Court Opinion

ID: 9653951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:59:53.75578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.469871
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant’s principal contentions are that the court should have granted his motion to suppress and his motion to require the State to disclose the identity of its informant. A proper consideration of these contentions requires that we examine the pertinent events in the order in which they occurred.
I.
The affidavit supporting the search warrant was sworn to on December 20,1974, by Officer Roger Duncan. It is set out in full in the majority opinion, and therefore only a small part of it will be repeated here:
“On December 18, 1974, the informant and an undercover officer of the Dallas Police Department called 231-9061 and requested seven (7) females for prostitution purposes be sent to their hotel. The female known only as ‘Sin’ again answered the call and stated that she would send seven (7) prostitutes to their location to perform straight dates, french dates, and show dates of prostitution.” (Emphasis added.)
Prior to trial appellant filed his motion to suppress, and the trial court held several hearings on the motion. The first of these was on April 4, 1975. At that time Officer Duncan testified that he prepared the affidavit, typed it himself, signed it, and swore to it on his oath before the magistrate. He stated that Sergeant B. F. Fowler was the undercover officer who was referred to but not named in the affidavit.
On cross-examination Duncan was asked “which of the allegations in this affidavit are based upon Sergeant Fowler’s information that he had given you?” The following exchange then took place:
“A Yes, I can. Towards the bottom of the affidavit where it states on December the 18th — about middleways through the affidavit — ‘On December the 18th, 1974, the informant and the undercover officer of the Dallas Police Department — ,’ —that’s with reference to Sergeant Fowler.
“Q All right. So then the sentence following that, describing the activities on December the 18th, are connected with Sergeant Fowler?
“A That’s correct.
“Q All right. Are any of the other allegations contained there on the face of the affidavit pertaining to information related to you by Sergeant Fowler?
“A No, they’re not.”
At no time during this hearing did Duncan suggest that the statements in the affidavit which concerned Sergeant Fowler were untrue or distorted in any way. In fact, in testifying about the affidavit and *761the search warrant,1 Duncan indicated that he remembered all of the information in both “quite clearly.” In doing so, he thereby implied that he had nothing to say which would constitute a qualification or repudiation of the statements in the affidavit. The following exchange took place while Duncan was in the process of verifying the authenticity of the photocopies of the affidavit and search warrant:
“Q Now State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 are Xerox copies, is that correct?
“A Yes, they are.
“Q Are they, as far as you know and to the best of your knowledge, true and exact Xerox copies of the originals? “A Yes, they are.
“Q How do you know that?
“A My signature is affixed to the affidavit and I recall the information quite clearly on both copies.” (Emphasis added.)
On April 18, 1975, the trial court held a second hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress. The primary purpose of this hearing was to determine whether the search warrant was sufficiently specific in its description of the address and location of the premises to be searched. Duncan testified, and again the record reflects no retreat from the language in the affidavit.
The next hearing was held on July 8, 1975. At the beginning of the hearing the trial judge indicated that he had granted all of appellant’s motions “with the exception of the Motion to Quash and I have not ruled on the Motion to Reveal the Informant.”2 The record makes it clear that the motion to reveal the informant’s identity was presented to the trial court on the day of this hearing3 and that the State received its copy of this motion on or before the day of this hearing but after the day of the last previous hearing.
Not coincidentally, it was at this hearing that Duncan — as well as the undercover agent Fowler — first testified that the statements in the affidavit were in essence incorrect. Fowler testified that on December 18, 1974, he met Duncan and Duncan’s informant. Subsequently, in the presence of Duncan and the informant, Fowler used a pay telephone attached to the wall of a building and called appellant’s residence. The purpose of the call was to inform Pamela Wood (also called “Sin” and “Cyn”) of the location for the proposed dates of prostitution.
Fowler testified that Duncan and the informant were standing “three or four feet” away from him when he made the call. He denied that the informant listened in on or participated in the phone call, and he stated that he did not believe that the informant heard what Fowler was saying to Wood. After completing the call, Fowler quietly told Duncan that Wood had assured him that the seven prostitutes would be at the designated hotel room by nine o’clock. On re-direct examination Fowler stated that the informant had played no role in the earlier negotiations which led to the purported date with the seven prostitutes.
Duncan followed Fowler to the stand and testified that he met Fowler during the afternoon of December 18,1974. He stated that the informant was with him, but the informant was not at the location in order to help Fowler “in any way.” Duncan acknowledged that the informant was present when Fowler called Pamela Wood and that he (Duncan) was able to overhear Fowler’s *762portion of the call to Wood. However, according to Duncan, the informant was not as close to Fowler during the call as Duncan was.
Duncan testified that after Fowler’s call was completed he spoke with Duncan but not with the informant. Duncan stated that Fowler did not tell the informant anything about the phone call or anything about the date with the seven prostitutes.
When asked to explain the above-quoted language of his affidavit — which unequivocally indicated that Fowler and the informant were acting together in making the call to Wood — Duncan stated simply that Fowler made the call personally and that in speaking of “their hotel” he did not mean to refer to the informant in any way. On cross-examination, Duncan testified that what he meant to say in the affidavit was that the informant was merely “at the location along with the undercover officer when the call was made.” He also stated that by using the word “their” in the phrase “their hotel,” he meant to refer to the group of undercover officers who were to be at the hotel for the date with the seven prostitutes.
II.
Appellant’s initial complaint about the nondisclosure of the informant’s identity is related to his contention that his motion to suppress should have been granted. Specifically, he alleges that he needed to know who the informant was in order to show that the statements in the affidavit were false.
A.
In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), the Supreme Court held that where the undercover informant plays a material part in the criminal occurrence which results in charges being filed against the accused, his identity must be revealed. Accord: James v. State, 493 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). However, in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1061, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967), the Court held that Roviaro applied “where the issue was fundamental one of innocence or guilt,” and that even in such cases the Court “was unwilling to impose any absolute rule requiring disclosure of an informer’s identity.” 386 U.S., at 311, 87 S.Ct., at 1062. Instead, the Court stated, what was necessary was a case-by-case “ ‘balancing [of] the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.’ ” 386 U.S., at 310, 87 S.Ct., at 1062, quoting from Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S., at 62, 77 S.Ct. 623.4
The ultimate holding in McCray was that it was not necessary to reveal the informant’s identity where his only function in the case against the defendant was to provide information which led to a valid search of the defendant’s person. However, it should be remembered that there was no allegation or preliminary showing in McCray that the search was based on a false statement; in fact, the trial judge there was “convinced, by evidence submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers did rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable informant.” 386 U.S., at 305, 87 S.Ct., at 1059. Nonetheless, in its holding the McCray Court made it clear that disclosure of an informant’s identity is much more likely to be necessary where the issue is guilt or innocence than where it is the preliminary question of probable cause. See McCray, supra, 386 U.S., at 309, 311-313, 87 S.Ct. 1056.
The holding in McCray applies to the case before us. However, I believe McCray must be read in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978).
*763B.
In Franks, the Supreme Court of Delaware had held that a defendant could in no instance challenge the truthfulness of the statements in a search warrant affidavit after the warrant had issued. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that:
“ . . . where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” 438 U.S., at 155-156, 98 S.Ct., at 2676-2677.
The present case goes beyond Franks. Here, as in Franks, the appellant made a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant, acting with reckless disregard for the truth, included false statements in the affidavit. Moreover, a reading of the affidavit makes it evident that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. Compare the affidavit in Franks, reproduced as Appendix A of that opinion. 438 U.S., at 172-176, 98 S.Ct., at 2685-2687.
However, in this case, appellant was given at least a partial evidentiary hearing on his allegations. He was allowed to question the affiant (Duncan) and the undercover officer (Fowler) at the hearing on July 8th. But, significantly, he was not given the name of the informant despite his clearly-alleged desire to have the informant testify in behalf of appellant’s contention “that the officers did not rely upon credible information supplied by a reliable informant.” The opinion in Franks makes it clear that allegations of deliberate or reckless falsehood in an affidavit must be specific and must be accompanied by an offer of proof.
“Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained.” Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct., at 2685.
The problem in the case before us is that, because the informant’s identity was not disclosed, appellant was not able to offer proof of what the informant’s testimony would have been. In a case such as this— where there is a timely preliminary showing that the affidavit contains a recklessly false statement which is necessary to the finding of probable cause — I would hold that the trial judge must not only hold a Franks hearing, he must also require the State to reveal the name of the informant in those cases where (1) the informant played a material part in the determination of probable cause, and (2) the defense expresses a desire to present his testimony at the preliminary hearing. To hold otherwise is to take over the fact-finding function of the trial judge by assuming that he would give no credence to any of the informant’s testimony which happened to disagree with that which supported his finding of probable cause.
This appellant did make the required preliminary showing of a reckless and material falsehood; he also sought to present the testimony of the unknown informant. I would hold, under these facts, that the trial judge’s failure to require disclosure of the informant’s identity constitutes reversible error. I would also hold that, until the informant’s identity is disclosed and the appellant is given an opportunity to present his testimony, we are without power to review on appeal the issue of probable cause.
III.
Appellant’s complaint about the nondisclosure of the informant’s identity is directed not only to the issue of probable cause. Although appellant initially contends that *764he needed to know the informant’s name in order to show that Duncan’s affidavit was not based on probable cause, he also urges that knowledge of identity was also crucial to the issue of entrapment, which is directly related to the issue of appellant’s innocence or guilt. Appellant raised this contention in a timely manner in the trial court as part of his motion to require the State to disclose the identity of the informant.
I would hold that Roger Duncan’s sworn statements contained in his search warrant affidavit (set out in the majority opinion) were sufficient to show that the unidentified informant “helped set up the criminal occurrence and played a prominent part in it.” James v. State, supra, 493 S.W.2d at 202. It is not significant that the appellant did not raise an entrapment defense at trial. See James, supra, 493 S.W.2d at 203, 206 (dissenting opinions).5
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand.

. State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.

. This latter motion bears no filemark, although the unsigned order attached to it is dated July 8, 1975. The memorandum in support of this motion is filemarked with the date July 8, 1975, as are the motion to quash the indictment, the “motion with reference to arraignment of the accused,” the motion to require endorsement of grand jury witnesses, the motion to direct the court reporter to record certain portions of the trial, the motion for inspection of grand jury testimony, the motion for disclosure of electronic surveillance evidence, and the motion requesting that the jury assess punishment. From this and the judge’s statement quoted in the text, it seems inescapable that the motion to disclose the identity of the informant first came to the court’s and the State’s attention on July 8, 1975, at the very latest.

.See footnote 2, supra.

. However, it should be noted that the McCray Court also quoted with approval from the Rovi-aro holding that where “ ‘the disclosure of an informer’s identity ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the [informer’s] privilege must give way.’ ” McCray, supra, 386 U.S., at 310, 87 S.Ct., at 1062, quoting from Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S., at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623.

. Although I dissented in James, I am of course bound by the holding in that case.