Court Opinion

ID: 4053075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 03:03:49.955895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:27.113341
License: Public Domain

March 12, 2015

                      IN THE COURT

              OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

GENE ALLEN BURKS,           §
    APPELLANT               §
                            §
V.                          §     NO. PD-0157-15
                            §
THE STATE OF TEXAS,         §
    APPELLEE                §

                          §§§

       STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

                          §§§

                        SHAREN WILSON
                        Criminal District Attorney
                        Tarrant County, Texas

                        DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant
                        Criminal District Attorney
                        Chief, Post-Conviction

                        TANYA S. DOHONEY, Assistant
                        Criminal District Attorney
                        Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center
                        401 W. Belknap
                        Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
                        (817) 884-1687 FAX (817) 884-1672
                        State Bar No. 02760900
                        CCAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcountytx.gov

                        LISA C. MCMINN
                        State Prosecuting Attorney

              ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
                                 SUBJECT INDEX

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... iv

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ........................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE ............. 2

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................... 3

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW................................................. 4

FIRST QUESTION FOR REVIEW .............................................................. 4
Does a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw conducted
pursuant to TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b)
violate the Fourth Amendment?

SECOND QUESTION FOR REVIEW ......................................................... 4
Are Fourth Amendment warrant-preference exceptions the
sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness in
warrantless scenarios?

THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW .............................................................. 4
Do exclusionary rule principles mandate suppression of
blood evidence seized via a warrantless, nonconsensual,
valid-at-the-time mandatory blood draw?
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b).

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES............................................................ 5

I. Valid, compelled statutory blood draw ..................................................... 6

     A. Codification of Fourth Amendment principles................................... 7

     B. Special-needs framework adds to the
        reasonableness calculation ............................................................. 9
                                                ii
     C. Erroneous Consideration of the “Less Intrusive Means” Test ........ 11

II. Implied-Consent Draws Are Reasonable ............................................. 12

III. Exclusionary rule inapplicable and not invoked .................................... 14

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................. 18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................ 19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................... 19

COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION ............................................... APPENDIX

                                              iii
                                 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Beeman v. State,
 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................. 15

Breithaupt v. Abram,
  352 U.S. 432 (1957)............................................................................... 13

Burks v. State,
 No. 02-13-00560-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 115964
 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015) ............................................. 2,3

Davis v. United States,
 ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) ............................................... 14,15

Douds v. State,
 434 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th] 2014, pet. granted) ....... 5,6n

Ex parte Tharpe,
 935 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ................................................ 10

Heien v. North Carolina,
 ___ S.Ct. ___, 2014 WL 7010684 (2014) ............................................... 16

Holidy v. State,
 No. 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171
 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted) ....................................... 6 & n

Hulit v. State,
 982 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ........................................... 12,13

Illinois v. Krull,
    480 U.S. 342 (1987)........................................................................ 14,15n

Karev v. State,
 281 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. Crim. App 2009) ............................................... 15n
                                                  iv
Mapp v. Ohio,
 367 U.S. 643 (1961)............................................................................... 15
Md. v. King,
 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) ..................................................... 12

McGee v. State,
 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ................................................ 13

Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
 496 U.S. 444 (1990)............................................................................... 12

Michigan v. DeFillippo,
 443 U.S. 31 (1979)................................................................................. 16

McGruder v. State,
 No. 10-13-109-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 3973089
 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. granted) ............................................... 6 & n

Miles v. State,
 241 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .................................................... 7

Missouri v. McNeely,
 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) .............................................. passim

Reeder v. State,
 428 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted)........... 6 & 6n

Schmerber v. California,
 384 U.S. 757 (1966)............................................................................... 8n

Segundo v. State,
 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), cert. denied,
 558 U.S. 828 (2009).......................................................................... 12,13

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,
 489 U.S. 602 (1989)............................................................................ 9-12

                                                  v
Smith v. State,
 No. 13-11-00694-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 5901759
 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2014, pet. granted) ................................. 6 & n

State v. Reese,
  353 Wis. 2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396 (Wis. App. 2014) ............................. 16n

State v. Villarreal,
  ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
  (reh’g granted Feb. 25, 2015) ......................................................... passim

Thornton v. State,
 145 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .............................................. 16n

United States v Peltier,
 422 U.S. 531 (1975)............................................................................. 15n

Weems v. State,
 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. granted) .......... 6 & n

Welsh v. Wisconsin,
 466 U.S. 740 (1984)................................................................................. 8

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
 515 U.S. 646 (1995)............................................................................... 11

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES

U.S. CONST. amend. IV .......................................................................... 9,12

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 14.04................................................................ 9

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.16 ................................................................ 7

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23 ...................................................... 4,15-17

                                                  vi
TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07 ............................................................................. 15

TEX. PENAL CODE §49.04 ............................................................................. 7

TEX. PENAL CODE §49.00 ............................................................................. 7

TEX. TRANSP. CODE §524.01 ...................................................................... 10

TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012 ............................................................. passim

TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 .................................................................................... 6

                                                    vii
                        IN THE COURT
                OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

GENE ALLEN BURKS,                       §
    APPELLANT                           §
                                        §
V.                                      §     NO. PD-0157-15
                                        §
THE STATE OF TEXAS,                     §
    APPELLEE                            §

            STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

      Comes now the State of Texas, by and through her Tarrant

County Criminal District Attorney, and respectfully urges this Court to

grant discretionary review of this cause in accordance with the rules

of appellate procedure.

              STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      The reasonableness of statutory mandatory blood draws merits

argument.    Likewise, argument should be granted to discuss the

inapplicability of the exclusionary rule to cases where, at the time of

the seizure, the officer’s conduct conformed to ubiquitous, nationally-

recognized criterion that did not violate constitutional protections.

                                       1
                             STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      Appellant premised a pretrial suppression claim on the

Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133
S. Ct. 1552 (2013).         (1CR at 14-17).        The trial judge rejected the

defense argument attacking the validity of blood seized pursuant the

Texas implied-consent statute. (2RR at 11-16). Appellant pled guilty

to felony driving-while-intoxicated [DWI], and the trial court sentenced

him to ten years’ incarceration, probated. (1CR at 5,49-54,56-58).

TEX. PENAL CODE §§49.04, 49.091; TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b).

    STATEMENT OF THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

      The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in a

published opinion authored by Justice Sue Walker. Burks v. State,

No. 02-13-00560-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 115964 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015). Rehearing was not sought. The

State files this petition, due on March 11, 2015, following one

extension.

      1
          Statutory cites throughout are to the current version.
                                              2
                      STATEMENT OF FACTS

     The parties stipulated to the case’s facts including those

encompassing the stop of Appellant’s vehicle, the factors culminating

in his felony DWI arrest, and the mandatory-draw predicate under

Texas’ implied-consent statute.    TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b).

(1CR at 48; 2RR at 5-7; 3RR at SX1). When denying the motion to

suppress, the judge found that:

  • the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s offense did not
    present any factual exigency, (2RR at 12);

  • officers conducted the blood draw under the authority of
    Transportation Code Section 724.012(b), (2RR at 12,14);

  • the totality of the circumstances warranted reliance on the
    limited provisions of the implied-consent statute, (2RR at 13);

  • officers could have obtained a warrant, (2RR at 14);

  • as a licensed driver, Appellant had notice of the implied-
    consent provisions applied, (2RR at 15);

  • public safety/welfare considerations supported the judge’s
    decision to reject suppression, (2RR at 13-16).

The Fort Worth Court rejected the trial court’s ruling. Burks, 2015 WL
115964, at *1-3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth January 8, 2015). The court

relied on this Court’s decision in Villarreal. State v. Villarreal, ___

                                     3
S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reh’g granted

Feb. 25, 2015).     The lower court’s opinion also applied article

38.23(b) and held that the Texas exclusionary rule did not apply to a

warrantless seizure. Id. at *3.

              QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

                  FIRST QUESTION FOR REVIEW

          Does a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw
       conducted pursuant to TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b)
                 violate the Fourth Amendment?
                          (2RR at 11-16)

                 SECOND QUESTION FOR REVIEW

       Are Fourth Amendment warrant-preference exceptions
      the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
                    in warrantless scenarios?
                          (2RR at 11-16)

                  THIRD QUESTION FOR REVIEW

       Do exclusionary rule principles mandate suppression of
      blood evidence seized via a warrantless, nonconsensual,
               valid-at-the-time mandatory blood draw?
         TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b). (2RR at 11-16)

                                    4
                 ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

     This Court is in the midst of deciding the issues presented

herein. Whilst a November 2014 decision addressed the merits of

the Fourth Amendment issue in one of the several McNeely-related

cases pending before this Court at that time, the case is in flux since

the Court recently granted rehearing. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reh’g granted Feb. 25, 2015).         Per the

Court’s docket, Villarreal is now set for submission on March 18,

2015, the same day another McNeely case is set for submission.

See Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th]

2014, pet. granted Sep. 17, 2014).

     The State’s petition focuses on two aspects of any McNeely-

related consequences: the validity of a statutorily compelled draw

and the invalidity of the exclusionary rule. Note that Villarreal only

went to the merits of the mandatory-draw issue, not addressing the

applicability of the exclusionary rule. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178.

However, Douds addressed the exclusionary rule’s applicability.

Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 861. In other words, this Court has already

granted review on the issues presented herein.

                                     5
      Review should be granted because this case involves important

questions of law that are have not been finally addressed by this

Court, matters in conflict in the interim appellate courts, and the

misapplication of a Supreme Court decision that does not undermine

the validity of the country’s implied-consent statutes. TEX. R. APP. P.

66.3(a)(b)(c)(d)(f). 2

I.    Valid, compelled statutory blood draw

      The State’s appellate stance is in lockstep with that of

prosecutors from other counties across the State who have already

had cases granted for review on a McNeely-related issue. 3 Hence,

the State respectfully asks this Court to dispose of the instant case in

a manner consistent with the petitions in Villarreal, Smith, McGruder,

Douds, Weems, Holidy, and Reeder. Here, the officer reasonably

relied on an existing, ubiquitous statute to obtain a compelled blood

      2
         See Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 (reh’g granted); Smith v. State, No. 13-
11-00694-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2014 WL 5901759 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2014, pet. granted); McGruder v. State, No. 10-13-109-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___,
2014 WL 3973089 (Tex. App.—Waco 2014, pet. granted); Douds, 434 S.W.3d
842 (pet. granted); Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2014, pet. granted); Holidy v. State, No. 06-13-00261-CR, 2014 WL 1722171
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted); Reeder v. State, 428 S.W.3d at 930
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. granted); see also McNeely, 133 S.Ct at 1566
& n.9 (referencing nationwide reliance on implied-consent provisions).
      3
          See cases cited supra note 2.
                                           6
draw.     The seizure occurred when the officer—at the time of the

offense—possessed probable cause that Appellant’s impaired and

intoxicated conduct constituted felony DWI.            TEX. PENAL CODE

§§49.04, 49.09; TEX. TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b).

        In addition, the State differs with Villarreal’s original-submission

reasoning and further asserts that several important arguments

should be considered on the merits.

        A.    Codification of Fourth Amendment principles

        Villarreal failed to consider that the implied-consent statute

codified Fourth Amendment principles. For instance, this Court has

previously recognized a statutory codification of the exigency

exception. See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 39-40 & n.54 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.16). McNeely

recognized that every case involving the dissipation of alcohol

included some exigency. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561, 1568. This

ever-present exigency must be considered when assaying the

reasonableness of statutory draws.

        Combine the static alcohol-evaporation exigency consideration

with the Legislature’s clear codification of the gravity-of-the-offense

                                         7
exigency.      The implied-consent statute extinguished a defendant’s

right to refuse where an officer possesses probable cause to believe

that certain enumerated, egregious circumstances exist.                        TEX.

TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b). Defendants only lose their refusal right

under       carefully    circumscribed      scenarios      involving     felonious

intoxication-related offenses and/or resultant injuries necessitating

hospitalization. Id. 4

        This statutory limitation amounts to a codification of an

additional recognized exigency unrelated to blood-alcohol dissipation.

Welsh v. Wisconsin held that the Fourth Amendment authorizes

common-sense consideration of the underlying offense’s gravity

when weighing the existence of an exigency. Welsh v. Wisconsin,

466 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1984) (exigency calculations include

consideration of a crime’s severity).             Consideration of a crime’s

gravity is the essence of reasonableness because the state’s interest

is greater in a more serious case. Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

        4
         Notably, under the Texas statute, the McNeely and Schmerber defendants
would have retained their right to refuse based upon the less serious nature of their
crimes. Compare McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1556-57 (DWI); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 758-59 (1966) (DWI arising from a one-car collision).
                                             8
14.04 (authorizing warrantless arrests for felonies where an officer

did not observe the offense).

     Of course, it almost goes without saying that Texas’ implied-

consent legislation codified Fourth Amendment probable cause

requirements. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Predicate elements of the

implied consent statute codify this well-known quantum-of-evidence

as a requirement for a compelled search.          TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§724.012(b). Probable cause, along with the exigencies based upon

the gravity-of-the-crime and the dissipation-of-alcohol exigency,

create a framework that provides a neutral set of guidelines

authorizing a narrowly defined seizure from an already-in-custody

arrestee.    These provisions embrace the essence of Fourth

Amendment reasonableness.

     B.     Special-needs framework adds to the
            reasonableness calculation

     The now-withdrawn Villarreal decision rejected application of

the Supreme Court’s special needs doctrine to the mandatory blood

draw framework.     Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178, at *14-15; see

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619

                                    9
(1989).   However, the Court did not consider that blood drawn

pursuant to Chapter 724’s mandate also implicates administrative

license revocation [ALR] procedures, a separate regulatory process

that focuses on protecting the traveling public by removing offenders

from the road. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §524.012(b)(1) (mandating

license suspension based upon BAC).

      “The primary purpose of the administrative license suspension

statute is not to deter the licensee or to seek retribution, but to protect

the public from the carnage on the public roads of Texas caused by

drunk drivers.” Ex parte Tharpe, 935 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996).    Such regulation focuses on the government’s strong

interest in removing intoxicated drivers from the road, just as railroad

regulation in Skinner sought to increase railway safety by detecting

intoxicated employees. Compare Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 with

Ex parte Tharpe, 935 S.W.2d at 159.

      Special needs’ principles recognize the statute’s provision of a

neutral, detached vehicle for protecting citizens from impaired drivers

and defendants from unfettered discretion.            The special-needs

exception constitutes another factor to consider in a non-dualistic

                                       10
analysis that renders Texas’ compelled-draw framework reasonable.

      C. Erroneous Consideration of the “Less Intrusive Means” Test

      The original Villarreal decision considered the ready availability

of warrants when rejecting the validity of Texas’ mandatory draw

statute. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178, at *18 (finding no compelling

need to uphold warrantless, nonconsensual blood searches where

warrants are “often readily available”).    However, factors such as

electronic warrants and the availability of a magistrate shift the focus

away from an officer’s conduct and, instead, weigh considerations of

alternative means. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1561-63.

      The Supreme Court often rejects arguments applying less-

intrusive-alternative-practices attacks in Fourth Amendment cases.

Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)

(upholding warrantless, random urine screening of athletes and

rejecting an argument for drug testing based upon suspicion of drug

use); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9 (upholding random, suspicionless

drug screening of railway employees following safety breaches and

rejecting arguments voicing less drastic and equally effective means).

One footnote in Skinner flatly rejects the propriety of considering less-

                                      11
drastic alternatives in scenarios that include warrantless and even

suspicionless seizures for toxicological testing, similar to Appellant’s

facts. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9. Villarreal mistakenly applied

this discounted, post-hoc consideration on original submission.

II.   Implied-Consent Draws Are Reasonable

      Reasonableness has always been the linchpin of the Fourth

Amendment, venerated in the provision’s plain language.            U.S.

CONST. amend IV; Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 435-36, 438 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998).     Discernment of what is “reasonable” requires

courts to consider the balance between an individual’s privacy and

the legitimate governmental interests, especially when public safety is

of utmost concern. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1979 (2013); Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 455 (1990); Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 828 (2009). Villarreal viewed the choice

between applying a Fourth Amendment exception and consideration

of a reasonableness balancing approach as mutually exclusive

analytical constructs. The State respectfully believes that this black-

white consideration of these two concepts is mistaken, especially in

                                     12
light of the fact that this Court has conducted the reasonableness

balancing approach to similar issues. See Segundo, 270 S.W.3d at

96-99; McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);

Hulit, 982 S.W.2d at 434 n.1, 436.

     Years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that a framework

requiring a driver’s consent was anything but nonsensical.     The

Breithaupt court pointed to then recently adopted implied-consent

provisions and wrote:

     It might be a fair assumption that a driver on the highways in
     obedience to a policy of the State, would consent to have a
     blood test made as part of a sensible and civilized system
     protecting himself as well as other citizens not only from the
     hazards of the road due to drunken driving, but also from some
     use of dubious lay testimony.

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957).      The State

contends that compelled draws under implied-consent provisions are

inherently reasonable when all side’s needs are weighed. Indeed,

Fourth Amendment reasonableness underpins the statute. The well-

known exceptions—as argued in the myriad cases already before this

Court—considered individually and in concert with each other,

alongside a balancing of the competing interests, all support the

                                     13
continued viability of Texas’ implied-consent framework.

III.   Exclusionary rule inapplicable and not invoked

       Statutory mandatory blood-draws are reasonable.                    But see

State v. Villarreal, 2014 WL 6734178 (opinion on original submission;

under re-submission). 5 When the ink dries on Villarreal and future

McNeely-related decisions and if those cases are adverse to the

State on the merits, the rules requiring evidence exclusion should not

apply to mandatory blood-draw scenarios that occurred prior to the

Supreme Court’s April 2012 pronouncement.

       Federally, the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment’s

exclusionary rule applies when law enforcement, at the time of the

search, acted objectively reasonably by relying on (1) a statute, later

declared        unconstitutional,      or   (2)    binding   judicial   precedent,

subsequently overruled. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 342, 349-57 (1987)

(statutes); Davis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2419,

2428-34 (2011) (caselaw).

       Under state law, the Texas exclusionary rule is not invoked

because—at the time of the offense—no violation occurred.                     The

       5
           See cases cited supra note 2.
                                              14
State recognizes that article 38.23(b)—Texas’ limited good faith

exception—requires a warrant.               TEX. CODE CRIM. APP. §38.23(b).

Notwithstanding, invocation of exclusionary rule principles relies on

article 38.23(a). That subsection’s plain language requires a violation

for exclusion to be triggered. When Appellant’s blood was drawn, no

one credibly questioned the validity of the officer’s statutory

authority. 6    In other words, at the time of the seizure, the officer

followed then-existing law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a);

see also TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07(a)(30) (defining “law” as meaning

the state and federal constitution and statutes, in addition to the

written opinions of a court of record); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at

2427-28 (“obtained” applies to unlawfulness at the time of the

seizure; exclusion not triggered in an absence of police culpability).

Simply put, these circumstances do not invoke exclusion. 7

       6
           See Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); TEX.
TRANSP. CODE §724.012(b); see also Karev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim.
App 2009) (statutes presumed constitutional until held otherwise).
         7
           See also United States v Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 541-42 (1975) (upholding
suspicionless, warrantless seizure of individual by roving border patrol agents based
upon statutory framework that, at the time, was constitutional); Krull, 480 U.S. at 349–50
(exclusionary rule inapplicable when police reasonably rely on a statute later deemed
unconstitutional); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (exclusionary rule
seeks to deter officers from committing violations of the law to obtain evidence);
Thornton v. State, 145 S.W.3d 228, 233-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (exclusion not
justified where facts reveal marginal or nonexistent deterrent benefits); accord State v.
Reese, 353 Wis. 2d 266, 844 N.W.2d 396, 402 (Wis. App. 2014) (exclusion inappropriate
                                               15
       The Supreme Court mentioned, in dictum, the application of the

exclusionary rule versus Fourth Amendment violations in a non-

blood-draw scenario decided recently. In Heien, the Court weighed

the validity of an investigatory stop where the officer misunderstood

the traffic code provision he relied on to support the stop. See Heien

v. North Carolina, ___ S.Ct. ___, 2014 WL 7010684, at *6-9

(December 15, 2014).                The Supreme Court considered the

reasonableness of the officer’s mistake that lead to the stop and

arrest when considering remedies. In so doing, the Court pointed out

the     myriad      decisions        finding        exclusionary-rule      invocation

inappropriate where the officer’s conduct—valid at the time—was

later declared unconstitutional. Id. With only one justice dissenting,

the Supreme Court’s decision pondered the exclusionary rule’s limits

which had been briefly considered in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31,33,37-38 (1979) (suggesting that exclusion might have been

appropriate      had     the    provision      been     “grossly    and     flagrantly

unconstitutional”) (citation omitted). Although the Heien discussion is

merely dicta, it reiterates the importance of focusing on the fact that

in McNeely scenario because no officer misconduct at the time of the seizure).
                                               16
the instant officer’s conduct fully complied with mandatory, settled law

at the time of Appellant’s arrest. McNeely and subsequent caselaw

questioning implied-consent blood draws came later.          Since, no

violation occurred at the time of the Appellant’s 2011 blood draw,

article 38.23’s exclusionary provision does not apply.

                                     17
                   CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

     Review should be granted and the decision of the Court of

Appeals should be reversed, upholding this felony DWI conviction.

                                Respectfully submitted,

                                SHAREN WILSON
                                Criminal District Attorney
                                Tarrant County, Texas

                                DEBRA WINDSOR
                                Chief, Post-Conviction
                                Assistant Criminal District Attorney

                                /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney
                                TANYA S. DOHONEY
                                Assistant Criminal District Attorney
                                Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center
                                401 W. Belknap
                                Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
                                (817) 884-1687
                                (817)884-1672 FAX
                                State Bar No. 02760900
                                CCAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcountytx.gov

                                    18
                        CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

        This document, prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller

than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes, complies with the

typeface requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e). This document also

complies with the word-count limitations of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (i)

because it contains less than 3100 words, excluding any parts

exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1), as computed by Microsoft

Word10, the computer software used to prepare the document.

                                              /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney
                                              TANYA S. DOHONEY

                                CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        A true copy of the State’s petition has been e-served to

opposing counsel, Hon. Abe Factor, 5719 Airport Freeway, Fort

Worth, Texas 76117 at lawfactor@yahoo.com, and to the State

Prosecuting Attorney, Hon. Lisa McMinn, information@spa.texas.gov,

P.O. Box 13046, Austin, Texas 78711, on this 11th day of March,

2015.

                                              /s/ Tanya S. Dohoney
                                              TANYA S. DOHONEY

H:\DOHONEY.D11\BRIEFS\011615 burks mcneely post-villarreal.doc

                                                  19
(COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION)

            A