Court Opinion

ID: 9777837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:25:35.09964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.646495
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
dissenting to the denial of the State’s motion for leave to file motion for rehearing.
Appellant was convicted of burglary of a building. The jury assessed his punishment at 10 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal appellant advanced a single ground of error to wit:
“The Honorable Trial Court committed error in refusing to grant defendant’s motion for an instructed verdict of not guilty because of insufficient evidence.”
It is observed that the motion for instructed verdict was presented to the trial court after the State rested its case at the guilt stage of the trial. It was argued and overruled before any charge was submitted to the jury.
The burglary occurred in Harris County on the night of December 29, 1978. According to Margaret Lynn Wilson, appellant and his wife came to Austin and stayed with her. They told her how the burglary was committed and showed her some of the fruits thereof. She pawned some items for the appellant and his wife. After a rift Wilson reported the burglary to the Austin police.
In arguing his motion for instructed verdict to the trial court, appellant urged that Wilson was an accomplice witness as a matter of law and that her testimony was not corroborated as required by Article 38.-14, V.A.C.C.P. In Easter v. State, 536 S.W.2d 223, 228 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), it was held that the 1974 Penal Code made some *618notable changes with regard to parties to a crime, and that an accessory after the fact had been eliminated as a party to a crime. See now V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 38.05. Thus what was an accessory after the fact under the former Code is not now an accomplice witness under Article 38.14, V.A. C.C.P. See also Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Emmett v. State, 654 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983). His or her uncorroborated testimony alone may support another’s conviction. Under the record Wilson was not an accomplice witness. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for instructed verdict as claimed in appellant’s sole ground of error. On appeal the contention advanced could have been quickly answered.1 This should have ended the matter.
The Court of Appeals, however, sua sponte broadened the contention and did not mention at all the motion for instructed verdict set forth in appellant’s only ground of error. The court stated, “Appellant’s sole ground of error is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction because the same was based upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice witness. Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P.”
The court noted the facts and observed that the court charged the jury that Margaret Lynn Wilson was an accomplice witness as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals agreed the evidence was insufficient to corroborate Wilson’s testimony if she was an accomplice witness, but held that in light of Easter, supra, that Wilson could not be prosecuted as a party to the burglary, and was not an accomplice witness. The claim of insufficient evidence was rejected. Boozer v. State (Tex.App.—El Paso—No. 08-81-00230-CR 1982).
Switching from his original and only contention on appeal, appellant filed his petition for discretionary review stating his only ground of review as
“The Court of Appeals erred in denying the Appellant the benefit of the finding by the trial court that the witness was an accomplice as a matter of law.”
In its brief opposing the grant of the said petition the State notes the appellant does not question the correctness of the holding that Wilson was not an accomplice witness as a matter of law, but takes the position for the first time that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence the appellate court is bound by the incorrect jury instruction of the trial court.
The petition for discretionary review was granted.
This Court reversed the conviction and remanded to the trial court for an order of acquittal. Four judges joined in the opinion with one judge concurring. Four judges dissented. The majority opinion stated:
“On direct appeal, appellant asserted the trial court had reversibly erred by denying his motion for instructed verdict of acquittal. Specifically, it was appellant’s contention that the State failed to meet its burden of adducing independent evidence of the accomplice witness, which the court’s charge required as a matter of law before warranting a conviction. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
*619Such language is interesting in view of the observation earlier made (see footnote # 1) that nowhere in appellant’s brief did he mention, refer to or rely upon the court’s charge, which came after the ruling on the motion for instructed verdict. The ruling on an instructed verdict motion is not measured by the charge.
Later the majority opinion stated:
“Much ado has been made by the parties as well as the Court of Appeals about whether the evidence adduced at trial supported submission of the court’s instruction that the witness was an accomplice as a matter of law. We, however, see no occasion to review that evidence for that purpose under appellant’s sole ground of error raised originally on appeal.” (Emphasis in original).
There may be some disagreement about the “much ado” observation. Appellant, urging only that the court erred in overruling his motion for instructed verdict, did not even mention the court’s charge in his original brief. The Court of Appeals simply recited the facts, noted the charge given and concluded that under Easter, supra, Wilson was not an accomplice witness and held the evidence sufficient. The State’s brief hardly aids the observation. Be that as it may, it is the second sentence in the paragraph quoted above that is mystifying. The sentence seems to say the court will not review evidence supporting the court’s charge on the accomplice witness in passing on appellant’s ground of error that prior to giving the charge the trial court erred in overruling the instructed verdict motion. To add to the puzzlement the majority goes on to hold the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured only by the language of the charge given. Apparently what the majority was really saying was that it was not going to discuss whether the accomplice witness instruction given was erroneous.
This is borne out because the majority opinion, turning to consider appellant’s sole ground of error originally raised, held that “the sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the charge that is given,” and if the evidence does not conform to the instruction given it is insufficient as a matter of law to support the guilty verdict, citing Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). The majority then held that in the instant case, under the charge given, the only verdict authorized in view of the evidence was “not guilty,” for if the jury had followed the trial court’s instructions the appellant would have been acquitted. The majority concluded the State’s failure to object to the court’s charge waived any “trial error” on appeal, and that double jeopardy prevented retrial and appellant was entitled to an acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).
After all the discussion on the court’s charge and none on the instructed verdict motion, the majority stated:
“It is clear appellant should have been acquitted on his motion, failing that, the jury was authorized only to find appellant ‘not guilty.’ ”
The majority holds the sufficiency of the evidence is judged only by the charge given to the jury, and this is true even if, as in this case, the charge was erroneous under the law and facts and favorable to the appellant. And the appellant is permitted to go scot-free by the majority on a double jeopardy theory because the State did not object, even though Article 36.14, V.A.C. C.P., permits only the defendant, not the State, to object to the court’s charge. The majority reasons, however, that had the State objected, then the erroneous court’s charge would have only been “trial error,” permitting reprosecution of the appellant.
Here the appellant had the advantage of an erroneous jury instruction favorable to him which he utilized during the trial. If he had been found “not guilty” because of the erroneous jury instruction, that would have been the end of the case. Now on appeal the majority still allows him to use the jury instruction to go scot-free even though the evidence shows his guilt of the *620offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
In McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524, 529 (1948), the Court held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence it was not bound by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that corroboration of the accomplice witness was required although it found corroboration to be present in any event.
In Hammonds v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 499, 316 S.W.2d 423 (1958), and Pitts v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 14, 210 S.W. 199 (1919), the jury charges failed to include instructions on the need for corroboration of accomplice witness testimony. The defendants did not object to the charges nor present special requested charges. For that reason they were not allowed to attack the jury charges on appeal for the omission of the accomplice witness instruction. Nevertheless, this Court held it could and would review the sufficiency of the evidence under accomplice witness standards since the records demonstrated that certain witnesses were in fact accomplice witnesses. Thus the acquiescence of those defendants in the charges did not mandate that the evidence supporting the convictions be reviewed only from a “charge as given” vantage point. There should not be a different standard for the State, or these cases should be overruled.
Aston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), involved a murder ease. There the trial court instructed the jury that both Foster and Wilson were accomplice witnesses as a matter of law. Foster had testified for the State and Wilson had been called by the defense. Article 38.14, V.A. C.C.P., does not require corroboration of a defense witness. Cranfil v. State, 525 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and cases there cited. The trial court erred, instructing the jury that Wilson was an accomplice witness. This Court, without dissent, held that under these circumstances it was not error for the trial court to have failed to charge that one accomplice witness may not corroborate another accomplice witness.
Applying the standard of looking only at the court’s charge as the majority doesin this case, several questions come to mind. Suppose a trial court charges the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence, telling the jurors the case rests upon circumstances and gives them the burden of proof required thereunder by the former law. On appeal the appellate court finds that the evidence does not meet the burden of proof required by the charge, but that the evidence was direct, not circumstantial, and that a rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, a lesser burden of proof than that set forth in the charge. The charge on circumstantial evidence need not have been given, and in light of Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), need not have been given even if the evidence was circumstantial. Must an appellate court, under the standard utilized today, reverse and order the acquittal of the defendant? Does the reversal depend upon the State’s failure to object to the charge, and the fact there is supposed to be no such thing as surplusage in a court’s charge, at least as to the part which authorizes conviction, whichever part that is?
Another question comes to mind. The Legislature’s lawmaking authority includes the right to define crimes and fixe penalties therefor. Article III, § 1, Tex. Const.; Baker v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 618, 158 S.W. 998 (1913); McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166, 176 (TexiCr.App.1980) (Opinion on Rehearing). This is certainly not a judicial function, and there is a constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. Article II, § 1, Tex. Const. Suppose the Legislature enacts a penal statute defining a crime with elements “a,” “b,” “c” and “d.” A defendant is indicted for the commission of said offense. The indictment properly charges the offense and includes all four elements thereof. In charging the jury the trial court submits the four elements required by the statute, but redefines the crime by adding element “e” or a fifth element, and requires the jury to find all five elements beyond a reasonable doubt *621before convicting. On appeal the defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the fifth element submitted. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the appellate court agrees that despite the jury’s finding, that the evidence is insufficient to support the fifth element, but that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the “essential” four elements of the crime as defined by the Legislature. Under such circumstances, because the State did not object to the charge, does the court’s erroneous inclusion of an additional and unnecessary element call for reversal and an order to acquit the defendant?
There are other questions. Does it make any difference in the standard applied by the majority if the erroneous charge, favorable to the defendant, is given only upon his objection or because of his special requested charge? May he then use such favorable instruction to walk free? How does the standard apply to a bench trial?
The sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated only when the prosecution seeks to retry an accused after either a trial or where an appellate court has actually entered a judgment holding the evidence in the first trial insufficient. Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 104 S.Ct. 1805, 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317,104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). Thus Fifth Amendment cases such as Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), become directly applicable only after a court has already found the evidence in the first trial insufficient and is pondering whether a second trial can be permitted despite the lack of evidence in the first.
The Double Jeopardy Clause is not an absolute bar to successive trials. The general rule is that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction is overturned on appeal. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1589, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964); Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, supra.
The majority has gotten the double jeopardy cart before the due process horse. The majority has given the appellant more process than is due in determining that the sufficiency of the evidence is to be determined by looking only at the court’s charge. The error here is not in the sufficiency of the evidence but in the trial court’s instruction to the jury. See Williams v. State, 696 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Dissenting Opinion).
In summary, the majority originally errs in not sticking to appellant’s original contention that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for instructed verdict which does not implicate the subsequently given charge. Next the majority errs in determining the sufficiency of the evidence only by looking to the court’s instructions,2 even though erroneous, without reviewing the evidence or the holding of the Court of Appeals, and further insisting that the whole matter turns on the failure of the State to object. I dissent.3
W.C. DAVIS, McCORMICK and WHITE, JJ., join this opinion.

. In his brief appellant advanced his "instructed verdict" claim, recited the testimony and discussed several cases dealing with corroboration of an accomplice witness. At no time did he mention or rely upon the court's charge to the jury.
The overruling of a defendant’s motion for an instructed verdict will be presumed to have been proper. Lewis v. State, 481 S.W.2d 822 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The trial court is presumed to have had good cause in overruling the motion for instructed verdict. Thumann v. State, 466 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Wyatt v. State, 566 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Lewis v. State, supra. If necessary, it will also be presumed that the facts averred in the motion were not shown to be true. Wilson v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 75, 290 S.W. 1103 (1927). See Tex. Jur.3rd, Vol. 26, Crim.Law, § 4249, p. 608, 609.
"On appeal rulings relating to the conduct of the trial court will not be disturbed save for abuse of discretion matters to which this rule has been applied include ... directing or refusing to direct a verdict of not guilty_” Citing Wilkerson v. State, 131 S.W. 1108 (Tex. Cr.App.1910).

. Even in Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Opinion on State’s Second Motion for Rehearing), the majority stated:
"We hold that when a charge is correct for the theory of the case presented we review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict by comparing the evidence to the indictment as incorporated in the charge.”

. While the right result was reached in Benson on original submission, I would overrule Ortega v. State, 668 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), and Williams v. State, 696 S.W.2d 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).