Court Opinion

ID: 9911637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 17:00:49.05674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:10.315531
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2107     Document: 010110971737       Date Filed: 12/20/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        December 20, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-2107
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:20-CR-01587-KG-1)
  GILBERT J. GALLEGOS,                                         (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Gilbert J. Gallegos appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to two counts of

 production of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography.

 Over ten months, Mr. Gallegos repeatedly assaulted his daughter’s 10-year-old friend

 when she came to his house to play. During several of the assaults, Mr. Gallegos

 took photographs and videos of the victim and used social media to lure her into

 additional assaults.

       The district court imposed a 45-year sentence, including an enhancement based

 on the use of a social-media application to send and receive sexually-explicit content.

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 Mr. Gallegos contends that the enhancement was improper based on the timeline of

 the assaults in Counts 1–3. We disagree. The district court did not err in finding the

 photos, videos, and exploitative social-media messages were part of Mr. Gallegos’s

 continuing course of illicit conduct. Accordingly, the application of the computer

 enhancement was not in error. The sentence imposed was substantively reasonable

 given the district court’s careful consideration of the sentencing factors set forth in

 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

                                   I. Background 1

       Between July 2019 and April 2020, Mr. Gallegos sexually abused his

 daughter’s 10-year-old friend. The victim often went to Mr. Gallegos’s house to visit

 her friend M.G., Mr. Gallegos’s daughter. Mr. Gallegos sexually abused the young

 friend almost every time she went to his house, sometimes taking pictures and videos

 of the assaults. Mr. Gallegos communicated with the victim using the social-media

 platform Snapchat, sending her lewd pictures and messages, including instructions

 from Mr. Gallegos to delete the messages he sent her.

       In April 2020, the victim’s mother, A.S., discovered evidence of Mr.

 Gallegos’s abuse of her daughter when she viewed sexually-explicit messages from

 her daughter’s Snapchat account. Mr. Gallegos was arrested. A forensic

 examination of his cell phone revealed two videos dated July 2, 2019, that showed

 the victim naked from the waist down, laying with her legs spread open on the

 1
   These facts are taken from the district court’s findings at the sentencing hearing.
 R., Vol. IV at 33–34; R., Vol. II at 82–83.

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 ground while Mr. Gallegos rubbed his erect penis around her genitals until he

 ejaculated. The forensic examination also located the equivalent of hundreds of

 visual depictions of child pornography that did not involve the victim.

       Mr. Gallegos was indicted on two counts of production of visual depictions of

 a minor engaging in sexually-explicit conduct under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2251(e),

 and 2256, and one count of possession of material containing or constituting child

 pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(1). Counts 1 and 2

 occurred on July 2, 2019, while Count 3 began on July 2, 2019, and continued to

 April 8, 2020.

       Mr. Gallegos pleaded guilty to the charges without a plea agreement.

 Following his guilty plea, the probation office issued a presentence investigation

 report that assessed Mr. Gallegos’s total offense level of 42, a criminal history

 category of I, and a guidelines range of 360 to 960 months imprisonment. 2

       The PSR also assessed a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.

 § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(i) for using a computer or interactive computer service to solicit a

 minor to engage in sexually-explicit conduct. Mr. Gallegos objected to the

 enhancement, also requesting a downward variance to the statutory minimum

 sentence of 15 years. In support, Mr. Gallegos submitted a sealed sex offender

 evaluation report concluding that he presented a low risk of recidivism.

 2
   Based on Mr. Gallegos’s offense level and criminal history, the guideline
 imprisonment range came out to 360 months to life imprisonment, but the statutorily
 authorized maximum sentence in this case is 960 months.

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          At sentencing the district court overruled Mr. Gallegos’s objection and

 sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment as to Counts 1 and 2, to run concurrently,

 and 15 years’ imprisonment as to Count 3, to run consecutively for a total term of 45

 years.

                                      II. Discussion

          Mr. Gallegos contends that both the computer enhancement and the length of

 his sentence constitute reversible error. We address each argument in turn.

          A. Computer enhancement

          Mr. Gallegos first argues that the district court erred by overruling his

 objection to the revised presentence investigation report and applying the two-level

 computer enhancement in (B)(i). 3 He argues the enhancement does not apply

 because he produced the sexually-explicit videos before he engaged his daughter’s

 friend on Snapchat.

          “When evaluating sentence enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines,

 this Court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and questions of

 law de novo.” United States v. McDonald, 43 F.4th 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2022). “In

 applying the clear-error standard, we can reverse only if the finding was simply not

 plausible or permissible in light of the entire record on appeal.” United States v.

 Worku, 800 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 3
   If the two-level enhancement were not applied, the total offense level would have
 been 40 and the guideline range would have been 292 to 365 months.

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 “[S]entencing enhancements . . . need be determined by only a preponderance of the

 evidence.” United States v. Craig, 808 F.3d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 2015).

       Mr. Gallegos was convicted of three counts of sexual abuse of a minor,

 including the production of sexually-explicit content, and possession of child

 pornography. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a)(e); 2256; and 2252A. Under the United States

 Sentencing Guidelines, convictions under these counts are entitled to enhanced

 sentences if the defendant used a computer (cell phone) or interactive computer

 service (social media, such as Snapchat) during the crimes.

       The computer enhancement states:

              If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material . . .,
              the offense involved . . . the use of a computer or an interactive
              computer service to (i) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or
              facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit
              conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such
              conduct . . . increase by 2 levels.

 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(i). As a threshold matter, a cell phone is a “computer”

 under federal law, which defines the term as

              an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high
              speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or
              storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
              communications facility directly related to or operating in
              conjunction with such device, but such term does not include
              an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held
              calculator, or other similar device.

 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). Snapchat is an “interactive computer service” as defined by

 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2):

              The term “interactive computer service” means any
              information service, system, or access software provider that

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              provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
              computer server, including specifically a service or system that
              provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
              services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

 Id.

       The Guidelines instruct how to apply the enhancement. Application Note 6 to

 § 2G2.1 tells us:

              Subsection (b)(6)(B) provides an enhancement if the offense
              involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer
              service to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the
              travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
              purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for the
              purpose of transmitting such material live or otherwise to
              solicit participation by a minor in such conduct for such
              purposes. Subsection (b)(6)(B) is intended to apply only to the
              use of a computer or an interactive computer service to
              communicate directly with a minor or with a person who
              exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.
              Accordingly, the enhancement would not apply to the use of a
              computer or an interactive computer service to obtain airline
              tickets for the minor from an airline’s Internet site.

 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.6(B) (emphasis added).

       Mr. Gallegos objected to the application of the enhancement and explained

 that his conduct could not support the computer enhancement because the videos

 were produced “on or about” July 2, 2019, while he sent the Snapchat messages to

 the victim only after that date. According to Mr. Gallegos this means he did not use

 his phone or Snapchat for the purpose of producing sexually-explicit material.

       We first note that the language of the computer enhancement does not require

 that the use of a computer or an interactive computer device occur before the

 production of sexually-explicit material. Instead, the enhancement references

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 “conduct” associated with the “offense,” which is defined as “the offense of

 conviction and all relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) unless a

 different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the context.” § 1B1.1, cmt.

 n.1(I) (emphasis added). Because no other meaning of “offense” is specified in

 § 2G2.1, offense as used in the enhancement and defined by § 1B1.1 encompasses all

 “relevant conduct” committed during the commission of the crime. Relevant conduct

 is defined as “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,

 commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that

 occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that

 offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that

 offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added). 4 While we do not reach the

 4
   See also United States v. Wilson, 17 F.4th 994, 1001 (10th Cir. 2021) (“Subdivision
 (a)(1)(A) [of § 1B1.3(a)] encompasses ‘all acts and omissions committed . . . by the
 defendant; and . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction,
 in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
 responsibility for that offense.’” (emphasis added)); United States v. Patton, 927 F.3d
 1087, 1096 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Relevant conduct includes acts and omissions ‘in the
 course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility’ for the offense.” (citing
 § 1B1.3(a)(1))); United States v. Garcia-Rivas, 669 F. App’x 960, 961 (10th Cir.
 2016) (“Under § 1B1.3 [relevant conduct] includes all acts and omissions of a
 defendant “that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
 preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
 responsibility for that offense.”); United States v. McCowan, No. 21-8035, 2022 WL
 572475, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2022) (“Relevant conduct includes ‘all acts and
 omissions’ ‘during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
 that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for
 that offense.’” (citing § 1B1.3(a)(1))).

 While our circuit precedent is clear that relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)
 contemplates all acts and omissions of a defendant during the commission of the
 offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to

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 other subsections of § 1B1.3 here, we note that “[a] defendant can be ‘accountable

 for particular conduct’ under more than one subsection of § 1B1.3.” United States v.

 Solis, 746 F. App’x 764, 767 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing § 1B1.3 cmt. nn.2, 4(A)(i)).

        Mr. Gallegos labors under the false impression that the computer enhancement

 is applicable only to his offense of conviction. As shown by the Guidelines’

 definitions, this is far too narrow a reading of the computer enhancement. Instead,

 Mr. Gallegos is liable for the full extent of his conduct — “the offense of conviction

 and all relevant conduct.” § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(I) (emphasis added). The definition of

 relevant conduct included Mr. Gallegos’s ongoing efforts to lure and entice the

 victim back to his house for his intended sexual assaults. And relevant conduct also

 includes his efforts to “avoid detection or responsibility for that offense,”

 § 1B1.3(a)(1)—he normalized his exploitation of the victim by sending sexually-

 explicit content to her and attempted to avoid detection by instructing her to delete

 his messages. Normalizing his exploitation of the victim encouraged her not to tell

 anyone about his July 2, 2019, production of child pornography and requesting the

 deletion of his subsequent sexually explicit messages would have impeded, and did

 impede, the ultimate discovery of that production. United States v. Altamirano-

 avoid detection or responsibility for that offense, we note to be certain and for the
 sake of edification that this interpretation agrees with the Sentencing Commission’s
 Primer on Relevant Conduct (2022). The Primer states, under Conduct of the
 Defendant (§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)), that “[r]elevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)
 includes acts and omissions done or caused by the defendant during three time
 periods: (i) in preparation for the offense; (ii) during the offense; and (iii) following
 the offense in an attempt to avoid detection.” Office of Gen. Counsel, U.S.
 Sentencing Comm’n, Primer: Relevant Conduct 3 (2022) (citing § 1B1.3(a)(1)).

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 Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087, 1095 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Relevant conduct for sentencing

 purposes . . . comprises more, often much more, than the offense of conviction itself,

 and may include uncharged and even acquitted conduct.” (internal quotation marks

 omitted)); see also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 403 (1995) (noting that

 relevant conduct is a “sentencing enhancement regime[] evincing the judgment that a

 particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the authorized range

 if it was either accompanied by or preceded by additional criminal activity”).

       The district court’s factual findings made clear that Mr. Gallegos’s messages

 to the victim via Snapchat, which occurred after the July 2 videos, were for the

 ongoing purpose of producing sexually-explicit images and videos of the victim. R.,

 Vol. IV at 33–34; R., Vol. II at 82–83. The record also revealed that Mr. Gallegos

 used Snapchat to lower the victim’s inhibitions so that he could continue to sexually

 assault her, record that abuse, and lastly, to attempt to escape detection and

 responsibility by having her delete the messages he sent her. 5,6 The district court

 stated as much during the sentencing hearing:

 5
   Mr. Gallegos’s Snapchat messages to the victim included: graphic pictures of his
 genitals; telling the victim that he would penetrate her when they got together;
 sexually explicit messages, including that he missed her, that he wanted to engage in
 oral sex, and that he wanted to use his “monster” on her; and finally, telling her to
 delete the messages he sent. R., Vol. II at 6–8.
 6
   The district court made findings that “Gallegos told [the victim] to delete the
 message he sent her on Snapchat.” R., Vol. II at 83. The inference that he did so in
 order to escape detection and avoid responsibility is a reasonable one.

 The sentencing court did not apply the enhancement on this basis, but we have the
 “discretion to affirm on any ground adequately supported by the record,” United

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               I’m finding that, indeed, Mr. Gallegos used a computer, i.e., a
               cell phone, and utilized Snapchat to send messages and images
               in a way that enticed or solicited this young victim to engage
               in sexually explicit conduct. While it’s true that she went to
               Mr. Gallegos’ house, in part, to visit and even play with her
               friend, Mr. Gallegos’ daughter, the messages that were sent
               clearly, to me, were intended and had the result of enticing—
               attempting to entice, at least, this young victim to engage in
               sexually explicit conduct. It’s certainly the purpose that they
               were sent, and that’s, I think, sufficient to warrant the upward
               two-level adjustment.

  R., Vol. IV at 34–35.

        Given the support in the record and the preponderance-of-the-evidence

  standard for sentencing enhancements, the district court’s factual findings were not

  clearly erroneous, and it did not err in applying the computer enhancement.

        Mr. Gallegos disagrees with our interpretation of § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(i) but his

  arguments rely on cases that say nothing of his preferred interpretation of the

  computer enhancement. For example, Mr. Gallegos relies on United States v.

  Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001), for the proposition that the computer

  enhancement cannot be applied to conduct that occurred after the commission of the

  offense. But Reaves dealt with interpreting the term “solicit” in the 1998 version of

  States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178, 1203 n.17 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
  marks omitted). “[I]n exercising that discretion,” we are guided by the fact that “the
  parties have fully briefed and argued the alternative ground, and . . . they have had a
  fair opportunity to develop the factual record.” Id. (internal quotation marks
  omitted). Mr. Gallegos addressed this ground in his opening brief. Aplt. Br. at 26.
  The government likewise addressed this issue. Aple. Br. at 15. In his reply brief,
  Mr. Gallegos repeats his argument from the opening brief. Reply Br. at 4. Because
  Mr. Gallegos had a fair opportunity to address this ground and further factual
  development by the parties was unnecessary, affirming on this ground as an
  alternative holding is not unfair to Mr. Gallegos.

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  the computer enhancement, not with the temporal aspect of the enhancement. Id.

  That the defendant in Reaves used a computer to show sexually-explicit content to his

  victims before the production of child pornography says nothing about whether the

  computer enhancement may be legally applied when the use of a computer occurs

  only after the production of sexually-explicit material. Id. at 1203. Indeed, the

  defendant in that case also showed his victims sexually-explicit imagery “after their

  participation in sexually explicit conduct.” Id. (emphasis added).

        Mr. Gallegos’s reliance on United States v. Raiburn, 20 F.4th 416 (8th Cir.

  2021), is also misplaced. Mr. Gallegos cites Raiburn for the proposition that the

  application of the computer enhancement was proper when a defendant requested

  sexually-explicit photos from a minor using a cell phone. Like Reaves, this

  proposition is both true and unhelpful to his argument. The relevant issue in Raiburn

  was whether the district court erred in concluding that the parties’ mutual

  masturbation over a video call satisfied the “participation with a minor in sexually

  explicit conduct” language from § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii). Id. at 424–25. The Eighth

  Circuit did not address Raiburn’s argument because it found that such error by the

  district court, if it occurred, was harmless since the defendant’s conduct supported

  the enhancement from subsection (B)(i) instead. Id. at 425.

        The factual basis for the guilty plea made clear that Raiburn had “knowingly

  employed and used the minor victim to engage in sexually explicit conduct by

  communicating with her via cellular phone and requesting she take a selfie of her

  genitals and send him the photo via text message.” Id. (cleaned up). The minor

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  victim took such an explicit photo using her cell phone and sent it to Raiburn’s cell

  phone via text message. Id. Absent from Raiburn is any discussion of a timing

  element of the enhancement.

        Mr. Gallegos’s remaining cases are similarly as unpersuasive. They are

  factually distinct from his pattern of conduct with the victim here and do not engage

  with any temporal aspect of the computer enhancement. See United States v. Turner,

  756 F. App’x 576, 580–81 (6th Cir. 2018) (affirming the application of the computer

  enhancement for use of a computer in soliciting participation of a minor in sexually-

  explicit conduct and for the purpose of producing sexually-explicit material); United

  States v. Zagorski, 807 F.3d 291, 293–94 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (affirming the district

  court’s application of § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) when the defendant sent sexually-explicit

  material of a minor to another person and also solicited that person to engage in

  sexual activity with a minor); United States v. Roman-Portalatin, 476 F. App’x 868,

  869–70 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the

  district court’s incorrect reference to subsection (B)(ii) because, as an alternate

  enhancement, subsection (B)(i) could have been applied when the defendant used a

  computer to induce a minor to have sex with him and to send the defendant explicit

  photos of herself).

        In sum, the district court did not err in applying the computer enhancement.

        B. Reasonableness

        Mr. Gallegos also challenges his sentence of 45 years as substantively

  unreasonable.

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        “We review the substantive reasonableness of all sentences—whether inside,

  just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-

  of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lente, 759 F.3d 1149, 1157–58 (10th Cir.

  2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, we will deem a

  sentence unreasonable only if it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly

  unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When evaluating the

  substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we afford substantial deference to the

  district court, and determine whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given

  all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

  § 3553(a).” United States v. Gieswein, 887 F.3d 1054, 1064 (10th Cir. 2018)

  (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] within-Guidelines sentence is entitled to a

  presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.” United States v. Craig, 808

  F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        When considering whether a sentence is substantively reasonable, we ask

  “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the

  case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v.

  Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

  The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history

  and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence to reflect the

  seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law; the need to deter criminal

  conduct; and the need to protect the public from future crimes.

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        Because Mr. Gallegos’s sentence was within the Guidelines, it is entitled to a

  presumption of reasonableness. Craig, 808 F.3d at 1261. Mr. Gallegos argues he

  can rebut this presumption because his 45-year sentence is greater than necessary to

  fulfill the basic sentencing objectives of retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence.

  While he recognizes the need for retribution given the “horrendous” nature of the

  offense, R., Vol. IV at 67, Mr. Gallegos contends that 45 years is longer than

  necessary to satisfy that need. Moreover, Mr. Gallegos reasons that his drug

  problems mitigate his moral culpability and that he immediately accepted

  responsibility, cooperated with the prosecution, and demonstrated great remorse.

        Mr. Gallegos also attests that the interests of incapacitation and deterrence do

  not justify a 45-year sentence. Mr. Gallegos relies on Bureau of Justice Statistics for

  the proposition that sex offenders are less likely than other offenders to be rearrested

  or go back to prison and that rates of recidivism for sex offenders plummet with age.

  Aplt. Br. at 32. Mr. Gallegos also notes that he would be close to 60 years old at

  release with the imposition of a 15-year sentence, and any risk of recidivism would

  be lowered. With the imposition of a 15-year sentence, Mr. Gallegos argues he could

  resolve his drug habit and his minor daughter would be an adult upon his release, so

  he would not be near children.

        The district court considered these same arguments at sentencing, noting that

  Mr. Gallegos was “appropriately remorseful,” had the minimum criminal history

  category of I, and was found to be “not a risk for future danger and future

  recidivism” by the doctor conducting his sex-offender evaluation report. R., Vol. IV

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  at 67–69. But the court also noted that Mr. Gallegos’s drug use, while a contributing

  factor, was not the only reason for his conduct; that the doctor conducting his

  evaluation did not consider the victim’s forensic interview so while “somewhat

  helpful,” the report was neither complete nor “entirely helpful”; and that “given the

  nature of the offense and [Mr. Gallegos’s] methodology in luring and taking

  advantage of [the victim],” the court considered him dangerous and viewed him as a

  future danger. Id. The district court further noted that any sentence it imposed “has

  to protect the public, that certainly includes children, as well as to bring just

  punishment for victimizing [the child].” Id. at 69–70. Finally, the court

  acknowledged its intent to protect the victim from Mr. Gallegos until a time she was

  older and more secure. Id. at 73.

         The district court considered Mr. Gallegos’s arguments, assessed them under

  the § 3553(a) factors, and imposed a guideline sentence. Mr. Gallegos’s sentence of

  45 years was well within the bounds of permissible choices, and he has not met his

  burden to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.

                                      III. Conclusion

         We affirm the district court.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                               Circuit Judge

                                              15