Court Opinion

ID: 9785416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:40:42.903965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:22.767943
License: Public Domain

CHÁVEZ, Justice (specially concurring). {31} I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion. The thorough discussion of Blockburger persuades me that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated for any of the charges brought in district court. Accordingly, I too would affirm Defendant’s convictions. {32} I write separately to express my views on the jurisdictional exception to double jeopardy. Although it was unnecessary given our conclusion that double jeopardy is not implicated, the exception was thoroughly discussed by the majority, and because we granted certiorari to consider “our continued application of the jurisdictional exception,” I feel compelled to comment. In my view, the only time the exception could arise under the majority’s approach is when a defendant has either been acquitted or convicted in a court of limited jurisdiction and the State later seeks to prosecute the defendant in a court of general jurisdiction on a greater offense arising from the same transaction or occurrence. In attempting to limit application of the jurisdictional exception, the majority distinguishes between the case in which a defendant pleads guilty in a court of limited jurisdiction and that in which the defendant is actually tried of the lesser offense in the court of limited jurisdiction. Where the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offense, the majority would apply the jurisdictional exception to permit a prosecution of the greater offense in a court of general jurisdiction. If the defendant is convicted in the court of general jurisdiction of the lesser included offense to which he pled guilty in the court of limited jurisdiction, the majority would cure the double jeopardy problem by voiding the conviction. Opinion, ¶ 16. I disagree with both the distinction drawn by the majority and its cure for the following reasons. {33} While I appreciate that the majority limits the application of the jurisdictional exception to cases in which a defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offense in a court of limited jurisdiction, as opposed to actually being tried and found guilty, I find the distinction to be without a meaningful difference. A plea of guilty constitutes a conviction, French v. Cox, 74 N.M. 593, 596, 396 P.2d 423, 425 (1964), and upon sentencing in a court of general jurisdiction, a guilty plea bars subsequent prosecution for a greater offense arising from the same act. State v. Angel, 2002-NMSC-025, ¶ 13, 132 N.M. 501, 51 P.3d 1155. In my view, when the State has the necessary facts to charge a defendant with all crimes arising from the event at issue, a defendant’s plea of guilty to a lesser included offense in a court of limited jurisdiction bars a prosecution of the greater offense, even if in a court of general jurisdiction. See State v. Medina, 87 N.M. 394, 396, 534 P.2d 486, 488 (Ct.App.1975) (when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included offense in a court of general jurisdiction, the defendant may not be tried subsequently for the greater offense). {34} Continuing to apply the jurisdictional exception simply because a defendant has pled guilty necessarily encourages defendants not to enter guilty pleas in courts of limited jurisdiction. While there may be defendants who “abuse the multi-tiered judicial system,” it is at least equally plausible that defendants will plead guilty soon after charges are filed in a court of limited jurisdiction to bring closure to the matter by accepting responsibility for their wrongdoing, avoiding unnecessary expense, and getting on with their lives. A well-stated purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to prevent the government from repeatedly subjecting citizens to the expense, embarrassment, and ordeal of repeated trials. State v. Davis, 1998-NMCA-148, ¶ 16, 126 N.M. 297, 968 P.2d 808. This purpose is frustrated by application of the jurisdictional exception when a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense in a court of limited jurisdiction. {35} My disagreement with the majority’s proposed cure, voiding the subsequent conviction of the same crime to which the defendant pled guilty and for which he was sentenced in the court of limited jurisdiction, is that such an approach is contrary to Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution, which provides, “nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.”1 Double jeopardy attaches well before a defendant has been tried and convicted. See State v. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶28, 129 N.M. 63, 2 P.3d 264 (internal footnote omitted) (“In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear at least some evidence on behalf of the state. In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches at the point when a jury is impaneled and sworn to try the case.”); cf. Angel, 2002-NMSC-025, ¶10, 132 N.M. 501, 51 P.3d 1155 (where a defendant enters a guilty plea, jeopardy attaches upon entry of judgment and sentencing). A conviction of a lesser offense necessarily included in a greater offense bars a subsequent prosecution for the greater offense. Medina, 87 N.M. at 396, 534 P.2d at 488. {36} For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result but would abolish the jurisdictional exception. I CONCUR: PAMELA B.MINZNER, Justice.  . The language I rely on from Article II, Section 15 is similar to the language in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”