Court Opinion

ID: 9630489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:12:06.487302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:38.978206
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 Whereas the majority would affirm the judgment of sentence, I would reverse. Since I believe that appellant’s motion to suppress chemical test results should have been granted, I respectfully dissent7.
¶ 2 The majority correctly asserts that a police officer is required to have “articula-ble and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the [Motor] Vehicle Code” pri- or to executing a traffic stop, quoting 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). The majority also properly cites Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995), which restates this requirement: “... it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” (“sic” in original).
¶ 3 However, in affirming the judgment of sentence, the majority errs by relying on precedent of dubious viability. It cites Commonwealth v. Howard, 762 A.2d 360 (Pa.Super.2000), in which this court found that a police officer’s observation of “erratic driving” over a distance was sufficient to raise in the officer a “reasonable and artic-*403ulable” suspicion that a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code had occurred. Such suspicion, we held, allowed the officer to effectuate a proper traffic stop. But our supreme court has recently reversed several cases with similar holdings. See Commonwealth v. Baumgardner, - Pa. -, 796 A.2d 965 (2002), reversing 767 A.2d 1065 (Pa.Super.2001). See also Commonwealth v. Roudybush, 567 Pa. 667, 790 A.2d 313 (2002). In doing so, the supreme court referred to its decision in Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d 983 (Pa.2001), which follows the standard for a proper vehicle stop set out in Whitmyer.
¶ 4 Relying upon weakened precedent, the majority concludes that appellant’s “erratic” driving warranted a vehicular stop: “We conclude that Appellant’s continuous weaving over a five mile stretch of road, coupled with his acceleration deceleration, suffice to justify [the officer’s] suspicion that Appellant may have been intoxicated... ” To the contrary, I believe that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that appellant had violated any portion of the Motor Vehicle Code. In support of this contention, I would note that appellant was later acquitted by the court of the charge of Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic8.
¶ 5 Therefore, I believe that the lower court erred in concluding that the officer had probable cause to execute a traffic stop on appellant’s motor vehicle. The record supports this conclusion. As a result, I need not consider separately appellant’s claim that blood alcohol content analysis results should have been suppressed. These should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. See Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 560 Pa. 345, 744 A.2d 1261, 1268 (2000).

. Motion as part of appellant's omnibus pretrial motion for relief, filed June 19, 2000.

. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).