing scheme that establishes a general and uniform system of education.
It is only at this point that I depart from the opinion. I do not share its concept of what the legislature is required to do and disagree with its answer to the rhetorical question: “But what then is a general and uniform public school system?” Maj. op. at 241, 877 P.2d at 814. In my view, the constitution does not require that the state “provide sufficient funds to educate children on substantially equal terms.” Id. at 241, 877 P.2d at 814. Further, I believe that we have an obligation to explain to the legislature, which after all must now create a new financing scheme, just what the constitution requires and what we mean when we state that the system must provide an adequate education. Id. at 242, 877 P.2d at 815.
The framers of our constitution contemplated both local control of school districts and that schools would be financed, at least on a primary basis, through school district levies. As the dissent points out, this was the regime before the constitution was drafted, at the time it was adopted, and throughout statehood. Diss. op; at 253, 877 P.2d at 826. By sustaining this regime, the framers perpetuated what is inherent in it—some degree of inequality.
The general and uniform clause was enacted to limit this inequality. But limit it to what? Arizona history, common sense, and persuasive precedent from a sister state supply the answer. The clause was intended to guarantee not the unattainable result—equal education—but an equal opportunity for each child to obtain the basic, minimum education that the state would prescribe for public school students. One of our most capable state constitutional scholars has also concluded that the general and uniform language “suggest[s] statewide minimum standards.” John D. Leshy, The Arizona State Constitution: A Reference Guide 247 (1993).
As Justice Martone acknowledges, an Arizona school district may provide capital facilities that “go above and beyond the statewide system.” Maj. op. at 242, 877 P.2d at 815. But when the state itself sets minimum, basic standards for educational curricula and attainment—as it does in Arizona—the general and uniform clause requires that the state provide a financing scheme that will enable each district in the state to acquire the facili*247ties and equipment necessary to achieve those standards.
At this point, it would be very helpful to analyze cases from other states construing similar constitutional language. Unfortunately, as Justice Martone indicates, precedent has generally not been very informative or persuasive in ascertaining the meaning of the “general and uniform” language in our constitution’s education article. Maj. op. at 241, 877 P.2d at 814. The important exception is Washington. It is not surprising that the Washington Supreme Court has crafted the most compelling decisions in this area. In educational matters, Arizona and Washington are remarkably alike, and not just by happenstance. As a condition to their admission to the Union, Congress required both states to provide for the establishment and maintenance of public school systems.3
Because it was admitted to statehood in 1889, Washington was the first of these two territories to respond to this congressional mandate. Washington’s solution appears at Wash. Const, art. 9, § 2 (1889), which states that the “legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.” In 1910, the delegates to the Arizona Constitutional Convention clearly paraphrased this language in adopting Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 1, which provides: “The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system.” Given the fact that our delegates routinely borrowed provisions from the Washington Constitution,4 our nearly identical general and uniform education clauses are far more than coincidence.
The Washington Supreme Court has also preceded Arizona in directly confronting the meaning of the general and uniform directive in its constitution. The two most instructive Washington Supreme Court opinions are Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington, 90 Wash.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978), and Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1975). Both cases cogently analyze the school financing dilemma in the context of the constitutional clause that was the model for Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 1. For these reasons, and because of long-standing, clear Arizona precedent on constitutional construction, the two opinions are exceptionally persuasive. See Solana Land Co. v. Murphey, 69 Ariz. 117, 124, 210 P.2d 593, 597 (1949) (“While the opinion from the Supreme Court of Washington is not controlling, it is peculiarly persuasive both by reason of its sound reasoning as well as the fact that our constitutional provision ... was obviously copied from the constitution of that state.”).5
In terms actually relating to student educational opportunities, Northshore defines the constitutionally-mandated general and uniform school system as one in which every schoolchild has “free access to certain minimum and reasonably standardized edu*248cational and instructional facilities and opportunities to at least the 12th grade.” 530 P.2d at 202 (emphasis added). In 1978, the Washington Supreme Court required the legislature to “act to comply with its constitutional duty by defining and giving substantive meaning to” the required basic education or course of study. Seattle Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d at 95.6 The court found the school funding system unconstitutional because it did not assure enough money for Washington students to attain a basic education. Id, at 102-04;7 see also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. # 1 v. State by and through North Dakota Legislative Assembly, 511 N.W.2d 247, 262 (N.D.1994).
Moreover, the Arizona Constitution already tells us how to achieve a general and uniform school system. At the constitution’s command and the legislature’s direction, the Arizona State Board of Education (“Board”) has already completed this difficult task. Article 11, § 2 provides that the “general conduct and supervision of the public school system shall be vested in a State Board of Education, a State Superintendent of Public Instruction, [and] county school superintendents----” Section 3 gives the legislature the right to prescribe the Board’s “powers [and] duties.” In 1912, our first state legislature enacted a law directing the Board to devise courses of study for Arizona’s schoolchildren. See An Act To Provide for the Establishment and Maintenance of a General and Uniform Public School System, 1912 Ariz.Sess.Laws ch. 77, § 4, ¶ Sixth (emphasis added). As the title of the 1912 law indicates, it implements the constitutional language of art. 11, § 1. The Board has been performing this crucial and complex function ever since.
The present versions of this legislative directive are essentially unchanged. Under AR.S. § 15-203(A)(15) (Supp.1993), the Board must:
Prescribe a minimum course of study in the common schools, minimum competency requirements for the promotion of pupils from the third grade and minimum course of study and competency requirements for the promotion of pupils from the eighth grade.
(Emphasis added); see also AR.S. § 15-721 (course of study and textbooks for the common schools).
AR.S. § 15-203(A)(16) (Supp.1993) requires the Board to:
Prescribe [a] minimum course of study and competency requirements for the graduation of pupils from high school.
(Emphasis added); see also AR.S. § 15-722 (course of study and textbooks for the high schools).
The Board regularly sets and updates the minimum courses of study and competency requirements for Arizona’s schoolchildren.8 The courses of study are basic; the competency requirements are attainable by the average, reasonably motivated student. In light of this, I can only conclude that the legislature cannot constitutionally impose a capital funding scheme that creates such disparity in facilities and equipment that it prevents some Arizona school districts from fur*249nishing the environment, facilities, textbooks, equipment, and other capital resources needed to give students an equal opportunity to attain the Board’s prescribed minimum course of study.
Contrary to the opinion, however, I do not go so far as to conclude that even if every child in the state were receiving an “adequate education, gross facility disparities” resulting from a state-imposed financing scheme “would violate the uniformity clause.” Maj. op. at 241 n. 7, 877 P.2d at 814 n. 7. I go no further than this: the Board, acting under legislative authority and direction, has set minimum educational standards applicable to all Arizona school districts. To the extent that the legislature fails to put into effect a financing scheme that provides for facilities and equipment that will enable all districts to give their students the opportunity to meet the minimum standards that the state itself has set, the legislature has failed to comply with the constitutional requirement that it “shill enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system.” Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 1 (emphasis added).
Finally, I disclaim any notion that quality of education depends on the amount of money spent. I agree, to be sure, that “there is some correlation between the amount of money spent and the quality of education.” Diss. op. at 253, 877 P.2d at 826. I think it enough to say, however, that this case turns on the facts, pleaded and argued by the plaintiffs and not denied by the state, that show a correlation exists. Moreover, logic and experience also tell us that children have a better opportunity to learn biology or chemistry, and are more likely to do so, if provided with laboratory equipment for experiments and demonstrations; that children have a better opportunity to learn English literature if given access to books; that children have a better opportunity to learn computer science if they can use computers, and so on through the entire state-prescribed curriculum.
If these concepts are wrong, then the state should have interposed some sort of denial, or we should perhaps vacate judgment and remand for further evidence. It seems apparent to me, however, that these are inarguable principles. If they are not, then we are wasting an abundance of our taxpayers’ money in school districts that maintain libraries and buy textbooks, laboratory equipment, and computers.
C. Methodology
Both the opinion and the dissent take the view that the concept of minimum state standards is a “theory” neither “pled nor proved” and “beyond the scope of the pleadings in this case,” thus “afford[ing] us no opportunity to define ... minimum standards under the constitution.” Diss. op. at 251 n. 1, 877 P.2d at 824 n. 1, maj. op. at 241 n. 7, 877 P.2d 814 n. 7. I believe these conclusions are incorrect. The pleadings and the summary judgment motion raised these issues.
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the “school districts are unable to provide students in their districts with facilities essential to adequate provision of curriculum.”9 In their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued and presented evidence that deficiencies in capital facilities “materially and substantially detract from the quality of education received by students in the plaintiff districts, and result in many students receiving an inadequate and substandard education.”10 When replying in support of their motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs also asserted that the “uncontroverted evidence in this case shows that educational opportunities for children in poor school districts are systematically reduced because of inadequate capital funding.”11
In their opening brief to this court, plaintiffs cited the Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction’s trial testimony (by affidavit) that “modern well-equipped school fa*250cilities are very important in ensuring a quality education for school children.”12 Of course, the state vigorously argued throughout this case that school facilities do not affect the adequacy of a child’s education. Plaintiffs countered, saying that “the state’s claim that school facilities are irrelevant to learning is contrary to modern opinion and common sense.”13 The record, in short, is replete with examples in which the issue of the districts’ inability to comply with the prescribed curriculum and standards was raised as a part of the argument on the meaning and interpretation of the general and uniform provision.
Thus, I believe the issue is squarely before us. If there is any doubt as to the facts, appropriate deference to the reasoned views of the other members of the court does not require acquiescence in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. We cannot close our eyes to the educational standards existing in the real world or refuse to read the statutes enacted by our first state legislators in attempting to effectuate the constitutional requirements that they enact a general and uniform system of schools. Deference to the needs of our citizens demands, instead, that summary judgment be vacated and the case remanded for a full trial on the issues.
This case is simply too important to be decided by parsing sentences in a two-foot stack of pleadings, motions, and briefs. It involves the meaning and application of a state constitutional clause that gives the children of Arizona a fundamental constitutional right to education and that places on the legislature the corresponding obligation to enact laws necessary to establish and maintain a system that will transform that right from dry words on paper to a reality bringing to fruition the progressive views of those who founded this state.
Parents, their children, and all citizens need to know what rights the constitution gives our children, and the legislature needs to know the extent of its obligation in effectuating those rights. This court exists primarily for the purpose of resolving such issues. Neither the intricacies of code pleading, the nuances of Wigmoke on Evidence, nor the lawyers’ artfulness in drafting pleadings should control the outcome of such a case. When this court decided Shofstall in 1973, it left open the meaning of the general and uniform clause. The issues are now squarely before us, and now is the time to decide them. If the factual record is too deficient to support judgment, we need to remand for a full trial. If the legal issues were not well argued, we should request additional briefing. But let us get on with it.
I believe, however, that the record in this case is quite sufficient to enable us to read the constitution in light of the decisions of our sister state, from whom we borrowed this clause, and the statutes passed by our legislature to effectuate that language. Thus, I join the plurality in holding that the present statutory scheme provides for neither a general nor a uniform funding system and that the legislature must follow the constitutional command that it enact such a method for establishing and maintaining our public school system.
CONCLUSION
I concur in the result and much of the analysis of the opinion and join in the holding that the present state financing system for capital facilities violates Ariz. Const, art. 11, § 1. The very structure of the present financing scheme denies to Arizona’s schoolchildren the general and uniform school system that is their right under our constitution. Although local control is to be preserved and equality in facilities and equipment is not required, the system cannot claim uniformity if the legislature’s financing scheme results in such great disparity in facilities and equipment that many children are denied the opportunity to obtain the basic education that the state itself requires.

. ShofstaU implied, of course, that a system that "meets the educational requirements of our constitution" would have to be "uniform, free, available ... [and] rational, reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious.” 110 Ariz. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592 (emphasis added).

. Contrary to the opinion, I do not believe that Albright v. Oliver, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), applies. Maj. op. at 238, 877 P.2d at 811. We already visited the issue in Shofstall under the equal protection provisions of our state constitution; we need but to revisit that case and correct its analytical error in the application of the clause. Contrary to the concern of the dissent, this does not require overruling the legal principle announced in Shof-stall. Diss. op. at 254, 877 P.2d at 827. It is not a question of new personnel on the court. It is, rather, the need to use the strict scrutiny test, as established by subsequent opinions, as the appropriate analytical basis for determining the validity of these statutes. See Lowing v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Ariz. 101, 107, 859 P.2d 724, 730 (1993); Wiley v. Industrial Comm'n, 174 Ariz. 94, 103, 847 P.2d 595, 604 (1993).

. The Washington Enabling Act stipulates: "That provision shall be made [in the Washington Constitution] for the establishment and maintenance of [a] system[ ] of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of [Washington], and free from sectarian control.” Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 677, § 4, ¶ Fourth. The Arizona Enabling Act similarly states: "That provisions shall be made [in the Arizona Constitution] for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools which shall be open to all the children of [Arizona] and free from sectarian control.” Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 570, § 20, ¶ Fourth.

. See, e.g., Mohave County v. Stephens, 17 Ariz. 165, 170-71, 149 P. 670, 672 (1915) ("section 4, art. 6 of our Constitution is taken almost word for word from the Washington Constitution"); Faires v. Frohmiller, 49 Ariz. 366, 371, 67 P.2d 470, 472 (1937) (as "far as its judicial features were concerned,” the Arizona Constitution was "evidently modeled on similar provisions" in the Washington Constitution); Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 163, 166, 370 P.2d 652, 654 (1962) (Arizona constitutional clause against uncompensated taking of private property "was adopted from the constitution of Washington”); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 160 Ariz. 350, 356 n. 12, 773 P.2d 455, 461 n. 12 (1989) (Arizona Constitution’s Declaration of Rights "came essentially verbatim” from Washington Constitution).

. This is a time-honored doctrine. See Schultz v. City of Phoenix, 18 Ariz. 35, 42, 156 P. 75, 77 (1916) (When clauses in the Washington Constitution are “very much like the same provisions” in our constitution, “we think the law announced by [the Washington Supreme Court] is very persuasive.”); see also Cienega Cattle Co. v. Atkins, 59 Ariz. 287, 292, 126 P.2d 481, 483 (1942).

. As noted post at n. 8, the Arizona Legislature long ago directed the Arizona State Board of Education to set minimum courses of study and competency requirements for Arizona’s schoolchildren.

. Interestingly, as this case worked through the appellate system, the Washington Legislature was already crafting a plan to overhaul and equalize state public school funding. The new law took effect in late 1978. See The Washington Basic Education Act of 1977, 1977 Wash.Laws, Ex.Sess., ch. 359 (eff. Sept. 1, 1978).

. Simplifying somewhat, to graduate from an Arizona high school, a student must complete twenty credits (a credit is a year-long course): (1) four credits of English; (2) one and one-half credits on the United States and Arizona constitutions and Arizona history; (3) one credit of world history/geography; (4) one-half credit on the free enterprise system; (5) two credits of mathematics; (6) two credits of science; (7) one credit of fine arts or vocational education; and (8) eight additional credits the local governing board prescribes, subject to approval by the Board. Ariz.Admin.Code R7-2-302.03 (1989). Thus, under the authority of Ariz. Const, art. 11, §§ 2 and 3 and the legislature’s directive, our system presently effectuates the uniformity provisions of art. 11, § 1 by prescribing a minimum statewide curriculum (items 1-7) for twelve credits, plus eight additional credits at the discretion of and of a nature chosen on the local level (subject to Board approval).

. Complaint at ¶48 (May 21, 1991).

. Statement of Facts in support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 6 (April 14, 1992).

. Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 12 (July 10, 1992).

. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 10 (June 1, 1993) (citation omitted to expert affidavit evidence before the trial court).

. Appellants’ Reply Brief in Arizona Court of Appeals at 13 (May 25, 1993).