Court Opinion

ID: 9884456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:57:49.241245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:38.498925
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Davis, dissenting: I dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case and believe that the objectors’ land was detached from the Buda Community High School District No. 506, on October 26, 1953, by the order of the county board of school trustees of Stark County. “The rule of law is, that where any official body or tribunal, such as a city council, is given authority to hear and determine any question, its determination is, in effect, a judgment having all the properties of a judgment pronounced by a legally created court of limited jurisdiction.” (People v. Ellis, 253 Ill. 369, 374.) Section 4B—5 of the School Code provides that the decision of the county board of school trustees shall be deemed, “ ‘an administrative decision,’ as defined in section 1 of the ‘Administrative Review Act.’” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap. 122, par. 4B—5; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap, 110, par. 264.) A valid administrative judgment has the same force and finality as a judicial judgment. People v. Ellis, 253 Ill. 369. It was the order of the administrative agency, rather than that of the court on review which operated to detach the territory in question. This court has consistently held that the location and alteration of school district boundaries are not judicial, but rather are legislative or ministerial functions. (People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusker, 411 Ill. 535; Board of Education of Waverly Community Unit School Dist. v. Nickell, 410 Ill. 98.) The county board of school trustees was performing a legislative or ministerial function in detaching the territory from the school district. The courts in reviewing this action were performing a judicial function subject to the provisions of the Administrative Review Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap, 110, pars. 264-279, incl.; People ex rel. Dolan v. Dusker, 411 Ill. 535, 540. The power of a school district to levy taxes is limited to property within its boundaries at the time of the levy, and any attempt to levy a tax on property detached from the district is illegal. (People v. Long, 328 Ill. 297, 305.) If section 4B—5 is to be construed to permit the levy of taxes on the detached property, it violates the provisions of section 9 of article IX of the Illinois constitution. A statute should, if possible, be given a construction consistent with its constitutionality. It is true that section 4B—5 provides that “the commencement of any action for review shall operate as a supersedeas, and no further proceedings shall be had until final disposition of such review.” A supersedeas terminates the authority of the subordinate court or administrative body to take any action in the proceeding in which the judgment or order was entered; it operates against the enforcement of a judgment and not against the judgment itself. It does not vacate or suspend the judgment and place the parties in a position of status quo prior to the judgment or order. Its purpose is accomplished by leaving the judgment in full force and staying all future proceedings to enforce the judgment. (Gumberts v. East Oak Street Hotel Co. 404 Ill. 386, 389; People v. Thompson, 316 Ill. 11, 15; 3 Am. Jur., Appeal and Error, par. 543.) Thus, this statutory provision leaves the order of the county board of school trustees in full force and effect, and preserves the status quo as it existed after, not before, the entry of this order, but no further proceedings should be had under the order pending the termination of the appeal. The majority opinion renders the order of the county board of school trustees a nullity upon the commencement of any action for its review, and grounds such result on section 4B — 5. Under this decision, the order which is the basis of the jurisdiction of the reviewing court becomes a nullity, ipse dixit, by legislative enactment, upon the commencement of action for its review. Yet this proceeding, restored to the status quo as it existed prior to the entry of final order, is reviewed under the Administrative Review Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, chap, 110, pars. 264-279.) Under article 4B — 4 of the School Code the Administrative Review Act and prior decisions of this court, a supersedeas, contrary to the concept of the majority, cannot maintain the status quo prior to the entry of an order or judgment. Article 4B of the School Code is entitled “Creation of new districts and change of boundaries of existing districts.” It makes no reference and has no relation to the levy and collection of taxes. I have considered article 4B of the School Code and particularly sections 4B—4 and 4B—5 in their entirety; and I believe that the legislature by the enactment of the foregoing clause of section 4B—5 had reference to further annexation and detachment proceedings which are the subject matter of article 4, rather than to tax proceedings which are not mentioned or referred to therein. I would sustain the tax objections and reverse the county court.