Court Opinion

ID: 9897281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:38.05204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.380684
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Sep 27 2023, 10:21 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marielena Duerring                                         Theodore E. Rokita
South Bend, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
                                                           Caroline G. Templeton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

B.T.,                                                      September 27, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-XP-636
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Michael A.
Appellee-Respondent                                        Christofeno, Judge
                                                           The Honorable Elizabeth A.
                                                           Bellin, Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           20C01-2209-XP-116

                             Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Kenworthy concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023                            Page 1 of 6
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   B.T. molested his sisters for four years beginning when he was 10 years old.

      When he was 23, B.T. petitioned to expunge the juvenile delinquency and child

      welfare records documenting the molestations after the records derailed his

      employment as a teacher. Although the trial court expunged the juvenile

      delinquency records, it denied B.T.’s motion to expunge the child welfare

      records substantiating his molestations.

[2]   B.T. appeals that judgment, contending Indiana’s expungement requirements

      should differ depending on whether the substantiated offense was committed by

      a child or by an adult. As the expungement statute at issue already includes

      such a distinction, we affirm.

      Facts
[3]   From age 10 to 14, B.T. continuously molested his sisters, who, respectively,

      were about 3 and 5 years younger than he was. After one sister reported the

      molestations, which included anal and oral sex, B.T. was adjudicated a

      delinquent for an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute Class A

      felony child molesting. The juvenile court placed B.T. on probation, during

      which he repeatedly failed polygraph examinations designed to unveil his

      sexual history. B.T. later acknowledged deceit but only for one of his failed

      examinations.

[4]   The terms of B.T.’s probation also included therapy. B.T. reported to his

      therapist that he was engaging in sexual fantasies about an eighth grader who

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023    Page 2 of 6
      was not his sister. B.T. did not successfully complete therapy before being

      discharged from probation and beginning college. He later blamed his sexual

      misconduct partly on his “very high desire for sexual activity.” Tr. Vol. II, pp.

      35-36.

[5]   The revelation of the molestations also led to a parallel investigation by the

      Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS). As part of the investigation into

      whether B.T.’s sisters were children in need of services, DCS substantiated the

      allegations of child molesting.

[6]   B.T. graduated from college and obtained a teaching job at a high school, but

      the school fired him after a background check detected DCS’s substantiation.

      Over objection of both the prosecutor and DCS, B.T. petitioned to expunge the

      records of both his juvenile adjudication and DCS’s substantiation.

[7]   After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court expunged the juvenile adjudication,

      but not DCS’s substantiation. The court determined that B.T. had failed to

      prove the statutory requirements for expungement of DCS’s records. B.T.

      appeals that judgment.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   B.T. essentially contends the trial court erroneously applied Indiana Code § 31-

      33-27-5 (expungement statute), which governs expungement of DCS’s

      substantiation records. This statute authorizes the trial court to grant

      expungement if it “finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) there is

      little likelihood that the petitioner will be a future perpetrator of child abuse or
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023        Page 3 of 6
       neglect; and (2) the information has insufficient current probative value to

       justify its retention in records of the department for future reference.” Ind. Code

       § 31-33-27-5(f).1

[9]    We review the trial court’s expungement ruling for an abuse of discretion. R.M.

       v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 563 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “A trial

       court abuses that discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances before it or when the trial court

       misinterprets the law.” Id. In reaching this determination, we neither reweigh

       evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. (citing Samples v. Wilson, 12 N.E.3d

       946, 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)).

[10]   In denying B.T.’s expungement petition as to the DCS records, the trial court

       found insufficient evidence of the second statutory requirement: that the

       information has insufficient current probative value to justify its retention in

       DCS records for future reference. B.T. does not challenge that specific

       conclusion. Instead, he argues that the General Assembly must have intended a

       more lenient standard for expungement of offenses committed by a juvenile

       than those committed by an adult, given the greater rehabilitative goals of the

       juvenile system. B.T. views the expungement statute as “silent regarding the

       1
         Expungements of juvenile delinquency records are governed by different statutes, with a different burden of
       proof. See Ind. Code § 31-39-8 et seq. Among other things, petitioners seeking to expunge juvenile
       delinquencies, unlike petitioners seeking to expunge DCS substantiations, need not prove that the records at
       issue have insufficient probative value to justify their retention. See id. B.T. does not focus specifically on the
       statutory peculiarities of disallowing expungement of the DCS substantiation records when the arguably
       more conclusive juvenile delinquency records are expungable.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023                                   Page 4 of 6
       distinction between substantiated reports that relate to juveniles or adults.”

       Appellant’s Br., p. 11.

[11]   Statutory interpretation is a question of law reserved for the courts. G.E. v. Ind.

       Dep’t of Child Servs., 29 N.E.3d 769, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “When

       determining the legislature’s intent, we look at the ‘plain language of the statute

       and attribute the common, ordinary meaning to terms found in everyday

       speech.’” Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 979 N.E.2d 156, 158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

[12]   In support of his claim for a new interpretation of the expungement statute,

       B.T. largely relies on our Supreme Court’s decision in In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d

       631 (Ind. 2004). The K.G. Court determined the legislature did not intend to

       apply the criminal court competency procedures to juvenile proceedings. But

       the linchpin of that decision was the juvenile code’s silence on competency

       matters. Id. at 637-38.

[13]   Here, the expungement statute is found within the juvenile code and, contrary

       to B.T.’s contention, specifically distinguishes between juvenile and adult

       perpetrators. When the expungement petitioner was a juvenile at the time of the

       offense, the court may review “the factors listed in IC 31-39-8-3 in relation to

       the petitioner, if the substantiated report was the subject of a juvenile court

       case.” Ind. Code § 31-33-27-5(e)(1). And Indiana Code § 31-39-8-3 specifies

       factors to be considered in juvenile delinquency or child in need of services

       expungement proceedings. These factors include the child’s age at the time of

       the offense, the child’s best interests, and various other considerations

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023       Page 5 of 6
       specifically relating to the underlying juvenile proceeding. Indiana Code § 31-

       39-8-3(e).

[14]   Through this overlap between the expungement statute and Indiana Code § 31-

       39-8-3, the legislature has ensured the same factors considered in juvenile

       delinquency expungement proceedings also are considered in expungements of

       DCS-substantiated juvenile offenses. Conversely, those statutory provisions do

       not authorize those factors to be considered in proceedings under the

       expungement statute when the substantiated offense was committed by an

       adult.

[15]   As the expungement statute already incorporates the very distinction between

       adult and juvenile offenses that B.T. advocates, B.T. offers no persuasive basis

       for reversing the trial court’s denial of his request to expunge the DCS records.

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

       Altice, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-XP-636 | September 27, 2023     Page 6 of 6