Court Opinion

ID: 9713857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:19.143798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:17.578189
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, J.,
Concurring:
¶ 1 While I agree with my esteemed colleagues that we must reverse the decision of the lower court, I do so for reasons other than those stated; thus, I write separately.
*1264¶ 2 I agree with the majority’s assertion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its decision that appellants failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that William J. Bahl was the natural or adopted child of William and Rose Bahl. I also agree that 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5102 and § 2107 are inapplicable to the case before us. However, I would contend that under those circumstances alone, we would be constrained to follow the precedent established in In re Estate of Hoffman, 320 Pa.Super. 113, 466 A.2d 1087 (1983). The majority rejects In re Estate of Hoffman, as inapplicable to these facts because ap-pellee should be estopped from denying William J. Bahl’s parentage in light of the Bahl’s conduct throughout their grandson’s life. I cannot agree.
¶ 3 The majority’s opinion, in effect, would create “common law adoption” for inheritance purposes. This is in direct conflict with In re Estate of Hoffman, which clearly established that “foster children” raised by relatives are not issue as defined by Pennsylvania’s laws on intestate succession. See id. at 1090 (The Court determined that appellee was the Hoffman’s “foster child” and not their issue). The majority reached this decision even though Ruth Hoffman DeLong established that the Hoffman’s clearly held her out to the community as their daughter. See id.
¶ 4 Instead, the majority relies on In re Estate of Simmons-Carton, 434 Pa.Super. 641, 644 A.2d 791 (1994), to establish es-toppel in intestate cases where maternity and/or paternity is at issue. However, that case is clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the present facts. The father in In re Estate of Simmons-Carton believed throughout his daughter’s life that he was her natural father. See id. at 793-94. In fact, he married the child’s mother, lived with them as a family until the parties separated, and provided support for the child. See id. The Court determined that the child’s mother was equitably es-topped from denying paternity when she had never mentioned during the child’s life that he might not be the father. See id. at 800. In the present case, it is clear that William and Rose Bahl knew that they were the grandparents of William, not his parents. They simply chose to forego the humiliation associated with his illegitimate status in the 1920’s, and raise him as their own. As such, they were William’s “foster parents,” not his natural or adopted parents. See In re Estate of Hoffman, at 1090.
¶ 5 However, any party in interest should have brought these claims within five years of distribution of either William or Rose Bahl’s estate. 20 Pa.C.S. § 3521; see Deposition Genevieve Friedah at 19. Because the beneficiaries never raised this issue, the lower court should not have reviewed it. Instead of properly contesting the proposed beneficiaries, the parties simply sold the property.
¶ 6 In addition, appellee had at least constructive notice of William J. Bahl’s interest in the property. Constructive notice is what a party “could have learned by inquiry of the person in possession and of others who, they had reason to believe, knew of facts which might affect title, and also by what appeared in the appropriate indexes in the office of the recorder of deeds.” Mid-State Bank and Trust Co. v. Globalnet Intern., Inc., 710 A.2d 1187, 1192 (Pa.Super.1998). Estate documentation recorded in the Orphan’s Court lists William J. Bahl, as the son of Rose Bahl, and proposes distribution of it of the estate to him. Orphan’s Court of Sullivan County, Pennsylvania 44th Judicial District Number 6 September Term 1969. Estate documentation dated August 23, 1988, lists William J. Bahl’s issue as heirs to the *1265Estate of Rose Bahl. Thus, appellee would have had constructive notice of appellants’ intestate claim to Rose Bahl’s farm when they purchased it in 1991.
¶ 7 Under these circumstances, the trial court should not have permitted appellee to challenge William J.-> Bahl’s status or that of his issue. Therefore, I agree that the trial court’s order denying appellants’ petition for partition should be reversed and the case remanded.