Court Opinion

ID: 9471951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:44:53.855583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:39.478367
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
with whom GAR-WOOD, Circuit Judge, joins, specially concurring:
Judge Williams’ thorough opinion establishes that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to approve one among many provisions of a consent decree designed to eradicate discrimination against black officers in the New Orleans Police Department — a one-for-one promotion quota of lengthy duration that is unsupported even by the evidence of the complainants’ labor economist. See 729 F.2d at 1561-1562 (Williams’ op.). My views are generally in accord with those expressed in the dissent of Judge Reavley from the panel opinion, to be found at 694 F.2d 987, 997-998. No more is required to affirm the district court’s judgment, and I would write no more.
I cannot join in the opinion’s general approbation of racial quotas for governmental entities. I do not believe that the Constitution authorizes the imposition of a decree that requires a unit of state government to discriminate on the basis of race without reference to whether those favored have ever been the victims of discrimination or those injured have either practiced or benefited from it. Certainly I do not believe that any decision of the United States Supreme Court blesses such a measure. Writing for the Court in Weber,1 Justice Brennan went out of his way, on at least eleven different occasions, to point out that what was there before the Court was private affirmative action. He also specifically stated that the Court in Weber was not concerned with “what a court might order to remedy a past proved violation of the Act” 2 (and I note that here there is no finding of past violation, merely a likelihood of a prima facie case).
Such quotas are desperate measures, inherently invidious as calculated denials of the rights of one citizen in order to enhance those of another — both done on the frank ground of race. If they are ever appropriate, in my view, that can only be as a last resort, when it is clear that nothing else will suffice. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.1974). Their employment in casual social tinkering by the courts is dangerous and unwise; I would lend it no unnecessary credence. Since Judge Williams’ opinion does so, I concur in the result only.

. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979).

. 443 U.S. at 200, 99 S.Ct. at 2725.