Court Opinion

ID: 9555250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:09:52.562533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:01.551584
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0421-MR

RAY HACKER, JR.                                                       APPELLANT

                     APPEAL FROM JACKSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                    HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 10-CR-00036

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Ray Hacker, Jr., appeals from the order denying his RCr1 11.42

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment of guilt and sentence, entered

on March 10, 2022, by the Jackson Circuit Court. Following a careful review of

the record, briefs, and law, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
         BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            Direct appeal of this case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of

Kentucky in Hacker v. Commonwealth, No. 2015-SC-000170-MR, 2016 WL

2605243, at *1 (Ky. May 5, 2016). We adopt those facts:

                   This case originally went to trial on February 14,
            2012. Following trial, the jury convicted Hacker of
            murder, and he appealed to this Court as a matter of right.
            This Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because
            the trial court had erroneously permitted the
            Commonwealth to introduce into evidence a police report
            regarding a prior incident of domestic violence involving
            Hacker and Walerski. Hacker v. Commonwealth, No.
            2012-SC-000269-MR, 2014 WL 1664232 (Ky. 2014). In
            our previous opinion, we set forth the following relevant
            facts:

                          Having recently relocated from Florida, Ray
                  Hacker and girlfriend Gerilyn Walerski shared a
                  rented room in the home of Jackson County,
                  Kentucky resident Raymond Crouch. On June 13,
                  Crouch’s stepdaughter Connie Worthington, who
                  was visiting Crouch at the time, witnessed Hacker
                  and Walerski drinking and bickering throughout
                  the day. That afternoon, Crouch and Worthington
                  watched Hacker enter the living room, retrieve a
                  rifle from behind a flag-stand, and head toward the
                  bedroom that he shared with Walerski. After
                  hearing what Worthington described as the sound
                  of a B.B. gun firing, Crouch confronted Hacker,
                  who stated that “there was only one [bullet] in the
                  gun and it’s in the back of her head.” Hacker then
                  began to suffer a seizure and left the residence, but
                  remained on the front porch until the police
                  arrived. First responders found Walerski lying on
                  the floor having suffered a fatal gunshot wound to
                  the head.

                                        -2-
Id. at *1.

      During the first trial, Hacker’s theory of defense
was that the shooting was accidental. In support of that
theory, Hacker testified that he heard a scream coming
from the bathroom and, when he opened the bathroom
door, he found Walerski pointing the rifle at her own
head. According to Hacker, he and Walerski struggled
for control of the rifle and, during the struggle, it
accidentally discharged, killing Walerski. During the
second trial, Hacker planned to use a new and alternative
theory of defense – that he shot Walerski while under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance.

        At a pretrial conference, the Commonwealth stated
that it intended to use video recordings from the first trial
of the testimony of Savannah Gibson and Raymond
Crouch. Because Gibson was in labor and Crouch had
died, the court deemed that neither was available. The
court asked Hacker if he wanted to continue the trial until
Gibson could be available, but he declined the court’s
offer, stating that he did not object to the admission of
Gibson’s testimony. However, Hacker objected to the
admission of Crouch’s testimony arguing that he would
not be able to cross-examine Crouch based on his new
theory of defense. The court overruled Hacker’s
objection and permitted the Commonwealth to play video
of the testimony of Gibson and Crouch from the first
trial.

      In support of his new theory of defense, Hacker
provided evidence that: he and Walerski had been
consuming alcohol and pills throughout the day; he and
Walerski constantly argued and were arguing that day;
Walerski was often the instigator of such arguments; and
during their argument that day Walerski accused him of
being responsible for the death of his son. The jury was
not swayed by Hacker’s extreme emotional disturbance

                             -3-
              defense, and it convicted him of murder and
              recommended a sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment.

Id. at *1-2 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court found no reversible error and

affirmed. Hacker then moved the trial court to vacate the judgment and sentence

pursuant to RCr 11.42, claiming he had ineffective assistance of counsel at his

second trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied his motion, and

this appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              As established in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12

(Ky. 2002):

              [t]he Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for
              ineffective assistance of counsel: [f]irst, the defendant
              must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
              This requires showing that counsel made errors so
              serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
              guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
              defendant must show that the deficient performance
              prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
              counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
              defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
              Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
              2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984). To show
              prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable
              probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
              the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
              reasonable probability is the probability sufficient to
              undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104
              S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.

                                          -4-
Both Strickland prongs must be met before relief may be granted. “Unless a

defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted

from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In the instant case, we need not

determine whether Hacker’s counsel’s performance was adequate on the issue

raised on this appeal because Hacker fails to demonstrate prejudice resulting from

counsel’s alleged deficient performance.

             To establish prejudice, a movant must show a reasonable probability

exists that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In short, one must

demonstrate that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Fairness is

measured in terms of reliability. “The likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable.” Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867,

876 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. Ritcher, 562 U.S. 86, 100, 131 S. Ct. 770,

791, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S. Ct. at

2067)).

                                 LEGAL ANALYSIS

             On appeal, Hacker first argues that his counsel was ineffective by

failing to produce witnesses essential to the theory of his defense of extreme

                                           -5-
emotional disturbance (EED). This theory centered on Walerski’s accusation that

Hacker was responsible for his son’s death. While Hacker asserts he was the

primary witness in the first trial about the details of his son’s death, and contrary to

his argument on appeal, those details were not critical to the jury’s ability to find

EED, had they chosen to do so.

             Our review of the record reveals that, although Hacker could have

supplied further evidence by testifying at his second trial, Hacker’s testimony

probably would have harmed rather than helped his defense. Hacker testified at

the evidentiary hearing that Walerski’s comments about his son’s death did not

have any effect on him at the time she was shot because he was already over it.

             Moreover, Hacker’s counsel allowed him to testify at his first trial and

found him to be a “loose cannon” with potential to offend the jury. Accordingly,

counsel felt it was in Hacker’s best interest not to testify at the second trial and so

advised. Even so, the decision not to testify was ultimately Hacker’s; therefore, he

cannot now complain.

             Furthermore, Hacker has not specifically detailed what other evidence

could have been offered in his defense to demonstrate EED. During the second

trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Raymond Crouch, deceased,

                                          -6-
from the first trial and also called Connie Worthington. This testimony supported

Hacker’s EED defense.2

               Hacker asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to call his sister,

Diana McQueen. McQueen testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not

know much about Hacker’s son, but his death had something to do with a train and

losing him was hard on Hacker. Hacker failed to show how McQueen’s testimony

would add anything new to his defense. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 336

2
    The Supreme Court of Kentucky summarized their testimony as:

               Crouch testified on cross-examination that: Hacker and Walerski
               argued all the time; he never heard Hacker threaten Walerski but
               heard Walerski threaten Hacker on multiple occasions; he had
               never seen Hacker hit Walerski but had seen Walerski hit Hacker;
               both Hacker and Walerski drank a great deal every day and
               Walerski was “nuts” when she drank; Hacker and Walerski were
               fighting and drinking the day Walerski was shot; and Hacker had a
               seizure after Walerski was shot. These facts support Hacker’s
               [EED] theory of defense in his second trial[.]

               ...

               Worthington testified that: Walerski hated living in Kentucky and
               always blamed Hacker for making her move from Florida;
               Walerski blamed Hacker for wrecking his car; Walerski blamed
               Hacker for the death of his son; she had seen Walerski hit Hacker
               but had never seen Hacker hit Walerski; Hacker and Walerski were
               always drinking; and Walerski was “a pure bitch,” “obnoxious,”
               and “embarrassing.” As to the day of the murder, Worthington
               testified that Hacker and Walerski were arguing and during this
               argument Walerski again accused Hacker of causing his son’s
               death, to which Hacker responded “shut your F-ing mouth,” which
               was the loudest Worthington had heard Hacker yell that day. This
               testimony by Worthington supported Hacker’s [EED] defense.

Hacker, 2016 WL 2605243, at *3, 4.

                                              -7-
S.W.3d 42 (Ky. 2011) (RCr 11.42 movant’s failure to specify what evidence

potential witnesses would have provided was fatal to his claim that counsel was

ineffective in having failed to subpoena them).

             During closing, Hacker’s counsel made a very compelling argument

which was sufficient for the jury to find EED. However, it was the jury’s

prerogative to find Hacker guilty of murder as the first jury had done.

             Ultimately, Hacker has failed to demonstrate that his counsel violated

either of Strickland’s prongs by not presenting further evidence on behalf of his

EED claim. Therefore, we must affirm.

             Hacker next argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate and prepare for the penalty phase of his second trial and failing to

present mitigating evidence. Hacker’s counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing

that he intended to call McQueen to testify during the penalty phase of the second

trial, as she had done at the first, but she was too emotional and refused.

McQueen’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was that she was not approached

by counsel and that when she approached him to testify, he told her it would not be

a good idea. Hacker also points out that his counsel did not call his mother, Joan

Hacker, to testify. Counsel testified that he did not call Joan as a witness because

she was even more upset than McQueen and unable to testify. “The totality of the

circumstances surrounding the . . . trial and the subsequent RCr 11.42 hearing

                                          -8-
provides ample evidence of the trial court’s opportunity to see the witnesses and

observe their demeanor on the stand, and recognition must be given to its superior

position to judge their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.”

McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Ky. 1986). Here, the trial

court believed counsel’s testimony over McQueen’s. The trial court then correctly

found that counsel cannot be held responsible when a witness refuses or is unable

to testify.

              Hacker also claims his counsel was ineffective in his cross-

examination of the Commonwealth’s witness during the penalty phase. Yet,

Hacker fails to present any further questions that should have been asked. Thus, he

fails to properly allege a claim justifying relief under RCr 11.42 on that issue. To

be entitled to relief under RCr 11.42, one must “state specifically the grounds on

which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in

support of such grounds.” RCr 11.42(2). “Conclusory allegations that counsel was

ineffective without a statement of the facts upon which those allegations are based

do not meet the rule’s specificity standard and so ‘warrant a summary dismissal of

the motion.’” Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012).

              Hacker’s final argument is that his Sixth Amendment autonomy right

was violated when counsel pursued a defense that he shot Walerski while under the

influence of EED. This argument is belied by the record in which Hacker clearly

                                         -9-
stated to the trial court during the second trial that it was his decision not to testify.

Hacker was given the opportunity to object to this line of defense on the record but

declined to do so.3 At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that although

Hacker maintained his innocence and never assumed responsibility for Walerski’s

death, Hacker agreed not to testify and allowed counsel to pursue an EED defense

at the second trial. Thus, Hacker has not shown that his autonomy was encroached

upon.

                                        CONCLUSION

                Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order upholding

Hacker’s judgment and sentence entered by the Jackson Circuit Court is

AFFIRMED.

3
    When a defendant objects to a concession of guilt, he must make an objection on the record.

                        The requirement of an objection on the record is only
                logical. Should an attorney concede guilt to the charged crime, the
                trial court can only presume that such a concession is part of a
                legitimate and agreed upon strategy absent an objection from the
                defendant himself. It is absurd to suggest otherwise, as that would
                force the trial court to divine whether the defendant does in fact
                have an objection to a concession of guilt. A competent defendant,
                capable of assisting in his own defense, is also capable of lodging
                such an objection to the trial court. We will not interpret [McCoy
                v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018)] in such a
                way that allows a defendant to sleep on his rights and allege a
                structural error after his direct appeal has proven unsuccessful.

Epperson v. Commonwealth, 645 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Ky. 2021).

                                               -10-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

David L. Stewart          Daniel Cameron
LaGrange, Kentucky        Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Christina L. Romano
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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