Court Opinion

ID: 9489610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:19:40.921425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:37.187387
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Until today, our decision in United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.1990),1 made clear that, in light of the circumstances presented in the cases at bar,2 (1) the District Court abused its discretion when it refused to ask prospective jurors on voir dire whether they believed that police and corrections officials are “more worthy of belief’ than other members of the community, and (2) the error was not harmless. See United States v. Lancaster, 78 F.3d 888, 897-901 (4th Cir.1996) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting). When the instant appeals were heard by a panel of this court, the panel majority agreed that Evans mandated a finding that the District Court had abused its discretion, but, with respect to the question of harmlessness, found Evans distinguishable. See id. at 892-97. A majority of the en banc court now overrules Evans, believing that the rule articulated in that case is contrary to the deference ordinarily accorded to district courts’ handling of the voir dire process and might apply to a broader range of circumstances than the majority evidently deems acceptable. Applying a new standard, the majority further concludes that the District Court adequately questioned prospective jurors concerning biases they might have had with respect to testimony given by law enforcement officials. Because I believe that the rule we adopted in Evans was necessary to secure the constitutional rights of criminal defendants in circumstances such as those presented in the cases at bar, and that, even under the new standard fashioned by the majority, the District Court committed reversible error, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant is entitled to be tried by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury_”); U.S. Const, amend. V (“No person ... shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law_”); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No State shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....”); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020 n. 6, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976) (“Principles of due process ... guarantee a defendant an impartial jury.”); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (“Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the ease solely on the evidence before it_”). Consequently, while trial courts possess broad discretion to control the manner in which a jury is assembled, see, e.g., Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413, 15 S.Ct. 951, 953, 39 L.Ed. *7461033 (1895); Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(a), that discretion is “subject to the essential demands of fairness,” Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, 471, 75 L.Ed. 1054 (1931).
Central to the fairness of the manner in which a jury is seated is the voir dire’s effect both upon the trial court’s ability to excuse potential jurors for cause and upon the defendant’s ability intelligently to strike potential jurors peremptorily. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.”); United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1049 (4th Cir.1977) (“A voir dire that has the effect of impairing the defendant’s ability to exercise intelligently his challenges is ground for reversal, irrespective of prejudice.”). While the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, it “is ‘one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.’ ” Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408, 14 S.Ct. 410, 414, 38 L.Ed. 208 (1894)).
The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory satisfies the rule that to perform its high function in the best way[,] justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
In the instant cases, Appellants asked the District Court to inquire of prospective jurors whether they believed that police and corrections officials are “more worthy of belief’ than other members of the community. Appellants believed — quite correctly — that the jury’s finding of guilt or innocence was going to turn primarily upon its assessment of testimony given by Lorton Reformatory officials. Consequently, they hoped to eliminate jurors — in the form of either peremptory challenges or excusáis for cause — who would decide the case based not on the evidence presented in the courtroom, but on their biases concerning the comparative credibility of law enforcement officials and other citizens. The District Court refused to ask the question.
By so refusing, the District Court indisputably violated circuit precedent. In Evans, we held that, when the outcome in a ease is expected to be determined primarily by the jury’s assessment of a law enforcement officer’s credibility, the District Court abuses its discretion if it denies a party’s request that prospective jurors be asked whether they believe that, as a general matter, the testimony of law enforcement officers is more credible than that of other citizens. See Evans, 917 F.2d at 805-09. We found in Evans that, when “a test of credibility” lies at the heart of a case, such a question must be asked in order to give the defendant a fair opportunity intelligently to exercise his peremptory challenges and to give the District Court an opportunity either to persuade bias-possessing individuals (through instructions or additional questions) to change their minds or to dismiss them for cause. Id. We further stated that the erroneous failure to ask the given question may or may not be harmless, depending upon such factors as whether the voir dire or closing charge to the jury adequately covered the point in issue. Id. at 807 (“[FJailure to ask a question on voir dire may often be harmless, but here the voir dire was perfunctory, the question was vital to a fair exercise of peremptory challenges, the request was made and denied, and the point was not covered in the closing jury charge.”). A comparison of the facts presented in the cases at bar and in Evans makes clear that the error here was not harmless.
Despite the fact that the panel majority determined that Appellants’ convictions could be sustained notwithstanding the rule we had applied in Evans — a determination with which I strongly took issue, see Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 897-901, and which I continue to believe represents a total disregard for the rule that one panel of this court is bound by *747the published decisions of prior panels — the en banc majority, apparently having given up the futile task of attempting to distinguish Evans, now sees fit to overrule that ease. Under a new and more deferential standard, the majority finds that the District Court in the instant cases acted within the bounds of its permissible discretion. The reasoning underlying both of those principal holdings is fatally flawed.
II.
The en banc majority rests its decision to overrule Evans upon four expressed considerations. I shall address each of those considerations in turn.
A.
First, the majority asserts that Evans is contrary to the rule applied by other circuit courts of appeals. The majority states:
In the context of cases like this one, in which the proposed voir dire question does not address issues of racial or ethnic prejudice, circuit courts of appeals have held that the district court need not pursue a specific line of questioning on voir dire, provided the voir dire as a whole is reasonably sufficient to uncover bias or partiality in the venire.
Supra at 739-40 (citing cases from the third, fifth, and eleventh circuits). That is hardly an accurate characterization of all the other circuit courts’ rulings on the issue before us.
In Evans, as the majority acknowledges, see supra at 740, we relied, in part, upon what have proved to be two seminal cases: Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C.Cir.1964), and United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1979). In Brown, then Circuit Judge Warren Burger wrote for a panel of the District of Columbia Circuit, holding that the district court had abused its discretion when it failed to ask on voir dire whether the prospective jurors would “give greater credence to the testimony of a law enforcement officer merely because he is an officer as compared to any other witness.” 338 F.2d at 544-15. Upon noting that the testimony of two military police officers comprised the heart of the Government’s case, the court stated the applicable rule in broad terms:
[W]hen important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested. Failure to make appropriate inquiry, when requested, does not necessarily require reversal; the issue turns on the degree of impact which the testimony would be likely to have had on the jury and what part such testimony played in the case as a whole. In this case, at the opening of trial, the Government had announced that it ... would rely on the testimony of the two military police officers who had witnessed the [alleged crime].
Id. at 545. Circuit Judge Burger emphasized that the answers elicited by the proposed question might have proved useful to both the defendant and the prosecutor, and stated that, “independent of the scope of the requested query, the phrasing of the court’s inquiry should include whether any juror would tend to give either more or less credence because of the occupation or category of the prospective witness.” Id.; see also Faulkner Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 557 F.2d 866, 870-72 (D.C.Cir.1977) (favorably citing Brown and holding that an administrative law judge cannot accord greater weight to testimony offered by lawyers merely because they are members of the bar). In a decision handed down by us twenty-six years ago, we “approve[d] the rule stated in Brown.” United States v. Gore, 435 F.2d 1110, 1113 (4th Cir.1970).
In Baldwin, the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether the district court had committed reversible error when it refused to ask potential jurors whether they “would give greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer, by the mere reason of his/her position.” 607 F.2d at 1297. Relying in part upon the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Brown, the Ninth Circuit *748held that the lower court had indeed erred. Id. The court then summarized the kinds of criteria by which it and other courts determined whether such errors had been harmless:
All circuits appear to be in agreement that the refusal to ask the question of whether the prospective jurors would be unduly influenced by the testimony of a law enforcement officer does not always constitute reversible error; that question hinges upon such factors as the importance of the government agent’s testimony to the case as a whole; the extent to which the question concerning the venireperson’s attitude toward government agents is covered in other questions on voir dire and on the charge to the jury; the extent to which the credibility of the government agent-witness is put into issue; and the extent to which the testimony of the government agent is corroborated by non-agent witnesses.
Id. at 1298. Under those standards, the court concluded that the error had not been harmless. Id. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly reiterated and applied the Brown-Baldwin rule. See, e.g., United States v. Nielsen, 1 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1410, 128 L.Ed.2d 82 (1994); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1475 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 975, 112 S.Ct. 1598, 118 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992).
At least four other circuit courts of appeals (five, if one counts our holding in Evans) have applied one form or another of the Brown-Baldwin rule. In United States v. Pappas, 639 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 1988, 68 L.Ed.2d 304 (1981), the First Circuit adopted the Brovmr-Baldwin rule and held that— even though the district court had asked prospective jurors numerous questions concerning whether they knew or were related to law enforcement officials and whether they were in any way prejudiced against the Government or the defendant, see id. at 4 n. 4— the lower court had erred when it refused to ask prospective jurors “whether they would give added credence to the testimony of a government employee,” id. at 4-5. The court further concluded that the error had been harmless because the testimony provided by government officials did not prove to be central to the Government’s case and because the district court had asked numerous general questions concerning the prospective jurors’ ability to render an impartial verdict. Id. at 5. The First Circuit has reiterated its approval of the Brown-Baldwin rule. See, e.g., United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77, 84 (1st Cir.1990) (“Where government agents are apt to be key witnesses, the trial court ... should ordinarily make inquiry into whether prospective jurors are inclined to have greater faith in the agents’ testimony merely by virtue of their official positions. The phrasing of the inquiry, of course, is up to the judge, but the failure to make any inquiry at all is usually considered to constitute error.”), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 2053, 114 L.Ed.2d 458 (1991); United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 2-4 (1st Cir.1988).
In United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 994, 110 S.Ct. 544, 107 L.Ed.2d 541 (1989), the district court had refused to ask prospective jurors whether “they understood that testimony of a law enforcement official is not entitled to enhanced credibility simply by virtue of the official position of the witness.” Id. at 1157. The Second Circuit noted the holdings in Baldwin and Anagnos, then ruled that, under the Baldwin criteria, any error that may have occurred had been harmless because Government officials had testified only briefly, the credibility of those officials had not been extensively challenged, the district court had “properly charged the jury in regard to assessing the credibility of law enforcement witnesses,” and the most incriminating testimony had been provided by the defendant’s accomplices. Id. at 1164-65.
In United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428 (7th Cir.1974), the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion and that a new trial was warranted because the court had refused to ask prospective jurors whether they believed that Government agents’ testimony is entitled to more weight than testimony given by non-agents. Id. at 432-33. The court reasoned as follows:
*749The Government argues that the trial judge, in effect, asked this question, since he told the entire jury panel at the start of the voir dire examination that they were not to consider whether a witness was a government employee for purposes of determining credibility; later he asked each juror about his ability to be impartial. Mere admonitions, however, are not enough. The sole purpose of voir dire is not to tell potential jurors that they are to be fair and then ask them if they think they can be impartial. The defendant’s proposed questions were meant to elicit specific attitudes and prejudices. We cannot assume that a juror would state that he could not be impartial merely because he had ... a high regard for the credibility of government agents. Such questions should have been asked directly.
Id. at 432; see also United States v. Alarape, 969 F.2d 349, 351-52 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that, when the district court refused to ask such a question, no abuse of discretion had occurred because “the case turned on inferences from uncontested facts ... rather than on the outcome of a swearing contest”).
The Eighth Circuit similarly applied the Brown-Baldwin rule in United States v. Amerson, 938 F.2d 116 (8th Cir.1991). In that case, the court held that the district court had abused its discretion — and that the error had not been harmless — when it refused either (1) to excuse for cause potential jurors who had stated that, when faced with conflicting testimony by a police officer and another member of the community, they would tend to believe the police officer, or (2) to convince such jurors, by way of instructions or additional questions, that testimony provided by law enforcement officers is not entitled to special credence. Id. at 117-18. In reaching that conclusion, and relying in part upon our decision in Evans, the court stated:
When, as here, a ease turns on the credibility of law enforcement officers, the district court has a responsibility to ensure the jurors are not predisposed to believe the testimony of the officers is inherently more credible than that of other witnesses. Indeed, a defendant cannot receive a fair trial at the hands of jurors who are inclined to give unqualified credence to law enforcement officers simply because they are officers.
Id. at 118 (citations and quotations omitted).
Contrary to the majority’s implication, it is therefore clear that, by overturning Evans, the majority today abandons the rule applied by at least six other circuit courts of appeals. Because that is surely not a matter to be taken lightly, and because at issue is the protection of defendants’ constitutional right to be tried by impartial juries, one would hope that the majority’s rejection of the Browfir-Baldwin rule would rest upon reasoning that is nothing less than compelling. In my view, though, the majority’s rationales are decidedly unpersuasive.
B.
The majority concludes that the rule we adopted in Evans “is simply inconsistent with the broad deference traditionally and wisely granted trial courts in their conduct of voir dire.” Supra at 740. As support, the majority cites, among other cases, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973), and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974).
The fact that discretion is and should be accorded to district courts in their handling of the voir dire process in most instances does not seem to me to present an obstacle to identifying — as the courts in Brown, Baldwin, Gore, Evans, Pappas, Anagnos, Victoria-Peguero, Gelb, Martin, Alampe, Amer-son, and other such cases have identified — a narrow exception to that general rule of deference. All exceptions are “simply inconsistent” with the general rules to which they correspond. That inconsistency hardly constitutes a substantive reason for ridding the law of such exceptions, particularly when, as here, the exception was created in order to ensure that persons are not deprived of rights expressly conferred upon them by the Constitution. To overrule Evans because it conflicts with the general rule of deference is to ignore the sensitive balancing of interests that constitutional decision-making almost inevitably requires.
*750The Supreme Court’s rulings in Ham and Hamling in no way bar the application of the Brown-Baldwin rule. In Ham, the Court held that the district court had not erred when it refused to grant a defendant’s request that prospective jurors be asked whether they would be prejudiced against him because he wore a beard. 409 U.S. at 527-28, 93 S.Ct. at 850-51. The Court reached that conclusion because district courts do have broad discretion in conducting voir dire and because the Court could perceive no means by which “to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice against beards from a host of other possible prejudices.” Id. at 528, 93 S.Ct. at 851. It does appear that, if the Constitution were held to require inquiry into such matters as facial-hair prejudices, it would also require inquiry into an endless list of other biases dealing with hair length and color, eye shape and color, length of nose, manner of dress, accent, mannerisms, jewelry, tattoos, and so on. Inquiries concerning such non-evidentiary matters, though, seem to me easily “constitutionally distinguish[ed]” from inquiries concerning a predisposition to believe the entirety, or near entirety, of the Government’s case due to the occupations held by the persons through whom that ease will be presented.
The Court’s decision in Hamling is also distinguishable. In that ease, the district court had asked prospective jurors general questions concerning their views with respect to obscenity, but had refused to make the additional inquiry requested by the defendant — namely, “whether the jurors’ educational, political, and religious beliefs might affect their views on the question of obscenity.” 418 U.S. at 139-40, 94 S.Ct. at 2918. Finding that the district court had sufficiently addressed the obscenity issue, the Court ruled that the lower court had not erred. In the cases at bar, the District Court did not ask the prospective jurors any questions whatsoever concerning the credibility of law enforcement officials.
In short, I believe that district courts have a responsibility, when asked, to make inquiries concerning “prejudices of a serious character,” see Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 313, 51 S.Ct. at 472, and that the District Court erred by failing to do so here.
C.
The majority states that its decision to overturn Evans rests, in part, upon its conclusion that the Brown-Baldwin rule gives district courts “little guidance as to when their ability to conduct voir dire as they see fit has been curtailed.” Supra at 740.
It has been six years since we decided Evans, thirty-two years since the District of Columbia Circuit decided Brown, and twenty-six years since we stated in Gore that we approved of the rule articulated in Brown. There has been absolutely no indication whatsoever — at least none that I know of and none that the majority cites — that district courts in the seven (now six) or more circuits applying the Brown-Baldwin rule have proved unable to carry out the exceedingly simple mandate laid down by those cases: if a ease is expected to turn primarily upon the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a law enforcement officer’s testimony, and if a party so requests, then the court must ask prospective jurors whether they would be inclined to believe a law enforcement officer’s testimony merely because he or she is such an officer. To my surprise and disappointment, the majority apparently believes that district courts are not up to the task of determining whether a case will boil down primarily to a test of a law enforcement officer’s credibility. See supra at 741 (stating that there is an “inherent difficulty” in determining whether a case depends primarily upon a law enforcement officer’s testimony). I do not share that disturbingly low view of the district courts; they daily make many more complicated judgments and calculations and undoubtedly possess the unexceptional powers of discernment necessary to implement the Brown-Baldwin rule.
Moreover, if the majority is genuinely concerned about clearly marking the bounds within which district courts properly exercise their discretion, one must wonder why it has chosen to abandon a rule that gives at least some guidance — far more, in my view, than the majority acknowledges — in favor of a rule that gives little or none at all. Under *751the rule adopted by the majority, district courts will be held to have abused their discretion when they refuse to ask prospective jurors whether they believe that the testimony of law enforcement officers is entitled to special credence if we determine, upon “examin[ing] the voir dire as a whole,” that the voir dire was not “reasonably sufficient to probe the prospective jurors for bias and partiality.” See supra at 742. “Reasonably sufficient” is an inherently amorphous phrase. It is therefore hard to imagine how the majority can believe that, by adopting such a standard, it is removing ambiguities from the law, rather than creating new and more significant ones. By what measures will we determine whether a voir dire was “reasonably sufficient”? The answer to that question apparently will be slowly revealed by us on a ease-by-case basis. Under Evans, the district courts knew where we stood.
D.
The final reason adduced by the majority for overruling Evans is that, in its view, we there adopted “a rule with virtually unlimited application.” Supra at 741. The majority states that the Brownr-Baldwin rule
admits of no limiting principle. If the district court must, on pain of reversal, ask the venire whether they would give heightened credibility to the testimony of a police officer when the Government’s case depends on law enforcement testimony, logic compels that a similar question be asked whenever the Government’s case depends on the testimony of any identifiable class of witnesses that might conceivably be thought by jurors to be inherently credible, be they firefighters, priests, physicians, attorneys, butchers, bakers, or candlestick makers.
Supra at 741. The majority’s flippant tone suggests that it believes it has seized upon a glaring logical flaw heretofore unperceived by the members of this court and others. The truth is that, thirty-two years ago, Circuit Judge Warren Burger — quite wisely, in my view — framed the rule in precisely the kind of terms that the majority now regards as laughably and unworkably broad. As I indicated earlier, Judge Burger wrote in Brown that,
when important testimony is anticipated from certain categories of witnesses, whose official or semi-official status is such that a juror might reasonably be more, or less, inclined to credit their testimony, a query as to whether a juror would have such an inclination is not only appropriate but should be given if requested.
338 F.2d at 545 (emphasis added).
Should the case arise — and it is worth noting that, in the more than three decades that have elapsed since Brown was decided, it apparently has not — I would imagine that priests would fall within the bounds of the Browvr-Báldwin rule. I would also expect that butchers, bakers, and candlestick makers would not. (Is the majority really unable to make such distinctions?) Whether firefighters, physicians, or attorneys would be covered by the rule is not immediately clear to me3 — but even if they would be, that hardly seems to me to constitute cause for abandoning the task of attempting to implement the Constitution’s assurance that criminal defendants will be tried before impartial juries. All that would be required in such cases — and, again, the circuits applying the Brown-Balduñn rule have been anything but overrun by them — is a question concerning a predisposition to believe the testimony of persons holding a given occupation. As I read them, our constitutional rights are not so weak and tenuous as to be worth jettisoning when it takes as many as one or two minutes to ensure that they are not violated. The majority — at least when it comes to the sometimes unpopular task of ensuring that criminal defendants receive fair trials — apparently sees things differently.
*752III.
In place of the rule we adopted in Evans, the majority finds that
the proper method of resolving the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of law enforcement testimony is to examine the voir dire as a whole to determine whether it was reasonably sufficient to probe the prospective jurors for bias and partiality.
Supra at 742. Applying that new standard, the majority concludes that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to ask the proposed question. The majority rests its conclusion upon the fact that the District Court asked whether any members of the venire had been employed, or knew or were related to anyone who had been employed, by a law enforcement agency; that “counsel and the court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of all veniremembers during these exchanges, thus providing them with ample information on which to base their challenges, both peremptory and for cause”; that the District Court made general statements and inquiries concerning biases and the need to be impartial; and that the District Court asked whether the prospective jurors would be prejudiced against Appellants due to their status as inmates. Supra at 742-43.
Questions concerning law enforcement employment and general biases seem to me wholly inadequate to ensure that jurors will not be predisposed to believe the testimony of a law enforcement official. Because such testimony indisputably constituted the heart of the Government’s case, the risk that Appellants would be convicted, not on the basis of the evidence presented, but on the basis of the jurors’ predisposition to believe the testimony of a law enforcement officer, seems to me to have been sufficiently great to warrant a direct question on the matter. Unlike the majority, I would not stake Appellants’ constitutional rights upon the possibility that prospective jurors might be prompted by questions concerning employment histories and general biases to identify within themselves an inclination to attach special credence to law enforcement officers’ testimony, to resolve to overcome that inclination, and to succeed in doing so. Appellants should have been given the opportunity to assess for themselves the prospective jurors’ responses to the proposed question.
Attorneys surely do rely, in part, upon prospective jurors’ demeanor during voir dire when deciding whom to strike peremptorily. I strongly disagree, though, with the majority’s statement that Appellants received “ample information on which to base their challenges” by observing “the demean- or of all veniremembers during” the District Court’s questioning concerning biases arising from the panelists’ employment histories. The Constitution is a real document providing — when properly construed — real assurances. The seriousness with which the majority takes, or fails to take, Appellants’ right to an impartial jury is sadly revealed by its willingness to regard facial expressions and body movements — during questioning about a matter not even precisely on point — as “ample information” for determining whether prospective jurors would be predisposed to credit the testimony of the Government’s star witnesses. I am at a loss to understand how such a conclusion can be reached by persons who take the Constitution seriously.
With respect to the last of the bases for its conclusion, the majority reasons as follows:
While [a question concerning bias against Appellants due to their status as inmates] is not the same as a question regarding whether veniremembers would give the testimony of police officers more credibility solely because of their position, it had the same impact on the jury. In effect, the district court’s questions conveyed to the veniremembers that Appellants’s testimony should be given the same consideration as that of any other witness. Where, as here, the only “other witnesses” were law enforcement officers, the undeniable effect of probing for bias against Appellants was to negate the possibility that members of the jury would give greater credibility to the testimony of law enforcement officers solely because of their status.
Supra at 743-44 (emphasis added).
I am not persuaded. The majority assumes that all of the prospective jurors in*753ferred from the inmate-focused question that they were not to make any assumptions about any witnesses’ credibility based upon those witnesses’ statuses and occupations. I see no basis whatsoever for making that assumption, particularly in light of the fact that at stake is nothing less than Appellants’ constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury. Moreover, at the time the inmate-focused question was asked, the prospective jurors presumably did not know that inmates and law enforcement officials would together comprise the entire universe of witnesses. Consequently, they might very well have inferred from the inmate question that they were not to assume that inmates are more or less credible than average members of the larger community, but yet also have believed that law enforcement officials are more credible than average citizens. That is, to state that one group of individuals is not, on average, less credible than the average citizen is not at all to state that one does not believe that some other group of individuals is more credible than the average citizen. The inmate question therefore most assuredly did not have “the undeniable effect of ... ne-gat[ing] the possibility that members of the jury would” harbor a pro-law enforcement bias.
IV.
Though I do not wish to dwell on the matter at length, I must briefly express my dismay at the manner in which we have found our way to the point at which the en banc court may overrule Evans. We have repeatedly stated that one panel is bound to adhere to the published decisions of prior panels of this court. See, e.g, Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Director, OWCP, 5 F.3d 777, 779 (4th Cir.1993); Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363, 1381-82 (4th Cir.1991); Derflinger v. Ford Motor Co., 866 F.2d 107, 110 (4th Cir.1989); Hutchins v. Woodard, 730 F.2d 953, 957 (4th Cir.1984). Such a rule is critical, of course, if we are to be governed by laws, rather than by men and women. Though each of us frequently brings to our cases an understanding of the law that differs, in one respect or another, from the understandings possessed by other members of the court, the litigants that come before us are entitled to receive judgments that are, to as great an extent as is possible, determined more by prior panels’ renderings of the applicable law than by the composition of the panels hearing their appeals.
Though perhaps reasonable minds may differ, I am absolutely persuaded that, when the instant appeals were heard before a three-judge panel, our decision in Evans mandated a finding that Appellants were entitled to receive new trials. Having already once described my reasons for reaching that conclusion, see Lancaster, 78 F.3d at 897-901, I will not here consume additional pages of the Federal Reporter in pursuit of the same objective. Suffice it to say that I remain convinced that those reasons were entirely sound and that the panel majority failed to abide by binding (in theory, if not in practice) precedent. If the members of the panel majority wished to overrule Evans — as one member of the panel stated he wished to do — I therefore believe that the proper course would have been to issue an opinion overturning Appellants’ convictions, then to initiate a poll of the court for rehearing en banc. Instead, the panel majority elected to attempt to distinguish Evans, on the most demonstrably dubious of grounds. The litigants that come before us and the rule of law upon which the federal courts are founded are badly served by such practices.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. As the majority states, we are here presented with two appeals.

. As Circuit Judge Burger suggested, the issue turns upon the extent to which the public believes that the word of a member of the given occupation is, as a general matter, to be trusted. Though trustworthy citizens can be found in all occupations, there are surely no more than a handful of occupations that much of the public has come to believe, by necessity or experience, are held by persons whose descriptions of events are trustworthy.