Court Opinion

ID: 9564240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:37.247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:18.717426
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
dissenting. This case arose out of the death of William F. Peck (employee), claimant’s deceased husband, who was employed by Gainesville Machine Company (employer). Pacific Employers Insurance Company (insurer) provided the employer’s workmen’s compensation insurance coverage. A rather complete review of the facts surrounding the employee’s death is necessary for complete understanding of the case.
The employee was regularly employed as a truck driver. On this particular occasion, he was instructed by his immediate superior to drive a 1969 ton and a half Chevrolet flat bed, single axle truck to deliver certain poultry equipment to Decatur, Arkansas, a trip of 800 miles from the employer’s place of business in Gainesville, Georgia. The trip commenced on July 8, 1971, at approximately 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. On July 10, 1971, at 7:00 a.m., the employee delivered the poultry equipment to its destination at Peterson Industries Poultry Plant in Decatur, Arkansas. The employee did not assist in the unloading, but, after the same was accomplished, departed to return to Gainesville, Georgia at approximately 8:30 a.m. On the return trip, at approximately 3:00 p.m. on July 10, while traveling east on U. S. Highway 72 at a point over 400 miles east of Decatur, Arkansas and about 2 miles west of Iuka, Mississippi, on a "straight piece of road,” the truck driven by the employee was seen leaving the road’s south side (right side for eastbound traffic). The truck then traveled up an embankment, came down the embankment, and across the highway to a point 10 feet off the highway down an embankment on the north side thereof (left side for eastbound traffic). Witnesses arriving at the scene immediately thereafter found the employee lying on his right side on the seat with his feet back toward the steering wheel; and observed that he was struggling, gasping for breath, had small blue spots on the left side of his face, did not have his right color, and had a small laceration on his forehead. This condition continued for 8 to 10 minutes, then he stopped breathing. He was not breathing when the ambulance arrived and was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The medical doctor at the hospital testified that he conducted a superficial examination of the then deceased employee and did not find any evidence of injury severe enough to have caused his death; that there were some superficial abrasions on the forehead; that he was not stating that the deceased did not die of any injury; that it is possible that the deceased could have died from an internal *444injury; that he could not determine the cause of death because no autopsy was performed (deceased was embalmed in Mississippi and returned to Gainesville for burial); that he did not determine from his examination if the deceased had a broken neck; that, in the absence of any physical findings of injury, the most likely cause of death of a man in his late forties (as was the employee) would be a heart attack; that there were no findings on his examination that the deceased may have died of a heart attack — an autopsy would be required; and that he did not examine the employee’s arms and legs.
Another medical doctor, a pathologist, on hypothetical question testified that the employee most likely died of an acute myocardial infarction if the doctor found no external causes of death; that his answer was premised on the fact that the employee died unexpectedly and for no apparent reason; that, if there was evidence of bruising to the front of the head and lacerations to the back of the neck, this would indicate that the employee could have died from injuries; that the possibility exists that excitement, fear, or excessive stimulations would and could precipitate an acute heart attack; that it is possible to have a broken neck without extensive damage to the head; that he could not say whether employee died of natural or accidental causes.
Examination of the truck being driven by the employee, revealed that the front axle was bent under, the frame was bent, the windshield had been knocked out, the cab was warped, and there was "quite a bit” of frame damage. Repairs were estimated to cost between $2,000 and $2,500.
Other evidence showed that the employee was 49 years of age; was a tall, thin man who had no prior history of a heart condition; that in addition to the injuries previously described, the employee’s body showed bruises on the lower back of his head and the chest, a 3 to 5-inch laceration on the back of the head, abrasions of both legs, "a place on the right side of his head... a bruise on his arm, ... ahole in his head.”After burial, the employer/insurer requested the claimant/widow to allow an autopsy to be performed on the employee/decedent, which was refused.
There was no question as to marriage or dependency, or that employee was acting within the scope of his employment and about the business of his employer when he met his death. The employer/insurer defended the action claiming that employee’s death did not arise out of his employment, but was due to a heart attack.
*445The deputy director found that "the evidence is insufficient to show the cause of this accident and I am unable to determine whether the deceased’s accident was triggered by illness, falling asleep, or some mechanical defect in the vehicle, and I conclude that his death was caused by an accident and injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and is therefore compensable.” The deputy director went on to find the existence of an issuable defense, but awarded compensation to the widow/claimant.
The State Board of Workmen’s Compensation approved the claimant’s attorney fee contract (331/3% contingency).
Employer/insurer appealed the award to the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation, requesting a de novo review. The claimant thereafter petitioned the board to penalize the employer/insurer by the assessment of attorney fees and costs against them under the provisions of Code Ann. § 114-712. Upon review, the full board unanimously affirmed the award of the deputy director as to compensation and found (2 to 1) that "this matter was defended without reasonable grounds” and ordered reasonable attorney fees assessed against the employer/insurer. The employer/insurer appealed to the Superior Court of Hall County, which affirmed the award in toto, but declined to assess any additional attorney fees. The appeal to this court is from the award of attorney fees only.
In my opinion, the facts demand a finding that the employee’s death was compensable and that the defense of the claim was unreasonable. It is well settled that where an employee is found dead at the place where he might be expected to be in the performance of the duties of his employment, the natural presumption arises that his death arose out of an accident in the course of his employment. For an excellent discussion of this point see New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682 (2a, b) (118 SE 786). See also Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga. App. 706 (5) (165 SE 850); Williams v. Gartrell, 124 Ga. App. 391 (184 SE2d 49). After this is shown, the burden is on the employer to show otherwise. American Surety Co. v. Castleberry, 57 Ga. App. 402, 403 (195 SE 590).
That the deceased employee met the foregoing requirement, has never been questioned in this case. What then is the basis for the defense of the claim? The employer/insurer contend that the employee died of a heart attack, yet there was no proof of this contention. At most, the two physicians that testified stated that *446the employee could have died of a heart attack, or, based on certain hypothetical facts, that in their opinion he probably died of a heart attack. Both doctors testified that they did not know the cause of the claimant’s death. This is obviously not sufficient to even establish that the employee died of a heart attack, much less overcome the presumption that the death arose out of his employment. The facts in the instant case indisputably show that, within a 48-hour period in July, 1971, the employee had driven a 1-1/2 ton flat bed truck over 1,200 miles. This court knows from human experience that a trip of such length is tiring, particularly in July in the southern part of this country. Even if it had been conclusively proved that the employee died of a heart attack, after such a trip we most certainly could not say as a matter of law that this did not contribute to his condition and that an award of compensation would not be authorized. The employer/insurer must take the case as it is, not as they might wish it to be. Here, there was positive proof of a violent accident immediately preceding the employee’s death — which had been preceded by a long, strenuous trip — involving an employee who was in the performance of his employer’s business at a place where he could be expected to be.
I agree with the majority opinion that the issue of assessment of attorney fees is one of fact for determination by the board and that the finding of fact that the claim was defended without reasonable grounds, must be supported by evidence. The evidence heretofore recited in some detail, amply meets these requisites. The award is not subject to the criticism of being based on speculation. It is not sound to justify the employer/insurer’s position on the mere possibility of a heart attack being the cause of the employee’s death under the facts in this case, or the claimant/widow’s refusal to authorize the exhuming of her husband’s body for an autopsy (which she was under no compulsion to follow. See: Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Carson, 100 Ga. App. 409 (111 SE2d 918). I am constrained to note that in Carson the autopsy was requested prior to burial, whereas here the request occurred on September 13, 1971 — two months after burial), or the fact that one member of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation dissented from the award of attorney fees.
As previously mentioned, the issue as to the propriety of the award of attorney fees, was one of fact for resolution by the full board. " 'Under the provisions of § 114-712, as amended, whether or not the employer had defended the action without reasonable *447ground was an issue of fact for determination by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation.’ ” Meeks v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 569 (167 SE2d 927) and cit.; Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 71 Ga. App. 184, 191 (30 SE2d 420).
In cases of this nature, "reasonableness” is a fact which must be determined from all the evidence in the case. Once that fact is determined by the board, it is conclusive as to that issue (as it is to any other issue in the case) if there is any evidence to sustain it and such cannot be reviewed in the appellate court. Ocean Accident &c. Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 270 (178 SE 728); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Sanders, 182 Ga. 594 (186 SE 693); Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 812 (129 SE 75); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909, 915 (122 SE 881).
The following are examples of cases where attorney fees were assessed against employer/insurer: Federated Ins. Group v. Pitts, 118 Ga. App. 356 (163 SE2d 841); U. S. Cas. Co. v. White, 108 Ga. App. 539 (133 SE2d 439); s. c., 111 Ga. App. 267 (141 SE2d 321); Baggett Transportation Co. v. Barnes, 113 Ga. App. 58 (147 SE2d 372).
Employer/insurer did not show any evidence which indicates that this claim was anything but a compensable claim. The award of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation awarding attorney fees, which was affirmed by the Superior Court of Hall County, should not be disturbed by this court. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 100 Ga. App. 677, 686 (112 SE2d 273); Federated Ins. Group v. Pitts, 118 Ga. App. 356, 358, supra.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Deen concurs in this dissent.