Court Opinion

ID: 9854944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:20.670465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.371125
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
Slip and fall cases continue to come to us with baffling regularity. Indeed, one is tempted to ask: “How many ways can one slip and fall?” The problem arises not from the myriad ways to slip and fall, but, rather, from our inconsistent application of certain stale principles.
Our law in slip and fall cases is so confusing that it places both *523plaintiffs and defendants in the untenable and unenviable position of having to choose between the disastrous and the despicable. Indeed, this area of the law, more than any other, may constitute the enigma of our time. As we strive for strength in the struggle, our goal should be not only to reach a just and fair result, but also to eliminate confusion and bring some predictability to this troublesome area.
Although I concur in the majority’s opinion, I write separately to address what I believe to be the appropriate boundaries of summary judgment in a “foreign substance” slip-and-fall such as this one and to clarify the proper analysis to be applied.
1. The dissent refers to a “comparative negligence analysis” to determine whether Kroger or Moore proximately caused Moore’s injury. The proper test on a proprietor’s motion for summary judgment, however, is a two-part determination of the parties’ knowledge of the foreign substance. The separate issues are 1) whether the proprietor had actual or constructive knowledge of the foreign substance and 2) whether the plaintiff did not know of the foreign substance and, exercising ordinary care, would not have discovered the foreign substance in time to avoid it. Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980); Piggly Wiggly Southern v. Brown, 219 Ga. App. 614 (468 SE2d 387) (1995); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 199 Ga. App. 808 (406 SE2d 234) (1991). The proprietor is entitled to summary judgment if he can show, without question of fact, either his lack of actual or constructive knowledge or the plaintiff’s actual or imputed knowledge. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). In this analysis, the court does not compare negligence', it compares knowledge. A plaintiff may prevail only by showing the proprietor knew (or was deemed to know) of the danger and he did not know (and was not legally deemed to know) of it.
2. Although the test is simple in appearance, it is difficult in application. In this case, however, Moore admitted she could have seen the orange colored substance on the “off-white” floor halfway down the aisle and, indeed, alleged the cashier could have seen it from the opposite end of the aisle. Although she had her hands full, and her attention was focused on the shelves of pasta sauce, she said she was not distracted and nothing prevented her from looking down. Under the narrow facts of this case — especially the apparent visibility of the orange spill — and the precedents cited by the majority holding that merchandise on shelves is no distraction, Kroger has pierced the second element of the test and has shown Moore should have discovered the danger.
Moore’s case fails because she was unable, as a matter of law, to show she exercised ordinary care for her own safety and thus had no reason to know of the danger she encountered. See Lau’s Corp., supra. At the same time, the evidence she presented in opposition to *524Kroger’s motion shows the difficulty of these cases. Like that of many shoppers, Moore’s attention was consumed by the load of groceries in her arms and by her search for a specific product on the shelves.
By creating a flat rule and policy that these facts do not excuse her failure to watch the floor, we have denied Moore the ability to present that explanation to a jury of her peers. We should question that policy, recalling that “[t]he Summary Judgment Act does not authorize the trial [or appellate] court[s] to sit as both judge and jury, weighing the evidence and deciding issues that are traditionally for the jury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Haire v. City of Macon, 200 Ga. App. 744, 747 (409 SE2d 670) (1991). Moreover, that policy is a relic that should be relaxed because it contradicts reality. We have, in effect, ruled Moore’s evidence to have no weight. In light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling in Barentine v. Kroger Co., 264 Ga. 224, 225 (443 SE2d 485) (1994), in which the court considered the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the plaintiff exercised due care, it is time to reconsider the hard and fast rules we have made for determining what does and what does not constitute “ordinary care.” See Dill’s Food City v. Johnson, 219 Ga. App. 654 (466 SE2d 250) (1995); McDonald’s Restaurants of Ga. v. Banks, 219 Ga. App. 667 (466 SE2d 240) (1995).1 Accordingly, I reluctantly join in the court’s opinion only because I feel constrained by current authority to do so.

 While both Barentine and Banks involved clear liquid on the floor, they show the use of a “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether a plaintiff exercised ordinary care for his or her own safety.