Court Opinion

ID: 9832538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:59:05.295795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.777210
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The able counsel for appellees seem inept in contentions on rehearing to the effect:
(1) That the order herein appealed from was other than one wherein the trial court simply overruled the appellant’s application for a temporary injunction, holding that his bill therefor did not state a good cause of action for that relief. The judgment itself appearing in the transcript .unmistakably shows that to have been its effect. It was both accelerated into this court and advanced here under the statutes especially providing therefor in cases where preliminary injunctions have been refused or granted. There can therefore be no doubt about the matter, and this court simply reversed that action, holding that, taking the well-pleaded aver-ments as true, as had to be done under the general demurrer on the appeal, a good cause of action for injunctive relief had been stated, and that its refusal amounted in the circumstances to an abuse of a sound discrer tion on the trial court’s part.
(2) That this court held that the rental agreement, so alleged to have been entered into between the appellant and the city, amounted to a joint enterprise to the extent that they had become liable as partners in the adventure. This court made no such holding, as the language of its original opinion plainly shows, simply likening it to that sort of undertaking in legal consequences to the effect that, after having entered into such a special arrangement as was specifically alleged, the city would not be permitted to summarily cancel or unilaterally extinguish all rights of appellant therein without at least doing equity toward him.
(3) In insisting that such lease agreement or rental contract as was alleged by appellant could not be entered into by the city except upon some ordinance, motion, or resolution duly passed by its city council, which had not been alleged. This presentment is conclusively answered by article 2, § *40710, of the eity charter, reading as follows: “Marltets. — Said city shall have power to establish, lease, maintain, regulate and operate markets and market places, and abattoirs, and to build, own and maintain buildings therefor, and to rent and lease the same.” See Charles H. Mayer v. John Kostes et al., 71 S.W.(2d) 398, decided by this court March 1, 1934.
In other respects it is not deemed necessary that enlargement be made upon what was said in the former opinion.
The motion for rehearing has accordingly been overruled.
Overruled.