Court Opinion

ID: 9675727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:03:49.303277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:38.022889
License: Public Domain

W. C. DAVIS, Judge,
concurring.
While I concur in the reversal of this judgment, I do so for a different reason than that of the majority. The majority opinion states that appellant’s objection at trial to the introduction of the booking sheet was sufficient to preserve error as to hearsay admitted. I cannot agree that his objection at trial was a hearsay objection. Appellant’s sole objection was,
“We’ll object to State’s Exhibit Number Two on the grounds that the witness was not personally present when the document was prepared, nor does the instrument contain any certification that it is a true and correct copy, and bears no signature at all.”
I cannot agree with the majority that this objection can be construed as an objection to hearsay. Thus, I would hold that this objection was insufficient to apprise the trial court that appellant's objection was to hearsay evidence. See Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Nevertheless, it appears that the judgment should be reversed for the reason that the evidence is insufficient to show that appellant was the same person convicted of misdemeanor theft. The booking sheet was used as the connecting link. However, when the booking sheet was admitted into evidence, it was offered solely to show the birthdate and license number. The court stated,
“It will be admitted solely for that purpose and nothing else.”
Since the evidence was admitted for this limited purpose before the trial court, nothing else contained on the booking sheet may be considered. This, standing alone, appears to be insufficient to show that appellant was the person convicted of misdemeanor theft, upon which the State relied to revoke appellant’s probation.
I concur in the reversal of this judgment.