Court Opinion

ID: 9915432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:09:28.597729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:06.586940
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Old Forge Borough                         :
                                          :
             v.                           :   No. 679 C.D. 2022
                                          :
Walter Stocki, Jr., individually          :   Argued: December 4, 2023
and now trading as Scrap                  :
Enterprises, Inc.,                        :
                     Appellant            :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                   FILED: January 5, 2024

             Walter Stocki, Jr., individually (Stocki), and trading as Scrap Enterprises,
Inc., appeals from the April 22, 2021 order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Lackawanna County (trial court), finding Stocki in contempt for violating a July 31,
2018 order entered upon the agreement of Stocki and Old Forge Borough (Borough)
and the trial court’s subsequent bench order entered on May 9, 2019. Upon careful
review, we affirm.
                       I.     Procedural and Factual History
             Stocki is the owner of real property located at 105 North Keyser Avenue,
in the Borough (Property) upon which he operates, what he described throughout these
proceedings as, a machinery sales and rental business. The Property is located in a C-
2 Commercial Highway Zoning District, where machinery and sales are a permitted
use. The front and sides of the Property are adjacent to commercial real estate and
undeveloped land. The rear portion of the Property borders a residential neighborhood.
Community residents brought multiple complaints to Borough officials about the
activities being conducted on the Property as well as the nuisances resulting from such
activities including, but not limited to, the uncleanliness of the Property; noise, dirt,
and odor coming from the Property; oil and chemical fires on the Property; chemical
spills on the Property and public thoroughfares, and the extension of activities beyond
normal working hours into the nights and weekends.
             The Borough initiated an enforcement proceeding against Stocki by
enforcement notice, via letter dated June 1, 2017, notifying him of violations of the
Borough’s Zoning Ordinance; specifically, that Stocki was using the Property for a
non-permitted use in violation of Chapter 350 of the Zoning Ordinance by operating a
junkyard within a C-2 Highway Commercial Zoning District. Stocki failed to timely
appeal said enforcement notice, failed to comply with said enforcement notice, and
continued to operate the business in violation of the Zoning Ordinance.
             As a result, on August 11, 2017, the Borough filed a civil enforcement
proceeding against Stocki before a magisterial district judge (MDJ). After a hearing
on November 16, 2017, at which Stocki did not appear but was represented by counsel,
the MDJ entered judgment in favor of the Borough. On November 27, 2017, Stocki
appealed to the trial court. Despite being found guilty and fined by the MDJ, Stocki
continued to operate his business in violation of the Zoning Ordinance.
             On February 22, 2018, the Borough filed a complaint, seeking injunctive
relief to restrain Stocki from operating a junkyard in violation of Borough ordinances,
as well as fines for the violations. On May 1, 2018, the Borough filed a petition for a
preliminary injunction, alleging that Stocki had continued to operate a junkyard on the
Property.

                                           2
                After a hearing was held on July 30, 2018, on the Borough’s complaint
and petition for injunctive relief, the parties jointly drafted a proposed stipulated order,
which the trial court adopted and entered on July 31, 2018. The stipulated order
directed Stocki to, inter alia, immediately cease any and all activity on the Property in
violation of the Zoning Ordinance, including the operation of a junkyard business and
activities related or ancillary thereto. More specifically, Stocki was given six months
to remove non-operational equipment, vehicles, and machinery from the Property.
That order also set up a schedule of status conferences to monitor Stocki’s progress.
                The trial court granted Stocki multiple continuances and extensions of
time to clean the Property. On October 11, 2018, during a scheduled status conference,
the trial court received evidence that Stocki had increased the amount of materials on
the site. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a.) The trial court then stated:

                THE COURT: . . . you have to remove non-operational
                equipment, the vehicles from the [P]roperty by October 31st.
                If you don’t do that, I’m setting-- I wrote it down here, I’m
                going to hold you in contempt of court. I am setting
                November 1st, that’s one day after that is the sentencing date
                at 9:30. And Mr. Stocki, I’m going to tell you, you’re not
                going to be happy with the sentence. Now, I don’t want to do
                that to you, but I’m going to incarcerate you. I’m going to
                hold you in contempt of court if this isn’t done by October
                31st . . . .
(R.R. at 4a.)
                On May 2, 2019, the trial court conducted a site visit with both parties and
their counsel present, as well as a neighbor, Chris Goetz (Goetz), and the media. A
court reporter was present, and the trial court viewed the Property, both on the site and
around it. During the site visit, there were conversations between counsel and the trial
court, Stocki and the trial court, Stocki and Goetz, and the trial court and Goetz about

                                              3
the progress Stocki had made in cleaning the Property. Suffice it to say, the trial court
was not satisfied with the amount of progress Stocki had made.

             THE COURT: . . . I’m glad I came to see the [P]roperty, but
             I’m not happy with what I see. I didn’t think it would look
             like this.
                                           ****
             THE COURT: I’ve given you months to do something about
             this. I don’t like what I see, number one. You said -- I heard
             you say that you’re going to sell this and get rid of it. By next
             Thursday -- which at this point, Mr. Stocki, I’m prepared to
             put you in jail. I don’t like this one bit at all. Be prepared to
             sell the [P]roperty if that’s what you want to do. Just sell the
             [P]roperty and get rid of it. But that might not alleviate the
             problem that I’m prepared to put you in jail on Thursday. It’s
             just unbearable. Look at it. It smells. It’s turned into a dump.

(R.R. at 20a-23a.)
             On May 9, 2019, after having given Stocki nearly a year to address the
violations, the trial court held an emergency hearing to address compliance with the
July 31, 2018 stipulated order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court informed
Stocki he had 100 additional days to comply with the July 31, 2018 stipulated order; if
not, then the trial court would sua sponte hold Stocki in contempt if the Borough did
not file a Petition for Contempt and Rule Returnable beforehand. The trial court further
directed Stocki to post a bond for $20,000 and to stop doing business as a scrap/junk
yard. Stocki was present and acknowledged on the record that he understood the trial
court.
             On August 14, 2019, the Borough filed a Petition for Contempt and Rule
to Show Cause as to why its Petition for Contempt should not be granted.
              On August 26, 2019, Stocki filed a Motion for Recusal and for a Stay
pending disposition of the recusal motion. Stocki alleged the trial court was biased

                                            4
towards him at the May 2, 2019 site visit. He claimed that representatives of the
Borough, neighbors, and residents were allowed to make comments to the trial court
relative to the Property and the pending zoning matters. He asserted that the comments
made by the Borough representatives, neighbors, and others to the trial court were not
under oath and were not subject to cross-examination by his counsel. He alleged that
in addition to engaging in conversations with representatives of the Borough,
neighbors, and other residents during the site visit which were not on the record, the
trial court publicly expressed dissatisfaction regarding the appearance of the Property
and stated to him that it was prepared to put him in jail for his alleged non-compliance
with the July 31, 2018 stipulated order. Id. at 23a. The trial court’s comments in this
regard were reported later that day by WNEP T.V. and again the following morning in
a news article published by the Scranton Times/Tribune. Id. at 59a. Stocki further
alleged that following the conclusion of the site visit and without notice or invitation
to either him or his counsel, the trial court met with representatives of the Borough,
neighbors, and residents at the adjoining residential neighborhood where the judge
again engaged in ex parte discussions and heard comments from these persons relative
to the pending zoning case. He maintained that by engaging with persons who had an
interest in the case adverse to his interests at both the May 2, 2019 site visit and the
subsequent visit to the adjoining residential neighborhood without either him or his
counsel present, the trial court’s objectivity and impartiality were seriously
compromised.
             A hearing was held on Stocki’s Motion for Recusal on September 19,
2019, at which time the trial court denied said Motion. The trial court gave both parties
a chance to make statements. Borough’s counsel stated on the record that there were
no ex parte communications between the trial court and the Borough. It was also the

                                           5
Borough’s position that Stocki waived any recusal issue because he failed to raise it in
a timely manner.
             The trial court responded directly to Stocki’s allegations that it was biased
against him, explaining that it had at all times been impartial, and that it had treated
Stocki fairly during the proceedings, giving him multiple opportunities to comply with
the Ordinance. The trial court specifically denied talking to anyone ex parte at the site
visit:
             THE COURT: And I think somebody drove me to [a
             neighbor’s] house. I don’t even remember talking to him at
             the -- I didn’t say anything to him. I just went to look,
             [Stocki’s counsel], to see what it looked like from his house
             and if there was a smell in the area where his house was from
             [the neighbor’s] yard. I don’t remember even talking to [the
             neighbor] at this [P]roperty.

                                         ****

             Mr. Stocki, I just want to tell you I did everything I could,
             everything I could to help you and be impartial in this case. .
             . . I had several status conferences to help you. Several status
             conferences. I don’t remember how many, but there might
             have been four or five or six. I granted numerous
             continuances, over objection of [Borough’s counsel], to help
             you. To help you do something with this [P]roperty.

                                         ****

             I had many status conferences. I issued a court order, and
             your job is to respect the court order. That’s what you’re
             supposed to do, respect a court order. I did everything.
             [Borough’s counsel] kept objecting to me when I’d give you
             these court orders, do this, do that, because he’d say why are
             you giving him more time? I gave you so many days and you
             never listened to what I said.

                                            6
             I want you to hear me clearly, Mr. Stocki. If you don’t follow
             a court order – [your counsel] said I said you’re going to go
             to jail. If you don’t follow a court order that’s usually what
             happens. And I’ll say it again, if you don’t follow a court
             order that’s usually what happens. I’m not going to issue a
             court order and just say to you Mr. Stocki, well, if you don’t
             follow it don’t worry about it. This is a court of law. You
             have to understand what this is all about. Your lawyer
             understands that.

             I’m not going to recuse myself from this case, Mr. Stocki.
             What I’m telling you now is go and clean up this mess. I’m
             going to set another hearing. I’m going to set a contempt
             hearing in 30 days. That’s what I’m going to do. It’s a
             contempt hearing. I’m going to set it for 30 days. I did
             everything I could to help you. Actually, when I was walking
             on that [P]roperty you know you helped me walk around that
             [P]roperty. You helped me because I couldn’t do it. You
             were holding my arm, helping me walk around that
             [P]roperty. I don’t have anything against you personally. I
             don’t have anything against you personally at all.
(Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 30b-32b, 35b.)
             Subsequently, the trial court held three hearings on the Borough’s Rule
and Petition for Contempt on December 18, 2019, March 2, 2020 and July 10, 2020.
The witnesses for the Borough included, but were not limited to, the zoning officer,
public officials of the Borough, neighbors, and a civil engineer. In addition to the
testimony of Stocki, the trial court heard testimony from an employee of Scrap
Enterprises, Inc. and an expert in planning and zoning.
             Stocki testified that he was familiar with, read and understood the July 31,
2018 stipulated order. (S.R.R. at 40b.) He testified that he was present in court on May
9, 2019, and recalled what the trial court had ordered him to do. Id. at 41b- 43b. Stocki
acknowledged that non-operational equipment, vehicles, and machinery were still
located on the Property when the trial judge viewed the Property. Id. at 45b-46b. He

                                           7
testified that he kept items on the Property which might be non-operational but could
have parts beneficial for use. He sold both non-operational equipment and equipment
he repairs. Id. at 139b-40b. Upon dismantling non-operational equipment there is a
lot of waste, so sometimes he kept the whole non-operational item that had parts on it
that he could use. Id. at 137b-38b. He further testified that he has not read nor is he
familiar with the Borough Zoning Ordinance, nor did he obtain a permit to bring the
Property in compliance with said Ordinance. He was not aware of the zoning district
of the subject Property. Id. at 142b-46b.
             Joe Kolmansperger testified that he worked for Stocki and that Stocki’s
business was to take equipment and disassemble it to use and sell the parts. Id. at 131b-
32b. He acknowledged that a tire, a caterpillar track, and an engine are “parts” and that
separately they cannot do anything and would be non-operational items. Id. at 133b-
34b. He explained that a subcontractor, Scorching Metals LLC, would enter the
Property to cut up the pieces of equipment to send some parts to the junkyard and other
parts such as tracks, cylinders, engines, pumps would be piled up on the Property and
sold. Id. at 135b-36b.
             The Borough’s Zoning Officer testified that he was familiar with the
Property since prior to 2013, and that he was the Zoning Officer who filed the original
violation notice.   Id. at 47b-48b, 68b.        He had observed and documented by
photographing non-operational equipment, vehicles, machinery, scrap, and parts on the
Property. Id. at 49b-67b, 71b-97b. He testified that the Property has not come into
compliance with the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance, the July 31, 2018 stipulated order,
or May 9, 2019 bench order. Id. at 67b-70b. He identified a photo depicting parts of
a dismantled piece of equipment that he explained could not be used for resale, but
rather would be considered “junk.” Id. at 66b-70b. He testified that machinery rental

                                            8
and sales are permitted on the Property, and that Stocki would not be in violation of the
Ordinance if he brought a piece of operational equipment onto the Property and sold it
as operational.   Id. at 98b-99b.    He explained, however, that Stocki could not
disassemble a piece of equipment for resale of a part and that a machine is something
that is fully operational. He testified that the C-2 Commercial Highway Zoning District
does not permit the sale of parts that come off other equipment but rather it allows the
sale and lease of machinery. Id. at 102b. The Borough’s Zoning Officer testified that
under the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance, machinery that is subject to being dismantled,
processed for reclamation, salvaged, or recycled to sell again is “junk.” Id. at 102b-
03b.
             Robert Laczi, a representative of the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection, testified that he is familiar with the Property and was last on
the Property on February 5, 2020. At that time, he observed equipment in pieces on
the Property. Id. at 105b-07b. He also testified that he saw and documented (by
photographing) pieces of equipment, parts, and engines uncontrollably leaking oil onto
the Property. Id. at 108b-11b.
             Robert Wenzler, a neighbor, testified that he has been living across the
creek from the Property since July 2018. He noticed on two or more occasions fires at
the Property, and heard noise from heavy equipment seven days a week. Id. at 111b-
15b.
             Nicholas Rosa testified that he worked for Medico Industries as a field
service technician and worked on heavy equipment. He was on the Property on
November 6, 2019, and observed parts missing from equipment and testified that, in
his experience, missing parts render equipment non-operational. Id. at 116b-25b.

                                           9
               Chris Goetz testified that he lived directly behind the Property and that
since May of 2019, he saw machines moving, heard metal being dropped and pulled
apart, and equipment being delivered to the Property, which had to be removed from
trailers by other equipment because it was not operational. He also saw torches and
people cutting up pieces of equipment and parts such as engines, tracks and other parts
on lowboys being taken off the Property for sale. Id. at 126b-30b.
               On April 22, 2021, the trial court filed its Opinion and Order, adjudicating
Stocki in civil contempt and enjoining Stocki from importing onto the Property any
equipment, vehicles or machinery that are not immediately and readily made wholly
operational, or for the purposes of dismantling and/or salvaging its parts.
               On May 5, 2021, Stocki filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied.
                                        II.     Issues

               1. Whether the trial court erred in declining to recuse itself.

               2. Whether the April 22, 2021, Contempt Order is contrary
                  to the weight of the substantial evidence and is contrary
                  to the law.1

       1
          Stocki’s Statement of Questions Involved also includes two additional issues: (1) whether
the trial court committed an error of law by granting injunctive relief against Stocki when the
proceedings at issue related to the Borough’s Petition for Contempt; and (2) whether the trial court
erred in denying Stocki the opportunity to present evidence of selective enforcement. (Stocki’s Br.
at 5.) Although listed as issues, nowhere in the argument section of his brief does Stocki address them.
In fact, there are only two arguments identified in the argument section. In accordance with Pa.
R.A.P. 2119(a), the argument section of a brief must separately address each claim presented. Issues
raised in the statement of questions involved but not addressed in the argument section are waived.
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 431 A.2d 944 (Pa. 1981). Accordingly, these issues are waived as this
Court cannot provide meaningful review of an issue which is raised but not addressed in the argument
section.

                                                  10
                                    III.   Discussion
             A. Whether the trial court erred in declining to recuse itself
             In his first issue, Stocki argues that, given the appearance of bias created
by the facts and circumstances, the trial court should have recused itself. He contends
that the trial court expressed bias towards him on two occasions: (1) at the October 11,
2018 status conference, during which the trial court threatened Stocki with jail despite
the fact that there was no contempt petition pending; and (2) at the May 2, 2019 site
visit where it “publicly expressed its dissatisfaction to [] Stocki regarding the
appearance of the [P]roperty and stated to [] Stocki it was prepared to put him in jail
for his alleged non-compliance with the July 31, 2018 stipulated order.” (Stocki’s Br.
at 23-24.) In addition, he contends that “the [trial court] further demonstrated its
apparent inability to be fair and impartial by consenting to attend a tour of the adjoining
residential neighborhood” and “engaged in ex parte discussions and heard comments
from” Borough representatives and neighbors. Id. at 24.
             The party requesting recusal must produce evidence establishing bias,
prejudice or unfairness “which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to
preside impartially.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998). The
motion for recusal “is initially directed to and decided by the jurist whose impartiality
is being challenged.” Id. The Supreme Court has explained:

             In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a
             conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the
             case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest
             in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or
             her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance
             of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public
             confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and
             unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. . . .
             Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and dispose

                                            11
            of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will
            not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion.
Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
            There is a presumption that judges of this Commonwealth are “honorable,
fair and competent,” id. at 89 (citation omitted), and, when confronted with a recusal
demand, are able to determine whether they can rule “in an impartial manner, free of
personal bias or interest in the outcome.” DeLuca v. Mountaintop Area Joint Sanitary
Authority, 234 A.2d 886, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (citation omitted). Our Supreme
Court has recognized that

            [w]hile the mediation of courts is based upon the principle of
            judicial impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness
            pervading the whole system of judicature, so that courts may
            as near as possible be above suspicion, there is, on the other
            side, an important issue at stake: that is, that causes may not
            be unfairly prejudiced, unduly delayed, or discontent created
            through unfounded charges of prejudice or unfairness made
            against the judge in the trial of a cause. . . . If the judge feels
            that he can hear and dispose of the case fairly and without
            prejudice, his decision will be final unless there is an abuse
            of discretion. This must be so for the security of the bench
            and the successful administration of justice. Otherwise,
            unfounded and ofttimes malicious charges made during the
            trial by bold and unscrupulous advocates might be fatal to a
            cause, or litigation might be unfairly and improperly held up
            awaiting the decision of such a question or the assignment of
            another judge to try the case. If lightly countenanced, such
            practice might be resorted to, thereby tending to discredit the
            judicial system. The conscience of the judge alone is brought
            in question; he should, as far as possible, avoid any feelings
            of unfairness or hostility to the litigants in a case.
Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 489 A.2d
1291, 1299 (Pa. 1985).

                                            12
             A party is required to request a judge’s recusal “at the earliest possible
moment, i.e., when the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a motion to
recuse.” Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2017). In other words, “[i]f the
party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time, then the party’s recusal issue is
time-barred and waived.” Id. (emphasis added); DeLuca, 234 A.3d at 895 (“party
that does not move promptly to recuse the assigned judge upon learning the facts
relevant to recusal waives the issue”).
             At the outset, we note that Stocki never previously raised any issue of bias
in relation to the October 11, 2018 status conference. He did not raise it in his motion
for recusal. The first time Stocki raised this issue is in the instant appeal. He cannot
raise a new issue on appeal; therefore, he has waived any claim that the trial court was
biased towards him at the October 11, 2018 status conference. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
             Regarding the timeliness of the motion to recuse, we agree with the
Borough that the motion was untimely. The facts central to Stocki’s motion to recuse
were known to him on May 2, 2019. Stocki did not raise any issue with bias at or
during the May 2, 2019 site visit, or when the trial court issued its May 9, 2019 order,
or during the 100 days the trial court gave him to comply with the Bourgh’s Zoning
Ordinance. Rather, he only filed his motion to recuse 12 days after the Borough filed
its Petition for Contempt on August 14, 2019, which was nearly three months after the
May 9, 2019 site visit. Therefore, because Stocki did not request recusal at the earliest
opportunity, we conclude that he has waived this claim.
             In any case, we agree with the Borough that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Stocki’s motion to recuse. Again, the party who seeks to
disqualify a trial judge must “produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or

                                            13
unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside
impartially.” Commonwealth v. Druce, 848 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. 2004) (The party who
asserts [that] a [] judge must be disqualified bears the burden of producing evidence
establishing bias, prejudice, or unfairness necessitating recusal.). Here, there is no
evidence whatsoever to support Stocki’s allegation that the trial judge met with or held
meetings or discussions with neighbors or Borough representatives after the site visit.
The only information of record on the subject is the trial judge’s statement at the
hearing on the motion for recusal that he simply rode around the rear of the Property,
and that he did not say anything to any neighbors and did not remember even talking
to any neighbors at the Property. Moreover, there is not even a hint of bias in the trial
judge’s statements to Stocki during the site visit. The trial judge visited the Property
to determine if Stocki had complied with the court’s orders and found that Stocki had
not. The trial judge had many options at that point, including putting Stocki in jail for
contempt of court. Instead, the trial judge issued an order a week after the site visit, on
May 9, 2019, which gave Stocki another 100 days to comply with the Borough’s
Zoning Ordinance. Stocki did not meet his burden of showing the trial judge had any
bias towards him at any point during the proceedings. If anything, the record reflects
that the trial judge went above and beyond trying to give Stocki enough time to comply
with the July 31, 2018 stipulated order. Thus, we reject Stocki’s claim that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying his recusal motion.2

       2
         We also disagree that the trial court’s statements during the October 11, 2018 status
conference demonstrated bias. That was not bias. That was a trial court telling a litigant what the
repercussions could be if he continued to refuse to comply with the Borough’s Zoning Ordinance and
orders.

                                                14
             B. Whether the contempt order was contrary to the weight of the
                evidence
             In his second issue, Stocki argues that contempt was not proven because
he substantially complied, and has in good faith attempted to comply, with the July 31,
2018, stipulated order and the trial court’s May 9, 2019 bench order.
             The law is well established that “[c]ourts possess an inherent power to
enforce their orders by way of the power of contempt.” Department of Environmental
Protection v. Cromwell Township, Huntingdon County, 32 A.3d 639, 653 (Pa. 2011)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Bowden, 838 A.2d 740, 760 (Pa. 2003)). “Courts have
broad discretion in fashioning and administering a remedy for civil contempt.”
Mulligan v. Piczon, 739 A.2d 605, 611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), aff’d, 779 A.2d 1143 (Pa.
2001).
             “The purpose of civil contempt is to compel performance of lawful
orders[.]” Cecil Township v. Klements, 821 A.2d 670, 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). To
sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct
elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he is
alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s violation was
volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. W. Pittston Borough
v. LIW Investments, Inc., 119 A.3d 415, 421 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
             In the instant case, the evidence submitted at the hearings before the trial
court substantially proved that (1) Stocki had notice of the specific orders which he is
alleged to have disobeyed; (2) Stocki’s acts constituting his violations were volitional;
and (3) Stocki acted with wrongful intent in choosing to continue the illegal operation
of his business all while continuously and repeatedly violating both trial court orders
long after each had been entered on July 31, 2018 and on May 9, 2019. He did so by
failing to (1) remove non-operational equipment, vehicles, and machinery from the

                                           15
Property; (i.e., bringing the use and activities of the Property in compliance with the
Borough’s Zoning Ordinance); and (2) clean the Property. At one point, during the
timeframe he was supposed to be clearing junk from the Property, he had more
delivered.
             Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that
Stocki violated its Orders dated July 31, 2018, and May 9, 2019, or abuse its discretion
when it entered its April 22, 2021 Order finding Stocki in contempt.
             The trial court’s April 22, 2021 order is affirmed.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                          16
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Old Forge Borough                      :
                                       :
             v.                        :    No. 679 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Walter Stocki, Jr., individually       :
and now trading as Scrap               :
Enterprises, Inc.,                     :
                     Appellant

                                    ORDER

             AND NOW, this 5th day of January, 2024, the April 22, 2021 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge