Court Opinion

ID: 9769829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:02:59.890367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:08.402598
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that Tex.Code Crim.Proe. art. 11.071 passes constitutional muster. I write *232separately to supplement the majority opinion in an effort to avoid any confusion in the future.
I.
The majority states: “[ajrticle 11.071 simply provides the methodology for rendering the writ of habeas corpus and does not prevent this Court from exercising its constitutional powers over the writ of habe-as corpus.” Ante, 947 S.W.2d at 219.1 The potential for confusion arises when one considers this statement in light of Judge McCormick’s statement that art. 11.071 provides the “exclusive procedures for the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction under [Tex. Const, art V, § 5]”. Ante, 947 S.W.2d at 222 (McCormick, J., concurring)(emphasis in original). For the following reasons, the majority correctly holds art. 11.071 does not impact our original habeas jurisdiction. This is true because art. 11.071 is a statutory creation while our original habeas corpus jurisdiction is derived from the Constitution. Therefore, this Court has original habeas corpus jurisdiction separate and apart from that provided in art. 11.071.
II.
Prior to 1977, the Texas Constitution provided in part:
The Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, issue such writs as may be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction....
Tex. Const, art. V, § 5. Under this provision, this Court had “general original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus.” Ex parte Jackson, 602 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980); and, Ex parte Cvengros, 384 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Tex.Cr.App.1964). See also, Ex parte Hofmayer, 420 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. 1967) (Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has general original jurisdiction to grant the writ of habeas corpus, the Texas Supreme Court does not.). And, this jurisdiction was unlimited. Ex parte Supercin-ski, 561 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Herrin, 537 S.W.2d 33, 34 (Tex.Cr. App.1976); Ex parte Waters, 499 S.W.2d 309, n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); State ex rel. Wilson v. Briggs, 171 Tex.Crim. 479, 351 S.W.2d 892, 894 (1961).
In 1977, the Texas Constitution was amended to provide:
Subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and, in criminal law matters, the writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, and certiorari. The Court and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue such other writs as may be necessary to protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments ....
Texas Const, art. V, § 5.
The intent behind the 1977 amendment was to expand, not limit, our jurisdiction. At the time the Legislature was considering this amendment, then Presiding Judge Onion and other Judges of this Court appeared before the Senate and House Committees to explain the effect of the proposed amendment. Thomas v. Stevenson, 561 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Onion, P.J., concurring). The legislative history demonstrates the purpose of the amendment was to provide this Court with greater power to grant extraordinary writs in criminal matters. Id., 561 S.W.2d at 847. As Presiding Judge Onion explained: “... [the amendment] was drafted to give this court original jurisdiction not only to issue writs of habeas corpus but writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition and certiorari.” Id., 561 S.W.2d at 848. Therefore, the 1977 constitutional amendment did not limit our habeas jurisdiction. See also, State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for the Third Dist., 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (Court refused to assume “original habeas corpus jurisdiction” when real party in interest was “free to pursue his claims through the filing of an application under Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 11.07.”); Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Under the definitions set forth in Chapter 11 of the *233Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Tex. Const, art. V, § 8 has much broader availability to applicants than a writ filed pursuant to art. 11.07); and, Ex parte Krupps, 712 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Onion, P.J., concurring) (“The Court has general and unlimited jurisdiction to issue original writs of habeas corpus in all cases, including those of a civil nature.”). From this authority it is clear our original jurisdiction is unlimited, notwithstanding arts. 11.07 and 11.071.
This was made clear in Ex parte Renier, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), where the applicant, contending the indictment upon which his conviction was based was void, sought relief under art. 11.07. Id., 734 S.W.2d at 350. Even though Renier had successfully completed his probation and was not confined, he contended the void indictment was nevertheless subject to habeas corpus review. Id., 734 S.W.2d at 351 (citing Ex parte Ormsby, 676 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984)). We held Renier’s application was not authorized under art. 11.07 because Renier was not “confined.” Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 351-53. See, art. 11.07 §§ 2(c) and (d). But we specifically noted that one who otherwise suffers collateral restraint was not barred from seeking relief by way of original habeas corpus. Renier, 734 S.W.2d at 353. Had we held otherwise, we would have unconstitutionally “suspended” the writ of habeas corpus. Id., 734 S.W.2d at 353-54 (citing Tex. Const, art. I, § 12). We dismissed Renier’s application without prejudice to his right to file another application invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction. Ibid. See also, Ex parte Brager, 704 S.W.2d 46, n. 1 (Tex.Cr. App.1986) (Distinguishes between an original application for writ of habeas corpus and an application filed under art. 11.07.). Both Re-nier and Brager were decided after the 1977 amendment to art. V, § 5.
III.
Citing no controlling authority, Judge McCormick argues art. 11.071 provides the “exclusive procedures for the exercise of this Court’s original habeas corpus jurisdiction.” Ante, 947 S.W.2d at 222 (emphasis in original). These arguments have been raised and rejected in the past. For instance, Judge Teague’s similar argument fell on deaf ears in his dissenting opinion to Renier; an opinion which Judge McCormick refused to join. Further, Judge McCormick joined the majority in Brager.2
Finally, the holding proposed by Judge McCormick could have a preclusive effect on our jurisdiction to review contempt orders. There is no right of appeal from an order of contempt. Ex parte Eureste, 725 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Ex parte Jacobs, 664 S.W.2d 360 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); and, Ex parte Moorehouse, 614 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Cr. App.1981). The proper course of review from a contempt order is by original application for writ of habeas corpus. Eureste, 725 S.W.2d at 216. Indeed, writing for the Court in Collins v. Kegans, 802 S.W.2d 702, 704-705 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), Judge McCormick held: “the validity of a contempt judgment can be attacked only by way of habeas corpus.” Ibid. See also, Ex parte Gray, 649 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). But, because contempt orders are not “final convictions,” they are not subject to review under either art. 11.07 or 11.071. See, Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, § 3(a). Therefore, our jurisdiction to review contempt orders is entirely based upon art. V, § 5. Eureste, 725 S.W.2d at 216. If we adopted Judge McCormick’s position that art. 11.07 and 11.071 provide the exclusive means to invoke our habeas corpus jurisdiction, there would be no vehicle to challenge the validity of a contempt order.
In sum, Judge McCormick’s argument today is contradicted not only by controlling *234precedent, but by his earlier positions. With respect, Judge McCormick has yet to advance a principled reason for deviating from the positions he took in Renier, Brager and, Collins. See, State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (McCormick, J., dissenting).
Because the majority opinion reaffirms our precedent holding art. 11.07 does not affect our original habeas jurisdiction, I join that opinion.
OVERSTREET, J., joins this opinion.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Further, in Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, Eighth Supreme Judicial Dist., 769 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), the Court of Appeals sought to limit Renier. We rejected this construction, however, and again held that art. 11.07 does not limit our original habeas corpus jurisdiction. Rodriguez, 769 S.W.2d at 558. In Rodriguez, Judge McCormick wrote: "I believe we are all in agreement that Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., is totally inapplicable to this situation. Likewise, I believe we all recognize that, to a limited extent, the district courts of this State have certain constitutional authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus." Rodriguez, 769 S.W.2d at 562 (McCormick, J., dissenting).