Court Opinion

ID: 9693291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:34:52.10536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:44.315378
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the holding of the majority reversing the trial court in this matter as I believe it extends Farinacci v. Beaver County Industrial Development Authority, 510 Pa. 589, 511 A.2d 757 (1986), beyond its holdings and ignores the intent of Lamp v. Heyman, 469 Pa. 465, 366 A.2d 882 (1976).
In this case, appellant instituted an action in trespass by filing a writ of summons in the prothonotary’s office on January 4, 1988. On the same day, counsel for appellant sent a handwritten note to appellees, by regular mail, enclosing a copy of the Writ of Summons. The writ was subsequently reissued pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(2), on May 17, 1988, and personally served by the sheriff of Dauphin County. However, the two-year statute of limitations had run on April 4, 1988.
The appellant acknowledged that service by regular mail is not permitted either under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure or under local rules (except for special circumstances which do not apply here). Construing Lamp and Farinacci in relation to the facts of this case, I believe we are bound by the trial court’s finding. As correctly stated by the majority, Lamp was promulgated to curb an abuse widely prevalent whereby a praecipe would be filed with the prothonotary, to toll the running of the statute of limitations, but the plaintiff would direct the sheriff to not *315serve the writ. Lamp held that a plaintiff must refrain “from a course of conduct which serves to stall in its tracks the legal machinery he has just set in motion.” Id., 469 Pa. at 478, 366 A.2d at 889. Subsequent cases have held the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a good faith effort to effect service to avoid dismissal under Lamp. Feher v. Altman, 357 Pa.Super. 50, 515 A.2d 317 (1986); Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446, 460 A.2d 271 (1983).
In further clarification of Lamp, Farinacci held that the trial court must evaluate each case on its facts, measured against compliance with Supreme Court and local rules to ascertain whether a good faith effort had been made to effectuate service. Lamp held the plaintiff could not obstruct service by directing the sheriff to hold service indefinitely. Here, in the absence of either statewide or local rules, appellant, whether inadvertently or not, obstructed proper service by failing to deliver the writ for service to the sheriff. Had he done so, service would have been made routinely in accordance with the local custom or rule. By retaining the summons and mailing a copy, appellant failed to make proper service and interfered with the process, a practice prohibited by Lamp.
The holding of the majority provides cart blanche right in every plaintiff to select a manner of service, outside that required by the rules, and creates more confusion and uncertainty than that cured by Lamp. Farinacci addressed only the issue of when a good faith effort to effect service within the rules was attempted. It did not consider nor does it approve attempted service outside the rules.
The majority spelled out in detail the contacts between the parties preliminarily, which showed some attempt at notice by reference. This is inadequate to meet the test of Lamp or Farinacci as negotiations may continue for considerable periods of time, and in and of themselves, are not evidence as to notice of commencement of an action for purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.
I believe case law instructs us that, in the absence of a gross abuse of discretion, we are bound by the trial court’s *316findings of fact in an issue such as the one presented here. I would, therefore, affirm on the basis of the Opinion of Honorable Herbert A. Schaffner.