Court Opinion

ID: 9930795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 18:02:12.197274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:28.316971
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                        KISOR, DALY, and MIZER
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                     Christian SALINAS
      Aviation Machinist’s Mate Second Class (E-5), U.S. Navy
                            Appellant

                             No. 202300008

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 7 February 2024

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                             Military Judge:
                     Kimberly J. Kelly (arraignment)
                    Rachel E. Trest (motions and trial)

 Sentence adjudged on 18 August 2022 by a general court-martial con-
 vened at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida, consisting of officer
 and enlisted members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to
 E-1, confinement for three years, and a dishonorable discharge.

                             For Appellant:
                          Mr. Frank J. Spinner
             Lieutenant Christopher B. Dempsey, JAGC, USN

                              For Appellee:
               Lieutenant Rachel E. Noveroske, JAGC, USN
               Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC
                  United States v. Salinas, NMCCA No. 202300008
                                Opinion of the Court

   Judge MIZER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior Judge
   KISOR and Judge DALY joined.

                            _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                            _________________________

MIZER, Judge:
    Appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of at-
tempted sexual assault, in violation of Article 80, Uniform Code of Military
(UCMJ), 1 and one specification of assault with intent to commit sexual assault,
in violation of Article 128, UCMJ. 2 Because these offenses were charged in the
alternative, 3 the military judge conditionally dismissed the Article 128, UCMJ,
attempt-type assault specification without prejudice until completion of appel-
late review. 4
    Appellant asserts three assignments of error: (1) whether Appellant’s trial
defense counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate or use material evi-
dence in his defense; (2) whether Appellant was possibly convicted on the in-
valid legal theory that he attempted to assault her when he “knew or reasona-
bly should have known” AD3 Sierra 5 was asleep; and (3) if this Court finds that
Appellant waived his claim of being convicted on an invalid legal theory,
whether his trial defense counsel were ineffective for failing to object.

                                 I. DISCUSSION

   The resolution of this case should be easy enough. Appellant’s case was
docketed almost three months before this Court’s decision in United States v.
Marin, 6 which held that the crime of attempt requires the Government to prove

   1 10 U.S.C. § 880.

   2 10 U.S.C. § 928.

   3 R. at 34.

   4 R. at 918.

   5 Other than the names of Appellant, the judges, and counsel, all names in this

opinion are pseudonyms.
   6 83 M.J. 626 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2023).

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                United States v. Salinas, NMCCA No. 202300008
                              Opinion of the Court

an accused had the specific intent to commit the underlying offense and, there-
fore, an accused cannot be charged or convicted of an attempted sexual assault
on the basis that he “reasonably should have known” of an underlying condi-
tion. 7
    Both parties agree that Appellant’s second assignment of error, which chal-
lenges his conviction for attempted sexual assault where he “reasonably should
have known” the victim was asleep, has merit. They also agree that the consti-
tutional error involved is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And they
agree that the findings and sentence should be set aside, and a rehearing au-
thorized, in light of Marin.
   But both parties nevertheless insist the Court accompany them on sepa-
rate, quixotic adventures.
   For its part, the Government concedes that Marin is fatal to both Appel-
lant’s conviction for attempted sexual assault under Article 80, UCMJ, and his
conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual assault under Article 128,
UCMJ. We agree.
    But the Government insists that we should affirm a conviction for a lesser
included offense (LIO), which the Government asserts is assault consummated
by a battery. 8 This would require the Court to be the first military appellate
court to address the inconsistency between the Government’s position and the
list of LIOs prescribed by the President under Article 79(b)(2), which—alt-
hough not exhaustive—states that simple assault is the LIO of assault with
intent to commit sexual assault. 9 The Court would then have to determine
whether the overt acts alleged in the charged Article 128, UCMJ, attempt-type
assault “are drafted in such a manner that” 10 they allege facts that necessarily
satisfy all the elements of assault consummated by a battery, which we
acknowledge is a possibility. 11

    7 Because Marin was decided while Appellant’s case was pending direct appeal, he

is entitled to the benefit of that decision. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d
415, 423 (5th Cir. 2012)(en banc)(“[W]here the law is unsettled at the time of trial but
settled at the time of appeal, the ‘plainness’ of the error should be judged by the law at
the time of the appeal.”); United States v. Harcrow, 66 M.J. 154, 159 (C.A.A.F. 2008).
    8 Gov’t Br. at 36-37.

    9 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.) [MCM], pt. IV, ¶ 3.b.(3); App.

12A.
    10 United States v. Armstrong, 77 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

    11 United States v. Riggins, 75 M.J. 78, 85 n. 7 (C.A.A.F. 2016).

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                United States v. Salinas, NMCCA No. 202300008
                              Opinion of the Court

    After making quick work of the elements test, and its implications in a case
where Appellant was charged in the alternative, the Court would have to de-
cide whether to order a rehearing as to sentence or reassess the sentence pur-
suant to United States v. Winckelmann. 12 As might be expected, the Govern-
ment anticipates a string of successive victories and asks the Court to conclude
its necessarily lengthy, hypothetical opinion by authorizing a—“rehearing and
resentencing.” 13 In other words, the Government asks the Court to end its opin-
ion where it began—with a rehearing.
   The Government does not appear to appreciate the potential perils of its
chosen litigation strategy. For example, and without deciding the matter, the
Court could in a future case accept the Government’s invitation to resolve a
case by affirming an LIO, but not the one proposed by the Government. Indeed,
the Court might agree with the President’s determination that an attempt-
type, simple assault is the LIO of assault with intent to commit sexual as-
sault. 14
   The Court would then have to determine whether it should accede to the
Government’s request to order a rehearing as to the sentence or, pursuant to
Winckelmann, reassess the sentence. Using this case as an example, Appellant
was sentenced by a military judge, and the crime of sexual assault is, unfortu-
nately, the type of offense that the judges of this Court have both the requisite
experience and familiarity to reliably determine the sentence that “would have
been imposed at trial.” 15 We note that Appellant has been confined since 18
August 2022. In a case where the maximum statutorily authorized period of
confinement is potentially somewhere between three and six months, should
the Court order a rehearing as to the sentence? 16
   Of course, we need not reach that question because Appellant has recently
abandoned the position he took at trial that simple assault is the authorized

   12 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

   13 Gov’t Br. at 40.

   14 See Exec. Order No. 13825, 83 Fed. Reg. 9889 (March 1, 2018).

   15 Winckelmann, 73 M.J. at 16.

   16 Compare MCM, (2019 ed.), pt. IV, ¶ 77.d.(1)(a) (maximum punishment for simple

assault is confinement for three months and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for
three months) with, id. at ¶ 77.d.(2)(a) (maximum punishment for assault consum-
mated by a battery is a bad conduct discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for six months).

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                   United States v. Salinas, NMCCA No. 202300008
                                 Opinion of the Court

LIO 17 for the charged offense and, without citation to authority, now agrees
with the Government that assault consummated by a battery is an LIO. 18
   But all of this is beside the point, according to the Defense, because the
Court should address the Defense’s first assignment of error, which alleges
that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 19 Were the
Court to do so, the remedy would be—a rehearing. 20 Further, the Defense
agrees with the Government that the Court should delay the resolution of this
case and order affidavits from trial defense counsel, as required by United
States v. Melson, 21 in an effort to achieve—a rehearing. 22 And all of this is to
occur while Appellant continues to serve his sentence to three years of confine-
ment.
    For that predicament, the Defense proposes a novel solution: a Motion for
Expedited Review of Appellant’s second assignment of error. The Defense
makes clear that Appellant is “not seeking expedited review” of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, 23 but merely Appellant’s release from confinement
“pending resolution [of that issue].” 24 Put another way, the Defense asks the
Court order the rehearing required by Marin immediately, and determine later
whether his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel merits—another rehear-
ing.
    The Government responds that there is no authority for bifurcated appel-
late review. 25 And for good reason. “A criminal case in the court-martial system
moves along a ‘time-line’ or through a ‘tunnel of power’ where, depending upon
the locus of the case, a particular authority has power over the substance of
the case.” 26 And the decisions of this Court are not self-executing. 27 That means

   17 R. at 786.

   18 Def. Reply at 1.

   19 Def. Reply at 2.

   20 See, e.g., United States v. Rivas, 3 M.J. 282, 289 (C.M.A. 1977).

   21 66 M.J. 346 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

   22 Def. Reply at 12.

   23 Def. Mot. for Exp. Rev. at 2.

   24 Id. at 3.

   25 Gov’t Opp. to Def. Mot. Exp. Rev. at 2.

   26  United States v. Diaz, 40 M.J. 335, 344 (C.A.A.F. 1994) (citation omitted)
(cleaned up).
   27 United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352, 361 (C.A.A.F. 1997).

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               United States v. Salinas, NMCCA No. 202300008
                             Opinion of the Court

Appellant would not be entitled to the pretrial confinement hearing he appar-
ently seeks until thirty days after this Court fully resolved Appellant’s case. 28
    This case has been hard fought since its inception. And left unchecked,
counsel for both sides may yet devise even more elaborate proposals to fully
achieve pyrrhic victories on behalf of their clients. 29 That is their prerogative.
But the “duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” 30

    The novel issues ably raised by the parties across more than ninety pages
of pleadings can be left for another day. Today, we need only hew closely to
binding precedent and authorize a rehearing. 31

                                 II. CONCLUSION

    After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, the
findings and sentence are SET ASIDE. A rehearing is AUTHORIZED. 32

                                   FOR THE COURT:

                                   MARK K. JAMISON
                                   Clerk of Court

   28 Id.

   29 “The term ‘Pyrrhic victory,’ where the battle is won but the war is lost, finds its

origins in the ultimately ill-fated war pursuits of King Pyrrhus of Epirus. Pyrrhus is
said to have suffered the first Pyrrhic victory around 280 B.C.E. Though he defeated
the Romans in two battles, he endured an extremely high number of casualties. As a
result, he wound up eventually losing the war.” McKathan v. United States, 969 F.3d
1213, 1231 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted) (cleaned up).
   30 Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895).

   31 See Marin, 83 M.J. at 634 (authorizing rehearing where members were errone-

ously instructed as to the requisite mens rea for attempted sexual assault).
   32 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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