Court Opinion

ID: 9385182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 08:25:03.332881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:00.463185
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-22-00295-CR

                           JESS ELLIOTT ANDREWS, APPELLANT

                                                 V.

                             THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 90th District Court
                                   Young County, Texas
            Trial Court No. CR11827, Honorable Jerry Ray, Presiding by Assignment

                                          April 4, 2023

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Jess Elliott Andrews appeals his conviction for injury to an elderly individual. One

issue pends for disposition. It concerns the denial of his motion to suppress statements

made during an interview with law enforcement officials. We affirm. 1

       1  Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent
when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
       Background

       Appellant lived with his eighty-seven-year-old grandmother.          Friends noticed

worsening bruising on the grandmother and took her to an urgent care facility from which

she was referred to a hospital. The grandmother informed a physician that her grandson

caused the bruising that was present all over her body. She was moved to a rest home

where she resided at the time of trial.

       Texas Ranger Michael Schraub testified he was called to aid in the investigation

concerning the bruising on the grandmother.        Appellant voluntarily appeared for an

interview at the sheriff’s office at the request of law enforcement. Schraub testified that,

during an interview with himself and another officer, appellant confessed to squeezing

and twisting his grandmother’s breasts because he was frustrated with her and as an

effort to force her to comply with his directives. A video of the interview was played in the

presence of the jury. The statements were the subject of appellant’s pretrial motion to

suppress. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

       Analysis

       Again, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to

suppress statements he made during a purported custodial interrogation. This is so

because warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona and article 38.22, § 2 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure were not afforded him during the interview. See Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

38.22, § 2. Consequently, using the statements violated his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel,

according to him. We overrule the issue.

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       A trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We apply the standard,

as described in Wexler, here

       Next, the provision of warnings described in both Miranda and article 38.22, § 2

are dependent upon the accused being in custody. Mahorney v. State, No. 07-21-00197-

CR, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5300, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 28, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); Dock v. State, No. 02-18-00462-CR, 2019

Tex. App. LEXIS 10123, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication). Custody may be established in several ways. The

one urged by appellant involves the manifestation of an officer’s knowledge of probable

cause to the suspect in a way that, when “combined with other circumstances, would lead

a reasonable person to believe she is under restraint to a degree associated with an

arrest.” Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 168. Under this formula, the manifestation of probable

cause is simply one factor to be considered in the total mix. See Dock, 2019 Tex. App.

LEXIS 10123, at *16. But, irrespective of the means utilized, the test remains founded

upon the perspective of a reasonable suspect, not the particular suspect, and what that

person would have believed under the totality of the circumstances.           And, when

evaluating whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have felt that

there was a restraint on his freedom to a degree associated with arrest, the record must

establish the objective circumstances experienced by him. Id. With that, we turn to the

record at bar.

       The trial court made findings of fact which appellant does not contest. They

included the factual determinations that 1) appellant “came to the interview on September

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22, 2021, voluntarily by means of his own transportation and he left voluntarily by means

of his own transportation at the conclusion of the interview”; 2) “when [appellant] inquired

as to whether he needed a lawyer, he was told by Ranger Schraub that, ‘the door was

closed for privacy only, it was unlocked and the [appellant] was free to leave and do

whatever you want’”; 3) appellant “was not Mirandized at the outset of the interview as he

was not in custody”; and 4) “[a]t no point during the interview did Defendant’s status as

being ‘free to leave[]’ change.” Evidence supports each finding and also depicts the

following.

       First, appellant shook hands with Ranger Schraub before the interview and with

both officials at its end as he left. Second, no passcode was needed to leave the facility.

Nor was appellant at the mercy of law enforcement officials to leave for he could exit

through one door by pushing the bar and another by pushing a button. Third, the interview

transpired in an office, not an interrogation room, during which appellant was seated in a

chair, as were the Ranger and another law enforcement official. Fourth, appellant sat

nearest the door, while the others sat some distance away from him. Fifth, physical

restraints, like handcuffs, were not used at any time. Sixth, no one told appellant he was

under arrest for any charge. Nor was he arrested until several days later. Seventh, when

appellant pondered about the need for a lawyer, Schraub iterated that he (appellant) was

free to leave whenever he desired. Eighth, while the door was shut, appellant was told it

was so for privacy, it was unlocked, and he was free to leave at any time. Ninth, the

interview was conversational in tone and lasted about an hour. Tenth, no coercive

communications were employed.        Eleventh, though appellant was the sole suspect,

others were interviewed as well. Twelfth, the Ranger believed he had probable cause to

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arrest appellant, but no one iterated that to appellant during the interview. Thirteenth, the

Ranger informed appellant that he (the Ranger) could have him (appellant) in custody if

he cared to. Fourteenth, the Ranger’s impetus for speaking with appellant was the desire

to obtain the complete story. Fifteenth, appellant acknowledged his awareness of the

investigation and the recording of their exchange.        Sixteenth, appellant made both

incriminating and mitigating statements during the interview.

       A reasonable person would know that law enforcement officials investigate

allegations of criminal activity and gather evidence which may inculpate or exculpate a

suspect. This is especially true if that person, like appellant, had previously matriculated

through the Texas penal system. Indeed, one could reasonably infer that the experiences

garnered from that event would include knowledge of the Miranda warnings. So, it is

difficult to say that a reasonable person in appellant’s position would be entering the

interview room with eyes closed or under a specter of ignorance.

       Next, that the Ranger said he could place appellant in custody may be viewed as

indicating the existence of probable cause to believe appellant committed the crime. Yet,

again, the existence of probable cause alone does not equate custody. It is but one factor

in the entire mix. Moreover, telling one that he could be placed in custody also indicates

that he was not in custody at the time. Indeed, little sense underlies telling someone he

could be in custody if he already were in custody.

       These circumstances, coupled with appellant’s voluntary appearance, shaking

hands with the Ranger, the conversational tone of the exchange, being told he could

leave, his leaving, and the other aforementioned circumstances would not lead a

reasonable person to believe appellant was under the restraint mandated in Wexler. See

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Dock, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 10123, at *16–19 (finding the interview noncustodial where

the appellant voluntarily accompanied officers to the police station, was told he was free

to leave, and did leave). So, the trial court did not err in holding that the interview was

noncustodial and the warnings in question were unnecessary.

       Finding no abused discretion on the part of the trial court and having overruled

appellant’s sole issue, we affirm its judgment.

                                                       Brian Quinn
                                                       Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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