Court Opinion

ID: 9860649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:28:41.98129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:18.016451
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder must be affirmed. I also agree that the defendant was not properly found eligible for the death penalty under the “cold, calculated and premeditated” aggravating circumstance found in section 9 — l(b)(ll) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9— l(b)(ll) (West 1994)). Unlike the majority, however, I do not believe that the second eligibility finding made by the sentencing jury, that involving section 9 — 1(b)(6) (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(6) (West 1994)), the commission of murder in the course of another felony, was invalid under People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995). Like Justices Bilandic and Heiple, I believe that the jury’s determination concerning section 9 — 1(b)(6) may stand, even though the verdict form used in this case omitted any reference to the mental state necessary to sustain a finding under that provision, which was the defect found in Mack. In the present case, the same jury had previously found the defendant guilty of first degree murder. At the guilt phase of the proceedings, the jury was instructed on all three forms of murder: intentional murder, knowing murder, and felony murder. After deliberating, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty on the charge of first degree murder. Addressing similar issues in the capital sentencing context, our cases have consistently held that the return by a jury of a general verdict of guilty of murder, after being instructed on the multiple forms of the offense, gives rise to the presumption that the jury found the defendant guilty of intentional murder. Under that principle, a jury’s implicit finding of intent or knowledge at the guilt stage of the proceedings may satisfy the subsequent requirement of a finding of intent or knowledge for purposes of establishing a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty, whether under section 9 — 1(b)(6), murder in the course of another felony, as in this case, or under section 9 — 1(b)(3), multiple murders (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(3), (b)(6) (West 1998)). See People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 149-52 (1998) (jury trial, jury sentencing; section 9 — 1(b)(6)); People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 228-30 (1997) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9 — 1(b)(6)); People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133, 149-51 (1996) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9 — 1(b)(6)); People v. Johnson, 149 Ill. 2d 118, 156-57 (1992) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9 — 1(b)(6)); People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d 401, 455-56 (1988) (jury trial, bench sentencing; section 9 — 1(b)(3)). Thus, while I continue to believe that Mack was wrongly decided, I would find it distinguishable here. Unlike the present case, Mack involved a bench trial and a jury sentencing hearing, and the eligibility stage marked the first opportunity for the jury to make any findings of intent. Applying the preceding rules to the present case, we may conclude that the jury found the defendant guilty of intentional murder, and we may use the determination of intent implicit in that verdict to supply the finding needed to establish the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty under section 9 — 1(b)(6). The mittimus entered by the trial judge properly cites section 9 — 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(a)(1) (West 1994)), intentional murder, as the statutory basis for the defendant’s conviction. We should do likewise and recognize the finding of intent implicit in the jury’s verdict. That much should be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Mack, and, like Justices Bilandic and Heiple, I would therefore uphold the jury’s determination of eligibility under the murder-in-course-of-felony aggravating circumstance. Because a majority of this court has not affirmed either of the two statutory aggravating circumstances on which the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty was premised, I agree that the defendant’s death sentence must be vacated and that the cause must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.