Court Opinion

ID: 9733044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:51:07.888979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:37.986416
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
One of the oldest maxims in the law is simply this: Like cases should be decided alike.
State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286 (S.D.1992) handed down by this Court on March 1992, is a “like case.” In that case, I fully set forth my views, which are: (1) A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury trial (which is a great principle to observe and must be inflexible) but (2) The applicability of SDCL 19-12-5, this state’s statute on the “bad acts” evidence rule, to have vitality, must have flexibility so that the statute may be applied to each set of facts. There are two weighty sentences in that statute and both must be given effect. As I wrote in Klein, cited in the majority opinion, “it is not a matter, in every case, of automatic inclusion or automatic exclusion.”
It appears to me that Christopherson had a fair trial. Acting on the evidence before them, the jury found Christopherson not guilty of two counts of sexual contact and not guilty of rape. Yet, it found him guilty of three counts of sexual contact. Objectivity is one of the life lines of the law. This jury, sifting through the evidence and employing fairness, was able to reach separate decisions on separate counts. Their reasoning process is a tribute to the jury system. Observe, also, that the trial court did not automatically include or exclude all of the state’s proffered evidence; rather, it excluded evidence of two witnesses and included testimony of three witnesses. In a sense, were not both sentences in the statute, being implemented? I think so. In applying this statute, we might very well have different perception. And perception does not, necessarily, beget perfection. This turn on words takes my thoughts to the trial judge who is held only to: Did he/she abuse his/her discretion? So there you have it, perception, perfection and discretion. And thereupon, mayhaps, the evidentiary war doth and will rage.
Here, Christopherson had the opportunity to commit these crimes, developed a relationship of trust with the families of the victims so he could take advantage of the young boys, and then concocted, which he implemented, a plan. He prepared his crimes. And he executed them. He gained the confidence of the victims and their families. In reading over his activities, over *305the course of nearly two decades, it becomes obvious that he also created an opportunity to take advantage of these young males, isolating them, and using his position as a teacher, to implement his secretive intentions. There is a remarkable consistency in Christopherson’s activities and mode of operation for approximately two decades. One last thought on the remoteness issue: Christopherson did not commit crimes obvious to the eye or to the public or to law enforcement. His entire plan and strategy was to prevent detection, to force himself upon these young males in clandestine encounters, all in an effort to secrete his misdeeds. Oh, is not the universal mother of law — the truth? And was it not uncovered here?
Judge Tucker did not abuse his discretion in permitting this evidence to be placed before the jury so it could ferret out the truth. State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.1986) and State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1982).