Court Opinion

ID: 9624348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:59:18.749649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:57.163847
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree that the trial court did not err by charging the jury that the jury should find for the defendant6 solely because it found that Grange had tendered its $50,000 policy limits, I must respectfully dissent. This charge was the equivalent of directing a verdict for Grange because the parties did not dispute *674that Grange had tendered its policy limits. That was not the sole issue in the case. Instead, the broader issue was whether Grange was negligent in failing to settle Fortner’s claim against Arnsdorff, Grange’s insured, within its policy limits because it attached to the tender of its policy limits the conditions that Fortner must agree to sign a general release and must dismiss his complaint against the defendant with prejudice.7
Although it is true that this charge is based upon language in our Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman, 276 Ga. 683, 687 (2) (580 SE2d 519) (2003), that
an insurance company faced with a demand involving multiple insurers can create a safe harbor from liability for an insured’s bad faith claim under [Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 (416 SE2d 274) (1992),] by meeting the portion of the demand over which it has control, thus doing what it can to effectuate the settlement of the claims against its insured.
Id. Nowhere in Brightman, however, is there a statement that an insurance company may defeat any failure to settle claim, regardless of the circumstances, merely by tendering its policy limits, and that is the effect of this charge. Further, the question in Brightman was whether the insurance company was “excused, as a matter of law, from tendering its policy limits because the plaintiffs demand contained a condition over which Cotton States had no control.” Id. at 685 (1). That was not a question in this case.
Immediately following the portion of Brightman upon which the charge in question was based, the Supreme Court explained:
This rule is intended to protect the financial interests of policyholders in cases where continued litigation would expose them to a judgment exceeding their policy limits while protecting insurers from bad faith claims when there are conditions involved in the settlement demand over which they have no control.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 687 (2).
This appeal is like Brightman because Fortner’s settlement demand did make demands upon two insurance companies and *675Grange did tender its policy limits, but it is unlike Brightman because Grange added conditions to its tender: “This offer is only contingent upon the Plaintiff signing a full release with indemnification language and dismissing the claim of Cecil Fortner against Alan Lee Arnsdorff with prejudice.” As including these conditions in Grange’s response to Fortner’s policy limits demand was solely Grange’s decision, they were not conditions over which Grange had no control. Our law does not require that these conditions be included and nothing in the case otherwise demanded that they be included in the response. Under these circumstances, the charge based upon Brightman was not appropriate because it was not tailored to fit the evidence and issues in this case. Consequently, the trial court erred by giving it even though it was derived from Brightman.
It is well settled in this State that language used by appellate courts in decisions may embody sound law, but it is not always proper to use such language in a jury charge. Dept. of Transp. v. Hillside Motors, 192 Ga. App. 637, 640 (3) (385 SE2d 746) (1989). When determining whether a particular charge is erroneous, we consider the jury charge as a whole, id., and we consider whether the disputed charge was adequately explained by other portions of the trial court’s charge. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. New Freedom Mtg. Corp., 285 Ga. App. 22, 24 (1) (645 SE2d 536) (2007). Merely stating the correct burdens upon the parties elsewhere in the charge, however, does not mean that an erroneous charge was harmless.
An erroneous and injurious instruction is not cured by a correct statement of law in another part of the charge to the jury wherein the incorrect charge is not expressly withdrawn from the jury’s consideration and their attention directed thereto. Rather than clarifying the issue for the jury, the juxtaposition of internally inconsistent and mutually incompatible instructions on the issue of [the burden on Grange] could have misled and confused the jury over the [acts necessary for Grange to “create a safe harbor from liability”].
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 26 (1). Consequently, because “the erroneous instruction did not [only deflect] the jurors . . . from the true issues in dispute, but actually authorized them to return a verdict in favor of [Grange] based [up] on [an] invalid theory of [defense],” the charge given was harmful error and the judgment in favor of Grange must be reversed. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 27 (1).
Accordingly, as I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, I *676must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this dissent.

 The charge stated:
In responding to a settlement demand, which demand is conditional upon the response of another insurance company, an insurance company can offer its policy limits in response to the demand and then let the plaintiff negotiate with the remaining insurers. In that situation the insurance company would have given equal consideration to its insured’s financial interest and fulfilled its duty to him. And you would return your verdict in favor of the defendant.
(Emphasis supplied.)

 Because the issue before us is solely whether the trial court’s charge was erroneous, we need not consider whether Grange was unreasonable for so doing, or whether a limited release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1 would have adequately protected Arnsdorff s interests, or whether Fortner correctly determined that executing the general release and dismissing his claims against Arnsdorff would have prejudiced his right to recover from Auto Owners Insurance Company.