Court Opinion

ID: 9570292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:06.090624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:35.671227
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, C.J.,
dissenting: By following Montague v. Burgerhoff, 150 Kan. 217, 92 P.2d 98 (1939), the majority resurrects a case that has been inferentially overruled since 1967. The majority opinions contrary to Montague in cases subsequent to that *224decision failed to even mention its existence. Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502, 638 P.2d 914 (1982); Duckers v. Lynch, 204 Kan. 649, 465 P.2d 945 (1970); Lemon v. Busey, 204 Kan. 119, 461 P.2d 145 (1969); Roberts v. Beebe, 200 Kan. 119, 434 P.2d 789 (1967); Ralls v. Caliendo, 198 Kan. 84, 422 P.2d 862 (1967). In the cases where Montague was mentioned in the majority opinion it was rejected. Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978); Morris v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Rly. Co., 198 Kan. 147, 422 P.2d 920 (1967). The majority decision here overrules not only these cases but other cases where the court has stated the duty an owner or occupant of premises owes to a mere licensee is the duty to refrain from willfully, intentionally, or recklessly injuring him. Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. 528, 581 P.2d 385 (1978); Blackburn v. Colvin, 191 Kan. 239, 380 P.2d 432 (1963); Hogan v. Hess Construction Co., 187 Kan. 559, 358 P.2d 755 (1961); Backman v. Vickers Petroleum Co., 187 Kan. 448, 357 P.2d 748 (1960); Steinmeyer v. McPherson, 171 Kan. 275, 232 P.2d 236 (1951); Bessette v. Ernsting, 155 Kan. 540, 127 P.2d 438 (1942).
It has long been said bad facts make bad law. Here, the facts take place in a suburban setting where the main activity involved was social entertainment, the mixing of drinks. As the amicus curiae brief of the Kansas Association of Defense Counsel points out, those seeking to have the classification system abolished argue its foundation has lost its purpose in today’s urban society. The classification system arose under the feudal notion that land was most important and due to the extent of a landowner’s vast land holdings, he could not guard against intruders. The argument of urbanization, that an urban landowner can better supervise his property, has been criticized, however:
“The argument that contemporary conditions no longer supply any rational basis for the status rules is not particularly persuasive. Abolitionist decisions that contrast modern urban, industrialized conditions with those existing in feudal times have taken liberties with history. This reasoning fails to recognize that current rural or suburban environments may more closely resemble the general physical characteristics of property holdings under the manorial system than property use in crowded urban settings. Since the historical justification for abolition relies in part upon this misconception, the historical rationale offers a policy basis narrower than the sphere to which the negligence rule applies: the negligence rule applies to all modern physical environments — urban, suburban, and rural — yet the historical rationale advanced for application of the negligence rule may be valid only with respect to modern urban property holdings.” *225Comment, The Common Law Tort Liability of Owners and Occupiers of Land: A Trap for the Unwary?, 36 Md. L. Rev. 816, 836-37 (1977).
By focusing on the urban setting of this case, the majority has adopted new law which will affect all owners and occupiers of premises in Kansas. In 1984 there were 74,000 farms in Kansas, totaling 48 million acres. 67th Annual Report and Farm Facts, Kansas State Board of Agriculture, p. 99. The total land acreage in the entire state of Kansas is 52.3 million acres. The majority has ignored the fact that 91.8% of Kansas land is dedicated to farming. That leaves only 8.2% of Kansas land which is “urbanized.” As a result of this decision, farmers will undoubtedly experience a substantial increase in insurance premiums to cover the resulting increased risk of liability, or find themselves trapped as the unwary.
Furthermore, a great burden will be placed on the jury that hears a premises liability case in the future. In Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. at 450, this court recognized the many factors the jury would have to consider:
“If the traditional classifications are discarded the legal distinctions which have heretofore governed the courts in imposing a particular standard of care are also discarded. In such case the standard, reasonable care under all the circumstances, would have to be applied by the jury to the specific facts of each case. Can a lay jury reasonably be expected to consider the proper relative effect of natural and artificial conditions on the premises which are or may be dangerous, the degree of danger inherent in such conditions, the extent of the burden which should be placed on the possessor of premises to alleviate the danger, the nature, use and location of the condition or force involved, the foreseeability of the presence of the plaintiff on the premises, the obviousness of such dangerous condition or the plaintiff s actual knowledge of the condition or force which resulted in injury? It would appear these considerations should be imparted to the jury [through instructions] if it is to be placed in a position to decide whether reasonable care was exercised by the possessor of the premises. Otherwise the jury will have a free hand to impose or withhold liability.”
The active negligence/passive negligence distinction now “resurrected” will be no easier for the jury to grasp. If the court continues to ignore the doctrine of stare decisis, this distinction will soon pass into oblivion. With the statutory adoption of comparative negligence the active/passive negligence distinction has been swept aside in many cases. See Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452-60, 618 P.2d 788 (1980).
In view of the many decisions overruled by the Kansas Supreme Court in the recent past, I am constrained to discuss *226briefly the doctrine of stare decisis. New decisions have been written elaborating on the doctrine of stare decisis because it has been so basic in the teaching of the law throughout the centuries. Students of the law are thoroughly indoctrinated by the proposition that an appellate court’s decision is binding authority upon itself as well as upon inferior courts. The binding effect concerning the law enunciated by our Supreme Court decisions upon the district courts of Kansas was emphatically discussed by Justice Harold Herd in a concurring opinion in State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 174-75, 689 P.2d 822 (1984). The doctrine must also be given respect by the jurists on the appellate court of last resort in the state.
Addressing the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Alex Fromme, writing for the court in Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 96-97, 631 P.2d 646 (1981), said:
“It is not always easy to determine the proper ambit of the court’s authority on an issue of the present kind. We must not discard the time-tested advantages of consistency and uniformity in the fabric of the law to do that which we might conceive to be justice in a particular instance. Many statutes in Kansas establish and protect the marital relátionship. We as judges may have the power, though not the right, to ignore the ultimate effects of legislative pronouncements. History teaches us that departures from clear principles of law lead to more and more departures, many of which for the moment may seem in the highest public interest; but, when that happens, the day will soon come when personal preferences of judges overcome long established principles, and the law instead of being rules governing action becomes vacillating judgments dependent upon the particular membership of the court at any given time.
“ ‘The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to “the primordial necessity of order in the social life.” ’ Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, at 141 (1921).”
The overruling of earlier case law and the resurrection of Montague is contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine, its literal Latin meaning being “let the decision stand,” is essential to maintaining certainty and stability in the legal community. By this doctrine, attorneys are able to advise their clients and their clients, in turn, are able to behave accordingly.
In the early case of Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H.L. Cas. *274, *338 (1861), it was said that an appellate court’s decision is binding *227authority upon itself as well as upon inferior courts. The function of the judiciary is not to make the law, but to ascertain and apply existing law to the facts before it. The fact the composition of the court may have changed since an earlier decision is not sufficient reason to overrule established precedent set by that earlier decision. This court has stated the doctrine of stare decisis is not inflexible, and that if an earlier decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed materially, the earlier rule should be set aside. Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369, 372, 559 P.2d 1148 (1977); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 332-33, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); In re Estate of Preston, 193 Kan. 145, 148, 392 P.2d 922 (1964); Warburton v. Warkentin, 185 Kan. 468, 476, 345 P.2d 992 (1959).
Here, the rationale for the well established traditional rule concerning the classifications and their corresponding duties of care in premises liability is not clearly erroneous, nor have conditions changed. The feudal rationale behind the classification system, that a landowner with vast land holdings could not guard against intruders, remains clearly applicable to the 91.8% of agricultural land existing in Kansas today. Under the doctrine of stare decisis the decisions subsequent to Montague should be followed. Those decisions, contrary to Montague, are based on sound legal principles still applicable today.
The duty of a judge was established more than 2000 years before Christ. The following quotations from Benchmark, Vol. II, Nos. 3 & 4, p. 130 (1986), are relevant:
“If a judge pronounce a judgment and afterward reverse ft, he shall pay twelve fold the damages which were awarded, and they shall expel him from his seat of judgment, and he shall not return.” The Code of Hammurabi, 2250 B.C.
Sir Francis Bacon said:
“When a judge departs from the letter of the law he becomes a lawbreaker.” De Augmentis scientiarum, 1623.
He also stated:
“Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare — to interpret law, and not to make or give law.” Francis Bacon, Essays, LVI, 1625.
Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, p. 198 (14th ed. 1968), quotes Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634):
“Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason.” First Institute (1628).
*228It is inconceivable to me that jurists for centuries have been mistaken in the application of reason to given facts.
It is respectfully submitted the Court of Appeals decision affirming the district court should be affirmed.