Court Opinion

ID: 9772094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:11.803328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.046159
License: Public Domain

DALLY, Judge,
dissenting.
It should be remembered that this appellant was not prosecuted for theft of an automobile, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.-03(a), (b)(1); he was not prosecuted for appropriating stolen property knowing that it had been stolen by another, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.03(a), (b)(2); he was prosecuted for the offense of intentionally and knowingly using a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner.
The majority says:
*189“The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction because the State did not prove that the appellant knew the automobile was stolen. We agree with appellant’s contention and reverse....
“The State has the burden to prove all of the elements of an offense. Under the facts of this case, the State was required to prove that the appellant knew that the car was stolen in order to show that the appellant intentionally and knowingly operated the vehicle without the owner’s consent. Knowledge that the property was stolen may be implied from the circumstances.”
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.07(a) provides that:
“A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly operates another’s boat, airplane or motor-propelled vehicle without the effective consent of the owner.”
Paul Merritt, the lawful owner of the automobile, testified that he did not consent to the appellant’s use of his motor vehicle. There is ample evidence that the appellant intentionally and knowingly drove and operated the motor vehicle which belonged to Paul Merritt. This evidence supports the allegations of the indictment and is ample to sustain the conviction. See e. g., Shaw v. State, 529 S.W.2d 75 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Glover v. State, 566 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
It is the appellant who has interposed the defense that someone else stole the automobile and he, the appellant, not knowing it was stolen, used the motor vehicle thinking he had the consent of one who could lawfully give such consent. It is incorrect to say that the State must prove what the appellant has set up for his defense. The State proved all that is necessary to be proved to sustain the conviction and the judge as the trier of the facts did not believe the appellant’s defense and found him guilty. Cf. Glover v. State, supra; Shaw v. State, supra.
Since the evidence amply supports the conviction for the unauthorized use of the motor vehicle, this Court is in error in saying that it was necessary for the State to prove that the appellant knew that the automobile was stolen. The majority are improperly acting as fact finders and have improperly acquitted the appellant. See Lyles v. State, 582 S.W.2d 138 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). I dissent.
Before the court en banc.