Court Opinion

ID: 9726337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:44:57.719912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.122615
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in Parts I and III, but not Part II, of the Court’s opinion.
As stated in People v. John Willie Williams (1970), 26 Mich App 218, the rule which prevents questioning a defendant on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent does not preclude questioning him regarding a prior inconsistent statement. Therefore, and in the light of the defendant’s lawyer’s failure to object to the questions asked by the prosecutor, I join in Part I of the opinion.
In Part II the Court unnecessarily aligns itself with cases decided in other jurisdictions which reach conclusions contrary to our holdings in Williams and in People v. Hicks (1970), 22 Mich App 446, and People v. Seales (1969), 16 Mich App 572.
There seems to be complete agreement that evidence of or argument based on a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent when confronted with an accusation is impermissible. This the majority acknowledges, citing Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974) .1
The issue which separates my colleagues and me is whether a different rule should obtain when the defendant takes the stand and thereby subjects him*668self to cross-examination. In People v. McCrea (1942), 303 Mich 213, the Michigan Supreme Court did so rule, holding that when a defendant takes the stand he may be questioned about his exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent.2 In Hieles, however, we held, in an opinion authored by the Chief Judge which I signed and from which Judge Danhof dissented, that MeCrea was superseded by later decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
In Seale, decided before Hides, and Williams, decided afterwards, we also held that a defendant who takes the stand may not be challenged for exercising his right to remain silent in the face of accusation. In my opinion Seale, Hides and Williams were correctly decided. Accordingly, I cannot join in Part II of the Court’s opinion in this case.

 See fn. 37, p 468 of the Miranda opinion. See, also, People v. Fry (1969), 17 Mich App 229, 233 and cases there cited.

 When questioned as a witness before a grand jury MeCrea had stood upon his constitutional rights and refused to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him. He testified at the trial, and on cross-examination he was asked certain questions he had declined to answer before the grand jury. The prosecutor then read from the grand jury proceedings showing that MeCrea had stood upon his constitutional rights. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the (pp 285, 286) “trial court did not err in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine MeCrea regarding his grand-jury testimony, which disclosed that he had there stood upon his constitutional rights and refused to testify”.
In Grunewald v. United States (1957), 353 US 391, 420 (77 S Ct 963, 1 L Ed 2d 931), the United States Supreme Court, on facts seemingly the same as those in MeCrea, held that a defendant could not be cross-examined at his trial concerning his exercise before a grand jury of his constitutional privilege not to be a witness against himself.