Court Opinion

ID: 9929670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-03 01:00:35.891712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:23.013797
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60068       Document: 00517054714             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/02/2024

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit
                                    ____________                                FILED
                                                                          February 2, 2024
                                     No. 23-60068
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________
                                                                                Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                           versus

   Antonio Wiley,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Mississippi
                              USDC No. 3:22-CR-33-1
                    ______________________________

   Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
           Antonio Wiley pled guilty to a drug offense and failed to file a timely
   notice of appeal. When Wiley asked the district court for permission to file a
   late notice of appeal, the district court denied his request. Wiley now appeals.
   Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           *
              Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
   should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
   forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 23-60068       Document: 00517054714            Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/02/2024

                                       No. 23-60068

                                   I. Background
          Wiley pled guilty to one count of abetting the distribution of metham-
   phetamine in excess of fifty grams. The district court advised Wiley of his
   right to appeal the sentence the court would later impose. The district court
   eventually sentenced Wiley to seventy months of imprisonment, followed by
   three years of supervised release. The district court again advised Wiley of
   his right to appeal his sentence. The district court entered a judgment on
   December 15, 2022.
          Wiley had until December 29 to appeal his sentence by filing a notice
   of appeal. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A). But neither he nor his trial counsel,
   Whitman Mounger,1 filed a notice of appeal by that date.
          Instead, on January 22, 2023, twenty days after the filing deadline,
   Wiley filed a notice of appeal and a motion for an extension to file a notice of
   appeal. That notice and motion were filed by Susan Clouthier, his newly re-
   tained counsel.
          The district court denied Wiley’s motion without prejudice because
   Wiley’s reason for the delay weighed against a finding of excusable neglect.
   In so doing, the court found that Wiley failed to explain why Mounger, who
   was Wiley’s counsel before and at the time the appeal deadline expired, could
   not have filed a timely notice of appeal.
          Wiley then renewed his motion for an extension of time, making the
   same arguments he raised in the previous motion. The court held an eviden-
   tiary hearing on Wiley’s renewed motion. After hearing argument from
   Wiley’s new counsel, along with testimony from Wiley, Wiley’s mother, and

          _____________________
          1
           Mounger did not move for leave to withdraw as Wiley’s counsel until January 24,
   2023. The magistrate judge granted Mounger’s motion on January 31, 2023.

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                                     No. 23-60068

   Mounger, the district court denied Wiley’s renewed motion from the bench.
   Once again, the district court found that all factors, except Wiley’s reason for
   delay, weighed in favor of granting his motion. But because Wiley failed to
   provide an adequate explanation for failing to file a timely notice of appeal,
   the court declined to find excusable neglect and denied the renewed motion.
                                 II. Discussion
          A notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed within fourteen days
   of the entry of the judgment or order being appealed.             FED. R. APP.
   P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). But Rule 4 allows the district court to permit a party to file
   a late notice of appeal “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect or good cause.”
   FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4). Should the district court find excusable neglect or
   good cause, it may “extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not
   to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the” fourteen days following the
   entry of the judgment or order being appealed. Id.
          This court “review[s] the district court’s denial of [a] motion to file a
   late notice of appeal for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ramos Juarez,
   960 F.3d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 2020).
                                          A.
          Wiley first argues that because his failure to file a timely notice of
   appeal was due to excusable neglect, the district court abused its discretion
   in denying his request to file a late notice. In determining whether a party’s
   failure was caused by excusable neglect, a court should consider: (1) “the
   danger of prejudice to” the appellee; (2) “the length of the delay and its
   potential impact on judicial proceedings”; (3) “the reason for the delay,
   including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant”; and
   (4) “whether the movant acted in good faith.” United States v. Clark, 51 F.3d
   42, 44 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates

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   Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993)) (quotations
   omitted).
          The district court found that the first, second, and fourth factors
   weighed in favor of granting Wiley’s request. But the third factor did not;
   Wiley had not supplied an adequate reason for not filing a timely notice of
   appeal. Because Wiley failed to satisfy this factor, the district court declined
   to find excusable neglect.
          Wiley still offers no reasonable explanation for missing the deadline.
   Wiley knew he had a right to appeal on the date the district court entered
   judgment. Mounger remained his counsel during the fourteen days after the
   district court entered judgment. Yet Wiley failed to ask Mounger to file a
   notice of appeal, even though Mounger would have done so if Wiley had
   simply asked him. In fact, Wiley did not even attempt to contact Mounger
   until January 10, twelve days after the deadline to file a timely notice of appeal
   had passed. In short, Wiley could have, but did not file a timely notice of
   appeal.
          Wiley nevertheless contends his medical issues and the holiday season
   made it difficult for him to retain appellate counsel. But that argument
   ignores the fact that Mounger remained Wiley’s counsel during the crucial
   period following entry of judgment, and Mounger would have filed the notice
   of appeal for Wiley, regardless whether he later worked on the appeal. In
   fact, Mounger testified that although he typically does not do appeals, if
   Wiley had expressed an interest in filing an appeal, he would have sought
   appellate counsel. Moreover, Mounger testified he would have filed the

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   notice of appeal before referring Wiley to appellate counsel. Wiley’s first
   argument is, therefore, unpersuasive.2
           Wiley’s second argument fares no better. Wiley implies he failed to
   file a timely appeal because Mounger had told him that “there was no need
   to appeal, as [Wiley] had no grounds to appeal.”                         This argument
   misrepresents the testimony offered during the evidentiary hearing. To be
   sure, Wiley’s mother testified that Mounger said “there was no need to
   appeal.” But Wiley testified that it was Mounger’s wife who told him he
   lacked grounds for an appeal, and that Wiley never discussed filing an appeal
   with Mounger.3 Wiley also testified that he understood Mounger’s wife was
   not his lawyer.
           Second, whatever Mounger’s wife might have told Wiley about his
   odds of success on appeal was irrelevant to filing a timely appeal. Indeed,
   Wiley’s conversation with Mounger’s wife took place thirteen days after the
   deadline had passed. Mounger’s wife’s comments are of no moment.
           Finally, Wiley argues the district court abused its discretion in denying
   his renewed motion because the government did not oppose it. But “a court
   is not required to grant every unopposed motion.” Edward H. Bohlin Co.,
   Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993). Although the
           _____________________
           2
             Wiley argues this court’s decisions in Brewen v. United States, 375 F.2d 285 (5th
   Cir. 1967), and Bunn v. United States, 369 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), support
   his argument that the district court should have granted his request to file a late notice of
   appeal. In Brewen, we reversed a district court’s denial of an appellant’s request to file an
   untimely appeal because the district court improperly assumed the appellant had retained
   counsel capable of filing an appeal. See 375 F.2d at 288–89. Similarly, in Bunn, we held
   “the filing of notice of appeal was extended by reason of [the defendant’s] having no
   counsel available at the time the notice of appeal was required to be filed in the district
   court.” 369 F.2d at 810. These cases are inapplicable, however, because Wiley did not
   lack counsel capable of filing a timely notice of appeal.
           3
               Mounger corroborated Wiley’s testimony.

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   government took no position on Wiley’s renewed motion, the government’s
   lawyer called Mounger as a witness during the evidentiary hearing, elicited
   testimony unfavorable to granting Wiley’s renewed motion, and made
   arguments against granting the renewed motion. Thus, the government’s
   position on the renewed motion—or lack thereof—does not demonstrate the
   district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.
           Because Wiley failed to offer an adequate explanation for his failure to
   comply with Rule 4, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
   an absence of excusable neglect.
                                               B.
           Wiley alternatively contends that the court erred by failing to consider
   whether “good cause” justified his failure to file a timely appeal separately
   from whether excusable neglect did. Rule 4(b)(4) provides, “[u]pon a
   finding of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may—before or
   after the time has expired, with or without motion and notice—extend the
   time to file a notice of appeal . . . .” FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1) (emphasis
   added). Based on Rule 4’s text, Wiley contends “excusable neglect” and
   “good cause” are separate inquires. This argument, raised for the first time
   on appeal, is forfeited for failure to assert it to the district court not once, not
   twice, but three times.4
           Moreover, Wiley does not explain how his renewed motion would
   have succeeded under a “good cause” standard, even if it failed to cross an
   “excusable neglect” threshold. Wiley asserts the “good cause” standard is
   more lenient than the “excusable neglect” standard, but in patent

           _____________________
           4
           Specifically, Wiley failed to make this argument in his initial motion, his renewed
   motion, and during the evidentiary hearing, at which the district court entertained
   argument from Wiley’s new counsel.

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                                    No. 23-60068

   contradiction, he contends the factors used to assess “good cause” are the
   same as those underlying “excusable neglect.” Attempting to separate
   “good cause” from “excusable neglect” does not advance Wiley’s position.
                                         C.
          Finally, Wiley argues the district court abused its discretion by
   denying his renewed motion for a reason not permitted under the law. He
   quotes the evidentiary hearing, during which the district court stated:
          [I]f this Court allowed a defendant who missed a deadline to
          come forward with the evidence that has been forwarded here,
          presented in this courtroom today and on these papers an
          extension, everyone would request one. And that is not what
          the Court is going to allow. You have got to show excusable
          neglect. And to me, the important factor about the reason for
          the delay, it has not been established here to the Court’s
          satisfaction.
   Based on this statement, Wiley claims that the district court denied his
   request to file a late notice of appeal to deter future litigants from not
   complying with Rule 4. He argues that in this respect, the district court
   abused its discretion because neither Rule 4 nor Clark includes “deterrence”
   as a factor a court may consider when deciding a motion to file a late notice
   of appeal.
          Wiley misinterprets the district court’s statement. In fact, the district
   court was merely saying what Rule 4 commands: a district court may not
   grant a party permission to file a late notice of an appeal simply because he
   requests it and offers reasons in support of granting his request. Rule 4
   demands more. That means the district court must find excusable neglect or
   good cause to grant a party’s request to file a late notice of appeal. FED. R.
   APP. P. 4(b)(4). In simply stating that Wiley’s arguments did not fulfill

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   Rule 4 and basing its decision on Rule 4’s requirements, the district court did
   not abuse its discretion.
          The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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