Court Opinion

ID: 9564985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:51.344823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.298002
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s treatment of the appellant’s sixth assignment of error. The majority concedes that the appellant was not present at the hearing where the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to waive a twelve person jury after one of the jurors became ill during deliberations and was unable to continue. Under Article II, section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution, an accused has a fundamental constitutional right to a unanimous twelve member jury in all felony cases.
This Court has previously held that the trial judge has an affirmative duty to make inquiry of the accused to assure that such waiver was expressly and intelligently made. See Beck v. State, 626 P.2d 327, 328 (Okl.Cr.1981). The instant case is wholly distinguishable from Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okl.Cr.1983), where this Court, in finding a valid waiver of the accused’s right to trial by jury, noted that the trial judge “painstakingly and carefully examined the appellant personally at length to determine whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.” In the instant case, the trial judge specifically stated that he would be “compelled” to grant a motion for mistrial if requested to do so, and that, “I wouldn’t feel uncomfortable in doing that ... [although] I would hate to have a seven-day trial result in a mistrial, but certainly if either one of the defendants wants to so move, I won’t have any hesitancy in granting a mistrial at this point....” In spite of this, however, the trial judge failed to make any inquiry of *1037the appellant to determine on the record whether he was personally knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional right to a unanimous twelve person jury.
An examination of prior cases in which this Court has approved waivers of jury trials or juries composed of less than twelve members as mandated by Article II, § 19, of the Oklahoma Constitution for felony cases, reveals that in each case the defendant personally waived such right in open court. See, e.g., Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377381 (Okl.Cr.1983); Colbert v. State, 654 P. 624, 627 (Okl.Cr.1982); Holloway v. State, 365 P.2d 829, 831 (Okl.Cr.1961); Trott v. State, 62 Okl.Cr. 52, 70 P.2d 118, 119 (1937); Ex parte Hollingsworth, 46 Okl.Cr. 353, 287 P. 840, 841 (1930). In Swift v. State, 510 P.2d 286, 287 (Okl.Cr.1973), Judge Bussey wrote the opinion reversing a conviction where the defendant had expressly objected to being tried by an eleven member jury. In Hayes v. State, 541 P.2d 210, 212 (Okl.Cr.1975), this Court reversed in a similar situation where the trial court failed to conduct an appropriate inquiry of the defendant to establish a personal waiver, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant authorized, consented to, or ratified the waiver.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that:
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a factfinding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 263, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930) (emphasis added). The Court in Patton specifically found no meaningful distinction between a complete waiver of a jury trial and consent to be tried by less than twelve members. Id. at 290, 50 S.Ct. at 255. Federal courts require that the waiver of jury trial be in writing. See Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 23(a). The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. III, Ch. 15, Trial by Jury, § 1.2(b) (1980) recommends the following:
The Court shall not accept a waiver unless the defendant, after being advised by the court of his right to a trial by jury, personally waives his right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the record.
Several jurisdictions hold that an accused must personally waive his right to a jury trial either in writing or in open court for the record. See State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct.App.1985); Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388 (Alaska 1978); Rice v. People, 193 Colo. 270, 565 P.2d 940 (1977); State v. Butrick, 113 Ariz. 563, 558 P.2d 908 (1976); State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975); People v. Holmes, 54 Cal.2d 442, 5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 583 (1960).
The record indicates that the trial judge swore in thirteen (13) jurors. I fail to understand why the alternate juror was not utilized. On the basis of the foregoing, I would remand this case to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a twelve member jury by consenting, authorizing or ratifying counsel’s waiver upon his behalf. In the absence of such a showing at the evidentiary hearing, I believe that the foregoing authority would require that the appellant be given a new trial. In the future, trial courts must carefully examine the defendant in open court to build a record for appellate determinations of an accused’s knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. Of course, it would always be preferable, although not mandatory, *1038that such waivers be in writing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.