Court Opinion

ID: 9753325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:07:55.568905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:34.080681
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
While the majority opinion carefully analyzes all of the issues in this many faceted appeal, I must respectfully dissent from two of the conclusions reached therein, viz., the decision to overrule Giosa v. School District of Philadelphia, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 489, 630 A.2d 511 (Giosa II), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 525 Pa. 629, 578 A.2d 416 (No. 639 E.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1993, filed December 14, 1993), dealing with the offset for insurance benefits, and second, the modification of the prior order of the common pleas court.
First, concerning the deduction of insurance benefits “from the amount of damages which would otherwise be recovera*682ble,” under Section 8553(d) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8553(d), our opinion in Giosa II, I believe, reached the correct result for the cogent reasons expressed by President Judge Craig writing for this Court sitting en banc.
Second, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding which would permit the trial court to modify its previous order regarding delay damages. Section 5505 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, is explicit and states that “a court ... may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry. ...” That language is, in my opinion, abundantly clear.
Further, the two cases upon which the majority relies for authority to reach the result it does, are inapposite. Marble v. Fred Hill & Son, 425 Pa.Superior Ct. 149, 624 A.2d 190 (1993), concerned an appeal from an order of the common pleas court which denied appellant the opportunity to amend its answer and new matter to assert the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The Marble court, “finding the order in question to be interlocutory,” quashed the appeal and remanded for trial. In the appeal now before us we are not dealing with an interlocutory order; otherwise, how could it have been appealed?
The other case authority relied upon by the majority, In re Interest of C.K, 369 Pa.Superior Ct. 445, 535 A.2d 634 (1987), concerned the filing of an appeal nunc pro tunc in an appellate court and that decision merely held that the appeal was untimely because there was no fraud or breakdown in the court’s operations. C.K, therefore, is also inapposite to the issue presented here.
Apart from the two issues discussed, I concur in all other respects with the majority opinion.
McGINLEY and KELLEY, JJ., join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.