Court Opinion

ID: 9899919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 21:09:37.455457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:55.350741
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Jeter v. Kruz 'N' Kleen, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-4165.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

Danielle Jeter                                               Court of Appeals No. L-23-1070

        Appellant                                            Trial Court No. CI0202101740

v.

Kruz ‘N’ Kleen, LLC, et al.                                  DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellees                                            Decided: November 17, 2023

                                                   *****

        Gregory S. Reichenbach, for appellant.

                                                   *****

        SULEK, J.

        {¶ 1} In this accelerated appeal, appellant Danielle Jeter appeals the judgment of

the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, awarding her reasonable attorney fees and

expenses in the amount of $8,004.63. Because the trial court considered the appropriate

factors and determined an award that was within the range of reasonableness, its decision

is not an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
                     I. Factual Background and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} In September 2020, Jeter purchased a vehicle from a car dealership known

as Kruz ‘N’ Kleen.1 By November 2020, Jeter was behind on her payments and Kruz ‘N’

Kleen repossessed her vehicle.

        {¶ 3} On April 7, 2021, Jeter initiated the present matter when she filed a

complaint against Kruz ‘N’ Kleen, alleging a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices

Act (“CSPA”) and two violations of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). Jeter

sought monetary and declaratory relief, as well as reasonable attorney fees provided

under the CSPA.

        {¶ 4} The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Jeter and set

the matter for a hearing on damages. Following that hearing, the trial court found that

Jeter suffered $6,149.00 in damages on her claim for violation of the CSPA. Finding that

damages must be trebled pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(B), the court ordered Kruz ‘N’ Kleen

to pay $18,447.00. The court further found that Jeter suffered $450.00 in damages on

one of her claims for violation of the UCC. Jeter voluntarily dismissed the other claim

for violation of the UCC. The trial court entered judgment accordingly on December 20,

2022.

1
 It was later discovered that Kruz ‘N’ Kleen was operated by appellee S.L.A.V.N., LLC.
Also named as defendants, and appellees herein, were George Hicks and Darius Hicks
who were agents of S.L.A.V.N., LLC, and who operated Kruz ‘N’ Kleen. For ease of
discussion, this decision will refer to appellees collectively as “Kruz ‘N’ Kleen.”

2.
       {¶ 5} On January 5, 2023, Jeter moved for an award of attorney fees and expenses

pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F)(2) of the CSPA. Jeter sought attorney fees for 49.1 hours at

the rate of $475.00 per hour for a total of $23,322.50, as well as reasonable expenses of

$644.63. Jeter supported her motion with reports showing the rate for consumer law

attorneys in the Toledo area with 16-20 years of experience is $475.00 per hour. Kruz

‘N’ Kleen opposed the motion, and Jeter filed a reply in support.

       {¶ 6} On March 3, 2023, the trial court entered its judgment granting Jeter’s

motion for attorney fees, but awarding only $7,360.00 plus expenses of $644.63. In

reducing the award from the requested amount, the trial court engaged in a detailed

analysis examining: (1) the time and labor involved in maintaining the litigation; (2) the

novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the professional skill required to

perform the necessary legal services; (4) the attorney’s inability to accept other cases; (5)

the fee customarily charged; (6) the amount involved and the results obtained; (7) any

necessary time limitations; (8) the nature and length of the attorney/client relationship;

(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; and (10) whether the fee is

fixed or contingent.

       {¶ 7} Upon consideration of all of the factors, the trial court determined that an

award of attorney fees at the rate of $475.00 per hour was not reasonable. Remarking

that the matter was “a relatively simple case where an apparently uninformed small car

dealership failed to give notices after repossessing the vehicle,” the trial court stated that

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a fee in line with the hourly fee for an attorney in general practice was reasonable. Based

on the Ohio State Bar Association fee survey submitted by Jeter, the trial court concluded

that the reasonable rate was $200.00 per hour. Furthermore, the trial court determined

that since Jeter dismissed one of her four claims, “a reasonable amount of time spent on

this matter is three-fourths of the amount requested, or 36.8 hours.” The trial court then

reached the reasonable fee award of $7,360.00 by multiplying the $200.00 hourly rate by

36.8 hours.

                                  II. Assignment of Error

       {¶ 8} Jeter has timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and now asserts one

assignment of error for review:

              1. The trial court erred by awarding attorney fees at an average

       hourly rate for a general practice attorney in Ohio, and not taking into

       account the average rates in the geographical area where the case was

       litigated, for attorneys with a similar amount of experience handling

       consumer cases.

                                       III. Analysis

       {¶ 9} At the outset, Jeter expressly does not challenge the trial court’s reduction of

the requested hours. Thus, this analysis will focus solely on the hourly rate of

compensation.

4.
       {¶ 10} Jeter acknowledges that attorney-fee awards under the CSPA are generally

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

       It is well settled that where a court is empowered to award attorney fees by

       statute, the amount of such fees is within the sound discretion of the trial

       court. Unless the amount of fees determined is so high or so low as to

       shock the conscience, an appellate court will not interfere. The trial judge

       which participated not only in the trial but also in many of the preliminary

       proceedings leading up to the trial has an infinitely better opportunity to

       determine the value of services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case

       before him than does an appellate court.

Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 146, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991),

quoting Brooks v. Hurst Buick-Pontiac-Olds-GMC, Inc., 23 Ohio App.3d 85, 91, 491

N.E.2d 345 (12th Dist.1985).

       {¶ 11} An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial court’s attitude is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217,

219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a

reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” In

re Trust of Tary v. Seiple, 2022-Ohio-3773, 199 N.E.3d 230, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.), quoting In

re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 137-138, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991).

5.
       {¶ 12} Jeter first contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it used

the old procedure for determining attorney fees under Bittner, rather than the new

procedure under Phoenix Lighting Group, L.L.C. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, L.L.C., 160

Ohio St.3d 32, 2020-Ohio-1056, 153 N.E.3d 30.

       {¶ 13} In Bittner, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[w]hen awarding reasonable

attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(F)(2), the trial court should first calculate the

number of hours reasonably expended on the case times an hourly fee, and then modify

that calculation by application of the factors listed in [Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)].”2 Bittner at

syllabus. Those factors include:

       the time and labor involved in maintaining the litigation; the novelty and

       difficulty of the questions involved; the professional skill required to

       perform the necessary legal services; the attorney’s inability to accept other

       cases; the fee customarily charged; the amount involved and the results

       obtained; any necessary time limitations; the nature and length of the

       attorney/client relationship; the experience, reputation, and ability of the

       attorney; and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Bittner at 145-146.

       {¶ 14} In that case, Bittner settled her CSPA claim for $3,500.00. She then sought

attorney fees under R.C. 1345.09(F) in the amount of $10,200.00, plus expenses of

2
 Bittner referred to DR 2-106(B), which has been superseded by the substantially similar
Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). Phoenix Lighting at ¶ 12.

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$811.98. After a hearing, the trial court awarded $7,615.00, plus expenses of $885.00.

On direct appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding that the amount of attorney fees

was unconscionably high when compared to the amount of the settlement. Id. at 143-

144. The appellate court held that “one of the most important factors to consider when

determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the relationship of the fee award to the

amount recovered.” Id. at 144.

       {¶ 15} On further appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s

holding, reasoning that requiring a direct relationship between the attorney fees awarded

and the amount of the judgment on the claim would frustrate the purpose of the CSPA.

Id.

       {¶ 16} The court then set forth the procedure for determining a proper fee award.

The court stated, “[T]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by

a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make

an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” Id. at 145, quoting Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The trial court

should then adjust the fee upward or downward depending on application of the factors

listed in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a). Id. at 145-146.

       {¶ 17} In Phoenix Lighting, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its holding in

Bittner. Consistent with Bittner, the court stated that “[t]he beginning point for

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determining the award of attorney fees is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the

number of hours worked, a calculation that is sometimes referred to as the ‘lodestar.’”

Phoenix Lighting, 160 Ohio St.3d 32, 2020-Ohio-1056, 153 N.E.3d 30, at ¶ 1. The Ohio

Supreme Court then reaffirmed Bittner “to the extent that it held that a lodestar can be

modified,” but clarified “that the lodestar is presumptively reasonable and that

enhancements to the lodestar should be rarely granted and allowed only when the

prevailing party has presented evidence that enhancement is necessary to provide

reasonable compensation, that is, if the lodestar does not take into consideration any

factor that may be properly considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Id. at ¶ 2.

       {¶ 18} Phoenix Lighting was awarded approximately $5.3 million dollars in

compensatory and punitive damages on its claims for tortious interference with a business

relationship, misappropriating trade secrets, and civil conspiracy. Phoenix Lighting also

sought an award of attorney fees. During the hearing on attorney fees, the trial court

established a lodestar of approximately $2 million dollars, which “accurately represents

the amount of attorney fees * * * that would have been charged to Phoenix under a

standard hourly rate agreement.” Id. at ¶ 6. The trial court then applied a multiplier of

two to the lodestar based upon its determination that

       the case was “quite complex, both factually and legally,” that the case took

       up so much of counsel’s time that they were hindered “from accepting and

       pursuing other cases and clients,” that Phoenix’s attorneys “obtained a

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       highly favorable outcome,” that the hybrid hourly fee and contingent nature

       of the compensation “forced Phoenix’s counsel to assume a great financial

       risk,” and that all of the attorneys involved in this case were “of high

       caliber,” were “highly experienced, and maintained excellent reputations.”

Id. at ¶ 6. On direct appeal, the Ninth District concluded that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in applying a multiplier of two to the lodestar. Id. at ¶ 7.

       {¶ 19} On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the court noted that its decisions on

reasonable attorney fees “have been guided by decisions issued by the United States

Supreme Court.” Id. at ¶ 10. Since Bittner, the United States Supreme Court has

“backed away from enhancements based on factors like those contained in Prof.Cond.R.

1.5(a).” Id. at ¶ 13. The court reasoned, “It is simple economics that an attorney charges

an hourly rate that takes into account the difficulty of the question involved, the

opportunity cost, the time limitations imposed by the client, the skill requisite to perform

a legal service, the attorney’s professional relationship with the client, and the fee

customarily charged in the jurisdiction for similar legal services.” Id. at ¶ 17. “‘A

reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant community * * * given

the complexity of the issues and the experiences of the attorney * * *.’” (Internal citation

omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Harris v. Rubino, 156 Ohio St.3d 296, 2018-

Ohio-5109, 126 N.E.3d 1068, ¶ 4. “Thus, the factors in Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a), including

the results obtained, are subsumed within the lodestar; they do not enhance the lodestar.”

9.
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 17, citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900, 104 S.Ct. 1541,

79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). The Ohio Supreme Court held,

       [T]here is a strong presumption that the reasonable hourly rate multiplied

       by the number of hours worked, which is sometimes referred to as the

       “lodestar,” is the proper amount for an attorney-fee award. Enhancements

       to the lodestar should be granted rarely and are appropriate when an

       attorney produces objective and specific evidence that an enhancement of

       the lodestar is necessary to account for a factor not already subsumed in the

       lodestar calculation.

Id. at ¶ 19.

       {¶ 20} Applying its holding to the facts before it, the Ohio Supreme Court

determined that the trial court’s reasoning for enhancing the lodestar was based on factors

that were subsumed within its determination of a reasonable rate in the lodestar

calculation. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that there should have been

no enhancement to the lodestar. Id. at ¶ 28.

       {¶ 21} Turning to the present case, Jeter asserts that the trial court used the old

procedure under Bittner by first calculating a lodestar and then adjusting that number

downward. Jeter’s assertion, however, is incorrect. Rather than determining a lodestar

and then adjusting that number, the trial court’s analysis focused on determining the

reasonable hourly rate in the first instance. In so doing, the trial court considered the

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Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors and concluded that the reasonable hourly rate was $200.00.

The court then used that hourly rate to determine the lodestar of $7,360.00. No further

adjustments to the lodestar were made. Thus, the trial court used the correct procedure as

set forth in Phoenix Lighting.

       {¶ 22} Alternatively, Jeter argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the

reasonable hourly rate was $200.00. In her brief, Jeter considers each of the factors in

Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) and argues that they support a reasonable hourly rate of $475.00

consistent with the average rate for a consumer law attorney in Toledo, Ohio. Those

factors will be discussed in turn.

       {¶ 23} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(1), the factor to be considered is “the time and

labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite

to perform the legal service properly.” The trial court found that the matter “did not

require any extraordinary efforts beyond what is otherwise required in a typical or

ordinary case in Common Pleas” and it did not involve any “novel or unusual questions

of law or fact.” Further, the trial court found that the matter “did not require any

extraordinary professional skill to perform the necessary legal services above those of an

average competent attorney.” Jeter, on the other hand, argues that the areas of

commercial law involved in the case were complex, requiring an understanding of the

interaction between the UCC, the retail installment sales act, and the CSPA, each of

which can be difficult to navigate on their own. Jeter also argues that this case involved

11.
an unusual damages calculation, requiring a higher level of professional skill, and that

counsel demonstrated his skill when he proved those damages using a defense witness

and documents in the record after Jeter was unexpectedly absent at the hearing. Thus,

Jeter suggests that this factor supports at least the average hourly rate for a consumer law

attorney, not a reduction.

       {¶ 24} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(2), the factor to be considered is “the likelihood,

if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude

other employment by the lawyer.” The trial court found that the matter did not involve

any novel or unusual questions of law or fact. In addition, the court noted that counsel

spent an average of 2.4 hours per month on this case over the 20 months from the filing

of the complaint to judgment, which “should not have had a significant effect upon

Plaintiff’s counsel’s ability to accept other cases.” Jeter argues, however, that counsel

has worked at full capacity since 2006 and that if he did not take this case, he likely

would have accepted another one.

       {¶ 25} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(3), the factor to be considered is “the fee

customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” The trial court found that

the median hourly fee for all attorney specialty practice areas is $250.00 and the median

hourly fee for general practice attorneys is $200.00. For consumer law attorneys, the

median hourly rate is $475.00 in the Toledo area and $435.00 statewide. Jeter argues that

12.
the starting point for the trial court’s calculations should have been the hourly rate for

consumer law attorneys.

       {¶ 26} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(4), the factor to be considered is “the amount

involved and the results obtained.” The trial court found that the actual damage amount

was $6,149.00 and the mandatory treble damages awarded was $18,447.00. Jeter

contends that this is a very favorable result supporting an increase in the hourly rate

because she went from defaulting on her car contract and being liable for a deficiency to

owing nothing on her contract and recovering damages of over $18,000.00.

       {¶ 27} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(5), the factor to be considered is “the time

limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.” The trial court found that

there were no extraordinary time limitations in the case. Jeter agrees and argues that this

factor is neutral and does not justify a lower hourly rate.

       {¶ 28} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(6), the factor to be considered is “the nature and

length of the professional relationship with the client.” The trial court found that this was

the sole matter in which counsel represented Jeter. Again, Jeter agrees and argues that

this factor is neutral and does not justify a lower hourly rate.

       {¶ 29} Under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(7), the factor to be considered is “the

experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.”

The trial court found that it “ha[d] no reason to doubt” counsel’s experience, good

reputation, and ability in practicing consumer law. Given counsel’s experience, good

13.
reputation, and ability, Jeter suggests that this factor supports a higher hourly rate, not a

lower one.

       {¶ 30} Finally, under Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a)(8), the factor to be considered is

“whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” The trial court found that while the attorney fee

agreement was not provided to the court, counsel’s affidavit established that the fee was

contingent upon success and upon the amount of attorney fees recovered under R.C.

1345.09(F). Jeter argues that this is the most significant factor because attorneys who are

paid only if they win are at risk of not being paid at all and therefore are justified in

receiving a higher rate.

       {¶ 31} Examining all of the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) factors, Jeter concludes that many

of the factors support awarding a higher-than-average hourly rate for consumer law

attorneys, not a rate that is less than 50 percent of the average. Thus, Jeter urges this

court to find that the trial court’s determination of a reasonable hourly rate of $200.00 is

an abuse of discretion.

       {¶ 32} Upon review, it cannot be said that the trial court’s decision was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. The trial court diligently considered each of

the factors and gave particular weight to the simple nature of the case, noting that it

involved an apparently uninformed small car dealership failing to give notices after

repossessing a vehicle. Whether or not this court would have made a different decision,

it is the trial judge who “has an infinitely better opportunity to determine the value of

14.
services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case before [her].” Bittner at 146, quoting

Brooks v. Hurst Buick-Pontiac-Olds-GMC, Inc., 23 Ohio App.3d 85, 91, 491 N.E.2d 345

(12th Dist.1985). Because the trial court determined that the value counsel provided in

this case was commensurate with a general practice attorney, the $200.00 hourly rate was

within the range of reasonableness and not so low as to “shock the conscience” thereby

warranting this court’s interference. Id..

       {¶ 33} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s judgment is not an abuse of

discretion and Jeter’s assignment of error is not well-taken.

                                      IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Jeter is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to

App.R. 24.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                          ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
                                                ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                ____________________________
                                                        JUDGE

15.
       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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