Court Opinion

ID: 9739085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:08:31.416906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.941342
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with most of the majority’s opinion in this cause. With respect to the majority’s conclusion on the granting of a new trial due to error in the verdict form, I respectfully dissent. Our supreme court in Ervin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 140, 357 N.E.2d 500, stated that “we do not foreclose the possibility that there might be unusual circumstances under which the interests of justice require a relaxation of this rule.” 65 Ill. 2d at 145, 357 N.E.2d at 502. In the instant case, I do not believe plaintiff is estopped from raising her argument concerning the verdict form even though it was plaintiff who tendered the verdict form about which she later complained. The verdict form complained of by plaintiff read as follows: “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and against the defendant and further find the following: First: Without taking into consideration the question of reduction of damages due to the negligence of the plaintiff, if any, we find that the total amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the occurrence in question is $__ Second: Assuming that 100% represents the total combined negligence of the plaintiff and of the defendant we find that the percentage of negligence that was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury attributable solely to the plaintiff is _percent (%). Third: After reducing the total damages sustained by the plaintiff by the percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff, we assess plaintiff’s recoverable damages in the sum of$__” The third paragraph essentially instructs the jury to find some negligence on the part of plaintiff. It does not provide the cautionary language, “if any,” which is found in the verdict form used at the second trial. The verdict form used in the first trial is so misleading that it constitutes error. This situation is exactly what the Ervin court envisioned when it stated that “there might be unusual circumstances under which the interests of justice require a relaxation of this rule.” 65 Ill. 2d at 145, 357 N.E.2d at 502. The decision to grant a new trial is an exercise of judicial discretion which should not be disturbed unless there is a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (McCracken v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 26, 430 N.E.2d 539.) After a review of the verdict form of which plaintiff complains and a review of the instructions as a whole, I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff a new trial. Therefore, the verdict delivered by the second jury should be allowed to stand. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County.