Court Opinion

ID: 9838499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:30.466344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.486040
License: Public Domain

J-S17028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DAYON WILLIE LUCAS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1269 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 7, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-25-CR-0001168-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: September 6, 2023

       Appellant, Dayon Willie Lucas, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on October 7, 2022, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence

motion on October 17, 2022, following his jury trial convictions for aggravated

assault, simple assault, and two counts of recklessly endangering another

person (REAP).1 We affirm.

       “The facts of this case stem from the assault of Israel Baker and

Jonathon Roberts, which occurred in the early morning of April, [17] 2021 at

Rockstarz Bar, located in Erie, Pennsylvania.”           Appellant’s Brief at 3

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) (aggravated assault against Jonathon Roberts),
2701(a)(1) (simple assault against Jonathon Roberts), and 2705 (REAP
against Jonathon Roberts and Israel Baker), respectively. “Appellant was
found not guilty of aggravated assault (against Israel Baker), aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, simple assault, and attempted homicide.” Trial
Court Opinion, 1/4/2023, at 1 n.1.
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(quotations omitted). “The assaults took place as the result of an argument

between two rival gangs, the Forty Gang, also known as 4 Nation, and the

1800 Gang, known as Sheed Nation.”               Id.   The victims “who [we]re not

members of the 1800 Gang, but ha[d] minor associations, were not part of

the initial argument, but faced the brunt of the assault while trying to help

their cousin[.]” Id.     A three-day jury trial commenced against Appellant and

three co-defendants on July 13, 2022.          Appellant testified on his own behalf

at trial and “repeatedly denied being a member of 4 Nation.” Id. On July 15,

2022, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned crimes. On October

7, 2022, “Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate [term] of 72 to 144

months [of] incarceration.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/2023, at 1. Appellant

filed a post-sentence motion on October 14, 2022. The trial court denied relief

by order entered on October 17, 2022. This timely appeal resulted.2

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues3 for our review:

____________________________________________

2 Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 26, 2022. On October 31,
2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant requested,
and the trial court granted, an extension to file the Rule 1925(b) statement
until after the trial transcripts were filed. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal on November 30, 2022. The trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on January 4, 2023.

3 Appellant identified another issue in his Rule 1925(b) statement pertaining
to “a gang enhancement provision at sentencing” but he concedes that he did
not raise that issue on appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 9 n.1. Appellant
abandoned that issue and, therefore, it is waived. See Commonwealth v.
Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted) (“[A]n issue
identified on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned
and, therefore, waived.”).

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      1. [Whether t]he trial court erred in failing to grant [Appellant’s]
         request for a judgment of acquittal on the [REAP] count
         regarding victim Baker, since the jury found [Appellant] not
         guilty of aggravated assault [against Baker] and the two
         verdicts were inconsistent[?]

      2. [Whether t]he trial court erred in failing to grant [Appellant’s
         m]otion [to dismiss] under [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600, as the
         Commonwealth failed to bring the case to trial within the 365
         day deadline [pursuant to] Rule 600[?]

      3. [Whether t]he verdict in this case was against the weight of the
         evidence regarding the aggravated assault charge related to
         victim Roberts when it was clear from videos presented at trial
         that [Appellant] never used a deadly weapon and when
         [surveillance camaras captured his interaction with] Roberts
         and thus the jury conviction [] should be vacated[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 9 (numbers supplied; footnote omitted).

      In his first issue presented, Appellant contends that he is entitled to

judgment of acquittal on his REAP conviction pertaining to victim Baker since

the jury found him not guilty of aggravated assault regarding the same victim.

Id. at 9-12.     Appellant concedes that, while the two verdicts appear

inconsistent, inconsistent verdicts are permissible so long as there is sufficient

evidence to support his conviction. He suggests, however, that “the facts did

not support the [REAP] conviction any more than [the facts] supported the

aggravated assault charge.”     Id. at 10-11.     Appellant maintains that the

criminal information filed by the Commonwealth contained the exact same

language in the factual basis to support both charges. Id. at 11. In sum,

Appellant argues:

      Specifically, the language in the aggravated assault charge, as
      related to Mr. Baker, stated that [Appellant] did “strike him with

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      a glass bottle and/or did kick him and/or did strike him multiple
      times as he lay on the floor as part of a group assault.” The
      [REAP] charge uses the exact same language.

      The jury found that [Appellant] did not intentionally cause or
      attempt to cause serious bodily injury to Mr. Baker, but they found
      that [Appellant’s] actions placed Mr. Baker in jeopardy of serious
      bodily injury. The fact that there would even be no attempt to
      cause serious bodily injury but the [Appellant’s] actions placed
      him in jeopardy of serious bodily injury suggests two different
      factual scenarios, while these charges were based on one factual
      scenario [and] where the video evidence itself never even showed
      [Appellant] striking Mr. Baker.      Thus, the verdicts were so
      inconsistent that the trial court should have upheld the defense’s
      request for a judgment of acquittal on the [REAP] count.

Id. at 11-12 (original brackets omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has held that

      the rule that controls the propriety of inconsistent verdicts is as
      follows:

         Inconsistent verdicts ... are allowed to stand so long as the
         evidence is sufficient to support the conviction
         notwithstanding      the   defendant's    acquittal   on   an
         accompanying charge. In determining whether there is
         sufficient evidence to support a conviction, “The appellate
         court must view all the evidence and all reasonable
         inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to
         the Commonwealth, as verdict winner.” Commonwealth
         v. Weston, 749 A.2d 458, 461 (Pa. 2000) (internal
         quotation marks omitted) (holding that a conviction of
         voluntary manslaughter did not abrogate the requisite
         intent for PIC or criminal conspiracy when there was
         sufficient evidence, notwithstanding the verdicts for the
         associated crimes, that the defendant armed himself prior
         to going to the victim's house, showing an intent to threaten
         or harm the victim).

Commonwealth v. Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1252 (Pa. 2014) (some

quotations and citations omitted).

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      Moreover, our Supreme Court has recognized:

      Whether the jury's verdict was the result of mistake, compromise,
      lenity, or any other factor is not a question for [an appellate court]
      to review.

      [Instead, our Supreme Court] reaffirm[ed] that an acquittal
      cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of
      the evidence, and that even where two verdicts are logically
      inconsistent, such inconsistency alone cannot be grounds for a
      new trial or for reversal.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1213 (Pa. 2012).               There is no

“special weight” afforded by an acquittal when arguing verdicts are

inconsistent “because, by definition, one of the verdicts will always be an

acquittal.” Id.

      Finally, this Court has previously determined:

      A person commits REAP, a misdemeanor of the second degree if
      he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
      another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. 18
      Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

      Reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of aggravated
      assault[.] Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Pa.
      Super. 2008).

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(quotations and original brackets omitted).

      Here, the trial court determined “[t]here [was] no basis for [A]ppellant’s

assertion that it was inconsistent for the jury to find him guilty of [REAP] but

not guilty of aggravated assault.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/2023, at 1. The

trial court noted that the mens rea requirements for the offenses are different.

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Id. Finally, the trial court recognized that “assuming arguendo that the

verdicts are inconsistent, such is not a basis to overturn a conviction.” Id.

      We agree with the trial court’s assessment.            Here, Appellant was

convicted of REAP, a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. The jury

concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support that conviction based

upon the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial. Because the jury

could have found that Appellant’s conduct placed Baker in jeopardy of serious

bodily injury, but that Appellant did not intentionally inflict or attempt to inflict

serious bodily injury upon Baker under circumstances demonstrating extreme

indifference to the value of human life, Appellant’s acquittal for aggravated

assault does not undermine his guilty verdict for REAP. Moreover, assuming

the verdicts were inconsistent, we cannot interpret Appellant’s acquittal for

aggravated assault as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence or

give the acquittal special weight. As such, we conclude that there is no merit

to Appellant’s first claim.

      In his second issue presented, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth

failed to bring his case to trial within 365 days in violation of Pennsylvania

Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 and, therefore, the trial court erred in failing

to grant Appellant’s motion to dismiss.        Appellant’s Brief at 12-15.     More

specifically, while conceding that there were “delays due to the pandemic,”

Appellant complains that he was tried 61 days after the Rule 600 deadline as

the result of continuances requested by the Commonwealth.                Id. at 12.

Appellant assails the trial court’s opinion that the delay was not attributable

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to the Commonwealth “but instead on the fact that there were four

co-defendants in this case and the ‘[trial c]ourt’s schedule.’”         Id. at 12.

Accordingly, Appellant argues that the record belies the Commonwealth’s

claim that it “exercised due diligence in attempting to try this case within the

required time period or that the trial court held any sort of hearing to

determine the Commonwealth’s reasoning for continuing the case.” Id. at 14.

      When presented with a speedy trial claim, our standard of review is

well-settled:

      In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial
      court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
      Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
      facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
      and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
      error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
      overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
      as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

      The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record
      of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial
      court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most
      favorable to the prevailing party.

      Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is
      not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule
      600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of
      the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of society.
      In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has
      been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to
      effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those
      guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the
      administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate
      the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed
      through no fault of the Commonwealth.

      So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
      Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial

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     rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be construed in a manner
     consistent with society's right to punish and deter crime. In
     considering these matters ..., courts must carefully factor into the
     ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
     accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
     enforcement as well. The Commonwealth bears the burden of
     proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that it acted with due
     diligence throughout the proceedings.

     Rule 600 provides that “trial in a court case in which a written
     complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within
     365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
     Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). In computing the Rule 600 deadline,
     however, we do not necessarily count all time following the filing
     of the complaint. Rather, “periods of delay at any stage of the
     proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
     Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
     included in the computation of the time within which trial must
     commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
     computation.”     Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).   Rule 600 expressly
     excludes from computation periods of delay resulting from “any
     continuance granted at the request of the defendant or the
     defendant's attorney.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(3)(b). Continuances
     based on joint requests by the Commonwealth and the defendant
     are excludable time under this rule.

     The Rule 600 analysis entails three steps:

        First, Rule 600(A) provides the mechanical run date.
        Second, we determine whether any excludable time exists
        pursuant to Rule 600(C). We add the amount of excludable
        time, if any, to the mechanical run date to arrive at an
        adjusted run date.

        If the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we apply
        the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600(D). As we
        have explained, Rule 600 encompasses a wide variety of
        circumstances under which a period of delay was outside the
        control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the
        Commonwealth's lack of diligence. Any such period of delay
        results in an extension of the run date.

        Addition of any Rule 600 extensions to the adjusted run date
        produces the final Rule 600 run date. If the Commonwealth

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          does not bring the defendant to trial on or before the final
          run date, the trial court must dismiss the charges.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 292 A.3d 601, 610–611 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(internal case citations and original brackets omitted).

        In this case, the trial court “found that the Commonwealth had made

numerous attempts to bring this case to trial and no undue delay was

attributed to the Commonwealth.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/2023, at 2. The

trial court, instead, attributed the delays to the other three co-defendants and

schedule management. Id. We discern no error or abuse of discretion.

        Here, the Commonwealth filed a complaint against Appellant on April

22, 2021. Thus, the mechanical run date of this case was April 22, 2022, or

365 days later. On September 8, 2021, the trial court granted Appellant’s

request to continue the case until November 8, 2021. Those 61 days of delay

are attributed to Appellant. Accordingly, the adjusted run date was June 22,

2022.    Because the trial commenced on July 15, 2022, we apply the due

diligence analysis set forth in Rule 600(D) to determine whether the period of

delay was outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the result of the

Commonwealth's lack of diligence.

        Initially, we note that Appellant concedes that there were courtroom

scheduling difficulties due to the pandemic which cannot be attributed to the

Commonwealth. Furthermore, upon our review of the record, we discern no

undue trial delay or lack of due diligence by the Commonwealth. On March

14, 2022, citing the appointment of new counsel for a co-defendant who

needed additional time for discovery and the trial court’s prior denial of

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severing the trials, the Commonwealth filed a motion for continuance and

requested a new trial date so that all of the co-defendants could be tried

together. The Commonwealth averred that there were no defense objections

and asked "that all delays connected to [this] motion[] not be counted against

the Commonwealth, as the Commonwealth is unable to try the cases in March,

following   the   [o]rders   of   the   [trial   c]ourt    regarding   [s]everance.”

Commonwealth’s Motion, 3/14/2022, at 1.                   On April 25, 2022, the

Commonwealth filed another motion for continuance, averring that it had not

received the results of DNA tests needed for trial, defense counsel did not

object to the continuance, and “[t]here [were] no Rule 600 issues that would

prevent this case from being moved to the June 2022 trial term.”

Commonwealth’s Motion, 4/25/2022, at 1.            Finally, on June 6, 2022, the

Commonwealth requested a continuance because it was “having difficulty

meeting the scheduling needs of all of the attorneys in this matter” and

“limited judge/courtroom availability.” Commonwealth Motion, 6/6/2022, at

1. Again, the Commonwealth averred that defense counsel did not object and

there were no Rule 600 issues that would prevent this case from being moved

to July. Id. From our review, we discern no undue delay and conclude that

the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in bringing this case to trial.

Because the trial court barred severance of the co-defendants’ trials, the

Commonwealth clearly had no choice but to seek continuances even when a

single co-defendant was unavailable.        As such, Appellant’s Rule 600 claim

lacks merit.

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      Finally, in his third appellate issue presented, Appellant claims that his

conviction for aggravated assault pertaining to victim Roberts was against the

weight of the evidence “as the record showed no evidence that [Appellant]

had any sort of weapon with him.”       Appellant’s Brief at 15-16.    Appellant

argues that the victim was the first aggressor and Appellant “was pulled down

into a choke hold and had to move away from the situation, using [only] his

hands to do so.” Id. at 16. Appellant maintains that “[t]his action should not

have been found by the jury to be criminal behavior, nor does it fit within the

definition of aggravated assault[.]” Id.

      Here, the trial court rejected Appellant’s argument that his conviction

for aggravated assault was against the weight of the evidence presented

because he did not use a deadly weapon. Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/2023, at

2. The trial court noted that Appellant struck Roberts in the head with his fists

and that Roberts suffered serious injuries as a result. Id. at 2. As such, the

verdict did not shock the conscience of the trial court.

      We employ the following standards:

      The weight given to trial evidence is a choice for the factfinder. If
      the factfinder returns a guilty verdict, and if a criminal defendant
      then files a motion for a new trial on the basis that the verdict was
      against the weight of the evidence, a trial court is not to grant
      relief unless the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one's sense of justice.

      When a trial court denies a weight-of-the-evidence motion, and
      when an appellant then appeals that ruling to this Court, our
      review is limited. It is important to understand we do not reach
      the underlying question of whether the verdict was, in fact,
      against the weight of the evidence. We do not decide how we
      would have ruled on the motion and then simply replace our own

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      judgment for that of the trial court. Instead, this Court determines
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in reaching whatever
      decision it made on the motion, whether or not that decision is the
      one we might have made in the first instance.

      Moreover, when evaluating a trial court's ruling, we keep in mind
      that an abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment.

      Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest
      unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law. By contrast, a
      proper exercise of discretion conforms to the law and is based on
      the facts of record.

Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 737 (Pa. Super. 2023).

      Here, the trial court did not err as a matter of law.                   See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 2 A.3d 598, 603 (Pa. Super. 2010) (affirming

judgment of sentence for aggravated assault where defendant punched victim

one time in head while victim was not looking, and victim was knocked

unconscious), appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1275 (Pa. 2011). Moreover, the trial

court’s decision did not involve bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, or manifest

unreasonableness.     As such, we discern no abuse of discretion in denying

Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

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