Court Opinion

ID: 9839659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 18:07:11.315936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.421831
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39782

BLOCHHOUSE, LLC,

      Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

v.

FRANCINE M. TRUJILLO and ALL
OTHER UNKNOWN OCCUPANTS,

      Defendants/Counterclaimants-Appellants,

and

FRANCINE M. TRUJILLO,

      Third-Party Plaintiff,

v.

ESTANCIA BLUEWATER, LLC;
DEVELOPING OPPORTUNITIES, LLC;
and STEPHEN PALEVICH,

      Third-Party Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Benjamin Chavez, District Court Judge

Vance, Chavez & Associates, LLC
James A. Chavez
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

New Mexico Legal Aid
Corinna Laszlo-Henry
Las Vegas, NM

for Appellant

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

WRAY, Judge.

{1}    Having granted the motion for rehearing filed by Defendant Francine Trujillo
(Tenant) and considered the response of Plaintiff Blochhouse LLC (Landlord), we
withdraw the opinion filed June 28, 2023, and substitute the following opinion in its
place. Tenant appeals the district court’s grant of a writ of possession in favor of
Landlord. Tenant argues that the district court erroneously granted Landlord possession
of the property under the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act (UORRA), NMSA
1978, §§ 47-8-1 to -52 (1975, as amended through 2007). We affirm.

{2}    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the
background of this case, we discuss pertinent facts and procedural history as needed
within our analysis.

DISCUSSION

{3}    Tenant challenges the district court’s (1) construction of the lease and related
option agreements; (2) procedural handling of the case, including the bifurcation of the
UORRA claims from Tenant’s counterclaims; and (3) refusal to apply equitable
estoppel. Tenant, as the appellant, bears the burden to demonstrate error by the district
court. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111
N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063. We review contracts and statutory language de novo and the
findings of the district court for substantial evidence. Cheng v. Rabey, 2023-NMCA-013,
¶¶ 19, 22-23, 525 P.3d 405. We review the district court’s decision to bifurcate for an
abuse of discretion. Sandoval v. Gurley Properties Ltd., 2022-NMCA-004, ¶ 5, 503 P.3d
410. We begin with the district court’s basis for granting the writ of possession.

I.    Tenant Does Not Demonstrate Error by the District Court

{4}    Tenant argues that Landlord sought eviction for “no cause” but that the lease
agreement and the related option agreements did not permit termination of the tenancy
without cause. Landlord responds that it proved Tenant did not pay rent, thereby
establishing cause. In reply, Tenant maintains that even if Landlord proved
nonpayment, the petition for writ of possession did not plead that Landlord provided the
notice required under UORRA to terminate for nonpayment, and the district court,
therefore, did not have jurisdiction to enter the writ for nonpayment. We conclude that
the district court had jurisdiction to enter the writ of possession in these proceedings
and that Tenant has not met the burden to demonstrate error on appeal on any other
ground.
{5}     The lease states that the term is two years, after which Tenant may remain on
the property month-to-month “so long as they are in good standing with all the terms
and conditions of” the lease. On October 23, 2020, Landlord issued a written thirty-day
notice of termination of the lease and listed no cause for the termination. Landlord filed
the petition for writ of restitution January 13, 2021, well after the thirty-day notice period
expired. Landlord’s notice and petition conformed to UORRA’s single requirement for
terminating a month-to-month lease—thirty days’ written notice, see § 47-8-37(B), and
as a result, the district court had jurisdiction over Landlord’s petition. See Cheng, 2023-
NMCA-013, ¶ 17 (explaining that the district court’s jurisdiction depends on the
petitioner’s right to possession at the time the petition is filed, which in turn depends on
compliance with UORRA).

{6}    As we have noted, the lease had an additional term that permitted Tenant to
continue to reside on the property provided that Tenant was in good standing with the
lease. See § 47-8-14 (permitting parties to a lease to add terms and conditions to an
agreement that are not prohibited by UORRA). Thus, for Landlord to establish the right
to terminate the lease, it was necessary to prove some breach of the lease agreement.
In the petition for writ of restitution, Landlord elected to plead nonpayment of rent in
order to establish the breach.1 At the hearing on the writ of possession, the district court
clearly found that Tenant was chronically behind in paying the rent. Tenant
acknowledges that both the lease and the option agreements permit termination for
nonpayment and does not dispute that the evidence supported a finding that she did not
pay the total amount owed (although Tenant did dispute the amount owed). See Cheng,
2023-NMCA-013, ¶ 22 (reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for substantial
evidence). Nor does Tenant specifically challenge on appeal the district court’s finding
of nonpayment. See Seipert v. Johnson, 2003-NMCA-119, ¶ 26, 134 N.M. 394, 77 P.3d
298 (“An unchallenged finding of the trial court is binding on appeal.”). Although Tenant
claims that the district court should have considered extrinsic evidence to resolve
ambiguities in the agreements, Tenant does not point to an ambiguity in the relevant
portions of the agreements or explain what extrinsic evidence would have refuted a
finding of nonpayment. As a result, we conclude that Landlord established a right to
terminate the lease, and that Tenant has failed to persuade us that the district court
improperly granted the writ of possession.

{7}    In the brief in chief on appeal, Tenant argues that rather than being a month-to-
month lease, the lease and related option agreements combined to create a life estate
that could not be terminated without cause and that no-cause termination was contrary
to the parties’ intent. Tenant observes that the opportunity to cure differentiates the
termination of a month-to-month lease from other termination methods, that the district

1Tenant argued in the district court that if the eviction was for nonpayment, our Supreme Court’s COVID-
19 pandemic moratorium on evictions would stay any writ of possession. The district court rejected this
argument based on its construction of the moratorium. Because the moratorium has since been lifted, see
Order, In the Matter of Lifting the Stay of Writs of Restitution Issued Under the Uniform Owner-Resident
Relations Act and the Mobile Home Park Act During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, No. 22-
8500-012, at 3-4 (N.M. March 16, 2022), https://supremecourt.nmcourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/3/2022/04/Order-No.-22-8500-012.pdf, mooting this issue, we do not address the
district court’s interpretation of the moratorium’s application in this case.
court’s procedures permitted an “end run” around the opportunity to cure, and that
Landlord should have been estopped from establishing breach without providing an
opportunity to cure. In response, Landlord argues that nonpayment was uncontested
and established at trial. In reply, Tenant continues to argue that the lease could not be
terminated without cause, referencing the opportunity to cure, and also argues for the
first time in this Court that even if Landlord’s allegations of nonpayment were true, “the
complaint fail[ed] to plead a present right to possession because of [Landlord]’s failure
to provide a [three]-day notice demanding past-due rent prior to termination and
commencement of the action.” We note that a lease may only be terminated for
nonpayment under UORRA “[i]f rent is unpaid and the resident fails to pay rent within
three days after written notice from the owner of nonpayment and [owner’s] intention to
terminate the rental agreement.” Section 47-8-33(D). We do not, however, address
arguments suggested for the first time in reply briefs. Guest v. Berardinelli, 2008-NMCA-
144, ¶ 36, 145 N.M. 186, 195 P.3d 353.

{8}    Tenant continues to focus on the district court’s jurisdiction and does not argue
on appeal that without establishing compliance with UORRA’s three-day notice and
opportunity to cure, the evidence did not support a finding that the lease was breached
by nonpayment. Tenant does not cite Section 47-8-8, which directs that UORRA
“applies to, regulates and determines rights, obligations and remedies under a rental
agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state.” Tenant does
not develop any argument that Landlord must have pleaded or have complied with
Section 47-8-33(D) in order rely on nonpayment to satisfy the contractual requirement to
show breach before terminating the lease in this case. We therefore conclude that
Tenant has not satisfied her burden on appeal to establish that the district court erred in
granting the writ of restitution.

II.    Tenant Did Not Demonstrate That the Procedures Employed Were an
       Abuse of Discretion

{9}     Tenant maintains that the district court improperly used a bifurcated and
summary proceeding and refused to permit Tenant to offer evidence to support contract
ambiguity asserted in a motion to dismiss. According to Tenant, “[t]he district court erred
by determining that the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts were required to
yield to the expedited trial provisions” of UORRA because the present case involved
“the existence of an option agreement, other complex contractual issues, and a 15-year
history of instruments and orally-modified agreements.” We discern no abuse of
discretion. The bifurcated and expedited procedure is permitted by both UORRA and
the rules. See § 47-8-42 (providing for bifurcated proceedings); § 47-8-43 (requiring
expedited proceedings); Rule 1-001(A) NMRA (permitting application of statutory
provisions that are contrary to rule provisions); Rule 1-042 NMRA (permitting
bifurcation). This Court has further acknowledged the need to quickly evaluate
possessory proceedings in part for the benefit of dispossessed tenants. See White v.
Farris, 2021-NMCA-014, ¶ 24, 485 P.3d 791 (“recognizing an immediate right to appeal
enables residents to avoid the drastic consequences of eviction until their appeal is
heard”). The district court granted Tenant’s initial request for more time and five months
after the petition was filed, heard Tenant’s motion to dismiss and the writ of restitution
back-to-back. Tenant remained in the home during this extended period. Tenant
identifies no particular procedural rule that the district court sacrificed for the purposes
of expediency.

{10} Tenant next contends that to establish contractual ambiguity and the parties’
intent, the district court should have allowed the introduction of evidence and testimony
on the motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss, however, like the motion brought by
Tenant under Rule 1-012(B) NMRA, does not allow the district court to consider
“matters outside the pleadings.” See Rule 1-012(C). And although the district court did
not take evidence at the motion to dismiss hearing, Tenant points to no witness who
was prevented from testifying at the trial on Landlord’s writ of possession, which was
held later that same day. Further, although Tenant suggests that discovery might have
been helpful, she has identified no discovery sought during the five-month proceeding.
Tenant has not met the “burden on appeal to demonstrate through discussion of facts,
arguments, and rulings appearing in the record how the district court abused its
discretion.” Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104.

III.   Tenant Did Not Preserve the Estoppel Argument

{11} Tenant argues on appeal that Landlord should have been estopped from
pursuing the writ of possession because of Landlord’s past acceptance of late payments
and prior willingness to create a payment plan for Tenant. In the answer to the
complaint, Tenant raised a similar affirmative defense but has not identified for this
Court where in the record the argument made on appeal was offered at trial or when a
ruling was invoked from the district court. We therefore conclude that this argument was
unpreserved and decline to consider it further. See McDonald v. Zimmer Inc., 2020-
NMCA-020, ¶ 39, 461 P.3d 930 (“[A]n affirmative defense is not preserved for our
review unless it is litigated before the district court and a ruling is invoked on the
issue.”).

CONCLUSION

{12}   For these reasons, we affirm the district court.

{13}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge