Court Opinion

ID: 9409148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 19:09:58.773371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.097342
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00389-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JOHN VALENZUELA,                                                        Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                      Appellee.

                  On appeal from the 117th District Court
                        of Nueces County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

      A jury convicted appellant John Valenzuela for the offense of aggravated assault

against a public servant, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.02(b)(2)(B). An amended indictment alleged that Valenzuela had two prior felony

convictions, subjecting the charged offense to an enhanced punishment range. See id.

§ 12.42. The jury found the enhancement paragraph true, and Valenzuela was sentenced
to a twenty-year term of imprisonment. In one issue with multiple sub-issues, Valenzuela

argues that certain evidence was improperly admitted during the punishment phase and

that the evidence was insufficient to link him to a prior federal conviction. We affirm.

                                  I.       BACKGROUND

       A grand jury indicted appellant on November 12, 2020. An amended indictment

dated October 29, 2021, charged Valenzuela with the offense of aggravated assault

against a public servant and included an enhancement paragraph alleging that

Valenzuela had two prior felony convictions: (1) a 2013 conviction out of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of Texas for conspiracy to transport unlawful aliens;

and (2) a 2017 conviction out of DeWitt County for harassment by a person in a

correctional facility. Valenzuela pleaded “not guilty” to the charged offense and “not true”

to the enhancement paragraph. Following the guilt-innocence phase of trial, a jury

convicted Valenzuela of aggravated assault against a public servant. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B).

       During the punishment phase, the State offered a non-certified copy of a federal

judgment against Valenzuela as State’s Exhibit 8, which detailed Valenzuela’s arrest and

conviction for conspiracy to transport unlawful aliens, a felony, in cause number

2:13CR00237-001. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Valenzuela objected, stating the judgment was

hearsay and not certified. However, the trial court overruled the objections and admitted

the judgment into evidence. The State offered its State’s Exhibit 8 through Dana

Richardson, a criminal investigator for the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office.

Richardson testified that this document was a non-certified copy of an original kept by the

                                              2
Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and had been

furnished by the Clerk to the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office upon request.

       The State then offered State’s Exhibits 9 and 10 simultaneously. State’s Exhibit 9

was a certified copy of Valenzuela’s 2017 judgment of conviction out of DeWitt County

for harassment by a person in a correctional facility, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.11. State’s Exhibit 10 was a computer printout of Valenzuela’s criminal

history taken from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Texas Crime

Information Center. Initially, when the State offered these exhibits into evidence,

Valenzuela objected only to State’s Exhibit 9 on authentication grounds. The objection to

State’s Exhibit 9 was overruled and both exhibits were admitted into evidence. After

admission of exhibits, Valenzuela urged the following objection to State’s Exhibit 10:

       I would object to the NCIC because he was not able to match the—he was
       not able to find the cause number on the NCIC that matched the judgment
       that he purports to belong to my client—that is not certified. I object to the
       one-half of the Exhibit 10 on the NCIC and I object again to the federal
       judgment.

The judge, once again, overruled the objections.

       State’s Exhibit 10 contains, among other things, Valenzuela’s name, date of birth,

sex, height, weight, race, aliases, addresses, social security number, emergency contact

information, dates of arrest, charged offenses, findings of guilt, sentencing information,

and judicial case identification numbers. Richardson testified that State’s Exhibit 10 was

a computer-generated printout retrieved from the Texas Department of Public Safety. He

explained that the data retrieved during his search of Valenzuela’s criminal history was a

consolidation of information taken from the Texas Department of Public Safety as well as

                                             3
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, all of which pertained to Valenzuela.

       The jury charge instructed the jury to find the enhancement paragraph true if it

found that Valenzuela had previously been convicted of the 2013 federal offense; it did

not mention the 2017 harassment conviction. The jury found the enhancement paragraph

true and sentenced Valenzuela to twenty years imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                            II.      ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

       Valenzuela argues that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the non-

certified federal judgment and the computer-generated report of his criminal history.

Specifically, Valenzuela argues that these exhibits constitute inadmissible hearsay.

Valenzuela also argues that the exhibits were not certified, which we construe as a

challenge to their authentication.

A.     Standard of Review

       We review a trial court’s admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion

standard. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also

Strickland v. State, No. 13-16-00701-CR, 2020 WL 373072, *20 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Jan. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Such

a ruling is upheld on appeal “if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct

under any theory of law applicable to the case.” Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Under this standard, a trial court’s ruling will be deemed an abuse

of discretion only if it is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement or is arbitrary or unreasonable. Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002); Taylor v. State, 509 S.W.3d 468, 472 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet.

                                            4
ref’d) (citing State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). This

deferential standard of review requires appellate courts to view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and not substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court. Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

B.     Federal Judgment

       Valenzuela contends that the trial court erroneously admitted the non-certified

federal judgment into evidence because the federal judgment was hearsay and lacked

authentication. We address both arguments as separate sub-issues below.

       1.     Hearsay

       “Hearsay” is a written or oral statement that “the declarant does not make while

testifying at the current trial or hearing” and “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted in the statement.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay is generally

inadmissible, see TEX. R. EVID. 802, but pursuant to Rule 803 of the Texas Rules of

Evidence, a final judgment of conviction is admissible in a criminal case notwithstanding

the general hearsay exclusion. TEX. R. EVID. 803(22)(B). To be properly admitted under

Rule 803, the proponent must show the judgment was entered after a trial or a guilty or

nolo contendere plea, the conviction was for a criminal offense, and the evidence

admitted proved any fact essential to the judgment. Id. Furthermore, when offered for a

purpose other than impeachment, the proponent must show that the judgment was

against the defendant. Id. Lastly, an appeal of the conviction must not be pending. Id.

When offered in a criminal case, Rule 803 broadly permits showing a judgment of

conviction of any “criminal offense.” Id.

                                               5
       Richardson testified that State’s Exhibit 8 was a federal conviction for Valenzuela.

On the first page of State’s Exhibit 8, there is an entry in bold print stating “JUDGMENT

IN A CRIMINAL CASE” adjacent to another entry indicating that Valenzuela had pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to transport unlawful aliens on April 24, 2013. The State relied on this

exhibit, among others, as a part of the foundation necessary to establish an essential fact

pertaining to the enhancement paragraph of the amended indictment. Id. R.

803(22)(B)(iii). Moreover, during questioning from both parties, Richardson indicated that

the information he retrieved specified that the federal judgment was a conviction based

on a guilty plea. See TEX. R. EVID. 803(22)(B)(i). Valenzuela does not argue that the

federal judgment was not final. 1 See TEX. R. EVID. 803(22)(B)(v).

       Therefore, the federal judgment was properly admitted under the judgment of a

previous conviction exception to hearsay. See id.

       We overrule this sub-issue.

       2.      Authentication

       Texas Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication requirement for the

admissibility of evidence. “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an

item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the item is what the proponent claims it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a).

       Rule 901(b) “does not erect a particularly high hurdle” for authentication and

provides a nonexclusive list of methods for authenticating evidence. See TEX. R. EVID.

901(b); see Campbell v. State, 382 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet;

       1
         No evidence in the record indicates that the judgment was the subject of a pending appeal. See
TEX. R. EVID. 803(22)(B)(v).
                                                   6
see also Bryant v. State, No. 13-21-00230 CR, 2023 WL 2182423, at *13 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi—Edinburg Feb. 23, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). “Evidence may be authenticated in a number of ways, including by direct

testimony from a witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other

authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial evidence.” Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633,

638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Authenticity may also be established with evidence of

“distinctive characteristics and the like,” which include “the appearance, contents,

substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together

with all the circumstances.” Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(quoting TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4)).

       Furthermore, conclusive proof of authenticity is not required. Id. Rule 901 “merely

requires some evidence sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what

the proponent claims.” Id. (quoting Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991)); see TEX. R. EVID. 901. The proponent of evidence is neither required to rule out

all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity nor prove beyond any doubt that the

evidence is what it purports to be. See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 548; see also Segovia

v. State, 467 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d). “If the trial

court’s ruling that a jury could reasonably find proffered evidence authentic is at least

‘within the zone of reasonable disagreement,’ a reviewing court should not interfere.”

Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991) (op on reh’g)). “The trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion in

admitting evidence where he or she reasonably believes that a reasonable juror could

                                              7
find that the evidence has been authenticated or identified.” Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d

491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Mitchell v. State, 419 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d).

        Prior to the admission of State’s Exhibit 8, Valenzuela repeatedly asserted that it

could not be admitted into evidence because the federal judgment was not certified. We

find this argument unpersuasive. Certified copies of public records are self-authenticating,

see TEX. R. EVID. 902(4), but Rule 901 does not require certification as a condition

precedent for authenticity. See id. R. 901. Here, Richardson testified as the State’s

sponsoring witness that he recognized State’s Exhibit 8 as a federal conviction for

Valenzuela which he retrieved during his investigation. 2 See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638

(“Evidence may be authenticated by direct testimony from a witness with personal

knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence, or by circumstantial

evidence.”) To the extent that Valenzuela argues against the authenticity of State’s Exhibit

8 due to a lack of certification, we note that the State “need [not] ‘rule out all possibilities

inconsistent with authenticity,’” nor “prove beyond any doubt that the evidence is what it

purports to be.” See Campbell, 382 S.W.3d at 549; Segovia, 467 S.W.3d at 551.

Therefore, we cannot say that under the circumstances the admission of State’s Exhibit

8 into evidence was “clearly wrong,” arbitrary or unreasonable. See Taylor, 509 S.W.3d

at 472; Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 439.

        We overrule this sub-issue.

        2   On cross-examination, Richardson stated that in the present case, he contacted the federal
district clerk’s office via phone requesting a copy of the federal judgment, and the federal district clerk
mailed a copy in an envelope addressed to him at the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office. Richardson
further testified that he used State’s Exhibit 8 to corroborate other information pertaining to Valenzuela.
                                                    8
C.     Computer-Generated Report

       Valenzuela contends that the trial court erroneously admitted the computer-

generated printout of his criminal history, arguing the document is hearsay and lacks

authentication.

       Preservation of error is a systemic requirement on appeal. Dixon v. State, 595

S.W.3d 216, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (observing that “preservation of error is a

systemic requirement that a first-tier appellate court is obligated to address before

reversing a conviction”). A reviewing court should not address the merits of an issue that

has not been preserved for appeal. Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012); Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 473–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

       Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 sets forth the general requirement of error

preservation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Generally, to preserve error for appellate review,

the record must show that a timely objection or request was made to the trial court; the

grounds for relief were made “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of

the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context”; and the trial

court ruled upon the objection or request. Id. R. 33.1(a); see Gibson v. State, 541 S.W.3d

164, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). Although error preservation does not require a “hyper-

technical or formalistic use of words or phrases,” the complainant must “let the trial judge

know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the

judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something

about it.” Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Clark v.

State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

                                             9
       Here, the record reveals that during the punishment phase, the State

simultaneously offered State’s Exhibit 9, a certified felony judgment out of DeWitt County,

and State’s Exhibit 10, the computer-generated printout, into evidence. Counsel solely

objected to State’s Exhibit 9, stating, “I object to—nine because, again, it doesn’t have

identifiers on this. It does not have a thumbprint and it does not have a photo. I object to

it and it does not have an identifier of my client.” The objection was overruled, and both

exhibits were admitted into evidence. It was only after the exhibits were admitted that

Valenzuela urged his objection to State’s Exhibit 10. Therefore, Valenzuela failed to timely

preserve his complaint as to the trial court’s admission of State’s Exhibit 10. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1. Furthermore, Valenzuela’s complaints on appeal—that State’s Exhibit 10

contained hearsay and lacked authentication—do not comport with his objection at trial.

See Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Whether a party’s

particular complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal comports

with the complaint made at trial.”).

       Accordingly, we overrule this sub-issue.

                                  III.     SUFFICIENCY

       Valenzuela next argues that the evidence admitted during the punishment phase

is insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of true regarding the enhancement paragraph in

the indictment.

A.     Standard of Review

       We review the sufficiency of the evidence under the single standard set out in

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.

                                            10
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense

as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is

authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof

or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. This principle applies to necessary

elements of the offense as well as to findings necessary to support enhanced punishment.

Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In reviewing the sufficiency

of evidence supporting a conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at

319 (1979)).

       The standard we must apply deals only with “the record evidence adduced at the

trial.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. This includes evidence both properly and improperly

admitted, but it cannot include evidence not admitted. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d

772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). To say otherwise would allow a defendant “to retry the

case on appeal” through sufficiency review, which we cannot do. Flores v. State, 620

S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

       This same standard is used to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

a finding of “true” on enhancement paragraphs. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894–95. The

factfinder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight

                                              11
to be given to the testimony. See Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). We give great deference to the trier of fact and assume the factfinder resolved all

conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      Texas Penal Code § 12.42 provides for enhancement of the applicable punishment

range of felony offenses for repeat felony offenders. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42.

Under § 12.42(c)(1):

      If it is shown on the trial of a felony of the first degree that the defendant has
      previously been finally convicted of a felony other than a state-jail felony
      punishable under [§] 12.35(a), on conviction the defendant shall be
      punished by imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for
      life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 15 years.

Id. § 12.42(c)(1). In addition to imprisonment, an individual may be punished by a fine not

to exceed $10,000. Id.

      We note that a federal conviction for an offense which does not constitute a felony

under the Texas Penal Code may be used to enhance punishment under § 12.42. Ex

parte Blume, 618 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Crim. App.1981); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 12.41(1) (setting out that a conviction that has been obtained from a prosecution that is

not in the Texas Penal Code shall be classified as a “felony of the third degree” if

imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or another penitentiary is

affixed to the offense as a possible punishment). When it is clear on the face of the

document that an appellant was incarcerated in a penitentiary for a conviction, the

evidence of that conviction is sufficient for enhancement purposes. Golden v. State, 874

S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994, pet. ref’d).

                                             12
       Furthermore, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior

conviction exists, that the conviction is linked to the defendant, and the conviction is “final.”

See id. § 12.42; Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). To prove

final, prior convictions, the State is not limited to any one type of evidence. See Flowers

v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). For example, the State can

meet its burden by introducing multiple documents that, when read together, contain

“sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the

defendant’s identity as the person convicted.” Id. In proving up the final prior conviction,

the State may rely on certified judgments, admissions from the defendant, or other

testimony. See id.

B.     Discussion

       As discussed above, the State offered a federal judgment of conviction, State’s

Exhibit 8, and a computer printout of Valenzuela’s criminal history, State’s Exhibit 10, to

prove Valenzuela had a prior conviction. The State also offered State’s Exhibit 9, a prior

felony judgment of conviction out of DeWitt County. All three exhibits were admitted into

evidence.

       State’s Exhibit 8 is a six-page exhibit, and its pages are arranged in chronological

order. The first page is a federal judgment, signed by United States District Judge Nelva

Gonzalez Ramos on July 18, 2013, containing Valenzuela’s name, indicating that he

pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Transport Unlawful Aliens in cause number

2:13CR00237-001. An entry on the bottom left corner of this page lists July 17, 2013, as

the date of disposition. The second page states that the length of sentence was thirty-

                                               13
seven months. Pages three through four contain conditions for release from confinement,

along with special conditions of supervision. Pages five through six contain information

regarding a $100.00 fine. Richardson testified that Valenzuela was the individual to which

this judgment pertained. The evidence submitted by the State to establish the federal

conviction shows that appellant was sentenced to confinement in the United States

Bureau of Prisons. Accordingly, the federal conviction was sufficient for purposes of

enhancement.

      State’s Exhibit 10 is a twenty-four-page exhibit containing a detailed compilation

of information pertaining to Valenzuela’s criminal history and personal identifying

information. The first page of this exhibit lists Valenzuela by name as well as current and

prior addresses. Page three lists descriptive information, such as Valenzuela’s social

security number, date of birth, height, weight, and other associated information. Notably,

there are two identification numbers on this page: “FBI 194176MB6” and “TX05912968.”

“TX05912968” matches the identification number for Valenzuela that is listed on the first

page of his prior felony judgment of conviction out of DeWitt County in State’s Exhibit 9.

In addition, page eight of State’s Exhibit 10 indicates that Valenzuela was arrested on

February 22, 2013, for Conspiracy to Transport Aliens, see 8 USC § 1324, along with

information outlining a thirty-seven-month sentence, a disposition date of July 17, 2013,

and the imposition of a $100 fine—the same information found in Valenzuela’s federal

judgment in State’s Exhibit 8.

      Valenzuela cites Beck v. State in support of his sufficiency argument. In Beck, the

Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that certified copies of a judgment and sentence

                                            14
“are not normally sufficient standing alone to prove prior convictions, even if the name on

the judgment and sentence and in the pen packet is the same as the defendant in trial.”

719 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Texas courts have similarly held that,

absent additional evidence, a defendant’s full name on a judgment and their signature on

said judgment is insufficient to support enhancement. See Prihoda v. State, 352 S.W.3d

796, 808–10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. ref’d) (finding insufficient evidence to

support enhancement where only evidence linking appellant to prior conviction was (1) his

full name on the prior conviction judgment, (2) his signature on that judgment, and (3) a

police officers’ vague response to a single question about a prior DWI); see also Flowers,

220 S.W.3d at 925.

      However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that computer printouts

from a government-operated database can provide a legitimate basis for proving the

existence of a prior conviction. Ex parte Warren, 353 S.W.3d 490, 495 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). In Ex parte Warren, the court held that a computer printout offered to prove a prior

conviction contained sufficient information and indicia of reliability to constitute the

functional equivalent of a judgment and sentence tied to the appellant. There, the printout

stated the defendant’s name, the offense charged, and date of commission; stated that

he was found guilty of and sentenced for the offense; and gave the specifics of the

sentence and the amount of time served. Id. Likewise, the computer printout here

included similar information sufficient to corroborate and link Valenzuela to the 2013

federal conviction admitted into evidence. See id. Moreover, the documents used in the

instant case were supported through the testimony of Richardson.

                                            15
        We conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt,

based on the testimony and information in the exhibits offered at trial, that the alleged

prior federal conviction existed, and was linked to Valenzuela. See Flowers, 220 S.W.3d

at 921; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(1).

        We overrule Valenzuela’s final sub-issue. 3

                                            IV.    CONCLUSION

        We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                            NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                                            Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
13th day of July, 2023.

         3 In a passing reference, Valenzuela raised a due process issue in his brief but otherwise does not

present any pertinent legal authority or argument to substantiate this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[A]
brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to
authorities and to the record.”). Therefore, Valenzuela has waived this issue through inadequate briefing.
See id.; Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 342–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (noting that we have no obligation
to make an appellant’s argument for him); Lucio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 873, 877–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
(finding a point of error inadequately briefed where the brief contains a single-sentence assertion and is
unaccompanied by any other argument or authorities).
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