Court Opinion

ID: 9388665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 14:00:24.263672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.642448
License: Public Domain

20-3259
   Sharma v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                        Wright, IJ
                                                                     A208 617 697
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 21st day of April, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                 Chief Judge,
            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
            EUNICE C. LEE,
                 Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   JAIDEEP SHARMA,
            Petitioner,

                       v.                                  20-3259
                                                           NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                     Dalbir Singh, Esq., New York, NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                       Attorney General; Holly M. Smith,
                           Assistant Director; Kohsei
                           Ugumori, Senior Litigation
                           Counsel, Office of Immigration
                           Litigation, United States
                           Department of Justice, Washington,
                           DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

    Petitioner Jaideep Sharma, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of an August 28, 2020, decision of the BIA

affirming a September 13, 2018, decision of an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”).   In re Jaideep Sharma, No. A 208 617 697 (B.I.A. Aug.

28, 2020), aff’g No. A 208 617 697 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept.

13, 2018).    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

“for the sake of completeness.”        Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).       The

applicable standards of review are well established.    “[T]he

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

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reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.”    8 U.S.C.   § 1252(b)(4)(B).    “Accordingly,   we

review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and

must defer to the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.”    Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113

(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)

(reviewing adverse credibility determinations for substantial

evidence).

    A factfinder “may base a credibility determination on .

. . the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s

written and oral statements,” “the internal consistency of

each such statement,” “the consistency of such statements

with other evidence of record,” and “any inaccuracies or

falsehoods in such statements,” and it may do so “without

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”          8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).    “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

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adverse credibility ruling.”         Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

at 76.

    Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

determination in this case.      Sharma alleged persecution by

ruling parties in India because of his membership in the

Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA”) party.             The agency

reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Sharma’s own

statements   and   his   documentary   evidence.   See    8   U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      Sharma’s application and testimony

provided that members of the ruling parties twice attacked

him, he reported the first attack to the police, and the

police warned him that he would be arrested and jailed if he

made further reports.      He testified that the police pushed

him out of the station, but he confirmed that he was not

arrested, interrogated, or prosecuted.      However, he submitted

two documents that directly contradicted these statements.

His father’s affidavit said that “police also filed false

charges against my son,” Certified Administrative Record

(“CAR”) 103, and a letter from a SADA official said that

Sharma was “arrested, interrogated and prosecuted by Punjab

                                 4
Police because of his political activities,” id. at 106–07.

The agency was not required to accept Sharma’s explanations

for these inconsistencies.            “A petitioner must do more than

offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements

to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-

finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”                     Majidi

v.   Gonzales,    430    F.3d   77,    80    (2d    Cir.    2005)    (internal

quotation   marks       omitted).          When    questioned       about   the

inconsistency, he admitted that the document from the party

official was “not correct,” CAR at 88, and he said that his

father’s statement might be inaccurate because his father

lacks education and may not have understood what was in the

affidavit, see id. at 84.             The agency was not required to

credit these explanations because the explanations did not

resolve   the    inconsistencies       and    Sharma       testified   at   the

beginning of the hearing that his supporting documents were

true and correct.       Id.

     The inconsistency between Sharma’s statements and his

documentary evidence is alone substantial evidence for the

adverse credibility determination.                 See Likai Gao v. Barr,

968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

                                       5
inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

was compelled to find him credible.”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480

F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false document . .

. may (if attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance

of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).

The   adverse   credibility   determination   is   dispositive   of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

three claims are based on the same factual predicate.            See

Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                               FOR THE COURT:
                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                               Clerk of Court

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