Court Opinion

ID: 9373510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:33.262465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.797362
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MICHAEL P. MARONEY,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DA-0752-15-0594-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,                    DATE: August 4, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lorenzo W. Tijerina, Esquire, San Antonio, Texas, for the appellant.

           Anna E. Virdell, James T. Hedgepeth, and Charles R. Vaith, Esquire, Joint
             Base San Antonio, Randolph, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the agency’s petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision, and REMAND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant served as a GS-11 Training Instructor (Pararescue), a position
     with strenuous physical requirements. Maroney v. Department of the Air Force,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-07523-15-0594-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5,
     Subtabs 4I, 4N. Following an agency-ordered examination, which found that he
     was medically unfit for duty, id., Subtab 4O, the agency proposed and effected
     his removal for medical inability to perform the essential duties of his position.
     Id., Subtabs 4A-4B, 4D.     On appeal, the appellant argued that, in takin g the
     action, the agency discriminated against him based on his disability by denying
     him reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tab 1 at 6, Tab 7. He requested a hearing,
     IAF, Tab 1 at 2, which the administrative judge duly scheduled, IAF, Tab 5. But,
     during adjudication, both parties requested a postponement of the hearing. IAF,
     Tabs 6-7.   The administrative judge granted the joint motion, dismissing the
     appeal without prejudice to its being automatically refiled after 60 days and
     setting a new hearing date. IAF, Tab 9; Maroney v. Department of the Air Force,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-15-0594-I-1, Initial Decision at 1-2 (Oct. 16, 2015).
     Adjudication resumed as provided.     Maroney v. Department of the Air Force,
     MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-15-0594-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 1.
¶3        During this time, the appellant added retaliation for engaging in equal
     employment opportunity activity as an affirmative defense. I-2 AF, Tab 9. He
     clarified an earlier allegation of harmful procedural error, claiming that the
     agency failed to provide him an opportunity to orally reply to the notice of
     proposed removal, and he also described this error as a violation of his due
     process rights. I-2 AF, Tab 16 at 18. During a subsequent status conference, the
     appellant withdrew his request for a hearing, opting instead for a decision on the
     written record, I-2 AF, Tab 22, and he also withdrew his affirmative defenses.
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     I-2 AF, Tab 23. The administrative judge issued a close of record notice, id., and
     both parties made additional submissions, I-2 AF, Tabs 24-29.
¶4         Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an initial decision in which,
     without reaching the merits of the removal action, she found that the agency
     violated the appellant’s due process rights by not affording him a right to resp ond
     orally to the proposed action.     I-2 AF, Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID) at 4-6.
     Specifically, the administrative judge found that, when the appellant submitted
     his written reply, he asked to make an oral reply but that the agency did not
     schedule one and later issued the letter of decision. ID at 4-6. As such, the
     administrative judge reversed the agency’s action, stating that the appellant was
     entitled to a new constitutionally correct removal procedure.       ID at 6.    The
     administrative judge ordered the agency to provide the appellant interim relief if
     either party filed a petition for review. ID at 7.
¶5         The agency has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tab 1, challenging the initial decision, id. at 9-17, and providing evidence on the
     issue of interim relief, id. at 18. The agency has supplemented its petition for
     review by providing further evidence of interim relief. PFR File, Tab 3. The
     appellant has responded to the agency’s petition, PFR File, Tab 4, and has
     challenged the agency’s showing of interim relief, seeking dismissal of its
     petition for review for failure to comply with the administrative judge’s order ,
     PFR File, Tab 5.

                                          ANALYSIS
     The Board declines to dismiss the agency’s petition for review for failure to
     comply with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
¶6         In his motion to dismiss, the appellant claims that the agency has failed to
     pay him pursuant to the initial decision and also has failed to reinstate him to his
     former position, instead placing him on administrative leave pending the Board’s
     final decision. PFR File, Tab 5 at 7, 14.
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¶7            When, as here, the appellant is the prevailing party in an initial decision
     that grants interim relief, any petition or cross petition for review must be
     accompanied by a certification that the agency has complied with the interim
     relief order either by providing the required interim relief or by satisfying the
     requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B).         In an appeal from an
     adverse action that was reversed, the agency’s evidence must show, at a
     minimum, that it has appointed the appellant to a position carrying the
     appropriate title, grade, and rate of pay, effective the date of the initial decision.
     Moore v. U.S. Postal Service, 78 M.S.P.R. 80, 83 (1998). An agency need not
     physically return the employee to his place of employment pending the outcome
     of the petition for review if it determines that doing so would be unduly
     disruptive to the work environment.
¶8            Regarding the appellant’s claim that he has not been timely paid, the agency
     is required only to take appropriate administrative action by the deadline for
     filing the petition for review that will result in the issuance of a paycheck for the
     interim relief period and is not required to have paid the appellant by the filing
     deadline. Tisdell v. Department of the Air Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 8 (2003).
     Here, with its October 4, 2016 petition for review, the agency submitted a
     September 19, 2016 memorandum from the Training Advisor of the appellant’s
     Training Group to the effect that the agency had placed him in pay status,
     effective September 2, 2016, the date of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 18.    The agency also submitted a Standard Form 52, Request for Personnel
     Action, indicating that the request to initiate action returning the appellant to his
     position of record, effective that same date, was made on October 6, 2016, just
     2 days after the agency filed its petition for review.     PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-6.
     Although the appellant asserts that on November 10, 2016, he phoned the agency
     to explain that he had still not been paid, he submitted a copy of a November 16,
     2016 email from the agency representative to his representative explaining that a
     “remedy ticket” would be submitted to the Defense Finance and Accounting
                                                                                       5

     Service (DFAS) to determine the problem with the appellant’s pay, that the
     proper paperwork had been timely submitted to DFAS for payment, and that the
     appellant’s representative should let her know if he had any questions. PFR File,
     Tab 5 at 13.     The appellant has not submitted any evidence or argument
     suggesting that the payment matter has not been satisfactorily resolved. Even if
     he did not receive all of the payment he was due by the time the agency filed its
     petition for review, reasonable, inadvertent delays in issuing pay under an interim
     relief order do not demonstrate noncompliance with an interim r elief order
     sufficient to support dismissing the agency’s petition for review. Archerda v.
     Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 13 (2014); cf. Bradstreet v.
     Department of the Navy, 83 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶¶ 11-13 (1999) (dismissing an
     agency’s petition for review based on its 8-month delay in providing the appellant
     with pay required by an interim relief order).
¶9        Regarding the appellant’s challenge to his placement on administrative
     leave, the September 19, 2016 memorandum the agency submitted with its
     petition for review explained that, in accordance with the administrative judge’s
     interim relief order, the appellant was being placed on administrative leave, in
     pay status, effective the date of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18. The
     agency’s action placing the appellant on administrative leave does not, in and of
     itself, reflect a failure on its part to comply with interim relief.     See, e.g.,
     Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 12.        However, such placement, without an
     accompanying certification from the agency that the appellant’s return to work
     would be “unduly disruptive to the work environment,” would fail to evidence the
     agency’s compliance with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.
     Aquino v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 7 (2014). The
     agency has not presented any evidence that it informed the appellant that his
     return to work would be unduly disruptive; rather, as noted, the agency’s
     evidence only shows that it explained to the appellant the steps it had taken to
     place him on paid administrative leave. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18.
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¶10         If an agency fails to establish its compliance with an interim relief order,
      the Board has the discretion to dismiss its petition for review, but it need not do
      so. Kolenc v. Department of Health & Human Services, 120 M.S.P.R. 101, ¶ 11
      (2013). Here, based on the evidence submitted by the agency, we find that i t
      substantially complied with the administrative judge’s interim relief order.         It
      could not reasonably have returned the appellant to his Training Instructor
      (Pararescue) position because, as noted, he was found to be medically unable to
      perform those duties.     Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 12 n.2; IAF, Tab 4,
      Subtab 4O. Under the circumstances, therefore, we exercise our discretion not to
      dismiss the agency’s petition for review as argued by the appellant. Omites v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶¶ 7-8 (2000).

      The appellant has not established that the agency violated his due process rights.
¶11         In finding that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights and
      that he was therefore entitled to a new removal proceeding, the administrative
      judge cited and based her decision on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland
      Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985), and two Board
      cases, Massey v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013), and
      Alford v. Department of Defense, 118 M.S.P.R. 556, ¶¶ 6-7 (2012), both of which
      relied on Loudermill to reverse employees’ removals when they were denied the
      right to reply to the deciding official regarding the actions proposed against them.
      ID at 4-6. The administrative judge stated that an employee cannot be said to
      have had a meaningful opportunity to present his side of the story and invoke the
      deciding official’s discretion if the deciding official did not hear the appellant’s
      oral reply to the proposal notice. The administrative judge found that, in the
      appellant’s written reply to the notice of proposed removal, he requested the
      opportunity to reply orally and that, because the agency failed to afford him an
      oral reply, it therefore violated his due process rights. ID at 6.
¶12         On review, the agency argues that the appellant, in fact, received all the due
      process to which he was entitled under Loudermill and that the Board cases upon
                                                                                              7

      which the administrative judge relied to reverse the agency’s action do not
      support a contrary conclusion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-14. We agree.
¶13         In Loudermill, the Supreme Court clarified that, if a tenured public
      employee is entitled to a full post-decisional hearing, such as a hearing before the
      Board, a pre-decisional trial-type hearing is not required and fundamental due
      process requirements under the Constitution are satisfied if the employee has a
      pre-decisional opportunity to present, either in person or in writing, reasons why
      the proposed action should not be taken. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. In other
      words, the employee is entitled to notice of the charges against him, an
      explanation of the employer’s evidence, “and an opportunity to present his side of
      the story.” Id. Here, the appellant submitted a substantive written reply to the
      proposal notice in which he explained why he believed the agency’s action was
      unwarranted and included a number of positions he felt he could perform, despite
      his physical limitations. IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4C. Moreover, the deciding official
      considered all facets of the appellant’s written response. Id., Subtab 4B. The
      appellant not only had the opportunity to, but in fact did, in his written reply,
      “present his side of the story” regarding the agency’s allegations in support of his
      removal. White v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶¶ 16-20
      (2013); Spentzakis v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-12-
      0126-I-1, Final Order at 4 (Nov. 20, 2013).          Therefore, even if the appellant
      requested an oral reply but was denied one, the agency did not violate his right to
      minimum due process under the Constitution, and the administrative judge’s
      contrary finding was in error. 2 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; cf. Hodges v. U.S.

      2
        In Alford, the Board reversed the appellant’s removal based on the agency’s violating
      his right to minimum due process when, not having submitted a written reply, he timely
      requested an oral reply but the agency failed to wait a reasonable time for its delivery,
      instead issuing its decision, thereby denying him a meaningful opportunity to present
      his side of the story and invoke the deciding official ’s discretion. Alford, 118 M.S.P.R.
      556, ¶¶ 5-7. Similarly, in Massey, the Board reversed the appellant’s removal based on
      the agency’s violating his right to minimum due process when, not having submitted a
      written reply, his representative requested an oral reply on the last day provided for
                                                                                                8

      Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 6 (2012) (reversing the appellant’s reduction
      in grade based on the agency’s denying his due process rights upon finding that
      he did not have a meaningful opportunity to present his side of the story and to
      invoke the deciding official’s discretion when the deciding official did not
      provide for an oral response and did not read the appellant’s written response to
      the proposal notice before issuing his decision).

      The appellant did not establish that the agency committed harmful procedural
      error regarding his right to reply.
¶14         Although the agency’s conduct did not constitute a constitutional violation,
      we still must decide consider whether the agency violated the appellant’s rights
      under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2) and 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(c)(1) to respond to the
      proposal notice both orally and in writing. Here, we agree with the administrative
      judge that the appellant requested to make an oral reply when, at the conclusion
      of his written reply, he asked that his response “receive full disclosure to the
      37th Training Wing Commanders” and that he be afforded “the ability to respond
      verbally.”   ID at 3-5; IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4C at 2.            The administrative judge
      considered, but rejected, the agency’s claim that the brief conversation the
      appellant had with the deciding official when he submitted his written reply
      constituted an oral reply. She found that the deciding official failed to mention
      any such reply in her decision letter, that the agency failed to make a summary of
      the conversation and furnish it to the Board as required by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(e) and
      5 C.F.R. § 752.406(c), and that the agency did not argue that the appellant had
      given an oral reply at that time until it made its final submission on the date the
      record closed below.       ID at 5-6.     The agency has not shown error in these
      well-supported findings, and we therefore agree that the appellant requested to

      such, but the deciding official did not respond, instead issuing a decision letter.
      Massey, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶¶ 8-10. In both of these cases, unlike the instant case, the
      appellants were denied minimum due process under the Constitution when the deciding
      officials issued decisions in their cases without having considered either the ir written or
      oral replies.
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      make an oral reply, that the deciding official did not convene one, and that her
      failure to do so constituted procedural error in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)(2)
      and 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(c)(1).
¶15        The Board’s harmful error standard applies in the review of an agency’s
      failure to comply with a statutory procedure provided in 5 U.S.C. § 7513. See
      Baracco v. Department of Transportation, 15 M.S.P.R. 112, 119-23 (1983), aff’d
      sub nom. Adams v. Department of Transportation, 735 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
      see also Rawls v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 614, ¶ 23 (2003); Stephen v.
      Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 685 (1991). Reversing an action
      for harmful error is warranted when the procedural error, whether regulatory or
      statutory, likely had a harmful effect upon the outcome of the case before the
      agency. Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R. at 681. Harmful error cannot be presumed, and the
      burden of showing harmful error lies with the appellant. Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R.
      at 685; see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1). To show harmful
      error, an appellant must prove that any procedural error was likely to have caused
      the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it wo uld have reached in
      the absence or cure of the error. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).
¶16        The appellant has not shown, or even argued in his response to the agency’s
      petition for review, that he suffered any harm by not having an opportunity to
      reply orally to the proposal notice. PFR File, Tab 3 at 5-7. Nor did he argue or
      show harmful error below. I-2 AF, Tab 16 at 18-21, Tab 19 at 4-6, Tab 22 at 7-8,
      Tab 26 at 8-9. As noted, he submitted a substantive written reply in which he
      explained why he believed the agency’s action was unwarranted and included a
      number of positions he felt he could perform, despite his physical limitations,
      IAF, Tab 4, Subtab 4C, and the deciding official considered all aspects of that
      reply, id., Subtab 4B. In the absence of a showing by the appellant that, if he had
      been afforded an oral reply, the agency would likely have reached a different
      conclusion regarding his removal, he has not shown harmful procedural error, and
      the administrative judge erred in reversing the agency’s action.
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                                           ORDER
¶17        For the reasons discussed above, we reverse the administrative judge’s
      decision to reverse the removal and remand this case to the regional office for
      adjudication on the merits of the agency’s action. Because it appears that the
      appellant withdrew his request for a hearing and his affirmative defenses based on
      the administrative judge’s advising the parties at the prehearing conference that
      “it is undisputed” that the appellant was not afforded an oral reply and her
      encouraging them to review the Board’s decisions in Massey and Alford, both
      denial of minimum due process cases under the Constitution, I -2 AF, Tabs 22, 23,
      the administrative judge shall, on remand, allow the appellant to renew his
      request for a hearing and to reinstitute his affirmative defenses if that is what he
      wishes to do.

      FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.