Court Opinion

ID: 4064053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 21:15:18.717665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:43.681936
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                          06-15-00151-CR
                                                               SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                     TEXARKANA, TEXAS
                                                                    12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM
                                                                         DEBBIE AUTREY
                                                                                   CLERK

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
          SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
                                                         FILED IN
                                                  6th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR.      §                  12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM
   APPELLANT                   §                       DEBBIE AUTREY
                                                           Clerk
                               §
    v.                         §       No. 06-15-00151-CR
                               §
THE STATE OF TEXAS,            §
   APPELLEE                    §

                      STATE'S REPLY BRIEF

                 FROM THE I 96TH DISTRICT COURT
                      HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS
                   TRIAL CAUSE NUMBER 30,536
         THE HONORABLE ANDREW BENCH, JUDGE PRESIDING

                               NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR.
                               District Attorney
                               Hunt County, Texas

                               G CALVIN GROGAN V
                               Assistant District Attorney
                               P. 0. Box441
                               4th Floor Hunt County Courthouse
                               Greenville, TX 75403
                               (903) 408-4180
                               FAX (903) 408-4296
                               cgrogan@huntcounty.net
                               State Bar No. 24050695
                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... 2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 3

STATEMENT OF CASE ........................................................................ 6

ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................... 6

SUMMARY OF THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS .................................................... 6

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 7

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR ONE ............................................. 9

     STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................. 9

     EDDIE DEAN'S ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY ............................................ 11

     NON-ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATING EVIDENCE ............................... 12

     HARMLESS ERROR ...................................................................................... 13

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR TWO ........................................... 14

      STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 14

     TRIAL COUNSEL'S SOUND STRATEGY .................................................... 15

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR THREE ....................................... 18

     STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 18

     EVIDENCE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE AG ROBBERY ............ 19

PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 21

                                                                                                                 2
                                   INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 308 (1979) ............................................................ 18
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) ......................... 15

Texas Cases
Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................... 17
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ......................... 11
Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) ................................... 14
Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ........................... 19
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................... 18
Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ........................ 19
Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ............................ 10
Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................... 10
Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ........................... 10
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............................ 18
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................... 17
Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet.
re:fd) ........................................................................................................... 12,13,18
Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580, 586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. re:fd) .... 12
Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ............................... 15
Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........................ 11-14
Malikv. State, 953, S.W.2d 234,240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............................ 18
Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ................................. 17
Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ......................... 19
Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) .................. 13,14
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ....................... 18
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ......................... 17
Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991, en bane) ............ 15

U.S. Const., Texas Const., Texas Rules of Evidence
TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07 (Vernon 2014) .........................................................                      14
TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02(A)-(B) (Vernon 2014) ............................................                            18
TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014) .................................................                        19
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.14 (Vernon 2014) ..............................................                          10

                                                                                                                  3
              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
           SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA

EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR.                     §
    APPELLANT                                 §
                                              §
      v.                                      §   No. 06-15-00151-CR
                                              §
THE STATE OF TEXAS,                           §
    APPELLEE                                  §

                            STATE'S REPLY BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

      NOW COMES the State of Texas, Appellee, in this appeal from
Cause No. 30,536 in the 1961h District Court in and for Hunt County, Texas,
Honorable Andrew Bench, Presiding, now before the Sixth District Court of
Appeals, and respectfully submits this its brief to the Sixth District Court of
Appeals in support of the judgment of conviction and sentence in the court
below.

                                                                              4
                        STATEMENT OF CASE

      Appellant was indicted on June 26, 2015, for Aggravated Robbery.

CR Vol.l.p.14. Appellant was arraigned on July 10,2015. CR Vol.l.p.13.

      A jury found Appellant guilty as charged on August 12, 2015, and

assessed his punishment at fifty (50) years in the Texas Department of

Corrections. CR Vol.1.pp. 77, 84. Appellant gave written notice of appeal on

August 14, 2015. CR Vol.l.p.97.

                          ISSUES PRESENTED

Issue 1. Did Trial Court commit error by not including an accomplice

witness instruction in the jury charge, and if so was it harmless error

based upon all the other non-accomplice evidence?

Issue 2. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failing to request an

accomplice witness instruction in the jury charge?

Issue 3. Was the evidence legally sufficient to prove Appellant was guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery?

                   SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1. While an accomplice witness instruction should have been included in

   the jury instruction since Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter-of-

   law, it was harmless error based upon all of the other non-accomplice

   corroborating evidence presented by the State.

                                                                             5
2. Although Trial Counsel failed to request a jury instruction for accomplice

   witness testimony, a single instance does not show that Trial Counsel's

   performance was deficient, and it did not affect the final outcome.

3. The victim's testimony alone was legally sufficient to prove Appellant

   committed Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

                        STATEMENT OF FACTS

      On June 15, 2015, Spencer Sweeden had fmished working his night

shift at the local Taco Bell and decided to walk over to a friend's apartment

to play video games. RR Vol.3.pp.27, 29. After playing video games,

Spencer decided to walk horne to his apartment. RR Vol.3.p.29. At some

point during the walk horne, Spencer noticed two African-American men

corning towards him in the street. RR Vol.3.pp.29, 32. Spencer had already

noticed one of the suspects because he was on a bicycle a few blocks before.

RR Vol.3 .p.31. Spencer was able to describe the other suspect's clothing:

wearing basketballs shorts and at-shirt. RR Vol.3.pp.32, 39. Spencer also

said the other suspect had com rolls in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 114.

      As the two suspects approached Spencer, they began to make

threatening comments. RR Vol.3 .p.33. Both suspects then proceeded to

"rush" Spencer, with the Appellant doing the beating and the other suspect

                                                                                6
holding a sawed-off shotgun. RR V ol.3 .p.34. As the assault continued,

Appellant kept asking Spencer for his personal property. RR Vol.3.p.35.

Eventually the suspects released Spencer, and he took off. RR Vol.3.p.37.

Appellant took Spencer's wallet, keys, hat, and a C02 pistol. RR Vol.3.p.35.

      When Spencer got home, he called 911. RR Vol.3.p.38. Once

Commerce Police quickly responded to Spencer's home, he provided

descriptions ofboth suspects. RR Vol.3.p.38. Spencer described Appellant's

clothing as a black vest with lots of pockets. RR Vol.3.pp.38, 95. Spencer

also described the Appellant as being shorter than the suspect with com rolls

in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 97.

      Commerce Police Officer Tyler Oakley met a very traumatized

Spencer at his home to obtain suspect identification information. RR

Vol.3.pp.73, 90. Spencer told Officer Oakley that one of the suspects was a

black male riding a bicycle wearing a vest, and provided the direction he last

saw the suspects. RR Vol.3 .p. 73. Within two minutes of speaking with

Spencer, Commerce Police Officers had detained a person matching the

Appellant's description a few blocks away. RR Vol.3.pp.76, 92, 95.

      Sergeant Marcus Cantera had seen an individual riding a bicycle as he

was patrolling the area. RR Vol.3.pp.109-10. As Sgt. Cantera gave pursuit,

he came upon that same individual standing next to the bicycle in a

                                                                              7
driveway. RR Vol.3.p.110. That person was later identified by Commerce

Police as the Appellant. RR Vol.3.p.90. Within arms-length distance of

where the Appellant was initially detained were most of Spencer's personal

property items, including his photo identification. RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110.

Also within arms-length of Appellant was a bicycle and a vest. RR

Vol.3.pp.78, 93. Officer Oakley arrested Appellant and transported him to

the station. RR Vol.3.pp.71, 94. While waiting to be transported, Appellant

started talking to himself repeatedly. See State Exhibit No.7.

      Spencer recovered most of his personal property at the Commerce

Police Department later that morning while providing a written affidavit. RR

Vol.3.pp.36, 39. A few days later Spencer went up to the Commerce Police

Department and participated in photo lineups of possible suspects. RR

Vol.3.p.40. Not only did Spencer identify both suspects in the photo

lineups, but he also testified in court that the Appellant was the suspect

riding the bicycle. RR Vol.3.p.41.

                                ARGUMENT

1. Accomplice Witness Testimony

      a. Standard of Review

                                                                               8
      A conviction cannot stand on an accomplice witness's testimony

unless the testimony is corroborated by other, non-accomplice evidence that

tends to connect the accused to the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.

38.14 (Vernon 2014). An accomplice is a person who participates in the

offense before, during, or after its commission with the requisite mental

state. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A

State's witness may be an accomplice as a matter of law or as a matter of

fact. Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A

witness who is indicted for the same offense as the accused is an accomplice

as a matter of law. Id. At 748. When the evidence clearly shows that a

witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial judge must instruct the

jury accordingly. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App.

1987). Failure to provide such a charge is error. Id.

      The State concedes that Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter of

law, and that a jury instruction on accomplice witness testimony was not

included in the charge. Trial Counsel did not object to the jury charge. RR

Vol.3 .p.126.

     If a required accomplice witness instruction is omitted, and Appellant

did not object to the charge or request submission of the instruction, then the

appellate court looks at the record to determine if the error caused egregious

                                                                                  9
harm. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on

reh'g).

      Under the egregious harm standard, the omission of an
      accomplice witness instruction is generally harmless unless the
      corroborating (non-accomplice) evidence is 'so unconvincing in
      fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly
      and significantly less persuasive.

Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632.

      b. Eddie Dean's Testimony

   Eddie Dean stood charged with committing the same crime as the

Defendant. RR Vol.3.p.50. Eddie, a convicted felon, testified that both

Appellant and he had committed this crime and identified the Appellant in

open court. RR Vol.3.pp.50, 58. Eddie and the Appellant had known each

other for quite some time, but had become really close in last few months.

RR Vol.3.p.57. Prior to the aggravated robbery, Appellant and Eddie had a

conversation about "jacking somebody." RR Vol.3.pp.52-3. Eddie testified

that Appellant confronted Spencer in the front of his driveway before he

came and joined the confrontation. RR Vol.3.p.55. Eddie testified that

Appellant started robbing Spencer before he arrived. RR Vol.3.p.64. Eddie

admitting to robbing Spencer on the night of June 15, 2015. RR Vol.3 .p.51.

Eddie admitted he was the suspect holding the shotgun during the robbery,

                                                                             10
while Appellant did the actual stealing and beating. RR Vol.3 .pp.51-2.

Eddie also claimed that Appellant did not know he went to his house to grab

the shotgun during the robbery. RR Vol.3.p.62.

      c. Non-Accomplice Evidence

   In determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, the court

eliminates the testimony of the accomplice witness and examines all other

evidence and testimony looking for the reliability and believability as well as

the tendency to connect Appellant to the crime. Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d
142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref d). To determine

reliability, the courts look to see if there is non-accomplice evidence, and if

there is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding the non-accomplice

evidence. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 633. Thus, non-accomplice evidence can

render harmless a failure to submit an accomplice witness instruction. !d. at

632. "If the evidence clearly warrants conviction independent of the

accomplice testimony, the court's failure to instruct on the law of

accomplice testimony is not reversible error." Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580,

586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. ref d).

   Spencer's testimony alone proved all of the elements of aggravated

robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Spencer identified the Appellant as the

suspect who assaulted him while taking his personal property. RR

                                                                                  11
Vol.3.p.35. Spencer testified that both the Appellant and Eddie came

towards him in the street, and Eddie was holding a shotgun. RR Vol.3 .p.34.

   There is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding Spencer's

testimony that linked Appellant to the crime. Unlike Hall and Saunders,

where the State's evidence was largely based upon weak circumstantial

evidence, there was direct evidence from the eyewitness/victim that

identified Appellant as a suspect. CfHall, 161 S.W.3d at 150; Saunders v.

State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

   Besides Spencer's testimony, there was other very strong non-accomplice

evidence. Appellant was initially detained arms-length distance from

Spencer's personal property that had just been stolen two minutes earlier.

RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110. There is no reason to doubt the reliability of this

non-accomplice evidence that connected Appellant to the crime. See Herron,
86 S.W.3d at 633.

      d. Harmless Error Analysis

      Omission of an unrequested jury instruction applicable to the case

calls for a new trial only when the defendant was greatly disadvantaged

thereby. Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692. It is reversible error when the State's

case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive had they been

properly instructed. !d. At 693.

                                                                               12
       Instead of being disadvantaged by Eddie's testimony, the Appellant

was helped by his testimony. On the issue of Appellant's criminal intent,

Eddie may have possibly confused the jury. Although Appellant was

charged as a party to the offense, Eddie attempted to create a separate

criminal intent requirement for the use of a deadly weapon when the law did

not require it. See Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).

A firearm such as a shotgun is considered a deadly weapon per se and there

is no separate criminal intent requirement. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07

(Vernon 2014). Eddie's testimony that Appellant never knew he had a

shotgun during the robbery was helpful.

   The State's case relied exclusively upon non-accomplice evidence.

Under an egregious harm analysis, this non-accomplice evidence was not

"so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction

clearly and significantly less persuasive." Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632.

2. Trial Counsel's Performance was not Deficient under Strickland

   Standard

      a. Standard of Review

      "When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness
      of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's
      representation fell below an objective standard of
      reasonableness. The court should recognize that counsel is

                                                                                13
       strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
       made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
       professional judgment."
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).

      "The defendant must also show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at

2068. Texas has adopted the Strickland standard. Hernandez v. State, 726
S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Counsel must make errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment. Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1991, en bane).

      b. Sound Trial Strategy to Have Jury Focus on Eddie's

          Testimony

      There may have been a sound trial strategy for not requesting an

accomplice witness jury instruction- Eddie Dean's testimony was very

helpful to the Appellant on one crucial element. Eddie testified that the

Appellant never knew he grabbed a shotgun during the course of the

robbery. RR Vol.3.p.64. To highlight for the jury Eddie's credibility issues

may have undermined Trial Counsel's ability to argue that if his client was

guilty, he was only guilty of robbery based upon Eddie's testimony. RR

                                                                              14
Vol.3.pp.144-47. Indeed, in Trial Counsel's closing argument he stressed

that his client if guilty, is only guilty of robbery. RR Vol.3.p.144.

   Eddie Dean's testimony was only supposed to strengthen the State's case,

even though the State had no way of preparing for his testimony since he

had neither provided an interview or affidavit before arriving in court on the

day of trial. See RR Vol.3.p.61. Instead, Eddie's testimony gave hope to the

Appellant. In its closing argument, the State tried to minimize Eddie Dean's

testimony. RR Vol.3.p.142. The State emphasized in closing arguments that

the jury, as factfinder, could decide Eddie was only credible in part of his

testimony, and not credible in other parts. RR Vol.3.p.142.

      Trial Counsel's strategy also involved impeaching Spencer with

inconsistent statements, and to show that he was the initial aggressor

because he was carrying a C02 pistol on him that night. RR Vol.3.p.144.

Trial Counsel attacked Spencer's credibility by suggesting he knew how

easy it was to make a complaint in person at the Commerce Police Station.

RR Vol.3.p.144.

      Based upon Trial Counsel's strategy, his performance cannot be called

deficient. Normally, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to

show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical

or strategic decision making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's

                                                                               15
conduct was reasonable and professional. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "Appellate courts can rarely decide the issue of

ineffective assistance of counsel because the record almost never speaks to

the strategic reasons trial counsel may have considered." Aldrich v. State,

104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The proper procedure for

raising this claim is therefore almost always habeas corpus. Id. at 896

      c. Confidence in Outcome Not Undermined

      For the same reasons as discussed supra, Trial Counsel's jury charge

omission did not undermine confidence in the outcome. See Section 1.d.

Any allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in the

record. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The Appellant has the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a

preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999). Based upon a single instance found in the record that

may have actually helped Appellant and been part of sound trial strategy, he

has failed to meet his burden of proof.

3. Evidence Was Legally Sufficient

      a. Standard of Review

                                                                              16
      When reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Courts review

all the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine

whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the

charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893,912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319

(1987). The standard of review is the same for both direct evidence and

circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991 ). "While each piece of evidence lacked strength in

isolation, the consistency of the evidence and the reasonable inferences

drawn therefrom, provide the girders to strengthen the evidence and support

a rational jury's finding the elements beyond a reasonable doubt."

Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although

the accomplice witness instruction was omitted, legal sufficiency review is

based upon the hypothetically correct jury charge. Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 148

citing Malik v. State, 953, S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

      A person may be convicted as a party to an offense if the offense is

committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another for which he is

criminally responsible. TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02 (Vernon 2014). The

evidence will be held legally sufficient under the law of parties where the

defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and

                                                                                17
encourages its commission by words or other agreement. Ransom v. State,

920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Cordova v. State, 977 S.W.2d
791, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). For a conviction to be upheld, the

evidence must show at the time of the offense, the parties were acting

together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common

purpose. Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

      b. Spencer Sweeden's Testimony

      To prove Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon, the State had

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant individually and acting

together with Eddie James Dean, Jr., did then and there while in the course

of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of said

property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place Spencer Sweeden in

fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and did then and there use or exhibit

a shotgun. TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014). Spencer's

testimony alone was enough evidence for a rational juror to find Appellant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery. While being

attacked on cross-examination, having his credibility challenged, and

accused of initiating the incident, Spencer's response would be enough for

any rational juror to convict the Appellant of this crime- "Okay, I

understand that. But why would they take my things." RR Vol.3.p.46.

                                                                              18
      c. Commerce Police Officer Testimony

      Commerce Police Officers testified that Spencer was still shaken up

about the robbery when they met with him. As Sgt. Cantera summarized

their decision that night to arrest the Appellant for aggravated robbery, "he

had all the matching descriptors involved and the victim's possessions in his

possession." RR Vol.3.p.ll2.

      The evidence in this case is legally sufficient to prove Appellant guilty

of the offense as charged; therefore, his conviction should be affirmed.

                                  PRAYER

      Appellant's trial was without prejudicial error. The State prays

that Appellant's conviction and sentence be affirmed.

                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                              NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR.
                                              District Attorney
                                              Hunt County, Texas

                                                      ./
                                                  /

                                              G CALYIN GROGAN V
                                              Assistant District Attorney
                                              P. 0. Box 441

                                                                                19
                                              4thFloor, Hunt County
                                              Courthouse
                                              Greenville, TX 75403
                                              State Bar No. 24050695
                                              (903) 408-4180
                                              FAX (903) 408-4296
                                               cgrogan@h untcounty.net

     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3)

       Relying on Microsoft Word's word count feature used to create the
State's Reply Brief, I certify that the number of words contained in this brief
is 3,766 and the typeface used is 14Font.                ,",:; '::.. -
                                                        l ·' ' ~
                                                         ·~'' ,J ~?~i-, ,.. //'
                                                                              §
                                              G CALVIN GROGAN V
                                              Assistant District Attorney

                      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      A true copy of the State's brief has been mailed via first-class mail to
Jessica Edwards, Appellant's attorney of record, today, December 4, 2015,
pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

                                                    '_" ,.-,.   ~-,   t_ ..
                                                                ,-
                                                            /

                                              G CALVIN GROGAN V
                                              Assistant District Attorney

                                                                                  20