Court Opinion

ID: 9396644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 14:06:37.512221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.544253
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  21-P-899

                            FANNIE MAE1 & another2

                                       vs.

                           ANTHONY MICHAEL BRANCH.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The defendant homeowner, Anthony Michael Branch, appeals

 from a final judgment entered by a Housing Court judge granting

 Fannie Mae, also known as Federal National Mortgage Association

 (FNMA), possession and dismissing the homeowner's counterclaims

 against FNMA.3     We conclude that FNMA's judgment for possession

 is moot because it no longer has a possessory interest in the

 property and that the homeowner's appeal of the allowance of

 Roberto Pina Cardoso's motion to intervene is moot because

 Cardoso never obtained judgment for possession.             We further

 conclude that, on the homeowner's counterclaims, he failed to

 raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether

 1   Also known as Federal National Mortgage Association.
 2   Roberto Pina Cardoso, intervener-appellee.
 3   FNMA was also awarded damages.
Pentagon Federal Credit Union (bank) agreed not to foreclose on

the property.   Accordingly, we vacate FNMA's judgment for

possession as moot and remand the matter for entry of a new

judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and the

homeowner's counterclaims.

     1.   Background.   In April 2009, the homeowner obtained a

mortgage loan from the bank in the amount of $103,050 on a home

in Brockton (the property).    In mid-2012, the homeowner

defaulted.   Between February 2013 and June 2014, the bank sent

the homeowner three separate notices informing him that he was

in default and had a right to cure the default.4    After the

homeowner failed to cure the default, the bank proceeded to

schedule a foreclosure sale.

     On January 7, 2016, the homeowner filed for bankruptcy

under Chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, causing the bank

to cancel its already scheduled foreclosure sale.    In May 2016,

the bankruptcy trustee agreed to abandon the property so that

the homeowner could sell it to avoid foreclosure.    When the

homeowner failed promptly to retain a broker to sell or list the

property (apparently because of a pending divorce), the bank

sent the homeowner a letter notifying him of the bank's intent

to foreclose by sale on September 14, 2016.

4 The parties dispute whether these notices complied with the
mortgage and State law requirements.

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    On September 2, 2016, the homeowner requested that the bank

postpone the scheduled foreclosure sale so that he could attempt

to sell the property.    The bank denied the request because it

"came in less than 15 days prior to the scheduled sale date."       A

week before the scheduled foreclosure sale, the homeowner

informed the bank that he had received an offer to purchase the

property for $150,000.    The bank, however, quickly rejected the

offer because it was "less than the payoff amount required to

release the lien."   At the foreclosure sale, the bank was the

highest bidder and purchased the property for $155,918.59.

    On October 12, 2016, the bank assigned its bid to FNMA.        On

June 5, 2017, FNMA served the homeowner with a summary process

summons and complaint.    The homeowner answered raising several

counterclaims.   On November 24, 2017, FNMA moved for partial

summary judgment on its claim for possession and on the

homeowner's counterclaims.    In response, the homeowner filed an

opposition and a supporting affidavit, as well as an affidavit

requesting additional discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.

56 (f), 365 Mass. 824 (1974).    After a judge (first judge)

denied the homeowner's request to reopen discovery on the basis

that it was untimely, the judge granted FNMA's motion for

partial summary judgment on its claim for possession and

dismissed the homeowner's counterclaims.    The homeowner filed a

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timely notice of appeal both at this point and after final

judgment entered.

    After final judgment entered, Cardoso purchased the

property from FNMA.   Shortly thereafter, he filed a summary

process complaint.

    On September 21, 2020, a panel of this court granted

Cardoso leave to file a motion to intervene or to be substituted

as the plaintiff in the underlying summary process action.      On

November 3, 2020, Cardoso filed a motion requesting that he be

allowed "to intervene as a party Plaintiff in this action,

substitute him as Plaintiff on the claim for possession,

permitting him to proceed as Plaintiff in this matter going

forward."    That same day, he also filed a motion requesting use

and occupancy payments during the pendency of the appeal.

    While these motions were pending in the Housing Court and

before there was any determination as to who had a superior

possessory interest in the property as between Cardoso and the

homeowner, Cardoso moved to dismiss his summary process

complaint.   A second judge allowed the motion, dismissed the

complaint without prejudice, and transferred the homeowner's

counterclaims to the civil docket.

    On April 21, 2021, the same second judge allowed Cardoso to

"be joined as a plaintiff in this case" (emphasis added).    The

judge did not substitute Cardoso for FNMA or amend the judgment

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to award Cardoso possession.     Rather, the judge specifically

stated that the homeowner "would not be precluded from

challenging the validity of the Plaintiff's title by foreclosure

and consequently, Cardoso's subsequent title by conveyance from

the Plaintiff."     The judge further ordered the homeowner to make

use and occupancy payments to Cardoso.      The homeowner's appeal

of the judgment granting FNMA possession and dismissing his

counterclaims and his appeal of the order allowing Cardoso to

intervene are now before us.

    2.     Mootness.   "It is a 'general rule that courts decide

only actual controversies . . . and normally do not decide moot

cases.'"   Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481

Mass. 810, 816 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020),

quoting Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dep't of the Trial

Court, 421 Mass. 502, 504 (1995).      Litigation is moot "where a

court can order 'no further effective relief.'"      Troila v.

Department of Correction, 490 Mass. 1013, 1014 (2022), quoting

Lynn v. Murrell, 489 Mass. 579, 582 (2022).      "[W]here a case

becomes moot on appeal, we vacate the [judgment] appealed from

with a notation that the decision is not on the merits, and

remand the case to the [lower court] with directions to dismiss

the [complaint]."      Aquacultural Research Corp. v. Austin, 88

Mass. App. Ct. 631, 634-635 (2015), quoting Building Comm'r of

                                   5
Cambridge v. Building Code Appeals Bd., 34 Mass. App. Ct. 696,

700 (1993).

     a.    FNMA's judgment for possession.     The homeowner argues

that the first judge erred in allowing FNMA's motion for partial

summary judgment on its claim for possession because there was a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether it was entitled

to the property.   On appeal, the homeowner seeks to reverse,

whereas Cardoso seeks to affirm, FNMA's judgment for possession.

     Here, "the application of the mootness doctrine is

warranted" because FNMA no longer has any possessory interest in

the property.5   Robinson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.,

62 Mass. App. Ct. 935, 936 (2005) (plaintiff's claim for medical

eligibility was moot because "even if [the plaintiff] could

prove the essential elements of a [G. L. c. 32,] § 7 [1] claim,

he would not be entitled to collect the benefits").       After the

final judgment for possession, FNMA transferred the property to

Cardoso.   See Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Rego, 474 Mass. 329,

330 (2016) ("judge allowed Fannie Mae's motion for summary

judgment 'as to possession only'").      Given that FNMA no longer

has a superior possessory interest to the homeowner, FNMA's

judgment for possession is moot.       See Gutierrez v. Board of

5 Both before us and the Housing Court, FNMA expressed its intent
to abandon the monetary judgment for use and occupancy and the
judgment for possession.

                                   6
Managers of Flagship Wharf Condominium, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 678,

689 (2022) (vacating judgment in part "not on the merits, but

because the claims therein have become moot").

     b.   Motion to intervene.    Given that Cardoso failed to

obtain judgment for possession, the appeal of the allowance of

his motion to intervene is moot.       Cf. Reilly v. Hopedale, 102

Mass. App. Ct. 367, 382-383 (2023) ("[plaintiffs'] motion to

intervene was not moot [where they] . . . sought to intervene in

the Land Court suit to effectuate the Superior Court judgment").

The second judge implicitly denied Cardoso's request to be

substituted as the plaintiff in the summary process action and

rather merely added him as a plaintiff, specifically reserving

the right of the homeowner to challenge the validity of

Cardoso's title.   As the judgment of possession for FNMA does

not allow Cardoso to take possession and, in any event, is being

vacated and dismissed, it no longer matters whether Cardoso was

properly allowed to intervene.6    Accordingly, the appeal of the

order allowing intervention is moot.

6 We acknowledge that the intervention also allowed Cardoso to
obtain use and occupancy payments while this appeal was pending.
Those orders, however, were affirmed by a single justice of this
court and are not before us. Those use and occupancy payments
will cease with the end of this appeal. We recognize that,
under certain circumstances, a judge may order use and occupancy
payments during the pendency of a summary process action. See
Davis v. Comerford, 483 Mass. 164, 177-178 (2019). Any such
request for use and occupancy payments, however, will be made in
a new summary process action initiated by Cardoso and will not

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     3.   Dismissal of the homeowner's counterclaims.   a.

Standard of review.    "We review a grant of summary judgment de

novo to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have

been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law."   LaRace v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 99 Mass.

App. Ct. 316, 321 (2021), quoting Pinti v. Emigrant Mtge. Co.,

472 Mass. 226, 231 (2015).   "In deciding a motion for summary

judgment the court may consider the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits."

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Morin, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 506 (2019),

quoting Niles v. Huntington Controls, Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct.

15, 18 (2017).

     In his opposition to FNMA's motion for partial summary

judgment the homeowner raised two different counterclaims, under

the theories of promissory estoppel and negligent

misrepresentation, based on the bank's alleged agreement to

allow the homeowner to sell the property to avoid foreclosure.7

be impacted by the propriety of the intervention order in FNMA's
action.
7 In his answer, the homeowner counterclaimed that FNMA brought

the summary process action to retaliate against him for
complaining of deceptive and unfair business practices during
the collection and foreclosure process and that FNMA's rejection
of the third-party offer to purchase the property violated G. L.
c. 244, § 35C. Because he failed to raise these counterclaims
in his opposition to FNMA's motion for partial summary judgment,
these claims are waived. See Weiner v. Commerce Ins. Co., 78

                                 8
The bank provided an affidavit stating that "[the homeowner] and

his counsel agreed to immediately sell the property to avoid

foreclosure."   The homeowner attested that his attorney advised

him that he could sell the property "once the judgment nisi was

handed down" and that he "did not get [his] divorce Judgment

until July 2016."    The homeowner, however, provided no evidence

that the bank agreed to wait later than September 2016 to

foreclose on the property or that it agreed to accept "less than

the full payoff" on the mortgage.    See Abdulky v. Lubin & Meyer,

P.C., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 451 (2023), quoting Mass. R. Civ.

P. 56 (e) (in opposing motion for summary judgment, "'an adverse

party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleading'; instead, the adverse party must -— 'by affidavits or

as otherwise provided' under rule 56 -— 'set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial'").

Accordingly, the counterclaims were properly dismissed on

summary judgment.8

Mass. App. Ct. 563, 568 (2011) (issues not raised in trial court
are waived). Additionally, the homeowner's counterclaims based
on G. L. c. 93A violations, although raised in his opposition,
were not briefed. Accordingly, these claims are not before us.
See Malden Police Patrolman's Ass'n v. Malden, 92 Mass. App. Ct.
53, 62 n.11 (2017).
8 The homeowner also claims that he was entitled to additional

discovery pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (f). See Caira v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 374, 384 (2017) ("Rule
56 [f] . . . permits a judge to grant a continuance where a
nonmoving party needs to conduct discovery or to take
depositions for the purpose of presenting facts in opposition to

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    4.     Conclusion.   So much of the final judgment as grants

FNMA possession and damages is vacated, not on the merits but

because it is moot, and the matter is remanded to the Housing

Court for entry of a judgment dismissing FNMA's complaint.      So

much of the final judgment as dismisses the defendant's

counterclaims is affirmed.    The appeal of the allowance of the

motion to intervene is dismissed as moot.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand &
                                         D'Angelo, JJ.9),

                                       Clerk

Entered:   May 23, 2023.

the summary judgment motion"); Coastal Orthopaedic Inst., P.C.
v. Bongiorno, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 61 n.8 (2004) (party can
request continuance for additional discovery by "fil[ing] an
affidavit as required by Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 [f]"). The
homeowner's affidavit was based on the proposition that FNMA's
discovery responses were incomplete. The homeowner, however,
does not provide any argument as to why the first judge abused
his discretion in determining that it was too late to raise this
issue in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
rather than in a motion to compel at the time that the homeowner
received the allegedly incomplete discovery responses. See
Alphas Co. v. Kilduff, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 107 (2008)
(request for additional discovery reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
9 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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