Court Opinion

ID: 9498961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:33:33.476612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:11.512852
License: Public Domain

R. GUY COLE. JR., Circuit Judge
dissenting.
The majority concludes that Radolo-vieh’s performance was constitutionally deficient. With this proposition, I am in complete agreement. However, because I believe that Slaughter was prejudiced by such deficient legal representation, and because I believe Slaughter preserved his federal claim, I respectfully dissent.
I.
At the RCr 11.42 hearing, Slaughter’s post-conviction counsel presented mitigation evidence that was available at the time of trial, but which Radolovich had not uncovered or presented. This included testimony from Slaughter’s mother, brothers, grandparents, and a friend, as well as testimony from a social worker, medical doctor, and educational specialist. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, the evidence presented at the hearing is not only overwhelming, but is substantively more comprehensive than (and in many instances conflicts with) that presented during Slaughter’s penalty phase. See Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339, 1346 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present evidence that, although cumulative to some degree, “would have contradicted directly” negative testimony). This evidence is so substantial, in fact, that the trial court described it as “impressive,” and stated that the court had “never been presented at trial with such an accumulation of ‘mitigating’ evidence during a penalty phase.” Had this evidence been presented during the penalty phase, there is certainly “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A. Family
Slaughter testified on his own behalf during the penalty phase. Although Rado-lovich prepared Slaughter to testify during the guilt phase, he did not prepare Slaughter for the all-important penalty phase. Regarding penalty-phase preparation, Ra-dolovich testified that “[tjhere was none to that .... Our whole thrust was on the guilt phase.” During the penalty phase, Slaughter took the stand. On direct examination, Slaughter testified that he ran away from home when he was twelve-years old, that he dropped out of school in the seventh grade, and that he was on drugs at the time of the offense. Slaughter testified that he was not then providing financial support for his three-year old son. Furthermore, Slaughter testified that he had been involved in an incident in which his companions shot a man in a car. Slaughter testified that he did not do anything upon realizing the man had been shot.
Although Radolovich elicited some testimony that could fairly be described as mitigating, it was minimal. Slaughter testified that he was twenty years old, that his parents separated when he was three years old, that his father was killed in 1972, that his mother beat him with extension cords, that he ran away from home when he was twelve, that his mother died *243of cancer in 1980, that he had a young child, and that he was sorry about the victim’s death. Slaughter also described his activities in prison, including his jobs in the prison hospital and the janitorial division. Radolovich did not present mitigating evidence from any other witness. He introduced no documents chronicling Slaughter’s childhood, nor his school or medical history.
Had Radolovich properly investigated Slaughter’s background, he would have been able to present the testimony of Slaughter’s mother, Mary Moon, who was not deceased; Slaughter’s two younger brothers, Bobby and Vincent Moon; and Slaughter’s maternal grandparents, Clara and Charles Leonard. The jury would have learned that Slaughter had an exceptionally difficult childhood. Mary Moon, Slaughter’s mother, testified that she gave birth to Slaughter when she was only fifteen-years old, and that Slaughter’s biological father abandoned him after spending only a month with Slaughter. The jury also would have learned that Slaughter’s father was a thief, who provided no financial support for his son.
Thomas Moon, Mary’s husband and the father of Slaughter’s brothers, lived with the family for seven years, although he did not provide any support for the children. Mary testified that Thomas was an abusive alcoholic; she testified that due to fighting, there were police at their home every weekend. When Slaughter was eight years old, Thomas threatened to kill Mary and the children. Upon hearing this threat, Slaughter exited the front door of the house with his little brother in his arms. Thomas Moon shot at the children through the front door, but did not hit them. Mary Moon and her children left Thomas after that incident.
Mary Moon testified that Slaughter was raised in impoverished circumstances. After she left Thomas, she had another child named Vincent. Although Vincent’s father helped support Vincent financially, no one else provided additional financial support to the family. To support her family, Mary Moon worked as a cleaning woman, for which she earned $5 a day. At her job at the local sawmill, she earned $1.35 an hour, and she earned an additional $1.05 an hour working as a waitress. Moon did not receive assistance from the state, and she and her children lived in low-income housing. Slaughter attempted to help his mother financially, by cutting grass at cemeteries and doing odd jobs. When Slaughter’s grandmother was not able to care for the children, Slaughter was charged with taking care of his two younger brothers. Both brothers testified that they were usually left in Slaughter’s care, who was only four years older than the eldest of his younger brothers.
The jury would have learned that Mary Moon was abusive to Slaughter and his brothers. She testified: “I really whooped the devil out of my children.” She testified to beating Slaughter so badly that scars remain on his back. She would beat him with a switch or a belt, and when he made her angry enough, she would beat him with whatever it was she had in her hand at the time. Bobby Moon confirmed Mary Moon’s testimony; he testified that their mother would beat them with a variety of objects: ‘We got whoopens with a belt, switches, extension cords, broom, probably the first thing she could pick up, cause she was mad.” Vincent testified that he saw his mother beat Slaughter with an extension cord. He also testified that his mother would lock them in their rooms without food, but that when Vincent was locked up, Slaughter would slip him food after their mother left for work.
Furthermore, the jury would have learned that Slaughter could not retreat *244into the neighborhood to escape his turbulent home life. Both brothers confirmed that they had a difficult childhood, and testified that their neighborhood was crime-ridden. Despite the prevalence of crime in their neighborhood, Vincent testified that none of the brothers, including Slaughter, used drugs or alcohol.
The jury would have further learned that despite the fact that Slaughter had a difficult childhood, he was exceptionally close with his family. Referring to Slaughter’s grandmother, Mary Moon testified that “[s]he was his heart. He was her heart too.” Up until her death in 1991, Slaughter talked to his grandmother on the phone every week. Charles Leonard, Slaughter’s maternal grandfather, testified that when Slaughter lived with his mother, they visited Leonard during the summer. Bobby Moon testified that Slaughter took care of him and Vincent. “[H]e did everything for us. You know, he made sure we was [sic] fed and, you know, we was there at the house. He basically took care of us.” Vincent similarly testified that Slaughter cooked for them, and did his best to provide for them.
Bobby testified that Slaughter encouraged his younger brothers to stay out of trouble, and that he always gave them good advice. Both brothers testified that when they were children, Vincent found a bullet, which Slaughter took away from him. Vincent testified that when Slaughter was asleep, he recovered the bullet, which subsequently exploded in Vincent’s face. Vincent testified that Slaughter picked him up, took him across the street, and convinced a neighbor to take them to the hospital.
Finally, the jury would have learned that Slaughter received a head injury when he was five years old. Mary Moon testified that she believed that Slaughter hit his head on the corner of the refrigerator; the gash took at least ten stitches to close. Slaughter received no further medical care for the injury, until he began suffering from terrible headaches. At that point, he also started “falling out.” Moon took him to a doctor, who recommended that he see a specialist, which Moon could not afford. Instead, she took Slaughter to another doctor, hoping that the doctor would prescribe pills or some other form of relief. Slaughter never received proper treatment for his injury. According to Moon, Slaughter did receive some x-rays, and the doctors wanted him to go to Birmingham, Alabama, for more specialized treatment. However, because she did not have insurance, he did not receive any such treatment. Slaughter’s grandmother and grandfather both testified that Slaughter suffered from severe headaches as a child.
Perhaps most importantly, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to observe that, despite this abuse, Slaughter’s family cared about him deeply. Slaughter’s mother, brothers and grandparents each testified that they did not even know about the trial until after it had taken place. Not one of them was contacted by Radolo-vich to testify on Slaughter’s behalf. Each testified at the hearing that they would have been eager to testify on Slaughter’s behalf. Mary Moon testified that she loved Slaughter. Bobby Moon also testified that he cared about his brother:
I can say — I think about my brother every night. I love my brother a lot. I just can’t explain to the Court how I feel about him. [inaudible] excuse me. There’s not a night that I don’t think about my brother. I think about him everyday. I love him a lot, I really do.
Bobby testified that he did not want to see Slaughter die in the electric chair, and that if he did, he “probably couldn’t make it [him]self.” Vincent testified that he loved *245Slaughter, and that he did not want to see him die.
B. Expert Testimony
The majority concludes that Slaughter was not prejudiced by the Radolovich’s rebanee on Dr. Johnson’s testimony. Dr. Johnson, a psychiatrist from the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center,1 described Slaughter as cavalier, as having an extensive history of anti-social behavior, and as a “marginally functioning individual” with a predisposition for violent activities. Dr. Johnson testified that Slaughter was uncooperative during the examination and that Slaughter has a borderline personality disorder. He testified that “[b]order-line individuals typically experience a wide variety of problems in their life, problems with their families, problems in occupation, problems in academic achievement, difficulties ranging from moderate to severe across virtually every dimension of their life.” During cross-examination, Dr. Johnson testified that a high percentage of people who commit robbery and murder have an anti-social personality disorder.
Dr. Johnson also testified that Slaughter had abused alcohol, amphetamines, cannabis, and hallucinogens. He testified that Slaughter’s functioning was very poor, noting “marked impairment in both social relations and occupational functioning.” He further testified that Slaughter had never held steady, legal employment, and had obtained no lasting interpersonal relationships with friends or family. Dr. Johnson testified that without treatment, “Mr. Slaughter in all likelihood would continue his lifestyle very much as it has been for the last fifteen years or so, kind of nomadic lifestyle, wandering around the country, never establishing any permanence, never achieving much of anything in his life, never contributing anything in society
Dr. Johnson’s testimony does not strike me as mitigating. As Radolovich expressed during his testimony in the RCr 11.42 hearing, “Dr. Johnson’s testimony was harmful.”
Although the majority conveys great confidence in the accuracy of Dr. Johnson’s assessment of Slaughter, the expert witnesses testifying at the RCr 11.42 hearing were understandably skeptical. Dr. Delbert Drogin, a clinical psychologist and attorney in Kentucky, reviewed Dr. Johnson’s evaluation of Slaughter. Dr. Drogin testified that at the time of Slaughter’s evaluation, Dr. Johnson had been licensed to practice as a psychologist for only a year. Dr. Drogin further testified that it did not appear that Dr. Johnson received any information about Slaughter from his family members, nor did it appear from his report that Dr. Johnson conferred in any significant manner with Slaughter’s attorney.
Dr. Drogin testified that although Dr. Johnson attempted to administer a series of intelligence tests on Slaughter, he did not successfully administer any test that was an adequate measure of Slaughter’s intelligence. The order in which Dr. Johnson attempted to administer tests is unclear from his report, and thus drastically undermines the accuracy of those tests. Dr. Drogin further testified that there were errors in the administration of some of the tests: correct answers were marked as incorrect, the scoring was incorrectly totaled, and some answers had been written and crossed out. Dr. Drogin testified that by misscoring a key test, Dr. Johnson effectively cut Slaughter’s IQ by up to 25 points, an error that Dr. Johnson failed to *246notice or remedy. Based on these errors, Dr. Drogin testified that he had very little confidence in Dr. Johnson’s report. “[T]here are two classes of mistake that are there on their face. I don’t know what else it might have right or wrong about the test.” Similarly, Dr. Drogin testified that he had very little confidence in Dr. Johnson’s testimony during the penalty phase, because it was based on his inaccurate testing.
In evaluating Slaughter, Dr. Johnson further relied on the Rorschach Personality Test, wherein the subject interprets a series of inkblots. Dr. Drogin testified that the test is not a valid measure in a forensic evaluation, because there are too many questions about its reliability and validity. Furthermore, Dr. Drogin testified that Dr. Johnson “partially or mostly” scored the Rorschach test. Dr. Drogin testified that, because Dr. Johnson did not include any of results of the Rorschach test in his report, it is not “possible to evaluate the accuracy of [Dr. Johnson’s] ultimate conclusions.”
Dr. Drogin testified that the Rorschach Personality Test and the Meyer Incomplete Sentence Test, another test that Dr. Johnson administered unsuccessfully, were not objective tests, and were thus not reliable indicators of personality. The only objective test Dr. Johnson attempted to perform was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (“MMPI”), which consists of over 500 true/false questions, which Slaughter never completed. Dr. Drogin testified that the MMPI is regarded very highly by clinical psychologists, in contrast to the tests upon which Dr. Johnson ultimately relied. Dr. Drogin testified that based on Slaughter’s score sheet, it appeared that he had answered twenty fairly random questions. Dr. Drogin testified that based on the pattern of responses, he could not ascertain anything from the answer sheet — not even the order in which the answers were originally filled out.
In his report, Dr. Johnson said about the MMPI: “Generally the patient was reluctant to constructively participate in taking the MMPI and stated that he preferred to talk to examiner.” Dr. Drogin testified that Slaughter’s score sheet revealed “twenty separate attempts to do something with this test.” He testified that Slaughter’s ability to answer some questions, but not complete the whole test, could be explained by confusion, improper instruction, or that fact that Slaughter was taking his time, as opposed to a refusal to cooperate. Dr. Drogin opined that Slaughter might have answered some but not all of the questions because of difficulty reading or comprehending the questions. In order to complete the test, Dr. Drogin testified that the MMPI could have been administered to Slaughter orally, or given on an audio tape, neither of which Dr. Johnson appeared to attempt.
Dr. Drogin commented on Dr. Johnson’s testimony regarding Slaughter’s alleged history of drug and alcohol abuse. Dr. Drogin testified that at the time that Dr. Johnson evaluated Slaughter, there were objective tests for drug and alcohol abuse, including subtests of the MMPI and a test for substance abuse known as the Alcohol Use Inventory. However, Dr. Drogin found no evidence that Dr. Johnson used any of the readily available objective tests to determine drug or alcohol abuse.
Most troubling is the fact that Slaughter received a score indicating that his competency was “borderline” on the Competency Screening Test. Dr. Johnson indicated on Slaughter’s score sheet that “[m]ore clarification is needed on the competency to stand trial assessment instrument.” Dr. Drogin testified that there was no indication that Dr. Johnson took further steps to *247determine Slaughter’s competency to stand trial. The fact that Slaughter’s competency level was “borderline” was never reported to the trial court in Dr. Johnson’s report.
Regarding Dr. Johnson’s evaluations, Dr. Drogin testified that he did not have confidence in Dr. Johnson’s diagnoses. Dr. Drogin testified that if a psychologist is unable to reach a conclusion based on testing, he should try to obtain additional information. If a psychologist were still unable to reach a conclusion based on the evidence in his possession, he should note that inability in the report, and decline to draw a conclusion regarding the patient. Dr. Johnson failed to do so.
Dr. Engum, a clinical psychologist specializing in neuropsychology and forensic psychology, also testified at the RCr 11.42 hearing. He too strongly disagreed with each of Dr. Johnson’s conclusions. Dr. Egnum conducted a series of objective, standardized tests on Slaughter, including the Wechsler Intelligence Scale Revised Test on IQ, the Halstead Reitan Neurological Battery test of neuropsychological functioning, and a variety of ancillary assessment techniques of learning, memory, problem-solving, conceptual reading, motor speed, coordination and academic skills.
Based on Slaughter’s test results and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (Fourth Edition), Dr. Engum diagnosed Slaughter with a cognitive disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), and attention deficit disorder. Dr. Engum testified that as far as he could determine, Slaughter’s cognitive disorder was the result of a brain injury, based on the “depressed skull fracture, [and] the localization on the right frontal lobe.” Dr. Engum testified that a cognitive disorder could have an impact on a person’s ability to understand legal concepts, such as those implicated by the Miranda warnings, mitigation, and aggravation.
Additionally, Dr. Engum conducted a personality assessment, using standardized actuarial objective personality tests, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (which he described as the “gold standard” for personality tests) and the Meyer Clinical Multiaxil Inventory. Based on the personality tests, Dr. Engum concluded that Slaughter has a paranoid personality disorder, which was a result of his background, where “survival is an important aspect of daily existence.” Dr. Engum testified that Slaughter’s childhood had “lots of threats in the environment,” “lots of reasons to distrust people and things,” and was a place where “not a lot of importance [was] put upon things such as academic achievement or more of what we consider the middle class kinds of values.”
Significantly, Dr. Engum testified that Slaughter was not a sociopath. Dr. En-gum also testified that he disagreed with Dr. Johnson’s conclusion that Slaughter has borderline personality disorder; based on Dr. Johnson’s reports, Dr. Engum testified that he had not performed any tests that would allow him to conclude validly that Slaughter had borderline personality disorder. Dr. Engum also disagreed with Dr. Johnson’s conclusion that Slaughter would not be a good candidate for rehabilitation. Based on the results of the Meyer Clinical Multiaxil Inventory, the MMPI, and the Personality Assessment Inventory, Dr. Engum testified that he believed Slaughter could overcome the vast majority of his problems if placed in the right environment. Further, Dr. Engum pointed to Slaughter’s scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, particularly his scores on the social comprehension and judgment sub-tests, and the picture arrangement sub-test. Dr. Engum testified *248that Slaughter’s high scores on these tests indicate that he has social judgment, social comprehension, and a strong sense of cause and effect, all of which would make him a good candidate for rehabilitation. Dr. Engum also indicated a lack of a major psychopathology and the lack of significant drug or alcohol problems. Finally, he testified that to the extent that the science of predicting future violent behavior would allow, Dr. Engum believed that Slaughter would neither kill someone in a penitentiary, nor kill someone in the community.
Lane Veltkamp, a clinical social worker at the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Kentucky Medical Center, described Slaughter’s relationship with his father as one of “abandonment and neglect[].” Slaughter’s father was “in no way involved” in Slaughter’s life. Velt-kamp testified that because Slaughter’s father was absent, Slaughter did not have the benefit of a male role model. Velt-kamp testified that when Slaughter was eight or nine, he was put in charge of his younger brothers. He testified that although Slaughter did take significant responsibility for his brothers, including providing food and supervision, Slaughter was too young for that level of responsibility. Veltkamp testified that this “role reversal” is very wearing on a child. As a result of his obligations at home, Slaughter often slept in school, and had a variety of problems.
Veltkamp and Dr. Gary Kearl, a medical doctor specializing in family medicine and the treatment of children who may be the victims of sexual and physical abuse, testified as to the extent of the physical abuse Slaughter received. Veltkamp testified that Slaughter has “scars all over his body and was hit with belts and extension cords and slapped and so on.” Upon examination, Dr.Kearl observed a number of scars on Slaughter’s back, shoulders, chest, lower legs, forearms and thighs. These scars were consistent with Bobby and Vincent’s testimony that as a child, Slaughter had been beaten with braided switches, leather belts and extension cords. Dr. Kearl testified that the lacerations on Slaughter’s forearm also suggested neglect; the size of the scar indicated that Slaughter received a wide cut that was not sutured. Dr. Kearl testified that the particular laceration was so deep that it cut through the underlying muscle.
Dr. Kearl also observed a scar on Slaughter’s head at the hairline, consistent with Mary Moon’s testimony that Slaughter had incurred a head injury. Slaughter told Dr. Kearl that he had trouble sleeping at night, had difficulty seeing objects that were far away, and that he had suffered from recurring headaches ever since he was a young child. Dr. Kearl testified that beneath the scar, Slaughter’s skull was depressed. Dr. Kearl expressed concern that Slaughter’s skull was not x-rayed at the time of the injury; not only did the failure to seek medical care indicate abuse,2 but conventional skull films would have shown how deep or severe Slaughter’s skull fracture was, and whether surgery was needed to place the skull bones back in their original position. Such films would have also helped determine whether there was an underlying accumulation of blood, known as a hematoma, which could cause brain damage. “If it were there and it were not treated properly, that could have resulted then in brain damage and subsequent decreased reasonability.” Dr. Kearl testified that Slaughter still has a depressed skull fracture.
*249II.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court explicitly set forth the test for determining whether ineffective assistance of counsel prejudiced a criminal defendant. “When a defendant challenges a death sentence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This test does not require that Slaughter prove that it is more likely than not that he would have received a life sentence if not for the deficient performance of counsel; the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected such a stringent test for prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“[A] defendant need not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”). See also Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 376 n. 18 (6th Cir.2005) (noting that the Strickland standard requires less than a preponderance of the evidence); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 639 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that petitioner need not show that counsel’s deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome); Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 570 (6th Cir.2004) (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, but something less than a showing that the outcome more likely than not would have been different.”) (citations omitted); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 452 (6th Cir.2001) (Strickland “does not require showing that counsel’s unreasonable performance more likely than not altered the outcome in the case.”). Applying this standard, we must only ask whether there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
Given the voluminous amount of mitigating evidence presented at the post-eonviction proceeding, and the shockingly paltry and negative evidence presented during the penalty phase of the trial, there is clearly a reasonable probability that the jury would have sentenced Slaughter to life imprisonment had it been presented with the evidence that was presented at the RCr 11.42 hearing. Contrary to the assertion by the majority, the evidence presented in the post-conviction hearing did not merely expound on that presented during the penalty phase. Notably, Dr. Engum disagreed with Dr. Johnson’s conclusions that Slaughter suffered from borderline personality disorder, and would not be a good candidate for rehabilitation. He further disagreed with Dr. Johnson’s conclusion that Slaughter was predisposed toward violence.
Furthermore, nothing in the testimony presented during the penalty phase suggested that Slaughter was a devoted son and brother. Nothing suggested that he had family that was willing, let alone eager, to testify on his behalf. In fact, the jury heard testimony that Slaughter had not formed meaningful relationships with family members. Although Slaughter testified that his mother beat him, his testimony did not reveal the extent to which he was neglected as a child. The penalty phase testimony did not reveal that Slaughter had a learning disability, nor did it reveal that Slaughter suffered from a significant head injury as a child.
The majority opines that the jury learned all it needed about Slaughter’s background from the testimony of Slaughter and Dr. Johnson. Our precedent makes clear, however, that a defendant *250can be prejudiced by counsel’s deficient presentation of mitigating evidence even when some mitigation is presented to the jury. See Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 639-40 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence on traumatic childhood, physical abuse, and head injury, despite the fact that defendant and a psychiatrist offered mitigating testimony during the trial3). Furthermore, we have held that a defendant can be prejudiced when trial counsel fails to adduce enough information regarding mitigating circumstances, despite the fact that the jury is made aware of the bare contours of a defendant’s woeful history. See Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (6th Cir.1996) (“Here the jury was given virtually no information on [the defendant’s] history, character, background and organic brain damage — at least no information of a sort calculated to raise reasonable doubt as to whether this young man ought to be put to death.”). In Glenn, a minister, teacher and lawyer testified on the defendant’s behalf. Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1207. As Slaughter did, Glenn testified on his own behalf. Id. at 1208. As in the instant ease, none of the testimony revealed that the defendant may have suffered from brain damage. Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1210. As was the case here, Glenn’s trial counsel never talked to his siblings or family members. Glenn, 71 F.3d at 1208.
The majority’s denial of the writ runs counter to the relief granted in Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir.2003). There, as here, post-conviction proceedings revealed a wealth of mitigation that was not presented to the jury during the penalty phase. There, as here, trial counsel put on a pathetic display of largely negative evidence during the penalty phase. Id. at 491. Slaughter, like Hamblin, grew up in extreme poverty and neglect. Id. at 490. They both lived with an abusive, alcoholic father who beat their mother. They were both left to fend for themselves, without the supervision or assistance of their mother. Both attempted to care for younger siblings. Neither received a proper education. They both started getting into trouble with the law as teenagers. Both have demonstrated psychological problems. Both suffered from a severe blow to the head during childhood. In both cases, extraordinary mitigating evidence was only revealed in post-conviction proceedings. Like the petitioner in Hamblin, Slaughter was prejudiced by his attorney’s failure to present compelling mitigation to a jury.
In concluding that Slaughter was prejudiced by Radolovich’s failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence, the district court summed up the image of Slaughter the jury must have had. Rather than seeing the man described in post-conviction proceedings,
[T]hey saw “James Earl Slaughter,” in many senses, the man who never was, standing alone and defiant. Slaughter was a man [who] testified recklessly; a man who apparently was so unloved and so uncared for that not a single individual, relative or friend would vouch for him, though his life hung in the balance.
Had Radolovich investigated Slaughter’s background, he would have found an entire family willing to testify on his behalf. The jury would have learned that Slaughter was abused as a child, that he cared for his younger brothers, and that he suffered a head injury. Most importantly, they would have learned that he had a family who cared about him. The district court *251correctly concluded that but for Radolo-vieh’s failure to investigate and present a full picture of Slaughter’s life, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would be different. “[T]he presentation of even a substantial subset of the mitigating evidence detailed above ‘would have humanized Petitioner before the jury such that at least one juror could have found he did not deserve the death penalty.’ ” Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 452 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 592 (6th Cir.2000)).
III.
Slaughter also argues that he was denied due process and an impartial sentencing jury when the trial court allowed a juror to question him. After Slaughter testified at the penalty phase, a juror asked the following:
I have a question. He stated that he knew, he and this Red had been friends for sometime. Where did this Red live[?] He would had to visit or something. Where did this Red live? Where did he hangout at? Why didn’t any of your friends know about you and Red and since you...
When Slaughter refused to answer the question to the juror’s satisfaction, the juror responded:
You are asking for your life and nobody can find Red and you refuse. Why do you refuse to tell his address so he can be found to save you probably?
At this point, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and interrupted the questioning. Counsel moved for a mistrial, and argued that the juror had shown a “predisposition before the close of any evidence.” The trial court denied the motion. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Slaughter’s argument. That court noted that Slaughter did not testify during the guilt phase, and that the question took place during the sentencing phase after Slaughter had been found guilty. Relying on Kentucky law, that court then held that it is proper for jurors to ask questions of the defendant. The state court did not address the issue as a matter of constitutional law. The Supreme Court of Kentucky declined to consider the issue upon a RCr 11.42 motion, because it had considered the issue on direct appeal.
The extent of Slaughter’s constitutional argument before the Kentucky Supreme Court was a reference to due process, followed by a citation to the Fourth and Sixth Amendment. Relying on Levine v. Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506 (6th Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995), Slaughter now argues that a federal claim is fairly presented if a petitioner cites to a provision of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1516 (holding that a habeas petitioner properly presented his federal claim in state court insofar as he alleged that due process prohibits confinement of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity when that person is no longer mentally ill); Franklin v. Rose, 811 F.2d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1987) (“The ways in which a state defendant may fairly present to the state courts the constitutional nature of his claim, even without citing chapter and verse of the Constitution, include (a) reliance on pertinent federal cases employing constitutional analysis, (b) reliance on state cases employing constitutional analysis in like fact situations, (c) assertion of the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the Constitution, and (d) allegation of a pattern of facts well within the mainstream of constitutional litigation.” (emphasis omitted)). See also, Purnell v. Missouri Dept. of Corrs., 753 F.2d 703, 706 *252(8th Cir.1985) (“[Reference to the Constitution, a federal case, or a specific constitutional right [is required] to meet the ‘fair presentation’ and ‘fair opportunity tests.’ ”) (emphasis added); Petrucelli v. Coombe, 735 F.2d 684, 688-87 (2d. Cir.1984) (“It is not necessary for a habeas petitioner to cite ‘book and verse’ of the Constitution,” in order to put state court on notice that they are to decide federal constitutional claims).
Before the Kentucky Supreme Court, Slaughter argued: “Based on this denial of due process and a fair trial by an impartial jury, appellant is entitled to a new trial. 14th and 6th Amendments. Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.” Under Levine, Slaughter sufficiently notified the state court of his federal argument by citing a provision of the United States Constitution. See Levine, 986 F.2d at 1516. See also Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir.2003) (“There is no requirement that the petitioner cite to cases that employ federal constitutional analysis where he has phrased his claim in terms of a denial of a specific constitutional right.”). This holding is entirely consistent with Blackmon v. Booker, 394 F.3d 399, 400 (6th Cir.2004), in which the petitioner did not cite a specific provision of the Constitution. To the extent that Blackmon is inconsistent with Levine’s holding that citation to a provision of the Constitution is sufficient to preserve a claim based on federal law, we are obligated to follow Levine. See Sowards v. Loudon County, Tenn., 203 F.3d 426, 431 n. 1 (6th Cir.2000) (“When a later decision from this court conflicts with its prior decisions, the earlier cases control.”).
The majority argues that this case is distinguishable from Dye v. Hofbauer, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 5, 163 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), in which the Supreme Court reversed our holding that a petitioner had failed to preserve his federal claim in the state court. Although this case is certainly distinguishable, the majority would ignore the remaining body of Supreme Court precedent. Thus, we must take heed of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 31, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004), which informs us that:
A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim “federal.”
In fact, Supreme Court precedent informs us that Slaughter may have in fact gone above and beyond what is required under the law to preserve his federal claim. “[T]o state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke the talismanic phrase ‘due process of law’ or cite book and verse of the federal constitution.” Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (citations omitted). Slaughter not only invoked due process, but he cited the specific book and verse of the federal constitution, a step explicitly cited as unnecessary by the Supreme Court. To the extent that the law of our circuit requires more, it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and obviously cannot bind this court. See Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 501 (6th Cir.2002).
IV.
Because the majority turns a blind eye to the breadth and depth of mitigating evidence presented during the RCr 11.42 hearing, all of which have been presented during the penalty phase, and because the majority ignores Supreme Court precedent as to the action a defendant must take to *253preserve his federal claim, I respectfully dissent.

. Radolovich did not seek funds to hire an independent expert to evaluate Slaughter, although it was common in Lexington in 1983 to seek such funds in death penalty cases.

. The family's poverty should not have prevented Slaughter from receiving treatment. Dr. Kearl testified that in the late 1960s, there were a number .of hospitals in Slaughter's area that would have accepted Slaughter as a patient.

. See Harries v. State, 958 S.W.2d 799, 806-08 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997), for a discussion of the mitigation presented at trial.