Court Opinion

ID: 9729123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:26:55.470791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.507540
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Ms. Justice Jones:
I dissent from the decision of the majority affirming in toio the lower court’s exclusion of certain specified uses of portions of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport *152terminal from exempt classification on the County’s property assessment rolls.
The majority’s approach to the problems involved deprives the taxpayer, viz., the County, the owner of the airport and its terminal building, of appellate review of the property assessments for taxation purposes directed to be made against it by the order of the court below. Thus, the opinion for this court deems the answers to the issues involved as being conclusively determined by the lower court’s factual findings to which finality is accorded on the ground that there is evidence to support them. Actually, the material facts are not in dispute. What is called for is a conclusion of law as to whether, under the established facts, the contested uses of the airport property serve a public purpose or are reasonably essential to a public service. The learned court below has correctly observed that “the mere rental of public property to private parties to operate for private gain is not a bar to a claim for exemption and . . . the question turns on whether the use to which the property is put is actually a public one.” After referring to the statutory powers specifically conferred on Allegheny County by Sections 2401 and 2402 of the Second Class County Code of 1953, P. L. 723, the court below further noted that “Appellants [appellees here] do not contend that the operation of a municipal airport is not a public use. They narrow the issue to a question of whether certain operations conducted therein are within that public use.”
In treating with the question of tax exemption of publicly owned property, the rule is exactly the opposite to that applicable in the case of a private citizen. With the latter, taxation is the rule and exemption the exception whereas in the case of a county exemption is the rule (see The General County Assess*153ment Law of 1933, P. L. 853) and taxation the exception. Consequently, while a private citizen claiming exemption from taxation has the burden of showing clearly that his claim comes within a specific statutory provision, the burden is upon one asserting that a county’s property is subject to taxation to prove its taxability.
The exemption from taxation thus attaching presumptively to county-owned property should be faithfully respected especially where the hearing judge was in such obvious doubt, as in the case of the 60-room hotel in the terminal building, whether that portion of the property should be accorded tax-exempt status as being essential to the proper promotion of the public use to which the terminal building is devoted. After conceding that “The 60-room hotel comes, closer to the line of necessity . . the court below went on to say,— “However, in view of the proximity of other suitable accommodations for the traveler who because of delay in making connections is required to stay overnight, or for an extended period during the day and who may need rest, which in air travel is unusual except during occasional periods of dense fog, I would rule it without the exempt class. A large motel is within five minutes of the Airport and the downtown Pittsburgh hotels within thirty minutes of it with adequate ground transportation available.”
It is plain enough that the court thus denied tax exemption to the portion of the terminal building utilized by the 60-room hotel because there happens to be other sleeping accommodations near the airport. The issue was, therefore, not decided on the basis of whether the maintenance of hotel accommodations in the airport terminal for aircraft passengers was using the property for the authorized public aviation purpose. *154The fact that the operation of the terminal hotel was left by the county to a concessionaire does not deprive the use of its public nature: Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 377 Pa. 274, 279-282, 105 A. 2d 165. The testimony in the instant case established that airport hotels are being maintained by municipalities elsewhere for the accommodation of the air-travelling public. Instances could be multiplied many times where hotel facilities available to airplane passengers at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport are not only a convenience but a necessity. Yet, the majority of the court approve the action of the court below on the briefly stated ground “That the hotel was taxable in view of the proximity of other suitable accommodations for travelers who, because of delay in making connections, might be required to stay overnight or for an extended period during the day.”
A number of the other uses of portions of the terminal building, such as the news stand, drugstores, etc., which have been made taxable, are no more than appropriate incidental services to the main public service of the airport. However, I shall not take the time to enumerate them. For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that to hold that a private commercial motel on a public highway near the airport supplies the need for sleeping or resting accommodations for arriving or departing airline passengers stretches one’s imagination beyond the breaking point.
What may be presently noted is that assessments made as a result of the order now affirmed by this court will not preclude a re-examination of the subject-matter upon a subsequent triennial assessment. Additional proofs can then, and no doubt will, be adduced to demonstrate beyond reasonable dispute that many *155of tbe presently assessed uses of tbe terminal property are in furtherance of the authorized public use of the airport.
Mr. Justice Musmanno joins in this dissent.