Court Opinion

ID: 9394513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:24.800892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.506779
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ARKEL GARCIA                             :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1983 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004845-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                            FILED MAY 15, 2023

      Arkel Garcia appeals from the order entered in the Philadelphia County

Court of Common Pleas on July 22, 2022, dismissing his petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

Because we agree with the PCRA court that Garcia’s petition was untimely and

he failed to plead and prove an exception to the PCRA time-bar, we affirm the

PCRA court’s order denying the PCRA petition.

      On November 5, 2015, Garcia entered an open guilty plea to aggravated

assault and disarming a law enforcement officer. The factual basis for the plea,

as set forth by the Commonwealth, described Garcia’s instigation of a

courtroom fracas. Earlier that same year, on February 17, 2015, a jury found

Garcia guilty of second-degree murder. When the Judge asked Garcia to rise

after the verdict was issued, Garcia shoved his chair back, striking a sheriff.
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When the sheriff attempted to remove Garcia from the courtroom, a struggle

ensued. Garcia subsequently punched the sheriff and attempted to wrestle his

gun from its holster, while yelling expletives. The weapon was eventually

secured and Garcia was taken into custody.

      The trial court sentenced Garcia to an aggregate term of five years and

one day to fifteen years’ incarceration, to run concurrently to the murder

sentence of life imprisonment. Garcia did not file any post-sentence motions

or a direct appeal.

      On June 4, 2021, Garcia’s murder conviction was vacated. Garcia

subsequently filed a request for parole under the instant docket, as he had

already served the minimum term of his sentence. The request was denied

based on numerous reasons including          unacceptable   compliance   with

institutional programs, institutional behavior including reported misconduct,

and level of risk to the community. See Notice of Board Decision, 10/19/21.

      On November 17, 2021, Garcia filed the instant, counseled PCRA

petition, alleging his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary based on the

new fact of his exoneration. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss,

arguing the petition is time-barred and meritless. After receiving Garcia’s

response, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The PCRA court later

dismissed the petition as untimely. This timely appeal followed.

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      Prior to reaching the merits of Garcia’s claims on appeal, we must first

consider the timeliness of his PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014).

      A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be
      filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of
      sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the
      three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A
      judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this
      Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of
      the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness
      requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not
      address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not
      timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA
      petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised
      therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
      of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three
      exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations

and footnote omitted).

      Since Garcia did not file a post-sentence motion or a direct appeal, his

judgment of sentence became final on December 9, 2015, when his time for

seeking direct review with this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)

(judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review … or

at the expiration of time for seeking the review”). Therefore, Garcia had until

December 9, 2016, to timely file a PCRA petition in this matter. The instant

petition – filed almost 5 years later – is patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA

court lacked jurisdiction to review Garcia’s petition unless he was able to

successfully plead and prove one of the statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s

time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

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      The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

      In his petition, Garcia asserts he meets the requirements of Section

9545(b)(1)(ii), i.e., the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-

bar, “because the consequences of pleading guilty to the charges stemming

from his courtroom outburst were not known to [Garcia] until he was

exonerated in June of 2021.” PCRA Petition, 11/7/21, at 8.

      Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) “requires [a] petitioner to allege and prove that

there were ‘facts' that were ‘unknown’ to him” and that he could not have

ascertained   those   facts   by   the   exercise   of   “due   diligence.”    See

Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007). “The focus

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of the exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered

or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v.

Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (citation and brackets omitted). “Due

diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own

interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned of the new

fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v.

Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 53 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted). Further, the

“fact” on which the petitioner predicates his claim to an exception to the time-

bar must bear some logical connection to a plausible claim for relief. See

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Here, Garcia argues he should be able to withdraw his guilty plea related

to his courtroom outburst based on the newly discovered fact that his murder

conviction was overturned. While Garcia’s outburst occurred at the close of his

murder trial, this is the only connection between the two cases. Otherwise,

the facts of each case are independent. New facts regarding his murder

conviction simply cannot be used as new facts regarding his plea to

aggravated assault and disarming a law enforcement officer.

      Notably, Garcia does not argue his innocence for the relevant

convictions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 8. On the contrary, he admits that his

“subsequent exoneration does not excuse” his conduct in the courtroom, but

merely “sheds light on his intent to commit aggravated assault.” Appellant’s

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Brief, at 14. While we recognize the unfortunate circumstances regarding

Garcia’s murder conviction, those circumstances are not a legal justification

for Garcia’s acts which support his aggravated assault and disarming a law

enforcement officer convictions. And while the circumstances may help explain

his behavior, they do not negate his admission that he acted willfully in

assaulting and attempting to disarm the deputy sheriff. At that point in time,

Garcia still had all appellate avenues available to him for fighting his murder

conviction. Our laws simply do not allow an individual to punch an officer in

open court and/or attempt to take that officer’s weapon.

      Further, Garcia’s substantive claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness

cannot support an exception to the time-bar either. See Commonwealth v.

Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1284-85 (Pa. 2016). Garcia attempts to couch the

same claim in terms of ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failure to

advocate for him during the plea hearing, based on his new knowledge that

his murder conviction was later overturned. However, attempts to utilize

ineffective assistance of counsel claims as a means of escaping the

jurisdictional time requirements for filing a PCRA petition have been regularly

rejected by our courts. See Commonwealth v. Gamboa–Taylor, 753 A.2d

780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save

an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits); see also

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1999).

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      As the PCRA court properly concluded Garcia’s PCRA petition was

untimely and does not fall under an exception to the PCRA time bar, we affirm

the PCRA court’s order dismissing the petition.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/15/2023

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