Court Opinion

ID: 9913865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 21:01:13.812081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:26.630412
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10613    Document: 32-1      Date Filed: 12/28/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10613
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JOHNTAVIOUS TILLER,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cr-00013-MW-MJF-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10613

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Defendant Johntavious Tiller appeals his convictions for
        possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of 21
        U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm in
        furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). On appeal, Tiller challenges the district court’s
        denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during his arrest.
        After review, we affirm.
                           I. BACKGROUND FACTS
                The following facts are based on Corporal Thomas Young’s
        testimony at the suppression hearing, which the district court
        credited. At about 6:00 p.m. on October 29, 2019, Corporal Young
        of the Bay County Sheriff’s Office was looking for Travis Shutes
        based on a federal warrant. Corporal Young was in an unmarked
        car in the area of a bar and liquor store called Foghorn’s that Shutes
        was known to frequent. Foghorn’s was the location of past fights,
        and complaints of drug use and drug sales. Shutes also was the only
        suspect in a recent strong-arm robbery at Foghorn’s.
               While surveilling the property, Corporal Young noticed
        defendant Tiller walking around the parking lot, sitting and talking
        briefly with people in their cars, and driving in and out of the
        parking lot. Corporal Young did not know either Shutes or Tiller,
        but had a digital picture of Shutes. From his location across the
        road, a distance of about 200 feet, Corporal Young believed Tiller
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        23-10613               Opinion of the Court                        3

        looked similar to Shutes, and notified his shift supervisor that he
        had spotted Shutes in Foghorn’s parking lot.
               Based on his experience observing drug deals, Corporal
        Young also believed defendant Tiller’s activities in the parking lot
        were consistent with drug dealing. Corporal Young explained that
        these transactions are quick, with the individuals first meeting up
        to negotiate a deal. The drug dealer then retrieves the product and
        brings it back so the transaction can take place.
               Because Corporal Young believed that defendant Tiller was
        Shutes and that he was engaged in drug activity, Corporal Young
        decided to make contact with him. As Tiller drove away and
        returned to the parking lot once more, Corporal Young pulled in
        behind Tiller’s car. As he did so, Corporal Young saw a passenger
        exit Tiller’s car. Corporal Young did not try to speak to or stop the
        passenger because as the sole deputy there, doing so would not
        have been safe.
               Corporal Young walked up to defendant Tiller’s car, and
        Tiller rolled his window down “just slightly.” Corporal Young
        introduced himself as an investigator with the Bay County Sheriff’s
        Office and explained that he was investigating Tiller’s suspicious
        activity that he believed involved drug transactions. Corporal
        Young asked Tiller for his identification. Tiller appeared agitated
        and refused to produce his identification several times. Corporal
        Young spent several minutes attempting to calm Tiller down.
               While Corporal Young talked with Tiller, a second officer
        arrived and requested a K-9 unit to respond to the scene. At that
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10613

        point, Tiller produced his identification. Corporal Young entered
        Tiller’s driver’s license number into his car computer and learned
        that the license was valid. At that point, Corporal Young realized
        Tiller was not Shutes.
                Nonetheless, Corporal Young continued to investigate the
        suspected drug activity by Tiller that he had witnessed. Corporal
        Young ran Tiller’s identification through state and national crime
        databases to research his recent criminal history and began filling
        out a field interview card to document his contact with Tiller. As
        he was doing so, the K-9 unit arrived and gave a positive alert on
        Tiller’s car. Corporal Young estimated that the K-9 unit arrived six
        minutes after being requested and that the entire encounter with
        Tiller from first contact to the drug dog’s alert lasted ten minutes
        at most.
              Subsequently, in Tiller’s car, officers found bulk amounts of
        crack and powder cocaine, smaller plastic baggies of individually
        packaged drugs, a digital scale, and a firearm and ammunition.
                        II. DISTRICT COURT RULING
              At the conclusion of the suppression hearing and in a
        subsequent written order, the district court denied Tiller’s motion
        to suppress the evidence seized during the October 29, 2019 stop.
        The district court credited Corporal Young’s testimony and found
        that Corporal Young had reasonable suspicion to stop Tiller.
              Specifically, the district court found that Corporal Young’s
        reasonable suspicion for the initial stop was based on: (1) Tiller’s
        presence in a high crime area known for drug transactions; (2)
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        23-10613               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Tiller’s actions in the parking lot that Corporal Young knew, based
        on experience and training, were consistent with hand-to-hand
        drug transactions; and (3) what appeared to Corporal Young to be
        a resemblance to Shutes, a wanted robbery suspect. The district
        court noted also that, when interacting with Corporal Young,
        Tiller “acted nervous, anxious, and belligerent” and “refused to
        turn over his driver’s license,” which “only buttressed the Officer’s
        reasonable suspicion.”
               The district court observed from pictures introduced at the
        hearing that Tiller and Shutes do not look alike. The district court
        acknowledged, however, that Corporal Young saw an African
        American man with short hair and dark complexion like Shutes’s,
        and who was approximately the same age and build as Shutes, and
        had a hunch that Tiller was Shutes. The district court stated that
        while Corporal Young’s hunch alone would not be enough, his
        observations of Tiller’s activities consistent with hand-to-hand
        drug dealing—walking to another car, talking to someone briefly,
        getting out and driving away, then immediately coming back and
        parking again—in a high crime area known for drug transactions
        rose to the level of reasonable suspicion.
                Ultimately, a jury convicted Tiller of possession with intent
        to distribute the crack cocaine found in his car on October 29, 2019,
        and of a separate drug offense committed on September 21, 2019.
        Later, Tiller entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of the
        firearm found in his car on October 29, 2019. The district court
        imposed concurrent 60-month sentences for the two drug offenses
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10613

        and a consecutive 60-month sentence for the firearm offense, for a
        total sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment.
                                 III. DISCUSSION
               On appeal, Tiller does not challenge his conviction for the
        September 2019 drug offense or his sentences. Rather, Tiller
        appeals only the motion to suppress as to the crack cocaine and
        firearm found in his car on October 29, 2019. In that regard, Tiller
        argues that the district court clearly erred in finding Corporal
        Young’s hearing testimony credible and that Corporal Young did
        not have reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop on
        October 29.
        A.     Standards of Review
                In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress,
        we review its fact findings “for clear error, considering all the
        evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United
        States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 870 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (quotation
        marks omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). We review de novo
        the district court’s application of the law to those facts. Id.
                With respect to credibility findings, we must accept the
        district court’s “choice of whom to believe unless it is contrary to
        the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face
        that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Holt,
        777 F.3d 1234, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). In
        other words, “we defer to the district court’s factual
        determinations unless the district court’s understanding of the facts
        is ‘unbelievable.’” Id. at 1256.
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        23-10613                    Opinion of the Court                     7

        B.      General Principles
               The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
        and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the Fourth
        Amendment, a law enforcement officer may conduct a brief
        investigatory stop, known as a Terry stop, 1 if the officer (1) has a
        reasonable suspicion that the person detained has participated in or
        is about to participate in criminal activity, and (2) the stop is
        “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
        the interference in the first place.” United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d
        1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also
        United States v. Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021).
               Tiller’s appeal focuses on the first prong, arguing that the
        stop was not justified at inception by reasonable suspicion. Tiller
        does not argue that the officers unlawfully extended the stop. Cf.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th at 881-82 (explaining that officers must diligently
        conduct their investigation and “cannot unlawfully prolong a
        stop”).
               Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than
        probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
        preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
        123 (2000). “Reasonable suspicion may ‘be based on commonsense
        judgments and inferences about human behavior.’” Gonzalez-Zea,
        995 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). However,
        because “at least a minimal level of objective justification for

        1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10613

        making the stop” is required, the law enforcement officer “must be
        able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized
        suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-
        24 (quotation marks omitted).
                To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, we
        look to the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Bautista-
        Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009). “We may not consider
        each fact only in isolation, and reasonable suspicion may exist even
        if each fact alone is susceptible of innocent explanation.” Id.
        (quotation marks omitted).
               Some circumstances that may support a finding of
        reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop include: (1) an officer’s
        observation of conduct consistent with street-level, hand-to-hand
        drug transactions, even without witnessing an actual exchange;
        United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2009),
        (2) a person’s presence in a “high crime area” known for drug
        dealing and drug use; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, and (3) a person’s
        nervous, evasive behavior. Id. A person’s physical resemblance to
        a known felony suspect may also support reasonable suspicion. See
        United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“[I]f police have a
        reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,
        that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in
        connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be
        made to investigate that suspicion.”).
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        23-10613               Opinion of the Court                          9

        C.     Credibility Determination
               At the outset, the district court did not clearly err in finding
        Corporal Young’s testimony was credible. Tiller has not shown in
        any way that the district court’s finding that Corporal Young was
        credible was contrary to the laws of nature or improbable on its
        face. See Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255.
               For example, Corporal Young’s testimony—that he
        understood Shutes to be at large, that he was looking for Shutes,
        that from afar he believed Tiller resembled the picture of Shutes,
        and that Tiller’s actions in Foghorn’s parking lot were consistent
        with hand-to-hand drug transactions—was not internally
        inconsistent or unbelievable. See id. at 1255-56.
               Although Tiller was able later to show with pictures that he
        and Shutes did not look alike, the fact remains that, as the district
        court found, both were the same race, had a dark complexion,
        short hair, the same build, and were approximately the same age.
        The district court credited Corporal Young’s testimony that when
        he initiated the stop, he believed Tiller “resembled” Shutes.
               Notably too, Corporal Young did not know Shutes and first
        observed Tiller across the street and from a distance of about 200
        feet. Tiller has not shown the district court’s credibility finding was
        contrary to the laws of nature or improbable on its face.
              Defendant Tiller points out that, at trial, he presented
        evidence that Shutes was arrested in Arkansas on August 15, 2019,
        and was still in custody at the time of Corporal Young’s stop on
        October 29, 2019. Tiller suggests this evidence contradicts
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10613

        Corporal Young’s testimony that he was actively looking for
        Shutes and that Shutes had committed a “recent” strong-arm
        robbery at Foghorn’s in Bay County, Florida. But at trial Corporal
        Young testified that he was unaware of Shutes’s August 2019 arrest
        when he was surveilling Foghorn’s in October 2019. Further, the
        fact that Shutes was arrested and detained in Arkansas ten weeks
        before the stop is not inconsistent with Corporal Young’s
        testimony that Shutes was suspected of committing a “recent”
        strong-arm robbery at Foghorn’s. In sum, Tiller’s trial evidence
        about where Shutes was at the time of the stop does not render
        Corporal Young’s testimony that he was looking for Shutes so
        improbable that no factfinder would believe it. See id.
                Similarly, contrary to defendant Tiller’s assertion, it was not
        clear error to find, based on Corporal Young’s testimony, that
        Tiller’s behavior in Foghorn’s parking lot was consistent with
        hand-to-hand drug transactions. Tiller stresses that Foghorn’s was
        open to the public when Corporal Young was conducting
        surveillance and that Corporal Young did not see Tiller conduct a
        hand-to-hand exchange.
               But Corporal Young did not merely observe Tiller walking
        in or out of Foghorn’s like a patron. Instead, he saw Tiller walk
        across the parking lot, to and from his car to other people’s cars,
        briefly talk with people inside their cars, and then drive away in his
        own car and return a short time later. As Corporal Young
        explained, in his experience investigating drug activity, Tiller’s
        pattern of movement in the parking lot was consistent with street-
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        23-10613               Opinion of the Court                        11

        level drug dealing, in which the seller first negotiates the deal with
        the buyer and then retrieves the drugs to complete the transaction.
        D.    Reasonable Suspicion
               The district court also did not err in concluding, based on
        the totality of the circumstances, that Corporal Young had
        reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop. While
        conducting surveillance, Corporal Young believed Shutes was at
        large on a federal warrant. Corporal Young knew that drug use
        and drug sales occurred in the area around Foghorn’s and that
        Shutes, who was involved in this kind of activity, frequented
        Foghorn’s. Corporal Young observed Tiller, who he thought
        looked like Shutes, walking around the Foghorn’s parking lot.
        Tiller got in and out of cars to talk to people and came and went
        from the parking lot in his own car, all actions Corporal Young
        knew, based on his training and experience, were consistent with
        negotiating drug deals and then going to get the drugs to complete
        the transactions. It was not necessary for Corporal Young to see
        Tiller make a hand-to-hand exchange to reasonably suspect him of
        drug dealing. See Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1313-14.
               Tiller argues that his nervous and uncooperative behavior
        to law enforcement should have held “very little significance.”
        While we conclude Corporal Young already had reasonable
        suspicion that Tiller was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity
        before Corporal Young spoke with Tiller, we agree with the district
        court that Tiller’s agitation and initial refusal to provide Corporal
        Young with his driver’s license “only buttressed” that suspicion.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10613

               Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        government, Tiller’s actions consistent with hand-to-hand drug
        dealing in and around the Foghorn’s parking lot, an area known for
        drug dealing, coupled with Corporal Young’s belief that Tiller
        resembled Shutes, a known felony suspect who frequented the
        area, created reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Tiller and
        investigate whether he was in fact Shutes and whether he was
        engaged in drug dealing.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
               For all these reasons, we find no error in the district court’s
        denial of Tiller’s motion to suppress and affirm Tiller’s convictions.
              AFFIRMED.