Court Opinion

ID: 9397930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-27 06:00:14.88736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:29.003167
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TONYA EVETTE RHODES,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-12-0316-X-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: May 26, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Tonya Evette Rhodes, Seffner, Florida, pro se.

           Kristin Langwell, Esquire, and Caroline E. Johnson, Saint Petersburg,
             Florida, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         In a December 10, 2013 compliance initial decision, the administrative
     judge found the agency in noncompliance with the March 15, 2013 initial

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     decision 2 reversing the appellant’s removal. Rhodes v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-I-1, Tab 48, Initial Decision (I-1
     ID); Rhodes v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-
     0316-C-1, Compliance File, Tab 11, Compliance Initial Decision (C-1 CID). On
     April 13, 2015, September 25, 2015, July 18, 2016, and April 26, 2022, we issued
     nonprecedential orders finding the agency in partial compliance with the initial
     decision. Rhodes v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-
     12-0316-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 5, Tab 12, Tab 30, Tab 46.
     For the reasons discussed below, we now find the agency in compliance and
     DISMISS the petition for enforcement.

         DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE
¶2         On March 15, 2013, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
     reversing the appellant’s removal and requiring the agency to restore her effective
     February 15, 2012. I-1 ID at 1, 16-17. The decision required the agency to pay
     her appropriate back pay and benefits. Id. As explained in footnote 2, neither
     party filed a timely petition for review, and thus the initial decision became the
     final decision of the Board with respect to the appellant’s removal.
¶3         Following the appellant’s first petition for enforcement, 3 the administrative
     judge issued a compliance initial decision on December 10, 2013, finding the

     2
       On March 10, 2021—seven years after issuance of the initial decision, and six and a
     half years after issuance of the compliance initial decision underlying the instant
     compliance referral matter—the appellant petitioned for review of the initial decision.
     Rhodes v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-I-1,
     Petition for Review File, Tab 1. On April 26, 2022, the Board dismissed her petition
     for review as untimely filed without good cause for delay. Rhodes v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-I-1, Final Order (Apr. 26, 2022).
     Thus, the operative decision regarding the appellant’s reversed removal remains the
     March 15, 2013 initial decision.
     3
       On March 5, 2021, the appellant filed a second petition for enforcement. Rhodes v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-C-2, Compliance
     File (C-2 CF), Tab 1. On March 19, 2021, the administrative judge dismissed the
     petition for enforcement, finding it had been docketed in error. The administrative
                                                                                              3

     agency in noncompliance with the Board’s final decision. C-1 CID.                     The
     administrative judge held that the agency failed to adequately explain its back pay
     calculations, including how it calculated the back pay period and interest
     amounts. C-1 CID at 3-4. The administrative judge further held that the agency
     failed to provide evidence to show that it made appropriate transfers to the
     appellant’s Thrift Savings Plan account and her Federal Employees’ Group Life
     Insurance. Id. Finally, the administrative judge found that the agency admitted it
     may have erroneously submitted a debt notice to the Office of Personnel
     Management regarding the appellant’s Federal Employees Health Benefits
     (FEHB) plan and had not provided evidence that it corrected such err or. Id.
¶4         On January 13, 2014, the agency notified the Board of the compliance
     actions it had taken pursuant to the compliance initial decision. 4 CRF, Tab 1.
     There followed a series of Board orders finding the agency noncompliant with its
     obligations as set forth in the initial decision, culminating in our April 26, 2022
     Order, which required the agency to do the following:

     judge found that the matters raised by the appellant pertained to her first petition for
     enforcement or her underlying removal appeal, and forwarded the pleadings to the
     Office of the Clerk of the Board for consideration. C-2 CF, Tab 7, Compliance Initial
     Decision (C-2 CID). The Clerk of the Board construed the pleadings as a petition for
     review of the underlying removal appeal, which ultimately was adjudicated as described
     above in footnote 2. The Clerk of the Board also added the pleadings to the instant
     compliance referral file as Tab 42, and we address them infra to the extent necessary to
     our decision in this matter.
     4
       In the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge informed the agency that,
     if it decided to take the actions required by the decision, it must submit to the Office of
     the Clerk of the Board, within the time limit for filing a petition for review under
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), a statement that it had taken the actions identified in the
     compliance initial decision, along with evidence establishing that it has taken those
     actions. C-1 CID at 5-6; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6)(i). She also informed the parties of
     their option to request Board review of the compliance initial decision by filing a
     petition for review by January 14, 2014, the date on which the findings of
     noncompliance would become final unless a petition for review was filed. C-1 CID
     at 6; see 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.114(e), 1201.183(a)(6)(ii), 1201.183(b). Neither party filed
     an administrative petition for review of the compliance initial decision.
                                                                                        4

          1. Submit evidence that it waived the $74.28 debt it had assessed
             against the appellant for retirement contributions, along with any
             interest assessed against the appellant in connection with this
             debt.
          2. Submit evidence that it paid the appellant $4,366.56 to refund
             her for FEHB premiums erroneously withheld between April 1,
             2012, and May 5, 2013 ($198.48 per pay period x 22 pay
             periods), along with interest, and an explanation of the interest
             calculations.
     CRF, Tab 46 at 5, 7.
¶5        Following this order, both parties filed multiple submissions.          For the
     reasons discussed below, we find the agency has complied with the obligations
     set forth above and in our April 26, 2022 Order.       We reject the appellant’s
     arguments that she is entitled to compensatory damages or attorney fees for work
     performed in non-MSPB proceedings not related to her prevailing clams before
     MSPB, and we decline her invitations to consider claims of error she did not
     timely raise in her late-filed petition for review of the initial decision in her
     removal appeal.

                                       ANALYSIS
¶6        When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it
     orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation she
     would have been in had the wrongful personnel action not occurred. House v.
     Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 530, ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the
     burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. Vaughan v. Department of
     Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5 (2011). An agency’s assertions of compliance
     must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported by
     documentary evidence. Id. The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of
     compliance by making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of
                                                                                       5

     continued noncompliance.”        Brown v. Office of Personnel Management,
     113 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶ 5 (2010).

     Waiver Notice for Debt Generated by Lack of Retirement Contributions
¶7        In our April 13, 2015 Order, we found that the agency satisfactorily
     explained that the appellant owed a $74.28 debt for retirement contributions that
     the agency erroneously failed to deduct from her back pay payment. CRF, Tab 5
     at 9. However, in our September 25, 2015 Order, we found that the agency had
     failed to submit evidence that it provided her any applicable notice and
     opportunity to request waiver of this debt mandated by her collective bargaining
     agreement. CRF, Tab 12 at 8-9. In our April 26, 2022 Order, we directed the
     agency to waive this debt and any interest outstanding as a result of the
     appellant’s failure to pay the debt. CRF, Tab 46 at 5.
¶8        On August 2, 2022, the agency filed a submission asserting that it “did
     waive Appellant’s debt on or about June 6, 2022.” CRF, Tab 55 at 4. The agency
     cited as support its Exhibit 1; however, this exhibit is missing from the
     submission.   Id. at 2, 4.   On January 5, 2023, the agency filed an additional
     submission asserting that it had waived both the debt and the interest, and
     included a form appearing to show that these obligations had been waived. CRF,
     Tab 60 at 4, 5. The appellant did not respond. In view of this evidence, we find
     the agency in compliance with respect to this debt and any associated interest.

     FEHB Premiums Withheld After the Back Pay Period
¶9        In our September 25, 2015 Order, we held that the agency failed adequately
     to explain whether and how it refunded the $4,366.56 it owed the appellant for
     FEHB premiums erroneously withheld between April 1, 2012, and May 5, 2013
     ($198.48 per pay period x 22 pay periods). CRF, Tab 12 at 9. Although the
     agency claimed it had credited the full amount to the appellant’s outstanding
     annual leave debt, its documents appeared to show otherwise.            Id.   After
     considering the agency’s explanation for this discrepancy, we found in our
                                                                                        6

      April 26, 2022 Order that the agency had erroneously deducted the $4,366.56
      from the appellant’s annuity as payment for the appellant’s $6,800.63 debt for
      annual leave (which we previously found to be valid, CRF, Tab 12 at 7 -8). CRF,
      Tab 46 at 6-7.      Thus, we found that the agency had erroneously required the
      appellant to pay $4,366.56 on top of the correctly assessed $6,800.63 debt for
      annual leave, and we ordered the agency to pay the appellant $4,366.56 plus
      interest. Id. at 7. We explained that the interest calculation should begin from
      the dates the FEHB premiums were originally withheld and continue to within
      30 days of the date the payment was made, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(2)(B).
      Id. We further ordered the agency to submit a narrative explanation of its interest
      calculations and documentary evidence of payment of the principal amount and
      interest. Id.
¶10         The agency’s August 2, 2022 submission explained that it paid the appellant
      the required $4,366.56, plus $2,046.69 in interest, for a total payment of
      $6,413.25.      CRF, Tab 55 at 5.    The agency stated that it used the Office of
      Personnel Management back pay interest calculator, and inputted the entire
      amount owed to the appellant as if it were owed as of April 1, 2012, the starting
      date of the first of 22 pay periods for which FEHB premiums were erroneously
      withheld. CRF, Tab 46 at 7. The agency’s evidentiary submission indicates that
      the start date was actually March 31, 2012—a day earlier than ordered—and that
      the end date was August 1, 2022, which is consistent with the order to end the
      interest calculation within 30 days of the date it was paid. Id. at 8. The agency
      included the chart of the changes in interest, automatically calculated by the back
      pay calculator.    Id. at 8-10.   The agency submitted an additional pleading on
      October 5, 2022, showing that the above amount was disbursed to appellant on
      August 9, 2022. CRF, Tab 58 at 4, 6-7.
¶11         We see no errors adverse to the appellant in the agency’s calculation —
      indeed, by crediting the appellant with the full amount of the d ebt as of March 31,
      2012, rather than starting with only the amount actually withheld th at pay period
                                                                                        7

      and adding the remaining withholding amounts in the pay periods in which they
      were originally withheld, it is likely the agency paid the appellant more interest
      than was required.
¶12         The appellant challenges the agency’s explanation of the int erest calculation
      and overall payment of $6,413.25 on the basis that it is less than the $10,000 she
      states the agency offered her in settlement of this claim.      CRF, Tab 57 at 5.
      However, it is well settled that “an unaccepted offer of settlement is ordin arily
      not admissible evidence to show the existence or extent of liability.” Special
      Counsel v. Costello, 75 M.S.P.R. 562, 609 (1997) (citing Cheyenne River Sioux
      Tribe v. United States, 806 F.2d 1046, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1986), reversed on other
      grounds by Costello v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 182 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
      1999). Therefore, that the agency allegedly offered more in settlement than it
      ultimately paid is irrelevant to whether the agency complied with its obligations.
      The appellant further states that the agency’s explanation is “convoluted” and
      “makes no sense,” CRF, Tab 57 at 5; but as discussed above, the agency’s
      calculations appear correct or even more generous than required. Accordingly,
      we find the agency has complied with its obligation to reimburse the appellant for
      the FEHB premiums debt, with interest.

      Appellant’s Remaining Claims
¶13         In various submissions, the appellant raises multiple other claims of
      noncompliance. As explained below, these are either outside the scope of our
      review or non-meritorious, and thus do not bar a finding of compliance.
¶14         The appellant requests attorney fees related to work performed in her equal
      employment opportunity (EEO) and court cases, both of which concern her
      disability   discrimination   claims   adjudicated   by   the   Equal   Employment
      Opportunity Commission (EEOC). CRF, Tab 48 at 7, Tab 49 at 3; see Rhodes v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 828 F. App’x 685, 686 (11th Cir 2020)
      (nonprecedential) (explaining the history of the appellant’s EEOC and related
                                                                                  8

court litigation). The appellant states that she prevailed before the EEOC , and the
decision in her Eleventh Circuit case confirms that the EEOC awarded her
$30,994.90 in compensatory damages for her disability discrimination claims.
CRF, Tab 57 at 5; Rhodes, 828 F. App’x at 686. We must deny her request for
attorney fees related to these claims, however.     The Board generally does not
award attorney fees for work performed in other forums unless such work
“significantly contribute[d] to” success in the MSPB appeal.       Driscoll v. U.S
Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 13 (2011); Sowa v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 96 M.S.P.R. 408, ¶ 12 (2004) (denying attorney fees for work performed
in grievance and EEOC proceedings on issues irrelevant to the appellant’s victory
before the Board). The appellant prevailed in her original removal appeal solely
on the ground that the agency failed to prove the charge u nder which the agency
removed her. I-1 ID at 12. The administrative judge rejected the appellant’s
affirmative defenses of race discrimination and retaliation based on prior EEO
activity. I-1 ID at 14, 15. The appellant’s success before EEOC on her disability
discrimination claims thus did not contribute (at all, let alone “significantly”) to
her success in her removal appeal. Driscoll, 116 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶13; see CRF,
Tab 57 at 5 (the appellant concedes this award pertained solely to her EEOC
claims); CRF, Tab 59 at 4 (the appellant states she had “an EEO disability and
MSPB wrongful termination pending at the same time”). Accordingly, we cannot
award attorney fees for this work. 5

5
  However, if the appellant has retained counsel as part of her MSPB compliance
matters, she may file a timely motion for attorney fees within 60 days of this Final
Order and present argument and evidence related to whether her fees expended in
obtaining a favorable compliance decision merit an attorney fee award. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.203(d). Her attorney fee request must be limited to work performed by her
counsel in her MSPB compliance matters and must concern work performed for the
issue(s) on which she prevailed in her compliance matters.          See Shelton v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 115 M.S.P.R. 177, ¶12 (2010).
                                                                                        9

¶15        The appellant argues that she alleged disability discrimination claims in her
      original removal appeal, but that the administrative judge failed to rule on them
      (while, however, ruling on her race discrimination and retaliation claims). CRF,
      Tab 54 at 7.      The appellant’s prehearing submission does not list disability
      discrimination (or race discrimination) among the “statement of issues” she
      presented before the administrative judge; the sole discrimination-related
      affirmative defense listed is retaliation for prior EEO activity.       Rhodes v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-I-1, Initial
      Appeal File, Tab 37 at 3.     Regardless, assuming arguendo that the appellant
      alleged disability discrimination elsewhere in the record          and that the
      administrative judge therefore erred in not addressing it, the appellant failed to
      challenge this error through a timely petition for review.        See Rhodes v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-12-0316-I-1, Final
      Order (Apr. 26, 2022); supra n.2. We therefore reject her attempt to raise this
      claim in this compliance proceeding, and confine our consideration and analysis
      to the compliance issues discussed above.
¶16        We further reject the appellant’s related argument that the agency’s
      noncompliance with its obligations as set forth in the original removal decision,
      compliance   initial   decision, and   subsequent   Board   decisions   constitutes
      retaliation for the appellant’s prior discrimination complaints. See CRF, Tab 54
      at 7-8 (arguing that agency’s noncompliance constitutes ongoing retaliation under
      the “continuing violations” theory); CRF, Tab 42 (same). The sole issue before
      the Board on a petition for enforcement is whether the agency complied with the
      Board’s prior orders.    5 U.S.C. §1204(a)(2); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(a).      In this
      context, the Board does not adjudicate claims that the alleged noncompliance was
      discriminatory.   Arredondo v. U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 40, n.5 (2001)
      (finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claim that agency’s
      compliance actions constituted “continuing discrimination”) (citing King v. Reid,
      59 F.3d 1215, 1217-19 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). To the extent the appellant’s argument
                                                                                        10

      could be construed as a claim that the agency acted in bad faith throughout this
      compliance litigation, we deny it. The proceedings have been protracted and the
      appellant’s frustration is understandable, but the procedural history is complex
      and complicated by the appellant’s repeated overlapping filings and litigation in
      multiple forums.    Moreover, a significant portion of the delay is due to the
      Board’s 5-year lack of quorum, which prevented the Board from issuing its
      April 26, 2022 Order before that date. The agency has complied, in reasonably
      prompt fashion, with its obligations as set forth in that Order.
¶17         Finally, we deny the appellant’s claims for compensatory damages related
      to her removal (which the original removal decision reversed) and her
      disability-related EEOC proceedings. CRF, Tab 49 at 3, Tab 57 at 4-5, Tab 59
      at 4. The original removal decision and the subsequent compliance decisions did
      not order compensatory damages, and thus such damages are beyond the scope of
      this compliance matter. To the extent the appellant seeks compensatory damages
      in connection with her EEOC proceedings, she would have to file s uch a claim
      with EEOC; and indeed, she already has, and received an award of $30,994.90.
      Rhodes, 828 F. App’x at 686. She has litigated this issue to finality, as explained
      in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, and may not now collaterally attack or reopen
      it in these compliance proceedings. Although the appellant does not feel fairly
      compensated for the adversities she has suffered, we find that she has received all
      the relief to which she is entitled before the Board (with the exception of any
      potential future meritorious attorney fee claim, as noted above in footnote 5).
¶18         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      compliance proceeding.        Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
      section 1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).
                                                                                     11

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        12

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                13

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other secur ity.       See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     14

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                               15

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particula r
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.