Court Opinion

ID: 9834184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:22:06.158532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.503948
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In the motion for rehearing filed by appel-lees it is very earnestly insisted that this court erred in stating in the opinion heretofore filed herein that the bills of lading and drafts in the cases of Seley v. Williams, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 405, 50 S. W. 399, and Callender v. Short, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 364, 78 S. W. 366, “by notations or recitals therein taken together were held to constitute a contract by which the defendant bound himself, in consideration of the paymejnt of the amount of the draft, to deliver to the plaintiff in the county of plaintiff’s residence grain in the one case and cotton in the other of a specified weight and class, and upon breach of the contract to deliver the specified character of grain or cotton suit to recover damages therefor could be maintained in the county in which the defendant had contracted to make the delivery.”
*654This statement is inaccurate as applied to the C'allender-Sbort Cases if it be construed to mean that there was any notation on the bills of lading or drafts in evidence in that case indicating the grade or weight of the cotton. The bills of lading in that case, just as in this case, only called for a certain number of bales of cotton, and the drafts were drawn for the value of the cotton at the agreed price per pound, based on grade and weight at the point of shipment. Neither the bills of lading nor the drafts contained any notations or recitals indicating the grade or weight of the cotton.
The contract under which the cotton was purchased provided that the cotton should be paid for at so much per pound f. o. b. cars at Houston, on a basis middling, Houston weights and classification.
This court held, in effect, in the case mentioned, that the bills of lading and the drafts above described constituted a contract in writing by the defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs at Houston cotton which, when classified and weighed at Houston, would at the agreed price per pound be worth the amount of the drafts, and for a breach of this contract suit could be maintained against the defendant at Houston.
We are not inclined to question the correctness of that holding, and any expressions in our main opinion which can be so construed were not so intended, and are here withdrawn.
The facts in this case distinguish it from the Callender Case. As stated in our main opinion, the undisputed evidence in this case shows that the draft on appellees was not drawn by appellant, nor indorsed by him. He was not the payee in the draft which was drawn on appellees by its agent at El Paso in favor of the El Paso bank. It was cashed by the El Paso bank, and the proceeds paid to appellant in El Paso. The cotton was weighed by the public weigher at El Paso, and a sample from every bale was examined by appel-lees’ agent, Freund, after which he began negotiations with appellant, for the purchase of the cotton. The parties finally agreed upon the price, and agreed amount was paid appellant in the manner stated. Appellant testified:
“The purpose of having these bills of lading taken in my name as the consignor for the shipment of cotton from El Paso to Houston was so that Mr. Freund could negotiate his drafts in order to pay me the money for the cotton. I did not suggest .to him that it be fixed that way. He suggested it to me. * * * I explained to Mr. Freund fully. I wanted the cash there in El Paso.”
Appellees’ agent, Freund, testified:
“It is a fact that I paid Mr. Valdespino in cash the price of the cotton that he wanted there at El Paso, the full amount of it according to my class and weights there at El Paso, according to what we had agreed on there at El Paso. I paid him every cent of the value of the cotton that we had agreed on there at El Paso.”
How is it possible to get out of these bills of lading and drafts a contract on the part of appellant to deliver cotton of any specific weight and grade at Houston? Appellant was not a party to the drafts, and the drafts and the bills of lading, taken together, fail to show what amount appellant was paid for the cotton, and appellee’s cause of action depends entirely upon the oral contract of sale made by appellant with appellee’s agent at El Paso. This being true, it necessarily follows that a suit for the breach of that contract could not be maintained over appellant’s objection, elsewhere than in the county of his residence.
We are fully satisfied that our disposition of this appeal as indicated by our main opinion was correct, and the motion for rehearing must be overruled.
Overruled.