Court Opinion

ID: 9771571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:47:34.081045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:33.102873
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I fully recognize that the majority’s holding that the evidence injected by the juror was not an “outside influence” is supported by Robinson Elec. Supply v. Cadillac Cable Corp., 706 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) and Daniels v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc., 704 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Nevertheless, I refer to the concurring opinion of Justice Draughn in Robinson, supra at 133. He very ably points out the defects in adopting such a narrow construction of “outside influence.”
The efforts of competent lawyers and judges to seat a jury with no preconceived ideas about a case and have it consider only evidence allowed under the rules are rendered meaningless when appellate courts allow jurors to inject other evidence during the deliberations. This deprives the litigants of a fair trial and makes a mockery of the trial judge’s instructions. Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.