Court Opinion

ID: 9394941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 17:02:43.192033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.341697
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

              IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H., J.H., and N.H.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0003
                                FILED 5-16-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD42438
                 The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:
                 IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H. et al.
                        Decision of the Court

¶1            Lakrysia H. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s finding
that her children J.H. (herein “A.H.”), J.H., and N.H. are dependent. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             In September 2022, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”)
took temporary custody of the children after receiving reports of physical
abuse and neglect. Soon after, DCS filed a dependency petition on the
grounds that Mother used excessive physical discipline, withheld food as
discipline, and was emotionally abusive. The superior court held a three-
day trial on the dependency in November and December 2022. Relevant to
this appeal, the court heard testimony from Mother, the DCS investigative
case specialist, and a Peoria police detective.

¶3            At trial, Mother conceded that A.H. and J.H. were dependent,
as they refused her supervision. However, she disputed the proposed
factual bases of the dependency—abuse or neglect. As for N.H., Mother
contested the dependency and the finding requested by DCS.

¶4             The DCS investigative case specialist testified that DCS
received a report that Mother had withheld food from N.H. and A.H. as
discipline. A few weeks later, A.H. was detained at a juvenile facility and
then sent to MIND 24-7 at Mother’s request. DCS received a second report
of abuse or neglect after Mother appeared unwilling to pick up A.H. from
the juvenile facility.

¶5           Following the initial report, A.H. disclosed a pattern of food
deprivation as punishment, Mother hitting A.H. with a broom, a belt, and
her hand, and inappropriate physical discipline of all three children. J.H.
and N.H. corroborated A.H.’s allegations of physical abuse, emotional
abuse, and food withholding.

¶6             The DCS specialist testified that A.H. did not wish to return
home, and noted that “the first thing out of [A.H.’s] mouth” after the
specialist introduced herself was “why haven’t you taken us yet, and why
does our mom keep getting to do this to us?” A.H. told the specialist that
Mother used physical discipline “basically anytime she was unhappy,” but
more often, Mother verbally abused the children. N.H. described A.H.
being left “bleeding with scratches and bruises” following Mother’s
physical discipline. N.H. and A.H. both disclosed that Mother had
instructed them not to speak to DCS.

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                  IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H. et al.
                         Decision of the Court

¶7            Mother called A.H.’s special education teacher who testified
that A.H. did not disclose abuse or food withholding to him. A police
detective who had investigated Mother on DCS’s behalf testified that
Mother was cooperative, allowed N.H. and J.H. to speak with the officer,
and that neither child disclosed abuse during the investigation. The officer
observed food in the refrigerator and in the pantry that was accessible to
the children. The detective reviewed photos of a bruise on N.H.’s leg that
was allegedly caused by Mother spanking her and believed that the “faint”
bruising visible in the photo was inconsistent with criminal abuse and
therefore closed the case.

¶8             Mother denied that she abused or neglected her children. She
testified that she used physical punishment only “as a last resort,” which
included spanking with a belt or throwing a slipper at the children. She
claimed the children were violent towards each other, and that she could
not control A.H. Mother explained that A.H. was admitted to Mind 24-7
for mental health concerns after breaking windows in the family’s
apartment. While she admitted she did not want A.H. returning home after
Mind 24-7 released her, Mother denied that she refused to pick her up.

¶9            Mother admitted to throwing some “junk food” away,
explaining that in one instance she did so because the children had bought
more at the Dollar Store on her EBT card than she allowed. Mother
admitted she had switched off the electrical breaker that would allow the
children to cook food to determine which child made any given mess in the
kitchen.

¶10           Mother participated in counselling services from A New Leaf,
but denied she had anger issues. She testified that she requested DCS
provide respite and attendant care, and that these services would help her
reunify with the children.

¶11           Mother testified that she is willing to have N.H., J.H., and
A.H. in her home. And while Mother agreed that the children “may be
traumatized at this point,” she was “not sure” whether any of her behavior
caused their trauma.

¶12            After the second day of trial, Mother pled no contest to the
allegations in the petition but noted that she planned to challenge the plea’s
factual basis on appeal.

¶13            The court accepted the plea and stated it would not find that
physical discipline was abuse as a matter of law, but did find “[Section] 8-
201’s definition of abuse is broad, and [the court] is crediting the children’s

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                   IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

statements that there was more than just the belt being used and that it was
being used . . . sort of in anger and often inappropriately that did result in
at least one bruise, if not more regularly.”

¶14           The court issued a detailed minute entry finding the children
dependent as to Mother. N.H. was placed in an in-home dependency at her
request while A.H. and J.H. remained in out-of-home placement. In finding
that Mother’s physical discipline was excessive, the court credited the case
manager’s testimony about N.H.’s bruise and the children’s statements to
DCS that Mother’s discipline had resulted in injury. The court also found
severe emotional abuse as to N.H. based on school psychologist
evaluations. The court found Mother’s testimony that she used physical
discipline as a last resort not credible and determined Mother “had little
insight” into the effect her physical discipline had on the children. The
court found Mother withheld food as a means of discipline “which has and
will place the children at a substantial risk of harm.”

¶15         Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-235(A).

                                DISCUSSION

¶16            We review a superior court’s dependency finding for an
abuse of discretion and will affirm if any reasonable evidence supports the
finding. Joelle M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 525, 527, ¶ 9 (App. 2018).
We do not reweigh the evidence or second-guess the superior court’s
credibility determinations on appeal. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶17          On appeal, Mother challenges the factual basis for the
superior court’s findings of abuse and neglect following her no contest plea
and challenges the superior court’s failure to order “specifically requested”
services.

   I.      An adequate factual basis supports the superior court’s findings
           of abuse or neglect.

¶18           Mother argues that the record 1) did not support a neglect
finding because her actions did not create an unreasonable risk of harm 2)
did not support a physical abuse finding because her actions caused no
physical injuries, and 3) did not support a finding of “severe or serious”
emotional damage. Because we affirm on grounds 1 and 2, we do not
address ground 3.

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                   IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H. et al.
                          Decision of the Court

¶19            A parent who pleads no contest to a dependency allegation
may challenge the factual basis for a dependency finding, Tina T. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 236 Ariz. 295, 298, ¶¶ 14-15 (App. 2014), overruled on other
grounds by Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020), which we
review for an abuse of discretion. Louis C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz.
484, 488, ¶ 12 (App. 2015). A court must set forth written findings
constituting a factual basis. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(d)(3)-(4). Abuse means “the
infliction or allowing of physical injury, impairment of bodily function or
disfigurement . . . .” A.R.S. § 8-201(2).

¶20          The record has more than reasonable evidence to support the
superior court’s dependency finding, including the children’s statements.

¶21            Mother only wants us to reconsider the question based on
evidence she prefers, which we will not do. She first argues the record had
inadequate evidence of “physical injury.” But § 8-201 does not require, as
Mother alleges, that physical abuse leave “lasting marks, bruises or other
like injuries.” It only requires the “infliction or allowing of physical injury.”
Id.

¶22               She next argues that because DCS agreed that the children
“did not appear to be malnourished” withholding food from them did not
cause an unreasonable risk of harm. Neglect means, “[t]he . . .
unwillingness of a parent . . . of a child to provide that child with . . . food
 . . . if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of harm to the
child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a) (emphasis added). But as
we noted in E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, neglect need not result in a serious
physical injury to constitute abuse. 237 Ariz. 56, 59, ¶¶ 13-15 (App. 2015).
To hold otherwise, “a parent could neglect and physically abuse his child,
but as long as his behavior did not cause serious physical or emotional
injury, no grounds would exist to terminate his parental rights.” Id. at ¶ 14.
The plain text of § 8-201 contradicts Mother’s interpretation.

¶23            Here, the children disclosed to DCS that Mother regularly
withheld food from them as a method of discipline. Even if no serious harm
resulted, a finding that this practice created “a substantial risk” of harm is
not an abuse of discretion. We affirm the court’s finding of neglect.

   II.     The superior court did not err by failing to order all services
           requested by Mother.

¶24           Mother argues that the court’s failure to order DCS to provide
respite care and attendant care constituted an abuse of discretion. DCS has
an obligation to provide services designed to address the circumstances

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                 IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO J.H. et al.
                        Decision of the Court

leading to dependency. A.R.S. § 8-846. While DCS must make reasonable
efforts, DCS need not provide “every conceivable service.” Maricopa Cnty.
Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). While Mother
requested these services, she fails to explain how they would address the
issues leading to dependency: her excessive discipline. We find no abuse
of discretion in the superior court declining to require these services.

                              CONCLUSION

¶25          We affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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