Court Opinion

ID: 9838065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 12:07:12.657963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:21.388911
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 31, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00679-CV
                            ———————————
           ERIN MCCAIN AND MARC A. TOWNLEY, Appellants
                                        V.
                         LINDA A. LANIER, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 151st District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2020-59696

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellants Erin McCain and Marc A. Townley, acting pro se, filed this

interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s orders denying their request for an oral

hearing on their Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA)1 motion to dismiss a

1
      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 27.001-.011.
motion for sanctions filed by appellee Linda A. Lanier and finding the TCPA motion

to dismiss moot. In five issues on appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred

by: (1) denying their request for a hearing on their TCPA motion; (2) mooting and

failing to rule on their TCPA motion; (3) failing to dismiss Lanier’s motion for

sanctions because it infringed on their right to petition; (4) imposing sanctions

without a hearing in violation of due process; and (5) sustaining Lanier’s special

exceptions without first providing appellants an opportunity to respond or to cure

defects.

      Because we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal from an

order imposing sanctions or an order granting special exceptions, we dismiss

appellants’ appeal to the extent they purport to appeal from such orders. We further

affirm the trial court’s denial of appellants’ TCPA motion to dismiss.

                                    Background

      Appellants sued Lanier for actions related to a fence built by Lanier

purportedly along the property line between her property and the appellants’

property. The record reflects that the trial court referred the case, which was set for

trial on November 15, 2021, to mediation on August 28, 2021. On November 4,

2021, Lanier moved for a continuance of the trial explaining that the “Court ordered

the parties to mediation . . . and an agreeable date has not been decided upon between

the parties and mediator.” The certificate of conference noted that Lanier’s counsel

                                          2
attempted to confer with appellants (who were also pro se in the trial court) on

October 27, but the emails were not returned.

       Appellants filed objections to the motion for continuance that same day,

which contained the following statements:

    • “In the Motion, counsel for the Defendant is lying, as per usual in this case, to
      the Court. Counsel did not attempt to confer with the Plaintiffs about the
      Motion for Continuance.”

    • “Plaintiff would further show that the Defendant has unilaterally failed to
      cooperate with the mediation process in this case. See attached ‘Exhibit A’, e-
      mail dialogue. Plaintiffs contacted the appointed mediator Steven C. Howard
      on August 31, 2021 and proposed four dates during the first week of October
      for mediation. Defendant did not respond to any of these distributed e-mails
      or otherwise attempt to arrange time for mediation. Defendant had sufficient
      opportunity over a two month period to participate in mediation of this matter,
      but instead utterly refused to cooperate. Plaintiffs argue that the reason cited
      for continuance is solely Defendant’s own fault.”

    • “The appointed mediator, Steven C. Howard, did not ‘select a date, for all
      parties to appear as directed by the Mediator’ as set forth under the Order of
      Referral for Mediation.”

       In response, on November 5, Lanier filed a reply to appellants’ objections and

moved for sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13.2 She cited the above

2
       Rule 13 provides:

             The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them
             that they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the
             best of their knowledge, information, and belief formed after
             reasonable inquiry the instrument is not groundless and brought in bad
             faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment.
             Attorneys or parties who . . . shall make statements in pleading which
             they know to be groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a
             delay of the trial of the cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt. If a
                                             3
statements in appellants’ objections and argued that appellants “knew [these

statements] to be groundless and were made in bad faith.” Lanier argued that these

statements constituted a violation of Rule 13 and requested that the trial court award

$750.00 in sanctions.

      On November 11, appellants responded to Lanier’s motion for continuance

and motion for sanctions. In their response, appellants stated that Lanier’s “motions

for sanctions constitute violations of Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code to the extent that these actions interfere with Plaintiffs’ exercise of

their Constitutional rights to petition.” Appellants further stated that “[f]or purposes

of Defendant’s requests for sanctions which are currently pending before the Court,

Plaintiffs hereby invoke the provisions of § 27.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code and move to dismiss.”

      The trial court granted Lanier’s motion for continuance on November 15,

continuing the case “until the 2 week docket starting April 4, 2022.” The trial court’s

order further stated: “The parties are hereby reminded that they must comply with

the Court’s prior mediation Order. Further the Court would like to indicate that

             pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
             court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing,
             shall impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215, upon
             the person who signed it, a represented party, or both.”

      TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
                                            4
Plaintiffs’ reference to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 27, et seq.

are not persuasive nor legally applicable to Defendant’s Motions.” The trial court

also granted Lanier’s motion for sanctions and awarded $50 to Lanier as reasonable

attorney’s fees. The same day, appellants filed a “request for hearing/notice of

submission” and requested “a hearing on their motion according to § 27.004 of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code” and, alternatively, requested that the

motion “be set on the Court’s submission docket for Monday, November 29, 2021

at 8:00 a.m.” Appellants filed an amended request for hearing the following day,

stating that “counsel for Defendant has complained that notice is inadequate under

subsection (d) of the [CPRC] (requiring 21 days[’] notice).” Accordingly, appellants

requested that the motion “instead be set on the Court’s submission docket for

Monday, December 13, 2021 at 8:00 a.m.”

      On November 18, Lanier filed special exceptions to appellants’ amended

request for hearing, arguing that appellants’ representation that Lanier’s counsel

complained that notice of the hearing was inadequate was “blatantly false” as

counsel “asserted no such complaint.” Further, Lanier noted that the trial court had

already ruled on her motion for sanctions. Lanier requested that the trial court strike

the amended request for hearing in full and remove the motion to dismiss from the

trial court’s docket, as the motion was moot and the setting was not necessary. On

November 29, the trial court sustained Lanier’s special exceptions and found that

                                          5
appellants’ TCPA motion to dismiss was moot and denied their request for a hearing.

The trial court further found “no need for further discussion or hearing of the Motion

to Dismiss or the Special Exceptions based upon this Order and prior Orders of this

Court.”

      Appellants filed their notice of appeal, purporting to appeal from the trial

court’s November 15 and 29 orders.

                                     Jurisdiction

      In their five issues on appeal, appellants challenge the trial court’s denial of

their TCPA motion to dismiss and oral hearing on that motion, as well as the trial

court’s substantive rulings on Lanier’s motion for sanctions and special exceptions.

      Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s rulings

after entry of a judgment finally disposing of the case. Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp.,

39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction is an exception

to this general rule; it enables appellate courts to review a trial court’s ruling while

the case is still pending before the trial court. See Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu,

233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2007). As an intermediate appellate court, we lack

jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless a statute specifically authorizes

an exception to the general rule that appeals may only be taken from final judgments.

Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. 2000). And we

                                           6
strictly construe statutes authorizing appeals from interlocutory orders. Brand FX,

LLC v. Rhine, 458 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.).

      The Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that a person may appeal from

an interlocutory order of a district court that denies a motion to dismiss filed under

Section 27.003. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(12). Thus, to the

extent appellants appeal from the portion of the trial court’s orders denying their

TCPA motion to dismiss, we have jurisdiction over that portion of this appeal.

      But in their fourth and fifth issues, appellants also purport to appeal from and

challenge the trial court’s substantive orders and rulings on Lanier’s motion for

sanctions and special exceptions. Neither an order imposing sanctions nor an order

granting special exceptions is an appealable interlocutory order. See Brenners v.

Green, No. 06-20-00034-CV, 2020 WL 4044716, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July

16, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Generally, an order imposing monetary sanctions is

reviewed on appeal from the final judgment in the case.”); Nguyen v. Aventus Ins.

Co., No. 14-18-00720-CV, 2018 WL 5261141, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Oct. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that orders sustaining special

exceptions and granting motion for sanctions are interlocutory in nature and not

appealable before final judgment); Kamel v. Advocare Int’l, L.P., No. 05-15-01295-

CV, 2016 WL 836809, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(“A sanctions order that does not dispose of all the parties and issues is neither an

                                          7
appealable final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order.”); Matassarin v.

Odiorne, No. 04-01-00498-CV, 2001 WL 1479258, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Nov. 21, 2001, no pet.) (per curiam) (“An order for monetary sanctions rendered in

connection with an underlying lawsuit is interlocutory if it does not dispose of all

parties and claims in the lawsuit.”).

      Where only a portion of an order qualifies for interlocutory review, we

generally cannot exercise jurisdiction over other portions of the order. See

Schlumberger Ltd. v. Rutherford, 472 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (dismissing appeal from partial grant of TCPA motion to

dismiss and concluding that “denial of a [TCPA] motion to dismiss does not provide

an avenue of interlocutory appeal to all other ancillary rulings contained within the

same written ‘interlocutory order’”); see also Five Star Glob., LLC v. Hulme, No.

05-20-00940-CV, 2021 WL 3159792, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (considering interlocutory appeal to extent it challenged

appointment of receiver but dismissing remainder of appeal because appellate court

lacked jurisdiction to review trial court’s order to extent it appointed person to act

as auditor or master); Waite v. Waite, 64 S.W.3d 217, 224 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“When a litigant challenges both appealable and

unappealable interlocutory orders, we review the portion of an order which is

                                          8
appealable and refuse to consider the portion which is not[]appealable.” (internal

citation and quotation omitted)).

      Because appellants challenge three interlocutory rulings, only one of which is

appealable by statute, “the proper course is to dismiss that portion which is non-

appealable, and to rule on the portion from which an appeal may be taken.” Bobbitt

v. Cantu, 992 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.); see also Five

Star Glob., 2021 WL 3159792, at *2–4; Schlumberger, 472 S.W.3d at 891; Waite,

64 S.W.3d at 224 n.6. Accordingly, because an interlocutory appeal is not authorized

from the imposition of sanctions or from the granting of special exceptions, we

dismiss those portions of appellants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                     Preservation

      In their first three issues, appellants challenge the trial court’s failure to hold

a hearing on or expressly deny their TCPA motion to dismiss, and request that this

Court “itself render judgment dismissing Appellee’s Motion for Sanctions, because

the legal action clearly is purposed to suppress Appellants’ Constitutional exercise

of their right to petition.” At the outset, we note that appellants conceded in

supplemental briefing3 that although the trial court did not conduct an oral hearing

on their motion, the trial court heard their motion by submission on November 29.

3
      Supplemental briefing was requested by this Court with respect to the jurisdictional
      issue, as discussed above.
                                           9
See Garcia v. Semler, 663 S.W.3d 270, 278 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.) (“The

current TCPA allows the ‘hearing’ on the merits of a motion to dismiss to be

conducted by submission.”). Appellants also concede that the trial court’s rulings in

the November 15 and 29 orders, concluding that the TCPA did not apply to Lanier’s

motion for sanctions and then finding that appellants’ TCPA motion was moot, taken

together resulted in a denial of their motion to dismiss. Thus, we conclude that

appellants have abandoned their first two issues on appeal challenging the trial

court’s failure to hold a hearing and rule on their motion to dismiss. We overrule

their first two issues.

       Turning to their third issue on appeal, i.e., whether the trial court erred in

denying their motion to dismiss, we hold that appellants have not preserved this issue

for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

       As explained above, Lanier filed a motion for sanctions under Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 13 seeking sanctions against appellants for allegedly “groundless”

and “bad faith” statements appellants made in their objections to Lanier’s motion for

continuance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Appellants filed a response, in which they

included two paragraphs referencing the TCPA. The entirety of appellants’ TCPA

argument is set out below:

              4. Plaintiffs further contend that the Defendant’s motions for
       sanctions constitute violations of Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice
       and Remedies Code to the extent that these actions interfere with
       Plaintiffs’ exercise of their Constitutional rights to petition.
                                          10
            5. For purposes of Defendant’s requests for sanctions which are
      currently pending before the Court, Plaintiffs hereby invoke the
      provisions of § 27.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
      and move to dismiss.

      In order for appellants to be entitled to dismissal, they must demonstrate that

a “legal action” is “based on” or “in response to” their exercise of the right to

petition. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.005(b)(1)(B). The term “legal action”

includes “a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, or

counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal, declaratory,

or equitable relief,” but does not include “a procedural action taken or motion made

in an action that does not amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory

relief.” Id. § 27.001(6). The right to petition is defined as, among other things, a

“communication in or pertaining to . . . a judicial proceeding.” Id. § 27.001(4).

      Appellants did not file any briefing related to their TCPA “motion” and did

not make any of the arguments that they make on appeal. For instance, appellants

did not argue below that Lanier’s motion for sanctions fits within the definition of

“legal action” as is defined by the TCPA. Nor did they identify any

“communications” that qualified as an exercise of their right to petition or otherwise

explain how Lanier’s motion for sanctions implicated their right to petition.

Appellants made no legal argument whatsoever. They simply included a one-

                                          11
sentence statement purporting to invoke the TCPA. We hold that this is not sufficient

to preserve the issue for our review on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

      We are mindful that the Texas Supreme Court has cautioned courts of appeals

not to impose “too strict a view of error preservation in th[e TCPA] context. Rules

of error preservation should not be applied so strictly as to unduly restrain appellate

courts from reaching the merits of a case.” Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC,

547 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. 2018). In Adams, Adams moved to dismiss Starside’s

defamation claim under the TCPA, which was purportedly based on various

statements he made about Starside’s conduct in texts and emails. Adams contended

that the TCPA applied because he had a constitutional right to speak about Starside’s

services and to interact with law enforcement. Adams v. Starside Custom Builders,

LLC, 545 S.W.3d 572, 578 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016), rev’d, 547 S.W.3d 890

(Tex. 2018). The court of appeals held that Adams failed to establish that the

statements forming the basis of Starside’s defamation claim were based on or related

to Starside’s services in the marketplace, and therefore, an exercise of his right to

free speech. Id. at 578–79. The court of appeals declined to address Adams’s

argument on appeal that the statements also implicated his right to free speech

because they were related to community well-being because Adams did not raise

that argument in the trial court. Id. at 578 n.4. The Supreme Court reversed, first

noting that it was “not convinced that Adams failed to argue community and

                                          12
environmental well-being in the trial court, as he expressly mentioned these concerns

at the hearing on the motion to dismiss.” Adams, 547 S.W.3d at 896. The Supreme

Court explained that it had not “previously cabined [its] TCPA analysis to the precise

legal arguments or record references a moving party made to the trial court regarding

the TCPA’s applicability.” Id. at 897. Therefore, the Supreme Court considered the

appellant’s arguments that his alleged defamatory statements were related to

Starside’s services in the marketplace and to the community and environmental

well-being. Id.

      We find this case distinguishable from Adams because this is not a case where,

on appeal, appellants merely expanded on issues previously presented to the trial

court or presented new arguments in support of those issues previously raised. See

id. at 896–97 (“We do not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below,

but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before

the Court.” (citing Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex.

2014)).   Rather,   in   their   “motion,”    appellants   identified   no   protected

communications, provided no explanation for how Lanier’s motion infringed on a

protected right, and included no analysis of the applicability of the TCPA. The

motion consisted of a single statement that the TCPA applied because the motion for

sanctions interfered with appellants’ right to petition. Apart from this single

statement, appellants presented no legal argument to the trial court in the first

                                         13
instance. Cf. Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014) (“Preservation

of error reflects important prudential considerations recognizing that the judicial

process benefits greatly when trial courts have the opportunity to first consider and

rule on error.”). For this reason, based on the specific facts of this case and the

manner in which the TCPA was presented to the trial court, we hold that appellants

have failed to preserve their argument that the trial court should have granted their

TCPA motion to dismiss. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). We overrule appellants’

third issue.

                                    Conclusion

       We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction appellants’ appeal from the trial court’s

November 15 and 29 orders to the extent that those orders impose sanctions and

grant special exceptions. We affirm the trial court’s November 15 and 29 orders to

the extent that they deny appellants’ TCPA motion to dismiss.

                                                    Amparo Guerra
                                                    Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

                                         14