Court Opinion

ID: 9553014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:20:35.787909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:30.553809
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in affirming the judgment of conviction, but do not agree that hybrid representation is permitted by our rules. I dissent from the court’s reduction of sentence without first giving the trial judge an opportunity to reweigh.
I. Hybrid Representation
I do not agree that a trial judge has the discretion to allow hybrid representation. Ante, at 325, 878 P.2d at 1363. The court concedes that there is no right to hybrid *337representation. I am of the view that there either is a right, or there is not. If there is a right to hybrid representation, then the trial court has the power to allow it just as he has the power to allow a defendant to represent himself, or invoke his right to counsel. And the trial judge’s exercise of that power is subject to review. But if there is no right to hybrid representation, then the trial judge has no power to allow it. By saying that a trial judge does have the discretion to allow it, we create the very right that we say does not exist. We will be put in the position of reviewing the trial judge’s exercise of the power to allow or not to allow hybrid representation. If we should ever conclude that a trial judge abused his or her discretion in denying hybrid representation, we will have acknowledged the existence of a right to hybrid representation. But we have held that there is no such right. Thus, I reject as a matter of logic the distinction the court draws between the absence of a right to hybrid representation and the absence of any prohibition against it.
Legal representation in criminal cases is governed by Rule 6, Ariz.R.Crim.P. It occupies the field. Rule 6.1 describes the right to counsel. Rule 6.1(c) acknowledges a defendant’s right to waive the right to counsel. It then provides that when a defendant waives his or her right to counsel, the court may appoint an attorney to advise him or her dining any stage of the proceedings. Rule 6.1(e) allows a defendant to withdraw the waiver of the right to counsel.
It is thus clear that when a defendant waives the right to counsel, our rule only allows a court to appoint advisory counsel. There is no middle ground. When counsel represents a client, the client has no authority to represent himself. I fear today’s decision will breed confusion and mischief.
II. Remand for Reweighing
As the court notes, ante, at 335, 878 P.2d at 1373, when an aggravating circumstance is knocked out and when, as here, reweighing on the record is undesirable because there exists the possibility of a more substantive mitigation hearing, we remand to the trial judge for reweighing. He is the one who tried this case. He is the one who sentenced the defendant to death. He is the only one familiar enough with this record and this defendant to decide whether the death sentence should be reimposed notwithstanding the absence of one aggravating factor.
As the court notes, the state has not conceded that sentence reduction is preferable. Instead, the court arbitrarily reduces the sentence. As I have noted before. State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 614, 863 P.2d 881, 906 (1993) (Martone, J., dissenting), “we have an obligation to ensure that the death sentence is not imposed in an arbitrary and freakish way.” It is arbitrary to impose the death sentence on others, and then, on a record like this, relieve a defendant of the death sentence without first giving the trial judge an opportunity to properly reweigh. I therefore respectfully dissent. I would remand to the sentencing judge for reweighing.