Court Opinion

ID: 9365563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 16:00:42.450887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.235043
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-1335     Document: 010110802261          Date Filed: 01/24/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                         PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            January 24, 2023

                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                              Clerk of Court
                          _______________________________________

  REBECCA BRIGHAM,

         Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 21-1335

  FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.,

         Defendant - Appellee.

                     ___________________________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of Colorado
                   (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-03417-WJM-STV)
                          ___________________________________________

 John R. Crone, Law Office of John R. Crone, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for
 Plaintiff-Appellant.

 David Charles Gartenberg (Danielle L. Kitson and Carolyn Bailey Theis with
 him on the briefs), Littler Mendelson, L.L.P., Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
 Appellee.
                      __________________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, MCHUGH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
              ___________________________________________

       This case involves claims brought by Rebecca Brigham, who worked

 as a flight attendant for Frontier Airlines. Ms. Brigham was a recovering

 alcoholic who wanted to avoid overnight layovers because they tempted her
Appellate Case: 21-1335   Document: 010110802261   Date Filed: 01/24/2023   Page: 2

 to drink. To minimize overnight layovers, Ms. Brigham asked Frontier

 (1) to excuse her from the airline’s bidding system for flight schedules or

 (2) to reassign her to the General Office. Frontier rejected both requests.

       Unable to bypass the bidding system or move to the General Office,

 Ms. Brigham missed too many assigned flights and Frontier fired her. The

 firing led Ms. Brigham to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

       We address two main issues:

       1.     Relief from Frontier’s Bidding System. The first issue
              involves Ms. Brigham’s request to bypass the bidding system
              for flight schedules. The bidding system was required under
              Frontier’s collective bargaining agreement with the flight
              attendants’ union. Under the collective bargaining agreement,
              Frontier assigned initial schedules through a bidding system.
              After bidding, all active flight attendants had a limited
              opportunity to swap from a pool of flights that would otherwise
              go to flight attendants serving in reserve. Ms. Brigham asked
              Frontier to excuse her from the bidding system, allowing her to
              pick her flights from the pool without the limitations placed on
              swaps.

              Would this accommodation have been plausibly reasonable
              even though it would have violated the collective bargaining
              agreement and freed Ms. Brigham from limitations imposed on
              every other active flight attendant? We answer no, concluding
              that this accommodation would not have been plausibly
              reasonable.

       2.     Reassignment to the General Office. Ms. Brigham also
              requested temporary reassignment to the General Office.
              Reassignment might have been necessary if a vacancy existed.
              A position would be considered vacant only if it had been
              reasonably available to similarly situated non-disabled
              employees. But the General Office was available for
              reassignment only if an employee had been injured on the job,
              and Ms. Brigham hadn’t suffered an injury on the job.

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              Was the General Office vacant for Ms. Brigham? We answer no
              because Ms. Brigham wasn’t similarly situated to the
              employees eligible for reassignment to the General Office.

 1.    Frontier fired Ms. Brigham after she missed too many days.

       As a Frontier flight attendant, Ms. Brigham needed to comply with a

 collective bargaining agreement and an attendance policy.

       Under the collective bargaining agreement, each active flight

 attendant had to bid on flights. Once flight attendants submitted their bids,

 Frontier assigned flights based on seniority. After bidding closed, Frontier

 assigned the initial schedules and allowed flight attendants to swap for

 unassigned flights through a system called “Open Time.” 1 After the swaps,

 however, each full-time flight attendant had to end up with at least 60

 monthly hours.

       Active flight attendants also needed to comply with Frontier’s

 attendance policy. Under this policy, Frontier treated a sick call as an

 “occurrence” and a no-show as two “occurrences.” Employees could be

 fired if they had at least eight occurrences within a twelve-month period.

       Ms. Brigham accrued at least eight occurrences within a twelve-

 month period, and Frontier fired her. She complains that many of the

 occurrences resulted from her inability to bypass the bidding system or

 move to the General Office.

 1
      Flight attendants could also swap flights through a system called the
 “Trade Board.”
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 2.    We conduct de novo review based on the summary-judgment
       standard.

       The district court granted summary judgment to Frontier, and we

 conduct de novo review based on the same standard that applied in district

 court. SEC v. GenAudio Inc., 32 F.4th 902, 920 (10th Cir. 2022). Under

 this standard, the district court must view the evidence and draw all

 reasonable inferences favorably to Ms. Brigham. See Anderson v. Liberty

 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The district court could grant

 summary judgment to Frontier only in the absence of a genuine dispute of

 material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

 3.    Ms. Brigham’s proposed accommodations weren’t plausibly
       reasonable.

       An employer can incur liability under the Americans with

 Disabilities Act for failing to accommodate an employee’s disability. 42

 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Under the Act, the employee must request a

 “plausibly reasonable accommodation.” Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d

 1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017).

       Ms. Brigham requested accommodations, and we must consider

 whether a factfinder could view them as plausibly reasonable. That inquiry

 entails a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 1050–51.

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       A.     Ms. Brigham’s request to bypass the bidding system wasn’t
              plausibly reasonable.

       Ms. Brigham asked Frontier if she could bypass the bidding system

 and build her schedule from scratch through Open Time. This request

 wasn’t plausibly reasonable because it would have

             required Frontier to violate the collective bargaining agreement
              and

             interfered with the rights of other employees.

 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977)

 (concluding that “the duty to accommodate” doesn’t require an employer to

 “take steps inconsistent with” a collective bargaining agreement); see also

 Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998)

 (concluding that an employee’s request for a transfer was not reasonable

 because “it would have violated the seniority provisions of the collective

 bargaining agreement,” which was “not required by the [Americans with

 Disabilities Act]”).

       Though Ms. Brigham’s request would have violated the collective

 bargaining agreement, Ms. Brigham argues that she would only be taking

 flights that no one else wanted. 2 She bases this argument on the availability

 2
       Ms. Brigham’s argument assumes that Frontier had to provide an
 accommodation in violation of the collective bargaining agreement in the
 absence of prejudice to an employee with greater seniority. The Sixth
 Circuit rejected a similar argument when violation of the collective
 bargaining agreement would have affected only a more junior employee.
 Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 285 F.3d 508, 518–19 (6th Cir.
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 of unbid flights in Open Time. Those unbid flights opened up only after

 active flight attendants had obtained their initial schedules through the

 bidding system. After bidding closed, flight attendants could adjust their

 schedules by swapping for other flights available in Open Time.

       Given the opportunity to swap through Open Time, the union

 representative urged Frontier to accommodate Ms. Brigham’s request

 through the scheduling system mandated in the collective bargaining

 agreement. But the union representative opposed any violation of the

 collective bargaining agreement itself. 3

 2002). We need not address Ms. Brigham’s assumption because her desired
 accommodation would disrupt the seniority-based scheduling system
 created by the collective bargaining agreement.
 3
       The union representative expressed this opposition in her declaration.
 Ms. Brigham argues that the declaration conflicted with the union
 representative’s deposition testimony, but we see no conflict. In her
 declaration, the union representative stated that the union had asked for an
 accommodation “within the seniority provision” in the collective
 bargaining agreement, allowing Ms. Brigham “to bid for shifts within her
 existing seniority to avoid layovers as much as possible” and trade, swap,
 or drop “shifts in compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.”
 Appellant’s App’x vol. 5, at 1220. In her deposition, the union
 representative testified that she’d never intended an accommodation that
 would excuse Ms. Brigham from the bidding system:

       Q.     Okay. And you say here that you proposed that you work within
              that Collective Bargaining Agreement; is that correct?

       A.     Correct.

       Q.     Did you ever intend that any accommodation for Rebecca
              Brigham would violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement?

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       The union representative appeared to propose the same thing that

 Frontier was already providing: Ms. Brigham could bid on flights, receive

 an initial schedule, and swap flights through Open Time. But Ms. Brigham

 wanted to bypass the entire bidding system. 4

       A.      No.

       Q.      Did you ever intend that Ms. Brigham should be excused from
               the requirement that she bid like every other flight attendant?

       A.      No, I did not intend.

       Q.      Did you ever intend that she be excused from the requirement
               that in the bidding process she hold 45 hours just like everyone
               else?

       * * *

       A.      No.

       Q.      So it was your intention, on behalf of the union, that she had
               comply with those rules, correct?

       A.      Correct.

       Q.      Okay. And it was your intention, on behalf of the union, that
               she not be allowed to get any benefit that someone more senior
               to her did not get, correct?

       A.      Correct.

 Appellant’s App’x vol. 5, at 1236.
 4
        Though flight attendants had to work at least 60 hours each month to
 keep full-time status, Ms. Brigham suggested in oral argument that she
 might benefit from a chance to dip below the minimum. But she had
 testified that she had wanted to stay full-time, and her appellate briefs
 hadn’t suggested a desire to become part-time. So we decline to address
 Ms. Brigham’s new suggestion at oral argument.
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       Frontier argues that if Ms. Brigham were to bypass the bidding

 system, she’d be taking options from flight attendants with greater

 seniority. Ms. Brigham responds that she’d be taking only the options that

 no one had picked during the bidding process. But this response suggests

 that Ms. Brigham could already select those flights in the bidding process.

 Given the alleged availability of these flights under the status quo,

 Ms. Brigham couldn’t explain at oral argument how her requested

 accommodation would provide a benefit over the status quo. See Burch v.

 Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314 (5th Cir. 1997) (“In all cases a

 reasonable accommodation will involve a change in the status quo, for it is

 the status quo that presents the very obstacle that [the Americans with

 Disability Act’s] reasonable recommendation provision attempts to

 address.”).

       In fact, exemption from the bidding process would have benefited

 Ms. Brigham by freeing her from Frontier’s limitations on the use of Open

 Time. For example, Frontier pointed out at oral argument that every full-

 time flight attendant had to bid at least 60 hours and keep at least 45 hours

 during the Open Time period. So Ms. Brigham’s participation in the

 bidding system limited her ability to swap flights. An exemption from the

 bidding process would free Ms. Brigham from these limitations and allow

 her to grab 60 hours of flights out of Open Time. This expansion of

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 Ms. Brigham’s options could have diminished the options available to

 other flight attendants.

       Exemption from the bidding process would also have freed

 Ms. Brigham from Frontier’s limitations on the swaps themselves. These

 limitations didn’t exist when Frontier had enough flight attendants

 available on reserve. When Frontier had enough reserve flight attendants,

 anyone could trade an assigned multi-day trip for multiple one-day trips

 posted in Open Time. But when there weren’t enough reserve flight

 attendants, Frontier limited swaps so that flight attendants could only swap

 for trips of the same duration. For instance, a flight attendant could swap a

 three-day trip only for another trip that lasted three days; the flight

 attendant couldn’t replace a three-day trip with three single-day trips.

       This restriction existed throughout the pertinent time-period because

 Frontier didn’t have enough flight attendants on reserve. This restriction

 prevented Ms. Brigham and many other active flight attendants from

 trading in Open Time for single-day trips.

       Ms. Brigham’s requested accommodation would have freed her from

 the restriction on swaps that applied to every other active flight attendant.

 Frontier did not need to give Ms. Brigham this singular advantage over

 every other active flight attendant.

       Ms. Brigham argues that even though the accommodation would have

 violated the collective bargaining agreement, she would not be taking

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  flights away from more senior flight attendants. But this argument is

  unsupported, for Ms. Brigham acknowledged in her testimony that the

  senior flight attendants would usually win the bids for single-day trips.

        Granted, seniority didn’t entitle anyone to the flights in Open Time

  because they were first-come, first-serve. But when Frontier was

  understaffed, as it was during the relevant time-period, seniority provided

  flight attendants with greater flexibility in swapping for flights posted in

  Open Time. Because bids for the single-day trips usually went to the senior

  flight attendants, they were usually the only individuals who could swap in

  Open Time for other single-day trips. If Ms. Brigham could build her

  schedule from scratch in Open Time, she could have taken those flights and

  limited the options for more senior flight attendants.

        Ms. Brigham points out that senior flight attendants had no

  contractual right to the options available in Open Time. But the bidding

  system itself rewarded flight attendants with greater seniority. So the most

  senior flight attendants could reasonably expect the greatest flexibility for

  swaps.

        By freeing Ms. Brigham from the limitations on swaps, her requested

  accommodation would have disrupted the legitimate expectations of other

  employees relying on the collective bargaining agreement. See Boersig v.

  Union Elec. Co., 219 F.3d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 2000) (classifying an

  accommodation as unreasonable because it would “disrupt a carefully

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  negotiated agreement between union and employer at the expense of other

  union employees who hold legitimate expectations . . . based on the

  governing [collective bargaining agreement]”); see also Trans World, Inc.

  v. Hardison, 423 U.S. 63, 78, 81 (1977) (treating a requested scheduling

  modification as unreasonable in part because it would have interfered with

  a system that gave a preference to senior employees for requested days

  off). It would be unreasonable to require Frontier to give Ms. Brigham

  greater flexibility for swaps at the expense of flight attendants with greater

  seniority. 5 See Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 337–39 (8th Cir.

  1992) (concluding that an employer was not required to accommodate an

  employee’s schedule by freeing the employee from a seniority-based shift-

  bidding system combined with a first-come-first-serve procedure for

  requesting days off).

        Ms. Brigham points out that some flight attendants could already

  bypass the bidding system. But those flight attendants were inactive during

  5
         It might be different if Frontier hadn’t consistently and uniformly
  required every active flight attendant to participate in the bidding system.
  See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002) (stating that a
  “[p]laintiff might show that the system already contains exceptions such
  that, in the circumstances, one further exception is unlikely to matter”).
  But Ms. Brigham doesn’t question the consistency or uniformity of
  Frontier’s adherence to the bidding system.

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  the bidding. 6 Their inactive status triggered a separate provision of the

  collective bargaining agreement, which allowed flight attendants returning

  from inactive status to build their schedules out of Open Time. That

  provision didn’t apply to Ms. Brigham because her status was active—not

  inactive.

                                       * * *

        Though Ms. Brigham was entitled to an accommodation if it was

  plausibly reasonable, Frontier didn’t need to violate the collective

  bargaining agreement by allowing Ms. Brigham to take options away from

  flight attendants with greater seniority. So Ms. Brigham’s request to

  bypass the bidding system was not plausibly reasonable.

        B.    Temporary reassignment to the General Office was not
              plausibly reasonable because no vacancy existed for
              similarly situated employees.

        Ms. Brigham requested not only a chance to avoid the bidding system

  but also a temporary assignment in the General Office. Under the

  collective bargaining agreement, Frontier allowed flight attendants with

  on-the-job injuries to perform light-duty work in the General Office.

        Frontier may have needed to reassign Ms. Brigham if a vacancy

  existed in the General Office. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d

  6     The collective bargaining agreement defined “inactive” flight
  attendants as those who were on continuous, approved leave during a
  monthly bidding period.
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  1154, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (discussing the scope of the

  reassignment duty); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (defining

  “reasonable accommodation” in the Americans with Disabilities Act to

  include “reassignment to a vacant position”). Without a vacancy, Frontier

  wouldn’t need to create a new position for Ms. Brigham. See Duvall v.

  Georgia-Pac. Consumer Prods., L.P., 607 F.3d 1255, 1261–63 (10th Cir.

  2010).

        The parties disagree on whether a vacancy existed in the General

  Office. We’ve held that “a position is ‘vacant’ with respect to a disabled

  employee for the purposes of the [Americans with Disabilities Act] if it

  would be available for a similarly-situated non-disabled employee to apply

  for and obtain.” Id. at 1262; see Koessel v. Sublett Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t,

  717 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2013) (“A position is vacant when a similarly

  situated, non-disabled employee would be able to apply for it.”).

        Under this definition, Frontier had no vacancy in the General Office.

  A position in the General Office was available only for employees injured

  on-the-job. Ms. Brigham had no on-the-job injury, so she wasn’t similarly

  situated to the flight attendants eligible for reassignment to the General

  Office.

        A similar situation arose in Duvall v. Georgia-Pacific Consumer

  Products, L.P., 607 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2010). There the plaintiff worked

  at a paper mill and requested reassignment because he had a preexisting

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  condition that worsened with exposure to paper dust. Id. at 1257–58. The

  plaintiff asked to work in another area that had less paper dust. Id. at 1257.

  But in that area, the paper mill used only temporary workers. Id. at 1264.

  So the paper mill declined to reassign the plaintiff, and we rejected

  liability based on the absence of a vacancy in the preferred area. Id. at

  1264. Though work there was available to temporary workers, no jobs

  existed there for permanent employees (like the plaintiff). So the paper

  mill had no vacancy in the plaintiff’s preferred area. Id. 7

        The same thing took place here. Frontier gave injured employees a

  chance to work in the General Office. But Frontier had no vacancy in the

  General Office for uninjured flight attendants like Ms. Brigham, just as the

  Duvall paper mill had no vacancy in the preferred area for permanent

  employees.

  7
        Ms. Brigham points to the Equal Employment Opportunity
  Commission’s guidance, arguing that it requires an employer to consider
  reassigning disabled employees lacking on-the-job injuries to light-duty
  positions typically reserved for employees with occupational injuries.
  EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers’ Compensation and the ADA ¶ 28,
  available at https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/enforcement-guidance-
  workers-compensation-and-ada). Typically, we might consider this
  guidance based on the EEOC’s experience and informed judgment.
  Richardson v. Chi. Transit Auth., 926 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2019). But
  the EEOC’s interpretive guidance “does not carry the force of law and is
  not entitled to any special deference.” Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300,
  1305 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999). Despite the EEOC’s interpretive guidance, we
  must follow our precedent in Duvall.
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  4.    Failure to engage in the interactive process is not independently
        actionable.

        When an employee requests an accommodation for a qualifying

  disability, the Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to

  participate in an “interactive process” with the employee to determine a

  mutually suitable accommodation. Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1007

  (10th Cir. 2020). Ms. Brigham claims that Frontier violated the Act by

  failing to engage in an interactive process.

        But the failure to engage in the interactive process is not

  independently actionable under the Act. See Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900

  F.3d 1166, 1207 n.29 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[O]ur case law is clear that an

  employee cannot maintain a failure to accommodate claim based solely on

  an employee’s failure to engage in the interactive process.”); accord

  McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., Inc., 583 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir.

  2009) (“[F]ailure to engage in an interactive process does not form the

  basis of an [Americans with Disabilities Act] claim . . . .”); Fjellestad v.

  Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[T]here is no

  per se liability under the [Americans with Disabilities Act] if an employer

  fails to engage in an interactive process . . . .”). So Frontier can’t incur

  liability solely for a failure to engage in the interactive process.

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  5.    Ms. Brigham’s claims of retaliation and discrimination fail as a
        matter of law.

        The Act also prohibits both discrimination against disabled

  employees and retaliation for opposing discrimination. 42 U.S.C.

  §§ 12112(a) (discrimination), 12203(a) (retaliation); Anderson v. Coors

  Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). Ms. Brigham asserts

  both kinds of claims.

        For both claims, Ms. Brigham’s prima facie case required a threshold

  showing of causation. On the discrimination claim, she needed to show

  discrimination “because of her disability.” Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d

  995, 1014 (10th Cir. 2020). And on the retaliation claim, she needed to

  show a causal link between the firing and her engagement in a protected

  activity. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir.

  1999).

        Both claims turn on the reason for her firing. Frontier attributed the

  firing to Ms. Brigham’s absences. In our view, her failure to provide

  advance notice prevented a genuine dispute of material fact on causation.

        In the briefing on summary judgment, Ms. Brigham admitted

             that during the pertinent time-period, Frontier’s policy allowed
              eight “occurrences” within a twelve-month period and

             that she had more than eight “occurrences” within the
              preceding twelve months.

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  Appellant’s App’x vol. 2, at 467 ¶ 65; Appellant’s App’x vol. 5, at 1200 ¶

  65. She argues that she missed her assigned flights only because she

  needed to avoid overnight layovers. But she still accrued those absences.

        Ms. Brigham also argues that she qualified for monthly intermittent

  leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. But for this form of leave,

  Frontier required advance notice.

        When Ms. Brigham had otherwise used up her eight “occurrences”

  within a twelve-month period, she requested four more days of intermittent

  leave. But she didn’t ask for leave until the second day of a four-day trip,

  and she had already missed the first day of the trip. She explained that

  she’d forgotten to request the leave earlier. Whatever her reason, though,

  Frontier denied the request because she hadn’t asked in advance. And

  Ms. Brigham doesn’t question Frontier’s right to deny that request. See 29

  C.F.R. § 825.303(c) (“When the need for leave is not foreseeable, an

  employee must comply with the employer’s usual and customary notice and

  procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual

  circumstances.”).

        Given the undisputed evidence, Ms. Brigham incurred too many

  occurrences, which subjected her to firing. And she lacks any evidence that

  Frontier had used these occurrences as a pretext to discriminate or

  retaliate.

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  6.    Frontier has a right to seal the supplemental appendix.

        Frontier has moved to seal the supplemental appendix, which

  contains a list of accommodations requested by current and former

  employees.

        The common law provides that judicial documents are presumptively

  available to the public, but these documents may be sealed “if the right to

  access is outweighed by the interests favoring nondisclosure.” 8 United

  States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811 (10th Cir. 1997). The party seeking

  nondisclosure faces a “‘heavy’” burden; “sealing is appropriate only when

  the interest in confidentiality is ‘real and substantial.’” McWilliams v.

  DiNapoli, 40 F.4th 1118, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Helm v.

  Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)). In our view, Frontier has

  met this burden. 9

        A party seeking to seal a judicial document must (1) explain why the

  confidential information cannot reasonably be redacted and (2) articulate a

  8
        The parties haven’t briefed the existence of a constitutional right to
  access documents in the supplemental appendix.
  9
         In district court, Ms. Brigham filed the list under seal. But she can
  still object here to the sealing. McWilliams v. DiNapoli, 40 F.4th 1118,
  1131 (10th Cir. 2022). After all, the right to access judicial documents
  belongs to the public rather than the parties. Id.; accord Rudd Equip. Co. v.
  John Deere Const. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 595 (6th Cir. 2016)
  (concluding that a party could not waive the public’s common law right to
  access court filings).

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  substantial interest that justifies depriving the public of access. 10th Cir.

  R. 25.6. The list in the supplemental index contains confidential

  information about employees’ names, medical diagnoses, discipline

  records, retirement plans, and severance payouts. Given the nature of this

  information, the privacy interests outweigh the public’s right to access and

  redactions would largely nullify the value of the list.

          Because Frontier has satisfied its burden, we grant the motion to

  seal.

  7.      Conclusion

          We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary

  judgment to Frontier, and we grant Frontier’s motion to seal the

  supplemental appendix.

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