Court Opinion

ID: 9564150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:55:12.514806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:15.041761
License: Public Domain

Moss, Chief'Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the lower court.
Lemuel Triplett, Jr., as temporary administrator of Lemuel Triplett, deceased, the respondent herein, by letter *430dated February 18, 1972, sent by certified mail, forwarded to R. M. Wade and Company, the appellant herein, two copies of summonses, (Complaint not Served) ; one being designated “Wrongful Death”, and the other being designated “Survival Action”. The aforesaid letter was addressed to the appellant at 1919 N. W., Thurman Street, Portland, Oregon, with an indication thereon that a carbon copy was being sent to the Secretary of State for South Carolina. The caption of each case is identical and the sole differentiating description was as to the nature of each action. It is thus apparent that these are tort actions.
It is agreed that copies of these summonses were served upon the Secretary of State for South Carolina pursuant to Section 10-424 of the 1962 Code of Laws, as amended.
The appellant, following the receipt of these summonses, through its attorneys, appeared specially and for the sole purpose of moving to quash and dismiss the purported service of process upon it for the lack of jurisdiction.
The motions of the appellant were heard by The Honorable J. A. Spruill, Presiding Judge, upon documentary evidence and affidavits. Thereafter, the trial judge denied the motions to dismiss and held that the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County had jurisdiction of the appellant in these two actions because “the defendant was doing business in South Carolina to such an extent that it does not offend one’s sense of fair play and substantial justice to permit service in the instant case.” Even though the respondent argued that service was good under Section 10-2.803 of the Code, the “long arm statute,” the trial judge did not base his decision on this section.
The respondent has invoked the provisions of Section 10-424 of the 1962 Code of Laws, as amended, in his attempt to serve a summons in each action on the appellant through the office of the Secretary of State and by mailing to the appellant copies thereof at its State of Oregon address. The aforesaid action permits constructive service upon a foreign *431corporation “if such foreign corporation transacts business in this State.” The issue presented here is whether or not, at the time of the event which gave rise to these actions, the appellant was transacting business in South Carolina.
In Boney v. Trans-State Dredging Co., 237 S. C. 54, 115 S. E. (2d) 508, we held:
“No universal formula has been, or is likely to be, devised for determining what constitutes ‘doing business’ by a foreign corporation within a state in such sense as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state. The question must be resolved upon the facts of the particular case. Jones v. General Motors Corporation, 197 S. C. 129, 14 S. E. (2d) 628; State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S. C. 379, 38 S. E. (2d) 242.
“Recent decisions of both federal and state courts have tended to discard older concepts whereby jurisdiction was accorded on the fictional premise of the corporation’s implied consent or on the theory that the corporation is ‘present’ wherever its activities are carried on, and to substitute therefor, as the jurisdictional test, the requirement that the corporation have such contact with the state of the forum ‘that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A. L. R. 1057.”
However, in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. (2d) 1283, the court noted that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice do not confer unlimited jurisdiction of foreign corporations upon state courts, saying:
“But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. See Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U. S. 416, 418, 77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed (2d) 1456, 1459. Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenience or distant litigation. They are a conse*432quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the' ‘minimal contacts’ with that State that are a prerequisite to - its exercise of power over him. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 159, 90 L. Ed. 95, 103, 161 A. L. R. 1057.”
In Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 245 S. C. 383, 140 S. E. (2d) 786, plaintiff was injured when an appliance for brewing coffee-, manufactured by the defendant, allegedly exploded. The plaintiff attempted service of process on the defendant through the office of the Secretary of State under Section 10-424 of the Code. The circuit court, finding that the defendant had no agent and transacted no business in South Carolina, granted the motion of the defendant to dismiss the action. We held that the judgment of the circuit court was supported by all of the evidence and must be sustained. We further held that the fact alone, that products ihanufactured by the defendant and bearing its trade name passed through the channels of trade into South Carolina and were here resold by independent merchants, did not constitute the transacting of business by the defendant in this State.
In the case of Carolina B. & P. Co. v. Glascoat Distributors, 249 S. C. 49, 152 S. E. (2d) 352, the facts show that Glascoat had a salesman, who resided in North Carolina, who operated in South Carolina, and who called regularly upon Carolina and other firms in South Carolina for the purpose of soliciting orders for its products, and over a period of several years Carolina and its predecessor in business had purchased from Glascoat products amounting to more than $10,000 annually; similar business was trans-. acted by Glascoat with other corporations in five other counties in this State; the purchase.orders by Carolina were given sometimes to Glascoat’s soliciting agent' in. person';' sometimes by letter or telephone to Atlanta of Miami'; and *433deliveries of its products in South Carolina were made by mail or truck. Glascoat, a foreign corporation, appearing specially, moved to dismiss upon the grounds that it was not transacting business in the State and was not amenable to substituted service of process. From an order denying the motion, Glascoat appealed. We affirmed holding that the evidence before the circuit court furnished an adequate basis for the conclusion that such corporation was transacting business in South Carolina and was amenable to substituted service of process.
In this case, as well as the Boney case, we pointed out that the jurisdictional test requires only that the corporation have such contact with the state of the forum that the maintenance there of an action against it in personam does not “offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,’ ” and that each case must be resolved upon its particular facts. In these cases we suggested that among the factors to be considered in determining jurisdiction are the duration and nature of the corporate activity within the state, the character of the acts giving rise to the litigation, the circumstances of their commission, and the relative inconvenience to the respective parties of a trial in the state of the forum on the one hand and in the state of the corporate domicile on the other.
We now examine the record to determine whether the appellant was “transacting business” and had the requisite minimal contacts with this State sufficient to give our courts jurisdiction.
Wade Quicklock Couplers are manufactured by the appellant at its plant in Portland, Oregon. These couplers are used for joining pipes or other apparatus for use in transmitting or conducting liquids, gases or air. In order that one of these couplers can be used, it is necessary that the customer be supplied with tubing. The appellant does not manufacture this tubing, but it is obtained by its distributors from independent sources.
*434It is uncontradicted that the appellant is an Oregon corporation and is not domesticated in South Carolina. It is likewise uncontradicted that the appellant has no agents, officers, servants, or other representatives in South Carolina, and has no offices, places of business, warehouses, listed telephones or other incidents of business in this State.
It appears that on July 1, 1955, the appellant entered into a Distributor Agreement with John W. Burress of Roanoke, Virginia, then a proprietorship, now a corporation. By the terms of such agreement Burress acquired exclusive rights to sell and distribute Wade Quicklock Couplers, for commercial and industrial purposes only, in eleven southern and southeastern states, including South Carolina. The agreement specified that Burress was not an agent or employee of Wade, but an independent contractor and classified as a “stocking” distributor, buying from the appellant and keeping on hand a large stock of couplers and fittings. Burress bought Quicklock Couplers from the appellant and then resold them for its own account to its customers. The agreement further provided that any inquires received from points within the territory would be referred by the appellant to Burress. It was also agreed that Burress would actively promote the sale of the appellant’s products within its territory. All orders of Burress for couplers, under the terms of the agreement, were acceptable only at appellant’s place of business in Portland, Oregon.
It appears by affidavit of one Harold P. Tennant, Eastern Sales Manager of the appellant, residing in Farmville, Virginia, and who had been so employed for approximately eighteen years, that in 1971, he heard that an accident had occurred at Lone Star Industries, Columbia, South Carolina, and such involved Quicklock Couplers manufactured by his employer. He stated that he came to South Carolina, this being his first trip in eight or ten years, for the sole purpose of investigating this accident. He avers that he had a conversation with a representative of Lone Star Industries and got what information he could about the accident. This *435affiant also avers that his primary function with the appellant was to call upon distributors who bought from Wade and to make investigations when required. He further stated that he has had no business dealings in South Carolina, since he came here to investigate the accident at Lone Star Industries.
The respondent filed an affidavit of one Donald M. Pridgen, whose identity or connection with these cases is not disclosed, in which it is averred that on November 3, 1972, he spoke with Harold Tennant who had come to Columbia “to investigate as to whether his company had contributed to the accident.” He further says that he received a business card from Tennant showing him to be the “Eastern National Sales Manager” for the appellant. He also avers that on about August 15, 1972, that he found that Quicklock Couplers, manufactured by the appellant, could be purchased at the store of W. P. Law & Co., Lexington, South Carolina.
It is indicated in the record that Lone Star Industries obtained two publications having to do with Quicklock installation instructions and Wade Quicklock Couplers. The source from which Lone Star Industries received these two publications is not revealed.
There is also nothing in the record to indicate that the appellant ever delivered any Quicklock Couplers to destinations in South Carolina or that it ever shipped them from its plant in Oregon to any point in this State.
Although Quicklock Couplers were in use when the event which gave rise to these actions occurred, there is nothing to indicate from whom, when or where Lone Star Industries acquired them. There is no evidence that they were distributed through Burress of Roanoke, Virginia, or from any customer of either the appellant or Burress. Of course, if the couplers manufactured by the appellant and bearing its trade name passed through the channels of trade into South Carolina and were here resold by independent merchants, *436such would not constitute the transacting of business by the appellant in this State. Phillips v. Knapp-Monarch Co., Supra.
Under the facts disclosed by the record here, the only connection that the appellant had with South Carolina was (1) its couplers were being used by Lone Star Industries in Columbia, South Carolina; and (2) after the accident happened a representative of the appellant came to Columbia to investigate the accident at Lone Star Industries. It is not sufficient to show that Wade was transacting business in South Carolina merely because couplers manufactured by it were being used by Lone Star Industries in Columbia, South Carolina. The additional fact that a representative of the appellant came to South Carolina to investigate the accident at Lone Star Industries likewise does not constitute transacting business in South Carolina by the appellant. Such was an isolated incident or event and did not imply or show that the appellant was transacting business in South Carolina. Hoffman v. D. Landreth Seed Co., 220 S. C. 193, 66 S. E. (2d) 813. A corporation not otherwise doing business in the state is not brought therein by the presence of an agent for the purpose of investigating a single claim. 20 C. J. S. Corporations § 1920(e) (3), at page 162.
It is my conclusion that the appellant has not had the necessary relations, minimum contacts or ties with the State of South Carolina to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State by service of process pursuant to Section 10-424 of the Code, as amended.
The judgment of the lower court holding that the appellant was subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State should be reversed and this case remanded thereto for an appropriate order dismissing the purported service of process.
Littlejohn, J., concurs.