Court Opinion

ID: 9846931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:43.604042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:57.390900
License: Public Domain

Hines, Justice,
dissenting.
The issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing Vogleson’s conviction on the ground that Vogleson was denied his constitutional right to cross-examine his co-indictee about the mandatory minimum sentence the co-indictee faced before agreeing to testify against him. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals because the Court of Appeals was wrong in overturning the conviction on the basis of the abridgment of Vogleson’s constitutionally-protected right of confrontation.
As noted in the majority, following a jury trial, Vogleson was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Wilson, who was indicted for the same offenses as Vogleson plus possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, negotiated with the State for a reduction in sentence in exchange for his testimony against Vogleson. During his direct examination, Wilson admitted that his deal with the State included the recommendation that his sentence be reduced to serving ten years in prison. The following colloquy occurred on cross-examination of Wilson:
Vogleson’s Attorney: And so you are going to plead guilty to a reduced charge of possession with intent to distribute the cocaine?
Wilson: Yes.
Vogleson’s Attorney: But you want this jury to believe that the cocaine belonged to Mr. Vogleson?
Wilson: That’s who it belonged to. . . .
Vogleson’s Attorney: By pleading guilty to the possession *643with intent to distribute you save yourself from getting a mandatory —
The Court: We don’t talk about mandatory sentences. We don’t talk about any of that stuff.
Vogleson’s Attorney: Okay. You are saving yourself 15 years, aren’t you?
The trial court then chastised Vogleson’s attorney for his “complete disregard of the court’s instructions,” adding, “and I have asked you not to get into that. And you just disregarded what I asked.” The clear consequence of this exchange was that the jury was informed that Wilson, charged with the same drug offenses as Vogleson, was going to be sentenced to serve 10 years, saving himself 15 years in prison; thus, the mandatory minimum sentence for Vogleson would be 25 years in prison. Following this, Vogleson’s attorney farther cross-examined Wilson about additional advantages of his deal with the State; Wilson admitted that he would not have to face the firearms charge for which he was also indicted, and Vogleson’s attorney asked, ‘You had a lot to gain by putting it all on Owen Vogleson?” Wilson responded that he had told the whole truth and nothing but the truth throughout the course of the case.
In the face of this thorough cross-examination of Wilson regarding his potential bias as a witness, Vogleson successfully argued to the Court of Appeals that he was denied his constitutional right to explore bias. In fact, the Court of Appeals found that the jury was prevented from “considering the most important aspect of Wilson’s deal - how much prison time he was avoiding by agreeing to cooperate with the State.” Now a majority of this Court joins in the flawed analysis.
In the recent case of Hodo v. State, 272 Ga. 272 (528 SE2d 250) (2000), the defendant claimed that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court did not permit him to question a State’s witness, who was a drug dealer, about the potential sentence he could face because of criminal conduct the witness had admitted on the stand. Id. at 274 (4). This Court unanimously determined that Hodo was allowed to amply explore the witness’s potential for bias or partiality, and that “[t]he mere fact that Hodo was unable to ask [the witness] to conjecture about possible punishment did not diminish Hodo’s attempt to show [the witness’s] motive for testifying on behalf of the State.” Id.
Now the majority, as did the Court of Appeals, seeks to distinguish Hodo on the bases that there the drug dealer witness was not involved in the crimes being tried and had not been charged with any crime, and consequently, that requiring such a witness to speculate about possible punishment for crimes with which he might be *644charged differed from requiring an accomplice to reveal the punishment he would receive but for the accomplice’s deal with the State. But these are distinctions without a difference because the abiding legal principles in Hodo and in this case are the same.
There is no dispute that a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness in order to explore the witness’s potential bias or partiality is of great importance. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316-317 (2) (94 SC 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974). However, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 679 (2) (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986), quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 20 (106 SC 292, 88 LE2d 15) (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original).
A trial court’s discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination is broad. Allen v. State, 275 Ga. 64, 68 (3) (561 SE2d 397) (2002). And the exercise of the court’s discretion is not a cause for reversal of a defendant’s conviction unless there is an abuse of that discretion. Bromley v. State, 259 Ga. 377, 382 (7) (380 SE2d 694) (1989); Chastain v. State, 257 Ga. 54, 55 (354 SE2d 421) (1987). In Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 260 (2) (290 SE2d 911) (1982), this Court determined that an abuse of discretion exists in the limitation of a defendant’s cross-examination when a trial court cuts off all inquiry on a subject with respect to which the defense is entitled to a reasonable cross-examination. In that case, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to prohibit defense counsel from cross-examining a crucial State’s witness about separate criminal charges pending against the witness, and whether the witness assumed that he would receive some benefit by testifying favorably for the State. Id. at 258. As this Court observed in regard to exposing the witness’s motivation in testifying, “What counts is whether the witness may be shading his testimony in an effort to please the prosecution.” Id. at 260 (2); Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F2d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Isaac v. State, 269 Ga. 875, 876 (2) (505 SE2d 480) (1998); Owens v. State, 251 Ga. 313, 314 (1) (305 SE2d 102) (1983).
Here, the trial court certainly did not bar Vogleson from inquiry about the accomplice witness’s possible motivation for giving testimony favorable to the State. The trial court permitted Vogleson to elicit from the witness not only that he had made a deal with the State, but also the beneficial details of the deal, that is, the witness would plead guilty to a lesser drug charge, would not have to face the firearms possession charge for which he had also been indicted, and would receive the obviously more favorable sentence of ten years in prison. Thus, the jury learned that the witness believed that he stood to gain the advantage of more lenient punishment from his coopera*645tion with the State. The majority’s finding that this information was insufficient so as to constitute a violation of constitutional magnitude is a liberal departure from precedent of this Court.
So too, is it at odds with decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which has repeatedly held that in the situation in which the accused seeks to cross-examine a key government witness, a trial judge may limit such cross-examination without infringing the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights where,
(1) the jury, through the cross-examination permitted, was exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness; and, (2) the cross-examination conducted by defense counsel enabled him to make a record from which he could argue why the witness might have been biased.
United States v. Calle, 822 F2d 1016, 1020 (1987). See also United States v. Burke, 738 F2d 1225, 1227-1228 (11th Cir. 1984) (no sixth amendment violation when sufficient information is elicited from witness from which jury can adequately gauge credibility and assess possible motive or bias); United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F2d 1549, 1559 (11th Cir. 1983) (no abuse of discretion where defendant had opportunity to expose facts from which jury could draw fair inferences regarding credibility of witness), cert, denied, 464 U. S. 1069 (104 SC 974, 79 LE2d 212) (1984). Other federal appeals courts have similarly held that in limiting cross-examination, a trial court abuses its discretion “only if the jury is left without ‘sufficient information concerning formative events to make a “discriminating appraisal” of a witness’s motives and bias.’ ” United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F3d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1997), quoting United States v. Twomey, 806 F2d 1136, 1140 (1st Cir. 1986) and United States v. Campbell, 426 F2d 547, 550 (2nd Cir. 1970).
Certainly, in this case Vogleson put ample information about Wilson before the jury so as to enable Vogleson to attempt to discredit Wilson’s testimony. The trial court’s restriction was solely in regard to Vogleson’s exploration of the witness’s possible sentence had the witness not made a deal with the State in exchange for his testimony. This was the trial court’s proper recognition of the legal principle, long-embodied in state statutes and case law, that the jury is to disregard any consideration of punishment in its deliberation of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 17-10-1; 17-10-2; Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) (527 SE2d 867) (2000); Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 42 (2) (485 SE2d 189) (1997); Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 (218 SE2d 583) (1975).
In this case, the witness, Wilson, was an accomplice, indicted for *646the same drug offenses as Vogleson, and thus, subject to the same punishments for those offenses. Consequently, evidence of the mandatory minimum sentence the accomplice sought to avoid would inform the jury about the specific sentence Vogleson would receive if the jury returned a verdict of guilty. It is up to the trial court to ensure the fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each charge. Terry v. State, 259 Ga. 165, 168 (1) (377 SE2d 837) (1989); Moss v. State, 245 Ga. App. 811, 813 (2) (538 SE2d 876) (2000). The majority allows the criminal defendant, by his unfettered cross-examination, to compromise the jury’s neutrality on the question of punishment during its consideration of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The inherent danger of such a practice has been recognized by other states as well. See State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877 (26 P3d 673) (2001) (trial court properly precluded murder defendant from cross-examining co-defendant concerning possible sentencing range under plea agreement because it would have allowed jury to infer what defendant’s sentence might be); State v. Greenleaf, 591 NW2d 488 (Minn. 1999) (trial court was properly concerned that recitation of number of months of confinement accomplice could serve might mislead the jury, and trial court properly prevented the jury from speculating about possible sentences).
Also, the theory underlying the majority analysis is problematic; the majority provides no support, empirical or otherwise, for the premise that there is a correlation between the degree of a witness’s truthfulness or credibility and the amount of punishment the witness seeks to avoid. As has already been noted, what is critical to a defendant’s cross-examination of a State’s witness is the ability to expose the witness’s motivation for testifying, that is, whether the witness has reason to “[shade] his testimony in an effort to please the prosecution.” Hines v. State, supra at 260 (2). A jury need not know exactly how much prison time the witness may be avoiding by cooperating with the State to be able to accurately discern that the witness’s testimony may be self-serving, and thus, less than truthful. To hold otherwise brings into question whether the jury must also be informed of the witness’s possibilities for credit for “good time,” probation, pardon and/or parole, insofar as the prosecutor may have any involvement in such matters. It is a slippery slope.
I depart from the majority for yet another reason. The alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause is subject to a harmless error analysis. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra; Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 330 (6) (528 SE2d 800) (2000). Even if the limitation of Vogleson’s cross-examination was found to be a constitutional violation, it would have to be deemed harmless under the facts of this case. The jury was made well aware, albeit by the insistence and assistance of defense counsel, of the mandatory minimum sentence *647faced by the witness. Vogleson’s conviction should stand.
Decided October 28, 2002.
J Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Jennifer M. Daniels, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Sara Martha T. Yeager, Ruth L. Rocker, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Carley join in this dissent.