Court Opinion

ID: 9847135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:35.098011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.619108
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I dissent in Cause No. 2320, liability action of Chaves v. Chenoweth. I concur in the remainder of the opinion. A. Reference to plaintiff’s insurance in opening statement by defendant’s attorney is reversible error. In this negligence action, an attorney for defendant, who is employed by State Farm Insurance Company, an attorney learned in the law and experienced in practice for many years, with knowledge that it was not relevant to the issues, with knowledge that it might be improper and prejudicial, in an opening statement said: But even on top of that, there will be testimony that she was going forty miles an hour, and this from her own statement. She gave a statement to her own insurance company, State Farm Insurance [also defendant’s insurance carrier], in which she said that— MR. CARIAN: If the Court please, I object to this statement before the jury, and I would like to approach the bench. THE COURT: Just say what the evidence is going to show. I don’t know that the statement would necessarily be admitted in evidence. Just say ■ what the evidence will show. MR. CARIAN: I would like at this time to ask for a mistrial on the basis that— THE COURT: It will be denied. Let’s not make any reference any more, to insurance. MR. KLECAN: The evidence will be that she was going forty miles an hour from her own mouth. THE COURT: First, let me give this instruction. The statements of counsel, whether made in their opening statement, the opening statement is not supposed to be an argument of counsel. The argument is made at the conclusion of the case, but statements of counsel, at the beginning of the case are merely for the purpose of telling the jury what the evidence will consist of, what they expect to prove, what the proof will show. This is the preface that counsel should use in making the opening statement, it will show thus and so; the evidence will show this and that and not make an argument. Then you, the jury, will determine whether or not they did prove what they said they were going to prove, when you hear the evidence, and if they tell you that this is the evidence, you don’t have to believe that, because the lawyers cannot testify, and put it out of your mind. The only evidence which you will hear is that you will hear from the witness stand, and when they tell you this is a fact, or is not a fact, you don’t have to pay any attention to that, because they are not the witnesses; they are just merely, or supposed to be merely telling you what the evidence will be, and not telling you what it is, because they are not witnesses. So you disregard all statements made by counsel, other than when they tell you what the evidence is going to be, what they will produce as evidence. You may proceed. [Emphasis added]. This instruction by the court was good in an ordinary case, when an attorney makes an argument instead of an opening statement. In this case, I think the statements of the trial court were entirely too mild to eradicate the objectionable part of the opening statement made. Chavez v. Valdez, 64 N.M. 143, 325 P.2d 919 (1958). The trial court had a duty to give a stern admonition to the jurors to- absolutely disregard the statement made by defendant’s attorney with reference to State Farm Insurance Company as insurer of plaintiff or the court should have permitted plaintiff to disclose the conflict of interest position of State Farm Insurance Company. In Chavez, supra, insurance was not involved. But the Court said: We have held in many cases that the trial court had not, in our opinion, abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial because of claimed improper statements or arguments of counsel, but we did hoist a warning signal in Griego v. Conwell, 54 N.M. 287, 222 P.2d 606, about improper arguments and say we would not hesitate to reverse a judgment in a proper case, and we believe this is a proper case for such action. We do not believe there is a valid distinction to be drawn between an improper opening statement such as we have here and an improper argument to the jury. [64 N. M. at 148, 325 P.2d at 922], The basis for my opinion is that defendant’s attorney did not disclose that State Farm Insurance Company was also defendant’s insurer. With the court’s admonition that no more reference to insurance be made, plaintiff was denied the right to disclose the conflict of interest position of State Farm Insurance Company. During the redirect examination of plaintiff, plaintiff offered into evidence her testimony that the man who took her statement was an agent for State Farm Insurance Company and represented defendant. This offer was denied. The trial court erred. Wood v. Dwyer, 85 N.M. 687, 515 P.2d 1291 (Ct.App.1973); Turner v. Caldwell, 349 S.W.2d 493 (Mo.App.1961); Williams v. Matlin, 328 Ill.App. 645, 66 N.E. 2d 719 (1946). My attitude on the mention of “insurance” during trial was set forth in a special concurring opinion, Hale v. Furr’s Incorporated, 85 N.M. 246, 253-54, 511 P.2d 572, 579-80 (Ct.App.1973): Secrecy of “insurance” is an old fashioned antique. The “hush-hush” policy should be discarded. The dignified term “insurance” should be placed on the drawing board of the courtroom. When plaintiff and defendant play this game fairly and openly before a fury in the last quarter of the twentieth century, both plaintiff and defendant will receive a fair trial. [Emphasis added]. This concept has not been adopted in New Mexico. The main opinion quoted the following: Defendant relies on the following from Falkner v. Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 391 P. 2d 660 (1964): “. . . A mistrial will generally be declared in a negligence action if the question of insurance is brought into the case in such manner as to be calculated to influence the verdict of the jury. . . .” Fort v. Neal, 79 N.M. 479, 444 P.2d 990 (1968) states: “. . .we recognize that a jury may be prejudiced by knowledge that insurance is present. . .” See also, Garcia v. Sanchez, 68 N.M. 394, 362 P.2d 779 (1961). [85 N.M. at 249, 511 P.2d at 575]. “Many companies have such suits involving two insureds suing each other. This results from the high percentage of automobile insurance written by these companies”. Allen, “Selected Conflicts of Interest Problems In Insurance Litgation”, Vol. 1971, No. 5, The Defense Research Institute, Inc., p. 50. Cases have not been cited and none have been found in which such litigation arose. Varney v. Taylor, 71 N.M. 444, 379 P.2d 84 (1963) illustrates the conflicts of interest problem of an insurance company that seeks to be a party plaintiff, when it also defends insureds in a negligence action. The Court said: The problem is troublesome, because, quite obviously, no litigant should be allowed to participate on both sides of a lawsuit. [71 N.M. at 445, 379 P.2d at 85], To allow unencumbered intervention would create such a potential conflict of interest that we do not believe it should be allowed. [71 N.M. at 447, 379 P.2d at 86]. The conflicts of interest position of State Farm in the instant case appears to be a matter of first impression in the United States. On the other side of the coin, “Inferences in his opening statement by counsel for the plaintiff in a negligence action that the defendant carries liability insurance are highly improper, and in a number of instances have been held to constitute ground for a reversal or a new trial.” [Emphasis added]. 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial § 208, p. 292 (1974); 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 786-87, § 15 (1949), and supplements to April, 1976 ; 88 C.J.S. Trial § 161 (1955). Plaintiffs have, in innumerable cases, been punished for merely mentioning, even by implication, that insurance of defendant existed. In Estes v. Town of Big Flats, Chemung County, 41 A.D.2d 681, 340 N.Y.S.2d 950, 951 (1973), attorney for plaintiff, in an opening statement, made a comment: “They had insurance for this bridge. They deny it in the papers. They deny responsibility for the bridge.” The Court reversed. It said: Even assuming a legitimate issue were present, the opening statement was not the proper time to comment on how the ownership or control would be proven, particularly when no such proof would be offered into evidence during the trial. Such was the case herein and it can only be concluded that it was a deliberate and unwarranted disclosure to the jury that defendant town carried liability insurance on the bridge, strongly suggesting a calculated attempt at prejudice. In such a close case of liability this prejudicial conduct cannot be condoned and constitutes reversible error. [Emphasis added]. This kind of judicial language can be multiplied many times. And where the defendant's attorney, in his opening statement said “Mr. Wass has no liability insurance”, it was reversible error. Bacon v. Wass, 200 Okl. 581, 198 P. 2d 423 (1948). The question for decision is: Was plaintiff prejudiced by the conflict of interest position of State Farm Insurance Company? I think she was. Courts of review have no' actual knowledge of the effect that “insurance” has on the minds of the -jury. Neither do we know what discussion occurs during the jury’s deliberations. In cases on the other side of the coin, the courts simply say that in personal injury actions, reference to insurance is calculated to influence the jury in its verdict, both upon the issue of negligence and the amount of damages. . . [T]he average juror is either unconsciously or otherwise influenced by the fact that the alleged negligent actor carries insurance. Such average juror, it has been found, is frequently led astray and returns an unauthorized verdict . .’ ” Turpin v. Schrivner, 297 Ky. 365, 178 S.W.2d 971, 974 (1944). In the instant case, did the jury believe that plaintiff did have insurance and defendant did not ? Did the jury then believe that this was a close case of liability, and by reason thereof, returned a verdict for the defendant? We should not have to speculate. An experienced trial attorney knows the meaning of an opening statement. We have no statute, rule or case law that requires an opening statement by the parties. “While it is the usual custom to do so, an opening statement is ordinarily intended to do no more than to inform the jury in a 'general way of the nature of the action, and defense, so that they may better be prepared to understand the evidence.” Winter v. Unaitis, 123 Vt. 372, 189 A.2d 547, 5 A.L.R.3d 1400, 1403 (1963); Hays v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 304 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.1957); 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 203 (1974); 88 C.J.S. Trial § 161 (1955). We should adopt a judicial rule in negligence cases that attorneys for plaintiff and defendant should confine the opening statement to the nature of the action, and defense. Ofttimes, attorneys for plaintiff and defendant make closing arguments at the opening of the case, give the case an “insurance” coating, and sprinkle it with an “insurance” perfume, or use some other colorful language to persuade the jury of the justice of the action and the righteousness of the defense. We should not condone this prejudicial conduct. We should protect the conscience of the man or woman on the street who sits on a jury. If attorneys do not play the game fairly and openly before a jury, their clients should not profit by this type of rivalry. No attorney has a right to do what he pleases in the trial of a case, except when he pleases to do right. Plaintiff is entitled to a new trial in Cause No. 2320.