Court Opinion

ID: 9373520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:37.066306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.851963
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARNETTE BOLDEN-PRUITT,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          CH-0353-16-0431-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: August 1, 2022
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jacqueline Stewart-Harris, Bedford Heights, Ohio, for the appellant.

           Thao T. Pham, Saint Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her restoration appeal for lack of jurisdiction .          For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and REMAND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

     the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.
¶2        The appellant, a former Mail Processing Clerk, filed the instant appeal
     alleging that, although she contacted the agency in August 2015 regarding
     reemployment based upon her full recovery from a compensable injury, the
     agency improperly failed to respond to her inquiry. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1. She asserted that this constituted harmful error on the part of the agency
     and requested a hearing. Id.
¶3        The administrative judge informed the appellant of her burden of
     establishing jurisdiction over her restoration claim. IAF, Tab 4. She informed
     the appellant that an employee who separated because of a compensable injury,
     and whose full recovery took longer than 1 year from the date eligibility for
     compensation began, may establish jurisdiction in a restoration appeal if she
     nonfrivolously alleges, among other things, that she requested restoration within
     30 days after the cessation of Office of Workers’ C ompensation Programs
     (OWCP) compensation.      Id. at 4-5; see Nixon v. Department of the Treasury,
     104 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 11 (2006); 5 C.F.R. §§ 353.301(b), 1201.57(a)(4), (b). She
     also noted that an employee who recovers from a compensable injury more than
     1 year after she was found eligible for OWCP benefits is only entitled to priority
     consideration for restoration and is not entitled to a position until one is found
     through the priority consideration process.      IAF, Tab 4 at 3; see Hall v.
     Department of the Navy, 94 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 17 (2003), modified on other grounds
     by Welby v. Department of Agriculture, 101 M.S.P.R. 17, ¶¶ 14-15 (2006);
     5 C.F.R. § 353.301(b).
¶4        The appellant responded to the administrative judge’s order, reasserting her
     prior claims and alleging that the agency violated the applicable collective
     bargaining agreement (CBA) in failing to respond to her restoration inquiry . IAF,
     Tab 6. However, she did not address the jurisdictional elements. Id. Without
     holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the
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     appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the appellant’s failure to
     nonfrivolously allege that she requested restoration within 30 days after cessation
     of her OWCP compensation.             IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID). 2          The
     administrative judge found that the appellant asserted that her benefits ceased in
     May 2015 but that she did not seek reemployment until August 2015. ID at 3-4.
¶5         The appellant has petitioned for review, the agency has responded in
     opposition to the appellant’s petition, and the appellant has replied. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 4, 6. In her petition, the appellant challenges the
     dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because she asserts that the agency never
     notified her of her appeal rights. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2. She also has attached an
     August 2016 letter stating that she will be converted to the position of
     unassigned Career Full Time Clerk, effective Saturday, September 3, 2016, with
     the ability to bid on certain positions and a December 2016 roster of certain
     Cleveland-area employees, including the employees’ seniority date s and numbers.
     Id. at 4-9.
¶6         An employee who separated because of a compensable injury, and whose
     full recovery takes longer than 1 year from the date eligibility for compensation
     began, may establish jurisdiction in a restoration appeal if she nonfrivolously
     alleges the following: (1) she was separated, absent, or placed in a lower grade
     job because of a compensable injury; (2) she fully recovered after 1 year; (3) she

     2
       The administrative judge initially informed the appellant that she was only required to
     make nonfrivolous allegations of jurisdiction to obtain a hearing on the merits . IAF,
     Tab 4 at 2. However, in the initial decision, she stated that, if the appellant made a
     nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction, then she would be entitled to a hearing at which
     she must prove jurisdiction. ID at 2-3. Under the Board’s revised regulations, the
     appellant was only required to make nonfrivolous allegations of jurisdiction to obtain a
     hearing on the merits. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2016);
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b). Nevertheless, because she found that the appellant did
     not make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction and because we are remanding the
     appeal for further adjudication, any such error in the initial decision is harmless as it
     does not prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. Panter v. Department of the Air
     Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
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     requested restoration within 30 days after the cessation of OWCP benefits; and
     (4) the agency violated her reemployment priority rights.                    See Nixon,
     104 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶¶ 11-12; 5 C.F.R. §§ 353.301(b), 1201.57(a)(4), (b).              First,
     we find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged she was separated because
     of a compensable injury.       She asserted that she was injured on duty and was
     approved for disability retirement in October 2011. IAF, Tab 5 at 27. Her Postal
     Service Form 50 further supports her assertion because it indicates that she was
     separated, effective October 28, 2011, pursuant to a disability retirement and that
     she was totally disabled for useful and efficient service in her position . Id. at 29.
     Additionally, she indicated in her application for disability retirement that she
     received OWCP benefits because of a job-related injury beginning on
     September 4, 2010. Id. at 35. Next, the record supports a nonfrivolous allegation
     that she recovered more than 1 year after her separation because she submitted a
     doctor’s note indicating her full recovery that was dated March 26, 2013. Id.
     at 28.     Further, we find that the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that the
     agency violated her restoration rights because, although she asserted that she
     contacted the agency in May 2015, she met with the agency in January 2016 and
     was not provided priority consideration until September 2016. 3               IAF, Tab 4
     at 17-18, 27, Tab 5 at 17-18; PFR File, Tab 1 at 16.
¶7            Regarding the third jurisdictional element, we find that remand is necessary
     to further develop the issue of whether the appellant has nonfrivolously alleged
     that the 30-day deadline for requesting restoration may be waived based upon her
     exercise of due diligence. An employee who recovers from a compensable injury

     3
       To the extent that the agency’s providing the appellant information about its process
     for requesting reinstatement in January 2016, or priority consideration effective
     September 2016, constituted proper relief, this does not render the appeal moot because
     it is possible that the appellant could have obtained additional priority consideration for
     the period prior to those dates. IAF, Tab 5 at 17-18; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; cf. White v.
     U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 244, ¶¶ 9, 24 (2012) (affirming the administrative
     judge’s dismissal of the appellant’s restoration appeal as moot when the agency had
     provided him with status quo ante relief, including appropriate back pay and benefits).
                                                                                  5

more than 1 year after she was found eligible for OWCP benefits must typically
apply for restoration within 30 days of the cessation of compensation. 5 C.F.R.
§ 353.301(b). Nevertheless, pursuant to regulation, when an agency separates an
employee because of a compensable injury, it has the responsibility to “notify the
employee of his or her rights, obligations, and benefits relating to Government
employment, including any appeal and grievance rights.”        5 C.F.R. § 353.104.
Thus, if the agency failed to notify the appellant of the deadline for requesting
restoration, the Board may excuse the delay. See, e.g., Ward v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 67 M.S.P.R. 425, 429-32 (1995) (finding, in a military
restoration appeal, that the agency’s failure to notify the appellant of his
restoration rights excused the untimeliness of his request for restoration by
approximately 3 months); McKoy v. Department of the Army, 18 M.S.P.R. 636,
639-40 (1984) (finding, when the appellant sought full restoration approximately
17 months after her recovery and the cessation of benefits, that the request could
not be dismissed as untimely because the agency failed to notify the appellant of
the 30-day regulatory deadline for applying for restoration and because it did not
object to the delay on appeal). 4 However, regardless of the agency’s obligation,
pursuant to current regulations, “an employee is still required to exercise due
diligence in ascertaining his or her rights, and to seek reemployment . . . as soon
as he or she is able after a compensable injury.”        5 C.F.R. § 353.104; see
Dunklebarger v. Department of the Army, 67 M.S.P.R. 607, 612 (1995) (quoting
53 Fed. Reg. 857, 859 (Jan. 14, 1988) (stating that the amended regulations
requiring an employee to exercise due diligence were added to inform the
employee that he or she “has an obligation to use due diligence in ascertaining his
or her rights, and to return to duty as soon as he or she is able”). Thus, even if

4
  In Ward and McKoy, the Board applied 5 C.F.R. § 353.106 (1986), a previous version
of the regulations that did not require an appellant to exercise due diligence in
ascertaining his or her rights. See Ward, 67 M.S.P.R. at 430 n.3; McKoy, 18 M.S.P.R.
at 638.
                                                                                        6

     the agency did not notify the appellant of the 30-day deadline for requesting
     restoration, she still must demonstrate that she acted diligently in determining her
     rights to restoration and after she discovered the deadline.          See generally
     Cranston v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 290, ¶ 13 (2007) (explaining that,
     regardless of agency notification, an employee is required to exercise due
     diligence regarding her restoration to duty rights but is not required to
     demonstrate due diligence in discovering Board appeal rights ).
¶8         The appellant asserted both below and on review that the agency did not
     notify her of the deadline for requesting restoration. IAF, Tab 5 at 27; PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 2. The agency has not submitted evidence or argument to contradict her
     contention. PFR File, Tab 4 at 5. However, she was not provided notice of her
     burden to nonfrivolously allege that she acted diligently in requesting restoration ,
     despite the delay, and she did not do so. Accordingly, we find it necessary to
     remand the appeal to afford her this opportunity.
¶9         On remand, the administrative judge shall inform the appellant of her
     burden to nonfrivolously allege that she acted diligently in ascertaining her rights
     and requesting restoration to duty.     If the administrative judge finds that the
     appellant has made such a nonfrivolous allegation, then she has established
     jurisdiction, and the administrative judge should afford the appellant her
     requested hearing on the merits.
                                                                              7

                                    ORDER
     For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.