Court Opinion

ID: 9571162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:32.227847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:03.800021
License: Public Domain

Todd, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion in the matter of the petition of Martin J. Rafferty, Jr.
The majority opinion compounds a series of strained judicial interpretations to avoid “a result which was not intended by those who voted on the question.”1 With candor, the majority concedes its reluctance to amend our constitution by implication. Nevertheless, in so doing, the court has placed our constitution in a precarious position.
*208This case presents a number of questions of interpretation. The first of these was the construction of the 1970 amendment itself. The majority chooses to construe this amendment -narrowly and to limit its effect to lowering the voting age for elective public office. Strong arguments could be made against such a construction since, by a single question, both the matter of lowering the age to vote under Minn. Const, art. 7, § 1, and the matter of fixing the age for holding public office under art. 7, § 7, were submitted to the voters. If this were the only conclusion reached by the majority, this dissent would be unnecessary. However, this initial interpretation has become the springboard for additional judicial interpretations with which I cannot agree.
The majority next seeks to avoid the unequivocal language of art. 7, § 7, which provides that the limitations provided therein apply “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution * * There is no dispute that art. 4, § 25, except as interpreted by the majority, still provides that a qualified voter, meeting the residency requirements therein, may hold the office of state senator or representative. Petitioner Rafferty meets these qualifications. To disfranchise him and the voters who might have supported him in his district, the majority must add by judicial implication the words “as to age” to the above-quoted exception in art. 7, § 7, of our constitution. It should be noted that the exception contained in art. 7, § 7, existed prior to the adoption of the 1970 amendment and that amendment did not seek to add the limitation now being judicially imposed. The insertion, by judicial construction, of the words “as to age” is crucial to the majority opinion to avoid amending by implication the language of art. 5, § 3, providing a minimum age limit of 25 years for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor. Without the addition of that language, any attempt to amend art. 4, § 25, by implication would also necessarily amend art. 5, § 3, by implication. I question this judicial selection of language to achieve by implication a desired result with respect to one section of our constitution while attempting to avoid a similar result with respect to another *209section. A change in art. 5, § 3, which the majority seeks to avoid, must necessarily follow the avoidance of the clear and express language of the constitution. It is impossible to imagine the language the court might next be forced to read into our constitution to select judicially the portions of the constitution that have and have not been affected by the amendment adopted by the electorate.
If one is to accept the premise of the majority, we could hold that the voters intended to lower the required age for holding the office of governor or lieutenant governor to 21 and that the excepting clause of art. 7, § 7, was repealed by implication. The question submitted to the voters at the polls is no more explicit on this proposition than it is on the issue of the age of our state senators or representatives. The language of our court in Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 194, 89 N. W. 2d 635, 649 (1958), is particularly applicable here:
“While this case may illustrate the need for some constitutional revision, the fact remains that the right to amend the constitution rests with the people and should not be usurped by the courts in the guise of judicial interpretation.”
Next, the majority attempts to construe the amendment to implement the legislative intent. A review of the house and senate journals of the 1969 legislature shows that companion bills were introduced in the house and senate.2 These original bills sought to amend art. 7, § 1, of the constitution by lowering the voting age to 18. Both the house and the senate files were subsequently amended to propose that art. 7, § 3, be amended to deny residency to college students at the place they were attending school.3 The only reported senate action on its own file after the *210introduction and first reading was committee action adding the limitation with respect to college students and recommending the bill to pass.4 The house journal reports a series of committee actions culminating in the passage of the house version of the bill on May 22, 1969.5 The senate acknowledged receipt of House File 18 on May 23, 1969,6 and, after its first reading, referred the bill to the judiciary committee.7 The bill was reported back by that committee with a recommendation that it pass with the following amendments: That the proposed amendment to art. 7, § 1, be changed to lower the voting age to 18; that the proposed amendment to art. 7, § 3, with respect to the residency limitation on college students be deleted; and that a proposed amendment to art. 7, § 7, be included purporting to limit the eligibility to hold public office to persons 21 years of age.8 This is the first point at which any proposal to amend art. 7, § 7, appears in the published reports. The recommendation of the judiciary committee was made on May 24, 1967, and, since that was the last day the legislature could pass legislation, the rules of the senate were suspended, the bill was again amended to change the voting age back to 19, and the bill, as finally amended, was passed.9 The bill was immediately returned to the house where it was finally passed as amended on the same day, May 24, 1969.10 There is no mention anywhere in the Journal of the House regarding the amendment to art. 7, § 7. It is obvious that there were no public hearings in either body on the proposal for amending § 7.
The problem faced by the court is that we cannot presume lack of legislative intent despite the procedural history of the particular legislation. Nevertheless, I do not believe we should close our *211eyes to the obvious. I do not believe we should lend judicial support to a situation created by hasty legislative action by stretching reasonable rules of interpretation to achieve a result which in effect substitutes judicial intent for legislative intent; and since the legislation in this case deals with amendments to our constitution affecting the basic rights of our citizens, we should be even more cautious.
Finally, the majority proceeds to interpret the intent of the voters at the time the amendment was adopted. Necessarily, a broad view of the legislation must be taken since a strict interpretation would prohibit the result reached in this decision. The question submitted to the voters was couched in language limited to the proposed amendments to art. 7, §§ 1 and 7, but even the broad view adopted by the majority has deficiencies which I regard as fatal. As previously indicated, it is not free from doubt which sections of the constitution are to be affected by the question submitted to the voters, referring in particular to the sections dealing with the age of legislative candidates and the age of candidates for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor.
Further, the entire legislative focus, as disclosed by the house and senate journals, was on the question of the age of voters. The record reflects the public pressure to establish the voting age at 18 instead of 19. Nothing in the record discloses any legislative history regarding the age for holding public elective office. Other than the language contained in the question submitted to the voters, there is no evidence available to show whether the age requirement for holding office was brought to the attention of the public in thé 5-month period from the time of the adoption of the legislation to the time of the vote of the people. To subscribe to the voters a particular intent, as the majority has done, is to ascribe to the question submitted a clarity it is sadly lacking.
I would have granted petitioner Rafferty’s request and ordered *212his name placed on the ballot as the unambiguous language of our constitution requires.

 Ante, p. 206.

 House File 18, introduced January 13, 1969, Journal of the House, 1969, p. 66; and Senate File 18, introduced January 14, 1969, Journal of the Senate, 1969, p. 44.

 Journal of the House, 1969, p. 1883; Journal of the Senate, 1969, p. 639.

 Journal of the Senate, 1969, p. 639.

 Journal of the House, 1969, p. 3756.

 Journal of the Senate, 1969, p. 2828.

 Id. p. 2830.

 Id. p. 2952.

 Id. p. 3163.

 Journal of the House, 1969, p. 4220.