Court Opinion

ID: 9906039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:26.717408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.843154
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Moore CA4/1
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081699

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD290659)

GIOVONNI ARMAINI MOORE,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Reverse and remand to correct number of conduct
credits and affirm in all other respects.
         Kirstin M. Ault, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel
Rogers and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                            I. INTRODUCTION
      Giovonni Armaini Moore appeals from a January 9, 2023, sentencing
order that he claims denied him of 106 days of conduct credit for the time he
spent at Patton State Hospital (Patton) after January 1, 2022, in violation of
Penal Code section 4019.1 The People concede Moore is entitled to an
additional 106 days of conduct credit. We agree.

          II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      On June 25, 2021, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a
complaint charging Moore with one count of felony robbery, in violation of
section 211, and one count of misdemeanor battery, in violation of section
242, after he struck a woman and took her personal property.
      On July 7, 2021, proceedings were suspended pursuant to section 1368
pending Moore’s mental competency evaluation. On September 27, 2021, the
court received a competency evaluation, found Moore not mentally competent
to stand trial, and ordered Moore committed to Patton.
      On June 17, 2022, the court received a further competency evaluation,
determined Moore was mentally competent to stand trial, and reinstated the
criminal proceeding.
      On December 8, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, Moore pleaded
guilty to one count of robbery, in violation of section 211, and admitted his
2017 burglary conviction was a strike prior, pursuant to sections 667,
subdivisions (b) through (i), 668, and 1170.12. Moore stipulated to a six-year
prison sentence.
      In the January 9, 2023, Stipulated Sentence Report, the probation
department indicated Moore was confined in county jail from June 23, 2021

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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through April 7, 2022 [289 days]; moved to Patton from April 8, 2022 through
August 10, 2022 [125 days]; and moved back to county jail until his
sentencing on January 9, 2023 [152 days]. The probation department
recommended Moore be sentenced to the stipulated six-year sentence and
that he be given credit for a total of 650 days, comprised of 566 actual days
and 84 conduct days (applying section 2933.1’s 15 percent limitation to 566).
      At the January 9, 2023, sentencing hearing, Moore objected to the
probation department’s credit calculation, asserted the 15 percent cap on
conduct credits under section 2933.1 did not apply to the time he spent at
Patton,2 and requested the court to award him 124 days of conduct credit for
the time at Patton based on section 4019. The People submitted on the
probation department’s credit calculation.
       The trial court denied Moore’s request regarding conduct credits,
stating: “I’m not aware of any authority that says the defendant is entitled to
4019s while at Patton and then gets 2933.1 as well serving his prison
commitment.”3 The court then sentenced Moore to the stipulated six-year
prison term. The court followed the probation department’s recommendation

2     Moore does not dispute his presentence time in the county jail is
subject to the 15 percent limitation of section 2933.1 because he was
convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 (robbery).
(§ 2933.1, subd. (a).)

3     This case is an example of “how perplexing the computation of custody
credits may be for the trial court.” (People v. Daniels (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
736, 739.) Courts have authorized the use of two formulas to calculate
custody credits in some situations because “the calculation of conduct credits
depends on the purpose for which they are being calculated.” (People v.
Arevalo (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 821, 827 [section 4019 governs calculation of
credits when defendant convicted of violent felony is placed on probation, but
section 2933.1 governs calculation if that defendant later sentenced to
prison]; see also Daniels, supra, at pp. 739-742 [same].)
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and granted him 650 total days of credit, divided into 566 actual days and
84 conduct days, with all of the conduct days capped at 15 percent of the
total, pursuant to section 2933.1.
      On February 3, 2023, Moore timely filed a notice of appeal. (§ 1237;
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).)

                              III. DISCUSSION
      A. Standard of Review
      We review the trial court’s interpretation of sections 2933.1 and 4019
de novo. (People v. Yang (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 120, 125; see also People v.
Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294 [“We independently review
questions of statutory interpretation. [Citation.]”].) In our review, we are
guided by long-established principles of statutory interpretation. First, “our
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th
136, 142.) “We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain
and commonsense meaning. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “If the statutory language is
unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If, however, the language
supports more than one reasonable construction, then we may look to
extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the
legislative history. [Citation.]” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975.)

      B. Section 4019
      We first examine section 4019. Section 4019 “offer[s] prisoners in local
custody the opportunity to earn ‘conduct credit’ against their sentences for
good behavior.” (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 317.) In October
2021, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 317, which took effect on
January 1, 2022, and amended section 4019 to expand eligibility for

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presentence conduct credit to a prisoner confined in or committed to a mental
health treatment facility. (People v. Orellana (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 319,
333.) As a result, the statute now applies to “a prisoner [who] is confined in
or committed to a state hospital or other mental health treatment facility, or
to a county jail treatment facility[ ] . . . .” (§ 4019, subd. (a)(8).) We find this
language unambiguous. (See Orellana, supra, at p. 333 [“The plain meaning
of [subdivision (a)(8)] is that, as of January 1, 2022, defendants undergoing
treatment for incompetence in a state hospital are eligible for section 4019
conduct credit on the same terms as those confined to county jails.”].)

      C. Section 2933.1
      Next, we turn to section 2933.1. Section 2933.1, subdivision (c), limits
conduct credit earned under section 4019 to 15 percent of the actual period of
confinement, but this limitation only applies to a confinement in “a county
jail, industrial farm, or road camp, or a city jail, industrial farm, or road
camp[.]” (§ 2933.1, subd. (c).) The parties agree, as do we, the plain language
of the statute indicates the 15 percent limitation on conduct credit does not
apply to persons confined in a state mental hospital.4 (See People v. Ramos
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 816 [finding 15 percent in section 2933.1
unambiguously means 15 percent and nothing more.].)

      D. Correction of Moore’s Conduct Credit on Remand
      We conclude section 2933.1’s 15 percent limitation does not apply to the
time Moore spent at Patton, and section 4019 allows Moore to receive conduct
credit for the time he spent at Patton after January 1, 2022. Therefore,
Moore is entitled to 124 days of conduct credit for the 125 days he served at

4     We acknowledge courts have found some of the language in section
2933.1 to be ambiguous, but we have not found any authority addressing the
specific language of the statute at issue here.
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Patton.5 (People v. Whitaker (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1358 [“Section
4019 . . . requires that a defendant actually serve two days in custody before
he or she will be entitled to two additional days of conduct credit. A
defendant who serves an odd number of days is not entitled to an additional
single day of conduct credit for his or her final day of actual custody.” (Italics
omitted.)].)

                              IV. DISPOSITION
      The January 9, 2023, sentencing order is reversed and the matter is
remanded to the trial court to give Moore an additional 106 days of conduct
credit. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections.
In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

                                                         MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DO, J.

5     We do not assess the accuracy of the calculation because both parties
agree Moore is entitled to an additional 106 days of conduct credit for his
time at Patton.
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