Court Opinion

ID: 9870104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:48:22.939322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:06.618768
License: Public Domain

Tom, J.P., and Webber, J.,
dissent in a memorandum by Web-ber, J., as follows: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the trial court properly denied defendant’s challenge for cause to a prospective juror. The totality of the responses by the prospective juror established that she could be fair and impartial.
Defendant was charged with second-degree murder, first-degree manslaughter and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. It was alleged that defendant quarreled with the deceased during a basketball game at a neighborhood playground, that he left the playground and returned 20 minutes later with a gun and shot and killed the deceased.
During the preliminary voir dire by the court, the prospective juror, referred to as Ms. J., informed the court of crimes that had been committed against two of her siblings. Ms. J. responded to follow-up questions from the court, and provided multiple unequivocal assurances that she could consider what “happened] in the courtroom” rather than in her personal life. Ms. J. also informed the court that while her son had been convicted of a drug-related crime, his conviction would not prevent her from being a fair and impartial juror. Thus, she assured the court that she would be able to render an impartial verdict based on the evidence (see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d 417 [2002]).
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, defense counsel’s question to Ms. J. as to reasonable doubt also allayed any concerns as to her bias or inability to be fair and impartial. During the People’s voir dire, Ms. J. stated that the fact that her siblings had been the victims of crimes would “probably” impact her ability to be fair. During the voir dire by the defense, defense counsel asked if she would have any problem in returning a verdict of not guilty if she had a reasonable doubt. She stated she would have “no problem.” She then repeated her response when asked by the People to do so. Thus, Ms. J. stated unequivocally that she would be fair and impartial and would have no difficulty returning a not guilty verdict if she had a reasonable doubt (see People v Chambers, 97 NY2d at 419; People v Narvaez, 125 AD3d 415 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 991 [2015]).
Here, unlike in People v Arnold (96 NY2d 358, 364 [2001]), which is cited by the majority, defense counsel’s question regarding reasonable doubt, which was directed specifically to *484Ms. J., did “force her to confront the crucial question whether she could be fair to this defendant in light of her expressed predisposition” (id. at 363-364). Further, unlike in People v Blyden (55 NY2d 73, 78-79 [1982]), also cited by the majority, the totality of Ms. J.’s responses indicated that she could set aside any bias or hostility based upon what happened to her siblings.
As noted by the Court of Appeals in People v Williams (63 NY2d 882, 885 [1984]): “[M]ost if not all jurors bring some predispositions, of varying intensity, when they enter the jury box. It is only when it is shown that there is a substantial risk that such predispositions will affect the ability of the particular juror to discharge his responsibilities (a determination committed largely to judgment of the Trial Judge with his peculiar opportunities to make a fair evaluation) that his excuse is warranted. Were the rule otherwise, it would be difficult not to require the discharge ... of every potential juror who disclosed anything but total absence of prejudice . . . , notwithstanding his stated readiness to lay his feelings aside in the discharge of his duties as a juror.”
Clearly Ms. J. brought with her certain life experiences. However, her final and unequivocal responses to the questions posed by the court and defense counsel clearly indicated that those life experiences would not interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial or to follow the court’s instructions to render an impartial decision.
Finally, this Court should defer to the determination of the trial court that the challenge for cause should have been denied. As noted in Williams, the trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor of the prospective juror and to determine if her promise to be impartial was credible (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363; see also People v Shulman, 6 NY3d 1, 27 [2005], cert denied 547 US 1043 [2006]; People v Ellis, 305 AD2d 208 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 580 [2003]).
Based on the voir dire record as a whole, and giving due deference to the determination of the trial court, I do not believe it was an improvident exercise of discretion to have denied defendant’s challenge for cause.