Court Opinion

ID: 9897563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:10.865787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.005633
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NO. A-3379-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,          APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
                                           August 9, 2023
v.
                                        APPELLATE DIVISION

TYSHON M. NIEVES, a/k/a
TYSHON NIEVES,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

           Argued May 3, 2023 – Decided August 9, 2023

           Before Judges Accurso, Vernoia and Natali.1

           On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
           Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 21-09-
           1334.

           Margaret Ruth McLane, Assistant Deputy Public
           Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
           Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Margaret Ruth
           McLane, of counsel and on the brief).

           Boris Moczula, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
           cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney
           General, attorney; Boris Moczula, of counsel and on
           the brief).
1
  Judge Natali did not participate in oral argument but joins in the opinion
with the consent of counsel. R. 2:13-2(b).
      The opinion of the court was delivered by

VERNOIA, J.A.D.

      In this matter we determine whether law enforcement officers executing

a knock-and-announce search warrant on a residence in the early morning

hours violated defendant Tyshon M. Nieves's constitutional rights by failing to

wait a reasonable time after knocking and announcing their presence to

forcibly enter the residence.   We also consider whether a violation of the

constitutional requirement that officers executing a knock-and-announce

search warrant wait a reasonable time after knocking and announcing their

presence requires exclusion of the evidence seized during the subsequent

search. Based on our review of the record, we determine the law enforcement

officers did not wait a reasonable time after knocking and announcing their

presence to forcibly enter the residence, and, as a result, the evidence seized

during the subsequent search should have been suppressed.

                                      I.

      Police arrested defendant following the execution of a knock-and-

announce search warrant and seizure of heroin and a handgun at an Atlantic

City home in which he occasionally stayed with his girlfriend, her child, her

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two juvenile brothers, and her mother. 2 A grand jury returned an indictment

charging defendant with third-degree possession of heroin, third-degree

distribution of heroin, second-degree distribution of heroin within 500 feet of

the Atlantic City boardwalk, and second-degree possession of a firearm by a

certain person prohibited from possessing weapons.

      Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the

residence, arguing the police did not wait a reasonable time prior to forcibly

entering the premises after knocking and announcing their presence. The trial

court denied the suppression motion, and defendant later pleaded guilty to the

possessory weapons offense in exchange for the State's recommendation of a

five-year sentence with a five-year period of parole ineligibility and dismissal

of the remaining charges.           Following the court's imposition of the

recommended sentence, defendant filed this appeal challenging the court's

denial of the suppression motion.

      The New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice and the New Jersey State

Police obtained a warrant to search the Atlantic City residence, which the

warrant affidavit described as a "two story duplex" with a front and rear door

and a detached garage with a side door and a "garage door . . . ." The warrant

2
   During the search, police also seized marijuana, a magazine with bullets,
shell casings, and a hollow point bullet. The indictment against defendant
does not include any charges related to those items.

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authorized execution of the search warrant "between the hours of 5:00 a.m. and

11:59 p.m. by first knocking and announcing [the officers'] presence" and the

seizure of items concerning controlled-dangerous-substance-related offenses.

      At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the seized evidence,

New Jersey State Police Sergeant Bernard Tennant testified he was not

involved in the investigation that resulted in the application for, and issuance

of, the search warrant. Instead, Sergeant Tennant led a team of fifteen of ficers

who were assigned to execute the search warrant.             Sergeant Tennant

understood the warrant required the officers first knock-and-announce before

entering the home, and he explained he did so by knocking loudly on the

home's front door and stating, "State Police, search warrant. State Police,

search warrant."

      Sergeant Tennant further explained the officers gained entry to the home

by using a breaching element — a battering ram — to "knock-in" the home's

front door. The fifteen officers entered the home after the door was breached.

      Sergeant Tennant did not know "how long a period of time" elapsed

from when he first knocked and announced the officers' presence to the breach

of the door with the battering ram. Sergeant Tennant explained he does not

"think of time" while "out there." Sergeant Tennant acknowledged there is a

"legal requirement" that officers "need to wait a period of time before [they]

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knock, announce, and then breach the door[.]" He also said he had "no idea

how long" after he first knocked and announced the officers' presence that they

breached the front door with the battering ram.

      Sergeant Tennant was "one of the last" officers to enter the home after

the door was breached. As a result, he did not have "any idea" who was in the

home or what their circumstances were at the time of the officers' entry. He

testified there were "people" in the residence, but he did not recall their ages or

how many there were.

      Defendant called Lavida Jones as a witness at the suppression hearing .3

Lavida Jones testified she rented the residence police searched and resided

there with her fourteen-year-old and seven-year-old sons, her two-year-old

granddaughter, and her daughter, Kanaya Jones.           Lavida Jones explained

defendant is Kanaya Jones's boyfriend. Lavida Jones testified defendant did

not reside at the home but would "come[] over sometimes," and he was present

at her home when the police executed the search warrant.

      Lavida Jones testified the officers executed the search warrant "[a]t

about five in the morning . . . ." At that time, she was asleep with her seven-

year-old son on a sectional couch located about two feet from the front door.

3
  In its written decision on defendant's motion, the trial court refers to Lavida
Jones as Lavedia Jones. We use the former name because it is the name
employed to identify the witness in the transcript of the motion hearing.

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                                        5
She first heard a "bang[,]" then heard the officers "announce[,]" and, "by the

time she jumped up and got to the door[,]" the door was "already off the

hinges." Lavida Jones explained she did not have pants on, and the officers

who entered would not let her put clothes on. When asked how much time

passed between her hearing the officers' first announcement and their forcible

entry into her home, Lavida Jones stated only that "it wasn't even five

minutes . . . ."

      Lavida Jones identified a video and audio recording she obtained from a

security camera from an adjacent home owned by her landlord. She testified

the recording shows the officers knocking and announcing themselves until

they knocked her "door down." The recording was admitted in evidence at the

suppression hearing.

      Kanaya Jones also testified. She explained defendant is her boyfriend

and she and defendant shared a bedroom at the rear of the home's second floor

when the officers executed the search warrant. She heard a bang at about 5:00

a.m. and then next heard officers rushing into the home and up the stairs. She

testified the officers then broke through her locked bedroom door.        The

officers immediately took defendant from her bed, removed him from the

room, and told her to put pants on before also removing her from the room.

Kanaya Jones testified that from her bedroom's location at the rear of the

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home's second floor, she could "[p]robably not" hear anyone speaking from

outside the front door.

      The court issued a written decision on defendant's motion. The court

noted defendant's argument the search was unlawful because the officers

waited only six seconds after first knocking and announcing their presence

before forcibly entering the home.      Defendant claimed the purported six

seconds the officers waited to enter the home following the first knock -and-

announce was an unreasonably short period of time and therefore the ensuing

search was unlawful.

      The court explained the State argued entry into the home was lawful

because Sergeant Tennant knocked and announced the officers' presence three

separate times prior to the entry. The court also determined the evidence

rendered it "unclear" whether the entry occurred within six seconds of the first

knock-and-announce as defendant claimed. The court also noted the State's

argument that even if the officers did not wait a reasonable time to enter the

home following the first knock-and-announce, suppression of the evidence was

not the appropriate remedy.

      The court made credibility determinations, finding the three witnesses —

Sergeant Tennant, Lavida Jones, and Kanaya Jones — "testified concisely and

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believably." The court further explained it reviewed the video recording and

determined it showed the following:

            [T]he executing officers knock[ed] six bangs on the
            front door. The officer then shout[ed], "State Police!
            Search Warrant."     The officer then immediately
            follow[ed] up with knocking on the door with five
            more bangs, and again repeat[ed], "State Police!
            Search Warrant!" The officer then knock[ed] on the
            door with four more bangs. Finally, the officer
            announc[ed] a third time, "State Police! Search
            Warrant!" At that point, what sound[ed] like a K-9
            dog can be heard barking and the video footage ends.

      Based on its review of the recording, the court determined it could not

"ascertain . . . the exact time between the initial knocking and announcing of

the police's presence and their entry into the home."         The court noted

defendant claimed the time between the first knock-and-announce and entry

into the home was six seconds. Based on its review of the recording, however,

the court found only that there "appears to be eight seconds from the first

knock until the video abruptly ends." According to the court, "[w]hat is clear

from the footage, however, is that the [officers] effectuated several rounds of

knocks and several rounds of announcing, 'State Police! Search Warrant!' at a

high volume."

      The court also explained "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires that the

police must knock and announce on the door of the premises to be searched

before using force to enter the location," and that, "[u]nder New Jersey as well

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                                       8
as federal law, the knock-and-announce law serves three purposes: to reduce

the risk of violence to police and bystanders, to protect privacy by reducing the

risk of entering the wrong premises, and to prevent property damages."

      The court noted that determining whether the police waited a reasonable

amount of time before entering the premises by force requires consideration of

"common factors[,]" including the suspect's criminal history, whether weapons

were believed to be present, "the risk to officers' lives and safety," the property

size, the presence of other people on the property, and the time of day the

search was executed. Quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006),

the court further observed that, "in narcotics cases, reasonableness in delay is

not a function of merely 'how long it would take the resident to reach the door,

but how long it would take to dispose of the suspected drugs.'"

      The court explained it "examin[ed] the conduct of the officers in light

of" what it determined was "the ambiguous record regarding the time that

elapsed" and concluded "[t]he conduct of the officers in the execution of

the . . . warrant did not rise to a level of being a flagrant disregard for the

knock-and-announce requirement."        The court accordingly held "it cannot

find" that the entry "was in fact unreasonable." Although it found it could not

determine the amount of time that elapsed from the first knock-and-announce

to the officers' forcible entry into the home, the court concluded it is "clear that

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                                         9
there were several knocks, announcements, and testimony from occupants as to

the entry being less than 'five minutes.'"

      The court also found: police executed the warrant "within the bounds of

the time frame" authorized by the search warrant itself, which "adds to the

reasonableness of the knock-and-announce warrant's execution"; "[t]his was a

narcotics operation, and it is well-known that there is an increased possibility

of destruction of evidence in such cases"; defendant's "criminal history

includes . . . a conviction for failure to turn over [controlled dangerous

substances] in 2013 and resisting arrest in 2014," raising questions as to his

"ability . . . to abide by the law and the criminal justice system"; and the

property was a duplex "on the smaller side, with the couch within two feet of

the door."4   The court relied on those findings as further support for its

conclusion the officers acted reasonably in their execution of the warrant.

4
  Although unnecessary to its disposition of the suppression motion, the court
further determined that, even if the officers acted unreasonably in their
execution of the search warrant, suppression of the evidence was not warranted
under the exclusionary rule. In support of its decision, the court cited Hudson
for the proposition that "the exclusionary rule is not the appropriate remedy for
a violation of the knock-and-announce requirement." We note only that in
State v. Caronna, we rejected Hudson's application under the New Jersey
Constitution and determined a violation of a search warrant's knock-and-
announce requirement during a residential search requires the suppression of
evidence under our State constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 469 N.J. Super. 462, 494-96 (App. Div. 2021).

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                                        10
      The court entered an order denying defendant's suppression motion. As

noted, defendant later pleaded guilty to the possessory weapons charge and

was sentenced. This appeal, which is limited to a challenge to the court's order

denying the suppression motion, followed.

      Defendant presents the following argument for our consideration:

            POINT I

            THE UNREASONABLE EXECUTION OF THE
            SEARCH WARRANT REQUIRES SUPPRESSION
            OF THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE HOME.

                                        II.

      Our review of a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited.

State v. Erazo, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op. at 12); State v. Ahmad, 246

N.J. 592, 609 (2021). We "must uphold the factual findings underlying the

trial court's decision" on a motion to suppress "as long as those findings are

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." Ahmad, 246 N.J. at

609 (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Deference is given

"to those findings in recognition of the trial court's 'opportunity to hear and see

the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court

cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244). "A reviewing court

'ordinarily will not disturb the court's factual findings unless they are "so

clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand intervention and

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                                        11
correction."'"   State v. Gray, 474 N.J. Super. 216, 222 (App. Div. 2022)

(quoting State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022)). "A trial court's legal

conclusions, however, and its view of 'the consequences that flow from

established facts' are reviewed de novo." Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 398 (quoting

State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015)).

      Our deference to a trial court's findings of fact is not limited only to

those based on live testimony presented at an evidentiary hearing. We also

defer to a court's fact finding based on its review of video and documentary

evidence because of the court's "expertise in fulfilling the role of factfinder."

State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 379-80 (2017). We will not reject a trial court's

findings of fact merely because we "disagree[] with the inferences drawn and

the evidence accepted by the trial court or because [we] would have reached a

different conclusion." Id. at 374.

      Defendant argues the court erred by denying his suppression motion

because only six seconds elapsed between Sergeant Tennant's first knock -and-

announce and the officers' forcible entry into the home. He claims that under

the circumstances presented, six seconds did not constitute a reasonable

amount of time following the first knock-and-announce, and, for that reason,

the search following the forcible entry was unlawful.

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                                       12
      "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J.

156, 164-65 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)).

"Within the framework of the [Fourth Amendment], the United States Supreme

Court has determined 'that the reasonableness of a search of a dwelling may

depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announce . . . their

presence and authority before entering.'" State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 616

(2001) (quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995)).

      "The     rationale   undergirding        the   knock-and-announce   rule    is

compelling."     Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. at 488.            The rule serves the

"worthwhile purposes[,]" Johnson, 168 N.J. at 616, of "decreasing the potential

for violence[,]" protecting the privacy of the individuals within the residence,

and "preventing the physical destruction of property[,]" ibid. (quoting 2 Wayne

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) at 599-600 (4th ed. 1984)).

      Our Supreme Court has explained "[t]he knock-and-announce rule

renders unlawful a forcible entry to arrest or search 'where the officer failed

first to state his authority and purpose for demanding admission.'" State v.

Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 13-14 (2009) (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.

301, 308 (1958)). "A necessary corollary of the knock-and-announce rule is

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                                          13
that when 'the police announce . . . their presence and [are] greeted with

silence . . . a reasonable time must elapse between the announcement and the

officer's forced entry.'" Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson, 168

N.J. at 621).   Officers that fail to wait a reasonable time before forcibly

entering a residence following an appropriate knock-and-announce violate the

reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the

States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589; Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931-36, and Article 1, Paragraph

7 of the New Jersey Constitution, Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16; Johnson, 168 N.J.

at 616.

      The "'reasonable wait time' standard" is "necessarily vague" and requires

consideration of the circumstances existing when the police execute the

warrant. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590; State v. Rodriguez, 399 N.J. Super. 192,

200 (App. Div. 2008). The United States Supreme Court has "described the

'proper measure' of the 'reasonable wait time' as the time it would take the

suspect to dispose of the evidence sought[.]" Id. at 201 (quoting Hudson, 547

U.S. at 590). A court "may also validly consider the time it would reasonably

take an occupant to answer the door, given that another purpose of the knock -

and-announce rule is to prevent the physical destruction of property, such as

the door itself[.]" Ibid. (citing Johnson, 168 N.J. at 616).

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                                        14
      "[W]hen the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to

determine what officers must do." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16 (quoting Hudson,

547 U.S. at 590). The inquiry necessarily requires a determination of "[h]ow

many seconds' wait are too few?" Ibid. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590).

"[T]he time lapse [preceding forced entry need not be] extensive in length,

depending on the circumstances of a given case." Ibid. (second alteration in

original) (quoting Johnson, 168 N.J. at 621-22).       The "facts known to the

police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time[,]" ibid. (quoting

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 39 (2003)), and "the crucial fact in

examining [law enforcement's] actions is not the time" it may take a resident

"to reach the door but the particular exigency claimed[,]" id. at 17 (quoting

Banks, 540 U.S. at 40).

      Where, as here, the search warrant is founded on evidence showing the

defendant is involved in the distribution of narcotics, "reasonableness in delay

is not a function of merely 'how long it would take the resident to reach the

door, but how long it would take to dispose of the suspected drugs[.]'" Ibid.

(alteration in original) (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 590).        As the Court

explained in Johnson, "[i]n respect of the destructibility of heroin and cocaine,

we take judicial notice of the fact that small quantities of narcotics sold out of

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                                       15
a person's home are almost always susceptible to destruction or disposal." 168

N.J. at 620.

        Where a search is executed pursuant to a warrant, the "warrant is

presumed to be valid and . . . [the] defendant challenging its validity has the

burden to prove 'that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of

the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable.'" State v. Jones,

179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J.

126, 133 (1983)).     That is, defendant bore the burden of establishing the

officers' execution of the search warrant at the residence was unreasonable.

Ibid.

        In its decision on defendant's suppression motion, the court effectively

determined defendant did not sustain his burden because he failed to establish

the length of time the officers waited to forcibly breach the front door after

first knocking and announcing their presence. As noted, the court found the

"ambiguous" recording did not allow a determination of the officers ' waiting

time because although it showed the officers knocking and announcing at the

front door, it abruptly ended seconds later. Of course, a lack of evidence

establishing the time the officers waited — beyond Lavida Jones's vague

testimony the officers waited less than five minutes — might support a finding

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defendant did not carry the burden of establishing execution of the search

warrant was unreasonable. Jones, 179 N.J. at 388.

      Although we generally defer to a court's fact findings based on its

review of a recording, S.S., 229 N.J. at 379, we are required to do so only

where "more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the review of a

video recording," id. at 380. Where a recording does not support more than

one reasonable inference, and a trial court's "factual findings" based on its

interpretation of a recording "are so clearly mistaken — so wide of the mark

— that the interests of justice demand intervention[,]" a reviewing court owes

no deference to a trial court's fact findings drawn from the recording. Id. at

381. Measured against that standard, our intervention is warranted here.

      There is nothing ambiguous about the recording. Contrary to the trial

court's finding, the recording's abrupt end does not obscure what clearly

precedes it. The recording shows a number of individuals — the officers —

appearing as shadowlike figures in the early morning light and approaching the

porch of the residence. Once on the porch, the officers quickly and repeatedly

knock and announce their presence in three rapid and uninterrupted sequences,

during the last of which an object is hoisted above the waist level of the

officers on the porch and thrust forward toward the residence. In that instant, a

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loud bang is heard, the door to the residence opens, and light from the interior

illuminates the porch as the officers first enter the home.

      Although the recording then abruptly ends, it nonetheless captures the

events essential to a determination of defendant's challenge to the validity of

the execution of the search warrant. Contrary to the trial court's finding, the

recording allows for a precise calculation of the officers' waiting time and,

concomitantly, whether the time was reasonable based on the circumstances

presented.

      Defendant argued before the trial court, and argues on appeal, the

officers waited six seconds to forcibly enter the premises after knocking and

announcing their presence. Our review of the recording causes us to conclude

the officers waited even less time than that. It appears defendant measured the

time from the moment the officers first knocked on the door to the moment the

door was forced open by the battering ram described by Sergeant Tennant

during his testimony. In our view, defendant's measure of the time is incorrect

because it fails to account for the requirement that officers wait a reasonable

time "between the announcement and [their] forced entry." Robinson, 200 N.J.

at 16 (quoting Johnson, 168 N.J. at 621). As such, the officers' wait time must

be measured from the completion of the first knock-and-announce to the

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moment the officers forcibly breached the door with the battering ram. 5 Based

on our review of the recording, the elapsed time between those two events is

less than five seconds.

      Since there is not more than one reasonable inference that can be drawn

from the recording, S.S., 229 N.J. at 380, the court's conclusion the recording

presented "ambiguity" regarding the time the officers waited to forcibly breach

the front door after first knocking-and-announcing is unsupported by

substantial credible evidence because it was not reached "by drawing

permissible inferences" from the recording, ibid.      The critical point is the

recording does not "abruptly end" until after it shows the officers breaking

down the door. We owe no deference to a court's fact findings that "are not

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."      Id. at 381.    We

therefore do not defer to the trial court's finding the waiting time before entry

as captured by the recording could not be determined based on the evidence

presented. Ibid.

5
  The court's finding the officers made three separate knocks-and-announces is
technically accurate, but they followed each other in such rapid succession it
might be argued they should be considered as a single knock-and-announce. If
that argument was made and accepted, the officers did not pause and wait at all
as required, Robinson, 200 N.J. at 13-14, because simultaneous with the end of
the last of the three, the officers breached the front door with the battering
ram. The issue is not raised or argued by the parties, and, despite our
observations concerning it, we offer no opinion on its merit.

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      A determination whether officers waited a reasonable time to forcibly

enter a residence to execute a knock-and-announce warrant "is not gauged

purely by a Procrustean approach to the passage of time." Rodriguez, 399 N.J.

Super. at 201.    But since officers are constitutionally required to wait a

reasonable time prior to forcibly entering a residence during the execution of a

knock-and-announce warrant, the amount of time the officers wait is an

essential element of the analysis. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 589; Wilson, 514

U.S. at 931-36; Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16; Rodriguez, 399 N.J. Super. at 200-

02. Thus, the court's erroneous determination it could not properly determine

the time the officers waited prior to forcibly knocking in the front door to the

residence mandates a rejection of the court's analysis and legal conclusion the

seized evidence should not be suppressed. It further warrants our review of the

validity of the search based on the record presented.

      We opt to exercise our original jurisdiction to decide the search's

reasonableness as we are permitted to do "as is necessary to the complete

determination of any matter on review." R. 2:10-5. An exercise of original

jurisdiction is warranted "to avoid unnecessary further litigation" and because

"the record is adequate to terminate the dispute and no further fact[ ]finding" is

required and "a remand would be pointless because the issue to be decided is

one of law and implicates a public interest." Vas v. Roberts, 418 N.J. Super.

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                                       20
509, 523-24 (App. Div. 2011).        Our exercise of original jurisdiction is

warranted "as a way to achieve the judicial system's goals of efficiency,

finality, and fairness." Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 283 (2013).

      "[I]n evaluating the constitutionality of police conduct in executing a

warrant, 'the basic test under . . . Article I, Paragraph 7, of the New Jersey

Constitution is . . . was the [police] conduct objectively reasonable in light of

"the facts known to the law enforcement officer at the time of the search."'"

Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. at 495 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 46-47 (2011)).          A determination of whether officers

waited the requisite reasonable time to forcibly enter a residence after

knocking and announcing their presence "turns on the circumstances existing

when the police execute the warrant." Rodriguez, 399 N.J. Super. at 200; see

also Banks, 540 U.S. at 39. In making the determination, we must consider

whether the officers' conduct was "objectively reasonable in light of 'the facts

known to the . . . officer[s] at the time of the search.'" State v. Rockford, 213

N.J. 424, 441 (2013) (quoting Handy, 206 N.J. at 46-47).

      Generally, "[t]here are common factors to be applied in determining the

reasonableness of the delay between knocking and announcing and a forcible

entry." Robinson, 200 N.J. at 17. Those factors include: the defendant's

"violent criminal history"; "an informant's tip that weapons will be present";

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                                       21
any "risks to [the] officers' lives and safety"; "the size [and] layout of" the

property; "whether persons other than defendant reside there"; "whether others

involved in the crimes are expected to be present"; and "the time of day" of the

search. Ibid. (citations omitted).

      Here, there is no evidence defendant had a violent criminal history

supporting a finding it was reasonable for the officers to have waited a shorter,

as opposed to a longer, period of time before forcibly entering the premises.

See Jones, 179 N.J. at 399-400 (explaining a defendant's prior history for

violent crimes may support a no-knock search warrant). The search warrant

did not disclose defendant had any prior violent crime history. The affidavit

also did not include any information, from either a confidential informant or

otherwise, suggesting defendant might possess weapons or that defendant

posed any risk to the officers' lives and safety. See id. at 406-07 (describing

evidence, including records of a defendant's prior arrests and convictions for

violent crimes, supporting a finding the defendant has a "violent nature" and

poses a risk to officer safety supporting issuance of a no-knock warrant).

      In its denial of the suppression motion, the court relied on defendant's

prior conviction for a disorderly persons offense for failing to turn over a

controlled dangerous substance in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(c) in part to

support its finding the officers waited a reasonable amount of time prior to

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forcibly entering the residence. The elements of the offense, however, do not

include any defiance of authority, refusal to comply with an officer's order, the

destruction of any evidence, or violence supporting a finding that officers

executing a search warrant need be concerned about a threat to their safety or

the destruction of evidence. An offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10 is committed

by any individual possessing a controlled dangerous substance who does not

"voluntarily deliver the substance to the nearest law enforcement officer." We

do not minimize the offense. We find only it is not of such a nature that it

objectively created any urgency for the officers in forcibly entering the

residence either to protect the officers' safety or to prevent destruction of

evidence.

      The court correctly cited defendant's prior conviction for resisting arrest,

N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2, as a basis supporting a heightened concern defendant might

take action to resist the officers once they entered the residence. However, the

search warrant affidavit did not indicate whether defendant was convicted of

fourth-degree resisting by flight, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2), or third-degree

resisting arrest by either using or threatening the use of physical force or

violence or by "any other means to create a substantial risk of causing physical

injury to the public servant or another," N.J.S.A. 29:2-2(a)(3)(a) and (b).

Thus, that the search warrant affidavit showed defendant had a conviction for

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"resisting arrest" did not establish an objective basis for the officers to

conclude defendant posed a risk of violence during execution of the warrant.

      The trial court generally referred to the nature of the residence —

identifying it as a duplex — but the court did not consider its size in its

determination of the reasonableness of the officers' wait time. The testimony

of the witnesses — which the court found credible — established the duplex

was two stories and large enough that, from her bedroom on the second floor,

Kanaya Jones could not hear the officers announce their presence and instead

she first heard a "bang" and then the officers running up the stairs.

      The reasonable wait time prior to a forcible entry during the execution of

a search warrant is in part determined by the time it might take an occupant of

a residence to get to the door. See Robinson, 200 N.J. at 17 (explaining a

court considering the reasonableness of the requisite wait time following the

initial knock-and-announce and forced entry must consider the time of day the

warrant was executed); see also United States v. Granville, 222 F.3d 1214,

1218 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding unreasonable an early morning forced entry

execution of a search warrant five seconds after knocking and announcing

because the occupants were likely asleep and did not have sufficient time to

deny the officers' entry). In Banks, the United States Supreme Court observed

the time it might take an occupant to get to the door is dependent in part on the

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size of the property. 540 U.S. at 40. The Court explained the time it would

take an occupant to get to the door "will vary with the size of the

establishment, perhaps five seconds to open the motel room door, or several

minutes to move through a townhouse." Ibid.

      Here, the officers did not wait minutes for the occupants to move

through Lavida Jones's duplex. Instead, they broke down the door of Lavida

Jones's two-story residence less than five seconds after they first knocked and

announced. Even though she slept on a couch only a few feet from the front

door, she did not have sufficient time to get to that door prior to the officers'

forced entry into her home. In our view, the size of Lavida Jones's residence,

which was generally known to the officers, therefore weighs against a finding

the less-than-five seconds the officers waited is reasonable. See Rodriguez,

399 N.J. Super. at 201-02 ("It is also reasonable to expect police to wait a

longer period of time before entering when the premises are large as opposed

to an apartment or hotel room.").

      Also weighing against a finding the officers' wait time was reasonable is

the time of day — 5:00 a.m. — they executed the warrant. "[T]he expected

time for a resident to answer a knock at the door may be longer at a time when

it is reasonable to assume that the occupant is sleeping." Id. at 201; cf. Banks,

540 U.S. at 40 (noting a "significant circumstance[]" in finding a fifteen -to-

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                                       25
twenty-second wait time was reasonable was that police executed the search

warrant upon arriving "during the day, when anyone inside would probably

have been up and around[.]").      It may be reasonably inferred the officers

executed the warrant at 5:00 a.m. in part because they understood the

occupants would likely be asleep. Thus, the officers knew it would take the

occupants longer to take any action — either to walk to the door or destroy

evidence — than if the warrant was executed when the occupants were awake,

yet the officers waited less than five seconds to forcibly breach the front door.

      The officers had reason to believe "persons other than defendant

reside[d]" at the residence, but they had no information "others involved in the

crime [we]re expected to be present[.]" Robinson, 200 N.J. at 17. The search

warrant affidavit showed defendant did not list the residence as his home

address in his filings with the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission. The

officers therefore had reason to know:       the residence was not defendant's

home; he lived elsewhere; and others inhabited the residence to be searched.

Indeed, although the search warrant affidavit states defendant has "used and

continues to use the residence . . . to commit the specified crimes, and that

evidence of the specified crimes will be recovered upon the said premises[,]"

and the police had "probable cause to believe the [residence] is used to store,

distribute, and stockpile . . . drugs, along with evidence of distribution[,]" the

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search warrant affidavit does not include any facts supporting a finding

defendant would be physically present at the residence at the time of the search

or that any other person residing in the home may be involved in his alleged

criminal activity. Those facts weigh in favor of the officers waiting a longer

period, rather than a shorter one, before forcibly entering the residence. See

id. at 17-18.

      In denying defendant's motion, the court also relied on the notion that

because the search warrant affidavit showed defendant was involved in the

distribution of illegal narcotics, it was reasonable for the officers to move

more quickly to enter the residence to prevent the destruction of evidence.

Johnson, 168 N.J. at 620; Rodriguez, 399 N.J. Super. at 201. The court did

not, however, consider that the search warrant affidavit did not identify the

quantity of drugs allegedly distributed by defendant and therefore offered no

objective basis for the officers to determine or conclude defendant possess ed a

small quantity of controlled dangerous substances that might be amenable to

quick disposal or destruction if he was awakened at 5:00 a.m. See Johnson,

168 N.J. at 620. Moreover, there is no other information in the search warrant

affidavit establishing defendant presented a particularized risk of destroying

evidence. See id. at 620-21 (explaining a no-knock warrant is not supported

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by a mere claim an individual could destroy evidence during a search executed

pursuant to a warrant).

      In sum, we are convinced any reasoned analysis of the pertinent factors

requires a finding the officers did not wait a reasonable amount of time — less

than five seconds — before forcibly entering the premises. To the extent the

reasonableness of the wait time is measured against whether the occupants of

the residence had time to get to the door or to destroy evidence, Robinson, 200

N.J. at 13-14, the recording provides vivid and compelling evidence none of

the occupants had the opportunity to do either during the less -than-five

seconds the officers waited before knocking in the front door at 5:00 a.m. The

knock-and-announce and forcible breach of the door shown in the recording

occurred so quickly and with such fluidity that the occupants of the house were

effectively denied the requisite pause and reasonable wait period to which they

are constitutionally entitled prior to the officers' forcible entry.

      We do not find there could never be circumstances under which a

waiting time of five seconds or less may be reasonable. We determine only

that because the pertinent factors weigh strongly against the abbreviated wait -

time here, and the State offers no objective facts known to the officers

demonstrating any urgency presented by the execution of the warrant, the less -

than-five-second period the officers waited here constitutes an unreasonable,

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and unconstitutional, execution of a knock-and-announce warrant. See, e.g.,

Granville, 222 F.3d at 1218 (finding early morning forced entry unreasonable

because occupants were likely still asleep and five seconds was insufficient

time to infer denial of admittance).

      To hold otherwise under the circumstances presented — where the

purported pause following the officers' first knock-and-announce is tantamount

to no pause at all — would impermissibly render the constitutional

requirement that officers wait a reasonable time prior to making a forcible

entry during the execution of a knock-and-announce search warrant a

meaningless nullity. We therefore conclude the amount of time the officers

waited after knocking and announcing before breaching the front door was

unreasonable and violated defendant's constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16-17.

      The State argues that even if the officers violated defendant's

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, the

exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence. We disagree.

      In Caronna, we explained the purposes of the exclusionary rule and our

State's broad application of the rule to violations of the knock-and-announce

requirement. 469 N.J. Super. at 494. We held the exclusionary rule bars the

admission of evidence seized following an unreasonable entry into a dwelling

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in violation of a knock-and-announce requirement contained in a search

warrant. Id. at 495; see also Rodriguez, 399 N.J. Super. at 203-05 (suggesting,

but not deciding, the exclusionary rule applies where law enforcement officers

fail to wait a reasonable period of time to forcibly enter a residence after

knocking and announcing their presence during execution of a search warrant).

We are unpersuaded a different remedy should apply where the officers violate

a "necessary corollary" of the constitutionally required knock-and-announce

rule by failing to wait a reasonable period before forcibly entering a residence

pursuant to a search warrant that requires the officers knock-and-announce.

See Robinson, 200 N.J. at 16.

      The State claims a different result should apply under the circumstances

presented because we are not confronted with what we characterized as a

"flagrant" violation of the knock-and-announce rule in Caronna. The argument

ignores that in our State even a good faith violation of a defendant's

constitutional rights provides law enforcement no refuge from application of

the exclusionary rule.   State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 157-58 (1987)

(declining to recognize a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in our

State because doing so would "undermine the constitutionally-guaranteed"

protections that inhere in Article 1, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey

Constitution).

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      We also reject the State's claim the constitutional violation here cannot

be properly characterized as flagrant. Constitutional principles required the

officers pause for a reasonable period before knocking down the front door of

the residence, Robinson, 200 N.J. at 13-14, but Sergeant Tennant, who led the

team of fifteen officers, testified he did not think about "time" at all during the

execution of the search. And, as we have explained, the officers failed to

honor the reasonable-wait requirement by effectively failing to wait any time

at all before battering down the door to the residence.

      The officers opted not to seek a no-knock warrant. Having done so, and

having not received authorization from the court for a no-knock warrant, the

officers effectively rendered their entry into the residence a no-knock entry by

their failure to comply with the reasonable-wait requirement. That entry, even

if due to ignorance, simple error, or good-faith belief, may be properly

characterized as a flagrant violation of defendant's constitutional rights for

which there is a need to deter "similar future violations of constitutional

rights." Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. at 503 (quoting State v. Chaney, 318 N.J.

Super. 217, 227 (App. Div. 1999)). Moreover, a violation of the knock-and-

announce rule requires suppression under the exclusionary rule. Id. at 495; see

also id. at 503 (rejecting "application of the inevitable discovery exception to

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                                        31
the exclusionary rule" where law enforcement clearly disregarded the knock-

and-announce requirements of a search warrant).

     We reverse the court's order denying defendant's suppression motion and

remand to the trial court to allow defendant to take such actions as he may

deem appropriate concerning his plea to the charge for which he was

convicted.

     Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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