Court Opinion

ID: 9884658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:05:17.614062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:51.390217
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 44. (dissenting). I do not join the majority opinion because the majority has not interpreted Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) (1993-94)1 in conformity with the express legislative purpose of the Children's Code. I also am not persuaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish the present case from past cases in which this court has indicated that the definitions of "child" and "person" include a viable fetus. Furthermore, I find it significant that although the legislature amended the Children's Code last session, it did not act to alter the court of appeals' interpretation of §48.02(2) in State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995) — an interpretation in accord with the one set forth in this dissent.2
¶ 45. Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) defines "child" as "a person who is less than 18 years of age." The majority holds that the legislature did not intend to include a *139viable fetus within this definition of "child" based on several factors. First, the majority emphasizes the lack of debate and dialogue regarding whether a fetus should be included in the definition of "child" in the legislative history of Chapter 48. Majority op. at 124. Second, the majority asserts that certain relevant sections of the Children's Code would be rendered absurd if the definition of "child" includes a viable fetus. Id. at 126-27. Finally, the majority concludes that Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967), in which this court held that the definition of "person" includes a viable fetus, is "unpersuasive in this context." Id. at 128-30.
I.
¶ 46. The initial issue before the court is whether the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus. Section 48.02(2) defines "child" as "a person who is less than 18 years of age." § 48.02(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, resolution of this issue depends upon whether the legislature intended the words "child" and "person" to include a viable fetus.
¶ 47. As determined by the majority, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus; therefore, the statute is ambiguous. Majority op. at 121-23. Accordingly, the court must examine extrinsic matters such as the history, context, subject matter, scope, and object of the statute in order to ascertain the legislative intent. See, e.g., Stockbridge School Dist. v. DPI, 202 Wis. 2d 214, 220, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996) (quoting Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327, 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996)). After considering these extrinsic matters, I conclude that the legislature intended *140the word "child" in § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus for three reasons: (1) the ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "child" and "person;" (2) the express legislative purpose of ch. 48; and, (3) legislative inaction to the recent court of appeals' decision in State ex rel. Angela M.W..
A.
¶ 48. First, in construing a statute, a court must give effect to the ordinary and accepted meaning of the language. State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 904, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991) (citing County of Walworth v. Spalding, 111 Wis. 2d 19, 24, 329 N.W.2d 925 (1983)). In light of medical knowledge concerning fetal development, several sources, including precedent of this court, indicate that the ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "child" and "person" includes a viable fetus.3
*141¶ 49. For example, in Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980), this court considered whether a child can recover for injuries allegedly caused by a car accident that occurred when the child was a non-viable fetus. Although the jury returned a verdict in favor of the child, the circuit court struck the award based on Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).4 The Puhl court affirmed the circuit court's decision on other grounds, finding that there was not sufficient evidence of causation. However, the court nonetheless considered the vitality of Lipps. The court stated:
What is now known as the viable theory is based on medical knowledge and even on common knowledge that a child in the viable stage can and does live separately in the womb of its mother and can live and exist as an independent person if bom in that stage. Based on this knowledge the courts began to allow recovery for injuries sustained while the child was viable. This reasoning was adopted in 1933 by the supreme court of Canada. . . . This reasoning has been followed by the states of Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, and Oregon.
*142Puhl, 8 Wis. 2d at 355-56 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).5 Puhl is significant because the court used the word "child" to refer to a viable fetus. Id. at 355-56.
¶ 50. This court relied heavily on Puhl in Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). The Kwaterski court was asked to determine whether the term "person" in Wis. Stat. § 331.03 (1963) includes a viable fetus. Section 331.03 provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the person who, . . .would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured; provided, that such action shall be brought for a death caused in this state.
Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). After considering Puhl in great detail, the Kwaterski court determined: "[T]he weight of authority continues the trend noticed in Puhl, favoring recognition of an unborn child as a person for purposes of recovery under a wrongful-death statute." Id. at 19. The court therefore held that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of § 331.03. Id. at 22.
*143¶ 51. Kwaterski has significant precedential value in the present case because the legislature has defined "child" as a "person" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2). Kwaterski therefore supports the proposition that the definition of "person," and hence "child," includes a viable fetus.
¶ 52. The majority attempts to distinguish Kwaterski by pointing out that "the wrongful death statute does no more than vindicate the interest of parents in the potential life that a fetus represents." Majority op. at 130. Therefore, the majority implies that Kwaterski "has limited applicability to the present case" because Kwaterski does not provide the fetus with legal rights. Majority op. at 130. However, this is a distinction without a difference, because the key issue in this case is not one of fetal rights. Instead, this case centers on a question of statutory interpretation, just as Kwaterski did.6 Kwaterski is persuasive here because both Kwaterski and this case revolve around the question of whether a viable fetus is a "person" under Wisconsin statutes. Thus, the majority's conclusion that Kwaterski only vindicates the interests of parents does not provide a logical basis for concluding that the Kwaterski court's interpretation of "person" is inapplicable here.7
*144¶ 53. This court's decision in In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) (L.K. v. B.B.), appeal dismissed, Buhse v. Krueger, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984), also supports the proposition that the word "child" includes a viable fetus. In Baby Girl K., this court was called upon to decide whether the termination of parental rights under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(a)2 could be based upon a parent's prenatal conduct. In order to decide this issue, the court considered the language of Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) (1981-82),8 which read in relevant part:
In evaluating whether the person has had a substantial parental relationship with the child, the court may consider such factors, including, but not limited to, whether the person has ever expressed concern for or interest in the support, care or well-being of the child or the mother during her pregnancy....
Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Based on this language, the court concluded: "It is clear therefore that the legislature intended that a father's pre-delivery behavior be a consideration in determining whether the father had established a substantial parental relationship." Id. at 438. Furthermore, this court emphasized that "what happens to a fetus in utero can have a significant impact upon the quality of life a child will have after birth...." Id. at 439.
¶ 54. Baby Girl K. is significant for two reasons. First, this court determined that the word "child" includes a fetus under Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b), a sec*145tion of the Children's Code, when it concluded that this section authorizes a court to consider a parent's conduct before a child is born to determine whether the parent has established a substantial parental relationship with the child. Id. at 438. Second, this case highlights the language of § 48.415(6)(b), in which the legislature clearly used the word "child" to refer to a fetus. See § 48.415(6)(b) ("child or mother during her pregnancy").9 Thus, both the language of § 48.415(6)(b) and the court's decision in Baby Girl K support the proposition that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus.
¶ 55. The majority finds justification for its conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include a viable fetus in the definition of "child" by emphasizing the absence in the legislative history of any "news accounts of debate, dialogue, or even consideration of whether fetus should be included in the definition of 'child' in Chapter 48." Majority op. at 123-24. However, lack of such legislative discussion did not prevent this court from holding that "person" in Wis. Stat. § 331.03 includes a viable fetus in Kwaterski.10
*146¶ 56. In addition, the majority considers Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) in the context of other relevant sections of the Children's Code. Majority op. at 127-28. The majority concludes that it would lead to an absurd result in other sections of the Children's Code if "child" is interpreted to include a viable fetus. Id. at 127. However, in the sections that the majority emphasizes, interpreting "child" to include a viable fetus will not lead to ridiculous results. For example, as the majority points out, Wis. Stat. § 48.19(2) "requires the person taking a child into physical custody to immediately notify the parent by the most practical means." Id. If "child" is interpreted to include a viable fetus, § 48.19(2) will not be rendered absurd, since a logical reading of it requires notification to the father, as well as the mother. Likewise, Wis. Stat. § 48.19(1)(c) refers to the removal of a child "from his or her present custody." Again, this section will not be rendered inane, because the detention of a mother, and hence an unborn child, in a drug treatment program does, in effect, constitute a change in custody of the child — the viable fetus. It also is essential to point out that interpreting the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus does not lead to an absurd result, but rather allows the state to protect a viable fetus from substantial harm, consistent with the objectives of the Children's Code. See infra § IB.
¶ 57. Furthermore, the majority erroneously assumes that every provision of the Children's Code *147must fit before it can conclude that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus. This is an erroneous assumption, because not every provision of the Children's Code is applicable to all situations. Common sense dictates that sections of the Children's Code relating to runaways will never apply to a very young child, i.e. a newborn. Despite the fact that every section of ch. 48 is not applicable in every situation, this court in Baby Girl K did not have any difficulty in holding that the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b), a section of the Children's Code, includes an unborn child.
¶ 58. Moreover, it is the application of the majority's interpretation of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) that leads to an absurd result, by rendering the state's power to protect a child dependent upon whether the child is inside or outside of the womb. For example, under the majority's interpretation of § 48.02(2), the state will have the power to protect an eight-month-old child that has been born prematurely; however, the state will have no power to protect an eight-month-old fetus that is in the womb. The Kwaterski court recognized the absurdity of distinguishing between a viable fetus and a born child in 1967. See Kwaterski, 34 Wis. 2d at 20. This court should certainly recognize the same absurdity in 1997.
B.
¶ 59. Second, the legislative objectives enunciated in the Children's Code support a conclusion that "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus. The preamble to the Children's Code expressly directs that the chapter "shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives" set forth by the legislature. Wis. Stat. § 48.01(2) (emphasis added). One of the objectives set forth by the legislature is "[t]o provide for the care, *148protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children_" § 48.01(1)(b) (emphasis added). Section 48.01(2) also mandates that "[t]he best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration."
¶ 60. This court has stated that "a 'cardinal rule in interpreting statutes' is to favor a construction which will fulfill the purpose of the statute over a construction which defeats the manifest object of the act." In re Estate of Halsted, 116 Wis. 2d 23, 29, 341 N.W.2d 389 (1983) (quoting Student Ass 'n, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976)); accord UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). We likewise have indicated that "the intent of a section of a statute must be derived from the act as a whole." Standard Theaters, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp., Div. of Highways, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Aero Auto Parts, Inc. v. State, Dept. ofTransp., Div. of Highways, 78 Wis. 2d 235, 239, 253 N.W.2d 896 (1977).
¶ 61. Accordingly, the canons of statutory construction require the court to interpret the word "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) consistently with the purpose of the Children's Code, which is clearly to protect children at risk from harm. There can be no dispute that a mother's ingestion of cocaine after her fetus becomes viable has a substantial impact on the physical development of her child in utero and ultimately after birth.11 Certainly, a mother's ingestion of cocaine is not *149in the best interests other child, born or unborn. Moreover, what occurs in útero will have long lasting effects not only on the child, but on society as well.12 Thus, interpreting the word "child" to include a viable fetus fulfills the express legislative objectives of the Children's Code, by allowing the state to intervene to protect and care for the physical development of an unborn child. Conversely, the majority's interpretation of "child" fails to liberally construe the Children's Code in order to carry out its intentions, fails to consider adequately the best interests of the child, and, in fact, defeats the manifest objectives of ch. 48.13
*150c.
¶ 62. Third, legislative inaction after the decision by the court of appeals in State ex rel. Angela M.W. indicates that the court correctly interpreted Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2). "Legislative inaction following judicial construction of a statute, while not conclusive, evinces legislative approval of the interpretation." State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 240, 247, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997); accord State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 456 N.W.2d 143 (1990). The presumption of legislative adoption of a judicial interpretation is entitled to less weight when there is nearly complete inaction by the legislature. Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980); Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v. Department of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 72 Wis. 2d 26, 35, 240 N.W.2d 422 (1976). However, "[w]here the legislature has made amendments to the statutory section in question and has not corrected the court's interpretation, the presumption of adoption or ratification is strengthened." York v. National Continental Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 2d 486, 497, 463 N.W.2d 364 (Ct. App.) (citing Reiter, 95 Wis. 2d at 471-72), review denied, 465 N.W.2d 656 (1990).
¶ 63. In the current case, the court of appeals' holding in State ex rel. Angela M.W. that the definition of "child" under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) includes a viable fetus was released on October 6, 1995. This was a published decision of the court of appeals, which therefore had "statewide precedential effect." Wis. Stat. § 752.41(2); Wolf v. F & M Banks, 193 Wis. 2d 439, 455-56, 534 N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App.) (quoting *151§ 752.41(2)), review denied, 537 N.W.2d 572 (1995); see also In re Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 82 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 263 N.W.2d 149 (1978); Skrupky v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 56, 526 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1994). After October 6, 1995, the legislature revised the definition of "child," and made substantial changes to the Children's Code in general. Specifically, 1995 Wis. Act 352, § lOp, enacted on May 23, 1996, and effective on July 1, 1996, directly changed the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) of the Children's Code. In addition, 1995 Wis. Act 275, enacted April 22, 1996, and effective July 1, 1996, made extensive changes to ch. 48 in general. However, the legislature did not alter the court of appeals' interpretation of "child" in either of these amendments. This legislative inaction following the court of appeals' decision demonstrates legislative approval of the court's interpretation of § 48.02(2). Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d at 247; Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d at 566; Reiter, 95 Wis. 2d at 471; Milwaukee Fed'n of Teachers, Local No. 252 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 83 Wis. 2d 588, 599, 266 N.W.2d 314 (1978) (quoting Zimmerman, 38 Wis. 2d at 633-34).14
*152¶ 64. Despite this overwhelming support to the contrary, the majority has reached the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to include viable fetus within the definition of "child". Majority op. at 137-38. The majority states: "Despite ample opportunity, the legislature has not expressly provided that a fetus is a 'child' under the Code. We decline the. . .invitation to 'take on this burden' to fill the legislative void." Id. However, interpreting the term "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus does not constitute a "rewriting [of] the Children's Code under the guise of statutory construction," as the majority suggests. Id. at 136-37. Instead, interpreting the word "child" to include a viable fetus fulfills the express purpose of the legislature in ch. 48, and is in conformity with precedent of this court. It simply is not within the spirit of the Children's Code or in accordance with past case law to exclude a viable fetus, capable of life outside the womb, from the same protection afforded a born child under the Children's Code.
II.
¶ 65. Since I am satisfied that the legislature intended the definition of "child" to include a viable fetus under Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2), the arguments concerning the juvenile court's jurisdiction and the alleged *153violation of Angela's constitutional rights to due process of law and equal protection must be addressed.
¶ 66. Angela first argues that the juvenile court did not have original jurisdiction over her or her viable fetus under Wis. Stat. § 48.13.15 However, the statute does not require jurisdiction over a parent in order to obtain jurisdiction over a child. As the court of appeals determined: "The order worked its custodial effect on Angela not because the juvenile court has asserted jurisdiction over her, but because Angela and her fetus are physically and biologically one." State ex rel. Angela M.W., 197 Wis. 2d at 562.
¶ 67. Accordingly, the pertinent issue is whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Angela's viable fetus. In order to take a child into protective custody pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 48.19, the county must make a showing satisfactory to the juvenile court that the welfare of the child demands that the child be immediately removed from his or her present custody. See § 48.19(1)(c). In the present case, the county met this burden to the satisfaction of the juvenile court and, as a result, the order was issued. The conclusion that "child" includes a viable fetus, coupled with the finding that the court fulfilled the requirements of § 48.19(1)(c), leads to the conclusion that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over Angela's viable fetus.
¶ 68. Angela next contends that the custodial effect of the protective order violated her due process liberty interest under the United States Constitution *154and the Wisconsin Constitution.16 The test for violation of a fundamental liberty interest is two pronged. First, in order to restrict a fundamental liberty interest, a challenged statute must further a compelling state interest. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388, (1978); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), petition for cert. filed, Mar. 7, 1996. Second, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve that compelling state interest. E.g., Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 302.
¶ 69. In regard to the state interest implicated here, the United States Supreme Court has determined:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological justifications.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). Nearly twenty years later, the Court confirmed its position, stating:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of the second life can *155in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992). The Casey Court further emphasized:
[I]t must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in establishing not only the woman's liberty but also the State's "important and legitimate interest in potential life." Roe, supra, at 163. That portion of the decision in Roe has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases.
Id. at 871. Thus, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, the state's interest in protecting the life and health of an unborn child becomes compelling and dominant once the fetus reaches viability.
¶ 70. In addition, this court's decision in State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 526 N.W.2d 132 (1994), is also relevant. In Black, the petitioner allegedly caused the death of a fetus due to be born in five days by assaulting the unborn child's mother. The state subsequently charged Black with feticide under Wis. Stat. § 940.04(2)(a).17 Id. at 643. Black argued that the feti-cide statute, due to its title of "abortion," could not be enforced against him. Id. at 644. The court held that Black was properly charged with feticide because the "statutory language clearly and simply proscribes the intentional destruction of a quick child." Id. at 645. Accordingly, the Black court concluded that the state *156may enact legislation to protect a viable fetus in areas other than simply abortion, and, therefore, implicitly determined that the state has a compelling interest in the welfare of a viable fetus in other contexts.18 See id. at 645.
¶ 71. In the present case, there is no dispute that Angela's child was a viable fetus when the petition was filed, that Angela was actively using cocaine, and that the use of cocaine put the child at substantial risk of great bodily harm or possibly death. As such, the state has a compelling state interest to protect Angela's fetus under Roe,19 Casey, and Black.
¶ 72. The next issue therefore is whether the infringement on Angela's liberty is narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest. I conclude that it is. The Children's Code specifies the procedures necessary to further the state's compelling interest in the protection of children. These procedures must be complied with before the state can exercise its right to detain and ultimately protect a child.
¶ 73. In particular, the Children's Code requires the state to have jurisdiction over the child. See Wis. *157Stat. §48.13. Wis. Stat. §48.19 provides that the state's power to take a child into custody is limited by specifically enumerated regulations. In addition, the state must conduct a hearing within 24 hours of the time the decision was made to hold the child in protective custody. Wis. Stat. § 48.21.20 At the hearing, the juvenile court must determine whether there is probable cause to believe the child is within the jurisdiction of the court, and that the child will be subject to injury if he or she is not taken into protective custody.21 Wis. Stat. § 48.205; Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff, Staff Brief 94-1, Overview of Wisconsin Law Relating To Children in Need of Protection or Services, at 23 (Sept. 1, 1994). In light of all the statutorily imposed procedures necessary to detain a child, it is clear that the means by which the state's compelling interest is served are narrowly tailored to "attain the purposes and objectives of the legislation" to protect children. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 438, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
¶ 74. Finally, Angela argues that if the state is allowed to intervene when the mother ingests cocaine, this will "open the door" for the state to intervene whenever a mother acts in any manner that is potentially harmful to her viable fetus. Angela cites as examples the possibility of state intervention if a mother smokes or refuses to take her prenatal vitamins.
*158¶ 75. This argument is not a realistic one because ch. 48 contains the necessary protections against unreasonable or unjustified intervention by the state. Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 48.255(1)(e) requires a petition requesting that a court exercise jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of protection or services (CHIPS petition) to state "reliable and credible information which forms the basis of the allegations necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the court." Accordingly, the test for determining compliance with § 48.255 is the same as that governing the sufficiency of a criminal complaint — probable cause. In re Courtney E., 184 Wis. 2d 592, 601, 516 N.W.2d 422 (1994). In addition, Wis. Stat. §48.13 lists eighteen scenarios in which ch. 48 authorizes the juvenile court to exercise its original jurisdiction. These scenarios represent situations in which the child is at substantial risk either because of his or her own actions or those of others. See § 48.13. For example, § 48.13(10), the subsection that the county relies on in this case, requires that the parent has "neglect [ed], refus[ed] or [been] unable for reasons other than poverty to provide necessary care, food, clothing, medical or dental care or shelter so as to seriously endanger the physical health of the child...." § 48.13(10) (emphasis added).
¶ 76. Clearly, the Children's Code enables the state to intervene only when a child faces substantial risk. Thus, ch. 48 contains the necessary stopping point to protect against Angela's slippery slope argument.22 In fact, if this were not true, then the same argument *159would have validity under the Children's Code even if the child has been born. See Whitner v. State, no. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).
¶ 77. In conclusion, I am satisfied that the legislature intended to include a viable fetus within the definition of "child" in Wis. Stat. § 48.02(2). The ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "child" and "person," as established by Kwaterski, Puhl, and Baby Girl K., supports this conclusion. Furthermore, despite ample opportunity, the legislature did not alter the court of appeals' interpretation in State ex rel. Angela M.W. when it amended § 48.02(2). The legislature's acquiescence to the court of appeals' interpretation of § 48.02(2) indicates that this interpretation was correct and acceptable to the legislature. Finally, interpreting "child" in § 48.02(2) to include a viable fetus carries out the express purpose of the legislature in ch. 48. Consequently, I conclude that the majority's interpretation of § 48.02(2) defeats the legislative objectives of the Children's Code by denying its protections to a viable fetus, ignores established precedent, and fails to acknowledge the importance of legislative acquiescence to the court of appeals' decision.
¶ 78. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 79. I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ and Justice JON P. WILCOX join this dissent.

 All future references are to the 1993-94 Statutes unless otherwise indicated. However, note that 1995 Wis. Act 275 and 1995 Wis. Act 352, which became effective July 1, 1996, made significant changes to the Children's Code.

 The court of appeals concluded that a viable fetus is a "child" for the purposes of the Children's Code. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 560, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995).

 See In Re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) (holding that the word "child" as used in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) includes a fetus), appeal dismissed, Buhse v. Krueger, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967) (concluding that the word "person" includes a viable fetus for purposes of wrongful death statute); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 355-56 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959) (referring to a viable fetus as a "child"), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980); Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *1 (S.C. July 15, 1996) (in an analogous case, the court interpreted a provision of South Carolina's Children's Code that defined "child" as "person under the age of eighteen." The court held that the word "person," and therefore "child," includes a viable fetus.); American Heritage Dictionary 332 (3d ed. 1992) (defining "child" as "[a]n unborn infant; a fetus"); Black's Law Dictionary 239 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "child" as "unborn or recently born human being").

 In Lipps, the court held that "[s]ince a non-viable child cannot exist separate from its mother, it must in the law of torts be regarded as part of its mother, and hence, being incapable of a separate existence, it is not an independent person or being to whom separate rights can accrue." Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, 164 Wis. 272, 276, 159 N.W. 916 (1916) (emphasis added).

 The court also stated: "If the common law has any vitality, it has been argued that it should be elastic enough to adapt itself to current medical and scientific truths so as to function as an efficient rule of conduct in our modern, complex society." Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 357, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980).

 Even the majority stresses from the outset that "this case is one of statutory construction." Majority op. at 130.

 Moreover, as the Supreme Court of South Carolina has concluded:
[W]e do not see any rational basis for finding a viable fetus is not a "person" in the present context. Indeed, it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of. . .wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse.
*144Whitner v. State, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164, at *3 (S.C. July 15, 1996).

 As of 1993-94, Wis. Stat. § 48.415(6)(b) had not changed in any significant manner.

 I do not agree with the majority's interpretation of this phrase. See majority op. at 132 n.14. The focus of this section of the statute is on the parent's relationship with the child during the mother's pregnancy. My reading of this section is consistent with the holding in Baby Girl K. that the father's actions prior to birth of his child may form a sufficient basis for termination of his parental rights.

 I also do not find the lack of legislative debate to be of significant persuasive value, given the fact that the definition of child was originally enacted in 1919. Why would the legislature have debated whether a "child" included a viable fetus in 1919, since this was not such a controversial issue at that time?
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the court is often faced with silence in the legislative history. However, *146when the legislative intent is not explicitly stated in the drafting files or newspapers, we do not simply decline to interpret the language at issue. Instead, this court is required to consider extrinsic sources to ascertain the legislative intent, such as precedent and the purpose of the statute. This is exactly what this dissent has attempted to do.

 See I.J. Chasnoff et al., Cocaine use in pregnancy: Perinatal morbidity and mortality, 9 Neurotoxicol Teratol 291 (1987). Studies have confirmed that the cessation of cocaine use in the third trimester can have a significant positive impact on the development of the fetus. These benefits include improved *149intrauterine growth, reduced incidences of seizures, and reduced incidences of premature labor which alleviates low birth weight and the multitude of problems associated with low birth weight babies. I.J. Chasnoff et al., Temporal patterns of cocaine use in pregnancy: Perinatal outcome, 261 JAMA 1741 (1989); I.J. Chasnoff, Cocaine: Effects on pregnancy and the neonate, in Drugs, Alcohol, Pregnancy, and Parenting, at 97-103 (1988).

 R.A. Aronson & L.H. Hunt, Cocaine use during pregnancy: Implications for physicians, 89(3) Wis. Med. J. 105 (1990) ("Cocaine damaged children, particularly those from impoverished home environments, are at great risk for school failure and dropout, juvenile crime, teenage pregnancy, unemployment, and chronic disabilities. According to Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas), chair of the Senate Finance Committee, government at all levels will soon be spending $15 billion annually to prepare cocaine-affected children to enter kindergarten.")

 The majority claims: "The logical extension of the dissent's argument regarding liberal construction would expand the definition of 'child' to the moment after conception." Majority op. at 130.1 stress that this case deals only with the issue of whether the words "child" and "person" include a viable fetus. In addition, I emphasize that the United States Supreme Court and this court have drawn the line at viability. See Planned *150Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).

 I reject the majority's determination that legislative acquiescence to a court of appeals' decision is of no value because the legislature cannot be presumed to know that the decision will remain unchanged. See majority op. at 125-26. The grant of review in a case does not render the legislature powerless to clearly state its intent, especially where it is currently revising the very statutory language at issue. In addition, the majority supports its conclusion with a portion of the following quote: "The legislature is presumed to know that in absence of its changing the law, the construction put upon it by the courts will remain unchanged. . . ." Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 633-34, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968). *152This statement was originally made by the court ten years prior to the development of the court of appeals, and therefore could not have been intended to stand for the proposition that acquiescence to a court of appeals' decision has no significance. Although this language was quoted by the court in Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980), the Reiter court in no way indicated that it was relying on this statement to mean anything other than what it meant in 1968.

 Section 48.13 provides in part: "The court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be in need of protection or services which can be ordered by the court, and: " The statute then lists eighteen scenarios in which the court may exercise its jurisdiction.

 As noted by the court of appeals, despite her invocation of the Wisconsin Constitution, Angela did not make a separate argument under the Wisconsin Constitution. See State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 564 n.16, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995). All of her arguments rest on cases in which courts considered the federal constitution. Therefore, I do not address any possible implications of the Wisconsin Constitution.

 Section 940.04(2)(a) (1989-90) provided in pertinent part: "Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following may be imprisoned not more than 15 years:. . .Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child;. .." State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 644, 526 N.W.2d 132 (1994).

 Even the majority recognizes that in Black, this court determined that the legislature can act to protect a viable fetus in contexts other than abortion. See majority op. at 131-32.

 The court of appeals succinctly summarized the significance of Roe to the current case when it stated:
By recognizing that a state may intervene in an abortion decision after viability, Roe necessarily recognizes the right of the state to protect the potential life of the fetus over the wishes of the mother to terminate the pregnancy. Why then cannot the state also protect the viable fetus from maternal conduct which functionally presents the same risk and portends the same result — the death of the viable fetus?
State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 197 Wis. 2d 532, 552 n.11, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Ct. App. 1995).

 1995 Wis. Act 275, enacted April 22, 1996 and effective July 1, 1996, changed the time of the hearing from 24 hours to 48 hours.

 Section 48.205 lists several situations in which a probable cause showing would result in the detention of a child; however, only the portion relevant to this case was cited.

 Moreover, the Milwaukee County District Attorney noted in his amicus brief at 11-12 that "despite the extensive and sustained headline coverage of Angela's case in the Milwaukee-area media last fall, in the last nine months the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office has yet to receive a single *159Angela-type CHIPS referral. . . . [T]he 'floodgates,' if opened, have not yet impacted Milwaukee County."