Court Opinion

ID: 9454475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:47:44.666631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:08.108285
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I do not dissent from the general principles of law relating to indemnification as applied in the many cases cited by the majority. Since, however, I believe that it is the function of courts to decide specific cases presented for decision on the particular facts of each case, I do not feel free to indulge in generalities.
Crosson, a stevedore, was injured on a ship owned by Nederland. Nederland was insured by Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford). Crosson recovered a judgment of $12,500 which Hartford paid. Hartford, as the insurer, defended the action, using its own attorneys, whose salaries were paid semi-monthly by Hartford. At the completion of each trial (or other disposi*869tion), certain charges were attributed by Hartford’s attorneys to each file (case). The parties stipulated that $1,-750 was a reasonable amount to be assigned to this case for attorneys’ fees and costs.
Had Nederland paid this amount, there would be no question but that it would have been an item for which it would have been entitled to indemnity from ITO. But it made no such payment— directly or indirectly.
After hours of debate and hearings on two separate days, the parties agreed upon a fact stipulation which in my opinion is the only basis for a legal conclusion here. Nederland and ITO agreed that:
(1) “the disposition of the issue in this particular case before the Court now will in no way financially affect the Third-Party Plaintiff [Nederland].”
(2) “Recovery of counsel fees will not benefit the Third-Party Plaintiff [Nederland] and the failure to recover counsel fees will not work a financial detriment to the Third-Party Plaintiff in any way.”
(3) “The resolution of the issue before the Court will in no way affect the experience of the ship owner for rating purposes for premium of any policy.”
Therefore, whether Nederland’s claim be based upon indemnity for expenses incurred or upon a quasi-subrogation theory of reimbursing Hartford (Note: “The Court: There is no right of subrogation. I don’t have the Hartford before me.”), the stipulated facts fail to support it. Even if some undeterminable fraction of premium cost attributable to hypothetical counsel service is assumed to have been a possible expense of Nederland, such an item, is precluded by the parties’ agreement that Nederland’s premium would be affected “in no way.” Thus, on the facts before us, I cannot find any justification for the assessment of Nederland’s- non-existent attorneys’ fees and costs against ITO.