Court Opinion

ID: 88368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:38+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:33.034496
License: Public Domain

79 U.S. 121 (____)
12 Wall. 121
NOONAN
v.
BRADLEY, ADMINISTRATOR.
Supreme Court of United States.

*123 In consequence of this decision, Messrs. N.J. Emmons and J.S. Brown, in behalf of Ogden.
Mr. M.H. Carpenter, contra.
*124 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Particular reference to the nature of the controversy and the prior adjudications in respect to the same are indispensable in order that the motion and the effect of it, if granted, may be properly understood.
Noonan, on the first day of October, 1855, purchased of Lee certain real estate, situated in Wisconsin, by deed of warranty, and gave his bond for the purchase-money conditioned to pay four thousand dollars in four equal annual instalments, with interest, and gave a mortgage on the premises to secure the payments as specified in the bond, and the mortgage also contained a stipulation that upon any default on the part of the mortgagor in making the payments, including the interest and taxes as well as the principal, the whole of the mortgage debt, with interest, should, at the option of the mortgagee, become due and should be collectible on demand.
At the time the conveyances were executed the premises were in the possession of one John J. Orton, holding the same adversely to the grantor, in consequence of which the grantee required from the grantor an agreement to the effect that if the title failed the bond should not be enforced, and that if any incumbrances existed on the premises the amount of the same should be deducted from the stipulated consideration.
On the fourth of March, 1859, Lee filed a bill in equity in *125 the District Court of the United States for that district, exercising Circuit Court powers, setting forth that the grantee and mortgagor had not paid either principal or interest of the mortgage debt; that he, the complainant, had notified the party that he claimed that the whole debt had become due, and praying for a sale of the mortgaged premises, the payment of the mortgaged debt, and for general relief.
Such proceedings were had in the cause that the court rendered a final decree in the same, the court finding that the sum of five thousand two hundred and sixty-seven dollars and twenty cents was due to the grantor and mortgagee of the said premises, and the decree also directed the sale of the premises, the payment of the mortgage debt, and that the surplus, if any, should be brought into court; that, if the moneys arising from the sale were insufficient to pay the mortgage debt, interest, and costs, the marshal, in his report of the sale, should specify the amount of the deficiency, and that the respondent should pay the deficiency with interest, "and that the complainant may have execution therefor."
From that decree the respondent appealed to this court, and at the December Term, 1862, the appeal was duly entered here on the calendar. When the cause was reached the parties were heard, and this court decided that the complainant, upon the proofs exhibited, was entitled to a decree for the whole amount of the mortgage debt by virtue of the special stipulation in the mortgage, although one of the instalments, according to the terms of the bond, was not due when the bill was filed. Pursuant to that decision the court affirmed that part of the decree, but the court also decided that in the absence of a rule of the court conferring such authority the court below could not enter a decree in such a case, that the complainant should have execution for the balance found to be due to him over and above the proceeds of the sale, and reversed that part of the decree.[*]
Pending the appeal, however, and before the parties were heard in this court, to wit, on the seventh of February, 1862, *126 the death of the respondent, John B. Lee, was suggested, and on motion leave was granted that the appearance of Alfred F.R. Bradley might be entered as administrator of the estate of the deceased, and he was admitted as appellee in the case. Doubts arising as to the validity of the title acquired by Noonan from his grantor, he commenced an action of ejectment in the State court against John J. Orton, the party in possession at the date of the conveyances, and gave notice to his grantor that he might appear and defend the title to the premises. Lee accordingly employed counsel, but the decision of the State court, rendered in January, 1863, was that the party in possession was seized in fee of the premises.
Both parties concede that Lee, when he died, was domiciled in New York, and that Bradley was duly appointed administrator by the proper tribunal in that State. When Lee died he also had effects of value in Wisconsin, and in February, 1865, the party who filed the motion, Thomas L. Ogden, was duly appointed administrator of those effects by the proper tribunal having jurisdiction of the matter in that State. On the sixth day of September, 1866, Bradley as administrator of the estate of John B. Lee, deceased, commenced an action of debt against Josiah A. Noonan, counting on the before-mentioned bond given by the latter to the decedent, for the purchase-money of the said real estate, as more fully set forth in the record.[*]
Three defences were set up by the defendant to the suit: (1) That the plaintiff was not and never had been administrator of the estate of the deceased. (2) That the deceased, at the time of his death, had effects in that State, among which was the bond in suit, and that the defendant was duly appointed administrator of those effects, and that the letters issued to the plaintiff, as applied to the cause of action in the declaration mentioned, were void and of no effect. (3) That the title to the premises had failed, the plea setting up the judgment in the ejectment suit rendered in the State court.
*127 To the several pleas the plaintiff demurred, and judgment was rendered against the defendant for the sum of seven thousand five hundred and eighty-nine dollars and seventy-five cents, and the defendant appealed to this court, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was reversed, the court holding that an administrator appointed in one State cannot, by virtue of such an appointment, maintain an action in another State, in the absence of a statute of the latter State giving effect to that appointment, to enforce an obligation due his intestate.
Based on the conclusion announced in that case the proposition of the party submitting the motion is that all the proceedings in the case first mentioned, subsequent to the time when the death of the respondent in that suit was suggested, were irregular, that the administrator appointed by the tribunal of the jurisdiction where the intestate had his domicile at his decease was improperly admitted as appellee, and that the final decree in the case should be set aside and that a decree or order should be entered that the suit abated at the death of the appellee in the appeal, and that the clerk here should be directed to transmit a certificate to that effect to the court below.
Apart from the novel character of the motion and the grave doubts which arise whether the proposed certificate, even if the party is entitled to a remedy, is an appropriate process to be sent from an appellate to a subordinate tribunal, the court is of the opinion that the relief sought in the case cannot be granted, and that the motion must be denied upon three grounds, either of which is a complete and satisfactory answer to the application. They are as follows:
1. That the administrator of the domicile where the intestate resided at his decease was properly admitted as the appellee in the case, because, at that time, no ancillary administration had been granted in the State of Wisconsin.
Admitted as he was, without objection from the appellant, it may well be doubted whether the appellant in this case, *128 inasmuch as his appointment bears date subsequent to those proceedings, can be permitted to intervene, in the absence of fraud, for the purpose of setting aside what had passed in rem judicatam before he was appointed, but the court is not inclined to rest its decision upon that ground, as the statute of the State authorizes foreign executors and administrators to sue in the courts of the State, in cases where no executor or administrator of the estate of the decedent has been appointed in the State.[*]
Responsive to that it may be suggested that the right so conceded is subject to the condition that such representative party has filed in the Probate Court an authenticated copy of his appointment, but it is a sufficient answer to that suggestion in this case to say that nothing appears in the record to show that the condition, if it be one, was not fulfilled, and the court is of the opinion that a compliance, under the circumstances of this case, must be presumed, as the record shows that this court passed an order that the appearance of the administrator be entered and "that the said administrator be and he hereby is made the appellee in this case."
2. Grant that an administrator appointed in one State cannot, by virtue of such an appointment, maintain an action in another State unless so authorized by statute, still it does not follow that the proceedings in this case were irregular, as the suit was commenced by the appellee in his lifetime and was prosecuted by him in the court below to a final decree, and from that decree the respondent appealed to this court. All these proceedings took place while the intestate was in full life, and it appears that the appeal was pending in this court at the time that his death was suggested, and that the administrator appointed in the jurisdiction of the decedent's domicile was admitted as the appellee by the order of the court, as before explained. He did not commence the suit, and as he was the only administrator appointed, the court is of the opinion that he was a competent party to appear and support the decree.
*129 3. Suppose, however, that neither of those propositions is correct, still the court is of the opinion that the motion must be denied, as this court, subsequent to the term when a judgment or decree is rendered, possesses no power to review its own final judgments or decrees. Where the merits of a case are decided in the Circuit Court and the decree on appeal is reversed in this court and the mandate of the court is sent down directing the court below to execute the decree, it is well-settled law that it is too late to call in question the jurisdiction of the subordinate court.[*] Repeated decisions of this court have established the rule that a final judgment or decree of this court is conclusive upon the parties, and that it cannot be re-examined at a subsequent term, as there is no act of Congress which confers any such authority.[] Second appeals or writs of error are allowed, but the rule is universal that they bring up only the proceedings subsequent to the mandate, and do not authorize an inquiry into the merits of the original judgment or decree. Rehearings are never granted where a final decree has been entered and the mandate sent down, unless the application is made at the same term, except in cases of fraud.[] Appellate power is exercised over the proceedings of subordinate courts and not on those of the appellate court, and the express decision of this court in several cases is that the "court has no power to review its decisions, whether in a case at law or in equity, and that a final decree in equity is as conclusive as a judgment at law.[§] Other cases to the same effect might be referred to, but it does not seem to be necessary, as the views of the court from its organization to the present time appear to have been uniform and consistent, as is sufficiently exemplified by the cases to which reference is made.
MOTION DENIED.
NOTES
[*]  Noonan v. Lee, 2 Black, 501; Rule 94.
[*]  Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wallace, 399.
[*]  Sessions Acts, 1860, 24.
[*]  Skillern's Executors v. May's Executors, 6 Cranch, 267.
[]  Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheaton, 355.
[]  Browder v. McArthur, 7 Wheaton, 58; The Santa Maria, 10 Wheaton, 442.
[§]  Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart et al., 3 Howard, 424; Ex parte Sibbald, 12 Peters, 492; Peck v. Sanderson, 18 Howard, 42.