Court Opinion

ID: 9716657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:47:19.541744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.708045
License: Public Domain

FREEDBERG, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that constitutional principles of openness do not attach to Rule 500 proceedings. In my view, a Rule 500 proceeding is a pretrial criminal proceeding to which, the public has a qualified First Amendment right of access.
*503¶ 2 I have no quarrel with the majority’s analysis of the public’s common law right of access to criminal proceedings. “The importance of the public having an opportunity to observe the functioning of the criminal justice system has long been recognized in our courts.” Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 515 Pa. 501, 530 A.2d 414, 417 (1987), citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 266, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (suggesting that the origin of our nation’s practice of guaranteeing a public trial predates the settlement of our land); Commonwealth v. Contakos, 499 Pa. 340, 453 A.2d 578, 582 (1982) (“Closed trials are the mechanics of tyranny.”). However, this general policy of openness did not apply to pretrial hearings at common law. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 390, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (“Closed pretrial proceedings have been a familiar part of the judicial landscape in this country;” specifically noting former Pa.R.Crim.P. 323 as evidence of a lack of common law right to open pretrial proceedings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir.1982) (“We recognize that, at common law, the public apparently had no right to attend pretrial criminal proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa.Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316, 1319 (1983) (expressly adopting Criden). Thus, the common law does not afford The Times Leader the right to attend the Rule 500 proceeding.
¶ 3 The common law and constitutional inquiries are similar, as “both rights of access seek to foster the fairness and the appearance of fairness of the criminal justice system by ensuring that the public has access to proceedings.” Long, 922 A.2d at 897, citing Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 417-
18. However, “the First Amendment provides a greater right of public access than the common law.” Long, at 897, citing Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir.2006).1 The evolution of our understanding of the First Amendment right of access was set forth by a panel of this Court as follows:
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 [99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608] [ (1979) ], the United States Supreme Court held that the public has no right under the sixth amendment to attend pretrial proceedings in a criminal case. That case is not controlling here, for appellant invokes not the sixth but the first amendment. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia [448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) ], the Court held that the public has the right under the first amendment to attend the trial in a criminal case; the Court did not consider the public’s right to attend a pretrial proceeding. Therefore, that case is not controlling either. However, in United States v. Criden [675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir.1982) ], the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the same societal interests and structural arguments that mandated a first amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers apply with equal force to pretrial criminal proceedings. [Criden,] 675 F.2d at 557.
Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa.Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316, 1319 (1983). Buehl expressly adopted Criden and held that the public has a qualified First Amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings2 and to a copy of the transcript of such hearings.
*504¶4 Based on Buehl, the First Amendment secures a public right of access to Rule 500 proceedings. Further, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) {“Globe ”), the United States Supreme Court outlined a two-part test useful in analyzing whether any particular criminal proceeding is subject to the First Amendment right of access. In analyzing whether “a right of access to criminal trials ... is properly afforded protection by the First Amendment,” the Court explained:
First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and general public ... This uniform rule of openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only because the Constitution carries the gloss of history, but also because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience ... Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society as a whole. Moreover, public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process — an essential component in our structure of self-government. In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience.
Globe, 457 U.S. at 605-06, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Supreme Court formally adopted the “experience and logic” test in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (“Press Enterprise II”), which relied upon the “experience and logic” test to conclude that the First Amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings as conducted in California. Therefore, this test should be applied to the Rule 500 proceeding. Doing so, I conclude that the First Amendment secures a public right of access.
¶ 5 Although the majority’s historical exposition of out-of-court depositions is comprehensive, it is not dispositive to the experience inquiry. For example, the majority has neglected any mention of former Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(e), which allowed for closed suppression hearings on motion of the defendant. The rule was rescinded in favor of Pa.R.Crim.P. 581. The comment to Rule 581 provides insight to the evolution of the constitutional right to public access to pretrial criminal proceedings as follows:
Formerly, the law provided that a suppression hearing would be held in camera on motion of the defendant. Recently, however, developments in the law have established minimum constitutional requirements that are to be met before a court may order any criminal proceeding closed.
The law on closure of criminal proceedings is still developing. The 1985 amendments, therefore, are intended to remove the possibility that the rule will be mistaken to imply that the defendant has an absolute right to closure of a suppression hearing. It is intended that a suppression hearing will be held in open court unless the court orders all or part of the hearing closed in accordance with the existing case law. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3d Cir.1982); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318 (1980); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 316 Pa.Super. 215, 462 A.2d 1316 (1983), in which the courts *505recognized the public’s general constitutional right to access to criminal proceedings.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, Comment (revised November 2, 2007, effective February 1, 2008.).
¶ 6 Further, there is a dearth of historical guidance on whether Rule 500 proceedings should be open to the press and public. The lack of specific guidance regarding the rule is not surprising. Rule 500, formerly numbered Rule 9015, was first adopted November 8, 1982, effective January 1, 1983. Pa.R.Crim.P. 500, Note.
¶ 7 In light of this bare historical record, Selenski advocates an examination of the express provisions of Rule 500, claiming that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court intended that testimony preserved pursuant to Rule 500 should not be readily accessible by the press and public until actually used at trial. Selenski contends that this intent is clearly implied by the language of Subsection (A)(4), which provides an enumerated list of individuals whose presence at the proceeding is required unless the court orders otherwise. Pa.R.Crim.P. 500(A)(4) (providing that “[t]he testimony shall be taken in the presence of the court, the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant(s), and defense counsel, unless otherwise ordered.”). However, this is not persuasive. The Rule does not prohibit any individual or group from attending a Rule 500 proceeding, but rather requires the presence of certain individuals. In light of the strong preference in favor of open criminal procedures, I would not make an inferential leap toward excluding the press and public from a criminal proceeding without much clearer evidence.
¶ 8 Selenski also contends that Subsection (A)(5) requires denying the relief sought by The Times Leader. According to Selenski, this provision and the comment to Rule 500 reflect an implicit recognition of a compelling state interest in closing Rule'500 proceedings. Subsection (A)(5) provides that “[t]he preserved testimony shall not be filed of record until it is offered into evidence at trial or other judicial proceeding.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 500(A)(5). In relevant part, the comment suggests that paragraph (A)(5) “[is] intended to guard against pretrial disclosure of potentially prejudicial matters.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 500, Comment. Although the Court will consider the comments to Rules of Criminal Procedure when interpreting the meaning of a particular Rule, they have not been adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 959 n. 4 (Pa.Super.2002), citing Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 451 Pa.Super. 248, 679 A.2d 779, 783 (1996). In my view, paragraph (A)(5) does not obviate the constitutional inquiry. The United States Constitution requires a particularized inquiry into whether there exists specific evidence of prejudice and whether there is no less intrusive means of eliminating such prejudice. See Criden, 675 F.2d at 554-557 (rejecting the generalized argument that “there was a reasonable likelihood that dissemination of information which might be disclosed in the closed hearing would impair the defendants’ right to a fair trial”).
¶ 9 In response, Amicus notes that the Rule also requires that the parties and counsel are present during the testimony and conditionally requires the presence of the judge, unless the parties agree otherwise. According to Amicus, a Rule 500 proceeding bears all the hallmarks of a formal judicial proceeding to which the presumption of public access should attach. The Times Leader adds that counsel is free to cross-examine the witness and make objections. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 500, Comment (“When testimony is taken under this rule, the proceeding should be *506adversarial, and afford the parties full opportunity to examine and cross-examine the witness. Counsel should not reserve objections for time of trial.”).
¶ 10 In the common law context, the fact a document is not filed of record is relevant but not determinative as to whether the document should be considered a public judicial document. Commonwealth v. Upshur, 592 Pa. 273, 924 A.2d 642, 650 (2007) (“[T]he status of materials as ‘part of the record’ or ‘filed with the court,’ though relevant, is not necessarily disposi-tive when deciding whether an item is a public judicial record or document.”), quoting United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 969 (3d Cir.1984). In the constitutional context, the First Amendment provides a more robust right of access than that which is found at common law. Long, 922 A.2d at 897, 898 n. 6.
¶ 11 The Commonwealth suggests that a Rule 500 proceeding is comparable to civil pretrial discovery. The Commonwealth cites Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So.2d 378 (Fla.1987), which concluded that “the press does not have a first amendment right to be present at discovery depositions or to obtain copies of depositions which are not filed with the court.” Palm Beach Newspapers, 504 So.2d at 382. A Rule 500 proceeding is akin to a deposition. Depositions are generally held in private. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). However, the comparison to pretrial discovery is not dispositive. “Discovery, whether civil or criminal, is essentially a private process because the litigants and the courts assume that the sole purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir.2007), quoting United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir.1986) (emphasis added). Trial preparation is not the purpose of a Rule 500 proceeding. Rather, the purpose of a Rule 500 proceeding is the preservation of testimony for use at trial where it is in the interest of justice that the witness’ testimony be preserved. Pa.R.Crim.P. 500(A)(1).3
¶ 12 As ably noted by the majority, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court endorsed the increased formality in the manner in which parties conduct a proceeding to preserve testimony as preservative of a criminal defendant’s right of confrontation. See Majority Opinion, at 499 n. 9 (discussing Commonwealth v. Stasko, 471 Pa. 373, 370 A.2d 350, 353-355 (1977)). Our Supreme Court further noted that “confrontation is essential to the elicitation of reliable testimony.” Stasko, 370 A.2d at 353. Reliable testimony is the foundation of the factfind-ing process. In my view, just as Rule 500 provides a procedural framework which protects against the potential erosion of a criminal defendant’s fundamental rights, public scrutiny of Rule 500 proceedings safeguards the integrity of this process. A witness testifying with the knowledge that his assertions will be disseminated immediately to the public is more likely to be truthful than one who believes his testimony may or may not be made public at a time when he can no longer be confronted or sanctioned for falsehood.4
*507¶ 13 Accordingly, I differ from the majority. I believe there is no historical evidence which supports a conclusion that Rule 500 proceedings have traditionally been held open to the press and public. Yet, the provisions of Rule 500 suggest a formal judicial proceeding, subject to modifications and degrees of formality, and to which attaches the presumptive right of access.
¶ 14 Focusing on the logic inquiry, I note the following:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. . Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.
Long, 922 A.2d at 899-900, quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (“Press Enterprise /”). The same benefits identified in Globe are relevant here. See Globe, 457 U.S. at 605-06, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (identifying the quality and integrity of the factfinding process, the appearance of fairness, and public respect for the judicial process as “particularly significant” to the proper functioning of the judicial process). While the quoted language refers to trials, the advantages cited apply as well to the taking of testimony to be used at a future trial.
¶ 15 The Commonwealth suggests that permitting public access to Rule 500 pro-eeedings risks the dissemination of irrelevant or inadmissible information, thus tainting the jury pool and undermining defendants’ right to a fair trial. “[T]he mere statement of one party that allowing public dissemination of a record or document will prejudice the trial, without additional evidence, does not warrant a denial of access.” Upshur, 924 A.2d at 652. The asserted risk is no different than that presented by open preliminary hearings and suppression hearings. Moreover, notwithstanding the trial court’s comments to the contrary, wide ranging voir dire or a change of venue or venire are reasonable alternatives to closure. Upshur, at 652; Martin, 746 F.2d at 973-74.
¶ 16 In a similar vein, the majority concludes that public access to Rule 500 proceedings could create a costly and time-consuming process which serves no positive role in the functioning of our criminal justice system. I respectfully disagree. These arguments have previously been evaluated and rejected. Speculative threats or concerns do not sufficiently justify the curtailment of the public right of access to criminal proceedings:
Though, in our constitutional scheme, no right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial, speculative threats to that right have never been sufficient to overcome either First Amendment rights to attend and report on trials.
¶ 17 United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir.1984) (internal quotations omitted); see also Upshur, at 652. Therefore, in my view Rule 500 proceedings presumptively should be open.
¶ 18 Having determined that the public has a qualified First Amendment right of *508access to Rule 500 proceedings, I now briefly address the trial court’s decision to close the Rule 500 proceeding taking Steiner’s testimony. The right of access to criminal proceedings is not absolute. Long, at 900, citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13,106 S.Ct. 2735.
[A] trial court can close the proceedings when it demonstrates an overriding interest “to preserve higher values,” including the right of the accused to a fair trial. In such instances, the closure must be narrowly tailored to serve the interest in question. Consequently, the right of access is only a “qualified right.”
Id., citing Press Enterprise II, at 14, 106 S.Ct. 2735. “The burden of showing that closure is warranted under the circumstances is on the party seeking to prevent access.” Upshur, at 651. A trial court’s decision to close proceedings to the public or regarding access to a particular item must be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Upshur, at 647, citing Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 420.
¶ 19 At the hearing on The Times Leader’s motion, the Commonwealth and Selen-ski argued that public access to the Rule 500 proceeding risked the public dissemination of inadmissible or prejudicial information. They contend this public dissemination would negatively impact the ability to select a fair and impartial jury. The trial court agreed, noting its concern that it would be required to supervise an extensive voir dire or move the trial to a different venue. The trial court further noted the potential expense which would be incurred if a jury pool was assembled from out-of-county residents.
¶ 20 These considerations do not rise to the level required to justify excluding the public and press from a pretrial criminal proceeding. Therefore, I would reverse the order of the trial court.

. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides the same right of access as the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 489 Pa. 419, 414 A.2d 318, 322 (1980).

. In my view, a Rule 500 proceeding is a “pretrial procedure.” Thus, it is included in Chapter 5, "Pretrial Procedures in Court Cases,” of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

. The majority defines deposition to mean out-of-court testimony reduced to writing and used either for discovery purposes or for trial, without commenting on the importance of this distinction. Majority Opinion, at 498 n. 7. I find the distinction significant. In contrast, the majority's conclusion embraces the Commonwealth's argument, built upon a premise that Rule 500 proceedings are nothing more than "informal discovery.” See Commonwealth’s Brief, generally; Majority Opinion, at 500. Fundamentally, that premise is flawed. The purpose of discovery is to assist trial preparation, whereas the purpose of a Rule 500 proceeding is the preservation of trial testimony.

. The Commonwealth filed a motion to preserve the testimony of Robert Steiner, who "is an elderly witness in ill health” and "may or may not be available at the time of trial.” Trial Court Opinion, at 1 (July 15, 2009).