Court Opinion

ID: 9560456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:49:22.121558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:55.967861
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s order but not with all that is contained in the opinion.
1. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the result of any breath test administered and a motion in limine to restrict testimony about it, on the ground that he was not properly informed of his rights under Georgia’s Implied Consent Law. He also filed a motion to dismiss the intoxicated driving charge altogether because, he alleged, the officer lacked an articulable suspicion to stop him. The court acted only on the latter motion and ordered the charge dismissed, relying on State v. Golden, 210 Ga. App. 800 (437 SE2d 492) (1993). That case reviewed the grant of a motion to suppress evidence.
Although the trial court procedurally could have granted a motion to suppress the evidence it deemed unlawfully obtained in this case, leaving the State to try the case without it, the conclusion that evidence was not obtained legally would not invalidate the charge itself. I find no authority for a court to dismiss a charge because of illegally seized evidence. All of the cases cited by Wright, both in the trial court and here, involve motions to suppress evidence.
As in or similar to the cases Wright depends on, he could have filed a motion to suppress evidence the legality of which was precluded by the lack of an articulable suspicion to stop his pickup truck. OCGA § 17-5-30. A motion in limine to exclude related testimony on the same ground would also be procedurally correct. See State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413, 414 (3) (291 SE2d 543) (1982). However, he did not do so, and his motions of this nature addressed another concern.
According to the statute, a motion to suppress “shall . . . state facts showing that the search and seizure v/ere unlawful.” The movant must state facts showing wherein the unlawfulness lay. Mosier v. State, 160 Ga. App. 415 (2) (287 SE2d 357) (1981). The legality of the stop “extended] beyond the boundaries of defendant’s motion to suppress,” which involved the officer’s compliance with the *209Implied Consent Law, and thus was not determinable in that context. Wilson v. State, 197 Ga. App. 181, 183 (397 SE2d 744) (1990). See also Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 315, 316 (2) (416 SE2d 789) (1992).
Decided April 30, 1996.
Robert E. Turner, Solicitor, Cynthia T. Adams, Assistant Solicitor, for appellant.
Sammons & Sammons, Walter G. Sammons, Jr., for appellee.
Thus, Wright was not entitled to suppression of the evidence on the ground ruled on by the trial court, because he had not pursued such in his motion to suppress and motion in limine, and he was not entitled to dismissal of the charge for the reason asserted and ruled on. On the procedural error alone, without our even considering the underlying substance of the ruling, reversal of the court’s order is warranted.
2. Even if the merits of the challenge to the traffic stop were properly before us, it is unrefuted that it was initiated because of erratic driving by Wright observed by all three officers. An objectively determined articulable suspicion of criminal behavior was present. Wright states that the sole issue is whether police officers are permitted to single out and follow an individual when they lack articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Assuming that issue was adequately presented before and preserved for review, I would agree with the majority’s answer to it.