Court Opinion

ID: 9544935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:03:42.70707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:47.875657
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent in this case because I am in agreement with District Judge Johnson’s conclusion that the Secretary of State acted outside the scope of her authority in canvassing the petitions filed by the appellees. I am also deeply concerned with the future impact that the court’s reversal will have on the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people of Wyoming by Art. 3, § 52 of the Wyoming Constitution.1 As I view it, the *792majority opinion has the effect of impairing the right of Wyoming citizens to express themselves as a citizen’s legislature through initiative and referendum, which process constitutes the purest and highest form of a democracy. This the majority does by approving the assumption of powers by the Secretary of State that were not intended by the legislature to be vested in that office, and which are not authorized by applicable law.
At the outset, I cite a general rule which has long been recognized as the foundational principle for guiding courts in reviewing cases involving the people’s initiative or referendum powers. The Alaska Supreme Court in Boucher v. Engstrom, Alaska, 528 P.2d 456, 462 (1974), said:
“In reviewing an initiative prior to submission to the people, the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the use of initiatives should be liberally construed so that ‘the people [are] permitted to vote and express their will on the proposed legislation * * * all doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedure will be resolved in favor of the accomplishment of that purpose.’ * * * ” (Emphasis added.) Citing from Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977, 979 (1958).
This rule has, as its intended purpose, the recognition of the proposition that the constitutional guarantee of initiative and referendum insures that “the power of the people to legislate is as great as the power of the legislature to legislate.” Iman v. Bolin, 98 Ariz. 358, 404 P.2d 705, 709 (1965). Therefore, the courts generally agree that constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the initiative and referendum process are to be construed in favor of the general right of citizens to vote on proposed measures whenever possible. See: Rousso v. Meyers, 64 Wash.2d 53, 390 P.2d 557 (1964); State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 502, 183 Neb. 521, 162 N.W.2d 262 (1968). We said as much in State ex rel. Benham v. Cheever, 71 Wyo. 303, 257 P.2d 337 (1953), where, in discussing the right of city residents to petition for a vote on whether to adopt the city manager form of government, this court said:
*793“ * * * In that connection, it seems to us that any type of initiative or referendum accorded to the voters by the legislature or by the Constitution is a right which should be liberally construed to provide the voters a right to speak. No technical inhibitions and prohibitions should be set up by administrators to whom such requests are by law submitted. If the request proves inherently bad for the City, the voters can so decide at an election. If the ‘petition’ is legally imperfect, the city officials may challenge its validity in the courts, but should not be permitted to defend it by mere inertia.” (Emphasis added.) 257 P.2d at 341.
The above-discussed proposition should be the foundation for any statutory interpretation made in the present case, although it is my fear that the majority opinion pays it little heed.
The question for resolve in this appeal pertains solely to the scope of the Secretary of State’s powers as vested by § 22-24-116(a)(i), W.S.1977. That statute provides in relevant part:
“(a) Within not more than sixty (60) days of the date the petition is filed, the secretary of state shall review it and shall notify the committee whether the petition was properly or improperly filed. The petition shall be determined to be improperly filed if:
“(i) There is an insufficient number of signatures of qualified registered voters;”
Our singular concern has to do with the Secretary of State’s duty to review the filed petitions in order to determine whether or not they contain a sufficient number of signatures of “qualified registered voters” to equal the constitutionally mandated “fifteen per cent (15%) of those who voted in the preceding general election.” Article 3, § 52(c) of the Wyoming Constitution, supra, n. 1.
In addressing the issue appellant Secretary of State argues that, through § 22-24-116(a)(i), she is vested with discretionary powers to review each petition in order to determine its sufficiency or insufficiency, and, in the exercise of her discretion, it is proper for her to make factual determinations with respect to the validity of signatures appearing thereon. The appellant further argues that, since § 22-24-116(a)(i) grants her discretion, the legislature did not intend for a presumption of validity to attach to the petition’s signatures.
The appellee Committee, on the other hand, urges that the duty outlined in § 22-24-116(a)(i) is a ministerial one and the Secretary of State therefore has no authority to exercise discretion with respect to which signatures will be counted and which will not, on any grounds save whether or not the signer appears to be a registered voter in the state of Wyoming. With respect to her canvass of the names on the petition, the appellee Committee goes on to point out that a presumption of validity attaches to petitions that are properly verified and the Secretary of State is not empowered, nor is she the proper party, to question or rebut the presumption.
In ruling on the merits, Judge Johnson, I think correctly, found generally in favor of the Committee’s position. He determined that the duty of the Secretary of State outlined in § 22-24-116(a)(i) was of a ministerial nature involving no discretion and that the Secretary of State had, in this dispute, acted in excess of her delegated authority. The trial judge then discussed the applicability of the general rule2 that a *794presumption of validity attaches to signatures appearing on properly verified petitions and therefore the Secretary of State had no authority to disregard them. In discussing this he concluded in his letter opinion:
“ * * * As noted in the previous quotation from Am.Jur.2d, the administrative officer does not have authority to challenge signatures. The challenge of signatures it is interesting to note in this proceedings is frequently not on the basis of whether or not the individuals are registered, but as previously indicated in testimony appearing in the transcript, whether or not the individual used the proper name, used initials, used a nickname, improperly used a married name, changed address within the county of registration without notification, was illegible in the manner that he signed his signature, etc. All of these issues go into the underlying question of illegality or impropriety, rather than the fact of qualification or registration. Additionally, the record would indicate that further investigation in many instances would have revealed the qualification of the individual signer. This is a problem which the Court is uniquely capable of resolving with its authority to receive evidence and make findings.
“The respondent-state next argues the express legislative provisions in Wyoming for verification and the criminal penalties and warning on the petitions have insufficient deterrent quality to entitle the petitions to a presumption that they contain valid signatures. The state argues that if no systematic check of petitions is made by the Secretary of State, how are violations to be discovered and prosecuted? It is interesting to note that so far as this Court is aware no prosecutions have been initiated as a result of the investigation here. The answer to the State’s question is simple and in a court proceedings by those who are opposing the initiative proceedings the evidence of fraud, abuse and mistake may be brought out and as a matter of public record could then be proceeded upon by the County Attorney’s Office. Whether prosecutorial officials might wish to proceed is, of course, another matter.
“The State next contends that the sampling process revealed or overcame any presumption of validity; however, the sampling process was in itself an examination of underlying problems. One might even speculate that the verification process selected by the Secretary’s office in and of itself indulges in certain presumptions as to the validity of the registration. Testimony reflected in the transcript would indicate there are substantial questions existing in this case about registration and whether or not the sig-nator must be registered at the time of signing, at the time of verification, what list should be relied upon by the Secretary (either 1980 or 1981), whether or not certain defects should have been waived (failure of sponsors to be registered, failure to notarize petitions). Waived here. The practical effect of the proceedings was to find approximately five thousand signatures to be invalid without substantial opportunity in a court proceedings to resolve the issues arising as to those signatures. The petitioners, instead, were granted four days spent from nine o’clock in the morning until seven o’clock at night to review the record composed of the petitions in this matter. No further hearing was granted by the Secretary’s office and as a result the matter comes before the Court on the issues here discussed and with some evidence having been presented at a hearing on May 10, 1982. It appears that in the limited time afforded to the petitioners by the state certain of the signatures previously found to be invalid were in fact valid. If the act of the Secretary’s office is purely ministerial in nature, not requiring proce*795dures being established and proceedings taking place under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act as has been suggested here, then it would seem appropriate that the actions of the Secretary be restricted to strictly ministerial matters. Accordingly, the petitions should have been presumed valid. Mr. Weber is directed to prepare an order in this matter to be approved as to form by the office of the Attorney General before signature by the Court.” (Emphasis added.)
I agree with these observations and conclusions.
I would have held that the trial judge correctly determined that the Secretary of State’s duties under § 22-24-116(a)(i) are ministerial. It is also interesting to note that the majority opinion discusses the possibility of an identical conclusion. Thus, the essential question to be answered is: Does the Secretary of State have discretion in these matters or are her duties ministerial in nature?
In Oyler v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1042 (1980), we said that a public officer’s duty is to be construed as ministerial when:
“ ‘ * * * it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task, and when the law which imposes it prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion of its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. * * * 618 P.2d at 1049.
Applying this language to that contained in § 22-24-116(a)(i), it is readily apparent that the legislature intended that the Secretary of State would simply function as a counter, tabulator, or canvasser in the process of determining whether or not properly filed and verified petitions contained a sufficient or insufficient number of signatures of qualified registered voters. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that § 22-24-114(a)(iii), W.S.1977, specifically notes that petitions not properly verified are not to be counted.3 The fact that the legislature utilized the word “review” in § 22-24-116(a) is of no particular significance, in my opinion, since such term was limited by the language which focuses that review on two areas — one being the duty to determine whether the petitions contain an “insufficient number of signatures of qualified registered voters” (emphasis added), and the other to determine whether “[t]he subscribers were not resident in at least two-thirds of the counties of the state.” See: § 22-24 — 116(a)(i) and (ii), supra. The Secretary of State readily admits that the second duty encompasses a ministerial act, but alleges that discretion necessarily attaches to the first. I cannot agree.
A similar question was addressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter, 257 Mo. 52, 165 S.W. 773 (1914), where the court, in determining whether or not the secretary of state was performing a ministerial duty in canvassing filed petitions, reached the following conclusions:
“ * * * It was so ruled in Oklahoma, notwithstanding there are some slight differences in the statutes of Oklahoma, as compared to ours, which differences have the effect of imposing, upon the Secretary of State of Oklahoma, duties which call for the exercise of a modicum of discretion. For example, in the latter state, touching a referendum petition, duties are enjoined upon the Secretary which involve, it is said: ‘The power to receive protests against the sufficiency of the petitions, and to hear evidence and argument in support thereof, and to determine the sufficiency of the petitions involve the power to find facts and require the exercise of judicial or quasi judicial powers.’ Norris v. Cross, 105 *796Pac. loe. cit. 1010. We have no such provision in our statute. The duties of the Secretary of State as to filing a referendum petition and dealing therewith are with us purely ministerial. Sections 6748-6754, R.S. 1909.
“If these cases and holdings do not settle this point upon well-known principles of law and beyond cavil and against the contentions of relator, then a cursory reference to the provisions of our statutes indubitably does settle it.
“It will be seen that the sole question to be determined by our Secretary of State, before he files a verified referendum petition offered to him for filing, is to ascertain whether such petition has been signed by 5 per cent, of the voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts of the state (section 6748, supra), as shown by the vote cast in the last preceding election for the office of judge of the Supreme Court. Section 57 of article 4, Const, of Mo. This duty to so far examine and determine is enjoined upon him by fairly clear inference, but manifestly it involves more of arithmetic than it does of discretion, either judicial or other sort. Likewise it is manifest that ordinarily he will be able to determine these two facts from an inspection but little more than casual, and which may fall far short of requiring an immediate and certain count of the whole number of signers upon the petition presented. * * * ” 165 S.W. at 780.
Essentially the Missouri court was relying on the fact that the constitution and statutes relating to initiative and referendum procedures made no provision for the taking of evidence by the secretary of state before performing his duties. The court, therefore, concluded that obviously the duty was purely ministerial in nature. A similar conclusion was also reached by the Supreme Court of Michigan in People ex rel. Wright v. Kelly, 294 Mich. 503, 293 N.W. 865 (1940), where the court stated:
“ * * * The overwhelming weight of authority is, that the duties of the secretary of state are ministerial only and that he may not conduct an independent investigation to determine the genuineness of the signatures. * * *
* * * * * *
“When the secretary of state is given the power to conduct investigations, particularly when the legislature has not provided machinery for a speedy determination of the sufficiency of the petitions, long and tedious arguments unduly delay the presentation of the measures to the electorate. Ewing, ‘Sufficiency Certification of Initiative Signatures in Oklahoma,’ 31 American Political Science Review, p. 65; Associated Industries v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, supra. It is significant that, out of the 21 jurisdictions where the referendum has been adopted, only two States by Constitution, and two by statute, have given the secretary of state quasi-judicial power. Arkansas Constitution, Amendment No. 7; North Dakota Constitution, art. 2, § 25; Oklahoma Compiled Statutes 1921, § 6631, 34 Okl.St.Ann. § 8; 3 Colorado Statutes 1935, ch. 86, § 6. The overwhelming majority of the States provide by statute that either the county clerks, the circuit courts, or the State ballot commission shall test the genuineness of the petition. In order that there will not be undue delay and that the sufficiency of the petition will be speedily determined, the statutes provide that hearings must be commenced within a certain time, finished as quickly as possible, and that either party may apply to the Supreme Court where the case is to be advanced upon the docket and disposed of with as much speed as is practical. 2 Oregon Code Annotated 1930, §§ 36-2004, 36-2005; 3 Colorado Statutes 1935, ch. 86, § 6; Struckmeyer’s Revised Code of Arizona 1928, § 1744; 2 Missouri Revised Statutes 1929, ch. 62, § 10705, Mo.St.Ann. § 10705, p. 4274; Nebraska Compiled Statutes 1929, § 32-1905; Baldwin’s Ohio Code 1934, §§ 4785-175 to 4785-183. It is for the legislature, and not the court, to establish the machinery by which the genuineness of signatures may be determined.” (Footnote omitted.) 293 N.W. at 870-871.
*797As can be seen, the Michigan court was also concerned with the fact that the procedures failed to require some process for the taking of evidence before the secretary of state’s canvass was made. I would also refer to the California case of Boggs v. Jordan, Cal., 204 Cal. 207, 267 P. 696 (1928), where the court held that even though the county clerks and registrars were authorized to compare voting registration lists with the names appearing on petitions, such a duty was clearly ministerial. The court reasoned as follows:
“It is the duty of the county clerk or the registrar of voters under the Constitution to examine the petition filed in his office and to ‘determine from the records of registration what number of qualified electors has signed the same.’ Const. § 1, art. 4. It may be assumed that it is also his duty to see that the petition filed with him meets the requirements of the Constitution and of section 1083a of the Political Code. But when, as in the case at bar, a petition has been filed in his office which is regular in form and substance and appears on its face to be in conformity with the law, and he has examined the same and has determined from the records of registration what number of qualified electors has signed the same, and has made and attached to the petition his certificate showing the result of his examination, and has transmitted the petition and his certificate to the secretary of state, his duties in the premises have been fulfilled. His duties are ministerial, and he has no authority to go beyond the face of the petition or to resort to extraneous evidence to determine the contents of the petition. [Citations.]” 267 P. at 699.
From the above authorities it is evident that the general rule with regard to an official’s duty to scrutinize a properly filed initiative or referendum petition is that such duty is ministerial unless some procedure is contained in the statutes for the taking of evidence and filing of protests before the administrative official. In light of this, I am of the opinion that § 22-24-116(a)(i) must be construed as delegating a simple ministerial counting task to the Secretary of State.
As noted previously, the majority of this court have determined that § 22-24-116(a)(i) only authorizes the Secretary of State to exercise a clearly delineated ministerial task; however, they also conclude that such task permits the Secretary to go behind the face of the petition for purposes of challenging or disregarding certain signatures. Thus, although the majority opinion holds that the Secretary of State is acting in a ministerial capacity, it also reaches the conclusion that her duty involves the exercise of discretion. To say that a task is ministerial in nature but it calls upon the performer to exercise discretion is a contradiction in concepts. These inherently different doctrines cannot be reconciled and when the majority tries to do so, the incongruous result becomes exhibit A for the proposition that the answer to the dilemma lies in the admission that there must be a presumption of validity which attaches to signatures appearing on a properly verified petition.
WHEN AND WHY DOES THE PRESUMPTION ARISE?
Most jurisdictions in the United States have recognized that, in light of the purposes to be served by initiative provisions, the law will presume that a signature appearing on a properly verified petition is valid. The reasons for the presumption stem directly from the procedural safeguards contained in either constitutional or statutory provisions. It was said in In re Initiative Petition No. 23, State Question No. 88, 35 Okl. 49, 127 P. 862 (1912):
“Those who circulate the petition will necessarily be drawn from the ranks of volunteers or those who, for a very small consideration, call attention to their fellow citizens to the measure proposed, and solicit their interest therein. Necessarily even with the best safeguards that can be thrown around the circulation of petitions, where such a large number of names are required, inaccuracies and technical departure from prescribed forms are certain to occur every time a *798petition is circulated. The people who sign the petitions often, if not generally, lack both convenience and the best writing materials to distinctly, legibly, and permanently attach their names thereto. All of these things are proper to be noted and taken in consideration in the administration of this law. It can be made effective or defeated by the officers charged with its administration, and it is our duty to sustain it, rather than destroy, if it can be accomplished within the law. The presumption is that petitions which are circulated, signed, and filed are valid. People interested as the circulators of these petitions, and the others who sign them, are acting in the capacity of legislators. They are members of the largest legislative body in the state, and, where so acting, do so in a public or at least a quasi public capacity, and when so acting the law presumes the validity and legality of their acts, and even though it should be claimed that they were .acting simply in a private capacity, until overcome by proof, their acts, involving the performance of ministerial or administrative duties, such as those performed in the circulation and signing of these petitions, are presumed to be legal and not fraudulent.
“Such is the holding of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma in the case of Watkins v. Havighorst, 13 Okl. 128, 74 Pac. 318, following the case of Board of Education v. Boyer, 5 Okl. 225, 47 Pac. 1090, wherein the court in the syllabus said: ‘The law presumes the validity and regularity of the official acts of public officers within the line of their official duties, as it does the legality of acts of private persons, and this presumption obtains until overcome by proof as to the acts involving the performance of ministerial or administrative duties, except in cases where it is sought to take away personal rights of a citizen or deprive him of his property, or place a charge or lien thereon.’ The statute provides (section 3675, Comp. Laws 1909): ‘Each initiative petition and each referendum petition shall be duplicated for the securing of signatures, and each sheet for signatures shall be attached to a copy of the petition. Each copy of the petition and sheets for signatures is hereinafter termed a pamphlet. On the outer page of each pamphlet shall be printed the word “warning” and underneath this in ten point type the words, “It is a felony for any one to sign an initiative or referendum petition with any name other than his own or knowingly to sign his name more than once for the measure or to sign such petition when he is not a legal voter. * * * >f f
“The presumption above noted is further strengthened by the stringency of the provisions of this act. People are not presumed on mere conjecture, with no semblance of proof, to have committed felony by wholesale, especially with the act denouncing it staring them right in the face. These petitions, therefore, and the signatures thereto, are presumed to be valid, and the presumption obtains on the filing of the objections in the office of the Secretary of State that those who have signed them are legal voters of the state of Oklahoma, and this is the one provision that is the sine qua non, the substantial material element necessary in every case to constitute a valid signature, and the burden of proof to overcome this presumption should be and is, in every instance, upon the protestant, and, in the absence of any evidence of fraud, forgery, or other improper or wrongful conduct in securing the signers to the petitions sufficient to throw discredit upon the entire petition or upon a sufficient number, the same, in keeping with the presumption above noted, will be held valid. We do not mean to hold that the circulator’s affidavit can be dispensed with, but that technical defects therein will not destroy the petition. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) 127 P. at 866-867.
There, the court relied upon the fact that each person who signed knew that it was a crime to do so if he or she was not a qualified voter of the state. In other words, the courts have recognized that a signer would be guaranteeing his or her *799qualifications to participate in the initiative process. Other courts have also relied on the fact that one of the procedural safeguards generally required is that each petition should inform the signer of the criminal penalties associated with forging a signature, signing twice, or placing his or her name on the petition when the individual is not a registered voter. State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, supra, 162 N.W.2d at 267; Rousso v. Meyers, supra. In other instances the courts have held that the presumption arises because the circulators of an initiative provision are required to establish by affidavit the verity of signatures appearing thereon. See: Direct Sellers Association v. McBrayer, 16 Ariz.App. 231, 492 P.2d 727 (1972), vacated on other grounds 109 Ariz. 3. 503 P.2d 951 (1972); State ex rel. McNary v. Olcott, 62 Or. 277,125 P. 303, 307 (1912).
In my opinion, the above-cited cases stand for the proposition that, under the Wyoming constitutional and statutory scheme for initiative and referendum measures, a presumption of validity attaches to all signatures appearing on a properly filed and verified petition. I say this because, pursuant to the powers granted by Art. 3, § 52(f) of the Wyoming Constitution,4 the legislature insured that, by the time the signed petitions were submitted to the Secretary of State, certain procedures would be followed to protect against fraud, forgery and abuse. In § 22-24-111, W.S.1977,5 the legislature provides that each circulated petition must include a warning to each individual that certain acts on his part will constitute a crime. Included within this warning is the requirement that the individual be a “qualified registered voter” at the time of signing. Then, through § 22-24-114, W.S.1977,6 the legislature has required that before filing any petition the circulator thereof must include an affidavit verifying (1) that he was the only circulator of that petition; (2) that all signatures on the petition were made in his presence; and (3) that to the best of his knowledge the signatures represent the persons whom they appear to represent. Thus, when the petitions are filed with the Secretary of State so that she may discharge the duties described by § 22-24-116(a)(i), the signers have been made aware of the fact that they must be a “qualified registered voter” and the circulator has verified that all signatures were made in his or her presence and that to the best of his or her knowledge the 'person who signed is the person he or she purports to be. These procedures were not intended to be without substance, but rather were intended to protect against fraud, forgery, and abuse in order to guarantee, insofar as the Secretary of State is concerned, the legality of the petitions. Because of these safeguards, the presumption of validity arises. Also, in my opinion, the presumption of validity arises because, at the time of signing, the individual knows it is illegal to sign a petition if he or she is not a registered voter, and when the signer affixes his or her name to the petition, we must assume the individual acts within the law. As was referenced previously:
“ * * * People are not presumed on mere conjecture, with no semblance of proof, to *800have committed felony by wholesale, especially with the act denouncing it staring them right in the face. These petitions, therefore, and the signatures thereto, are presumed to ■ be valid, and the presumption obtains on the filing of the, objections in the office of the Secretary of State * * In re Initiative Petition No. 23, State Question No. 38, supra, 127 P. at 866.
In light of this conclusion, I place no significance on the appellant’s argument that a presumption is not present because the cir-culator does not have to verify that the signature is that of a registered voter, because clearly the legislature deemed the warning contained in § 22-24-111 as sufficient to cover this matter.
Now that I have established, at least for me, that the case law supports a conclusion that a presumption of validity attaches to the signatures appearing on petitions that are properly filed and verified with the Secretary of State, it becomes important to discuss how the presumption operates with respect to the Secretary of State’s duty previously outlined in § 22-24-116(a)(i).
I recognize, of course, that in making her count the Secretary of State is faced with a formidable task in cases like the present where petitions containing over 30,000 signatures are filed. However, here is where the presumption comes into play, and the Secretary of State is then relegated to the function of comparing applicable voter registration lists with the signatures appearing on the petitions. This point was discussed in State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter, supra:
“We are not saying that the Secretary of State must file a referendum petition upon which either there is not enough congressional districts represented by the signers thereon, or not enough signers from such or any of such districts. But, where prima facie all of these facts appear, he must file the petition as presented to him, and leave to the courts the determination of questions of latent fraud, forgery, and hermetic illegality, for which determination our statutes, it would seem, have provided full and ample machinery for every condition and contingency, and for the protection and safeguarding of both protagonists and antagonists of the act sought to be referred. Clearly the warning provided for by statute, which recites that a breach of the law as to a referendum petition constitutes a felony, and the careful provisions for verification of the states facts as to residence, names, and qualifications of signers, indicate that these provisions were deemed such adequate safeguards against fraud and forgery as that compliance therewith, showing prima facie sufficiency and regularity, was intended to import such sufficient verity to the Secretary of State as to make it his duty to file petitions bearing such legal indicia when such were presented to him for filing.” 165 S.W. at 781.
Likewise, I am not suggesting that the Secretary of State merely had to count the number of signatures submitted without some investigation. Nor can it be said that the trial judge did not recognize the Secretary of State’s duty to compare the petitions with registration lists. However, the inquiry delegated to the Secretary of State by § 22-24-116(a)(i) in conjunction with the presumption only permits her to invalidate a signature if the name in question does not either appear or correspond in any respect with á name on a statewide registration list. This is so because the legislature has only required that a signer be a registered voter within the state of Wyoming.7 Thus, as the trial judge concluded, it is not the role of the Secretary of State to make factual determinations concerning a signature where initials are used, or a nickname, or a surname, etc., but rather to give to these signatures the presumption of validity. In other words, the courts, recognizing the limited ministerial role of officers in *801our Secretary of State’s position, also recognize that it is not proper for the counting official to go beyond the face of the petition absent some procedure for the taking of protests. People ex rel. Wright v. Kelly, supra; State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, supra; State ex rel. Kemper v. Carter, supra. The simple fact is that the Secretary of State in these circumstances is not the proper party to raise objections to signatures. This function and the accompanying burden of proving invalidity lies with the protestors. State ex rel. McNary v. Olcott, supra. I am therefore in agreement with District Judge Johnson in this case and am of the opinion that the Secretary of State acted in excess of her authority in invalidating some 4,900 signatures.
As a final thought, I would add a short discussion about a matter that has bothered me substantially since undertaking a review of this appeal. My concerns find their genesis in the fact that the appellant readily admits to not using a statewide voter registration list in making her “review” and confesses that she checked only two county registration lists at the most in .order to determine whether a given signer was a registered voter. This two-county check was undertaken where the address as given by a signer referred to residence in another county. The problem with the entire cheeking process lies in the fact that many of the signers, who might have been registered voters within the state, were not found unless they gave an address for a county where they were registered to vote. With respect to this, the appellant argues that the circulators agreed to instruct the signers to give the address of registration rather than their present residence if the two addresses were different. The appellant also argues that such a condition could properly be imposed under her authority contained in § 22-24-110(a)(v), W.S.1977, which provides that she can require other specifications within the petition to “assure proper handling and control.” Thus, pursuant to the agreement, she was not required to look for a particular signature on a statewide basis.
In my opinion, notwithstanding the evidence that the sponsors agreed to that outlined above, the Secretary of State, under § 22-24-110(a)(v), W.S.1977, is without authority to impose a condition which goes beyond the statutory requirements imposed by § 22-24-113 and § 22-24 — 116(a)(i) that the signer be a “qualified registered voter” in the state. As a general rule, the powers and duties of a public officer as prescribed by the constitution or statute are limited by specific provisions which delegate various duties. 63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 263 (1972). Also, it is clear that an administrative officer has only those powers expressly conferred by the legislature. McNeill v. Park County School District No. 1, Wyo., 635 P.2d 818 (1981). Here, the statutes in question grant the Secretary of State only the power to canvass properly filed and verified petitions to determine whether they contain a sufficient number of signatures of qualified registered voters. To properly perform her duty, the Secretary of State was obligated to check all county voting lists or, in lieu thereof, a statewide voting list, and the fact that the signers may not have given their addresses where registered would have no effect on her obligation to perform that duty, nor would it obviate the need for the canvass as required by § 22-24-116(a)(i).
CONCLUSION
The statutes in question must be construed in the manner I have proposed since this is the only way that the foundational principle of “liberal construction” can be recognized and applied. The following quote best expresses my concerns:
“ * * * The right of direct legislation in the people must he administered by the officers charged with that duty in such manner as to make it operative. If technical restrictive constructions are placed upon the laws governing the initiation and submission of these measures, the purpose and policy of the people in establishing the same will be entirely defeated, and instead of becoming an effective measure for relief from evils, under which they have heretofore suffered, *802there will be naught but an empty shell and a continuation of the conditions for which relief in this manner has been sought The people who circulate a petition to submit for the consideration of their fellow citizens, constitutional and statutory provisions for the most part are unquestionably animated by a purpose which to them and the signers thereof, at least, appears good. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) In re Initiative Petition No. 23, State Question No. 38, supra, 127 P. at 866.
My need to file this dissenting opinion is strong and directly results from what I believe is an unlawful intrusion on the rights of the citizens and voters of Wyoming to legislate. The majority of this court have imposed technical and prohibitive restrictions on the initiative power of Wyoming residents rather than protecting and upholding this most basic and precious right still remaining in a democratic society.

. Article 3, § 52 of the Wyoming Constitution guarantees:
“(a) The people may propose and enact laws by the initiative, and approve or reject acts of the legislature by the referendum.
“(b) An initiative or referendum is proposed by an application containing the bill to be initiated or the act to be referred. The application shall be signed by not less than one hundred (100) qualified voters as sponsors, and shall be filed with the secretary of state. If he finds it in proper form he shall so certify. Denial of certification shall be subject to judicial review.
“(c) After certification of the application, a petition containing a summary of the subject matter shall be prepared by the secretary of state for circulation by the sponsors. If signed by qualified voters, equal in number to fifteen per cent (15%) of those who voted in *792the preceding general election and resident in at least two-thirds (⅜) of the counties of the state, if [sic] may be filed with the secretary of state.
“(d) An initiative petition may be filed at any time except that one may not be filed for a measure substantially the same as that defeated by an initiative election within the preceding [five] (5) years. The secretary of state shall prepare a ballot title and proposition summarizing the proposed law, and shall place them on the ballot for the first statewide election held more than one hundred twenty (120) days after adjournment of the legislative session following the filing. If, before the election, substantially the same measure has been enacted, the petition is void.
“(e) A referendum petition may be filed only within ninety (90) days after adjournment of the legislative session at which the act was passed, except that a referendum petition respecting any act previously passed by the legislature may be filed within six [ (6) ] months after the power of referendum is adopted. The secretary of state shall prepare a ballot title and proposition summarizing the act and shall place them on the ballot for the first statewide election held more than one hundred eighty (180) days after adjournment of that session.
“(f) If votes in an amount in excess of fifty per cent (50%) of those voting in the preceding general election are cast in favor of adoption of an initiated measure, the measure is enacted; if votes in an amount in excess of fifty per cent (50%) of those voted in the preceding general election are cast in favor of rejection of an act referred, it is rejected. The secretary of state shall certify the election returns. An initiated law becomes effective ninety (90) days after certification, is not subject to veto, and may not be repealed by the legislature within two (2) years of its effective date. It may be amended at any time. An act rejected by referendum is void thirty (30) days after certification. Additional procedures for the initiative and referendum may be prescribed by law. “(g) The initiative shall not be used to dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropriations, create courts, define the jurisdiction of courts or prescribe their rules, enact local or special legislation, or enact that prohibited by the constitution for enactment by the legislature. The referendum shall not be applied to dedications of revenue, to appropriations, to local or special legislation, or to laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety.”

. The trial court relied on the following quotation from 42 Am.Jur.2d, Initiative and Referendum, § 54 (1969):
“If the question of the validity of the petition is properly raised, a court may take evidence on the question.
“There is a presumption that petitions that have been circulated, signed, and filed are valid, and the burden of proof to show their invalidity rests upon those protesting against them.
“In the absence of evidence of intentional fraud or guilty knowledge on the part of the circulator, the names on a petition properly verified are presumed to be genuine. This presumption has been said to arise from the required verification of the signatures under oath and from the criminal sanctions on placing an improper signature on such a petition. *794“Because of the presumed validity of signatures on a verified petition, an administrative officer has no authority to challenge signatures, but must file a properly verified petition and leave to the court the determination of fraud, forgery, and illegality.” (Emphasis added.)

. Section 22-24-114(a)(iii) provides:
“(a) Before petition is filed, it shall be verified by the sponsor who personally circulated it. The verification shall be in affidavit form and shall state in substance that:
* * ⅛: * * %
“(iii) To the best of his knowledge, such signatures are those , of the persons whose names they purport to be. In determining the sufficiency of the petition, the secretary of state shall not count signatures on petitions not properly veriñed." (Emphasis added.)

. Supra, n. 1.

. Section 22-24-111, W.S.1977, states:
“Each petition shall include a statement of warning that a person who signs a name other than his own on the petition, or who knowlingly [sic] signs his name more than once for the same proposition at one (1) election, or who signs the petition knowing that he is not a qualified registered voter, upon conviction, is punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year or both.” (Emphasis added.)

. Section 22-24-114, W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) Before petition is filed, it shall be verified by the sponsor who personally circulated it. The verification shall be in affidavit form and shall state in substance that:
“(i) The person signing the affidavit is a sponsor and is the only circulator of that petition;
“(ii) The signatures on the petition were made in his presence; and
“(iii) To the best of his knowledge, such signatures are those of the persons whose names they purport to be. In determining the sufficiency of the petition, the secretary of state shall not count signatures on petitions not properly verified.”

. See § 22-24-116(a)(i), supra; also see § 22-24-113, W.S.1977, which provides:
“Any qualified registered voter may subscribe to the petition by signing his name and listing his address. A person who has signed the petition may withdraw his name only by giving written notice to the secretary of state before the time that the petition is filed.”