Court Opinion

ID: 9571037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:38.778642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:49.236519
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which holds that a motion for summary judgment was properly granted against plaintiff, who was injured when she fell on a dance floor. She had paid the regular admission charge and was therefore an invitee. She testified that "slippery wax is what I hit” (R. p. 65), and "the floor was extra slippery with wax in that one spot,” (R. p. 66), and that when she danced on the floor at this particular spot "my feet leaped out from under me.” (R. p. 59)
1. Even if defendant had introduced testimony to contradict plaintiffs testimony, a jury question would have been left; and only a jury could decide the "mystery” — that is, who was telling the truth. McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408). In no event could the judge take over this function of fact-finding.
*5352. It is questionable as to whether defendant’s testimony actually took issue with plaintiffs testimony. Plaintiff testified the room was dimly lighted and it was almost impossible to see what was on the floor. She did not testify that she actually saw the slippery wax on the floor, but simply that her feet came in contact with same and leaped out from under her. Defendant did not deny that the room was dimly lighted or that the room was so dark as to make it extremely difficult to see what was on the floor. She did not deny that the floor was extra slippery with wax at the particular place where plaintiff fell; or that plaintiffs feet hit the slippery wax and leaped from under her. No one testified that any other person was seen dancing at the particular place where defendant fell during the entire evening.
3. How does defendant attempt to remove and blot out the testimony of plaintiff? Defendant submitted her affidavit, from which I quote as follows: "I was personally present, supervising the operation of the Egyptian Ballroom on September 16, 1972 when Mrs. Hammonds fell on the dance floor. I immediately went ... to determine if anything was present on the floor that would have caused her to fall. There was no rubbish or trash on the floor, nor did I observe any unusual slick spots on the floor.” (R. p. 91.) (Emphasis supplied.) She did not testify that she turned on the lights so she could see the darkened floor. She said there was no rubbish or trash on the floor, but plaintiff did not contend rubbish or trash caused her to fall. Defendant did not testify there were no "unusual slick spots on the floor” — but rather she testified she did not observe unusual slick spots on the floor. The slick spots may well have been there without being visible to her in the darkened condition of the room. Defendant did not feel the floor at this place, nor get down on her hands and knees to examine it in order to determine whether it was unusually slick.
Quoting further from defendant’s affidavit: "I personally supervise the cleaning of this dance floor each weekend and there are no slick spots or wax build-ups on said floor. I have operated the club for ten (10) years and during this ten-year period, there has never been any liquid wax of any type placed on this floor. The method *536of waxing this floor is: during the months of January and June the floor is waxed with shaved paraffin. There had been no paraffin placed on the floor area since June, 1972.” (Emphasis supplied.) (R. p. 91.)
4. All ambiguities, conclusions and inferences in the evidence, including defendant’s affidavit, must be construed most strongly against movant for summary judgment. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 5, 9 (126 SE2d 442).
5. The majority opinion asserts that a Mrs. Norris testified that plaintiff fell while she and her partner were dancing a sort of fast dance on the floor, but then states that Mrs. Norris did not really see the fall. Actually, Mrs. Norris testified that "I didn’t know it (the fall) until my daughter come and told me. She (plaintiff) was down at the front when she fell and I was at the back.” (R. p. 22) The majority opinion also asserts that Mrs. Norris testified that she danced but knew nothing about unusually slick spots on the floor and saw no substance on it. How does this help defendant’s case? How does this take issue with plaintiff’s testimony?
6. As to defendant’s testimony that the dance floor was waxed only in January and June of each year, and no paraffin had been placed thereon since June, 1972, the majority opinion (p. 529), quotes from testimony of Mrs. Bernice Norris, witness for defendant, as follows: "The floor was waxed, and had been each time she had been there for dancing”; thus disputing defendant’s testimony. (Emphasis supplied.)
7. Further, as to the testimony of defendant, her affidavit was made on October 5, 1973, whereas the fall took place on September 16, 1972. Therefore the statement that "there are no slick spots or wax build-ups on said floor” necessarily relates to the condition of the dance floor on the date of the affidavit, more than a year after the date of the fall. (Emphasis supplied.) She does not swear there were no slick spots on the floor on the date of the fall. Defendant testified that there had never been any liquid wax placed on this floor, but plaintiff did not testify that it was liquid wax that caused her to fall. Defendant then testified that there had been no paraffin placed on the floor area since June, 1972; but plaintiff did *537not contend that paraffin caused the unusually slippery condition of the floor. It is true that paraffin is a waxy substance, but wax is a generic term, including many and various kinds of substances and is in no wise limited to paraffin. Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines wax thus: "A substance secreted by bees for constructing the honeycomb; beeswax. It is a dull-yellow solid of agreeable odor, plastic when warm, and melting at about 62-66° C. (143-151° F.). Sp. gr., usually 0.958-0.967 at 15°C. Any of various substances resembling beeswax; specif., Any of a class of substances of plant or animal origin, containing esters and often free fatty acids, free alcohols, and higher hydrocarbons, and including, beside beeswax, spermaceti, carnuba wax, etc. Any of certain solid substances of mineral origin, as ozocerite and paraffin wax. A pliable composition for uniting surfaces, for excluding air, etc.; as, sealing wax. A resinous preparation used by shoemakers for rubbing their thread.” Thus, at most, defendant sought to deny the slippery condition was caused by liquid wax or paraffin. She did not deny that some other form of wax — and the various kinds of wax are legion — caused the unusually slippery condition of the floor.
8. The majority opinion (p. 531) asserts that authorities generally hold that the owner "is liable only for his failure to exercise reasonable care to avoid reasonably foreseeable danger to his invitees by keeping the premises in a reasonably safe condition for use in a manner consistent with the purposes of the premises.” (Emphasis supplied.)
But this statement runs head-on into a respected authority of this court, to wit, Martin v. Henson, 95 Ga. App. 715 (99 SE2d 251): "An owner of premises must, as to invitees, exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe, not reasonably safe. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
9. The majority opinion (p. 531) quotes from one textbook and three foreign authorities, none of which binds the courts of Georgia.
10. The majority opinion (p. 532) asserts that "Plaintiff herself alleges nothing more than a 'slick spot’ on the dance floor. She makes charge of no foreign substance on the floor and testified that she saw none.” *538We must correct this error on part of the majority. Surely the majority opinion overlooks the record because plaintiff testified positively as to a foreign substance, to wit, wax on the floor, and did not simply say there was a "slick spot on the dance floor. ’’ She testified "slippery wax is what I hit. ”(R. p. 65), and she further testified "the floor was extra slippery with wax in that one spot. ” (R. p. 66) (Emphasis supplied.) If any ambiguity is found in her testimony, the law says to construe it in favor of the respondent!
11. The majority opinion urges that "Defendant, Mrs. Jackson, pierced the pleadings when she testified that the floors are waxed with shaved paraffin twice each year — in January and June — that no wax or paraffin had been applied to this floor since June when the injury occurred in September . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
First of all, we are not here concerned with piercing the pleadings. This is a case in which both parties submitted testimony. Surely the majority can not and will not contend that defendant’s testimony — even if contradictory of plaintiffs — (which seems to be the case) pierces plaintiff’s testimony! We are quite familiar with the term "pierce the pleadings” — but as of this moment we are unfamiliar with any equivalent term for piercing the evidence.
12. Next, the quotation above misquotes the record in a very vital part, to wit, in asserting that Mrs. Jackson testified "that no wax or paraffin had been applied to this floor since June when the injury occurred in September.” This witness did not so testify but instead, testified: "there had been no paraffin placed on the floor area since June, 1972.” (Emphasis supplied.) She did not testify that no wax had been placed on the floor, in that period, but limited her testimony to one particular kind of wax, to wit, paraffin. We have previously pointed out how important the definition of the word "wax” is in this case and that it involves many various kinds of wax, and not paraffin only. Defendant’s testimony, in this motion for summary judgment, must be construed most strongly against her, and when she testified that no paraffin was placed on the floor since June, her testimony is absolutely limited to paraffin, and does not include the many other *539types of wax.
And let us not forget that the majority opinion asserts that defendant’s witness, Mrs. Bernice Norris, testified "The floor was waxed, and had been each time she had been there for dancing. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
13. Judge Pannell concurs in the majority opinion, but in his specially concurring opinion states that he does so "solely on the grounds that plaintiff assumed the risk of a slippery floor” and cites Food Fair v. Mock, 129 Ga. App. 421 (199 SE2d 820). I have studied the Food Fair case closely and find no reference to "assumption of risk” therein, and I am not familiar with any Georgia authority which holds that one assumes the risk of injury in dancing upon a dance-hall floor. It has been held that one assumes the risk of trying to beat a rapidly approaching train across the track; or in accompanying one who is about to engage in a drag race; or in walking out onto a frozen pond where the ice is thin. Yandle v. Alexander, 116 Ga. App. 165 (156 SE2d 504). Likewise it has been held in certain instances that spectators at athletic contests assume the risk of being injured by batted balls, etc. Hunt v. Thomasville Baseball Co., 80 Ga. App. 572 (56 SE2d 828). But as to dancehalls, I feel sure same are governed by the principle announced in Martin v. Henson, 95 Ga. App. 715, supra, to wit: "An owner of premises must, as to invitees, exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe, not reasonably safe. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
14. Questions as to negligence, what and whose negligence was the proximate and contributing cause of an injury, are all questions for jury determination. Boatright v. Rich’s, Inc., 121 Ga. App. 121, 122 (2) (173 SE2d 232).
15. The question of negligence in this case should be solved by a jury, and not by a judge, or judges, on motion for summary judgment.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and vote to reverse the lower court in granting a summary judgment to defendant.