Court Opinion

ID: 9710828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:18:39.239381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.128280
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCUSKEY, dissenting: In my view, the trial court was correct when it excluded the defendant’s statements in the case at hand. I cannot agree that a defendant’s statement is an "admission” and thus not hearsay merely because it is offered against him. Rather, I believe that a statement is not an admission unless the finder of fact could infer guilt from the statement when considered with the other facts in evidence. According to several Illinois cases, only statements which fall within this definition meet the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. Based upon many cases relying upon Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the majority infers that Rule 801(d)(2) should be the law in this State. According to that rule, a defendant’s statement is not hearsay when offered against the defendant. However, our supreme court has never expressly adopted Rule 801(d)(2). The court has addressed this issue on at least three occasions within the past 17 years. (People v. Pasch (1992), 152 Ill. 2d 133, 197, 604 N.E.2d 294, 321; People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 22, 56-57, 473 N.E.2d 840, 857, People v. Simpson (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 276, 282, 379 N.E.2d 1248, 1252.) Our supreme court has had ample opportunity to adopt Rule 801(d)(2) as the law of this State, yet it has not done so. As a result, I am not persuaded that the principles expressed in that rule govern the result in the case at hand. In my opinion, the following cases articulate the better approach to the admissibility of the defendant’s statements in the instant appeal. In Stewart, the defendant told a witness that he was angry at a victim for reporting the defendant to the police. At trial, the trial court allowed the witness to testify to the defendant’s statements. Our supreme court held that the statements were admissible. The court in Stewart first defined an admission as a statement or conduct from which guilt may be inferred when taken in connection with other facts, but from which guilt does not necessarily follow. The court said the defendant’s statements were relevant to show motive for killing the victim and that the jury could have inferred guilt when considered with the other evidence. Based upon this definition and the defendant’s statement, the court held that the statement was an admission and thus was not hearsay. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d at 56-57, 473 N.E.2d at 857. In People v. Garcia (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 792, 420 N.E.2d 482, the defendant was tried for the death of his infant son. The child died from skull fractures caused by a blunt force to his head. During the investigation, the defendant said that he had fallen asleep on the sofa with the child. When he awoke, the child was on the floor and was not breathing. The defendant gave this version of the events to the attending physician and the police investigator. He signed a written statement containing essentially the same facts. At trial, the State presented testimony that the distance from the sofa to the floor was 15 inches and that a fall of that distance could not have caused the child’s severe injuries. In addition, the trial court received the defendant’s written statement into evidence. The appellate court said that the trial court had properly admitted the written statement. Though the appellate court in Garcia first said that every statement by an accused may be used against him unless excluded by other evidentiary bars, it did not rely upon this principle in affirming the trial court’s decision to admit the written statement. Rather, the Garcia court considered the defendant’s written statement with all of the other evidence. In light of testimony that a 15-inch fall could not have caused the child’s injuries, the court said that the defendant’s statement tended to imply his guilt. Therefore, the written statement was properly admitted. Garcia, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 420 N.E.2d at 488. Finally, in People v. Lane (1993), 256 Ill. App. 3d 38, 628 N.E.2d 682, the defendant killed two people and fled to Italy. In exchange for the defendant’s extradition, the State agreed with Italian authorities not to seek the death penalty at the defendant’s trial. When the extradition process became final, two FBI agents took the defendant into custody in Italy and returned him to Illinois for trial. When the agents assumed custody of him, the defendant made the following statement to the agents: "I’ve already won because I can’t get the death penalty now.” (256 Ill. App. 3d at 50.) The trial court allowed one of the agents to testify regarding this statement. The appellate court in Lane held that the statement was properly admitted. The court relied upon Stewart for the definition of "admission.” The court then said that admissions are not objectionable under the rule against hearsay. In finding that the defendant’s statement was properly admitted as an admission, the court said the statement tended to imply the defendant’s guilt. Lane, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 50-51, 628 N.E.2d at 690-91. Based upon the principles and reasoning contained in Stewart, Garcia and Lane, I believe that the proper test of whether a defendant’s statement constitutes inadmissible hearsay is the evaluation of the statement in conjunction with the other facts in evidence. If the finder of fact could not infer guilt from the statement when considered with the other evidence, the statement is not an admission and thus is inadmissible hearsay. The only statements which are not hearsay are statements which meet the definition of "admission” expressed above. In my view, the trial court stated and applied the correct rule of law when it excluded the defendant’s statements as hearsay. The final question is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Evidentiary rulings are within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Kidd (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 510, 535, 591 N.E.2d 431, 442-43.) Based on the facts contained in the record, I conclude that the trial court correctly determined that the statements were not admissions. I agree with the trial judge that a finder of fact could not have inferred guilt from the defendant’s statements in the instant case when those statements were considered with the other evidence in the case. Consequently, I find no showing on review that the trial court abused its discretion. For the reasons indicated, I believe that the trial court applied the correct rule of law to the facts of the case at hand. In my view, the statements at issue did not constitute admissions and were therefore inadmissible hearsay. As a result, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.