Court Opinion

ID: 9758459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:32:05.613644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:51.952234
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, President Judge,
concurring:
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately because my analysis is somewhat different.
I agree that the Supreme Court’s language in Gradel indicates that the Court did not consider that it was changing the law, and that its decision must therefore be applied retroactively — not only prospectively. See also Gradel v. Inouye, 252 Pa.Super. 392, 412, 381 A.2d 975, 985 (1977) (in holding that trial court erred in refusing jury instruction, plurality stated, “However, in view of the fact that this ruling is a departure from previous practice, it should not be regarded as mandatory in any cases tried before this date.”). Given that the Supreme Court’s decision in Gradel is to be applied retroactively, it doesn’t matter, and I *186therefore find it unnecessary to consider, whether this court’s decision in Gradel was a plurality or a majority decision.
I also agree that the jury instruction was not harmless error, but again, my analysis is somewhat different. The first part of the instruction — that the award would not be subject to federal income taxes — was clearly prejudicial in that it may have given the jury the idea of reducing the award because appellant would not be taxed on it. I don’t agree, however, that the second part of the instruction— that taxes should be neither added nor subtracted — reinforced the error. Majority Op. at 183-185. It seems to me that to some extent it undid the prejudice that resulted from the first part of the instruction: in effect, it told the jury that if the first part of the instruction had given the jury the idea of reducing the award, the jury should put that idea out of its mind. However, to extirpate an idea once it has been planted may be very difficult, and the teaching of Gradel is that the second part of the instruction was not sufficient to overcome the prejudice that resulted from the first part.
I agree that appellant is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages.