Court Opinion

ID: 9730146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:02:35.520022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.140190
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring and dissenting: I agree that Levendoski’s confession should not have been suppressed. I would also reverse the trial court’s order which suppressed the statement defendant made to Detective Montesanto. My disagreement stems from the majority’s interpretation of what constitutes “interrogation” as announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602. My colleagues conclude the police interrogated Levendoski without affording him the procedural safeguards Miranda warnings are designed to promote. I do not think Levendoski was interrogated. Therefore, I do not believe a rendition of Miranda warnings was required. Levendoski sought out a jailer and told him he wanted to talk to an officer. Detective Montesanto was called to the cellblock area. Defendant said he wanted to talk about an armed robbery. The police officer then asked what armed robbery, and defendant indicated a holdup of a fast-food restaurant. Montesanto said he needed more details. Levendoski confessed, indicating his participation in the offense and implicating two others. The conversation lasted 10 minutes. Defendant’s decision to speak with police is the very act he now claims violated his right to silence. He ignores the fact that he initiated that conversation. Custodial interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612.) The questioning complained of was the product of defendant’s own voluntary act. Motivated for whatever reason, it was independent of any police conduct to elicit such a statement. Defendant was not subjugated to questioning which exploited the custodial setting. No psychological ploys (accord, Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 487, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 97 S. Ct. 1232) were used by the police to encroach upon Levendoski’s right to remain silent, or compel him to talk. Nor in the record is any reference that Officer Montesanto, by talking with Levendoski, did so with the design to make him admit his complicity in any armed robbery. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 303 n.9, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 305-06 n.9, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1690 n.9.) Clearly, before the conversation occurred, Montesanto had no indication whatsoever that Levendoski was involved in any armed robbery. Every time the police talk to a prison inmate does not mean each such dialogue must be prefaced by Miranda warnings. Many conversations require it. This one does not. As Miranda notes: “Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk with the police without benefit of warnings and counsel but whether he can be interrogated.” 384 U.S. 436, 478,16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 726, 86 S. Ct. 1602,1630. Because I believe Levendoski was not interrogated, Miranda warnings were not required. Accordingly, I cannot concur with the affirmance which suppresses Levendoski’s statement to Detective Montesanto. As to that portion of the majority’s opinion, then, I respectfully dissent.