Court Opinion

ID: 9476337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:53:25.977092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:15.584317
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Chief Judge Wald’s opinion only to the extent that its analysis is necessary to its holding. I write separately to *664distinguish its holding from dicta, in which I do not join.
As Chief Judge Wald correctly observes, the Supreme Court has held categorically that “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.... By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly....” Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (emphasis added). Thus we have before us the rather straightforward task of determining whether Congress, in 42 U.S.C. § 1437p (Supp. III 1985), has “unambiguously” and “clear[ly]” imposed on local housing authorities a duty not to abandon the premises while demolition applications are pending before HUD.
The clear language of § 1437p, we hold, does no more than “create[] conditions precedent that must occur before the Secretary approves a demolition application____ [Tjhese conditions precedent do not, by themselves, constitute independent duties.” Ante at 659 (footnote omitted). Thus, § 1437p does not “create[ ] rights in public housing tenants against the constructive demolition of their units.” Ante at 659 (footnote omitted).
Since there is no language in § 1437p addressing the question of constructive demolition at all, I think it unnecessary to embark on a broad survey of the quality of language that would be necessary to create such a right. See ante part II.A. Nor do I find it necessary to sift through § 1437p’s legislative history for some hint of unexpressed congressional intent to create such a right. See ante at 659 - 660. No amount of legislative history could convert nonexistent language into a “clear” and “unambiguous[]” expression of congressional intent.
Nor can I agree with my colleagues’ assertions that § 1437p creates a right that tenants can enforce against actual demolition. Ante at 658 n. 7, 659-660, 660 n. 12; post at 668-669. The point is, of course, quite unnecessary to our holding, in light of our conclusion that § 1437p creates no clear PHA duty not to abandon. It is, however, essential to Judge Will’s conclusion, and it is appropriate in these circumstances to suggest how the statute can make sense in the absence of such a reading.
We may safely assume that Congress would not have required HUD to impose conditions on consent to demolition if it expected PHAs to be free to demolish without consent at all. Yet, equally clearly, the language of § 1437p imposes no clear obligation on PHAs to secure HUD consent to demolition. The most likely explanation for the absence of such a clear statutory obligation is that Congress intended that HUD would secure a promise from the PHAs not to demolish, or would by regulation prohibit them from doing so, without HUD approval.1 HUD has done exactly that. A clause of the Annual Contributions Contract (“ACC”), which all PHAs sign as a prerequisite to receipt of their subsidies, requires PHAs to abide by all regulations issued by HUD pursuant to the United States Housing Act of 1937. See Addendum for Federal Appellees at 36, 39, 40 (ACC part 1, § 5 requires PHA to “operate all Projects covered by this Contract in compliance with all provisions of ... the Act [and] all regulations issued by the Government pursuant thereto”). The regulations in turn prohibit demolition without submission and approval by HUD of an application. See 24 C.F.R. § 970.8 (1986) (“[w]ritten approval by HUD shall be required before the PHA may undertake any transaction involving demolition”).2
*665Thus there is no reason to fear that my reading of the clear language “would create a loophole in the statutory scheme that would effectively repeal it,” post at 668, much less that it would leave a PHA free “to do whatever it pleased,” id. Any actual demolition by a PHA would put it in violation of HUD regulations and in breach of the ACC and subject it to enforcement action and contract remedies at HUD’s behest. But HUD’s sensible implementation of the congressional will, in this contractual and regulatory form, is quite different from Congress’s clearly creating a tenant right enforceable under § 1983.
The statutory scheme is quite coherent without our transforming a condition precedent to HUD action (approval) into a condition precedent to PHA action (demolition), compare ante at 659 - 660, or a PHA obligation to HUD into a PHA obligation to tenants. Blurring these distinctions violates our duty under Pennhurst to find § 1983 obligations only where “Congress speak[s] with a clear voice,” 451 U.S. at 17, 101 S.Ct. at 1540.
To be sure, there are cases in which an agency regulation can define the exact scope of a duty that Congress has clearly created. See School Board v. Arline, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987); Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). But where Congress has not clearly created any duty, there is no § 1983 right for regulations to define.3
Accordingly, I do not join in part II.A of Chief Judge Wald’s opinion, or in any implication in part II.B that legislative history could resolve the inquiry before us or that a PHA’s actual demolition would be actionable by tenants.

. "The most likely explanation” that I suggest in the text is speculation as to what Congress might have intended, not (as Chief Judge Wald’s truncated quotation of that sentence would suggest, ante at 660 n. 12) a finding of congressional intent. No one can make such a finding with confidence in this case precisely because Congress has not made its intent clear.

. Elsewhere in the legislation that enacted § 1437p Congress required the Secretary to impose conditions on granting of consent without, so far as appears, requiring consent. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-15(a) (Supp. III 1985) (added by Pub.L. No. 98-181, § 433, 97 Stat. 1221 (1983)), "the Secretary shall not accept an offer to prepay [a] mortgage" without first making specific *665determinations. But these conditions are triggered only with respect to "any period in which an owner of a multifamily rental housing project is required to obtain the approval of the Secretary for prepayment of the mortgage.” Id. The statute defines no such period.

. Here, of course, even if § 1437p imposed any clear duty on PHAs, the regulations would be of no assistance to plaintiffs, for they do not encompass abandonment.