Court Opinion

ID: 9848861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:28:48.215891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:50.429909
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the majority inappropriately applies the decision of Johns v. State, 160 Ga. App. 535 (287 SE2d 617) (1981), for several reasons. First, Johns addressed multiple felony sentences to a term of years in the state penitentiary, followed by a term of probation. This court held that the prison sentence was fully served at the time of Johns’s release by the department of offender rehabilitation under “good time” rules and that “[a]ny attempt by a court to impose its will over the Executive Department as to what constitutes service of a period of confinement would be a nullity and constitute an exercise of power granted exclusively to the Executive. [Cits.]” Id. at 536. In contrast, here we consider a relatively brief misdemeanor sentence to be served in the county jail, in which the trial court balances the need for confinement and the need for continued supervision by the court, with the assistance of the probation department. Because of the different considerations inherent in the administration of misdemeanor sentences through county jails and probation departments, applying *263Johns in this case could interfere significantly with the ability of trial courts in this state to fashion effective misdemeanor sentences.
Decided March 29, 2000
Closson, Bass & Tomberlin, J. Michael Bass, for appellant.
Richard W. Shelton, Solicitor, for appellee.
Second, Johns was sentenced on each of three counts to “two years in the penitentiary and eight years on probation.” Johns, supra at 535. In contrast, the trial court here sentenced Hutchins to “confinement for a period of 12 months in the Lowndes County Jail. . . . Provided, that after the service of 180 days in confinement, the balance shall be probated.” (Emphasis supplied.) The distinction in the wording of these sentences is significant. Here, the trial court made a determination that Hutchins required the supervision of the trial court in some form for 12 months, and we should not interfere with that determination.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.