Court Opinion

ID: 9740252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:31:00.41167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.107713
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE WEBBER, dissenting: I cannot concur in the majority opinion. It seems to me that laches on part of the plaintiff is clear and no explanation for the delay is offered. I agree that the sheriff had no power to discharge the plaintiff and that his action was void, but this does not excuse the plaintiff from taking some action about it. I do not read Casey as broadly as does the majority. Casey apparently arrived at its conclusion because there was a test case on appeal which would directly govern it. Such is not the case here. Plaintiff was litigating his suspension and whatever the outcome of that, it could not be res judicata on the discharge. He might just as well have been appealing a traffic citation. It long has been established in Illinois that discharged public employees seeking review of their discharges must file their complaints for review within six months of the time of discharge or offer a good explanation in their complaint the reasons why it was not filed within that six-month period. (Clark v. City of Chicago (1908), 233 Ill. 113.) In Casey, the court could infer a satisfactory explanation for the delay from the face of the complaint. No such satisfactory explanation for the delay is present in the instant case. The plaintiff was perfectly willing to litigate his prima facie valid suspension by the merit commission which possessed the power of suspension, but for some reason, unexplained, he took no action judicial or otherwise, concerning the sheriff’s purported discharge for almost two years. He is now guilty of laches. The well established six-month rule was grounded, in part, upon the theory that cases of reinstatement after a period of time are inherently prejudicial to the governmental body. (Kadon v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1964), 45 Ill. App. 2d 425, 195 N.E.2d 751; People ex rel. Sullivan v. Smith (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 218, 272 N.E.2d 755.) I must disagree with the majority opinion that the six-month rule has now been rejected. As the six-month rule was not addressed in Casey, I can only conclude that it is still good law.