Court Opinion

ID: 9605156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:30:58.803084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:26.258538
License: Public Domain

LORENZO F. GARCIA, District Judge, Division III, sitting by designation, dissenting. In 1908 the Territorial Supreme Court considered and decided a factual situation analogous to the case at bar. In Territory v. Sanches, 14 N.M. 493, 94 P. 954 (1908), an elected sheriff was charged with habitual and willful neglect of duty, gross partiality, oppression, corruption and willful maladministration, and his removal from office was sought by the district attorney. Evidence of misconduct occurring in the sheriff’s prior, uninterrupted term of office was presented to the jury. The jury returned a verdict against the sheriff, and the Court subsequently entered a judgment of removal. On appeal, the issue presented to the Territorial Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in holding that a defendant could be removed from office for acts occurring while the defendant held the same office in a prior, uninterrupted term. The Court noted a split of authority on the issue and stated: As the case usually is with questions on which good lawyers could reasonably differ they have been decided in opposite ways by different courts of last resort, among the more than half a hundred courts of that class in this country, and we are much in the same position we should be in if there had been no decision whatever on them, since we are not constrained by the unquestioned authority of adjudged cases to adopt conclusions which might seem to us contrary to reason and justice. Id. at 496, 94 P. at 954. The Court stated: The weight of authority, in numbers, is probably with the defendant .... But is a public officer less unfit to hold his office, or are the people less injuriously affected by his holding it because the act demonstrating his unfitness was committed on the last day of one term of office rather than on the first day of the next succeeding term? There can be but one answer to that question. Id. at 497, 94 P. at 954. The Court was aware of the split of authority; nevertheless, it adopted broad policy considerations intended to improve good government. The Court commented that the purpose of a removal proceeding was not to punish the officeholder, but to improve public service. The Court adopted the rationale of State v. Welsh, 109 Iowa 19, 21, 79 N.W. 369 (1899), and stated: The very object of removal is to rid the community of a corrupt, incapable, or unworthy official. His acts during his previous term quite as effectually stamp him as such as those of that he may be serving. Reelection does not condone the offense. Id. at 497, 94 P. at 955. The Court’s reasoning was sound. Public policy considerations compel a higher standard of conduct from elected officials. The majority indicates that the better rule is cited in In Re Thaxton, 78 N.M. 668, 437 P.2d 129 (1968), wherein the Court stated in dicta Also, we would observe that if petitioner occupies the office pursuant to a new appointment, removal proceedings based on conduct during a previous term are generally considered to be moot. Id. at 673, 437 P.2d at 134. A review of the decisions upon which the Thaxton decision was based shows that in virtually all of the cases, the term of office had expired prior to the time the court issued a final order of removal, and thus, the removal proceedings were indeed moot. Sufficient cause has not been presented to the Court that would compel a retreat from the position taken in Sanches, supra. Accordingly, I would respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.