Court Opinion

ID: 9658323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:55:23.872786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.630703
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
These actions were filed to seek a declaratory judgment and to enjoin enforcement of PA 1962, No 128 (CL 1948, § 435.51 et seq. [Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 18.857(1) et seq.)). Since the issues were identical, the cases were consolidated for decision and determination. "We make disposition of both by this opinion. Plaintiffs, operators of retail stores, sought to have the act declared unconstitutional and invalid. The circuit court, on motions for summary judgment heard considerable testimony, dismissed the complaints, and entered judgments for the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
The act purports to be “to promote the health, recreation and welfare of the State.” It forbids the sale by certain merchants on any successive Saturday and Sunday of various articles and merchandise. The act makes any violation of it a misdemeanor, subject to a fine of not more than $100 for the first offense and not more than $500 for the second and subsequent offenses. A court may suspend or revoke the license to do business of any person so convicted. The operation of any business contrary to the act is declared to be a public nuisance, subject to proceedings to enjoin the same. Any transaction in violation of the act is voidable at the option of the purchaser within one year upon tender of the property sold. Since it is a penal statute it must be strictly construed. People v. Goulding, 275 Mich 353; In re Bourne, 300 Mich 398.
First, how does the act accomplish its purpose? Each merchant may make his own election whether to sell on Saturday or Sunday. The regulation here *73sought cannot be of the articles sold, since it cannot be foreseen what the effect of the law will be in this regard. Sunday sales could be in no way affected as .all merchants might and could elect to remain open on Sunday rather than Saturday. The act does not tend to create a single day of rest as was the purpose of the laws in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US 420 (81 S Ct 1101, 1153, 1218, 6 L ed 2d 393); Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 US 582 (81 S Ct 1135, 1153, 1218, 6 L ed 2d 551); and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US 599 (81 S Ct 1144, 1153, 1218, 6 L ed 2d 563).
If the law is not aimed at the regulation of the sale of merchandise so as to reduce commercial activity on one day in seven, can it be said that its purpose is to achieve one day of rest in seven for employees of these establishments? The law in no way controls or attempts to control the hours of labor of an employee. It merely prevents the use of labor on successive Saturdays and Sundays by the affected merchants. The employee who works Saturday for one merchant is free to work Sunday for .another.
What does the act accomplish? As to the merchant who has elected to carry on his business Monday through Saturday, or Sunday through Hriday, absolutely nothing. His operation is unaffected. As to the merchant whose operation was based upon a 7-day week, he now must forego either Saturday or Sunday—one of his two, it is alleged, most profitable days.
In the case of Carolene Products Co. v. Thomson, 276 Mich 172, this Court was called upon to interpret a somewhat similar statute. In that case the statute attempted to forbid the sale of milk to which had been added any fat or oil other than milk fat. Justice Head said (p 178):
*74“But the police power of regulation does not include the absolute prohibition of trade in useful and harmless articles of commerce. # * *
“The principles involved are well settled and do not need extensive citation of authorities. The Constitution guarantees to citizens the general right to engage in any business which does not harm the public. People, ex rel. Valentine, v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 124 Mich 664 (50 LRA 493, 83 Am St Rep 352). The constitutional right to engage in business is subject to the sovereign police power of the State to preserve public health, safety, morals or general welfare and prevent fraud. In the exercise of the police power there must be not only a public welfare to be conserved or public wrong to be corrected, but there must be also a reasonable relation between the remedy adopted and the public .purpose. 12 CJ, Constitutional Law § 441, p 929.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute was declared in violation of the constitutional right to do business, secured under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 2, § 16, of the Michigan Constitution (1908).
Again in the case of Ritholz v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich 258, where the city of Detroit attempted by ordinance to forbid the advertisement of the price of eyeglasses, the Court held that in the exercise of the police power there must not only be a public welfare to be conserved or a public wrong to be corrected but there must be a reasonable relation between the remedy adopted and the public purpose. .Whether such relation exists is a question for the courts to determine. It was held (p 275) that a city ordinance prohibiting such advertising had no relation to public health and was an unlawful interference with private business. The ordinance was declared void as being in violation of the Fourteenth *75Amendment of the United States Constitution. (See, also, Levy v. City of Pontiac, 331 Mich 100, for a similar holding as to the price of gasoline.)
In the case of People, ex rel. Valentine, v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 124 Mich 664 (50 LRA 493, 83 Am St Rep 352), a statute attempted to require a $5,000 bond, conditioned for the faithful performance of their contracts, of merchants who sold farm produce upon commission. The statute was declared void .as an unjustifiable- interference with the right of citizens to carry on legitimate business, the Court saying (p 666):
“There is no more reason why a commission merchant should pay a license fee, and execute a bond to pay his debts and to do his business honestly, than there is that any other merchant should pay a like fee, and file a like bond to properly do his business and pay his debts. The business requires no regulation, any more than any other mercantile pursuit. There is nothing in it hostile to the comfort, health, morals, or even convenience, of a community. It is carried on by private persons in private buildings, and in a manner no different from that in which the merchant selling hardware or groceries or dry goods carries on his business. The law can find no support in the police power inherent in the State.”
Since it appears that the sole and only objective of PA 1962, No 128, is to eliminate, or at least reduce, competition, since the general welfare is neither enhanced nor promoted, and since no evil is elimi-mated by the act, it must be concluded that it is not a valid and proper exercise by the legislature of its police power.
Appellants contend that section 9 of the act, even If it were1 valid regulation, unconstitutionally delegates to counties the right to determine the extent *76to which, if at all, the law shall he applied within a particular county. Section 9 of the act provides:
“In any county by action of the board of supervisors, the board,' after notice and hearing and with the concurrence of 2/3 of the members elect, may permit the sale of specific items prohibited by this act.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A fair reading of this provision can only mean that any or all items prohibited by the act may be sold within a county by action of its board of supervisors. A substantial number of Michigan’s 83 counties have presently elected to permit sale of all items prohibited by the act.
On the other hand, appellees contend that under section 9 counties are properly delegated power to determine the extent to which the act should apply,, based upon local needs which vary widely from county to county. They rely upon article 8, § 8,, Michigan Constitution of 1908, which provided:
“The legislature may by general law confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, as it may deem proper.”
The Michigan Constitution of 1963 permits delegation of powers at least as broadly as before. Article 7, § 8, Const 1963, provides:
“Boards of supervisors shall have legislative, administrative and such other powers and duties as provided by law.”
Article 7, § 34, provides in part:
“The provisions of this Constitution and law concerning counties, * * * shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers granted to counties *77* * * by this Constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this 'Constitution.”
Counties properly are delegated legislative powers ■over county affairs. This is similar to the legislative powers that may he granted to municipalities over their affairs and to townships over theirs. The Constitution does not permit counties to determine legislative policies of statewide concern, nor does it permit the State legislature to delegate such power. Attorney General, ex rel. Lennane, v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich 631.
Section 9 (CL 1948, § 435.59 [Stat Ann 1963 Cum Supp § 18.857(9)]) violates the principle of legislative delegation of power because, while purporting do he a State law, it permits each county to change the State law to suit its own purposes. This is not delegation of authority to a county to enact a local ■county ordinance. Nor is the supervisors’ choice ■either to come under a State law by taking no action or to avoid the law’s effect within the county by a two-thirds vote. Bather, each board of supervisors has an unlimited number of choices, since a board may permit the sale of any or all of the prohibited items. The provisions of a purported State law "therefore become dependent upon action which may he taken by the hoards of supervisors of Michigan’s •83 counties and could differ from county to county "throughout the State.
Both the 1908 and 19-63 Constitutions provide  Ihat:
“The legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives.”
A county cannot, by action which affects only that ■county, be permitted to alter the statewide policy.
*78We conclude that the act is an improper delegation of legislative power. We do not consider other claims of invalidity of the act because it is not necessary to do so. for disposition of these cases.
No costs, a public question being involved.
Black and Souris, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.