Court Opinion

ID: 5173536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-02 05:14:04.994567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:59.319988
License: Public Domain

The case which the Court does not deign to review is procedurally strikingly similar to Harvey v. F.B. Truck LineCompany and Charles MacGuinnis, 115 Idaho — , 767 P.2d 254
(1987), presently pending in this Court on a petition for rehearing. This Court's opinion issued in July of 1987 and at this time is found only in 87 ISCR 1239. The similarity mentioned is found by going to the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Shepard in Harvey, and in particular his discussion therein of the Mann case, Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,518 P.2d 1194 (1974). Mann was a personal injury case wherein the plaintiff's verdict was set aside on defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. In Harvey, too, it was the defendant's verdict which was set aside. In the case we are asked to review here, the jury's verdict was for the defendant by reason of an assessment of equal 50 percent causal negligence to plaintiff and to defendant. There followed plaintiff's motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to substantiate finding of any plaintiff negligence.
In a well-reasoned memorandum decision, appended hereto, the trial judge set aside the verdict and ruled that the defendant's evidence was not substantial enough to justify the jury in assessing any negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
On defendant's appeal the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, and decided by opinion dated July 31, 1987, and by a substitute opinion dated January 28, 1988, 113 Idaho 887,749 P.2d 1012 (Ct.App. 1988). The Court of Appeals in both opinions cited and looked to Mann for guidance on the validity of the trial court's ruling, "All that is required is that the evidence be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the jury's verdict was proper." Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 95 Idaho at 736,518 P.2d at 1198. (Emphasis in original.)
So far, so good.
Notwithstanding that the plaintiff's case was established by direct evidence presented at trial, the Court of Appeals, in making its review of the record on the correct premise that it "will draw all inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to Praegitzer (defendant)," proceeded to allocate to her inferences that her speed was 20 to 25 m.p.h., her vision was impaired by sunlight, and she did not accelerate or veer toward plaintiff [whom she never admitted seeing until just prior to impact], upon which slender reeds it further presumed or assumed as follows, and to my own singular amazement:
 From this evidence it is legitimate to infer that Smith misjudged the distance of Praegitzer's vehicle. Further, it is reasonable to infer that Smith acted improperly by failing to remain vigilant in assessing the hazard of an approaching vehicle. Based on these *Page 148 
determinations, the jury could have found that Smith failed to yield the right-of-way to a vehicle which posed a threat of imminent danger. 113 Idaho at 890, 749 P.2d at 1015. (Emphasis added.)
While there certainly is some Idaho case-law which holds that the non-moving party is given the benefit of a favorable interpretation and application of the evidence, and inferences which can be legitimately drawn therefrom, I am presently unaware of any cases which authorize the drawing of adverse inferencesagainst the moving party's evidence. If there is such a case, it should be brought forth and summarily executed. Be that as it may, here it is readily concluded that it was only under that sort of hypothesis that the Court of Appeals could rule:
 Based on our review of the evidence we cannot agree with the district judge that reasonable jurors, given the evidence and instructions we have described, could only have concluded that Praegitzer was one hundred percent at fault. A conclusion that Smith was also negligent is reasonable and is supported by substantial and competent evidence. We hold that reasonable minds could conclude that the jury's verdict was proper. 113 Idaho at 890-91, 749 P.2d at 1015-16.
As appears to this humble jurist, the impermissible inference drawn against Smith's evidence were facilely converted into evidence.
Time constraints do not allow me to write a decision solemente
purporting to decide upon the merits of the decision of the Court of Appeals. The decision which this Court is required to make, however, is whether to grant review in order that the merits should be reached after further briefing by the parties. The inquiry here narrows down to deciding whether well-established case law is at risk of becoming confused if the Court of Appeals' opinion is left to stand, which in my view readily seems so simply by weighing into the equation the excerpts from Mann which the Chief Justice utilized in his Harvey dissent:
 In my opinion, Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 518 P.2d 1194 (1974) is the seminal case regarding the duties of a trial court when faced with a motion for a judgment n.o.v. In Mann, the Court, per Donaldson, J., reviewed the different tests found in earlier opinions of the Court, and ". . . concluded that the proper test . . . is, a motion for judgment n.o.v. should not be granted when there is substantial competent evidence to support the verdict of the jury." The Court in Mann, 95 Idaho at 736, 518 P.2d at 1198, continued:
 By substantial, it is not meant that the evidence need be uncontradicted. All that is required is that the evidence be of such sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was proper. It is not necessary that the evidence be of such quantity or quality that reasonable minds must conclude, only that they could conclude. Therefore, if the evidence is so weak that reasonable minds could not reach the same conclusion the jury has, the motion for judgment n.o.v. is properly granted.
Mann has been approved, followed and applied in Hibbler v.Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007, 712 P.2d 708 (Ct.App. 1985); Brand SCorporation v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 639 P.2d 429 (1981); andSmith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 561 P.2d 1299
(1977).
 * * * * * *
As stated by the trial court, and also by the majority opinion, there was no direct evidence that MacGuinnis switched trailers. As indicated, MacGuinnis testified as to his actions from the time he picked up the Montgomery trailer until the time of the accident, and no switching of trailers was indicated in that testimony. Hence, the argument that the trailers were switched rests on no evidence, substantial or otherwise, but rather only on an inference which arises from the testimony of two witnesses, each identifying the trailer as being of a different manufacturer. Judge Durtschi identified that inference as resting on "the slender thread of an uncorroborated assumption," *Page 149 
and "pure speculation as to the circumstances and reason for the switching." As correctly quoted by the majority, Judge Durtschi stated:
 The record is totally silent as to why the supposed two switches were made, when they were made, where they were made, or where the phantom trailmobile trailer came from or what happened to it. It seemingly appeared at the Stinker Station from nowhere and thereafter disappeared, never to be seen again so far as this trial record is concerned.
The trial judge then stated: "Hence, I conclude that the jury's finding in answer to question no. 3 is not supported by substantial evidence and is in fact contrary to the great weight of the evidence."
 Hence, I would hold that the trial judge utilized the correct standard in ruling upon the motion for judgment n.o.v., i.e., that the jury's finding was not supported by substantial evidence as set forth in Mann v. Safeway, supra, and its progeny. 87 ISCR 1255, 1256.
As is well pointed out in the plaintiff's brief, appended hereto, filed in support of its petition for review, there is good reason to wonder after today how Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441,599 P.2d 1012 (1979) can co-exist with the Court of Appeals opinion in Smith v. Praegitzer. In Owen, the driver defendant wife testified to her belief that her vehicle tires had not crossed a groove two and one-half feet from the edge of the pavement prior to impact with the defendant's bicycle. In resisting a plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, she requested that the truth of her belief must be assumed and she wanted to attach an inference therefrom that her vehicle could not have struck the decedent Randall Owen if he, in fact, were riding as near the right side of the roadway as practicable. The Court reasoned as follows:
 There is no sure way to distinguish between a legitimate inference to which a party is entitled and an unreasonable one to which he is not entitled. (cites omitted.) It is well established that an inference would be unreasonable if it would permit a jury to base its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture. (cites omitted.) Here, the inference sought by appellants would permit a jury to indulge in speculation and conjecture. Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d 1012, 1019.
This Court, in rejecting the plaintiff's petition for review should be extremely aware that in the Owen case there was no eyewitness, whereas in this case there was an independenteyewitness who testified at trial.
The serious problem which arises when review of a Court of Appeals' opinion is sought and denied is that the trial bench and bar will quite naturally see the denial as tantamount to this Court's approval of the principles of law which have been announced by the Court of Appeals' opinion. In Mabe v. State,86 Idaho 254, 262, 385 P.2d 401 (1963), Justice McFadden in writing for a unanimous court, the membership of which did not include any of us now constituting the Court, was very careful to explicitly state the true rule:
 A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under I.R.C.P. 50(b) similarly to the previous rule, admits the truth of the adversary's evidence and every inference of fact which may be legitimately drawn therefrom and should be granted only when there is absence of evidence to support the verdict. Hendrix v. City of Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 130, 29 P.2d 352; Hobson v. Security State Bank, 56 Idaho 601, 57 P.2d 685; 2B Barron Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1079, p. 413 and § 1075, p. 375. Mabe v. State, 86 Idaho 254, 262, 385 P.2d 401, 406 (1963) (emphasis added).
Obviously, so it seems to me without any benefit of the thinking of my colleagues, the Court of Appeals' opinion which is not being reviewed does violence to that clear statement of the rule. *Page 150 
 APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
 OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
 Case No. 8641

 Richard K. Smith and Janice L. Smith, Plaintiffs, v. Joyce
 Preagitzer, Defendant.

 MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. AND MOTIONS
 FOR NEW TRIAL

 The above entitled case came before the Court on a jury trial
on December 17, 1985 at Rupert, Idaho. The case involved an
accident in Burley, Idaho between Mr. Richard Smith and an auto
driven by the Defendant, Mrs. Joyce Praegitzer. After the
presentation of evidence by both Plaintiff and Defendant and
after instructions and argument the jury rendered a special
verdict finding 50% negligence on the part of both parties, thus,
precluding the Plaintiff from recovery. The Plaintiff now argues
that the evidence does not support the verdict on the jury's
findings of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff.
 Based upon the following analysis the Court has concluded that
a Judgment n.o.v. on the question of fault is appropriate and
that a new trial on the issues of damages be had. The principles
the Court must apply to a motion for Judgment n.o.v. are clearly
set forth in recent Idaho Supreme Court Decisions. First, as the
Court stated in Brand S Corporation vs. King, 102 Idaho 731
[639 P.2d 429], "A judgment n.o.v. should be granted when there is no
substantial, competent evidence to support the verdict of the
jury". Secondly, in the case of Owen vs. Burcha [Burcham],
100 Idaho 441 [599 P.2d 1012], the Court stated that on a motion for
a judgment not withstanding the verdict the moving party admits
the truth of the adverse evidence and every interference which
may be legitimately drawn therefrom.
 In the same case the Court stated "to be `substantial' the
evidence need not be uncontradicted. All that is required is that
there be evidence of such sufficient quality and probative value
to support the party against whom the motion is directed so that
reasonable minds could conclude that there is evidence upon which
the jury could properly find a verdict for that party".
 In the case at hand, the only evidence submitted by the
Defendant was testimony of the Defendant and such evidence the
Defendant may have adduced on cross-examination of the
Plaintiff's witnesses.
 The Defendant testified that she did not see the Plaintiff
until just at the second her vehicle struck the Plaintiff, thus,
the Defendant did not introduce any direct evidence in her case
in chief of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff. Therefore,
the only negligence the jury could have found on the part of the
Plaintiff would have come from the Plaintiff's own evidence. The
Plaintiff testified substantially as follows: That on the 20th
day of August, 1985 he followed his normal practice of arising
early in the morning to jog. He left his home at approximately
6:45 o'clock p.m. on a typical summer day; he recalled that the
morning was humid and the sky was overcast. Mr. Smith was jogging
with his shepherd dog on a leash. Mr. Smith followed his usual
jogging route which led him around the area of his residence on
residential streets. Approximately 25 minutes after beginning his
morning jog he came to the intersection of Miller and 24th
Street; Mr. Smith was jogging south on Miller Avenue, a
residential street within the City of Burley. Twenty-fourth
Street at the location of its intersection with Miller Street is
also in a residential area, although there is a church on the
north corner of Miller Avenue and 24th Street. As Mr. Smith
approached the intersection of Miller and 24th Mr. Smith noticed
a car coming north on Miller Street across the intersection from
him. Previous to seeing the car, Mr. Smith had been jogging on
the left side of Miller Street, when he saw the car Mr. Smith
moved to the right side of Miller Street. Mr. Smith did not jog
on the sidewalks but in the parking areas of the streets, as much
as he could. According to
 *Page 151 
Mr. Smith's direct testimony, from ten to twelve feet from the
actual intersection of Miller Street with 24th Street, Mr. Smith
glanced to his right and saw an automobile approximately 300
yards distance.
 Mr. Smith continued to adhere to this observation under
cross-examination although there were attempts made by Counsel to
suggest Mr. Smith may have been incorrect in this testimony. Mr.
Smith determined that the approaching vehicle on 24th Street was
not a threat to him and he entered the intersection. There is a
stop sign on Miller Street, thus, 24th Street may be considered a
more heavily travelled street than Miller Avenue.
 Mr. Smith testified, on direct, that he jogged at a fairly slow
rate of speed approximately a ten minute mile. He testified that
as he entered the intersection he was probably at that same
speed, although perhaps a little slower. At the time Mr. Smith
entered 24th Street he was parallel within approximately 3 feet
of the west curb of Miller Street. As he entered 24th Street he
was looking to the left. He next recalls hearing a motor
accelerating. At that point he glanced to the right and found an
auto bearing down on him. Mr. Smith started yelling and waving
his arms at the automobile and began running faster. The auto
began drifting right following Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith did have time
to turn and face the automobile with his arms out in an attempt
to push himself up onto the automobile. Mr. Smith further
testified that he was able to observe the Defendant driving the
automobile and that she had a look of total surprise just at the
point of impact. The accident occurred almost all the way across
the north part of the intersection.
 In addition to the Plaintiff's testimony the Plaintiff called
the driver of the vehicle who Mr. Smith had observed approaching
the intersection of Miller and 24th Street heading to the north.
Mr. Terry Billingsley, the driver of the automobile stated as he
approached the stop sign on Miller and 24th heading north he
observed Smith jogging. He observed Mr. Smith to be close to the
right hand curb. Mr. Billingsley testified he stopped at the stop
sign, looked both ways and could see no vehicles coming but
wanted for Mr. Smith to come across the intersection. Again
looking onto 24th Street, he observed the Defendant's car
traveling east on 24th but did not think the Defendant's car
presented a danger to Mr. Smith. However, shortly afterwards Mr.
Billingsley observed the accident occur basically in front of his
vehicle. He saw Mr. Smith yell, wave his arms, and turn towards
the vehicle. Mr. Smith, according to Mr. Billingsley, was almost
across the intersection into the north parking lane. He did
observe the Defendant's vehicle veer to the right, towards Mr.
Smith. He further testified that had the vehicle continued in a
straight line in the traffic lane there would not have been a
collision between the vehicle and Mr. Smith. On cross-examination
Mr. Billingsley indicated he did not know how fast the
Defendant's vehicle was going but he did not think it was
exceeding the speed limit although he was not a good judge of
speed.
 The Plaintiff also introduced the responding Police Officer,
Officer Lonnie Richardson, who testified concerning statements
made by the parties. The Defendant stated she never saw the
jogger until the point of impact. Mr. Smith made the statement he
had seen the vehicle and felt he had plenty of time to cross the
intersection.
 Officer Richardson was also told by the Defendant that her
vision was obstructed by the bright sunlight, however, his
recollection was that the day was cloudy. Officer Richardson also
testified that there was very little physical evidence and that
he could not determine the existence of any skid marks relating
to this accident. Officer Richardson stated that when he arrived
at the accident Mr. Smith was apparently in the same position as
he was immediately following the accident. Mr. Smith's head was
three feet from the curb with his head pointing to the stop sign
on Miller Street on the north side of 24th Street. The Officer
indicated there was approximately an eight foot parking lane at
that point and that Mr. Smith was completely in the parking lane.
The speed limit along that stretch of highway
 *Page 152 
according to Officer Richardson was 25 miles per hour.
 The Plaintiff's then called Mr. Les Stimpson, who is a State
Patrolmen who has had training and testified as an expert witness
in accident reconstruction. Mr. Stimpson's testimony primarily
centered on the point of impact. Mr. Stimpson testified that in
his opinion the point of impact would have been approximately
nine foot off of the north curb of 24th Street. He could not
determine a north-south point of impact. In both direct and
cross-examination, there was a great deal of testimony concerning
the facts upon which he based his opinions. He stated many times
there were many variables that would affect his decision. Of some
concern to both parties, was from Mr. Stimpson's ultimate
conclusion another conclusion could be reached that the
Defendant's vehicle would have been going at a speed of 37 to 42
miles per hour.
 The Plaintiff's also called Mr. Smith's personal physician who
gave no testimony concerning the facts surrounding the accident
only testimony concerning the extent of Mr. Smith's injuries.
 Other evidence introduced during the course of the trial
included photographs taken by the Plaintiff and a drawing of the
intersection prepared at the request of the Defendant by a
licensed engineer. The Plaintiff, on cross-examination was
requested to make several points on the drawing, as were several
of the other witnesses. None of the witnesses had viewed the
drawing prior to trial. The Plaintiff also introduced weather
reports indicating that on August 20, 1985 there was a broken sky
cover.
 There was virtually no conflicting essential evidence. The only
area of conflict centered around Mr. Stimpson's testimony and
various results which could be reached by changing his
assumptions. This is not direct evidence. Further Mr. Stimpson
stated several times there were too many unknown variables to
reach a firm conclusion as to reconstructing the accident. Thus,
the jury had few if any facts to resolve.
 Applying the law to the facts as they were introduced in this
case, the Court cannot conclude that there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict of 50% negligence on the part of
the Plaintiff. The Court has noted there is no direct evidence of
the Plaintiff's negligence. However, there is certainly a great
deal of direct evidence of the Defendant's negligence. By the
Defendant's own testimony, she did not see Mr. Smith until her
car collided with him. For the jury to have determined negligence
on the part of Mr. Smith they would have had to have made
inferences. As the Court noted in the case of Owen vs. Burcham
(Supra), there is no way to distinguish between a legitimate
inference to which a party is entitled and an unreasonable one to
which he is not entitled. However, the Court further stated it is
well established an inference would not be reasonable if it would
permit a jury to base it's verdict on mere speculation and
conjecture. In this case the argument of the Defendant is
basically that Mr. Smith must have been negligent for the
accident to have occurred. However, that overlooks undisputed,
uncontradicted evidence by Mr. Smith that he did observe the
Defendant's car and that the car presented no danger to him as he
began crossing the intersection and that the car sped up and
veered to the right striking Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith's testimony is
verified and enhanced by the testimony of Mr. Billingsley, who
also testified he observed the Defendant's vehicle and it did not
appear to him to present a threat to Mr. Smith as he crossed the
intersection, and the vehicle did veer to the right striking Mr.
Smith. Further, there is physical evidence that the accident
occurred in or near the parking area of 24th Street. The
Defendant's argument basically as, noted by Counsel for the
Plaintiff, can only be made because the Defendant did not see Mr.
Smith until the accident. To allow the Defendant to thus benefit
from her admitted negligence is inappropriate. The Court could
attempt to speculate as to how the jury reached the verdict from
the facts presented but that serves no purpose. Defense Counsel
when asked what evidence or facts inferred from the evidence
supports
 *Page 153 
the verdict could only point to the accident itself and in
essence argue it is unreasonable to think a pedestrian cannot
avoid an accident with a car. Basically, Counsel argued a
pedistrian is in a much better position to stop when he perceives
he is in danger from an automobile than an automobile is. That
may be true if the driver of the automobile is fulfilling his
duty which here, clearly, the driver was not. The Court must
conclude that the jury must have entered into speculation and
conjecture to find Mr. Smith negligent.
 Thus, in the Court's view, the Plaintiff is entitled to a
Judgment n.o.v. on the question of the Plaintiff's negligence
because there is not substantial competent evidence for the jury
to have found the Plaintiff negligent.
 Since the jury acted properly in response to the directions of
the special verdict form and did not consider the question of
damages in this case the Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on
the question of damages must also be granted.
 DATED this 18th day of February, 1986.
 /s/ John F. Varin
 John F. Varin
 Magistrate Judge acting as District
 Judge
 APPENDIX B

 BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

 At approximately 7:30 A.M. on Saturday, August 20, 1983, Smith
was jogging in the City of Burley. At the intersection of 24th
Street and Miller Avenue he was struck by an eastbound vehicle
being operated by Praegitzer. The entire accident was witnessed
by Terry Billingsley who was stopped at a stop sign waiting for
Smith to cross the street. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24 to 30.
 Smith testified directly as to the circumstances surrounding
the accident. He testified that as he approached the intersection
he observed the Praegitzer vehicle approaching from his right at
a distance of approximately 300 feet. The vehicle was far enough
away so that it did not pose an apparent threat. He entered the
intersection, proceeding straight across toward the opposite curb
line.
 As smith entered the intersection he looked to the left and did
not observe any traffic coming from that direction. As he
continued a few more steps into the intersection his attention
was drawn by the sound of an accelerating motor. He turned to see
the Praegitzer vehicle accelerating directly at him. Smith tried
to get out of the way of the approaching vehicle. He could see
Praegitzer's face and could see that she was totally oblivious to
his presence. He also was yelling trying to get her attention.
Tr. Vol. I, p. 32 to 34.
 As Smith tried to escape, the Praegitzer vehicle seemed to be
drifting with him, as though she was following him. Smith made it
almost completely across the street before he was struck. Just
before impact he could see Praegitzer's face registering total
surprise. Tr. Vol. I, p. 32 to 36.
 Terry Billingsley also testified directly as to the
circumstances of the accident. He was perhaps in the best
position to observe the accident. Billingsley testified that as
he pulled up to the stop sign at the intersection of Miller and
24th he observed Smith and his dog approaching from the other
direction. At that time Billingsley looked both directions and
didn't see any vehicles approaching on 24th. Billingsley waited
for Smith to cross the intersection. Tr. Vol. I, p. 85 to 86.
 As Billingsley waited for Smith, he looked again and this time
saw the Praegitzer vehicle approaching. At that time Smith was
coming out into the intersection. Billingsley did not feel that
Smith was in any danger at that time because there appeared to be
ample time for him to come across the road. Billingsley then
looked to the right, and when he looked back to the left he
observed the accident itself. He observed Smith yelling and
trying to escape the Praegitzer vehicle. He observed Smith escape
the traffic lane into the parking lane. He observed the
Praegitzer vehicle veer towards the right striking Smith in the
parking lane. Finally, Billingsley
 *Page 154 
testified that he did not think the accident would have occurred
if Praegitzer had simply driven in a straight line in the traffic
lane. Tr. Vol. I, p. 86 to 88.
 Praegitzer's testimony about the circumstances of the accident
was greatly limited by her back of attentiveness. She didn't
observe Smith until the moment of impact. Even that observation
was so limited that she didn't know whether he had come from the
right or the left, she was unaware that he was jogging, she was
unaware that he was accompanied by a dog and she didn't testify
about observing the Billingsley vehicle. Tr. Vol. I, pg. 157 to
160.
 Because of her lack of observation, Praegitzer offered no
testimony on how far she was from the intersection when Smith
entered. Nor of the point of impact. She did testify to the
absence of a recollection of turning to the right and provided an
estimate of her speed based upon the fact she "knew it was a
residential area; and that's the posted speed limit. I generally
don't speed." Tr. Vol. I, pg. 49 L. 13 to L. 22. Praegitzer had
not looked at her speedometer and did not express an opinion of
speed based upon observations on the date of the accident.
 BASES FOR REQUEST FOR REVIEW

 Smith requests review by the Supreme Court for the following
reasons:
 1. The Court of Appeals decided a question of substance not
heretofore determined by the Supreme Court, without resolving the
apparent conflict between the various statutes dealing the duties
and obligations of drivers and pedestrians in unmarked
intersections.
 2. The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance
not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme
Court with respect to what constitutes substantial competent
evidence supporting a jury verdict.
 3. The Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict
with a previous decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of
whether a witness's testimony of the lack of a recollection can
give rise to a legitimate inference of sufficient substance to
support a jury verdict in the face of direct competent evidence
to the contrary.
 ARGUMENT

 The propriety of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict turns
on two questions. First, was there substantial competent evidence
which could support a verdict finding Smith negligent in entering
and proceeding through the intersection. Secondly, even if the
answer to the first question is yes, was that negligence a
proximate cause, or a cause in fact, of the accident in light of
Smith's effort to escape, which was defeated by Praegitzer's
conduct.
 I. ENTERING INTERSECTION

 The direct testimony clearly established no negligence on the
part of Smith in entering the intersection. Sections II and III
of the Respondents brief outline the evidentiary and legal basis
supporting the Judgment N.O.V. at length. Rather than reiterate
it will be summarized here allowing reference to the Respondents
brief for more detail.
 A. Speculation and Inference Upon Inference

 The direct testimony of both Smith and Billingsley established
that at the time Smith entered the intersection the Praegitzer
vehicle was far enough away not to pose a threat. Both
specifically established the distance of the Praegitzer vehicle.
The foundation for this testimony was the actual visual
observations by both witnesses.
 Praegitzer could not directly testify as to her location when
Smith entered the intersection, having no recollection of seeing
Smith. Praegitzer also could not directly testify as to her speed
on the date and time in question. The only evidence offered by
Praegitzer was an estimate of her speed based upon the fact that
she generally didn't speed. From this she asked the court to
infer her speed, from that inference draw a further inference as
to relative location of her vehicle and finally to draw an
inference that Smith and Billingsley
 *Page 155 
both misjudged the distance of Praegitzer's vehicle.
 Praegitzer's testimony was grossly inadequate to constitute
substantial evidence to overcome direct, competent testimony as
to the facts. Not only was Praegitzer unable to state her speed
based upon an actual observation of her speedometer, she failed
to even express an opinion as to her speed based upon
observations and perceptions occurring the date of the accident.
To allow an estimate of speed based only upon the statement that
she normally didn't speed is purely speculation. She had no real
idea whether or not she was speeding on the day in question.
 The Court of Appeals accepted the Defendant's argument and
stated that that testimony was sufficient to support the jury
verdict. In doing so, the Court of Appeals implicitly over-ruled
Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 559 [599] P.2d 1012 (1979). It
also expressly overruled Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,
518 P.2d 1194.
 In Owen v. Burcham, as in this case, the Defendant admittedly
hadn't seen the pedestrian prior to the accident and was unable
to directly testify as to the pedestrian's location or conduct.
Despite her lack of perception, Burcham attempted to weave a web
of inferences to establish facts to which she could not testify
directly. There, as here, the web of inferences amounted to no
more than speculation. To allow unwarranted inferences to be
drawn from hypothesized facts does not promote the search for
truth. Praegitzer's testimony doesn't really help us know how
fast she was going, or the location of her vehicle when Smith
entered the intersection. It was offered in the hope of creating
an evidentiary basis where she couldn't produce a real one.
 It wasn't only Smith who testified directly as to Praegitzer's
location, there was an independent third party on the other side
of the road who saw her also. To allow direct competent testimony
of an event to be ignored based upon a mere speculation creates a
new and lesser standard of substantial evidence than that
recognized in Owen.
 The Court of Appeals also rejects the language of Mann v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. supra. Praegitzer asked the court to infer
that her speed was 20 to 25 m.p.h. based upon her testimony that
she didn't "normally" or "generally" speed. From this inference
she asked the court to draw an additional inference that her
vehicle was at a distance from the intersection different from
that directly testified to by Smith and Billingsley. From the
second inference she asked the court to draw yet a third
inference that because of the different location of her vehicle,
a reasonable man would have perceived the danger and not entered
the intersection. It is this third inference which she attempts
to use to establish negligence on the part of Smith.
 In Mann the Court stated:
 When a Motion for judgment n.o.v. is made, the truth of
 plaintiff's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be
 drawn therefrom is admitted. (Citation Omitted) Circumstantial
 evidence can be used to prove one's case. (Citation Omitted)
 However, if an inference drawn from circumstantial evidence is
 to be made the basis of further inference, the first inference
 must be established to the exclusion of all other reasonable
 inferences. (Citations Omitted)
 The first inference which Praegitzer asked the court to draw
was not established to the "exclusion of all other reasonable
inferences." Praegitzer estimated her speed based upon the fact
that she did not "normally" or "generally" speed. Praegitzer did
not testify that she never sped. A reasonable person could infer
that on the date of the accident Praegitzer's speed was not
"normal". Praegitzer did not rule that out, nor did any other
evidence introduced at trial.
 The Court of Appeals dismissed Mann as limiting but not
prohibiting stacking of inferences, and expressed its
disagreement with the rule.
 B. Conflict Between Statutes.

 The opinion filed by the Court of Appeals does not resolve who
had the right of way.
 *Page 156 
The intersection involved in this accident does not fit neatly
into the statutes. The side of the street that Smith was on had a
sidewalk, but it dead-ended in a bush before it reached the
intersection. To reach the intersection a pedestrian would
necessarily have to go around the bush either through the yard or
along the curb. The sidewalk on the other side of the street is
off-set to the west. As a result, when a pedestrian goes around
the bush along the curb he has a choice of proceeding straight
across the street or proceeding at an angle so as to intersect
with the sidewalk on the other side. A reduced photocopy of the
demonstrative exhibit showing the intersection is attached as
Exhibit "A" to this brief.
 Idaho Code § 49-722(1) provides that the pedestrian has the
right of way when "crossing the roadway within a crosswalk."
"Cross-walk" is defined by Idaho Code § 49-510 as follows:
 49-510. Crosswalk. — (1) That part of a roadway at an
 intersection included within the connections of the lateral
 lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway
 measured from the curbs or in the absence of curbs, from the
 edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a
 sidewalk on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway
 included within the extension of the lateral lines of the
 existing sidewalk at right angles to the centerline. (2) Any
 portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly
 indicated for pedestrian crossing by line or other markings on
 the surface.
 The sidewalk on Smith's side of the road dead-ended in a bush.
The sidewalk on the other side of the roadway was off-set a
significant difference to the west. When Smith approached the
intersection at the location of the bush, Idaho Code § 49-726(2)
required that he run along the curb. As he reached the
intersection, Idaho Code § 49-722(5) required Smith to proceed
straight across the intersection.
 The nature of the intersection and the controlling statutes
raise a whole series of interesting questions. Did Smith have the
right of way because his location and direction were in strict
compliance with the Idaho statutes? If not, if he would have
moved one foot to his right so as to be in the area that would
have been an unmarked cross-walk if the sidewalk would have
proceeded completely to the intersection, would he than have had
the right-of-way? Does a pedestrian who is in an unmarked
cross-walk, but who inadvertently moves six inches past an
invisible line, suddenly lose the right-of-way?
 Fortunately the Legislature has provided yet another statute to
clarify the situation. Idaho Code § 49-724 provides:
 49-724. Drivers to exercise due care. — Notwithstanding other
 provisions of this title or the provisions of any local
 ordinance, every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to
 avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any person propelling a
 human-powered vehicle and shall give an audible signal when
 necessary and shall exercise proper precaution upon observing
 any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or
 intoxicated person.
 The Court of Appeals should have ruled Smith had the
right-of-way.
 II. THE ESCAPE AND ITS FAILURE

 Smith perceived the danger of the Praegitzer vehicle in time to
escape. He was approximately in the middle of the intersection
when he began his effort to escape. Both Smith and Billingsley
directly testified as to Smith's efforts and of how the
Praegitzer's vehicle veered or drifted to the right. Both
testified of how Smith made it almost completely across the
street into the parking lane. Billingsley testified that if
Praegitzer had simply driven straight in the traffic lane there
would have been no accident.
 Again Praegitzer was unable to directly contradict Smith and
Billingsley. Instead, she testified that she did not recollect
turning to the right and invited the court and jury to infer from
this absence of a recollection that she did not drift or veer to
the right. This required a further inference that the testimony
of Smith and Billingsley,
 *Page 157 
as to the success of his escape and the location of impact, was
incorrect.
 If Owen v. Burcham, supra, and Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
supra, were applied, this approach would qualify as mere
speculation. The absence of a recollection isn't evidence of a
fact. It simply means that the witness doesn't know what happened
and is willing to admit it. Praegitzer also didn't recollect
observing Smith enter the intersection, that there was a dog with
Smith, that Smith was jogging, or that Billingsley was stopped at
a stop sign on the side street. It would seem ridiculous to
suggest a jury could conclude from Praegitzer's absence of
recollection that Smith, the dog and Billingsley weren't there at
the time of the accident.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that because Praegitzer testified to
the absence of a recollection that it must take as true that she
did not veer towards Smith. This is directly contrary to another
recent opinion filed by the Court of Appeals.
 In Arnold v. Diet Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040
(Idaho App. 1987) the Court of Appeals also dealt with a party
trying to overcome positive testimony concerning an event by
stating his absence of a recollection. The Court of Appeals
stated:
 Arnold cannot avoid the positive testimony of Mr. Morris
 regarding the reading and signing of the cover page of the
 employee handbook, simply by alleging a lack of recollection.
id at 584, 746 P.2d 1043. The rule adopted in Arnold is the
correct rule and should be applied uniformly. Praegitzer should
not be allowed to overcome positive testimony of two witness by
simply asserting a lack of recollection.
 CONCLUSION

 Smith was not a negligent pedestrian. He was attentive as he
approached the intersection. He observed the approaching vehicle.
He made a determination, corroborated by another witness on the
other side of the road, that the vehicle was not a hazard to him.
As he continued through the intersection he remained attentive.
He perceived when the vehicle became a hazard and took steps to
both escape and gain the attention of the driver of the vehicle.
As was again corroborated by Billingsley, Smith successfully got
out of the way of the approaching vehicle but for one serious
problem, the vehicle changed direction.
 Praegitzer was oblivious to the events preceding the accident.
The closest thing which she could offer to direct testimony was
that she recalled the sun being in her eyes. Other than that, she
had no idea what had happened.
 The trial court granted the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict relying on Owen v. Burcham, supra. It seemed obvious that
a person who had no recollection of the events and could not
positively testify as to any significant fact was not in a
position to contradict the positive testimony of two competent,
credible witnesses. The controlling authority supported the trial
court's decision that a party could not spin a web of inferences
drawn from inferences to create by speculation facts which could
not be established by direct evidence.
 The Supreme Court should grant the Petition for Review.