Court Opinion

ID: 9728739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:15:34.350737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:10.983478
License: Public Domain

Blair Moody, Jr., J.
(dissenting). The plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on cottage cheese which accidentally spilled in an aisleway of defendant’s store. Plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the iharket was negligent in not discovering or removing the cottage cheese before the accident. The defendant responded that its employees discovered the danger only seconds before plaintiff’s fall and had no time to remove it. The defendant claimed as an affirmative defense that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence because she failed to look where she was going and to see the spilled cottage cheese on the floor.
Our colleagues found no evidence to indicate *703that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety. Accordingly, they concluded that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the issue of contributory negligence. We respectfully disagree.
I

A. Contributory Negligence Instruction

Contributory negligence is normally a question of fact submitted to the jury for consideration under proper instruction. Dockham v Marr, 373 Mich 680, 684; 130 NW2d 924 (1964); Cochran v Pinto, 333 Mich 91, 99; 52 NW2d 611 (1952); White v Herpolsheimer Co, 327 Mich 462, 470; 42 NW2d 240 (1950); Neal v Cities Service Oil Co, 306 Mich 605, 609; 11 NW2d 259 (1943); Reedy v Goodin, 285 Mich 614, 620; 281 NW 377 (1938).
Only where the record is so clear or undisputed that reasonable minds could not conceivably draw contrary conclusions of fact can the court remove the question from the jury by finding either contributory negligence or the absence of contributory negligence as a matter of law:
"This Court has in recent years frequently reiterated that it must be a very clear case to justify a trial judge in taking a negligence action from the jury on grounds of contributory negligence.” Churukian v LaGest, 357 Mich 173, 179; 97 NW2d 832 (1959).
See also Koehler v Detroit Edison Co, 383 Mich 224; 174 NW2d 827 (1970); Hall v Wood, 26 Mich App 135; 181 NW2d 924 (1970); Desmarais v Myefski, 20 Mich App 436; 174 NW2d 174 (1969).
Ordinarily, the court’s instruction on contributory negligence defines the legal duty required of the plaintiff and the legal standard to be used in *704evaluating that duty with regard to the facts of the case:
"If plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care under all of the circumstances, he was not guilty of contributory negligence; and what is ordinary care is usually a question of fact. It is the care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.” Reedy, supra, 620.
The trial court in the instant case appropriately gave the following instruction on contributory negligence pursuant to the Michigan Standard Jury Instructions:1
"Now, when I use the terms 'negligence’ or 'contributory negligence’ with respect to the plaintiffs conduct, I mean the plaintiff’s failure to use ordinary care for her own safety which proximately contributed to her injuries.
"By failure to use ordinary care for her own safety I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do under the circumstances which you find existed in this case. And again it is for you to decide what a reasonably careful person would do or would not do for her own safety under the circumstances.”

B. Negligence Instruction

Defendant’s negligence is treated in a similar way. It is a question of fact, normally determined by the jury. Where contributory negligence is also at issue, the court will submit the negligence claim to the jury under proper instruction, unless the case for contributory negligence is so clear that reasonable minds could not possibly differ.
In addition, because this case concerns the negli*705gence of retail store owners in failing to maintain aisleways safe from defect or obstruction, the duration of the condition is significant:
"It is the duty of a storekeeper to provide reasonably safe aisles for the customers. The proprietor is liable for injury resulting from an unsafe condition caused by the active negligence of himself and his employees; and he is liable when the unsafe condition, otherwise caused, is known to the storekeeper or is of such a character or has existed a sufficient length of time that he should have knowledge of it.” (Citations omitted.) Carpenter v Herpolsheimer’s Co, 278 Mich 697, 698; 271 NW 575 (1937).
In the instant case, the trial court gave the following instruction regarding defendant’s duty of care to provide safe aisleways in its stores:
"Now, it is the duty of every storekeeper to provide a reasonably safe aisle or aisles for customers and a storekeeper is liable for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition either caused by an act of negligence by himself or his employees or if otherwise caused where known to the storekeeper or is of such a character or has existed such a sufficient length of time that the storekeeper should have had knowledge of it.”
On the basis of these instructions, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action in defendant’s favor.
II
A review of the record indicates sufficient evidence to justify the court’s decision to instruct on contributory negligence. During discovery, testimony was taken from Mr. Frank Balester, apparently the only person to actually witness the plaintiff’s slip and fall. Witness Balester, who was un*706loading a cart of milk only a few feet from where plaintiff fell, gave the following information in his deposition:
"Well, just as I hollered 'cleanup’, this other woman [the plaintiff], which I thought she had seen it, she slipped on the cottage cheese and fell. And I had no chance of getting to her to warn her or anything else.” (Emphasis added.)
Later, during the trial, plaintiffs own testimony was replete with evidence indicating her inattention to the surroundings and that she was not in the store that day to "display” shop:
”Q. [Plaintiff’s Attorney]: You had picked up several items in that far aisle, do you recall specifically what you picked up?
"A. [Ms. Jaworski]: I don’t remember, I know I had a box of crackers and—
"Q. A box of crackers?
"A. I couldn’t really tell you what I did have.
”Q. How long were you in that particular aisle?
"A. I just walked through, on the way I picked this and that up, I wasn’t there to stop and look at anything.
”Q. Did you, again, make observations of the display counters and the aisleway itself?
"A. Well, I wasn’t there to observe things.
"Q. When you first got to the end of this long aisle and made this right hand turn, did you make any observations?
"A. Well, I wasn’t looking for anything.” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the record demonstrated plaintiffs specific inattention to the danger the spilled cottage cheese presented:
*707"Q. [Plaintiff’s Attorney]: Had you seen this cheese at any time at all prior to your fall or your slip?
”A. [Ms. Jaworski]: No, I wasn’t looking for any cheese, so I didn’t look for it.” (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in the record shows that plaintiff was distracted by the display of items in defendant’s store. Rather the evidence reflects she was preoccupied with her purpose for being in the store, i.e., to cash a check and pick up specific items she had come to purchase. By her own testimony, she was not in the store to shop randomly. She knew what she wanted and was not "display” shopping.
The record in this case, at a minimum, contains evidence that plaintiff was not watching the aisle-way floor in front of her when she approached the site of the accident. The jury could have considered this evidence to conclude that plaintiff failed to make reasonable observations and, thus, was guilty of contributory negligence.
In addition, plaintiff stated twice that she was three or four steps beyond Frank Balester and the merchandise he was unloading when she slipped. Accordingly, the jury could have determined that her view of the area was clear enough before she fell to recognize and avoid the danger had she not been inattentive. In other words, significant evidence existed in the record for a finding of contributory negligence based on plaintiff’s failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety. See Sparks v Luplow, 372 Mich 198; 125 NW2d 304 (1963).
Ill
Our colleagues conclude that under the circumstances no evidence existed as a matter of law to support an instruction on the issue of contributory negligence.
*708This determination is apparently based upon the following analysis:
"While ordinary prudence generally requires one to see that which is to be seen, contributory negligence depends upon the circumstances, and the circumstances are substantially different in a parking lot or on a public street than in a modern self-service type store. We cannot accept the notion that a customer in a modern supermarket or department store should be under an obligation to see every defect or danger in his pathway.”
We do not differ with this general observation. In essence, it restates the proposition that all circumstances should be taken into consideration by the fact finder in evaluating the contributory negligence of a self-service market patron. Diverse factors evolve from different circumstances. What may be unreasonable under one set of conditions may be quite reasonable when considered within a different situation.
It may be quite proper that under a particular set of facts a customer in a modern supermarket should not be required to see every defect in her pathway. However, when there is evidence that a patron fails to make any observation, it is up to the jury to decide whether, under the circumstances, such failure to look or see a defect is reasonable. In this case it was up to the jury to decide whether under the circumstances this plaintiff, as a reasonably careful person, should have looked or should have seen the cottage cheese in her pathway.
To reach the conclusion that no question of fact existed as to contributory negligence in the instant case, the majority opinion must completely ignore all testimony raising the question whether plain*709tiff failed to make reasonable observations. It cannot be asserted that patrons have no duty of ordinary care to observe the aisleways of a self-service type store unless they actually see the danger.
Clearly, the standard of care required of a patron in a self-service store is that of a reasonably careful person under all of the circumstances.
It is well recognized that a conspicuous display of merchandise may divert the attention of customers from aisleway floors. Therefore, this factor may be considered and evaluated by the jury together with all other circumstances in determining whether the customer exercised ordinary care. However, the basic duty of customers to make reasonable observations of market aisleways remains unaltered.
Previously, this Court has refused to alter "the degree of care which plaintiff was required to exercise for her own safety” simply. because a defendant maintained a potentially distracting display of merchandise. Boyle v Preketes, 262 Mich 629, 632-633; 247 NW 763 (1933). See also Suci v Mirsky, 61 Mich App 398; 232 NW2d 415 (1975); Steehler v Fashion City of Michigan, Inc, 14 Mich App 76, 77-78; 165 NW2d 306 (1968).
Furthermore, present negligence standards allow the jury to consider unusual conditions or extreme distractions in their deliberations. Boyle, supra, 632; Shorkey v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 259 Mich 450, 452; 243 NW 257 (1932).
Significantly, no special instruction reflecting this consideration was requested by the instant plaintiff.2 The standard jury instructions were fully *710presented by the court. The negligence and contributory negligence instructions furnished to the jury were framed most properly in terms of reasonable care under all circumstances. The plaintiff was given full opportunity to present and did submit her view of the factual circumstances to the jury.
Historically, our Court has jealously guarded the broad discretion conferred upon the jury to decide factual questions. This sound tradition should not be encroached upon.
In this case, the conflicting viewpoints regarding contributory negligence were extensively argued by counsel. The jury was aware of plaintiff’s reason for shopping, her degree of attentiveness, the proximity of display counters, the time lag between the spill and her fall, and all other circumstances involved in the occurrence. Clearly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a jury instruction on the question of contributory negligence. The scope of our reviewing authority is limited to this narrow issue.
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jury verdict of no cause of action.
J. Coleman, J., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr.,

 See SJI 11.01.

 The plaintiff only objected to the trial court’s decision that the facts, as reflected by the record, did require an instruction covering her alleged contributory negligence.