Court Opinion

ID: 9683426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:28:20.798668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:47.758203
License: Public Domain

SPECTOR, Justice,
dissenting.
Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed that the insurance policy at issue in this ease covered Kelly McKee’s claim. Nevertheless, this Court concludes that the disputed policy provisions lend themselves to only one reasonable interpretation so that Kelly’s claims are not covered. 943 S.W.2d at 459. Because I believe that the policy is ambiguous, I dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, we determine whether a contract is ambiguous by examining the contract in light of the circumstances present at the time the parties entered into it. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996). In this case, the named insured under the policy in question was a corporation solely owned by Gerald McKee.1 The uninsured motorist and personal injury protection endorsements under which Kelly sought coverage applied to “family member” claims. The court of appeals and, presumably, the trial court concluded that the policy was ambiguous under the circumstances present at the time these endorsements were added to the policy. I agree that, in light of Gerald McKee’s sole ownership of the corporation, the “family member” language in the PIP and UM/UIM endorsements created an ambiguity. Accord Hager v. American W. Ins. Co., 732 F.Supp. 1072, 1075 (D.Mont.1989) (“family member” language in policy issued to closely held family corporation created ambiguity so that minority shareholder family member’s claims were covered); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lambrecht & Sons, Inc., 852 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (wife of sole shareholder of named insured corporation was covered under uninsured motorist policy provisions making “any family member” an additional insured); Ceci v. National Indem. Co., 225 Conn. 165, 622 A.2d 545, 549 (1993) (uninsured motorist endorsement providing coverage to “family members” was ambiguous and thus covered claims of brother of sole shareholder of named insured corporation); see also Roepke v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d 350, 353 (Minn.1981) (survivors of named corporate insured’s sole shareholder were entitled to stack coverage because decedent should be viewed as an “insured” under reverse corporate veil piercing theory); American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Stack, 208 N.J.Super. 75, 504 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984) (policy issued to unincorporated trade name business covered company owner’s son’s claim); King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380, 1383-84 (1988) (policy issued to community action agency containing family-oriented language was ambiguous so that employee’s claim was covered); Carrington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 169 Wis.2d 211, 485 N.W.2d 267, 270 (1992) (corporate youth home’s policy containing “family member” language covered claims of children residing at the home). Because the policy is ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of coverage. See Kelly Assocs., Ltd. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 681 *461S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex.1984); Blaylock v. American Guar. Bank Liab. Ins. Co., 632 S.W.2d 719, 721 (1982).
The majority’s conclusion that the policy language at issue here is not ambiguous defies common sense: the two lower courts in this case and the courts of several other states have discerned a lack of clarity that escapes the majority. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for the McKees.

. I agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that attorney Scott Stolley's coverage letter produced by Grain Dealers in response to the McKees' request for production of documents constitutes valid summary judgment proof that Gerald McKee was the sole shareholder of the corporation. See 943 S.W.2d 456.