Court Opinion

ID: 9588740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:02.841844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:51.480592
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm appellant’s conviction because, in my opinion, the evidence was wholly insufficient for a rational trior of fact to find this appellant guilty of the crime with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). The mere presence of the appellant at the place where the contraband was found and nothing more is not enough to support a conviction. See generally Blankenship v. State, 135 Ga. App. 482 (218 SE2d 157) (1975); Braden v. State, 135 Ga. App. 827, 829 (219 SE2d 479) (1975); McCann v. State, 137 Ga. App. 445 (224 SE2d 99) (1976). The evidence of cocaine in appellant’s urine and of appellant’s sharing other noncontraband intoxicants is clearly circumstantial with regard to the attempt to prove appellant’s possession of the *819cocaine contained in the “white plastic bag,” dropped by Walls, seen “sticking out from under Walls’ foot” and picked up by the officer.
I totally agree with the majority that the results of the urinalysis test conducted by the Georgia Crime Laboratory “is direct positive evidence that the defendant had ingested cocaine and that at some time within the immediate past the defendant had possessed the cocaine he subsequently ingested.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, appellant is not charged with possessing the cocaine which he ingested but, rather, he is charged with constructively possessing the cocaine actually possessed by Walls. “There is no direct evidence that he had any control (possession) or even knowledge (constructive possession) of [that] contraband.” Denham v. State, 144 Ga. App. 373, 374 (241 SE2d 295) (1977). “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” Code Ann. § 38-109. That appellant was driving the vehicle and was sharing beer with Walls does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save appellant’s guilt of possessing the contraband which was in the actual possession of Walls. See Russell v. State, 132 Ga. App. 35, 36 (1) (207 SE2d 619) (1974); Greeson v. State, 138 Ga. App. 572, 574 (4) (226 SE2d 769) (1976), aff'd, 237 Ga. 193 (2) (227 SE2d 324) (1976). Nor does evidence that appellant had ingested some cocaine within the previous 24 hours, as demonstrated by the urinalysis, show that appellant was a party to the crime of possessing the specific cocaine which was found in the actual possession of Walls. Cf. McCann v. State, supra. “[T]he circumstances are equally compatible with guilt or innocence so that it is just as reasonable to draw one inference as the other, [therefore,] the conviction can not stand.” Braden v. State, supra, at 829. Also see Denham v. State, supra, at 374.
I believe that, construing the evidence most strongly in support of the verdict of guilty, that evidence was insufficient to support that verdict.
Although, as set forth above, I believe that the case must be reversed on the general grounds, I must also point out that even if, the evidence were sufficient to support a verdict of guilty, I would disagree with that portion of Division 3 of the majority opinion which determines that the trial court committed no error in failing to sever the trials so that appellant could call the co-defendant as a witness. As the majority notes, “[i]n the hearing on the motion to sever the counsel for Stevens and Walls attempted to show that Stevens wanted to call Walls as a witness and that Walls would claim , the Fifth Amendment privilege at their joint trial but would testify for Stevens in a separate trial that Walls was in possession of the cocaine.” It is *820my opinion that under the authority of Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128 (218 SE2d 856) (1975), cited and discussed by the majority, appellant sufficiently showed “that the testimony of the co-defendant would tend to exculpate [appellant].” Cain v. State, supra at 130. The majority holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because “there is no indication that Walls would testify to anything other than he alone possessed the cocaine which he discarded. Such testimony does not refute the simple fact that defendant Stevens’ urine showed he had ingested cocaine and at some time in the immediate past, he had possessed the cocaine which he subsequently ingested.” (Emphasis supplied.) As pointed out above in connection with my discussion of the general grounds, appellant is charged with possessing “the cocaine which [Walls] discarded” and not the cocaine which the urine test showed that appellant had “ingested.” Therefore, I believe that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to sever appellant’s trial from that of his co-defendant. However, I would not reach that issue because I would reverse on the general grounds for the reasons set forth above.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Shulman and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.