Court Opinion

ID: 9635320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:47:01.108445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:23.883569
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with Mr. Chief Justice Cappy that the present controversy is best resolved by invocation of the economic loss doctrine, but my reasoning proceeds from a somewhat different viewpoint in terms of the general application of such doctrine.
At the outset, in addressing the issues in this appeal, I believe that it is important to maintain the perspective that the Court is engaged in the evaluation of substantive principles under the common law, and that the nature of this exercise favors adherence to reasoned precedent. This approach reflects that the fashioning of substantive rules in matters involving weighty and competing interests (as to which inquiry must be made into the varying consequences that will attend implementation of the different options) is often best suited to the legislative province.1 It is also signifi*488cant that the General Assembly is aware of our precedents, and obviously, may choose to alter course in substantive affairs subject only to constitutional constraints.
My assessment therefore proceeds from this Court’s longstanding practice of treating liability for negligent misrepresentations on the part of those in the business of providing information as a matter that is separate and apart from, and not subject to, the economic loss doctrine, see, e.g., Renn v. Provident Trust Co., 328 Pa. 481, 482, 196 A. 8, 9-10 (Pa.1938), akin to the scheme set forth in Restatement (Second) Section 552. Accordingly, the central question of concern to me here is whether (and to what extent) persons and entities providing architectural services should be deemed to be in the business of supplying information for such purposes.
In 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass’n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 136 Ill.2d 302, 144 Ill.Dec. 227, 555 N.E.2d 346 (1990), the Illinois Supreme Court found design-related architectural services to be outside the general category of information services for purposes of the relevant exception to the economic loss doctrine. In so holding, the court borrowed from an Eleventh Circuit decision to contextualize the economic loss rule as follows:
“The rule acts as a shorthand means of determining whether a plaintiff is suing for injuries arising from the breach of a contractual duty to produce a product that conforms in terms of quality or performance to the parties^] expectations or whether the plaintiff seeks to recover for injuries resulting from the breach of the duty arising independently of the contract to produce a nonhazardous product that does not pose an unreasonable risk of injury to person or property. The economic loss rule prevents recovery in tort when a defective product has resulted in the loss of the value or use *489of the thing sold, or the' cost of repairing it. Under such circumstances, the duty breached is generally a contractual one and the plaintiff is merely suing for the benefit of his bargain.”
2314 Lincoln, 144 Ill.Dec. 227, 555 N.E.2d at 352 (quoting Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 948 (11th Cir. 1982)); accord Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., The Center Holds: The Continuing Role of the Economic Loss Rule in Construction Litigation, 11-APR Construction Law 3 (1991) (observing that, for purposes of the economic loss doctrine, “an ‘economic loss’ is the loss of an expectancy interest created by contract, often described as the ‘benefit of the bargain’ ”). As concerns design-related architectural services, the Illinois court chose to characterize these as incidental to a tangible end product or object, namely, the construction of a building, as contrasted with information services producing opinions or ideas that do not result in some tangible end product (such as attorney and accountant services). See 2314 Lincoln, 144 Ill.Dec. 227, 555 N.E.2d at 352-53; accord Tolan and Son, Inc. v. KLLM Architects, Inc., 308 Ill.App.3d 18, 241 Ill.Dec. 427, 719 N.E.2d 288, 295 (1999) (explaining that “an architect’s duty generally arises by virtue of a contract specifying the duties necessary to complete the construction of a structure”). Thus, the court was able to categorize claims for negligent misrepresentation arising from design-related architectural services within the general prohibition against non-contractual recovery for economic loss, as opposed to the information-business exception.2
It should be frankly acknowledged that the Illinois approach has its limitations, both in terms of its dependence on charac*490terization to distinguish design-related architectural services from a broader range of services, and its practical implications in an era in which information-based products and services proliferate. See generally Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec. Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 471-72 (Wis.2004) (criticizing the Illinois approach and adopting a bright-line rule that the economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to claims for the negligent provision of services). Having surveyed the many ways in which courts have addressed the competing interests involved, and recognizing that the Illinois position thus suffers from some of the drawbacks associated with common law pronouncements of substantive law, I nonetheless view it as a restrained one that best reconciles with the nature, purposes, and development of the economic loss and negligent misrepresentation doctrines in Pennsylvania, in the absence of legislative intervention.
Therefore, I concur in the Chief Justice’s dissenting position that the Superior Court’s order should be affirmed.

. The substantial, competing policy considerations with which this Court is faced in fashioning Pennsylvania's common law answer to this question are amply developed by the majority on the one hand, and Chief Justice Cappy, on the other. Briefly, foreclosing the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation relative to design professionals will likely increase construction costs by requiring exhaustive design investigation by contractors as a prerequisite to bidding. See Philip L. Bruner and Patrick J. O'connor, Jr., 5 Bruner & O’connor Construction Law § 17:27 (2004). As the Chief Justice emphasizes, however, allowing the tort cause of action to be maintained impairs the ability of design professionals to regulate their own risk via contractual provision. See Dissenting Opinion at-, 866 A.2d at 289 (quoting Ber*488schauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle School Dist. No.1, 124 Wash.2d 816, 881 P.2d 986, 992 (1994)); see also Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 233 Va. 31, 353 S.E.2d 724, 727 (1987) ("Protection against economic losses caused by another's failure to properly perform is but one provision the contractor may require in striking his bargain."). Additionally, further uncertainty results from the difficulty in determining the proper scope of economic injuries subject to redress.

. As Appellee notes, the circumstances presented in Illustration 9 following Section 552 of the Restatement, relied on by the majority, see Majority Opinion at 463-64, 483-84, 866 A.2d at 276, 288, are distinguishable from design-related architectural services, since they do not reflect end-product design, but rather, concern a pre-bid, advisory, engineering report supplying information only. See generally Tolan, 719 N.E.2d at 298 (distinguishing design-related architectural services from circumstances in which an architect or engineer is engaged solely to provide information based upon an evaluation, and the value of the services lies in the analytical work rather than in the tangible end product).