Court Opinion

ID: 9373462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:12.640891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.615525
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ERIC WILLIAMS,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-3330-18-0427-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: August 26, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Eric Williams, North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.

           Katherine Largo Yourth, Esquire, Richmond, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment
     Opportunities Act (VEOA) of 1998. On petition for review, the appellant argues
     that he is entitled to corrective action because he proved that the agency violated

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     his veterans’ preference rights, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 3311(2) and 3319, 2 5 C.F.R.
     § 302.302(d), and another provision that appears to be from the Office of
     Personnel Management (OPM) Delegated Examining Operations Handbook
     (DEOH), 3 by rating him ineligible based only on his occupational assessme nt; by
     rating him ineligible, regardless, because his response to Question #1 of the
     assessment showed that he rated himself as minimally qualified ; by failing to
     place him in the highest category; and by selecting a nonveteran over him without
     following the passover procedures. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 5, 9-
     12. He also argues that the administrative judge was biased because he ruled for
     the agency, declined his request for a hearing, failed to issue a close of record
     order, and denied him an opportunity to respond to the agency’s evidence before
     issuing the initial decision. Id. at 6-10.
¶2         Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fac t;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due

     2
       The appellant argues that the agency violated the passover procedures identifi ed in
     5 U.S.C. § 3318, which apply to the traditional rating and ranking process. Here, the
     agency utilized category rating in making a selection for the position at issue. Initial
     Appeal File, Tab 5 at 49. Section 3319 sets forth the process for utilizing category
     rating, including the procedures for placing preference-eligible candidates in categories
     in accordance with their veterans’ preference and passing over preference -eligible
     candidates. 5 U.S.C. § 3319(a), (b), (c)(7). We therefore construe the appellant’s
     argument as raising a section 3319 claim.
     3
       See Office of Personnel Management, Delegated Examining Operations Handbook,
     chapter 5, section B at 105 (May 2007), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
     oversight/hiring-information/competitive-hiring/deo_handbook.pdf (last visited Aug.
     19, 2022).
                                                                                       3

     diligence, was not available when the record closed.      Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).           After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the appellant has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     address the appellant’s claims that the administrative judge committed rever sible
     procedural errors and to consider in more detail his arguments that were not
     addressed below, we AFFIRM the initial decision.
¶3        The administrative judge did not address whether the agency allowed the
     appellant to credit all of his experience when completing the assessment. Under
     5 U.S.C. § 3311, a preference eligible is entitled to have a broad range of prior
     experience considered, including relevant military experience and experience
     gained “in religious, civic, welfare, service, and organizational activities.”   No
     aspect of the application materials restricted the appellant from considering that
     type of experience in assessing whether he met the specialized experience
     requirement for the position and in selecting the most appropriate response to
     Question #2 of the assessment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 21, 47-48; see
     5 U.S.C. § 3311; cf. Kirkendall v. Department of the Army, 573 F.3d 1318,
     1324-25 (2009) (finding that the agency violated the veterans’ preference rights
     afforded to the preference-eligible applicant under 5 U.S.C. § 3311 by failing to
     consider his relevant military experience in determining his eligibility). Rather,
     the announcement apprised applicants that such experience would be credited.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 47-48. To the extent that the appellant did not consider those
     experiences in selecting an answer to Question #2, that error is attributable to
     him, not the agency.
¶4        Further, the appellant’s claim that the DEOH required the agency to
     consider his application attachments in determining his eligibility is without
     merit. PFR File, Tab 2 at 11-12; Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 4. The
     DEOH is not a statute or regulation and therefore cannot support a claim for
                                                                                         4

     corrective action under VEOA. Cf. Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     117 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 9 (2012) (finding that, to the extent the appellant alleged that
     the agency violated OPM’s VetGuide, he failed to nonfrivolously allege a
     violation of statute or regulation relating to veterans’ preference). Because the
     appellant rated himself not minimally qualified in his assessment, he was not
     entitled to be considered for the next phases of the selection process, such as
     being placed in a category in accordance with his veterans’ preference. IAF, Tab
     6, Initial Decision (ID) at 5-6; IAF, Tab 5 at 10-12, 18, 20-21, 47-48; see
     Harellson v. U.S. Postal Service, 113 M.S.P.R. 534, 539 (2010) (observing that
     no authority requires that a preference eligible be considered at every stage of the
     selection process); Dale v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 646,
     ¶ 13 (2006) (explaining that VEOA does not provide that veterans will be
     considered for positions for which they are not qualified).
¶5        In addition, we agree with the administrative judge that a hearing was
     unnecessary, as the parties did not dispute the dispositive factual issues—that the
     appellant indicated in his online assessment that he lacked the specialized
     experience and/or education for the position at the advertised levels and that his
     application was automatically removed from consideration as a result. ID at 5;
     see Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 113 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 10 (2010) (explaining
     that the Board may decide the merits without a hearing when there is no genuine
     dispute of material fact and one party must prevail as a matter of law ). However,
     as correctly argued by the appellant, the administrative judge erred by failing to
     advise him that she would not be holding his requested hearing, set a date on
     which the record would close, or allow the parties to submit further argument and
     evidence on the merits of the appeal before the close of the record. 4 See Jarrard,

     4
       The appellant cites to Schucker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 401 F.3d
     1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005), as support for his contention that the administrative judge
     committed reversible error in denying him an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence .
     PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-10. In Schucker, the Federal Circuit found that the Board had a
     longstanding policy of finding that an administrative judge has committed error by
                                                                                        5

     113 M.S.P.R. 502, ¶ 11. Because of that error, we have considered all of the
     appellant’s submissions from below and on review, including his May 7, 2018
     response that he submitted to the administrative judge after the initial decision’s
     issuance. PFR File, Tabs 2, 4; IAF, Tabs 1, 4, 8. Accordingly, the appellant has
     not shown how, under these circumstances, the administrative judge’s procedural
     errors prejudiced his substantive rights; therefore, those errors do not provide a
     basis for review. See Heckman v. Department of the Interior, 106 M.S.P.R. 210,
     ¶ 13 (2007) (finding no reversible error because the appellant did not show that
     the cancellation of his requested hearing prejudiced his substantive rights under
     VEOA); see generally Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127
     (1981) (finding that an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no legal
     consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive
     rights).
¶6         Finally, in making a claim of bias or prejudice against an administrative
     judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
     accompanies     administrative   adjudicators.       Oliver   v.   Department      of
     Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980). An administrative judge’s conduct
     during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if his
     comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would
     make fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d
     1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
     555 (1994)).   The appellant’s claims, which do not relate to any extrajudicial
     conduct by the administrative judge, neither overcome that presumption, nor
     establish a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.

     closing the record without allowing the parties an opportunity to submit rebuttal
     evidence. 401 F.3d at 1355-57. Although Schucker did not involve a VEOA appeal,
     the Board’s approach in VEOA appeals is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding
     in that case.
                                                                                      6

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your s ituation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.             5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         7

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                  8

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                      9

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appea ls of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdicti on expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Cour t of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           10

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.