Court Opinion

ID: 9374514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 15:05:06.347875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.349764
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-813

                      EDUCATIONAL DIVIDE REFORM, INC.

                                       vs.

                       CITY OF CAMBRIDGE & another.1

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment

 dismissing its complaint.        We affirm.

       Background.     In 2016, the plaintiff, Educational Divide

 Reform, Inc. (EDR) entered into a lease with the Roman Catholic

 Archbishop of Boston (church) to rent property in Cambridge.

 Under the terms of the lease, EDR was responsible for paying any

 property tax that was assessed to the church.             In June 2018, the

 church received a property tax bill that it forwarded to EDR for

 payment.    EDR's president contacted the church contending that

 EDR was exempt from the property tax because both the church and

 EDR were non-profit organizations.          In turn, the church

 contacted Robert Reardon, the director of assessing for the City

 1 Robert Reardon, individually and in his representative
 capacity.
of Cambridge (city).   Reardon advised both the church and EDR's

president that the exemption did not apply because the leased

premises were not used for church business at that time.     EDR

claimed that it was "ill advised" by Reardon, and that the

information was "wrong" and "false."

     EDR paid the property taxes for 2018, 2019, and 2020 (tax

years).   On October 20, 2020, it filed a property tax refund

application with the city for the tax years, as well as a

request for a denial letter so it could bring the matter to the

Appellate Tax Board (board).2   The city denied the applications

as untimely and refused to issue a denial determination letter.

On November 18, 2020, EDR asked the city to reconsider its

determination; the city refused EDR's request.   Thereafter, EDR

filed a three-count complaint in the Superior Court against the

defendants for deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and

liability for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions.    The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the city

and Reardon were immune from liability under the Massachusetts

Torts Claim Act (MTCA); the court lacked jurisdiction, as EDR

2 EDR did not include a copy of the "refund application"
referenced in its complaint, but it did request "a refund of all
prior property tax payments." The lease makes reference to
abatement proceedings for real estate taxes and the disposition
of any potential refund. At argument in the Superior Court,
EDR's counsel referred to an "abatement application." We
therefore understand EDR's reference to the "refund application"
to be the equivalent of a request for a tax abatement.

                                 2
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and timely appeal

the tax assessments; and judicial relief was precluded because

the statutory tax scheme was the exclusive remedy for EDR.      A

Superior Court judge agreed and dismissed the complaint.      This

appeal followed.

     Discussion.     "We review an order on a motion to dismiss de

novo.     Factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss if they plausibly suggest that the plaintiff is entitled

to relief." (internal citations omitted).      A.L. Prime Energy

Consultant, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 479 Mass.

419, 424 (2018).     We "look beyond the conclusory allegations in

the complaint and focus on whether the factual allegations

plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief."      Curtis v. Herb

Chambers I-95, Inc., 458 Mass. 674, 676 (2011), citing

Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008).

     1.    Administrative remedies.    In order to appeal a

determination of tax-exempt eligibility, a charitable

organization must seek an abatement within three months of the

determination.     See William B. Rice Eventide Home, Inc. v.

Assessors of Quincy, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 867, 871 (2007), quoting

G. L. c. 59, § 59.    EDR concedes,3 as it must, that it did not do

3 EDR contends that it received the 2018 tax bill in "June 2018."
The complaint is silent as to the date of receipt of the 2019
and 2020 tax bills. In any event, EDR did not apply for a tax
abatement until October 20, 2020, when it "filed a refund

                                   3
so, and its attempt to recast its complaint as one sounding in

tort is not a substitute for EDR's failure to administratively

appeal the property tax assessments to the board.          At bottom,

the city properly denied EDR's attempt to appeal the assessments

for the tax years as untimely.

     A taxpayer who timely filed for abatement and remained

aggrieved, must then appeal to the board "within three months

after the time when the application for abatement is deemed to

be denied."     G. L. c. 59, § 64.       EDR's failure to appeal the

assessor's denial of the abatements within three months of the

city's determination deprived the board of subject matter

jurisdiction.4    See Nature Church v. Assessors of Belchertown,

384 Mass. 811, 812 (1981).     Because EDR failed to appeal to the

board, EDR is not entitled to seek judicial review.         See G. L.

c. 58A, § 13.    Moreover, because the statutory scheme provides

the exclusive remedy to challenge tax abatements, and EDR did

not appeal the denial of the abatements to the board, EDR's

claims also fail as a matter of law.         See Sears, Roebuck & Co.

application for 2018, 2019 and 2020." Assuming that EDR
received the tax bills on June 30th of each year, the
application was at least twenty days late for 2020; it was more
than one year late for 2019; and it was more than two years late
for 2018.
4 EDR did not need a denial letter to appeal to the board.  See
G. L. c. 59, § 63 (if assessor fails to take action on
application for three months, application is deemed denied and
appeal to board from inaction may be taken).

                                     4
v. Somerville, 363 Mass. 756, 758-759 (1973).         See also G. L.

c. 58A, § 13 (appeal to Appeals Court exclusive method to review

action of Appellate Tax Board).

       2.    MTCA.   The MTCA is the "exclusive remedy for bringing

tort claims against the Commonwealth and its municipalities."

Magliacane v. Gardner, 483 Mass. 842, 850 (2020).         EDR cannot

assert common law negligence claims to avoid compliance with the

MTCA.       Under the MTCA, the Commonwealth and its municipalities

are immune from liability for "any claim arising in respect of

the assessment or collection of any tax."         G. L. c. 258, § 10

(d).    They are also immune from "any claim based upon an act or

omission of a public employee when such employee is exercising

due care in the execution of any statute or any regulation of a

public employer."       G. L. c. 258, § 10 (a).    Moreover, the MTCA

does not waive immunity for intentional torts of public

employees, and government entities retain their immunity from

liability for such conduct.       See G. L. c. 258, § 10 (c).

Accordingly, EDR's claims against the city are barred by the

MTCA.       And because the MTCA is the exclusive remedy for a claim

of tortious conduct against a public employer or employee, EDR's

claims for deceit and negligent misrepresentation fail as a

matter of law.       Reardon is also immune from liability because

the MTCA shields public employees acting within the scope of

their employment from personal liability for negligent conduct.

                                     5
See McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 46 (1989).5   See also

G. L. c. 258, § 2.

                                    Judgment affirmed.

                                    By the Court (Blake,
                                      Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.6),

                                    Clerk

Entered:   February 23, 2023.

5 Based on our disposition, we need not consider the defendant's
claim that EDR knew that Reardon's statement was false.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                6