Court Opinion

ID: 9624361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:00:23.647176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:45.640861
License: Public Domain

RUFFIN, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in part.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2, but I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis in Division 3 and so concur in the judgment only in Case No. A08A1200.
I agree with the majority that the trial court’s order is overbroad to the extent that it provides that nothing in SGMC’s “credentialing files” is discoverable. The trial court is unable to make such a sweeping determination at this point. I am concerned, however, that the majority has misconstrued the applicable law in reaching its finding that “to the extent that there is information in Tri’s credentialing files that does not involve evaluations of his performance of [medical] procedures, that information is discoverable.” (p. 632)
*633In Hollowell v. Jove,1 our Supreme Court concluded that the protection from discovery provided by OCGA § 31-7-143 includes
information generated in the course of medical review committee proceedings which relates to the physician’s general competence, his competence to treat the condition from which the decedent suffered as evidenced by his treatment of other similarly afflicted patients and his competence to perform medical procedures other than those specifically involved in the subject litigation.2
The protection from discovery of proceedings and records of peer review organizations afforded by OCGA § 31-7-133 (a) is similarly broad.3 There is nothing in either OCGA § 31-7-133 or § 31-7-143, the statutes directly at issue, which limits protection from discovery to information- involving the evaluation of a medical procedure. Rather, “what is not discoverable is . . . records generated solely to provide peer review or information [gained] exclusively through or by the committee for investigation by peer review, that is, discovery relative to medical or peer review.”4 Thus if SGMC’s “credentialing files” include information related to Dr. Tri’s general competence, and the information was generated exclusively through a medical review or peer review proceeding, it would be privileged and not subject to discovery.
McCall v. Henry Med. Center5 is not applicable here. At issue in Division 1 of McCall, from which the majority quotes at length, was the scope of civil immunity afforded to peer review organizations,6 and any analysis contained in that opinion limiting the definition of peer review to the review of medical procedures cannot be fairly *634extended to this discovery dispute.7 Even in Division 2 of McCall, which did involve a discovery issue, we did not attempt to apply the analysis contained in Division 1 to whether information was protected from discovery under OCGA § 31-7-133 (a).8
Decided October 27, 2008
Reconsideration denied November 18, 2008
Reinhardt, Whitley, Wilmot, Summerlin & Pittman, Glenn Whitley, Karen H. Summerlin, Coleman, Talley, Newbern & Kurrie, Wade H. Coleman, Jr., Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Thomas M. Burke, Jr., Anthony A. Rowell, Walter H. New, for appellant.
Adams, Jordan & Treadwell, Marc T. Treadwell, O. Wayne Ellerbee, for appellees.
Accordingly, in Case No. A08A1200, I would reverse the trial court’s order as overbroad and premature to the extent it provides that nothing in SGMC’s credentialing files is discoverable, but limit direction to the trial court to consider the admissibility of the credentialing files and the information contained therein in accordance with the principles set forth by the majority in Division 1 of the opinion.

 247 Ga. 678 (279 SE2d 430) (1981).

 (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 682 (b).

 OCGA § 31-7-133 (a) provides, as to peer review organizations, that “the proceedings and records of a review organization shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action.” A “review organization” is defined to include any panel, committee, or organization which, in addition to certain requirements as to its composition, “engages in or utilizes peer reviews and gathers and reviews information relating to the care and treatment of patients for the purposes of: . . . [pierforming any of the functions or activities described in Code Section 31-7-15.” OCGA § 31-7-131 (3) (B) (vi). In turn, OCGA § 31-7-15 provides that review of professional practices required thereby shall include “the qualifications and professional competence of persons performing or seeking to perform such services.” OCGA § 31-7-15 (a) (3).

 (Citations omitted.) Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth. v. Martin, 208 Ga. App. 326, 327-328 (430 SE2d 604) (1993).

 250 Ga. App. 679 (551 SE2d 739) (2001).

 See id. at 679-682 (1).

 It is not clear that, even in the context of civil immunity, we intended in McCall to strictly define peer review functions to the review of medical procedures:
We do not hold that no aspect of the credentialing process is a peer review function, especially if the process involves the evaluation of a physician’s performance of an actual medical procedure, but summary judgment is not warranted merely because a peer review committee has approved Dr. Parker, and this appears to be the basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 682 (1).

 See id. at 682-685 (2).