Court Opinion

ID: 9945646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 07:12:08.986814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:35.467614
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 21, 2024

                                      In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01347-CR
                               No. 05-22-01348-CR

                   ADOLPHUS O’NEAL DAVIS, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7
                            Dallas County, Texas
               Trial Court Cause No. F19-70684-Y, F22-00657-Y

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Nowell
      A jury convicted appellant Adolphus O’Neal Davis of two counts of theft of

property greater than $30,000 but less in $150,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 31.03(e)(5). He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment in cause number F19-

70684-Y and six years’ imprisonment in cause number F22-00657-Y, probated for

five years. In four issues, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting into evidence four unauthenticated documents. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.
                                     Background

      Because the facts are known to the parties and appellant does not challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1. In January 2006, Noel Balderas purchased two adjoining lots located

at 4827 and 4835 Corrigan Avenue in Dallas, Texas. Appellant asked Balderas if he

could graze his horse on the property in exchange for taking care of the property.

Balderas and appellant entered into a “horse-grazing agreement.”              Balderas

interacted with appellant through the years, and eventually, appellant asked Balderas

if he wanted to sell the property. They negotiated but never reached an agreement.

      Jorge Loera and his wife, Ariana Espinoza, lived nearby and often saw

appellant on the property. In 2016, appellant asked Loera if he wanted to graze his

horses on the property. Loera declined the offer. Some time later, Loera heard

appellant was interested in selling the property. They reached an agreement to buy

“owner to owner.” Loera had no reason to believe appellant did not own the

property; however, a few weeks later, he received a letter from the City of Dallas

explaining the City could not transfer title to him because Balderas still owned the

property.

      The State subsequently indicted appellant on two counts of unlawfully

appropriating property, “the aggregate value of which was more than $30,000 but

less than $150,000,” namely the money Loera and Espinoza paid appellant for

                                          –2–
property he did not own. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(5).             A jury

convicted him on both counts, and this appeal followed.

                                     Discussion

      In four issues, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting State’s Exhibits 3, 12, 23, and 24 because the State failed to properly

authenticate them. We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an

abuse of discretion and may not reverse if its decision is within the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015); Dickson v. State, No. 05-14-01061-CR, 2016 WL 772766, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 29, 2016, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

      “To satisfy the requirement of authentication . . . the proponent must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims.”

TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). In a jury trial, it is the jury’s role ultimately to determine

whether an item of evidence is indeed what its proponent claims; the trial court need

only make the preliminary determination that the State has supplied facts sufficient

to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.

Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. This can be accomplished in a myriad of ways, including

through the testimony of a witness with knowledge or through evidence showing

distinctive characteristics. TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (testimony of a witness with

knowledge) & 901(b)(4) (distinctive characteristics). The proponent need not

eliminate all other possibilities inconsistent with authenticity, and circumstantial

                                        –3–
evidence, other than a signature, may establish authorship. See Jones v. State, 466

S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d); see also Soria

v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (drawing found in appellant’s

cell was sufficiently connected to appellant to permit the State to argue it belonged

to appellant). This has been described as a “liberal standard of admissibility.”

Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600.

      Appellant first challenges State’s Exhibit 3, the residential lease-purchase

agreement. Loera’s testimony authenticated the agreement. He explained appellant

hand-delivered the agreement to him. Loera identified his signature on the contract.

He confirmed the agreement included the property description and the terms of sale

based upon previous in-person discussions.         Under the liberal standard of

admissibility, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant’s

authentication objection because Loera testified to the accuracy of the information

in the residential lease-purchase agreement based on his personal knowledge of the

transaction. TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). These facts provided sufficient information

for the trial court to make the preliminary determination the proffered evidence was

authentic. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

      Appellant next challenges State’s Exhibit 12, the $8,500 down payment

receipt. The State introduced the document during Espinoza’s testimony. She

explained it was a signed receipt from appellant memorializing their $8,500 partial

cash down payment for the property. It was titled “RECEIPT,” dated December 15,

                                        –4–
2016, and “Paid to: Adolphus Davis,” “Received from: Jorge Loera and Ariana

Espinoza,” “For: down payment on 4835 Corrigan Ave, Dallas, TX 75214.” The

State introduced a similar receipt memorializing another cash payment “For: down

payment on 4835 Corrigan Ave, Dallas, Texas 75214” without objection. The only

difference in the two documents is the amount received. A party waives any alleged

error regarding the erroneous admission of evidence if the same or substantially

similar evidence has been previously admitted without objection. See Debnam v.

State, No. 04-22-00177-CR, 2023 WL 4223625, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

June 28, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because

appellant failed to object to substantially similar evidence, he waived his issue for

review. Id. Even assuming appellant preserved this issue, Espinoza testified she

gave appellant $8,500, and he personally delivered the receipt to her, which noted

the amount she gave for “down payment” on the property. Her testimony, as a

witness with personal knowledge, provided enough information for the trial court to

make the preliminary determination based on sufficient facts that the proffered

evidence was authentic. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600; see also TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).

We overrule appellant’s second issue.

      Finally, appellant challenges the admission of two letters addressed to Loera

and Espinoza and signed by appellant: (1) State’s Exhibit 23, dated December 5,

2016, and (2) State’s Exhibit 24, dated January 7, 2017. Espinoza testified she

recognized both letters because appellant personally handed them to her. Upon

                                        –5–
review, both letters reference specific details about the parties’ negotiations to

purchase the property as well as references to other past discussions between them.

Given the distinctive characteristics of the content of both letters and Espinoza’s

testimony that appellant personally delivered the letters to her, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by making a preliminary determination that the letters were

authentic. See TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (4); see also Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600. We

overrule appellant’s third and fourth issues.

      In overruling appellant’s issues, we reject his argument that the documents

were not authenticated because a handwriting expert did not testify and the State did

not introduce an exemplar to compare with his signature. Circumstantial evidence,

other than a signature, may establish authorship. See Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 60; see

also Pierce v. State, No. 2-03-517-CR, 2004 WL 1798088, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Aug. 12, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding

contents of letter were sufficient to authenticate it). As discussed above, the State

met the “liberal standard of admissibility” to satisfy rule 901(a). See TEX. R. EVID.

901(a); Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600.

                                          –6–
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                          /Erin A. Nowell//
221347f.u05                               ERIN A. NOWELL
221348f.u05                               JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                       –7–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

ADOLPHUS O’NEAL DAVIS,                       On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                    Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F19-70684-Y.
No. 05-22-01347-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
                                             Justices Miskel and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 21st day of February, 2024.

                                       –8–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

ADOLPHUS O’NEAL DAVIS,                       On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                    Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. F22-00657-Y.
No. 05-22-01348-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
                                             Justices Miskel and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 21st day of February, 2024.

                                       –9–