Court Opinion

ID: 9797516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:44.124941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:35.333096
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
1 16 I concur in the result of affirming the determination that Trooper Jensen had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Defendant was involved in drug trafficking. But I dissent from the main opinion's analytical approach of discounting certain factors, such as those specifically mentioned in footnote 4.
T 17 "When reviewing a given factual situation to determine if reasonable suspicion justified a detention, '[clourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, ¶ 11, 112 P.3d 507 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 14, 78 P.3d 590); see also State v. Alveres, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 14, 147 P.3d 425 ("When determining whether police officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, . courts cannot evaluate individual facts in isolation to determine whether each fact has an innocent explanation." (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002))). Of particular *740importance in understanding this analytical framework is a relatively recent case, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). In Arvigu, a border patrol agent stopped a minivan and performed a search of the vehicle, during which the agent found a substantial amount of marijuana. See id. at 268, 122 S.Ct. 744. In reaching its conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed, the Ninth Circuit "categorized [seven of the ten] factors relied upon by the District Court as simply out of bounds in deciding whether there was 'reasonable suspicion' for the stop." Id.
118 The United States Supreme Court, acting unanimously, reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision and stated, "The court's evaluation and rejection of seven of the listed factors in isolation from each other does not take into account the 'totality of the cireum-stances, as our cases have understood that phrase." Id. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744. The Supreme Court further explained that the Ninth Circuit
appeared to believe that each observation by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent explanation was entitled to "no weight." Terry[ v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ], however, precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis. The officer in Terry observed the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was "perhaps innocent in itself," we held that, taken together, they "warranted further investigation."
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.. [The [Ninth Cireuit's]) approach [therefore] would ... seriously undereut the "totality of the cireumstances" principle which governs the existence vel non of "reasonable suspicion."
Id. at 274-75, 122 S.Ct. 744 (citations omitted).
1 19 The majority's discounting of the additional factors-the cell phones, the atlas, the fast food wrappers, and Defendant's travel story-does precisely what the Arvigu court forbade. It improperly isolates these factors, individually examines them, and places some of them "out of bounds" for purposes of a reasonable-suspicion determination.1
The majority's outright rejection of Trooper Jensen's suspicion of Defendant's travel story as an irrelevant, subjective hunch is also inconsistent with controlling case law. The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Terry to permit consideration of an "officer's subjective interpretation of the facts as part of the totality of the circumstances," thereby acknowledging that "subjective elements ... may be considered in an otherwise objective analysis." Warren, 2003 UT 36, ¶ 20, 78 P.3d 590 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 276, 122 S.Ct. 744). Thus, Trooper Jensen's subjective evaluation of Defendant's travel story, while alone not sufficient to justify the search, is nonetheless a legitimate factor to consider when evaluating reasonable suspicion. See id. ("In stating that subjective belief alone is not enough to justify a frisk, the United States Supreme Court appears to recognize that subjective belief may be one of the factors in determining the reasonableness of an officer's decision to perform a Terry frisk.").
[21 In conclusion, I would base the reasonable suspicion determination on the totality of the circumstances present in the instant case.

. The majority cites two cases in support of the proposition that atlases and fast food wrappers are so common and innocent as to never suggest criminal activity. See supra ¶ 10 n. 4 (citing United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Farias, 43 F.Supp.2d 1276 (D.Utah 1999)). The continuing validity of these cases on this particular issue is questionable in light of the Supreme Court's more recent ruling in United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). See, e.g., State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (Ct.App.2008) (declining to follow United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.1997), because its "reasoning conflicts with the totality of the circumstances test articulated by [the Arizona Supreme Court], because it invites the type of piecemeal evaluation of the innocence of each individual factor rejected by the United States Supreme Court" (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. 744)).