Court Opinion

ID: 9714855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:47:10.59822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:29.047369
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
There was insufficient evidence of identification submitted at the trial and, therefore, this conviction should be reversed and appellant discharged. With regard to the merits of this claim, the debate of the parties is focused at the point of two cases in which the defendant was tried in absentia and the claim on appeal was insufficient evidence of identification. In Broecker v. State (1976), 168 Ind.App. 281, 342 N.E.2d 886, there was testimony at trial that the defendant was arrested in the course of committing a burglary of a filling station and was later identified by name. The name, of course, was the same as the name of the person being tried in absentia. In Iseton v. State (1984), Ind. App., 472 N.E.2d 643, the defendant was tried in absentia, and an officer testified that he arrested a man at the scene, called him the defendant, and noted that the man then carried identification showing him to be Iseton. Thereafter, according to the testimony, the vie-tim identified him.
In this case, by contrast, only the name connects the person arrested and charged and being tried in absentia, over whom the court has jurisdiction, with the person who sold the drugs to the undercover officer. The illegal sale here occurred on March 21, 1986. The person arrested and charged for this offense as Kenneth Murphy was taken into custody by the sheriff of Greene County more than a year later pursuant to a bench warrant issued on June 12, 1987. None of the officers at the scene was ac*133quainted with appellant, and none knew his address. The confidential informant knew him, but did not testify.
Officer Seever testified as follows:
Q. Do you know where Kenneth Murphy lived?
A. At this time?
Q. That time March 21, 1986.
A. Yes I did.
Q. Was that in Greene County, State of Indiana?
A. Well let me-rephrase that-I have seen him on a couple of occasions. I really can't say that he was living there at the time. It would be in Linton, Indiana, on the Northwest 9th and B Streets.
* # # * # *
Q. Now prior to this occasion were you personally acquainted with the Defendant, Kenneth Murphy?
A. Not personally, no.
Q. Prior to March 1986, had you ever seen Kenneth Murphy?
A. I really can't answer that. I might have and might not have.
Officer McElroy testified that he saw the defendant one time, namely at the time of the buy and had not seen him thereafter. According to the majority opinion, he testified that he saw him in a photograph, and I have no reason to question the accuracy of that statement. Officer McElroy also testified:
Q. Had you to your knowledge ever seen Kenneth Murphy prior to March 21, 19867
A. No I hadn't.
Officer Burton testified:
Q. Now you didn't previously know Kenneth Murphy.
A. No sir.
Q. Never saw him before in your life as far as you know.
A. No.
Here, only the name connects the person arrested and charged with this illegal sale of drugs. I still see the State's burden in these circumstances to have the same form and dimension as described in my dissent ing opinion in Preston v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 353, 358, 287 N.E.2d 347, 349-50 (De-Bruler, J., dissenting):
It is a material element of the State's case to prove that the person who committed the crime is the person presently on trial. Having a supposed eye-witness testify to a name or refer to the title "defendant" does not tend to prove this element but merely tends to establish that criminal acts were committed by a person who may or may not be the present defendant. Trials are designed to test the truth or falsity of allegations made against a person in custody not against a name in the abstract. A definite link must be established between the person actually on trial and the crime. It is not sufficient to simply link the crime and a name.
Due process requires that this definite identification link be established to a moral certainty beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution at all trials on the issue of guilt or innocence. This requirement applies with equal force where the defendant is tried in absentia, and it cannot be satisfied by supplying evidence at a later sentencing hearing.
DICKSON, J., concurs.