Court Opinion

ID: 9668384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:11:09.346724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.114933
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
The instant case presents in dramatic fashion the mischief that is potential in this Court’s holding in State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Importantly absent from the majority opinion are the facts underlying the present mandamus application.
On November 20, 1989, a grand jury sitting in the 198th Judicial District in McCulloch County (Brady, Texas) returned indictments against David J. Guzman, Boyd Harrold Pool, John Andrew Smith, Billie Sol Estes, and Load Star International, Incorporated. The indictments alleged the defendants engaged in organized criminal activity by conspiring to commit the offense of theft of trade secrets. On October 29, 1990, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the indictment. The trial court held a hearing on this motion on November 9, 1990, in Kerr County (Kerrville, Texas)1 for the convenience of the parties.
The Court, in part, granted the motion to quash, reasoning that “theft of trade secrets” did not fall within the umbrella of *58the theft provision of the organized crime statute. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 71.02. Following its announcement in open court, the trial court directed defense counsel to prepare the proposed order and tender it to the State’s counsel for approval. Instead, defense counsel, ex parte, forwarded the order to Kerr County for the trial judge’s signature. On Friday, November 16, 1990, while in Kerr County (Kerr-ville) the trial judge signed the order granting the defendants’ motion and subsequently caused it to be mailed to the clerk in McCulloch County (Brady) for filing. The district clerk of McCulloch County filed the order on Tuesday, November 20, 1990. The clerk apparently assumed the State had notice that the order had been signed and filed because no notice was sent to the State’s counsel, as is evidenced by the clerk’s notation on the bottom of the Court’s order indicating to whom copies were sent.
The State’s counsel did not learn the order had been signed and filed until the afternoon of December 3, 1990, thirteen days after the filing and seventeen days after the signing. Immediately, on December 4, 1990 (fourteen days after the filing and eighteen days after the signing), the State filed notice of appeal from the trial court’s order to dismiss the indictment by bench filing with the trial court judge and by FAXing a Notice of Appeal to the clerk of McCulloch County. The State’s original Notice of Appeal reached the clerk by mail on December 6, 1990, and was filed the same day. The clerk of the Third Court of Appeals subsequently declined to file the State’s appeal reasoning that the notice of appeal was not filed within fifteen days following the signing of the district court’s order, pursuant to Article 44.01(d), V.A.C.C.P., and Tex.R.App.Proc. 41(b)(1).
The provisions of Article 44.01(d), V.A.C.C.P., being in linguistic conflict with Tex.R.App.Proc. 41(b)(1), must prevail over the Rule. More importantly, when the law imposes a time limitation upon a party, it should concomitantly provide some notice to that party. The “signing” of an order is not notice. The term “Entered of Record” as applied to criminal cases “is not synonymous with the term ‘signed’ but has a definite fixed meaning and refers to the ministerial act of the clerk in spreading the Court’s judgment in the minutes of the Court.” Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
The facts presented in this cause should be sufficient to demonstrate the error in the majority’s construction of Article 44.-01(d), V.A.C.C.P. Clearly, a party may be denied a right to appeal in any case where a judge, without notice to the party, signs an appealable order which does not get filed (entered) of record within the time required for notice of appeal.
For these reasons, and the reasons expressed in Judge Baird’s dissent, I dissent.
BAIRD, J., joins this dissent.

. Brady and Kerrville are approximately 90 miles apart but are located in the same judicial district.