Court Opinion

ID: 9759264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:10:30.875921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.620726
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
Although I believe that on this record appellant is not entitled to relief, I reach this result on grounds different from those relied on in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Larsen.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), the most recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Fourth Amendment area, holds that absent exigent circumstances or consent, the police may not lawfully search “for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without obtaining a search warrant.” Id. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 1644. That holding, which as a matter of federal constitutional law is binding upon this Court, compels the conclusion that the police should have obtained a search warrant prior to entering the apartment of Jackie Keim to arrest appellant. Thus the opinion of Mr. Justice Larsen errs in stating that “a search warrant or probable cause [was] wholly unnecessary.”
However, notwithstanding the fact that a search warrant should have been obtained to arrest appellant in a third party’s home, the absence of a search warrant has not infringed upon appellant’s Fourth Amendment right to be *340free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As the Supreme Court recognized in Steagald, the purpose of requiring police to obtain a search warrant prior to executing an arrest warrant in the home of a person other than the suspect is to protect the third party’s legitimate expectation of privacy in his home. On this record I am convinced that appellant cannot assert an infringement of that privacy. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
Appellant’s legitimate expectation to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was protected by police compliance with Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Williams, 483 Pa. 293, 396 A.2d 1177 (1978). Prior to entering the apartment to arrest appellant, the police had ample reason to believe that appellant was within and they had obtained the issuance of an arrest warrant from a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause to believe that appellant had committed an offense. Thus, appellant has not established that the absence of a search warrant violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his claim for relief on this basis must be denied. See Remarks of Professor Kamisar at the Third Annual Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium, reprinted in The Supreme Court: Trends and Developments 1980-81, at 121-27 (1982) (search warrant required to search third party’s home for suspect, but absence of search warrant not properly asserted by suspect whose “expectation of privacy” in his host’s home is legally insufficient); Harbaugh & Faust, “Knock on Any Door”— Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald, 86 Dick.L.Rev. 191, 236 (1982) (“non-resident suspect present in the home of another person does not have the right to challenge the absence of a search warrant”).
I also note my disagreement with the opinion of Mr. Justice Larsen in its evaluation of appellant’s claim that the *341police unconstitutionally failed to announce their purpose. Although I am satisfied that the police conduct in executing the arrest warrant was reasonable in the circumstances, I cannot agree with the opinion’s observation that “by announcing their identity and waiting at all, the police did more than was required by the Fourth Amendment.” Where, as here, the police seek to execute an arrest warrant in the home of a third party who has not consented to entry by the police, the police must at the very least announce their identity. See generally Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Commonwealth v. DeMichel, 442 Pa. 553, 227 A.2d 159 (1971); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968).
For the above reasons, I concur only in the result.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.