Court Opinion

ID: 9902384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:11.07753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.841224
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 In re X.A. CA4/2
See dissenting opinion.

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re X.A., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                              E081399

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIJ2100247)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 C.A.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mona M. Nemat, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Carissa A. Rarick,

Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant and appellant C.A. (Mother) is the mother of M.B. (female, born May

2010), D.B. (female, born May 2016), and X.A. (male, born April 2021; Minor). Mother

appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and

Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Mother challenges the court’s finding that the Indian

Child Welfare Act of 19782 (ICWA) did not apply to Minor. For the reasons set forth

post, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders and findings.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY3

       In April 2021 plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public

Social Services (the Department) received a referral that Mother and Minor tested

positive for amphetamines when Minor was born.

       When a social worker interviewed Mother at the hospital, she admitted using

methamphetamine to “ ‘numb’ her feelings.”

       M.B. and D.B. were living with their father, W.B. W.B. did not want to provide

care for Minor until paternity was determined. W.B. believed A.B. could be Minor’s

possible father. A.B.’s whereabouts were unknown.4

       1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

       2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

       3 We will concentrate on the facts and procedural history that pertain to ICWA.

       4 M.B. and D.B. remained with W.B. and the three are not parties to Mother’s
appeal. A.B. is also not a party.

                                             2
       On April 23, 2021, the Department submitted warrant requests under section 340

to remove M.B. and D.B. from Mother’s custody, and to remove Minor from Mother’s

and A.B.’s custody. The juvenile court granted the Department’s request and issued the

protective custody warrants.

       On April 25, 2021, the Department filed section 300 petitions on behalf of the

three children.

       The ICWA-010(A) form, attached to the section 300 petition, provided that

Mother and W.B. were asked about the Indian status of the three children on April 24,

2021. Both parents gave the social worker no reason to believe the three children were or

might be Indian children. Since A.B.’s whereabouts were unknown, the Department was

unable to obtain his statement regarding Native American ancestry.

       On April 28, 2021, the juvenile court made temporary detention filings, detained

the three children from Mother, and detained Minor from W.B. and A.B. The court

found that the Department conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and that ICWA did not

apply. Mother and W.B. filed ICWA-020s indicating no Indian status.5 The court

ordered DNA testing for Minor to determine paternity.

       On May 21, 2021, the Department filed a first amended petition. Among other

changes, the petition removed W.B. as Minor’s father and added A.B. as Minor’s father.

       5 W.B.’s ICWA-020 form noted all three children involved in the case. Mother’s
ICWA-020 form only noted M.B.’s name. However, it is reasonable to infer that
Mother’s response regarding her Indian status would be the same for her other two
children. Moreover, at the detention hearing on April 28, 2021, the juvenile court stated,
“The Court is in possession of the parental notification of Indian status of both mother
and father. Neither parent is aware of any American Indian ancestry.”

                                            3
On June 28, 2021, the Department received DNA results excluding W.B. as Minor’s

father.

          On July 8, 2021, at the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile

court found the Department conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and found that ICWA

did not apply. The court removed Minor from Mother and A.B., ordered reunification

services for Mother, and denied services to A.B.

          The Department was unsuccessful in its efforts to locate A.B.

          On January 31, 2022, at a contested section 366.21, subdivision (e), review

hearing, the court continued reunification services for Mother, found that the Department

conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry, and that ICWA did not apply.

          On September 15, 2022, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for

Mother and set a selection and implementation hearing. Again, the court found that the

Department conducted a sufficient ICWA inquiry and ICWA did not apply.

          At the selection and implemental hearing on January 12, 2023, Mother was

present. The court ordered Mother to appear at the continued hearing on April 11, 2023.

The court found that ICWA did not apply.

          At the continued hearing on April 11, 2023, neither Mother nor A.B. were present.

The juvenile court found that Minor was likely to be adopted and found no applicable

exceptions to adoption. Thereafter, the court terminated parental rights to Minor.

          On May 25, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                                4
                                       DISCUSSION

       On appeal, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not

apply because the court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements under ICWA. For

the reasons set forth post, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

       A.     LEGAL BACKGROUND

       Under ICWA, the juvenile court and the Department have an “ ‘ affirmative and

continuing duty to inquire’ whether a child in a dependency proceeding ‘is or may be an

Indian child.’ ” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678, quoting § 224.2, subd.

(a).) “The duty to inquire consists of two phases—the duty of initial inquiry and the duty

of further inquiry.” (Ibid.) Mother’s argument concerns the duty of initial inquiry.

       “ ‘The duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency proceeding.’ [Citation.]

[The Department]’s ‘duty to inquire begins with the initial contact, including, but not

limited to, asking the party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any

information that the child may be an Indian child.’ [Citation.] In addition, ‘[f]ederal

regulations require state courts to ask each participant “at the commencement” of a child

custody proceeding “whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is

an Indian child.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Similarly, ‘[s]tate law requires the court to

pursue an inquiry “[a]t the first appearance in court of each party” by asking “each

participant present in the hearing “whether the participant knows or has reason to know

that the child is an Indian child.” ’ ” (In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 828, 841,

review granted Nov. 15, 2023, S282054 (Andres R.).)

                                               5
       This court has recognized that “[i]n some cases, California law requires [the

Department] to do more as part of its initial inquiry. Specifically, under section 224.2(b),

‘[i]f a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant

to [s]ection 306,’ [the Department] must ask ‘extended family members’ about the child’s

Indian status.” (Andres R., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 841, fn. omitted.)

       “Section 306 authorizes a social worker to take a child into temporary custody

‘without a warrant’ in emergency situations, namely, when ‘the social worker has

reasonable cause to believe that the child has an immediate need for medical care or is in

immediate danger of physical or sexual abuse or the physical environment poses an

immediate threat to the child’s health or safety.’ [Citation.] Peace officers may also take

children into temporary custody without a warrant when similar exigent circumstances

exist [citations], and section 306 also permits the social worker to ‘[r]eceive and

maintain, pending investigation,’ temporary custody of a child ‘who has been delivered

by a peace officer.’ [Citation.] By contrast, section 340 provides for the issuance of

protective custody warrants, and on a weaker showing than is required for a warrantless

detention under section 306. [Citations.] Section 340 also ‘requires that “[a]ny child

taken into protective custody pursuant to this section shall immediately be delivered to

the social worker,” who must then conduct an investigation “pursuant to [s]ection

309.” ’ ” (Andres R., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 841.)

       “On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for substantial

evidence. [Citations.] But where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine

                                             6
whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th

1041, 1051.)

       B.      THE DEPARTMENT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO INQUIRE OF

               MOTHER’S RELATIVES

       In this case, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred because “[e]ven though

there were maternal family members available from the beginning of the case and

throughout the proceedings, there was no inquiry of them about Indian ancestry.” The

Department contends that “this court should affirm the trial court’s order because the

Department complied with inquiry duties under ICWA.”

       Under section 224.2, subdivision (b), the county welfare department must ask the

“child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, . . . , whether

the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) However, there is a split of

authority in this court on the issue of whether the duty to inquire of extended family

members under section 224.2, subdivision (b), applies (1) only when a child is taken in

temporary custody under section 306; or (2) applies in every case, regardless of whether

the child is taken into “temporary custody” without a warrant under section 306 or is

taken into “protective custody” pursuant to a warrant under section 340.

       In three cases, several panels of this court have adopted the first view. (See In re

Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 599-594 (Robert F.), review granted July 26, 2023,

S279743; In re Ja.O. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 672, 677-678 (Ja.O.), review granted July

26, 2023, S280572; Andres R., supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 842-859.)

                                              7
       However, in a fourth decision, another panel of this court disagreed with Robert

F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 492, and concluded, “there is only one duty of initial inquiry,

and that duty encompasses available extended family members no matter how the child is

initially removed from [the] home.” (In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 962,

review granted Sept. 27, 2023, S281447 (Delila D.); see also In re V.C. (2023) 95

Cal.App.5th 251; In re Jerry R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388; In re C.L. (2023) 96

Cal.App.5th 377.)

       In a dissent in Delila D., Justice Miller disagreed with the majority opinion.

Instead, Justice Miller agreed with Robert F.’s finding that “the plain language of section

224.2, subdivision (b), controls and it only requires that the Department make an inquiry

of extended relatives if the child ‘is placed into the temporary custody of a county

welfare department pursuant to Section 306.’ ” (Delila D., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp.

34-35 (dis. opn. of Miller, J.). Justice Miller went on to discuss the reasonings in Robert

F. and Ja.O., supra, which followed the holding in Robert F. and concluded, “I see no

reason to depart from the reasoning of our previous cases of Robert F. and Ja.O.” (Delila

D., at p. 35.)

       We agree with the dissent in Delila D., and this court’s reasonings and holdings in

Robert F., Ja.O., and Andres R.

       Here, as provided ante, on April 25, 2021, the Department submitted warrant

requests under section 340 to remove M.B. and D.B. from Mother’s custody, and Minor

from Mother’s and A.B.’s custody. The juvenile court granted the Department’s request

and issued the protective custody warrants. Two days after obtaining the warrants under

                                             8
section 340, the Department filed a section 300 petition as to Minor. The petition states

that Minor was detained on April 25, 2021, at 3:43 p.m.

       Therefore, because the record reveals that Minor was detained after the

Department obtained a detention warrant under section 340, not under the authority of

section 306, the expanded duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b),

does not apply. (Ja.O., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 679; Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th

at p. 500.)

       Based on the above, we find the Department did not remove Minor under section

306. Hence, no further inquiry under ICWA was required.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The juvenile court’s findings and orders are affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                        MILLER
                                                                                            J.

I concur:

MENETREZ
                                 J.

                                             9
[In re X.A., E081399]

RAMIREZ, P. J.

       I respectfully dissent. In my view, the analysis set forth in In re Delia D. is

persuasive. (In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, 965-976, review granted

Sept. 27, 2023, S281442; accord, In re C.L. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 377, 385-391, Third

Dist.; In re V.C. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 251, 256-260, First Dist., Div. Two; In re Jerry

R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388, 411-426, Fifth Dist.) Accordingly, I would conditionally

reverse the order terminating parental rights with instructions to comply with California’s

provisions designed to implement and enhance the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act of

1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.), including subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institution

Code section 224.2 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).

                                                         RAMIREZ
                                                                                         P. J.

                                              1