Court Opinion

ID: 9946630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 22:02:36.207746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.471753
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                   )
                                     )
                  Plaintiff,         )
                                     )
                                     )
      v.                             )     Cr. ID. No. 93008966DI
                                     )
                                     )
LUTHER DICKSON,                      )
                                     )
                  Defendant.         )

                         Submitted: November 3, 2023
                          Decided: February 29, 2024

    COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
     DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
             SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

Susan Purcell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Luther Dickson, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.

SALOMONE, Commissioner
      This 29th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion

for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court as follows:

              BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On March 29, 1993, Defendant Luther Dickson (“Dickson” or the

“Defendant”) was indicted on the charges of (i) Burglary First Degree, (ii)

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, (iii) Unlawful Sexual Penetration Third

Degree and (iv) Kidnapping First Degree. On August 30, 1993, he was reindicted

on these same charges and two additional charges of Robbery First Degree and

Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third Degree.          The charges arose out of an

incident that occurred on the night of March 6-7, 1993 in which Dickson forced his

way into an elderly woman’s home, sexually assaulted her, stole her money, and

tore her telephone lines from the wall so she would be unable to call for help.

      Dickson was tried twice with respect to these charges. The first jury trial in

this case began on September 13, 1993. At the conclusion of the first trial, the jury

found Dickson guilty of Unlawful Sexual Penetration Third Degree, Unlawful

Imprisonment Second Degree (a lesser-included offense of Kidnapping), and

Robbery First Degree. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Unlawful

                                          1
Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Burglary First Degree charges and a mistrial

was declared as to those counts. 1

      The second jury trial in this case was conducted on December 12-16, 1993.

On December 16, 1993, a second jury found Dickson guilty of Unlawful Sexual

Intercourse in the First Degree and the lesser-included offense of Burglary in the

Second Degree. The remaining charge of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Third

Degree was nolle prossed.2

      On February 4, 1994, Dickson was sentenced to life imprisonment for the

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree conviction and an additional ten years of

incarceration on the remaining convictions, followed by probation.3 On February

17, 1994, Dickson filed a direct appeal of his convictions to the Delaware Supreme

Court.4 The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on November 7, 1994.5

      On April 10, 2010, over fifteen years after the Supreme Court affirmed his

convictions, Dickson filed his first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief.6 In

this first Motion, Dickson asserted four grounds for relief, which included, inter

alia, claims that (i) he was unlawfully deprived of DNA testing which could prove

his innocence and (ii) another person committed the crimes for which he was

1
  State v. Dickson, Delaware Superior Court Criminal Docket, ID No. 93008966DI at 5
(hereinafter, “D.I. __”).
2
  D.I. 8-9.
3
  D.I. 10.
4
  D.I. 12.
5
  Dickson v. State, 1994 WL 632533 (Del.).
6
  D.I. 30.

                                        2
convicted.7       Despite being procedurally barred from bringing his Motion for

Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(1) and (3),

the Court considered his claims and found them all to be without merit.8

        On November 26, 2018, Dickson filed a second pro se Motion for

Postconviction Relief (the “Second Rule 61 Motion”) and Motion for Appointment

of counsel. 9      The Second Rule 61 Motion was prompted by a letter, dated

December 18, 2017, from the United States Department of Justice, which advised

that the FBI had determined that its expert analyst on microscopic hair comparison

evidence (“MHC evidence”), Federal Agent Michael Malone, may have overstated

the results of its examination by testifying to the conclusiveness of microscopic

hair samples in making an identification. 10 Counsel was appointed to represent

Dickson in his Second Rule 61 Motion to determine whether the MHC evidence at

issue prejudiced Dickson’s case in light of the Department of Justice’s letter

raising this new revelation.11

        On June 28, 2019, assigned counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as

Postconviction Counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7).12 In

the Motion to Withdraw, Dickson’s Rule 61 counsel represented that he had

7
  Id.
8
  D.I. 42, 44.
9
  D.I. 46-47.
10
   D.I. 46.
11
   D.I. 50, 53.
12
   D.I. 54-56.

                                          3
thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the proceedings and the record in this case

and that after undertaking this thorough analysis, counsel determined that Dickson

did not have any meritorious basis to raise a claim for relief.13

      Rule 61 counsel explained that the new MHC revelations were not helpful to

Dickson because MHC testimony and the report were only admitted at Dickson’s

first trial. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the Unlawful Sexual

Intercourse First Degree and Burglary First Degree charges in that first trial. The

MHC evidence was not used and was not mentioned to the jury in any fashion

during the second trial. The FBI agent, Agent Michael Malone, did not testify at

Dickson’s second trial nor was the MHC report admitted at the second trial. At the

second trial, Dickson was convicted of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree,

for which he is serving a life sentence, and was also convicted of Burglary in the

Second Degree.

      Rule 61 counsel concluded that the new evidence that led to the filing of the

Second Rule 61 Motion, that the FBI overstated the results of its examination of

microscopic hair samples, played no part whatsoever in Dickson’s conviction of

Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree.          Therefore, the second trial was

untainted by any alleged FBI misconduct.             Accordingly, Rule 61 counsel

13
  See, D.I. 54-56. Rule 61 counsel’s Motion to Withdraw along with the accompanying
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw and appendix.

                                           4
concluded that the MHC evidence claims were without merit under the facts and

circumstances of this case and sought to withdraw as Rule 61 counsel.

       Prior to filing the Motion to Withdraw, and again at the time of the filing,

Rule 61 counsel advised Dickson that he had the right to file a response thereto

within 30 days, if Dickson objected to the Motion to Withdraw. 14 Dickson chose

not to file a response.

       Following a full, thorough and careful review of the Second Rule 61 Motion,

Rule 61 counsel’s Motion to Withdraw, and the record, a Superior Court

Commissioner recommended denial of the Second Rule 61 Motion.15 Dickson did

not file any objections to the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation. 16 On

October 16, 2019, after a de novo review of the record and the Commissioner’s

Report and Recommendation, the Superior Court entered an Order adopting the

Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and denying the Second Rule 61

Motion.17 Dickson did not appeal the denial of his Second Rule 61 Motion to the

Delaware Supreme Court.18

14
   See D.I. 54 (letter, dated June 28, 2019 from Rule 61 counsel advising Dickson of the Motion
to Withdraw and having 30 days to file a response thereto).
15
   See, State v. Dickson, 2019 WL 473830 (Del.Super.).
16
   Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Rule 62, any objections to the Report needed to be filed
within 10 days after the filing of the Report.
17
   D.I. 59.
18
   Dickson was required to file an appeal within 30 days of the Superior Court’s October 16,
2019 Order as required by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(k) and Delaware Supreme Court
Rule 6(a)(iv). He did not appeal within the required time period or at any time thereafter.

                                              5
       On September 14, 2020, eleven months after the Court’s Order in his Second

Rule 61 Motion, Dickson filed a third pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief (the

“Third Rule 61 Motion”). 19 In the Third Rule 61 Motion, Dickson objected to his

counsel’s decision to move to withdraw in the Second Rule 61 Motion, and

objected to and challenged the Court’s decision in the Second Rule 61 Motion that

the MHC evidence claims were without merit. Dickson did not raise anything new

or recently discovered in his Third Rule 61 Motion, but rather, belatedly objected

to this Court’s determination in his Second Rule 61 Motion.

       A Superior Court Commissioner recommended that the Third Rule 61

Motion be summarily dismissed because it failed to meet the pleading

requirements for second or subsequent postconviction motions in that Dickson

failed to establish that (i) new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that he

defendant is actually innocent of the charges for which he is convicted, or (ii) the

existence of a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral

review rendered his convictions invalid.20 The Commissioner also found the Third

Rule 61 Motion to be procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule

Rule 61(i)(4) since the claims raised in the Third Rule 61 Motion were resolved in

the Second Rule 61 Motion. 21 Dickson did not object to the Commissioner’s

19
   D.I. 60.
20
   Super. Ct. Crim.R. 61(d)(2) & (5); Rule 61(i).
21
   D.I. 63.

                                                    6
findings with respect to his Third Rule 61 Motion and the Superior Court entered

an Order adopting the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and denying

the Third Rule 61 Motion.22 Dickson did not appeal the denial of his Third Rule

61 Motion to the Delaware Supreme Court.

                     DICKSON’S FOURTH RULE 61 MOTION

        On October 26, 2023, Dickson filed a fourth pro se Motion for

Postconviction Relief (the “Fourth Rule 61 Motion”) pursuant to which he asserts

(i) “newly discovered evidence of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, appellate

and postconviction counsel” in his initial Rule 61 Motion and (ii) “newly

discovered evidence of police and prosecutorial misconduct based upon Brady

material violation[s].” 23 He claims that both “ground one and ground two [are]

based on actual innocence.”24

        In his Memorandum of Law in Support of his Fourth Rule 61 Motion,

Dickson contends that trial counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation into

certain Brady material within the State’s possession which would have

demonstrated that Dickson did not commit the crimes for which he was

convicted.25 Dickson asserts that another individual by the name of Kevin J.

22
   D.I. 64.
23
   D.I. 65-66.
24
   Id.
25
   D.I. 66 at 5-6.

                                         7
Howard (“Howard”) committed the crimes. 26 He contends that a witness told the

police that she gave a “slip of paper” containing her telephone numbers to the man

who was repairing her car.27 That paper was found wedged in the door of the rape

victim’s home.28 Dickson asserts that he and Howard share similar facial features

and that the witness mistakenly identified Dickson as the man to whom she gave

the slip of paper. 29 He further contends that Howard is an auto mechanic while he

is not. 30 Dickson argues that all of this information was contained in the police

reports and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence at

Dickson’s trial of the possibility that another suspect committed the crimes

alleged.31 He claims this evidence, which was not presented to the jury, may show

his actual innocence. He likewise claims that postconviction counsel was deficient

for failing to raise trial counsel’s purported ineffectiveness in his Second Rule 61

Motion.32 Therefore, according to Dickson, he is “entitled to a new trial where he

can have the benefit of effective assistance of counsel and the newly discovered

evidence or identified evidence of another suspect that former trial counsel should

have presented at his original trial.”33

26
   Id.
27
   Id.
28
   Id.
29
   Id.
30
   Id.
31
   Id. at 7.
32
   Id. at 7-10.
33
   Id. at 10.

                                           8
           Dickson also asserts that he has identified “new evidence of police and

prosecutorial misconduct based upon the intentional loss or willful destruction of

DNA testing of the physical evidence that would probably show with a reasonable

degree of technical certainty that he is actionally [sic] innocent . . .” 34 Put more

simply, Dickson seems to contend that if certain unspecified physical evidence

from the crime scene had been tested for DNA it would have established his actual

innocence and proved that Howard committed the crimes.            In support of his

assertion of police and prosecutorial misconduct, Dickson cites a letter, dated

January 28, 2002, from the Wilmington Police Department to a representative of

the Innocence Project in which the police state that they no longer have any

evidence in their possession that is associated with Dickson’s case. He makes the

leap from this letter that the loss of the evidence was willful and that the State

violated his due process rights because “the undisclosed physical evidence was

favorable to him because it was exculpatory and impeaching” and material to his

defense.35

                  APPLICABLE LAW FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF

Rule 61 and Procedural Bars to Relief

           Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) governs the procedures by

which an incarcerated individual may seek to have his conviction set aside on the

34
     Id.
35
     Id. at 13.

                                           9
ground that the court lacked jurisdiction or any other ground that is a sufficient

factual and legal basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.36 That is, it is a

means by which the court may correct Constitutional infirmities in a conviction or

sentence.37 “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors in the trial process, not allow

defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their convictions.” 38

       Given that intent, before considering the merits of any claims for

postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether there are any

procedural bars to the postconviction motion.39          Rule 61(i) establishes four

procedural bars to postconviction relief.40 Rule 61(i)(1) prohibits a motion for

postconviction relief from being filed “more than one year after the judgement of

conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly

recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the

right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States

Supreme Court.”41

       Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless certain

conditions are met. 42 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief that

was not previously raised is deemed waived, and any claims that were formerly

36
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
37
   Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500 (Del. 1970).
38
   Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811,820 (Del. 2013).
39
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
40
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
41
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
42
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).

                                               10
adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in

an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus

proceeding, are thereafter barred.43

          The foregoing bars to relief do not apply to a claim that the court lacked

jurisdiction or to a claim that satisfies the pleading requirements of Rule 61(d)(2).

Rule 61(d)(2) provides as follows:

                  A second or subsequent motion under this rule shall be
                  summarily dismissed, unless the movant was convicted
                  after a trial and the motion either:

                         (i) pleads with particularity that new evidence
                  exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is
                  actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the
                  charges of which he was convicted; or

                         (ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new
                  rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
                  collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or
                  the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s
                  case and renders the conviction or sentence invalid.44

          The Delaware Supreme Court recently examined the first prong of Rule

61(d)(2), referred to as the “actual innocence exception,” in Purnell v. State where

the Court explained what constitutes “new” evidence and a “strong inference” of

innocence.

                  To qualify for an exception to Rule 61’s procedural bars
                  against untimely, successive motions, [a defendant] must

43
     Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) and (4).
44
     Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).

                                             11
              identify with particularity new evidence that creates a
              strong inference that he is actually innocent in fact of the
              acts underlying the charges. Stated differently, [a
              defendant] must present additional evidence that was not
              available at trial and would not have been despite his
              exercise of due diligence. [The defendant] must also
              convince us that the new evidence, when considered in
              the context of all the relevant evidence by a properly
              instructed jury, is such as will probably change the result
              if a new trial were granted.”45

       The Court also found that “satisfying the actual innocence test is, by design,

a heavy burden, and such meritorious claims are exceedingly rare.” 46

       This is Dickson’s Fourth Rule 61 Motion and it is procedurally barred.

First, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion was filed nearly 29 years after the judgment of

conviction became final and should be barred by Rule 61(i)(1) for being untimely.

Second, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion should be barred by Rule 61(i)(3) because

Dickson failed to assert any of the instant grounds for relief at trial, on direct

appeal or in his initial Motion for Postconviction Relief. Third, while Dickson

makes yeoman efforts to try to couch his claims in terms that meet the pleading

requirements of Rule 61(d)(2)(i), he has not presented any new or additional

evidence of actual innocence that was not available to him at trial or otherwise

45
  Purnell v. State, 254 A. 3d 1053 (Del. 2021), at 1060.
46
  Id. (noting that Purnell was the first defendant to be found eligible for the actual innocence
exception to Rule 61’s procedural bar). In Purnell, the Court found much of the evidence
presented by the defendant to be “new” because trial counsel’s disabling conflict of interest
prevented him from investigating or pursuing several key areas of potentially exonerating
evidence and defensive strategies on behalf of the defendant. No such conflict of interest exists
in Dickson’s case.

                                               12
exonerates him of the crimes for which he was convicted.47 Dickson proffers no

post-trial recantation by a key witness or exculpatory physical evidence that was

not previously available to the defendant as was the case in Purnell. Rather, what

Dickson has presented to the Court in his Fourth Rule 61 Motion is merely his

theory and conjecture that another person committed the crimes for which he was

convicted coupled with supposition that evidence that no longer exists would

exonerate him. Such mere assertions of actual innocence do not suffice under Rule

61(d)(2)(i).48 As such, his Fourth Rule 61 Motion should also be barred under

Rule 61(i)(2).

       Moreover, the Fourth Rule 61 Motion simply restates the same issues raised

by Dickson in his initial Rule 61 Motion in which he asserted, among other things,

that (i) he was deprived of his right to postconviction DNA testing to establish his

innocence and (ii) Howard committed the crimes for which he was convicted.49

Both of these claims were found to be without merit by the Court in 2010 after a

thorough review of all the evidence in the case.50 The Commissioner concluded in

his Report and Recommendation as follows:

47
   Nor has he cited to any new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral
review under Rule 61(d)(2)(ii) or that the Court lacked jurisdiction.
48
   See State v. Miller, 2023 WL 2854227, at *5. Having found no “new” evidence, the Court
need not consider the second “persuasiveness” prong of the Purnell test.
49
   D.I. 30.
50
   The evidence against Dickson at trial was substantial and included, among other things, (i) a
taped confession by Dickson admitting to being present at the scene of the crime, (ii) victim
testimony that she knew Dickson because he had shoveled her snow on two occasions and she

                                               13
               Two juries found Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
               doubt. Defendant seeks evidence which no longer exists
               and asks for that evidence to be tested over 17 years after
               his conviction in a motion that is thirteen years too late.
               Defendant has failed to persuade this Court that his
               theories about another rapist or possible DNA evidence
               warrants this Court to reopen his case and disregard the
               evidence or the jury’s verdict. 51

       Given the foregoing, Dickson’s current claims in his Fourth Rule 61 Motion

are also procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4) as they have been previously

adjudicated by this Court. These claims cannot now be refined, restated or re-

raised in order to again seek judicial review. 52

got a “very clear look” at him during the rape and (iii) two witnesses that testified that Dickson
was near the scene of the crime on the night of the rape. D.I. 42 at 11-12.
51
   Id. at 13.
52
    See State v. Clay, 2022 WL 893744, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2022), aff’d Clay v. State,
2022 WL 4295417 (Del. Sept. 16, 2022) (finding that where an affidavit asserting the
defendant’s innocence was formerly adjudicated in a postconviction proceeding, it cannot
constitute newly discovered evidence in a subsequent postconviction proceeding); see also
Johnson v. State, 1992 WL 183069, *1 (Del.); Duhadaway v. State, 877 A.2d 52 (Del. 2005).

                                               14
                                    CONCLUSION

      Dickson postconviction claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule

61(i)(1), (3) and (4) and he has failed to meet the strict pleading requirements for

proceeding with his motion under Rule 61(d)(2)(i) as he has failed to provide any

newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence. For the foregoing reasons,

Dickson’s Fourth Motion for Postconviction Relief should be SUMMARILY

DISMISSED.

      IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

                                             /s/ Janine M. Salomone
                                             Commissioner Janine M. Salomone

cc:   Prothonotary
      Susan Purcell, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
      Luther Dickson, pro se. (SBI #00173261)

                                        15