Court Opinion

ID: 9608121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:06:34.030044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:43.751320
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I concur in the judgment of reversal but cannot agree with the holding in the majority opinion that in an eminent domain action, evidence of sales of similar property in the vicinity is not admissible on the issue of the value of the property involved therein.
I have expressed my views on this proposition in my dissent in City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, 519 [170 P.2d 928], but there is more to be said on the subject which T believe requires the majority of the court to give further consideration to the matter. The rule stated is squarely contrary to the statutory law of this state. (I pointed that out in my dissent in the Cole case, but now propose to demonstrate the inescapable truth of the above statement.) In 1937, the Legislature added section 1872 to the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a new section embodying a matter never before stated in the statutory law, and reads: "Whenever an expert witness gives his opinion, he may, upon direct examination, be asked to state the reasons for such opinion,.and he may be fully cross-examined thereon by opposing counsel.” The expert witness may give the reasons for his opinion of value. If some of his reasons are in truth and in fact based upon sales of similar property in the neighborhood, how can he possibly be forbidden to give them under section 1872 ? That section puts no limit on the scope, nature or character of his reasons. He may give his reasons, whatever they may be. How, then, may some of his reasons (sales of similar property in the community) be excluded and others admitted? Aside from those considerations, however, the authorities that announced the rule of exclusion of other sales were based *761on the proposition that the expert valuation witness could not give the reasons for his value opinion on direct examination. In one of the first cases on the subject in this state, it is said: “But, while the opinions of witnesses thus qualified by their knowledge of the subject are competent testimony, they cannot, upon the direct examination, be allowed to testify as to particular transactions, such as sales of adjoining lands, how much has been offered and refused for adjoining lands of like quality and location, or for the land in question, or any part thereof, or how much the company have been compelled to pay in other and like cases—notwithstanding those transactions may constitute the source of their knowledge.” (Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 262.) (Emphasis added.) It is said in Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 544: “While the opinions of such witnesses may be founded mainly upon their observation and experience in other like cases, it is well settled that they cannot, on the direct examination, be questioned as to particular instances. The reason of this rule is obvious. Different witnesses might have different theories. Their opinions might be founded upon the observance of several and distinct instances. If allowed to adduce one, they may adduce all. The opposite party would have a legal right to controvert each particular ease mentioned by the witnesses, and yet be unable to avail himself of the right because of his inability to anticipate the cases mentioned and prepare for their investigation.” (Emphasis added.) It is said in De Freitas v. Town of Suisun City, 170 Cal. 263, 266 [149 P. 553] : “By preliminary questions the examiner should elicit the facts relating to the qualifications of the witnesses, for example, that he has seen and examined the land, or that he knows something of its character and condition, or the market values of land in that vicinity, if such values have' been established, or the values of land similarly situated, and the like. He may, thereupon, be asked to give his opinion of its respective values with and without the use of the water in question. From such evidence the court or jury can estimate the amount of damage caused by the deprivation of the water, if they shall find that there is such and that it is produced by defendant’s tunnel. The weight of the testimony of such witness will, of course, depend upon the knowledge he shows in his answers to the preliminary questions and on cross-examination. He should not be asked regarding specific facts in the examination in *762chief.” (Emphasis added.) This court stated in Estate of Ross, 171 Cal. 64, 66 [151 P. 1138] : “The party calling a witness to give his opinion on value may qualify him by showing his familiarity with the property and with other property in the neighborhood, his experience in the business, his familiarity with the state of the market and with sales of similar property in the vicinity, and any other facts tending to show his knowledge of the subject and capacity to give an opinion thereon. But while the fact that he knows of sales made and of the prices obtained may be elicited, the prices given in any particular instance are not admissible, except as stated, on the cross-examination of the opposing party, if he sees fit to make the inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) The thought expressed in all those cases is that the expert can give general reasons for his opinion, but not specific reasons. There is no such limitation in section 1872, and this court should read none into it. To do so is to make the adoption of the section a wholly idle gesture. Such cases as Santa Ana v. Marlin, 99 Cal. 538 [34 P. 224]; Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528 [28 P. 681]; City of San Luis Obispo v. Brizzolara, 100 Cal. 434 [34 P. 1083] ; and City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 202 Cal. 731 [262 P. 737], merely follow the Pearson case. They were all decided before 1937, when section 1872 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted. It is obvious that in enacting said section the Legislature intended to change the rule announced in the last cited eases which was and is out of harmony with the weight of authority and in conflict with the general rule in other jurisdictions as appears from the authorities cited in my dissenting opinion in City of Los Angeles v. Cole, 28 Cal.2d 509, at pages 520-521 [170 P.2d 928]. The holding in the majority opinion, which reaffirms the holding in the Cole case, in effect nullifies the above-mentioned code section by rendering it meaningless.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 20, 1947.