Court Opinion

ID: 9352554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:29.812055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:43.682939
License: Public Domain

J-S41036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN PHILIP BENNETT                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 615 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-28-CR-0000782-2018

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    BRIAN PHILLIP BENNETT                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 616 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-28-CR-0001927-2018

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED JANUARY 06, 2023

        Appellant Brian Phillip Bennett appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County after a jury

convicted Appellant of involuntary manslaughter, endangering the welfare of

a child (two counts), delivery of a controlled substance, criminal use of a

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S41036-22

communication facility, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant

challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his

involuntary manslaughter conviction and asserts that the trial court abused

its discretion in imposing his sentence. We affirm.

       Appellant was charged with third-degree murder along with the

aforementioned offenses in connection with the untimely death of L.S.

(“Child”), the three-year-old daughter of Appellant’s girlfriend, Brittany

Higgins. As discussed infra, Child died after ingesting methamphetamine and

buprenorphine, which Appellant and Higgins admitted to possessing.1

Appellant proceeded to a joint jury trial along with Thomas Stephen Keogh,

the individual accused of acting as the supplier for the drug distribution ring

that ultimately sold and delivered the drugs that led to Child’s death.2

       The tragic factual background in this case was described in great detail

by the trial court in its March 21, 2022 opinion. We will summarize the

undisputed facts that were developed over multiple days at Appellant’s trial.

____________________________________________

1 Higgins, who was charged as a co-defendant, entered a nolo contendere plea
to third-degree murder and received a sentence of ten to twenty years’
imprisonment for her role in Child’s death. Higgins entered a cooperation
agreement with the prosecution and testified against Appellant at his trial.
2 Keogh was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, corrupt

organizations, drug delivery resulting in death, and criminal use of
communication facility. Keogh received an aggregate sentence of 12 years, 1
month to 24 years, 2 months’ incarceration. Keogh’s appeal (docketed at 585
MDA 2022) has been resolved in a separate decision.
       The Commonwealth also prosecuted multiple other individuals who pled
guilty to their role in the drug distribution ring and testified against Appellant
and Keogh after signing cooperation agreements.

                                           -2-
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      On Saturday, January 6, 2018, at approximately 8:00 p.m., emergency

personnel were summoned to an apartment in Greencastle Borough based on

the report of an “unconscious toddler.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 9/8/21, at

23. Higgins called 9-1-1 to report she had discovered three-year-old Child,

lying in her bed, cold and stiff and with bruises on her face. Id. at 21.

      When emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived at the home, they

discovered Child lifeless, lying on her back on a bed in a bedroom near the

kitchen. Id. at 34-35. EMT Richard Wertman indicated he did not believe the

child had died recently as rigor mortis had already set in. Id. at 35-36.

      When Corporal Ismail El-Guemra of the Pennsylvania State Police

responded to the scene and was informed Child was deceased, he observed

that Child had dark areas around her mouth and did not appear to have been

cared for properly. Id. at 29. While speaking with Higgins and Appellant,

Corporal El-Guemra noted that both adults appeared to be distressed, but

noticed Appellant was in even more stress. Id. at 27.

      The Forensics Services Unit of the State Police collected evidence and

took photographs of the scene as well as Child’s condition and the markings

on her face. Id. at 41. Child was wearing a pink Hello Kitty shirt, was lying on

a mattress without sheets, and her head was surrounded by stuffed animals.

Id. at 47; N.T., 9/10/21, at 16-17. One of the investigators thought it was

strange that Child was laying on a mattress without sheets and expressed

concern that the bedroom could have been staged. Id. at 47.

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       Dr. Samuel Land conducted Child’s autopsy and found no evidence of

significant disease, infection, bacteria, virus, or organisms that could have

been responsible for Child’s death. Id. at 95-119. Dr. Land determined Child

did not have any significant internal trauma or broken bones and asserted the

bruises on Child’s head were not the cause of her death. Id. at 100-103, 110-

11.3 Dr. Land noted that the dark coloration on Child’s face was postmortem

injury caused by “gastric contents,” most likely vomit, that had splashed on

her face and had been there for “some time.” Id. at 107-109.

       Dr. Land sent samples of Child’s blood for toxicological testing, which

revealed the presence of methamphetamine (18 nanograms/milliliter) and

buprenorphine in her system (1.2 nanograms/milliliter). Id. at 67-68, 80, 95-

97. Methamphetamine, a stimulant that is almost always used illegally, can

elevate blood pressure and temperature, and can lead to seizures or misfiring

of the heart. Id. at 96, 116. Buprenorphine is a semi-synthetic opioid used to

treat opioid abuse and withdrawal symptoms. Id. at 96-97. Buprenorphine is

sold as Suboxone or Subutex tablets that dissolve under the tongue;

Suboxone contains naloxone whereas Subutex does not. Id. at 72, 99. Child’s

toxicology tests did not reveal the presence of naloxone. Id. at 95.4
____________________________________________

3 Dr. Land noted Child had a black eye as well as bruising to her left chin,
which he opined was an unusual pattern of injury for a three-year-old. N.T.,
9/8/21, at 111-113. Dr. Land also discovered a bruise on Child’s face which
he attributed to an open hand slap mark. Id.
4 The prosecution presented testimony of forensic toxicologists that tested

Child’s blood samples. Dr. Robert Middleburg of NMS Labs testified that blood
testing does not always detect the presence of naloxone as it might be in such
a small quantity that it cannot be measured. N.T., 9/8/21, at 72-73.

                                           -4-
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      Based on his professional training, education, and experience, Dr. Land

concluded with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Child’s cause of

death was mixed substance toxicity of methamphetamine and buprenorphine,

neither of which was prescribed to Child. Id. at 114-117. Dr. Land indicated

either drug could have been lethal to Child, but stated there was no way to

differentiate which drug ultimately caused her death. Id. at 102.

      When police initially interviewed Appellant and Higgins, Higgins told

police that she was unsure of how Child had died as she was sick in bed all

day with the flu on January 6, 2018, and she believed that Appellant was

caring for Child. N.T., 9/9/22, at 21-22, 36.

      However, when officers presented Higgins and Appellant with toxicology

reports noting the presence of drugs in Child’s system, Higgins and Appellant

confessed that they were high on methamphetamine (“meth”) the night of

January 5, 2018 to the morning of January 6, 2018, the time period in which

Child likely ingested the drugs. Id. at 30-33.

      Higgins admitted to police that she and Appellant regularly used meth

in the home they shared with her two children: L.H., her nine-year old son,

and Child, her three-year old daughter. Id. at 30, 43-46. While Higgins had

been prescribed Suboxone and Appellant was prescribed Subutex, the couple

would share both of these drugs. Id. at 50-51, 112-13, 117, 129.

      Higgins told police that she purchased meth on January 5, 2018 from

Rodney (Allen) Mower, who delivered it to their residence at 5:00 p.m. Id. at

32-33, 47-48. Higgins conceded that she and Appellant bought meth to share

                                     -5-
J-S41036-22

together on numerous occasions from Mower and other individuals. Id. at 47,

87-88. As Mower had just received a large amount of meth from his supplier,

Mower cut the meth on their kitchen table to measure it out into individual

packages. Id. at 69-76. When asked if the action in cutting the meth had left

“teeny tiny particles … on [her] kitchen table at some point that Friday night,”

Higgins admitted it was possible. Id. at 76.

      Higgins believed Child was in the living room behind a baby gate when

Mower delivered the meth. Id. Once Higgins received the meth, she went into

her bedroom to use the drugs and did not return that evening. Id. at 47-49.

As Higgins was extremely dehydrated and malnourished from drug use, it

would take her hours to find a vein to inject the meth. Id. at 47. When she

finally injected herself, Higgins entered a trans-like state, and had sexual

intercourse with Appellant. Id. at 56-57. After Higgins came down from her

high, she crashed as she had gone days without sleep. Id. at 57.

      Although Higgins woke around 9 or 10 a.m. the next morning to an

alarm she had set to take care of the kids, Appellant turned off the alarm and

told her he would take care of the children that day. Id. Appellant woke

Higgins up several hours later around 6-7 p.m. and brought her food he had

purchased from McDonald’s. Id. at 54-59. When Higgins asked where the

children were, Appellant indicated that Child appeared to be sleeping and L.H.

was at his grandmother’s house. Id.

      Higgins went into Child’s bedroom at 8 p.m to wake her up. Id. at 49.

At that point, Higgins had not seen Child for more than 24 hours since she

                                     -6-
J-S41036-22

injected the meth the previous evening and had not checked on her. Id. When

Higgins discovered Child was cold, stiff, unresponsive, and with bruises on her

body, she began to scream and asked Appellant, “[w]hat did you do?” Id. at

56, 61. Appellant responded with surprise, put his head in his hands, and

claimed that he did not know what happened. Id. at 61. Thereafter, Higgins

used her cell phone to call 9-1-1. Id. at 63.

      Higgins noted that she found Child lying face up on the mattress without

sheets but surrounded by stuffed animals. Id. at 54. Higgins did not notice

any vomit near Child. Id. Higgins recalled that there was a sheet on Child’s

bed on the night of January 4, 2018 and asserted she always had sheets on

Child’s bed as the mattress was a plastic material. Id. at 54-55. Higgins

claimed she did not put Child to bed on January 5, 2018. Id.

      While Higgins denied cleaning up the bedroom after finding Child

unresponsive, she admitted that she “probably” threw drugs away before first

responders arrived. Id. at 55-56. Higgins did not suspect that L.S. died from

ingesting drugs, but believed the marks on Child’s face were bruises that had

something to do with her death.

      Higgins shared that she was careful to keep her meth and Suboxone in

a small wooden jewelry box in her bedroom. Id. at 89-90. She found it helpful

to store the drugs in her bedroom as she only typically used them there as it

was so difficult for her to find a vein to do so. Id. at 68. She also kept her

drugs concealed so Appellant would not use them. Id. at 91.

                                     -7-
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      In comparison, Appellant would keep his drugs on his person so that he

could use it when he wished and to keep it from Higgins. Id. at 90. Higgins

indicated that Appellant would inject his drugs “wherever he needed to” and

would use meth in multiple areas of the home, even in the kitchen or living

room where the children were. Id. at 68.

      Higgins felt Appellant was not careful with his drug use as he often left

drugs in areas accessible to the children; Higgins addressed her concern with

Appellant out of fear that her children would find the drugs. Id. at 92. On one

of those occasions, Appellant left a needle full of drugs on the kitchen counter

where Higgins’ son found it and asked what it was. Id. at 92-93. Higgins

realized Child could have easily found it as well. Id.

      Higgins consented to a search of her cell phone. Id. at 65. At trial, the

prosecution introduced text messages from Higgins to Appellant that were

sent prior to Child’s death. In one message, Higgins wrote, “[s]he always ends

up with marks like that when we do [meth] and I space out. Are you sure you

didn’t get rough with her or something in the last few days[?]” Id. at 159.

Appellant responded that he had no idea what happened to Child. Id.

      In a text message one month before Child’s death, Higgins wrote “you

cannot ever leave shit out like this[,]” and sent Appellant a picture of his

nightstand next to his bed, where he had left a spoon and Q-tips which were

used to absorb drugs and presumably had drug residue on them. Id. at 160-

61. Higgins then wrote “what if [Child] would have eaten it and overdosed

before she woke me up this morning … you could have killed my child.” Id. at

                                      -8-
J-S41036-22

161-62. Higgins continued on, “[i]f you want to be her parent you’ve got to

start thinking like a fucking parent.” Id. at 162.

      Sergeant Aaron Martin testified that officers conducted a second search

of Appellant and Higgins’ apartment after receiving Child’s toxicology reports

and recovered both drugs and paraphernalia. Id. at 229. Specifically, police

discovered a white powdery substance on the night table, in a syringe, and on

the floor next to Appellant’s side of the bed. Id. at 232-34. Officers also found

packaging for buprenorphine and naloxone tablets, as well as Q-tips, syringes,

glassine baggies, foil wrappers used for smoking, and smoking devices made

of glass and metal. Id. at 234-239.

      Trooper Lindsay Trace, the lead investigator, testified as to his role in

conducting interviews with Appellant after Child’s death and the electronic

evidence obtained from Appellant’s cell phone. N.T., 9/10/21, at 7-8. Trooper

Trace indicated that Appellant eventually confessed to using meth the night of

January 5, 2018 and early morning of January 6, 2018. In addition, Trooper

Trace recalled that Appellant shared that he put the children to bed on the

night of January 5th because Higgins was sick in her room.

      Trooper Trace testified that investigators recovered deleted videos from

Appellant’s phone taken the morning of January 6, 2018. Id. at 105. The first

video, taken at 10:18 a.m. shows Appellant standing over Child as she lay in

bed. N.T., 9/13/21, at 5. The second video, taken at 11:18 a.m., scanned

Child’s body and showed her wearing a red shirt, which was different than the

Hello Kitty shirt Child was wearing when she was found by first responders.

                                      -9-
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Id. at 5-6, 11-12; N.T., 9/8/21, at 47. In addition, in the video, there were

no stuffed animals on Child’s bed, but first responders found numerous stuffed

animals on her bed when they found Child deceased. N.T., 9/8/21, at 12-13.

Trooper Trace testified that Child’s room looked different in the video than

when he had arrived at the scene. Id. at 15.

      Trooper Trace obtained Appellant’s internet search records for the

morning of January 6, 2018, which showed two searches on how to shock the

heart back into rhythm, three searches for toddler not breathing, limp body,

and eight searches for toddler CPR. Id. at 39. There were no searches for child

ingestion of Subutex, Suboxone, or buprenorphine. Id.

      Dr. Kathryn Crowell, a pediatrician at Penn State Hershey Children’s

Hospital, testified as an expert in child abuse and neglect. When viewing

photographs of Child’s bruises on her body, Dr. Crowell believed such injuries

were caused by “blunt force trauma” and repetitive abuse, opining that

someone struck Child with more force than should have been used with

“general caretaking and day-to-day activities.” N.T., 9/9/21, 14, 19-20.

      The prosecution presented testimony of Brittany Baker, an acquaintance

of Appellant and Higgins who sold them meth and also abused controlled

substances. Baker indicated that on January 6, 2018, the day Child was

discovered deceased, she met with Appellant on two separate occasions to sell

him meth, once at approximately 10 a.m. and again in the evening. Id. at

180-83. When Baker asked where Higgins was, Appellant told her that Higgins

and the kids were sick and sleeping. Id. at 182.

                                    - 10 -
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      Appellant testified in his own defense at trial. He characterized himself

as a “functioning drug addict” that was able to hold employment. N.T.,

9/15/21, at 59-60. He recalled that on the evening of January 5, 2018, Mower

delivered meth to the apartment Appellant shared with Higgins and her

children. Id. at 61-62. Appellant described the meth as the size of a baseball

and the largest amount of meth he had ever seen. Id. Appellant agreed Mower

weighed and divided the meth on the couple’s kitchen table. Id. at 63-64.

      Appellant admitted that he and Higgins started to inject the meth after

Mower left, but Higgins went into her bedroom to do so. Id. at 65-66.

Appellant believed the children were behind a baby gate in the living room

when the meth was delivered and claimed he put them to bed around 11 p.m.

Id. Appellant alleged for the first time at trial that Higgins went into Child’s

bedroom thirty minutes after he had put her to bed. Id. at 68. Appellant did

not sleep at all the evening, but stayed awake having sexual intercourse with

Higgins until 5 or 6 a.m. Id. at 71.

      When Appellant checked on Child at approximately 10 a.m., he found

her unresponsive, cold, and blue. Id. at 72-73. He attempted to slap her to

“see what’s going on” and believed she might have been deceased. Id.

Appellant claimed that he tried to give Child CPR and did not realize Child had

ingested drugs. Id. at 74-77. Appellant testified that there was no vomit on

Child and denied changing her clothes. Id. When asked if Higgins had changed

Child’s clothes, he responded, “it would have had to have been.” Id.

                                       - 11 -
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      Appellant asserted that he took videos of Child in her bed accidentally

and subsequently deleted it, not because he wanted to obstruct the

investigation, but simply because he did not realize what the video was. Id.

at 79-80. After finding Child unresponsive, Appellant admitted that he did not

call an ambulance, but instead went to purchase more meth. Id. at 82-83.

      Appellant claimed that he did not know Child had ingested drugs, but

learned she died from drug toxicity when one of the troopers told him. Id. at

76-77. Appellant admitted to his drug use at the home he shared with the

children, but claimed he and Higgins had “separate stashes” of drugs and

denied ever leaving drugs or drug paraphernalia unattended. Id. at 95. When

asked if he was responsible for Child’s death, he responded that “I used meth,

absolutely. It was in her system absolutely but did we both have separate

stashes, did I leave with some left on the table by me, no.” Id. at 85.

      At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Appellant of third-degree

murder, but convicted him on the remaining charges. On November 10, 2021,

trial court sentenced Appellant to the following terms of imprisonment: 60-

120 months for involuntary manslaughter, two terms of 36-72 months for

endangering the welfare of a child, 30-60 months for unlawful delivery, 18-36

months for criminal use of a communication facility, and 6-12 months for

possession of drug paraphernalia. As all these sentences ran consecutively

(with the exception of the paraphernalia charge), Appellant received an

aggregate sentence of 180-360 months’ (15-30 years’) imprisonment.

                                     - 12 -
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       On November 22, 2021, Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions,5

which the trial court denied on March 22, 2022. On April 18, 2022, Appellant

filed timely notices of appeal and subsequently complied with the trial court’s

direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal (stated

verbatim):

       1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient
          to establish that [Appellant’s] actions/inaction was a direct
          cause of death where the Commonwealth’s expert opined that
          the cause of death was mixed drug toxicity?

       2. Whether [Appellant’s] conviction for Involuntary Manslaughter
          was against the weight of the evidence where the
          Commonwealth’s theory at trial was the deceased child
          accidentally ingested two separate narcotics? In the
          alternative, Bennett’s failure to render aid (which is belied by
          the record) was not a direct cause of the child’s death from
          multiple drug toxicity and the verdict shocks one’s sense of
          justice?

       3. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing outside the
          aggravated range was manifestly and unduly harsh as the
          sentencing scheme employed by the Court on all convictions
          was tantamount to a sentence for third-degree murder – a
          charge Appellant was acquitted of by the jury. Especially in
          light of the fact that the for-profit narcotics dealer
          ([Appellant’s] co-defendant at trial) was given substantially
          less time for a more serious conviction)?

Appellant’s Brief, at 8 (renumbered for ease of review).

____________________________________________

5 Appellant’s post-sentence motions were timely filed on Monday, November
22, 2021. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (whenever the last day of any … period
shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday…, such
day shall be omitted from the computation).

                                          - 13 -
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      In the first two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight

of the evidence supporting his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. We

begin by noting the difference between sufficiency and weight claims:

      The distinction between a claim challenging the sufficiency of
      evidence and a claim challenging the weight of evidence is critical.
      A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
      to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
      evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that “notwithstanding
      all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to
      ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to
      deny justice.” A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,
      however, asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support at
      least one material element of the crime for which Appellant has
      been convicted.

Commonwealth v. Arias, __A.3d __, 2022 PA Super 202 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa.Super. 2003)

(citation omitted)).

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our

standard of review is as follows:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
      133 (Pa.Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
      2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citations

omitted).

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      The Crimes Code provides that an individual “is guilty of involuntary

manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a

reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless

or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). In other words, “involuntary manslaughter requires 1) a

mental state of either recklessness or gross negligence[,] and 2) a causal

nexus between the conduct of the accused and the death of the victim.”

Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 151 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

      Specifically, Appellant limits his sufficiency challenge to argue that there

was insufficient evidence that his conduct was a legal cause of Child’s death.

As the autopsy revealed that Child’s cause of death was mixed substance

toxicity, Appellant claims the prosecution failed to show how Child

simultaneously ingested both meth and buprenorphine and could not prove

which drug ultimately was the cause of Child’s death.

      As to the meth, Appellant denies that Child accessed his stash of meth

as he testified that he did not leave his meth unattended. With respect to the

buprenorphine, Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to present

any evidence as to how Child accessed this drug. Further, Appellant argues

that Child could not have ingested Subutex, the brand of buprenorphine

Appellant was prescribed as Child did not have naloxone in her system.

      In addition, while Appellant admits that he failed to seek emergency

assistance for Child when he found her lifeless on the morning of January 6,

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2018, he asserts there is no evidence that the delay in contacting medical

personnel resulted in Child’s death.

      In reviewing similar claims, this Court has held that:

      “It is undisputed that the Commonwealth must prove a direct
      causal relationship between the acts of a defendant and the
      victim's death.” Commonwealth v. Long, 425 Pa.Super. 170,
      624 A.2d 200, 203 (1993). “Criminal responsibility is properly
      assessed against one whose conduct was a direct and substantial
      factor producing the death.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835
      A.2d 801, 807 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.
      Nicotra, 425 Pa.Super. 600, 625 A.2d 1259, 1260 (1993)). “This
      is true even though ‘other factors combined with that conduct to
      achieve the result.’” Id. Additionally:

         In order to impose criminal liability, causation must be direct
         and substantial. Defendants should not be exposed to a loss
         of liberty based on the tort standard which only provides
         that the event giving rise to the injury is a substantial factor.
         Although typically the tort concept refers to only substantial
         and not to direct and substantial as in the criminal context,
         the additional language in the criminal law does not provide
         much guidance. Therefore, criminal causation has come to
         involve a case-by-case social determination; i.e., is it just
         or fair under the facts of the case to expose the defendant
         to criminal sanctions. In other words, was the defendant's
         conduct so directly and substantially linked to the actual
         result as to give rise to imposition of criminal liability or was
         the actual result so remote and attenuated that it would be
         unfair to hold the defendant responsible for it?

      Commonwealth v. Rementer, 410 Pa.Super. 9, 598 A.2d 1300,
      1304–05 (1991). “In seeking to define the requirement that a
      criminal defendant's conduct be a direct factor in the death of
      another, the courts of this Commonwealth have held that ‘so long
      as the defendant's conducted started the chain of causation which
      led to the victim's death, criminal responsibility for the crime of
      homicide may properly be found.’” McCloskey, 835 A.2d at 808
      (citing Nicotra, supra).

                                       ***

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     “[I]t has never been the law of this Commonwealth that
     criminal responsibility must be confined to a sole or
     immediate cause of death.” Commonwealth v. Skufca, 457
     Pa. 124, 321 A.2d 889, 894 (1974) (citation omitted). “Criminal
     responsibility is properly assessed against one whose
     conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing
     the death even though other factors combined with that
     conduct to achieve the result.” Id.

Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152 (emphasis added).

     Our review of the record in this case shows the Commonwealth met its

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s conduct was a

direct and substantial factor in causing Child’s death. While Child’s autopsy

results revealed Child’s cause of death was mixed substance toxicity of meth

and buprenorphine, Appellant and Higgins admitted they regularly possessed

and used both of these substances in the home they shared with Child.

     More specifically, Appellant and Higgins admitted that they purchased

and used meth on the evening of January 5, 2018, just hours before Child was

found lifeless in her bed. Appellant and Higgins conceded that their seller,

Mower, cut a large amount of meth on their kitchen table, an area accessible

to Child. Although Appellant and Higgins asserted that Child was behind a

baby gate when the meth was delivered, they admitted that after Child was

placed in her bedroom that night to go to sleep, Child could leave her bedroom

and was not restricted from entering the kitchen.

     With respect to Child’s ingestion of buprenorphine, Appellant asserts

that Child must have accessed Higgins’s Suboxone tablets (and not Appellant’s

Subutex tablets) as toxicology reports showed that Child did not have

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naloxone in her system. However, this argument is based on Appellant’s faulty

premise that Subutex contains naloxone and Suboxone does not. In reality,

as suggested by its name, Suboxone contains naloxone and buprenorphine,

whereas Subutex is merely buprenorphine. As such, this contention actually

works against the defense as the absence of naloxone in the toxicology reports

would suggest that Child ingested Subutex, the brand of buprenorphine

prescribed to Appellant.6

       Despite the fact that no individual witnessed Child ingesting meth or

buprenorphine before her death, the jury was free to consider the

circumstantial evidence to conclude that Child accessed these substances that

were in Appellant’s possession and control. Appellant admitted that there were

no other sources of meth other than the amount he and Higgins purchased

from Mower that evening.

       Appellant’s claim that Child could not have accessed the drugs in his

“stash” is belied by the record. In addition to the fact that Appellant and

Higgins may have left drug residue on the kitchen table the night before Child

ingested meth, Higgins had confronted Appellant on multiple prior occasions

when he recklessly left drugs and paraphernalia in areas accessible to her

children and Higgins had expressed concern for their safety. Appellant

____________________________________________

6 Nevertheless, the absence of naloxone in Child’s blood is not dispositive as
forensic toxicologists testified that naloxone is often not measured in testing
as it may be present in amounts too small to detect. Moreover, Appellant and
Higgins shared their buprenorphine prescriptions with each other.

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admitted that he used his drugs in multiple areas of the house whereas Higgins

claimed she confined her drug use to her bedroom.

      Moreover, other circumstantial evidence points to Appellant’s culpability

including the fact that he was the individual who put the children to bed on

January 5, 2018. Appellant wanted the children to go to bed so that he and

Higgins could do meth and have sexual intercourse. While Appellant told police

that Higgins remained in her bedroom from the night of January 5th and the

majority of the day on January 6th, Appellant conceded that he did not sleep

the entire night, turned off Higgins’s alarm in the morning, and told her he

would take care of the children.

      Appellant’s phone contained videos that showed he found Child

unresponsive in the morning of January 6th. While his internet search history

revealed inquiries about child CPR, Appellant did not seek emergency care to

help Child. Instead, after finding Child in this state, Appellant left the home

on two occasions to purchase more meth and fast food. Appellant admitted he

did not tell Higgins about Child’s condition, which Higgins did not discover until

the evening of January 6th, after which she called 9-1-1.

      Further, first responders discovered Child in a scene that had been

manipulated since the recording of the videos on Appellant’s phone that

morning. Child’s clothes had been changed and stuffed animals had been

staged on her bed, which did not have any sheets.

      Reviewing    the   evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to   the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude that there was sufficient

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evidence to allow the jury to infer that Appellant’s reckless conduct caused

Child’s death. Therefore, there is no merit to his sufficiency challenge.

      Appellant also claims his involuntary manslaughter conviction is not

supported by the weight of the evidence. Our standard of review for challenges

to the weight of the evidence is well-established:

      The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie
      in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support.
      Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
      court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

      A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
      the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
      trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
      conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
      would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
      the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

      An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
      weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
      applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
      review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
      of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

      In raising this claim on appeal, Appellant simply asks this Court to find

the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant does not

cite to this Court’s standard of review in evaluating whether the trial court

abused its discretion in denying his challenge to the weight of the evidence.

      In a recent decision, a panel of his Court in Commonwealth v. Rogers,

259 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2022),

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found that the appellant did not properly mount an abuse-of-discretion attack

against the trial court's decision to deny his challenge to the weight of the

evidence, when the appellant failed to cite the correct standard review and

“demonstrate how the trial court's ruling overrode the law, was manifestly

unreasonable, or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality.” Id. at

542. As such, this Court was dismissed the weight claim as the appellant did

not show that an abuse of discretion had occurred.

      Similarly, in this case, Appellant does not acknowledge the distinction

between the standards of review applied by trial courts and appellate courts

to claims challenging the weight of the evidence. Appellant simply asks this

Court to set aside the jury’s verdict, which he characterizes as “so contrary to

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Appellant’s Brief, at 32.

      However, we may not conduct a de novo review of whether the jury’s

verdict shocked the trial court’s conscience, but must defer to the trial court’s

discretion. As Appellant has made no attempt to assess whether the trial court

abused its discretion, we must dismiss his challenge to the weight of the

evidence as meritless.

      Lastly, Appellant claims that the trial court’s sentencing scheme, which

included multiple consecutive sentences in the aggravated range of the

guidelines, was manifestly and unduly harsh. In reviewing challenges to the

trial court’s sentencing discretion, we are mindful that:

      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
      entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Prior to reaching the
      merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[, w]e conduct a four-

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      part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a
      timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
      the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
      reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3)
      whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
      (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
      appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quotation marks, some citations, and emphasis omitted).

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved numerous

sentencing claims in a timely post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief contains

a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in which he asserts that the trial

court (1) imposed aggravated range sentences without considering mitigating

factors and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and (2) ran multiple sentences at

the top of the guideline ranges consecutively. Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17.

      In addition, to obtain review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects

of a sentence, the appellant must raise also raise a substantial question that

the sentence violates either the Sentencing Code or any fundamental

sentencing norm. Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 A.3d 391, 401 (Pa.Super.

2018). We make the substantial-question determination based on the

contents of the Rule 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812

A.2d 617, 621-22 n. 14 (Pa. 2002) (noting that an “appellate court decides

whether to review the discretionary portions of a sentence by reviewing the

Rule 2119(f) statement”) (emphasis and citation omitted).

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       This Court has held that a claim that the trial court imposed an

aggravated range sentence without consideration of mitigating circumstances

raises a substantial question for our review. Commonwealth v. Felmlee,

828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc). In addition, this Court has

found that “a substantial question exists when the issue is whether the

decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal

conduct[.]” Commonwealth v. Bankes, ___A.3d___, 2022 PA Super 212

(Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-DeJusus, 994 A.2d

595, 598-99 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

       In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant's claim that the trial

court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon

fashioning its aggravated range sentences along with his challenge to the

imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, each raises a

substantial question. Thus, we proceed to address the merits of his sentencing

claims.7 Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa.Super. 2015).

       Our standard of review of a sentencing claim is as follows:

____________________________________________

7 Appellant also baldly claims that the trial court’s sentence is excessive when
compared to (1) the sentence given to his co-defendant, Keogh and (2) the
penalty for a third-degree murder conviction for which Appellant was
acquitted. Appellant did not raise these claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement
or develop analysis to support his arguments on appeal. We find these claims
waived for lack of development. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736
(Pa.Super. 2014) (“[a]s Appellant has cited no legal authorities nor developed
any meaningful analysis, we find this issue waived for lack of development”).

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       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
       sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2006).

       Pursuant   to   Section   9721(b)   of    the   Sentencing   Code,    courts

“shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for

confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of

the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9721(b). “[T]he court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open

court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the

sentence imposed.” Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not

undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or

specifically reference the statute in question.” Commonwealth v. Crump,

995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010).

       Rather, the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s

consideration of the facts of the case and the defendant’s character. Id. “In

particular, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his

age,   personal    characteristics   and   his    potential   for   rehabilitation.”

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002).

                                     - 24 -
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      Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors

and his need for rehabilitation is belied by the record. Notably, the trial court

had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report prior to

sentencing. “[W]here the trial court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is

presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135

(Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). In addition, we can assume the court was

aware of the relevant information regarding Appellant’s character and weighed

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. Commonwealth

v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

      The sentencing transcript also shows that the trial court noted on the

record that it had considered multiple mitigating factors such as Appellant’s

“substance use history, criminal history, employment history, his version of

events, and the many letters of support that were provided.” N.T. Sentencing,

11/10/21, at 50. The trial court specifically noted the following:

      [Appellant], I do think that the fact you have so many individuals
      who have taken the time to write me very thoughtful[,] caring
      letters, leads me to believe when this is all over you have a loving,
      supportive family and community to return to, and that I urge you
      to rely on the strength of these individuals as you continue to deal
      with the consequences of your behavior.

Id. at 59-60.

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      The trial court also recognized Appellant’s need for rehabilitation as it

noted Appellant was “in the throes of his addiction” when he arranged two

drug transactions after finding Child was unresponsive instead of contacting

emergency personnel. Id. In imposing the sentence, the trial court directed

that Appellant submit to a drug and alcohol assessment and undergo

treatment and periodic testing as a condition of the sentence.

      In its decision denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the trial court

recognized Appellant had admitted to participating in two drug transactions

after Child’s death and expressed remorse. However, the trial court noted that

Appellant in his trial testimony had attempted to minimize his role in Child’s

death and had not been fully truthful even when presented with the

prosecution’s evidence.

      We also reject Appellant’s claim that the trial court’s sentencing scheme

was “manifestly and unduly harsh” in that it chose to impose multiple

aggravated range sentences and run them consecutively. It is well established

that the trial court has discretion to impose its sentences consecutively or

concurrently to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to

sentences already imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a); Commonwealth v.

Wright, 832 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (recognizing that “the trial

[court] may determine whether, given the facts of a particular case, a

sentence should run consecutive to or concurrent with another sentence being

imposed”).

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     This Court has declined to disturb a consecutive sentencing scheme

unless the aggregate sentence is “grossly disparate” to the defendant's

conduct, or “viscerally appear[s] as patently unreasonable.” Gonzalez-

Dejusus, 994 A.2d at 599.

     Our review of the record leads us to conclude that it was reasonable for

the trial court to run Appellant’s individual aggravated range sentences

consecutively to impose an aggregate term of 15-30 years’ imprisonment. The

trial court considered the gravity of Appellant’s offenses and their impact on

the victim and the community. The untimely death of three-year old Child

“turned her family’s lives upside down” in the “most horrific set of

circumstances anyone could ever envision having to live through.” N.T.

11/10/21, at 45; Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/21/22, at 44-45.

     The trial court explained its rationale for imposing aggravated range

sentences:

     [Appellant,] I have sentenced you in this way. Some of these
     sentences are at the top of the standard range – top of the
     aggravated range. I need for you to understand that I made this
     determination based on the evidence I heard. A little girl died on
     your watch.

     The single most damning and disturbing piece of evidence that I
     saw, and I would suggest, perhaps, the jury say, was the video
     that you likely were not aware you took or probably would have
     tried to get rid of it, of you entering [Child’s] bedroom, trying to
     wake her by slapping her, and then leaving.

     A period of time elapsed, 12 hours, during which that little girl laid
     on her bed. I don’t know if she was already dead when you tried
     to slap her or if she was in a severely compromised state, but
     what I do know is that for that period of time between you

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      entering her bedroom and finding her in that state and her mother
      eventually calling 911, you did nothing.

      You may have performed searches, and there was evidence to
      suggest you performed searches on the internet to figure out how
      to resuscitate her, but you never called people who could have
      helped.

      Instead, in the throes of your addiction, you arranged two
      separate drug deliveries. I find that to be cold, callous, hard-
      hearted, and the kind of behavior of someone who is completely
      devoid of any ability to provide care of a child.

      These are the circumstances. I also saw evidence of a series of
      bruises, text messages from [Child’s] mother to you, that lead me
      to believe that [Child] was subjected to abusive behavior over a
      course of conduct.

      So these are the reasons I’m imposing the sentence that I have
      imposed.

N.T., 11/10/21, at 58-60.

      We conclude that Appellant’s aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’

imprisonment is not patently unreasonable or grossly disparate to the criminal

conduct proven in this case. We also decline to find that the trial court was

required to give Appellant a volume discount for the numerous crimes for

which he was convicted. See Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571, 581

(Pa.Super. 2020) (emphasizing that “defendants convicted of multiple

offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate sentence”).

      Accordingly, our review of the record, party briefs, trial court opinion,

and relevant authority uncovers no reason to disturb the trial court's discretion

in imposing its sentence. See Shugars, supra (“[s]entencing is a matter

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion”).

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     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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