Court Opinion

ID: 9896256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 20:14:23.568451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:30.384801
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                            SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                          FILED
                                                                                 November 9, 2023
                                                                                       released at 3:00 p.m.
In re S.B. and A.W.                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                   SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                        OF WEST VIRGINIA
No. 22-798 (Raleigh County 2021-JA-179-D and 2021-JA-180-D)

                                  MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Petitioner Mother, B.W., 1 appeals from an order the Circuit Court of Raleigh County
entered on September 24, 2022. 2 By that dispositional order, the circuit court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to both of her children, S.B. and A.W. On appeal, Mother argues the circuit court
erred by terminating her parental rights. The West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources (“DHHR”) and the children’s guardian ad litem support termination.

        Upon consideration of this matter, we find that the circuit court properly terminated
Mother’s parental rights to S.B. and affirm that portion of the circuit court’s order. However, we
further find that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.W.,
vacate that portion of the circuit court’s order, and remand for further proceedings. Additionally,
this case satisfies the “limited circumstances” requirement of Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules
of Appellate Procedure and is appropriate for disposition by memorandum decision.

        This case began as an abuse and neglect proceeding against Mother, who is the mother of
S.B. and A.W. The DHHR filed its petition on November 2, 2021, and alleged that it had attempted
to provide services to Mother 3 prior to the filing of the petition, but such efforts were unsuccessful,
and a subsequent referral necessitated the filing of a formal child abuse and neglect proceeding.

       1
          We use initials, rather than the parties’ full names, in cases involving sensitive facts. See
generally W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e) (restricting use of personal identifiers in cases involving
children); In re K.L., 241 W. Va. 546, 548 n.1, 826 S.E.2d 671, 673 n.1 (2019) (using initials to
refer to child parties).

       2
         Amanda J. Taylor represents Petitioner Mother. Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and
Assistant Attorneys General Andrew T. Waight and Jason R. Trautwein represent Respondent
West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. G. Todd Houck is the children’s
guardian ad litem.
       3
         The petition also named S.B.’s father and A.W.’s father as additional respondents. S.B.’s
father has not appealed the circuit court’s order terminating his parental rights, and A.W.’s father
has been determined to be a non-offending parent.
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Specifically, the petition alleged that S.B. was an abused, neglected, and/or abandoned child
because Mother’s drug use prevented her from being able to care for the child, and the child often
was hungry because there was not adequate food in the home. The petition further alleged that, as
a result of S.B.’s abuse, A.W. also was an abused and/or neglected child. At the time of the
petition’s filing, S.B. lived with Mother in Raleigh County, but A.W. lived with her non-offending
father in a different county.

        Throughout the underlying abuse and neglect proceedings, Mother continued to abuse
various substances, including heroin and methamphetamine. During the March 3, 2022
adjudicatory hearing, Mother entered a stipulation that stated: “I, [B.W.], acknowledge that my
drug screens have been positive, and request an improvement period to correct the conditions of
abuse and neglect that led to the filing of the petition.” The circuit court accepted Mother’s
stipulation and adjudicated her on that basis. The adjudicatory order references S.B., but it does
not mention A.W., and the appendix record does not contain any other adjudicatory orders
pertaining to A.W.

        The circuit court granted Mother a post-adjudicatory improvement period but she failed to
complete a treatment program to help her overcome her substance abuse addiction, was repeatedly
absent from court hearings and scheduled drug screens, and had positive drug test results when she
submitted to drug screens scheduled in conjunction with the few court hearings she did attend.
Ultimately, the circuit court terminated Mother’s parental rights to both S.B. and A.W. In its
September 24, 2022 dispositional order on appeal, the circuit court based its disposition of
termination upon Mother’s failure to remedy the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the
petition’s filing, i.e. Mother’s substance abuse addiction. The circuit court also based its decision
to terminate Mother’s parental rights upon her abandonment of her children. Although the
DHHR’s abuse and neglect petition alleges abandonment, Mother’s stipulated adjudication
addressed only her drug use, and the circuit court did not set forth findings of fact to explain its
finding of abandonment. From this dispositional order, Mother appeals to this Court. 4

       The standard of review we apply to a circuit court’s rulings in an abuse and neglect case is
well-settled.

               Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de
       novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the
       facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
       evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such
       child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing
       court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
       is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
       with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However,
       a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided

       4
         The children’s current permanency plan contemplates S.B. being adopted by her foster
family, and A.W. continuing to reside with her non-offending father.

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       the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the
       evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.

Syl. pt. 1, In Int. of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

       Mother appeals from the circuit court’s order terminating her parental rights to S.B. and
A.W. Because the children’s circumstances at the time of the petition’s filing were different—S.B.
resided with Mother in Mother’s home, while A.W. resided with her non-offending father in his
home—we will address Mother’s assignment of error with respect to each child separately.

        We find the circuit court did not err by terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.B. After
the DHHR filed its petition alleging that Mother had abused and neglected S.B., she entered a
stipulated adjudication in which she stated that “I, [B.W.], acknowledge that my drug screens have
been positive, and request an improvement period to correct the conditions of abuse and neglect
that led to the filing of the petition.” This stipulation meets the requirements for a stipulated
adjudication. See W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse & Neglect Proc. 26(a) (“(a) Required Information.
Any stipulated or uncontested adjudication shall include the following information: (1) Agreed
upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondents’ [sic] problems, conduct, or
condition; and (2) A statement of respondent’s problems or deficiencies to be addressed at the final
disposition.”).

        Following this adjudication, the circuit court granted Mother an improvement period to
correct the conditions of abuse and neglect that led to the petition’s filing. Mother’s family case
plan terms required her to submit to drug screens and obtain treatment for her substance abuse
addiction. Throughout the proceedings, Mother failed to submit to required drug screens unless
they were ordered in conjunction with her appearance at a court hearing that she attended. Mother
also attempted to enter rehabilitation programs several times during the pendency of the case, but
she did not complete any of these treatment programs.

        The circuit court, by its September 24, 2022 dispositional order, terminated Mother’s
parental rights to S.B. upon finding that she had not corrected the conditions of abuse and neglect
that had led to the petition’s filing. This disposition is supported by the governing statute, West
Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), which finds that termination of a parent’s parental rights is proper
when “there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially
corrected in the near future and . . . when necessary for the welfare of the child[.]” The statute
further directs that “‘[n]o reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be
substantially corrected’” exists when “the abusing adult . . . ha[s] demonstrated an inadequate
capacity to solve the problems of abuse or neglect on their own or with help.” W. Va. Code
§ 49-4-604(d). These conditions include circumstances in which

               [t]he abusing parent . . . ha[s] habitually abused or [is] addicted to alcohol,
       controlled substances or drugs, to the extent that proper parenting skills have been
       seriously impaired and the person . . . ha[s] not responded to or followed through
       [with] the recommended and appropriate treatment which could have improved the
       capacity for adequate parental functioning [and]
                                                  3
                ....

                [t]he abusing parent . . . ha[s] not responded to or followed through with a
        reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts of social, medical, mental
        health, or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the abuse or
        neglect of the child, as evidenced by the continuation or insubstantial diminution
        of conditions which threatened the health, welfare, or life of the child[.]

W. Va. Code §§ 49-4-604(d)(1, 3). Given Mother’s failure to comply with the majority of the drug
screening ordered by the court and her failure to obtain treatment to remedy the conditions of abuse
and neglect in this case, the circuit court properly terminated her parental rights to S.B.

        However, we do not find that the circuit court properly terminated Mother’s parental rights
to A.W. While the DHHR’s petition contained lengthy factual statements upon which it based its
allegations that Mother had abused and/or neglected S.B., the DHHR’s allegations of the
circumstances constituting abuse and/or neglect of A.W. are sparse. With respect to A.W., the
petition in this case alleges only that, “[a]s a result of the abuse to [S.B.], the child [A.W.], is also
abused and/or neglected. Furthermore, this abuse has impaired [Mother’s] parenting skills to a
degree as to pose an imminent risk to a child’s health or safety as defined in W. Va. Code
§ 49-1-201.” This allegation of Mother’s abuse and/or neglect of A.W. is not sufficient to support
the DHHR’s petition as to this child for several reasons.

       First, the statute defining “abuse” allows a finding of abuse as to one child to extend to
another child living in the same home:

        “Abused child” means:

                (1) A child whose health or welfare is being harmed or threatened by:

                        (A) A parent, guardian, or custodian who knowingly or
                intentionally inflicts, attempts to inflict, or knowingly allows
                another person to inflict, physical injury or mental or emotional
                injury, upon the child or another child in the home. Physical injury
                may include an injury to the child as a result of excessive corporal
                punishment[.]

W. Va. Code § 49-1-201. Accord Syl. pt. 2, In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692
(1995) (“Where there is clear and convincing evidence that a child has suffered physical and/or
sexual abuse while in the custody of his or her parent(s), guardian, or custodian, another child
residing in the home when the abuse took place who is not a direct victim of the physical and/or
sexual abuse but is at risk of being abused is an abused child under W. Va. Code [§ 49-1-201].”).
Nevertheless, at the time of the petition’s filing, A.W. was not living in the same home with Mother
and S.B. A.W. was living with her non-offending father in a different county. Therefore, the
DHHR’s attempt to extend an allegation of abuse of S.B. to A.W. is not supported by the facts
                                                   4
alleged in the petition or the law defining the circumstances that may give rise to a finding of
“abuse.”

         Moreover, when a child resides outside the home, the DHHR may still allege that the child
has been abused and/or neglected, but such allegations of harm must be specific. See Syl. pt. 3, in
part, In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023) (emphasizing, with respect to petitions filed
to protect children who are not residing with their parents at the time of the petition’s filing, that
“generalized findings [as to how the children have been abused and/or neglected] applicable to all
children named in the petition will not suffice; the circuit court must make specific findings with
regard to each child so named”). The specificity required in a petition’s allegations includes
“specific conduct including time and place [and] how the conduct comes within the statutory
definition of neglect or abuse.” W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(b). Accord W. Va. R. P. Child Abuse &
Neglect Proc. 18(c)(1) (requiring petition to include “[a] statement of facts justifying court
intervention which is definite and particular and describes . . . [t]he specific misconduct, including
time and place, if known, or incapacity of the parent(s) . . . responsible for the child’s care”). The
DHHR’s scant allegation of the abuse and/or neglect of A.W. does not satisfy this specificity
requirement. In particular, the DHHR does not specify how Mother’s conduct constituted abuse
and/or neglect as to A.W. other than to explain that, because S.B. was abused and/or neglected by
Mother’s conduct, A.W. should, by extension, also be found to have been abused and/or neglected
by Mother’s conduct. Therefore, the petition was not sufficient to permit the circuit court to
adjudicate A.W. as an abused and/or neglected child.

       Finally, adjudication is a jurisdictional prerequisite to disposition.

               For a circuit court to have jurisdiction over a child in an abuse and neglect
       case, the child must be an “abused child” or a “neglected child” as those terms are
       defined in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 (2018). Pursuant to West Virginia Code
       § 49-4-601(i) (2019), a circuit court’s finding that a child is an “abused child” or a
       “neglected child” must be based upon the conditions existing at the time of the
       filing of the abuse and neglect petition.

Syl. pt. 8, In re C.S., 247 W. Va. 212, 875 S.E.2d 350 (2022). Given that the petition did not
contain adequate allegations to support a finding that A.W. had been abused and/or neglected, the
circuit court could not adjudicate her as an abused and/or neglected child. 5 Since adjudication is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to disposition, we find that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
proceed to the dispositional phase of the proceedings as to A.W. In light of these procedural errors,
we vacate the circuit court’s dispositional order to the extent it terminated Mother’s parental rights

       5
          In fact, it does not appear from the appendix record that the circuit court actually
adjudicated A.W. as an abused and/or neglected child during the underlying proceedings because
the court’s adjudicatory order does not include A.W. in either the style or the body of that order,
and the record does not contain any other adjudicatory orders pertaining to A.W.

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to A.W. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 6 See Syl. pt. 5, In re
Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001) (“Where it appears from the record that the
process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and
related statutes for the disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected
has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order of disposition will be vacated
and the case remanded for compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate dispositional
order.”).
       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court properly terminated Mother’s
parental rights to S.B., and we affirm that portion of the circuit court’s September 24, 2022 order.
However, we further conclude that the circuit court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights
to A.W., and we vacate that portion of the circuit court’s September 24, 2022 order and remand
for further proceedings. Finally, we direct the Clerk of this Court to issue the mandate
contemporaneously with this decision.

                                                 Affirmed, in part; Vacated and Remanded, in part.

ISSUED: November 9, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       6
         These further proceedings may require the DHHR to file an amended petition alleging
A.W. is an abused and/or neglected child if sufficient facts exist to support such allegations. See
W. Va. R. P. Abuse & Neglect Proc. 19 (explaining procedure for amendments to abuse and
neglect petitions).

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