Court Opinion

ID: 9366988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 16:01:01.02776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.465929
License: Public Domain

20-2131
   Chen v. Garland
                                                                           BIA
                                                                    McCarthy, IJ
                                                                   A205 034 120
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 30th day of January, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                 Chief Judge,
            PIERRE N. LEVAL,
            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
                 Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   QI YONG CHEN,
            Petitioner,

                     v.                                  20-2131

   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                   Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                     Attorney General; Anthony C.
                                Payne, Assistant Director; Judith
                                R. O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney,
                                Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                United States Department of
                                Justice, Washington, DC.

     UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

     Petitioner Qi Yong Chen, a native and citizen of the

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 2, 2020,

decision of the BIA affirming a March 29, 2018, decision of

an   Immigration   Judge   (“IJ”)   denying      his   application   for

asylum,    withholding     of   removal,   and     relief   under    the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).        In re Qi Yong Chen, No.

A 205 034 120 (B.I.A. June 2, 2020), aff’g No. A 205 034 120

(Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 29, 2018).         We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

     We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

Cir. 2005).     The applicable standards of review are well

established.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that

“the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
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the contrary”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination under

a substantial evidence standard).

       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

the applicant or witness” and on inconsistencies within and

between    an   applicant’s    statements   and   other   evidence,

“without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or

falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any

other relevant factor.”       8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   “We

defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.       Here, we conclude

that    substantial   evidence   supports   the   agency’s adverse

credibility determination.

       In his asylum application, Chen alleged that police twice

raided the family church he attended in China, beating him

and his grandmother in 2009, and arresting, detaining, and

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torturing him for a week in 2010.       At the hearing, however,

he initially omitted any mention of the 2009 incident and

answered affirmatively when asked if his 2010 arrest was the

only    incident   of   physical   abuse.   This   represented   a

significant inconsistency between Chen’s testimony and his

application and one on which the agency reasonably relied.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      Chen failed to adequately

address this inconsistency when confronted about it, stating

only that he was nervous and had trouble speaking.     See Majidi

v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner

must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit

his testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)).

       Chen also offered inconsistent testimony on the date of

his release from detention, expressing some ambiguity as to

whether he was released on April 25, 2010 (the same day he

was allegedly first detained) or May 2, 2010.         While this

inconsistency may be explained as a mere misstatement or

having resulted from confusion, a reasonable fact-finder

would not be compelled to view it as such and, accordingly,

                                   4
the agency did not err in considering it as part of its

broader credibility determination.       Id.

     The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies and

the lack of corroboration regarding Chen’s claimed practice

of Christianity in the United States.            See Biao Yang v.

Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s

failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on

credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general

makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has

already been called into question.”).          As the agency noted,

although Chen submitted a certificate of baptism dated 2011

from the Brooklyn Christian Congregation, he testified that

he began to attend church at the Church of Grace for Fujianese

in 2012 and did not testify that he had attended any other

church earlier while in the United States.              Additionally,

though he testified that he attended church once or twice a

month,   he    submitted      letters   allegedly       from    fellow

practitioners stating that Chen attended every week.               The

agency reasonably found these discrepancies to undermine

Chen’s credibility.      Moreover, the agency was not required

to   credit   the   undated   and   unsigned   letter    from   Chen’s

                                    5
grandmother.       See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir.

2013)       (upholding   BIA’s    decision          to   afford    “very       little

evidentiary weight” to letter from applicant’s spouse in

China “because it was unsworn and because it was submitted by

an interested witness”).

      The inconsistencies, which relate to both the alleged

harm and Chen’s practice of Christianity, as well as the lack

of reliable corroboration, provide substantial evidence for

the     adverse       credibility       determination.             See    8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);           Xiu     Xia     Lin,       534    F.3d    at     167.

Accordingly, we need not address Chen’s argument that the BIA

erred in finding inconsistencies between his testimony and a

medical record as well as a “certificate of detention,”

respectively.         See Lianping Li v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 144, 149

(2d Cir. 2016) (holding that “we may . . . deem remand futile

and deny the petition for review if . . . substantial evidence

in    the    record    relied    on    by     the    IJ,    considered     in     the

aggregate, supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner lacked

credibility”       (quotation         marks    omitted)).           The    adverse

credibility       determination          is     dispositive         of     asylum,

withholding of removal and CAT relief because all three forms

                                         6
of relief were based on the same factual predicate.    See Paul

v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

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