Court Opinion

ID: 9697423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:16:08.621193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.287889
License: Public Domain

KERN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Upon examination of the record, I am unable to agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant’s rights were not “scrupulously honored.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).1
The record reflects that appellant, without any questioning by police officers who responded to the scene of the crime, confessed to them that she had stabbed the decedent. (Record at 10, 11, 33, 34.)
Officer Rau, the arresting officer, testified that after appellant initially indicated that she did not want to speak without an attorney present, by answering “no” to the third and fourth PD-47 questions, she “continued to make the statement, T stabbed him. I stabbed him’ ... approximately five or six times ... that was just coming out of her, without any questions from us, whatsoever.” (Record at 16 — 17.) The other officer present testified that appellant “continued to say that she stabbed her boyfriend”, despite the fact that no further questions were asked by the arresting officers. (Record at 35.) Appellant’s counsel “conceded” that his client’s repeated confession on the scene after answering “no” to the two form questions was voluntary. (Record at 148.) Additionally, Detective McCloskey, one of the arresting officers, testified that appellant “seemed to want to relate more information” at the scene of the crime, but was told that conversation would resume later. (Record at 110.)
The homicide detective at headquarters, where appellant was taken, testified that when he met appellant to perform the “standard paperwork relating to preparation of the case for filing in court” (Record at 70), he read her the Miranda rights from the standard form. (Record at 72.) The following colloquy between the prosecutor and the detective occurred at trial. (Record at 73-74):
Q. And after you advised her of her constitutional rights, did she indicate that she was willing to speak with you?
A. Yes.
Q. And did she indicate she was willing to speak to you without the assistance of a lawyer?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened after that time, did you at that time begin to write things down, or did you have a conversation with her?
A. I asked her briefly what happened. She told me in approximately two to five minutes of what transpired.
A. Following her advice of rights which was taken from the statement form I generally asked a general question to begin a narrative of the sequence of events of an incident, and shortly thereafter, concluding that first paragraph, the narrative, I’ll begin a more specific questioning of, to draw out details that have been left out in the narrative.
Q. Did you use that procedure when you talked to Ms. McKeamer?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when she gave her narrative of what happened, at any time did she say to you she didn’t want to speak to you?
A. No.
Q. Did at any time she request to have the assistance of a lawyer?
A. No.
Q. Did at any time she say she just didn’t want to talk any more?
A. No.
The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), has ruled:
[W]e now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present *353during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. [Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884 (emphasis added).]
The Court went on:
In concluding that the fruits of the interrogation initiated by the police .. . could not be used against Edwards, we do not hold or imply that Edwards was powerless to countermand his election or that the authorities could in no event use any incriminating statements made by Edwards prior to his having access to counsel. [Id. at 485,101 S.Ct. at 1885 (emphasis added).]
The Court noted:
Various decisions of the Courts of Appeals are to the effect that a valid waiver of an accused’s previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is possible.... the rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contract.... Waiver is possible [in the Fifth Circuit] when the request for counsel is equivocal. [Id. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 9.]
Mr. Justice Powell commented in his concurrence:
It is not unusual for a person in custody who previously has expressed an unwillingness to talk or a desire to have a lawyer, to change his mind and even welcome an opportunity to talk. Nothing in the Constitution erects obstacles that preclude police from ascertaining whether a suspect has reconsidered his original decision. ...
In sum, once warnings have been given and the right to counsel has been invoked, the relevant inquiry — whether the suspect now desires to talk to police without counsel — is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances. [Id. at 490-91, 101 S.Ct. at 1887-88.]
The majority, relying on the application of factors outlined in Mosley, supra, finds that appellant’s rights were not “scrupulously honored.” As in Mosley, however, where the Supreme Court found no violation of Miranda rights, appellant was fully advised of her rights at the scene of the crime, and her initial decision not to answer questions was fully respected by all the officers present. In addition, as in Mosley, the statements complained of were made after a fresh set of Miranda warnings were given in a different location — at the sta-tionhouse. Any differences between Mosley and the instant case are not dispositive given “the particular facts and circumstances of the police interrogation” which make clear that appellant had waived her rights by the time she made her statement at the station. See Peoples v. United States, D.C. App., 395 A.2d 41 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99 S.Ct. 2826, 61 L.Ed.2d 277 (1979).
The trial court in the instant case found that “[b]efore any further inquiry was made of the defendant [appellant] at the police station, there was again a full reading of the ... rights statement .... This time she chose not to [decline to answer questions] and before Detective Aduddell questioned her, the Court finds ... she affirmatively agreed to answer questions at this time.” (Record at 149.) The trial court went on to find “from all of the evidence that the statements [at the station and reduced to writing] were voluntarily made after a full advisement of rights which from all of the evidence, appears to have been understood by the defendant [appellant].” (Record at 150.)
Appellant’s repeated and coneededly voluntary confessions to the police made on the scene after having initially answered “no” to the PD — 47 questions, coupled with appellant’s effort at the scene to relay information to Detective McCloskey (Record at 110) and her affirmative assertions at the police station that she wished to talk, were enough to support the trial court’s finding of fact that she had waived her right to have counsel present when she answered questions, and enough to allow the police *354officers to ascertain that appellant had reconsidered her original decision not to talk. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 490-91, 101 S.Ct. at 1887-88 (Powell, J., concurring).
The majority also places reliance upon the cases of Edwards v. Arizona, supra; United States v. Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 42 (1981); and Wilson v. United States, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 25 (1982). There are two important differences between those cases and the case at bar. First, there is no evidence in any of those cases of the type of voluntary, repeated confessions that took place here to demonstrate that appellant was withdrawing her initial invocation of rights.
Second, in this case, the record reflects no additional interrogation or subtle interrogative tactics designed to elicit incriminating statements, during the time between the first and second Miranda questionings. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302-03, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690-1691, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). It is undisputed that Detective Aduddell, who interviewed appellant at the station, was not aware that appellant had previously answered “No” to the final two PD-47 questions. Thus, his actions cannot be construed as not “scrupulously honoring” appellant’s rights. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).
In Edwards, supra, despite the defendant’s clear statement to a guard that he did not wish to talk to anyone, the guard replied that the defendant “had” to talk with them and escorted the defendant to meet with detectives who had brought with them a taped statement of an accomplice who had implicated him. 451 U.S. at 479, 101 S.Ct. at 1882. In Alexander, supra, within minutes of defendant’s invocation of her Miranda rights, the detective stated “we know you are responsible for the stabbing,” and at a suppression hearing admitted that this was an interrogation technique to get someone to talk. 428 A.2d 42, 45 n. 9. Finally, in Wilson, supra, in an attempt to get the defendant to confess, detectives continued to discuss the case despite defendant’s remark that he had “nothing to tell.”
In the instant case there is no evidence of any interrogation until after appellant changed her answers to Miranda questions.
Given these circumstances I would affirm appellant’s conviction and dissent from the majority’s reversal of the conviction for self-confessed murder.

. I do not disagree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s conclusion that appellant invoked her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present by answering “no” to the PD-47 questions posed by Officer Rau when he first arrived at the scene of the crime. (Infra at 350 n. 5.)