Court Opinion

ID: 9666111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:05:13.479858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:23.822549
License: Public Domain

E. H. Papp, J.
(dissenting). I most respectfully dissent. Although the majority holds that the parking lot incident should never have occurred, they conclude that admission of testimony concerning this out-of-court identification during trial was harmless because of the "strength of the other identification testimony”. With that conclusion I cannot agree.
Assuming that defendants were not deprived of their constitutional rights in either the method of presentation or by the photographs themselves, the victim’s identification as the result of that presentation was tentative at best. She was 85% sure of one of the defendants and much less sure of the other. It was because of this lack of strength in the first identification that the subsequent incident in the parking lot occurred.
On the second day following the rape, the victim was called to the sheriffs department on the pretext of having more photographs of her injuries and a set of fingerprints taken. The sheriffs detectives’ real purpose in summoning her to the station was to stage a confrontation with defendants who were then on trial for another rape in the *52courthouse across the parking lot from the sheriffs department.
No confrontation could be staged in the morning. Although all that she had been requested to do had been completed early in the morning the victim was asked to return to the department after she and her mother took a short shopping trip. When the victim returned she was escorted to the parking lot to view colors of cars in an attempt to fix the color of the car in which she had been abducted. One of the three cars pointed but before lunch was that of defendant Wright. The detective then treated the victim and her mother to lunch.
After lunch, one of the detectives waited with the victim at the rear of the courthouse to again view cars as they drove into the parking lot. This was done even though the victim repeatedly stated that she could not identify the color of the car. Within a short time defendants drove by. The victim did not respond to the officer’s question of whether that was the color of the car but asked to take a closer look at the occupants.
She was rushed into the courthouse and stood before the elevators which the detective knew defendants would be taking as they returned to court. She made some type of identification as defendants approached the elevator and was then pushed into the elevator by the detective to ride the five floors up with the defendants. On the fifth floor her identification was positive and emphatic.
I agree with the majority that this procedure should not have occurred. The detectives knew defendants were "readily available” for a lineup and that they had counsel to represent them in the other rape prosecution. They must also have known that such a charade would violate defendants’ rights. This practice was unconscionable and should not be condoned by the Court.
*53I cannot accept the majority’s conclusion that this procedure was not improperly suggestive. Nor can I accept, as does the majority, that the victim was totally unaware of the real purpose of her visit to the parking lot. She must have had some suspicion as she stood on the steps of the courthouse that something other than the color of the car was in question. She had repeatedly told the detectives that morning that she was unsure of the color and could not identify it.
In determining the admissibility of testimony concerning this pretrial identification the "totality of the circumstances” must be examined. This totality includes (a) the suggestive aspects of the procedure itself, (b) the justification for the procedure used and (c) the reliability of the resulting identification. United States ex rel Kirby v Sturges, 510 F2d 397 (CA 7, 1975), cert den, 421 US 1016; 95 S Ct 2424; 44 L Ed 2d 685 (1975). Reliability is tested by the factors mentioned in Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188; 93 S Ct 375; 34 L Ed 2d 401 (1972).1
The majority admits that the procedure should never have occurred. There is agreement then that there was no justification for not holding a corporeal lineup, the preferred method of testing identifications. I would also hold that the show-up was suggestive. The victim must have felt that the police believed these individuals were "the ones”. She had tentatively selected their photographs the day before; been shown their car that morning; and no reasonable excuse existed for standing in *54the lot on the pretext of identifying the color of the car. While the subsequent confrontation in the hall and on the elevator strengthened her identification, it seems patently suggestive.
"The confrontation was therefore defective for both of the reasons stated in Biggers; the show-up increased the likelihood of misidentification, and that increased risk of error was gratuitous.” United States ex rel Kirby v Sturges, supra at 404.
See People v Yacks, 49 Mich App 444, 449; 212 NW2d 249 (1973).
Applying the reliability standards of Biggers does nothing to dispel the conclusion that this testimony was erroneously admitted. Although the victim was with her attackers for a significant period of time, the night was dark and she was forced to look straight ahead while in the car. She was severely beaten and also expressed the belief that she had been drugged. When she was found the morning after the attack she was incoherent and her thinking was "fuzzy”.
Before viewing the photographic display, she gave three descriptions of her attackers to the sheriffs department. Each of these descriptions gave various heights and weights, none of which approached defendants’ actual height of 6'5" and 6'1". There were also discrepancies in her descriptions of other features of the defendants and the car they were driving.
Based on this record I cannot join in the conclusion that introduction of this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Considerable time was devoted to repeating this testimony at trial. There was no real corroborating evidence connecting defendants with this crime. The strong identifi*55cations that the majority relies upon are in reality a tentative identification one day after the events from the photographs and an in-court identification. Given the intervening events, I would reverse. However, I fully agree with the majority as to the reversal on the rape charge for the reasons therein cited.
These convictions should be reversed.

 These factors "include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” 409 US at 199-200.