Court Opinion

ID: 9392619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 17:08:30.080076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:47.122386
License: Public Domain

[J-49-2022]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 MIDDLE DISTRICT

    BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

    DONNA DAVIS JAVITZ,                          :   No. 85 MAP 2021
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                 :   Commonwealth Court at No. 115 CD
                                                 :   2020 dated July 19, 2021 Affirming
                v.                               :   the order of the Luzerne County
                                                 :   Court of Common Pleas, Civil
                                                 :   Division, at No. 2783 of 2019 dated
    LUZERNE COUNTY, ROBERT LAWTON,               :   December 18, 2019
    AND DAVID PARSNIK,                           :
                                                 :   ARGUED: September 14, 2022
                       Appellees                 :

                                         OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE                                                DECIDED: May 5, 2023

        In this discretionary appeal, we consider the standard that a plaintiff must meet in

order to establish a prima facie claim under Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law 1 and

whether the Commonwealth Court erred in its application of that standard. As explained

in this opinion, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court did so err. We therefore

vacate its order and remand for further proceedings.

                                      I. Background

        On August 4, 2014, Appellant Donna Davis Javitz (“Javitz”) became the Director

of Human Resources for Luzerne County. In that role, Javitz negotiated contracts,

1   43 P.S. §§ 1421-1428.
handled employee complaints, conducted Loudermill hearings, 2 and addressed union-

related matters on behalf of Luzerne County. Her union-related responsibilities included

participating in investigatory meetings for disciplinary matters involving union employees.

In March 2015, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees

(hereinafter “AFSCME” or “Union”) filed an unfair labor practice charge (“ULP Charge”)

with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board against Luzerne County, raising allegations

concerning Javitz’s conduct in two investigatory meetings.             Paula Schnelly, an

administrative assistant in the appellate division of the Luzerne County’s District

Attorney’s Office and Union president, attended the investigatory meetings referenced in

the ULP Charge as a representative for the Union members. As is common, attached to

the ULP Charge were documents in support of the allegations. Among these documents

were what appeared to Javitz to be transcripts of the investigatory meetings at issue. The

highly detailed nature of the documents, as well as Javitz’s recollection that Schnelly did

not take notes during investigatory meetings, gave rise to a suspicion on Javitz’s part that

Schnelly recorded the investigatory meeting in violation of the Wiretap Act.

       Shortly thereafter, on or about March 20, 2015, Javitz took her concern to the

Director of Administrative Services, David Parsnik. Together they took the matter to the

Luzerne County District Attorney. The District Attorney stated that she would refer the

matter to the Attorney General’s Office to investigate, as Schnelly’s employment in the

District Attorney’s office created a conflict of interest. At various times over the following

months, Javitz inquired of Parsnik, County Solicitor David Pedri, Esquire, and the District

2 A pre-termination hearing for public employees required to satisfy due process rights.
See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

                                       [J-49-2022] - 2
Attorney about the status of the investigation into the alleged Wiretap Act violation, but

received no response. Instead, Javitz contends, she learned that the County Manager,

Robert Lawton, instructed the District Attorney to drop the matter. On October 15, 2015,

the Union and County settled the ULP Charge.           On October 26, 2015, Javitz was

terminated from her position.

      In December 2015, Javitz filed an action in federal district court, naming Luzerne

County, Lawton, and Parsnik as defendants (collectively, “Appellees”). Her complaint

raised federal and state claims, including a claim under Section 3(a) of the Whistleblower

Law, which provides the following:

             (a) Persons not to be discharged.--No employer may
             discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate
             against     an    employee        regarding    the    employee’s
             compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of
             employment because the employee or a person acting on
             behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about
             to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate
             authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public body
             or an instance of waste by any other employer as defined in
             this act.

43 P.S. § 1423(a). 3 In connection with the Whistleblower Law claim, Javitz alleged that

after reporting what she believed to be illegal recording of investigatory meetings by

Schnelly, Parsnik stopped including her in discussions pertinent to her responsibilities

and instead went directly to her subordinates; he was disrespectful to her in front of her

staff; he removed her from talks with human resource consultants and vendors; her key

to a filing room that contained the personnel files was taken from her; she was no longer

3 The remaining state law claims alleged breach of contract for violation of the County’s
Personnel Code, Home Rule Charter, and Ethics Code, and a common law claim for
wrongful termination. The federal claims alleged violations of Javitz’s Fourteenth and
First Amendment rights.

                                     [J-49-2022] - 3
permitted to lead contract negotiations; she was told, for the first time, to do the filing for

her office; she was excluded from meetings; and she was excluded from participating in

talks about the budget for the human resources department. Javitz v. Luzerne Cnty., No.

3:15-CV-2443, 2017 WL 1217178 at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2017). She also alleged that

Lawson instructed the District Attorney not to pursue the investigation and that Parsnik

ignored her attempts to discuss the investigation after the initial meeting in the District

Attorney’s office. Id. at *11. Appellees sought dismissal of all of Javitz’s claims. The

district court agreed in part. It refused to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation and

Whistleblower Law claims, finding, inter alia, that these allegations sufficiently pled a

causal connection between her report of the alleged Wiretap Act violation and her

termination. Id.

       Subsequently, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The

district court denied Javitz’s motion in its entirety, but granted Appellee’s motion as to the

remaining federal claims. Although Javitz’s state law claims remained viable, the district

court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them, and subsequently they

were transferred to the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas. 4 See Javitz v. Luzerne

Cnty., No. 3:15-CV-2443, 2018 WL 1545589 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018).

       In March 2019, Appellees moved for summary judgment as to all of Javitz’s claims.

As to the whistleblower claim, Appellees argued that they were entitled to summary

judgment because Javitz failed to establish that Schnelly was acting as a county

employee when the alleged recordings occurred and further, that Javitz was fired for poor

4  Javitz sought to have her claims heard in Lackawanna County, but Appellees
successfully moved to have the case transferred to Luzerne County, where the Honorable
Kenneth W. Seamans was specially assigned to hear the matter. Javitz’s Brief at 6-7.

                                       [J-49-2022] - 4
performance.     To refute Javitz’s particularized claims of retaliatory behavior and

termination, Appellees proffered the depositions of various human resources department

employees to establish that the entire human resources department (not just Javitz) was

relocated from the County Courthouse and that Javitz knew this move was going to

happen when she interviewed for her position. They relied on emails to refute Javitz’s

claims that she was cut off from budgetary meetings, union meetings, and contract

negotiations. In support of their defense that Javitz was terminated for poor performance,

Appellees pointed to the ULP Charge (which it settled) as evidence of Javitz’s poor

handling of union matters. Appellees also produced emails showing that Javitz failed to

fill a particular position that Parsnik instructed her to fill. In response, Javitz relied on

deposition testimony from the District Attorney, in which she confirmed that she referred

Javitz’s Wiretap Act allegation to the Attorney General because of the conflict caused by

Schnelly’s employment in the District Attorney’s office, as well as Javitz’s own affidavit, in

which she swore that she had no prior discipline before her termination and that she was

not given a warning nor a chance to improve before being terminated.

       The trial court granted Appellees’ motion and dismissed the complaint with

prejudice. Relevant to this appeal, it found that Javitz failed to set forth a prima facie case

under the Whistleblower Law on two grounds. It first found that Javitz failed to establish

wrongdoing by a public body because it was “undisputed from the record” that Schnelly

was acting in her union capacity and not as a county employee when she was alleged to

have committed the alleged Wiretap Act violation. Trial Court Opinion, 3/10/2020, at 7-9.

Further, of relevance to this appeal, it found that Javitz failed to establish a causal

connection between her report of wrongdoing and her termination. Id. at 9-10. In its view,

                                       [J-49-2022] - 5
Javitz’s evidence constituted no more than her perception of how she was treated after

making the report, which was insufficient to meet her burden. Id. at 10-11.

         Javitz appealed to the Commonwealth Court, where she challenged both of these

determinations. 5 The Commonwealth Court recognized that to establish a prima facie

claim under the Whistleblower Law, a plaintiff must establish “(1) a protected report of

wrongdoing, (2) by a public body, and (3) a causal connection between the report and her

termination.” Javitz v. Luzerne Cnty., 115 C.D. 2020, 2021 WL 3028160, at *6 (Pa.

Commw. July 19, 2021) (unpublished disposition), appeal granted, 267 A.3d 482 (Pa.

2021).    Concerning a causal connection, Javitz argued that the parties’ competing

evidence as to the reasons for her termination established an issue of material fact,

thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment. Id. Appellees took a different view,

arguing that Javitz’s evidence was insufficient to establish a causal connection, and

therefore, that Javitz failed to meet her burden to establish a prima facie case, entitling

them to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at *7.

         The Commonwealth Court agreed with Appellees. The court specified that the

requisite causal connection must be shown by “concrete facts or surrounding

circumstances that the report of wrongdoing or waste led to plaintiff’s dismissal, such

that there was specific direction or information received not to file the report or that there

would be no adverse consequences because the report was filed.” Id. (emphasis added)

5  Because the Commonwealth Court found that Javitz failed to establish the requisite
causal connection, it limited its discussion to that aspect of the trial court’s decision and
did not reach the issue of Schnelly’s county employment.

                                       [J-49-2022] - 6
(misquoting Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 720 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1998)). 6 The

intermediate court warned that vague and inconclusive circumstantial evidence will not

suffice to establish a causal connection and that the mere fact that negative actions by

an employer or termination occur after a report is made will not satisfy the plaintiff’s

burden. Id. (quoting Evans v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 81 A.3d 1062, 1070 (Pa. Commw.

2013)).

       Turning to the record, the Commonwealth Court found itself “constrained to agree”

that the record was bereft of facts establishing that Javitz was terminated because of her

report of alleged illegal recording by Schnelly. Id. It explained that Javitz

              has not provided “concrete facts” or shown any “surrounding
              circumstances” that could lead to the conclusion that there
              was “a specific direction” that she would suffer retaliation or
              be terminated because of the report as required by precedent.
              Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 761. Nor is there any evidence or
              allegation that she was directed to not make the report; in fact,
              [Javitz] provided evidence that Parsnik, her supervisor[,]
              joined her when she made her report to the District Attorney.
              Instead, the evidence [Javitz] points to – the positive
              performance evaluations she had received prior to the report,
              the moving of her office from the County Courthouse, her
              alleged restriction in involvement in union meetings and
              contract negotiations, the alleged changes in delegation of
              responsibilities, what [she] perceived as rude behavior by her
              supervisors, and her ultimate termination – are nearly
              identical to the claimed retaliatory actions alleged by the
              employees in Golaschevsky and Evans, which were
              determined to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case
              on causation. Thus, under Supreme Court and our [c]ourt’s
              precedent, these perceived retaliatory acts amount only to

6 The Commonwealth Court misquoted Golaschevsky in that it omitted an “as” from the
sentence it purported to reproduce. The language used in Golaschevsky provides that a
causal connection must be established by “concrete facts or surrounding circumstances
that the report of wrongdoing or waste led to plaintiff’s dismissal, such as that there was
specific direction or information received not to file the report or that there would be no
adverse consequences because the report was filed.” Golaschevsky v. Dep’t of Env’t
Prot., 720 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis added).

                                      [J-49-2022] - 7
              Appellant’s subjective perception that these actions resulted
              from her report of alleged wrongdoing and do not rise to the
              sort of concrete facts required to show causation under the
              Whistleblower Law.

Id. Finding itself bound by the case law, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Javitz

failed to satisfy the burden required to set forth a prima facie whistleblower claim. Id. at

*8.

       The Honorable Patricia A. McCullough dissented. Stressing that for purposes of

summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Javitz as

the non-moving party, she concluded that Javitz put forth sufficient evidence to establish

a causal connection between her report and subsequent termination.               Id. at *11

(McCullough, J., dissenting). In particular, the dissent pointed to evidence establishing

that after Javitz participated in two investigatory meetings involving Union members she

was given a good faith basis to believe that the Union’s president illegally recorded those

meetings. Id. Javitz reported this suspected wrongdoing to Parsnik, who agreed that

there may have been illegal recording and joined Javitz to report the misconduct to the

District Attorney. County Manager Lawton intervened and instructed the District Attorney

to cease the investigation. Id. When Javitz inquired of Parsnik, Lawton or the District

Attorney about the status of the investigation, they all “effectively shunned” her inquiries.

Id. It was around this time that Javitz began to experience “retaliatory employment actions

in an apparent attempt to ‘squeeze’ her out.” Id. Months later, Javitz was fired when she

refused to resign, and was not given reasons for her firing. Id. The dissent distinguished

Golaschevsky on the basis that the employer there submitted performance evaluations

to prove that the termination was due to poor job performance rather than the report of

wrongdoing, whereas here Appellees did not submit evidence of historically

                                      [J-49-2022] - 8
unsatisfactory job performance. Id. The dissent further noted that in the federal action,

the district court denied Appellees’ motion to dismiss, having found that the corresponding

factual averments in Javitz’s amended complaint adequately pled a causal connection

between the report and termination. Id. at *12-*13. The dissent also observed that in

neither Golaschevsky nor the later case of O’Rourke v. Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194

(Pa. 2001), did this Court require that to establish causation, a plaintiff must prove either

that the employer made a direct threat of adverse employment action or specifically

directed the plaintiff not to make a report. Id. at *14. In the dissent’s view, a finding of

causation may be based on the totality of the circumstances, and applying that standard

here, it found that Javitz satisfied her burden. Id.

        Javitz petitioned this Court for review of the Commonwealth Court’s determination,

which we granted. See Javitz v. Luzerne Cnty., 267 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). 7

7   We granted review of two issues, as phrased by Javitz:
               1. Whether this Court should allow this appeal to proceed
               where the Commonwealth Court in this case has rejected the
               well-established holding of the Supreme Court in O’Rourke []
               and Golaschevsky [] and instead determined that in order to
               establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower Law
               litigant must establish causation with direct evidence proving
               (1) the County directly threatened [Javitz] with adverse
               employment action for filing a report or (2) specifically directed
               [Javitz] not to file the report, in effect nullifying the
               Whistleblower Law?

               2. Did the Commonwealth Court err in entering an order
               dismissing this appeal by limiting its findings of facts and
               misapplying the law established by the Supreme Court?

Javitz v. Luzerne Cnty., 267 A.3d 482 (Pa. 2021) (per curiam). Under the heading of the
second issue in her brief, Javitz asks this Court to reinstate her Ethics Code claim.
Satisfied that the record supports a finding of causation for the Whistleblower Law claim,
she reasons that she must have established a prima facie case under the Ethics Code
(continued…)

                                        [J-49-2022] - 9
                                  II. Parties’ Arguments

       Javitz contends that the court below misapplied the applicable causation standard

in assessing the evidence that she offered to establish a prima facie case by requiring

that she establish, through direct evidence, either that she was instructed not to report

the alleged wrongdoing by Schnelly or that she was threatened with adverse employment

consequences for making the report.           The thrust of her argument is that the

Commonwealth Court impermissibly narrowed the causation standard established in

Golaschevsky and reiterated in O’Rourke by requiring direct proof of an explicit threat of

retaliation or explicit instruction not to file a report of wrongdoing. Javitz attributes this

misapplication of the law to the Commonwealth Court’s erroneous recitation of the

standard set forth in Golaschevsky, substituting the phrase “such that” for “such as that,”

and as a result, turning what this Court offered as examples of conduct that would support

a causation nexus into requirements.        Javitz’s Brief at 38.   She contends that the

Commonwealth Court’s decision has changed the standard so as to preclude

Whistleblower Law claims absent a proverbial smoking gun. Id. at 35-36. Javitz argues

that the Commonwealth Court’s decision has altered the landscape such that “unless a

threat of termination is spoken, we cannot assume that a firing without anything less than

a concurrent threat was caused by the report of wrongdoing. Anything less is a perception

problem.” Id. at 36. In Javitz’s view, not only is this a corruption of the Golaschevsky

because its whistleblower provision is broader than the Whistleblower Law, as it applies
to any wrongdoing, and Javitz has alleged sufficient facts to establish that Schnelly
committed a crime. Javitz’s Brief at 52. She also asks that if the Court were to find that
she lacks a statutory remedy, we reinstate her common law wrongful discharge claim. Id.
at 53-54. Both of these requests are beyond the scope of the issues upon which this
Court granted discretionary review.

                                      [J-49-2022] - 10
standard, but it runs contrary to the remedial purposes of the Whistleblower Law. Id. at

36-37.

         Perhaps in recognition of the Golaschevsky Court’s rejection of the employee’s

“perceptions of how others treated him” as a basis for a causal connection, Javitz further

contends that the Commonwealth Court “selectively chose certain facts and ignored

others” when undertaking its review of the record. Id. at 33. In particular, she draws our

attention to her evidence that after she reported the alleged Wiretap Act violation, Parsnik

excluded her from aspects of her job that she previously performed and spoke directly to

her subordinates; eliminated her from discussions and meetings with human resource

vendors and consultants; revoked her access to critical files and documents; was

disrespectful to her in front of her own staff; and denied her input on discussions regarding

the budget for the human relations department. Id. at 33 n.16. She emphasizes that she

had no negative performance reviews before she was terminated, and further that Lawton

referred to her as an outstanding employee in a newspaper article prior to the report. Id.

She further faults the Commonwealth Court for failing to appreciate that she made

multiple attempts to follow up on her report, all of which were ignored by her superiors.

Id. at 34-36. 8   Javitz argues that this selective review impermissibly narrowed the

circumstances under which a claimant can seek protection under the Whistleblower Law.

Id. at 33.

         Appellees do not address whether the Commonwealth Court misconstrued the law

by requiring proof that Javitz was explicitly told not to make the report or received a threat

8Javitz also argues that, for the same reasons cited by the Commonwealth Court dissent,
her case is distinguishable from Golaschevsky. Javitz’s Brief at 38-46.

                                      [J-49-2022] - 11
of adverse employment action. 9 Rather, they address the remaining elements of Javitz’s

Whistleblower Law claim in an effort to prove that she has failed to substantiate her

allegations, such that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In that vein, they

contend that Javitz has failed to put forth any evidence to establish a genuine issue of

material fact as to an instance of wrongdoing or that the alleged wrongdoing was

committed by an entity subject to the Whistleblower Law. Id. at 17-19.

      Appellees respond to Javitz’s evidentiary claim with their own review of the

evidence to prove that Javitz has “failed to establish causation through her alleged

instances of antagonism and retaliation.” Appellees’ Brief at 12. They point to Javitz’s

admission that she knew when she was hired that her offices would be relocated,

documents showing that Parsnik continued to communicate with Javitz after March 2015,

and correspondence showing that Javitz continued to participate in union matters

generally, and AFSCME matters specifically, after she made the report. Id. at 13-15.

Appellees also reference email correspondence and other documentation to counter

Javitz’s claim that her job responsibilities were diminished or that she was excluded from

union matters and contract negotiations. Id.

                                     III.   Analysis

      We are called on to review the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that Javitz failed

to establish the causal connection element of her whistleblower claim because she did

not put forth direct evidence that she was instructed not to make a report of wrongdoing

or threatened with adverse employment action for making such a report. Javitz, 267 A.3d

9 Absent from their discussion is any citation to, much less discussion of, Golaschevsky
or O’Rourke.

                                     [J-49-2022] - 12
482. This is a question of law, over which our scope of review is plenary. Moorhead v.

Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 788 (Pa. 2001) (invoking plenary scope of review

in connection with question of whether lower courts properly interpreted case law).

                 The Whistleblower Law & the Golaschevsky Standard

      The Whistleblower Law is “chiefly a remedial measure” that aims to promote

openness in governmental operations and governmental compliance with the law.

O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1202. It achieves these goals by protecting employees from

adverse employer action following a report of actual or suspected violation of federal,

state or local law; protecting employees who participate in hearings, investigations, or

court proceedings regarding employer misconduct; and providing remedies for

employees and penalties against employers for actions that violate its terms. Bailets v.

Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300, 307 (Pa. 2015); see also 43 P.S. § 1421, Historical and

Statutory Notes (“An Act providing protection for employees who report a violation or

suspected violation of State, local or Federal law; providing protection for employees who

participate in hearings, investigations, legislative inquiries or court actions; and

prescribing remedies and penalties.”). The protective measure for employees who report

wrongdoing is found in Section 3(a), which provides the following:

             (a) Persons not to be discharged.--No employer may
             discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate
             against     an    employee        regarding    the    employee’s
             compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges of
             employment because the employee or a person acting on
             behalf of the employee makes a good faith report or is about
             to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate
             authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste by a public body
             or an instance of waste by any other employer as defined in
             this act.

                                    [J-49-2022] - 13
43 P.S. § 1423(a). Section 4 of the Whistleblower Law provides a cause of action,

allowing that “[a] person who alleges a violation of this act may bring a civil action in a

court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate injunctive relief or damages, or both, within

180 days after the occurrence of the alleged violation.” Id. § 1424(a). To establish a

prima facie case of a violation of Section 3(a), an employee must establish “by a

preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the alleged reprisal, the employee or a

person acting on behalf of the employee had reported or was about to report in good faith,

verbally or in writing, an instance of wrongdoing or waste to the employer or an

appropriate authority.” Id. § 1424(b). In the case of alleged retaliatory termination, the

employee must show a causal connection between the report of wrongdoing and the

termination. Bailets, 123 A.3d at 306. 10

       The causation requirement was first articulated in Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa.

Commw. 1994), aff’d per curiam, 669 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1995). The plaintiff therein was

employed by the Department of the Auditor General from May 1991 to September 1993,

during which time he was assigned to the Office of Special Investigations. In his position

with the Office of Special Investigations, the plaintiff investigated a variety of fraudulent

activity, including the misuse of public funds by Commonwealth agencies or illegal acts

involving institutions that receive state funds. Id. at 223. In the course of his duties, the

10  Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the complained-of actions
were made for “separate and legitimate” reasons. 43 P.S. § 1424(c); O’Rourke, 778 A.2d
at 1203-04. If the employer satisfies this burden, the burden shifts back to the employee
to prove that the reasons offered are merely pretextual. Watson v. City of Phila., 683
A.2d 489, 492 (Pa. Commw. 1994). As discussed later in this opinion, this burden-shifting
framework is consistent with other statutes that protect employees from retaliation by
employers.

                                      [J-49-2022] - 14
plaintiff filed a report with the Auditor General detailing instances of waste and

wrongdoing by the Center for Research and Human Development in Education (“Center”),

which was located within Temple University. Id. The Auditor General took no action

based on this report. Four months later, a Temple University representative contacted

the Auditor General and requested access to the report about the Center. Within weeks

of this request, the Auditor General confronted the plaintiff with a resignation letter and

asked him to resign or face termination. The plaintiff signed the letter under duress.

       Based on these facts, the plaintiff brought a claim in the Commonwealth Court’s

original jurisdiction under the Whistleblower Law. The only substantive allegation in the

complaint was that the plaintiff (an investigator employed by the Auditor General) made

a report to the Auditor General of criminal acts by the Center. The Auditor General

demurred, arguing that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. The Commonwealth Court granted the Auditor General’s preliminary objection,

finding that the plaintiff’s lone allegation fell short of the threshold to plead a Whistleblower

Law claim. The court recognized that the plaintiff elaborated on his sparse pleading in

his brief by clarifying that after he made the report about the Center in May 1993, he

received no response relative to it until a Center employee contacted the Auditor General,

after which his resignation was demanded. As the court characterized it, the sum of the

plaintiff’s allegations were that “based on the timing of the request for a copy of the report

and his termination, the Auditor General was guilty of violating the Whistleblower Law.”

Id. at 225.

       The Commonwealth Court explained that it could not accept these “minimal”

allegations as sufficient to establish an allegation of wrongdoing by the Auditor General;

                                       [J-49-2022] - 15
otherwise, every public employee who performs investigatory functions and files a report

upon which his department head does not act would automatically establish a prima facie

Whistleblower Law claim if terminated. Id. Rather, the Commonwealth Court explained,

at the pleading stage, such an employee must allege a connection between the report of

waste or wrongdoing and the termination:

             To make out a cause of action under the Whistleblower Law
             by one who, as part of his or her regular job duties, files
             reports of waste or wrongdoing based on wrongdoing outside
             the governmental entity that he is charged with seeking out,
             that person must make more than a general statement that a
             report was filed and, within a given amount of time, the
             employee was fired as a result. An employee who has been
             terminated based on a filed report and wants to base his or
             her complaint on their employer’s violation under the
             Whistleblower Law must specify how their employer is guilty
             of waste and/or wrongdoing. They must also show by
             concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that the report
             led to their dismissal, such as that there was specific
             direction or information they received not to file the report or
             there would be adverse consequences because the report
             was filed.

Id. (emphasis added).

      Four years later, this Court adopted this causation standard. Golaschevsky, 720

A.2d at 759.     Golaschevsky involved an employee hired by the Department of

Environmental Resources (“DER”) as a computer systems analyst. The employee was

hired on September 7, 1993. On December 20, 1993, approximately three months into

this position, the employee informed his supervisor that he believed that other employees

in his division were using computer software in a manner that violated federal copyright

laws. The supervisor encouraged the employee to report his suspicions. Id. at 757-58.

A few weeks later, the employee received his first performance review, which detailed

several areas of deficient performance, and he was given a list of projects to complete in

                                    [J-49-2022] - 16
a designated timeframe. After that period lapsed, the employee was subject to another

evaluation, at which time his performance was rated again as unsatisfactory. Ten days

later, on April 25, 1994, DER terminated the employee.

       The employee later filed a whistleblower claim, alleging that he was terminated in

retaliation for his report of suspected copyright law violations by co-workers. Pertinent to

the present appeal, the employee testified that prior to alerting his supervisor of the

suspected copyright violations, he had never been told that his work was unsatisfactory

and that the report instigated not only his first negative performance reviews, but also

obstructive behavior by colleagues and supervisors that impeded his ability to complete

his work and ultimately, his termination. Id. at 759-60.

       Following the close of discovery, DER sought summary judgment, arguing that the

employee failed to establish a prima facie cause of action. The Commonwealth Court

granted the motion and the employee appealed to this Court, arguing, inter alia, that the

Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that he failed to establish a causal connection to

support a Whistleblower Law claim was in error. Id. at 758. Quoting directly from Gray,

this Court stated that to establish the causal connection for a claim of retaliatory

termination under the Whistleblower Law, an employee “must show by concrete facts or

surrounding circumstances that the report of wrongdoing … led to the [] dismissal, such

as that there was specific direction or information received not to file the report or that

there would be adverse consequences because the report was filed.” Id. at 759 (internal

quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Gray, 651 A.2d at 225). 11

11 Arguably, the standard announced in Gray was designed to address claims brought
by a public employee whose job is to investigate public entities other than his employer.
(continued…)

                                     [J-49-2022] - 17
        Based on this standard, the Court rejected the employee’s evidence of a causal

connection between the report and his termination:

                 He does not allege that his supervisors threatened to fire him
                 or to impose any other adverse consequences because of his
                 report, nor does he establish any other “concrete facts” to
                 connect the report with the dismissal. Instead, [a]ppellant
                 relies solely on vague and inconclusive circumstantial
                 evidence.

Id. After recounting the employee’s evidence, the Court concluded:

                 However, this “evidence” is nothing more than [a]ppellant’s
                 perception of how others treated him after he made the …
                 report — a perception that is obviously colored by [a]ppellant’s
                 interest in proving that he is a victim of retaliatory discharge.

                                               ***

                 Appellant offers no concrete evidence tending to show a
                 causal connection between his report of alleged copyright
                 violations and his subsequent termination, and, therefore, he
                 cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge
                 pursuant to the Whistleblower Law.

Id. at 760. 12

        While concurring in the result, Justice Nigro wrote separately to stress that absent

direct evidence, a whistleblower claim may be established through circumstantial

As such, the employee must specify how the investigative-agency employer committed
waste or wrongdoing by failing to take action on a report of wrongdoing by the outside
public entity made by the employee. The example of causation cited in Gray appears to
derive from the reporting responsibilities of the employee, i.e., he was told not to do his
job. This Court did not note this factual distinction when adopting the examples of
causation in Golaschevsky, a case involving a plaintiff who was not employed in a
capacity that required the filing of investigatory reports. That said, the broad application
of the examples of evidence that meet the standard has never been challenged, and it is
not challenged here.
12 Beyond rejecting the employee’s evidence as insufficient, this Court found relevance
in the fact that the employer encouraged the employee to follow up on his concern and
submit a written report. Golaschevsky, 720 at 760.

                                        [J-49-2022] - 18
evidence. Id. (Nigro, J., concurring). 13 In so doing, he recognized that the Whistleblower

Law’s shifting burden of proof is similar to those used in claims of unlawful discrimination

brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ,43 P.S. §§ 951-963 (“PHRA”), and

Title VII discrimination cases. Id. at 760 & n.3.

       The concurrence agreed that to prove a causal connection, a whistleblower plaintiff

must establish concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that a report led to dismissal.

Id. at 761. Justice Nigro noted that in Title VII cases, the Third Circuit has accepted

circumstantial evidence of a pattern of antagonism or retaliatory animus following the

report as sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Id. After

performing a separate review of the evidence, which was based exclusively on the

employee’s deposition testimony reporting his view that his treatment in the workplace

adversely changed after reporting the alleged illegal activity, including the negative

performance evaluation, Justice Nigro concluded that it was insufficient to support a

reasonable finding that the employer engaged in antagonistic behavior against the

employee after his report of illegal activity, culminating in his termination.      Without

elaboration, Justice Nigro stated that “[w]hile in another case the circumstances may

13  The majority opinion does not mandate direct evidence to establish the causal
connection. First, the majority certainly was aware of the term of art and did not use it to
describe the type of acceptable evidence. Instead, it used the phrase “concrete evidence”
explaining that it must “tend[] to show a causal connection” between the report and
subsequent termination. Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 760. Direct evidence is evidence
that if true, proves a fact without inference. Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th Ed.
2019). Thus, “concrete evidence” described by the Court as evidence “tending to show”
refers to circumstantial evidence, which is evidence of a fact or set of facts from which
the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred. D’Ardenne by
D’Ardenne v. Strawbridge & Clothier, Inc., 712 A.2d 318, 320 (Pa. Super. 1998) (quoting
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 39, at 242 (5th ed.
1984)).

                                      [J-49-2022] - 19
permit a jury to infer that a report of wrongdoing led to an employee’s dismissal, such a

factual scenario is not present here.” Id. at 762.

       Thus, in Golaschevsky, the Court held that a plaintiff’s prima facie case for

causation may be established by use of either “concrete facts or surrounding

circumstances” but not by the employee’s conclusory perception of how others treated

him after making a report of alleged wrongdoing. Id. at 759-60.

       When considered in the context of the evidence adduced by the employee, it is

clear that the requirement for “concrete facts or surrounding circumstances” to establish

a causal connection means that the whistleblower plaintiff cannot rely on his or her

perception of the facts to support a conclusion that the employer engaged in antagonistic

conduct after the report. Instead, the plaintiff must prove the concrete facts or surrounding

circumstances14 from which the factfinder can draw the inference that the employer’s

conduct was antagonistic.

       For example, in Golaschevsky, the employee did not offer evidence of pre-report

positive performance evaluations that were followed by post-report negative reviews, from

which a jury could infer that the negative review was a result of the whistleblowing. 15

Likewise, there was no evidence of the type of input required from co-workers to complete

14 As previously explained, this language originated in Gray, a case in the Commonwealth
Court’s original jurisdiction, involving a ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer. Given this procedural posture, the Commonwealth Court was focused on the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint to establish a claim upon which relief could
be granted – i.e., allegations establishing the elements of a Whistleblower Law claim. By
referencing “concrete facts” and “surrounding circumstances,” the court was directing that
to plead a prima facie whistleblower claim, the plaintiff was required to plead the factual
basis upon which the causal connection was based.
15 Instead, the employee relied on the fact that he had not received a negative evaluation
prior to reporting the alleged illegality.

                                      [J-49-2022] - 20
his assignment, or other projects for which input was provided followed by the withholding

of input by co-workers after the report. Instead, the employee testified only that his co-

workers refused to cooperate with him. Golaschevsky stands for the proposition that a

plaintiff cannot rely on self-serving conclusions of an antagonistic post-report workplace

and subsequent discharge to establish a prima facie case of causation. 16

       This understanding of Golaschevsky is reinforced by the Commonwealth Court’s

treatment of the evidence of causation in O’Rourke.         O’Rourke was a food service

instructor in the culinary department of SCI-Dallas who, in the course of performing his

job, discovered a scheme that involved the theft of thousands of pounds of meat from the

culinary department and the fraudulent alteration of the culinary department’s inventory

books to disguise the theft. O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1196. O’Rourke reported this conduct

to the deputy superintendent, and an investigation ensued. After making the report,

O’Rouke’s co-workers became hostile toward him, engaging in “petty acts of irritation and

harassment,” and his superiors reassigned him to a less desirable position in the dining

16  Federal case law applying Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law is in accord with this
explanation of the Golaschevsky standard, as it reveals an understanding that factually
unsupported conclusions about post-report antagonistic conduct by employers or
retaliatory discharge are insufficient to establish a causal connection. See, e.g., Bennett
v. Republic Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 3d 451, 456 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (explaining
Golaschevsky as requiring facts or circumstances that support an inference tying report
of wrongdoing to termination and finding insufficient plaintiff’s sole, bald conclusory
allegation that termination was made in retaliation for her report); McAndrew v. Bucks
Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 982 F.Supp.2d 491, 503 (E.D.Pa. 2013) (“In order to sustain a
[Whistleblower Law] claim, plaintiff must plead facts or surrounding circumstances
supporting the inference that the reports … led to her dismissal.”); Mosley v. City of
Pittsburgh Pub. Sch. Dist., 702 F. Supp. 2d 561, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (finding evidence
inadequate to establish causal connection where “there [was] no evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer that [supervisor] decided to terminate [p]laintiff because of his
report” where the only evidence offered was plaintiff’s belief that supervisor began to “set
the stage” for plaintiff’s termination after plaintiff reported wrongdoing).

                                      [J-49-2022] - 21
hall and removed him from a list of employees eligible to work as a supervisor. Id. at

1197. Having suffered these consequences, O’Rourke filed a whistleblower claim. The

Commonwealth Court, in its original jurisdiction, found that the only actionable retaliatory

acts pled by O’Rourke were the reassignment and removal from the supervisor list, having

rejected the evidentiary worth of his perception that the employee suffered “petty acts of

irritation and harassment.” Id. at 1198. While the causal connection was ultimately

admitted by O’Rourke’s employer, on review this Court pertinently summarized

Golaschevsky by stating that “[t]his Court has … held that a Whistleblower Law claimant

must come forward with some evidence of a connection between the report of

wrongdoing and the alleged retaliatory acts.” Id. at 1200 (emphasis added) (citing

Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759).

                        IV.    Application to the Present Case

       Javitz is correct that when setting forth the standard, the Commonwealth Court

misquoted Golaschevsky, rendering the original “such as that” into “such that.” Compare

Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759 ( “[A] plaintiff must show by concrete facts or surrounding

circumstances that the report … led to … dismissal, such as that there was specific

direction or information received not to file the report or [that] there would be adverse

consequences because the report was filed.”) (emphasis added), with Javitz, 2021 WL

3028160, at *6 (“[T]he causal connection … must be shown “by concrete facts or

surrounding circumstances that the report of wrongdoing or waste led to plaintiff’s

dismissal, such that there was specific direction or information received not to file the

report or that there would be adverse consequences because the report was filed.”)

(emphasis added). Further, upon a complete reading of the Commonwealth Court’s

                                     [J-49-2022] - 22
decision, it appears that the court required direct evidence to satisfy Javitz’s burden to

establish a causal connection. In addition to finding that Javitz failed to provide evidence

of a specific direction not to file the report or that she would be terminated for filing the

report, the court addressed some of the evidence that she did put forth:

              [T]he evidence [Javitz] points to – the positive performance
              evaluations she had received prior to the report, the moving
              of her office from the County Courthouse, her alleged
              restriction in involvement in union meetings and contract
              negotiations, the alleged changes in delegation of
              responsibilities, what [she] perceived as rude behavior by her
              supervisors, and her ultimate termination – are nearly
              identical to the claimed retaliatory actions alleged by the
              employees in Golaschevsky and Evans,[17] which were

17 Contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s view, the evidence presented by the plaintiff in
Evans was materially different from the evidence presented in Golaschevsky. As
recounted above, the plaintiff in Golaschevsky attempted to establish a causal connection
based on his first performance review, which occurred after he made his report and was
negative, and his perception of how others treated him. Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 759-
60. Evans involved a plaintiff nurse who made a report regarding conduct by the director
of the hospital’s addiction clinic, after which, the plaintiff alleged, she received multiple
disciplinary warnings, was subjected to suspensions without pay, and ultimately
terminated. Evans v. Thomas Jefferson Hosp., 81 A.3d 1062, 1064-67 (Pa. Commw.
2013). While the plaintiff relied on her perception that co-workers and superiors treated
her poorly after making her report, she did so only in part. The plaintiff also put forth
evidence of positive performance reviews that turned negative after she made her report,
as well as evidence that the warnings and suspensions occurred only after she made her
report. Id. at 1070. This was evidence of concrete facts and surrounding circumstances
from which an inference of causation could be drawn; evidence not presented in
Golaschevsky.
The Commonwealth Court did not parse the evidence. It looked only at the similarity
between some of the allegations made by the plaintiffs in both cases (the receipt of poor
performance reviews and the plaintiffs’ perception that others began to treat them
differently) and concluded that pursuant to Golaschevsky, the evidence was insufficient
to establish a causal connection. See id. at 1071 (“The evidence submitted by Evans is
the very same type of evidence that the Supreme Court held insufficient in
Golaschevsky.”). The Commonwealth Court failed to consider the evidence offered in
support of the employer’s perception of mistreatment, and in so doing, reached a false
equivalency and misapplied Golaschevsky’s holding.            As discussed infra, the
Commonwealth Court committed a similar error here. However, it is pertinent to note that
in Evans, the Commonwealth Court provided alternative reasons for its decision, including
(continued…)

                                      [J-49-2022] - 23
              determined to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case
              on causation. … [T]hese perceived retaliatory acts amount
              only to [Javitz’s] subjective perception that these actions
              resulted from her report of alleged wrongdoing and do not rise
              to the sort of concrete facts required to show causation under
              the Whistleblower Law.

Javitz, 2021 WL 3028160, at *6. The Commonwealth Court considered Javitz’s evidence

and upon finding it “nearly identical” to the evidence rejected in Golaschevsky, found it

insufficient to establish a causal connection.

       This was error.    The Commonwealth Court’s wholesale classification of this

evidence as Javitz’s “subjective perception” is wrong. The only item of evidence properly

characterized as “subjective perception” evidence is her characterization of the “rude

behavior of her supervisors.” Evidence of pre-report performance praise 18 and the post-

report relocation of her office, restriction of her participation in union meetings and

contract negotiations, and changes in the delegation of responsibilities is evidence of

facts, not perception, upon which an inference of post-report antagonism and causation

could be based. 19    In its summary of Javitz’s evidence, the Commonwealth Court

neglected to include the additional evidence of post-reporting antagonism that she, as the

that the pre- and post-report performance evaluations were similar in that they faulted the
employee’s professional interaction with patients, which was ultimately the reason for her
termination. Id. at 1070.
18  Javitz did not establish that she received a formal positive performance evaluation
prior to the report; rather, she put forth evidence that before the report, Lawton praised
her as an “outstanding county employee” to the local press. See Javitz’s Brief at 10 (citing
Lawson’s Deposition testimony). It appears that this is what the Commonwealth Court
referred to as a positive performance evaluation.
19 Appellees offered evidence to rebut this evidence, but because of the shifting burdens
of proof, that evidence becomes relevant and is properly considered only after Javitz
establishes a prima facie claim. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1424(c); O’Rourke, 778 A.2d at 1203-
04.

                                     [J-49-2022] - 24
human resources director, was denied access to personnel files that were locked away

and not given a key to access them, that she was told for the first time to do the filing for

the office, that Lawson instructed the District Attorney not to pursue an investigation into

the report, that Parsnik ignored all of her inquires as to what action was being taken as a

result of her report, and that she was not provided a reason for her termination, even after

requesting it. This is “concrete evidence” offered in support of establishing a causal

connection. Javitz argues in her brief that she produced evidence of facts supporting an

inference of a pattern of post-reporting antagonism culminating in her discharge, 20 and

20 Javitz’s argument is aligned with retaliation cases in other contexts. Javitz Brief at 50-
51. As discussed in his concurring opinion in Golaschevsky, Justice Nigro noted the
strong similarities between the evidentiary requirements of whistleblower claims and
PHRA and Title VII cases. Golaschevsky, 720 A.2d at 760 & n.3 (Nigro, J. concurring).
The same is true as to First Amendment retaliation claims as demonstrated by Javitz’s
federal court lawsuit and the district court’s overlapping analysis of her state law
whistleblower claim and her First Amendment retaliation claim. Javitz, 2017 WL 1287178,
at *11 (“The factual allegation that provides support for the First Amendment claim
provides support for the whistleblower claim and her First Amendment retaliatory claim.”).
While state court case law analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence of the causal
connection between post-reporting antagonistic workplace treatment and retaliatory
discharge of a whistleblower is scant, cases involving the PHRA, Title VII and First
Amendment retaliation claims utilize an essentially identical analytical framework to
assess the sufficiency of the evidence proffered to establish the causal connection in light
of the totality of the circumstances: the temporal relationship between the protected
activity and the retaliatory discharge and/or a pattern of antagonism perpetrated by the
employer in the period between the occurrence of the protected activity and the adverse
employment consequence. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Temple Univ., 185 A.3d 396, 405 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (explaining that plaintiff asserting a PHRA retaliation claim usually proves
causation through “either (1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the
protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled
with timing to establish a causal link.”); Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d
259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007) (providing that causal connection for a First Amendment
retaliation claim commonly is established by unusually suggestive temporal proximity
between the activity at issue and the allegedly retaliatory action or a pattern of antagonism
coupled with timing); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 (3d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that to establish a prima facie cause of discriminatory retaliation under the
PHRA or Title VII, a plaintiff can establish the necessary link between protected activity
(continued…)

                                      [J-49-2022] - 25
we agree that the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that it was instead merely

her perception that the conduct was antagonistic.

       For this reason, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court erred and misapplied

the law. Accordingly, we vacate its order and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 21

       The order of the Commonwealth Court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED

for further proceedings.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy and Brobson join the

opinion.

       The Late Chief Justice Baer did not participate in the decision of this matter.

and termination through temporal proximity between the two events or “a pattern of
antagonism in the intervening period”); Rosati v. Colello, 94 F. Supp. 3d 704, 717 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (providing that to establish causation for PHRA or Title VII retaliation claim on
temporal proximity alone, “[d]ays are suggestive; months are not” and that “the timing of
an alleged retaliatory action must be unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive before a
causal link will be inferred”).
21 The trial court granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor on the Whistleblower Law
claim upon finding that Javitz failed to establish a prima facie case as to multiple aspects
of her claim, not just for her failure to establish a causal connection, and Javitz challenged
each of those determinations on appeal. See Javitz, 2021 WL 3028160, at *4-*6. In
disposing of Javitz’s appeal, however, the Commonwealth Court addressed only the trial
court’s causal connection ruling, leaving unresolved Javitz’s remaining challenges
including, inter alia, her challenge to the trial court’s ruling that she failed to establish
wrongdoing by a public body because of the county employee’s role as a union
representative at the time of the alleged wiretap violation. Upon remand, the
Commonwealth Court should address the balance of the issues Javitz raised on appeal.

                                      [J-49-2022] - 26