Court Opinion

ID: 9731783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:57:57.807923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.196259
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Garrard, J.
I agree that the City of Gary was improperly defaulted and the judgment must be reversed.
The action is an appeal from the administrative decision terminating appellee Baker from the Gary Fire Department. As such, it is governed by IC 1971,18-1-11-3. Also, as pointed out by Judge Hoffman, that statute obviates the necessity of the city filing any responsive pleading. Accordingly, the city was not subject to default on that ground.
The remaining ground assigned to support the default was the failure of the city to have its appearance (in person or by counsel) entered in the action. Although the statute does not expressly speak to this question, I find the failure does not, under such a statute, constitute grounds for default.
*32Under the code practice existing in Indiana prior to the adoption of our present rules of procedure, a complaint was deemed to stand for issue and trial upon the return date indorsed upon the summons if proper service was had. See, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-801 (Burns 1967 Repl.) and § 2-1905 (Burns 1968 Repl.) both of which were repealed with the adoption of the new rules.
Under that practice the appearing defendant was ruled to plead and his failure to do so would subject him to default. Jelley v. Gaff (1877), 56 Ind. 331.
Where a properly served defendant failed to appear, he too was subject to default. This, however, appears to have been because of the uselessness of requiring that he be first ruled to plead. Langdon v. Bullock (1856), 8 Ind. 341; Trew v. Gaskill (1858), 10 Ind. 265.
Thus, by defaulting, judgment might be entered against the defaulter because he was deemed to have confessed to the allegations of the complaint.1 Rooker v. Bruce (1908), 171 Ind. 86, 85 N.E. 351; State Bd. v. Pickard (1931), 93 Ind. App. 171, 177 N.E. 870.
However, only traversable averments in the complaint were deemed admitted, Richcreek v. Russell (1904), 34 Ind. App. 217, 72 N.E. 617; and if the complaint was subject to demurrer, this could be raised on appeal to secure reversal. Old v. Mohler (1889), 122 Ind. 594, 23 N.E. 967; Smith v. Carley (1856), 8 Ind. 451.
The Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure, Trial Rule 4, to reduce the time necessary to bring a case to issue, eliminated the old requirement of an appearance followed by a rule to plead. The concept that the cáse stood for issue and trial on the return date was eliminated. In so doing, the rules eliminate the formal entry of appearance as an operational event.
*33I affirm the desirability of the entry of a formal appearance for practical reasons. In addition, it is conceivable that a duly notified defendant seeking a continuance may be ill advantaged where it appears that the request would have been unnecessary had a formal appearance been entered. However, where by statute no responsive pleading is required, a defendant cannot be deemed to have admitted the allegations against him. Neither does his want of formal appearance delay putting the case at issue or require “the performance of useless acts” by the court.
I would therefore hold that in this case, failure to enter an appearance does not constitute a ground for default.
Note. — Reported at 333 N.E.2d 808.

. This, of course, did not apply to the amount of damage claimed.