Court Opinion

ID: 9466229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:09:02.961042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:36.861167
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I part company with the majority because I believe that under Pennsylvania law the answers to the pertinent interrogatories are reconcilable.
The jury’s answers establish three propositions that we must accept: (1) the defendant maintained an unreasonably dangerous condition, (2) the defendant did not breach its duty to warn plaintiff, either because the danger was obvious or because the defendant actually gave warning, and (3) the plaintiff neither assumed the risk nor was he contributorily negligent. The majority believes that as a matter of Pennsylvania law once there is adequate warning (whether actual or through obviousness), a plaintiff who is injured in the face of that warning necessarily either is negligent or assumed the risk of being injured. Thus in the majority’s view the answers are inconsistent.
The starting point in any case where it is claimed that answers to special interrogatories are inconsistent is that the court must attempt a fair reconciliation of the answers. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio RR., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963). To do otherwise would encroach on the function of the jury, a practice especially to be avoided in negligence cases, where the jury acts as the repository of the standards of the community. In this case, such a reconciliation must begin with the rules that determine the rights and duties of the parties and the rules allocating the burden of proof on each issue.
The plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion on the defendant’s duty to give warning. Although no case directly addresses the point, Pennsylvania law seems to be that the warning is measured by an objective standard in that it must be sufficient to alert a reasonable person as to the danger. The defendant’s duty is not to ensure that each particular invitee is in fact warned, but rather that a reasonable person would be warned. Cf. Debenjak v. Parkway Oil Co., 159 Pa.Super. 603, 49 A.2d 521 *949(1946) (question of whether warning must be given depends on all the circumstances); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, comment e (1965) (invitee cannot expect special precautions for his safety). Whether the warning is actual or through obviousness makes no difference. Because this tort is not one of strict liability and the defendant only has the duty of being reasonable, that duty is discharged once there is a warning that is reasonable under the circumstances. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 27.13, at 1492 (1956).
As to the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion. Pennsylvania makes a clear distinction between these two defenses: contributory negligence is measured by an objective standard, while assumption of risk is based on a subjective determination. See Weaver v. Clabaugh, 255 Pa.Super. 532, 388 A.2d 1094 (1978). Moreover, Pennsylvania is one of an increasing number of jurisdictions that severely restrict the scope of the assumption of risk rule. Not only must the plaintiff have been aware of the danger, he must have fully appreciated its nature and extent. For example, in Watson v. Zanotti Motor Co., 219 Pa.Super. 96, 280 A.2d 670 (1971), the plaintiff was injured while test riding a snowmobile. Reversing a dismissal by demurrer, the court stated: “Even if it may be said that snowmobiles are ‘inherently risky’ and the danger of ice was ‘obvious,’ [because of allegations in the complaint] we must assume that appellant did not know this. Thus, he could not have assumed the risk of operating the machine.” Id. at 99, 280 A.2d at 672. Thus the defendant has a heavy burden of proof on assumption of risk. Moreover, Pennsylvania does apply its strict assumption of risk rule to the invitee situation. . See Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75, 394 A.2d 546 (1978).
Turning to this case, the question is whether the rules and the corresponding burdens of proof can be reconciled with the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories. This raises two questions. First, assuming reasonably adequate warning, does it follow that the plaintiff necessarily was contributorily negligent? Such cannot be the case for there are many situations in which it is not negligent for the plaintiff to knowingly encounter a danger negligently maintained by the defendant. The test is whether the plaintiff was reasonable under all the circumstances. See 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 27.13, at 1496-97 (1956).
Second, again assuming adequate warning, does it follow that plaintiff necessarily assumed the risk? The majority seems to believe that the warning required of the defendant is of such a nature that it necessarily informed the plaintiff as to each bit of information required by the assumption of risk rule. But because the defendant’s duty to warn is tested by an objective standard while plaintiff’s assumption of risk is subjective, there is an area between the two rules where the defendant satisfies its duty yet the plaintiff does not fully appreciate the nature and extent of the risk.1 The strictness of the assumption of risk doctrine in Pennsylvania means that a warning that suffices as to an invitee may not provide the invitee with all the information necessary for him to voluntarily and intelligently assume the risk. The answer of the jury finding no assumption of risk simply means that the defendant failed to carry its heavy burden of proof.2 It does not follow that *950because the warning, however, given, was reasonable, then plaintiff fully appreciated the exact extent and nature of the danger.
Thus given the district court’s instructions, see note 2, supra, I do not find an inconsistency requiring reversal. Although the jury believed that the defendant did not breach its duty to warn, it also could have believed both that the plaintiff acted in an objectively reasonable manner and that at the same time he did not fully comprehend the exact extent of the danger posed by the metal sheets. There was evidence at trial that these sheets commonly were stacked all over the site without falling over. Indeed, another employee had measured the sheets involved here without mishap and reported the results to the plaintiff. Moreover, the sheets were needed to repair a faulty pillar in danger of collapsing on the plaintiff’s work site, making the need for measurement rather urgent. Finally, plaintiff, the only eyewitness to the event, testified that he was careful and that the sheets seemed safe to him. The jury could have inferred from these facts that plaintiff acted reasonably in the circumstances. They also could have believed that the plaintiff was unaware of the precise danger in this case, an inference buttressed by the prior measurement by another employee. When metal sheets lean against the wall, the more obvious danger may be that the bottom may slide out away from the wall. Here, the top tipped over, and the jury could have thought that the plaintiff did not anticipate that particular risk. Cf. Carr v. Pacific Telephone Co., 26 Cal.App.3d 537, 103 Cal.Rptr. 120 (1972) (plaintiff hurt while working on tree that fell on electrical wire; wire threw tree up in air, which then landed on plaintiff; held: even though plaintiff was aware that the activity was generally dangerous, there was no assumption of risk because the plaintiff was unaware that this specific event might happen).
Because the jury’s answers are fairly reconcilable on this record, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. In the usual case, once there is a finding that the defendant did not breach any duty, that is the end of the matter. Thus in this case, it would have been preferable for the district court to have included in the interrogatories a statement that if the jury decided that defendant had not breached its duty to warn, then the jury should not answer the remaining questions. See Guy v. Rudd, 480 F.2d 677, 680 (3d Cir. 1973).

. The district court gave this charge to the jury:
To find that Mr. Andrasko assumed this risk Chamberlain must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Andrasko knew of the specific risk that the steel plates stacked as they were constituted a danger to himself, and that he voluntarily exposed himself to that danger. The standard to be used is a subjective one, involving the determina*950tion of what Mr. Andrasko, in fact, saw, knew, understood and appreciated. You may take into account Mr. Andrasko’s prior experience and his knowledge concerning steel plates stacked in the manner similar to the ones which fell on him. Mr. Andrasko’s testimony as to what he actually knew, understood or appreciated with respect to these steel plates is evidence that may be considered by you.