Court Opinion

ID: 9566623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:41:22.689621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:43.306827
License: Public Domain

LATOURETTE, J.,
dissenting.
The renewal provision in the lease: “Lessee shall have the option of renewal of this lease, on the same rental basis and on the same terms, from year to year, for a like period of one year” is ambiguous. We have held many, many times that where a written document is ambiguous, we must look to the entire instrument to ascertain the intent of the parties. Eggen v. Wetterborg, 237 P2d 970, 193 Or 145, Hardin et al. v. Dimension Lumber Co., 140 Or 385, 13 P2d 602. In my opinion this well-established rule has been totally disregarded by the majority. The prevailing opinion proceeds on the theory that the language of the renewal clause alone is the guiding star and that all other clauses of the lease bearing on the question are of no importance.
In addition to what was said in my former opinion, there is another matter which further confirms my belief that the original parties in the lease intended a renewal for more than one year. According to the testimony of Mr. Feike, the attorney who drew duplicate original leases for the parties, the duplicate leases, at the time of their execution, contained the following provision:
“It being understood that lessee will be given credit on said purchase price of the amount of $100 per month for each month of rental paid to lessor during the life of this lease or any renewal thereof.” (Italics supplied.)
This provision was in the lease retained by defendant which is in evidence, having been recorded with the county clerk. Plaintiffs introduced in evidence as Exhibit 1 a purported duplicate original of the lease *241retained by Gibbs and wife, the original lessors. The clause “or any renewal thereof” was penned out in Exhibit 1 and there was substituted therefor the words “or any rental thereof”. The substituted language is. meaningless. The plaintiffs or the original lessors, Gibbs and wife, did not testify at the trial.
Since this alteration was not accounted for, we have a right, in my opinion, to indulge in any reasonable inference detrimental to plaintiffs’ position that the intention of the parties was to create but one renewal.
The word “any” is a word of flexible meaning and broadly inclusive. It may have reference to more than one. See 3A Words and Phrases (Perm Ed) 53 et seq. It is quite obvious to me that either the original lessors or plaintiffs made the change, believing and hoping that it would go unnoticed for the purpose of obscuring the real intent of the parties, to-wit, successive renewals.
“Any renewal” as used in the lease in my opinion implies more than one renewal. If the lessors had intended only one renewal, it was within their power to have the lease so written. Where a lease is doubtful or uncertain as to its meaning, it will be construed in the tenant’s favor. Weddle v. Parrish, 135 Or 345, P. 295, 454.
Construing the lease in its entirety and considering the unexplained alteration of the lease in a clause pregnant with significance, I am of the opinion that the parties intended successive renewals of the lease, until the $100 a month rental payment absorbed the $26,000 purchase price, unless the option was sooner exercised.
I dissent.