Court Opinion

ID: 9706807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:52:07.418334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.229115
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the order of *316the Attorney Discipline Board reinstating Irving A. August to the practice of law.
i
The Michigan Court Rules1 provide that a law*317yer who has been suspended for more than 119 days or who has been disbarred may be reinstated by the Attorney Discipline Board if, among other criteria, the board concludes that
—the lawyer’s conduct, since the order of discipline was entered, "has been exemplary and above reproach” (MCR 9.123[B][5]), and
—the lawyer has a "proper understanding of and attitude toward” the "standards” imposed on members of the bar (MCR 9.123[B][6]), and
—the lawyer can "safely be recommended” to the public, the courts and the legal profession "as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court.” MCR 9.123(B)(7).
The hearing panel declined to reinstate August. The chairman of the hearing panel dissented and filed findings that were adopted by the other two members of the hearing panel with the exception of the findings relating to the criterion set forth in clause 7.
All three members of the hearing panel, by adopting the dissenting panel member’s findings of fact, agreed, however, that August met the clauses 5 and 6 criteria:
—August’s conduct since the order of discipline was entered had "been exemplary and above reproach” and
—August had a proper understanding of and *318attitude toward and would conduct himself in conformity with the standards imposed on members of the profession if he were to be reinstated.
On appeal, the Attorney Discipline Board ordered reinstatement. The sole dissenter at the Attorney Discipline Board did not contend that August did not meet the clause 5 or 6 criteria.
The majority of the hearing panel and the dissenter at the Attorney Discipline Board nevertheless concluded that August could not be safely recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession because, having in mind the seriousness of the offense committed by August, they were not, as stated by the hearing panel majority, convinced that his "subsequent conduct, no matter how exemplary, has sufficiently ameliorated the taint placed upon the legal profession, by his commission of the crimes in question, to the extent that he could now be safely recommended as a person of trust. To do so, would only further erode an already diminishing public confidence in the legal system.”
The dissenter in the Attorney Discipline Board, noting that her colleagues on the Attorney Discipline Board "acknowledge that the petitioner’s conduct which led to his conviction was particularly reprehensible,” expressed her agreement with the majority of the hearing panel "that reinstatement in this case will inevitably erode public confidence in the legal system and that that consideration was relevant to the finding that the petitioner cannot be safely recommended to the public as a person fit to act in matters of trust and confidence.”
The question posed by the court rule is whether August will, if reinstated, conduct himself in accordance with the standards imposed on the profession (clause 6) and can safely be recommended *319to the public, the courts and the legal profession (clause 7). If the Attorney Discipline Board concludes, as it has, on the basis of adequate evidence, which there is, that he will so conduct himself, and that he can be so safely recommended, it is quite beside the point that his misconduct was an embarrassment to the profession or, even, that his reinstatement would be an embarrassment to the profession because of adverse reaction by persons who do not wish to see him reinstated, who might raise a clamor resulting in public dissatisfaction with his reinstatement.
Since 1985, only former Judge James Del Rio has been denied reinstatement. Seventy lawyers have been reinstated, including lawyers who have embezzled and misappropriated their clients’ money, and who have lied and cheated.
n
This Court entered an order allowing the State Bar of Michigan to file a brief amicus curiae.2 In its moving papers, the State Bar said that it has not taken a position on the applicability of the standards to August’s specific case and does not propose to do so. It seeks rather a declaration that the nature of the underlying misconduct is properly considered in the course of a reinstatement proceeding, and to have this matter remanded to the Attorney Discipline Board for further consideration in light of such a declaration by this Court.
I agree with the State Bar when it asserts:
—The requisite showing of rehabilitation can by definition only be measured in relation to the nature and seriousness of the original misconduct. Hearing panels of the Attorney Discipline Board *320cannot determine how far along the road to rehabilitation the petitioner has come without reference to a starting point.
—MCR 9.123 must be interpreted in the context of other court rules relating to license removal and reinstatement. Those rules provide further evidence that the original misconduct must be considered in a reinstatement proceeding.
—MCR 9.123 must be understood to encompass consideration of the original misconduct when a disbarred lawyer seeks reinstatement.
—A petitioner’s fitness to be reinstated to practice cannot be determined without consideration of the nature and circumstances of the misconduct resulting in the discipline.
—When considering reinstatement of a lawyer who converted and misappropriated client funds, the evidence of present character must be considered in light of the moral shortcomings that resulted in the discipline, Tardiff v State Bar [27 Cal 3d 395; 165 Cal Rptr 829; 612 P2d 919 (1980)].
—Like fitness, rehabilitation must be viewed from a reference point, i.e., rehabilitation from what, of what type, nature and extent.
—Without considering the nature of the misconduct, the Attorney Discipline Board has no reference point from which to relate "fitness” and "rehabilitation” to the standards of trustworthiness and confidence required by MCR 9.123.
I disagree with the following statement by the State Bar:
An evaluation of Petitioner/Appellee’s fitness *321and rehabilitation must take into account the impact the nature of his misconduct will have on the administration of justice, e.g. whether judges, counsel, and court employees, knowing of the conduct which led to disbarment, will treat Petitioner/Appellee so differently to avoid any suspicion that Petitioner/Appellee’s clients and their interests may be disadvantaged.
The question, under the court rule, is whether August will conduct himself properly, and whether he can safely be recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession. If he can be safely recommended, the Attorney Discipline Board is authorized to reinstate him, and judges, lawyers, and court employees will and should accept that determination.
I also disagree with the following statement of the State Bar:
Similarly, the protection of the public and the courts cannot be assured without review of the nature and seriousness of the misconduct giving rise to the discipline, and whether in light of the gravity of those acts the integrity of any judicial proceeding in which the petitioner if reinstated might participate is likely to be brought into question.
The record establishes clearly and convincingly that August’s conduct since he was disbarred has been exemplary and above reproach, and that he will bend over backwards to avoid even the appearance of impropriety were he to be reinstated. August states that he has no intention of practicing in the courts for the present. His reinstate*322ment could, for an appropriate period of time, be so conditioned.3
The Grievance Administrator did not claim, or seek to establish before the hearing panel, that judges, counsel, and court employees would treat August differently, or that the integrity of judicial proceedings in which he was involved is "likely” to be brought into question. No witness was offered by the Grievance Administrator to support such a claim, and thus there is nothing in the record that would justify denying reinstatement on this basis.
The Attorney Discipline Board considered the seriousness of August’s prior misconduct when it adopted by reference, with one exception, the findings of the hearing panel dissenter. Those findings reflect that the seriousness of August’s prior misconduct was considered in determining whether he could be safely recommended. The findings state that "the panel is well aware of the seriousness of the acts which led” to August’s conviction and revocation of his license to practice law. The majority in the Attorney Discipline Board acknowledged that August’s conduct was particularly "reprehensible.”
hi
The Attorney Discipline Board’s conclusion that the seriousness of the misconduct did not justify denial of reinstatement has proper evidentiary support on the whole record. This Court has ruled that the standard of review to be applied by this *323Court when reviewing disciplinary decisions is "whether, upon the whole record, there is proper evidentiary support for the findings of the State Bar Grievance Board.”4
I agree with the majority that this Court reviews the decision of the Attorney Discipline Board, not the decision of a hearing panel. While there are decisions of this Court that refer to the adequacy of the evidentiary support for findings of a hearing panel, no decision of this Court indicates, let alone holds, that this Court reviews the hearing panel’s decision. As set forth in Del Rio, this Court reviews the "findings of the State Bar Grievance Board,” now the Attorney Discipline Board. To be sure, frequently those findings are the findings of the hearing panel which the Attorney Discipline Board has adopted as its own.
The court rules provide that the Attorney Discipline Board may, on review of the hearing panel’s decision, "affirm, amend, reverse, or nullify the order of the hearing panel in whole or in part or order other discipline.”5
In In re Daggs, 411 Mich 304, 318; 307 NW2d 666 (1981), this Court affirmed the decision of the Attorney Discipline Board that modified the discipline imposed by a hearing panel. The administra*324tor argued in this Court "that the board’s action is so contrary to the evidence and findings it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” The administrator contended "that abuse of discretion should be the appropriate standard and that the consequence of the existing standard is exemplified by the instant case where the board substituted its judgment for that of the panel.” Id. at 319. This Court responded:
[A]n abuse of discretion standard would operate to prevent the board from effectively carrying out its overview function of continuity and consistency in discipline imposed. [Citation omitted.] Hearing panels meet infrequently and are exposed to a relatively small number of discipline situations.[6] [Id. at 319-320.]
IV
The Grievance Administrator relies on cases from other jurisdictions, including jurisdictions where disbarment may be permanent. It appears that six states7 provide for some form of permanent disbarment:
*325—Ohio: by a court rule.8
—District of Columbia: by statute and judicial interpretation that disbarment means the lawyer cannot be reinstated.9
—Florida: by court rule a disbarment is for five years or longer as the court determines; in at least one case the court made the disbarment permanent.10
—Kansas: by judicial decision, and now by court rule, a disbarment may be made permanent.11
—New Jersey: essentially by custom, disbarment *326always has meant permanent disbarment, there being only three instances, according to the New Jersey Supreme Court, of reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer in the last one hundred years.12
—North Carolina: by court rule with the consent of the lawyer involved; this apparently is done in cases where the lawyer can thereby avoid criminal prosecution.13
In contrast with Ohio, the Michigan rule does not provide for permanent disbarment; it provides for reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer after five years.
In contrast with the District of Columbia, the Michigan rule has not been judicially construed to mean that the disbarred lawyer cannot be reinstated — countless disbarred lawyers have been reinstated in Michigan.
In contrast with Florida, neither the Attorney Discipline Board nor this Court made August’s disbarment permanent.
In contrast with Kansas, the only state that by judicial decision, apart from a court rule, decides to make disbarment permanent, Michigan has provided the criteria for reinstatement — Kansas had not.
In contrast with New Jersey, the custom or practice in Michigan has not been to make disbarment permanent.
It does not appear that any court has ruled that *327a lawyer may not be reinstated in a state where, as in Michigan, criteria for reinstatement have been enumerated by the court, and the lawyer has been found to have complied with those criteria.
v
It is noteworthy that the aba reinstatement criterion, 25E(4),14 providing that the lawyer should recognize the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred, does not require that the lawyer acknowledge his guilt, but only that he recognize the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which he was suspended or disbarred.
The 1986 ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in effect recognize that disbarment is not permanent unless so provided in the jurisdiction.15
The 1989 ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement do not provide for permanent disbarment.16 The 1989 Model Rules provide for *328reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer after five years.17 The criteria for reinstatement are set forth in Rule 25E.18 The Model Rules contemplate that *329reinstatement may be on conditions.19

 MCR 9.123 provides:
(A) Suspension, 119 Days or Less. An attorney whose license has been suspended for 119 days or less is automatically reinstated by filing with the Supreme Court clerk and the administrator an affidavit showing that the attorney has fully complied with the terms and conditions of the suspension order. A false statement contained in the affidavit is ground for disbarment.
(B) Revocation or Suspension More Than 119 Days. An attorney whose license to practice law has been revoked or suspended for more than 119 days is not eligible for reinstatement until the attorney has petitioned for reinstatement under MCR 9.124 and has established by clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) he or she desires in good faith to be restored to the privilege of practicing law in Michigan;
(2) the term of the suspension ordered has elapsed or 5 years have elapsed since revocation of the license;
(3) he or she has not practiced or attempted to practice law contrary to the requirement of his or her suspension or revocation;
(4) he or she has complied fully with the order of discipline;
(5) his or her conduct since the order of discipline has been exemplary and above reproach;
(6) he or she has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed on members of the bar and will conduct himself or herself in conformity with those standards;
(7) he or she can safely be recommended to the public, the courts, and the legal profession as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the court;
(8) he or she is in compliance with the requirements of subrule (C), if applicable; and
(9) he or she has reimbursed the client security fund of the State Bar of Michigan or has agreed to an arrangement satisfactory to the fund to reimburse the fund for any money paid from the fund as a result of his or her conduct. Failure to fully reimburse as agreed is ground for revocation of a reinstatement.
*317(C) Reinstatement After Three Years. An attorney who, as a result of disciplinary proceedings, resigns, is disbarred, or is suspended for any period of time, and who does not practice law for 3 years or more, whether as the result of the period of discipline or voluntarily, must be recertified by the Board of Law Examiners before the attorney may be reinstated to the practice of law.

 437 Mich 1202 (1990).

 MCR 9.106(2) permits suspension of a license for a specified term "with such additional conditions relevant to the established misconduct as a hearing panel, the board, or the Supreme Court may impose . . .
MCR 9.121(C)(3) permits entry of a probation order under circumstances requiring the respondent to practice law only under the direct supervision of other attorneys.

 State Bar Grievance Administrator v Del Rio, 407 Mich 336, 349; 285 NW2d 277 (1979).
See also State Bar Grievance Administrator v Kopp, 402 Mich 74; 259 NW2d 559 (1977), a per curiam opinion in which this Court stated the same standard of review; and State Bar Grievance Administrator v Estes, 390 Mich 585; 212 NW2d 903 (1973), where this Court opted to retain this standard of review, adopted by case law before the adoption of the present disciplinary rules.

 MCR 9.118(D).
It is noteworthy that if the Attorney Discipline Board believes "additional testimony should be taken, it may refer the case to a hearing panel or a master.” MCR 9.118(C)(2). The Attorney Discipline Board may thus bypass the first hearing panel, and refer the case to another panel or a master when it believes that additional testimony should be taken.

 In State Bar Grievance Administrator v Williams, 394 Mich 5, 15; 228 NW2d 222 (1975), aff’d after remand 396 Mich 166; 240 NW2d 246 (1976), this Court affirmed the board’s modification of panel orders of discipline from reprimand and three years suspension to disbarment, after the board provided a statement of reasons therefor. This Court explained that "[t]he Board may also use its review power to adjust disparities arising out of the discipline imposed by individual hearing panels.”
In reviewing the panel findings, the board also reversed some of the findings of fact and affirmed others. This action was affirmed by this Court.

 In North Dakota (In re Kraemer, 411 NW2d 71, 73 [ND, 1987]), and Louisiana (Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v Krasnoff, 488 So 2d 1002 [La, 1986], 502 So 2d 1018 [La, 1987], and 515 So 2d 780 [La, 1987]), the grievance authorities may bring a second or third disbarment petition on the basis of conduct not charged the first time. Thus, while they do not have permanent disbarment they may save a count or two for a later proceeding.

 (7) Manner of Discipline. Any Justice, judge or attorney found guilty of misconduct shall be disciplined as follows: (a) a permanent disbarment from the practice of law, or, (b) suspension for an indefinite period from the practice of law subject only to reinstatement as hereinafter provided, or, (c) suspension for a period of six (6) months to two (2) years from the practice of law ....
(8) Effect of Discipline; Enhancement. (A) A person disbarred or a person who has voluntarily surrendered his license to practice shall never thereafter be readmitted to the practice of law in this State. [Emphasis added. Governing Rule V of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio.]
See Akron Bar Ass’n v Thorpe, 23 Ohio St 3d 210; 492 NE2d 162 (1986), Office of Disciplinary Counsel v Hughes, 17 Ohio St 3d 210; 478 NE2d 796 (1985), and Office of Disciplinary Counsel v Klunk, 17 Ohio St 3d 43; 476 NE2d 1051 (1985).

 By court rule, the District of Columbia provides for reinstatement after five years in an ordinary disbarment. DC Bar Rules, R XI, § 16(a). By statute, the District of Columbia provides for disbarment following a conviction of crime involving moral turpitude. DC Code, § ll-2503(a).
The statute has been construed to mandate permanent disbarment without the possibility of reinstatement. In re Colson, 412 A2d 1160 (DC App, 1979); In re Kerr, 424 A2d 94 (DC App, 1980).

 Florida Rules Regulating the Florida Bar discipline provide for disbarment for five years or such longer period as the Court shall determine. Florida also provides for permanent disbarment by consent. Rule 3-7.12. See Florida Bar v Winter, 549 So 2d 188 (Fla, 1989).

 Supreme Court Rule 219 permits a disbarred attorney to petition for reinstatement after five years. The five-year disbarment period may, however, be extended at the discretion of the Supreme Court.
See In re Russo, 244 Kan 3; 765 P2d 166 (1988); State v Russo, 230 Kan 5; 630 P2d 711 (1981).
See also In re Brown, 166 W Va 226; 273 SE2d 567 (1980).

 New Jersey Court Rules provide for disbarment by consent which is also permanent. NJ Ct Rule l:20-8(a).
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court Rules do not provide for any disciplinary sanctions other than disbarment by consent, the Supreme Court has the authority to discipline attorneys as needed. NJ Const, art 6, § 3. And when disbarment is the imposed sanction, it is almost always permanent. In re Wilson, 81 NJ 451; 409 A2d 1153 (1979). See also In re Tumini, 95 NJ 18; 468 A2d 707 (1983).

 Rules of the North Carolina State Bar, "Surrender of License While Proceeding Pending,” art IX, § 17(2)(b). See Vann, III v North Carolina State Bar, 339 SE2d 95 (NC App, 1986).

 See n 18.

 2.2 Disbarment
Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer. Where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established for a lawyer who has been disbarred to apply for readmission, provided that:
(1) no application should be considered for five years from the effective date of disbarment; and
(2) the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) successful completion of the bar examination,
(b) compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules; and
(c) rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.

 RULE 10. SANCTIONS.
A. Types of Sanctions. Misconduct shall be grounds for one or more of the following sanctions:
(1) Disbarment by the court.
*328(2) Suspension by the court for an appropriate fixed period of time not in excess of three years.
(3) Probation ....
(4) Reprimand by the court or the board. . . .
(5) Admonition by disciplinary counsel ....

 RULE 25. REINSTATEMENT AFTER SUSPENSION FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS AND READMISSION.
A. Generally. A lawyer suspended for more than six months or a disbarred lawyer shall be reinstated or readmitted only upon order of the court. No lawyer may petition for reinstatement until [six months before] the period of suspension has expired. No lawyer may petition for readmission until [five] years after the effective date of disbarment. . . .

 Rule 25. E. Criteria for Reinstatement and Readmission. A lawyer may be reinstated or readmitted only if the lawyer meets each of the following criteria, or, if not, presents good and sufficient reason why the lawyer should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted:
(1) The lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders except to the extent that they are abated under Rule 26.
(2) The lawyer has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment.
(3) If the lawyer was suffering under a physical or mental disability or infirmity at the time of suspension or disbarment, including alcohol or other drug abuse, the disability or infirmity has been removed. Where alcohol or other drug abuse was a causative factor in the lawyer’s misconduct, the lawyer shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless:
(a) the lawyer has pursued appropriate rehabilitative treatment;
(b) the lawyer has abstained from the use of alcohol or other drugs for at least [one year]; and
(c) the lawyer is likely to continue to abstain from alcohol or other drugs. .
(4) The lawyer recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred.
(5) The lawyer has not engaged in any other professional misconduct since suspension or disbarment.
(6) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined, the lawyer has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law.
*329(7) The lawyer has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice.

 Rule 25. I. Conditions of Reinstatement or Readmission. The court may impose conditions on a lawyer’s reinstatement or readmission. The conditions shall be imposed in cases where the lawyer has met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the court reasonably believes that further precautions should be taken to insure that the public will be protected upon the lawyer’s return to practice.
The court may impose any conditions that are reasonably related to the grounds for the lawyer’s original suspension or disbarment, or to evidence presented at the hearing regarding the lawyer’s failure to meet the criteria for reinstatement or readmission. The conditions may include any of the following: passing the bar examination as a condition to readmission following disbarment; limitation upon practice (to one area of law or through association with an experienced supervising lawyer); participation in continuing legal education courses; monitoring of the lawyer’s practice (for compliance with trust account rules, accounting procedures, or office management procedures); abstention from the use of drugs or alcohol; active participation in Alcoholics Anonymous or other alcohol or drug rehabilitation program; monitoring of the lawyer’s compliance with any other orders (such as abstinence from alcohol or drugs, or participation in alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs). If the monitoring lawyer determines that the reinstated or readmitted lawyer’s compliance with any condition of reinstatement or readmission is unsatisfactory and that there exists a potential for harm to the public, the monitoring lawyer shall notify the court and, where necessary to protect the public, the lawyer may be suspended from practice under Rule 20(B).