Court Opinion

ID: 9596075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:45:52.754611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:32.102786
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON
dissenting:
The trial court upheld the facial constitutionality of sections 23-21-401 to 23-22-111, 9 C.R.S. (1990 Supp.).1 The majority, relying on various sections and provisions of the Colorado Constitution, has reversed the trial court and found that the statute is unconstitutional. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the trial court are an appendix to this dissent and, in my view, address and properly resolve the issues relating to the University Hospital.
University Hospital was established by the Regents of the University of Colorado pursuant to the Colorado Constitution, which provides:
The establishment, management, and abolition of the state institutions shall be subject to the control of the state, under the provisions of the constitution and such laws and regulations as the general assembly may provide; except that the regents of the university at Boulder, Colorado Springs, and Denver may, whenever in their judgment the needs of that institution demand such action establish, maintain, and conduct all or any part of the schools of medicine, dentistry, nursing, and pharmacy of the university, together with hospitals and supporting facilities and programs related to health, at Denver; ...; and provided further, that subject to prior approval by the general assembly, nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the state institu*152tions of higher education from hereafter establishing, maintaining, and conducting or discontinuing centers, medical centers, or branches of such institutions in any part of the state.
Colo. Const. art. VIII, § 5.
The wording of article VIII, section 5 reflects the intent of the framers of the constitution to provide the regents with the power to establish, maintain, and operate the University Hospital in the manner directed and authorized by the General Assembly. Economic emergencies confronting the regents in the operation of the University Hospital caused the General Assembly to enact the legislation which the majority has declared to be facially unconstitutional. I believe the General Assembly had the power and authority under article VIII, section 5 to reorganize the University Hospital as a private corporation.
For the reasons so well set forth by the trial judge, I would uphold the constitutionality of the statutes in question.
APPENDIX
DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO
Case No. 89 CV 10176, Courtroom 21
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
COLORADO ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES; C.W. PETERSON; SHELLEY OSTREM; JERRY D. ARAGON; DENNIS DEUTSCH; JOYCE SCHULER; SHIRLEY D. BLACKMON; RUTH C. ROBBEN; MARIANNE I. GALENSKY; and JENNIFER M. FRANK, Plaintiffs, v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, and each of its members in their official capacities, KATHLEEN ARNOLD; RICHARD BER-NICK; ROBERT CALDWELL; PETER DIETZE; LYNN ELLINS; HARVEY PHELPS; NORWOOD ROBB; ROY SHORE; and DAVID WINN, Defendants.
The Court, having reviewed the briefs and exhibits, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having considered the legislative history of Colorado House Bill 1143 (“H.B. 1143”), hereby enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
GENERAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1. H.B. 1143 was duly enacted by the Colorado General Assembly on April 21, 1989. It authorized the Regents to:
Take all steps necessary to create a private nonprofit-nonstock corporation under articles 20 to 29 of title, 7 C.R.S., which conforms to the requirements of section 23-21-404, for the purpose of operating the hospital. The corporation shall not be an agency of state government, nor be a department or political subdivision thereof. It shall not be subject to any provisions of law affecting only governmental or public entities and, unless otherwise provided in this part 4, shall have all rights and powers of a private nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of this state.
C.R.S. § 23-21-403(l)(a).
2. As part of the University of Colorado’s Health Sciences Center, University Hospital has achieved considerable success in its four missions: patient care, research, education and service to the community, especially care to the medically indigent. University Hospital was ranked among the top 25 hospitals in the nation in a 1987 national peer survey. Facts University Hospital Reorganization, House Bill 1143, at 2, submitted as Exhibit 2 to Defendant Regents’ Brief in Support of the Constitutionality of Colorado House Bill 1143.
3. In the mid-1980s, however, it became apparent that several forces were combining to threaten University Hospital’s status as the premiere teaching hospital in the Rocky Mountain Region, threatening its ability to accomplish its mission, and potentially threatening its very existence. Several of these threatening forces were external: the dramatic increase in competition *153for patient care and resulting competition in the employment marketplace for health care professionals; the greatly increased need for capital expenditures to provide state-of-the-art medical technology; and increasing reluctance by employers and governmental insurers to subsidize care for the medically indigent through traditional cost-shifting measures.
4.University Hospital’s status as a state entity severely restricted its ability to respond to these changes in the health care marketplace. Among the more significant limitations caused by University Hospital’s status as a state entity were:
1. The constitutional inability to participate in beneficial joint ventures with private hospitals;
2. The inability to participate in hospital purchasing pools because of state procurement regulations;
3. The inability to build capital reserves or borrow money for investment and hospital improvements, equipment and medical services;
4. The resulting inability to establish new programs and therefore to attract leading specialists and research grants to the health sciences center; and
5. The inability to pay wages competitive with the private sector, especially for nursing care because of constraints caused by the state personnel system on paying wages.
5. The limitation on University Hospital’s ability to pay wages competitive with the private sector reached crisis proportions in July 1988, when 284 nurses submitted their resignations in a dispute with the Hospital over compensation. These resignations were withdrawn only after emergency executive action by the Governor of Colorado, which resulted in the Hospital being able to offer a 7V2% pay increase to its nursing staff.
6. Unable to pay a competitive wage, the University was required to contract with private nursing pools to provide nurses to the Hospital on a temporary basis. Prior to reorganization, University Hospital paid approximately $31 per hour for pool nurses, whereas the average pay rate for its nurses under the state personnel system was $14 to $15 per hour. Many of University Hospital’s nurses reduced the hours they worked as employees of the Hospital, or have quit the Hospital entirely, in order to obtain employment with nursing pools because they could be paid a higher wage by the nursing pool. This situation resulted in University Hospital paying $3.8 million for nursing pool services in 1988, while it was prohibited from paying its nurses directly at a wage scale commensurate with other hospitals in the community. The use of pool nurses also created significant additional training burdens for the Hospital because it is more difficult to maintain the required consistency of procedures and treatment practices with a heavy dependency upon temporary nurses.
7. Additionally, University Hospital has been called upon by the state to provide increasing amounts of uncompensated medically indigent (“MI”) care. In 1988-89 University Hospital’s unreimbursed MI programs cost was approximately $7.4 million dollars.
8. The combined forces of increased competition for patient care, inability to pay competitive wages to attract and hold professional staff, increasing requirements to provide uncompensated medically indigent care and the inability to borrow money to acquire state-of-the-art equipment necessary to maintain accredited graduate medical education programs and to attract private paying patients, threatened the ability of University Hospital to fulfill its four-fold mission and threatened its long-term existence.
9. The recommendation to transfer the assets and liabilities of University Hospital to a private nonprofit corporation was made with the benefit of the experience of at least four state academic health centers which have reorganized as private nonprofit corporations: the Universities of Arizona, Florida, Maryland, and West Virginia.
*15410. H.B. 1143 was the subject of substantial legislative scrutiny and debate. The legislative history of H.B. 1143, consisted of four days of committee hearings and three days of floor debate. Each argument in favor of and in opposition to H.B. 1143 received a full airing before final passage of the legislation.
11. In enacting H.B. 1143 the General Assembly expressly found that:
a. The mission of the hospital established by part 1 of this article is to facilitate and support the education, research, and public service activities of the health sciences schools operated by the regents of the university of Colorado and to provide patient care, including care for the medically indigent, and specialized services not widely available elsewhere in the state and region.
b. In order to provide for the education and training of health care professionals, to provide a clinical setting for biomedical research, to ensure the availability of quality patient care including specialized medical services not otherwise widely available, and to provide for the care and treatment of the medically indigent, it is necessary that the hospital be a facility of the finest possible quality.
c. The present hospital, known as the university of Colorado university hospital, is unable to become and remain economically viable because it is subject to various kinds of government policy and regulation.
d. Unless the hospital can become and remain economically viable, it will become ever more dependent upon state subsidies, and the quality of medical service and education will inevitably decline.
e. The needs of the citizens of the state of Colorado and of the university of Colorado health sciences schools will be best served if the hospital is reorganized to operate as a private nonprofit corporation charged with the mission of operating a teaching hospital for the benefit of the health sciences schools and providing care for the medically indigent.
12. Plaintiffs have abandoned all claims except claims relating to the facial constitutionality of H.B. 1143. The parties have stipulated that this case is to be submitted on their briefs, exhibits and oral arguments as to the constitutionality of H.B. 1143.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
13. “Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a party asserting that a particular statute is unconstitutional assumes the burden of establishing such assertion beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson v. State Dep’t of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 975 (Colo.1988) (emphasis added). Accord Urbish v. Lamm, 761 P.2d 756, 767 (Colo.1988); Mr. Lucky’s, Inc. v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 195, 591 P.2d 1021 (1979); Mosko v. Dunbar, 135 Colo. 172, 309 P.2d 581 (1957); People ex rel. Colorado State Hosp. v. Armstrong, 104 Colo. 238, 90 P.2d 522 (1939); People ex rel. Thomas v. Goddard, 8 Colo. 432, 7 P. 301 (1885).
14. “The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of a statute is extremely high where the challenge is to the facial validity of the statute, and there is no potential inhibition of fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech.” Beathune v. Colorado Dealer Licensing Bd., 198 Colo. 483, 601 P.2d 1386, 1387-88 (1979).
15. “Among the cardinal principles to be applied when construing a constitution are those which tell us that a legislature is supreme in legislative matters except as its power is limited by a constitutional provision, and that doubts and ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of an act.” In re Interrogatories by the Colorado State Senate, Forty-Sixth Gen. Assembly, 168 Colo. 558, 452 P.2d 391, 393 (1969).
16. The Court is “not authorized to read into a statute an intention on the part of the legislature to exceed its constitutional powers unless the. words used are such that under no reasonable construction such intention can be excluded.” Public Utils. Comm’n v. Manley, 99 Colo. 153, 165, 60 P.2d 913, 919 (1936). The good faith of the *155Legislature in enacting a statute must be presumed. People v. Morgan, 79 Colo. 504, 507, 246 P. 1024 (1926). It will not be presumed that the Legislature acted unlawfully. People v. Texas Co., 85 Colo. 289, 296, 275 P. 896 (1929).
17. It is well established that this Court must review H.B. 1143 from the perspective that the power of the General Assembly is plenary:
State constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, are not grants of power to the legislative branch of government. Because state legislatures have plenary power for all purposes of civil government, state constitutions are limitations upon that power.... We therefore ask, not if the Act’s [provisions] are authorized, but if they are prohibited.
Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1968) (emphasis added in part).
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THE REORGANIZED UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
18. H.B. 1143 expressly contemplates that the reorganized Hospital be a private nonprofit corporation. The Legislative Declaration to H.B. 1143 specifically finds:
The needs of the citizens of the state of Colorado and of the university of Colorado health sciences schools will be best served if the hospital is reorganized to operate as a private nonprofit corporation charged with the mission of operating a teaching hospital for the benefit of the health sciences schools and providing care for the medically indigent.
C.R.S. § 23-21-401(1)(e).
19. H.B. 1143 does not itself create a nonprofit corporation, but rather authorizes the Regents to:
Take all steps necessary to create a private nonprofit-nonstock corporation under articles 20 to 29 of title 7, C.R.S., which conforms to the requirements of section 23-21-404, for the purpose of operating the hospital. The corporation shall not be an agency of state government, nor a department or political subdivision thereof. It shall not be subject to any provisions of law affecting only governmental or public entities and, unless otherwise provided in this part 4, shall have all rights and powers of a private nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of this state.
C.R.S. § 23-21-403(1)(a). H.B. 1143 defines the “corporation” as “the private nonprofit non-stock corporation created for the purpose of operating University Hospital.” C.R.S. § 23-21-402(3). The legislative history also makes it clear that the reorganized Hospital is intended by the General Assembly to be a private corporation. See, e.g., Legislative History, Vol. 6 at p. 459, 11. 3-5.
20. Thus, the expressed intent of the legislature is that the reorganized Hospital be a private corporation formed under the general law relating to Colorado nonprofit corporations. The expressed intent of the legislature is entitled to reverent weight by this Court. Allardice v. Adams County, 173 Colo. 133, 476 P.2d 982, 989 (1970).
21. In H.B. 1143, the General Assembly has limited the authority of the Regents by precisely defining the attributes of the private nonprofit corporation to which the Regents may transfer the assets of University Hospital. See C.R.S. § 23-21-403(l)(a) and § 23-21-404. The General Assembly has authority under Article VIII, Section 5 of the Colorado Constitution to impose these restrictions upon the Regents. See Uberoi v. University of Colorado, 686 P.2d 785 (Colo.1984); Associated Students of University of Colorado v. Regents, 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59 (1975).
22. At the time of enactment of H.B. 1143 University Hospital’s assets were state assets. The General Assembly unquestionably has authority to specify the conditions under which these assets may be transferred. The General Assembly, pursuant to its plenary police power, may also impose constraints upon and limit the functions of a corporation. Queen v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 375, 380 (W.Va.1987). Article XV, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution recognizes an in*156dependent legislative power of the General Assembly to alter, revoke or annul upon condition, any part of a corporate charter, so long as it is just to the incorporators. Platte & Denver Canal Milling Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376, 30 P. 68 (1892), appeal dismissed, 154 U.S. 512, 14 S.Ct. 1150, 38 L.Ed. 1079 (1893). This power is expressly reserved to the General Assembly with respect to nonprofit corporations under C.R.S. § 7-20-107.
23. H.B. 1143 further provides that the private corporation cannot be transferred to any other entity except the Regents, and that upon dissolution the corporate assets revert to the Regents. C.R.S. § 23-21-404(l)(f) and (g). In authorizing the Regents to transfer the assets of University Hospital to a private nonprofit corporation, the legislature may properly prescribe the conditions of the transfer. Transfers of property to private corporations containing a reversionary interest are not exceptional. In fact, C.R.S. § 7-26-103[ (1) ](c) recognizes that assets held by a nonprofit corporation are frequently “held upon a condition requiring return.”
24. The Board of Directors and management of the private nonprofit corporation organized to receive the assets and liabilities of University Hospital have direct and immediate responsibility for the Hospital’s day-to-day affairs. Subject to the conditions on transfer imposed by H.B. 1143, the corporation has the general powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation pursuant to C.R.S. § 7-22-101, such as the right to sue and be sued, to purchase or lease real or personal property, to sell, convey, or pledge its property and assets, to hold interests in other corporations, partnerships or joint ventures, to make contracts, incur liabilities, borrow money and severally control its own affairs. For example, H.B. 1143 amends C.R.S. § 23-22-104, C.R.S., relating to the psychiatric hospital, to provide expressly:
The board of regents of the university of Colorado shall have full control and supervision of all the property and grounds and buildings of the hospital and shall have the entire government and management of the same exclusive of any property transferred to a private corporation pursuant to part ⅛ of article 21 of this title.
(emphasis added).
25. The Court finds that none of the restrictions upon the form of the nonprofit corporation and none of the conditions imposed upon the transfer of property to the corporation, deprive the corporation of its private nonprofit status.
26. Plaintiffs cite Queen v. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 375 (D.Va.1987) in support of their contention that the reorganized Hospital is the state. On the contrary, Queen found that the reorganized West Virginia University Hospital was not a political subdivision of the state, a state agency, or a public corporation. See id. at 383, and id. at 383 n. 5.
27. Queen did find that the reorganized West Virginia Hospital was a “public body” as defined in West Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, and that the reorganized West Virginia University Hospital was a “public actor” for due process purposes under the 14th Amendment of the United Constitution. However, the instant case challenges only the facial constitutionality of H.B. 1143, and does not raise any issue with respect to either the records of the reorganized Hospital or any alleged violation of due process. The issue of whether the reorganized University Hospital is a “state actor” for due process purposes, is not before this Court. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention, however, that because the reorganized Hospital might be a “state actor” for Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes, it must be deemed the “state” for all purposes, as being illogical and contrary to case law. See Queen.
28. The Court further finds that H.B. 1143 does not violate Article XV, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution, prohibiting the creation of private corporations by special legislation. Article XV, Section 2 provides:
No charter of incorporation shall be granted, extended, changed or amended *157by special law, except for such municipal, charitable, educational, penal or reformatory corporations as are or may be under the control of the state; but the general assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization of corporations hereafter to be created.
West Virginia’s constitution contains a mirror image of Colo.Const. art. XV, § 2:
The legislature shall provide for the organization of all corporations hereafter to be created ... but no corporation shall be created by special law.
W.Va.Const. art. XI, § 1. Interpreting West Virginia’s constitutional provision in the face of similar allegations, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals states:
We think that a detailed analysis of the cited constitutional sections would not prove particularly helpful to us, since, from the records of the constitutional debates, it is clear that in adopting the precursors to current article XI, section 1 and article X, section 6 of the West Virginia Constitution the framers were exclusively concerned with stock corporations formed for profit making purposes, which is not the case here.
Queen, 365 S.E.2d at 380.
The history of the Colorado Constitutional Convention of 1975 shows that in Article XV, Section 2, the drafters of the Colorado Constitution also were concerned with stock corporations formed for profit making purposes, particularly railroads, and only sought to prohibit the legislature from creating corporations with special privileges and prerogatives:
Probably no subject has come before the Convention causing more anxiety and concern than the troublesome and vexed question pertaining to corporations. The Legislatures of other States have, in most cases, been found unequal to the task of preventing abuses and protecting the people from the grasping and monopolizing tendencies of railroads and other corporations. Experience has shown that positive restrictions on the powers of the Legislature in relation to these matters are necessary.
To this end we have provided for the wiping out of all dormant and sham corporations claiming special and exclusive privileges. We have denied the general assembly the power to create corporations, or to extend or enlarge their chartered rights by special legislation, or to make such rights and privileges irrevocable; but in case it be found that the exercise of such rights and privileges proves injurious to the people, then the General Assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke or annul such charters, when that can be done without injustice to the incorpo-rators.
Address to the People contained in Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention Held in Denver, December 20, 1875 to Frame a Constitution for the State of Colorado, etc., 728 (1907) (emphasis added). The language emphasized above leaves no doubt that Colorado’s Constitutional provision, like West Virginia’s, is only a limitation on the legislature creating by special enactment private for-profit corporations having “special and exclusive privileges.” It was not intended to limit the General Assembly’s authority to restrict corporate charters.
29. This conclusion is reinforced by Article XV, § 3 of the Colorado Constitution, which provides:
The general assembly shall have the power to alter, revoke or annul any charter of incorporation now existing and revocable at the adoption of this constitution, or any that may hereafter be created, whenever in their opinion it may be injurious to the citizens of the state, in such manner, however, that no injustice shall be done to the corporators.
See also Platte & Denver Canal Milling Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376, 30 P. 68 (1892), appeal dismissed, 154 U.S. 512, 14 S.Ct. 1150, 38 L.Ed. 1079 (1893). It is also reinforced by the express provisions of C.R.S. § 7-20-107, which reserves to the General Assembly the power to prescribe such provisions and limitations for nonprofit corporations as it chooses.
*15830. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that the nonprofit corporation should be considered to be the alter ego of the Regents, because the conditions and restrictions placed upon the transfer of assets and liabilities to the nonprofit corporation are with the General Assembly’s power and because there is no evidence or allegation that the nonprofit corporation is to be used to promote an injustice or protect a fraud. See Gude v. City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691 (Colo.1981). Accordingly, the Court finds that the corporation authorized by H.B. 1143 is a private nonprofit corporation.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AMENDMENT
31. H.B. 1143 enacted C.R.S. § 23-21-406 which provides:
(1) Any hospital employee who is a classified employee of the state personnel system on the transfer date shall have the option to become an employee of the corporation or to remain an employee of the state and a member of the state personnel system.
(2) Any hospital employee who elects to remain a member of the state personnel system may remain so for a period of not more than two years, but shall not be eligible to return to the state personnel system as a hospital employee once he has elected to become a corporation employee.
(3) Any hospital employee who elects to remain a member of the state personnel system shall retain all rights and privileges of membership in the state personnel system. In the case of any dispute involving an employee who is a member of the state personnel system, the hospital shall agree to accept resolution of all disciplinary appeals or other employment disputes governed by the statutes of the state personnel system or the rules of the state personnel department according to the rules and procedures applicable to members of the state personnel system.
(4)Any classified employee who elects during the two-year transition period to become an employee of the corporation shall, under the terms of his new employment, receive full credit for sick leave and annual leave accrued as a classified employee.
32. As enacted, H.B. 1143 does not displace any classified employee from the state personnel system. On the other hand, H.B. 1143 gives those employed at University Hospital on the transfer date a right they would otherwise not have: the right to work for up to two years at the private corporation’s Hospital without losing any rights they presently enjoy as State employees. If a certified employee elects not to become an employee of the corporation within two years, the employee remains an employee of the State and retains all rights and privileges of membership in the State Personnel System. He simply may no longer work for the Hospital owned by the private corporation.
33. The Civil Service Amendment cannot be read as creating a constitutional right to continued employment at University Hospital after reorganization.
The purpose of civil service legislation is to protect employees from arbitrary and capricious political action and to ensure employment during good behavior. Such protection applies during authorized service. Civil service tenure, however, is not meant to guarantee duration of employment for any number of set years or over any particular period of time.
Coopersmith v. City and County of Denver, 156 Colo. 469, 399 P.2d 943, 948 (1965) (emphasis added).
34. Article XII, Section 15(3)(a) of the Civil Service Amendment, creating a preference for veterans, contemplates that laying-off classified employees is permitted when there is a “lack of work or curtailment of funds.” Similarly, C.R.S. § 24-50-124(1), regarding the reduction of employees under the State Personnel System, contemplates that certified employees may be “separated from State service due *159to lack of work, lack of funds, or reorgani-zation_” (emphasis added).
35. Further, by its express terms, the Civil Service Amendment applies only to “appointed public officers and employees of the State_” Colo.Const. art. 12, § 13(2) (emphasis added). The Colorado Supreme Court has held:
The language used in the Civil Service Amendment is plain, its meaning clear, and no absurdity is involved. Hence, it must be declared and enforced as written: all officers of the state must be under civil service except for certain exceptions which are described in specific terms.
Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 448 P.2d 624, 627 (1968) (emphasis added). Having found that the corporation authorized by H.B. 1143 is a private nonprofit corporation, the Civil Service Amendment has no applicability to the reorganized University Hospital.
36. Because H.B. 1143 does not deprive any classified employee of his status as a classified employee, and because employees of the reorganized University Hospital will not be “employees of the state,” H.B. 1143 does not violate the Civil Service Amendment.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE XI, SECTION 3
37. Article XI, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution provides that “[t]he state shall not contract any debt by loan in any form,” subject to certain exceptions, none of which is applicable here. The general prohibition upon the creation of “public debt” is designed primarily to prevent a present legislature from irrevocably committing future legislatures to the payment of an obligation. Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872, 878 (Colo.1983). Indications of a “public debt” in the constitutional sense are “that the obligation pledges revenues of future years, that it requires use of revenue from a tax otherwise available for general purposes, that it is a legally enforceable obligation against the state in future years, or that appropriation by future legislatures of monies in payment of the obligation is nondis-cretionary.” Id. at 878-879 (citations omitted).
38. The provision of H.B. 1143 challenged by Plaintiffs provides that the Regents may:
Subject to applicable constitutional limitations and in the regents’ discretion, issue bonds or otherwise borrow money on behalf of the corporation for any of the corporation’s lawful purposes, including the refunding or refinancing of any of the corporation’s indebtedness, to be repaid from the revenues of the corporation. Any bonds or other instruments of indebtedness shall substantially comply with the requirements of sections 29-3-105 and 29-3-106, C.R.S., applicable to counties and municipalities. The regents may, to facilitate the marketability of bonds issued by the corporation, enter into agreements providing that, subject to available appropriations, the regents will make contributions to any reserve fund required to be maintained under the terms of any bonds issued to redress any impairment of the reserve fund. The general assembly specifically finds that financial assistance to the corporation as provided in this paragraph (e) would promote a. substantial public purpose.
§ 23-21-403(1)(e), C.R.S. (emphasis added).
39. It is thus plain on the face of H.B. 1143 that the indebtedness the Regents are authorized to create is not “public debt.” H.B. 1143 permits, but by no means obligates, the Regents to issue bonds or borrow money on behalf of the corporation. The Regents' authority to issue bonds and borrow money is expressly limited insofar as the indebtedness must be repaid from the revenues of the private corporation, and not the state. Furthermore, while H.B. 1143 permits the Regents to enter into agreements to make contributions to a bond reserve fund, any such agreements entered into by the Regents must be “subject to available appropriations.” Just as the lease/purchase agreement in Glennon Heights provided that the State Depart*160ment of Institutions would use its “best efforts” to obtain funding every year for rent payments, the agreements into which the Regents are authorized to enter are “specifically tied to appropriation of sufficient funds.... Nothing in the agreement limits the discretion of the legislature.” 658 P.2d at 879. Accord Gude v. City of Lakewood, 686 P.2d 691, 699 (Colo.1981) (holding that discretionary or contingent obligations are not constitutional debt). Finally, the authority of the Regents is expressly “subject to applicable constitutional limitations.”
40. Further, to the extent Plaintiffs allege that H.B. 1148 violates Article XI, Section 3 because, Plaintiffs argue that the reorganized University Hospital is the state, this Court has found to the contrary. Accordingly, this Court holds that H.B. 1143 does not violate Article XI, Section 3.
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE XI, SECTION 1
41. Plaintiffs further argue that, if the reorganized corporation is not the state, H.B. 1143 violates Colo. Const, art. XI, § 1. This section provides:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township or school district shall lend or pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of, any person, company or corporation, public or private, for any amount, or for any purpose whatever; or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any person, company or corporation, public or private, in or out of the state.
Article XI, Section 1 is not violated where there is not, in fact, a pledge of the government’s general credit or where a pledge of credit is for a public purpose. Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445 (Colo.1986).
42. As in Witcher, any contractual obligation of the reorganized Hospital is solely that of the private nonprofit corporation and not the state. See id., 716 P.2d at 454. The Regents have no authority to unconditionally pledge the Regents’ assets or to obligate the state to pay any indebtedness of the ' corporation. C.R.S. § 23-21-403(l)(e). Therefore, H.B. 1143 does not authorize a pledge of the state’s credit in violation of Article XI, Section 1.
43. Moreover, H.B. 1143 plainly serves a public purpose. The legislative declaration specifically states:
The needs of the citizens of the state of Colorado and of the university of Colorado health sciences schools will be best served if the hospital is reorganized to operate as a private nonprofit corporation charged with the mission of operating a teaching hospital for the benefit of the health sciences schools and providing care for the medically indigent,
(emphasis added). The challenged provision of H.B. 1143 contains an express legislative finding that any financial assistance to the corporation by the Regents would “promote a substantial public purpose.” C.R.S. § 23-21-403(l)(e). “Although the expressed intent of the legislature has no magical quality which validates the invalid, it is entitled to reverent weight in determining whether the Act promotes a public purpose.” Allardice v. Adams County, 173 Colo. 133, 476 P.2d 982, 989 (1970).
44. Where, as here, the challenged legislation plainly serves a public purpose, the provision of health care to the citizens of the state, the prohibitions of Article XI are inapplicable. See Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445, 455 (Colo.1986); Gude v. City of Lakewood, 636 P.2d 691, 695 n. 2 (Colo.1981); In re Interrogatories by the Colorado State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 306-07, 566 P.2d 350, 356 (1977); McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 131 Colo. 246, 280 P.2d 1096 (1955). In considering a substantially similar challenge to a lease transaction between the Arizona Board of Regents and University Medical Center Corporation, the Arizona Supreme Court, after reviewing the structure of the reorganized University Hospital, held, “In the instant case, it cannot be seriously contended that the existence of UMCC as a nonprofit hospital does not serve a public purpose.” Kromko v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 149 Ariz. 319, 718 P.2d 478, 480 (1986). Accord Queen v. *161West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc., 365 S.E.2d 375, 381 (W.Va.1987) (quoting Kromko with approval). The Court concurs with the analysis of Kromko that H.B. 1143 plainly serves a public purpose within the meaning of Article XI of the Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court.
ABANDONED CLAIMS
45. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have abandoned their claims that H.B. 1143 violates Colo. Const, art. V, § 34 or art. XI, § 2, that it constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations, that it violates due process, and that Plaintiffs have abandoned their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENT
46. The power of the General Assembly is plenary, unless specifically limited by the Constitution. The constitutionality of H.B. 1143 is presumed unless Plaintiffs demonstrate unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof.
47. Accordingly, this Court declares that H.B. 1143 is constitutional, and judgment is entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs. Costs shall be taxed as provided for in the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 31st day of October, 1989.
/s/ George B. Lee, Jr.
George B. Lee, Jr.
District Court Judge

. The trial judge identified the statutory sections te issue as H.B. 1143.