Court Opinion

ID: 9789792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:41:21.848804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.460523
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON
specially concurring in the result:
I agree with the majority that the district court’s discharge of the writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed. However, in my view, the availability of other possible legal recourse at the time Moody instituted the habeas corpus action precluded issuance of the writ as premature and there is consequently no need to address Moody’s assertions of error. See Kodama v. Johnson, 786 P.2d 417 (Colo.1990); Mulkey v. Sullivan, 753 P.2d 1226 (Colo. 1988).
I also write separately because I am troubled by the majority’s resolution of the speedy trial issue. I do not concur with the majority’s conclusion that the fact that Moody pled guilty and that the district court accepted the pleas does not preclude his constitutional challenges. Maj. op. at 1363. Instead, I agree with the jurisdictions that have held that the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not extend to the sentencing stages of a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., State v. Drake, 259 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1977); State v. Johnson, 363 So.2d 458 (La.1978).1 There is no need to engage in the ad hoc balancing test of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), in a case such as this, where the defendant pled guilty and subsequently fled the jurisdiction prior to sentencing.
The constitutional right to a speedy trial “is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). However, none of the concerns underlying the right to a speedy trial are implicated in a situation where the accused has already pled guilty and is awaiting sentencing. See Brooks v. United States, 423 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 872, 91 S.Ct. 109, 27 L.Ed.2d 111 (1970); Johnson, 363 So.2d at 460-61.
Although certain rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, such as the right to counsel, apply to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not, under the facts of this case, apply to sentencing. In my view, the right to a speedy trial does not guarantee a speedy sentencing procedure to a defendant who has pled guilty and then has fled from the jurisdiction.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice VOLLACK join in this special concurrence in the result.

. The majority recognizes that the United States Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the issue of whether a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution extends through the sentencing phase of the prosecution. Maj. op. at 1363; see Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 485, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957).