Court Opinion

ID: 9712292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:50:54.045086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.346728
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The trial court was correct. The supreme court’s recent decision in Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 489 N.E.2d 867, persuades me to believe that the trial court was correct in its rulings granting summary judgment to both the doctor and the hospital. Although the affidavits of both the plaintiffs’ expert and the defendant doctor are conclusory in nature, as the majority states, the affidavits should be admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. City of Beardstown (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 584, 491 N.E.2d 803. The plaintiffs’ affidavit, being the affidavit of Dr. Gieselman, is not sufficient to overcome the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It does not appear that the plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit contradicts the statements made in the defendant doctor’s affidavit. Paragraph 4 of the Gieselman affidavit states that perforation secondary to dilation occurs in less than 1% of the cases so treated. This particular provision in itself is a conclusion and states nothing which helps the plaintiff. Paragraph 6 of Gieselman’s affidavit alleges that there were two perforations on the followup X rays and indicates there was not prudent passage of the dilators. The affidavit does not say that it was the fault of the defendant doctor. There also is nothing in the plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit which would establish the applicable standard of care that the defendant doctor violated. The plaintiffs have not presented medical opinion testimony which would be sufficient to sustain the allegations of the complaint as contrasted to the affidavit filed by the defendants. The plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit nowhere states that the defendant doctor did anything wrong. As stated in Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 241-42, 489 N.E.2d 867, 872: “In a negligence medical malpractice case, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the following elements of a cause of action: the proper standard of care against which the defendant physician’s conduct is measured; an unskilled or negligent failure to comply with the applicable standard; and a resulting injury proximately caused by the physician’s want of skill or care.” The plaintiffs’ affidavit does not establish this proper standard of care to measure the defendant doctor’s conduct and it also does not assert any unskilled or negligent failure to comply with the applicable standard, if any. In Purtill, the plaintiff’s expert affidavit stated that the doctor was familiar with “the minimal standards of acceptable medical care diagnosis, and treatment for Carol L. Purtill's condition of ill-being as it existed.” The affidavit further stated that those minimal standards were uniform throughout the United States wherever patients similar to Carol L. Purtill were examined, cared for, and treated for the condition of ill-being similar to that suffered by Carol L. Purtill. The affidavit then indicated that the doctor had reviewed the records, diagnosis, care, and treatment of the plaintiff received from the defendant doctor. The doctor’s expert said, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such diagnosis, care, and treatment were not in accordance with those uniform minimum standards and that this deviation from the accepted standard of care resulted in injury to the plaintiff. The affidavit further set forth specific instances in which the defendant doctor was negligent in the diagnosis and treatment. As stated in Purtill: “If a party moving for summary judgment supplies facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle such party to a judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party cannot rely on his pleadings alone to raise issues of material fact. *** Thus, facts contained in an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment which are not contradicted by counteraffidavit are admitted and must be taken as true for purposes of the motion.” Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41, 489 N.E.2d 867, 871-72. The supreme court in Purtill referred to Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hospital (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 458 N.E.2d 1072, and stated that in Bartimus: “Plaintiff’s expert admitted a lack of knowledge of the standard of care applicable to physicians in the Paxton area or in similar communities, as well as a lack of familiarity with Paxton Community Hospital and its facilities.” Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 229, 243-44, 489 N.E.2d 867, 873. The plaintiff’s expert in Bartimus did testify, however, that according to “minimum standards across the country” the defendant physician’s conduct deviated from those minimum standards. The appellate court set forth the requirement that prior to the introduction of an expert witness’s testimony, a foundation must be paid which demonstrates that the witness is familiar with the standard of care applicable to a defendant’s position. This foundation mandates an affirmative showing that the witness is familiar with medical practice in a community similar to that where the defendant physician practices. Supreme Court Rule 191, Purtill, Taylor, Bartimus and Heidelberger, all support the trial court’s order in the instant case.