Court Opinion

ID: 9891669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 14:18:40.046429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:02.784997
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wayne Thomas,                           :
                                        :
                         Petitioner     :
                                        :
                v.                      : No. 235 M.D. 2022
                                        : Submitted: January 27, 2023
K. Smith, Major of Security at          :
Dept. of Corrections; Ken               :
Goodman, Deputy Supt. of Facility       :
Security; Kevin Ramson, Supt.           :
Chairperson Committee Commissary        :
Central DOC,                            :
                                        :
                         Respondents    :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
            HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                     FILED: October 19, 2023

            Before this Court are the preliminary objections (POs) of K. Smith,
Major of Security; Ken Goodman, Deputy Superintendent of Facility Security; and
Kevin Ramson, Superintendent Chairperson Committee Commissary, all of whom
are employed by the Department of Corrections (Department) (collectively,
Respondents) to Wayne Thomas’s (Inmate) Petition for Review (PFR) filed in this
Court’s original jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, we overrule in part and
sustain in part Respondents’ POs and dismiss Inmate’s PFR.
                                     I. Background
              On April 13, 2022, Inmate, representing himself, filed his PFR seeking
the ability to purchase a word processor typewriter with memory capacity. Inmate,
who is housed at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCI-Albion), states
that he initially pursued grievance procedures by filing an administrative remedies
form claiming that he was deprived of the ability to purchase a typewriter in violation
of his constitutional rights. An SCI-Albion grievance officer responded that the
prison commissary was in the process of obtaining a new vendor contract for the sale
of typewriters to inmates. The grievance officer advised that, once the contract was
agreed upon, a catalog and price for typewriters for purchase would be made
available.
              Inmate filed another administrative grievance on the basis that he and
other SCI-Albion inmates were not notified in advance that typewriters would be
temporarily unavailable. The Department denied relief on the basis that typewriters
were now available for purchase. Inmate then appealed the denial challenging the
choice of vendor and the cost of the typewriters, claiming the set price of $400 was
double what an outside vendor would charge. The Department denied the appeal
explaining that Policy DC-ADM 815 (Policy)1 states that if an item is available
through the commissary, it cannot be purchased from an outside vendor.
              Inmate attempted to purchase a Swintec 2416 typewriter and was
informed that it was no longer available through the commissary for purchase, but
that the Swintec 2410 would be available from the vendor via outside purchase.

      1
         We may take judicial notice of the Department’s policies found on its website at:
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx. (Last visited October 18, 2023).
Figueroa v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 900 A.2d 949, 950 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2006).
                                            2
Inmate asserts: “The difference being there is no memory in the 2410 typewriter.
The decision to not allow memory was a determination made by [Department]
Security at Central Office.” PFR, Exhibit G.
             Inmate filed this action against Respondents asserting that they violated
his due process and equal protection rights, deprived him of access to the courts, and
committed willful misconduct. More particularly, he alleges that Respondents,
identified as part of the Department’s Security and/or “Commissary Committee,”
have committed torts and violated his constitutional rights by creating, adopting, and
enforcing the Policy that bans the sale of typewriters with memory capacity to
inmates, and by contracting with the Swintec Company as the exclusive vendor for
the sale of all typing merchandise to inmates statewide. According to Inmate,
Respondents have offered no compelling or rational governmental interests to
support the ban on word processor typewriters; any implied “security risk” reason
lacks legitimate penological justification. Inmate claims that Respondents violated
his due process rights by failing to provide him and other inmates with advance
notice of the Policy before the ban of word processor typewriters went into effect.
Inmate claims that the Policy limitation to offer only a standard typewriter without
memory capability deprives him of meaningful access to the courts. He further
complains that the limitation violates his equal protection rights because other
devices with memory are readily available to inmates such as an electric keyboard
and an electronic tablet and there is no basis for this dissimilar treatment. Finally,
he asserts that Respondents have committed tortious acts by failing to make proper
contractual decisions and by exclusively contracting with the Swintec Company that
sells standard typewriters for $400, which he asserts is not affordable and double the

                                          3
price of the competition. Inmate seeks a declaratory judgment allowing him to
purchase a word processor typewriter.
              In response to the PFR, Respondents filed POs in the nature of
demurrer. Therein, Respondents challenge the PFR’s legal sufficiency on several
grounds. First, Respondents assert that all claims against them should be dismissed
based on lack of personal involvement. Next, Inmate’s due process claim should be
dismissed because the grievance process was available and utilized by him. Inmate’s
access to the courts claim and his equal protection claim should both be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Finally, Respondents
argue Inmate’s tort claim should be dismissed because Respondents are protected by
sovereign immunity.
              Inmate responded by filing a motion to file an amended pleading with
an attached “First Amended Pleading.” This Court granted Inmate “leave to file and
serve a complete Amended Petition for Review, or a proper Response to [the POs],
within 30 days from the exit date of this Order.” Commonwealth Court Order,
6/15/2022. Inmate filed an answer to the POs.

                                      II. POs
              In ruling on POs, “we accept as true all well-pleaded material
allegations . . . and any reasonable inferences that we may draw from the
averments.”    Armstrong County Memorial Hospital v. Department of Public
Welfare, 67 A.3d 160, 170 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). However, we are not required to
accept as true “legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative
allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Id. For this Court to sustain POs, “it must
appear with certainty that the law will permit no recovery[.]”          McCord v.

                                         4
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board, 9 A.3d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). If
there is any doubt, this Court should overrule the POs. Id. This Court “may sustain
a demurrer only when a petitioner has failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.” Armstrong, 67 A.3d at 170. We address each PO in turn.

                       A. Absence of Personal Involvement
             First, Respondents argue that the PFR does not make any factual
averments reflecting their personal involvement with regard to the denial of a word
processor typewriter. We do not agree.
             To begin, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983)
provides:

             Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
             regulation, custom, or usage, of any [s]tate . . . subjects, or
             causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
             [(U.S.)] or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
             the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
             secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
             party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
             proper proceeding for redress[.]
42 U.S.C. §1983. “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the [U.S.], and must show
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” Hill v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 271 A.3d 569, 573-74 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2022) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, (1988)) (emphasis omitted).
“Section 1983 claims may be brought in the courts of this Commonwealth and are
not subject to state sovereign immunity defenses.”           Watkins v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, 196 A.3d 272, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

                                           5
            “[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in an alleged constitutional
violation is a prerequisite under Section 1983.” Rivera v. Silbaugh, 240 A.3d 229,
237 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citations omitted). “To maintain a Section 1983 claim, an
inmate must allege that each defendant was directly and personally responsible for
the purported conduct and establish fault and causation on the part of each
defendant.” Id. “[P]ersonal involvement can be shown through allegations of
personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Bush v. Veach, 1 A.3d
981, 986 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988)). Such allegations “must be made with appropriate particularity.” Id.
However, liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat
superior. Bush, 1 A.3d at 986.
            In his PFR, Inmate alleges that Respondents “colluded and conspired”
together in the creation, adoption, and/or implementation of the Policy. PFR, ¶13.
He also alleges that these individuals are responsible for contracting with Swintec
Company for the sale of typewriters to inmates. PFR, ¶15. Inmate further alleges
that two of the Respondents are in charge of Security and one is a member of the
Department’s Commissary Committee. According to the exhibits attached to the
PFR, the Department advised Inmate that he could address any requests seeking
“further explanation on the removal of memory for the Swintec typewriter,” to the
“Commissary Committee Chairperson, Superintendent at SCI Dallas,” which Inmate
has identified as Respondent Ramson. PFR, Exhibit J. The Department further
advised: “The decision to not allow memory was a determination made by DOC
Security at Central Office.” PFR, Exhibit G. In response to a request seeking the
name and rank of the person in charge of the Department “Security at Central
Office,” the Department informed Inmate that that person was Respondent “Major

                                        6
K. Smith.” PFR, Exhibit H. The Department also identified Respondent Ken
Goodman, Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Facility Security and Special
Operations. PFR, Exhibit I. Accepting the allegations in the PFR and exhibits
attached thereto as true, Inmate has alleged a sufficient connection between the
individual Respondents and the denial of his asserted right to purchase a word
processor typewriter. Therefore, we overrule this PO.

                                  B. Due Process
             Next, Respondents argue that Inmate’s procedural due process claims
regarding lack of notice should be dismissed because the grievance process was
available and utilized by him. We agree.
             The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” As this Court has explained:

             When a prison official confiscates a prisoner’s property in
             an allegedly unauthorized way, whether it be negligently
             or intentionally, due process requires only the existence of
             an adequate post-deprivation remedy because it is not
             feasible for a prison to provide a hearing prior to taking
             property that is perceived to be contraband or against
             prison regulations.
Shore v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 168 A.3d 374, 383 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017).
             Here, no property was actually confiscated from Inmate. Inmate was
merely deprived of his ability to purchase a word processor typewriter. Although
Inmate was not provided with advance notice of the prohibition, he was accorded a
post-deprivation remedy. Inmate not only acknowledges that he pursued redress
through the Department’s grievance procedures, but he attached the grievance
                                           7
decisions he received to his PFR. These decisions show that Inmate received due
process. Thus, we sustain Respondents’ PO to Inmate’s due process claim.

                              C. Access to the Courts
             Next, Respondents assert that Inmate’s access to the courts claim
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Again, we agree.
             Prison inmates have a constitutional right of meaningful access to law
libraries, legal materials, and legal services. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25
(1977); accord Johnston v. Lehman, 609 A.2d 880, 881-82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
“[C]laims regarding denial of a lamp, typewriter, and access to a photocopier, do not
involve denial of ‘direct’ access to legal materials or to the courts, but may properly
be construed as denial of materials or services peripheral to that access.” Johnston,
609 A.2d at 882. To establish a Bounds violation, an inmate must show an “actual
injury” by showing that the denial or “alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). An inmate cannot simply show that the prison’s law
library or legal assistance program is “subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id.
             Inmate has not alleged that his inability to purchase a word processor
typewriter has caused an actual injury in his litigation efforts. In fact, we note that
Inmate’s handwritten PFR, answer, and brief have all been accepted by this Court.
We, therefore, conclude that Inmate has failed to state a cause of action related to an
alleged denial of access to courts. Thus, we sustain Respondents’ PO regarding
access to courts.

                                          8
                                D. Equal Protection
             Respondents further assert that Inmate’s equal protection claim should
be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We agree.
             The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides: “No
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. A plaintiff asserting equal protection claim
under the “class of one” theory must allege that “he has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment.” Rivera, 240 A.3d at 242 (citations omitted).
             Here, Inmate does not allege that he was treated differently from other
inmates. He does not allege that he was denied the ability to purchase a word
processor typewriter while other similarly situated inmates were not. Rather, he
alleges that Respondents, by banning word processor typewriters with memory
capability but allowing other electronic devices with memory capability, such as
keyboards and tablets, are treating these similar objects differently without any
rational government interest. PFR, ¶16. “Persons,” not objects, are entitled to equal
protection. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 (emphasis added). The Policy applies to all
inmates. Department Policy DC-ADM-815; see also PFR, ¶¶ 7, 13, 16, Exhibit K
and L. Therefore, Inmate fails to properly state an equal protection claim.

                                           9
                                 E. Sovereign Immunity2
              Lastly, Respondents assert that they are entitled to sovereign immunity
with respect to any intentional tort claims raised because the acts complained of were
committed within the scope of their duties. We agree.
              Generally, sovereign immunity protects Commonwealth officials and
employees acting within the scope of their duties from civil liability. 1
Pa. C.S. §2310; Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Sovereign
immunity has been waived in limited situations involving the negligence of a
Commonwealth official or employee acting within the scope of his employment.
42 Pa. C.S. §8522; La Frankie v. Miklich, 618 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
In addition, an employee is liable for willful misconduct and intentional torts
committed outside the scope of his employment. Kull, 81 A.3d at 157-58. An
employee acts within the scope of his employment when he performs his assigned
task; when the conduct occurs within the authorized time and place of employment;
and when the conduct serves the employer. Hinton v. Beers, 274 A.3d 777 (Pa.
Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 284 A.3d 120 (Pa. 2022).
              Here, Inmate has identified Respondents as employees of the
Department. Although Inmate has asserted both intentional and negligent acts, a

       2
         Under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a), the assertion of immunity is an affirmative defense that must
be pled in a responsive pleading as new matter. However, courts allow an exception where the
defense is “clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.” Minor v. Kraynak, 155 A.3d 114, 121
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citation omitted). Where the petitioner does not object to a PO that raises
sovereign immunity, the court may rule on the sovereign immunity issue. Id.; see Smolsky v.
Pennsylvania General Assembly, 34 A.3d 316, 321 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (holding that courts
have ruled on POs raising sovereign immunity where a petitioner did not object to improper
procedure).
                                               10
plain reading of his assertions reveal that he only alleges intentional acts.3
Specifically, Inmate alleges that Respondents committed “willful misconduct” by
acting “in collusion and conspiracy” with each other to adopt a new policy which is
carried out by the commissary to deny “the sale of typewriters which have a memory
capacity” to inmates. PFR, ¶¶13, 15. He further alleges that they contracted with
the Swintec Company for the sale of typewriters. PFR, ¶15. Inmate does not allege
that Respondents acted outside the scope of their employment in taking these
actions. To the contrary, Inmate alleges Respondents operated as state agents, under
the color of law for the Department. PFR, ¶17. The alleged conduct of creating,
adopting, and/or implementing a Departmental policy and contracting with vendors
for the commissary goods are Departmental duties. We, therefore, conclude that
Inmate’s tort claims do not overcome sovereign immunity. Thus, we sustain
Respondents’ PO.

                                      III. Conclusion
              Accordingly, with the exception of Respondents’ PO based on lack of
personal involvement, we sustain Respondents’ other POs and dismiss Inmate’s
PFR.

                                            MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

       3
         Specifically, Inmate “avers the negligence and malfeasance of [] Respondents[’] failure
not to make proper contractual decisions is the result of willful misconduct . . . .” PFR, ¶15
(emphasis added). Even if Inmate adequately pleaded a negligence claim, it would not fit within
any of the enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity. See Section 8522(b) of the Judicial
Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §8522(b).
                                              11
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wayne Thomas,                           :
                                        :
                        Petitioner      :
                                        :
                v.                      : No. 235 M.D. 2022
                                        :
K. Smith, Major of Security at          :
Dept. of Corrections; Ken               :
Goodman, Deputy Supt. of Facility       :
Security; Kevin Ramson, Supt.           :
Chairperson Committee Commissary        :
Central DOC,                            :
                                        :
                        Respondents     :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 19th day of October, 2023, Respondents’ preliminary
objections are SUSTAINED IN PART and OVERRULED IN PART, and
Petitioner’s Petition for Review is DISMISSED.

                                      _________________________________
                                      MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge