Court Opinion

ID: 9951858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 14:08:37.563473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:10.266861
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2874-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHARLES GONZALEZ,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided March 19, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 06-05-0933.

                   James R. Lisa, attorney for appellant.

                   Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
                   respondent (Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

          On March 6, 1997, defendant having pled guilty plea to one count of first-

degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), was sentenced to ten
years in prison with community supervision for life (CSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4,

in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement. The judgment of conviction

(JOC) was entered March 10.

      Over nine years later, on July 27, 2006, defendant pled guilty to one

fourth-degree count of violating CSL. A JOC was entered on September 22,

2006, showing defendant was sentenced to twelve days' time served. The JOC

incorrectly listed both defendant's birthdate and arrest date as December 7, 2002.

However, a judgment of dismissal reflecting a second indictment against

defendant for fourth-degree violating CSL, entered the same day, correctly listed

defendant's dates of birth (January 4, 1963) and arrest (October 25, 2005).

      On February 7, 2019, we denied defendant's motion for leave to appeal

his 1996 conviction as within time. We determined the appeal was "woefully

untimely."

      On February 2, 2022, defendant made another attempt to overturn his 1996

conviction by filing a first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). The PCR

court denied the petition on March 18, finding it "statutorily time-barred, as it

ha[d] been more than five years since the date of sentence" and defendant "ha[d]

not provided any reason why [his petition satisfied] the exceptions to warrant a

good cause review."

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       On March 31, defendant filed a second PCR petition claiming "he [was]

not the defendant named in [the September 22, 2006 JOC]. If true, then he would

not have had any reason to be aware of the entry of the [JOC]; and did not

become aware [of it] until last year." Defendant submitted no sworn statement,

affidavit, or certification supporting these allegations. The same PCR court

decided the second petition on the papers and issued an order denying relief

pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b)1 on April 19.

1
    Rule 3:22-4(b) provides:

             A second or subsequent petition for post-conviction
             relief shall be dismissed unless:

             (1) it is timely under R. 3:22-12(a)(2); and

             (2) it alleges on its face either:

             (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
             constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
             petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
             Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
             during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or

             (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could
             not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
             of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the
             ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the
             evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable
             probability that the relief sought would be granted; or

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      Before us, defendant argues the PCR court erred in denying him relief

without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant acknowledges he was arrested in

2005 for a parole violation but claims he only spent two days in jail, not twelve

days. He maintains he did not plead guilty on July 27, 2006, to fourth-degree

violating CSL, which resulted in the September 22, 2006 JOC. He further

contends "even if he had attempted to so plead, it should not have been accepted

without the [plea] court ensuring his understanding that [his sentence] would

result in a lifetime bar from seeking termination of [CSL]." There is no merit

to defendant's contentions.

      Initially, we must indicate that while the court order states relief is denied

under Rule 3:22-4(b), nothing in the record shows the PCR court "state[ed]

separately its findings of fact and conclusions of law." R. 3:22-11; accord R.

1:7-4(a). The order was issued on the papers and does not indicate the court's

reasoning was set forth on the record. However, to avoid unnecessary litigation

delay, we will not remand because the record provided allows us to determine

whether the PCR court appropriately denied defendant's second PCR petition.

            (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
            ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
            defendant on the first or subsequent application for
            post-conviction relief.
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See State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 590-92 (App. Div. 1988); Pressler &

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2018).

      Defendant's first PCR petition was properly denied because it was not

filed within five years of his 1996 conviction and cited no facts showing

"excusable neglect for the late filing and fundamental injustice if defendant's

claims [were] not considered on their merits." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.

387, 398 (App. Div. 2013) (citing R. 3:22-12(a)(1)). His second PCR petition

was properly denied given his reliance on bald assertions unsupported by the

record, which are insufficient to establish a prima facie case for PCR or

entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 396; State v. Cummings, 321

N.J. Super. 154, 164 (App. Div. 1999) (requiring facts supporting PCR be "set

forth with specificity").   Additionally, under Rules 3:22-8 and 3:22-10(c),

defendant's factual assertions must be supported by a verified petition, affidavit,

or certification based on personal knowledge. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. at 396.

Here, there are none. Gonzalez's assertions are improperly made in his counsel's

brief without factual support by someone with personal knowledge.

      Defendant does not reconcile his alleged unawareness of the 2006 JOC

with his concession that he was arrested for violating the terms of his sentence

of CSL. He failed to "provide clear evidence that [he] mistakenly pleaded guilty

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or has received a manifestly improper sentence," justifying the PCR court's

conclusion that there is no "injustice" to relax the time bar. State v. Mitchell,

126 N.J. 565, 583 (1992).

       Defendant relies on State v. Jamgochian, 363 N.J. Super. 220, 226 (App.

Div. 2003), for the principle that a PCR court should grant an evidentiary

hearing if a defendant's petition sufficiently "alleges misinformation as to a

penal consequence and also that if [the defendant] had been correctly informed[,

they] would have not entered a guilty plea." But in Jamgochian, the defendant's

plea counsel attested to what they told the defendant about the consequences of

accepting the contemplated plea agreement and what concerns the defendant

weighed when deciding to plead guilty. Id. at 223-24. No such affidavit or

certification exists here from defendant's plea counsel. Thus, defendant fails to

show either how he was misinformed "as to [his] penal consequence" or how if

he was "correctly informed[,] he would have not entered a guilty plea." Id. at

226.

       Finally, the State correctly contends defendant's loss of the right to seek

release from CSL is only a collateral consequence of pleading guilty to a CSL

violation because loss of the right to seek release from CSL "does not

automatically flow from the conviction." See State v. Bellamy, 178 N.J. 127,

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138 (2003). Defendant's right "to be informed of the consequences of his plea .

. . extends only to those consequences that are 'direct,' or 'penal,' but not to those

that are 'collateral.'" State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988). Hence, even

if defendant had timely and properly alleged he would not have pled guilty in

2006 had he known it would cost him the ability to ever seek release from CSL,

he cannot use it as a basis for seeking PCR or to seek an evidentiary hearing.

      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's legal

arguments it is because we have concluded they are of insufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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