Court Opinion

ID: 9377730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:00:41.46867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.053523
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 20-3230        Document: 010110823338    Date Filed: 03/08/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       Tenth Circuit

                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 8, 2023
                             _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  LINDA WILLIAMS,

           Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 20-3230
                                                    (D.C. No. 6:18-CV-01252-EFM)
  AEROFLEX WICHITA, INC.; LORI                                 (D. Kan.)
  CROMWELL,

           Defendants - Appellees.
                          _________________________________

                                 ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                             _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, and EBEL and EID, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Linda Williams sued her employer, Aeroflex Wichita, Inc., and her former

 supervisor, Lori Cromwell, under Title VII for hostile work environment, racial

 discrimination, and retaliation. She also brought a claim for intentional infliction of

 emotional distress against Cromwell. The district court granted judgment on the

 pleadings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in favor of

 Cromwell and summary judgment on the Title VII claims in favor of Aeroflex and

 Cromwell. Williams appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

 affirm.

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 20-3230    Document: 010110823338       Date Filed: 03/08/2023       Page: 2

                                           I.

       Linda Williams began working for Aeroflex in the customer service

 department in 1999. Customer service is generally an entry-level position, and most

 Aeroflex employees only stayed in the department for a few years. By the time she

 filed this suit, Williams had worked there for over twenty years.

       Lori Cromwell became Williams’ supervisor in September 2000. Their

 relationship was contentious from almost the very beginning. In her complaint,1

 Williams, who is African American, alleged a long list of poor treatment she suffered

 at Cromwell’s hands. She alleged Cromwell made derogatory comments about her

 hair and appearance, publicly belittled her several times a week, harassed her over

 small errors in her work, enforced a stricter dress code with Williams than other

 employees, made fun of her in front of other employees, and once whispered in a

 threatening manner that she was watching Williams. In addition to general

 harassment, Williams specifically recalled one incident when Cromwell told her the

 scent of Williams’ hair oil made her want to vomit; another when Cromwell asked

 her how many times she was going to change her wig; a time when Cromwell told

 Williams she looked like Richard Simmons, which she intended as an insult; and an

 incident when Cromwell threw papers on the floor and made Williams pick them up.

       1
         At the motion to dismiss stage we treat all Williams’ allegations as true,
 Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008), and at the summary
 judgment stage, we view all evidence in a light most favorable to her and make all
 reasonable inferences in her favor, Tabura v. Kellogg USA, 880 F.3d 544, 549 (10th
 Cir. 2018).
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 Finally, in late 2016, Cromwell recommended Williams receive a “1” on her

 performance review, which was lower than other employees. However, Cromwell’s

 superiors overruled her and raised the evaluation to a “2” (in line with the other

 employees) before adding it to Williams’ official file.

        This behavior did not go unnoticed by Williams’ coworkers. One coworker,

 Erin Craig, believed Cromwell “was always different with [Williams],” and might

 have been prejudiced based on “just the way her—the tone of her voice would

 change.” App’x Vol. II at 98. Another coworker, Emily Trimpe, testified she

 thought Cromwell treated Williams unfairly, and she felt “everybody else got

 common courtesies that [Williams] didn’t get.” Id. at 14. Trimpe did not think

 Cromwell was “necessarily motivated by the fact that Linda was nonwhite.” Id.

 at 119. Neither Craig nor Trimpe recalled a specific instance where Cromwell

 treated Williams differently than an employee of a different race, and neither

 reported this behavior to Human Resources.

        Cromwell’s behavior was not unique to Williams. One of the only other

 African American employees Cromwell supervised wrote in her exit letter, “there is a

 high level of tension created by [Cromwell] in the air which caused me to feel that I

 had to walk on eggshells to approach her for a simple question, and hope that she

 didn’t get irritated.” App’x Vol. III at 33–34. Other employees noted Cromwell had

 a “direct . . . straight to the point style” and that she “was inconsistent, played

 favorites, and did not offer much encouragement to employees.” App’x Vol. I

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 at 195–96 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Cromwell’s department

 had a high turnover rate.

       Williams reported Cromwell’s behavior numerous times. In 2003, she made a

 complaint to the then-director of Human Resources, Marjie Hale. Williams told Hale

 that it felt like Cromwell was “picking on her,” and she hoped Cromwell was not

 prejudiced but feared she might be. App’x Vol. III at 37, 233. Nine years later, she

 complained again to Connie Tindal, who succeeded Hale, after being “singled out

 and put under a magnifying glass” for making mistakes. Id. at 144 (capitalization

 omitted). Tindal reported that Williams implied Cromwell’s treatment “may be

 racially motivated” but did not offer any examples of discriminatory treatment.

 App’x Vol. I at 188–89. In October 2016, Williams sent an email with the subject

 line “My Cry for Help” to Tindal and Martin Burgess, the Executive Vice President

 for Human Resources at Aeroflex’s parent company. In the email, Williams told

 them her relationship with Cromwell was “abusive,” she felt “put on the spot,

 degraded or threatened for the loss of [her] job,” and that she had been “harassed,

 belittled, [and] humiliated on more than one occasion.” App’x Vol. II at 180–81.

 She specifically mentioned an incident when Cromwell had issued Williams a

 disciplinary warning for violating the break time policy on a day when Cromwell had

 not been present. Cromwell later withdrew the disciplinary warning.

       Aeroflex investigated the accusations in Williams’ email, interviewing

 Williams and other employees under Cromwell’s supervision and reviewing other

 employees’ exit interviews. Other employees expressed a belief that Cromwell was

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 “belittling” and “controlling” to her employees, App’x Vol. VI at 55, but none

 reported prejudice or that Cromwell singled out Williams for particularly bad

 treatment. When asked directly whether Cromwell treated Williams differently

 because of her race, one employee said, she “did not know, maybe.” App’x Vol. III

 at 175. As a result of the investigation, Aeroflex counseled Cromwell on her

 management style. The company allowed Williams to transfer to a different manager

 in her department. Aeroflex did not decrease Williams’ salary, cut any of her

 benefits, or give her a worse evaluation than any of her coworkers. Aeroflex also

 referred Williams to the employee assistance program for her anxiety and stress,

 which had manifested in weight fluctuations, uncontrollable crying, and hair loss.

       Shortly before Williams sent her “Cry for Help” email, Aeroflex put some

 employees in the customer service department, including Williams, on a pass-fail rate

 program. The program was designed to catch an employee’s errors and help them

 improve accuracy. Aeroflex had used the pass-fail rate program in the past. As a

 result of the program, Williams’ accuracy improved from seventy-six percent to

 ninety-four percent.

       In late October 2016, while the investigation into her “Cry for Help” email

 was ongoing, Williams filed complaints with the Kansas Human Rights Commission

 (“KHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging

 violations of state and federal antidiscrimination statutes. She specifically alleged

 Aeroflex had discriminated against her because of her race and her age from April

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 through August 2016. The KHRC investigated her allegations and held a mediation.

 The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on June 20, 2018.

       Williams then filed this suit against Aeroflex and Cromwell for violations of

 Title VII under theories of hostile work environment, retaliation, and racial

 discrimination. She also sued Aeroflex for negligent hiring and retention, negligent

 training or failure to train, and negligent supervision and sued Cromwell for

 intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional

 distress under Kansas law.

       The district court granted judgment on the pleadings on Williams’ negligent

 hiring and retention, negligent training or failure to train, and negligent supervision

 claims against Aeroflex and the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional

 distress claims against Cromwell. It granted summary judgment on all remaining

 claims in favor of Aeroflex and Cromwell. Williams appeals the dismissal of her

 Title VII claims against both Aeroflex and Cromwell and her intentional infliction of

 emotional distress claim against Cromwell.

                                            II.

                                            a.

       We begin with Williams’ Title VII claims. On appeal, we review a grant of

 summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as the district court.

 Fassbender v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 882 (10th Cir. 2018). We

 will uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment if Aeroflex and Cromwell

 can show there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are entitled to judgment

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 as a matter of law. Tabura, 880 F.3d at 549. We view all evidence in the light most

 favorable to Williams and resolve all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id.

                                             i.

       Williams argues Cromwell created a hostile work environment by engaging in

 a years-long campaign of humiliation and degradation against Williams because of

 her race, which Aeroflex tolerated.

       Under Title VII, an employer may be liable for creating or permitting a hostile

 work environment when an employee can show “that the workplace is permeated

 with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or

 pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

 working environment.” Sandoval v. City of Boulder, Colo., 388 F.3d 1312, 1327

 (10th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff must prove the treatment stemmed from racial

 animus, id., and that the employer was responsible because it failed to remedy a

 hostile work environment of which it knew or should have known, Tademy v. Union

 Pacific Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2008).

       To prove racial animus, our court has long accepted evidence of “‘facially

 neutral abusive conduct . . . when that conduct is viewed in the context of other,

 overtly racially-discriminatory conduct.’” Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n,

 684 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting O’Shea v.

 Yellow Cab Servs., 185 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999)). Overtly racially

 discriminatory conduct can include, for example, ongoing offensive or inappropriate

 racist comments and racial slurs, Ford v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 45 F.4th 1202,

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 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2022), or “a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments,”

 Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994). However, “[g]eneral

 harassment if not racial . . . is not actionable.” Id.

        Williams’ evidence contains numerous instances of neutral abusive conduct,

 including Cromwell’s comment about her hair smell, the paper throwing incident,

 and Cromwell’s general poor treatment. But she fails to show the “steady barrage” of

 “blatant racial harassment” needed to support her claim for a hostile work

 environment. See id.

        Williams argues our decision in Strickland v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 555

 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2009), “provides a good example of how neutral conduct can

 create [] a triable question regarding discriminatory animus” such that she can

 advance past summary judgment without showing any overt racial animus. Aplt. Br.

 at 44. In Strickland, the female plaintiff alleged she was treated differently than her

 male colleagues by her male supervisor. 555 F.3d at 1230. Her allegations were

 backed up by her male and female colleagues, who testified the supervisor treated her

 differently than everyone else. Id. Many mentioned a specific example where the

 supervisor had put the plaintiff, but not her male colleague, on a performance

 improvement plan even though the male coworker “trailed [her] in nearly every sales

 measure.” Id. Williams analogizes the testimony from Strickland’s coworkers to

 that of Trimpe and Craig. However, unlike in Strickland, Trimpe and Craig’s

 testimony was vague and equivocal, and neither could point to any specific instance

 where Cromwell treated Williams differently than a similarly situated non–African

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 American employee. Craig even testified that, while she “really believed” Cromwell

 was prejudiced, “I don’t have any evidence.” App’x Vol. II at 98. Trimpe likewise

 testified that, while Cromwell did treat Williams differently, “I don’t know that it

 was necessarily motivated by the fact that [Williams] was nonwhite. I don’t think that

 was necessarily what motivated her.” Id. at 119. This testimony falls short of

 proving Williams was treated differently because of her race, and Williams therefore

 fails to make a prima facie case for a hostile work environment under Title VII. We

 hold the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Aeroflex and

 Cromwell on this claim.

                                            ii.

       As to her Title VII retaliation claim, Williams argues the increased scrutiny

 over her work and the fact that Aeroflex put her on the pass-fail rate program are

 evidence Aeroflex and Cromwell retaliated against her for reporting Cromwell’s

 actions. We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to Title VII

 retaliation claims when the plaintiff does not have direct evidence of a retaliatory

 motive. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing McDonnell

 Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973)). Under this framework, the

 plaintiff must show (1) “he or she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination”;

 (2) he or she suffered an employment action that a reasonable employee would have

 found materially adverse; and (3) there was a causal connection between the

 protected activity and the materially adverse employment action. Piercy v. Maketa,

 480 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007). Then, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie

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  case, “the employer can rebut it by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason

  for the adverse action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The employee must

  then show “the proffered reason actually is a pretext masking discriminatory

  animus.” Id.

        We “liberally construe the phrase adverse employment action,” Stover, 382

  F.3d at 1071 (cleaned up), and have found an adverse employment action may

  “extend beyond readily quantifiable losses,” MacKenzie v. City and Cnty. of Denver,

  414 F.3d 1266, 1279 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d

  437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)), abrogated on other grounds by Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co.,

  900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018), as long as “the action is ‘harmful to the point that [it]

  could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

  discrimination,’” Payan v. United Parcel Serv., 905 F.3d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir. 2018)

  (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006)).

  However, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” are

  not sufficient. Johnson v. Weld Cnty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 2010)

  (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68). “[N]ot everything that

  makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, minor and

  even trivial employment actions that an irritable chip-on-the-shoulder employee did

  not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit.” MacKenzie, 414 F.3d

  at 1279.

        Williams argues Cromwell and Aeroflex subjected her to adverse employment

  actions by scrutinizing and criticizing her more than her coworkers, by putting her on

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  the pass-fail rate program, and by giving her a lower evaluation. But “in our circuit,

  a [performance improvement plan], standing alone, is not an adverse employment

  action” unless “it effects a significant change in the plaintiff’s employment status.”

  Ford, 45 F.4th at 1226 (internal quotations marks omitted); see also Payan, 905 F.3d

  at 1174 (“ . . . placement on an employee improvement plan alone does not qualify as

  a materially adverse action as defined by Burlington Northern.”). Further, “Title VII

  protects individuals not from all retaliation but only from retaliation that produces an

  injury or harm that itself rises to a level of seriousness.” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1216

  (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497

  F.3d 1079, 1087 (10th Cir. 2007)). Williams was not fired, demoted, denied benefits,

  reassigned to an inferior position, or denied a promotion. She was not the only

  employee put on the pass-fail rate program, and, as a result of the program, her

  accuracy improved almost twenty percent. While Cromwell did attempt to give

  Williams a lower evaluation than other employees, the company raised the evaluation

  before it went in Williams’ official file.

         Without more, this increased scrutiny and the pass-fail rate program would not

  “cause a reasonable employee to for[]go exercising [her] rights under Title VII,”

  Payan, 905 F.3d at 1173, and therefore do not rise to the level of an adverse

  employment action required to sustain a Title VII retaliation claim. We therefore

  hold the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Aeroflex and

  Cromwell on this claim.

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                                             iii.

        Williams next argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

  Cromwell and Aeroflex on her Title VII racial discrimination claim after finding

  Aeroflex did not subject her to an adverse employment action.

        We apply the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to

  Title VII discrimination claims. Fassbender, 890 F.3d at 883. To make a prima facie

  case for discrimination, the plaintiff “must establish that (1) she is a member of a

  protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she qualified for

  the position at issue, and (4) she was treated less favorably than others not in the

  protected class.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012).

        The adversity standard for a Title VII discrimination claim is more stringent

  than for a retaliation claim. See Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1203 n.12. For the purposes of a

  discrimination claim, the employer’s actions must have “affect[ed] employment or

  alter[ed] the conditions of the workplace.” Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

  Co., 548 U.S. at 63). Because, as discussed above, Williams has not shown she

  suffered an adverse employment action under the more lenient retaliation standard,

  she cannot establish a prima facie case for Title VII racial discrimination, and we

  need not examine the other elements of the claim. We therefore affirm the district

  court’s grant of summary judgment to Aeroflex and Cromwell on this claim.

                                             b.

        Finally, Williams argues the district court erred in granting judgment on the

  pleadings in favor of Cromwell on her intentional infliction of emotional distress

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  claim by finding Williams did not allege sufficiently extreme and outrageous

  conduct.

        We review dismissals granted under Rule 12(c) de novo. Corder v. Lewis

  Palmer School Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009). Under this

  standard, we do not weigh potential evidence; we only assess whether the plaintiff’s

  claim is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Id.

  at 1223–24. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or

  outrage under Kansas law, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant acted intentionally

  or with reckless disregard for the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme

  or outrageous; (3) the plaintiff suffered extreme and severe mental distress; and

  (4) there is a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s

  mental distress. Bolden, 43 F.3d at 553. “Kansas courts have been reluctant to

  extend the outrage cause of action to [workplace] discrimination and harassment

  claims,” and we have extended it in only a few cases. Id. at 554. Intentional

  infliction of emotional distress is for conduct that is “extreme and utterly

  intolerable,” not for hurt feelings or workplace unhappiness, even if the conduct is

  inappropriate and unnerving. Id. at 554–55. Conduct must be “outrageous to the

  point that it goes beyond the bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a

  civilized society.” Taiwo v. Vu, 822 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Kan. 1991).

        Williams contends Cromwell’s “discriminatory and racist conduct . . . coupled

  with its consistency and length of time [constitutes] severe and outrageous conduct.”

  Aplt. Br. at 60. But in Bolden, we held explicitly racist name-calling, “inappropriate

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  and unnerving” slurs and jokes, poor performance reviews, and suboptimal work

  assignments over a period of five years were “not so extreme and outrageous as to

  permit recovery” under Kansas law. 43 F.3d at 549–50, 554–55. Laughinghouse v.

  Risser, 754 F. Supp. 836 (D. Kan. 1990), a workplace harassment case to which

  Williams compares her case, is distinguishable. In Laughinghouse, the court

  declined to grant summary judgment where the defendant-employer harassed and

  abused an employee by (1) screaming and cursing at her; (2) touching and directing

  sexual comments towards her without permission; (3) throwing things at her and

  tearing up files in fits of rage; (4) threatening her with loss of employment; and

  (5) inhibiting her job performance through several tactics after the employee declined

  to sleep with him. 754 F. Supp. at 843. The conduct Williams alleges in her

  complaint—including the derogatory comments, the one time Cromwell threw papers

  on the floor and made Williams pick them up, and the time Cromwell whispered she

  was watching Williams—does not reach this level. She does not allege unwanted

  touching, repeated screaming, cursing, yelling, or threats of loss of employment.

  Compare id. (describing conduct that was so outrageous as to be actionable). While

  undoubtedly unpleasant, Cromwell’s actions do not meet the “extreme and

  outrageous” conduct Kansas courts require.

           We therefore hold the district court did not err in granting judgment on the

  pleadings to Cromwell on Williams’ intentional infliction of emotional distress

  claim.

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                                          III.

        For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary

  judgment to Aeroflex and Cromwell on Williams’ Title VII claims and grant of

  judgment on the pleadings to Cromwell on Williams’ intentional infliction of

  emotional distress claim.2

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Allison H. Eid
                                            Circuit Judge

        2
          Appellant’s motion to seal Volumes V and VI of the appendix is granted.
  However, the court has cited to and quoted from the portions of those volumes that
  appear in the parties’ publicly filed briefs.
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