Court Opinion

ID: 9956703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 19:02:09.801731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:45.655591
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 Marriage of Yanes CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                           DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of KATELYN                                         2d Civil No. B326799
and ALVARO YANES.                                               (Super. Ct. No. D401624)
                                                                    (Ventura County)

KATELYN YANES,

     Respondent,

v.

ALVARO YANES,

     Appellant.

          Alvaro Yanes appeals from the judgment dividing property
in the dissolution of his marriage to Katelyn Yanes.1 Katelyn
requests we dismiss the appeal on the ground that Alvaro

          1 We refer to the parties’ first names to avoid confusion.                                        No
disrespect is intended.
prematurely filed his notice of appeal. We deny the request for
dismissal and affirm.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
       Alvaro and Katelyn were married for almost nine years and
separated in May 2021. They have three minor children. The
parties stipulated to a custody agreement and the trial court
terminated the parties’ marital status in December 2022.
                          Trial proceedings
       The parties tried the division of property issues. At the
beginning of trial, Alvaro moved in limine to exclude forensic
accountant, Wayne Lorch, from testifying. Alvaro argued that
the contract between the parties and LorchGreene LLP precluded
Lorch from doing so. The court denied the motion.
       Lorch prepared two schedules (one for each party)
reflecting the parties’ separate and community properties. He
reviewed bank statements, canceled checks, paystubs, and other
financial documents, and relied on the Family Code to create the
schedules. He divided the assets that existed as of the date of
separation.
       Lorch testified he was unable to allocate the parties’
E-trade account, stock units, restricted stock units (RSU), or
stock options as either community or separate property because
information was missing. He created two scenarios—one where
he assumed all stock units were community property, and one
where he assumed they were separate property. He assumed all
the transfers in the E-trade account were community property.
Lorch testified he had difficulty getting information from Alvaro,
who managed the assets and transfers and had the stock options.

      2 Most of the facts are taken from the certified settled
statement.

                                 2
Lorch said that Alvaro’s failure to provide such information
“exacerbated [his] fees.”
      At the conclusion of Lorch’s cross-examination, Alvaro
informed Lorch he had the additional documents regarding the
RSUs and E-trade account. The court directed Alvaro to provide
such documentation to Lorch, Katelyn, and the court.
      Lorch wrote “[To Be Determined]” for the value of personal
property such as furniture, furnishings, and appliances. Alvaro
indicated Katelyn had about $37,400 of personal property in her
possession. Lorch testified that neither party provided any
documentation other than their own lists of personal property.
      Alvaro testified he earned about $180,000 in gross income
in 2020 and about $420,000 in 2021. He quit his job in November
2021 and did not work again until April 2022. He received RSUs
from his former employer after the date of separation. He
liquidated the RSUs and put the funds into the children’s 529
accounts. He also exercised stock options from another former
employer, and put these funds into the E-trade account. He
disbursed $50,000 each to himself and Katelyn from the E-trade
account. Alvaro testified he purchased a Cadillac for Katelyn
during their marriage.
      Katelyn testified she inherited $100,000 from her father.
She placed the funds into a joint account and used about half of
the funds for a down payment on the family residence. Alvaro
invested the remainder of the inheritance. With respect to
personal property, Katelyn testified Alvaro took office equipment,
exercise equipment, computer monitors, a speaker system, and
musical instruments. Katelyn testified they had an E-trade
account, but she never had access to it. They agreed each would

                                3
receive $50,000 from the account, and she acknowledged
receiving a check from Alvaro.
                   Ruling on the submitted matter
       On January 30, 2023, the trial court issued a ruling on the
submitted matter. The court found Katelyn’s inheritance was
separate property, and there was no transmutation to community
property when she placed the funds into a joint account.
       With respect to personal property, the court noted that
each party claimed the other had a substantial worth of personal
property. The court found “both parties lack[ed] credible
evidence to substantiate their respective positions. Each are
awarded the personal property in his/her possession without
off-set.”
       The court relied on Lorch’s valuation of the parties’
deferred compensation/retirement plans and allocated the
interests between the parties. The court also relied on Lorch’s
analysis of the E-trade account, which held Alvaro’s stocks from
employment. The court found Alvaro “did not provide any
accounting of the use of the funds in the [E-trade] account until
the second day of trial when he provided the court with proof of
his post-separation receipt of [RSUs].” Thus, the court accepted
Lorch’s analysis of the E-trade account with modifications as to
the RSUs.
       As to the children’s 529 accounts, the court awarded Alvaro
$21,569.
       The court relied on Lorch’s report to divide the assets and
debts between the parties. The court also accepted Lorch’s
accounting for the purpose of calculating reimbursements for
post-separation use of the community funds with modification as
to Alvaro’s RSUs. The court considered the RSUs as separate

                                4
income for the purpose of determining the Ostler/Smith award3
for spousal support. Based on Alvaro’s 2021 earnings, the court
ordered Alvaro to pay an Ostler/Smith award of $40,894.
       The court found Alvaro’s conduct increased Katelyn’s fees
and costs. It ordered Alvaro to pay Katelyn $5,000 for forensic
accounting costs and pay Katelyn’s counsel $20,000 in attorney
fees pursuant to Family Code section 271. The court subtracted
the amount Alvaro was owed in equalization from the amount he
owed Katelyn in fees and costs, and ordered him to pay $2,072 to
Katelyn. Alvaro did not request a statement of decision. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 632.)
                            DISCUSSION
                      Premature notice of appeal
       Katelyn requests we dismiss the appeal because Alvaro did
not file a notice of appeal after the judgment. We deny the
request for dismissal.
       Here, the trial court ruled on the matters concerning the
division of property on January 30, 2023, and directed Katelyn’s
counsel to prepare the judgment. Alvaro filed his notice of appeal
on February 27, 2023, before Katelyn’s counsel prepared the
judgment. Notice of entry of judgment was served on June 9,
2023, and Alvaro did not file another notice of appeal.

      3 An Ostler/Smith award is “ ‘an additional award, over and
above guideline support, expressed as a fraction or percentage of
any discretionary bonus actually received.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Minkin (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 939, 949; In re Marriage of Ostler
& Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33.) “Its purpose is to capture
fluctuations in the supporting spouse’s income that are not
included in a flat rate amount of support.” (In re Marriage of
Minkin, at p. 949.)

                                5
       “The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed after
the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before
it has rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of
judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d)(2).) We exercise
our discretion to do so. (Ibid.; In re Marriage of Grimes & Mou
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 420.)
                           Noncompliant brief
       As Katelyn correctly points out, Alvaro’s opening brief does
not comply with the California Rules of Court. An appellant
must provide a summary of the significant facts and “ ‘accurately
and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of
bias . . . .’ ” (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
1507, 1531; Cal. Rules of Court,4 rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Any
reference to a matter in the record must be supported by a
citation to the record. (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
       Here, Alvaro’s statement of the case does not include a
single citation to the settled statement. His statement of facts
consists of tables of exhibit lists. Moreover, his reference to some
facts, such as allocation tables included in the judgment, is not
fair and unbiased. He annotates these tables with comments
such as “gross overvaluation” or “gross undervaluations” or
“[i]ncludes errors committed by Lorchgreene accounting.”
       Alvaro also bears the burden of affirmatively
demonstrating error. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.) “Whether legal or factual, no error warrants reversal
unless the appellant can show injury from the error.” (City of
Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “[T]o
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court

      4 Unspecified rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

                                 6
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis.” (Id. at
pp. 286-287.) “[W]e may disregard conclusory arguments that are
not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the
reasoning by which the appellant reached the conclusions [they]
want[] us to adopt.” (Id. at p. 287.)
       Here, Alvaro’s brief fails to include cogent legal arguments,
legal analysis, and pertinent legal authority. Thus, we may
disregard his arguments. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8
Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2 [“To the extent [a party] perfunctorily
asserts other claims without development . . . , they are not
properly made, and are rejected on that basis”].)
       We are mindful Alvaro appears in pro per, but that does
not entitle him to special treatment. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.) “ ‘A litigant has a right to act as
his own attorney [citation] “but, in so doing, should be restricted
to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of
those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise,
ignorance is unjustly rewarded.” ’ ” (Doran v. Dreyer (1956) 143
Cal.App.2d 289, 290.)
       Despite these deficiencies in Alvaro’s brief, we nonetheless
review his claims on the merits.
                    Division of personal property
       Alvaro contends the trial court erred in ruling on the
division of personal property. He contends there was no
substantial evidence he regained possession of personal items
after vacating the former residence. He also contends Lorch’s
report failed to credit him for personal property in Katelyn’s
control. We disagree.
       We review factual findings of the family court for
substantial evidence, construing evidence in the light most

                                 7
favorable to the prevailing party. We also resolve conflicts in
favor of the prevailing party. (In re Marriage of Hill & Dittmer
(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1051.) “[I]t is well established that
the trial court weighs the evidence and determines issues of
credibility and these determinations and assessments are binding
and conclusive on the appellate court.” (Id. at pp. 1051-1052.)
       Here, each party claimed the other had personal property
worth a substantial amount, and the trial court found both
parties lacked credible evidence. It awarded each the personal
property in his or her possession without offset. We will not
disturb the trial court’s weighing of evidence and credibility
findings. Alvaro does not show the court erred.
                        Alleged errors at trial
       Alvaro argues the trial court “failed to recognize [Katelyn’s]
actions as fraudulent, hemorrhaging [his] legal costs and well
outside the scope of [F]amily [C]ode § 271.” Alvaro does not
support these conclusory arguments and does not demonstrate
error at trial. Thus, to the extent he argues he is entitled to any
legal costs and fees, we reject this argument.
       Alvaro further argues the trial court erroneously refused or
ignored his proffered evidence, including a photograph, a letter,
text messages, and evidence of settlement attempts. We review
the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of
discretion. (Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855,
861.) Alvaro does not show the court abused its discretion. He
merely states the court “refused evidence” from him and does not
provide further argument or reasoning. Nor does he show how
such exclusion of evidence resulted in prejudice. (Cal. Const., art.
VI, § 13.)

                                 8
       Alvaro also claims Katelyn sought a restraining order
“solely for the purpose of receiving more child support.” He
alleges that such conduct increased legal fees and requests
$44,000 in excess child support payments. Again, Alvaro does
not support his conclusory statements with legal authority,
argument, or reasoning. We reject his claim.
               Lorch accounting report and testimony
       Alvaro contends Lorch’s testimony and documentary
evidence are “illegitimate” because the parties had an agreement
prohibiting him from testifying or using his work product in
litigation. He also argues Lorch’s accounting was inaccurate. We
disagree.
       Alvaro moved to exclude Lorch’s testimony based on the
language of the joint agreement with LorchGreene. The parties
originally agreed that Lorch would serve as a mediator and that
his work product would be “made in pursuit of settlement and
will not be used for any purpose in litigation.” The agreement
also states that LorchGreene “will be disqualified as a witness
and [its] work product will be inadmissible as evidence.”
       However, Katelyn’s counsel explained that the parties
agreed at prior hearings to use Lorch’s balance sheets at trial,
notwithstanding the contract. Both parties provided Lorch
information for trial purposes. The trial court also examined
Lorch about his role as mediator. He testified he never acted as a
mediator and confirmed that both parties provided information to
him up to the date of trial. Lorch prepared two different
community property analyses, but “did not provide an opinion,
conduct mediation, or settlement conferences.”

                                9
       The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that
Lorch “did not act as a mediator, did not engage in settlement
conferences, and was not precluded from testifying.”
       Based on this record, we conclude there was no error in
admitting Lorch’s testimony and reports as evidence. The parties
waived any contract provision prohibiting use of Lorch’s work
product when they agreed to use Lorch’s reports at trial and
provided him information up to the trial date. (See Biren v.
Equality Emergency Medical Group, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th
125, 141 [the parties may, by their conduct, waive contract
provision where the evidence shows waiver was their intent]; see
also Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216
Cal.App.3d 1379, 1388 [where a party behaves in a manner
antithetical to a written provision and induced the other party to
rely on the oral representations and conduct, it would be
inequitable to deny the relying party “the benefit of the other
party’s apparent modification of the written contract”].)
Moreover, the contract was for Lorch’s mediation services, and, as
the trial court observed, there was no mediation. There was no
error in finding that the contract did not preclude Lorch from
testifying or using his work product at trial.
       We also reject Alvaro’s claim of accounting error, including
error in calculating the Ostler/Smith award. “Under [Family
Code] section 2550, the court must divide the community estate
of the parties equally. In this regard, the court has broad
discretion to determine the manner in which community property
is divided and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and
liabilities in order to accomplish an equal division. [Citations.]
The trial court’s determination of the value of a particular asset
is a factual one and as long as that determination is within the

                                10
range of the evidence presented, we will uphold it on appeal.” (In
re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 631-632.)
       Here, the trial court relied upon Lorch’s report to
determine the value of assets and liabilities and to divide the
assets. It was entitled to do so. Nothing in the record supports
Alvaro’s claims of error or fraud in the accounting.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment entered June 8, 2023, is affirmed. Katelyn
shall recover costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                11
                   JoAnn Johnson, Judge

              Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

     Alvaro Yanes, in pro. per., for Appellant.
     Ferguson Case Orr Paterson and Wendy C. Lascher for
Respondent.