Court Opinion

ID: 9488023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:34:07.314767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.548452
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The due process principles driving personal jurisdiction analysis point toward the permissible exercise of jurisdiction in this case. The court’s opinion isolates all of the contacts present in this case (a contract with a South Dakota corporation to produce goods in South Dakota, foreseeability of impact of the contract on the residents of South Dakota, interstate communications and the shipment of camera-ready film in anticipation of the contract, and the choice of law clause) and states that, without more, these are insufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction. Although each of these factors alone may be insufficient, they are all present here. Most importantly, however, they are all present in such a manner that demonstrates that the exercise of jurisdiction in this instance would not offend due process of law.
An inquiry as to the propriety of jurisdiction should not turn on a mere counting of the contacts, but rather on whether those contacts relate to the maintenance of South Dakota as the forum in accord with “fair play and substantial justice.” Although I agree that there are insufficient contacts to support the assertion of general jurisdiction over Trans Western, the exercise of specific jurisdiction over this particular contract dispute lies well within the recognized constraints of due process. See Bell Paper Box v. U.S. Kids, 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1994) (relatedness of contacts to the dispute is most probative factor); see also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23, 78 S.Ct. 199, 200-01, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957) (finding jurisdiction permissible from the mailing of a single insurance contract to the forum state). The contacts present here directly gave rise to the cause of action and were in no way random, fortuitous, or attenuated. Further, although choice of law analysis is distinct from that of minimum contacts, the choice of law clause itself makes evident that Trans Western availed itself of the benefits and burdens of South Dakota law and should have foreseen the possibility of being haled into a South Dakota court to defend itself on a claim on this particular contract. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, *924481-82, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2187, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Such a provision was absent in U.S. Kids, where we nevertheless found jurisdiction permissible. Finally, although it is a secondary consideration, South Dakota does have an interest in protecting its citizens, providing them a convenient forum, and enforcing its laws. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, 105 S.Ct. at 2182.
Although Trans Western faces some inconvenience (as would any corporation facing suit in foreign state), there is no showing of unfairness or unreasonableness that would rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See id. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. at 2184 (lesser showing of contacts necessary when notions of “fair play and substantial justice” point towards allowing jurisdiction); see also id. at 485-86, 105 S.Ct. at 2189-90 (noting that facts of each case must be weighed to resolve the due process inquiry). Trans Western cannot now invoke a “territorial shield to avoid” voluntarily assumed obligations purposefully directed towards the forum. Id. at 474,105 S.Ct. at 2183; see U.S. Kids, 22 F.3d at 820 (requiring only “that a commercial actor purposefully direct its efforts toward residents of the forum state”). The very reason we require minimum contacts is to ensure the advancement of fundamental fairness. Trans Western has made no showing that the exercise of jurisdiction in South Dakota would be oppressive or unfair on any level. Indeed, Trans Western has not even proffered an argument to that effect. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. at 2184 (where defendant purposefully directs activities at forum, “he must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable”); Watlow Elec. Mfg. v. Patch Rubber Co., 838 F.2d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 1988).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.