Court Opinion

ID: 9832306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:47:59.294922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.413095
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.'
Appellant again urgently contends that the only limitation under section 2 of article 6 of the Constitution that could be placed upon those possessing the qualifications for voting therein prescribed, must be confined to those who are by law required to pay a poll tax; and that since those more than 60 years of age are not required by law to pay a poll tax, then, if they meet the other requirement of the Constitution, they are qualified voters whether they ever secure an exemption certificate or not. That is, that since section .2 of article 6 of the Constitution makes no mention of exemption certificates as a prerequisite to a right to vote, the Legislature is without power to impose such a requirement.
Whether authorized under section 2 of article 6 to require a citizen to procure an exemption certificate as a qualification for voting or not, section 4 of article 6 of the Constitution does authorize the Legislature to enact such laws as it deems necessary to preserve the purity of the ballot box; and to require registration of voters in cities of 10,000 inhabitants or more.' In this connection appellant further contends that if the-requirement that exemption certificates be first obtained be treated as a registration statute, it cannot disqualify one otherwise entitled to vote who fails to comply with it. That is, that registration is but a method: of furnishing to the election judges evidence of the right to vote, and not a limitation upon the citizens’ right to vote prescribed in section 2 of article 6. With this, contention we cannot agree. If it were sustained, section 4 of article 6 of the Constitution relating to cities of 10,000 or more-inhabitants would be meaningless. If registration of voters may be required, but failure to register be no disqualification, the efficacy of registration to preserve the purity of the ballot box would be destroyed and the constitutional provision'authorizing it would mean nothing. We see no valid' reason to disqualify one otherwise authorized under the Constitution to vote, because-he has not obtained a poll tax receipt, yet to hold that one in a city of 10,000 inhabitants or more, who is required by law under section 4 of article 6 of the Constitution, to register before he can vote, becomes a. qualified voter whether he registers (obtains an exemption certificate) or not. The-steps required by law for one who possesses-the other attributes of suffrage prescribed, by the Constitution are a,s essential, it seems-to us, to qualify him as a voter in the one-case as in the other.
Appellant also insists that section 18 of' article II of the charter of the city of Brownwood requires that a proposed ordinance granting a franchise of the character here involved be published in a newspaper two days prior to its final passage;, that the one here involved was not published' until after its final passage, and is therefore-void and no franchise ever became effective..
This section of the city charter provides, that no such utility shall be granted a right to use the streets of the city without the-consent of the governing body of the city-expressed by ordinance; “and before such, ordinance proposing to make any grant or franchise or privilege to any applicant to-use or occupy any street, avenue, alley or any other public ground belonging to or under control of the city, shall become effeq-tive, publication of said ordinance, as finally-proposed to be passed, shall be made in a. newspaper published in the City of Brown-wood for two days, or once if in a weekly paper; which publication shall be made at the expense of the applicant desiring said. *1229grant, and said proposed ordinance shall not be changed unless republished as in the first ■instance, nor shall any such ordinance take ■effect or become a law or contract or vest any rights in the applicant therefor, until .after the expiration of twenty days from the last publication of said ordinance, as .aforesaid. Pending the time such ordinance may become effective, it is hereby made the duty of the governing authority •of the City to order an election, if requested so to do, by written petition, signed by at least twenty per cent, of the legally ■qualified voters, as shown by the tax rolls for the preceding year, at which election •the qualified voters of said City shall vote for or against the proposed grant, as set forth in detail by the ordinance conferring the right and privileges upon the applicant therefor. Such election shall be ordered not less than ten days nor more than thirty •days from the date of filing of said petition, .and if, at said election, the majority of the votes cast shall be for the granting of such franchise or privilege, said ordinance and the making of said proposed grant shall thereupon become effective; but if the majority of the votes cast at said election shall be against the granting of such franchise or privilege, such ordinance shall be ineffective and the making of such proposed •grant be null and void.”
In the instant case the ordinance embodying the proposed franchise was presented to a regular meeting of the city •council on November 27, 1934, and on motion unanimously adopted by the council passed first reading. At a called meeting of the council on December 4, 1934, it unanimously passed second reading. On January 22, 1935, at a regular meeting of the city council the ordinance, as amended (in what particular it was amended is not shown), passed third reading and final passage by unanimous vote of the council, and was on that date approved by the mayor. Publication of the ordinance was made on June 8 and 10, 1935.
On the one hand, as urged by appellant, a reasonable construction of the charter provision above quoted is that it contemplated the publication of the proposed franchise ordinance before it was finally passed. Such publication would, while the matter ■was still pending before the city council and before final action be taken thereon, fully apprize the public of its contents and so give them opportunity to appear before the council in favor of or against such grant by the governing body of the city.
On the other hand, if publication of such proposed ordinance had been made in the instant case for two days prior to November 27th, when it passed first reading before the council, or prior to December 4th, when it passed second reading, the 20-day period following such last publication would have expired prior to January 22, 1935, when the ordinance was finally passed, and it could have then become effective immediately. If it had, under such circumstances, become effective immediately upon approval by the mayor (and it could not have been a valid grant until then), then no time would then have intervened in which a referendum could have been asked for by petition as provided for in the charter. And the language of the latter portion of section 18 above quoted', viz., “Pending the time such ordinance may become effective,” etc., such referendum petition may be filed, manifestly contemplates that such ordinance has been finally passed by the council, but that something still remains to make it become effective. Under this part of the charter provision, therefore, it may with equal reason be urged that publication of the ordinance as finally acted upon by the council was meant, and the 20 days intervening after publication thereof before it should become effective, was to afford the voters by petition an opportunity to refer the matter to popular vote.
In no event would the ordinance become effective until the expiration of 20 days after the last publication thereof. Without a referendum thereon it would, if otherwise regular, become a binding grant after such 20 days. We are of the opinion, therefore, that a publication, after final action of the council upon the proposed franchise, meets the requirements of the city charter, and so affords, as this case clearly demonstrates, an opportunity, after the city council has acted in the premises, for interested qualified voters to refer the grant or refusal of the franchise to the people, rather than abide the decision of the city council in the matter.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.
Overruled.