Court Opinion

ID: 9888910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 20:03:38.769317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:47.029644
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 P. v. Soto CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061193

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 10WF3109)

 ALEXANDER SOTO,                                                       OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              Alexander Soto appeals from the order denying his petition for resentencing
                                            1
under former Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition after
issuing an order to show cause and conducting a hearing. Based on the court’s review of
Soto’s original trial record and counsel’s argument, the court concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt Soto was guilty of second degree murder as a direct aider and abettor.
Soto seeks reversal of the order denying his petition on the grounds: (1) an aider and
abettor can only be convicted of murder upon a finding of express malice; and (2) even if
an aider and abettor can be convicted of murder based on a finding of implied malice,
insufficient evidence showed Soto acted with implied malice.
              We affirm. Pursuant to the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990 (Reyes), a defendant may directly aid and
abet an implied malice murder. As substantial evidence shows Soto acted with implied
malice, the trial court did not err by denying Soto’s petition.

                                           FACTS
              The following facts are taken from the factual and procedural background
set forth in a prior opinion by another panel of this court in People v. Soto (Feb. 3, 2016,
G049639, G050098, G050120) [nonpub. opn.], which Soto and the Attorney General
                                                                               2
have adopted as the statement of facts in their respective appellate briefs:
              “Harvey Romero, the victim, accompanied several friends to a party before
it was broken up by police. Harvey left the party with his cousin, Anthony Romero, and

1
  Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6
with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All further statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2
  The term “defendants” as used in this summary of facts refers to Soto and his two
codefendants at trial, David Anthony Luna and Jeremy Erin Valdez.

                                                2
                [3]
three others.         Isidro Martinez drove, with Vanessa Bruno sitting next to him in the front
seat, and Harvey sat in the back seat by a window. Anthony and his girlfriend, Kaylin
Allbee, also sat in the back seat. The group set out in search of another partygoer who
already had left, Chloe Cruz, and wound up on Santa Catalina Street in Stanton, an area
the Crow Village criminal street gang claimed as its territory.
                  “Unfamiliar with the neighborhood, the group remained in touch with Cruz
by cell phone. As they looked for her, Martinez drove slowly in his gray SUV past
several men standing in the street, including the three defendants, Jorge Huante, and two
others. Defendants and Huante belonged to the Crow Village gang.
                  “Earlier in the evening, a neighbor had heard Huante announce to
defendants and another male that he had his ‘.38’ with him. The neighbor, fearing
violence, declined to give Huante a ride to a party that night and ultimately decided not to
go to the party. But now Huante and the others had returned and gathered in the street.
                  “Meanwhile, as Harvey and his friends drove by looking for Cruz, the
Crow Village group approached their vehicle, with Huante and Soto leading the way,
trailed by Luna and another man. One of the four called out to Martinez’s vehicle,
‘Where are the girls at?’ Anthony tried to deflect the question, saying there were none,
and Martinez continued driving, but the four men kept alongside on foot.
                  “Huante and Soto each called out at the vehicle, ‘Where are you from,’ or
‘Where do you bang,’ which Anthony understood meant ‘What gang are you with?’
Anthony, who did not belong to a gang, felt the encounter was escalating and declined to
respond, though he and Huante ‘mad dogg[ed]’ each other, which he explained meant,
‘Like when I’m looking at somebody in a mean way.’ Luna and the other man trailing

3
  “For ease of reference, we use Harvey’s and Anthony’s first names to differentiate
between the two cousins.”

                                                  3
Huante and Soto began making gang hand signs at the SUV and calling out their gang’s
name.
              “According to one witness, Valdez stood nearby and stepped out into the
street in the direction the SUV was traveling, as if to stop it.
              “Someone in the Crow Village group yelled at the SUV, ‘You know where
you’re at,’ and Huante declared, ‘It’s Crow Village.’ According to a witness from the
neighborhood, someone from the SUV retorted, ‘Fuck this neighborhood.’
              “As Martinez began to turn at the nearest intersection, Harvey leaned his
head out the window and gunfire immediately rang out. He and Allbee collapsed in the
back seat. Allbee confirmed she was okay, but when Anthony tried to lift Harvey, he was
limp and heavy. Anthony’s hands grew very warm and he realized Harvey was bleeding
profusely from his face. At some point in the confrontation and commotion, Anthony
saw Huante holding a gun. Another witness in the neighborhood also saw Huante pull
out and fire the gun.
              “Martinez sped away to find a hospital, but spotted Orange County Sheriff
Department deputies conducting an unrelated traffic stop, so Martinez pulled over for
help. Back at the shooting scene, Huante, Soto, and Valdez (but not Luna) had jumped
into Yosep Palacio’s black SUV. Valdez’s girlfriend, Brianna Casanovo, already was in
the car, and so was Cruz, whom Martinez’s group had been trying to find.
              “Palacio drove off and happened to pass where Martinez had stopped to ask
the sheriff’s deputies for help. Martinez noticed the black SUV approaching and told one
of the deputies, Peter Mach, that it looked like a vehicle he saw at the shooting scene. As
the vehicle passed, Mach thought he recognized Huante from prior police contacts.
              “A nearby deputy gave chase, but Palacio did not stop immediately. He
ultimately pulled into the back of a church parking lot, where Huante and Valdez exited
the vehicle and scaled a wall. Valdez hid in a ditch, then ran back to his residence,
showered, changed his clothes, and called a Crow Village neighbor to visit around

                                               4
11:00 p.m. He told the neighbor of his escape after being pulled over, but as he drew a
diagram of the area where the stop occurred and showed it to his neighbor, the police
arrived and apprehended him.
               “Harvey was transported to the hospital, but died of his injuries, which
included a fractured skull from the gun shot, blood loss, and brain hemorrhaging.
               “Police surveillance of a Westminster home led officers to Huante the next
evening, but he escaped in a Mustang driven by a female accomplice, who briefly eluded
police twice. When the officers pulled the vehicle over, Huante was gone and remained
at large at the time of trial. A phone recovered from the Mustang bore traces of Huante’s
DNA.
               “A car wash employee found a gun in the bushes near the church where
Palacio had been stopped. The gun, a five-shot revolver, contained four live rounds and
one fired cartridge casing. Although the ammunition in the gun was not designed for it,
the gun still could fire those rounds. The gun ordinarily required special .38-caliber
ammunition, but contained other .38-caliber bullets made by Smith and Wesson, which
matched a fragment recovered from Harvey’s wound.
               “Forensic analysis of the recovered gun showed DNA traces of at least
three individuals on the grip and hammer, and at least four individuals on the trigger.
The DNA samples were not suitable to make a positive identification, but Huante,
Palacio[], and defendants Valdez and Luna were possible contributors to the DNA
mixture on the gun grip. Huante and defendants Valdez and Luna were also possible
DNA contributors on the trigger. The testing excluded defendant Soto as a contributor on
the grip or trigger.
               “Within a week of the shooting, new graffiti at the intersection where
Harvey was killed made reference to Crow Village and to Soto’s and Huante’s gang
monikers.

                                              5
              “Valdez’s former girlfriend, Brianna Casanova, testified Valdez stood by a
wall talking to a group of women at the time of the shooting. After she heard gun fire,
Valdez joined her in Palacio’s car and they drove away to go to a party.
              “Luna’s cousins and friends testified that he was at a birthday party at the
time of the shooting. Soto’s father and mother claimed for the first time at trial that he
was home at the time of the shooting.
              “Bruno testified for the defense that Allbee, Anthony’s girlfriend, directed
Martinez where to go in Stanton to get drugs. As they drove slowly through the
neighborhood, she saw between seven and 10 males nearby, and she heard the questions
about whether there were any girls in the car and “where are you from?” According to
Bruno, she heard two gun shots separated by a couple of seconds. None of the shots
came from inside Martinez’s vehicle.
              “The defense also called Allbee, and when she remembered little, refreshed
her recollection with her statement to an investigator that she heard two gun shots.”

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY
              In 2013, a jury convicted Soto of second degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).)
The jury also convicted Soto of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246), and found various penalty
enhancement allegations true, including that he committed the murder to promote the
                                                            4
activities of a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), vicariously discharged a
firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)), and committed the offenses for the

4
  The trial court struck this enhancement, stating in the minutes: “By operation of law,
the Enhancement alleged pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2 applies only to
convictions of First Degree Murder. Defendant was convicted of Second Degree
Murder.” Both parties and the trial court agreed the jury’s true finding on this
enhancement should not be considered in the resolution of Soto’s petition for
resentencing.

                                              6
                                                         5
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced Soto to
an aggregate term of 40 years to life.
              Soto appealed from the judgment of conviction. In February 2016, a panel
of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction, rejecting Soto’s arguments regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence, instructional error, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
(People v. Soto, supra, G049639, G050098, G050120.)
              In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) which limited accomplice liability under the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine by amending sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Cruz
(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 740, 755; People v. Solis (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 762, 768.) It also
implemented a process in former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6) whereby persons
previously convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory could petition the superior court to vacate their murder convictions
and for resentencing. (People v. Cruz, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 753.)
              In April 2019, Soto filed a petition for resentencing under former section
1170.95. (People v. Soto (Aug. 4, 2020, G058078) [nonpub. opn.].) The petition alleged
he was convicted of second degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and that under Senate Bill No. 1437 he could not now be convicted of murder.
(People v. Soto, supra, G058078.)
              The trial court denied the petition on the sole basis Senate Bill No. 1437
was unconstitutional because it improperly amended Propositions 7 and 115. (People v.
Soto, supra, G058078).) A panel of this court reversed the trial court’s order and directed
                                                                     6
the trial court to consider the merits of Soto’s petition. (Ibid.)

5
  The jury also convicted Luna and Valdez of the same offenses. Since Luna and Valdez
are not parties to this appeal, we reference them only to provide relevant background.
6
  In the opinion, this court explained: “In two recently published opinions, this court
concluded Sen. Bill 1437 is constitutional because it neither adds any particular provision

                                               7
              Following remand to the trial court, the prosecution conceded the petition
made a prima facie showing Soto was entitled to relief and the trial court issued an order
to show cause on the petition. The parties filed supplemental briefs and presented
argument at the hearing; no additional evidence was presented at the hearing on the
petition. The trial court thereafter denied the petition, stating in the court minutes: “The
People have proven to this court beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Soto’s conviction is
                                                                  7
valid under a still-viable theory of liability.” Soto appealed.

                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I.
         SENATE BILL NO. 1437 AND THE SECTION 1172.6 PETITION PROCEDURE
              Senate Bill No. 1437 amended the felony murder rule and eliminated the
natural and probable consequences doctrine for murder “to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) One of the changes it made was amending
section 188, which defines malice. As amended, section 188 states, except for felony
murder, “in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) This amendment effectively eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty
of murder. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846–848, abrogated by statute on

to nor subtracts any particular provision from either Proposition 7 or Proposition 115.
[Citations.] We decline to revisit those decisions.” (People v. Soto, supra, G058078.)
7
  During the pendency of this appeal, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 980. We invited the parties to file supplemental letter briefs
addressing the impact of the Reyes decision on this appeal; Soto and the Attorney General
each did so.

                                              8
another ground as stated in People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 591, review
                                                                8
granted Jan. 27, 2022, S274792, review dism. May 31, 2023.)
              With Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature also created a process through
which defendants convicted of felony murder or murder via a natural and probable
consequences theory under the former law could petition the superior court to have their
murder convictions vacated pursuant to the new law. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
              The process begins when a defendant, who was previously convicted of
murder under a qualifying theory, files a petition, which includes a declaration by the
defendant that he or she is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 based on the statute’s
requirements. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Once a defendant has made a prima facie
showing for entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
              Unless the parties stipulate the defendant is eligible for relief under the
statute, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be
granted relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1), (2).) At the hearing, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of murder under the
law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “[T]he court may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible
under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters
judicially noticed.” (Ibid.) Both parties may present “new or additional evidence to meet
their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) If the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
defendant is guilty of murder under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437, the
petition is denied. However, “[i]f the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the

8
  While Senate Bill No. 1437 also amended the felony murder rule (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 3), we need not discuss those changes here as the felony murder rule is not at
issue in this case.

                                              9
prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall
be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)
                                                II.
                                     STANDARD OF REVIEW
                 “Ordinarily, a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed
for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under this standard, we review the record ‘“‘in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”’
[Citation.] But where there is an issue as to whether the trial court misunderstood the
elements of the applicable offense, the case presents a question of law which we review
independently.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
                                               III.
        THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPREHENDED THE
             APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS FOR AIDING
                    AND ABETTING IMPLIED MALICE MURDER

                 At trial, the prosecution relied on two theories of aiding and abetting to
establish Soto’s liability for murder. After conceding Soto was not the shooter, the
prosecutor informed the jury it could find Soto (and his codefendants) guilty of second
degree murder under a theory of direct aiding and abetting or under the natural and
probable consequence doctrine. Because Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated the latter
theory, we examine whether the trial court properly understood the elements of direct
aiding and abetting. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 990.)
                 In his opening brief, Soto argues as an aider and abettor he could only be
convicted of murder upon a finding of express malice. In Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
page 990, however, the California Supreme Court stated case law has recognized and

                                                10
applied the direct aiding and abetting theory of second degree murder “and we see no
basis to abrogate it.” (Id. at p. 990.) The Supreme Court explained: “In Gentile, we
observed that ‘notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not
expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with
conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.] Since our decision in Gentile, the Courts of
Appeal have held that a defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice murder.”
(Ibid.)
              Citing People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710–714, the Supreme
Court in Reyes stated: “‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus
of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of
implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-
endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts
constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an
implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the
commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which
must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the
perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious
                                                                         9
disregard for human life.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.)

9
  The California Supreme Court further explained: “‘The reason why there is a dearth of
decisional law on aiding and abetting implied malice murder may be the heretofore
availability of the natural and probable consequences doctrine for second degree murder,
which was easier to prove. . . . [T]he natural and probable consequences doctrine did not
require that the aider and abettor intend to aid the perpetrator in committing a life-
endangering act . . . . What was natural and probable was judged by an objective
standard and it was enough that murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
crime aided and abetted.’” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)

                                             11
              As pointed out by the Attorney General in his supplemental letter brief,
nothing in the record suggests the trial court misapprehended the applicable legal
principles or required elements for aiding and abetting implied malice murder in ruling
on the petition. We therefore consider Soto’s arguments regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence.
                                            IV.
  SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING SOTO IS GUILTY OF
           SECOND DEGREE MURDER AS A DIRECT AIDER AND ABETTOR.
              Soto argues that even if his second degree murder conviction based on an
implied malice aiding and abetting theory is valid, his petition should have been granted
because insufficient evidence shows Soto acted with implied malice. We disagree.
              As we will explain, substantial evidence showed Soto, by words and
conduct, aided the commission of the life-endangering act of Huante shooting at the
SUV. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Substantial evidence also showed Soto
knew Huante intended to commit the shooting, intended to aid Huante in the commission
of that act, knew the act of shooting at an occupied vehicle is dangerous to human life,
and acted in conscious disregard for human life. (See ibid.)
              Trial testimony showed on the night of the shooting, Soto was gathered
with fellow Crow Village criminal street gang members in an area claimed by that gang
when Huante, also a member of Crow Village, showed Soto and the others he had a gun,
telling them: “‘I got a .38.’” After displaying the gun to the group for about a minute,
Huante put the gun in his waistband. When the SUV turned onto the street where Soto
and the other Crow Village gang members were gathered, Soto and Huante approached
the SUV; Valdez jumped in front of it trying to stop its forward progress. Huante
thereafter initiated a “hit-up” by asking the occupants of the SUV where they were from.
              The prosecution’s expert gang witness testified: “A hit-up is basically a
challenge, a verbal challenge, where are you from, where do you bang, things of that

                                            12
nature. There is not necessarily any right or wrong answer, but when you say where are
you from, where do you bang, it’s basically a challenge to see if you’re a gang member, if
you’re a rival of that gang, or an ally of that gang, and trying to figure out who you are in
a very small amount of time. If you’re deemed a rival, then immediate reaction is they
have to fight you. If you – if the gang member perceives you gave the wrong answer,
they will, at the very least, assault you.”
              The expert witness explained “respect is everything in the gang world” and
“[d]isrespect requires immediate retaliation.” He also testified that it was common within
gang culture that a “wrong” response, e.g., a disrespectful response, will escalate into an
attempted murder or murder. He stated: “Again, it goes back to the sign of disrespect
and also the possible wrong answer to where are you from. If you don’t, if they see you
as a challenge or a threat, they have to do something, the gang member has to do
something right then and there, even if it’s a normal tone, they don’t like their answer,
they are going to be assaulted.”
              He also explained how gang members back each other up: “If, say, there is
one person in a group that’s hitting up another person, there are several subjects behind
him backing up. If that front person is disrespected, then the people in the background,
the backup, don’t do something about it, then they are losing respect also.”
              Evidence presented at trial shows Soto did not just accompany Huante in
hitting up the occupants of the vehicle, he also participated directly in hitting them up,
asking them where they were from and flashing gang signs, and as Huante’s backup.
After Huante and Anthony had mad-dogged each other and Huante declared they were
“in Crow Village,” someone in the SUV gave a wrong answer, stating “Fuck this
neighborhood.” Moments later, Huante pulled out the gun and fatally shot Harvey.
              Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s findings. The trial
court did not err by denying Soto’s petition for resentencing.

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                                   DISPOSITION
             The postjudgment order denying Soto’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                               MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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