Court Opinion

ID: 9408151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 18:01:23.272657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.873709
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50842    Document: 00516816186        Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        July 11, 2023
                                No. 22-50842                           Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                 Clerk

   Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Company; The
   Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                     versus

   Blue Bell Creameries USA, Incorporated; Blue Bell
   Creameries, L.P.; Blue Bell Creameries, Incorporated;
   John W. Barnhill, Jr.; Greg A. Bridges; Richard
   Dickson; Paul A. Ehlert; Jim E. Kruse; Paul W. Kruse; W.
   J. Rankin; Howard W. Kruse; Patricia I. Ryan; Dorothy
   McCleod MacInerney,

                                         Defendants—Appellants.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 1:21-CV-487
                 ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
         The Blue Bell Defendants appeal the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment in favor of Discover Property & Casualty Insurance Company and
   the Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut. Because the complaint
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                                   No. 22-50842

   in the underlying shareholder lawsuit does not allege any “occurrence” or
   seek “damages because of bodily injury,” we AFFIRM.
                                         I
          This case concerns an insurance coverage dispute. In 2015, a Listeria
   outbreak led to a shut-down of Blue Bell factories and a nationwide recall of
   its products. Consequently, Blue Bell suffered a substantial financial loss.
   That financial loss led to a shareholder lawsuit against Blue Bell’s directors
   and officers in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Marchand v. Barnhill, No.
   2017-0586-JRS, 2018 WL 4657159 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018), rev’d, 212 A.3d
   805 (Del. 2019). In that case, Jack L. Marchand II, a shareholder of Blue Bell
   Creameries USA, Inc., brought a derivative action against Blue Bell’s
   directors and officers, alleging breach of fiduciary duties.       Blue Bell
   Creameries USA, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, and the lawsuit is governed
   by Delaware law. Id.
          Relevant here, a shareholder derivative action is “an action brought
   by a shareholder in the name or right of a corporation to redress an injury
   sustained by, or to enforce a duty owed to, the corporation.” 13 Fletcher
   Cyc. Corp. § 5939. Under Delaware law, directors and officers “owe
   fiduciary duties of care and loyalty” to the corporation and its shareholders.
   Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009). Broadly speaking, the
   duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries “to advance the principal’s interests and
   bars them from promoting their own interests at the principal’s expense,”
   whereas the duty of care “requires fiduciaries to exercise power
   competently.”     Holger Spamann, Scott Hirst & Gabriel Rauterberg,
   Corporations in 100 Pages 36 (3d ed. 2022).
          Marchand, on behalf of Blue Bell, alleged that Blue Bell’s officers and
   directors breached their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by failing “to
   comply with regulations and establish controls.” The complaint also alleged

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   that the directors and officers knew that Blue Bell’s manufacturing plants had
   repeatedly and consistently tested positive for Listeria contamination, yet
   they continued to manufacture and distribute ice cream products in
   conscious disregard of the known risks. The complaint asserted that, “[a]s a
   result of the breaches of fiduciary duty alleged [in the complaint], the
   Company and its stockholders suffered injury in the amount of at least
   hundreds of millions of dollars.”
           As to liability, Marchand contended that the directors and officers are
   personally liable for the violations against Blue Bell and its shareholders. As
   compensation, he asked that the court award “Blue Bell the damages
   sustained by it as a result of the breaches of fiduciary duties.” See Tooley v.
   Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004)
   (“Because a derivative suit is being brought on behalf of the corporation, the
   recovery, if any, must go to the corporation.”). The complaint also requested
   that the court order “disgorgement and cancellation of stock in Blue Bell”
   owned by the directors and officers.
           Three years after the shareholder lawsuit was filed, the directors and
   officers sought defense coverage under Blue Bell’s Commercial General
   Liability insurance policies. In response, the Insurance Companies filed a
   lawsuit in this case, seeking a declaration that they have no duty to defend or
   indemnify1 the directors and officers in relation to the shareholder lawsuit.

           _____________________
           1
              Although the Insurance Companies seek declaratory judgment as to both their
   duty to defend and duty to indemnify, the parties have submitted a joint stipulation stating
   that “If the [district court] finds there is no duty to defend, it may also find there is no duty
   to indemnify, but otherwise the duty to indemnify will not be a subject of the Parties’
   motions.”

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           The parties agree as to which policy governs.2 The applicable policy
   states that, in addition to the company, “‘executive officers’ and directors
   are insureds, but only with respect to their duties as [the company’s] officers
   or directors.” As to the duty to indemnify, the insurer agreed to “pay those
   sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of
   ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage.’” The insurer also has a “duty to
   defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.” But the duties
   to defend and indemnify apply “only if the ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property
   damage’ is caused by an ‘occurrence,’” which is defined as “an accident,
   including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
   harmful conditions.” Having stipulated that the policy was in effect at all
   relevant times, both parties filed a motion for summary judgment.
           The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
   Insurance Companies based on three independent grounds: (1) the directors
   and officers are not “insureds” under the policy when sued for “breach of a
   duty owed to the corporation”; (2) the shareholder lawsuit does not stem
   from either an “accident” or “occurrence” because the alleged misconducts
   were “undertaken with knowledge”; and (3) the shareholder suit does not
   allege damages “because of bodily injury.” The Blue Bell Defendants timely
   appealed.
                                               II
           This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. Sweetin v.
   City of Texas City, Texas, 48 F.4th 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2022). “Summary

           _____________________
           2
              The Blue Bell Entities were covered at all relevant times by several different
   Commercial General Liability policies. Here, the parties have stipulated that all of those
   policies are identical in “all material respects to the 2015 Policy.” They also agreed that
   their cross-motions for summary judgment in this case would be governed by “the eight-
   corners rule [and] the terms and conditions of the 2015 Policy.”

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   judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of
   material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
   Id. “On cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each party’s
   motion independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most
   favorable to the nonmoving party.” Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co.,
   611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010)
          Texas law governs this diversity case. See Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615
   F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010). However, the Supreme Court of Texas has not
   addressed the precise issues here. Thus, we must make an “Erie guess” as
   to how the Supreme Court of Texas would decide the questions before us.
   Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2011). An
   Erie guess must be based on: (1) decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas in
   analogous cases, (2) the rationales and analyses underlying the Supreme
   Court of Texas’s decisions on related issues, (3) dicta by the Supreme Court
   of Texas, (4) lower state court decisions, (5) the general rule on the question,
   (6) the rulings of courts of other states to which Texas courts look when
   formulating substantive law, and (7) other available sources, such as treatises
   and legal commentaries. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Rentech Steel
   LLC, 620 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks
   omitted); see Sanders v. Boeing Co., 68 F.4th 977, 981 (5th Cir. 2023).
          Under Texas law, it is well established that the duty to defend and the
   duty to indemnify are “distinct and separate duties.” King v. Dallas Fire Ins.
   Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002). An “insurer may have a duty to defend
   but, eventually, no duty to indemnify.” Farmers Texas Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
   Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997). Likewise, an “insurer may have a
   duty to indemnify its insured even if the duty to defend never arises.” D.R.
   Horton-Texas, Ltd. v. Markel Int’l Ins. Co., 300 S.W.3d 740, 741 (Tex. 2009).

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          As to the duty to defend, two documents are determinative: “the
   insurance policy and the third-party plaintiff’s pleadings in the underlying
   litigation, which the court must review ‘without regard to the truth or falsity
   of those allegations.’” Amerisure, 611 F.3d at 309 (quoting GuideOne Elite
   Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex. 2006)). In
   contrast, the “duty to indemnify depends on the facts proven and whether
   the damages caused by the actions or omissions proven are covered by the
   terms of the policy.” D.R. Horton-Texas, 300 S.W.3d at 744. “Evidence is
   usually necessary in the coverage litigation to establish or refute an insurer’s
   duty to indemnify.” Id.
          Here, only the duty to defend is at issue because the parties have
   stipulated that “If the [district court] finds there is no duty to defend, it may
   also find there is no duty to indemnify, but otherwise the duty to indemnify
   will not be a subject of the Parties’ motions.” Accordingly, we are confined
   by Texas’s “eight-corners rule,” which directs courts to determine an
   insurer’s duty to defend based on: (1) the pleading against the insured in the
   underlying litigation and (2) the terms of the insurance policy. Monroe Guar.
   Ins. Co. v. BITCO Gen. Ins. Corp., 640 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2022).
          “Insurance policy interpretation principles emphasize a policy’s plain
   language in determining its intended coverage.” Gilbert Texas Const., L.P. v.
   Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 131 (Tex. 2010). When there
   is ambiguity, we “resolv[e] any doubt in favor of coverage.” Allstate Ins. Co.
   v. Hallman, 159 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2005). But a contract “is not
   ambiguous simply because the parties to a lawsuit offer conflicting
   interpretations of the contract’s provisions.” Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
   Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. 2017).
          There are three issues on appeal. First, whether the directors and
   officers qualify as additional insureds in relation to the shareholder lawsuit.

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   Second, whether the alleged injuries in the shareholder lawsuit were caused
   by an “occurrence.” And third, whether the shareholder lawsuit seeks
   “damages because of bodily injury.” The district court answered “no” to all
   three questions. While we disagree with the district court’s determination as
   to the first issue, we agree with its determination as to the second and third.
   We discuss each issue in turn.
                                         III
          First, we address whether the directors and officers qualify as
   additional insureds in relation to the shareholder lawsuit. The policy states
   that Blue Bell’s directors and officers are insureds, but “only with respect to
   their duties as [the company’s] officers or directors.”
          The Insurance Companies argue, and the district court agreed, that
   the directors and officers do not qualify as additional insureds. The district
   court noted that the underlying allegation in the shareholder lawsuit is that
   the directors and officers “knowingly disregarded contamination risk and
   safety compliance” despite positive Lysteria tests and thus violated their
   fiduciary duties to the corporation. Given that the lawsuit is for breach of
   fiduciary duty, the district court rejected the proposition that the directors
   and officers were sued for actions “with respect to their duties” when it is
   alleged that they breached those very duties.
          We disagree with the district court and hold that the directors and
   officers are “insureds” in relation to the shareholder lawsuit. At first glance,
   the argument adopted by the district court might sound like a logical
   tautology. After all, how can the directors and officers be “acting with
   respect to their duties” during the alleged violations of fiduciary duties?
          Relevant here are two distinct meanings of the word “duty.” On the
   one hand, “duty” can mean moral or legal “obligation” (e.g., “duty to
   indemnify,” “duty to defend”). On the other hand, it can also mean

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   something that is more analogous to “job” or “role” (e.g., “the President’s
   official duties,” “the scope of his duties”). Duty, Oxford Dictionary &
   Thesaurus of Current English (2d ed. 2007) (“duty n. 1 responsibility,
   obligation, commitment. 2 job, task, assignment, mission, function, charge,
   role.”). With this distinction in mind, it is possible that a director or officer
   breached his fiduciary duty (i.e., legal obligation) while still acting with
   respect to his duties (i.e., role) as a director or officer of the corporation. Cf.
   Alexander v. Walker, 435 S.W.3d 789, 789–90, 92 (Tex. 2014) (holding that a
   lawsuit against two sheriffs alleging “false arrest, false imprisonment, and
   malicious prosecution” was nonetheless “based on conduct within the
   general scope of the officers’ employment”).
          To be sure, some violations are wholly unrelated or contrary to one’s
   role such that they render the person effectively acting outside the scope of
   his role. See, e.g., Am. States Ins. Co. v. Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church
   Outside of Russia, 170 F. App’x 869, 872 n.16 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
   monks who are accused of sexual molestation “do not qualify as insureds
   because clergy are considered insureds under the policy only ‘with respect to
   their duties as such’”); Farr v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 61 F.3d 677,
   681 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that corporate officers are not “carrying out their
   duties” when acting “in a manner that is antagonistic toward the
   corporation[]”).
          Here, however, as the Blue Bell Defendants noted, the shareholder
   did not allege that the directors and officers were taking any action that was
   outside the scope of “managing and operating the ice cream company.” To
   the contrary, the complaint alleged that the directors and officers violated
   their fiduciary duties because they “continued the Company’s production
   and distribution of ice-cream” when they should not have. While it is
   possible that they violated their fiduciary duties by failing to stop production

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   and distribution of ice-cream, their deciding to continue is plainly within the
   scope of their role.
          Thus, based on the complaint, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty
   occurred while the directors and officers were acting “with respect to their
   duties” as such. Accordingly, we hold that they are “insureds” in relation
   to the shareholder lawsuit. See Bitco Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Monroe Guar. Ins. Co.,
   31 F.4th 325, 329 (5th Cir. 2022) (“If a complaint alleges at least one cause
   of action that is ‘potentially’ within the policy’s coverage, the insurer must
   defend the entire lawsuit.”). In the alternative, there is at least sufficient
   uncertainty on this issue that we must choose an interpretation that favors
   coverage. Id.
                                         IV
           Next, we address whether the alleged injuries in the underlying
   lawsuit were caused by an “occurrence.” Under the policy, the Insurance
   Companies have a duty to defend only if the alleged injury “is caused by an
   ‘occurrence.’” And “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including
   continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
   conditions.”
          Under Texas law, a person’s act is not an accident “when [1] he
   commits an intentional act that [2] results in injuries that ordinarily follow
   from or could be reasonably anticipated from the intentional act.” Am. States
   Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 372 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Trinity Universal
   Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 827–28 (Tex. 1997)). We have noted that,
   in this context, “an intentional act and the intent to cause injury are two
   distinct concepts.”    Id. at 372 n.11.    To illustrate, “the hunter who
   deliberately fires a gun at what he believes to be a deer but is actually a
   person” committed an “intentional” act, even though the harm was not
   intentional. Trinity, 945 S.W.2d at 828. As such, the “intentional acts”

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   requirement is concerned with the voluntariness of an action or omission, not
   the actor’s intended outcome.
                                           A
          We agree with the Insurance Companies and the district court that the
   alleged injuries were not caused by an “accident.” As an initial matter, the
   intentional act requirement is easily met because there were no allegations
   that the directors or officers were acting involuntarily. To the contrary, the
   shareholder    complaint      alleged   that   they   “knowingly   disregarded
   contamination risk and safety compliance” and “willfully failed to exercise”
   their authority.
          As to foreseeability, the shareholder complaint alleged several facts
   showing that the Listeria outbreak and the attendant financial harm “could
   be ‘reasonably anticipated.’” Trinity, 945 S.W.2d at 828 (quoting State Farm
   Fire & Casualty Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex.1993)). For example,
   the complaint alleged that:

       In February 2015, Blue Bell received notification that the Texas
          Department of State Health Services had positive tests for Listeria in
          Blue Bell samples.
       In March 2015, health authorities reported that they suspected
        connection between human Listeria infections in Kansas and products
          made by Blue Bell’s Brenham facility.
       In April 2015, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention stated
        that tests indicated Blue Bell products from the manufacturing plants
          in Texas and Oklahoma were the source of a Listeria outbreak.
       Beginning in early 2013 and continuing into early 2015 . . ., Company
          management received increasingly frequent and continuing positive
          presumptive test results for Listeria.

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       Positive tests also included repeated positive results from the
          Company’s third-party laboratory in 2014, on consecutive samples.
          Because our review is confined by the eight-corners rule, we assess the
   shareholder’s allegations “without regard to the truth or falsity of those
   allegations.” GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at 308 (citations omitted). Having done
   so, we agree with the district court that, as alleged in the shareholder
   complaint, the breach of fiduciary duties stemmed from intentional acts, and
   the Listeria outbreak and the resulting financial harm were natural and
   probable consequences that could be reasonably anticipated.
                                          B
          On appeal, the Blue Bell Defendants offer three reasons for why the
   district court erred on this issue.
                                          1
          First, the Blue Bell Defendants assert that the district court ignored
   the additional, relevant policy language stating that accident “includ[es]
   continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
   conditions.” The full definition reads as follows:
          “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or
          repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
          conditions.
   The Blue Bell Defendants argue that the second part of the definition is
   relevant because the shareholder lawsuit alleged that Blue Bell’s plants
   “contained harmful conditions that allowed the Listeria to multiply through
   continuous exposure.”       They contend that because such an allegation
   signifies “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
   harmful conditions,” the shareholder lawsuit alleged an “occurrence.” In
   making this argument, the Blue Bell Defendants propose that we read the
   dependent clause (i.e., “including continuous or repeated exposure to

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   substantially the same general harmful conditions”) as extending the scope
   of the definition.
          We refuse to do so, however, because that proposed interpretation is
   unpersuasive when we apply the whole-text canon. See Antonin Scalia &
   Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012)
   (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every
   part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”).
   As the Supreme Court of Texas observed, when the definitional language is
   read in context, it is evident that the function of the dependent clause is “to
   limit the number of occurrences an insured can claim for what the policy
   deems to be a single accident.” Don’s Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co.,
   267 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. 2008). Stated differently, the clause serves to
   ensure that “continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
   general harmful conditions” is not counted as multiple accidents or
   occurrences. “This limitation is sometimes important because the dollar
   limits of the policy include an aggregate limit and also a lower dollar limit per
   occurrence.” Id. For example, the policy at issue here has an “Each
   Occurrence Limit” of $5,000,000.
          Accordingly, we are unpersuaded by the Blue Bell Defendants’
   proposed interpretation. The dependent clause functions “to limit the
   number of occurrences,” not to enlarge the scope of the meaning of
   “occurrence.” Id.
                                          2
          Second, the Blue Bell Defendants argue that, because the policy
   includes an explicit exclusion for “bodily injury expected or intended,” some

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   intentional conduct3 must fall within the definition of “occurrence.” Or else,
   they contend, the explicit exclusion would be rendered surplusage.
           This argument is likewise unpersuasive because the “occurrence” /
   “accident” analysis is meaningfully different from the exclusion for
   “expected or intended” injuries. Under Texas law, whether the insured
   “expect[s] or intend[s] [the injury] is of no consequence to our determination
   of whether his actions were an ‘accident.’” Trinity, 945 S.W.2d at 827–28.
   If the resulting injury ordinarily follows from or could be “reasonably
   anticipated” from the intentional act, then the act is not an accident, and thus
   not an occurrence. Id. at 828 (quoting S.S., 858 S.W.2d at 377).
           To the extent that the Supreme Court of Texas’s understanding of
   “accident” overlaps with the intentional-injury exclusion, such an overlap
   should not be interpreted as an unintended surplusage because, as the Court
   recognized, “there is a [historical] relationship between the policy’s
   definition of ‘occurrence’ and the exclusion for intentional acts.” King, 85
   S.W.3d at 192. That relationship arises from the fact that, before the 1986
   modification to the Corporate General Liability Policy, the intentional-injury
   exception was subsumed within the definition of “occurrence.”                       The
   definition of “occurrence” in pre-1986 CGL policies read:
           “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or
           repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
           condition, which results in bodily injury or property damage
           neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
   Id. at 192 (citing 16 Eric Mills Holmes, Holmes’ Appleman On Insurance 2d
   § 117.5) (emphasis added). In 1986, however, “[t]he language ‘expected or
   intended from the standpoint of the insured’ was removed from the
           _____________________
           3
             We understand the phrase “intentional conduct” in the Blue Bell Defendants’
   brief to mean a conduct that is intended to cause harm rather than mere voluntary action.

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   definition of ‘occurrence’ and reinserted as an exclusion from coverage.” Id.
   The upshot of this historical fact is that any overlap between the definition of
   “occurrence” and the intentional-injury exclusion is a byproduct of historical
   practices rather than an unintended surplusage that ought to be excised.
                                          3
          Third, the Blue Bell Defendants assert that, even assuming arguendo
   that their previous arguments fail, coverage still exists because “there are not
   enough details in the Underlying Suit to conclude that a Listeria outbreak was
   an expected result of Appellants’ actions.” As support, they observe that the
   shareholder lawsuit fails to allege that “any regulatory authority took any
   drastic action to stop the production of ice cream, which one might expect if
   Listeria contamination was a natural and probable result of the conditions at
   the facilities.” Given this deficiency, they conclude that the district court
   erred because the shareholder lawsuit “does not conclusively show
   scientifically that Listeria outbreak was the natural and probable result” of
   the alleged misconducts.
          But the relevant question is not whether the complaint “conclusively
   show scientifically” that the injuries were probable. Under Texas law, so
   long as the underlying complaint alleged facts showing that the injuries
   “could be reasonably anticipated” to result from the misconduct, the
   complaint did not allege an accident. Trinity, 945 S.W.2d at 828 (citation and
   quotation marks omitted).      “To hold otherwise would inappropriately
   enhance rather than minimize the moral hazard inherent in insurance.” Id.;
   see Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. Econ. 541, 541
   (1979) (“Moral hazard refers here to the tendency of insurance protection to
   alter an individual’s motive to prevent loss.”).
          Here, the underlying complaint alleged that the company
   management had received “increasingly frequent and continuing positive

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   presumptive test results for Listeria” from several governmental authorities
   and on multiple different occasions. And the complaint also alleged that the
   company had received “repeated positive results . . . on consecutive
   samples” from its own third-party laboratory.         Because we assess the
   shareholder’s allegations “without regard to [their] truth or falsity,” we hold
   that the shareholder complaint does not allege any accident. GuideOne, 197
   S.W.3d at 308.
          Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that the
   shareholder complaint does not allege an “occurrence” under the terms of
   the policy.
                                         V
          Finally, we address whether the shareholder lawsuit seeks “damages
   because of bodily injury.” The insurance policy requires the insurer only to
   “pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
   because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage,’” and “to defend the insured
   against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.” The Blue Bell Defendants do not
   argue that there is any “property damage” at issue. And so, to maintain that
   the Insurance Companies are obligated to defend the shareholder lawsuit, the
   Blue Bell Defendants must show that the lawsuit seeks “damages because of
   bodily injury.”
          The Blue Bell Defendants argue that because the “damages
   contemplated by the [shareholder lawsuit] are factually attributable to bodily
   injuries suffered by Blue Bell customers,” the damages are therefore
   “because of” bodily injury. In response, the Insurance Companies contend
   that the lawsuit does not seek damages “because of bodily injury” because
   the shareholder only seeks to recover “financial harm” that stemmed from
   breach of fiduciary duties. Like the district court, they observe that any
   reference to bodily injury is “merely informative” and “ancillary to the

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   dispute.” And so, they conclude that the district court was correct in holding
   that the shareholder lawsuit does not seek damages because of bodily injury.
          Because the Supreme Court of Texas has not addressed this precise
   issue, we must make an “Erie guess” as to how the Supreme Court of Texas
   would decide this issue. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Relevant
   here, the Supreme Court of Texas has “repeatedly stressed the importance
   of uniformity when identical insurance provisions will necessarily be
   interpreted in various jurisdictions.” Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268
   S.W.3d 487, 496–97 (Tex. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
   Thus, “[w]hen construing an insurance policy, [the Supreme Court of Texas
   is] mindful of other courts’ interpretations of policy language that is identical
   or very similar to the policy language at issue.” RSUI Indem. Co. v. The Lynd
   Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015).
          This court has previously resolved the applicability of equivalent
   contractual language in similar factual situations under Louisiana and
   Mississippi law. Preau v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 645 F.3d 293 (5th
   Cir. 2011); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. A.H. ex rel. Hunter, 444 F. App’x 753
   (5th Cir. 2011). In both cases, we rejected the same argument the Blue Bell
   Defendants assert here and concluded that the underlying lawsuit did not
   seek damages because of bodily injury.
          In Preau, Dr. Preau argued that his insurance company owed him
   coverage for a misrepresentation lawsuit because that lawsuit requires him
   “to pay damages for bodily injury.” 645 F.3d at 296. In that underlying
   lawsuit, Kadlec Medical Center sought damages against Dr. Preau for alleged
   misrepresentation in a letter of recommendation he wrote. Dr. Preau had
   written a letter of recommendation on behalf of Dr. Berry, and that letter
   failed to mention the fact that Dr. Berry had a history of drug abuse. In
   reliance on that letter, Kadlec Medical Center allowed Dr. Berry to practice

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                                    No. 22-50842

   at its hospital. While practicing at the hospital, Dr. Berry failed to properly
   administer anesthesia to a patient because he was under the influence. As a
   result, the patient remains in a permanent vegetative state.
          That patient brought a tort lawsuit against Kadlec Medical Center,
   seeking damages because of a bodily injury. The lawsuit settled for $7.5
   million. To recover that loss, Kadlec then sued Dr. Preau and other
   defendants for negligent misrepresentation.        The jury “awarded total
   damages of approximately $8,244,000, which represented the amount
   Kadlec had paid to settle the [tort lawsuit] plus the attorney’s fees Kadlec
   incurred in defending that suit.” Id. at 295. Dr. Preau was liable for a portion
   of that total damages.
          Like the Blue Bell Defendants here, Dr. Preau argued that the lawsuit
   against him sought damages for bodily injury because the damages can
   ultimately be traced back to the patient’s injury. And so, he contended that
   the damages were covered under his insurance policy. The Preau panel
   disagreed, holding that the “economic damages” sought against Dr. Preau
   are distinct from the damages that the patient sought for her bodily injuries.
   Id. at 296. And that is so even if “the amount of the damages . . . was directly
   related to the amount [the hospital] paid to defend and settle the [tort
   lawsuit].” Id.
          The same is true here. The shareholder complaint seeks damages to
   compensate for Blue Bell’s economic loss caused by its directors’ and
   officers’ breach of fiduciary duties. It does not seek to recover any damages
   on behalf of customers who may have suffered “bodily injury” from the
   Lysteria outbreak. Accordingly, we hold that the damages in the shareholder
   lawsuit are not covered under the plain terms of Blue Bell’s insurance policy.
          Moreover, Preau is not the only case supporting our conclusion. In
   Nationwide, for example, we applied our holding in Preau when addressing an

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                                      No. 22-50842

   identical insurance provision under Mississippi law. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
   v. A.H. ex rel. Hunter, 444 F. App’x 753, 755 (5th Cir. 2011). There, appellant
   Tri County argued that its insurer ought to indemnify the contempt judgment
   against it because the judgment sought “damages because of bodily injury.”
   Id.
          As background, an automobile accident victim obtained a $ 2 million
   tort judgment against John Hunter, a parent of the tortfeasor. To collect that
   judgment, the victim filed a writ of execution against Tri County, a company
   allegedly owned by John Hunter. Under a state statute, Tri County was
   required to provide a sworn statement within ten days of the extent of
   Hunter’s interest in the company. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the
   state court held that Tri County had not complied with the statute and
   entered judgment for the entire $2 million.
          To recover that loss, Tri County argued that the $2 million judgment
   was covered under its liability policy, which required the insurer to pay
   “sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because
   of ‘bodily injury.’” Id. The Nationwide panel disagreed and held that “As in
   Preau, Tri County had not become ‘legally obligated to pay’ any damages as
   a result of a ‘bodily injury.’” Id.
          Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court of
   Ohio, and the Supreme Court of Delaware have all addressed the meaning of
   a similar provision under similar facts and come to the same conclusion.
   Westfield Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Quest Pharms., Inc., 57 F.4th 558, 565 (6th Cir.
   2023) (holding that liability insurance covering claims for damages “because
   of bodily injury” provides coverage “only for claims requiring proof of an
   actual bodily injury, not all claims tangentially related to bodily injuries”); id.
   (“The claims, all of which are for economic damages, are simply beyond the
   policies’ scope.”); Bliss Sequoia Ins. & Risk Advisors, Inc. v. Allied Prop. & Cas.

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                                     No. 22-50842

   Ins. Co., 52 F.4th 417, 423 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that “the phrase ‘because
   of bodily injury’ in [appellant’s] insurance policy” does not automatically
   include any “lawsuit connected in some way to someone’s injury.”); Acuity
   v. Masters Pharm., Inc., 205 N.E.3d 460, 472 (Ohio 2022) (holding that “the
   phrase ‘damages because of bodily injury’ in the policies before [the court]
   requires more than a tenuous connection between the alleged bodily injury
   sustained by a person and the damages sought”); ACE Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite
   Aid Corp., 270 A.3d 239, 247 (Del. 2022) (“There must be more than some
   linkage between the personal injury and damages to recover ‘because of’
   personal injury: namely, bodily injury to the plaintiff, and damages sought
   because of that specific bodily injury.”).
          Although these cases did not address the issue under Texas law, we
   nonetheless consider them highly persuasive because the Supreme Court of
   Texas has emphasized the importance of “other courts’ interpretations of
   policy language that is identical or very similar to the policy language at
   issue.” RSUI Indem., 466 S.W.3d at 118.
          On the other side, the Blue Bell Defendants do not present any
   analogous cases that have adopted their contrary interpretation. They cite a
   line of cases addressing lawsuits by cell phone consumers who suffered bodily
   injury because of radiation exposure, see, e.g., Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. Fed.
   Ins. Co., 202 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006); Ericsson, Inc. v. St. Paul
   Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 2006); Voicestream
   Wireless Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 112 F. App’x 553 (9th Cir. 2004), and two other
   cases addressing damages from “prescription drug abuse,” Cincinnati Ins.
   Co. v. H.D. Smith, L.L.C., 829 F.3d 771, 772 (7th Cir. 2016), and “increased
   emergency medical care,” Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat. Shooting Sports Found.,
   226 F.3d 642, at *1 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).

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                                      No. 22-50842

          But none of those cases are analogous to the present case because they
   relied on a materially different provision that states:
          Damages because of bodily injury include damages claimed by
          any person or organization for care, loss of services or death
          resulting at any time from the bodily injury.
   Samsung, 202 S.W.3d at 381; Ericsson, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 593; Voicestream,
   112 F. App’x at 556 n.5; Cincinnati Ins., 829 F.3d at 773; Scottsdale, 226 F.3d
   642, at *2 n.3.
          The court in Ericsson, for example, considered an underlying lawsuit
   where the plaintiffs requested damages in the form of “headsets” (or the
   funds to purchase them). 423 F. Supp. 2d at 589. These headsets helped
   reduce exposure to “radio frequency radiation,” which had caused the
   plaintiffs “to sustain bodily injuries” in the form of cellular dysfunction. Id.
   Because the applicable policy stated that damages because of bodily injury
   included “damages . . . for care,” the court in Ericsson observed that damages
   “in the form of a headset neither clearly falls within a policy provision, nor is
   clearly excluded by the text of the policy.”            Id. at 593–94 (quoting
   Voicestream, 112 F. App’x at 556). And so, the court concluded that the
   “ambiguity must be construed against [the insurer].” Id. Following the
   holding in Ericsson, the court in Samsung also determined that the cost of
   obtaining headsets to avoid radiation injury is damage “because of bodily
   injury” because it might be encompassed as damages “for care.” Samsung,
   202 S.W.3d at 381–82 (citing Ericsson, 423 F. Supp. 2d 587).
          Similarly, in Cincinnati, the court considered an underlying suit that
   sought damages based on the cost of “addressing and combating the
   prescription drug abuse epidemic,” which can likewise be considered as
   damages “for care.” 829 F.3d at 774–75; id. at 775 (emphasizing that “the
   policy covers ‘damages claimed by any person or organization for care . . .
   resulting . . . from the bodily injury.’”); see also Scottsdale Ins., 226 F.3d 642,

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                                      No. 22-50842

   at *1 (addressing damages for “increased emergency medical care” from
   bodily injuries). In all of these cases, the court determined that the damages
   sought in the underlying lawsuits might be encompassed within the inclusion
   of damages “for care, loss of services or death resulting at any time from the
   bodily injury.”
          Here, in contrast, there is no colorable argument that the shareholder
   lawsuit seeks damages “for care, loss of services or death” because it only
   seeks compensation for breach of fiduciary duties. Even the Blue Bell
   Defendants do not argue that there are any such damages at issue. As the
   Sixth Circuit observed, the inclusion of damages “for care, loss of services or
   death” was meant to include claims “like loss of consortium claims by family
   members, and subrogation claims.” Westfield, 57 F.4th at 566.
          Thus, in accordance with our holding in Preau, we hold that the
   economic damages sought in the shareholder lawsuit are not “damages
   because of bodily injury” under the plain language of the contract. 645 F.3d
   293.
                                  *        *         *
          While we disagree with the district court’s determination as to
   whether the directors and officers are “insureds” in relation to the
   shareholder lawsuit, we agree with its determination that the complaint in the
   shareholder lawsuit does not allege any “occurrence” or seek “damages
   because of bodily injury.” Because each issue is independently sufficient for
   affirmance, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
   favor of the Insurance Companies.

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