Court Opinion

ID: 9549893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:06.427224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:01.446759
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
specially concurring, in which THOMAS, Justice, and GRANT, District Judge, join.
I agree with that portion of the majority opinion entitled “Speedy Sentencing” and with the result achieved in that part of the majority opinion entitled “Speedy Trial.” With reference to this latter part of the opinion, however, I do not agree that this court’s speedy trial analysis is, or should be, based upon “the justification and limitation of Rule 204, Uniform Rules for the District Courts, as a basic 120-day criteria for speedy trial.”
In 1972, this court expressly adopted the four-part balancing test established, explained and applied in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). See Cosco v. State, 503 P.2d 1403, 1405 (Wyo.1972). Again, in 1979, this court faithfully applied the balancing test in Cherniwchan v. State, 594 P.2d 464 (Wyo.1979), where the court found the defendant had been wronged by excessive delay but not wronged in a constitutional sense. A year later this court once more faithfully applied the balancing test in Estrada v. State, 611 P.2d 850 (Wyo.1980). Again, in 1981, in Robinson v. State, 627 P.2d 168 (Wyo.1981), this court applied the balancing test “previously adopted in this jurisdiction as the means by which a speedy trial claim should be judged.” Id. at 171. Significantly, the court observed that on September 14, 1979, the Wyoming Judicial Conference adopted Rule 22, the forerunner of present Rule 204. Although Estrada was decided after the adoption of the rule, the rule “was not an issue in that case and was not considered by this court in the decision.” Robinson, 627 P.2d at 171. In Robinson the criminal defendant specifically asserted that his denial of speedy trial was in viola*87tion of Rule 22. This court rejected that assertion and the application of the rule’s absolute deadline. Id. at 172. In particular, this court said:
This court does not approve or disapprove district court rules * * *. The adoption of Rule 22 by the Judicial Conference was obviously to set guidelines to encourage and motivate prompt disposition of criminal cases and to avoid a constitutional violation with respect to speedy trial requirements * * *. [NJo sanction of dismissal is provided by the rule. To so provide would have caused it to be inconsistent with Rule 45(b), W.R.Cr.P. by defining “unnecessary,” which this court has decided must be determined on a case-to-case basis following standards and the tests set out in Estrada. Its adoption was accordingly admirable but the fixing of an absolute deadline by Rule 22(d), Uniform Rules for the District Courts of the State of Wyoming was in conflict with, superseded and modified by Estrada.
Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added).
A few months after Robinson, this court considered another speedy trial claim invoking Rule 22 in Cook v. State, 631 P.2d 5, 9 (Wyo.1981). In that case, the criminal defendant contended that Rule 22 provided the exclusive and mandatory guidance for a speedy-trial action. Rejecting that argument, this court again expressly rejected the strict application of Rule 22’s time limitations and embraced the balancing test from Barker. Id. at 10.
This court continued to apply faithfully the balancing test in Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo.1986); Binger v. State, 712 P.2d 349 (Wyo.1986); Caton v. State, 709 P.2d 1260 (Wyo.1985); Tageant v. State, 683 P.2d 667 (Wyo.1984); Grable v. State, 649 P.2d 663 (Wyo.1982); Heinrich v. State, 638 P.2d 641 (Wyo.1981).
Curiously and unexplainably, the majority opinion says nothing about the two most recent cases decided by this court in which the balancing test was applied. I refer to Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1989) and Phillips v. State, 774 P.2d 118 (Wyo.1989). Although these two most recent applications of the balancing test drew two dissents, at least the court applied the balancing test and did not abandon it outright in favor of the earlier rejected strict time limitations of present Rule 204.
If a majority of this court wants to modify a straightforward application of the Barker balancing test by making Uniform District Court Rule 204 mandatory in a constitutional sense, it should expressly overrule a long line of cases including Ca-tón, Robinson and Cook and say so. Otherwise, this court’s analysis of speedy trial cases has been muddled to impliedly justify what seems to be a plurality opinion in Phillips and Harvey. Sound jurisprudence requires that we clearly enunciate controlling law. Previous majority opinions of this court which conflict with a newer position should be overruled rather than overwhelmed. See B. Witkin, Manual On Appellate Court Opinions § 101 at 195 (1977) (referencing Bennett v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. 153, 165, 21 P.2d 946, 950 (1933) (Zangdon, J., specially concurring)). I suspect that the votes to expressly overrule Catón, Robinson and Cook in this case simply do not exist.
I specially concur, therefore, in the “speedy trial” portion of this opinion because, under the well-established and often-applied balancing test which is the law of this jurisdiction, no speedy trial violation occurred.