Court Opinion

ID: 6734900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:17:31.376674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:44.317706
License: Public Domain

*48ON REHEARING.
Warrin, J.
Upon the petition of plaintiff’s counsel a rehearing was granted in this action, and the case was again fully argued at the present term. Our views remain unchanged. In the opinion formulated by the late Chief Justice Corliss, this Court said: “Assuming for the purposes of the disposition of this case that the plaintiff was entitled to the possession of the property at the time the action was commenced, still it is obvious, under the undisputed facts, that he is proceeding against the wrong party defendant.’' This point, being in our opinion well taken, is necessarily decisive of the case. Upon the leargument, counsel urged that if it be held that the plaintiff cannot recover the grain itself, under the complaint, which is strictly a complaint in replevin, nevertheless, as counsel contend, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover the value of the grain, under the same complaint. Counsel strenuously contend for the liberal rules of construction which prevail in code pleading, and insist that, governed by such rules, the allegations of the complaint are broad enough to allow the plaintiff to recover either the wheat in specie, or its value in money. But it is clear to this Court that the crucial question in this case is not one of pleading. The controlling facts as stated in the original opinion are not in dispute. The defendant at no time had actual possession of the grain covered by the plaintiff’s mortgage, and long prior to the commencement of this action the defendant had disposed of the elevator tickets in question. But let us suppose that the complaint was sufficient as a complaint in conversion, and further suppose that plaintiff made demand for the wheat of defendant, and commenced this action, while the elevator tickets still belonged to the defendant and were in his possession. Under these suppositions, could plaintiff recover the value of the wheat? We think not. To recover in such an action, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant at some time had the actual or the constructive possession of the property. Just here the plaintiff fails in his proof; and this, regardless of any defect in the complaint. The evidence conclusively shows that the defendant at no time had either the actual or the constructive possession or control of the specific grain covered by the plaintiff’s mortgage. Defendant at one time had certain elevator tickets, but these would not have entitled the defendant to demand of the elevator company the wheat covered by the plaintiff’s mortgage, or any specific wheat. While it is true that under chapter 130 of the Laws of 1887, as amended by section 1 of the Laws of 1889, an elevator receiving-wheat for storage becomes a mere bailee of the wheat, yet the bailment is of such a peculiar character that the elevator company can fully discharge its obligations to the ticket holder by a delivery of grain of the same kind, grade, and quantity as that delivered by the bailor. Section 9,. c. 130, Laws 1887, declares that “nothing in this section shall be construed to mean the delivery of the identical grain specified in the receipt.” It therefore clearly appears that *49the defendant, as a storage-ticket holder, did not have any constructive possession of the grain in question, or of any specific grain. Under such circumstances it is entirely clear that an action would not lie against the defendant for the value of the grain covered by plaintiff’s mortgage.
(77 N. W. Rep. 95.)