Court Opinion

ID: 9925991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 17:04:08.174315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.328060
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Jan 23 2024, 8:31 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita                                       Mark A. Bates
Attorney General of Indiana                              R. Brian Woodward
                                                         Office of Lake County Public
Jesse R. Drum
                                                         Defender
Assistant Section Chief
                                                         Crown Point, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,                                        January 23, 2024
Appellant-Defendant/Cross-Appellee,                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                         22A-CR-2557
        v.                                               Appeal from the Lake Court
                                                         The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas,
Trisha M. Woodworth,                                     Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant.                      Trial Court Cause No.
                                                         45G02-1703-F1-5

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                             Judges Vaidik and Mathias concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024                           Page 1 of 32
      Statement of the Case
[1]   The State of Indiana (“the State”) appeals the trial court’s order, which granted

      the trial court’s own motion to correct error, vacated Trisha Woodworth’s

      (“Woodworth”) conviction by jury for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

      resulting in death, and granted Woodworth a new trial. The State argues that

      the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct

      error. On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is insufficient evidence to

      support her conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in

      death.

[2]   Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own

      motion to correct error, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate

      Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in

      death. Further, addressing Woodworth’s cross-appeal and concluding that

      there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction, we reverse

      Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in

      death.

[3]   We reverse.

      Issues
               Appeal Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion when
               it granted its own motion to correct error.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 2 of 32
              Cross-Appeal Issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to
              support Woodworth’s conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a
              dependent resulting in death.

      Facts
[4]   M.M. (“M.M.”) was born in July 2015 to Ryan Moore (“Father”) and Megan

      Garner (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”). Mother’s stepmother (“maternal

      step-grandmother”) initially cared for M.M. while Parents worked. However,

      when maternal step-grandmother went back to work in January 2016 and was

      no longer able to care for M.M., Mother asked Woodworth if she could take

      care of M.M. four days a week while Parents worked. Mother and Woodworth

      had been “really good friends” since middle school, and Mother had lived with

      Woodworth’s family for a short time while Mother and Woodworth were in

      high school. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 69). Woodworth, who was a stay-at-home mom

      with two children, including a one-year-old son (“Woodworth’s son”) and a

      six-year-old daughter, agreed to care for M.M. on Mondays, Tuesdays,

      Wednesdays, and Fridays. Another friend of Mother’s, Kerri Hart (“Hart”),

      had already agreed to take care of M.M. on Thursdays.

[5]   On the evening of Monday, April 11, 2016, Mother was sitting on the floor

      playing with eight-month-old M.M. when M.M. fell over Mother’s leg and hit

      her head on the hardwood floor. M.M. had a “little red scuff” on her forehead

      above her eyebrow and cried for about thirty seconds. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 36).

      Parents did not notice any changes in her behavior that evening and did not

      seek medical assistance.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 3 of 32
[6]   During the course of that week, Mother noticed that M.M. was fussier and

      whinier than usual and wanted Mother to hold her. When Mother dropped

      M.M. off at Hart’s home on Thursday, April 14, Mother asked Hart to give

      M.M. ibuprofen because she “seemed fussy[,]” and Mother believed that M.M.

      was teething. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 16). Hart noticed that M.M. had a bruise on her

      forehead. M.M. usually took a nap at 11:00 a.m.; however, that day, Hart

      noticed that M.M. seemed tired at 9:15 a.m. When M.M. woke up from her

      nap, she was “fussy and whiny.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 22). Later that day, Hart took

      M.M. outside for a walk. Hart and M.M. walked past a neighbor’s house, and

      the neighbor noticed a “little goose bump on [M.M.]’s head with a bruise.” (Tr.

      Vol. 4 at 57). Hart and M.M. returned to Hart’s house, and M.M. played

      outside at a water table for about three hours and seemed fine.

[7]   Mother dropped M.M. off at Woodworth’s home on Friday, April 15, at 8:00

      a.m. Woodworth’s significant other and the father of her children, Enrique

      Meraz (“Meraz”) left the house for work at approximately 9:15 a.m. As he

      walked out the front door, Meraz noticed that M.M. was playing with toys

      while lying on a blanket in the living room.

[8]   Woodworth had invited her sister, Tasha Woodworth (“Tasha”), mother, Lori

      Woodworth (“Lori”), and grandmother, Patricia Thomas (“Patricia”) to her

      house to have lunch that afternoon. Tasha and Lori arrived at Woodworth’s

      home at 11:30 a.m., and Patricia arrived at noon. The women sat in the living

      room and visited while Woodworth’s son and M.M. were napping.

      Woodworth’s son woke up at approximately 1:00 p.m.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024   Page 4 of 32
[9]    About five minutes later, the women heard M.M. crying in the bedroom where

       she had been napping. Woodworth and Tasha went into the bedroom to check

       on her. M.M. seemed “crabby[,]” “fussy[,]” and “a little whiny[,]” but she

       grabbed Tasha’s finger and appeared alert. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 44). Woodworth

       changed M.M.’s diaper and handed M.M. to Tasha. Tasha took M.M. into the

       living room and played with her while Woodworth went to the kitchen to make

       her bottle. Lori noticed that M.M. had a bruise with “an egg-sized knot” on her

       forehead. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 66). When Woodworth came into the living room with

       M.M.’s bottle, Tasha handed M.M. to Woodworth. Woodworth attempted to

       feed M.M.; however, M.M.’s eyes closed, she “kind of slumped over[,]” and

       she would not take the bottle. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 24). Lori thought that M.M. was

       “still a little sleepy from her nap.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46). But, when Woodworth

       tried to feed M.M. again, M.M. “didn’t look right[.] [H]er eyes weren’t open

       and her breathing looked funny.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46).

[10]   At 1:15 p.m., Woodworth texted Mother and asked Mother to telephone her.

       While Woodworth was attempting to contact Mother, Tasha and Lori put a

       cold rag on M.M.’s head to help her wake up. However, the cold rag had no

       effect. Tasha and Lori then took M.M. outside to get some fresh air, but that

       had no effect on M.M. either. When Mother telephoned Woodworth,

       Woodworth told her that she had tried to give M.M. a bottle and that “she

       wasn’t waking up.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 91). Mother told Woodworth to call 911.

       Woodworth called 911 at 1:24 p.m.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024    Page 5 of 32
[11]   Paramedic Richard Traybsza, Jr., (“Paramedic Traybsza”) and EMT Micheal

       Chiaro (“EMT Chiaro”) were dispatched to Woodworth’s home for an

       unresponsive eight-month-old child. When Paramedic Traybsza and EMT

       Chiaro arrived at the scene, Tasha handed M.M. to Paramedic Traybsza. As

       Paramedic Traybsza was walking towards the ambulance with M.M., M.M.’s

       “caretaker” told him “[t]hat this ha[d] been going on all day.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at

       75). Paramedic Traybsza noticed that M.M. had a bump on her forehead and

       was “belly breathing[,]” which is abnormal breathing without full lung

       expansion. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 78). In addition, Paramedic Traybsza noticed that

       M.M. was unresponsive, her eyes were not moving, and she had no reaction to

       light or pain stimulus.

[12]   While Paramedic Traybsza was examining M.M., Tasha told EMT Chiaro that

       “this [had] just happened.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 105). Tasha further told EMT Chiaro

       that M.M. had been “fine for awhile after she [had gotten] up and then . . . she

       wasn’t waking up and she wasn’t responding to anything.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 28).

       When EMT Chiaro asked about the bump on M.M.’s head, Tasha told him

       that Mother had said that the bump had happened a few days ago. EMT

       Chiaro responded that “[i]f it were my child, I would have taken them in to get

       seen.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 116).

[13]   Lake County Sheriff’s Department Officer Lawrence Obregon (“Officer

       Obregon”) was the first officer to arrive at the scene. He had heard the radio

       dispatch and had responded to the scene because he had been in the vicinity.

       As he walked by the ambulance, Officer Obregon noticed the medical

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 6 of 32
       professionals rendering aid to M.M. Officer Obregon walked to Woodworth’s

       residence and asked Woodworth what had happened. Woodworth responded

       that she was M.M.’s babysitter and that she had noticed at some point that

       M.M. had become unresponsive. Woodworth further told Officer Obregon that

       when she had realized that “something was not right,” she had “immediately”

       called 911. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 179).

[14]   When Mother arrived at the scene shortly after 1:30 p.m., she noticed two

       ambulances and five Lake County Sheriff’s Department vehicles. Mother ran

       to the ambulance, opened the doors, and explained that she was M.M.’s

       mother. However, the deputies refused to allow Mother to enter the ambulance

       and told her to wait in the yard. While Mother was waiting in the yard, the

       deputies “yelled at” her, mentioned the bruise on M.M.’s head, and asked

       Mother why she had not taken M.M. to the hospital. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 123).

       Mother “felt like a suspect.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 124). Shortly thereafter, the

       ambulance transported M.M. to Methodist Hospital in Gary.

[15]   After the ambulance had left, Lake County Sheriff’s Department Detective

       Jeremy Kalvaitis (“Detective Kalvaitis”) spoke with Woodworth. Woodworth

       told Detective Kalvaitis that M.M. had arrived at her home at approximately

       8:00 a.m. that morning. According to Woodworth, at that time, M.M. had

       been happy and alert. Woodworth had played with M.M. that morning, and

       after she had given M.M. a bottle, Woodworth had put M.M. down for her

       morning nap at 10:00 a.m. Woodworth further told Detective Kalvaitis that “a

       couple of hours later, which [Detective Kalvaitis had] denoted . . . in [his] notes

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024          Page 7 of 32
       as noon[,]” M.M. had woken up. (Tr. Vol. 5 at 200). In addition, Woodworth

       told Detective Kalvaitis that M.M. had been lethargic. According to

       Woodworth, M.M.’s “breathing had become funny, and she just didn’t seem

       like herself[.] [I]t seemed as if she were gasping for air.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 201).

       Woodworth further told Detective Kalvaitis that Tasha and Lori had tried to

       revive M.M. by using a cold compress and by taking her outside. When that

       did not work, Woodworth had contacted Mother, who had told Woodworth to

       call 911. Woodworth showed Detective Kalvaitis her cell phone, which

       showed that she had called 911 at 1:24 p.m.

[16]   In the meantime, when Mother arrived at Methodist Hospital in Gary, hospital

       staff members were preparing M.M. for a helicopter transfer to the University of

       Chicago Comer Children’s Hospital (“Comer Children’s Hospital”). Mother,

       Father, and other family members drove to Chicago. Mother thought that

       M.M.’s condition was a result of the fall on her head at home on Monday

       evening. However, when Parents arrived at Comer Children’s Hospital, Dr. Jill

       Glick (“Dr. Glick”), medical director of the child advocacy and protective

       services team at Comer Children’s Hospital, told Parents that “a violent shaking

       episode [had taken] place at [Woodworth]’s home.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 140). M.M.

       died two days later at Comer Children’s Hospital. Following an autopsy, the

       medical examiner concluded that M.M.’s cause of death was “blunt force head

       injuries with . . . cervical injuries as a contributing factor.” (Tr. Vol. 6 at 57).

       The medical examiner further concluded that the manner of M.M.’s death was

       homicide.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024          Page 8 of 32
[17]   In March 2017, the State charged Woodworth with: (1) Count 1 - Level 1

       felony aggravated battery; (2) Count 2 – Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

       resulting in death; and (3) Count 3 – Level 2 felony battery resulting in death to

       a person less than fourteen years of age. Specifically, Count 1 alleged that

       Woodworth “did knowingly or intentionally inflict injury on a person that

       created a substantial risk of death to [M.M.] . . . and did result in the death of

       [M.M.][.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39). Count 2 alleged that Woodworth “did

       knowingly place [M.M.] in a situation that endangered [M.M.]’s life or health,

       to-wit: not providing immediate medical attention upon injury and resulted in

       the death of [M.M.][.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39). In addition, Count 3 alleged that

       Woodworth, “did knowingly or intentionally touch [M.M.] . . . in a rude,

       insolent, or angry manner, to-wit: shaking [M.M.] resulting in the death of

       [M.M.][.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39).

[18]   At Woodworth’s six-day trial in July 2022, the jury heard testimony regarding

       the facts as set forth above. In addition, Dr. Glick, the State’s first expert

       witness, testified that when M.M. had arrived at Comer Children’s Hospital,

       M.M. had presented with both a “subdural hematoma . . . pretty much over the

       right side of her head[]” and “significant retinal hemorrhaging in both eyes.”

       (Tr. Vol. 3 at 136, 139). According to Dr. Glick, M.M.’s injuries were

       consistent with “[a]busive head trauma and the mechanism [was] cranial

       rotation or shaking.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 146). In addition, Dr. Glick testified that

       when a child has this type of brain trauma, the child is “immediately

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024         Page 9 of 32
       symptomatic[]” and that “[t]here’s really no delay.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 154). Dr.

       Glick further testified as follows:

               [I]n the adult world, we know that with cranial rotational injury
               it’s the same thing. And so you’re immediately symptomatic,
               and that’s just a normal dictum in head trauma. In fact, I was
               part of helping develop the Regional Response to Head Trauma
               in Illinois, and the goal is to get the person in within an hour to
               treat, because then you can even reverse the disease, the damage.
               That implies they’re immediately symptomatic. So the bottom
               line is this child was immediately symptomatic after this shaking
               event occurred or shaking events occurred.

       (Tr. Vol. 3 at 154-55). Dr. Glick further testified that she had not been

       concerned that M.M. had fallen and hit her head the Monday before her death

       because she had not shown any symptoms of a brain injury for four days.

[19]   During cross-examination, Dr. Glick acknowledged that given the number of

       people in Woodworth’s home at the time of M.M.’s alleged injury, it could

       have been anyone who had shaken M.M. Dr. Glick further acknowledged that

       M.M. had no external injuries consistent with having been shaken and that

       irritability and fussiness are possible symptoms of a brain injury.

[20]   The State’s second expert witness was Dr. Ponni Arunkumar (“Dr.

       Arunkumar”), the chief medical examiner at the Cook County medical

       examiner’s office in Chicago. Although Dr. Arunkumar did not perform

       M.M.’s autopsy, Dr. Arunkumar had reviewed M.M.’s medical records and

       had drawn her own conclusions. According to Dr. Arunkumar, M.M.’s cause

       of death was “blunt force head injuries[,]” and the manner of death was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 10 of 32
       homicide. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 57). Dr. Arunkumar testified that M.M. would have

       become “unconscious when the injuries [had been] inflicted.” (Tr. Vol. 6 at

       59). Dr. Arunkumar further opined that M.M.’s injuries could not have

       resulted from her fall on the Monday night before her death.

[21]   At the end of the State’s case-in-chief, Woodworth made an oral motion for a

       directed verdict on all three counts. The trial court denied Woodworth’s

       motion, and the trial continued.

[22]   During Woodworth’s case, she presented the testimony of three expert

       witnesses. Dr. John Galaznik (“Dr. Galaznik”) was the first expert witness.

       Dr. Galaznik “closely follow[s] and ha[s] published in the area of the

       biomechanical research relevant to shaking and short distance falls.” (Vol. 6 at

       113). Dr. Galaznik testified that he disagreed with Dr. Glick’s opinion that

       M.M.’s injuries had resulted from a shaking. Dr. Galaznik specifically

       explained as follows:

               [B]ecause [M.M.] weighed greater than 16 pounds, and the
               biomechanical studies from a retinal hemorrhaging point of view,
               from a brain injuring point of view and from a subdural
               hemorrhage point of view have failed to confirm with
               experimental research that the levels that you could generate in
               such a maneuver would actually be predicted to be injuring.

       (Tr. Vol. 6 at 118). According to Dr. Galaznik, M.M.’s fall on the Monday

       before she died was significant because M.M. “was about 28-inches tall. So

       you’re talking about a 28-inch head drop to a hard surface.” (Tr. Vol. 6 at 150-

       51). Dr. Galaznik opined that M.M.’s fall could have contributed to her death.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 11 of 32
[23]   Dr. Joseph Scheller (“Dr. Scheller”), a pediatric neurologist who specializes in

       neuroimaging, was Woodworth’s second expert witness. Dr. Scheller testified

       that he had reviewed M.M.’s medical records, including the results of a scan

       that had been done at Comer Children’s Hospital. According to Dr. Scheller,

       M.M.’s fall on the Monday evening before her death

               affected a large vein that was responsible for draining the blood
               out of a good portion of her brain. That head injury triggered a
               blood clot. That blood clot grew over time. And it grew big
               enough that [it] seriously disrupted blood flow out of her brain.
               Not into her brain, but out of her brain. And it caused the brain
               to swell and it caused her to collapse and become deathly ill. The
               other things that the attorney mentioned, the small subdural
               hematoma and the retinal hemorrhages, are incidental. They go
               along with it, but those didn’t kill her, and those are not
               responsible for what turned out. They are just incidental
               findings. And so it’s an unfortunate thing, and we would never
               want it to happen to anybody, but she had bad luck and died
               from complications of a relatively minor head injury.

       (Tr. Vol. 7 at 51). Dr. Scheller further explained that as the clot in M.M.’s brain

       was growing, M.M. would have shown symptoms such as increased irritability.

       In addition, Dr. Scheller explained that on April 15, the blockage caused by the

       blood clot became so dramatic that M.M.’s brain began to swell. Dr. Scheller

       further explained that once the clot had blocked the blood flow, the symptoms

       would have been immediate. According to Dr. Scheller, the labored breathing

       that M.M. experienced after waking up from her nap at Woodworth’s home

       was “consistent with the moment where the backup just got too dramatic and

       the stroke got too large.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 55). Dr. Scheller also testified that “[a]s

       a neurologist who has seen a lot of kids with strokes and adults with strokes,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024        Page 12 of 32
       [he] would disagree” with Dr. Glick’s opinion, which was “spoken by a non-

       neurologist.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 59).

[24]   Forensic pathologist, Dr. George Nichols (“Dr. Nichols”), was Woodworth’s

       third expert witness. Dr. Nichols also disagreed with Dr. Glick’s opinion that

       M.M. had been shaken. Specifically, Dr. Nichols testified that M.M.’s fall on

       the Monday before her death “was of sufficient force in the right place to set in

       motion a series of events that eventually led to her death.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 137).

       Dr. Nichols further testified that M.M. had a borderline abnormally large head,

       which may have rendered her “more prone to develop intracranial

       hemorrhage.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 116). In addition, Dr. Nichols pointed out that

       M.M. did not have ligament, muscle, or tissue damage that “you find with

       shaking.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 207).

[25]   Following the presentation of evidence in her case, Woodworth orally renewed

       her motion for a directed verdict, and the trial court denied it. In addition, the

       trial court asked one of Woodworth’s counsels (“Woodworth’s counsel”) if he

       was going to tender final instructions on any lesser-included offenses, and

       Woodworth’s counsel responded that he was not.

[26]   During closing argument, Woodworth’s counsel argued that the State had

       failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that M.M. had been shaken or that

       Woodworth had shaken her. In addition, Woodworth’s counsel specifically

       addressed “the State’s argument [based on Detective Kalvaitis’ testimony] that

       somehow [Woodworth had gone] into the bedroom at noon and [had] woke[n]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 13 of 32
       [M.M.] up.” (Tr. Vol. 7 at 218-19). Woodworth’s counsel specifically argued

       as follows:

               If [M.M.] woke up at noon, that would mean . . . that they didn’t
               call 911 for an hour and 15 minutes. So [M.M.] wakes up and
               [she] is not alert and healthy and functioning. Do you think that
               these four people - - it’s not only [Woodworth] at that point, it’s
               all four of them - - are going to let [M.M.] languish and call 911
               an hour and 20 minutes later? The evidence is that [M.M.] woke
               up at 1:00 [p.m.]. [M.M.] was healthy. [M.M.] was alert. And
               suddenly [M.M.] stroked, and that’s when [M.M.] went
               downhill.

       (Tr. Vol. 7 at 219-20).

[27]   The jury convicted Woodworth of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

       resulting in death and acquitted her of Level 1 felony aggravated battery and

       Level 2 felony battery resulting in death to a person less than 14 years of age.

       In August 2022, Woodworth filed a motion to correct error wherein she argued

       that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for Level 1 felony

       neglect of a dependent resulting in death. She asked the trial court to either

       direct a verdict in her favor or to grant her a new trial. Woodworth also asked

       the trial court to grant her a new trial based on a juror’s letter that had

       expressed doubt about Woodworth’s guilt. The State filed a response asking

       the trial court to deny Woodworth’s motion to correct error.

[28]   The trial court held a motion to correct error hearing in September 2022. After

       the parties had made their respective arguments, the trial court stated that “[t]he

       attorneys, obviously, worked hard on both sides. They did a great job

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024           Page 14 of 32
       developing their respective cases, their theories. The work that went into it is

       extensive, and that’s obvious.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 49-50). The trial court specifically

       told Woodworth’s counsel that he “clearly [was] a skilled trial attorney.” (Tr.

       Vol. 8 at 50). The trial court further told Woodworth’s counsel as follows:

       “Your examination of the experts, defense experts and State’s was masterful.

       There’s no doubt you prepared upon this case.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 50-51). The trial

       court then asked Woodworth’s counsel, “what number criminal trial is this of

       yours?” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 51). When Woodworth’s counsel responded that it was

       his first felony trial, the trial court told Woodworth’s counsel that “[i]t wasn’t

       obvious[.]” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 51).

[29]   Thereafter, the trial court reviewed the State’s theory of the case that

       Woodworth had inflicted an injury on M.M., Woodworth’s theory of the case

       that M.M. had fallen on a Monday and had had a stroke on a Friday, and the

       jury’s verdicts that Woodworth had not inflicted an injury on M.M. The trial

       court then explained that the issue was whether Woodworth had “place[d]

       [M.M.] in a situation that [had] endangered [M.M.]’s life or health by not

       providing immediate medical attention.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 52). The trial court

       further explained as follows:

               [T]he evidence as presented by [Woodworth’s counsel] . . . was
               that from the time [M.M.] became unresponsive to the time that
               a phone call was placed to 911, was approximately - - I am just
               going to say nine minutes. But in between, members of
               [Woodworth]’s family were trying to render aid to [M.M.] They
               were - - a damp cloth. Take [M.M.] outside for fresh air. They
               were doing what I think would be in the normal realm of a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024        Page 15 of 32
               layperson trying to render aid. From my perspective, it would
               not be immediately apparent that 911 should have been called.
               [M.M.] is not responsive, let’s call 911. Well, first let’s try a cold
               cloth, outside. I think those are reasonable actions to take. Now
               if that had been a couple of hours and they didn’t call, clearly
               that’s a different story.

                                         *        *       *        *         *

               So I am left with sentencing a woman to between 20 to 40 years
               in prison for arguably, at the farthest stretch, a nine-minute delay
               in calling the ambulance. Let’s say that it took five or six
               minutes to provide compresses and take her outside and then
               there’s three or four minutes left, so they took some reasonable
               steps, took five or six minutes. And then they determined to call
               the ambulance after those efforts of - - it wouldn’t be quite
               resuscitation, but trying to wake her up. So three or four
               minutes, she is going to prison for a minimum of 20 years? I
               don’t know.

       (Tr. Vol. 8 at 52, 53).

[30]   The trial court apologized to Woodworth’s counsel for what it was “about to

       say.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 53). According to the trial court, it had “coincidentally”

       and “serendipitously” read a case that morning regarding the topic of ineffective

       assistance of counsel. (Tr. Vol. 8 at 54). The trial court told Woodworth’s

       counsel that it was not saying that he was unprofessional but that there were

       some things that had troubled the trial court regarding the procedure of the

       case. The trial court first asked if the State had offered a plea to Woodworth.

       The State told the trial court that Woodworth’s counsel “had made a proposal

       at the far low end of the felony scale. And I believe with a request for a

       misdemeanor as well. Based on that, I didn’t think we could ever bridge the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024         Page 16 of 32
       gap.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 54-55). The trial court responded that it “underst[oo]d that

       completely.” (Tr. Vol. 8 at 55).

[31]   The trial court then pointed out that Woodworth’s counsel had not requested

       jury instructions on lesser-included offenses. In addition, the trial court stated

       that it did not believe that Woodworth’s counsel had included the Level 1

       felony of neglect of a dependent resulting in death count in closing arguments.

       The trial court acknowledged that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are

       typically “raised on a PCR[]” but further explained as follows:

               So there’s a case State v. Johnson[,] 714 N.E.2d 1209 [(Ind. Ct.
               App. 1999)] that basically says that the trial court under Rule 59(b)
               can grant it[]s own motion to correct error. Basically, what I have
               just stated that it is [Woodworth’s counsel]’s first [felony] trial. I
               don’t think he argued anything on the Count II [Level 1 felony
               neglect of a dependent resulting in death] during his closing,
               coupled with the fact that it’s - - it would be, from my perspective,
               a manifest injustice to sentence Trisha Woodworth to prison for
               20 years for a nine-minute delay of the phone call.

               I am setting aside the verdict in this case and vacating the
               sentencing [hearing scheduled for] tomorrow. I am recusing
               myself and setting this case out of this court. That is what is
               happening.

                                         *        *       *        *         *

               And I may very well be wrong with everything I said, it’s - - I
               don’t know. But I - - under these circumstances, I cannot - - I
               can’t do it.

       (Tr. Vol. 8 at 55-56).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024        Page 17 of 32
[32]   When the State asked the trial court under which of the Woodworth’s theories

       it was granting relief, the trial court responded and explained as follows:

               None by the defense[.] That is my conglomeration of it being a
               manifest injustice without - - [Woodworth’s counsel] didn’t argue
               Count II in his closing argument. It’s his first jury trial. He’s a
               skilled trial attorney. He’s new to the criminal thing - - the
               criminal realm. He didn’t try to minimize his client’s exposure to
               prison time by way of a plea agreement. Plus coupled with the
               fact that in my own opinion that nine minutes is not an
               unreasonable delay to have called the ambulance.

                                         *        *       *        *         *

               That’s what I am finding. Nine minutes does not justify 20
               years, regardless of what the jury found. Even if they found - - so
               I am not saying I am going against the jury and reweighing the
               evidence.

       (Tr. Vol. 8 at 57, 59).

[33]   The trial court further stated that it was vacating Woodworth’s conviction for

       Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death and ordering a new

       trial. In addition, the trial court released Woodworth on her own recognizance

       despite the State’s request that Woodworth post an additional bond.

[34]   In its written order issued that same day, the trial court agreed with

       Woodworth’s “excellent argument . . . with regard to the time line of the onset

       of symptoms to the 911 call. This time frame was approximately nine (9)

       minutes[.] The Court finds that nine (9) minutes was a reasonable amount of

       time to determine whether or not 911 needed to be called.” (App. Vol. 2 at 7).

       The trial court’s order further provides as follows:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024       Page 18 of 32
               The Court acknowledges that [Woodworth’s counsel] is a skilled
               civil trial attorney however, the Court finds that due to
               [Woodworth’s counsel]’s inexperience, he failed to negotiate any
               type of plea agreement to present to his client in an attempt to
               minimize punishment. Also, at the end of the trial, he neglected
               to consider lesser-included offenses and discuss them with his
               client. Had [Woodworth] requested instructions on lesser-
               included offenses, under the facts and circumstances of this case,
               the Court would have seriously considered I.C. 35-46-1-4(a)(1) as
               a potential relevant lesser-included offense. Moreover, in closing
               arguments, [Woodworth’s counsel] failed to make any arguments
               with regard to Count II, Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in
               Death, for which his client was convicted. The Court finds that
               counsel’s lack of criminal experience, and therefore performance,
               fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, which the
               Court attributes to this being the first criminal trial of defense
               counsel.

       (App. Vol. 2 at 7-8).

[35]   The State now appeals, and Woodworth cross-appeals.

       Decision
[36]   The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its

       own motion to correct error. On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is

       insufficient evidence to support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a

       dependent resulting in death. We address each of the parties’ contentions in

       turn.

       1. Motion to Correct Error

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 19 of 32
[37]   The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted its

       own motion to correct error and granted Woodworth a new trial. We agree.

[38]   We review the trial court’s decision to grant a new trial for an abuse of

       discretion. Weida v. Kegarise, 849 N.E.2d 1147, 1154 (Ind. 2006). An abuse of

       discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court or if the trial court has

       misinterpreted the law. Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1083 (Ind. 2022).

[39]   Here, the trial court granted Woodworth a new trial for two reasons.

       Specifically, the trial court found that: (1) Woodworth’s counsel was

       ineffective; and (2) the jury’s verdict did not accord with the evidence because

       nine minutes was a reasonable amount of time for Woodworth to determine

       whether she should call 911. Neither reason supports the trial court’s grant of

       its own motion to correct error.

[40]   Regarding the trial court’s findings that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective,

       we note that the trial court found that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective

       because he failed to: (1) negotiate a plea agreement; (2) tender lesser-included

       offense instructions; and (3) argue the Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

       count in his closing argument.

[41]   At the outset, we note that the trial court cited State v. Johnson, 714 N.E.2d at

       1209, as authority to grant Woodworth a new trial based upon the

       ineffectiveness of her counsel. However, the facts in Johnson are distinguishable

       from the facts in this case. In the Johnson case, after Johnson had been

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024        Page 20 of 32
       convicted, his counsel filed a motion for a mistrial based entirely on his own

       ineffective representation. Johnson’s counsel specifically claimed that “due to

       his responsibilities in other cases, a lack of time for preparation, and fatigue, he

       was not adequately prepared for trial and made ‘grievous and prejudicial errors

       that . . . rose to the level of ineffective counsel.’” Id. at 1210. The trial court

       denied Johnson’s counsel’s mistrial motion. “However, citing its responsibility

       to prevent manifest injustice, the trial court set aside the jury’s verdict[]” and

       ordered a new trial. Id. The State appealed. We concluded that the “record

       before us present[ed] ample evidence of trial counsel’s deficient performance[]”

       and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. at 1212.

[42]   Here, however, Woodworth’s counsel did not ask for a new trial based on his

       own ineffective representation. Rather, despite showering Woodworth’s

       counsel with glowing compliments regarding his excellent advocacy, the trial

       court sua sponte found that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective. Johnson does

       not support the trial court’s action in this case.

[43]   We further note that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) established

       the two-part test of deficient performance and prejudice for adjudicating

       challenges to the effectiveness of trial representation. The deficient

       performance prong ultimately presents a single overarching issue of whether

       counsel’s performance, as a whole, fell below “an objective standard of

       reasonableness” based on “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 685.

       “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness or inexperience do

       not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless, taken as

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024         Page 21 of 32
       whole, the defense was inadequate.” Davis v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1097, 1100

       (Ind. 1996) (cleaned up). For example, our Indiana Supreme Court has

       previously held that a strategical decision not to tender a lesser-included offense

       instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, even where the

       lesser included offense is inherently included in the greater offense. Autrey v.

       State, 700 N.E.2d 1140, 1141 (Ind. 1998). In addition, counsel’s performance is

       presumed to be effective. Id. Further, “Indiana courts have required strong and

       convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of effective defense counsel.”

       Davis, 675 N.E.2d at 1100.

[44]   As the trial court noted, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is typically

       raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding, where the post-conviction court

       may receive new evidence to develop facts beyond those contained in the

       record. See Jewell v. State, 887 N.E.2d 939, 941-42 (Ind 2008). For example, a

       trial counsel has the opportunity to testify as to his or her trial strategy. Here,

       the trial court essentially converted the motion to correct error hearing into a

       post-conviction hearing but did not offer Woodworth’s counsel the opportunity

       to testify regarding his trial strategy. As a result, the trial court ignored the

       presumption that counsel’s performance was effective. In addition, the trial

       court failed to ask Woodworth if she wanted to assert such a claim and use her

       one post-conviction opportunity. We caution trial courts against sua sponte

       making an ineffective assistance of counsel determination and conclude that the

       trial court abused its discretion when it granted its own motion to correct error

       based on a finding that Woodworth’s counsel was ineffective.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024         Page 22 of 32
[45]   Regarding the trial court’s finding that the jury’s verdict did not accord with the

       evidence, we note that although Trial Rule 59(B) authorizes a trial court to

       make its own motion to correct error, “[s]etting aside a jury’s verdict and

       granting a new trial is not to be done lightly[.]” Walker v. Pullen, 943 N.E.2d

       349, 352 (Ind. 2011). “In all cases where relief is granted, the [trial] court is

       required to ‘specify the general reasons’ for granting relief.” Id. Trial Rule

       59(J)(7) further requires as follows:

               When a new trial is granted because the verdict, findings or
               judgment do not accord with the evidence, the court shall make
               special findings of fact upon each material issue or element of the
               claim or defense upon which a new trial is granted. Such finding
               shall indicate whether the decision is against the weight of the
               evidence or whether it is clearly erroneous as contrary to or not
               supported by the evidence; if the decision is found to be against
               the weight of the evidence, the findings shall relate the supporting
               and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is
               granted; if the decision is found to be clearly erroneous as
               contrary to or not supported by the evidence, the findings shall
               show why judgment was not entered upon the evidence.

[46]   Our Indiana Supreme Court has “long held that strict compliance with the

       substantive and procedural requirements of Trial Rule 59(J) is of ‘paramount’

       importance.” Walker, 943 N.E.2d at 352. Our supreme court has further

       explained that “[s]pecific findings are necessary to temper the use of the

       ‘extraordinary and extreme’ power to overturn the jury’s verdict by assuring

       that the decision is based on a complete analysis of the law and facts.” Id. In

       Weida, our Indiana Supreme Court also explained that the most important

       reason for Rule 59(J)’s “arduous and time-consuming requirements” is “to
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024        Page 23 of 32
       assure the public that the justice system is safe not only from capricious or

       malicious juries, but also from usurpation by unrestrained judges.” Weida, 849

       N.E.2d at 1153 (cleaned up). “In other words, when a court overrides the jury

       in its special domain and substitutes its own verdict for theirs without a clear

       showing that the ends of justice required it, it is likely that they did not.”

       Walker, 943 N.E.2d at 352 (cleaned up). When a court grants a new trial

       without making the specific findings, the remedy on appeal is to reinstate the

       jury verdict. Weida, 849 N.E.2d at 1147.

[47]   Here, our review of the trial court’s order reveals that the trial court granted

       Woodworth a new trial because it believed that the jury’s verdict was not in

       accord with the evidence. However, the trial court did not state whether the

       jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous.

       Rather, the trial court made only general findings and not the special findings

       required by Trial Rule 59(J). We, therefore, reinstate Woodworth’s conviction

       for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.1

       2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[48]   On cross-appeal, Woodworth argues that there is insufficient evidence to

       support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in

       1
         Woodworth acknowledges that the trial court failed to make the specific findings required by Trial Rule
       59(J)(7). However, she argues that “[s]trict adherence to the rule’s requirement of special findings relating
       the supporting and opposing evidence upon which a new trial is granted should not be applied so forcefully in
       criminal trials where the burden of proof is higher than in civil trials.” (Woodworth’s Br. 14). Woodworth’s
       argument is essentially a request that we change the law. We decline this request.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024                            Page 24 of 32
       death. Because we have reinstated her conviction, we address this issue and

       agree that there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction. 2

[49]   Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled.

       We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting

       the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not

       reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm the

       conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the elements of the crime

       proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an

       inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at 147.

[50]   In addition, in Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), we

       explained as follows:

                Although this standard of review is deferential, it is not
                impossible, nor can it be. Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana
                Constitution guarantees “in all cases an absolute right to one
                appeal.” An impossible standard of review under which
                appellate courts merely “rubber stamp” the fact finder’s
                determinations, no matter how unreasonable, would raise serious
                constitutional concerns because it would make the right to an
                appeal illusory. While we seldom reverse for insufficient
                evidence, in every case where that issue is raised on appeal we
                have an affirmative duty to make certain that the proof at trial

       2
         Woodworth also argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in denying her directed verdict motion,
       which she made at the end of the State’s case. However, because Woodworth presented evidence after the
       trial court denied her motion, she has waived appellate review of this issue. See Cox v. State, 19 N.E.3d 287,
       281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that a defendant who presents evidence after a denial of her motion for a
       directed verdict made at the end of the State’s case waives appellate review of the denial of that motion).
       Thus, we consider only Woodworth’s sufficiency claim. See id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024                             Page 25 of 32
               was, in fact, sufficient to support the judgment beyond a
               reasonable doubt. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may
               reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. A reasonable
               inference of guilt must be more than a mere suspicion,
               conjecture, conclusion, guess, opportunity, or scintilla.

[51]   At the time that the State charged Woodworth in 2016, INDIANA CODE § 35-46-

       1-4 provided, in relevant part, as follows:

               (a) A person having the care of a dependent, whether assumed
               voluntarily or because of a legal obligation, who knowingly or
               intentionally:

                        (1) places the dependent in a situation that endangers the
                        dependent’s life or health;

                                          *       *        *        *        *

                        commits neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony.

               (b) However, the offense is:

                                          *       *        *        *        *

                        (3) a Level 1 felony if it is committed under subsection
                        (a)(1) . . . by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age
                        and results in the death of a dependent who is less than
                        fourteen (14) years of age.

[52]   Here, consistent with INDIANA CODE § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), the charging

       information alleged that Woodworth had “knowingly place[d] [M.M.] in a

       situation that endangered [M.M.]’s life or health[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39). The

       alleged factual omission was that Woodworth had failed to “provid[e]

       immediate medical attention upon injury[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39). In addition,

       to support the elevation of the offense to a Level 1 felony, the State alleged that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024             Page 26 of 32
       Woodworth’s failure to provide immediate medical attention upon injury had

       “result[ed] in the death of [M.M.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 39).

[53]   “When the allegation of neglect is the failure to provide medical care, the State

       must show that the need for medical care was actual and apparent and the

       accused was actually and subjectively aware of that need.” C.T. v. State, 28

       N.E.3d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Here, there is no doubt that

       M.M.’s need for medical care was actual and apparent and that Woodworth

       was actually and subjectively aware of that need. We must, therefore,

       determine whether Woodworth delayed in providing that medical care.

[54]   In Lush v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we explained that

       our Indiana Supreme Court established a reasonable parent standard in cases of

       neglect of a dependent for failing to timely obtain medical care. Specifically,

       “‘in order to determine whether [a] mother’s conduct constituted medical

       neglect under the facts of [a] case, her conduct must be squared against the

       appropriate conduct of a reasonable parent, guardian, or custodian who finds a

       child in a like condition.’” Id. (quoting State ex rel. N.K.C., 995 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah

       Ct. App. 1999)). Ultimately, whether a parent’s or a caregiver’s delay in

       providing medical care for an ailing child constitutes criminal neglect is a

       question for jurors to answer. Lush, 783 N.E.2d at 1198. We must simply

       determine whether their answer is reasonable. Id.

[55]   In the Lush case, Lush cared for his two-year-old stepdaughter, H.R. (“H.R.”),

       while H.R.’s mother (“Mother”) worked. On September 20, 1996, Mother

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024       Page 27 of 32
       went home for lunch at 11:00 a.m. At that time, she noticed nothing unusual

       about H.R., who was sitting at the kitchen table eating breakfast. Further,

       Mother saw no injuries on H.R. Lush, accompanied by H.R., drove Mother

       back to work at 11:15 a.m. That same afternoon, Lush telephoned Mother at

       work and asked her to meet him outside. Mother’s co-worker saw Lush drive

       up to the front of the building between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m. Lush, who was

       driving at a fairly normal speed, sat outside and waited for Mother to come out

       and talk to him. After Mother had briefly talked to Lush, Mother’s co-worker

       saw Mother hurry back inside the business. Mother’s co-worker further saw

       Lush shake H.R. as if he were attempting to wake her. When Mother ran back

       out to the car, Lush handed H.R. to her, and they left the parking lot of the

       business fairly quickly.

[56]   At approximately 2:00 p.m., Lush and Mother arrived at the emergency room

       of a Columbus hospital with H.R., who was unconscious and not breathing. A

       pediatrician at the hospital determined that H.R. should be flown by helicopter

       to Riley Hospital for Children (“Riley”) in Indianapolis. When H.R. arrived at

       Riley, Dr. Luerrson (“Dr. Luerrson”) performed the initial examination of H.R.

       Dr. Luerrson noticed that H.R. had linear bruising on her legs and back,

       substantial bruising on her face and neck, her eyes were swollen, and she had

       retinal hemorrhaging that was not consistent with an accidental injury. In

       addition, H.R. had sustained an acute subdural hematoma that was collecting

       blood and was rapidly herniating her brain stem. That injury was likely

       inflicted by an angular momentum that had rendered H.R. immediately

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024     Page 28 of 32
       unconscious. The injuries appeared to have been inflicted within a few hours

       before H.R. had arrived at the emergency room in Columbus. If left untreated,

       H.R. would have died. H.R. had to be placed in a medically induced coma for

       two weeks, and one year later, she had permanent brain damage, walked with a

       limp, and remained weak on one side of her body.

[57]   The State charged Lush with Class B felony neglect of a dependent. The State

       specifically alleged that Lush had deprived H.R. of medical care and that the

       deprivation had resulted in serious bodily injury. The jury convicted Lush as

       charged. On direct appeal, Lush argued that “there [was] insufficient evidence

       to sustain his conviction of neglect of a dependent for his conduct after inflicting

       the life-threatening injuries on H.R. while she was in his exclusive care.” Id. at

       1097. Lush specifically contended that his delay in rushing H.R. to the hospital

       had not deprived her of necessary medical care and had not caused her serious

       bodily injury.

[58]   This Court reviewed the evidence and first concluded that there was evidence

       from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Lush himself had

       inflicted the life-threatening injuries upon H.R. Id. We further noted that

       because Lush had been aware of the severity of H.R.’s injuries, he was in a

       position to understand the urgency of the situation and that medical attention

       was needed. Id. Although Lush argued that he had not deprived H.R. of

       medical care by picking up Mother at work before taking H.R. to the hospital,

       we noted that under the facts and circumstances of this case, the jury had found

       that a fifteen-minute delay had been a deprivation of medical care. Id. at 1198.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 29 of 32
       We further explained that “[i]t [was] entirely plausible for the jury to have

       found that a reasonable parent would not have done as [Lush] did – drive past a

       hospital in order to pick up the child’s mother from work before taking an

       unconscious but breathing child back to the hospital.” Id. at 1198. We,

       therefore, affirmed Lush’s conviction.

[59]   Here, the facts before us are distinguishable from those in Lush. In the Lush

       case, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded

       that Lush had inflicted the life-threatening injuries on H.R. In the instant case,

       the jury determined that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable

       doubt that Woodworth had inflicted an injury on M.M. Thus, unlike Lush,

       Woodworth, who had not inflicted an injury on M.M., was not in a position to

       understand the severity of M.M.’s injuries.

[60]   Indeed, when M.M. did not take her bottle at 1:15 p.m., Lori had initially

       believed that M.M., who had woken up fussy and whiny from her nap, was still

       just a little bit sleepy. However, when M.M. “didn’t look right[,]” Woodworth

       immediately texted Mother and asked her to call Woodworth. (Tr. Vol. 5 at

       46). While Woodworth was attempting to contact Mother, Lori and Tasha

       tended to M.M. by placing a cold rag on M.M.’s head to help her wake up.

       When the cold rag had no effect, Lori and Tasha took M.M. outside to get

       some fresh air. When Mother telephoned Woodworth and learned that M.M.

       was having difficulty waking up from her nap, Mother directed Woodworth to

       call 911. Woodworth called 911 at 1:24 p.m., just nine minutes after she had

       noticed that M.M. “didn’t look right.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024      Page 30 of 32
[61]   Based on these facts and circumstances, we conclude that Woodworth’s actions

       were those of a reasonable caregiver who finds that a child in her care is having

       difficulty waking up from a nap and does not “look right.” (Tr. Vol. 5 at 46).

       Stated differently, we conclude that Woodworth’s nine-minute delay in calling

       911 - while she contacted Mother and while her mother and sister

       simultaneously tended to M.M. by applying a cold rag to M.M.’s head and

       taking her outside to get some fresh air - was not a failure to provide immediate

       medical attention to M.M. Woodworth did not knowingly place M.M. in a

       situation that endangered M.M.’s life. Thus, the evidence presented at trial is

       insufficient to support her conviction of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent

       resulting in death. Accordingly, we reverse Woodworth’s conviction. 3

       3
          We further note that even if Woodworth had failed to provide immediate medical care to M.M., we agree that
       “the State here presented no evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Woodworth]’s failure to provide
       immediate medical care or call 911 immediately resulted in [M.M.]’s death.” (Woodworth’s Br. 25). This Court
       has previously determined that “the phrase ‘results in the death of a dependent’ for purposes of the neglect statute .
       . . implicates proximate causation.” Patel, 60 N.E.3d at 1052. Under this standard, the State must, at a minimum,
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death would not have occurred “but for” the neglectful act. Id.

       In Patel, the defendant, who was attempting to self-induce an abortion with misoprostol pills, gave birth to a
       premature male infant. Rather than take the infant to a hospital, Patel threw him in a dumpster, where he was later
       found dead. The State charged Patel with Class A felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death, which is the
       equivalent of the current Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. However, at trial, because the
       doctors were unsure of the infant’s condition at birth, they could not testify with any certainty as to the
       effectiveness of medical intervention. Instead, they opined that it was “absolutely possible” medical intervention
       could have saved the infant. Id. at 1053. On appeal, we explained that such possibilities did not amount to proof
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the infant’s death would not have occurred but for Patel’s failure to obtain medical
       care. Id. at 1054. We, therefore, vacated Patel’s Class A felony conviction and remanded her case to the trial court
       to enter judgment of conviction for Class D felony neglect of a dependent, which is the equivalent of the current
       Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, and to sentence Patel accordingly. See id. at 1062.

       Here, our review of the record of the proceedings reveals absolutely no testimony regarding whether M.M.’s death
       would not have occurred but for Woodworth’s failure to obtain immediate medical care. The State directs us to
       Dr. Glick’s testimony that in the adult world, the goal is to get the person medical treatment within one hour
       because you can reverse the disease. However, Dr. Glick’s testimony was offered to support her previous
       testimony that when a baby is shaken, the child is immediately symptomatic. Dr. Glick’s testimony was not given
       in response to a question that was specific to M.M. and whether her death would have occurred but for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024                                     Page 31 of 32
[62]   Reversed.

       Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Woodworth’s failure to obtain immediate medical care. Indeed, the record reveals that the State never posed this
       question to any of its witnesses. Thus, even if Woodworth had failed to obtain immediate medical care for M.M.,
       the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that M.M.’s death would not have occurred but for
       Woodworth’s failure.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2557| Janaury 23, 2024                                Page 32 of 32