Court Opinion

ID: 9728612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:31.358325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.197429
License: Public Domain

*699STONE, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur with the findings reached by the majority opinion except I join with the dissent of the Chief Justice concerning hearing' of the Neilsen estate without full disclosure and preferential treatment of the Bank. In my opinion both of these matters were established to be in violation of the Judicial Standards.
Given the findings of the majority. I agree with the sanctions imposed.
ON MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
KELLY, Justice.
This matter is before us on motion of the Honorable John T. McDonough, Judge of the County Court for Washington County, for a supplemental order of this court directing the Minnesota State Board on Judicial Standards to close its file on the “Bar-tholet Matter.”
By virtue of the nature of our decision in In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 (Minn.1979) filed March 23, 1979, we retained continuing jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, Judge McDonough moves this court for a supplemental order pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 127. For the reasons hereinafter discussed, the motion is granted.
In September of 1976 the Board on Judicial Standards initiated an investigation of Judge McDonough. Formal proceedings began with service of Notice of Inquiry in May of 1977 and a Complaint in June of 1977. Twenty-two days of hearing before the Honorable Thomas J. Stahler, District Judge of the Eighth Judicial District, followed in November and December of 1977. He issued his findings in March of 1978. The Board made numerous charges of misconduct, some of which were found proved by clear and convincing evidence and others of which were found not proved both by Judge Stahler and this court. For purposes of this motion, only Charge 8 by the Board and Judge Stahler’s findings relating thereto is pertinent. The Board charged that Judge McDonough violated Canon 5D of the Rules Governing the Conduct of Judges which states:
A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties
and Canon 7A(l)(c) which provides in part: A judge * * * should not:
¡fc * ⅝: * ‡ ⅜
(c) * * * make a contribution to a political organization or candidate * * except as authorized in subsection A(2).
“in that he accepted money for serving as an appraiser of the estate of an unrelated person and subsequently paid over part of the appraisal fee to the judge who was a political candidate and who appointed Respondent as appraiser.”
Judge Stahler found “No proof was presented by the Petitioner in respect to Charge 8 above and therefore it is found not proved.” The Board amended this finding in August of 1978 as follows:
“That no proof was allowed by the Referee to be presented by Petitioner as to Paragraph IV 8 of the Complaint because the Respondent had raised the defense of Statute of Limitations (MS Section 490.16 Subd. 3) at the Pre-Trial Conference; that the Referee had ruled, by Pre-Trial Order of October 12, 1977, that the statute applied to the substance of said charge; that consequently Paragraph IV 8 of the Complaint has not been litigated herein.”
Minn.Stat. § 490.16 (subd. 3) (1976), effective during the hearing before Judge Stah-ler, did in fact bar inquiry into the so-called “Bartholet Matter,” dealt with at length by *700this court in In re Bartholet, 293 Minn. 495, 198 N.W.2d 152 (1972). That section provided:
“ * * * [T]he supreme court may * * * censure or remove a judge for action or inaction occurring not more than four years prior to such action being reported to the board on judicial standards * * *.” Minn.Stat. § 490.16, subd. 3 (1976).
In March of 1978 the statute of limitations was amended as follows:
The board is specifically empowered to reopen any matter wherein any information or evidence was previously precluded by a statute of limitations or by a previously existing provision of time limitation. Minn.Stat. § 490.16, subd. 3 (1978).
The operative facts of the “Bartholet Matter” occurred in 1966 and 1967. The old statute of limitations “restrict[ed] Supreme Court action to those incidents which were reported to the Board within four years of their occurrence * * *.” McDonough, 296 N.W.2d at 691. The Board does not dispute the fact that the then existing limitation period barred inquiry into the Bartholet Matter when it began its investigation in September of 1976 and when the case was before Judge Stahler. However, at the time of oral argument before this court the new statute of limitations was effective. By reply brief the Board indicated that it was aware of the repeal of the old limitation period. However, the Board did not request a remand for findings on the “Bartholet Matter” in its brief. Furthermore, at oral argument, this court asked the parties whether they wished a remand for any purpose.
Instead of requesting a remand, the Board’s attorney stated:
“I truly don’t. As a matter of fact, I think the precedent might be something that the Court would live to regret. There was a 6-week hearing here. If, even after that and a hearing before the Board the Board had this transcript. They had things they were not required to have by the Rules and even then if the Court remands back it seems that if this case requires remand it is difficult to imagine one that wouldn’t. The inquiry here has been so exhaustive I cannot imagine — I have evidence that I would like to have gotten in the record before Judge Stahler and I am sure Mr. Miley would say the same. None of us I suppose has ever tried a lawsuit in which we got all the evidence which we truly believed should go in evidence in evidence. I don’t think anything would be gained.”
In In re McDonough, 296 N.W.2d 648 filed March 23, 1979, we neither specifically addressed the issue of which limitation period applied to the “Bartholet Matter” nor expressly adopted or rejected the findings of the Board or Judge Stahler with respect to the “Bartholet Matter.” Thus, we agree with the Board’s argument that there has been no final decision on the issue of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the doctrine of res judica-ta is not directly applicable. Nevertheless, we find instructive several principles announced in Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 124 N.W.2d 328 (1963) and Nelson v. Dorr, 239 Minn. 423, 58 N.W.2d 876 (1953). We held that a judgment on the merits acts as a bar in a second suit based on the same cause of action and is conclusive not only as to every matter which was actually litigated but also as to every matter which might have been litigated. Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn, at 466, 124 N.W.2d at 340. Furthermore, we recognized that a judgment acts as a bar in a subsequent action not only as to issues submitted in a prior suit but also as to issues covered in the pleadings which were not expressly determined in the first action and which were not withdrawn. Nelson v. Dorr, 239 Minn, at 431, 58 N.W.2d at 881.
We have expressed our preference for the inclusion of all charges of professional misconduct in one disciplinary complaint. In re Williams, 221 Minn. 554, 564, 23 N.W.2d 4, 9 (1946). See also In re Peterson, 178 N.W.2d 738, 741 (N.D.1970).
This case has consumed an incredible amount of time and energy of all those *701involved for four years. The record before this court at the time of the first oral argument was enormous, consisting of over 4,000 pages of testimony and 245 exhibits. In short, the first investigation of Judge McDonough was detailed and thorough. Apparently the Board had similar sentiments since it expressly declined a possible opportunity to have the case remanded for further proceedings on the “Bartholet Matter” or any other matter.
In light of the foregoing, and on the peculiar facts of this case, it seems to us fundamentally unfair to reopen this investigation. Despite the fact that disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, we note that due process principles of fundamental fairness guarantee the subject of the investigation a certain regularity of proceedings as well as a certain finality of those proceedings. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884). Therefore, pursuant to our inherent supervisory powers over disciplinary proceedings, we grant Judge McDo-nough’s motion and hereby order the Board to close its file on the “Bartholet Matter.”
So ordered.
TODD, YETKA and WAHL, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.