Court Opinion

ID: 9965362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 14:08:57.826961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.630082
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1182-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY
by the COMMISSIONER OF
TRANSPORTATION,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NICK WU, a/k/a SZU FU WU,
and DAISY GARDEN CENTER,
LLC, a New Jersey Limited
Liability Company,

          Defendants-Appellants,

and

DISCOVER PRODUCTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT
OF TREASURY, and TOWNSHIP
OF HILLSBOROUGH, in the
COUNTY OF SOMERSET, a
Municipal Corporation of New Jersey,

          Defendants,

and
OUIDA VENIS, a/k/a QUIDA
VENIS,

     Defendant-Respondent.
______________________________

            Submitted February 26, 2024 – Decided May 2, 2024

            Before Judges Gilson and DeAlmeida.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-0187-21.

            Steven P. Lombardi, attorney for appellants.

            McKirdy, Riskin, Olson & Della Pelle, PC, attorneys
            for respondent Ouida Venis (Joseph W. Grather, of
            counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      This appeal arises out of a condemnation action brought by the New Jersey

Department of Transportation (the DOT) to take a portion of property currently

owned by defendant Nick Wu and formerly owned by defendant Ouida Venis.

The issue on appeal involves a dispute between Wu and Venis concerning the

apportionment of the condemnation proceeds.

      The DOT paid $95,000 for the condemned property and deposited that

amount with the court. Wu and a limited liability company he owns, Daisy

Garden Center, LLC (the Garden Center), appeal from an amended October 5,

2022 order allocating $70,700, plus interest, to Venis and $24,300, plus interest,

                                                                            A-1182-22
                                        2
to Wu. Wu and the Garden Center also appeal from orders dated June 25, 2021,

and December 2, 2022. 1 The December 2, 2022 order denied Wu's and the

Garden Center's motion for reconsideration of the October 5, 2022 order.

Because we discern no basis to reverse or modify any of the orders from which

Wu and the Garden Center appeal, we affirm.

                                       I.

      On April 8, 2005, Wu and Venis entered into an agreement for sale of real

estate (the Contract), under which Venis agreed to sell to Wu a property located

at 181 Route 206 North, Hillsborough, New Jersey (the Property). At the time

the Contract was executed, Venis and Wu were aware that the DOT was seeking

to condemn a portion of the Property to construct a bypass and widen Route 206,

a public highway. In that regard, prior to the execution of the Contract, the DOT

had provided Venis with an estimate of the fair market value of the portion of

1
  In their brief, Wu and the Garden Center list a May 25, 2021 order as another
order they are appealing. We note, however, that the order was executed before
the court granted an adjournment and then issued a June 25, 2021 order
addressing both Venis' motion to withdraw the funds and Wu's and the Garden
Center's cross-motion. Because Wu and the Garden Center do not present any
arguments about the May 25, 2021 order in their appellate brief, we deem any
challenge to that order abandoned and waived. See Green Knight Cap., LLC v.
Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting Woodlands Cmty.
Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 319 (App. Div. 2017)).

                                                                           A-1182-22
                                       3
the Property to be condemned. That estimate valued the condemned portion of

the Property at $24,300, based on assessments that the land was worth $18,100,

the improvements were worth $4,850, and the lost value to the remainder of the

Property was $1,350.

      In the Contract, Wu and Venis included a condemnation clause. The

condemnation clause included a section addressing how proceeds from the

condemnation would be allocated. In that regard, section 10.2 of the Contract

stated:

            Notwithstanding Sections 1.2 and 10.1, Purchaser
            acknowledges that the New Jersey Department of
            Transportation (the "DOT") has provided notice of a
            taking of frontage on Route 206 and has offered
            compensation to Seller of $24,300.00. Purchaser
            agrees that Purchaser has no right to terminate this
            Agreement as a result of this taking. The Seller
            reserves the right to challenge the award and/or
            negotiate with the DOT for additional compensation.
            To the extent that such negotiations extend beyond the
            Closing Date, Purchaser agrees as necessary to appoint
            Seller as Purchaser's agent for this purpose. The sum
            of $24,300, as and when paid by the DOT, shall belong
            to Purchaser. All sums payable by the DOT in excess
            of $24,300 shall be the property of Seller; Purchaser
            agrees to promptly remit all such excess sums to Seller
            should the excess sums be remitted by the DOT to
            Purchaser. If the award is paid to Seller before the
            Closing date, the Purchase Price shall be reduced by
            $24,300.

                                                                        A-1182-22
                                      4
      The State did not complete the condemnation and taking prior to the

closing of the Contract and the sale of the Property. The record does not indicate

what, if any, efforts plaintiff made to negotiate a higher condemnation

compensation. Instead, it is undisputed that the DOT did not move forward with

the condemnation of the portion of the Property until 2019.

      In the interim, approximately five years after the sale of the Property, Wu's

counsel wrote to Venis' counsel to inquire about the status of the condemnation

and whether Venis had been paid compensation.            In that correspondence,

counsel for Wu stated: "Pursuant to Paragraph 10.2 of the Contract of Sale, once

the Seller has settled with [the] DOT, the Purchaser was entitled to receive the

sum of $24,300.00." Counsel for Venis responded by representing that the

condemnation had not occurred and Venis had not received any compensation

from the DOT as of that time.

      In September 2019, the DOT sent Wu a letter offering to purchase a

portion of the Property for $95,000. The letter included an updated appraisal ,

which valued the portion of the Property the DOT sought to acquire based on a

valuation of the land at $47,000; a valuation of the improvements at $7,900; and

a valuation of the loss to the remainder of the Property at $40,100. Shortly

thereafter, Wu accepted the DOT's offer, and on January 17, 2020, after

                                                                             A-1182-22
                                        5
receiving approval from the Commissioner of Transportation, the DOT signed

an agreement to acquire the portion of the Property for $95,000.

      The sale from Wu to the DOT did not immediately go forward.              In

February 2021, the DOT filed a verified complaint and order to show cause to

enforce the January 2020 agreement of sale. In its complaint, the DOT stated

that it was unable to acquire the portion of the Property through bona fide

negotiations because Wu failed to close title. Accordingly, the DOT sought to

estop Wu from seeking compensation greater than the agreed-upon amount of

$95,000.

      While that action was pending, the DOT learned of Venis' interest in the

Property, and it amended its complaint to add Venis as a defendant. Thereafter,

the court executed a supplemental order to show cause and directed that the

$95,000 be deposited with the clerk of the court.

      Wu did not object to the estoppel count of the DOT's complaint.

Consequently, on May 4, 2021, the court entered a final judgment authorizing

the taking of the portion of the Property and directing that the $95,000 be paid

as compensation for the portion of the Property taken.

      On May 10, 2021, Venis moved to withdraw $70,700, with interest, as her

portion of the proceeds from the condemnation. In support of her motion, Venis

                                                                          A-1182-22
                                       6
sought to enforce section 10.2 of the Contract. Wu and the Garden Center cross-

moved to stay the withdrawal of funds, to allow for discovery, and for a plenary

hearing on the distribution of the funds.

      On June 25, 2021, after hearing oral argument on the motions, the trial

court entered an order and statement of reasons denying Venis' motion to

withdraw the funds and Wu's request for limited discovery and a plenary

hearing. Instead, the court ordered that the matter would proceed to a summary

hearing to determine the distribution of the deposited funds.

      Thereafter, the judge who entered the June 25, 2021 order retired , and

another judge took over management of the case. A "summary hearing" was

then scheduled for October 5, 2022. The hearing took place telephonically, and

counsel for Venis and Wu appeared. Both attorneys informed the court that they

would rely on the papers already submitted. The judge then issued an oral

decision, granting Venis' motion to withdraw $70,700, plus interest, from the

deposited monies.     In making that ruling, the trial court relied on and

incorporated the statement of reasons issued by the court in support of its June

25, 2021 order. That same day, the court entered an "Amended Order for

                                                                          A-1182-22
                                        7
Withdrawal of Deposit Monies."2 That order directed the clerk of the court to

pay $70,700, together with accrued interest, to Venis, and to pay $24,300,

together with accrued interest, to Wu.

      On October 24, 2022, Wu moved for reconsideration. After receiving

papers in opposition, on December 2, 2022, the court denied Wu's motion for

reconsideration and issued a statement of reasons. In the statement of reasons,

the court explained that Wu had failed to satisfy the standard for reconsideration

because he had not identified any legal or factual matters the court had

overlooked and he had failed to demonstrate that the court's October 5, 2022

decision was palpably incorrect or irrational.

      Wu and the Garden Center now appeal from the orders entered on June

25, 2021, October 5, 2022, and December 2, 2022.

                                         II.

      On appeal, Wu makes three arguments. First, he contends that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying his request for limited discovery, arguing

that there are material factual disputes concerning the appraisal supporting the

2
  The October 5, 2022 order apparently sought to amend the May 25, 2021 order.
The October 5, 2022 order is identical to the May 25, 2021 order except the
word "Amended" was written above "Order for Withdrawal of Deposit Monies"
and "May 2021" was crossed out and substituted with "October 2022."
                                                                            A-1182-22
                                         8
DOT's compensation offer in 2004 and the appraisal supporting the DOT's

compensation offer in 2019. Second, Wu contends that the second judge failed

to follow "the law of the case," which he argues required a summary judgment

motion and not a summary proceeding. Finally, Wu asserts that the trial court

erred in denying his motion for reconsideration because he presented new

evidence concerning disputed facts and the court had failed to make adequate

factual findings and legal conclusions.

      The dispute on this appeal involves the interpretation of the Contract.

When interpreting a contract, appellate courts conduct a de novo review. Serico

v. Rothberg, 234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018); JPC Merger Sub LLC v. Tricon Enters.,

Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 145, 159-60 (App. Div. 2022). In interpreting a contract,

courts start with the plain language. Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park,

241 N.J. 595, 615-16 (2020). Courts enforce contracts based on the intent of the

parties, the contract's express terms, the surrounding circumstances, and the

contract's purpose. Ibid. "[W]hen the intent of the parties is plain and the

language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as

written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result." Id. at 616 (quoting

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)).       In other words, courts enforce

                                                                          A-1182-22
                                          9
contracts as written and do not "make a better contract for either party."

Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super. 328, 342 (App. Div. 1999).

      Section 10.2 of the Contract is clear and unambiguous. It states that if the

condemnation takes place after the sale of the Property from Venis to Wu, Wu

will receive $24,300 and Venis will receive any amount in excess of that amount.

There is no time limitation in the Contract concerning the allocation of

condemnation proceeds. To the contrary, the Contract stated that Venis will get

any amount beyond $24,300 "as and when paid by the DOT." Nor is there any

provision allowing for a modification based on any change in the DOT's

appraisal of the portion of the Property to be condemned and taken.

      Accordingly, we reject Wu's first argument that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying limited discovery. See Davis v. Disability Rts. N.J., 475

N.J. Super. 122, 140-41 (App. Div. 2023) (explaining that an appellate court

reviews a trial judge's discovery order for an abuse of discretion and will only

reverse a discovery order "when a decision is made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis"). Wu argues that the different appraisals provided by the

DOT in 2004 and in 2019 raise material issues of disputed fact. A change in the

appraisal value does not raise any disputed issues of material fact. The Contract

                                                                            A-1182-22
                                      10
does not allow for an adjustment of the agreed-upon allocation in favor of Wu

based on a change in the appraisal provided by the DOT. To the contrary, the

Contract stated that Venis could seek to increase the compensation to be paid by

the DOT and that anything above $24,300 would be paid to her. There is no

provision in the Contract allowing an adjustment in favor of Wu. In short,

discovery would not provide anything to support Wu's contentions. To allow a

revision to the Contract would be to effectively rewrite the Contract in Wu's

favor, which is something a court will not do. See Lucier v. Williams, 366 N.J.

Super. 485, 491 (App. Div. 2004).

      We also reject Wu's argument concerning the law of the case. The June

25, 2021 order did not mandate a summary judgment motion.             Instead, it

expressly stated that the matter would proceed as "a summary hearing." In the

accompanying statement of reasons, the court described Venis' application as

one seeking summary judgment, but that statement did not create a legally

binding ruling that required a summary judgment motion. Instead, the trial court

proceeded consistent with the governing Court Rules.

      Rule 4:73-9 governs the procedures for disputes concerning the allocation

of condemnation proceeds once the award has been paid into court. Subsection

(c) of that rule authorizes any party to "apply for withdrawal of money paid into

                                                                           A-1182-22
                                      11
court by motion on notice to all other parties." R. 4:73-9(c). If a party disputes

the withdrawal, "the moving party shall proceed under paragraph (b)" of Rule

4:73-9. Ibid. That paragraph states:

            If allocation of the proceeds of an award or judgment is
            in dispute, the same shall be tried only after the award
            has been paid into court or a judgment upon appeal
            from an award has been entered. The matter may be
            initiated by any party by a petition in the cause and shall
            proceed as a summary action under Rule 4:67.

            [R. 4:73-9(b) (citation reformatted).]

      Rule 4:67-1 states that "all actions in which the court is permitted by rule

or by statute to proceed in a summary manner" can proceed in a summary

fashion, provided it appears to the court "that it is likely that the matter may be

completely disposed of in a summary manner." Under Rule 4:67-5, the trial

court is authorized to determine actions on the pleadings and affidavits and

render final judgment if the "affidavits show palpably that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact." Alternatively, if there is a showing of a material

factual dispute, the court "shall hear the evidence as to those matters which may

be genuinely in issue" before rendering final judgment. R. 4:67-5.

      Wu has not identified any material factual disputes. Instead, as already

noted, he wants to argue that the changes in the appraisal value of the Property

related to improvements he and the Garden Center made on the portion of the

                                                                             A-1182-22
                                       12
Property to be condemned.       Even if there is a connection between the

improvements and the appraisal value, however, it is not material because the

Contract does not allow for an adjustment of the allocation of the condemnation

proceeds based on those changes.

      Finally, we reject Wu's arguments concerning the denial of the motion for

reconsideration. Wu presented no new evidence and failed to identify any

palpable errors made by the trial court in the order entered on October 5, 2022.

Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Wu's motion for reconsideration.

See Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Guido v. Duane

Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87-88 (2010)); In re Belleville Educ. Ass'n, 455 N.J.

Super. 387, 405 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super.

374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)).

      In summary, having considered the entire record, we discern no basis to

reverse or modify any of the orders from which Wu and the Garden Center

appeal. Instead, we affirm all the orders because they are consistent with the

plain and governing language in the Contract.

      Affirmed.

                                                                          A-1182-22
                                      13