Court Opinion

ID: 9931335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:09:14.100601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:18.637361
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Adams, 2024-Ohio-376.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  ADAMS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                              :
                                            :    Case No. 22CA1158
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                            :
        v.                                  :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                            :    ENTRY
JAMES ADAMS, JR.,                           :
                                            :
        Defendant-Appellant.                :     RELEASED: 01/24/2024

                                       APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Aaron Haslam, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Austin Ervin, Assistant
Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio for Appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Court of Common Pleas

judgment entry that convicted appellant, James Adams, Jr. (“Adams”), of fifth-

degree felony possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). On appeal

Adams maintains that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress,

permitted the state to amend the indictment because it changed the essential

element of the offense, and his conviction for possession of drugs was against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

        {¶2} After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable

law, we find that the court did not err in denying Adam’s motion to suppress or

abuse its discretion in permitting the state to amend the indictment. We further

hold that Adams’ conviction for possession of drugs was not against the manifest
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                            2

weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment entry of

conviction.

                                  BACKGROUND

       {¶3} On November 9, 2018, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Samie

Wedmore testified that she was dispatched to investigate a single-vehicle crash

involving a motorcycle, and the operator of the vehicle was Adams. Prior to her

arrival at the scene, Wedmore was advised by dispatch that Adams was not

injured but he was showing signs of impairment according to the EMTs and the

Adams County Sheriff’s Department. Wedmore spoke to Adams who described

the vehicle that he had been driving as a “mini dirt bike” and that he had been

using a flashlight as a headlight, which is why he crashed.

       {¶4} Wedmore described Adams as being “restless,” his “pupils were

dilated[,]” and he had a “dry mouth,” which were signs of possible impairment.

Wedmore asked Adams if he had consumed any illegal drugs. Adams admitted

that two days prior to the accident he had used illegal drugs.

       {¶5} Wedmore decided to have Adams take several field-sobriety tests.

She stated that field-sobriety tests can help determine if a person is impaired

because it divides the suspect’s attention making it more difficult for them to

successfully complete the tests. However, upon learning that Adams suffered an

injury in the crash, Wedmore did not have him take the walk-and-turn test or the

one-leg-stand test. Thus, the only field sobriety test that she administered to

Adams was the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN test”).
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                           3

        {¶6} Wedmore stated that the HGN test, which looks for an “involuntary

jerking of the eyes[,]” may indicate the suspect is impaired. It can show

impairment if the person has consumed alcohol, but only shows impairment with

“certain drugs” “or depressants.” After administering the HGN test to Adams,

Wedmore did not see any clues of impairment.

        {¶7} Wedmore also decided to have Adams take two “ARIDE” tests,

including the lack-of-convergence test and the modified Romberg test. She

administered the lack-of-convergence test, which similar to the HGN test may

show impairment for only certain drugs. A lack of convergence of a suspect’s

eyes is a sign of impairment. Wedmore testified that based on her training and

experience, marijuana use would show lack of convergence of the eyes, while

opiates would not. Wedmore did not observe any lack of convergence in Adams’

eyes.

        {¶8} Finally, Wedmore administered the modified Romberg test, which

required Adams to close his eyes, tilt back his head, and hold that position for 30

seconds. Wedmore observed involuntary tremors in Adams’ legs, which was a

sign of impairment. Wedmore did not believe that Adams’ injury affected the

results of the modified Romberg test.

        {¶9} Wedmore testified that based on her experience and training under

the totality of the circumstances, she believed that Adams was under the

influence of a controlled substance that night. Consequently, Wedmore arrested

Adams. During a search incident to the arrest, Wedmore discovered a brown
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                              4

plastic bag that contained a white powder in the pocket of Adams’ pants. Based

on her training and experience, Wedmore believed that the powder was heroin.

       {¶10} On June 26, 2019, a grand jury charged Adams with possession of

a controlled substance (acetyl fentanyl/fentanyl) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a

fifth-degree felony, and operating a vehicle while under the influence of drugs or

alcohol, or both, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-degree misdemeanor

(“OVI”).

       {¶11} On August 27, 2021, Adams filed a motion to suppress evidence or

in the alternative for an order in limine prohibiting admission of the evidence

obtained by law enforcement at the scene, as well as the observations and

opinions of the law enforcement officers present at the scene, including the

results of the field sobriety tests administered by Wedmore. On September 8,

2021, the state filed a memorandum contra to Adams’ motion to suppress. On

September 21, 2021, the court held a suppression hearing. Subsequently, the

court issued a judgment entry denying Adams’ motion to suppress.

       {¶12} On September 8, 2022, Adams’ trial began. The state presented

several witnesses. Trooper Wedmore testified that based on the totality of the

circumstances she believed that Adams was intoxicated and arrested Adams for

OVI, and confiscated a substance from Adams that she believed was illegal

drugs. Heather Sheskey, supervisor of the Ohio State Highway Patrol crime lab

(“OSP lab”), testified that the substance confiscated from Adams contained

fentanyl, a schedule 2 controlled substance, which is an illegal drug unless taken

under the direction of a doctor.
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                            5

       {¶13} The state then moved the trial court to amend count one of the

indictment to dismiss the allegation that Adams possessed acetyl fentanyl, which

would mean that Adams would be charged with possessing only fentanyl. Over

appellant’s objection, the trial court granted the motion dismissing acetyl fentanyl

from the indictment.

       {¶14} In his defense, Adams called one witness, the Adams County

Sheriff’s Deputy Walters, who is dispatched to the scene of the accident. He

stated that the investigation was taken over by the Ohio Highway Patrol when he

arrived. Walters testified that “typically when he arrives at a scene and [he’s]

dealing with a suspect, it is very common to do a weapons pat[-down search.]”.

However, Walters testified that he did not recall searching Adams.

       {¶15} The jury found Adams guilty of possessing fentanyl, but not guilty of

OVI. It is this judgment that Adams appeals.

                              ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S
              MOTION TO SUPPRESS FINDING THAT THERE WAS
              PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST APPELLANT FOR OPERATING
              A MOTOR VEHICLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS OR
              ALCOHOL.

       II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT PERMITTED THE STATE
              OF OHIO TO AMEND THE INDICTMENT DURING TRIAL WHEN
              SUCH AMENDMENT CHANGED AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
              THE OFFENSE.

       III.   THE CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF DRUGS WAS
              AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                             6

                           I. First Assignment of Error

      {¶16} Adams asserts that the evidence presented at the motion to

suppress hearing did not establish probable cause for Wedmore to arrest

appellant for OVI. Adams alleges that neither the results from the various field

sobriety tests, nor Wedmore’s observations were sufficient to constitute probable

cause that he was operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Adams claims his use of a flashlight as a headlight for his motorcycle was the

cause of his crash.

      {¶17} In response, the state asserts that based upon the totality of the

circumstances, Wedmore had probable cause to arrest Adams for operating a

vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

      {¶18} Wedmore did not administer the walk-and-turn and one-leg field

sobriety tests because Adams told Wedmore that he had a leg injury, which

could invalidate the results. The state also acknowledges that the results of the

HGN test did not indicate impairment, but noted the HGN test is more focused on

determining impairment from alcohol. Finally, the state admits that Wedmore

observed no lack of convergence but further indicated this was normal because

the convergence test is best at detecting impairment from marijuana.

      {¶19} However, the state maintains that the results of the modified

Romberg test should be afforded extra weight and indicated that Adams was

impaired. Further, Wedmore’s observations that Adams was talkative, restless,

had a dry mouth, and had dilated pupils were all signs of impairment.

Additionally, Adams admitted to using heroin two days prior to the accident,
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                                7

which would indicate that Adams was “an active drug user.” Finally, the state

maintains that the single-vehicle accident itself could be a sign of impairment.

Under the totality of these circumstances, the state alleges that Wedmore had

probable cause to arrest Adams for OVI.

       {¶20} Thus, the state maintains that the trial court did not err in denying

Adams’s motion to suppress.

                                        A. Law

                                1. Standard of Review

       {¶21} This court’s “review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress

presents a ‘mixed question of law and fact.’ ” State v. Pine, 2023-Ohio-2191, 219

N.E.3d 423, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,

2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. “At a suppression hearing, the trial court

acts as the trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve factual questions and

evaluate witness credibility.” State v. Sheets, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 21CA6,

2023-Ohio-2591, ¶ 45, citing State v. Leonard, 2017-Ohio-1541, 89 N.E.3d 58, ¶

15 (4th Dist.). “Accordingly, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Jones, 4th Dist.

Washington No. 11CA13, 2012-Ohio-1523, ¶ 6, citing State v. Landrum, 137

Ohio App.3d 718, 722, 739 N.E.2d 1159 (4th Dist. 2000). “However, ‘[a]ccepting

those facts as true, we must independently determine whether the trial court

reached the correct legal conclusion in analyzing the facts of the case.’ ” Sheets

at ¶ 45 quoting State v. Gurley, 2015-Ohio-5361, 54 N.E.3d 768, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.),
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                              8

citing State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶

100.

                                 2. Probable Cause

       {¶22} “A law enforcement officer possesses probable cause to arrest an

individual for [OVI] when the totality of the circumstances gives rise to a

reasonable belief that the individual drove while under the influence of alcohol [or

drugs].” State v. Richards, 4th Dist. Athens No. 14CA1, 2015-Ohio-669, ¶ 26,

citing State v. Schmitt, 101 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-37, 801 N.E.2d 446, ¶ 8.

Law enforcement officers can utilize “field sobriety tests [to] evaluate one's

coordination and movements so as to indicate whether one's actions, reactions,

conduct, movement or mental processes are impaired to an appreciable degree

so as to demonstrate if one is ‘under the influence’ to a degree to impair one's

ability to drive a motor vehicle.” State v. Littleton, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 01CA30,

2002-Ohio-2521, *2. Standard field sobriety tests include the HGN test, the walk-

and-turn test, and the one-legged-stand test. See State v. Rasheed, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-21-1065, 2021-Ohio-4509, ¶ 10.

       {¶23} Law enforcement officers may also administer “advanced roadside

impaired driving enforcement (“ARIDE”) tests.” Id. at ¶ 12. The “ARIDE” tests,

which are “useful for detecting drivers impaired by drugs[,]” include the lack of

convergence and modified Romberg tests. Weiler, Weiler, and Katter, Baldwin's

Ohio Handbook Series Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law, Section 7:20

(2022). However,

        [p]robable cause to arrest may exist in the absence of field
        sobriety tests results if there is evidence “that the defendant
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                             9

        caused an automobile accident; a strong odor of alcohol
        emanating from the defendant; an admission by the defendant
        that he or she was recently drinking alcohol; and other indicia of
        intoxication, such as red eyes, slurred speech, and difficulty
        walking.”

State v. Martin, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2023 CA 00008, 2023-Ohio-2739, ¶ 9,
quoting State v. Judy, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2007-CAC-120069, 2008-Ohio-
4520, ¶ 27, citing Oregon v. Szakovits, 32 Ohio St.2d 271, 291 N.E.2d 742
(1972).

Being “talkative” has also been recognized as an indicia of impairment. See

Rockhill v. City of Dayton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 1076, 1931 WL 2750, * 1.

See also State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. Medina No. 18CA0005-M, 2019-Ohio-583,

¶13. (“[T]alking fast” has been recognized as a sign of possible impairment.) A

single-vehicle accident with other observable indicia of impairment may also

support probable cause of OVI. See e.g. State v. Richards, 2016-Ohio-3518, 67

N.E.3d 147, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.) (The court of appeals found that the defendant’s

“single-car accident at 2:30 a.m.; red and watery eyes; odor of alcohol; slow and

deliberate speech; prior OVI; admission to consuming alcohol; and performance

on the field-sobriety tests” supported that he was “under the influence.”).

                                    B. Analysis

       {¶24} Trooper Wedmore testified that she had been trained on how to

administer field sobriety tests, which can assist in determining a driver’s

impairment. She also received additional training to recognize drug impairment.

Wedmore testified that prior to Adams’ incident, she had been the investigating

officer for 75 to 80 OVI cases. Consequently, we find Wedmore had the training

and experience to investigate Adams’ case.
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                               10

         {¶25} While the HGN and convergence tests did not give any indications

that Adams was impaired, Wedmore testified that the HGN test is not typically

used to determine impairment from drugs, and the convergence test is primarily

helpful in determining only marijuana use.

         {¶26} However, the modified Romberg test conducted on Adams

demonstrated leg tremors, which can be indicative of impairment. Further,

Wedmore observed that Adams was “very restless, um, very talkative. His

mouth was dry, pupils were dilated. Um, these are all signs of impairment based

on my training and experience.” Wedmore testified that Adams’ pupils “had little

to no reaction[,]” to her flashlight, which is another sign of impairment. Adams

was involved in a single-vehicle accident while purportedly attempting to use a

flashlight instead of a headlight. Finally, the emergency medical technicians and

sheriff’s deputy who responded to the accident suspected that Adams was

impaired.

         {¶27} Based on our independent review of the evidence, we find that

under the totality of the aforementioned circumstances, Trooper Wedmore had

probable cause to arrest Adams for operating a vehicle while under the influence

of drugs or alcohol. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in denying

Adams’ motion to suppress. Accordingly, we overrule Adams’ first assignment of

error.

                           II. Second Assignment of Error

         {¶28} In his second assignment of error, Adams maintains that when a

single count of the indictment alleges two separate offenses, it is improper to
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                           11

allow an amendment of the indictment when the amendment changes an

essential element of the offense. Adams claims that count one of the indictment

charged him with possessing acetyl fentanyl/fentanyl, i.e., two different

substances. The trial court permitted the state to amend the indictment by

removing the acetyl fentanyl charge and proceeding solely on the fentanyl

charge. Adams alleges that removal of acetyl fentanyl from the indictment

violated Crim.R. 7, which allows an amendment to an indictment provided it does

not change the name or identity of the crime.

       {¶29} Adams cites State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 453 N.E.2d 716

(1983) in support of his argument. Adams claims that in Headley the Court found

that in an indictment charging a drug offense, the name of the controlled

substance is an essential element of the offense. Adams claims the dismissal of

acetyl fentanyl from the indictment changed the essential element of the drug

possession offense alleged against him. Therefore, Adams claims that the

amendment was “unlawful and prejudicial” to him.

       {¶30} In response, the state maintains that Headley is distinguishable

because it determined that the “omission” of the type of controlled substance

from the indictment cannot be cured by an amendment because it would change

the very identity of the offense charged. In the case at hand, the indictment

charged Adams with possession of acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl, only fentanyl

was a controlled substance at that time. Therefore, the state maintains that

dismissing acetyl fentanyl from the indictment “did not alter in any form the

essential element under Headley.” In other words, dismissing acetyl fentanyl
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                                 12

from the indictment did not change the essential element of Adams’ offense,

which was possession of fentanyl.

       {¶31} Accordingly, the state claims that we should overrule Adams’

second assignment of error.

                                        A. Law

       {¶32} We review a trial court’s decision to amend an indictment for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Hannah, 4th Dist. Highland No. 16CA17

2017-Ohio-1239, ¶ 16. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ implies that a court's

attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Sites v. Sites, 2023-Ohio-

1278, 215 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.), citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

       {¶33} “ ‘The primary purpose of an indictment is to inform a defendant of

the offense with which he is charged to enable his preparation for trial.’ ” State v.

Butler, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 10CA36, 2011-Ohio-1652, ¶ 8, quoting State v.

Evans, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3268, 2010-Ohio-2554, ¶ 19. In part, Crim R.

7(D) states: “The court may at any time before, during, or after a trial amend the

indictment, information, complaint, or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect,

imperfection, or omission in form or substance, or of any variance with the

evidence, provided no change is made in the name or identity of the crime

charged[.]”

       {¶34} In Headley, the state charged the defendant with one count of

aggravated trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(8), but failed to name any

controlled substance that he purportedly possessed. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                                13

475, 453 N.E.2d 716. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the

grounds that it failed to allege an essential element of the crime. Id. The trial

court denied the defendant’s motion and permitted the state to amend the

indictment by adding the word “to-wit-cocaine.” Id. The court of appeals

reversed finding “that the indictment was defective due to the failure to name the

controlled substance involved.” Id. at 476.

       {¶35} On appeal, the Supreme Court found Section 10 of Article I of the

Ohio Constitution required that a criminal indictment must notify the accused of

“the essential facts constituting the offense[,]” which in a drug case includes “the

type controlled substance involved.” Id. at 478-479. Thus, the Court in Headley

found that the indictment’s failure to name the drug involved in the appellant’s

trafficking charge was fatal to the state’s case and affirmed the court of appeals

reversal of appellant’s conviction.

                                      B. Analysis

       {¶36} The holding in Headley that the indictment was improper was

predicated on the indictment’s failure to name any controlled substance. The

instant case is distinguishable from Headley because the indictment charged

Adams with possessing both acetyl fentanyl and fentanyl.

       {¶37} However, the parties agree that at the time of Adams’ arrest, acetyl

fentanyl was not a controlled substance. See R.C. 3719.41 Schedule I,

Schedule II (B)(9). Therefore, as charged in the original indictment, and after the

amendment dismissing acetyl fentanyl, the state charged Adams with possession

of only one controlled substance, fentanyl. Thus, the amendment “[did] not
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                              14

charge a new or different offense, nor * * * change the substance of the offense.’

” State v. Evans, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 08CA3268, 2010-Ohio-2554, ¶ 35. Adams

knew that he was being charged with possession of fentanyl before and after the

amendment, which is the purpose of having to name the controlled substance in

the indictment.

       {¶38} Dismissing the alleged possession of acetyl fentanyl did not change

an essential element of the offense. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to amend the indictment herein by

removing acetyl fentanyl from Adams’s indictment. We, therefore, overrule

Adams’ second assignment of error.

                           III. Third Assignment of Error

       {¶39} In his third assignment of error Adams alleges that his conviction for

possession of fentanyl is against the manifest weight of the evidence because

the state cannot prove a chain of custody of the substance that Wedmore

confiscated from him. The substance was initially delivered to the OSP lab in

November of 2018, but subsequently transferred to the National Medical Lab

(“NML”) in Pennsylvania for testing. However, it was not tested at NML and it

was eventually transported back to the OSP lab. There it eventually tested

positive for fentanyl.

       {¶40} Adams maintains that there is no evidence showing how the drugs

were transported to NML. Nor was there evidence to show a chain of custody of

the drugs for the time they were at NML, until they were transported back to the

OSP lab in July 2019. Adams also questions why the substance was transported
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                             15

from NML back to the OSP lab and kept there for 2 ½ years before it was tested.

Adams claims that these deficiencies in the chain of custody of the drugs causes

his conviction for possession of fentanyl to be against the weight of the evidence.

       {¶41} In response, the state argues that it presented sufficient evidence to

establish a chain of custody of the drugs confiscated from Adams. The state

claims that it is not required to “prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody.” The

state only needs to establish that “it is reasonably certain that substitution,

alteration, or tampering [of the evidence] did not occur.” Breaks in the chain of

custody do not go to the admission of the evidence, but to the weight afforded

that evidence.

       {¶42} Heather Sheskey, supervisor of the OSP lab, testified that the

“lieutenant in charge” would have transported the drugs from the OSP lab to

NML. She stated that the OSP lab had contracts to outsource drug testing,

including one with NML. Sheskey testified that the OSP lab picked up the drugs

from NML on July 31, 2019. The only location where the drugs were not

explicitly tracked was while they were at NML. However, the drugs arrived to and

from the NHL by way of the Ohio State Highway Patrol personnel.

                                       A. Law

       {¶43} “In a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, we ‘will not reverse a

conviction where there is substantial evidence upon which the [trier of fact] could

reasonably conclude that all the elements of an offense have been proven

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Brackets sic.) State v. Jenkins, 4th Dist.

Highland No. 12CA10, 2013-Ohio-595, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                                   16

St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), paragraph two of the syllabus. In making such

an analysis, we must “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

reversed.” State v. Wade, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3435, 2015-Ohio-997, ¶ 29,

citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

However, “ ‘the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.’ ” Jenkins at ¶ 9, quoting State v.

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the

syllabus.

       {¶44} “The purpose of requiring a chain of custody is to ensure that the

substance offered into evidence is in substantially the same condition as when

seized.” State v. Kiel, 9th Dist. Wayne No. C.A. 1480, 1977 WL 199005, *3

(Sept. 8, 1977), citing United States v. Santiago, 534 F. 2d 768 (7th Cir. 1976).

“Items such as blood samples or drugs generally require some showing of a

chain of custody to establish identity because visual identification of the

substance itself is difficult, if not impossible: the substance has no unique, readily

identifiable characteristics.” Id., citing State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App.2d 54, 59,

288 N.E.2d 296 (3rd Dist. 1971). However, “ ‘[a]ny breaks in the chain of custody

go to the weight afforded to the evidence, not to its admissibility.’ ” Jenkins, 4th

Dist. Highland No. 12CA10, 2013-Ohio-595, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Smith, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96348, 2011-Ohio-6466, ¶ 37.
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                          17

                                   B. Analysis

      {¶45} Sheskey, of the OSP lab, testified that the drugs recovered from

Adams were received by the OSP lab on November 21, 2018. The sample was

outsourced to NML because of a backlog at the OSP lab.

      {¶46} Referencing an “internal chain of custody report[,]” Sheskey testified

that the fentanyl recovered from Adams would have been flown or driven to NML

on April 20, 2019 by whoever the lieutenant was overseeing the property section

at the time. It was delivered to NML on April 22, 2019. Sheskey explained that it

was unnecessary to have a witness from NML to come and testify about the

fentanyl while it was at NML because the OSP lab has records of “who had the

evidence when they had it, what was done with it.”

      {¶47} On July 31, 2019, NML returned the drugs to Ohio where it was

stored in the Ohio State Patrol’s long-term storage near the OSP lab. Sheskey

testified that the drugs were transported from NML back to Ohio by the lieutenant

who was overseeing the property section at that time. Sheskey testified the

drugs were tested by OSP lab on February 17, 2022.

      {¶48} We find that the state has presented substantial evidence from

which a jury could infer that the state demonstrated a chain of custody of the

drugs recovered from Adams in this case. Therefore, we overrule Adams’ third

assignment of error.
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                     18

                                 CONCLUSION

      {¶49} Having overruled Adams’ three assignments of error, we affirm

Adams’ conviction for possession of fentanyl.

                                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Adams App. No. 22CA1158                                                              19

                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

                IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                        For the Court,

                                   BY: ____________________________
                                       Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.