Court Opinion

ID: 9819380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:24:10.638842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:11.169940
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: The majority relies on Gusciara v. Lustwig, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 806 N.E.2d 746 (2004), which relies on National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002), in coming to the conclusion that the chief legal counsel erred in sustaining the dismissal of allegations A and B. In Morgan, a divided Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, held that a hostile work environment claim under Title VII includes events that occurred prior to and outside of the federal 180-day filing period, as long as at least one act occurred within the 180-day period. In reaching this decision, the Court specifically noted that the Title VII filing period was not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Rather, it was a requirement subject to the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling “ ‘when equity so requires.’ ” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 127, 122 S. Ct. at 2076 (2002), quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398, 71 L. Ed. 2d 234, 246, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1982). Whether one agrees or disagrees with Morgan is irrelevant to our discussion here. There is a defining and dispositive difference between the filing periods under Title VII and the Act. As previously stated, under Title VII, the filing period is a statute of limitations, subject to equitable tolling. “However, courts have uniformly held that the charge-filing time limitations period [of the Act] is jurisdictional.” Faulkner-King v. Department of Human Rights, 225 Ill. App. 3d 784, 791, 587 N.E.2d 599, 604 (1992). The majority here “agree[s] with the sound reasoning in Gusciara.” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 196. I find the reasoning in Gusciara to be seriously flawed. Gusciara acknowledges that state courts are not required to interpret our statutes in lockstep with the federal courts’ interpretation of cognate federal statutes, but then finds no “compelling reason to interpret the Act inconsistently with the federal courts’ construction of Title VII.” Gusciara, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 1019, 806 N.E.2d at 751. There is nothing sound about this reasoning, which sees no compelling reason to treat a statute of limitations any differently than a jurisdictional filing period. After finding no compelling reason not to follow Morgan, the Gusciara court continues: “We do diverge from Morgan in one important respect. The Supreme Court held that because Title VH’s limitations provision is not jurisdictional, it is subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and tolling. [Citation.] Because section 7A-102(A) (l)’s time limit is jurisdictional, we do not incorporate such equitable defenses into section 7A-102(A)(1). Nonetheless, we are confident that Morgan’s holding will discourage potential claimants from undue delay in filing charges.” Gusciara, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 1020, 806 N.E.2d at 752. With all due respect, this makes absolutely no sense in light of Gusciara’s holding. It was precisely the fact that Title VTI’s limitations provision was not jurisdictional and therefore subject to equitable doctrines such as waiver, estoppel and tolling that was the sine qua non of the Morgan decision. A reading of Gusciara and the majority opinion here shows a misapprehension by the two courts of the effect that a jurisdictional filing period has on equitable defenses. Every Illinois case before Gusciara has made it clear that since the filing period under the Illinois statute is jurisdictional, equitable defenses of waiver, estoppel and tolling are unavailable to the claimant. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Northeastern Illinois University v. Rothbardt, 98 Ill. App. 3d 423, 424 N.E.2d 742 (1981); Larrance v. Human Rights Comm’n, 166 Ill. App. 3d 224, 519 N.E.2d 1203 (1988). Both Gusciara and the majority here speak of that concept as though equitable defenses are not available to the employer. This basic misapprehension is apparently what allows the courts in these two opinions to acknowledge that equitable defenses do not apply and then turn around and create an equitable defense to the filing period for acts alleged to constitute part of a judicially created hostile work environment claim. One need only study Gusciara to understand that the judicial rewrite of the Act will be the rule that ate the law, at least the 180-day filing period. In Gusciara, as here, there were discrete and egregious acts of sexual harassment alleged that occurred outside of the 180-day jurisdictional filing period. Up until this time, Illinois courts understood that any claim which might be actionable under the Act was lost if not filed within 180 days. Now, if a claimant fails to file a claim within 180 days of any violation, he or she need only allege even rather innocuous violations of the Act within the 180 days and thereby reach back beyond the 180 days to resuscitate claims that the legislature declared to be “DOA.” More importantly, the majority here, as in Gusciara, ignores the principles of separation of powers fundamental to our system of government. The court has rewritten the Human Rights Act. This is judicial legislation, pure and simple. The Human Rights Act creates rights not afforded by the Illinois Constitution. Pickering v. Human Rights Comm’n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 340, 496 N.E.2d 746 (1986). It creates rights and causes of action that did not exist at common law. Therefore, the duty of the courts is to strictly construe the statute. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 809 N.E.2d 1248 (2004); Bush v. Squellati, 122 Ill. 2d 153, 522 N.E.2d 1225 (1988). It has long been held that “in construing statutes in derogation of the common law, it will not he presumed that an innovation thereon was intended further than that which is specified.” Walter v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 370 Ill. 283, 288, 18 N.E.2d 906, 908-09 (1938). If there are to be exceptions to the jurisdictional filing period, our tripartite form of government requires that they come, not from the courts, but from those whose role it is to make the laws: the legislature. I respectfully dissent.