Court Opinion

ID: 9710256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:05:20.151612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.412487
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
This is a review of an order of the court of appeals, summarily affirming an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Honorable Elliot N. Wal-stead, Circuit Judge, granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Stacey Lea, Kimberly Ann and Barbara Lynn Bell’s claim for loss of society and companionship arising from negligent injury to their father, Bernard W. Bell. The issue on review is whether this Court’s decision in Theama v. City of Kenosha, 117 Wis. 2d 508, 344 N.W. 2d 513 (1984), recognizing causes of action by minor children for loss of society and companionship due to negligent injury of a parent, but announc*28ing that the holding would apply to the Theama case and otherwise apply prospectively, bars the cause of action in this case.
We conclude that the claim of the minor Bell daughters is not barred by the Theama prospectivity language. This case merits a special exception to Theama, based on the fact that the plaintiffs here are “similarly situated” to the Theama plaintiffs and equitable considerations warrant similar treatment. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals and remand the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
The material facts are as follows. On October 31, 1981, Bernard W. Bell sustained permanent injuries in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of the accident, he is a quadriplegic and breathes only with the aid of a mechanical device. Bernard Bell and his wife Sandra brought suit, filing a complaint on April 27, 1982. Bernard sought damages for his injuries, and Sandra sought damages for loss of society and companionship, loss of financial and familial support, mental anguish, and compensation for the time and effort expected to be spent in the future in caring for Bernard. Bernard and Sandra Bell entered into a Pierringer1 agreement with Ronald Holup, the driver of the van in which Bernard was injured, and his insurer.
Bernard Bell’s three minor daughters, Stacey Lea, Kimberly Ann, and Barbara Lynn, by their guardian ad litem, Kenneth J. Dunlap, brought a claim for loss of their father’s society and companionship. The Bell daughters were not part of the Pierringer release.
Defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the action of the Bell children, arguing that minor children have no *29cause of action against a tortfeasor for damages suffered by them in connection with an injury to a parent. Judge Walstead, in a memorandum decision dated February 16, 1983, denied the motion. Noting that the question presented was one of first impression in Wisconsin, Judge Walstead, citing analogous Wisconsin cases, cases from other jurisdictions, and various legal authorities, reasoned that allowing a minor child’s cause of action for loss of society and companionship due to negligent injury of a parent was consistent with principles of Wisconsin common law.
On March 8, 1984, this court expressly recognized that minor children have a cause of action for the loss of their parent’s society and companionship caused by negligent injury to the parent. Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 509. The newly created cause of action was given prospective effect, although the Theama children were given the benefit of the new law: “The change in the rule announced in this opinion is to be limited to causes of action arising on or after March 8, 1984, the date of the filing of this opinion, except that it is to be applicable to the instant case.” Theama, 117 Wis. 2d at 528.
Following Theama, the defendants in the instant case joined in a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the Bell daughters’ claim on the ground that the prospectivity rule set forth in Theama barred the Bell daughters’ claim since it arose prior to March 8,1984.2
Judge Walstead vacated his earlier decision upholding the cause of action and, relying exclusively on *30Theama, granted summary judgment for the defendants. In a decision dated October 17, 1984, Judge Wal-stead noted that the Theama holding applies to “causes of action arising on or after March 8, 1984,” and that the Bell action was “commenced prior to March 8, 1984.”
The court of appeals, also relying on the Theama rule, summarily affirmed the trial court. This court granted the Bell daughters’ petition for review on January 14,1986.
Upon review of a summary judgment decision, this court must apply the standards set forth in 802.08(2), Stats. (1983-1984)3 in the same manner as the trial court. Kremers-Urban Co. v. American Employers Ins., 119 Wis. 2d 722, 733, 351 N.W. 2d 156 (1984). Since there is no disagreement as to issues of fact, this court must determine whether the defendant moving parties were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Section 802.08(2), Stats. This court decides questions of law independently, without deference to the decision of the trial court and the court of appeals. Ball v. District No. 4 Area Board, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537, 345 N.W. 2d 389 (1984).
*31Literal application of the Theama prospectivity rule would bar the Bell'daughters’ claim. Recognition of their claim could thus only come about if this court decides to create an exception to the Theama rule or if the Theama rule of prospective application is overturned. Plaintiffs argue that the special circumstances of this case warrant that an exception be made to the Theama prospectivity rule.
The general rule adhered to by this court is the “Blackstonian Doctrine.” “This doctrine provides that a decision which overrules or repudiates an earlier decision is retrospective in operation.” Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 575, 157 N.W. 2d 595 (1968). This court can limit the retrospective operation of a decision and make it exclusively prospective or applicable to the case and condition its prospective operation. Olson v. Augsberger, 18 Wis. 2d 197, 200, 118 N.W. 2d 194 (1962). The decision to apply a judicial holding prospectively is a question of policy and involves balancing the equities peculiar to a given rule or case. Harmann v. Hadley, 128 Wis. 2d 371, 377-79, 382 N.W. 2d 673 (1986). A decision is given prospective effect only when there are compelling judicial reasons for doing so. Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 576, citing Dupuis v. General Casualty Co., 36 Wis. 2d 42, 45, 152 N.W. 2d 884 (1967).
In Theama, this court did not articulate the basis for its decision to apply the holding prospectively. We take this opportunity to clarify the reasons for the pros-pectivity rule.4 In Kurtz v. City of Waukesha, 91 Wis. 2d 103, 109, 280 N.W. 2d 757 (1979), this court approved *32the three factors announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for determining whether a holding should be applied retrospectively:
“In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroac-tively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied,... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed _Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation....’ Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hardship” by a holding of nonretroactivity.’ ” Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-107. (Citations omitted.)
This court has noted two exceptions to the Black-stonian doctrine of retroactive operation; these have been labeled the “reliance” exception and the “administration of justice” exception. Fitzgerald, 38 Wis. 2d at 576. Prospective operation will sometimes be chosen when there has been great reliance on an overruled decision by a substantial number of persons and they would suffer considerable harm or detriment if the decision was retroactively applied to them. Id. at 576. It may also *33be chosen where retroactivity would tend to thrust an excessive burden on the administration of justice. Id.
One commentator has stated that the question of reliance “must be appraised in every case involving a prospective overruling.” Schaefer, The Control of “Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631, 643 (1967). The author stated:
“Reliance takes many forms, ranging from the clear case of the contract entered into in specific reliance upon a particular decision, to tort situations in which reliance has been found in the actual or assumed failure of a defendant to insure against the newly created risk, or to investigate the accident at the time it occurred. This latter consideration has weighed most heavily in cases involving minors, where the bar of a statute of limitations may be postponed until after a potential litigant has attained his majority.” Id. at 643.
Implicit in the analysis of the prospectivity question in Theama was a consideration of the foregoing factors. Chief among the matters considered were the “reliance” and “administration of justice” factors. Since Theama creates a new cause of action available in tort cases, tortfeasors face a new potential liability. Prospective application of the Theama decision enables insurance companies and their customers to prepare for this potential risk and incorporate it when calculating insurance costs. At the same time, the insurers and insureds do not face liability for incidents arising prior to Theama, and thus are not unfairly forced to pay damages for an unforeseen risk. Their “reliance” on the scope of potential liability risks existing prior to Theama is therefore protected.
*34Further, the prospective nature of the rule results in avoiding an “opening of the floodgates” with respect to minor children’s claims for loss of society and companionship for negligent injury to a parent. Wisconsin’s disability tolling statute, 893.18, Stats.,5 provides that if a person entitled to bring an action is, at the time the cause of action accrued, within the age of 18 years, “the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action,” except that it cannot be extended “in any case longer than one year after the disability.” Many lawsuits, which otherwise have been settled or decided, would suddenly come to life, in the event that the Theama holding creating a new cause of action was applied retrospectively. This potential flood of litigants would pose a substantial burden on the administration of justice.
One of the cases relied on in Theama is Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975), which recognized the parents’ right to recover for loss of aid, *35comfort, society, and companionship of a child during minority when the loss is occasioned by another’s negligence. In Shockley, this court determined that the change brought about by the decision would apply to the Shockley case but would otherwise be limited to causes of action arising on or after February 4,1975. 66 Wis. 2d at 404-05.
The cause of action created by Shockley inured to the benefit of parents of children. The applicable statute of limitations in these negligence actions is three years. 893.54(1), Stats.6 The cause of action created by Theama inures to the benefit of minors. The applicable statute of limitations, as noted, applies in a way that may extend the limitations period well beyond the typical three year period that applies to plaintiffs not under a disability. If there were reasons to apply the Shockley holding prospectively based upon a concern for a potential flood of litigants, these reasons loom larger in the Theama situation.
While the foregoing factors form the core of the court’s analysis when it is faced with the question of whether to apply a holding retroactively, we note that there are other significant considerations. In creating a new cause of action, as was done in Theama, it is often desirable to make a clean break with the past and initiate a fresh start. As one commentator has put it:
“Prospective limitation... allows the courts freedom to make needed changes unrestrained by concerns about the effect of those changes on past events. *36While the cornerstone of the technique is the protection of justified reliance, its use also promotes the stability, certainty and finality of judicial decision-making. Further, it is argued, in insulating precedent from changes in personnel on the state or federal high courts, prospectivity enhances public confidence in the fairness and objectivity of the judiciary.” Moody, Retroactive Application of Law-Changing Decisions in Michigan, 28 Wayne L. Rev. 439, 443 (1982) (Footnotes omitted.)
The overarching concern present in a decision to create a new cause of action is that the change works equitable results, i.e., that the element of fairness is preserved. Fairness in this context is best defined by the principle that those parties “similarly situated” are treated similarly.
In setting forth conditions applicable to the prospective operation of a decision, this Court has been conscious of the principle that similarly situated parties should be treated the same, and has allowed parties other than parties to the law-changing case to benefit from the decision. See, In Interest of J.V.R., 127 Wis. 2d 192, 202, 378 N.W. 2d 266 (1985). Perhaps the key consideration in determining whether to allow an exception to the prospectivity rule here is the question of what is meant by the phrase “similarly situated.”
One observer has noted that the goal of treating similarly situated parties similarly is something that courts have agreed upon as an important consideration in dealing with matters related to retrospective and prospective laws: “No one can quarrel with the goal. But the question is, Similarly situated with respect to what?” Shaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Supreme Ct. Rev. 1, 8.
*37Defendants have conceded that this court has employed the “similarly situated — similar treatment” rule as a basis for carving out individual exceptions to rules of law given prospective application and whose cut off date would otherwise bar the claim asserted. They argue, however, that in these cases, the basis for concluding that the parties were “similarly situated” was that the parties’ cases had similar procedural histories and it was solely a matter of chance that the law-changing case made it to this court first. Thus, the parties to the law-changing case were accorded the benefit of the law-changing decision, while the claims of parties seeking similar relief were barred due to the prospective nature of the law-changing decision. Exceptions were granted on the ground that the timing of the case was crucial and that in this respect the parties were “similarly situated.”
One of the cases cited by defendants is Harmann. In Harmann, this court dealt with a rule enunciated in Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 276, 366 N.W. 2d 857 (1985), holding social hosts liable for personal injury caused by the conduct of a minor driver to whom social hosts negligently furnish intoxicating beverages. The Koback court declared that this holding would be applied prospectively, stating: “[Tjhere shall be liability only for the negligent conduct of a social host who furnishes liquor to a minor when the conduct which causes injury occurs on or after September 1, 1985.” Koback, 123 Wis. 2d at 277.
Although a literal application of the prospective rule set forth in Koback barred the claim asserted by the Harmann plaintiffs, this court held that the procedural history of Harmann warranted that it be treated as an *38exception to the Koback rule of prospectivity. Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 374. This court noted that the plaintiffs in both Koback and Harmann pursued the same claims in the circuit court, the court of appeals, and the supreme court during the same time period. Id. at 384. Reasoning that individuals similarly situated should be treated similarly, it was held that the Harmann case should be treated as an exception to the Koback rule of prospectivity. Id. at 384-86.
It was recently noted that the Harmann decision “creates a narrow exception to this court’s pronouncements regarding the prospective effect of its decisions.” Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg, 130 Wis. 2d 464, 491, 387 N.W. 2d 751 (1986). In Delvaux, this court stated that the “Harmann-type result” was “based on considerations of equity when sufficiently similar procedural histories are shared by factually and legally similar cases.” Id. at 492. The procedural similarity in the Harmann decision was clear because it was mere chance that this court heard the Koback case prior to the Harmann case. This fact led the Delvaux court to describe Harmann as representing a “narrow exception” to the prospectivity rule.
At oral argument, the Defendants cited Jepson v. Stilen, Nos. 85-1832, 85-1833, 85-2125, a per curiam opinion filed by this court on September 17, 1986. The issue in Jepson, 133 Wis.2d 35, 393 N.W. 2d 93 (1986), was whether the court should make an exception to the Koback rule of prospectivity. This court stated: “Because all three actions arise out of the same accident, an incident which occurred prior to the accidents in both Koback and Harmann, we believe they should be entitled to utilize the theory of liability in Koback.” Jepson, at 37-38
*39The Jepson action was commenced on October 5, 1982. The Defendants moved for summary judgment and on June 14, 1983 the trial court denied the motion. Two other actions arising out of the same accident were subsequently filed and all three actions were consolidated. As of the date of the Koback decision, April 30, 1985, all three actions were pending.
Koback recognized a theory of liability similar to that advocated by the Jepson plaintiffs, but its rule was made applicable prospectively, to causes of action arising on or after September 1, 1985. On the basis of Koback, all three of the Jepson actions were dismissed by the circuit court on June 6, 1985. The court of appeals summarily affirmed.
This court noted that the Jepson action involved a complaint that was filed prior to the complaints in Koback and Harmann and, “but for favorable circuit court treatment, might have reached this court first and served as the vehicle for the change in law announced in Koback. ” Jepson, At 6. Citing Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 383, we noted that this was the type of “chance, but determinative, circumstance” that should not work to a party’s disadvantage. Id.
This court also saw fit to grant the same exception to the two Jepson companion cases despite the fact that they were commenced after the Koback and Harmann decisions. This court stated: “[W]e believe that within the context of this case the right of action accruing to one party as the result of a particular accident should be available to all similarly situated parties regardless of when the actions, otherwise timely, were commenced in relation to each other.” Id. We note that the concept “similarly situated,” although employed in the context of a single accident out of which all the claims arose, was *40not used in the limited sense of describing parties that shared a highly similar or parallel procedural history. The plaintiff parties in the three actions brought in the Jepson case were described as “similarly situated” despite different procedural histories.
One consequence of a decision to apply a judicial holding prospectively is that this decision may itself, in its application, produce inequities. As noted in Harmann, one apparent inequity may be that “[t]he party who happens to present the question when it is ripe for consideration is the chance beneficiary of our decision, to the exclusion of all others who may have been diligently pressing for the change in the law.” Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 382. We are persuaded that just such an inequity would occur in the instant case, were we to insist on applying the Theama rule of pros-pectivity literally and bar the Bell daughters’ claim.
The instant case does not evince a shared procedural history with Theama in the same way that Harmann paralleled the timing of the Koback case.7 Nevertheless, we are convinced that the Bell *41daughters are “similarly situated” to the Theama plaintiff children and should be treated similarly.
We find it significant that the trial court considered the question of whether a cause of action existed prior to the Theama holding, and concluded that the plaintiff daughters had a cause of action. Significantly, the trial judge employed much the same reasoning in reaching his conclusion as did this court in Theama. In many respects, Theama’s analysis resembled the trial judge’s analysis and confirmed the direction in which he determined Wisconsin law was moving.
By the time of the Theama decision, March 8,1984, the Bell daughters had pleaded, raised, and pursued their claim. Further, they had received a favorable decision by the trial judge upholding their claim. It is inequitable to deny the Bell daughters’ claim on the basis of a literal reading of a prospective rule, given the foregoing factors. We find that the plaintiffs here should receive benefit from an exception to the Theama prospectivity rule.
We also note that our decision to grant an exception to the Theama prospectivity rule does not necessitate the overturning of a completed trial and the initiation of a new trial. The result in the present case is therefore consistent with statements made by this court in Jepson concerning the distinction between granting an exception to a prospective rule in cases that are “pending” as opposed to cases where the trial has already been completed.
*42We choose not to state any hard and fast rule as to how to determine when procedural histories are “sufficiently similar” to warrant that an exception be made to a law applied prospectively. We do note, however, that equitable considerations may affect the determination of whether the parties are “similarly situated.” We thus see the “exception” question to be one best determined on a case by case basis. In the instant case, we have found the fact that the trial judge ruled favorably, initially, on the status of the claim, and that the plaintiff children have persistently pursued their claim at each stage of the proceedings, to be determinative.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W. 2d 106 (1963).

 A cause of action, if there is one, arises on the date of plaintiffs injury. Hunter v. Sch. Dist. Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 442, 293 N.W. 2d 515 (1980). The accident in which Bernard Bell was injured occurred on October 31, 1981, over two years prior to the Theama decision date of March 8, 1984.

 Section 802.08(2), Stats., provides:
“802.08 Summary Judgment.... (2) MOTION. The motion shall be served at least 20 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.”

 For a general discussion of the factors involved in deciding whether to apply a law prospectively, see, Fairchild, Limitation of *32New Judge-Made Law to Prospective Effect Only: “Prospective Overruling” or “Sunbursting,” 51 Marq. L. Rev. 254 (1967-68).

 Section 893.18(2), Stats., provides:
“893.18 Transition; persons under disability.... (2) If a person entitled to bring an action mentioned in this chapter, except actions for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture or against a sheriff or other officer for an escape, or for the recovery of real property or the possession thereof is, at the time the cause of action accrued, either
“(a) Within the age of 18 years, except for actions against health care providers; or
“(b) Insane; or
“(c) Imprisoned on a criminal charge or in execution under sentence of a criminal court for a term less than life, the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, except that the period within which the action must be brought cannot be extended more than 5 years by any such disability, except infancy; nor can it be so extended in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases.”

 Section 893.54 (1), Stats., provides:
“893.54 Injury To The Person. The following actions shall be commenced within 3 years or be barred:
“(1) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person.”

 One of the chief reasons that this court granted the Harmann plaintiffs an exception to the Koback prospectivity rule was that there was a possibility that the Harmann case would have made it to this court prior to Koback, had the Harmann petition to bypass not been denied. Harmann, 128 Wis. 2d at 386. A judgment was filed in the Harmann case before one was filed in Koback, and the Harmanns filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals five months before the Kobacks did. Id. at 382-83.
In the instant case it does not appear that the Bells could have preceded Theama and been the law-changing case. The initial memorandum decision by Judge Walstead, denying summary judgment to the defendants and recognizing the Bell daughters’ claim, was dated February 16, 1983. An amended order prepared in accordance with the memorandum decision was signed March 16,1983.
*41The petition for review in the Theama case was accepted on March 9, 1983, one week before the order in the instant case was signed. Hence, even if the Bells had been unsuccessful on the initial summary judgment motion, and taken an appeal, they would not have reached this court prior to the Theamas.