Court Opinion

ID: 9483710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:29:42.554824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:48.053070
License: Public Domain

BOGGS,
Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court’s opinion that the enhancement for obstruction of justice was proper. However, I am not prepared at this time to rule that the district court had the discretion to consider Hoffman’s collateral attack on his prior convictions.
With regard to collateral challenges, the court’s opinion (p. 190) places some emphasis on the possibility of an ex post facto problem because Application Note 6 was amended after defendant committed his crime, but before his sentencing. I disagree. A criminal defendant has a vested interest only in the statutory limits on his punishment at the time the crime is committed. Within the bounds of the punishment statutorily authorized, the guidelines themselves, and the factors governing the exercise of the district court's discretion, are not matters in which defendant has a vested interest, and to which ex post facto jurisprudence applies. To the contrary, courts have repeatedly held that the sentencing guidelines that apply are those in effect at the time of the sentencing. Thus, a defendant who commits a crime with a statutory sentencing range of, for example, five to twenty years has no constitutionally valid complaint if the guidelines that would have led to a sentencing range of, for example 100-120 months are, prior to his sentencing, changed either upward or downward. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(5); United States v. Marin, 916 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Russell, 913 F.2d 1288, 1292 (8th Cir.1990).
The crucial Background Note (which is a lesser level of authority than even the Application Notes themselves), does not explicitly give district courts discretion to consider, or fail to consider, collateral attacks. Rather, having already adopted an amended Application Note 6 that uses the term “a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid,” (emphasis added), the Commission then waffles a bit by adding a Background Note stating that it “leaves for court determination,” not the individual case, but “the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior conviction.” This is precisely the issue that our court will be determining, following an en banc rehearing of United States v. McGlocklin, 962 F.2d 551 (6th Cir.1992) held on December 9. At this time, I am not prepared to take a position on that issue, pending the argument and disposition of that case. Therefore, I cannot join in the court’s opinion holding that the district court did have discretion to consider this challenge.