Court Opinion

ID: 9372787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:35.895995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.618835
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2022 MSPB 12
                             Docket No. SF-0752-16-0813-I-1

                                     Bradley S. Sikes,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                                  Department of the Navy,
                                         Agency.
                                       May 23, 2022

               Jeff Letts, Ewing, New Jersey, for the appellant.

               Wendy Kelly, Bremerton, Washington, for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                              Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction his appeal alleging that the agency had
     improperly continued his indefinite suspension after the restoration of his access
     to classified information.    For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the
     appeal for further adjudication consistent with this Opinion and Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant serves as an Electrician at the agency’s Puget Sound Naval
     Shipyard, a sensitive position that requires him to maintain a security clearance
     and access to classified information. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 25. On
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     April 13, 2015, the agency suspended the appellant’s access to classified
     information and proposed his indefinite suspension on that basis. Id. at 25-27.
     The appellant did not respond to the proposed indefinite suspension. Id. at 21.
     On April 29, 2015, the agency issued a decision indefinitely suspending the
     appellant, effective on June 18, 2015. 1      Id. at 21-24.    The agency’s decision
     informed the appellant that the suspension would continue until his security
     clearance status was resolved, or until there was sufficient evidence to either
     return him to duty or take other administrative or disciplinary action against him
     during the term of the suspension. Id. at 22. The decision specifically informed
     the appellant that if the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication
     Facility (DOD CAF) did not revoke his security clearance and restored his access
     to classified information, he would be returned to a duty status.            Id. at 21.
     Although he was informed of his Board appeal rights, the appellant did not appeal
     the imposition of the indefinite suspension. See id. at 22.
¶3        On August 16, 2016, DOD CAF issued a favorable security determination
     rendering the appellant eligible for a Secret security clearance and assignment to
     a sensitive position. Id. at 18. On the same date, the agency was notified of the
     favorable adjudication and determined that the appellant was eligible to return to
     work. Id. at 19. On August 29, 2016, the appellant returned to duty. Id. at 17.
¶4        On September 22, 2016, the appellant filed an initial appeal to the Board.
     IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judged issued an order notifying the appellant of
     the requirements to prove Board jurisdiction over his appeal and ordering him to

     1
       The agency’s decision notified the appellant that administrative leave would end on
     May 13, 2015; at his request, he would be carried in an annual leave status from May 14
     to June 17, 2015; and his indefinite suspension would be effective on June 18, 2015.
     IAF, Tab 6 at 21. Although the appellant did not appeal the agency’s decision, it is not
     clear whether his use of annual leave was a voluntary action or effectively part of the
     involuntary suspension. See Abbott v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 294, ¶ 10
     (2014) (finding that an agency’s placement of an employee on enforced leave for more
     than 14 days constitutes an appealable suspension within the Board’s jurisdiction).
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     file evidence and argument establishing jurisdiction within 15 days of the date of
     the order. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-3. After receiving evidence and argument from both
     parties, the administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative
     judge found that the condition subsequent necessary to end the appellant’s
     indefinite suspension, restoration of his access to classified information, occurred
     on August 16, 2016, and that the agency ended the indefinite suspension on that
     date. ID at 2-3. He also found that on the same date, the agency contacted the
     appellant to advise him that he could return to work, but he asked to return to
     duty on August 29, 2016, instead, to complete a training program he had begun.
     ID at 3. The administrative judge further found that on August 29, 2016, the
     appellant returned to work, and the agency issued a Standard Form 50 (SF-50)
     ending the indefinite suspension on that date; after the appellant filed his Board
     appeal, the agency retroactively returned the appellant to duty on August 16,
     2016, and carried him in a leave without pay (LWOP) status from August 16 to
     29, 2016.   IAF, Tab 6 at 15-17; ID at 3 & n.1.          The administrative judge
     concluded that, even if the appellant was constructively suspended from
     August 16 to 29, 2016, the period totaled at most 13 days, and thus the Board
     lacked jurisdiction over the suspension. ID at 3-4.
¶5        The appellant has timely filed a petition for review in which he argues that
     the administrative judge erred in requiring the length of the improper continuation
     of the indefinite suspension to be 15 days or more for the Board to have
     jurisdiction over his suspension, contrary to the holding of White v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 58 M.S.P.R. 22 (1993), and that he has established that the Board has
     jurisdiction over the suspension. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 3-4.
     The agency has responded to the petition for review, and the appellant has replied
     to the response. PFR File, Tabs 3-4.
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                                            ANALYSIS
¶6        The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.           Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). A suspension of more than
     14 days is within the Board’s jurisdiction, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(2), 7513(d), but a
     suspension of 14 days or fewer is not an appealable action, Lefavor v. Department
     of the Navy, 115 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 5 (2010).              The Board’s jurisdiction is
     determined by the nature of an agency’s action against an appellant at the time his
     appeal is filed.   Id., ¶ 10.     An agency’s unilateral modification of its adverse
     action after an appeal has been filed cannot divest the Board of jurisdiction unless
     the appellant consents to such divestiture or the agency completely rescinds the
     action. Id. Here, the record reflects that the agency initially issued one SF-50
     initiating the indefinite suspension on June 18, 2015, and one SF-50 returning the
     appellant to duty on August 29, 2016. IAF, Tab 6 at 12, 17, 20. It was only after
     the appellant filed his September 22, 2016 Board appeal that the agency took
     steps on October 6, 2016, to retroactively place him in an LWOP status from
     August 16 to 29, 2016.          Id. at 12-13, 15-16.   There is no evidence that the
     appellant consented to the agency’s unilateral modification of the indefinite
     suspension. Accordingly, we find that, when the appellant filed his appeal, the
     agency had continued the indefinite suspension until August 29, 2016.           See
     Lefavor, 115 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶¶ 9-10 (finding that, as of the date the appellant filed
     his appeal, the agency had inadvertently imposed an appealable 15-day
     suspension, and the agency’s correction of the error after the appellant filed his
     appeal did not divest the Board of jurisdiction).
¶7        We further find that the Board has jurisdiction over the agency’s
     continuation of the indefinite suspension. By regulation, an indefinite suspension
     ends with the occurrence of the pending conditions set forth in the notice of
     action.   5 C.F.R. § 752.402.        The parties do not dispute that the condition
     subsequent that should have ended the indefinite suspension occurred when the
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appellant’s access to classified information was restored on August 16, 2016.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 3 at 5, 10. When a suspension continues after the
condition subsequent that would terminate it, the continuation of the suspension
is a reviewable agency action separate from the imposition of the suspension
itself. Rhodes v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 487 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Both the imposition of an indefinite suspension—and the continuation of
that suspension after the condition subsequent—concern the same personnel
action; thus, the appeal of the continuation of a suspension relates to the entire
suspension for jurisdictional purposes.       White, 58 M.S.P.R. at 25-26; see also
Rhodes, 487 F.3d at 1382 (recognizing that the Board treats an agency’s failure to
end an indefinite suspension as a separately reviewable action from the
imposition of the indefinite suspension, although both matters involve the same
personnel action).     As such, the length of the entire indefinite suspension is
considered in determining if the Board has jurisdiction over the continuation of
an indefinite suspension, regardless of whether the subject matter of an appeal
concerning the continuation of an indefinite suspension is a suspension of 14 days
or fewer. White, 58 M.S.P.R. at 25-26. Here, although the appeal concerned the
improper continuation of the indefinite suspension for no more than 13 days, the
entire indefinite suspension lasted over 14 days and is within the Board’s
jurisdiction. 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 17, 20.

2
  The record is not clear as to whether the appellant’s initial appeal was timely filed, as
his access to classified information was restored on August 16, 2016, and he filed his
appeal on September 22, 2016, 37 days later. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 6 at 18. There is no
evidence that the appellant was notified of his right to appeal a continuation of his
indefinite suspension to the Board. See Shiflett v. U.S. Postal Service, 839 F.2d 669,
674 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the agency’s failure to give notice to the appellant of
his appeal rights may constitute good cause for his untimely filing of a Board appeal).
Neither the appellant nor the administrative judge addressed whether the appeal was
timely, but given the lack of notice and the circumstances of this case, we would find
that, if the appeal were untimely, good cause would exist for the delay in filing the
appeal.
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¶8         The Board’s role in an appeal alleging an improper continuation of an
      indefinite suspension is to ascertain whether the condition subsequent identified
      by the agency has occurred and whether the agency acted within a reasonable
      amount of time to terminate the suspension following the satisfaction of the
      condition subsequent. Sanchez v. Department of Energy, 117 M.S.P.R. 155, ¶ 9
      n.2 (2011). Here, there is no dispute that the identified condition subsequent, the
      restoration of the appellant’s access to classified information, occurred.    PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 3 at 5, 10. The issue is whether the agency acted within a
      reasonable amount of time to end the suspension once the appellant’s access to
      classified information was restored.
¶9         As set forth above, on August 16, 2016, the same day that DOD CAF issued
      a favorable security determination for the appellant, the agency contacted the
      appellant to advise him that he could return to work. The existing record reflects
      that the appellant asked instead to return to duty on August 29, 2016, to complete
      a training period he had begun. The record does not appear to indicate the nature
      of the training and whether it was work-related.          The agency ultimately
      retroactively returned the appellant to duty on August 16, 2016, but carried him in
      an LWOP status through August 29, 2016.
¶10        Here, whether the agency acted within a reasonable amount of time to end
      the suspension once the appellant’s access to classified information was restored
      may be affected by, among other things, whether the training the appellant
      requested to complete was work-related, and whether the agency was obligated to
      place him in a paid duty status during that training.         Cf. Boudousquie v.
      Department of the Air Force, 102 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 10 (2006) (holding that an
      agency’s misleading statements that the appellant must request LWOP may
      support a finding of a constructive suspension). Thus, the appellant’s apparent
      request to continue training before his return, and the agency’s placement of him
      on LWOP in response, may implicate whether the agency acted within a
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      reasonable amount of time to end the suspension once the appellant’s access to
      classified information was restored.
¶11         The appellant did not have an opportunity to respond to the declarations
      regarding training that the agency submitted on the day the record closed. See
      Schucker v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 401 F.3d 1347, 1355-56
      (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting the Board’s longstanding policy of affording the parties
      an opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence); White v. Department of the Army,
      46 M.S.P.R. 63, 66-67 (1990) (closing of the record must comport with the basic
      requirements of fairness and notice, including an opportunity to respond to
      submissions of the parties); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(c)(2).

                                             ORDER
¶12         Under these circumstances, we vacate the initial decision and remand this
      appeal to the regional office for further adjudication consistent with this Opinion
      and Order.   After affording the parties an opportunity to submit evidence and
      argument, the administrative judge shall determine whether the agency acted
      within a reasonable amount of time to end the suspension once the appellant’s
      access to classified information was restored.

      FOR THE BOARD:

      /s/
      Jennifer Everling
      Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.