Court Opinion

ID: 9721282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:54:55.952909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.561768
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I would affirm the ruling of the trial court in sustaining appellee’s motion for discharge. The delay here in issue is the period from October 8, 1968, the day on which appellee entered his plea of not guilty and filed his motion for separate trial, to January 15, 1969, the day the court denied that motion. If this delay was caused by the act of the appellee in filing his motion for separate trial, the trial court erred in discharging the appellee. In my judgment, the entire period should not be attributed to the filing of this motion. The only part of this period properly attributed to the motion is that time necessary for the trial court to rule on the motion, and the remainder of the delay would not be caused by the pending motion. In this case, the trial court stated that he was delaying the ruling on the motion for the reason that the co-defendant had entered a plea of insanity. Such a turn of events is obviously no responsibility of the appellee.
In my opinion, ten days would constitute a reasonable period for the trial court to study the motion, hear arguments, if necessary, and to rule on the motion. I would, therefore, consider the delay from October 28, 1968, the end of such ten day period, to January 15, 1969, as delay not caused by the act of the appellee.
There being no further delays, after the filing of this motion for separate trial, attributable to the appellee, the trial court *249was correct in finding a delay of six months, as of May 1,1969, the date the motion for discharge was filed.
Note. — Reported in 268 N. E. 2d 80.