Court Opinion

ID: 9865159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:25:31.73448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:39.043641
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissenting.
I was absent when the motion determined in the court opinion was argued orally; but since it is thought desirable that all the judges participate in the consideration of the cause, I have given attention to the matter. It is to be noted that the case came to issue here April 3, 1941, while the motion to dismiss was not filed until April 29. The statute on which that motion is predicated was signed by the Chief Executive, and became effective April 15.
*216I think the motion to dismiss is without merit. The statute on which the labor parties to the proceeding based their injunction suit was in force when advertisement for bids for the work involved was made, when bids were submitted, and when, on their bid, Horner, Brewer and Monaghan, other parties, were awarded the contract. It was in force during the pendency of the suit in the trial tribunal, and for nearly a month following the time when the matter was at issue here, as we have seen. Because the new statute does not contain a “saving' clause as to pending matters, inchoate rights or issues in litigation,” to quote from the court opinion, rights which labor enjoyed under the former statute, and concerning which its representatives had judgment at trial — not reversed or even considered here — they are dismissed from the temple of justice. The test, as I conceive, is not whether the new act contained a saving clause, as the court adjudges, but rather whether it -expressly negatived or repealed rights enjoyed and to be enjoyed under the former act, which it does not directly essay to do. In such circumstances, as my study convinces, section 4, chapter 159, ’35 C.S.A. (L. ’91, p. 366, §1, R.S. ’08, §6298, C.L. ’21, §6519), controls. It reads: “The repeal, revision, amendment or consolidation of any statute or part of a statute or section or part of a section of any statute, shall not have the effect to release, extinguish, alter, modify or change in whole or in part any penalty, forfeiture or liability, either civil or criminal, which shall have been incurred under such statute, unless the repealing, revising, amending or consolidating act shall expressly so provide; and such statute or part of a statute or section or part of a section of a statute so repealed, amended or revised, shall be treated, and held as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any and all proper actions, suits, proceedings and prosecutions, as well civil as criminal for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability, as well as for the purpose of sustaining any judg*217ment, decree or order which can or may be rendered, entered or made in such actions, suits, proceedings or prosecutions imposing, inflicting or declaring such penalty, forfeiture or liability.” See Day, Adm’r v. Madden, 9 Colo. App. 464 (48 Pac. 1053), where that court, in a learned and exhaustive opinion answers every contention made by the movants here. “The legislature, in passing the repealing statute without a saving clause,” said the court there, “had in view the terms, scope, and legal effect of a statute evidently passed to provide for just such contingencies. That act [section 4, supra], is in general terms; it aims at no specific statute; it is intended to embrace all statutes, both civil and criminal, and was evidently intended by the legislature to cover cases of this description, which, without intending to be offensively critical, we may justly say not infrequently happen. The statute [still referring to section 4] is broad in its scope, ample in its terms, and without giving undue force to its language, and without the adoption of a strained construction, may be taken to be a part and parcel of this repealing or amended statute. If this is so, then the statute was amended and reenacted with this provision attached, and we must read that section * * * as though it contained a provision that it should not be taken to extend to or effect any suits or proceedings already begun.”
On the theory that a constitutional question was involved in the Day case, error was prosecuted to the supreme court; but, determining that no such question was presented, we dismissed the writ. In the course of our discussion, however, we did analyze the holding of the Court of Appeals, saying: “The repealing act containing no provision to the contrary, the general saving clause statute (Session Laws, 1891, p. 366; 3 Mills’ Ann. Stats., sec. 418a) — whose object is to protect prior rights and remedies — is to be read into it, * * Madden v. Day, Adm’r, 24 Colo. 418, 51 Pac. 165. See, also, Cavanaugh v. Patterson, 41 Colo. 158, 91 Pac. 1117. I think *218Perry v. Denver, 27 Colo. 93 (59 Pac. 747), cited in the court opinion, is obviously distinguishable.
I submit that the court should have addressed itself to the merits of the writ of error, rather than to what, regarded most favorably, I think is a doubtful expedient. It is clear that the legislative branch of the government purposed to repeal a statute which labor regarded as a continuing measure of protection in an active field of state endeavor. But did it purpose to thwart rights which, in a particular instance, and existing prior to the enactment of the repealing statute, labor representatives had caused to be established by judicial decree? I do not so conclude. Otherwise, and proceeding in the light of the 1891 statute, which we are not to assume was overlooked by the legislature, such purpose would have been adequately stated in the enactment. What was not done directly by those responsible for the legislation, and possessing constitutional power to that end, I think the judicial department should not supply by implication; and I decline to join therein.