Court Opinion

ID: 9603322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:05:05.182252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:38.075186
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(dissenting):
The majority opinion concludes that the “quasi-community property” section of A.R.S. § 25-318 applies only to property acquired after the effective' date of the statute. I disagree. The portion of the statute in question reads as follows:
“For purposes of this section only, property acquired by either spouse outside the state shall be deemed to be community property if said property would have been community property if acquired in this state.” A.R.S. § 25-318 A. (Emphasis added.)
The majority’s conclusion is based on language in A.R.S. § 1-244, which states that no statute is retroactive unless expressly declared therein. I find language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion to be dispositive on this issue:
“In Schuster, [Schuster v. Schuster, 42 Ariz. 190, 23 P.2d 559 (1933)] the Court stated that when language used in a statute is plain and demonstrates that it is to be applied to periods prior to its effective date, then the statute should be so applied. The legislature, stressed the Court, need not use the expression ‘this statute shall be retroactive’ or any similar language in expressing its legislative purpose. The Court went on to hold that the language of the statute before it was sufficient to indicate legislative intent because it was phrased in the past tense.
“The same type of language is used here. At the time the statute became effective, the only property to which it could apply was property acquired in the past by the parties in other jurisdictions. The statute expressly applies to property ‘acquired’ in other jurisdictions.” (Emphasis added.) Furimsky v. Furimsky, 122 Ariz. 385, 390, 595 P.2d 177, 182 (1978).
In footnote # 4, the Court of Appeals’ opinion further elaborated:
“California’s statute [which was held to be retroactive] specifically states that it is to apply to all property ‘heretofore or hereafter acquired,’ but we do not believe that the absence of that language in the Arizona statute indicates an intent to make our statute apply prospectively only. The language was added to the California statute in response to an early California court decision, Estate of Frees, 187 Cal. 150, 201 P. 112 (1921), which had misinterpreted that legislature’s intent. In Estate of Drishaus, 199 Cal. 369, 249 P. 515 (1926), the court treated this language as demonstrating a legislative intention to make the statute retroactive.” Furimsky, supra, 122 Ariz. at 390 n. 4, 595 P.2d at 182 n. 4.
The majority opinion also states that A.R.S. § 25-318 was held to have retroactive effect in Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 22 Ariz.App. 238, 526 P.2d 762 (1974) and Batesole v. Batesole, 24 Ariz.App. 83, 535 P.2d 1314 (1975) and that in each case review was denied by this Court. As the Court of Appeals’ opinion properly stated:
“That decision [Oppenheimer], however, involved a different portion of A.R.S. § 25-318 which deals with division of joint tenancy property acquired in Arizona and has nothing whatsoever to do with property acquired in other jurisdictions.” Furimsky, supra, 122 Ariz. at 391, 595 P.2d at 183.
Batesole, supra, also dealt solely with the division of joint property.
I am also persuaded by the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it is highly unlikely that the legislature intended to promulgate such awkward procedures as are now mandated by the majority’s conclusion that the statute in question applies only to property acquired after its effective date.
“Under such an application, two different kinds of property would be created: that acquired prior to August 8,1973, and that *433acquired after. If that were the case, our courts would continue to cope with the problems of the prior law in every dissolution involving parties who lived outside of this state prior to 1973, and it would take a generation or more to achieve the consistent and unified application of law envisioned by the statute. Thus, hypothetically, if a couple moved to Arizona in 1977 from a common law jurisdiction, and applied for dissolution in this State today, the court would have to apply the law of the former domicile to all property acquired prior to 1973, but Arizona law to property acquired in that same State thereafter. We perceive little social utility in such an application.” Furimsky, supra, 122 Ariz. at 390, 595 P.2d at 182.
For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.