Court Opinion

ID: 9812755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:47:07.115219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:22.115308
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
[¶ 28] I concur with the majority opinion except with regard to Part III A with which I respectfully disagree and therefore dissent.
[¶ 29] My understanding of our decisions in Dominguez v. State, 2013 ND 249, 840 N.W.2d 596 and State v. Borner, 2013 ND 141, 836 N.W.2d 383, is that under N.D.C.C. § 12.1 — 16—01 (1)(b) a person who causes the death of another human being under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life is guilty of murder. A person who intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being is guilty of murder under subsection (l)(a). However, if a person acts under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life and does not cause the death of another human being, that person is not guilty of attempted murder although the person may be guilty of other crimes. We said that in Bomer, at ¶ 18 in reversing a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder under N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-06-04 and 12.1-16-01(l)(b). We observed that extreme indifference murder is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime and that under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(l)(b)
a person does not intend to cause the death of another human-being, but rather death is a consequence of the defendant’s willful conduct. In other words, extreme indifference murder results in an unintentional death from behavior manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Conspiracy, however, requires the intent to cause a particular result that is criminal. To be guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, an individual must intend to achieve the results — causing the death of another human being.
*435Bomer, at ¶ 18 (citation omitted). Because the offense under subsection (l)(b) does not involve intent, the person cannot be guilty of attempted murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-06-01. Section 12.1-16-01(l)(b) and section 12.1-06-01 are antithetical to one another.
[¶ 30] The majority distinguishes Dominguez and Bomer because, as the majority reads the instructions here, “both of the attempted murder instruction options for the jury required it to find Keller intentionally attempted to murder a police officer, it is not possible the jury found Keller guilty of the incognizable offense of attempted murder under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.” I disagree. Under the facts of this case, attempted murder under § 12.1-16-01(b) should never have been charged or instructed upon by the trial court. But it was charged, the instruction was given and subsection b was argued to the jury as an alternative basis for conviction by the State. As the majority opinion notes, there was no special verdict form provided to the jury asking the jury to find whether or not Keller was guilty of attempted murder under subsection (l)(a) or subsection (l)(b). To the extent the jury might have found Keller guilty of attempted murder under subsection (l)(b), Keller was found guilty of an incognizable crime, i.e., a crime which does not exist. Because no statute of limitations can justify denying review of a judgment of conviction for a crime that does not exist, under the circumstances of this case I would reverse the judgment convicting Keller of attempted murder.
[¶ 31] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J.