Court Opinion

ID: 9901384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:06:31.42283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.932588
License: Public Domain

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                       NEWS RELEASE #050

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 17th day of November, 2023 are as follows:

PER CURIAM:

 2023-B-00343             IN RE: TIM L. FIELDS

                          SUSPENSION IMPOSED. SEE PER CURIAM.

                          Weimer, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons. Crichton,
                          J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.

                                                     1
                     SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                NO. 2023-B-0343

                             IN RE: TIM L. FIELDS

                ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

PER CURIAM

      This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of

Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) against respondent, Tim L. Fields, an attorney

licensed to practice law in Louisiana.

                             UNDERLYING FACTS

                                         Count I

      Dr. George Van Wormer is a chiropractor who has had a longstanding

arrangement with respondent to provide his personal injury clients with medical care

and receive payment for those services upon settlement of the clients’ claims. From

February 2016 to August 2016, Dr. Van Wormer treated three of respondent’s

clients, namely Edwin Brooks, Mathieu Fletcher, and Mateo Fletcher. Respondent

settled the claims of all three clients in early 2017. Nevertheless, and despite Dr.

Van Wormer’s staff contacting respondent’s office numerous times in an effort to

collect the three clients’ debts, respondent failed to pay Dr. Van Wormer’s bills,

which totaled $6,916.

      On December 13, 2018, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint from Dr.

Van Wormer. The ODC sent notice of the complaint to respondent, which he

received on January 1, 2019. On January 3, 2019, respondent issued a $6,916 check

from his trust account to Dr. Van Wormer. This check was signed by respondent’s

CPA, who is not an attorney.
      Upon further investigation, the ODC received copies of the three trust account

checks respondent issued to the clients who were the subject of Dr. Van Wormer’s

complaint. Two of the checks were dated February 21, 2017 and one check was

dated April 21, 2017. The checks were signed by respondent’s former paralegal

instead of an attorney.

      On June 19, 2019, respondent appeared with his counsel at the ODC’s office

to provide a sworn statement. During the sworn statement, respondent testified that

his CPA and his former paralegal both had authority to sign his trust account checks.

Respondent also testified that his former secretary Mary Samuels left the firm, and

he was not aware Dr. Van Wormer was not paid because the matter was never

brought to his attention. Respondent further testified that he never had a problem

with this type of issue before the current situation occurred.

      Also during the sworn statement, respondent testified that his law practice has

consisted of “almost exclusively personal injury” cases since 1999. However,

respondent later acknowledged that he did not maintain a trust account between

approximately 2006 and 2011.         Furthermore, on the trust account disclosure

statements he filed with the disciplinary board from November 10, 2006 to

November 14, 2012, respondent falsely certified that he did not handle client or

third-party funds.

      On August 14, 2019, respondent again appeared with his counsel at the ODC’s

office, at which time he participated in a recorded interview with Deputy

Disciplinary Counsel Robin Mitchell as well as the ODC’s forensic auditor,

Angelina Marcellino. During this interview, respondent acknowledged that he

“wasn’t exactly candid” during his sworn statement. He then indicated that, in

approximately March 2015, he discovered Ms. Samuels had failed to pay his clients’

medical providers and other third parties (approximately 50 third parties associated

with at least 300 clients) a combined total of approximately $4.2 million between

                                          2
2009 and 2015.          He explained that Ms. Samuels had been indiscriminately

transferring client settlement funds from his trust account to his operating account.

Those client funds in his operating account were then used to pay his personal and

office expenses. Respondent further explained that he contacted the third parties to

whom he owed the majority of the client settlement funds, namely Louisiana

Primary Care, Health Care Center, Metropolitan Health Group, and Magnolia

Diagnostics, and those third parties agreed to continue working with him and his

current and future clients. However, they required respondent to pay the oldest client

accounts first. Therefore, between 2015 and August 2019, his pattern and practice

was to use third-party funds from settlements obtained for his current clients to pay

the older third-party invoices generated by his previous clients between 2009 and

2015. 1 Finally, respondent advised the ODC during the interview that he had

recently ceased this pattern and practice.

       The ODC then obtained bank statements and trust account records from

respondent for the period between January 1, 2017 and January 31, 2019.

Respondent’s CPA also provided the ODC with documentation he had compiled

relevant to respondent’s trust account and money owed to third parties. Upon

reviewing this information, Ms. Marcellino confirmed that respondent had converted

$4,148,944.59 as of July 10, 2015 and had engaged in “rolling conversion” between

2015 and August 2019 just as he had admitted to during the August 14, 2019

recorded interview. According to Ms. Marcellino and the records provided by

respondent, by September 30, 2019, respondent’s trust account was still short

1
  Evidence in the record indicates that, in addition to using current client settlement funds to pay
the old outstanding third-party debt, respondent also obtained business and personal loans in
August 2015, borrowed from his individual retirement account in July 2015, sold two pieces of
real property in 2019, cashed in an annuity in 2019, and withdrew from his investment accounts
in 2019 and 2020.

                                                 3
$1,840,366.54 needed to repay the original third-party debt. By June 14, 2020,

respondent had reduced the shortage to $814,268.69.

      The ODC also obtained a copy of respondent’s standard contingency fee

contract used for all personal injury clients. The contract stated, “A standard file

charge of One hundred twenty-five dollars ($125.00) shall be assessed at the time of

distribution of any funds received in judgment or settlement.” This $125 fee

appeared on various disbursement statements provided by respondent and was not

attributable to any costs or services undertaken for those specific clients.

Respondent has since deleted this fee from the contract and no longer lists the charge

on disbursement statements.

                                      Count II

      In August 2018, Sam Montgomery hired respondent to handle his personal

injury claim.   Mr. Montgomery signed respondent’s standard contingency fee

contract, which conveyed “complete settlement authority” to respondent. Mr.

Montgomery also signed a power of attorney in favor of his relative, Calvin Stewart.

      In April 2019, respondent settled Mr. Montgomery’s claim for the $15,000

insurance policy limits because it was his normal practice to accept the policy limits

as full and final settlement. When respondent received the settlement check in May

2019, someone from his office endorsed Mr. Montgomery’s signature on the back

of the check. The check was then deposited into respondent’s trust account.

      Mr. Stewart stopped by respondent’s office in June or July 2019 and was told

Mr. Montgomery’s case had settled.         In August 2019, Mr. Stewart and Mr.

Montgomery went to respondent’s office to view the insurance policy limits and a

copy of the settlement check. Mr. Montgomery then signed the release and the

disbursement statement and accepted $4,529.52 as his portion of the settlement

proceeds.

                                          4
      On August 29, 2019, the ODC received a disciplinary complaint from Mr.

Montgomery, alleging that respondent settled his claim without his knowledge or

consent. In response to the complaint, respondent admitted that he settled Mr.

Montgomery’s claim without his permission but asserted he had the authority to do

so pursuant to the contingency fee contract. Respondent has since removed such

authority from his standard contingency fee contract. He also admitted that he had

someone in his office sign Mr. Montgomery’s name on the back of the settlement

check but asserted Mr. Montgomery had given him verbal authority to do so.

                        DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

      In June 2020, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent. In Count I,

the ODC alleged that respondent violated the following provisions of the Rules of

Professional Conduct: Rules 1.1(c) (failure to submit accurate trust account

information), 1.8(e)(3) (overhead costs of a lawyer’s practice, which are those not

incurred by the lawyer solely for the purposes of a particular representation, shall

not be passed on to a client), 1.15(a) (safekeeping property of clients or third

persons), 1.15(d) (failure to timely remit funds to a client or third person), 1.15(f)

(every check, draft, electronic transfer, or other withdrawal instrument or

authorization from a client trust account shall be personally signed by a lawyer),

1.15(g) (a lawyer shall create and maintain a trust account for funds belonging to

clients and third persons), 5.3 (failure to properly supervise a non-lawyer assistant),

8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand for information from a

disciplinary authority), 8.1(c) (failure to cooperate with the ODC in its

investigation), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), and 8.4(c)

(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). In

Count II, the ODC alleged respondent violated Rules 1.2 (scope of the

representation) and 1.8(k) (a lawyer shall not solicit or obtain a power of attorney or

                                          5
mandate from a client which would authorize the attorney, without first obtaining

the client’s informed consent to settle, to enter into a binding settlement agreement

on the client’s behalf or to execute on behalf of the client any settlement or release

documents) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

       Respondent, through counsel, filed an answer to the formal charges on July

27, 2020. In his answer, he denied engaging in any misconduct. However, if he

were to be found to have engaged in misconduct, he claimed that he did so

negligently and asserted the affirmative defense of prescription, pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule XIX, § 31, against allegations of misconduct occurring more than ten

years ago.2 He also indicated he still owed $735,079.39 to third-party providers but

asserted he would have this amount paid in full within approximately six months.

       In light of respondent’s answer, the matter proceeded to a formal hearing on

the merits.

                                       Formal Hearing

       The hearing committee conducted the formal hearing on April 15, 2021. Both

respondent and the ODC introduced documentary evidence and called witnesses to

testify before the committee. Respondent also testified on his own behalf and on

cross-examination by the ODC.

       Additionally, the parties filed joint stipulations wherein they stipulated that, if

certain witnesses were called to testify, their testimony would be consistent with the

underlying facts set forth above. These witnesses were Dr. George Van Wormer,

Dr. Van Wormer’s office manager Jennifer Joubert, Edwin Brooks, Mathieu and

Mateo Fletcher’s father Mervin Fletcher, Sam Montgomery, and Calvin Stewart.

2
  Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 31 provides that “[a] disciplinary complaint, or the initiation of a
disciplinary investigation with regard to allegations of attorney misconduct, where the mental
element is merely negligence, shall be subject to a prescriptive period of ten years from the date
of the alleged offense.”

                                                6
                             PETER HENRY’S TESTIMONY

      Mr. Henry, the director of risk management and counsel for Oasis Financial

(“Oasis”), testified that Oasis provides loans to individuals engaged in personal

injury litigation by purchasing a portion of the client’s future settlement proceeds

from pending lawsuits. Oasis requires clients to sign a contract and also requires the

client and the client’s attorney to sign a letter directing the attorney to pay Oasis out

of proceeds from the client’s lawsuit. The amount a client owes Oasis will increase

in a “stair step function” over time, and respondent’s office would need to contact

Oasis for a final payoff amount when the client’s case settles.

      As of March 31, 2021, Oasis had 55 accounts open with respondent’s clients.

Oasis was advised by respondent’s CPA that 18 of those clients’ cases had settled

without Oasis having been paid. Oasis occasionally submits accounts to collections,

and all attempts to collect are from the client. Mr. Henry testified that the accounts

of two of respondent’s clients, Elijah Sorina and Jovita Davis, were sent to

collections.

                              JAMES KEEL’S TESTIMONY

      Mr. Keel, a part-owner of Magnolia Diagnostics (“Magnolia”), testified that

all patients, including respondent’s clients, sign a form guaranteeing they are

responsible for payment. However, Magnolia never pursued any of respondent’s

clients personally for payment even though respondent had a habit of falling behind

in paying his clients’ bills. Mr. Keel stated that this tendency to fall behind occurred

most often while Mary Samuels worked for respondent.

      Whenever Mr. Keel would “chase down” respondent about the status of cases,

respondent would give him the truth even if the case was already settled. One day,

respondent bragged to Mr. Keel about purchasing an expensive bottle of wine. At

                                           7
the time, respondent owed Magnolia approximately $100,000, which included bills

on some cases that had already settled.

      Mr. Keel initiated a call to respondent in an effort to collect the outstanding

debt owed to Magnolia and prod respondent into making payments. Because Mr.

Keel was concerned about prescription on cases that had settled more than three

years earlier, he made an agreement with respondent wherein respondent would

make large payments on the older cases first. Magnolia initially received large

payments in bulk, such as $70,000 or $40,000. Later, however, respondent started

sending one or two checks a month that paid off accounts in groups. For example,

Magnolia received a check dated October 13, 2020 in the amount of $12,350 for

payment on ten different client accounts with dates of service from 2018.

                          RON MCDONALD’S TESTIMONY

      Mr. McDonald, the marketing director for the Health Care Center, testified

that his company provides services to respondent’s clients with an unwritten

agreement to accept payment from client settlements at the conclusion of their cases.

The Health Care Center relies on attorneys to pay bills upon settlement of the cases,

and he has no way of knowing if bills are paid timely unless a lawsuit has been filed.

      In 2015, the Health Care Center discovered outstanding accounts for

respondent’s clients totaling between $430,000 and $440,000. At that time, Mr.

McDonald initiated a meeting with respondent, during which respondent

acknowledged a large outstanding debt on his clients’ cases that had settled.

Respondent agreed to pay the Health Care Center $5,000 per week until he paid the

outstanding amount due, which he ultimately did. Furthermore, Mr. McDonald

understood that “as new cases were being settled, [respondent] was going to take

that money to pay off old antecedent debts.” Mr. McDonald indicated that the Health

                                          8
Care Center never pursued respondent’s clients personally for payment even if their

cases had settled long ago.

                              KEVIN HARVEY’S TESTIMONY

      Mr. Harvey, who handles collection services for Metropolitan Health Group

(“Metropolitan”), testified that his staff would send respondent a narrative and final

medical packet with complete bills and records at the conclusion of each client’s

treatment. His staff would also send aging reports to respondent several times a

year. Mr. Harvey explained that his staff is trained to question patients about the

status of their lawsuits, and it raises a red flag when patients indicate their case was

settled. At some point, Mr. Harvey ran an aging report for all of respondent’s clients

and told respondent the aging report showed a debt of approximately $3 million.

      After respondent met with his CPA about the matter, Mr. Harvey agreed to

allow respondent to pay him on older cases and stay current with the other cases as

they settled. Thereafter, Mr. Harvey and respondent entered into an agreement

whereby respondent would pay $10,000 a week on the various accounts with

balances. Respondent abided by the agreement, sometimes paying more than

$10,000.    The current debt owed by respondent’s clients to Metropolitan is

approximately $800,000, which amount includes clients currently treating. Mr.

Harvey acknowledged that it was in Metropolitan’s best interest to wait for

respondent to pay as opposed to try to collect from each client.

                       ANGELINA MARCELLINO’S TESTIMONY

      Ms. Marcellino testified that, at the conclusion of her audit of respondent’s

trust account, she determined he had mismanaged the account and allowed a non-

lawyer to authorize disbursements from the account. She also determined that he

had converted client and third-party funds, having defined conversion as “[a]t any

                                           9
point in time, the trust account does not hold a sufficient balance to honor the sum

of any and all client and third-party money received by the attorney and not yet paid

to the respective parties due.” She further indicated that respondent did not have to

benefit from the conduct for it to be considered conversion. In explaining rolling

conversion, Ms. Marcellino stated that it “starts with the trust account being

insufficient to honor a client or third party’s obligation, and then over time, that first

converted balance is resolved; however, it results in separate and unrelated matter

balances being converted.” In other words, a rolling conversion is “robbing Peter to

pay Paul.”

      Based upon her audit, Ms. Marcellino determined that, between 2009 and July

2015, respondent converted approximately $4.2 million owed to third-party

providers on behalf of clients. Between July 2015 and 2019, funds owed to third-

party providers from current settlements were instead used to pay the balances owed

to third-party providers affected by the previous $4.2 million conversion. Third-

party provider funds converted from settlements that occurred between 2015 and

2019 totaled approximately $1.8 million. In August 2019, respondent stopped this

rolling conversion and began, instead, to only use his personal assets or earned

attorney’s fees to repay the money owed that had previously been converted. Based

upon this information, Ms. Marcellino concluded that, between 2009 and 2019,

respondent converted a total of approximately $6 million. However, by the time of

the formal hearing, respondent had reduced the amount owed in previously-

converted funds to approximately $200,000.

                                           10
                           MARY SAMUELS’ TESTIMONY

      Ms. Samuels testified that she worked as respondent’s secretary from 2009 to

November 2015. One of her responsibilities was to pay third-party providers. Other

staff members assisted in making these payments, but she handled the majority. Ms.

Samuels stated that respondent never provided any training, and she had to learn on

the job. She had no law office or accounting experience before respondent hired her,

and respondent had 300 to 400 files open at any given time. She described the office

as very chaotic.

      Before writing the checks to third-party providers, Ms. Samuels would have

to call them to verify the amount due. However, respondent’s office was so chaotic

that the task would be put to the side, and the number of files needing verification

from third-party providers would stack up. She also sometimes had problems getting

responses and/or written confirmations of bill reductions from the third-party

providers, which also contributed to the lag in payments. Whenever a third-party

provider called about not being paid promptly, respondent would tell Ms. Samuels

to just pay them without trying to figure out why they had not been paid in a timely

manner.

      Ms. Samuels denied that respondent told her not to pay the third-party

providers. She also never saw him take money that he was not entitled to. Therefore,

it is her belief that respondent never knowingly or intentionally failed to pay third-

party providers. Furthermore, she did not think respondent knew money that should

have been paid to third-party providers was, instead, transferred to his operating

account. However, she denied indiscriminately transferring money. Instead, she

transferred money when told to do so. Respondent also informed her every time an

overdraft occurred, which happened a lot. There were many times when the

operating account did not have enough money to pay bills, and respondent would

                                         11
give her permission to transfer money into it from his personal account or the trust

account.

      When asked if she was responsible for the $4.2 million in unpaid third-party

provider debt, Ms. Samuels stated that she probably could have managed her job a

little better. She also indicated that, once respondent learned of the $4.2 million

conversion, he shifted the responsibility of settlement disbursements to his CPA.

                             RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY

      Respondent testified that his office collects approximately $5 to $7 million in

settlements per year. Over the past decade, respondent estimated that he has

collected a total of $60 to $70 million in settlements for his clients.

      Respondent disagreed that the initial conversion amount was as high as $4.2

million because the total included some cases that had not yet settled. However, he

admitted to using current client settlement funds between July 2015 and August 2019

to pay older debts owed to third-party providers affected by the initial conversion,

which he claimed was what the third-party providers wanted him to do. In August

2019, he ceased this practice and, instead, paid the old outstanding third-party debt

by (1) borrowing against his 401(k), (2) trying to refinance his home loan, (3)

cashing out an annuity and an investment account, (4) selling two pieces of real

property, and (5) using his own attorney’s fees. Prior to 2019, he had liquidated

other personal assets to help pay the debt but had never used his attorney’s fees.

Respondent also acknowledged that the total conversion amount was approximately

$6 million. However, he pointed out that the total amount of conversion at any one

time was never more than the initial $4.2 million.

      Regarding his failure to maintain a trust account for several years, respondent

claimed that a woman from the Louisiana State Bar Association (“LSBA”) called

him in 2006 and informed him he only needed a trust account if he kept succession

                                           12
or real estate funds in escrow. He told her that he only handled personal injury

matters, and she advised him that, in that case, he did not need a trust account. Based

upon this advice, he closed his trust account in 2006. He could not recall the

woman’s name and made no effort to contact the LSBA to determine who had called

him. During this time period, respondent deposited client settlement funds into his

operating account. He admitted the operating account had numerous overdrafts

during this time period, but he thought the overdrafts were “typical” because they

were writing 500 checks a month out of the account. Respondent further claimed

that, when he switched to a different bank in 2011, he opened a new trust account.

However, he had no documentation showing he opened the new account in 2011 and

admitted that he did not update his trust account disclosure statement with the new

trust account information until November 2012. Respondent further admitted that,

between 2006 and 2012, he misrepresented on his trust account disclosure statements

that he did not handle client or third-party funds.

      Once he opened the new trust account, all client settlement funds were

deposited into and disbursed from the trust account. Ms. Samuels was responsible

for transferring his earned attorney’s fees from the trust account to the operating

account. Until July 2015, respondent did not know Ms. Samuels was making bulk

transfers from the trust account into the operating account, and no issues or problems

with the trust account were brought to his attention. Respondent admitted he did not

direct or oversee each individual transfer Ms. Samuels made from the trust account.

He also acknowledged that she was overwhelmed and that he failed to supervise her.

Before hiring Ms. Samuels in 2009, respondent indicated he handled all

disbursements himself. He stated, “I just assume everybody knows everything that’s

going on and they can catch on. And it’s not that hard to do a disbursement… but

she was just overwhelmed.”

                                          13
      Respondent claimed he first learned of the $4.2 million outstanding balance

owed to third-party providers in July 2015 from his CPA.             Unbeknownst to

respondent at the time, Ms. Samuels had met with Mr. Harvey of Metropolitan, who

informed her that respondent owed Metropolitan $3 million from client settlements.

After that meeting, Ms. Samuels informed respondent’s CPA of the issue, and the

CPA informed respondent.         Soon thereafter, respondent’s CPA took over the

handling of the trust account.

      Once his CPA took over, respondent began to use new client settlement funds

to pay the old outstanding third-party debt at the direction of the third-party

providers. In paying the old third-party debt, respondent’s CPA would include a list

of several clients’ bills to which the bulk check should be applied. Although

respondent took a more active role in the third-party disbursements beginning in

2015, he still allowed non-lawyers to sign trust account checks until after he met

with the ODC in 2019.

      Respondent maintained that his staff never informed him of Dr. Van

Wormer’s numerous requests for payment. Respondent claimed his staff knew about

Dr. Van Wormer’s requests but kept the bills in accounts payable instead of paying

them right away. According to respondent, all third-party providers were put on the

accounts payable list because of the large amount of outstanding debt, and which

ones got paid first sometimes depended upon which ones were demanding payment

at the time. When respondent finally became aware of Dr. Van Wormer’s attempts

to contact him, he called and left a message for Dr. Van Wormer and never received

a call back. Instead, he received notice of Dr. Van Wormer’s disciplinary complaint.

      Regarding the $125 general office expense set forth in the contingency fee

contract, respondent stated that he did not know how the fee slipped into his contract.

He also acknowledged that charging this type of fee violates the Rules of

                                          14
Professional Conduct. He claimed the fee is no longer a part of the contract and is

no longer charged to clients.

      Respondent also admitted to making false and misleading statements to the

ODC during his sworn statement. For example, he blamed Ms. Samuels for not

informing him of the issue with Dr. Van Wormer even though she was no longer

working for him when the issue initially arose. He also failed to inform the ODC of

the extent of the outstanding third-party debt, instead stating that this type of thing

had never occurred before. When he provided the recorded interview to the ODC in

August 2019, he provided accurate information.

      Regarding the Montgomery matter in Count II, respondent acknowledged that

he did not obtain Mr. Montgomery’s permission to settle his claim. However, the

contingency fee contract Mr. Montgomery signed gave respondent the authority to

settle the claim. Respondent indicated he settled the claim for the policy limits, but

he did not inform Mr. Montgomery that he could pursue the driver personally for

further compensation. Currently, the contingency fee contract respondent uses does

not include the clause giving him the authority to settle a client’s claim without their

knowledge or consent because such a clause violates the Rules of Professional

Conduct.

      In mitigation, respondent testified that he is involved in numerous charities by

donating funds and/or sitting on the board. He also liquidated his personal assets to

help pay the outstanding third-party debt long before the ODC started investigating

him. By the time of the formal hearing, the outstanding debt had been reduced to

approximately $229,550.59.

                             Hearing Committee Report

      After considering the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the

hearing committee made the following findings:

                                          15
         Count I: Respondent acknowledged his failure to maintain a trust account

from some time in 2006 until January 10, 2011. However, respondent asserted his

misconduct was negligent because he was following the instructions of someone

from the LSBA who had advised him he did not need a trust account if he did not

hold client funds in escrow. The committee determined respondent’s testimony was

not credible since he acknowledged making no effort to find out the person’s name.

The committee also noted that respondent’s decision to close his trust account in

2006 coincided with the November 1, 2006 effective date of the overdraft

notification procedure set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 28.3 Similarly, the

committee found unconvincing respondent’s testimony that he misunderstood the

trust account disclosure statement because, when he signed the trust account

disclosure statement each year, he knew he was handling client and third-party funds

and would continue to do so in the future. Based upon these findings, the committee

determined respondent knowingly violated Rules 1.1(c) and 1.15(g) of the Rules of

Professional Conduct.

         Between 2009 and July 2015, approximately $4.2 million in settlement funds

were withheld from respondent’s clients to pay their third-party provider debts.

However, the funds were instead used to pay respondent’s personal and operating

3
    Rule XIX, § 28(D) provides:
                A financial institution shall be approved as a depository for lawyer
                trust accounts if it files with the Board an agreement, in a form
                provided by the Board and approved by the Court, to report to the
                Office of Disciplinary Counsel whenever any properly payable
                instrument is presented against a lawyer trust account containing
                insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is
                honored. The Board shall administer securing participation of the
                financial institutions, and shall annually publish a list of the
                financial institutions that have executed overdraft notification
                agreements with the Board. No trust account shall be maintained in
                any financial institution that does not agree to so report. Any such
                agreement shall apply to all branches of the financial institution and
                shall not be cancelled except upon thirty (30) days notice in writing
                to the Board. Notification of trust or escrow account overdrafts shall
                be made in accordance with La. R.S. 6:332 and La. R.S.
                6:333(F)(16).

                                                 16
expenses. Respondent acknowledged that, in July 2015, he did not have $4.2 million

in his various bank accounts to pay these third-party debts. Based upon this

information, the committee determined respondent converted client funds.

Respondent claimed the conversion was the result of his failure to supervise his non-

lawyer staff, namely Mary Samuels. Respondent authorized Ms. Samuels to sign

his name on checks and process online account transfers but did so despite the fact

that she had no law office or bookkeeping experience. During part of the time Ms.

Samuels worked for respondent, he used his operating account to hold client and

third-party funds, and said account was overdrawn on numerous occasions.

Respondent failed to take steps to determine the cause of the overdrafts. When

respondent eventually reopened a trust account, he continued to allow Ms. Samuels

to handle disbursements to third-party providers. He also continued to allow her

online access to the trust account so she could transfer funds from the account to his

operating and personal accounts. Respondent admitted he did not oversee or direct

each individual transfer Ms. Samuels handled. Respondent also admitted that he

authorized his CPA and former paralegal to sign trust account checks. However, he

claimed to have ceased this practice in 2019. Based upon these findings, the

committee determined respondent violated Rules 1.15(a) and 1.15(f).               The

committee also determined that respondent initially acted negligently, but then his

actions became knowing and, in some instances, intentional.

      The committee considered the testimony of the representatives from several

third-party providers affected by the $4.2 million conversion. The committee

viewed the testimony against the backdrop that these third-party providers had a

vested interest in respondent’s continued practice of law so (1) he would be able to

continue to pay the outstanding bills and (2) he would continue to send them new

clients. Respondent acknowledged that, in addition to the approximately $4.2

million withheld from client settlements between 2009 and July 2015, he also

                                         17
withheld approximately $1.8 million from other client settlements between July

2015 through August 2019. He used the $1.8 million to pay a portion of the $4.2

million previously-unpaid client debt and acknowledged that the cumulative amount

of client settlement funds converted was approximately $6 million even though the

amount was never higher than $4.2 million at any one time because of the nature of

the rolling conversion. The committee further determined that the clients’ signing

of the settlement disbursement statements was a directive under Rule 1.15(d) to

respondent as to how much and to whom each client’s settlement funds were to be

distributed. Documents prepared by respondent’s CPA demonstrate that numerous

clients and third-party providers were harmed because their settlement funds and

recovered costs were converted. Specifically, reports dated September 30, 2019

indicate approximately 75 third-party providers were owed money stemming from

client settlements that occurred between July 2015 and August 2019 but were not

paid upon disbursement of the clients’ settlement funds. While respondent had

permission from the four largest third-party providers to shift funds owed from

current client settlements to aging client debt, there was no evidence presented that

he had permission from any of the remaining 71 third-party providers or from a

single client to do so. With respect to respondent’s mental state, the committee

determined the initial $4.2 million conversion resulted from respondent’s

negligence.    However, with respect to the conversion of the $1.8 million,

respondent’s actions were intentional since he consciously directed that money from

current client settlements be used to pay unrelated bills associated with prior client

settlements in order to cover the earlier conversion of funds. The committee also

noted that not a single debt owed to Medicare or Medicaid, which both have statutory

rights of recovery, was left unpaid. The committee determined respondent and his

staff knew about the statutory rights because they paid these debts in a timely manner

while choosing not to pay other third-party debts with no such statutory rights. In

                                         18
the committee’s view, the picking and choosing of which third-party debts to pay

and which to convert was intentional. Based upon these findings, the committee

determined respondent violated Rule 1.15(d). The committee also determined that

respondent initially acted negligently, but then his actions became knowing and, in

some instances, intentional.

      Respondent indicated he took a more active role in managing his office after

discovering the extensive, unpaid third-party debt in 2015. However, he admitted

he continued to allow non-lawyers to write checks and transfer money from the trust

account. In fact, the trust account records respondent provided for January 2017

through December 2018 revealed that, of the approximately 963 checks issued from

the trust account, respondent signed only one, his associate attorney signed

approximately 70, his CPA signed 18, and his former paralegal (Jennifer King)

signed approximately 875. Respondent’s defense to this misconduct was “when you

have that many clients, it’s almost impossible to write that many checks and practice

law.” Based upon these findings, the committee determined respondent knowingly

violated Rule 5.3.

      Respondent’s contingency fee contract included a provision allowing him to

pass overhead costs to his clients, which he did by listing a $125 charge on settlement

disbursement statements as “Office Expenses.” Respondent acknowledged this

occurred but stated, “I don’t know how it slipped in. Maybe somebody started – a

new person started at the office and started doing that.” The committee determined

that, despite having substantial experience in the practice of law and in the area of

personal injury, respondent allowed a provision into his contract in violation of Rule

1.8(e)(3). The committee also determined that respondent did so knowingly.

      Respondent told the ODC that his agreements with third-party providers were

oral agreements and were not reduced to writing. However, testimony and evidence

presented at the formal hearing indicated there were written agreements or

                                          19
guarantees with at least Oasis and Magnolia. Furthermore, respondent’s clients

signed settlement disbursement statements upon disbursement of their settlement

funds, which disbursement statements detail the amounts being withheld from the

clients’ settlements to pay third-party providers. The committee found the client’s

signature on the disbursement statement indicated their agreement to the deductions

and disbursements. The committee also found, however, that respondent appeared

to believe only the client was bound by the disbursement statement. Disagreeing

with respondent, the committee determined the disbursement statements allowed

clients to rely upon respondent to pay the bills listed on said disbursement

statements.     Therefore, according to the committee, respondent clearly

misrepresented to certain clients that he would pay the bills when he, in fact, knew

he intended to use the funds to pay the third-party debts of other clients. Respondent

also knowingly made false statements to the ODC during both his sworn statement

and his recorded interview. During the sworn statement, these false statements

included (1) blaming Ms. Samuels for Dr. Van Wormer not being paid even though

she was no longer employed by respondent at the time, (2) claiming he did not know

why Dr. Van Wormer was not paid, (3) claiming he reconciled his trust account

settlement disbursement statements, and (4) claiming he had never had a problem

with failing to pay third-party providers before Dr. Van Wormer’s disciplinary

complaint. During the recorded interview when he advised the ODC of the $4.2

million conversion, respondent denied knowledge of the conversion and again

blamed Ms. Samuels. He also (1) failed to advise the ODC that he did not have a

trust account for approximately four years during the years of conversion, (2) failed

to disclose that he processed all client settlements through his operating account even

before Ms. Samuels began working for him and for four years during her

employment, and (3) failed to disclose the numerous overdrafts of his operating

account during that time period. The committee further found that respondent made

                                          20
misleading statements during the formal hearing. A review of reports created by

respondent’s CPA demonstrated that respondent was still failing to pay several third-

party providers (outside of the limited number of providers with whom he had made

such an agreement) immediately upon settlement after 2015.              Nevertheless,

respondent falsely stated at the hearing that these providers were being paid

immediately. Based upon these findings, the committee determined respondent

intentionally violated Rules 8.1(a), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c).        The committee also

determined respondent violated Rule 8.4(a) through his violation of the other

provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct in Count I.

      Count II: Respondent acknowledged that Mr. Montgomery’s personal injury

claim was settled without his permission or authority, which the committee

determined violated Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent also

acknowledged that he did not explain to Mr. Montgomery the option of pursuing the

driver individually for injuries and damages not covered by the insurance policy. In

mitigation, respondent claimed that he settled Mr. Montgomery’s claim for the

policy limits and that he could tell the driver had no assets because of his age,

location, type of vehicle, and type of policy. In settling the claim, respondent relied

on the power of attorney provision in his contingency fee contract, which the

committee determined violated Rule 1.8(k). In light of respondent’s substantial

experience in the practice of law, the committee determined respondent acted

knowingly.

      After making its factual findings and determinations regarding rule violations,

the committee determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the public,

and the legal system. As discussed above, the committee determined respondent

acted negligently, knowingly, and intentionally at times. His conduct caused actual

harm to two clients when their accounts were sent to collections by Oasis. His

conduct also continues to cause harm because, as of the date of the formal hearing,

                                          21
collected funds totaling $229,550.59 remain unpaid to third-party providers.

Additionally, third-party providers suffered the loss of the time value of money

during the period of non-payment. Finally, Dr. Van Wormer incurred the additional

time, effort, and expense of trying to collect from respondent before filing his

disciplinary complaint. Nevertheless, the committee noted respondent’s extensive

efforts to pay down the third-party debt. Relying on the ABA’s Standards for

Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the committee determined the baseline sanction is

disbarment.

      The committee found the following aggravating factors are present:

submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during

the disciplinary process, substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted

1997), failure to properly train and supervise his office staff, failure to seek

appropriate counsel upon learning of the several million dollars in unpaid third-party

debt, the amount and duration of the conversion, and the significant number of

clients and third-party providers impacted by the conversion. In mitigation, the

committee noted the absence of a prior disciplinary record, efforts to make

restitution or rectify the consequences of the misconduct, and character or

reputation.

      After further considering the court’s prior jurisprudence addressing similar

misconduct, the committee recommended respondent be disbarred. The committee

further recommended that respondent make restitution on the balance of the unpaid

third-party debt.

      Both respondent and the ODC objected to the hearing committee’s report.

                       Disciplinary Board Recommendation

      After review, the disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee’s factual

findings with one exception. While the committee found respondent failed to

                                         22
maintain a trust account from 2006 to January 2011, the board determined that

respondent’s testimony and other evidence presented at the hearing established he

failed to maintain a trust account from 2006 to November 2012. Respondent’s trust

account registration records indicate he added a new trust account on November 14,

2012, and he could provide no documentary evidence to show he maintained a trust

account in 2011.

      Based on these facts, the board agreed with the committee’s findings

regarding rule violations with one exception. While the committee determined

respondent violated Rule 1.15(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct in part

because it determined the settlement disbursement statements constitute a directive

by the clients under Rule 1.15(d) for respondent to deliver to third parties the funds

set forth in the disbursement statement, the board found that the disbursement

statements do not fall under the purview of Rule 1.15(d). Accordingly, the board

declined to find this rule violation as it relates to the disbursement statements.

      The board then determined respondent violated duties owed to his clients, the

public, the legal system, and the legal profession. The board agreed with the

committee that, at times, respondent acted negligently, knowingly, and intentionally.

The board also agreed with the committee regarding the harm caused by

respondent’s misconduct. Additionally, the board determined respondent caused

potential harm to his clients who still owe debts to third-party providers and to the

third-party providers who are still owed money. Mr. Montgomery also suffered

actual and potential harm, and respondent’s conduct caused harm to the reputation

of the legal profession. The board agreed that disbarment is the baseline sanction.

      In aggravation, the board found a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses,

submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during

the disciplinary process, and substantial experience in the practice of law. In

mitigation, the board found the absence of a prior disciplinary record, timely good

                                          23
faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, and

character or reputation.

      Turning to the issue of an appropriate sanction, the board determined that

Guideline 1 (repeated or multiple instances of intentional conversion of client funds

with substantial harm) of the permanent disbarment guidelines set forth in Supreme

Court Rule XIX, Appendix D, is applicable here. According to the board, the court’s

prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct also supports permanent

disbarment as the appropriate sanction in this matter. Nevertheless, the board also

considered the court’s mandate, set forth in Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10(A)(1),

that permanent disbarment shall only be imposed when (1) the lawyer’s misconduct

is so egregious as to demonstrate a convincing lack of ethical and moral fitness to

practice law, and (2) there is no reasonable expectation of significant rehabilitation

in the lawyer’s character in the future.       Regarding the first factor, the board

determined respondent’s efforts to remedy the initial $4.2 million conversion, which

was negligent, amounted to additional violations of the Rules of Professional

Conduct that were intentional and egregious. With respect to the second factor, the

board noted that respondent intentionally lied to the ODC during its investigation

and made “less than forthright statements” during the formal hearing, both of which

demonstrate there is no reasonable expectation of significant rehabilitation in his

character in the future.

      Under these circumstances, the board recommended respondent be

permanently disbarred.      The board further recommended respondent make

restitution to the third-party providers to whom money is still owed. 4

4
 Respondent’s exhibits indicate these third-party providers include Magnolia ($44,850),
Metropolitan ($70,930.09), and Oasis ($113,770.50).

                                          24
      Respondent filed an objection to the board’s recommendation. Accordingly,

the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, §

11(G)(1)(b).

                                    DISCUSSION

      Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La.

Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has

been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La. 10/2/09),

18 So. 3d 57.       While we are not bound in any way by the findings and

recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the

manifest error standard is applicable to the committee’s factual findings. See In re:

Caulfield, 96-1401 (La. 11/25/96), 683 So. 2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.

3/11/94), 633 So. 2d 150.

      The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that respondent

failed to properly supervise his non-lawyer staff, resulting in the conversion of

approximately $4.2 million belonging to third parties, intentionally continued to

convert third-party funds totaling approximately $1.8 million in order to pay older

third-party debts, failed to maintain a trust account for several years, lied on his trust

account disclosure statements that he did not handle client funds, allowed non-

lawyers to sign trust account checks, charged clients for inappropriate office

expenses, settled a client’s personal injury claim without the client’s knowledge or

consent, and lied to the ODC during its investigation. This conduct amounts to a

violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as found by the hearing committee

and modified by the disciplinary board.

      Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a

determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent’s actions. In determining

                                           25
a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain

high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,

and deter future misconduct. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Reis, 513 So. 2d 1173

(La. 1987). The discipline to be imposed depends upon the facts of each case and

the seriousness of the offenses involved considered in light of any aggravating and

mitigating circumstances. Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Whittington, 459 So. 2d 520

(La. 1984).

      The record further establishes that respondent acted negligently, knowingly,

and intentionally in violating duties owed to his clients, the public, the legal system,

and the legal profession. His conduct caused actual and potential harm to his clients,

third-party providers, and the legal profession. We agreed with the committee and

the board that disbarment is the baseline sanction.

      Aggravating factors include a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses,

submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during

the disciplinary process, and substantial experience in the practice of law. Mitigating

factors include the absence of a prior disciplinary record, timely good faith effort to

make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, character or

reputation, and remorse.

      Considering the mitigating factors present, in particular the significant

restitution respondent has already made and continues to make, we find a downward

deviation from the baseline sanction is appropriate. Accordingly, we will impose a

three-year suspension from the practice of law. We will further order respondent to

make full restitution to the third-party providers to whom money is still owed.

                                      DECREE

      Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee

and the disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it

                                          26
is ordered that Tim L. Fields, also known as Timmy L. Fields, Louisiana Bar Roll

number 24794, be and he hereby suspended from the practice of law for three years.

It is further ordered that respondent shall make full restitution to the third-party

providers to whom money is still owed. All costs and expenses in the matter are

assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1,

with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s

judgment until paid.

                                         27
                   SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                 NO. 2023-B-0343

                             IN RE: TIM L. FIELDS

                      ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

WEIMER, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

      I concur in the majority’s conclusion that discipline is warranted in this

matter, but respectfully dissent from the discipline imposed, believing that

disbarment is not only appropriate but required based on respondent’s prolonged

and egregious course of misconduct.

      The majority documents extensively and in great detail the misconduct

proved by clear and convincing evidence that (the majority agrees) warrants the

baseline sanction of disbarment: “respondent failed to properly supervise his

non-lawyer staff, resulting in the conversion of approximately $4.2 million

belonging to third parties, intentionally continued to convert third-party funds

totaling approximately $1.8 million in order to pay older third-party debts, failed to

maintain a trust account for several [6] years, lied on his trust account disclosure

statements that he did not handle client funds, allowed non-lawyers to sign trust

account checks, charged clients for inappropriate office expenses, settled a client’s

personal injury claim without the client’s knowledge or consent, and lied to the

ODC during its investigation.” In re: Tim L. Fields, 23-0343 (La. 11/ __/23),

slip op. at 25. While respondent acknowledged that he “wasn’t exactly candid”

during the ODC’s investigation, in fact, he lied during a sworn statement and

continued his deception by claiming that a “woman” at the LSBA whose name

who he could not remember and whose identity he made no attempt to verify

contacted him and advised that he did not need a trust account because he only
handled personal injury matters.        Id. , slip op. at 12-13.      This claim is

unbelievable and, quite frankly, preposterous.

      In describing the conversion of funds in which respondent engaged as a

“rolling conversion,” akin to “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” the sheer breadth and

volume of respondent’s transgressions is understated. Between 2009 and 2019 (a

10-year period), respondent converted a total of approximately $6 million. Id.,

slip op. at 10. Respondent’s behavior is more akin to robbing Peter and Paul to

pay John, James, Matthew and Luke.

      The majority acknowledges all of these facts and yet finds a downward

deviation from the baseline sanction of disbarment is appropriate, citing

respondent’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, remorse, and “good faith” efforts

at restitution. Respectfully, I disagree.

      As to the absence of a prior disciplinary record, I note that respondent’s

conduct extended over a period of ten years and was comprised of multiple deeds

warranting disciplinary action.     The sheer length and breath of respondent’s

misconduct, and the fact that respondent was able to avoid the day of disciplinary

reckoning for such a long period of time, in my view, mitigates against respondent

receiving any credit for lack of a prior disciplinary record. As to respondent’s

remorse and efforts at restitution, both are admirable, but cannot erase or mitigate

the fact that efforts at restitution only occurred after respondent was called out for

his misconduct. And, even those efforts involved a Ponzi-like scheme of “rolling

conversions.” The majority’s imposition of a three-year period of suspension,

based largely on respondent’s “significant” restitution, serves only to empower

individuals to misappropriate funds and then, if caught, pay them back. Such a

result is counterintuitive to our responsibility to “maintain high standards of

                                            2
conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession, and deter

future misconduct.” Id., slip op. at 26.

      Given the depth, breadth, and volume of respondent’s misconduct, as

outlined above, and the lack of any excuse therefor, disbarment is the minimum

sanction I would consider in this matter.

                                            3
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                 No. 2023-B-00343

                              IN RE: TIM L. FIELDS

                 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING

Crichton, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

      I agree with the majority’s finding that respondent has violated the multitude

of Rules of Professional Conduct as alleged. However, I disagree with the significant

downward deviation made by the majority to impose the sanction of three years

suspension, as I find it unduly lenient. The majority determined that the mitigating

factors, notably restitution made by respondent, support the downward deviation. In

my view, the restitution that respondent made does indeed support such a deviation,

but only from the permanent disbarment recommended by the Disciplinary Board to

regular disbarment. See In re: Perricone, 18-1233 (La. 12/5/18), 263 So. 3d 309

(Crichton, J., additionally concurring and explaining the difference between

permanent disbarment and regular disbarment). See also, e.g., In re: Pullins-

Gorham, 20-0692 (La. 12/11/20), 315 So. 3d 187 (Crichton, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part, noting respondent’s “timely good faith efforts to make

restitution”); In Re: Connie P. Trieu, 19-1680 (La. 3/9/20), 290 So. 3d 658

(Crichton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, noting the majority failed to

consider the numerous mitigating factors and would therefore impose a lesser

sanction).

      As thoroughly set forth by the majority, respondent has engaged in egregious

rule violations that, in my view, demonstrate a deliberate disregard for our noble

profession and a lack of moral fitness to practice law. In addition to the specific and

intentional conversion of millions of dollars belonging to third parties, respondent

                                          1
has engaged in flagrant dishonesty in the face of these violations. I therefore would

impose the sanction of disbarment.

                                         2