Court Opinion

ID: 9551094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:37.142432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:03.140409
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I do not agree with the portion of the opinion dealing with the state’s challenge to Ms. Earns haw.
The trial judge denied defendant’s challenge for cause to Ms. Stump, even though she admitted to having formed some “drastic opinions.” At 734. The majority concludes that there was no error because, after extensive questioning, Ms. Stump stated that she could find the facts objectively, apply the law and be a “fair and impartial juror.” At 735. The majority correctly states that the “standard is whether the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties.’ ” At 735, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. —, -, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985).
The majority neglects to tell us why the same legal principles should not apply to Ms. Earnshaw, successfully challenged by *57the state because she feared that it would “be weighing on my mind” that the defendant was a teenager charged with having murdered his father and sister and attempting to kill his mother. As the court indicates, “ ‘it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.' ” At 735, again quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra. That burden was not carried here. The only follow-up question revealed that Ms. Earnshaw’s “beliefs with respect to capital punishment might cause [her] a problem.” At 736. We do not know what type of belief the juror held nor what type of problem she had. Neither the state nor the court demonstrated “that the potential juror [lacked] impartiality.”
The majority speculates (At 736-737) that Ms. Earnshaw’s “statements, read as a whole, indicated her inability to sit as a juror without distraction.” The juror did not indicate any such inability. In any event, sitting “without distraction” is not the test. The majority twice tells us that the Wainwright test requires the trial judge to determine whether the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties____” At 735 and 736. There is no evidence that this standard was met with respect to juror Earnshaw, and no amount of speculation over what the juror may have meant can change that fact. The juror was worried about matters that would naturally evoke concern from any civilized juror. The court did not ask any question to elicit information upon which to ground a conclusion that the witness could not be fair and impartial. Thus, the majority holds that the defense challenge was properly denied even though the juror had “drastic opinions” because the juror could be “fair and impartial.” The state’s challenge, however, was properly granted although there was no evidence of opinion or partiality.
I cannot agree that trial judges may apply legal principles differently when ruling upon challenges for cause made by the defendant and by the state. This is a case in which evidence of guilt is clear and the problem deals only with a challenge to a single juror. It is quite understandable that the court might be reluctant to face the issue of whether the error was prejudicial. In my view, however, it is better to struggle with that issue and even to call it harmless error, than to send a message that rules of law will be unevenly applied.