Court Opinion

ID: 9527400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:30:20.51065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:46.739891
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court had definitively ruled to exclude the evidence of the prior Indiana conviction. I further believe that the result of the majority’s opinion is an unwarranted overturning of a proper exercise of discretion by the trial court and that it results in an exclusion of evidence which a jury could properly consider in rendering its verdict. I accordingly respectfully dissent. I think it evident from the trial court’s remarks and the actions of counsel for both the defense and prosecution that the initial ruling was considered interlocutory. The court stated that he would “not admit this into evidence because it doesn’t contain the same elements that we have in Illinois. * * * I hope that we can get better information somewhere. I am erring on the side of the defendant if I am erring.” During argument on the matter defense counsel objected on the basis that the documentation of the conviction was improper and incomplete. However, neither he nor the prosecution offered any case citations or other authority in support of the positions taken. The defendant then took the stand. The following day, before the jury was reconvened, the State’s Attorney again moved for the introduction into evidence of defendant’s prior conviction. The court noted “we have previously discussed this to some degree. [To defense counsel:] I assume you are still objecting to the introduction of this?” Counsel for the defendant renewed his objection and then offered case citations and other authority in support of his position. The prosecution also was prepared on this occasion with authorities to support its arguments. After hearing argument, the trial court indicated that although he would have preferred that the conviction be documented in a different form he would nevertheless permit it to be introduced into evidence for purposes of impeachment. A proper limiting instruction was given to the jury. I think it fair to infer that both defense and prosecution counsel had done research and were prepared to cite authority in support of their respective positions because each was aware that the issue of the admission of defendant’s prior conviction had not been finally resolved and that the court would entertain further argument on the subject since he wanted “better information” before making a final and binding ruling. I do not believe that the defendant was therefore unfairly surprised. Whether or not to admit evidence of a prior conviction is a matter resting within the discretion of the trial court. (People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695.) That discretion was not abused in the instant case. The trial court may entertain this issue more than once during trial and may use its discretion to rule differently when the issue is reconsidered. People v. Spicer, 44 Ill. App. 3d 200, 358 N.E.2d 104. I would affirm the court’s action in admitting the record of the Indiana conviction.