Court Opinion

ID: 9449067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:54:47.356709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:40.710872
License: Public Domain

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As Judge WRIGHT states, the cases are divided on the construction of a provision of the Social Security Act similar to the provision of the Railroad Retirement Act here involved.1
The majority opinion is based largely upon the premise that agency determination of matters of law is entitled to weight. I think this is correct, and I have considered the case before us with that general rule of law in mind. However, since statutory construction is a judicial function, in the final analysis, the court may examine agency determination in matters of law, to determine whether or not it is correct. In this connection, the language of Judge Vinson, then of this court (later Chief Justice of the United States), in Railroad Retirement Board v. Bates, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 251, 252, 126 F.2d 642, 643 (1942), is particularly pertinent:
“Although the Board argues that the question here is whether its interpretation of the Act is plainly erroneous, the issue we shall decide, as has been stated, is whether a person otherwise eligible for an annuity under section 2 is disqualified because he receives a pension under subsection 6(a). Inasmuch as the Board is familiar with problems in its field and has had experience and understands the Act which creates it, it is proper that weight should be given to its interpretations. Nonetheless the question is a question of law, one of statutory interpretation, and that is a field in which courts are regarded as having some expertness just as administrative tribunals have special knowledge of the recurring factual patterns in their several spheres of activity. This is, apparently, the first decision the Board has made on the instant problem in accordance with its interpretation of the Act, and our attention has been called to only one similar situation. There is no long administrative interpretion of the Act as a whole nor of the sections with which we shall deal in particular. There has been no congressional re-enactment after an administrative interpretation. This factual situation is one on which the Act carries no positive directive terms; it is at least an interstitial situation. Thus, while according weight to the Board’s conclusion and reasoning, in view of the nature of the question and the terms of the Act, we are free to affirm the District Court, although the Board’s interpretation of the Act may not be plainly erroneous.”
In this case, we have a judgment of a court of the State of New York (which is entitled to full faith and credit) declaring null and void from its inception the marriage entered into by appellant in 1959, allowing her to resume her maiden name, and awarding no alimony.
Bearing in mind the broad purposes of the Railroad Retirement Act and its humanitarian objectives, I would prefer to follow those cases 2 which hold that a marriage declared void ab initio does not *572deprive a widow of her right to compensation under the Railroad Retirement Act after the marriage has been so declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. See Sparks v. United States, 153 F.Supp. 909 (D.C.Vt.1957), where the court, speaking of a similar provision in the Social Security Act, said:
“The ruling of the Administrator brings a result directly contrary to the purpose of the Act. A husband is under a legal duty to support his wife, and the widow’s insurance benefits under this portion of the Act were designed to provide the widow with some security upon the death of her husband and the consequent loss of his support. [Citing cases.]
“This part of the Act is to be liberally construed to aid in the achievement of the purpose of the Act. [Citing case.]” At 912.
Carried to its logical conclusion, the decision of the Board would give rise to absurd results: Assume that annulment follows the development of the following hypothetical situations: Suppose a widow goes through a ceremonial marriage, not knowing that the man she married has a living wife from whom he was not divorced; or suppose a widow marries a person physically or mentally incapable of entering into the marital relationship. Is the widow to be deprived of her annuity in such cases ? How does the present case differ from these instances? Here the court having jurisdiction has decreed the marriage to be void ab initio. I think the Board’s view is based upon its inability to discern the difference in status of a woman who goes through a marriage ceremony and one who goes through an actual marriage with a person capable of marriage and free from fraud in entering into it. In the present case, the marriage between petitioner and Mr. Gloss had existed for over a quarter of a century at the time of his death.
I think the action of the Board was harsh and unreasonable, does not have reasonable basis in law, and should be reversed.

. 45 U.S.C. § 228e(b) (1958), in pertinent part reads: “A widow of a completely or partially insured employee * * * who at the time of filing an application for an annuity under this subsection will have in her care a child of such employee entitled to receive an annuity under subsection (c) of this section shall be entitled to an annuity for each month * * *. Such annuity shall cease * * * upon her remarriage * *

. Among such cases are the following: Yeager v. Flemming, 282 F.2d 779 (5th Cir., 1960), affirming D.C., 173 F.Supp. 316; Folsom v. Pearsall, 245 F.2d 562 (9th Cir., 1957), affirming D.C., 138 F.Supp. 939; Santuelli v. Folsom, 165 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.Cal.1958); Sparks v. United States, 153 F.Supp. 909 (D.C.Vt. 1957); Mays v. Folsom, 143 F.Supp. 784 (D.C.Idaho, 1956).