Court Opinion

ID: 9840880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 16:09:18.975963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:54.992761
License: Public Domain

J-A20016-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  DELORES W. MANNING                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  PAUL AND KELLY OYSTER                        :   No. 1 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 29, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
                            Civil Division at 21-0407

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

       Delores W. Manning (Appellant) appeals from the order sustaining the

preliminary objections of Paul and Kelly Oyster (the Oysters) and dismissing

Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

       On August 24, 2021, Appellant filed a complaint in replevin. The trial

court explained:

       [Appellant] alleges she purchased a black Labrador retriever as a
       gift to her son, William Gonzalez. [Appellant] alleges her son
       subsequently died. [Appellant] alleges that prior to her son’s
       death[,] he “charged [Appellant]” with the continued care of the
       dog.     [Appellant] alleges that during a period of her
       hospitalization[,] an unidentified “neighbor” gave the dog
       previously in [Appellant’s] “care” to [the Oysters]. [Appellant]
       alleges that the “neighbor” was without authorization to act on her
       behalf and had in fact forged a power of [a]ttorney. [Appellant]
       alleges [the Oysters] have refused to return the dog to

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20016-23

      [Appellant]. Accordingly, [Appellant] demands the immediate
      return of the dog.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 2.

      The Oysters filed preliminary objections raising four counts: 1) failure

to conform to rules of court; 2) insufficient specificity of pleading; 3)

nonjoinder of a necessary party; and 4) demurrer. Preliminary Objections to

Complaint, 10/12/21, at 1-4.

      After hearing argument on the preliminary objections, the trial court

entered an order overruling objections to the first, second and third counts,

and sustaining the objection to the fourth count. The trial court also ordered

Appellant to file an amended complaint. Order, 3/28/22.

      Appellant filed an amended complaint on April 14, 2022. The Oysters

filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint. The Oysters renewed

their claims of nonjoinder of a necessary party and demurrer. Preliminary

Objections to Amended Complaint, 6/8/22, at 1-2.

      The trial court heard argument on the preliminary objections to the

amended complaint on August 24, 2022.           The trial court subsequently

observed:

           [The Oysters] request that we dismiss the [amended
      c]omplaint, as [Appellant] has previously been granted leave to
      amend after [the Oysters’ first] preliminary objections.

             In their first [claim], [the Oysters] assert [Appellant] has
      failed to join necessary parties, the Estate of William Gonzalez and
      the Estate of Guillermo O. Gonzalez. … [The Oysters] assert that
      Guillermo P. Gonzalez is an interested party in this action.
      Guillermo P. Gonzalez is the father of [Appellant’s] son who died

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       intestate. Previously, [the Oysters] asserted that the Estate of
       William Gonzalez, the decedent having been the title owner of the
       dog at his time of death, must be added as a party. The [trial
       c]ourt was unable to determine whether the referenced Estate was
       a necessary party based on the initial [c]omplaint because
       [Appellant] did not plead the mechanism in which she obtained
       ownership of the dog. [Appellant] specifically pleads in the First
       Amended Complaint that her son [] was survived by [Appellant]
       (mother) and Guillermo P. Gonzalez (father) as beneficiaries. No
       estate was opened on behalf of son. [Appellant] alleges son’s
       property passed to [Appellant] and Guillermo Gonzalez. Guillermo
       Gonzalez subsequently passed away. An Estate has been opened
       on behalf of Guillermo to handle his property. The Estate of
       William Gonzalez is a necessary party[,] as the deceased was the
       owner of the dog at the time of his death. The Estate of Guillermo
       Gonzalez[,] as an alleged owner of the subject property[,] is a
       necessary party. …

              In their second [claim], [the Oysters] raise legal
       insufficiency of the complaint or demurrer.          [The Oysters]
       correctly argue that in order to state a cause of action in replevin,
       a plaintiff must show title and right to immediate possession.
       International Electronics Co. v. NST Metal Products Co., [88
       A.2d 40, 42 (Pa. 1952)].

                                           ***

             [The Oysters] allege [Appellant]’s complaint fails to allege
       passage of title of the dog from [Appellant]’s son to [Appellant].
       This [c]ourt has previously held “[Appellant] pleads no facts []
       which establish[] she is or was the owner of the dog. [Appellant]
       does not establish through what legal mechanism the dog became
       her property in order for [the dog] to be subject to a replevin
       action.”1 An Estate was not opened on behalf of [Appellant]’s son.
       [Appellant] alleges ownership of son’s property was shared
       between [her] and son’s father. [Appellant] acknowledges a
       renunciation for father’s estate may be necessary to establish
       [Appellant]’s ownership. …

Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 2-4 (footnote added).

____________________________________________

1 The trial court does not provide a cite for the quote.

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      On November 29, 2022, the trial court issued an opinion and order

sustaining the Oysters’ preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s

amended complaint with prejudice. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal.

Appellant also filed a timely court-ordered concise statement of errors

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In response, the trial court “refer[red] the

Superior Court to [the trial court] Opinion and Order of November 29, 2022,

for the factual background and reasons for the [trial court’s] ruling.” Opinion,

3/28/23.

      Appellant presents the following questions for review:

      1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, when there existed genuine
      issues of fact and issues of law.

      2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, upon reaching an erroneous
      conclusion that [Appellant] has not plead ownership of the dog,
      only the dog being in her “care”.

      3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, pursuant to the trial court’s
      erroneous conclusion that “[Appellant] pleads no facts for which
      establishing she is or was the owner of the dog”.

      4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, upon reaching an erroneous
      conclusion that “[Appellant] does not establish through what legal
      mechanism the dog became her property in order for such to be
      subject to replevin action”.

      5. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First

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      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, upon reaching an erroneous
      conclusion that “[Appellant] alleges ownership of son’s property
      was shared between [Appellant] and son’s father”.

      6. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, upon reaching an erroneous
      conclusion that “[Appellant] alleges son’s property passed to
      [Appellant] and Guillermo Gonzalez”.

      7. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, based upon the trial court’s
      erroneous conclusion that “The Estate of William Gonzalez is a
      necessary party as the deceased was the owner of the dog at the
      time of his death”.

      8. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, based upon the trial court’s
      erroneous conclusion that “the Estate of William Gonzales is a
      necessary party. . . .”

      9. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, upon reaching an erroneous
      conclusion that “The Estate of Guillermo Gonzalez as an alleged
      owner of the subject property is a necessary party”.

      10. Whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse
      of discretion when the [c]ourt dismissed [Appellant]’s First
      Amended Complaint, with prejudice, without affording [Appellant]
      the opportunity to amend the pleading to clarify the gifting and
      transfer of title of dog from William Gonzalez to [Appellant] prior
      to the demise of William Gonzalez.

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7.

      Appellant’s issues are related and her arguments are repetitive. See

id. at 16-32. Accordingly, we address the issues together.

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       Appellant claims the trial court based the dismissal of her amended

complaint “on erroneous conclusions.”2 Appellant’s Brief at 13. According to

Appellant, the trial court improperly sustained the preliminary objections

because the preliminary objections were not “clear and free from doubt.” Id.

at 16, 19, 23, 25, 31 (citing Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super.

1998)).

       Appellant specifically argues “it is not entirely clear from the averments

… whether or not she actually completed a gift and legal transfer of ownership

to her son.” Id. at 19. She asserts it is unclear whether her son, “granted a

life estate in [the dog] back to Appellant.” Id. at 20. Appellant repeatedly

relies on her averments that she purchased the dog for her son, and following

her son’s death, cared for the dog until she was hospitalized. Id. at 21, 23-

25. Appellant also references her averments about intestacy laws. Id. at 26-

32.

       “In reviewing an order disposing of preliminary objections, our standard

of review is well-settled. This Court reviews an order sustaining preliminary

objections for an error of law and in so doing, must apply the same standard

as the trial court.” Sayers v. Heritage Valley Med. Grp., Inc., 247 A.3d

1155, 1160–61 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). We have explained:

____________________________________________

2 The Oysters did not file an appellate brief.
                                        Thus, this Court advised counsel
that the Oysters were precluded from oral argument. Correspondence,
7/13/23.

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     Under that standard, the court accepts as true all well-pled
     material facts set forth in the complaint along with all reasonably
     deducible inferences from those facts.        Turner v. Medical
     Center, Beaver, PA, Inc., 454 Pa.Super. 645, 686 A.2d 830
     (1996), appeal denied, 548 Pa. 673, 698 A.2d 596 (1997).
     Essentially, our inquiry assesses the legal sufficiency of the
     complaint.    Guistra Development Co., Inc. v. Lee, 428
     Pa.Super. 394, 631 A.2d 199 (1993). Surmise and conjecture can
     play no part in the decision. Smith [v. Weaver, 665 A.2d 1215,
     1218 (Pa. Super. 1995)]. The court must be able to say with
     certainty that upon the facts averred, the law will not permit
     recovery. Id. Preliminary objections will be sustained only if they
     are clear and free of doubt. Milliner v. Enck, 709 A.2d 417 (Pa.
     Super. 1998).

            Also, Pennsylvania law requires the court to consider the
     sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in a complaint before
     granting a party’s preliminary objections. Smith v. McDougall,
     365 Pa.Super. 157, 529 A.2d 20 (1987). Failure of the trial court
     to consider the sufficiency of the complaint before sustaining
     preliminary objections and dismissing the case without leave to
     amend is an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Harley Davidson
     Motor Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 296 Pa.Super. 37, 442 A.2d 284
     (1982)). …

Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord, 728 A.2d 964, 968 (Pa. Super. 1999).

     Preliminary objections “may be filed by any party to any pleading” based

on “legal insufficiency of a pleading (demurrer),” and “nonjoinder of a

necessary party.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) and (5).

                                 DEMURRER

     With respect to legal insufficiency and demurrer, this Court explained:

     A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is properly
     granted where the contested pleading is legally insufficient.
     “Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer require the
     court to resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no
     testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be

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      considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by the
      demurrer.” All material facts set forth in the pleading and all
      inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as
      true.

Weiley v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 51 A.3d 202, 208 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citations omitted). “Where it appears that the law will not permit recovery,

the court may sustain preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer.”

Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Com., Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 884

(Pa. 2010).

      Appellant filed her complaint in replevin. Replevin is an action taken to

regain possession of property. Int’l. Electronics Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Prod.

Co., 88 A.2d 40, 42 (Pa. 1952).

      To be successful in a replevin action, the plaintiff must show not
      only title, but also the exclusive right of immediate possession of
      the property in question. “Exclusive” right of possession means
      only a right which excludes the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff in a
      replevin action must show good title and right to possession as
      against the defendant, but is not required to set up such a title or
      right as against the whole world.

      The focus in a replevin actions is strictly limited to title and right
      of possession; all matters foreign to those limited issues are
      expressly excluded from consideration and are not available as
      defenses or counterclaims.

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Caiazzo, 564 A.2d 931, 933 (Pa. Super. 1989)

(citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court concluded, “on the facts alleged by [Appellant,] she

will be unable to recover in [] replevin. [Appellant] cannot show title or right

to immediate possession of the dog.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 4.

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The trial court found Appellant did “not plead ownership of the dog, only the

dog being in her ‘care.’” Id. at 5.

      In arguing preliminary objections, the Oysters’ counsel asserted that

Appellant did “not demonstrate[] title or ownership of the dog as required to

sustain a replevin action.” N.T., 8/24/22, at 6-7. Counsel claimed Appellant

“only demonstrated … she was once in possession” of the dog.           Id. at 6.

Counsel added:

      Title is a thing that legally passes, and there has been no act which
      legally conveys title. And by [Appellant’s] own admission in her
      complaint, this dog was in fact the property of her son. I was
      astonished that she did not plead that [the dog] was hers because
      she paid for it but she pleads that it was the property of her son.

Id. at 9.

      The trial court then observed:

      I’m looking at the factual background [in Appellant’s amended
      complaint], Paragraph 7. “[Appellant] purchased [the dog] as a
      gift to her son.” There is a gift. That’s a transfer of title. “Prior
      to William’s demise, William charged [Appellant] with [the dog’s]
      continued care.” So in … the first paragraph … [Appellant]
      purchased [the dog]. She got title. Paragraph 7, she gifted [the
      dog] to her son, transferred title to her son.

      Nowhere in [the] pleading does it say title was ever transferred
      back to [Appellant]. It says she was charged with the care of the
      dog, indicating that her son retained title to the dog. Words are
      important.

Id. at 10.

      Consistent with the above comments, the trial court concluded, “the

material facts set forth in [Appellant’s] amended complaint, even if admitted

as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, cannot

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sustain [Appellant’s] burden to plead facts legally sufficient to recover in

replevin.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 4-5. The record supports the trial

court’s conclusion.

      Appellant averred that she purchased the dog “around October 4th, 2017

… as a gift to her son, William Gonzalez.” Amended Complaint, 4/14/22, ¶¶

4, 7. Appellant averred that prior to her son’s death, he “charged” Appellant

with the dog’s “continued care.” Id. ¶ 8. William Gonzalez died intestate on

January 15, 2018, and “an estate was not opened.” Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Appellant

cared for the dog until Appellant was hospitalized on February 11, 2019. Id.

¶¶ 20, 21. In sum, Appellant failed to demonstrate her title and “exclusive

right of immediate possession” of the dog. Ford Motor Credit Co., 564 A.2d

at 933.

                      NONJOINDER OF A NECESSARY PARTY

      Regarding Appellant’s failure to a join a necessary party, the trial court

recognized “a necessary party is one whose presence, while not indispensable,

is essential if the court is to resolve completely a controversy and to render

complete relief.”     Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 3; see also Shannon

Invs., L.P. v. Joyce Outdoor Advert. Wallscapes, LLC, 258 A.3d 479, 481

n.1 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

      It is undisputed that Appellant’s son, William Gonzalez, died intestate

and no estate “was opened on behalf of son.”         See Trial Court Opinion,

11/29/22, at 3. Appellant averred that her son’s estate passed to her and her

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son’s father, Guillermo Gonzalez, under the laws of intestacy; she also averred

that Guillermo Gonzalez died around October 10, 2018, “leaving ownership

rights to all property owned by William at the time of his passing” to Appellant.

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 14, 15, 16. Appellant further averred that Guillermo

Gonzalez died testate and Jeffrey Gonzalez is the executor of the estate. Id.

¶ 17. According to Appellant, Jeffrey Gonzalez, “in his capacity as executor of

the estate of Guillermo Gonzalez, has verbally renounced any ownership

interest or rights in the personal property owned by William pursuant to

William’s death on January 15, 2018.” Id. ¶ 18. Appellant averred she was

“in the process of obtaining a written renunciation.”      Id. ¶ 19.    Notably,

Pennsylvania law provides that a “person to whom an interest in property

would have devolved by whatever means, including … a person entitled to

take by intestacy, … may disclaim it in whole or in part by a written

disclaimer.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6201 (emphasis added).

      The estates of William and Guillermo Gonzalez were necessary parties

because they were “essential if the court [wa]s to resolve completely [the]

controversy and to render complete relief.” Shannon Invs., L.P., 258 A.3d

at 481 n.1. As the trial court explained, the estate of William Gonzalez “is a

necessary party because the deceased was the owner of the dog at the time

of his death.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 3. The estate of Guillermo

Gonzalez, “as an alleged [50%] owner of the [dog,] is a necessary party.” Id.

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        Finally, Appellant claims the trial court erred and abused its discretion

by not affording her another opportunity to amend her complaint. Appellant’s

Brief at 33-34. However, the trial court, in its discretion, accurately explained

that while the right to amend pleadings “is to be construed liberally, it is not

absolute.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/29/22, at 5 (citing Junk v. E. End Fire

Dep’t, 396 A.2d 1269, 1277 (Pa. Super. 1978)).

        For the above reasons, we discern no error and affirm the trial court’s

order    sustaining   the   Oysters’   preliminary   objections   and   dismissing

Appellant’s amended complaint with prejudice.

        Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/20/2023

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