Court Opinion

ID: 9852437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:23.435036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.723108
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I find it necessary to disagree with the opinion of Clinton, J. In the case of School Dist. of Seward Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Seward, 188 Neb. 772, 199 N. W. 2d 752, the question of the constitutionality of the act creating and defining the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations was not raised by the parties and the majority opinion ignored that question. For the first time we are now obliged to meet the constitutional questions.
I will not reiterate my dissent in the Seward case. It will suffice to point out that the Constitutional Convention of 1920 in adopting Article XV, section 9, Constitution of Nebraska, clearly intended to exempt the state and its political subdivisions from the operations of the Court of Industrial Relations. The Constitution is restrictive and whenever a constitutional provision is adopted dealing with legislative powers, it is evidence that it is intended to restrict the broad, plenary powers vested in the Legislature. Otherwise it would be meaningless. I agree with Judge Clinton that the Legislature already had the authority to create an industrial commission prior to the adoption of Article XV, § 9. Why then was it adopted? Why was authority over state and political subdivisions deleted? His opinion defeats the clear will of the people of Nebraska.
Constitution must not be given a construction which will defeat obvious will of people. State ex rel. Hennepin County Bar Assn. v. Amdahl, 264 Minn. 350, 119 N. W. 2d 169.
With respect to constitutional interpretation, court should endeavor to place itself in position of framers of *690constitution and ascertain what was meant at the time. # * *
Constitutional provision cannot mean one thing at time of its adoption and another thing subsequently when public sentiments have undergone change. Walber v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772.
Intent of constitutional convention and people who .ratified that which convention framed is primary guideline in construing constitution. White v. Anderson, 155 Colo. 291, 394 P. 2d 333.
“The Constitution should not be construed as to defeat the obvious intent of its framers, if another interpretation may be adopted equally in accordance with the words and sense which will carry out the intent. * * *
“In construing the Constitution, intent must be gathered from both the letter and the spirit of the document, and the polestar is the intention of the makers and adopters.” Grantz v. Grauman (Ky. App.), 302 S. W. 2d 364.
A specific constitutional provision must be given effect as against a general clause. Ridgeway v. Catlett, 238 Ark. 323, 379 S. W. 2d 277.
The foregoing sets out a few well-recognized rules of constitutional interpretation and all are applicable to the present situation.
Another well-recognized rule should be considered. “The doctrine is established that legislative authority may be limited by constitutional restrictions which are impliedly imposed. Restrictions in a constitution as to legislation are equally effective whether they arise by implication or are stated in express terms; and such restrictions may be found either in the language employed or in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of the organic law.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 230, p. 480.
It is apparent that the delegates to the Constitutional-Convention of 1919-1920 intended that the state and its political subdivisions should not fall within the jurisdic*691tion of the Court of Industrial Relations. Under such circumstances there is definitely an implied restriction on the constitutional power of the Legislature to ignore the restriction so effected at the convention. It is true that the Legislature speaks for the people of the State of Nebraska but only within the confines of the state Constitution and in this instance, its power has been restricted at a constitutional convention which was likewise representative of the people of Nebraska and the constitutional provisions then framed were adopted by vote of the people of Nebraska. By what authority does the Legislature ignore such a situation?
This court apparently has undertaken a legislative or constitutional function on policy grounds.
Clinton, J.,
respondente.
Judge Newton, in his dissent, accuses this court of undertaking a legislative or constitutional function on policy grounds. This assertion is so serious that it cannot go unanswered. No reason existed for elaborating in the majority opinion the fundamental nature of the power of the Legislature to enact laws beyond the statement of the general principle as set forth in Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, supra.
Judge Newton cites and relies upon text authority, 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 230, p. 480, in support of a doctrine of limitation by implication of the authority of the state Legislature to enact laws. An' examination of the cases cited in the text footnotes reveals that they do not support the broad brush treatment which Judge Newton would apply and have no application at all to the particular question we are considering. The dissent fails to call attention to a portion of the text statement on which it relies and which omitted portion reads as follows: “Legislative power is deemed curtailed by implied limitations only in cases where it is clear that a construction of the constitutional provisions involved requires such restrictions. Restraints upon legislative powers are not to be lightly inferred. *692The implied restriction must be one that is clearly implied.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 230, p. 481.
The dissent contends that, because the Constitution authorized the Legislature to create an industrial commission for the purpose of dealing with certain labor relations problems, that constitutional provision restricts the Legislature from ever after entrusting to that same commission, later created by it, authority to deal with, in such manner as the Legislature shall direct, the labor relations of governmental subdivisions. Such a construction is contrary to the fundamental nature of the state legislative power under our system of government. The position which the dissent takes is but an application of the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.” That maxim has no application to the state legislative powers. The doctrine against restriction by implication of the legislative powers of state Legislatures rests upon a fundamental difference in the nature of the federal legislative power and that of the states. The federal Constitution is a grant of power. The state Constitutions are restrictions on powers. The state Legislatures have plenary legislative power except as is expressly denied them by the Constitutions or as is expressly reserved to the people themselves. In State ex rel. Meyer v. County of Lancaster, 173 Neb. 195, 113 N. W. 2d 63, Judge Spencer discusses this fundamental. In that case this court was called upon to construe the provisions of the constitutional amendment then recently adopted which authorized the Legislature to authorize counties and cities to issue revenue bonds for industrial development. Art. XV, § .16, Nebraska Constitution (repealed 1972). This article had been adopted by the voters to avoid the constitutional restriction against lending the credit of the state or its subdivisions to private persons or corporations. An earlier industrial development act had been declared unconstitutional by this court for that reason. Article XV, section 16, of the Nebraska Constitution, was in part as follows: “Sec. 16. Notwithstanding any other *693provision in the Constitution, the Legislature may authorize any county, incorporated city or. village, including cities operating under home rule charters, to acquire, own, develop, and lease real and personal property to manufacturing and industrial enterprises and to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of defraying the cost of acquiring and developing such property by construction, •purchase, or otherwise.” (Emphasis supplied.) When, pursuant to this constitutional amendment, the Legislature enacted the enabling statutes, it authorized the municipalities not only to “own, develop, and lease real . . . property,” but also to sell the property acquired and owned. It was argued that the Legislature could not authorize the sale of the property by the municipality because the constitutional provision merely authorized the municipality to “own, develop, and lease.” This contention was rejected by this court. Judge Spencer, writing for the court, said: “Contention No. 4 raises the point that the amendment did not specifically mention the power to sell, so that L.B. 159 exceeds the authority granted by the amendment. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Constitution is not a grant but rather is a restriction on legislative power, and the Legislature may legislate upon any subject not inhibited by the Constitution. Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N. W. 264.
“We said in State v. Sheldon, 78 Neb. 552, 111 N. W. 372: In the construction of a governmental system upon the American plan, the broad outlines are furnished by the constitution, but all the details necessary to carry the powers of government into effect are provided by the action of the legislature. The provisions of the constitution, while in one sense creative, also limit and define the powers to be exercised by the various departments of the government; but, except so far as its authority is limited or defined by the constitution, the legislature of the state is as fully vested with governmental powers as the British parliament. See a discussion of this subject in State v. Nelson, 34 Neb. 169.’
*694• “Certainly the right of the Legislature to grant the power of sale of property to a municipality has not been inhibited by the Constitution, and there is no merit to . plaintiff’s fourth contention.”
In State ex rel. Sayre v. Moore, 40 Neb. 854, 59 N. W. 755, this court quoted from Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (4th Ed.), p. 210: “When a law of congress is assailed as void, we look into the national constitution to see if the grant of specified powers is broad enough to' embrace it; but when a state law is attacked on the same ground, it is presumably valid in any case, and this ■presumption is a conclusive one, unless in the constitution of the United States, or of the state, we are unable .to discover that it is prohibited. We look in the constitution of the United States for grants of legislative power, but in the constitution of the state to ascertain if any limitations have been imposed upon the complete .powers with which the legislative department of the state is vested in its creation. . . . the state legislature 'has jurisdiction of all subjects on which its legislation is not prohibited. The law-making power of the state recognizes no restraints, and is bound by none, except such as are imposed by the constitution.”
The principles we have enunciated above are generally followed. Particularly well-considered opinions include Earhart v. Frohmiller, 65 Ariz. 221, 178 P. 2d 436; and Penrod v. Crowley, 82 Idaho 511, 356 P. 2d 73.