Court Opinion

ID: 9668990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:35:58.136855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.993807
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 103. (dissenting). The issue in the present case is whether Ms. Becker's detention following the execution of the search warrant was an unlawful seizure. I conclude it was. Therefore, Ms. Becker's consent to search the apartment she and Vorburger shared, given during her detention, was invalid.
¶ 104. This case does not involve, as the majority opinion would have you believe, the legality of Ms. Becker's detention while waiting for the search warrant and its execution. The majority opinion emphasizes at length the period of detention that occurred before execution of the search warrant. It buries within the depths of the opinion the whole body of law that governs unlawful detentions that are not connected with the execution of a search warrant.
¶ 105. Ms. Becker's treatment before the search warrant was executed does color whether Ms. Becker's detention after the search warrant was executed became an unlawful arrest. But Ms. Becker's detention before and her detention after the search warrant was executed are, as the majority opinion reluctantly recog*584nizes, two- separate events for the purposes of our analysis. See majority op. at ¶¶ 70-72, 84-87.
¶ 106. Let me agree for the purposes of this dissent that the initial stop of Ms. Becker at 9:20 p.m. was based on reasonable suspicion and lawful, although the State concedes that no probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Becker.
¶ 107. The majority opinion relies on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), to hold that Ms. Becker could be lawfully detained while the search warrant for contraband was executed. For purposes of this dissent, I am willing to agree with this conclusion.1 Once the search warrant was executed, however, Summers and its progeny2 become irrelevant, because Summers applies to a detention only until a search warrant is executed.3 See majority op. at ¶¶ 47-60, 69.
¶ 108. The execution of the search warrant yielded no evidence to connect Ms. Becker to the marijuana in the motel room.4 Any reasonable suspicion that Ms. Becker was more closely linked to the motel room and its contents other than her presence at the door was dispelled at that time. Nevertheless, the police continued to detain Ms. Becker after the search warrant had been executed.
*585¶ 109. As the majority opinion explains, the status quo changed after the warrant was executed.5 At this time the law enforcement officers began "a second detention," an investigative detention. One of the officers moved Ms. Becker into a different motel room and began interrogating her.
¶ 110. An investigative detention must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity supported by articulable facts.6 On review of the record, I could not find that any of the police officers articulated any reason for detaining or questioning Ms. Becker. The majority opinion claims that Ms. Becker was detained for questioning as a potential witness.7 However, there is no support for this claim in the record.
¶ 111. "[A]n investigative detention must he temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."8 The detention should be no longer than necessary to dispel or verify the officer's suspicion, that is, no longer than necessary to determine whether Ms. Becker had any knowledge about, or connection with, the drugs in the motel room.9 Unless a person who is detained and questioned provides answers that give the police probable cause to arrest that person, she must be released.10 The State concedes it *586never had probable cause to arrest Ms. Becker either before or after executing the search warrant.
¶ 112. I now apply the following legal standard that the majority opinion at ¶ 86 and the State use to determine whether the facts in the present case constitute a lawful detention or an illegal seizure or arrest after the search warrant was executed: "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."11
¶ 113. In the present case, a reasonable person in Ms. Becker's position would have considered herself arrested after the search warrant was executed. Ms. Becker arrived at the motel room at 9:20 p.m., at which time she and her companions were intercepted by at least seven police officers, were placed in handcuffs, patted down for the presence of weapons or contraband, and separated from each other. While waiting for a search warrant to arrive and to be executed, Ms. Becker was not permitted to use the bathroom without supervision by a police officer and remained handcuffed for about an hour. Ms. Becker was told repeatedly before the search warrant was executed that she was not under arrest, but merely being detained.
¶ 114. After the execution of the warrant, a police officer escorted Ms. Becker into a different motel room for the purpose of interrogating her. After the search warrant was executed the police officer no longer told Ms. Becker that she was not under arrest. Indeed, shortly after escorting her into the motel room for *587interrogation, a police officer read Ms. Becker the Miranda warnings. We can assume that a reasonable person has at least a casual familiarity with television crime programs (a critical aspect of our national culture) and would conclude from the Miranda warnings that he or she was under arrest.12
¶ 115. Immediately upon questioning, Ms. Becker denied any knowledge about the drugs. She was not then or at any time charged with any offense in connection with the marijuana in the motel. After she denied any involvement in the crime being investigated, the police officer did not release her, but broadened the scope of the interrogation to. include subjects other than the marijuana in the hotel.
¶ 116. The detention after the execution of the search warrant lasted fifty minutes. The length of the investigative detention is one factor to weigh in determining whether a lawful detention has escalated into arrest. For example, in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a fifteen-minute investigative detention at an airport was impermissible.
¶ 117. In addition to the length of the investigation, we must examine how Ms. Becker was treated. Ms. Becker clearly was treated as if she were in police custody. Before the search warrant was executed, Ms. Becker was kept in handcuffs but was repeatedly told she was not under arrest. Shortly after execution of the search warrant, the police officer removed her handcuffs, but did not tell her she was not under arrest. *588After execution of the search warrant, the police officer allowed Ms. Becker to use the bathroom without an officer present, but the officer required that the bathroom door be left slightly ajar. The officer did not tell Ms. Becker that she was free to leave. The officer apparently believed Ms. Becker was in custody after the search warrant was executed because the officer gave Ms. Becker Miranda warnings.
f 118. It is only by using a legal fiction that anyone can say with a straight face that a reasonable person under the circumstances of this case would not have thought she was under arrest.13
¶ 119. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 120. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this opinion.

 Majority op. at ¶¶ 45-69.

 Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990).

 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).

 See Officer Gaber's testimony at suppression hearing, Record at 59:62; Officer Olsen at suppression hearing, Record at 59:73.

 Majority op. at ¶ 70.

 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).

 Majority op. at ¶ 79.

 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330-32 (2001).

 The police knew there was marijuana in the motel room at the time of Becker's initial detention.

 United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 664-65 (1993) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984)).

 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), quoted with approval and applied in State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶ 23, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834. See also State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 446-47, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991).

 "A classic example of the law bite in operation are reports of motorists arrested by Canadian police who repeatedly insisted that the Miranda rights be read to them." J.M. Balkin, What Is a Post Modem Constitutionalism ?, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1966, 1981 (1992).

 See State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶¶ 41-44, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).