Court Opinion

ID: 9666195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:07:36.293314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:01.464127
License: Public Domain

STONE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the record establishes that Clifford Chetwood received ineffective assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing, I respectfully dissent.
The majority has reasoned that it cannot find that defense counsel’s performance was deficient because “[bjoth Chetwood’s and the State’s interpretations of the ISP condition of probation are equally plausible.” (P4). Faced with two equally plausible interpretations, the majority concludes that counsel could have believed the State’s interpretation, and thus counsel cannot be found ineffective. I disagree.
The two interpretations of the ISP condition are complete opposites, and only one interpretation can be correct. It was trial counsel’s duty to determine the correct interpretation, and advise Chetwood on the basis of the correct interpretation. Neither the record nor relevant case law supports the State’s interpretation of the ISP condition, and Chetwood should have been so advised.
The very basis of Chetwood’s appellate complaint is that the ISP condition was stated in the order simply as a six month requirement, but with no beginning date specified. In the absence of a specified starting date, or other qualifying language, the terms and conditions of an order become effective on the date the order is signed. See State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex Crim.App.l991)(hold-ing that starting date for appellate timeta*372bles is date order is signed); In the Interest of Simpson, 932 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, no wi*it)(holding that time period to file motion for new trial begins from date judgment is signed). In the instant case there was no qualifying language noting a different effective date for the ISP. The only notation is a parenthetical “(6 mos”), indicating the duration of the condition, but not the starting date. Under these circumstances, it was not reasonable for trial counsel to assume that the ISP condition was to begin at any time other than who the order was signed.
The State contents that it was reasonable to assume that the ISP condition was to begin at some later date because Chet-wood was incarcerated on an unrelated matter when the order was signed. However, the order imposing the ISP condition included no language indicating that Chet-wood’s period of reporting would be suspended during the period of incarceration. Indeed, the record indicates that the State did not assume that the ISP condition was suspended during Chetwood’s incarceration. Rather, the State filed a Motion to Extend ISP, reciting that the first six-month period of ISP had been completed.1
In short, the order imposing ISP must prevail, not the State’s subsequent assertion that the ISP condition “obviously” did not apply while Chetwood was in jail. Under the State’s argument, we would be required to honor an allegation by Chet-wood that the ISP condition did not apply while he was hospitalized; his mother, father, sister, brother, spouse, or child was hospitalized with their final illness; or he suffered from debilitating depression which prevented him from leaving the house. The fact is, any of these “excuses” — from incarceration to debilitating depression — constitute a possible defense to a motion to revoke for failing to report for ISP. They do not, however, constitute an automatic suspension of the ISP reporting requirement.
For these reasons I believe Chetwood received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his plea of true involuntary. I therefore dissent.

. It could be argued that Chetwood indeed completed his full six months’ of ISP-incarceration must surely be the most intensive supervision available.