Court Opinion

ID: 9706858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:53:27.282235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.460830
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. We are called upon to determine whether or not the plaintiff exercised “due diligence” in obtaining service on the defendant Paul Shallow. While I agree with the majority’s general statements of the law as they relate to this issue, on balance I would come to the opposite conclusion. The following is a chronology of events. 7/14/85 Date of the occurrence. 5/22/87 Suit filed. 5/22/87 Summons issued to defendant Shallow at 10216 South Fairfield, Chicago. This was the address that the defendant gave to the plaintiff at the scene of the occurrence. 6/12/87 The sheriff’s return shows “Not Served.” 9/17/87 Alias summons was issued for 10615 South Hale, Chicago. This was the address on the police report. 11/9/87 The plaintiff checked the alias summons and found it had not been served and contained the notation “not at this address.” The return itself is not in the record and the actual date of the return is not noted. 2/5/88 Answers to Interrogatories from a codefendant, Willie Griffin, listed Shallow’s address on Hale. 5/26/88 Plaintiff requested the Secretary of State to provide the current information on Paul Shallow. 6/7/88 The plaintiff received a report from the Secretary of State showing the defendant’s address in Woodridge, in Du Page County, Illinois. 6/15/88 An alias summons was issued at the Woodridge address. 6/28/88 Defendant was served. While the affidavit is not entirely clear, it appears that after the alias summons was returned without service, the plaintiff’s law clerk traced the telephone number that had been given to the plaintiff by Shallow at the scene of the occurrence and obtained a corresponding address. An alias summons was prepared for the address in Chicago that corresponded to the telephone number, but telephone contact was made with the person who had that telephone number and it was determined that that person was not at all acquainted with Paul Shallow. The due diligence rule is designed to ensure that justice is rendered promptly. (O’Connell v. St. Francis Hospital (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322; Womick v. Jackson County Nursing Home (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 371.) Also it is designed to protect defendants from unnecessary delay or the circumvention of the statute of limitations. (Segal v. Sacco (1990), 136 Ill. 2d at 286.) Dismissal is a harsh penalty which is justified when the defendant is denied a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances of his alleged liability. Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co. (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 273, 289-90,122 N.E.2d 540; Segal v. Sacco, 136 Ill. 2d at 288. While not a textbook example of due diligence, the plaintiff exercised a sufficient amount of diligence to avoid the harsh result of dismissal of his lawsuit. On the date of the occurrence the plaintiff was given Shallow’s home address on Fairfield in Chicago. The police report, however, contains a different address, one on Hale, also in Chicago. The plaintiff, upon the filing of the lawsuit, immediately attempted to serve the defendant on Fairfield and when not successful, a short time later attempted to serve the plaintiff on Hale. While attempting to serve process, the suit was pursued against the codefendants, one of whom answered interrogatories listing Shallow’s address, as did the police report, on Hale. With respect to these events, the plaintiff proceeded with reasonable diligence. The plaintiff’s conduct after checking the service of the alias summons, however, was not satisfactory. Ignoring the obvious recourse of checking with the Secretary of State, while attempting to check out the telephone number given by the defendant at the time of the occurrence and waiting for answers to interrogatories of codefendants, is not reasonable diligence. However, when the plaintiff’s diligent efforts in attempting immediate service at the addresses provided by the defendant and the police report, and in pursuing the case against the other defendants, are weighed against the minimal efforts made after and until the time that the plaintiff obtained the information from a simple inquiry of the Secretary of State, I do not believe that the extreme penalty of dismissal is warranted.