Court Opinion

ID: 9692782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:05:39.632399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:36.913253
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Van der Voort, J.:
Appellant, accused of violating his parole, was brought before Judge Grifo upon his order for a hearing on September 19, 1973, at which time he was represented by counsel. Before any testimony was taken, the judge in*186formed the appellant, among other things, that he had “a report that tells me that it is the medical opinion of Dr. Ovitz that you need institutional care and specifically, ‘this patient is dangerous and may need a return to the Allentown State Hospital for supervision and setting of controls’ ”. Appellant’s counsel asked for a continuance “on the grounds that we have had absolutely no advance notice of what this evidence is1 or what this report is. We need a copy of all the pertinent information. I would also like an opportunity to compare the report of this psychiatrist ... to the report of the Allentown State Hospital, which evidently, discharged this man as cured last April...”
The judge said he had a file and would “make them available to counsel.” He further informed counsel as follows: “I will set the matter for additional hearing after you have had an opportunity. You tell me and I will set up another date for a hearing and I am going to direct the Warden at the County Prison to segregate him.”2
On October 24, 1973, a petition for the examination of appellant by two psychiatrists under Section 408 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 was presented to Judge Clinton Palmer who made an order for the examination. The doctors tried to examine appellant on that day (October 24th) but were unsuccessful because the appellant refused to cooperate on the advice of his counsel. The next day (October 25th), which had been set for a hearing on the 408 petition, appellant filed a petition for a habeas corpus and a hearing thereon was held before Judge Grifo who granted the writ and ordered the appellant discharged from the alleged parole violation. Immediately following the Judge’s ruling the attorney for the Commonwealth moved to amend the *187petition for a mental examination to one under Section 406 instead of 408 inasmuch as the appellant was no longer incarcerated. The amendment was granted and the court entered into an immediate hearing under Section 406 to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to warrant the commitment of appellant to a mental hospital not to exceed ten (10) days for an examination and report to the court on his mental condition. Appellant’s counsel objected that she had not been given notice of the hearing under Section 406 although she had notice of a hearing under Section 408.
The hearing pursuant to Section 406(3) (ii) was held. Testimony was heard on behalf of the Commonwealth from a psychiatrist who had examined Appellant on July 9, 1973, and from a probation officer familiar with Appellant’s case, both relating that Appellant remained dangerous and in need of care. Testimony was heard on Appellant’s behalf from a psychiatrist at Allentown State Hospital, under whose care he had been from January 22 to March 12, 1973, and from a priest who had known him since April of 1973, both relating that the Appellant was no longer dangerous. As a result of this hearing, Appellant was ordered admitted to Muhlenberg Medical Center for examination, for a period not to exceed ten days, pursuant to Section 406(4).
On October 30, 1973, appellant caused to be filed another petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the October 25 hearing had deprived him of his liberty without due process of law, in that he was neither served with nor given proper notice of the 406 petition for civil commitment. He also argued that the “Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966” is unconstitutional in that it does not warn a patient of his right against self-incrimination when talking with a psychiatrist or physician and does not require the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-standard for determination of the patient’s mental condition being such that he is a danger to himself and others.
*188On November 5, 1973, a hearing was had on both this habeas corpus petition, as well as a civil court commitment hearing to inquire into the report of the psychiatrist who had examined appellant during his ten-day commitment. Appellant was ordered committed to Allentown State Hospital for a period not to exceed 6 months, and habeas corpus was denied. It is this denial of habeas corpus which is the subject of this appeal.
The appellant complains that in his commitment under Section 406 of the Mental Health Act he was not afforded due process; that the Act is unconstitutional because it does not require
(1) A warning to the patient that he has a right to remain silent and not converse with physicians or psychiatrists which may be self-incriminatory; and
(2) That the patient’s danger to himself and others must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In considering proceedings under Section 406 it must be kept in mind that this involves a civil commitment and that the objective of the Act is the protection of the mentally disabled as well of course as the protection of society from irresponsible actions of mentally disabled persons. The due process afforded a person such as the appellant who cannot be examined (in the instant case appellant refused to be examined at a time when there was opportunity to accomplish the examination) consists of a number of steps as follows:
(1) A petition is made by a person who would most likely be a responsible one setting forth his belief of the mental disability and the efforts made to secure an examination of the person involved by a physician;
(2) Upon consideration of the petition the Court, if it is satisfied as to the merits of the petition, issues a warrant to bring the person before the Court,3 fixes a *189date for an immediate hearing, makes sure that the person is represented by counsel, (appointing counsel if necessary) and notifying the parties in interest;4 and
(3) The Court holds a hearing at which hearing the Court determines whether or not there is probable cause either to hold an immediate examination by two physicians or to order the commitment of such person to a hospital or institution where a mental examination can be accomplished. After the mental examination has been accomplished the Court holds a second hearing as a result of which it determines whether or not the person is mentally ill and in need of care and treatment. If the person is adjudged to be mentally ill and in need of care and treatment the Court can then order the person to a facility where such care and treatment can be had. It may permit partial hospitalization or out-patient care.
In this process the person believed to be mentally disabled has representation by counsel at every critical stage of the proceeding. He and his counsel are given an opportunity to present evidence at the preliminary hearing and they have ten days in which to prepare additional evidence to present at the second hearing if they deem it advisable. Furthermore, in the instant case the appellant and his counsel had notice on October 24, 1973, of the presentation of the petition to the Court for a mental examination of the appellant under Section 408 and had a psychiatrist and a priest as witnesses in his behalf.
*190The essential ingredients of due process are afforded the person involved in that he is given notice and opportunity to be heard, he is represented by counsel, he has a public hearing based upon testimony taken under oath and an adjudication made by an impartial tribunal: Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Maroney, 413 Pa. 254, 196 A.2d 659 (1964).
The appellant claims that he has a right to remain silent and not converse with the examining physicians because what he might say may be self-incriminating and that he should have Miranda warnings of his right to remain silent given to him before the physician asked him any questions.
Proceedings under the Mental Health Act are not criminal investigations. They involve no attempt to charge the person involved with any criminal offense or wrong doing. There is no attempt to convict him nor to punish him. Certainly where the person is mentally disabled he could not understand nor appreciate Miranda silence warnings. A very essential ingredient to most psychiatric examinations is conversation with the party being examined. It is unrealistic to attempt to diminish communication between the psychiatrist and the person being examined by warning him to remain silent.
Appellant further claims that his being mentally disabled must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here again, appellant attempts to equate proceedings under the Mental Health Act with criminal trials. Appellant cites the case of Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), in which the Court does equate civil commitment proceedings for mental disability with trials in criminal cases. Under our Mental Health Act hundreds of people have been committed to mental institutions for care and treatment for mental disability and many have been cured completely. Nearly all have been released after a matter of months of treatment and only hopeless cases have been detained for long periods. Experience *191also teaches that the question of mental disability is a highly complicated one, that most examining physicians cannot express their opinion as to mental disability beyond a reasonable doubt but can so express them to be with reasonable medical certainty. We have held that proceedings under the Mental Health Act are not criminal, Commonwealth v. Anderson, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 349, 236 A.2d 555 (1967).
In view of the great number of mentally disabled people who have been helped by proceedings under the Mental Health Act, wherein the standard of proof of the person’s mental disability has been by a preponderance of the evidence, I would hold that the standard of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” does not apply in proceedings under the Act.
I would affirm the Order.
Watkins, P. J., and Price, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Referring to the evidence of violation of parole.

. i.e., he would have no cell mate.

. No warrant was issued in the instant case for the reason that the appellant was present in Court at the time set for a hearing. The hearing had already been set because the petition *189stated it was one under Section 408 of the Mental Health Act because the appellant was incarcerated on a charge of violation of parole. There was no necessity to issue a warrant when the petition was amended to be one under Section 406 of the Act since the appellant was already before the Court with his counsel and his witnesses.

. In the instant case, the appellant and his counsel had notice in open Court on September 19, 1978, that Dr. Ovitz, a psychiatrist had informed the Court that “This patient is dangerous and may need a return to the Allentown State Hospital for supervision and setting of controls.”