Court Opinion

ID: 9372307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 13:05:20.907938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.603725
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                    No. COA22-548

                                Filed 21 February 2023

Durham County, No. 21 CVD 500218

KATHRYN CHOCIEJ, Plaintiff,

              v.

MARSHALL JERRY RICHBURG, Defendant.

        Appeal by Plaintiff from judgment entered 5 October 2021 by Judge Doretta L.

Walker in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January

2023.

        Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Corey Frost, Dietrich D. McMillan,
        Larissa Mañón Mervin, TeAndra H. Miller, Celia Pistolis, and James Battle
        Morgan, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

        No brief filed on behalf of Defendant-Appellee.

        CARPENTER, Judge.

        Kathryn Chociej (“Plaintiff”) appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of her

Complaint and Motion for Domestic Violence Protective Order (“Complaint”) filed

against Marshall Jerry Richburg (“Defendant”) and the trial court’s denial of her

subsequent Rule 59 Motion to Amend the Judgment or for New Trial (“Rule 59

Motion”). On appeal, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by granting Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint despite finding Defendant assaulted Plaintiff on

two occasions. After careful review, we agree with Plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse
                                CHOCIEJ V. RICHBURG

                                  Opinion of the Court

and remand for entry of a Domestic Violence Protective Order (“DVPO”).

                  I.     Factual and Procedural Background

      In 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant resided together in a dating relationship. On

31 May 2021, an altercation broke out between the couple, and Defendant assaulted

Plaintiff with his fists and forehead, breaking her nose. Defendant also threw a vodka

bottle and a peanut butter jar against the wall, leaving holes, and destroyed

Plaintiff’s television. Afterwards, Defendant apologized and promised to seek mental

health treatment. On 16 June 2021, another fight broke out in the parties’ bedroom.

This time, Defendant assaulted Plaintiff with a belt, household objects, including a

drawer and a lamp, and his forehead and fists, causing a black eye and bruises to

Plaintiff’s hands. When the police arrived, Defendant had already fled, but he was

arrested in early July and charged with assault on a female.

      After his arrest, Defendant called Plaintiff’s employer to report she had

wrongfully disclosed his confidential medical information to a third party. After

being suspended on 16 July 2021, Plaintiff was terminated by her employer on 20

July 2021. Also on 20 July 2021—the same date as the adverse employment action—

Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendant.

      During the hearing on 5 October 2021, Plaintiff testified that Defendant

assaulted her on multiple occasions, and she introduced photographs of her injuries,

which the court admitted into evidence. Defendant presented no evidence. In open

court, the trial court considered the duration of time between the assaults and

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Plaintiff seeking DVPO relief. The trial court also noted the timing between the

adverse employment action and Plaintiff’s initiation of the case. Ultimately, the trial

court concluded Plaintiff “failed to prove grounds for [the] issuance of a [DVPO]” and

dismissed her Complaint. To support its conclusion, the court made the following

findings of fact:

              Although this court believes Defendant assaulted Plaintiff
              on two different occasions. Court does not believe that
              Plaintiff would have taken out [the DVPO] if she had not
              been in trouble at her job for releasing to Defendant’s
              friend his medical information. Her fear of defendant
              appears to have developed after she was suspended from
              her job due to defendant’s ‘harassment and vindictiveness’
              per Plaintiff’s testimony by Defendant’s calling her boss to
              report Plaintiff’s violation of releasing his private
              information.

       Plaintiff timely filed the Rule 59 Motion. After a hearing on 6 December 2021,

the trial court denied Plaintiff’s Rule 59 Motion by written order filed on 19 January

2022. Plaintiff timely appealed from both orders.

                                 II.      Jurisdiction

       This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal from both orders pursuant to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2021).

                                       III.    Issues

       The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (1) dismissing

Plaintiff’s Complaint due to insufficient fear of serious bodily injury or continued

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                                   Opinion of the Court

harassment after finding Defendant had assaulted Plaintiff on two occasions; and (2)

denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59 Motion.

                                   IV.     Analysis

      On appeal, Plaintiff first argues the trial court erred by dismissing the

Complaint where uncontroverted evidence showed Defendant assaulted Plaintiff on

two occasions, and by denying relief absent a showing of fear of imminent serious

bodily injury or continued harassment. After careful review, we agree with both

arguments.

      “When the trial court sits without a jury [on a DVPO], the standard of review

on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court's

findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.”

Forehand v. Forehand, 238 N.C. App. 270, 273, 767 S.E.2d 125, 127 (2014) (quoting

Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 59, 685 S.E.2d 541, 544 (2009)). “Competent

evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

finding.” Ward v. Ward, 252 N.C. App. 253, 256, 797 S.E.2d 525, 528 (2017) (internal

quotations omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied 369 N.C. 753, 800

S.E.2d 65 (2017).

      A trial judge sitting without a jury must specifically find facts and state

separately its conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1)

(2021).   “Evidence must support findings; findings must support conclusions;

conclusions must support the judgment. . . . [E]ach link in the chain of reasoning must

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                                CHOCIEJ V. RICHBURG

                                  Opinion of the Court

appear in the order itself.” Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 714, 268 S.E.2d 185, 190

(1980).

      “Domestic violence” has been defined by our Legislature as:

             the commission of one or more of the following acts upon
             an aggrieved party or upon a minor child residing with or
             in the custody of the aggrieved party by a person with
             whom the aggrieved party has or has had a personal
             relationship, but does not include acts of self-defense:
             (1) Attempting to cause bodily injury, or intentionally
             causing bodily injury; or
             (2) Placing the aggrieved party or a member of the
             aggrieved party’s family or household in fear of imminent
             serious bodily injury or continued harassment, as defined
             in [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 14-277.3A, that rises to such a level
             as to inflict substantial emotional distress; or
             (3) Committing any act defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat. §§] 14-
             27.21 through . . . 14-27.33.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a) (2021). Each subsection of the statute—separated by the

disjunctive conjunction, “or”—independently and sufficiently constitutes an act of

domestic violence under North Carolina law. See Rudder v. Rudder, 234 N.C. App.

173, 180, 759 S.E.2d 321, 326 (2014) (“The statute thus specifies several alternative

ways in which one may commit an act of domestic violence.”). A showing of “fear of

imminent serious bodily injury or continued harassment” is not required where a

defendant intentionally causes bodily injury or attempts to cause bodily injury upon

the aggrieved party. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a).

      Upon a finding that “one or more” acts of domestic violence have occurred

between individuals with a sufficient past or present “personal relationship[,]” N.C.

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                                CHOCIEJ V. RICHBURG

                                   Opinion of the Court

Gen. Stat. § 50B-1, “the court shall grant a protective order . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. §

50B-3(a) (emphasis added). When subsections (a) and (b) of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1

are satisfied, the issuance of a DVPO is mandatory, not discretionary. See D.C. v.

D.C., 279 N.C. App. 371, 373 n.2, 865 S.E.2d 889, 890 n.2 (2021) (“[I]f a trial court

determines that an act qualifying as domestic violence occurred, the trial court is

required to issue a DVPO.”).

       Here, the parties were in a cohabitating dating relationship at the time of the

incidents, which constitutes a “personal relationship” within the meaning of the

statute.   See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(b)(6) (“persons . . . who are in a dating

relationship or have been in a dating relationship.”). In the 5 October 2021 order

dismissing the Complaint, the trial court explicitly found, based upon competent and

uncontroverted evidence, that “Defendant assaulted Plaintiff on two different

occasions.” The finding that Defendant committed two separate assaults against

Plaintiff is irreconcilable with the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff “failed to

prove grounds for issuance of a [DVPO].” See Forehand, 238 N.C. App. at 273, 767

S.E.2d at 127. At minimum, the trial court’s finding of two separate assaults based

upon the evidence presented necessitates the conclusion that Defendant

“[a]ttempt[ed] to cause bodily injury” to Plaintiff. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a)(1).

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of a DVPO, inclusive of any relief set

forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) that the trial court deems appropriate under the

facts of this case.

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                                CHOCIEJ V. RICHBURG

                                   Opinion of the Court

      Having concluded the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s

request for a DVPO, we do not reach the issue of whether the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59 Motion, wherein Plaintiff sought the same

relief under a more exacting standard.

                                   V. Conclusion

      In sum, because the trial court found that one or more acts of domestic violence

occurred between two individuals with a sufficient personal relationship, the trial

court lacked discretion to deny Plaintiff’s request for a DVPO. See D.C., 279 N.C.

App. at 373, 865 S.E.2d at 890. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of

the Complaint and remand for entry of a DVPO. On remand, the trial court should

consider all potential relief set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) and grant any such

relief the trial court deems appropriate under the facts of this case.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Judges MURPHY and GRIFFIN concur.

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