Court Opinion

ID: 9400768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:05:39.66384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.712491
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 21–1015

              Submitted February 22, 2023—Filed June 9, 2023

JAMES A. STOGDILL, CHRISTOPHER DETERMAN, MATHEW D. JOHNSON,
ALESHA SMITH, and KIRK YENTES,

      Appellants,

vs.

CITY OF WINDSOR HEIGHTS, IOWA, and MUNICIPAL COLLECTIONS OF
AMERICA, INC.,

      Appellees.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Heather Lauber and

Celene Gogerty, Judges.

      Plaintiffs appeal from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment in challenge to municipality’s use of an income tax refund offset

program to enforce civil penalties issued pursuant to an automated traffic

enforcement system. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

      McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined.

      Claire M. Diallo (argued), James C. Larew, and Deborah Svec-Carstens of

Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for appellants.

      Michael C. Richards (argued) and Katelynn T. McCollough of Dentons

Davis Brown, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee City of Windsor Heights.
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      Jessica L. Klander (argued) of Bassford Remele, P.A., Minneapolis,

Minnesota, for appellee Municipal Collections of America, Inc.
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McDONALD, Justice.

      The plaintiffs filed this suit to challenge a municipality’s attempts to collect

automated traffic citation fines not reduced to a judgment in a municipal

infraction proceeding. The plaintiffs filed suit against the municipality and the

municipality’s collection agent. The district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’

claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand for further proceedings.

      I. The City’s Automated Traffic Enforcement Program.

      The City of Windsor Heights uses “an automated traffic enforcement

system for making video and/or photographic images of vehicles that fail to obey

red light traffic signals . . . or fail to obey speed regulations.” Windsor Heights,

Iowa, Mun. Code § 60.02.08 (2017). Pursuant to the ordinance, the city must

mail notice of an automated traffic citation to the vehicle owner within thirty

days of the police department’s determination that a violation occurred. Id.

§ 60.02.08(3)(A). It is the vehicle owner—rather than the driver—that is liable for

the citation. Id. § 60.02.08(2)(A), (B). Fines for violations of the ordinance

generally range from $65 to $160, with some additional fines assessed for

excessive speeding. See id. § 60.02.08(3)(B), (C). Any violation of a city ordinance

is a municipal infraction. Id. § 4.01. Thus, a violation of the city’s automatic

traffic enforcement (ATE) ordinance is a municipal infraction.

      A vehicle owner receiving an automatic traffic citation may either pay the

citation, contest the citation, or ignore the citation. Id. § 60.02.08(4). To contest

the citation, the vehicle owner can submit a form to the city requesting “an
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administrative review to be held at the Police Department before an impartial

administrative appeals board.” Id. § 60.02.08(4)(A). The administrative appeals

board shall either uphold or dismiss the citation and shall send notice of its

decision to the vehicle owner. Id. If the board upholds the citation, the vehicle

owner can either pay the fine or request the city file a municipal infraction

citation in the small claims division of the district court. Id. § 60.02.08(4)(A), (B).

The vehicle owner can also bypass the administrative appeals board process

altogether and simply request the city file a municipal infraction citation, in lieu

of the automatic traffic citation, in the small claims division of the district court.

Id. § 60.02.08(4)(B). The vehicle owner must request the city pursue a municipal

infraction within thirty days of receiving the board’s decision, if the owner elects

the board process, or within thirty days of notice of the citation, if the owner

bypasses that process and requests the city pursue a municipal infraction. Id. If

the vehicle owner ignores the citation and does nothing, then the city can take

action. Id. § 60.02.08(6).

      The city’s ordinance provides several enforcement mechanisms against a

vehicle owner that does not pay an automated traffic citation, whether the owner

contested the citation or not. The city may attempt further collection efforts by

issuing a second notice of the automatic traffic citation. Id. § 60.02.08(6)(A).

Under the ordinance, if the owner does not pay within thirty days of receiving

the second notice, the owner “shall be deemed guilty of the violation and be held

liable for the fine amount plus any additional service fees.” Id. The city may then

refer these allegedly guilty vehicle owners to a private collection agency. Id.
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§ 60.02.08(6)(B). The city may also “[r]efer the Vehicle Owner to the State’s

income offset billing program for payment.” Id. § 60.02.08(6)(C). Finally, the city

may file a municipal infraction and seek a judgment in the district court. Id.

§ 60.02.08(6)(D).

      The ordinance states that a private contractor may provide services in the

management and operation of the ATE system. Id. § 60.02.08. Here, the city

contracted with Municipal Collections of America, Inc. (MCA) to collect certain

debts and fines, including automated traffic citations. Under the contract, the

city was not required to pay MCA any fees unless MCA successfully collected

fines. With respect to automated traffic citations, the contract provides that the

city will add a 25% “cost of collection” fee to citations referred to MCA. The

contract then provides that MCA keeps 20% of the full balance recovered, while

the remaining 80% is remitted to the city.

      At issue in this case is the income offset program. The income offset

program is authorized pursuant to statute. See Iowa Code § 8A.504 (2019). The

statute allows the department of administrative services to “establish a debt

collection setoff procedure for collection of debts owed to the public agency.” Id.

§ 8A.504(1)(a). This includes money owed to a “political subdivision of the state,”

such as the city. Id. § 8A.504(1)(c). Use of the setoff procedure is limited to only

those liabilities “in the form of a liquidated sum due, owing, and payable.” Id.

§ 8A.504(1)(d)(3). Generally speaking, with respect to the collection of ATE

penalties, the setoff procedure begins when the city refers the name of a vehicle

owner to the department of administrative services. See id. § 8A.504(2)(b). If the
                                          6

vehicle owner is entitled to receive an income tax refund, the department

provides notice to the owner that the refund will be offset by the unpaid amount

of the ATE penalty. See id. § 8A.504(2)(f). The vehicle owner can either consent

to the offset, pay the ATE penalty to the city directly and receive their full income

tax refund, or contest the offset. See id. § 8A.504(2)(h).

      The city entered into a memorandum of understanding with the

department of administrative services to avail itself of the income offset program.

The memorandum provided that only debts “in the form of a liquidated sum due,

owing and payable” were eligible for placement in the program. The

memorandum further provided that “[a]ll applicable remedies with regard to

such a debt and claim must be exhausted . . . as a condition precedent for

eligibility to participate in the offset program.” It was the city’s obligation to

develop and maintain a system for reporting eligible debts to the department.

According to the memorandum of understanding, the department charged an

administrative fee of $7 for each debt placed in the offset program.

      II. Background and Procedural Posture.

      The procedural posture of this case is long and somewhat complicated. We

discuss it at length to provide necessary context for resolving this appeal. Five

plaintiffs—James A. Stogdill, Christopher Determan, Mathew D. Johnson,

Alesha Smith, and Kirk Yentes—filed this suit against the City of Windsor

Heights and MCA on December 19, 2019. The plaintiffs asserted the following

claims: (1) the city’s collection efforts, including use of the income offset program,

violated the statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(1); (2) the
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city’s ATE ordinance was an unlawful property tax not authorized by the general

assembly, in violation of Iowa Code section 364.3(4); (3) the city’s ATE ordinance

and the city’s use of the income offset program was preempted by Iowa Code

section 364.22; (4) the city’s use of the income offset program to enforce

automatic traffic citations not reduced to a judgment constituted unjust

enrichment; (5) the city’s use of the income offset program to enforce automatic

traffic citations not reduced to a judgment constituted conversion; (6) the city’s

attempts to collect automatic traffic citations violated the Iowa Debt Collection

Practices Act, Iowa Code §§ 537.7101–.7103; (7) the agreement between the city

and MCA to collect ATE penalties constituted a civil conspiracy; and (8) the city’s

use of the income offset program violated their rights to due process under

article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution.

      The defendants filed several dispositive motions in the district court,

including pre-answer motions to dismiss followed by two different motions for

summary judgment. In several different rulings on each of the motions, the

district court dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims. Only two of the original five

plaintiffs—Determan and Smith—seek appellate review. We set forth the facts

and circumstances surrounding only their claims.

      A. Plaintiff Christopher Determan. On May 18, 2018, the city issued a

notice of violation to Determan arising out of an alleged speeding violation on

May 15. The fine was $65. The notice provided payment was due on June 17.

The notice further provided that “[f]ailure to pay the penalty or contest liability

by the due date is an affirmation of responsibility to pay the listed fine amount
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and will result in this penalty being forwarded to collections and or submitted to

the Iowa Income Tax Offset program.” The notice provided Determan four ways

to contest the violation. First, he could request an in-person administrative

review. Second, he could request an administrative review by mail if he lived

more than 150 miles outside the city. Third, he could request a civil infraction

suit be filed in the district court. Fourth, if he no longer owned or possessed the

vehicle on the date of the violation, he could directly contest liability with the

“Violation Processing Center.”

      Determan completed the form to request an administrative review. On

June 26, the city denied Determan’s request for an administrative review

because the request was “received too late.” That same day, the city sent a second

notice of violation to Determan. The second notice of violation contained the

following notice:

             Please be advised that your failure to address the first Notice
      of Violation prior to its posted due date has resulted in an expiration
      of your administrative review option. This 2nd and Final Notice is
      considered debt due and owing to the City of Windsor Heights.
      Failure to pay the fine prior to the due date on this second notice
      OR make request for a municipal infraction citation to be filed . . .
      will result in a finding of “liable” and will subject you to formal
      collection procedures and additional associated fees.

After receiving this second notice, Determan objected to the city’s contention that

his request for an in-person administrative review was not timely. The city

relented and scheduled an administrative review. The administrative review

occurred on August 16, and Determan was found liable. The city issued him a

notice stating that he had been found liable, that the amount of the fine was

$65, and that the fine was due on September 15. The notice provided that the
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decision could be appealed by requesting the filing of a civil infraction suit in the

district court.

      At this point, the proceedings against Determan came to an end. Determan

did not appeal the decision. Determan never paid the fine. The city never referred

Determan to collections or the income offset program. During the course of

proceedings in this case, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the

city filed an affidavit from the mayor of Windsor Heights stating the city will not

proceed against Determan. The city specifically disclaimed “any right to proceed

with any action in relation to an automated traffic enforcement (ATE) citation

issued to Defendant CHRISTOPHER DETERMAN as a result of a violation on

May 15, 2018.” The affidavit also stated, “The City will not pursue any fines,

collections, or actions connected to ATE citation in the future.”

      B. Plaintiff Alesha Smith. On March 23, 2017, the city issued a notice of

violation to Smith arising out of an alleged speeding violation occurring on

March 17. The fine was $65. The notice provided payment was due on April 22.

As with Determan, the notice provided that “[f]ailure to pay the penalty or contest

liability by the due date is an affirmation of responsibility to pay the listed fine

amount and will result in this penalty being forwarded to collections and or

submitted to the Iowa Income Tax Offset program.” And, as with Determan, the

notice provided that Smith could contest the violation the same four ways. Smith

took no action.

      On May 1, the city sent Smith a delinquency notice. The notice stated that

her administrative options for contesting the violation had expired but that she
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could request a court proceeding. The notice also stated the fine was “considered

debt due and owing” to the city. In response, Smith made a written request for a

hearing. On May 8, the city rejected Smith’s request for a hearing on the ground

her request was “received too late.” The letter rejecting Smith’s request provided

her with options to pay the penalty online, by phone, by mail, or by MoneyGram.

The letter did not provide a way to contest the violation.

      At some point, the city referred Smith to the income offset program. On

February 27, 2018, the city sent her notice that her income tax refund of $320

was being held because she owed “$88.00, plus any additional charges, to the

City of Windsor Heights.” The notice of offset provided Smith could appeal the

amount of the debt by filing a notice of appeal to MCA or the city within fifteen

days of the notice. The notice also stated Smith could contest the validity of the

offset process by filing a written protest with the department of administrative

services. The notice also stated, “DO NOT contact the Department of

Administrative Services if you wish to dispute the amount in question, do not

believe you owe the money, or believe you have paid the debt. Contact the City

of Windsor Heights.”

      In response to this notice, Smith sent a letter to the department of

administrative services. In the letter, she contested the violation. The letter

provided, “I am contesting this ticket because the person driving the car when

the ticket was issued by the camera was not me, but someone test driving my

car to buy it.” The letter went on to state Smith sold the car on March 20, 2017,

three days after the alleged violation. Smith received no response from the
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department. On April 1, she received her income tax refund. The tax refund had

been offset by $88.

      C. District Court Proceedings. The city and MCA first moved to dismiss

Stogdill, Yentes, and Johnson’s claims on the grounds that their claims were

barred by the applicable statute of limitations and on the grounds that their

claims arising under the debt collection practices act failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted. The district court granted this motion, dismissed

all claims asserted by Stogdill, Yentes, and Johnson, and dismissed plaintiffs’

count six alleging a violation of the debt collection practices act.

      The city and MCA then filed motions for partial summary judgment as to

Smith. The defendants argued that all of Smith’s claims were barred by the

applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 670.5 (“[A] person

who claims damages from any municipality . . . shall commence an action

therefor within two years after the alleged wrongful death, loss, or injury.”). The

district court granted the motions in part and denied them in part. The petition

was filed on December 19, 2019. In the district court’s view, the date of injury

for Smith’s procedural due process claim was the date of offset, April 1, 2018,

and her procedural due process claim was thus not time-barred. The injury for

all other claims, in the district court’s view, was the date of the alleged violation,

March 17, 2017, and all other claims were thus time-barred.

      Following the district court’s ruling on this motion, the defendants filed a

motion to enlarge or amend. Defendants argued there was ambiguity in the

ruling regarding the status of the other plaintiffs’ claims. The district court
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granted the motion and held that the only claims remaining were (1) all of

Determan’s claims, and (2) Smith’s procedural due process claim.

      The defendants then filed additional motions for summary judgment. The

city argued that Determan lacked standing to assert any claim because he never

paid the ATE penalty and because he was never referred to the income offset

program. The city further argued Smith’s procedural due process claim failed as

a matter of law. MCA argued that Determan’s claims against MCA failed as a

matter of law because Determan’s account was never sent to MCA for collections.

MCA further argued that Smith’s procedural due process claim failed as a matter

of law because MCA (1) was not a state actor, and (2) was not involved in

establishing the city’s income offset program procedures.

      The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment. As to

Determan, the district court concluded he did not have standing to pursue any

claim relating to payment of the ATE penalty or use of the income offset program

because Determan never paid the penalty and was never referred to the program.

The district court concluded, however, that Determan did have an “injury-in-fact

as far as the ATE ordinance and its appeals process” and “[t]herefore, Plaintiff

Determan has standing to bring any remaining claims that involve the ATE

ordinance, Notices of Violation, and the administrative review process for alleged

violations of the ATE ordinance.” The district court then went on to address the

merits of his claims. The district court held that Determan’s claim that the

defendants violated the statute of limitations failed as a matter of law because

all collection efforts directed toward Determan occurred within one year of the
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alleged violation. See Iowa Code § 614.1(1) (providing actions to enforce payment

of penalty under ordinance must be brought within one year). With respect to

the rest of his claims, the district court held that (1) the city’s ATE ordinance

was not an unlawful tax, (2) the city’s ATE ordinance was not preempted by Iowa

Code section 364.22, and (3) Determan’s claims for unjust enrichment,

conversion, and procedural due process failed as a matter of law because he had

not paid the ATE penalty and because the city specifically disclaimed “any right

to proceed with any action” against him based on the challenged violation.

      As to Smith, the district court held that Smith was provided with

constitutionally sufficient process. The district court reasoned that Smith was

provided with multiple opportunities to contest the fact of the violation and the

amount of the penalty prior to being referred to the income offset program. The

district court also explained that Smith was provided notice of offset and an

opportunity to contest whether she owed the debt. However, contrary to the

directions in the notice, Smith mailed her letter of contest to the department

rather than the city. The district court concluded that although Smith

“unfortunately committed an error in her attempt to contest the fine, this does

not change the fact that the City did provide adequate opportunity.”

      The district court also granted MCA’s motion for summary judgment. The

district court held Determan could not assert a claim against MCA because his

account was never referred to MCA for collections and he never paid any money

to MCA. With respect to Smith, the district court further reasoned that MCA was

merely a vendor with respect to mailing notices of violation. MCA did not
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administer the income offset program, had no access to the income offset

program, and was not involved in the city’s referral of accounts to the department

of administrative services for offset.

      III. Determan’s Claims.

      Determan appeals the district court’s ruling on two separate issues. He

contends the district court erred in concluding the city’s use of the income offset

program did not violate the statute of limitations. He also contends the district

court erred in concluding the city’s ATE ordinance is not an unlawful property

tax. He specifically states he does not appeal the ruling dismissing his state law

preemption, conversion, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and due process claims.

At the outset, we question whether Determan has standing to raise any claims.

The city never referred Determan to the income offset program, and the city has

disclaimed any future right to enforce or collect the fine from him. Determan

contends he has standing because he seeks declaratory relief and because the

city could try to enforce the citation at some later date. We assume without

deciding that Determan has standing, and we address his claims on the merits.

See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 544 (Iowa 2018); Ostergren v. Iowa Dist.

Ct., 863 N.W.2d 294, 297–98 (Iowa 2015); LSCP, LLLP v. Kay-Decker, 861 N.W.2d

846, 864 (Iowa 2015).

      A. Statute of Limitations Claim. The district court did not err in

dismissing Determan’s claim for violation of the statute of limitations. The

statute of limitations is wholly inapplicable to the city’s out-of-court collection

efforts. We begin with the plain language of the relevant statute. State v. Boone,
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989 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Iowa 2023). The statute provides, “Actions may be brought

within the times herein limited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not

afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared.” Iowa Code § 614.1. The

statute then goes on to provide that those actions “to enforce the payment of a

penalty or forfeiture under an ordinance” must be brought “within one year.” Id.

§ 614.1(1). As the text indicates, the statute of limitations applies only to

“[a]ctions.” Id. § 614.1; see Downing v. Grossmann, 973 N.W.2d 512, 518 (Iowa

2022) (“A statute of limitations governs how much time a plaintiff has to bring a

cause of action after it accrues.”). In this context, an “action” denotes a “judicial

proceeding.” Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

      What the text denotes, context confirms. See Com. Bank v. McGowen, 956

N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2021) (“In determining the fair and ordinary meaning of

the statutory language at issue, we consider the language’s relationship to other

provisions of the same statute and other provisions of related statutes.”); State

v. Mathias, 936 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Iowa 2019) (“When the legislature does not

define the term, we look to the context in which the term appears and give it its

ordinary and common meaning.”). Chapter 614, governing the limitations of

actions, is set forth in title XV, subtitle 3 of the Iowa Code. Title XV relates to the

judicial branch and judicial procedures, and subtitle 3 relates to civil procedure.

As indicated by its placement in the Code, the statute of limitations relates to

court proceedings. In addition, when the word “action” is used within title XV, it

refers to court proceedings. See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 611.1 (“Every proceeding in

court is an action, and is civil, special, or criminal.”), .2 (“A civil action is a
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proceeding in a court of justice . . . .”), .4 (“[P]laintiff may prosecute an action by

equitable proceedings in all cases where courts of equity . . . had jurisdiction

. . . .”); id. §§ 613.8 (providing state consent to “any suit or action . . . in any of

the district courts of Iowa”), .11 (waiving immunity from suit and consenting to

jurisdiction “of any court in which an action is brought against the state

department of transportation”); id. § 614.14(5)(a) (setting forth limitations on

actions “in any court” relating to interests in real estate).

      The statutory text and context are confirmed by precedents. In Dean v.

Iowa-Des Moines National Bank & Trust Co., this court directly addressed the

statute of limitations and concluded that, in this context, “an action is a

proceeding in court.” 281 N.W. 714 (Iowa), modified on reh’g, 290 N.W. 664 (Iowa

1940). Iowa’s courts have repeatedly concluded that “action” refers to court

proceedings. See, e.g., Jones & White v. Park, 262 N.W. 801, 802 (Iowa 1935)

(“An action is a proceeding in court.” (quoting Box v. Chi., R.I. & P. RY., 78 N.W.

694, 696 (Iowa 1899))); Dille v. Plainview Coal Co., 250 N.W. 607, 612 (Iowa 1933)

(same); Nkanta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12–0475, 2012 WL 5954530, at *6

(Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2012) (same); see also Christiansen v. Emp. Appeal Bd.,

No. 11–1715, 2012 WL 4513853, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2012) (“Our Iowa

case law recognizes that the word ‘action’ is a term of art and applies to

proceedings in court.”).

      Determan also misapprehends the nature of a statute of limitations.

Determan contends the city violated the statute of limitations when it sought to

collect an ATE penalty more than one year after the alleged traffic violation. He
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seeks damages for the alleged violation, including repayment of any funds

obtained, costs, and attorney fees. A party cannot violate the statute of

limitations. The statute of limitations is not a cause of action; the statute of

limitations is an affirmative defense to a cause of action. See Lasko v. Caliber

Home Loans, Inc., No. 20–17181, 2022 WL 728820, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022)

(affirming dismissal of cause of action for violation of statute of limitations on

ground that statute of limitations is not a cause of action); Bank of N.Y. Mellon

v. DeSelms, No. EDCV 18–1044 PSG (MRWx), 2019 WL 8198310, at *7 (C.D. Cal.

Mar. 25, 2019) (“[T]he statute of limitations provides an affirmative defense, not

a cause of action.”); Miller v. Coxe, 45 S.E. 940, 942 (N.C. 1903) (stating it is a

“well-settled rule that the statute of limitations can be used only ‘as a shield, and

not as a sword’—as a defense, and not a cause of action”). As an affirmative

defense, the statute of limitations can be waived. See, e.g., Porter v. Good

Eavespouting, 505 N.W.2d 178, 182 (Iowa 1993) (“Because the limitations

defense was not raised, the defendant waived it.”). When a party brings an action

beyond the limitations period, the party does not violate the statute of

limitations. There is nothing that prohibits a party from bringing an action

beyond the relevant limitation period. The action may be barred and dismissed

if the defendant timely raises and proves the limitations defense, but the party

bringing the action has not violated any statute.

      B. Illegal Property Tax Claim. Determan contends the district court erred

in concluding the city’s ATE ordinance is not an illegal property tax. According

to Determan, the ATE ordinance “has no relation to safety” because the
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ordinance fines the vehicle owner rather than the driver. Although the ATE

ordinance has no relation to safety, Determan argues, the ordinance has

generated millions of dollars for the city. Thus, according to Determan, the ATE

ordinance is an unauthorized, de facto “revenue-generating personal property

tax imposed in a manner that is inconsistent with the City’s police powers.” We

disagree and conclude the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.

      This court has defined a tax as “a charge to pay the cost of government

without regard to special benefits conferred.” In re Shurtz’s Will, 46 N.W.2d 559,

562 (Iowa 1951). “In other words, taxes are for the primary purpose of raising

revenue.” Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines,

644 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Iowa 2002). The express purpose of the Windsor Heights

police department’s ATE system is unrelated to revenue:

      It is the policy of the Windsor Heights Police Department to operate
      Automated Traffic Enforcement (ATE) program . . . for the purpose
      of efficiently utilizing the resources of the Department; to reduce
      speeding violations and traffic collisions, property damage, personal
      injuries, and deaths; to reshape the motoring behaviors of the
      community; and to address neighborhood complaints of flagrant
      violators.

In addition, this court has already concluded that ticketing vehicle owners was

a rational way to advance a municipality’s public safety objectives:

      Even if we were to employ a more rigorous rational basis review, we
      think it is permissible under the Iowa due process clause for an ATE
      ordinance to allow a city to make a prima facie case of liability based
      upon vehicle ownership and photographic evidence that the vehicle
      was involved in a violation of the ordinance. The asserted
      governmental interest in public safety is certainly “realistically
      conceivable” with “a basis in fact.” [The plaintiff] has developed no
      record suggesting that the asserted City interest is insubstantial or
      empirically unsustainable. As presented in this case, this means the
      chosen methods used by the City to advance the public interest in
                                        19

      safety, clearly reasonably fit the City’s legitimate objective in public
      safety.

City of Sioux City v. Jacobsma, 862 N.W.2d 335, 348 (Iowa 2015) (quoting Racing

Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Iowa 2004)).

      While the ATE system does generate revenue for the city, revenue

generation does not negate the city’s stated purpose of promoting safety. See

Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 552 (Iowa 2019) (“It is, of course,

true that the ATE system generates revenues for Cedar Rapids,” but “[j]ust as a

tax on tobacco has the potential of deterring youth smoking, Cedar Rapids may

rationally believe that the impositions of fines for speeding violations generally

deters speeding.”). The district court did not err in rejecting Determan’s claim

that ATE penalties are an illegal property tax.

      C. Conclusion With Respect to Determan. We conclude the district court

did not err in dismissing all of Determan’s claims against the city and MCA. We

affirm the district court’s rulings as to Determan.

      IV. Smith’s Claims.

      Smith challenges the district court’s dismissal of her claims. She contends

the district court erred in holding her claims were barred by the two-year

limitation period set forth in Iowa Code section 670.5. Smith further contends

the district court erred in dismissing her claim that the city’s use of the income

offset program violated her right to due process as protected by article I,

section 9 of the Iowa Constitution.

      A. The City’s Defense Under Iowa Code Section 670.5. We first address

the district court’s ruling regarding the limitations period. Iowa Code
                                        20

section 670.5 provides that “a person who claims damages from any municipality

or any officer, employee or agent of a municipality for or on account of any . . .

injury . . . shall commence an action therefor within two years after the alleged

wrongful” injury. Pursuant to this statute, the district court dismissed all of

Smith’s claims except her procedural due process claim. In the district court’s

view, the date of injury for all of her claims, other than procedural due process,

was the date of the alleged traffic violation—March 17, 2017. The district court

concluded Smith’s claims were time-barred because the petition was filed more

than two years later—December 19, 2019. With respect to the due process claim,

the court concluded the date of injury was the date Smith’s tax refund was offset.

The date of offset—April 1, 2018—was within the two-year limitations period.

      “Although frequently referred to as a statute of limitations, section 670.5

is a statute of creation.” Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa

2019). “Chapter [670] created a new right of action—one that was not available

at common law nor available elsewhere by statutory authority, and therefore,

while cases interpreting other limitation statutes are helpful, they do not control

here.” Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Montgomery v. Polk

County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 1979) (en banc)). This statute “bars any claim

not filed within the requisite time period as measured from the date of injury

rather than date of accrual.” Id.

      The district court erred in dismissing Smith’s claims. Smith filed her

petition on December 19, 2019. She is not barred from pursuing claims where

her injury arose within two years of that date. She undoubtedly suffered an
                                         21

injury on April 1, 2018, when her income tax refund was offset to pay the ATE

penalty plus the additional costs. All of her claims relate, at least in part, to the

income offset. To the extent Smith’s claims assert an injury relating to the city’s

use of the income offset program, Smith’s claims are not barred by section 670.5.

Smith’s challenges to conduct occurring prior to the income offset are

time-barred.

      B. Procedural Due Process Claim. Smith contends the district court erred

in dismissing her claim that the city’s use of the income offset program violated

her right to procedural due process. “A party claiming a violation of procedural

due process must first show an impairment of an interest in life, liberty, or

property by government action.” Behm, 922 N.W.2d at 566. “Once a protected

interest has been established, the next question is what procedural minima must

be provided before the government may deprive the complaining party of the

protected interest.” Id. “Ordinarily, the procedural minima include two

components—notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue.” Id.

      Here, Smith was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.

“Notice must be reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the

pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their

objections.” Meyer v. Jones, 696 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 2005) (quoting

Hutcheson v. Firstar Bank (In re Est. of Borrego), 490 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa

1992)). The original notice of violation provided Smith with different options to

contest the violation, including the right to request the city proceed with a

municipal infraction proceeding. We have already held that it does not violate
                                        22

due process to require a party to request the city proceed with a municipal

infraction proceeding:

             There is, however, at least one complication. The ATE
      ordinance puts the burden on a vehicle owner to request a hearing
      in small claims court. Is a requirement that a citizen take affirmative
      action to obtain a hearing before a small claims court consistent
      with due process? We think it is. The amount at stake is relatively
      small, and the burden of requesting a hearing is not heavy. Further,
      the ordinances provide a vehicle owner with the opportunity for a
      prior administrative hearing to challenge the automated traffic
      citation in an informal proceeding.

Behm, 922 N.W.2d at 569 (citations omitted). Smith did not timely avail herself

of any of these options.

      Smith argues that even if she did not avail herself of these options, the city

nonetheless violated her right to due process by referring her account to the

income offset program without first reducing the fine to a judgment in a

municipal infraction proceeding pursuant to Iowa Code section 364.22. At first

glance, her argument has some appeal. Iowa Code section 364.22 sets forth the

processes and procedures required for a municipality to enforce a municipal

infraction. This court has had several occasions to discuss the interplay between

ATE programs and section 364.22. We have held that section 364.22 does not

preclude a city from collecting a voluntary payment of ATE penalties without first

filing a municipal infraction. See Rhoden v. City of Davenport, 757 N.W.2d 239,

241 (Iowa 2008). We have also held that section 364.22 does not preclude a

municipality from offering an informal administrative hearing where vehicle

owners can contest alleged ATE violations as additional process beyond what is

required under section 364.22. See City of Cedar Rapids v. Leaf, 923 N.W.2d
                                         23

184, 198 (Iowa 2018). However, in Weizberg v. City of Des Moines we held “that

to the extent a municipality seeks to assert the coercive power of government to

enforce payment of a penalty for a municipal infraction, a municipality must

pursue a municipal infraction under Iowa Code section 364.22.” 923 N.W.2d

200, 220 (Iowa 2019). And in Behm v. City of Cedar Rapids, we could not have

been clearer that “no liability arises until the city takes the affirmative step of

filing an enforcement action in district court and obtains a judgment against the

defendant.” 922 N.W.2d at 562. In other words, there is no debt due and owing

in the absence of a judgment from the district court. See id. at 564 (“[N]o liability

of any kind attaches to a vehicle owner without the filing of a municipal

infraction.”); id. at 565 (stating the relevant statutes do “not provide for any

liability to arise until the [municipality] takes the affirmative step of filing an

enforcement action in district court and obtains a judgment against the

defendant”). We reiterated this point in Weizberg, stating “that no enforceable

obligation will arise unless the [municipality] files a municipal infraction in small

claims court and obtains a judgment.” 923 N.W.2d at 215 n.4.

      On closer inspection, however, the fact that the city referred Smith’s

account to the income offset program without first obtaining a judgment does

not necessarily establish a due process violation. The government’s failure to

comply with a statute or ordinance does not necessarily establish a due process

violation. See id. at 214 (“The failure to follow such a procedure or ordinance

cannot give rise, in and of itself, to a due process violation.”); Behm, 922 N.W.2d

at 568 (“A mere violation of a statute does not give rise to a due process
                                        24

violation . . . .”); see also Womack v. Carroll County, 840 F. App’x 404, 407 (11th

Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“[T]he mere violation of a state statute outlining a

required procedure does not necessarily equate to a due process violation.”). “[I]n

all cases, the focus of the analysis must be on the critical question of whether

the process that was provided comported with the basic requirements of notice

and an opportunity to be heard.” Weizberg, 923 N.W.2d at 214.

      Here, Smith was given additional notice and an opportunity to contest

payment of the citation. Critically, the notice of offset provided Smith with an

opportunity to contest whether she owed the debt. The notice provided, “DO NOT

contact the Department of Administrative Services if you wish to dispute the

amount in question, do not believe you owe the money, or believe you have paid

the debt. Contact the City of Windsor Heights.” The city’s notice did afford Smith

the opportunity to contest the fact that she did not “owe the money.” Smith did

not avail herself of the opportunity. Smith did not follow the notice instructions;

she sent her letter of contest to the department instead of the city. And she sent

that notice one day too late. Smith’s failure to request a hearing to contest

liability as directed in the notice defeats her procedural due process claim.

      C. Conclusion with Respect to Smith. In sum, as to Smith, we hold the

district court erred in dismissing Smith’s claims against the city as time-barred

by Iowa Code section 670.5. Specifically, we conclude the district court erred in

dismissing the following claims against the city on the ground they were

time-barred: (1) violation of the statute of limitations, (2) imposition of an

unlawful property tax, (3) preemption under Iowa Code section 364.22, (4) unjust
                                        25

enrichment, (5) and conversion. As with Determan, however, Smith’s claims for

violation of the statute of limitations and imposition of an unlawful property tax

fail as a matter of law even though not time-barred, and the district court should

dismiss those claims after remand. We express no opinion on the merits of any

of the remaining claims or any potential defenses to the remaining claims. We

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Smith’s procedural due process claim.

      V. Claims Against MCA.

      Finally, we address the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor

of MCA as to all claims. The district court concluded that MCA could not be liable

for the operation of the city’s ATE program, including its use of the income offset

program. We agree with the district court.

      The actionable conduct at the heart of Smith’s claim is the submission of

her debt to the income offset program. Smith fails to acknowledge that MCA plays

no role in the referral of ATE penalties to the income offset program. MCA’s sole

role here was to send letters on behalf of the city. MCA was acting merely as a

collection agent or third-party vendor for the city. MCA did not create or

authorize the ATE program. MCA played no part in the city’s decision to send a

particular account to the income offset program. If MCA’s letter did not result in

the collection of an ATE penalty, MCA transferred the account back to the city.

MCA’s involvement ended there. Once an account was transferred back to the

city, the city alone decided whether to refer an account to the income offset

program. There is no basis to impose liability on MCA for the city’s use of the

income offset program. See Vroegh v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686,
                                        26

707–08 (Iowa 2022) (finding third-party health plan administrator was not

“agent” of state liable for discretionary choices within plan).

      VI. Disposition.

      For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court.

The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.