Court Opinion

ID: 9776184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:21:49.440675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:35.295447
License: Public Domain

ANGELINI, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The evidence regarding P.M.’s prior accusation of abuse against his mother was properly excluded under Rule 608(b).
Rule 608(b) provides that “[sjpecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime ..., may not be inquired into on cross examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that this rule is “very restrictive and *409allows for no exceptions.” See Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The Court in Moody, however, indicated that “constitutional considerations are of some import to this issue.” Id. More recently, the Court has recognized that if a conflict between Rule 608(b) and the right to cross examine a witness exists, the constitutional right of confrontation would prevail. See Carroll v. State, 916 S.W.2d 494, 501(Tex.Crim.App.1996). It is this constitutional right to confrontation analysis that the majority opinion relies on. I do not believe this analysis applies to this case however.
The majority recognizes that the Court of Criminal Appeals in Moody “drew an apparent distinction between evidence merely attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness and evidence showing that the witness had a motive or bias that would cause him to lie." The majority then properly states that the Court in Moody concluded, and later reaffirmed in Carroll, that if the evidence would show bias or motive by the witness against the defendant, the evidence should be admitted pursuant to the constitutional right to confrontation. Thus, it is clear that evidence that is excludable under Rule 608(b) is, nevertheless, admissible if it shows bias or motive by the witness to lie but is not admissible if it is merely for the purpose of attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness. See Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.App. — Austin 1996, pet. ref'd) (stating that greater latitude is granted to prove a witness’s bias than to prove a witness’s untruthful character). Therefore, whether the evidence of P.M.’s prior accusation of abuse against his mother was improperly excluded depends upon whether it tended to prove he was biased or motivated to lie when he testified against the appellant or whether it merely showed an untruthful character.
Lopez attempted to prove that P.M. had made a false accusation of abuse on a prior occasion. This was an obvious attempt to use a specific act of conduct to impeach P.M.’s character for truthfulness and not to show P.M.’s bias or motive to lie. The most it would prove is that P.M. had made a prior accusation of abuse against his mother and that the TDPRS investigator had “ruled out” the incident. The majority concludes that the TDPRS report concerning P.M.’s prior allegation against his mother “could have been helpful to the jury, when coupled with the testimony of Appellant’s wife in determining whether P.M. had any motive or interest in making a false accusation against Appellant.” I disagree. The evidence would merely show the complainant had made a prior allegation that was apparently not true — not that he had a bias in this case against this defendant or a motive to lie in this case against this defendant. The majority states the “motive” in this case “appears to be P.M.’s efforts to get attention and his jealousy over Appellant’s recent marriage and a corresponding loss of attention.” That evidence did come in through Appellant’s wife, but had nothing to do with the complainant’s prior accusations of abuse against his mother.
I conclude that the evidence was properly excluded under Rule 608(b) and, therefore, I dissent.