Court Opinion

ID: 9731717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:55:58.1924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.758972
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is contrary to the supreme court’s recent decision in Crespo. “We emphasize that in Dixon, this court held that each separate blow of a mop handle could support a separate conviction and that this remains a valid proposition of law. Today’s decision merely holds that in cases such as the one at bar, the indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345. In Crespo, the supreme court pointed out that the counts charging defendant .with armed violence and aggravated battery “do not differentiate between the separate stab wounds. Rather these counts charge defendant with the same conduct under different theories of criminal culpability.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 342. The supreme court noted the language in each count, “by stabbing Arlene Guerrero with said knife,” and “stabbed Arlene Guerrero with a knife,” and commented that “[nlowhere in these charges does the State attempt to apportion these offenses among the various stab wounds.” Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 343. The offenses in the present case are charged the same way as the offenses in Crespo: count III, “in committing a Criminal Sexual Assault,” count IV, “in committing a Criminal Sexual Assault,” and count Y “in committing a Criminal Sexual Assault.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 315. Nowhere in these charges does the State attempt to apportion these offenses among the various penetrations. There was testimony in the present case that defendant forced the victim to engage in oral sex, anal sex, and sexual intercourse. In Crespo, however, there was testimony that defendant stabbed the victim three times. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 339. That testimony alone was not sufficient to apportion the offenses among the various stab wounds. The same is true here. Throughout the course of the trial, the prosecutor referred to the penetrations collectively as “the sexual assault.” The prosecutor’s argument distinguished between the three offenses only on the basis of the aggravating factor. “The [defendant caused bodily harm to [R.Y.]. That’s one of the three different ways.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 316. “Whether the [defendant acted in a manner as to threaten or endanger the life of the victim, another aggravated factor that makes it more serious than criminal sexual assault. And the last one, committing it during a home invasion.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 316. Nowhere in the argument did the prosecutor attempt to apportion the offenses among the various penetrations. “As to all three of those[,] you have to prove first the [d]efendant committed the act of sexual penetration; second, that he committed the act by the use of force or threat of force; and then one of those different aggravating factors.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 316. The argument was not that there were “acts” of penetration; according to the argument, the jury was permitted to find that “the act of sexual penetration” occurred, accompanied by “one of those different aggravating factors.” (Emphasis added.) 334 Ill. App. 3d at 316. There was no reference to different acts of sexual penetration. I do not understand the majority’s argument that “the State presented and argued the case to the jury as separate acts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 318. As the majority says elsewhere, “the jury was instructed without objection and returned verdicts on three separate crimes of criminal sexual assault: (1) by threatening the victim, (2) by causing bodily harm, and (3) by acting during a home invasion.” 334 Ill. App. 3d at 317. The only differentiation between the three counts was the aggravating factor. There was no attempt to apportion these offenses among the various penetrations. See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 343. The majority opinion raises several constitutional problems. Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions require that a defendant in a criminal prosecution be informed of the nature and cause of the prosecution. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345. If the majority is correct, defendant would not have known until the sentencing hearing that the State considered each of the penetrations to be separate offenses and therefore would not have been able to defend the case accordingly. See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 345; see also 334 Ill. App. 3d at 313 (“at the sentencing phase the State filed a sentencing memorandum recommending the trial court enter verdicts on each of the three aggravated sexual assault counts based upon three different acts of penetration”). I would affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence for count V I would vacate defendant’s convictions and sentences for counts III and IV