Court Opinion

ID: 9570140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:26.503534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:00.489509
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I dissent in part and concur in part in the court’s opinion. I disagree with the majority’s opinion on two points: (1) that “an award of costs under the Rehabilitation Act need not satisfy the Christians-burg test” and (2) “that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to Defendants as the prevailing party on the Rehabilitation Act claim.” Maj. Op. at 1053. In all other respects, I agree and concur.
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), the Supreme Court held that, under Title VII, a prevailing defendant may only recover attorney’s fees when the plaintiffs claim is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” In particular, the Supreme Court’ noted that “assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.” Id. at 422, 98 S.Ct. 694.
We have applied the Christiansburg standard to both attorney’s fees and costs under the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See Summers v. A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.1997) (applying the Christiansburg standard to an award of attorney’s fees under the ADA); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., *1054246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2001) (applying the Christiansburg standard to an award of costs under the ADA). But here the majority’s opinion concludes that the Christiansburg standard does not apply to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under the Rehabilitation Act. Maj. Op. at 1051-53.
The majority’s opinion states that “the wording of the statute supports an inference ... that costs are allowed in the ordinary course to the prevailing party.” Maj. Op. at 1053. I believe that the plain text of the Rehabilitation Act’s cost provision is ambiguous. The Rehabilitation Act’s cost provision states that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). The Rehabilitation Act, however, does not clearly state whether costs- are discretionary or presumed, nor does the Rehabilitation Act state which standard should be applied to an award of costs.
“If the statute’s terms are ambiguous, we may use canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute’s overall purpose to illuminate Congress’s intent.” Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Milne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir.2005)). While the majority’s opinion prefers to resolve any ambiguity by analogizing the text of the Rehabilitation Act to the text of Title VII, I believe that it is more appropriate that we look to the Rehabilitation Act’s overall purpose, and that we ensure that the cost provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are interpreted consistently because they deal with the same subject: disability rights. See United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 717 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1007) (stating that “we may consider related statutes because ‘statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously’ ”).
Both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA were enacted for the specific purpose of protecting the rights of individuals living with disabilities. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2) (stating that the purpose of the Rehabilitation Act is “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a leadership role in promoting the employment of individuals with disabilities, especially individuals with significant disabilities”) with 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (stating that the purpose of the ADA is “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and “to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities”). Indeed, as was the case here, many plaintiffs living with disabilities present claims under both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act when bringing a federal action to protect their rights. Accordingly, the standard for awarding costs to a prevailing defendant under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be consistent.
Therefore, the better rule would be to apply the Christiansburg standard to an award of costs to a prevailing defendant under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. If a plaintiff pursues an unsuccessful Rehabilitation Act claim, he should not be forced to bear the costs associated with litigation unless his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Subjecting a plaintiff to an award of costs on reasonable Rehabilitation Act claims will likely deter individuals with disabilities from bringing suit and thus limit effective enforcement of the statute.
Accordingly, I dissent in part and concur in part.