Court Opinion

ID: 9742396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:13:02.290036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.187368
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN dissenting: In my opinion the majority erroneously conclude that there was no evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the defendant knew or should have known that the interior of the slack pile was burning at the time the plaintiffs father purchased it. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §353, comment on subsection (1), states: “(c) It is not, however, necessary that the vendor have actual knowledge of the condition, or that he be" in fact aware that it involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land. It is enough that he has reason to know that the condition exists and is dangerous, as reason to know’ is defined in Section 12(1) — that is to say, that he has information from which a person of reasonable intelligence, or his own superior intelligence, would infer that the condition exists, or would govern his conduct on the assumption that it does exist, and would realize that its existence would involve an unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land.” In Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 417 S.W.2d 568, the court said at 571: “As a general rule, ‘a vendor of land is not subject to liability' for physical harm caused to his vendee or others while upon the land after the vendee has taken possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession.’ Restatement of Torts, Second, Sec. 352, p. 234; Smith v. Tucker, 151 Tenn. 347, 270 S.W. 66, 41 A.L.R. 830; Belote v. Memphis Development Company, 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441. But, where the vendor knows of a dangerous condition upon the land and knows or should realize that the vendee has no knowledge of the condition and probably would not discover it or its potentiality for harm, the vendor owes the affirmative duty to disclose the condition and to warn the vendee of its danger, and if he fails to do so, he becomes subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee for any physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken possession of the land. Belote v. Memphis Development Company, 208 Tenn. 434, 346 S.W.2d 441, citing Section 353 of the Restatement of Torts, Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908, 909, 910, and Palmore v. Morris, 182 Pa. 82, 37 A. 995, 999, 61 Am. St. Rep. 693. Cf. Restatement of Torts, Sec. 353, p. 235 where the exception voiced in the Belote case and in the earlier Restatement is broadened so as to impose the duty to disclose a dangerous condition upon those vendors who have reason to know of it.’ Knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition by a vendor will be presumed where the building or dwelling sold was built by the vendors’ workmen. Belote v. Memphis Development Company, supra. In the light of the foregoing authorities and after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as we are required to do, we are of the opinion that a jury reasonably could find that at- the time of sale the defendants had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition created by the shoddy’ or sub-par construction of the basement stairs; that due to the nature of the defect, the defendants knew or should have realized that the plaintiffs had no knowledge, of the condition and probably would not discover it or its potentiality for harm; that, as a consequence, the defendants were under a duty to disclose the construction defect to the plaintiffs and their failure to do so subjected them to liability for the injuries and damages suffered by the plaintiffs as the result of the collapse of the stairs.” Other courts have expanded the exception stated in section 353 of Restatement. See Rogers v. Scyphers 251 So. C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81; Fisher v. Simon 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d 705; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314. “An employer is presumed to be familiar with the dangers, latent as well as patent, ordinarily accompanying the business in which he is engaged.” (Baumgartner v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 292 Pa. 106,140 A. 622.) “Knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition by a vendor will be presumed where the building or dwelling sold was built by the vendor’s workmen.” (Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, supra.) “A manufacturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts.” Moren v. Samuel Langston, 96 Ill.App.2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759; Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill.App.2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684; Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1st ed. (1956) par. 28.14, at 1541. Since the defendant was in the business of producing coal and it created the slack pile in question which ultimately caused plaintiff’s injuries, under the rationale of the foregoing authorities it will be presumed to have such knowledge of matters pertaining to its business as was possessed by those having special acquaintance with that industry. Since the evidence disclosed that slack piles have a propensity to burn under the surface and this fact is known to those in the coal mining business, defendant will be presumed to have such knowledge. Assuming the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that the jury was warranted in finding that prior to the date of the purchase, defendant was a coal mine operator, had mined the land on which the accident occurred and had created thereon a slack pile which was in existence at the time of sale. An odor of sulphur lay about the land at the time of the conveyance to plaintiff’s father, up until the time the slack pile was bull-dozed into a mine shaft. Slack piles have a propensity to bum under the surface and this fact is known to those experienced in coal mining. On this important point, there are no glaring contradictions in the testimony of witnesses who testified regarding the propensities of coal-mined property to be subject to fires beneath the surface. Not only did the expert witness for plaintiff testify that a mound of coal dust such as was involved here, and which had been created by the mining operations of the previous owners, could bum undetected for a period of “six, seven, eight years”, but also a local coal miner with 35 years of mining experience, a witness for defendant, testified to substantially the same information as plaintiffs expert. Defendant sold the property without giving any warning. In my opinion, the foregoing is sufficient to establish an evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the fire that caused plaintiffs injuries was in existence_at the time of the sale, since the condition was a latent one. Was there also an evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the plaintiffs father did not know or have reason to know of the condition or risk involved as required by section 353 of the Restatement? It is the jury’s function to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses and draw the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. Its conclusion, whether relating to negligence, causation, or any other factual matter, should not be set aside merely because different conclusions could be drawn or judges feel that other results are more reasonable., (Finley v. New York Central R.R. Co., 19 Ill.2d 428, 167 N.E.2d 212.) “The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury.” Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166. Verdicts ought to be directed and judgments n.o.v. entered only in those cases in which all of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R. R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494. Plaintiffs father testified that he did not know that slack would bum beneath the surface; that the sulphur odor was on the surface of the ground for the entire time that he owned it, up until the time that his daughter was injured; that no one warned him of any danger concerning the premises; that he always thought the odor came from the mine shaft.. There was also evidence that the mine shaft was incapable of inspection. He also testified that he had worked in a mine for 12 years prior to 1948 when he went into the junk business. In my opinion, this was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Under the evidence the jury could reasonably have found that plaintiffs father .did not know or have reason to know of the condition or risk involved, since the condition was latent rather than open and obvious. On the other hand, it may well have considered all of the evidence, including plaintiffs father’s past experience, as a miner and decided otherwise-. This was a question of fact and not a .question of law and I am. unable to say that the evidence on this issue when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiff so overwhelmingly favored the defendant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could stand. Since the majority conclusion concerning plaintiff s complaint is based upon the erroneous premise that plaintiff did not prove a cause of action, I refrain from, commenting on that portion of the majority opinion.