Court Opinion

ID: 9614635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:26:59.873613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:37.825140
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
1. The majority holds:
Because OCGA § 19-8-6 (b) forecloses an inquiry into the reasons for a parent’s failure to provide care and support, thus depriving that parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it denies due process of law. [Opinion, pp. 651-2.]
I suggest respectfully that a careful examination of the facts cannot support that holding.1
2. There is no doubt as to any of the material facts in this case. They are:
(a) Custody of the minor child was removed from Thorne and placed in the child’s mother by order of the Juvenile Court of DeKalb County in 1984.
(b) During that same year, Thorne was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen years, and he remains in prison in Richmond County today.
(c) Thorne has provided no significant support for his child for a period of more than five years.
3. As to procedure, Thorne sought a writ ad testificandum in order to make a personal appearance before the trial court. The writ was denied, and his testimony was taken by deposition. That testimony was available to the trial court.
4. It should be apparent that:
(a) Thorne’s “reasons for failure to provide care and support” *653were placed fully before the court by means of his own testimony, which was not in conflict in any material aspect with the other evidence of the case; and
(b) Thorne was not deprived of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,” because he was heard by deposition;
(c) If Thorne has been deprived of anything, it is nothing more than a personal appearance before the trial court. It is exceedingly difficult to understand how that might have been of any value to him. The factual circumstances would have been no different; Thorne would have said before the court in person exactly what he said to the court by way of deposition; the court would have found that he had failed to provide significant support for more than a year because he was in prison; the court would have been bound to find, under our holding in Chandler v. Cochran, supra, that there was no justification for his failure; the court would have been obligated to act in the best interest of the child; and the court would have approved the adoption.
5. What happens now?

Upon the publication of this opinion, it appears that stepparents and relatives seeking to adopt children with a living parent who has failed to provide support may no longer do so.

6. This is because OCGA § 19-8-3 (a) provides the exclusive means of adopting a child with a living parent or guardian — except as otherwise specified in OCGA § 19-8-6. “Except as otherwise specified in Code Section 19-8-6, no adoption of a child who has a living parent(s) or guardian (s) of his person shall be permitted except where
(a) OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) permits adoptions without surrender or termination of parental rights:
where (1) a child has been abandoned by a parent, or (2) the parent of a child cannot be found after a diligent search has been made, or (3) the parent is insane or otherwise incapacitated from surrendering such rights, where the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interests of the child.
(b) OCGA § 19-8-3 (a) (1), (3), (4) and (5) permit adoptions when the parent or guardian has surrendered rights voluntarily.
(c) OCGA § 19-8-3 (a) (2) permits adoptions when
[t]he parent(s) or guardian(s) of the child has had his rights terminated by order of the court of competent jurisdiction the child has been committed by the court to the Department of Human Resources or to a licensed child-placing *654agency for placement for adoption, and the department or agency thereafter consents to the adoption.
Decided December 5, 1989.
Paul E. Kauffmann, Phyllis J. Holmen, Vicky 0. Kimbrell, John L. Cromartie, Jr., for appellant.
Bips & Bips, R. Andrew Bips, for appellee.
(d) OCGA § 19-8-3 (a) (6) permits adoptions when “The child has been placed for adoption by a juvenile court or other court of competent jurisdiction, which court has terminated the parental rights of the parents.”
7. Because the majority has stricken OCGA § 19-8-6 (b), there now is no means by which stepparents and relatives who seek to adopt a child with a living parent who has failed to support that child may do so.
That is lamentable.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.

 The majority recognizes that the statute has been amended to remove the former requirement that the trial court examine whether the failure to support was “without justifiable cause.” It recognizes also that our earlier holding in Chandler v. Cochran, 247 Ga. 184 (6) (275 SE2d 23) (1981), would as a matter of statutory interpretation demand the opposite result from that reached by the majority. We held there, regarding another natural parent who had been sentenced to a lengthy period of confinement on felony charges: “It is well settled that no person can object to the natural consequences of his own act voluntarily performed.” Hence, a constitutional invalidation would provide the only alternative to the trial court’s rulings and the Court of Appeals’ affirmance.