Court Opinion

ID: 9738091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:32.357637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:46.126492
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: Although I am aware that under the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of due process under the Federal Constitution, section 122 — 2.1 does not violate defendants’ Federal due process rights (Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987), 481 U.S. 551, 556-57, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539, 547, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 1994), I believe that denying assistance of counsel to indigent post-conviction petitioners violates due process rights established in article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). As judges of the supreme court of this State, we have an independent obligation to apply our State constitution to defendant’s claims, especially when Supreme Court interpretations filed after the adoption of our 1970 Constitution are looked to as precedents to diminish those individual rights that defendants’ possessed in 1970 when the Illinois Constitution was adopted. Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion, which fails to discuss whether section 122 — 2.1 comports with our State constitution. Over 10 years ago, Justice Brennan pointed out that Supreme Court decisions provide minimal safeguards to individual rights and encouraged State courts to provide the double protection of citizens’ rights inherent in our Federal system. (Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502-03 (1977).) I agree with Justice Brennan that it is our duty to protect vigilantly the rights of Illinois citizens, particularly when Federal protection of rights is diminished. Commentators have chronicled how our sister State courts in some 375 cases since 1970 have relied on their State constitutions to vindicate rights not protected by Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Constitution. (See Collins & Galie, Upholding Rights Left Unprotected by U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, Nat’l L.J., November 9, 1987, at 32; Collins & Galie, Special Section on State Constitutional Law, Nat’l L.J., September 29, 1986 (listing cases).) I believe it is time for this court to join our sister State courts that have “responded with marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the constitutional gaps left by the decisions of the Supreme Court majority.” (Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 535, 549 (1986).) Therefore, I believe the majority should have addressed defendant’s State due process claim. In assessing the scope of due process rights preserved by our State constitution, this court should begin with an analysis of the text and meaning of article I, section 2: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2.) To understand what the framers meant by due process, it is instructive to examine both State and Federal interpretations of due process prior to 1970. (See 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1496-97 (presenting majority view on section 2, Mr. A. Lennon noted that “[t]he due process that we have in Illinois at the present time *** is similar to the Federal Constitution” and cited several Illinois cases that in a very general way helped define the concept).) As is the case in construing statutes (see Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 241, 249 (construing Messages Tax Act in accordance with Federal constitutional law in effect when statute was enacted); see also Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431 (concluding that Illinois long-arm jurisdiction' does not vacillate with Supreme Court’s due process interpretations)), the only Federal constitutional interpretations that should impact upon our interpretation of the State Constitution are those existing at the time the Illinois Constitution was adopted. Thus, to determine whether section 122 — 2.1 violates State due process, I begin with this court’s due process decisions interpreting the then-existing post-conviction act. Prior to the enactment of section 122 — 2.1 in 1983, the post-conviction statute provided that if appointment of counsel was requested and the court determined that the defendant had no means to procure counsel the court was to appoint counsel for the defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 122 — 4.) In cases in which the trial court failed to appoint counsel, this court remanded to the trial court to appoint counsel, holding that such failure “ *thwart[ed] the legislative purpose and creat[ed] due process problems.’ ” (People v. Butler (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 386, 388, quoting People v. Polansky (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 84, 87.) Though the court provided little analysis in Polansky, it nonetheless made clear that due process requirements were not met in post-conviction proceedings in which the trial court failed to provide indigent defendants with counsel. Polansky, 39 Ill. 2d at 87. It is also important to note that at the time the Illinois Constitution was adopted the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of Federal due process rights was not inconsistent with the Polansky court’s understanding of due process. The majority relies on dieta from Johnson v. Avery (1969), 393 U.S. 483, 488, 21 L. Ed. 2d 718, 722, 89 S. Ct. 747, 750, to suggest that the Supreme Court’s decisions held that due process did not require appointment of counsel under the Illinois post-conviction statute (122 Ill. 2d at 75). The remoteness of this dicta to the holding of Johnson is apparent when one considers that the Johnson Court invalidated a State regulation that limited petitioner’s access to Federal habeas corpus. Specifically, the Court held that unless the State provides reasonable alternative assistance in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief, it could not validly enforce a prison regulation that prevented inmates from assisting other prisoners. Also, the majority’s reliance on Rodriguez v. United States (1969), 395 U.S. 327, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340, 89 S. Ct. 1715, is misplaced, for Rodriguez neither “declared that fundamental fairness does not require that counsel be appointed for post-conviction petitioners” nor “approved the Federal habeas corpus statute.” (122 Ill. 2d at 74-75.) In fact, Rodriguez reversed and remanded a denial of habeas corpus because the district court’s denial was based on the petitioner’s failure to specify the points he would raise if his right to appeal were reinstated. (Rodriguez, 395 U.S. at 330, 23 L. Ed. 2d at 344, 89 S. Ct. at 1717.) Ironically, the discussion in Rodriguez that is most relevant to the issue in these cases was quoted by the appellate court in support of its determination that the operation of section 122 — 2.1: “deprives an indigent prisoner of meaningful access to post-conviction relief. ‘Those whose education has been limited and those *** who lack facility in the English language might have grave difficulty in making even a summary statement of points to be raised [in a post-conviction petition]. Moreover, they may not even be aware of errors which occurred at trial. Thus they would be deprived of their only chance to [litigate a claim pursuant to the Act] even though they have never had the assistance of counsel in preparing one. Rodriguez v. United States (1969), 395 U.S. 327, 330, 23 L. Ed. 2d 340, 344, 89 S. Ct. 1715, 1717.” (People v. Wilson (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 567, 583.) In sum, I believe the majority errs when it cites cases the Supreme Court decided prior to the adoption of the Illinois Constitution to support its conclusion that an indigent petitioner’s due process rights do not ensure meaningful, adequate, or effective access to post-conviction relief under our statute. To the majority’s credit, the opinion recognizes the keystone in this due process analysis — examining the nature of the post-conviction proceedings in order to ascertain what procedural safeguards fundamental fairness demands. (122 Ill. 2d at 74.) Unfortunately, the majority overlooks this court’s previous comprehensive discussion of the nature and function of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. (See People v. Slaughter (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 278, 283-85.) In Slaughter, Justice Schaefer writing for the court observed that the Act was enacted in direct response to Marino v. Ragen (1947), 332 U.S. 561, 92 L. Ed. 170, 68 S. Ct. 240, a case in which the Supreme Court criticized Illinois’ inadequate collateral-remedy scheme. Justice Rutledge’s concurring opinion cut to the heart of the matter: “If the federal guarantee of due process in a criminal trial is to have real significance in Illinois, it is imperative that men convicted in violation of their constitutional rights have an adequate opportunity to be heard in court.” Marino, 332 U.S. at 570, 92 L. Ed. at 176, 68 S. Ct. at 245. In describing how the post-conviction statute put an end to what Justice Rutledge described as the “Illinois merry-go-round” of post-conviction remedies, this court stated: “The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides that counsel shall be appointed to represent indigent prisoners who request counsel, and it also provides that a petition may be amended or withdrawn. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, chap. 38, pars. 122 — 4, 122 — 5.) These provisions were included because it was anticipated that most of the petitions under the Act would be filed pro se by prisoners who had not had the aid of counsel in their preparation. To the end that the complaints of a prisoner with respect to the validity of his conviction might be adequately presented, the statute contemplated that the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner would consult with him either by mail or in person, ascertain his alleged grievances, examine the record of the proceedings at the trial and then amend the petition that had been filed pro se, so that it would adequately present the prisoner’s constitutional contentions. The statute can not perform its function unless the attorney appointed to represent an indigent petitioner ascertains the basis of his complaints, shapes those, complaints into appropriate legal form and presents them to the court.” (Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 284-85.) In short, this court found that providing post-conviction petitioners with counsel was essential to ensure that defendants had an adequate, opportunity to present their constitutional claims. The inescapable implication was that to deny defendants this access would violate indigent prisoner’s due process rights. Nevertheless, the majority rejects defendants’ due process arguments by discounting the difficulties indigent defendants face in alleging facts sufficient to state a constitutional claim. (122 Ill. 2d at 74.) That a petitioner does not have to “construct legal arguments or cite to legal authority” (122 Ill. 2d at 74) hardly opens the courts’ doors to petitioners, often illiterate, who have only the vaguest notion of what their constitutional rights are. As the appellate court observed in Mason, “[t]he difficult task *** is to understand what one’s rights are before it is possible to set out in a petition the facts which support them, particularly so since the petitioner has only one opportunity to set forth his claims.” 145 Ill. App. 3d at 225. Based on what I have seen as a member of this court, the majority’s faith in the constitutional knowledge of indigent petitioners is greater than mine. Every term we review numerous pro se prisoner petitions for leave to appeal, and I cannot believe that my colleagues have not noticed how difficult practically every one of those pro se petitions is to understand. Of course, we are aided in our review by the mandatory attachment of the appellate court opinion. (107 Ill. 2d R 315(b)(5).) But under section 122 — 2.1, a judge who has neither knowledge of the case nor court records or an appellate court opinion may summarily dismiss the post-conviction petition after looking only at the petition itself. In my view, application of section 122 — 2.1 turns our post-conviction proceedings into an empty formality for indigent petitioners. Intended to stop the “Illinois merry-go-round,” the post-conviction statute has been transformed into a ride to nowhere for indigent petitioners. I think it is most unfortunate that the majority allows petitioners’ due process rights to meaningful access to the courts to be dependent on a trial judge’s ability to process petitions within 30 days. In addition, the relationship between the post-conviction statute and our Rule 651(c) presents an anamoly. By upholding section 122 — 2.1, the majority creates a scheme in which the circuit court may dismiss an indigent petitioner without counsel under section 122 — 2.1, but as long as that petitioner files a timely notice of appeal, the appellate court must under Rule 651(c) appoint counsel and allow “any amendments to the petition filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” (107 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).) To shift the locus of meaningful post-conviction representation from the circuit court to the appellate court under Rule 651 strikes me as quite odd, particularly in view of this court’s previous admonition that: “the purpose underlying Rule 651(c) is not merely formal. It is to ensure that all indigents are provided proper representation when presenting claims of constitutional deprivation under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.” (People v. Brown (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 227, 230.) Because Rule 651(c) safeguards indigent petitioners by granting them counsel and allowing amendment of the post-conviction petitions in the appellate court even when the trial court denied them the privilege of counsel and dismissed their petitions, the operation of section 122 — 2.1 is uneconomical. It is also unfair to the extent it may lay yet another procedural trap in which indigent defendants may lose their rights to challenge constitutional deficiencies in the prior proceedings. Further, though I agree with the majority that section 122 — 2.1 does not threaten the separation of powers for the same reasons stated in my dissent to People v. Joseph (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 36, I think it is most curious that the majority opinion fails to apply or even acknowledge the separation of powers analysis set forth in Joseph. Instead of clarifying and analyzing “which legislative acts intrude upon a ‘fundamentally judicial prerogative’ and which merely involve ‘peripheral effect on judicial administration’ ” (emphasis in original) (Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 50 (Simon, J., dissenting)), the majority cites an appellate court decision to support its conclusory assertion that the appointment of counsel is a legislative matter. (122 Ill. 2d at 72-73.) I cannot understand how on the one hand this court invalidates the legislature’s requirement that the original trial judge cannot consider post-conviction petitions (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122 — 8), holding that such legislation encroaches on the area of court administration (Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 44), while on the other hand the majority approves the legislature’s decision to limit litigants’ rights to effective access to the courts. The court’s rulings in Joseph and here force litigants to play a shell game whenever they make separation of powers arguments. Hopefully, the conspicuous absence of citation to Joseph signals a departure from both Joseph and “the road to a government of ‘rigidly separated compartments’ ” (Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 49 (Simon, J., dissenting)). Finally, I am baffled by the majority’s chameleonic interpretation of the word “shall” in section 122 — 2.1. (122 Ill. 2d at 81-83.) I agree that the “shall” in the 30-day requirement is mandatory, but cannot understand why “shall” in the written order provision is not similarly mandatory. The majority’s citation of People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, to support both a mandatory and a directory interpretation is particularly perplexing. At the very least one would expect the legislature intended to provide an explanation to those indigent petitioners whose access to the court is derogated by section 122— 2.1. Thus, even if I did not believe section 122 — 2.1 violates defendants due process rights, I would reverse and remand the circuit court’s dismissal of Porter’s post-conviction petition because the circuit judge failed to enter a written order specifying his reasoning in dismissing Porter’s petition. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.