Court Opinion

ID: 9844047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:56:41.104498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:27.093288
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(dissenting).
The Louisiana Constitution1 and the United States Constitution 2 establish the right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278, it was held that in the trial of those jointly accused the admission of one defendant’s pretrial statement or confession did not violate the other defendant’s right to confrontation, on the theory that a jury would follow the clear instructions of the judge to disregard one defendant’s statement in considering the guilt or innocence of the other. The recent case of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, specifically overruled that jurisprudence, stating: " * * * we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination * * The Su*467preme Court in that case concluded that a judge’s instructions to disregard this hearsay evidence as to the other accused does not in fact erase that evidence from the jurors’ minds in their deliberations over that accused’s guilt or innocence, and that the admission of such evidence is a denial of his right to confrontation of all witnesses against him.
In Bruton only one of two defendants had confessed, and that confession was used in the trial of the codefendants. In the present case both defendants gave statements, both statements were admitted and used in trial, and the trial judge charged the jury that each defendant’s statement should be disregarded in determining the guilt or innocence of the other. The majority refuses to apply the rule of Bruton v. United States here upon the theory that the cases are distinguishable upon their facts: Whereas Bruton involved the confession of one codefendant, in the instant case each accused made inculpatory statements, and according to the majority “* * * each defendant voluntarily admitted in his separate statement the same criminal conduct recited in the statement of his codefendant”.3
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that these two statements admit the same criminal conduct. The statements reflect different views, different facts, and different degrees of culpability and criminality. The recitals of the statement of Hopper, one of the defendants,4 standing alone, might in the minds of a jury exonerate him from any criminal responsibility under a plea of self-defense. Certainly, when his statement is considered alone, he was justified at the beginning of the fracas in repelling a battery committed by the deceased upon him — contrary to the majority’s finding that his statement, like *469Woodard’s, “ * * * reveal[s] a joint assault and battery * ■ * * ” on the deceased. To be fair, one must conclude that under the facts related by Hopper’s statement a jury could return a verdict of not guilty by determining that Hopper used no more force than was necessary to repel the battery. However, Woodard’s statement is that he held the deceased while Hopper hit him, that they both pushed him down and struck him several times on the head, that Woodard then kicked him on the head and Hopper continued to strike him thereafter, leaving “ * * * a whole lot of blood on the concrete slab”. This statement is totally damning of the conduct of both defendants and takes away from Hopper’s statement any exculpatory effect. To say under these circumstances that the statement reflects the same criminal conduct and, more particularly, that Woodard’s statement was not prejudicial to Hopper, is an erroneous judgment on the facts. However, as I will discuss later, I am of the opinion that the “harmless error” doctrine requiring a showing of prejudice is inapplicable, and I will therefore not ground this dissent upon the above factual distinction.
Nevertheless, even if the statements of these codefendants were similar in all respects, we must remember that more than the mere contents of a statement or the bare facts related by a witness impresses and weighs upon the minds of the jurors. The law as well as human experience recognizes that facts which are repeated may carry greater weight than those related by one witness only. A codefendant’s pretrial statement which is greatly similar to and even supportive of the accused’s own pretrial inculpatory statement tends to verify and add weight to those inculpatory recitals and is additional evidence against the accused in the minds of the jury. Also, an accused has a right to recant a pretrial statement and often does, but such a recantation will be of little benefit if he is deprived of the right to effectually attack a codefendant’s pretrial statement through confrontation and cross-examination. Therefore, even under the facts found by the majority the admission of the codefendants’ statements without the right of confrontation is obvious prejudice which would remove this case from the harmless error rule.
The majority has erred by applying to this case the Louisiana rule for harmless error set out in Article 921 of our Code of Criminal Procedure. We are here concerned with the violation of a federal as well as a state constitutional guarantee, and it is firmly established that in such cases the federal harmless error rule must be applied. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.5 The state rule under which the majority has acted *471says that reversal will not be had on any ground unless “ * * * it appears that the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, is prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or constitutes a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right”. (Emphasis supplied.) The federal rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, which is applicable to this case, does not require a showing of prejudice if a substantial constitutional right has been abrogated. It is not the nature or extent of the violation which is controlling, but it is only the nature of the right denied which is to be considered. As is said in Chapman v. California, supra, “* * * there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error * * * »6
Since the harmless error doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court may not be invoked when a substantial federal constitutional right has been denied, it is necessary only to determine whether the right to confrontation of witnesses is so essential to a fair trial that it 'is, like such guarantees as the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury in certain circumstances, the right to be informed of the charge, a substantial right. The right to confront the accusing witnesses, if not the most important requirement in a criminal trial, is certainly an essential right and a substantial constitutional guarantee, deprivation of which invalidates a conviction without a requirement that prejudice be shown. In such a situation prejudice is to be presumed, and one need not speculate as to just what benefit confrontation and cross-examination might have availed the accused.- Bruton v. United States, supra, having determined that the judge’s instruction to disregard is not an acceptable substitute for the right of confrontation, and the right of confrontation being a substantial right, under the facts found by the majority this case should be reversed and remanded without an inquiry into the question of prejudice or harmless error.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied.
FOURNET, C. J., and BARHAM, J., are of the opinion a rehearing should be granted.

. La.Const. of 1921, Art. 1, Sec. 9: “ * * * The accused in every instance shall have the right to bo confronted with the witnesses against him * *

. U.S.Const. Amend. VI: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him * *

. See United States ex rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (C.C.A.2 1968), which apparently refused to apply Bruton because Oatanzaro himself confessed and his confession interlocked with and sup- . ported the confession of the codefendant. ' That court theorized that where the jury has heard not only the codefendant’s confession but the defendant’s own confession, tlie lack of confrontation is not prejudicial, ; and that Bruton does not apply. This decision, of course, is not binding upon us, but in any event I believe the holding erroneous and contrary to the law of Bruton.

. This statement pertinently reads: “ * * * One of the boys started talking as wo walked out. We were leaning on one another. I mean the boy who turned out to be Beeson [the deceased]. We kept walking toward the outside and when we got outside I asked him if he had been getting any whiskey off the table. We stopped walking and started facing each other. I then heard some one coming up from behind. I turned around to see who it was then Beeson hit me on the left side of my head with a glass or bottle. I don’t know what it was. I automatically turned and started hitting him. I don’t know what all happen. I remember hitting him after he hit me with the glass. The next thing I remember he was down and I was hitting him in the face with my fist. When I got up Joe [Woodard] jumped back. I then said let’s go get in tire car and get out of here.”

. See also Fairy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171.

. See, for example, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (coerced confession); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (right to counsel); Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (impartial judge).