Court Opinion

ID: 9353880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 23:03:07.711169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:23.802486
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211308-U
                                            No. 1-21-1308
                                     Order filed January 12, 2023
                                                                                       Fourth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                               IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                          FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 19 CR 9718
                                                                )
 KING COLLIER,                                                  )   Honorable
                                                                )   Michael R. Clancy,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge, presiding.

           PRESIDING JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Hoffman and Rochford concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: The State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
                defendant constructively possessed a firearm.

¶2        Following a bench trial, defendant King Collier was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon

by a felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)) and possession of a firearm without a

Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), 14(c)(3) (West 2018)) and

sentenced to two concurrent terms of two years in prison. On appeal, defendant challenges the
No. 1-21-1308

sufficiency of the evidence to convict, arguing that the State failed to prove he constructively

possessed the firearm at issue. For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 1

¶3      Defendant’s convictions arose from the execution of a search warrant at a single-family

Chicago home on April 29, 2019. Following his arrest, defendant was charged by indictment with

two counts of possession of a controlled substance (PCS) with intent to deliver, four counts of

UUWF, two counts of possession of a firearm without a FOID card, and one count of defacing

identification marks of firearms.

¶4      At trial, Chicago police officer Joy McClain testified that on the date in question, she was

working in the narcotics unit as part of an eight-member team executing a search warrant at the

5900 block of South Laflin Street. Defendant was the named target of the search warrant. As the

evidence officer for the team, McClain’s duties included taking photographs and recovering and

inventorying evidence. At 10:23 p.m., the team of officers arrived at the house, knocked, and

announced their office. When no one answered, the officers forced entry.

¶5      McClain went straight to the basement, followed by two other officers, Mark Hernandez

and Scott McKenna. While descending the stairs, McClain shouted, “Chicago police, search

warrant,” and heard someone respond, “I’m laying on my stomach, my hands are above my head.”

As she walked into the basement, she inhaled “a white cloud of powder.” Her nose started tingling

and burning, she became lightheaded, and she started coughing. Believing the powder could be

heroin or cocaine, she called out to the other officers, directing them not to come downstairs so

        1
          In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.

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No. 1-21-1308

that they would not inhale the powder as well. However, Hernandez and McKenna both

experienced the same symptoms McClain did, and McKenna had to go to the hospital.

¶6      Defendant, who was the only person in the basement, was lying on the ground “in the

middle of the floor.” He obeyed McClain’s order that he put his hands behind his back and was

compliant while she and Hernandez handcuffed him. When the officers lifted defendant off the

ground, McClain saw baggies of suspect heroin stuck to his stomach. More baggies of suspect

heroin lay on the floor and there was “powder everywhere.” The officers walked defendant up to

the first floor.

¶7      Once McClain was treated on the scene for exposure to the powder and after the air in the

basement had “settled,” she, Hernandez, and Officer Xavier Chism returned to the basement and

conducted a systematic search. They recovered and inventoried baggies of suspect heroin from the

floor where defendant had been lying; suspect cannabis, a bag of suspect cocaine, and $96 from a

bar countertop; live ammunition from a shoebox on the floor; loose white powder they “scooped

up” from the floor; and a book bag containing sandwich bags, Ziploc bags, Dormin, three digital

scales, and two mixers. About seven to eight feet from where defendant had been lying, Chism

discovered a gap in a wall under a window, in which two bags were hanging. One of the bags

contained a .357 Colt with its serial number “graded off” so that it was illegible. The other bag

contained “a bunch” of different caliber live rounds, shotgun shell casings, a knotted bag of suspect

heroin, and a knotted bag of suspect crack cocaine. McClain recovered and inventoried the Colt

and the suspect narcotics.

¶8      After searching the basement, McClain searched the first floor. In a bedroom the police

identified as the “west bedroom,” which contained a king- or queen-sized mattress and a folding

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No. 1-21-1308

table, McClain’s attention was directed to a “beer bucket” on the floor. Inside the bucket was a

wallet and a .45-caliber derringer handgun loaded with a .410-caliber shotgun shell. The wallet

contained defendant’s Illinois State identification (ID) card and Social Security card. McClain

recovered and inventoried the derringer. From the west bedroom, McClain also recovered a letter

from AAA bearing defendant’s name and the address of the residence being searched.

¶9     On cross-examination, McClain agreed that when she testified on direct examination as to

the inventory numbers of various items she recovered, she was “testifying off of the information

that the State’s Attorney wrote down on the back of the pictures.” After being shown an inventory

slip and a “narcotics supp report,” she acknowledged that she had testified to incorrect inventory

numbers for the powder recovered from one of the bags in the wall and for the loose powder

recovered from the floor. She clarified that she recovered and inventoried 27 bags of suspect heroin

from the basement floor, which included the bags that had been stuck to defendant’s stomach but

fell when he stood up.

¶ 10   According to McClain, four or five other civilians were present “[u]pstairs somewhere” in

the house at the time of the search. Because she went straight to the basement upon entering the

house, she did not know where the other people had been in the house. She did not see any of them

in the west bedroom. McClain agreed that, according to her evidence log, the letter from AAA was

recovered from inside a shoebox on the floor of the west bedroom. After being shown a photograph

of the envelope of the AAA letter, she agreed that it did not have a postmark with a date on it and,

therefore, she did not know how long it had been in the house. She also agreed that among the

photographs she took were pictures of an ID, a credit card, and a paycheck stub, all with the name

Shawn Guice on them, and pictures of two pieces of mail addressed to Roseanne Williams. She

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No. 1-21-1308

also took photographs of a cell phone on the mattress in the west bedroom, another cell phone in

“one of the bedrooms,” and two cell phones on the bar in the basement. She did not know who

owned any of the cell phones and did not inventory them.

¶ 11   When shown the photograph of defendant’s ID, McClain agreed that it listed his address

as 5923 South Bishop Street. She inventoried the wallet, but did not take a picture of or inventory

defendant’s Social Security card. McClain explained that she would have left the Social Security

card at the house or with the family. She did not take photographs of or recover any pictures of

defendant from inside the residence, did not recover any keys to the residence from him, and did

not see him entering or exiting the residence at any time.

¶ 12   On redirect, McClain refreshed her memory with “the supp” and clarified the inventory

numbers for various items recovered during the search. She indicated that the ID, credit card, and

paycheck stub with the name Shawn Guice on them were recovered from a table in a different

bedroom than the west bedroom. She explained that as a matter of course, she does not photograph

or recover Social Security cards because “God forbid I lose it or someone steal[s] the identification

of the person whose Social Security card it is.”

¶ 13   On re-cross, McClain stated that she did not recall where in the house she took photographs

of the mail addressed to Roseanne Williams. Other than defendant, she did not know the names of

any of the people present in the house at the time of the search.

¶ 14   Chicago police officer Gerold Lee testified that at 10:23 p.m. on the day in question, he

and a team of officers arrived at the subject residence to execute a search warrant of which

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No. 1-21-1308

defendant was a target.2 Lee knocked on the front door and announced “police search warrant”

several times. Receiving no response, the officers forced entry. As Lee made his way through the

living room, four people came downstairs from the second floor and out of the “middle” and “east”

bedrooms on the first floor. About this time, Lee was “yelled at by other officers to not come

downstairs.” Defendant was brought upstairs from the basement, and the civilians and officers

gathered in the living room.

¶ 15    While in the living room, defendant was wearing a tank top, sweatpants, socks, and flip

flops or shower shoes. Officer Angela Pitman asked defendant “what he wanted to wear.”

Defendant “specifically asked for a jacket and a pair of white Nike tennis shoes that were in the

west bedroom.” Chism asked defendant about any weapons and/or narcotics. In response,

defendant “freely admitted that there was a derringer in a beer bucket in that west bedroom.” At

some point, Lee saw the derringer, as well as a black wallet, both of which had been recovered

from inside a bucket in the west bedroom.

¶ 16    While other officers searched the house, Lee gave defendant Miranda warnings on the front

porch, after which defendant admitted “knowledge to the drugs being in the basement and

admit[ed] knowledge of the gun.” Defendant also reiterated that there was a derringer in a beer

bucket in the west bedroom.

¶ 17    After defendant was transported to the station, Lee informed him he “was still Mirandized”

and defendant acknowledged he understood. Lee advised defendant “of the charge,” that several

        2
          When Lee was asked, “Who was the target of the search warrant,” he answered, “Mr. King Collier.
I think he’s the second.” Defendant interprets this statement to mean that Lee thought defendant was the
second target of the warrant. In contrast, the State, pointing out that defendant’s ID lists his name as “King
Collier Jr.,” interprets Lee’s use of the word “second” as a reference to defendant’s status as a “Junior.”

                                                    -6-
No. 1-21-1308

officers had been “exposed,” and that one officer was in the hospital. Defendant agreed to speak

with Lee and Chism and “took acknowledgment” of the concealed location behind a wall under

the ledge of a block window in the basement where the police had found a .357 revolver, a variety

of ammunition, and suspect heroin and cocaine. Defendant asked whether he could apologize to

the officer in the hospital and requested that Lee tell that officer it was not his intention to hurt

anyone.

¶ 18   On cross-examination, Lee testified that he did not record his conversations with defendant

on the porch and at the station. He acknowledged that the supplemental report, which he helped

prepare, did not include defendant’s verbatim statements. Lee agreed that while defendant said he

knew the drugs and gun were behind the wall, he did not expressly say they were his and did not

say he placed them there. He also agreed that defendant did not say the gun in the bucket belonged

to him. Lee described the west bedroom as unkempt and containing a bed, a dresser, clothing,

including female clothing, and “a lot of stuff.”

¶ 19   The State entered into evidence certified copies of defendant’s conviction for possession

of a controlled substance in 2011 and for violating probation in 2013. The parties stipulated that

as of April 29, 2019, defendant had not been issued a FOID card or concealed carry license by the

Illinois State Police. The parties also stipulated to the testimony of a forensic chemist that some of

the items recovered from the house tested positive for cocaine, fentanyl/heroin, and cannabis.

¶ 20   Defendant made a motion for a directed finding, which the trial court denied.

¶ 21   Defendant entered into evidence a certified Illinois Secretary of State identification card

application, dated December 12, 2013, listing his residential address as 5923 South Bishop Street.

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No. 1-21-1308

¶ 22      Following closing arguments, the trial court acquitted defendant of all the drug charges,

finding that the testimony regarding inventory numbers was inconsistent for some of the narcotics

and that defendant did not admit to possession of the narcotics found in the wall. The court also

acquitted defendant of the charges related to the .357 Colt and ammunition recovered from the

wall, noting he never admitted to possession, as well as the charge relating to .45-caliber

ammunition, as there was no testimony regarding ammunition of that caliber.

¶ 23      The trial court found defendant guilty of count IV, which charged UUWF based on

possession of the derringer, and count VII, which charged defendant with violating the FOID

statute by possessing the derringer without a FOID card. The court explained that in coming to its

determination that defendant constructively possessed the derringer, it had considered defendant’s

statements that he knew it was in the bucket, that defendant’s wallet was “right next to the gun,”

and “the fact that he goes to that bedroom to get clothing *** when he was getting dressed to leave

the residence.”

¶ 24      Defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing, among other things, that the State failed to

prove he constructively possessed the derringer. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the

motion. In the course of doing so, the court explained it found the State had proved constructive

possession beyond a reasonable doubt because the derringer was “in a bucket in a room where he’s

getting clothing to get dressed. The gun is right next to his wallet, it has identifying information of

[defendant]. He also indicates he knew about the gun.”

¶ 25      The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of two years in

prison.

                                                 -8-
No. 1-21-1308

¶ 26   On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, arguing that the

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed the derringer.

Specifically, he maintains the State failed to show he exercised control over the derringer or the

area where it was found, and, therefore, failed to prove he constructively possessed it.

¶ 27   When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their

testimony, and the resolution of any conflicts in the evidence are within the province of the trier

of fact, and a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on these

matters. People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 131 (1999). Reversal is justified only where the evidence

is “so unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible” that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt. People v. Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989).

¶ 28   To sustain defendant’s convictions for UUWF and possession of a firearm without a FOID

card as charged in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

possessed a firearm, had previously been convicted of a felony, and did not possess a FOID card.

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018); 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1), 14(c)(3) (West 2018). Defendant does

not dispute the existence of a prior felony conviction or his lack of a FOID card. As such, the

relevant inquiry in this case is whether the State proved he possessed a firearm.

¶ 29   Because defendant was not found in actual possession of the firearm in question, the State

was required to present evidence that he constructively possessed it. People v. Walker, 2020 IL

App (1st) 162305, ¶ 20. To establish constructive possession, the State was required to prove that

                                                -9-
No. 1-21-1308

defendant had knowledge of the presence of the firearm and exercised immediate and exclusive

control over the area where it was found. Id.

¶ 30   Here, defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his knowledge of the

derringer in the west bedroom. He only challenges the element of control. He contends that the

evidence of control over the premises was insufficient where he did not have immediate access to

the west bedroom; he did not own, rent, or live at the house; his ID listed a different address as his

residence; and the undated AAA letter was “junk mail” with little or no evidentiary value.

¶ 31   In the context of constructive possession, control is established by showing the defendant’s

intent and capability to exercise dominion over the contraband. People v. Jackson, 2019 IL App

(1st) 161745, ¶ 27. The fact that others also have access to the area where contraband was found

does not diminish the defendant’s constructive possession. Id. Habitation in the premises where

contraband is discovered is sufficient evidence of control to constitute constructive possession.

People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Proof of residency, which can take the form

of rent receipts, utility bills, and clothing in closets, is relevant to show habitation and, therefore,

control. Id. When deciding whether constructive possession has been shown, the trier of fact is

entitled to rely on reasonable inferences of knowledge and possession. Id. Constructive possession

is typically proved entirely through circumstantial evidence. People v. Smith, 2015 IL App (1st)

132176, ¶ 26.

¶ 32   Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the State, as we must, we

find that there was sufficient evidence of defendant’s control over the area where the derringer was

found to establish constructive possession. First, it cannot be ignored that defendant was present

in the house at the time of the search. Second, defendant’s wallet, containing his ID and Social

                                                 - 10 -
No. 1-21-1308

Security card, was found alongside the derringer in the bucket. Third, defendant kept clothing in

the room where the derringer was found. When the police asked defendant what he wanted to wear

to leave the house, he “specifically asked for a jacket and a pair of white Nike tennis shoes that

were in the west bedroom.” Finally, the police found a letter from AAA in the west bedroom,

which was addressed to defendant at the house’s address. While defendant is correct that “junk

mail” has little evidentiary value given the nature of mass mailing solicitations (see People v.

Maldonado, 2015 IL App (1st) 131874, ¶ 28), we agree with the State that in this case, the AAA

letter cannot be dismissed so easily. A photograph of defendant’s open wallet, which was

introduced into evidence at trial, depicts a AAA membership card inside. As such, we agree with

the State that the presence of the letter in the west bedroom supports a finding of control.

¶ 33    Defendant’s presence in the house during the search, coupled with the presence of several

of his personal items in the west bedroom—his clothing, a letter, and, significantly, his wallet

containing his ID and Social Security card in the same container as the derringer—support the trial

court’s conclusion that he controlled the area where the weapon was found. See People v.

McLaurin, 2021 IL App (1st) 192203-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (finding control of bedroom based on presence

of utility bill in defendant’s name at that address, birth certificate, and family photograph); see also

Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2021) (nonprecedential Appellate Court orders entered on or after

January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes). The evidence was sufficient to establish

control and, in turn, constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 34    Defendant nevertheless argues the evidence of his control over the derringer itself was

insufficient where “other than the fact that a few of [his] personal items were in the west bedroom,

nothing indicated that he was anything more than a visitor at the location or that he exercised

                                                 - 11 -
No. 1-21-1308

control over any of the items in that bedroom beyond a few personal belongings.” In making this

argument, he asserts that Lee’s testimony regarding his statement asking for clothing “was found

to have limited weight by the court.”3 He notes that other people were present in the house, and

asserts that, after the police entered the premises, people came out of the bedrooms on the first

floor, “which included the west bedroom.”4 In support of his argument for a finding of lack of

control, defendant also highlights that mail and documents bearing others’ names were found in

the house, that women’s clothing was observed in the west bedroom, and that a cell phone on the

bed in the west bedroom was not inventoried.

¶ 35    The various circumstances defendant claims argue against a finding of control do not

change our conclusion. Although, at the time of his arrest, defendant was not in the same room as

the derringer, a defendant need not have immediate access to a location to be found to have

constructive possession of contraband within it. See, e.g., Jackson, 2019 IL App (1st) 161745,

¶ 30 (constructive possession found where defendant was in basement apartment that had indoor

access to first-floor apartment in which contraband was recovered); People v. Faulkner, 2017 IL

App (1st) 132884, ¶ 40 (constructive possession found where defendant was in first-floor unit and

contraband was recovered from attic accessible from enclosed back porch).

¶ 36    The fact that defendant’s ID listed an address other than the house as his residence is not

dispositive, as “[t]here is no requirement that [items of contraband] be found in defendant’s

residence as proof of his exclusive and immediate control over them.” People v. Hines, 2021 IL

        3
           The record reveals that the trial court indicated it was giving “limited weight” to Officer Lee’s
testimony that defendant admitted knowledge of the contraband in the basement. The trial court did not say
it was giving limited weight to any other portions of Lee’s testimony.
         4
           Defendant is correct that the first floor “included the west bedroom.” However, at trial, Officer
Lee testified that “people came out from the middle and east bedrooms.”

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No. 1-21-1308

App (1st) 191378, ¶ 34. Finally, we are mindful that documents bearing other people’s names were

found in the house and that women’s clothing was observed in the west bedroom. However, even

if others had access to the west bedroom, it would not exonerate defendant, but, rather, would

make his possession of the firearm joint. People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d 897, 901 (2009).

Constructive possession is not diminished by evidence of others’ access to contraband. People v.

Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 338 (2010).

¶ 37   The trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences that flow normally from the

evidence, nor seek all possible explanations consistent with innocence and elevate them to

reasonable doubt, and the State need not disprove or rule out all possible factual scenarios in order

to sustain its burden. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶¶ 24, 27. Taking the evidence in the

light most favorable to the State, as we must, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could find that

defendant had constructive possession of the derringer. Accordingly, defendant’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence fails.

¶ 38   For the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 39   Affirmed.

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