Court Opinion

ID: 9792830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:37:41.369098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:57.327409
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the views of the majority in this case. I would affirm the judgment of the district court. This is not because I have any quarrel with the technical accuracy of the conclusion drawn in the majority opinion that Floyd C. Reno, Sr., following the 1972 agreement with Harriet Reno, was possessed only of a life estate with a special power of appointment. It is my conclusion, however, that the appellants are estopped from asserting that Floyd C. Reno, Sr., was possessed only of a life estate coupled with the power of appointment. Furthermore, I am persuaded that included in the property held by the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., deceased, there is a 25 percent undivided mineral interest in the lands which were the subject of the 1972 agreement and which is different property from the life estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr.
Other events which are not referred to in the majority opinion must be recognized. The situation is not unlike witnessing a clever quarterback on a football field. It is sometimes possible to lose track of the ball. The 25 percent undivided mineral interest in the lands in issue here, which is different from Floyd C. Reno, Sr.’s interest, became a part of the estate property as a product of an interesting series of events. First of all it should be noted that the interest which the majority opinion describes as a life estate subject to a power of appointment was inventoried and appraised in the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., both by an Inventory and Appraisement filed on March 4, 1977, and by an Amended Inventory and Ap-praisement filed July 27, 1977. In the Amended Inventory and Appraisement the value of the mineral interest was increased, and it seems to have been the deliberate intent to include that property in the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr. Thereafter, on April 28,1977, Harriet P. Reno and Mathew John Reno and Harriet Reno Underwood entered into an agreement which provided that Harriet P. Reno had conveyed to the estate *557of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., a part of her interest in and to the minerals which had been the subject of the 1972 agreement between her and Floyd C. Reno, Sr. The agreement identified Mathew John Reno and Harriet Reno Underwood as two of the devisees under the Last Will and Testament of Floyd C. Reno, Sr. It noted that they were devised an interest .in the minerals in and under the lands described in an executor’s deed from Mathew John Reno to Harriet P. Reno and that they had consented to the sale of that mineral interest. The apparent consideration was the conveyance of an equivalent interest by the Reno estate to Harriet P. Reno.
By a mineral deed executed on April 17, 1978, which was recorded on April 21, 1978, Harriet P. Reno did convey to Mathew J. Reno, executor of the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., an undivided 50 percent of her interest in the oil and gas and other minerals which were acquired by virtue of the mineral deed dated October 4, 1972, from Geraldine McKinney. (This transaction is described in some detail in the majority opinion.) In the meantime, by an executor’s deed executed on June 20, 1977, and recorded June 28,1977, Mathew John Reno, as executor of the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., deceased, conveyed to Harriet P. Reno an undivided one-half interest in the minerals held by lands of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., which had previously been inventoried and appraised in his estate.
On June 16,1977, Mathew J. Reno filed a Return and Account of Sale of Real Property in the Estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., Deceased, pursuant to which he reported the transaction described above. On the same date there was filed a Consent to Sale of Real Property in the estate proceeding executed by Mathew John Reno and Harriet Reno Underwood. On June 17, 1977, the district judge in his probate capacity executed and there was caused to be filed an Order Confirming Sale of Real Property, which confirmed the transaction set forth above. In so doing the appellants invoked the authority of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, and created a record which would cause others to believe that the transaction had been endorsed by the court. It is noteworthy that consistently with the position previously taken these mineral interests were included as property of the estate in the Final Accounting and Petition for Distribution which was filed by Mathew John Reno on November 23, 1977.
By virtue of these machinations it is my opinion that these appellants not only succeeded in causing to be included in the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., Deceased, 25 percent of an undivided mineral interest in the lands previously owned by Floyd C. Reno, Sr., and Harriet P. Reno, which were not held by Floyd C. Reno, Sr., as a life estate subject to a power of appointment, but they took a position with respect to these matters which has the effect of invoking a judicial estoppel against them. They should be estopped from asserting in this case that the mineral interests are not a part of the estate of Floyd C. Reno, Sr., deceased. I take no position as to how other parties who might have an interest in such lands should be treated, but would hold only that these two parties, the appellants here, are foreclosed from asserting the contentions they present in this appeal relative to the limited nature of the interest owned by Floyd C. Reno, Sr.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel has been invoked on prior occasions by this court. Snell v. Ruppert, Wyo., 582 P.2d 916 (1978); Gray v. Fitzhugh, Wyo., 576 P.2d 88 (1978); Allen v. Allen, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1137 (1976); hatten Realty Co. v. Baylies, 42 Wyo. 69, 290 P. 561 (1930). In my judgment this language from Allen v. Allen is apt and applicable:
“The principle, while denominated judicial estoppel, is sometimes referred to as a doctrine which estops a party to play fast and loose with the courts or to trifle with judicial proceedings. It is an expression of the maxim that one cannot blow hot and cold in the same breath. A party will just not be allowed to maintain inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, as here. 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 117, pp. 624-625. [Footnote omitted.]
*558“ * * * Following the same reasoning reached in flatten, it would be highly inequitable for the defendant to have a decree in his divorce case holding the property not to be his and at the same time be held the owner of an interest in this proceeding. It is that very inconsistency that judicial estoppel will not tolerate. Defendant’s statements in the previous action are the very highest order of evidence against him and are entitled to judicial sanctity. He cannot play hanky-panky with the courts of this state and thus interfere with the integrity of the judicial system. * * *
“We are not a bit concerned that the matter of judicial estoppel was not raised in the lower court or argued by either of the parties. This court has general superintending control over all the courts of the state [footnote omitted] and the Wyoming judicial system in general. It is our duty to protect its integrity and prohibit dealing lightly with its proceedings. We are at liberty to decide a case upon any point which in our opinion the ends of justice require, [footnote omitted] particularly on a point so fundamental that we must take cognizance of it. [Footnote omitted]” 550 P.2d at 1142.
The same comment is appropriate with respect to language from Snell v. Ruppert, supra:
“ * * * By failing to raise at this obviously appropriate juncture an assertion of ownership, plaintiffs’ predecessors not only interrupted the continuous nature of their ownership claim, but erected as well the barrier of judicial estoppel to any future assertion of ownership by themselves or their successor in interest, the plaintiffs herein. One cannot blow hot and then cold on the same point in separate judicial proceedings. [Citations.] In effect, the former proceedings quieted title in the defendant as far as plaintiffs are concerned. Such an estoppel result may well be particularly appropriate in the situation at bar in the light of the fact that plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, as revealed by the record, are closely related by blood and marriage.” 582 P.2d at 918.
The appellants by their conduct have subjected themselves to the accusations that they wanted to play “fast and loose with the courts” and attempted to “blow hot and cold in the same breath.” It seems to me that the district court was concerned that the appellants were attempting to use and misuse the court “and thus interfere with the integrity of the judicial system.” I agree with that concern, and for that reason I would affirm the judgment of the district court.