Court Opinion

ID: 9942029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:10:28.866907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:35.992877
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joshua Bergenstock,                             :
                              Appellant         :
                                                :
                 v.                             :    No. 69 C.D. 2023
                                                :    ARGUED: December 4, 2023
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                   :
Department of Transportation,                   :
Bureau of Driver Licensing                      :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
               HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                         FILED: February 20, 2024

               Licensee, Joshua Bergenstock, appeals from an order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Northumberland County denying his appeal from the suspension
of his operating privilege for 18 months under Section 1547(b)(1)(ii)(A) of the
Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii)(A),1 and from the lifetime disqualification
of his commercial driving privilege under Section 1611(c) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §
1611(c),2 by the Department of Transportation (DOT), Bureau of Driver Licensing.
DOT’s actions were the result of Licensee’s arrest for driving under the influence
(DUI) two nights in a row and his refusal of chemical testing both times. We affirm
the trial court’s order denying Licensee’s appeal from the 18-month suspension of

    1
     An 18-month suspension is warranted when a licensee commits a second violation of Section
1547. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii)(A).
    2
       A lifetime disqualification is warranted when a person is the subject of two or more reports
of test refusals as specified in Section 1613 of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1613, arising from two or
more separate and distinct incidents. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1611(c).
his operating privilege but reverse the order denying his appeal from the lifetime
disqualification of his commercial driving privilege.
              The relevant facts are undisputed. At approximately 12:51 a.m. on July
31, 2022, Corporal Daniel Zettelmoyer3 of the Milton Police Department was
dispatched to Speedy’s Place following the report of a truck with its engine running
in the bar’s parking lot with a man inside who appeared to be intoxicated. Upon
arrival, Zettelmoyer located a black truck with its engine running and Licensee
seated in the driver’s seat, slumped over the center console. Zettelmoyer identified
Licensee as the subject of the previous night’s DUI arrest when Zettelmoyer served
as the assisting officer. After Zettelmoyer was unable to rouse Licensee, a second
police officer, Officer Noviello, arrived on the scene and roused Licensee by
pounding on the vehicle’s window. Following Licensee’s exit from the truck,
Zettelmoyer observed that Licensee’s face was flushed, his eyes were bloodshot and
glassy, his speech was slow and slurred, and he emitted an odor of alcohol. After
administering several field sobriety tests, Zettelmoyer placed Licensee under arrest
for suspicion of DUI and transported him to the hospital for a blood draw.
              At the hospital, Zettelmoyer read Licensee the blood test warnings from
side one of the DL-26B form advising him of the Implied Consent Law.4 In pertinent
part, the consequence portion provides: “If you refuse to submit to the blood test,
your operating privilege will be suspended for at least 12 months. If you previously
refused a chemical test or were previously convicted of [DUI], your operating
privilege will be suspended for up to 18 months.” Ex. C-1, Sub Ex. 2, DL-26B Form;

    3
      As evident from the DL-26B form, the correct spelling of the officer’s name is Zettelmoyer,
not Zettlemoyer. Ex. C-1, Sub Ex. 2, DL-26B Form; Reproduced R. (R.R.) at 32a.
    4
     Section 1547 of the Code is commonly referred to as the Implied Consent Law and permits
chemical testing of drivers under certain circumstances.

                                               2
Reproduced R. (R.R.) at 32a. Notably, Zettelmoyer did not read side two of the DL-
26B form setting forth the blood testing warnings pertaining to the potential loss of
a licensee’s commercial driving privilege. When Licensee refused to answer any
questions or sign the form, Zettelmoyer recorded a refusal.
               Subsequently, DOT sent Licensee a notice advising him that it was
suspending his operating privilege for 18 months pursuant to Section 1547 and a
second notice advising him that it was disqualifying his commercial driving
privilege for a lifetime pursuant to Section 1611. Licensee appealed from both
notices and the trial court conducted one de novo hearing.5 At that time, DOT
submitted into evidence two packets: Exhibit C-1 (suspension of operating privilege
for 18 months) and Exhibit C-2 (lifetime disqualification of commercial driving
privilege). In addition, DOT presented the testimony of Zettelmoyer. Neither the
second officer nor Licensee testified.
               The trial court denied Licensee’s statutory appeals of both the
suspension and the disqualification. With respect to the suspension, the trial court
determined that DOT met its burden of proving that Zettelmoyer had reasonable
grounds to believe that Licensee was operating or in actual physical control of the
truck. The trial court concluded that the disqualification was mandated by statute.
Licensee’s appeal to this Court followed.
                     18-Month Suspension of Operating Privilege
               To sustain a suspension of a licensee’s operating privilege under
Section 1547, DOT has the burden, pertinent here, to prove that the licensee “was

    5
      The trial court heard the two matters as one appeal: Joshua Bergenstock v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (C.C.P. Northumberland Cnty., No. CV-2022-
1364, filed Jan. 11, 2023). At the hearing, counsel for DOT acknowledged that the hearing entailed
both matters. Nov. 9, 2022 Hearing, Notes of Test. (N.T.) at 3; R.R. at 4a. Before this Court,
Licensee filed one notice of appeal pertaining to both matters.

                                                3
arrested for [DUI] by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the
licensee was operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of the
vehicle while under [the] influence of alcohol[.]” Banner v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa. 1999). Whether reasonable
grounds exist is a question of law subject to our plenary review. Id. at 1207. The
test for reasonable grounds is not very demanding, and it is not necessary for the
police officer to be correct in his or her belief. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing v. Bird, 578 A.2d 1345, 1348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Reasonable grounds
are established when a “police officer, viewing the facts and circumstances as they
appeared at the time, could have concluded that the motorist was operating the
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” Banner, 737 A.2d at 1207.
“It is immaterial whether alternative reasonable explanations for how the motorist
came to be as he was found exist.” Gammer v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 995 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Bird, 578 A.2d at 1348).
Here, although Zettelmoyer testified that Licensee told the officer that he had been
drinking but not driving, it was clear that the officer believed to the contrary since
the officer proceeded to arrest him for DUI.
             Although there is no bright line for determining reasonable grounds,
“[g]enerally, the motorist’s presence in the driver’s seat of the vehicle with the
engine on has been deemed sufficient to satisfy the reasonable grounds test.”
Gammer, 995 A.2d at 384. In Gammer, we concluded that “the reasonable grounds
test is satisfied when a police officer discovers . . . a motorist slumped over in the
driver’s seat of the vehicle with the engine running while the vehicle is parked in a
legal parking space in a parking lot.” Id. There is no requirement that an officer

                                          4
witness a licensee operating a vehicle. Walkden v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
             Having assisted another officer with Licensee’s DUI arrest the previous
night, Zettelmoyer recognized Licensee upon encountering him the very next night
in the parking lot of a bar. Nov. 9, 2022 Hearing, Notes of Test. (N.T.) at 9; R.R. at
10a. Initially, Licensee was unable to respond to efforts to rouse him. He was seated
in the driver’s seat of his truck with the engine running, slumped over the center
console, and exhibited indicia of having overly imbibed alcohol. Accordingly we
conclude that Zettelmoyer had reasonable grounds to believe that Licensee was
operating or was in actual physical control of the movement of his truck while under
the influence of alcohol. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
Licensee’s appeal of the 18-month suspension under Section 1547 of the Code.
           Lifetime Disqualification of Commercial Driving Privilege
             Section 1613 of the Code, “Implied consent requirements for
commercial motor vehicle drivers,” provides:

                   (a) Implied consent.--A person who drives a
             commercial motor vehicle in this Commonwealth is
             deemed to have given consent to take a test or tests of the
             person’s breath, blood or urine for the purpose of
             determining the person’s alcohol concentration or the
             presence of other controlled substances.
                   (b) Tests ordered by police officer.--A test or tests
             may be administered at the direction of a police officer
             who, after stopping or detaining the commercial motor
             vehicle driver, has reasonable grounds to believe that the
             driver was driving a commercial motor vehicle while
             having any alcohol in his system.
                   (c) Warning against refusal.--A person requested
             to submit to a test as provided in subsection (a) shall be
             warned by the police officer requesting the test that refusal

                                          5
               to submit to the test will result in the person’s being
               disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle
               under subsection (e).[6]
                      (d) Report on test refusal.--If the person refuses
               testing, the police officer shall submit a sworn report to
               [DOT] certifying that the test was requested pursuant to
               subsection (a) and that the person refused to submit to
               testing.
                      (d.1) Disqualification for refusal.--Upon receipt
               of a report of test refusal, [DOT] shall disqualify the
               person who is the subject of the report for the same period
               as if [DOT] had received a report of the person’s
               conviction for violating one of the offenses listed in
               section 1611(a) (relating to disqualification). A person
               who is disqualified as a result of a report of test refusal that
               originated in this Commonwealth shall have the same right
               of appeal as provided for in cases of suspension. Where
               the report of test refusal originated from another state or
               other foreign jurisdiction, the review of a court on an
               appeal from a disqualification under this subsection shall
               be limited to whether [DOT] has received a report of
               refusal and whether the person has successfully
               established one of the following defenses:
                        (1) The person being disqualified is not the one
                      identified in the report.
                        (2) The person has successfully contested the
                      report in the jurisdiction from which it originated.
                        (3) [DOT] has erred in determining the length of
                      the disqualification to be imposed as a result of the
                      report of test refusal.
                      (d.2)    Limitation on noncommercial motor
               vehicle-based refusal.--A report of test refusal which
               occurred prior to the effective date of this subsection and
               which did not involve a commercial motor vehicle shall
               not be considered by [DOT] for purposes of applying a
               disqualification pursuant to this section.

    6
      Subsection (e) was deleted and the warning section was not updated. Our Supreme Court
has ruled that Section 1611(e)’s lifetime disqualification was not rationally related to protecting
highway safety. Shoul v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 173 A.3d 669 (Pa. 2017).

                                                6
                  (d.3) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
            “report of test refusal” shall mean the following:
                    (1) A report of a police officer submitted to
                  [DOT] that a person refused to submit to testing
                  requested under this section.
                    (2) A notice by a police officer to [DOT] of a
                  person’s refusal to take a test requested pursuant to
                  section 1547 (relating to chemical testing to
                  determine amount of alcohol or controlled
                  substance) where the person was a commercial
                  driver at the time relevant to the refusal.
                    (3) Any document, including an electronic
                  transmission, submitted to [DOT] from a court of
                  competent jurisdiction indicating that a person was
                  convicted of an offense that involves the refusal to
                  submit to testing for alcohol or controlled
                  substances where the person was a commercial
                  driver at the time of the violation.
                    (4) Any document, including an electronic
                  transmission, submitted to [DOT] from a court,
                  administrative tribunal, administrative agency or
                  police officer or other agent of another state or other
                  foreign jurisdiction indicating that a person refused
                  to take a test requested to aid enforcement of a law
                  against driving while under the influence of alcohol
                  or a controlled substance where the person was a
                  commercial driver at the time relevant to the refusal.
                  (e) Disqualification for refusal.--(Deleted by
            amendment).
                  (f) Appeal of disqualification.--(Deleted by
            amendment).

75 Pa.C.S. § 1613(a)-(f) (footnote added).

                                         7
               Licensee contends that the lifetime disqualification should be set aside
because Zettelmoyer never advised him that he would be disqualified for life from
driving a commercial vehicle if he refused to submit a blood sample. We agree.7
               DOT has misinterpreted the Code and incorrectly determined which
drivers are entitled to the blood test warning prescribed by the General Assembly in
Section 1613(c). DOT asserts that Zettelmoyer was required to read only side one
of the DL-26B form because Licensee was arrested in a personal vehicle. Had
Licensee been arrested in a commercial vehicle, DOT contends that the officer
would have been required to read both sides of the form. In addition, DOT argues
that both sides of the form would have been required for a driver who lacked a
commercial driver’s license but was arrested in a commercial vehicle.
               As an initial matter, Section 1613 does not require that the driver be
driving a commercial vehicle to be entitled to a warning that a refusal will result in
disqualification from operating a commercial vehicle. In pertinent part, subsection
(a) provides that “[a] person who drives a commercial motor vehicle in this
Commonwealth is deemed to have given consent to take a test or tests . . . .” 75
Pa.C.S. § 1613(a). Subsection (c) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person
requested to submit to a test as provided in subsection (a) shall be warned by the

    7
       Licensee also argues that the disqualification should be set aside because he was not a
commercial driver at the time of his arrest such that the lifetime disqualification should not have
been triggered. Although we ultimately rule in favor of Licensee on the lifetime disqualification,
we disagree that he was not a commercial driver. DOT submitted evidence that Licensee became
a “CDL holder” on October 23, 2021, and continued to hold a CDL until September 7, 2022. Ex.
C-2, Sub Ex. 5, Sept. 30, 2022, CDL Holder Date Span Inquiry List; R.R. at 53a. The arrest at
issue occurred on July 31, 2022. A CDL holder is defined as “[a] person who has been issued a
commercial driver’s license or a commercial driver’s learner’s permit.” Section 1603 of the Code,
75 Pa.C.S. § 1603. The disqualification applies both to a person who held a CDL at the time of
the disqualifying offenses and to one who operated a commercial vehicle at the time of the offense.
Sondergaard v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 994, 998 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013). Accordingly, Licensee’s argument is without merit.

                                                8
police officer requesting the test that refusal to submit to the test will result in the
person’s being disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle . . . .” 75
Pa.C.S. § 1613(c). Subsection (a)’s person “who drives a commercial vehicle in this
Commonwealth” is not the same as one who is driving a commercial vehicle in this
Commonwealth at the time of his arrest. Notably, the General Assembly did not
employ the latter phrase. In addition, the General Assembly’s use of the phrase
“where the person was a commercial driver at the time relevant to the refusal” in 75
Pa.C.S. § 1613(d.3) similarly does not equate to a requirement that the driver be
driving a commercial vehicle at the time of the DUI arrest in order to be entitled to
the warning. Rather, reading the statutory scheme as a whole, we believe that the
phrase “person who drives a commercial vehicle in this Commonwealth” refers to
CDL holders, the class of persons to whom the lifetime disqualification applies.
             Taken to its logical conclusion, DOT’s interpretation of Section 1613
renders an absurd result whereby a person without a commercial driver’s license but
driving a commercial vehicle would merit an enhanced warning but not a person
with a commercial driver’s license but driving a personal vehicle. As noted above,
the lifetime disqualification applies “to CDL holders who have committed the
disqualifying offenses, regardless of whether the motor vehicle operated at the time
of the offenses was commercial or personal.” Sondergaard v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 994, 998 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Accordingly, it
is of no moment that Licensee was driving a personal vehicle at the time of his arrest.
             In summary, DOT’s position is inconsistent with a plain reading of
Section 1613 pursuant to which Zettelmoyer was required to provide the more
detailed warning to Licensee as a commercial driver regardless of the vehicle he was
in at the time of his DUI arrest. While it is true that Section 1611(c) is a remedial

                                           9
law, enacted to reduce or prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities, and
injuries by disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed certain serious
traffic violations or other specified offenses,8 the Code must be followed to ensure
that commercial drivers, especially those who make their living from driving
commercial vehicles, receive the warning that the General Assembly intended. We
emphasize that the Code rules over any language in DOT’s forms providing contrary
instructions to police officers.
                Accordingly, having determined that Zettelmoyer was required to
advise Licensee that he would be subject to a lifetime disqualification of his
commercial driving privilege if he refused to submit a blood sample, we need not
address the potential unconstitutionality of the lifetime disqualification under
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016).
                                       Conclusion
                We affirm the trial court’s order denying Licensee’s appeal from the
18-month suspension of his operating privilege but reverse the order denying his
appeal from the lifetime disqualification of his commercial driving privilege.

                                         _____________________________________
                                         BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                         President Judge Emerita

    8
        Sondergaard, 65 A.3d at 997.

                                          10
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Joshua Bergenstock,                      :
                          Appellant      :
                                         :
              v.                         :   No. 69 C.D. 2023
                                         :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,            :
Department of Transportation,            :
Bureau of Driver Licensing               :

                                      ORDER

             AND NOW, this 20th day of February, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Northumberland County is AFFIRMED as to the suspension of
Appellant’s operating privilege for 18 months and REVERSED as to the lifetime
disqualification of his commercial driving privilege.

                                       _____________________________________
                                       BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                       President Judge Emerita