Court Opinion

ID: 9965836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:06:51.685976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:45.220498
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,985

                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                    MICHAEL KEITH GOLDSTEIN,
                                           Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Douglas District Court; STACEY DONOVAN, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed May 3, 2024. Affirmed.

        Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Brian Deiter, assistant district attorney, Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GARDNER and ISHERWOOD, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Michael Keith Goldstein appeals his conviction for possession of
cocaine, arguing instructional and prosecutorial errors denied him the right to a fair trial.
Finding no error, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

        On March 8, 2020, Goldstein ran a red light and collided with another car.
Lawrence police officers responded to the accident. Officer Justin Snipes arrived and saw

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that Goldstein had a bloody nose, but Goldstein assured Snipes that he was not injured.
Goldstein told Snipes that he was on his way to his mother's house.

        While speaking with Goldstein, Snipes also observed several hypodermic needles
strewn throughout Goldstein's car. Goldstein told Snipes that the needles were "medical
waste from his home," which he planned to take to a hospital for disposal.

        Snipes noticed that some needles in Goldstein's car were uncapped, bent, and
appeared to be used, and some "had liquids inside of them." It also appeared that the
needles had fallen out of two containers: an empty two-liter soda bottle and an
"aluminum container that was originally for [an] alcoholic beverage." And some needles
had spilled out of these containers onto the passenger side floorboard. There were also
"small, clear plastic baggies that had some sort of markings on them" inside of the two-
liter bottle.

        Snipes observed that Goldstein's speech was "slurred and slow in pace" and his
pupils were dilated. He characterized Goldstein's demeanor as "odd" and noted that
Goldstein was particularly "focused on . . . drinking his drink from McDonald's after the
accident occurred." Because of all these indicators, Snipes suspected Goldstein of driving
while under the influence (DUI) of drugs.

        Another officer, Jamal Curry, asked Goldstein to perform standardized field
sobriety testing, which Goldstein agreed to. Goldstein's performance during a walk and
turn test showed six out of eight clues of impairment. He also completed a one-legged
standing test, which showed three out of four clues of impairment. After these tests,
Curry also suspected Goldstein of DUI and drug use. Curry thus arrested Goldstein and
transported him to Lawrence Memorial Hospital for blood testing.

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       A third officer, Zachary Isaac, recovered 139 used needles and 5 small plastic
baggies from Goldstein's car. Isaac noted in his incident report that the baggies were
stamped with "blue devils." Isaac was familiar with the symbol and believed it related to
narcotics.

       A phlebotomist at the hospital, Jenny Messing, collected Goldstein's blood sample
and the Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) later tested it. These tests confirmed the
presence of cocaine, benzoylecgonine, methylecgonine, and delta-9 carboxy THC in
Goldstein's blood. The KBI also tested the needles and containers found in Goldstein's
car and confirmed that the residue inside the small plastic baggies was cocaine.

       The State first charged Goldstein with felony DUI and possession of drug
paraphernalia. The State later amended the complaint to add charges for cocaine
possession and failure to obey a traffic light.

       The case was tried to a jury in March 2022. The State called eight witnesses:
the two occupants of the other vehicle involved in the crash; Snipes, Curry, and Isaac;
Messing; and two KBI forensic scientists. Their testimony collectively described the
crash, Goldstein's behavior after the crash, the items found in Goldstein's car, the
procedures for testing Goldstein's blood and the substances in his car, and the test results.

       Goldstein testified that he had found the containers in his garage. He put the two
containers of used needles in his car the morning of the accident and planned to transport
them to a hospital that day to properly dispose of them as "medical waste." Goldstein
denied that he had used any of the needles but agreed that the needles were "used for
injectable drugs." He had never seen the plastic baggies that tested positive for cocaine
residue, but he admitted that he had used cocaine two days before the accident.

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        During deliberations, the jury asked the district court whether a "minimum
amount" or a "usable quantity" of cocaine was required to prove cocaine possession.
After getting input from counsel, the district court directed the jury to consider the jury
instructions as written. The jury ultimately acquitted Goldstein of DUI and possession of
drug paraphernalia but convicted him of possession of cocaine and failure to obey a
traffic light.

        The district court sentenced Goldstein to 14 months in prison, suspended that
sentence, and granted Goldstein 12 months' probation.

        Goldstein timely appeals.

Did the District Court Err in Instructing the Jury?

        Goldstein first raises a claim of instructional error related to his conviction for
possession of cocaine. He claims that the court should have included an instruction
defining voluntary acts for this charge.

        Our appellate courts apply a multistep process when reviewing this kind of claim:

        "First, the court decides whether the issue was properly preserved below. Second, the
        court considers whether the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. Third, upon
        a finding of error, the court determines whether that error is reversible. Whether the
        instructional error was preserved will affect the reversibility inquiry in the third step of
        this analysis. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Couch, 317 Kan. 566, 589, 533 P.3d 630
        (2023).

Goldstein concedes that he did not request the instruction he now desires, so we review
the failure to give the instruction for clear error. This means that we must affirm

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Goldstein's conviction unless we are firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a
different verdict had any instructional error not occurred. 317 Kan. at 590.

       The State charged Goldstein under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5706(a) and K.S.A.
2019 Supp. 65-4107(b)(5). K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5706(a) prohibits possession of several
types of drugs, including certain stimulants. Our Supreme Court has defined
"'possession'" as "having control over a place or thing with knowledge of and the intent to
have such control." State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, Syl. ¶ 3, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976).

       K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5201(a) states that "[a] person commits a crime only if such
person voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission or possession."
Goldstein claims that the district court needed to instruct on this statute's voluntariness
requirement because it was legally and factually appropriate, and because his testimony
proved he did not "voluntarily" possess cocaine—he had simply found the containers
with the cocaine in his garage. Goldstein acknowledges that he moved the containers to
his car and drove with them, but Goldstein suggests that these actions are irrelevant
because "[o]nce [he] discovered the containers in his garage, he had no way to avoid
possessing them."

       The State responds that Goldstein did not simply "find" contraband in his garage.
The State instead asserts that at the very least, the evidence establishes that Goldstein
exercised physical control over the cocaine by moving it from his garage to his car and
then driving with it. The State also claims that Goldstein's argument about a voluntary act
improperly conflates the actus reus and mens rea elements of his crime. The State argues
that Goldstein admitted at trial that he voluntarily exercised physical control over the
cocaine, so the remaining question for the jury was whether he had the requisite
knowledge and intent to commit the crime of possession. Because Goldstein did not
dispute the voluntariness of his actions in taking control over the containers, a voluntary
act instruction was not factually appropriate. Alternatively, the State argues that the

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failure to give the instruction does not amount to clear error, so reversal is not
appropriate.

       The parties agree, as do we, that an instruction on the voluntariness of Goldstein's
act was legally appropriate because it correctly stated K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5201(a). But
an instruction based on this statutory language that a "person commits a crime only if
such person voluntarily engages in . . . possession" is not factually appropriate here.

       In State v. Dinkel, 311 Kan. 553, 560, 465 P.3d 166 (2020), our Supreme Court
interpreted a voluntary act under K.S.A. 21-5201 to mean "'[a] willed bodily movement.'"
See also State v. Vano, No. 124,232, 2023 WL 1487801, at *11 (Kan. App.) ("The term
'voluntary' in K.S.A. 21-5201 (a) has the common meaning of having the intent to engage
in the underlying conduct, 'not impelled by outside influence.' Black's Law Dictionary
1886 [11th Ed. 2019]."), rev. denied 317 Kan. 850 (2023). The evidence presented at
Goldstein's trial does not show he was compelled by some person or other influence to
possess cocaine. See 2023 WL 1487801, at *11 ("[I]f a person were to take defendant's
hand and use it to slap a third person, that would not be a voluntary act on the part of the
defendant.").

       True, Goldstein testified that he did not know how the needles ended up in his
garage and said that a prior housemate may have stowed the needles and baggies in his
garage after using them. He also claimed that he never saw the "baggies with blue devils"
on them before the day of the accident. But he admitted that he knew the needles were
used for illegal drug use. He had also seen that woman use drugs in his home and knew
what kind of drugs she used. He described them as "crystalline and some were powder,
chunk powder." And despite blaming this woman for leaving the illegal materials in his
garage, Goldstein testified that he never saw her use baggies with blue devils on them.

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         And although Goldstein claimed that he did not drink or use drugs on the day of
the accident, he admitted that he had snorted cocaine two days before the accident and
had eaten marijuana gummies two weeks earlier. He also admitted that he had found the
two containers in his garage several months before he loaded them into his car.

         These facts establish that Goldstein voluntarily took control of the containers and
their contents, including the cocaine residue. Goldstein presented no evidence of an
involuntary act and thus fails to establish that a voluntariness instruction would be
factually appropriate. See Vano, 2023 WL 1487801, at *11 (finding court properly denied
voluntary act instruction for aggravated assault and reckless aggravated battery when no
evidence showed defendant was "'compelled' by some other person to commit his
crimes").

         We also agree with the State that Goldstein's claim improperly conflates the actus
reus and mens rea elements of his crime. In Dinkle, our Supreme Court distinguished
between K.S.A. 21-5201(a)'s voluntary act requirement and the relevant culpable mental
state:

         "A voluntary act is an intentional bodily movement, i.e., the intention to lift an arm or
         move a leg in a certain direction—whatever bodily movement is needed to complete the
         act requirement. In contrast, intentional mental culpability is the conscious desire to
         engage in conduct of a certain nature or produce a certain result—i.e., to desire injurious
         movement or a slap or a kick." 311 Kan. at 560.

         Although Goldstein characterizes his claim as a voluntariness issue, his argument
challenges only the evidence related to his mental culpability. But the district court
properly instructed the jury on the offense of possessing cocaine, defining "[p]ossession"
as "having joint or exclusive control over an item with knowledge of and the intent to
have such control or knowingly keeping some item in a place where the person has some
measure of access and right of control." And the jury convicted Goldstein after hearing
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evidence of his discovery of the containers, actions following this discovery, and
admitted use of cocaine and other substances.

       Goldstein raises a hypothetical in which a parent finds their child's stash of
marijuana in a sock drawer. Goldstein suggests that once discovery occurs, the parent
must either take control of the marijuana to dispose of it or knowingly leave the drugs in
their home. He then posits that either way the parent is guilty of possession unless the
jury receives a voluntary act instruction.

       Yet Goldstein's hypothetical and its conclusion ignore basic legal principles. Our
Supreme Court has recognized that "when a defendant is in nonexclusive possession of
the premises on which illegal drugs are found, the mere presence of or access to the
drugs, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate possession absent other incriminating
circumstances." State v. Rosa, 304 Kan. 429, 434, 371 P.3d 915 (2016) (citing State v.
Anthony, 242 Kan. 493, 502, 749 P.2d 37 [1988]). So contrary to Goldstein's argument,
the hypothetical parent does not necessarily "possess" marijuana based solely on the
discovery of the drug in their home.

       A parent who stumbles on drugs in the house is unlike Goldstein, who admitted
that he not only discovered the drugs on his premises, but he kept them, moved them, and
drove with them after he discovered them in his garage. He also admitted that he believed
that the needles were used to inject drugs and that he had recently used cocaine.

       Goldstein claimed at trial that he did not know about the baggies and thus implied
that he did not know they contained cocaine. But Goldstein does not base his argument
about voluntariness on the factual contention that he did not know the containers had
cocaine residue in them. He thus waives or abandons the argument. State v. Davis, 313
Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021) (An issue not briefed is deemed waived or
abandoned.).

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       We thus find no instructional error and affirm Goldstein's conviction for
possession of cocaine.

Did the Prosecutor's Statements During Voir Dire Deprive Goldstein of a Fair Trial?

       Goldstein next asserts that the prosecutor committed reversible error by stating
during voir dire: "[Y]ou'll have to make decisions in this case, but one of those decisions
will not be whether the laws are fair or reasonable."

       Goldstein did not object to this alleged error while selecting the jury, but we may
review a claim of prosecutorial error without a timely objection. State v. Shields, 315
Kan. 814, 835, 511 P.3d 931 (2022). We apply a two-step analysis. We first "'decide
whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude afforded
prosecutors to conduct the State's case and attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that
does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.'" 315 Kan. at 835-36. If
we find error, we then apply the constitutional harmless-error standard which requires the
State to show that "'there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the
verdict.'" 315 Kan. at 836.

       During jury selection, the State made these comments about the jury's duty to
consider the law when deciding this case:

               "There's a benefit of living in the United States is that we have the freedom to
       disagree with the government, governmental officials, and even the laws of the land, and
       we constantly hear individuals debate the fairness of our laws but as a juror, you'll have
       to make decisions in this case, but one of those decisions will not be whether the laws are
       fair or reasonable.
               "As a juror, you'll be required to apply the laws and instructions that are given to
       you by the Court at the close of trial."

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The prosecutor asked if any potential juror thought they would be unable to apply the
laws as "written and instructed," and none of the jurors responded.

       Goldstein asserts that this misstated the law on jury nullification, citing State v.
Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 164, 340 P.3d 485 (2014). In that case, our Supreme Court
held that jury instructions cannot forbid a jury from exercising its power of nullification.
"A judge cannot compel a jury to convict, even if it finds all elements proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." 301 Kan. at 164.

       The Smith-Parker court considered a jury instruction that told the jury: "'If you do
not have a reasonable doubt from all the evidence that the State has proven murder in the
first degree on either or both theories, then you will enter a verdict of guilty.'" 301 Kan. at
163. Our Supreme Court compared this instruction to one given in an earlier case—State
v. Lovelace, 227 Kan. 348, 354, 607 P.2d 49 (1980)—which told the jury that if the State
proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury "'must'" convict. The Smith-Parker
court found that telling a jury that it either "must" or "will" convict would "fly too close
to the sun of directing a verdict for the State." 301 Kan. at 164. The court thus rejected
use of the words "will" or "must" but approved using the word "should." 301 Kan. at 164.
Goldstein claims that the prosecutor's statement here is more akin to the rejected "will" or
"must" language and thus constitutes legal error.

       But the district court here correctly instructed the jury on its duty to follow the
law: "If you have no reasonable doubt as to the truth of each of the claims required to be
proven by the State, you should find the defendant guilty." (Emphasis added.) This
instruction follows the holding in Smith-Parker and mirrors the pattern instruction. See
PIK Crim. 4th 51.010 (2020 Supp.); see also State v. Butler, 307 Kan. 831, 847, 416 P.3d
116 (2018) ("'strongly recommend[ing] the use of PIK instructions, which knowledgeable
committees develop to bring accuracy, clarity, and uniformity to instructions'").

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       A prosecutor errs by misstating the law. State v. Watson, 313 Kan. 170, 179, 484
P.3d 877 (2021). And Goldstein correctly notes that jurors have "the raw physical power
to disregard both the rules of law and the evidence in order to acquit a defendant." State
v. McClanahan, 212 Kan. 208, Syl. ¶ 3, 510 P.2d 153 (1973).

       But our Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected claims like Goldstein's because
despite the raw power to nullify, "there is no '"right" to jury nullification.'" State v.
Patterson, 311 Kan. 59, 68, 455 P.3d 792 (2020) (quoting State v. Boothby, 310 Kan.
619, 631, 448 P.3d 416 [2019]). See also State v. Trotter, No. 114,743, 2017 WL
3668908, at *3 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (while "jurors have the
unchecked power to acquit a defendant in defiance of clear-cut law and overwhelming
evidence of guilt . . . they have no legal right to exercise it").

       This court applied this basic principle in rejecting a nearly identical claim in State
v. Taylor, No. 118,160, 2019 WL 405912, at *5 (Kan. App. 2019) (unpublished opinion).
As here, the panel in Taylor reviewed a statement made to potential jurors during voir
dire for prosecutorial error. The statement advised the jury that "the law that is given to
you, you have to follow as instructed by the Judge.'" 2019 WL 405912, at *5.
Recognizing the lack of the right to nullification, the panel held that the prosecutor did
not misstate the law, concluding, "Since juries have only the power of nullification and
not the right to nullification, the prosecutor did not misstate the law when he told the jury
it did not have the right to disregard the law." 2019 WL 405912, at *5. We agree with this
reasoning and find no error in the prosecutor's statement at Goldstein's trial. We thus have
no need to determine whether any error was harmless.

Does Cumulative Error Warrant Reversal?

       Finally, Goldstein argues that cumulative error denied him the right to a fair trial.
But the cumulative error rule does not apply if there are no errors or only a single error.

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State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262, 277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021). Because Goldstein fails to
successfully show any trial errors, this rule does not apply.

       Affirmed.

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