Court Opinion

ID: 9758066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:09:49.743094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:03.335472
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority finds that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands compels its reversal of the Superior Court’s affirmance of the lower court’s order admitting the September 27, 1979 writing as the decedent’s will. The majority concedes that the lower courts did not commit reversible error in *553determining that undue influence had not been established by the contestant to the will, but interjects its equity analysis to justify its conclusion. The foundation for its holding is that the Appellee’s conduct interfered with the court’s "... determination based on untainted disinterested evidence, as to whether this testator freely willed his worldly goods to Appellee and Appellee’s brother.” [Majority op. at 535]. The conduct of the Appellee to which the majority refers is:
“Appellee’s failure to secure any witness to what transpired between him and the testator, despite the second opportunity created when he came back two days later to effect a beneficiary change in his own favor, effectively insulated the will he prepared to his own benefit from any acceptable inquiry into the very issue before the court, undue influence.” [Majority op. at 535].
The majority opinion unduly emphasizes the Appellee’s failure to have the decedent re-execute the will in the presence of disinterested subscribing witnesses. The error in this reasoning is that it disregards the function of a subscribing witness to testify to the authenticity of the testator’s signature.1 The presence of subscribing witnesses would not eliminate the need for a court’s determination of undue influence, nor would it resolve the issue. Even if witnesses had been secured, inquiry into the presence of undue influence would not have been foreclosed.
Typically, the witnesses are unaware of the contents of the document. Subscribing witnesses would rarely be privy to discussions between an attorney and client related to the dispositive provisions of a will. Nor would witnesses necessarily be aware of whatever pressures may have been brought to bear on a testator’s scheme. This is the common experience whether or not the beneficiary is the attorney.
*554Since procuring witnesses would not have prevented the contestant to the will from challenging the validity of its provisions by claiming undue influence, his failure to do so may not reasonably be interpreted as conduct barring the attorney from receiving property which has been devised to him. The majority ignores the very nature of the attorney-client relationship. The practical, but unintended, effect of the majority’s opinion is that the Appellant is permitted to accomplish through a circuitous route what the Court expressly disdains — enforcing the Code of Professional Responsibility by affecting the substantive rights of an attorney-beneficiary during litigation of the contestant’s claim.
It is inconceivable to me that a contestant should be permitted to successfully raise a claim of undue influence without having to establish the claim at trial. And, yet, that is the outcome of the holding in the majority’s opinion. The majority accepts the hearing court’s finding, supported by the record, that the will was not procured by the exercise of undue influence, but permits the contestant to prevail. If, as the majority finds, the Appellee’s conduct inhibited inquiry into the issue of undue influence, so too has the majority prevented such inquiry by creating a rule which would prevent a hearing court from making an independent finding based on evidence presented. The majority recognizes that the Appellee had the burden of going forward with evidence to demonstrate that there was no undue influence. The effect of the majority’s reasoning, however, is that the attorney-beneficiary is put out of court because of “unclean hands” without the opportunity to meet his burden.
I agree with the majority that the Code of Professional Responsibility does not have the force of substantive law. Until such time as the substantive law relating to an attorney-beneficiary has been altered by statute or rule, it should not be legislated by this Court in individual cases under the guise of equity.
McDERMOTT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The decedent’s death occurred prior to the effective date of 20 Pa.C.S. § 3132.1 [relating to self-proved wills]; however, my analysis would not be affected by this provision as a witness’ affidavit made pursuant thereto will be accepted by the register as proof of the facts stated “[u]nless there is a contest with respect to the validity of the will.”