Court Opinion

ID: 9769586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:55:11.434999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:05.452106
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
This Court’s initial decision reversed the conviction due to the introduction of evidence at the punishment phase that Appellant had previously entered a plea of guilty to a burglary indictment. He was placed on seven years probation under the deferred adjudication provisions of Article 42.12, sec. 3d of the Code of Criminal Procedures. The probation was subsequently revoked; the court proceeded to an adjudication of guilt, and sentenced Appellant to three years confinement. Appellant gave notice of appeal, and the appeal was still pending at the time of the trial in this cause.
The State now urges a reconsideration of our initial decision, citing Johnigan v. State, 628 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1982). The alleged error in Johnigan was identical to that presented in this cause.
We are not persuaded to change our ruling by the decision in Johnigan. That portion of the opinion cited in the State’s motion indicates that the filing of a motion to revoke tolls the running of a probationary period. The State seizes upon that language for the proposition that, while Appellant’s prior conviction was not final and hence not admissible under the final conviction provision of Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 37.07, during the pendency of his burglary appeal, he was still on probation and the conviction could therefore be introduced under the probated or suspended sentence provision of that article.
The Johnigan opinion is in conflict with decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals with regard to the tolling of a probationary period. A motion to revoke and capias do not toll the running of the probationary period. Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Guillot v. State, 543 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Nicklas v. State, 530 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Standley v. State, 517 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). The probation continues to run and may, in fact, expire. The timely filing of a motion to revoke and issuance of a capias will preserve only those alleged violations contained therein, and will permit revocation on that basis even after the probationary period has expired.
Additional support for the State’s position is offered in the Johnigan opinion’s reliance on Roliard v. State, 506 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.1973). We note that in Roliard there is no indication that the prior revoked probation was on appeal at the time of its introduction into evidence. Franicevich was a federal prosecution, and the appellate decision was based upon federal evidentiary rules. The Fifth Circuit Court indicated that there was a split in the United States Circuit Courts as to the admissibility of convictions on appeal, some courts holding them admissible and others not. The Fifth Circuit authorized admissibility as long as the jury *660was advised of the appellate status of the conviction.
Neither of these cases support the State’s position. As indicated in our earlier opinion, Article 42.12, sec. 3d(b), states that after an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of probation, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred. The probation is not simply revoked, it is annulled. Appellant is in the same posture he was in on the day he entered his plea. His appeal goes to the initial proceeding; he has, in fact, no right to appeal the decision to proceed to an adjudication of guilt. Should his appeal be successful, the entire conviction is reversed. This is distinct from an individual who appeals from the revocation of an ordinary probation under Section 3, and Subsections 3a and 3c. In those cases, a successful appeal places the individual back on probation.
The appeal following revocation of a deferred adjudication probation is in essence an appeal from a guilty plea, and the range of errors which may be raised are accordingly restricted. As a practical matter, the chances of obtaining reversal may be slight, but whether such a prior conviction is admissible under Article 37.07 does not depend upon appellate probabilities but upon the proper characterization of the status of the prior cause.
Appellant’s prior conviction was not final at the time of this trial. Nor was it a probated or suspended sentence case, that aspect having been nullified by the decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The conviction was not admissible under Article 37.07.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is denied.