Court Opinion

ID: 9546525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:31:28.705249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:34.473529
License: Public Domain

LOCKWOOD, Justice
(dissenting):
An examination of the record leaves me extremely disturbed with the majority’s analysis of two important aspects of this case. The immense tragedy out of which this matter arose cannot negate constitutional safeguards which apply to all defendants alike.
CUSTODY
The majority casually disposes of the question of when Louis Taylor was taken into custody in two sentences in their section on “Voluntariness of Appellant’s Statements” by concluding that “there is *85substantial testimony to support the finding of the trier of fact.” The nature of this “substantial testimony” is not related to us in the majority’s opinion, nor is it discoverable from a survey of the record.
The determination of when the defendant was taken into custody is critical as “[ojnce custody is established no interrogation whatsoever, even the routine or casual, is permitted unless a valid waiver of defendant’s stated [Miranda] rights is demonstrated.” State v. Mumbaugh, 107 Ariz. 589, 491 P.2d 443 (1971). In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held:
“ * * * the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. .at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706.
In State v. Mumbaugh, supra, we stated: “Whether defendant is in custody is determined by an objective test, based on the evidence. Police testimony that the defendant is free to go is relevant but not controlling. Similarly, defendant’s subjective belief that he is not free to go is only a factor worth considering. Custody must be determined by an analysis of the relevant circumstances with particular attention to probable cause gauged by the ‘reasonable man’ test.
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“But a finding that no probable cause exists does not necessarily mean that there was no ‘custody’ or that defendant was not ‘otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ There exists, then, the second situation where the police detain someone on mere suspicion where no probable cause exists.
In such cases detention constitutes custody where a reasonable innocent man under the relevant circumstances would believe he is not free to go. [citations omitted].” 107 Ariz. at 594-95, 491 P.2d at 448-49.
A review of the “relevant circumstances” leads me to the conclusion that the defendant was sought at the hotel as more than a mere witness and, in fact, was effectively taken into custody by Officer Adams just after Sgt. Lingham directed him to take Taylor to the police station for a statement.
Attention was originally focused on the defendant when Giles Scoggins, the hotel beverage manager, noticed him coming down the steps between the mezzanine and lobby levels at approximately 2:00 a. m. Upon seeing the defendant, Scoggins turned to Leroy Brockbank, Vice President and Director of the Pioneer Hotel, and remarked “take a good look at that fellow there, he knows something about the fire.” Scoggins then proceeded outside and informed Officer Sedlymeyer of the defendant’s statements at the early stages of the fire. Officer Adams testified that while scanning the crowd on Stone Avenue Scoggins commented “the boy we are looking for might have set it because he was right there when I first got there.” The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the relevance of this remark by stating “we believe it was nothing more than a gratuitous remark by one who had not seen the fire start.” In re Anonymous, 14 Ariz.App. 466, 484 P.2d 235 (1971). This conclusion may have been prompted in part by Adams’ testimony that the remark by Scoggins did not persuade him to view the defendant as a suspect: “* * * just because a man says so and so set a fire, it’s not necessarily so.”
I feel compelled, however, to assess it greater significance. This remark, in conjunction with Taylor’s unexplained presence at the early stages of the fire on a floor which contained only guest rooms and the natural desire of the police to ap*86prehend any arsonist responsible for this tragedy, undoubtedly cast some degree of suspicion on the defendant. Further evidence of the tone of Scoggins’ remark is indicated by the fact that upon finding the defendant, Scoggins immediately retrieved the white busboy jacket that Taylor had discarded, retaining that piece of evidence for eventual use at the trial. Moreover, prior to pointing out Taylor to Officers Adams and Carstensen, Scoggins stepped into a small alcove or room, and apparently motioned the two officers to follow. Scoggins then peeked around the corner, pointed at Taylor and stated “that’s the boy we are looking for.” These factors indicate the defendant was considered more than a possible witness. The bare fact that an individual is under suspicion, of course, is not enough to establish custody. State v. Bainch, 109 Ariz. 77, 505 P.2d 248 (1973). It does, however, constitute an input into what Mumbaugh, supra, referred to as the “relevant circumstances.”
Officer Adams testified that he asked the defendant to accompany him outside and the response was “sure”. Taylor, on the other hand, testified “[h]e told me to come downstairs with him.” Adams testified that, except for a brief distance on the third floor, he alone escorted the defendant downstairs and then to the intersection command post. He also testified the defendant was neither handcuffed nor physically touched at any time. Taylor, on the other hand, testified “[h]e was holding my arm” and “[wjhen I got outside, * * * he told me to stay put in the corner- — right by the corner.” Officer George Biggs discredited a portion of Adams’ version by testifying he saw the defendant during this period of time flanked by two officers on the mezzanine level.
Adams and the defendant walked north on Stone Avenue to a police vehicle after Sgt. Lingham had instructed the officer to go to the station and obtain a statement. Taylor testified “Officer Adams told me to come on” and “grabbed me by the arm.” The defendant felt he was not given a choice as to whether he was going to the station: “I didn’t have no other choice.” Adams, on the other hand, denied he physically touched the defendant, yet conceded he was unsure what he would have done had Taylor attempted to flee.
At this point I feel custody was firmly established. The defendant was not asked to go to the police station, he was taken. A survey of the record reveals only one instance, at the transfer hearing, where Adams asserted he in any way asked the defendant if he would accompany him to the station. Even in that testimony it is clear that the alleged inquiry was made only after the officer had begun escorting Taylor to his vehicle. Thus if Adams commented to Sgt. Lingham that the defendant was agreeable to making a statement it would have been merely an assumption on the officer’s part.1 At the preliminary hearing Adams testified:
“A. I told Sergeant Lingham that I found the boy that I was looking for and this was him.
“Q. Anything more ?
“A. Not that I recall.
“Q. What were you told ?
“A. To take him to the detectives for a statement.
******
“Q. At that point did you say anything to Louis Taylor?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. What was that?
“A. Pointing north I said, ‘My car is over here.’ ”
My conclusion as to what occurred is further strengthened by another portion of the officer’s testimony:
“Q. With regard to the conversation with Taylor in [sic] route to the station, will you tell us what the conversation was at that time as you recall it ?
*87******
“A. Mr. Taylor asked me why we were going to the station. I explained to him that I had understood he was at the • scene of the fire and that the detectives would like to talk to him to find out what he had seen or done.
“Q. And at the time you related this to him, did he indicate in any way that he didn’t want to accompany you.
“A. No.
“Q. By action or by word ?
“A. No. He gave no indication.”
The police station was approximately a two or three block drive from the Pioneer Hotel. It seems almost certain that the defendant would not inquire why they were going to the station if Adams had asked him if he would go to the station in order to make a statement only seconds before getting in the car. The fact that “[h]e gave no indication” when told why he was being taken to the police station manifests continued submission to the custody of the officer.
The fact that Officer Adams told the defendant he was not under arrest and permitted him to ride in the front seat of the car is not controlling. This factor, like the fact that a “patdown” search was conducted, is merely an item of information bearing on the question of whether “a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
Further evidence of the nature of Officer Adams’ relationship to the defendant that morning is provided by a comment the officer made soon after arrival at the station. Adams testified twice at the preliminary hearing that as he seated Taylor in the coffee room and before conferring with the desk sergeant he requested one of his colleagues “keep an eye on” the defendant: “I told somebody to keep an eye on him, that he was at the scene of the fire.”2 The coffee room, variously described as 10' x 10' to 15' x 20', at that point contained three to five police officers and the defendant. Under the facts of this case I believe a “reasonable innocent man under the relevant circumstances would believe he * * * [was] not free to go.” State v. Mumbaugh, supra.
The state may not remove the custodial environment or negate its consequences by arguing that the defendant was casually questioned by Rossetti and initially by Adams only as a “witness.” 3 First, Rossetti obviously had no such impression as he merely heard that Taylor was found “wandering around the hotel.” Second, even if the description was appropriate, I would be inclined to accord it little significance in a case such as this. In Commonwealth v. Banks, 429 Pa. 53, 239 A.2d 416 (1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court commented:
“The Commonwealth argues that up to the moment Banks first admitted his participation in the crime, he was merely being questioned as ‘a witness’ to a crime and it was unnecessary to advise him of his right to remain silent so long as this role continued. With this we cannot agree. The appellation given the individual questioned is not controlling. Otherwise the police could evade the procedural safeguards required by Escobedo, supra, and Miranda, supra, to protect one’s privilege against self-incrimination during police questioning by inter*88viewing everyone as ‘a witness.’ If questioning is initiated and pursued during custodial interrogation, proper warning of constitutional rights is first required, Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra.” 429 Pa. at 58, 239 A.2d at 418-19.
Statements made by the defendant after being taken into custody at approximately 2:41 a. m. in front of the Pioneer and before Officer Adams informed him of his rights were improperly admitted at the trial. Statements made by the defendant after Officer Adams advised him of his rights and before the second portion of the Gassaway interview commenced at approximately 4:15 a. m. are inadmissible as a product of illegal custodial interrogation. The test to be applied is “Whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963). In this case it is clear the connection between the illegal conduct by the police and the statements made by Taylor in response to questions by Adams, Murchek and Gassaway was not “so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); United States v. Castellana, 488 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1974); Reed v. Roylston, 22 Ariz.App. 118, 524 P. 2d 513 (1974). The question of whether statements made by the defendant at the police station later that morning are also barred as the “fruit” of the illegal custodial interrogation need not be determined as I conclude below they are inadmissible on other grounds.
VOLUNTARINESS
The second issue concerning which I strongly disagree with the majority’s conclusion is the question of whether statements made by the defendant after Officer Adams read the Miranda rights were voluntarily ■ made. In summary fashion the majority notes that Taylor was a member of a minority group, came from a fatherless poverty-level home, had an eighth grade education, functioned at the borderline level of intelligence, and was questioned at one time or another during the night and early morning hours by eight police officers and one fire department official.
Admitting that “the questioning was long,” the majority is somehow “impressed by the fact that despite this alleged overwhelming atmosphere, the appellant never confessed to anything,” but rather “continued through an ever-changing pattern of fabrications to protest his innocence * * I fail to see how the end product of police interrogation relates to the issue of whether statements were voluntarily given.
The weakness in the majority’s rationale is further highlighted by their reliance on People v. Lara, supra, where the California Supreme Court was supposedly “in the same position.” In fact, the cases are dissimilar in several key respects. In Lara, the interrogation was not conducted during the late night and early morning hours, or by relays of experienced police officers, or stretched over a seven hour period. The defendant in Lara displayed a high degree of sophistication in bargaining with his interrogators. In addition, the California Court noted that the trial took place before Miranda and commented that “the standards there laid down are not controlling.” Rather than finding “ourselves in the same position” as the court in Lara, the only significant similarities seem to be that both cases involved a juvenile defendant with subnormal intelligence.
The majority concludes that an “examination of the record convinces us that Taylor’s statements were voluntarily made.” A survey of the record brings me to the opposite conclusion.
The determination whether a waiver of rights is voluntary and intelligently made *89by a juvenile is a fact question dependent upon the “totality of the circumstances.” 4
The United States Supreme Court has commented that application of principles excluding the use of involuntary statements by a minor “involves close scrutiny of the facts of individual cases.” 5 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). Instruction that the court’s analysis of the facts should be particularly thorough is provided by In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1967):
“ * * * the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique — but not in principle — depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of parents. * * * If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” (Emphasis added.) 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S. Ct. at 1458, 18 L.Ed.2d at 561.
Courts are continually grappling with the question of “voluntariness,” yet no single definition has been agreed upon. I agree with the following:
“ * * * a confession [or statement] is not deemed to be voluntary merely because it represents a conscious choice among alternatives. On the other hand, it cannot be said that a statement is voluntary only if it would have been made even if no inquiry or other action by law enforcement officials had occurred. Rather, a ‘confession is voluntary if it is the product of an essentially free and un*90constrained choice and involuntary if the product of a will overborne.’ ” United States ex rel. Sanney v. Montanye, 364 F.Supp. 905, at 911 (W.D.N.Y.1973). See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745,9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963).
The atmosphere at the Pioneer Hotel soon after outbreak of the fire was discovered can be described as one of panic. The record indicates several guests were forced to jump to their deaths before helpless would-be rescuers were able to coordinate their efforts and control the fast-spreading fire. There is significant evidence to indicate the defendant took part in these rescue efforts, helping to evacuate third floor guests and carrying several injured persons downstairs to waiting ambulances. Taylor testified he made approximately fifteen trips between the third floor and lobby levels.
As I previously concluded, the defendant was taken into custody by Officer Adams on the street in front of the Pioneer Hotel at approximately 2:41 a. m. Taylor testified he was “tired” at that point. He was then taken to the jammed police station and told to wait in a coffee room, described as small as 1(X x 10' with at least three to five officers.6 The testimony of various witnesses indicates almost every detective in the department and an unusual number of uniformed officers were present at the station that morning because of the fire.7 In this atmosphere Taylor' was almost immediately approached by Sgt. Rossetti and asked “how he had occasion to be at the Pioneer Hotel.” Taylor then launched into the first of what proved to be a series of unsuccessful attempts to divert suspicion to unknown Blacks, Mexicans, and Caucasions he allegedly had seen in the hotel.
The record is replete with disputes over key factors relating to voluntariness. Adams testified that after he read the departmental rights card Taylor did not request an attorney and stated “sure” he understood his rights and would answer the officer’s questions. The defendant, on the other hand testified that he asked to make a telephone call and requested “a lawyer or something”, but that both requests were ignored.
The defendant testified he first went to the second floor of the police station when escorted by an unknown officer after asking him if he could use a restroom. Taylor asserted that after using the restroom he asked this officer if he could make a telephone call and requested an attorney but, as with Adams previously, received no response.
Det. Gassaway testified that the second floor interview room was approximately 10' x 10' to 12' x 12' and that there were never more than two police officers and the defendant present in the room. The defendant alleges a total of eight or nine individuals interrogated him that morning. Gassaway stated Taylor exhibited occasional “hostility”, but never seemed reluctant to talk. The detective testified that the defendant never asked to make a telephone call and never requested an attorney.8
*91The tension of the interrogation process exploded when Gassaway returned to the interview room about 4:15 a. m. (after talking with Scoggins) and accused Taylor of lying. Gassaway described the defendant as “irate and [he] began to curse- at me.” The defendant wanted to know “Why you are picking on me.” Gassaway acknowledged “he did cry at one point there during his anger when he was shouting at me.” Taylor was accused at least twice of starting the fire. At the preliminary hearing the detective testified profanity was used “[b]y both of us.”9 The record shows Gassaway to be a trained and skillful interrogator.10 Intermittent outbursts were interlaced with methodical questioning on details. Strong language was mixed with an appeal to Taylor’s sense of compassion:
“Q. When Gassaway screamed at you, do you remember what he said? ******
“A. He hold me where did I — he said what did I, you know, I want to kill those people before, you know, Christmas.
“Q. Anything else?
“A. And he shouted to me that I was a liar and I was lying to him and stuff like that.”
The defendant eventually told Gassaway “If he didn’t believe me, you know, that I would be willing to take a lie detector test.” Throughout the interview Taylor appears to have been helpless in his own confusion, frantically trying to extricate himself. Constantly on the defensive, the defendant was clearly being pressured for a confession.
Taylor asserted at the voluntariness hearing that he told several detectives, including Gassaway and Murchek, that he did not want to talk by telling them to “get off my back”. Gassaway, on the other hand, testified Taylor merely said “I just wanted you off my back” in response to a query why he had lied to the detective.
The interrogation by Det. Angeley began around 5:40 a. m. — 6:00 a. m.. The detective testified Taylor appeared “somewhat agitated” during the interview. Taylor testified he told Angeley, like Gassaway, to “get off my back.” Angeley testified inconsistently as to whether he actually accused the defendant of starting the fire, but admitted he did not believe what Taylor was saying. This interview, like the others, is the subject of conflicting evidence.11 The defendant testified he requested an attorney during the interrogation. Angeley denies this. The detective testified “sometime after daylight” Taylor stated “when am I going to get to go home?” At the conclusion of the interview the defendant asked to notify his mother and was allowed to make two telephone calls: “ * * * I called twice and that’s all they let me do, you know. They say you have got to go.”
Det. Angeley dialed both times and testified the calls were two different numbers, and that only the second call was answered. Taylor testified, however, that both calls were to the same number and on both *92occasions Caudelle Neal, one of his mother’s neighbors, answered the phone. This was confirmed by Mrs. Neal who testified she received two calls from Taylor early in the morning on December 20th. Det. Angeley testified the defendant told the person who answered the second call “I am at the Detective Division. [pause] They think I set the fire at the hotel, [pause] Tell her, no, I will be home in a little bit, no don’t tell her, I will be home in a little bit.” The defendant and Mrs. Neal do not dispute the accuracy of this testimony, but do contradict Angeley by asserting that in addition to the above a request was made over the phone for an attorney. Angeley testified he was within hearing distance and heard no such request. Mrs. Neal testified that the defendant stated “Mrs. Neal, I did not do it” and sounded like “a scared young boy. * * * Like he was frightened, scared, didn’t know what was going to happen from one minute to the next.”
Angeley testified he conducted all or almost all of the interrogation with just he and the defendant in the second floor interview room. However, at least one other detective participated since Captain Gilmore testified at the transfer hearing that as he entered the interview room between 6:30 a. m. and 7:00 a. m. Det. Angeley and another detective were just leaving.
Officer Scoopmire, who administered the polygraph exam at 7:15 a. m., testified at the transfer hearing that Taylor “asked me on more than one occasion if he was going to be allowed to go home after the examination.” The officer responded he “wasn’t in the position to make that decision.” The defendant was escorted by Scoopmire and Officer Sulzbach back to the same second floor interview room.
Between 8:00 a. m. and 9:00 a. m. the defendant remained in that room and the questioning continued. Det. Smith testified “[t]here were other detectives talking to him” but was unable to remember their names or the number of interrogations. The detective testified he entered the interview room at 9:00 a. m. and immediately read the departmental rights card. The defendant allegedly responded that he understood his rights and agreed to answer questions.
Upon arrival at the Pima County Juvenile Court Center the defendant was informed of his rights by the receiving officer, Gerald Soop, who testified “[h]e advised me that he wanted a lawyer as soon as I advised him.” Taylor, whom Soop described as “nervous”, was also informed for the first time that he could be remanded for trial as an adult.
Confusing evidence indicates that just before or just after this, probably the latter, Det. Smith took the defendant to an interview room at the Center and advised him of his rights. Taylor at that point stated he understood his rights and wanted the assistance of an attorney. Undaunted the detective proceeded to conduct a ten minute interview. Just how unwilling the police were to relent in pressuring for some sort of admission by Taylor is demonstrated by the appearance of Officer Kohlman and Sgt. Bunting at the Juvenile Center the following day, despite their probable knowledge that the defendant had previously requested a lawyer.
The record fails to disclose a single police officer involved in the series of interrogations that was not aware the defendant was a juvenile. Despite this at no time before Taylor was transported to the Juvenile Center on the morning of December 20th did the police attempt to contact the defendant’s mother. Without judging the credibility of the defendant’s assertion that he asked two or three officers besides Angeley at the station if he could make a phone call, it certainly is relevant to the question of voluntariness that the first independent effort by the police to contact Taylor’s mother was when Det. Smith attempted to call her at 10:00 a. m. from the Juvenile Center. This inaction by the police is especially troublesome because Det. Angeley knew exactly where the defendant’s mother lived and, in fact, had been there on several occasions. Det. Murchek *93testified he asked Sgt. Moore at approximately 4:30 — 4:45 a. m. whether Taylor's parents had been notified. The sergeant allegedly replied he would “check into it,” but for unknown reasons nothing was done.
Not one officer at the station that morning informed the defendant he could be remanded, for trial as an adult. While Taylor’s prior contact with the law and the fact he recalled being informed he could be tried as an adult in connection with prior incidents is obviously a counter-balancing factor, it is also clear from the record that the defendant had never been involved in a transfer hearing.
Commencing with the second half of the Gassaway interview, at 4:15 a. m., a concerted effort was launched by the police to seek an admission by Taylor that he had started the fire at the Pioneer Hotel. The interrogation process became accusatory and vehement in nature. Gassaway and the defendant were screaming and cursing at each other. Series of police officers subsequently entered the interview room armed with the knowledge prior interrogators had gleaned from their sessions. This barrage was directed at the defendant despite the fact that at the time of these interviews no independent evidence existed that arson was the cause of the fire. It is uncontroverted that the defendant never' even hinted he was in any way responsible for the tragedy.
The record discloses what I conclude to be a juvenile suddenly confronted with the overwhelming machinery of law enforcement who gradually disintegrates from a state of fright to a feeling of despair and frustration. He was emotionally unable to cope with the seasoned skills of his opponents in debate on his opponent’s home ground.12 It would be extremely difficult for a juvenile, even one who had prior encounters with the police, to conceive that it might be in his best interests to remain silent when under suspicion for the murder of more than a dozen people.13 When confronted with the slightest incriminating evidence in a case such as this a youth would instinctively feel compelled to establish an alibi, whether guilty or not, lacking the maturity to understand “constitutional rights.” A juvenile’s natural inability to understand the significance of his “rights” would be compounded by the existence of an unusually low level of education14 and subnormal intelligence,15 such as the defendant’s. The alleged voluntariness of any waiver is further questioned when the interrogations are conducted in the dead of night by relays of experienced police officers.16
Some indication of Taylor’s state of mind during these interrogations is pro*94vided by the fact that almost everything the defendant said was inconsistent with something he had previously stated, sometimes only seconds before. In his naivete the defendant’s overriding concern was when he was going to be allowed to go home. The defendant in this case was questioned almost continuously by at least eight different police officers and one fire department official for almost seven hours through the night and early hours of the morning, from approximately 2:45 a. m. until 9:40 a. m. Even without the additional considerations of the time of day during which questioning was conducted, a low level of education, subnormal intelligence and coercive conduct by the police, any alleged waiver by a juvenile in the absence of counsel or parents during questioning of that duration should be suspect.17
When considering the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), the United States Supreme Court made the following comments which I consider particularly appropriate in the instant case:
“What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere child — an easy victim of the law —is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race. He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad, questioned through the dead-of night by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature men might stand the ordeal from, midnight to 5 a. m. But we cannot believe a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear, then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence of the law, as he knows it, may not crush him. No friend stood at the side of this 15-year old boy as the police, working in relays, questioned him hour after hour, from midnight until dawn.” 332 U.S. at 599-600, 68 S.Ct. at 303-04, 92 L.Ed. at 228-29.
The court also determined that the fact the juvenile defendant was informed of his constitutional rights does not necessarily establish the voluntariness of subsequent statements:
“The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the police towards his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the law should not sanction. Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.
“But we are told that this boy was advised of his constitutional rights before he signed the confession and that, knowing them, he nevertheless confessed. That assumes, however, that a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full appreciation of that advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom of choice. We cannot indulge those assumptions. Moreover, we cannot give any weight to recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements. Formulas of respect for consti*95tutional safeguards cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them. They may not become a cloak for inquisitorial practices and make an empty form of the due process of law for which free men fought and died to obtain.” 332 U. S. at 600-01, 68 S.Ct. at 304, 92 L.Ed. at 229. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962).
Any advantage Taylor might be presumed to have over the juvenile in Haley, because of increased age, 16 years, eight months old as compared to approximately 15 years old, would be more than compensated for by Taylor’s subnormal intelligence and lack of education.
I have concluded on the basis of the “totality of circumstances” present in this case that statements made by the defendant after Gassaway re-entered the interview room after talking to Scoggins were “the product of a will overborne” by a coercive environment and coercive conduct by law enforcement personnel in violation of Taylor’s Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This determination in no way represents acceptance on my part of the defendant’s version of what occurred at the Tuscon Police Station the morning of December 20th.
The events of the fire and its aftermath, horrible as they undoubtedly are, are not sufficient to nullify that calm and judicial determination of the rights of an individual to a fair trial, let alone a juvenile of the mental capacity of the defendant, even if the law enforcement officers believed that he was guilty of causing the holocaust. The case should be decided rather on the observance of those constitutional principles guaranteed to all persons. The majority’s failure to recognize this ominously encourages the sort of police misconduct and disregard for juvenile rights that occurred in this case.
I would, therefore, reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

. Adams never testified he told Sgt. Lingham that the defendant had agreed to make a statement. Sgt. Lingham, however, testified that the officer made such a remark.

. I am aware that at the subsequent voluntariness hearing, Adams testified he could not recall this prior testimony or that he, in fact, made such a statement.
At the trial Adams hedged on his denial: “[i]t’s possible I might have told somebody to keep an eye on him.”

. It is interesting to note that while the defendant was allegedly brought to the station as a “witness” in order to secure a statement, no recording devices were utilized that morning in order to make a record of what was being said.
In addition, Officer Adams testified that he could not recall seeing any civilians other than the defendant brought to the station as witnesses by the police. We know, of course, that Scoggins and a hotel security guard arrived at the station around 4 a. m.

. The vast majority of jurisdictions utilize this test: Alaska: Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973) ; California: People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert, denied 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968) ; Connecticut: State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 A.2d 867 (1970), cert, denied 402 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 1637, 29 L.Ed.2d 115 (1971) ; Illinois: People v. Pierre, 114 IU.App.2d 283, 252 N.E.2d 706 (1969), cert, denied 400 U.S. 854, 91 S.Ct. 71, 27 L.Ed.2d 92 (1970) ; Louisiana: State v. Melanson, 259 So.2d 609 (La.App.1972) ; Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Cain, 279 N.E.2d 706 (Mass.1972) ; Minnesota: State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973) ; North Carolina: State v. Dawson, 278 N.C. 351, 180 S.E.2d 140 (1971) ; New York: People v. Stephen J. B., 23 N.Y.2d 611, 298 N.Y.S.2d 489, 246 N.E.2d 344 (1969) ; New Jersey: State v. R. W., 115 N.J.Super. 286, 279 A.2d 709 (1971) ; Ohio: State v. Carder, 3 Ohio App.2d 381, 210 N.E. 2d 714 (1965) ; Oregon: Nunn v. Cupp, 15 Or.App. 212, 515 P.2d 421 (1973) ; Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 287 A.2d 131 (1971) ; Tennessee: Vaughn v. State, 3 Tenn.Cr.App. 54, 456 S.W. 2d 879 (1970) ; Texas: In re Garcia, 443 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Civ.App.1969) ; Washington: State v. Grant, 9 Wash.App. 260, 511 P.2d 1013 (1973) ; Wisconsin: Theriault v. State, 66 Wis.2d 33, 223 N.W.2d 850 (1974) ; Wyoming: Mullin v. State, 505 P.2d 305 (Wyo.1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 940, 94 S.Ct. 245, 38 L.Ed.2d 166.
Most federal courts are in accord: United States v. Poole, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 495 F.2d 115 (1974) ; United States v. Miller, 453 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1972), cert denied 406 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 1790, 32 L.Ed.2d 123; Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968) ; West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968), cert, denied 393 U.S. 1102, 89 S.Ct. 903, 21 L.Ed.2d 795 (1969) ; United States v. Harden, 480 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Hilliker, 436 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 958, 91 S.Ct. 987, 28 L.Ed.2d 242 (1971).
See Theriault v. State, supra, at n. 11-12.

. The court in GaUegos also stated “[tjhere is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, except the totality of circumstances that bear on the two factors we have mentioned [procedural due process and compulsion].” (Emphasis added.) 370 U.S. at 55, 82 S.Ct. at 1213, 8 L.Ed.2d at 329.
See Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969) ; Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed. 2d 246 (1957).

. Testimony given by Det. Gassaway at the voluntariness hearing and trial indicates there were eight to ten officers in the coffee room at 3:00 a. m. In testimony which is almost impossible to reconcile with that given by Adams, the detective stated he and Adams but not the defendant were present at that point.

. Det. Murchek and Det. Gassaway testified they were called at home and told to come to the station because of the fire at 2:50 a. m. and 3:00 a. m. respectively.
A comparison of footnotes 6 and 7 shows Gassaway testified at different hearings that he was both called at home and arrived at the police station at 3:00 a. m. We do know that Sgt. Moore described the defendant in such a manner to Gassaway during the phone call that Taylor must have already arrived at the station. Thus the only thing we can be sure of is that the call was made after 2:44 a. m.

. It is clear the police were exercising very tight control over the defendant. As an *91example, during the first portion of the interview, between 3:30 a. m. and 3:55 a. m., the defendant was granted his request to use the drinking fountain and restroom. Det. Murchek testified he escorted Taylor to the drinking fountain because “I didn’t know if he knew where it was.” This sounds dubious as testimony indicated it was also on the second floor and easy to find. Moreover, Murchek stated he accompanied the defendant into the restroom, yet could not remember whether he himself used the facilities. The police were unwilling to let Taylor out of their immediate presence.

. At the trial, however, Gassaway denied ever testifying he used profanity during the interrogation. He acknowledged merely raising his voice on two occasions.

. When Gassaway was in the interview room he was in command. Murchek asked very few questions.

. The substance of what was said during the various interrogations is a matter of great dispute. The conflict is being considered in this discussion, however, only insofar as it relates to the issue of voluntariness.

. “Even innocent questions asked of a suspect in the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station may create in him the impression that he must answer them.” Proctor v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.G. 241, 404 F.2d 819 (1968).

. The seriousness of the crime with which a juvenile stands accused and the possible consequences it threatens are factors to be considered when analyzing the “totality of circumstances” surrounding an allegedly voluntary waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.

. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ot. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) ; Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed. 2d 167 (1957) ; Story v. State, 452 P.2d 822 (Okl.Cr.1969).

. “ [I]f the minor is mentally retarded or of subnormal intelligence for his age, * * * that is a factor weighing heavily against a finding of capacity [to waive one’s rights] * * * [although] the ‘totality of circumstances’ test still applies.” People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, at 385, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, at 600, 432 P.2d 202, at 216 (1967), cert, denied 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968). See Eikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 77 S.Ct. 281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957) ; United States v. Blocker, 354 F.Supp. 1195 (D.C.D.C.1973).

. The individuals who interrogated the defendant were all experienced officers in the Tucson Police Department: Adams, 4 years; Rossetti, 9 years; Gassaway, 8 years; Murchek, 9% years; Angeley, 9% years; and Smith 3 years.

. All courts agree that lengthy interrogation, repeated and prolonged questioning and the lack of sleep or food are factors bearing on voluntariness. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1940).
In this ease the defendant was up all night and was never offered anything to eat by the police.