Court Opinion

ID: 9369054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 19:00:58.953036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:12.613308
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30078      Document: 00516636936           Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/07/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                          February 7, 2023
                                    No. 22-30078
                                                                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk

   Raymond Harold Kimble, III,

                                                              Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                        versus

   Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office; Joseph P. Lopinto, III,
   individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff; Lindsay L. Truhe,
   individually and in her official capacity as Assistant District Attorney at 24th
   Judicial District Court; Sue Ellen Monfra, individually and in her
   official capacity as Deputy Chief of Jefferson Parish Correctional Center;
   Daniel J. Schilling, individually and in his official capacity as Attorney
   at 24th Judicial District Court; Richard M. Thompson, individually
   and in his official capacity as District Defender at 24th Judicial District Court;
   Jefferson Parish; Sean Hayes, individually and in his official capacity as
   Deputy, Jefferson Parish Correctional Center; Sean Thompson,
   individually and in his official capacity as Deputy, Jefferson Parish Correctional
   Center,

                                                            Defendants—Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                             USDC No. 2:21-CV-409

   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-30078         Document: 00516636936             Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/07/2023

                                         No. 22-30078

   Per Curiam:*
          In February 2021, Raymond Harold Kimble, III, then a pretrial
   detainee housed at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, filed a pro se 42
   U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Eastern District of Louisiana (“EDLA”) against
   more than 40 defendants. His claims stemmed from his arrest, detention,
   and prosecution for offenses occurring in East Baton Rouge and Jefferson
   Parishes in 2016. Kimble’s civil case has a long procedural history and is still
   proceeding in the EDLA. Before filing this case in the EDLA, Kimble filed a
   civil action in the Middle District of Louisiana (“MDLA”) on October 19,
   2020, against many of the same defendants. That action also remains
   pending.
           This appeal involves Kimble’s challenge to a Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 54(b) judgment entered January 18, 2022, dismissing certain
   claims against three groups of defendants in the EDLA action. In that
   judgment, the district court adopted the report and recommendation of the
   magistrate judge and found “no just cause for delay” in entering final
   judgment.
           First, the EDLA court dismissed without prejudice Kimble’s claims
   of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution against
   numerous defendants. The court determined the claims were malicious and
   dismissed them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A. 1
           The court also dismissed, with prejudice, Kimble’s claims alleging
   speedy trial violations, excessive bail, and ineffective assistance of counsel
   against Jefferson Parish, Public Defender Richard Thompson, 2 Public
   Defender Daniel Schilling, and Assistant District Attorney Lindsay Truhe.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
          1
              Kimble does not appeal the EDLA court’s dismissal of these claims.
          2
             The record contains several different spellings of Thompson’s name. We use the
   spelling from the caption of his brief.

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                                         No. 22-30078

   The court determined that these claims were properly dismissed pursuant to
   § 1915(e) and § 1915A as frivolous, for failure to state claims for relief, and as
   brought against an immune defendant.
           Finally, the district court dismissed without prejudice Kimble’s
   claims of sexual assault under the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)
   and retaliation against Deputy Sean Hayes, Deputy Sean Thompson, Chief
   Sue Ellen Monfra, Sheriff Joseph Lopinto, III, and the Jefferson Parish
   Sheriff’s Office. The court determined that these claims were likewise
   malicious under § 1915(e) and § 1915A because they were duplicative of the
   matters pending in the prior-filed MDLA case. 3
           Kimble timely filed a notice of appeal challenging the EDLA court’s
   dismissal of his claims against Thompson, Schilling, Truhe, and Jefferson
   Parish for due process violations and ineffective assistance of counsel; and
   Lopinto, Monfra, Hayes, Thompson, and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s
   Office for sexual assault and retaliation. 4
                                               I.
           As a preliminary matter, we must confirm our jurisdiction, as some of
   Kimble’s claims remain pending in the district court. See Trent v. Wade, 776
   F.3d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 2015). Rule 54(b) addresses such situations by
   enabling a district court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,

           3
             The MDLA court severed Kimble’s sexual assault and retaliation claims from his
   other claims on February 5, 2021, and ordered Kimble to file a new complaint against those
   defendants. Later that month, Kimble alleged the same claims, against the same
   defendants, in the EDLA action. At the time the magistrate judge’s report and
   recommendation was filed in the EDLA, the MDLA docket disclosed no separate cause of
   action for the severed claims, and that court had not dismissed Kimble’s sexual assault and
   retaliation claims.
           4
             While Kimble’s briefing groups these defendants into separate claims and
   categories, we follow the district court’s grouping of the claims for ease of analysis.

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   but fewer than all, claims or parties [but] only if the court expressly
   determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
   The language in the appealed order, either itself or together with portions of
   the record referenced in the ruling, must reflect the unmistakable intent of
   the district court to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).
   Briargrove Shopping Ctr. Joint Venture v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 170 F.3d 536,
   539 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Jackson v. Cruz, 852 F. App’x 114, 116 (5th Cir.
   2021) (per curiam) (explaining “unmistakable intent” exists when the court
   “directly mentions Rule 54(b)”).
          Here, the challenged order is titled “Rule 54(b) Judgment,” states
   that there is “no just cause for delay,” and indicates the district court’s
   unmistakable intent to dismiss certain claims from the ongoing proceeding.
   “[N]othing else [was] required to make the order appealable.” Briargrove,
   170 F.3d at 539 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We therefore
   have jurisdiction to consider Kimble’s appeal. See id. at 539–41.
                                         II.
          Turning to the merits, we review de novo the district court’s dismissal
   of claims under § 1915A(b) and § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Geiger v. Jowers, 404
   F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“We review the dismissal of a
   complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as frivolous for abuse of
   discretion, and . . . dismissal . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1997e(c)(1)
   de novo. Because the district court referred to all three statutes in dismissing
   [Plaintiff-Appellant’s] claims, we review the issues de novo.”). A district
   court shall dismiss a prisoner’s civil rights complaint if it “is frivolous,
   malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or if it
   seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. § 1915A(b); see also
   § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing similarly).      An action may be dismissed as
   “malicious” if it “involve[s] a duplicative action arising from the same series

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                                    No. 22-30078

   of events and alleg[es] many of the same facts as an earlier suit[.]” Bailey v.
   Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also Pittman v.
   Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994–95 (5th Cir. 1993). Such is the case with Kimble’s
   claims.
          Kimble contends that the district court erred in dismissing his claims
   against: (A) Public Defender Thompson and Jefferson Parish for violating
   his constitutional rights and for ineffective assistance of counsel, and
   Schilling and Truhe for breach of the attorney client privilege and ineffective
   assistance of counsel; and (B) Jefferson Parish, Lopinto, Monfra, Hayes, and
   Deputy Thompson for violating PREA, sexual assault, and retaliation. The
   district court did not err in dismissing these claims.
          A.     Thompson, Schilling, Truhe, and Jefferson Parish
          The district court entered judgment for Thompson, Schilling, Truhe,
   and Jefferson Parish as to Kimble’s § 1983 speedy trial, excessive bail, and
   ineffective assistance claims because the court concluded they were
   “frivolous, for failure to state claim for which relief can be granted, and/or
   for being brought against an immune defendant, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
   § 1915(e) and § 1915A.” We agree.
          As an initial matter, Kimble’s speedy trial, ineffective assistance, and
   due process claims “lie ‘within the core of habeas corpus.’” Wilkinson v.
   Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487
   (1973)); see also Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. Transitional Plan. Dep’t, 37
   F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The core issue in determining whether a
   prisoner must pursue habeas corpus relief rather than a [§ 1983] action is to
   determine whether the prisoner challenges the ‘fact or duration’ of his
   confinement or merely the rules, customs, and procedures affecting
   ‘conditions’ of confinement.”). Kimble therefore should have pursued these
   claims through habeas proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Serio v. Members

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                                        No. 22-30078

   of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
   claims that impact the constitutionality of a plaintiff’s state conviction or
   sentence must be initially pursued through state habeas proceedings).
   However, “in instances in which a petition combines claims that should be
   asserted in habeas with claims that properly may be pursued as an initial
   matter under § 1983, and the claims can be separated, federal courts should
   do so, entertaining the § 1983 claims.” Serio, 821 F.2d at 1119. That is the
   case here, as Kimble seeks both monetary damages and injunctive relief for
   these claims; we thus separate his § 1983 claims for analysis. 5
           Section 1983 provides a remedy for the deprivation of federal rights
   “under color of state law.” Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 518 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (internal quotation marks omitted). Private individuals are not generally
   considered to be state actors for the purpose of § 1983, but “a private
   individual may act under color of law in certain circumstances, such as when
   a private person is involved in a conspiracy or participates in joint activity
   with state actors.” Id. The same principle applies to public defenders like
   Thompson and Schilling, who are not state actors in this context absent any
   allegation of complicity between the attorneys and other state actors. See Polk
   Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324–25 (1981) (holding that public defenders
   are not state actors for § 1983 purposes when acting in their role as counsel
   to a defendant); Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214, 216–17 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (dismissing claims that alleged “nothing more than professional
   malpractice” against private defense attorneys).

           5
             To the extent Kimble attempts to request habeas relief in the instant case, his
   petition would be subject to dismissal because he has not exhausted state remedies. 28
   U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be
   granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
   courts of the State[.]”).

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                                         No. 22-30078

           Kimble’s allegations against Thompson and Schilling at best boil
   down to professional malpractice, which is insufficient to render them
   amenable to suit under § 1983. See Pete, 8 F.3d at 216–17. Thus, as to the
   ineffective assistance claims, the district court correctly determined that
   Kimble failed to state any valid claim against his attorneys. 6 See Dodson, 454
   U.S. at 325.
           Likewise, Kimble’s claims against Assistant District Attorney Truhe,
   both in her official and individual capacity, were properly dismissed. As for
   her official capacity, Truhe acted as an arm of Jefferson Parish, the
   governmental entity she represented. Cf. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
   54, 60 (2011) (analyzing lawsuit against “Connick, in his official capacity as
   the Orleans Parish District Attorney,” under municipal liability principles);
   Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 470 (5th Cir. 1999) (“For
   purposes of ‘official capacity’ suits under § 1983, the district attorney’s
   office resembles other local government entities.”).                 Under Monell v.
   Department of Social Services, Kimble was thus required to show that “action
   pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
   tort.” 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Kimble has not alleged that Truhe is a final
   policymaker for the Parish or the District Attorney’s Office. Nor has Kimble
   identified any policy involved that caused a constitutional injury. Thus, the

           6
             Insofar as Kimble alleges that Thompson violated his constitutional rights during
   the performance of administrative functions, Kimble would arguably have sufficiently
   alleged that Thompson was acting under color of state law. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 325
   (“It may be—although the question is not present in this case—that a public defender also
   would act under color of state law while performing certain administrative and possibly
   investigative functions.”). But even liberally construed, such an argument concerns only
   Kimble’s speedy trial, due process, and equal protection claims and should have been
   pursued via habeas relief. Moreover, because success on these issues would implicate the
   validity of Kimble’s convictions, any claims for damages are barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
   See 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994); see also Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81–82.

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   district court correctly determined that Kimble failed to state a Monell claim
   against Truhe in her official capacity.
           Kimble’s claims against Truhe in her individual capacity also fail. As
   a prosecutor, Truhe is “absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for
   [her] conduct in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,
   insofar as that conduct is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
   criminal process.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2003) (per
   curiam) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). 7 The district court
   did not err in dismissing these claims as frivolous and otherwise for failure to
   state a claim for which relief can be granted.
           Finally, Kimble’s claims against Jefferson Parish were also properly
   dismissed. Under Monell, Kimble was required to allege and identify a
   specific policy that caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. 436
   U.S. at 691. As noted above, he has failed to do so. And, to the extent these
   claims overlap with the pending MDLA case, they are also duplicative and
   malicious. See infra II.B.
           In sum: The district court correctly dismissed Kimble’s § 1983 due
   process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Thompson,
   Schilling, Truhe, and Jefferson Parish as frivolous, for failure to state a claim,
   and as brought against an immune defendant (Truhe).
           B.      Lopinto, Monfra, Hayes, and Thompson, and Jefferson
                   Parish Sheriff’s Office
           Kimble also challenges the dismissal of his sexual assault and
   retaliation claims against Deputy Hayes, Deputy Thompson, Chief Monfra,

           7
             Furthermore, Younger abstention likely applies to Kimble’s claims against Truhe
   for injunctive relief because there are ongoing state criminal proceedings involving Kimble.
   See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971).

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   Sheriff Lopinto, and the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office as malicious
   pursuant to § 1915(e) and § 1915A. In analyzing these claims, the district
   court, through the adoption of the magistrate judge’s report and
   recommendation, noted that the district judge in the MDLA action severed
   the claims and ordered Kimble to file a new complaint; the MDLA docket
   contained no separate case for the severed claims; the MDLA court had not
   dismissed the claims notwithstanding the severance; and Kimble filed his
   EDLA complaint after the severance order in the MDLA action. Because the
   MDLA claims remained pending, the district court in this case dismissed the
   sexual assault and retaliation claims as duplicative and therefore malicious.
   Kimble challenges this analysis, arguing (as liberally construed) that his
   claims are not malicious because (1) they are not duplicative in light of the
   MDLA severance order, and (2) he alleged Lopinto and Monfra were liable
   based on their administrative function and actions as policymakers in the
   EDLA action but not in the MDLA action. Neither argument is persuasive.
          When the district court dismissed Kimble’s EDLA claims, his sexual
   assault and retaliation claims remained pending in the MDLA. Though
   severed, they were nonetheless duplicative of his EDLA claims. See Acevedo
   v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 2010) (per
   curiam). And even if Kimble did not base his MDLA claims on the precise
   theory of liability—Lopinto’s and Monfra’s administrative and policymaking
   roles—the claims stem from the same factual allegations that Kimble
   asserted in his EDLA complaint. Therefore, the EDLA court properly
   dismissed the claims as duplicative and malicious. See Brown v. Tex. Bd. of
   Nursing, 554 F. App’x 268, 269 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (affirming
   dismissal of complaint as duplicative and thus malicious because even if it
   raised new claims, the claims stemmed from the same event challenged in
   prior state and federal cases).

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                                         No. 22-30078

           Finally, and with quite liberal construction, Kimble argues that he will
   be prejudiced if the EDLA court’s dismissal is not reversed because the
   MDLA court has now dismissed, without prejudice, Kimble’s sexual assault
   and retaliation claims. We are unmoved by Kimble’s argument, as it is based
   on his own gamesmanship in filing duplicative actions. 8 And, we see no
   reason to stray from our long-held rule of only considering facts that were
   before the district court at the time of the challenged ruling. See Theriot v.
   Par. of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999).
                                             III.
           In addition to appealing the dismissal of his claims, Kimble moves this
   court for the appointment of counsel. A court is not required to appoint
   counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights action unless there are
   exceptional circumstances. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 581 (5th Cir.
   2012). In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, courts
   consider “many factors,” including the complexity of the litigation and the
   indigent litigant’s abilities. Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock Cnty., 929 F.2d 1078,
   1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
           The instant appeal involves review of a discrete ruling. Although
   Kimble argues that he will have difficulty litigating his claims due to his
   imprisonment, he has demonstrated the ability to present his claims in the
   district court (indeed, in two district courts simultaneously) and on appeal.

           8
             Kimble patently filed the same claims in two different courts. He was admonished
   by the EDLA magistrate judge’s November 2021 report and recommendation for the
   blatantly duplicative litigation. Later that month, Kimble moved voluntarily to dismiss the
   MDLA claims. Soon thereafter, in January 2022, the district court here issued its final
   judgment dismissing the EDLA claims. Kimble took no action in either court. In July 2022,
   the MDLA magistrate judge recommended granting Kimble’s motion to dismiss, and in
   September 2022, the MDLA court granted the motion. Kimble thus had multiple
   opportunities to correct this self-made thicket; he failed to do so.

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   We therefore deny Kimble’s motion for the appointment of counsel. See
   McFaul, 684 F.3d at 581; see also Cooper, 929 F.2d at 1084.
          Finally, Kimble asks this court for leave to supplement his appeal with
   a recent order from the EDLA. Kimble’s motion to supplement is denied.
   The ruling issued five months after the challenged Rule 54(b) judgment,
   involves different parties, and has no apparent relevance to the Rule 54(b)
   judgment on appeal. To the extent that Kimble seeks to challenge an
   additional ruling in this appeal, that request is likewise denied.
                                         IV.
          The district court did not err in dismissing Kimble’s claims for due
   process violations and ineffective assistance of counsel against Public
   Defenders Thompson and Schilling, Assistant District Attorney Truhe, and
   Jefferson Parish. Likewise, the district court correctly determined that
   Kimble’s claims for sexual assault and retaliation against Deputies Hayes and
   Thompson, Chief Monfra, Sheriff Lopinto, and Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s
   Office were duplicative and malicious, and therefore subject to dismissal,
   pursuant to §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. His motions for appointment of counsel
   and to supplement the record on appeal are not well-taken.
                                       AFFIRMED; MOTIONS DENIED.

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