Court Opinion

ID: 9747168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:59:42.793672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:20.625955
License: Public Domain

BELL, C.J.,
Dissents and Concurs.
In a thoughtful, thorough, and well reasoned opinion, the majority addresses the validity of certain of the “directives,” adopted by the State Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS), the appellee, and pursuant to which Richard L. Massey, Jr., the appellant, having been found to have violated them, was serving additional prison time. The appellant argued that the “directives” at issue in this case are in actuality “regulations,” and, therefore, were required to be promulgated in conformance with the State Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), Maryland Code (1984, 2005 Replacement Volume) §§ 10-101 — 10-117 of the State Government Article. After conducting the appropriate analysis, the majority, agreeing with the appellant, concluded that the “directives” are indeed “regulations,” as defined in § 10-101(g)(1)1 of the State Government Article, because they “constitute statements that have general application through*527out all of the correctional institutions in DOC and apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have future effect; they were adopted by a ‘unit’ to carry out laws that the unit administers; and they are in the form of rules, standards, statements of interpretation, and statements of policy,” 389 Md. 496, 507-08, 886 A.2d 585, 592 (2005). Moreover, continued the majority, the “regulations” were not statements concerning only internal management of the unit, that do not affect directly the lights of the public or the procedures available to the public, thus rejecting the appellee’s contention in that regard, that the exception, contained in § 10-101(g)(2) applied. Then, noting the absence of a dispute with respect to the appellant’s allegation that these “regulations” were not adopted in conformance with the APA, the majority declared the “regulations” to be invalid and ineffective. Id. at 500, 886 A.2d at 587. Specifically, the majority holds “that DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5 constitute regulations under SG § 10-101(g), that they are not exempt from the APA requirements, and that, to be legally effective, they must be adopted in conformance with those requirements.” Id. at 524, 886 A.2d at 602. With these holdings and conclusions, I am in complete agreement, and so concur in the opinion to this point.
Having enforced the legislative mandate with respect to the manner of promulgating regulations, the majority, noting the motivation for, and the history of, the adoption of the regulations in this case — to comply with Federal due process requirements — and concerned about “bringLing] prison discipline proceedings to a halt,” delays the issuance of the Court’s mandate for 120 days in order that the appellee will have time *528to comply with the APA. 389 Md. at 525, 886 A.2d at 602. To justify this result, it characterizes the deficiency in the challenged regulations as “essentially a procedural one.” Id. at 525, 886 A.2d at 602.
As to the appellant’s claim, the majority concludes that it remains alive, but that the appellant is not entitled to any specific relief. While it pointedly and expressly refrains from opining on the merits, the majority acknowledges that the appellant has the right to have his claim resolved in accordance with validly adopted procedures. Id. Implicit in the majority’s decision is either that the appellant did not raise a challenge entitling him to dismissal of the charges against him or any such relief and/or that, in any event, he was not prejudiced by the appellee’s failure to act in conformity with the APA. According to the majority,
“[The appellant’s] complaint was that he had been subjected to discipline and had lost diminution credits pursuant to the substantive and procedural provisions of DPSCSD 105-4 and 105-5, which he believed to be invalid, in part, at least, because they had not been adopted in conformance with the APA. His initial challenge, as he made clear, was not to whether he was guilty of an infraction that called for the discipline imposed but only to the Secretary’s directives pursuant to which the matter was adjudicated.”
Id. at 507, 886 A.2d at 591. In effect, it says: unless an appellant, at the least, disputes his or her guilt or states precisely that he or she believes both the charge and the punishment to be deficient, the substantive sufficiency of the one not mentioned has not been challenged and, thus, need not be addressed. It is, therefore, apparently the majority’s position that the appellant failed to preserve the issue of his culpability for the infractions with which he was charged and punished. In reaching this conclusion, it gives the appellant’s complaint the narrowest possible construction, not to mention an untenable and a strained one.
I have no serious quarrel with the decision to delay the mandate in this case. In fact, in view of the purpose of the regulations, specifically pointed out by the majority, see 389 *529Md. at 525, 886 A.2d at 602 — to ensure that prisoners are afforded due process, as required by the Constitution — sensitivity to there being such regulations in place, without a gap, is not simply commendable, it is essential.
Whether the charges and the punishment meted out to, and challenged by, the appellant should be subject to retrial upon the adoption of new, valid regulations is quite another matter. I do not share the majority’s view that the appellant failed to raise the issue of his guilt of the infractions with which he was charged, having chosen, altruistically, perhaps, to chide the appellee only as to its procedural default, neglecting entirely to challenge the substantive deficiency. The record does not support that view as a matter of fact.
The appellant’s initial complaint was that the “regulations are unlawful,” as a consequence of which, in violation of his interest in fairness, he was being punished by being required to serve additional prison time. And, although the grievance he filed following the denial of that complaint addressed only the ground of the denial — that the appellant’s complaint exceeded the number of requests for administrative remedy that the appellee permitted by regulation, as to which he argued that such regulation suffered from the same deficiency as those he initially challenged, it was not validly promulgated— the appellant’s petition for judicial review reverted to his original ground: he contended that the regulations subjecting him to increased punishment and limiting his access to court were not validly adopted because they were not adopted in accordance with the APA.
I do not believe, as the majority does and seems to require, that where there are various objections to regulations that could be made, separately and seriatim, in a complaint, a prisoner expressly must make each one he intends to pursue to preserve that objection. That is simply not necessary. By challenging the validity of the regulations pursuant to which he had received additional punishment, it is clear beyond cavil that the appellant was doing more than simply raising whether the regulations were properly promulgated as a procedural issue: he was contending that the entire process, from his *530being charged, found guilty and punished, was a nullity. If the regulations forming the basis for an infraction are invalid, it seems to me clear that the proceedings pursued pursuant to those regulations can be no more valid. There is, in that circumstance, therefore no necessity that a complainant would, or should, address the particulars of those proceedings; discussing the issue of his guilt or the appropriateness of the punishment imposed, under these circumstances, is simply irrelevant and unnecessary.
I agree with the majority that the appellant “is entitled to have his claim resolved in accordance with validly adopted procedures.” 389 Md. at 525, 886 A.2d at 602. On the other hand, this Court’s holding that the regulations pursuant to which the appellant was charged, convicted and punished were not validly promulgated answered fully and adequately the appellant’s concern. Because the regulations were invalidly promulgated and thus are a nullity, the effect of that holding necessarily is that the actions taken pursuant thereto are nullities, as well. The appellant’s additional punishment therefore is of no effect and this Court should clearly and unhesitatingly say so.

. Maryland Code (1984, 2005 Replacement Volume) § 10 — 101(g)(1) of the State Government Article provides:
'Regulation' means a statement or an amendment or repeal of a statement that:
(i) has general application;
(ii) has future effect;
(iii) is adopted by a unit to:
1. detail or carry out a law that the unit administers;
2. govern organization of the unit;
3. govern the procedure of the unit; or
4. govern practice before the unit; and
(iv) is in any form, including:
1. a guideline;
2. a rule;
*5273. a standard;
4. a statement of interpretation; or
5. a statement of policy.
Subsection (g)(2) excludes from the definition of "regulation,” inter alia:
“(i) a statement that:
"1. concerns only internal management of the unit; and
"2. does not affect directly the i ights of the public or the procedures
available to the public.”