Court Opinion

ID: 9596730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:52:35.997064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:30.077781
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. The trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests of justice in the administration of criminal justice. The adversary nature of the proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his own initiative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a just determination of the trial. The only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law. (ABA Standards of Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge [June, 1972], § 1.1; see also State v. Keehn, 85 Kan. 765, 118 Pac. 851, and State v. Bean, 179 Kan. 373, 295 P. 2d 600.)
In a criminal action it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the theories of both the prosecution and the accused so far as they are supported by any competent evidence. The instructions given must be germane to the issues raised by the charge in the information and limited to those issues supported by some evidence. (State v. Hamrick, 206 Kan. 543, 479 P. 2d 854; K.S.A. 1972 Supp. 22-3414 [3].)
Under the law of this state an accused may by information be charged along with another as having committed a crime when it is apparent his participation in the crime was only to the extent of aiding and assisting the other. This was the present case. When the state requested an instruction on aiding and assisting in the crime of Glover in this case the trial court was obligated to give some such instruction and, if necessary, to change the other instructions of the court in all particulars necessary to fairly apprise the juiy of the law.
This was not done in the present case since instruction No. 2 of the court specifically limited the instruction to Ingram and there was no way the jury could have found Ingram guilty of aiding and assisting Glover in the act. When requested instruction No. 6 was submitted by the state the trial court had a duty to *592give such an instruction and to make any changes in the other instructions so when read as a whole they would be applicable to the theories of both the prosecution and the accused.
The appeal by the state should be sustained.
Schroeder, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.