Court Opinion

ID: 9700832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:50:29.669047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:14.910376
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). These cases, consolidated on appeal, concern the application of the discovery doctrine to causes of action claiming injury as a result of des1 exposure.
In Moll v Abbott Laboratories, the Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until Moll learned that she likely had a cause of action. I would vacate that decision and remand for trial on the issue whether Moll acted with reasonable *37diligence in discovering that des exposure was a cause of her hooded cervix and infertility.
In Harrington v Abbott Laboratories, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Abbott Laboratories on the ground that the statute of limitations began to run when Harrington learned of an abnormality of her uterus. I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial on the issue whether Harrington should have discovered that she was injured by des exposure before she learned of her infertility.
i
Jean Moll has an "incompetent cervix,” and for that reason is unable to carry a pregnancy to term. Because her cervix appeared irregular, her gynecologist, in 1975, asked her if she had had an abortion. She had not, and the gynecologist said that she had nothing to worry about regarding her cervix. Another gynecologist, in 1977, told her that she had a "hood over [her] cervix,” asked her if her mother had taken des while she was pregnant with Moll, and asked that she obtain her mother’s medical records. That physician also told her that her cervix "didn’t look good,” that the condition might be related to exposure to des, and that her difficulty conceiving might be related to des. The physician added that des exposure could lead to some forms of cancer. The physician also advised her to have a fertility test. Moll did not have the test at that time because she was "too chicken” and preferred to continue attempting to conceive.
By 1985, Moll, not having become pregnant, had the fertility test. After the test, her physician identified the hooded cervix as the probable cause of her inability to conceive.
*38This action was commenced on December 30, 1986, seeking damages for injuries from in útero exposure to des. Abbott Laboratories filed a motion for summary disposition, asserting that Moll’s mother had not ingested des. The motion was granted, but entry of the order was stayed until Moll could complete her search for her mother’s medical records.
In October, 1988, Moll obtained medical records establishing that her mother had taken des. Abbott Laboratories then moved for summary disposition, asserting that Moll’s claim was barred because more than three years had elapsed since she knew or should have known that her injuries may have been caused by in útero exposure to des.
The circuit judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but remanded for a finding when a reasonable person in Moll’s circumstances would have concluded that her mother’s ingestion of des was a likely cause of her hooded cervix.
A
The issue is whether Moll exercised reasonable diligence in discovering that des exposure had caused her cervical condition and inability to conceive.2 I agree with my dissenting colleague3 that in assessing the reasonableness of Moll’s delay in commencing this action, one should consider a number of factors including whether Moll sought to learn whether her mother had ingested des, had *39informed herself through medical advice or lay literature of the potential connection between des and reproductive problems, or sought to verify that des, rather than another element, was a cause of her inability to conceive.4
In the des context, the concept of reasonable diligence should take into account that when a reasonable woman learns that she may be afflicted with a serious reproductive disorder, she may initially take steps to address her medical problem in light of the available medical information and the course of treatment prescribed by her physician. Such a reasonable woman may reasonably continue to focus on the healing or diagnostic process until she has reasonable confidence that her condition has been correctly diagnosed or is under control. Reasonable diligence should include as a factor that a woman anxious to have children may, although advised that she may be a victim of defective drugs, be more concerned about her health and achieving conception than abandoning those efforts in favor of recourse to the courts.5
b
The record on appeal is sparse. We are therefore not in a good position to evaluate comprehensively the reasonableness of Moll’s behavior in delaying the commencement of this action.6 We do not have *40the full depositions either of Moll or her mother. The small bit of evidence that the parties have chosen to include in the record is sufficient, however, to lead me to conclude that the issue of Moll’s diligence should not have been decided summarily.
Moll’s testimony shows a woman confused about her condition, unable to obtain her mother’s medical records, and fearful of a fertility test. Moll was receiving mixed signals from her physicians, who appear to have sought to alert her to the possibility of des exposure without unduly frightening her. For instance, as the majority notes, in 1978 Moll was informed that the results of her colpos-copy "were . . . fine” and also that "there was no cause for real concern at that time,” but also that her cervical condition could indicate des exposure which could lead to cancer.
After receiving these mixed signals about her health and the warnings about possible des exposure, Moll did make an attempt to locate her mother’s medical records in 1979. Her mother’s records had been stored at the Highland Park General Hospital, which had since closed because of fire, and Moll was unable to obtain the records. Moll’s physician then made an unsuccessful attempt to locate the missing records. That, too, failed. Moll decided to focus her energies on conceiving a child to determine if the des exposure had truly left her unable to bear children. She did not pursue the medical records again until after this action was commenced. Even then, Moll was able to find and obtain the records only pursuant to a court order. The records finally confirmed that Moll’s mother had been treated with des during Moll’s gestation.
c
The majority concludes, as a matter of law, that *41Moll did not exercise due diligence in attempting to discover the cause of her medical problems. However, before 1985, Moll’s physicians were only able to speculate about a possible link between her health problems and her mother’s ingestion of des. No doctor told her with a fair degree of certainty that her condition was caused by des.7
The consultations with her physicians concerning her possible des exposure came while Moll was undergoing examination and treatment for ailments such as excess vaginal discharge and infertility. The trier of fact could reasonably conclude that during this period Moll was reasonably justified in focusing on solving her medical problems rather than immediately searching to discover whether des was a cause of those problems.
In all events she made a good-faith attempt to discover whether des was a cause, without success. Moll and her physician each made attempts to find her records in the late 1970’s, but failed to do so. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that due diligence required no more.
D
In holding that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a woman, situated as was Moll, *42discovers a "possible cause of action,” the majority places all such women in an untenable dilemma. If Moll had commenced an action when she was able to allege only a "possible” link between des exposure and her injury, she very well may have suffered summary disposition. The majority’s approach thus effectively may deprive women like Moll of a meaningful opportunity to commence an action and recover for their injuries.
The Ohio Supreme Court recently struck down a DES-specific statute of limitations — which mirrored the Court’s approach in this case — because the statute did not afford DES-exposed women a reasonable opportunity to bring a claim for their injuries. Burgess v Eli Lilly & Co, 66 Ohio St 3d 59; 609 NE2d 140 (1993). The statute at issue in Burgess provided that a cause of action for DES-related injuries accrues "upon the date on which the plaintiff learns from a licensed physician that he has an injury which may be related to such exposure, or upon the date on which by the exercise of reasonable diligence he should have become aware that he has an injury which may be related to such exposure . . . .” Id. at 61. In the Ohio court’s words, the statute of limitations "is triggered when the plaintiff learns that she possibly has a DES-related injury.” Id.
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court explained why the statute was unreasonable:
If a plaintiff were to file a complaint stating that she suffered a bodily injury which might be related to des, the complaint would be dismissed for failure to state a claim. . . . Because the statute of limitations begins running when there is the slightest evidence that des may be a possible cause of plaintiff’s symptoms, an attorney may be forced to file a complaint long before he can believe that *43there is good ground to support it. The alternative is to file no complaint. A plaintiff encounters further difficulties at the summary judgment level. A claim . . . must be filed based upon the possibility of an injury. A plaintiff faces the likely prospect that her claim will be unable to survive a motion for summary judgment. [Id. at 62.]
The "possible” claim approach was seen as unreasonable8 by the Ohio Supreme Court because it deprived plaintiffs of "an opportunity for remedy at a meaningful time or in a meaningful manner.” Id. at 63. The majority’s approach deprives women of remedies for DES-related harms in much the same way as the Ohio statute in Burgess.
ii
Judith Harrington was exposed to des in útero. She became aware of her des exposure in January, 1975, and, between 1975 and 1983, saw several physicians who informed her that she exhibited certain abnormalities associated with des exposure, including having a mosaic on her cervix. In 1983, because she was having difficulty becoming pregnant, she had an hsg test — an x-ray of the uterus and fallopian tubes. On December 27, 1983, her physician informed her of the results of the test — that she had a bicornuate uterus, and that it might also be abnormally T-shaped, which could cause difficulty in conceiving or carrying a preg*44nancy to term — and he scheduled additional tests, including a d and c.9
During that office visit the physician told Harrington, however, that while some des exposed daughters have difficulty conceiving and carrying a pregnancy to term, he was optimistic it would not be the case with her.10
Harrington became pregnant in January or February, 1984, and miscarried in March 1984. Her physician then performed a d and c and informed her that after a better look at her uterus, he found that it was too small to permit her to carry a pregnancy to term. The physician advised her not to become pregnant again.
Harrington filed this action on December 30, 1986.
The circuit judge granted Abbott Laboratories’ motion for summary disposition on the basis that, pursuant to the discovery rule set forth in Larson v Johns-Manville Sales Corp, 427 Mich 301, 309; 399 NW2d 1 (1986), the three year statute of limitations began to run on December 27, 1983— when Harrington learned of the result of the hsg test and knew that she had suffered "some damage” in the form of a misshapen uterus. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
A
The issue is when Harrington "knew” or "should have known” that she was "injured.” Lar*45son, supra at 309. I would hold that considering the unique nature of DES-related harms, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Harrington should not have known that she was injured before she learned of her infertility.
Exposure to des can have multiple effects — some of which will develop into compensable injuries— including cancer, uterine abnormalities, and difficulty with conception and then carrying a pregnancy to term. Not all the effects caused by des exposure are in fact "harms” or "injuries” at the instant that the des effect is discovered.
Harrington’s physician told her that des exposure might have caused the development of her abnormal uterine condition. He also told her that this condition could cause difficulty in conceiving and carrying a child to term, but he was optimistic that would not be the case with her.11 At the same time, her physician advised her that many des-exposed daughters do not have difficulty bearing children. The trier of fact could reasonably conclude that when Harrington first learned of her uterine condition it was not causing her any harm, and that she was reasonably justified in not considering it to be a present injury.
The Court errs in defining Harrington’s initial uterine condition as her injury and in defining the infertility as mere "additional consequences” of her "physical abnormality.” Ante at 20. Harrington’s physical abnormality was not, in itself, clearly an injury that would cause her any sort of distress. Only after Harrington discovered that the physical abnormality would indeed prevent her *46from conceiving and carrying a child to term did she know that she had been truly harmed.12
The majority’s approach places plaintiffs like Harrington in an untenable position in much the same way as the majority placed plaintiffs like Moll in an untenable position. The majority would have had Harrington file her action before she learned whether the uterine condition would truly be a problem. If she would have filed an action when she first learned of her uterine condition, before she knew whether the condition would cause infertility or other health problems, her action would probably have been dismissed on a motion for summary disposition. At that juncture, Harrington would not have been able to show how she had been harmed by des. Her own physicians were telling her that they were optimistic that she could have children even with the uterine condition. Harrington would not have been able to identify any harm she was then suffering from the des exposure, nor could she have carried the burden of showing that it was reasonably certain that her DES-related condition would eventually develop into a compensable injury. See Larson.13 A reason*47able trier of fact could conclude that Harrington acted with reasonable diligence in waiting until 1986 to conclude that she had suffered an injury.
iii
The majority also errs in holding that a circuit judge should decide, on a motion for summary judgment, whether Moll and Harrington exercised due diligence in discovering the nature and extent of their injuries. The majority states that a circuit judge "does not have to remain idle in the presence of undisputed, uncontroverted facts” where "the only question remaining is what legal conclusion can be drawn from the facts.” Ante at 27-28.
It is well settled as a matter of both Michigan and federal civil procedure that it is for the trier of fact, generally the jury, to decide where reasonable persons can draw different inferences from undisputed facts. In DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32, 54; 398 NW2d 896 (1986), this Court said, "where there is no material factual dispute, a motion for summary disposition (as well as directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict) should not be granted if the facts can support conflicting inferences.” See also Windsor Securities, Inc v Hartford Life Ins Co, 986 F2d 655, *48659 (CA 3, 1993) ("Summary judgment may not be granted, however, where there is disagreement over the inferences that can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed”); Webb v Allstate Life Ins Co, 536 F2d 336, 339 (CA 10, 1976) ("Where different ultimate inferences may properly be drawn, the case is not one for summary judgment”).
The undisputed facts in both Moll and Harrington are subject to conflicting inferences. Reasonable minds could differ concerning when Harrington knew or should have known that she sustained a compensable injury: was the key event the discovery of the misshaped uterus or the discovery that the consequence of that uterine condition would be infertility? Reasonable minds could also differ whether Moll acted with due diligence in pursuing the des exposure issue. The answers to the questions posed by these factual situations are far from clear. Thus, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in neither, and both Moll and Harrington are entitled to a determination by the constitutionally ordained trier of fact, a jury.
In a closely related discovery case, also involving a claim for DES-caused injuries and in which there was "no dispute between the parties as to the essential evidentiary facts, but only as to the ultimate conclusion to be drawn from those facts,” the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the resolution of the question "whether, under all the circumstances, [the plaintiff] reasonably should have discovered the cause prior to” the running of the statute of limitations "requires a determination of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s conduct,” and therefore did "not lend itself to determination as a matter of *49law.” Errichiello v Eli Lilly & Co, 618 F Supp 484, 487 (D Mass, 1985) (emphasis added).14
IV
Neither of the primary justifications for applying the statute of limitations — the barring of stale claims and providing the defendant reasonable notice of potential claims — is served by closing the courthouse door to Moll and Harrington and their des sisters.
As the Rhode Island Supreme Court observed, allowing plaintiffs such as Moll and Harrington to bring des claims long after their mothers ingested the drug does not unfairly " 'force an unfresh claim against a party who is left to shield himself from liability with nothing more than tattered or faded memories, misplaced or discarded records, and missing or deceased witnesses.’ ” Anthony v Abbott Laboratories, 490 A2d 43, 47 (RI, 1985). Rather, in des cases:
''Most of the evidence necessary to prove or *50defend against liability is likely to be documentary in nature. It is not the kind of evidence that is lost or becomes unreliable as time passes. Companies generally compile and maintain research records that document the extent of their knowledge of the harmful propensities of their drugs. Certainly, doctors and hospitals meticulously maintain and store records of patient treatments.” [Id. Citations omitted.]
See also Raymond v Eli Lilly & Co, 117 NH 164, 174; 371 A2d 170 (1977) (noting that extending the statute of limitations against drug companies is equitable, inter alia, because "unlike the situation in most cases, the passage of time in a drug case is likely to increase both the amount and the accuracy of the evidence”). Indeed, "because this product [des] usually affects a different generation from that which received the product, plaintiffs and not defendants would be most prejudiced by faded memories, misplaced records, or deceased witnesses.” Anthony, 490 A2d 47. Thus, the claims in the instant cases are hardly "stale,” and the passage of time has not deprived the pharmaceutical companies of relevant evidence that would support a defense.
Allowing Moll and Harrington to proceed would not force the pharmaceutical companies to defend against wholly unexpected claims. Indeed, since well before the landmark case of Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal 3d 588; 163 Cal Rptr 132; 607 P2d 924 (1980) (approving the market-share basis of liability for des manufacturers), the pharmaceutical companies who manufactured des have had actual notice that potentially thousands of so-called "des daughters” would have possible causes of action.
The hundreds of reported des cases against these *51pharmaceutical companies suggest that in all likelihood they have legal counsel well experienced in litigating des suits. Against this dense background of des litigation, the majority’s concern about " 'put[ting Lilly and Abbott] on notice’ ” that they may face additional des claims rings hollow. Ante at 23, n 27.
I would remand the cases for trial.

 Between 1947 and 1971 several million daughters were bom to women who took des during their pregnancies to prevent miscarriage. Subsequent research linked des to cancerous and precancerous vaginal tract abnormalities, as well as problems related to pregnancy, in those prenatally DES-exposed daughters. Any woman exposed to des in útero may, in varying degree, experience some, or all, or none, of these anomalies. Market share liability: An answer to the DES causation problem, 94 Harv L R 668 (198Í).

 I agree with my dissenting colleague that the majority needlessly opens an area of possible confusion in focusing on the asserted difference between "possible cause of action” and "likely cause of action.” The majority acknowledges that other courts — including the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in a decision cited by the majority as support for the " 'possible cause of action’ standard”— have had difficulty distinguishing between the two standards. See ante at 25, n 29.

 Ante at 35.

 See Renfroe v Eli Lily & Co, 541 F Supp 805 (ED Mo, 1982); Raymond v Eli Lily & Co, 412 F Supp 1392 (D NH, 1976), aff’d 556 F2d 628 (CA 1, 1977).

 The majority’s approach requires that a woman who might possibly have a claim commence an action although there has not been a deñnitive diagnosis. That approach might give rise to litigation that may appear to be groundless although, in the fullness of time, after entry of summary disposition and possible assessment of costs against her, it may appear that the woman had a meritorious cause of action.

 Each of the parties has included only the portions of the depositions that they rely on.

 In a similar case, the court rejected Lilly’s claims that where the plaintiff’s doctors had speculated about a potential link between the plaintiff’s health problems and des exposure, she had sufficient notice of a cause of action to commence the running of the statute of limitations. Renfroe v Eli Lilly & Co, n 4, supra. Renfroe’s doctor testified that he discussed with her "the possible association of her cervical cancer with her mother’s ingestion of Stilbestrol or des during her pregnancy . . . .” Id. at 811. The court refused to grant summary disposition on the basis of the doctor’s statements because it was not "absolutely clear that plaintiff was sufficiently apprised of a definite link between her des exposure and her cancer” by those statements. Id.

 The Ohio court struck down the statute because it violated the Ohio Constitution’s guarantee of a remedy for every injury. The Ohio court had previously construed its constitution as requiring a meaningful remedy. While Burgess technically involved the application of a unique provision of Ohio constitutional law, it more fundamentally involves a determination by the Ohio court that a rule of law commencing the running of the statute of limitations on a DES-related claim when a plaintiff has only limited and speculative knowledge concerning the nature of her possible claim unfairly deprives many DES-exposed women of a meaningful remedy for their injuries.

 The other tests were a hysteroscopy, a laparoscopy, and a hydro-perfusion of her tubes, all of which were done — with inconclusive results — in early January, 1984.

 The record describes the miscarriage as occurring in March, 1984, and in April, 1984.

 The majority errs in stating that "[t]he full extent of Judith Harrington’s injury and subsequent damage related to her physical abnormality (i.e., her infertility) was fully detectable at the time of initial discovery of her injury [i.e., her uterine condition].” Ante at 19.

 See Harper v Eli Lilly & Co, 575 F Supp 1359, 1362 (ND Ohio, 1983). In that des case, the court noted that "many courts, when faced with the task of identifying a specific date of manifestation of injury, have adopted dates more closely identified with discovery of significant injury or causation.” (Emphasis added.)

 Treating Harrington’s infertility rather than her uterine condition as the relevant injury (the discovery of which triggered the discovery rule) is fully consistent with this Court’s recent discovery rule decision in Larson, supra at 304-305: a plaintiff in an asbestos-based harm case who develops cancer may commence an action within three years of when the cancer was or should have been discovered, notwithstanding that he may have developed asbestosis long before the three-year limitation period. The Court observed that the plaintiffs in the asbestos cases "were exposed to asbestos long before they suffered any measurable [cancer-related] harm from the exposure,” id. at 311, and nevertheless held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run with respect to their cancer claims until the plaintiffs suffered measurable, cancer-related harm.
*47In this case, the injury was not measurable — did not truly exist— until Harrington discovered her infertility. Thus, under the Larson rationale, the statute of limitations on Harrington’s claim did not begin to run until then.
The majority narrowly construes Larson as being "premised ... on the independence” of the two different harms: asbestosis and cancer. Ante at 19. The Court then distinguishes this case from Larson on the basis of the assertion that Harrington’s infertility is not distinct from her uterine condition. The majority overlooks that the independence of the harms in Larson was important precisely because it demonstrated that when the first harm appeared, the second harm was not measurable (i.e., asbestosis was not a clear precursor to cancer). Similarly, in this case, when the uterine condition appeared, there was literally no measurable harm.

 See also Raymond v Eli Lilly & Co, n 4, supra at 1401. The court first noted that the issue of a plaintiff’s due diligence is usually a "determination of fact left ... for the jury . . . .” Lilly argued that the plaintiff should have known of the link between its product and her vision problem on the basis of some fairly vague and contradictory remarks by her ophthalmologist and her other doctors. In particular, the ophthalmologist told the plaintiff that he was taking her off the birth control pill "just as a precautionary measure,” and other doctors told the plaintiff that they were not sure" whether Lilly’s product had caused the plaintiff’s eye condition. The Court concluded that these statements by the plaintiff’s doctors were "insufficient to warn plaintiff that there was a correlation between the drug and her vision problems.” Id.
Similarly, in Harrington’s case, the mixed messages she received from her doctors about the extent and consequences of her uterine condition were insufficient to put her on notice of her injury so as to preclude her claim as a matter of law. And, in Moll’s case, her physician’s suggestion that she should check her mother’s records because des was a possible cause of her condition was not sufficient to provide Moll notice of her possible claim against the drug manufacturers so as to preclude her claim as a matter of law.