Court Opinion

ID: 9695411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:02.712531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.137382
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
In its application for rehearing, appellee contends that: (1) the sales receipts signed by appellant in making purchases with her charge card were negotiable instruments and that she is liable for those purchases even though they were for necessaries; and (2) where a wife executes a negotiable instrument, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury whether she is liable on the instrument, regardless of the fact that it may have been executed for the purchase of necessaries.
We would point out that appellee’s complaint was in the Code form for a suit on an account (Title 7, Section 223, Form 10, Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958); the case was tried before a jury on the basis of a suit on an account, and was reviewed by this court on appeal on that same theory.
Yet, on rehearing, appellee now characterizes the case as premised on a negotiable instruments theory.
New questions or new theories for deciding a controversy cannot be presented or raised for the first time on rehearing.
The Supreme Court in Kirkland v. Kirkland, 281 Ala. 42, 198 So.2d 771, said:
“We cannot sanction the practice of bringing up new questions for the first time in application for rehearing. Robinson v. Allison, 97 Ala. 596, 604, 12 So. 382, 604 (sic).
“An application for rehearing on ground not argued or suggested until after our judgment was rendered cannot be now considered. Goodgame v. Dawson, 242 Ala. 499, 504, 7 So.2d 77; Rudolph v. Rudolph, 251 Ala. 317, 319, 36 So.2d 902; Austin v. Pepperman, 278 Ala. 551, 572, 179 So.2d 299.”
This court is thereby precluded from considering the questions raised in the application for rehearing.
We would say again, however, that this case was not tried and decided on the basis of a negotiable instrument, but went to the jury on the basis that there was a joint ac*433count with appellee, appellant and her husband, for which she was to be held liable.
There was never any effort to characterize the sales slip or charge ticket signed by appellant as a negotiable instrument. Moreover, had the controversy been tried and decided on the basis of a negotiable instrument rather than an account authorized by Section 223, supra, the appellant could have been held liable only for those charges made by her.
Section 3-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Title 7 — A, § 3-401, Code of Alabama 1940, as Recompiled 1958), provides :
“No person is liable on any instrument unless his signature appears thereon.”
Therefore, the question would have been one of law rather than fact. Hence, no jury question would have been involved.
Opinion extended.
Application for rehearing overruled.