Court Opinion

ID: 9410709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 05:01:21.212891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:59.837607
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-1550
ZAILEY HESS,
                                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                v.

JAMIE GARCIA, Officer, and
JOHN DOUGHTY, Chief,
                                            Defendants-Appellees.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
     No. 3:21-cv-00101-JD-MGG — Jon E. DeGuilio, Chief Judge.
                    ____________________

     ARGUED FEBRUARY 9, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 5, 2023
                ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and LEE, Circuit Judges.
   HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This suit arises from a seventeen-
year-old student’s class assignment to go on a “ride along”
with law enforcement. According to the complaint, this ride
along quickly strayed from its educational purpose as the of-
ﬁcer repeatedly sexually assaulted and harassed the student.
She has sued both the oﬃcer and the local police chief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating her constitutional rights.
2                                                   No. 22-1550

   The district court granted both defendants’ motions to dis-
miss with prejudice for failure to state a claim. We aﬃrm dis-
missal of the claim against the chief of police. Plaintiﬀ did not
plead facts suggesting the chief had a requisite level of in-
volvement in the alleged violations for personal liability un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    We reverse dismissal of the claim against the oﬃcer. It is
well established that sexual assault by a government oﬃcial
acting under color of law violates the Constitution. Cases
from diﬀerent circuits have relied on diﬀerent constitutional
provisions, but they have agreed on that bottom line, holding
that sexual assault can violate the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause as sex discrimination, the Fourth
Amendment right “of the people to be secure in their per-
sons,” and the right to bodily integrity protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause. We reject the defense
argument that the alleged conduct was simply “boorish” and
not serious enough to implicate the Constitution. We decline
the invitation to draw lines between constitutional and un-
constitutional sexual assaults by government oﬃcials acting
under color of law. Sexual assault is an intentional act that
never serves a legitimate governmental purpose.
   Because we are considering this case on the pleadings, we
do not decide which of the three constitutional theories pro-
vides the best path for litigation. The complaint should have
survived the motion to dismiss under each theory. If it be-
comes necessary later to focus on doctrinal diﬀerences among
these theories, jury instructions applying them to actual evi-
dence may provide the best opportunity to do so.
No. 22-1550                                                     3

I. Factual and Procedural Background
    We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true
and draw reasonable inferences in plaintiﬀ’s favor because we
are reviewing de novo a dismissal on the pleadings for failure
to state a claim. E.g., Word v. City of Chicago, 946 F.3d 391, 393
(7th Cir. 2020).
   A. The Ride Along
    When plaintiﬀ Zailey Hess was a seventeen-year-old stu-
dent, one of her classes required her to participate in a ride
along with a police oﬃcer. On February 15, 2019, Hess went
on a ride along with defendant Jamie Garcia of the Ham-
mond, Indiana, police. Oﬃcer Garcia picked Hess up in his
private vehicle and drove her to the police station before his
shift began. Garcia introduced Hess to other oﬃcers around
the station before leading her to the parking lot. Hess got into
the patrol vehicle and put on her seatbelt.
   The complaint describes a day-long sequence of
inappropriate comments and questions punctuated by
unwelcome physical sexual contacts. When Hess got into the
patrol car, Oﬃcer Garcia immediately began touching her,
reaching over and rubbing his arm against her breast while
adjusting the seatbelt she had already secured. Throughout
the ride along, Oﬃcer Garcia repeatedly reached across the
center console to place his hand on Hess’s thigh. Even outside
the vehicle, Garcia’s sexual groping continued. Garcia drove
Hess to a gas station in what Hess described as a bad area of
town where the cashier worked behind bulletproof glass.
Hess and Garcia went inside the store. Hess got in line behind
Garcia, who told her to move to stand in front of him. When
Hess did so, Oﬃcer Garcia placed his hand on her buttocks.
4                                                   No. 22-1550

    Throughout the ride along, Garcia also asked Hess about
her dating and sex life. While on patrol, Garcia told Hess he
was going to ﬁnd a prostitute for her. Garcia stopped a
woman he assumed was a prostitute, introduced Hess, and
told the woman that Hess wanted to become a prostitute her-
self.
    Late in the evening, Garcia and other oﬃcers made an ar-
rest. After leaving the scene, Garcia drove Hess to a secluded
area where they met another Hammond police oﬃcer. In this
secluded area, Garcia spoke to the other oﬃcer through open
car windows and repeatedly asked the other oﬃcer if he
wanted to have sex with Hess, who stayed in the car, terriﬁed.
    After Hess’s ride along, another female classmate partici-
pated in the course-required ride, also with Oﬃcer Garcia.
When the classmate told Hess that Garcia had acted inappro-
priately with her, the two students reported their experiences
to a teacher. Defendant John Doughty was the Hammond po-
lice chief at the time.
    B. This Lawsuit
    Hess sued Garcia and Chief Doughty in their individual
capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although a complaint need
not plead legal theories, e.g., Koger v. Dart, 950 F.3d 971, 974–
75 (7th Cir. 2020), the complaint made clear that Hess was in-
voking the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants Doughty and Garcia
ﬁled separate motions to dismiss. The district court granted
both motions and dismissed all claims with prejudice. Z.H. v.
No. 22-1550                                                              5

Garcia, No. 3:21-CV-101 JD, 2022 WL 857035, at *6 (N.D. Ind.
Mar. 21, 2022). This appeal followed. 1
II. Analysis
    “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
suﬃcient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibil-
ity when … [it] pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007).
    A. Common Ground Across the Circuits
    In similar cases, diﬀerent circuits have taken several doc-
trinal paths to a common ground: sexual assault by an oﬃcial
acting under color of law violates the constitutional rights of
the victim. E.g., United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 47 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“victims [have] a right under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be free from sexual abuse by a state actor”);
United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 444–45, 450 (3d Cir. 2018)
(aﬃrming conviction of correctional oﬃcer who raped pre-
trial detainee for violating constitutional right to bodily integ-
rity); United States v. Sepulveda, 64 F.4th 700, 703–04 (5th Cir.
2023) (same for police oﬃcer who committed sexual assault);
Sexton v. Cernuto, 18 F.4th 177, 184, 192–93 (6th Cir. 2021) (re-
jecting qualiﬁed immunity for oﬃcial who facilitated sexual

    1 Based on Hess’s youth and the nature of the allegations, the district
court allowed Hess to sue without making her name public. At oral argu-
ment on appeal, we questioned the need and justification for continuing
the secrecy since Hess was by then an adult. Hess agreed to use her real
name in the caption and other documents.
6                                                                No. 22-1550

assault, violating victim’s right to bodily integrity); Johnson v.
Phillips, 664 F.3d 232, 239 (8th Cir. 2011) (law was “clearly es-
tablished in this circuit that the commission of a sexual assault
by a government oﬃcial acting under color of law constitutes
a violation of due process that shocks the conscience”); United
States v. Gonzalez, 533 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In-
cluded in the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
is the concept of personal bodily integrity and speciﬁcally ‘the
right to be free from certain sexually motivated physical as-
saults….’”), quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 262
(1997). 2
    Seventh Circuit precedents involving sexual assault by an
oﬃcial acting under color of law approve of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clause theo-
ries of liability. E.g., Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331, 337–38 (7th Cir.
2006) (concluding that sexual abuse by school dean may vio-
late Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses); 3 Wudtke v.
Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 1997) (same for sexual
assault by school superintendent). The parties have not cited

    2  See also, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 382–83 (5th Cir.
2008) (city attorney who raped misdemeanants violated constitutional
right to bodily integrity); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 794 (8th
Cir. 1998) (acknowledging due process right to be free from sexual touch-
ing by officials); Doe by Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School Dist., 81 F.3d
1395, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996) (“At least since 1987, the law has been clearly
established that … physical sexual abuse by a school employee violates”
due process right to bodily integrity); Dang Vang v. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476,
479 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting “constitutional right to be free from sexual as-
sault”).
    3 A different, statutory holding in Doe v. Smith was abrogated by Fitz-
gerald v. Barnstable School Committee, 555 U.S. 246 (2009).
No. 22-1550                                                                7

and we have not found a factually analogous case from this
circuit addressing a Fourth Amendment theory of liability.
    Several other circuits say that sexual assault by an oﬃcial
violates the Equal Protection Clause. E.g., Jennings v. Univ. of
North Carolina, 444 F.3d 255, 273–74, 279 (4th Cir. 2006) (sexual
assault is “a ‘severe’ example of sexually harassing behavior”
that violates Constitution as sex discrimination); Johnson v.
Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 1999) (clearly estab-
lished that oﬃcial sexually harassing private citizen violates
clause).
    Some courts apply the Fourth Amendment to similar facts
and reject Fourteenth Amendment theories. Dickey v. United
States, 174 F. Supp. 3d 366, 370–71 (D.D.C. 2016) (analyzing
oﬃcer fondling of genitalia during search under Fourth
Amendment); Jones v. District of Columbia, No. 00-1773 (RJL),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27746, at *10–12 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2002)
(analyzing sexual misconduct during arrest under Fourth
Amendment, rejecting due process theory); see also Fontana v.
Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 882 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Sexual misconduct
by a police oﬃcer … generally is analyzed under the Four-
teenth Amendment; sexual harassment by a police oﬃcer of a
criminal suspect during a continuing seizure is analyzed un-
der the Fourth Amendment.”). 4
    Other circuits say that these claims are best analyzed not
as Fourth Amendment violations but as violations of the right
to bodily integrity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. Tyson v. County of Sabine, 42 F.4th 508,

    4 See also Smith v. Ray, 409 F. App’x 641, 649 (4th Cir. 2011) (non-prec-

edential) (“sexual assault by a police officer clearly violates the security
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment”).
8                                                   No. 22-1550

514–20 (5th Cir. 2022) (favoring Fourteenth Amendment the-
ory over Fourth Amendment where oﬃcer went to woman’s
home for welfare check and sexually abused her); Martinez v.
Hongyi Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2010) (same for rape
by physician); Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 125, 136–37 (2d Cir.
2002) (same for oﬃcer recording woman undressing); Rogers,
152 F.3d at 796 (same for rape by oﬃcer, noting the “violation
here is diﬀerent in nature from one that can be analyzed un-
der the fourth amendment reasonableness standard,” as “[n]o
degree of sexual assault by a police oﬃcer acting under color
of law could ever be proper”); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620,
628 (4th Cir. 1997) (same for rape by oﬃcer after traﬃc stop);
Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 1997)
(favorably citing Wellham for point that sexual assault outside
an arrest can violate bodily integrity).
    Some cases rejecting the Fourth Amendment for the Four-
teenth say that the Fourth Amendment applies only when the
challenged conduct occurred in the context of a criminal in-
vestigation. E.g., Poe, 282 F.3d at 136 (“The Fourth Amend-
ment is not the proper source of Poe’s constitutional right be-
cause Pearl’s objectionable conduct occurred outside of a
criminal investigation….”); Jones, 104 F.3d at 628 (rejecting
Fourth Amendment theory because “the harm inﬂicted did
not occur in the course of an attempted arrest or apprehension
of one suspected of criminal conduct”).
    With respect, that narrow view of the Fourth Amendment
seems to be contrary to Supreme Court precedent. For exam-
ple, in City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), the Court
expressly rejected the argument that the Fourth Amendment
did not apply to searches of pagers and text messages because
their owners were not under criminal investigation. The
No. 22-1550                                                     9

Court wrote: “It is well settled that the Fourth Amendment’s
protection extends beyond the sphere of criminal investiga-
tions. ‘The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts
by oﬃcers of the Government,’ without regard to whether the
government actor is investigating crime or performing an-
other function.” 560 U.S. at 755–56, quoting Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (citation
omitted).
    As we explain next, Hess has plausibly alleged facts sup-
porting liability under the theories of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. At this early
procedural stage, we leave all three of these doctrinal lanes
open on remand, and we see no basis for requiring plaintiﬀ to
choose just one or two while federal courts are sorting out
these theories. Alternative legal theories for relief for the same
injury can present procedural challenges at trial but are cer-
tainly permissible.
   B. Equal Protection
    The district court held that Hess failed to allege a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause because her complaint did not
identify a similarly situated individual whom Garcia treated
more favorably. Z.H., 2022 WL 857035, at *5. We reverse dis-
missal on this theory for two reasons. First, identifying a sim-
ilarly situated individual is not necessary at the pleading
stage so long as the complaint plausibly alleges diﬀerential
treatment motivated by plaintiﬀ’s membership in a group
that is distinct for equal protection purposes. Second, in equal
protection cases plausibly alleging sexual assault or sexual
10                                                           No. 22-1550

harassment, the identiﬁcation of a similarly situated individ-
ual is not necessary at any procedural stage.5
    First, we repeat that even in cases where identiﬁcation of
a similarly situated individual may be necessary at trial, such
identiﬁcation is not required in the pleadings. FKFJ, Inc. v. Vil-
lage of Worth, 11 F.4th 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2021) (“we have con-
sistently held a plaintiﬀ need not identify a similarly situated
entity in its complaint”); Capra v. Cook County Bd. of Review,
733 F.3d 705, 717 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal based on
failure to name similarly situated comparator in complaint);
Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 748 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012)
(reversing dismissal: “Even the more demanding pleading re-
quirements under Iqbal and Twombly do not require a plaintiﬀ
to identify speciﬁc comparators in a complaint.”); see gener-
ally Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002)
(reversing dismissal because plaintiﬀ alleging employment
discrimination need not plead elements of McDonnell Douglas
method of proof, including comparator: “Given that the
prima facie case operates as a ﬂexible evidentiary standard, it
should not be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for
discrimination cases.”).

     5 Garcia argues that Hess waived her equal protection theory. We dis-

agree. The district court addressed equal protection on the merits, and
Hess’s brief before this court engaged with that ruling. We also disagree
with the district court’s suggestion that the theory was “as good as”
waived before that court. Z.H., 2022 WL 857035, at *5. Hess’s response
brief in the district court set forth the proper standard of review and said
clearly why the complaint adequately alleged a violation: It is plausible
that Garcia subjected Hess to groping and sexual harassment because
Hess is female. Further development of the obvious connection between
sexual misconduct and sex discrimination is not necessary to state a claim
under an equal protection theory.
No. 22-1550                                                                  11

    Second, naming a similarly situated person who was not
subjected to sexual misconduct by a public oﬃcial is
unnecessary even at later stages of litigation. As a matter of
evidence in equal protection or discrimination cases,
comparators may help a plaintiﬀ undermine a defendant’s
oﬀered justiﬁcation for his treatment of the plaintiﬀ. But we
recognize that requiring a comparator “would elevate form
over substance” where the facts alleged “clearly suggest
harassment by public oﬃcials that has no conceivable
legitimate purpose.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748. “The nature of
the harm is such that there is virtually no scenario imaginable
where sexual harassment … is substantially related to
important governmental objectives.” Bohen v. East Chicago,
799 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, no
comparator is necessary in cases of sexual assault or sexual
harassment by government oﬃcials because there is no
legitimate governmental purpose for such actions. 6
    Counsel for Garcia made the surprising assertion in brief-
ing and at oral argument that there could be a governmental
interest served by the conduct alleged here. Counsel sug-
gested that Garcia “was making for an exciting ride along”
with his “frankly innocuous” yet “perhaps boorish conduct.”
Garcia’s brieﬁng repeats the characterization of his behavior
as nothing more than “boorish ﬂirtation,” “arguably pre-
sented in a joking fashion intended to make the ride-along
more sensational but not dangerous.” Perhaps the defense

    6Other circuits agree. E.g., Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880 (repeating “there
can be no ‘countervailing governmental interest’ to justify sexual miscon-
duct”); Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994)
(“Obviously, there is never any justification for sexually molesting a
schoolchild, and thus, no state interest [served.]”).
12                                                 No. 22-1550

might try to persuade a jury with that theory—a matter we
leave to the district court in the ﬁrst instance—but we con-
tinue to reject the idea that a police oﬃcer’s sexual assault or
sexual harassment serves any legitimate governmental inter-
est.
    To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Hess
had to allege plausibly that Garcia “discriminated against
[her] based on [her] membership in a deﬁnable class.” Word,
946 F.3d at 396, quoting Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453
(7th Cir. 1996). The complaint describes Garcia’s abuse of his
position of authority by groping Hess, telling another male
oﬃcer he should have sex with Hess in a remote location, ask-
ing Hess about her sexual experience, and seeking out a pros-
titute to ask for “tips” on behalf of Hess for her supposed fu-
ture in the profession. All during a ride along meant to edu-
cate a student about law enforcement. There is no suggestion
here that Garcia was an “equal opportunity harasser” who
sexually assaulted men as well as women. Plaintiﬀ’s allega-
tions easily support an inference that Garcia acted this way
based on Hess’s sex.
     C. Fourth Amendment
    To state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiﬀ
must show that a search or seizure occurred and that the
search or seizure was unreasonable. See, e.g., Carlson v. Buko-
vic, 621 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 2010). Hess’s complaint sup-
ports the theory that seizures occurred through sexual touch-
ing without consent, see id. at 620–21 (whether oﬃcer’s touch
constituted seizure was question for jury considering all cir-
cumstances, including consent and governmental purpose),
and through being driven to a remote area where Garcia re-
peatedly asked another oﬃcer if he wanted to have sex with
No. 22-1550                                                                13

Hess. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) (“sei-
zure occurs if ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
[or she] was not free to leave’”), quoting United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (principal opinion). In ad-
dition to pleading these facts with obvious ties to the Fourth
Amendment—and even though plaintiﬀs need not plead le-
gal theories, e.g., Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12
(2014); Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital, 915 F.3d 473, 479
(7th Cir. 2019)—the complaint explicitly alleges a Fourth
Amendment violation. 7

    7 The district court found that Hess withdrew the Fourth Amendment

theory, Z.H., 2022 WL 857035, at *1 n.1, and the issue was not raised before
this court until oral argument. However, we disagree with the district
court over withdrawal and exercise our discretion to review the Fourth
Amendment theory. All parties understood that the complaint raised a
Fourth Amendment theory. Each defendant’s motion to dismiss ad-
dressed the Fourth Amendment, and Hess’s briefs cited precedent for ap-
plying the Fourth Amendment. The district court seems to have relied on
one sentence from plaintiff’s briefing to find withdrawal: “Rather than
beat a dead horse, Plaintiff ZH is comfortable with the Court ruling that
only the 14th Amendment applies.” That statement was conditional,
premised on the district court denying the motion to dismiss on the Four-
teenth Amendment theory. As plaintiff explained, such a denial would
allow the lawsuit to proceed, and plaintiff could refine legal theories later.
Nowhere did Hess indicate she did not want the district court to rule on
the merits of the Fourth Amendment even if that court rejected her Four-
teenth Amendment theories. In fact, plaintiff wrote that if the court dis-
missed the Fourth Amendment theory, “Plaintiff seeks leave to amend.”
Allowing Hess’s Fourth Amendment theory to fall away would be unfair
considering how clearly her complaint invoked the Fourth Amendment
and how persistently she briefed the issue on the merits before the district
court.
14                                                              No. 22-1550

  A Fourth Amendment seizure can occur regardless of
whether an oﬃcer is involved in a criminal investigation:
        In our view, the reason why an oﬃcer might en-
        ter a house or eﬀectuate a seizure is wholly ir-
        relevant to the threshold question whether the
        Amendment applies. What matters is the intru-
        sion on the people’s security from governmen-
        tal interference. Therefore, the right against un-
        reasonable seizures would be no less trans-
        gressed if the seizure … was undertaken to col-
        lect evidence … or on a whim, for no reason at

     Garcia argues that Hess waived her right to the application of the
Fourth Amendment to her claims by not addressing the district court’s
finding of “withdrawal” in her opening brief before this court. We disa-
gree. Hess put squarely before this court the merits of her claim that Gar-
cia’s conduct violated her constitutional right to be free from sexual as-
sault by a government official. “When an issue or claim is properly before
the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced
by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and
apply the proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Finan-
cial Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); see also Williams-Guice v. Board of Educ.,
45 F.3d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1995) (“litigants’ failure to address the legal ques-
tion from the right perspective does not render us powerless to work the
problem out properly. A court of appeals may and often should do so un-
bidden rather than apply an incorrect rule of law to the parties’ circum-
stances”). As explained above, different courts allow similar claims to pro-
ceed under several legal theories. The circuits’ conflicting opinions about
the appropriate constitutional theories for officials’ sexual assaults present
an unusual situation where there is value in considering which constitu-
tional path or paths best fit Hess’s claim. By analyzing Hess’s claim under
the Fourth Amendment, we are not identifying sua sponte a claim that the
plaintiff did not bring. Instead, we are properly addressing a legal theory
that fits the claim squarely before us. See United States v. Robl, 8 F.4th 515,
528 n.32 (7th Cir. 2021).
No. 22-1550                                                   15

       all. As we have observed on more than one oc-
       casion, it would be “anomalous to say that the
       individual and his private property are fully
       protected by the Fourth Amendment only when
       the individual is suspected of criminal behav-
       ior.”
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 69 (1992), quoting Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). Hess does not re-
ceive less protection against unreasonable seizures under the
Fourth Amendment because she encountered Oﬃcer Garcia
in her role as a student learning about law enforcement rather
than as a criminal suspect.
    A seizure “can take the form of ‘physical force’ or a ‘show
of authority’ that ‘in some way restrain[s] the liberty’ of the
person.” Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021), quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). “It must be recognized
that whenever a police oﬃcer accosts an individual and re-
strains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. Physically grabbing someone is likely to
be a seizure because it is likely to restrict movement, at least
brieﬂy. “The ﬂeeting nature of some seizures by force un-
doubtedly may inform what damages a civil plaintiﬀ may re-
cover…. But brief seizures are seizures all the same.” Torres,
141 S. Ct. at 999.
    Not all touches by oﬃcers rise to the level of seizures un-
der the Fourth Amendment, of course, but sexual assaults do.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to
be secure in their persons … against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It is “the only part of the
Constitution directly addressing seizures of the person by po-
lice.” Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404 (7th Cir. 1985)
16                                                   No. 22-1550

(Easterbrook, J., concurring). Sexual assault intrudes into bod-
ily security and is quite literally a “seizure,” restricting free-
dom of movement even if brieﬂy. An oﬃcer who sexually as-
saults someone while acting under color of law has seized the
victim for Fourth Amendment purposes.
    Hess has also plausibly alleged a seizure in another way.
A person is seized if, considering the totality of the circum-
stances, a reasonable person in the situation would not feel
free to leave. Carlson, 621 F.3d at 618; see also Mendenhall, 446
U.S. at 554. Late in the evening, Garcia drove Hess to a se-
cluded area where he met another male police oﬃcer and
asked him repeatedly if he wanted to have sex with Hess. It is
plausible that a reasonable person in this situation would not
feel free to leave. Similarly, Hess alleges that Garcia groped
her buttocks after he instructed her to stand in front of him in
a gas station line. Hess notes that the station was in “a bad
area,” and it is plausible that a reasonable person would not
feel free to walk away from Garcia, who provided her trans-
portation. Garcia made the point repeatedly in brieﬁng and at
oral argument that Hess never asked to end the ride along.
There is no requirement that a person ask whether she is free
to leave before a seizure can occur. E.g., Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d
819, 833 (7th Cir. 2010) (“whether a person asks permission to
leave is but one factor among many in the arrest analysis”).
   Because Hess plausibly alleged that a seizure occurred, we
consider whether she plausibly alleged that the seizure was
unreasonable. To assess reasonableness, we look to the gov-
ernmental purpose served by the challenged conduct, “bal-
ancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, quoting
Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–35, 536–37. Even when challenged
No. 22-1550                                                   17

conduct promotes a governmental interest, the Supreme
Court cautions that searches and seizures must not be under-
taken lightly. “Even a limited search of the outer clothing for
weapons [to protect oﬃcer safety] constitutes a severe,
though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and
it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps hu-
miliating experience.” Id. at 24–25. Sexually motivated grop-
ing is an even more severe intrusion upon personal security.
    No governmental interest is served by a state actor sex-
ually assaulting anyone. We agree with Judge Loken: “there
is nothing inappropriate or unusual in imposing virtually per
se Fourth Amendment liability on police oﬃcers who misuse
their power to arrest or otherwise seize a person by commit-
ting sexual assaults.” Rogers, 152 F.3d at 801 (Loken, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). Hess plausibly alleged that
an unreasonable seizure occurred.
   D. Substantive Due Process
    The district court also found that Hess’s complaint failed
to allege a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Z.H., 2022 WL 857035, at *3–5.
We also reverse dismissal on this ground. Our precedents
have recognized a substantive due process right against sex-
ual assault by state actors in cases where no search or seizure
occurred. See Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir.
2003); Wudtke, 128 F.3d at 1063.
    In response to these precedents, Garcia asks us to draw
lines between sexual assault that is unconstitutional and sex-
ual assault that, in his view, is not severe enough to implicate
the Constitution. We decline to do so.
18                                                 No. 22-1550

    Before digging into the substantive due process jurispru-
dence, we acknowledge that the Fourth Amendment will of-
ten provide the proper avenue for litigating a claim of sexual
assault by an oﬃcial acting under color of law. When “the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against [a particular] sort of physi-
cally intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not
the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’
must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Con-
nor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The Supreme Court has even
noted that Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which for-
mulated the “shocks the conscience” test in substantive due
process law that we discuss below, was decided before the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that the Rochin stomach-pumping case “today
would be treated under the Fourth Amendment, albeit with
the same result.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
849 n.9 (1988). At the same time, as a panel of this court, we
also follow circuit precedents recognizing a substantive due
process theory in cases of sexual assault under color of law.
    Further, the Fourth Amendment is triggered only by a
search or seizure. Substantive due process under the Four-
teenth Amendment still protects people from unconstitu-
tional conduct committed under color of law when neither a
search nor seizure occurs. The Supreme Court has cautioned
that Graham “does not hold that all constitutional claims relat-
ing to physically abusive government conduct must arise un-
der either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments; rather, Graham
simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a
speciﬁc constitutional provision … the claim must be ana-
lyzed under the standard appropriate to that speciﬁc
No. 22-1550                                                     19

provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833, quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 272 n.7 (1997). Substantive due process may apply when,
“outside the context of a seizure, … a person [is] injured as a
result of police misconduct.” Id. at 844 (giving example of a
due process claim existing if an oﬃcer crashes into and injures
a person outside the context of that oﬃcer attempting a sei-
zure).
    Hess has alleged that Garcia seized her, but Garcia has dis-
puted those allegations. At this stage of the case, we will not
restrict Hess to a Fourth Amendment theory if her complaint
also pleads facts that set out a plausible Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process theory. It does so.
    The Due Process Clause is violated by an infringement of
a fundamental right through an abuse of government power
that “‘shock[s] the conscience’ of federal judges.” Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992), quoting Rochin,
342 U.S. at 172; see also Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 902 (7th
Cir. 2005). Case law has established a fundamental right to
bodily integrity that includes the right to be free from sexual
assault. See Wudtke, 128 F.3d at 1062 (“Her liberty claim of a
right to bodily integrity is … the type of claim that has often
been recognized as within substantive due process.”). Dobbs
v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), did not
mention or undermine the right to bodily integrity. In fact, the
Court’s opinion emphasized twice that “[n]othing in this
opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents
that do not concern abortion…. It is hard to see how we could
be clearer.” Id. at 2277–78, 2280. Rather, Dobbs refused to
recognize “the right to an abortion” under the Due Process
Clause and said that substantive due process must be “guided
20                                                            No. 22-1550

by the history and tradition that map the essential
components of our Nation’s concept of ordered liberty.” Id. at
2242, 2248. The right to bodily integrity (also referred to as
“personal security”) has long been recognized in law,
including by Blackstone, who traced the right to the Magna
Carta. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *123–25 (citing
the Magna Carta in listing absolute rights including “the right
of personal security” and “the right of personal liberty”). 8
    The Supreme Court explains how to analyze whether an
action shocks the conscience by focusing on “tort law’s spec-
trum of culpability.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848. That spectrum
spans diﬀerent degrees of intent, not diﬀerent degrees of harm.
Id. at 849. Illustrating this point, the Supreme Court found no
conscience-shocking conduct where an oﬃcer unintentionally
killed a motorist during a chase, id. at 836, while it found con-
science-shocking conduct where oﬃcers intentionally had
medical professionals induce vomiting in a suspect to retrieve
evidence, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166, 173. The nature or extent of
the harm was not the Court’s focus. Accord, Jackson v. Indian

     8The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to bodily integrity
as an essential component of our liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807
(1997) (noting the right to refuse medical treatment is grounded in “well
established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from un-
wanted touching”); see also Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 269 (1990) (“Before the turn of the century, this Court observed that
‘no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law.’”), quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“The right to one’s person may be said
to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone.”) (citation omitted).
No. 22-1550                                                     21

Prairie School Dist. 204, 653 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting
action intended to injure is most likely to rise to level of con-
science-shocking); Wudtke, 128 F.3d at 1063–64 (reversing dis-
missal of claim alleging sexual assault because though
“merely negligent action by the state oﬃcial would not be
enough for a substantive due process claim … [the alleged
facts] amount to far more than negligence”).
    The alleged sexual assaults here were intentional, so re-
gardless of whether they were severe, they would fall toward
the worse end of the culpability spectrum, which is concerned
with intent, not with the degree of harm caused by the behav-
ior at issue. Sexual assault invades bodily integrity and cannot
serve a governmental purpose. An oﬃcer’s sexual assault
while acting under color of law is conscience-shocking.
   The district court disagreed. It focused on the level of
harm that it assumed Garcia’s conduct caused, noting that
“[v]ery serious batteries, such as rape and egregious sexual
conduct, have been held as conscience-shocking,” but that
Garcia’s conduct was “not as severe” as that in other cases of
oﬃcer sexual abuse and thus “did not rise to the level neces-
sary” to violate the right to bodily integrity. Z.H., 2022 WL
857035, at *3–4.
    With respect, we disagree with this attempt to draw a line
between constitutional and unconstitutional sexual assaults.
The court’s inquiry into whether the sexual assault was “seri-
ous” enough to be conscience-shocking reads too much into
the use of that word in Alexander. 329 F.3d at 916. There, a
woman argued that oﬃcers violated her right to bodily integ-
rity by threatening her with 40 years of prison time unless she
agreed to wear a wire while exchanging sex for money. Id. at
914–15. In analyzing her claim, this court noted that the right
22                                                               No. 22-1550

to bodily integrity “is infringed by a serious, as distinct from
a nominal or trivial, battery,” and that rape “is not only a bat-
tery, but a very serious battery, and a rape committed under
color of state law is therefore actionable” as a due process vi-
olation. Id. at 916 (citations omitted). Alexander did not say
that some sexual assault is “nominal or trivial” or anything
further about which batteries are serious or not. Alexander did
not set the ﬂoor for a sexual battery qualifying as “serious” at
rape and did not alter the Supreme Court’s instruction that
shocks-the-conscience analysis focus on the spectrum of in-
tent balanced against relevant governmental interest.9
    The most egregious examples of an oﬀense do not change
the ﬂoor for what conduct is criminal or unconstitutional. The
right to bodily integrity is not made harder to violate by the
fact that even worse cases come along, such as where an

     9 This district court case was not the first in this circuit to dismiss sex-
ually abusive official conduct as falling below some unclear bar of egre-
giousness. In Decker v. Tinnel, the court found that an officer’s sexual as-
saults of his ride-along passenger did not shock the conscience. No. 2:04-
CV-227, 2005 WL 3501705 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2005). There, the officer
asked his young ride-along passenger if she would strip for him, forcibly
kissed her multiple times trying to “stick[] his tongue down [her] throat,”
“forced his hand between her closed thighs,” and grabbed her breasts. Id.
at *1–2. The court reasoned the conduct was not “serious” enough to im-
plicate the Due Process Clause because “each touching or kissing incident
lasted only a matter of seconds, and concluded when Decker either
pushed Tinnel away, or told him ‘no.’” Id. at *7–9. The Third Circuit cited
this case and was “not persuaded” by its reasoning that an intentional in-
trusion into bodily integrity was not “serious” enough to be conscience-
shocking. Kane v. Barger, 902 F.3d 185, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding of-
ficer’s behavior conscience-shocking where he “acted for his own personal
gratification … in both touching Kane and photographing her intimate
bodily areas”). We are similarly unpersuaded.
No. 22-1550                                                    23

oﬃcer present during a sexual assault victim’s hospital exam-
ination coerced her into going to a private room and removing
her clothing while he touched her and photographed her gen-
italia on his personal phone, Kane, 902 F.3d at 189–90, where
an oﬃcer sent to a woman’s house for a wellness check forced
her to strip and touch her own genitalia while he mastur-
bated, Tyson, 42 F.4th at 512, 514, or where an oﬃcer sexually
assaulted a woman in her home after seeing her address on
her driver’s license during a traﬃc stop, Stidham v. Jackson,
No. 2:07cv00028, 2009 WL 792961, at *1–3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 24,
2009). These cases and the one before us today diﬀer factually
and may diﬀer in terms of severity and appropriate damages
if liability is proven, but they all involve the alleged violation
of bodily integrity through conscience-shocking oﬃcial ac-
tion.
    We decline to recognize a category of constitutionally per-
missible sexual assault by a public oﬃcial. An oﬃcer acting
under color of law does not avoid violating the Constitution
by sexually assaulting a member of the public but stopping
short of rape or use of force at the level federal judges might
consider extreme. Otherwise, line drawing would be impos-
sible. We asked counsel for Garcia where this line should be
and received no answer except that wherever the line is for a
sexual assault to qualify as a violation of bodily integrity, that
line required worse conduct than Garcia’s. We will not engage
in such line drawing. Accord, Tyson, 42 F.4th at 520 (denying
qualiﬁed immunity and rejecting argument that lack of force
defeated claim: “No degree of physical sexual abuse eﬀected
for a law enforcement oﬃcer’s sexual gratiﬁcation is justiﬁed
by a legitimate governmental objective …. [P]hysical sexual
24                                                              No. 22-1550

abuse by a state oﬃcial oﬀends the Constitution. No reasona-
ble oﬃcer could believe otherwise.”) (citations omitted). 10
    Where, as here, a plaintiﬀ plausibly alleges sexual assault
by a public oﬃcial acting under color of law, that plaintiﬀ has
stated a claim for a violation of her right to bodily integrity
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such conduct
shocks the conscience because it is intentional and serves no
governmental purpose.
     E. Claims Against Chief Doughty
   We aﬃrm the dismissal with prejudice of all claims against
Chief Doughty. In Section 1983 suits, oﬃcials are held ac-
countable only for their own misconduct. Kemp v. Fulton
County, 27 F.4th 491, 497–98 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676 (“Government oﬃcials may not be held liable for
the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a
theory of respondeat superior.”). To claim personal liability
against a supervisor for a supervisee’s conduct, a plaintiﬀ
must plausibly allege that the supervisor played some role in

     10 See also Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020)

(“it is ‘obvious’ that a juvenile corrections officer should not sexually har-
ass or abuse a juvenile ward as [such conduct] is always wrong”); Johnson,
664 F.3d at 239 (“[I]t [is] clearly established in this circuit that the commis-
sion of a sexual assault by a government official acting under color of law
constitutes a violation of due process that shocks the conscience.”); Fon-
tana, 262 F.3d at 875, 882 n.8 (reversing dismissal of claim based on officer
sexually harassing arrested woman in back of squad car on the way to
booking and noting that no qualified immunity would apply because the
conduct was inherently wrong); Stoneking v. Bradford Area School Dist., 882
F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989) (“sexual molestation of a student could not
possibly be deemed an acceptable practice … [so] a student's right to be
free from such molestation may be viewed as clearly established even be-
fore” relevant 1977 Supreme Court precedent).
No. 22-1550                                                     25

the conduct through facilitation, approval, or turning “a blind
eye for fear of what they might see.” Id. at 498, quoting Mat-
thews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).
   This complaint alleges that Chief Doughty “permitted”
the ride along while knowing another oﬃcer had accused
Garcia of acting inappropriately “with females.” In brieﬁng
before the district court, Hess clariﬁed that by “permitted,”
the complaint meant that Chief Doughty “failed to issue an
order prohibiting Oﬃcer Garcia from having female ride
alongs.” These allegations do not plausibly allege that Chief
Doughty played a role at the level required to impose per-
sonal liability. Further, Hess has not identiﬁed any amend-
ments she could make to the complaint to cure the problem,
so the district court correctly dismissed the claim against
Chief Doughty with prejudice.
    To sum up, Hess’s complaint plausibly alleges claims un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the
Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. On a ﬁnal note, counsel for Garcia said at oral
argument that reversing dismissal would open proverbial
ﬂoodgates and that this is not the kind of case federal courts
want to hear “every time that incidents such as these” occur
involving conduct “as frankly innocuous” as Garcia’s. We dis-
agree with the premise. We will not close the federal court-
house doors to people sexually assaulted by government oﬃ-
cials acting under color of law. The dismissal of plaintiﬀ’s
claims against Chief Doughty is AFFIRMED. The dismissal of
her claims against Oﬃcer Garcia is REVERSED, and the case
is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
26                                                  No. 22-1550

   EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge concurring. I concur in the
judgment and join all but Part II.D of the court’s opinion.
   Part II.D states that sexual assault by a police oﬃcer may
be condemned under “substantive due process.” At least two
decisions in this circuit say this. Alexander v. DeAngelo, 329
F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2003); Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057,
1062–63 (7th Cir. 1997). Defendants have not asked us to over-
rule them. Given the principle of party presentation, see
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020), I would
stop there. My colleagues continue, however, with language
favorable to those holdings.
    I ﬁnd them (and equivalent decisions in other circuits)
hard to reconcile with Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989), which holds that, when the Fourth Amendment sup-
plies “an explicit textual source of constitutional protection
against [a particular] sort of physically intrusive governmen-
tal conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized no-
tion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for ana-
lyzing these claims.” See also Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
849 n.9 (1998). My colleagues acknowledge those decisions
but believe that we are bound by Alexander and Wudtke. Yet
neither Alexander nor Wudtke mentions Graham, and we are
supposed to follow the Justices when there is a conﬂict. Part
II.C of today’s opinion holds, correctly, that the Fourth
Amendment supplies an appropriate means to analyze Of-
ﬁcer Garcia’s conduct. It follows that substantive due process
does not.
    Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct.
2228 (2022), reiterated that substantive due process is limited
to a few “fundamental” rights with strong historical prove-
nance but no other constitutional footing. Alexander and
No. 22-1550                                                   27

Wudtke treat “bodily integrity” as the qualifying “fundamen-
tal” right, but this takes us back to Graham. The Fourth
Amendment reads directly on bodily integrity, and Graham
tells us that the rules that Amendment supplies for searches
and seizures cannot be avoided by invoking substantive due
process. Like the panels in Alexander and Wudtke, the dissent-
ing Justices in Dobbs contended that bodily integrity is a fun-
damental right that receives protection through substantive
due process. 142 S. Ct. at 2319, 2322, 2328 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). The majority in Dobbs was not persuaded, and that deci-
sion binds us.
    One norm under the Fourth Amendment is that courts
evaluate reasonableness objectively. See, e.g., Torres v. Madrid,
141 S. Ct. 989 (2021); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996). It does not matter what the police think or intend nor
what the private party believes. Move to substantive due pro-
cess, though, and we ask whether conduct shocks the con-
science. Whether the conscience involved is that of a judge, a
juror, an oﬃcer, or a private party, the inquiry is subjective.
And whether conduct shocks a particular conscience lacks
historical provenance as a legal standard. This approach was
created by the Supreme Court from whole cloth in the Twen-
tieth Century, long after the Due Process Clauses were pro-
posed and ratiﬁed.
    If the Supreme Court had held that substantive due pro-
cess provides the right way to analyze oﬀensive physical
touching or threats of rape in remote locations that amount to
seizures, that would be that. Dobbs insisted that it was not dis-
turbing any line of decisions, other than holdings about abor-
tion. But Graham shows that by 1989 it was established that
substantive due process is not the way to analyze Hess’s
28                                               No. 22-1550

contentions. Graham was all about bodily injury inﬂicted both
directly and indirectly by oﬃcers’ misconduct, so bodily in-
tegrity cannot be an escape hatch out of Graham’s purview.
Police are accountable for objectively unreasonable searches
and seizures, but they are not liable just because jurors are
disgusted by an oﬃcer’s loutish behavior.