Court Opinion

ID: 9528659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:42:50.110472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:11.126629
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court, which did an exceptional job explaining its decision. The court clearly did not abuse its discretion here. The court meticulously crafted a fair dissolution judgment. The majority creates a magical new law and is second-guessing the trial court, which is inappropriate: “Of course, that does not mean that trial courts can do whatever they please in awarding maintenance. It is important that reviewing courts have some ability to maintain control of and clarify the legal principles underlying maintenance awards.” 383 Ill. App. 3d at 390. This trial court did not do whatever it pleased. The trial court followed the law and should be affirmed. The trial court’s award of maintenance and a property settlement in this high-income family does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The amount of a maintenance award lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court must not reverse that decision unless it was an abuse of discretion. Selinger, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 619, 814 N.E.2d at 161. “An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 972, 605 N.E.2d at 675. Section 504 of the Dissolution Act (750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2004)) sets forth factors the trial court is to consider when fashioning a maintenance award. In considering the factors, the court is not required to give them equal weight “so long as the balance struck by the court is reasonable under the circumstances.” In re Marriage of Miller, 231 Ill. App. 3d 480, 485, 595 N.E.2d 1349, 1353 (1992). “Although the trial court must consider all the relevant statutory factors, it need not make specific findings as to the reasons for its decisions.” In re Marriage of Reynard, 378 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1004, 883 N.E.2d 535, 541 (2008) (Reynard II). David argues the trial court improperly fashioned its maintenance award in an attempt to equalize the parties’ disposable net income. “Neither the Dissolution Act nor Illinois case law requires the equalization of [disposable] incomes.” Reynard I, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 791, 801 N.E.2d at 596. However, equalization of parties’ incomes may be appropriate in some cases. Reynard I, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 801 N.E.2d at 596. “The benchmark for determination of maintenance is the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking maintenance in view of the standard of living established during the marriage.” (Emphases added.) Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 972, 605 N.E.2d at 676. While one goal is for the formerly dependent spouse to become financially independent, “the trial court should bear in mind that financial independence does not mean the ability to merely meet one’s minimum requirements, but entails the ability to earn an income which will provide a standard of living similar to that enjoyed during the marriage.” (Emphasis added.) In re Marriage of Sisul, 234 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1039-40, 600 N.E.2d 86, 88 (1992). The trial court equalized the distribution of marital property. However, contrary to David’s claims that the court equalized the parties’ disposable net incomes, the court specifically stated it did not fashion its maintenance award to equalize the parties’ disposable income. Regardless, whether the court equalized the parties’ disposable income is irrelevant because, as stated, equalizing parties’ incomes may be appropriate in some cases. Reynard I, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 801 N.E.2d at 596. The real question is whether the amount of maintenance is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in section 504 of the Dissolution Act and the standard of living established during the marriage. The trial court’s November 2006 letter ruling shows the court considered the appropriate factors. The court’s initial letter ruling correctly stated it was within the court’s discretion to look “beyond the basic needs of the parties and allow for additional, discretionary income, particularly in a marriage of this duration with the amount of income available for the [c]ourt’s consideration.” The court noted that (1) Lela was 52 years of age and does not have a college education; (2) the years spent establishing the business were a joint effort; (3) while David acted as primary breadwinner, Lela acted as primary caregiver to their daughters; (4) Lela’s involvement in the workforce came to an end when she became primary caregiver to their granddaughter Olivia; (5) Lela currently generates no income but gets support from David in the amount of $5,400 per month and by his payment of the mortgage on her house; (6) Lela estimates future expenses at $9,000 per month; (7) Lela hopes to generate $20,000 per year after reestablishing herself in the real-estate business; (8) after combining David’s three financial affairs affidavits, David has a monthly surplus of over $14,000 even after paying monthly expenses on behalf of Lela; and (9) the parties enjoyed a good standard of living. The court noted that Lela will never produce the type of income David produces. Further, David’s exhibit Nos. A and B fail to take into consideration the considerable tax deduction he will receive for making $150,000 in maintenance payments and the tax consequences to Lela. Finally, David in large part controls how much income he receives and will control how much rental income Lela receives and, in fact, has indicated he intends to move the business from the property awarded to Lela. As he testified, he has left large amounts of profit in the business. This couple lived a very nice lifestyle. They enjoyed substantial income. While David was the primary breadwinner, Lela had a substantial part in helping get the business started. She was the primary caregiver to their children and later to their granddaughter. Because of Lela’s sacrifices and significant contributions to the family, David has a much greater earning capacity than does Lela. “It is inequitable upon dissolution to saddle a party with the burden of her reduced earning potential and to allow the other party to continue in the advantageous position he reached through their joint efforts.” Reynard I, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 801 N.E.2d at 596. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Lela $12,500 per month in maintenance for 111 months where the parties enjoyed a high standard of living and there is sufficient income to sustain that standard for both parties. The majority outrageously claims, “Lela made important contributions to the business in its early years, but she has been compensated for those contributions.” 383 Ill. App. 3d at 391. Au contraire, Lela has not been compensated for those contributions. She created that family business side by side with her husband since high school. David and Lela even worked for nothing for years to get that business off the ground. Lela also worked for years as a grocery store clerk to provide the family health insurance. Lela gave up a career in education to work for her family, to raise her family, and to raise a disabled granddaughter, all with David’s agreement and encouragement. Lela gave up no less than the wives in Rubinstein and Mayhall, and she was just as disadvantaged by the marriage in comparison to David as were those wives in comparison to their husbands. She is a 52-year-old uneducated woman in the process of obtaining a real-estate license, hoping to earn $20,000 a year. David, on the other hand, earns $31,124 per month, and the business retains earnings regularly on a yearly basis in excess of half a million dollars. Lela deserves more than a property settlement. Lela deserves the maintenance the trial court awarded to sustain her lifestyle. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.