Court Opinion

ID: 9741256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:52:28.451077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.178870
License: Public Domain

Beasley, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
1 do not believe People v Van Dorten1 is intended by the Supreme Court to announce a new rule that under no circumstances will a trial judge be permitted to exercise the discretion afforded him under MRE 609 to determine whether the probative value of admitting evidence of a prior unspecified conviction outweighs possible prejudicial effects. For over a century many, if not a majority of, trial judges have exercised the discretion vested in them under this rule and under the case law. This is not to deny the existence of a difference of opinion regarding this complex and important evidentiary issue. But, it is to say that the Supreme Court does not change a substantial portion of existing practice with summary, four-sentence orders such as employed in Van Dorsten.
For the reasons set forth in detail in People v Huff2 I would affirm._

 409 Mich 942; 298 NW2d 421 (1980).

 101 Mich App 232; 300 NW2d 525 (1980).