Court Opinion

ID: 9710947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:21:15.591159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.301157
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
In this case, on November 6, 1974, appellant’s driver license was revoked by order of the Secretary of State. The reason for revocation was that appellant had too many points and, over a period *74of time, had been involved in five noninjury accidents. After revocation, defendant was caught driving and his suspension extended another year.
On January 13, 1975, appellant filed a petition in the circuit court for restoration of his driver license asserting that the revocation caused him great personal hardship.
By stipulation between appellant’s counsel and an assistant prosecuting attorney, appellant was given a so-called "Caesar’s Wife” limited license. This term means that the restricted license will be automatically picked up by "any law enforcing officer or agency” and returned to the Secretary of State "upon being cited for any moving violation, upon evidence of drinking and driving” or upon any other violation of the restoration order. The restoration order contained other requirements which are not relevant here.
After entry of the stipulated order on June 4, 1975, appellant was charged with failing to obey a yield sign in another collision accident. Pursuant to the terms of the order of restoration, his license was picked up and returned to the Secretary of State. On October 30, 1975, the Secretary of State revoked appellant’s license for an additional two years, that is, through October 8, 1977.
On November 17, 1975, appellant went back into the circuit court, this time to attack the order he had earlier sought and obtained by stipulation. He claimed the automatic pickup part of the order was unconstitutional, but, of course, otherwise claimed the benefit of the order of restoration. When his petition was denied, he appeals as of right.
Section 323 of the Michigan vehicle code delineates the powers of the circuit court as follows:
*75"Section 323. Any person denied a license to operate a motor vehicle or whose license for such purpose has been revoked or suspended by the Secretary of State under the provisions of this act or any other law of this state with the exception of the financial responsibility act * * * shall have a right to file a petition for a hearing in the matter in a circuit court in the county from which came the recommendation or conviction upon which such license was denied, suspended or revoked, * * * and such court is hereby vested with jurisdiction and it shall be its duty to enter an order setting the cause for hearing for a day certain in not to exceed thirty (30) days from the date of such order; * * * On the hearing in said cause such court is hereby authorized to take testimony and examine into all the facts and circumstances incident thereto. Such court is further authorized to confirm, modify or set aside such order of suspension, revocation or denial of such license * * * .” MCLA 257.323; MSA 9.2023.
The foregoing must be viewed in conjunction with § 323c which provides:
"Section 323c.
(a). A person denied a license to operate a motor vehicle or whose license for such purpose has been revoked or suspended by the Secretary of State under Section 625f has a right to review the matter in circuit court as provided in Sections 323 and 323a. However, upon a determination confirming or modifying the action of the Secretary of State, the court may issue a restricted license only when all of the following circumstances exist:
(1) Public transportation is not readily available to such person.
(2) Operating his motor vehicle is the only means by which the person can travel to and from his place of employment.
(3) There are no other persons within the person’s household who are licensed to operate a motor vehicle in this State and could transport the person to his place of employment. When such restricted license is issued it *76shall be issued on condition that the person operate his motor vehicle only to and from his place of employment.
(b). Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the court shall not issue a restricted license to any person who has accumulated over twenty-four (24) points as provided in Section 320a within the two year period preceding the date of the suspension or revocation of his license.” MCLA 257.323c; MSA 9.2023(3).
While §323c appears to be limited to suspensions arising from driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, it is interesting that the necessary conditions of such a restricted license are similar to the usual conditions imposed upon court ordered driver license restorations on the basis of alleged hardship.
These statutory provisions vest discretion in the trial judge to determine whether under all the facts and circumstances the suspension should be confirmed, modified or set aside.
It is clear that in view of appellant’s very bad driving record, there would have been no abuse of discretion if the initial suspension had been confirmed. As a matter of fact, the discretion afforded trial judges in restoration of driver licenses under these and preceding statutes on a hardship basis has never been interpreted or even thought of as giving a driver a vested right to restoration. However, acting in reliance upon the stipulation of the attorneys, the suspension was modified to afford appellant a restricted license.
There is no constitutional issue involved here. Appellant cannot, under these circumstances, obtain relief from the court and then turn around and claim that the very relief he obtained is unconstitutional when it later serves his purpose to do so. Part of the purpose in the "Caesar’s *77Wife” provision is that it is well known among those who try lawsuits that adjudication of a traffic ticket can be delayed for many months by resourceful counsel and, thus, a mockery can be made of the time provisions of the point system. Under the circumstances of this case, appellant’s claim that the automatic pickup provision is unconstitutional is without merit. Where a driver seeks a limited driver license after suspension on the basis of hardship and stipulates to entry of such an order, he cannot later successfully attack it.
It is also worth noting that if appellant was correct in his argument, then the order of restoration would be invalid. It would be a strange result if the automatic pickup portion of the stipulated order was invalidated, but the rest remained in full force and effect. If, as appellant claims, the automatic pickup provision is unconstitutional, I would set aside and find the order of restoration ineffective, leaving appellant to the control and order of the Secretary of State. However, as indicated, it is not necessary to so find here.
I would affirm the order of the trial court denying appellant any further relief.