Court Opinion

ID: 9861734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:24:56.47704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:53.499736
License: Public Domain

STONE, J.
I dissent. As I view the majority opinion, it would have the effect of establishing two separate burdens of proof in entrapment eases. As to the prosecution's case, the jury must be instructed to apply Penal Code section 1096 except for the defense of entrapment, which it must weigh according to the preponderance of the evidence rule.
The majority cite cases and treatises which say it is logical to apply the preponderance of evidence rule to defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment. Logical or not, the language of Penal Code section 1096 leaves no room for this distinction. Moreover, logical consistency in every instance is not a sine qua non in the application of a statute.
The language of section 1096 is clear and unequivocal, and its application to anything less than “the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence” does violence to the statute.
If all a jury had before it on the issue of entrapment was the word of an informer against the word of a defendant, the evidence might well be evenly balanced as to entrapment, yet raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors. Penal Code section 1096 gives the defendant the benefit of this doubt.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 4, 1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.