Court Opinion

ID: 9674517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:30:12.540803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.917626
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It should be noted that Rockwood moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the policy did not cover Danzy, introducing the affidavit of George Barrow, the insurance agent, and including a copy of the policy purportedly issued to James M. Danzy d/b/a Interstate Exterminators. The policy contains no endorsement specifying that Danzy himself was covered by the policy.
Danzy responded to Rockwood’s motion for summary judgment (1) by challenging the genuineness of the written policy introduced by Rockwood and (2) by alleging that Barrow orally represented to Danzy that Danzy himself would be covered by the policy, binding the insurance company. Danzy filed a supporting affidavit stating that Barrow knew that Danzy himself, as well as his employees, needed workers’ compensation coverage and assured Danzy both before the policy was issued and after the accident that he would be covered by the policy. The affidavit further stated that the $540 premium he paid was based on a percentage of his payroll which included his own salary.
Danzy raises two points of error asserting that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because factual issues regarding representations attributed to ap-pellee’s agent and issues concerning the genuineness and sufficiency of the policy offered by appellee remained unresolved.
A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310 (Tex.1984). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in his favor. Id. at 311.
Rockwood disputes that Danzy raised a material issue under his “oral representation” theory by citing this court to Powell v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 511 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ.App. — Tyler 1979, no writ). In Powell, a partner of the business to which the workers’ compensation policy was issued claimed that the agent through whom the policy issued had made certain oral representations giving rise to a special insurance contract which covered the partner. The court, in affirming the summary judgment for the insurance company, noted that the partner’s summary judgment proof in no way showed that the insurance company said or did anything to lead the partner to believe that the company intended to cover him, nor was there any proof that the partnership actually paid any premiums on the partner’s salary. By comparison, Danzy, *616in the case at bar, expressly stated that Barrow told him he would be covered and that the company paid premiums on its payroll including his salary.
Rockwood also argues that Danzy failed to aduce proof that Barrow had authority to bind Rockwood by any oral statements he might have made. I disagree. Danzy stated facts in his affidavits which tend to show apparent if not actual authority. See Hope v. Allstate Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.).
Danzy, in his affidavit, also expressly challenged the genuineness of the policy by stating that he never executed the policy introduced by Rockwood or the application for workers’ compensation insurance excluding the sole proprietor from coverage.
Rockwood never controverted any of these contentions by Danzy. Danzy did not sustain its burden. I would reverse the granting of the summary judgment and remand.
Since the majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.