Court Opinion

ID: 9377358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 18:02:39.030624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.654418
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/23 Casarez v. Taylor CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    ESMERALDA CASAREZ,
                                                                                             F082839
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. BCV-20-101255)
                    v.

    EMILY Y. TAYLOR,                                                                      OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Kern County.
David R. Lampe and Stephen D. Schuett, Judges.*
         McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth and Todd W. Baxter for
Defendant and Appellant.
         KRA Legal, Kenechi R. Agu and Eric Sapir, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*
       Judge Lampe entered the default judgment; Judge Schuett entered the order denying the
motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment and to quash service of summons.

                                          SEE CONCURRING OPINION
       Defendant Emily Y. Taylor (Taylor) appeals from the default judgment against her
and from the order denying her motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment
and to quash service of summons. She contends, inter alia, that the attempted service of
process on her by substituted service on a homeless man she occasionally permitted to do
odd jobs for her, occasionally permitted to sleep in her garage, and permitted to receive
food stamps at her address was invalid because he was not a competent member of her
household, as required by statute. We agree that service was invalid, the default and
default judgment subsequently entered were void, and the motion to set aside entry of
default and default judgment should have been granted. We reverse the order denying
defendant’s motion to set aside entry of default and default judgment.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Plaintiff Esmeralda Casarez filed a complaint against defendants Taylor and
Luis E. Taylor, Jr., (Taylor’s husband), alleging plaintiff was walking by defendants’
residential premises when plaintiff was attacked and bitten by dogs that emerged from the
premises. She allegedly sustained serious injuries as a result. On September 9, 2020,
plaintiff filed a request for entry of default of both defendants. It was accompanied by
proofs of service of summons, the complaint, and a statement of damages, showing
substituted service on both defendants at the address of the premises. The proofs of
service included declarations of a process server, stating he attempted to serve the
defendants on seven occasions between June 1, 2020, and June 16, 2020, but the property
was gated; he honked his horn but received no response. On the seventh attempt, he
noted: “[S]aw kids playing, but when I called out, they went out of sight and no one
came to fence. No further movement seen from the home. Possibly evasive.” A
different process server declared he attempted personal service on defendants on July 24,
2020, then performed substituted service on “Occupant, Freddie Herrera.” The clerk of
court entered default on September 9, 2020.

                                              2.
       On December 10, 2020, Taylor appeared in the trial court at a case management
conference; plaintiff’s counsel was not present. The trial court continued the matter to
March 11, 2021, for a further case management conference, noting the reason for the next
appearance was “Status of Default, and [Taylor] to seek legal advice.”
       On January 5, 2021, plaintiff filed a request for a court judgment with supporting
documents. Plaintiff requested over $1 million in damages, including $18,282.27 in
special damages, $1 million in general damages, plus costs and attorney fees. On
February 5, 2021, plaintiff filed an amended request for court judgment, which omitted
the request for attorney fees, lowered the amount of costs included, and asked for a total
of $1,018,567.27.1 Three days later, on February 8, 2021, the trial court entered default
judgment in favor of plaintiff in the exact amount requested in the amended request.
       On February 18, 2021, Taylor filed a motion to set aside entry of default and
default judgment, and to quash service of summons or allow her to answer the complaint.
The motion to set aside her default was based on Code of Civil Procedure sections 473.5
and 473, subdivisions (b) and (d).2 The supporting papers included Taylor’s declaration,
which stated that her husband had been deceased since 2009, she was unaware of the
lawsuit until she received paperwork notifying her of the December 10, 2020 case
management conference, and she was surprised to learn that she and her husband had
been sued. She received the paperwork in late November or early December 2020. She
also received paperwork for entry of default judgment. She stated that Herrera, to whom
the process server stated he delivered the summons and complaint to effect substituted
service, did not live on her property; he did odd jobs for her about every month, did not
always talk to her when he was on her property, and once in a while slept on her garage
floor for a night. She stated Herrera was homeless; he started receiving food stamps at

1
      Both requests for entry of default judgment omitted the request for $5 million in punitive
damages that was included in the statement of damages.
2
       All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                                3.
her address about a year before. He did not give her any paperwork or communicate with
her about the lawsuit.
       Herrera’s declaration stated he did not remember receiving any paperwork while
he was in Taylor’s yard and did not give any paperwork to Taylor or tell her about the
lawsuit. He stated he was homeless, did yard work or repairs for Taylor every three or
four weeks, but she did not contact him to ask him to come; he did not always talk to her
when he was there, and she did not always know what he was doing. Sometimes after he
worked in her yard, he slept on the floor of her garage on a mat. He started receiving
food stamps at her address. He did not live at Taylor’s home and had only gone into it
twice, to speak with Taylor’s attorney about his declaration. His primary language is
Spanish, but he understands some English. Taylor’s attorney read the declaration to him
in English, he understood it, and it was correct.
       Plaintiff filed opposition to Taylor’s motion. She presented the declaration of
James Wimberly, the process server who delivered the summons and complaint to
Herrera. He stated that, after the first process server attempted service seven times, he
attempted to serve Taylor on July 24, 2020. He performed substituted service by delivery
to Herrera at Taylor’s residence; Herrera informed Wimberly that Herrera was an
occupant of the residence. Wimberly left the documents with Herrera and informed him
what they were. The following day, Wimberly mailed a copy of the documents to Taylor
at the same address where he left them with Herrera. The documents Wimberly mailed
were not returned.
       Plaintiff’s opposition included the declaration of plaintiff’s attorney, which stated
that in April 2020, he sent to defendants, via Federal Express, a letter notifying them of
plaintiff’s claim and asking that they preserve evidence. He received no response, so he
filed the complaint. On August 10, 2020, he served discovery requests on defendants by
mail, but received no response; the documents he mailed were not returned.

                                             4.
       The trial court denied Taylor’s motion, finding the substituted service was proper
and discounting the credibility of Taylor’s declaration concerning her lack of notice of
the lawsuit. Taylor appeals.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Taylor moved to set aside the default and default judgment based on three
statutory provisions: section 473, subdivision (b) (relief from a judgment or proceeding
taken against the defendant through the defendant’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect); section 473, subdivision (d) (setting aside a void judgment or order);
and section 473.5 (relief from default or default judgment when service of summons has
not resulted in actual notice to the defendant in time to defend). The trial court denied
relief on all grounds. We conclude service of process was defective, the default and
judgment were void, and relief should have been granted under section 473,
subdivision (d).
       Although we need not reach the issue, we have an additional concern about entry
of the default judgment. The trial court’s December 10, 2020 case management
conference minute order continued the matter to March 11, 2021, and described the
“Reason for next appearance” as “Status of Default, and [Taylor] to seek legal advice.”
While this language implied that Taylor would have until March 11, 2021, to consult
counsel and attempt to set aside the default, the trial court entered default judgment on
February 8, 2021. The trial court may have simply overlooked the prior order, but we
have serious concerns about the equity of effectively lulling a defendant into a false sense
of security, then allowing the plaintiff to quickly have a judgment entered while the
defendant is trying to follow the trial court’s instructions. We will not formally address
this issue, however, because the threshold issue of the validity of service of process is
dispositive.

                                             5.
I.     Standard of Review
       “The court … may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set
aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473, subd. (d).) “ ‘[C]ompliance with the statutory
procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. [Citation.]
Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a
summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.’ ” (Ellard v. Conway (2001)
94 Cal.App.4th 540, 544 (Ellard).) “Where the question on appeal is whether the entry
of default and the default judgment were void for lack of proper service of process, we
review the trial court’s determination de novo.” (Hearn v. Howard (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1200.) If the trial court’s determination requires factual findings,
however, those findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
(Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273.)
II.    Trial Court’s Denial of Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default and Default
Judgment
       Section 473, subdivision (d), provides: “The court … may, on motion of either
party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order.” (§ 473,
subd. (d).) Although the decision is not entirely clear, the trial court appears to have
denied relief under section 473, subdivision (d) because it found the judgment was not
void on its face. It seemed to believe it could grant Taylor relief under this provision
only if the judgment was void on its face; in doing so, it could review only the judgment
roll, and could not consider other evidence proffered by the parties. That conclusion was
incorrect.
       “Under section 473, subdivision (d), the court may set aside a default judgment
which is valid on its face, but void, as a matter of law, due to improper service.” (Ellard,
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) “Generally, defendants have six months from entry of
judgment to move to vacate. [Citation.] But, if ‘the judgment is void on its face, then the
six[-]month limit set by section 473 to make other motions to vacate a judgment does not

                                              6.
apply.’ ” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 358, 369–370.) Thus, if Taylor’s
motion was filed within six months after entry of default, it was timely even if the
judgment was not void on its face.
       Taylor’s default was entered on September 9, 2020. Her motion to set aside entry
of default and default judgment was filed on February 18, 2021, less than six months
after entry of default. Consequently, the motion was timely to challenge a default valid
on its face, but void due to improper service of process. The trial court’s consideration
was not limited to the judgment roll.
       In its discussion of Taylor’s motion based on section 473, subdivision (b), the trial
court concluded the motion was untimely, because it was filed more than six months after
entry of Taylor’s default. That erroneous conclusion was apparently the basis for the trial
court’s belief that, in addressing the motion based on section 473, subdivision (d), it
could only consider the judgment roll and whether the default and default judgment were
void on the face of the record. We must determine whether the judgment was valid on its
face, but void for lack of service.
III.   The Default and Default Judgment Were Void
       When a defendant challenges a judgment on the ground it is void for lack of
proper service, “the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by
proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Dill v. Berquist
Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1439–1440 (Dill).) “[B]ecause the law
strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473
must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of
Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) “An order denying relief from default ‘ “is subject
to closer appellate scrutiny than one granting relief, and doubts will be resolved in favor
of the party attempting to get to trial.” ’ ” (Jade K. v. Viguri (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d
1459, 1473.) Relief is particularly appropriate when it will not seriously prejudice the
opposing party. (Elston, at p. 235.)

                                               7.
       A summons may be served on an individual “by delivering a copy of the summons
and of the complaint to such person or to a person authorized by him to receive service of
process.” (§ 416.90.) If personal service under section 416.90 cannot be accomplished
with reasonable diligence, an individual may be served by substituted service:
               “If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable
       diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in
       section … 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the
       summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of
       abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United
       States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent
       member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her
       office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United
       States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be
       informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the
       summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the
       person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and
       complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed
       complete on the 10th day after the mailing.” (§ 415.20, subdivision (b).)
       The brief plaintiff filed in the trial court in support of entry of a default judgment
asserted Taylor was “personally served” with the summons and complaint. The proof of
service, however, reflected substituted service, by delivering the papers to “Freddie
Herrera—Occupant,” at Taylor’s residence address. The evidence does not establish
personal service. Accordingly, we consider whether the evidence shows proper
substituted service on Taylor.
       “ ‘The evident purpose of Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20 is to permit
service to be completed upon a good faith attempt at physical service on a responsible
person. …’ [Citation.] Service must be made upon a person whose ‘relationship with the
person to be served makes it more likely than not that they will deliver process to the
named party.’ ” (Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Group, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393
(Bein).) In this case, the burden was on plaintiff to prove Herrera was an appropriate
person to serve as “a competent member of [Taylor’s] household.”

                                              8.
       In other contexts, the term “household” has been interpreted to mean: “[A]
collection of persons, whether related or not, who live together as a group or unit of
permanent or domestic character, with one head, under one roof or within a common
curtilage, who direct their attention toward a common goal consisting of their mutual
interests.” (Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 584, 594, fn. omitted
[interpreting insurance policy]; accord, O’Kane v. Irvine (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 207, 212
[interpreting domestic violence statutes].) “This judicial definition comports with the
dictionary definition of household which provides: ‘[T]hose who dwell under the same
roof and compose a family; also: a social unit comprised of those living together in the
same dwelling.’ ” (O’Kane, at p. 212.)
       Plaintiff did not establish Herrera fell within this definition. There was no
evidence he lived with Taylor under the same roof, as a family or social unit; there was
no evidence they lived together as a unit, on a permanent basis, “with one head,” or with
their attention directed toward a common goal consisting of their mutual interests. The
evidence indicated Herrera was a homeless person who occasionally did odd jobs for
Taylor and occasionally slept on the floor of her garage.
       Substituted service has been found valid when made on the spouse of the
defendant at their shared residence. (City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 670, 681.) In Trackman v. Kenney (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 175, the
court upheld substituted service at the defendant’s address on a person identified only as
“ ‘John Doe, co-resident.’ ” (Id. at pp. 182–185). There, however, the defendant moved
to set aside the judgment more than five years after default was entered. (Id. at p. 179.)
Consequently, he was limited to challenging the judgment as void on its face; he was not
permitted to rely on extrinsic evidence that, at the time of service, he lived elsewhere and
the house where he was substitute served was occupied by a tenant. (Id. at pp. 180–181.)
       In Bein, the Court of Appeal upheld a default judgment, finding the defendants
were validly served through substituted service. (Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1390.) Two

                                             9.
individual defendants were served at their home, after three unsuccessful attempts, “by
substitute service on a ‘Linda Doe’ when she emerged from the residence.” (Ibid.) She
then ran back into the house. (Ibid.) Another individual defendant lived in a gated
community, where a gate guard stationed at the entrance denied the process server access
to their residence. (Id. at pp. 1390–1391.) After unsuccessful attempts at personal
service, the process server performed substituted service on the gate guard. (Id. at
p. 1391.)
       The court found substituted service on the gate guard was valid service on a
“competent member of the household.” (Bein, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1390, 1393.)
The court stated: “The gate guard in this case must be considered a competent member
of the household and the person apparently in charge. [The defendants] authorized the
guard to control access to them and their residence. We therefore assume the relationship
between [the defendants] and the guard ensures delivery of process.” (Id. at p. 1393,
fn. omitted.) The defendants “authorized the guard to control access to them and their
residence.” (Ibid.) Because of the relationship between the gate guard and the
defendants, the court concluded it was “more likely than not that he would deliver
process to [the defendants].” (Id. at pp. 1393–1394.) The court noted the defendants did
not claim they failed to receive notice of service. (Id. at p. 1394.)
       In Ellard, the gate guard at the defendants’ residence address told the process
server that the defendants had moved. (Ellard, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 542.) The
plaintiffs’ counsel obtained the defendants’ new address from the United States Postal
Service. The new address was a postal box at a private postal service store. The manager
of the private postal service store knew the defendants and told the process server they
received mail there. The process server served the defendants by substituted service, by
delivering the documents to the manager and later mailing them to that address. (Id. at
p. 543.) The court observed that “[i]t was the [private postal service store] manager’s
duty to deliver mail to the [defendants] as lessees of the post office box. Under these

                                             10.
circumstances, it was more likely than not the manager would deliver the summons and
complaint as well.” (Id. at p. 547.) The court found substitute service on the defendants
under section 415.20, subdivision (b) was proper. (Id. at pp. 545, 547; accord, Hearn v.
Howard, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201–1203.)
       In Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403 (Summers), the plaintiff’s
attorney served the summons and complaint on the defendant by service on her personal
manager, Lawrence, as her authorized agent, at Lawrence’s office. (Id. at pp. 405, 413.)
Lawrence forwarded the papers to the defendant’s attorney, who notified the defendant of
the lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 405–406, 415.) The court concluded the plaintiff did not carry his
burden of proving service was proper. (Id. at p. 413.) Lawrence was not involved in the
transaction that was the subject of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. (Ibid.) Lawrence testified her
service to the defendant was to advise the defendant on defendant’s career choices. (Id.
at p. 415.) There was no evidence the defendant specifically authorized Lawrence to
accept service of process as her agent, and Lawrence testified she was not so authorized.
(Id. at p. 414.) The court also rejected the argument that there was such a close
connection between the defendant and Lawrence that it was highly probable the
defendant would receive actual notice of the service of process on Lawrence on the
defendant’s behalf. (Ibid.) There was no evidence they were in frequent communication,
or had a close business or personal relationship, such that it would be highly likely
Lawrence would inform the defendant she was being sued. (Id. at p. 415.)
       Here, plaintiff attempted to serve Taylor at her residence, but was unable to serve
her personally. Instead, the process server attempted substituted service by delivery of
the papers to Herrera, whom the process server identified in the proof of service as an
“Occupant.” The evidence presented by Taylor was that Herrera was a homeless person
who occasionally did odd jobs for her, was sometimes permitted to sleep in her garage,
and was permitted to use her mailing address to receive food stamps. When he worked
on her property, Herrera did not always communicate with her.

                                             11.
       Plaintiff had the burden of proof of proper service. In support of her claim of
proper service, she presented only the process server’s declaration that “Mr. Herrera
informed me that he is an occupant of the residence.” Plaintiff presented no evidence
contradicting Taylor’s and Herrera’s declarations concerning their limited relationship.
Plaintiff presented no evidence Herrera resided in Taylor’s house with her or lived on the
property on an ongoing basis. The process server did not declare that he served Herrera
after he saw Herrera emerge from the house, or that Herrera entered the house after he
received the papers. There was no evidence Herrera communicated with Taylor
regularly, acted as her gate guard, acted on her behalf in any of her business or personal
matters, or was authorized to receive mail or important legal documents on her behalf.
The process server’s statement that Herrera said he was an occupant does not constitute
substantial evidence that Herrera was a “competent member of [Taylor’s] household.”
We conclude substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that Herrera was a
member of Taylor’s household.
       It has been said that the service of process statutes should be “ ‘ “liberally
construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction of the court if actual notice has
been received by the defendant, and in the last analysis the question of service should be
resolved by considering each situation from a practical standpoint.” ’ ” (Pasadena Medi-
Center Associates v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 773, 778; accord, Dill, supra,
24 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1436–1437.) “Thus, substantial compliance is sufficient.” (Dill, at
p. 1437.) As stated in Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852: “We
question whether service that does not comply with statutory requirements should ever be
allowed to stand, over a defendant’s challenge, as the basis for a default judgment. We
think a distinction should be drawn between the sufficiency of service to support a
default judgment, and the sufficiency of service for other purposes, including to avoid
dismissal for want of prosecution.” (Id. at pp. 864–865.) “The rule of liberal
construction of service rules is designed to ‘ “uphold jurisdiction of the court, thus

                                             12.
insuring the opportunity for a trial on the merits.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 865.) Liberal
construction to uphold a default judgment would have the opposite effect.
       The court in Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 852 concluded
that, if substantial compliance is permitted at all in the default setting, “a finding of
substantial compliance requires three preconditions. First, there must have been some
degree of compliance with the offended statutory requirements. [Citations.] Second, the
objective nature and circumstances of the attempted service must have made it ‘ “ ‘highly
probable’ ” ’ that it would impart the same notice as full compliance. [Citation.] Finally,
it must in fact have imparted such notice, or at least sufficient notice to put the defendant
on his defense.” (Id. at pp. 865–866.)
       In this case, there was little or no compliance with the requirement that the
summons and complaint be served on a competent member of Taylor’s household.
Additionally, the second condition was not met. Attempted substituted service on a
homeless man who occasionally did odd jobs on the property, occasionally was permitted
to sleep on a mat on the floor of the garage, and was permitted to receive food stamps
mailed to the address, did not make it highly probable that Taylor would receive notice of
the lawsuit the same as if service had been made on an actual member of Taylor’s
household. Considering the situation from a practical standpoint (see Pasadena Medi-
Center Associates v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 778), a reasonable individual
would not expect that, if named as a defendant in a lawsuit, the individual could be
served with legal process by having it delivered to the person who did the individual’s
yard work and happened to be standing in the yard when the process server arrived.
Further, there is no evidence the papers delivered to Herrera actually reached Taylor.
Both Herrera and Taylor declared that they did not. Plaintiff presented no contrary
evidence.
       While the trial court disbelieved Taylor’s statement that she did not receive any
papers for this action by mail before November 2020, and implicitly found she had actual

                                              13.
notice of the action earlier, actual notice of a lawsuit is not a substitute for proper service.
(See Summers, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 415; Honda Motor Co. v. Superior Court
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1049 [“ ‘Mere knowledge of the action is not a substitute
for service, nor does it raise any estoppel to contest the validity of service.’ [Citation.]
‘[O]ur adherence to the law is required if we are ever to instill respect for it.’ ” (first
bracketed insertion added)].)
       We conclude that, even if the statute is liberally construed, the attempted service
on Taylor by substituted service on Herrera failed to comply with the requirements of
section 415.20, subdivision (a). Substantial evidence does not support a conclusion that
Herrera was a member of Taylor’s household or that there was such “a close connection
between [Taylor] and [Herrera]” that it was “ ‘ “highly probable” ’ [Taylor] would
receive actual notice of the service of process on [Herrera] on [Taylor’s] behalf.”
(Summers, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.) We conclude the default and default
judgment based on the invalid substituted service are void.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The order denying Taylor’s motion to set aside entry of default and default
judgment and to quash service of summons is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to grant the motion and to set a reasonable time for her to file
and serve her responsive pleading. The appeal from the default judgment is dismissed as
moot. Defendant is awarded her costs on appeal.

                                                                                     HILL, P. J.
I CONCUR:

DETJEN, J.

                                               14.
SNAUFFER, J., Concurring.
       I agree with the majority that the judgment should be set aside but for a different
reason than the majority. I would conclude the trial court abused its discretion in not
setting aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b),1
on the ground of surprise. The court continued the December 10, 2020, case
management conference to March 11, 2021, for Taylor “to seek legal advice.” In my
view, and apparently in the majority’s view also, this would have led a self-represented
litigant to trust that no adverse action would be taken against her, including the entry of
judgment, before the continued case management conference. Yet the same judge
entered judgment on February 8, 2021, well ahead of the continued case management
conference. Taylor would have had no reason to expect that would happen. However,
she acted promptly, moving to set aside the judgment and entry of default 10 days after
the judgment was entered. I would conclude the trial court abused its discretion by not
vacating the judgment under section 473, subdivision (b), on the ground that Taylor
would have been surprised by the entry of judgment before the continued case
management conference.
       I disagree with the majority that the judgment is void for invalid service of process
and thus can be set aside under section 473, subdivision (d), which provides a trial court
may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment
or order. (§ 473, subd. (d).) The majority concludes the judgment is void in that Casarez
did not comply with section 415.20, subdivision (b), largely because Freddie Herrera was
not a “competent member of Taylor’s household” and thus substitute service could not be
made on him.
       My primary disagreement is that the majority does not give due deference to the
trial court’s credibility findings. The majority correctly notes that the trial court’s

       1
           All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
determination whether a judgment is void is reviewed de novo. (Pittman v. Beck Park
Apartments Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1020.) But when the trial court’s
determination of whether a judgment is void requires factual findings, those findings will
not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. (Pavlovich v. Superior Court
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273.) This standard requires deference to the trial court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations. “Under the deferential substantial evidence
standard of review, we ‘liberally construe[ ]’ findings of fact ‘to support the judgment
and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing
all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.’ [Citation.] ‘We may not reweigh
the evidence and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.’ [Citation.]
Testimony believed by the trial court ‘may be rejected only when it is inherently
improbably or incredible, i.e., “ ‘unbelievable per se’ ” physically impossible or “
‘wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.’ ” ’ ” (McPherson v. EF Intercultural
Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257.) Even so, the judge may “disregard
the testimony of any witness[] … when he is satisfied that the witness is not telling the
truth or his testimony is inherently improbable[.]” (Tom Thumb Glove Co. v. Han (1978)
78 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) We presume the lower court is correct “and imply findings that are
necessary to support the judgment.” (Estate of O’Connor (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159,
169.) We also “indulge every reasonable inference and presumption in favor of the trial
court’s findings.” (Deegan v. City of Mountain View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 40.)
       In sum, whether Herrera was a competent member of Taylor’s household is a
question reviewed de novo; but in making this de novo determination, we must defer to
the trial court’s relevant factual findings and credibility determinations, both express and
implied.
       A crucial credibility determination is that the trial court apparently fully credited
Wimberly’s proof of service and declaration, which stated that Herrera identified himself
to Wimberly as an “occupant” of Taylor’s house. The trial court apparently believed that
                                              2.
Herrera told Wimberly he was an “occupant,” and the trial court was entitled to believe
this. In his declaration, Herrera does not deny that he identified himself as an occupant to
Wimberly. Instead, to contradict Wimberly’s declaration, Taylor resorts to the assertions
in her and Herrera’s declarations that Herrera was homeless, had never been inside
Taylor’s house before the day of the purported substitute service, and only slept on the
property in the garage about once a month. The trial court was free to disbelieve these
assertions.
       Moreover, Taylor’s admissions that Herrera had been receiving food stamps at her
house for about a year and that he was allowed to sleep in her garage are consistent with
Herrera being a member of her household. The trial court did not have to believe Taylor
and Herrera’s attempts to walk back Herrera’s statement to Wimberly that he was an
“occupant” of Taylor’s house.
       The majority appears to give full credit to Taylor and Herrera’s declarations,
although the trial court did not. The majority does not explain why the lower court was
precluded from making the findings it did. I would conclude, based on the relevant
evidence and trial court findings, that service of process was valid, the court obtained
jurisdiction over Taylor, and that the court was thus correct to deny relief under
section 473, subdivision (d). But as explained above, I would still reverse on section 473,
subdivision (b), grounds.

                                                                            SNAUFFER, J.

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