Court Opinion

ID: 9956731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 20:00:44.694293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:46.111110
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 2 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SURINDER SINGH,                                 No. 23-143
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A097-586-573
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 29, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, WALLACH,*** and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.

      Surinder Singh (“Singh”), a 58-year-old native and citizen of India, petitions

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision denying his

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Evan J. Wallach, United States Senior Circuit Judge
for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

        “A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Aguilar

Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bonilla v. Lynch, 840

F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016)). “A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is

‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’” Id. at 892 (quoting Bonilla, 840 F.3d at

581).

        To prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a

petitioner must “(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country

of removal, (2) show that the evidence is material, (3) show that the evidence was

unavailable and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous

hearings, and (4) establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Singh v.

Garland, 46 F.4th 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2022); see also

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

        During his underlying proceedings, Singh sought asylum, withholding of

removal, and Convention Against Torture relief on the basis of three instances of

police harassment he suffered in India, due to a perceived affiliation with the

Mann—also called the SADA—party. In 2007, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found

Singh “not worthy of credence” as to “anything . . . in his case,” based on

discrepancies in his testimony regarding his whereabouts and the alleged

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mistreatment. In his motion to reopen, Singh alleges changed country conditions

on the basis of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s recent targeting of Mann party

supporters. The BIA denied his motion to reopen, because Singh “has not

submitted additional evidence to establish either his party membership or that

individuals in his hometown have imputed political views to him,” citing the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination. Singh argues the BIA erred in relying on this

determination to deny his motion.1

      On a motion to reopen, the BIA may not make credibility determinations and

must credit evidence unless it is “inherently unbelievable.” Shouchen Yang v.

Lynch, 822 F.3d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d

1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2014)). Here, however, the IJ found Singh not credible as to

“anything . . . in his case.” IJs are permitted to “find that a witness who testified

falsely about one thing is also not credible about other things.” Id. (citing Enying

Li v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1160, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2013)). Because Singh’s additional

evidence is not “independent of the facts that formed the prior credibility finding,”

1
  We need not address the two other issues Singh raises on appeal: (1) whether the
BIA abused its discretion in finding no changed circumstances; and (2) whether the
BIA abused its discretion in finding Singh did not show that he is prima facie
eligible for relief. The BIA did not make a separate finding as to these issues, and
instead rested its finding on Singh’s failure to “establish that he is a SADA party
worker or that individuals in his hometown impute this status to him,” Navas v.
I.N.S., 217 F.3d 646, 658 n.16 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court cannot affirm the BIA
on a ground upon which it did not rely.”).

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the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion. See Singh, 46

F.4th at 1122 (finding the BIA erred in denying a motion to reopen based on a

prior adverse credibility determination where the new, “independent,” evidence

included, inter alia, “a letter from the Mann leader attesting to his membership in

the party, and a letter from his mother stating that the police were looking for

Singh”).

      PETITION DENIED.

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