Court Opinion

ID: 9825848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:08:57.620032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:01.548875
License: Public Domain

McFaddin, J., concurring. I concur in the result reached in this case by the majority, but I cannot agree with certain statements in the opinion which I consider to be very dangerous dicta. The purposes of this concurring opinion are (1) to demonstrate the dicta, and (2) to point out the dangerous implications therefrom. I. The majority holds — and I agree thereto — that the appellant failed to prove any fraud in the procurement of the pardon. This holding conclusively disposes of all questions as to what official could raise the issue of fraud in procuring the pardon; because, if no fraud was shown, then it makes no difference what official might try to raise the question. Therefore, all language in the opinion — as to which official (i.e.,the Governor, Attorney General, Prosecuting Attorney, arresting officer, etc.) could raise the issue of fraud in procurement — must be dicta. Notwithstanding this fact, the majority opinion cites and discusses the Iowa case of Rathbun v. Baumel, 196 Ia. 1233, 191 N. W. 297, 30 A. L. R. 216, and refers to the fact that there was a strong dissenting opinion in the Iowa case, and, with apparent approval, gives this quotation from the Iowa dissenting opinion in referring to the Governor: “If he discovers such fraud or deceit and is disposed to waive the affront and permit the pardon to stand, no other person or authority may rightfully object, but, having discovered it, there is no constitutional provision or reason which prohibits him from applying to the court and on due notice to the holder of the pardon asking a 'decree of cancellation of the grant, but, in the absence of any such complaint on his part, neither the court nor any public officer or citizen is entitled to assume or exercise powers of guardianship over the executive or to interfere in any matter upon any pretense in the exercise of the executive discretion.” Certainly, this quotation is dicta, because, when we hold — as we did in the case at bar — that no fraud was shown, then it is immaterial who is seeking to raise the issue of fraud, and all language as to whether the Governor could waive the fraud is dicta, since no fraud was shown. II. This dicta has dangerous implications. The quotation from the dissenting opinion in Rathbun v. Baumel, supra, says that the Governor, after discovering the fraud, may waive the fraud and permit the pardon to stand and “no other person or authority may rightfully object.” This is dangerous. A Governor, in granting a pardon, does not act in a private-capacity, but acts in his official capacity as the chief executive of the state. In 39 Am. Jur. 527, in speaking of the pardoning power, it is stated: “It is as much an official act as any other act. It is vested in the Governor, not for the benefit of the convict only, but for the welfare of the people, who may properly insist upon the performance of that duty by -him if a pardon or parole is to be granted.” And in 391 Am. Jur. 529 the rule is stated: “The Governor, however, does not hold the power simply because he is the chief executive, but because the sole power to pardon is delegated to his office To say that the Governor may personally waive the fraud is to make the issuance of a pardon a personal or private act, rather than an official act. Any fraud in procuring the pardon is not a fraud against the individual who grants it, but is rather a fraud against the office and the state. If the quoted language from the Iowa dissenting opinion means what it says, then, if a Governor should be absent and a Lieutenant Governor should grant a pardon, the Governor, upon return to the state, could not question the pardon on the basis of fraud in procurement. Furthermore, if the quoted language from the Iowa dissenting opinion means what it says, then the Attorney General of the state could never question a pardon on the basis of fraud in the procurement. These two previous sentences demonstrate how dangerous is the dicta of which I complain. In Horton v. Gillespie, 170 Ark. 107, 279 S. W. 1020, and in Nelson v. Hall, 171 Ark. 683, 285 S. W. 386, the Governor, on return to the state, questioned, through the warden of the penitentiary and the sheriff of the county, the validity of the acts of the Lieutenant Governor (there called Acting Governor) in issuing pardons. Those cases did not present the issue of fraud in procurement; but they might well have done so, because the right of the Governor to question the acts of the Lieutenant Governor was not considered of sufficient importance to be raised as an issue. In the recent case of State, ex rel. Attorney General, v. Karston, 208 Ark. 703, 187 S. W. 2d 327, we had occasion to review the power of the Attorney General, and we there said that the Attorney General was the chief law officer of the state. As such official he should certainly be not only allowed, but required to see, that no fraud be practiced on the office of Governor in the obtaining of a pardon. To hold otherwise is to restrict the power and duty of the Attorney General as the chief law officer of the state. The dangerous implications from this dicta impel this separate concurrence.