Court Opinion

ID: 9711132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:55.476784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.443480
License: Public Domain

Clifford, J.,
dissenting. Today’s opinion of the Court creates yet another fissure in the wall of separation between church and state. It does so, unmistakably and despite protestations to the contrary, by sanctioning the indefinite use of public school facilities for religious worship during non-school hours. While as a matter of public policy there is much to be said for the maximum use of public facilities by all segments of society, the statute, N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34, does not extend permission for such use and the United States Constitution forbids it. Our constitutional obligation to guard against excessive governmental involvement in religious affairs, however pure the motive therefor may be, is clear. Because I see today’s decision as falling short of that obligation, I dissent.
I
As the Court’s opinion recites, the East Brunswick Township Board of Education’s rental program under scrutiny here provides for the leasing of public school facilities during non-school hours to various religious organizations as well as to other non-profit social, civic, recreational and charitable groups. Under the procedures established by the Board, a qualified association seeking to use the public school facilities submits an application directly to a local school administrator. The applicant is required to specify the intended use of the facility as well as the anticipated duration. The principal of the local school, guided by the regulations adopted by the Board, routinely grants such requests as long as the stated use .does not conflict with school scheduling. While the rental charge varies according to the activity being conducted, there is no dispute that it is substantially less than the fair rental value of such facilities. Likewise *122is there no dispute that while the requisite application may be submitted for use on a weekly, monthly, annual or indefinite basis, all of the religious bodies involved in the present case submitted applications requesting an indefinite use of the facilities.
Pursuant to this program the religious organizations in this case began in 1968 (Nativity Evangelical Lutheran Church), 1969 (East Brunswick Baptist Church), and 1973 (Reform Temple iof East Brunswick) leasing school facilities for the various purposes set forth in the majority opinion. These included, with respect to one or the other or both of the two Churches, the use of classrooms on Sunday for religious services and religious instruction, as well as of limited classroom space on a weeknight for prayer meeting. Various religious artifacts, including bibles, hymnals, and a wooden pulpit with a cross, were stored in a closet or cabinet adjoining the area being utilized. It is noteworthy that the Nativity Evangelical Lutheran Church’s initial leasing of school premises was intended to be of indefinite duration and the Board therafter approved yearly renewals. It no longer uses public school facilities. Likewise in the case of the East Brunswick Baptist Church the initial application was to rent the facilities for an “indefinite” period; it was treated by the Board as a request for use of the school space for one year and was granted; and the Board approved yearly renewals thereafter until the Church purchased its own building in the community. As regards the Reform Temple, it rented virtually an entire elementary school building for religious instruction for five hours on Sundays; a gymnasium for religious services and social gatherings on Friday evenings; and five classrooms for Hebrew language instruction on Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Religious articles used in these activities were also stored at the school. In its initial application the Temple sought to use the facilities for an indefinite period and the Board has renewed the Temple’s application on a yearly basis. At the time of the commencement of this litigation the Temple had an option to purchase *123a building site and had also retained an architect, but as of the time of oral argument the building had not yet been completed. We are informed that the Temple, after utilizing school facilities for some five years, recently discontinued using public school premises for any purpose, but that other church groups in East Brunswick are still using those facilities.1
Plaintiff, a taxpayer of East Brunswick, filed suit in Chancery Division seeking to enjoin the aforementioned use of public school facilities on statutory and constitutional grounds. Specifically, he asserted that the Board lacked the authority under N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34 (permissible uses of public school facilities) to permit such a use and, more importantly, that the practice itself violated the federal and state constitutions. The trial court held that while the Board lacked statutory authority under N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34 to permit the use of public schools by religious groups for worship services, the Sunday school and Hebrew instruction were permissible uses under the statute. Resnick v. East Brunswick Township Board of Education, 135 N. J. Super. 257, 261-62 (Ch. 1975). However, since the religious organizations did not fully reimburse the Board for the out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of their use of the facilities, the expenditure of public funds to meet these costs was held to violate *124the New Jersey constitutional prohibition against public expenditures in support of religion. 135 N. J. Super, at 268; see N. J. Const. (1947), Art. I, ¶ 3.
The trial court held further that the renting of public school facilities at a reduced rate to religious groups on an indefinite basis violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution since
[t]he program involves entanglement between church and state, administrative entanglement in the record keeping and scheduling by defendant board’s employees, and political entanglement in subjecting defendant board’s members, elected officials, to the demands and pressures of religious bodies and of those opposing them to approve or disapprove leases for religious use of public school facilities.
[135 N. J. Super, at 268.]
Notwithstanding these entanglement problems the court declined to enjoin the rental practice and gave the Board 45 days within which to submit a proposal for continued use of the facilities for such fixed periods of time as would enable the affected religious bodies to secure alternative accommodations for religious services and religious instruction. The proposal subsequently submitted by the Board provided that religious organizations could continue to use public school facilities for religious education and services for one year on the condition that they pay the fair rental value of the facilities as well as any actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred as a result of such use. In addition, no religious artifacts were to be stored in the school. The proposal was modified slightly and embodied in the trial court’s final order.2
The Appellate Division affirmed substantially for the reasons given by the trial court. Resnick v. East Brunswick *125Township Board of Education, 144 N. J. Super. 474 (App. Div. 1976).
The majority, in reversing the Appellate Division, approves the continued storing of religious artifacts and holds:
[R]eligious groups who' fully reimburse school boards for related out-of-pocket expenses may use school facilities on a temporary basis for religious services as well as educational classes. We further hold that the courts below erred in requiring these sectarian groups to pay a commercial rental rate and in placing the one-year limitation on their continued use of the school premises.
[Ante at 120 (emphasis added).]
The Court thus takes the position, in effect, that the mere payment by the religious bodies of "related out-of-pocket expenses” somehow cures the constitutional defects presented by the indefinite use of public school facilities for religious worship and religious instruction. I think it does not.3
II
Before the constitutional issues implicated by the Board’s rental program are addressed, an initial determination must be made as to whether a local school board has the authority to permit public school facilities to be used for religious worship and religious instruction. As a general proposition the powers of a municipality are limited to those granted expressly or by necessary or fair implication of state legislation. E. G., Ringlieb v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 59 N. J. 348, 351-52 (1971); see also 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 10.09 at 754-60 (3rd. ed. 1966). The powers of a local school board, a fortiori, are similarly *126limited. See, e.g., Botkin v. Westwood, 52 N. J. Super. 416, 427 (App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 28 N. J. 218 (1958).
The applicable statute concerning the permissible uses of public school facilities during non-school hours, N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34, provides in pertinent part:
The board of education of any district may, pursuant to rules adopted by it, permit the use of any schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the grounds and other property of the district, when not in use for school purposes, for any of the following purposes:
a. The assembly of persons for the purpose of giving and receiving instruction in any branch of education, learning, or the arts, including the science of agriculture, horticulture, and floriculture;
c. The holding of such social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments and such other purposes as may be approved by the board; 4" *
Pursuant to this enactment the Board adopted rules and regulations permitting the rental of its facilities by “any East Brunswick organization which is non-profit in nature” and whose “activities of an educational and/or cultural nature * * * are of benefit to the community.” As implemented the Board permitted the religious associations involved in the present case to lease the facilities for purposes of religious instruction and religious services. The threshold issue, then, is one of statutory construction, namely, whether N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34 authorizes the use of public school facilities for purposes of religious instruction and religious services.
While I agree with the Court that the language of subsection (a) of the statute is sufficiently broad to comprehend the instruction of religious tenets as well as the Hebrew language involved in the present case, the use of public school facilities for religious worship is not authorized under N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34(a) or (c). Subsection (a) refers generally to instructional activities and, as such, cannot fairly be read to comprehend the religious worship *127services involved in this case, they being admittedly devoid of any pedagogical purpose. Subsection (c) provides that public school facilities may be used during non-school hours for “such social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments and such other purposes as may be approved by the board.” (Emphasis added.) The majority, in the course of holding that religious services are authorized under subsection (c), expansively interprets the emphasized language as affording a local board “wide discretion” in determining the permissible uses of school facilities. Ante at 99. That interpretation disregards settled principles of statutory construction and, in so doing, circumvents the presumed intent of the legislature in enacting N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34(c).
Under traditional canons of statutory construction where general statutory language follows specific words describing a legal subject, “the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the specific words.” 2-A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 47.17 at 103 (Sands ed. 1973); see also Villanova v. American Federation of Musicians, 123 N. J. Super. 57, 59 (App. Div.), certif. den., 63 N. J. 504 (1973). This sensible doctrine of ejusdem generis, which is invoked only when the meaning of statutory language is, as here, unclear, attempts to harmonize the apparent incompatibility between the specific and general statutory language in a manner which the legislature most likely intended. As applied to the present case statutory authorization for religious services may be derived from N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34(c) only if religious services are deemed to be similar in nature to “social, civic, and recreational meetings and entertainments.” While the majority spins a beguiling semantical web in reasoning that religious services share the common characteristics of these enumerated permissible uses, the assemblage of persons offering worship to a deity according to established exercises and rituals is plainly different in nature. Moreover, the majority’s expansive interpretation of “such other uses *128as may be approved by the board” renders superfluous the uses specifically enumerated in subsection (c), thereby ignoring the recognized presumption that a legislature has not used superfluous words in drafting a statute. See Sutherland, swpra, § 47.17 at 103.
Consequently, since N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34 does not authorize expressly or by fair implication the holding of religious services in public school facilities during non-school hours, I would agree with the courts below that the Board lacked the authority to permit such activity.
Ill
But even were I of the view that N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34(c) authorizes the Board to permit religious worship in public school facilities, I would nevertheless overturn, on federal constitutional grounds, the rental program as applied to these religious organizations, including both the religious worship and the religious instruction.4
The religion clauses of the First Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provide that government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Since, as the majority likewise concludes, the rental of public school facilities by the religious groups involved in the present ease did not implicate a free exercise question, ante at 105, the issue, then, is whether this practice violated the establishment clause.
The prohibition against the "establishment of a religion,” growing out of a protracted colonial straggle for individual freedom of religion, reflects a societal aversion to varying types of noncoercive governmental intrusions into religious *129freedom. Underlying the establishment clause are two fundamental social concerns:
(1) the furtherance of voluntarism by eschewing all governmental association with religion that may influence beliefs; and (2) the maintenance of neutrality by avoiding all manifestations of official preference for one religion over another or for religion over secularism.
[Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1175 (1974).]
In application the establishment clause requires government to adopt a posture of “neutrality” in its relations with religious groups. See, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15-16, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511, 91 L. Ed. 711, 733 (1947). Over the years the rather amorphous requirement of governmental neutrality has been expanded into the following three-part test to be used in determining whether an enactment or practice runs afoul of the establishment clause: ,(1) it must have a secular legislative purpose; (3) a principal or primary effect of the practice must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2598-99, 53 L. Ed. 2d 714, 724-25 (1977); Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, 72 N. J. 237, 252 (1977).
Under this three-part test, the Board’s practice of renting public school facilities to religious groups for an indefinite duration at less than the fair rental value must initially be examined to determine whether the threshold requirement — that the rental program have a secular purpose — is satisfied. Since there is no dispute that the purpose underlying the program before us is the optimum utilization of public school facilities during non-school hours by diverse groups within the community, the secular purpose requirement was thereby met.
*130As modified by the majority, however, this rental program raises serious constitutional problems under the second prong of the three-part test, since a primary effect is to confer significant benefits on any religious association utilizing the facilities. Under the majority’s view such a group need reimburse the Board only for the “related out-of-pocket expenses” incurred. Ante at 120. Included expenses are the utility, heating, administrative and janitorial costs which would not be incurred but for the use of the facilities.
This nominal “rental fee” is significantly less than the rental value — $.75 per area hour — of the facilities. Hence it is apparent that the Board’s policy of not assessing the fair rental value of the facilities allowed these religious organizations to realize a substantial financial savings. Por instance, the Reform Temple saved approximately $2600 annually by not being assessed the fair rental value. Such governmental largesse, while doubtless motivated by concern for the well-being of all non-profit associations within the community, nevertheless has the undeniable effect of conferring a significant economic benefit upon a particular religious association5 — precisely the evil which the establishment clause seeks to prevent.
Completely aside from the conferring of any financial benefit, the extensive use of public school facilities for *131religious worship and religious instruction affords the religious bodies an otherwise unavailable public forum for expounding their tenets. That the use of public facilities for worship services over any substantial period allows access to a greater audience cannot be doubted. More importantly, however, the extent and duration of such use has the inevitable effect, at least in the minds of some, of placing the imprimatur of government upon religion in general. Indeed, the majority concedes as much when it notes that “[a]t some point, such continuous use will surely implicate the Board in the promotion of religion.” Ante at 117. In my view that point was surely reached in the present ease.
Thus, the program as applied conferred benefits both tangible and intangible upon the religious organizations utilizing the school premises. This practice over a substantial period had the undeniable effect of advancing religion contrary to the establishment clause. Yet the majority, while conceding that these religious bodies were benefitted by the rental program, contends that the program is not constitutionally infirm since whatever benefits may be received are simply an incidental effect of the program. Ante at 111. It reasons that the primary effect is to aid an internally pluralistic group of non-profit community organizations. Although unstated, the apparent rationale of this position is that while a direct effect of the rental program as applied may be to benefit religion, the program may not be overturned under the second tier of the three-part establishment clause test unless the primary effect is to advance religion. Since the program on its face benefits the community as a whole, so the argument goes, its effect is not impermissibly to advance religion.
But I think the effect is just that. The Supreme Court, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 2955, 37 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1973), expressly rejected any such attempt to adhere rigidly *132to the literal meaning of the second tier of the three part test:
Appellees, focusing- on the term “principal or primary effect” which this Court has utilized in expressing the second prong of the three-part test, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612, 91 S. Ct. at 2105, 2111, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 745, 755 (1971), have argued that the Court must decide in these cases whether the “primary” effect of New York’s tuition grant program is to subsidize religion or to promote these legitimate secular objectives. Mr. Justice White’s dissenting opinion [413 U. S. at 823, 93 S. Ct. at 2998, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 987], similarly suggests that the Court today fails to make this “ultimate judgment.” We do not think that such metaphysical judgments are either possible or necessary. Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a “primary” effect to promote some legitimate end under the State’s police power is immune from fur the examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.
[413 U. S. at 785 n. 39, 93 S. Ct. at 2971, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 969 n. 39, (emphasis added).]
In analyzing the delicate issue of whether a governmental enactment or program has the impermissible- effect of advancing religion, the Court wisely cautioned against an inflexible interpretation of the three-part establishment clause test, harking back to Chief Justice Burger’s sage observation in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 614, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 2112, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 757 (1971) :
[Constitutional analysis is not a “legalistic minuet in which precise rules and forms govern.” Instead * * “the form of the relationship [must be examined] for the light that it casts on the substance.”
[413 U. S. at 790-91, 93 S. Ct. at 2974, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 972.]
Thus, under the approach called for in Nyquist, even if the primary effect of the rental program is legitimate, it may nevertheless run afoul of the -establishment clause if a direct and immediate effect of the program is to advance religion. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-9 at 840 (1978). In the present case a direct effect of the rental program as applied was to afford the associations *133in question a highly visible forum for advancing their religious tenets at a nominal price for an indefinite period. On this basis alone the program should be declared unconstitutional inasmuch as it had in this case — and hence continues to have, with respect to any future operation of the program, the potential for — an impermissible effect of advancing religion.
This result is buttressed by the failure of the rental program to satisfy the final component of the three-part test — whether the practice fosters excessive governmental entanglement in religious affairs. Plainly there must be involved a not insubstantial amount of record keeping and frequent communications between the Board employees and the religious bodies using the facilities concerning scheduling and the like. Moreover, by permitting any future users to store various religious artifacts and assorted paraphernalia on the school premises, the employees of the Board will be forced to exercise supervision order to ensure the safety of the items and avoid open display of the artifacts.
In addition, the potential political entanglement engendered by the rental of public school facilities on an indefinite basis or for any substantial period is equally manifest. The rules and regulations adopted by the Board provide that the principal of the school has broad discretion in granting or rejecting an application. In theory the principal is guided by the policies, rules and regulations of the Board in granting or denying an application. If these guidelines are not sufficiently detailed to aid in the disposition of an application, then either the Superintendent of Schools or the Board itself is called upon to make the determination. In any event, a local official, presumably well-known within the community, is given significant discretionary authority to grant or deny the application.
The political pressures which may be placed on such an official arise out of the necessity for decision not only on whether to grant or deny an application but also on whether to afford one religious body favored treatment over another *134should a conflict arise by applicants seeking the same facility at the same time. Whether this potential political divisiveness along religious lines rises to the level of constitutional infirmity is, of course, a question of degree. In the present case the religious organizations use the facilities on an indefinite basis. However, since any indefinite use, as permitted by the program, may involve yearly renewals of the application, the political pressure exerted upon the official handling any other applications may be a recurring consideration. Although community opposition to the use of public facilities at reduced rental rates would not be sufficient, standing alone, to prevent such a use, a court cannot ignore the potential political divisiveness along religious lines engendered by this ongoing beneficent treatment of religious bodies. See Johnson v. Huntington Beach Union High School District, 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43, 50-51 (Ct. App. 1977), cert. den. 434 U. S. 877, 98 S. Ct. 228, 54 L. Ed. 2d 156 (1977) (potential divisiveness along religious lines implicated by a Bible study club using public school facilities during the school day “cannot be ignored” in an establishment clause analysis). As Chief Justice Burger has pointed out:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.
[Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U. S. at 623, 91 S. Ct. at 2116, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 761.]
And so I conclude that the rental of public school facilities to religious organizations at reduced rates for a substantial or indefinite duration not only has a primary or direct effect which advances religion in general, but also fosters excessive governmental entanglement in religious affairs. Consequently, under the three-part test for determining whether governmental action runs afoul of the *135establishment clause, the rental program as modified by the majority is, in my respectful view, unconstitutional.
Nor is this conclusion undercut -by Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1959), where the Supreme Court of Elorida held that the temporary use of public school facilities for religious worship did not violate the federal constitutional prohibition against the establishment of religion. Significantly, the court added this caveat:
[I]f the use of the school buildings were permitted for prolonged periods of time, absent evidence of an immediate intention on the part of the Church to construct its own building, we think it could hardly be contemplated that the public school system or its property could be employed in the permanent promotion of any particular sect or denomination.
[115 So. 2d at 700.]
Under Southside Estates, then, the use of school facilities for religious worship cannot be reconciled with the establishment clause if the use is prolonged and there is no immediate intention on the part of the religious body to construct its own facility. Here all the religious organizations used the facilities on an indefinite basis, up to seven years duration in two instances and 5 years in the other. That such use is the type of prolonged use referred to in Southside Estates cannot be doubted. While the majority takes the position that the second requirement of Southside Estates is satisfied since “every single religious group using East Brunswick schools has actively pursued plans to build its own house of worship”, ante at 107 n. 7,1 hesitate to adopt so indulgent a view in light of the record, sparse though it may be, indicating that the pursuit of building plans was anything but “active.” Eive to seven years is a leisurely pace, at best. In any event, Southside Estates is not persuasive authority for either position since, as noted, it was decided long before the formulation of the currently applicable three-part establishment clause test.
*136IY
In summary, although the rental program is unquestionably valid as applied to non-sectarian charitable organizations and should be permitted to continue as to them, its application to religious groups runs afoul of both statutory and constitutional law. The Board has not been given the authority under N. J. S. A. 18A:20-34 to permit the use of public school facilities for religious worship. Even assuming such authority, the rental program fails to withstand scrutiny under the establishment clause. While the result may be looked upon as harsh, the necessity for the vigilant enforcement of the constitutional requirement of separation of church and state is particularly acute where, as here, public school facilities are transformed into houses of worship during non-school hours on a regular basis. As noted by Justice Frankfurter:
Separation means separation, not something less. Jefferson’s metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a “wall of separation,” not of a fine line easily overstepped. The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its school, to avoid confusing, not to say fusing, what the Constitution sought to keep strictly apart. “The great American principle of eternal separation” —■ Elihu Root’s phrase bears repetition — is one of the vital reliances of our Constitutional system for assuring unities among our people stronger than our diversities. It is the Court’s duty to enforce this principle in its full integrity.
[McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231, 68 S. Ct. 461, 475, 92 L. Ed. 649, 669 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).]
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Judge Contoed joins in this opinion.

Even though the matter might be considered moot because none of the religious organizations who participated in this litigation presently uses public school facilities, I agree with the Court that it is appropriate to reach the merits in the instant case. In view of the public importance attached to resolution of the issues and the likelihood of recurrence of the circumstances giving rise to this litigation, the case is properly allowed to proceed to decision. See, e. g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N. J. 576, 579 (1971) ; Busik v. Levine, 63 N. J. 351, 363-64, appeal dismissed, 414 U. S. 1106, 94 S. Ct. 831, 38 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1973) ; Dunellen Board of Education v. Dunellen Education Association, 64 N. J. 17, 22 (1973).

Beeause plaintiff filed no cross-appeal from this final order, the issue of the propriety of its provisions is not presented. I would emphasize, however, that nothing in this opinion should be read to imply approval of the continued use, for one year, of school facilities for religious services.

There is no question as to the validity of the program as applied to the non-sectarian, non-profit organizations utilizing the facilities. Thus any finding that the program as applied W the religious groups utilizing the facilities is infirm would not affect the viability of the program as applied to the remaining non-profit organizations.

The rental program as applied to religious groups is also challenged on state constitutional grounds. See N. J. Const. (1947), Art. I, ¶ 4. Inasmuch as the program as applied is contrary to the establishment clause of the federal constitution, however, the state constitutional issue need not he reached.

The majority, in the course of holding that the program as applied does not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, states that
there is no question that incidental expenses of wear and tear on school property when used during non-instructional hours for religious worship and teaching as well as a myriad of other activities are not a public expense primarily for the benefit of religion.
[Ante at 112.]
This analysis misperceives the inquiry required by the second tier of the three-part establishment clause test. Under the second tier the impact of the program must be examined from the perspective of the tmefioiaries of the program, not from that of the taxpayers who finance the facilities.