Court Opinion

ID: 9908301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:35.307355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.392674
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0262-MR

CHERYL SWANSON                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM GREENUP FAMILY COURT
v.               HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CI-00380

BRITTANY TACKETT AND
RAYMOND CHARLES
SWANSON                                                              APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Cheryl Swanson (“Cheryl”) appeals from a Greenup Family

Court order denying her petition for visitation with her granddaughter. She

contends the family court failed to consider that the child’s father was motivated

by vindictiveness in stopping her visitation. Upon careful review, we affirm.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             Cheryl is the paternal grandmother of L.T. (“Child”), who was born in

2018. Cheryl’s son, Raymond, is Child’s father. Brittany Tackett is Child’s

mother. Raymond and Brittany are divorced.

             Cheryl filed a petition for grandparent visitation on October 6, 2022,

alleging that Brittany and Raymond had denied her communication and contact

with Child for no legitimate reason. Brittany filed a response to the petition in

which she stated that she was not required to give visitation to any person and that

she was acting in the rational best interest of her child in denying visitation.

Raymond filed a response pro se in which he stated that he did not believe his

mother was an appropriate individual to be around his daughter. He alleged that

Cheryl is incapable of maintaining healthy boundaries with him and Child, that she

becomes aggressive and irate when challenged, that she lives in terrible conditions

and may be a compulsive hoarder, that she is rude and inappropriate, that she feeds

Child expired or insect-infested foods or foods to which Child is allergic, and

allows Child to engage in play which he deems inappropriate.

              The family court conducted a hearing at which Cheryl was the only

witness. She testified that she used to see Child when Raymond brought her over

on Sunday afternoons, from approximately 2:00 p.m. until dark. When Raymond

moved to Ashland, Child stayed with him on weekends so Cheryl would see her

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for longer periods, from Friday night until Sunday. She testified that she had not

spoken to Brittany for several years. She alleged that Raymond ceased allowing

visitation when she stopped giving him money.

             On cross-examination by Brittany’s counsel, Cheryl testified that she

had not seen Child for one year and three months. She also testified that she was

not alleging Brittany was an unfit parent or that she was not capable of making

good decisions for Child. She testified that the same was true for Raymond.

             Brittany’s attorney made a motion for a directed verdict which the

family court granted. The family court explained that fit parents have the right to

make decisions about who can be around their children, except if the parents have

allowed the child to be around a grandparent to such an extent that taking away

visitation would be detrimental to the child. The family court concluded that

Brittany and Raymond had not allowed Cheryl’s relationship with Child to get to

the point that withholding it would be to the detriment of Child.

             The family court entered a written order denying the petition, finding

that Cheryl’s testimony proved that Brittany and Raymond are fit and proper

parents who can make rational decisions in regard to their child. The court further

found, based on Cheryl’s testimony, that she had not seen Child in over fifteen

months and before that would see her occasionally on Sunday afternoons. The

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family court concluded that there was not sufficient proof of a relationship between

Cheryl and Child to order visitation.

              This appeal by Cheryl followed.

    THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

              Kentucky Revised Statute 405.021(1)(a) provides that the “Circuit

Court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal

grandparents of a child . . . if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child

to do so.” In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49

(2000), the United States Supreme Court recognized that parents’ fundamental

right to raise their children means “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the

best interests of their children[,]” and that “if a fit parent’s decision . . . becomes

subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the

parent’s own determination.” Id. at 68, 70, 120 S. Ct. at 2061, 2062.

              Because of this constitutional presumption, the Kentucky Supreme

Court has held that a grandparent must show that visitation is in the child’s best

interest by the heightened clear and convincing standard. “In other words, the

grandparent must show that the fit parent is clearly mistaken in the belief that

grandparent visitation is not in the child’s best interest. If the grandparent fails to

present such evidence to the court, then parental opposition alone is sufficient to

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deny the grandparent visitation.” Walker v. Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862, 871 (Ky.

2012).

             It is typical in grandparent visitation determinations for
             grandparents to present proof of the nature of the
             relationship between the grandparent and child. The
             question arises whether clear and convincing proof of a
             loving relationship alone is enough to overcome the
             parental presumption. Except in special circumstances, it
             is not enough. . . . The grandparent must show
             something more – that the grandparent and child shared
             such a close bond that to sever contact would cause
             distress to the child. Again, these determinations are
             fact-intensive. But we can imagine such a close bond,
             for example, in situations where the child and
             grandparent lived in the same household for a period of
             time, or where the grandparent regularly babysat the
             child. To allow visitation on a lesser showing would put
             fit grandparents on equal footing as fit parents, which
             violates the Due Process Clause.

Id. at 872 (footnote omitted).

             In determining whether visitation is in the child’s best interest, the

trial court is provided with several factors to consider:

             1) the nature and stability of the relationship between the
             child and the grandparent seeking visitation;

             2) the amount of time the grandparent and child spent
             together;

             3) the potential detriments and benefits to the child from
             granting visitation;

             4) the effect granting visitation would have on the child’s
             relationship with the parents;

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             5) the physical and emotional health of all the adults
             involved, parents and grandparents alike;

             6) the stability of the child’s living and schooling
             arrangements; . . .

             7) the wishes and preferences of the child[;] . . . [and]

             8) the motivation of the adults participating in the
             grandparent visitation proceedings.

Id. at 871 (citing Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. 2004)).

             “[W]e will review the family court’s findings of fact under a clearly

erroneous standard of review, giving due regard to the opportunity of the family

court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Blackaby v. Barnes, 614 S.W.3d

897, 900 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

             Cheryl argues that the family court failed to consider and give

adequate weight to the eighth factor listed above, the motivation of the adults

participating in the grandparent visitation proceedings. In the seminal case of

Walker v. Blair, the Kentucky Supreme Court expounded on this factor:

             A grandparent can rebut the presumption that a fit parent
             acts in the child’s best interest by presenting proof that
             the parent is not actually acting in the child’s best
             interest. If the parent is motivated purely by spite or
             vindictiveness, this can be proof that the parent is acting
             out of self-interest rather than a concern for the child’s
             best interest. It may also be the case that a parent is
             acting out of spite, but the best interest of the child truly
             is not served by granting grandparent visitation. So proof

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             of vindictiveness on the parent’s part does not
             automatically rebut the parental presumption. It is
             likewise true that grandparents may also act out of spite
             or vindictiveness in seeking visitation. The trial court
             should also consider the grandparent’s motivation when
             determining whether grandparent visitation is in the
             child’s best interest.

382 S.W.3d at 872-73.

             The only evidence presented that Raymond was acting vindictively in

ending Cheryl’s visitation with Child was Cheryl’s own testimony. Raymond’s

response to her petition for visitation listed several reasons for ending visitation,

and at the hearing he questioned Cheryl specifically about giving his daughter food

to which she is allergic. The family court did not find evidence that Raymond and

Brittany were motivated by vindictiveness to the point that overriding their wishes

regarding visitation would be in Child’s best interest. The family court did give

considerable weight to the fact that Cheryl’s visits with Child were of relatively

short duration and that Cheryl had not seen Child for well over a year. “Kentucky

courts cannot presume that grandparents and grandchildren will always benefit

from contact with each other. If the only proof that a grandparent can present is

that they spent time with the child and attended holidays and special occasions, this

alone cannot overcome the presumption that the parent is acting in the child’s best

interest.” Id. at 872.

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             Cheryl herself testified that Raymond and Brittany are fit parents. She

simply did not provide clear and convincing evidence to override the

constitutionally mandated presumption that their wishes regarding visitation with

Child are paramount.

                                    CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, the Greenup Family Court’s order denying

the petition for visitation is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE BRITTANY
                                           TACKETT:
James W. Lyon, Jr.
Greenup, Kentucky                          Erin N. Hall
                                           R. Stephen McGinnis
                                           Greenup, Kentucky

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