Court Opinion

ID: 9797556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:24:05.535249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:10.295459
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 44] I respectfully dissent. After reading the transcript of the change of plea hearing, I believe that the parties agreed on a specific sentence as part of the plea bargain. When presenting the plea agreement to the district court, defense counsel stated that, as part of the agreement, Frederick “would receive a third degree sexual assault disposition, and the sentence would be five to seven years suspended. And furthermore, YoUr Honor, if the PSI supports a 301 agreement, the state has agreed to agree to that.” (Emphasis added.) The State acknowledged that the statement presented by defense counsel corresponded with its understanding of the plea agreement.
[¶ 45] While it would have been helpful to this Court for the parties to have put the plea agreement in writing, I believe the above-quoted language is sufficient to indicate that this was an agreed sentence as contemplated by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1)(C). In such case, Frederick retained the right to withdraw his plea in the event the district court rejected the terms of the plea agreement. The district court, however, apparently misunderstood the nature of the plea agreement and instead, in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(2), advised Frederick that he “would not be allowed to withdraw [his] plea.” Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel corrected the district court.
[¶ 46] At sentencing, the district court rejected the sentencing terms of the plea agreement and sentenced Frederick to imprisonment for a term of two to four years. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel objected to the sentence on the basis that it ran contrary to the plea agreement. On appeal, Frederick argues that the lack of objection at both the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing equates to both prosecutorial misconduct, jnd ineffective assistance of defense counsel. Frederick also claims that the district court erred in not advising him at sentencing, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(4), that he could withdraw his plea as a consequence of the court’s rejection of the agreed upon sentence. Because I believe these claims have merit, I would reverse and remand with directions that Frederick be allowed to withdraw his plea.
[¶ 47] I am compelled to discuss one additional item. The majority opinion discusses the issue of reimbursement for a sexual assault medical examination pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6 — 2—309(j) (LexisNexis 2005). The majority remands the case for the purpose of correcting the judgment and sentence *1150to reflect the district court’s oral pronouncement that reimbursement for the sexual assault medical examination should be paid to either the state or the agency that assisted the victim. I believe this is in error. The ambiguity of the oral pronouncement as to where payment should be directed reflects the confusion on the issue of reimbursement. The district court did not know precisely who should be reimbursed because there was no evidence that the cost of the examination had been paid, let alone by whom. All the prosecutor was able to say was that the victim had been erroneously billed for the medical examination and that she was attempting to correct the billing mistake. Since no specific loss payee was identified, the district court’s decision regarding reimbursement was premature. The district court’s order requiring Frederick to reimburse the victim for the cost of the medical examination should simply be reversed. ;