Court Opinion

ID: 9784974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:59:46.51439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.925284
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 15] Because there is no provision in the Town of Levant Land Use Ordinance that expressly prohibits the temporary parking of an unconnected and unoccupied house trailer on a parcel of land, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 16] Article 1010 of the Town of Levant Land Use Ordinance is best interpreted as a summary chart outlining the specific permitting requirements of the Ordinance stated in Articles 1000 through 1350. It depicts what actions upon the land in the Town require no permit, what actions require a permit from the CEO, and what actions require both planning board approval and a permit from the CEO, pursuant to the separate individual permitting requirements of the Ordinance.
[¶ 17] Article 1010 immediately follows Article 1000, which states that permits are required before buildings are constructed, inhabited, or used. Notably, the court found no violation of the comprehensive permitting requirement stated in Article 1000 and no violation of any other specific permitting requirement. The court found only a violation of the summary chart in Article 1010.
[¶ 18] We review local interpretations of local ordinances de novo as a question of law. Aydelott v. City of Portland, 2010 ME 25, ¶ 10, 990 A.2d 1024, 1026; Kittery *836Retail Ventures, LLC v. Town of Kittery, 2004 ME 65, ¶ 10, 856 A.2d 1183, 1188. In this review, we examine the ordinance for its plain meaning and “construe its terms reasonably in light of the purposes and objectives of the ordinance and its general structure.” Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2002 ME 81, ¶ 6, 797 A.2d 27, 29.
[¶ 19] Article 1010 is placed between Article 1000 and the next numbered article, Article 1005. It appears to have been a later amendment to the Ordinance, placed immediately after Article 1000 to summarize those activities that require permitting pursuant to Article 1000 and subsequent articles between 1005 and 1350, describing specific permitting requirements, fees and processes. However, the language of Article 1010 does not, itself, establish specific permitting requirements independent of those specified in Articles 1000 through 1350.
[¶ 20] The court found no violation proved of any of the specific permitting requirements of articles that the Town alleged were violated between Article 1000 and Article 1350. De novo review of Articles 1000 through 1350 indicates none that would apply to a mobile home parked on a lot while remaining on its mobile home trailer, when the mobile home is not occupied or used for any purpose or connected to plumbing or any other utilities, and no site work is being done to prepare the lot for placement of the mobile home on the lot.
[¶ 21] A “mobile home” that would require a permit is defined in Article 1620 of the Town Ordinance. The definition of mobile home is “[m]anufactured housing which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without permanent foundation, when connected to the required utilities, including plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein.” (Emphasis added).
[¶ 22] The definition of “mobile home” in Article 1620, by its terms, excludes the parked, unoccupied, unused, and unconnected mobile home at issue here from the several permitting requirements applicable to occupied and connected mobile homes.
[¶23] The term “locating” in Article 1010 is ambiguous as to whether it may include temporary parking of a mobile home, or anything else, on a property. However, when read in the context of the specific permitting requirements of the Ordinance that the court found not to be violated, including the general permitting requirement in Article 1000, the term “locating” in Article 1010 must be construed not to extend to the temporary parking of a mobile home on a lot as occurred in this case. Ordinances must be construed by looking at the entire context and structure of the ordinance, including related sections. See Stewart, 2002 ME 81, ¶ 6, 797 A.2d at 29.
[¶ 24] So construed, the court erred in concluding that the parking or storing activity in this case required a code enforcement officer permit and that the lack of such a permit constituted a violation of Article 1010. Accordingly, I would vacate the District Court’s judgment and the nearly $12,000 it awarded pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 (2010) as penalties, fees, and costs for temporarily parking this mobile home.