Court Opinion

ID: 9654918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:54:30.524755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.684318
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
A three-ring circus is underway: in the near ring, a majority of this court doing a sidestepping act; in the far ring, President Bush’s Department of Justice doing a juggling act; and in the center ring, three appointed federal judges taming the legislative lion. Unfortunately, the people of Texas are being had, not entertained. In this latest development, the majority wants to sweep under the rug new revelations that indicate the injustice it has previously *758accomplished. Because I believe this injustice should be corrected, not forgotten, I dissent. Rather than summarily rejecting the motion for rehearing the majority should reconsider the case, withdraw the prior opinions, commend Judge Ramirez for appropriately handling this matter, and apologize to the people of this state for the millions of dollars of taxpayer monies wasted by the wholly-unwarranted prior decision.
I.
In a manner previously unwitnessed in the history of Texas and perhaps in the history of the United States, the majority has twisted and bent our law to afford Republicans more suitable election districts from which to seek legislative office. Politics, not precedent or the rule of law, governed its ill-advised judicial decision.
A well-orchestrated Republican effort to obtain more favorable election districts has occurred contemporaneously in both state and federal forums. Rejecting the reapportionment settlement drawn by the Texas Attorney General on the recommendation of a majority of the Texas Senate, which had been approved by a Texas trial court (acting pursuant to a specific order of the Texas Supreme Court) and then pre-cleared by the Department of Justice, a majority of this court ensured that no valid plan would be in effect at the very time redistricting was being scrutinized by a federal court. By seizing immediately upon the lack of a valid state plan, the federal court justified imposing its own plan based upon Republican recommendations. Terrazas v. Slagle, Civil Nos. A-91CA-425, -426, -428 (W.D.Tex. Dec. 24, 1991). Observing that “there are no legal plans for reapportioning seats for election to the Texas House or Senate that have been precleared by the DOJ,” id. at 7, the federal court filled the void by crafting its own plans.
If there were any doubts as to the real reasons why the Republican Relators received unprecedented, extraordinary relief, those doubts must surely have vanished on December 24.1 For the truly unsuspecting, though, Relators have since taken actions that make the situation even clearer. After having been allowed to intervene in Mena and Quiroz, Relators promptly sought a seven-month continuance of the proceedings in those cases. Then, on January 8, 1992, Relators showed their real interest in Mena and Quiroz by taking non-suits in both cases, and refiling their claims in a Midland court. Craddick v. Richards, No. B-38,899 (Dist.Ct. of Midland County, 238th Judicial Dist. of Texas, filed Jan. 8, 1992). On the same day, the Relators filed an application in Terrazas asking the federal court to stay the state court proceedings indefinitely.
In the face of all this, a majority of this court still stands by its original opinions, decrying the Relators’ inability to participate in the state court proceedings. The obvious truth is that the Relators’ only interest in those proceedings is in moving them away from Judge Ramirez’s Edin-burg courtroom — either to the federal courthouse here in Austin, or to Midland County. This court has now done everything to further that aim but put the plaintiffs on a bus headed northward. Justice Hecht’s original opinion indicated that the right to intervene justified granting mandamus relief; now he says that the failure of Relators to exercise that right in good faith is of no consequence.
Not everything in the plurality’s original opinion is unprecedented. The requirements for redistricting judgments have indeed been developed in numerous cases; and those requirements were unequivocally embraced in the original opinions by at least seven members of the court, including all four dissenters.
The provision of mandamus relief, however, is another matter altogether. The *759plurality s original opinion, while recognizing that “mandamus is not available to compel an action which has not first been demanded and refused,” Majority Opinion at 723, nonetheless proceeded to grant relief never demanded and that the trial court had never refused. Under the circumstances of this proceeding, the action approved by five members of this court is not only unprecedented, it is truly incredible.
The Relators were not parties below, and they never requested the relief from the Texas trial judge charged with overseeing this litigation, nor was he given an opportunity to refuse to grant the relief granted by the majority. The approach taken by the majority is contrary to what heretofore has been the black-letter law of mandamus, supported by a countless number of decisions from this court and the courts of appeals, including the very recent writing of Justice Gonzalez in Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 556 (Tex.1990, orig. proceeding) (“Without ... a refusal by the trial judge, mandamus ... is improper.”). See also Hursey v. Bond, 172 S.W.2d 305, 306 (Tex.1943, orig. proceeding) (“Mandamus will not lie to compel a court to perform an act .. in the absence of a request for such performance by the party at interest and a refusal to perform on the part of the court.”); Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 526 (1930, orig. proceeding); Cleveland v. County of Jack, 802 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex.App. —Fort Worth 1991, orig. proceeding) (in absence of refusal, mandamus will not lie); Bantuelle v. Renfroe, 620 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1981, no writ) (in absence of demand and refusal, mandamus is denied); Fox v. Lewis, 344 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (mandamus relief denied because individuals had watched proceedings without requesting relief). Until the plurality’s opinion issued in this cause, the law had always been that you cannot get from this court what you have not first asked the trial court to provide.
II.
In presenting this case to the court, the Relators painted a picture of insidious, back-room dealings between the Texas Attorney General and the Mexican-American plaintiffs in the underlying redistricting litigation. Counsel for the Relators told the court that the Quiroz/Mena plan “was simply the product of a back-room deal,” and that, like Frankenstein’s monster, it was brought to life “only in the dead of night.” Oral argument of John McCamish, counsel for Relators, Dec. 10, 1991. These shady operations, the argument went, had left the Relators completely in the dark:
We would have had a right to intervene, but we weren’t interested in the census count_and it didn’t turn into a redistricting lawsuit until after we had filed our suit here.
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Your honor, we were free to intervene early on, but there was no reason to believe that we should have.
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We were certainly aware of the proceedings again and felt there was no reason for us to intervene in those proceedings. Up until October the 7th, the Attorney General was defending S.B. 31.
Id. In other words, since Relators could not foresee any settlement of the case, they had no reason to intervene. The plurality opinion unhesitatingly accepts these claims, almost verbatim:
Relators had no reasonable opportunity to intervene in Mena. They had no reason to want to do so as long as the state defendants were actively defending the validity of Senate Bill 31.
Maj. Op. at 724. The plurality heatedly rejects any suggestion that Relators monitored the proceedings in Judge Ramirez’s courtroom:
The dissents assert that relators deliberately chose not to intervene in Mena as part of their overall litigation strategy. There is nothing in the record before us to substantiate this assertion_ Justice Mauzy’s dissent even goes so far as to state that “Relators may have been in Judge Ramirez’s Edinburg courtroom” the day he rendered final judgment in *760Mena. There is absolutely no suggestion of that before us in any form.
Opinion at 724. Similar comments appear in Justice Gonzalez’s concurring opinion:
I also note that there is absolutely no support in the trial court’s record for the statement in Justice Mauzy’s opinion that Relators were “[individuals who sat in a courtroom in judicial proceedings in Mena, without ever asking the trial judge to do anything.”
Opinion at 728.
The motion for rehearing which Inter-venors seek to file places in serious question Relators’ account upon which the majority relied.2 Intervenors now present newly-obtained deposition testimony indicating that Relators were far less than candid to this court regarding their knowledge of the underlying proceedings. On behalf of the Republican Party of Texas, Relators’ counsel were formally monitoring the Mena proceedings at least as early as July 19, and billed the Republican Party for over 1,400 hours of legal work from July through December. Of those hours, 29.3 are recorded for the period from October 4 through October 7, suggesting that the Quiroz proceedings on October 7 might not have come as a complete surprise.3 One of Relators’ counsel, John Shields, has testified that his work included personally observing the Mena proceedings on numerous occasions — including the week of November 25,4 the very time during which the plurality insists there is “absolutely no suggestion” of Relators’ presence “in any form.” Maj. Op. at 724.
Further sworn testimony offered by In-tervenors confirms that Relators were fully aware of the parties’ intention to settle upon an agreed plan. George Korbel, an attorney who was involved in the Mena proceedings, has testified that the Republican Party was constantly informed as to those proceedings, and knew of the ongoing negotiations leading toward the Qui-roz/Mena settlement.5 Korbel further testified that he advised the Republicans that “they ought to be sure that their lawyers were involved in that.” Korbel deposition at 15. Nonetheless, though counsel for Relators performed over 1,400 hours of work on redistricting for the Republican Party from July to December, the Republicans did not find time to intervene in Mena.
In light of this information, the court’s decision to afford mandamus relief seems all the more incredible. The court can no longer maintain any plausible pretense that the Relators were unaware of the steps leading toward the Quiroz/Mena settlement. By ignoring the Relators’ failure to intervene in those proceedings, the court rewards a litigation strategy that is fundamentally at odds with the structure of our judicial system. In essence, the majority has created a new exception to our legal standard for granting mandamus relief, the *761“Triple R” exception: Republican Relators in Redistricting.
III.
There should be no misunderstanding about the degree of intransigence the court demonstrates today. The court does not deny the Intervenors’ motion for rehearing. Rather, the court denies the Intervenors’ motion for leave to file the motion for rehearing, and sends the motion for rehearing back to the Intervenors without ruling on it. In other words, the court does not even deign to consider any suggestion that the Republican Relators misrepresented salient facts to this court. Given the additional evidence adduced, it is understandable why five members of this court are so eager to seal the lips and tie the hands of the Intervenors.
Contrary to the plurality’s protestations, it is indeed rare for this court to refuse to allow any motions for rehearing. Of the thousands of cases decided by this court since the state’s birth, the plurality could find only thirteen in which we disallowed motions for rehearing. Significantly, none of those thirteen were decided on grounds that had not been urged by any party, as was this case. Now, as never before, the losing party has been denied any opportunity to argue the grounds upon which the court has decided the case. If the plurality had been interested in fairness as well as promptness, it could easily have shortened the time for filing a motion for rehearing, rather than denying that right altogether. Tex.R.App.P. 190(a).
Moreover, in the past, the court’s refusal to allow motions for rehearing always required at least five votes. Today, those votes are simply not there. Only the plurality opinion states that no motions for rehearing may be filed. That portion of the plurality opinion has the approval of only four judges: Justice Gonzalez and the three members of the plurality. Thus, a majority of this court actually disavows the decree that no motions for rehearing may be filed.
Justice Cornyn’s original opinion stated that he concurred with “the judgment of a majority of the court,” Op. at 731, and the court’s official judgment does state that “[n]o motions for rehearing shall be entertained.” That judgment, however, is based solely on the plurality opinion; and Justice Cornyn’s language in no way signifies agreement with the plurality’s refusal to entertain motions for rehearing. Since Justice Cornyn expressly disavows that portion of the opinion stating that no motions for rehearing will be entertained, there is no “judgment of a majority of the court” on the matter of motions for rehearing. Moreover, Justice Cornyn clearly does not intend to concur in all parts of the judgment, since he disagrees with a significant aspect of it. While the judgment denies relief against the Attorney General, Justice Cornyn’s opinion expressly states that he would grant that relief. Op. at 738. We can reasonably conclude, therefore, that Justice Cornyn intended to concur only in the main part of the judgment — that is, only in the granting of mandamus relief against Judge Ramirez.
Justice Cornyn has now decided that he really meant to join in “the judgment of the court.” Op. at 756. Notably, though, he does not dispute the observation that he did not join in the entire judgment of the court. Try as he might, Justice Cornyn cannot have it both ways: either he joined in only part of the court’s judgment, as he previously indicated, in which case the court must allow the motion for rehearing; or, alternatively, he joined in the court’s entire judgment, in which case his previous statement that he would issue mandamus against the Attorney General is plainly false.
Having no solid basis on which to deny the motion for leave to file, Justice Cor-nyn’s new writing attacks this dissent in every way except on the merits. Justice Cornyn first questions the very idea of writing on rehearing, since “the dissenters were in the minority then; they are in the minority now.” Op. at 756. In case anyone is unaware of this court’s practices, it is hardly novel for a dissenting judge to write further on motion for rehearing, even when the judge remains “in the minority.” *762See, e.g., Lee v. City of Houston, 807 5.W.2d 290, 302 (Tex.1991) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting on motion for rehearing). Justice Cornyn then assails this dissent simply for urging a reversal of the court’s position, suggesting that there is some “malevolence” in the way this court corrects its errors. Op. at 756. As Justice Cornyn certainly knows, this court typically corrects its errors on rehearing by withdrawing its original opinion and substituting a new one, without additional oral argument.6 This process hardly avoids “procedural and substantive niceties,” as Justice Cornyn strangely suggests; all proceedings on rehearing, like all other proceedings before the court, are supposed to be governed by standard rules.7
The implication that the Relators have been denied “an opportunity to be heard,” Maj. Op. at 754, is patently false: the Inter-venors’ original motion has been languishing in this court since January 2, 1992; the Intervenors have since filed four additional motions, repeatedly urging oral argument and action by this court. Relators have had every opportunity to respond to these filings, but have declined to do so. Frankly, I would be eager to have their response, and have no objection to giving them a further opportunity to explain to the court the inconsistencies between their attorney’s argument to this court and the sworn evidence presented. Justice Cornyn goes so far as to liken this dissent to a Dodge City judge who says, “We’ll give ’em a fair trial — then we’ll hang ’em.” Op. at 757. What he ignores is that under the circumstances of this case, the Intervenors have already been hung out to dry, and now the majority will not even give them a decent burial.
Equally peculiar is Justice Gonzalez’s new opinion, in which he joins fully in “Justice Hecht’s opinion,” Op. at 756, to deny the Intervenors an opportunity to be heard on their motion and to reaffirm the grave injustice that has been accomplished here. The belated comments in this new opinion serve no legal purpose; they do not address the Intervenors’ arguments, and they certainly do not undo the damage done by the court’s judgment. Justice Gonzalez fails to note that it was his vote that unleashed what he now characterizes as a “1000-pound gorilla,” Op. at 756, by providing the federal court with the rationale for intervening. See Terrazas v. Slagle, slip op. at 6.
This court has a solemn obligation to preserve the integrity of its proceedings. By refusing to even consider claims of misrepresentations by the Relators, the court sacrifices that obligation on the altar of partisan politics. Its unwillingness to consider this motion for rehearing contrasts sharply with the “conscious manipulation” by a majority of this court — specifically, Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Cook, Hightower, Hecht, and Cornyn — criticized in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 506 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., concurring), where the entire purpose of writing on rehearing was to address matters that had not even been raised in any motion for rehearing.
IV.
Four Republican members of this court, aided in the final stage of deliberations of this cause by Justice Gonzalez, have subverted the law in a manner never before seen in this state. Their collective action provided the linchpin for federal action that *763caused “harm to minority voting rights and chaos in the Texas electoral system.”8 Without the ruling by these five, there would have been no basis for federal intrusion. With the ruling, the elected officials of this state’s executive and legislative branches have been shut out of the redistricting process. In a circus of legal maneuvering, Relators and their counsel have stood federalism on its head, ensuring that Texas House and Senate districts would be drawn by the federal judiciary. This court’s participation in that circus, including its absolute refusal to consider the motion for rehearing, makes the spectacle all the more appalling.
What has occurred here is not justice, but a perversion of justice. And when justice is perverted every citizen of Texas is hurt, people of every party affiliation and of none. The five members of this court who have approved this extraordinary action can object to the characterization of their misconduct in whatever terms they choose, they can attempt to distort the public perception of their misconduct, but they cannot escape the truth. An announcement of this truth, well-known to all nine members of this court, is my responsibility as a judge.
DOGGETT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The plurality takes curious exception to the dissent’s use of the term "Republican” to describe these parties. Dissenting Opinion at 746, n. 10. Interestingly, this is the same terminology the federal court employed in its writing. See Terrazas v. Slagle, slip op. at 3 (designating Relators as "Republican plaintiffs”).

. Intervenors are the Mexican-American plaintiffs in Mena, who are participating in this proceeding as Real Parties in Interest.

. Some unspecified part of the 12.5 hours billed on October 7 was devoted to "attention to Qui-roz suit and agreement." Additionally, at least seven billing entries from the preceding three days have been redacted, making it impossible to determine how much time was spent attending to the settlement negotiations.

. Q. What other times were you there in Edin-burg for trial?
A. The week before Thanksgiving. I think it was Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.
Q. And you were there for all of that?
A. Yes.
Oral deposition of John Shields, Dec. 26, 1991, p. 46. Thanksgiving 1991 fell on Thursday, November 28.

. Q: Did you ever have any other discussions about the Mena vs. Richards case in the Edin-burg case?
A: We discussed it frequently. [Republican party official Jim Duncan] would call me while the negotiations were going on for the Senate, wanting to know whether or not— what the process was on the negotiations and what we were doing, and he and I had a good personal relationship. I talked to him about those things.
A: Now, when you say the settlement with respect to the Senate, is this a Senate settlement that was eventually effectuated in Qui-roz and Mena?
A: That’s correct.
Oral deposition of George Korbel, Dec. 26, 1991, p. 16. Korbel also states that he furnished the Republican Party with over 2,000 pages of documents relating to the redistricting negotiations. Id. at 23.

. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.1991); Bowman v. Lumberton, 801 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.1990); Mitchell v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 786 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.1990); Phillip Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.1990).

. To make the Intervenors’ motion seem more sinister than it is, Justice Cornyn repeatedly employs the term "ex parte” to describe the Intervenors’ arguments, knowing that the term has highly negative connotations. The only arguments upon which this dissent is based are drawn solely from the record in this cause. In a mandamus proceeding, the parties are permitted to prepare their own record, provided that the materials filed are either certified or sworn. Tex.R.App.P. 121. Materials filed on rehearing have no less stature under this court's rules than those to which other members of this court have referred throughout their respective opinions. All materials in the record have, of course, been served on all parties.

. Second Supplement to Intervenor's Motion for Leave to file Motion for Rehearing, p. 3.