Court Opinion

ID: 9628939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:34:46.850763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:13.488036
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT
concurs and specially concurs:
We granted certiorari and ordered briefing by the parties regarding two questions:
(1) Whether a political subdivision of the State, which owns and operates a general aviation reliever airport, and which has never permitted scheduled passenger service, may prohibit scheduled passenger service under state and federal law.
(2) Whether a state court may determine the proprietary powers of a political subdivision of the State, which owns and operates a general aviation reliever airport, to ban scheduled passenger service.
In answer to the first question, like the majority, I conclude that a state political subdivision, Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority (the Authority), which owns and operates a general aviation reliever airport without a terminal and passenger security system, may prohibit scheduled passenger service. My response to the second question is predicated on the answer to the first: Yes, in order to effect a prohibition on scheduled passenger service and to protect its proprietary interests, the Authority may obtain the aid of our state courts.
I write separately, however, to make clear that, in my view, because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has not acted, it is inappropriate at this time to conclude that any such prohibition by the Authority is preempted. Likewise, I believe it would not be proper or prudent to withhold judicial review on this record in light of the conduct of Centennial Express Airlines, Inc. (Centennial), or under the assumption the FAA will act.
Because I fail to see how the state injunction interferes with any agency action or otherwise exercises jurisdiction in excess of what is necessary to stay the actions of Centennial, which threaten the proprietary interests of a state agency, I find no error in the district court orders. Consequently, I join the opinion of Chief Justice Yollack to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
*598I.
State courts generally have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to decide questions of federal law. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). I can see no reason why a state court’s exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over a particular set of questions would be displaced because a party before the court subsequently initiates additional proceedings with a federal agency that has concurrent jurisdiction over those questions. Therefore, I have no trouble concluding that the district court had the power to decide both the state and federal questions necessary to resolve this case with injunctive orders issued on the merits.
II.
The claim raised by the Authority in the district court was based principally on state law. Indeed, few can question that the Authority plainly has the power to exclude scheduled passenger service from Centennial Airport, unless, of course, Congress preempts state laws permitting such a prohibition, see maj. op. at 592-593, 594-596; dissenting op. at 602 (Bender, J.); see also Banner Advertising, Inc. v. People of the City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Colo. 1994), which Congress has not done.
In addition, preemption may occur pursuant to a federal statute authorizing the FAA, by formal agency action, to preempt state law. However, unless the FAA acts within its defined authority, no preemption results. It is uncontroverted that the FAA has not acted.1
In that vacuum, on December 22,1994, the district court first issued a temporary restraining order (temporary order). The temporary order was, by its terms, an order that “would preserve the status quo pending a trial on the merits.” As the court explained, “[t]he status quo is that no scheduled passenger service is allowed at the Airport.... Granting [the] order would preserve the status quo.” Thus, the court ordered Centennial “to refrain immediately from conducting and/or expanding scheduled passenger service at Centennial Airport.”
Subsequently, the district court issued its Permanent Injunctive Order of January 10, 1995. However, as I read the court’s order, it has self-imposed limitations worthy of note. Building upon the temporary order, the permanent injunction states that it “preserved] the status quo[,] no scheduled passenger service,” and that it “PERMANENTLY ENJOINS [Centennial] ... to refrain immediately from conducting scheduled passenger service at Centennial Airport so long as such use is prohibited by the Minimum Standards of the Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority.” (Emphasis added.)
Here, in the absence of FAA action, the Minimum Standards of the Arapahoe County Public Airport Authority continue to prohibit scheduled passenger service. I therefore agree that, under these circumstances, the district court did not err when it issued its injunction barring Centennial from conducting scheduled passenger flights based on the state law grounds urged by the Authority.
*599Consistent with our holding today, we have previously recognized that even where a court does not have jurisdiction to decide a controversy on the merits, it may nonetheless issue an injunction to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the dispute in an appropriate forum. See Hughley v. Rocky Mtn. Health Maintenance Organization, Inc., 927 P.2d 1325, 1330 (Colo.1996) (court may enter injunction to preserve status quo despite statutory divestiture of jurisdiction over merits of dispute submitted to arbitration); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc. v. District Court, 672 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (Colo.1983) (same).
In my view, there can be little question as to whether the district court had jurisdiction over the state law issue and was obligated to exercise the state judicial power. Our constitution does not contemplate that a trial court can, as executive departments of government may, avoid a matter properly before it solely by exercise of its discretion. Colo. Const. Art. II, § 6. (“Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay.”) As the United States Supreme Court held in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821):
We cannot pass [a case] by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty.
III.
In sum, an injunction was appropriate to protect the proprietary interests of the Authority. Therefore, I too would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Accordingly, I join the majority in holding that the district court’s order enjoining Centennial to preserve the status quo was appropriate to resolve the dispute before that court.

. For purposes of this opinion, I am willing to assume that the FAA has, by statutory grant, the power to preempt the Authority’s regulations. Moreover, under the grant agreements, the FAA may also be able to prevent the Authority from barring scheduled passenger service pursuant to the various assurances or contract clauses under the terms of the grant agreement. See 14 C.F.R. § 16.1—16.307 (establishing rules of practice for complaints involving violations of FAA regulations and grant assurances). The FAA is obligated to enforce its grant agreements and, where necessary, to compel compliance by its various grant recipients. See 14 C.F.R. § 151.7(a) (providing that FAA may authorize grant funding only where the FAA administrator is satisfied grant assurances have been or will be met). Hence, the FAA may attempt to invoke the assurances or contract clauses of the grant agreement as a bar to the Authority’s actions based on a breach of contract theory. Of course, if the FAA is unable to enforce the grant agreements administratively or the Authority wishes to challenge the FAA action, the matter must be litigated in federal court because the United States would be a party. Notwithstanding the assurances under the grant agreement, in the event a grantee violates FAA regulations, the agency might also commence an enforcement proceeding under the FAA’s other regulations. Nonetheless, the limiting factor in any preemption analysis here is the failure of the FAA to act and the fact no party has turned to the federal courts to compel FAA action.