Court Opinion

ID: 9838195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 17:01:26.635844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:08.045118
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        SEP 5 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE ILENE LAZARUS,                        No.    21-55483

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                5:18-cv-00718-VBF-MAA
 v.

JENNIFER CORE,                                  MEMORANDUM*

                Respondent-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                 Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted August 16, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, CHRISTEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Stephanie Lazarus (“Lazarus”), a former Los Angeles Police Department

(“LAPD”) officer, appeals the district court’s denial of her writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 2009, Lazarus was charged with the 1986 murder of

Sherri Rasmussen (“Rasmussen”) after DNA evidence linked Lazarus to a bite

mark on Rasmussen’s body. In 2012, Lazarus was convicted of first-degree

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
murder with a handgun enhancement and sentenced to 27 years to life in state

prison. Lazarus contends that she is entitled to habeas relief because the state’s 23-

year pre-indictment delay violated her due process rights. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we affirm.

      1.     The district court did not err by concluding that the California Court

of Appeal’s February 8, 2018 order is the “last reasoned” state court decision for

purposes of federal habeas review. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to federal

law, we look to the state’s last reasoned decision.”); see also Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). We have found “no cause to treat a state court’s

summary order with citations as anything but a ‘reasoned’ decision, provided that

the state court’s references reveal the basis for its decision.” Curiel v. Miller, 830

F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2016).

      Lazarus contends that the February 8, 2018 order was not “reasoned”

because it summarily denied her petition without discussing the merits. But as the

district court found, the order’s citation to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474–75

(1995) establishes that the state Court of Appeal rejected Lazarus’s petition for

failure to state a prima facie case for habeas relief. See Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870–71

(holding the state court’s one-sentence order citing to Duvall was a “reasoned”

decision for purposes of habeas review). Because the citation to Duvall reveals the

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basis for its decision, the order of the Court of Appeal is the “last reasoned” state

court decision for the purpose of our review.

      2.     The district court did not err by determining that the California Court

of Appeal reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent to deny Lazarus’s petition.

The Supreme Court set forth the standard for reviewing whether an intentional

investigative delay violates the Due Process Clause in United States v. Marion, 404

U.S. 307 (1971) and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). To determine

whether such a delay violates due process, the length of the delay is weighed

against the reasons for the delay, and the defendant must show that the delay

offends those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil

and political institutions.” United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112

(9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lovasco,

431 U.S. at 790). The defendant must also prove “actual, non-speculative

prejudice from the delay.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see

also Marion, 404 U.S. at 325. The Supreme Court instructs courts to examine the

constitutionality of pre-accusation delays on a case-by-case basis. See Lovasco,

431 U.S. at 796–97.

      Lazarus argues that her due process rights were violated because the LAPD

engaged in an intentional cover-up of her involvement in Rasmussen’s murder to

protect her and to shield the LAPD from embarrassment. Even assuming the truth

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of Lazarus’s cover-up allegations, it was not objectively unreasonable for the Court

of Appeal to conclude that an intentional cover-up intended to benefit Lazarus

would not offend our society’s fundamental conceptions of justice in the same way

as a cover-up intended to gain a tactical advantage over a defendant, as

contemplated in Marion and Lovasco. Furthermore, because there is no federal

precedent addressing this type of pre-indictment delay, the Court of Appeal’s

application of existing precedent to these facts was reasonable.

      Nor has Lazarus demonstrated that she suffered “actual prejudice” from the

delay. To establish “actual prejudice,” a defendant “must demonstrate by definite

and non-speculative evidence how the loss of a witness or evidence is prejudicial

to the defendant’s case.” United States v. Huntley, 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.

1992). Lazarus relies on the state trial court’s finding that she may have

experienced “plausible prejudice” on account of lost records, lost gun residue kits,

the death of witnesses who may have identified a culpable third-party, and faded

witness memories. But “plausible prejudice” is not the same as “actual prejudice,”

and Lazarus fails to provide an explanation beyond mere speculation for how this

allegedly lost evidence would have affected her case. Because Lazarus has failed

to prove “actual prejudice” as required by Supreme Court precedent, the Court of

Appeal’s application of that precedent was reasonable.

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      3.     The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lazarus’s

request for an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is required only “when

the petitioner’s allegations, if proven, would establish the right to relief.” Totten v.

Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998). Because the record is sufficient to

support the California Court of Appeal’s finding that Lazarus failed to state a

prima facie case for relief, Lazarus was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

      AFFIRMED.

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