Court Opinion

ID: 9441831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:10:56.725795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.400546
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/3/23 Marriage of Wehrli CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re the Marriage of AMBER L. and
 JOHN E. WEHRLI.
                                                                 D079527
 AMBER L. BERRY,

           Appellant,                                            (Super. Ct. No. DN172161)

           v.

 JOHN E. WEHRLI,

           Respondent.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patti C. Ratekin, Commissioner. Affirmed.
         Amber L. Berry, in pro. per., for Appellant.
         Stephen Temko for Respondent.

         Appellant Amber L. Berry (Mother) appeals a postjudgment order,
issued on June 24, 2021, that modified a prior joint custody order by
awarding respondent John E. Wehrli (Father) sole legal and physical custody
of their children. On appeal, she contends: (1) the trial court erred by
issuing domestic violence restraining orders against her in 2020; (2) the court
erred by modifying the prior custody order without finding there were
changed circumstances; (3) substantial evidence does not support a finding
there were changed circumstances; (4) substantial evidence does not support
a finding that Father’s requested change in custody was in the children’s best
interest; (5) the court erred by admitting certain expert testimony; (6) the
court erred by allowing Father to draft and submit a proposed statement of
decision to the court without serving her with a copy and by not complying
with certain rules in issuing the final statement of decision and findings and
order after hearing; (7) the court erred by denying her requests for awards of
attorney fees and by relieving her counsel and the children’s counsel before

trial; and (8) the court erred by awarding Family Code section 2711 sanctions
against her. As explained below, we affirm the order.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2005, Mother and Father married and thereafter had three children.
In 2012, they separated and Mother filed a petition for dissolution of their
marriage. In 2013, following mediation, Mother and Father entered into a
stipulation, and the trial court ordered, that they have joint legal custody and
shared physical custody of the children pursuant to the schedule set forth in
their stipulation.
      On January 8, 2015, the court entered a judgment dissolving the
parties’ marriage and bifurcating its resolution of the remaining issues
pursuant to section 2337. In August, the parties entered into a stipulation
for entry of a judgment regarding the remaining issues. On January 8, 2016,
the court entered a judgment on reserved issues pursuant to the parties’

1     All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise
specified.
                                       2
stipulation, including an order regarding child custody. In particular, that
judgment ordered that the parties have joint legal and physical custody of the
children and share time with the children pursuant to the schedule set forth
in their stipulation. The parties expressly stipulated as follows:
         “The parties agree the foregoing child custody, visitation
         and sharing provisions are in the best interests of the
         minor children. They further agree these provisions are
         intended to constitute a final judicial custody
         determination pursuant to Montenegro v. Diaz (2001)
         26 Cal.4th 249. In the event either party wishes to modify
         the child custody, visitation or sharing provisions stated
         herein, that party shall be required to demonstrate a
         significant change of circumstances justifying such a
         modification.”

Per the parties’ stipulation, that judgment further ordered as follows:
         “[4]J. Neither party shall say or do anything in the
         presence or hearing of the minor children that would in any
         way diminish the minor children’s love or affection for the
         other party, and shall not allow others to do so.
         Accordingly, neither party shall make derogatory
         comments or allow third parties to make derogatory
         comments about the other party in the presence of the
         minor children.

         “K. Neither party shall create a negative attitude in the
         minor children of the parties toward the other party, or
         towards the idea of spending time with the other party.

         “L. Neither party shall discuss with any minor child of the
         parties, other than in a general, explanatory manner, any
         legal proceedings between the parties, any order of the
         Court, or a party’s non-compliance with a court order.
         Specifically, each party is restrained from discussing with a
         child his or her opinions on the issues or the merits of the
         proceedings, or allowing or providing a child access to any
         pleadings, declarations, court orders or other materials
         relevant to or dealing with the proceedings.”

                                       3
      On June 12, 2017, the parties entered into an amended and restated
stipulation and order regarding postjudgment issues, which order the court
issued pursuant to parties’ stipulation. That order provided, inter alia, that:
         “[Mother] agrees and acknowledges that she shall not
         publish, whether in writing or electronic or photographic or
         videographic form, including, without limitation, posting on
         any on-line internet medium, social media (e.g.[,]
         FaceBook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.), blogs, written or
         electronic publications, audio communications, or other
         media, that is defamatory or libelous or that a reasonable
         person could conclude (i) is public[ly] accessible, (ii) is
         derogatory, disparaging, degrading, demeaning, or
         slandering, (iii) refers to or concerns [Father], whether by
         name or implication (e.g.[,] [Mother] posting regarding her
         “ex”, “ex-husband”, “father of her children”, or any
         reference to employer, title, or personally identifiable
         information (e.g.[,] social security number, job title,
         employer, medical information protected under HIPAA,
         phone numbers, home address, email address[,] etc[.])), and
         (iv) harms or can harm or cause emotional distress to,
         [Father] or [Father’s] family, or harm or can harm
         [Father’s] professional, social, familial, or public reputation,
         employment, or ability to become employed, professional
         licenses, credit rating, or financial condition, (the
         ‘Prohibited Publications’), and further agrees to use her
         best efforts to immediately remove or have removed any
         such Prohibited Publications that she has previously
         published or posted. Nothing in the for[e]going is intended
         to prohibit [Mother] from publishing, whether in writing or
         electronic form, in any of the above media, information
         outside of the scope of the Prohibited Publications,
         including, without limitation, related to her role as a board
         member of, and, advocate for Break the Silence Against
         Domestic Violence.”

      On May 9, 2019, Father filed a request for order against Mother
seeking section 271 sanctions against her for repeated violations of court

                                        4
orders. He alleged that Mother had defamed him on her social media and
disparaged him to the children in communicating with them, which actions
violated the January 8, 2016 order. Also on May 9, 2019, Father filed a
request for order to change the amount of his child support based on the
reduction in his income and impending job loss.
      On June 19, Father filed an ex parte application for an order to modify
the prior custody order and instead award him sole legal and physical
custody of the children. He alleged that Mother “continues to engage in
conduct that presents an immediate and present risk of psychological harm to
the parties[’] children by disparaging [Father] to the children and
undermining his relationship with them. [Mother] has shown no present
ability to understand the seriousness of her actions.” The court granted
Father’s ex parte application, finding there was an emergency to change the
prior custody order.
      On June 20, Father filed a request for order to change the prior custody
order. In support of his request, Father attached his declaration that he
submitted in support of his June 19 ex parte application and certain e-mails
and text messages sent by Mother to him or the children. On June 20, the
court issued a temporary order awarding Father sole physical custody of the
children and allowing Mother supervised visitation, pending the scheduled
hearing on his request for order.
      On July 31, the court issued a findings and order after hearing on
Father’s request to modify his child support and reduced his child support
obligation to zero. Also on July 31, the court issued an order appointing
Linda M. Altes, Ph.D., as a private child custody evaluator to perform a child
custody evaluation pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 regarding Father’s
request for order modifying child custody.

                                       5
      On October 18, Father filed an ex parte application for an order
suspending Mother’s visitation rights until a hearing, alleging that their
oldest son had been taken into custody at his school and placed in a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150 hold because of Mother’s false accusations
to child welfare services that their son had easy access to guns at Father’s
home and was suicidal. In support of his application, Father submitted his
declaration describing the incident regarding their son. Finding an
emergency, the court issued an order suspending Mother’s visits with the
children pending a hearing. On October 30, the court issued a temporary
emergency order granting temporary physical custody to Father and allowing
Mother supervised visitation.
      On January 27, 2020, Father filed a request for order, seeking, inter
alia, orders that the children not be permitted to use electronic devices
purchased by Mother, that Mother have no contact with Father’s nanny for
the children, and section 271 sanctions against Mother for her repeated
violations of court orders. In support of his request, Father lodged various
exhibits, including certain social media posts and texts by Mother. The court
issued a temporary emergency order for the immediate removal of the
electronic devices purchased by Mother for the children.
      On May 1, Father filed a request for a domestic violence restraining
order (Form DV-100), requesting a restraining order protecting the children
and him from Mother, except for limited supervised calls and screened letters
between the children and her. Father alleged that he and the children had
suffered severe emotional distress and psychological trauma as a result of
Mother’s abusive conduct, which conduct he described. In support of his
request, he lodged certain exhibits showing Mother’s conduct. On May 1, the

                                       6
court issued a temporary restraining order protecting Father and the
children against Mother.
      On July 22, following an evidentiary hearing, the court issued a
domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) protecting Father and the
children from Mother for a period of five years. In its minute order, the court
ordered that Father have legal and sole physical custody of the children and
that a section 3044 presumption would apply to Mother. The DVRO attached
section 3044’s provisions.
      On August 21, the court issued a second DVRO, which protected Father
and the children against Mother for a five-year period and also ordered that
Father have sole legal and physical custody of the children with Mother to
have supervised visitation.
      The court conducted an evidentiary hearing over 19 days (from July
2020 through February 2021) on Father’s request for orders regarding
custody and section 271 sanctions and other contested issues. Father
requested that the court issue a statement of decision. On April 30, 2021, the
court issued its proposed statement of decision (PSOD). On June 14, Father
filed his objections to the PSOD.
      On June 24, 2021, the court issued its 137-page final statement of
decision (FSOD). The FSOD included an extensive discussion of the evidence
and made detailed findings of fact. In particular, the court found that Mother
was not credible, citing instances where she was untruthful. Based on its
consideration of the evidence, the court observed: “[Mother] hates [Father]
more than she loves her children.” It found that Mother “refuses to stop
doing the behaviors which are harming the children. [She] violates almost
every order the court makes, refuses to abide by the [DVRO], . . . continued to
contact the children in violation of the order, delivers things to the children in

                                        7
violation of the order, continues to post derogatory, denigrating and
disparaging things about [Father] [online] and sharing them with the
children, violating the stipulation which was so carefully crafted to stop this
behavior.” The court found that because it had issued the DVRO, there was a
section 3044 rebuttable presumption which Mother had not overcome. Based
on the evidence and its findings, the court ordered that Father have sole legal
and physical custody of the children. The court further ordered that Mother
and her sister have no contact with the children. The court also awarded
Father $25,000 in section 271 sanctions against Mother. In so doing, the
court stated: “This case deserves sanctions more than any other case this
court has dealt with or any case that this court has read dealing with
sanctions.”
      On August 11, the court issued a findings and order after hearing
(FOAH), incorporating its FSOD and restating the orders set forth therein.
On August 12, the court clerk served the parties with a notice of entry of the
FOAH issued on August 11. On August 20, Mother filed a notice of appeal
challenging the FSOD issued on June 24, 2021.2
      On March 25, 2022, Mother filed a renewed motion to augment the
record on appeal, attaching documents separated into a confidential binder
(binder #1) and a nonconfidential binder (binder #2). Also on March 25,
Mother submitted a renewed notice of intent to lodge documents and notice of
lodgment of exhibits. On April 27, we issued an order stating that we would

2      To the extent the FSOD may not constitute an appealable final judicial
decision because it requested that Father’s counsel prepare the FOAH and
submit it to the court for its signature, we construe Mother’s notice of appeal
to be from the subsequent FOAH, issued on August 11, 2021, which
incorporated the FSOD. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b); Vitkievicz v.
Valverde (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1310, fn. 2.)
                                       8
consider Mother’s renewed motion to augment and renewed notice of
lodgment concurrently with the appeal. We now grant her renewed motion to
augment the record on appeal and, in so doing, order that the documents set
forth in binder #1 remain confidential and not available to the public. We
also accept her renewed notice of lodgment and consider the exhibits and
other documents so lodged in our disposition of this appeal.
                                DISCUSSION
                                       I
                      Mother’s Challenge to the DVROs
      Mother initially contends that the trial court erred by issuing the
permanent domestic violence restraining orders, presumably referring to the
DVROs issued on July 22, 2020 and August 21, 2020. In challenging the
DVROs, Mother argues that the court was biased, there was insufficient
evidence to support its underlying findings, and the DVROs violated her right
to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution,
her right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and her fundamental right to oversee the care, custody, and
control of the children under the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
      However, as Father argues, Mother did not timely appeal the DVROs
and therefore cannot now challenge them in this appeal. Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6) provides that an appeal lies from
an order granting an injunction. (See, e.g., R.D. v. P.M. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [civil harassment restraining order is appealable];
Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 357 [temporary restraining
order is appealable]; In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 208
[same].) Because the DVROs were clearly orders granting injunctions,

                                       9
Mother had a right to appeal from those DVROs pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6).
      Mother did not timely appeal the DVROs within the required time
period. California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)3 provides that a notice of
appeal generally must be filed within the earliest of 60 days of service of a
notice of entry or filed-endorsed copy of the judgment or, if none, 180 days
after entry of the judgment. Accordingly, to challenge the DVROs, Mother
was required to file a notice of appeal challenging them no later than 180
days after their issuance (e.g., on or before February 17, 2021, which was 180
days after issuance of the DVRO issued on August 21, 2020). The trial court’s
register of actions shows, and Mother does not dispute, that she did not file a
notice of appeal challenging either DVRO within that 180-day period.
      If an appealable judgment or order is not timely appealed, we lack
jurisdiction to consider any challenge to it and must dismiss any appeal of it.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 906; rule 8.104(b); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696; Adoption of Alexander S. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 857,
864.) “California follows a ‘one shot’ rule under which, if an order is
appealable, appeal must be taken or the right to appellate review is
forfeited.” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8; see also
Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 959, 967 [“If the ruling is
appealable, the aggrieved party must appeal or the right to contest it is
lost”].) Under that rule, we have no discretion to entertain appellate review
of an appealable judgment or order from which a timely appeal was not
taken. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906; Reyes v. Kruger (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 58, 67-
68; Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1315-1316; In re
Marriage of Lloyd (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 216, 219 [“If a party fails to appeal

3     All references to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
                                       10
an appealable order within the prescribed time limit, this court is without
jurisdiction to review that order on a subsequent appeal”].) Applying the one-
shot rule to this case, we conclude that Mother has forfeited any challenge to
the DVROs by not timely appealing them. Because we lack jurisdiction to
consider her challenge to the DVROs in her appeal of the FSOD issued on
June 24, 2021, we need not, and do not, address the merits of her specific
arguments in challenging the DVROs.
                                        II
 Finding of Changed Circumstances for Modification of Prior Custody Order
      Mother contends that the trial court erred by modifying the prior
custody order without first finding that the circumstances had significantly
changed since that order.
                                        A
      Mother correctly notes that for a trial court to modify a prior final
custody order, it must find that the party seeking a modification has shown
both: (1) a significant change in circumstances since the prior custody order;
and (2) the proposed custody order is in the child’s best interest. (See, e.g.,
Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256 (Montenegro); In re Marriage
of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 37; Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531,
534.) “Under the so-called changed circumstance rule, a party seeking to
modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a
significant change of circumstances justifying a modification.” (Montenegro,
at p. 256.) Alternatively stated, “once it has been established [under a prior
judicial custody decision] that a particular custodial arrangement is in the
best interests of the child, the court need not reexamine that question.
Instead, it should preserve the established mode of custody unless some

                                       11
significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement
would be in the child’s best interest.” (Burchard, at p. 535.)
      In Montenegro, the court held that “a stipulated custody order is a final
judicial custody determination for purposes of the changed circumstance rule
only if there is a clear, affirmative indication the parties intended such a
result.” (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 258.) As discussed above, the
record in this case shows that on January 8, 2016, the trial court entered a
judgment on reserved issues, including custody of the children, based on the
parties’ stipulation. That judgment ordered that the parties have joint legal
and physical custody of the children and share time with the children
pursuant to the schedule set forth in their stipulation. Importantly, the
parties expressly stipulated that this was “intended to constitute a final
judicial custody determination pursuant to Montenegro” and that a party
seeking to modify them “shall be required to demonstrate a significant
change of circumstances justifying such a modification.”
      Mother argues, and Father does not appear to dispute, that the 2016
stipulation and judgment satisfied Montenegro’s requirement for stipulated
orders to constitute final judicial custody determinations for purposes of the
changed circumstance rule. We agree. Based on the express language in the
parties’ stipulation, which included a citation to Montenegro, we conclude
their stipulation constituted “a clear, affirmative indication the parties
intended” that their stipulation regarding custody of their children constitute
a final judicial custody determination within the meaning of Montenegro and
therefore any modification of that determination would require a showing of
a significant change of circumstances. (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 258.)

                                       12
                                        B
      Our review of the FSOD shows, as Mother asserts, that the trial court
did not make an express finding on the question of whether Father had met
his burden to show there had been a change of circumstances since the prior
2016 custody order. However, as Father asserts, we conclude that the trial
court made an implied finding on the question of changed circumstances.
The record shows that Father requested that the court issue a statement of
decision. The court issued the PSOD and Father filed his objections thereto.
The record further shows that Mother also had an opportunity to review and
object to the PSOD. On May 27, 2021, the court granted Mother’s ex parte
request to extend the time to file objections to the PSOD until June 14 and
ordered that the PSOD be available at the court clerk’s office by May 28 for
Mother to pick up. Despite the availability of the PSOD to Mother and her
presumed review of it, she did not file any objections to the PSOD and, in
particular, did not object to its omission of an express finding on the question
of whether Father had shown a significant change of circumstances since the
prior 2016 custody order.
      On appeal, we must presume the order being challenged is correct.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) We further presume that
the trial court followed applicable law. (Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor
Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563.) Unless express findings are required, “we
presume the court followed the law in making its determination [citation],
including a consideration of the criteria set forth in [an applicable rule].”
(Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)
Here, Mother does not cite, nor are we aware of, any case requiring that a
trial court make an express finding on the question of changed circumstances
for modification of a prior custody order. Therefore, we presume the trial

                                        13
court here made an implied finding that Father showed there had been a
significant change of circumstances since the 2016 custody order.
      Furthermore, because Mother did not request that the court include in
its statement of decision an express finding on the question of changed
circumstances, we presume that the court made such a finding based on the
evidence before it. (Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d
1047, 1070, fn. 19 [absent contrary findings, “ ‘we must presume in favor of
the judgment every finding of fact necessary to support it [that is] warranted
by the evidence’ ”].) “Ordinarily, when the court’s statement of decision is
ambiguous or omits material factual findings, a reviewing court is required to
infer any factual findings necessary to support the judgment. [Citations.] . . .
[¶] In order to avoid the application of this doctrine of implied findings, an
appellant must take two steps: First, the appellant must request a statement
of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632 . . . ; second, if the
trial court issues a statement of decision, ‘a party claiming omissions or
ambiguities in the factual findings must bring the omissions or ambiguities
to the trial court’s attention’ pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] section
634. [Citation.]” (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475,
494; see also In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 346
[appellant forfeited right to complain on appeal about omission in statement
of decision of finding on specific factual issue because he did not specifically
object below]; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133-1134
[“[I]f a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court’s attention,
that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the statement [of decision]
was deficient in these regards, and hence the appellate court will imply
findings to support the judgment”].)

                                        14
      Here, the record shows that Mother did not request a statement of
decision, make any proposals as to the content of the requested statement of
decision, and did not bring the omission of a finding regarding changed
circumstances to the trial court’s attention before issuance of the FSOD or
thereafter in a motion for new trial or motion to vacate the judgment.
Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrine of implied findings applies in the
circumstances of this case and, based thereon, conclude that the trial court
impliedly found that Father showed there had been a significant change of
circumstances since the 2016 custody order.
                                      III
     Substantial Evidence to Support Finding of Changed Circumstances
      Mother contends that substantial evidence does not support an implied
finding by the trial court that there had been a significant change of
circumstances since the prior 2016 custody order. However, she cites only
evidence and inferences favorable to her position (e.g., arguing that her
conduct was the same before and after the prior custody order and therefore
had not changed) and, in so doing, misconstrues and/or misapplies the
applicable substantial evidence standard of review. When an appellant’s
opening brief states only evidence favorable to the appellant’s position and
ignores evidence supporting the judgment or finding, we may treat the
substantial evidence contention as waived and presume the record contains
evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings. (Delta Stewardship
Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1072 (Delta); Doe v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218
(Doe).)
      In any event, our review of the record shows that substantial evidence
supports the court’s implied finding that there had been a significant change

                                      15
of circumstances since the prior 2016 custody order. Given the voluminous
trial record that includes extensive percipient and expert testimony and
supporting exhibits, we need to cite only some of that evidence to satisfy the
substantial evidence standard of review. As discussed above, the 2016
stipulation and judgment ordered that the parties have joint legal and
physical custody of the children and furthermore that “neither party shall
make derogatory comments . . . about the other party in the presence of the
minor children.” At the 19-day evidentiary hearing on Father’s request for
an order changing custody, extensive evidence was admitted showing Mother
had sent text messages and made social media posts that disparaged Father
after the 2016 custody order. In the FOAH, which attached and incorporated
the FSOD, the court listed the 81 exhibits that it had admitted in evidence
and stated that it had reviewed those exhibits, along with the pleadings and
trial testimony, in making its findings and orders.
      In particular, the court admitted in evidence, and considered, Father’s
declarations and exhibits submitted in support of his prior requests for
orders. In support of his request for order filed on May 9, 2019, Father
attached an exhibit (Exh. 549) consisting of Mother’s text messages to the
children implying that he was a bad parent and stating that he “ ‘keeps
forgetting’ ” to transfer funds into one child’s school lunch account (despite
Mother’s responsibility, according to Father, to promptly fund that account
which she controlled). The court also cited Mother’s text message to the
children (Exh. 549) regarding Father’s tradition of taking them to a Denny’s
restaurant for breakfast before school, stating: “ ‘Enjoy your 736th Denny’s
breakfast,’ ” and then adding a vomit emoji. Exhibit 549 also included text
messages from Mother to the children in which she stated: “I’m sorry that
dad couldn’t make it again, I wish that he could remember your guys’ things

                                       16
the way he remembers the gym, you deserve better” and “when you’re home
dad never texts or calls or checks on you guys to let you know that he loves
and misses you so probably when he takes your iPads he’s only trying to hurt
me by preventing you from communicating with you, and even though it
hurts you guys too, he isn’t trying to, he just doesn’t care” and “the problem is
him and not you or me” and “I do not know what is wrong with him.”
      In support of his request for order filed on June 19, 2019, Father
attached an exhibit (Exh. 559), which set forth Mother’s text messages to the
children regarding his time at the gym, stating: “[Father’s] been there for
about 4 hours now. . . . Let me know when [he] gets home from the gym ok,
so I don’t have to worry about it anymore. . . . [¶] How long was your dad at
the gym yesterday? So far today it has been 2 ½ hours. . . . [¶] 3 hours and
he’s not home? That sucks for you guys, I’m sorry. . . . [¶] Good lord, dad is
spending 4 ½ hours at the gym with you guys home alone? . . . [¶] That sucks
bruh. For real[.]” Father’s supporting declaration (Exh. 556) stated that
Mother had not only exaggerated his time at the gym, but also disregarded
the fact that the children had been in the care of his 22-year-old daughter
during that time.
      The court also admitted in evidence, and considered, Father’s
declaration in support of his ex parte application filed on October 18, 2019
(Exh. 570), in which he described an incident one week earlier during which
their oldest son was forcibly removed from school and involuntarily placed in
a Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 hold for 72 hours for risk of
harm to himself or others, which hold resulted, in part, from Mother’s false
allegations that the child had access to Father’s guns at his home. Father
declared that Mother and her attorney confirmed that Mother had “called
CWS and reported the false school threat and about the guns being easily

                                       17
accessible to our children at my house” and that their “son was severely
traumatized as were his siblings” by the incident.
      In the FSOD, the court cited other exhibits, such as Mother’s text
message to an unidentified recipient, which she shared with the children
(Exh. 613), stating in part: “ ‘I’m reaching out to you now because my 3
children are being withheld any contact with me by my abuse (sic) ex-
husband . . . and I am hopeful that you can help to shed light on this horrible
abuse of parental rights.’ ” It also cited Mother’s group text message (Exh.
613) in which she referred to Father as a “ ‘psychopath’ ” and “a literal waste
of oxygen that people literally don’t give a shit about . . . .”
      We conclude that the evidence described above, along with other
extensive evidence admitted and considered by the court, provided
substantial evidence to support the court’s implied finding that there had
been a significant change of circumstances since the prior 2016 custody order.
In particular, based on the evidence, as well as its issuance of the two DVROs
against Mother in 2020, the trial court could reasonably have found that her
misconduct had continued, and even escalated, since the 2016 custody order.
Accordingly, Mother has not carried her burden on appeal to show
substantial evidence does not support the court’s implied finding that Father
had met his burden to prove the first part of the two-part test for
modification of a prior custody order (i.e., there had been a significant change
of circumstances). (Montenegro, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 256.)
                                         IV
           Substantial Evidence to Support Finding That Mother
              Had Not Rebutted Section 3044 Presumption That
       Father’s Custody of the Children Would Be in Their Best Interest

      Mother also contends that substantial evidence does not support a
finding by the trial court that Father’s requested modified custody order

                                         18
placing the children in his sole legal and physical custody would be in their
best interest. However, in so arguing, she misconstrues and/or misapplies
the relevant legal principles.
                                       A
      In the FSOD, the trial court stated that because it had issued the prior
DVROs, there was a section 3044 rebuttable presumption which Mother had
not overcome. Based on the evidence and its findings, the court ordered that
Father have sole legal and physical custody of the children.
                                       B
      Section 3044 sets forth the rebuttable presumption cited by the court
and provides in part:
         “(a) Upon a finding by the court that a party seeking
         custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence within
         the previous five years against the other party seeking
         custody of the child, or against the child or the child’s
         siblings, . . . there is a rebuttable presumption that an
         award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to
         a person who has perpetrated domestic violence is
         detrimental to the best interest of the child, pursuant to
         Sections 3011 and 3020. This presumption may only be
         rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.

         “(b) To overcome the presumption set forth in subdivision
         (a), the court shall find that paragraph (1) is satisfied and
         shall find that the factors in paragraph (2), on balance,
         support the legislative findings in Section 3020.

         “(1) The perpetrator of domestic violence has demonstrated
         that giving sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child
         to the perpetrator is in the best interest of the child
         pursuant to Section 3011 or 3020. In determining the best
         interest of the child, the preference for frequent and
         continuing contact with both parents, as set forth in
         subdivision (b) of Section 3020, or with the noncustodial
         parent, as set forth in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of

                                       19
         Section 3040, may not be used to rebut the presumption, in
         whole or in part.

         “(2) Additional factors: [¶] . . . [¶]

         “(E) The perpetrator is restrained by a protective order or
         restraining order, and has or has not complied with its
         terms and conditions.

         “(F) The perpetrator of domestic violence has committed
         further acts of domestic violence. [¶] . . . [¶]

         “(g) In an evidentiary hearing or trial in which custody
         orders are sought and where there has been an allegation
         of domestic violence, the court shall make a determination
         as to whether this section applies prior to issuing a custody
         order . . . .”

      In In re Marriage of Fajota (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1487 (Fajota), we
stated: “The clear terms of section 3044 require that a court apply a
presumption that it is detrimental to the best interest of the child to award
joint or sole physical or legal custody to a parent if the court has found that
that parent has perpetrated any act of domestic violence against the other
parent in the preceding five years. The presumption is rebuttable, but the
court must apply the presumption in any situation in which a finding of
domestic violence has been made.” (Id. at p. 1498.) Section 3044’s rebuttable
presumption applies whenever a trial court makes custody orders pursuant to
the best interests of the child standard, including decisions on requests for
orders modifying a prior custody order. (See, e.g., Ellis v. Lyons (2016)
2 Cal.App.5th 404, 416-418 (Ellis) [§ 3044 rebuttable presumption applied to
trial court’s decision on request to modify prior custody order where domestic
violence restraining order had been issued within five years of hearing];
Christina L. v. Chauncey B. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 731, 735-737 (Christina

                                         20
L.) [same].) “Because a DVPA [Domestic Violence Prevention Act]
restraining order must be based on a finding that the party being restrained
committed one or more acts of domestic abuse, a finding of domestic abuse
sufficient to support a DVPA restraining order necessarily triggers the
presumption in section 3044.” (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249,
1267 (S.M.).) The section 3044 presumption “changes the burden of
persuasion, but ‘may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence
showing that it is in the child’s best interest to grant joint or sole custody to
the offending parent.’ [Citations.]” (Christina L., at p. 736.)
                                        C
      In arguing there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding regarding the children’s best interest, Mother’s opening brief omits
any discussion of section 3044 or its effect on the trial court’s finding
regarding the children’s best interest and, in addition, cites only evidence and
inferences favorable to her position. By so doing, she has waived her
argument and, in any event, has not carried her burden on appeal to show
that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding.
      Here, the trial court issued two DVROs in 2020 that restrained Mother
against Father and the children based on its findings that she had committed
acts of domestic violence. Because those DVROs were issued within five
years of the court’s June 24, 2021 decision on Father’s request for an order
modifying the prior custody order, the court was required to apply section
3044’s rebuttable presumption in determining the children’s best interest.
(Fajota, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498; Ellis, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 416-418; Christina L., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at pp. 735-737; S.M., supra,
184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) To overcome the section 3044 presumption,
Mother had the burden to persuade the court with a preponderance of

                                        21
evidence showing that the children’s best interest would be sole or joint legal
and/or physical custody with her, rather than sole legal and physical custody
with Father.
      However, the court found that Mother was not credible and that she
“refuses to stop doing the behaviors which are harming the children. [She]
violates almost every order the court makes, refuses to abide by the
[DVRO], . . . continued to contact the children in violation of the order,
delivers things to the children in violation of the order, continues to post
derogatory, denigrating and disparaging things about [Father] [online] and
sharing them with the children, violating the stipulation which was so
carefully crafted to stop this behavior.” By so finding, the court implicitly, if
not expressly, found that Mother was restrained by the DVROs issued
against her and that she had committed further acts of domestic violence
since the issuance of the DVROs. (§ 3044, subd. (b)(2)(E) & (F).) The court
also implicitly found that Mother had not carried her burden to persuade it
that it would be in the children’s best interest for Mother to have sole or joint
physical or legal custody of them and stated that the section 3044 “has not
been overcome as [Mother] continues to violate the order.” (§ 3044, subd.
(b)(1).) Based on our review of the record, we conclude the court properly
applied the section 3044 presumption in finding that Mother did not carry
her burden to rebut it.
      To the extent Mother argues in her opening brief that the court erred
by finding that she did not rebut that presumption, she does so by merely
citing evidence and inferences favorable to her and by arguing, in a
conclusory manner, that the court should have considered certain reports and
testimony of professionals that have been lodged with us or included in the
augmented record. However, by so arguing, she has waived her contention.

                                        22
(Delta, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072; Doe, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at
p. 218.)
                                        V
                        Admission of Expert Testimony
      Mother contends that the trial court erred by admitting certain
testimony of expert witnesses. In particular, she argues the court abused its
discretion by allowing Dr. Steven Miller to testify on his diagnosis regarding
her mental health.
      We conclude that Mother has waived or forfeited any challenge to
Dr. Miller’s testimony by not citing to specific pages from the reporter’s
transcript showing that she objected below to that challenged testimony and,
in addition, by not citing to specific pages from the reporter’s transcript
showing that Dr. Miller did, in fact, so testify. In support of her contention,
she simply argues in a conclusory manner, and without citations to the record
showing her purported objections, that “[t]he court continually disregarded or
overruled a number of objections that I lodged and further repeatedly
prevented me from interrupting [Dr. Miller’s] testimony no matter how long
that he misused the court[’]s time.” In her sole citation to the record
purporting to show she objected to Dr. Miller’s expert testimony, Mother, in
fact, agreed with Father’s counsel that Dr. Miller was qualified to testify as
an expert witness in the areas of behavioral medicine, child alignment,
parental alienation, estrangement, enmeshment, maltreatment, and their
effects on children. In so doing, Mother added the caveat that Dr. Miller was
not qualified to testify specifically regarding her because she had never
spoken with him and did not know what information he had. The court
clarified that she was agreeing that Dr. Miller would be testifying in those
areas of his expertise and not on her case. The court then ruled that

                                       23
Dr. Miller was “qualified to testify subject to objections about his testimony,
foundation and those types of things.”
      Despite that initial limitation regarding Dr. Miller’s expert testimony,
Mother does not cite to any page in the reporter’s transcript showing she
thereafter made any specific objection to Dr. Miller’s expert testimony on the
ground that it purported to convey his diagnosis regarding her mental health
or was otherwise beyond the scope of his expertise.4
      If an appellant does not timely make an objection below to testimony on
the specific ground challenged on appeal, the appellant waives or forfeits any
challenge on appeal to the admission of that testimony on that ground.
(Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 717 [challenge to
admission of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in absence of specific
and timely objection in trial court]; SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v.
Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 563-564 [appellant
forfeited challenge on appeal to admission of testimony by not timely and
specifically objecting in trial court].) By not citing to any page in the
reporter’s transcript or otherwise showing that she timely and specifically
objected to certain testimony by Dr. Miller, we conclude that Mother has

4      Instead of citing to the record showing that she objected to certain
testimony by Dr. Miller, Mother cites only to the court’s own statement
during Dr. Miller’s testimony in which it asked Father’s counsel “to move on
to something new, please.” The court then added that it would not be
questioning Dr. Miller because his testimony had “just gone on too long.
We’re going to finish with this doctor today. [¶] . . . [¶] Otherwise, I’m getting
close to a mistrial here. So let’s move it. I think I have your picture from
your side, [Father’s counsel’s name]. I really think I’ve got it. I do.” By so
admonishing Father’s counsel, the court appeared to convey that it had heard
ample expert testimony by Dr. Miller and did not need any more testimony
from him and, in so doing, did not, as Mother now asserts, imply that
Dr. Miller had testified beyond the scope of his expertise.
                                        24
waived or forfeited any challenge on appeal to that purported inadmissible
testimony. Accordingly, we need not, and do not, address the merits of her
challenge to Dr. Miller’s testimony.
      Also, Mother has not made any attempt to show that the admission of
Dr. Miller’s purported testimony regarding her mental health was prejudicial
(i.e., that it is reasonably probable she would have obtained a more favorable
result at trial had that testimony been excluded). By not showing that
purported inadmissible testimony was prejudicial, Mother has failed to show
the instant order must be reversed on that basis. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13
[reversal of judgment only if trial court error resulted in miscarriage of
justice]; Code Civ. Proc., § 475; Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson) [miscarriage of justice due to state law
error is shown where it is reasonably probable appellant would have obtained
more favorable result in absence of such error]; People v. Gonzales ( 2018)
5 Cal.5th 186, 195 (Gonzales) [appellant has burden on appeal to show
prejudice due to error]; cf. Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008)
170 Cal.App.4th 229, 282 [appellant failed to show how error in excluding
evidence would have made any difference in result at trial].)
                                       VI
                      Trial Court’s Statement of Decision
      Mother contends that the trial court erred by allowing Father to draft
and submit the PSOD to the court without serving her with a copy and then
issuing the FSOD without allowing her to review and object to the PSOD.5

5    In conjunction with this contention, Mother also argues in a conclusory
manner that the trial court erred by signing the DVRO in July 2020.
However, as we concluded above, she cannot challenge that order now
because she did not timely appeal it.
                                       25
However, she does not cite to the record to support her assertions and merely
speculates that the court so acted.
                                        A
      On February 19, 2021, Father requested that the trial court issue a
statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and, in
so doing, address certain controverted issues specified in his request. Father
served a copy of his request on Mother. The record does not show that
Mother thereafter requested that the court address any other specific
controverted issues in its statement of decision. On April 30, the court issued
the PSOD, which ordered that the court clerk immediately serve it on all
parties. The record on appeal includes the court clerk’s proof of service
showing that copies of the PSOD were served on Mother and Father’s counsel
at their respective San Diego mailing addresses.
      On May 26, Mother filed an ex parte application for an order extending
the time for filing objections to the PSOD and requesting clarification
regarding who had written the PSOD. On May 27, the court granted the
requested relief, stating: “Statement of Decision to be at the clerk[’]s office by
5/28/21 for [Mother] to pick up and all objections due 6/14/21 per [rule]
3.1590(g).”
      On June 9, the court conducted a hearing (at which both parties
appeared remotely by video or telephone) to address certain pending motions,
including Father’s request for section 271 sanctions against Mother and
various pending requests for orders filed by Mother. During that hearing,
Father’s counsel represented that, per Mother’s request, she sent Mother a
copy of the PSOD. Father’s counsel represented to the court that Mother
thereafter sent her e-mails accusing Father and/or her of drafting the PSOD

                                       26
instead of the court. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the court stated
that it would thereafter issue a written ruling on the pending motions.
      On June 14, Father filed his objections to the PSOD. The record does
not show that Mother filed any objections to the PSOD. On June 24, 2021,
the court issued its 137-page FSOD. Also on June 24, the court clerk filed a
certificate of service representing that it had sent copies of the FSOD to
Mother and Father’s counsel at their respective e-mail addresses. In the
FSOD, the court addressed, inter alia, the questions raised by Mother
regarding receipt of the PSOD and its author, stating:
         “The court issued [the PSOD] which was served on both
         parties by mail to the addresses on file with the court.
         [Mother] subsequently claimed that she had not received
         the document as she was evicted from her apartment. An
         [ex parte] hearing was held, the court ordered [Mother] to
         come to the clerk’s office to pick up a copy of the decision
         and the time for objections was extended to June 15, 2021.
         At that hearing, [Mother] was adamant that [Father]
         drafted the [PSOD]. The court attempted to reassure her
         that the entire decision was written solely by the court.
         There are numerous communications between [Mother] and
         [Father’s counsel] stating [Mother’s] emphatic [belief] that
         the court did not write the decision. The court has
         considered these documents as objections to the [PSOD].

         “[Father’s] objections were received by the court on June
         14, 2021. The court did not receive any document entitled
         objections by [Mother]. However[,] the court received a
         Notice of Intent to Lodge Documents which was received by
         the court on June 7, 2021 and the court is going to treat
         that document as [Mother’s] objections. The court has
         considered all of the objections by [Father] and the
         information submitted by [Mother]. The court has modified
         the [PSOD] accordingly. All objections have been
         considered and ruled upon.” (Italics added.)

                                      27
The FSOD requested that Father’s counsel prepare the FOAH and submit it
to the court for its signature.
      On August 11, the court issued the FOAH, which attached and
incorporated the FSOD. The FOAH, inter alia, restated the court’s orders set
forth in the FSOD.
                                      B
      Mother asserts that the trial court erred by issuing the PSOD on April
30, 2021, because (1) it was written by Father and (2) it was not properly
served on her. However, she does not cite to any specific page in the record
that supports her assertion and simply speculates that Father, rather than
the court, drafted the PSOD. Furthermore, our review of the record does not
support her assertions. As discussed above and as stated by the court in the
FSOD, the PSOD was issued on April 30, 2021, and then mailed to the
parties at their addresses of record at that time. On May 26, Mother filed an
ex parte application, asserting that she had not received a copy of the PSOD
because she had recently been evicted from the residence to which it had been
mailed. At the May 27 hearing on her application, Mother asserted that
Father, and not the court, had drafted the PSOD. At that hearing, as the
court stated in the FSOD, “[t]he court attempted to reassure [Mother] that
the entire [PSOD] was written solely by the court.” At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court ordered the court clerk to have a copy of the PSOD
available for Mother to pick up and then extended the time for the parties’
objections to the PSOD until June 14, 2021. Nevertheless, Mother did not file
any objections to the PSOD (although on June 7, as the court noted in the
FSOD, she lodged certain documents with the court).
      Based on our review of the record, we conclude that, contrary to
Mother’s assertion, the trial court, and not Father, drafted the PSOD and the

                                      28
FSOD. Accordingly, neither the trial court nor Father had a duty to serve the
PSOD on her for her approval by signature. (Cf. rule 5.125(b) & (c) [where
one party prepares proposed order after hearing per court’s order, that party
must serve proposed order on other party for either approval by signature or
objections].) Mother does not cite any statute or rule requiring the court to
obtain her approval before issuing the PSOD or FSOD. Likewise, the record
shows that the PSOD was made available to her and she had an opportunity
to object to it before the court issued the FSOD.
                                       C
      Mother also asserts that Father drafted the FOAH and failed to obtain
her signature on it before submitting it to the court. Our review of the record
shows that the court in the FSOD ordered Father’s counsel to prepare the
FOAH and submit it to the court for its signature. On August 11, 2021, the
court issued the FOAH, which was presumably prepared by Father’s counsel.
The FOAH attached and incorporated the FSOD and restated the court’s
orders set forth in the FSOD. Mother correctly argues that because Father’s
counsel prepared the proposed FOAH per the trial court’s order, Father was
required by court rule to serve the proposed order on her for her approval by
signature or objection. (See rule 5.125(b) & (c).) The record on appeal does
not show that Father’s counsel complied with that court rule before
submitting the proposed FOAH to the court. Nevertheless, assuming
arguendo that Father’s counsel did not comply with that rule and the court
erred by issuing the FOAH without first requiring such compliance, we
conclude Mother has not carried her burden on appeal to show that she
suffered any prejudice from that purported error. In particular, she has not
shown that it is reasonably probable that she would have obtained a more
favorable order or other result after trial if Father had complied with that

                                      29
rule. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Gonzales,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
      Also, contrary to Mother’s assertion, the record shows that the trial
court complied with rule 5.125(f), which requires a trial court to first compare
an unapproved proposed order after hearing “to the minute order; official
transcript, if available; or other court record” before signing the order. (Rule
5.125(f).) Here, the FOAH issued by the court attached and incorporated the
FSOD in which the court stated that it had reviewed all the pleadings,
exhibits, testimony, and arguments. Construing that incorporated statement
broadly while presuming the court acted in accordance with the law, we
conclude the court complied with rule 5.125(f) before issuing the FOAH. In
any event, Mother again has not carried her burden on appeal to show that
she suffered any prejudice from that purported error. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Gonzales, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
Accordingly, we conclude that Mother has failed to show there is any ground
to reverse the FOAH.
                                      VII
  Denial of Mother’s Requests for Attorney Fees and Her Other Contentions
      Mother contends that the trial court erred by denying her requests for
attorney fees, relieving her counsel and the children’s counsel before trial, not
holding a trial readiness conference, and allowing Father’s counsel to
continue to represent Father even though the children’s former counsel
worked for Father’s counsel during trial.
                                       A
      Mother contends that the court erred by denying her requests for
awards of attorney fees. However, in so doing, she argues in a conclusory
manner and without any supporting substantive legal analysis. Accordingly,

                                       30
we conclude that she has waived or forfeited that contention and therefore we
need not address its merits. (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344,
368 (Niko); Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947,
948 (Ewald); People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 (Stanley); Salas v.
Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1074 (Salas).)
      Assuming arguendo that Mother has not waived or forfeited her
contention, we nevertheless conclude she has not carried her burden on
appeal to show the court abused its discretion by denying her attorney fee
requests. On January 24, 2020, Mother filed an ex parte application
requesting, inter alia, an award of $100,000 for attorney fees. She apparently
did not attach a current income and expense declaration to her application.
On January 27, the court issued an order finding that her application was not
an emergency and setting a hearing on the request for February 25. At the
February 25 hearing, the court addressed other issues, but apparently did not
address Mother’s attorney fee request and retained jurisdiction over that and
all other outstanding issues.
      On January 26, 2021, Mother filed another ex parte application
requesting, inter alia, an award of $100,000 for attorney fees. In support of
her request, Mother declared: “I have less than $5,000 remaining to my
name and have completely exhausted $288,000 in funds I received as a
division of the liquid assets received earlier last year as a result of our
marital dissolution.” However, she apparently did not attach a current
income and expense declaration to her application. On January 26, the court
issued an order setting a hearing on the request for February 10. On
January 28, Mother, in propria persona, filed an additional declaration in
support of her ex parte application, stating in part: “I am asking the court to
level the playing fields and issue an order for attorney fees so that I can hire

                                        31
an attorney and an expert witness to continue to refute [Father’s] constant
court filings . . . .” She further stated: “The evidentiary hearings concluded
more than 3 months ago and closing arguments have been postponed several
times, and are still pending.” She also stated: “I do not have any
money . . . .” At a February 11 hearing, the parties agreed that they would
submit their arguments regarding attorney fees in writing to the court.
      On February 19, Father submitted his closing argument brief on
financial issues, including his opposition to Mother’s request for an award of
attorney fees. He argued that the court should exercise its discretion under
sections 2030 and 2032 and deny her request for attorney fees. In particular,
he argued that Mother had not filed a current income and expense
declaration, which was required for an attorney fee request. He further
argued that because Mother had received $1,300,000 in spousal support and
a total of more than $3,000,000 in support and assets during the course of
their dissolution proceedings, she had not shown a financial need for an
attorney fee award. He further argued that considering the parties’
respective expenses, Mother had more disposable income from which to pay
her attorney than he had.
      On May 3, Mother belatedly filed an income and expense declaration,
stating that she had no income, no assets, and expenses of $16,550 per
month.
      On June 9, the court heard arguments on Mother’s request for attorney
fees. In the FSOD, the court denied Mother’s request for attorney fees,
stating: “There are no further proceedings at this time and the court has
considered . . . section 4320 and specifically relied on . . . section 4320[,
subdivision](i).”

                                         32
      As Father notes, a trial court has discretion in deciding a motion for
attorney fees in a marital dissolution proceeding and we must affirm that
exercise of discretion unless no judge could reasonably make that decision.
(In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 630.) To the extent
Mother challenges the trial court’s implicit denial of her January 2020
ex parte application for attorney fees, we conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion by doing so. Because she did not file a current income and expense
declaration together with her application, the court could reasonably deny
her application solely on her failure to comply with rule 5.427(b)(1)(C). (Cf.
In re Marriage of Tydlaska (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 572, 575-576 (Tydlaska)
[income and expense declaration required for any hearing on motion
involving financial issues].) Furthermore, because she did not timely
challenge the court’s implicit denial of her January 2020 application, she
cannot now challenge it in this appeal. (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976)
18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [interlocutory collateral orders are directly appealable].)
      Regarding Mother’s January 2021 ex parte application, we conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying that attorney fee
request because the court could reasonably have denied it solely on her
failure to timely file a current income and expense declaration with her
application as required by rule 5.427(b)(1)(C). (Cf. Tydlaska, supra,
114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.) Furthermore, in citing section 4320,
subdivision (i) in the FSOD, the court presumably found that Mother’s
history of domestic violence, as shown by the DVROs and evidence admitted
at trial, weighed against an award to her of attorney fees. (§ 2032, subd. (b)
[in deciding whether to award attorney fees under § 2030, court must
consider what is just and reasonable under relative circumstances of parties,
including circumstances listed in § 4320]; § 4320, subd. (i) [“[a]ll documented

                                       33
evidence of any history of domestic violence” between parties or perpetrated
by one party against child, including evidence of issuance of protective order];
cf. In re Marriage of Cauley (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1107, fn. 5 [“[W]e
remain unpersuaded that victims [of domestic violence] must be required to
financially support those who have been convicted of harming them”].)
      Also, the court here could have rationally denied Mother’s request for
attorney fees based on a finding that an award of fees was not reasonably
necessary because her litigation of the case had been unreasonable. (Cf. In re
Marriage of Huntington (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1524; In re Marriage of
Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997, 1022-1023 [trial court properly denied
request for attorney fees where it found much of party’s fees were generated
due to party’s lies and fabrications]; In re Marriage of Behrens (1982)
137 Cal.App.3d 562, 576.) Here, the court found that Mother had repeatedly
lied and was not credible, and, in particular, it stated: “The court does not
believe that [Mother] has no income.” Accordingly, the trial court could
rationally have denied her request for attorney fees based on its finding that
it did not believe her declaration that she had no income or assets and an
implied finding that much of her litigation costs were incurred because of her
lies and fabrications.
                                       B
      Mother also argues that the trial court erred by relieving her counsel
and the children’s counsel before trial. At the February 25, 2020 hearing, the
children’s counsel requested that the court relieve her as their counsel
because Mother was not willing to continue paying one-half of her fees. The
court granted her request and relieved the children’s counsel from her

                                       34
representation of them. At the June 16, 2020 hearing, the court also granted
the request of Mother’s counsel to be relieved from his representation of her.6
      However, Mother does not present any substantive legal analysis
showing that the trial court erred by relieving either counsel or that she was
prejudiced by such purported errors in relieving counsel. In particular, she
has not cited any case or other authority showing that in the circumstances of
this case there was no good cause for the court to relieve counsel. (Cf. § 3150,
subd. (b) [private counsel appointed to represent child in custody proceeding
shall continue to represent child unless relieved by court for good cause or on
substitution of other counsel]; rule 5.240(f)(4) [counsel for child shall continue
representing child until removed by court on its own motion or request of
counsel for good cause shown].) Here, the court could reasonably have
concluded that there was good cause to relieve counsel due to nonpayment of
their fees or, in any event, neither Mother nor the children would suffer
undue prejudice from the withdrawal of their counsel. (See, e.g., People v.
Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 406 [client’s refusal to pay attorney fees
constitutes good cause for attorney to withdraw from representation];
Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915 [no authority prevents
attorney from withdrawing from representation when it can be accomplished
without undue prejudice to client].) Accordingly, we conclude that Mother
has not carried her burden on appeal to show the court abused its discretion
by granting the requests of Mother’s counsel and the children’s counsel to be
relieved from their representation and, in any event, does not show she

6       As Mother notes, the court clerk erroneously date-stamped the June 16,
2020 order with the year “2019” instead of the correct year “2020.” However,
she does not show she suffered any prejudice due to that mistaken date of
filing.
                                       35
suffered prejudice from those purported errors. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Gonzales, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
                                         C
      Mother also makes a conclusory argument that the court erred by not
holding a trial readiness conference, which was initially scheduled for May 5,
2020 and subsequently postponed per the court’s COVID-19 emergency
executive order. However, we conclude that she has waived or forfeited her
argument, or at least not carried her burden on appeal, by failing to present
any substantive legal analysis in support of her argument that the court
erred by postponing and/or not holding a trial readiness conference. (In re
A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 (A.C.) [“If an argument in an appellate
brief is supported by only an opinion or argument . . . without ‘citation to any
recognized legal authority,’ that argument may be deemed waived for failure
to present supporting substantive legal analysis”]; Badie v. Bank of America
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When an appellant fails to raise
a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as waived”].) In any event, she has
not carried her burden to show that she suffered any prejudice from that
alleged error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836;
Gonzales, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 195.)
                                         D
      Mother also apparently argues that the court erred by allowing
Father’s counsel to continue to represent Father even though the children’s
former counsel worked for Father’s counsel during trial. As discussed above,
on February 25, 2020, the court granted the request of the children’s counsel
to be relieved as their counsel. On January 25, 2021, in Mother’s ex parte
application, she noted that the children’s former counsel was working for

                                         36
Father’s counsel at that time. On February 10, the court heard her
application and Mother’s complaint about the children’s former counsel.
Mother argued that the children’s former counsel was “part of [Father’s] legal
team.” Father’s counsel responded, representing to the court that the
children’s former counsel “is not on my legal team in this case. She can’t be,
of course. And, yes, she did come to work for my office five months after she
was released [as the children’s counsel].” In the FSOD, the trial court stated
that it accepted assurances by Father’s counsel that adequate measures had
been taken to avoid any disclosure to Father’s counsel of confidential
information by the children’s former counsel. The court stated: “There was
no evidence presented that caused the court to be concerned that [Father’s
counsel] had received any confidential information from minor’s counsel’s
file.”
         Mother’s ex parte application, filed on January 25, 2021, complaining
that the children’s former counsel was working for Father’s counsel was, in
effect, a motion to disqualify Father’s counsel. At the February 10 hearing,
the court implicitly denied her disqualification motion. That denial was a
final order regarding the disqualification matter and was therefore
immediately appealable. (Roush v. Seagate Technology, LLC (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 210, 218 [“An order denying a disqualification motion is
appealable either as an order refusing to grant an injunction to restrain
counsel from participating in the case (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6))
or as a final order on a collateral matter”]; Meehan v. Hopps (1955) 45 Cal.2d
213, 217.) However, Mother did not timely appeal that order within the
required time period under rule 8.104(a)(1) (i.e., within 180 days after

                                        37
February 10, 2021).7 As discussed in Section I above, if an appealable
judgment or order is not timely appealed, we lack jurisdiction to consider any
challenge to it and must dismiss any appeal of it. (Code Civ. Proc., § 906;
rule 8.104(b); Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com., supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 696.) Because under the “one-shot” rule we have no jurisdiction and/or
discretion to review an appealable order from which a timely appeal was not
taken, Mother has forfeited any challenge to the February 10, 2021 order
denying her disqualification motion by not timely appealing it and we need
not, and do not, address the merits of her challenge to that order in this
appeal.
                                       E
      To the extent Mother makes tangential arguments in the course of
presenting her main contentions, we conclude that she has not adequately
briefed those points and therefore has waived or forfeited them by not
adequately citing to the record and/or presenting any substantive legal

analysis.8 (A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 672; Badie, supra,

7     On August 20, 2021, Mother filed her instant notice of appeal
challenging only the FSOD, which was issued on June 24, 2021. That notice
did not cite the court’s February 10 order as being appealed. In any event,
her August 20 notice of appeal was filed more than 180 days after the
February 10 order and was therefore untimely to the extent it appealed that
order. (Rule 8.104(a)(1).)

8     Mother’s tangential arguments include her assertions that the trial
court was biased against her, violated her right to free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, wrongly precluded her from
timely obtaining assistance from the family law facilitator’s office, and
improperly ordered her to not directly contact its clerk. Furthermore,
regarding her assertion of bias, such a claim against a judge can only be
made by means of a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 170.6 and therefore we have no jurisdiction to consider her
                                       38
67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785; Niko, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 368;
Ewald, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 948; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793;
Salas, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074.) Accordingly, we need not, and do
not, address their merits.
      Mother also raises a number of new arguments in her reply brief that
were not raised in her opening brief.9 Because those new arguments were
belatedly first raised in her reply brief and Mother has not shown good cause
for her failure to raise them in her opening brief, we need not, and do not,
address their merits. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005)
35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales &
Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10 [points raised in reply
brief for first time will not be considered by appellate court absent showing of

claim in this appeal. (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 665, 672 [Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6 petition for writ of mandate is
exclusive method to disqualify judge]; Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3, subd. (d).)
Regarding her free speech assertion, we conclude that the trial court could
properly conclude that many of Mother’s statements and her other conduct
constituted domestic violence or abuse and was therefore not protected by the
First Amendment. (Cf. In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney (2015)
237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1427-1428.)

9      In her reply brief, Mother raises the following arguments that were not
raised in her opening brief: (1) there is ample evidence that Father harassed
and abused her and the trial court erred by excluding or disregarding such
evidence; (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s order not
requiring further counseling for the parties or the children and its finding
that it was in the children’s best interest for Father to decide the children’s
therapy, medication, and contact with other family members; (3) there is
insufficient evidence to support a purported order requiring her to submit to
a further mental health evaluation; (4) the court erred by not applying
Dr. Miller’s expert testimony regarding parental alienation to both parties
instead of just to her; and (5) there is insufficient evidence to support the
court’s finding that she engaged in parental alienation.
                                       39
good reason for failure to present them before]; Jay v. Mahaffey (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1542.)
                                      VIII
               Award of Section 271 Sanctions Against Mother
      Mother contends the trial court erred by awarding section 271
sanctions against her in the amount of $25,000.
                                       A
      On May 9, 2019, Father filed a request for an order awarding him
section 271 sanctions against Mother for her repeated violations of the court’s
orders. At a June 11 hearing, the court continued the hearing on his request
for sanctions. On January 27, 2020, Father filed another request for order
awarding him section 271 sanctions against Mother for her repeated
violations of the court’s orders. In his July 15 evidentiary hearing brief,
Father argued, inter alia, that the court should award section 271 sanctions
against Mother for her continued violations of restraining orders and
disparagement of him on the Internet. On February 19, 2021, after the
evidentiary hearing was concluded, Father filed a closing argument brief on
financial issues, including his request for an award of $300,000 in section 271
sanctions against Mother. In the FSOD attached to, and incorporated in, the
FOAH, the court granted Father’s request for section 271 sanctions against
Mother, but imposed only $25,000 in sanctions against her. The court stated:
         “This case deserves sanctions more than any other case this
         court has dealt with or any case that this court has read
         dealing with sanctions. . . . [Mother] had been warned
         multiple times that her conduct was improper, that her
         conduct was and is causing unjustified attorney fees for the
         other party. Her conduct is an abuse of the legal system
         that is not fair to [Father] but most importantly not fair to
         the children who are victimized by her conduct. . . . The
         court does not believe that [Mother] has no income, she

                                       40
         lives a very affluent lifestyle for someone who claims to
         have no income, on one day of the hearing she was in
         Mexico. She claimed it was paid for by someone else, the
         court does not believe her. . . . Based upon [Mother’s] own
         conduct and lack of credibility, the court does not know
         what [her] financial circumstances are at this time. But
         the testimony is she received $288,000 early in the year of
         litigation and has only accounted for a portion of that.
         There should be in excess of $100,000.00 remaining.
         Therefore the court is going to sanction [Mother] pursuant
         to . . . section 271 the sum of $25,000.00.”

In the FOAH, the court awarded Father section 271 sanctions against Mother
in the amount of $25,000.
                                        B
      Section 271 authorizes a family law court to award attorney fees and
costs as sanctions based “on the extent to which the conduct of each party or
attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote the settlement
of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by
encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (§ 271,
subd. (a).) In making a section 271 award, the court must consider “all
evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities” and “not
impose a sanction . . . that imposes an unreasonable financial burden on the
party against whom the sanction is imposed.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) A trial court
has broad discretion in deciding whether to impose sanctions under
section 271. (Parker v. Harbert (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177; In re
Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226-1227.) On appeal, an
appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing an
award of section 271 sanctions and reverses only if the trial court has abused
its discretion (i.e., if no judge could reasonably make the order). (Parker, at

                                        41
p. 1177; Corona, at pp. 1225-1226; In re Marriage of Fong (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 278, 291.)
                                       C
      In challenging the court’s award of section 271 sanctions against her,
Mother makes only a conclusory argument, consisting of slightly more than
one page in her opening brief, and does not present any substantive legal
analysis showing that the court abused its discretion by awarding such
sanctions against her. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother has waived or
forfeited this contention or, at least, not carried her burden on appeal to show
the court abused its discretion in awarding section 271 sanctions against her.
(A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 672; Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 784-785; Niko, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 368; Ewald, supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 948; Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793; Salas, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1074.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

                                                       BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                      42