Court Opinion

ID: 9913915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:09:02.839297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:30.442854
License: Public Domain

J-S34025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JOSHUA KEITH BISHOP                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 342 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 28, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-25-CR-0001758-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                    FILED: December 28, 2023

      Appellant, Joshua Keith Bishop, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on January 28, 2022 in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

following entry of his open guilty plea to aggravated assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(4). Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to permit

him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and that his sentence was

manifestly excessive because the court failed to consider his ability to pay

costs. Following review, we affirm.

      The record reflects that on April 28, 2021, Appellant was charged in an

eight-count complaint with, inter alia, attempted murder as well as aggravated

assault as both a first- and second-degree felony. The charges stemmed from

a shooting on April 27, 2021 that followed a verbal altercation between

Appellant and his victim, Nicholas Keesling.      The complaint reflects that
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Appellant ‘was in possession of a .38 caliber revolver which he did fire one

shot into the floor . . . and an additional shot which did strike Keesling in the

chest.   Keesling did require immediate life saving medical procedures[.]”

Criminal Complaint (Brief Summary of Facts), 4/28/21, at 1-2 (unnumbered).

We note that Appellant was licensed to carry the firearm.

      At a hearing held on October 28, 2021, Appellant entered into an open

guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault as a second-degree felony. The

Commonwealth proposed a state sentence of one-to-two years in prison. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered a pre-sentence

investigation report.    Appellant’s sentencing hearing was conducted on

January 28, 2022.

      With regard to Appellant’s guilty plea, the trial court explained:

      A review of the record shows that on January 19, 2022,
      [Appellant] sent a letter to his plea counsel requesting to withdraw
      his guilty plea because he was “not guilty of the charge(s).” No
      motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed.

      ...

      In this case, no motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed.
      [Appellant’s] sole basis, in his letter, for requesting to withdraw
      the plea was based on a claim of innocence. At the time of his
      sentencing, the court discussed the matter thoroughly with
      [Appellant].

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 1-2.

      In an excerpt from the sentencing hearing quoted in the trial court’s

opinion, the court explained that Appellant sent his letter requesting

withdrawal of the guilty plea to the Erie County Clerk of Courts. The court

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advised Appellant that “when you have an attorney, that’s not going to work.

You have to go through your attorney, and your attorney has to file a motion

to withdraw the plea.”      Id. at 3 (quoting Notes of Testimony, Sentencing

[“N.T.”], 1/28/22, at 7).

        The trial judge proceeded to explain that he would permit Appellant to

file a motion to withdraw his plea, in which case a hearing would be held on

the motion. Further discussion ensued, during which it was explained that the

filing of a motion to withdraw the plea would prompt the withdrawal of the

plea deal offered to Appellant. The deal was a “global deal” that included a

separate domestic case. The prosecutor explained, “They are separate cases.

It’s just we gave you a very large break on one of them, due to you pleading

on the other one. So, if the consideration to us goes away, we can’t give you

that benefit anymore. So, just want to make you[] aware of that. Id. at 4

(quoting N.T., 1/28/22, at 11).     The court then asked Appellant what he

wanted to do, to which Appellant responded, “I’m going to go through with

this.   I’m going to go through with sentencing with both pleas.”     Id. at 5

(quoting N.T., 1/28/22, at 11). The court then imposed the sentence of one-

to-two years in prison, with credit for time served, followed by concurrent

sentences of probation on both dockets. In addition, the court imposed costs

totaling $6,511.75.

        No direct appeal was taken but Appellant later sought, and was awarded,

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights and an appeal was subsequently filed

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with this Court. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellant presents two issues for our consideration:

        The trial court erred in failing to allow [Appellant] to withdraw his
        plea when he requested that trial counsel file a motion to withdraw
        his plea prior to sentencing[.]

        The sentence in this case was manifestly excessive and clearly
        unreasonable and was illegal, when the trial court failed to
        consider during his sentencing his ability pay fines or court costs[.]

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

        In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing

to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. As this Court

observed in Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660 (Pa. Super. 2017), “It is

well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a

guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”        Id. at 664.

However, as noted above, “[i]n this case, no motion to withdraw guilty plea

was filed.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 2. Nevertheless, Appellant claims

that he did not have an opportunity “to share with the trial court his reasons

for requesting a withdrawal of his plea, as trial counsel did not heed his request

in his letter by filing a motion to withdraw.” Appellant’s Brief at 6.

        The record belies Appellant’s assertion.      The trial judge specifically

stated, “I’ll allow you to file the motion.     I’m not saying that we’ll let you

withdraw the pleas. But I’ll at least allow you to file the motion, and we’ll

have a hearing on it. Umm, but that’s up to you and your counsel.” N.T.,

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1/28/22, at 7. Subsequently, after being advised that his plea deal would be

withdrawn if he sought to withdraw his plea, Appellant stated, “I’m going to

go through with this.     I’m going to go through with sentencing with both

pleas.” Id. at 11.

      Because Appellant did not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, he

cannot complain that the trial court erred in “failing to allow [him] to withdraw

his plea.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant’s first issue fails.

      In his second issue, Appellant asserts that his sentence was manifestly

excessive, unreasonable, and illegal because the trial court failed to consider

his ability to pay costs imposed at the time of sentencing.         He does not

challenge the length, reasonableness, or legality of the term of his

incarceration or the probationary sentences imposed. Rather, he “argues that

his sentence was manifestly excessive and clearly unreasonable due to the

fact that the costs lodged against him . . . was beyond his ability to pay and

is an excessive punishment.” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      As this Court explained in Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913

(Pa. Super. 2020):

      In addition to the sentencing alternatives under section 9721(a),
      the Sentencing Code provides for mandatory restitution to the
      victim and mandatory payment of costs. Unlike restitution
      imposed under 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 1106, 9721(c), and unlike fines,
      which are both part of a defendant’s sentence, 42 Pa.C.S.
      § 9726(a), (b)(1)-(2), “a direction to pay costs in a criminal
      proceeding is not part of the sentence, but is an incident of
      the judgment. Costs do not form a part of the penalty imposed
      by the statutes providing for the punishment of criminal

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       offenses[.]” [Commonwealth v. Soudani, 165 A.3d 709, 711
       (Pa. Super. 1960).]

Id. at 919 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

       In Commonwealth v. Lopez, 280 A.3d 887 (Pa. 2022), our Supreme

Court specifically considered whether Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C) “requires a trial

court to consider a defendant’s ability to pay prior to imposing mandatory

court costs at sentencing[.]”         Id. at 894 (citation omitted).1   The Court

observed that “[t]he proper interpretation of a rule of criminal procedure is a

question of law, for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of

review is plenary.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 75, 65 (Pa.

2013)). After conducting its review, the Court announced:

       [I]t is apparent from multiple decisions by this Court and the
       Superior Court, as well as the plain language of the rule, its
       comment, and statutes in pari materia, that Rule 706(C) does not
       require consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay prior to the
       imposition of mandatory court costs at sentencing.

Id. at 902.2

____________________________________________

1 Rule 706(C) provides: “The court, in determining the amount and method of

payment of a fine or costs shall, insofar as is just and practicable, consider
the burden upon the defendant by reason of the defendant’s financial means,
including the defendant’s ability to make restitution or reparations.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C).

2 Although it is not necessary to determine the ability to pay prior to imposing

costs, we note that an ability-to-pay determination would be required before
sanctions could be imposed upon failure to pay those costs. In accordance
with Rule 706(A), “A court shall not commit the defendant to prison for failure
to pay a fine or costs unless it appears after hearing that the defendant is
financially able to pay the fine or costs.” As the Court stated in Lopez, “Rule
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Because the costs imposed on Appellant were not part of his sentence,

and because Rule 706(C) does not require consideration of a defendant’s

ability to pay prior to imposition of mandatory costs at sentencing, Appellant

has failed to articulate any cognizable challenge to his sentence. Appellant’s

second issue fails.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 12/28/2023

____________________________________________

706 requires the court to determine the defendant’s ability to pay prior to
committing him to prison for a default but no sooner.” Id. at 901.

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