Court Opinion

ID: 9574394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:37.571036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:28.520301
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Dissenting.
In holding that plaintiff’s complaint does not state a cause of action in negligence, today’s majority opinion fails to recognize the expanding nature of the special relationship doctrine. As a result, the majority opinion represents a significant step backwards in the evolution of negligence law toward the concept of responsibility and accountability for negligent omissions.
I:
The threshold question presented by this case is whether the highway patrol officers who investigated the automobile accident owed a duty of care to plaintiff. In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166], this court stated that “legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done.” A duty of care is found to exist when considerations of policy lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery for his injury. (Ibid.)
*31As a general rule, a person does not have an affirmative duty to assist or protect another who is in danger. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 554, p. 2821.) However, the existence of a special relationship between the parties will give rise to such a duty. (Ibid.; Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 56, p. 339.)
The evolving trend of negligence law is to increase the number of situations in which an affirmative duty will be imposed “by expanding the list of special relationships which will justify departure from” the general rule of nonliability. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 435, fn. 5; Prosser, supra, § 56 at p. 339.) As the Restatement Second of Torts (§ 314A, com. b) explains, “[t]he law appears ... to be working slowly toward a recognition of the duty to aid or protect in any relation of dependence or of mutual dependence.” (Italics added; see also Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) General Liability and Immunity Principles, § 2.64, p. 143.)
This expansion of the special relationship concept to encompass situations in which one party becomes dependent upon another has been recognized in several opinions of the Court of Appeal. (See, e.g., Pamela L. v. Farmer (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 206, 211 [169 Cal.Rptr. 282] [special relationship was predicated upon children’s dependence on an adult]; Buford v. State of California (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 811, 821, 823 [164 Cal.Rptr. 264]; J. A. Meyers & Co. v. Los Angeles County Probation Dept. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 309, 315 [144 Cal.Rptr. 186].) Two decisions have explicitly held that a special relationship based on dependence arises when a highway patrol officer stops to render assistance to a disabled motorist. (Clemente v. State of California (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 374 [161 Cal.Rptr. 799]; Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773 [139 Cal.Rptr. 82].)
In Mann, a highway patrol officer stopped to assist two cars that had broken down in the speed-change lane of a freeway. The officer parked his vehicle behind the two cars and turned on his rear flashing lights. After a tow truck arrived, the officer left to resume his patrol without informing anyone at the scene. His departure left the rear of the disabled cars unprotected by the flashing lights of the patrol car. In addition, the officer failed to place any protective flares on the highway. A few minutes later, a motorist driving on the freeway sides wiped one of the cars and hit several persons standing nearby.
In his civil suit, plaintiff alleged that the highway patrol officer had failed to exercise reasonable care to protect him from the accident. Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was subsequently granted by the trial court. This judgment was reversed on appeal.
*32The court held that the jury could have found from the evidence that a special relationship existed between plaintiff and the investigating officer. (Id., at p. 779.) “Clearly plaintiff was dependent upon [the highway patrol officer] here. [The officer] was the expert in traffic safety and charged with specific responsibility for it on the stretch of freeway in question.” (Id., at p. 780.) Thus, the court concluded, “once a state traffic officer has chosen to investigate the plight of specific persons on a freeway and informed himself of the foreseeable danger to them from passing traffic, a special relationship requiring him to protect them by readily available means arises . . . .” (Ibid.)1
The reasoning of the Mann court was followed in Clemente v. State of California, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d 374. In that case, plaintiff’s complaint against the state alleged that he was struck by a motorcycle while walking in a pedestrian crosswalk. Plaintiff suffered severe physical injuries. Immediately after the accident, a highway patrol officer arrived at the scene. The officer cleared the intersection of traffic and interviewed the witnesses who were present. The motorcyclist admitted to the officer that he had struck plaintiff, but explained that his vision had been blocked by the presence of a van. After radioing his dispatcher for an ambulance, the officer left the accident scene without obtaining the identity of the motorcyclist. The motorcyclist also departed and his identity was never discovered by plaintiff.
Plaintiff claimed that the officer was negligent in failing to learn the motorcyclist’s name. This negligence allegedly prevented plaintiff from recovering damages for the injuries caused by the accident. Defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint was sustained by the trial court.
The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, relying on the holding in Mann. (Id., at pp. 379-380.) The court explained that in Mann “we . . . said that a special relationship in tort law obtained between the California highway patrol officer there involved and the stranded motorists by reason of their dependence on his expertise. [Citation.] Here, the completely disabled and apparently incompetent plaintiff was likewise completely dependent on [the officer] following the traffic accident.” (Ibid.) As a result of this relationship of dependence, the officer had an affirmative duty to learn the identity of the motorcyclist that had collided with plaintiff.
*33The majority opinion fails to perceive that the Mann and Clemente decisions are in accord with the expanding nature of the special relationship doctrine in modern tort law. The reasoning of these decisions should be followed in the present case. Here, as in those cases, plaintiff’s complaint established that she was completely dependent upon the investigating highway patrol officers to protect her from foreseeable harm following the accident. This relationship of dependence arose from several factors.
First, it can be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged in the complaint that plaintiff was physically unable to pursue the tortfeasor or otherwise investigate the accident on her own. The brake drum that was propelled through the front windshield lacerated plaintiff’s face, fractured several facial bones, and caused the loss of an eye. After sustaining such injuries, it is unlikely that plaintiff had the capacity to pursue the identity of the truck driver.
Moreover, the complaint alleges that after the highway patrol officers arrived at the scene, they “assumed the responsibility of investigating the accident.” Under Vehicle Code section 2400, the commissioner of the highway patrol has “full responsibility and primary jurisdiction ... for the investigation of traffic accidents” on all state freeways. All persons involved in an accident must cooperate with the highway patrol’s investigation. For example, if an injury occurs, a driver must “give his name, address, the registration number of the vehicle he is driving, the name of the owner . . . and exhibit his driver’s license to any traffic . . . officer at the scene of the accident . . . .” (Veh. Code, § 20003.) Thus, even if plaintiff had not been disabled by the accident, once the officers arrived, she and the car driver were not free to immediately leave the scene to pursue the tortfeasor.
Finally, after the officers undertook the investigation, it was reasonably foreseeable that plaintiff would rely on their expertise rather than seek the assistance of other persons at the scene. At the same time, other persons were unlikely to come forward to interview witnesses or gather evidence because they would assume that the officers would perform these tasks.
Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s dependence upon the highway patrol officers gave rise to an affirmative duty to act. The officers were obligated to exercise reasonable care in investigating the accident. Their failure to talk to witnesses at the scene or otherwise take steps to learn the identity of the truck driver constituted a breach of that duty. As a result of this negligence, plaintiff was denied any possibility of recovering damages from the tortfeasor for the physical injuries she sustained.
*34II.
Since plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action in negligence, the trial court’s order dismissing the suit should not be affirmed unless the state is immune from liability. The state contends that several sections of the Government Code shield it from liability for the allegedly negligent omissions of the patrol officers.
In reviewing this contention, it must be kept in mind that “[t]he 1963 Tort Claims Act did not alter the basic teaching of Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. [1961] 55 Cal.2d 211, 219 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 457]: ‘when there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity is the exception.’” (Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 798 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352].) Thus, “[ujnless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.” (Ramos v. Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685, 692 [94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93].)
The state places primary reliance on section 820.2 of the Government Code. That provision states in pertinent part that “a public employee is not liable for any injury resulting from an act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”2
This court authoritatively construed section 820.2 in Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d 782. In that case, a literal interpretation of the term “discretion” was rejected. (Id., at p. 790.) Instead, the court distinguished between a public entity’s “basic policy decision” and the “subsequent ministerial actions in the implementation of that basic decision.” (Id., at p. 797.) Actions of the latter type were held to be nondiscretionary within the meaning of section 820.2 and, consequently, unprotected by the provision’s grant of immunity. (Id., at pp. 793-798; see also HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 519 [125 Cal.Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237].)
In the present case, the alleged negligence did not involve “basic policy decisions” of the California Highway Patrol. Once the officers decided to investigate the traffic accident, their performance of that investigation was purely ministerial. (McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252, 261-267 [74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453]; Mann v. State of California, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 778.) Thus, the failure to exercise reasonable care in investigating the accident does not come within the protection of the discretionary immunity statute.
*35The other, more specific statutory grants of immunity relied upon by the state are also inapplicable. Plaintiff’s complaint is not based on the officers’ failure to arrest the tortfeasor. (Gov. Code, § 846.) Rather, the state is charged with not adequately investigating the identity of the truck driver and failing to marshal information for purposes of civil litigation.
Nor does the complaint allege that the state failed to enforce a law or enactment within the meaning of Government Code sections 818.2 and 821. “[T]o enforce a law normally means to compel obedience to the law by actual force, such as involuntary detention, arrest or punishment.” (Clemente v. State of California, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 378.) The phrase may also mean to give effect to a law or to cause a law to have force. (Meridian, Ltd. v. Sippy (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 214, 220 [128 P.2d 884].) None of these concepts accurately describe the allegations contained in plaintiff’s complaint.
Finally, the state is not protected by statutory immunity for injuries caused by the failure to provide police protection. (Gov. Code, § 845.) This statute merely immunizes a public entity’s or employee’s “political decision” concerning the extent to which police protection should be provided. (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com. to Gov. Code, § 845, 32 West’s Ann. Gov. Code (1980 ed.) p. 410; Mann v. State of California, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 778.)
Since the state’s alleged negligence does not fall within the scope of the immunity statutes, the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was improper. In not permitting plaintiff to go forward on her complaint, the majority opinion violates the fundamental principle of our judicial system that the victims of negligence should be compensated for their injuries.
For all of the reasons articulated, I respectfully dissent.

The majority opinion views the Mann case as ‘"simply an application of the “good Samaritan” doctrine.’ ” (Maj. opn. at p. 26, quoting from Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 208 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894|.) However, even though application of that doctrine to the facts of the case may have led to the same result. Mann's holding is explicitly predicated on the special relationship of dependence between the highway patrol officer and plaintiff. (Mann v. State of California, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 779-780.) The opinion neither discusses, nor applies, the “good Samaritan” rule.

With certain exceptions not applicable in this case, “a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” (Gov. Code, § 815.2.)