Court Opinion

ID: 9597919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:03:57.451333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:40.000494
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur completely with the majority and write only as the author of Williams v. State, 233 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1) (503 SE2d 324) (1998), to emphasize why the facts of this case are drastically different from Williams. First, in Williams, the stop was not under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968), as a reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI or other impairment, but the violation of a traffic law in the officer’s presence. See Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) (443 SE2d 474) (1994). Second, the delay in completing the Williams stop arose from the delay in completing the computer traffic check caused by a common name, regarding the traffic offense. Then, there was further delay from the presence of a pistol in the vehicle, requiring further delay while a computer check was made of the gun. At no time was Williams asked to leave the vehicle prior to the consensual search.
In this case, a Terry stop, as soon as the deputy smelled Hanson’s breath and observed him after examining his driver’s license and insurance card, further questions were outside the scope of the Terry stop, unless a new reasonable articulable suspicion had arisen, which *542had not occurred prior to the search. At that point Hanson should have been allowed to leave and any request to search should have been made. However, the driver and the passenger were separately questioned, and the driver was removed from the vehicle while the deputy held his driver’s license questioning him and stalling by making out a bogus warning. Further, the deputy told him that he could leave but ordered him to stop.