Court Opinion

ID: 9692357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:52:29.666108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.237581
License: Public Domain

J. JEROME PLUNKETT, Justice *
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority holding that Minn.St. 16.821 to 16.827, setting up the state designer selection board, is a valid intrusion as it relates to the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota.
This court in State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928), laid down the fundamental proposition that the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota had complete autonomy in the management of the university. It is true that since the Chase case the Board of Regents has allowed certain actions of the legislature to govern the University of Minnesota, such as application of the workers’ compensation act, the labor relations act, and several others. However, such acquiescence by the Board of Regents must be construed as a matter of comity with the legislature and not a waiver of its fundamental rights as set forth by Minn. Const, art. 13, § 3.
The state designer selection board act takes away the Board of Regents’ right to select designers and architects for university buildings. It is true that consultation would be made with the Board of Regents, but the state designer selection board has the final authority and the voting power. It is significant that pursuant to Minn.St. 16.826, subd. 6, the commissioner of administration may appoint a designer of a project without the recommendation of the state designer selection board if certain conditions have failed to take place.
I am not unmindful of the problem that the legislature has had in recent years in appropriating increasingly large sums of money for the operation of the university and its building program. The appropriation for the university in any given biennium is one of the largest sums provided for by the legislature. The legislature does, however, have certain valid constitutional controls over the Board of Regents by virtue of its right, without consent of the governor, to elect the Board of Regents and also the right to appropriate funds for the university.
The majority opinion places great emphasis for validity of the intrusion on the grounds that the intent of the act is to avoid conflict of interest of designers and architects dealing with the state. However laudable this aim, constitutional limitations are not to be ignored because the proposed violation is for a commendable purpose.
A second justification for the majority opinion is the fact that millions of dollars of state appropriated money are involved. This is a very novel and unique justification for allowing unconstitutional actions. An act is to be construed as to constitutional validity without regard to whether one penny of money is involved or millions of dollars.
The last justification of the majority opinion is the grounds that the intrusion here is very minor. The trial judge very succinctly answered this in his memorandum where he stated:
*804“It is argued by the Attorney General on behalf of the Defendants that the mere selection of an architect would not constitute an infringement upon the duties and responsibilities of the Regents in regards to University buildings. Few things, however, touch more upon the essence of our environment and community than the shape and style of the buildings in which we work and live. The selection of an architect and designer is perhaps the most important step in that building process, and is indisputably a managerial function, which must be exercised by the Regents.”
If the intrusion into the rights of the Board of Regents is allowed in this case, what lies next — a “teacher selection board” —a “student selection board”? Where do we draw the line? The Chase case has already drawn the line and if we are to step over the line, the Chase case must be overruled.
For the above reasons I cannot agree with the majority opinion and hereby state that the trial court should be affirmed.

 Acting as Justice of the Supreme Court by appointment pursuant to Minn.Const. art. 6, § 2, and Minn.St. 2.724, subd. 2.