Court Opinion

ID: 9628410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:19:59.579684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:00.138408
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — The statute the court is called upon to apply to this case, RCW 42.17.310(l)(d), reads as follows:
The following are exempt from public inspection and copying:
(d) Specific intelligence information and specific investigative records compiled by investigative, law enforcement, and penology agencies, and state agencies vested with the responsibility to discipline members of any profession, the nondisclosure of which is essential to effective law enforcement or for the protection of any person's right to privacy.
While I concur with the disposal of the privacy issue by the majority, I cannot accept its refusal to discuss whether *42the nondisclosure of the investigation report is "essential to effective law enforcement". I believe it is and thus dissent.
The majority disposes of the issue of whether nondisclosure would be "essential to effective law enforcement" in two sentences. First, the majority attempts to distinguish Cowles Pub'g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wn.2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988):
Unlike Cowles Pub'g, which was recently before us, no testimony was taken at the trial court level in this case and there is no finding by the trial court that nondisclosure is essential to effective law enforcement.
Majority, at 37.
The majority, at 35 quotes the controlling statute, RCW 42.17.330, which states:
The examination of any specific public record may be enjoined if, upon motion and affidavit, the superior court for the county in which the movant resides or in which the record is maintained, finds that such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions.
The matter was before the trial court and is before us solely on the affidavits, documents, and arguments of counsel. No testimony was taken. Under these circumstances, as the majority accurately states, "the appellate court stands in the same position as did the trial court in reviewing the record." (Footnote omitted.) Majority, at 36. Just as the trial court and this court may determine the question of privacy on the record presented, so can this court determine whether nondisclosure is "essential to effective law enforcement". The failure of the trial court even to mention this issue does not bar our addressing the issue. In addition, it should be noted the trial court, in its discussion of the statute, did not have the benefit of our opinion in Cowles.
The majority then negates the need to address the "essential to effective law enforcement" issue in another sentence:
*43The agency's decision to voluntarily turn over these records, made as it was by the law enforcement agency which itself prepared the records, convinces us in this case that the nondisclosure of the records is not essential to effective law enforcement.
Majority, at 37. The majority assumes only the effectiveness of the law enforcement agency which prepares the records, here the Liquor Control Board, is protected by RCW 42.17.310(l)(d). The majority fails to consider whether nondisclosure is essential to effective law enforcement of the Spokane Police Department.
This case is controlled by Cowles Pub'g Co. v. State Patrol, 109 Wn.2d 712, 748 P.2d 597 (1988). In Cowles, we held "the confidentiality of the names of persons reflected on the records of internal investigations is necessary to effective law enforcement." Cowles, at 733. In Cowles, the issue was whether the Spokane Police Department could be required, pursuant to the public disclosure act, RCW 42.17, to release all internal investigation records pertaining to citizens' complaints against police officers. One of the reasons for the nondisclosure in Cowles was:
Unlike a criminal defendant, an officer subject to internal investigation must give a statement regarding an incident under investigation, and failure to cooperate with the internal investigations unit could lead to dismissal.
Cowles, at 730. Accordingly, there are a number of facts, not mentioned by the majority, which I believe are essential to reaching a decision.
1. In a memorandum of November 6, 1986, R.D. Panther, Chief of the Spokane Police Department, directed all members of the Spokane Police Department "to cooperate with the [Liquor Control] Board's investigation [of the Spokane Police Guild Club] pursuant to department Rule 3.27.3." This rule states: "Members shall cooperate with all agencies engaged in the administration of criminal justice and other public agencies ..." Chief Panther ended his memorandum by stating: "Any member who fails to comply with this *44or any other rule will be subject to appropriate disciplinary sanctions."
2. Four of the five officers interviewed by the Liquor Control Board — and this was undisputed — stated they were ordered by their employer, the Spokane Police Department, to answer all questions of the Board's investigation. All officers stated they were given assurances of confidentiality. Although this is disputed by the Board and the trial court found the issue of promises or agreement that the officers' statements would be held confidential to be disputed, there is no dispute that the investigatory files were marked "Confidential" by the Liquor Control Board.
3. The affidavit by the .Assistant Chief of the Spokane Police Department, Richard A. Jorgenson, who was authorized to speak on behalf of the Spokane Police Department, is undisputed. I quote from this affidavit extensively because of its importance to the case:
1. The officers' activities had already been thoroughly investigated by the Internal Affairs Unit of the Spokane Police Department; numerous letters of reprimand and several suspensions were issued as a result.
2. The officers did not give voluntary statements to the Board; their statements were compelled by virtue of a Spokane Police Department rule and a special order of Chief of Police Robert Panther. See Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth.
3. The names of the officers involved have not been disclosed through other potential resources.
4. There will not be a public hearing over the incident in question because the Board and licensee have agreed upon a penalty.
5. This investigation focused on the Club, not the officers.
6. The officers believed their identities would remain confidential at this stage.
7. The confidentiality of the witnesses was critical to the investigator, Marion Berry — she would probably not have received much information without assuring the officers of confidentiality.
*45I consider the fact that the officers' statements were compelled to be very significant. No other citizen is compelled to talk about off-duty activity as these officers were. If they violated the rule or order (Exhibit B) they could be punished for insubordination, including termination of employment. The written order was requested by the Washington State Liquor Control Board investigator because she anticipated, and received, great reluctance on the part of the officers to talk to her. Officers refused to talk to her until they were ordered to. Their compelled statements, which were generated during an investigation of the licensee's activity, [are] now being used as a sword against them by the newspapers. It will be extremely difficult for me and other law enforcement commanders to order officers to give statements and cooperate with other agencies when those statements are used for purposes other than law enforcement.
As stated by Assistant Chief Jorgenson, "numerous letters of reprimand and several suspensions were issued as a result" of an investigation of the officers' activities by the internal affairs division of the Spokane Police Department. Given our recent opinion in Cowles, it seems clear that if the statements by the officers in question had been made in an internal investigation, they would have been held confidential under RCW 42.17.310(l)(d).
If these investigations may be kept confidential, consistent with effective law enforcement by the Spokane Police Department, it hardly makes sense for this same confidentiality to be breached essentially through the back door by the release of the information by another law enforcement agency. To use the words in a memorandum of the City Attorney for Spokane:
Clearly, the Board's file in this matter constitutes "specific investigative records [compiled] by [an] investigative [or] law enforcement" agency as defined by the statute. Ashley v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 16 Wn. App. 830, 560 P.2d 1156 [(1977)]. Nondisclosure of the officers' identities is essential to effective law enforcement for various reasons.
*46First, the officers were compelled to give their statements; they were not voluntary. In effect, they were compelled to blow the whistle on themselves to another agency. To publish their statements under the circumstances of this case is totally unfair to the individuals and constitutes an abuse of a compelled statement. If their identities are disclosed with their statements, the Spokane Police Department rule and the Chiefs order to cooperate with the Board constitutes nothing less than an order to the officer to sit down with and tell all to a newspaper reporter. This is contrary to the intent of the rule, which is to ensure that the law enforcement agencies that need certain information get it in the most efficient manner possible. Disclosure in this case will discourage officers from complying in the future. The officer's reward for compliance is wholesale embarrassment. The effect is to put law enforcement agencies in the position of not being able to compel their employees to give statements to other agencies.
Disclosure is also extremely unfair and unsettling to the officer because of the promises of confidentiality, as discussed in plaintiffs' brief. It is important to consider that the Board was not investigating the officers — it was investigating the Club. This factor ties into both the privacy issue and the "essential to effective law enforcement" issue. The problems of lowered morale and higher stress levels among the officers are real problems for police administrators to deal with. It is essential that officers have the ability to think clearly and use proper judgment at all times. Low morale and high stress levels reduce that ability and interfere with the discipline and motivation within the organization.
By affidavit, the City Attorney stated that: "Release of this information, under the circumstances presented by this case, will cause substantial and irreparable damage to the Spokane Police Department's ability to operate as a law enforcement agency, which is a vital governmental function." I find this reasoning compelling. Furthermore, this affidavit is uncontroverted.
Although I strongly dissented in Cowles (see Cowles, at 734 (Dolliver, J., dissenting)), it is now the rule in this state. Cowles held compelled officer statements given in an *47internal police investigation were exempt from disclosure as essential to effective law enforcement. To refuse to extend this analysis and exempt compelled officer statements given in an internal investigation by another law enforcement agency makes little sense. It places the court in the position of appearing to play a game when dealing with these police officers' statutory rights. I would reverse the trial court and order the Liquor Control Board files under consideration here are exempt from disclosure under RCW 42.17-,310(l)(d).
I dissent.
Callow, C.J., and Pearson, J., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied April 14, 1989.