Court Opinion

ID: 9370428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 17:00:25.603449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.353733
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-4015     Document: 010110811889      Date Filed: 02/13/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 13, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  ANNETTE HENRIE,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 22-4015
                                                   (D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00732-DAK)
  CARBON SCHOOL DISTRICT, a                                   (D. Utah)
  political subdivision of the State of Utah,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Annette Henrie worked for the Carbon School District as a teacher. She had a

 difficult working relationship with her supervisor beginning in 2012, and then in

 2016 she accused him of sexual harassment. After she retired in 2017, Ms. Henrie

 sued the District under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, and Title IX, 20 U.S.C.

 § 1681, for past retaliation based on her complaints of the harassment.

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-4015      Document: 010110811889        Date Filed: 02/13/2023    Page: 2

          The district court granted summary judgment for the District. Because the

 District engaged in no actionable retaliation, we affirm.

                                     I. Background

          The parties are familiar with the background facts, so we recite only those

 necessary to our disposition.

          When Ms. Henrie worked for the District, she had a poor relationship with

 her supervisor, Robert Cox, the District’s Special Education and Human Resources

 Director. In September 2015, she sent the District a memorandum complaining about

 Mr. Cox. Although Ms. Henrie accused Mr. Cox of demeaning and belittling

 behavior, she did not specifically allege sexual harassment or other unlawful

 discrimination. In response, the District implemented several changes to help Ms.

 Henrie, including providing her with a new supervisor. Mr. Cox never supervised her

 again.

          A year later, in November 2016, Ms. Henrie reported to the District that Mr.

 Cox had sexually harassed her four years earlier, during the spring of 2012. In a

 written complaint she accused Mr. Cox of staring at her body in sexually suggestive

 ways and moving his hips in a way that made her uncomfortable. She also

 acknowledged that she had not previously reported the sexual harassment. The

 District investigated and found Ms. Henrie’s claims were unsupported. She retired in

 June 2017.

          In 2019, Ms. Henrie sued the District for, among other things, retaliation in

 violation of Title VII and Title IX. The district court granted summary judgment for
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 the District on all her claims. With respect to retaliation, although the court found

 Ms. Henrie’s 2016 complaints were protected activity, it concluded no reasonable

 jury could find the alleged conduct—excluding her from meetings; taking her off

 Medicaid billing training; and issuing her a corrective letter—constituted materially

 adverse employment actions.

       Ms. Henrie appeals only the grant of summary judgment on her retaliation

 claims.

                                     II. Analysis

       Ms. Henrie alleges the district court erred in granting summary judgment

 on her retaliation claims. She contends enough evidence exists for them to go to

 a jury.

       We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

 standard as the district court. Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567,

 569 (10th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine

 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of material fact is genuine”—and will

 therefore preclude summary judgment—“if a ‘reasonable jury could return a

 verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Henderson, 41 F.3d at 569 (quoting Anderson

 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

       Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who

 engage in protected activity, i.e., opposing “an unlawful employment practice”

 like discrimination because of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Title IX prohibits
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 educational programs that receive federal funding from retaliating against

 employees who oppose discrimination because of sex. Jackson v. Birmingham

 Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005). Sexual harassment is discrimination

 because of sex. Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006)

 (Title IX); Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996)

 (Title VII).

       To make a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Henrie must show (1) she

 engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and

 (3) “there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

 employment action.” Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 155 F.3d 1257,

 1263–64 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). An employee

 engages in protected activity only if she opposes an unlawful employment

 practice. Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002).

       To establish an adverse employment action, Ms. Henrie must show “a

 reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,

 which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker

 from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa

 Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted;

 emphasis added). “[N]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an

 actionable adverse action.” Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.

 1996). Generally, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good

 manners” do not qualify. White, 548 U.S. at 68. “Otherwise, minor and even

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 trivial employment actions . . . would form the basis of a discrimination suit.”

 Johnson v. Weld County, 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

 marks omitted). Adverse conduct must carry “a significant risk of humiliation,

 damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects”

 to be considered actionable. Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1239 (10th

 Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

       We agree with the district court that the 2015 complaint does not allege

 protected activity. Although the complaint alleged Mr. Cox treated Ms. Henrie

 poorly and unprofessionally, it never alleged Mr. Cox engaged in sexual

 harassment or other discriminatory acts because of her sex.

       But Ms. Henrie’s 2016 complaint—when she specifically accused Mr. Cox

 of sexual harassment—does constitute protected activity under Title VII and Title

 IX. We thus consider whether the District’s alleged retaliatory conduct

 constituted materially adverse employment actions.

       Ms. Henrie contends the District engaged in three forms of retaliatory

 conduct. We conclude they do not qualify as materially adverse employment

 actions.

       A. Meetings

       Ms. Henrie first alleges the District retaliated against her by excluding her

 from meetings she normally participated in.

       When she was still supervised by Mr. Cox, he occasionally asked Ms.

 Henrie to substitute for him at special education directors’ meetings. After the

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 complaints (it is unclear from the briefs whether the September 2015 complaint or

 the November 2016 complaints are the basis for this claim), she claims she was

 excluded from directors’ meetings. But she makes no claim that her new

 supervisor intentionally excluded her from the meetings. Moreover, since Ms.

 Henrie was not a director and did not regularly attend those meetings, any

 “exclusion” was—at most—a petty slight.

       Ms. Henrie also asserts she was left out of a spring 2017 meeting about

 how the District would respond to a request from the Utah State Board of

 Education. She claims this was a project she ordinarily would have been

 involved in. But all the record shows is that only a minor piece of information

 from Ms. Henrie was needed for the report, so someone else was tasked to obtain

 it. Mr. Cox also testified he could not use Ms. Henrie for the project “because at

 that time [he] was to have no contact with [Ms. Henrie].” Supp. App. 497.

       Again, Ms. Henrie’s exclusion from one meeting where she only had to

 provide a minor data point was not a materially adverse action.

       B. Medicaid Billing Training

       Ms. Henrie next alleges the District retaliated against her by stopping her

 training on Medicaid billing. She never actually did any billing but rather “did

 the Medicaid time studies” because she “was supposed to take over the Medicaid

 billing” when the incumbent left, so she “was supposed to go in and be trained.”

 Supp. App. 161–62. But she did not do significant training because the

 incumbent “wasn’t ready to step down yet.” Supp. App. 163. The District later

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 informed Ms. Henrie that someone else would take over billing if and when the

 incumbent stepped down.

       By her own admission, Ms. Henrie had not undergone significant training

 because the incumbent was not ready to leave. Cf. White, 548 U.S. at 69

 (emphasis added) (“But to retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly

 training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional

 advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about

 discrimination.”). Her case may have been different if she had undergone

 significant training, had done some billing, was on the cusp of taking over

 billing, or had a set date when she would take over. But here, the District

 stopped Ms. Henrie from doing minimal training for a position she might take

 over at some undetermined point in the future.

       This was not a materially adverse action.

       C. Letter

       Lastly, Ms. Henrie alleges the District retaliated against her when it issued

 a letter in January 2017 that accused her of talking negatively about Mr. Cox.

 Her conduct supposedly made other employees uncomfortable, violated several

 District policies, and interfered with her work. The letter was “a directive to stop

 spreading negative information” and to focus on her work. App. 205. The letter

 stated that if Ms. Henrie believed the District “received inaccurate information

 and [she had] not been speaking negatively about Mr. Cox and [had] been

 [fulfilling her responsibilities], then [she should] please continue to do [her] job

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 as expected.” Id. The letter emphasized it was “a directive and not a disciplinary

 letter” and that it would “not go in [her] permanent personnel file.” Id.

       By its plain terms, the letter was not a formal reprimand or other

 disciplinary measure. And the District even acknowledged it could be wrong on

 the substance and requested clarification if necessary. Importantly, the letter

 stated it would not be placed in Ms. Henrie’s permanent personnel file, indicating

 it would not be used for future employment decisions or otherwise harm her. Nor

 does she allege that it caused her to retire after the 2016-17 school year. See

 Alabi v. Vilsack, 860 F. App’x 576, 582 (10th Cir. 2021) (concluding a warning

 letter was not a materially adverse employment action when there was no

 evidence it caused the employee “any serious injury or material disadvantage”).

 The corrective letter would not have dissuaded a reasonable employee from

 reporting discrimination and cannot be considered a materially adverse

 employment action.

                                     *    *    *

         In sum, Ms. Henrie has not provided sufficient evidence to show she

 suffered a materially adverse employment action. Because no reasonable jury

 could find the District engaged in retaliatory conduct, summary judgment was

 appropriate.

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                                  III. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                            Circuit Judge

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