Court Opinion

ID: 9864809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:12:32.290864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:01.601362
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Butler,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment, but for reasons other than those stated in the majority opinion.
The office of deputy assessor is a legally existing public office created by statute. C. L. §§7940, 7921, 8818. There is a well-recognized distinction between a deputy and an assistant. The former must be a qualified elector, take the oath of office and give bond to the assessor (C. L. §8818), whereas the latter need not be a qualified elector and is not required to take the oath of office or to give bond. A deputy assessor performs duties requiring the exercise of discretion; not so an assistant. Section 8818 (an early enactment) provided for the division of counties by the board of county commissioners into assessment districts and the appointment by the assessor of a deputy in each district. At that time there was no provision for the employment of mere clerical assistants. Such was the situation when the case of Roberts v. People, 9 Colo. 458, 13 Pac. 630, came before the court. The board had neglected to divide the county into assessment districts, and therefore there were no deputies. Unable to do all the work himself, the assessor employed clerical assistants to aid him by footing up the assessment rolls, making copies and doing other writing and clerical *339work necessary to complete the assessment. The question was whether the salaries of those assistants constituted a proper charge against the county. It was held that they did. That decision was rendered in 1886. In 1891 the Legislature, put a check upon the assessor’s power to employ assistants, as well as upon his power to employ deputies, by requiring such appointments to be made “under the direction of the board of county commissioners.” ft. S. 1908, §2580. No division of counties into assessment districts is required. That section, as amended, appears in the Compiled Laws as section 7940. It is as follows: “Deputies and assistants may be employed by county clerks, county treasurers, county assessors and county superintendents of schools, and their compensation and time of service shall be fixed by the official appointing them, with the approval of the board of county commissioners.”
The case of Board of County Commissioners v. Madam, 90 Colo. 10, 5 P. (2d) 866, definitely fixes the status of the deputies mentioned in that section. The provision with reference to deputies includes deputies appointed by county clerks as well as those appointed by county assessors. In the Madan case we held that the office of deputy county clerk is a statutory office by virtue of section 7940. The statute makes no distinction between the two and there is none.
In the performance of his duties an assessor may need a deputy or a mere assistant, or both. In the present case the assessor sought authority to employ, not an assistant, but a deputy. The board refused to give the authority. Upon appeal, the tax commission gave him, or attempted to give him, the desired authority. The order was expressed in words that conferred ample authority to employ either a deputy or an assistant. Of course, a deputy may not only perform his official duties but also render assistance in other ways. Acting’ under the authority thus conferred, or attempted to be conferred, the *340assessor appointed Julia Davis, not Ms assistant, but Ms deputy.
Under color of appointment, Julia Davis performed the duties of the office of deputy assessor, and therefore, if not a de jure officer, as to which I express no opinion, she was at least an officer de facto. In the Madan case, supra, the county clerk, acting pursuant to section 7940, supra, appointed Madan his deputy. The board of county commissioners rejected the appointment, but Madan performed the duties of deputy. We held that he was at least an officer de facto, and therefore entitled to his salary. And see Butler v. Phillips, 38 Colo. 378, 88 Pac. 480; Board of County Commissioners v. Wheeler, 39 Colo. 207, 89 Pac. 50; Board of County Commissioners v. McLean, 50 Colo. 602, 115 Pac. 525; Haynes v. Board of County Commissioners, 66 Colo. 397, 182 Pac. 896; Roberts v. People, 81 Colo. 338, 255 Pac. 461; Board of County Commissioners v. Wharton, 82 Colo. 466, 261 Pac. 4; Henderson v. Glynn, 2 Colo. App. 303, 30 Pac. 265; Board of County Commissioners v. Gould, 6 Colo. App. 44, 39 Pac. 895.
As an officer de facto, Julia Davis was entitled to recover her salary from the county. In this proceeding, which was brought to recover the salary, the county commissioners are not entitled to question the legality of her appointment to the office. Quo Warranto is the exclusive method by which to try title to public office. See cases cited above.
For the reasons stated above, I believe that the judgment of the district court is right and that its affirmance is proper.