Court Opinion

ID: 9583088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:41.609281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:50.822165
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that plaintiff sufficiently alleged a cause of action for wrongful termination, I respectfully dissent.
In the case sub judice, both parties agree that plaintiff was discharged from his employment. Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated public policy when they terminated plaintiff for his involvement in a domestic violence incident. Plaintiff makes the following pertinent allegations in his complaint:
7. Plaintiff was employed at will by Asheville City Coach Lines, Inc. for approximately 27 1/2 years, from approximately 1974 until his termination on August 17, 2001.
8. Prior to his termination, the Plaintiff was a victim of domestic violence, in that, on or about July 12, 2001, he was shot and seriously injured by his wife, Sandra Imes, after she accused Plaintiff of an extramarital relationship.
9. The gunshot wound sustained by the Plaintiff required him to seek the help of a neighbor to contact the police and to be taken by ambulance to the hospital followed by a several-day hospitalization period and surgery.
10. Within days of receiving his gunshot injury, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant Asheville City Coach Lines, Inc. and/or the City of Asheville Transit Services Department to inform his general manager of the circumstances, the Plaintiff’s need for surgery, and the Plaintiff’s need to miss work.
11. On or about August 17, 2001, the Plaintiff’s general manager, Lamel Blair, informed the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff was terminated from his employment.
13. On August 17, 2001, Lamel Blair informed the Plaintiff that he was being terminated due to the Plaintiff being a victim of domestic violence.
14. Domestic violence is a serious social problem in North Carolina, recognized as such by the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the state government.
*67415. The Plaintiff was a victim of domestic violence and as such was a member of a class of persons sought to be protected by the laws of the state of North Carolina.
16. The termination of Plaintiff’s employment by the Defendants based on the Plaintiffs status as a victim of domestic violence violates the public policy of this state, in that, termination of any employment based on the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence tends to be injurious to the public and against the public good.
I agree with the majority that North Carolina has not yet held that an employer violates public policy when the employer discharges an employee solely because of the employee’s status as a victim of domestic violence. However, I note that this Court has previously characterized “public policy” as a “vague expression,” left to “the appropriate province of the courts to interpret.” McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp., 95 N.C. App. 301, 305, 307, 382 S.E.2d 836, 839, 840, cert. denied, 325 N.C. 546, 385 S.E.2d 498 (1989). Thus, “[t]here is no ‘bright-line’ test for determining when the termination of an at-will employee violates public policy.” Teleflex Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arnold, 132 N.C. App. 689, 691, 513 S.E.2d 85, 87 (1999). Our Supreme Court has previously explained why no definitive test exists:
Although it may be tempting to refine the definition of “public policy” in order to formulate a more precise and exact definition, we decline to do so. Any attempt to make the definition more precise would inevitably lead to at least as many questions as answers. True to common law tradition, we allow this still evolving area of the law to mature slowly, deciding each case on the facts before us.
Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 353, n.1, 416 S.E.2d 166, 169, n.1 (1992). Therefore, as public policy evolves, so must this Court’s ability to find a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
I find it persuasive that a number of our fellow states have found that assisting victims of domestic violence is a matter of public policy. See Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Painter, 356 Md. 293, 307, 739 A.2d 24, 32 (1999) (respondent attorney disbarred for committing domestic violence against his wife and children “contrary to the policy of this State, which abhors such acts.”); In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 461, 655 A.2d 920, 922 (1995) (attorney *675who committed domestic violence on client reprimanded by court, which found that “[i]n enacting the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 1991, the Legislature recognized that ‘domestic violence is a serious crime against society’ that affects people ‘from all social and economic backgrounds and ethnic groups.’ The policy of New Jersey is ‘that violent behavior will not be excused or tolerated.’ ” (citations omitted)).
I also find persuasive the actions of our own state legislature in defining our laws regarding domestic violence and its victims. In 1979, the North Carolina Legislature enacted the North Carolina Domestic Violence Act, a series of statutes designed to protect victims of domestic violence from perpetrators of domestic violence. N.C. Gen. Stat. ch. 50B (2003). In N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a), the Legislature specifically authorized courts to issue protective orders to an aggrieved party in order to “bring about a cessation of acts of domestic violence.” The Legislature further authorized courts to order an offending party to “refrain from . . . harassing [an aggrieved party] . . . by . . . visiting the home or workplace, or other meansf.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a)(9) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, if an individual is forced to leave work or is discharged from work “as a result of domestic violence committed upon the [individual],” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(lf) (2003) ensures that the individual is not denied employment security benefits.
I find the authorizations detailed in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50B-3(a) and 96-14(lf) relevant to the case sub judice. While discussing the impetus behind the Domestic Violence Act in State v. Thompson, our Supreme Court noted that the Act was a formal recognition by then-Governor James B. Hunt, Jr., that “domestic violence is a ‘serious and invisible problem’ in North Carolina.” 349 N.C. 483, 486, 508 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1998) (quoting North Carolina Legislation 1979, at 61 (Inst, of Gov’t, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, Joan G. Brannon & Ann L. Sawyer eds. 1979)). While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Domestic Violence Act formally recognized the problems associated with domestic violence, I conclude that the Act also formally recognized that the perils of domestic violence are often experienced in the workplace. In response to this recognition, the Legislature took the affirmative steps detailed in §§ 50B-3(a) and 96-14(lf). Noting that any exception to the at-will employment doctrine “should be adopted only with substantial justification grounded in compelling considerations of public policy,” Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 334, 493 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1997), for the reasons *676detailed above, I conclude that the Domestic Violence Act and the pertinent Employment Security Law provisions detailed herein represent an expression of North Carolina’s strong public policy aimed not only at supporting victims of domestic violence, but also at preventing the effects of domestic violence from entering the workplace.
In Considine v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., this Court held that an at-will employee may only bring a wrongful discharge claim based on a violation of established public policy. 145 N.C. App. 314, 317, 551 S.E.2d 179, 183 (2001). In his complaint, plaintiff specifically alleges that his discharge for being the victim of domestic violence was in violation of North Carolina’s public policy to protect victims of domestic violence, and that the violation was “injurious to the public and against the public good.” I conclude that plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges that plaintiff’s discharge violated public policy. Therefore, I would hold that no “insurmountable bar to recovery” appears on the face of the complaint. Forbis v. Honeycutt, 301 N.C. 699, 701, 273 S.E.2d 240, 241 (1981). Furthermore, defendants make no argument, and I perceive no reason to hold, that plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to give defendants “notice of the nature and basis of [plaintiff’s] claim[,] so as to enable [defendants] to answer and prepare for trial.” Id. Thus, I conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.