Court Opinion

ID: 9390242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:00:22.506065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.112142
License: Public Domain

20-1950
    Vakhabov v. Garland
                                                                                    BIA
                                                                          Christensen, IJ
                                                                          A208 018 033
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                SUMMARY ORDER
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         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 27th day of April, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
             JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
             STEVEN J. MENASHI,
             BETH ROBINSON,
                  Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    SHERZOD VAKHABOV,
             Petitioner,

                     v.                                          20-1950
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Berdymurat Berdyev, Esq.,
                                      Berdyev Law, P.C., Woodbridge,
                                      NJ.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                      Attorney General; Matthew B.
                                  George, Senior Litigation Counsel;
                                  Timothy Bo Stanton, Trial
                                  Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                  Litigation, United States
                                  Department of Justice, Washington,
                                  DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

      Petitioner Sherzod Vakhabov, a native of the former

Soviet Union and citizen of Uzbekistan, seeks review of a May

27, 2020 order of the BIA, affirming a July 26, 2018 decision

of    an   Immigration      Judge     (“IJ”),        which    denied    asylum,

withholding    of    removal,     and       relief    under   the   Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re Sherzod Vakhabov, No. A208

018 033 (B.I.A. May 27, 2020), aff’g No. A208 018 033 (Immig.

Ct.   N.Y.   City   July    26,     2018).       We    assume   the    parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final agency

determination.      See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146

(2d Cir. 2008).      The applicable standards of review are well

established.        “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

conclusive     unless      any    reasonable         adjudicator      would   be

compelled     to     conclude        to       the     contrary.”       8 U.S.C.

                                        2
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).         “Accordingly,        we   review   the    agency’s

decision for substantial evidence and must defer to the

factfinder’s findings based on such relevant evidence as a

reasonable      mind   might   accept    as    adequate     to    support    a

conclusion. . . . By contrast, we review legal conclusions de

novo.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Yanqin Weng v.

Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

    An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal “must

establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion was or will be

at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A);

Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 105–06, 114 (2d Cir.

2022).     “In order to establish persecution on account of

political    opinion    . . . ,     an   asylum    applicant      must   show

. . . , through direct or circumstantial evidence, that the

persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the applicant’s

political belief.”       Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540,

545 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).       “[O]pposition to endemic corruption or extortion

. . .    [or]    opposition    to   other     government    practices       or

                                     3
policies[] may have a political dimension when it transcends

mere    self-protection        and    represents    a    challenge    to   the

legitimacy or authority of the ruling regime.”                    Id. at 547–

48.

       The IJ did not err in concluding that Vakhabov failed to

establish that a shop owner in Uzbekistan harmed him on

account of his anti-corruption political opinion.                    Vakhabov

testified    that       he    had     confiscated       the   shop    owner’s

merchandise as part of an official investigation for the

Ministry of Economics and that the shop owner threatened and

harmed him in an effort to have the merchandise returned and

as revenge for business losses.              Vakhabov did not testify

that he had expressed an anti-corruption belief or reported

endemic corruption, or that the shop owner targeted him for

such beliefs or actions.             See id. at 547–48 (“[An] important

question[] for determining the nature of the applicant’s

opposition [is] . . . whether the persecutor was attempting

to suppress a challenge to the governing institution, as

opposed to a challenge to isolated aberrational acts of greed

or malfeasance.”).           Further, Vakhabov admitted that he had

no    evidence   that    the    shop     owner’s    uncle,    a    government

official, was involved in targeting Vakhabov.                 And the IJ did

                                        4
not clearly err in concluding that Vakhabov did not suffer

adverse consequences in his government job for resisting his

supervisor’s instruction to give the shopkeeper preferential

treatment.     Because Vakhabov did not provide evidence from

which to infer that the shop owner or a government official

considered    him   to   have   opposed   endemic   corruption    or

government practices and targeted him on that account, the IJ

did not err in finding that he failed to establish that he

was or will be targeted on account of a political opinion and

thus did not err in denying asylum and withholding of removal

for failure to show a nexus to a protected ground.               See

8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Yueqing Zhang,

426 F.3d at 545, 547–48.

    The agency also did not err in denying CAT relief.

Unlike asylum and withholding, CAT relief does not require a

nexus to a protected ground.         See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c),

1208.17.     To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must show that

it is “more likely than not” that he will be tortured.

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.17(a).       To show that torture

is “more likely than not,” an applicant “must establish that

there is greater than a fifty percent chance . . . that he

will be tortured upon return to his . . . country of origin.”

                                 5
Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 n.20 (2d Cir.

2003).

      In finding that Vakhabov had not established a likelihood

of torture, the IJ reasonably noted that Vakhabov had not

worked as an investigator since 2012, and the merchandise he

confiscated in that position had since been returned to the

shop owner.       Although the shop owner had informed Vakhabov,

who had moved to Russia in the interim, that he was watching

him   and    would      seek   revenge       (a   threat   Vakhabov’s    expert

believes might be carried out), Vakhabov remained unharmed in

Russia      for   two    years   and     returned     without      incident   to

Uzbekistan three times for a total of more than two months.

Cf. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999)

(finding     a    fear    of   future    harm      weakened    when   similarly

situated     family      members   remain         unharmed    in   petitioner’s

native country).          Based on this evidence, the IJ was not

compelled to conclude that it was more likely than not that

Vakhabov would be tortured in Uzbekistan.                          See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1); see Mu-Xing Wang, 320 F.3d

at 144.

                                         6
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

                              7