Court Opinion

ID: 9790353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:04.364165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.091203
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
concurring: The majority opinion fails to explain why this court, without a dissent, upon rehearing has reversed its prior decision in this case, which also was without a dissent. When originally briefed and argued, the issue to focus upon was whether a county, by merely designating a “secondary arterial highway” a “trafficway,” could issue general obligation bonds to fund a highway project without using the procedure set out in K.S.A. 68-580 et seq. The motion for rehearing clearly indicated that the issue was much broader and that our decision affected not only the narrow issue decided but the limits of home rule and the methods of local government financing of highway projects.
*15I agree with the majority that home rule is available to cities and counties in all areas of local government in which it is not prohibited by Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution or K.S.A. 19-101a and in which there is a state statute uniformly applicable to all cities or counties. However, to reach its goal, the majority travels a new path of legal reasoning by rewriting the rationale of our prior decisions on local government exercise of police power and home rule. First, it states that, when reviewing concurrent legislation on police power regulations, the court has the power to impose exceptions to the constitution. The majority then determines that “[l]ocal regulatory legislation [the police powers] is a special area of law governed by different rules than home rule; its origins precede both Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution and K.S.A. 19-101a.” The majority then finds that our prior home rule decisions which used the police power rationale as a basis for the decision are dicta. The majority then creates a new restriction to constitutional and statutory home rule, i.e., the “enabling statute.”
After denying what we have stated in the past about home rule, the majority creates a single equitable exception to a prohibited use of home rule power and approves Douglas County’s financing of the South Lawrence Traffic way. The majority reasons that, because Douglas County relied on what it believed we had said in the past, it is all right for Douglas County to finance and build the trafficway this time, but no other cities or counties can ever again use that method of financing a similar highway I cannot agree with that rationale.
Both Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution, which grants cities the power of home rule, and K.S.A. 19-101a, which grants home rule to counties, state that the power granted is to be liberally construed to give local government the largest measure of self-government. City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 332, 607 P.2d 459 (1980). That requirement influenced this court’s prior decisions on the power and scope of home rule.
K.S.A. 19-101a specifically sets out the prohibitions, restrictions, and limitations to county home rule powers. K.S.A. 19-101a provides in part:
“(1) Counties shall be subject to all acts of the legislature which apply uniformly to all counties.
*16“(4) Counties shall be subject to acts of the legislature prescribing limits of indebtedness.
“(9) Counties may not exempt from or effect changes in statutes made nonuniform in application solely by reason of authorizing exceptions for counties having adopted a charter for county government.”
Limitations of debt, not the method of financing highways, are subject to the prohibitions of 19-101a. The sole remaining question is whether K.S.A. 68-581 uniformly applies to all counties.
A city or county ordinance should be permitted to stand unless an actual conflict exists between the ordinance and a statute, or unless the legislature has clearly preempted the field so as to preclude local governmental action. In determining whether a legislative enactment is uniformly applicable to all cities or counties, such legislative intent should be clearly evident before a city’s or county’s right to exercise home rule power in that area is denied. See Moore v. City of Lawrence, 232 Kan. 353, 654 P.2d 445 (1982). It is necessary to examine the provisions of the enactment to determine whether the constitutional and statutory standard of uniform application to all cities and counties has been met. If not uniform, legislative intent expressed within the enactment will not overcome the constitutional and statutory requirement for uniform application. See Clark v. City of Overland Park, 226 Kan. 609, 615, 602 P.2d 1292 (1979). The majority agrees that K.S.A. 68-580 et seq., the Arterial Highway Act, is not uniform.
K.S.A. 68-581 states:
“68-581. Same; primary arterial highways; designation and financing. By resolution the board of any designation and financing, designation and financing. county may designate as a primary arterial highway: (1) All or any portion of an existing or proposed new county road or highway; or (2) all or any portion of an existing or a proposed new street within a city in such county which is or would be an extension of a county road or a connecting link between county roads. Such resolution shall set out the primary arterial highway designation and its location, a general description of the proposed improvement and an estimate of the total cost thereof, exclusive of any grants from any other public agency. Upon the adoption of such resolution, a copy thereof attested by the county clerk shall, if such designation is of a city street, be transmitted to the city clerk of each city wherein such primary arterial highway is located or is proposed to be located. The res*17olution shall become effective upon publication by the county in its official newspaper.
“The board and the governing bodies of all cities in which any primary arterial highway is located or is proposed to be located may enter into an agreement providing for the cooperative financing of the acquisition of right-of-way for and the construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of such proposed primary arterial highway, including major bridges and overpasses thereon, together with all engineering costs, under such terms as the board and governing bodies shall agree upon. Such agreement may be part of an agreement between the secretary of transportation, the county and the cities.
“The board and governing body of any city wherein any portion of such primary arterial highway is to be located may use any public funds available to such county or city for the construction, reconstruction, maintenance or repair of such primary arterial highway, including major bridges and overpasses thereon, in like manner as if it were a normal county road or a city street, and the board and the governing body of each such city may issue bonds as provided in K.S.A. 68-584. Whenever any such bonds are issued, either with or without a referendum, the board or governing body issuing the same may use the moneys received from the distribution of motor-fuel tax revenues pursuant to K.S.A. 79-3425c, and any amendments thereto, to pay all or part of the principal and interest on such bonds. In the event that such moneys are insufficient to retire such bonds, an annual tax shall be levied upon the taxable tangible property in such county or city in an amount sufficient to pay the principal of and interest on said bonds.” (Emphasis added.)
The K.S.A. 68-581 method of financing the trafficway is not prohibited by 19-101a; it provides alternative method^ of proceeding under the statute and is not the only statutory method by which a county can finance an arterial highway. We have recognized in the past the fact that there is state legislation other than home rule legislation which the county might- have used does not mean the county cannot legislate on the same subject as long as it does not conflict with state law.' City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360, 366, 311 P.2d 306 (1957). A plain reading of 68-581 reveals no indication of legislative iritent to make its provision exclusive. Douglas County properly exercised its home rule power when entering into the agreements and authorizing the bonds to finance the trafficway.
The majority makes the broad statement: “An enabling act is uniformly applicable to all cities or counties if it authorizes all cities or counties to perform certain acts. Such statutes are state law and preempt the field of their application without the use of *18preemptive language . . . .” Such a statement opens Pandora’s box and casts dark shadows on past acts of cities and counties that relied on the language of our prior decisions.
The majority of legislation confers power to act. Are all such legislative acts “enabling acts,” preempting home rule? If so, except where the legislature is silent, a local unit of government’s exercise of its home rule power is reduced to the use of charter ordinances.
Paul Miller, District Judge, assigned, joins the foregoing concurring opinion.