Court Opinion

ID: 9902102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 22:09:14.082907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:45.591962
License: Public Domain

11/22/2023
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT NASHVILLE
                                  Assigned on Briefs July 3, 2023

                                IN RE CHRISTABELL B.1 ET AL.

                     Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County
                       No. A-011-21       Stella L. Hargrove, Judge
                         ___________________________________

                                 No. M2021-01274-COA-R3-PT
                             ___________________________________

Rebecca F. B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her children
Christabell B., Ashtynn B., Colton B., and Elan B. (Colton B. and Elan B. collectively,
“Minor Children”; the Minor Children, Christabell B., and Ashtynn B. collectively,
“Children”).2 The Chancery Court for Maury County (“trial court”) granted a default
judgment against Mother and terminated her parental rights based on several statutory
grounds: abandonment; persistent conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume legal and physical custody. We conclude that the ground of
abandonment was not proven by clear and convincing evidence, and therefore reverse the
trial court’s judgment as to that ground. However, we affirm the trial court’s findings as
to the other statutory grounds and its finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights
is in the Minor Children’s best interests.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
                           in Part and Reversed in Part

        1
         This Court has a policy of abbreviating the last names of children and other parties in cases
involving termination of parental rights in order to protect their privacy and identities.
        2
          At the time the petition for termination was filed, Christabell B. was seventeen, Ashtynn B. was
sixteen, Colton B. was twelve, and Elan B. was just shy of eleven. Christabell B. reached the age of majority
three months before the trial court entered its order terminating parental rights. Ashtynn B. reached the age
of majority five months after the trial court entered its order terminating parental rights. Under the
circumstances, we conclude that this case is moot as to Christabell B. and Ashtynn B. See In re Jeffery B.,
No. W2012-00924-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 4854719, at *1 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2012); In re K.H.,
No. W2008-01144-COA-R3-PT, 2009 WL 1362314, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 15, 2009); see also Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (13), (39) (defining “child” as “any person or persons under eighteen (18) years of
age[,]” and defining “parental rights” as “the legally recognized rights and responsibilities to act as a parent,
to care for, to name, and to claim custodial rights with respect to a child”); but see In re Jeremy C., No.
M2020-00803-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 754604, at *6 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2021) (reviewing trial
court’s decision to terminate mother’s parental rights despite son reaching age of majority during the
pendency of the appeal).
KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT, J.,
and J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., joined.

Shawn D. Snyder, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Rebecca F. B.

Seth M. Lasater, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellees, David J. B. and Mary B.

                                               OPINION

                                          BACKGROUND

        On September 14, 2017, Mother informed David B. (“Father”) that she had no food
and could not take care of the Children. On that day, she dropped at least two of the
Children off with Father.3 On September 19, 2017, Father filed a petition for dependency
and neglect in the Maury County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) concerning Mother’s
ability to care for the Children. Father averred that the Children reported to him that
Mother “was using her money to buy and smoke weed[,] was taking a lot of pills . . . there
was no food in [Mother’s] home[, the Children] had to fend for themselves,” and Mother
and Children were staying with Mother’s boyfriend “from whom she bought drugs and
with whom she did drugs.” Mother agreed it was in the Children’s best interest for them
to remain in Father’s care pending the adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court granted
Father sole custody and found probable cause that the Children were dependent and
neglected.

       On January 29, 2018, the juvenile court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and
found that the Children were dependent and neglected by Mother as defined by Tennessee
Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13). Specifically, the juvenile court found that the
Children “were certainly dependent and neglect[ed] when the Mother dropped them off at
Father’s residence on or about September 14, 2017[,] and the Mother has not appropriately
addressed the concerns that existed at that time such that they continue to exist.” These
concerns include Mother’s “many or more mental health diagnoses than [that c]ourt has
ever seen” and Mother’s “long history of marijuana use and abuse.” The juvenile court left
the Children in Father’s custody and granted Mother unsupervised visitation for a four-hour
period every Saturday and a four-hour period every Sunday in public places until she
completed ten such visitations, after which she would be required to undergo a hair follicle
drug screen. In the event such drug screen was positive for marijuana, Mother’s visitations
would cease. Finally, the order provided that “Mother shall give Father forty-eight (48)

        3
           The findings by the juvenile court indicate that Mother dropped off two children. However, in
his petition for dependency and neglect filed in the juvenile court, Father alleged that Mother “dropped off
the minor children at his home, two of whom were shirtless and shoeless, and without school bags.”

                                                   -2-
hours notice of whether she intends to exercise her visitation or not. If Mother fails to
provide said notice for any scheduled visitation, that visitation shall be deemed canceled
by the Mother.”

       Thirty-two months later, on August 27, 2020, Father’s counsel sent a letter to
Mother’s counsel and the guardian ad litem advising them that he believed Mother had
completed her tenth visitation and requesting that she submit to a hair follicle drug screen.
Mother never submitted to the drug screen. Petitioners aver, and Mother has not disputed,
that on March 24, 2021, Mother requested visitation, which was the first such request she
had made since August 2020.

        On March 25, 2021, Father and his wife, Mary B., (collectively, “Petitioners”) filed
a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and for adoption (“petition”) in the trial
court. Notably, Mother never filed an answer or made any substantial efforts to defend the
case.

      On April 27, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion for default judgment. A hearing was
held on the motion on May 7, 2021, at which Mother appeared and requested appointed
counsel. The trial court denied the motion and appointed counsel for Mother and a
Guardian ad Litem for the Children.

        On September 8, 2021, Petitioners filed a motion to compel Mother to respond to
discovery requests propounded upon her by Petitioners and to deem admitted Requests for
Admission propounded upon Mother. Petitioners’ motion was heard on October 5, 2021.4
The trial court ordered Mother to fully answer the discovery requests within ten days from
the entry of the order and cautioned Mother that a failure to respond would result in
sanctions, “which may include her inability to rely on any fact or defense that may have
fairly been raised in response to said discovery or entry of a default judgment against her.”
Additionally, the trial court deemed the Requests for Admission admitted. As a result, the
following facts were conclusively established:

        1. [Mother] has not provided Petitioners with a hair follicle drug screen since
        September 15, 2017.

        2. [Petitioners] are fit and proper persons to raise [the] minor children.

        3. [Mother] has not demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the
        minor children’s basic material, education, housing and safety needs since at
        least September 15, 2017.

        4
          Petitioners and Mother agree that the hearing took place on October 5, 2021, and that the resulting
order erroneously indicated September 29, 2021, which was a typographical error.

                                                    -3-
        4. [Mother] and the minor children have not secured a healthy parental
        attachment.

        5. The minor children are fearful of living in [Mother]’s home.

        6. Each of the minor children has an emotionally significant relationship with
        Petitioner Mary [B.]

        7. [Mother] has not demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of circumstances,
        conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the minor children
        to be in her home.

        8. [Mother] has not taken advantage of available programs, services, or
        community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
        circumstances, conduct, or conditions.

        9. [Mother] has not provided safe and stable care for the minor children since
        at least September 15, 2017.

        10. [Mother] has not demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific
        needs required by each of the minor children to thrive.

        11. [Mother] has not demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating
        and maintaining a home that meets the minor children’s basic needs and in
        which the children can thrive.

        12. [Mother] has failed to consistently provide more than token financial
        support for [Mother’s] minor children.

        13. [Mother]’s mental and emotional fitness would be detrimental to the
        children or prevent Mother from consistently and effectively providing safe
        and stable supervision for the children.

       Mother failed to respond to Petitioners’ discovery requests. On October 15, 2021,
Petitioners filed a motion for sanctions “up to and including granting a default judgment”
against Mother. The trial court heard Petitioners’ motion for sanctions on October 25,
2021,5 and found that an appropriate sanction was the entry of default judgment against
Mother. The trial court noted “that, had it not granted a default judgment, [Mother] would
have been precluded from presenting evidence or relying on any fact or defense that may

        5
          The resulting order states that the hearing occurred on October 15, 2021; however, the parties’
briefs indicate that the hearing actually occurred on October 25, 2021.

                                                  -4-
have fairly been raised in response to” Petitioners’ discovery requests. The trial court
terminated Mother’s parental rights, finding that the following grounds were conclusively
established and proved by clear and convincing evidence:

      (1) willful failure to visit/abandonment, as defined in T.C.A.
      § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and (1)(A)(iv); (2) the conditions that led to the minor
      children’s removal or other conditions that in all reasonable probability
      would cause the children to be subjected to further abuse or neglect and that,
      therefore prevent the children’s safe return to [Mother] still persist. There is
      little likelihood that these conditions would be remedied at an early date so
      that the children can be safely returned to [Mother], and the continuation of
      the parent and child relationship greatly diminishes each of the children’[s]
      chances of continued early integration into a safe, stable and permanent
      home; (3) [Mother] has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
      willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
      responsibility of the minor children, placing the minor children in [Mother]’s
      legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the
      physical or psychological welfare of the minor children; and (4) the actions
      and inactions of [Mother] have shown a wanton disregard for the minor
      children, as set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). The Court finds that
      the termination of [Mother]’s parental rights is in the best interest of the
      minor children, by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to T.C.A.
      § 36-1-113(i)(1).

                                         ISSUES

Mother raises the following issue for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred by entering a default judgment against
      Mother.

Because this is a termination of parental rights proceeding, we “must review the trial
court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the
[Minor Children]’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these
findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 525–26 (Tenn. 2016).

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the
      oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by
      the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v.
      Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Stanley

                                           -5-
       v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); In re
       Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption of Female
       Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547–48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
       573, 578–79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although fundamental and
       constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at
       250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors....’
       Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority as parens patriae when
       interference with parenting is necessary to prevent serious harm to a child.”
       Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429
       (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747, 102
       S. Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 521–22. Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-113(g) provides the various statutory grounds for termination of parental rights. “A
person seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the existence of one of the
statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re
Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(c)).

       Considering the substantial interests at stake in termination proceedings, the
heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence applies. In re Carrington H., 483
S.W.3d at 522 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769). This heightened burden “minimizes the
risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental parental
rights” and “enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth
of the facts[.]” Id. (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010)). “The
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly
probable, rather than as simply more probable than not.” Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182
S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Accordingly, the standard of review in
termination of parental rights cases is as follows:

       An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination
       proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re
       Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246. Under
       Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record
       and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence
       preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re M.L.P.,
       281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d
       793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in
       termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own
       determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as
       supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and
       convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.

                                            -6-
      In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596–97. The trial court’s ruling that the
      evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion
      of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of
      correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of
      A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in
      parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with
      no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523–24.

                                      ANALYSIS

                                             I.

      The trial court deemed the truth of matters contained in the Requests for Admission
conclusively admitted pursuant to Rule 36.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:

      A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission,
      for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the
      scope of Rule 26.02 set forth in the request that relate to (a) facts, the
      application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (b) the genuineness
      of any described documents. Copies of documents shall be served with the
      request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or made available
      for inspection and copying. The request may, without leave of court, be
      served upon the plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any
      other party with or after service of the summons and complaint upon that
      party.

      Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth.
      The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or
      within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom
      the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a
      written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or
      by the party’s attorney….

       “Unanswered requests for admission are deemed admitted and the matter requested
is conclusively established for the purposes of the pending case.” Tenn. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs. v. Barbee, 714 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tenn. 1986); Tenn. R. Civ. P. 36.02.

      Here, Mother does not appeal the trial court’s order deeming these matters admitted.
Based on these admissions and Mother’s failure to respond to Petitioners’ discovery

                                           -7-
requests, the trial court entered a default judgment pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-1-117(n), which provides:

        The court may enter a default judgment against any party to the adoption or
        termination proceeding upon a finding that service of process has been
        validly made against that party in accordance with the Tennessee Rules of
        Civil or Juvenile Procedure and the statutes concerning substituted service;
        however, in termination proceedings, proof must be presented as to legal
        grounds and best interest pursuant to § 36-1-113.

        As this court has previously explained:

                A default judgment, while a necessary part of a trial court’s
                repertoire, is a big stick that should not be wielded
                haphazardly. Default judgments should be granted only when
                a defendant (1) makes no appearance in the case, in spite of
                being properly served, (2) appears, but fails to respond to the
                complaint, or (3) disobeys a pretrial order directing defendant
                to comply with some procedural requirement.

In re Connor B., 603 S.W.3d 773, 782 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting First Union Nat’l
Bank of Tenn. v. Abercrombie, No. M2001-01379-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22251347, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003) (internal citations omitted)).

       Mother was properly served with notice of the termination proceeding in this case
and, although she appeared in the case, she failed to respond to the petition for termination
or defend her position. Additionally, Mother did not comply with court-ordered procedural
requirements, including responding to written discovery.

       Recently, this Court upheld a trial court’s grant of summary judgment terminating
a mother’s parental rights based upon admissions made by the mother in response to
requests for admission and the petitioners’ statement of undisputed facts filed pursuant to
Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. In re Rhyder C., No. E2021-01051-
COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2837923 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2022), no perm. app. filed. 6 This

        6
         Generally, a default judgment is based on the defendant’s failure to plead or otherwise defend the
case. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. On the other hand, a summary judgment is granted when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We acknowledge the difference in procedural posture of this case and that in In re
Rhyder C. Nonetheless, summary judgment in a parental termination case is based on facts deemed
undisputed by a trial court, see Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04, just as the facts at issue in this case were deemed
undisputed by the trial court. As such, despite the differing procedural postures, In re Rhyder C. is
persuasive in this case.

                                                   -8-
Court noted that, “when the facts material to the application of a rule of law are undisputed,
the application is a matter of law for the court since there is nothing to submit to the jury
[or finder of fact] to resolve in favor of one party of the other.” Id. at *9 (alteration in
original) (quoting Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993)). Accordingly, the trial
court in that case did not err when it granted summary judgment based on the mother’s
admissions, just as the trial court in this case did not err simply because it granted a default
judgment based upon the facts conclusively established pursuant to Rule 36 in this case,
which was a valid exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

       With our determination that the default judgment was well within the trial court’s
discretion, we now examine the grounds for termination and the best interests of the
children.

                                                    II.

                                            A. Abandonment

       The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the
Children pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and section
36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).      Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) includes
abandonment, as defined in section 36-1-102, as a ground for terminating parental rights.
At the time the petition was filed,7 the applicable version of section 36-1-102 provided as
follows:

        (1)(A) For purposes of terminating the parental . . . rights of a parent . . . of
        a child to that child in order to make that child available for adoption,
        “abandonment” means that:

        (i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the
        filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or any amended petition to
        terminate the parental rights of the parent . . . of the child who is the subject
        of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption, that the parent
        . . . either ha[s] failed to visit or ha[s] failed to support or ha[s] failed to make
        reasonable payments toward the support of the child[.]

       Failure to visit as a ground for termination is established when a parent, “for a period
of four (4) consecutive months, [fails] to visit or engage in more than token visitation.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(E). As an affirmative defense, a parent may establish, by

        7
          We apply the version of the statute in effect at the time the petition for termination was filed in
March 2021, see In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d 708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017), therefore we reference that
version of each statute throughout this opinion.

                                                    -9-
a preponderance of the evidence, that the failure to visit was not willful. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-102(1)(I). As this Court has explained,

       [f]ailure to visit or support a child is “willful” when a person is aware of his
       or her duty to visit or support, has the capacity to do so, makes no attempt to
       do so, and has no justifiable excuse for not doing so. Failure to visit or to
       support is not excused by another person’s conduct unless the conduct
       actually prevents the person with the obligation from performing his or her
       duty, or amounts to a significant restraint of or interference with the parent’s
       efforts to support or develop a relationship with the child.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 864 (footnote and citations omitted); see also In re Mattie
L., 618 S.W.3d 335, 350 (Tenn. 2021) (“Failure to visit is not willful if it is the result of
coercion.”); In re Adoption of Angela E., 402 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tenn. 2013) (“A parent
cannot be said to have abandoned a child when his failure to visit or support is due to
circumstances outside his control.”).

        The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the
Children by failure to visit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-102(1)(A)(i). However, the record does not support the trial court’s finding as to this
ground. Petitioners aver, and Mother does not dispute, that Mother did not visit the
Children in the period between August 27, 2020, and March 24, 2021; however, the trial
court did not make a finding of fact as to the specific time period during which Mother
failed to visit the Children, and the matters deemed admitted contain no such admission.
The unproven averment in the petition does not constitute clear and convincing evidence
of this failure. Consequently, we hold that Petitioners did not prove abandonment by
failure to visit during the four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
petition.

       Likewise, the admissions establish that Mother failed to consistently provide more
than token financial support for the Children; however, the record does not contain any
evidence regarding the period during which she failed to provide such support. Because
the facts do not establish by clear and convincing proof that Mother failed to consistently
provide more than token financial support specifically during the four-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the petition, the ground of abandonment cannot be
established based on the facts in the record.

       The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that “the actions and
inactions of [Mother] have shown a wanton disregard for the minor children, as set forth
in T.C.A. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).” However, that subsection requires clear and convincing
evidence that a parent:

                                            - 10 -
       is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or
       amended petition to terminate the parental rights of the parent or guardian of
       the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of parental rights
       or adoption, or a parent . . . has been incarcerated during all or part of the
       four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the action
       and has: . . . (c) . . . engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a
       wanton disregard for the welfare of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added). Again, the record does not
support the trial court’s finding as to this ground because there is no evidence in the record
that Mother was incarcerated at the time the petition was filed or at any time during the
four-month period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Although Petitioners
aver in the petition, and Mother does not dispute, that Mother was convicted of harassment
and arrested for fraudulent use of a credit card at some time, this does not constitute clear
and convincing proof of abandonment as defined by 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

       We conclude that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that
Mother abandoned the Children as defined by Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-102(1)(A)(i) or (iv). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment as to the ground
of abandonment. Nevertheless, because Petitioners successfully established alternative
grounds, this ruling does not affect the trial court’s ultimate termination of Mother’s
parental rights.

                                   B. Persistent Conditions

       A parent’s rights may also be terminated when:

       The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody
       of a parent . . . for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered at any
       stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court
       alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

       (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the
       child’s safe return to the care of the parent . . ., or other conditions exist that,
       in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further
       abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent[;]

       (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early
       date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent . . . in the near future;
       and

                                              - 11 -
      (iii) The continuation of the parent . . . and child relationship greatly
      diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and
      permanent home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).

      As we have previously explained,

      “[a] parent’s continued inability to provide fundamental care to a child, even
      if not willful, . . . constitutes a condition which prevents the safe return of the
      child to the parent’s care.” In re A.R., No. W2008-00558-COA-R3-PT, 2008
      WL 4613576, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008) (citing In re T.S. & M.S.,
      No. M1999-01286-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 964775, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
      July 13, 2000)). The failure to remedy the conditions which led to the
      removal need not be willful. In re T.S. & M.S., 2000 WL 964775, at *6 (citing
      State Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Smith, 785 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tenn. 1990)).
      “Where . . . efforts to provide help to improve the parenting ability, offered
      over a long period of time, have proved ineffective, the conclusion [ ] that
      there is little likelihood of such improvement as would allow the safe return
      of the child to the parent in the near future is justified.” Id.

In re Navada N., 498 S.W.3d 579, 605–06 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016).

       The record here clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Mother failed to remedy the persistent conditions necessitating the Children’s initial
removal. After Mother informed Father that she could not take care of the Children and
dropped them off with Father, he initiated a dependency and neglect action as to the
Children on September 19, 2017. The Children were removed from Mother’s legal custody
pursuant to the juvenile court’s order entered October 3, 2017, approximately three and a
half years before the petition to terminate Mother’s rights was filed in March of 2021 and
the Children were never returned to Mother’s custody after that date. This well exceeds
the six-month requirement of section 36-1-113(g)(3)(A). The removal was based upon,
among other things, concerns about Mother’s drug use, mental health issues, and an unsafe
home.

      The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that

      the conditions that led to the minor children’s removal or other conditions
      that in all reasonable probability would cause the children to be subjected to
      further abuse or neglect and that, therefore prevent the children’s safe return
      to [Mother] still persist. There is little likelihood that these conditions would
      be remedied at an early date so that the children can be safely returned to

                                            - 12 -
       [Mother], and the continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly
       diminishes each of the children’[s] chances of continued early integration
       into a safe, stable and permanent home.

        As previously discussed, Mother’s failure to respond to Petitioners’ Requests for
Admission resulted in the trial court deeming the matters set forth therein admitted, thereby
conclusively establishing such matters requested as conclusive in this case. See Tenn.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Barbee, 714 S.W.2d at 266. The matters deemed admitted include
the following critical admissions:

       1. [Mother] has not provided Petitioners with a hair follicle drug screen since
       September 15, 2017.

                                           ***

       3. [Mother] has not demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting the
       minor children’s basic material, education, housing and safety needs since at
       least September 15, 2017.

       4. [Mother] and the minor children have not secured a healthy parental
       attachment.

       5. The minor children are fearful of living in [Mother]’s home.

                                           ***

       7. [Mother] has not demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of circumstances,
       conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the minor children
       to be in her home.

       8. [Mother] has not taken advantage of available programs, services, or
       community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
       circumstances, conduct, or conditions.

       9. [Mother] has not provided safe and stable care for the minor children since
       at least September 15, 2017.

       10. [Mother] has not demonstrated an understanding of the basic and specific
       needs required by each of the minor children to thrive.

                                           - 13 -
       11. [Mother] has not demonstrated the ability and commitment to creating
       and maintaining a home that meets the minor children’s basic needs and in
       which the children can thrive.

       12. [Mother] has failed to consistently provide more than token financial
       support for [the] minor children.

       13. [Mother]’s mental and emotional fitness would be detrimental to the
       children or prevent [Mother] from consistently and effectively providing safe
       and stable supervision for the children.

       These admissions clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the drug use, mental
health issues, and unsafe home that led to the Children’s removal from Mother’s legal
custody still persist, preventing the Minor Children’s safe return to Mother’s care. Given
the time that has already lapsed since the Children’s removal from Mother’s legal custody
and the lack of progress by Mother, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be
remedied so the Minor Children can be safely returned to Mother in the near future.
Further, the continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly diminishes the Minor
Children’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home.
Accordingly, the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s
conclusion that termination based upon the ground of persistent conditions was warranted,
and we affirm the trial court’s judgment as to that ground.

          C. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody

       Finally, a parent’s rights may be terminated when they have

       failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally
       assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and
       placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk
       of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). This ground requires clear and convincing proof of
two elements. In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *7
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018). The petitioner must first prove that the parent has “failed
to manifest ‘an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or
financial responsibility of the child[ren].’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Tenn. Code
Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14)). The petitioner must then prove that placing the children in the
custody of the parent poses “a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological
welfare of the child[ren].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(g)(14)).

                                            - 14 -
        As to the first element, the statute requires “a parent . . . to manifest both an ability
and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility
for the child.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 677 (Tenn. 2020). Therefore, if a party
seeking termination of parental rights establishes that a parent or guardian “failed to
manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” Id.
(citing In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *13 (Tenn.
Ct. App. June 20, 2018)).

       Regarding the second element,

       [t]he courts have not undertaken to define the circumstances that pose a risk
       of substantial harm to a child. These circumstances are not amenable to
       precise definition because of the variability of human conduct. However, the
       use of the modifier “substantial” indicates two things. First, it connotes a real
       hazard or danger that is not minor, trivial, or insignificant. Second, it
       indicates that the harm must be more than a theoretical possibility. While the
       harm need not be inevitable, it must be sufficiently probable to prompt a
       reasonable person to believe that the harm will occur more likely than not.

In re Greyson D., No. E2020-00988-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 1292412, at *8 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 2021) (quoting Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001))
(footnotes omitted).

       The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that, “[Mother] has failed to
manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and
physical custody or financial responsibility of the minor children, placing the minor
children in [Mother]’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to
the physical or psychological welfare of the minor children[.]”

        As to the first element, the evidence in the record establishes, at a minimum, that
Mother failed to manifest a willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility of
the Children. Significantly, Mother never submitted a hair follicle drug screen as required
by the juvenile court to continue having visitations with the Children, never made any effort
to regain legal custody of the Children, and failed to consistently provide more than token
financial support for the Children.

       Regarding the second element, we affirm the juvenile court’s conclusion that
placing the Minor Children in Mother’s custody would pose a significant risk of substantial
psychological harm to the Minor Children’s welfare given Mother’s failure to demonstrate
continuity and stability in meeting the Minor Children’s basic material, education, housing,
and safety needs. The record further demonstrates that Mother and the Minor Children

                                             - 15 -
have not secured a healthy parental attachment, and the Minor Children are fearful of living
in Mother’s home.

        Accordingly, the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial
court’s conclusion that termination based upon the ground of failure to manifest an ability
and willingness to assume custody was warranted, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment
as to that ground.

                                              III.

        In addition to proving at least one statutory ground for termination, Petitioners must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Minor Children’s best interests are served
by terminating Mother’s parental rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). Indeed, “a
finding of unfitness does not necessarily require that the parent’s rights be terminated.” In
re Marr, 194 S.W.3d 490, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d
187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Rather, our termination statutes recognize that “[n]ot all
parental misconduct is irredeemable[,]” and that “terminating an unfit parent’s parental
rights is not always in the child’s best interests.” Id. As such, the focus of the best interests
analysis is not the parent but rather the child. Id.; see also White, 171 S.W.3d at 194 (“[A]
child’s best interests must be viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s,
perspective.”).

       At the time Petitioners filed their petition, Tennessee Code Annotated section
36-1-113(i) provided nine factors for analyzing whether termination of parental rights is in
the best interest of the Children:

       (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of
       circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best
       interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;

       (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment
       after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such
       duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;

       (3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other
       contact with the child;

       (4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established
       between the parent or guardian and the child;

       (5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
       have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;

                                             - 16 -
       (6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent
       or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or
       psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult in
       the family or household;

       (7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is
       healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether
       there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance
       analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care
       for the child in a safe and stable manner;

       (8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status would
       be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively
       providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or

       (9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the
       child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to
       § 36-5-101.

This list is non-exhaustive. In re Marr, 194 S.W.3d at 499. “Ascertaining a child’s best
interests does not call for a rote examination of each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)’s
nine factors and then a determination of whether the sum of the factors tips in favor of or
against the parent.” Id. “The relevancy and weight to be given each factor depends on the
unique facts of each case.” Id. In some circumstances, one factor may prove dispositive.
In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Nevertheless, we must still consider “all the factors
and all the proof” before concluding termination is in the child’s best interests. In re
Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 682 (Tenn. 2017).

       The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the Mother’s
parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. After considering all the relevant
factors, we agree with the trial court’s determination. The record conclusively established
that Mother has not demonstrated a lasting adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or
conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the Minor Children to be in her home. There
is no dispute that Mother has not taken advantage of available programs, services, or
community resources to assist in making lasting adjustments of her circumstances, conduct,
or conditions; her failure to do so has been for such a duration of time that lasting
adjustment does not reasonably appear possible. Mother did not have any visitation or
other contact with the Children between August 2020 and March 2021, and Mother and
the Minor Children have not secured a healthy parental attachment such that the Minor
Children are even fearful of living in Mother’s home. In contrast, the Minor Children each
have an emotionally significant relationship with Mary B.

                                           - 17 -
       As to factors six through nine, the Minor Children were previously found by the
juvenile court to be dependent and neglected in Mother’s care. The juvenile court found
that Mother’s use of controlled substances rendered her consistently unable to care for the
Minor Children in a safe and stable manner, and there is no evidence in the record that
Mother has discontinued her use of controlled substances. Further, Mother’s mental and
emotional fitness would be detrimental to the Minor Children or prevent Mother from
consistently and effectively providing safe and stable supervision for the Minor Children.
The juvenile court stated that it had not previously seen anyone with as many mental health
diagnoses as Mother. Finally, it is undisputed that Mother has failed to consistently provide
more than token financial support for the Minor Children.

        The record clearly supports the trial court’s determination that the Minor Children’s
best interests are served by terminating Mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, we have no
difficulty affirming the trial court’s decision.

                                      CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court on the statutory ground of abandonment is reversed.
The judgment of the trial court is in all other respects affirmed, including the trial court’s
ultimate termination of Mother’s parental rights. Costs on appeal are assessed to the
appellant, Rebecca F. B., for which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                     _________________________________
                                                     KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE

                                            - 18 -