Court Opinion

ID: 9881719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 18:00:40.669128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:14:21.165362
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20541      Document: 00516917703         Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/03/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                               FILED
                                                                      October 3, 2023
                                  No. 22-20541
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________
                                                                            Clerk

   Deana Pollard Sacks,

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Texas Southern University; Ahunanya Anga; James
   Douglas; Fernando Colon-Navarro; Ana Otero; April
   Walker; Darnell Weeden,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:22-CV-299
                  ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          Deana Pollard Sacks resigned from her tenured professorship at the
   Thurgood Marshall School of Law at Texas Southern University (TSU) in
   August 2020. She then sued TSU and several TSU employees for Title VII
   constructive discharge, Equal Pay Act (EPA) retaliation, and civil rights
   violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed all her claims,
   holding that res judicata barred her § 1983 claims and that she failed to state
   Title VII and EPA claims. We AFFIRM.
Case: 22-20541      Document: 00516917703          Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/03/2023

                                    No. 22-20541

                                          I
          We start at the beginning. In 2018, while Sacks was still teaching at
   TSU, she filed her first suit against TSU and its employees (Sacks I). Sacks
   sued TSU for (1) Title VII hostile work environment, (2) Title VII
   retaliation, (3) EPA violation, and (4) § 1983 civil rights violations. She also
   sued Ahunanya Anga, James Douglas, Fernando Colon-Navarro, Ana Otero,
   and April Walker, all TSU employees, for (1) § 1983 civil rights violations
   and (2) invasion of privacy.
          Sacks lost on all claims. The district court dismissed all of Sacks’s
   claims except her (1) Title VII race-based hostile work environment claim,
   (2) EPA claim, and (3) § 1983 civil rights claim against Douglas. The Title
   VII and § 1983 claims were later dismissed on summary judgment. The EPA
   claim continued to trial, where the jury found for TSU.
          In August 2020, while Sacks I was ongoing, Sacks resigned from TSU.
   A month later, she moved for leave to amend her complaint in Sacks I to add
   several claims and defendants, including a Title VII constructive discharge
   claim against TSU. The district court denied her motion.
          Sacks then filed a second suit against TSU and TSU employees, this
   case, now before us on appeal (Sacks II). Against TSU, she claims (1) Title
   VII constructive discharge, (2) EPA retaliation, and (3) breach of contract.
   Against the same individual defendants from Sacks I, plus current Thurgood
   Marshall School of Law professor Darnell Weeden (the Individual
   Defendants), Sacks claims (1) EPA retaliation and (2) § 1983 violations.
   TSU and the Individual Defendants moved to dismiss all claims, arguing that
   Sacks’s claims were barred by res judicata—that is, claim preclusion—and
   that she failed to state a claim. Alternatively, they argued that these claims
   should be consolidated with Sacks I. The district court denied the motion to
   consolidate.

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            The district court held that res judicata did not bar Sacks’s Title VII
   constructive discharge claim or her EPA claim. But, looking to conduct after
   August 29, 2019—which the parties agree was the last day to amend
   pleadings in Sacks I—the court held that Sacks did not state Title VII and
   EPA claims. The district court held that Sacks’s § 1983 and breach of
   contract claims were barred by res judicata and that she also failed to state a
   claim.
            Sacks timely appealed the district court’s dismissal of all claims except
   breach of contract. We first address whether Sacks’s claims are barred by res
   judicata and then, if they are not, whether Sacks states a claim.
                                           II
            “The res judicata effect of [the Sacks I] judgment is a question of law
   that we review de novo.” See Davis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309,
   313 (5th Cir. 2004) (italics omitted). Res judicata is an affirmative defense.
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). So Defendants bear the burden to plead and prove
   it. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)
   for res judicata can be appropriate when the elements of res judicata
   “appear[] on the face of the pleadings.” Kansa Reinsurance Co. v. Cong.
   Mortg. Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1366 (5th Cir. 1994).
            “We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
   claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 463 (5th Cir.
   2021). We may affirm dismissal on any ground that the record supports. See
   In re S. Recycling, L.L.C., 982 F.3d 374, 382 (5th Cir. 2020).
                                           III
            “[R]es judicata[] bars the litigation of claims that either have been
   litigated or should have been raised in an earlier suit.” Test Masters Educ.
   Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). True res judicata—

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   also called claim preclusion—applies only if “(1) the parties are identical or
   in privity; (2) the judgment in the prior action was rendered by a court of
   competent jurisdiction; (3) the prior action was concluded by a final
   judgment on the merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was
   involved in both actions.” Id.
          We apply the transactional test to determine whether both suits
   involve the same claim or cause of action. Id. Under this test, res judicata bars
   litigation of “all rights of the plaintiff with respect to all or any part of the
   transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the original
   action arose.” Id. To determine whether facts constitute a “transaction” or
   “series of transactions,” we consider “whether the facts are related in time,
   space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
   whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or
   business understanding or usage.” Id. So, “[t]he critical issue is whether the
   two actions are based on the ‘same nucleus of operative facts.’” Id. (quoting
   New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000)).
          “‘[S]ubsequent wrongs’ by a defendant constitute new causes of
   action” not barred by res judicata when those wrongs “occurred either after
   the plaintiffs had filed their prior lawsuit or after the district court had
   entered judgment in the prior lawsuit.” Davis, 383 F.3d at 314. Simply, res
   judicata does not “extinguish[] claims which did not even then exist and
   which could not possibly have been sued upon in the previous case.” Lawlor
   v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 328 (1955).

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                                     No. 22-20541

                                          A
          We start with Sacks’s Title VII constructive discharge claim against
   TSU. At issue is whether Sacks I involved the same claim. See Test Masters,
   428 F.3d at 571. We agree with the district court that it does not.
          To state a claim for constructive discharge, the former employee must
   show (1) “that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point
   where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to
   resign,” and (2) “that he actually resigned.” Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547,
   555 (2016). “In other words, an employee cannot bring a constructive-
   discharge claim until he is constructively discharged.” Id.
          Accordingly, Sacks could not bring a constructive discharge claim
   until she resigned in August 2020. Her claim thus did not exist until well after
   August 29, 2019, which the parties agree is the last day that Sacks could
   amend her pleadings in Sacks I. See Lawlor, 349 U.S. at 328. Sacks
   nonetheless moved to amend her complaint in Sacks I to add her constructive
   discharge claim. The district court denied her motion. Sacks therefore could
   not have brought her constructive discharge claim in Sacks I. We simply
   cannot treat the Sacks I judgment as extinguishing a claim that did not exist
   until well into Sacks I and that Sacks was not permitted to bring in that case.
   See id.; see also Davis, 383 F.3d at 314 (“Res judicata ‘bars all claims that were
   or could have been advanced . . . [in the earlier action].’” (quoting Nilsen v.
   City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 1983))); Anderson v. Hous.
   Cmty. Coll. Sys., 90 F. Supp. 3d 667, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (citing Suter v.
   Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, No. SA-12-CV-969-OLG, 2013 WL 6919760
   (W.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2013)).
           Therefore, Sacks’s resignation, which she alleges was a constructive
   discharge, is a “subsequent wrong” by TSU. See Davis, 383 F.3d at 314. It is
   thus a new claim that survives res judicata.

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          Sacks argues that the district court gave de facto res judicata effect to
   Sacks I by holding that Sacks could look only to post–Sacks I conduct. We
   agree. Having decided that Sacks could not have brought a constructive
   discharge claim in Sacks I, we cannot now truncate that claim merely because
   some underlying facts overlap with facts in Sacks I. Res judicata bars
   relitigation of “claim[s] or cause[s] of action,” not individual facts. Test
   Masters, 428 F.3d at 571.
          Thus, we hold that res judicata does not bar Sacks’s Title VII
   constructive discharge claim and that Sacks can look to conduct before and
   during Sacks I.
                                          B
          Next, we turn to Sacks’s EPA retaliation claims against TSU and the
   Individual Defendants. The first and fourth res judicata factors are in play:
   whether the Sacks I and II parties are identical or in privity and whether Sacks
   I involved the same claim. See id.
          Because Weeden was not a party in Sacks I, res judicata bars Sacks’s
   claim against him only if he was in privity with someone who was. See id. We
   conclude that there is privity here.
          “‘Privity’ is recognized as a broad concept, which requires us to look
   to the surrounding circumstances to determine whether claim preclusion is
   justified.” Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir.
   1992). We have recognized privity in three circumstances: “(1) where the
   non-party is the successor in interest to a party’s interest in property; (2)
   where the non-party controlled the prior litigation; and (3) where the non-
   party’s interests were adequately represented by a party to the original suit.”
   Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1990).

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          Weeden is not a successor in interest and did not control Sacks I. So
   he is only in privity with named defendants in Sacks I if his interests were
   adequately represented. See id. That is, a named defendant in Sacks I must
   have been “so closely aligned to [Weeden’s] interests as to be his virtual
   representative.” Id. at 1267 (citation omitted). A vicarious liability
   relationship between an employer and employee can create the requisite
   privity here. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1288–89 (5th Cir.
   1989) (collecting cases from the First, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
          Weeden’s interests were adequately represented in Sacks I by TSU,
   which employs Weeden and is vicariously liable for his conduct. In Sacks I,
   Sacks built her claims against TSU in part on allegations about Weeden’s
   conduct as professor and former associate dean of the law school. And when
   Sacks moved to amend her complaint in Sacks I, she also sought to name
   Weeden as a defendant. Only after the Sacks I district court denied her
   motion to amend did she file the current suit. On these facts, TSU
   adequately represented Weeden’s interests in Sacks I. So Weeden is in privity
   with a Sacks I party.
          Now to the fourth res judicata factor. “[A] Title VII plaintiff is free to
   bring successive actions, claiming in each that his employer has taken
   retaliatory actions against him more recent than the prior lawsuit.” Dawkins
   v. Nabisco, Inc., 549 F.2d 396, 397 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). The parties
   agree that August 29, 2019, was the last day that Sacks could move to amend
   her complaint in Sacks I. Accordingly, res judicata bars Sacks from bringing
   an EPA retaliation claim based on conduct occurring before August 29, 2019.
   Any EPA claim based on that conduct could have and should have been
   raised in Sacks I. See Davis, 383 F.3d at 313. But to the extent Sacks’s EPA
   claim is based on conduct after August 29, 2019, it is not barred.
                                          C

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          Finally, we consider Sacks’s § 1983 claims against the Individual
   Defendants. We look again to the first and fourth res judicata factors. See Test
   Masters, 428 F.3d at 571. We have already established that Weeden is in
   privity with a Sacks I party. And, as with Sacks’s EPA claims, res judicata
   bars Sacks from bringing § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants
   based on conduct occurring before August 29, 2019. Because Sacks alleges
   only post–August 29, 2019 conduct as to Walker, only her claim against
   Walker survives res judicata.
                                         IV
          Having tackled res judicata, we now turn to whether Sacks states
   claims that survive a motion to dismiss. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
   complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
   claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
   678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
   “But we ‘do not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual
   inferences, or legal conclusions.’” Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479
   (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 624 F.3d 201,
   210 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
   content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
   defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
   well-pleaded facts must “permit the court to infer more than the mere
   possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
                                          A
          We start with Sacks’s Title VII constructive discharge claim. “A
   claim of constructive discharge . . . has two basic elements. A plaintiff must
   prove first that he was discriminated against by his employer to the point

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   where a reasonable person in his position would have felt compelled to resign.
   [And] he must also show that he actually resigned.” Green, 578 U.S. at 555.
             To determine whether a reasonable person would feel compelled to
   resign, we have considered:
             (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job
             responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work;
             (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6)
             badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer
             calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation; or (7)
             offers of early retirement [or continued employment on terms
             less favorable than the employee’s former status].
   Brown v. Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
   original) (quoting Barrow v. New Orleans S.S. Ass’n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th
   Cir. 1994)).

             Sacks does allege that the dean “add[ed] time-consuming,
   unnecessary, and menial tasks such as rearranging the order of subjects
   taught in classes[,] . . . call[ing] many extra faculty meetings[,]”adding “new
   methods of attendance recording,” and assigning torts professors to “correct
   and edit 25 proposed Kaplan torts questions.”
             Even if we assume these tasks are menial, Sacks’s constructive
   discharge claim still falls short. She fails to allege any other factor that would
   make a reasonable person feel compelled to resign. See Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d
   at 782.
             She does not allege a demotion, reduction in salary, reduction in job
   responsibilities, reassignment to work under a younger supervisor, or offers
   of early retirement. See Newbury v. City of Windcrest, 991 F.3d 672, 677 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (looking for these factors); Perret v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 770 F.3d
   336, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2014) (same).

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          And she fails to allege facts showing that TSU “badger[ed],
   harass[ed], or humiliate[ed] [her] . . . to encourage [her] resignation.” Bunge
   Corp., 207 F.3d at 782. Again, we do not accept as true Sacks’s bald,
   conclusory allegations. Heinze, 971 F.3d at 479.
          Sacks mainly alleges systemic problems at TSU: the claimed gender
   pay gap, the racial discrimination lawsuit against Douglas and his subsequent
   promotion, the American Bar Association’s public censure of TSU after
   sexual discrimination allegations, the American Bar Association’s demands
   on TSU to remedy the pay gap, and TSU’s conduct toward other female
   professors. Aside from the pay gap, these allegations do not personally
   implicate Sacks.
          As for conduct that allegedly targeted Sacks, Sacks alleges that TSU
   investigated her for discrimination but found no evidence that Sacks
   discriminated, that “Walker threw her hair into [Sacks’s] face in the law
   school lobby,” and that Walker yelled at Sacks that she couldn’t park in a
   church parking lot. But no facts suggest that these were more than personal
   disputes between Walker and Sacks. Indeed, their parking lot confrontation
   was not even on school property. Sacks also alleges that Walker “has made
   comments about [her] race,” but she does not identify the comments or their
   context.
          In addition, Sacks claims that Weeden “deprive[d] her of a sabbatical
   and research monies” and “encouraged others to vote against [Sacks]” to
   deny her those benefits. But at least as to the sabbatical, this alleged
   deprivation occurred almost three years before Sacks resigned. This lack of
   temporal proximity between the alleged discrimination and her resignation
   undermines her constructive discharge claim. See Johnson v. PRIDE Indus.,
   Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 407 (5th Cir. 2021).

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             Even assuming this conduct is harassment, Sacks alleges no facts that
   show that this conduct was “calculated to encourage [her] resignation.”
   Bunge Corp., 207 F.3d at 782. Though Sacks alleges that she “reasonably felt
   compelled to resign because it was clear that the racism and harassment
   would not be addressed,” this statement is conclusory. See Heinze, 971 F.3d
   at 479.
             Looking only to her factual allegations, Sacks does not allege conduct
   by TSU that plausibly—not just possibly—states a constructive discharge
   claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
                                             B
             Next, we consider whether Sacks states EPA retaliation claims
   against TSU and the Individual Defendants based on conduct after August
   29, 2019. See 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
             The EPA disallows discharge or retaliation “because such employee
   has filed any complaint.” Id. EPA retaliation claims are analyzed under Title
   VII’s framework. Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 469–70 (5th
   Cir. 2021). To state an EPA retaliation claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate
   that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action
   occurred; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
   adverse employment action.” Id. at 469 (internal quotation marks omitted).
   To be a protected activity, “the employee’s conduct must have ‘opposed’
   the employer’s practice” and the plaintiff must have “reasonably believed the
   practice was unlawful.” Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209–
   10 (5th Cir. 2021). “‘Adverse employment action’ is a materially adverse
   action that ‘might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
   supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Lindsley, 984 F.3d at 470 (quoting
   Burlington N. & Santa Fe R.R. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).

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          Sacks claims that TSU and the Individual Defendants retaliated
   against her for filing Sacks I. Again, we look only to conduct after August 29,
   2019. And we disregard any bald, conclusory statements. See Heinze, 971 F.3d
   at 479. Even spotting Sacks that her resignation is an adverse employment
   action, she does not show a causal link between her filing Sacks I and her
   resignation. See Lindsley, 984 F.3d at 469–70.
          Sacks alleges that, in “2019-2020,” “Walker threw her hair into”
   Sacks’s face in the law school lobby and separately yelled at Sacks, “You
   can’t park here!” in a church parking lot. Even if we assume that this
   happened after August 29, 2020, Sacks does not allege any facts showing that
   Walker’s behavior was motivated by Sacks I.
          Similarly, Sacks alleges that the dean introduced “new methods of
   attendance recording and micromanag[ed] the order [in] which the torts
   topics were taught.” She states that “the female professors had to perform
   burdensome and time-consuming work that the males did not have to
   perform.” But as the district court notes, Sacks does not offer any facts
   showing that the dean’s “broad changes in school procedures and policies,
   or non-particularized changes to faculty workload, were designed to retaliate
   against Sacks.” See Sacks v. Tex. S. Univ., No. CV H-22-299, 2022 WL
   4227257, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2022).
          Sacks points out other conduct that, even assuming it occurred after
   August 29, 2019, lacks a causal link to Sacks I. For example, she does not
   show that the law school’s decision to promote Anga, “despite multiple
   harassment complaints on file [against her] with TSU’s Human
   Resources,” was causally linked to Sacks I. Same for Sacks’s allegation that a
   law school professor was promoted to dean after advising a female student
   not to make a Title IX sexual assault complaint. And same for Sacks’s

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   allegations that other female professors resigned and that TSU has been
   paying women less than men.
           Sacks argues that we must take as true that there was an “agenda to
   overwork, underpay, and abuse females in the law school, and white females
   in particular” in 2019. But this is a bald allegation of discriminatory conduct.
   See Heinze, 971 F.3d at 479. Because this and other allegations like it in
   Sacks’s complaint are conclusory, we don’t assume they are true. See id.
           Sacks thus fails to state EPA claims against TSU and the Individual
   Defendants.
                                         C
           Finally, we consider Sacks’s § 1983 claim against Walker. To state a
   claim, Sacks must show that Walker acted under color of state law. See Tyson
   v. Sabine, 42 F.4th 508, 521 (5th Cir. 2022). “It is firmly established that a
   defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the
   position given to him by the State.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49–50
   (1988).
           Again, the only post–August 29, 2019 incidents are Sacks’s
   confrontations with Walker in the law school lobby and in a church parking
   lot. No facts suggest that Walker “use[d] [her] official power [at the law
   school] to facilitate [these] actions.” See Tyson, 42 F.4th at 522. Walker and
   Sacks’s confrontation in the church parking lot did not occur at the school.
   And during neither incident did Walker assert her authority or even mention
   law school affairs. As TSU argues, these facts merely indicate a personal
   conflict between Sacks and Walker. See Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d
   407, 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that an “altercation ar[ising]
   out of an argument over family and political matters” wasn’t under color of
   law).

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          Thus, Sacks fails to allege that Walker acted under color of state law
   and thus fails to state a § 1983 claim.
                                             V
          Res judicata does not bar Sacks’s Title VII constructive discharge
   claim, her EPA claims based on conduct after August 29, 2019, and her
   § 1983 claim against Walker. However, Sacks fails to state claims that survive
   a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we do not reach the question whether her
   case should be reassigned.
          We AFFIRM.

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