Court Opinion

ID: 9796006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:45:04.900753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:43:08.848797
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, P. J.,
dissenting.
After acquiring property outside the urban growth boundary (UGB) of the City of Sherwood, Timberline Baptist Church sought approval from Washington County for special uses of the property for a church, a day care facility, and a religious school. The proposed facilities were intended to serve the church’s members, the majority of whom lived within the UGB. The county granted special use and development review approvals for construction of the church and use as a day care facility. However, based on one of several requirements in the county ordinance pertaining to school uses — that at least 75 percent of the student body of a rural school must be students residing in rural areas — the county denied the requested special use of the property for a religious school. The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed the county’s decision.
*468On judicial review, the issue is whether LUBA correctly determined that Washington County’s denial of a special use permit for a religious school, while at the same time approving a special use permit for both a church and day care facility in the same building, did not constitute a “substantial burden” on Timberline Baptist Church’s religious exercise for the purpose of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000 (RLUIPA), 42 USC §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000). The majority concludes that the county’s denial of a special use permit to use the approved church for a religious school did not constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA. For the reasons set out below, I would conclude that the county’s decision constituted a substantial burden under RLUIPA and would reverse and remand for a determination of whether denial of the special use permit for a religious school furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of doing so. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

Substantial Burden under RLUIPA

In Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn, 338 Or 453, 111 P3d 1123 (2005), the Oregon Supreme Court considered whether a city’s denial of a conditional use permit to build a new church meetinghouse constituted a substantial burden for RLUIPA purposes. The court explained that, in enacting RLUIPA, Congress intended the term “substantial burden” to be interpreted by reference to the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 338 Or at 464. The court reviewed three such cases—Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 US 136, 140-41, 107 S Ct 1046, 94 L Ed 2d 190 (1987); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 US 707, 717-18, 101 S Ct 1425, 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398, 403-08, 83 S Ct 1790, 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963)—and determined that, under the Free Exercise Clause analyses therein, a “substantial burden” is one that “pressure [s] someone to forgo or modify the expression of a religious belief.” Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or at 465.
Because of their “similarity” to the case before it, the Oregon Supreme Court also found instructive the analyses in *469several federal circuit court cases.1 First, the court noted that, in Westchester Day v. Village of Mamaroneck, 386 F3d 183 (2d Cir 2004), the Second Circuit found no substantial burden where the government’s denial of a permit application was not the “death knell” of the application, but left open the possibility that the government would approve a modified application. The Second Circuit also explained that a denial is more likely to constitute a substantial burden when it is “disingenuous” or when curing the problems on which the denial was based would impose a great financial burden or would directly affect religious practice. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or at 465-66 (citing and quoting Westchester Day, 386 F3d at 188, 188 n 3). Next, in San Jose Christian College v. Morgan Hill, 360 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2004), the Ninth Circuit held that the mere requirement that the applicant submit a new and more complete application did not impose a substantial burden. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or at 466 (citing and quoting San Jose Christian College, 360 F3d at 1035). Finally, in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F3d 1214 (11th Cir 2004), cert den, 543 US 1146 (2005), two synagogues had challenged a zoning ordinance that excluded religious institutions from the town’s business district, and the town sought to enjoin synagogue members from meeting in leased space within the district. The Eleventh Circuit held that requiring congregants to walk farther to attend services did not constitute a substantial burden. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 338 Or at 466 (citing Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F3d at 1228.
The Oregon Supreme Court explained that it “agree [d] with the reasoning” of those federal circuit court cases. It thus concluded that, for purposes of RLUIPA, a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise “only if it ‘pressures’ or ‘forces’ a choice between following religious precepts and forfeiting certain benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one or more of those precepts *470in order to obtain the benefits, on the other.” 338 Or at 465. The court applied that test to the facts before it:
“We agree with the church that the denial of the [conditional use permit] has several adverse consequences for the church’s effort to build a meetinghouse. The city’s decision requires the church to submit a new permit application that reflects the use of a greater portion of an available lot, provides for additional buffering, and includes all of the required noise studies. That resubmission necessarily will impose additional expenses on the church. It also will create delay, during which church members will continue to face crowded conditions at their [current] meetinghouse and the longer drive required to get there.
“Those hardships, however, do not constitute ‘substantial burden [s]’ under RLUIPA. The church already has indicated that it would be possible to acquire more land to provide the necessary buffering space between the parking lot and Shannon Lane that the city has requested. The expenses associated with submitting a new application do not constitute a substantial burden in and of themselves, nor does the requirement of submitting the application. The siting of a large building often involves multiple applications by the builder, changes requested by a city planning commission or city council based on zoning and similar requirements, and related legal, architectural, and engineering costs. The city gave specific reasons for denying the first application, and nothing in the record indicates that the city would not approve a revised application that met its concerns. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the crowded conditions at the meetinghouse have forced the church to turn away anyone who wished to attend church or to eliminate or reduce church activities. Nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest that the city’s denial was motivated by religious animus. In short, nothing in the record suggests that requiring the church to submit a new application would pressure the church to forgo or modify the expression of a religious belief, as described in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. Moreover, the hardships imposed on the church are likely to be relatively short-lived.”
338 Or at 467 (third brackets in original). Finally, the court noted that, because the denial of the permit did not constitute a substantial burden on the church’s religious exercise, it needed not consider whether the denial served a compelling *471governmental interest, whether the denial was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, or whether RLUIPA violates the First Amendment. Id. at 467-68.
As does the majority, I treat the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Corp. of Presiding Bishop as the “departure point” for analysis of this case. See 211 Or App at 451.1 agree with the majority that Corp. of Presiding Bishop is “instructive,” but not dispositive. See 211 Or App at 453. As the majority notes, Corp. of Presiding Bishop did not involve a final and outright denial, whereas here, the county’s denial of the special use permit for a religious school is a final and outright denial. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of Corp. of Presiding Bishop to the facts here.
As noted, the county approved Timberline Baptist Church’s requested special use of its property for a church and an associated day care facility. However, because Timberline Baptist Church’s proposed religious school did not meet the special use criterion established in Washington County Development Code (CDC), § 430-121.3, it denied Timberline Baptist Church’s requested special use of the property for a religious school to be attended solely by Timberline Baptist Church’s members’ children.2 The county argued, and then LUBA agreed, that it was incumbent on Timberline Baptist Church to purchase property on which its desired use would be permitted outright and that the cost of selling its existing property in order to now do so was not a substantial burden.
I agree with the majority that the county’s argument and LUBA’s agreement with that argument were not correct. Timberline Baptist Church was not required to purchase property that permitted outright the building of a church, day care facility, and religious school. See 211 Or App at 450.3 As the majority states, the dispositive question becomes *472whether implementation of CDC § 430-121.3 in relation to Timberline Baptist Church’s property imposes a substantial burden on Timberline Baptist Church’s religious exercise for the purpose of RLUIPA, that is, whether the development code forces Timberline Baptist Church to choose between adhering to a religious practice and obtaining a desired government benefit. As does the majority, I understand the relevant religious practice to be the operation of a religious school to be attended by Timberline Baptist Church’s members’ children, the vast majority of whom reside within the UGB, and that the religious school be located on the same property as Timberline Baptist Church’s church; and the relevant benefit is approval of the special use permit for the religious school. In my view, one the majority does not share, the relevant benefit also includes the county’s approval of the church and day care facility.
Particularly after the county approved the special use permit for a church and day care facility, the implementation of CDC § 430-121.3 imposes a substantial burden on the identified religious practice. That is, because, in order to obtain approval of the religious school, by meeting the criterion that the school be scaled for rural use, Timberline Baptist Church will be required to forgo or modify its practice of operating the religious school solely for the children of its members. Alternatively, if Timberline Baptist Church operated the religious school at some other location, it would have been forced to forgo its religious practice of operating its religious school in physical conjunction with its church building. The Supreme Court held that, for purposes of RLUIPA, a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise “if it ‘pressures’ or ‘forces’ a choice between following religious precepts and forfeiting certain benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one or more of those precepts in order to obtain the benefits, on the other.” 338 Or at 466. Implementation of CDC § 430-121.3 pressures or forces Timberline Baptist Church to make such a choice here.
To restate my position, the court in Corp. of Presiding Bishop stated that a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise “only if it ‘pressures’ or ‘forces’ a choice between following religious precepts and forfeiting certain benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning *473one or more of those precepts in order to obtain the benefits, on the other.” 338 Or at 466. The land use regulation here is CDC § 430-121.3. Timberline Baptist Church’s religious precept is the operation of a religious school on the same property as its church. The benefit is the county’s approval of the special use permit for the church and day care facility. Timberline Baptist Church is being “pressured” or “forced” to give up the approved church and day care facility on the property it owns, or to “abandon” its religious precept of operating a church and religious school on the same property and keep the approval of building a church on its property. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of RLUIPA in Corp. of Presiding Bishop, CDC § 430-121.3 imposes a substantial burden on Timberline Baptist Church.
The “adverse consequences” to Timberline Baptist Church of not receiving a special use approval for not complying with CDC § 430-121.3 are in sharp contrast to the consequences at issue in Corp. of Presiding Bishop. There, the court expressly determined that none of the adverse consequences of the city’s denial of the building permit application related to any of the church’s religious practices. The consequences, therefore, did not cause the church to forgo or modify any such practice. 338 Or at 467. Rather, the adverse consequences concerned the need to comply with conditions relating to the design of the proposed facility, the need to submit a further application incorporating such conditions, and the necessity of incurring the expense and delay associated with taking those actions. The Supreme Court indicated that those types of requirements do not, in and of themselves, constitute substantial burdens but are, instead, typical costs — in both time and money — of obtaining land use approvals. Moreover, the cases deemed instructive by the Supreme Court also involved primarily those types of burdens. See Westchester Day, 386 F3d at 188 (substantial burden not likely where the governing body denied “only the application submitted, leaving open the possibility that a modification of the proposal * * * would result in approval”; reversing grant of summary judgment); San Jose Christian College, 360 F3d at 1035 (governing body’s request that religious entity provide additional required information with its application did not impose a substantial burden); see also Civil Lib. for *474Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F3d 752, 761 (7th Cir 2003), cert den, 541 US 1096 (2004) (expenditure of even “considerable” time and money to engage in permit approval process was not a substantial burden).
Here, in order to meet the criterion in CDC § 430-121.3 and still adhere to its religious practice of having its church and religious school at the same location, Timberline Baptist Church apparently will be required to arrange for most of its members to move outside the UGB. Alternatively, it must sell its current property and purchase other property. Those consequences are different in both nature and extent from those present in Corp. of Presiding Bishop.
The consequences of the denial relate directly to Timberline Baptist Church’s adherence to its religious practice of operating a religious school for the benefit of its members’ children in the same location as the church. The denial imposes a “significantly great restriction or onus” on Timberline Baptist Church’s religious exercise of operating a combined church and religious school on the subject property. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. v. Sutter County, 456 F3d 978, 988 (9th Cir 2006) (a land use regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise when it is “oppressive to a significantly great extent” and imposes a “significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise” (citing and quoting San Jose Christian College, 360 F3d at 1034 (internal quotation marks omitted))); Midrash Sephardi, Inc., 366 F3d at 1227 (determining that a “substantial burden” on religious exercise is “more than an inconvenience” and is “akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly,” that is, pressure to forgo religious precepts or pressure that mandates religious conduct).
In determining that the burden at issue here is not substantial, the majority relies on Free Exercise Clause cases that draw a distinction between regulations that directly compel an individual to violate his or her religious beliefs, or noncompliance with which may subject an individual to criminal sanctions or to the loss of a significant government benefit, on the one hand, see, e.g., Sherbert; Wisconsin v. Yoder, *475406 US 205, 92 S Ct 1526, 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972); and regulations that merely make the practice of religion more difficult or expensive, on the other, see, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Cong. of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 699 F2d 303, 306-07 (6th Cir 1983). See also Episcopal Student Foundation v. City of Ann Arbor, 341 F Supp 2d 691, 701-02 (ED Mich 2004) (drawing that distinction for purposes of interpreting and applying RLUIPA). From those cases, the majority concludes that imposition of a land use regulation ordinarily cannot be deemed to impose a substantial burden on religious exercise when the impact is essentially economic. 211 Or App at 453-55.4 For several reasons, I believe that those cases are either inapposite or distinguishable.
First, although Sherbert and Yoder involved regulations that subjected a religious adherent to, respectively, loss of a government benefit (unemployment compensation) and criminal sanctions (for failure to send children under age 16 to school), neither case holds that economic burdens— regulations that “merely” make the practice of religion more expensive — always are insufficient to implicate the Free Exercise Clause.
Second, the majority’s reliance on Lakewood, a Free Exercise Clause case, and Episcopal Student Foundation, which, in turn, rely on Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US 599, 81 S Ct 1144, 6 L Ed 2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion), is misplaced. In Braunfeld, a state statute criminalized the retail sale of certain commodities on Sunday. 366 US at 600. Several Orthodox Jews who operated retail stores challenged enforcement of the statute, alleging that their religion required them to close their businesses on Saturday and that the statutorily required Sunday closing forced them to choose between giving up their observance of the Sabbath or suffering a “serious economic disadvantage” by being closed on both days. Id. at 601. The Court rejected the challenge. It explained that the statute
*476“does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to [the religious adherents], operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive. Furthermore, the law’s effect does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday. And even these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal prosecution. Fully recognizing that the alternatives open to appellants and others similarly situated — retaining their present occupations and incurring economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for either Saturday or Sunday labor — may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs, still the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious practice itself unlawful.
“To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. * * *
“* * * Consequently, it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions. We do not believe that such an effect is an absolute test for determining whether the legislation violates the freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment.
“Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification. If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.”
*477366 US at 605-07 (footnote omitted).
Braunfeld, which was decided almost 40 years prior to the adoption of RLUIPA, does not compel the result here. The statute at issue “simply regulate [d]” the religious adherents’ conduct of a “secular activity.” 366 US at 605. By comparison, the regulation at issue here prevents Timberline Baptist Church from conducting the religious activity itself— operation of a religious school — in the desired manner. Concomitantly, the economic burden on the adherents in Braunfeld resulted from the impairment of their secular, nonreligious activities. Id. at 606. The statute in Braunfeld affected only those Orthodox Jews who operated retail businesses. The statute did not affect Orthodox Judaism as a whole. Id. at 605. By contrast, here, the entire congregation arguably is affected by the inability of Timberline Baptist Church to operate a religious school for the benefit of members’ children. In short, the effect of the statute in Braunfeld was more “indirect,” 366 US at 606, than the direct effect of the ordinance at issue here.5 “If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions * * *, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.” (Emphasis added.) Braunfeld, 366 US at 607. See also Sherbert, 374 US at 404.
The majority also quotes at length from the federal district court’s opinion in Christian Methodist Episcopal Church v. Montgomery, CV22322, 2007 WL 172496 (DSC Jan 18, 2007). See 211 Or App at 455-56. In that case, the town conditionally permitted churches in certain zones and required landowners to obtain the necessary permission. After tenants of a building began holding worship services in the building, the town notified the landowners of the need to comply with town ordinances. The owners took no action. Eventually, the tenants brought a 42 USC section 1983 claim against the town, asserting, among other claims, a violation of RLUIPA and seeking money damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the town on three alternative *478bases: first, that RLUIPA is a remedial statute and that a section 1983 claim for money damages does not lie under RLUIPA; second, that, even if the tenants had properly pleaded RLUIPA as an independent cause of action, the case was not ripe because the landowners had not applied for any permits; and third, that, in any event, the tenants had not demonstrated a substantial burden on their religious exercise.
In the latter context, the district court relied in part on Civil Liberties for Urban Believers for the proposition that no substantial burden is present where zoning regulations present only “ordinary difficulties” attendant on any permitting process. The district court also relied extensively on the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished opinion in a 1991 Free Exercise Clause case, Christ College v. Fairfax County, 944 F2d 901 (4th Cir 1991), cert den, 502 US 1094 (1992). In the latter case, the Fourth Circuit had concluded that, where several of the relevant county’s zones permitted the requested use outright and the zone in which the religious entity wished to locate its facility permitted the use with a “special exception”; where the religious entity had not shown either why its members could exercise their religious beliefs only in the desired zone or how the need to comply with the “special exception” requirements and with applicable fire and safety regulations would impair their religious practice; and where the religious entity had failed to show any “nexus” between the challenged regulation and the impairment of its members’ religious practice, the religious entity had failed to demonstrate a substantial burden. Applying those same tests, the district court in Christian Methodist Episcopal Church concluded that the religious entity in that case could not prove that the relevant regulations substantially burdened its members’ religious exercise, because the landowners had never applied for the desired use.
The procedural and factual differences between Christian Methodist Episcopal Church and this case make the former distinguishable and not persuasive. That is because, as previously explained, I believe that the burden on petitioner in this case amounts to more than the “ordinary difficulties” of the land use permitting process and that petitioner has both justified the desire to locate its religious *479school on its church property and demonstrated that compliance with the 75 percent rule will impair that religious practice — that is, petitioner has shown a “nexus” between the regulation and that impairment. No such nexus was established in Christian Methodist Episcopal Church.
Nor does Corp. of Presiding Bishop suggest that the fact that a burden can be an economic consequence means that it cannot be a substantial burden, as a matter of law. Again, that case, as well as two of the cases relied on by the Oregon Supreme Court in that case — Westchester Day and San Jose Christian College — turned on quite different burdens from those at issue here: the requirement that the applicants, at some expense, submit additional applications that met the substantive or procedural conditions or requirements implicated in the governmental entity’s denial of the existing applications, such as the modification of building plans or the submission of additional information.6
Another group of cases that suggest that economic consequences — particularly, market forces affecting the price of property — do not constitute a substantial burden under RLUIPA are distinguishable for a different reason: they involve facial challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances, in which the applied-for uses were prohibited, not conditionally permitted, ones. See, e.g., Civil Lib. for Urban Believers, 342 F3d 752; Petra Presbyterian Church v. Village of Northbrook, 409 F Supp 2d 1001, 1007 (ND Ill 2006). RLUIPA may indeed fail to protect a religious institution from the “harsh” economic reality that land in zones in which religious practice is permitted outright is relatively more expensive. However, those cases do not stand for the proposition that economic hardships never constitute a substantial burden. Nor do they apply with equal force in a case where an applicant received approval of a permitted use for a church and failed to meet one condition out of several for an associated religious school.7
*480The majority acknowledges that, although there is no bright-line test as to what showing an applicant must make in that regard, such a showing “must, at the least, demonstrate that a land use decision has forced the applicant to forgo its religious precepts.” 211 Or App at 459. Corp. of Presiding Bishop does not address any requirement relating to the availability of alternative property. Neither case presented any facts or analysis relating to such availability.8 In my view, Timberline Baptist Church in this case presented sufficient evidence of the substantial burdens, economic and otherwise, that such a requirement would impose.
The fact that the ordinance at issue here is facially neutral and uniformly applicable to all applicants does not mean that the ordinance cannot impose a substantial burden. First, by its terms, the “substantial burden” provision of RLUIPA expressly prohibits specified effects; it does not exempt facially neutral regulations from that prohibition. See Sts. Constantine, Helen Greek Orth. v. New Berlin, 396 F3d 895, 900 (7th Cir 2005) (where RLUIPA includes both a “substantial burden” provision and an “equal treatment” provision, the substantial burden provision must mean something other than a mere requirement to treat a religious entity on equal terms with other land use applicants). Second, as the Oregon Supreme Court explained in Corp. of Presiding Bishop, RLUIPA was enacted by Congress in response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 US 872, 110 S Ct 1595, 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990)—in which the Court had held that government enforcement of valid and neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally restrict religious exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause *481even if they burden religious exercise — specifically to embody, and thus restore, the “heightened scrutiny” test set out in Sherbert. See also Yoder, 406 US at 220 (“A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” (citing Sherbert)). Thus, both the express terms of the statute and its legislative history indicate that neither the facial neutrality of a land use regulation, nor its ostensibly uniform application to both secular and religious applicants, is dispositive of the lawfulness under RLUIPA of the governmental implementation of the regulation.
To be perfectly clear, I believe that RLUIPA requires giving preference to a religious institution over a secular institution so long as Congress acted in the “space for legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause.” Cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 US 709, 719-20, 125 S Ct 2113, 161 L Ed 2d 1020 (2005) (institutionalized-persons provision of RLUIPA is a “permissible legislative accommodation of religion” that operates in the “space for legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause”).

Burden of Providing Sufficient Evidence

I also respectfully disagree with the majority that Timberline Baptist Church failed to meet its burden to demonstrate a substantial burden by reason of its failure to provide sufficient evidence of the unavailability of other property. The need to sell one’s existing property and to locate and purchase alternative property is a burden unlike that of merely meeting design conditions or submitting additional applications relating to one’s existing property. At least two federal circuit courts have recognized the significance of being required to sell existing property and purchase alternative property. In New Berlin, the plaintiff church acquired a 40-acre parcel in a residential zone that did not allow churches outright. At the time that the church purchased the property, it was bordered on one side by a parcel owned by a second church and on the other side by a parcel owned by a *482third church that had already sought and obtained a rezoning of its property and approval of a church building. 396 F3d at 898. Approximately five years after acquiring the property, the plaintiff church sought rezoning and permission to build a church. After the city expressed concern that the plaintiff church might use the property for other uses allowed by the requested new zoning classification, the church modified its application to seek only a planned unit development overlay ordinance, which specifically allowed only a church. Id. The city nevertheless denied approval, suggesting that the church instead seek a conditional use permit. The church demurred out of concern that it could not begin the building process within the relevant time period allowed under that form of permit. Id. at 898-99.
The plaintiff church then initiated an action under RLUIPA. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, concluding that, where the church failed to show that there was no other parcel on which it could build the church, the denial did not impose a substantial burden. Id. at 899-900.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, determining that the burden in that case — consisting of either “search [ing] around for other parcels of land” or filing additional applications relating to the existing property — was substantial. 396 F3d at 901. As particularly pertinent here, in regard to the burden of searching for other property, the court noted that, in Sherbert, the fact that the plaintiff may eventually have found employment that did not require her to work on her Sabbath, did not make the denial of unemployment benefits insubstantial. Id. (citing Sherbert, 374 US at 399 n 2). The Seventh Circuit therefore reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the city and remanded for the parties to negotiate acceptable conditions of approval. Id. That court again noted the distinction between the submission of modified applications, on the one hand, and New Berlin, involving the location and purchase of a new parcel, on the other, in Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F3d 975, 999-1000 (7th Cir 2006). The Ninth Circuit apparently also recognizes that distinction. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc., 456 F3d at 989 (noting with approval the reasoning in New Berlin that, in order to prove a substantial burden under RLUIPA, a *483religious organization need not show that there was no other parcel of land on which it could carry out the relevant religious exercise).9
In summary, I would conclude that CDC § 430-121.3, as applied to Timberline Baptist Church, has the effect of forcing Timberline Baptist Church to forgo or modify its religious practice of operating a school for the benefit of its members’ children at the same location as its approved church. Specifically, in order to obtain the requested school use approval, Timberline Baptist Church must either operate a school primarily for children other than the children of its members or must arrange for most of its members to move outside the urban growth boundary. Alternatively, Timberline Baptist Church must locate and purchase new property where the school use is not conditioned on the criterion imposed under CDC § 430-121.3, a significant burden in and of itself and, here, one that also will cause Timberline Baptist Church to forfeit its previously obtained church use approval.
In the circumstances presented here, I would conclude that each of those alternative adverse consequences constitutes a substantial burden within the meaning of RLUIPA.10 Accordingly, I would reverse LUBA’s contrary decision and remand for consideration of whether CDC § 430-121.3 furthers a compelling governmental interest of the *484county and is the least restrictive means of doing so. 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(l)(A), (B). That disposition also would obviate the necessity to consider at this time whether, as applied to the county’s denial of Timberline Baptist Church’.s requested school use, RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I respectfully dissent.

 Decisions from the various federal circuit or district courts are helpful only to the extent that their analyses are persuasive; those decisions are not controlling. We are, of course, bound by our Supreme Court’s interpretation of RLUIPA. Additionally, we would be bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of RLUIPA, if the Supreme Court had interpreted the land use provisions of RLUIPA.

 Timberline Baptist Church’s permit application stated that the religious school was “closed,” that is, only children of members would be allowed to attend the religious school.

 The concurrence notes that Timberline Baptist Church knew or could have known what land use ordinances applied to the property before it purchased the property. 211 Or App at 467 (Breithaupt, J. pro tempore, concurring). I agree on this point. Likewise, Timberline Baptist Church knew or should have known that the provisions of RLUIPA also applied to this property at the time of purchase.

 In one sense, I agree with the majority that “the consequences of the implementation of the regulation are merely economic.” See 211 Or App at 463 (emphasis in original). But all decisions concerning the development of real property, at some level, are economic. If there were unlimited financial resources available to Timberline Baptist Church, there would not be this dispute.

 In addition, the result in Braunfeld was due at least in part to the significant state interest in “providing] a weekly respite from all labor.” See id. at 607-09 (discussing purpose of Sunday closing law); see also Sherbert, 374 US at 408 (explaining that the statute at issue in Braunfeld was “saved by * * * a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers”).

 See also Konikov v. Orange County, Fla., 410 F3d 1317, 1323-24 (11th Cir 2005) (requiring submission of applications does not itself offend RLUIPA; where zoning ordinance at issue required application for “special exception” but did not prohibit engaging in religious activity, ordinance did not impose substantial burden).

 It is worth noting that, in Civil Lib. for Urban Believers, the Seventh Circuit based its determination that RLUIPA does not protect religious adherents from the *480“harsh reality of the marketplace” in part on Braunfeld. Civil Lib. for Urban Believers, 342 F3d at 761-62. As discussed above, that result in Braunfeld is more properly attributable to the significantly indirect nature of the economic burden imposed on the religious adherents in that case, as well as to what the court identified as the strong governmental interest in the relevant regulation.

 In Corp. of Presiding Bishop, the petitioner proposed to construct its meetinghouse on 3.85 acres of its 5.64-acre parcel. 338 Or at 456. The Supreme Court noted that submission of a new application would entail the church’s “use of a greater portion of an available lot” and noted that the church had “indicated that it would be possible to acquire more land” for required buffer space. Id. at 467. Neither of those references implicate a requirement that a church sell its existing property and purchase, or demonstrate the infeasibility of purchasing, alternative property.

 See also Lighthouse Community Church v. City of Southfield, 2007 WL 30280 (Jan 3, 2007) (ED Mich) (selling current property and searching for another is not a “mere inconvenience” but is a substantial burden); Living Water Church of God v. Charter Tp. of Meridian, 384 F Supp 2d 1123, 1132-34 (WD Mich 2005) (substantial burden means “something more than an incidental effect on religious exercise”; finding a substantial burden where the plaintiff was “a small church with limited funds” and the denial of the requested special use would require it to search for and acquire alternative property); Greater Bible Way Temple v. Jackson, 268 Mich App 673, 708 NW2d 756 (2005), rev allowed, 474 Mich 1133, 712 NW2d 728 (2006) (where applicant submitted evidence showing that it could not afford to purchase different property, and there was no dispute that the value of the existing property and the applicant’s investment in it were substantial, implementation of ordinance so as to preclude requested religious use of property imposed substantial burden under RLUIPA).

 I emphasize that I do not mean to suggest that implementation of a land use regulation in a manner necessitating the purchase of alternative property will always constitute imposition of a substantial burden for the purpose of RLUIPA. I conclude only that the specific circumstances at issue here constitute such a burden.