Court Opinion

ID: 9943668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-24 01:00:46.699894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:43.288976
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40144      Document: 81-1      Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/23/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                            ____________                                FILED
                                                                February 23, 2024
                             No. 23-40144                          Lyle W. Cayce
                            ____________                                Clerk

United States of America,

                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                  versus

Chad Michael Rider,

                                        Defendant—Appellant.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Texas
                        USDC No. 4:20-CR-232-2
               ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
      Chad Michael Rider was convicted of three counts of producing or
attempting to produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
and was sentenced to 720 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals the jury’s
verdict and raises five issues on appeal. We AFFIRM.
 Case: 23-40144         Document: 81-1           Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/23/2024

                                      No. 23-40144

                                            I.
                                           A.
        In 2019 and 2020, law enforcement learned that two IP addresses
associated with the Denison Church of the Nazarene and its pastor, David
Pettigrew, uploaded images of child pornography online. After acquiring
search warrants for Denison Church and Pettigrew’s home, officers found a
Maxtor hard drive in Pettigrew’s office at the church. The hard drive
contained “dozens and dozens of videos” that “captured children, in various
stages of undress, taking baths in the church offices.” The footage also
captured Pettigrew and another man “setting up cameras before the children
came in, escorting them in, instructing them how to bathe in front of the
cameras so the cameras would capture them, and then taking the cameras
down.” The church treasurer identified the second man as Appellant Chad
Michael Rider.1
        Two weeks later, officers executed a search warrant at Rider’s
residence. After locating Rider, Detective Joseph Adcock and Agent Bruce
Donnet escorted Rider to a police car to speak with him. Rider was read his
Miranda rights and admitted to placing cameras at Pettigrew’s request on two
occasions. Rider claimed he felt “forced” to set up the cameras because
Pettigrew had obtained nude photos of Rider’s wife, Pettigrew “was [his]
pastor,” and because Rider “believed there was nothing malicious—nothing
sexual about it.” Throughout the conversation, Rider maintained that he did
not know Pettigrew intended to film the children naked and believed the
equipment captured only audio. Rider was arrested later that day.

        _____________________
        1
         According to Special Agent Mitchell, these videos captured images of Rider’s face
and Pettigrew was also heard calling him “Michael.”

                                            2
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                                     No. 23-40144

       The police later discovered additional videos on the Maxtor hard drive
that were filmed at different locations. These included the so-called
“Neighbor Videos” and “Home Bathroom Videos.” The Neighbor Videos
were filmed at Rider’s neighbor’s house and consisted of three consecutive
recordings of Rider’s teenage neighbor (“Victim 1”) using the restroom. The
footage captured Victim 1 “entering her private home bathroom and looking
at herself in the mirror; standing up from the toilet while nude from the waist
down; and washing her hands prior to leaving the bathroom.”2 The video
included footage of Victim 1’s genitals. The Home Bathroom Videos were
filmed in Rider’s home, took place over several days, and captured a different
minor (“Victim 2”). Victim 2 was friends with Rider’s children, and Rider
was Victim 2’s legal guardian when he filmed her. The Home Bathroom
Videos captured Victim 2 on multiple occasions as she “undresses, examines
her body, enters the shower, exits the shower, uses a towel to dry off all of
her body, and dresses.”
        Rider was indicted on three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a)
and (e), which prohibit the sexual exploitation of minors, or attempted
exploitation of children, to produce child pornography.3 Section 2251(a)
provides that:
       Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or
       coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any
       other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or
       affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or

       _____________________
       2
           The three videos were shown to the jury and trial testimony described their
content.
       3
         Rider was first indicted on August 19, 2020 on one count of violating 18 U.S.C.
§2251(a) and (e) related to the Church Videos. On July 13, 2022, the Government returned
a superseding indictment that included the counts related to the Neighbor and Home
Bathroom Videos.

                                           3
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                                         No. 23-40144

        Possession of the United States, with the intent that such
        minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
        of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the
        purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct,
        shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) . . .4
        “[S]exually explicit conduct” includes the “lascivious exhibition of
the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any person,”5 which the Fifth Circuit
defines as “a depiction which displays or brings forth to view in order to
attract notice to the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite
lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the viewer.”6
        All three counts were based on footage discovered on the Maxtor hard
drive. Count One accused Rider and Pettigrew of conspiring or attempting to
conspire to employ youth at the Denison Church to engage in sexually
explicit activity for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such
conduct. Counts Two and Three related to the Neighbor Videos and the
Home Bathroom Videos, respectively, and alleged that Rider “did and did
attempt to” use Victims 1 and 2 to produce child pornography. Counts Two
and Three read:
        Between [the specified dates] in the Eastern District of Texas,
        Chad Michael Rider, defendant, did and did attempt to employ,
        use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce any minor to engage
        in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing
        any visual depiction of such conduct, and [1] such visual
        depiction was transported and transmitted using any means
        and facility of interstate and foreign commerce and in and
        affecting interstate and foreign commerce; [2] that such visual
        _____________________
        4
            18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
        5
            18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v).
        6
         United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 828 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2001)).

                                              4
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                                    No. 23-40144

       depiction was produced using materials that had been mailed,
       shipped, and transported in and affecting interstate and foreign
       commerce by any means, including by computer; and that [3]
       the defendant knew and had reason to know that the visual
       depiction would be transported and transmitted using any
       means and facility of interstate and foreign commerce and in
       and affecting interstate and foreign commerce.
       Specifically, the defendant, Chad Michael Rider, did employ,
       use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce Victim [1 or 2], a
       minor known to the Grand Jury, and did attempt to employ,
       use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce Victim [1 or 2], to
       engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
       producing a visual depiction of such conduct, using a concealed
       recording device and the internet.7
                                          B.
                                          1.
       Before trial, Rider moved to suppress his conversation with Detective
Adcock and Agent Donnet on the basis that his statements were involuntary.
He argued that the officers violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination by failing to secure the voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights
and by disregarding his request for counsel. Rider also claimed the officers
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because
Donnet “repeatedly preyed upon [Rider’s] substantial faith” to coerce Rider
into confessing.
       After holding a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended rejecting
Rider’s Fifth Amendment claim because he was not in a “custodial
interrogation.” Alternatively, the magistrate judge found that Rider received
       _____________________
       7
          Counts Two and Three were substantively identical and differed insofar as the
counts had different date ranges and Count Two referred to Victim 1 while Count Three
referred to Victim 2.

                                          5
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                                   No. 23-40144

his Miranda warnings, implicitly waived his rights by voluntarily speaking
with the officers, and did not invoke his right to counsel. The district court
overruled Rider’s objections and accepted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendations on the day of the trial.
                                        2.
       Rider sought to use Dr. Kristi Compton, a licensed psychologist, as an
expert witness at trial. Dr. Compton had conducted a “pedophilia
assessment” and planned to provide her expert opinion that Rider “shows
no signs of pedophilia” and “that [Rider’s] personality leads him to be
compliant and conflict avoidant, possibly to the point of being in denial about
other’s intentions.” The Government moved to exclude Dr. Compton’s
testimony.
       After holding a pretrial conference, the district court excluded Dr.
Compton’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and
702.8 The district court found the testimony irrelevant because whether
“Rider has the characteristics of a pedophile or a particularly compliant
personality that may have motivated him to act is simply not relevant to any
element of § 2251 that the Government must prove.” The court further
determined that, even if Dr. Compton’s testimony had some probative value,
that value was substantially outweighed by the risk that “the jury may give
the testimony undue consideration simply because it comes from an expert.”
Finally, to the extent that Dr. Compton would testify “solely on Rider’s
capacity and character to form the requisite intent,” the court found the jury
could determine this information without need for expert testimony.

       _____________________
       8
           Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 702.

                                        6
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                                      No. 23-40144

                                          3.
       The Government introduced, inter alia, the following evidence at trial:
(1) the “Church Videos” taken of children at Denison Church; (2) the
Neighbor Videos; (3) the Home Bathroom Videos; (4) testimony by the
children depicted in the Church Videos, the Neighbor Videos, and the Home
Bathroom videos; and (5) receipts and records from Amazon.com showing
that Rider and Pettigrew purchased thousands of dollars of hidden cameras
and had them shipped to various addresses, including Rider’s home and
rental properties.
       Rider took the stand, testified in his defense, and advanced two
defenses relevant here. First, he testified to his belief that Pettigrew merely
wanted to create funny, candid moments for a video montage. Second, Rider
claimed he was pressured into helping Pettigrew either because of
Pettigrew’s role as his pastor or because Pettigrew had nude photos of
Rider’s wife.
                                          4.
       The jurors were instructed that they could convict Rider of violating
or attempting to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2251.9 Relevant on appeal, the jury
charge for Counts Two and Three read:
       For you to find the Defendant guilty of this crime, you must be
       convinced that the Government has proved each of the
       following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
       First: That the Defendant did or did attempt to employ, use,
       persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in
       sexually explicit conduct;

       _____________________
       9
           18 U.S.C. §2251(a), (e).

                                           7
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                                     No. 23-40144

        Second: That the Defendant acted for the purpose of
        producing a visual depiction of such conduct; and
        Third: That the visual depiction was produced using materials
        that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in and affecting
        interstate and foreign commerce by any means, including by
        computer.
        The jury charge for attempting to commit Counts Two and Three
read:
        The Government can prove Count [Two or Three] by showing
        beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did or did
        “attempt” to commit the offense. It is a crime for anyone to
        attempt to commit a violation of certain specified laws of the
        United States. For you to find the Defendant guilty of
        attempting to commit the sexual exploitation of children a/k/a
        child pornography, you must be convinced that the
        Government has proved each of the following beyond a
        reasonable doubt:
        (1) That the Defendant intended to commit the sexual
        exploitation of children a/k/a production of child
        pornography; and
        (2) That the Defendant did an act that constitutes a substantial
        step towards the commission of that crime and that strongly
        corroborates the Defendant’s criminal intent and amounts to
        more than mere preparation.
        The jury issued a general verdict convicting Rider on all three
counts.10 The verdict form did not reflect whether Rider was convicted on
Counts Two and Three for the completed or inchoate offense.

        _____________________
        10
           For all three counts, the verdict form asked the jury to mark “guilty” or “not
guilty” as to the offense charged.

                                           8
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                                        No. 23-40144

                                              5.
        The Presentence Report (“PSR”) recommended a sentencing range
of 324–360 months.11 After considering the factors provided in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3353, the district court found that an upward variance was warranted and
sentenced Rider to 720 months’ imprisonment.
        In explaining its sentence, the district court noted that the “facts of
this case [were] uniquely disturbing” because Rider “used his position of a
trusted adult and a church leader to gain unfettered access to the children
and church properties for the purpose of producing child pornography,” and
he had “preyed on children in the community that necessarily didn’t attend
[church] with their families.” The court further explained that Rider took
“extraordinary steps” to effectuate his plan, including spending large
amounts of money on cameras, creating an alias, shipping the cameras to
multiple addresses, and devising “multiple church events which would cause
certain children to get wet or dirty, necessitating them having to change
clothes.” Moreover, Rider had “tested the cameras and adjusted them
before and after the events in order to obtain the most optimal angles to
record the children naked.” The court concluded the Sentencing Guidelines
did not account for these factors, Rider’s “complete lack” of remorse, or the
fact that he shared the footage with Pettigrew. Finally, the district court
agreed with the “[G]overnment that ordering the counts to be served
concurrently would deprive the victims of justice for the specific crimes
committed against them.”

        _____________________
        11
           Rider’s total offense level was calculated at 41 with a criminal history category of
I, leading to an initial guidelines range of 324–405 months. Because 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e)
authorizes a maximum imprisonment of 30 years, the guidelines range was adjusted to 324–
360 months.

                                              9
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                                       No. 23-40144

                                            6.
        Rider raises five issues on appeal. First, he argues the district court
erred by denying the motion to suppress his conversation with Detective
Adcock and Agent Donnet. Second, he asserts that Dr. Compton’s testimony
was relevant and should not have been excluded. Third, Rider claims there
was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts Two and
Three. Fourth, he asserts that the jury charges on Counts Two and Three
constructively amended the indictment and allowed the jury to convict on a
factual basis not alleged in the indictment. Finally, Rider argues that his
sentence was unreasonable.
                                           III.
                                            A.
        Rider argues that Detective Adcock and Agent Donnet violated his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that the district court erred by
not excluding any inculpatory statements made to the officers. Specifically,
Rider claims his statements were involuntary and that the officers
manipulated him into believing he could reunite with his family if he
cooperated. He also contends Donnet violated his due process rights by
referencing their shared Christian faith, which exploited the “human need to
disclose” one’s “flawed acts or thoughts.”
        “Where a district court has denied a motion to suppress evidence, we
review its factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de
novo.”12 Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if a review of the record
leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
        _____________________
        12
           United States v. Lim, 897 F.3d 673, 685 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v.
Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2015)); United States v. Roper, 63 F.4th 473, 475–76 (5th
Cir. 2023).

                                            10
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                                        No. 23-40144

committed.13 This Court must “uphold the district court’s ruling if there is
any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.”14
                                              1.
        The Fifth Amendment forbids law enforcement from using
statements, “whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”15 In
Miranda, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement officials “must
inform a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent, that any statement
he makes may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to
retained or appointed counsel.”16
        Thus, the threshold question is whether a suspect was “in custody,”17
an issue that Rider did not address in his appellate briefing. Even if Rider did
not abandon this argument on appeal by failing to contest this point, his
arguments regarding the waiver of his rights are relevant only if he was in
custody. Because we agree with the district court that Rider was not “in
        _____________________
        13
             Roper, 63 F.4th at 475.
        14
          United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th 357, 367 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation and
citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Iglesias-Villegas v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 268
(2023).
        15
             Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
        16
          United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444). “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way . . . Miranda warnings are required only where
there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him ‘in custody.’”
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977) (citation omitted).
        17
           Lim, 897 F.3d at 690 (“‘Miranda warnings must be administered prior to
‘custodial interrogation.’”) (citing United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc)).

                                              11
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                                           No. 23-40144

custody” when he made the inculpatory statements, we do reach the waiver
of those rights.
        A suspect is “in custody” when they are “‘placed under formal arrest
or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood
the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
which the law associates with formal arrest.’”18 In Rider’s case, “there is no
indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s
freedom to depart was restricted in any way.”19 Although the conversation
lasted for over one and a half hours, Rider was interviewed in an unlocked
police car and his counsel admitted at oral argument that Rider was free to
leave the police vehicle. Furthermore, Rider was made comfortable and kept
“in view of his family members” throughout the conversation. The
magistrate judge described the interaction as “conversational” and, at one
point and without objection from Adcock or Donnet, Rider opened the car
door and asked officers to be careful about searching his truck so as not to
scratch the hitch. Under these facts, we see no error in the district court’s
determination that a reasonable person “would not have understood the
situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement equivalent to
formal arrest.”20 Therefore, Rider was not “in custody” and the district

        _____________________
        18
             Courtney, 463 F.3d at 337 (citing Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 596).
        19
             Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
        20
           United States v. Gonzalez, 814 F. App’x 838, 843–45 (5th Cir. 2020) (defendant
not “in custody” when he sat in front seat, was interviewed on his property within 40 feet
of his home, and could see his family); United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769 773–77 (5th
Cir. 2015) (defendant not “in custody” when he was told he was “free to leave,” was not
physically restrained, interrogation “took place close to the home, in a car subject to public
scrutiny,” and transcript “highlights that the conversation was as much an opportunity
taken by Wright to tell his story to the officers as it was an opportunity taken by the officers
to get information from Wright”).

                                               12
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                                        No. 23-40144

court correctly determined there was no violation of his Fifth Amendment
rights.21
                                              2.
        Nor was Rider subject to the type of coercion prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As set out in Chavez v. Martinez, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a suspect’s right to be free from coercive questioning
and prohibits “[c]onvictions based on evidence obtained by methods that are
‘so brutal and so offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shoc[k] the
conscience’ [and] violate the Due Process Clause.”22 To violate the Due
Process Clause, law enforcement must use a “substantial element of
coercive” conduct that is “intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest.”23 This demanding standard applies to “police
torture or other abuse.”24

        _____________________
        21
           Even if Rider was “in custody,” we agree that the officers issued his Miranda
rights and that Rider either waived or failed to invoke his rights.
        22
          Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003) (citation omitted); Edmonds v.
Oktibbeha Cnty., Miss., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012); Nenno v. Quarterman, 489 F.3d
214, 217 (5th Cir. 2007) (“It is true, as Nenno argues, that a confession might in some
circumstances be coerced from a person not in custody. But the question then is one of
fundamental fairness under the due process clause.”).
        23
          Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64 (1986) (“While each confession case
has turned on its own set of factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was
oppressive, all have contained a substantial element of coercive police conduct.”); Chavez,
538 U.S. at 775 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).
        24
           Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773; id. at 794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) for the proposition that the Due
Process Clause, not the Self-Incrimination Clause, prohibits convictions based upon
“tortured confessions”); see also Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys,
675 F.3d 849, 868 (5th Cir. 2012) (“As one court has recently summarized, ‘[t]he burden
to show state conduct that shocks the conscience is extremely high, requiring stunning
evidence of arbitrariness and caprice that extends beyond mere violations of state law, even

                                              13
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                                        No. 23-40144

        Although Rider was interviewed in a police vehicle, the car was not
locked and was kept at a comfortable temperature. His counsel admitted he
could exit the vehicle at any time. Rider’s health and safety was not
threatened, nor was he verbally threatened.25 To the contrary, the record
indicates the interaction remained “conversational.” Even if Rider is correct
that Donnet “manipulated [Rider’s] faith to suggest forgiveness from God if
[Rider] confessed,” the Supreme Court has held that appeals to the
conscience do not constitute coercive police tactics.26 Simply put, Rider can
point to no behavior that violates the “decencies of civilized conduct”27 and

        _____________________
violations resulting from bad faith to something more egregious and more extreme.’”)
(citing J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73, 80 (1st Cir. 2010)).
        25
           Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (concluding that “[i]llegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what
was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents” do “more than offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically”); Jackson v. Harris, 446 F. App’x 668, 670 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Regarding
Jackson’s contention that Harris acted coercively, mere verbal abuse, threatening language,
and gestures do not amount to a constitutional violation.”) (citing Bender v. Brumley, 1 F.3d
271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993)); see Keys, 675 F.3d at 867–68 (collecting cases to support
statement that “many cases that have applied the [shocks the conscience] standard have
involved the use of extreme force by police officers or other state actors”).
        26
            Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1985) (“The Fifth Amendment, of
course, is not concerned with . . . moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating
from sources other than official coercion.”) (citation omitted); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560
U.S. 370, 387 (2010) (“The fact that Helgert’s question referred to Thompkins’ religious
beliefs also did not render Thompkins’ statement involuntary. The Fifth Amendment
privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating
from sources other than official coercion.”) (cleaned up) (citation and quotations omitted).
Although Elstad and Berghuis concern the Fifth Amendment, Chavez teaches that the
Fourteenth Amendment standard is higher, and we see no reason why appeals to religion
would be permissible under the Fifth Amendment but impermissible under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
        27
             Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.

                                             14
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                                         No. 23-40144

meets Chavez’s high standard.28 The district court did not err in denying
Rider’s motion to suppress on this basis.
                                               B.
        The district court excluded Dr. Compton’s testimony pursuant to
Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 702.29 Rider contends that this was
error. We disagree and uphold the district court’s exclusion under Rule 403.
        Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, subject to
harmless-error analysis.30 Determinations under Rule 403 are given “‘an
especially high level of deference’” and reversal is “called for only ‘rarely’
and only when there has been ‘a clear abuse of discretion,’”31 i.e., a complete
disregard of the controlling law.32
        Rule 403 permits the court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed” by a danger of confusing the
issues or misleading the jury.33 Here, the district court believed Dr.
Compton’s testimony “present[ed] a risk that the jury may give the
testimony undue consideration simply because it [came] from an expert” and

        _____________________
        28
          Rider analogizes his situation to that of United States v. Adair, No. 4:16-CR-527,
2018 WL 322228 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018), to support his argument that his statements were
involuntary. Although Adair presents similar facts as this case, the district court did not
apply Chavez’s “shock the conscience” standard. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774 (citation
omitted). As such, Rider misplaces his reliance on Adair.
        29
             Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 403; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
        30
             United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
        31
            United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 354 (5th Cir. 2007)).
        32
             United States v. Naidoo, 995 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation
omitted).
        33
             Fed. R. Evid. 403.

                                               15
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                                        No. 23-40144

that this risk outweighed its “limited” probative value. Although Rider
argues the court erred by “reason[ing] from the general to the specific,” he
has not shown how this error “amounts to a complete disregard of the
controlling law.”34 To the contrary, this circuit has previously affirmed
decisions to exclude expert testimony regarding a defendant’s sexuality in
child pornography cases.35 Rider makes no attempt to explain why his case is
different.
        Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by excluding the testimony pursuant to Rule 403. Because we find that the
district court did not err on this basis, we need not address Rider’s arguments
regarding Rules 401 and 702.
                                            C.
        Rider next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
Counts Two and Three of the indictment. The indictment on Counts Two
and Three set out two theories of criminal behavior: first, that Rider sexually
exploited Victims 1 and 2, and second, that he attempted to exploit Victims
1 and 2. The jury were instructed on both the completed and inchoate offense
and returned a general verdict finding Rider guilty.36 As to the completed
offense, the parties now dispute whether Rider’s videos portrayed a
“lascivious display of the genitals.”37 As to the inchoate offense, Rider
        _____________________
        34
             Naidoo, 995 F.3d at 375.
        35
           See generally id. at 375–76 (holding that district court did not err in excluding
expert testimony regarding defendant’s sexuality in 18 U.S.C. § 2252 possession case).
        36
          The jury was told that the Government did “not have to prove both of these for
you to return a guilty verdict” so long as the verdict was unanimous. The Government
provided proposed jury instructions, including a general verdict form. Rider filed several
objections and requested amendments but did not object to the general verdict form.
        37
            The parties’ arguments focus on the six Dost factors, which this Circuit allows
juries to consider when deciding whether an image is lascivious. See Steen, 634 F.3d at 826–

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                                         No. 23-40144

admits “the attempt charge is the hardest for him,” but argues there was
insufficient evidence of attempt because “the cameras were set up so that
they would be unlikely to focus on the female-sexual organ or pubic area.”
        “In determining whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain [the]
convictions, we must decide, viewing the evidence and the inferences [] in
the light most favorable to the verdict, whether a rational juror could have
found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”38 “The evidence
need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to
choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence.”39 Because of the
general verdict, we cannot determine whether the jury convicted on the
completed offense theory, the attempt theory, or both. Regardless, when
cases are submitted on two alternative, legally valid theories, this Court must
affirm if either theory is supported by sufficient evidence.40 The Court finds

        _____________________
27; United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff’d sub nom. United States v.
Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987), and aff’d, 813 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1987). Relevant
here, the sixth Dost factor asks “[w]hether the visual depiction is intended or designed to
elicit a sexual response in the viewer.” Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832. Rider argues there was
no evidence that he intended his footage to elicit a sexual response in the viewer, and that
like the defendant in United States v. Steen, “merely being a voyeur excited” him. The
Government disagrees and contends that Rider’s extensive preparation and dissemination
of the recordings to Pettigrew demonstrated his intent to capture sexually explicit material.
        38
             United States v. Mann, 493 F.3d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
        39
             Id.
         Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991); Sochor v. Fla., 504 U.S. 527, 538
(1992); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 753–54 (5th Cir. 1999) (“As already
mentioned, the case was submitted to the jury on two alternative, legally valid theories. If
either theory was supported by sufficient evidence, we are bound to affirm.”); United States
v. Garza-Robles, 627 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 2010) (“If the evidence was sufficient to
support one theory, the fact that the evidence was insufficient to support another of the
theories does not negate the verdict.”).

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                                         No. 23-40144

that sufficient evidence supports Rider’s conviction for attempting to
produce child pornography.
        It is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e) to attempt to employ, use,
persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any minor to engage in any sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such
conduct.41 Attempts require proof of two elements: “first, that the defendant
acted with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of
the underlying substantive offense, and, second, that the defendant had
engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission
of the crime.”42 Thus, the conviction may be upheld so long as sufficient
evidence indicates Rider acted with specific intent to film Victims 1 and 2
engaging in sexually explicit conduct and took a substantial step towards
doing do.
        There is ample evidence that Rider had the intent and took the
necessary steps towards accomplishing his aim. A rational jury could have
gleaned Rider’s intent from his extensive planning and efforts to hide his
behavior. For example, Rider spent thousands of dollars purchasing
recording equipment and specifically selected discreet cameras. He bought
cameras disguised as household items, such as a clock, a pen, and hooks,43

        _____________________
        41
             18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e).
        42
             United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
        43
          The purchases were made using a false name, with an email address created on
Rider’s phone, and shipped to properties owned, in part, by Rider. Some orders were
shipped to Rider’s parents’ home. Generally, individuals do not use an alias to purchase
hidden cameras if they intend to document others for clinical, scientific, or artistic
purposes. The premediated nature of his conduct strongly supports that he was no
opportunistic voyeur, unlike the defendant in Steen. See Steen, 634 F.3d at 827 n.23 (noting
“[t]he voyeuristic nature of the offense limits his ability to control the location and
poses.”).

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                                 No. 23-40144

and then placed these cameras in locations where their presence would seem
innocuous. Furthermore, he selected locations where his victims would
expect privacy and, for various reasons, were sure to expose their genitals.
Rider positioned and angled his cameras to capture his victims’ pubic areas.
The camera used in the Neighbor Videos was angled to capture Victim 1’s
midsection and recorded her urinating and standing in her underwear. Rider
likewise placed cameras to capture Victim 2’s pubic area, including one
camera inside the bath directly above the knob to turn on the water, i.e., at a
height designed to capture her breasts and pubic area. Finally, there is
evidence that Rider made a concerted effort to record Victim 2 in particular.
Victim 2 testified that Rider would frequently “stop[] her” before she went
into the bathroom so that could “fix something real quick or make it up for
me.” Footage later recorded Rider turning on the cameras before Victim 2
entered the bathroom. When she asked Rider about the “flickering light” she
noticed, he told her “it was nothing to worry about, that they had always been
there.”
       Nevertheless, Rider contends that he did not attempt to film explicit
content. He claims such an attempt would have required the “cameras [] to
be placed differently,” such as “placed facing a person who sat on the
commode” or “set up to take a ‘zoomed’ in image of someone getting into
or out of the shower.” Rider essentially argues that had he intended to film
explicit material, he would have placed his cameras differently and tried
harder to zoom in on his victims’ genitals. This argument is unpersuasive and
ignores the fact that his cameras were angled and positioned to capture his
victims’ genitals. Additionally, criminal attempts take a myriad of forms, and
this Court will not hamstring § 2251(e) when defendants fail to perfectly
execute their plans. As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. Johnson,

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                                       No. 23-40144

“[a] defendant’s success in attaining his criminal objective is not necessary
for an attempt conviction.”44
        Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,
Rider expended significant funds to acquire discreet recording equipment
and set up these devices in areas where Victims 1 and 2 were guaranteed to
display their public areas. Given the expectation of privacy that accompanies
bathrooms and showers, a rational juror could have found that Rider hoped
and intended to capture a lascivious display of the victims’ genitals. A jury
could use the same evidence to conclude that Rider took substantial steps to
record this explicit footage. In short, substantial evidence supports the jury
verdict.
                                             D.
        Rider asks this Court to overturn his conviction on the basis that the
jury charge constructively amended the first superseding indictment. The
indictment for Counts Two and Three listed the elements of the offense and
alleged that Rider engaged in the prohibited conduct “using a concealed
recording device and the internet.” The jury charge likewise enumerated the
elements of the offense but did not include language regarding a “concealed
recording device and the internet.” Rider claims that this omission
constitutes reversible error.

        _____________________
        44
           United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 439 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); see
also United States v. Moran, 57 F.4th 977, 981 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 22-7847,
2023 WL 8007353 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2023) (“Using the Supreme Court’s terminology,
Moran could have ‘consciously desired’—and thus intended—to produce child
pornography, however remote the ‘likelihood of that result happening.’”) (citing United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978)).

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                                         No. 23-40144

        We review constructive amendment claims de novo and convictions
must be overturned if a constructive amendment has occurred.45 Because
Rider raises this argument for the first time on appeal, it is reviewed for plain
error.46 “A constructive amendment occurs . . . when the Government is
allowed to prove an essential element of the crime on an alternative basis
permitted by the statute but not charged in the indictment.”47 Phrased
differently, constructive amendments occur when the government
“convict[s] the defendant on a materially different theory or set of facts than
that with which she was charged.”48
        We find no constructive amendment occurred. Although the language
regarding a “concealed recording device and the internet” was omitted from
the jury charge, the Government introduced plenty of evidence that Rider
purchased and used concealed recording devices—including hidden camera
alarm clocks, cameras disguised as hooks, a “super small hidden spy
camera,” pens with cameras, camera adapters, and camera smoke
detectors—to film his victims. Thus, the Government provided evidence
that Rider used “a concealed recording device.” The Government also
offered evidence that Rider purchased these cameras through Amazon.com
and that they were shipped “in and affecting” interstate commerce,
satisfying the indictment’s language regarding use of the internet.

        _____________________
        45
             United States v. Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501, 514 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
        46
           United States v. Vargas, 6 F.4th 616, 621 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v.
Stanford, 805 F.3d 557, 566 (5th Cir. 2015); Lockhart, 844 F.3d at 514 (“When the
indictment alleges a particular set of facts as forming the basis for the defendant’s violation
of a statute, but the trial court allows evidence of other facts not alleged in the indictment
to form the basis of the jury’s guilty verdict, this court finds a constructive amendment.”).
        47
             Vargas, 6 F.4th at 621.
        48
             United States v. Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

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                                         No. 23-40144

        Accordingly, “the government did not maintain two alternative
theories—only one of which was charged—and urge the jury to convict upon
either of them. Rather, the government presented a single, consistent theory
of conviction throughout.”49 Because the evidence presented and relied upon
for conviction was that alleged in the indictment, there was no constructive
amendment.
                                              E.
        Finally, Rider claims that his 720-month sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We disagree.
        This Court generally reviews a sentence for unreasonableness but
decisions to depart from the Guideline range and the extent of the departure
are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.50
        Rider argues that the district court “failed to account for Pettigrew’s
control of this production scheme” and Rider’s diminished culpability given
that he “had less responsibility” than Pettigrew at the church. Rider asserts
that Pettigrew’s sentence “should have been a benchmark” and “there is no
basis for [Rider] to have a sentence double that of Pettigrew.” Rider

        _____________________
        49
           Thompson, 647 F.3d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212 (1960) (indictment alleged a defendant used his position to “unlawfully obstruct,
delay [and] affect interstate commerce ... and movement of [sand] by extortion” but jury
charge was allowed to convict if conduct affected interstate commerce as to sand or affected
interstate commerce as to steel shipments); Lockhart, 844 F.3d at 515–16 (finding
constructive amendment after “district court materially modified an essential element of
the indictment by transforming the offense with which the indictment charged McCullouch
from one requiring a specific mens rea into a strict liability offense”); United States v.
Chambers, 408 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding essential element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
was possession of ammunition and constructive amendment occurred when indictment
alleged knowing possession of “104 rounds of .40 caliber S&W jacketed hollow-point
ammunition” but government only put on evidence of bullets and primers).
        50
             United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006).

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                                  No. 23-40144

essentially asked the district court to ignore his conduct and transfer
responsibility wholly onto Pettigrew. The district court’s refusal to do so did
not constitute an abuse of discretion.
       When considering Rider’s sentence, the district court adopted the
PSR’s factual findings and guideline applications and then looked to the
factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether the sentence
should deviate from the advisory range.51 After considering these factors, the
district court determined “an upward variance [was] warranted” because of
the “uniquely disturbing” facts of the case and its belief that the “guidelines
do not account for . . . the level of depravity exhibited by the defendant in this
case.” The district court justified its upward variance because of Rider’s
“complete lack of remorse” or acceptance of responsibility, position as
church leader, predation upon vulnerable children, and the “extraordinary”
steps taken to conceal his conduct. To “protect the community and . . .
provide adequate punishment” the district court imposed the maximum
punishment.
       These considerations directly responded to Rider’s belief that he was
not culpable in the “production scheme.” Indeed, at sentencing, the district
court highlighted Rider’s behavior and explained exactly why it found Rider
culpable. The district court explained that Rider held a “position of a trusted
adult and church leader” and described how he used this position to “gain
unfettered access to the children and church properties,” orchestrated
church events designed to get children dirty, and “encouraged the children
to disrobe and then bathe in the room.” The district court observed how
Rider “made the children feel safe by ensuring that the doors were locked for

       _____________________
       51
         The PSR calculated that the advisory guidelines range was 324–360 months’
imprisonment and Rider does not object to this calculation.

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                                       No. 23-40144

their privacy and comfort” and then abused their trust by “secretly filming
them naked.” The district court further referenced Rider’s comments
regarding “bus kids,”52 found that Rider preyed “upon children who didn’t
necessarily have [] parental supervision,” and “sometimes singled out
certain children for special events during which he would then record them
naked at the church.” Not only did Rider exhibit “extreme conduct” but he
“took extraordinary steps” to cover his behavior. In sum, we agree with the
Government that “the district court made clear that it considered Rider’s
argument that he was less culpable than Pettigrew and rejected it.” And given
the district court’s thorough reasoning on this point, we cannot say that the
district court erred in doing so.
        Rider is incorrect that this sentence is unreasonable in light of
Pettigrew’s sentence because Pettigrew does not provide an appropriate
benchmark. While 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) encourages district courts to
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct” in imposing sentences, district courts need not avoid sentencing
disparities between co-defendants who are not similarly situated.53 Here,
Pettigrew pled guilty to a single offense whereas Rider was convicted by a jury
of three counts; Rider’s additional offenses involved two additional victims,
“different locations,” “different dates,” and “different . . . kind[s] of secret

        _____________________
        52
          During his conversation with Adcock and Donnet, Rider referred to the “bus
kids” as children in the community who “cause[d] a lot of trouble” in the community but
whose parents did not attend Denison Church.
        53
          18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); United States v. Guillermo Balleza, 613 F.3d 432, 435 (5th
Cir. 2010) (“However, this disparity factor requires the district court to avoid only
unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants nationwide, and it does not
require the district court to avoid sentencing disparities between co-defendants who might
not be similarly situated.”) (citation omitted).

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                                      No. 23-40144

filming.”54 Rider and Pettigrew are not similarly situated and the difference
between their sentences is permissible.
        The district court properly calculated the applicable guidelines range
and articulated legitimate reasons for an upward departure. The district
court’s explanation and findings in support of that departure demonstrate
that the sentence is substantively reasonable.
                                          IV.
        In conclusion, the district court did not err by denying Rider’s motion
to suppress nor by excluding Dr. Compton’s testimony. We conclude that
the jury charge did not constructively amend the first superseding indictment
and the jury verdicts were supported by sufficient evidence. Finally, Rider’s
sentence is not substantively unreasonable. We therefore AFFIRM.

        _____________________
        54
           See also United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 767 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding two defendants not “similarly situated” when one, inter alia, “pled guilty [and]
provided information to law enforcement authorities”).

                                           25