Court Opinion

ID: 9955609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 20:08:58.044123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.543795
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion Z
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 CHRISTOPHER KABEW,                                        No. 86982
                 Petitioner,
                 vs.
                 THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                 COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF                                  If LEO
                                                                              -a

                 CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
                 MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT
                 JUDGE,                                               CL
                 Respondents,                                         BY

                   and
                 THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                 Real Party in Interest.

                             Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district
                 court order denying a motion to set aside a judgment of conviction.
                             Petition granted.

                 Darin F. Imlay, Public Defender, and Cherae Muije, Deputy Public
                 Defender, Clark County,
                 for Petitioner.

                 Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                 Attorney, and Alexander Chen, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark
                 County,
                 for Real Party in Interest.

                 BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, PICKERING, and
                 PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

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                                                 OPINION
                By the Court, STIGLICH, J.:
                            Petitioner Christopher Kabew pleaded guilty to attempted
                residential burglary and was placed on probation. As a term of probation,
                Kabew had to successfully complete a substance abuse treatment program.
                Kabew did so and moved the district court to set aside the judgment of
                conviction under NRS 176A.240(6)(a). The district court denied the motion
                and honorably discharged Kabew from probation.
                            In this original proceeding, we consider a district court's
                discretion when resolving cases under NRS 176A.240(6)(a). That statute
                provides that when a defendant fulfills the terms and conditions of
                probation pursuant to a substance abuse treatment program (drug court), a
                district court Islhall discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings
                or set aside the judgment of conviction, as applicable, unless the defendant"
                has either a prior felony conviction or previously failed a specialty court
                program. We hold that the statute does not afford district courts any
                discretion to deny a motion to set aside the judgment of conviction when the
                defendant meets the statutory requirements. Accordingly, we grant the
                petition.
                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            The State charged Kabew with stalking and attempted
                residential burglary.   Kabew pleaded guilty to attempted residential
                burglary—a category C felony—pursuant to plea negotiations. In exchange
                for Kabew's guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss two other cases and to
                not oppose probation with drug court as a condition. The district court
                entered a judgment of conviction, imposing a suspended sentence of 12-36
                months and placing Kabew on probation for a period not to exceed 24
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                      months. In addition to the general terms of probation, the district court
                      imposed special conditions, including that Kabew enroll in and complete the
                      drug court program. The conviction was Kabew's first felony conviction.
                                  Kabew successfully completed the drug court program.
                      Accordingly, Kabew requested that the case be dismissed under NRS
                      176A.240(6)(a), which provides that upon a defendant's "fulfillment of the
                      terms and conditions" of drug court, the district court "[s]hall discharge the
                      defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the judgment of
                      conviction" unless the defendant has a prior felony conviction or previously
                      failed to complete a specialty court program. The district court declined to
                      dismiss the case but permitted the parties to brief the issue. In response,
                      Kabew filed a motion to set aside the judgment of conviction. Kabew argued
                      that the use of the word "shall" in NRS 176A.240(6)(a) required the district
                      court to set aside the judgment of conviction. The State argued that the
                      motion should be denied for two reasons. First, the State asserted that
                      reading NRS 176A.240(6)(a) as mandatory would unconstitutionally usurp
                      the district court's discretion in setting aside a judgment of conviction.
                      Second, the State asserted that setting aside the judgment of conviction
                      went against the "spirit" of the guilty plea negotiations.
                                  After hearing argument, the district court orally denied the
                      motion without explanation. The district court entered a written order
                      summarily denying the motion and honorably discharging Kabew from
                      probation. This petition for a writ of mandamus followed.
                                                       DISCUSSION
                      We elect to entertain the petition
                                   Kabew seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to
                      enter an order setting aside the judgment of conviction.           A writ of
                      mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law
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                      requires as a duty resulting from an office or to control a manifest or
                      arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. NRS 34.160; Round Hill Gen.
                      Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536
                      (1981).   It is within our discretion to determine if a petition for
                      extraordinary relief will be considered. Poulos v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 98
                      Nev. 453, 455, 652 P.2d 1177, 1178 (1982); State, Off. of the Att'y Gen. v.
                      Just. Ct. of Las Vegas Twp. (Escalante), 133 Nev. 78, 80, 392 P.3d 170, 172
                      (2017). A writ of mandamus will not issue when there is a plain, speedy,
                      and adequate remedy at law. NRS 34.170.
                                     Kabew asserts that this court should entertain the petition for
                      three reasons. First, Kabew has no adequate remedy at law because the
                      district court's order is not appealable. Second, this petition presents an
                      issue of statewide importance affecting numerous successful drug court
                      participants who are entitled to have their convictions set aside. Finally,
                      the district court failed to perform an act required by law because NRS
                      176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory.       We agree and exercise our discretion to
                      entertain the petition because Kabew does not have an adequate remedy at
                      law to challenge the district court's order and the interpretation of NRS
                      176A.240(6)(a) is an important issue requiring clarification that would
                      provide needed guidance to lower courts. Escalante, 133 Nev. at 80, 392
                      P.3d at 172.
                      The district court improperly denied the motion to set aside the judgment of
                      conviction
                                     Entertaining the merits of this writ petition requires us to
                      interpret NRS 176A.240. Questions of statutory construction are reviewed
                      de novo. Escalante, 133 Nev. at 80-81, 392 P.3d at 172; Hobbs v. State, 127
                      Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). We look first to the statute's plain

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                language. Id. When the plain language is clear and unambiguous, we will
                give effect to the clear meaning and "enforce the statute as written." Id.
                      NRS 176A.240(6)(a) imposes a duty to act and affords district courts
                      no discretion
                            Kabew argues that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is mandatory because
                it uses the word "shall," and therefore, the district court failed to perform
                an act (setting aside the judgment of conviction) required by law. In the
                State's view, NRS 176A.240(6)(a) is discretionary, and the district court did
                not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the
                judgment of conviction.
                            NRS 0.025(1)(d) provides that Is]hall' imposes a duty to act"
                unless "otherwise expressly provided in a particular statute or required by
                the context." Consistent with that definition, we generally construe "shall"
                as mandatory. Thomas v. State, 88 Nev. 382, 384, 498 P.2d 1314, 1315
                (1972); see also Goudge v. State, 128 Nev. 548, 553, 287 P.3d 301, 304 (2012)
                ("This court has explained that, when used in a statute, the word 'shall'
                imposes a duty on a party to act and prohibits judicial discretion and,
                consequently, mandates the result set forth by the statute.").
                            Under NRS 176A.240(1), the district court has discretion to
                make the successful completion of a substance use disorder program a
                condition of a defendant's terms of probation. NRS 176A.240(6) provides
                two outcomes after a defendant successfully completes a substance abuse
                treatment program as a condition of probation. Those outcomes depend on
                whether the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony or failed a
                specialty court program. If the defendant has no prior felony conviction and
                has not previously failed a specialty court program, subsection 6(a) provides
                that the district court "Nhall discharge the defendant and dismiss the
                proceedings or set aside the judgment of conviction." (Emphasis added.)
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                But if the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony or failed a
                specialty court program, subsection 6(b) provides that the district court
                "Pnjay discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings or set aside the
                judgment of conviction." (Emphasis added.)
                            Clearly, the use of "shall" and "may" in the two subsections
                indicates that the Legislature used "shall" in subsection 6(a) to differentiate
                between defendants based on their history when it comes to felony
                convictions and specialty court programs. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
                Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)
                ("[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially
                different term in another, the presumption is that the different term
                denotes a different idea."). Because the statute uses "shall" with respect to
                defendants with no prior felony convictions or failed efforts in a specialty
                court program and "may" with respect to repeat offenders and those who
                previously failed to complete a specialty court program, the Legislature
                clearly intended to remove a district court's discretion under subsection 6(a)
                while affording a district court discretion under subsection 6(b). Reading
                the word "shall" in NRS 176A.240(6)(a) as discretionary would thwart, not
                further, that legislative objective. We therefore interpret the word "shall"
                by its ordinary meaning as provided in NRS 0.025(1)(d).
                            The   State   concedes    that   the   statute's plain   language
                demonstrates that the Legislature worded it so as to remove judicial
                discretion. Nevertheless, the State urges us to disregard the plain meaning
                and construe the statute as discretionary because the decision to set aside
                a judgment of conviction is a judicial function. When a statute intrudes on
                the functions of the judicial branch, this court may construe the statute as
                directory rather than mandatory. State v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 106 Nev.

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                880, 883, 802 P.2d 1276, 1278 (1990) ("When statutory provisions 'relate to
                judicial functions, they should be regarded as directory only." (quoting
                Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230, 234, 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952))).
                            In Goudge v. State, this court considered whether district courts
                had discretion to release a defendant from lifetime supervision after the
                defendant satisfied the statutory requirements for release under NRS
                176.0931. 128 Nev. at 552, 287 P.3d at 303. The State argued that
                "determining punishments is within the purview of the district court." Id.
                Accordingly, the State asserted "that divesting a district court of discretion
                in this context renders the role of the judiciary meaningless with regard to
                determining whether convicted sex offenders are ready to be released from
                lifetime supervision." Id. at 553-54, 287 P.3d at 304. This court disagreed
                and concluded that "reading the statute as mandatory does not encroach
                upon the judicial function." Id. at 554, 287 P.3d at 304. This court explained
                that when the Legislature uses the mandatory word "shall" to limit the
                extent of a punishment, "the district court must comply with the
                Legislature's mandate." Id.
                            We find the reasoning in Goudge applicable to this case.
                Construing NRS 176A.240(6)(a) as rnandatory does not "usurp" a judicial
                function. "[T]he    egislature, within constitutional limits, is empowered to
                define crimes and determine punishments . . . ." Schrnidt v. State, 94 Nev.
                665, 668, 584 P.2d 695, 697 (1978). And this court has recognized that "it
                is within the Legislature's power to completely remove any judicial
                discretion to determine a criminal penalty by creating mandatory
                sentencing schemes." Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 640, 218 P.3d
                501, 505 (2009). Because the Legislature defines the framework of the
                specialty court programs, it is within the Legislature's authority to define
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                the outcome for a probationer who successfully completes one of those
                programs. In NRS 176A.240(6)(a), the Legislature has provided certain
                probationers a benefit based on their successful completion of a drug court
                program.   Where a defendant has satisfied the terms and conditions of
                probation and met the requirements under NRS 176A.240(6)(a), the district
                court lacks discretion to deny the motion to set aside the judgment of
                conviction. Accordingly, we decline the State's invitation to eschew the
                provision's plain meaning and thus interpret the statutory language as
                written. In doing so, we elect to abide by the legislative mandate contained
                in NRS 176A.240(6)(a) because it serves the legitimate goal of providing
                first-time felons who have not previously failed to complete a drug court
                program an opportunity to reenter society without the impediments of a
                felony conviction.
                      Kabew is entitled to have the judgment of conviction set aside pursuant
                      to NRS 176A.240(6)(a)
                            We next consider the district court's denial of Kabew's motion
                in this case. The State does not dispute that Kabew met the statutory
                requirements provided in NRS 176A.240(6)(a). Instead, the State argues
                that interpreting NRS 176A.240(6)(a) as mandatory goes against the
                "spirit" of Kabew's guilty plea agreement because the plea agreement did
                not contemplate NRS 176A.240(6)(a) and prosecutors will be dissuaded
                from negotiating plea agreements.'        Neither argument is relevant to
                interpreting the statute. See Platte River In.s. Co. v. Jackson, 137 Nev. 773,

                        'Notably, NRS 176A.240 was in effect when Kabew entered his guilty
                plea. 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 633, § 22, at 4391; 2019 Nev. Stat., ch. 633,
                § 137(2), at 4488 (providing that the law became effective on July 1, 2020);
                ,see also Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 481, 151 P. 512, 513 (1915) (noting that
                "[e]very one is presumed to know the law").
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                   778, 500 P.3d 1257, 1262 (2021) (explaining that this court "may not adopt
                   an interpretation contrary to a statute's plain meaning merely because we
                   'clisagree[] with the wisdom of the Legislature's policy determinations"
                   (alteration in original) (quoting Anthony v. State, 94 Nev. 338, 341, 580 P.2d
                   939, 941 (1978))).
                               Moreover,    we   find   the   State's   policy   concerns   to   be
                   inconsequential in light of NRS 176A.240(7), which provides that a
                   discharge and dismissal under the statute is not a conviction for public or
                   private purposes "but is a conviction for the purpose of additional penalties
                   imposed for second or subsequent convictions or the setting of bail." Thus,
                   the statute allows a successful first-time drug court participant to reenter
                   society without the conviction on their public record, while ensuring that
                   the conviction nonetheless can be used for enhancement purposes if that
                   person reoffends. Having decided that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) removes judicial
                   discretion under the facts presented in this case, we conclude the district
                   court failed to perform a duty required by law.
                                                 CONCLUSION
                               We hold that NRS 176A.240(6)(a) removes judicial discretion in
                   cases where a defendant fulfills the terms and conditions of probation
                   pursuant to a drug court prograrn and satisfies the statutory requirements.
                   Because Kabew satisfied those conditions and met both requirements under
                   NRS 176A.240(6)(a), the district court had no discretion to deny the motion
                   to set aside the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that the
                   district court failed to perform a duty required by law. Therefore, we grant
                   the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus

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                        directing the district court to enter an order setting aside the judgment of
                        conviction.

                                                                 AleZst,G4..Q            J.
                                                           Stiglich

                        We concur:

                        Pickering

                        Parraguirre

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