Court Opinion

ID: 9929717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-03 18:11:41.489437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:45:18.726631
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00362-CV

                                  COURT OF APPEALS

                       THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                          CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

            IN THE INTEREST OF D.W., A.W., I.W., I.W., CHILDREN

                   On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
                            of Nueces County, Texas.

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
                      Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

        Appellant S.S.W. (Mother) appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to

the children, D.W., A.W., I.W.1, and I.W.2.1 The attorney ad litem for the children also

appeals the judgment. In three issues, Mother argues that: (1) the judgment is void

because trial did not commence before the lapsing of the statutory dismissal date; and

there is legally
        1 To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights,

parents and children are referred to by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d). We designate
I.W. as 1 and 2 for clarification purposes.
and factually insufficient evidence supporting the (2) the statutory termination grounds,

and (3) that termination was in the children’s best interest. The children’s attorney ad litem

argues in her sole issue that there is insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s best

interest finding. 2 We affirm.

                                         I.       BACKGROUND

A.      Pretrial Proceedings

        Mother and her ex-husband D.W. (Father) are the parents of D.W., A.W., I.W.1,

and I.W.2, who were aged eleven, seven, six, and four, respectively, at the time of trial.

On May 27, 2021, appellee, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the

Department), filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights to her four

children. The petition was accompanied by an affidavit in support of removal alleging

domestic violence and methamphetamine use by Mother and her paramour J.G.

According to the affidavit, both Mother and J.G. had threatened to harm the children and

used methamphetamine in their presence. A.W. was observed to have fresh bruises and

cuts almost daily. A Department investigator visited the family’s home and observed that

holes were punched in the wall and that multiple doors were broken in half. The

investigator also saw faint blood stains on the carpet. Mother had bruises and swelling on

her face, arms, and shoulders. The Department sought removal of the children after

Mother violated her safety plan multiple times which required her to always be supervised

with her children and that J.G. not stay at the home overnight.

        2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father, D.W. However, he does

not appeal.

                                                     2
       The trial court named the Department as the children’s temporary managing

conservator, and the statutory dismissal date was initially set at May 30, 2022. At a March

16, 2022 hearing, the trial court extended the dismissal date to November 26, 2022,

pursuant to § 263.401(b) of the family code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). On

May 19, 2022, the trial court entered an order that J.G. be removed from Mother’s home

because it was necessary for the children’s protection. The trial court also ordered that

J.G. have no contact with the children.

       At a September 28, 2022 hearing, the trial court ordered that the dismissal date be

extended to March 26, 2023, pursuant to § 263.403 of the family code, allowing for a

monitored return of the children to Mother. See id. § 263.403. Trial commenced on March

9, 2023, and resumed on June 1, July 7, and July 18, 2023. After trial commenced, on

April 21, 2023, the children were removed again from Mother’s care due to the

Department’s safety concerns.

B.     Trial Record

       Father testified that he was incarcerated at the time of trial for aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon. He explained that in 2019, while living with Mother, he found

Mother with another man and stabbed him. Mother’s grandmother testified that the

relationship between Father and Mother was “a violent relationship . . . and the children

saw a lot.”

       A police report dated October 27, 2020, indicates that officers were called to the

residence that evening and observed that Mother was bleeding from her nose and

forehead and that she had a large contusion on her forehead. Mother told police she was

assaulted by her boyfriend J.G. Mother reported that J.G. stomped on the family’s cat

                                             3
until its eyes bulged out. J.G. then kicked Mother three times on her side and stomach.

J.G. then put a knife to Mother’s throat and threatened to kill Mother and the children.

Finally, J.G. took the cat into the bathroom and slit its throat before leaving the residence.

       At trial, Mother testified that on the night of October 27, 2020, she and J.G. were

using drugs, and they began fighting. She said the children were in the bedroom and did

not witness the altercation. Mother signed an affidavit of non-prosecution concerning the

incident. Mother stated she experimented with methamphetamine but was not “on it on

it.”

       A review report filed in November 2022 and entered into evidence stated that

Mother failed to inform the Department that J.G. was residing with her and that another

domestic violence incident was reported in September of 2021. According to a

subsequent review report, the children disclosed that J.G. was residing in the home. A

therapist also advised the Department that Mother and J.G. were not making themselves

available for counseling.

       Denise Guerrero, A.W.’s first grade teacher, testified that on February 7, 2023,

A.W. told Guerrero that J.G. was living with them but not to tell the Department

caseworker. On February 15, A.W. told Guerrero that Mother beats A.W. and leaves

bruises on her arm. On February 16, A.W. told Guerrero that Mother wanted to punch her

the night before and Mother told the children that she wanted them to go away because

she hated them. A.W. said that an abrasion on her knee was caused by Mother. On

February 17, A.W. reported that J.G. tried to slap D.W. while walking to school. On March

1, Guerrero observed a dime-sized bruise to A.W.’s wrist. A.W. said she was late to school

that day because Mother was beating the children.

                                              4
         Gina Morris, a counselor at the children’s school, testified that A.W. told her that

Mother beat the children and the family dog every night, and she showed Morris a bruise

on her arm. A.W. told Morris she did not feel safe at home. A.W. told Morris that Mother

pushed her on another occasion causing her to scrape her knee. Morris stated that I.W.1

who was in kindergarten was still wearing diapers. I.W.1 told Morris that his siblings were

not at school that morning because they were hurt. I.W.1 then explained that Mother beat

the children with a belt the night before and that Mother pulled I.W.2’s hair. On April 20,

A.W. reported that J.G. was hitting Mother again and that J.G. was drinking a lot. A.W.

shared that Mother wears a sweater to hide bruises when she comes to the school. Morris

also spoke to I.W.1 that day who said that Mother hits him with a belt and put hot sauce

in his mouth so he would stop crying. I.W.1 stated that Mother also put hot sauce in I.W.2’s

mouth. I.W.2 stated that after the Department caseworker left the residence two nights

ago, J.G. punched Mother in the face. On April 21, A.W. told Morris that Mother hits I.W.2

with a shoe all over his body.

         The Department entered photographs into evidence showing that J.G. was at

Mother’s residence with the children on April 9, 2023, in violation of the court’s no-contact

order.

         Naomi Quintero, a Department employee, testified that she became the family’s

Department caseworker at the beginning of April 2023. She conducted weekly visits to

the home. On one visit she discovered J.G. hiding in a bedroom closet. On another visit,

she observed I.W.1 and I.W.2 with full and saggy diapers. Quintero testified that A.W. got

lice in January 2023 and that it remained untreated for months.

                                              5
       On April 21, 2023, the Department again removed the children from Mother’s home

due to safety concerns. On June 23, 2023, Christian Escamilla, a Department

investigator, opened an investigation into I.W.1’s abuse allegations. During an interview

at the children’s advocacy center, I.W.1 stated that Mother spanks him with a belt and

that J.G. cusses at Mother. I.W.1 told his foster parents that J.G. and Mother strangled

him with a belt.

       Mother testified that she would be moving into a new apartment the following

Monday. Mother admitted that J.G. would visit the family so he could see the children and

give her money. Mother stated she is employed cleaning offices two to three days a week.

Mother recently obtained a tattoo with J.G.’s name on her neck. Mother stated that she

would not allow J.G. to physically abuse her in the future. Mother admitted that J.G. had

a history of using methamphetamine.

       J.G. has an extensive criminal history, including assault, theft, and drug offenses.

J.G. was charged with continuous violence against the family, concerning a prior

paramour. J.G. testified that he and Mother still speak, despite being ordered out of the

home with the children previously. J.G. stated he is on medication to stabilize his mood

because of his mood swings. J.G. failed to complete court-ordered services, including

counseling and drug testing. J.G. only recently began submitting to testing, and he tested

positive for marijuana.

       At the time of trial, D.W. resided in a foster home in Houston. I.W.2 and A.W.

resided together in a separate foster home in Houston. I.W.1 resided in a treatment foster

home in Edinburg. Vanessa Test, a conservatorship specialist with the Department,

testified that I.W.1 is suspected to have autism and that he receives special therapies in

                                            6
his current placement, including behavioral and mental health therapy. Test testified that

A.W. and I.W.2 had initial adjustment issues in their placement and that they believe they

will return soon to Mother. Test stated that D.W. is adjusting well to his new placement.

D.W. is diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder, adjustment disorder, child neglect,

and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. D.W. is currently in therapy. Test stated that

D.W., A.W., and I.W.1 want to return to Mother. I.W.2 did not communicate her wishes

due to her age.

        Test testified that the Department is concerned with returning the children to

Mother because of the potential for ongoing domestic violence. She stated that the

Department is also concerned about the children’s aggressive behaviors and

inappropriate discipline techniques used by J.G. and Mother. Test said that the main

concerns with J.G. were anger management and domestic violence.

C.      Trial Court’s Ruling

        The trial court signed an order terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), and (P). See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

(E), (N), (O), (P). The trial court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights

was in the children’s best interests. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). This appeal followed.

                          II.    STATUTORY DISMISSAL DEADLINE

        In her first issue, Mother contends that the termination decree is void because the

trial court lost jurisdiction when trial was not commenced after the statutory dismissal

date.

                                              7
A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “Before a court may enter judgment against a party, the court must have obtained

jurisdiction over that party pursuant to applicable rules or statutes.” Whatley v. Walker,

302 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). A judgment is

void when the court rendering judgment had no jurisdiction over the parties or property,

no jurisdiction over the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or

no capacity to act. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020). We review whether a

trial court has jurisdiction de novo. Joyner v. Joyner, 352 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2011, no pet.).

       Section 263.401(a) of the family code provides that if a trial court fails to commence

the trial on the merits or grant an extension within one year after the trial court appointed

the Department as temporary managing conservator, the trial court’s jurisdiction

terminates, and the case is automatically dismissed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.401(a) (providing that the trial court’s jurisdiction ends on the first Monday after the

first anniversary of the date the trial court rendered a temporary order appointing the

department as temporary managing conservator); In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 292

(Tex. 2021). However, § 263.401(b) provides that the trial court may extend its jurisdiction

by an additional 180 days if extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining

in the Department’s conservatorship and continuing the Department’s appointment is in

the child’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.401(b). This extension may be

made “orally on the record or in some other writing.” In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 299.

       Notwithstanding the provisions of § 263.401, the trial court may retain jurisdiction

over a case if it: (1) finds that retention is in the best interest of the child; (2) orders a

                                              8
Department-monitored return of the child to a parent; and (3) continues the Department

as temporary managing conservator of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.403(a);

see also In re A.H.J., No. 05-15-00501-CV, 2015 WL 5866256, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Oct. 8, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). If the trial court renders an order pursuant to

§ 263.403, it shall “schedule a new date, not later than the 180th day after the date the

temporary order is rendered, for dismissal of the suit unless a trial on the merits has

commenced.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.403(b).

B.     Analysis

       Mother argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction because trial commenced after

the extended dismissal date of November 26, 2022. However, Mother fails to

acknowledge that the trial court twice extended the dismissal deadline. First, on March

16, 2022, the trial court extended the dismissal date to November 26, 2022, including in

its order that:

       Pursuant to § 263.401 (b), Texas Family Code, the Court finds that
       extraordinary circumstances necessitate the subject children, remaining in
       the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department and that
       continuing the appointment of the Department as temporary managing
       conservator is in the best interest of the subject children, an extension of
       not more than 180 days should be granted due to extraordinary
       circumstances, the case should be retained on the Court’s docket and a
       new dismissal date should be scheduled and the suit should be set for final
       hearing on a date that will allow the court to render a final order before that
       dismissal date.

Then, on September 28, 2022, the trial court ordered a monitored return of the children

to Mother finding it was in the children’s best interest. See id. § 263.403. Trial commenced

on March 9, 2023, before the new dismissal date of March 26, 2023. Because § 263.403

allows a trial court to retain jurisdiction beyond the provisions of § 263.401, trial was timely

commenced, and the trial court’s final judgment is not void. See id.; see also In re K.R.,

                                               9
No. 07-20-00149-CV, 2020 WL 6266286, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 23, 2020, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). We overrule Mother’s first issue.

                            III.   SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

         In her second issue, Mother argues there is legally and factually insufficient

evidence supporting each termination ground. In Mother’s third issue, and the children’s

sole issue, both parties argue there is legally and factually insufficient evidence

supporting the trial court’s best interest finding.

A.       Standard of Review & Applicable Law

         Because of the fundamental rights at issue, due process requires that parental

termination be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d

576, 580 (Tex. 2014); In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 112 (Tex. 2014). Clear and

convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of

the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex.

2002).

         In parental termination cases, our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor

this elevated burden of proof while respecting the factfinder’s role. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 630 (Tex. 2018) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264). “The distinction between

legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a

finding may be considered.” Id. In a legal sufficiency review, we “cannot ignore undisputed

evidence contrary to the finding, but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved

disputed facts in favor of the finding.” Id. at 630–31 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

Thus, “[e]vidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable

                                              10
to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder

could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631 (citing In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

       Factual sufficiency, on the other hand, requires us to weigh disputed evidence

contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. Id. We “must consider

whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved

it in favor of the finding.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per

curiam)). Therefore, “[e]vidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the

disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is

so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the

finding was true.” Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Before parental rights may be

involuntarily terminated, the trier of fact must find two elements by clear and convincing

evidence: (1) that the parent committed one of the statutory grounds for termination found

in § 161.001(b)(1) of the family code; and (2) that termination is in the child’s best interest.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012).

B.     Statutory Grounds

       “To affirm a termination judgment on appeal, a court need uphold only one

termination ground—in addition to upholding a challenged best interest finding—even if

the trial court based the termination on more than one ground.” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

230, 232–33 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). The Texas Supreme Court has held that,

regardless of whether other grounds for termination are unchallenged on appeal, an

appellate court must always review issues alleging the evidence was insufficient to

support findings of endangerment under parts (D) or (E) of the family code

                                               11
§ 161.001(b)(1). In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234, 237 (holding that “due process and due

course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an

appeal of termination of parental rights” on endangerment grounds because an

endangerment finding “becomes a basis to terminate that parent’s rights to other children”

under § 161.001(b)(1)(M)). Therefore, we will first address the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s (D) and (E) findings.

       1.     (D) & (E) Grounds

       Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(D) allows termination when the evidence proves by

clear and convincing evidence that the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the

child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the child’s physical or

emotional well-being, and subsection 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows termination if the parent

has engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engage in

conduct which endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). “Subsection (D) addresses the child’s surroundings and

environment rather than parental misconduct, which is the subject of subsection (E)”. In

re A.L.H., 624 S.W.3d 47, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (quoting In re B.C.S.,

479 S.W.3d 918, 926 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). Subsection (D) permits

termination based on only a single act or omission. In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). In contrast, subsection (E) requires

evidence of a “voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent” and

generally more than a single act or omission. In re D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 78 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (quoting In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)).

                                             12
         “For both of these provisions, ‘endanger’ means ‘to expose to loss or injury; to

jeopardize.’” Id. (quoting In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam)).

“Although ‘endanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill

effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be

directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id. “It is enough if the youth

is exposed to loss or injury or his physical or emotional well-being is jeopardized.” Id.

(quoting In re P.E.W., 105 S.W.3d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.)). “As a

general rule, conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers

the physical and emotional well[-]being of a child.” In re S.A., 665 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex.

App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied) (first citing In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 503 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); and then citing In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). Endangering conduct is not limited to actions

directed towards the child. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.

1987).

         A parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on her ability to parent may qualify as an

endangering course of conduct. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). Domestic

violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may also be considered as

evidence of endangerment. In re S.A., 665 S.W.3d at 70 (first citing In re T.R.L., No. 10-

14-00290-CV, 2015 WL 1020865, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem.

op.); and then citing In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet.

denied). “A parent’s decision to continue living with someone who has committed

instances of domestic violence may support an endangerment finding[.]” In re O.E.R., 573

                                              13
S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (citing In re M.V., 343 S.W.3d 543,

547 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)).

      2.     Analysis

      Here, there was significant evidence that the children were exposed to domestic

violence on a constant basis, both before removal and during the children’s monitored

return to Mother. Prior to removal, J.G. was arrested after physically assaulting Mother in

the presence of the children and brutally killing the family cat. Both Mother and J.G.

engaged in methamphetamine use in and around incidents of domestic violence. See In

re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. J.G. punched holes in the walls of the home and broke

multiple doors in the home. According to a police report, Mother was observed with

injuries to her nose and forehead and told officers that J.G. assaulted her by punching

her in the face and kicking her. J.G. threatened to kill the children while under the

influence of drugs. Despite J.G.’s assaultive conduct, Mother declined to press charges

and continued to allow J.G. to remain in the home in violation of the Department’s safety

plan and the trial court’s later no-contact orders. See In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d at 905.

      Multiple incidents of violence were reported from October of 2020, when the

Department became involved, and May 26, 2021, the date of the removal. After the

children were returned to Mother, J.G. continued to reside with them. A.W. made multiple

outcries to her teacher and counselor regarding the ongoing violence in the home,

including Mother’s abuse of the children. A.W. stated that Mother beats the children and

the family dog every night. A.W. revealed that Mother told the children that she wanted

them to go away because she hated them. A.W. said that an abrasion on her knee was

caused by Mother. She also reported that J.G. was hitting Mother again and that J.G. was

                                            14
drinking a lot. A.W. reported that Mother wears a sweater to hide bruises when she comes

to the school. I.W.1 stated that his siblings were not at school one day because Mother

beat them with a belt the night before and that Mother pulled I.W.2’s hair. I.W.1 revealed

that Mother put hot sauce in his mouth so he would stop crying and that she did this to

I.W.2 as well. A.W. reported that Mother hits I.W.2 with a shoe all over his body. A.W.

had a recurring problem with lice that went untreated for months.

      Considering the entire record, including evidence both supporting and

contradicting the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the contrary evidence is not so

overwhelming as to undermine the court’s finding that Mother both engaged in conduct

that endangered her children’s physical or emotional well-being and knowingly placed or

knowingly allowed her children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered

their physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E);

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 261, 266; see also In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 832–33 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (considering domestic violence in the home

and a parent’s propensity for violence as evidence of endangerment). Because the

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support both grounds, we need not address

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the remaining grounds. See In re N.G., 577

S.W.3d at 232–33. We overrule Mother’s second issue.

C.    Best Interest

      1.     Holley Factors

      There is a strong, though rebuttable, presumption that keeping a child with a parent

is in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131; In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112,

116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam). We consider the following factors in determining whether

                                            15
termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the

emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and

physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parenting abilities of the parties

seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist the parties seeking custody; (6) the

plans for the child by the parties seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed

placement; (8) the acts or omissions committed by the parent which may indicate that the

existing parent-child relationship is not proper; and (9) any excuse for the acts or

omissions committed by the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).

The party seeking termination is not required to prove all nine Holley factors, and in some

cases, undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that

termination is in the best interest of the child. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25, 27 (Tex. 2002).

The Legislature has also provided guidance on factors for courts to consider. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307. The same evidence that supports a termination ground may

also be probative of the children’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (first citing

Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 370; and then citing Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Tex.

1976)).

       2.      Analysis

       As to the first Holley factor, Mother notes that there is evidence that three of the

children wish to return to Mother, although I.W.2 was too young to credibly express her

desire. See In re R.S.D., 446 S.W.3d 816, 818, 820 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no

pet.) (finding that the child, who was “almost four years old” at the time of trial, was “too

young to have stated his desires”). However,

       [a]lthough a child’s love of his natural parents is a very important
       consideration in determining the best interests of the child, it cannot override

                                                16
       or outweigh the overwhelming and undisputed evidence showing that the
       parents placed or allowed the child to remain in conditions, and engaged in
       conduct or placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct, which
       endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the child. The child’s
       love of his parents cannot compensate for the lack of an opportunity to grow
       up in a normal and safe way equipped to live a normal, productive, and
       satisfying life.

In re W.S.M., 107 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.). In light of the

unstable home environment provided by Mother, the trial court could have determined

that this factor is neutral as to the children’s best interest.

       As to the second Holley factor, I.W.1 is suspected to have autism and he receives

special therapies in a treatment foster home. D.W. is diagnosed with oppositional defiant

disorder, adjudgment disorder, child neglect, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

and he receives therapy. There is no indication Mother could adequately address the

children’s needs due to the chaotic nature of the home environment. The trial court could

find from the evidence that this factor supports a best interest finding.

       Relevant to the third Holley factor, regarding emotional and physical danger, is

Mother’s admitted methamphetamine use. See In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (noting that a parent’s drug use supports a finding that

termination is in the best interest of the child). Even more relevant is the evidence of

ongoing domestic violence in the home. Despite the extreme and constant violence

exhibited by J.G., Mother was either unable or unwilling to discontinue her relationship

with J.G., even after she was ordered by the court to do so. Mother was untruthful with

the Department regarding her relationship with him. At trial, she expressed her continued

commitment to J.G. with a recently obtained tattoo with his name. Mother also routinely

abused the children, who described nightly beatings. The trial court could have

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determined from this evidence that, should Mother’s rights not be terminated, the children

would be in danger of physical harm now and in the future. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(b)(7) (listing “whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the

child’s family” as a best-interest factor); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding that evidence of domestic violence supported

a best-interest finding); see also In re A.H., No. 04-15-00416-CV, 2015 WL 7565569, at

*7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Evidence of the parents’

history of domestic violence supports the trial court’s best interests finding.”).

       As to the fourth Holley factor, “a fact[ ]finder can consider the parent’s past neglect

or past inability to meet the physical and emotional needs of the children.” In re O.E.R.,

573 S.W.3d at 907–08 (citing D.O. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 851 S.W.2d 351, 356

(Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ)). Mother routinely abused her children, failed to shield

them from domestic violence, used methamphetamine in their presence, and failed to

treat her children’s mental and physical ailments. This evidence supports a conclusion

that Mother has demonstrated poor parenting skills and that she failed to provide the

children with a safe home environment.

       As to the fifth, sixth, and seventh Holley factors, the evidence showed that the

children’s current caregivers were meeting their basic needs, while Mother showed no

ability to protect the children from violence in the future. A child’s need for permanence

through the establishment of a “stable, permanent home” has been recognized as the

paramount consideration in determining best interest. In re G.A.C., 499 S.W.3d 138, 141

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied); In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2007, no pet.). These factors support a best interest finding. See In re L.W., 609

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S.W.3d 189, 205 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (concluding that “Mother’s

inability to stay in one domestic violence program and her poor judgment in repeatedly

returning herself and her children to her abuser” was evidence that “established a lack of

parental abilities and a refusal to utilize available programs”). Regarding, the eighth and

ninth Holley factors, Mother offered no credible excuse for her behavior in exposing the

children to violence. See In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d at 911. These factors support a best

interest finding as well.

       Considering all the Holley factors, we conclude that the evidence was legally and

factually sufficient to rebut the strong presumption that keeping the children with their

biological mother is in their best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131. We

overrule Mother’s third issue and the children’s sole issue.

                                   IV.    CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                               L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                               Justice

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of January, 2024.

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