Court Opinion

ID: 9353233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 16:02:38.192454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:18.642535
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 11, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                              No. 3D22-128
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-16057
                          ________________

                         Yosef Deitsch, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

           Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Vivianne Del
Rio, Judge.

     Litigation & Recovery Law Center, PL, and Alex Stern, for appellants.

     R+C Litigators, PLLC, Efrain Carlos and Elis M. Rojas, (Fort
Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and SCALES and GORDO, JJ.

     GORDO, J.
      Yosef Deitsch and Miriam Deitsch (“the Deitschs”) appeal a trial court

order denying their motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section

626.93731, Florida Statutes, and dismissing the case against Certain

Underwriters at Lloyds of London (“Lloyds”) with prejudice. We have

jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). Because we find the Deitschs’

lawsuit was a necessary catalyst to resolve their claim and force Lloyds to

proceed with the appraisal process, we reverse and remand. See Lewis v.

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 13 So. 3d 1079, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)

(stating that “the insureds were entitled to fees as the insureds did not ‘race

to the courthouse,’ the suit was not filed simply for the purpose of the

attorney’s fee award, but rather to resolve a legitimate dispute, and the filing

of the suit acted as a necessary catalyst to resolve the dispute and force the

insurer to satisfy its obligations under the insurance contract”) (internal

citation omitted); Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So. 2d 679, 684–85 (Fla. 2000)

(“[W]here an insurer pays policy proceeds after suit has been filed but before

judgment has been rendered, the payment of the claim constitutes the

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   “Because section 626.9373 is patterned after section 627.428, the
confession-of-judgment doctrine applicable to section 627.428 applies
equally to section 626.9373.” Bryant v. GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co., 271 So.
3d 1013, 1019 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also Capitol Specialty Ins. Corp.
v. Ortiz, 2019 WL 383868, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2019) (noting that sections
627.428 and 626.9373 “are nearly identical” and “that courts apply the two
fee provisions in the same way”).

                                       2
functional equivalent of a confession of judgment or verdict in favor of the

insured, thereby entitling the insured to attorney’s fees.”); Cincinnati Ins. Co.

v. Palmer, 297 So. 2d 96, 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (holding that “it is neither

reasonable nor just that an insurer can avoid liability for statutory attorney's

fees by . . . paying the insurance proceeds . . . after suit is filed but before

final judgment is entered”).

      Reversed and remanded.

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