Court Opinion

ID: 9558186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:04:00.652445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:27.573330
License: Public Domain

FISHER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment:
I concur in Part I of Judge Tashima’s opinion. I write separately with regard to Part II because I do not believe the FTCA exposes federal law enforcement officers to tort liability when they are acting within the confines of the special law enforcement privileges conferred upon them by other federal statutes.
I.
I agree that United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 126 S.Ct. 510, 163 L.Ed.2d 306 (2005), undermines the prior rule in this *857circuit, first articulated in Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir.1985), that the unique obligations of law enforcement officials “make the law of citizen arrests an inappropriate instrument for determining FTCA liability” and thus “the law governing arrests pursuant to warrants” defines the standard of care. See id. Amsberg’s conclusion was premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 2674, which makes the United States liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” We held that because federal law enforcement officers arrest suspects pursuant to their unique governmental duties, “a private citizen making a citizen’s arrest does not act under ‘like circumstances’ required by § 2674.” Amsberg, 757 F.2d at 979 (citing Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d 68, 73-74 (2d Cir.1984)). Olson rejected this type of reasoning, holding that “like circumstances do not restrict a court’s inquiry to the same circumstances,” and that tort law governing the conduct of private parties— not governmental entities — should supply the liability standard in FTCA suits involving unique governmental functions. Olson, 546 U.S. at 46-47 126 S.Ct. 510 (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original).
Even though law enforcement officers’ unique governmental function in making arrests would not in general avoid analogizing to the law of citizen arrests, there is a second and independent basis for treating officers differently in an FTCA suit such as this one. Specifically, federal law grants law enforcement officials special privileges that allow law enforcement officers to do their jobs without violating civil and criminal sanctions that would otherwise apply. These privileges authorize federal law enforcement officers, acting within lawful bounds applicable to such officers, to execute search warrants on private property without committing the tort of trespass, to make valid arrests without committing the tort of false arrest and to use reasonable force in arresting suspects without committing the tort of battery. These same acts if done by private parties would often not be privileged from civil tort liability.
Olson could be read to support the conclusion that law enforcement privileges should not be recognized in FTCA suits, and that federal officers are left only with those privileges available to private citizens such as the citizen’s arrest privilege. But I would read Olson’s instruction that “like circumstances do[es] not restrict a court’s inquiry to the same circumstances, but require[s] it to look further afield,” Olson, 546 U.S. at 46, 126 S.Ct. 510 (emphasis in original), to provide courts with enough flexibility to preserve law enforcement privileges. Because Olson did not involve such privileges, and because the FTCA’s text does not clearly foreclose their availability, I would not reach' out to construe Olson’s definition of “like circumstances” to override them.
Adopting this construction avoids creating tension between the FTCA and other provisions of federal law. In this case 26 U.S.C. § 7608(a)(2) accorded the IRS agent defendants the privilege to “execute and serve search warrants and arrest warrants.” To hold that the FTCA makes IRS officers liable even when acting within the scope of this federal privilege would bring the FTCA into conflict with § 7608(a)(2), whereas the two statutes could easily be harmonized by reading the FTCA to impose liability only when the officers have exceeded the bounds of the privilege. See California ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir.2000) (“[I]t is a well established axiom of statutory construction that, whenever possible, a court should interpret two *858seemingly inconsistent statutes to avoid a potential conflict.”).
Construing the FTCA as preserving federal law enforcement privileges would also avoid an absurd result: that federal officers acting lawfully may nonetheless be held civilly liable if they do not conform their conduct to what is required of private citizens. See United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir.2007) (“Statutes should be read to avoid ... absurd results.”). Congress could have explicitly waived federal law enforcement privileges when it singled out federal law enforcement officials for removal from the protection of the FTCA’s intentional tort exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). We have held, however, that § 2680(h)’s law enforcement proviso was intended to provide remedies for victims of law enforcement abuses, not for the routine and lawful exercise of law enforcement privileges. See Orsay v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (9th Cir.2002) (citing S.Rep. No. 93-588 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2792 (1974)). Absent a clear expression by Congress on the subject, we should not abridge statutorily conferred federal law enforcement privileges.1
One final element of the FTCA’s text solidifies that law enforcement privileges survive the Act. The statute requires us to apply “the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). We have understood this to mean that we apply the law a state court would apply in analogous circumstances, including federal law if the state’s choice-of-law rules would so provide. See Rhoden v. United States, 55 F.3d 428, 431 (9th Cir.1995) (per curiam). Thus we have allowed defendants in FTCA suits to assert the privileges that a state court would recognize in an analogous state law tort action. For example, in Rhoden we held that a California court would apply federal law to determine whether federal immigration officials’ detention of the plaintiff was privileged against a claim of false imprisonment under California law. Id.; accord Trenouth v. United States, 764 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir.1985). We held that the defendants would be liable only if the detention violated applicable federal statutes or the Constitution. See Rhoden, 55 F.3d at 431, 432 n. 5. We reached a similar conclusion in Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 758 (9th Cir.2004), although by applying state rather than federal privilege law. We looked to California Penal Code § 847(b)(1), which makes both state and federal officers immune from civil suits for false imprisonment where the detention was the result of a lawful arrest.2 See *859Galvin, 374 F.3d at 758. Despite the slight tension between Rhoden and Galvin regarding which body of privilege law should apply, the principle that California courts would apply a law enforcement privilege (not the citizen’s arrest privilege) is settled — and Olson does not clearly unsettle it. Cf. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (holding that a three-judge panel may overrule pri- or precedent only “where the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority” (emphasis added)).
I would therefore hold that federal officers should not be held liable under the FTCA if they are acting within the scope of a privilege conferred by another federal statute.
II.
Our holding that a rational jury could conclude that Tekle’s detention was constitutionally unreasonable applies with equal force to Tekle’s FTCA claim of false arrest. See Rhoden, 55 F.3d at 432 n. 5 (noting that the same conduct might give rise to both FTCA and Bivens actions). Tekle accordingly has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the detention was made “without lawful privilege.” Cf. Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 (2000) (affirming defendant’s demurrer because plaintiffs “failed to allege facts establishing that the conduct of which they complain was not lawfully privileged”); see also Rhoden, 55 F.3d at 430 (“Once the plaintiff has proven the elements of the tort, the defendant has the burden to establish that the detention or arrest was legally justified.”). I therefore agree that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim should be reversed.
Similarly, issues of fact remain regarding whether the officers acted lawfully in pointing a gun at Tekle’s head and picking him up by the chain of his handcuffs. Therefore I agree that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Tekle’s assault and battery and emotional distress claims should be reversed.

. Far from expressing congressional intent to eliminate federal law enforcement privileges, the FTCA's text might be understood to support the preservation of those privileges by providing that "[w]ith respect to any [FTCA] claim ... the United States shall be entitled to assert any defense ... to which the United States is entitled.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The government has not argued here that federal law enforcement privileges fit within this provision, however, and I therefore do not rely on it.

. The statute provides in relevant part:
There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or law enforcement officer ... acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.
(2) The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested.
Cal.Penal Code § 847(b) (emphasis added).