Court Opinion

ID: 9650817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:52:45.379539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:26.330872
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority bases its ruling today on a statute that had not been enacted at the time of trial. Instead of applying the *108statute as it existed when the trial court ruled on the expert witness’s testimony, the majority effectively creates a new hearsay exception for the purpose of deciding a single appeal. I respectfully dissent.
As a preliminary, I must address the Appellate Division’s view that the attorney’s verification was admissible because plaintiff did not offer it for the truth of the matter asserted. See 164 NJ.Super. 127,129 (App.Div.1978). The majority implicitly and correctly rejects this reasoning as unsound. The trial court was asked to accept as evidence the expert’s opinion on valuation based in part upon the truth of an out-of-court assertion of an attorney who was not a witness. That assertion does not support the expert’s opinion unless it is accepted as true. Thus, the expert’s testimony as to the verification by the attorney is “[ejvidence of a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated which is made other than by a witness * * Evid.R. 63. It is therefore hearsay and inadmissible at trial unless it falls within one of the enumerated hearsay exceptions, Evid.R. 63(1) to 63(32), or the statute at issue on this appeal, N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1. Since no claim is made that any of the enumerated exceptions applies, the inquiry focuses on the statute.
The majority acknowledges that the statute in effect at the time of trial did not permit valuations based on hearsay verifications by attorneys. See ante at 105. Yet the majority finds that the practice of admitting such evidence existed in spite of the limiting statutory language, and that the Legislature recognized this assertedly established practice as valid by enacting L.1979, c. 114, § 14, to include attorneys within the statute. See ante at 105-106. Both premises of the majority's reasoning are in error.
To establish that attorney verifications were admitted as hearsay notwithstanding their exclusion from N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1, the majority relies on White v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals, 123 N.J.L. 350 (Sup.Ct.1939), and Rockland Elec. Co. v. Bolo Corp., 66 N.J.Super. 171 (App.Div.1961). Neither case supports the majority’s contention. In White, the court ruled that the stat*109ute would permit an attorney to testify as to comparable sales if the sources of his testimony qualified under the provision. See 123 N.J.L. at 354-355. This result would not permit someone else to rely on an attorney’s valuation—a source outside the scope of the statute. The Appellate Division in Rockland Elec. Co. held that N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1 did not govern the evidence a trial court could receive in determining the qualifications of an expert in real estate valuation. 66 NJ.Super. at 177-178. The court there specifically noted, however, that the statute controlled when the expert testified on the sales information he used in reaching his opinion on valuation. Id.
Neither White nor Rockland Elec. Co. involved an expert’s testimony as to the verification by an attorney of comparable sales when offered as direct evidence of value. The majority’s conclusion that “testimony based on information supplied to an expert witness by an attorney has been held admissible,” see ante at 106, is therefore erroneous.
In holding that the statute as it existed at the time of trial encompassed attorney verifications, the Court ignores a well-established principle of statutory construction. An express provision governing a given subject matter may reveal by implication that all omissions are to be understood as exclusions. See Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. Bd. of Educ., 77 N.J. 88, 99 (1978); Reilly v. Ozzard, 33 N.J. 529, 539 (1960); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 47.23 at 123 (4th ed. 1973). This maxim is based on the commonsense notion that “generally when people say one thing they do not mean something else.” Id., § 47.24 at 127. It has direct application to the statute at issue. The provision authorizes testimony regarding comparable sales when verified by one of the following persons: an owner, seller, purchaser, lessee, occupant or broker. N.J.S.A. 2A:83-1. Attorneys are conspicuous only by their absence from the statute’s plain language.
Although relying on the absence of directly applicable language is an aid to statutory construction which should be employed with caution, see Resnick, supra, 77 N.J. at 99; Reilly, supra, 33 N.J. at 539; Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 11 (1957), I *110believe it is determinative in this case. When the majority’s attempt to include attorneys by interpreting prior cases erroneously is compared with the inferences arising from the statute’s plain language, the balance weighs heavily in favor of the latter commonsense approach. Nor should the fact that the Legislature recently amended the statute to include attorneys, L.1979, c. 141, § 14, be construed as evidence of the Legislature’s prior intent. The majority provides no explanation why the original provision did not include a reference to attorneys. See ante at 105-106. It is thus equally likely that the failure to refer to attorneys was not inadvertent, but a deliberate choice. In the absence of any enlightening legislative history, the safer course is to rely on the literal meaning of the statute.
Because on appeal it is impossible to determine the weight the trial court placed on the expert’s testimony—which in part was based upon inadmissible hearsay—I would remand the case for the limited purpose of redetermining the value of the condemned property. On remand the amended statute would, of course, apply to allow the witness’s reliance on attorney verifications of comparable sales. However, opposing counsel would now have a fair opportunity to rebut this testimony, which at the original trial was unexpectedly admitted only by ignoring clear statutory language.1
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
SCHREIBER, J., concurring in result.
For affirmance—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK —6.
For reversal —Justice PASHMAN—1.

The record before the Court discloses that defendant’s counsel was not notified before trial that the expert would base his testimony upon inadmissible verifications of comparable sales.