Court Opinion

ID: 9907897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 16:02:55.816964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:18:18.087047
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 177
                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                       No. CV-23-300

                                                Opinion Delivered:   December 7, 2023
 MAURICE TRAMMEL
                               APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
                                         CHICOT COUNTY CIRCUIT
                                         COURT
 V.
                                         [NO. 09CV-22-107]

 DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR,      HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON
 ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF       III, JUDGE
 CORRECTION
                     APPELLEE AFFIRMED.

                              JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

       Appellant Maurice Trammel appeals from the denial of his petition to proceed in

forma pauperis in seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. For reversal,

Trammel argues that the circuit court did not provide sufficient findings setting forth the

basis for its conclusion that Trammel had failed to state a colorable cause of action. Because

Trammel’s underlying petition fails to state a colorable cause of action, we affirm.

                                           I. Facts

       In September 2018, Trammel pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated robbery, theft

of property, and furnishing prohibited items. Trammel was sentenced to 240 months’

imprisonment with 60 months’ suspended imposition of the sentence for his aggravated-

robbery conviction. Trammel was concurrently sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment

for his theft conviction and 240 months’ imprisonment for his furnishing-prohibited-items

conviction. The sentencing order reflects that he was sentenced as a habitual offender
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2017). The record

also contains the amended information, which included the habitual-offender charge.

          On October 17, 2022, Trammel filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and a petition for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, and request for

injunctive relief. In his petition, Trammel contended that he was entitled to declaratory

relief because there was no proof offered by the State that he was a habitual offender who

had committed more than one but less than four felonies pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-4-501(a) (Supp. 2017). Trammel alleged in the petition for declaratory

relief filed in the circuit court that because the State failed to provide proof of his prior

felony convictions, the sentencing order should be declared illegal, which would shorten

the period of his parole eligibility. The circuit court found that Trammel was indigent but

that he had failed to state a colorable cause of action for declaratory relief.

          Trammel appeals the circuit court’s denial of his in forma pauperis petition and argues

that the circuit court erroneously concluded that he had failed to state a colorable cause of

action.

                II. Standard of Review, Declaratory Judgment, and Writ of Mandamus

          Our standard of review of a decision to grant or deny a petition to proceed in forma

pauperis is abuse of discretion. Berger v. Bryant, 2020 Ark. 157, at 2, 598 S.W.3d 36, 38. An

abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Id., 598 S.W.3d

at 38. If the underlying petition clearly fails to state a colorable cause of action, there has

been no abuse of discretion, and this court may summarily affirm the denial of in forma

pauperis status. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38. A colorable cause of action is a claim that is legitimate

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and may be reasonably asserted given the facts presented and the current law or a reasonable

and logical extension or modification of it. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38.

       The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to settle and to afford relief from

uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Rogers v.

Knight, 2017 Ark. 267, at 2, 527 S.W.3d 719, 721. Declaratory relief may be granted if the

petitioner establishes (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) that the controversy is between persons

whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the

controversy; and (4) that the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial

determination. Id. at 2–3, 527 S.W.3d at 721. A justiciable controversy is when a claim of

right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Id. at 3, 527 S.W.3d at 721.

A case is nonjusticiable when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect

upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id., 527 S.W.3d at 721. The question whether there

was an absence of a justiciable issue shall be reviewed de novo on the record of the circuit

court. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 792.

       The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce

the performance of a duty. Harmon v. Noel-Emsweller, 2022 Ark. 26, at 2. A petitioner must

show a clear and certain right to the relief and that there is no other remedy. Id. Unless a

petitioner can establish a right to declaratory judgment, there is no basis for a writ of

mandamus. Waller v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 252, at 5–6, 493 S.W.3d 757, 761. The standard of

review on a denial of a writ of mandamus is likewise whether the circuit court abused its

discretion. Andrews v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 129, at 3, 674 S.W.3d 450, 452.

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                                     III. Claims for Relief

       It is clear from the face of Trammel’s petition that there is no justiciable controversy,

and Trammel has no legally protectible interest. Trammel named the director of the

Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) as the respondent in his petition for relief,

arguing that the ADC has denied him parole on the basis of his habitual-offender status,

which Trammell challenges as being illegally imposed. Trammel’s petition assumes that the

director of the ADC has authority to modify his sentencing order by eliminating the

habitual-offender enhancement reflected in the order entered by the circuit court. While

the ADC has exclusive authority to determine parole eligibility, it does not have the

authority, either by statute or case law, to modify a sentence imposed by a circuit court. See,

e.g., Ward v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 471, at 4, 506 S.W.3d 224, 226 (per curiam). Therefore, the

director of the ADC does not have a legal interest in, or the authority to contest, a sentence

enhancement imposed by a circuit court. Trammel does not have a claim of right to compel

the ADC to nullify a sentence enhancement.

       Further, Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief is a claim for postconviction relief

in that he is collaterally attacking a sentence that was placed into execution in 2018 on

grounds that should have been raised in timely postconviction petitions. A collateral attack

challenging a guilty plea, as well as the sentencing orders entered therein, is not cognizable

in a petition for declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 340 Ark. 413, 414, 12

S.W.3d 203, 204 (2000) (per curiam). A declaratory-judgment action is neither a substitute

for an appeal nor a substitute for petitions for postconviction relief. Wise v. Norris, 2011

Ark. 362, at 2. Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief seeks to set aside a sentence that

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Trammel alleges was illegally imposed. Declaratory judgments are not ordinarily granted

when another adequate remedy is available. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332

(2002). Here, Trammel had adequate postconviction remedies pursuant to either Arkansas

Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016) or Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of

Criminal Procedure. However, the time limitations for filing a petition under section 16-

90-111 alleging that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner were superseded by

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c). See Green v. State, 2021 Ark. 19, at 3, 615

S.W.3d 389, 392. Trammel’s sentencing order was entered in September 2018; therefore,

under Rule 37.2(c), his claims that his sentence was illegally imposed are barred as untimely.

Id., 615 S.W.3d at 392. In sum, Trammel does not have a legally protected interest.

       Moreover, a guilty plea is, in itself, a conviction, and an admission of all elements of

the charges constitutes a waiver of any defense other than a jurisdictional claim. Waller v.

State, 2020 Ark. 381, at 6. Trammel was charged as a habitual offender and pleaded guilty

to all the charges, including his habitual-offender status. Trammel’s challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his habitual-offender status was not a jurisdictional

issue and was therefore waived by his guilty plea. Id.

       Because there is no right to declaratory judgment, there is no basis for the issuance

of a writ of mandamus. Waller, 2016 Ark. 252, at 5–6, 493 S.W.3d at 761. Based on our de

novo review, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found that

Trammel had failed to state a colorable cause of action in that he had not stated a justiciable

controversy that would entitle him to declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit

court’s denial of Trammel’s in forma pauperis petition.

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       Affirmed.

       WOOD, J., concurs.

       WOMACK, J., dissents.

       SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Appellant’s request for relief is barred

by article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.1 Because there is not an express

constitutional provision that allows the State to be a defendant in this context, dismissal is

proper.2 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Perry v. Payne, I respectfully dissent.3

       Maurice Trammell, pro se appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

       1
           See, e.g., Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5 (Womack, J., dissenting).
       2
           Id.
       3
           Id.

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