Court Opinion

ID: 9910309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:01:52.016553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:11.776040
License: Public Domain

Rel: December 15, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2023-0338
                                   _________________________

                                    Markis Antwuan Watts

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                             Appeal from Lee Circuit Court
                                      (CC-21-90.70)

COLE, Judge.

        Markis Antwuan Watts appeals the Lee Circuit Court's judgment

revoking his probation for having committed two new criminal offenses

-- namely, discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, a violation of §

13A-11-61(b), Ala. Code 1975, and first-degree assault, a violation of §
CR-2023-0338

13A-6-20, Ala. Code 1975. On appeal, Watts argues that the circuit court

erred when it revoked his probation because, he says, "the State failed to

present sufficient nonhearsay evidence connecting Watts to the alleged

violation of his probation." (Watts's brief, p. 7.) The State concedes that

the "vast majority of [its] evidence was comprised of hearsay," and it

admits that "the nonhearsay evidence by itself does not prove that Watts

committed those offenses," but it argues that this Court should affirm the

circuit court's judgment because the nonhearsay evidence was "sufficient

to connect" Watts to the new offenses. (State's brief, pp. 16-17.) We agree

with Watts.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     On April 28, 2021, Watts pleaded guilty to first-degree promoting

prison contraband, a violation of § 13A-10-36, Ala. Code 1975. The circuit

court sentenced Watts to 15 years' imprisonment, split to serve 1 year

imprisonment followed by 2 years of probation. (C. 4.) While he was on

probation, a warrant was issued for Watts's arrest because he had

allegedly violated his probation. (C. 5-6.) On March 3, 2023, Watts was

arrested on the warrant, and he was given notice that he was alleged to

have violated his probation by committing the offenses of discharging a

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firearm into an occupied vehicle and first-degree assault. (C. 8.) The

circuit court set Watts's probation-revocation hearing for May 3, 2023.

      At the revocation hearing, Watts, who was represented by counsel,

denied the allegations that he had committed the two new offenses. (R.

2.)   Thereafter, the State presented evidence from one witness, Det.

Timothy Huffman of the Montgomery Police Department, to prove its

claim that Watts had violated his probation.

      Det. Huffman's testimony established the following: On November

3, 2022, he was assigned to investigate a shooting that had occurred on

Winona Avenue in Montgomery, in which "Mr. Kennebrew" 1 was shot in

the left eye while sitting in his car in front of Brittney Fuller's home. (R.

7-8.) According to Det. Huffman, the shooting occurred at around 5:00

a.m. Det. Stewart2 was the first officer to respond to the scene, and he

also went to the hospital to talk to Kennebrew and Fuller. (R. 8.) Det.

Huffman said that, when he responded to the scene of the shooting, he

collected three 9 mm shell casings near where Kennebrew had been

parked. Fuller, who was Watts's ex-girlfriend, was taken to the detective

      1Kennebrew's first name does not appear in the record on appeal.

      2Det. Stewart's first name does not appear in the record on appeal.

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division of the Montgomery Police Department for questioning.

According to Det. Huffman, Fuller witnessed the shooting and told him

the following:

          "She stated that Mr. Watts -- earlier that morning
     between two and three in the morning, Mr. Watts kept
     sending her text messages and actually calling her, actually
     trying to get in her house, but she stated that she didn't want
     him in her residence. And then she said apparently he just
     showed up to her house banging on the front causing her
     blinds to fall down and her to see him. She told him that she
     was not going to let him in; she stated that he -- he stated that
     he was going to kick in her front door, shoot through her house
     and crash out on her."

(R. 12.) Fuller also told him that Watts had come to her house in a "black

Lincoln vehicle" but had eventually left. Fuller said that, while she was

interacting with Watts, she was also on the telephone with Kennebrew.

(C. 12-13.) Fuller then told Det. Huffman:

           "After that, she stated that [Watts] actually left and she
     continued on the phone with [Kennebrew]. She stated that
     she told [Kennebrew], hey, look; don't come over here right
     now because, you know, he is making threats. So then she
     stated that the victim, which is Mr. Kennebrew, he pulled up
     in his vehicle, actually on the same street, but actually on the
     side of the street. Her house is on the other side.

           "So he parked on the other side of the street. And he
     just waited there for like three seconds and then he pulled off.
     When he pulled off, he saw the black Lincoln car come back to
     the residence. And he stated that he circled [the] block, and

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CR-2023-0338

     when he came back, he stated that the Lincoln Town Car was
     gone from the residence. So that's when he parked on the side.

           "Now, as far as Ms. Fuller, she stated that she saw Mr.
     Kennebrew parked on the side of the street and then she saw
     the black Lincoln Town Car that Mr. Watts was driving come
     back and pull beside her residence. She stated that Mr. Watts
     got out -- got out on the passenger's side of the Lincoln and
     she stated that a white U-Haul pulled up in between the black
     Lincoln Town Car. You have the black Lincoln Town Car, you
     have the white U-Haul truck, and then you have the victim's
     vehicle parked. She stated that Mr. Watts got out of the car
     and was talking to somebody in the truck, and then she stated
     that she told the driver to unlock the back driver's side door.
     She stated that once he got to the driver's side door, he opened
     it.

           "The white U-Haul truck pulled off and she stated[] that
     she actually saw Mr. Watts hanging out of the back
     passenger's side of the Lincoln Town Car shooting at Mr.
     Kennebrew's vehicle and then actually pulling off from
     Winona Avenue to -- that's Federal Drive, and then that's
     when she ran outside to see the victim, Mr. Kennebrew, and
     that's when they went to the hospital."

(R. 14-15.) Det. Huffman said that Fuller also identified Watts as the

shooter in a photo lineup that he had prepared for her. (R. 23.)

     Det. Huffman said that the physical evidence that he collected at

the scene corroborated Fuller's account of what she said had happened.

Additionally, Det. Huffman said that he saw the bullet holes in

Kennebrew's windshield and that he viewed the text messages that

Fuller said were sent by Watts. However, Det. Huffman did not testify

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CR-2023-0338

about the content of those text messages other than stating that Watts

and Fuller were "arguing back and forth." (R. 24.)

     Det. Huffman testified that, on November 14, 2022, the United

States Marshals Service apprehended Watts at the Red Lyons

Apartments in Montgomery. At that time, Watts was served with the

arrest warrants for discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle and

first-degree assault. (R. 17.) Det. Huffman said that he searched the

black Mercedes vehicle that Watts was driving the day he was

apprehended, but he found no firearms. (R. 17.) Det. Huffman said that,

after he advised Watts of his Miranda 3 rights, Watts exercised his right

to remain silent.

     On cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between

Det. Huffman and Watts's counsel:

          "[Watts's counsel]: Okay. The testimony that you're
     giving today that would identify Mr. Watts as the person who
     was there who did this is based on statements that other
     people have told you; correct?

           "[Det. Huffman]: Yes.

          "[Watts's counsel]: The bullets, for instance, did you go
     out and find those casings yourself?

     3Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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CR-2023-0338

              "[Det. Huffman]: Yes.

          "[Watts's counsel]: Okay. And there is nothing about --
     you haven't done anything about those casings, testing or
     anything, that would independently tell you that those
     casings belonged to Mr. Watts?

              "[Det. Huffman]: Correct.

          "[Watts's counsel]: Okay. So any information that you
     have given the Judge that would identify Mr. Watts as the
     person who was there, the person who shot this firearm is
     based on statements that other people have told you?

           "[Det. Huffman]: That's it. Just based on other -- just
     based on Ms. Fuller and Mr. Kennebrew. Also I did -- I think
     I did a photo [template] of Mr. Watts or -- I think I did a photo
     [template] for a lineup with Mr. Watts in which Ms. Fuller
     identified him actually as the one who was shooting.

              "....

           "[Watts's counsel]: And you witnessed her identify him
     in the six pack, but once again, --

              "....

         "[Watts's counsel]: -- you're telling us based on what
     someone else indicated to you?

              "[Det. Huffman]: Correct."

(R. 22-23.)

     At the close of the evidence, Watts argued that the evidence was

insufficient to revoke his probation for committing the two new offenses

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CR-2023-0338

of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle and first-degree assault

because, he said, "the only evidence that we have before us today that

Mr. Watts is the person who fired that weapon[] is hearsay testimony.

We don't have any substantive evidence that he is the person that fired

that weapon." (R. 27-28.) The circuit court rejected Watts's argument,

explaining:

            "And part -- part of what is -- was hearsay, but there was
      also -- the bullet casings were found consistent and
      corroborating the witnesses' testimony and the photo lineup
      identifying [Watts]. Although, it was her -- he was there for
      the identification of the witness. And the text messages also
      corroborated.

            Although, they might be considered hearsay or they are,
      in fact, hearsay. But he reviewed the text messages that were
      consistent with [Watts's] being there. So it corroborated -- it's
      not the uncorroborated testimony of one person.              It's
      corroborated by those facts."

(R. 28.)

      Thereafter, the circuit court revoked Watts's probation, finding that

it was reasonably satisfied that Watts had violated his probation by

committing two new offenses. (R. 30-31.) The circuit court memorialized

its decision in a written order. (C. 12.) This appeal follows.

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CR-2023-0338

                               Discussion

     On appeal, Watts argues that the State's evidence was insufficient

to revoke his probation for committing two new offenses because, he says,

there was no nonhearsay evidence presented at the revocation hearing

that connected him to the crimes.           As noted above, the State

acknowledges the dearth of nonhearsay evidence presented at Watts's

revocation hearing but asserts that the nonhearsay evidence that was

presented was sufficient to connect Watts to the new offenses.

     In Walker v. State, 294 So. 3d 825 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019), this Court

addressed what must be shown to revoke a person's probation when, as

is the case here, the evidence presented at a probation-revocation hearing

consists of a mixture of hearsay and nonhearsay evidence:

          "To determine whether the evidence presented at a
     probation-revocation hearing is sufficient to revoke a
     defendant's probation for committing a new offense, the
     Alabama Supreme Court has set out the following standard:

                            " ' " ' "Probation     or
                      suspension of sentence
                      comes as an act of grace to
                      one convicted of, or pleading
                      guilty to, a crime.           A
                      proceeding         to    revoke
                      probation is not a criminal
                      prosecution, and we have no
                      statute requiring a formal

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CR-2023-0338

                    trial. Upon a hearing of this
                    character, the court is not
                    bound by strict rules of
                    evidence, and the alleged
                    violation of a valid condition
                    of probation need not be
                    proven beyond a reasonable
                    doubt." ' "

               " ' "Martin v. State, 46 Ala. App. 310,
               312, 241 So. 2d 339, 341 (Ala. Crim.
               App. 1970) (quoting State v. Duncan,
               270 N.C. 241, 154 S.E.2d 53 (1967)
               (citation omitted)).       Under that
               standard, the trial court need 'only be
               reasonably satisfied from the evidence
               that the probationer has violated the
               conditions of his probation.' Armstrong
               v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 103, 312 So. 2d
               620, 623 (1975). Absent a clear abuse
               of discretion, a reviewing court will not
               disturb the trial court's conclusions.
               See Moore v. State, 432 So. 2d 552, 553
               (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), and Wright v.
               State, 349 So. 2d 124, 125 (Ala. Crim.
               App. 1977)."

         " 'Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So. 2d [240] at 242 [(Ala.
         2000)]. See Rule 27.6(d)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P.
         (providing that at a revocation hearing the "court
         may receive any reliable, relevant evidence not
         legally privileged, including hearsay," and the
         court must be reasonably satisfied from the
         evidence that a violation of probation occurred
         before revoking probation). Whether to admit
         hearsay evidence at a probation-revocation
         hearing is within the discretion of the court.

                                  10
CR-2023-0338

         Puckett v. State, 680 So. 2d 980, 981 (Ala. Crim.
         App. 1996). However,

               " ' "[i]t is well settled that hearsay
               evidence may not form the sole basis for
               revoking an individual's probation. See
               Clayton v. State, 669 So. 2d 220, 222
               (Ala. Cr. App. 1995); Chasteen v. State,
               652 So. 2d 319, 320 (Ala. Cr. App.
               1994); and Mallette v. State, 572 So. 2d
               1316, 1317 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). 'The
               use of hearsay as the sole means of
               proving a violation of a condition of
               probation denies a probationer the
               right to confront and to cross-examine
               the persons originating the information
               that forms the basis of the revocation.'
               Clayton, 669 So. 2d at 222."

         " 'Goodgain v. State, 755 So. 2d 591, 592 (Ala.
         Crim. App. 1999).

               " 'To summarize, at a probation-revocation
         hearing a circuit court must examine the facts and
         circumstances supporting each alleged violation of
         probation. The court may consider both hearsay
         and nonhearsay evidence in making its
         determination. The hearsay evidence, however,
         must be reliable,2 and it cannot be the sole
         evidence supporting the revocation of probation.
         Thus, a circuit court must assess the credibility of
         the particular witnesses at the probation-
         revocation hearing, the reliability of the available
         evidence, and the totality of the evidence in each
         individual case to determine whether it is
         reasonably satisfied that the probationer has
         violated a term of his or her probation and that
         revocation is proper. Moreover, an appellate court

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CR-2023-0338

         will disturb a circuit court's decision only if the
         record establishes that the circuit court exceeded
         the scope of its discretion.

         " '_______________

                " '2Cf. Hampton v. State, 203 P.3d 179, 185
         (Okla. Crim. App. 2009) ("[W]e conclude that the
         due process confrontation requirement applicable
         to revocation[] matters will generally be satisfied
         when a trial court determines that proffered
         hearsay bears substantial guarantees of
         trustworthiness or otherwise has sufficient indicia
         of reliability.").'

    "Sams v. State, 48 So. 3d 665, 667-68 (Ala. 2010).

          "Recently, in Ex parte Dunn, 163 So. 3d 1003 (Ala.
    2014), the Supreme Court refined this standard, explaining
    that, when the State presents a mixture of hearsay and
    nonhearsay evidence to show that a defendant violated his
    probation by committing a new offense, the circuit court
    cannot revoke a defendant's probation for that violation
    unless the nonhearsay evidence connects the defendant to the
    alleged offense. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed this
    Court's decision upholding the circuit court's revocation of
    Dunn's probation for committing a new offense because 'the
    State [had] not corroborated by nonhearsay evidence the
    hearsay evidence connecting the pants, and by extension
    Dunn, to the burglary.' 163 So. 3d at 1006. See also Wright
    v. State, 292 So. 3d 1136, 1139 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019)
    (reversing the circuit court's revocation of Wright's probation
    for committing a new offense because the nonhearsay
    evidence that Wright was merely present at a party at the
    time a shooting occurred did not sufficiently connect him to
    the alleged murder); and Miller v. State, 273 So. 3d 921, 925
    (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (reversing the circuit court's revocation
    of Miller's probation because 'the State failed to present any

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     nonhearsay evidence indicating that Miller had, in fact,
     committed the alleged arson').

           "In sum, Sams and Dunn establish that hearsay is
     admissible at a probation-revocation hearing to show that a
     defendant committed a new offense and that the circuit court
     can rely on hearsay to revoke a defendant's probation. But
     those cases warn that hearsay cannot serve as the sole basis
     for revoking a defendant's probation, and instruct that,
     although the State does not have to prove every element of the
     alleged new offense with nonhearsay evidence, the State must
     present sufficient nonhearsay evidence connecting the
     defendant to the commission of the alleged new offense."

294 So. 3d at 831-32 (footnote omitted). Having set out the appropriate

standard under which to review this case, we now consider whether the

circuit court properly revoked Watts's probation for committing the new

offenses of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle and first-degree

assault.

     There is no question that the State's evidence (both hearsay and

nonhearsay) was sufficient to establish that, on November 3, 2022, a

firearm was discharged into a vehicle occupied by Kennebrew, see § 13A-

11-61, and that Kennebrew was a victim of a first-degree assault, see §

13A-6-20. What we must resolve here, however, is not whether the State

presented sufficient evidence that those offenses had been committed,

                                    13
CR-2023-0338

but whether the State presented sufficient nonhearsay evidence to

establish that Watts is the individual who committed the offenses.

     Here, the only nonhearsay evidence the State presented at Watts's

probation-revocation hearing was Det. Huffman's testimony that he

collected 9 mm shell casings from the crime scene, that he saw bullet

holes in Kennebrew's windshield, that he saw Kennebrew's injury, that

he found nothing when he searched Watts's vehicle, and that Watts

exercised his right to remain silent when Det. Huffman attempted to

question him.    Although the circuit court correctly found that this

nonhearsay testimony "corroborated" the hearsay testimony that

Kennebrew was shot while he sat in his car outside of Fuller's home, this

nonhearsay evidence does not connect Watts to those crimes. Thus, the

evidence presented at Watts's probation-revocation hearing was

insufficient to revoke Watts's probation.

                               Conclusion

     Because the State failed to present sufficient nonhearsay evidence

connecting Watts to the alleged violations of his probation, the circuit

court erred in revoking his probation. Accordingly, this Court reverses

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CR-2023-0338

the circuit court's judgment revoking Watts's probation and remands this

case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Windom, P.J., and Kellum, McCool, and Minor, JJ., concur.

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