Court Opinion

ID: 9684050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:34.752848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.907051
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the charge of tampering with physical evidence was properly submitted to the jury. KRS 524.100(1)(a). The defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict.
Page was convicted of second-degree manslaughter and first-degree wanton endangerment as well as tampering with physical evidence. In this case, there was evidence that Page concealed himself after his crime and thereby prevented police from obtaining a blood sample. There is no question that blood is physical evidence and concealment of such physical evidence would justify submitting the tampering charge to a jury. The trial judge admitted that the determination was a “close call” but determined that the definition “seems to apply.” The trial judge promised he would take another look at the issue upon receipt of a post-judgment motion for relief. Defense counsel did not present any further motions regarding the issue and declined to do so when the trial judge solicited his motions at the end of the trial.
It is uncontroverted that Page wrecked his automobile which resulted in the deaths of his sister and a six-year old niece. He then fled, cleaned his own injuries and encouraged a false, or at least misleading, statement to police by his brother.
This Court as well as the United States Supreme Court has properly recognized the evidentiary importance of the blood of a criminal defendant. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Speers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 638 (1992). It is in the nature of blood to have a tendency to change quickly as a result of normal body function and this produces an elimination of drugs and alcohol. Consequently, there is a compelling state interest in the expedient collection of blood evidence after a drug or alcohol-related offense. There is no sacred attachment to the blood contained in the body because the sample must be obtained from blood in the body. The reliance by the majority opinion on the integrity of body blood is unconvincing.
Page concealed himself after the crime because he did not want the police to observe him. He was afraid that he would be arrested and that he would have to go back to prison. The blood evidence was not readily available when the police finally apprehended Page because of the acts of concealment.
Reliance by the majority on State v. Peplow, 307 Mont. 172, 36 P.3d 922 (2001), *426is unpersuasive. Peplow, supra, is very different. The Montana Supreme Court said that standing alone, the consumption of alcohol after the accident was not sufficient evidence of tampering. The comparison to the innocent eating, sleeping or medicine ingestion is misplaced. Here, the defendant fled, cleaned his appearance and encouraged misleading information. In this case, the conviction of Page is not based on some kind of isolated or facially innocent conduct.
The Montana statute does not define “physical evidence.” Kentucky does in Chapter 524, and the definition is comprehensive enough to include a sample of the defendant’s blood. The blood sample must come from blood in the body. It logically follows that if the source of the sample is concealed by the defendant, the blood evidence is certainly tampered with. The charge was correct and the jury was entitled to decide.
The judgment of conviction of the tampering with evidence charge should be affirmed.