Court Opinion

ID: 9882523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:11:06.468188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:23.892324
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Estate of Pursell v. Pursell, 2023-Ohio-2531.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                ALLEN COUNTY

IN RE: THE ESTATE OF:
PAUL R. PURSELL, SR., ET AL.,

        PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,                                   CASE NO. 1-23-04
        -and-

CHRISTY T. PURSELL, ET AL.,

        PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

        v.                                                      OPINION

PAUL R. PURSELL, JR.,

         DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

                   Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
                                  Probate Division
                           Trial Court No. 2020 ES 276(A)

                                       Judgment Affirmed

                               Date of Decision: July 24, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Jonathan D. Balcerzak and John P. Lewandowski for Appellants

        Melissa R. Sherrick for Appellee
Case No. 1-23-04

WALDICK, J.

          {¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants Paula Ann Augsburger, Christy T. Pursell, and

Opal L. Wright (“Appellants’)1, bring this appeal from the December 30, 2022,

judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court, Probate Division, dismissing

their complaint after awarding summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Paul R.

Pursell, Jr. (“Appellee”). On appeal, Appellants contend that the trial court erred by

determining that no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to whether

the parties’ father, Paul Pursell, Sr. (“Decedent”), lacked testamentary capacity

when he executed a will in 2014, and that the trial court erred by determining that

no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to whether Decedent was

unduly influenced by Appellee in executing the 2014 will. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                           Background

          {¶2} Appellants and the Appellee are all children of Decedent. Decedent

retired from Ford and his wife of nearly fifty years managed farmland that was in

her name until her death in October 2013.2 Decedent was the executor of his wife’s

estate.

1
  Appellant Paula is now deceased and she provided no evidence in this case. She was estranged from
Decedent long before the will at issue was drafted. Where we refer generally to “Appellants” providing
evidence or testimony herein, we are referring to Appellants Christy and Opal.
2
  Decedent’s wife was the mother of Appellants Christy and Opal, but not Appellant Paula.

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Case No. 1-23-04

        {¶3} In November of 2013, approximately three weeks after his wife died,

Decedent met with a UAW Legal Services Plan attorney (“UAW attorney”) to

prepare a new will; however, he ultimately decided to take time to grieve before

having the new will prepared. Decedent resumed his interactions with a UAW

attorney in early 2014, discussing the drafting of his new will.

        {¶4} As part of his new will, Decedent wanted all of his personal property

and the residue of his estate to go to Appellee, if Appellee survived Decedent. If

Appellee did not survive Decedent, then Decedent wanted everything to go to

Appellant Christy Pursell. Decedent told the UAW attorneys, inter alia, that he

wanted to leave everything to Appellee because Appellants had plenty of money

and jobs and Appellee did not.3 Further, Decedent indicated that he had provided

for the Appellants during his life, with the exception of Paula. Based on Decedent’s

wishes, the UAW attorneys drafted the will and set a signing date.

        {¶5} On September 9, 2014, Appellee drove Decedent to Decedent’s

appointment for the will signing. Appellee was forced to wait outside while the

UAW attorney met with Decedent and confirmed all the information in the will.

Decedent ultimately executed the will in front of the UAW attorney and another

witness.

3
 Again, this excludes Appellant Paula, as Decedent had no relationship with her and she was excluded from
his prior will.

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Case No. 1-23-04

       {¶6} Several years passed in which there were varying degrees of family

strife. At one point, Decedent banned Appellants from his property, though that did

not last for the rest of Decedent’s life. One of Decedent’s friends also averred that

while Decedent had a good relationship with Appellee for years, that relationship

was strained toward the end of Decedent’s life.

       {¶7} Decedent died on June 9, 2020. Following his passing, Appellants

learned of the will and filed a complaint challenging its legitimacy. Appellants

alleged that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to make a valid will in 2014,

and that, in any event, Decedent was unduly influenced by Appellee.

       {¶8} Appellee filed an answer denying the allegations and the case

proceeded through discovery. Depositions were taken of Appellants Christy and

Opal, as well as the Appellee.

       {¶9} On October 26, 2021, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment

contending that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Appellee was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellee supported his motion with copies

of the deposition transcripts and, inter alia, the affidavit of the UAW attorney who

met with Decedent on September 9, 2014. The attorney averred that Appellee was

not present in the room when the will was executed, that it was her standard practice

to determine that the testator was of sound mind and memory, and that it was her

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Case No. 1-23-04

standard practice to determine that the testator was signing willingly and not under

any restraint.

       {¶10} Appellants filed a memorandum in response, arguing, inter alia, that

Decedent struggled with some of his own financial affairs after his wife died and

that he had the assistance of an attorney when he was administering his wife’s estate,

showing a possible lack of testamentary capacity. Further, Appellants alleged that

numerous incidents in the years after the will was signed established that Appellee

was taking advantage of Decedent, and, separately, that Appellee told Decedent lies

about the Appellants. According to the Appellants, this had to be the reason that

Decedent removed them from his will.

       {¶11} Appellee filed a reply in support of his motion for summary judgment,

adding the notes from the meetings the UAW attorneys had with Decedent. The

notes indicated that UAW attorneys confirmed with Decedent on multiple occasions

that he specifically did not want to leave anything to the Appellants. (Doc. No. 58,

Ex. A).

       {¶12} On December 30, 2022, the trial court filed a lengthy judgment entry

analyzing the issues raised by the Appellants. The trial court determined that there

was no actual evidence that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity on September

9, 2014, when he executed the will in question, and, in fact, the only evidence

supported a finding that Decedent was of sound mind at that time. Further, the trial

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Case No. 1-23-04

court determined that there was no evidence beyond the speculations of Appellants

that Decedent was unduly influenced. Based on its conclusions, the trial court

granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Appellants’

complaint. It is from this judgment that the Appellants’ appeal, asserting the

following assignments of error for our review.

                            First Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court erred in finding that no genuine issue of material
       fact exists as to whether the Decedent was unduly influenced by
       the Defendant.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court erred in finding that no genuine issue of material
       fact exists as to whether Decedent held testamentary capacity
       when he executed the 2014 Will.

       {¶13} For ease of discussion, we will review the assignments of error out of

the order in which they were raised.

                            Second Assignment of Error

       {¶14} In their second assignment of error, Appellants argue that the trial

court erred by determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether Decedent lacked testamentary capacity when he executed the 2014 will.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶15} We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Doe v.

Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390 (2000). “De novo review is independent and without

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Case No. 1-23-04

deference to the trial court’s determination.” ISHA, Inc. v. Risser, 3d Dist. Allen No.

1-12-47, 2013-Ohio-2149, ¶ 25.

       {¶16} Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of

material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and

reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor

of the non-moving party, and the conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party.

Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Whittaker v. Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office, 164 Ohio

St.3d 151, 2021-Ohio-1241, ¶ 8. Material facts are those facts “‘that might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d

337, 340 (1993), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106

S.Ct. 2505 (1986). “Whether a genuine issue exists is answered by the following

inquiry: [d]oes the evidence present ‘a sufficient disagreement to require submission

to a jury’ or is it ‘so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law[?]’” Id.

quoting Anderson at 251-252.

       {¶17} “The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of

producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material

fact.” Carnes v. Siferd, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-88, 2011-Ohio-4467, ¶ 13, citing

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 282 (1996). “In doing so, the moving party is

not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those portions

of the record which affirmatively support his argument.” Id., citing Dresher at 292.

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Case No. 1-23-04

“The nonmoving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of

a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings.” Id. citing Dresher at 292.

                                 Relevant Authority

       {¶18} Revised Code 2107.74 creates a presumption of the validity of a will

admitted to probate. Included in this presumption is that the testator was of sound

mind and possessed testamentary capacity to execute the will. Zimpfer v. Roach, 3d

Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-03, 2017-Ohio-8437, ¶ 58.

       {¶19} However, an otherwise valid will may be invalidated if the party

contesting the will can establish that the testator lacked testamentary capacity at the

time the will was executed. Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145 (1917), paragraph

four of the syllabus. Evidence of the testator’s mental and physical condition, both

at the time the will is executed and within a reasonable time before and after its

execution, is admissible as casting light on testamentary capacity. Kennedy v.

Walcutt, 118 Ohio St. 442 (1928), paragraph two of the syllabus, overruled on other

grounds, Krishbaum v. Dillon, 58 Ohio St.3d 58 (1991).

       {¶20} Testamentary capacity exists when the testator has sufficient mind and

memory to: 1) understand the nature of the business in which the testator is engaged;

2) comprehend generally the nature and extent of the testator’s property; 3) hold in

the testator’s mind the names and identities of those who have natural claims upon

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Case No. 1-23-04

his bounty; and 4) appreciate the testator’s relation to members of his family.

Niemes, supra.

                                      Analysis

       {¶21} At the outset, we emphasize that a presumption was created in this

matter that the will was valid and that Decedent had the requisite testamentary

capacity to execute the will once the will was admitted to probate. See R.C. 2107.74;

Zimpfer, supra, at ¶ 58. In Appellants’ attempt to rebut the presumption, Appellants

point to statements in the record indicating that Decedent was deeply distraught by

his wife’s death, that he was in a “steady cognitive decline” before and after he

executed the 2014 will as exhibited by Decedent often writing notes to himself, and

that Decedent needed assistance with his bills and finances after his wife died.

       {¶22} Importantly, however, both before, during, and after the execution of

the 2014 will, there was never any challenge to Decedent’s competency. In fact,

Appellant Opal testified that up until his death, Decedent was “healthy as a horse.”

(Opal Wright Depo. at 7). Further, it is undisputed that Decedent was executor of

his wife’s estate, and that Decedent managed the farm business after his wife died,

securing better pricing for renting the farmland.

       {¶23} Notwithstanding these points, focusing strictly on the time the will

was executed, and a reasonable time before and after, the only evidence in the record

supports Decedent having testamentary capacity in this matter. Decedent met with

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Case No. 1-23-04

a UAW attorney shortly after his wife’s death about updating his will, but

specifically indicated he wanted more time to grieve before he did so.

       {¶24} Then, months later, Decedent met with a UAW attorney again about

altering his will. At that time, according to the notes of the UAW attorney, Decedent

discussed numerous matters with the UAW attorney including his children, his

assets, his land, his vehicles, his bank accounts, and who he wanted to be his

executor. Decedent informed the UAW attorney that he wanted Appellee to be his

executor, unless Appellee predeceased him, and he wanted all his property and the

residue of his estate to go to Appellee. Decedent specifically stated he did not want

to give anything to Appellant Opal because she and her husband owned farms and

had numerous homes, and he stated that they did not need anything more. As to

Christy, Decedent said she had plenty of money and a job so she did not need

anything. Decedent had no relationship with Appellant Paula, and did not want

anything to go to her. This conversation, which occurred when Appellee was not

present, establishes that Decedent was aware of his assets and his heirs.

       {¶25} In the months following this meeting, the will was drafted, and after

some delay, a signing was scheduled for September 9, 2014. Prior to the will being

signed, another UAW attorney took over the case. She spoke with Decedent the day

before the scheduled will signing, specifically asking him about his decision to

disinherit his daughters. Decedent reaffirmed his commitment to disinherit his

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Case No. 1-23-04

daughters, stating that he was doing it because of things that they had done, and

because Christy had been taken care of “material wise.” Decedent thus again

demonstrated a knowledge of his heirs and his assets prior to executing the will.

       {¶26} As to the day of the execution of the will itself, Appellee drove

Decedent to the will-signing appointment on September 9, 2014. Appellee indicated

that his father was in good health on the day of the signing. He testified that he

dropped Decedent off at the office and then went to Kewpee, a local hamburger

shop. The UAW attorney confirmed that Appellee was not present when the will

was signed, and she averred as follows with regard to the signing itself.

       7. The practice of our office was that those witnessing a will
       execution were to confirm the identity and age of the
       testator/testatrix; confirm that the testator/testatrix had read it,
       understood it, and was of sound mind and memory, and that the
       testator/testatrix was signing the Last Will & Testament willingly
       and not under restraint.

       8. If a client arrived with another person for a signing
       appointment, I had a standard practice while at the UAW Legal
       Services Plan of not permitting the other person in the room while
       the testator/testatrix executed a Last Will & Testament.

       9. I saw Paul R. Pur[s]ell, Sr. sign the subject Last Will and
       Testament of Paul R. Pur[s]ell, Sr. on September 9, 2014 as did
       the other witness, Rosemary Perez.

       {¶27} Given the UAW attorney’s uncontested evaluation of Decedent on the

date of the will signing, all of the evidence in the record points to Decedent having

testamentary capacity both before the execution of the will and during the execution

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Case No. 1-23-04

of the will. Thus the only question remaining is whether Appellants presented any

evidence that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity within a reasonable time after

the execution of the will, and there is no evidence specifically indicating that

Decedent had any cognitive issues that impacted his ability to execute the 2014 will.

       {¶28} In sum, the Appellants’ allegations that Decedent was sometimes

forgetful do not undermine Decedent’s testamentary capacity on or around

September 9, 2014 as attested to by the UAW attorney. See Zimpfer v. Roach, 3d

Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-03, 2017-Ohio-8437, ¶ 70 (where the only evidence in the

record was an affidavit indicating that decedent was competent when the will was

signed, summary judgment is proper, particularly given the presumption of

validity). After reviewing all the evidence, the trial court found that the Appellants

had produced no actual evidence that Decedent lacked testamentary capacity in

executing the will in question. In our own de novo review, we agree with the trial

court. Therefore, Appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶29} In their first assignment of error, Appellants argue that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether Decedent executed his will under undue

influence of the Appellee.

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Case No. 1-23-04

                                          Relevant Authority4

           {¶30} Undue influence occurs when the wishes and judgment of the

transferor are substituted by the wishes and judgment of another. Thomas v.

Delgado, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-22-06, 2022-Ohio-4235, ¶ 26. To prove undue

influence, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the

testator was susceptible to undue influence, (2) another person had an opportunity

to exert influence over the susceptible testator, (3) improper influence was exerted

or attempted and (4) a result showing the effect of such influence.” Id. We note that

undue influence need not be shown by direct proof, but can be inferred from the

circumstances. Id. citing Calloway v. Roy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 77AP-301, 1997

WL 200400, * 3.

                                                  Analysis

           {¶31} Appellants contend that they presented evidence that should have

defeated summary judgment on the issue of undue influence. Further, Appellants

actually argue that a presumption of undue influence should have been applied in

this case because Appellee had a fiduciary relationship with Decedent when he was

granted a Power of Attorney (“POA”) when the will was executed. See Thomas v.

Delgado, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-22-06, 2022-Ohio-4235, ¶ 26.

4
    The same standard of review used previously is applicable here.

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Case No. 1-23-04

           {¶32} At the outset, we disagree with Appellants’ assertion that under

Thomas a presumption of undue influence should be applied here because Appellee

was granted POA of Decedent. Thomas is readily distinguishable because in this

case, the POA was not granted to Appellee until the will was executed. Thus

Appellee could not have abused a fiduciary relationship that he did not yet have in

order to induce Decedent to execute the 2014 will.5 Moreover, we have no

knowledge of what the POA entailed or if it was ever even used. Finally, Thomas

also specifically involved a claim of intentional interference with the expectancy of

an inheritance, which is not a claim alleged in this case. Thus a presumption of

undue influence will not be applied here.

           {¶33} With the determination made that a presumption of undue influence

should not be applied here, we will review the evidence submitted by the Appellants

and their arguments with regard to undue influence. Appellants first contend that

Decedent was susceptible to undue influence because Decedent was taken to his

initial meeting with the UAW attorney to discuss his will by Appellee

approximately three weeks after Decedent’s wife died, when Decedent was still

grieving. Appellants argue that Decedent’s wife handled all aspects of the couple’s

daily life, including finances, to such an extent that Decedent could not even write

a check.

5
    According to the affidavit of Tom Bradshaw, Decedent terminated Appellee’s POA at some unknown date.

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Case No. 1-23-04

       {¶34} Although Appellants suggest that Decedent’s grief made him

susceptible to undue influence, there is no evidence of that in the record. In fact,

Decedent delayed making his new will specifically so he could take time to grieve.

In addition, the record establishes that while Appellee drove Decedent to his

meetings with the UAW attorney, Appellee was not involved with the discussions

regarding the will.

       {¶35} As to Appellants’ claims that Decedent was susceptible to undue

influence because his wife handled the couple’s finances, Decedent was able to

manage his wife’s estate. In addition, Decedent took over management of the

farmland and secured better pricing than his wife had. The actual evidence regarding

Decedent’s ability to manage his affairs does not point to susceptibility.

       {¶36} Next, Appellants argue that Decedent was susceptible to undue

influence as illustrated by Appellee “misusing” Decedent’s money. Appellants

argue that this showed that Decedent was susceptible to manipulation.

       {¶37} Notably, there is some evidence to support Appellants’ claims that

Appellee used Decedent’s money through the affidavits of Bob Rieman and Tom

Bradshaw. Both individuals, friends of Decedent, indicated that Decedent showed

them bank account statements wherein Appellee was withdrawing over $800 per

month from a bank account for a personal loan, separate from Appellee’s regular

expenses. While this evidence could be troubling if certain other facts were present,

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Case No. 1-23-04

it is important to emphasize that Appellee had a joint bank account with his parents

even while his mother was still alive. The evidence indicated Decedent and his wife

paid for many of Appellee’s expenses, and according to the UAW attorney’s notes,

Decedent was clearly concerned with Appellee’s ability to provide for himself—a

concern he did not have for Appellants Opal or Christy. Moreover, Appellee also

testified in his deposition that he contributed money to the joint account while he

was working.

       {¶38} Furthermore, there is no time frame indicating when Appellee’s

purported withdrawals were made from the joint bank account, which could have

been long after the will was executed and irrelevant to the question of undue

influence at the time the will was executed. Thus we have no evidence that the

money was actually misused, or when it was used it all. But, even assuming

Appellee did misuse some funds, there is no evidence that when he did he was

exerting undue influence in the execution of the will. Young v. Bellamy, 5th Dist.

Delaware No. 16CAF110051, 2017-Ohio-2994, ¶ 19 (stating undue influence must

be present at the time of the execution of the will resulting in dispositions which the

testator would not otherwise have made.) The actions of Appellee after the

execution of the will are simply not relevant to a determination of undue influence.

       {¶39} Appellants next argue that Appellee had the opportunity to influence

Decedent and that he did, in fact, exert his influence to get Decedent to change his

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Case No. 1-23-04

will so that he was the only beneficiary. Appellants contend that after Decedent’s

wife died, Decedent needed assistance with his finances and with running errands.

Further, Appellants indicate that Appellee saw Decedent almost daily. In addition,

Appellants assert that Appellee was a liar, who was always making up stories. For

example, Appellant Christy testified that at Decedent’s funeral Appellee told

“unbelievable stories all the time” such as being “attacked by 6 guys dressed like

Ninja’s [sic].” (Christy Pursell Depo at 23). Christy also testified that Appellee told

his niece that he wrestled a bear once, but it had a muzzle on its face. Appellants

also indicated that Appellee fabricated a story that the Appellants were going to put

Decedent in a nursing home.

         {¶40} Again, however, at best it is unclear when these statements were

allegedly made, and some of the statements were definitely made several years after

the 2014 will was executed. Appellants’ assertions that Appellee is a liar and that

he could be manipulative does not establish that he exerted any “undue” influence

on Decedent, particularly when compared to the unequivocal statement of the UAW

attorney who indicated she spoke with Decedent and determined that he was

executing his will freely.6

6
  We note that pursuant to the affidavit of Bob Rieman, presented by Appellants, during the last years of
Decedent’s life, his relationship with Appellee was strained, but the two had been close prior to that. Even
with this purportedly “strained” relationship with Appellee in his later years, Decedent never decided to alter
his will. Decedent’s friend asserted that he had conversations with Decedent toward the end of Decedent’s
life that led him to believe that a new will had been made subsequent to the 2014 will. However, there is no
other evidence of this will. Decedent’s friend implied that Appellee disposed of the will when he gained
access to Decedent’s residence after Decedent passed to look for “important papers.” Notwithstanding this

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Case No. 1-23-04

         {¶41} Importantly, we have already determined that there was no evidence

that Decedent lacked the mental capacity to understand the will he executed in 2014.

That the will may be considered unfair by the Appellants does not directly indicate

that Decedent did it with a lack of understanding or under undue pressure. It is

important to emphasize that influence alone is not enough to establish undue

influence, the influence must be “undue” and induce the testator to act contrary to

his wishes. Fikes v. Estate of Fikes, 5th Dist. Hamilton No. C-210515, 2022-Ohio-

2075, ¶ 9. We simply have no evidence of that here.

         {¶42} Upon reviewing the record, the trial court found that the only evidence

of undue influence was speculation by the Appellants, which was not sufficient to

establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to undue influence. After our

de novo review, we agree with the trial court. Appellants attempt to point to

instances that occurred well after the execution of the 2014 will to show that undue

influence had occurred, but these later assertions and family squabbles do nothing

to alter the analysis. Therefore, Appellants’ first assignment of error is overruled.

point, the “general rule * * * is that declarations of the testator not made contemporaneously with the
execution of the will or so near thereto as to constitute a part of the res gestae are not admissible as substantive
proof of the fact of undue influence.” See West v. Henry, 173 Ohio St. 498, 502.

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Case No. 1-23-04

                                     Conclusion

       {¶43} Having found no error prejudicial to Appellants in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court,

Probate Division, is affirmed.

                                                           Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

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