Court Opinion

ID: 9938006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 19:02:21.202281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:38.446101
License: Public Domain

On original deliverance this cause was remanded with instructions that a hearing be conducted and those jurors, who were excused because of their affirmative answers as to their opinions against capital punishment, be summoned and examined. Further instruction was that the examination should be for the purpose of determining whether or not the excused jurors could, in view of their affirmative answers, nevertheless consider the evidence and instructions of the court and return a verdict of guilty, although that verdict could result in the death penalty, if they were convinced of the guilt of the accused and that the facts warranted a sentence of death.
After remandment, the trial court undertook to hold a hearing pursuant to the instructions. It is proper to note at this point that the judge who originally tried the case is no longer a state judge, and the person who was the court reporter on the trial has not been a state court reporter for several years and his present whereabouts are unknown to the trial court.
So far as we can ascertain, when the trial court examined the jury venire as to their qualifications, the court reporter did not take down in shorthand or stenotype the questions to or answers of the jurors. It is certain that we do not have before us any transcription of the evidence taken on qualification of the jurors. It is only fair to the trial court and the court reporter to state that, at the time this case was tried, the law as we knew it did not require that the qualifying questions and answers to jurors be transcribed unless some objection was made during the qualification. See: Title 15, § 380; Supreme Court Rule 25; Davis v. State, 259 Ala. 212, 66 So.2d 714; and Seals v. State, 271 Ala. 142, 122 So.2d 513. Since the trial, the law has been changed by the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois,391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776.
In the recent case of Beecher v. State, 1971, 288 Ala. ___,256 So.2d 154, this court said:
 ". . . . Therefore, we find ourselves in the position of being aware that the Supreme Court of the United States will not permit the imposition of the death sentence unless an affirmative showing is made in the record that the requirements of Witherspoon have been met. . . . ."
In the case of Liddell v. State, 1971, 287 Ala. 299,251 So.2d 601 this court said:
 "Further, in Witherspoon, supra, the court made it clear, in footnote 22 to the opinion, that the doctrine was to apply retroactively.
". . . . . . . . . .
"After Remandment
 "However, in the hearing below it was shown that the juror Herman Williams had died prior to the hearing.
". . . . . . . . . .
 "Regardless of what might be our views, we are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on matters involving federal questions. Howard v. Davis, 209 Ala. 113, 95 So. 354; State v. Curran, 220 Ala. 4, *Page 640 124 So. 909; Opinion of the Justices, 278 Ala. 412, 178 So.2d 641.
". . . . . . . . . .
 "Regardless of our views as to the soundness of the Witherspoon doctrine, we are bound thereby, and must perforce reverse the judgment in this case because of the exclusion of the juror Herman Williams."
As stated on original deliverance in the instant case, the only record before us of the examination of jurors as to their qualifications was on Audograph recordings which contain many questions and answers which we cannot understand. Set out in the original opinion of this court are several extracts which appear to be questions to and answers by jurors which we understand to be on the recordings. It is clear that one or more jurors were excused because of their statements as to their beliefs as to capital punishment. We cannot say that the names of all the excused jurors can be understood from playing the recordings.
Set out in our original opinion is the answer of an unidentified juror on Side 3 that he does ". . . . not believe in capital punishment. For what . . . ." Later on Side 3, is the statement: ". . . . we would like to challenge Mr. Ayres under Section 55, Title 30." Mr. Jessie Ray Richardson is mentioned on Side 7.
Juror Robert L. Richardson, Jr. was challenged and, it seems, excused because he did ". . . . not believe in capital punishment for rape?" He was examined at length on the hearing after remandment. He testified that he had been a juror on the panel at the trial of the instant case. He testified as to his belief at the time of trial and the time of the hearing:
 "A Well, my position was that I didn't believe in capital punishment in the case of rape unless death incurred (sic) as the result."
He testified that he did believe in capital punishment for murder but not for rape. He testified on examination by counsel for defendant:
 "Q Mr. Richardson, you say that under the facts that any — are there any conceivable sets of facts in a rape case that you would consider the death sentence?
"A No.
 "Q And you reached those conclusions about how you felt the day of the Wheeler Billingsley trial, is that not correct?
 "A I'd say that is when I first thought about it.
". . . . . . . . . .
 "Q I will ask you another question along that same line, Mr. Richardson. If the Judge instructed you in this particular case, if you happened to have been on the jury to consider both the life as well as the death penalty in this particular case, would you so consider it, both of those alternatives?
"A May I ask a question before I answer that?
"Q Yes, sir.
 "A You mean after we had established guilt or innocence?
"Q Yes, sir.
 "THE COURT: Mr. Richardson, it is the duty of the jury, first, to consider guilt or innocence.
 "Q Yes, sir, I am assuming that they have returned — they have established guilt in this case and the Judge says, 'You are entitled to consider the death penalty or life imprisonment'. Would you consider both of those alternatives? If he so instructed you?
"A Not both of them.
"Q Which one would you consider?
"A Only the life.
 "Q In other words, if he told you to consider it in such case you would refuse *Page 641 
to do so — not give it, just consider it, and not just —
"A Sure, I could consider it.
 "Q All right. But, you wouldn't give it — you would consider it, is that what you are saying?
"A Right.
"Q If he so instructed you.
"A (Witness nods head in the affirmative.)
 "Q Let me ask you a question which is always a concern to me about these cases. Have you ever had a fixed opinion in your lifetime, Mr. Richardson, which you thought very certainly that you would hold forever, and then, change your mind?
"A You say have I ever?
"Q Yes, sir.
 "A I'm sure I have. I can't recall just what, but — yes, sir.
 "Q Well, I assume that you at one time when you answered these questions, you thought you would always consider giving the death sentence in a murder case, but you have changed your mind, haven't you?
"A Right.
 "Q So, let me ask you this question. You really can't be certain in this case, then, Mr. Richardson, even though you answered back in '65 as such, that when you got on this jury and listened to the evidence, you still might not have changed your mind, can you?
"A Can't be certain.
". . . . . . . . . .
 "Q Mr. Richardson, if you were sitting on the jury in this case, rape case, and you listened to what the other jurors were saying — I assume that — have you ever been on a jury since that time?
"A (Witness shakes head in the negative.)
"Q Never have?
"A Never have.
 "Q When you listened to — you do understand that when you are on a jury, you listen to views of all of the jurors about different things before you make a decision, is that right?
"A Right.
 "Q All right, assuming that there were other jurors on this particular panel who would avocate (sic) the death sentence, would you listen to what they have to say and consider it?
"A Yes.
"Q All right. Mr. —
 "THE COURT: Would it change your opinion? Would their opinion change your mind ?
"A I don't know —
". . . . . . . . . .
"Q What did you say?
"A Which question?
 "THE COURT: When I asked you if it would change your mind, what other jurors said.
"A I don't think so.
"Q But you are not certain?
"A Can't be certain."
 The witness, in answer to the question: "Do you know of any other jurors in this case that were excluded —," testified: "A I wasn't the only one."
 "Q All right, do you know the names of any others?
 "A No, but I can remember one specific man just a row behind me that said almost the same thing —
 "THE COURT: Now, Mr. Rayburn, you object to that? That is outside of the realm —
"MR. ADAMS: Judge, I — *Page 642
 "THE COURT: — not only that, there is higher and better evidence. I sustain it."
The witness testified further:
"A Judge, I do remember one other man.
 "THE COURT: You don't know why he was excused, do you?
"MR. ADAMS: He said it was —
"THE COURT: What was it?
 "A When he was asked if he believed in the death penalty, he said not in a rape case."
No other witness was examined at the hearing after remandment. On the hearing, Juror Robert L. Richardson testified in the beginning that he did not believe in capital punishment unless death ensued. Near the end, he testified that he did not think the opinion of other jurors would change his mind but he did not know and he could not be certain.
Whether other jurors were excused on account of their statements that they did not believe in capital punishment we cannot say with reasonable satisfaction on the evidence now available to us. The rule, as we understand it, is that the burden is on the State to show affirmatively that the jury was not ". . . . chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. . . . ." (391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777.) As we understand the record before us, the State has not carried the burden imposed by Witherspoon, and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for another trial.
Reversed and remanded.
HEFLIN, C. J., and LAWSON, MERRILL, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX, and McCALL, JJ., concur.