Court Opinion

ID: 9812712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:45:32.456354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:56.033536
License: Public Domain

Connor, J.,
dissenting: This case has given me much anxious concern. Certainly there is nothing in the record 'calculated to arouse any sympathy with the prisoner or his conduct. This fact imposes upon the judge the duty of especially guarding himself against relaxing rules of the law and permitting wrong and injustice to be done him. It behooves the State through its courts to protect the lives of its citizens. One of the means by which this is sought to be done is the detection and upon conviction, the punishment of those who commit a criminal homicide. It clearly, if not primarily, affects the honor of the State that she permit none to be punished who are innocent or convicted otherwise than by the law of the land. I trust that if I appear to be jealous of the honor of the State in that respect, I may not for that reason be charged with a want of as much concern for the due execution of the law as my brethren. To my mind no greater wrong can be done the State and every citizen thereof than the punishment of an innocent man. It seems from the evidence that the prisoner belongs to a class of persons who purchase “concessions” at State fairs to conduct the business of “fakirs.” This fact does not in my judgment throw any light upon the legal aspects of his conduct at the time of the homicide as presented upon this record. In this *870connection my mind reverts to the lofty sentiment and noble words of a learned, wise and good judge, when it was being urged against a prisoner that be was a slave. They are worthy to be perpetuated and held in everlasting remembrance. Gaston, approved by Ruffin, C. J., and Daniel, J., in State v. Will, 18 N. C., 121 (172). I cannot concur in the conclusion that His Honor correctly defined to the jury the right of self-defense. I must confess, with all possible deference to the learned judge who tried the cause and my brethren, that I do not clearly comprehend the meaning of the language, and while not necessarily so, it is not entirely unreasonable to assume, that the jury may not have fully understood the extent of this right and its legal limitations. His Honor said to the jury: “Self-defense exists where one is suddenly assaulted and in the defense of his person, where immediate and great bodily harm would be the apparent consequences of waiting for the assistance of the law and there is no other probable means to escape, he kills the assailant.” Without undertaking to discuss the question at length, I find the law as approved by this court laid down by Mr. Justice Bynum, in State v. Dixon, 75 N. C., 275 (279):
“The general rule is, That one may oppose another attempting the perpetration of a felony, if need be, to the taking of a felon’s life;’ as in the case of a person attacked by another, intending to murder him, who thereupon kills his assailant. He is justified. 2 Bish. Cr. Law, section 682. A distinction which seems reasonable and is supported by authority, is taken between assaults with felonious intent and assaults without felonious intent. In the latter the person assaulted may not stand his ground and kill his adversary, if there is any way of escape open to him, though he is allowed to repel force by force, and give blow for blow. In this class of cases, where there is no deadly purpose, the doctrine of the books applies, that one cannot justify the'killing of the other, though apparently in self-defense, unless he *871Erst ‘retreat to tbe wall.’ .In the former class, where the attack is made with murderous intent, the person attacked is under no obligation to flee; he may stand his ground and kill his adversary if need be. 2 Bish. Cr. Law, section 6333, and cases there cited. And so Mr. East states the law to be. ‘A. man may repel force by force, in defense of his person, habitation or property, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a known felony, such as murder, rape, burglary, robbery and the like upon either.’ In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he has secured himself from all danger; and if he kill him in so doing, it is called justifiable self-defense.”
This I consider to be the correct .statement of the law as frequently approved in this court. State v. Matthews, 78 N. C., 523; State v. Castle, 133 N. C., 779; State v. Clark, 134 N. C., 698; State v. Hough, 138 N. C., 663; Wharton’s Crim. Law (9 Ed.), sections 306, 487. I cannot think that the “sacredness of human life” is promoted by weakening or unnecessarily limiting the right of self-defense. The latter hath in all ages been held to be a protection to human life and the preservation of it in its integrity is, to my mind, a safeguard to the life of the citizen. I cannot but deplore any tendency to place unnecessary restrictions upon it. Its landmarks have been fixed 'by the sages of the law and should not be departed from. In regard to the motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence, I can only say that upon the uncontradicted affidavit of the jailer, it appears that the prisoner knew of the testimony of which he now seeks to avail himself. As, however, the question is discussed at length in the opinion I deem it proper to say that while I recognize the force of the precedent made in this court, I have never been able to understand why if this court has the power to grant a new trial for newly discovered evidence in a case involving property of ever so small a value, it has not like *872power where the liberty and life of the citizen is involved. I have read with care all that has been said upon this subject. The force of the argument which deprives us of the power to grant this relief, to my mind applies with equal force against our power to grant it in a civil case. It is one of those questions which, to my mind, will only be settled when reasons more cogent than any yet advanced are found to. sustain the conclusion of the court. The argument ab inconvenienti does not impress me. When human life and liberty are at stake I cannot concede the force of this argument. I am much impressed with the learned brief containing a history of our statute upon this subject, filed by the counsel for the prisoner. If the facts set forth in these affidavits are true, coupled’ with the doubtful character of the testimony, I am impressed with the deep conviction that a grave and fatal mistake has been made in fixing the guilt upon the prisoner. The testimony, to my mind, strongly tends to show that another and a swift witness in this cause took the life of the deceased, who was a friend and partner of the prisoner. Upon his own evidence the prisoner is guilty of a grave and highly criminal violation of the laws of the State. Eor the reasons given I am constrained to dissent from the conclusion reached by a majority of the court.
Walker, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.