Court Opinion

ID: 9409477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 14:12:04.373346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.744505
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Athey, Ortiz and Senior Judge Clements

              ANDREI J. KUBLAN, ESQUIRE
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.      Record No. 1073-22-4                                        PER CURIAM
                                                                                  JULY 18, 2023
              DEVON B. HUMPHREYS, ESQUIRE

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
                                               Stephen E. Sincavage, Judge

                               (Andrei J. Kublan; Kublan Khan PLC, on briefs), pro se.

                               (John C. Whitbeck, Jr.; WhitbeckBennett PLLC, on brief), for
                               appellee.

                      The Circuit Court of Loudoun County (“circuit court”) awarded sanctions against Andrei J.

              Kublan, Esquire (“Kublan”) after he issued a witness subpoena to an attorney who, by virtue of

              being bound by attorney-client privilege, could not testify without her former client waiving her

              privilege. On appeal, Kublan contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by sanctioning

              him because the witness subpoena he issued was well grounded in fact and existing law. After

              examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is

              unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

              As a result, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                         I. BACKGROUND

                      Alexey Avdeev (“father”) and Ievgeniia Doroshenko (“mother”) were married on October

              23, 2014. They are the parents of a minor child (“the child”). On November 7, 2018, the circuit

              court entered a final order of divorce, awarding mother a divorce from father.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
        On April 20, 2021, mother was represented by the appellee, Devon B. Humphreys, Esquire

(“Humphreys”), and Humphreys filed a petition to modify custody of and visitation with the child.

While her petition was pending, mother enrolled the child in a new school without notifying father

or obtaining his consent. Father subsequently filed a petition for rule to show cause, contending that

mother’s unilateral decision to enroll the child in a new school violated the final order of divorce.

After the circuit court issued the requested rule to show cause, Humphreys withdrew from her

representation as mother’s counsel before being replaced by Kublan.1 The circuit court scheduled a

hearing on the rule to show cause for June 7, 2022.

        On May 31, 2022, Kublan issued a witness subpoena to Humphreys related to her role as

mother’s former counsel (“the witness subpoena”). Humphreys then retained her own counsel,

who contacted Kublan concerning the issuance of the witness subpoena. Kublan informed

Humphreys’ counsel that Humphreys was “being subpoenaed as a witness so she could confirm

that she had provided [mother] with . . . legal advice to unilaterally transfer the child to another

school.” Humphreys’ counsel responded by informing Kublan that Humphreys’

communications with mother were protected by attorney-client privilege and that Humphreys

could not discuss the alleged advice nor testify unless mother waived the privilege. Kublan then

advised Humphreys that mother would not waive mother’s attorney-client privilege and that “if it

[became] necessary,” mother would do so “in court on June 7th before or during . . . Humphreys’

testimony.”

        On June 3, 2022, counsel for Humphreys filed a motion to quash the witness subpoena

and requested that the circuit court sanction Kublan under Code § 8.01-271.1(B) for issuing the

        1
          On May 31, 2022, father filed an amended petition for rule to show cause clarifying his
position that mother’s decision to enroll the child in a new school violated both the final order of
divorce as well as a separate custody order. The circuit court granted father’s petition and issued
a new rule to show cause on June 3, 2022.
                                                  -2-
witness subpoena “while simultaneously refusing to have his client waive . . . attorney-client

privilege.” In accordance with the witness subpoena, Humphreys and her counsel appeared at

the June 7, 2022 hearing on the rule to show cause, at which point Kublan withdrew the

subpoena.2

        The circuit court subsequently held a hearing on Humphreys’ motion to sanction Kublan

on June 24, 2022. During the hearing, Humphreys contended that since she could not have

testified without a waiver of attorney-client privilege, and mother had refused to waive the

privilege, the witness subpoena was frivolous pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1(B). In response,

Kublan argued that he had a good-faith basis for serving the witness subpoena because mother

informed him that Humphreys had previously advised her that she could “go ahead and take the

child out of [her current] school and put her in a different school.” Kublan, however, admitted

that he did not know whether Humphreys would confirm mother’s claim and that he did not

“want [mother] to waive attorney-client privilege” because “[he] might not want [Humphreys] to

testify.”

        After argument on the motion for sanctions, the circuit court found that “at the heart of all

of this was . . . Kublan’s attempt and intention to zealously represent his client.” The circuit

court found that Kublan nevertheless violated Code § 8.01-271.1(B) because, absent a waiver of

attorney-client privilege, “it was not well grounded in fact and existing law to issue a subpoena

to an attorney when the subject of the desired testimony of the attorney . . . clearly and directly

flows . . . from the attorney’s representation . . . of [her] former client.” The circuit court further

opined that there was “not an apparent intention to provide a sufficient written waiver of

attorney-client privilege” that would have allowed Humphreys to testify “about the matters that

        2
        Kublan contends that he orally withdrew the subpoena before the June 7, 2022 hearing.
Humphreys maintained, however, that, although Kublan stated that he would withdraw the
subpoena, he never did so nor provided a written release.
                                              -3-
the subpoena was intended to elicit testimony about.” As a result, the circuit court ordered

Kublan to pay Humphreys’ attorney fees in the amount of $1,250. Kublan appeals.

                                              II. ANALYSIS

                                         A. Standard of Review

        “Under settled principles, we apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a

sanctions award pursuant to Code § 8.01-271.1.” AV Automotive, LLC v. Gebreyessus, 301 Va.

321, 329 (2022) (quoting Robert & Bertha Robinson Fam., LLC v. Allen, 295 Va. 130, 139 (2018)).

A “court’s imposition of a sanction will not be reversed on appeal unless the court abused its

discretion in 1) its decision to sanction the litigant, or 2) in the court’s choice of the particular

sanction employed.” Id. (quoting Switzer v. Switzer, 273 Va. 326, 331 (2007)).

                                               B. Sanctions

        Kublan contends, on brief, that his actions could not constitute a violation of Code

§ 8.01-271.1(B) and therefore the circuit court erred in sanctioning him. We disagree.

        Code § 8.01-271.1(B) states:

                The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him
                that (i) he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper, (ii) to the
                best of his knowledge, information and belief, formed after
                reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
                existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification,
                or reversal of existing law, and (iii) it is not interposed for any
                improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
                needless increase in the cost of litigation.

Code § 8.01-271.1 further provides that “[i]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed or made in

violation of this section, the court . . . shall impose upon the person who signed the paper or made

the motion, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction.” Code § 8.01-271.1(D).

        This Court uses “an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a litigant

and his attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the pleading

was well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
                                                    -4-
modification, or reversal of existing law.” Gebreyessus, 301 Va. at 330 (quoting Flippo v. CSC

Assocs. III, L.L.C., 262 Va. 48, 65-66 (2001)). It further resolves any doubts “in favor of the

counsel and party filing the pleading.” Id.

       Kublan contends that the circuit court erred by finding that he violated Code

§ 8.01-271.1(B) because the witness subpoena was well grounded in fact and warranted by law. He

argues that it was objectively reasonable for him to issue the witness subpoena based on mother’s

representation of Humphreys’ advice to her regarding the underlying custody matter. He further

submits that there is no general prohibition against subpoenaing a party’s former counsel.

       Kublan’s contentions ignore the key rationale supporting the circuit court’s imposition of

sanctions, namely that he issued a witness subpoena to an attorney who, bound by attorney-client

privilege, could not testify.3 See Castillo v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 394, 429 (2019)

(“Virginia law recognizes that ‘[c]onfidential communications between attorney and client made

because of that relationship and concerning the subject matter of the attorney’s employment “are

privileged from disclosure, even for the purpose of administering justice.”’” (quoting

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 235 Va. 499, 508-09 (1988))). Here, the record clearly demonstrates

that before issuing the witness subpoena, Kublan understood that Humphreys could not testify

unless mother waived her attorney-client privilege because he acknowledged that he did not want

       3
          Kublan argues that it was not necessary for mother to waive her attorney-client privilege
because Humphreys was “free to provide the exculpatory evidence on the specific issue of her
legal advice” under the Virginia State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. Kublan did not
present this argument to the circuit court and consistently took the position that a waiver was
necessary for Humphreys to testify. Indeed, Kublan admitted that he did not know whether
Humphreys would confirm mother’s claim and that he did not “want [mother] to waive
attorney-client privilege” because “[he] might not want [Humphreys] to testify.” Accordingly,
we do not address whether a waiver of attorney-client privilege was necessary for Humphreys to
testify because Kublan failed to preserve this argument for appeal. See Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling
of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with
reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable this Court
to attain the ends of justice.”).
                                                   -5-
mother to waive the privilege until he determined that Humphreys’ testimony would be beneficial.

Hence, the circuit court correctly found that there “was not an apparent intention to provide a

sufficient written waiver of attorney-client privilege” following the issuance of the subpoena. Thus,

mother’s refusal to waive her attorney-client privilege, and Kublan’s refusal to recommend that she

do so, amply supports this finding.

         In conclusion, since the record supports the circuit court’s finding that Kublan issued a

witness subpoena to an attorney who, bound by attorney-client privilege, could not testify, we

further find that an objectively reasonable person, after reasonable inquiry, could not have formed a

reasonable belief that the witness subpoena was well grounded in fact. See Gebreyessus, 301 Va. at

330. Hence, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning Kublan by requiring him to

reimburse Humphreys for the $1,250 of attorney fees she expended in opposing the witness

subpoena frivolously issued by Kublan. Thus, the circuit court did not err.

                                      C. Appellate Attorney Fees

         As a final matter, Humphreys requests, on brief, that this Court award her attorney fees and

costs incurred in connection with this appeal under Rule 5A:30(b). See O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin,

23 Va. App. 690, 695 (1996). “This Court has discretion to grant or deny attorney’s fees incurred

on appeal.” Stark v. Dinarany, 73 Va. App. 733, 757 (2021). “In making such a determination, the

Court considers all the equities of the case.” Id.; see Rule 5A:30(b)(3). After considering the record

before us and the equities of the case, we deny Humphreys’ request for appellate attorney fees and

costs.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

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