Court Opinion

ID: 9798039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:35:25.822362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:37.005943
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
The majority reverses the defendant’s domestic violence convictions for criminal mischief and menacing his wife, on the grounds that the trial court erred by forcing the defense to expend one of its peremptory challenges on a military police reservist, rather than simply removing him from the jury panel for cause. I respectfully dissent from that holding because I do not believe the trial court was obliged to permit the defendant to revisit the matter, once his counsel declined the court’s invitation to challenge the venireman as a compensated employee of a public law-enforcement agency. Even if defense counsel had been entitled to challenge the prospective juror for cause as he did, however, I believe that the majority’s conclusion is premised upon a misconstruction of controlling Colorado law and a fundamental misunderstanding of the organization and command structure of the United States Army.
Initially, the majority confuses a failure to object with an affirmative choice not to object, and in doing so I believe it unjustifiably *213impedes a trial judge’s ability to conduct proceedings in his own court. It is well-settled that trial courts necessarily retain great discretion regarding the conduct of trials, even where rules prescribe a typical or usual order. Although the statutes and rules of this jurisdiction specify the grounds upon which challenges for cause will lie, § 16 — 10— 103(1), C.R.S. (2005), Crim. P. 24(b)(1), in contrast to peremptory challenges, they prescribe no manner or order for exercising those challenges. Compare, Crim. P. 24(b), with 24(d)(4). And even with regard to the exercise of peremptory challenges, the committee comments to Crim. P. 24 explain that the rule leaves much discretion with the trial court.
The trial court in this case made clear to both counsel from the outset its practice of dealing with juror qualifications and challenges for cause, prior to general questioning by counsel, in order to permit the dismissal of affected prospective jurors, without unnecessary inconvenience or delay. It therefore proceeded down the list of statutory challenges for cause, in sequence, requiring prospective jurors to respond affirmatively to any applicable ground. When the court asked whether any prospective juror was an employee of a law-enforcement agency or the public defender’s office, as enumerated in § 16 — 10—103(l)(k), one member of the panel indicated that he served as a military police reservist; and in response to further questioning, indicated that he was a First Lieutenant and served one weekend a month as a platoon leader over MP’s performing combat MP missions and site security missions. The court immediately inquired whether either party had a challenge for cause to this prospective juror, and without reservation or request for further clarification, each counsel responded that he did not. The court moved on to discuss hardship and other general grounds for which prospective jurors might be excused from service.
While evidence of a prospective juror’s incompetency, disqualification, or prejudice must be offered and the matter resolved, before the jury is impaneled, see Crim. P. 24(b)(2), the rule does not otherwise address the exercise of a party’s right to assert challenges for cause. In any event, any question concerning counsel’s awareness of the grounds for a challenge or his duty to make himself aware of such grounds cannot be at issue in this case because the prospective juror’s employment status was explicitly revealed to both court and counsel. Similarly, any question concerning a point in the proceedings beyond which counsel’s failure to assert such a challenge might constitute a waiver is not presented here because the court expressly confronted both counsel as to this statutory ground and both affirmatively declared their lack of objection.
Whether a trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to reopen a matter for changed circumstances or other good cause will always be subject to judicial review. But in this case, there is no suggestion of the prospective juror’s recanting or modifying his earlier statement. Even if defense counsel were not obliged to seek clarification before committing to the court’s demand for challenges, his subsequent questioning of this prospective juror in no way altered the circumstances of his employment. Defense counsel simply reacted to the extent of the prospective juror’s past experience with domestic law enforcement and his attitude about the trustworthiness of law enforcement officers in general. While these matters may have provided some support for a challenge based on actual enmity or bias toward the defendant, or an inability to follow the instructions of the court, they did not alter (or even amplify) the prospective juror’s employment status.
To elevate tactical trial decisions to the level of constitutional rights by holding, as the majority apparently does today, that courts may not rely on counsel’s explicit representations — including an explicit waiver of an objection or challenge — in the absence of a warning that he will not be permitted to change his position at some later time, is not only an unjustified infringement on the authority of trial courts, but also a formula for disaster in the day-to-day conduct of courtroom proceedings. I would therefore approve the trial court’s ruling without addressing the merits of the defendant’s challenge.
*214In addition to considering it unnecessary, however, I strongly disagree with the majority’s treatment of this statutory challenge for cause, and I fear that it will undermine the framework that has governed the analysis of such challenges in this jurisdiction for considerable time. By defining the term “public law enforcement agency” from the dictionary, rather than the context in which it is used, the majority ignores the legislature’s clear reference to agencies that are not just subdivisions of government but also ones with hiring authority.
As the court of appeals has recognized on a number of occasions, the specific challenge for cause defined at § 16-10-103(l)(k) is not concerned with training, background, or service as a law enforcement officer, but rather with a prospective juror’s dependence for his livelihood on the continued approval of a public law-enforcement agency. See, e.g., People v. Veloz, 946 P.2d 525, 529-30 (Colo.App.1997)(holding volunteer reserve police officer not “compensated” under statute); People v. Maes, 43 Colo.App. 365, 609 P.2d 1105 (Colo.App.1979)(finding mechanic in police garage subject to challenge under statute); People v. Scott, 41 Colo.App. 66, 583 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo.App.1978)(holding trial court properly denied challenge to retired prison guard because statute did not apply to former employees). This narrow statutory provision in no way suggests the existence of a presumption of individual bias arising from association or affinity with law enforcement officers; it addresses a matter of competing or conflicting interests. It recognizes the conflict inherent in taking a public position perceived as being contrary to the interests of one’s employer, and therefore the risk of endangering one’s livelihood.
The subdivision of government referred to as a public law-enforcement agency in the statute therefore includes only subdivisions with the authority to hire and fire the prospective juror. The performance of law-enforcement related functions on behalf of a governmental unit that cannot itself be fairly characterized as a law-enforcement agency does not, standing alone, establish cause, nor can assignment by a non-law-enforcement governmental employer to one of its subdivisions performing law-enforcement related functions. See People v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487 (Colo.App.2004)(finding employee of Environmental Protection Agency could not be challenged under the statute since the EPA is an investigating and rule making body, not a law-enforcement agency). The statutory provision applies, by its own terms, only to employees of, and compensated by, public law-enforcement agencies, and only then is the rationale for its existence satisfied.
The majority should therefore have addressed the question whether the Department of the Army, rather than the military police corps, is a public law-enforcement agency, just as the court of appeals did. The published law of this jurisdiction has long answered that question in the negative. People v. Urrutia, 893 P.2d 1338, 1346 (Colo.App.1994)(“That the functions of the Department of Defense require it to maintain security measures at its facilities, and to hire civil security guards who conduct investigations and searches, does not transform the Army and its various installations into a law enforcement arm of the government.”).
Even if, however, a non-employing subdivision of government could qualify as a law-enforcement agency within the meaning of the statute, merely by right of its members having the authority to perform law-enforcement functions, I believe the majority opinion betrays a fundamental lack of appreciation for military organization and command structure by classifying the military police corps, or branch, as such an agency. Apart from considerations of esprit, branch designation in the military appears to be little more than an organizational tool for personnel management, indicative of occupational specialty, or classes of occupational specialties, and career development. While branch designation may apparently indicate the kind of training and determine the nature of the units and missions to which its members have been or will be assigned, nothing in the pamphlets or training manuals cited by the majority even remotely suggests that a branch of the service is a tactical or administrative unit of organization; or that branch designation imbues anyone with authority to act.
*215While military police personnel may be trained and made available to assist commanders, at select organizational levels, with the performance of law-enforcement activities, their particular mission and the authority to perform it derive directly from the orders of the commander — not their branch designation. It seems clear that members of military police units may be tasked with, and have the authority to perform, traditional law-enforcement functions, but nothing suggests that this is necessarily the case. In fact, the prospective juror in this ease testified that he led a platoon performing combat missions and site security — not the military police combat service support mission of law enforcement. Branch designation as a military policeman seems more akin to certification by the P.O.S.T. Board than being employed by a civilian police department.1 See maj. op. at 212.
On the other hand, depending upon their particular assignments, soldiers and officers other than the military police are clearly responsible for carrying out traditional law-enforcement functions in their units, including maintaining order, arresting suspected criminals, conducting investigations, and temporarily detaining prisoners. See maj. op. at 212. The quasi-military trappings of civilian police forces, which set them apart in appearance from the rest of civilian society, are definitionally present in the military itself, without regard to particular domestic law-enforcement responsibilities. Bearing arms, wearing uniforms, and being subject to a military command structure, however, was never intended to support a challenge for cause.
By ignoring the statute’s clear limitation to prospective jurors, in criminal trials, who are employed by public law enforcement agencies, the majority loses sight of the rationale supporting this per se rule of exclusion and finds itself attempting to define the term “agency,” as well as the concept of “law-enforcement,” virtually without context. Its journey in search of legislative intent is therefore, not surprisingly, unsatisfying. To add insult to injury, the majority then attempts to apply its newly minted, global definition to a military organization, structured for purposes and governed by authority vastly different from the civilian society for which the term was written. Because the defendant expressly waived his right to assert a challenge for cause arising from this provision, I consider it unnecessary to construe the statute, even as it would apply to this context, much less to define “public law-enforcement agency” for all contexts.
Because I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice KOUR-LIS and Justice RICE join in this dissent.

. Peace Officers Standards and Training Board, § 24-31-302, C.R.S. (2005).