Court Opinion

ID: 9757211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:25:29.003496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.370911
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Nex :
The United States Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) required the exclusion from federal and state courts, respectively, of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 While that Court *209has discussed in great detail the allegations necessary to establish probable cause2 it has expressly withheld any decision as to what if any extent a defendant may be permitted to proceed beyond the face of the affidavit to challenge the accuracy of those allegations.3 The decision whether to allow any challenge beyond the face of the affidavit presents a myriad of perplexing problems, e.g., how far should the inquiry be allowed; which inaccuracies should justify the imposition of the doctrine of exclusion.4
My concern is that this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. D’Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A. 2d 441 (1970) and the majority opinion in this case should be understood as being limited to situations where the challenge alleges deliberate misstatements by a police official affiant*2105 as to a material6 fact within the affidavit. If these two decisions are to be so construed, then I concur.
Where the affiant is a police official and perjury is committed by that official or with his knowledge and consent to provide a basis for securing the warrant I am satisfied that this is the type of offensive governmental action that the Fourth Amendment was directed against and the exclusionary doctrine designed to deter.
It must be remembered that every misstatement need not be a result of perjury and could just as likely result from inadvertence or negligence. In either instance the problems are unique. They differ not only from the deliberate lie but between themselves and should be resolved only when that specific factual issue is raised.
In conclusion, in my judgment, the decision in this case and in D’Angelo, supra, should not suggest that we have affirmed unlimited inquiry into the underlying validity of the affidavit or that any inaccuracy would necessarily justify the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant thereto.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Pomeroy join in this concurring opinion.

 United States Constitution, Amendment IV
“Tbe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

 “Petitioner attacks tke validity of the search warrant. This Court has never passed directly on the extent to which a court may permit such examination when the search warrant is valid on its face and when the allegations of the underlying affidavit establish ‘probable cause’.” Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1964).

 The federal eases are divided not only as to whether a challenge should be allowed but also as to the nature and extent of that challenge. Some federal decisions have held that the defendant cannot go behind the face of the affidavit: United States v. Brunett, 53 F. 2d 219 (W.D. Mo. 1931) ; Kenney v. United States, 157 F. 2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Other cases have recognized the propriety of allowing a challenge to the truth of an affidavit: United States v. Ramos, 380 F. 2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967) ; while still others have permitted challenges to particular allegations in affidavits: United States v. Bozza, 365 F. 2d 206 (2d Cir. 3966) ; United States v. Freeman, 358 F. 2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 882, 87 S. Ct. 168 (1966) ; United States v. Bowling, 351 F. 2d 236 (6th Cir. 1965) ; King v. United States, 282 F. 2d 398 (4th Cir. 1960).

 Perjury by an informant where police are unaware of the falsehood and had a reasonable basis to believe the information received presents an entirely different situation and in my judgment should not be controlled by this decision or the decision in Commonwealth v. D’Angelo, 437 Pa. 331, 263 A. 2d 441 (1970).

 Where the perjury concerned a fact not necessary to establish the probable cause on the face of the affidavit I would find great difficulty in concluding the appropriateness of the exclusionary doctrine. Such a case would present distinctly different considerations and should not be considered as being answered by this decision.