Court Opinion

ID: 9372773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:27.364807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.362949
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 26
                            Docket No. DC-1221-19-0677-W-1

                                   Peggy A. Maloney,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
            Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration,
                                          Agency.
                                      August 3, 2022

           Peggy A. Maloney, Alexandria, Virginia, pro se.

           Raheemah Abdulaleem, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant petitions for review of the initial decision that dismissed her
     individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the following
     reasons, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
     REMAND the appeal for further adjudication consistent with this Opinion
     and Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant, a GS-11 Management Analyst with the Office of
     Administration (OA), an entity within the Executive Office of the President
                                                                                           2

     (EOP), filed this IRA appeal alleging that, in reprisal for whistleblowing
     disclosures, the agency took numerous actions against her, including placing her
     on administrative leave, issuing a letter of reprimand, placing her on a work
     improvement plan, denying her a within-grade increase (WIGI), and proposing
     her suspension. 1 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, 6-19, Tabs 5-6, Tab 11
     at 19. The agency moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction asserting,
     among other things, that it was not an “agency” under 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a),
     2302(a)(2)(A), (b)(8), over which the Board has jurisdiction in an IRA appeal .
     IAF, Tab 8 at 14-21. The appellant filed a response to the agency’s motion to
     dismiss, in which she addressed this issue. IAF, Tab 14 at 14-17.
¶3         Based on the written record, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal,
     finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over IRA appeals filed by OA employees
     in EOP. 2 IAF, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 5-8. She reasoned that, under

     1
       The appellant also filed and had automatically refiled Board appeals challenging her
     subsequent separation from employment. Maloney v. Executive Office of the President,
     Office of Administration, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-20-0092-I-1; Maloney v.
     Executive Office of the President, Office of Administration , MSPB Docket
     No. DC-0752-20-0092-I-2. Those cases will be adjudicated by the Board in separate
     decisions. The appellant also has filed a request for regulation review, the disposition
     of which does not impact our decision here. See Maloney v. Office of Personnel
     Management, MSPB Docket No. CB-1205-21-0005-U-1. Therefore, that request will be
     separately adjudicated.
     2
       Although not raised by the parties on review, the agency asserted below that the
     appeal was untimely filed because it was not filed within the 60-day deadline set forth
     at 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3)(A). IAF, Tab 8 at 21-23. The administrative judge found the
     appellant timely filed the appeal, but provided no reasoning in support of that
     conclusion. We agree that the appeal was timely filed. Section 1214(a)(3)(A) of title 5
     provides that an IRA appeal must be filed no more than 60 days after “notification was
     provided” that the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) terminated its investigation of the
     appellant’s complaint. The statutory language does not specify whether the 60-day
     period begins to run from the date of the Special Counsel’s notice or the date of the
     whistleblower’s receipt of that notice. Practices and Procedures for Appeal and Stay
     Requests of Personnel Actions Allegedly Based on Whistleblowing, 62 Fed. Reg.
     59992-01, 59992 (Nov. 6, 1997).        Under the Board’s implementing regulations
     clarifying that issue, an IRA appeal must generally be filed no later than 65 days after
                                                                                            3

     the applicable statute, only employees in a covered position in an “agency” may
     seek corrective action from the Board, and that EOP was not an “agency.” Id.
     The administrative judge also noted that, although the appellant asserted that the
     agency denied her a WIGI, “there is no record that the appellant filed an appeal of
     that action.” ID at 4 n.2.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the
     agency has filed a response thereto. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2, 4,
     13. 3 The appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response to her petition for
     review. PFR File, Tab 14. 4

     the date OSC issued its close-out letter or, if the letter is received more than 5 days
     after its issuance, within 60 days of the date of receipt. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a)(1); e.g.,
     Heimberger v. Department of Commerce, 121 M.S.P.R. 10, ¶ 6 (2014). If the 65th day
     falls on a weekend or holiday, the filing period automatically is extended to the next
     work day. Pry v. Department of the Navy, 59 M.S.P.R. 440, 442-43 (1993); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.23. Here, the 65th day after OSC emailed its May 9, 2019 letter advising the
     appellant of her right to file an IRA appeal with the Board was Saturday, July 13, 2019.
     IAF, Tab 11 at 6-7. Thus, she timely filed her appeal on the next workday, which was
     July 15, 2019. IAF, Tab 1.
     3
       Because the appellant’s arguments at Tabs 1 and 4 of the Petition for Review File are
     identical, we have cited only to where those arguments appear at Tab 1 for the sake of
     clarity. For the same reason, to the extent the appellant repeats the same arguments in
     Petition for Review File, Tab 2, we have cited only to where those arguments appear in
     Tab 1.
     4
       The appellant has filed several motions for leave to submit additional pleadings in
     which she raises “objection[s]” and “concerns” that address arguments already
     mentioned in her petition for review, such as the administrative judge’s decision to
     sever her appeals and failure to issue a decision within 120 days. PFR File, Tabs 10,
     20; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5) (providing that no pleading other than those
     described in 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a) will be accepted unless the Clerk of the Board
     grants the party’s motion to do so). She also raises new claims such as an alleged
     criminal conspiracy. PFR File, Tab 10. Once the record closes on review, no
     additional evidence or argument will be accepted unless it is new and material and was
     not readily available before the record closed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k). We deny the
     appellant’s motions because she has not met these requirements.            See Durr v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 195, ¶ 23 (2013) (denying an appellant’s
     request to submit a document containing information that he failed to show was
     unavailable despite his due diligence before the record closed on review).
                                                                                     4

                                        ANALYSIS
     Our focus in this case is primarily on whether OA, rather than EOP as a whole , is
     subject to the Board’s IRA jurisdiction.
¶5        It is not clear whether the administrative judge based her jurisdictional
     determination on a finding that OA was not an “agency,” or on a determination
     that the entire EOP was not an “agency.” Compare ID at 5 (“The Board lacks
     jurisdiction over IRA appeals from employees in the Office of Administration in
     the Executive Office of the President.”), 8 (“There is no evidence or argument to
     establish that OA, EOP is covered under the definition of an ‘executive
     agency.’”), with ID at 5-6 (finding that EOP was not an executive department or a
     Government corporation, and stating that “[t]his case turns on whether EOP is an
     ‘independent establishment’ in the executive branch”). Because of the unique
     nature of EOP as a collection of “offices and entities that directly support the
     work of the President of the United States . . . courts have routinely examined
     whether individual components within the EOP qualify as ‘independent
     establishments’ or as ‘agencies,’ rather than examining the EOP’s status as a
     whole.”   Argus Secure Technology, LLC, B-419422, B-419422.2, 2021 WL
     694804, *6 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 22,          2021) (citing    Kissinger v. Reporters
     Commission for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980) (determining
     that “the President’s immediate personal staff or units in the [EOP] whose sole
     function is to advise and assist the President” are not agencies subject to the
     Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), even though EOP is expressly included in
     the definition of an “agency” under FOIA (citations omitted))); Citizens for
     Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. Office of Administration, 566 F.3d 219,
     223-24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (CREW) (reviewing which units within EOP the U.S.
     Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (D.C. Circuit) had found were, and which it
     had found were not, agencies subject to FOIA); United States v. Espy, 145 F.3d
     1369, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the D.C. Circuit has declined to
     consider EOP as a whole to be an agency under FOIA); Electronic Privacy
                                                                                            5

     Information Center v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity,
     266 F. Supp. 3d 297, 315-18 (D.D.C. 2017) (declining to deem EOP as a whole a
     “parent agency” subject to the Administrative Procedures Act; instead, examining
     the functions of the EOP entity at issue, the Director of White House Information
     Technology, and concluding it was not an agency). 5 Thus, our review focuses on
     the specific EOP organization that took the actions at issue here, which was OA.

     The central issue in this appeal is whether OA is an independent establishment
     within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 104(1).
¶6         An “employee . . . may, with respect to any personnel action taken, or
     proposed to be taken, against such employee . . . as a result of a prohibited
     personnel practice described in [5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C),
     or (D)], seek corrective action from the [Board]” by filing an IRA appeal.
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). A “personnel action,” in turn, means one of a number of
     listed employment actions “with respect to an employee in . . . a covered position
     in an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Therefore, the Board’s jurisdiction in
     an IRA appeal is dependent, in part, on whether an “agency” took the alleged
     personnel action or actions. 6     See O’Brien v. Office of Independent Counsel,
     74 M.S.P.R. 192, 199 (1997).

     5
       The Board may consider decisions by Federal district courts, and opinions of the
     Comptrollers General and the Attorneys General, as persuasive guidance, but not as
     binding authority. Walker v. Department of the Army, 104 M.S.P.R. 96, ¶ 11 n.2 (2006)
     (finding that the Board may follow district court decisions it finds persuasive); Special
     Counsel v. DeMeo, 77 M.S.P.R. 158, 172 (1997) (finding that the Board may consider
     decisions of the Comptrollers General and Attorney General as persuasive, but not
     binding, authority), aff’d per curiam, 230 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Table). We find
     that, for purposes of our determination to focus primarily on OA, the reasoning of
     Argus Secure Technology and the various courts cited above is persuasive in this case.
     6
       This jurisdictional requirement is absent from chapter 75 of title 5. The only
     requirements for the Board’s chapter 75 jurisdiction generally are that a tenured
     employee suffered an appealable adverse action. Moncada v. Executive Office of the
     President, Office of Administration, 2022 MSPB 25, ¶¶ 13, 24. With exceptions not
     relevant to our discussion here, the Board’s jurisdiction over a chapter 75 appeal is not
                                                                                           6

¶7          An “agency” for purposes of an IRA appeal is defined as an “Executive
     agency” and the Government Publishing Office, but does not include certain
     intelligence and counterintelligence entities and the Government Accountability
     Office (GAO).        5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C).        Section 2302 does not define
     “Executive agency.”     In defining that term in IRA appeals, the U.S. Court of
     Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) and the Board have generally
     relied on 5 U.S.C. § 105. See, e.g., Booker v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     982 F.2d 517, 519 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Wilcox v. International Boundary & Water
     Commission, 103 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 8 (2006); O’Brien, 74 M.S.P.R. at 199; Pessa v.
     Smithsonian Institution, 60 M.S.P.R. 421, 425 (1994). The appellant states in her
     petition for review that the administrative judge “denies section 105 of title 5 is
     applicable in this case.”      PFR File, Tab 2 at 13.        She is mistaken.       The
     administrative judge properly cited to, and relied on, 5 U.S.C. § 105. ID at 5-6 &
     n.3.
¶8          Section 105 of title 5 defines an “Executive agency” as “an Executive
     department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.”
     Sections 101 through 105 of title 5 were enacted together. Act of Sept. 6, 1966,
     Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 378-79 (codified as amended, in pertinent part,
     at 5 U.S.C. §§ 101-105).       Therefore, we read them together as part of a
     harmonious whole. 2A Shambie Singer & Norman Singer, Sutherland Statutes &
     Statutory Construction § 46:5 (7th ed. 2021).        The Executive departments are

     dependent on whether the entity that took the action was an “agency” because the
     relevant statutory language does not contain such a requirement.                5 U.S.C.
     §§ 7511(a)(1), 7512, 7513(d), 7701(a); Moncada, 2022 MSPB 25, ¶¶ 13-20, 24 & n.4.
     Because, as explained above, the Board only has IRA jurisdiction over an “agency,”
     cases addressing the Board’s chapter 75 jurisdiction over OA employees are not helpful
     for our analysis here. Thus, to the extent that the appellant argues that we have
     jurisdiction over this appeal because the Board adjudicated the merits of her coworker’s
     removal under chapter 75 in Moncada, and found it had jurisdiction over an OA
     employee’s chapter 75 appeal in Caveney v. Office of Administration, 64 M.S.P.R. 169,
     170, 172 (1994), PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-10, we find those cases to be inapposite.
                                                                                         7

      listed in 5 U.S.C. § 101. A Government corporation, according to 5 U.S.C. § 103,
      “means a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the
      United States.” An “independent establishment,” as relevant here, is defined as
      “an establishment in the executive branch . . . which is not an Executive
      department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part
      of an independent establishment.” 7 5 U.S.C. § 104(1).
¶9         The administrative judge determined that OA is neither an Executive
      department, nor a Government corporation.         ID at 5-6.    The parties do not
      challenge this determination, and we discern no basis to disturb it.         As the
      administrative judge correctly observed, OA is not included in the list of
      Executive departments set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 101. ID at 5. Moreover, there is no
      indication that OA is a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the
      United States.     ID at 5-6; cf. Snead v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,
      74 M.S.P.R. 501, 503 (1997) (finding that Congress explicitly classified the
      Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as a wholly owned                  Government
      corporation). Therefore, to be an Executive agency within the jurisdiction of the
      Board    in      this   IRA   appeal,   OA    must     meet    the   definition   of
      “independent establishment.”

      OA is an “independent establishment.”
¶10        There are no Board or Federal court cases directly addressing whether OA
      is an “independent establishment” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 104.
      Therefore, the administrative judge looked to other statutes relating to OA and
      decisions that interpreted the terms “agency” or “independent establishment” as
      used in other statutes. ID at 6-8. The appellant disputes the applicability of these

      7
        The definition expressly excludes the U.S. Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory
      Commission, and expressly includes GAO. 5 U.S.C. § 104. Because these entities
      are not before us here, we will not discuss them further.
                                                                                                8

      statutes and cases to this IRA appeal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11. In order to
      address her arguments, we look first to the language of section 104.

             The meaning of “independent establishment.”

¶11         The interpretation of a statute begins with the language of the statute itself.
      Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 13 (2016). As set
      forth above, an “independent establishment” is defined as “an establishment in
      the executive branch . . . which is not an Executive department, military
      department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent
      establishment.” 5 U.S.C. § 104(1). This definition does not clarify what is meant
      by an “establishment.” 8 Instead, section 104 defines “independent establishment”
      primarily in terms of what it excludes.             OA is clearly not an Executive
      department, military department, or Government corporation, or part thereof. We
      find that OA also is not “part of an independent establishment.” Rather, it is part
      of EOP, which as set forth more fully below, itself can be viewed as not an
      independent establishment for purposes of this appeal.

      8
        The heading of section 104 is entitled, “[i]ndependent establishment,” but the text of
      that provision does not suggest that any additional element of “independence” is
      required to meet the definition, other than the requirements set forth in the text. In
      other words, the statutory text contemplates that, so long as an establishment is not an
      Executive department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or
      part of an independent establishment, the establishment is “independent.” Although the
      title and headings of a statute may be “permissible” indicators of meaning, Fulton v.
      City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1928 (2021), and can aid in resolving an
      ambiguity in the legislation’s text, I.N.S. v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights,
      Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991), as the Supreme Court explained in Brotherhood of
      Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947), a
      “wise rule” of statutory interpretation is “that the title of a statute and the heading of a
      section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.” See 2A Sutherland Statutory
      Construction § 47.3(7th ed. 2021) (“The title cannot control a statute’s plain words.”).
      As set forth below, we address whether OA meets the definition of “independent
      establishment” as set forth in the plain meaning of the text of section 104, which is
      clear. We therefore need not separately address the meaning of the term “independent.”
                                                                                        9

¶12         To the extent the statutory term “establishment” may be ambiguous, the
      legislative history of section 104 sheds little light on its meaning.    A Senate
      Report covering the enactment of section 104 merely provides that “[t]he section
      is supplied to avoid the necessity for defining ‘independent establishment’ each
      time it is used in this title,” and that “[c]ertain agencies are not independent
      establishments under the definition since they are constituent agencies or parts of
      an independent establishment.” S. Rep. No. 89-1380, at 22 (1966). However, the
      Senate Report specifies that “these agencies would continue to be subject to the
      provisions of this title applicable to the independent establishment of which th ey
      are a constituent or part.” Id.
¶13         In the absence of a statutory definition or clear guidance in the legislative
      history, the Board generally will interpret words as taking their ordinary,
      contemporary, common meaning.          Weed v. Social Security Administration,
      107 M.S.P.R. 142, ¶ 6 (2007). In determining that meaning, the Board may refer
      to dictionary definitions. Winns v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 113, ¶ 14
      (2017), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 892 F.3d
      1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Therefore, we do so here.
¶14         The ordinary meaning of the term “establishment” has remained essentially
      unchanged since the early 19th century. An “establishment” is “[t]hat which is
      fixed or established; as a . . . local government, an agency, . . . etc.”
      Establishment, Webster’s 1828 Dictionary; see Webster’s 1993 Dictionary 778
      (using similar terms such as “something that has been established ,” and providing
      as an example “a permanent civil or military force or organization”). As set forth
      below, a review of the historical background leading up to the creation of EOP
      and OA is helpful in ascertaining whether OA meets the above definition.

            The history of EOP and OA.

¶15         EOP first came into existence as a result of President Roosevelt’s
      Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939, pt. 1, 4 Fed. Reg. 2727 (July 1, 1939), as
                                                                                        10

      reprinted in 53 Stat. 1423 (1939); Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research
      Service, 98-606 GOV, The Executive Office of the President:          An Historical
      Overview 8 (2008) (Relyea). In his message to Congress accompanying the plan,
      President Roosevelt wrote that the plan reduced the number of agencies reporting
      directly to the President and gave the President “assistance in dealing with the
      entire executive branch by modern means of administrative management.”
      Message of the President to the Congress of the United States Accompanying the
      Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939, as reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. 1.         Both in
      Reorganization Plan No. 1, and in a second reorganization plan issued the same
      year, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1939, the President transferred a number of
      functions and entities to EOP. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939, §§ 1-4, 4 Fed.
      Reg. at 2727-28; Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1939, § 301(a), 4 Fed. Reg. 2731,
      2732 (July 1, 1939), as reprinted in 53 Stat. 1431. By joint resolution, Congress
      provided that both reorganization plans went into effect on July 1, 1939. S.J.
      Res. 138, 76 th Cong., 53 Stat. 813 (1939) (enacted).
¶16        A few months later, the President issued an Executive Order organizing
      EOP by defining its functions and duties so as to provide the President with
      “adequate machinery for the administrative management of the Executive branch
      of the Government.” Exec. Order No. 8248, 4 Fed. Reg. 3864 (Sept. 8, 1939).
      Since its creation, EOP has had a varying number of principal units within it.
      Relyea at 8-10 (2008). As it exists today, “[t]he function of the EOP is to support
      the work of the President . . . at the center of the executive branch of the federal
      government.” Argus Secure Technology, LLC, 2021 WL 694804, *1.
¶17        President   Jimmy    Carter   “established”   OA    in   EOP   by   means     of
      Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, § 2, 42 Fed. Reg. 56,101 (July 15, 1977, as
      amended Sept. 15, 1977), as reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2, refs. & annot.          In a
      message to Congress accompanying the plan, the President emphasized that “ EOP
      exists to serve the President and should be structured to meet his needs,” and that
      he desired to “[l]imit the EOP, wherever possible, to functions directly related to
                                                                                         11

      the President’s work.”     Message of the President Transmitting Reorganization
      Plan No. 1 of 1977 (July 15, 1977), as reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2, refs. & annot.
      He summarized the functions of EOP as including, for example, “[p]rovid[ing]
      day-to-day operational support (e.g., scheduling, appointments),” assisting with
      presidential communications, and managing his “decisionmaking processes
      efficiently and fairly.” Id.
¶18         Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 provided that OA shall “be headed by
      the President,” have a Director “appointed by the President,” and “provide
      components of [EOP] with such administrative services as the President shall
      from time to time direct.”       Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, § 2, 42 Fed.
      Reg. 56,101.    President Carter set forth additional information and direction
      regarding     OA’s   responsibilities   in   Executive    Order   No. 12,028, 42 Fed.
      Reg. 62,895 (Dec. 12, 1977).        Per the Executive Order, OA “shall provide
      common administrative support and services to all units within [EOP], ” and
      “upon request, assist the White House Office in performing its role of
      providing . . . administrative services” to the President.             Executive Order
      No. 12,028,    § 3(a),   42 Fed.   Reg.      at 62,895.     Further,    OA’s   common
      administrative support and services “shall encompass all types of administrative
      support and services that may be used by, or useful to, units within [EOP],”
      including personnel management services,             equal employment opportunity
      programs, financial management services, data processing, library services,
      records, information services, and mail services. Executive Order No. 12,028,
      § 3(b), 42 Fed. Reg. at 62,895. The Director of OA shall, among other things,
      “do all other things that the President, as head of [OA], might do.” Executive
      Order No. 12,028, § 4(a)(4), 42 Fed. Reg. at 62,896. Thus, OA is an extension of,
      and provides support to, the President.         It also supports EOP, which reports
      directly to, and serves as an extension of, the President.
                                                                                        12

            OA meets the definition of “independent establishment.”

¶19         As discussed above, the meaning of the word establishment” has remained
      virtually unchanged throughout this period.       An “establishment” could be a
      permanent civil, military, public, or private institution. Establishment, Webster’s
      1828 Dictionary; see Webster’s 1993 Dictionary 778.        OA is an establishment
      within the meaning of this definition. EOP was created in 1939, and since OA
      was “established” in 1977 by means of Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977, it has
      been a civil organization within EOP. See Pessa, 60 M.S.P.R. at 425 (finding the
      Smithsonian Institution to be an “independent establishment” under 5 U.S.C.
      § 104 because the statute creating it identified it as an “establishment,” and it was
      independent of any of the Executive departments).             As examples of its
      permanency, it has subdivisions and a staff. IAF, Tab 2 at 87 (describing the
      appellant’s position as within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO)
      within OA), Tab 9 at 123-24 (establishing a Staff Advisory Council within OA,
      which is designed to “provide a unified voice to the Director and chief officers to
      affect meaningful change on behalf of the OA workforce,” and “serve as a bridge
      between staff and senior management”), 124 (listing five offices within OA),
      Tab 12 at 52, 57 (describing positions as existing within the White House
      Information Technology subdivision of OA and the CFO Office).
¶20         Moreover, OA is not “part of an independent establishment.”           5 U.S.C.
      § 104(1).   As set forth above, OA is integrated into EOP and subject to the
      President’s control. The U.S. Government Manual’s organizational chart does not
      include EOP on its list of independent establishments, but instead places it on the
      chart directly under the President and Vice President.       Federal Register, The
      United States     Government       Manual,      Organizational      Chart     (2021)
      https://www.usgovernmentmanual.gov (last visited Aug. 1, 2022); see 1 C.F.R.
      § 9.1 (requiring the Director of the Administrative Committee of the Federal
      Registrar to publish the U.S. Government Manual).         As previously discussed,
                                                                                            13

      EOP itself operates at the center of the Executive branch, serves the President’s
      needs, and is limited, as much as possible, to supporting his work. E.g., Message
      of the President Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 (July 15, 1977),
      as reprinted in 3 U.S.C. ch. 2, refs. & annot; Argus Secure Technology, 2021 WL
      694804, *1. 9
¶21         The appellant asserts on review that Wilcox, 103 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶¶ 8-10,
      supports a finding that OA is an “agency” for purposes of her IRA appeal. PFR
      File, Tab 2 at 20. In Wilcox, the Board found that the International Boundary and
      Water Commission (IBWC) was an “agency” for purposes of the appellant’s IRA
      appeal because, among other things, IBWC employees were covered by various
      provisions of title 5 of the U.S. Code, such as the Federal Employees’ Retirement
      System, the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Program, the Federal
      Employees’ Health Benefits Program, title 5 leave provisions, and the Fair Labor
      Standards Act, all of which the Board found either rely on the same definition of
      “agency” or apply to “executive agencies.” Id., ¶¶ 8-10. The Board found that
      “[t]hese are all indicia of Executive agency status.” Id., ¶ 9. While there appear
      to be some organizational differences between OA and IBWC, we agree with the
      appellant that Wilcox does provide some support for our determination in this
      case, given that the appellant is also covered by many of those same programs
      and statutes. IAF, Tab 12 at 51, 56.
¶22         Similarly, we find support for our determination in O’Brien, 74 M.S.P.R.
      at 200, 202. The Board found therein that the Office of Independent Counsel was
      an executive agency, and thus within the definition of “agency” for purposes of
      the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), primarily because of the lack of an

      9
          Even assuming, however, that EOP were to be considered an “independent
      establishment,” such a determination would not affect our determination in this case.
      As set forth above, see supra ¶ 12, OA would continue to be subject to the provisions of
      title 5 applicable to the independent establishment of which it is a constituent or part.
                                                                                       14

      express statutory exclusion of that entity from 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C), as well
      as court and GAO determinations finding that it was within the Executive branch.
      The Board quoted from a GAO finding that independent counsels and their staff
      are governed by the same statutory provisions and regulations applicable to other
      executive branch officers and employees contained in title 5 of the U.S. Code
      relating to pay, allowances, travel, and transportation. Id. at 200.
¶23         More importantly, because the whistleblower statutes are remedial
      legislation, the Board will construe them liberally to embrace all cases fairly
      within their scope, so as to effectuate the purpose of those statutes. Fishbein v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 102 M.S.P.R. 4, ¶ 8 (2006). In this
      case, such a liberal construction includes 5 U.S.C. §§ 1221(a), 2302(a)(2)(A), and
      2302(a)(2)(C), which together permit an employee in a covered position in an
      “agency” to seek corrective action from the Board.         The specific mention of
      certain things in a statute implies the exclusion of other things.     See Graves,
      123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 13.         Here, it is significant that, although 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(C) specifically excludes certain Federal entities from the definition
      of “agency,” including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
      Intelligence Agency, other entities involved in intelligence or counterintelligence
      activities, and the GAO, it does not identify OA as being so excluded.          See
      O’Brien, 74 M.S.P.R. at 199 (holding that, when Congress excluded government
      entities from coverage of the breadth of Federal civil service protections, it has
      done so with specificity).     Thus, this failure to specifically exclude OA from
      section 2302(a)(2)(C) informs our interpretation of the term “Executive agency”
      in that section, especially given that the definition of “Executive agency” set
      forth at 5 U.S.C. § 105 is not specific to the whistleblower process.           See
      Jacobsen v. Department of Justice, 101 M.S.P.R. 134, ¶ 7 (2006) (holding that
      specific statutory language aimed at a particular situation ordinarily controls over
      general statutory language).
                                                                                              15

¶24         In fact, the legislative history of the 1994 Amendments to the WPA
      indicates that Congress was dissatisfied with the Board’s narrow interpretation of
      the statute that led to gaps in coverage.        O’Brien, 74 M.S.P.R. at 208.        In its
      discussion of the expansion of the definition of “agency” in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(C) to include a government corporation, the responsible House
      Committee    warned    against    technically    rigid   criteria   and   directed    that
      “government corporation” be broadly construed to cover the full range of
      federally-funded institutions “where the merit system may be relevant to defend
      the taxpayers’ interest.”        H.R. Rep. No. 103-769, at 23 (1994).                More
      significantly, the report provided as follows:
            H.R. 2970 expands merit system coverage to virtually the entire
            Federal workforce, including employees of the Department of
            Veterans’ Affairs and of Government corporations. In addition to
            those agencies exempted under section 2302(c)(ii) and 2302(c)(iii)
            (the General Accounting Office, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
            the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
            the National Security Agency, and upon Presidential determination,
            any Executive agency or unit thereof the principle function of which
            is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
            activities), the only employees not covered are those expected [sic]
            from the competitive service when they applied or took office;
            because of [the] position’s confidential, policy-determining,
            policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or those excluded by
            the President based on the President’s determination that it is
            necessary and warranted by conditions of good administration.
      Id. at 10. Given the above language in the legislative history, our determination
      regarding OA adopts a         broad construction         of   the terms “independent
      establishment” and “Executive agency” to help expand whistleblower protection
      coverage and make the merit systems more relevant to taxpayer interests.
¶25         Our interpretation of the applicable whistleblower statutes as not excluding
      the appellant from Board appeal rights is not only consistent with the legislative
      history of the Amendments, but is also consistent with OA’s historical position on
      the appeal rights of its employees.       The Presidential and Executive Office
                                                                                      16

      Accountability Act (PEOAA), Pub. L. No. 104-331, 110 Stat. 4053 (1996)
      (codified at 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-471), expanded the rights of individuals employed at
      the EOP.      The laws that became applicable to EOP employees under PEOAA
      included, among others, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, title VII of the
      Civil Rights Act of 1964, various other statutes prohibiting discrimination, the
      Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, and the Occupational Sa fety and Health
      Act of 1970.      3 U.S.C. § 402.   PEOAA’s failure to include the applicable
      whistleblower statutes of title 5 in the list suggests that Congress already
      considered certain EOP employees to be covered by those statutes, which
      predated PEOAA. In fact, in recommending the extension of these discrimination
      and labor protections to EOP employees, the House Report appeared to assume
      that the Board had jurisdiction over most EOP employees.           See H.R. Rep.
      No. 104-820, at 40-42 (1996) (indicating that most EOP employees “are covered
      by Title 5 of the U.S. Code,” and that “Title 5 [EOP] employees are already
      entitled to an administrative . . . hearing” before the Equal Employment
      Opportunity Commission or the Board), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4348,
      4375-77.
¶26         The legislative history also includes testimony regarding H.R. 3452, the bill
      that became PEOAA, from Franklin S. Reeder, then-Director of OA. Mr. Reeder
      explained that, “[t]he vast majority of [EOP] employees —two thirds or more—are
      civil service employees covered by the same protections and rights as other career
      executive branch employees under Title 5 of the U.S. Code.” Presidential and
      Executive Office Accountability Act:        Hearing on H.R. 3452 Before the
      Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform and
      Oversight, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 152 (1996) (statement of
      Franklin S. Reeder, Director, Office of Administration, Executive Office of the
      President).     He contrasted these employees with the remaining one third,
      employed “in the four offices closest to the President: the White House Office,
                                                                                      17

      Office of the Vice President, Office of Policy Development, and Exe cutive
      Residence.” As to these employees:
               By long tradition and express statutory authority, employees in
               these four offices have served at the pleasure of the President. As
               Congress mandated in the provisions of Title 3 of the
               United States Code, these employees are hired “without regard to
               any other provision of law regulating the employment or
               compensation of persons in the Government service . . . . This
               long tradition and express statutory authority flow from the
               structure of the federal government established by the
               United States Constitution.      The unfettered ability of the
               President to choose his closest advisers—and to choose when to
               dismiss them—is a necessary outgrowth of the separation and
               balance of the branches of government established in
               the Constitution.
      Id. at 152-53. In a footnote, Mr. Reeder added:
               The [OA] is also authorized by Title 3, but its employees are, by
               design, virtually all career civil servants hired under Title 5
               authority. A small number of [OA] employees are Title 3
               employees who serve at the will of the President, on the same
               standing as employees in the White House Office and the other
               three Title 3 offices. See 3 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1)(A). Accordingly,
               the Office of Administration is more properly treated as a
               “Title 5” agency for purposes of the applicability of employee
               workplace laws.
      Id. at 152 n.1. In later proceedings held on the PEOAA bill, the idea of creating a
      new entity to review EOP employee claims was abandoned, with Representative
      Carolyn Maloney explaining that EOP “employees already have recour se to the
      Merit Systems Protection Board.” 142 Cong. Rec. H12,283-02, H12,286 (daily
      ed. Oct. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Maloney).
¶27        In sum, because we find that OA is an independent establishment under
      5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103-104, it is also an Executive agency under 5 U.S.C. § 105,
      and therefore      meets the definition   of   “agency” set forth at      5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(C).
                                                                                        18

      We decline to rely on decisions interpreting other statutes and concerning other
      agencies to determine whether OA is an independent establishment.
¶28         We note that the agency and the administrative judge relied in part on
      CREW, 566 F.3d at 220, 222, a case in which the court found that OA was not an
      “agency” under FOIA, and therefore not covered by that statute. Although we
      have relied on CREW in our determination above that the agency at issue in this
      case is OA and not EOP, we otherwise find the CREW decision distinguishable
      and do not rely upon it as a touchstone for determining the status of the OA. The
      court in CREW noted that the term “agency” was defined for purposes of FOIA
      as, among other things, an “establishment in the executive branch of the
      Government (including the Executive Office of the President).” Id. at 222. The
      court determined that the issue in deciding whether an EOP unit was an “agency”
      subject to FOIA      was whether the entity wielded substantial authority
      independently of the President.    Id. In adopting this standard, the court cited
      Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156, which relied on the legislative history of FOIA. Id.
      The court concluded that the OA was not an “agency” subject to FOIA because it
      did not wield substantial independent authority. Id. at 223-24. The statutes at
      issue in this case differ significantly from those in CREW. Moreover, as set forth
      above, there is scant legislative history for 5 U.S.C. § 104; thus, there is no basis
      for using the CREW test to determine the status of OA in this case.
¶29         The agency and the administrative judge also relied on 3 U.S.C.
      § 107(b)(1), which provides that the President is authorized to regulate the
      employment and compensation of certain OA employees without regard to other
      provisions of law. ID at 7-8. The administrative judge found that this statute
      supports a finding that OA is not an “agency” because “the President may
      exercise authority over employees of OA as he determines to be appropriate.” ID
      at 8. However, section 107(b)(1) addresses the President’s authority to appoint
      and fix the pay of not more than 10 OA employees at designated rates of basic
      pay “without regard to such other provisions of law as the President may specify
                                                                                        19

      which regulate the employment and compensation of persons in the Government
      service.” It does not suggest that all employees of OA are appointed under the
      authority of title 3 of the U.S. Code.     In fact, as set forth above, most EOP
      employees are appointed under the authority of title 5 of the U.S. Code.
      Therefore, we are not persuaded that section 107(b)(1) provides a basis for
      making a determination as to whether OA is an “independent establishment”
      under 5 U.S.C. § 104. 10
¶30         The administrative judge relied on Haddon v. Walters, 43 F.3d 1488, 1489
      (D.C. Cir. 1995), wherein the court addressed whether an employee of the
      Executive Residence of the White House could bring a title VII discrimination
      case under 29 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. ID at 6. The administrative judge noted that
      the court, in finding that the Executive Residence was not an “independent
      establishment,” relied on 3 U.S.C. § 112, which the court held “distinguish[es]”
      the   Executive   Residence   from    independent   establishments.      ID   at 6-7.
      Section 112 provides that “[t]he head of any department, agency, or independent
      establishment of the executive branch of the Government may detail, from time to
      time, employees of such department, agency, or establishment to the White House
      Office, the Executive Residence at the White House, the Office of the Vice
      President, the Domestic Policy Staff, and the Office of Administration.” 3 U.S.C.

      10
         The agency cites to Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977 in support of its contention
      that “by law, staff members of OA are appointed by the President himself (or his
      designee).” PFR File, Tab 13 at 16. However, section 2 of that reorganization plan,
      which establishes the OA in the EOP, only references the President’s appointment of
      the Director of the OA, who shall serve as its chief administrative officer.
      The agency also contends that the Board’s website provides that PEOAA is the “only
      basis” for its jurisdiction over EOP employees, and onl y after certain procedural
      requirements have been met. PFR File, Tab 13 at 20-21. The agency has not shown
      that the Board is bound by informational statements included on its website to assist
      appellants with answers to common questions. In any event, t he Board’s website
      merely provides a brief description of PEOAA; it does not identify PEOAA as the only
      basis for Board jurisdiction over an appeal filed by an EOP employee.
                                                                                            20

      § 112. It provides that any such office to which an employee has be en detailed
      shall reimburse the detailing department, agency, or establishment for the pay of
      each employee under certain circumstances. Id. Thus, Haddon held that because
      Congress     distinguished     the    Executive     Residence      from    independent
      establishments, this suggested that Congress did not regard the Executive
      Residence to be an independent establishment. Haddon, 43 F.3d at 1490. The
      administrative judge applied analogous reasoning to OA. ID at 6-7. 11
¶31         However, we find that a provision in a statute like 3 U.S.C. § 112, relating
      to details involving certain entities within EOP, does not shed light on the intent
      of Congress regarding whistleblower protections in general, and whether an OA
      employee can file an IRA appeal in particular. In other words, although Congress
      may have intended that independent establishments be distinct from the OA for
      purposes of details—although section 112 could just as easily be read as simply
      setting forth a way of authorizing certain details without implying anything about
      the status of the sending and receiving entities—it does not shed light on the
      intent of Congress regarding whistleblower rights. Thus, we find that 3 U.S.C.
      § 112 and 5 U.S.C. § 104 are not in pari materia, and that section 112 is therefore
      not helpful in discerning the meaning of the term “independent establishment.”
      See Iverson v. United States, 973 F.3d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying the
      statutory canon requiring that statutes be in pari materia (“on the same subject”)
      before courts can construe them “as if they were one law,” and finding that the
      Federal Tort Claims Act and the Air Transportation Security Act are not “on the

      11
          The appellant contends that Haddon is distinguishable from this appeal because
      Mr. Haddon was appointed to his White House chef position under the authority of
      title 3 of the U.S. Code, while she was appointed to her positi on under the authority of
      title 5. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11. Given our determination that the reasoning in
      Haddon is otherwise not persuasive for purposes of this appeal, we need not address
      this argument.
                                                                                      21

      same subject,” and thus, “there is no reason to assume that Congress attached the
      same meanings to employee and officer in each.”).
¶32        Moreover, any reliance on 3 U.S.C. § 112 in interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 104 has
      an unacceptable statutory effect. It uses a later enactment —3 U.S.C. § 112—to
      aid in the construction of an earlier enactment—5 U.S.C. § 104. In this regard,
      section 112 was enacted as part of Pub. L. No. 95-570, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 2449, on
      November 2, 1978.     Section 104, by contrast, was enacted as part of Pub. L.
      No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 379, on September 6, 1966.        Relying on section 112 in
      construing section 104, therefore, would require the Board to hold that Congress
      silently informed or altered a term’s meaning in one statute by passing an
      unrelated statute over 10 years later, which would be contrary to general
      principles of statutory interpretation. See Iverson, 973 F.3d at 849-50.

      The appellant is an “employee” in a “covered position.”
¶33        Because the administrative judge did not address any other jurisdictional
      issues in this IRA appeal, we address some of them here. The right to file an IRA
      appeal derives from 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a), which provides a right to seek corrective
      action from the Board to “an employee, former employee, or applicant for
      employment.”     Fishbein, 102 M.S.P.R. 4, ¶ 11.      To be an employee under
      section 1221(a), an individual must meet the definition of employee un der
      5 U.S.C. § 2105. Id., ¶ 12. Under 5 U.S.C. § 2105(a), an “employee” is: (1) an
      officer and an individual who is appointed in the civil service by one of the types
      of individuals enumerated in the statute acting in their official capacity;
      (2) engaged in the performance of a Federal function under authority of law or an
      Executive act; and (3) subject to the supervision of an authorized official while
      engaged in the performance of the duties of his position. The “civil service” is
      defined as “all appointive positions in the executive, judicial, and legislative
      branches of the Government of the United States, except positions in the
      uniformed services.” 5 U.S.C. § 2101(1). Based on the record, it appears that the
      appellant meets the definition of an employee. IAF, Tab 11 at 19, 59, Tab 12
                                                                                        22

      at 43-52, 56-57. The agency does not assert otherwise. IAF, Tab 8; PFR File,
      Tab 13.
¶34        A “covered position” means, among other things, “any position in the
      competitive service,” but does not include any position that is excepted from the
      competitive   service    because    of      its   confidential,   policy-determining,
      policy-making, or policy-advocating character, or that is excluded from the
      coverage of section 2302 by the President based on a determination by the
      President that it is necessary and warranted by conditions of good administration.
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B).     The record reflects that the appellant occupied
      positions in the competitive service.    IAF, Tab 11 at 19, 59, Tab 12 at 51-52,
      56-57.    There is no indication that her positions were excepted from the
      competitive service for a reason listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B)(i) or excluded
      from coverage based on a determination by the President.            See Usharauli v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 116 M.S.P.R. 383, ¶ 18 (2011). The
      agency does not make such arguments in this case. IAF, Tab 8; PFR File, Tab 13.
      Thus, we find that the appellant’s positions were “covered” under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(B).

      The appellant’s remaining arguments on review are without merit.
¶35        The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s decision to sever this
      appeal from her appeal of her separation from employment. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5;
      Maloney v. Office of Administration, Executive Office of the President , MSPB
      Docket No. DC-0752-20-0092-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 38. On October 30,
      2019, the administrative judge joined this IRA appeal involving pre -separation
      personnel actions with the appellant’s separation appeal. IAF, Tab 17. However,
      in her July 23, 2020 initial decision, the administrative judge stated that “the
      appeals were later severed.” ID at 3 n.1.
¶36        An administrative judge may join cases if doing so would expedite
      processing of the cases and not adversely affect the interests of the parties.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(b).   The decision whether to join two appeals is a matter
                                                                                             23

      committed to the sound discretion of the administrative judge in accordance with
      the above guidance. McCarthy v. International Boundary & Water Commission,
      116 M.S.P.R. 594, ¶ 10 (2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 4 (Fed. Cir. 2012).                By
      extension, an administrative judge has the same discretion in severing appeals.
      The appellant has shown no abuse of discretion by the administrative judge in her
      determination to sever the appeals.        See Orr v. Department of the Treasury,
      83 M.S.P.R. 117, ¶ 6 n.2 (1999) (finding no abuse of discretion in the
      administrative judge’s failure to grant joinder), aff’d per curiam, 232 F.3d 912
      (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table).
¶37         Additionally, the appellant appears to argue that she was not given
      sufficient notice to object to the administrative judge’s decision to sever the
      appeals because she first learned of the severance in the initia l decision. 12 PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 4-5.    Assuming, without deciding, that the administrative judge
      erred in failing to provide prior notice, the appellant has failed to demonstrate
      how she was harmed. An administrative judge’s procedural error is of no lega l
      consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s substantive
      rights. See Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R. 124, 127 (1981). The
      jurisdictional issue in the instant appeal is unaffected by its joinder with or
      severance from the appellant’s appeal of her separation.
¶38         The appellant also appears to assert that the administrative judge decided to
      sever her appeals and dismiss the instant appeal after she complained to the

      12
         The appellant similarly appears to assert that she received the email notification that
      her appeal was severed 48 hours after it was issued. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 14. She
      also asserts that the way in which her private email provider displayed emails in her
      inbox caused her to overlook some of the Board’s emails. Id. at 14. Throughout this
      appeal, the appellant has been a registered e-filer. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. As such, she has an
      obligation to monitor case activity in the Board’s e -Appeal Online system, and the
      initial decision is deemed to have been served on her on the date it was issued.
      5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.14(j)(3), (m)(2). Her arguments regarding her receipt of automated
      email notifications from e-Appeal Online do not demonstrate any error by the
      administrative judge or the Board.
                                                                                           24

      Department of Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility regarding the
      administrative judge’s “intentional delay of Appellant’s due process .” PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 6, Tab 2 at 25-26. In making a claim of bias against an administrative
      judge, a party must overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity that
      accompanies administrative adjudicators. Thompson v. Department of the Army,
      122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 29 (2015). An administrative judge’s conduct during the
      course of a proceeding warrants a new adjudication only if her comments or
      actions evidence a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
      judgment impossible. Id. We find that the appellant’s allegations of bias do not
      meet this standard. The mere fact that the administrative judge ruled against a
      party does not establish bias. Id.
¶39         The appellant further contends that the administrative judge did not meet
      the Board’s 120-day time limit for issuing an initial decision and incorrectly
      stated that the agency placed her on a performance impr ovement plan when it
      actually placed her on a work improvement plan. 13 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 8-9, 12.

      13
         The appellant also appears to challenge the administrative judge’s determination that
      she did not appeal the denial of a WIGI. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. She cites to locations in
      the record purportedly reflecting that she raised two WIGI denials, one in July 2017,
      and another in July 2018, and appears to allege she was denied a third WIGI in 2019.
      Id. (citing IAF, Tab 1 at 9-10, Tab 14 at 7-8); IAF, Tab 11 at 37-38. Although the
      administrative judge acknowledged that the appellant raised a WIGI denial as an alleged
      personnel action in this IRA appeal, she observed that the appellant did not otherwise
      seek to appeal the denial. ID at 4 n.2. We discern no error by the administrative judge
      in this regard. When an appellant raises a claim that may fall within the Board’s
      jurisdiction, the Board must provide explicit information on what is required to
      establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The record contains no records of WIGI denials
      in 2018 or 2019. As to the July 2017 WIGI denial, the agency issued a final decision to
      withhold the appellant’s WIGI on August 22, 2017, and notified her of her right to
      appeal that action to the Board within 30 days. IAF, Tab 11 at 28-29. The appellant
      filed the instant appeal approximately 11 months later. In her initial appeal, the
      appellant contested at least 30 alleged personnel actions since 2015, including two
      WIGI denials. IAF, Tab 1 at 7-10. Thus, read in context, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the appellant raised her WIGI denials as alleged personnel
                                                                                          25

      These arguments are without merit. The Board’s general practice is to issue an
      initial decision within 120 days of the filing of the appeal.            McCollum v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 75 M.S.P.R. 449, 462 (1997). This time period
      is a yardstick that the Board relies on to evaluate its administrative judges and its
      rate of expeditiously processing appeals.        Milner v. Department of Justice,
      87 M.S.P.R. 660, ¶ 9 (2001). Although the administrative judge issued the initial
      decision 8 months beyond the 120-day standard, compare IAF, Tab 1 at 1, with
      ID at 1, the appellant has not shown that the administrative judge was biased
      against her or otherwise committed reversible error in this regard.                See
      McCollum, 75 M.S.P.R. at 462; Sanborn v. Department of the Navy, 15 M.S.P.R.
      553, 554 (1983). Further, the nomenclature used by the administrative judge to
      address the appellant’s performance or work improve ment plan is not relevant to
      the jurisdictional issue.
¶40         The appellant appears to reiterate a claim of sexual harassment that she
      raised below. PFR File, Tab 2 at 21-22, Tab 14 at 10-11; IAF, Tab 1 at 8, 14.
      This claim does not bring her appeal within the Board’s IRA jurisdiction.
      Discrimination claims do not provide the Board with an independent source of
      jurisdiction. Wooten v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶ 11
      (2006). Further, the Board lacks the authority to decide, in conjunction with an
      IRA appeal, the merits of an appellant’s allegation of prohibited discrimination.
      Newcastle v. Department of the Treasury, 94 M.S.P.R. 242, ¶ 12 (2003).
      Therefore, the appellant’s discrimination claim does not change the outcome in
      this appeal.

      actions in this IRA appeal and not as otherwise appealable actions. To the extent that
      the appellant is now attempting to appeal the denials of WIGIs as separate matters
      under 5 U.S.C. § 5335(c), she may file a Board appeal challenging those actions . She
      will need to show that such an appeal is timely filed or that good cause exists for any
      delay in filing. See Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980);
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(b).
                                                                                      26

¶41        Finally, the appellant claims that: the administrative judge failed to rule on
      her request that he ask the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) for an injunction
      against EOP; she has new evidence concerning her health condition; and the
      agency’s attorneys engaged in misconduct. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 12, Tab 2 at 24;
      IAF, Tab 1 at 14-15. Although the Board may rule on an appellant’s request to
      stay an employing agency’s personnel action, the appellant has not shown that
      she has met the criteria for the Board to seek a stay or injunction on her behalf.
      5 C.F.R. §§ 1209.8-1209.10. The appellant’s medical condition and any alleged
      misconduct by the agency’s attorneys are not relevant to the jurisdictional issue,
      and do not warrant a different result in this case.
¶42        Having found that OA is an “agency” for purposes of an IRA appeal and
      that the appellant is an “employee” in a “covered positio n,” the remaining
      jurisdictional questions in this case include whether the appellant has exhausted
      her remedy with OSC and made nonfrivolous allegations that she made a
      protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity that w as a contributing
      factor in a personnel action.       See Graves, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 12.        The
      administrative judge shall address these questions on remand. If the appellant
      establishes Board jurisdiction over this IRA appeal, the administrative judge shall
      adjudicate the merits of the appeal.
                                                                                   27

                                           ORDER
¶43         Accordingly, we remand this case for further adjudication c onsistent with
      this Opinion and Order, including the hearing the appellant requested.

      FOR THE BOARD:

      /s/
      Jennifer Everling
      Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.