Court Opinion

ID: 9452988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:59:03.349369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:27.122143
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(Specially Concurring in the Result Only):
Crume’s objection to what occurred at the lineup in his state habeas petition (R. 224, et seq.) was that he “was forced to make an incriminating statement against himself and was forced to incriminate himself by being forced to put on a hat and coat'and speak certain words so as to enable a witness to ‘identify him better’.” Similarly in his federal habeas petition (R. 156, et seq.), Crume complained that what he was required to do in the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Judge Ingraham, the Federal District Judge, made only one conclusion of law as to the occurrences at the lineup, viz: “5. Petitioner was not required to incriminate himself in the ‘show up’ at Houston police headquarters.” The correctness of that conclusion is amply sustained by part I of the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Wade, June 12, 1967, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149. Upon that holding, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
The question of whether the confrontation at the lineup “was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law”, or “that the confrontation resulted in such unfairness that it infringed his right to due process of law”, was left open to persons convicted prior to June 12, 1967, by Stovall v. Denno, June 12, 1967, 87 S.Ct. 1971. That question is not a ground as to which Crume has exhausted his state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Further it is not a ground properly before this Court, because it was not considered or decided by the federal district court.
I therefore concur specially in the result only.