Court Opinion

ID: 9792414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:04.661375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.722222
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
It is my belief that the trial court and this Court in the majority opinion have totally overlooked substantial problems that are inherent in this cause. The ultimate end of these proceedings is to bastardize a seven-year old child, a result with which I cannot concur regardless of the protestations of and quarrels between a mother, her ex-husband, who is the presumptive father of the child, and an interloper whom the mother claims as the father of the child because he slept with her during the course of her marriage to the first husband.
Appellant mother was married to one Stephenson on November 16,1974, and that marriage was not terminated by divorce until August of 1976. The child, which is the focus of this action, was born February 3, 1976. Admittedly, that child was conceived and born during the Stephenson marriage. Until 1970, the clear law in Idaho was that a child conceived or bom during the time of a marriage was well nigh irrebuttably presumed to be the child of that husband. In Alber v. Alber, 93 Idaho 755, 472 P.2d 321 (1970), the then existing law was modified to provide that the theretofore existing presumption “is not conclusive but may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” In Alber, the ultimate question ordered to be addressed by the trial court on remand was:
“a specific finding of fact based on the evidence heretofore adduced regarding whether the appellant had access for the purpose of sexual intercourse with his then wife following their separation in November, 1966, and during the possible period of conception. Following the entry of such finding of fact, the trial court *675is further instructed to enter his conclusion of law stating whether or not the presumption of the legitimacy of the child conceived during the marital period has been overcome by clear and convincing evidence.” Id., 93 Idaho at 761, 472 P.2d at 327.
In the instant case, those questions have not been addressed. In my view, the trial court rather proceeded on the bland assumption that Stephenson was not the father of the child and the only question was whether Crain was the father of the child. Such a result, of course, leaves the child floating in limbo, a result I cannot countenance.
If the issue in the instant ease was the paternity of a child born to an unwed mother, the majority’s discussion of Comish v. Smith, 97 Idaho 89, 540 P.2d 274 (1975), and Isaacson v. Obendorf, 99 Idaho 304, 581 P.2d 350 (1978), would clearly be relevant, since in both Cornish and Isaacson, unwed mothers had brought paternity proceedings under the provisions of Idaho’s Paternity Act, I.C. § 7-1101, et seq, to require that person, named by the mother and found by the court to be the father of the child, to support the child. If the facts of the case at bar bore any resemblance to either Cornish or Isaacson, I would instantly concur and applaud the majority for allowing our trial court to utilize the technological advances in medicine, specifically the HLA test, to further the cause of justice in paternity proceedings. We are not, however, presented with such a set of facts.
In the instant case, as in Alber, a wife, during the course of a marriage, had extramarital relations with another man. A child was conceived. As in Alber, in the instant case it is unclear to me at least, and the trial court made no finding, whether the then husband had sexual access to his wife during the time of the conception of the child. During the divorce proceedings, in Alber, as in the instant case, the mother took the stance that her husband whom she was divorcing was not the father of the child. It was held in Alber that the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and res judicata “do not apply to a case of this nature where the specific issue drawn in question is that of child support. Child support is for the benefit of the children ... [and] she [the mother] is not the real person in interest who can waive the rights of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id., 93 Idaho at 758, 472 P.2d at 324. The Alber result was reached notwithstanding that the mother had communicated, both orally and in writing, to everyone who would listen to her that her husband was not the father of the child and that another specifically named individual was the father of her child.
Much of today’s majority opinion is hinged upon the interpretation of Idaho’s Paternity Act, I.G. § 7-1101, et seq. Contrary to the utilization of that Act by the majority opinion, I would hold that the clear legislative intent, as disclosed by the definitions contained in § 7-1103, is that the Act should apply only to proceedings brought to establish the paternity of a child bom out of wedlock. That statute specifically defines “child” as a “child born out of wedlock.” It defines “mother” as “the mother of a child born out of wedlock.”
In sum, I feel the Court embarks upon a dangerous voyage today. It is clear that Crain, regardless of his previous conduct, now cares little or nothing about the child, which milk of human kindness is equally shared by Stephenson. The mother also did not hesitate to abandon any rights the child might have to the name or the support of her presumptive father but appears to have been primarily interested in clearing the way for a permanent relationship with her erstwhile lover. It also appears that the “interests” of the child became paramount in her mind when love flew out the window, her second marriage terminated, and she found that the rights of the child she had so readily abandoned in the first divorce could only be recouped by way of child support from her second husband. I find it difficult to choose between the various alternatives. Does one excuse Crain from supporting a child which the testimony indicates he very probably fathered, because of the fortuitous circumstances that his copulation partner *676was at that time married? Does one excuse Stephenson from his otherwise paternal duties because the child born during his marriage was undoubtedly the result of adulterous relationship between then Mrs. Stephenson and Crain? Does one reward the mother of the child for her sterling qualities and her actions on behalf of the child? The inclination would be to say, “A pox upon all of your houses,” were it not for the existence of the child.
We stated in Alber v. Alber, supra, 93 Idaho at 758, 472 P.2d at 324, and reiterated in Miller v. Miller, 96 Idaho 10, 523 P.2d 827 (1974), “The conduct and the misrepresentations of a parent cannot militate against the interest of a child which is of paramount consideration.” In Miller, supra, 96 Idaho at 11, 523 P.2d at 828, “[a] medical report was introduced in the record which established that the appellant was not the father of the child.” Nevertheless, over the protestations of the mother of the child, its custody was awarded to the former husband of the mother.
I can readily visualize some results of today’s majority decision which I for one would not perceive as advances in our jurisprudence. Among the parade of horribles, I see husbands in divorce cases disclaiming parentage of children born during the marriage and demanding that medical technology settle the issue.
I would remand the cause to the trial court for trial on the issue of Stephenson’s parentage of the child. He is clearly presumptively the father of the child, regardless of the previous divorce negotiations entered into by him and his then wife. Only if the presumption is adequately rebutted by clear and convincing evidence should the trial court conclude that Stephenson is not the father of the child. Only thereafter would I hold that there is any issue as to Crain’s paternity of the child and only in that phase of the trial would I conclude that there is any relevance to any evidence of Crain’s parentage of the child.
Last, but not least, I would order the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child, which person should be an officer of the court and thoroughly detached from any of the other parties to the action, and hence without bias or prejudice but serving only the best interests of the child.