Court Opinion

ID: 9688013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:57:15.333875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.188831
License: Public Domain

T.E.Brennan, J.
(dissenting). Boykin v Alabama 395 US 238; 89 S Ct 1709; 23 L Ed 2d 274 (1969), has not been uniformly understood in these parts.
*14To put the controversy in focus, the following excerpt from Boykin should he re-examined:
“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains hut to give judgment and determine punishment. See Kercheval v United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 [47 S Ct 582; 71 L Ed 1009 (1927)]. Admissibility of a confession must be based on a ‘reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.’ Jackson v Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 387 [84 S Ct 1774; 12 L Ed 2d 908; 1 ALR3d 1205 (1964)]. The requirement that the prosecution spread on the record the prerequisites of a valid waiver is no constitutional innovation. In Carnley v Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 516 [82 S Ct 884; 8 L Ed 2d 70 (1962)], we dealt with a problem of waiver of the right to counsel, a Sixth Amendment right. We held: ‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’
“We think that the same standard must he applied to determining whether a guilty plea is voluntarily made. For, as we have said, a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.4 Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might he a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. The question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a proceeding is of course governed by federal standards. Douglas v Alabama, 380 U. S. 415, 422 [85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965)].
*15“Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Malloy v Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 [84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964) ]. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Duncan v Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 [88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968)]. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers. Pointer v Texas, 380 U. S. 400 [85 S Ct 1065; 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965)]. We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record.5
“What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought6 (Garner v Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157, *16173 [82 S Ct 248; 7 L Ed 2d 207 (1961)]; Specht v Patterson, 386 U. S. 605, 610 [87 S Ct 1209; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967)]), and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.7
“The three dissenting justices in the Alabama Supreme Court stated the law accurately when they concluded that there was reversible error ‘because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty.’ 281 Ala., at 663, 207 So. 2nd, at 415.”
From this language, some of my Brothers have concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States has now declared as an inflexible rule of constitutional law that a plea of guilty in a state criminal case does not satisfy the mandate of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless, prior to the acceptance thereof, the court shall have expressly told the defendant on the record that his plea of guilty will deprive him of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and his Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial and confrontation.
Boykin simply does not require such a procedure.
The recorded guilty plea which the United States Supreme Court found constitutionally infirm in Boy-kin was as follows:
“xThe record states only that:
“ ‘This day in open court came the State of Ala*17bama by its District Attorney and the defendant in his own proper person and with his attorney, Evan Austill, and the defendant in open court on this day being arraigned on the indictment in these cases charging him with the offense of Bobbery and plead guilty.’ Appendix 4.”
Bule 11 of the Federal Buies of Criminal Procedure governs the duty of a Federal trial judge before accepting a guilty plea.
Bule 11 is as follows:
“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences, of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966.)”
GrCB 1963, 785.3(2) provides:
“Imposing Sentence. If the accused pleads guilty, after such plea and before sentence the court shall inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and the consequence of his plea; and regardless of whether he is represented by counsel, the court shall examine the accused, not necessarily under oath, and as a condition of accepting the plea of guilty and imposing sentence shall ascertain that the plea was freely, understandingly, and voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion, or duress, and without promise of leniency. Unless the court deter*18mines that the plea of guilty was so made, it shall not be accepted.”
I have read and re-read the Michigan and Federal Rules. I cannot perceive any substantial difference between them. If anything, the Michigan rule seems more precise and demanding.
Nor can I comprehend, much less agree with the argument that Boykin requires more ritual, more formalism in state court guilty pleas than Federal Rule 11 requires of the United States District Courts.
The Bench and Bar must be weary of our hyper-scrupulous efforts to codify the imponderable.
On August 24, 1966, we promulgated proposed Amendments to GCR 785.3. A storm of protest led to reconsideration and the eventual entry of our June 8, 1967 order.
“ ‘The various amendments of GCR 1963, 785, adopted since January 1, 1963, are repealed effective instanter.
“ ‘The Court wishes to advise the profession and bench generally that the Rules Committee of the Michigan Judges Association, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association and the Special Committee on Revision of the Criminal Code of the State Bar of Michigan have been requested by the Court, and have accepted the assignment, to draft for recommended adoption such amendments of original Rule 785 as may in their judgment be required in view of constitutional interpretations and constitutional changes taking place since the General Court Rules of 1963 were considered and adopted.
“ ‘Pending submission and approval by the Court of such forthcoming amendments, the bench and bar will proceed in accordance with original Rule 785, in accordance with article 1 of the Constitution of 1963 and in accordance with such decisions of the United *19States Supreme Court and of the Supreme Court of Michigan as máy he deemed applicable to the particular criminal matter at hand.’
“It is ordered that all amendments of GCR 1963, 785, adopted since January 1, 1963, be and the same are repealed effective this date and that the Court Administrator be directed to furnish copies of this order to all trial judges, all judges of the Court of Appeals, the President of the Michigan Judges Association, the President of the Prosecuting Attorneys Association and the Secretary of the State Bar.’’
That loudly heralded committee came to naught.
I see no point in announcing or commissioning a new committee; I see no point in amending the rule.
Post conviction proceedings will always be with us. Appeals from guilty pleas will continue. We ought to be content to decide the cases as they come to us, without shaking our fists at the sky, and bewailing the absence of mandated magical minutia which would relieve us of the burden of doing what the taxpayers are paying us to do.
Turning to this case of Butler. The record of the plea is set forth in full in my Brother’s opinion.
The sum and substance of appellant’s objection to the plea is as follows:
“In the instant case the United States Supreme Court via the Boykin (supra) decision has super-ceded G-.C.R. 1963, 785.3(2). In Michigan, as well as every state in the Union, a Defendant must be advised on the record that:
“(1) He has the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
“(2) He is entitled to a jury trial.
“(3) He has the right to confront his accusers.
“Anything less than advising of all three of the above will fall short of the United States Constitutional standard and will not be acceptable in any *20State proceedings regardless if the State standard is less.”
The answer to that contention is simply NO. The United States Supreme Court has NOT, via Boykin v Alabama, superceded Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted, — and hopefully never will adopt — the dangerous and novel requirement that a trial judge must play the role of defense counsel and give the defendant legal advice from the bench.
I would affirm this conviction.

“4 ‘A ,plea of guilty is more than a voluntary confession made in open court. It also serves as a stipulation that no proof by the prosecution need be advanced .... It supplies both evidence and verdict, ending controversy.’ Woodward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 552, 558, 171 So. 2d 462, 469 [1965].

“5 In the federal regime we have Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which governs the duty of the trial judge before accepting a guilty plea. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 [89 S Ct 1166; 22 L Ed 2d 418 (1969)]. We said in that case:
“ ‘A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461] (1938). Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.’ Id., at 466.

“6 Among the States requiring that an effective waiver of the right to plead not guilty appear affirmatively in the record are Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-8; Illinois, Ill. Rev. Stat. e. 38, §§ 113-1 to 114-14; Missouri, State v. Blaylock, 394 S.W.2d 364 (1965); New York, People v. Seaton, 19 N.Y.2d 404, 407, 227 N.E.2d 294, 295 (1967); Wisconsin, State v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d *1691, 96 (1964); and Washington, Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 601, 605, 414 P.2d 601, 604 (1966).

“7 ‘A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to satisfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the charges, his right to a jury trial, the act sufficient to constitute the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of sentences.’ Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 105-106, 237 A.2d 196, 197-198 (1968).”