Court Opinion

ID: 9957276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:13:55.891526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.374780
License: Public Domain

04/03/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                                 March 5, 2024 Session

                  LAVINO HORNE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                 No. 10-00509       Jennifer Johnson Mitchell, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00675-CCA-R3-PC
                       ___________________________________

        Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of
limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his
petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court
erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing
his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State
further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments
of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of
limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s post-
conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations
and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the
petition as untimely.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.
HOLLOWAY, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Josie S. Holland (on appeal) and Terita Hewlett (at post-conviction hearing), Memphis,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Lavino Horne.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Steve Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Leslie Byrd, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
                                            OPINION

                            Factual and Procedural Background

       Petitioner and his co-defendants, Leterpa Mosley and Charles McClain, were each
convicted of one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder, and one count
of especially aggravated robbery for the shooting death of Tederrial Hancock, a student at
the University of Memphis. Mr. Hancock was shot seven times while sitting in his car
outside of the Hollywood Public Library. A full recitation of the facts can be found in this
court’s opinion on direct appeal affirming Petitioner’s and his co-defendants’ convictions.1
State v. McClain, et al., No. W2013-00328-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4754531, at *1-2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2014).

        Petitioner’s untimely pro se petition for post-conviction relief was filed on February
8, 2016, which indicated that he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing on February
1, 2016. The petition alleged newly discovered evidence and other grounds. Thereafter,
the State filed a motion to dismiss based on the petition’s having been filed beyond the
one-year statute of limitations. Post-conviction counsel was appointed, and Petitioner filed
a response to the motion to dismiss indicating that he sent numerous letters to trial counsel
requesting copies of his records, trial transcripts, and information regarding the filing
deadlines. He asserted that trial counsel did not respond to his requests for several months,
and he did not receive copies of his trial transcripts until after he filed a complaint with the
Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR”). He further asserted that he was
a juvenile at the time of the offenses, and “still ha[d] no higher education. As a result,
Petitioner struggled to figure out what he should do in order to proceed with his case and
relied substantially on efforts to contact his attorney.” Petitioner alleged that “[a]s a result
of this lack of communication and lack of access to his case files, Petitioner was not able
to file his pro se petition for relief until after the deadline.” Petitioner attached to his
response several documents concerning his efforts to contact trial counsel and to obtain his
trial records for post-conviction proceedings.

       At the January 11, 2019 hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the petition,
Petitioner did not dispute that his petition was untimely. He agreed that his Rule 11
application to the Tennessee Supreme Court was denied on January 15, 2015, the mandate
was issued on January 20, 2015, and his petition was not filed until February 8, 2016.
Relying on Whitehead v. State, 402 S.W.3d 615 (Tenn. 2013), Petitioner argued that

  1
     The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction for
Petitioner and each co-defendant and imposed concurrent sentences of life for first degree murder and
twenty-five years for especially aggravated robbery.

                                                -2-
“extraordinary circumstances that were out of [his] control led to [his petition] being filed
untimely.”2

         Trial counsel testified that he had been practicing criminal defense law since 1994
and was appointed to represent Petitioner. After trial, he filed a motion for new trial and
an appeal, which were both denied. After receiving notice that Petitioner’s Rule 11
application was denied by the supreme court, he instructed an intern who was assisting him
to send Petitioner a letter, dated February 9, 2015, indicating that trial counsel’s
representation of Petitioner had ended. Trial counsel further explained that the purpose of
the letter was “[t]o notify [Petitioner] that the [s]upreme [c]ourt had denied his application,
his Rule 11 application, our representation had ended. And in this particular letter [the
intern] included the documentation, the things that we believed [Petitioner] had already
been provided by us through the course of our representation.” Trial counsel agreed that
Petitioner did not have the trial transcripts at the time of the letter. However, in the letter,
Petitioner’s family was invited to pick up the transcripts and Petitioner’s case file from trial
counsel’s office because they were too large to mail. Trial counsel was familiar with
Petitioner’s father and occasionally saw him after the trial. However, no one came to pick
up the transcripts or file. Trial counsel said that the letter ended by stating, “I wish you
well and . . . as always, if there’s any other way our office may assist you, please don’t
hesitate to contact us.” Trial counsel agreed that that sort of closing was standard in his
letters.

        Trial counsel testified that Petitioner’s file contained letters received from
Petitioner. He said that Petitioner wrote to him on September 6, 2015, “requesting opening
and closing arguments, sentencing hearing, . . . motion for new trial transcripts, things of
that nature.” Trial counsel’s office did not respond to the letter. He next received a letter
from the BPR on September 29, 2015, notifying him that Petitioner had sent them a letter
assuming that trial counsel “was his post-conviction lawyer.” Trial counsel did not respond
to the letter because he did not feel that it required a response. He explained that the BPR
“often sends letters saying, Hey, here’s a copy of something that a client of yours sent us
and requires no action.”

       Trial counsel received a second letter from the BPR on October 20, 2015, with three
attached letters from Petitioner, indicating that Petitioner had “contacted the Consumer
Assistance Program and had a request, and that they requested I respond to him within ten
days.” He noted that a portion of one of Petitioner’s letters to the BPR says, “Is there any
way y’all can get [trial counsel] to send me the proper paperwork that I have requested? I
am behind on my post[-]conviction due to a lack of paperwork. Without transcripts, I can’t
argue my claim.” Trial counsel immediately mailed Petitioner’s trial transcripts to him.
He received a letter back from Petitioner on November 5, 2015, indicating that the

   2
    At the hearing, Petitioner introduced a collective exhibit that included numerous letters he wrote to and
from trial counsel, the criminal court clerk, and the BPR.

                                                   -3-
transcripts had been received and acknowledging that trial counsel had withdrawn from his
case “back in February[.]” Petitioner also asked several questions about the next steps in
his case such as going back to court to get new counsel appointed and filing something pro
se. He also asked what his “next appeal” would be and the deadline for such an appeal.
Trial counsel did not respond to the letter.

        On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed that Petitioner had until January 15,
2016, to file his post-conviction petition. He further agreed that in Petitioner’s October 8,
2015 letter to him, Petitioner said that he was behind on his post-conviction petition “due
to a lack of paperwork” and that he had never filed his petition. Trial counsel thus agreed
that Petitioner was aware that he had a right to file a post-conviction petition and knew he
needed an attorney to represent him. Trial counsel explained that he did not respond to the
questions raised in Petitioner’s November 5, 2015 letter because:

       I knew he was aware of his post[-]conviction. I knew that - - that, you know,
       I’d invited the family to come get the file. I knew that my representation was
       over and that there was really nothing else for me to do. Wasn’t trying to
       hurt him in his attempt to have his post[-]conviction, but I knew he knew it
       well. It - - and this is not fair to [Petitioner], but unfortunately, when you’ve
       been through a murder trial or a very serious trial, if you lose, you appeal,
       and ultimately there’s a post[-]conviction. The - - the tenor of the letters you
       receive and the attitude from people is not the most pleasant. They’re - -

       *      *      *

       - - they are angry with you. They are upset with you. Again, that’s not fair
       to [Petitioner] because nothing he wrote me seems to be like that, but that is
       the mindset you’re used to dealing with. And once I know my job is done,
       we got him what he needs to do, I assume he knew very well he had a post[-
       ]conviction and a deadline. I did not think I had to spoon feed him any of
       that and it wasn’t out of ugliness. Honestly, it was more out of, I knew he
       knew those things.

Trial counsel testified that in addition to acknowledging that he was behind on his post-
conviction petition, Petitioner also knew that he needed transcripts in order to argue his
claims. In Petitioner’s November 5, 2015 letter, he acknowledged that he had received the
transcripts. His deadline for filing his post-conviction petition was more than two months
later on January 15, 2016.

       Petitioner testified at the hearing and conceded that his post-conviction petition was
untimely filed. He said that he was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses and had an
eighth grade education. He was twenty-three at the time of the tolling hearing and had
obtained his GED while incarcerated. Trial counsel represented him throughout trial and

                                             -4-
on appeal. Petitioner testified that he wrote a letter to trial counsel on December 29, 2014,
requesting copies of his transcripts. He said that the purpose of the letter was to get
information for his “appeal process,” which was pending at the time. He wrote the criminal
court clerk’s office on December 31, 2014, also inquiring about the transcripts. Petitioner
said that he had an inmate helping with the “appeals process” who wanted to review the
transcripts. Petitioner claimed that he never received any information about his appeal and
learned that it had been denied when he tried to file his post-conviction petition. He said
that he did not receive trial counsel’s February 9, 2015 letter advising him that his file was
closed and that trial counsel no longer represented him, because he was in a different
correctional facility from the one where the letter was sent.

       Petitioner testified that he wrote to trial counsel again in September of 2015 in order
to obtain his trial transcripts to “start on [his] next appeal.” When asked what his next
appeal was, Petitioner replied: “I didn’t know. Like, an inmate told me that I need to start
on my appeal, but I ain’t know which one it was.” He did not get a response to his letter
from trial counsel, so he wrote a letter to the BPR asking if they would direct trial counsel
to send the trial transcripts to Petitioner. Petitioner said that the BPR wrote a letter back
assuming that trial counsel had already filed Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. He was
“confused” and wrote a second letter to the BPR indicating that trial counsel still had not
sent his “proper paperwork” and that he was behind on his post-conviction petition because
he thought that trial counsel had already filed it, but he was not sure.

        Petitioner wrote another letter to the BPR clarifying that he had not filed a post-
conviction petition and that his direct appeal and motion for new trial had been denied. He
said that he was seeking assistance concerning his “next appeal” and what he needed to do.
Petitioner estimated that he wrote five or six letters each to trial counsel and to the BPR
seeking assistance. He also wrote letters to the “[c]ourt [c]lerk.” Petitioner agreed that
trial counsel contacted him within ten days after the BPR asked trial counsel to respond to
Petitioner’s concerns, and Petitioner received his trial transcripts. Petitioner said that he
wrote to trial counsel after receiving the transcripts “[b]ecause at the end of the letter he
told me to - - like, if I needed any more help or had any more questions, feel free to write
him. So that’s what I did.” He said that he asked trial counsel three questions about his
“next appeal.” Petitioner testified that he did not receive a response from trial counsel and
then wrote to the court clerk to ask about the deadline for filing his post-conviction petition.
However, he did not receive a response from the court clerk, so he then filed his post-
conviction petition which was late. He said that he learned that his petition was untimely
after post-conviction counsel was appointed.

        On cross-examination, Petitioner agreed that in his October 8, 2015 correspondence
to the BPR, he acknowledged that he did in fact receive trial counsel’s February 9, 2015
letter indicating that trial counsel’s representation of Petitioner had ended and that he had
not filed his post-conviction petition. He knew at that time that trial counsel had withdrawn
from his case and he was focused on filing his post-conviction petition and was looking for

                                             -5-
assistance. Petitioner testified that as of October 8, 2015, he thought that he had one year
from the date of his trial to file his post-conviction petition, and he was “trying to meet that
deadline.” In Petitioner’s November 5, 2015 letter to trial counsel, he also acknowledged
that trial counsel had withdrawn from his case in February of 2015 and no longer
represented him. Petitioner testified that he had inmates helping with the post-conviction
petition, “who’s been there over 20 years and legal advisors.” When asked about getting
assistance from inmates, Petitioner replied: “You go to the law library and find someone
who [has] been doing law work, or you talk to an inmate around and they’ll point you to
the right person. That’s how I found out about my post[-]conviction and stuff like that.”
Petitioner testified that someone explained “post-conviction petitions” to him and began
helping him with the process. He was told that he needed the transcripts to find out which
issues to raise. Petitioner agreed that he received the transcripts approximately two months
before his post-conviction petition was filed. He reiterated that he had completed the eighth
grade and a few months of the ninth grade before his indictment in this case and had
obtained his GED while incarcerated. Petitioner also stated that he had previously missed
one year of school because no school would accept him due to some other juvenile court
proceedings.

       Virgil Clay, Petitioner’s father, testified that he never saw a letter from trial counsel
indicating that Petitioner’s transcripts could be picked up by a family member. He
sometimes saw trial counsel during court proceedings for Mr. Clay’s other son, but trial
counsel did not mention Petitioner’s case. Mr. Clay testified that he visited trial counsel’s
office four or five times to get “some kind of paperwork” on Petitioner’s case and that he
was “specific about the transcripts.” He said that trial counsel indicated that the transcripts
were on his desk, but trial counsel did not tell him to pick them up. Mr. Clay said that trial
counsel did not know where to “send the papers” because trial counsel did not know
Petitioner’s location. Mr. Clay testified that trial counsel gave three or four excuses for not
getting paperwork to Petitioner. He did not know how Petitioner obtained copies of his
transcripts.

       At the conclusion of the tolling hearing, the post-conviction court noted that
Petitioner’s situation was “unfortunate” and that he was arrested and indicted for first-
degree murder at the age of sixteen and that he was twenty-two or twenty-three with an
eighth-grade education “just a couple of months into his 9th grade year” when he began
his post-conviction proceedings. The post-conviction court further concluded:

       And I think it’s real important that - - that great consideration be taken for
       his - - his age. And - - and not to say that he, - - he’s a, for lack of a better
       term, a dumb young man, because he’s not, but he was 22 or 23, and at the
       time he had an 8th grade education. And he testified to that he had done just
       a couple of months into his 9th grade year.

                                             -6-
When [trial counsel] wrote these letters - - wrote this letter to inform
[Petitioner] that he was ending his representation, it says - - it says here that
he’s filed both the appeal, he was denied the appeal, and he’s requested
review from the - - from the [s]upreme [c]ourt. But of course, it’s left up to
the Court’s discretion.

And then he goes on to further state that [Petitioner’s] file is at his office.
It’s too large to mail. He doesn’t get - - he’s not able to bill for the mailing,
and so therefore, it’s left at his office if someone wants to come pick it up.
But this letter doesn’t go any further into now what’s the next step for
[Petitioner]. And clearly, that’s what [Petitioner] was looking for. And he
was looking for that in all of these requests when - - when he - - he states
what’s my next - - what’s my next step? What’s my next step?

There are some timing issues. This whole thing of course is a timing issue,
but we’ve discerned in this hearing that [Petitioner] finally got transcripts
two months prior to the deadline - - the filing deadline for this post-
conviction petition to be filed.

The State makes - - makes the argument that [Petitioner] knew what his
remedy was, that he - - he knew he had a deadline coming. And that’s true.
He - - he knew enough to get to the law library where he was housed to talk
to some people. And he needs to file a post[-] conviction, and his post[-
]conviction has to be filed within a year.

However, it’s that same lack of education and - - and lack of familiarity with
this system and the - - the details of this system that come into play. Because
[Petitioner] was under the impression that he had a year from conviction date
or motion for new trial date. Whichever one, it was the wrong deadline.

So, yes, we - - we see in his communications that he recognizes there is a
deadline that he’s - - that he’s working with. But in his - - his quest to - - to
do what he knows he’s supposed to do, he’s still working with the wrong
deadline. It’s a reason why we have attorneys to make sure these deadlines
are - - are met and met in a timely fashion.

I’m also, I don’t know, puzzled by this letter that Ms. Beverly Sharpe from
the [BPR] sends to [Petitioner], dated September 29, 2015, because I was
confused when I read it. I don’t quite know what it means and I’m not certain
what Ms. - - Ms. Sharpe is responding to.

And maybe she didn’t understand what [Petitioner] was requesting or what
he was trying to tell her, but if she recognizes that it’s a post[-]conviction

                                      -7-
      that he needs to file, then I’m not sure why he just couldn’t tell her - - why
      she just couldn’t relay to him that you have a date from the - - the highest
      court’s ruling to file a post[-] conviction. But that’s not what she does in this.
      And this letter is probably the most confusing of this whole file.

      Applying the - - the two standards of the Whitehead case, the first one being
      the requirement - - excuse me, the - - that the defendant or petitioner in this
      matter was pursuing reasonable due diligence in trying to - - trying to get
      some answers. I believe we’ve met that. I believe [Petitioner] has met that
      in the fact that he’s - - he sent several letters to his attorney, to the [BPR], to
      the Clerk, just requesting help, requesting deadlines.

      There’s also another letter that I - - I feel compelled to mention, later dated
      November 5, 2015. And I believe it’s - - I believe it’s attached to this October
      8, 2015 batch of letters. But it’s addressed to [trial counsel], and I believed
      it was afforded to - - it was forwarded to [trial counsel] through the [BPR].
      And in it, [Petitioner] states that he received his transcripts, thank you dearly,
      but he has a few questions.

      And he has three questions out here clearly, clearly defining what the issues
      may be. If you withdrew from my case in February, why haven’t I been back
      to court? And - - and that’s letting us know that he doesn’t know how he can
      get another lawyer to help him with the next step.

      And then he doesn’t know what the next step is. He’s not sure at this point,
      but he knows he’s got to file something, and he’s talked to enough people in
      the prison to know, Do I need to file something pro se. And then the last one
      states, What’s the deadline on my next appeal? What is my next appeal? So
      I - - I think that’s the most telling in the fact that - - that he was pursuing this
      diligently. And the ordinary circumstances are - - are those ones that we - -
      we’ve already stated.

      First of all, the fact that he - - he had at the time an 8th grade education, that
      there was several miscommunications. And I think the most telling of those
      is the one from the [BPR], the fact that we’re talking about such a serious
      case. This is a first degree murder where [Petitioner] was sentenced to life.
      I just believe due process and fundamental fairness requires tolling of the
      statute.

Thereafter, Petitioner, through counsel, filed an amended post-conviction petition, and a
hearing was held over several different dates during which Petitioner’s mother, father,
uncle, and Youth Services Bureau probation counselor all testified. Additionally, trial
counsel, Petitioner, and retired Memphis Police officers Lieutenant Eric Freeman and

                                             -8-
Inspector Joe Stark also testified.3 The post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s post-
conviction petition finding that trial counsel was deficient but that Petitioner failed to prove
that he was prejudiced and “that the mandatory life sentence imposed violated Petitioner’s
Eighth Amendment Rights against cruel and unusual punishment but denie[d] the
Petitioner a sentencing hearing pursuant to the ruling in State v. Tyshon Booker, No. E2018-
01439-SC-R11-CD (Nov. 18, 2022).”

                                          ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court correctly determined that
the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently
pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-
conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner
from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as
untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial.

        Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or voidable
because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the
Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103. A person in custody under a
sentence of a court of this state must petition for post-conviction relief “within one (1) year
of the date of the final action of the highest state appellate court to which an appeal is taken
or, if no appeal is taken, within one (1) year of the date on which the judgment became
final[.]” Id. § 40-30-102(a). “The statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason,
including any tolling or saving provision otherwise available at law or equity.” Id.
Moreover, “[t]ime is of the essence of the right to file a petition for post-conviction relief
or motion to reopen established by this chapter, and the one-year limitations period is an
element of the right to file the action and is a condition upon its exercise.” Id. If it plainly
appears on the face of the post-conviction petition that the petition was filed outside the
one-year statute of limitations or that a prior petition attacking the conviction was resolved
on the merits, the post-conviction court must summarily dismiss the petition. Id. § 40-30-
106(b). “The question of whether the post-conviction statute of limitations should be tolled
is a mixed question of law and fact that is . . . subject to de novo review.” Bush v. State,
428 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011)).

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b) provides three exceptions to the
statute of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief: (1) claims based on a final
ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right not recognized as existing at

  3
     Because we dismiss Petitioner’s post-conviction petition as untimely, we will not summarize the
testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing.

                                               -9-
the time of trial and given retroactive effect by the appellate courts; (2) claims based upon
new scientific evidence establishing that the petitioner is actually innocent of the
conviction offense; and (3) claims seeking relief from a sentence that was enhanced
because of a previous conviction and the previous conviction was later held to be invalid.
T.C.A. §§ 40-30-102(b)(1)-(3).

        In addition to the statutory exceptions, our supreme court has held that due process
principles may require tolling the statute of limitations. See Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at
622-23. To date, our supreme court “has identified three circumstances in which due
process requires tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations”: (1) when the claim for
relief arises after the statute of limitations has expired; (2) when the petitioner’s mental
incompetence prevents him from complying with the statute of limitations; and (3) when
the petitioner’s attorney has committed misconduct. Id. at 623. To succeed upon such a
claim, a petitioner must show “(1) that he or she ha[d] been pursuing his or her rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his or her way and
prevented timely filing.” Id. at 631 (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-49
(2010)). The first prong “does not require a [petitioner] to undertake repeated exercises in
futility or to exhaust every imaginable option, but rather to make reasonable efforts. . . .
Moreover, the due diligence inquiry is an individualized one that must take into account
the conditions of confinement and the reality of the prison system.” Id. (quotations
omitted) (quoting Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008)). “[T]he second
prong is met when the [petitioner’s] attorney of record abandons the [petitioner] or acts in
a way directly adverse to the [petitioner’s] interests, such as by actively lying or otherwise
misleading the [petitioner] to believe things about his or her case that are not true.” Id. In
Whitehead, the court cautioned that due process tolling “must be reserved for those rare
instances where – due to circumstances external to the party’s own conduct – it would be
unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross injustice would
result.” Id. at 631-32 (quotations omitted) (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,
330 (4th Cir. 2000)).

        We agree with the State that Petitioner in this case failed to present sufficient facts
to justify a tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions
in his brief, the evidence presented at the tolling hearing does not demonstrate that
Petitioner was abandoned by trial counsel or that he diligently pursued his post-conviction
petition.

       Although Petitioner wrote several letters to trial counsel, the BPR, and the court
clerk requesting help with his post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner was aware that he
needed to file a post-conviction petition and that he had a deadline to do so. Petitioner
admitted at the tolling hearing that he knew trial counsel had withdrawn from his case in
February of 2015, after Petitioner’s Rule 11 application to the supreme court was denied
on January 15, 2015. Trial counsel’s February 9, 2015 letter to Petitioner advised him that
his application to appeal was denied by the supreme court and that trial counsel’s

                                             - 10 -
representation had ended. While Petitioner testified that he did not receive trial counsel’s
letter, Petitioner’s October 8, 2015 complaint to the BPR clearly indicated that Petitioner
had in fact received trial counsel’s letter. The February 9, 2015 letter further indicated that
a family member could pick up Petitioner’s file, which was “quite large and would be
burdensome to mail[,]” from trial counsel’s office and that Petitioner had been provided
with discovery prior to his trial and that the only things Petitioner was missing were his
“trial transcripts and record.” Petitioner’s trial transcripts and file were not picked up from
trial counsel’s office by any family member; however, trial counsel eventually mailed the
materials to Petitioner following Petitioner’s letter to the BPR requesting that they be sent
to him. Petitioner admitted that he received his trial transcripts at least two months prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations.

        In his letters to the BPR, Petitioner indicated that he was “behind” on his petition
due to a “lack of paper work” and that he was unable to argue his claims without his
transcripts. However, “having one’s case file is not a [prerequisite] to the filing of a post-
conviction petition.” State v. Weidekamp, No. M2020-00736-CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL
1345567, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2021); see also Carino v. State, No. E2018-
00775-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 5780231, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2018) (finding
that “[t]he Petitioner’s case file is not a condition precedent to his filing of his petition for
post-conviction relief”); Davis v. State, No. M2016-02512-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL
2257704, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 23, 2017) (noting that “even if the Petitioner had
not received his case file by the deadline for filing his post-conviction petition, the
Petitioner could have timely filed his post-conviction petition before his case file arrived
and later amended the petition”).

        We acknowledge Petitioner’s testimony that he was confused about the deadline to
file his post-conviction petition, and his letters contain several requests for information on
the deadline to file his petition. However, this court has stated that “a petitioner’s personal
ignorance of post-conviction procedures, ‘even when alleged to stem from an attorney’s
negligent failure to render advice to the petitioner, does not toll the running of the statute’
of limitations.” Jacobs v. State, No. M2009-02265-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3582493, at
*3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 2010) (quoting State v. Phillips, 904 S.W.2d 123, 124
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). Petitioner testified at the tolling hearing that he had inmates
helping with the post-conviction petition, “who’s been there over 20 years and legal
advisors.” When asked about getting assistance from inmates, Petitioner replied: “You go
to the law library and find someone who [has] been doing law work, or you talk to an
inmate around and they’ll point you to the right person. That’s how I found out about my
post[-]conviction and stuff like that.” He further testified that someone explained “post-
conviction petitions” to him and began helping him with the process.

       Trial counsel in this case did not abandon Petitioner as Petitioner alleges in his brief.
He complied with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 14 by advising Petitioner that
Petitioner’s case appeal to the supreme court had been denied, that his case had thus

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concluded, and that his representation had ended. See Montgomery v. State, No. M2022-
00780-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 5341132, at * 4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2023) (finding
that “trial counsel complied with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 14, advised the Petitioner
her case had concluded and of the deadline to file an appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court, and properly withdrew from representation.”), perm app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 11,
2024). Trial counsel did not act in any way directly adverse to Petitioner’s interest by
actively lying to or misleading Petitioner about his case. Petitioner has failed to show that
he was “prohibited from timely filing his petition for post-conviction relief by
circumstances outside of his control.” Watts v. State, No. M2019-00849-CCA-R3-PC,
2020 WL 5757618, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2020); id. At the conclusion of the
majority’s opinion in Whitehead, our supreme court stated,

           As we recently noted, “[i]n every case in which we have held the
           statute of limitations is tolled, the pervasive theme is that
           circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control prevented the petitioner
           from filing a petition for post-conviction relief within the statute of
           limitations.” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d at 358. This observation
           holds true today.

402 S.W.3d at 634 (emphasis in original); see also Watts, 2020 WL 5757618, at *3.
Because there are insufficient facts in this case to justify due process tolling of the statute
of limitations, the post-conviction court erred by denying the State’s motion to dismiss
Petitioner’s post-conviction petition as untimely. We, therefore, reverse the post-
conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

                                      CONCLUSION

        Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the petition for post-conviction relief was
untimely and that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the statute of limitations should be
tolled on due process grounds. Therefore, we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of
the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

                                               ____________________________________
                                                JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

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