Court Opinion

ID: 9963745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 05:06:18.511717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:58.443227
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re J. S. ALLEN, Minor.                                            April 25, 2024

                                                                     No. 365457
                                                                     Wexford Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 22-030538-NA

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), appeals by right the
trial court’s order dismissing a petition for removal of the minor child, JA, on the basis of lack of
venue. We reverse and remand.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        JA and his mother lived in Wexford County. Respondent, who is JA’s legal father and
lives in Georgia, had been absent for the majority of JA’s life. In October 2022, petitioner filed a
petition for removal, alleging that JA was at risk of significant harm because of the mother’s
substance abuse, homelessness, domestic violence, and refusal to work with JA’s caretakers.
Petitioner further alleged that respondent’s last known address was in Georgia, that petitioner had
been unable to locate respondent, and that respondent had no relationship with JA. Petitioner
alleged that both parents had abandoned JA. At the preliminary hearing, respondent was absent
but represented by counsel. Testimony showed that the mother was homeless and that JA was
living in his former foster home. Petitioner recommended that JA continue in this placement. The
court found that there was probable cause to support the allegations, took jurisdiction over JA, and
placed JA with the department. Respondent was given supervised parenting time.

         One month later the mother passed away, and after she was removed from the petition,
respondent’s counsel made an oral motion to have JA returned to respondent. Alternatively,
respondent requested unsupervised visits from JA to Georgia. The parties and trial court agreed
that the motion would be postponed until after the Christmas holiday; instead, JA would visit
respondent during the holiday season. In January 2023, the trial court convened a placement
hearing, and both petitioner and the guardian ad litem opposed returning JA to respondent’s care
at that time because of the lack of a relationship between JA and respondent, JA’s grieving for his

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mother, and JA’s connection to Wexford County. However, the goal remained reunification. The
holiday visit had not occurred because of illness, and JA was ordered to visit respondent in late
January for a one-week visit. The trial court also entered a mediation order in which the parties
agreed to various visits throughout February and March.

        However, in mid-February, petitioner filed an amended petition against respondent
alleging domestic issues, absence for long periods of JA’s life, and an extensive criminal history
involving drug possession and physical violence. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that JA struggled
with his mental health after the loss of his mother, and that JA needed to remain with his foster
family to help stabilize his mental health. Petitioner requested that the trial court take jurisdiction
over JA and remove him from respondent’s care. Another amended petition was subsequently
filed in which petitioner alleged that JA, who was a teenager, was refusing to visit respondent in
Georgia and that new criminal charges had been filed against respondent. Petitioner also moved
to suspend respondent’s parenting time, relying on the same grounds as in its petitions.

        In March, the trial court convened a hearing on this motion. The court stated that it had
met with the parties in chambers to discuss whether venue was proper, and this was the first time
venue was mentioned by either the parties or the trial court. Both respondent and the guardian ad
litem opined that venue was proper in Georgia, while petitioner argued that venue was proper in
Wexford County because JA was “physically present” in the county. The trial court determined
that venue was not proper in Wexford County, and dismissed the petitions.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We review for an abuse of discretion a decision on change of venue. See Shock Bros, Inc
v Morbark Indus, Inc, 411 Mich 696, 698; 311 NW2d 722 (1981); Chilingirian v City of Fraser,
182 Mich App 163, 165; 451 NW2d 541 (1989). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court’s decision is “outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Saffian v Simmons,
477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). Additionally, the “trial court necessarily abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.” Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n , 499 Mich 269, 274;
884 NW2d 257 (2016). Questions of statutory or court rule interpretation, construction, and
application are reviewed de novo. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 416; 789 NW2d
211 (2010). We review for clear error a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a child. In re BZ, 264
Mich App 286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). “To properly exercise jurisdiction, the trial court
must find [by a preponderance of the evidence] that a statutory basis for jurisdiction exists.” Id.

                                         B. DISCUSSION

       Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly dismissed the petition because JA was
found within Wexford County.

        The same principles for statutory interpretation and application apply to court rules. Haliw
v Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 704-705; 691 NW2d 753 (2005). “When interpreting a statute, we
must ascertain the Legislature’s intent,” which is accomplished “by giving the words selected by
the Legislature their plain and ordinary meanings, and by enforcing the statute as written.” Griffin

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v Griffin, 323 Mich App 110, 120; 916 NW2d 292 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
If a statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as written. McQueer v Perfect Fence Co, 502 Mich
276, 286; 917 NW2d 584 (2018). We may not read something into the statute “that is not within
the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). A statute must be read as a whole, Bush v Shabahang, 484 Mich 156,
167; 772 NW2d 272 (2009), and we “must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute
and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory,” State
Farm Fire & Cas Co v Old Republic Ins Co, 466 Mich 142, 146; 644 NW2d 715 (2002).

         MCL 712A.2, which is part of the Probate Code of 1939, MCL 710.21 et seq., provides the
grounds under which Michigan courts may take jurisdiction over minor children. Relevant to this
appeal is MCL 712A.2(b), which provides that a court has jurisdiction when a child is “found
within the county” and “is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his or her mental well-being,” is
“without proper custody or guardianship,” is “abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or other
custodian,” MCL 712A.2(b)(1), or when the “home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty,
drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile
to live in,” MCL 712A.2(b)(2). “[A] child is ‘found within the county’ in which the offense against
the child occurred, in which the offense committed by the juvenile occurred, or in which the minor
is physically present.” MCR 3.926(A) (emphasis added).

        At the outset of this case, and throughout the proceedings, JA was living in Wexford
County. Accordingly, at the time the petition was filed, JA was “found within the county” because
he was “physically present” there. There were allegations that respondent had been absent from
JA’s life for approximately 12 years. Later on, new allegations arose of criminality, domestic
issues, and mental health concerns for JA. Therefore, the requirements of MCL 712A.2(b) and
MCR 3.926(A), assuming there was probable cause to support them, would be met. Although the
trial court expressed concern that respondent was in Georgia and that the allegations occurred in
Georgia, this was immaterial because JA was “found within” Wexford County. Similarly,
although the trial court appeared to be concerned with the costs of dispositional services, this had
no bearing on whether JA was “found within the county” for purposes of MCL 712A.2(b) and
MCR 3.926(A).

        Furthermore, the trial court had authorized a petition before the death of JA’s mother, the
court was familiar with the case and circumstances, and there was no argument that respondent
would be unable to attend the proceedings. See In re Pasco, 150 Mich App 816, 824; 389 NW2d
188 (1986) (reasoning that “[t]he motion came over three years after the court assumed
jurisdiction,” that the trial court had been “familiar with the case and the surrounding
circumstances,” and that “no evidence was presented that denial of the motion would prevent
respondent from attending the termination hearing”). Although the trial court was convinced that
JA should be returned to respondent’s care because he was JA’s father, serious allegations were
pending against respondent. There were also allegations that JA needed time to process his
mother’s passing and that respondent’s forcefulness about seeking visits was seriously and
negatively affecting JA’s mental health. See In re Anjoski, 283 Mich App 41, 44; 770 NW2d 1
(2009) (holding that a surviving parent is not automatically entitled to have their child returned
“where sufficient legitimate and compelling indicia exist on the record indicating that a
noncustodial parent is currently unfit”). On remand, the trial court must examine the amended
petitions’ allegations and determine whether there is probable cause to authorize the amended

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petitions. If respondent should move for a change of venue to Georgia, the trial court must follow
MCR 3.9261 to determine whether transfer to another court is warranted.

        Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray

1
  At the time of the petition, JA did not reside in a county with JA’s sole legal parent, and no county
was presumed to be JA’s county of residence under MCR 3.926(B)(1). Accordingly, the factors
in MCR 3.926(B)(2) may be relevant considerations before ordering the case transferred.

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