Court Opinion

ID: 9406899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 06:07:48.621942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.012132
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 27, 2023

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-01045-CR

                         DERRICK WALTON, Appellant
                                    V.
                        THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F17-41375

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Derrick Walton appeals his aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against

a family member conviction. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant

entered a guilty plea, and the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to fifteen

years’ confinement. In a single issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his right to a speedy

trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                     BACKGROUND

      On October 10, 2017, appellant was charged by indictment in Dallas County

on a charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a family member.

The probable cause affidavit stated that, on August 1, 2017, appellant “drop kicked”

his uncle, Amos Walton, in the head and then “fled the scene in a Penske truck.”

Amos spent two days in the hospital to recover from his injuries, and police

interviewed Amos on August 4, 2017. Amos stated he had a broken jaw requiring

surgery, a broken nose, and a broken arm resulting from appellant drop kicking

Amos to the ground and kicking, stomping, and punching Amos.

      Also on August 4, 2017, appellant struck another vehicle in Collin County.

The record contains a Collin County probable cause affidavit stating that appellant

was driving the Penske rental truck at the time of the accident, and he left the scene

after the accident. Police interviewed Belinda Wright, appellant’s passenger at the

time of the accident, and she stated her relationship with appellant had recently

ended, but she got in the truck with appellant so they could talk. Appellant drove

off at a high rate of speed and refused to stop and let Wright out of the truck. After

the accident, appellant drove away from the scene and eventually lost control of the

truck, striking a tree in a parking lot where Wright was able to exit the truck and run

away. Appellant yelled at Wright to get back in the truck and drove toward her as if

he was going to run her over, but Wright escaped. Appellant was arrested in Collin

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County for driving while intoxicated, unlawful restraint, aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon, and accident involving damage to vehicle.

        On August 9, 2017, an at-large warrant for appellant’s arrest on a charge of

aggravated assault was issued in Dallas County. On October 3, 2017, appellant

posted a $15,000 bond in Dallas County. When appellant failed to appear at a trial

setting on January 25, 2018, his bond was forfeited and a warrant for his arrest was

issued. On June 22, 2018, Amos died while appellant remained at large with an

active warrant. The warrant was executed on November 29, 2018. On December

13, 2018, the trial court in Dallas County appointed an attorney to represent

appellant.      On September 26, 2019, appellant’s bond in Dallas County was

discharged because appellant was incarcerated in the Denton County jail. On

February 7, 2020, a Denton County jury convicted appellant and sentenced him to

ten years’ confinement. Appellant was sent to the Institutional Division of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice on March 12, 2020.

        On January 31, 2022, at the State’s request, a bench warrant was issued, and

appellant was booked into Dallas County jail on February 11, 2022. On June 22,

2022, appellant rejected the State’s plea bargain offer, and appellant orally asserted

the clear invocation of the right to a speedy trial.1 On July 21, 2022, appellant filed

a motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. The next day, the trial

    1
     In asserting the right, counsel remarked that appellant “may have asserted it before,” but the record is
devoid of any prior assertion.
                                                    –3–
court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss. On August 29, 2022, appellant and the

State reached a plea bargain agreement in which appellant pled guilty and agreed to

a sentence of fifteen years’ confinement. At a hearing that same day, the trial court

agreed appellant preserved the right to appeal his speedy trial motion. The trial

court’s certification of appellant’s right of appeal provided that this case is a plea-

bargain case, but matters were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before

trial and not withdrawn or waived, and appellant had the right of appeal. This appeal

followed.

                                       DISCUSSION

      In a single issue, appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his right to a speedy trial.

      The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees the accused in a

criminal prosecution the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The

right to a speedy trial attaches once a person is either arrested or charged. Cantu v.

State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Courts determine a speedy trial

claim on an ad hoc basis by analyzing and weighing four factors: (1) the length of

the delay, (2) the State’s reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his

right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the length of

delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. The

State has the burden to justify the length of the delay, while the defendant has the

                                         –4–
burden to prove he asserted his right and has been prejudiced. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d

at 280.

      We apply a bifurcated standard of review in a speedy trial analysis: we employ

an abuse of discretion standard for the factual components and a de novo standard

for the legal components. State v. Lopez, 631 S.W.3d 107, 113–14 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). Thus, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s historical findings of

fact that are supported by the record. Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014). The balancing test of the Barker factors is a purely legal question

that we review de novo. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767–68 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016).

                              The Length of the Delay

      To trigger a speedy trial analysis, the defendant must make an initial showing

that “the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing

ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808

(quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1992)); see also Barker,

407 U.S. at 530–32 (length of delay is “triggering mechanism” for analysis of other

factors). Here, at the hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss, the State agreed that

the delay of four years and eight months between appellant’s indictment on October

10, 2017, and his assertion of his right to a speedy trial on June 22, 2022, was

sufficient to trigger a full Barker analysis. We agree that, in this case, the length of

time without a trial setting merits our addressing the three remaining Barker factors.

                                          –5–
                                  The Reason for the Delay

       The State blamed the delay in bringing appellant to trial, in part, on restrictions

in court procedures during the Covid-19 outbreak. Specifically, the State pointed

out that, from mid-March 2020 to April 21, 2021, no jury trials occurred in Dallas

County due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The State argued further that the reason for

the delay was “primarily the defendant’s own conduct” in “failing to appear for

nearly a year with an active warrant” and “the defendant’s other criminal conduct”

and conviction in Denton County. The State conceded, however, that a delay of

thirteen months was due to State “negligence outside the period of the Covid-19

pandemic.” Yet the State argued that, during that time, appellant was “in custody

serving a TDC sentence, so he has not suffered any pretrial incarceration, essentially,

at the hands of” the State.

       Delay caused by the onset of a pandemic cannot be attributed as fault to the

State. State v. Conatser, 645 S.W.3d 925, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.).

There is no evidence that the State deliberately delayed appellant’s trial for strategic

gain. See id. Moreover, the record shows appellant failed to appear at his first trial

setting in January of 2018 while out on bond, and he remained at large with an active

warrant from August 2017 until November 2018. Appellant was appointed counsel

in December 2018.2 By September 2019, appellant was incarcerated in the Denton

   2
      During the hearing an exchanged occurred between appellant and the prosecutor relative to counsel
signing pass slips resetting the case between January 2019 and September 2019. However, the record does

                                                 –6–
County jail, and on February 7, 2020, a Denton County jury convicted appellant and

sentenced him to ten years’ confinement. Under the facts and circumstances of this

case, we conclude the second Barker factor weighs against neither the State nor

appellant.

                             Appellant’s Assertion of the Right

        There is no evidence in the record that Appellant asserted his right to a speedy

trial prior to the oral invocation in June of 2022 after plea bargain negotiations failed.

The subsequent written motion sought only to dismiss the indictment for violation

of the right to a speedy trial. Appellant’s assertion of his right should receive “strong

evidentiary weight” in our determination of whether he has been deprived of that

right. See Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. If a defendant does not timely demand a

speedy trial, we must assume that he did not really want one. Id. And the longer the

delay before trial, the more likely it would be that a defendant wanting a speedy trial

would request it. Id.

        Here, the record reflects that appellant first raised the issue of a speedy trial

approximately four years and eight months after he was arrested and indicted in

Dallas County. When he finally raised the issue, defense counsel orally invoked the

right to a speedy trial at the conclusion of a June 22, 2022 hearing. However, in the

motion he filed on July 21, 2022, he solely sought dismissal of the indictment.

not contain these pass slips or an affirmative representation that the same were part of the court’s file;
therefore, this seven month span is without explanation.
                                                  –7–
“Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy-trial

claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one.” Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 283. We conclude appellant’s focus on the dismissal of the indictment as

opposed to a speedy trial weighs against him.

                               Prejudice to Appellant

      The fourth and final Barker factor we consider is the prejudice caused to the

defendant as a result of the State’s delay. The defendant has the burden of showing

prejudice. Id. at 280. We assess this factor in light of the three interests the right to

a speedy trial is intended to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration,

(2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility

that the defense will be impaired. Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017).

      Here, appellant testified that his memory was “much sharper a couple of years

ago,” and his memory had “eroded” since he had been in the Institutional Division

of the Texas Department of Corrections. In response to questioning, appellant

testified he knew Amos had passed away in 2018, and the underlying events

occurred in 2017. The prosecutor argued that anxiety and loss of memory were “the

weakest most attenuated form of prejudice.” We conclude that appellant failed to

identify any significant prejudice caused by the State’s delay in bringing him to trial.

See id. The most significant prejudice, the loss of the complainant Amos, occurred

approximately eleven months after the date an at-large warrant for appellant’s arrest

                                          –8–
on a charge of aggravated assault was issued in Dallas County and was not caused

by the State’s delay. At the time of Amos’ death appellant was not seeking a speedy

trial but instead remained at large with an active warrant. This factor weighs heavily

against him.

      We agree that the delay in this case merits a full Barker analysis; however,

application of the Barker factors shows that the reason for the delay is shared by

both appellant and the state, and is of neutral consideration, while the remaining two

factors weigh to a greater or lesser degree against appellant. We conclude that the

Barker factors weigh against finding a speedy trial violation. See Barker, 407 U.S.

at 530; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying

appellant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his right to a speedy

trial. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                             /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                             BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
Do Not Publish                               JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
221045F.U05

                                         –9–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

DERRICK WALTON, Appellant                     On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial
                                              District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01045-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F17-41375.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Goldstein. Justices Nowell and
                                              Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered June 27, 2023

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