Court Opinion

ID: 9417307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:07:48.542389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:38.379245
License: Public Domain

A petition for a rehearing having been filed,
Mr. Chief Justice Waite
delivered the opinion of the court.
Buie 6, par. 4, as amended Nov. 4, 1878, 97 U. S. vii, provides that there may be united with a motion to dismiss a writ of error or appeal, a motion to affirm, on- the ground that, although the record may show that this court has jurisdiction, it is manifest the appeal or writ of error was taken for delay only, or that the question on’ which the jurisdiction depends is so frivolous as not to need further argument. This is a modification of the rule as originally promulgated May 8, 1876, 91 U. S. vii, when it was confined to motions to dismiss writs of error to a State court. In Whitney v. Cook (99 U. S. 607), we held that to justify a motion to affirm under this rule there must be a motion to dismiss and at least- some color of right to a dismissal.
In Stewart v. Salamon (97 U. S. 361), we decided that if an *766appeal was taken from a decree entered on our mandate upon a previous appeal, we would, on tbe application of the appellee, examine the decree entered, and if it conformed to the mandate, dismiss the case, with costs. The motion to dismiss in this case was apparently based upon that ruling. It seemed to us, when it was up for hearing, to have been made in good faith ; and while we did not think it ought to be sustained, we . could not say it was without any color of right. For that rea son we felt at liberty to look into the motion to affirm.
The record in this case showed that Hinckley was appointed receiver in-the Kelly suit Nov. 24, 1879, and that his receivership ended by his turning over the property to the trustees of the mortgage on the 12th of August, 1875. The record of the former appeal, to which we think we may with propriety look, as the order now appealed from was made upon a petition of intervention filed in that cause, shows that in the settlement of accounts then made Hinckley was paid for his services during the whole period of his receivership, that is to say, from the date of his appointment in the Kelly suit until his final discharge.
We are still of the opinion that the case is a proper one for the application of our rule in respect to motions to affirm, and, therefore, the petition for a rehearing is

jDenied.