Court Opinion

ID: 9380760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 13:10:01.847001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.359590
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Huff, Fulton and White
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

            JARON DEVONTAE NOTTINGHAM
                                                                                   OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 1006-21-1                                         JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                  MARCH 21, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY
                                          W. Revell Lewis, III, Judge

                           Charles E. Haden for appellant.

                           Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   Jaron Devontae Nottingham (“appellant”) appeals a judgment from the Northampton

            County Circuit Court (the “trial court”) revoking his previously suspended sentences in connection

            with his two previous convictions from 2010.1 In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that

            the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his previously suspended sentences in their entirety.

            He alleges that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority to revoke his sentences because the

            instant violations were his first “technical violations” under Code § 19.2-306.1. Consequently, he

            contends that the trial court erred by “implicitly” refusing to apply Code § 19.2-306.1. This Court

            concludes that, on the contrary, the trial court properly applied Code § 19.2-306.1 in reaching its

            sentencing decision. Accordingly, this Court holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

            revoking appellant’s sentences and therefore affirms the trial court’s judgment.

                   1
                     Nottingham was convicted of breaking and entering (CR09000085-01) and felony
            destruction of property (CR09000085-02).
                                         BACKGROUND2

       On September 29, 2009, appellant was convicted of breaking and entering and felony

destruction of property; on January 29, 2010, on each conviction, he was sentenced to five years’

incarceration, with five years suspended. In 2011, appellant was found in violation of his

probation for failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions. In 2012, he was found in

violation of his probation for again failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions and for

marijuana use. Appellant was found in violation of his probation for a third time in 2015.3

       On September 14, 2020, the trial court issued a capias for appellant following his

probation officer’s report alleging that appellant had violated his probation by: failing to report

new arrests for firearm offenses and a speeding citation, possessing a controlled substance,

failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions, failing a drug screen, and traveling out of

state without permission. The capias was executed on April 6, 2021, after appellant waived

extradition from Delaware.

       At the revocation hearing on August 23, 2021, appellant stipulated that he had violated

his probation. Nevertheless, he asserted that his violations collectively constituted a single

“technical violation” under Code § 19.2-306.1 because “[t]he statute . . . provi[ded] that multiple

technical violations in the same revocation period should not be considered separate technical

violations.” Appellant maintained that none of his earlier probation violations could be included

in the tally of his “technical violations” under Code § 19.2-306.1 because “technical violations”

       2
         “The evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the
prevailing party below.” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535 (2013).
       3
          The 2015 revocation order does not state the basis for the revocation; it merely states
that “the completed Sentencing Guidelines Revocation Report [had been made] a part of the
record.” The sentencing revocation report dated September 21, 2015, signed by the trial judge,
states that appellant was charged with a Condition 1 violation (failure to obey the law) and a
“special condition” violation (failure to pay restitution) and that he had been found in violation.
                                                 -2-
did not exist until Code § 19.2-306.1 was enacted on July 1, 2021. Thus, appellant argued that

the current violations were his first “technical violations.”

       The Commonwealth did not dispute that Code § 19.2-306.1 applied to the revocation

proceedings. Instead, it challenged appellant’s argument that “technical violations” did not exist

before the statute’s enactment in July 2021. It presented testimony from appellant’s probation

officer that the term “technical violation” had been used by parole and probation as early as 2010

to refer to violations of Conditions 2 through 7 of supervised probation. Appellant’s probation

officer testified that, before the revocation hearing, appellant had a technical violation of

“Condition 6” in 2011 and another technical violation of “Condition[s] 6 and . . . 8” in 2012.

The probation officer testified that appellant had a third technical violation in 2015, but he did

not specify the nature of that violation. Moreover, the probation officer testified that appellant

had a “law” violation in 2015 that was not a “technical” violation. The Commonwealth argued

that the term “technical violation” in Code § 19.2-306.1 was not a new legal concept, but rather

“a word . . . in common usage . . . [adopted] by the legislature.”

       The trial court found that appellant had at least three “technical violations.” It revoked

the balance of appellant’s suspended sentences on his convictions for breaking and entering and

destruction of property.4 This appeal followed.

                                            ANALYSIS

               I. Code § 19.2-306.1 governed appellant’s revocation proceedings.

       “On an appeal of probation revocation, the trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment

will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Heart v.

       4
         The trial court’s revocation order states it “[r]eimpose[s]” two years and six months
with respect to each of appellant’s suspended sentences. As the Commonwealth notes, appellant
did not object to this finding at the revocation hearing; nor does he challenge it on appeal.
Accordingly, this Court does not address here whether the revocation order accurately recites the
revocation history.
                                                  -3-
Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 453, 460 (2022) (quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App.

69, 76 (2022)). But “an issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law[,] which we

review de novo.” Id. (quoting Green, 75 Va. App. at 76).

       The Commonwealth asserts at the outset that Code § 19.2-306.1 did not apply at

appellant’s revocation hearing. This Court disagrees, given the holding in Heart. In that case,

both the Commonwealth and the defendant agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1. Id. at

465. Code § 19.2-306.1 likewise applies to appellant’s revocation proceeding because the

arguments and evidence presented at the hearing demonstrate both parties’ agreement that the

new statute controlled the proceedings. See id. at 463 (holding that new non-retroactive law will

still be applied to proceedings where “the parties all agreed to proceed under the new law”).

       Consequently, the trial court imposed sentences consistent with the new mandates of

Code § 19.2-306.1 after finding appellant had committed at least three technical violations. At

no point during the proceedings below did the Commonwealth claim that the new statutory

regime did not apply; it instead disputed appellant’s claim that prior probation violations could

not be considered under the new statute. In support of that position, the Commonwealth

presented evidence concerning the nature of appellant’s prior probation violations, including

testimony characterizing at least two of them as technical violations.

       Therefore, the trial court correctly conducted the August 2021 revocation hearing and

sentencing in accordance with the post-July 1 statutes.

                        II. The record supports the trial court’s judgment.

       Despite the foregoing, appellant now asserts that the trial court “implicitly. . . ruled that

Code § 19.2-306.1 did not apply in [his] revocation hearing” and such ruling was error because

                                                 -4-
the statute “became effective on July 1, 2021, before [his] revocation hearing.”5 (Emphasis

added). That argument, however, ignores the court’s express finding that appellant had at least

three “technical violations.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the record plainly demonstrates that the

trial court applied Code § 19.2-306.1 in reaching its sentencing decision.6

       Appellant further contends that the trial court incorrectly determined his number of

technical violations because: (1) the current technical violations at issue in the August 2021 hearing

could not be “considered separate technical violations for the purposes of sentencing,”7 and (2) the

instant violations constituted only a “second technical violation” for which there was a

“presumption against . . . active incarceration” under Code § 19.2-306.1(C).8 Assuming without

       5
         Appellant asserts that the statute in effect at the time of the revocation hearing itself
controls the court’s analysis, and he claims the trial court concluded otherwise because the
revocation proceedings—capias was issued in September 2020 and executed in April 2021—
commenced prior to the effective date of Code § 19.2-306.1. However, because both parties
agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1, judicial restraint dictates that this Court need not
address appellant’s moot argument.
       6
         Appellant also maintains that “the plain language of . . . Code § 19.2-306.1 shows that
the General Assembly intended to require trial courts to follow the new statutory decision
procedure and apply the statutory limits on active incarceration in all probation violation cases.”
He contends that Green was wrongly decided and should be overturned. Because the parties
consented to the application of Code § 19.2-306.1, this Court need not address those arguments.
See Matzuk v. Price, 70 Va. App. 474, 481 n.6 (2019) (noting that “Virginia courts ‘strive to decide
cases on the “best and narrowest grounds available”’” (quoting Alexandria Redevelopment and
Hous. Auth. v. Walker, 290 Va. 150, 156 (2015))).
        Nevertheless, this Court reiterates that “[w]e are not at liberty to ignore the decision of a
previous panel.” Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 293 (2011) (quoting Collins v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 443, 449 (1999)). Under the interpanel accord doctrine, a decision by
a panel of this Court “cannot be overruled except by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the
Virginia Supreme Court.” Id. (quoting Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 73 (2003)).
       7
           Code § 19.2-306.1(A).
       8
         Appellant provides no explanation on appeal for his calculation that the instant
violations are only his “second technical violation” rather than his third. And he does not
otherwise contend that the trial court’s sentences were an abuse of discretion.
                                                -5-
deciding that appellant properly preserved his arguments for appellate review, those arguments

nevertheless fail on their merits.9

        Before the trial court issued the 2020 capias, appellant had accrued at least two separate

technical violations: his 2011 violation of failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions;

and his 2012 violation of failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions and using

marijuana. See Code § 19.2-306.1(A)(v), (vii). Admittedly, the term “technical violation” did

not exist in a statute prior to the enactment of Code § 19.2-306.1 in July 2021. However, the

General Assembly’s use of that term in Code § 19.2-306.1 simply reflects its intent to clearly

categorize existing types of probation violations by classifying them according to the nature of

the violative conduct. The purpose of this approach was to restrict the court’s ability to impose a

period of active incarceration for low-level violations without first giving the defendant a second

chance to comply with probation. See Code § 19.2-306.1(A)-(C); Heart, 75 Va. App. at 470

(“[T]he purpose behind the statutory changes . . . was clearly to treat technical violations less

harshly than non-technical violations.”).10

        9
          The Commonwealth asserts that appellant has failed to preserve his arguments because
the particular arguments he raised below do not match those in his appellate brief. Namely,
during the revocation hearing, appellant claimed that his prior probation violations could not be
considered under Code § 19.2-306.1. However, because the general issue appellant argued
below, as he does on appeal, is that he had not accumulated the requisite number of technical
violations to warrant incarceration, this Court assumes without deciding that his argument was
sufficiently preserved as to the number of technical violations calculated by the trial court.
        As explained herein, this Court ultimately concludes that the trial court did not err in
finding appellant had at least three technical violations which justified its imposition of active
incarceration, regardless of whether the court applied newly enacted Code § 19.2-306.1 or
former Code § 19.2-306. Indeed, a finding of two or more prior technical violations was
unnecessary, for purposes of sentencing, under the old revocation scheme. See Heart, 75
Va. App. at 453 (noting that under the old statutory scheme, Code § 19.2-306(C) required the
trial court to revoke the entire sentence, but granted the court discretion to resuspend all or any
part of the sentence).

         See Code § 19.2-306.1, which is titled: “Limitation on sentence upon revocation of
        10

suspension of sentence.”
                                              -6-
        The new statute did not redefine or expand the scope of conduct constituting a probation

violation. Rather, the legislature merely determined which of the existing types of prohibited

conduct should fall into the “technical violation” category, for which subsection (C) now restricts

a trial court’s sentencing discretion.

        As discussed above, given that both parties agreed to proceed under Code § 19.2-306.1 in

the trial court, this Court has no cause to conduct a retroactivity analysis. Instead, the issue

raised on appeal is whether the trial court complied with the specific provisions of Code

§ 19.2-306.1 in imposing its sentences. Neither Green nor Heart stands for the proposition, as

appellant appears to suggest, that a trial court governed by Code § 19.2-306.1 cannot consider

the nature of prior probation violations to determine under which sentencing provision of the

new statute it must proceed.

        Based on subsection (C) of Code § 19.2-306.1, a court’s sentencing options for technical

violations are restricted by the number of separate times it has found that the probationer

engaged in the violative conduct listed in subsection (A).11 As relevant here, subsection (A)

instructs the court to treat as “technical violation[s]” a probationer’s failure to: “(i) report any

arrest, including traffic tickets, within three days to the probation officer;” “(v) follow the

instructions of the probation officer, be truthful and cooperative, and report as instructed;”

“(vii) refrain from the use, possession, or distribution of controlled substances or related

paraphernalia;” or “(ix) gain permission to change his residence or remain in the Commonwealth

or other designated area without permission of the probation officer.” Code § 19.2-306.1(A).

        Appellant’s probation violation in 2011 consisted solely of his failure to follow the

instructions of his probation officer—a technical violation. Code § 19.2-306.1(A)(v). He

        11
          These mandatory sentencing restrictions are limitations the legislature has placed on
the court’s sentencing discretion, not mandatory sentences of increasing severity for probationers
who commit multiple technical violations.
                                               -7-
committed that same violation again in 2012, along with a violation of Code § 19.2-306.1(A)(vii)

for his use of marijuana, which is also a technical violation.12 Thus, based on the subsequent set

of violations alleged in the 2020 major violation report and resulting capias, appellant appeared

before the trial court in 2021 on his “third or subsequent technical violation.” Code

§ 19.2-306.1(C). After finding that the probationer has committed a “third or subsequent

technical violation,” “[t]he [trial] court may impose whatever sentence might have been

originally imposed.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the

balance of appellant’s suspended sentences.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the reasons stated herein, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

       12
         These violations are considered as one technical violation. Code § 19.2-306.1(A)
(“Multiple technical violations . . . considered at the same revocation hearing shall not be
considered separate technical violations for the purposes of sentencing pursuant to this section.”).
                                                 -8-