Court Opinion

ID: 2963723
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:14:16.531296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:45.139426
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1082

                                  SHEREE A. CARTER,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                            STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                 [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             James R.  Lee, Assistant Attorney  General, with whom  Jeffrey B.
             _____________                                          __________
        Pine, Attorney General, was on brief for appellants.
        ____
             George  Carvalho,  with whom  Patrick  J. Quinlan  and  George E.
             ________________              ___________________       _________
        Babcock were on brief for appellee.
        _______

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   October 18, 1995
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR, Circuit Judge.  Appellee Sheree A. Carter, a state
                    CYR, Circuit Judge.
                         _____________

          prison guard, filed suit against the State of Rhode Island, eight

          of her supervisors or superior officers, and her  union, alleging

          race and  gender  discrimination.   Four  individual  defendants,

          among the  eight individual defendants who  initiated this inter-

          locutory appeal,  challenge a  district  court order  disallowing

          their  "qualified immunity"  defenses  at summary  judgment.   We

          dismiss their appeal, for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    The Rhode Island Department of Corrections hired Carter

          as  a prison  guard in October  1990.  Her  superior officers and

          supervisors embarked on a prolonged campaign of workplace harass-

          ment in  April 1991.    The work  environment was  marked by  (i)

          several disciplinary measures against Carter based on infractions

          for  which defendants  had never  disciplined white  male guards,

          (ii) especially  undesirable or  dangerous work assignments  made

          without regard to her seniority and class ranking, and failure to

          accord "serious consideration" to  her application for promotion,

          (iii)  repeated  racial  slurs  and  sexual  threats  anonymously

          directed against Carter  in telephone  calls at work  and at  her

          home, and  in graffiti posted  at or near her  work station, (iv)

          failure to address her  repeated complaints about ongoing harass-

                              
          ____________________

               1The material facts are related in the light  most favorable
          to  Carter, the party resisting summary judgment.  See Hegarty v.
                                                             ___ _______
          Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1368 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995). 
          _______________

                                          2

          ment,  amounting  to  implicit condonation,  and  (v)  defamatory

          comments to  the press  relating to Carter's  discrimination com-

          plaints. 

                    Carter commenced  suit  in federal  district  court  in

          August 1993,  alleging, inter  alia, that defendants  violated 42
                                  _____  ____

          U.S.C.   1983 by  infringing her constitutional right to  be free

          from race and  gender discrimination  under the  Fifth and  Four-

          teenth  Amendments  to  the  United States  Constitution.2    She
                              
          ____________________

               2Only the  ruling  denying summary  judgment on  the    1983
          claims is before us on appeal.  An amended complaint additionally
          alleged civil  rights claims under  42 U.S.C.    1981 (race-based
          discrimination only)  and   1985, pendent  state-law claims under
                         ____
          the Rhode Island Whistleblower Protection Act, see R.I. Gen. Laws
                                                         ___
             28-14-18 (1994), and common law tort claims for defamation and
          intentional infliction of emotional  distress.  Later, Carter was
          allowed to amend  the complaint  again by including  a Title  VII
          claim, see 42 U.S.C.   2000e-2(a)(1), to conform to the proffered
                 ___
          evidence.  Defendants moved for  summary judgment on all  claims,
          based on their qualified immunity defenses to the   1981,    1983
          and   1985 claims.
               The  district court  denied  summary judgment  to all  eight
          defendants on the Title VII claims, finding trialworthy issues of
          material fact.   See Carter  v. State  of Rhode  Island, No.  93-
                           ___ ______     _______________________
          0447B,  slip op. at 6-7, 18-20  (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 1994) (Report and
          Recommendation).   The  court also  dismissed the     1985 claims
          against  all eight  defendants  because Carter  failed to  adduce
          sufficient  evidence to generate  a trialworthy  issue as  to the
          existence  of  a "conspiracy."   Id.  at  15-17, n.47.   Finally,
                                           ___
          except for  the defamation claim against  "supervisory" defendant
          Vose,  the court denied all  motions for summary  judgment on the
          state-law claims.  Id. at 25-27.  
                             ___
               Though not at issue in this interlocutory appeal, we note an
          apparent inconsistency  between the district court  order and the
          memorandum explaining its rationale; viz., there is no foundation
          in  the memorandum and order for the district court's decision to
          dismiss the   1981 claims  against the four "supervisory"  defen-
          dants.  The court dismissed the   1981 claims against the "union"
                                                                ___  _____
          defendants because Carter had adduced  insufficient evidence that
          __________
          the union  intentionally  or purposefully  discriminated  against
              _____
          Carter by selectively invoking a union  policy not to investigate
          a union  member's complaints  while the complainant  is receiving
          workers' compensation.  Id.  at 11-13.  On the  other hand, there
                                  ___
          is no discussion  of the    1981 claims  against appellants,  who
                                                   _______ __________

                                          3

          sought injunctive relief, compensatory  and punitive damages, and

          attorney fees.  Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending

          that Carter had failed to state  a claim upon which relief may be

          granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), and asserting "quali-
                   ___

          fied immunity" from suit.

                    The  district court  categorized the  eleven individual

          defendants in three groups:  

                    "Union" Defendants:  Rhode Island Brotherhood
                     _________________
                    of  Correctional  Officers  (Union);  William
                    Bove (Union president); Kenneth Rivard (Union
                    grievance chairman);

                    "Supervisory" Defendants: George A. Vose, Jr.
                     _______________________
                    (Director of Rhode Island Department  of Cor-
                    rections);  Captain  Walter Whitman  (Warden;
                    Carter's  supervisor);  Captain  Thomas  Par-
                    tridge (Deputy  Warden; Carter's supervisor);
                    Barry Levin (the Department's  Chief Supervi-
                    sor of Employee Relations); and 

                    "Superior  Officer"  Defendants:   Lieutenant
                     ______________________________
                    Ronald  Le  Clerc;  Captain  Kenneth  Ahearn;
                    Captain  Peter  Germani  and  Captain  Ronald
                              
          ____________________

          moved  for summary judgment  on the    1981 and    1983 claims on
          qualified immunity grounds only, and whose   1981 liability is in
          no sense derivative of, nor dependent upon, the union defendants.

               Nevertheless,  dismissal of  the    1981 claims  against the
          "superior  officer"  defendants  does  appear to  flow  from  the
          dismissal  of the   1983 claims against those defendants based on
          insufficient  evidence of  discriminatory intent.   On  the other
          hand,  assuming  the  district  court  correctly  denied  summary
          judgment to  the  four "supervisory"  defendants  on the     1983
          claims,  we discern  no basis  for dismissing  the    1981 claims
          against  these  "supervi-sory"  defendants.   Although  qualified
          immunity may be available under    1981, defendants normally  are
          denied  the pretrial  benefits of an  immunity defense  where, as
                                                                         __
          here,  the court  finds  trialworthy issues  pertaining to  their
          ____
          subjective  state  of mind,  i.e.,  discriminatory  intent.   See
                                                                        ___
          Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc.,    F.3d     ,   
          ______    _____________________________________  __      ____  __
          (1st Cir. 1995) [No. 94-1554, slip  op. at 13, n.7 (1st Cir. Oct.
          10,  1995)].  Accordingly, the parties should explore this appar-
          ent inconsistency on remand.

                                          4

                    Brodeur (Carter's superiors).3

                    The  first  district  court  ruling  pertinent  to  the

          present  appeal dismissed  the  section 1983  claims against  the

          "superior  officer" defendants because  Carter's alleged right to

          be  free from undesirable  or dangerous  work assignments  is not

          protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the actions charged

          against defendants  could not  support a reasonable  inference of

          discriminatory  intent.  Carter v. State of Rhode Island, No. 93-
                                   ______    _____________________

          0447B,  slip op.  at  23-24 (D.R.I.  Nov.  9, 1994)  (Report  and

          Recommendation).  And,  as to defendant  Le Clerc, who  allegedly

          issued a  public reprimand  of Carter,  the district  court found

          that the  allegation  that  white  male prison  guards  were  not

          subjected  to  similar reprimands  did  not  provide an  adequate

          foundation for an inference  that Le Clerc was motivated  by race

          or gender  discrimination.  Accordingly, the  court dismissed the

          section 1983  claims against  the four "superior  officer" defen-

          dants.4

                    Second, the court ruled  that Carter had stated action-

                              
          ____________________

               3After  the  motions  for  summary  judgment  were  referred
          pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   636(b)(1)(B),  the district court adopted
          the report and recommendation issued by a magistrate  judge three
          days prior to  oral argument  in this appeal.   Accordingly,  the
          report and  recommendation is  cited throughout, as  the district
          court ruling.

               4Although  eight "superior officer" and "supervisory" defen-
          dants  are  named in  the notice  of  appeal, the  order granting
                                                                   ________
          partial summary judgment for the "superior officer" defendants is
          not immediately appealable, as it has not been certified pursuant
          to Fed.  R. Civ. P.  54(b).   See Hegarty, 53  F.3d at  1372; see
                                        ___ _______                     ___
          generally  Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 3 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir.
          _________  ______    _________________
          1993). 

                                          5

          able section  1983 claims  against the four  "supervisory" defen-

          dants, by alleging that she caused copies of her complaints to be

          sent to each     thereby  establishing that they  knew about  her
                                                            ____

          allegations of  ongoing race and gender  harassment and disparate

          treatment    thus demonstrating a trialworthy dispute as to their

          intent  in  failing  to redress  her  allegations.    Id. at  23.
          ______                                                ___

          Finally,  the district  court ruled  that the  four "supervisory"

          defendants  were not  entitled  to qualified  immunity from  suit

          because  the right to be free from race and gender discrimination

          by  government  officials  had  been "clearly  established"  long

          before 1990.   Id. at 24-25.   Thus, only the four  "supervisory"
                         ___

          defendants [hereinafter:   "appellants"] presently  challenge the

          district court summary judgment ruling rejecting their "qualified

          immunity" defenses.  See supra notes 2 & 4. 
                               ___ _____

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                    A  government  official  is not  entitled  to qualified

          immunity  from suit "if the  right asserted by  the plaintiff was

          `clearly established' at the time of its alleged  violation . . .

          [and] a  reasonable official  situated in the  same circumstances
           ___                                   __ ___  ____ _____________

          should have understood that  the challenged conduct violated that
                                       ___ __________ _______

          established right."  Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st
                               _____    ________

          Cir. 1990)  (citing Mitchell  v.  Forsyth, 472  U.S. 511  (1988))
                              ________      _______

          (emphasis  added).   The  district court  determined that  "[t]he

          constitutional right to be  free from [] invidious discrimination

          is  so well established and  so essential to  the preservation of

                                          6

          our  constitutional  order  that  all public  officials  must  be

          charged with knowledge of it."  Carter, No. 93-0447B, slip op. at
                                          ______

          25 (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 1994).  

                    Appellants contend  in  their opening  brief  that  the

          district  court should have  proceeded to consider  whether, as a

          matter of law, the  particular conduct of each individual  defen-

          dant was objectively reasonable.  They rely heavily on an analogy

          to Harris  v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), a Title
             ______     ___________________

          VII  case.    Appellants  argue that  Harris  prescribes  minimum
                                                ______

          evidentiary  standards for establishing the "objectively abusive"

          conduct needed to support a  reasonable inference that a particu-

          lar defendant  harbored an  invidious discriminatory intent.   As

          they  see it,  the facially  innocuous or  objectively reasonable

          conduct  in which appellants,  as well as  the "superior officer"

          defendants, are alleged to have engaged (e.g., defendants "glanc-

          [ed]" at  Carter during roll  call; refused  to let her  drive an

          automobile without a license) falls far short of the "objectively

          abusive  conduct" required  under Harris  (viz., repeated  use of
                                            ______

          explicit  gender-based insults,  sexual  innuendo,  threats,  and

          coercion against  a subordinate).   This is  demonstrated, appel-

          lants  say, by  the district  court ruling  that the  evidence is

          insufficient  to support  a  reasonable inference  that the  four

          "superior  officer" defendants harbored  a discriminatory intent.

          See  Carter,  No. 93-0447B,  slip op.  at  23-24 (D.R.I.  Nov. 9,
          ___  ______

          1994); see also supra  note 4.  Appellants therefore  insist that
                 ___ ____ _____

          they  were entitled  to qualified  immunity because,  viewing the

                                          7

          disputed evidence most favorably  to Carter, reasonable officials

          situated in  their circumstances should not  have understood that
                                                  ___

          their conduct violated Carter's established right to be free from

          race or gender discrimination.  See Burns, 907 F.2d at 235-36.  
                                          ___ _____

                    While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the United

          States  Supreme Court decided Johnson  v. Jones, 115  S. Ct. 2151
                                        _______     _____

          (1995).  Displacing our  longstanding precedents allowing  inter-

          locutory  appeals from  virtually all  rulings denying  qualified

          immunity  defenses  at  summary  judgment, see,  e.g.,  Unwin  v.
                                                     ___   ____   _____

          Campbell,  863 F.2d 124, 128  (1st Cir. 1988),  the Supreme Court
          ________

          held that 

                    a defendant,  entitled to invoke  a qualified
                    immunity  defense, may not  appeal a district
                    court's  summary  judgment  order insofar  as
                    that  order  determines  whether or  not  the
                    pretrial record sets forth a  'genuine' issue
                    of fact for trial.  

          Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159.  Recently, this court summarized the
          _______

          Johnson message:
          _______

                    Thus,  on the  one hand,  a  district court's
                    pretrial rejection of  a proffered  qualified
                    immunity defense  remains immediately appeal-
                    able as a collateral order to the extent that
                    it  turns on  a pure  issue of  law, notwith-
                    standing  the absence of a final judgment. On
                    the other hand,  a district court's  pretrial
                    rejection of a  qualified immunity defense is
                    not immediately appealable to the extent that
                    it turns on . . . an issue of fact . . . . In
                    such a  situation, the movant  must await the
                    entry of final judgment before  appealing the
                    adverse ruling.  

          Stella v.  Town of Tewksbury,  __ F.3d  ___, ___ (1st  Cir. 1995)
          ______     _________________

          [No. 95-1223, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23942, at *7-8 (1st  Cir. Aug.

          23, 1995)].

                                          8

                    Johnson  emphasized  that  routinely  allocating  fact-
                    _______

          intensive  inquiries  to  appellate  courts  entails  significant

          delays  and imprudent use of scarce  judicial resources, since an

          appellate  court may have to  wade through a huge, underdeveloped

          pretrial record  to resolve especially  "nebulous" factual  ques-
                                                             _______

          tions such  as a defendant's  "intent."  Johnson,  115 S.  Ct. at
                                         ______    _______

          2158 (emphasis added).  

                    Appellants'  first  reaction  to  Johnson  is  to  mis-
                                                      _______

          characterize  the summary judgment ruling in this case as a "law-

          based"    rather than  a "fact-based"    denial of  summary judg-

          ment.    Johnson  explicitly  directs that  "a  district  court's
                   _______

          pretrial rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not immedi-

          ately appealable to the extent that it turns on . . . an issue of

          fact . . .  ."  Stella,  __ F.3d at ___  [No. 95-1223, 1995  U.S.
                          ______

          App.  LEXIS  23942, at  *7-8 (1st  Cir.  Aug. 23,  1995)] (citing

          Johnson,  115 S.  Ct.  at 2159).    Determining the  presence  or
          _______

          absence of discriminatory "intent" based  on evidentiary proffers

          at summary judgment entails a quintessential  factual assessment,
                                                        _______

          see Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1993) (normally,
          ___ _________    ______

             1983 defendants  are  not entitled  to  brevis disposition  on

          summary  judgment  where  qualified  immunity  defense  turns  on

          factual determination  as to  their subjective intent),  which is

          part and parcel of the "merits" dispute on the claims brought  by

          Carter in this case.  

                    Second,  appellants contend, citing  Harris, 114 S. Ct.
                                                         ______

          367  (1993), that their conduct, as alleged, was not "objectively

                                          9

          abusive"     as a matter of law     since it was not sufficiently
                       __ _ ______ __ ___

          egregious to support a  reasonable inference that appellants were

          motivated by race or gender discrimination: 

                    [Such a standard]  would permit any  minority
                    [worker] to  allege anything against  a white
                                        ________
                    male  [supervisor] and force  that white male
                    to  a jury  trial.   For example,  a minority
                    could 
                    allege  a violation  of the  equal protection
                    clause because a white supervisor said hello,
                    one time, to a  white worker before saying it
                    to the  minority worker.  That  lawsuit would
                    obviously allege the  violation of a  clearly
                    established  right [to  be free  from] racial
                    discrimination),  but  it  would  not  allege
                    facts that violated that right.
                    _____

          Supplemental  Brief for  Appellants  at 4.    Given the  evidence

          adduced by Carter at summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e),
                                                 ___

          we reject this artificial characterization as well.  

                    For summary  judgment purposes, all evidence in genuine

          dispute must be  viewed in  the light most  favorable to  Carter.

          The district court  found that Carter  adduced evidence that  (i)

          each  appellant had  been given  written  notice of  a pervasive,

          continuing campaign of workplace harassment and  disparate treat-

          ment aimed  at her, see  supra pp.  2-3, (ii) each  appellant had
                              ___  _____

          authority to redress her  complaints, and (iii) all failed  to do

          so.  In  this factual  setting, Harris does  appellants no  good,
                                          ______

          even as an analog.5 

                    For one thing, contrary  to appellants' contention, see
                                                                        ___

          supra  pp. 6-7,  the Harris  Court not  only did  not  purport to
          _____                ______
                              
          ____________________

               5We  need not  test the  assumption implicit  in appellants'
          analogy; viz., that Harris, a sexual harassment case, defines the
                              ______
          boundaries of racial harassment claims as well.

                                          10

          prescribe  an evidentiary threshold for establishing "objectively

          abusive  conduct," it  explicitly  noted that  merely because  an

          earlier decision "present[ed]  some especially egregious examples

          of  harassment, [it did] not mark the [lower] boundary of what is

          actionable."   Harris, 114  S. Ct  at 371.   Moreover,  the Court
                         ______

          noted that  

                    whether  an environment is "hostile" or "abu-
                    sive"  can be determined  only by  looking at
                                                               __
                    all the circumstances. These may  include the
                    ___ ___ _____________
                    frequency of the discriminatory  conduct; its
                    _________
                    severity; whether it is  physically threaten-
                    ________                 __________ _________
                    ing or humiliating,  or a mere  offensive ut-
                    ___    ___________
                    terance; and whether  it unreasonably  inter-
                    feres with an  employee's work performance. .
                    . . [N]o single factor is required.

          Id. (emphasis  added).  The  factual allegations  attested to  by
          ___

          Carter, relating  to conduct  and context,  are presumed true  at

          this stage  in the case, see supra pp. 2-3, and must be evaluated
                                   ___ _____

          by  the  ultimate factfinder  with a  view  to their  adequacy as

          support for a reasonable  inference on the "nebulous"  element of

          discriminatory "intent."  Thus,  her factual allegations call for

          precisely the  type of fact-intensive inquiry  that Johnson coun-
                                                              _______

          sels against, as an inappropriate judicial exercise on interlocu-

          tory review. 

                    Furthermore, the "conduct" we must deem established for

          summary  judgment purposes in this case cannot be confined to the

          straitjacket designed for it by appellants (viz., "a white super-

          visor said hello, one time, to a white worker before saying it to
                            ___ ____

          the minority worker").  Rather, their  hypothetical substantially

          understates  the  allegations  actually  attested  to  by Carter.

                                          11

          Consequently, we need not address their artificial construct.

                    Carter  expressly attests,  for example,  that repeated

          racial and  gender-based epithets were directed  against her, and

          that appellants  condoned this harassment by  their knowing inac-

          tion.   We  can discern  no permissible  ground for  treating the

          district  court ruling    that  there was a  trialworthy issue of

          fact as to whether appellants harbored a discriminatory intent   

          as  an  immediately  appealable  law-based  decision  within  the
                                           ___

          meaning of Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159.6 
                     _______

                    Johnson announces a jurisdictional rule     signaling a
                    _______

          new day in the First Circuit, see Stella, __ F.3d at ___ [No. 95-
                                        ___ ______

          1223, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23942, at *9 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 1995)]

              and  not one  to be  undone  by recasting  fact-based rulings

          denying summary judgment on qualified immunity defenses into law-

          based "collateral  orders" immediately appealable under  Cohen v.
                                                                   _____

          Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,  337 U.S. 541 (1949).   See Elliott
          ____________________________                          ___ _______

          v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991) ("By sleight of hand
             ______

          [defendants] can turn any defense on the merits into a defense of

          qualified immunity."),  cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121  (1992).  The
                                  _____ ______

          Johnson rule would be undermined     its important aims frustrat-
          _______

          ed, see, e.g., Johnson, 115 S.  Ct. at 2158 (noting, inter  alia,
              ___  ____  _______                               _____  ____

          "danger of  denying justice  by delay")     were defendant  offi-

                              
          ____________________

               6Likewise, the  district court's ruling  -- that there  is a
          trialworthy  issue of fact as to the existence of an "affirmative
          link"  between  appellants' acts  or  omissions  and the  alleged
          deprivation of civil rights, see, e.g., Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque,
                                       ___  ____  ________    ____________
          864  F.2d 947,  953  (1st Cir.  1989)     is  not  an immediately
          appealable law-based decision.  Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159. 
                                          _______

                                          12

          cials,  spurred  by the  prospect of  delay  and the  leverage it

          occasions, permitted to contrive insubstantial "issues of law" as

          grounds for interlocutory review. 

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    As  Johnson  precludes  interlocutory  review   of  the
                        _______

          district court  order  denying summary  judgment  on  appellants'

          qualified  immunity defenses,  founded  on the  fact-based ruling

          that there was a  trialworthy issue of fact as  to whether appel-

          lants acted with discriminatory intent, their appeal is dismissed
                                                  _________________________

          for lack of appellate jurisdiction, with costs to appellee. 
          __________________________________  ____ _____ __ ________

                    SO ORDERED. 
                    SO ORDERED.
                    __ _______

                                          13