Court Opinion

ID: 9539245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:00:50.621048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:55.081142
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-2739
                         ___________________________

                              United States of America

                         lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                            v.

                                      Clark Gray

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                       ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                   ____________

                             Submitted: April 10, 2023
                              Filed: August 7, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before GRUENDER, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                       ____________

PER CURIAM.

       Clark Gray pleaded guilty to one count of transportation of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1). Gray faced a statutory mandatory minimum
sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), which was also
his advisory sentence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).
The district court1 varied upward and sentenced Gray to 228 months’ imprisonment.

       Gray argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to
adequately explain the upward variance and by failing to consider all relevant
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gray did not object to the adequacy
of the district court’s explanation or its consideration of the sentencing factors, and
thus we review only for plain error. See United States v. Shoulders, 988 F.3d 1061,
1063 (8th Cir. 2021) (standard of review).

       Although brief, the court’s explanation satisfies us that it had “considered the
parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The
court considered both Gray’s request for a 180-month sentence and the government’s
position that a 240-month sentence should be imposed. Defense counsel ably set
forth the circumstances regarding Gray’s biological mother’s mental illness and
Gray’s placement into foster care, as well as his childhood physical and mental health
issues. Counsel explained that Gray had been adopted into a caring home, but that,
even as an adult, his intellectual disabilities and his ongoing health issues prevented
him from living independently. The government countered that Gray’s sexual-abuse
crimes against children and his lengthy criminal history demonstrate that he is unable
to conform with the law and that he constitutes a danger to the community. After
stating that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, the district court agreed that an
upward variance was justified, although not to the extent the government requested.
The court recognized Gray’s “terrible upbringing and youth,” as well as his “serious
emotional problems,” but decided that a 228-month sentence was necessary “to
protect the public from further crimes by the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C).

      1
       The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

                                         -2-
The district court thus committed no plain procedural error in imposing Gray’s
sentence.

       Gray also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, which we
review for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
Gray argues that the district court gave too much weight to the need to protect the
public because the Guidelines sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment adequately
accounted for that factor, which thus could not justify a 48-month variance,
particularly in light of Gray’s disabilities. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d
455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (district court abuses its discretion when it
commits a clear error of judgment in weighing sentencing factors). We find no clear
error of judgment in the district court’s decision to accord substantial weight to the
need to protect the public, however, because the record establishes that (with respect
to his instant offense) Gray’s cell phone contained numerous images and videos of
child pornography, that Gray previously had been convicted of offenses related to
child sexual abuse, and that he was generally unable or unwilling to conform to the
law. See United States v. Brown, 992 F.3d 665, 673 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[Defendant’s]
assertion of substantive unreasonableness amounts to nothing more than a
disagreement with how the district court chose to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in
fashioning his sentence.”); United States v. King, 898 F.3d 797, 810 (8th Cir. 2018)
(“The district court’s decision not to weigh mitigating factors as heavily as [the
defendant] would have preferred does not justify reversal.” (cleaned up)). Gray’s
sentence is thus not substantively unreasonable.

      The judgment is affirmed.
                     ______________________________

                                         -3-