Court Opinion

ID: 9901294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:01:08.06617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.139962
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FREDRICK WAID, appointed co-               No. 22-15382
special administrator of the Estate of
Robert Anderson Jr.; JENNIFER               D.C. No.
ANDERSON, as co-special                  3:20-cv-00435-
administrator of the Estate of Robert      LRH-CSD
Anderson Jr.; JENNIFER
ANDERSON, individually; M. R. A.,
a minor, through parent and guardian        OPINION
Jennifer Anderson; S. G. A., a minor,
through parent and guardian Jennifer
Anderson,

               Plaintiffs-Appellants,
  v.

COUNTY OF LYON; TIMOTHY
WRIGHT; BRETT WILLEY,

               Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Nevada
        Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted December 5, 2022
                  Pasadena, California

                 Filed November 21, 2023
2                    WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Ryan D. Nelson, and Bridget S.
                 Bade, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge R. Nelson;
    Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Berzon

                          SUMMARY *

             Qualified Immunity/Deadly Force

    The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment granting qualified immunity to two police officers
in an action alleging, in part, that the officers used excessive
deadly force when they shot and killed Robert Anderson
during a response to a 911 call seeking help with a domestic
violence incident.
    After officers arrived at Anderson’s home, Anderson’s
two minor children exited the house and told the officers that
their parents were fighting, that their mother needed an
ambulance, and that there were no weapons in the house
other than a BB gun. When officers entered the house,
Anderson shouted “Fuck you, punks,” ignored a command
to get to the ground, and ran down a short hallway towards
the officers, at which point the officers shot him five times.
    The panel held that defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity on plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim because plaintiffs’ rights were not clearly

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   3

established. First, it was not obvious that defendants were
constitutionally precluded from firing given that they were
responding to an active domestic violence situation, lacked
the benefit of having time to fully assess the circumstances,
and needed to make split-second decisions as they were
being charged.
    Second, plaintiffs failed to show controlling authorities
(or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would have put
every reasonable officer on notice that defendants’ conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing this case
from other cases, the panel noted that Anderson was in a
narrow hall and rapidly approaching the officers, with no
barrier between them. He could have accessed the officers’
weapons at any time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if
the officers took the option to retreat to the house’s
entryway, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for
whom they had just called an ambulance—alone with her
husband or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a
weapon from somewhere in his home.
    The panel held that defendants did not violate plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights
because there was no evidence suggesting that the officers
acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate law-
enforcement objective of defending themselves.
    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Berzon
would hold that defendants’ use of force was
unconstitutionally excessive, and they were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The
officers’ repeated, rapid use of deadly force was objectively
unreasonable given that Anderson was unarmed, shirtless,
empty handed, outnumbered, tactically disadvantaged, not
reaching for the officers’ guns, and, when the last two shots
4                  WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

were fired, not moving toward the officers. Additionally,
A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005 (9th
Cir. 2016), established that an officer may not shoot an
unarmed suspect within seconds, multiple times, in rapid
succession, and without warning, if the suspect is not
reaching for a gun—even when the suspect was recently
involved in a domestic violence incident, has not complied
with commands, and quickly closes a short distance between
the officer and the suspect.
   Judge Berzon agreed with the majority that the officers
were properly granted qualified immunity on plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment claim.

                        COUNSEL

Dale K. Galipo (argued) and Eric Valenzuela, Law Offices
of Dale K. Galipo, Woodland Hills, California; Peter
Goldstein, Law Offices of Peter Goldstein, Las Vegas,
Nevada; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Katherine F. Parks (argued) and Christine R. Hotchkin,
Thorndal Armstrong PC, Reno, Nevada, for Defendants-
Appellees.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                  5

                        OPINION

R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:

    Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey responded to
a domestic violence call where they shot and killed Robert
Anderson. Anderson’s estate and family sued Wright,
Willey, and the County of Lyon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Nevada law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and
the district court granted qualified immunity to the officers
on the § 1983 claims. We affirm.
                              I
    The events leading to Anderson’s death began with a 911
call. The caller—who did not request emergency medical
care or report any weapons—sought help with a domestic
violence incident. Officers Wright and Willey responded,
and both wore body cameras that recorded the encounter
with Anderson.
    Once they arrived at Anderson’s home, Wright knocked
on the door and announced himself. The Andersons’ two
minor children, both distressed, exited the house and spoke
to Wright in the front yard. They told Wright that their
parents were fighting and that their mother needed an
ambulance. Wright called for medics. The Andersons’ son
stated that there were no weapons in the house other than a
BB gun.
    Wright walked back to the front door, leaving the
children behind. Willey joined Wright on the porch in front
of the door. Wright recounted what the children had told
him and explained that Anderson was “throwing [Jennifer
Anderson] around.” The officers then entered the home,
with Wright entering first and again announcing himself.
6                  WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

Willey, directly behind Wright, drew his weapon and
pointed it forward as he entered.
    As the officers entered the kitchen, Anderson, out of
view, shouted, “Fuck you, punks.” Willey, with his gun still
drawn, moved past Wright toward a hallway to the left of the
kitchen, saw Anderson at the other end of the hallway, and
told him to get on the ground. Wright, now behind Willey,
also drew and pointed his gun in front of him.
    Anderson ignored the commands and ran down the short
hallway toward the officers. Willey fired three shots in
quick succession at Anderson as Anderson crossed the
threshold between the short hallway and the kitchen. Wright
fired his weapon twice. Anderson fell to the ground and
began to bleed from his chest as Willey continued to shout
at him, “Get on the ground!” Willey reported the shots and
that the suspect was down. Anderson, who had been shot
five times, died from his injuries.
    Plaintiffs sued the officers for (1) violating the Fourth
Amendment by using excessive force; (2) violating the
Fourth Amendment through denying medical care; and (3)
violating the Fourteenth Amendment through unwarranted
state interference with the familial relationship between
Anderson and his wife and children. They also brought three
state-law claims against the officers and the County. The
district court granted qualified immunity to defendants on all
constitutional claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Plaintiffs appeal only
the grant of summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim and the Fourteenth Amendment claim
against the officers.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   7

                              II
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Desire,
LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir.
2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant
shows “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and
“entitle[ment] to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “In qualified immunity cases, as in other cases, ‘we
view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.’” Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 476 (9th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 768
(2014)).
                             III
    Qualified immunity protects government officials “from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It protects
government officials “unless (1) they violated a federal
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of
their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (quoting
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). We may
address either prong first, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236–42 (2009), and “may exercise our discretion to
resolve a case only on the second ground when no clearly
established law shows that the officers’ conduct was
unconstitutional,” O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1036
(9th Cir. 2021).
8                  WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

                              A
    As to plaintiffs’ excessive-force claim, we find the
clearly established prong dispositive. A right is clearly
established when it is “sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The Supreme Court
“do[es] not require a case directly on point”; it requires
“existing precedent” to “place[] the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
at 741. “Such specificity is especially important in the
Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has recognized
that ‘it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how
the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply
to the factual situation the officer confronts.’” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (alteration omitted)
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)).
    Cases “cast at a high level of generality” are unlikely to
establish rights with the requisite specificity. Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam). While a
case addressing general principles may clearly establish a
right “in an obvious case,” id., such obvious cases are “rare,”
Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64. Instead, a clearly established right
usually requires “controlling authority or a robust consensus
of cases of persuasive authority.” Id. at 63 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–
42). Plaintiffs must either explain why their case is obvious
under existing general principles or, more commonly, show
specific cases that control or reflect a consensus of non-
binding authorities in similar situations. See Hopson v.
Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 698 (9th Cir. 2023) (plaintiff bears
the burden to show that a right is clearly established).
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                    9

    Plaintiffs argue that granting qualified immunity was
improper because genuine disputes of material fact remain,
including whether Anderson was reaching for the officers’
weapons when he was shot. While we cannot resolve
genuine factual disputes at summary judgment, we can
nonetheless evaluate an assertion of qualified immunity “by
assuming that the version of the material facts asserted by
the non-moving party is correct.” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d
895, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204
F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000)).
                              1
    We first conclude that the facts do not show an obvious
violation of Anderson’s constitutional rights, even when
viewed in plaintiffs’ favor.
    Those few cases in which courts have found obvious
constitutional violations are instructive. In one case, Hope,
a prison inmate, was chained to a “hitching post” for seven
hours as punishment, during which he was forced to be
shirtless in the hot sun, given water only “once or twice,”
and provided no bathroom breaks. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 734–35 (2002). Although the Supreme Court found
that controlling circuit authority clearly established the
Eighth Amendment violation, it noted that “[a]rguably, the
violation was so obvious that [the Court’s] Eighth
Amendment cases gave respondents fair warning that their
conduct violated the Constitution.” Id. at 741. The Court
explained that “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice
should have provided respondents with some notice that
their alleged conduct violated Hope’s constitutional
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at
745.
10                    WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

    We have noted that “this obviousness principle, an
exception to the specific-case requirement, is especially
problematic in the Fourth-Amendment context.” Sharp v.
County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 912 (9th Cir. 2017). This
is so because a categorical statement that conduct obviously
violates the Fourth Amendment “is particularly hard to make
when officers encounter suspects every day in never-before-
seen ways,” including “countless confrontations . . . that
yield endless permutations of outcomes and responses.” Id.
We thus require Fourth Amendment violations to be
“beyond debate” to be considered obvious. See Hopson, 71
F.4th at 701 (citation omitted). 1
    For that reason, we have only found obvious violations
in exceedingly rare circumstances with extreme facts absent
here. For example, we held that the police could not seize
the plaintiffs “for over five hours solely because they were
witnesses to a crime.” Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708
F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013). While the witnesses were
seized, the officers had neither “probable cause to arrest” nor
“reasonable suspicion for a temporary Terry detention.” Id.
at 1084. Moreover, “[t]he crime was solved,” no exigencies
justified the detention, and evidence suggested that the
officers “did not perceive” a need to secure the crime scene.
Id. at 1084–85.
   We have also held that officers obviously violated the
constitutional rights of a sixth-grade student when they

1
  Other circuits apply a similarly high standard. See, e.g., Joseph on
behalf of Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 337 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“The standard for obviousness is sky high[.]”); Coffin v. Brandau, 642
F.3d 999, 1015 (11th Cir. 2011) (“‘obvious clarity’ cases” are “rare,” a
“narrow exception,” and “very occasionally encounter[ed]” (internal
citations omitted)).
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   11

arrested him even though the child was “compliant and
calm,” committed no known wrongdoing, posed no “threat
to himself or others,” and “engage[d] in no act of resistance.”
C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014).
On those facts, we explained that the child’s arrest was “an
obvious violation of the constitutional principle that the
nature of the seizure of a schoolchild must be justified by the
circumstances.” Id.
    We recently confirmed that only the rare case will find
that conduct obviously violated the Constitution. For
example, we concluded that a police officer committed an
obvious constitutional violation after he shot and killed a
suspect holding a baseball bat because the suspect was not
facing the officer, was holding the bat pointed downwards,
and was not threatening anyone else when he was shot. See
Est. of Aguirre v. County of Riverside, 29 F.4th 624, 626–27,
629 (9th Cir. 2022). We noted: “Assuming that [the
decedent] posed no immediate threat to [the officer] or
others at the time of his death, this ‘general constitutional
rule’ applies ‘with obvious clarity’ here and renders [the
officer’s] decision to shoot [the decedent] objectively
unreasonable.” Id. at 629 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).
    Against those cases, the officers here did not obviously
violate Anderson’s right to be free of excessive force. It was
not obvious that the officers’ use of force was objectively
unreasonable “in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397
(1989) (citations omitted). Even assuming that Anderson
was unarmed and not reaching for a weapon, there is no
dispute that he used aggressive language with the officers,
ignored an order from the officers, and rushed towards them
in a small and confined space. It is not obvious that the
officers were constitutionally precluded from firing in this
12                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

situation, where they were responding to an active domestic
violence situation, lacked the benefit of having time to fully
assess the circumstances, and needed to make split-second
decisions as they were being charged.
                              2
    Because this case does not present an obvious
constitutional violation, plaintiffs must show controlling
authorities (or a consensus of persuasive ones) that would
have put every reasonable officer on notice that Wright’s and
Willey’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. They
have not done so.
    In one case, an officer shot an individual nine times,
causing him to fall to the ground. Zion v. County of Orange,
874 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2017). The officer then fired
nine more rounds into the individual’s body from four feet
away and stomped on his head three times after seeing that
he was still moving on the ground. Id. The decedent’s
mother did not challenge the initial nine shots that brought
the decedent to the ground. Id. Instead, she argued that the
second round and the head-stomping violated the Fourth
Amendment. See id. We explained that “a reasonable
officer would reassess the situation rather than continue
shooting” since the suspect may no longer pose a threat after
he was shot nine times and fell to the ground. Id. at 1076.
    Here, Anderson was upright and moving when he was
shot. Although he may have started to fall before the officers
stopped shooting, the shots were fired sequentially, and
Anderson did not fully fall to the ground until after the
shooting stopped. At that point, both officers stopped. The
shots fired here thus are more like the nine shots that the
plaintiff in Zion did not challenge.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   13

    Plaintiffs’ other cases are similarly distinguishable. In
Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1507–08 (9th Cir.
1991), FBI SWAT agents went to Ronald Ting’s home to
arrest him. The agents found Ting naked inside his bedroom
with a handgun aimed at them. Id. at 1508. After Ting
complied with an order to drop the gun on the bed, another
agent restrained him next to his bed. Id. As the agents
searched the room, Ting “suddenly pulled his arm free from
Agent Burns’ grasp, stood up, and lunged toward an
unsecured, enclosed dressing area located behind a dividing
wall on the other side of the room.” Id. He was not lunging
toward any of the agents in the room or toward the gun on
the bed. See id. In response, the agent fired one round at
Ting’s back, aiming to kill. Id. We explained that a jury
could find Burns’ use of deadly force unreasonable because
“Ting presents evidence from which a jury could reasonably
conclude that he was shot at close range while in a prone
position or on his hands and knees.” Id. at 1510.
    Here, by contrast, Anderson was on his feet when he was
shot. And, unlike Ting, who did not attempt to retrieve his
gun or lunge at the agents searching his room, id. at 1508,
Anderson was quickly approaching Wright and Willey while
ignoring Willey’s command to get on the ground. Even if
Anderson’s hands remained at his side and he never reached
for a weapon, Anderson was rapidly advancing on the
officers and could access their weapons if he was not
stopped. Ting thus provides no harbor.
    Plaintiffs’ reliance on A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City of
Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2016), fares no better. There,
a woman called 911 to report that her ex-boyfriend, Herrera,
took her cell phone after hitting her on the head. Id. at 1008.
She reported that she was unhurt, her children were fine,
paramedics were unnecessary, her boyfriend did not carry
14                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

weapons, and he was walking down the road to catch a bus.
Id. The first officer, who drove a large police SUV, spotted
Herrera walking down the road, pulled up behind him,
turned on his lights, and commanded him to stop. Id. at
1009. Herrera did not comply, opting instead to skip, walk,
and run backwards while facing the officer. Id. The officer
continued to follow him in his SUV. Id. A second officer
pulled up and tried to cut off Herrera’s escape route by
driving to Herrera’s other side. Id. The second officer
testified that he did not hear the verbal commands to stop
from the first officer. Id.
    During this time, Herrera had his hand in his sweatshirt
pocket. Id. The second officer yelled at Herrera to remove
his hand from his pocket, and as Herrera took his hand out,
the second officer, from his vehicle, shot Herrera twice. Id.
We held the force was excessive because the domestic
violence incident was clearly over. Herrera was not a threat
to either his ex-girlfriend or the officers when he was shot,
the officers had no reason to believe he was armed, and the
second officer unreasonably escalated to deadly force
without warning while Herrera was complying. Id. at 1011–
13.
    This case is very different. While Herrera left the scene
of the domestic altercation before he encountered the
officers, id. at 1011, Anderson was in his home and possibly
near his wife, whose physical condition was unknown.
Unlike in A.K.H., where the decedent’s ex-girlfriend told the
officers herself that she “was not hurt” and “did not need
paramedics,” id. at 1008, Anderson’s children told the
officers that their mom needed an ambulance. Further, the
officers in A.K.H. were in their cars, which provided a
physical barrier between themselves and Herrera that would
have prevented Herrera from easily accessing their weapons.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                  15

See id. at 1009. Here, Anderson was in a narrow hall and
rapidly approaching the officers, with no barrier between
them. He could have accessed the officers’ weapons at any
time or otherwise harmed them. Further, if the officers took
the option to retreat to the house’s entryway, as plaintiffs
suggest, they would have left Jennifer Anderson—for whom
they had just called an ambulance—alone with her husband
or risked injury themselves if Anderson obtained a weapon
from somewhere in his home. The facts in A.K.H. thus differ
materially from the situation Wright and Willey walked into
with Anderson. A.K.H. did not clearly establish the law on
the facts we face here.
    Finally, in Cruz v. City of Anaheim, a confidential
informant told the police that Cruz was a gang member who
sold methamphetamine, carried a gun, had a past felony
conviction, and said that “he was not going back to prison.”
765 F.3d 1076, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2014). Multiple police
officers pulled Cruz over for a broken taillight. Id. at 1078.
The officers surrounded him, and Cruz tried to escape by
backing his SUV into a marked patrol car. Id. The officers
exited their vehicles with their guns lowered and ordered
Cruz to get on the ground. Id. According to the officers,
Cruz exited his car, ignored their commands, and reached for
the waistband of his pants, prompting all five officers to
open fire. Id. But some facts in the record undermined that
account. A bystander on the other side of Cruz’s vehicle
witnessed the shooting but was unable to see if Cruz in fact
reached toward his waistband because Cruz’s car blocked his
view. Id. The officers fired twenty shots in about two to
three seconds, killing Cruz. See id. His body was found
“tangled in his seat belt and hanging from it.” Id. The
officers did not find a weapon on him but recovered a loaded
gun from the passenger seat. Id.
16                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

    We reversed the grant of summary judgment to the
officers because of multiple disputed facts. The case came
down to whether a jury would believe the officers given
several pieces of evidence that undermined their account.
Cruz was unarmed when he died. An officer present had
shot a different suspect under the same set of facts. Many
officers reported Cruz used his right hand to reach when
Cruz was left-handed. And Cruz’s body was tangled in the
seat belt and had to be cut free, suggesting he could not have
exited and turned toward the officers. Id. at 1079–80. In
explaining these material disputes of fact, we stated,

       [I]f the suspect doesn’t reach for his
       waistband or make some similar threatening
       gesture, it would clearly be unreasonable for
       the officers to shoot him after he stopped his
       vehicle and opened the door. At that point,
       the suspect no longer poses an immediate
       threat to the police or the public, so deadly
       force is not justified.

Id. at 1078–79.
    Unlike in Cruz, even the facts most favorable to
Anderson suggest that he ignored multiple commands and
was quickly approaching the officers. And given that the
officers were responding to a domestic violence incident and
were told that the mother needed an ambulance, this case
also differs from other cases involving officer responses to
claims of domestic violence on which plaintiffs rely. In
those cases, the domestic violence incident was clearly over
when force was used. See George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829,
839 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Carol was unscathed and not in
jeopardy when deputies arrived.”); Mattos v. Agarano, 661
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   17

F.3d 433, 449–51 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“the domestic
dispute [was] seemingly over” at the time of the
investigation); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 703
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Smith was standing on his porch
alone and separated from his wife.”).
    Willey and Wright also had less control of the scene than
the officers in Cruz. Those police officers surrounded Cruz
with their cars, preventing his escape. By contrast, Willey
and Wright were both on one side of the hallway, leaving
Anderson free to go back toward the rest of the house where
his wife presumably was located, possibly trapped or
injured. And, in Cruz, five officers were present, while
Willey and Wright were alone. See Thompson v. Rahr, 885
F.3d 582, 590 (9th Cir. 2018) (presence of two deputies
rather than six police vehicles was a distinguishing factor for
clearly established law analysis). Cruz’s facts differ
significantly from those here.
    Because none of the cases on which plaintiffs rely are
sufficiently analogous, we conclude that they cannot put a
reasonable officer on notice that the use of deadly force here
would be unconstitutional. Thus, the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity.
                              B
    The district court also properly concluded that the
officers did not violate the Andersons’ Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the children of a decedent
“generally have the right to assert substantive due process
claims.” Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046,
1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). Our cases
“recognize[] a fundamental liberty interest in the
companionship and society of one’s child for which the
18                WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

state’s interference with that liberty interest without due
process of law is remediable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 678–79 (9th Cir.
2023) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
But “[o]nly official conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ is
cognizable as a due process violation.” Id. at 680 (quoting
Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)).
    Liability turns on “whether the circumstances are such
that ‘actual deliberation is practical.’” Moreland v. Las
Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 372 (9th Cir.
1998) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 851 (1998)). “[W]here a law enforcement officer
makes a snap judgment because of an escalating situation,
his conduct may only be found to shock the conscience if he
acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law
enforcement objectives.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546,
554 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Porter, 546 F.3d at 1140). By
contrast, “[w]here actual deliberation is practical, then an
officer’s ‘deliberate indifference’ may suffice to shock the
conscience.” Id. (quoting Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137).
    The purpose-to-harm standard applies here because
Wright and Willey had to make “a snap judgment because of
an escalating situation.” Id. Seconds after entering the
home, the officers encountered Anderson approaching
quickly toward them. This left little time for actual
deliberation. On these facts, the officers’ actions do not
shock the conscience. No evidence suggests that the officers
“acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate
law-enforcement objective of defending themselves.”
Hayes v. County of San Diego, 736 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.
2013). Thus, Wright and Willey did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                  19

                             IV
    Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the
Fourth Amendment claim because plaintiffs’ rights were not
clearly established. And the officers did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.
   AFFIRMED.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

    Yet again, we have before us a case concerning a
confrontation between a civilian and the police resulting in a
tragic death. Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey,
responding to a report of a domestic violence incident, shot
and killed Robert Anderson in his home. Anderson’s estate
and family (“Waid”) sued the officers and their employer
Lyon County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Nevada law.
Reviewing de novo the district court’s grant of qualified
immunity, I would reverse in part and affirm in part. In my
view, the officers’ use of force was unconstitutionally
excessive and the officers are not entitled to qualified
immunity on Waid’s Fourth Amendment claim. As to those
issues, I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that
the officers were properly granted qualified immunity on
Waid’s Fourteenth Amendment familial interference claim
and so concur in the portion of Part IV of the majority
opinion discussing that claim.
                       I. Background
    On September 2, 2019, an emergency dispatcher radioed
local law enforcement about a domestic violence incident in
20                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

Silver Springs, Nevada. The dispatch explained that no
weapons were involved and that no medics had been
requested. The incident reportedly involved a man who had
been drinking and a woman, later identified respectively as
Robert Anderson and Jennifer Anderson, his wife.
    Officers Timothy Wright and Brett Willey (“the
officers”) responded to the call. At the time of the incident,
Wright was 5’10” and weighed approximately 195 pounds.
Willey was 5’8” and weighed approximately 205 pounds.
Both officers were equipped with a firearm, a taser, and a
police baton, and Wright carried pepper spray as well.
    Wright was the first to arrive at the home of Jennifer and
Robert Anderson. When he got there, Wright knocked on the
front door of the home and announced, “Sherriff’s Office.”
The Andersons’ two children, M.R.A. and S.G.A., came out.
The Andersons’ daughter reported to Wright that she thought
her mother needed an ambulance. Wright then turned to the
Andersons’ son and asked if there were any guns in the
house. There was only a BB gun, the son stated, and his
father had not taken it out.
    Willey arrived at the home seconds after Wright’s
conversation with the children. Wright was standing at the
Andersons’ front door as Willey approached the porch.
Wright told Willey that Jennifer Anderson may need an
ambulance and that Anderson was “throwing [Jennifer
Anderson] around.” Willey asked: “Currently?,” and Wright
repeated: “Throwing the girl around.” The officers’
exchange lasted approximately ten seconds.
     Wright then again announced, “Sherriff’s Office,” and
pushed the Andersons’ front door open. Willey, who was
initially behind Wright, drew and pointed his firearm before
entering the home; Wright put his hand on his firearm but
                      WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                          21

left it holstered. Down a hallway that began at the kitchen
and went left, Anderson yelled, out of sight of the officers,
“Fuck you, punks!” Willey immediately rushed forward past
Wright, through the kitchen and toward the hallway, with his
gun pointed forward and the attached light on. The lights
were on in the kitchen, sunlight was coming through the
windows, and the interior of the house was clearly
illuminated in the body camera footage. At the corner where
the kitchen met the hallway, Willey turned left and saw
Anderson, and no one else, in the hallway. Anderson was
5’8” and weighed 185 pounds; he was unarmed and shirtless;
both of his hands were visible and open; and there was
nothing to be seen in his hands or his waistband. 1 Upon
seeing Anderson, Willey shouted to him: “Get down! Get
down on the ground right now!”
    Anderson started moving quickly down the hallway—
characterized as “charging” by the officers—in a straight
line; at no point did he change direction or, according to
Wright’s testimony and a reasonable view of the body
camera footage, attempt to reach Willey’s gun. As Anderson
traveled down the hallway and into the kitchen, Willey,

1
  The parties have disputed whether Anderson’s hands were visible,
whether Anderson’s hands were clenched, whether Anderson reached for
Willey’s gun, and whether Anderson was alone in the hallway. On a
motion for summary judgment, all evidence and reasonable inferences
are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Lowry v. City of San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 2017) (en
banc); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Waid’s characterization
of the facts is largely confirmed by the body camera footage, Wright’s
testimony, and Waid’s expert’s declaration, which was based on the
body camera footage and relevant documents and reports. So I assume
that Anderson’s hands were visible, Anderson’s hands were not
clenched, Anderson did not reach for Willey’s gun, and Anderson was
alone in the hallway.
22                    WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

without warning and in rapid succession, fired three shots.
Willey fired the first shot from a distance of approximately
three to five feet as Anderson reached the end of the hallway;
he fired the second shot at near point-blank range as
Anderson passed in front of him; and he fired the third shot
at Anderson’s back as Anderson fell forward into the
kitchen. Wright fired a single shot at Anderson, after Willey
fired his first two shots and after Anderson had passed
Willey and entered the kitchen. 2
    As the result of the several gunshot wounds, Anderson
lay sprawled on the kitchen floor bleeding profusely, while
Willey repeatedly yelled at him to “get on the ground.”
Willey then radioed in the incident and told Jennifer
Anderson, who had emerged from the back of the hallway
after the gunshots were fired, to stay in place. Willey kept
his gun aimed at Anderson, still lying on the kitchen floor
and bleeding, and again instructed him to “stay down.”
    The special administrators of Anderson’s estate, Jennifer
Anderson, and the Andersons’ minor children sued Lyon
County, Wright, and Willey, alleging claims under Section
1983 and Nevada law. Under Section 1983, Waid alleged, as
here pertinent, the use of excessive force by the officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers moved for
summary judgment on that claim. The district court granted
summary judgment to the officers on Waid’s excessive force
claim, holding that Wright and Willey did not commit any

2
 Wright testified that he fired his shot after Willey had fired two shots
and when Anderson was in the kitchen. Waid’s expert declared that
Wright fired his shot “[a]t the same time” as Willey’s second shot. I
adopt Wright’s version for present purposes, as it favors Waid. See
Lowry, 858 F.3d at 1254.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                  23

constitutional violation and were entitled to qualified
immunity.
                       II. Discussion
    We review a district court’s grant of qualified immunity
on summary judgment de novo. Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31
F.4th 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2022). “Because the excessive
force inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through
disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences
therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary
judgment . . . in excessive force cases should be granted
sparingly.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th
Cir. 2005) (en banc) (alterations and citation omitted). “This
principle applies with particular force where the only witness
other than the officers was killed during the encounter,” as
“the witness most likely to contradict [the officers’] story—
the person shot dead—is unable to testify.” Gonzalez v. City
of Anaheim, 747 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc)
(quoting in part Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir.
1994)).
    In resolving whether Wright and Willey are entitled to
qualified immunity, we ask two questions: first, whether the
officers—when the evidence and all reasonable inferences
are viewed in the light most favorable to Waid—violated a
constitutional right, and second, whether that constitutional
right was “clearly established” at the time of the
constitutional violation. Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 887
(9th Cir. 2022).
                A. Constitutional Violation
    Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), established the
framework for evaluating whether the officers used
24                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

excessive or reasonable force against Anderson. Sitting en
banc, we explained how to apply Graham in such cases:

       We apply Graham by first considering the
       nature and quality of the alleged intrusion; we
       then consider the governmental interests at
       stake by looking at (1) how severe the crime
       at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed an
       immediate threat to the safety of the officers
       or others, and (3) whether the suspect was
       actively resisting arrest or attempting to
       evade arrest by flight. As we have previously
       explained, “[t]hese factors, however, are not
       exclusive. Rather, we examine the totality of
       the circumstances and consider whatever
       specific factors may be appropriate in a
       particular case, whether or not listed in
       Graham.”
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (quoting Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th
Cir. 2010)) (citations omitted).
    We have considered several factors beyond the
enumerated Graham factors when evaluating the totality of
the circumstances. First, “an officer must give a warning
before using deadly force ‘whenever practicable.’”
Gonzalez, 747 F.3d at 794 (quoting Harris v. Roderick, 126
F.3d 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 1997)). Second, the availability of
“‘clear, reasonable and less intrusive alternatives’ to the
force employed . . . ‘militate[s] against finding [the] use of
force reasonable.’” Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d
864, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Bryan, 630 F.3d at 831).
Third, the length of time before an officer escalates to deadly
force can inform our inquiry. See A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   25

City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2016). Fourth,
an officer’s repeated use of force in a short time span can
weigh toward a Fourth Amendment violation. See Mattos,
661 F.3d at 445.
   Taken together, the foregoing factors in my view
demonstrate beyond doubt that Willey and Wright
unreasonably used deadly force against Anderson.
     1. Nature and Quality of the Alleged Intrusion
    The officers’ intrusion on Anderson’s Fourth
Amendment interests was “unmatched.” Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985). “The use of deadly force
implicates the highest level of Fourth Amendment interests
both because the suspect has a ‘fundamental interest in his
own life’ and because such force ‘frustrates the interest of
the individual, and of society, in judicial determination of
guilt and punishment.’” A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1011 (quoting
Garner, 471 U.S. at 9). Such an “extreme” intrusion, id., “is
reasonable only if ‘the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others,’” Gonzalez, 747 F.3d
at 793 (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 914).
           2. Governmental Interests at Stake
    The severity of Anderson’s alleged crime did not justify
the officers’ use of deadly force. Domestic violence
incidents are volatile and dangerous, as “violence may be
lurking and explode with little warning” in such situations.
See Mattos, 661 F.3d at 450 (quoting United States v.
Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005)). But
“domestic disputes do not necessarily justify the use of even
intermediate let alone deadly force.” A.K.H., 837 F.3d at
1011.
26                     WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

    Two factors suggest that the officers’ use of deadly force
was unwarranted considering the circumstances of
Anderson’s alleged crime. First, the officers did not shoot
Anderson to protect his wife. See A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1011;
Smith, 394 F.3d at 702–03. On a reasonable view of the body
camera footage, Anderson was alone when Wright and
Willey confronted him. At the time of the shooting,
Anderson was moving away from his wife’s presumed
location and was not actively engaged in a domestic dispute.
So his wife was not “in jeopardy” at the time of the shooting.
A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1011 (quoting George v. Morris, 736
F.3d 829, 839 (9th Cir. 2013)). Consistent with these
undisputed facts, the officers do not argue that they used
deadly force against Anderson to protect his wife.
    Second, Anderson was unarmed throughout the incident,
according to the emergency dispatcher, the Andersons’ son,
and the officers’ body camera footage. See Smith, 394 F.3d
at 702–03; Peck, 51 F.4th at 887–88. Although Anderson
moved quickly down the hallway upon seeing Willey, “[h]e
had no guns or other weapons in his possession and there
were none in the house.” 3 Smith, 394 F.3d at 703. The lack
of weapons on Anderson’s person throughout the domestic
dispute and shooting weighs significantly against the use of
deadly force.
    Nor did Anderson pose an immediate threat of death or
serious physical injury, as required for the use of deadly
force under the second and most important Graham factor.
See Gonzalez, 747 F.3d at 793; Peck, 51 F.4th at 887.
Anderson was unarmed and shirtless. His hands were
unclenched and visible. He did not verbally threaten the
officers, although he cursed at them, and he did not reach for

3
    Except the stored-away BB gun reported by the Andersons’ son.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                 27

Willey’s gun while moving down the hallway, according to
Wright’s testimony and a reasonable interpretation of the
body camera footage. Waid’s expert—a police-practices
specialist who served as a law-enforcement officer and
instructor for 37 years—concluded, after reviewing the
officers’ body camera videos, depositions of Willey and
Wright, and relevant reports and documents, that Anderson
“demonstrated no assaultive behavior toward the [officers]”
and “made no effort to attack or even make contact with
Willey.”
    As to the officers’ vulnerability, the officers
outnumbered Anderson and were each larger than him. Each
officer was armed with several lethal and nonlethal weapons,
including tasers and police batons. The officers were trained
in gun-retention techniques and could have holstered their
guns and tried physically to subdue Anderson before
resorting to deadly force. And as evidenced by the ground
covered by Willey when he rushed forward to confront
Anderson, the officers had the option to retreat to the
entryway of the house. Accordingly, Anderson, an unarmed
and outnumbered suspect, did not pose an immediate threat
of death or serious bodily injury to the armed and tactically
advantaged Wright and Willey, and the officers did not have
cause to believe otherwise.
    The remaining factor is that Anderson did not get on the
ground when ordered to do so and instead moved quickly
down the hallway. Contrary to the majority’s version of the
facts, Anderson was ordered once, not “multiple” times, to
get on the ground as he approached the officers. Majority
Op. at 16. And the body camera video shows that Anderson
was shot one second after that command to get down. His
failure to comply that fast—if he could even have done so
28                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

that quickly—did not justify the use of deadly force against
him. See A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1012.
    In sum, the enumerated Graham factors weigh strongly
toward the conclusion that Wright and Willey used excessive
force against Anderson.
                  3. Additional Factors
   Each of the additional factors that has been used in
Graham analyses confirms the unreasonableness of Willey
and Wright’s actions.
    First, the officers did not warn Anderson that they would
use deadly force. The absence of a warning does not
automatically make the use of deadly force unreasonable.
Gonzalez, 747 F.3d at 797. But an officer’s failure to give a
warning before using deadly force “whenever practicable,”
id. at 794 (quoting Harris, 126 F.3d at 1201), is a factor
strongly favoring a finding that excessive force was used.
Here, considering that the officers were able to issue the
command to get down to Anderson—“Get down! Get down
on the ground right now!”—before discharging their
firearms, a jury could find that it was practicable for the
officers to warn Anderson that they would use deadly force
before shooting, e.g., “Get down or we’ll shoot.”
    Second, less intrusive means of force were available.
Although “officers need not avail themselves of the least
intrusive means of responding to an exigent situation,”
“police are required to consider what other tactics if any
were available, and if there were clear, reasonable and less
intrusive alternatives to the force employed, that militates
against finding the use of force reasonable.” Glenn, 673 F.3d
at 876 (quoting Scott, 39 F.3d at 915, and Bryan, 630 F.3d at
831) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
                       WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                           29

Here, other “clear, reasonable, and less intrusive
alternatives” to shooting Anderson were available, given that
the domestic abuse was not occurring at the time the officers
confronted Anderson and that Anderson was not armed. See
supra, at 20–21, 26. Rather than use deadly force from the
get-go, the officers could have tried using nonlethal force
(e.g., their tasers); engaging in tactical retreat; or holstering
their weapons and physically subduing Anderson. In his
declaration, Waid’s expert explained that Willey and Wright
could have employed a “contact and cover” arrangement. In
such an arrangement, after calling out “contact and cover” at
the Andersons’ door, Willey would have entered the house
first with his taser in hand and Wright would have covered
Willey from behind with his firearm, using deadly force only
if necessary. 4 The officers’ failure to use available,
reasonable, and less-than-lethal alternatives supports the
conclusion that their use of deadly force against Anderson
was unreasonable.
    Third, the officers immediately—in the one second after
Anderson was first commanded to “get down”—escalated to
deadly force. Our decision in A.K.H. ex rel. Landeros v. City
of Tustin concluded that the “less than a minute” gap
between the officer’s initial contact with the suspect and the
officer’s firing of his weapon was “perhaps [the] most
important” factor in determining that the officer used
excessive force against the suspect. 837 F.3d at 1012. Within
that short gap, “[l]ess than a second elapsed between [the
officer] commanding [the suspect] to take his hand from his
pocket and [the officer] shooting him. [The officer] neither
warned [the suspect] that he was going to shoot him, nor

4
 “Contact and cover” is “a tactic that all police officers receive training
on,” as Waid’s expert explained. Willey received training on that tactic.
30                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

waited to see if there was anything in [the suspect]’s hand.”
Id.
    The logic in A.K.H. applies with equal force in the
present dispute. Willey drew his firearm before entering the
Andersons’ home, commanded Anderson to get on the
ground, and, starting one second after that command, fired
multiple shots at an unarmed Anderson without warning—
with Wright adding his own shot—all within a matter of
seconds. Willey and Wright’s immediate escalation to
deadly force against an unarmed suspect supports a
determination that the officers’ actions were unreasonable.
     Finally, Wright and Willey fired four shots at Anderson
in the span of seconds, at least two of which—Willey’s last
shot and Wright’s only shot—were fired after Anderson
plainly posed no objective threat whatever to the officers. In
Mattos v. Agarano, we held that an “overwhelmingly salient
factor” in deciding that the officer-defendants used
excessive force was that the officers tased the suspect three
times in less than one minute. 661 F.3d at 445. “Three
tasings in such rapid succession,” we explained, “provided
no time for [the suspect] to recover from the extreme pain
she experienced, gather herself, and reconsider her refusal to
comply.” Id. And in Tabares v. City of Huntington Beach,
we held that a reasonable jury could find the “number of
shots” fired by an officer to be unreasonable “even had an
initial threat existed,” where the suspect had already been
shot multiple times and the officer “did not give [the suspect]
any time to understand or comply with [his] command
before firing the [final] shot.” 988 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir.
2021) (citing Zion v. County. of Orange, 874 F.3d 1072,
1076 (9th Cir. 2017)).
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                 31

    A jury could find in this case, as in Mattos and Tabares,
that the number of shots fired by Wright and Willey was
excessive and served no reasonable purpose. Willey fired his
third shot at Anderson’s back after Anderson had already
passed Willey and was collapsing into the kitchen. Wright
fired his only shot at Anderson after Willey had fired his
second shot at Anderson and after Anderson had entered the
kitchen and was no longer heading toward the officers.
Moreover, Anderson did comply with the “get down” order
after Willey’s second shot, whether willingly or because he
was injured and could no longer stand, and yet was shot
twice more. The number of shots fired—especially after
Anderson could reasonably be understood to pose no danger
to either officer—weighs, once again, toward a finding of
excessive force.
                      *      *       *
    A full analysis of the record demonstrates that Willey
and Wright used excessive force against Anderson in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Despite Anderson’s
quick movement toward the kitchen, the officers’ repeated,
rapid use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable given
that Anderson was unarmed, shirtless, empty handed,
outnumbered, tactically disadvantaged, not reaching for the
officers’ guns, and, when the last two shots were fired, not
moving toward the officers. The Fourth Amendment does
not countenance a predictably deadly seizure in such
circumstances.
               B. Clearly Established Law
    The next step in the qualified immunity analysis—and
the only one undertaken by the majority—is to examine
whether the constitutional right violated by Wright and
32                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

Willey was clearly established at the time that they shot
Anderson. See Majority Op. at 8–17.
    I first note that, as my colleagues in the majority did not
undertake a constitutional merits analysis, their “clearly
established law” analysis is conducted in a vacuum. That is,
my merits analysis highlights the key aspects of the factual
circumstances that in my view give rise to the conclusion
that the force used was excessive. One can then look at the
law established at the time of the events with a focus on how
the case law treated circumstances similar as to the factors
that rendered the force used unreasonable. Otherwise, the
tendency is—as the majority opinion here illustrates—to
treat precedent as distinguishable, and therefore as not
clearly establishing pertinent law, by focusing on peripheral
facts that differ from those in the case before the court but
do not illuminate whether the force used in that case was
unreasonable.
    Further, although, to constitute clearly established law,
“[t]he ‘rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted,’” Peck, 51 F.4th at 887 (quoting City
of Tahlequah v. Bond, 585 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam), a
case “directly on point” is not required, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Without such a case, “officials
may ‘still be on notice that their conduct violates established
law even in novel factual circumstances,’” particularly in the
Fourth Amendment context. Bonivert v. City of Clarkston,
883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). Only a “high degree of
specificity” in prior case law defining the right is required.
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)
(quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts should
                    WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                    33

generally “identify a case where an officer acting under
similar circumstances was held to have violated the Fourth
Amendment,” id. (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79
(2017) (per curiam)) (ellipses omitted), where the “similar
circumstances” are those that in the prior case gave rise to
the conclusion that the force used was unreasonable.
    Here, there is such a case. This court’s decision in A.K.H.
ex rel. Landeros v. City of Tustin established that an officer
may not shoot an unarmed suspect several times—in rapid
succession and without warning—when the suspect is not
reaching for a gun, even if the suspect is involved in a
domestic violence incident, is noncompliant with an order to
get down, and is quickly moving toward the officer. See 837
F.3d at 1008–09, 1011–13. This ruling offered sufficient
notice to Willey and Wright that they used excessive force
against Anderson to preclude qualified immunity on Waid’s
excessive force claim.
    In A.K.H., as in the present case, the emergency
dispatcher reported a domestic violence incident involving a
man and a woman, with no weapons present. Id. at 1008.
According to the dispatch relayed to officers in A.K.H., the
suspect was a known gang member, possibly had a $35,000
traffic warrant out for his arrest, and was on parole for a state
drug possession offense. Id. at 1008–09. Two officers
responded to the 911 call in their vehicles as the suspect was
walking down the road from the apartment where he had
allegedly assaulted his ex-girlfriend. Id. at 1009.
   The first officer to encounter the suspect turned on his
SUV’s red lights, drew his gun, and told the suspect three
times to “get down,” using his car’s loudspeaker. Id. The
suspect, who had put his right hand in his sweatshirt pocket,
did not comply and continued moving away from the
34                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

officer’s SUV. Id. The second officer then drove forward
past the first officer’s car to box the suspect in, held his gun
with the front passenger window open, and shouted at the
suspect to “get your hand out of your pocket.” Id.
    While moving quickly toward the second officer’s car,
the suspect began removing his right hand from his pocket
in “an arcing motion over his head.” Id. Within a second of
issuing his command, the second officer fired two shots at
the suspect, without warning and in rapid succession. Id.; see
also id. at 1012. The suspect died as a result of his wounds.
Id. at 1008. The second officer testified that he shot the
suspect because he “believe[ed] that he had a weapon and he
was going to use that weapon on [him]” as the suspect’s right
hand had been “concealed” in his pocket with a “heavy”
object, and the suspect “charged [him] or shortened the
distance or closed the distance at [his] passenger window
very quickly.” Id. at 1009 (alterations in original). Both
officers later stated that they never saw anything in the
suspect’s hands, and the suspect was confirmed after the
incident to have been unarmed. Id.
    We denied qualified immunity to the shooting officer. Id.
at 1013. Evaluating the Graham factors in conjunction with
the officer’s rapid escalation to deadly force, we concluded
that the “the intrusion on [the suspect]’s interests
substantially outweighed any interest in using deadly force”
and held that the officer violated clearly established Fourth
Amendment law when he shot and killed the suspect. Id. We
noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Garner
established that a “police officer may not seize an unarmed,
nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” Id. (quoting
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11).
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                   35

    A.K.H. controls our analysis here. The striking
similarities between A.K.H. and the current dispute compel
the same conclusion regarding the officers’ entitlement to
qualified immunity. In both cases:

   •   a dispatcher reported a domestic violence call;
   •   no weapons were involved in the domestic incident;
   •   two officers responded to the call;
   •   the officers did not together establish a tactical
       approach to handle the situation;
   •   the second officer rushed forward to confront the
       suspect with his weapon drawn;
   •   the suspect did not comply with officer command(s)
       to “get down”;
   •   the suspect was unarmed;
   •   the suspect quickly closed the distance between
       himself and the relevant officers (i.e., Willey and
       Wright in this case, the second officer in A.K.H.)—
       in the officers’ words in both cases, the suspect
       “charged” at the officers;
   •   the suspect did not reach for a gun;
   •   the relevant officers stated that they believed that the
       suspect was either armed or about to arm himself;
   •   the officers had the option to retreat or to use less-
       than-lethal force; and
   •   instead, the relevant officers shot the suspect several
       times within seconds of encountering him and
       without giving any warning.

    Under our precedent, no more—and in fact, far less—
similarity to the relevant precedent is needed to demonstrate
that clearly established law was violated. We have denied
qualified immunity to officers solely on the principle that an
36                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

officer may not shoot a person who is unarmed and not
reaching for a weapon, without requiring other factual
parallels to the cases establishing that principle. See Peck, 51
F.4th at 887–88. We have determined that a Ninth Circuit
case holding that “use of a taser in drive-stun mode on a
person who actively resisted arrest, but posed no immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others” was sufficiently
specific to establish a constitutional violation for qualified
immunity purposes, again without discussing other factual
similarities or dissimilarities between the two cases. See
Bonivert, 883 F.3d at 879–81 (internal quotation marks
omitted). With exceedingly similar facts to the present case
and a constitutional holding establishing the officer’s
wrongs, A.K.H. easily clears the bar set by our precedent on
clearly established law. A.K.H. provided pellucid notice to
reasonable police officers that shooting and killing Anderson
in the circumstances confronting Willey and Wright violated
Anderson’s Fourth Amendment rights.
    Additional precedent underscores this conclusion,
confirming elements of the rule determined by A.K.H. and
highlighting the clearly established nature of the right
violated by Wright and Willey.
    For instance, our decision in Cruz v. City of Anaheim,
established that an officer may not shoot a noncompliant
suspect several times, in rapid succession and without
warning, so long as the suspect was not reaching for a
weapon. See 765 F.3d 1076, 1077–79 (9th Cir. 2014).
Indeed, we have held that “Cruz establishe[d] that officers
may not fire at a suspect—even an armed suspect—absent
some reason to believe that the suspect will soon access or
use the weapon”; we therefore denied qualified immunity to
officer-defendants who shot and killed a suspect when the
suspect was not reaching toward a gun when shot. Peck, 51
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                  37

F.4th at 888 (emphasis added). Here, Wright and Willey
repeatedly shot Anderson without warning even though
Anderson was unarmed and, a jury could conclude, not about
to arm himself, considering that: Anderson did not reach for
Willey’s gun; Anderson gave no indication that he intended
to arm himself as he approached and passed Willey; and,
even if Anderson had sought to arm himself by reaching for
Willey’s gun, Wright and Willey had numerous ways to
prevent Anderson from doing so, including their gun-
retention techniques and the option to retreat. See supra, at
20–22, 26–28.
    Further, in Zion v. County of Orange, we explained that
the use of deadly force against a suspect who “no longer
posed an immediate threat . . . violated long-settled Fourth
Amendment law.” 874 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017). At
an absolute minimum, Zion, together with A.K.H., clearly
established that Wright and Willey used excessive force
against Anderson when they fired shots at him after he was
already in the kitchen, was past the officers, and was falling
to the ground injured and bleeding.
    The majority’s reasons for rejecting A.K.H. and the other
supporting cases as clearly established law are not
persuasive.
    First, the majority maintains that A.K.H. did not put
Willey and Wright on notice that their use of force was
excessive, and so unconstitutional, because in A.K.H. “the
domestic violence incident was clearly over.” Majority Op.
at 14; see id. at 16 (distinguishing cases where “the domestic
violence incident was clearly over when force was used”).
But, on the record viewed in the light most favorable to
Waid, the domestic dispute in this case was likewise not
ongoing when the officers encountered Anderson. See supra,
38                 WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

at 20–21, 26. Anderson was alone in the hallway and moving
away from his wife’s presumed location when Wright and
Willey shot him. See supra, at 21–22, 26. In other words,
even though the domestic dispute was reportedly ongoing
when the officers arrived at the Andersons’ home, in both
A.K.H. and this case, the officers’ use of deadly force at the
time they deployed the force was completely disconnected
from the exigencies of the domestic dispute. In both cases,
the force was not used to protect the victim of the dispute
and so was not justified by the precipitating domestic
violence situation.
    Second, the majority maintains that A.K.H. is
distinguishable because the officers in that case were outside
and in vehicles. See Majority Op. at 14–15. But the “clearly
established law” inquiry does not require us to parse
differences at this level of detail unless such detail is
pertinent to the unreasonable force analysis.
    In Peck, for example, we denied qualified immunity to
the officer-defendants because Cruz established that an
officer may not use deadly force against a suspect who “was
not armed . . . and was not about to become armed.” Peck,
51 F.4th at 888 (emphasis omitted). There were pronounced
factual differences between the two cases: unlike in Cruz,
the suspect in Peck had pointed a gun at someone only
moments before the officers arrived on the scene, and unlike
in Peck, the suspect in Cruz was surrounded by police
vehicles. But those differences played no role in our
qualified immunity analysis in Peck. See Peck, 51 F.4th at
883; Cruz, 765 F.3d at 1078.
   The same logic applies here. As in Peck, the fact that
Anderson was unarmed and, on the record construed most
favorably to Waid, not about to arm himself is all that is
                       WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                          39

needed for “clearly established law” purposes. That, unlike
in A.K.H., the incident in this case occurred indoors and did
not involve police officers in a car is of no moment to the
clearly established law inquiry here, the majority’s
insistence to the contrary notwithstanding. See Majority Op.
at 14–15, 17. For one thing, the passenger car window in
A.K.H.—the one close to the suspect—was open, so the
protection a vehicle might otherwise offer was breached. See
A.K.H., 837 F.3d at 1009. For another, although they were
inside, Willey and Wright could have retreated to the door
and removed themselves from contact with Anderson as he
moved down the hall into the kitchen. More important, for
these details to matter as to the propriety of deadly force,
there would have to be a basis for believing Anderson was
armed or about to arm himself—and here, again, there was
not. Otherwise, the only fear could have been that Anderson
would try to hit or butt the officers, which would not justify
deadly force in return. So the distinctions relied upon by the
majority are beside the point with regard to why the force
used against Anderson was unreasonable under clearly
established law.
   On these facts, then, the officers are not entitled to
qualified immunity for their use of excessive force. 5

5
  I note, although the point is not necessary to my “clearly established
law” conclusion, that the officer in A.K.H. faced a significantly higher
probability that the suspect was armed than did the officers in this case.
In addition to having an earlier criminal conviction, reportedly having a
$35,000 warrant out for his arrest, and being a member of the “Southside
Gang,” the suspect in A.K.H. had one hand concealed in his pocket with
a “heavy” object. See 837 F.3d at 1008–09. In contrast, Anderson was
shirtless and visibly empty-handed; both the dispatcher and the
Andersons’ son confirmed that Anderson was unarmed in the moments
before the officers encountered him; and Anderson had no reported
40                     WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON

                           *        *         *
    A.K.H. established that an officer may not shoot an
unarmed suspect within seconds, multiple times, in rapid
succession, and without warning, if the suspect is not
reaching for a gun—even when the suspect was recently
involved in a domestic violence incident, has not complied
with commands, and quickly closes a short distance between
the officer and the suspect. Those factors, combined, are
more than enough to clearly establish the legal principles
governing this case. I would therefore reverse the district
court’s grant of qualified immunity to Wright and Willey on
Waid’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.
                           III. Conclusion
    This case involves the use of deadly force against a
suspect who was not armed nor thought to be armed when
shot. Even though the officers outnumbered the suspect and
had nonlethal options, the use of deadly force occurred
within seconds of encountering the suspect and continued
after he appeared to be complying, voluntarily or otherwise,
with the only order he was given—to “get down”—and was
already injured. Those who call the police to protect
themselves and their families, as the Anderson children did
here, have a right to expect that even in tense situations, the
actions of the police reflect circumspection about the use of
deadly force. That the officers’ fears might have materialized
later if several contingencies occurred—if the suspect had
not gotten down as ordered after a reasonable period for

criminal record or gang associations. See supra, at 19–20, 21 & n.1. In
short, if anything, the differences between A.K.H. and this case cut in the
opposite direction from that posited by the majority here—that is, there
was a higher probability in A.K.H. than here that the officers were in
danger from the suspect.
                   WAID V. COUNTY OF LYON                    41

compliance had elapsed, if lesser force had not worked, if
the suspect had grabbed for Willey’s gun and managed to
obtain it—is not enough to allow killing a suspect when no
one, including the domestic abuse victim, was in immediate
danger of death or serious bodily injury when the shots were
fired. An officer’s subjective fear for his safety or the safety
of others is not enough to justify the use of force; objective
factors must justify the officer’s fear. See Mattos, 661 F.3d
at 441–42. And peripheral factual differences with otherwise
controlling precedents cannot be allowed to provide
immunity to police officers for shooting and killing an
unarmed suspect who was making no attempt to arm himself
or otherwise threatening anyone with death or serious injury.
    For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully but
emphatically dissent from the majority decision to uphold
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the officers
on Waid’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.