Court Opinion

ID: 9838745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 19:00:20.574685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:47.642542
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                      For the First Circuit

No. 22-1843

                 KAMBIS ANVAR and MICHELLE DRUM,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                v.

ELIZABETH K. DWYER, in her official capacity as Interim Director
 of RI Department of Business Regulation; PETER F. NERONHA, in
 his official capacity as Attorney General of Rhode Island; and
   RHODE ISLAND RESPONSIBLE BEVERAGE ALCOHOL COALITION, INC.,

                      Defendants, Appellees.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

       [Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                 Montecalvo, Selya, and Thompson,
                          Circuit Judges.

     James A. Tanford, with whom Robert D. Epstein and Epstein
Seif Porter & Beutel, LLP were on brief, for appellants.
     Michael W. Field, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Katherine Connolly Sadeck, Assistant Attorney General, was on
brief, for appellees Dwyer and Neronha.
     Deborah A. Skakel, with whom Blank Rome LLP, Gerald J. Petros,
Ryan M. Gainor, and Hinckley Allen & Snyder LLP were on brief, for
appellee Rhode Island Responsible Beverage Alcohol Coalition, Inc.
     John C. Neiman, Jr. and Maynard Nexsen PC on brief for Center
for Alcohol Policy, amicus curiae.
     Jacob Hegeman, Frederick R. Yarger, Teresa G. Akkara, and
Wheeler Trigg O'Donnell LLP on brief for Wine & Spirits Wholesalers
of America, Inc. and American Beverage Licensees, amici curiae.

                        September 7, 2023
            SELYA, Circuit Judge.               This appeal arises out of a

challenge    to    Rhode     Island's    liquor      laws    on     the   ground   that

consumers     are    denied      access       to    alcohol       deliveries       from

out-of-state retailers in violation of the Commerce Clause.                         See

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.                     With respect to alcoholic

beverages, the Twenty-first Amendment, see U.S. Const. amend. XXI,

§ 2, adds a gloss to the Commerce Clause — and we have not had the

occasion     to     visit     this   arcane         corner     of     constitutional

jurisprudence following the Supreme Court's instructive opinion in

Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Association v. Thomas, 139 S.

Ct. 2449 (2019).            Other circuits, though, have grappled with

similar circumstances, and they have not been uniform in gauging

the reach of Tennessee Wine.            Compare, e.g., Block v. Canepa, 74

F.4th 400, 414 (6th Cir. 2023), with B-21 Wines, Inc. v. Bauer, 36

F.4th 214, 229 (4th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 567

(2023).     Consequently, we proceed with caution, deciding only the

narrow     issue    that     this    appeal        presents.          After   careful

consideration, we affirm the district court's judgment in part,

vacate it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                          I

            We briefly rehearse the background facts and travel of

the case.

                                        - 3 -
                                     A

          Rhode     Island,   like       many    states,     controls    the

distribution of alcohol within its borders through what is commonly

described as a three-tier system.            The state issues licenses

specific to the manufacture, wholesale, or retail of alcohol,

thereby maintaining a distinction between each tier of the alcohol

supply chain.     See R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-5-1.           Manufacturers and

wholesalers are licensed by the Rhode Island Department of Business

Regulation (DBR).     See id. § 3-5-14.1.         Each such licensee is

required both to maintain a physical premises within the state,

see id. §§ 3-6-1, -9 to -11, and to be a distinct economic entity

such that no manufacturer has an interest in the business of a

wholesaler, see id. § 3-6-15.

          The     licensing   of     retailers     is      left   to    local

municipalities.    See id. § 3-5-15.       The retailers, too, must have

a physical presence     within the state,        see id. §§ 3-7-1, -3;

230-30-10 R.I. Code R. § 1.4.27, and they must remain separate and

apart from the interests of any manufacturer or wholesaler, see

R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-22(a).        Licenses may issue only to Rhode

Island residents or companies authorized to do business in the

state.   See id. § 3-5-10.

          Within this three-tier system, alcoholic beverages sold

to consumers are first funneled through in-state wholesalers. They

are the only entities allowed to sell alcohol to licensed Rhode

                                   - 4 -
Island retailers.     See id. § 3-7-18.      And they alone can receive

shipments of alcoholic beverages from outside the state.                See id.

§ 3-4-8.

            This   regulatory    scheme    does     admit     one    exception:

consumers may buy alcohol for a non-business purpose from an

in-state or out-of-state manufacturer and have it shipped directly

to their home by common carrier if the purchase is made in person

on the manufacturer's premises.       See id.     Save for this exception,

consumers    purchase     alcoholic   beverages      only     from     licensed

retailers, who are permitted to sell them either in person, by

phone, or over the internet.1      See id. §§ 3-7-1, -3; 230-30-10 R.I.

Code R. § 1.4.10.       Those retailers are also permitted to deliver

a consumer's purchases directly to her as long as the delivery is

made by the retailer (or by an employee of the retailer) during

lawful business hours.          See 230-30-10 R.I. Code R. § 1.4.10.

Delivery by common carrier is forbidden.            See id.     Because Rhode

Island issues licenses only to in-state retailers, Rhode Island

consumers   cannot   avail   themselves    of     similar   deliveries     from

     1 RhodeIsland makes available various classes of retail-level
liquor licenses. Many of these licenses are applicable only to
specific types of businesses. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-15
(authorizing licenses for railroad, marine, and air carriers); id.
§ 3-7-16 (authorizing licenses for convention halls).          Our
discussion primarily relates to the (most general) "Class A" type
of retail license. See id. §§ 3-7-1, -3.

                                   - 5 -
out-of-state retailers (even those whose shops are very close to

the Rhode Island border).

                                           B

            Against this backdrop, we turn to the case at hand.

Plaintiffs-appellants Kambis Anvar and Michelle Drum are Rhode

Island wine consumers who allege that they would purchase wine

from out-of-state retailers and have it delivered to their homes

if that course of action was not prohibited by state law.                         In

October of 2019, they sued Elizabeth K. Dwyer, in her official

capacity as the Interim Director of the DBR, and Peter F. Neronha,

in his official capacity as the Rhode Island Attorney General, in

the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.

The   plaintiffs       entreated    the    district     court   to    declare    the

challenged   liquor      laws     unconstitutional       and    to    enjoin   their

enforcement.     Subsequently, the Rhode Island Responsible Beverage

Alcohol Coalition, Inc., an association of Rhode Island alcohol

wholesalers,     intervened       as   a   party-defendant       to    protect   the

interests of its members.           See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.

            In   due    course,     the    parties    cross-moved      for   summary

judgment.    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).              The plaintiffs argued that

Rhode   Island's       alcohol     control     regime   discriminates        against

out-of-state retailers in violation of the Commerce Clause because

those retailers cannot sell and deliver alcohol purchased from

out-of-state wholesalers to Rhode Island consumers, nor can they

                                       - 6 -
deliver          those    potential     purchases     by   common     carrier.2       The

defendants, in turn, asserted that Rhode Island's laws are either

nondiscriminatory            or    an   appropriate    exercise       of   the    state's

authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.

                  After hearing oral argument and mulling the parties'

competing contentions, the district court held that requiring

retailers to establish a physical presence within the state to

sell       and    deliver     alcohol    was   allowed     under     the   Twenty-first

Amendment because the physical-presence requirement was essential

to the state's three-tier system and, thus, necessary to "promote[]

the health and safety of Rhode Islanders."                    Anvar v. Dwyer, 633 F.

Supp.       3d        592,   599     (D.R.I.     2022).         In     upholding      the

in-state-presence requirement for retailers, the court did not

examine concrete evidence to discern the effectiveness of that

requirement in promoting public health and safety.                     The court also

upheld,          on    similar     grounds,    the    requirement      that      licensed

retailers             purchase     alcohol     only    from     licensed         in-state

wholesalers.             See id.

       At the outset, the plaintiffs' complaint also challenged
       2

laws limiting the amount of alcohol a consumer may physically carry
into the state.     See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3-1-1(9), -4-1.       The
plaintiffs later abandoned that argument and, therefore, cannot
resurrect it on appeal.     See Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v.
Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any
principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most
extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in
the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.").

                                             - 7 -
             As to the plaintiffs' challenge to the requirement that

retailers deliver alcohol themselves (as opposed to arranging for

delivery of customer purchases by common carrier), the district

court determined that the relevant laws do not discriminate against

out-of-state     retailers     because      no     retailer,      regardless    of

location, is permitted to deliver alcohol by common carrier.                    See

id.    The    court   did    not    address      whether   the    common-carrier

restriction, although neutral on its face, has a discriminatory

effect or purpose.

             When all was said and done, the district court granted

the   defendants'     motion   for    summary      judgment      and   denied   the

plaintiffs' cross-motion.          This timely appeal followed.

                                       II

             We review an order granting or denying summary judgment

de novo.     See Minturn v. Monrad, 64 F.4th 9, 13 (1st Cir. 2023).

"The pendency of cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter

the standard of review."       Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 154

(1st Cir. 2018).       "Cross motions simply require us to determine

whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law

on facts that are not disputed."         Barnes v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, N.A.,

370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield

Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir. 1996)).

                                     - 8 -
                                          III

               The    Constitution      grants    Congress      the    power    "[t]o

regulate Commerce . . . among the several States."                      U.S. Const.

art. I, § 8, cl. 3.          Encompassed within that affirmative grant of

power is, by negative implication, a concomitant command that

"prevents       states      from    creating     protectionist         barriers     to

interstate trade."          Fam. Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d

1, 9 (1st Cir. 2010).          Under this concomitant command, familiarly

known     as    the    dormant      Commerce     Clause,    a   state     law     that

discriminates against          either interstate goods or non-resident

actors can be upheld only if it "advances a legitimate local

purpose        that   cannot       be   adequately    served      by     reasonable

nondiscriminatory alternatives." Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis,

553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of

Env't Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994)); see Ne. Patients

Grp. v. United Cannabis Patients & Caregivers of Me., 45 F.4th

542, 546 (1st Cir. 2022).

               Even   so,   states      are    afforded    greater     leeway     when

regulating alcohol because of the authority granted to them by the

Twenty-first Amendment.             See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2470.

Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides:

               The transportation or importation into any
               State, Territory, or possession of the United
               States for delivery or use therein of
               intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
               thereof, is hereby prohibited.

                                         - 9 -
U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2.          Given its plain meaning, section 2

seems to stand in tension with the dormant Commerce Clause.                 But

— notwithstanding the broad sweep of its text — section 2 has been

authoritatively construed "as one part of a unified constitutional

scheme," Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2462, so that state laws

promulgated under its auspices must nevertheless conform to the

"nondiscrimination      principle"     latent    in    the   dormant   Commerce

Clause, id. at 2470 (quoting Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487

(2005)).

            It follows, we think, that when assessing whether a

state's law regulating alcohol runs headlong into the dormant

Commerce    Clause,     a   court    first    must    determine   whether   the

challenged law discriminates — either on its face, in effect, or

in purpose — against interstate commerce.                See Or. Waste Sys.,

Inc., 511 U.S. at 99; Fam. Winemakers of Cal., 592 F.3d at 9-10,

13.   If it does, the inquiry then shifts to whether the challenged

law "serve[s] a State's legitimate [section] 2 interests" such as

addressing "the public health and safety effects of alcohol use."

Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2469, 2474.           To prove as much, the state

may   not   rely   on   either      "mere    speculation"    or   "unsupported

assertions"    but,     rather,      must    proffer    "concrete      evidence"

demonstrating that the main effect of the law is the advancement

of, say, public health and safety, not economic protectionism.

                                     - 10 -
Id. at 2474 (quoting Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490, 492).                If the law's

predominant effect is protectionist in nature, such that it cannot

be upheld under the Twenty-first Amendment, the court must then

determine whether the law "advances a legitimate local purpose

that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory

alternatives."      Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co.

of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).

                                        IV

           With this legal framework in place, we move from the

general to the specific.         The plaintiffs asseverate that Rhode

Island's issuance of licenses only to retailers who maintain a

physical     presence        within     the      state      unconstitutionally

discriminates    against      out-of-state        retailers        who   are     thus

prohibited   from     delivering      alcohol    directly     to    Rhode      Island

consumers.      See   R.I.    Gen.    Laws     §§ 3-4-8,    -5-1,    -7-1,      -7-3;

230-30-10 R.I. Code R. § 1.4.27.                And if that prohibition is

unlawful — their thesis runs — so, too, is the requirement that

retailers make deliveries themselves (instead of through common

carrier) because out-of-state retailers would be put at an unfair

logistical disadvantage in comparison to in-state retailers when

making those deliveries.         See R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-4-8; 230-30-10

R.I. Code R. § 1.4.10.        We address each of these asseverations in

turn.

                                      - 11 -
          We first pause to note, though, that the plaintiffs do

not appeal the district court's determination that Rhode Island's

requirement that licensed retailers purchase alcohol only from

licensed in-state wholesalers, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-18, is

valid under the Twenty-first Amendment.         The plaintiffs make no

mention of the relevant provision in their opening brief and —

although they argue against that requirement in their reply brief

— that is too little and too late.         It is settled beyond hope of

contradiction that arguments appearing for the first time in an

appellant's reply brief are deemed waived.           See FinSight I LP v.

Seaver, 50 F.4th 226, 235 (1st Cir. 2022); Sandstrom v. ChemLawn

Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 1990).         Accordingly, we affirm

the district court's entry of summary judgment insofar as it

addresses the constitutionality of section 3-7-18, and we limit

our review to those issues properly before us.

                                    A

          Rhode   Island    law     facially    discriminates        against

out-of-state   retailers   by   authorizing    the   issuance   of    retail

licenses exclusively to state residents or in-state businesses.

See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 3-5-1, -5-10, -7-1, -7-3.              So, too, it

facially discriminates against out-of-state retailers by requiring

such licensees to maintain a physical presence within the state.

See 230-30-10 R.I. Code R. § 1.4.27.         Due to those restrictions,

out-of-state retailers cannot sell or deliver alcoholic beverages

                                  - 12 -
to Rhode Island residents within the borders of the state (as Rhode

Island retailers can).

          Despite that impediment to interstate commerce, the

district court upheld the in-state-presence requirement on the

ground that it is integral to Rhode Island's three-tier system of

alcohol regulation and, thus, a valid exercise of the state's

authority under the Twenty-first Amendment.     See Anvar, 633 F.

Supp. 3d at 598-99.   In announcing this holding, the court relied

in part on a Supreme Court dictum describing the three-tier system

of alcohol regulation in favorable terms.   See id.

          We do not gainsay that the Supreme Court has, in the

past, described the implementation of a three-tier system as an

appropriate use of a state's authority under the Twenty-first

Amendment.   See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 ("We have previously

recognized that the three-tier system itself is 'unquestionably

legitimate.'" (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S.

423, 432 (1990))); see also Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci,

505 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2007).3      But the Court, of late, has

     3 Historically, the three-tier system was adopted by states
to curb excessive alcohol consumption engendered by the "tied-
house" system — an economic arrangement under which alcohol
producers staked saloonkeepers to premises and equipment in
exchange for their agreement to sell the producer's product
exclusively (and often excessively). See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct.
at 2463 n.7. The three-tier system sought to prevent the resultant
harm to the public health by foreclosing vertical integration in
the supply chain for alcohol distribution. See id.

                              - 13 -
cautioned that the Twenty-first Amendment does not necessarily

"sanction[]     every   discriminatory     feature    that      a    State   may

incorporate into its three-tiered scheme."          Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct.

at 2471.     Each state's variation of the three-tier system, then,

"must be judged based on its own features."          Id. at 2472.

           Here,    the    district      court      concluded        that    the

in-state-presence requirement is an essential feature of Rhode

Island's three-tier system because it allows state officials to

conduct on-site inspections to ensure compliance with the law.

See Anvar, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 599.         But the court arrived at that

conclusion based on an expert report affirming that principle in

the abstract, together with the naked fact that retailers are

required by law to maintain certain sales records for inspection.

See R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-7-28.        At no point did the court engage

with any "concrete evidence" as to how the in-state-presence

requirement    furthers   the   legitimate   aims    of   the       Twenty-first

Amendment.    Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Granholm, 544

U.S. at 490).    For instance, the court made no mention of whether

such enforcement actions actually take place, whether such efforts

have effectively curtailed behavior deleterious to the public

health, or whether the requirement has tangibly benefited public

health and safety in some other way.

           Nor did the district court explicitly consider whether

the plaintiffs' arguments or proffered evidence were sufficient to

                                  - 14 -
rebut      the      defendants'        stated       justification        for        the

in-state-presence      requirement.          Cf.    Lebamoff      Enters.    Inc.    v.

Whitmer,    956     F.3d    863,    879   (6th     Cir.   2020)    (McKeague,       J.,

concurring)       (upholding       alcohol   regulation     because      plaintiffs

failed to produce "sufficient countervailing evidence" rebutting

state's showing that law promoted public health).                   The plaintiffs

offer data and reports ostensibly demonstrating that states that

allow out-of-state retail deliveries of alcohol do not experience

a corresponding erosion in public health and safety.                        They also

insist     that     Rhode      Island's      rationale       for     imposing        an

in-state-presence requirement on retailers is undercut by the

exception available to out-of-state manufacturers, who can deliver

directly to consumers as long as consumers make their purchases

from the manufacturer's premises.                See R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-4-8.

Whether this showing outweighs the defendants' offer of proof is

a matter to be decided in the first instance by the district court.

See Block, 74 F.4th at 414 (remanding to district court to assess

evidence within framework erected by Tennessee Wine).

            The short of it is that a discriminatory aspect of a

state's version of the three-tier system cannot be given a judicial

seal of approval premised either on the virtues of three-tier

systems generally or on the basis of a theoretical benefit to

public     health     and    safety       associated      with     the   challenged

regulation.       See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474-75.                 After all,

                                       - 15 -
there is nothing inherent in the three-tier system — which aims at

preventing     vertical      integration         between    alcohol          producers,

wholesalers,      and     retailers    —       that    necessarily          demands    an

in-state-presence requirement for retailers.                       See B-21 Wines,

Inc., 36 F.4th at 235 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) ("One can easily

imagine a state maintaining a strict licensing regime to ensure

that the tiers remain distinctly owned, while treating in-state

and out-of-state retailers alike."). But see id. at 229 (upholding

in-state retailer requirement as integral to three-tier system);

Sarasota Wine Mkt., LLC v. Schmitt, 987 F.3d 1171, 1185 (8th Cir.

2021) (same).      Such a requirement — if it is to be sanctioned —

must be supported by "concrete evidence" demonstrating that its

predominant      effect    advances    the       goals     of     the       Twenty-first

Amendment and not merely the protection of in-state business

interests.     Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474 (quoting Granholm, 544

U.S. at 490); see Block, 74 F.4th at 414.

                                           B

           We add a coda.       The plaintiffs argue vociferously that

the   district    court    applied    the      wrong     legal    standard       by   not

considering      whether     nondiscriminatory            alternatives          to    the

challenged laws were available.            That argument, however, conflates

the   proper   Twenty-first     Amendment        inquiry    with        a    traditional

analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause.                     See supra Part III.

The district court may find the existence of alternatives relevant

                                      - 16 -
in assessing whether the challenged laws in fact promote public

health and safety, but the mere existence of possible alternatives

does   not,    for   purposes      of   a   Twenty-first      Amendment     inquiry,

necessarily invalidate a challenged law.              See B-21 Wines, Inc., 36

F.4th at 225-26 ("Although consideration of nondiscriminatory

alternatives       could    have   some     relevance    to    [the    Twenty-first

Amendment] inquiry, it does not transform the applicable framework

into the test that ordinarily applies to a dormant Commerce Clause

challenge when the Twenty-first Amendment is not implicated.").

                                            C

              That ends this aspect of the matter.                    We vacate the

district      court's      entry      of    summary     judgment       as   to   the

constitutionality          of   the     in-state-presence       requirement      for

retailers, and we remand that issue for a fuller consideration of

the parties' respective offers of proof.                The district court may,

of course, take additional evidence on this issue if it sees fit.

                                            V

              The plaintiffs concede that their challenge to Rhode

Island's common-carrier restriction, see R.I. Gen. Laws § 3-4-8;

230-30-10 R.I. Code R. § 1.4.10(A)-(B), is conditioned upon a

finding       of     unconstitutionality          with        respect       to   the

in-state-presence requirement for retailers.                     If out-of-state

retailers cannot sell and deliver alcohol into the state, it does

not much matter whether they are prevented from making such

                                        - 17 -
hypothetical deliveries by common carrier.             But if the district

court determines on remand that the in-state-presence requirement

for retailers is unconstitutional, a separate inquiry must then be

mounted to determine the constitutionality of the common-carrier

restriction.

            Below,   the   district   court   —     despite    upholding   the

in-state-presence     requirement     —     proceeded     to    address    the

plaintiffs' challenge to the common-carrier restriction.                   The

court ruled that the latter requirement was nondiscriminatory

because the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions made no

distinction between in-state and out-of-state retailers.                   See

Anvar, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 599.            That portion of the district

court's judgment also must be vacated.            We explain briefly.

            Even if a law does not appear to be discriminatory on

its face, it still may have a discriminatory effect if "it affects

similarly     situated     entities    in     a     market     by   imposing

disproportionate burdens on out-of-state interests and conferring

advantages upon in-state interests."        Fam. Winemakers of Cal., 592

F.3d at 10.    So, too, a law may be discriminatory in its purpose

if it is "motivated by an intent to discriminate against interstate

commerce."     Id. at 13.     As a threshold matter, though, it is

incumbent upon the plaintiffs to provide proof of any allegedly

discriminatory effect or purpose.         See id. at 9.

                                 - 18 -
           Should the district court deem the in-state-presence

requirement unconstitutional — a matter on which we take no view

— it must then reassess whether the plaintiffs have sufficiently

demonstrated      that    the   common-carrier      restriction     has   a

discriminatory effect or purpose.          See id. at 10, 13.    If so, the

court must proceed to analyze whether the law is a permissible

exercise   of    Rhode   Island's   authority    under   the   Twenty-first

Amendment.      See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474-75.

                                      VI

           We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in

part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.   All parties shall bear their own costs.

So Ordered.

                                    - 19 -