Court Opinion

ID: 9397821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 16:09:08.256466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.961035
License: Public Domain

J-S10015-23

                                   2023 PA Super 91

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOHN COPES                                 :   No. 1275 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered April 19, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005914-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.:                                 FILED MAY 26, 2023

        The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the Philadelphia

Common Pleas Court order granting John Copes’s motion to dismiss for the

Commonwealth’s failure to consolidate prosecutions under Pennsylvania’s

compulsory joinder rule, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. The Commonwealth argues that

compulsory joinder does not apply because Copes’s unlawful possession of a

firearm charges did not arise from the same criminal conduct or episode as

the previous prosecution for simple assault. We agree and hereby reverse.

        For purposes of this appeal, the following factual and procedural history

is undisputed.1 On Sunday, June 13, 2021, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Copes

punched Darryl Marcellus near Route 20 at the Frankford Transportation

Center. The incident was reported to SEPTA transit officers and detectives were

____________________________________________

1   The Appellee, John Copes, did not submit a brief to the court.
J-S10015-23

given Copes’s description and reviewed surveillance video from the station.

Approximately an hour later, around 8:30pm, near Route 24, police officers

recognized Copes from the description and video and attempted to make an

arrest. As the officers approached, Copes fled and threw a backpack

containing a firearm on top of a nearby building.

      At trial court docket MC-51-CR-001474-2021 (“the assault charges”),

the Commonwealth charged Copes with simple assault and recklessly

endangering another person for striking Marcellus. On a separate docket, CP-

51-CR-0005914-2021 (“the firearm charges”), the Commonwealth filed three

charges of unlawful possession of a firearm based on the gun he threw away

while evading police: (1) possessing a firearm while prohibited from doing so

as a previously convicted felon; (2) possessing a firearm without a license;

and (3) possessing a firearm on the streets or on public property in

Philadelphia.

      Copes pled guilty to simple assault to resolve the assault charges. Then,

Copes filed a motion to dismiss the firearm charges, arguing section 110

barred prosecution of the firearm charges after Copes had already been

convicted of the assault offense. After a hearing, the trial court granted the

motion, thereby prohibiting the Commonwealth from prosecuting the firearms

offense. The Commonwealth now appeals.

      “Where the relevant facts are undisputed, the question of whether

prosecution is barred by the compulsory joinder rule … is subject to plenary

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and de novo review.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 212 A.3d 1076, 1082 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

     Section 110 of the Crimes Code generally prohibits subsequent

prosecution of a defendant for different crimes arising from the same criminal

episode after the defendant has already been convicted or acquitted of

criminal charges arising from that criminal episode. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth a four-part test to determine when

section 110 bars a subsequent prosecution:

     (1)   the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or
           conviction;

     (2)   the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal
           conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the
           former prosecution;

     (3)   the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the
           commencement of the trial on the former charges; and

     (4)   the current offense occurred within the same judicial district
           as the former prosecution.

Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 72 (Pa. 2008)

     Here, the Commonwealth only disputes the second element: whether

the firearm offenses were based on the same conduct or arose from the same

criminal episode as the assault crime for which Copes had already pled guilty.

“To determine whether various acts constitute a single criminal episode, a

court must consider the logical relationship and the temporal relationship

between the acts.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 759 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Pa.

2000) (citations omitted). Courts have recognized that although the

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relationship between the timing of actions is often determinative, “in defining

what acts constitute a single criminal episode, not only is the temporal

sequence of events important, but also the logical relationship between the

acts must be considered.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa.

2013) (citation omitted).

      Offenses are logically related when “there is a substantial duplication of

factual, and/or legal issues presented by the offenses." Id. (citation omitted).

Whether there is substantial duplication of fact and law “depends ultimately

on how and what the Commonwealth must prove in the subsequent

prosecution.” Id. at 585. For example, there would be substantial duplication

“if the Commonwealth's case rests solely upon the credibility of one witness

in both prosecutions" and there would not be substantial duplication if proof

requires “the introduction of the testimony of completely different police

officers and expert witnesses as well as the establishment of separate chains

of custody.” Id. (citations omitted.)

      Here, the Commonwealth argues that there was not a substantial

duplication of law and fact. As to the law, the assault charges, simple assault

and reckless endangerment, do not require the prosecution to prove any of

the same legal elements as the firearms charges. In its opinion, the trial court

explicitly acknowledges there is no duplication of law: “Although the elements

of simple assault and the gun charges are different, the gun charge stems

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from facts and circumstances surrounding the assault.” Trial Court Opinion,

9/14/2022, at 4.

      Instead, the trial court’s decision relies on its finding that the charges

arose from the same criminal episode. The trial court reasons the criminal acts

are temporally and logically related because the gun was discarded and

discovered while Copes was being arrested for the assault charges. Id.

      The Commonwealth argues on appeal that pursuant to Brown the trial

court’s reasoning constitutes legal error. We agree. In Brown, the defendant

drove around a blockade erected to protect emergency personnel responding

to a fire. The fire police officer operating the blockade reported Brown’s actions

to the local police, who responded to Brown’s home. While the police informed

Brown of the charges against him, Brown began to walk away. The police told

Brown he was not free to leave, and a struggle ensued, with Brown punching

one officer in the chest.

      Brown was charged with two summary offenses for driving around the

blockade. See Brown, 212 A.3d at 1079. A magisterial district judge

convicted Brown of both charges, but this result was overturned on appeal to

the Court of Common Pleas. See id.

      Brown was also charged with assaulting the police officer who responded

to Brown’s home. See id. Prior to trial, Brown moved to dismiss the assault

charge pursuant to the compulsory joinder rule. See id. at 1080. The trial

court denied Brown’s motion, finding that any duplication of factual issues or

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evidence was “de minimis and insufficient to establish a logical relationship

between the charges.” Id. at 1803 (citation to the record and internal

quotation marks omitted). The Brown panel adopted the trial court’s

reasoning and affirmed Brown’s conviction. See id.

      Here, although the one-hour separation between Copes’s criminal acts

could suggest a temporal relationship between the conduct at issue in each

prosecution, a closer review indicates there was no logical relationship

between the acts.    First, Marcellus never alleged, and the Commonwealth

offers no evidence to suggest, that Copes used or possessed the firearm while

committing the earlier assault. In fact, Copes sought, and received, a

reduction in bail because “[t]he gun was not used in any alleged crime.”

Petition For Reduction of Bail Amount, 10/26/2021, at 1.

      Moreover, there is little, if any, duplication in the witnesses or evidence

necessary to support the respective convictions. For the assault charges, the

likely key witness would be the victim, Marcellus. However, Marcellus’s

testimony would be irrelevant to the firearms charges. On the other hand, the

key witnesses for the firearm charges would likely be the police officers that

witnessed Copes throwing away the backpack containing the firearm.

Similarly, the surveillance video of the assault would likely be pertinent

evidence to support or refute the assault charges, but the footage does not

present evidence relevant to the firearm charges. See N.T., 4/19/2022, at 9.

As in Brown, any duplication of evidence would be de minimis and inadequate

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to establish the charges were logically related. Therefore, we conclude the

trial court erred in granting Copes’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the

compulsory joinder rule.

     Order reversed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2023

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