Court Opinion

ID: 9911940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 09:11:05.369478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:41.569490
License: Public Domain

In The
                                  Court of Appeals
                         Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                          No. 07-23-00097-CR

                                 DERRICK BARRY, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

                               THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 140th District Court
                                     Lubbock County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 2021-423165; Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding

                                        December 19, 2023
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
                     Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Pending before this Court is a motion to withdraw supported by a brief filed

pursuant to Anders v. California.1 Pursuant to an open plea of guilty, Appellant, Derrick

Barry, was convicted of three counts of sexual offenses as follows:

 Aggravated sexual assault (Count I)            TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(2)(B)   Fifty years

 Indecency with child by contact (Count II)     TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a)(1)       Twenty years

 Indecency with child by exposure (Count III)   TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a)(2)(A)    Ten years

       1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
The trial court ordered the sentences in Counts I and II to run concurrently but ordered

the sentence in Count III to run consecutively to the concurrent sentences. We affirm and

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

        In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel certifies he has conducted a

conscientious examination of the record, and in his opinion, it reflects no potentially

plausible basis for reversal of Appellant’s conviction. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,

744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).             Counsel candidly discusses why, under the controlling

authorities, the record supports that conclusion. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813

(Tex. Crim. App. 1978).             Counsel has demonstrated he has complied with the

requirements of Anders and In re Schulman by (1) providing a copy of the brief to

Appellant, (2) notifying him of the right to file a pro se response if he desired to do so, and

(3) informing him of the right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).2 By letter, this Court granted

Appellant an opportunity to exercise his right to file a response to counsel’s brief, should

he be so inclined. Id. at 409 n.23. Appellant filed a response by which he complains of

the severity of his punishment which he contends was based on emotion and not the

evidence presented. The State notified this Court it would not file a response unless

Appellant presented any meritorious issues.

        2 Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary

review upon execution of the Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal, counsel must comply
with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that counsel shall within five days
after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the opinion and judgment together with
notification of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Id. at 408 n.22, 411. The duty to
send the client a copy of this Court’s decision is an informational one, not a representational one. It is
ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and exists after the court of appeals has granted
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Id. at 411 n.33.

                                                      2
        By the Anders brief, counsel advances cruel and unusual punishment as a

potential error given Appellant’s sentences but after reviewing the record, he concedes

they are within the statutory range, not grossly disproportionate to the offenses, and do

not present reversible error. Woods v. State, 488 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2016, pet. ref’d); Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008,

pet. ref’d).3 Additionally, a trial court has broad discretion to cumulate sentences. TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.08(a); Byrd v. State, 499 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016). Counsel also reviewed various objections which, even if erroneous, would

not be harmful in light of the entire record.

        When we have an Anders brief by counsel and a pro se response by an appellant,

we have two choices. We may determine the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an

opinion explaining we have reviewed the record and find no reversible error; Bledsoe v.

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744),

or we may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause to the

trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief issues. Id. (citing Stafford v.

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

        We too have independently examined the record to determine whether there are

any non-frivolous issues which might support this appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409;

Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511. We have found no such issues. See Gainous v. State, 436

        3 Although the judgment for Count III does not include a special finding on cumulation, the summary

portion of that judgment ordering the sentence to run consecutively to the concurrent sentences in Counts
I and II is valid. A cumulation order is deemed sufficient when the same court on the same day pronounces
the cumulation order. See Ex parte Lewis, 414 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). See also Turner
v. State, 733 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (quoting Bullard v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. App. 348, 50
S.W.348 (1899) (holding cumulation order is valid if convictions occur at the same term in which appellant
is tried)). In the underlying punishment phase, the trial court pronounced the sentence in Count III would
run consecutive to concurrent sentences in Counts I and II at the same time.
                                                    3
S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). After reviewing the record, counsel’s brief, and

Appellant’s pro se response, we agree with counsel there is no plausible basis for reversal

of Appellant’s conviction. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27.

                                       CONCLUSION

      The trial court’s judgment is affirmed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

                                                        Alex Yarbrough
                                                           Justice

Do not publish.

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