Court Opinion

ID: 9532212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:19:10.22133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:42.283644
License: Public Domain

VIOLETTE, Justice,
with whom NICHOLS, Justice, joins dissenting.
Because I disagree with Part III of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the judgment. While it is true that by its express terms section 4055 does not make the department's reunification effort a discrete element of proof in termination proceedings, it belies the express purpose of the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, as well as our decision in In re Shannon R., to allow the department to seek termination without first showing that bona fide efforts at reuniting the family have failed.
Section 4003, which describes the several purposes of the act, states:
Recognizing that the right to family integrity is limited by the right of children to be protected from abuse and neglect and recognizing also that uncertainty and instability are possible in extended foster home or institutional living, it is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter ... (3) Give family rehabilitation and reunification priority as a means for protecting the welfare of children.
22 M.R.S.A. § 4003(3) (Supp.1983-1984).
Section 4041, which the majority agrees imposes an affirmative obligation on the department, provides, in part: “When a child has been ordered into the custody of the department under section 4035, it shall provide, arrange or coordinate services to facilitate the rehabilitation and reunification of the parents and child.” 22 M.R.S.A. § 4041(1) (Supp.1983-1984) (emphasis added).1 The section goes on to describe in some detail the services the department must provide, and the circumstances under which the department may discontinue those services. The statute does, not articulate the consequences of departmental noncompliance.
The majority focuses on section 4055 which describes the grounds for termination and, finding no express requirement in that section that the department prove it has attempted reunification, effectively ignores the directive of section 4041. It is more in accord with the express purpose of the act to view sections 4041 and 4055 as working in tandem: the department has an inescapable obligation to attempt to reunify the family, and only when these efforts have been made and have failed may the *773department bring its petition for termination. Only by interpreting the statutory scheme in this way can we effectuate the explicit purpose of the act, as declared in section 4003.
In this court’s recent opinion in In re Shannon R., 461 A.2d 707 (Me.1983), we construed these statutes in exactly this way. We explained how the department’s obligation to attempt reunification fits into the overall statutory scheme:
We recognize the difficult tasks that confront the Department. Considering, however, the extraordinary nature of a termination of parental rights, the Department must, prior to seeking termination, make the statutorily mandated effort to reunite the family. If those efforts fail, the Department must, at the termination hearing, show clearly and convincingly that it has made those efforts and that the parents “definitely give up their parental interests ...” and that the situation is not likely to change.
Id. at 715-16 (emphasis added). I cannot agree with the majority’s statement that this language means only that “at a termination hearing the department’s reunification efforts will affect the court’s evaluation of parental conduct in determining the existence vel non of the grounds for termination stated in section 4055(1)(B)(2).” Rather, it seems to me abundantly clear that in Shannon R. we found the department’s efforts at reunification to be a condition precedent to its bringing the petition seeking termination.
Having once thus interpreted the department’s obligation under section 4041 as a prerequisite to seeking termination under section 4055, and in view of the clear intent of the legislature to impose an affirmative obligation on the department to attempt reunification, in the instant case where all agree the department’s reunification efforts fell short of the requirements of section 4041, I would reverse the granting of the petition for termination of parental rights.
A high percentage of cases where the State has been awarded protective custody under section 4035 involve single parent family units, generally economically disadvantaged and supported in some degree by public assistance. The parent or parents often suffer from either a physical or mental health problem. In such cases it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the parent or parents to achieve an environment suitable for the return of custody of their children without the department arranging and coordinating a meaningful program of counselling and assistance. If relieved of the obligation of proving to the court that it has made the effort to rehabilitate and reunify the family unit or that it is incapable of doing so for the reasons set forth in section 4041(2)(A), the department could in effect thwart the clearly expressed legislative policy of preserving the viability of the family unit whenever possible. The department could, by adopting a policy of doing nothing and letting nature run its course, create the inexorable result that the majority of these cases would end in the termination of parental rights.
My interpretation of this part of the act in no way relieves the parents of doing their part and cooperating with the department to achieve reunification and rehabilitation. The break-up of the family unit should, however, be a last resort, when all else has failed. The statute does not place an unreasonable burden upon the State, and it is a burden the State cannot avoid.

. P.L.1984, ch. 772, has recently made substantial amendments to sections 4041 and 4055. The result I would reach in the present case, however, would not be affected by these changes.