Court Opinion

ID: 9377701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:05:29.089398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.527161
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-1829
                               Filed March 8, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF K.A., K.A., and K.A.,
Minor Children,

A.A., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Russell G. Keast,

District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      David R. Fiester, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Michelle R. Becker, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor children.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       The mother of K.A., K.A., and K.A. (born in 2009, 2013, and 2017

respectively), appeals the termination of her parental rights. In her appeal, she

argues the State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination, termination is

not in the children’s best interests, and the juvenile court should have applied a

permissive exception to termination. We reject the mother’s claims and affirm.

       I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) in March 2015, two years before the third child was born.

The mother reported that the father put her in a “choke hold” and punched her

while he was intoxicated. She also described other domestic violence, including

some committed while she was pregnant, and at least one instance in which the

father knocked a child to the ground or into furniture.        HHS made several

recommendations, including inpatient treatment and a mental-health evaluation for

the father, as well as therapy for the children. No evidence suggests the mother

or father followed any of these recommendations.

       Alcohol-fueled violence continued inside the home. In December 2018, the

father—again intoxicated—struck the mother in the face with an open hand, while

she was holding the then-one-year-old child. A sheriff’s deputy arrested the father,

who resisted and made several threats, even after he was tased. The father told

the deputy he planned to return to the house to assault the mother again. Civil

and criminal no-contact orders were in place at various points following this and

other incidents.
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      Illegal drugs and mental illness also played a role in the father’s violent and

dangerous behavior. He was civilly committed at least once in the years before

termination, and HHS reports document his use of multiple controlled substances.

In August 2019, while under the influence of methamphetamine, the father

“choked”1 the mother in her bed, in view of two children. The police arrested the

father again, and three days later, the police received a letter from the mother

explaining the entire incident was a misunderstanding and an accident. Because

of these incidents, the children were adjudicated as in need of assistance under

Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2019).

      Throughout the life of the case and the underlying proceedings, the mother

continued to associate with the father, all while denying or minimizing his actions.

After months of further incidents and resistance to any efforts to help, HHS sought

removal of the children from both parents’ custody, which the court granted in

March 2021.    The next day, the court also entered another no-contact order

between the mother and father. Less than one week later, the court returned

custody to the mother, so long as the mother engaged in domestic-violence victim

services and was more forthcoming and honest in further proceedings. The court

also ordered ongoing therapy for the children, no further contact between the father

and children, and for the children to reside with their maternal grandparents.

1 We use the word “choked” because that is the language the mother used when
reporting the violence to police. However, we note the correct terminology would
be “strangled.” See Mary Pat Gunderson, Gender and the Language of Judicial
Opinion Writing, 21 Geo. J. Gender & L. 1, 11 (2019) (on how language matters
and noting that describing acts of strangulation as “choking” can minimize or
mitigate).
                                          4

       The mother continued to associate with the father, sometimes involving the

children, and the family failed to progress over the next several months. For

example, during this time the father attempted suicide, both the mother and father

used methamphetamine, and the domestic abuse continued. The mother also lied

to her caseworkers, HHS, and law enforcement about her job status, drug use,

and whether she was seeing the father.

       Seeing little progress, the juvenile court ordered the mother to complete a

psychological evaluation, follow through with treatment recommendations, and

comply with drug testing in July 2021. Several months later, the mother began an

evaluation with a psychiatrist, but she did not return for a follow-up meeting. With

the information he had, the psychiatrist diagnosed the mother with a narcissitic

personality disorder and an anxiety disorder, and the psychiatrist opined that she

was not ready to end her relationship with the father.

       The State then filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both

parents. The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights, with all prior

orders remaining in effect for the mother. The father did not appeal. After trial, the

mother continued to refuse any mental-health services or drug testing, and visits

with her children never progressed past fully supervised. She also continued to lie

about her progress to relevant authorities, associated with the father, associated

with other known drug users, and rented out her home to transients.

       The State soon filed another petition to terminate the rights of the mother.

In October 2022, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The

mother appeals.
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       II.    Standard of Review

       We review termination of parental rights de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d

33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We place weight on the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but

we are not bound by them. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018).

       III.   Discussion

       Appellate review of the termination of parental rights is a three-step

analysis. In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we must determine

whether a ground for termination has been established; then, if a ground has been

established, we determine whether the best-interests framework supports

termination; and finally, if we find the framework supports termination, we consider

whether any exceptions apply to preclude termination. Id. at 219–20. The mother

challenges all three steps.

       A. Statutory Grounds

       The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under

section 232.116(1)(f), which allows termination if the court finds all of the following:

              (1) The child is four years of age or older.
              (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
       assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
              (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
       the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
       for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
       has been less than thirty days.
              (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
       time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
       as provided in section 232.102.

The mother focuses on the fourth element, arguing the children could have been

safely returned to her care at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4); see also In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The
                                         6

mother argues that she has reformed herself and—because her domestic abuser,

the father, is temporarily gone from her life—the children can safely come live with

her now.

       We reject the mother’s argument, as the evidence shows a reasonable

probability the children would face harm if returned to the mother. See In re M.M.,

483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992) (holding the State only needs to prove a

reasonable probability of the children being harmed if returned to the parent). The

mother has ongoing substance-abuse problems with methamphetamine and

fentanyl, and there is no evidence these issues have resolved. See In re A.B., 815

N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (finding unresolved, severe, and chronic drug

addiction can render parent unfit to raise children). She has declined to seek help

for her issues and has resisted HHS at almost every possible step.

       The mother has also declined to meaningfully recognize or engage in

treatment for her mental-health issues.       She was ordered to complete a

psychological evaluation, but she failed to complete a diagnostic assessment.

Based on limited information, the psychiatrist still diagnosed the mother with two

mental disorders, finding that she was not ready to end her relationship with the

father. The psychiatrist also strongly recommended against returning the children

to the mother’s custody “until she has demonstrated abstinence from illegal

substances, completed an extensive course on domestic violence, maintained

consistent involvement in individual counseling, and demonstrated an ability to

honestly provide accurate information to [HHS] in regard to her relationship with

[the father].”
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       These ongoing concerns gave rise to this termination proceeding, and they

remained at the time of trial. The near-permanence of these issues shows a

reasonable probability the children would face harm if returned to the mother,

which fulfills the statutory criterion. See M.M., 483 N.W.2d at 814.

       B. Best Interests of the Children

       The mother next contends the juvenile court erred in determining

termination is in the children’s best interests because of the closeness of the bond

between the children, as well as the closeness of the bond between her and the

children. This argument conflates the second and third steps of our analysis: the

provisions of Iowa Code section 232.116(2), in which we assess whether

termination is in the children’s best interests, and section 232.116(3), in which we

consider permissive exceptions to termination. We address the steps separately,

starting with best interests.

       The best interests of the children favor termination.            Iowa Code

section 232.116(2) outlines the primary factors to consider when assessing

whether termination would be in the children’s best interests: the children’s safety;

the best placement for furthering the long-term growth of the children; and the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the children. The defining

elements of this analysis are the children’s safety and a need for a home. In re

H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

       The mother’s inability to address her mental-health and substance-abuse

problems undermines her ability to provide adequate care and a safe home for her

children. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see also A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 776. The

children are in a stable environment with their grandparents, who are the parties
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most likely to adopt them. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (considering “whether

the child[ren] ha[ve] become integrated into the foster family . . . and whether the

foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child[ren] into the

foster family”).   With the grandparents, the children are excelling at school,

regularly see their therapists, and maintain healthy lives. Terminating the mother’s

rights and continuing placement with the grandparents is the best option available.

       C. Permissive Exceptions

       We decline to find the juvenile court should have applied a permissive

exception, as the children’s need for a stable and safe placement overrides the

bonds between mother and children. See M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225 (declining to

find a permissive exception outweighed the best interests of the children). A

parent’s love is not enough to prevent termination, nor is the mere existence of a

bond. See In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa 2021); D.W., 791 N.W.2d at

709. For permissive exceptions, the parent claiming the exception has the burden

to prove it should apply. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476.

       The mother has a bond with her children, but she is also unwilling to seek

help for her ongoing issues. Because these issues persist, the children would

likely face harm if returned to their mother. See In re S.A., 502 N.W.2d 23, 25

(Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (finding a parent’s ongoing mental-health and drug concerns

made it unsafe to return the child to their care). We find the interests in favor of

termination outweigh the bonds between the mother and her children, and she has

failed to carry her burden to invoke a permissive exception. See M.W., 876 N.W.2d

at 225.

       AFFIRMED.