Court Opinion

ID: 9870518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:02:30.46034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:09.764777
License: Public Domain

Crothers, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part..
[¶ 12] I concur with the portion of the majority opinion that affirms finding Jerry Harvey in contempt and modifying his parenting time. I respectfully dissent from that part reversing the district court’s order of attorney’s fees.
[¶ 13] Undisputedly, the district court has discretion in actions like this to award attorney’s fees. Here the district court exercised that discretion and awarded attorney’s fees to' Rasmussen, citing both N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1)(a) (remedial sanctions) and N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 (attorney’s fees in divorce action). Majority, at ¶ 7. As the majority notes, attorney’s fees awarded under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(l)(a) as a remedial sanction does not require analysis of need and ability to pay. See id. Conversely,-“the court must balance one party’s needs against the other party’s ability to pay” before awarding attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. ch. 14-05. Id. (citing Larson v. Larson, 2016 ND 76, ¶ 32, 878 N.W.2d 54).
[¶ 14] The majority reverses because the district court cited both N.D.C.C. § ,27-10-01.4(1)(a) and N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 without finding Rasmussen’s need for attorney’s fees (but did make findings on Harvey’s ability to pay). Majority, at ¶ 9. In general, I agree more robust findings should have been provided explaining the factual grounds supporting the legal basis cited by the court. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s disposition because it ignores our long-standing philosophy of affirming a correct result reached on incorrect reasoning. See Thompson v. State, 2016 ND 101, ¶35, 879 N.W.2d 93 (“While the majority .reverses and remands for the district court to appropriately analyze the second prong of the Strickland test, we may affirm the district court on any ground before it.”); State v. Otto, 2013 ND 239, ¶ 7, 840 N.W.2d 589 (“Although the district court upheld the search, on. the basis of a safety sweep, we may affirm the district court on any basis properly before it.”); State v. Ramsey, 2005 ND 42, ¶ 12, 692 N.W.2d 498 (“This Court will not set aside a correct result merely because the district court assigned an incorrect reason, if the result is the same under the correct law and reasoning.”); First Nat’l Bank of Belfield v. Burich, 367 N.W.2d 148, 154 (N.D. 1985) (“A correct outcome will not be set aside merely because-the trial court assigned an incorrect reason for its decision.... ”).
[¶ 15] Here, the district court awarded attorney’s fees as a remedial sanction under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1)(a). No finding of need or ability to pay is required. Therefore, we should affirm the district court’s attorney fee award under N.D.C.C. § 27-10-01.4(1)(a) without engaging the parties and the district court in the superfluous exercise of either finding Rasmussen’s need for Harvey to pay her attor-*547ne/s fees or simply deleting the citation to N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23. ■