Court Opinion

ID: 9778233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:56:33.864399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.459407
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
What this case boils down to is whether in criminal cases the appellate courts can substitute their judgment for the jury’s on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence. Because the majority does not leave these matters to be resolved at the local level by a jury, I dissent.
The legal issues are whether this Court and the courts of appeals have the power in direct appeal criminal cases to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support the elements of the offense.1 I would hold this Court and the courts of appeals have no such power, and they should, as they have done for years, continue to apply a single standard—the one set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (a reviewing court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational *152trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the substantive elements of the offense as defined by state law). Another question lurking here that the majority wholly fails to address is, assuming this Court and the courts of appeals have this power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard, whether, as a policy matter, we should exercise it. I also would hold judicial restraint is called for here.

POWER TO APPLY “FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY” STANDARD IN CRIMINAL CASES

Article V, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution, sets out this Court’s jurisdiction. In relevant part, it provides:
“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have final appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the state, and its determinations shall be final, in all criminal cases of whatsoever grade, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be provided in this Constitution or as prescribed by law.” (Emphasis Supplied).
Article V, Section 6, of the Texas Constitution, sets out the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction. In relevant part, it provides:
"... Said Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. Provided, that the decision of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on appeal or error.” (Emphasis Supplied).
As I understand the majority opinion, the general grant of appellate jurisdiction in these constitutional provisions grants this Court and the courts of appeals the same power to review “fact” questions in direct appeal criminal cases.2 See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 870-75 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (plurality op.). And, I agree. Our prior cases3 misconstrued the “factual conelusivity” clause in Article V, Section 6, by identifying it as the source of the courts of appeals’ “fact” jurisdiction. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 871. Our prior cases arguably meant only the courts of appeals had the power to review “fact” questions in direct appeal cases while this Court had no such power in direct appeal cases. See, e.g., White, 591 S.W.2d at 854r-56. The majority presents compelling reasons to disavow our prior cases to the extent they suggest the “factual conclusivity” clause is the source of the courts of appeals’ “fact” jurisdiction.
A civil “factual sufficiency” standard, which I assume the majority intends to adapt to the criminal side, requires the reviewing court to consider and weigh all the evidence; i.e., the reviewing court considers the evidence without the prism of “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” See Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 648-652; Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 684-35 (Tex.1986) (rejecting the position the reviewing court in civil cases is not free to “reweigh the evidence and set aside a jury verdict merely because the judges feel a different result is more reasonable”); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1951); Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 88 Tex.L.Rev. 361 (1960). The main difference between the Jackson v. Virginia standard and a “factual sufficiency” standard is the Jackson v. Virginia standard requires the reviewing court to defer to the jury on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence while the “factual sufficiency” standard allows the reviewing court to second-guess the jury on these questions. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (when a reviewing court *153reverses the verdict based on the weight of the evidence, the reviewing court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony); Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 437-38 (the Jackson “prism” serves as the appellate mechanism for deferring to the factfinder’s credibility and weight decisions).
Therefore, for purposes of the rest of this discussion, I assume the majority intends to adopt a “factual sufficiency” standard that requires the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Clinton, J., concurring) (the reviewing court must consider and weigh the evidence to determine whether the jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony was manifestly unjust).
With this understanding, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion the courts of appeals have the power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases. The issue here largely involves a question of statutory construction since the grant of appellate jurisdiction is subject to such exceptions and regulations as may be “prescribed by law.” See Article V, Sections 5 & 6 (Emphasis Supplied). The statutory scheme of things on the criminal side shows the Legislature undertook to insure a “factual sufficiency” standard would not be applicable in criminal cases.
The majority relies on Article 44.25, V.A.C.C.P., to support its conclusion the courts of appeals have the power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard. However, the Legislature made significant changes to Article 44.25 in 1981 when the courts of appeals received criminal jurisdiction in noncapital direct appeal cases. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 874-75 fn 5. The 1981 amendments modified Article 44.25 to its current form:
“The courts of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals may reverse the judgment in a criminal action, as well upon the law as upon the facts.” Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 874-75 fn 5.
Prior to this, Article 44.25 and its statutory predecessors provided:
“The Court of Criminal Appeals may reverse the judgment in a criminal action, as well upon the law as upon the facts. A cause reversed because the verdict is contrary to the evidence shall be remanded for a new trial.” Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 874-75 fn 5. (Emphasis Supplied).
Before this, the statutory predecessor to Article 44.25 provided:
“The court of appeals [the predecessor to this Court] may reverse the judgment in a criminal action, as well upon the law as upon the facts; but, when a cause is reversed for the reason that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the same shall, in all cases, be remanded for a new tried.” Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 874r-75 fn 5. (Emphasis Supplied).
Therefore, any questions about this Court’s and the courts of appeals’ power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard were resolved in 1981 when the Legislature deleted the emphasized portions of Article 44.25 which allowed the remedy of a new trial when the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The legislative changes to Article 44.25 indicate a legislative intent to limit the power of this Court and the courts of appeals to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial when they subjectively believe the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Any other construction would render the legislative changes to Article 44.25 meaningless. See Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Legislature is presumed to change the law when it amends a statute, and a construction should be adopted that gives effect to the intended change rather than one which renders the amendment useless). Of course, it is well-settled on the civil side that when a “factual sufficiency” challenge is sustained, the remedy is to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. However, the Legislature has insured that this Court and the courts of appeals do not have the power to do that. The legislative history of Article 44.25 does not support the majority’s conclusion the courts of appeals have the power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases.
The majority relies on various cases decided in the late 1800s and early 1900s to support its position Article 44.25 does not oper*154ate as a limitation on the power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases. See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 139-143 (Clinton, J., concurring). However, these eases were decided under the earlier versions of Article 44.25. The 1981 statutory changes to Article 44.25 render these cases irrelevant to the extent they can be read as supporting the application of the “factual sufficiency” standard the majority adopts.
The majority apparently concludes the 1981 legislative changes to Article 44.25 were “useless” because “presumably” these changes were in response to this Court’s opinion in Johnson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 4, 6 fii. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), which declared Article 44.25 unconstitutional to the extent it conflicted with Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 145-147 (Clinton, J., concurring). As I understand the majority’s position, Johnson is of no consequence since it is now understood that reversing and remanding for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence does not violate Burks-Greene. See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41-42, 102 S.Ct. at 2218.
However, Johnson was not concerned with what at the time was the well-settled standard of review which deferred to the jury on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence. Johnson was concerned with whether reversing and remanding for a new trial under that standard violated Burks-Greene. Johnson clearly intended for an acquittal to be the only remedy for a reversal “upon the law as upon the facts.” See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 32-33 (Tex.Cr.App.1993) (Clinton, J., dissenting) (one compelling effect of Burks-Greene was to render the second sentence of Article 44.25 unconstitutional). And, although we, and “presumably” the Legislature, now understand that reversing and remanding for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence does not violate Burks-Greene, the Legislature has not undertaken to give back what the majority fears it may have taken away in 1981 when it amended Article 44.25. Under these circumstances, I would find it appropriate to decide this Court did not do a “useless” act in Johnson and neither did the Legislature when it amended Article 44.25 in 1981.4 See Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d at 842.
More importantly, Article 38.04, V.A.C.C.P., also shows a legislative intent that a “factual sufficiency” standard is not applicable in criminal cases. Article 38.04, in relevant part, says the jury in all criminal cases “is the exclusive judge of the facts proved and of the weight to be given to the testimony.” The bottom line here is the majority adopts a standard that requires the reviewing court to weigh the evidence. However, the “plain language” of Article 38.04 makes the jury the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence.
The majority decides Article 38.04 does not apply to appellate review of sufficiency issues because Article 38.04 is meant “to distinguish the role of the jury from the role of the judge at trial.” The majority’s interpretation of Article 38.04 is contrary to its “plain language” and exceeds the scope of this Court’s power by legislating an “exception” to Article 38.04. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 800-01 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Clinton, J., concurring). Also, it makes no sense to hold the trial judge, who has observed the witnesses testify and their demeanor, has no power to weigh the evidence, while the reviewing court has the power to weigh the evidence on a cold record.
The majority’s interpretation of Article 38.04 also is contrary to this Court’s precedents which for about the last seventy-five years have consistently construed Article 38.04 and its statutory predecessors to re*155quire the reviewing court to defer to the jury on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Franklin v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 636, 183 S.W.2d 573, 574 (App.1944); Mason v. State, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 452, 1 S.W.2d 283, 284 (App.1927) (op. on reh’g); see also Jolly v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 288, 221 S.W. 279, 281 (App.1920) (the reviewing court sets aside the verdict when the evidence, viewed in its strongest light from the State’s standpoint, fails to make guilt reasonably certain). These precedents are unaffected by this Court’s disapproval of the cases set out in footnote three of this opinion.
The majority avoids the application of seventy-five years of well-settled precedent by its reliance on an 1883 “seminal opinion for a unanimous court” in Walker v. State, 14 Tex. App. 609 (1883).5 See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 138 (Clinton, J., concurring). According to the majority, the last seventy-five years of this Court’s precedents construing Article 38.04 are “wrong,” because Walker decided the statutory predecessors to Article 38.04 did not prohibit the reviewing court from weighing the evidence. Assuming this is a good reason to ignore principles of stare decisis,6 cases like Walker cannot be reconciled with the clear and unambiguous legislative command in Article 38.04 that the jury is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence. With all due respect, Walker was “wrong.” The majority shows no respect for principles of stare decisis or the “plain language” of our legislative enactments.
In addition, I have found no legislative provision similar to Article 38.04 on the civil side which apparently is one reason why the civil side can apply a “factual sufficiency” standard. For example, in Cropper, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed for the civil side that the “factual sufficiency” standard does not deny the right to trial by jury guaranteed by Article I, Section 15, of the Texas Constitution. See Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 648-53. The Supreme Court said the “factual sufficiency” standard does not violate this right to trial by jury because it only allows the reviewing court to “unfind” facts and remand the cause for a new trial before a different jury. See id. That the reviewing court could weigh the evidence and disagree with the jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony was irrelevant. See id. As long as the reviewing court does not render judgment for the appealing party, the civil side does not find a violation of the right to trial by jury. See id.
Cropper could support the proposition that adopting a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases does not violate the Texas constitutional right to trial by jury. But see Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 653-56 (Robertson, J., dissenting). However, Cropper has nothing to do with whether adopting a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases violates Article 38.04, which it does. Therefore, Cropper offers no support for adopting a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases, and the majority errs to harmonize “the criminal and civil jurisprudence of this State with regard to appellate review of questions of factual sufficiency.”
The majority also implicitly explains its holding is necessary to prevent an “unjust” conviction. However, the majority does not explain how this question is relevant to the issue before the Court or how a verdict that meets the Jackson v. Virginia standard can *156be considered “unjust.”7 Properly applied, the Jackson v. Virginia standard is about as exacting a standard as a “factual sufficiency” standard because both standards require the reviewing court to consider all the evidence.8 After a reviewing court determines the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, it is practically impossible to say, under a proper application of a “factual sufficiency” standard, the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Or, “once the Jackson sufficiency standard is met, the evidence could never be” insufficient under a proper application of a “factual sufficiency” standard. See Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 488. This is so because:
‘Within the constraints of our jury system, the Jackson standard ensures a just and fair result. The purpose of the Jackson standard is to ensure only the rationality of the factfinder. Id. Clearly, any irrational verdict would be manifestly unjust and clearly wrong under our jury system. Conversely, however, we cannot perceive of any sufficient, i.e., rational, verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that would be ‘manifestly unjust and clearly wrong.’ Furthermore, even if such a verdict is theoretically possible, we agree with the Tennessee Supreme Court, which under similar circumstances stated, We find the weight of the evidence standard to be difficult, if not impossible, to apply rationally and uniformly in criminal cases.’ (Cite and footnote omitted).” Id.
A proper application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard does not result in an “unjust” conviction.
Finally, and also contrary to the civil side, I have some reservations about whether applying a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases violates the constitutional right to trial by jury. See Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 653-56 (Robertson, J., dissenting). It seems irrelevant the reviewing court can only “unfind” facts. The reviewing court is still reversing the judgment and remanding the case for a new trial before a different jury merely because the reviewing court subjectively believes a different result is more reasonable. See Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41-42, 102 S.Ct. at 2218. Applying a standard that removes the “prism” of “in the light most favorable to the verdict” may violate the right to trial by jury in Texas.
However, in this case, I would not find it necessary to address the constitutional issue. I would only hold the 1981 legislative changes to Article 44.25 combined with Article 38.04 clearly “prescribe” this Court and the courts of appeals from applying a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal eases.
Having concluded that neither this Court nor the courts of appeals have the power to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases, the next issue to discuss is the standard to apply in exercising the reviewing court’s “fact” jurisdiction. See Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 870-75; Article 44.25. The Dallas Court of Appeals aptly presented the question as follows:
“Appellate fact jurisdiction, as authorized by article V, section 6, should not be confused with the appellate standard of review required to exercise that fact jurisdiction. The state constitution, at most, says that *157an intermediate appellate court has conclusive fact jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. It does not purport to set out the standard of review required to exercise that fact jurisdiction. The question before us in this case, therefore, is what standard of review we are required to apply in reviewing the appellant’s factual sufficiency challenge to the evidence supporting an element of the charged burglary offense.” Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 431 (Emphasis in Original).
The Jackson v. Virginia standard is consistent with the constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction, the constitutional right to trial by jury, Articles 38.04 and 44.25, and our prior practice in reviewing sufficiency issues. When this Court reverses a conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, it is reversing the judgment “upon the law as upon the facts.” See Article 44.25.; Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 437 {Jackson specifically requires the reviewing court to look at all the evidence, i.e., the facts).
In addition, the 1981 amendments to Article V, Section 6, were intended to grant the courts of appeals only the same power in noncapital direct appeal cases that this Court had exercised prior to the 1981 amendments. Cf. Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 649. For about seventy-five years, this Court has applied a single standard in reviewing sufficiency issues—the Jackson v. Virginia standard or something similar to it. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Jolly, 221 S.W. at 281. How this Court traditionally has exercised its power to review sufficiency issues should inform its decision on how to exercise that power now.
And, in light of how this Court traditionally has reviewed sufficiency issues and the intent of the 1981 amendments to Article V, Section 6, I also would hold the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the standard this Court and the courts of appeals should apply to the elements of the offense.

ASSUMING THE POWER TO APPLY A “FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY” STANDARD, SHOULD THE REVIEWING COURT EXERCISE THIS POWER

The only check on this Court’s exercise of its constitutional power, short of constitutional amendment and usually statutory enactment, is this Court’s own sense of self-restraint. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statutes commanding this Court or the courts of appeals to apply a “factual sufficiency” standard in criminal cases. Assuming this power exists, I would hold this is an appropriate case for the Court to exercise restraint and not adopt the “factual sufficiency” standard for essentially the same reasons Florida abandoned the application of a similar standard in Tibbs v. Florida, 397 So.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fla.1981) (considerations of policy support, if not dictate, this result). Twelve citizens sitting as jurors are better able to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony than are professional appellate judges. See Cropper, 754 S.W.2d at 653 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
Considerations of judicial economy also call for the exercise of judicial restraint. And, it does not make much sense to require the State to assume the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt in the trial court, then tell the State on appeal its evidence meets the Jackson v. Virginia standard, but then tell the State the reviewing court is reversing the conviction because the evidence is “factually insufficient.” The majority opinion continues us down the road of erecting such massive barriers to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law that the system will be unable to carry out its elementary function of protecting law-abiding citizens from dangerous criminals.
Law-abiding citizens, who are unconcerned with the legal niceties discussed in these pages, should understand the majority opinion increases the likelihood they will become a victim of violent crime because, according to the majority, this is the only protection a criminal defendant has from an “unjust” conviction. The majority opinion does not cite one instance of an “unjust conviction” under Jackson, and, in light of the foregoing discussion, a guilty verdict that meets the Jackson v. Virginia standard can never be considered an “unjust” conviction. The Jackson v. Virginia standard strikes a proper balance between granting defendants a fair evidentiary *158review of their convictions and protecting society from dangerous criminals. However, the majority opts to interpret the law to protect the criminal defendant at the expense of the law-abiding citizen. The benefit society receives is protection from the nonexistent chance of an “unjust” conviction.
The majority opinion unnecessarily expands the power of the judiciary to release dangerous criminals back into society. The majority accomplishes this by ignoring clear legislative intent and well-settled precedent in the tradition of “judicial activism.” Respectfully, I dissent.
KELLER, J., joins this dissent.

. The issues of this Court’s and the courts of appeals' power to apply a “factual sufficiency’’ standard are so related that this opinion addresses both issues. I use the term "factual sufficiency’’ standard as it is understood on the civil side, since the majority apparently adopts a modification of that standard today; i.e., the reviewing court, viewing the evidence without the prism of “in the light most favorable to the verdict,” should set aside the verdict if it is "so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Cf. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.1988) (the civil side sets aside a verdict that is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust). X say modification of the civil “factual sufficiency” standard because the majority apparently adapts the civil "factual sufficiency” standard to the State’s "beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof in criminal cases. See Clewis v. State, 876 S.W.2d 428, 433 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1994); Stone v. State, 823 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex.App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref’d, untimely filed). Of course, the majority opinion can only be intended to benefit criminal defendants since the State has no right to appeal an adverse jury verdict in a criminal case.

. I do not use the term “fact” jurisdiction as automatically requiring a “factual sufficiency” standard of review, as the majority appears to do. The two terms do not necessarily go hand-in-hand. See Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 431 (appellate "fact" jurisdiction should not be confused with the appellate standard of review to exercise that jurisdiction).

. See Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Cr. App.1990); Schuessler v. State, 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986); Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169, 106 S.Ct. 2891, 90 L.Ed.2d 978 (1986); Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); White v. State, 591 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. In Bigley, Judge Clinton took the position the “mandate" in Article 44.25 requires the remedy of an acquittal when the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Bigley, 865 S.W.2d at 32-33 (Clinton, J., dissenting). It should be noted Bigley was decided eleven years after the Supreme Court decided Tibbs which held a reversal and remand for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence does not violate double jeopardy principles. Judge Clinton did not claim in Bigley, as he appears to do here, that Johnson was of no consequence in light of Tibbs. Just two years after Bigley, Judge Clinton now takes the position the "mandate" in Article 44.25 no longer prohibits the reviewing court from reversing and remanding for a new trial. Judge Clinton’s position in this case is inconsistent with the position he took just two years ago in Bigley.

. The majority apparently reads Walker to support the application of four standards of review in criminal cases! See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 139 (Clinton, J., concurring) ("First,” “Second,” Third,” and "Fourth” rules).

. Apparently, as evidenced by the majority's reliance on cases like Walker, the crux of the majority's opinion is the pre-1920 cases are now "right” and the post-1920 cases are now "wrong.” See Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 143 (Clinton, J., concurring) (e.g., dismissing Franklin because the authoring judge was "less than thorough in his research”). However, the point is that for at least seventy-five years this Court in reviewing sufficiency issues has applied a single standard that defers to the jury on questions of credibility and weight of the evidence. And, the majority presents insufficient reasons to depart from these precedents. See Hubbard v. U.S., — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1754, 131 L.Ed.2d 779 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (departure from doctrine of stare decisis requires reasons that go beyond a mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong).

. The majority presents a hypothetical in footnote twelve of its opinion to illustrate an "unjust” conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard; i.e., the 40 nuns hypothetical. This hypothetical makes two assumptions neither of which are very practical. It assumes a prosecutor would choose to prosecute under that fact situation and a jury would actually convict under that fact situation. However, if such a conviction was ever had, the reviewing court in applying Jackson v. Virginia should not have too much trouble concluding that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the offense. Therefore, the 40 nuns hypothetical would not result in an “unjust” conviction under Jackson v. Virginia.

. The majority mischaracterizes how we apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard when it says, "we have applied Jackson in such a way that the only evidence a reviewing court considers is the evidence that supports the verdict.” This Court rejected this application of the Jackson v. Virginia standard in Butler v. State, 769 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), overruled on other grounds, Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Butler iterated the reviewing court must consider the "entire body of evidence.” See Butler, 769 S.W.2d at 239; Clewis, 876 S.W.2d at 437.