Court Opinion

ID: 9840647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:09:05.840921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:52.143284
License: Public Domain

J-A11020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: DILLE FAMILY TRUST                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: LORRAINE DILLE                    :
  WILLIAMS AND ROBERT NICHOLS                  :
  FLINT DILLE                                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 96 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 11, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 43 of 2019 O.C.

  IN RE: DILLE FAMILY TRUST                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: LORRAINE DILLE                    :
  WILLIAMS AND ROBERT NICHOLS                  :
  FLINT DILLE                                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 97 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 12, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 43 of 2019 O.C.

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

       Lorraine Dille Williams (“Lorraine”) and Robert Nichols Flint Dille

(“Robert”) (collectively “Appellants” or “Beneficiaries”) appeal at docket no.

96 WDA 2022 from the January 11, 2022 order declaring, following

reconsideration, that Louise Geer was lawfully appointed as Trustee of the
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A11020-23

Dille Family Trust (“DFT” or “Trust”) on June 6, 2011, and that Appellants’

purported removal of Ms. Geer on August 26, 2018, was ineffective.

Additionally, Appellants appeal at docket no. 97 WDA 2022 from the January

12, 2022 order declaring, inter alia, that Dennis W. Fox resigned from his

position as Trustee of the DFT on May 4, 2011, that he never acted in this

capacity as Trustee prior to tendering his resignation, and enjoining Appellants

and Mr. Fox from holding out to any person or entity that Mr. Fox is now or at

any time has been Trustee for the DFT.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       The instant matter stems from a dispute over the situs of the DFT and

whether Ms. Geer is the legitimate Trustee of the DFT. On April 17, 2019, Ms.

Geer, acting as Trustee of the DFT, instituted the underlying action with the

filing of a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County,

Pennsylvania, Orphans’ Court Division, seeking confirmation of her status as

the Trustee of the DFT and seeking approval of her proposed distribution of

the Trust assets. Appellants opposed the petition, claiming that Ms. Geer had

never been lawfully appointed as Trustee. The Nowlan Family Trust (“NFT”)

and the Buck Rogers Company (“BRC”) (collectively “Intervenors”) filed a

petition seeking to intervene in the orphans’ court action,2 which the court
____________________________________________

1 By per curiam order dated April 26, 2022, this Court consolidated the appeals

filed at 96 and 97 WDA 2022.

2 The DFT and the NFT have been involved in extensive litigation before the

United States Patent and Trademark Office, the Patent and Trademark Appeals
Board, and the United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, over the intellectual property rights of the fictional character,
Buck Rogers.

                                           -2-
J-A11020-23

granted on February 24, 2020, for the limited purpose of participating in the

hearings to determine whether Ms. Geer is the legally authorized Trustee of

the DFT. A bifurcated trial on the issue of Ms. Geer’s Trustee status, originally

scheduled to be held in April 2020, was continued multiple times due to

COVID-19 concerns and discovery issues, and was eventually held on April 22

and 23, 2021.3 After consideration of the evidence produced at trial and the

briefs submitted by counsel for the parties, the orphans’ court entered an

order on June 23, 2021, declaring that Ms. Geer became the de facto Trustee4

of the DFT on June 6, 2011, and that her status as de facto Trustee was

terminated on August 26, 2018.5
____________________________________________

3 The issue regarding approval of Ms. Geer’s proposed distribution of the Trust

assets was scheduled for a separate trial date and is not relevant to this
appeal.

4 As the orphans’ court explained:

       A de facto trustee is an individual who believes they have been
       appointed as trustee, performs actions on behalf of the trust for
       the benefit of the beneficiaries and who holds themselves out as
       a trustee to the third parties, but who has never been legally
       appointed to the position of trustee. The concept of a de facto
       trustee applies to uphold the transactions and actions taken in
       good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries by an individual who
       was not legally appointed trustee.

Order, 6/23/21, at 10-11 ¶ 11 (internal citations omitted).

5 Applying California law, the orphans’ court concluded that “[t]he purported

appointment of [Ms.] Geer as the Trustee of the [DFT] was not in accordance
with the requirements of Section 15660 of the California Probate Code, which
would require an order of court to make [Ms.] Geer’s appointment lawful.”
Order, 6/23/21, at 10 ¶ 9. See also id. at 12 ¶ 15-16 (“[T]he attempt to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -3-
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       On July 13, 2021, Ms. Geer and the Intervenors (collectively

“Appellees”) presented motions for reconsideration of the June 23, 2021

order, essentially arguing that the orphans’ court applied the wrong legal

standards regarding the appointment and removal of a trustee. The orphans’

court granted their motions that same day, ordered the parties to file briefs,

and scheduled argument on the reconsideration for October 20, 2021. The

parties were directed, in particular, to “be prepared to argue whether the laws

of Illinois or the laws of California are the determinative laws with regard to

the issue of the validity of the initial[,] claimed appointment of [Ms.] Geer as

Trustee of the [DFT].” Order, 8/3/21 (single page; unpaginated).

       After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs and the arguments made

by counsel, the orphans’ court issued the following amended findings of fact

and conclusions of law:

                                   Findings of Fact

       6.     The [DFT] was created by Robert C. Dille and Virginia N.
       Dille [(“Mr. and Mrs. Dille” or the “Settlors”)] on August 16, 1979,
       in the state of California. The original Trustees were [Mr. and Mrs.
       Dille]. The Trust was amended on January 5, 1982. The sole

____________________________________________

appoint Attorney Louise Geer as Trustee failed under the California Probate
Code, but because [Ms.] Geer was asked by both Beneficiaries to hold herself
out as Trustee and all three mistakenly believed that she had been properly
appointed under the California Code, [Ms.] Geer became the de facto Trustee
of the [DFT] on June 6, 2011…. [Ms.] Geer continued to be the de facto
Trustee of the [DFT] until August 26, 2018, when both Lorraine … and Robert
… took affirmative steps to dispossess [Ms.] Geer of her de facto
trusteeship.”); CA Probate § 15660 (providing that “on petition of any
interested person…, the court may, in its discretion, appoint a trustee to fill
[a] vacancy”).

                                           -4-
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     beneficiaries of the [DFT] are the children of the settlors, Lorraine
     … and Robert.

     7.     Under the terms of the Trust as drafted, the Trust
     agreement is a California contact [sic] that creates a California
     trust[,] and all of the terms and provisions therein shall be
     “interpreted” according to the laws of the State of California.

     8.     [Mr.] Dille died on March 30, 1983. Upon the death of [Mr.]
     Dille, under the terms of the Trust as drafted, Arthur Martin
     became a Co-Trustee with [Mrs.] Dille in 1983.

     9.   On February 1, 1989, the Beneficiaries and the Co-Trustees
     executed a document transferring the situs of the [DFT] to Illinois.

     10. [Mrs.] Dille died on February 17, 2009. Upon the death of
     [Mrs.] Dille, Arthur Martin became the sole Trustee in 2009.

     11. On March 8, 2011, [Mr.] Martin sent a notice of his intent to
     resign [from] his position as Trustee of the [DFT]. Pursuant to
     the Amendment to the Trust, Dennis W. Fox was to be appointed
     as successor Trustee upon [Mr.] Martin[’s] ceasing to act in that
     capacity.

     12. On May 4, 2011, [Mr.] Fox sent a notice of his resignation
     from the position of successor Trustee of the [DFT]. [Mr.] Fox
     never acted in his capacity as Trustee and took no officials [sic]
     actions on behalf of the [DFT] prior to tendering his resignation
     on May 4, 2011.

     13. According to the 1982 Amendment to the Trust, upon [Mr.]
     Fox[’s] ceasing to act in the capacity of [T]rustee, the American
     Guaranty & Trust Company (now known as RBC Trust Company)
     was to be appointed as the successor corporate [T]rustee.

     14. On May 19, 2011, the American Guaranty & Trust Company
     … declined to accept the position as successor Trustee to the
     [DFT]. The Beneficiaries attempted to secure a different corporate
     Trustee, but were unable to find a corporate Trustee willing to
     accept the position. These events left the [DFT] without a Trustee,
     in as much as the terms of the Trust made no other provisions for
     the appointment of a successor Trustee.

     15. Robert … had some prior business contact with Attorney
     Daniel Herman; and Daniel Herman had a license from the [DFT]
     for certain limited purposes. Because of that prior familiarity,
     Robert…, who along with his sister Lorraine … were the sole

                                     -5-
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     Beneficiaries of the Trust, contacted [Mr.] Herman about [his]
     becoming the Trustee for the [DFT].

     16. [Mr.] Herman is a partner with his wife, Louise Geer, in the
     Pennsylvania law firm of Geer and Herman, P.C., with its sole
     office located in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.

     17. [Mr.] Herman informed Robert … that he did not want to
     become Trustee for the [DFT], but that his wife[,] Attorney Louise
     Geer, would be willing to be Trustee.

     18. Arthur Martin was an attorney with an office in Chicago,
     Illinois[,] and had been the personal attorney for [Mr. and Mrs.]
     Dille, the original Settlors of the [DFT]. He had been the Co-
     Trustee and Trustee of the [DFT] for 28 years. To assist in the
     orderly appointment of a successor Trustee, [Mr.] Martin, on
     February 24, 2011, by email, communicated with Robert … and
     explained the steps that he believed were necessary to appoint a
     successor Trustee or to terminate the Trust. Because Lorraine …
     and Robert … had reached the minimum age of 35, under the
     terms of the Trust, the two of them by mutual agreement had the
     authority to terminate the Trust even before [Mr.] Martin sent his
     letter of resignation dated March 8, 2011.

     19. [Beneficiaries] chose not to terminate the Trust and decided
     to ask [Ms.] Geer to be the successor Trustee.

     20. [Beneficiaries] asked [Ms.] Geer to become the Trustee of
     the [DFT].

     21. On June 6, 2011, [Beneficiaries] signed documents
     purporting to appoint [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT].

     22. Prior to signing the document on June 6, 2011, both
     [Beneficiaries] showed their personal attorneys the document that
     they had been asked to sign to appoint [Ms.] Geer as Trustee for
     the [DFT]. Their personal attorneys at least saw and reviewed the
     document and voiced no objection to the method chosen to
     appoint [Ms.] Geer as Trustee.

     23. [Ms.] Geer and [Beneficiaries] all read the email between
     [Mr.] Martin and Robert … dated February 24, 2011[,] and
     followed the recommendations of [Mr.] Martin as to the method of
     appointing [Ms.] Geer as a successor Trustee.

     24. At the time that [the Beneficiaries] signed the document to
     appoint [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT], [they] had the

                                   -6-
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     complete and absolute authority to terminate the Trust, if they
     desired to do so. They were the only Beneficiaries of the Trust.

     25. At the time of the June 6, 2011 purported appointment of
     [Ms.] Geer as Trustee, California Probate Code required court
     approval for appointment of a non-corporate Trustee. Beyond the
     naming of specific successor Trustees and allowing for the
     appointment of a corporate Trustee, there were no provisions in
     the Trust document or its 1982 Amendment setting forth any
     other method of appointment of a Trustee.

     26. At the time of the June 6, 2011 purported appointment of
     [Ms.] Geer, Illinois law permitted the appointment of a Trustee by
     a majority in interest of the Beneficiaries.

     27. As of June 6, 2011, in the case of a vacancy, California law
     only allowed the appointment of a Trustee by court order.

     28. After June 6, 2011, with the permission and consent of both
     Beneficiaries, [Ms.] Geer acted as the Trustee of the [DFT] and
     was permitted and did hold herself out to third parties as the
     Trustee of the [DFT].

     29. After June 6, 2011, with the permission and consent of both
     Beneficiaries, [Ms.] Geer began administering the [DFT] from the
     office of Geer and Herman, P.C.[,] located in Lawrence County,
     Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania income tax returns were filed on
     behalf of the [DFT] by [Ms.] Geer as Trustee for the [DFT] in the
     years 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015[,] and 2016. A Trust bank
     account was opened in Pennsylvania. All Trust business was
     conducted by [Ms.] Geer from her offices in Lawrence County,
     Pennsylvania.

     30. As of June 6, 2011, the [DFT]’s United States Trademarks
     for Buck Rogers had expired…, but the [DFT] still maintained
     Canadian, German[,] and some other trademark rights, and the
     [NFT] had applied for the U.S. Trademark Rights to Buck Rogers.
     The [DFT] had very little income and owed approximately
     $42,000.00 in attorney[s’] fees to a law firm for work that had
     been done for the Trust prior to June 6, 2011. This court is not
     making any findings of fact or rulings as to the validity or
     ownership of any trademark or intellectual property.

     31. Holding herself out as Trustee, with the knowledge,
     consent[,] and acquiescence of [the Beneficiaries], [Ms.] Geer
     contested the [NFT]’s attempt to acquire the U.S. Trademark

                                   -7-
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     Rights to Buck Rogers. The contest included litigation.        The
     litigation was financed by the [DFT] and Lorraine….

     32. The litigation costs to contest the [NFT]’s claims to the U.S.
     Trademark Rights for Buck Rogers far exceeded the meager
     income of the [DFT].

                                     …

     35. On November 28, 2017, [Ms.] Geer purporting to act as
     Trustee of the [DFT], filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on behalf of the
     [DFT]. [Ms.] Geer purposefully did not seek the permission of [the
     Beneficiaries] prior to filing the bankruptcy. [Ms.] Geer did not
     notify either Beneficiary that she had filed the bankruptcy action
     on behalf of the [DFT]. Lorraine … and Robert … only learned of
     the Chapter 11 filing when Lorraine…, as a creditor, received
     notice from the Bankruptcy Court that she was a listed creditor in
     the bankruptcy action filed by [Ms.] Geer on behalf of the [DFT].

     36. On August 26, 2018, [the Beneficiaries] sent written notice
     to [Ms.] Geer that she was no longer representing the [DFT] as
     Trustee.

     37. Despite receiving the August 26, 2018 notice from the
     Beneficiaries, [Ms. Geer] continued to hold herself out as Trustee
     of the [DFT] and continued to act as though she was Trustee of
     the [DFT].

                                     …

     43. On December 11, 2018, [the Beneficiaries] filed an
     expedited motion in Bankruptcy Court to dismiss the bankruptcy
     case as improperly filed. The [NFT] and [Ms.] Geer filed objections
     to the motion.

     44. On February 20, 2019, Judge Jeffery A. Deller, dismissed
     the bankruptcy petition, finding that the [DFT] was not a business
     trust and therefore was not eligible for relief as a Chapter 11
     debtor.

     45. On April 4, 2019, the Beneficiaries filed an ex parte petition
     in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles[,]
     seeking an order of court confirming that [Ms.] Geer was not
     properly appointed Trustee and had no authority to act as such;
     confirming that the Beneficiaries removed the Trust assets on
     February 20, 2019; ordering that [Ms.] Geer cease purporting to

                                    -8-
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       act as Trustee; appointing the Beneficiaries as Co-Trustees of the
       Trust; and compelling [Ms.] Geer to immediately surrender all
       Trust property and records. [Ms.] Geer contested the ex parte
       petition by specially[]appearing and filing a motion to dismiss for
       lack of jurisdiction and improper venue.

       46. On July 11, 2019, in the Superior Court of California, County
       of Los Angeles, Judge Clifford Klein issued an order dismissing the
       Beneficiaries’ ex parte petition and finding that California lacked
       personal jurisdiction over [Ms.] Geer; that pursuant [to] California
       Probate Code § 17002[,] the principle [sic] place of Trust
       administration was Pennsylvania; and that California did not have
       jurisdiction over the Trust because the Trust had no substantive
       connection with the state.

       47. On October 2, 2020, in the Court of Common Pleas of
       Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, this court entered an order
       denying the [NFT]’s motion for partial summary judgment and the
       Beneficiaries’ renewed motion for summary judgment and made
       an explicit finding that Lawrence County, Pennsylvania[,] has
       subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

       48. On October 8, 2020, this court entered an order of court
       denying the [NFT]’s motion to quash notice of no subject matter
       jurisdiction and for other relief and finding that the Court of
       Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania[,] has exclusive
       jurisdiction to determine the status of [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the
       [DFT].

                                 Conclusions of Law

       1.    Pennsylvania [–] in particular[,] the Orphans’ Court Division
       of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania[,
       –] has mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over the
       administration and distribution of testamentary trusts.          20
       Pa.C.S.[] § 711(2).[6] The orphans’ court division also has
       mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction over the appointment,
       control, settlement of the accounts of, removal and discharge of,

____________________________________________

6  We note that the orphans’ court also has mandatory and exclusive
jurisdiction over the administration and distribution of real and personal
property of inter vivos trusts. 20 Pa.C.S. § 711(3). An inter vivos trust is
defined as “an express trust other than a trust created by a will, taking effect
during the lifetime or at or after the death of the settlor.” Id.

                                           -9-
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     and allowance to and allocation of compensation among all
     fiduciaries of estates and trusts. 20 Pa.C.S.[] § 711(12).

     2.     Paragraph 2.F of the [DFT] reads as follows:

          2.F Trust Situs

          This Trust Agreement is a California contract and creates a
          California Trust, and all of the terms and provisions hereof
          shall be interpreted according to the laws of the State of
          California, except that a majority of the beneficiaries may
          transfer the trust situs to a more convenient jurisdiction.

     Therefore, while the terms of the Trust are to be “interpreted”
     according to California law, the situs where the Trust is
     administered can be changed by the Beneficiaries. If the situs is
     changed, the law under which the Trust is administered is
     changed, there being no provision in the Trust requiring the Trust
     to be administered under California law.

     3.    Because the Trust’s situs was changed to Illinois on
     February 1, 1989, the laws of Illinois controlled the administration
     of the Trust at the time [Ms.] Geer was appointed as Trustee by
     the Beneficiaries on June 6, 2011.

     4.     [A]s of May 19, 2011, the [DFT] was without a Trustee and
     there were no provisions in the Trust document or its Amendment
     naming a successor Trustee or providing for a method by which a
     successor Trustee could be appointed following the resignations of
     all successor [T]rustees named in the document.

     5.     Since [Ms.] Geer’s purported appointment on June 6, 2011,
     until August 26, 2018, [Ms.] Geer administered the [DFT] from
     her office at Geer and Herman, P.C., located in Lawrence County,
     Pennsylvania. [Ms.] Geer held herself out as the Trustee of the
     [DFT] to third parties and conducted Trust business out of her
     office in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. [Ms.] Geer has resided
     in Lawrence County prior to June 6, 2011[,] and continues to
     reside in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. On November 27,
     2019, [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT] filed a first and partial
     account and statement of proposed distribution in Lawrence
     County, Pennsylvania.

                                       …

     7.    Pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.[] §[§] 711(2)[ and] … 711(12), this
     court has exclusive jurisdiction over questions relating [to Ms.]

                                     - 10 -
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       Geer’s administration of the [DFT],[7] [Ms.] Geer’s distribution of
       the [DFT] assets, over the question of [Ms.] Geer’s status, and all
       accountings and issues relating to surcharges.

       8.     [Ms.] Geer believed she had been appointed as Trustee of
       the [DFT]. And with the permission and acquiescence of both
       Beneficiaries, [Ms.] Geer held herself out to third parties as the
       Trustee for the [DFT] starting on June 6, 2011. Following June 6,
       2011, no further Trust business was conducted from the State of
       Illinois or California. Following June 6, 2011, the [DFT] was
       administered solely from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

       9.    After [Ms.] Geer’s purported appointment as Trustee on
       June 6, 201[1], the situs of the Trust was in the Commonwealth
       of Pennsylvania and the laws of Pennsylvania govern[ed] the
       administration of the Trust. The … terms of the Trust continue to
       be interpreted according to California law.

       10. While California law is to be used to interpret the terms of
       the Trust, the terms of the Trust with regard to the appointment
       of a successor Trustee are not in dispute. The Trust set forth a
       series of successor Trustees. However, all of the named potential
       successors either were deceased or had declined or resigned
       appointment and no corporate Trustee could be obtained following
       the resignation of [Mr.] Martin on March 8, 2011[,] and [Mr.] Fox’s
       resignation on May 4, 2011.

       11. On July 11, 2019, in the Superior Court of California, County
       of Los Angeles, Judge Clifford Klein ruled that California no longer
       had jurisdiction over the Trust and that the principal place off [sic]
       the Trust administration was Pennsylvania. The Trustee and the
       Beneficiaries participated in the case before Judge Klein and are
       bound by this ruling.

       12. As of June 6, 2011, Illinois law (Illinois Compiled Statutes
       Annotated 5/13(2)) provided that if there were no remaining
       trustees, “a successor trustee may be appointed by a majority in
       interest of the beneficiaries…[.]” [760 ILCS 5/13(2).] On June 6,
       2011, [Ms.] Geer was lawfully appointed Trustee of the [DFT] by
____________________________________________

7 Because the DFT was created by Mr. and Mrs. Dille and took effect during

their lifetime, the orphans’ court’s mandatory jurisdiction over administration
of the Trust is granted under subsection 711(3), which governs inter vivos
trusts, rather than subsection 711(2), governing testamentary trusts. 20
Pa.C.S. §§ 711(2)-(3).

                                          - 11 -
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       the two Beneficiaries, Lorraine … and Robert…, in accord with then
       applicable Illinois law where the Trust was sited and being
       administered.

       13. On June 6, 2011, [Ms.] Geer was lawfully appointed Trustee
       of the [DFT] by the Beneficiaries….

       14. The question of whether … [Ms.] Geer was lawfully
       appointed as Trustee on June 6, 2011[,] was before the court.
       The fact that counsel for [Ms.] Geer and the Intervenors did not
       argue that Illinois law should be applied to the purported
       appointment on June 6, 2011[,] until the filing of the[ir] motion[s]
       for reconsideration, did not waive or preclude this court from
       finding that Illinois law was applicable and that the June 6, 2011
       appointment of [Ms.] Geer as Trustee was lawful under Illinois
       law. Counsel was given notice and an opportunity to brief and
       argue whether Illinois law should be applied to the issue of the
       validity of the June 6, 2011 appointment.

       15. The court having determined that [Ms.] Geer was lawfully
       appointed as Trustee on June 6, 2011, must determine if the
       August 26, 2018 writing[] by the Beneficiaries informing [Ms.]
       Geer that by unanimous agreement of the Beneficiaries, she was
       removed as Trustee for the [DFT] effective immediately, legally
       removed her from her position as Trustee. While under Illinois
       law, when a vacancy in the trusteeship occurs, a majority of the
       beneficiaries can appoint a trustee, there is no provision in
       Pennsylvania law (or Illinois law) empowering a majority of the
       beneficiaries to remove a trustee. [U]nder 20 [Pa.C.S. §] 7766,
       a trustee may be removed by the court upon request made by a
       beneficiary. The trustee is to be ordered to appear and show
       cause why he should not be removed[.] 20 [Pa.C.S. §] 3183. If
       the court determines that one of the provisions of 20 [Pa.C.S. §]
       7766(b) applies, the court can then remove the trustee. (This
       statute mirrors [Section] 701 of the [Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”)8]
       and is also consistent with Illinois law.) There is no provision in
       Pennsylvania law to allow the Beneficiaries to remove the Trustee
       on their own. Therefore, the writing of August 26, 2018[,] by the
       Beneficiaries did not remove [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT].

____________________________________________

8 We believe the court meant to refer to Section 706 of the UTC. See 20
Pa.C.S. § 7766, Comment (noting that Section 7766 largely adopts Section
706 of the UTC in substance).

                                          - 12 -
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      The result would be the same if the court had found Illinois law
      applicable.

      16. The Beneficiaries did not file any action in either Illinois or
      Pennsylvania seeking a court order to remove [Ms.] Geer as
      Trustee.

      17. In as much as the issues of the status of [Ms.] Geer as
      Trustee were bifurcated from the other issues of account and
      surcharges, a hearing on those issues will be scheduled.

Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Court (“Order I”),

1/11/22, at 1-12 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; emphasis in original).

Accordingly, the orphans’ court declared that “Louise Geer was lawfully

appointed as Trustee of the [DFT] on June 6, 2011[; t]he purported removal

of [Ms.] Geer on August 26, 2018, by written notice of the Beneficiaries, was

ineffective and did not remove [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT],” and

scheduled a hearing on the remaining issues before the court. Id. at 12-13.

      Subsequently, the Intervenors presented a petition seeking an order

directing the Beneficiaries to give notice to Mr. Fox that he is not the Trustee

of the DFT; that the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County,

Pennsylvania, Orphans’ Court Division has exclusive jurisdiction of all

administrative matters pertaining to the DFT; that Mr. Fox is not permitted to

initiate any proceeding pertaining to the administration of the DFT, except in

the orphans’ court; and to order Aurelius Robleto, Esquire, to cease his

representation of the Beneficiaries absent a satisfactory explanation.       In

response, the orphans’ court issued the following order:

      1. Following a full trial on the issue as to whether or not [Ms.]
         Geer was lawfully appointed Trustee of the [DFT] … and
         whether or not [Ms.] Geer remains Trustee of the [DFT]…, this

                                     - 13 -
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        court entered an order finding that [Ms.] Geer was lawfully
        appointed as Trustee of the [DFT] on June 6, 2011[,] and that
        the purported removal of [Ms.] Geer on August 26, 2018, by
        written notice of the Beneficiaries, was ineffective and did not
        remove [Ms.] Geer as Trustee of the [DFT].

     2. This court found on October 8, 2020[,] that the court had
        subject matter jurisdiction to decide the status of [Ms.] Geer
        as Trustee of the [DFT,] and that this court has exclusive
        jurisdiction to decide whether or not [Ms.] Geer was appointed
        as Trustee of the [DFT] and whether or not [Ms.] Geer
        continues to be the lawful Trustee of the [DFT].

     3. In the court order dated January 10, 2022, [and entered on
        January 11, 2022,] this court found that on May 4, 2011, [Mr.]
        Fox sent a notice of his resignation from the position of
        successor Trustee of the [DFT] and that [Mr.] Fox never acted
        in this capacity as Trustee and took no official actions on behalf
        of the [DFT] prior to tendering his resignation on May 4, 2011.

     4. On July 11, 2019, in a case in which [Beneficiaries]
        participated, Judge Clifford Kline [sic] in the Superior Court of
        California for the County of Los Angeles dismissed the
        Beneficiaries[’] petition and found that pursuant to California
        Probate Code Section 17002[,] the principal place of Trust
        administration was Pennsylvania[,] and that California did not
        have jurisdiction over the Trust because the Trust had no
        substantive connection with the state of California.

     5. In the Superior Court of California for the County of San Mateo,
        on October 29, 2020, [Mr.] Fox, claiming to be the Trustee of
        the [DFT], [along with the Beneficiaries,] filed an ex parte
        petition without notice to [Ms.] Geer, or to the Intervenors in
        the above[-]captioned Lawrence County case, … asking for a
        court order confirming the termination of the [DFT] and the
        distribution of all assets of the [DFT] to the Beneficiaries. The
        petition did not inform the Superior Court of California for the
        County of San Mateo of the pending Lawrence County,
        Pennsylvania action or the prior ruling by the Superior Court of
        California for the County of Los Angeles, which had previously
        found that the [S]tate of California did not have jurisdiction to
        make rulings concerning the status of the [DFT]. While the
        court in the County of San Mateo did issue an order, the court
        later vacated it’s [sic] order and dismissed the petition of [Mr.]
        Fox and the Beneficiaries with prejudice.

                                    - 14 -
J-A11020-23

      6. On September 23, 2020, Attorney Jennifer Mihok filed a
         general appearance on behalf of [Mr.] Fox, purporting to be
         Trustee of the [DFT], in the Lawrence County, Pennsylvania
         case at No. 43 of 2019, O.C. In addition, a praecipe to
         discontinue the Lawrence County case was filed in the Court of
         Common Pleas of Lawrence County on behalf of [Mr.] Fox.

      7. By court order dated January 29, 2021 (filed on April 1, 2021),
         this court found that [Mr.] Fox had subjected himself to the
         personal jurisdiction of this court on September 23, 2020,
         when Attorney Jennifer Mihok entered her appearance on his
         behalf and the praecipe to discontinue was filed on behalf of
         [Mr.] Fox.

      8. [The Beneficiaries] and [Mr.] Fox are hereby enjoined and
         prohibited from representing or holding out to any person or
         entity or governmental agency or court that [Mr.] Fox is now
         or at any time has been Trustee for the [DFT]. [Mr.] Fox is
         enjoined from taking any action purporting to be Trustee of the
         [DFT].

      9. In as much as [the Beneficiaries] acted in concert with [Mr.]
         Fox as co-petitioners in filing a petition in the Superior Court of
         California for the County of San Mateo on August 29, 2020, the
         Beneficiaries have acted in concert with [Mr.] Fox in
         representing to others that [Mr.] Fox has [been] or is the
         Trustee of the [DFT]….

Order (“Order II”), 1/12/22, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      On January 21, 2022, Appellants timely filed separate notices of appeal

from the orphans’ court’s orders entered on January 11 and 12, 2022. On

February 14, 2022, Appellants filed timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal. The orphans’ court

filed Rule 1925(a) opinions on March 16 and 18, 2022. The appeals were

subsequently consolidated by this Court.      See Per Curiam Order, 4/26/22

(single page).

      Appellants present the following issues for our review:

                                     - 15 -
J-A11020-23

     1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in ruling that, on June 6,
        2011, [Ms.] Geer was lawfully appointed Trustee of the [DFT]
        by its Beneficiaries.

     2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in failing to determine that
        [Ms.] Geer and the Intervenors had waived the argument or
        had been precluded from arguing that Illinois law applied to
        [Ms.] Geer’s purported June 6, 2011[] appointment as
        [T]rustee of the DFT, since no party advocated that position
        until after the trial had concluded.

     3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in ruling that a change in
        the situs of the DFT to Illinois also changed the law governing
        administration of the [T]rust and, under Illinois law, [Ms.] Geer
        was lawfully appointed [T]rustee.

     4. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in its determination that
        Pennsylvania law controlled the administration of the Trust
        after [Ms.] Geer’s purported appointment and, under
        Pennsylvania law, the Beneficiaries had not successfully
        removed her by August 26, 2018.

     5. Whether the [orphans’] court erred with its finding that, after
        [Ms.] Geer read the email from [Mr.] Martin dated February 25,
        2011, Ms. Geer then followed the recommendations of Mr.
        Martin as to the method of appointing herself as a successor
        [T]rustee.

     6. Whether the [orphans’] court erred by enjoining [Mr.] Fox from
        taking any action purporting to be Trustee of the DFT, and by
        enjoining [Mr.] Fox and the Beneficiaries from representing or
        holding out to any person or entity or governmental agency or
        court that [Mr.] Fox is now or at any time has been Trustee for
        the DFT.

     7. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in determining that the
        execution of a resignation of trusteeship by [Mr.] Fox[]
        disqualified Mr. Fox from ever becoming [T]rustee of the DFT.

     8. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in determining that [Mr.]
        Fox had subjected himself to the personal jurisdiction in the
        [orphans’] court.

     9. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in finding that a California
        court had determined that California did not have jurisdiction
        over the [DFT].

                                    - 16 -
J-A11020-23

Appellants’ Brief at 7-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).9

       We review the merits of Appellants’ claims mindful of the following: In

an appeal from an orphans’ court’s decision,

       [we] must determine whether the record is free from legal error
       and the court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence.
       Because the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt sits as the fact-finder, it
       determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will
       not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that
       discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the same
       deference to any resulting legal conclusions. Where the rules of
       law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly
       inapplicable, we will reverse the court’s decree.

In re Vincent J. Fumo Irrevocable Children’s Trust ex rel. Fumo, 104

A.3d 535, 539 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). Moreover, to the extent

that Appellants’ claims involve statutory interpretation and/or interpretation

of the Trust document, such issues present questions of law over which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See In re

Jackson, 174 A.3d 14, 29 (Pa. Super. 2017); B.K.M. v. J.A.M., 50 A.3d 168,

172 (Pa. Super. 2012).

                                First & Third Issues

       We address Appellants’ first and third issues together as they are closely

intertwined.    Essentially, Appellants argue that the orphans’ court erred in

ruling that because of the Beneficiaries’ transferring of the Trust situs to

Illinois in February of 1989, Illinois law controlled regarding administration of

the Trust and that, consequently, the court mistakenly concluded Ms. Geer

____________________________________________

9 Appellants’ claims are addressed herein out-of-order for ease of disposition.

                                          - 17 -
J-A11020-23

was lawfully appointed Trustee of the DFT on June 6, 2011. See Appellants’

Brief at 22, 32-40. See also id. at 22 (asserting that the orphans’ court’s

prior June 23, 2021 decision, in which it applied California law and found that

Ms. Geer was not properly appointed as Trustee of the DFT, was the correct

decision,    and    that   the   court    erred    in   applying   Illinois   law   upon

reconsideration).     Appellants maintain that there is absolutely no basis to

support the orphans’ court’s application of Illinois law in determining Ms.

Geer’s Trustee status.        Id. at 32.       In fact, they argue that the court’s

concluding “a change in situs should somehow subvert the settlors’

unequivocal selection of California law defies logic.”         Id. at 36.     See also

Appellants’ Reply Brief at 6 (“[T]he [orphans’] court failed to provide a legal

basis for its conclusion that the Beneficiaries[’] exercise of their discretion to

change the situs of the DFT to Illinois resulted in the unintended consequence

of invalidating the selection of California law.”).10
____________________________________________

10 Appellants aver that the orphans’ court vacated its prior June 23, 2021
decision “without citation to a single legal authority,” and substituted it with
the following “bare conclusion”:

       [W]hile the terms of the Trust are to be “interpreted” according to
       California law, the situs where the Trust is administered can be
       changed by the Beneficiaries. If the situs is changed, the law
       under which the Trust is administered is changed, there being no
       provision in the Trust for requiring the Trust to be administered
       under California law.

Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5-6 (quoting Order I at 9 ¶ 2). See also id. at 6
(adding that the orphans’ court “simply restated that conclusion, again without
reference to any legal authority[,]” in its Rule 1925(a) opinion) (citation
omitted).

                                          - 18 -
J-A11020-23

      Appellants insist that the terms of the Trust document and California law

should govern any dispute over the appointment of a Trustee, and that

because California law would have required court approval, Ms. Geer was

never legally appointed as Trustee of the DFT. Appellants’ Brief at 18. In

support of their argument, they claim that the Settlors’ intent is “clear and

unambiguous” and that if the Settlors “had desired that matters of trust

administration be determined by the law of the situs state, they would have

said so.”   Id. at 39.   Hence, they conclude that “the law commands the

application of California law, in accordance with the intention of the [S]ettlors

of the DFT.” Id. at 32. See also id. (“This [T]rust agreement is a California

contract and creates a California trust, and all of the terms and

provisions hereof shall be interpreted according to the laws of the State of

California, except that a majority of the beneficiaries may transfer the trust

situs to a more convenient jurisdiction.” (quoting Geer’s Petition, 4/17/19, at

Exhibit 1 (“Trust Agreement” at ¶ 2.F) (emphasis added by Appellants)). After

careful consideration, we determine no relief is due on these claims.

      In its opinion, the orphans’ court acknowledged that it initially applied

California law and ruled that Ms. Geer was not properly appointed as Trustee

of the DFT on June 6, 2011. See OCO I at 6-7 (explaining that, at the time,

California law would have required court approval for Ms. Geer’s appointment

as Trustee, but “because the Beneficiaries had promoted [Ms.] Geer as

Trustee, held her out to the world as the Trustee, and had allowed [Ms.] Geer

to act as Trustee both in business dealings and before several courts,” the

                                     - 19 -
J-A11020-23

court had concluded Ms. Geer had become the de facto Trustee). However,

the court explained:

      Well within the thirty[-]day time limit following the … court’s initial
      decision, [Appellees] filed … motion[s] for reconsideration making
      the very credible argument that the situs of the Trust had been
      transferred in 1989 from California to Illinois, in accordance with
      the terms of the [T]rust document, and [Illinois] remained the
      situs for the Trust[] when [Ms.] Geer was appointed by the
      Beneficiaries on June 6, 2011. Pa.R.C[iv.]P. 5505 reads as
      follows:

            Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court
            upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order
            within thirty days after it’s [sic] entry…[.]

      During the thirty[-]day period, the trial court has broad discretion
      to modify it’s [sic] orders[.] PNC Bank[,] N[.]A[.] v. Unknown
      Heirs, … 929 A.2d 219[, 226 (Pa. Super. 2007)].                 The
      Beneficiaries cannot claim any surprise in this matter in as much
      as both the Beneficiaries’ packet of trial exhibits and [Ms.] Geer’s
      packet of trial exhibits contained the “Instrument Transferring
      Situs of Trust,” which was signed by both Beneficiaries and both
      of the then Co-Trustees. This document was offered by the
      Beneficiaries and [Ms.] Geer[,] and admitted into evidence.

Id. at 7.

      After consideration of the parties’ arguments on their motions for

reconsideration and their briefs on the issue of whether the laws of Illinois or

California were controlling as to the validity of the claimed appointment of Ms.

Geer, the orphans’ court amended its findings and conclusions of law and

found that Illinois law must be applied. Id. at 5. It reasoned:

      Because the situs had been changed by the Beneficiaries to the
      [S]tate of Illinois in 1989[,] and the Trust had been administered
      by [Mr.] Martin from the [S]tate of Illinois from that time until the
      date that [Ms.] Geer was appointed on June 6, 2011, the actual
      appointment of [Ms.] Geer on that date can only be adjudicated
      under the then applicable laws of the State of Illinois.

                                      - 20 -
J-A11020-23

Id. at 8. “[U]nder the law of the State of Illinois, as of June 6, 2011, when

the vacancy in the office of Trustee occurred, the Beneficiaries could, without

[c]ourt approval, appoint a Trustee. Therefore, the Beneficiaries’ appointment

of [Ms.] Geer as Trustee on June 6, 2011[,] was a lawful appointment.” Id.

at 5.

        In further support of its decision, the orphans’ court opined:

        [B]oth the Beneficiaries and [Ms.] Geer introduced the document
        that the Beneficiaries signed in 1989 transferring the situs of the
        Trust to the State of Illinois. While the terms and provisions of
        the Trust were still to be “interpreted” by California law, the
        change in the situs of the Trust to Illinois meant that the
        administration of the Trust would thenceforth be governed by the
        courts and the laws of Illinois, so long as the situs of the Trust
        remained in Illinois. Due to the resignation[] of [Mr.] Martin, the
        written refusal of [Mr.] Fox to accept the position of Trustee[,] and
        the refusal of the named corporate Trustee or any other corporate
        Trustee to accept the position, the Trust was without any Trustee
        and without any provision in the Trust document for the
        appointment of a successor Trustee.

        Therefore, in 2011, the appointment of a successor Trustee was a
        matter concerning the administration of the Trust, that had its
        situs in the [S]tate of Illinois. Under Illinois law, the majority of
        the Beneficiaries or an Illinois court, upon petition, could appoint
        a successor Trustee. Both Beneficiaries, Lorraine … and Robert…,
        acting under the direction of the retiring Trustee, signed a
        document appointing [Ms.] Geer as Trustee. [Ms.] Geer therefore
        became the successor Trustee in accordance with the then
        applicable Illinois law.

Id. at 7-8. As we explain further infra, we agree with the orphans’ court’s

reasoning, and we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in its

application of Illinois law in reaching its decision that Ms. Geer was lawfully

appointed as Trustee on June 6, 2011.

                                       - 21 -
J-A11020-23

      To the extent that Appellants attack the orphans’ court’s Rule 1925(a)

opinion for a lack of citations to legal authority, we note that “[t]he purpose

of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) is to facilitate appellate review of a particular trial court

order.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 224 A.3d 682, 692 (Pa. 2020) (internal

ellipsis and citation omitted). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) (“[U]pon receipt of

the notice of appeal, the judge who entered the order giving rise to the notice

of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall

… file of record at least a brief opinion of the reasons for the order….”)

(emphasis added); Commonwealth v. McBride, 957 A.2d 752, 758 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (“In order to conduct a thorough and proper review on appeal,

an opinion explaining the reasoning behind the trial court’s decisions is

advantageous.”). Here, the orphans’ court filed an opinion addressing each

of the issues listed in Appellants’ Rule 1925(b) concise statement of errors

and containing a thorough explanation of its reasonings for its January 11,

2022 decision, in compliance with Rule 1925(a).         See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a);

Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO I”), 3/16/22, at 5-8. In conducting appellate

review, it is the duty of this Court to determine whether the orphans’ court

correctly applied the law to the facts in this case. See McShea v. City of

Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. 2010) (indicating that when an

appellate court entertains an appeal from a non-jury trial, it is not bound by

the trial court’s conclusions of law, “because it is the appellate court’s duty to

determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts”) (citation

omitted). Moreover, we may affirm the decision of the orphans’ court if it is

                                     - 22 -
J-A11020-23

correct on any grounds.         See Lilliquist v. Copes-Vulcan, Inc., 21 A.3d

1233, 1235 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that an appellate court may affirm a

trial court’s decision on any grounds supported by the record on appeal).

       Instantly, we conclude that the orphans’ court properly applied Illinois

law in determining that Ms. Geer was lawfully appointed as Trustee on June

6, 2011, based on the following well-established principles.           First, we

recognize that, as of June 6, 2011, a conflict existed between the laws of

California and Illinois regarding the administration of a trust.11      Because

Pennsylvania is the forum state, we turn to Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules.

See 20 Pa.C.S. §§ 711(3), (12) (granting the orphans’ court with exclusive

and mandatory jurisdiction over matters regarding the administration of an

inter vivos trust and the appointment/removal of a trust fiduciary); Melmark,

Inc. v. Schutt By and Through Schutt, 206 A.3d 1096, 1104 (Pa. 2019)

(“Courts conduct a choice-of-law analysis under the choice-of-law rules of the

forum state.”). “As a general rule, the law of the chosen forum governs all

procedural matters.       A dispute concerning the applicable substantive law,

however, compels a choice[-]of[-]law analysis.” Sheard v. J.J. DeLuca Co.,

Inc., 92 A.3d 68, 76 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). “Where the laws

of the two jurisdictions would produce the same result on the particular issue

presented, there is a ‘false conflict,’ and the court should avoid the choice-of-

____________________________________________

11 As explained supra, Illinois law perm,I,itted the appointment of a successor

trustee by the majority in interest of the beneficiaries, whereas California law
required court approval. See Order I at 4 ¶¶ 25-26.

                                          - 23 -
J-A11020-23

law question.” Id. (brackets and citation omitted). However, if a true conflict

of law exists, as does in the instant matter, “the court must then decide which

state has the greater interest in the application of its law, including which state

had the most significant contacts or relationship to the action.” Id.

      In determining choice-of-law issues, Pennsylvania has adopted the

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. Section 272 of the Restatement

provides:

      The administration of an inter vivos trust of interests in movables
      is governed as to matters which can be controlled by the terms of
      the trust

            (a)    by the local law of the state designated by the settlor
                   to govern the administration of the trust, or

            (b)    if there is no such designation, by the local law of the
                   state to which the administration of the trust is most
                   substantially related.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 272 (1971).                “Matters of

administration” are defined as “those which relate to the management of the

trust[,]” which include “matters relating to the duties owed by the trustee to

the beneficiaries[,] … the powers of a trustee, … the removal of the trustee

and the appointment of successor trustees[,] … [and] the terminability of the

trust.” Id. at § 272, Comment a; Id. at § 271, Comment a.

   Significantly, Comment e to Section 272 states:

      If the actual place of administration is changed, either
      because the trustee acquires a place of business or domicil in
      another state, or if in the exercise of a power of appointment a
      trustee is appointed whose place of business or domicil is
      in another state, the question arises whether thereafter the
      administration of the trust is governed by the local law of the other

                                      - 24 -
J-A11020-23

       state. This depends on the terms of the trust, or it may be
       authorized by implication, such as when the trust instrument
       contains a power to appoint a trustee in another named state. A
       simple power to appoint a successor trustee may be construed to
       include a power to appoint a trust company or individual in
       another state.    In such cases, the law governing the
       administration of the trust thereafter is the local law of the
       other state and not the local law of the state of original
       administration.

       On the other hand, the terms of the trust may show the testator’s
       intention that the trust is always to be administered under the
       local law of the original state. In such a case[,] the mere fact that
       the trustee acquires a domicil in another state or that by the
       exercise of a power of appointment a successor trustee is
       appointed who is domiciled in another state does not result in a
       change of the law applicable to the administration of the trust.

Id. at § 272, Comment e.            Thus, under Section 272 of the Restatement

(Second), the administration of a trust will be governed by the local law of the

new state following the change in a trust’s situs, unless the trust agreement

indicates the settlor’s intent for the laws of the original state to continue to

apply.

       Here, there is no dispute that the Beneficiaries changed the situs of the

DFT to Illinois on February 1, 1989.12 The terms of the Trust allowed for the

transfer of the Trust situs and contain no language indicating that the Settlors

intended for the Trust to always be administered under California law. In fact,

____________________________________________

12 “On February 1, 1989, both Beneficiaries and both Co-Trustees executed a

document titled ‘Instrument Transferring Situs of Trust,’ transferring the situs
of the [DFT] to the State of Illinois. The document specifically stated that the
situs was being transferred to the State of Illinois, but, in accordance with
Section 2.F of the Trust, all of the terms and provisions of the Trust Agreement
are to continue to be ‘interpreted’ according to the laws of the State of
California.” OCO I at 2.

                                          - 25 -
J-A11020-23

the only reference to California law in the Trust is contained in the following

paragraph:

       2.F Trust Situs. This trust agreement is a California contract and
       creates a California trust, and all of the terms and provisions
       hereof shall be interpreted according to the laws of the State of
       California, except that a majority of the beneficiaries may transfer
       the trust situs to a more convenient jurisdiction.

Trust Agreement at ¶ 2.F (emphasis added). Paragraph 2.F only dictates that

the terms of the Trust be interpreted under California law. The Trust is silent,

however, as to which state’s law shall govern administration of the DFT.13

       Additionally, we note that as of June 6, 2011, the DFT was without a

Trustee and there were no provisions in the Trust naming a successor Trustee

or providing a method by which a successor Trustee could be appointed. See

Order I at 2 ¶ 14; id. at 4 ¶ 25; id. at 9 ¶ 4. Finally, we determine that at

the time of Ms. Geer’s purported appointment, the administration of the DFT

was most closely related to the State of Illinois. See Order I at 2 ¶¶ 8-11, 18

(indicating that the situs of the Trust was transferred to Illinois on February

1, 1989, and that Mr. Martin administered the Trust from his office in Chicago,

Illinois for 22 years, through his resignation on March 8, 2011). Hence, in

____________________________________________

13 We reject Appellants’ argument that the Settlors “plainly manifested their

intent to select California law – holding firm to California law even if the Trust’s
situs moved to another jurisdiction[,]” Appellants’ Brief at 33, and that the
Trust document evidences “[S]ettlors’ broad and indubitable selection of
California law.” Id. at 32. The record clearly belies these claims. Moreover,
we deem Appellants’ assertion that under Pennsylvania law, “[c]hoice[-]of[-
]law provisions in contracts will generally be given effect[,]” id. at 33 (citations
omitted), to be of no moment, as the DFT does not contain any such choice-
of-law provision.

                                          - 26 -
J-A11020-23

accordance with the terms of the Trust, Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules,

and Section 272 of the Restatement (Second), Illinois law governed the

administration of the Trust at the time of Ms. Geer’s claimed appointment.

See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 272(b); id. at Comment e.

      Turning now to the law of Illinois as it existed on June 6, 2011, we

observe that trustee vacancies and the appointment of successor trustees

were governed by 760 ILCS 5/13, which provided:

      In the event of the death, resignation, refusal or inability to act of
      any trustee[,] … [and] if there is no remaining trustee, a
      successor trustee may be appointed by a majority in interest
      if the beneficiaries then entitled to receive the income from the
      trust estate or, if the interest of the income beneficiaries are
      indefinite, by a majority in number of the beneficiaries then
      eligible to have the benefit of the income of the trust
      estate, by an instrument in writing delivered to the
      successor, who shall become a successor trustee upon
      written acceptance of the appointment, but no beneficiary
      who is appointed as a successor trustee shall have any discretion
      to determine the propriety or amount of any distribution of income
      or principal to himself or to any person to whom he is legally
      obligated.

760 ILCS 5/13(2) (emphasis added).         There is no dispute that Robert and

Lorraine were the sole, eligible Beneficiaries of the DFT. Moreover, Robert

and Lorraine both signed a written document purporting to appoint Ms. Geer

as Trustee on June 6, 2011, and the appointment was accepted by Ms. Geer.

See Order I at 4 ¶¶ 21, 24. Accordingly, we agree with the orphans’ court

that Ms. Geer was lawfully appointed as Trustee of the DFT on June 6, 2011,

pursuant to the laws of Illinois.

                                    Second Issue

                                       - 27 -
J-A11020-23

      In their second issue, Appellants claim that the doctrines of waiver and

preclusion barred Appellees’ argument that Illinois law controlled in

determining the status of Ms. Geer’s trusteeship.      Appellants’ Brief at 23.

First, they argue that “a party is ‘bound by the theory upon which he submits

and tries his case. He may not, at the post-trial motion stage, raise a new

theory which was not raised during trial.’” Id. at 29 (quoting Solomon v.

Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 530 A.2d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. 1987) (internal

citations omitted)). Nevertheless, they aver that Appellees maintained the

position throughout the trial that California law applied to Ms. Geer’s purported

June 6, 2011 appointment, and that it was not until Appellees filed briefs in

support of their motions for reconsideration that they raised the argument

that Illinois law should be applied instead. Id. at 29-30. Additionally, they

suggest that Appellees previously argued for the application of California law

before other courts in related cases. Id. at 27-28 (citations omitted). See

also id. at 30 (“[A] party to an action will be estopped from asserting a

position inconsistent with his/her assertion or claim in a previous action,

particularly if his/her contentions were successfully maintained.” (quoting

Ballestrino v. Ballestrino, 583 A.2d 474, 478 (Pa. Super. 1990))).

Consequently, Appellants conclude that Appellees have waived the argument

that Illinois law applies to determining the validity of Ms. Geer’s appointment

and/or that they should be judicially estopped from arguing that California law

does not apply. Id. at 28, 31. Appellants’ claims have no merit.

      First, as the orphans’ court opined regarding Appellants’ waiver claim:

                                     - 28 -
J-A11020-23

      In making decisions, [c]ourts have never been limited to the
      arguments presented by counsel. Likewise, appellate courts are
      not limited by the specific grounds asserted in the trial and may
      affirm a lower court opinion for any valid reason that is supported
      by the record[.] Scampone v. Highland Park C[a]re Center,
      LLC, … 57 A.3d 582[, 596] ([Pa.] 2012).

OCO I at 7. Moreover, we reject Appellants’ assertion that Appellees raised a

new theory post-trial. The question of whether or not Ms. Geer was lawfully

appointed as Trustee on June 6, 2011, was before the court. The underlying

facts and evidence presented by Appellees never changed. Appellees’ motion

for reconsideration proffered, rather, that the court should apply Illinois law

instead of California law, as previously argued.     The question as to which

state’s law should be applied is a question of law for the orphans’ court to

decide. See Melmark, supra; Sheard, supra. See also Order I at 12 ¶ 14

(“Counsel was given notice and an opportunity to brief and argue whether

Illinois law should be applied to the issue of the validity of the June 6, 2011

appointment.”); OCO I at 7 (noting that the document transferring the situs

of the DFT to Illinois was introduced at trial by both Appellants and Appellees).

      As to their estoppel claim, Appellants have failed to establish that

Appellees successfully argued in a previous action that California law should

be applied to issues regarding the administration of the DFT. In support of

their argument, Appellants reference a federal action instituted by Team Angry

Filmworks, Inc., in 2015, against Ms. Geer as Trustee of the DFT, in the United

States Central District Court of California, in which they claim Ms. Geer

successfully avoided personal jurisdiction “[b]y arguing for the application of

California law to administrative matters that were not directly addressed in

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the Trust [i]nstrument[.]”   Appellants’ Brief at 27 (citing Geer’s Motion to

Dismiss (“Exhibit L”) at 9, Team Angry Filmworks, Inc. v. Geer, No. 2:15-

cv-05880-R-JPR (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 15, 2015)).         See also id. at 28

(suggesting that Ms. Geer successfully avoided personal jurisdiction in the

federal case “only because of her insistence of the application of California’s

laws governing the administration of trusts”).

      Appellants erroneously attempt to conflate Ms. Geer’s arguments in the

federal action with the case sub judice. In the federal action filed by Team

Angry Filmworks, Inc., Ms. Geer argued:

      The Trust was formed and organized approximately 45 years ago
      in the State of California under California law. However, the situs
      of the Trust was transferred to Illinois in 1989. The Trustee was
      appointed to administer and oversee the Trust in 2011, which she
      has done from Pennsylvania. Under California law, trusts lack the
      capacity to sue or be sued, so personal jurisdiction here hinges on
      the contacts with California of the Trustee (who is the defendant
      in this action), not the contacts with California of the Trust itself
      (which is not a party to this action).

Id. at 27-28 (quoting Exhibit L at 9 (internal citations omitted)). Ms. Geer’s

only reference to California law was regarding whether the California district

court possessed personal jurisdiction over her in 2015, at which time she was

administering the Trust from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. We fail to

see how this is relevant to her argument in the present matter, in which she

asserts that the laws of Illinois should apply to determine whether she was

lawfully appointed as Trustee on June 6, 2011, because Illinois was the situs

of the Trust at that time.

                                  Fifth Issue

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      In their fifth issue, Appellants assert that the orphans’ court erred in

finding that Ms. Geer followed the recommendations contained in Mr. Martin’s

February 24, 2021 email to Robert, as to the method of appointing herself as

a successor Trustee. Appellants’ Brief at 42-43. They explain that Mr. Martin’s

instructions referenced the appointment provisions of the California Probate

Code, and that he advised the Beneficiaries and Ms. Geer to consult California

law, “since it may contain provisions on how that section should be

interpreted, or default rules for appointed trustees.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

Yet, Appellants argue that Ms. Geer failed to “heed Mr. Martin’s advice and,

as a result, her attempted appointment failed.”        Id. at 43.   Due to our

disposition of Issues 1 and 3, in which we determine that the orphans’ court

properly applied Illinois law in reaching its decision that Ms. Geer was lawfully

appointed as Trustee of the DFT, we deem this claim to be moot. See Orfield

v. Weindel, 52 A.3d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“Our Courts cannot decide

moot or abstract questions….”) (citation omitted).

                                 Fourth Issue

      In their fourth issue, Appellants claim that the orphans’ court erred in

determining that Pennsylvania law controlled the administration of the Trust

following Ms. Geer’s appointment as Trustee on June 6, 2011, and that the

Beneficiaries’ attempt to remove Ms. Geer from her position as Trustee was

therefore unsuccessful under Pennsylvania law. Appellants’ Brief at 45. In

the argument section of their brief, Appellants merely incorporate their

argument regarding issue three – that California law governs the issue of

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whether Ms. Geer was lawfully appointed as Trustee of the DFT – by reference,

see id., and they state: “The identical analysis commands that the laws of

California – and not Pennsylvania law – govern the question of whether the

Beneficiaries’ efforts to terminate [Ms.] Geer’s association with the DFT were

effective.” Id. No relief is due on this claim.

      As the orphans’ court found, immediately following Ms. Geer’s June 6,

2011 appointment,

      with the permission and consent of both Beneficiaries, [Ms.] Geer
      began administering the [DFT] from the office of Geer and
      Herman, P.C.[,] located in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.
      Pennsylvania income tax returns were filed on behalf of the [DFT]
      by [Ms.] Geer as Trustee for the [DFT] in the years 2011, 2012,
      2013, 2014, 2015[,] and 2016. A Trust bank account was opened
      in Pennsylvania. All Trust business was conducted by [Ms.] Geer
      from her offices in Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.

Order I at 5 ¶ 29. “Following June 6, 2011, no further Trust business was

conducted from the [S]tate of Illinois or California. Following June 6, 2011,

the [DFT] was administered solely from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.”

Id. at 10 ¶ 8. Hence, the orphans’ court concluded that “[a]fter [Ms.] Geer’s

… appointment as Trustee on June 6, 2011, the situs of the Trust was in the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the laws of Pennsylvania govern[ed] the

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administration of the Trust.” Id. at 10-11 ¶ 9.14, 15 We agree. See Sheard,

supra; Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 272(b).

       Accordingly, we look to the laws of Pennsylvania as they existed at the

time of the Beneficiaries’ writing dated August 26, 2018, to determine whether

their attempt to remove Ms. Geer from her position as Trustee was

successful.16    There is no provision under Pennsylvania law empowering a

majority of the beneficiaries to remove a trustee on their own. See Order I

at 12 ¶ 15. Rather, a trustee may only be removed by the court. See 20

Pa.C.S. § 7766(a) (“The settlor, a co[-]trustee[,] or a beneficiary may request

the court to remove a trustee or a trustee may be removed by the court on

its own initiative.”); 20 Pa.C.S. § 7766(b) (indicating the circumstances under

which the court may remove a trustee).             Here, no action was filed by the

Beneficiaries seeking a court order to remove Ms. Geer as Trustee. Order I at

12 ¶ 16. Thus, the orphans’ court properly concluded that the Beneficiaries’

____________________________________________

14 See also id. at 11 ¶ 9 (noting that “[t]he interpretation of the terms of the

Trust continue to be interpreted according to California law”).

15 The orphans’ court also pointed to Judge Klein’s July 11, 2019 ruling in the

Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, in which he declared that
California no longer had jurisdiction over the Trust and that the principal place
of the Trust administration was Pennsylvania. Id. at 11 ¶ 11. “The Trustee
and the Beneficiaries participated in the case before Judge Klein and are bound
by this ruling.” Id.

16 See Order I at 6 ¶ 36 (“On August 26, 2018, Lorraine … and Robert … sent

written notice to [Ms.] Geer that she was no longer representing the [DFT] as
Trustee.”).

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writing of August 26, 2018, did not remove Ms. Geer as Trustee of the DFT.

Id. at 12 ¶ 15.

                      Sixth, Seventh, & Eighth Issues

      Appellants’ sixth, seventh, and eighth issues concern alleged errors

regarding the orphans’ court’s January 12, 2022 order declaring that Mr. Fox

resigned from his position as Trustee of the DFT on May 4, 2011, that he never

acted in this capacity as Trustee prior to tendering his resignation, and

enjoining Appellants and Mr. Fox from “representing or holding out to any

person or entity or governmental agency or court that [Mr.] Fox is now or at

any time has been Trustee for the [DFT].” Order II at 2-3.

      Regarding Appellants’ sixth and seventh issues, Appellants assert that

the orphans’ court’s decision to enjoin Mr. Fox from serving as the DFT’s

Trustee was “surprising” and that its finding that Mr. Fox is not a Trustee of

the DFT “lacks any factual support or legal basis.” Appellants’ Brief at 47-48.

After noting that Mr. Fox was expressly named in the terms of the Amended

Trust as the successor Trustee to Mr. Martin and that the record reflects Mr.

Fox’s acceptance of that appointment, Appellants puzzlingly contend that Mr.

Fox “had not accepted a position as [T]rustee of the DFT” and, therefore, “the

concept of ‘resignation’ simply did not fit.” Id. at 49-51 (citing Order II at 2

¶ 12 (finding that Mr. Fox sent a notice of resignation from his position as

Successor Trustee on May 4, 2011, and that Mr. Fox never acted as Trustee

of the DFT)).     Moreover, they aver that “upon its own terms, [Mr.] Fox’s

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purported resignation had not been irrevocable…. Thus, [Mr.] Fox’s execution

of a ‘Trustee Resignation’ is of no moment.” Id. at 51. Appellants provide no

legal support or analysis for these contentions; thus, we deem these issues

waived. See In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“When an

appellant fails to develop his issue in an argument and fails to cite any legal

authority, the issue is waived. [M]ere issue spotting without analysis or legal

citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate review of a matter.”)

(citations omitted).

      Nevertheless, even if Appellants had not waived these claims, we would

deem the orphans’ court’s January 12, 2022 decision to be supported by the

record. The orphans’ court found that “[Mr.] Fox never acted in [the] capacity

as Trustee and took no official actions on behalf of the [DFT] prior to tendering

his resignation on May 4, 2011.”      Order II at 2 ¶ 3.    Notwithstanding, on

October 29, 2020, Mr. Fox, “claiming to be the Trustee of the [DFT],” along

with Lorraine and Robert, filed an ex parte petition in the Superior Court of

California for the County of San Mateo, without notice to Appellees, seeking

termination of the DFT and distribution of all Trust assets to the Beneficiaries.

Id. at 2 ¶ 5. Their petition also failed to inform the San Mateo, California

court that the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles had

previously determined the State of California lacked jurisdiction over the DFT.

Id. The orphans’ court further explained:

      [Mr.] Fox, acting in concert with the Beneficiaries, had attempted
      to usurp the jurisdiction of the Lawrence County Court of Common
      Pleas by participating in a surreptitious filing of ex parte petitions

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       in the State of California while the above[-]captioned case was
       pending before this court. The Beneficiaries and [Mr.] Fox
       attempted to obtain court orders from two separate California
       courts to terminate the Trust and to declare a retroactive
       distribution of all Trust assets to the Beneficiaries. This was done
       in spite of the fact that the Beneficiaries had requested and
       obtained a court order in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence
       County, Pennsylvania that enjoined any distribution, transfer or
       encumbrance of Trust assets. An order enjoining the Beneficiaries
       and [Mr.] Fox from holding [Mr.] Fox out as the Trustee to third
       parties and enjoining them from taking any action in the name of
       the Trust[] was necessary to enforce this court’s finding of January
       11, 2022[,] that [Ms.] Geer had been lawfully appointed Trustee
       of the [DFT] on June 6, 2011[,] and that she had not been
       removed as Trustee, and therefore continued to be the Trustee of
       the [DFT].

OCO II at 7-8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       In their eighth issue, Appellants claim that the orphans’ court lacked

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Fox and, therefore, “it lacked the authority to

order him to do or not do anything.” Appellants’ Brief at 52 (citations to record

omitted). They claim Mr. Fox only specially appeared in this case through

counsel with the caveat that he did not consent to the orphans’ court’s

jurisdiction. Id. (citation omitted). Other than providing a single citation to

King v. Detroit Tool Co., 682 A.2d 313, 314 (Pa. Super. 1996),17 Appellants

fail to provide any legal authority or meaningful analysis in support of their

claim. It is not our job to develop this argument on behalf of Appellants. See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). Thus, we

deem this issue waived. See In re S.T.S., Jr., supra; Lackner v. Glosser,

892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (explaining that arguments which are

____________________________________________

17 Appellants provide no explanation as to how King applies to this case.

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not appropriately developed are waived on appeal; arguments that are not

appropriately developed include those where the party has failed to cite

relevant authority in support of his contention).

       Even if Appellants had preserved this claim, we would conclude that no

relief is due. As the orphans’ court explained in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

       While Pa.R.C[iv].P. 1012[(a)] states that a party may enter a
       written appearance and that doing so does not constitute a waiver
       of the right to raise any defense including question of jurisdiction
       or venue, [Mr.] Fox did much more than just enter a general
       appearance through his attorney[,] Jennifer Mihok. Had he
       merely filed an appearance and filed a motion challenging the
       jurisdiction of the Lawrence County Court over the administration
       of the Trust, [Mr.] Fox may not have submitted himself to the
       personal jurisdiction of the [c]ourt. However, [Mr.] Fox did not
       only file an appearance and challenge jurisdiction, he conducted a
       substantive and affirmative act by claiming to be the Trustee of
       the [DFT] and filing a praecipe to discontinue the action that [Ms.]
       Geer had filed.[18] This is not a case in which [Mr.] Fox had been
       brought into the case as either a defendant or as a respondent to
       a claim or petition by another party. Rather, [Mr.] Fox inserted
       himself into the case and directed the Prothonotary to discontinue
       a case that he had not initiated. By conducting this act, [Mr.] Fox
       submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Lawrence County Court
       of Common Pleas.

OCO II at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

                                      Ninth Issue

       Appellants appear to have abandoned their final claim regarding the

orphans’ court’s finding that a California court had determined California did
____________________________________________

18 “[A] written appearance, in and of itself, does not constitute a waiver of the

right to raise jurisdictional questions.” O’Barto v. Glossers Stores, Inc.,
324 A.2d 474, 475 (Pa. Super. 1974) (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 1012). “However,
when a party takes some other and further action to the merits of a case, a
waiver may be found.” Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted).

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not have jurisdiction over the DFT, as there is no discussion or legal analysis

of this issue whatsoever in their brief. Hence, we are constrained to deem

this issue waived. See Estate of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (stating that the Rules of Appellate Procedure make clear that

an appellant must support each question raised by discussion and analysis of

pertinent authority; absent a reasoned discussion of the laws in an appellate

brief,    this   Court’s   ability   to   provide   appellate   review   is   hampered,

necessitating waiver of the issue on appeal).

         Nevertheless, even if Appellants had preserved this issue, we would

agree with the orphans’ court that Judge Klein’s July 11, 2019 order stating

         that the situs of the Trust had long been removed from the State
         of California, that the Trust had for years been administered in the
         Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, that the [DFT] no longer had any
         substantive connection with the State of California, and that
         California had no jurisdiction over [Ms.] Geer or the [DFT] …
         speaks for itself.

OCO II at 8.

         Accordingly, we affirm the orders entered by the orphans’ court on

January 11 and 12, 2022.

         Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2023

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