Court Opinion

ID: 9908417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 18:01:03.045282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:10.958030
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 22-50222

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                D.C. No.
                                                 3:22-cr-01359-
    v.                                               BAS-1

WILLIAM DAVID KLENSCH,
                                                    OPINION
                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Southern District of California
         Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding

             Argued and Submitted July 18, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                    Filed December 8, 2023

Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Danielle J. Forrest,
Circuit Judges, and Kathleen Cardone, * District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge Forrest;
               Partial Dissent by Judge Cardone

*
 The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2                         USA V. KLENSCH

                          SUMMARY **

                          Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part a sentence
imposed following the defendant’s guilty plea to one count
of transportation of an illegal alien, and remanded for
resentencing.
     Klensch argued that the district court applied the wrong
legal standard when it determined that he was not entitled to
a minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 because he
personally transported two men. Observing that the district
court’s cursory explanation for denying the minor-role
reduction gives no indication that it considered the factors
set forth in the Guideline commentary or did any
comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct, the panel
concluded that the district court did not apply the correct
legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction. Because
the Government did not argue harmless error, the panel
vacated the sentence and remanded for the district court to
determine whether Klensch played a minor role in the
transportation of illegal aliens consistent with the factors
listed in § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(c) and this opinion.
    Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing
a dangerous-weapons enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)(C) because he did not possess the stun gun in
his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The
panel held that even assuming that a nexus standard is
required under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C), as it is under U.S.S.G.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. KLENSCH                       3

§ 2D1.1, the district court could still have applied the
dangerous-weapon enhancement. The panel therefore
concluded that even if the district court applied an incorrect
standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove
a nexus to the stun gun, such error was harmless.
    District Judge Cardone dissented from the majority’s
decision to vacate and remand for resentencing on the minor-
role adjustment. She wrote that the majority’s decision
marks the first time that this Court has remanded for minor-
role resentencing on a record that contains no affirmative
misstatement of the law by either the district court or the
party whose argument the district court adopted, and does so
on a record that would easily sustain the denial of minor role
for Klensch’s failure to meet his burden to submit sufficient
evidence of other known participants.

                        COUNSEL

Jessica Agatstein (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego
Inc., San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.
Andrew Y. Chiang (argued), Assistant United States
Attorney; Daniel E. Zipp, Assistant United States Attorney,
Appellate Section Chief, Criminal Division; Randy S.
Grossman, United States Attorney; United States
Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, San
Diego, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
4                      USA V. KLENSCH

                         OPINION

FORREST, Circuit Judge:

    Defendant-Appellant William Klensch appeals his
sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation
of an illegal alien. Over Klensch’s objection, the district
court followed the presentence report’s (PSR)
recommendations to not grant a minor-role reduction under
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and to impose a six-level dangerous-
weapon enhancement under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C) because
Klensch possessed a stun gun during his offense. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm as to the
dangerous-weapon enhancement and vacate and remand for
resentencing for the district court to conduct a proper minor-
role analysis.
                    I. BACKGROUND
    In May 2022, a home inspector with whom Klensch had
worked offered him $500.00 to pick up an unspecified
number of “workers” at a grocery store near the border in
Jacumba, California and transport them to Spring Valley,
California. Klensch drove to the designated location and
picked up two men. That same day, a United States Border
Patrol agent working in the area was notified to watch for a
rental car matching the general description of Klensch’s
vehicle that had raised law enforcement’s suspicion. The
agent observed Klensch’s vehicle drive behind a local store,
reappear a few minutes later, pull onto the highway, and
drive away at a high rate of speed. Another agent was
contacted and pulled over Klensch’s vehicle. Klensch
consented to the agent opening the rear door of his car, and
the agent discovered two men trying to hide in the back seat.
                       USA V. KLENSCH                       5

    Border Patrol determined that the two men were
Mexican citizens without authorization to be in the United
States, and all the occupants in the car were arrested and
transported to a Border Patrol station. Agents discovered that
Klensch had an extensive criminal history. They also found
a stun gun and several packages of personal-use drugs in
Klensch’s driver-side door compartment. Klensch later
explained that most of his personal property was in his car
because he was homeless and preparing to move to
Washington.
    The two male passengers confirmed that they were
Mexican citizens without authorization to be in the United
States. One of them disclosed that he paid $8,500 to be
illegally smuggled into the United States. He also explained
that someone directed him by phone to an initial location,
where he hid until he received instructions to go to the
location where Klensch picked him up.
    The Government charged Klensch with two counts of
illegal transportation of an alien under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). Klensch pleaded guilty to one count
under a plea agreement, and he agreed to request a PSR. The
PSR calculated an offense level of 15 and a category VI
criminal history, resulting in a Guideline range of 33–41
months’ imprisonment. The PSR recommended against
applying a two-level minor-role reduction because the
evidence was insufficient “to support that [Klensch] was
substantially less culpable than other participants to support
a reduction under USSG § 3B1.2.” And in its offense-level
calculation, the PSR applied a six-level dangerous-weapon
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C) for
possession of the stun gun during the offense. The PSR
recommended 37 months’ imprisonment and three years’
supervised release.
6                      USA V. KLENSCH

    Klensch objected in writing to the PSR. He argued that
he was entitled to a minor-role reduction because the factors
governing this analysis weighed in his favor and he was
“substantially less culpable than the average participant in
the criminal activity of migrant smuggling.” He also argued
that the dangerous-weapon enhancement was improper
because the Government had not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that he possessed the stun gun in
relation to the crime charged.
    Klensch calculated his Guideline range as 6–12 months’
imprisonment based on, among other things, a base offense
level of 12, a two-level minor-role reduction, and no
dangerous-weapon enhancement. He argued for a 13-month
custody sentence with no supervision because of “the things
in his car.” The Government calculated a 18–24 months
Guideline range and requested a 21-month sentence.
     At the sentencing hearing, Klensch argued both the
minor-role reduction and dangerous-weapons enhancement.
The district court did not inquire about the minor-role
reduction, but it did ask Klensch why he had the stun gun.
Klensch responded that he had it for “protection” in case he
needed “to deter anybody away from” him. Klensch’s
counsel interjected and explained that Klensch was homeless
and in the process of moving to Washington to be with
family, and thus had all his personal property with him in his
car.
    After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court
issued its decision from the bench, following the
recommendations in the PSR. In cursory terms, the district
court stated that it declined to apply a minor-role reduction
because “Klensch was the one transporting the individuals”
and the evidence did not show “his role was minor.” And the
                       USA V. KLENSCH                        7

district imposed the dangerous-weapon enhancement
because “[Klensch] was engaged in a dangerous venture,”
and there was “evidence that [the stun gun] was related to
the offense. It was possessed right where he could grab it, in
case he needed it against the individuals who were in the car
with him or anyone who challenged him while he was
committing this offense.” Based on its findings, the district
court calculated a Guideline range of 33-41 months, and it
sentenced Klensch to a low-end 33 months’ imprisonment
with three years of supervised release. Klensch timely
appealed.
                     II. DISCUSSION
                A. Minor-Role Adjustment
    Klensch contends that he was entitled to a minor-role
reduction because he had no knowledge of the full alien
smuggling operation, he was asked to pick up “workers” and
did not know he would be transporting illegal aliens, and he
was paid only a small sum. He argues that the district court
applied the wrong legal standard when it determined that he
was not entitled to this reduction because he personally
transported the two men.
                              1.
    As an initial matter, the Government argues that this
issue must be reviewed for plain error because Klensch did
not challenge the sufficiency of the district court’s reasoning
below. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) sets out “a
contemporaneous-objection rule”: to preserve a claim of
error, a party must “‘inform[] the court—when the court
ruling or order is made or sought—of the action the party
wishes the court to take, or the party’s objection to the
court’s action and the grounds for that objection.’” Puckett
8                      USA V. KLENSCH

v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting Fed. R.
Crim. P. 51(b)). Sentencing objections “must have a specific
substantive basis” that “provides the district court with an
opportunity to address the error in the first instance and
allows this court to engage in more meaningful review.”
United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). Such objections may be raised at the
sentencing hearing or in written objections to the PSR. See
United States v. Hammond, 742 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir.
2014) (concluding that objections made in a “sentencing
memorandum and at sentencing” are “preserved”); United
States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1993)
(concluding that “written objections to the presentence
report” are “sufficient to preserve the issue”).
    Here, Klensch argued, both in his objections to the PSR
and at his sentencing hearing, that he was “less culpable than
the average” participant and thus was entitled to the minor-
role reduction. He specifically asserted that a comparative
analysis is required and that it is not determinative “that a
defendant performs an essential or indispensable role in the
criminal activity.” This is the same thrust of his argument on
appeal: that the district court erred by not comparing his
level of culpability to that of the other participants involved
in his criminal activity and by mistakenly asserting that he
did not qualify for a minor-role reduction because he “was
the one transporting the individuals.” Because we conclude
that Klensch properly preserved his challenge related to the
minor-role reduction, we review de novo whether the district
court applied the correct legal standard in denying a minor-
role reduction, and we review its factual findings for clear
error and its application of the Guidelines to the facts for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d
1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
                       USA V. KLENSCH                       9

                              2.
    Turning to the merits, § 3B1.2(b) of the Guidelines
allows for a reduction in the offense level if the defendant
“was a minor participant in [the] criminal activity.” To
receive this reduction, the defendant must prove that he is
“substantially less culpable than the average participant in
the charged criminal activity.” United States v. Diaz, 884
F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Before 2015, there was confusion in the
courts about whether the proper comparison was to the
defendant’s co-participants in the specific crime charged or
to those involved in the type of crime at issue more
generally. Id. at 915. The Sentencing Commission amended
the Guideline commentary to make clear that the proper
comparison is to the co-participants in the crime charged. Id.
The Commission also determined that the minor-role
reduction “was being ‘applied inconsistently and more
sparingly than the Commission intended,’” and it amended
the commentary “to induce district courts to grant
mitigating-role adjustments more frequently.” United States
v. Rodriguez, 44 F.4th 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted).
    In its amendment, the Commission listed five factors that
we have held district courts must consider “when
determining whether to grant a mitigating-role adjustment.”
Id. Of particular import here, the Commission also cautioned
that “[t]he fact that a defendant performs an essential or
indispensable role in the criminal activity is not
determinative.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (emphasis
added); see also Diaz, 884 F.3d at 915. It expressly
disapproved of cases denying minor-role adjustments to
defendants because they were “‘integral’ or ‘indispensable’
10                     USA V. KLENSCH

to the commission of the offense.” U.S.S.G. Supp. to App.
C. Amend. 794.
     We have since instructed that “a district court must
proceed in three steps” when determining “whether a
defendant is substantially less culpable than the average
participant in the offense.” United States v. Dominguez-
Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938, 960 (9th Cir. 2022) (emphasis
added). First, it must identify all “individuals for whom there
is ‘sufficient evidence of their existence and participation in
the overall scheme.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Second, the
court must calculate a rough average level of culpability for
these individuals, taking into consideration the five factors
in comment 3(C) to the Mitigating Role Guideline.” Id. And
third, it “must compare the defendant’s culpability to that
average.” Id. If this calculation shows that “the defendant is
substantially less culpable than that average and meets the
other criteria, he should be granted a mitigating role
adjustment.” Id.
    Here, the district court’s analysis of the minor-role
reduction is thin. It did not question the parties about or
discuss at the sentencing hearing the factors that govern the
comparative-liability analysis or the facts relevant to that
analysis. Rather, after the parties’ arguments, it simply
pronounced: “In this particular case, Mr. Klensch was the
one transporting the individuals. And I don’t find that there
is sufficient evidence that his role was minor in this case.”
    We assume district courts “kn[o]w the law and
underst[and their] obligation to consider all of the sentencing
factors,” Diaz, 884 F.3d at 916, and they do not have to “tick
off sentencing factors to show that [they] considered them,”
id. at 914 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
But they must explain their sentencing decisions. United
                        USA V. KLENSCH                        11

States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 2014).
Requiring an explanation for a given sentencing decision
“permit[s] meaningful appellate review.” United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see
also Emmett, 749 F.3d at 820 (“It is a general principle of
federal sentencing law that district courts have a duty to
explain their sentencing decisions.”); cf. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (explaining district courts
must “adequately explain the chosen sentence”). It also
“promote[s] the perception of fair sentencing.” Emmett, 749
F.3d at 820 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Here, the district court’s cursory explanation gives no
indication that it considered the required factors or did any
comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. While it was not
required to mechanically analyze each factor or reference
them verbatim on the record, Diaz, 884 F.3d at 914, 916,
providing some explanation, even in general terms, of how
the considerations embodied in the factors apply in this case
“is part and parcel of considering” them. Emmett, 749 F.3d
at 820.
     In Diaz, which we decided before Dominguez-Caicedo,
we had “no trouble determining from the sentencing
memoranda and the transcript of the sentencing hearing that
the district court was well aware of the” minor-role factors.
Id. at 913. We therefore rejected the defendant’s argument
that the district court erred by failing to mention the factors
in its decision. Id. at 916. But we were troubled by the district
court’s statement that the defendant’s role “of scouting and
acting as a courier to smuggle a large amount of drugs across
the border was not minor” because such reasoning could
“reflect[] reliance on courier conduct as dispositive,” and the
amendment to the commentary on the minor-role adjustment
“clarified that performance of an essential role . . . is not
12                         USA V. KLENSCH

dispositive.” Id. at 917. The same is true here. The district
court’s singular and cursory explanation for not granting a
minor-role reduction, referencing only that Klensch drove
the two men, indicates that the district court improperly
relied “on courier conduct as dispositive,” despite the
Guidelines’ clarification “that performance of an essential
role . . . is not dispositive.” 1 Id.
    The Government disputes that the district court applied
the wrong legal standard. First, it argues that the district
court’s statement was in reference to Klensch’s “unique
culpability, not his indispensability.” The Government
makes compelling points that human smugglers are more
culpable than drug smugglers because they make choices
that impact “life and death,” such as whether to conceal the
passengers, gain compliance from potentially unruly
passengers, bring water or other necessities for the
passengers, and so forth. But the problem is none of this
reasoning was articulated by the district court. See Emmett,
749 F.3d at 821–22 (remanding where “the single
explanation in the record” did not “explain why” the
defendant’s “request should be denied under the applicable
legal standard”). And it is just as plausible, based on what
the district court did say, that it concluded Klensch did not

1
  The Government contends that plain-error review applies because
Klensch did not argue to the district court that its reasoning was
insufficient. As discussed above, it is true that a defendant must raise
procedural errors to the district court, which includes a district court’s
failure to provide adequate explanation for its sentencing decision. See
United States v. Ayala-Nicanor, 659 F.3d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2011).
But here we find a substantive error—that the district court denied
Klensch a minor-role reduction because he physically transported the
two men who were in the U.S. illegally. And this issue was plainly
preserved. See Barnes, 993 F.2d at 684; see also Dominguez-Caicedo,
40 F.4th at 960 (discussing standard of review for minor role analysis).
                           USA V. KLENSCH                            13

play a minor role because transporting the two men who
entered the U.S. illegally away from the border was too
integral to be minor conduct.
    Second, the Government argues that the district court
rejected Klensch’s untruthful account about his level of
involvement, as evidenced by the district court’s statement
that it did not think there was “sufficient evidence that
[Klensch’s] role was minor.” As an initial matter, the
Government did not dispute the veracity of the facts recited
in the PSR. 2 We treat facts as undisputed when “they are
drawn solely from a Presentence Report whose accuracy
neither party challenged.” Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d at 1168. We
therefore reject the Government’s argument to the extent it
advances a new factual dispute.
    To the extent the Government is arguing that Klensch
failed to meet his burden of showing that he performed a
minor role in the criminal activity, it is true that the district
court can refuse to grant a minor-role reduction if it finds
that the evidence failed to show that there were co-
participants or that the defendant’s role was minor in
comparison to his co-participants. See Diaz, 884 F.3d at 914
(explaining that the defendant bears the burden of proof); see

2
  The PSR includes Klensch’s statement that he received $500.00 from
the home inspector for whom he worked to pick up the two men. The
Government notes that the PSR also identifies two other participants—
the person who negotiated the $8,500 smuggling fee and the person who
guided one of the men to Jacumba over the phone. The district court did
not explicitly find that there was insufficient evidence of these three
participants and their involvement or otherwise indicate that it was
rejecting the PSR’s or Klensch’s account of the events. Cf. Dominguez-
Caicedo, 40 F.4th at 966 (explaining the district court “made clear that
it did not believe” the defendant’s story where it explicitly stated it
“frankly” did not “buy” or “accept it”).
14                         USA V. KLENSCH

also Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th at 960 (explaining that a
district court must first identify individuals for whom there
is sufficient evidence of their existence and participation in
the scheme). But, again, the district court’s cursory
explanation does not make clear that either of these
rationales were the basis for its decision to deny a minor-role
reduction. While we generally assume that the district court
applied the correct legal standard, we cannot do so when the
record indicates the contrary. See Diaz, 884 F.3d at 917–18.
    Because we conclude that the district court did not apply
the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction,
we must determine the proper course for remedying this
error. Errors that impact Guideline calculations typically
require remand unless the Government establishes the error
was harmless. See Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th at 963; see
also United States v. Bankston, 901 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“[Where] we cannot say with certainty that the
district court’s sentencing error was harmless, we must
remand for resentencing.”). The Government has not argued
harmless error here. Therefore, we vacate Klensch’s
sentence and remand for resentencing with instruction that
the district court reassess the minor-role reduction consistent
with U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) and this opinion. 3
            B. Dangerous-Weapon Enhancement
    Klensch also argues that the district court erred by
imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did
not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his
illegal smuggling activity. “[W]e review the district court’s

3
  Klensch asks us to affirmatively hold that he is entitled to the minor-
role reduction. We decline to make this determination in the first
instance.
                        USA V. KLENSCH                       15

identification of the correct legal standard de novo . . . the
district court’s factual findings for clear error,” and the
“district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to
the facts of a given case . . . for abuse of discretion.” Gasca-
Ruiz, 852 F.3d at 1170 (9th Cir. 2017).
    Under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C), a sentence for
transporting an illegal alien is increased to the greater of two
levels or an overall increase to offense level 18 “[i]f a
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” 4
Klensch does not dispute that he possessed a stun gun during
his offense or that a stun gun qualifies as a dangerous
weapon under the Guideline. Klensch argues only that the
district court had to find a nexus between his possession of
the stun gun and “the criminal act” and that it erred in
applying a some-evidence standard in making this finding,
rather than a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
    The plain text of § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C) does not require a
nexus between possession of a weapon and commission of
the crime. But § 1B1.3 addresses enhancements based on
“specific      offense       characteristics”—such        as
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)(C)—and requires courts to consider acts “that
occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Thus, read together,
§ 1B1.3 and § 2L.1.1(b) require at least that the court find
that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon during the
commission of the offense.
   Klensch relies on cases interpreting § 2D1.1 (a provision
addressing weapons possession in connection with certain

4
  The Guideline provides greater enhancements where a dangerous
weapon is discharged or brandished, not merely possessed. Id.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)(A)-(B).
16                     USA V. KLENSCH

drug-related offenses) to argue that a nexus between his
possession of the stun gun and his crime must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Section 2D1.1 has a similar
dangerous-weapon enhancement as § 2L1.1, but the
commentary to the § 2D1.1 enhancement states that it should
not be applied if “it is clearly improbable that the weapon
was connected with the offense.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A).
The commentary to § 2L1.1 contains no such language, and
the Government argues that as a matter of plain text no nexus
is required under § 2L1.1. We need not resolve today
whether a nexus standard like that in § 2D1.1 is required
under § 2L1.1(b)(5)(C), because even assuming that it is, the
district court could still have applied the dangerous-weapon
enhancement.
    The enhancement for possession of a weapon under
§ 2D1.1 applies where “the weapon was present, unless it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense.” United States v. Gomez, 6 F.4th 992, 1008 (9th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The
government need only prove “that the weapon was possessed
at the time of the offense.” United States v. Alaniz, 69 F.4th
1124, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2023). And if it meets this burden,
the enhancement “applies unless the defendant shows it was
‘clearly improbable’ that the weapon was possessed in
connection with the offense.” Id. at 1127 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
    Klensch does not dispute that he had the stun gun in his
car when he transported the two men. By extension he does
not dispute that the Government met its initial burden. Thus,
under the § 2D1.1 standard, the burden would fall on
Klensch to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
was “improbable that the weapon was connected to the
offense.” Id. at 1126. This he cannot do. Klensch
                        USA V. KLENSCH                       17

acknowledged the stun gun was within his reach when he
was transporting the two men, and he told the district court
at his sentencing hearing that he had the stun gun “for . . .
my own protection, just if I need to deter anybody away from
me.” Even if Klensch was concerned about protecting
himself from risks related to homelessness, that does not
prevent the stun gun from also serving to protect him in the
course of his criminal activity. Klensch agreed to pick up
strangers at an unfamiliar location and drive them in his car
(which apparently contained most of his possessions). It is
understandable for someone in this situation to want some
means of self-protection. And it was not an abuse of
discretion for the district court to conclude that the stun gun
located within Klensch’s reach in his car had a nexus to his
criminal conduct that occurred in the car. We therefore
conclude that even if the district court applied an incorrect
standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove
a nexus to the stun gun, such error was harmless because the
district court “would have imposed the same sentence” even
if it had required the Government to make this showing.
Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992); see also
United States v. Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2021)
(applying Williams’s harmless-error standard). We affirm
the district court’s imposition of the dangerous-weapons
enhancement under § 2L1.1(b).
                      CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s application of the six-level
dangerous-weapons enhancement. However, because the
district court erred in its analysis of the two-level minor-role
reduction, we vacate Klensch’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. At resentencing, the district court is directed to
determine whether Klensch played a minor role in the
18                      USA V. KLENSCH

transportation of illegal aliens consistent with the factors
listed in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) and this opinion.
     AFFIRMED in part, VACATED, and REMANDED.

CARDONE, District Judge, dissenting in part:

    I agree with the majority’s analysis affirming the district
court’s imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement
and join that portion of the opinion in full. However, I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate
and remand for resentencing on the minor-role adjustment.
    The district court justified its decision to deny Klensch a
minor-role adjustment as follows: “In this particular case,
Mr. Klensch was the one transporting the individuals. And
I don’t find that there is sufficient evidence that his role was
minor in this case.” There are at least two plausible readings
of this admittedly terse explanation. Either one requires us
to do some reading between the lines. On the first reading,
the district court would have found that “[because] Mr.
Klensch was the one transporting the individuals, [he played
an essential role, and therefore,] I don’t find that there is
sufficient evidence that his role was minor in this case.” On
the second reading, the district court would have found that
“Mr. Klench was the one transporting the individuals[, and
there is very little in the record about the other known
participants, so] I don’t find that there is sufficient evidence
that his role was minor in this case.”
    I agree with the majority that “it is just as plausible” to
gather from the district court’s two-sentence explanation an
invalid rationale for denying minor role as it is to infer a
valid one. Maj. at 12. At least, so long as that explanation
                       USA V. KLENSCH                       19

is read in isolation. But more is required to warrant reversal
under this Court’s precedents. “We assume district courts
know the law and understand their obligation to consider all
of the sentencing factors, and they do not have to tick off
sentencing factors to show that they considered them.” Maj.
at 10 (cleaned up) (quoting Diaz, 884 F.3d at 914, 916). To
be sure, criminal sentences must be explained “sufficiently
to permit meaningful appellate review,” and “[i]t is most
helpful for this to come from the bench.” United States v.
Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “[B]ut
adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred
from the PSR or the record as a whole.” Id.
    Here, when viewed in light of the PSR and the record as
a whole, the best reading of the district court’s explanation
is that Klensch failed to carry his burden of showing he
played a minor role. See United States v. Diaz, 884 F.3d 911,
914 (9th Cir. 2018) (“The defendant bears the burden of
proving that he or she is entitled to a downward adjustment
based on his or her role in the offense.” (cleaned up) (quoting
United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1282 (9th Cir.
2006))). This was Probation’s conclusion in the PSR:
“Based on the available information regarding his role, there
is not enough to support that he was substantially less
culpable than other participants to support a reduction under
USSG § 3B1.2.” And although Klensch objected to
Probation’s legal conclusion that he should be denied minor
role, he made no objection to its factual basis. Instead of
proffering additional facts about the home inspector or other
known participants—about whom the record contains little
information—Klensch argued that the facts recounted in the
PSR, applied to the minor-role factors, warranted a
20                         USA V. KLENSCH

downward departure. 1 The crux of his argument was that he
was “substantially less culpable than the average participant
in the criminal activity of migrant smuggling,” a
“worldwide,” “clandestine enterprise.”          He offered
information about the roles “typically” filled in human
smuggling operations and argued his own role was minor “in
the big scheme of migrant smuggling.”
    But none of this is material to a minor-role analysis. “We
have repeatedly held that the relevant comparators are the
actual participants in the defendant’s crime.” United States
v. Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th 938, 965 (9th Cir. 2022)
(collecting cases). And “by ‘actual participants,’ we mean
only participants for whom there is ‘sufficient evidence of
their existence and participation.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 474 (9th Cir. 2000)).
In Dominguez-Caicedo, we affirmed the denial of minor role
for one of the three defendants who made similar arguments
appealing to “unknown members of ‘a giant, complex drug-
trafficking organization’ that may have been involved in the
manufacture and distribution of the drugs [the defendant]
was transporting.” Id. at 965. And we affirmed the denial
for a second defendant who, like Klensch, failed to object to
the omission of factual information about other known
participants when challenging the PSR’s recommendation to
deny minor role for lack of evidence. Id. at 966–67. These
decisions would provide firm footing for the district court
here to deny Klensch a minor-role adjustment on the ground
that he did not carry his burden to show himself substantially
less culpable than the average of the other actual participants

1
  In response to Klensch’s objections, Probation reiterated its conclusion
that “the limited available information” was “not enough” to support a
minor-role reduction.
                           USA V. KLENSCH                              21

in the crime. Rather than adopt this reasonable view of the
impetus for the district court’s decision, the Majority sends
the case back for a more meticulous explanation.
    This marks the first time that this Court has remanded for
minor-role resentencing on a record that contains no
affirmative misstatement of the law by either the district
court or the party whose argument the district court
adopted. 2 In Dominguez-Caicedo, we reversed the denial of
minor role for only one of the three defendants, and we did
so because the district court had explicitly excluded at least
one identified, known participant from consideration. Id. at
963. Here, the district court made no such unambiguous
misapprehension of law. Instead, as in Diaz, we are
confronted with a terse, vague explanation for the minor-role
denial. But in Diaz, “[t]he difficulty [was] that the district
court adopted the government’s argument with little
elaboration, and the government’s argument included an
incorrect interpretation” of the sentencing guidelines. 884
F.3d at 918.
   In this case, unlike Diaz, the Government did not
misstate the law to the district court. Certainly, the

2
  The Majority relies on United States v. Emmett, as an example of a case
in which this Court remanded on the basis of a terse explanation from
the district court that made no affirmative misstatement of the law. Maj.
at 11; see 749 F.3d at 821–22. In Emmett, the district court denied the
defendant’s motion for early termination of supervised release. Id. at
820. It did so in a brief order, “without a hearing or any response from
the government or probation office.” Id. at 821. Here, by contrast, a
hearing was held, the issues were argued by Klensch and the
Government, and Probation submitted its position in a PSR. Therefore,
unlike in Emmett, a permissible explanation for Klensch’s sentence
“may . . . be inferred from . . . the record as a whole.” See id. (quoting
Carty, 520 F.3d at 992).
22                     USA V. KLENSCH

Government did not encourage the district court to commit
the supposed error that forms the basis for the Majority’s
reversal—that Klensch may have been denied minor role
because of his indispensable role as transporter. Indeed, the
only mention of an indispensable role in the record below
comes from Klensch himself, who correctly informed the
court that “[e]ven though his role as a transporter in this
offense was necessary and indispensable, that alone is not a
determinative role factor.” In these circumstances, “our
caselaw requires that we assume the district judge knew the
law.” See Diaz, 884 F.3d at 916.
    In sum, today’s decision goes beyond Dominguez-
Caicedo and Diaz by vacating and remanding for
resentencing in the absence of any affirmative misstatement
of the law by either the court or the Government. And it does
so on a record that would easily sustain the denial of minor
role for Klensch’s failure to meet his burden to submit
sufficient evidence of other known participants. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent in part.