Court Opinion

ID: 9769220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:40:14.752311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:58.292052
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion does not prescribe any proper standard of care by which the negligence of the Department of Highways in the maintenance of highways may be determined, and it holds the Department to a higher standard of care than would be required of an individual under the same circumstances. See KRS 44.120. Inasmuch as the right to recover for the negligence of the Department or its employees ■exists because of the waiver of governmental immunity, it is felt that such right of recovery should be limited strictly.
The Department of Highways is charged with maintaining approximately 20,000 miles of highway. It is partially responsible for the maintenance of an additional 12,000 miles of highway. These 32,000 miles of highway extend the length and breadth of the state, through urban and rural areas, up hollows and down creeks. Many miles are in isolated areas. The character of highways ranges from four-lane interstate highways with beautiful median strips to gravel roads filled with “chug holes.” The surfaces vary from excellent and smooth through broken concrete, worn out blacktop, to rock and gravel. The surface or shoulders may be made hazardous by weather conditions. See Commonwealth Dept. of Highways v. Brown, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 24; and Commonwealth v. Justice, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 507.
In addition to the variations in highway conditions, there is the problem of personnel and money with which to maintain the system. Should the standard of care be set at the highest degree and then it be held that anything less is a failure to maintain properly and thus render the Commonwealth liable for any injuries resulting? Manifestly, it would be utterly wrong to say that the Commonwealth is liable for injuries suffered by a motorist received by reason of a rut on a big rock in a gravel road. The majority opinion holds the Department liable for failure to maintain U. S. 60 at a point near Sturgis because of a break in its surface. If this creates liability, how can any other rut, break, or rough condition of the surface be distinguished, or must the Department of Highways be held liable for all injuries resulting therefrom? Again, I say there is no proper standard of care prescribed.
Further, the effect of the majority opinion is to hold the Commonwealth liable for a greater standard of care than is required of an individual, contrary to KRS 44.120. The operator of a motor vehicle is priv*700ileged to use the highway by reason of the exercise of licenses granted by the Commonwealth. It is the duty of the operator to drive with due regard to highway conditions. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867, 192 S.W.2d 753. In this respect, the analogy of a social visitor in the home, who in law is a licensee, is pertinent. There is no duty owed by the home owner to the licensee other than that of not knowingly letting one come upon a hidden peril or willfully or wantonly causing one harm. Terry v. Timberlake, Ky., 348 S.W.2d 919.
In Commonwealth v. Young, Ky., 354 S.W.2d 23, the latter rule, in effect, was followed. Recovery was allowed for a hidden defect in the blacktop which was known to the Department of Highways but which was not apparent to the motor vehicle operator. I have no quarrel with such holding, but do not think that the Commonwealth’s liability should be extended.
Recovery against the Commonwealth is permitted because of its waiver of governmental immunity. Such liability should be limited strictly.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. I have purposely avoided any discussion of the more narrow field of proximate cause, which also is a problem.
STEWART, C. J., joins in this dissent.