Court Opinion

ID: 9725951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:22:22.26106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:21.719344
License: Public Domain

PUGLIA, P. J.
I agree that the writ must issue directing the trial court to sustain petitioner’s demurrer without leave to amend.
“The critical determination of whether the allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact or opinion is a question of law. (See Letter Carriers, supra [418 U.S. 264 (41 L.Ed.2d 745, 94 S.Ct. 2770)]; Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler (1970) 398 U.S. 6 [26 L.Ed.2d 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537]; Emde v. San Joaquin County etc. Council, supra, 23 Cal.2d 146 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916].) The distinction frequently is a difficult one, and what constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another, in light of the nature and content of the communication taken as a whole. Thus, where potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor dispute, or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601 [131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425].)
The alleged libel of the real party in interest took place in the heat of a campaign for local elective office. The words arguably offensive to the reputation of the real party in interest suggest that he sought a “pledge of allegiance to Cesar Chavez” as a condition of supporting petitioner’s bid for election. Considered in insolation, the putatively offending words are not defamatory. Such quid pro quos as sought by real party in interest may not be in the highest traditions of American politics but they are indisputably among the most commonly accepted. If these words *541are libelous, they are rendered so only by the accompanying gloss petitioner placed on the activities of Cesar Chavez. If the charge that Chavez forced many farms out of business and showed no consideration for the right of farmers or the public is factual, an inference arguably arises that real party in interest was closely allied with a ruthless, unprincipled malefactor.
However in the context of an election campaign the petitioner’s characterization of Cesar Chavez’ conduct constitutes a statement of opinion rather than fact and thus is protected speech to which no libelous connotation attaches.
The petition of real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 25, 1981.