Court Opinion

ID: 9545609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:16:10.614591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:10.109025
License: Public Domain

RULAND, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the disposition of this appeal as to the costs of the evaluation report, but I respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority opinion.
In this jurisdiction, the right of a spouse to recover damages arising out of the tor-tious conduct of another has, in effect, been treated as a separate property right. Thus, for example, one spouse has no right to recover damages for the pain and suffering incurred by the other; rather, that spouse’s claim is separate and is limited to loss of consortium. See § 14-2-209, C.R.S. (1987 RepLVol. 6B); Crouch v. West, 29 ColoApp. 72, 477 P.2d 805 (1970). Similarly, in the event of a spouse’s death, the surviving spouse has no right to recover for the decedent’s physical and mental pain, body disfigurement, and decreased earning power. Lee v. City of Fort Morgan, 77 Colo. 135, 235 P. 348 (1925). Instead, the surviving spouse’s separate right is to recover for net pecuniary loss arising out of the deceased spouse’s death. Fish v. Liley, 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).
In my view, § 14-10-113(2), C.R.S. (1987 RepLVol. 6B) preserves this distinction by limiting marital property to that “acquired” subsequent to the marriage. “Acquired” has a well established meaning and pertains to property “attained by the individual by or as if by his own efforts.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 18 (1961). Thus, I am persuaded by the analysis of the court in Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986) that the right of recovery allocated to an injured spouse based upon the tortious conduct of another may not be deemed an acquired marital right. It arises from unanticipated adversity which is totally unrelated to any initiative to acquire marital assets. I recognize that, to the extent the marital estate has been diminished by payment of costs such as medical expenses, and by the loss of wages, the trial court should have discretion to provide for reimbursement. Similarly, future lost wages may be considered in connection with any award of child support or maintenance. However, to the extent an injured spouse is entitled to recover for physical or mental pain and suffering, future medical expenses, or permanent or partial disability, these items should not be subject to any type of division which benefits the uninjured spouse.
As stated in Amato v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 434 A.2d 639 (1981):
“Nothing is more personal than the entirely subjective sensations of agonizing pain, mental anguish, embarrassment because of scarring or disfigurement, and outrage attending a severe bodily injury. *1375Mental injury, as well, has many of these characteristics.
... None of these, including the frustrations of diminution or loss of normal body functions or movements, can be sensed, or need they be borne, by anyone but the injured spouse. Why, then, should the law, seeking to be equitable, coin these factors into money to even partially benefit the uninjured and estranged spouse? In such case, the law would literally heap insult upon injury. The uninjured spouse has his or her separate and equally personal right to an action for loss of consortium.”
The rule of Amato was approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Landwehr v. Landwehr, 111 N.J. 491, 545 A.2d 738 (N.J.1988). Hence, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling that the husband’s personal injury claim is marital property and I would remand with directions to the trial court to order distribution of any proceeds realized from the claim consistent with the views expressed in this dissent.