Court Opinion

ID: 9657373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:23:39.443082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.332246
License: Public Domain

CADY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of Castaneda’s prior sex act. I would conclude the trial court acted within its discretion to admit the evidence.
The majority assumes the disputed evidence was relevant to the specific intent element of the crime of indecent contact with a child. This assumption is correct because the intent or state of mind associated with the prior sex act makes it more probable than not that Castaneda would have had the specific intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desire if other evidence at trial showed he engaged in the prohibited contact with a child. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 401, 404(b). Thus, the fighting question is whether this relevant evidence is nevertheless inadmissible because “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 403.
I acknowledge a danger of prejudice exists by permitting the jury to hear evidence of Castaneda’s prior sex act. However, the danger of unfair prejudice is not enough to exclude evidence under rule 403. The rule requires the probative value of the evidence to be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This means the evidence arouses “hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence.” 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 780 (4th ed.1992). Yet, we cannot assume prejudice will occur based simply on the nature of the evidence. Instead, rule 403 requires an assessment of the probative value of the evidence and the degree of danger, followed by a comparison of the two. 2 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 11:12, at 290 (7th ed.1994).
I agree with the majority that the probative value of the prior act evidence is diminished in this case because the specific *449intent to engage in the prohibited contact with a child is secondary to whether or not the act occurred. Nevertheless, specific intent remains an element of the crime that the State is required to prove.
On the other hand, the degree of danger posed by the evidence is also diminished. The prior act was not illegal and was factually dissimilar from the act charged. Generally, the greater similarity between the prior act and the crime charged gives rise to a greater risk of unfair prejudice. 3 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 17:93, at 618 (7th ed.1998). In this case, the factual dissimilarity makes it less likely the jury would misuse the evidence to conclude Castaneda committed the crime charged simply because he may have fantasized about children while committing a sex act with an adult. When evidence is dissimilar, there is less likelihood the jury will misuse it to infer guilt.
Additionally, the likelihood that the pri- or act evidence in this case would generate disgust or shock in such a way to render the jury unable to return a rational verdict is far less than it would be if the prior evidence consisted of an actual sexual abuse of a child. The crime charged in this case is shocking, and most of the evidence to support it will necessarily be shocking. Yet, there is nothing to suggest the jury will react in a particularly strong manner to the particular prior act evidence.
A comparison of the value of the prior act evidence with the fear of prejudice does not produce a clear conclusion that the prior act evidence should be excluded. This conclusion is reinforced by the cautionary instruction given to the jury by the district court and a lack of any indication that the prior act evidence was improperly used in argument.
Our role on appeal in an issue of this nature is not to substitute our judgment for the decision made by the trial judge but to look for a clear abuse of discretion of that decision. We must recognize that the balancing task under rule 403 is difficult, and “[w]ise judges may come to differing conclusions in similar situations.” 1 Strong, § 185, at 782. Thus, trial judges are in the best position to make such decisions and should be given “much leeway.” Id. at 783. The majority has failed to follow this important precept.
LARSON and TERNUS, JJ., join this dissent.