Court Opinion

ID: 9537502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:19:11.623863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:43.869624
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Fracasse, and all of the other cases cited as authority in the Court’s opinion, evolved from lawyer-client fee disputes. Such is not the case here. Here there is no dispute, if it be understood that a dispute is a controversy which arises from some sort of relationship. Annest and Stoker had no relationship.
We do have a controversy, one which in my opinion should not have found its way into the court system. The controversy arose when attorney Stoker undertook representation of clients who had theretofore been represented by attorney Annest. The controversy involves only the two attorneys, and I write primarily to lay to rest the suggestion found in the Court’s opinion that the Court’s justification for today’s opinion is the necessity of settling a fee dispute between Mr. Annest and his former clients. I also point out that the Court, in its zeal to reach out and make some law, where there is no need for so doing, entertains an appeal which should have been either dismissed out of hand as unappealable, or summarily affirmed.
The litigating parties in the wrongful death action reached a settlement over two years ago, and are no longer in court either in the district court or in this Court. The plaintiffs and the defendants in the wrongful death action are no longer lawing with each other, nor does either have any controversy with Mr. Stoker or Mr. Annest. The appeal record shows a stipulation for dismissal and order of dismissal dated the 22nd day of December, 1977, and on that date $25,000 was paid into the district court registry.1
Ten days prior to that dismissal of the action Stoker therein filed a unique motion, entitled Motion for Division of Attorney Fees, requesting
*804“an order dividing the attorneys fees between James Annest and Jeff Stoker. A request is máde for a hearing in front of the court where evidence can be presented in regard to an equitable division of the attorney fees in the above-entitled matter.”
The action was dismissed, as aforesaid, after which Annest moved that 40% of the settlement amount on deposit with the court be delivered to him.
At the ensuing hearing before Judge Cunningham, which was also after dismissal of the action, Stoker stipulated into the record: that the controversy between the parties to the then dismissed law suit, Anderson-Boyer v. Gailey, had been settled prior to his actual substitution as counsel of record; that the money that was deposited with the court was the amount agreed upon between the plaintiffs and the defense counsel in the settlement of the case.
At oral argument we learned that the plaintiffs, whose action stands long ago dismissed, have no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the appeal. We were informed that the plaintiffs have never challenged their fee arrangement with Annest, that they have received back their advanced costs off the top of the $25,000, and have received their 60% share of the $23,091.68 remaining after costs were repaid. We were told that there is absolutely no problem in this case of those plaintiffs being asked or required to pay any fee over and above the Annest contract fee of 40%. We were told by Mr. Stoker that his arrangement with the plaintiffs was that he would charge them no fee and that he would look to Annest for his fee. The plaintiffs in this action are as out of it as is the defendant, and the plaintiffs, though named as appellants on this appeal, have no interest in the outcome of this appeal; nor does the defendant.
The appellant’s brief states that an issue presented is:
“IF AN ATTORNEY, IN A CONTINGENT FEE CASE, IS DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE, IS HE ENTITLED TO THE FULL CONTINGENT FEE UPON SETTLEMENT OF THE CASE OR TO A FEE BASED UPON QUANTUM MERUIT?"
But factually there was no such dispute between the wrongful death plaintiffs and Mr. Annest. The issue presented to Judge Cunningham, correctly decided by him and erroneously decided here, is: Where an attorney is discharged without cause, and his clients do not challenge his right to compensation as per their contract, and another attorney supplants the former on an agreement with them that he will charge them nothing, and look instead to his compensation from the former attorney, does he have any legal claim against the former attorney — the latter being no party to such agreement or understanding? Judge Cunningham answered that question in the negative. Nor do I see anything in the Court’s opinion which points to any error on his part. The reversal comes only from the Court indulging itself in the belief that some remedy should be fashioned on behalf of Stoker and against Annest — but doing so in a manner which creates the illusion that the Court’s decision is in favor of the client.
I emphasize that there was no issue between the plaintiffs and Annest. It was not the plaintiffs who asked Judge Cunningham to relegate Annest to a fee based on quantum meruit. It was Stoker; he candidly states in his brief that he “made a motion to the court to have the court divide the attorney fees, asking the court to determine what portion Mr. Annest should receive and what portion Mr. Stoker should receive.” Annest, however, had no fee dispute with his former clients. Nor did he have any agreement with Stoker. Nor does it appear that Stoker obtained Annest’s consent to take over the representation of Annest’s clients. Nor does it appear that Annest desired such action on Stoker’s part or encouraged it.
Stoker’s motion was exactly as he portrayed it, a request of the court to award him some portion of Annest’s 40% fee. Stoker did not in his unique pleading make the least suggestion that application of California principles of law entitled the plain*805tiffs to breach their contract without cause and pay Annest off on a quantum meruit basis. In fact, had Stoker on behalf of Anderson-Boyer sought and succeeded in gaining Judge Cunningham’s approval to paying Annest on a quantum meruit basis, the records before us in this case and the prior appeal of the parties litigant show that the plaintiffs might indeed have been caused to pay far more than the 40% contingency fee which had been agreed upon.
At the hearing before Judge Cunningham, Stoker placed plaintiff Anderson on the stand. His only testimony had to do with costs advanced and his recollection of settlement offers which had been made and turned down. The other plaintiff, Mrs. Boyer, was called, testifying only to offers received. Stoker put attorney Paine on the stand. Paine had been defense counsel for Gailey. A summary of his testimony is simply his opinion that the settlement figure arrived at with Stoker would not have been reached had he negotiated with An-nest. He gave no testimony as to the amount of damages a jury might have awarded for the wrongful death. He contended steadfastly that before the first trial he had offered $10,000.00, and on the third day of the trial offered $25,000.00 — which offers were rejected. He was not asked to give an opinion of the value of services rendered by Annest prior to his discharge.
Annest in turn established by the testimony of attorney Lloyd Jackson Webb, after a review of the file, that the 40% fee would be grossly less than what would have been charged for time on a quantum meruit basis. Stoker, however, notwithstanding that he here asserts a quantum meruit as the fee which a wrongfully discharged attorney should earn, made no showing whatever on behalf of the plaintiffs Anderson-Boyer as to what Annest should have been compensated on a quantum meruit basis. Rather, Stoker sought a piece of Annest’s undisputed contract fee. No pleading whatever challenged the validity of the contract, or its fairness. Nothing whatever was offered to rebut attorney Webb’s testimony that payment of the contract fee was a better deal for the plaintiffs than a quantum meruit payment would have been. Stoker essentially sought a quantum meruit recovery for himself, but at the expense of Annest.
The only understanding which can reasonably be gathered from Stoker’s remarks at the conclusion of the hearing was that he was not urging anything on behalf of the plaintiffs, but that, on behalf of himself, standing pat on Annest’s 40% contract, he wanted the court to take it from Annest and divide it — in a manner Stoker thought equitable. In order to obtain the full flavor of Stoker’s unique contention, it is necessary to include pertinent remarks made at the close of the hearing before Judge Cunningham:
“MR. STOKER: Your Honor, an annotation setting forth the law dealing with the several employment of attorneys, found at 73 A.L.R.2d 1011, the section of that annotation that deals with this question, basically it sets forth the rule of a number of lawyers who are severally employed, all on one side of a controversy, and in a few such cases it was recognized that the fees should be determined on a quantum meruit basis. I went through several of the cases that dealt with this question, Jaslo versus United States [D.C.N.Y.] 308 Federal Supplement, Page 1164, a 1970 case, the Court said the attorneys’ fees should be determined considering all the circumstances of the case, and that case looked at the ultimate payment of damages plus the amount of time involved in the case.
“In this situation I think the fair determination as the division of these attorneys’ fees should be based on the relative value of services rendered. Although I think time should be a factor, still I think the primary question and consideration for this Court should be based upon the value of the services rendered. Mr. Paine, who was the defense attorney, in his dealings with Mr. Annest, he was unable to get the case settled, and, in fact, at the time of appeal being returned against him, in Mr. Annest’s favor, he offered $17,500 final settlement to settle *806the ease, that’s what Mr. Annest had earned, I submit at that point in time he had 40 per cent of that amount coming as a result of his efforts if the defense attorney was willing to concede $17,000 in settlement of the case.
“Your Honor, my involvement moved that amount up to $25,000, and we were able to settle the case in accordance with the clients’ wishes. On that basis I think regardless of the amount that — there is some controversy over the amount that was actually offered because if we take Mr. Annest’s amount of $10,000, and I think the amount that we have increased the offer substantially more, nevertheless giving him the benefit of the doubt. I think that we should figure $17,500 instead of $25,000, and I think this is a factor to be taken into consideration by the Court. Mr. Annest could have gone back to trial, and if the Court will review the transcript, this would be a very difficult one to win. Also the fact that he tried it once and lost it, I think are factors all to be taken into consideration. We were subsequently able to settle it decently and the circumstances have been presented to the Court I should be entitled to 40 per cent of that portion of the fee attributable to the amount between $17,500 and $25,000 which was the final settlement.
“MR. ANNEST: Your Honor, I’m going to leave it up to the Court. I thought that Mr. Stoker had indicated to the Court that he was going to stand on the contract. I agree it was a difficult case, and I think that we did a terrific amount of work, and I think that we did the best we could do for Mr. and Mrs. Boyer and Mr. Anderson
“MR. STOKER: Your Honor, in response to the contract, standing on the contract, if we take the literal terms of that contract, 40 per cent of what was recovered, and in Mr. Annest’s case it was nothing.
“Your Honor, I think that there has to be a fair and equitable meeting arrived at in regard to attorney fees, because I am certainly not going to say that Mr. An-nest is not deserving of something because of his efforts, he put a great deal of time, but I think the value of the services I put in justifies the proposition that I have submitted to the Court, and I think that the law will back me in the fact where a situation, an attorney doesn’t finish a case he doesn’t get anything, although this is not quite a point with this particular situation, still the extention of that contract’s language could be taken for that, because the Court is aware a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time, and on this basis we submit it to the Court and ask the Court to decide it.
“THE COURT: Well, gentlemen, it does appear to me that what I’m called upon to do in these proceedings is to determine how much Mr. Annest should receive as attorney fees under the employment contract between him and his clients. I’m not here to make any — I shouldn’t think I would be here to make a decision, it seems to me, Mr. Stoker, you’re entitled to whatever, fee your contract is with your client. I don’t know what that contract is, and I’m not trying to butt in and find out, but I think it would be unfair to you for me to make some contract up and say that your client owes you this. I don’t know what your agreement or contract with your client is, I think the only issue here is the interpretation of the contract between Mr. Anderson, Mrs. Boyer and Mr. Annest.
“You give a citation and I want to look at it, but I certainly don’t follow how I can interpret whatever agreement you and your clients have. That seems to be preposterous that I should be voiding some contract between you and your clients; that’s between you and your clients, not between — this isn’t a situation in which I’m advancing attorneys’ fees which were due under — or where I’m making a determination of reasonable attorney fees under a foreclosure contract. I assume that you, Mr. Stoker, have got *807some contract with your clients, and that’s not before me. I would not think it would be before me. What are your views?
“MR. STOKER: Well, Your Honor, as I understand the law in a situation where there is a contingent fee contract and the first attorney is terminated as here, that contract is not necessarily binding on the division of the fees from that point on.
“THE COURT: I don’t know that it is either. I’m talking about your contract, not Mr. Annest’s contract.
“MR. STOKER: Your Honor, the contract that I had with the clients was basically whatever fee was obtained under Mr. Annest’s contract would be divided by the Court in accordance with what we submitted here; in line with the cases I have been able to find, if it’s down to that question, I would request the right to submit a short brief to the Court dealing with that very subject, and whether the Court has the right to divide the 40 per cent fee or Mr. Annest should get the whole thing.”
Judge Cunningham’s memorandum opinion showed his awareness of Stoker’s novel request:
“Counsel has cited the annotation appearing in 73 ALR 2nd 991. That annotation deals with
“ ‘ * * * the question of division of fees or compensation between co-operating attorneys united in the performance of legal services without having any express contract as to the proportionate share or exact amount of the fee which each shall receive.’
“But that annotation hardly covers the present situation. We are not here dealing with a dispute between co-operating attorneys united in the performance of legal services and engaged in a dispute between themselves as to how they shall split a fee jointly earned between them. I do not know of any agreement, either expressed or implied, between Mr. Annest and Mr. Stoker for a division of attorney fees earned under Exhibit A.” (Emphasis added)
The manner in which Judge Cunningham is supposed to have erred in his decision totally escapes me. The plaintiffs Anderson-Boyer have never challenged their contractual arrangement with Annest. Yet the Court hands down an opinion which, seizing upon Stoker’s attempt to move in on Annest’s fees, intermeddles with long-settled law and so unsettles it as to make it wholly incomprehensible. An attorney’s contingent fee arrangement bears no similarity to the leasing of farm equipment or electric neon signs. In whatever clothing, contingent fee arrangements have long and well served the purpose of gaining legal representation for those who might otherwise have no representation. Ignoring this, and ignoring that the law has long been that the nonbreaching attorney is entitled to his contingent fee (or, at his option, payment for his services on a quantum meruit basis), the Court comes down with a holding which will put both the contingent fee client and the contingent fee attorney to litigation where must be proved the damages for the other’s breach.
Well settled principles of law have this day been needlessly unsettled. The law is left in a muddle. This was not the case, nor the time, nor the circumstances for the Court’s intermeddling in the field of contingent fee contracts.
DUNLAP, J., Pro Tem. concurs.

. The $25,000 fund was paid into the court registry, apparently by agreement and under the provisions of I.C. § 10-1115 in order that Annest would file a satisfaction of his lien against the proceeds. Annest filed such a satisfaction on January 16, 1978. Even though the main action had gone to judgment, satisfied by payment of $25,000 by the Gaileys, the $25,-000 was in the court’s possession, and the court certainly had the requisite authority to conduct a hearing in order to give some direction to the clerk of the court for disbursing it. The court ordered that, other than costs, 40% be paid to Annest on his contractual fee arrangement and 60% to the plaintiffs.
Annest in this Court moved that the appeal be dismissed. Although that motion should be granted, a majority of the Court are not so agreed, and, without addressing the issue, the majority proceeds to find error in Judge Cunningham’s decision. Accordingly it behooves me to extend more consideration to the merits than to the motion. I submit that case law generally would not allow the appeal. See Christian v. Cotten, 1 Ariz.App. 421, 403 P.2d 825 (1965); Wylie Brothers Contracting Co. v. Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Air Quality Control Bd., 80 N.M. 633, 459 P.2d 159 (1969); Ogle v. Ogle, 517 P.2d 797 (Okl.1973); Temple v. Feeney, 7 Wash.App. 345, 499 P.2d 1272 (1972); Anno., 91 A.L.R.2d 618 (1963). See also Common School Dist. No. 58 v. Lunden, 71 Idaho 486, 233 P.2d 806 (1951); French v. Christner, 173 Or. 158, 135 P.2d 464 (1943). A reading of our recent decision in James v. Dunlap, 100 Idaho 697, 604 P.2d 711 (1979), will show a readily observed distinction between that case and this.