Court Opinion

ID: 9772340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:03.948212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:08.561470
License: Public Domain

J-S18005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JUSTIN RANSOME                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 134 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 6, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002099-2017

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

       Justin Ransome appeals the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ order

denying his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42

Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We are constrained to find Ransome’s claims on

appeal are waived, and we therefore affirm.

       Ransome was charged with, among other offenses, first-degree murder

after stabbing his girlfriend’s brother 21 times with a knife during an

altercation and then texting his girlfriend he had “had enough of [the victim].”

Ransome alleged at trial he had acted in self-defense. The jury nonetheless

convicted Ransome of the first-degree murder charge, as well as possession

of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). The trial court sentenced Ransome to the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S18005-23

mandatory term of life imprisonment for the murder conviction and to a

concurrent sentence of two and one-half to five years’ incarceration for the

PIC conviction.

        Ransome filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. He

then filed a notice of appeal to this Court, raising four issues which this Court

found warranted no relief. See Commonwealth v. Ransome, 2020 WL

1487785 (Pa. Super. filed March 23, 2020) (unpublished memorandum).

Ransome did not file a petition for allowance of appeal, and his judgment of

sentence therefore became final in April 2020. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a).

        Ransome filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on November 12, 2020.

See id. at § 9545(b)(1). Counsel was appointed, and filed a no-merit letter

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), along

with an application to withdraw from representation.

        The PCRA court sent a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice to Ransome informing

him the court had determined the issues raised in his PCRA petition were

without merit and that the court therefore intended to dismiss the petition

without a hearing. The court ultimately dismissed the petition and permitted

counsel to withdraw from representation in an order entered December 6,

2021.

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        Ransome filed a pro se notice of appeal, and appellate counsel was

appointed. Ransome complied with the PCRA court’s directive to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and raised the following two issues in the

statement:

          1. Did the [PCRA] court err in dismissing the PCRA Petition
             without a hearing, when [Ransome] established a prima
             facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging the
             following:(a) failing to move for a mistrial after the medical
             examin[er] was permitted to answer a hypothetical about
             actions of an “unconscious” person; (b) failing to request a
             jury instruction limiting the use of this hypothetical answer;
             (c) agreeing to answer a jury question regarding a
             “concussion” in the manner in which it was answered, when
             applicable law should have been provided, in a case where
             the claim was self-defense?

          2. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for filing a Finley no-merit
             letter where [Ransome] set up a prima facie case of
             ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his pro se petition,
             but rather than pursue those claims, failed to properly
             consult with [Ransome] and [chose] to find no merit in his
             claims without proper investigation?

Statement      of   Matters   Complained   of   On   Appeal,   6/17/2022,      at   1

(unpaginated).

        In its responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court first found that

trial counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial or request a cautionary instruction

after    the   medical   examiner   answered     a   hypothetical   question        on

unconsciousness had not prejudiced Ransome. In support, the PCRA court

noted that Ransome had not shown how this testimony undermined his self-

defense theory, which, according to the PCRA court, did not rely on Ransome’s

state of consciousness. In addition, the PCRA court found that the evidence of

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first-degree murder had been overwhelming: Ransome “carried the knife with

him, stabbed the decedent [21] times, and texted his girlfriend he ‘had had

enough of [the decedent].’” PCRA Court Opinion, 8/5/2022, at 6.

      As for Ransome’s third claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, which

seemed to challenge counsel’s agreement to a particular answer to a jury

question on the basis that the agreement violated “applicable law”, the PCRA

court essentially found that Ransome had waived the claim. The PCRA court

explained that Ransome wholly failed to develop his claim in that he did not

identify the jury’s question, the challenged answer or the applicable law to

which he was referring. See id. at 7.

      In his appellate brief, Ransome raises two issues that are, for all intents

and purposes, identically worded to the two he raised in his Rule 1925(b)

statement. So, in his first claim, he again asserts that trial counsel had been

ineffective in three ways: (1) for failing to ask for a mistrial after the medical

examiner answered a hypothetical about the “actions of an unconscious

person;” (2) for failing to ask for cautionary instructions limiting the use of

“this hypothetical answer;” and (3) for agreeing to an answer to a jury

question regarding a “concussion.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. He also once again

raises a second claim that PCRA counsel was ineffective for filing a Finley no-

merit letter without properly consulting Ransome and even though Ransome

had established a “prima facie case” of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.

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      Ransome’s entire argument section in support of these two claims

consists of nothing more than a brief general recitation of this Court’s standard

when reviewing the denial of PCRA petitions and the standard for

ineffectiveness claims, followed by the verbatim repetition of the two

questions he raised in the statement of the questions involved section of his

brief. That is the entirety of Ransome’s argument. In other words, Ransome’s

argument section does not, with the exception of the cursory nod to general

law which he in no way applies to his case, differ in any way from his statement

of questions involved section. They both simply list the questions on which

Ransome seeks review.

      The Commonwealth takes issue with this woefully undeveloped brief,

and argues that Ransome’s ineffectiveness claims are “fatally undeveloped.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. We agree.

      As for Ransome’s first claim challenging trial counsel’s representation,

the Commonwealth points out that Ransome’s “one-sentence analysis simply

restates his bare allegations [and] does not provide any supporting facts or

case law.” Id. For instance, Ransome broadly asserts in his first two

ineffectiveness claims that trial counsel should have asked for a mistrial or a

cautionary instruction after the medical examiner was allowed to answer a

hypothetical question on “unconsciousness.” Yet, Ransome does not identify

the medical examiner or the testimony of that medical examiner which he

believes to have been improper. See Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring appellants

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to follow particular points raised in their brief with pertinent discussion and

citation to pertinent authorities). Nor does he point to the place in the record

where the challenged testimony occurred, in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c). In

fact, Ransome does not provide any context for his claims at all.

      In addition, Ransome fails to provide any case law supporting his claims,

again in violation of Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). He does not even attempt to dispute

the PCRA court’s finding that he was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions

regarding the testimony of the medical examiner when answering the

hypothetical.

      Ransome also does not attempt to address the PCRA court’s finding that

his third ineffectiveness claim regarding trial counsel, that counsel was

ineffective for agreeing to an answer to a jury question about a “concussion,”

was too undeveloped to permit review. In his brief, Ransome fails to identify

the question or the answer at issue despite the PCRA court’s explicit

admonition in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that Ransome failed to do so below.

Nor does Ransome point to the place in the record where the jury question or

the allegedly improper answer occurred as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).

Likewise, Ransome does not identify the “applicable law” he claims counsel

should have provided, again despite the PCRA court’s explicit notation that he

failed to do this below.

      In the end, we agree with the Commonwealth that Ransome’s summary

and undeveloped claims challenging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are waived.

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Ransome does not provide any context at all for these claims, does not cite to

the places in the record where the challenged testimony or answer occurred,

and does not cite to any relevant authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and (c).

Simply put, Ransome fails to meaningfully develop his claims of trial counsel

ineffectiveness in such a way that would allow for our review.               They are

waived. See Commonwealth v. Rahman, 75 A.3d 497, 504 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted) (stating that if an appellate brief does not discuss a

claim with “citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any

other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived”).

      In addition to the glaring deficiencies in the brief, Ransome’s claims of

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are also waived as they were not included in his

PCRA petition. While Ransome did raise several claims of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness in a five-page handwritten attachment to his pro se petition,

those claims did not include the three he raises in this appeal. See Motion for

Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 11/12/2020, unpaginated attachment;

Finley Letter, 5/3/2021, at 3 (listing claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

raised in the pro se petition). Counsel filed a Finley no-merit letter, and not

an   amended    petition.   As   such,   the   three   claims   of   trial   counsel’s

ineffectiveness that Ransome presents in this appeal were not included in his

PCRA petition in the first instance, and they are waived for that reason as well.

See Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 691 (Pa. 2004) (stating

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that a claim that is not raised in a PCRA petition and instead is raised for the

first time on appeal is waived).

      Ransome does complain in his second issue that PCRA counsel was

ineffective for filing a Finley letter without properly consulting him and

investigating the claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. He does not specify

the ineffectiveness claims to which he is referring, and this is but one reason

we agree with the Commonwealth that this second claim is also waived for

lack of development. The Commonwealth explains:

            Although [Ransome’s] attorney makes no mention of it,
      Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021),
      allows a PCRA petitioner to “raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness at the first opportunity.” Such claims, however,
      must “provide more than mere ‘boilerplate assertions of PCRA
      counsel’s ineffectiveness.’” Id. at 402, quoting Commonwealth
      v. Hall, 872 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. 2005).

             Although [Ransome] here arguably has raised his claim of
      ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel at the first opportunity, it
      is fatally undeveloped. Considering the extreme brevity of the
      argument, his allegation hardly even rises to the level of a
      “boilerplate assertion” of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness (which
      itself would be insufficient to state a claim for relief under
      Bradley). [See] Appellant’s [Brief] at 8. [Ransome’s] PCRA
      appeal attorney fails to present any argument as to the merits of
      his claim beyond [his] two sentence pronouncement [which is
      merely a recitation of the second question of his statement of
      questions involved]. [Ransome] does not plead or offer to prove
      any of the prongs necessary to establish ineffective assistance.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-12. Ransome also does not elaborate in any way

on his bald claim that PCRA counsel failed to consult with him or investigate

the unidentified claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, nor does he cite any

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case law in support of the claim. The claim is waived. See Rahman, 75 A.3d

at 504.

     Even though Ransome’s claim regarding the Finley letter is waived, we

add that we also agree with the Commonwealth that PCRA counsel did comply

with the requirements of Turner and Finley. Again, we turn to the

Commonwealth’s explanation:

            PCRA Counsel complied with the requirements of [Turner
     and Finley]. Before PCRA counsel may be permitted by the court
     to withdraw, he must file a “no merit” letter: (1) detailing the
     nature and extent of the review; (2) listing each issue the
     petitioner wished to have review[ed]; and (3) explaining why the
     petitioner’s issues were meritless. PCRA counsel must also send
     the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no merit” letter; (2) a copy of
     counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation; and (3) a
     statement advising the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or
     by new counsel. …

            Here, PCRA counsel’s Finley letter stated that he read the
     pro se Petition, the Superior Court Opinion, [the PCRA court’s]
     Opinion … and the entire trial. Counsel stated that he considered
     all of [Ransome's] claims and conducted his own review of the
     case. Counsel also wrote [Ransome] seeking input on his
     petition[’s] claims but never received a response.

            Counsel concluded that [Ransome’s] claims lacked merit.
     Counsel noted that two of [Ransome’s] 10 claims were so general
     and boilerplate that he could not address the claims. He then
     proceeded to go through each of [Ransome’s] remaining 8 claims,
     explaining that they were generally boilerplate, stated no facts to
     support the allegations, included no citations to the record or
     supporting case law, and could not establish prejudice. PCRA
     counsel also included the letter he sent [Ransome] explaining that
     [Ransome’s] claims were meritless, that he had filed a Finley
     letter with the court (a copy of which he included), and advised
     him that should the PCRA court agree with his conclusions and
     dismiss the case, [Ransome] could appeal the decision pro se or
     with private counsel.

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Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-13 (citations and quotation marks omitted;

original second paragraph divided into two paragraphs).

      As noted above, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition and after

Ransome filed a pro se notice of appeal, he was appointed counsel for

purposes of appeal. Although appointed counsel now raises four claims for

our consideration on appeal, all of those claims, as discussed above, are

waived because they are not sufficiently developed. It cannot be the job of

this Court to act as an appellant’s advocate in such circumstances. See

Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating

that when an appellant’s brief fails to provide an argument as to each question

as required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure, it is not this Court’s obligation

to develop the argument for the appellant as it “places the Court in the

conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.”).

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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