Court Opinion

ID: 9748759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:12:16.08957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.147554
License: Public Domain

CUNNINGHAM, J.,
dissenting.
With due respect, I dissent.
We are bound by law to adhere to a strong presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. Analysis begins with the presumption that legislative acts are constitutional. Cain v. Lodestar Energy, Inc., 302 S.W.3d 39, 43 (Ky.2009) (footnote omitted). In my opinion, this presumption has been ignored in our holding that the “bicameral confirmation requirement” of KRS 164.011(1) is “constitutionally infirm.”
Just last year, we addressed substantial deference given to upholding the constitutionality of statutes.
It is an axiomatic rule of statutory interpretation that when this Court considers the constitutionality of a statute, we must draw all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the validity of the statute. In Kentucky, a statute carries with it the presumption of constitutionality; therefore, when we consider it, “we are ‘obligated to give it, if possible, an interpretation which upholds its constitutional validity.’ ” To the extent that there is reasonable doubt as to a statute’s constitutionality, all presumptions will be in favor of upholding the statute, deferring to the “voice of the people as expressed through the legislative department of government.” A constitutional infringement must be “clear, complete and unmistakable” in order to render the statute unconstitutional.
Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dept. v. Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806 (Ky.2009) (internal citations omitted).
I take major issue with the statement of the majority that “there is nothing in the plain language of § 93 that permits the House to have any role in the confirmation vote.” That provision clearly authorizes both houses of the General Assembly to “prescribe by law” the method of Appellant’s appointment to the Council on Post-secondary Education.
This section of the Kentucky Constitution plainly states that the office in question is to be appointed by the Governor “in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” There is no ambiguity in those words. The provision simply broadens the representative involvement of the lawmaking body into the appointment process. There is ambiguity in the words “which may include a requirement of consent by the Senate.” In fact, the majority spends page after page explaining what it means. In short, the majority gives minimal thrift to the precise and direct language of the constitutional provision and reverses this case on the ambiguous wording.
Our Court today gives hefty consideration to the fact that the voters of Kentucky approved this constitutional amendment and, therefore, must have endorsed Senate only confirmation. Says the Court, “No reasonable voter could have construed that ballot question to mean the House had any right whatsoever to confirm nominees.” This requires a complete whiteout on the ballots throughout this state of the words “in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Of course, that was not the case.
In truth, when § 93 was on the ballot, it was all about the heart of the issue— authorizing the re-election of constitutional officers for one additional term. It is pure fantasy to think that the voters fully understood the last sentence we deal with here today when it has taken over a year of much consideration and discussion, and our Kentucky State Supreme Court almost forty pages, to tell us what it means.
*23In keeping with strong presumption of the constitutionality of statutes passed by our legislature, representing the citizenship of this state, I would affirm the decision below. Therefore, with deep appreciation for the five minds that differ, I respectfully dissent.
SCHRODER, J., joins.