Court Opinion

ID: 9856432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:47:20.437922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:45.052787
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the concluding language of the majority opinion. The majority evidently loses sight of the nature of the action which was one for injunctive relief. The majority opinion further ignores the rationale for the decision of the district court. In his memorandum opinion, the district judge stated:
“The question, basically, is whether the regulation of the defendants is unreasonable and arbitrary. Yet the Attorney General wants me now, merely on the basis of his complaint and without any further proceeding, to determine ex parte, that the regulation is unreasonable and enjoin the enforcement of that regulation. If he wants me to make that determination, I suggest that he must plead *218it. I decline to do so without an evidentiary hearing, and would dismiss his complaint based upon the theory that discrimination between the sexes, without further showing, is unreasonable. In short, the complaint shows that there has been a differentiation between the sexes but that is a far cry from unlawful discrimination.” (Emphasis supplied)
I suggest further that the regulation enacted by the school board carries the standard and orthodox presumption of validity since this action was not brought under constitutional theories as was the case of Murphy v. Pocatello School District, 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878 (1971).