Court Opinion

ID: 9530742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:03:08.55672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:14.237223
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
(concurring in the result):
I concur in part I of the opinion of Justice Stewart. I join in part II, subparts A, C, and D. I do not join in that portion of the introduction of part II that discusses principles of agency law and states that the knowledge of all Gibson’s servants is imputed to Gibson. Similarly, I join in sub-part B of part II, except that portion that states, based on the earlier discussion of agency law, that “Crosgrove’s knowledge was imputed to Gibson....”
On the question of damages, I join sub-part A of part III only to the extent that it finds no error in instruction No. 46, that it finds the evidence sufficient to support the punitive damage award against Crosgrove and Gibson each for their own conduct, and that it concludes that punitive damages were awardable against Gibson under section S)09(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for Crosgrove’s conduct.
I join in subpart B of part III only to the extent that it upholds the punitive damage award against Gibson on the ground that “[w]hen a case is submitted to a jury on several alternative grounds and a general verdict is returned, we will affirm if the jury properly could have found for the prevailing party on any of the theories comprehended by the general verdict.” Cambelt Int’l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1241-42 (Utah 1987) (citing Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301-02 (Utah 1982)).
I do not join in part IV. As noted above and as Justice Howe’s separate opinion affirms, there is no reason to reach the propriety of the verdict under the wrongful termination claim since it is otherwise sustainable. Were I to address the issue, I would have numerous points of disagreement with Justice Stewart’s discussion of the general legal principles as well as the issues particular to this case. However, since his discussion on this point is not joined by a majority of the court, I choose to wait for a more appropriate case in which to deal with the so-called public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.
HALL, C.J., concurs in the concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J.