Court Opinion

ID: 9611384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:56:16.449966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:14.295922
License: Public Domain

Abbott, J.,
Dissenting: I dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the hospital records were inadmissible and that it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and the lesser offense of battery, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3412.
The rule is well-established in Kansas that “[a] criminal defendant is, of course, entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense if it is supported by any evidence whatever.” State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195, 510 P.2d 115 (1973). We also recognize that the evidence must be sufficient, when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, to justify a jury finding for the defendant on the issue instructed on. State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543, 479 P.2d 854 (1971).
The voluntary intoxication instruction should have been given for two reasons, both of which are sufficient in and of themselves to justify a voluntary intoxication instruction. The evidentiary record disclosed that the defendant’s wife testified that she had observed her husband drinking during the course of the evening and that he had consumed some 15 or 20 “beers.” She further testified that he was drunk. She also stated that the defendant was staggering around and his eyes were red. The defendant exercised *705his constitutional right not to testify. The majority would hold that Mrs. Davis’ description of her husband is insufficient as a matter of law for a jury to conclude that defendant’s mental state was such that he was incapable of forming the required specific intent. Even though the evidence may have been weak and not persuasive, the jury could have reasonably inferred from Mrs. Davis’ description of the defendant that he was incapable of forming the required specific intent. In all of the cases where the Kansas appellate courts have held that it was not error for a trial court to refuse to instruct on voluntary intoxication, the defendant has testified in such a manner to indicate that he or she was not intoxicated to the requisite degree. The majority seeks to use a jury-type argument to the effect that since defendant played in a band, picked up a shovel and may have run from person or persons unknown, his álleged actions negate as a matter of law any question as to his ability to form the specific intent. The evidence on which they rely is skimpy and came from witnesses who were not asked to describe defendant’s condition or appearance and who did not do so. The majority rationalizes that since defendant’s wife said everyone was drunk, she referred to everyone involved in the incident as opposed to the large crowd (several hundred) in attendance. From this, the majority seems to argue that even if defendant’s wife said the witnesses were drunk, they nevertheless were able to describe the incident in detail, thus negating the possibility that the defendant himself was too drunk to form the necessary intent. It was a jury question, and I would reverse for failure of the trial judge to instruct on voluntary intoxication.
I am further unable to agree with the majority that the hospital records should have been excluded under the so-called “double hearsay” rule. In my opinion, the hospital records were clearly admissible under K.S.A. 60-460(m) and the majority’s decision could have serious implications in personal injury litigation. The majority dismisses People v. Herrera, 12 Mich. App. 67, 162 N.W.2d 330 (1968), as not applicable here. I disagree. I read the case as stating very clearly that the history of the patient who was a defendant in a criminal case was admissible in evidence. The court reasoned that since the medical profession relied on history in matters no less important than those involved in lawsuits, for a court to exclude such evidence would lead to error rather than to *706truth. It held it was error to refuse to admit the hospital admission forms showing the apparent physical condition of the defendant and her consumption of an unknown amount of phenobarbital. The court then went on to say that as another physician had testified to substantially the same information, it did not constitute error. Statements of a patient are the major portion of a patient’s history, and Herrera clearly admitted that portion of the hospital records containing the history.
In the case at bar, the defendant was brought to the hospital emergency room in an ambulance some thirty minutes after the alleged stabbing took place. The hospital records show that he had a history of a prior heart condition and was complaining of severe chest pains. He had an irregular pulse, and the admitting nurse made a notation that the defendant told her he had been at a party and had gone outside to urinate and then passed out, that when he woke up he was in handcuffs and on his way to jail, and that he did not recall being involved in any fight. He subsequently gave the treating doctor a history, stating that he had blacked out after several alcoholic drinks and when he arose he had a crushing pain in his chest and was hospitalized.
The trial judge did not state why he refused to admit the evidence. There was no argument presented by the state that the defendant had made the statements in bad faith or as a self-serving declaration. The trial judge at the conclusion of the argument merely stated that the motion to introduce the evidence would be overruled. Other states having a business record exception similar to that of Kansas (K.S.A. 60-460[m]) have admitted statements made by the patients as part of the history. See People v. Terrell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 35, 291 P.2d 155 (1955); State v. Finkley, 6 Wash. App. 278, 492 P.2d 222 (1972). There is an excellent article in Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence, 21 Md. L. Rev. 22, 51-52 (1961). It details how the problem of double hearsay evidence should be dealt with and notes the various exceptions which could legitimatize the patient’s statements to the hospital personnel under a business record exception. The article notes:
“Under the exception for statements of present bodily condition, the normal expressions of pain or mental suffering made by one at the time an injury is sustained or a disease becomes apparent, are admissible. This exception has also been held to have been satisfied by statements of medical history. Such a ‘history,’ however, must be pertinent to the existing disease or injury, or in other words, it *707must be germane to diagnosis or treatment. It would appear that in regard to this form of declaration the required circumstantial probability of trustworthiness is found more in the natural instinct of man to truthfully state his physical condition so as to receive the relief he seeks, than upon spontaneity.”
Kansas law would seem to b.e consistent with that reasoning. See In re Estate of Bernatzki, 204 Kan. 131, 460 P.2d 527 (1969), where, in my opinion, the medical records that were introduced contained history useful in determining the mental capacity of the testator at the time he executed a will. See also Gard, Survey of Kansas Law, 12 Kan. L. Rev. 239, 253 (1963), where Judge Gard stated:
“If the narration of past history to a physician who is called to treat or diagnose is found in hospital records which qualify under the business records exception, the history may be received as evidence as a part of the records.”
Defendant’s history of consumption of food, drugs and alcohol, and the stress he was under both immediately prior to and at the time of the onset of his chest pains, were an important part of the history. Given that a patient probably would want to be as truthful as possible when relating to a treating physician or nurse the details leading up to a cardiac episode, sufficient reliability would be present to warrant a hearsay exception, while the record would be clearly admissible under the business records exception.
I am unable to agree with the majority’s rather summary dismissal of a number of cases cited herein as well as State v. White, 72 Wash. 2d 524, 433 P.2d 682 (1967). In discussing the case of Bematzki, the majority states the hearsay is that of the hospital personnel, not a third party declarant. One of the records involved was a psychiatric diagnostic report signed by the clinical director. Such a report would by necessity contain not hearsay of numerous staff people who furnished test results and observations to the clinical director,-but would also contain the patient’s history as told by" the patient to the various staff members. The other record admitted into evidence was a medical case summary and I assume that it also contained a vast amount of history furnished by the patient.
State v. White, 72 Wash. 2d 524, has been clarified somewhat by a later Washington case, State v. Finkley, 6 Wash. App. 278. In any event, the evidence in White which was excluded was a statement by a rape victim that White committed the rape and a *708graphic description of the criminal act. In Finkley, it was held that a hospital record is admissible as a business record, subject to the trial court’s excising any portion that is not admissible.
In People v. Terrell, 138 Cal. App. 2d 35, the medical record admitted over the defendant’s objection contained the victim’s history as related by the victim’s husband. The California Court of Appeals held it was not error to admit the hospital record containing a patient’s history as a “business record.”
Admittedly, in many of the cases the words “double hearsay” were not used. The reason is simple. Evidence contained in a business record is not excluded simply because it is double hearsay so long as it is part of the patient’s history and is pathologically germane to diagnosing and treating the medical problem involved. The hospital record supplies evidence sufficient to justify a voluntary intoxication instruction.
Having concluded that the voluntary intoxication instruction should have been given, I must also conclude that by reason of the applicability of the voluntary intoxication instruction the court had a duty to instruct on the lesser offense of battery. State v. Seely, 212 Kan. 195.
I would reverse the case and remand it for retrial under appropriate instructions.