Court Opinion

ID: 9776327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:43.801209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.256466
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Associate Justice, concurring. The initial prevailing opinion in this cause interpreted Ark. Const, art. 16, § 9, which reads, “No county shall levy a tax to exceed one-half of one percent for all purposes.” The opinion stated that Jefferson County’s ordinance, approved by the voters, violates art. 16, § 9, because it imposes a one percent sales tax, exceeding the one-half of one percent limit provided by the Article 16 provision. This statement or holding is incorrect, however, if the constitutional framers of Article 16 intended only to apply the one-half of one percent limit to property taxes — an intention which seems abundantly clear when one reads other sections contained in Article 16. E.g. Section 5 (all real and tangible personal property taxed according to its value); Section 6 (all laws exempting property from taxation other than as provided in the Constitution shall be void); Section 7 (provides for taxation of corporate property); Section 8 (establishes maximum rate — one percent of assessed valuation of the property — state can levy taxes). Although not previously cited by any party, this court in its recent decision of Quapaw Cent. Business Improvement Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 315 Ark. 703, 870 S.W.2d 390 (1994) made it very clear that the Article 16 provisions of the Arkansas Constitution limited the maximum rate of general property taxation by counties and municipalities. Nonetheless, this court still held such restrictions do not apply to improvement districts created by governmental entities. We pointed out that improvement districts have been used in Arkansas as a means of constructing and financing large public improvements that counties and municipalities could not normally afford. See Horace Sloan, A Treatise On The Law of Improvement Districts In Arkansas (1928) § 16. In sum, this court in the Quapaw Improvement District case approved Little Rock’s creation and use of an improvement district as a mechanism to raise monies through property assessments to improve a geographical segment of its municipality. In doing so, this court was fully aware of the Article 16 constitutional restrictions imposed upon counties and municipalities, but the court still allowed such governmental entities the authority to finance needed improvements by a method other than directly increasing general property taxes. Surely if this court recognizes that a local governmental entity may obtain monies or financing through improvement district assessments, such an entity, authorized by the General Assembly and the electorate, should be permitted revenues or financing by use of a sales tax. Consistent with the underlying rationale this court employed in Quapaw Improvement District, a county or municipal sales tax simply does not fall within the property tax proscriptions or limitations of Article 16. Like improvement district assessments, sales taxes were not in existance when the 1874 Article 16 property tax restrictions were adopted. Sales taxes approved by the voters provide yet another or alternative means by which the state, counties and municipalities may finance their governmental functions. For the foregoing reasons, I join the majority court in granting a rehearing and affirm the trial court’s decision.