Court Opinion

ID: 9926826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 18:08:46.424545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.157581
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.A., 2024-Ohio-224.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In the Matter of:                                  :

[A.A.], neglected minor,                           :                  No. 23AP-152
                                                                  (C.P.C. No. 19JU-9131)
[F.I., Mother],                                    :
                                                               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                 Appellant.                        :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                       Rendered on January 23, 2024

                 On brief: Robert J. McClaren, for Franklin County Children
                 Services.

                 On brief: Alana Van Gundy, for appellant.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                      Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, F.I., mother of A.A., a minor child, appeals the February 16, 2023
decision and judgment entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch, which granted permanent custody of A.A. to appellee
Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On August 8, 2019, FCCS filed a complaint alleging A.A. was an abused,
neglected, and dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.031(C) and (D), 2151.03(A)(2), and
2151.04(C), respectively. That same day, a preliminary hearing was held before a juvenile
court magistrate. Appellant was present at the hearing and represented by counsel.
Appellant testified that she and A.A.’s father, M.A., were married and lived in Somalia when
A.A. was born. An attorney representing Permanent Family Solutions Network (“PFSN”)
No. 23AP-152                                                                             2

apprised the magistrate that FCCS was seeking a temporary order of custody (“TOC”)
because appellant had recently pleaded guilty to a charge of criminal mischief following an
incidence of domestic violence against A.A.; as a result of community control sanctions
imposed upon her conviction, appellant was ordered to have no contact with A.A. for two
years. Following the hearing, the magistrate entered an order terminating a previously
entered emergency care order and granted FCCS’ request for a TOC.
       {¶ 3} On August 13, 2019, a magistrate filed findings of fact and conclusions of law
finding FCCS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of A.A. from the home. The
magistrate outlined the facts surrounding the failure to prevent the removal of A.A. from
the home as follows: “On August 7, 2019, [appellant] was observed to be verbally abusive
to [A.A.] near or around [A.A.’s] school. [Appellant] and [A.A.] left, and when [A.A.]
returned he was upset and crying. He had a welt on his head. He reported that [appellant]
threw her iPhone at him. [Appellant] was charged with Criminal Mischief and was * * *
court ordered to stay away from [A.A.] for two (2) years.” (Findings of Fact at 1.)
       {¶ 4} On September 4, 2019, attorney Donald G. Worley was appointed as guardian
ad litem (“GAL”) for A.A. The GAL filed his first report on September 24, 2019. Therein,
after recounting the criminal proceedings against appellant, the GAL noted he met with
A.A. on September 12, 2019 at his then-foster-home in Mansfield, Ohio. After the foster
parents requested A.A. be removed from their home due to his behavioral issues, A.A. was
placed in a residential treatment facility in the Cincinnati, Ohio area. The GAL further
noted that A.A. was convinced appellant hated him and that neither A.A. nor appellant had
requested visitation. The GAL recommended mental health assessments for both appellant
and A.A.
       {¶ 5} On October 30, 2019, a magistrate conducted a hearing on the abuse, neglect,
and dependency complaint. Appellant did not attend the hearing due to illness; however,
her counsel appeared and advocated on her behalf. The assistant prosecuting attorney
noted the parties had agreed to proceed uncontested on the neglect cause of action with the
recommended dismissal of the abuse and dependency causes of action. On November 7,
2019, the magistrate issued an order (effective October 30, 2019) dismissing the abuse and
dependency causes of action, finding A.A. to be a neglected child, pursuant to R.C.
2151.03(A)(2), terminating the TOC, making A.A. a ward of the court, and granting
No. 23AP-152                                                                               3

temporary court commitment (“TCC”) to FCCS pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(2). The order
also approved and adopted the case plan filed by FCCS. The juvenile court adopted the
magistrate’s order the same day.
       {¶ 6} On June 25, 2020, FCCS and PFSN filed a motion requesting a first extension
of TCC. A hearing on the motion was set for July 29, 2020. The GAL filed his second report
on July 17, 2020. Therein, the GAL noted he had met with A.A. three times—once in A.A.’s
foster home and twice in the residential treatment facility in Cincinnati. The GAL reiterated
A.A.’s belief that appellant hated him and that neither A.A. nor appellant had requested
visitation. The GAL noted that treatment facility personnel indicated A.A. was ready to
leave the facility and FCCS was looking into placement options for A.A.
       {¶ 7} The July 29, 2020 hearing on the motion for first extension of TCC was held
via videoconference before a magistrate. Appellant did not appear; no explanation was
provided regarding her absence. Counsel for PFSN averred that if appellant made progress
on her case plan, PFSN would likely petition her public defender to request the municipal
court to lift the two-year no contact order. A PFSN caseworker stated a foster home had
been located for A.A. and that he would need to be linked with counseling. The GAL averred
that A.A. had not requested to see appellant and appellant did not want A.A. to return home
even if the two-year no contact order was lifted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
magistrate, citing the municipal court’s no contact order, indicated she would grant the
request for a first extension of TCC for a period of six months. On August 3, 2020, the
magistrate issued a decision to that effect, which was adopted by the juvenile court in a
judgment entry filed that same day.
       {¶ 8} On December 2, 2020, FCCS and PFSN filed a motion seeking a second and
final extension of TCC. A hearing on the motion was set for January 14, 2021. The GAL
filed his third report on January 11, 2021. The GAL reported that appellant had made no
effort to seek modification of the municipal court’s two-year no contact order. The GAL
further reported that he had met with A.A. on six occasions; the most recent meeting
occurred on October 31, 2020 after A.A. was released from the residential treatment facility
and returned to his prior foster home.
       {¶ 9} The January 14, 2021 hearing on the motion for a second and final extension
of TCC was held before a magistrate via videoconference; appellant appeared via telephone.
No. 23AP-152                                                                                4

Counsel for appellant asserted that appellant did not contest the motion; accordingly, the
magistrate indicated he would grant the request for a second and final extension of TCC for
a period of six months. On January 25, 2021, the magistrate issued a decision to that effect,
which was adopted by the juvenile court in a judgment entry filed that same day.
       {¶ 10} On April 14, 2021, a magistrate held a hearing via videoconference for
purposes of setting an annual review date; appellant appeared via telephone. Counsel for
PFSN averred that appellant had nine children, including A.A., and was currently pregnant;
counsel further asserted that the two-year no contact order was due to be lifted in July 2021.
Appellant disputed that she struck A.A. with a cell phone. On April 27, 2021, the magistrate
issued a decision maintaining TCC of A.A. and setting the matter for annual review; the
juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision in a judgment entry filed the same day.
       {¶ 11} On May 25, 2021, FCCS filed a motion for permanent court commitment
(“PCC”) of A.A. The GAL filed his fourth report on June 19, 2021. Therein, the GAL noted
that due to the no contact order imposed by the municipal court, appellant had not seen
A.A. for more than two years. The GAL further reported that appellant had previously
indicated A.A. was a liar and she did not want him back in her home; however, appellant
had recently indicated she might take A.A. back. The GAL also averred that he met with
A.A. at least eight times; the latest visit was on June 17, 2021 in A.A.’s foster home. The
GAL again noted A.A.’s belief that appellant hated him and that neither appellant nor A.A.
had requested visitation. The GAL further averred A.A. indicated he had no desire to see
appellant. The GAL further asserted that A.A. hoped to be adopted by his current foster
parents; however, the foster parents had not yet committed to adopting A.A. The GAL
supported FCCS’ motion for permanent custody, averring that such was in A.A.’s best
interest.
       {¶ 12} On June 29, 2021, a hearing was held before a magistrate regarding the PCC
motion. Noting that appellant had not contested prior proceedings related to A.A., counsel
for FCCS sought clarification of appellant’s position on the PCC motion. Appellant’s
counsel indicated that appellant was challenging the PCC motion. Counsel for FCCS
averred that neither A.A. nor appellant wanted visitation; indeed, A.A. consistently refused
to see his mother.
No. 23AP-152                                                                               5

       {¶ 13} On February 8, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing regarding the motion
for PCC. Appellant did not appear for reasons unknown to her counsel. Counsel for FCCS
described the relationship between appellant and A.A. as a “profound parent-child conflict”
which stemmed from the August 2019 incident that led to appellant’s conviction and the
two-year no contact order. (Feb. 8, 2022 Tr. at 4.) Noting the current case plan contained
no provision for visitation between appellant and A.A. as a result of appellant’s criminal
conviction involving A.A., counsel for FCCS requested the court issue an order allowing
visitation between appellant and A.A. subject to the recommendation of a family counselor.
The GAL noted that A.A. had been out of the home for over two years and had spoken to
appellant only once or twice during that time. The GAL agreed that family counseling for
appellant and A.A. could be beneficial. The GAL further averred that A.A.’s current foster
placement had been successful but would end soon because the foster parents were not
willing to adopt him. Accordingly, a new foster placement for A.A. was planned.
       {¶ 14} Following the February 8, 2022 hearing, the parties and the GAL filed an
agreed entry on February 14, 2022 which modified the case plan to allow for visitation
between appellant and A.A. with the restriction that visitation occur only as facilitated
and/or recommended by the family counselor. The agreed entry further statedvisitation
could extend to unsupervised visitation if recommended by the family counselor. The
juvenile court signed the entry permitting the parties’ facilitation of visitation contingent
on the preconditions set forth in the entry.
       {¶ 15} On April 12, 2022, the GAL filed his fifth report. Therein, he reported, inter
alia, that A.A. had recently moved to a new foster home and the GAL expected to visit him
in the coming weeks. The GAL further reported that although appellant had successfully
completed community control, she had not visited A.A. for two and one-half years. The
GAL averred he did not believe appellant had ever expressed any desire to visit A.A. and
that A.A. had very negative feelings toward appellant and did not want to see her.
       {¶ 16} On April 19, 2022, the juvenile court held a pretrial hearing on the PCC
motion. Appellant did not appear; her counsel attributed appellant’s absence to counsel’s
failure to remind her of the hearing. The hearing primarily consisted of a discussion about
establishing counseling services for A.A. Recognizing both the strained relationship
between A.A. and appellant and A.A.’s resistance to counseling, the trial court determined
No. 23AP-152                                                                                6

A.A. should attend individual counseling sessions before scheduling family counseling
sessions with appellant.
       {¶ 17} The GAL filed his sixth report on September 3, 2022. Therein, the GAL
reported three visits with A.A. at his new foster home, with the latest held on September 2,
2022. The GAL further reported that although appellant had completed community
control, she had not visited A.A. in over three years; the GAL understood that appellant had
never expressed any desire to visit A.A. In addition, the GAL noted that A.A. harbored
negative feelings about appellant and did not want to see her. According to the GAL, A.A.
was very reluctant to engage in family counseling because he wanted a complete break from
his entire family.
       {¶ 18} On September 29, 2022, the juvenile court held a pre-trial hearing on the PCC
motion. Counsel for FCCS reminded the court of FCCS’ prior request, filed November 10,
2021, that the court conduct an in-camera interview of A.A. The court set a trial date for
January 3, 2023 and indicated it would schedule an in-camera interview prior to trial.
Counsel for appellant inquired about the possibility of appellant visiting with A.A. prior to
trial. The juvenile court averred it would not force A.A. to visit appellant, but if A.A. was
willing to do so, any visits would occur during counseling sessions.
       {¶ 19} On December 24, 2022, the GAL filed his seventh report. The GAL averred
he had investigated all matters related to A.A.’s best interest since being appointed GAL in
September 2019. He further averred he had attended and participated in all court hearings
and had attended the trial court’s in-camera interview of A.A. on November 15, 2022. The
GAL further asserted he had visited with A.A. on many occasions in A.A.’s foster homes and
the residential treatment facility; his most recent visit with A.A. was in his new foster home
in September 2022. His latest communication with A.A. was by telephone on December 24,
2022. The GAL reiterated the history of the criminal proceedings involving appellant which
resulted in the imposition of the two-year no contact order. The GAL opined that had
appellant requested a modification of the no contact order in coordination with the current
juvenile court proceedings, such could have easily been accomplished. The GAL noted that
despite having successfully completed her community control, appellant had not visited
A.A. for over three years. The GAL reiterated that A.A. had consistently expressed no
interest in seeing appellant, as he was convinced she hated him. The GAL averred that
No. 23AP-152                                                                                                   7

family counseling had been suspended due to appellant’s behavior and the counselors’
opinions that the sessions were detrimental to A.A. The GAL opined that even if appellant
was committed to reunifying with A.A., such would be difficult because appellant, as a
single mother, has nine other minor children, including one autistic child with very high
needs. Noting that three years had passed without any meaningful contact between
appellant and A.A., the GAL opined that their relationship could not be repaired. The GAL
further opined that A.A. needed permanence in his life.
        {¶ 20} A trial on the PCC motion was held on January 3, 2023. At the outset, counsel
for appellant requested a continuance based on appellant having notified counsel the
previous afternoon that she was in an emergency room with flu symptoms. Counsel averred
she had provided FCCS counsel with documentation obtained from appellant purporting
to substantiate her claim. The parties agreed that appellant’s documentation consisted only
of two pieces of papers—one stating she was pregnant—the other providing general
information about combatting the flu.1 The juvenile court recessed the proceedings until
3:00 p.m. to allow time for appellant either to appear for trial or to provide physician-
certified verification that she was presently hospitalized and unable to appear. When trial
reconvened at 3:00 p.m., counsel for appellant asserted that appellant had not been
admitted to the hospital; however, she could not attend the trial proceedings because she
did not have child care. The juvenile court denied the continuance, noting appellant had
ample time to make child care arrangements, as she had been notified of the trial date over
three months prior to trial. The juvenile court further observed that A.A. had been in foster
care for a significant period of time and that appellant was represented by competent
counsel.
        {¶ 21} Agata Kurtek, a child protection specialist supervisor for PFSN, testified on
behalf of FCCS. Kurtek was assigned to A.A.’s case in May 2022. At the time of trial, A.A.
was 12 years old.2 According to Kurtek, FCCS obtained an emergency order of custody for
A.A. on August 7, 2019, followed by a TOC on August 8, 2019. A.A. remained in the
uninterrupted custody of FCCS from that date through the permanent custody hearing. In
August 2019, appellant pled guilty to a charge of criminal mischief arising from her striking

1 The two documents were admitted without objection as appellant’s exhibit A and B.
2 FCCS exhibit 1, admitted without objection, is a copy of A.A.’s birth certificate, listing his date of birth as

March 25, 2010.
No. 23AP-152                                                                                              8

A.A. in the head with a cell phone.3 At the time of the permanent custody hearing, appellant
had 10 children, including A.A.; 9 of the children were in her custody.
        {¶ 22} Kurtek testified that pursuant to FCCS’ case plan, appellant completed
parenting classes through Buckeye Ranch; however, she continuously struggled to
demonstrate her ability to communicate with A.A. Appellant also completed a mental
health assessment through Northland Community Center which resulted in a diagnosis of
adjustment disorder with a recommendation for individual counseling. Kurtek further
testified appellant had been referred to various agencies for counseling services but had not
participated in such services.
        {¶ 23} Kurtek also testified that FCCS had previously been involved with one of
A.A.’s siblings, a developmentally delayed child. After achieving her case plan goals of
engaging in services related to that child’s special needs and visiting with the child,
appellant and the child were reunified in August 2022.
        {¶ 24} Kurtek also asserted that from the time the no contact order imposed in the
criminal proceedings was lifted in August 2021 until January 2022, appellant consistently
stated she did not want A.A. to return home. She did not request reunification with A.A.
until January 2022 and did not request visitation with A.A. until late summer 2022. Kurtek
further testified that appellant and A.A. participated in two family counseling sessions in
September 2022. According to Kurtek, no further sessions were scheduled because A.A.’s
individual and family counselors determined it was in A.A.’s best interest not to have family

3 FCCS exhibit 2, admitted without objection, are copies of the documentation related to the criminal
proceedings against appellant in the Franklin County Municipal Court. That documentation established that
in April 2019 appellant was charged with domestic violence, assault, and endangering children arising from
an incident involving appellant striking A.A. in the head with a cell phone. On August 7, 2019, appellant
entered a guilty plea to an amended charge of criminal mischief, a third-degree misdemeanor; the assault and
endangering children charges were dismissed at the request of the state. Appellant was sentenced to a two-
year term of community control on the condition that she not engage in any acts of violence and have no
contact with A.A.
No. 23AP-152                                                                                                   9

sessions with appellant.4 Kurtek testified that both counselors indicated they would be
willing to re-engage in family counseling services, if appropriate, once appellant engaged in
individual counseling services. According to Kurtek, appellant was informed of this
requirement; however, she never linked with any of the recommended counseling services.
        {¶ 25} Kurtek testified she was concerned about appellant’s consistent use of
negative language in describing A.A., including referring to him as a liar, stating that he
caused problems for the family, no one in the family wanted to take him, and he did not act
like her other children. Kurtek further testified that A.A.’s maternal grandparents were not
interested in obtaining custody of A.A.
        {¶ 26} Kurtek also testified that A.A. was currently living in the foster home where
he was placed in February 2022. According to Kurtek, A.A. still had behavioral issues;
however, his behavior had consistently improved as a result of weekly individual counseling
sessions. Kurtek conducted one home visit with A.A. and his foster mother. Kurtek noted
that A.A’s attempts to “act out” during the visit were quickly thwarted by the foster mother,
with whom A.A. seemed bonded. (Jan. 3, 2023 Tr. at 29.) Kurtek indicated the foster
mother is interested in adopting A.A., with the only limitation being her financial
circumstances.

4 FCCS exhibits 3 and 4, admitted without objection, are letters from two different clinicians involved in A.A.’s

case. Exhibit 3 is a September 28, 2022 letter from Kaitlynn Harrell, MSW, LSW, an outpatient behavioral
therapist with National Youth Advocate Program, Inc. (“NYAP”). Harrell stated that she began individual
psychotherapy with A.A. on April 18, 2022. Over the course of several months, A.A. responded positively to
the therapy. However, when A.A. learned he was expected to participate in family therapy with appellant, he
presented as dysregulated—crying and begging Harrell to stop the session from taking place. After meeting
with appellant, A.A. presented with symptoms of trauma response such as irritability and increased anxiety;
he also appeared to be insecure and more dependent on his foster mother to assist with communication, which
he had not found necessary prior to the family sessions. Harrell further stated A.A. told her that during the
family counseling session, appellant accused him of lying about his trauma history and included another
family member in the session, which made him extremely uncomfortable. In Harrell’s clinical opinion,
continued family therapy sessions with appellant would be detrimental to A.A.

Exhibit 4 is a September 28, 2022 letter from NYAP therapist Amy Huffer, MS Ed., LPC. Huffer conducted
two family therapy sessions with A.A., appellant, and A.A.’s foster mother. Huffer averred that from the outset,
A.A. indicated he had no desire to speak to or see appellant and did not want to engage in therapy; A.A. had a
traumatic response to the idea of having to do so. A.A. eventually agreed to engage in therapy only to “get it
over with.” During the sessions, appellant and A.A. talked over each other, only communicating their own
desired outcomes. A.A. rejected appellant’s suggestion that interaction with other family members during the
therapy sessions might lead A.A. to want to come home. In fact, A.A. stated he did not want to see or speak to
other family members; rather, he wanted to continue living in his foster home, as he was content and thriving
both at home and school. NYAP ultimately concluded that continued family sessions would be detrimental to
A.A.’s well-being; A.A. would continue his individual counseling sessions with a different therapist.
No. 23AP-152                                                                             10

       {¶ 27} Kurtek further testified that during one of A.A.’s family counseling sessions
with appellant, which was held via teleconference, A.A. was able to view a few of his nine
siblings. Beyond an initial greeting, A.A. did not converse with them and did not seem
happy to see them. According to Kurtek, A.A. had never asked to visit his siblings.
       {¶ 28} Kurtek concluded A.A. was in need of a legally secure permanent placement
and recommended the juvenile court grant FCCS permanent custody of A.A. for purposes
of adoption.
       {¶ 29} On cross-examination, Kurtek acknowledged that appellant calling A.A. a liar
was arguably accurate because A.A. had lied in the past. She also acknowledged that one of
the family counselors did not allow a caseworker to observe the family session because A.A.
did not want the caseworker to attend. She also acknowledged that one of the family
counselors, in response to appellant’s statement that A.A. did not have a choice with regard
to seeing her, told appellant that A.A. had stated he did not want to see her. Kurtek
disagreed with the suggestion by appellant’s counsel that the counselor’s action in this
regard undermined the goal of reunification. Although Kurtek acknowledged that appellant
was successfully parenting her other nine children and had requested reunification with
A.A., she did not think appellant should be reunified with A.A. because she had not
completed the services outlined in the case plan despite having had three years to do so.
Kurtek also noted the unique circumstances involved in A.A.’s case, i.e., that criminal
charges had been filed against appellant arising from her striking A.A. with her cell phone.
       {¶ 30} The GAL, Worly, also testified on behalf of FCCS. He averred that over the
past three and one-half years, he had consistently visited with A.A, both in A.A.’s foster
homes and in the residential treatment facility in Cincinnati; he had also spoken to A.A. by
telephone approximately six times.      In addition, he had spoken to appellant, A.A.’s
counselors, and foster parents, maintained contact with various caseworkers, and had
obtained A.A.’s school records. The GAL further asserted he had observed A.A. interacting
with his current foster mother. According to the GAL, A.A. was happy and doing well in his
current foster home, was bonded with his foster mother, and was integrated into the family.
       {¶ 31} The GAL described A.A. as a “very smart,” “very inquisitive” “neat kid” with
a good sense of humor. (Jan. 3, 2023 Tr. at 40.) The GAL noted that when A.A. was
younger, he had a temper which sometimes resulted in fights with others, and he often used
No. 23AP-152                                                                               11

inappropriate language; however, through the maturation process, A.A.’s behaviors had
improved.
        {¶ 32} The GAL testified he had never had an opportunity to observe A.A.
interacting with appellant.        He noted that his review of court records pertaining to
appellant’s municipal court criminal case revealed that appellant had never filed any
motions or otherwise exerted any effort to have the no contact order lifted. The GAL
averred that in his experience, “had [appellant] wanted that order lifted there was an easy
route to get that done.” (Jan. 3, 2023 Tr. at 42.) The GAL further asserted that A.A. had no
contact with appellant from August 2019 to September 2022. During that time period,
appellant informed the GAL that someone in her family might want A.A., but she did not.
When appellant eventually expressed interest in seeing A.A., the GAL advised A.A. of
appellant’s assertion. A.A. told the GAL he had no desire to visit appellant, engage in
counseling with her, or ever see her again. A.A. also told the GAL he had no interest in
visiting with his siblings. Rather, he wanted to be adopted by his current foster mother.
The GAL recommended the trial court grant FCCS’ motion for PCC, as it was in A.A.’s best
interest. On cross-examination, the GAL acknowledged that A.A., at times, had been
untruthful and manipulated his previous foster parents.
        {¶ 33} Thereafter, the trial court provided the GAL the opportunity to summarize
the GAL report he filed on December 24, 2022.5 To that end, the GAL asserted he had
known A.A. for approximately three and one-half years; he described A.A. as a charming,
gregarious, inquisitive boy who was eager to learn, love, and be loved. The GAL
acknowledged experiencing periodic frustration with A.A.’s behaviors; however, at other
times he “felt like crying” about A.A.’s circumstances, particularly when visiting A.A. in the
residential treatment facility in Cincinnati. (Jan. 3, 2023 Tr. at 53.) The GAL noted that
many of the other children in the treatment facility had significant mental health issues to
which A.A. was exposed, and no one ever visited A.A. while he resided there.
        {¶ 34} The GAL averred that the state of A.A.’s relationship with appellant at the
time the juvenile case was opened, coupled with appellant not having had any contact with
A.A. for three and one-half years, made it difficult to imagine their relationship could be
repaired. He opined that appellant needed counseling to deal with A.A.’s behaviors, and

5 GAL exhibit 1, the December 24, 2022 GAL report, was admitted without objection.
No. 23AP-152                                                                                  12

she failed him in not pursuing such services. The GAL further opined it was in A.A.’s best
interest for FCCS to be granted permanent custody of A.A; in that event, FCCS should allow
A.A. to remain in his current foster home and facilitate the foster mother’s adoption of A.A.
       {¶ 35} In a decision and judgment entry dated February 16, 2023, the juvenile court
found by clear and convincing evidence that, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), A.A. had
been in FCCS’ custody for 12 or more months out of a consecutive 22-month period, and on
consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D), awarding FCCS permanent
custody of A.A. was in his best interest. Accordingly, the juvenile court granted FCCS’
motion and committed A.A. to the permanent custody of FCCS.
II. Assignment of Error
       {¶ 36} Appellant appeals and assigns the following sole assignment of error for our
review:
               Rule 48 was violated when the guardian ad litem did not
               observe the [A.A.] with [Appellant]. Thus, the court plainly
               erred when it entered the guardian ad litem’s report into
               evidence and relied on the report for its findings.

III. Discussion
       {¶ 37} “The right to parent one’s child is a fundamental right protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.” In re L.W., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-586, 2018-Ohio-
2099, ¶ 6. See also In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“[T]he right to raise one’s children is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic civil
right.’ ”). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and
management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
“Permanent termination of parental rights has been described as ‘the family law equivalent
of the death penalty in a criminal case.’ Therefore, parents ‘must be afforded every
procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’ ” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48
(1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist.1991).
       {¶ 38} However, the state has broad authority to intervene to protect children from
abuse and neglect. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing R.C. 2151.01.
An award of permanent custody, which terminates parental rights, is an “ ‘alternative of last
resort and is only justified when it is necessary for the welfare of the children.’ ” In re C.G.,
No. 23AP-152                                                                                 13

10th Dist. No. 13AP-632, 2014-Ohio-279, ¶ 28, quoting In re Swisher, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-
1408, 2003-Ohio-5446, ¶ 26.
       {¶ 39} On appeal, a court of appeals will not reverse a juvenile court’s determination
that it was in the best interest of a child to grant a motion for permanent custody unless
such determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence. L.W. at ¶ 8. The juvenile
court’s determination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C.
2151.414(B)(1). “Weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of
credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.
* * * Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on [the evidence’s] effect in
inducing belief.” (Emphasis deleted.) (Internal quotations omitted.) Eastley v. Volkman,
132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). See C.G. at ¶ 31. Thus, in
reviewing a judgment under the manifest weight standard, a court of appeals weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost it
way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed
and a new trial ordered. Eastley at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 40} In conducting its review, a court of appeals must make every reasonable
presumption in favor of the juvenile court’s findings of fact and judgment. L.W. at ¶ 8;
Eastley at ¶ 21, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984), fn. 3.
“ ‘[I]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we must give it that
interpretation which is consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to
sustaining the trial court’s verdict and judgment.’ ” L.W. at ¶ 8, quoting Karches v.
Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 19 (1988). Moreover, a court of appeals must recognize that
“[t]he discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of
permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect,
given the nature of the proceedings and the impact the court’s determination will have on
the lives of the parties concerned.” (Internal quotations omitted.) In re W.D., 10th Dist.
No. 09AP-589, 2009-Ohio-6903, ¶ 34, quoting In re A.L.D., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-238,
2008-Ohio-3626, ¶ 8, quoting In re Hogle, 10th Dist. No. 99AP-944 (June 27, 2000).
No. 23AP-152                                                                                              14

        {¶ 41} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues the juvenile court plainly
erred in admitting into evidence the GAL’s report and relying on that report in its findings.
Appellant specifically contends the GAL violated Sup.R. 48.03(D) by not observing A.A.
with appellant.
        {¶ 42} Preliminarily, we note that appellant failed to object to the admission of the
GAL’s report and, therefore, as appellant concedes, has forfeited all but plain error.6 In re
D.E., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-83, 2021-Ohio-524, ¶ 76, citing L.W. at ¶ 36; In re West, 4th Dist.
No. 05CA4, 2005-Ohio-2977, ¶ 25. “ ‘In civil cases, the plain error doctrine is not favored
and may only be applied in the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances
such that the error, if left uncorrected, would challenge the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial process itself.’ ” D.E. at ¶ 76, quoting Brisco v. U.S. Restoration
& Remodeling, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-109, 2019-Ohio-5318, ¶ 25. “Because parental
rights determinations are difficult to make and appellate courts accord wide latitude to the
trial court’s consideration of evidence in these cases, [p]lain error is particularly difficult to
establish.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Id., quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton, 10th Dist.
No. 14AP-1061, 2016-Ohio-5900, ¶ 8, quoting Faulks v. Flynn, 4th Dist. No. 13CA3568,
2014-Ohio-1610, ¶ 20, quoting Robinette v. Bryant, 4th Dist. No. 12CA20, 2013-Ohio-
2889, ¶ 28.
        {¶ 43} A juvenile court must appoint a GAL to protect the interest of a child in any
proceeding concerning an abused or neglected child and in any proceeding for permanent
custody held pursuant to R.C. 2151.414. R.C. 2151.281(B). The GAL must “perform
whatever functions are necessary to protect the best interest of the child, including, but not
limited to, investigation, mediation, monitoring court proceedings, and monitoring the
services provided the child” by a public children services agency that has custody of the
child and shall file any motions and other court papers that are in the best interest of the
child. R.C. 2151.281(I). If the GAL “fail[s] to faithfully discharge the guardian ad litem’s
duties,” the court must discharge the GAL and appoint another GAL. R.C. 2151.281(D).
        {¶ 44} Here, appellant does not contend the trial court erred in failing to discharge
the GAL under R.C. 2151.281(D), nor does she argue the trial court erred in admitting the

6 The juvenile court noted in its decision and judgment entry that “[n]o objections were made by any party to

the manner which the Guardian filed reports or offered testimony.” (Feb. 16, 2023 Decision & Jgmt. Entry at
5.)
No. 23AP-152                                                                               15

testimony of the GAL. Rather, appellant maintains the trial court should have excluded the
GAL’s report and not relied on it in its findings because the GAL failed to perform one of
the duties outlined in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Rules of Superintendence.
       {¶ 45} “Article IV, Section 5(A)(1) of the Ohio Constitution provides the Supreme
Court of Ohio with general superintendence over all the courts in the state.” In re A.S., 10th
Dist. No. 21AP-249, 2022-Ohio-1861, ¶ 51. “In accordance with this authority, the Supreme
Court originated the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts of Ohio, including the courts
of common pleas and the divisions thereof.” Id., citing Sup.R. 1; Arlington Bank v. Bee,
Inc., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-41, 2010-Ohio-6040, ¶ 16; D.E. at ¶ 72. The Rules of
Superintendence contain certain specified provisions that apply in domestic relations and
juvenile court cases where the court appoints a GAL. A.S. at ¶ 51.
       {¶ 46} The Rules of Superintendence provide a non-exhaustive list of duties GALs
are required to perform. Id. at ¶ 52. Former Sup.R. 48(D), in effect when the GAL was
appointed in this case in 2019, provided:
               In order to provide the court with relevant information and an
               informed recommendation regarding the child’s best interest,
               a guardian ad litem shall perform, at a minimum, the
               following responsibilities stated in this division, unless
               impracticable or inadvisable to do so:

               ***

               (13) A guardian ad litem shall make reasonable efforts to
               become informed about the facts of the case and to contact all
               parties. In order to provide the court with relevant
               information and an informed recommendation as to the
               child’s best interest, a guardian ad litem shall, at a minimum,
               do the following, unless impracticable or inadvisable because
               of the age of the child or the specific circumstances of a
               particular case:

               (a) Meet with and interview the child and observe the child
               with each parent, foster parent, guardian or physical
               custodian and conduct at least one interview with the child
               where none of these individuals is present;

               (b) Visit the child at his or her residence in accordance with
               any standards established by the court in which the guardian
               ad litem is appointed;
No. 23AP-152                                                                         16

               (c) Ascertain the wishes of the child;

               (d) Meet with and interview the parties, foster parents and
               other significant individuals who may have relevant
               knowledge regarding the issues of the case;
               (e) Review pleadings and other relevant court documents in
               the case in which the guardian ad litem is appointed;

               (f) Review criminal, civil, educational and administrative
               records pertaining to the child and, if appropriate, to the
               child’s family or to other parties in the case;

               (g) Interview school personnel, medical and mental health
               providers, child protective services workers and relevant court
               personnel and obtain copies of relevant records;

               (h)Recommend that the court order psychological
               evaluations, mental health and/or substance abuse
               assessments, or other evaluations or tests of the parties as the
               guardian ad litem deems necessary or helpful to the court; and

               (i) Perform any other investigation necessary to make an
               informed recommendation regarding the best interest of the
               child.

(Emphasis added.) In re R.P., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-538, 2021-Ohio-4065, ¶ 30; A.S. at
¶ 52.
        {¶ 47} The Rules of Superintendence were amended effective January 1, 2021. A.S.
at ¶ 51. Sup.R. 48.03(D), in effect when the GAL prepared and filed his final GAL report
and summarized its contents at the permanent custody hearing, and which appellant claims
the GAL violated, provides the following with respect to the duties of a GAL:
               Unless specifically relieved by the court, the duties of a
               guardian ad litem shall include, but are not limited to, the
               following:

               (1) Become informed about the facts of the case and contact
               all relevant persons;

               (2) Observe the child with each parent, foster parent,
               guardian or physical custodian;

               (3) Interview the child, if age and developmentally
               appropriate, where no parent, foster parent, guardian, or
               physical custodian is present;
No. 23AP-152                                                                                 17

               (4) Visit the child at the residence or proposed residence of
               the child in accordance with any standards established by the
               court;

               (5) Ascertain the wishes and concerns of the child;

               (6) Interview the parties, foster parents, guardians, physical
               custodian, and other significant individuals who may have
               relevant knowledge regarding the issues of the case. The
               guardian ad litem may require each individual to be
               interviewed without the presence of others. Upon request of
               the individual, the attorney for the individual may be present.

               (7) Interview relevant school personnel, medical and mental
               health providers, child protective services workers, and court
               personnel and obtain copies of relevant records;

               (8) Review pleadings and other relevant court documents in
               the case;

               (9) Obtain and review relevant criminal, civil, educational,
               mental health, medical, and administrative records pertaining
               to the child and, if appropriate, the family of the child or other
               parties in the case;

               (10) Request that the court order psychological evaluations,
               mental health or substance abuse assessments, or other
               evaluations or tests of the parties as the guardian ad litem
               deems necessary or helpful to the court;

               (11) Review any necessary information and interview other
               persons as necessary to make an informed recommendation
               regarding the best interest of the child.

(Emphasis sic; emphasis added.) A.S. at ¶ 52.

       {¶ 48} As we recognized in A.S., this court has “previously noted that ‘[s]ignificant
changes were made’ in the January 1, 2021 amendments to the Rules of Superintendence
governing GALs, ‘including the deletion of the GAL’s discretion to not perform duties
“unless impracticable or inadvisable” and to “make reasonable efforts” to perform the
duties.’ ” Id. at ¶ 51, fn. 10, quoting D.E. at ¶ 73, fn. 15. We further noted in A.S. that “the
amended rules, in addition to imposing ‘different and additional requirements,’ now also
‘provide the GAL shall perform the duties “[u]nless specifically relieved by the court,”
No. 23AP-152                                                                                 18

thereby giving the discretion to the court, not the GAL, to determine when it is
impracticable or inadvisable to not perform duties and whether the GAL has engaged in
reasonable efforts to perform the duties.’ ” Id. at ¶ 51, fn. 10.
       {¶ 49} In this case, the GAL was required to comply with the prior version of the
Rules of Superintendence from the time of his appointment in September 2019 until
January 1, 2021, after which he was required to comply with the amended rules. Id. at ¶ 51,
fn. 10; ¶ 56. “[U]nder both the present and former versions of the Rules of Superintendence,
the rules mandated that the provisions related to GALs ‘shall apply in all domestic relations
and juvenile cases in the courts of common pleas where a court appoints a guardian ad
litem’ for the child.” Id. at ¶ 51, fn. 11.
       {¶ 50} As stated above, appellant’s argument that the trial court should have
excluded the GAL’s report for failure to observe appellant and A.A. together is premised on
her contention that the GAL failed to comply with amended Sup.R. 48.03(D)(2), which
requires the GAL to “[o]bserve the child with each parent.” We note that former Sup.R.
48(D)(13)(a) includes the identical directive. This court has consistently observed,
however, that “[t]he Rules of Superintendence are internal housekeeping rules that create
no substantive individual rights.” R.P. at ¶ 31, citing D.E. at ¶ 77; In re S.S., 10th Dist. No.
17AP-681, 2018-Ohio-1249, ¶ 11. Moreover, “[b]ecause Sup.R. 48 is a general guideline that
lacks the force of statutory law, noncompliance with Sup.R. 48(D) is not grounds for
automatic exclusion of a [GAL’s] report, testimony, or recommendation.” R.P. at ¶ 31.
Rather, a juvenile court “may exercise its discretion to consider that evidence.” Id., citing
In re N.B., 8th Dist. No. 105028, 2017-Ohio-1376, ¶ 26.
       {¶ 51} While appellant contends the GAL failed to perform his duty of observing her
with A.A. (the GAL having acknowledged during his trial testimony that he did not observe
a visit between A.A. and appellant), the record establishes because of the unique
circumstances in this case, the GAL had little, if any, opportunity to do so. As noted above,
appellant’s criminal conviction in August 2019 resulted in a court order that appellant have
no contact with A.A. for two years; accordingly, appellant’s case plan did not allow for
visitation between A.A. and appellant during that two-year period. No evidence in the
record establishes that appellant made any effort toward having the no contact order lifted
prior to its expiration in August 2021. Further, evidence in the record establishes that
No. 23AP-152                                                                                  19

appellant did not request reunification with A.A. until January 2022 and did not request
visitation with A.A. until late summer 2022; both were well after the no contact order
expired. In addition, the February 2022 agreed entry permitting visitation between
appellant and A.A. restricted such visitation to family counseling sessions only. Appellant
argues the GAL “could have” observed A.A. and appellant during the counseling sessions.
(Appellant’s Brief at 13.) However, appellant does not direct this court to any evidence
supporting that assertion. There is no indication in either the February 2022 agreed entry
or at the hearing preceding and precipitating the filing of the agreed entry that the GAL was
permitted to attend the family counseling sessions. Further, the record establishes that
only two family counseling sessions occurred, after which A.A.’s counselors recommended
that further family counseling sessions would be detrimental to A.A.
       {¶ 52} In addition, appellant’s reliance on this court’s decision in A.S. is without
merit, as the facts in the present case are distinguishable from those in A.S. Here, the
removal of A.A. from appellant’s custody derived from her criminal actions in striking A.A.
with her cell phone. As a result, appellant was judicially ordered to have no contact with
A.A. for two years. It is evident from the record that the juvenile court was aware of the
criminal proceedings against appellant, including the judicially imposed two-year no
contact order, as well as appellant’s lack of effort to have that order lifted or to initiate
visitation with A.A. as soon as practicable after the no contact order expired. The record
also makes clear that the juvenile court was mindful of A.A.’s consistent articulation that he
did not want to visit appellant as well as A.A.’s traumatic reaction to the family counseling
sessions he attended with appellant.
       {¶ 53} Moreover, in A.S. we held that “under the facts and circumstances present in
this case, * * * the juvenile court committed plain error under R.C. 2151.281(D) in not
requiring the GAL to faithfully discharge his duties and in not discharging the GAL and
appointing a new GAL for failure to faithfully discharge GAL duties, as well as in admitting
the GAL’s report and testimony.” Id. at ¶ 75. The record in A.S. revealed multiple
deficiencies by the GAL in performing his duties well beyond the GAL’s failure to observe
A.S. at a visitation with either of his parents. Specifically, we noted the GAL “appear[ed]
not to have been informed about many important facts of the case,” including the GAL’s
error in stating in his final report that there had been no genetic testing of A.S.’s father when
No. 23AP-152                                                                                 20

FCCS’ exhibits at the permanent custody hearing established that A.S.’s father had
established paternity via genetic testing nearly two years before the permanent custody
hearing and the GAL’s final report. Id. at ¶ 57. We further observed the GAL visited A.S.
only once, via videoconference, over the three-year period from the time of A.S.’s removal
to the permanent custody hearing. Id. at ¶ 59, 75. We also noted the GAL failed to ascertain
A.S.’s wishes, concerns, or bonds with his biological parents. Id. at ¶ 61. In addition, we
noted the GAL had not observed the child’s interaction with both foster parents and that
the GAL had not communicated with any of A.S.’s school personnel or healthcare providers.
Id. at ¶ 63, 64. We also averred it appeared the GAL’s report and testimony were based on
the “mere handful” of times he interacted with some of the relevant parties and that he
based his opinion at the permanent custody hearing in part on testimony he heard at the
hearing itself. Id. at ¶ 70. We concluded that A.S. was the “extremely rare case” in which
the GAL so completely failed to discharge his responsibilities that he did not act in the best
interest of the children and the juvenile court plainly erred by failing to discharge and
replace the GAL and in admitting the testimony and report of the GAL. Id. at ¶ 54, 75.
       {¶ 54} By contrast, in the present case, as outlined above, the record confirms the
many and varied duties performed by the GAL over the three and one-half years he was
involved with A.A.’s case. The GAL interacted with A.A. on numerous occasions, both in
person in A.A.’s foster homes and residential treatment facility placements and by
telephone. During those interactions, the GAL ascertained A.A.’s wishes and concerns, i.e.,
that A.A. had no desire to visit appellant or his siblings, engage in counseling with appellant,
or ever see her again; rather, he wanted to remain in his current foster home and be adopted
by his foster mother. The GAL also communicated with A.A.’s past and present foster
parents, communicated with A.A.’s caseworkers and counselors, and observed A.A. with his
current foster mother. In addition, the GAL reviewed the court documents related to the
criminal proceedings against appellant which prompted the present juvenile court
proceedings. The GAL also attended all the juvenile court hearings related to A.A. and filed
seven reports documenting his investigation of A.A.’s case. Further, there is no indication
the GAL based his opinion at the permanent custody hearing on testimony he heard at the
hearing itself; rather, the GAL appears to have based his opinion on his independent
investigation of the facts of the case. In short, we find no evidence that the GAL was
No. 23AP-152                                                                                     21

deficient in the performance of his duties comparable to the extent of the deficiencies of the
GAL in A.S.
       {¶ 55} As noted above, neither former nor present Sup.R. 48 create “substantive
individual rights.” R.P. at ¶ 31. Further, “ ‘the trial court, as the trier of fact, is permitted to
assign weight to the GAL’s testimony and recommendation and to consider it in the context
of all the evidence before the court,’ and ‘[t]he decision of whether to consider a GAL report,
even when the [GAL] did not fully comply with Superintendence Rule 48, is within a trial
court’s discretion.’ ” In re B.T., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-485, 2022-Ohio-4093, ¶ 38, quoting
In re K.A., 5th Dist. No. 2021 CA 00002, 2021-Ohio-1772, ¶ 59. Although the juvenile court
did not specifically mention the GAL’s failure to observe appellant with A.A. in its judgment,
such was brought to the attention of the court through the GAL’s direct examination. A.A.
was represented by counsel who was separate from the GAL, and counsel had the
opportunity to cross-examine the GAL. Thus, the trial court was aware of the alleged
deficiency in the GAL’s investigation and exercised its discretion when deciding whether to
consider the GAL’s report. Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the juvenile
court’s admission of the GAL’s report and reliance on the report in its findings.
       {¶ 56} Moreover, even if the juvenile court erred in admitting the GAL’s report due
to the GAL’s failure to comply with one of the duties set forth in the Rules of
Superintendence, this case is not the “rare circumstance” in which such failure alone should
result in reversal. D.E. at ¶ 92. Here, FCCS presented clear and convincing evidence that
granting the motion for permanent custody was in the best interest of A.A. In determining
that permanent custody to FCCS was in A.A.’s best interest, the juvenile court relied not
only on the GAL’s report, but also on the testimony provided by Kurtek, the court’s own
observations of A.A. during the in-camera interview, and the testimony provided by the
GAL. As noted above, appellant does not specifically challenge the juvenile court’s
admission of the GAL’s testimony. Thus, the juvenile court’s admission of the GAL’s report
did not affect the outcome of the trial. In re D.K., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-801, 2020-Ohio-
5251, ¶ 40, quoting In re J.L., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-889, 2016-Ohio-2858, ¶ 60, quoting In
re C.C., 10th Dist. No. 04AP-883, 2005-Ohio-5163, ¶ 27 (considering plain error in a civil
case, including a permanent custody case, “[a]n error is prejudicial if it impacted the party’s
substantial rights by affecting the outcome of the trial”). (Internal quotations omitted.)
No. 23AP-152                                                                            22

      {¶ 57} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
      {¶ 58} Having overruled appellant’s sole assignment of error, we hereby affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
Juvenile Branch.
                                                                     Judgment affirmed.
                    LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.