Court Opinion

ID: 9765415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:02:15.75518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.722212
License: Public Domain

OP1NION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MALONEY, Judge.
A jury convicted appellant of terroristic threat pursuant to TexPenal Code Ann. § 22.07(a)(2),1 and the trial court assessed punishment at imprisonment for one hundred and eighty days, probated for two years, and a $1,000 fine. The First Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. George v. State, 841 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1992). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether, if requested at the guilt/innoeence phase of trial, the trial court must instruct the jury not to consider extraneous offense evidence admitted for a limited purpose under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 404(b),2 unless it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offense. We will affirm.
Appellant and his estranged wife, the complainant, were involved in a bitter divorce and custody battle. Appellant made a telephone call to his son who refused to talk to him. When the complainant so informed appellant, he told her, “I’m going to kill you, bitch.” To show that appellant intended to place the complainant in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, the State presented evidence that appellant had assaulted her on previous occasions.
The trial court limited the jury’s consideration of extraneous offenses to the issue of appellant’s intent, but denied appellant’s requested instruction that the jury could not consider evidence of extraneous offenses unless it believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed them.3
*75The Court of Appeals held the trial court erred in denying the requested instruction. George, 841 S.W.2d at 549 (citing Ray v. State, 382 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1964); Curry v. State, 169 Tex.Crim. 195, 333 S.W.2d 375, 376 (1960); Ernster v. State, 165 Tex.Crim. 422, 308 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (1957); Nichols v. State, 138 Tex.Crim. 324, 136 S.W.2d 221, 221-22 (1940);4 Miller v. State, 122 Tex.Crim. 59, 53 S.W.2d 790, 791-92 (1932); Rodriguez v. State, 687 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.); 8 Michael J. McCoRMick & Thomas D. Blackwell, Texas CRIMINAL FoRms and TRial Manual § 88.05 (Texas Practice 1985)). The court also found the error harmful. Id.
The Harris County District Attorney5 concedes that “Texas law has for years required a charge instructing the jury that, before they can consider evidence of extraneous bad acts, they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed those acts.” The State Prosecuting Attorney concedes this as well. The State contends, however, that since the enactment of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence the ease law relied upon by the Court of Appeals is no longer good law. The State argues that the jury instruction issue is inextricably tied to the standard of proof, for purposes of admissibility, applicable to the State in proving the defendant committed an extraneous offense. We agree. The State further argues that the standard of admissibility for extraneous offenses is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, the standard for jury consideration of extraneous offense evidence is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt either. For the following reasons, we disagree with the State’s latter contention.
In Lankford v. State, 93 Tex.Crim. 442, 248 S.W. 389 (1923), the defendant was charged with possession of intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale, and the State introduced evi-denee of extraneous sales of intoxicating liquor. We wrote:
It is the settled law in this state that when evidence of collateral crimes is introduced for one of the various purposes for which such evidence becomes admissible, the jury should be instructed that they cannot consider against the defendant such collateral crimes, unless it has been shown to their satisfaction that the accused is guilty thereof. This has been held to be the correct doctrine as applicable to collateral forgeries, thefts, and other crimes, and we can see no sort of reason for attempting to draw a distinction between the application of said rule in other felony cases and the one now under consideration. If it be true that the jury must be instructed as to a collateral theft or forgery or other collateral crime under our established decisions, that they must believe that guilt of the accused in such collateral crime has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt before same can be considered against him in determining his guilt in the case on trial, then the same rule is applicable here, and the jury should have been told that they could not consider as a guilty circumstance appellant’s selling intoxicating liquor in violation of law on the dates named, unless such guilt was shown by legal evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lankford, 248 S.W. at 389-90 (citations omitted).6 Since Lankford, we have consistently required that juries be instructed not to consider extraneous offense evidence unless they believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such offense. See, e.g., Ernster, 308 S.W.2d at 34-35; Nichols, 136 S.W.2d at 221-22; Vaughn v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 205, 118 S.W.2d 312 (1938); Miller, 53 S.W.2d at 791-92.
As the State asserts, and we presume, the standard for jury consideration of extraneous *76offense evidence was intended to mirror the standard for admissibility of that evidence. Harrell v. State, 884 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). Long before the enactment of our rules of evidence, the standard of admissibility for extraneous offenses was at one time proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Haley v. State, 84 Tex.Crim. 629, 209 S.W. 675, 677 (1919); Pelton v. State, 60 Tex.Crim. 412, 132 S.W. 480, 484 (1910) (op. on reh’g). In later years, the Court announced a standard of admissibility known as “clear” proof which has been anything but clear as to its meaning. See Harrell, 884 S.W.2d at 158 and cases cited therein.
In Harrell, we held that after the enactment of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence, for purposes of admissibility of extraneous offenses, the standard of proof applicable to the State in proving the defendant committed an extraneous offense is beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 159 & 160. Because the standard of proof necessary to admit extraneous offenses is beyond a reasonable doubt, the previous rationale for requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offenses continues to exist.7
Thus, we hold, if the defendant so requests at the guilt/innocence phase of trial, the trial court must instruct the jury not to consider extraneous offense evidence admitted for a limited purpose unless it believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offense.8
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
WHITE, J., not participating.

. Section 22.07(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code provides:
(a) A person commits [terroristic threat] if he threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or properly with intent to:
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(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury....
TexPenal Code Ann. § 22.07(a)(2).

. Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence provides, in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....
TexR.Crim.Evid. 404(b).

.The trial court instructed the jury:
You have received evidence of alleged extraneous offenses committed by the defendant. This evidence is admitted to assist you in making your determination with regard to the alleged intent of the defendant in this case, if it does so, and shall not be considered by you for any other purpose including the defendant’s character or that he acted in conformity with such conduct.

. The Court of Appeals mistakenly styles this case “Nicholas v. State."

. Both the Harris County District Attorney and the State Prosecuting Attorney have filed briefs in this cause. References to "the State” refer to both entities.

. The extraneous offense evidence was elicited through an accomplice, and this Court held the trial court "should have instructed the jury that the fact of such sales could not be considered against the appellant unless his guilt thereof was shown by legal testimony." Lankford, 248 S.W. at 389.

. In Harrell, supra, and in the instant case, we have declined to overrule long-standing prece--dent and have also reaffirmed that the standard for jury consideration of extraneous offense evidence and the standard for admissibility of that evidence should remain consistent. Although Judge Clinton in his concurring opinion agrees that precedent on these issues should not be overruled, he spends a good deal of time berating a majority of this Court for its decision to address Harrell and the instant case separately. His opinion adds nothing to the jurisprudence of the state.

. We are not concerned with the jury instruction given at punishment. But cf. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a) (extraneous offenses are admissible at the punishment phase of a non-capital trial of an offense occurring on or after September 1, 1993 if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extraneous offense).