Court Opinion

ID: 9892309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 15:00:35.594709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:58.283268
License: Public Domain

22-2775-cv
    Stewart v. City of New York

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

               At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
    Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of October, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
               JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
               STEVEN J. MENASHI,
               EUNICE C. LEE,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Ainsley Stewart,
                          Plaintiff-Appellant,             22-2775
                     v.
    City of New York, New York City
    Transit Authority,
                  Defendant-Appellee.
    _____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                       Ainsley Stewart, pro se, Brooklyn,
                                               NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                        Steven S. Efron, Law Office of
                                               Steven S. Efron, New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Pamela K. Chen, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Appellant Ainsley Stewart, at first through counsel and then pro se, sued

his employer, the New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”), under Title VII,

42 U.S.C. § 1981, and state law, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. The

district court granted summary judgment to the NYCTA on Stewart’s

discrimination claim because Stewart did not establish that he had suffered an

“adverse employment action.” The court also granted summary judgment to the

NYCTA on Stewart’s retaliation claim because he failed to demonstrate that

impermissible retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the alleged adverse

employment action or that the NYCTA or its agents were on notice that Stewart

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had complained about conduct prohibited by Title VII. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, “resolv[ing] all

ambiguities and draw[ing] all inferences against the moving party.” Garcia v.

Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is

proper only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344

(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

      I.     Disparate Treatment

      Title VII and § 1981 claims are evaluated under the three-step burden-

shifting framework set by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. See

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Littlejohn v. City of New

York, 795 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015). Under this framework, “[f]irst, the plaintiff

has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie

case of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-11 (2002)

(quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).

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After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer

to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. See Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015);

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to

present evidence that the employer’s proffered reason is pretext for an

impermissible motivation. See Vega, 801 F.3d at 83; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.

at 804–05. If the plaintiff cannot establish pretext, the employer is entitled to

summary judgment. James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).

      To make out a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff has the burden

of establishing, inter alia, that he was subjected to an adverse employment action

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Vega, 801 F.3d at 83. “A plaintiff sustains an adverse

employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms

and conditions of employment.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 85. We agree with the district

court that Stewart did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination because

he offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that

he was subjected to an adverse employment action.

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      There is nothing in the record establishing that Stewart was disciplined

because of racial animus; in fact, there is no evidence that he was ever disciplined

at all. Stewart argues that Superintendent Thomas Mathai and others in

management created an atmosphere in which it was more likely that he would

be disciplined and suffer reputational damage. But criticism, verbal reprimands,

and notices of potential discipline, by themselves, do not qualify as adverse

employment actions. See Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir.

2019) (no adverse employment action where employee was verbally

reprimanded and yelled at by employer because there was no material change in

employment terms or conditions); see also Weeks v. N.Y. State (Div. of Parole), 273

F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (notice of discipline that had no material effect was not

adverse for disparate treatment and retaliation claims), abrogated on other grounds

by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). Moreover, Stewart

offered no evidence that his reputation was damaged. See Scotto v. Almeas, 143

F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The non-moving party [at the summary judgment

stage] may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.”).

      Stewart also claims that his involuntary transfer to the Livonia

                                          5
maintenance shop constituted an adverse employment action because it reduced

his opportunities for promotion and overtime. Stewart has offered no evidence

to substantiate his claim that the transfer adversely impacted his employment

conditions. See Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 641 (2d Cir. 2000)

(granting summary judgment on the grounds that the “[a]ppellant has not

produced evidence to show that the transfer was to an assignment that was

materially less prestigious, materially less suited to his skills and expertise, or

materially less conducive to career advancement”), abrogated on other grounds by

Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010). He likewise offered no evidence

that the transfer was due to racial discrimination. “An inference of

discrimination can arise from circumstances including, but not limited to, the

employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance in ethnically degrading terms;

or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s protected group; or the

more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the

sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at

312 (internal quotation marks omitted). Stewart offered no evidence that Mathai

ever made racially charged comments about African Americans or disparaged

                                         6
his performance in racial terms. He claims that Mathai treated non-African

American coworkers better than him, but he offers no evidence that he was

similarly situated to these coworkers. See Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34,

40 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he standard for comparing conduct requires a reasonably

close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff’s and comparator’s

cases, rather than a showing that both cases are identical.”).

      Because Stewart offered no evidence that he was subjected to an adverse

employment action, let alone an adverse employment action attributable to a

discriminatory motive, he failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the NYCTA

on this claim.

      II.    Retaliation

      To make out a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show: “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that [the

employer] knew of [plaintiff’s] participation in that protected activity; (3) that

[plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that there exists a

causal relationship between the protected activity and the adverse employment

                                         7
action.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 166. To succeed on a retaliation claim after a defendant

has established a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action,

the plaintiff must present evidence that retaliation was the “but-for” cause of the

action. Univ. of Tex., Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013); see also Carr

v. New York City Transit Auth., 76 F.4th 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[T]he plaintiff

must prove that the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged

employment action.”) (quoting Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 70

(2d Cir. 2015)).

      Stewart did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he did

not offer evidence that the NYCTA was aware that he had participated in

protected activity. Stewart’s email to his supervisors of August 4, 2017, which he

claims caused them to reassign him to supervising cleaners and to transfer him

to Livonia in retaliation, did not mention any category protected by Title VII

(race, color, national origin, religion, or sex), much less complain of

discrimination based on any of these categories. (The email did, however,

contain an oblique reference to age discrimination, which is not covered by Title

VII.) While informal complaints, such as an email to management, can constitute

                                           8
protected activity, see Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990),

a plaintiff must show that his employer “understood, or could reasonably have

understood, that the plaintiff’s complaint was directed at conduct prohibited by

Title VII.” Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 660 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir.

2011) (alteration omitted) (quoting Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp.,

136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998)). The NYCTA and its agents would not have

reasonably understood this complaint, which included general allegations that

Mathai was incompetent and dishonest, was directed at conduct prohibited by

Title VII.

       Because the August 4 email did not contain language that would have put

NYCTA on notice that Stewart had participated in protected activity, Stewart did

not establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Therefore, the district court

properly granted summary judgment to the NYCTA on this claim.

                                   *      *      *

       We have considered Stewart’s remaining arguments, which we conclude

are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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