Court Opinion

ID: 9963926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 16:00:55.223038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:04.836643
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

REBECCA HUGHES,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
            Appellant,                          DA-0752-18-0087-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: April 25, 2024
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Amanda L.E. Smith , Esquire, Buffalo, New York, for the appellant.

      Joshua Norris Rose , Esquire, and Stephanye Snowden , Esquire,
        Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
sustained her removal for misconduct. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of
the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5
of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).
After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner
has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for
review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial
decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                  BACKGROUND
      The following facts are undisputed. The appellant was a GS-8 Consumer
Safety Inspector for the agency’s Food Safety Inspection Service, stationed at a
chicken   slaughter   facility   owned   by   Peco   Foods,   Inc.,   which   is     an
agency-regulated entity. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 4, Tab 10 at 16, 39,
Tab 33 at 5. The appellant’s job duties entailed observing the Peco facility’s
operations to ensure humane and sanitary poultry-handling practices.               IAF,
Tab 33 at 5.
      On June 7, 2017, the appellant removed a wire, a switch, and brackets
attached to a wooden pole next to the designated employee smoke break area.
She then placed these items in the bed of her truck. Id.; Hearing Transcript (Tr.),
Vol. 1 at 293 (testimony of the appellant). On August 4, 2017, the agency issued
the appellant a notice of proposed removal, based on one specification of
“Unauthorized Removal of Private Property.” IAF, Tab 10 at 25-30. The agency
specified that the appellant cut and removed cable from an electrical light pole
owned by Peco Foods, and that she did not have permission from Peco Foods to
do so. Id. at 25. After the appellant responded, the agency issued a decision
removing her effective October 24, 2017. Id. at 16-24.
                                                                                           3

      The appellant filed a Board appeal, challenging the merits of the removal
and raising affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error, disability
discrimination,   and   retaliation    for    grievance,      whistleblower,   and     equal
employment opportunity activity. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 42 at 1-2. After a hearing, the
administrative judge issued an initial decision upholding the removal.                 IAF,
Tab 48, Initial Decision (ID). She found that the agency proved its charge and
established a nexus to the efficiency of the service, ID at 3-6, 26-27, that the
appellant failed to prove any of her affirmative defenses, ID at 6-26, and that
there was no basis to disturb the agency’s penalty determination, ID at 27-31.
      The   appellant   has   filed     a    petition   for    review,   challenging     the
reasonableness of the penalty.        Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3.            The
agency has filed a response to the petition for review, and the appellant has filed
a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

                                      ANALYSIS
      Where, as here, the agency’s charge is sustained, the Board will review an
agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all the
relevant factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable limits of
reasonableness.   Jacoby v. U.S. Postal Service, 85 M.S.P.R. 554 (2000).                  In
making such a determination, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s
primary discretion in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing
that the Board’s function is not to displace management’s responsibility but to
ensure that managerial judgment has been properly exercised.              Id. The Board
will, therefore, modify a penalty only when it finds that the agency failed to
weigh the relevant factors or that the agency’s judgment clearly exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness.       Id.     The Board has identified a list of twelve
nonexhaustive factors that are generally relevant in determining a penalty for
misconduct. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).
                                                                                      4

      The deciding official in this case considered each of these twelve factors in
deciding that removal was the appropriate penalty. IAF, Tab 10 at 18-20. The
appellant made numerous arguments concerning these factors and the deciding
official’s penalty determination, but the administrative judge found that there was
insufficient basis to mitigate. ID at 27-31. On petition for review, the appellant
addresses five of these factors: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense,
(2) her disciplinary history, (3) her potential for rehabilitation, (4) the effect that
her offense had on her supervisors’ confidence in her ability to perform her
assigned duties, and (5) her length of service. PFR File, Tab 3 at 7-26.
      Regarding the nature and seriousness of the offense, the deciding official
found that the appellant’s conduct was serious because it involved damage to the
property of a regulated entity, which required the agency to detail the appellant to
a different location at significant expense to the agency. IAF, Tab 10 at 18. The
appellant argued that the materials she removed from the pole were of de minimis
value and that her actions were neither malicious nor for personal gain, but the
administrative judge found that these facts, to the extent that they were true, were
insufficient to detract from the agency’s penalty determination overall.            ID
at 28-31. On petition for review, the appellant again points out that the materials
she removed were of minimal monetary value, that her conduct was not malicious
or for personal gain, and that she removed the wire to remedy a safety concern.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 7-9, 17-23.
      We have considered the appellant’s arguments, but we find that they
provide no basis to disturb the initial decision. As the administrative judge stated
in her initial decision, even though the appellant ostensibly removed the wires to
address a safety hazard, she herself created that hazard by moving a bench from
where Peco Foods had placed it to over near the electrical pole. ID at 29; Tr.,
Vol. 1 at 283-85 (testimony of the appellant). Although the appellant had her
reasons for doing so, i.e., to provide a more comfortable seat for an injured
                                                                                    5

coworker, Tr., Vol. 1 at 283-84 (testimony of the appellant), her actions were
clearly imprudent.
       As for the de minimis value of the materials that the appellant removed, we
agree with the appellant that this is a relevant consideration in the penalty
determination. PFR File, Tab 3 at 7-9, 17-21; see Miguel v. Department of the
Army, 727 F.2d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Skates v. Department of the Army,
69 M.S.P.R. 366, 368 (1996). It is also relevant that the appellant’s intent does
not appear to have been to steal these materials but instead to get them out of the
way.    See Harris v. Department of the Navy, 15 M.S.P.R. 464, 467 (1983)
(finding that unauthorized possession of government property is less serious than
theft or attempted theft of government property). The Board has held that theft
entails an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the possession or use of
property. Nazelrod v. Department of Justice, 50 M.S.P.R. 456, 459 (1991), aff’d
sub nom. King v. Nazelrod, 43 F.3d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1994).           In this case, the
appellant was not charged with theft, and it does not appear that she had any
plans for the disposition of the materials because they were still in the bed of her
truck on Peco Foods property several days later when the agency confronted her
about the incident. Tr., Vol. 1 at 293-94 (testimony of the appellant).
       However, we disagree with the appellant that the deciding official failed to
consider these factors in arriving at her decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8-9, 18-21;
cf. Brown v. Department of the Treasury, 91 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 17 (2002) (finding
that when a deciding official fails to consider the pertinent penalty factors, the
agency’s penalty determination is not entitled to deference).         Although the
appellant cites excerpts of the deciding official’s hearing testimony that appear to
support her contention, the tenor of the decision letter and the deciding official’s
testimony as a whole is that the problem with the appellant’s conduct had less to
do with her intentions and the value of the property than it did with the strain that
                                                                                       6

it put on the agency’s relationship with Peco Foods. 2 IAF, Tab 10 at 18; Tr., Vol.
1 at 59-60, 64, 66-67, 81, 83 (testimony of the deciding official). We find that
this assessment of the facts was reasonable and distinguishes this case from
others involving theft or removal of agency property, where a de minimis
misappropriation might more easily be forgiven at the agency’s discretion. Cf.
Miguel, 727 F.2d 1081; Skates, 69 M.S.P.R. 366.               The deciding official’s
testimony reflected this consideration, where she related that it was Peco Foods’s
authority to determine the value of its own property. Tr., Vol. 1 at 83 (testimony
of the deciding official). It is also consistent with Board and Federal Circuit
precedent, finding the de minimis value of property immaterial where there are
other overriding factors involved.        See DeWitt v. Department of the Navy,
747 F.2d 1442, 1445-46 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding the de minimis value of
property immaterial where the employee had custody and control over the
property); Underwood v. Department of Defense, 53 M.S.P.R. 355, 359 (same),
aff’d sub nom. Underwood v. Defense Logistics Agency , 980 F.2d 744 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (Table). Regarding the appellant’s intentions, although her actions might
not have been malicious or for personal gain, they were at least carried out with
reckless disregard for the rights of Peco Foods.         The appellant did not, in a
moment, thoughtlessly dispose of corporate property that she found lying on the
ground. Rather, it took her 13 minutes and a set of tools to remove the materials
from the electrical pole. Tr., Vol. 1 at 91-92 (testimony of the deciding official),
285-87 (testimony of the appellant).         For these reasons, we agree with the
administrative judge that the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding the
appellant’s misconduct to be of a serious nature. IAF, Tab 10 at 18.
      The appellant also challenges the agency’s consideration of her disciplinary
record in arriving at its removal decision. It appears to be undisputed that the
appellant had two instances of prior discipline in her 24-year career with the
2
 The appellant’s removal was precipitated by a complaint that Peco Foods made to the
agency about this incident. Tr., Vol. 1 at 18 (testimony of the proposing official); IAF,
Tab 10 at 43-44, 50.
                                                                                     7

agency, both of which had occurred relatively recently.         IAF, Tab 10 at 19.
Specifically, the agency issued the appellant a letter of reprimand on June 15,
2016, for falling asleep on the line and reporting to work late without following
the prescribed call-in procedures.         IAF, Tab 11 at 26-29.         The agency
subsequently suspended the appellant for 7 days effective January 8, 2017, for the
same type of misconduct. Id. at 10-22. The deciding official considered this
disciplinary record to be an aggravating factor. IAF, Tab 10 at 19. On petition
for review, the appellant argues that the deciding official erred in doing so
because the prior discipline was for dissimilar misconduct and was related to her
disability. PFR File, Tab 3 at 8, 10-17.
      We agree with the appellant that the Board may discount a prior
disciplinary action that is unrelated in nature to the misconduct at issue in the
appeal. Id. at 11-15. However, the agency has primary discretion in assessing
the penalty factors, and we find that the deciding official did not abuse her
discretion in considering the appellant’s disciplinary history adversely.         See
Devall v, Department of the Navy, 77 M.S.P.R. 468, 471 (1998) (finding that the
agency has primary discretion in selecting the appropriate penalty, and that the
Board will review the agency’s determination under an abuse of discretion
standard). We find that this case is factually similar to Howlett v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 53 M.S.P.R. 604, 606 (1992), in which the Board found that the
appellant’s prior admonishment and suspension for absence without leave could
be properly considered in determining the appropriate penalty for theft, even
though the prior discipline was for a different type of misconduct.
      As for the appellant’s disability, the record shows that she has a blood
condition that causes her fatigue, and she attributes the incidents underlying her
prior discipline to this condition. Tr. Vol. 1 at 265, 272-75 (testimony of the
appellant). Although the appellant’s explanation for the prior incidents is entirely
plausible, we find that it is not appropriate in this case to relitigate the propriety
of the appellant’s suspension and letter of reprimand. The Board's review of a
                                                                                   8

prior disciplinary action is limited to determining whether that action is clearly
erroneous, if the employee was informed of the action in writing, the action is a
matter of record, and the employee was permitted to dispute the charges before a
higher level of authority than the one that imposed the discipline.        Bolling v.
Department of the Air Force, 9 M.S.P.R. 335, 339-40 (1981). We find that the
letter of reprimand and the 7-day suspension satisfy the Bolling criteria because
both of them were in writing and placed in the appellant’s Official Personnel File,
and the appellant was notified of her right to grieve both of them. IAF, Tab 10
at 10-15, 26-29; see Lambert v. Department of the Army, 44 M.S.P.R. 688, 699
(1990), aff’d, 928 F.2d 410 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Table) .       Although an argument
could perhaps be made on the current record that these prior disciplinary actions
were discriminatory, an equally strong argument could be made that they were
not, and we find that these disciplinary actions fall far short of being “clearly
erroneous” on that account. See Bolling, 9 M.S.P.R. at 339 (finding that a prior
disciplinary action is clearly erroneous when the Board is left with “the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed”). For these reasons, we
agree with the administrative judge that the deciding official properly considered
the appellant’s prior discipline as an aggravating factor. ID at 23, 30.
      In connection with her argument about prior discipline, the appellant argues
that the deciding official failed to properly consider her rehabilitative potential.
PFR File, Tab 3 at 7, 10, 14-17, 19. The deciding official found that the appellant
lacked rehabilitative potential because she failed to express remorse for her
actions, which had become part of a “pattern of misconduct.” IAF, Tab 10 at 20;
Tr., Vol. 1 at 85 (testimony of the deciding official). The appellant, however,
argues that her prior discipline is a poor indicator of her rehabilitative potential
because it was unrelated to the misconduct at issue. She argues that, if anything,
she has demonstrated rehabilitative potential because the type of misconduct for
which she was previously disciplined has not recurred. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10,
14-17. We disagree. Although the appellant’s prior discipline may have little
                                                                                      9

bearing on her propensity to commit the type of misconduct at issue in this
appeal, it does call into doubt her ability to follow the rules of the workplace in
general.   The agency is not required to afford the appellant a new chance at
rehabilitation every time she commits a new type of misconduct. See Villela v.
Department of the Air Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984).                 The
appellant further argues that the deciding official failed to consider her “clear
signs of contrition.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 7, 19. We have reviewed the record in
this regard and find the evidence of the appellant’s contrition to be equivocal at
best. The appellant testified that she “thought” she expressed remorse during her
oral reply to the notice of proposed removal, Tr., Vol. 1 at 319 (testimony of the
appellant), but neither the notes from her oral reply conference nor anything else
in the record give any indication that she did so, IAF, Tab 10 at 23 -24, 35-36,
46-48. In any event, under the totality of the circumstances, we find insufficient
basis to disturb the deciding official’s determination regarding the appellant’s
rehabilitative potential.
      The appellant also disputes the administrative judge’s finding that her
“interference with Peco’s private property caused the agency to lose confidence
in the appellant’s ability to perform her duties.” PFR File, Tab 3 at 23-26; ID
at 27. The appellant argues that this Douglas factor pertains to the supervisor’s
confidence in her ability to carry out her assigned duties, and that the misconduct
at issue has no bearing on that. In fact, the appellant’s supervisor, the proposing
official in this case, expressed that the appellant was competent to perform in her
job. PFR File, Tab 3 at 23-26. To the extent that the appellant is advancing a
mechanistic approach to the application of this Douglas factor, we reject that
approach. 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. We find that, under the particular facts of this case,
the deciding official’s evaluation of this factor was wholly reasonable. She wrote
in her decision letter that, while the appellant had the technical skill to do her job,
her ability to be effective and to follow the directives, policies, and regulations
                                                                                     10

consistently has suffered because of her conduct.           IAF, Tab 10 at 19; see
Harrison v. Department of the Treasury, 22 M.S.P.R. 462, 456-66 & n.3 (1984).
      Finally, the appellant argues that the deciding official failed to give weight
to her 24 years of good service, with no disciplinary actions prior to the
16 months leading up to her removal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 23-24. We agree with
the appellant that her service history is a significant mitigating factor. See Smith
v. U.S. Postal Service, 31 M.S.P.R. 508, 510 (1986). However, we cannot find
that the deciding official abused her discretion in finding that this factor did not
outweigh the gravity of the appellant’s misconduct or the other penalty
considerations as a whole. IAF, Tab 10 at 19; Tr., Vol. 1 at 81 (testimony of the
deciding official); see Suarez v. Department of Housing & Urban Development ,
96 M.S.P.R. 213, ¶ 51 (2004), aff’d, 125 F. App’x 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

3
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       11

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                12

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                           Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     13

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                              Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 4   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                 Washington, D.C. 20439
4
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              14

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.