Court Opinion

ID: 9574035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:44.664575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:58.718696
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.
I concur in our holding; Labor Code section 351 deprives the Industrial Welfare Commission of authority to establish a two-tier minimum wage system with a lower minimum wage for employees who receive tips. However, we have decided that identical issue before. In 1980, we examined the legislative history of Labor Code section 351, and indorsed the Industrial Welfare Commission’s conclusion that the section would not permit a two-tier wage system with a lower minimum wage for tipped employees. (Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 690, 729-731 [166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579].) That decision constituted a judicial interpretation of the statute, and deprived the Industrial Welfare Commission of any authority to interpret the statute in a way which is inconsistent with our 1980 decision. The Court of Appeal was right in this case when it said: “We need not construe section 351, as that judicial function has been performed by the California Supreme Court.”
In 1975 the Legislature amended section 351. The same year, the Industrial Welfare Commission rejected the request of employers that it establish a lower minimum wage for tipped employees. The commission interpreted the amended statute as depriving it of authority to establish a lower minimum wage for tipped employees. (Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 729.) The commission stated: “ ‘First, and most *1282important, the Legislature specifically revoked the authority it had earlier given the IWC to allow credit for tips against the minimum wage, when it amended section 351 of the Labor Code this year.[]’ ” (Ibid.)
The employers challenged this conclusion, arguing before this court that the commission had misinterpreted the amended statute. While the amendment may have been intended to prohibit the commission from allowing employers to deduct tips from wages directly, they argued, nothing in the amendment prohibited the indirect approach of allowing the commission to establish a lower minimum wage for tipped employees.
We agreed with the commission. We said: “[W]e think that the legislative history of the 1975 bill supports the IWC’s conclusion that the Legislature contemplated that the enactment would insure that tips received by an employee would not reduce an employer’s minimum wage obligation, either directly or indirectly.” {Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal. 3d at p. 730.) We turned to legislative committee reports to demonstrate that the Legislature intended the bill to assure that the employer would receive no benefit, even indirectly, from the employee’s tips. We concluded: “In light of the legislative history, the IWC could reasonably interpret the amendment of section 351 as a legislative determination that all employees should be guaranteed a minimum wage that is not reduced by virtue of any tips an employee may possibly receive.” {Ibid.)
Although we spoke of the “reasonableness” of the commission’s interpretation, and noted our duty to give the commission’s interpretation great weight, we did more than simply defer to the commission. Our examination of the legislative history of the 1975 amendments, and our statement about the intent of the Legislature, made it clear that we were exercising the judicial function of interpreting the statute and reaching a conclusion as to its true meaning. Our analysis of the statutory history showed that the commission’s interpretation was the correct interpretation of the statute. This was an exercise of judicial power which it was beyond the authority of the commission to disregard at a later date.
It is our obligation, when presented with a question of statutory interpretation, to determine the true meaning of the statute. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 325-326 [109 P.2d 935]; see also Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1389 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 917 [80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33].) We should not overstate the deference which we owe to administrative *1283interpretations of statutes.1 It is true that an administrative agency may interpret the statutes it is charged with implementing, and that this construction is entitled to great weight. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., supra, 17 Cal.2d 321, 325-326; see also Banning Teachers Assn. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 799, 804 [244 Cal.Rptr. 671, 750 P.2d 313].) Nonetheless, the administrative interpretation is not binding on this court. (See Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 935-936 [216 Cal.Rptr. 345, 702 P.2d 503]; Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 310 [118 Cal.Rptr. 473, 530 P.2d 161]; Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 663, 669 [174 Cal.Rptr. 665].) “[I]t is the duty of this court, when such a question of law is properly presented, to state the true meaning of the statute finally and conclusively. . . . [Citations.] The ultimate interpretation of a statute is an exercise of the judicial power. [Citations.]” (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 326; see also Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1389; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 71 Cal.2d 907, 917, fn. 15.) Once this court has indorsed a particular interpretation of a statute, an administrative agency lacks authority to interpret the statute differently. (See Crounse Corp. v. I.C.C. (6th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 1176, 1186, cert. den. 479 U.S. 890 [93 L.Ed.2d 264, 107 S.Ct. 290].)
In conclusion, we exercised the judicial function of interpreting Labor Code section 351 when we decided Industrial Welfare Com. v. Superior Court in 1980. When the issue was raised again the commission was required to follow our ruling and to refuse to impose a two-tier system with a lower minimum wage for tipped employees. The commission could have asked us to reconsider our 1980 decision. The commission could have sought a change in the law from the Legislature (see e.g., Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1393). However, *1284the commission was not free to disregard our decision. Our tripartite system of government requires the executive branch to be bound by judicial decisions on questions of law. We should not permit an unauthorized administrative decision to force us to reopen a question we have already decided. I see no legitimate basis for reconsidering our earlier decision, and so see no need to perform extensive analysis of the legislative history of the statute in order to justify our conclusion that section 351 means the same thing now as it meant in 1980.
Arguelles, J., concurred.

 The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated that courts should not rubber stamp administrative interpretations which the court finds inconsistent with the terms of the statute or the intent of Congress. (FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground (1988) 485 U.S._[99 L.Ed.2d 470, 475, 108 S.Ct. 1261], and cases cited.) Federal law, of course, requires courts to exercise the judicial function of declaring the true meaning of a statute when presented with a question of an agency’s interpretation of congressional intent. (Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council (1984) 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, and fn.10 [81 L.Ed.2d 694, 702-703, 104 S.Ct. 2778]; Rettig v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp (D.C. Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 133, 140-141 [240 App.D.C. 118].) The District of Columbia Circuit explained the Chevron standard: “First, we must determine whether Congress had a specific intent as to the meaning of a particular phrase or provision. [Citation.] To do this, we analyze the language and legislative history of the provision. As the Court noted in Chevron, ‘[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issue[s] of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.’ [Citation.] Thus, in ascertaining the congressional intent underlying a specific provision, we are not required to grant any particular deference to the agency’s parsing of statutory language or its interpretation of legislative history.” (Ibid.)