Court Opinion

ID: 9389295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 15:00:29.232775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.442394
License: Public Domain

20-2582
     Maravilla Campos v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                           Kolbe, IJ
                                                                       A206 879 638
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 25th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 9            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
10            EUNICE C. LEE,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   DINA MARIBEL MARAVILLA CAMPOS,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                    20-2582
18                                                           NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
25   FOR PETITIONER:                   Bruno Joseph Bembi,   Hempstead,
26                                     NY.
27
28
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                 Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
 2                                   Assistant Attorney General; Linda
 3                                   S. Wernery, Assistant Director;
 4                                   Taryn L. Arbeiter, Trial Attorney,
 5                                   Office of Immigration Litigation,
 6                                   United States Department of
 7                                   Justice, Washington, DC.

 8         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Dina Maribel Maravilla Campos, a native and

13   citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a July 7, 2020

14   decision of the BIA affirming a July 9, 2018 decision of an

15   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum,

16   withholding   of    removal,    and       relief    under   the    Convention

17   Against   Torture    (“CAT”).      In      re     Dina   Maribel   Maravilla

18   Campos, No. A 206 879 638 (B.I.A. July 7, 2020), aff’g No.

19   A 206 879 638 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City July 9, 2018).                 We assume

20   the   parties’   familiarity     with       the     underlying     facts   and

21   procedural history.

22         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

23   “for the sake of completeness.”                    Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

24   Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                     When we

                                           2
 1   review         adverse     credibility      determinations,          “the

 2   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 3   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 4   contrary.”        8   U.S.C.   § 1252(b)(4)(B).      “Accordingly,    we

 5   review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and

 6   must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant

 7   evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

 8   support a conclusion.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113

 9   (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

10   Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)

11   (reviewing an adverse credibility determination “under the

12   substantial evidence standard”).

13        A trier of fact may base a credibility          determination on

14   “the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written

15   and oral statements (whenever made and whether or not under

16   oath,    and    considering    the   circumstances   under   which    the

17   statements were made), the internal consistency of each such

18   statement, the consistency of such statements with other

19   evidence of record . . ., and any inaccuracies or falsehoods

20   in   such       statements,     without    regard    to   whether      an

21   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

                                          3
 1   the applicant’s claim.”       8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).               “We

2    defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

3    the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

4    reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

5    ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

6    2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.                 In this case,

7    substantial       evidence    supports        the     agency’s      adverse

 8   credibility determination.

 9         Maravilla Campos alleged in her application and testimony

10   that a man attempted to rape her because of her membership in

11   the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (“FMLN”).                     In

12   contrast,    at   her    credible   fear    interview,      she    said    she

13   believed the man tried to rape her because she is an orphan

14   and has no protection.         At the interview, she answered no

15   when asked if she feared something would happen to her because

16   of her political opinion or any other protected ground.

17   Moreover, she testified that a warning note left at her home

18   warned her against supporting the FMLN, but at the interview

19   she stated only that the note warned her against going to the

20   police.     The IJ did not err in relying on her statements at

21   the   credible    fear   interview       because    the   record   of     that

                                          4
 1   interview bore sufficient indicia of reliability.                     It was

2    memorialized in a typed list of questions and answers; the

3    interview was conducted through an interpreter in Maravilla

4    Campos’s native language of Spanish; she did not contend that

5    she did not understand the questions; and the interviewer

6    “explained the purpose of the interview, the importance of

7    providing full and accurate testimony, and the fact that [she]

8    could    ask   for    clarification      at   any   point      during    the

 9   proceedings.”        Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d

10   Cir. 2009).

11          The inconsistencies between her testimony, application,

12   and credible fear interview provide substantial evidence for

13   the     adverse   credibility     determination.         See         8 U.S.C.

14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (noting

15   that the agency “may rely on any inconsistency or omission in

16   making an adverse credibility determination as long as the

17   ‘totality of the circumstances’ establishes that an asylum

18   applicant is not credible”); see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968

19   F.3d    137,   145    n.8   (2d   Cir.    2020)     (“[E]ven     a    single

20   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

21   was compelled to find him credible.           Multiple inconsistencies

                                        5
 1   would so preclude even more forcefully.”).           The agency was

 2   not required to credit her explanation that she was nervous

 3   or afraid to speak about the FMLN during her interview, or

 4   that the interviewer told her to be as brief as possible,

 5   particularly because she answered no to a direct question

 6   about whether she had been harmed because of her political

 7   opinion.     See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.

 8   2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

 9   explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

10   he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be

11   compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks

12   omitted)).

13       Moreover,     she   did   not    rehabilitate   her   claim     with

14   reliable     corroboration.         “An   applicant’s     failure    to

15   corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

16   because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

17   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already

18   been called into question.”         Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d

19   268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007).      Her sister who testified had little

20   knowledge of her alleged political activities and had not

21   witnessed the attack, and an affidavit from another sister

                                         6
 1   was vague, stating that Maravilla Campos left El Salvador to

 2   earn more money to support their siblings, she was afraid of

 3   assassination, and her support of the FMLN caused problems

 4   of a different nature.          See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334

 5   (2d    Cir.   2013)     (holding      that the       weight    of   documentary

 6   evidence is within the agency’s discretion); Likai Gao, 968

 7   F.3d at 149 (holding that IJ acted within her discretion in

 8   discounting      evidence      from    interested         witnesses   who   were

 9   unavailable for cross-examination).

10          In sum, the discrepancies between Maravilla Campos’s

11   interview       statements     and      her        testimony   regarding     the

12   motivation for the attempted rape and warning, as well as the

13   lack    of    reliable     corroboration,            constitute     substantial

14   evidence for the adverse credibility determination.                          See

15   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d 145 n.8;

16   Biao    Yang,    496    F.3d   at     273.         This   adverse   credibility

17   determination      is    dispositive          of    asylum,    withholding    of

18   removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are

19   based on the same discredited factual predicate.                      See Paul

20   v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

21

                                             7
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  8