Court Opinion

ID: 9484300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:47:47.440247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:09.135091
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
with whom CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
We took this case en banc to untangle the knotted strands of this circuit’s law on the issue of when the relationship of drug seller to drug buyer constitutes a conspiracy. We intended to answer the question, “Is evidence of a sale of drugs in quantities greater than required for personal use enough to support a conviction for conspiracy of the seller with the buyer?” Although the majority indicates in dicta that the answer to this question is “no,” it makes little effort to deal with or explain the considerable body of law in this circuit apparently to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Sergio, 934 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1392 (7th Cir.1991); and United States v. Roth, 771 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir.1985). I happen to agree with the majority that there is very little in this record to support a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pinto (the ostensible buyer), even though that is the very conspiracy specified in the indictment. On the facts before us, Lechuga had no clue as to Pinto’s identity or modus operandi but only knew, based on the amount of drugs involved, that Pinto was buying for resale. The majority now says, I think correctly, that this is not enough, but unfortunately offers few practical suggestions as to what would be enough.
*358Instead of a Lechuga-Pinto conspiracy, the majority now focuses on Lechuga-Pagan, a putative conspiracy not specified in the indictment but reachable only through its omnibus clause (“other persons known and unknown to the grand jury”). The majority’s approach to the Leehuga-Paga relationship consists of endowing snippets of Pagan’s inarticulate testimony with a significance out of all proportion to their apparent import. This is accomplished by indiscriminate reliance on the mantra to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” But the majority offers little to establish workable principles defining conspiracy arising from a buyer-seller relationship. The majority posits the view that, in order to sustain a conspiracy allegation, there must be an agreement going beyond the simple agreement to buy and sell. So far so good, but the majority offers little insight into what facts would establish such a thing. The majority concludes that the Lechuga-Pinto relationship is not enough but that the Lechuga-Pagan link is. Because the basic features of these relationships are essentially the same, however, we are left to wonder what constitutes a conspiracy and what does not.
Lechuga’s primary argument on appeal assumes that there was sufficient evidence to identify him as the man who sold cocaine to Pagan. Nonetheless, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he conspired with anyone to distribute cocaine. Instead, even when taken in the light most favorable to the government, Lechuga contends that the evidence shows nothing more than a few isolated sales transactions, not a conspiracy.
The principal focus of the trial and of this appeal has been the existence of an alleged conspiracy between Lechuga and Pinto. The majority offers plausible reasons why there is no Lechuga-Pinto conspiracy. But it does so in the face of authority in this circuit that the charge of a sale for resale is a sufficient allegation of conspiracy. See, e.g., Sergio, 934 F.2d at 879 (“When a dealer buys for resale from another dealer ... it is reasonable to infer ‘a limited agreement to distribute’ between the two dealers.”) (quoting Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1392); Roth, 777 F.2d at 1205 (middleman who sells drugs to user is a conspirator with the drug supplier). The theory of these cases seems to be that the mere knowledge by the seller that the buyer would redistribute the drugs is enough to constitute a conspiracy. But the sine qua non of a conspiracy is not merely knowledge but an agreement to commit a crime, United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 285 (7th Cir.1992), the existence of which depends upon a meeting of two or more guilty minds. See 4 Charles E. Torica, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 726 at 531 (14th ed. 1981). The record reveals that, although Lechuga knew that a redistribution of cocaine was contemplated, he knew nothing about the identity of the reseller or the expected plan of redistribution.1 There is no evidence that Lechuga ever had a meeting of the minds with Pinto, or agreed to join a drug distribution enterprise of which Pinto was a member.
The majority agrees with this analysis and in fact concludes that a conspiratorial “meeting of the minds” is generally narrower than a “contract.” Ante at 348-49 (“[S]ome legally enforceable contracts do not involve a ‘real’ agreement in the sense of a meeting of the minds but are enforced because the parties uttered words or engaged in acts that the law deems sufficient to create a ... contract. In this respect the term ‘agreement’ is narrower than ‘contract.’ ”). Again, so far so good, but, if there is no conspiracy involving Pinto, how can there be one involving Pagan? For Pagan acted here on behalf of Pinto — in effect as Pinto’s agent for the purchase of cocaine. If there is no conspiracy with the principal, Pinto (as the majority finds), how can there be one with the agent? Of course, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government, but this does not mean that the facts may be viewed as a springboard for pure speculation. And that is all the majority has provided.
The majority has attempted to elevate Pagan from Pinto’s purchasing agent to an inti*359mate of Lechuga who “agreed” with Lechuga to foster the redistribution of the cocaine. The majority builds its case on a remarkably flimsy foundation: Pagan had become acquainted with Lechuga before the transaction in question; and Pagan in testimony - once used the pronoun “we” to indicate delivery of cocaine originating with Lechuga and passing through the hands of Pagan on its way to Pinto. Also, the sale from Lechuga to Pagan, acting on behalf of Pinto, was apparently done on credit. These are facts from which one might indulge in speculation about agreement, but they do not, in the best of circumstances, give rise to a rational inference of conspiracy.
Pagan admittedly had met Lechuga before this transaction. Pagan’s acquaintanceship with Lechuga, however, was not sufficiently close to enable Pagan to distinguish Humberto Lechuga from his brother, Raul. In any event, we may assume that the mine-run of narcotics purchasers are acquainted with their sellers. There is nothing to suggest that drug dealers do business only with strangers. From acquaintanceship alone it is certainly not permissible to infer a meeting of the minds — an agreement. This is even more emphatically the case where one party mistakes the other for his brother. The majority also quotes Pagan as testifying, “We had another deal with him [Pinto] and he claimed that we were short, so I request from [Raul] [Lechuga] again the three ounces.” Ante at 350-51. Particularly considering that to Pagan English was a second, and still somewhat foreign, language, there is no basis for inferring an agreement from this offhand comment. For an intermediate seller to include his supplier in the sweep of the plural pronoun “we” in a statement that both he and his supplier would have to make up for a short delivery is hardly grounds for inferring a conspiracy.
The very circumstances of the transaction suggest that, while there may have been an agreement between Pagan and Pinto to arrange for the purchase of cocaine, there certainly was none between Lechuga and Pagan to distribute it. First, undercover detective Carr sought to buy 500 grams of cocaine from Pinto. Pinto then called Pagan to obtain the drugs. Pagan, in turn, called Lechu-ga to set up the purchase. Then, Carr, Pinto and Pagan drove to an apartment building where Lechuga had indicated he would make delivery. Lechuga was not there, so Pagan sought further instruction from a woman later identified as Lechuga’s sister-in-law. The woman told Pagan that Lechuga was then on his way to the pick-up point. Pagan and his associates returned to the apartment building and, a few minutes later, Lechuga and a companion arrived. Pagan met Lechu-ga in the building and took delivery of 481 grams plus 3 ounces of cocaine. More specifically, Pagan took the cocaine from someone, later identified as Lechuga, who stuck his hand out from behind a partially open door. Pagan returned to his associates and gave the 481 grams to Carr and the 3 ounces to Pinto. Pinto and Pagan were subsequently arrested but Lechuga and his companion had already departed. These circumstances may support an inference that Pagan was an agent and a coconspirator of Pinto, but nothing about them suggests a conspiracy with Lechuga. Literally, as well as figuratively, the dealings with Lechuga were at arm’s length.
The majority’s reference to Pagan as a possible “go-between, facilitator, sales agent, and general helper,” ante at 350, merely makes colorful, but misleading, verbiage substitute for analysis. There is no evidence that Pagan agreed with Lechuga to do anything except to buy drugs on behalf of Pinto and, under the majority’s very analysis, this is not enough.2 There is no agreement going beyond the agreement to buy and sell itself. To call someone a “middleman” or a “facilitator” does not make him a coconspirator with either the party above him or the party below him in the chain of distribution. A “middleman” or a “facilitator” is a buyer who also sells or a seller who also buys. Calling someone a “middleman” certainly does not *360permit an inference that he has, by this activity alone, become part of a larger distribution operation and entered the realm of conspiracy.
The case law in this circuit remains tangled, and I doubt that the majority opinion provides serviceable guidelines to dispel the confusion. Thus, the government has pointed to the language of some of our cases and argued that a sale for resale is evidence enough for the jury “to infer a limited agreement to distribute between the two dealers.” United States v. Sergio, 934 F.2d 875, 879 (7th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 854 (7th Cir.1988).
But the proposition that a sale for resale is sufficient evidence of participation in a conspiracy runs headlong into United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.1990).3 In Baker, one defendant, Wireman, was convicted of conspiracy based on his purchase of 200 pounds of “ditch weed,” a noxious, low-quality variety of marijuana which no single individual could possibly consume in such quantities. In the opinion, we stated that even a large purchase does not demonstrate that the defendant “knew the existence and scope of the conspiracy and sought to promote its success ... any more than a purchase of 100 tons of steel to build a skyscraper shows that the buyer has ‘joined’ the corporate enterprise of the manufacturer.” Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). The proposition that a sale for resale is enough is also explicitly rejected in Lamon, which notes that the conviction in Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, was based not only on the large volume of the purchases but also on the extensive cooperation between the buyer and the seller. Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1191 n. 18.
One possibility on the facts of this case is that Lechuga joined an ongoing conspiracy between Pagan and Pinto. But although Le-chuga presumably knew that Pagan would resell or reconvey the cocaine, he did not know to whom or in what manner. If the language of Baker governs, Lechuga did not know the “scope” of the putative Pagan-Pinto conspiracy. 905 F.2d at 1106. Knowledge of a buyer’s illegal objectives does not establish an agreement to help him carry out those objectives. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir.1990) (“[M]ere knowledge of, approval of, association with, or presence at a conspiracy is insufficient to establish [a defendant’s participation in a conspiracy].”). As we noted in Townsend:
The suppliers in a “chain” are not necessarily interested in the success of a particular retailer, or group of retailers, down the line. If the chain is characterized by sporadic dealings between independent dealers, what do suppliers care if the middlemen are able to unload the stuff further?
924 F.2d at 1391. Of course, any wholesaler hopes that his customers will be successful. The more the retailers sell, the more they will buy from the wholesaler. But proving participation in a conspiracy requires “substantial” evidence. Durrive, 902 F.2d at 1225-30. This presumably means that proof of more than an abstract desire for more business is required.
An appropriate standard of proof of conspiracy helps ensure that vicarious responsibility will not be improperly assessed. Co-conspirators are liable for crimes committed by other members of the conspiracy in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). To hold that ■ a defendant joined a conspiracy therefore exposes that person to much more than criminal liability for joining the conspiracy itself: he also faces conviction for the substantive crimes committed by other members of the conspiracy. Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1389. In Townsend we also stated: “To join a conspiracy ... is to join an agreement.... [T]o be a conspirator you must know of the agreement ... and intend to join it....” Id. at 1390 (citations omitted).4 Here Lechuga had no adequate knowledge of any agree*361ment between Pagan and Pinto (whose very identity was unknown to Lechuga). Although Lechuga supplied cocaine to the Pagan-Pinto distribution chain through two apparently arm’s-length sales to Pagan, Lechu-ga was wholly unaware of what activities Pagan, or any subsequent occupier of a place in the chain of distribution, might undertake. The relationship of Lechuga to Pagan is simply that of seller to buyer or to buyer’s agent. The sale was consummated by Pagan taking delivery on Pinto’s behalf. For his part, Pinto gave an order to Pagan and Pagan saw that it was filled. None of this in any way changed the simple seller-buyer relationship between Lechuga and Pagan. And, as we have said repeatedly (but unfortunately not consistently) elsewhere, a buyer-seller relationship, standing alone, is insufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. See Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1394; Baker, 905 F.2d at 1106. But see United States v. Sergio, 934 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.1991); Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1392; United States v. Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir.1985).
United States v. Roth seems to contain a less demanding test for conspiracy than, for example, Sergio, and includes the following passage: “LWJhile the ultimate consumer is not himself a conspirator ... the middleman is.” 777 F.2d at 1205. It is true that this language appeal’s as dicta in the middle of a discussion of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury. It is also possible that the passage has no application to mere dealers but only to a somehow more entangled species of “middlemen.” And, in context, the panel in Roth may have been referring to parties who were acting as agents of the defendant. Id. (“The risk of Roth’s being caught would have been overwhelming. He had to have middlemen between him and the drug addicts who were his ultimate consumers.”). As previously noted, here Pagan — a man in the middle if not a “middleman” — was acting on behalf of the buyer to fill the buyer’s order.
The significant passage in Sergio, suggesting a broad inference to be drawn from the sale of substantial quantities of drugs, may be best read as a loose reference to Townsend, where we cited Baker approvingly, 924 F.2d at 1394, and used language that was rather more precise than in Sergio: “If [wholesale dealer] A knows of, and benefits from, [retail dealer] B’s subsequent distribution, we may infer a limited agreement to distribute between A and B_ But agreement to join other endeavors and distributors cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the buyer will use the drugs illegally.” Id. at 1392 (internal quotations omitted). It may also be significant that in Sergio itself, and in the eases that cite Sergio with approval, there was substantial evidence of the defendant’s involvement in the charged conspiracy, above and beyond the sale for resale. Sergio, 934 F.2d at 879 (noting the defendant’s “continuous involvement with the conspiracy”); United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1342-43 (7th Cir.1991) (deals at issue were “more than isolated arms-length transactions” and “revealfed] a high degree of trust and cooperation”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1177, 117 L.Ed.2d 422 (1992); and United States v. Atterson, 926 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir.) (regular purchases and drug sales records suggest that defendant was “warehouseman” for the marijuana), cert. denied sub nom. Laurelez v. United States, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2909, 115 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1991).
Perhaps anticipating that we might not strictly apply the language of Sergio, the government has also argued that the extra three ounces that Lechuga delivered to Pagan, who in turn delivered them to Pinto, indicate a sort of ongoing relationship of trust from which the jury could infer a conspiracy. But these additional ounces do nothing to change the role of Lechuga as an arms-length supplier to the Pagan-Pinto chain. They indicate merely that Pagan had bought cocaine from Lechuga once before and that Lechuga was a sufficiently honest broker to make up for a short delivery.5 Certainly, these facts, or similar facts, might well be found in any number of other typical arms-length sales. In sum, it is fair to con-*362elude, even though some of our cases suggest otherwise, that there is not sufficient evidence to support an inference that Lechuga joined or participated in a Pagan-Pinto conspiracy.
The possibility remains that Lechuga and Pagan, without reference to Pinto, together agreed separately to distribute cocaine. The majority finds such a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pagan on the grounds that Pagan knew Lechuga was a drug dealer and knowing this “assisted him in distributing drugs to at least one dealer farther down the , chain of distribution.... ” Ante at 350. I suppose that every cocaine supplier who sells to a reseller “assists” the reseller in the sense that, without the original provision of a supply, the reseller would have nothing to pass on down the line. This merely describes the economics of distribution; however, it does not address the occurrence of a meeting of the minds. There is abundant authority that Pagan’s activities vis-a-vis Le-chuga are insufficient to prove a conspiracy. United States v. Kimmons, 917 F.2d 1011, 1015 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 361, 58 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).
The majority purports to distinguish the dealings between Lechuga and Pagan from those between Lechuga and Pinto. Even the second leg (Lechuga-Pinto) of this comparison has its difficulties since Lechuga did not even know who Pinto was and had no direct dealings with him. A seller-buyer relation between Lechuga and Pinto can be postulated only on the theory that Pagan acted as Pinto’s agent in making the purchase from Lechuga. In any event, the majority correctly states that to establish a conspiracy, either between Lechuga and Pinto or Lechu-ga and Pagan, there must be “proof of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” Ante at 347. But what is lacking here is evidence from which such a further agreement between Lechuga and Pagan rationally can be inferred.
Lechuga and Pagan did sell and buy cocaine, and apparently they agreed to do so some time before the sale was consummated. But this sales agreement alone may not form the basis for affirming Lechuga’s conviction for conspiring to distribute cocaine. Like the majority, I too look for “proof of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” Specifically, I search for an agreement to distribute cocaine. The issue in this case, as I see it, is what evidence will permit an inference that such an agreement to distribute exists. The majority does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question.
As has been repeatedly noted, a conspiracy requires agreement, and there is a difference between knowing that something will occur— even as an absolute certainty — and agreeing to bring that same “something” about. After all, the relationship between a buyer and seller is presumptively adversarial: “the buyer’s purpose is to buy [presumably at the lowest possible price]; the seller’s purpose is to sell [presumably at the highest possible price].” United States v. Ford, 324 F.2d 950, 952 (7th Cir.1963). Hence, to find an agreement to cooperate in distributing cocaine requires evidence going considerably beyond the mere existence of a buyer-seller relationship.
Here the record shows clearly only that Lechuga and Pagan had been acquainted since February 1988, and that prior to their arrest in May 1988 Lechuga twice sold Pagan cocaine. Pagan, acting independently, then redistributed it to Pinto. Obviously, this evidence permits an inference of an existing supplier-dealer relationship, but this is not a relationship from which a conspiracy to distribute can be inferred. Thus, in Direct Sales v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 713, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 1270, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943), the Court upheld the conspiracy conviction of a morphine wholesaler that knew that its physician-customer was selling the morphine to addicts. This conclusion, however, emerged only after the Court emphasized the company’s “prolonged cooperation with [the physician’s] unlawful purpose.” Id. The Court distinguished the case from one involving “single or casual transactions, not amounting to a regular course of business, regular, sustained and prolonged, and involving nothing more on the seller’s part than indifference to *363the buyer’s illegal purpose and passive acquiescence in his desire to purchase, for whatever end.” Id. at 712, n. 8, 63 S.Ct. at 1269, n. 8. Compare United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 208, 61 S.Ct. 204, 205, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940) (conspiracy conviction overturned when evidence did “not do more than show knowledge by respondents that the materials would be used for illicit distilling....”). The case before us is much more like Falcone than like Direct Sales; a conspiratorial agreement to distribute cocaine cannot be inferred from evidence of two arm’s-length sales transactions, even between dealers who had met three months earlier. There is nothing about these sales to suggest that they are out of the ordinary.
The majority concludes that the record is replete with evidence of the “something-more” that permits an inference that Lechu-ga and Pagan were conspirators. For example, some of its members point to evidence that Lechuga was willing to sell cocaine after “a simple call from Pagan.” Ante at 353 (Coffey, J., concurring). I fail to see how this suggests anything beyond an ordinary buyer-seller relationship. Lechuga had admittedly sold to Pagan once before and, when Pagan exhibited a desire to buy again, Le-chuga was apparently pleased to oblige. Willingness to please and good service do not add up to conspiracy. To call these few typical transactions a conspiracy is inconsistent with Direct Sales and Falcone.
It has also been suggested that Lechuga’s instruction to Pagan to “bring the money back” shows that Lechuga “had a ‘stake in the success of ithe Lechuga-Pagan-Pintoj enterprise.’ ” Ante at 353-54 (Coffey, J., concurring) (quoting Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1397). But the circumstances show only that Pagan bought on credit, and a credit transaction standing alone in no way changes the adversarial relationship between a buyer and seller. See Baker, 905 F.2d at 1106. This was not a sale on consignment, in which Pagan had the option of paying Lechuga for the cocaine or returning any unsold amount. Such an arrangement would indeed link Le-chuga’s economic benefit from the transaction to Pagan’s success in distributing the cocaine. But here, the only rational inference to be drawn from the instruction “bring back the money” is that Pagan had to pay for the cocaine irrespective of his ability to resell it.6 If it means anything, this evidence suggests that Lechuga had implicitly refused to enter into a distribution agreement with Pagan; Lechuga had declined to take a stake in Pagan’s success or that of any larger enterprise.7
All this discussion raises the crucial question: If a sale for resale is not enough evidence of a conspiracy, what is? Although no exhaustive catalog is possible, examples are not difficult to find. Clearly, “prolonged cooperation” between buyer and seller is sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 713, 63 S.Ct. at 1270.8 So too might be evidence that the putative buyer is really working as the seller’s agent. Such evidence would, in many circumstances, destroy the presumption that the parties are dealing at arm’s length and would show an agreement to distribute. Sales on consignment may also establish a conspiracy since they indicate an ongoing relationship of the sort that “lowerfs] the transaction costs of committing crimes,” Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1394, and also show that the seller has a “stake in the success of [the buyer’s] enterprise.” Id. at 1397. See United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir.1992) (a single consignment transaction may support an inference of conspiracy), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1026, 122 L.Ed.2d 171 (1993). Evidence that the parties had standardized their transactions with one another might also lead to an inference that they were engaged in a *364cooperative effort. We also noted recently that evidence of “trust” and “mutual benefit” will support a conspiracy conviction, even though the parties’ dealings appear to involve merely a “simple sale of cocaine.” United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 764 (7th Cir.1993). See generally United States v. Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 286-89 (7th Cir.1992) (discussing the “line of demarcation” between sale and conspiracy).9
In sum, the evidence shows nothing more than a typical buyer seller relationship between Lechuga and Pagan. Further, Lechu-ga did not have the requisite knowledge of Pagan’s arrangements with Pinto to be said to have joined that purported conspiracy. Accordingly, Lechuga’s conviction for conspiracy must be reversed. I, therefore, respectfully dissent in the matters indicated.

. The majority engages in imaginative but wholly insupportable speculation that "Lechuga might have been frightened to deal face to face with Pinto, whom he had short-changed....” Ante at 347. The fact is that Lechuga never had an opportunity to deal face to face with Pinto.

. In the words of the majority, “If Lechuga and Pagan had the same simple seller-buyer relationship as Lechuga and Pinto, then, for the reasons explained earlier, there was no conspiracy between them." Ante at 350. The fact is that Lechuga dealt with Pagan as Pinto's buying agent. Lechuga’s relationship to Pagan was identical to his relationship to Pinto.

. Three defendants in Baker petitioned for certio-rari. The Supreme Court denied all three. Baker v. United States, 498 U.S. 876, 111 S.Ct. 206, 112 L.Ed.2d 167 (1990); Manns v. United States, 498 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 270, 112 L.Ed.2d 226 (1990); Manns v. United States, 498 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 686, 112 L.Ed.2d 677 (1991).

. Knowledge is thus a necessary but not a sufficient precursor to participation in a conspiracy.

. Perhaps there is honor among "thieves.” And I cannot imagine that a drug dealer who habitually shorted his customers would stay in business long. There is nothing extraordinary here from which conspiracy might be inferred.

. Drug dealers, like most participants in an underground economy, likely have effective collection methods.

. Pagan was an independent businessman who purchased cocaine from Lechuga to supply his own customers, and Lechuga had no direct pecuniary interest in his success.

. On this point, I agree with the majority: "Prolonged cooperation is neither the meaning of conspiracy nor an essential element, but it is one type of evidence of an agreement that goes beyond what is implicit in any consensual undertaking, such as a spot sale.” Ante at 350 (emphasis added).

. The majority has implied that citation of these factors pointing to conspiracy is too generalized to be of much help in the future. But the majority’s efforts at a bright-line rule arc even more unavailing. The majority's carefully crafted rule docs little more than state the obvious: to prove a conspiracy to distribute cocaine one must show something more than an agreement to sell, in fact, one must show an agreement to distribute. This statement, however, offers no insight into the facts from which such an agreement may be inferred. My answer to the difficult question, "What more than a sale for resale is necessary to prove a conspiracy?" is multi-faceted. This is inescapable since this is the only way to take into consideration the many variables that distinguish knowledge that something will occur, e.g., subsequent distribution, from an agreement to bring that something about.