Court Opinion

ID: 9743734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:41:51.155778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.188018
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LINDBERG, dissenting: Upon consideration of the State’s petition for rehearing, defendant’s response and the State’s reply, I now agree with the State’s position. I dissent from the majority’s adherence to the original disposition. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and defendant’s conviction. I believe it is unworkable and gives rise to inconsistent results to decide issues arising from police-citizen contacts from the perspective of the subjective reaction of the citizen. Rather, we should examine the officer’s conduct to determine the existence of a fourth amendment violation. In the first instance that examination should be concerned with whether there was a “stop” or a “seizure” of the citizen’s person. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868. In the case at bar we need go no further. The only evidence that suggests a “stop” or “seizure” by reason of Officer Garvey’s approach to the car and inquiry of defendant is defendant’s testimony of his subjective reaction. Defendant testified to the effect that he had intended to leave but for the approach of Officer Garvey. It appears that the trial court either chose to disbelieve defendant or, perhaps, concluded that defendant’s subjective reaction was irrelevant, as it denied the motion to suppress the evidence. I believe we should consider Professor LaFave’s criticism of the subjective-reaction or perception-of-the-suspect test. His comment in part is: “Thus, if the ultimate issue is perceived as being whether the suspect ‘would feel free to walk away,’ then virtually all police-citizen encounters must in fact be deemed to involve a Fourth Amendment seizure. The fact that such would be the result may, standing alone, be enough to warrant the conclusion that a perception-of-the-suspect test is undesirable. * * * Asking the officer to determine whether the suspect feels free to leave, however, ‘would require a prescience neither the police nor anyone else possesses.’ ” 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 9.2, at 50-51 (1978). I would adhere to those cases which found no stop or seizure of the person for fourth amendment purposes where the officer simply approached the occupied vehicle cited by Professor LaFave. (3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure sec. 9.2, at 18 (1983 Supp.).) Since the trial court’s implicit finding that the officer’s vehicle did not block the parking lot exit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must accept it. People v. Kincy (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 250. Since I conclude there was no stop prior to the officer’s view of the contraband, it is not necessary to discuss the law and circumstances under which an officer may properly make a stop or seizure. See United States v. Cortez (1981), 449 U.S. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 101 S. Ct. 690; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 107 — 14.