Court Opinion

ID: 9535251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:20.110965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:11.964227
License: Public Domain

Kaul, J.
(dissenting): I agree generally with principles for the construction of a will as stated in the court’s opinion. However, I cannot agree with the application of those principles to the instant will and, therefore, must respectfully dissent.
From my reading of this will in its entirety the intention of the testatrix is expressed clearly and unequivocally and thus there is no occasion for employing rules of judicial construction. (In re Estate of Ellertson, 157 Kan. 492, 142 P. 2d 724.)
The controlling question in this case is whether Paragraph Second, when read together with other paragraphs of the will, exonerates the legacies set out in Paragraph Third from estate, inheritance and succession taxes accruing on the death of the testatrix and imposes such liability on the residuary legatee.
The will before us is a carefully drawn and detailed instrument. It reflects a comprehensive donative scheme expressed in precise terms and undoubtedly is a result of thoughtful planning by the testatrix as to the disposition of her property. A proper interpretation requires careful attention to the chronological order and overall *411plan of disposition exhibited by the form and language of the total instrument.
The first paragraph is a traditional direction to pay debts and funeral expenses.
The second paragraph is a tax exoneration clause and will be discussed later.
The third paragraph proceeds to bequeath percentage interests totaling eighty-two percent of decedent’s estate to named individuals.
The fourth paragraph sets out a residuary clause in traditional words. (57 Am. Jur., Wills, § 1416, pp. 947, 948.)
Although the bequests in Paragraph Third must be considered general bequests in that payment from specific property is not designated; they are, nevertheless, in my opinion, clearly nonresiduary dispositions. Paragraph Fourth delineates the true and real residuary for here no amount or percentage is specified and therein falls everything left after prior directed payments have been made. This is the clause on which testatrix relied to prevent intestacy and it was here that she intended the tax burden to fall.
Returning to Paragraph Second, the court opinion notes that Paragraph Second protects donees of any gifts in contemplation of death from personal liability because of estate and inheritance taxes. To limit the force and effect of Paragraph Second to this one purpose requires the remaining language therein to be ignored. In my view, if this had been the intention of the testatrix, the language directing all estate, inheritance and succession taxes — “shall be paid out of the residue of my probate will,” and
“. . . My executor shall not be reimbursed for, nor collect, any part of such taxes from any person, legatee, devisee, or beneficiary under this will. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
would not have been included in Paraghaph Second. Since it was included testatrix obviously intended to exonerate from tax liability beneficiaries under her will as well as donees of any gifts in contemplation of death.
This leads to the next step in determining the intention of testatrix, i. e., what beneficiaries were to be exonerated from tax liability? This question is answered by the use of the phrase “out of the residue of my probate estate” in the direction as to payment of taxes contained in the first sentence of Paragraph Second. The use of the term “residue,” in the context of Paragraph Second and reiterated *412as it is in Paragraph Fourth, reflects the clear intention by testatrix to impose tax liability on the residuary legatee. The only possible way to read ambiguity in this will is to force a meaning on the term “residue” in Paragraph Second different from that given the term in Paragraph Fourth. There is nothing to be found in the language of this will which compels different interpretations of the term “residue.”
The intended purpose of Paragraph Second was to exonerate from tax burden, nonresiduary legacies, and any nontestamentary property involved as well as gifts in contemplation of death.
Paragraph Third delineates in alphabetical order ten particular percentage bequests. In seven of the bequests provision is made for succession in case the first named beneficiary predeceases the testatrix. In the other three [c], [i] and [/] no succession is provided for and bequests are specifically directed to lapse in case the named beneficiaries predecease testatrix. As noted in the court’s opinion, if none of the particular bequests lapsed; the residue would amount to eighteen percent. In view of the possible lapsing of the three particular bequests mentioned, totaling twenty-three percent, the potential residue falling in Paragraph Fourth could have amounted to forty-one percent of the estate.
The will was executed in 1955. A conclusion that testatrix must have known that the residue would be insufficient to pay the taxes cannot be justified in view of the fact that the potential residue amounted to forty-one percent of the estate. Furthermore, to impose upon testatrix the knowledge of what estate taxes might amount to in view of the charitable nature of the residuary legatee, changes in tax laws and interpretations of taxing authorities, would be to presuppose clairvoyance on testatrix of a higher degree than that possessed by most members of the bar, as evidenced by the contrary position taken by federal and state taxing authorities in this case.
I agree that percentage bequests are general rather than specific and ordinarily are considered to be residuary bequests, i. e., to be calculated with reference to the net rather than the gross estate. (169 A. L. R. Anno. p. 903.) However, the application of these principles succumbs to the cardinal rule that when testamentary intention is expressed to the contrary; intention must be given effect.
The form and order of this will and the language used in Paragraphs Second and Fourth, in my judgment, compels the conclusion *413that the percentage bequests in Paragraph Third were clearly intended to operate as nonresiduary bequests.
The practical effect of the court’s construction is to raise appellant’s legacy to the level of a particular eighteen percent bequest together with the other ten set out in Paragraph Third. If such had been the intention of testatrix, it would have been a simple matter to add another to the ten bequests in Paragraph Third to accomplish this end. Also, she could have easily provided for succession by appellant to the three bequests subject to lapsing as she had so carefully directed in the case of the other seven bequests. The intention of testatrix is so carefully delineated in all respects that she must have been well aware of the possibility that in case of no lapse, the tax liability might consume or wipe out entirely the residue.
As noted in the court’s opinion, this is the first appearance of a tax exoneration clause (sometimes referred to as a direction against apportionment of taxes) before this court. In Wells v. Menu, 158 Fla. 228, 28 So. 2d 881, 169 A. L. R. 892, a devise of ten percent of testator’s estate was held to be ten percent of the net or distributable part of the estate. However, the court was not faced with a testamentary declaration to the contrary expressed in a tax exoneration clause such as that which confronts us here.
In this state the order of appropriation of assets for the payment of debts and other lawful demands against a decedent’s estate is set out by statute. (K. S. A. 59-1405.) However, the statute specifically recognizes the right of a testator to provide otherwise.
From a perusal of recent cases, dealing with the subject, it appears to me that it is well-settled that a testator may specify which property or class of property shall bear the burden of succession or inheritance taxes and, if he desires, a testator may shift the burden by the employment of any words desired which may suffice to indicate his intent.
Time does not permit a discussion of authorities. Attention is directed to an in depth annotation on the precise subject found in 37 A. L. R. 2d p. 1, supplemented by an exhaustive digest of recent cases in Vol. 4 A. L. R. 2d Later Case Service commencing at page 377.
Although the trial court mistakingly denominated the bequests in *414Paragraph Third as specific, the correct disposition of this case was made. I would affirm the judgment.
Prick, C. J., and Fontron, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.