Court Opinion

ID: 9398372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 00:00:48.346811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.136499
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60146     Document: 00516768347          Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/30/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                            FILED
                                                                        May 30, 2023
                                   No. 21-60146
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk

   Saroun Khan,

                                                                       Petitioner,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                     Respondent.

                          Petition for Review of an Order
                       of the Board of Immigration Appeals
                             Agency No. A027 291 961

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
          Saroun Khan seeks relief from an order of the Board of Immigration
   Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
   finding that he is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Because the court finds that Khan’s
   conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3925(a) constitutes receipt of
   stolen property, and thus is an aggravated felony for purposes of the
   Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), we deny the petition for review.
Case: 21-60146       Document: 00516768347              Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/30/2023

                                       No. 21-60146

                                             I.
          Khan, a native and citizen of Cambodia, was admitted to the United
   States as a refugee in 1983. Khan’s status was changed to that of a lawful per-
   manent resident on May 12, 1986. In 1999, he pleaded guilty to receiving sto-
   len property in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3925(a) in Pennsylvania
   state court and was sentenced to 3 to 24 months imprisonment. Based on that
   conviction,    Khan     was     charged        as   removable   under    8    U.S.C.
   § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as de-
   fined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). 1 Khan filed a motion to terminate his re-
   moval proceedings. Relevant here, Khan argued that his conviction did not
   categorically qualify as an aggravated felony, because a mens rea of “reason
   to believe” that the property was stolen, he contended, was sufficient to sup-
   port a conviction under Pennsylvania law.
          An IJ denied the motion. In doing so, the IJ held that § 3925(a) “on its
   face” requires proof of “a defendant’s knowledge or belief, and that belief is
   not objective,” and that the statute thus satisfied the generic mens rea
   requirement. Further, the IJ emphasized that the Superior Court of
   Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127, 1132 n.7 (Pa.
   Super. Ct. 2010), explained that “[t]o the extent that the phrase ‘reason to
   believe the property was stolen’ is used in our case law, we must interpret
   that phrase as being the equivalent to the express statutory language
   ‘believing it had been stolen.’”
          On appeal to the BIA, Khan asserted that the IJ erred for two reasons.
   First, he contended that his conviction did not qualify as a generic theft
   offense because Pennsylvania courts had commonly held that a defendant

          1
             “[A]ggravated felony” includes “a theft offense (including receipt of stolen
   property)” for which the term of imprisonment was at least one year. 8 U.S.C.
   § 1101(a)(43)(G).

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                                           No. 21-60146

   could be found guilty of that offense if he, inter alia, had a “reason to believe”
   that the property had been stolen. Second, the IJ improperly relied on Newton
   because it did not accurately represent the law in effect at the time of his
   conviction.
           The BIA agreed with the IJ’s determination, holding that
   Pennsylvania courts have not created a jurisprudential “reason to believe”
   standard and that § 3925(a) requires purely subjective knowledge or belief
   that an item is stolen. Further, the BIA noted, “even if Newton strayed from
   previous applications of the law,” Newton applied retroactively under
   Pennsylvania law. The BIA then upheld removal and dismissed the appeal.
   Khan now petitions this court for review.
                                                 II.
           “When reviewing a BIA decision, questions of law are reviewed de
   novo, but this Court defers to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration stat-
   utes and regulations.” Vazquez v. Sessions, 885 F.3d 862, 870 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citing Danso v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 709, 712–13 (5th Cir. 2007)). Though our
   review is generally limited to the BIA’s decision, we may also review the IJ’s
   decision when it influences the BIA’s decision or where the BIA has adopted
   all or part of the IJ’s reasoning. Le v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 98, 104 (5th Cir. 2016).
                                                III.
           Khan argues that § 3925(a) is broader than the generic theft offense
   and that, accordingly, his conviction under the statute does not constitute an
   aggravated felony for receipt of stolen property. In addition, Khan contends
   that applying Newton retroactively violates his due process rights and impli-
   cates ex post facto concerns. 2 We discuss each argument in turn.

           2
              It is well-settled that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the judiciary. See
   Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) (“The Ex Post Facto Clause, by its own terms,
   does not apply to courts.”). Thus, to the extent that Khan makes this argument, we address
   it as a due process claim.

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                                      No. 21-60146

                                           A.
          Noncitizens convicted of certain criminal offenses are removable. See
   8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). To determine whether a noncitizen’s state conviction
   constitutes a removable offense, we apply a categorical approach comparing
   the elements of the state statute with the elements of the generic federal
   offense as defined in the INA. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013).
   “A state offense is a categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a
   conviction of the state offense would necessarily involve proving facts that
   would establish a violation of the generic federal offense.” Vetcher v. Barr,
   953 F.3d 361, 366 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). If “a state statute
   criminalizes offenses that fall outside of the generic definition, there is not a
   categorical match.” Id. (citation omitted).
          The categorical approach “requires more than the application of legal
   imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic probability, not
   a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that
   falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Vazquez, 885 F.3d at 871
   (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). To show
   this, the noncitizen must establish “that the State actually prosecutes the
   non-generic offense.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
          Neither the INA nor the BIA defines the term “theft offense,” but we
   have construed it to mean the “taking of property or an exercise of control
   over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of
   rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or
   permanent.” Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (emphasis in original) (quoting Burke v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir.
   2007)). “[T]his generic definition requires an intent to deprive the owner of
   the benefit proceeding from possession of the stolen goods.” United States v.
   Sanchez-Rodriguez, 830 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations and
   citation omitted). To satisfy this generic mens rea requirement for a receipt

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                                     No. 21-60146

   of stolen property offense under the INA the offense must, at a minimum,
   require a subjective mens rea of “knowledge or belief” that the property was
   stolen. In re Deang, 27 I. & N. Dec. 57, 61, 63 (BIA 2017).
          Khan contends that the BIA erred in determining that his Pennsylva-
   nia conviction for receipt of stolen property qualifies as an aggravated felony.
   Specifically, Khan argues that § 3295(a) cannot qualify as an aggravated fel-
   ony because, at the time of his conviction, Pennsylvania courts had long in-
   terpreted § 3295(a) as requiring only a “reason to believe” mens rea to satisfy
   a conviction.
          The statute underlying Khan’s conviction is 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
   § 3925(a), which provides that: “A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally
   receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it
   has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the prop-
   erty is received, retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.”
          The Third Circuit has recently held that a conviction under this stat-
   ute qualifies as an aggravated felony conviction. See Barradas Jacome v. At-
   torney Gen. United States, 39 F.4th 111, 123 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub
   nom. Barradas-Jacome v. Garland, 22-595, 2023 WL 3158362 (U.S. May 1,
   2023). We agree. In particular, we find that the Pennsylvania statute falls
   within the generic definition of “a theft offense” because the statute, by its
   plain text, requires the offender have “knowledge or belief” that the property
   was stolen. Id. at 123– 24; see Deang, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 63.
          Despite the language of § 3925(a), Khan argues that at the time of his
   conviction, Pennsylvania courts routinely applied a lower mens rea standard
   of “reason to believe” for receiving stolen property. However, this argument
   was recently resolved, adversely to Khan’s position, in Barradas Jacome v.
   Att’y Gen. United States. See 39 F.4th at 123. There, the court explained that
   the text of § 3925(a) was amended by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1972 to
   remove its objective reasonable person standard. See id. at 123 n.9; see also

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                                      No. 21-60146

   Act of Dec. 6, 1972, No. 334, 1972 Pa. Laws 1482, 1538–39. However, after
   its adoption, Pennsylvania lower courts were less than clear about the
   application of its mens rea standard. Id. at 124 n.10. Some of these lower
   courts applied the updated statute as written. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
   Robbins, 647 A.2d 555, 557 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (“Therefore, to obtain a
   conviction for receiving stolen property the Commonwealth must establish
   beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or should have known
   that the property was stolen.”); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 623 A.2d 838, 839
   n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), aff’d, 652 A.2d 297 (Pa. 1995) (“Model Penal Code,
   § 223.6, served as the basis for the present offense of receiving stolen
   property when the Legislature drafted the 1972 Crimes Code . . . and
   reads: . . . [a] person is guilty of theft if he purposely receives, retains, or
   disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
   believing that it has probably been stolen . . . .”).
          Other courts, however, cited the outdated mens rea language, even
   though they ultimately concluded that the offenders actually knew that they
   were receiving stolen property. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d
   1005, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“We find that sufficient circumstantial
   evidence existed for the trier of fact to conclude that Appellant received
   stolen goods knowing that they were stolen.”); Commonwealth v. Grabowski,
   452 A.2d 827, 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“The evidence in the instant case
   was sufficient to prove that appellant had received the Chevrolet truck
   knowing that it had been stolen or having reason to believe that it had
   probably been stolen.”); Commonwealth v. Brady, 560 A.2d 802, 806 (Pa.
   Super. Ct. 1989) (“Here, it is clear that the property had been stolen and that
   appellant knew it had been stolen.”); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 632 A.2d
   570, 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (“The present case is not similar to those cases
   where the condition of the vehicle clearly indicated that it had been stolen or

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                                          No. 21-60146

   where the actions of the accused support the inference that he knew the vehicle
   was stolen.”) (emphasis added).
           Thus, as the court in Barradas Jacome explained, while these cases use
   “loose language,” it appears only to reflect an oversight, not the creation of
   an objective requirement. See Barradas Jacome, 39 F.4th at 123; see also De
   Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 637 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting defend-
   ant’s argument that Pennsylvania Superior Court cases “injected an objec-
   tive element into the Pennsylvania statute”). Indeed, none of the decisions
   Khan relies upon involve a defendant who was prosecuted, or convicted, for
   receiving stolen property under a mens rea of “reason to believe,” as op-
   posed to the subjective standard put forth in § 3925(a). Consequently, we
   conclude that this use of outdated language does not establish a realistic prob-
   ability of conviction under § 3925(a).
           In sum, the Third Circuit, in two well-reasoned opinions, has held that
   Pennsylvania’s receipt of stolen property offense does not have an objective
   element and is “purely subjective.” Barradas Jacome, 39 F.4th at 123; De
   Leon-Reynoso, 293 F.3d at 636. The Third Circuit has considered variations
   on Khan’s argument and has rejected them. We are not inclined to part ways
   with those opinions. We, therefore, conclude that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.
   § 3925(a) is a categorical theft offense, and thus qualifies as an “aggravated
   felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
                                                B.
           Lastly, Khan contends that by applying Newton retroactively, the BIA
   violated his due process rights. 3 However, this argument is unavailing.

           3
             Khan also argues that the BIA erred in relying on Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d
   802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012), because it was decided in 2012, 14 years after his conviction.
   However, the BIA only used this case to set out the elements of § 3925(a), which are already
   in the text of the statute. So, for the same reasons that his argument regarding Newton fails,
   this argument is also unpersuasive.

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                                        No. 21-60146

   Retroactivity need not be addressed when a decision does not change the law.
   James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534 (1991) (“It is only
   when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity
   may be entertained.”); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)
   (“[T]he decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new
   principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants
   may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
   resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” (citations omitted)).
           Despite Khan’s contentions and the BIA’s assertion that Newton
   applied retroactively, such a proposition is unfounded. Newton did not
   announce a new rule, but instead clarified an existing rule that was adopted
   with the passage of the newest version of § 3925. Newton explained, as
   outlined above, that the Pennsylvania legislature explicitly removed the
   “reason to believe” standard from § 3925(a) in 1972. See Newton, 994 A.2d
   at 1132. Given the differences between the language in the pre-1972 statute
   and its current version, the court stated, “[w]e interpret this change as
   eliminating any suggestion that a person can be found guilty of receiving
   stolen property simply by retaining property that a reasonable person would
   conclude is probably stolen.” Id. at 1131–32.
           Thus, Newton did not announce a new rule; Newton renewed and
   reemphasized the understanding that § 3925(a) is subjective and lacks the
   objective component found in its predecessor. Consequently, Newton does
   not constitute a change in the law that triggers retroactivity analysis. 4
                                             IV.
           For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED.

           4
            As a result of our disposition of Khan’s first argument, we need not address his
   contention that the BIA erred by ignoring the test set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme
   Court for determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively.

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                                     No. 21-60146

   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
          The word “alien” is ubiquitous in statutes, regulations, judicial
   decisions, and scholarly commentary on federal immigration law. But despite
   this established usage, some members of the judiciary have recently begun to
   signal their opposition to using that term, on the ground that it is “offensive.”
   Avilez v. Garland, 48 F.4th 915, 917 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022). Respectfully, I do
   not share in that sentiment.
          United States citizenship is one of the greatest privileges this world
   has ever known. My own path to that privilege began with my admission into
   this country as an alien. The United States government assigned me an alien
   registration number. That number appears on my application for status as a
   lawful permanent resident alien. It also appears on numerous other forms,
   including the INS notification granting my application for permanent
   resident alien status—and ultimately, my certificate of citizenship.
          These documents are among my most treasured possessions. That is
   for one simple reason: It is my exquisitely good fortune that I was admitted
   into this country as an alien—and later naturalized as a citizen. I cannot
   imagine how enormously different (and considerably worse, I am sure) my
   life would have been had I not been granted resident alien status in America.
          There’s no need to be offended by the word “alien.” It’s a centuries-
   old legal term found in countless judicial decisions. See, e.g., Martin v.
   Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 370 (1816); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 221
   (1824). It’s used in numerous acts of Congress—including the ones that
   allowed me to become an American. To this day, both 8 U.S.C. and 8 C.F.R.
   address the subject of “Aliens and Nationality.”
          Some members of the judiciary are nevertheless concerned that “[t]he
   word alien can suggest ‘strange,’ ‘different,’ ‘repugnant,’ ‘hostile,’ and
   ‘opposed.’” Avilez, 48 F.4th at 917 n.1.

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                                          No. 21-60146

           That may be true in certain contexts. The word also refers to
   extraterrestrials in other contexts.
           But we always read words in their proper context. And in the context
   of immigration law, we use “alien,” not to disparage one’s character—or to
   denote one’s planetary origin—but to describe one’s legal status. 1
           I agree with my colleague (and fellow former alien) Judge Bea: “Our
   federal immigration statutes concern themselves with aliens. This word is
   not a pejorative nor an insult. . . . [W]hen used in its statutory context, it
   admits of its statutory definition, not those definitions with negative
   connotations that can be plucked at will from the dictionary.” Id. at 933 (Bea,
   J., concurring). Cf. Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of
   Legal Usage 912 (Oxford 3rd ed. 2011) (“Illegal alien is not an
   opprobrious epithet: it describes one present in a country in violation of the
   immigration laws (hence ‘illegal’).”); Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733,
   745 n.15 (5th Cir. 2015) (same).
           So I see no need to bowdlerize statutes or judicial decisions that use
   the word “alien” by substituting terms like “non-citizen.”
           I concur in the judgment.

           1
              See, e.g., Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2022) (“depending on
   context, ‘goat’ can mean ‘an athlete who failed, garishly, hilariously, and at the worst
   possible time’—or the ‘greatest of all time’”) (and collecting other examples). To take
   another example: Many provisions of federal law use the term “he”—not as a masculine
   pronoun, but as a generic term, when read in context. See also 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining
   the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise— . . . words
   importing the masculine gender include the feminine as well”). Women have held office
   in all three branches of the federal government—and in doing so, they surely did not violate
   Article I of the Constitution, or Article II (or the Twelfth Amendment), or 28 U.S.C. § 333.

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