Court Opinion

ID: 2964466
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:07.981354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:24.989098
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1337

                       PATRICK J. DOYLE AND H.P. LEASING, INC.,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                                HASBRO, INC., ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                _____________________

               Jeffrey  S. Entin and Sahady,  Entin & Entin,  P.C. on brief
               _________________     _____________________________
          for appellants.
               John A.  Tarantino, Patricia K.  Rocha and  Adler Pollock  &
               __________________  __________________      ________________
          Sheehan Incorporated on brief for appellees Hasbro, Inc. and Alan
          ____________________
          Hassenfeld.  J. Richard Ratcliffe and Temkin & Associates Ltd. on
                       ____________________     ________________________
          brief  for  appellees  Israel  and Miriam  Laudon.    William  A.
                                                                ___________
          Jacobson and  Kaplan  and Jacobson,  Inc. on  brief for  appellee
          ________      ___________________________
          David Thibodeau.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 23, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.   Plaintiffs-appellants, H.P.
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.
                                ____________

          Leasing,  Inc., and  Patrick J.  Doyle ("Doyle"),  H.P. Leasing's

          sole stockholder and President, brought this civil action against

          Hasbro, Inc.; Alan Hassenfeld ("Hassenfeld"), Hasbro's President,

          Chairman of the Board of Directors, and  Chief Executive Officer;

          Israel  Laudon  ("Laudon"), Vice  President  of Hasbro's  Traffic

          Department;   Miriam  Laudon,  Laudon's  wife;  David  Thibodeau,

          Laudon's assistant; Hugh Maxwell,  an Executive Vice President at

          Hasbro;  and Michael  Oliva d/b/a  Transport Services  ("Oliva").

          Plaintiffs claimed violation of the federal racketeering laws, 18

          U.S.C.     1962(c)  & (d)  ("RICO"),  as  well as  the  following

          violations  of  Massachusetts  state  law:   breach  of  contract

          against  all defendants  (Count  I); civil  conversion and  civil

          larceny  against   Laudon,  Oliva   and  Thibodeau  (Count   II);

          intentional  and  malicious  interference  with  an  advantageous

          business relationship against Laudon, Oliva, and Thibodeau (Count

          III);  intentional  infliction  of  emotional   distress  against

          Laudon,  Oliva,  and  Thibodeau  (Count IV);  fraud,  deceit  and

          misrepresentation  against  Laudon,  Thibodeau,  Hassenfeld,  and

          Hasbro  (Count  V);   and  negligent  entrustment   or  negligent

          supervision against Hasbro (Count VI).

                    The district court dismissed  the RICO claim and Counts

          I through VI as to  defendants Hassenfeld, Oliva, and  Thibodeau.

          Doyle v. Hasbro,  884 F.  Supp. 35, 42  (D. Mass.  1995).  In  an
          _____    ______

          order dated May  4, 1995,  the claims against  Israel and  Miriam

          Laudon  were also dismissed.   The RICO claim  against Hasbro was

                                         -2-

          dismissed from the bench on March 27, 1995, see id. at 38-39, and
                                                      ___ ___

          Counts I,  V, and VI  were also  dismissed as to  Hasbro.1   This

          appeal followed.2

                                    I.  BACKGROUND
                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                    Plaintiffs'  amended  complaint  alleges the  following

          facts.  In August and September 1980, plaintiffs met with Laudon,

          who  agreed,  on  Hasbro's  behalf,  to  retain  the  plaintiffs'

          services  for hauling and  delivering freight.   In October 1980,

          Laudon required that  Doyle pay  to Oliva a  "commission" of  ten

          percent of the  traffic charges  billed by H.P.  Leasing.   Doyle

          acceded to Laudon's  request, viewing the payments  as a business

          expense that would ensure a consistent volume of business.  Doyle

          was  instructed by  Laudon that  receipt of  the  commissions was

          necessary for the  continuance of  the contracts.   Early in  the

          relationship,  Laudon  informed  plaintiffs that  business  would

          increase and that additional  tractor-trailers would be required.

          In  reliance  on these  representations, plaintiffs  purchased 28

          tractors.   The increase in business  that materialized, however,

          did not merit such expansion.

                              
          ____________________

          1   Doyle  v. Hasbro,  884 F.  Supp. 35,  42-43 (D.  Mass. 1995),
              _____     ______
          dismissed Count V as  to Hasbro only "to the extent  liability is
          premised on the conduct of Hassenfeld, Oliva, and Thibodeau," and
          stated that the count may "proceed to the extent premised on  the
          conduct of  the remaining  defendants."   Id. at 42-43.   In  its
                                                    ___
          order of May 4, 1995, however, the district court dismissed Count
          V  against Israel  and Miriam  Laudon, the  remaining defendants,
          implying that the claim against Hasbro must also be dismissed.

          2   Plaintiffs-appellants  have appealed  only  a subset  of  the
          claims that were dismissed.

                                         -3-

                    As time went on, Oliva and Laudon reduced the volume of

          business  sent  to H.P.  Leasing.   Between  1982 and  1985, H.P.

          Leasing paid Laudon and  Oliva commissions averaging $440,000 per

          year,  but  from 1990  to  1992,  these  payments  averaged  only

          $45,000.

                    Over the  twelve years from  1980 to 1992,  Laudon also

          forced  Doyle  to pay  for  yearly Christmas  parties  for Hasbro

          employees,  to give gift certificates to Hasbro employees, to pay

          for personal vacations  for Laudon  and his wife,  and to  pledge

          $30,000  to  the Holocaust  Memorial.   Doyle  and his  wife were

          personally contacted, harassed and threatened during  the period.

          For  example, Thibodeau, Laudon, and their  wives would demand to

          be  taken out  to  dinner.   These  demands were  accompanied  by

          comments  such as "I own you" and  "I can put you out of business

          and you  won't have a house  to live in."   Laudon, Thibodeau and

          Hassenfeld worked closely together and were aware of each other's

          conduct.

                    In  1992, Laudon informed  plaintiffs that H.P. Leasing

          ought to file for  bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of  the Bankruptcy

          Code.  He promised that Hasbro would support H.P. Leasing  with a

          minimum  of $50,000  a week  in revenue.   Doyle  felt he  had no

          choice,   and,  on  March  12,   1992,  H.P.  Leasing  filed  for

          bankruptcy.  Defendants did not  provide the support promised  by

          Laudon.

                    In June 1992, Doyle stopped making  commission payments

          to Laudon.   Doyle perceived Hasbro's failure to  award contracts

                                         -4-

          to  plaintiffs as a breach  of the prior  representations made to

          him.  In November  1992, Doyle met with Hassenfeld,  who directed

          that  plaintiffs receive  twenty to  thirty thousand  dollars per

          week  in business.  In  January 1993, plaintiffs received $28,000

          in business from  Hasbro.  On January 27, 1993,  H.P. Leasing was

          closed for business.

                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    We review the  motion to  dismiss de novo.   Aulson  v.
                                                      _______    ______

          Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.  1996).  We accept as true "all
          _________

          well-pleaded  factual  averments  and  indulg[e]  all  reasonable

          inferences  in the  plaintiff's  favor."   Id.   Dismissal  under
                                                     ___

          Federal Rule  of Civil Procedure  12(b)(6) is appropriate  if the

          facts alleged, taken as true, do not justify recovery.   Id.  The
                                                                   ___

          pleading  requirement, however,  is  "not  entirely  a  toothless

          tiger."   The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13,
                    ____________________    _________________

          16 (1st Cir. 1989).  "The threshold [for stating a  claim] may be

          low, but it is real."  Gooley v.  Mobile Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513,
                                 ______     ________________

          514 (1st  Cir. 1988).  In  order to survive a  motion to dismiss,

          plaintiffs must set forth  "factual allegations, either direct or

          inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain

          recovery."  Id. at 515.   Although all inferences must be made in
                      ___

          the  plaintiffs'   favor,  this  court  need   not  accept  "bald

          assertions,      unsupportable     conclusions,      periphrastic

          circumlocutions, and the like."  Aulson, 83 F.3d at 3.
                                           ______

                    In conducting our review of the case, we are limited to

          those  allegations contained in  the amended complaint.   This is

                                         -5-

          true both as to facts, see Litton Indus., Inc. v. Col n, 587 F.2d
                                 ___ ___________________    _____

          70,   74  (1st  Cir.  1978)  ("[O]ur  focus  is  limited  to  the

          allegations  of the complaint.  The question is whether a liberal

          reading  of [the  complaint] can  reasonably admit  of  a claim."

          (internal quotations omitted)), and as to arguments, see McCoy v.
                                                               ___ _____

          Massachusetts Inst.  of Technology,  950 F.2d  13,  22 (1st  Cir.
          __________________________________

          1991) ("It is hornbook  law that theories not raised  squarely in

          the  district  court cannot  be surfaced  for  the first  time on

          appeal.").   We, therefore, do not  consider factual allegations,

          arguments,  and  claims that  were  not included  in  the amended

          complaint.

                          III.  THE RICO CLAIMS (COUNT VII)
                          III.  THE RICO CLAIMS (COUNT VII)

                    We begin by  considering plaintiffs-appellants'  claims

          under 18 U.S.C.    1962(c) and (d).  Section 1962(c) reads:

                      It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person
                      employed  by  or   associated  with   any
                      enterprise engaged in, or  the activities
                      of  which  affect, interstate  or foreign
                      commerce,  to   conduct  or  participate,
                      directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
                      such   enterprise's  affairs   through  a
                      pattern   of  racketeering   activity  or
                      collection of unlawful debt.

          18 U.S.C.   1962(c).  Section 1962(d) states that "[i]t  shall be

          unlawful  for  any person  to violate  any  of the  provisions of

          subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."  Id.   1962(d).
                                                          ___

                    For  the section 1962(c)  claim to survive  a motion to

          dismiss,  the amended complaint must allege:  "(1) conduct (2) of

          an  enterprise   (3)  through  a  pattern   (4)  of  racketeering

          activity."   Sedima,  S.P.R.L. v.  Imrex Co.,  473 U.S.  479, 496
                       _________________     _________

                                         -6-

          (1985); see also Arzuaga-Collazo v. Oriental Fed. Sav. Bank,  913
                  ________ _______________    _______________________

          F.2d 5, 5-6 (1st  Cir. 1990).  "In  addition, the plaintiff  only

          has standing if, and can only  recover to the extent that, he has

          been  injured  in   his  business  or  property  by  the  conduct

          constituting the violation."  Sedima, 423 U.S. at 496.
                                        ______

                    This court  has held  that under section  1962(c), "the

          unlawful  enterprise  itself  cannot   also  be  the  person  the

          plaintiff charges with conducting it."  Arzuaga-Collazo, 913 F.2d
                                                  _______________

          at 6; see also Odishelidze v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 853 F.2d
                ________ ___________    _________________________

          21, 23 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Schofield v. First Commodity
                                               _________    _______________

          Corp. of Boston, 793  F.2d 28, 29-30 (1st Cir.  1986) (collecting
          _______________

          cases).   In  order  to succeed,  therefore,  the complaint  must

          allege   the  existence   of   a  "person"   distinct  from   the

          "enterprise."

                    We must, therefore, determine  if the amended complaint

          is  sufficient to identify a  "person" and an  "enterprise."  The

          amended  complaint  is  reasonably  clear  with  respect  to  the

          "person" requirement,  stating that  "all of said  defendants are
                                                ___

          'persons' within the meaning  of this Act."  Amended  Complaint  

          62 (emphasis added).  The  only reasonable interpretation of this

          statement includes  all defendants:   Hasbro, Hassenfeld,  Israel

          Laudon, Miriam Laudon, Hugh Maxwell, Thibodeau, and Oliva.  Later

          in the same paragraph, the complaint once again alleges that "all
                                                                        ___

          defendants can be shown  to be persons within the meaning of this

          Act."  Id. (emphasis  added).  In paragraph 64,  where appellants
                 ___

          allege  the  section  1962(d)  violation,  the  amended complaint

                                         -7-

          states  that  "plaintiff  is   entitled  to  relief  against  all
                                                                        ___

          defendants,"  (emphasis added)  once again  suggesting that  each

          defendant is,  individually, identified  as a "person"  under the

          Act.

                    The amended  complaint fails to  distinguish any subset

          of  the  defendants  in  its  section  1962(c)  claim.    Indeed,

          plaintiffs-appellants  do not  mention any  defendant by  name in

          paragraphs  61-63, in which  the violation of  section 1962(c) is

          alleged.  Thus, although appellants'  brief would have us believe

          that only Hasbro  is a  "person" for RICO  purposes, the  amended

          complaint does not,  even under a generous  reading, support this

          claim.

                    Although the amended complaint alleges the existence of

          an enterprise, id. at   62, it never squarely identifies one.  It
                         ___

          may be that a  sympathetic reader could infer from  the complaint

          that   Hasbro was the alleged RICO enterprise; this reading might

          take support,  for example, from the  complaint's allegation that

          "[d]efendant, Hasbro,  Inc., is civilly liable  under [  1962(d)]

          for an  agreement of its officers  to conduct the affairs  of the

          corporation in  a manner  which violates  Section 1962(c)  of the

          RICO  Act."   Id. at    64.   However,  the possibility  that the
                        ___

          plaintiffs considered  Hasbro the  "enterprise" is  undermined by

          the  complaint's  repeated  contention  that  Hasbro  is  a  RICO

          "person."  A RICO person cannot also serve as the RICO enterprise

          that the person is  allegedly conducting in violation  of section

                                         -8-

          1962(c).  See Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44-45 (1st
                    ___ _______    _______________

          Cir. 1991); Arzuaga-Collazo, 913 F.2d at 6.
                      _______________

                    More importantly, the plaintiffs do not argue on appeal

          that  Hasbro is the enterprise.  Instead, they contend that their

          own  company, H.P.  Leasing, is  the enterprise.   We  decline to

          rewrite the complaint language  in order to find that  plaintiffs

          sufficiently  identified  Hasbro  as   a  RICO  enterprise   when

          plaintiffs  do not  even  suggest as  much  on appeal.    Rather,

          holding  plaintiffs to  their present  position, we  look to  the

          complaint to  see whether  it can  fairly be  taken  to bear  the

          meaning that plaintiffs now ascribe to it.

                    Unfortunately,  no reasonable  reading  of the  amended

          complaint supports plaintiffs' current position that H.P. Leasing

          is  the enterprise.  The complaint's only mention of H.P. Leasing

          in  connection  with  the   RICO  count  appears  to  distinguish

          plaintiff  H.P.   Leasing  from  the  enterprise   controlled  by

          defendants that  allegedly caused  H.P. Leasing injury.   Amended

          Complaint   63  ("The facts provided . . .  above, allege a nexus

          between  the   control  of  said   enterprise,  the  racketeering

          activity, and  ultimately the  injury to plaintiffs  H.P. Leasing

          and  Pat Doyle.").   We  add  that there  is  no indication  that

          plaintiffs' present  position was  ever advanced in  the district

          court.  Cf.  McCoy v. Massachusetts Inst. of  Tech., 950 F.2d 13,
                  ___  _____    _____________________________

          22-23 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
                                 ____________

                    The  complaint's  failure to  identify  any enterprise,

          distinct from a named person defendant, is fatal under RICO.  But

                                         -9-

          we think it worth adding, although we do not formally decide  the

          point,  that  the  claim  appears  remarkably  weak  in  a  quite

          different respect.  To prevail under section 1962(c), a complaint

          must  "establish a causal  relationship between  the racketeering

          predicates  and [the] asserted injury."  Miranda, 948 F.2d at 46-
                                                   _______

          47.   Here, if there  had been  no bribes, we  have no  reason to

          think that plaintiffs  would have gotten  any Hasbro business  at

          all.

                    We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs-appellants fail

          to  meet the  bare requirements  of a  RICO claim  under sections

          1962(c)  and (d).   Because we find  that the RICO  count must be

          dismissed for failure  to state a claim, we  need not address the

          other issues raised in plaintiffs-appellants' brief regarding the

          RICO claim.3   For the  foregoing reasons,  the dismissal of  the

          RICO claim is affirmed.
                        ________

                              IV.  THE STATE LAW CLAIMS
                              IV.  THE STATE LAW CLAIMS

                    A.   Negligence (Count VI)
                    A.   Negligence (Count VI)
                         _____________________

                    Count  VI alleges  "negligent entrustment  or negligent

          supervision"  by  Hasbro.   We  will  deal  with  the two  claims

          separately.

                    The tort  of negligent entrustment is  normally used in

          cases in which  a defendant has entrusted  a motor vehicle to  an

          incompetent driver, resulting in injury.  See,  e.g., Mitchell v.
                                                    ___   ____  ________
                              
          ____________________

          3   For  example,  the question  of  whether Schofield  v.  First
                                                       _________      _____
          Commodity  Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986) (limiting
          __________________________
          the circumstances under which corporate liability can attach in a
          RICO action),  applies to  the facts  of  this case  need not  be
          decided. 

                                         -10-

          Hastings & Koch Enters.,  Inc., 647 N.E.2d 78, 82-84  (Mass. App.
          ______________________________

          Ct.  1995); Kunkel v. Alger, 406 N.E.2d  402, 407 (Mass. App. Ct.
                      ______    _____

          1980).  The tort has also been applied to suppliers.  A "supplier

          may  be liable for harm  caused after the  supplier has knowingly

          placed property in the hands of  an incompetent person."  Kyte v.
                                                                    ____

          Philip Morris, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (Mass. 1990).
          ___________________

                    Plaintiffs-appellants  would have us apply the doctrine

          to the instant case.  They have not offered, and our own research

          has failed to uncover, any  cases from Massachusetts or elsewhere

          in  this circuit,  applying the doctrine  to facts  that resemble

          those at bar.4

                    The question  for this court, therefore,  is whether we

          should  expand  the  present  reach  of  the  tort  of  negligent

          entrustment,  as used in Massachusetts, to include this case.  To

          do so would require a novel  use of the doctrine which we decline

          to adopt.   The relationship between a firm and  its employees is

          very  different  from  the  relationships  usually  at  issue  in

          negligent  entrustment  cases.   The  latter  normally involve  a

          parent or other  adult entrusting a  minor or incompetent  person

          with a motor vehicle  or some other instrumentality.   "An action

          for  negligent entrustment  involves  a person's  duty to  keep a

          dangerous  instrumentality out of a child's reach."  Id. at 1036.
                                                               ___

          While it may  be possible  to point to  similarities between  the

                              
          ____________________

          4  Plaintiffs-appellants muster only a single district court case
          in support  of their claim, Bernstein v.  IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp.
                                      _________     _________
          1079 (D. Del. 1984).  Although that case has certain similarities
          to the case at bar, we are not bound by its holding.

                                         -11-

          current application  of the  doctrine  and the  one advocated  by

          plaintiffs-appellants, we  believe that the differences  are much

          more striking.

                    Furthermore, plaintiffs-appellants  offer no convincing

          argument showing  why  the application  of the  doctrine in  this

          context  would  be  desirable.   Indeed,  their  brief  offers no

          reasons  whatsoever why  this court  should extend  the doctrine.

          Because  the question  before us  is one  of state  law, we  must

          exercise considerable caution when  considering the adoption of a

          new  application.  "[A]s a  federal court hearing  this state law

          issue under  our supplemental  jurisdiction, we are  reluctant to

          extend [state]  law beyond its well-marked  boundaries."  Andrade
                                                                    _______

          v. Jamestown Housing Auth., 82 F.3d 1179, 1186-87 (1st Cir. 1996)
             _______________________

          (citations  omitted).    Without  a  powerful  argument  for  the

          extension of  the doctrine, we are, therefore, unwilling to apply

          the doctrine of negligent entrustment in a novel fashion.

                    For  the  above reasons,  we  affirm  the dismissal  of
                                                  ______

          plaintiffs-appellants' negligent entrustment claim.

                    We now turn  to the negligent  supervision claim.   The

          district court found that plaintiffs-appellants failed to provide

          any  case   law  suggesting   that  the  doctrine   of  negligent

          supervision reaches the instant case.  Doyle, 884 F. Supp. at 42.
                                                 _____

          We  need not decide that  issue here, however,  because the claim

          fails  on other  grounds.   The plaintiffs-appellants'  theory on

          appeal  is  that "had  plaintiffs  been  dealing with  competent,

          responsible and honest Hasbro  employees, H.P. Leasing would have

                                         -12-

          simply shipped goods, made a profit, and there would be no issues

          to litigate."  Appellants' Brief at 36.  This theory, however, is

          contradicted  by the  amended complaint,  which alleges  that the

          commissions, or kickbacks, were paid within a month or two of the

          start of the relationship between the parties  and that plaintiff

          believed  the  payments  "would  insure a  consistent  volume  of

          business."   Plaintiffs would be entitled to damages only if they

          alleged  that they would  have received Hasbro's  business in the

          absence of kickbacks.   If H.P. Leasing was awarded  the business

          only because it  agreed to the  kickback scheme, and,  therefore,

          earned  profits that it would not have earned without the scheme,

          it  cannot claim  damages  when  the  scheme  comes  to  an  end.

          Plaintiffs, however,  make no  claims to  the effect that  proper

          supervision by Hasbro would  have left plaintiffs-appellants in a

          better  position.  There is  no evidence that  H.P. Leasing would

          have  received any  business from  Hasbro in  the absence  of the

          kickback  scheme.   It  is not  sufficient  for the  purposes  of

          stating  a claim for damages  that the benefits  derived from the

          illegal  kickbacks  have disappeared.    Because  no damages  are

          alleged, plaintiffs-appellants  have failed to state  a claim for

          negligent supervision.

                    For the  foregoing reasons, we affirm  the dismissal of
                                                   ______

          Count VI.

                    B.   Fraud, Deceit, and Misrepresentation (Count V)
                    B.   Fraud, Deceit, and Misrepresentation (Count V)
                         ______________________________________________

                    Count V of  the complaint alleges  that the conduct  of

          defendants  Laudon, Thibodeau, Hassenfeld  and Hasbro constituted

                                         -13-

          "fraud, deceit  and misrepresentations."  Amended  Complaint at  

          54.   In order to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation,

          the plaintiff must allege:

                      (1) that  the  statement was  knowingly false;  (2)
                      that [defendants] made the false statement with the
                      intent  to  deceive;  (3)  that  the  statement was
                      material  to the  plaintiffs' decision  . .  .; (4)
                      that  the  plaintiffs   reasonably  relied  on  the
                      statement; and (5) that the plaintiffs were injured
                      as a result of their reliance.

          Turner v. Johnson & Johnson, 809 F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 1986); see
          ______    _________________                                   ___

          also Danca v.  Taunton Sav.  Bank, 429 N.E.2d  1129, 1133  (Mass.
          ____ _____     __________________

          1982).

                    With  respect to Hassenfeld,  plaintiffs allege that in

          November 1992, he "directed that plaintiffs receive $20,000.00 to

          $30,000.00 per week in business from the defendant, Hasbro, Inc."

          Amended  Complaint   37.   Hassenfeld also  promised that Doyle's

          son,  the owner of a contract carrier in the State of Washington,

          "would be  taken care of and  would continue to do  business with

          Hasbro."   Amended Complaint   41.   In both cases, the complaint

          suggests that Hassenfeld's comments were  "an effort to right the

          wrong done to  plaintiffs,"  amended complaint   37,  or to "make

          amends," amended complaint   41.

                    Several of  the required  elements of common  law fraud

          are absent from these allegations.  First, there is no allegation

          that Hassenfeld's statements were knowingly false.   In fact, the

          complaint states that  the promises  were an "effort  to right  a

          wrong done to plaintiffs," suggesting that Hassenfeld intended to

          keep these promises.   Second,  there is no  allegation that  the

                                         -14-

          statements were made with an intent to deceive.  Finally, neither

          reliance nor injury is alleged.

                    The district  court also dismissed the  claims of fraud

          against Laudon and Thibodeau.  Because plaintiffs-appellants have

          failed to argue  for the  reversal of these  dismissals on  their

          appeal, we do not review them here.

                    There remains  the questions of whether plaintiffs have

          claimed  that defendants  Hassenfeld, Thibodeau,  and Oliva  were

          part of a  larger conspiracy to  defraud and whether  a claim  of

          fraud is made against Hasbro.  The district court ruled that "the

          conclusory  allegations  throughout  the  amended  complaint  are

          insufficient   under Fed. R.  Civ. P.  9(b)'s strict  requirement

          that  fraud be pled with particularity."   Doyle, 884 F. Supp. at
                                                     _____

          41.  Appellants respond  that notice is the principal  purpose of

          any pleading,  including fraud, and  Rule 9(b) "does  not require

          the claimant to set out in detail all of the facts  upon which he

          bases  his claim,  nor  does it  require  him to  plead  detailed

          evidentiary  matters."  Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1292
                                  _______    _____

          (D. Mass. 1972).

                    There is a well-developed  body of case law surrounding

          the  application of  Rule  9(b) in  this  circuit.5   See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____
                              
          ____________________

          5  Rule 9 reads, in relevant part:

                      (b) In all averments of fraud or mistake,
                      the  circumstances constituting  fraud or
                      mistake    shall     be    stated    with
                      particularity.        Malice,     intent,
                      knowledge, and other condition of mind of
                      a person may be averred generally.

                                         -15-

          Serabian v. Amoskeag  Bank Shares,  Inc., 24 F.3d  357, 361  (1st
          ________    ____________________________

          Cir. 1994); Romani v.  Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d  875, 878
                      ______     ______________________

          (1st Cir. 1991); New England Data Servs. Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d
                           ____________________________    ______

          286, 288-90 (1st Cir. 1987); Wayne Inv. Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 739
                                       _______________    ____________

          F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1984).   In New England Data Services,  we held
                                        _________________________

          that  the  case law  interpreting and  applying  Rule 9  in cases

          dealing with general fraud  and securities fraud applies  to RICO

          cases.  The "degree of specificity [in RICO cases] is no more nor

          less  than  we have  required  in  general fraud  and  securities

          cases."  829 F.2d at 290.

                    Rule  9 imposes a  heightened pleading  requirement for

          allegations of fraud in order to give notice to defendants of the

          plaintiffs' claim, to protect  defendants whose reputation may be

          harmed  by  meritless  claims  of fraud,  to  discourage  "strike

          suits,"  and to prevent the  filing of suits  that simply hope to

          uncover relevant  information during discovery.   See McGuinty v.
                                                            ___ ________

          Beranger Volkswagen, Inc., 633  F.2d 226, 228-29 & n.2  (1st Cir.
          _________________________

          1980).

                    In McGuinty, this court stated that "[t]he clear weight
                       ________

          of authority is that  Rule 9 requires specification of  the time,

          place, and  content of an  alleged false representation,  but not

          the circumstances or evidence  from which fraudulent intent could

          be  inferred."    Id. at  228.    "[M]ere  allegations of  fraud,
                            ___

          corruption  or conspiracy,  averments to  conditions of  mind, or

          referrals to plans  and schemes are  too conclusional to  satisfy
                              
          ____________________

          Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

                                         -16-

          the  particularity requirement,  no  matter how  many times  such

          accusations  are repeated."  Hayduk  v. Lanna, 775  F.2d 441, 444
                                       ______     _____

          (1st Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).

                    We agree  with the district court  that the allegations

          of conspiracy included in  the amended complaint are insufficient

          to satisfy the requirements  of Rule 9(b).  The  complaint simply

          states that the defendants:

                      worked closely together and were aware of
                      the  others'  conduct.   These defendants
                      conspired  to use  H.P.  Leasing for  the
                      benefit of Hasbro and their  own personal
                      financial gain.   It is not certain  what
                      the specifics of the  conspiracy entailed
                      or how exactly defendants Thibideau [sic]
                      and   Hassenfeld   benefited  from   that
                      conspiracy.

          Amended  Complaint    24.   Elsewhere in  the  Amended Complaint,

          these conclusory  allegations are  repeated:  "defendants  worked

          together to shut  down H.P.  Leasing,"  Amended  Complaint    28;

          "all defendants were suddenly  acting to terminate H.P. Leasing,"

          Amended  Complaint    38.    The  amended  complaint includes  no

          specification of the time, place, and content of an alleged false

          representation as required  by McGuinty.   In addition, no  claim
                                         ________

          can survive  as against Hasbro in light of the fact that no claim

          has  been made against any  of the other  defendants through whom

          Hasbro could act.

                                         -17-

                    Because the plaintiffs-appellants  have failed to  meet

          the  requirements  of Rule  9,  we  affirm the  district  court's
                                              ______

          dismissal of Count V as against Hassenfeld and Hasbro.6

                    C.   Breach of Contract (Count I)
                    C.   Breach of Contract (Count I)
                         ____________________________

                    In order to sustain Count I's breach of contract claim,

          plaintiffs must plead:   (1)  that the parties  had an  agreement

          supported by valid consideration; (2) that plaintiffs were ready,

          willing  and able  to perform;  (3)  that defendant's  breach has

          prevented  them from  performing;  and (4)  that plaintiffs  were

          damaged.  See Singarella v. City  of Boston, 173 N.E.2d 290,  291
                    ___ __________    _______________

          (Mass. 1961); Petricca v. Simpson, 862 F.  Supp. 13, 17 (D. Mass.
                        ________    _______

          1994).   Plaintiffs-appellants are mistaken in  their belief that

          they "need no more  than to allege that the facts [demonstrate a]

          breach of  that contractual relationship."   Appellants' Brief at

          40.  "[I]t is essential to state with 'substantial certainty' the

          facts  showing the existence of the contract and the legal effect

          thereof."   Pollock v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 194 N.E. 133,
                      _______    ___________________________

          136 (Mass. 1935).  Appellants fail to do so.

                    The amended complaint fails to state the nature of  the

          alleged contract with any specificity.   There is no presentation

          of the  terms of a  contract, its duration,  or even when  it was

          formed.  Nor  does the Amended Complaint explain what obligations

          were imposed  on each of the parties by the alleged contract.  It
                              
          ____________________

          6   The district  court states  that "Count  V must  be dismissed
          against Thibodeau and Oliva as well [as Hassenfeld]."  Doyle, 884
                                                                 _____
          F. Supp. at 41.  The Amended Complaint does not,  however, allege
          that Oliva  has  committed  fraud,  and,  therefore,  he  is  not
          implicated in our discussion.

                                         -18-

          does  not plead that plaintiffs  were ready to  perform under the

          contract  or  that the  defendants'  breach  prevented them  from

          performing,  and it does not identify the damages attributable to

          the  breach.     Conclusory  statements  that   "Hasbro  and  its

          executives failed to meet their contractual requirement," amended

          complaint     34,  are   insufficient  to  satisfy  the  pleading

          requirements.

                    Because  appellants have  failed to  state a  claim for

          breach, we need not address the argument made in their brief that

          the alleged contract was, in fact, an at-will employment contract

          and that  it was breached  in bad faith.   Nor do  we address the

          question of  whether the individual defendants  are shielded from

          liability on the ground  that an agent for a  disclosed principal

          cannot  be personally liable  for the  principal's conduct.   See
                                                                        ___

          Doyle, 884 F. Supp. at 39.
          _____

                    For the  foregoing reasons, we affirm  the dismissal of
                                                   ______

          the breach of contract claim.

                                         -19-

                    D.   Intentional   Infliction  of   Emotional  Distress
                    D.   Intentional   Infliction  of   Emotional  Distress
                         __________________________________________________
                         (Count IV)
                         (Count IV)
                         __________

                    Count IV of  the amended complaint  alleges a claim  of

          intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress  against Laudon,

          Oliva, and Thibodeau.7  The  relevant requirements for this claim

          in  Massachusetts were set forth  in Agis v.  Howard Johnson Co.,
                                               ____     __________________

          355  N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).  A claim for intentional infliction

          of emotional  distress requires "(1)  that the actor  intended to

          inflict emotional distress or  that he knew or should  have known

          that emotional distress was the  likely result of [the]  conduct;

          (2) that  the conduct was  'extreme and outrageous,'  was 'beyond

          all possible bounds of decency' and was 'utterly intolerable in a

          civilized  community;' (3) that the actions of the defendant were

          the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional

          distress  sustained by the plaintiff was 'severe' and of a nature

          'that no  reasonable [person] could  be expected to  endure it.'"

          Id. at 318-19  (citations omitted).   The standard  for making  a
          ___

          claim  of intentional  infliction of  emotional distress  is very

          high in order to "avoid[] litigation in situations where only bad

          manners  and mere  hurt  feelings are  involved."   Id.  at  319.
                                                              ___

          Recovery on such a  claim requires more than "that  the defendant

          has acted with  an intent which is tortious or  even criminal, or

          that  he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that

          his conduct has  been characterized  by 'malice' or  a degree  of

          aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages
                              
          ____________________

          7   Plaintiffs-appellants have not appealed the dismissal of this
          claim against Oliva.

                                         -20-

          for another tort."   Foley v. Polaroid  Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72,  82
                               _____    _______________

          (Mass. 1986).

                    We agree  with the district court  that "[a]ssuming the

          truth of  all  the  allegations in  the  amended  complaint,  the

          conduct  complained of  does not  as a  matter of  law amount  to

          extreme  and outrageous  behavior beyond  all possible  bounds of

          decency  and  which  are   utterly  intolerable  in  a  civilized

          community."  Doyle, 884 F. Supp. at 40 (citations omitted).  "Nor
                       _____

          has Doyle even  attempted to  plead severe distress  of a  nature

          that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it."  Id.
                                                                        ___

                    Accordingly, we  affirm the  dismissal of the  claim of
                                     ______

          intentional infliction of emotional distress.

                    E.   Interference     with     Advantageous    Business
                    E.   Interference     with     Advantageous    Business
                         __________________________________________________
                         Relationships (Count III)
                         Relationships (Count III)
                         _________________________

                    Count III of the amended complaint alleges "intentional

          and  malicious  interference  with  the  plaintiffs' advantageous

          business  relationships" against  Laudon, Oliva,  and Thibodeau.8

          Amended Complaint   50.  The elements of the tort of interference

          with  an  advantageous relationship  include:    "(1) a  business

          relationship or  contemplated contract  of economic  benefit; (2)

          the  defendant's  knowledge   of  such   relationship;  (3)   the

          defendant's  interference  with  it  through  improper motive  or

          means;  and  (4)  the  plaintiff's  loss  of  advantage  directly

          resulting from  the defendant's conduct."   American Private Line
                                                      _____________________

          Servs., Inc. v.  Eastern Microwave,  Inc., 980 F.2d  33, 36  (1st
          ____________     ________________________
                              
          ____________________

          8   Plaintiffs-appellants have not appealed the dismissal of this
          claim as against Oliva.

                                         -21-

          Cir.  1992) (citing  United Truck Leasing  Corp. v.  Geltman, 511
                               ___________________________     _______

          N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990)).

                    Implicit  in  the  above requirements  for  intentional

          interference in a business  relationship is that the relationship

          be lawful.   See Chemewa Country  Golf, Inc. v. Wnuk,  402 N.E.2d
                       ___ ___________________________    ____

          1069, 1072  (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (requiring that the complained-

          of acts be "calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their

          lawful business" (emphasis added)).   Plaintiffs-appellants argue
          ______

          that defendants-appellees interfered with a business relationship

          that consisted  of allegedly  unlawful kickbacks in  exchange for

          business.  As such, the business relationship in question was not

          lawful, and plaintiffs cannot recover on their claim.

                    Accordingly, we affirm  the district court's  dismissal
                                    ______

          of Count III against Laudon and Thibodeau.

                                    V. CONCLUSION
                                    V. CONCLUSION

                    For  the  reasons  discussed   herein,  we  affirm  the
                                                                ______

          district court's dismissal on  all claims appealed by plaintiffs-

          appellants:  the  RICO  count  against all  defendants,  Count  I

          against all  defendants, Counts  III  and IV  against Laudon  and

          Thibodeau, Count V against Hasbro and Hassenfeld (and noting that

          plaintiffs-appellants failed to raise the liability of Laudon and

          Thibodeau), and Count VI against Hasbro.

                    Finally, we note that plaintiffs-appellants  have filed

          an  overly  long brief.   Although  the  brief is  less  than the

          permissible fifty pages,  it is  not double  spaced as  required,

          Fed.  R. App.  Proc. 32(a),  making the  effective length  of the

                                         -22-

          brief  considerably longer.  Additionally, we are able to find no

          reason for the length  of the brief.   Despite the extra  length,

          the  brief failed to adequately present  the claims of appellants

          or even to clearly identify the claims being appealed.  See In re
                                                                  ___ _____

          M.S.V., Inc., 892 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[W]hether or not we
          ____________

          grant  permission to  file an  overly long  brief, we  may assess

          special costs if we  subsequently conclude that the  extra length

          was  unnecessary and did not help.").  "We believe it appropriate

          to  discourage the  filing  of excessively  long  briefs in  this

          court," id., and we believe it appropriate to discourage  parties
                  ___

          from attempting  to flaunt the  page limits by  submitting briefs

          with improper line spacing.  Accordingly, we assess  double costs

          against appellants.

                                         -23-