Court Opinion

ID: 9352992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 18:01:05.375937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:25.691190
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0017n.06

                                        Case No. 22-3411

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                       FILED
                                                                                   Jan 10, 2023
 DUANE RAY,                                             )                      DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                        )
         Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                        )
                                                        )     ON APPEAL FROM THE
                v.
                                                        )     UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                        )     COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
 FIFTH THIRD BANK, N.A. and FIFTH THIRD
                                                        )     DISTRICT OF OHIO
 BANK INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,
                                                        )
       Defendants-Appellants.                           )                                  OPINION
 _______________________________________                )

Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

       ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Duane Ray sued Foundation Risk Partners

(FRP), Fifth Third Bank, N.A. (“the Bank”), and Fifth Third Insurance Agency (FTI).             FRP

moved for a preliminary injunction to enforce a non-compete agreement against Ray, but the

district court denied it. Ray v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 1:21-cv-76, 2022 WL 974341 (S.D.

Ohio, Mar. 31, 2022).   FRP appealed that order (No. 22-3387).     Neither the Bank nor FTI joined

that motion or that appeal, nor did either the Bank or FTI claim any injury from Ray’s alleged

violation of the non-compete agreement.       Nonetheless, the Bank and FTI filed this separate

interlocutory appeal, challenging the denial of FRP’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

       Specifically, the Bank and FTI claim that “notwithstanding that they did not seek injunctive

relief,” 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1) entitles them to an interlocutory appeal because they have “a

significant stake in the judicial determination as to [their] rights under the [employment contract]

and the scope of the assets [they] sold to FRP in the [sales contract].” Reply Br. at 4.    They rely
22-3411, Ray v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.

on City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 508 F.3d 827 (6th Cir. 2007), and Pedreira v. Sunrise Children’s

Servs., Inc., 802 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir. 2015). But that reliance is misplaced.

        In Pedreira, we allowed that “a party to the case can appeal any final judgment . . . that

imposes ‘some detriment’ on the party.”       Pedreira, 802 F.3d at 869 (emphasis added) (quoting

Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985)). But we do not

have a final judgment here; this is an interlocutory order denying a preliminary injunction.    “The

purpose of a preliminary injunction, unlike a permanent one, is to ‘prevent any violation of the

[movant]’s rights before the district court enters a final judgment,’” so appellate standing “depends

[at least in part] on whether our decision would have any ‘practical effect’ during that window of

time”; i.e., before the entry of final judgment.   Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel, 35 F.4th 524, 528 (6th

Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Ohio v. EPA, 969 F.3d 306, 308 (6th Cir. 2020)).

        In the order underlying this appeal, the district court determined that FRP had not shown a

substantial likelihood that FTI had properly assigned the employment contract to FRP in

accordance with the assignment provision, but that is not a final (appealable) judgment on the

merits of that issue. That is merely conclusive on the request for the preliminary injunction.

Thus, the Bank and FTI claim, at most, a stake in the final judgment, which remains pending.

        In City of Cleveland, 508 F.3d at 836-37, which was—like Pedreira—an appeal from a

final judgment, we found appellate standing for peripheral parties with “a sufficient stake in the

outcome of the case,” in contrast to cases in which appellants “were not personally aggrieved by

the judgment under appeal and did not seek to protect their own interests.”     This appeal falls into

that latter category; the Bank and FTI were not personally aggrieved by the denial of the

preliminary injunction, which sought to protect only FRP’s interest in the non-compete agreement.

        Because the Bank and FTI lack standing to appeal, we DISMISS.

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