Court Opinion

ID: 9662981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:01.683167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.551504
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I would reverse and remand as disclosed below.
This jury made an error on the question of damages and damages alone; thus, a new trial on that single issue is necessary. J.H. Larson Elec. Co. v. Vander Vorste, 81 S.D. 296, 134 N.W.2d 500 (1965). Further, I would platform my dissent on SDCL 15-6-59(a)(6), which provides, inter alia, that a new trial may be granted on the ground that the verdict is against the law.
There was no conflict in the evidence on damages. Tenant presented no damage evidence. No cross-examination of landlord’s witnesses took place. Landlord presented testimony in the amount of $35,261.45. In arriving at a damage verdict, this jury erroneously applied the 90-day period for notice of termination by the tenant which was no longer in effect. The majority opinion recognizes this concept but affords no relief therefor. The verdict is therefore unsupportable in law and landlord is entitled to a new trial on damages based upon this error and the insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Lewis v. Storms, 290 N.W.2d 494, 497 (S.D.1980).
Specifically, the damage verdict of $4,548.36 was submitted in (a) verdict form and (b) a handwritten note setting forth the basis for its damage calculations. It is obvious the jury’s award was based on a clause in a superseded lease which permitted tenant to vacate the premises in question on 90-day’s written notice.
Tenant moved for a directed verdict on the issue of damages. He argued that damages should be limited to 90-day’s rent, based upon his right to terminate under the original lease upon 90-day’s written notice. The trial court denied this motion. Furthermore, tenant proposed instructions which would have limited recovery to the 90-day notice period in the original lease; again, the court denied this requested instruction. As the reader can see, by the majority opinion’s declaration of the content of the jury’s handwritten note, the jury calculated damages contrary to that which the court refused by way of instruction. Moreover, the court gave explicit instructions on the elements of damages and the jury was bound to follow the instructions of the court. The trial court gave the following instructions on the elements of damages:
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for such elements of detriment or damage proved by the evidence to have resulted from the acts or omissions of the defendant whether such detriment could have been anticipated or not, namely:
*8751. Any and all extra costs and expenses, including taxes, incurred by plaintiff;
2. Any and all lost profits and rents incurred by plaintiff.
Whether any of these elements of damage have been proved by the evidence is for you to determine. Your verdict must be based on evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture.
There was no objection or exception taken by the tenant to this instruction on damage. Rather, as I have heretofore pointed out, tenant had his own theory of damages which was to restrict the landlord to rental for a 90-day period. Where “the jury has palpably mistaken the rules of law by which damages in the particular case were to be measured,” the verdict shall be set aside. Hanisch v. Body, 77 S.D. 265, 268, 90 N.W.2d 924, 926 (1958) (citations omitted).
The majority opinion, comforting its legal posture, takes haven in after-the-fact statements made by the tenant in post-trial proceedings. The crucial question on whether or not this “acquiescence theory” surfaces and estops landlord from asserting this lawful position, is grounded upon legal positions taken at the trial itself. (Reconstructed assertions which are self-serving are not the exact positions taken at trial.) When landlord’s counsel, in resisting tenant’s motion for a directed verdict, expressed that damages could be argued to the jury, it is clear that landlord was fighting against a directed verdict and it was vividly clear that tenant was not entitled to a directed verdict. At this time, counsel for landlord, by expressing “but it doesn’t limit the damages,” was expressing a rightful position and in accordance with the facts before the trial court, namely, that the 90-day limitation did not apply and that landlord was entitled to damages in excess of 90 days. Therefore, I disapprove of the “acquiescence theory” upon which the majority opinion has bottomed its decision.
Landlord’s motion for a new trial on damages only was based upon a sound premise, i.e., that the award was contrary to the evidence, instructions, and the law. I agree that the jury “sidestepped” the instructions but must disagree that landlord assented to this procedure. Closing arguments were not recorded. They are not part of the record. Hence, reconstruction of same is improper by any party and should not be used as the basis for decision herein. The motion for new trial on the issue of damages only was improperly denied, and I therefore respectfully dissent.