Court Opinion

ID: 5199878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-06 15:50:10.994354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:27:10.770389
License: Public Domain

Houghton, J. (dissenting):
I do not think the plaintiff has lost her right to hold the defendant Lanpher as an unknown principal simply because she happened to name her as the party whom she wished to indorse the defendant Tainter’s note. The defendant Lanpher, by such indorsement, it is true, became identified with the transaction of the loan of the money, but only through her contingent liability as indorser. This indorsement did not disclose to the plaintiff that Lanpher was the principal and that Tainter was a mere agent concealing the name of his principal. If the defendant Lanpher was in fact the principal and the money was borrowed for her as the jury has found, notwithstanding the giving of the note, the plaintiff has a right to recover from her on her direct liability for borrowed money. If the plaintiff cannot recover on the theory that the agent borrowed for an undisclosed principal she cannot recover at all, because the note was not protested and the defendant Lanpher refused to renew it. The fact that an undisclosed principal has something to do with the transaction short of making himself absolutely liable, does not release him from liability for the acts of his agent. It was not the fact that the plaintiff knew or suspected that the-money was being borrowed for the mother that led her to ask for the mother’s indorsement.
The theory upon which one is precluded from asserting liability against an undisclosed principal who has participated in the transaction is that the undisclosed principal has made himself absolutely liable, as though his principalship had been disclosed.
The liability of an indorser is contingent upon presentation of the note and notice of dishonor. In that sense it is contingent, and in that sense it is not as absolute as a direct liability for borrowed money.
*450If the money was in fact borrowed for the mother through the agency of the son, her indorsement was not a fulfillment of her obligation to repay because of the undisclosed agency.
The motions were finally properly disposed of, and I think the judgment should be affirmed instead of reversed.
O’Bbien, P. J., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellan, to abide event. Order filed.