Court Opinion

ID: 9552435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:10:41.767648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:26.521910
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
I must elaborate somewhat on that said in the majority opinion relative to appellant’s contention that the obvious-danger rule as set forth in Instruction No. 171 has been “abrogated” by the adoption of the comparative negligence statute in Wyoming.
The fallacy in appellant’s argument is in reading into the instruction a direction to the jury for an assumption of risk by appellant rather than reading therein a definition of the duty owed by appellee. Even before enactment of the comparative negligence statute in Wyoming, a distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence was not recognized. Assumption of risk was but a form of contributory negligence. Subsequent to enactment of the comparative negligence statute, assumption of risk, as a form of contributory negligence, is only a basis for apportionment of fault. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979).
In a negligence action, the jury is now called upon to ascertain the fact of negligence, if any, on the part of each of the parties, and then to apportion such negligence between them.2
Negligence consists of a duty, a violation of such duty, proximately causing injury. Beard v. Brown, Wyo., 616 P.2d 726 (1980); and Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187 (1979). The duty referred to in the definition of negligence is “legal” duty, the definition of which is for the court as a matter of law. Beard v. Brown, supra; Med lock v. Van Wagner, Wyo., 625 P.2d 207 (1981); and Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981).
In this instance there were two parties. Instruction No. 17 had reference to the duty owed by appellee. It was to be used in determining the negligence, if any, on the part of appellee. It did not pertain to the contributory negligence, i.e., assumption of risk, by appellant. In other instructions the trial court referred to the duty of appellee to “exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition” and to “protect his visitors against dangers known to him and against dangers which he might discover by use of reasonable care,” etc. The majority opinion reflects the basis upon which the instructions relative to ap-pellee’s duty were correct. The jury found that there was no violation of the duty on the part of appellee, or it found that if *791there was such violation, it was not the proximate cause of appellant’s injury. It found no negligence on the part of appellee. Instruction No. 17 was pertinent to this portion of the jury’s decision.
The jury also found no violation of a duty on the part of appellant, or if one, that it was not the proximate cause of the injury. In doing so, Instruction No. 17, defining the duty of appellee, was not pertinent. The jury did not find negligence, in the form of assumption of risk or otherwise, on the part of appellant.
The adoption of the comparative negligence statute did not “abrogate” any duty or standard of care. It simply directed consideration of “comparative fault.”

. Instruction No. 17 reads:
“An owner or occupant of land or premises does not have an obligation to protect his invitees against dangers that are known to them or that are so obvious and apparent that they may reasonably be expected to discover such dangers.”

. Section l-l-109(a), W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.”