Court Opinion

ID: 9564390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:59:39.37377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:23.093424
License: Public Domain

ELMORE, Judge,
dissenting in part, concurring in part.
The majority upholds the defendant’s robbery conviction holding that the State could amend the indictment by deleting the name of one of the two named victims. From this conclusion I respectfully dissent.
It is well established that “a valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court to try an accused for a felony.” State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 308, 283 S.E.2d 719, 729 (1981). Our General Statutes state that “[a] bill of indictment may not be amended.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-923(e) (2001). This has been interpreted by North Carolina case law to mean that “an indictment may not be amended in a way which ‘would substantially alter the charge set forth in the indictment.’ ” State v. Brinson, 337 N.C. 764, 767, 448 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1994) (citation omitted).
The issue is whether the amendment which omitted one of the two victims named in the conjunctive substantially altered the charge set forth in the indictment. The majority holds that the burden of proof did not change, and that the amendment was appropriate. I respectfully disagree.
Where an indictment charges the defendant with a crime against someone other than the actual victim, such a variance is fatal. State v. Bell, 270 N.C. 25, 153 S.E.2d 741 (1967). In Bell, the indictment charged defendant with the robbery of Jean Rogers, whereas the evidence showed the correct name of the victim was Susan Rogers. The Court held that the defendant’s motion for nonsuit should have been allowed as to the indictment on the ground that the indictment was in variance with the evidence. Bell, 270 N.C. at 29, 153 S.E.2d at 745. In *229State v. Overman, 257 N.C. 464, 125 S.E.2d 920 (1962), the indictment charged that Frank E. Nutley, rather than Frank E. Hatley, was victim of a hit-and-run accident. Because the indictment required the State to prove injury to someone other than the true victim, the Court held a fatal variance existed. Id. at 468, 125 S.E.2d at 924. See State v. Harper, 64 N.C. 100, 102 (1870) (“A variance or omission in the name of the person injured is more serious than a variance in the name of the defendant. . . .”). But see State v. Bailey, 97 N.C. App. 472, 389 S.E.2d 131 (1990) (change in indictment which stated victim’s name as Pettress Cebron to correctly reflect the victim’s name as Cebron Pettress was not a prohibited amendment).
I conclude from this line of cases that the identity of the victim is a substantial element of the indictment, and that a change in the victim’s identity is a substantial change, which change is prohibited by section 15A-923(e) of the General Statutes. In the case at bar, the indictment was amended from including two individual victims to including only one. In addition, the amendment was made at the close of the State’s evidence, well into the case and after the jury had been initially read the original indictment by the trial court and listened to the evidence with both victims in mind. This constitutes a substantial change which our law does not permit.
The trial transcript indicates that the State and the trial court were trying to bring the indictment into conformity with State v. Lyons, 330 N.C. 298, 412 S.E.2d 308 (1991), which held that disjunctive jury instructions using “and/or” between the victims names were fatally ambiguous and required a new trial when the indictment had used the conjunctive “and” between the names. The Lyons case established the rule that when a disjunctive jury instruction is given, which allows the jury to find a defendant guilty of either of two underlying acts each of which is in itself a separate offense, the instruction is fatally ambiguous because it is impossible to determine whether the jury unanimously found that the defendant committed one particular offense.
In the present case, however, the original indictment named two victims using the conjunctive “and”, not the disjunctive “and/or.” It follows that under the original indictment the State would have to prove that the defendant robbed from both of the named victims, Sandra Goodman and Stephonia Berger. The indictment was not ambiguous. After the amendment, the State’s burden was reduced to proving that the defendant robbed Sandra Goodman only.
*230The majority relies on State v. Montgomery, 331 N.C. 559, 417 S.E.2d 742 (1992), which does say that a conjunctive in the indictment does not require the State to prove both, in that case person and presence of the victim. This case is distinguishable because the conjunctive charges the defendant with a crime against two individuals. While in a well-worded indictment this would usually be two separate charges, when the State decided to charge both in one, I believe they must then carry the burden as to both to satisfy the charge. Lessening the State’s burden from two victims to one is a substantial alteration.
Because the amendment was in error and that error necessarily prejudiced the verdict given by the jury, I would vacate the judgment of the trial court. I concur in the other aspects of the majority opinion.