Court Opinion

ID: 9706613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:47:33.944823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:27.532677
License: Public Domain

*315O’Connell, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (wdca) and its exception for intentional torts is found in MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131X1). This statute provides as follows:
The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law.
As relevant to the present dispute, to constitute specific intent under the statute, plaintiff must establish that "the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.” Cavalier Mfg Co v Employers Ins of Wausau, 211 Mich App 330, 336; 535 NW2d 583 (1995).
It is not enough that the employer knew an injury might occur at some point in time. Oaks v Twin City Foods, Inc, 198 Mich App 296, 297; 497 NW2d 196 (1993). It is also not enough that the employer knew that the press was in need of some repair. Plaintiff must establish more than mere negligence on the part of the employer. Plaintiff must establish that he was subject to unavoidable *316danger of injury that the exercise of due care could not prevent. Cavalier, supra at 338.
In the present case, plaintiff was operating a press described as a "Minster Part Revolution Press.” The press had a safety feature referred to as a "pull-back” device. The pull-back device consisted of bands or hooks placed around the operator’s wrists. The bands or hooks are attached to a pulley located near to the top of the press. The pull-back device is set up such that when the press is activated, i.e., begins to descend toward the die, it pulls the wrists away from the die, thereby preventing the operator’s hands from being caught in the "pinch point” when the press strikes the die. Plaintiff worked on the press for approximately six to seven hours before the incident occurred. Plaintiff sustained an injury to his hand when the pull-back device allegedly failed to function properly, causing plaintiff’s left hand to become caught in the die. Plaintiff alleges that since the press had previously malfunctioned, the employer "had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.” Plaintiff alleges facts that may amount to negligence, but they do not rise to the level of an intentional tort.
Two days before this injury, plaintiff’s foreman was advised that the press had malfunctioned. The foreman immediately shut the job down and advised his supervisors. The press was ordered to be repaired. It is uncertain whether the press was repaired or whether it was improperly repaired. The repair needed was an adjustment to the "pullback devices.” What is certain is that the pull-back device malfunctioned and the plaintiff was tragically injured.
This Court’s review of motions for summary disposition is de novo. Coleman-Nichols v Tixon *317Corp, 203 Mich App 645, 650; 513 NW2d 441 (1994). In Oaks, supra at 297-298, we stated:
To satisfy specific intent under the statute, it must be established that "the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge.” Pawlak v Redox Corp, 182 Mich App 758, 768; 453 NW2d 304 (1990) (emphasis in original). The intentional tort exception is not triggered simply because the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was likely to occur at some point during the performance of a given task. See Benson v Callahan Mining Corp, 191 Mich App 443, 446-447; 479 NW2d 12 (1991). Similarly, it is not enough that the employer acted recklessly and even envisioned the type of accident that did in fact occur. Phillips v Ludvanwall, Inc, 190 Mich App 136, 139-140; 475 NW2d 423 (1991).
On the day in question, plaintiff had operated the press for six or seven hours before the accident occurred. For the reasons stated in Benson and Phillips, the trial court properly ruled that plaintiffs allegations fail to establish an intentional tort because they do not establish that defendant had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and wilfully disregarded that knowledge. Oaks, supra at 298. At best, plaintiffs allegations reveal a failure to repair the press or improper repairs (adjustments) to the pull backs. These alleged facts may indicate negligence, however, they do not rise to the level of an intentional tort.
I would find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion for summary disposition.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court.