Court Opinion

ID: 9575311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:56.810201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:07.952196
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
In order to explain my disagreement with the majority, it is necessary that I set out the facts of this case. In July 1984, appellant was indicted for two counts of sale of marijuana, one sale allegedly occurring on January 21, 1983, the other on January 28, 1983. Arguing that the lengthy preindictment delay hampered his ability to develop an alibi defense and left him with no defense other than mistaken identity, appellant successfully sought an order requiring the state to disclose the identity of the informant who was present at the January 21 incident. The State’s response was to dismiss Count 1 of the indictment and proceed to trial on Count 2 only. However, during the trial, the State offered testimony concerning the first incident. Over appellant’s objection that the evidence would place his character in issue and that if such testimony were permitted, he should have the benefit of the informant’s identity, the trial court permitted the State to present testimony concerning the first sale for the purpose of showing identity, motive, intent, scheme, and plan.
Appellant’s first enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to order disclosure of the informant’s identity. His second enumeration is that the trial court erred in permitting evidence of the first incident. Were either of these contentions presented separately, I would have no difficulty in holding that the trial court’s actions were permissible under Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160 (231 SE2d 729) (1977), and State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654 (1) (272 SE2d 321) (1980), respectively. However, the conjunction of the two rulings changes the *602complexion of each. In colloquy with counsel, the trial judge expressed the opinion that since the State’s pre-arrest delay left appellant in a posture where mistaken identity was his only defense, fairness required that the informant’s testimony be made available as to the first offense in order to break the deadlock of the swearing contest between the State’s agent, who swore that appellant sold him marijuana, and appellant, who swore he was not involved. I find the trial court’s assessment of that situation correct, but I am of the opinion that the court’s reasoning should have been extended, under the circumstances, to apply to the second count: even though the informant was not present at the second incident, evidence of the first was used to prove, among other things, appellant’s identity as the seller in the second transaction.
The State’s argument that disclosure was not required because appellant was no longer in jeopardy as to the first sale begs the question. Appellant’s jeopardy as to the second sale was greatly enhanced by evidence that he committed the same crime in the same way one week earlier. If it was unfair to make appellant face that first charge without the informant’s testimony, it was just as unfair to bolster the evidence of the second offense with evidence of the first without giving appellant the benefit of the informant’s testimony.
The majority’s assertion that the trial court would have been correct in denying disclosure of the informant’s identity because he was a mere tipster is not supported by the record. The informant here was not a person who merely provided information regarding criminal activity: the informer was alleged to have introduced the undercover agent to appellant and to have been present at the first alleged sale of marijuana. Since the informant was at least a witness and very likely a participant, there was no absolute privilege against disclosure and the trial court’s original ruling was correct. See Thornton, supra.
I would hold, therefore, that the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony concerning the first offense without requiring the State to reveal the identity of the informant was fundamentally unfair and violative of appellant’s right to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) (1956); Thornton v. State, supra. The error requires reversal of the conviction and entitles appellant to a new trial. For that reason, I must dissent from the majority’s judgment of affirmance.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.