Court Opinion

ID: 9710800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:18:00.196786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.014412
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe the majority has incorrectly construed the Indiana criminal jurisdiction statute, Indiana Code § 35-41-1-1. I would adopt the scholarly and well-reasoned opinion written by Judge Baker of the Court of Appeals in this case,1 with an additional discussion of the history of our criminal jurisdiction statute which I believe clearly demonstrates why the majority is incorrect.
I do agree with the majority’s analysis of both the federal and Indiana constitutional issues involved in this case. And I agree as well with the majority’s conclusions that jurisdiction is only as extensive as that granted by the legislature and that venue and jurisdiction are not the same thing. But as the *139following history of our current criminal jurisdiction and venue statutes makes clear, our legislature has from 1852 through today authorized criminal jurisdiction over the entire Ohio River opposite Indiana.
This history starts in 1851 when our forefathers provided in our constitution as follows:
The State of Indiana ... shall have concurrent jurisdiction, in civil and criminal cases, with the State of Kentucky on the Ohio River and with the State of Illinois on the Wabash River, so far as said rivers form the common boundary between this State and said States respectively.
Ind. Const, art. 14, § 2 (1851).
The legislature enacted a statute granting jurisdiction to the full extent of this constitutional provision in the very first session, of the General Assembly following adoption, of the new constitution:
That the proper courts of the several counties in this State bordering on the Ohio river, and on the Wabash river as far up as said river forms the boundary line between this State and the State of Illinois, shall have jurisdiction of all offences committed against the penal laws of this State on said rivers, opposite to said counties respectively.
1 R.S.1852, eh. 14, § 93, p. 197 (the “1852 Act”).
It is the 1852 Act which provided the jurisdictional authority for the prosecution of crimes committed on the Ohio River in the three cases cited by the majority: Welsh v. State (1890), 126 Ind. 71, 25 N.E. 888; Dougan v. State (1890), 125 Ind. 130, 25 N.E. 171; and Carlisle v. State (1869), 32 Ind. 55. The majority says that these cases were “decided before the enactment of the present ‘occur in Indiana’ limitation in Ind.Code § 35-41-1(a).” I think this statement is misleading. In fact, the language of the 1852 Act remained law without any change whatsoever from 1852 all the way until 1978.2
Meanwhile, in 1976 and 1977, following years of work by the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, an entirely new Indiana criminal code was enacted. See William A. Kerr, Forward: Indiana’s New and Revised Criminal Code, 11 Ind.L.Rev. 1 (1978); William A. Kerr, Forward: Indiana’s Bicentennial Criminal Code, 10 Ind.L.Rev. 1 (1976). One of the innovations of the new code was the creation, for the first time, of an entirely free-standing jurisdiction statute, Indiana Code § 35-41-1-1 (West 1978). This resulted in the enactment of the present “occur in Indiana” language in the jurisdictional statute but did not change or repeal in any way *140the law created by the 1852 Act and affirmed in Welsh, Dougan, and Carlisle, supra.3
That there was no intent by the legislature to change the jurisdictional rules with respect to crimes committed on the Ohio River is made crystal clear by language at the outset of the official4 commentary to the new Indiana criminal code which was published in the 1978 edition of West’s Annotated Indiana Code. The official commentary provides:
As reflected by this section, the modern view is to permit the application of a state’s penal law to a transaction even though it did not occur entirely within the state.
The general rule has developed that a state may exercise legislative jurisdiction over conduct which occurs within the state. However, Indiana and Kentucky have concurrent jurisdiction to impose their criminal laws upon conduct occurring on the Ohio River. Dougan u State, 125 Ind. 130, 25 N.E. 171 (1890); Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N.E. 883 (1890); Sherlock v. Ailing, 44 Ind. 184 (1873); Carlisle v. State, 32 Ind. 55 (1869). See also Memphis and Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Pikey, 142 Ind. 304, 40 N.E. 527 (1895).
Charles A. Thompson, Commentary to Indiana Code § 35-41-1-1 (West 1978).
Because the legislature in 1852 clearly provided jurisdiction in criminal law matters over the entire Ohio River opposite from Indiana, and because the legislature did not restrict this grant of jurisdiction in any way when the 1852 Act was replaced by the 1976 Indiana Criminal Code, the State of Indiana continues to have legislative authority to enforce its criminal laws on all of the Ohio River opposite Indiana. For this reason, I believe that Judge Baker’s analysis was correct and dissent from the majority’s opinion.

. I would, however, change Judge Baker's footnote reference to the War Between the States to its correct name, the Civil War.

. In 1905, the legislature adopted a new Criminal Law and Procedure Act which included the language of the 1852 Act verbatim. Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 7, p. 585.
In 1971, the legislature codified this language in the new Indiana Code, again verbatim. Ind. Code § 17-1-1-84 (1971).
In 1973, the legislature enacted the following subsection as part of a new venue statute:
If a crime is committed on any navigable waters bordering on this state, trial maybe had in the county opposite to such navigable Water where the crime was committed.
Ind.Code § 35 — 1.1—2—1(g), as added by Acts 1973, P.L. 325, § 1. Indiana Code § 17-1-1-84 remained unchanged.
In 1976 and 1977, the legislature enacted a new criminal code, including a jurisdictional statute that, in my view and the view of the official comments to the Code, maintained the principle of jurisdiction over the entire Ohio River. See text, infra. Indiana Code § 17-1-1-84 remained unchanged.
In 1978, the legislature repealed Indiana Code § 17-1-1-84. Acte 1978, P.L. 2, § 1731.
In 1981, the legislature replaced Indiana Code § 35 — 1.1—2—1(g) with § 35-32-2-l(g) which reads as follows:
If an offense is committed on the portions of the Ohio or Wabash Rivers where they form a part of the boundaries of this state, trial may be had in the county that is adjacent to the river and whose boundaries, if projected across the river, would include the place where the offense was committed.
Acte 1981, P.L. 298, §§ 1 and 9. This provision remains in effect today.
Thus, the 1852 Act and its successors provided both the jurisdiction and venue rules for offenses committed on the Ohio River from 1852 to 1978. Effective October 1, 1977, the jurisdiction rules were provided by Indiana Code § 35 — 41-1-1. The venue rules were provided by Indiana Code § 35 — 1.1—2—1(g) from July 1, 1978, until super-ceded by Indiana Code § 35-32-2-1 (g) on July 1, 1981. None of these changes reduced the extent of the jurisdiction authorized by the 1852 Act.

. In refuting this dissent, the majority argues that the legislature’s failure to enact Indiana Code § 35 — 11.1—1—3(c) providing for jurisdiction over the Ohio River as proposed by the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission indicates legislative intent to restrict the jurisdiction in effect since 1852. In response, I refer the reader to footnote 2 of this dissent. There was absolutely no reason for the 1976 or 1977 legislature to enact the provision referred to by the majority because Indiana Code § 17-1-1-84, which already provided jurisdiction over the entire Ohio River opposite Indiana, was in full force and effect. It is more reasonable to assume that the legislature did not adopt the Commission language simply because it would have been dupli-. cative of existing law.

. The majority takes issue with my reference to the Commentary published in West's Annotated Indiana Code (1978) as "official comments." Perhaps these comments were not denominated as "official” by the legislature but they present a scholarly and detailed discussion of the provisions of the Indiana criminal code written by one of the very draftsmen of the code itself, Charles A. Thompson, the first Reporter of the Indiana Criminal Law Study Commission, and his successor, Bobby Jay Small. This court, e.g., Greider v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 281, 284, 385 N.E.2d 424, 426, the Court of Appeals, e.g., Smith v. State (1986), Ind.App., 489 N.E.2d 140, 141, and our brethren at the Seventh Circuit, e.g., Williams v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 828, 832 (7th Cir.1984), have regarded the Commentary as authoritative. I submit that by our courts’ usage, we have made these comments "official.”