Court Opinion

ID: 9449851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:25:21.454391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:01.269775
License: Public Domain

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge,, with whom Chief Judge BAZELON concurs
(dissenting):
The issue presented here, not treated' in the panel opinion, and reurged in the-motion for rehearing en banc, relates to-an important aspect of the law concerning search warrants. Since Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), some misunderstanding has arisen in this area of' the-law, particularly with reference to the: right of the defendant, in a hearing on a motion to suppress, to challenge the representations of the affiant in the “unnamed reliable informant” affidavit':. This application for rehearing en bañéis based on the refusal of the District. Court to permit such a challenge. The-pertinent colloquy which presented this-, issue in the court below follows. The-policeman who signed the “unnamed reliable informant” affidavit on which the-search warrant was based is being examined by defense counsel:
“BY MR. SIMON:
“Q. Getting back to these informers you stated you relied upon-their statements and the affidavit,, were any of these informers-, known narcotic addicts?
“THE COURT: What has that to-do with this?
“MR. SIMON: Reliability of the informers, Your Honor.
* * * -* *
“MR. SIMON: * * * [There is J a factual question, assuming that - you could have an affidavit based1 wholly on hearsay, in this particular case were the informers reliable.
*601“THE COURT: I am not going to hear any evidence on that. In other words, stay with the execution of the warrant.”
Apparently the district judge was laboring under the mistaken impression that since Jones, supra, the policeman’s “unnamed reliable informant” affidavit is not subject to challenge as to misrepresentations contained therein. This, of ■course, is not the law. If, after weighing1 the public interest in preserving the anonymity of the informant against the right of the defendant to know in the particular circumstances of this case, it is determined that disclosure is not required, the defendant would nevertheless have the right to test the police officer’s representations in the affidavit, including the asserted reliability of the unnamed informant.
With respect to motions to suppress, Rule 41(e), F.R.Crim.P., provides that one of the grounds for suppressing the evidence obtained by a warrant is the lack of “probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued.” That Rule also provides that “[t]he judge shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.” And Jones, supra, while approving the issuance of a warrant based on an “unnamed reliable informant” affidavit, specifically recognizes that the affiant’s, as distinguished from the unnamed informant’s, representations are subject to challenge on a motion to suppress. 362 U.S. at 269-272, 80 S.Ct. at 735-737, 4 L.Ed.2d 697. It would seem, therefore, that the policeman is not the final judge of reliability of an informant, or of any other evidence of probable cause. At least, the facts on which he predicates his judgment are subject to judicial review. Ibid. Rule 41(e), F.R.Crim.P.
I would grant the motion for rehearing en banc.

. The judge also seems to have acted under the mistaken impression that, since Jones, supra, there is an absolute right- not to disclose the names of informants on the hearing of a motion to suppress. The Government asserted no such right. And, of course, there is none. “We believe that no fixed rule -with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper bal-anee renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628-629, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957).