Court Opinion

ID: 9636410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:27:40.544369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:45.263843
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
I agree, in the circumstances of this case, that plaintiffs’ causes of action against the attorney-defendants and the other defendants whom plaintiffs charged with collective fraud arose simultaneously. That fraud allegedly stemmed from a concerted plan to deprive plaintiffs of sewer permits for their land-development project. In that context, I agree that the entire controversy doctrine required joinder of the attorney-defendants in the plaintiffs’ action against the other conspirators. The attorney-defendants, Perskie & Nehmad (a professional corporation), Steven R. Nehmad, and Benjamin Zeltner nominally represented plaintiffs in the permitting process. That representation did not alter the attorneys’ status as potential defendants whose interests could be adverse to plaintiffs’ interests.
*335I write separately to urge the Court to reconsider its holding in Grunwald v. Bronkesh, 131 N.J. 483, 621 A.2d 459 (1993). In that case, we held that a cause of action tor attorney malpractice arises when a client reasonably believes that an attorney’s erroneous opinion has resulted in the client suffering injury, such as an adverse ruling. Id. at 499-500, 621 A.2d 459. In Grunwald, an attorney had given a client an opinion that the client had a binding contract with a purchaser of real property. Id. at 488, 621 A.2d 459. In an initial hearing the trial court disagreed with counsel on the law of the case, which alerted the client, who was present in court, that his attorney may have been mistaken. Id. at 500, 621 A.2d 459.
Under the theory that the Court adopts today, a client’s attorney-malpractice claim may arise before a trial judge’s ruling has been appealed, and that claim must be joined with the pending action — an action that may be en route to an appeal. Does it not make more sense for the attorney and client to maintain a relationship until it is determined whether the attorney’s opinion will stand up on appeal? After all, predicting the path of the law can be as difficult as predicting the path of a storm. The forecaster may have all the data and theories at hand, but the outcome may not be as predicted.
I adhere to the view I expressed in Grunwald:
I find myself in agreement * * * with the opinion of Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court interpreting the concept of injury under the California Legal Malpractice Act. He would construe the concept of injury in [attorney] malpractice cases with the purpose of “furthering the policies underlying statutes of limitations: ie., judicial economy, avoiding stale claims, and fairness to the parties.”
[Id. at 503, 621 A.2d 459 (quoting Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal.4th 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 562, 828 P.2d 691, 703 (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct 658, 121 L.Ed.2d 584 (1992)).]
As Justice Mosk points out:
To force malpractice plaintiffs to file their actions before they know the outcome of the case upon which their claim is based does not promote judicial economy. The status of the malpractice claim is uncertain until the appeal in the underlying case is resolved, because if it is ultimately decided in the client’s favor the malpractice suit may well become moot for lack of damages.
[Laird supra, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d at 563, 828 P.2d at 704.]
*336For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 7.
Justice O’HERN concurs in result — 1.