Court Opinion

ID: 9847906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:38.068059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:45.618775
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I agree fully with Divisions 1 and 2 of the opinion, I must explain my concurrence in the conclusion reached in Division 3.
The question of excessiveness can generally come to us in one of two ways. Depending on its posture in the record, our function in reviewing it differs somewhat.
If the question was presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial and denied, and that denial alone is appealed, we consider only whether the trial court abused its discretion. In applying OCGA § 51-12-12 to the question, the trial court has a great deal of leeway, because it has the benefit of seeing and hearing the evidence presented to the jury, simultaneously and in toto, with all of the evidentiary baggage which accompanies the communication of words. This point is made in Atlanta Transit System v. Robinson, 134 Ga. App. 170 (1) (213 SE2d 547) (1975).
If, however, the question is presented directly to this Court, now that a motion for new trial is not a prerequisite for appeal (OCGA § 5-6-36; Hulsey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 138 Ga. App. 523, 524 (1) (226 SE2d 791) (1976)), then of course we do not measure it in terms of the exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Instead, we would have to apply OCGA § 51-12-12 ourselves. Since we are a court only for the correction of errors of law, we would have to come to the conclusion that “the damages are either so small or so excessive as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias” as a matter of law.
The distinction is made in such cases as Kiker v. Davis, 103 Ga. App. 289, 290 (1) (118 SE2d 861) (1961), and Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn, 88 Ga. App. 285, 294 (8) (76 SE2d 647) (1953). See also Medoc Corp. v. Keel, 166 Ga. App. 615, 618 (3) (305 SE2d 134) (1983); Calloway v. Rossman, 150 Ga. App. 381, 386 (8) (257 SE2d 913) (1979).
In the present case appellant presented the excessiveness contention to the trial court, arguing that it was excessive as a matter of law because it was the result of jury “prejudice” brought on by the court’s erroneous admission of the mortality table in evidence and by its erroneous charge regarding permanent disability and use of the table. The trial court denied the motion “on the grounds set forth in defendant’s motion.”
On appeal, the enumeration is that the trial court erred in deny*537ing a new trial because the verdict is excessive as a matter of law, jury prejudice being shown by the admission of the table and by the charge. In this posture, we are faced with whether the trial court abused its discretion. We obviously must find that it did not, as we found no error in the evidence ruling or in the jury instruction. Those being the only bases upon which the trial court was urged to infer “prejudice,” and the only supports for the contention of excessiveness, I perceive no abuse of discretion because the trail court was correct as a matter of law. There being no other ground urged to support an inference of gross mistake or undue bias, a conclusion of excessiveness is not demanded as a matter of law.
Decided October 14, 1986.
H. Baxter Harcourt, Tina G. Stanford, for appellant.
Samuel W. Oates, Jr., Alexander V. Pinter, for appellee.