Court Opinion

ID: 9544398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:23.960735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:55.784975
License: Public Domain

TOBRINER, J., Dissenting.—
In very recent history various cultural subgroups in our society have demanded that they be accorded a legal status not inferior to that which has long been enjoyed by the dominant element. The minorities have attacked the symbols of discrimination, and, to a large extent, and rightly, have succeeded in demolishing them. The law has reflected the social pressure for equal treatment and afforded to the subgroups a new and more meaningful legal status.1
One of the sensitive points of the relationship between the minority and the majority elements has been that of language. In many situations the subgroup has been imprisoned within the barrier of inability to communi*818cate in the English language, and, because of that handicap has been denied fundamental rights. In this regard and in the establishment of the rights of minority groups, the decision of this court in Castro v. State of California (1970) 2 Cal.3d 223 [85 Cal.Rptr. 20, 466 P.2d 244] marks an historic and memorable step forward.
In Castro we posed the question before us in the following terms: “In this case we are called upon to determine whether that portion of article II, section 1 of the California Constitution which conditions the right to vote upon an ability to read the English language is constitutional as applied to persons who, in all other respects qualified to vote, are literate in Spanish but not in English.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 225.) We answered the query unequivocally: “. . . we have concluded that the challenged provision, as so applied, violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is, therefore, a constitutionally impermissible exercise of the state’s power to regulate the franchise.” (Id.) Our last words in that case were: “We cannot refrain from observing that if a contrary conclusion were compelled it would indeed be ironic that petitioners, who are the heirs of a great and gracious culture, identified with the birth of California and contributing in no small measure to its growth, should be disenfranchised in their ancestral land, despite their capacity to cast an informed vote.” (Id. at p. 243.)
In this case we deal with a more concrete and yet limited application of disqualification of members of a Spanish-speaking subgroup because of their exclusive knowledge of Spanish and corollary lack of knowledge of English. Here we do not encounter electoral disenfranchisement; we encounter, instead, disqualification from welfare benefits. The basis for that disqualification frames a narrow issue. When the administrators know the recipients speak Spanish only and when the administrators have previously orally communicated with the recipients in Spanish, can the administrators send notices of termination or reduction of benefits in English?
Aside from the belief by many social observers that such a practice is quite deplorable, we must weigh it in the scales of procedural due process. Procedural due process is not a matter of absolutes which permits of no distinctions between one situation and the next. Instead, in any particular case the right of the individual to procedural due process must be balanced against the legitimate interests and burdens of the state. We probe it here in light of those considerations.
In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011] the United States Supreme Court held that recipients of public assist*819anee payments were entitled under procedural due process to an evidentiary hearing before the state may terminate those payments. Although the court did not specify the exact form and content of the termination notice in that situation it did declare that the recipient was entitled to “timely and adequate notice” of a proposed termination. (Id. at pp. 267-268 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 298-299].)2
We said in Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1966) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265] “What is due process depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. (Holmes, J., in Moyer v. Peabody (1909) 212 U.S. 78, 84 . . . .) Its content is a function of many variables, including the nature of the right affected, the degree of danger caused by the proscribed condition or activity, and the availability of prompt remedial measures.”
I have pointed out on another occasion3 that a “cornerstone of the structure of due process of law is that the adjudication of a significant right must be ‘preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313 [94 L.Ed. 865, 873, 70 S.Ct. 652].) Accordingly, the courts have held that due process affords to the affected individual a right to timely and adequate notice in criminal proceedings [citations], in civil proceedings [citations], in juvenile proceedings [citation] and in administrative proceedings [citations]. [11] The United States Supreme Court ‘has consistently made plain that adequate and timely notice is the fulcrum of due process whatever the purposes of the proceeding. [Citations.] Notice is ordinarily the prerequisite to effective assertion of any constitutional or other rights; without it, vindication of those rights must be essentially fortuitous. So fundamental a protection can neither be spared here nor left to the “favor or grace” of state authorities. . . .’ [Citations.] In order to be constitutionally adequate and timely, notice must be ‘reasonably *820calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., supra, 339 U.S. 306, 314 [94 L.Ed. 865, 873]; . . .)”
In Mullane the Supreme Court further specified as to notice: “The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected [citations], or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.” (Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 315 [94 L.Ed. 865, 873-874, 70 S.Ct. 652].)
We submit, then, in sum, that procedural due process is not composed of weights of absolute quantities in the judicial scales but rather of relative counters in those scales; the issue turns on the relative importance of adequote notice to the welfare recipient and the corresponding burden to the departments in printing the notice in Spanish. We have pointed out that notice is the very essence of due process.
We need not labor the importance of the deprivation of notice to the recipient or the life and death aspect of welfare relief. As to the burden to the departments, the majority opinion is most helpful; the majority admit: “the state does print some of its welfare forms in Spanish.” (Opn. ante, at p. 817.) (Italics added.) If some “forms” are now printed in Spanish it cannot be unduly burdensome to print the form of revocation or reduction in Spanish, particularly when the departments are expected to mail the forms only to those whom the departments know speak Spanish exclusively and to whom the departments have previously communicated orally in Spanish and to whom the departments recognize the importance of so doing.4
Since defendant departments have already seen fit to identify Spanish-speaking recipients who are illiterate in English, to assign caseworkers fluent in Spanish to those recipients, and to furnish welfare forms in Spanish, the burden on defendants of printing a single additional form in Spanish—the notice of reduction or termination of benefits—would certainly be minimal. Indeed, every apologetic assertion as to that which the departments now do to communicate in Spanish is an argument that it is no great burden to do that which the Constitution requires. We there*821fore conclude that defendants’ present method of notifying AFDC recipients known by defendants to be illiterate in English but literate in Spanish is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Despite the fact that the departments would be exposed to so slight a burden by sending notices in Spanish but that the recipients would be subjected to so crucial a loss, and despite the fact the scales of procedural due process tip so heavily in favor of plaintiffs, defendants proffer two hypotheses of defense. First, they say it may be reasonably assumed that in any event, the recipient will get the notice translated. Second, an acceptance of plaintiffs’ position would lead to a requirement that notices in all assistance programs be printed in all foreign languages!
As to the first defense, the majority conclude that “the government may reasonably assume that the non-English speaking individual will act promptly to obtain such assistance (in translation) when he receives the notice in question.” (Opn. ante, at p. 813.) To postulate a “reasonable assumption” that recipients of the notice may seek out a translator is a far cry from finding that the notices are “reasonably certain to inform” a Spanish-speaking recipient of the reasons for the reduction or termination of his benefits and of his right to a hearing. (See Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. (1950) supra, 339 U.S. 306, 315.)
Two cogent reasons demonstrate why the method of notice employed here is not reasonably certain to inform persons illiterate in English. In the first place, the unwary recipient may not appreciate the need for a translation. Unlike the situation in Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011], plaintiffs may not have had the benefit of a prior personal conference with a caseworker to inform them that reduction or termination of their benefits is in the offing. Moreover, since plaintiffs’ personal dealings with defendants have been at least in part through Spanish-speaking caseworkers, and since defendants do print other welfare forms in Spanish, plaintiffs may have been led to believe the notice was simply not important enough to warrant an immediate translation.
Secondly, the recipient may be unable to obtain a translation at all; if he does obtain one, it may be too late to request a hearing within the prescribed 15-day persiod. The recipient may not be able to afford to pay for the services of translation. Even when free translation services are available, the recipient may lack the time or the transportation necessary to obtain them. In short, placing the burden on the recipient to obtain a translation of the notice employed by defendants is not reasonably calculated to apprise him of his right to request a hearing.
*822As to the second defense, the majority describe a concursus horribilium (People v. Crow (1973) 8 Cal.3d 815, 835 [106 Cal.Rptr. 369, 506 P.2d 193] (Mosk, J., dissenting)), which they insist will attend our approval of plaintiffs’ plea. According to the majority, the decision could not be limited to the AFDC program and the Spanish language, but would also apply to all categorical assistance programs and to all foreign languages. Next, the ruling would be extended to all official communications required to satisfy due process. Moreover, and the ultimate horror, the state would be required to conduct all its affairs in every language which is spoken by any person under its jurisdiction. Government would then grind to a halt, disabled by the need to perfectly inform its citizens.
The parade of horrors here, as so often, is no more than a retreat into the irrational. Surely we do not suggest that defendants would necessarily be required to furnish notices in Basque or Chippewa. We have explained in some detail that the application of procedural due process invokes the weighing of the state’s burden against the individual’s benefit; in view of the fact that a significant number of California residents speak and read only Spanish and that defendants recognize this fact, since they have taken the commendable steps of providing Spanish-speaking caseworkers and of printing some forms in Spanish, the burden of printing the challenged forms in Spanish would be comparatively light.
Whether the expense and inconvenience of printing forms in other languages of the notices of reduction or termination of benefits would be justifiable must be decided in each case on the basis of the relevant facts. The state knows which AFDC recipients read only Spanish; the state deals with a sufficient number of Spanish-speaking persons to justify the conclusion that printing notices in Spanish does not compose a special burden. Applying the same practical analysis the state need not print notices in Basque or Chippewa because it does not know which recipients, if any, speak only those languages, and because there are so few of such recipients that the expense of translating and printing the notice would be unreasonable.
We conclude that individuals situated as the plaintiffs before us are constitutionally entitled to notice in Spanish before their welfare payments may be reduced or terminated because the due process protections afforded by such notice are significant while the burden upon the state in providing them is minimal. We reject the implication that such a holding would necessarily extend to other language groups or to all other government communications. Under a different set of circumstances, the balance of *823interests between individual and state may be entirely different and may accordingly dictate a different result.
We subscribe to the majority’s allusion to the enrichment of our cosmopolitan society by the immigration “of persons from many lands with their distinctive linguistic and cultural heritages.” (Opn. ante, at p. 816.) We would insist that those of that group who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children are entitled to procedural due process as to reduction or termination of welfare benefits, notices which entail a relatively slight burden to the state, but which are crucial to the recipients.
In the long effort of the subgroups in our culture to attain recognition and participation the majority opinion can only be an unfortunate step backwards.
I would reverse the judgment.

See Friedman, A History of American Law (1973) pages 576-580.

The Goldberg court did not deal with the issue of whether welfare termination notices to Spanish-speaking recipients must be in that language; indeed, there is no indication that the question was before the court at all. The court did state, however, that the particular means of notice employed by the City of New York—a personal conference with a caseworker followed by a letter from a unit supervisor—were constitutionally adequate. (Id. at p. 268 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 299].) Although at least 2 of the 20 named plaintiffs in that case had Spanish surnames (id. at p. 256, fn. 2 [25 L.Ed.2d at pp. 292-293]), the opinion does not reveal if any of the plaintiffs were literate only in Spanish. We cannot determine from the opinion whether the City of New York employed caseworkers fluent in Spanish to work with Spanish-speaking recipients or whether the city sent termination notices in Spanish to recipients it knew to be literate only in that language.

In re Tucker (1971) 5 Cal.3d 171, 196 [95 Cal.Rptr. 761, 486 P.2d 657] (Tobriner, J„ concurring and dissenting).

See majority opinion, ante, page 816, footnote 10.