Court Opinion

ID: 9518858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:03:49.862788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:28.067854
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
I concur in Judge Boslaugh’s opinion with respect to the interpretation of the constitutional provisions of Article I, section 5, of the Nebraska Constitution. If that interpretation is correct, the Legislature had no power to alter the constitutional interpretation of Wertz v. Sprecher, 82 Neb. 834, 118 N. W. 1071, although this court obviously might do so.
Section 25-840, R. R. S. 1943, applies only to a libel in which the truth of the matter published is asserted and established. In this case, the falsity of the publication was alleged, and there was evidence from which the jury might have found that one or more of the statements about the plaintiff were false. Even though the presumption of malice arising merely from publication be blocked off, the existence of actual malice, when the fact is in issue, may be inferred from falsity, absence of probable cause, or other relevant circumstances. 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 266, p. 248.
Even under the rule of New York Times Co. v. Sulli*39van, 376 U. S, 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, actual malice is defined as the publication of a statement with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Mere negligence in discovering misstatements of fact is not sufficient. The case at bar was tried by both parties on the assumption that the New York Times rule was not applicable. For that’ reason alone, the rule should not be applied here, at least without reargument. Even if the Times rule were applicable, there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the issue of actual malice. Neither do I think that rule as to “public officials” was intended to extend to a school teacher whose duties do not extend to policy establishing functions. See footnote No. 23, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra. To apply the Times rule in this situation and treat it as official conduct would, for all practical purposes, make any public employee paid from tax funds a “public official.”
It is also apparent in this case that the trial court’s instructions, as well as the opinion of the majority, proceed on the assumption that the provisions of section 25-840.01, R. R. S. 1943, apply to this case. That section limits recovery to special damages unless a correction is requested and not published, but it does not apply where the plaintiff alleges and proves that the publication was prompted by actual malice. It should be noted here that under Nebraska law no punitive or exemplary damages are allowable in any event.
Section 25-840.01, R. R. S. 1943, applies to “the publication of a libel by any medium, * * To apply it to' any publication of a libel ignores the words “by any medium.” The statement of the Judiciary Committee to the 1957 Legislature with respect to L. B. 318 states that the bill provides for changes in the libel law “affecting newsipapers.” The complete legislative statement refers only to newspapers and newspaper libel laws. The provisions for publication of a correction are clearly aimed at á public purveyor of news and information. In such *40media, the correction provided for presumably is as broad and effective a way of retracting or correcting as could reasonably be required.
The term “medium” in the connotation of this section of the statute might well include newspapers, radio, television, and magazines. In some contexts it applies to a vehicle used to carry advertising. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
I do not believe the Legislature intended the section to apply to false and defamatory matter published in reports which had no circulation to the general public and in which a correction or retraction would not effectively undo the harm which the law- ordinarily presumes in awarding general damages for a libel per se. This is particularly true where, as here, there is no issue of honest mistake or error in identity. The publications in newspapers which followed defendants’ publication of the defamatory material emphasize the point.
Other states have approved similar statutes limiting general damages in libel actions with respect to newspapers. See Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers., 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P. 2d 825, 13 A. L. R. 2d 252, and the annotation following at page 277. The policy involved in such statutes is, of course, for the Legislature. However, to interpret section 25-840.01, R. R. S. 1943, as indicating a legislative intent that it applies to any and all libel, flies directly in the face of its specific legislative history, and also requires that we ignore the words “by any medium.” This violates the ordinary rules of statutory construction.
Prior to the 1957 legislative changes, Nebraska, and most other states, held that malice in law is presumed from the publication of an article libelous per se and that presumption becomes conclusive unless the truth of the libel is established. Rimmer v. Chadron Printing Co., 156 Neb. 533, 56 N. W. 2d 806. See, also, 33 Am. Jur., Libel and Slander, § 266, p. 247. Unless libel per se. has-now been abolished in. Nebraska, the burden of *41proof as to malice was satisfied here unless the defendants established the truth of the defamatory matter.
The majority opinion here reverses the trial court upon the ground that the instructions failed to place the burden on the plaintiff to prove actual malice. If the instructions were prejudicial, it would appear that they were prejudicial to the plaintiff in restricting the plaintiff to special damages unless the jury found actual malice. As a practical matter, the instructions required proof of actual malice before the plaintiff could recover any general damages, even though they did not specify who had to prove it. This was not prejudicial to the defendants.