Court Opinion

ID: 9910322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:04:07.879774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:17.443250
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                   No. 22–0326

             Submitted October 10, 2023—Filed December 15, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Plaintiff,

vs.

IOWA JUVENILE COURT FOR PLYMOUTH COUNTY,

      Defendant.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Daniel P.

Vakulskas, District Associate Judge.

      The State seeks certiorari review of a juvenile court order vacating an

earlier order waiving jurisdiction over a juvenile to the district court. WRIT

SUSTAINED AND REMANDED.
      Mansfield, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester (argued),

Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.

      Joel E. Fenton (argued) of Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, Des Moines,

for defendant.
                                        2

MANSFIELD, Justice.
      I. Introduction.

      This case, involving the prosecution of a seventeen-year-old for sexual

exploitation of a minor and possession of child pornography, presents the

question whether a juvenile court can reclaim jurisdiction over a case that it has

previously waived to the district court for criminal prosecution. We conclude that

there is no provision in Iowa law for such a “revocation of waiver,” and therefore

vacate the order of the juvenile court that attempted to bring about such a result.

      II. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      A. Investigation and Filing of Delinquency Petition. In January 2020,

the Plymouth County Sheriff’s Department received a tip from the Internet

Crimes Against Children Task Force that child pornography could be circulating

in the area. Deputy Struve conducted an investigation. Various subpoenas led

to I.S., who was almost sixteen years old at the time. Deputy Struve searched

I.S.’s phone and found what he believed to be child pornography. Based on his

own life experience, Deputy Struve believed the children in the images were

between seven and fifteen years old, some potentially older. Deputy Struve also

discovered that I.S. had communicated with others, including a fourteen-year-
old, to receive these images.

      Ultimately, Deputy Struve found approximately 500 photos and videos of

child pornography on I.S.’s cell phone. I.S. confessed that he would sometimes

“bait” and pretend to be a female to get other minors to send him these images

and videos.

      On February 4, 2021, a delinquency petition was filed in the Iowa Juvenile

Court for Plymouth County charging I.S. with one count of sexual exploitation of

a minor, in violation of Iowa Code Section 728.12(1) (2020), a class “C” felony;
and four counts of purchasing or possessing a depiction of a minor engaging in
                                         3

a sex act, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code Section 728.12(3), an aggravated

misdemeanor.

      At this point, I.S. was seventeen years old. He had no prior record and had

been receiving A’s in school and recounted having a 3.98 grade point average.

While in high school, I.S. was also taking online college courses. I.S. began

therapy after these events. He started at one facility with a therapist, who then

moved to a new facility. I.S. eventually was taken on as a client at this new

facility. I.S. said he would comply with recommendations for outpatient

treatment in relation to his charges and agreed that such treatment would help

him. A consulting clinical psychologist, Dr. Angela Stokes, emphasized in her

reports that I.S. had committed “noncontact offenses,” and was seeking

materials that displayed minors around his own age. She believed these factors

weighed in favor of his ability to be rehabilitated.

      B. Waiver from Juvenile Court to District Court. The county attorney

filed a motion to waive jurisdiction to the district court, where I.S. would be tried

as an adult. According to the motion, the assigned juvenile court officer (JCO)

was specifically concerned with:

            A. The nature and severity of the offenses and the extended
      period of time the child has been trading child pornography links
      with others and the approximate ages of the children involved, as
      young as seven years old.

            B. The child’s age and the length of time outpatient treatment
      in the community usually takes is 12-18 months and by the time
      the child reaches disposition the only viable option for treatment
      would be the State Training School. Other residential facilities do
      not have licensing to keep juveniles after they reach majority.

             C. The challenges of providing supervision and treatment to
      clients that are past their 17th birthday because their mindset
      operates differently when they are close to becoming legal adults.
                                         4

      In Iowa, a juvenile court can waive jurisdiction if the juvenile is over

fourteen years old, there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed

a delinquent act that would constitute a public offense, and the state establishes

that there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the juvenile

court retains jurisdiction and the child is adjudicated to have committed the

delinquent act. Iowa Code § 232.45(6) (2021). In determining the chances of

rehabilitation, the court can consider the nature and circumstances of the

alleged delinquent act, the juvenile’s prior interactions with juvenile authorities,

and the options available to the juvenile court for rehabilitation and treatment

as well as the options that would be available to the district court following a

waiver. Id. § 232.45(8).

      I.S. resisted the State’s motion. The contested issue was the prospect of

rehabilitating I.S. if the case continued in juvenile court.

      On March 8, the JCO filed his waiver investigation report. His report

discussed the dilemma posed by I.S.’s age (less than a year from his eighteenth

birthday) as contrasted with the time that would be required to complete sex

offender treatment (eighteen to twenty-four months for outpatient treatment).

The JCO noted that in district court, I.S. could potentially receive a deferred
judgment and a period of probation as needed:

      The alleged offenses for which [I.S.] is now in front of the Court are
      very serious, and therefore, it must require consistency and longer
      monitoring services including probation. Eighteen months is
      relatively a short time to provide services to [I.S.] who[] has watched,
      sent, and received child pornography through different social media
      applications at different times of the day and night and has done
      this behavior in secrecy. Avoidance and secrecy can not be easily
      ignored in this case because these two dynamics are not resolved
      quickly, or even set a timeframe as to how long it would take to
      assess and treat adequately more in depth these behaviors, but it
      would be more appropriate to examine the same in an adequate
      treatment process without rushing with enough time to address the
      current and underlying behaviors.
                                              5

      Dr. Stokes personally evaluated I.S. and prepared a report on April 20 that

disagreed with the JCO.1 She noted that I.S. was already in certain treatment

with the support of his family. She determined that I.S. was at “very low risk of

committing a contact offense and low risk of reoffending a noncontact offense.”

She characterized I.S.’s prognosis as “favorable” and felt that he could complete

supervised therapy within twelve to eighteen months. She concluded, “Based on

the low risk of recidivism and his evaluation results, [I.S.] should be given the

opportunity for treatment as an eligible juvenile who is not likely to reoffend.”

      After a hearing on April 23, the juvenile court entered an order on May 3

waiving jurisdiction to the district court.2 The court accepted the State’s position

that “there is simply not enough time for [I.S.] to complete treatment (if

adjudicated in juvenile court) before [the] juvenile court would lose jurisdiction

(at maximum when he turns nineteen and one-half).” More specifically, the court

reasoned,

      [T]he Court respects Dr. Stokes’ optimism about [I.S.’s] outlook;
      however, it does not convince the Court that [I.S.] has a reasonable
      prospect of rehabilitating himself in the short time he has left in
      juvenile court. [I.S.] appears to have some deep-seated issues that
      need to be addressed, in addition to anything related to his alleged
      crimes. [The JCO] testified credibly that he has never seen a child
      complete outpatient treatment in the time [I.S.] has left.

            The Court believes the State has established that, because of
      the time left, there are no reasonable prospects of rehabilitation for
      him in juvenile court. [I.S.] may need an in-depth treatment that
      takes time. It would be in his best interest to waive jurisdiction to
      adult court so he may address those issues in a jurisdiction with
      more time.

      Two weeks later, I.S. moved for reconsideration of the court’s order

pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), identifying various points that

      1According to the report, Dr. Stokes assessed I.S. on March 13.

      2The appellate record does not include a transcript of the waiver hearing.
                                          6

he believed the juvenile court had overlooked. The juvenile court denied the

motion.

      C. Filing of Trial Information and Other Proceedings in District Court.

On June 7, a trial information was filed in the district court. I.S. entered a written

plea of not guilty. The district court set a pretrial conference and a trial date of

December 21.

      On July 8, I.S. filed a motion for reverse waiver in the district court

pursuant to Iowa Code section 803.6. The State resisted. At the hearing that

ensued later in the month, I.S. made an offer of proof of additional evidence that

would support a waiver. This included evidence concerning programs that I.S.

might be able to complete within the relevant juvenile court deadlines. The

district court concluded that it did not have authority to transfer the case to

juvenile court because the case did not fall within section 803.6(1). However, the

district court added that “the Juvenile Court would still have jurisdiction under

Section 232.8 to reconsider its own waiver Order.”

      D. Motion in Juvenile Court to Modify Earlier Waiver Pursuant to Iowa

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012(6). Nearly two months later, on September 20,

I.S. filed a motion in the juvenile court to modify the order waiving jurisdiction
pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012(6). I.S. maintained that he had

additional information concerning programs that had not been available at the

time of the original waiver hearing, and that he had been “consistently attending

treatment with 100% attendance since April 2, 2021 (with the exception of one

excused absence due to illness).” I.S. attached an updated report from Dr. Stokes

recommending outpatient therapy at the Rosecrance Jackson Recovery Center

and, if this failed, an intensive treatment program at Woodward Academy.

      Over the State’s resistance, the juvenile court entered a “ruling re
jurisdiction,” concluding that it had jurisdiction to review its prior waiver order
                                               7

from May. It set an evidentiary hearing on the merits to take place on November

17.3

        E. Second Waiver Hearing in Juvenile Court. At the second waiver

hearing in juvenile court, Dr. Stokes testified that Rosecrance would be an

available placement, although Woodward was not available if intensive

outpatient treatment was unsuccessful. Dr. Stokes cited several other residential

programs as an alternative to Woodward, some of which were located outside

Iowa. She testified that she had not had time to obtain information on these

potential placements prior to the original waiver hearing.

        Dr. Stokes noted that I.S. had committed a “noncontact offense.” She

added that regarding the age of the children in the child pornography viewed by

I.S.:

        [T]he way that those pictures were identified and described didn’t
        give me, necessarily, the detail that I would have liked, as far as
        being able to look at that developmental piece, but it did seem to me,
        and [I.S.] certainly reported, that as he was getting older, he was
        more interested in age- -- age-appropriate [children].

Dr. Stokes also testified that I.S. had been undergoing therapy through a family

practice group while awaiting disposition of his case. In conclusion, she opined

that I.S. would be able to complete the necessary treatment before he turned
nineteen-and-a-half years old.

        On cross-examination, Dr. Stokes testified that she could not have

obtained the same information on available treatment options during the three-

day time span between the preparation of her evaluation report and the original

waiver hearing. She added that when she does an evaluation, such as was

        3That hearing was delayed to January 2022 because the State filed an untimely certiorari

petition with this court challenging the November 17, 2021 order, which we denied.
                                          8

contained in her April 20, 2021 report, “the State is very particular that I do only

what I’m being asked to do, which is to evaluate.”

      I.S. also took the stand and testified that he had been undergoing therapy

and that he would be willing to undergo outpatient treatment.

      Lastly, the JCO testified. He stated that his original recommendation for

waiver to district court had not changed, even in light of the information

presented that day. The State also reiterated its argument that the juvenile court

lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its earlier waiver order. In addition, the State

maintained that the evidence submitted was not new, and that it would have

been available prior to the original April 23, 2021 waiver hearing. According to

the State, the only thing that had changed was that “additional time has passed,”

so that I.S. was now very close to eighteen.

      On February 7, 2022, the juvenile court entered an order vacating and

modifying its ruling from nine months earlier waiving I.S.’s case to the district

court. The court explained that I.S. had submitted new evidence on inpatient

placement options not discoverable at the time of the previous hearing. The court

noted I.S.’s commitment to his current and future therapy and noted that the

offense had been a “noncontact.” The court summarized, “The Court finds that,
with this newly discovered evidence, the State is unable to show there are not

reasonable prospects to rehabilitate [I.S.] in the time left in juvenile court.”

      The State timely applied for a writ of certiorari, and we granted the petition.

The State raises two points on appeal. First, it argues that when the juvenile

court initially waived jurisdiction to the district court, it no longer had

jurisdiction or authority to modify or vacate the waiver order. Second, in the

alternative, the State argues that even if the juvenile court had the jurisdiction

or authority to reconsider and revoke the waiver order, it abused its discretion
in doing so under the circumstances presented here. According to the State, the
                                                9

evidence presented did not meet the rule 1.1012(6) standards for reopening a

prior order.

       III. Standard of Review.

       “[W]e review the juvenile court’s interpretation of statutes for correction of

errors at law.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Iowa 2018) (alteration in

original) (quoting In re A.M., 856 N.W.2d 365, 370 (Iowa 2014)).

       “We normally review proceedings in juvenile court de novo. When the issue

on appeal relates to statutory discretion exercised by the juvenile court, however,

we review the evidence de novo to determine whether the discretion was abused.”

In re A.J.M., 847 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). “In order to

show an abuse of discretion, a party must show the juvenile court’s action was

unreasonable under the attendant circumstances.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521,

526 (Iowa 2019). Iowa courts “find an abuse of discretion where the juvenile

court’s decision rests on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly

unreasonable.” In re B.A., 737 N.W.2d 665, 667–68 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007).

       IV. Legal Analysis.

       The threshold question we must answer is whether the juvenile court had

jurisdiction or authority as of February 7, 2022, to take back its original May 3,
2021 order waiving jurisdiction over I.S.’s case to the district court. If it didn’t,

then we must reverse the February 7 order.4

       4In State v. Erdman, we recently clarified that jurisdiction as used in Iowa Code sections

232.8 and 232.45 does not refer to subject matter jurisdiction and can be waived if a party does
not make a timely objection. 996 N.W.2d 544, 549 (Iowa 2023). Thus, in Erdman we upheld a
juvenile’s criminal conviction even though the case had been mistakenly commenced in juvenile
court, rather than district court. Id. at 549, 552. As we explained in that case, “ ‘Jurisdiction,’
as it is referenced in Iowa Code sections 232.8 and 232.45, refers to the court’s authority to
adjudicate the charges, not its subject matter jurisdiction over such cases.” Id. at 549.
        State v. Emery, a case we relied upon in Erdman, pointed out that a waiver of jurisdiction
under sections 232.8 and 232.45 in effect shifts “personal jurisdiction” over the child from the
juvenile court to the district court. 636 N.W.2d 116, 123 (Iowa 2001) (“These statutes clearly
focus on jurisdiction of the child, i.e., jurisdiction over a particular case, rather than subject
                                            10

      Iowa Code section 232.45 allows a juvenile court, under specified

circumstances, to waive its jurisdiction over a juvenile who is charged with

committing a public offense so that the juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult.

As relevant, the statute provides:

             1. After the filing of a petition which alleges that a child has
      committed a delinquent act on the basis of an alleged commission
      of a public offense and before an adjudicatory hearing on the merits
      of the petition is held, the county attorney or the child may file a
      motion requesting the court to waive its jurisdiction over the child
      for the alleged commission of the public offense . . . .
             ....
             6. At the conclusion of the waiver hearing the court may waive
      its jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission of the public
      offense . . . if all of the following apply:

             a. The child is fourteen years of age or older.

            b. The court determines . . . that there is probable cause to
      believe that the child has committed a delinquent act which would
      constitute the public offense.

             c. The court determines that the State has established that
      there are not reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child if the
      juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child and the child is
      adjudicated to have committed the delinquent act, and that waiver
      of the court’s jurisdiction over the child for the alleged commission
      of the public offense would be in the best interests of the child and
      the community.

Id. § 232.45(1), (6); see also id. § 232.8(3)(a) (“The juvenile court, after a hearing

and in accordance with the provisions of section 232.45, may waive jurisdiction

of a child alleged to have committed a public offense so that the child may be

prosecuted as an adult or youthful offender for such offense in another court.”).

matter jurisdiction.”). Whether we use the term “personal jurisdiction” or “authority,” the
analysis is the same.
                                           11

      The juvenile court followed this procedure and waived jurisdiction over

I.S.’s case on May 3, 2021. Approximately a month later, a trial information was

filed against I.S. in the district court and the criminal case went forward.

      Nothing in chapter 232 empowers the juvenile court to rescind a waiver of

jurisdiction over a juvenile and take back a case from the district court, as the

juvenile court sought to do on February 7, 2022. Again, a criminal case was

pending in the district court. Neither the Iowa Code nor the Iowa Rules of

Criminal Procedure authorize a criminal case to be terminated at the behest of

a juvenile court. True, a district court (not a juvenile court) may transfer

jurisdiction over a juvenile to a juvenile court under certain circumstances, but

as the district court recognized, those circumstances didn’t exist here. See id.

§ 803.5(1). Transfer is specifically prohibited if the juvenile court previously

waived jurisdiction to the district court, as had occurred here. Id.

      Also, section 232.45(7)(b) authorizes a juvenile court to maintain partial

jurisdiction when the juvenile is waived to the district court as a “youthful

offender.” Id. § 232.45(7)(b). Specifically, section 232.45(7)(b) provides that “[t]he

court shall retain jurisdiction over the child for the purpose of determining

whether the child should be released from detention under section 232.23.” Id.
But I.S. was too old to be treated as a youthful offender, and he was not treated

as one. See id. § 232.45(7)(a) (providing “the child may be prosecuted as a

youthful offender,” if “[t]he child is twelve through fifteen years of age”). This

limited provision for retaining partial jurisdiction over youthful offenders (not

someone like I.S.) also tends to confirm that in other circumstances, jurisdiction

is not “retain[ed]”; it is gone. Id. § 232.45(7)(b).

      We would consider the question before us to be one of statutory

interpretation if there were some statute or rule arguably supporting I.S.’s
position. We are aware of none. I.S. cites only to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure
                                         12

1.1012, which allows a “final judgment or order” to be vacated under some

circumstances. But the order waiving jurisdiction to the district court wasn’t a

final judgment or order. I.S.’s case was not over; it was continuing in another

form in another court. Rule 1.1012 allows a court to unwind its own final

judgment and order; it does not allow a court to take back a case from another

court. See id. Courts also have “inherent authority to manage proceedings on

their dockets and in their courtrooms,” Davis v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 943 N.W.2d 58,

62 (Iowa 2020), but we are not aware of any inherent authority to manage

proceedings taking place in other courts. See Bergman v. Nelson, 241 N.W.2d 14,

16 (Iowa 1976) (noting that a transfer order “is not simply a disclaimer of juvenile

court jurisdiction,” but “binds the juvenile to the jurisdiction of the district court

for criminal prosecution”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 895

N.W.2d 856 (Iowa 2017).

      One possible analogy to consider is that of a transfer of venue. Historically,

we do not allow transferring courts to rescind venue transfer orders. In Iowa

Loan Co. v. Wilson, we reversed a court for attempting to set aside a prior transfer

of venue. 124 N.W. 201, 202 (Iowa 1910). There, the superior court for Cedar

Rapids had transferred venue of a case to the district court for Linn County. Id.
at 201. Later, it sua sponte vacated that transfer because the moving party had

not paid the costs of transfer as previously ordered. Id. We reversed, noting that

where a transfer order is unconditional on its face, the district court loses

jurisdiction over the case:

      In Carroll County v. American Emigrant Co., 37 Iowa, 371, an order
      transferring the cause from Carroll to Polk [C]ounty was entered,
      based on an agreement to such change; but at the next term of
      court, on motion to vacate because of nothing having been done to
      effect the change, the court set aside the order and reinstated the
      case. The ruling was reversed on the ground that the order granting
      the change, being unconditional, deprived the court entering it of
      jurisdiction.
                                         13

Id. at 201–02; see also Brown v. Thompson, 14 Iowa 597, 597–98 (1863) (“The

venue of this cause was changed from Monona to Greene County, from the fourth

to the fifth judicial district. At a succeeding term the District Court of Monona

County, on motion of plaintiff, re-docketed the cause and ordered the same to

be set down for a hearing as though no change had been made. In this there was

error.”); Farr v. Fuller, 12 Iowa 83, 84 (1861) (“The order for the change of venue

was unconditional. After this the District Court of Story, and not that of Polk,

was the proper tribunal to apply to for any order or relief. The District Court of

Polk [C]ounty had no longer jurisdiction of the cause.”); Campbell v. Thompson,

4 Greene 415, 415 (Iowa 1854) (“After granting the change of venue, the district

court of Marion [C]ounty had no further jurisdiction over the subject matter or

the parties.”). We think the analogy works here. Once another court has a case,

the court that transferred the case or waived jurisdiction loses jurisdiction over

the parties. See State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 123 (Iowa 2001) (explaining

that the transfer provisions affect jurisdiction over the parties).

      Further, there are sound policy reasons not to read authority for a

revocation of waiver into chapter 232. See Iowa Code § 4.4(3) (setting forth the

presumption that “[a] just and reasonable result is intended” when the
legislature enacts a statute). A reconsideration of a prior waiver could lead to

disruption of proceedings and friction between the district court and the juvenile

court. What if the juvenile court tried to reclaim jurisdiction the day before the

criminal trial was about to begin in district court? What if the juvenile court tried

to reclaim jurisdiction after the juvenile had been found guilty (but before

sentencing and the entry of judgment)? What if the juvenile court and the district

court disagreed as to whether the criminal case should be terminated?

Additionally, the grounds cited by the juvenile court here as reasons for vacating
its prior waiver order are hardly unique. The juvenile court noted that the I.S.
                                           14

had discovered additional placement possibilities since the original waiver

hearing and had provided evidence of his commitment to therapy during the

period leading up to his criminal trial. But if those relatively common

occurrences are sufficient to undo a prior waiver order, it would be difficult for a

district court presiding over a criminal case involving a juvenile to have much

confidence that it would actually end up trying the case.

      I.S. invokes the expertise of juvenile courts in dealing with juvenile

offenders and chapter 232’s goals of serving the best interests of the child and

the best interests of the community. Iowa Code § 232.45(6)(c). Those are

undoubtedly important considerations. But the legislature presumably took

those matters into account when it made provision for a single “waiver hearing”

to occur “[a]fter the filing of [the] petition.” Id. § 232.45(1)–(2).

      Although juvenile court systems vary from state to state, we note that other

jurisdictions have turned down efforts by juvenile courts to take back waivers of

jurisdiction.

      In Maryland, the state’s highest court has held that a juvenile court cannot

retake jurisdiction once it has waived a juvenile to the district court. In re

Franklin P., 783 A.2d 673, 690 (Md. 2001). There, a juvenile was charged in
several delinquency petitions when he was fifteen and sixteen years old. Id. at

676. The juvenile court waived its jurisdiction to the criminal court for each of

the proceedings. Id.

      Subsequently, the juvenile filed a motion asking the juvenile court to

reconsider its waiver on the basis of evidence that the juvenile “could be placed

in an appropriate facility immediately.” Id. at 677, 679–80. In response, the

juvenile court revoked the waiver orders and returned the cases to its

jurisdiction. Id. at 680. Meanwhile, the state had obtained criminal indictments
against the juvenile. Id. at 677. Relying on the pendency of those indictments,
                                        15

the state declined to put on a case in juvenile court, which led that court to

dismiss the petitions before it. Id. Thereafter, the juvenile moved to dismiss the

charges against him in the criminal court. Id. The criminal court denied the

motion, reasoning that the juvenile court had previously relinquished

jurisdiction “upon its order waiving jurisdiction to the criminal court.” Id.

      On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the criminal court’s

refusal to dismiss the charges, concluding that the juvenile court lacked

authority to reconsider its prior waiver order. Id. at 689–90. As the court

explained,

      [J]urisdiction in this case (the authority to try it) was originally in
      the Juvenile Court; it was transferred to the Circuit Court and it
      remains there. Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, the
      Juvenile Court cannot rescind its past juvenile jurisdiction waiver
      order.

Id. at 690.

      Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear that a juvenile

court lacked authority to reconsider a waiver in State v. Husband, 162 A.3d 646,

653 (R.I. 2017). In that homicide case, the court originally waived jurisdiction

over the juvenile to adult criminal court. Id. at 652. Later, the juvenile sought to

reopen the waiver hearing after the state advanced a new theory that another
individual had actually been the shooter. Id. The juvenile court declined to do

so, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld that determination. Id. at 652–

53. The latter court explained jurisdiction was “vested completely in the adult

court” following waiver and that the juvenile court “properly refused [the

juvenile’s] repeated attempts to reopen the waiver hearing and correctly ruled

that it had no authority to entertain his petition.” Id. at 653 (quoting State v.

Day, 911 A.2d 1042, 1053 (R.I. 2006)).
                                        16

      Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that a juvenile court

cannot reconsider a waiver order “after the state has filed a criminal complaint,

and the criminal court has assumed jurisdiction.” State v. Vairin M. (In re Vairin

M.), 647 N.W.2d 208, 216 (Wis. 2002). The court did conclude “that the juvenile

court retains jurisdiction and may reconsider its own waiver order until a

criminal complaint is filed.” Id.

      The case arose after two juvenile delinquency petitions were filed against

a fifteen-year-old, alleging seven delinquent acts in total. Id. at 210–11. The

juvenile court waived jurisdiction for both cases and criminal charges were filed.

Id. at 211. Later, the juvenile moved for the waivers to be reconsidered because,

among other things, the juvenile court “had heard ‘misleading’ evidence

regarding the [placement options for] a sixteen-year-old convicted as an adult.”

Id. Further, the defense was concerned “about the possibility of [the juvenile]

being deported if he were convicted in adult criminal court of the crimes with

which he had been charged.” Id. The juvenile court denied reconsideration. Id.

at 213.

      The juvenile appealed, and Wisconsin’s highest court concluded,

      As soon as the criminal court assumes jurisdiction, it assumes
      exclusive jurisdiction, and the juvenile court loses jurisdiction to
      reconsider its own waiver order. However, until the criminal
      complaint is filed, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, and the
      problems of concurrent jurisdiction, or of one court dismissing an
      action that is before another court, are not presented.

Id. at 216. The court also opined that “if a juvenile has compelling new grounds

bearing on waiver, he or she may file a motion with the criminal court asking the

court to relinquish its jurisdiction by transferring the matter to juvenile court.”

Id. at 219.

      In a Georgia case, the court of appeals held that a superior court could not
revoke a prior order transferring a case to juvenile court. K.G.W. v. State, 231
                                        17

S.E.2d 421, 424–25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976). As the court put it, “It is anachronistic,

if not a contraposition, for the state to contend that the superior court

transferred jurisdiction to the juvenile court, yet retained jurisdiction to revoke

the order.” Id. at 424. To bring home the logic of its ruling, the court added that

“this issue can operate both ways. If the state contends that a superior court

can revoke its transfer of jurisdiction after the juvenile court has acted thereon,

then why should not the juvenile court have the same option of revoking

its transfer of jurisdiction after the superior court had begun the trial of the

defendant?” Id. at 425. Such a result, in the Georgia court’s view, would be

improper. Id.

      Because we find that the juvenile court did not have the ability to

reconsider and revoke its waiver of jurisdiction over I.S., we need not consider

the State’s alternative argument that it abused its discretion in doing so.

      V. Conclusion.

      For these reasons, we sustain the writ, we vacate the juvenile court’s

revocation of its waiver of jurisdiction, and we remand with the expectation that

any further proceedings will occur in the district court.

      WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED.