Court Opinion

ID: 9674898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:37:01.423712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.118518
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge
dissents.
I believe movant’s second Rule 27.26 motion qualifies for a hearing under the provi*409sions of Rule 27.26(d) governing successive motions.
Rule 27.26(d) was well-interpreted in Vaughan v. State, 614 S.W.2d 718 (Mo.App.1981): “If there are new facts or new constitutional principles which could not have been known to the petitioner at the time of the first motion, the court will not foreclose a second motion based on these new grounds.” Id. at 720.
Movant’s “new constitutional principle” is an allegation of denial of due process in his sentencing procedure which he says arises from Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir.1980), and its interpretation of Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
In these circumstances I feel that mov-ant is entitled to be heard on the merits of his motion rather than to be precluded because he states his claim in a second motion.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a hearing on the motion.