Court Opinion

ID: 9608893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:19:30.723843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:18.090415
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. The option depends upon the lease contract for a description of the land involved. That description can be fitted to the land described in the petition only by deletion of unambiguous and meaningful terms in the lease description. The petition seeks a decree of title to all lands embraced within a parallelogram measuring 190 feet x 265.5 feet. The description in the lease, after describing the *640building, contains the following significant clause: “This lease only covers ground on which the building is located.” Can this understandable language be disregarded? The plat which is expressly made a part of the lease description shows vacant areas between the building, thus the ground on which the building is located, and the alleys on the east, north, and west sides of the building, which alleys touch the building at one point on each of said sides. Courts should not rewrite the contract the parties executed by adding land that the contract expressly excludes. Then on the south side the plat shows that the building faces Virginia Avenue slightly more than half the distance from the alley on the west to the alley on the east. The petition seeks title to all land facing Virginia Avenue, while the lease covers “that space between front of said building and Virginia Avenue, and width of said building facing Virginia Avenue which represents front yard of said building.” The petitioner seeks, and the majority of this court sustains him, to get all the yard including the side yard, although to do so they ignore that the lease limits to “front yard,” and to width of building facing Virginia Avenue.
I believe that to sustain the petition.it is necessary to disregard the law which requires a clear meeting, of minds as to the property involved (Ga. S. & F. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 142 Ga. Ga. 350, 82 S. E. 1058; Sykes v. Reeves, 195 Ga. 587, 592, 24 S. E. 2d 688); and also the law requiring a definite and distinct description of the land involved (Studer v. Seyer, 69 Ga. 125; Bullard v. Bullard, 202 Ga. 769, 44 S. E. 2d 770; Lance v. Crane, 214 Ga. 284, 104 S. E. 2d 439). Surely the petitioner can not and will not say that only land on which the building is located as contained in the lease description includes vacant land surrounding the building, yet that is precisely what the decision means. Nor can the words of the lease “that space between front of said building and Virginia Avenue, and width of said building facing Virginia Avenue” be stretched to mean lands beyond the width of said building facing Virginia Avenue; yet the relief sought and the opinion allowing the same requires such stretching, which clearly changes the plain meaning of the words of the lease.
*641The petition describes the land to which the petitioner seeks title by a decree of specific performance of the option as follows: “Beginning at a point on the north side of Virginia Avenue, four hundred seventy six and seventy-five hundredths (475.75) feet west, along the north side of Virginia Avenue, from the corner formed by the north side of Virginia Avenue and the west side of Lang Avenue, with Lang Avenue measured as a forty (40) foot street, and running thence west, along the north side of Virginia Avenue, one hundred ninety (190) feet to a point; thence north, or almost north, in a direction parallel with the west side of Lang Avenue, with Lang Avenue measured as a forty (40) foot street, two hundred sixty five and five tenths (265.5) feet to a point; thence east, or almost east, in a direction parallel with the north side of Virginia Avenue, one hundred ninety (190) feet to a point, thence south or almost south, in a direction parallel with the west side of Lang Avenue measured as a forty (40) foot street, two hundred sixty-five and five tenths (265.5) feet to the north side of Virginia Avenue and the point of beginning.”
It is seen that the land described in the petition is a parallelogram measuring 190 x 265.5 feet and all four sides are unbroken and are straight. It is impossible to fit this description into that contained in the option which the petition seeks to have specifically performed. It can be done only by ignoring and in effect erasing the descriptive words in the option, to wit: “this lease only covers ground on which the building is located”; also the words: “and on the south side or front of said building that space between front of said building and Virginia Avenue and width of said building facing Virginia Avenue”; and the diagram expressly made a part of the description which shows considerable vacant areas between the building and the alleys on the east, north and west sides, as well as a vacant area abutting on Virginia Avenue, but east of the portion of the building facing Virginia Avenue.
When parties express plainly in their written contract what they agree to, the courts should not deprive them of such rights by simply refusing to recognize such express terms. It is not possible to misunderstand such simple expressions as: “this lease *642only covers the ground on which the building is located” and “that space between front of building and Virginia Avenue, and width of said building facing Virginia Avenue.” These two expressions constitute the entire description of the land involved. The references to 15-foot alleys on the east, north, and west merely state, and the diagram indisputably shows them to constitute, the respective outside boundaries of the building for it abuts on each of the alleys. The plat is as follows:

The petition alleges that the petitioner took possession of the land described therein and made valuable improvements. This it is contended cured defects in the description. Reliance is made on Deich v. Reeves, 203 Ga. 596 (48 S. E. 2d 373). The fatal fallacy of such contention is two-fold: (1) the descrip*643tion here is perfect and is in no wise uncertain; and (2) in the cited case the description was merely “Beach Cottage, known as 1301 Butler Ave., and located on Section 3 of Beach Lot 83, Savannah Beach, Chatham County, Georgia.” The opinion states that such description is merely a key by which the property could be located. The question was whether such description included more than the dwelling located thereon. Here the description answers that question by plainly saying it included only the land on which the building was located. That opinion cites Wardlaw v. Wardlaw, 185 Ga. 181 (194 S. E. 187), to support the ruling that the uncertainty, if it did exist, was made certain by possession with improvements. The proposition dealt with in those decisions is a stranger to the proposition here, where there can be no fair doubt or uncertainty as to the description. Trespassing on land clearly not leased in no possible manner can redound to the profit of the trespasser by giving him rights in land clearly not covered by the lease upon which he relies. These cases and those cited therein, as well as Etheridge v. Gillen, 199 Ga. 242 (34 S. E. 2d 105), all dealing with cases where the description was uncertain, ought not now be distorted to unjustly control in this case where the description is plain and unambiguous. The law and decisions of this court deserve to be spared such distortion and torture.
In similar fashion of misconstruction, Horton v. Murden, 117 Ga. 72 (3) (43 S. E. 786); Mayor &c. of Gainesville v. Brenau College, 150 Ga. 156 (103 S. E. 164); Baggett v. Ga. Conference Assn. of Seventh Day Adventists, 157 Ga. 488 (121 S. E. 838), are cited and relied upon. The most that any of those cases held was that, where the description referred to a building, it included the land upon which it was located and land adjacent thereto. The obvious reason such cases can not apply or control here is the provision in the description expressly limiting to only the land on which the building is located. None of those decisions holds that terms of the instrument can be ignored, as must be done here if the petition is sustained. The cited case of Trustees of the Academy of Richmond County v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159 (7 S. E. 633), is so completely not relevant until discussion of it would be a waste of space.
*644Thus far I have assumed that the alleged option is valid and there was consideration for same, and have shown that, even in such event, no cause of action is alleged for the reasons given above. Now I think I can demonstrate that the option is a nudum pactum (See Black v. Maddox, 104 Ga. 157, 30 S. E. 723), and was not executed simultaneously with the lease, as the petition alleges, and as must be true if it is valid. The petition attaches as exhibit copy of the lease which is dated October 1, 1952, and in the body of that lease appears the following: “W. L. Irwin has rented to J. P. Dailey building known as Hotel Hangar and Hotel Hangar Apartments ... for fifteen years beginning October 1st, 1952, and ending midnite September 30th, 1967, at a rental of One Thousand Dollars per month, payable in advance on first day of each month, beginning October 1st, 1952.” There is simply no legal way in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake, and then by reformation in an action therefor, to alter or change these written provisions of the lease. Parol evidence for that purpose is inadmissible. Also attached is a copy of the alleged option, which is dated December 15, 1952, and recites that the lease is for fifteen years, as follows: “You have a fifteen year lease on Hotel Hangar dated October 1st, 1952.” It must be admitted that the lease is for fifteen years ending “midnite September 30th, 1967,” as recited in the lease. The petition does not deny the correctness of the date of the option letter which is Dec. 15, 1952, but it alleges that the lease was executed at that time. This allegation is flatly and completely refuted- by recitals in the lease that it was for 15 years ending “midnite September 30th, 1967,” which is 15 years from October 1, 1952, the date the lease bears and rental in advance is required therein to begin October 1, 1952. These naked facts refute on their face the allegation of simultaneous execution, and hence show the option to be utterly without consideration and void. To accept the allegation that the lease and option were executed December 15, 1952, would require an erasure from the lease of its requirement that the rent be paid in advance beginning on October 1, 1952. It would be impossible to comply with that provision of the lease. Then both the lease and the option positively state *645that it shall be for 15 years, and this provision is impossible if it must terminate as therein provided at midnight on September 30, 1967. To retain the termination date written in the lease, and accept the allegation of the petition as to when it began, would change the lease from 15 years to 14 years 9% months. The allegation of the petition, which its exhibits demonstrate to be incorrect, demands that courts seeking truth and justice reject such allegation and decide the merits of the petition in accord with the exhibits and the undeniable truth. Vandiver v. Endicott, 215 Ga. 250, 251 (109 S. E. 2d 775); Strickland v. Lowry National Bank, 140 Ga. 653 (2) (79 S. E. 539). In the Strickland case, it is stated in headnote 2 that, “where it was alleged by the plaintiff that the second note was collateral to the first, but the copies of the notes attached as exhibits showed on their face that this was not correct, but that the parties agreed that the first note should be held as collateral to the second, on demurrer the contract will be construed in accordance with its terms so appearing, and not in accordance with the interpretation alleged by the pleader.” There being conflict between the written instrument and the pleadings, the instrument itself controls.
Having demonstrated as above that the lease was executed as it states on October 1, 1952, and the option was executed 2% months thereafter, on December 15, 1952, the conclusion is demanded that the alleged option is utterly without consideration, hence is invalid. The case depending upon the invalid option must fail, and the demurrer should have been sustained.