Court Opinion

ID: 9519860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:26:12.449278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:58.937504
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I write separately to address the dissents’ related contentions that certain statements in the majority opinion are irreconcilably inconsistent and that the majority’s conclusion is improperly based on the implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. I believe that the statements can be reconciled and that our conclusion is supported by sound reasoning. As the majority opinion states, the Post-Conviction Hearing Act has never been held to apply to juvenile proceedings. 206 Ill. 2d at 604. In the absence of such an affirmative holding, juvenile defendants necessarily face the possibility that no avenue of review exists for their claims, even when those claims allege constitutional violations. 206 Ill. 2d at 604. In this case, however, the State argues that section 2 — 1401 offers such an avenue. We explicitly reject that argument, holding that a juvenile cannot use a section 2 — 1401 motion to present a claim that trial counsel failed to comply with the mandates of Rule 604(d). 206 Ill. 2d at 605. After addressing these initial matters, we conclude that “[bjecause a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), *** dismissal is too harsh a sanction.” 206 Ill. 2d at 605. This last statement forms the basis for the dissenters’ contentions that the opinion is internally inconsistent because it both claims that the application of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in juvenile cases is an open question and implicitly assumes that it does not apply. I believe these contentions are premised on an unduly loose interpretation of our statements and, thus, write separately to explain that the majority’s conclusion, read in its proper context, does not suffer from a fatal flaw. In this opinion, we recognize the absence of any holding authorizing the use of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for review of juveniles’ claims. 206 Ill. 2d at 604. We also reject juveniles’ use of section 2 — 1401 for this purpose. 206 Ill. 2d at 605. Properly read in this limited context, our statement that “a juvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)” merely acknowledges the absence of any precedential authority supporting the conclusion that juveniles such as the respondent have a viable means of appellate redress. See 206 Ill. 2d at 605. It neither creates an inherent conflict with our prior statements nor necessarily relies on an implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is inapplicable in juvenile proceedings. It merely recognizes the unsettled state of the law in this matter. As for the dissenters’ contention that the majority should address the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juveniles in this case, I believe that our decision to decline that opportunity is well justified. The parties offer minimal argument on the issue. Indeed, as appellant, the State does not even raise the issue in its opening brief. Even more telling, the respondent’s brief explicitly requests that we simply affirm the appellate court’s remand, arguing that doing so would have the same effect as a decision on the merits of the substantive issue, plus have the additional benefits of serving the court’s interest in judicial economy, and avoiding the potential for overburdening relatively uneducated juveniles with the filing of pro se postconviction petitions capable of surviving first stage review. Based on only this limited adversarial context, resolving an issue as important as the applicability of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act in juvenile proceedings would be premature and unwise. A question of such magnitude should be fully briefed and argued by opposing parties zealously advocating the relevant arguments prior to its definitive resolution by this court. Lacking the benefit of such strong adversarial testing, this court declined to address the merits of the issue in this case. Thus, it remains an open question wisely left for another day.