Court Opinion

ID: 9893506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 15:00:53.477058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:22.069356
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12315    Document: 44-1      Date Filed: 10/27/2023   Page: 1 of 21

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12315
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ELIESER PEREIRA DELGADO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20441-KMM-8
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                    21-13377

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MANASCO, District
        Judge.∗
        PER CURIAM:
                Based on his participation in a fraudulent Medicare billing
        scheme run through several Florida pharmacies, Petitioner Elieser
        Pereira Delgado pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
        wire and healthcare fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The
        district court sentenced Delgado to 108 months of incarceration
        followed by three years of supervised release and imposed a forfei-
        ture money judgment of $2,200,779. On appeal, Delgado raises
        four 1 issues about his sentence: (1) the denial of a Sentencing
        Guidelines reduction for acceptance of responsibility; (2) the in-
        crease of his Guidelines oﬀense level for his use of sophisticated
        means in the scheme; (3) the amount of the forfeiture judgment
        that the court imposed against him; and (4) the district court’s pro-
        nouncement of the conditions of his supervised release.
              After careful consideration and with the beneﬁt of oral ar-
        gument, we vacate and remand as to the forfeiture money judg-
        ment and conditions of supervised release but aﬃrm in all other
        respects.

        ∗ The Honorable Anna M. Manasco, U.S. District Judge for the Northern Dis-

        trict of Alabama, sitting by designation.
        1 Delgado raised but then withdrew another claim related to the use of in-

        tended loss rather than actual loss for sentencing computation purposes. Since
        that claim is no longer before us, we do not address it here.
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        22-12315               Opinion of the Court                         3

                                 BACKGROUND

               Delgado was charged in a 39-count superseding indictment
        with conspiracy to commit wire and healthcare fraud, in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and healthcare fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 1347. To accomplish the fraud, Delgado and his co-defendants
        submitted false and fraudulent Medicare reimbursement claims for
        nine Florida pharmacies. In the scheme, Delgado acted as a patient
        and prescription recruiter, getting paid for providing Medicare ben-
        eﬁciary information and prescriptions. In total, the nine pharma-
        cies involved in the scheme submitted about $10,678,160 in fraud-
        ulent claims and received roughly $4,857,235 in Medicare pay-
        ments.
                Delgado agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy
        to commit wire and healthcare fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
        1349. In the plea agreement, the parties jointly recommended that
        the court ﬁnd, among other things, that the oﬀense level should be
        reduced by three levels based on Delgado’s acceptance of responsi-
        bility. Speciﬁcally, the agreement recommended a two-level de-
        crease under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) based on Delgado’s “recognition
        and aﬃrmative and timely acceptance of personal responsibility”
        and a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) based on Del-
        gado’s timely notiﬁcation of his intention to enter a guilty plea. But
        the plea agreement released the government from its obligation to
        recommend an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction if, among
        other events, Delgado “commit[ted] any misconduct after entering
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                22-12315

        into this plea agreement, including but not limited to, committing
        a state or federal oﬀense, [or] violating any term of release.”
              Following a plea colloquy, Delgado entered a guilty plea. In
        preparation for sentencing, the U.S. Probation Oﬃce submitted its
        Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). As relevant here, the PSI
        determined the following:
              1. Delgado was accountable for an intended loss of
              $4,429,275 and an actual loss of $2,200,779, the billed and
              paid amounts for the four Miami pharmacies for which Del-
              gado recruited.
              2. A two-level increase in the base oﬀense level applied be-
              cause of Delgado’s use of “sophisticated means.”
              3. An acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was not rec-
              ommended because Delgado tested positive for cocaine six
              times while on bond and did not attend mandatory drug
              treatment. So in the PSI’s judgment, Delgado had not “vol-
              untarily terminated or withdrawn from criminal conduct.”
               Delgado ﬁled objections to the PSI, speciﬁcally to its recom-
        mended denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. Del-
        gado argued that he should receive a sentence reduction despite his
        cocaine use because he had been diagnosed with substance addic-
        tion and had immediately notiﬁed the government of his intention
        to plead guilty. Delgado’s proposed alternative sentencing recom-
        mendation, which he submitted with his objections, included a so-
        phisticated-means enhancement. And in fact, Delgado did not
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        22-12315               Opinion of the Court                        5

        object to the application of the sophisticated-means enhancement
        in his objections.
                At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied Del-
        gado’s request for a downward variance. It reasoned that Delgado’s
        cocaine use while on bond was “inconsistent with acceptance” of
        responsibility, and given the nature of the conspiracy, a downward
        variance was not warranted. Before that happened, the prosecutor
        stated he had “no objection if [Delgado] receives acceptance.” But
        the court noted its “unique position to assess whether a defendant
        is entitled to an acceptance of responsibility” and denied the reduc-
        tion anyway.
               Ultimately, the district court sentenced Delgado to 108
        months of incarceration followed by three years of supervised re-
        lease and imposed a forfeiture money judgment of $2,200,779. Del-
        gado appealed to this Court.
                                 JURISDICTION

               The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
        We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and jurisdic-
        tion over Delgado’s challenges to his sentence under 18 U.S.C. §
        3742(a). Delgado timely ﬁled his appeal: the district court entered
        its ﬁnal judgment and commitment order on July 8, 2022, and Del-
        gado ﬁled his notice of appeal on July 11, 2022.
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              We review a defendant’s sentence under “the deferential
        abuse-of-discretion standard, ensuring ﬁrst that the district court
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

        committed no signiﬁcant procedural error, such as improperly cal-
        culating the sentencing guidelines range.” United States v. Wilson,
        979 F.3d 889, 916 n.16 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
        Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2012)). We review “the
        sentencing court’s factual ﬁndings for clear error and its interpreta-
        tion and application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de
        novo.” Id. (citing United States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th
        Cir. 2015)).
                When a party does not object to an enhancement or other
        issue at sentencing, we review for only plain error. United States v.
        Cingari, 952 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
        Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 842 (11th Cir. 2009)). The party claiming error
        bears the burden of proving that (1) error occurred; (2) the error is
        plain or obvious; (3) it aﬀects his substantial rights in that it was
        prejudicial and not harmless; and (4) it “seriously aﬀects the fair-
        ness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id.
        An error aﬀects a defendant’s substantial rights if it “‘aﬀect[s] the
        outcome of the district court proceedings,’” including the Guide-
        lines range calculated and sentence imposed. United States v.
        Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Puckett v.
        United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).
                We review a district court’s denial of an acceptance-of-re-
        sponsibility reduction for clear error, and we will not set such a de-
        nial aside ‘“unless the facts in the record clearly establish that a de-
        fendant has accepted personal responsibility.’” United States v.
        Singh, 291 F.3d 756, 764 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
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        22-12315                Opinion of the Court                          7

        Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir.1999)). We’ve also explained
        that the district court is in the best position to assess “a defendant’s
        apparent sincerity,” so we give “special deference” to district-court
        determinations on acceptance-of-responsibility reductions. United
        States v. Williams, 340 F.3d 1231, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).
               Finally, we’ve observed that a defendant lacks the chance at
        sentencing to object “to the discretionary conditions of supervised
        release because they [are] included for the ﬁrst time in the written
        judgment.” United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5 (11th
        Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.
        2000)). So we review challenges to those conditions de novo. Id.
                                    DISCUSSION

                   I.     Acceptance-of-Responsibility Reduction

                Delgado’s ﬁrst claim on appeal—and the only objection he
        raised below—is that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable
        because the district court did not grant an acceptance-of-responsi-
        bility reduction. He argues both that the district court erroneously
        believed it could not grant an acceptance-of-responsibility reduc-
        tion and that the government breached its plea agreement by fail-
        ing to recommend such a reduction. We conclude that the district
        court recognized and acted within its discretion. And as for Del-
        gado’s contention about the government’s failure to uphold its bar-
        gain, even if that’s technically true, we cannot say that any breach
        here changed the outcome of the sentencing proceedings.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

                The Sentencing Guidelines authorize a two-level reduction
        when “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsi-
        bility for his oﬀense” and an additional one-level reduction if the
        defendant “timely notif[ies] authorities of his intention to enter a
        plea of guilty.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. But the mere fact that a defendant
        pleads guilty does not entitle him under § 3E1.1 to a reduction for
        acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Mathews, 874 F.3d 698,
        709 (11th Cir. 2017); see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmts. n.3, 5. And we
        give “great deference” to a district court’s determination about
        whether to grant the reduction. Id. So while we typically view a
        guilty plea as “signiﬁcant evidence of acceptance of responsibility,
        ‘this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that
        is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.’” Id. (quot-
        ing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3). In deciding whether to grant a re-
        duction, the district court “may consider a broad variety of evi-
        dence.” Id.
               Here, we cannot conclude that the district court’s denial of
        an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was procedurally unrea-
        sonable. Rather, the district court’s decision fell within its broad
        discretion. The PSI noted that Delgado tested positive for cocaine
        six times while on bond and did not attend mandatory drug treat-
        ment. It further recommended against the acceptance reduction
        because Delgado “ha[d] not voluntarily terminated or withdrawn
        from criminal conduct.” Noting this ﬁnding, the district court rea-
        soned that Delgado “did violate the terms and conditions of his
        bond through his drug use while he was on bond. So, I think the
        Court is in a unique position to assess whether a defendant is entitled
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        22-12315                Opinion of the Court                          9

        to an acceptance of responsibility. His behavior is inconsistent with
        that acceptance. So, I’ll note the objection and deny it.” (Emphasis
        added).
               As we’ve noted, a district court has “broad discretion to
        grant or deny a reduction under § 3E1.1.” Mathews, 874 F.3d at 709.
        And to be sure, “failed drug test[s]” do not mean “that, as a matter
        of law, [the defendant] loses his acceptance of responsibility” re-
        duction. Id. (quotations omitted). But a district court does not
        commit clear error when, in the exercise of discretion, it denies the
        acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on post-arrest drug
        use. See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 344 (11th Cir. 1994)
        (holding that the district court did not err in denying an acceptance-
        of-responsibility reduction based on marijuana use while on bond,
        even if unrelated to the oﬀense of conviction); United States v. Scrog-
        gins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1216 (11th Cir. 1989) (same, for post-arrest co-
        caine use).
               Here, the record indicates that the district court understood
        that it could grant an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction but
        chose not to do so given its “unique position” at sentencing. In
        other words, the district court recognized its discretion but exer-
        cised that discretion to deny a reduction based on “conduct” that it
        found to be “inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility.”
        U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. Our precedent does not require anything
        more. So we conclude that the district court did not commit clear
        error when it denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12315

                 We turn to Delgado’s claim that the government breached
        its plea agreement. Because Delgado did not raise this issue at sen-
        tencing, we review for plain error only. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319.
        We’ve explained that the government breaches a plea agreement if
        “it fails to perform” in line with its promises in the plea agreement.
        United States v. Hunter, 835 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2016).
               So ﬁrst, we must consider “the scope of the government’s
        promises.” United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir.
        2004). The unambiguous language of the plea agreement controls.
        Id. Here, the government promised to “recommend” to the district
        court that Delgado’s Guidelines calculation “be reduced by 3 levels
        based on the defendant’s recognition and aﬃrmative and timely ac-
        ceptance of personal responsibility.” “Recommend” means “to
        suggest (an act or course of action) as advisable” 2—in other words,
        aﬃrmative advocacy on behalf of the acceptance-of-responsibility
        reduction.
               At oral argument, the government conceded that Delgado’s
        positive drug tests could have resulted from pre-plea drug use, so it
        was not relieved of its obligation under the language of the plea
        agreement to recommend the acceptance-of-responsibility reduc-
        tion. See Malone, 51 F.4th at 1321 (ﬁnding under a similarly worded
        plea agreement that the government was not released from its
        agreement to recommend an acceptance-of-responsibility

        2 Recommend, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (last visited Sept. 29, 2023),

        https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/recommend
        [https://perma.cc/H72Z-FELZ].
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        22-12315              Opinion of the Court                         11

        reduction by “only [the defendant’s] post-arrest, pre-plea con-
        duct”). In other words, the government breached its agreement if
        it failed to “recommend” that Delgado receive an acceptance-of-re-
        sponsibility reduction.
                We therefore review the prosecutor’s statements during sen-
        tencing to determine whether the government upheld its plea-
        agreement obligation to recommend the acceptance-of-responsi-
        bility reduction. The prosecutor said,
              I don’t quarrel with probation that one could not
              award him acceptance of responsibility because he’s
              violated the law by virtue of his cocaine use. But un-
              der the circumstances, your Honor, I think he does
              have a drug problem. Your Honor had remanded him
              when he tested positive the last time, after your initial
              review of this matter. So, I have no objection if he re-
              ceives acceptance.
        (Emphasis added).
                The prosecutor’s statement that he had “no objection” to the
        reduction falls short of aﬃrmatively recommending an acceptance-
        of-responsibility reduction. Yet the prosecutor’s response was gen-
        erally consistent with favoring a reduction. Indeed, the prosecu-
        tor’s reference to Delgado’s “drug problem” reﬂects a recognition
        that drug use did not necessarily mean that Delgado had not ac-
        cepted responsibility. But though the prosecutor may not have vi-
        olated the spirit of the plea agreement, his failure to aﬃrmatively
        recommend the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction did
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

        technically breach the government’s promise to “recommend”
        such an adjustment. See Hunter, 835 F.3d at 1324.
                Even so, though, that breach did not “aﬀect[] [Delgado’s]
        substantial rights” because it did not “aﬀect the outcome of the dis-
        trict court proceedings,” namely, “his sentence.” See Malone, 51
        F.4th at 1320 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). To the contrary, the
        district court explained, “I appreciate the government’s not taking
        any objection to that, but nonetheless . . . I’ll note the objection and
        deny it.” In other words, the district court determined based solely
        on its own view of the facts that, regardless of the government’s
        recommendation, it thought the acceptance reduction was not
        warranted.
                These facts distinguish this case from others in which we
        have found breach. See, e.g., Malone, 51 F.4th at 1321 (ﬁnding that
        the government breached the plea agreement “by arguing against
        an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction based on [the defend-
        ant’s] pre-plea conduct,” as the court “relied in part” on that argu-
        ment); Hunter, 835 F.3d at 1328 (same, where the government “per-
        sisted in actively and formally opposing the reduction” based solely
        on an adverse credibility ﬁnding at a prior suppression hearing).
               Because the district court independently determined that it
        would not award the acceptance reduction, regardless of the gov-
        ernment’s position, we cannot say that the government’s breach
        aﬀected Delgado’s “substantial rights.” So we aﬃrm Delgado’s sen-
        tence in this respect.
                      II.    Sophisticated-means Enhancement
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        22-12315               Opinion of the Court                        13

               Next, Delgado asserts that the government erred in impos-
        ing a sophisticated-means enhancement. The Sentencing Guide-
        lines provide for a two-level enhancement if the oﬀense “involved
        sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or
        caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. §
        2B1.1(b)(10). Commentary to § 2B1.1 deﬁnes “sophisticated
        means” as “especially complex or especially intricate oﬀense con-
        duct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an oﬀense.”
        U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B). Indicia of sophisticated means include
        “hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of ﬁctitious
        entities, corporate shells, or oﬀshore ﬁnancial accounts.” Id. But
        we’ve also upheld application of the sophisticated-means enhance-
        ment when defendants have concealed their crimes “in a variety of
        ways” that the Application Note does not expressly mention.
        United States v. Feaster, 798 F.3d 1374, 1381 (11th Cir. 2015).
               Still, though, we may not review an issue on appeal that the
        defendant waived in the district court by inviting the alleged error.
        United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). Here,
        Delgado invited any error in his written objections to the PSI.
        More speciﬁcally, when Delgado ﬁled written objections to the
        PSI’s recommendation against acceptance of responsibility, he sug-
        gested that his “Sentencing Guideline Computation should be cal-
        culated” through an alternative list that included a two-level sophis-
        ticated-means “[a]djustment per §2B1.1(b)(10)(C).” (Emphasis
        added). Then, after inviting the court pre-sentencing to apply the
        sophisticated-means enhancement, Delgado objected at sentencing
        to only the denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

        aﬃrmed that the PSI’s Guidelines calculation was otherwise cor-
        rect. These actions invited any error as to application of the so-
        phisticated-means enhancement.
               But even if they didn’t, we would ﬁnd no reversible error.
        Because Delgado failed to object in the district court to the appli-
        cation of the sophisticated-means enhancement, we would review
        for plain error. And here, we cannot say that the district court’s
        imposition of the sophisticated-means enhancement was plainly
        erroneous. Delgado’s participation in the fraud had several indicia
        of sophistication, including but not limited to his use of a shell
        company to receive proceeds. For instance, Delgado’s conduct
        spanned roughly three years, involved false documents in the form
        of fake drug prescriptions, and resulted in an actual loss of over $2
        million. Our precedent holds that, taken together, characteristics
        like these support a ﬁnding of sophisticated means. Cf. Feaster, 798
        F.3d at 1382 (ﬁnding that repetitive conduct that “went undetected
        for two years” supported a sophisticated means enhancement);
        United States v. Ghertler, 605 F.3d 1256, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting
        that the defendant’s use of “forged false company documents . . .
        over an extended period of time . . . support[ed] the district court’s
        ﬁnding” of sophisticated means).
                An error is not plain unless it is ‘“clear under current law.’”
        Cingari, 952 F.3d at 1305 (quoting United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d
        1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). Under our precedent,
        that means the district court must have acted contrary to “the ex-
        plicit language of a statute or rule” or “precedent from the
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        22-12315                Opinion of the Court                        15

        Supreme Court or this Court” that “directly resolv[es]” the issue.
        United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (per
        curiam) (citation omitted). “In the absence of any controlling prec-
        edent” or statutory text, there is no plain error. Id.
               Here, the district court’s application of the sophisticated-
        means enhancement does not conﬂict with the express text of the
        Guideline. Nor are we aware of a Supreme Court or Eleventh Cir-
        cuit opinion directly on point that holds that the district court’s ap-
        plication of the sophisticated-means enhancement is improper in
        these circumstances. As a result, even if we ignored the invited er-
        ror here, we would still aﬃrm the district court’s application of the
        sophisticated-means enhancement.
                      III.     Conditions of Supervised Release

               Delgado next challenges his conditions of supervised re-
        lease. He contends that the district court’s written judgment con-
        tains discretionary conditions that the court did not impose orally
        at sentencing, so remand is warranted. We agree.
                “When the oral pronouncement of a sentence varies from
        the written judgment, the oral pronouncement governs.” United
        States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omit-
        ted). Appellate review follows a two-step inquiry. First, we deter-
        mine whether the oral and written conditions of supervised release
        “unambiguously conﬂict[].” See United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336,
        1340 (11th Cir. 2000). Second, if so, we must direct a limited re-
        mand with instructions for the district court to “enter an amended
        judgment that conforms to its oral pronouncement.” Chavez, 204
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

        F.3d at 1316. But when there is merely ambiguity, “as opposed to a
        conﬂict between the oral pronouncement and the written judg-
        ment,” the written judgment governs. United States v. Purcell, 715
        F.2d 561, 563 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). We evaluate the
        district court’s intent “by reference to the entire record.” Id.
                We distinguish between mandatory conditions, which a
        court must impose under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and discretionary con-
        ditions, which a court may impose. Though a district court need
        not orally state mandatory conditions in the defendant’s presence,
        “a district court must pronounce at the defendant’s sentencing
        hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised release.” United
        States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 (11th Cir. 2023). The district
        court need not articulate each condition individually; rather, it may
        “satisfy this requirement by referencing a written list of supervised
        release conditions,” such as those “in the defendant’s PS[I] or in a
        standing administrative order.” Id. In this way, the court “aﬀords
        any defendant who is unfamiliar with the conditions the oppor-
        tunity to inquire about and challenge them” and thus satisﬁes due
        process. Id.
               At sentencing, the district court stated that Delgado “shall
        comply with the mandatory and standard conditions of supervised
        release.” The written judgment contained nine “[s]tandard
        [c]onditions” that § 3583(d) does not impose, including “meet[ing]
        family responsibilities and notifying the probation oﬃce of a
        change of residence at least ten days before any change of
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        22-12315                  Opinion of the Court                               17

        residence occurs.”3 These “[s]tandard [c]onditions” closely resem-
        ble the standing conditions for probation and supervised release
        that appear in the district court’s Administrative Order No. 1988-
        06. 4 But the district court did not expressly reference Order No.
        1988-06 when it imposed its “[s]tandard” conditions. And the writ-
        ten judgment diﬀers from Order No. 1988-06 in that it requires ten
        days’ advance notice of a change in address or employment, rather
        than 72 hours’ notice.5 As a result, we cannot entirely resolve any
        lack of clarity as to the meaning of “[s]tandard [c]onditions” by
        looking solely to Order No. 1988-06.
               We recently considered a similar situation in Rodriguez.
        There, “the district court announced that [the defendant’s] sen-
        tence included a ﬁve-year term of supervised release but did not

        3 Delgado does not challenge the “special” conditions imposed, as the district

        court’s oral pronouncement of those conditions is consistent with its written
        judgment and the PSI.
        4 S.D. Fla. Admin. Ord. No. 1988-06, Standing Conditions of Probation and Super-

        vised Release (Feb. 29, 1988),
        https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/sites/flsd/files/adminorders/1988-06.pdf
        [https://perma.cc/862T-LQCS]. In 2013, the monthly supervision report
        deadline was extended from five to fifteen days. S.D. Fla. Admin. Ord. No.
        2013-21, Amendment to Condition #2 of the Conditions of Supervised Release and
        Probation of a Judgment and Commitment Order (Apr. 10, 2013),
        https://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/sites/flsd/files/adminorders/2013-21.pdf
        [https://perma.cc/4R52-W2U5].
        5 Order No. 1988-06 has one additional condition: that the defendant “not

        commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision.”
        Since this is also a mandatory condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and already
        in the written judgment, no conforming action is necessary.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                22-12315

        identify any conditions of supervised release or reference any writ-
        ten list of conditions.” 75 F.4th at 1246. In its written judgment,
        though, the court “added 13 discretionary conditions of supervised
        release,” largely consistent with those in the same administrative
        order relevant here, Order No. 1988-06. Id. We held that “the mere
        existence of an administrative order recommending certain condi-
        tions of supervised release, without in-court adoption of that list
        by the sentencing court,” was insuﬃcient to satisfy due process,
        and the government had not met its burden of showing harmless
        error. Id. at 1249. So we remanded for the district court, “after
        giving [the defendant] an opportunity to be heard, [to] reconsider
        whether to impose each of the discretionary conditions.” Id.
                To be sure, the facts here are distinguishable from those in
        Rodriguez, as the district court at least referenced “standard condi-
        tions of supervised release” to which Delgado would be subject.
        But the district court did not refer to Order No. 1988-06 speciﬁcally
        or even its administrative orders generally. Its oral pronouncement
        fell short of “in-court adoption” of Order No. 1988-06, Rodriguez,
        75 F.4th at 1249. Nor did the court otherwise articulate the “stand-
        ard” conditions of supervised release imposed. And since the con-
        ditions in the written judgment did not exactly match those in Or-
        der No. 1988-06, we cannot assume the court’s intention was to in-
        corporate that order. See Purcell, 715 F.2d at 563. Nor can we as-
        sume that, because Order No. 1988-06 is publicly available, Del-
        gado had “the opportunity to inquire about and challenge” the
        “standard” conditions of supervised release at sentencing. See Ro-
        driguez, 75 F.4th at 1246.
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        22-12315               Opinion of the Court                        19

                Rather, the district court needed to “orally pronounce . . .
        any discretionary conditions of supervised release,” either individ-
        ually or by reference to its administrative order. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th
        at 1246. We remand so the district court may enter an amended
        judgment and orally clarify the discretionary conditions of super-
        vised release, either by explicit reference to Order No. 1988-06, if
        that is what it has decided to impose, or by articulating the condi-
        tions individually.
                         IV.    Forfeiture Money Judgment

               Finally, we vacate and remand the forfeiture money judg-
        ment entered against Delgado. The district court imposed a forfei-
        ture money judgment of $2,200,779 without ﬁnding that Delgado
        personally received proceeds in that amount. Delgado contends
        that this was plain error, and the government concedes this point
        on appeal.
                Since Delgado failed to challenge the forfeiture money judg-
        ment at sentencing, we review this claim for plain error. A decision
        that contravenes our or the Supreme Court’s “controlling prece-
        dent” commits plain error. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d at 1291. Joint
        and several liability for proceeds of a conspiracy in which Delgado
        was a lower-level participant plainly contradicts Honeycutt v. United
        States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), and our subsequent decision in United
        States v. Elbeblawy, 899 F.3d 925, 933 (11th Cir. 2018).
               Under traditional principles of joint and several liability,
        each co-conspirator could be held liable for the entire amount of
        loss caused by the conspiracy. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12315

        875 (Am. L. Inst. 1977). But in Honeycutt, the Court held that, un-
        der 21 U.S.C. § 853, a defendant cannot be held “jointly and sever-
        ally liable for property that his co-conspirator derived from the
        crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire.” 581 U.S. at
        445. In so holding, the Court reasoned that “joint and several lia-
        bility would mandate forfeiture of untainted property that the de-
        fendant did not acquire as a result of the crime,” which would run
        contrary to the statutory text and structure of § 853. Id. at 445, 451.
        Under binding Supreme Court precedent, then, a lower-level con-
        spirator’s forfeiture liability is limited to property he “actually ac-
        quired as the result of the” criminal conspiracy. Id. at 454.
               In Elbeblawy, we extended Honeycutt to the forfeiture statute
        for healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7), holding that § 982 “does
        not permit joint and several liability.” 899 F.3d at 941–42. Like §
        853, § 982 “reach[es] only property traceable to the commission of
        an oﬀense.” Id. at 941 (citation omitted). In a healthcare-fraud
        case, a forfeiture money judgment that exceeds the amount the de-
        fendant personally received runs contrary to both Honeycutt and
        Elbeblawy. As the forfeiture judgment here violates this principle,
        Delgado has established error that is plain.
               Delgado has also met his burden as to the other plain-error
        factors. The error aﬀected Delgado’s “substantial rights” because
        it “‘aﬀected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”
        Malone, 51 F.4th at 1319 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135). As a
        result of the error, the district court imposed a forfeiture judgment
        in the amount of the actual loss traceable to Delgado’s
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        22-12315                  Opinion of the Court                              21

        participation in the conspiracy, not the amount of proceeds he per-
        sonally received. Perhaps, as a lower-level conspirator, Delgado did
        not receive the entire $2,200,779. But even if he did, the district
        court must make that factual ﬁnding before imposing a forfeiture
        judgment against him in that amount.
                Finally, the district court’s error ‘“seriously aﬀects the fair-
        ness [and] integrity . . . of the judicial proceedings”’—namely, it un-
        dermines consistent application of and adherence to binding prec-
        edent. See Cingari, 952 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Beckles, 565 F.3d at 842).
        We are clearly bound by Supreme Court decisions and our prior
        panel precedent, as are district courts within our Circuit. See United
        States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Because the
        forfeiture judgment here does not comport with that precedent, we
        vacate the forfeiture judgment and remand for additional fact-ﬁnd-
        ing as to the amount of proceeds that Delgado personally received
        from the conspiracy and for the entry of an amended forfeiture
        judgment.6
                                     CONCLUSION
               For the reasons we have explained, we AFFIRM IN PART
        and VACATE AND REMAND IN PART Petitioner’s judgment
        for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        6 Delgado raises an additional argument related to substitute asset forfeiture,

        but because we remand for fact-finding as to the proceeds Delgado personally
        received, we need not reach this argument.