Court Opinion

ID: 9459323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:17:21.615463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:07.149214
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
I respectfully dissent. Notwithstanding the view expressed in the majority opinion, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 clearly only permits and does not mandate the assignment of public school teachers to private schools during regular school hours. That no such congressional purpose ever prevailed is evidenced by the Act’s legislative history. The bill’s floor manager in the House initially expressed the view that a public school teacher could not be assigned to a private school under the provisions of Title I.1 Fol*1359lowing lengthy debate a compromise was carefully reached by which “The decision about the best arrangement for providing special educational assistance under Title I is left to the public education agency of the school district, under the Constitution and laws of the State.” Ill Cong.Rec. 5979 (1965).2 Since the Act is only permissive with respect to school teacher assignments, the Missouri State Board of Education, bound by its state constitution and court decisions, could properly determine not to approve school district plans providing for the assignment of public school teachers to private schools during regular school hours.
I therefore find myself in complete agreement with Judge Collinson’s conclusion that:
“Title I clearly does not mandate the assignment of teachers paid by Title I funds to nonpublic schools. The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that such an intention was completely disavowed by every proponent of the bill.”
I would therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of injunctive relief.
If, as the majority holds, Title I mandates the assignment of public school teachers to private schools, I fail to see how the constitutional issue presented can be avoided. I share in the District Judge’s grave concern that Title I, under such circumstances, could not withstand the constitutional challenge. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Oakey, 339 F.Supp. 545 (D.Vt.1972) and Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F.Supp. 421 (D.Conn.1970), aff’d 403 U.S. 955, 91 S.Ct. 2292, 29 L.Ed.2d 865 (1971). The “entanglements” fostered by Title I, as construed by the majority, appear quite indistinguishable from the excessive entanglements proscribed by Lemon. See generally, 22 Rutgers L. Rev., supra.
I join in the majority’s concern with respect to the failure of the parties to negotiate a lawful program pursuant to the Act. Unfortunately, the victims of this lack of cooperation are the intended beneficiaries of Title I, the educationally deprived children.

. See 111 Cong.Rec. 5743-8 (1905) and G. LaNoue, “Church-State Problems in New Jersey: The Implementation of Title I (ESEA) in Sixty Cities,” 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 219, 234-235 (1968).

. See also, Sen.R.No.146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1456-1457.