Court Opinion

ID: 9665884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:54.864666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.068788
License: Public Domain

Wh. "Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority that Officer Midgett acted reasonably and in good faith in this case based upon what we have before us; however, I disagree with the majority that the facts of this case necessitate a determination of who was responsible for not quashing an outstanding arrest warrant that led to the appellant’s invalid arrest. Although the identity of the person(s) who failed to remove the warrant from the computer is unknown, I believe it is clearly immaterial in this particular case, wherein the arresting officer from one county relied in good faith upon the information from another county and exercised exceptional care in determining that the warrant was truly outstanding before he made the arrest. In my opinion, this case illustrates a perfect example of when the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply under Leon, thereby saving from suppression the evidence seized during the search incident to arrest. In Yancey v. State, 345 Ark. 103, 44 S.W.3d 315 (2001), we stated that the Supreme Court in Leon noted that the Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of .evidence obtained in violation of it commands. Id. In interpreting Leon, we stated: The Court further noted that an examination of the Fourth Amendment’s origin and purposes makes it clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure works no new Fourth Amendment wrong. The exclusionary rule rather works to deter future violations generally. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. The Court then went on to note that if the goal is to deter future police misconduct, then it only makes sense to apply the exclusionary rule where indeed its application has a deterrent effect, and that where the officers acted in objective good faith or where the transgressions are minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred upon guilty defendants offends the basic concepts of the justice system. Id. at 907. The Court found that in the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically correct, and that once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the officer can do in seeking to comply with the law. Leon, supra; Starr v. State, 297 Ark. 26, 759 S.W.2d 535 (1988). Id. at 118. Certainly, in this case, there was nothing more the arresting officer could have done except ignore the outstanding warrant, and that would have been a clear dereliction of his duty. Further, and more importantly, I fail to comprehend how the suppression of the contraband discovered in Clay County due to an error committed by someone in the Greene County court system or by its law enforcement personnel would have any deterrent effect on the law enforcement personnel of Greene County, which is not the county wherein the arrest was made and the case was tried. The majority relies heavily on the Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995), case to support its opinion that when police personnel are involved in faulty recordkeeping, the good-faith exception does not apply; however, I believe the majority’s opinion is too far-reaching. It is basically lumping all police personnel, from whatever county, city, or state, together under the theory that, in so doing, it will have some sort of universal deterrent effect. This is implausible. In Evans, the facts were substantially the same as the instant case with two exceptions. In both cases an officer had reasonable suspicion to make a routine traffic stop; upon checking with the patrol car’s computer, the officer learned of an outstanding arrest warrant and made an arrest; upon search of the subjects and the vehicles, unlawful drugs were found; and it was subsequently learned that the arrest warrant was no longer outstanding and should have been removed from the computer. In Evans, there was testimony that the failure to remove the arrest warrant from the computer was the error of an employee of the clerk of the court; and, in the instant case, there was no testimony as to the reason for the error. The other difference, and the one that makes this case so distinguishable from Evans, was that the officer in the instant case was not satisfied just to learn of the outstanding warrant on the computer; he also made two separate calls to the neighboring county where the warrant emanated and was told by two different dispatchers that the warrant was outstanding. Through his own dispatcher, Midgett checked appellant’s license with the National Crime Information Network (“NCIC”), which, according to Midgett, is a nationwide list of persons who have felony warrants for arrest, and found that a warrant for appellant’s arrest had been issued in Greene County. Midgett then contacted two different dispatchers for Greene County, one by telephone and one by radio, and Midgett was informed by both dispatchers that they possessed an arrest warrant for appellant based on his failure to appear on a felony charge for possession of a controlled substance. Midgett testified that he did not know that the warrant had been set aside, that this was his typical method for verifying warrants, and that he had no problems with Greene County in the past, as he had made several felony and misdemeanor arrests on Greene County warrants. Again, in this case, there was nothing more the arresting officer could have done, and I fail to understand how the suppression of the contraband discovered in Clay County due to an error committed by someone in the Greene County court system or by its law enforcement personnel would have any deterrent effect on the law enforcement personnel of Greene County, which is not the county wherein the arrest was made and the case was tried. Even if the error was determined to be the fault of law enforcement from Greene County, Officer Midgett, a Clay County officer, still acted in good faith. In short, although the identity of the person(s) who failed to remove the warrant from the computer is unknown, I believe it is clearly immaterial in this particular case. I, therefore, must dissent with the majority’s decision to remand the case for a determination of who was responsible for not quashing the warrant. Corbin and Hannah, JJ., join this dissent.