Court Opinion

ID: 9734227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:29:01.766776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.099590
License: Public Domain

Jansen, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the finding of the majority, I believe that the February 24, 1987, letter was, at best, ambiguous. As noted by the majority, what is required for denial of a personal protection insurance claim is a formal denial of liability. Mousa v State Auto Ins Cos, 185 Mich App 293, 295; 460 NW2d 310 (1990). The insurer must formally and explicitly deny liability. Johnson v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 183 Mich App 752, 763; 455 NW2d 420 (1990). Because the alleged denial was ambiguous, thereby not amounting to a formal and explicit denial of liability, I am of the opinion that a question of fact exists regarding the meaning that the parties attached to this letter.
Furthermore, because the letter was ambiguous, I believe it was inappropriate for the trial court to construe it as a matter of law. In its opinion, the trial court noted that the letter did not specifically indicate a denial of the claim. However, the trial court found that, on the basis of counsel’s presumed experience in the field of no-fault insurance, the letter did constitute a sufficient denial. I disagree with this finding. It is incumbent upon the insurer to formally and explicitly deny liability, regardless of a given attorney’s experience in *592the field. The trial court was correct in that the letter did not "specifically indicate a denial.” I believe that the ambiguous nature of the letter, coupled with the representations made by Allstate regarding the fact that it was still considering the claim, created an issue of fact regarding the meaning that the parties attached to the alleged denial of the claim.
I would reverse the order of the trial court to the extent it applies to the Nafsos and Mt. Carmel.