Court Opinion

ID: 9941287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:04.529657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.435073
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                  Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-1387-MR

TARA K. THOMAS                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE JOE W. HENDRICKS, JR., SPECIAL JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CR-01268

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                        OPINION
                                       AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Tara K. Thomas (“Thomas”), seeks reversal of

the final judgment of the Warren Circuit Court after a jury convicted her of

Retaliating Against a Participant in the Legal Process. Thomas contends the circuit

court erred in admitting too much evidence for the Commonwealth, including

misuse of KRE1 404(b), as contrasted with too little evidence allowed for her,

1
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
depriving Thomas of the opportunity to present a complete defense. Thomas also

believes the circuit court erred by amending the Indictment after the close of the

evidence with a consistent instruction to the jury and failing to give an instruction

for Harassing Communications as a lesser-included offense. Evaluation of this

record reveals no error by the circuit court. We affirm.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

               Because of events alleged to have occurred on October 7, 2020,

Thomas was charged with two counts each of Third-Degree Assault (of police

officers) and Third-Degree Terroristic Threatening, with additional counts of

Alcohol Intoxication, Resisting Arrest, and Harassment.2 Because of Thomas’ lack

of any disqualifying criminal record, the Commonwealth offered a felony pretrial

diversion to Thomas on September 20, 2021. Assistant Commonwealth Attorney,

Kori Beck Bumgarner (“Bumgarner”), communicated this offer to Thomas’

attorney.

2
  Warren District Court Case No. 20-F-01090. Because we seek to present a complete picture for
both sides of this case, we will refer to court records of cases referred to by the parties during the
case. Judicial notice may not be taken of Kentucky CourtNet records to present as evidence in a
trial. See Marchese v. Aebersold, 530 S.W.3d 441 (Ky. 2017). But information about the
existence of charges may be referenced by an appellate court to provide perspective for the trial
court proceedings. See, e.g., Mulazim v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 183, 203 n.6 (Ky. 2020).
After the trial in this case, Thomas pled guilty to amended misdemeanor charges in Case No. 20-
F-01090, which had by then resulted in an Indictment filed as Warren Circuit Court Case No. 21-
CR-01096.

                                                 -2-
             The diversion offer included a requirement to serve some time as an

alternate sentence. Thomas reacted badly to this offer. On the night of September

20-21, 2021, Thomas sent a series of messages to Bumgarner, her husband, and her

stepfather. In summary, these messages included vulgar language and declared

death to Bumgarner and her two small children. Thomas was indicted on

November 17, 2021.

             There were delays in this case because of the identity of the victim. A

special judge and a special prosecutor from other counties were appointed.

Thomas’ retained attorney withdrew because of a “breakdown of trust” according

to Thomas. It then took more time to appoint public defenders from another office.

This was needed because local public defenders worked frequently with

Bumgarner.

             The delays led to more time in pretrial custody for Thomas. Thomas

was out on a bond for this case, but this bond was eventually revoked due to a

confirmed positive drug test (methamphetamine). The special prosecutor also

reported that he and his wife had received attempts at communication from

Thomas, although this was not confirmed with evidence in the record. Thomas

denied this. Even with the delays, the circuit court acceded to Thomas’ demand

that the case be tried promptly, despite the concerns of her appointed counsel.

                                        -3-
             The circuit court conducted a pretrial conference on July 29, 2022. At

this pretrial conference, KRE 404(b) issues were addressed. The first day of the

trial was used to select a jury. The rest of the trial took place on August 3, 2022.

During the trial, the circuit court allowed Bumgarner’s husband and stepfather to

testify about the messages they had received, which were reported to Bumgarner.

Emotional testimony described Bumgarner’s reactions to the threats on the day

they were received.

             Thomas’ defense focused on her intent. She sought to prove that she

was expressing frustration with the justice system, not actual threats of harm. With

each witness, her counsel pointed out that the messages contained no actual

specific threat of how harm would come to Bumgarner. No witness called 911.

Thomas lived an hour away. Additionally, Thomas wanted to call her mother as a

witness to present evidence of Thomas’ frustration. After a discussion among

counsel and the circuit court for over ten minutes, Thomas decided not to call any

witnesses.

             At the conclusion of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury

with respect to threats not just about Bumgarner but also about her children,

although the Indictment referred only to Bumgarner by name. The jury convicted

Thomas and fixed her sentence at four years. The circuit court imposed this

                                         -4-
sentence, denying probation. The circuit court denied a new trial motion. We will

develop more details of the case as we address the appeal contentions.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The circuit court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Woodard v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 63, 67 (Ky. 2004). “The test

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. We review

legal questions de novo. We must determine whether the circuit court committed

error in the amendment of the Indictment or in its jury instructions, including

whether to instruct on a lesser included offense. See Fields v. Commonwealth, 219

S.W.3d 742 (Ky. 2007) (a case involving both issues).

                                     ANALYSIS

             We will review the evidentiary issues first as they will provide context

for the other decisions made by the circuit court. Thomas argues the presentation

of messages sent to Bumgarner’s husband and stepfather violated KRE 404. She

also insists the evidence about Bumgarner’s reaction to the messages was improper

for the first phase of the trial and should have been limited to the sentencing phase

as victim impact evidence. We start with the KRE 404 issues.

             KRE 404(b) is often imprecisely referred to as a rule governing “prior

bad acts.” The acts offered as evidence can be contemporaneous or even after the

                                         -5-
events at issue so long as they are offered and considered only for a proper purpose

other than the character of the actor. In this case, the evidence about the messages

served an important purpose other than an attack on Thomas’ character.

                 Retaliation Against a Participant in the Legal Process occurs when

someone “threatens to engage in conduct causing or intended to cause bodily

injury[3] . . . [to] a participant in the legal process.” KRS4 524.055(1). As it

pertains to this case, other elements are that the threat related to Bumgarner for

performing her duty as a prosecutor. KRS 524.055(1)(d), (3). These other

elements were not disputed. The question was whether a threat was intended.

                 Just as Thomas wanted to focus on the lack of a specific physical

harm threatened, the lack of any 911 call, and her physical distance from

Bumgarner, the Commonwealth needed to prove that this was a true threat. If the

threat was not a true threat, the communication to a government official would be

protected by the First Amendment right to express opposition or frustration. See

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003).

                 Under KRE 404(b), evidence of Thomas’ messages to three people

was relevant to her motive and intent and how real the threat was. KRS 524.055

3
    Of course, death is the ultimate bodily injury regardless of how it may be inflicted.
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                                  -6-
does not actually require direct communication5 of the threat to the victim. The

fact that Thomas sent messages to people close to Bumgarner is relevant evidence

of her intent to make sure Bumgarner found out about the threat.

              The contemporaneous reactions by Bumgarner and the other

recipients of the messages were evidence inextricably intertwined with the events

of that day. The reactions were evidence of whether the threats were real and to

rebut any claim by Thomas of her mistaken intention to just express frustration.

When the circuit court considered the probative value of the evidence, it correctly

concluded that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice. KRE 403.

              On the other side, Thomas wanted to introduce evidence of her level

of frustration with the justice system and the Warren County Commonwealth

Attorney. Thomas introduced evidence of comments made around the same time

expressing her constitutionally protected criticism of the Commonwealth Attorney

as it related to a case in which Thomas was the victim of a sexual offense. This

more recent case added to Thomas’ bad court experience when she was the victim

of sex crimes at the hands of a neighbor when she was 12 years old.

5
  Unlike intimidation under KRS 524.040, retaliation under KRS 524.055 does not require any
direct or indirect communication of a threat to the victim. Kentucky has not had the opportunity
to address this question, but other states agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., Hammonds v.
Maryland, 80 A.3d 698 (Md. App. 2013).

                                              -7-
                When Thomas came forward as a child, she faced the unfortunate

realities of a trial of such charges. Despite DNA evidence, people doubted

Thomas. She was accused of making prior false allegations. Thomas felt more

than let down by the process. It should be noted that the neighbor was convicted

and sentenced to prison.6 To this degree, Thomas was vindicated. That no doubt

did not take away from the negative feelings Thomas had about the process she

had experienced in the criminal justice system.

                Later, as a teenager, Thomas was sexually abused by a high school

teacher (“Goodpastor”).7 Unlike her prior case, this later case occurred in Warren

County. This is the connection that would later lead to the threats made in the

present case. Goodpastor was indicted for Third-Degree Sodomy, a Class “D”

felony subject to a prison term of one to five years.

                There was no trial in Goodpastor’s case. His charge was amended to

Second-Degree Unlawful Transaction with a Minor, also a Class “D” felony. He

pled guilty. During the trial in the present case, Thomas’ mother said that all that

happened to Goodpastor was that he lost his job. That does not appear to be

6
 Commonwealth v. Kenneth Ray Capshaw, Monroe Circuit Court Case No. 05-CR-00063. This
Court affirmed the conviction. Capshaw v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 557 (Ky. App. 2007).
7
    Commonwealth v. Douglas James Goodpastor, Warren Circuit Court Case No. 08-CR-00385.

                                            -8-
accurate. Goodpastor was sentenced to serve two years and was denied shock

probation.

             Thomas offered the criticism she had made about the Goodpastor case

as a related explanation that she was just expressing her frustration, not really

threatening to kill anyone. In further support of her intention, Thomas planned to

call her mother as a witness. During a bench conference, inevitable limitations for

what this witness could say about what Thomas said were discussed.

             Generally, the statements of a defendant are hearsay unless offered

against them. KRE 801A(b). There are exceptions to the hearsay prohibition. For

example, statements about a person’s “then existing mental, emotional, or physical

condition” are permitted. KRE 803(3). But this can only go so far. Thomas’

mother may have been able to describe times when Thomas was angry or agitated,

but this would not allow a wholesale introduction of everything Thomas said to

explain her feelings.

             We offer an example of KRE 803(3) evidence. A witness testifies

that a party to a case said she planned to get a divorce. This statement would fit

within KRE 803(3). When asked why she intended to seek a divorce, the party

gives specifics about various prior events in the marriage. These factual details

would not necessarily be part of the hearsay exception, which is limited to

expressions about current intent or state of mind.

                                          -9-
                Thomas argues the circuit court prevented her from calling a witness.

That is inaccurate. The circuit court did not prevent the calling of any witness.

The circuit court properly expressed concern about anticipated and proper

objections and the limitations the court would have to impose on the testimony.

Thomas chose not to call her mother as a witness and further chose, as she had the

right to do, not to testify herself about her state of mind and intentions.

                Thomas made no further record, such as an avowal of specific

questions and answers. Although there was no error in this regard, any such error

would have been harmless. RCr8 9.24. Thomas presented her defense about her

intentions through evidence of her other comments through other witnesses. What

limited evidence might properly have come from Thomas’ mother under KRE

803(3) would have been cumulative or would not have resulted in a different

verdict given all the other evidence in this record. This evidence includes the

actions by Thomas of deactivating the social media account just after sending the

messages and then being initially dishonest with the police about the account and

the messages sent.

                 The remaining claims of error ultimately both relate to the jury

instructions. Throughout discovery and during the trial, there was no question that

the threats made included Bumgarner’s children. While Thomas sought to limit

8
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -10-
evidence to the statements about death to Bumgarner herself, the circuit court

correctly permitted evidence about the threatened death to Bumgarner’s children.

All the threats were made at the same time and indicated the same criminal motive

and intent.

              In discussing instructions, Thomas argued the instructions should be

limited to Bumgarner herself because that was the only name in the Indictment.

Instead of altering the instructions, it appears the circuit court agreed to the

Commonwealth’s request to amend the Indictment to include a reference to the

children. A review of the record does not show that the Indictment was in fact

amended. The writing on the Indictment itself was not altered, and no written

order added the language about the children. Yet, the circuit court did orally

indicate the amendment was proper and ordered it.

              KRS 524.055(3) specifically includes the immediate family of the

participant. This overlaps with KRS 524.010, which provides definitions for the

same statutory chapter. Bumgarner clearly was a prosecutor as defined in KRS

524.010(7). A prosecutor is a participant in the legal process as defined by KRS

524.010(3). Significantly, by definition, every individual participant “includes

members of the participant’s immediate family.” Id. Thus, with the threats about

the children known to the defense from the beginning of this case, the reference to

                                          -11-
Bumgarner alone arguably should have been sufficient notice to include her

children.

             The dissent understandably expresses concern about RCr 6.16, which

instructs the court as to amendments to an indictment. Perhaps it would have been

better practice to name the children in the original Indictment. Even with the

typical use of initials for children, their identity would have been easy for the

public to determine. This concern may have led to the omission.

             Last minute amendments to Indictments may be permitted by our

rules, but they should be avoided. Our question here was whether the circuit court

abused its discretion in the particular circumstances of this case. And if so, was

this error harmful to Thomas?

             RCr 6.16 permits amendment of an indictment at any time before a

verdict is received by the court “if no additional or different offense is charged”

and there is no prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. Thomas faced

one count of Retaliation Against a Participant in a Legal Proceeding before the

amendment and after it. The difference was only in identifying the victim or

victims.

             In Clark v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W.3d 668 (Ky. 2008), the

Kentucky Supreme Court discussed a change of name in an indictment at trial.

While addressed in the context of palpable error, the analysis of RCr 6.16 is

                                         -12-
helpful to our question here. The basic idea is that “a defendant should be aware of

the crimes charged against him and the evidence forthcoming so that he may

prepare a defense.” Id. at 679. “[U]nder modern rules the essential question when

examining variance between the indictment and the proof is whether the defendant

had fair notice and a fair trial.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 266, 272

(Ky. 1993).

              From the beginning, Thomas knew of the evidence about the

simultaneous threats to the children. Given the intertwined nature of the

communications about Bumgarner and her children, which were evidence of the

nature of the threat and the intent behind it, Thomas’ counsel could not be

surprised about the admissibility of this evidence. When the circumstances of this

case are examined as a whole, there was no prejudice to Thomas by the addition of

the children’s names. The circuit court did not err in the amendment of the

Indictment or the consistent jury instructions. Even if there were any error in this

regard, it was harmless.

              This leaves the question of a lesser included offense. Thomas insists

that Harassing Communications is a lesser included offense. A lesser included

offense is one that “is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts

required to establish the commission of the offense charged[.]” KRS

505.020(2)(a). We have found no prior appellate case in which Harassing

                                         -13-
Communications was determined to be a lesser included offense of Retaliation

Against a Participant in a Legal Proceeding. We find good reason for this dearth

of caselaw. Harassing Communications does not fit as a lesser included offense

for the retaliation charge.

             Harassing Communications requires communication with the victim

using specified means. As we have previously pointed out, retaliation does not

actually require communication of the threat. Even if we could see our way clear

to consider the lesser included offense argument, Thomas would not have been

entitled to the instruction anyway. The circuit court was not required to give a

lesser included offense instruction in the circumstances of this case.

             “An instruction on a lesser included offense should not be given

unless the evidence is such that a reasonable juror could doubt that the defendant is

guilty of the crime charged but conclude that he is guilty of the lesser included

offense.” Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Ky. 1977). Given the

admitted messages sent to a prosecutor speaking of her death and the death of her

children, a rational juror could not have concluded that Thomas was guilty of

Harassing Communications but not Retaliation Against a Participant in the Legal

Process. No level of “frustration” may serve as a defense or excuse to threatening

the death of a prosecutor and her children.

                                         -14-
                                   CONCLUSION

             The Warren Circuit Court committed no errors in its evidentiary

rulings or with its instructions to the jury on the charge in this case. The Warren

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

             KAREM, JUDGE, CONCURS.

             TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. The original

indictment in this case only named the prosecutor, not her children, as the

purported victim of the charges against appellant arising from threats made in

violation of KRS 524.055. While the statute clearly provides that threats made

against the children could be a violation thereof, the children were not named in

the original indictment as victims. The Fifth Amendment mandates that a

defendant may only be tried for criminal conduct that is set forth in an indictment

by a grand jury. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217-19 (1960).

             The Commonwealth’s motion to amend the indictment at the close of

evidence to add the children as victims, and effectively create new charges against

the defendant, was clearly prejudicial in total contravention of RCr 6.16.

Similarly, including threats against the children in the jury instructions was

reversible error, in my opinion.

                                         -15-
             As the majority notes, the Commonwealth moved to amend the

indictment to include the children as victims at the close of evidence at trial, which

was granted by the trial court and is reflected in the jury instructions. The

Commonwealth had over eight months to amend the indictment prior to trial, yet

failed to do so. While the additional charges naming the children as victims were

the same type of crimes as committed against the prosecutor, they nonetheless are

entirely separate criminal acts against other victims. This clearly constituted an

unfair surprise to the defendant in planning her trial strategy and more importantly,

was unduly prejudicial for the defendant in the eyes of the jury.

             Under these circumstances, I do not believe this was harmless error. I

would vacate the judgment and remand for a new trial.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Kathleen K. Schmidt                       Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Christopher Henry
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -16-