Court Opinion

ID: 9781869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:18.134149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.735752
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with Judge Hunt's thorough and carefully reasoned opinion which upholds the right of the Municipality of Anchorage to randomly test police and firefighters for drug use. I have but little to add to her opinion.
Cases supporting suspicionless random drug testing of public employees whose work affects the public safety include the following: Hatley v. Department of Navy, 164 F.3d 602 (Fed.Cir.1998) (firefighters); Aubrey v. School Board of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir.1998) (school custodians); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.1990) (airline industry personnel); Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.1989) (correctional officers in regular contact with inmates); Thomson v. Marsh, 884 F.2d 113 (4th Cir.1989) (chemical weapons plant workers); National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney, 884 F.2d 603 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Army's civilian aviation personnel, police, and guards); Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir.1989) (police officers carrying firearms or engaged in drug interdietion efforts); Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey, Local 318 v. Washington Township, 850 F.2d 133 (3rd Cir.1988) (police officers); Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District, 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.1988) (nuclear power plant engineers); Smith v. Fresno Irrigation District, 72 Cal.App.4th 147, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 775 (1999) (construction and maintenance workers); McCloskey v. Honolulu Police Department, 71 Haw. 568, 799 P.2d 953 (1990) (police officers); Doe v. City and County of Honolulu, 8 Haw.App. 571, 816 P.2d 306 (1991) (firefighters); New Jer sey Transit PBA Local 304 v. New Jersey Transit Corp., 151 N.J. 531, 701 A.2d 1243 (1997) (transit police officers); Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142, 530 N.E.2d 850 (1988) (police officers in elite anti-nareotics unit); Boesche v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, 111 N.C.App. 149, 432 S.E.2d 137 (1993) (airport authority maintenance mechanics). By contrast, only one case decided since the United States Supreme Court's decision in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), Guiney v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 582 N.E.2d 523 (1991), supports the conclusion reached in today's opinion that the privacy interests of *561police or firefighters preclude random testing.1
Both Guiney and today's opinion call for a showing that there is a "documented history of substance abuse problems among Police Employees and Fire Fighters members" as a precondition for random tests.2 Other courts have recognized, however, that "police departments have not been immune from the drug use that has affected other workplaces.3 The absence of a documented drug problem within the police and fire departments should not logically negate the validity of the Municipality's testing program.4
The majority appears to believe that public safety will not suffer if the Municipality's random drug testing program is dispensed with.5 I would defer to the Municipality's public safety administrators on this point, for they are the experts on the realities of law enforcement work, the difficulties of identifying drug usage by law enforcement personnel, and the hazards created by drug-impaired public safety employees. Concerning these points, it has been recognized that identifying drug abuse among employees who operate largely outside the immediate supervision of their superiors presents significant difficulties for municipalities.6 As a result, numerous jurisdictions have found random testing necessary based on the ineffectiveness of alternative methods of detecting drug use by police and fire personnel.7 The difficulty of recognizing narcotics usage among public safety employees without random testing will, I fear, ensure that random testing will only be justified to the court's satisfaction after one or more drug-related accidents. In my opinion, the risk to public safety inherent in this approach outweighs the modest privacy interests prejudiced by on-the-job drug testing. Accordingly, I dissent.
APPENDIX A *
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE
ANCHORAGE POLICE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and ROB HEUN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,
Defendant.
*562INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, LOCAL 1264, and JOSEPH ALBRECHT,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE,
Defendant.
Case No. SAN 96 4880 CI Case No. BAN 96 5063 CI (Consolidated)
DECISION AND ORDER: CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
These consolidated cases were brought by the Anchorage Police Department Employees Association (APDEA) and its president, Rob Heun, (Case No. 3AN 96 4880 CI) and the International Association of Fire Fighters, Local 1264, (IAFF) and its president, Joseph Albrecht, (Case No. SAN 96 5063 CI). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the substance abuse testing policy adopted by the Municipality of Anchorage (Municipality) and seek to permanently enjoin implementation of those portions of the policy which permit testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion. APDEA is the bargaining unit for non-supervisory members of the Anchorage Police Department. IAFF is the exclusive bargaining unit for non-supervisory members of the Anchorage Fire Department.
Both APDEA and IAFF filed motions for summary judgment on grounds that provisions of the substance abuse testing policy which permit testing in the absence of reasonable suspicion violate employees' right to privacy under the Alaska State Constitution, Article I, Section 22, and employees' right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Alaska State Constitution, Article I, Section 14. APDEA and IAFF also ask the court to declare the provisions to be in violation of the United States Constitution.1 The Municipality filed eross-motions for summary judgment on grounds that the policy does not violate the privacy or the search and seizure provisions of either the state or federal constitutions.
I BACKGROUND
A. Municipal Policy No. 40 24
In September 1994, the Municipality adopted Policy No. 40 24 (hereinafter "the policy"),2 which establishes mandatory substance abuse testing procedures for many municipal employees. Municipality Exhibits D & E.3 The policy provides for testing upon application, promotion, transfer, or demotion, following a vehicular accident, upon reasonable suspicion, and pursuant to a random selection procedure. The policy was amended in October 1995 as a result of negotiations with municipal unions.4
The policy was not immediately implemented in either the Fire or Police Departments. However, on April 12, 1996, the Municipality sent a notice to all covered employees advising that as of May 15, 1996, they would be subject to testing upon promotion. Municipality Exhibit G, 4 12 96 letter from Thomas Tierney. APDEA and IAFF advised the Municipality that they believed suspicionless substance abuse testing was a violation of employees' constitutional rights and subsequently filed these actions. In October 1996, the Municipality actually began testing by implementing only the reasonable suspicion provisions for the Police Department and implementing all but the random testing provision for the Fire Department. Municipality Exhibit O, 10/24/96 letter to AFD Chief Nolan from Thomas Tierney and 10 29 96 letter to APD Chief O'Leary from Tierney.
*563B. Challenged Testing Provisions
At issue in these cases are the portions of the policy which provide for testing (1) upon promotion, transfer, or demotion, (2) post-accident,5 and (8) randomly.
1. Testing upon promotion, transfer, or demotion
Policy language appears to require substance abuse testing as the final step in the selection process for public safety positions even for employees transferred, promoted or demoted from another public safety position.6 Policy §§ 7.a.(1) & T.c.(1)-(2). According to the Municipality, promotion or demotion triggers testing for employees moving from a public safety position; however, transfer testing is triggered only when an employee changes from one position within a job classification which is not subject to testing to another position in the same job classification which is subject to testing. Affidavit of Charles Shelton at 1 3.
2. Post Accident Testing
The policy also requires testing when an employee is involved in a motor vehicle accident while performing job duties if the accident results in a moving violation, serious injury, or property damage. Policy §§ T.a.8), T.e.(4).7
3. Random testing
The policy also calls for periodic, unannounced, random testing of employees in public safety positions. Policy §§ 5, 7.2.2), Tec.(6).8 A designated independent *564percentage of the public safety employees are chosen for alcohol and drug testing on an irregular basis. The employees are chosen randomly and are not given advance notice. No discretion is vested in any supervisor.
C. Employees Required to Undergo Testing
Although all employees are subject to post-accident testing, only employees in "public safety positions" are subject to random testing and to promotion/transfer/demotion testing. The policy defines a "public safety position" as "a position in the Police or Fire Department having a substantially significant degree of responsibility for the safety of the public where the unsafe performance of an incumbent could result in death or injury to self or others.9 Policy § 5(t). An overwhelming majority of the members of AP-DEA and IAFF hold jobs which are classified as "public safety positions."10 Police Department "public safety position" job classifications were made at a meeting on March 15, 1996, attended by members of the APD, including then-Deputy Police Chief Duane Udland, and members of the Municipal Em ployees Relation Department, including Employment Manager Charles Shelton. Fire Department "public safety position" job classifications were also made in the spring of 1996 by Fire Chief James Nolan and members of the Municipal Employee Relations Department. Following are the general job classifications and duties designated as "pub-lie safety positions."
POLICE DEPARTMENT:
Police Sergeant; Senior Police Detective; Patrol Officer/Warrant Officer: Sworn officers whose duties include responding to emergencies, performing rescue operations, arresting and transporting suspects. Officers carry firearms, may use force and may operate vehicles at excessive speeds. Community Service Officer: Positions assist officers at emergency seenes with traffic control. May also be assigned to evidence room where dangerous weapons and drugs are kept.
Police Records Supervisors; Semior Police Clerk; Police Clerk; Communications Clerk III; Communications Clerk I/II: Police clerk positions may respond to emergency (911) calls Communication *565clerk positions may dispatch and route police units.
Identification Specialist; Identification Technician; Assistant Identification Specialist; Property and Evidence Specialist; Property and Evidence Technician: Positions involved in the collection, preservation, and storage of weapons, drugs, and blood/tissue evidence.
The positions of Crime Prevention Specialist, Data System Specialty Clerk, Speciality Clerk, and Police Messenger are not designated as public safety positions.
FIRE DEPARTMENT:
Fire Fighter/EMT; Fire Fighter/Paramedic: Positions respond to fire and medical emergencies, combat fire, administer medical care, and perform rescue operations.
Fire Apparatus Engineers: Position responds to fire and medical emergencies, operate emergency vehicles, operate support apparatus (i.e. pumps, hoses, ladders), and perform maintenance on emergency equipment.
Fire Captain: Semor Fire Captain; Paramedic Supervisor; Fire Battalion Chief: Positions conduct and supervise responses to emergency operations and may be required to perform fire fighter and paramedic functions in emergencies.
Fire Investigators; Fire Inspectors: Positions conduct criminal investigations, inspect complex fire response systems and building construction for code violations.
Fire Training Specialist Position responsible for all areas of emergency training and serve as supplemental safety officers during major emergencies.
Fire Dispatcher; Fire Lead Dispatcher: Positions receive and route emergency (911) calls.
Fire Mechanics; Fire Lead Mechanics: Positions inspect and repair all response apparatus, respond to major emergencies to service and maintain the equipment during response operations.
The positions of Fire Office Assistant, Fire Senior Office Assistan[t], and Fire Office Associate are not classified public safety positions.
Plaintiffs have not challenged the designation of these jobs as "public safety positions." Therefore, the court will assume as a factual matter that each of the designated "public safety positions" entails a "substantially significant degree of responsibility for the safety of the public where the unsafe performance of an incumbent could result in death or injury to self or others." Policy § 5(t).
D. Testing Procedures
The policy sets out testing procedures at length and incorporates current federal Department of Transportation regulations. Policy § 6. Employees report to a collection site to provide a urine sample. The collection site personnel checks an employee's photo identification, and any personal belongings (outer garments, contents of pockets, purses, briefcases, etc.) that the employee wants to take into the testing restroom. The employee is asked to provide a urine sample in a private restroom. The employee is not observed while providing the sample. The collection site personnel then verifies the urine specimen's integrity by checking for suffi-client volume, temperature, and the absence of unusual color or sediment. In the presence of the employee, the collection site personnel then pours part of the urine sample into a second container which is preserved for later testing if requested by the employee to verify initial results. The employee then seals and labels the urine specimens in the presence of the collection site personnel.
The sample is sent to the testing lab, where lab personnel verify that the ID on the bottle and chain of custody form match, that there is sufficient volume, and that the tamper proof seal is intact. An initial test is performed. If it yields a positive result, a second test is done via Gas Chromatography Mass Spectroscopy. If this second test also yields a positive result, a "positive test" is reported to the Medical Review Officer. Otherwise, a "negative test" is reported.
The Medical Review Officer reviews the test results and researches reasons for a confirmed positive test. This includes checking with the employee to determine if there *566is a legitimate medical explanation for the result such as a prescribed medication. If the Medical Review Officer determines that the positive test result does not have a legitimate medical explanation, the positive result is reported to the designated Employee Relations Representative.
Failure to show up for testing and failure to provide a sample are also reported to the Employee Relations Department.
II, DISCUSSION
The parties agree that the state constitution provides greater individual protection than the federal constitution, so if the policy passes muster under Article I, Sections 14 and 21 of the Alaska Constitution, it is also constitutional under the comparable provisions of the United States Constitution. Therefore, the court will focus its attention on the constitutionality of the challenged portions of the policy under the state constitution.
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Alaska Civil Rule 56(c); see also Whaley v. State, 438 P.2d 718, 719 720 (Alaska 1968). A genuine issue of fact "exists where reasonable jurors could disagree on the resolution of a factual issue." McGee Steel Co. v. State ex rel. McDonald Indus. of Alaska, Inc., 723 P.2d 611, 614 (Alaska 1986). The court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 545 P.2d 172, 175 n. 5 (Alaska 1976); Braun v. Alaska Commercial Fishing and Agriculture Bank, 816 P.2d 140, 142 n. 2 (Alaska 1991). The party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts demonstrating that a material issue of fact exists. Civil Rule 56(e), Howarth v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 489-90 (Alaska 1975), aff'd on rehearing, 551 P.2d 934 (Alaska 1976). If, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must decide questions of law, the court will adopt the rule of law which is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Ford v. Municipality of Anchorage, 813 P.2d 654, 655 (Alaska 1991); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).
The parties agree that the issues raised are appropriately resolved by summary judgment because the details of the Municipality's substance abuse testing policy are uncontested (although its implications are not), and the question for the court is a legal one. Seq e.g., American Federation of Government Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884, 894-95 (D.C.Cir.1989) (finding summary judgment procedure proper for reviewing constitutionality of drug testing program).
B. Does the Testing Policy Violate Employees' Constitutional Right to Privacy Under Article I, Section 22, of the Alaska Constitution?
1. Scope of the Right to Privacy
An individual's right to privacy is specifically protected by Article I, Section 22 of the Alaska State Constitution which provides in part:
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.
The right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution is broader and more encompassing than the right to privacy protected under the United States Constitution. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1980); Woods & Rohde v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148-49 (Alaska 1977); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 514-15 (Alaska 1975). Although the right to privacy under the United States Constitution is only an inferred right emanating from other enumerated rights, Alaska's constitution explicitly lists privacy as one of the basic rights granted to all Alaskan citizens. Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977). The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the right to privacy as extending to the communication of "private matters," "a person's more intimate concerns," "the type of personal information which, if disclosed even to a friend, could cause embarrassment or anxiety." Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, *567721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986) (quoting several prior Alaska cases).
A right to privacy will be recognized where an individual has an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990). However, the right to privacy is not absolute. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1980). "When a matter does affect the public, directly or indirectly, it loses its wholly private character, and can be made to yield when an appropriate public need is demonstrated." Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975), quoted in Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Tal P.2d 617, 630 (Alaska 1986). Thus, the right to privacy "must yield when it interferes in a serious manner with the health, safety, rights and privileges of others or with the public welfare." Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975).
2. Ravin Balancing Test
The Alaska Supreme Court has articulated the following test for determining whether a challenged state action violates an individual's right to privacy. First, the court must determine the nature of the plaintiff's rights, if any, infringed upon by the state's action. Second, the court must resolve the question of whether the infringement is justified by determining (1) whether there is a proper governmental interest in imposing the restriction and (2) whether the means chosen bear a close and substantial relationship to the governmental interest.11 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975). Thus, in order to determine whether Plaintiffs have a valid privacy interest that outweighs the Municipality's interest in suspicionless substance abuse testing, the court must answer the following questions:
a. Do employees have a subjective or actual expectation of privacy in the act of urination or in the information that can be disclosed by urinalysis which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?
b. If so, what is the nature and extent of Police and Fire Department employees' privacy and interest?
c. Does the Municipality have a proper governmental interest in imposing suspi-clonless substance abuse testing on employees?
d. If so, does suspicionless substance abuse testing bear a close and substantial relationship to the Municipality's proper governmental interest?
3. Applying the Ravin test
a. Do employees have a subjective or actual expectation of privacy in the act of urination or in the information that cam be disclosed by urinalysis which society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?
*568As evidence of a subjective or actual expectation of privacy on the part of Fire and Police Department employees, Plaintiffs offer the affidavit of APDEA president, Rob Heun:
Members of the APDEA, including myself, view the act of urination as a private and intimate matter which should not be compelled or witnessed by the Municipality. In addition, members of the APDEA believe that the analysis of their urine or their blood could reveal to the Municipality private matters, including but not limited to the employee's genetic makeup and predisposition to certain types of diseases, whether the employee is suffering from an illness which has no impact on the employee's performance as a Municipal employee, whether the employee is taking medication (such as birth control pills) which has no impact on job performance, what foods the employee has consumed, and other matters which could be disclosed through urine or blood testing which the employee wishes not to be shared with other individuals.
Affidavit of Rob Heun at 10 11, T XXIV. The Municipality does not offer any evidence that members of APDEA and IAFF do not hold this subjective expectation.
Society is prepared to recognize this expectation as reasonable. As the United States Supreme Court stated: "The collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable." Skimmer v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court quoted the Fifth Cireuit:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most people describe it by cu-phemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public observation; indeed its performance in public is generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
Id. (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987)).
The Alaska Supreme Court has also found that the privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution "shields the ingestion of food, beverages or other substances." Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524, 528 (Alaska 1974), quoted in Ravin, 537 P.2d at 502.
b. What is the nature and extent of Fire and Police Department employees' privacy interest?
Privacy interests deserve varying levels of protection, depending on the precise nature and the extent of the interest. Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977). "Expectations of privacy are not all of the same intensity.... Both subjectively and in society's judgment as to what is reasonable, distinctions may be made in the varying degrees of privacy retained in different places and objects." State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 242 (Alaska 1979).12
The Alaska Supreme Court has observed that "society often tolerates intrusions into an individual's privacy under cireumstances similar to those in urinalysis." Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1135 (Alaska 1989).13 It concluded that an analysis of the extent of the privacy invasion occasioned by urinalysis should focus on the reason for conducting urinalysis rather than on the conduct of the test. Id. at 1185. The court further quoted with approval from Judge Patrick Higgenbotham's analysis in his concurrence in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1987). Judge Higgenbotham observed that the act of urination required by the testing program involves a lack of privacy similar to that experienced by persons using public toilet facilities and that the information disclosed by urinalysis was not all that different from the background checks and release of medical records required for many government jobs. Id. at 1184-35.
Likewise, the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that an individual may have re*569duced or no expectation of privacy when involved in an extensively regulated industry. Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (1977) (discussing and interpreting prior holding in Nathanson v. State, 554 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1976)). The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that "the privacy expectations of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees." Skinner v. Railway Lobor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 627, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). Where employees' successful performance of duties is uniquely dependent on the employees' judgment and dexterity, employees "cannot reasonably expect to keep" from their employer "personal information that bears directly on their fitness." National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989).
The parties do not dispute that employees of both the Police and Fire Departments have a variety of tests, investigations, and regulations as conditions of employment.
(1) The Police Department
Police Department employees undergo intense scrutiny during the application process. An applicant for a sworn position with the Police Department initially fills out an extensive personal history questionnaire which inquires into the applicant's education, military experience, law enforcement experience, driving history, financial history, eriminal history, and alcohol and drug use. Municipality Exhibit I, APD Background Investigator's Manual, Standard Procedures, at 6 7. An applicant who has illegally used or sold controlled substances will usually be eliminated from consideration as will an applicant who has been convicted of driving while intoxicated in the previous five years. Id. at 183-14. If an applicant is not eliminated from consideration, an extensive background check is conducted. Previous employers, friends, roommates, spouse, and former spouses are asked about the applicant's character and reputation, criminal history, negative or adverse habits, and any other information that might bear on the applicant's suitability. Id. at 17 28. A credit check is also performed. Id. at 24. If still under consideration, the applicant undergoes a psychological exam, a polygraph exam, a physical agility test, a medical exam, and drug screening before a final offer of employment is made. Id. at 25.
Even applicants for non-sworn police department positions must undergo an extensive background investigation, a psychological exam (requirement added in 1996), and drug sereening test (requirement since 1998). Municipality Exhibit J, Vacant Position Announcements for Police Clerk Register and Police Dispatcher Register; Affidavit of Duane Udland.
Onee hired, all Police Department employees submit to a biennial physical examination, including a complete urinalysis. Municipality Exhibit K, Agreement By and Between MOA and APDEA at 16 17. AP-DEA contends that these are voluntary physical exams. It relies on the language in the agreement that the employees are "entitled" to the physical exam, and Rob Heun's affidavit which states the employees' general understanding that the physical exams are voluntary; some employees do not take them; and no one has been disciplined for not taking them. However, the agreement provides that the Municipality could require an examination: [it is] "mandatory that all employees covered by this Agreement shall receive a physical examination as required in this Article." Id. at 18. The examining physician does not report any information from the exam or tests to the Police Department unless the physician finds something that "might affect the employee's ability to perform his (sic) duties." Id. at 17.
The Police Department also regulates employees' lives both on-duty and off-duty. Employees cannot report to work with the odor of or under the influence of alcohol, may not drink on duty unless required in the performance of official duties, and may not consume intoxicants while in uniform. Municipality Exhibit L, APD Regulations & Procedures Manual §§ 1.02.165, .170, .175. *570Off-duty, employees may not consume intoxicants "to the extent that they become discourteous or engage publicly in conduct that reflects adversely on the Department." Id. § 1.02.200. Employees must notify their supervisor of any prescription or non-preseription medication that might adversely affect their ability to perform their duties. Id. § 1.02.205 (as amended in 1996). Finally, the employees are required to "maintain sufficient physical condition to satisfy the requirements of their assignment." Id. § 1.03.210.
M) Fire Department
Fire Department employees are subject to similar intrusions and regulations. Pre-em-ployment physical examinations are required for positions requiring physical fitness. Municipality's Exhibit Q, Vacant Position Announcements. Many of the positions also call for a background check including eriminal history, psychological examination, and drug screening. Fire Fighter/EMT and Fire Fighter/Paramedic employees are required to successfully complete the Standard Physical Performance Ability Screen Exercise ("SPASE") in order to be certified as a Fire Fighter. They must re-take the SPASE on a periodic basis including after returning to work following an injury or illness. Affidavit of James Nolan at 2 3, 14; Municipality Exhibit R, AFD Training Division SPASE Requirements. An annual physical examination is also required although the results are released to the Fire Department anonymously only for statistical purposes. Municipality Exhibit N, Health and Physical Fitness Program § 6.
Both on-duty and off-duty employee behavior is regulated by the Fire Department as well. Employees are subject to dismissal for diminished capacity to work due to alcohol or drugs or lack of sleep from off-duty activities. Municipality Exhibit N, Rules & Regulations of Conduct § 2.8.1. Regulations forbid intoxicating beverages, marijuana, or controlled substances on any Department premises. Tobacco use is strictly limited. Municipality Exhibit N, Safety & Health Program § 8.1.1(44), (51). Regulations limit facial hair and hair cuts. Safety & Health Program § 4. When an employee may wear a uniform or any insignia of the Department duty is also strictly regulated. Rules & Regulations of Conduct §§ 8.1.1(21), (28); Municipality Exhibit N, Uniform Standards. While on duty, employees are required to avoid all religious or political discussions or subjects of controversy while engaged in Fire Department business; they are forbidden from engaging in any malicious gossip, reporting, or activity; and they are strictly prohibited from engaging in any altercation with another employes. Rules & Regulations of Conduct §§ 3.1.1(26), (27), (28). Employees are subject to dismissal for engaging in behavior offensive to the public such as insulting, yelling at, or otherwise alienating the public, and for making gestures deemed to be obscene or discriminatory. Rules & Regulations of Conduct § 2.8.6. Off-duty, employees are prohibited from engaging in any activity that is inconsistent with or detrimental to their duties or service with the Fire Department. Rules & Regulations of Conduct § 8.1.1(18).
The pervasive pre-employment investigations, disclosures, and requirements along with the extension regulation of Police and Fire Department employees, particularly concerning their physical and mental preparedness for their demanding jobs, indicates a diminished expectation of privacy.14
The policy testing procedures themselves are designed to minimize further intrusiveness. An employee is permitted to remain clothed in his or her usual attire. Personal items are subject to search only if the em*571ployee insists on taking them into the rest room for the test. The employee is unaccompanied and unmonitored while actually providing the urine sample.15 The sample is tested only for the prohibited substances.16 Information on medication the employee is taking need be provided only after a positive test result, and a positive test result based on a permissible medication will not be reported to the Municipality.
Considering the employees' diminished expectation of privacy arising from their employment in a highly regulated, safety-essential field of work, the fairly slight privacy interest in the act of urination required for the testing, and the limited testing done on urine samples, the court finds that the intrusion on Plaintiffs' privacy interests is minimal.
c. Does the Municipality have a proper governmental interest in imposing suspicioniess substance abuse testing on Fire and Police Department employees?
The Municipality's stated goals in implementing the substance abuse testing are "deterring drug usage, sale, and/or possession by Municipal employees in the workplace" in order to "ensure a safe, healthful, and productive work environment." Policy No. 40 22 at 1. Plaintiffs assert that the Municipality does not have a proper governmental interest because the Municipality has offered no specific evidence that there is a problem with substance abuse among employees in either the Fire Department or Police Department.
No evidence has been provided of any specific problem with substance abuse by any employee of the Anchorage Police Department and minimal evidence has been provided concerning the Fire Department.17
In similar cases, courts have taken judicial notice of the problems of substance abuse in society and have not required a showing of specific drug and alcohol use among the employees to be tested. For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), the Supreme Court took notice that "drug abuse is one of the most serious problems confronting our society today. There is little reason to believe that American workplaces are immune from this pervasive social problem." The Court found that "[the mere cireumstance that all but a few of the employees tested are entirely innocent of wrongdoing does not impugn the program's validity." Id. at 676, 109 S.Ct. 1384. The Court concluded that a specific showing of a drug problem in the particular employee group was not necessary: "It is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the particular context." Id. at 676, 109 S.Ct. 1384. See also English v. Talladega County *572Board of Education, 938 F.Supp. 775 (N.D.Ala.1996) (holding that drug testing can be justified in absence of any evidence of drug use in the workforce if drug use is totally incompatible with the nature of the position); American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Cavazos, 721 F.Supp. 1361, 1372 (D.D.C.1989) (determining that court could not strike down drug testing program simply for lack of evidence that government agency had experienced a drug problem in the past). In Doe v. City and County of Honolulu, 8 Haw.App. 571, 816 P.2d 306, 311 (1991), the Hawaii Court of Appeals found that the trial court had not erred in taking judicial notice "of the fact that use and abuse of illegal drugs is a serious problem in society and that HFD's fire fighters, as members of society, are not immune from this pervasive social problem."
Plaintiffs rely on Guiney v. Police Commissioner of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 582 N.E.2d 523 (1991), in which a closely-divided Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the intrusion of government-mandated drug testing could not be justified absent specific proof of a drug problem in the group of employees being tested.
In the case before us ... the commissioner has made no demonstration, on the record or otherwise, that facts exist that warrant random drug tests of police officers. The record offers nothing to show that there is a drug problem in the Boston police department. Nor is there anything outside of the record of which he could take note that would permit such a conclusion.
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The court should not infer or assume the existence of facts that might justify the governmental intrusion. The reasonableness of a mandated urinalysis cannot fairly be supported by unsubstantiated possibilities If the government is to meet the requirements of [Massachusetts's constitutional search and seizure provision], it must show at least a conerete, substantial governmental interest that will be served by imposing random urinalysis on uncon-senting citizens. In such a case, the justification for body searches, if there ever can be one, cannot rest on some generalized sense that there is a drug problem in this country, in Boston, or in the Boston police department and that random urinalyses of police officers will solve, or at least help to solve, the problem or its consequences. We reject the view of the majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court that such proof is not required because "[it is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the particular context." See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, supra 489 U.S. at 675 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 1384.
The Guiney case has not been followed by other courts. It fails to appropriately consider the legitimate goals of substance abuse deterrence and prevention in light of the power vested in the police department and the public's reliance on the individual employee's physical and mental acuity in carrying out both Fire Department and Police Department responsibilities for the public welfare and safety.
Prior to the U.S. Supreme decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed drug testing in the context of private employment. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). Although the constitutional right to privacy was not implicated because no state action was involved, the court applied the Ravin balancing test finding that it is "analogous to the analysis that should be followed in cases construing the public policy exeeption to the at-will employment doctrine." Id. at 1185. The court observed that work on an oil rig could be very dangerous and found that it was important for oil rig workers to be drug-free on the job in order to protect the safety of other personnel and the oil field. Id. at 1186. It then weighed the public policy supporting the employees' privacy in off-duty activities against the public policy supporting the protection of the health and safety of other workers as well as the employees in question, and determined that the health and safety concerns were paramount. Id. at 1186, The court did not require a specific showing of a current drug problem among oil rig workers.
*573The position articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Von Raab and the approach taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Luedtke are persuasive on the issue of whether the Municipality must establish specific instances of substance abuse in the workplace before initiating a testing program. Although evidence of specific drug or aleohol abuse problems in the Police or Fire Department would be persuasive of the need for the testing program, the absence of significant statistical or anecdotal evidence of a drug or alcohol problem is not dispositive. The court takes judicial notice that drug and aleohol abuse is a serious problem in society. The court further observes that the use of illegal drugs and abuse of alcohol are incompatible with positions whose duties include "a substantially significant degree of responsibility for the safety of the public where the unsafe performance of an incumbent could result in death or injury to self or others." Policy § 5(t). Further, the workplaces of both the Police Department and the Fire Department are not confined to the stations; their workplace is everywhere in the community that Fire Department and Police Department services are needed. The court concludes that the Municipality has a proper governmental interest, one which is "concerned with the health [or] safety ... of others," Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975), and that this interest outweighs the Plaintiffs' privacy interest.
d. Does suspicionless substance abuse testing bear a close and substantial relationship to the Municipality's proper governmental interest?
Having found that the Municipality's interest in deterring alcohol and drug usage, sale, and possession in the workplace in order to ensure a safe, healthful, and productive workplace outweighs Fire and Police Department employees' privacy interest, the court must next consider whether the means chosen by the Municipality bear "a close and substantial relationship" to that interest. Plaintiffs contend that the means, suspicion-less drug and alcohol testing, do not bear a sufficiently close and substantial relationship. They argue first, that urinalysis is not the least restrictive means of achieving the Municipality's goals and second, that urinalysis is an unproved method of combatting drug and alcohol abuse.
Plaintiffs suggest that screening for substance abuse could be done at least as well and probably more effectively one of two ways. (1) It would be better if supervisors were trained to recognize signs of substance abuse, and to test only upon reasonable suspicion. (2) Standard sobriety tests (such as the HGN used by police) could be used to establish reasonable suspicion for testing.
The Municipality responds that neither of these methods would necessarily be less intrusive noting that the greater the discretion vested in a supervisor, the greater the potential for selective and discriminatory use of the testing procedures. The Municipality also argues that these alternatives would primarily aid in detecting drug or alcohol use, but would not be a significant aid to the Municipality's other goal of deterring substance abuse.
Courts have not required that the method chosen be the least restrictive one. For example, in Harrison v. State, 687 P.2d 332 (Alaska App.1984), the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a local option law permitting communities to prohibit the importation of aleohol into the community. In challenging the law as violative of the right to privacy, Harrison pointed to evidence suggesting that moderate consumption of aleohol may be medically beneficial and contended that moderate users would be improperly punished by the law. The supreme court found that, whatever the medical benefits might be, the harmful effects of alcohol were undisputed, and that increased access to alcohol would undoubtedly increase the number of alcohol abusers. The court then upheld the local option law finding that it bore a close and substantial relationship to the legitimate legislative goal of protecting the public health and welfare by curbing the level of alcohol abuse in the state. The Court did not accept the argument that the prohibition against alcohol in certain communities spread too *574broadly, encompassing people who were not problem drinkers.18
In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the government's actions have to be the least restrictive:
Respondents offer a list of "less drastic and equally effective means" of addressing the Government's concerns, including reliance on the private proseriptions already in force, and training supervisory personnel "to effectively detect employees who are impaired by drug or aleohol use without resort to such intrusive procedures as blood and urine tests." We have repeatedly stated, however, that "[the reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative 'less intrusive means.' " It is obvious that "[the logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternatives could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers," because judges engaged in post hoe evaluations of government conduct " 'can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the [Government] might have been accomplished." "
489 U.S. 602, 629 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). See Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2396, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) ("We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."). In the instance case, the court concludes that the method chosen need not be the least restrictive in order to have a close and substantial relationship to the government goals.
The Plaintiffs' second contention is that urinalysis is an unproved method of combat-ting drug abuse. None of the cases cited by the parties have struck down a program on this basis. IAFF offers the affidavit of Dr. Kurt Dubrowski, a board-certified clinical and forensic toxicologist who, among other qualifications, has served for the last thirty years as State Director of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence in Oklahoma. In his affidavit, Dr. Dubrowski points to studies which he contends establish "that random drug testing seldom, if ever, reveals illicit drug use in work populations which have been subject to [mandated drug testing]." Dubrowski Affidavit at 7. He specifically refers to data reported in the November 20, 1996, issue of Drug Detection Report: The Newsletter on Drug Testing in the Workplace, in which motor carrier industry employers who tested their employees pursuant to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 reported very small positive rates on drug tests. Dubrowski Affidavit at T 8.
In contrast, the Municipality offers the affidavit of Peter Bensinger, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency, who runs a private company providing consultation and services related to promoting a drug-free workplace and employee health and safety. Bensinger reaches a different conclusion from the data showing low "positive" rate for employees tested in the transportation industry. He concludes that the low positive rate results from the deterrent effect of the random drug testing program. Bensinger Affidavit 12/27/96 at 11, I 24. He also points to the 1995 Department of Defense survey of Health Related Behaviors Among Military Personnel in which the Department of Defense reported a dramatic drop in the use of illicit drugs by member of the armed forces since the institution of a mandatory drug testing program. Bensinger Affidavits: 8/26/96 at 5 6, 1 10 and Exhibits 1 & 2; 12/27/96 at 11, 1 23; 1/27/97 at 5 6, 112 18.
Having concluded that the requirement of a "close and substantial relationship" is not synonymous with a requirement that the means employed be the least restrictive, this court need not determine as a factual matter that the Municipality has chosen the very best means of preventing substance abuse in the workplace. The Municipality has offered sufficient evidence to establish a close and substantial relationship between its proper governmental interest in deterring alcohol *575and drug usage, sale, and possession in the Fire Department and Police Department in order to ensure a safe, healthful, and productive workplace and the Municipality's means of suspicionless drug and aleohol testing.
C. Does the Testing Policy Violate Employees' Constitutional Right to be Free from Unreasonable Search and Seizure Under Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution?
Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. No warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The protection against unreasonable search and seizure under the Alaska Constitution is broader than the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Seq, e.g., Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977). Plaintiffs contend that suspicionless drug and alcohol tests violate both the Alaska and U.S. Constitutions because the tests are not pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause; and even if a warrant is not required, such testing constitutes an unreasonable search. The preliminary question is whether drug and aleohol testing constitutes a search. If it is, should suspicionless drug and alcohol testing be an exception to the warrant requirement, and if so, is such a search unreasonable?
1. Do the procedures for collecting wrine samples and the urinalysis constitute a search?
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable, and therefore, must be deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. at 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402. This conclusion is equally applicable to the search provision of Article I, Section 14 of the Alaska Constitution.
2. Should suspicioniless substance abuse testing be am exception to the warrant requirement?
Plaintiffs contend that a warrant issued upon a determination of probable cause by a judicial officer is necessary before suspicion-less drug testing can be done because such testing does not fall within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Usually, "a warrantless search will be considered per se unreasonable unless it falls within a previously recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 241 (Alaska 1979). However, the court can, if required by the unique facts of a case, look, "albeit with great caution, beyond the four corners of previously recognized exceptions to the principles that gave rise to them." Id. at 242.
Plaintiffs rely on Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977), in which the court struck down war-rantless OSHA searches as violative of the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14. However, the decision was based on factors not present in this case. In that case, the court observed that OSHA violations can result in significant fines and imprisonment and for this reason, found that the rights extended to a citizen in a eriminal prosecution should also be extended to the owner of a business premise subject to an OSHA search. Id. at 151. It also found that without judicial review, far too much discretion was lodged with the official in the field. Id. It concluded that the burden of obtaining a warrant was not likely to frustrate the purpose of the OSHA inspections. Id. The court also noted that the OSHA regulations extended to all employers thereby reaching many commercial undertakings with no history of intensive regulation. Id. at 152.
The Municipality relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) and Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). In Von Raab, the Court explains that "neither a warrant, nor *576probable cause, nor, indeed any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance." 489 U.S. at 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384. The Court held that "where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's interest to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context." Id. at 665-66. It found the drug-testing program was not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement: "Test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution of the employee without the employee's consent." Id. at 666. The Court further found that the purposes of the program were to deter drug use and prevent the promotion of drug users to sensitive positions and that these purposes qualified as "special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Id. at 665-66.
In Skinner, the Court observed that requiring a warrant in the post-accident context would delay testing which would result in the destruction of evidence, and thereby frustrate the purposes of the search. The Court explained:
An essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that is narrowly limited in objectives and scope. A warrant also provides the detached seru-tiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case. In the present context, however, a warrant would do little to further these aims. Both the circumstances justifying toxicological testing and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the regulations that authorize them, and doubtless are well known to covered employees. Indeed, in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.
489 U.S. at 621-22, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
The reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court is persuasive. The Municipality's drug and alcohol testing policy spells out in great detail the procedures to be followed and vests almost no discretion in an individual. Moreover, the test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution and there is no sanction such as a fine or imprisonment. These circumstances readily distinguish the drug-testing case from the OSHA inspections in Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).
3. Is suspicioniess substance abuse testing an unreasonable search and sei-sure?
The remaining question is whether the search occasioned by suspicionless drug and alcohol testing is unreasonable. Alaska law does not provide a definition of what is "reasonable." Each case [is] to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. Davis v. State, 525 P.2d 541, 543 (Alaska 1974). In Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that the traditional probable cause standard is "peculiarly related to criminal investigations" and unhelpful in analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions. 489 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (citations omitted). In Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor below which a search will be deemed unreasonable. It set forth the following framework:
In limited cireumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search *577may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.
489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402.
Thus, in determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure, a court must determine the nature and extent of the privacy interest, whether there is an important governmental interest at stake, and whether the governmental interest outweighs the privacy interest. This analysis is similar to the one applied to the right to privacy issues. Pursuant to that analysis, this court has determined that suspicionless substance abuse testing does not violate the Fire and Police Department employees' right to privacy. Similarly, the court finds that the Municipality's suspicionless substance abuse testing program does not violate the Fire and Police Department employees' right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Likewise, the court finds that the Municipality's drug and alcohol testing program does not violate Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment or privacy rights under the United States Constitution.19
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 14th day of March, 1997.
/s/ Karen L. Hunt Karen L. Hunt Superior Court Judge

. See New Jersey Transit, 701 A.2d at 1254-55 (noting that "[plost Skinner/Von Raab cases that have considered challenges to random drug testing programs under the Fourth Amendment and parallel state constitutional provisions have generally upheld [such] testing," and relegating the Guiney case to "but see" status).

. Slip Op. at 559; see Guiney, 582 N.E.2d at 525 (noting that record offered nothing to show existence of a drug problem in Boston Police Department).

. New Jersey Transit, 701 A.2d at 1259 (citing Joseph F. Dietrich & Janette Smith, The Nonmedical Use of Drugs Including Alcohol Among Police Personnel: A Critical Literature Review, 14 J. Police Science & Admin. 300, 300-03 (1986)).

. See, eg., Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674, 109 S.Ct. 1384 ("'Where ... the possible harm against which the government seeks to guard is substantial, the need to prevent its occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal."); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 487 (D.C.Cir.1989); City and County of Honolulu, 816 P.2d at 313 (citing Harmon). R

. See Slip Op. at 558, 559-560.

. See Von Raab, 469 U.S. at 674, 109 S.Ct. 1384 ('Detecting drug impairment on the part of [such] employees can be a difficult task, especially where, as here, it is not feasible to subject employees and their work product to the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office environments.").

. See, eg., McCloskey, 799 P.2d at 958-59 (noting impossibility of detecting drug use by police officers through observation and individualized investigations); City and County of Honolulu, 816 P.2d at 315 (noting ineffectiveness of detecting drug use by fire fighters through observation, psychomotor tests, and cognitive tests); Caruso, 534 N.Y.S.2d 142, 530 N.E.2d at 855 (citing statistics concerning ineffectiveness of drug testing predicated upon reasonable suspicion}.

 Minor editorial changes have been made to the superior court's decision in compliance with the *562supreme court's technical guidelines for publication.

. The APDEA also raised substantive and procedural due process claims in its complaint, but failed to address these theories in its briefing. These arguments are not before the court in these motions. '

. See Appendix to this decision for the policy in its entirety.

. The policy was adopted as part of the implementation of Policy No. 40 22 (adopted June, 1991) which attempts to address the problem of substance abuse in the municipal workplace.

. APDEA participated in these negotiations, but IAFF chose not to take part. IAFEF's claim of unfair labor practices as a result of the implementation of the policy is not before the court on these motions.

. The IAFF does not oppose testing after a work-related accident involving a vehicle IAFF Memo at 4.

. Section 7.a.(1) of the policy describes under what circumstances an employee is subject to promotion/transfer/demotion testing. (This section also governs pre-employment testing which the parties do not challenge.)
Pre Employment drug and alcohol testing is the final step in the selection process for safety-sensitive and public safety positions. Pre-em-ployment testing may result from any of the following employment actions:
- New Hire
- Rehire
- Promotion
- Demotion
- Transfer
- Reinstatement
-_ Re-employment
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Employees in safety-sensitive or public safety positions will be required to re-test for transfer, promotion, or demotion unless this requirement is waived by the Director because an employee has passed a substance abuse exam within the last thirty days.

. Section 7.a.(3) requires testing under the following circumstances:
Post Accident Testing-Unless waived by the Employee Relations Department, post-accident testing will be conducted when there has been a work related vehicular accident. The procedures for post-accident tests are outlined in 7.c.(4).
Section 7.c.(4) lists the circumstances that will trigger post-accident testing.
Post accident testing may be conducted when there has been a work related accident occurring while an employee is performing job duties that results in: a citation for a moving violation; death or personal injury; damage to Municipal or private property excluding the vehicle; or a vehicle being towed from the scene of the accident or removed from service. In any of these circumstances, any employee who is directly involved in the incident shall be subject to the specific criteria set forth below, being tested for drugs and/or alcohol. The first priority will be treatment of any injuries and cooperation with law enforcement personnel. Post-accident testing will be done within 8 hours of the accident and drug testing must be completed within 32 hours after the accident.
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NOTE: If the accident resulting in damage to Municipal or private property was caused by a public safety employee, operating within standard operating policy guidelines, the requirement for post accident testing may be waived by a Command Officer.
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. The policy originally adopted by the Municipality in September 1994 included random testing for public safety employees. Municipality's Exhibit D, Policy No. 42 24 at 3 & 22 23, §§ 5.t & 7.c.(7). This provision was not included in the amended policy adopted in October 1995. However, if random testing is found to be constitutionally permissible, the Municipality intends to conduct such testing of all public safety employees. As Carol Smith, the Affirmative Action and Compliance Manager in the Department of Employee Relations with the Municipality, whose job includes Drug Free Workplace Act compliance duties, explains:
*564The Amended Policy 40 24 presently does not address random testing for "public safety"" employees. Language including "public safety" employees in random testing was omitted from the amended policy because the MOA intended to implement all other types of testing, prior to the court having the opportunity to review the constitutionality of random testing. The omission was intended to reflect the MOA's position that random testing would not be conducted for APDEA employees absent a court's decision. At no time did I state that the policy would be implemented in any other manner than by its terms.
It remains MOA's intent, however, to include "'public safety'" employees in random testing if such testing is found to be constitutional.
Affidavit of Carol Smith at 5 % 14, 15.
Section 5.v of the amended policy defines a random test (italicized language is added from the original policy):
Random Test-an unannounced substance abuse test given periodically to Transit and other employees who are required by government regulations to be subject to random testing, and individuals in public safety positions subject to random testing.
Section 7.a.(2) sets out the requirement of random drug testing and to whom the testing applies:
Random testing is only applicable to certain Transit Department employees, employees required to have a DCL, other employees required by government regulations to be subject to random testing, and individuals in public safety positions.
Once each month, the Contractor will randomly select the appropriate percentage of employees, determined by the Employee Relations Department, employed in safety-sensitive/public safety positions to be tested. The selection will be performed through use of a statistically valid computer random selection method.

. The policy also discusses "safety-sensitive" positions. There are no safety-sensitive positions] within the Police Department. Affidavit of Carol Smith at 4, (11. Nor do there appear to be any safety-sensitive positions within the Fire Department.

. 427 out of 437 APDEA members are employed in positions designated as "public safety positions." APDEA Response at 3; Supplemental Affidavit of Rob Heun at 2, 12. All but three job classifications for IAFF members are considered "public safety positions." Municipality Memo re: IAFF S.J. at 7; Municipality's Exhibit U.

. In Ravin, the Court explicitly adopted the "proper government interest"/"'close and substantial relationship" test rather than the traditional compelling state interest test for evaluating a right to privacy. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 498 (Alaska 1975). In Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission, 570 P.2d 469, 476 (Alaska 1977), the Court observed that "[ulnder the Alaska Constitution, the required level of justification turns on the precise nature of the privacy interest involved," contrasting this standard with the standard in federal cases of a "compelling state interest." However, in some subsequent privacy cases, the Court has referred to a compelling state interest in weighing the right to privacy against a state interest. See Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1990) (inquiring whether disclosure of personnel records was required to serve a compelling state interest as part of test adopted from Colorado case); Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980) (using compelling state interest test from Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972), for impairment of a fundamental right under the Alaska Constitution). In practical terms, there is probably no significant difference between these tests. See Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2394-95, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (emphasis in original):
It is a mistake, however, to think that the phrase "compelling state interest," in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation the question: Is there a compelling state interest here? Rather, the phrase describes an interest which appears important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.

. For example, the privacy interest in personnel records is less compelling than that implicated in home or familial settings. Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 n. 14 (Alaska 1990).

. Luedtke involved a private employer's drug testing program.

. Other courts have recognized a diminished expectation of privacy under similar circumstances. See, eg., Doe v. City and County of Honolulu, 8 Haw.App. 571, 816 P.2d 306, 314 (1991) (fire fighters have diminished expectation of privacy); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (Customs employees involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry a firearm have diminished expectation of privacy because employees cannot reasonably expect to avoid inquiry into information that reflects directly on their fitness); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627-28, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) {employees in a heavily regulated industry have diminished expectation of privacy where safety is dependent on health and fitness of employees).

. Compare Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2393, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), in which the United States Supreme Court considered the privacy invasion of required urinalysis of student athletes. The Court found that "the privacy interests compromised by the process of obtaining the urine sample are in our view negligible," where the students were permitted to remain fully clothed and were not directly observed while producing a sample. Id.

. Other courts have considered it significant that the questioned tests screen only for drugs. Vernonia School District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2393, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). Here Plaintiffs raise the specter of additional testing of the urine samples to provide information unrelated to safety-considerations. However, the policy allows testing only for specific substances. (The policy incorporates DOT regulations which prohibit testing for anything other than the specified controlled substances. Policy §§ 6.e.(1) & 6f.(1); 49 CFR. § 40.21(c).) The court will not assume that the Municipality intends to violate the policy. When a party chooses to challenge a policy on its face, the court will not assume the worst. Veronia, 115 S.Ct. at 2394.

. Fire Chief Nolan states in his affidavit that he is aware of several instances where employee drug use has been identified or suspected. He describes two instances where employees were subject to discipline: one employee quit after being disciplined on several occasions for being impaired by alcohol while on duty and one employee was terminated after testing positive for cocaine following discipline for suspicion of repeated marijuana use. He describes a third employee who successfully completed a treatment program and four other employees who were suspected of substance abuse, but who quit prior to any official action being taken. Affidavit of Chief Nolan at 10.

.But see Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1990) (requiring that disclosure of personnel records be done in "least intrusive" manner, utilizing test from Colorado case).

. See Von Raab (upholding transfer/promotion of employees in public safety positions); Skinner (upholding post-accident testing); Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C.Cir.1989) (upholding random testing under certain circumstances).