Court Opinion

ID: 9851014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:44.966674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.965652
License: Public Domain

Thornton, J.
I respectfully dissent.
My disagreement with the majority opinion is in each of the following: 1) That it fails to fully give to a person the constitutional rights embodied in Amendment 5 to the United States Constitution, “No person * * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” the right to remain silent, and in Amendment 6, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”, 2) it fails, as I conceive our duty to be, to apply the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and 3) it gives an erroneous and misleading effect to our statutory provisions incident to arrest.
The disagreement as to 1 and 2 above is a matter of degree, the majority recognizes the rights do exist but holds the rights do not arise until a much later time than I believe a person becomes entitled to them, not only as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, but as they must have been rationally intended at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791.
I. In considering the right to remain silent and the right to counsel it should be remembered they were adopted by a revolutionary people determined to secure the Blessing of Liberty to themselves and their posterity. These people were aware of governmental and police abuses. It cannot reasonably be thought these rights depend on actual assertions or do not arise until they have been lost. Nothing less should be attributed to the Congress and the state legislatures that ratified the Bill of Rights than the intention the right -tO’ the assistance of counsel meant the right to counsel at all critical times or times when the as*954sistance of counsel eo-uld be of benefit, and than the intention the right not to be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against himself be meaningful and the assertion thereof not made costly. Certainly they did not intend a vain thing.
II. To put this ease in its proper perspective it is necessary to consider 3) above first. The right of a police officer to arrest a person without a warrant is found in section 755.4, Code, 1962:
“A peace officer may make an arrest * * * without a warrant: * * * 3. Where he has reasonable ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been committed and has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.”
Section 755.1 defines arrest, “Arrest is the taking of a person into custody when and in the manner authorized by law, ^ »
Section 755.2 provides in part, “An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. * *
Section 758.1 provides, “When an arrest is made without a warrant, the person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest is made, and the grounds on which the arrest was made shall be stated to the magistrate by affidavit, subscribed and sworn to by the person making the statement, in the same manner as upon a preliminary information, as. nearly as may be.”
One under arrest may make a phone call without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention and an attorney is permitted to see and consult with him in private under section 755.17.
From the stories told to the officers by the two small boys the police officers had reasonable grounds for believing an indictable public offense had been committed and defendant had committed it. If they did not they had no authority to arrest him. The indictable offense contained in what was told them was sodomy, section 705.1. The officers did not have the authority to arrest defendant and charge him with “investigation to detee*955tives” as one of them stated or as appears to be condoned in the second paragraph of the majority opinion, “* * * as they were taking him to the police station for investigation and interrogation.” This statement also condones a violation of section 758.1 by the officers. Nor do the facts warrant the statement in the third paragraph of the majority opinion, “As a crowd gathered, the police placed defendant in the squad car and took him directly to the police station.” Though there is no suggestion the crowd, some 15 or 20 people, were friendly to defendant, there is likeAvise no suggestion the crowd in any manner acted to harm defendant. The “mauling” by the stepfather had ceased by that time. In fact if any person had attacked defendant it would have been the officers’ duty to arrest them. Section 755.4(1). There was no thought on the part of the officers to protect defendant from the crowd.
The only authority vested in the police was to arrest defendant and to proceed in conformity \AÚth statute. They have no authority under any statute or constitutional provision to hold a person for investigation. They must proceed according to statute and he cannot be held unless he is charged with a crime.
The record in this ease does not warrant a finding defendant was not under arrest for sodomy when questioned by the officers in the police car. The sum total of the officers’ testimony warrants of no other conclusion except they intended to book him for “investigation to detectives.” There is no such crime and no authority for such. It is appropriate to call to mind the words of Chief Justice Warren speaking of involuntary confessions in Spano v. People of the State of New York, 360 U. S. 315, 320, 321, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 1205, 1206, 3 L. Ed.2d 1265, 1270, “* * * the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law Avhile enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.”
III. The State concedes the defendant had become an accused. The officers testified defendant Avas not free to go and that he was under arrest. If the statutory procedure is followed a man under arrest has become an accused. Otherwise he should not be arrested. For the majority to say the defendant had not *956become an accused is to disregard the statutes! quoted above on arrest and to close one’s eyes to the record. Officer D’Ostillio testified on direct examination the boy told him what happened and,
“Q. I will ask you whether or not you' then placed Mr. Myers under arrest? A. We placed him in the patrol car and talked with him before we placed him under arrest.”
On voir dire examination: “Q. Had you not at that time heard the testimony of the people at the scene and at that time did you not consider that to constitute an act of sodomy? A. Yes, I had cause to believe that the acts had been committed.
“Q. Did you not tell the defendant that he would have to come with you or to the station with you at that time ? A. Either myself or Officer Lamb did.
“Q. Was the defendant free to walk away at that time? A. No.
“Q. He had been placed under detention? A. Yes.”
Officer Lamb testified on direct examination as follows:
“Q. I will ask you whether or not the defendant was placed in the police car and placed under arrest at that time? A. Yes, he was. * *
On cross-examination: “Q. Did you have any other suspects in this case, Mr. Lamb? A. No.”
It is clear from the knowledge of the officers and the evidence later produced at the trial that the investigation had begun to focus on the defendant. The pages written by the majority to show the inquiry was general have no rational basis. There was no one else upon whom the investigation could focus. This was not a crime where the criminal was unknown. There may have been, and undoubtedly was, a question whether a crime had in fact been committed, but that does not mean as to this defendant the inquiry was general. He had been accused and arrested based on that accusation. See People v. Treloar, 49 Cal. Rptr. 100, 410 P.2d 620; People v. Brooks, 48 Cal. Rptr. 879, 410 P.2d 383, 387; and annotation, 5 A. L. R.3d 1309.
IV. The next step' was the interrogation. The majority says it must be prolonged or abusive or its purpose must be to obtain a confession or to obtain an involuntary confession. That *957is not what the Supreme Court said in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed.2d 977.
The majority apparently by adding emphasis senses a difference between “incriminating statements” and “a confession.” In the quotation from Escobedo “confession” is emphasized but not “incriminating statements.” The apparent reason for this is, this case involves an incriminating statement and not a confession. If the majority opinion is valid it should so hold as to both.
Part of the opinion in Escobedo quoted in the majority opinion is as follows:
“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has' begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied ‘the Assistance of Counsel’ * *
There is no question the Supreme Court equates incriminating statements and confessions. In this context they amount to the same thing.
The quotation above and the one that follows as quoted by the majority point out the accusatory stage — the investigation is no longer a general inquiry, but had begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody and the police carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements or its purpose is to elicit a confession — at that point the court says our adversary system begins to operate.
What the court has done is point out when a suspect is entitled to counsel, when the investigation is no' longer a general inquiry but has begun to focus on a particular suspect and the interrogation lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Then the suspect is entitled to counsel. He then must be effectively warned of his constitutional right to counsel, of his right to remain silent and that anything he says will be used against *958him. See State v. Mabbitt, 257 Iowa 1063, 1070, 135 N.W.2d 525, 530; and Payne v. United States, 340 F.2d 748 (9 Cir. 1965).
His right to counsel does not depend on a request. This is made clear in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513, 82 S. Ct. 884, 889, 8 L. Ed.2d 70, 76. There the Supreme Court said, “But it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the rig’ht to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request.” Mr. Justice White in his dissent in Escobedo so states at page 495 of 378 U. S., page 1767 of 84 S. Ct., page 988 of 12 L. Ed.2d:
“The Court now moves that date back to the time when the prosecution begins to ‘focus’ on the accused. Although the opinion purports to be limited to the facts of this case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own counsel, cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, or has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation. Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed.2d 70. At the very least the Court holds that once the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any admission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has waived his right to. counsel.”
It is true the Supreme Court limited the decision to the' facts. That is whát was being decided. There was no. need to say a request for counsel was not necessary. There was in fact a request. And the question had previously been laid to rest in Carnley v. Cochran, supra.
V. Was the question asked of the defendant one that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements ? It was. The officer testified, “I masked the defendant how he could explain the boys being.in the apartment. He stated that they were in the apartment.” Like the time honored, “Have you stopped beating your wife ?” this question assumed the incriminating fact that the boys were in the apartment. To say this question was not a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements is to deny reality. It had no other purpose. Similar ques*959tions, whether he went to the Star Market to commit robbery, whether he displayed his gun to the cashier, and whether he fired at the man who pursued him, were condemned in People v. Ketchel, 63 Cal.2d 859, 48 Cal. Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694; and People v. Brooks, 48 Cal. Rptr. 879, 410 P.2d 383, 387.
The defendant was entitled to counsel at that point. He was also entitled to be advised of his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and that anything he said would be used against him. And, as has been pointed out, his right to counsel did not depend on a request. This was the critical stage stated in Escobedo. See pages 485, 486 of 378 U. S., page 1762 of 84 S. Ct.
By the admission in evidence of the statement attributed to defendant he was not only denied the right to counsel but the right to remain silent.
The majority opinion overlooks Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed.2d 70. It insists the defendant must request counsel and the request be denied. It seems the Carnley case should be considered. The Supreme Court was interpreting the Constitution in that opinion too. And, I might add, quite differently from the majority of this court.
YI. The majority opinion makes the exercise of his right to remain silent costly when it approves the instruction, “* * *, such silence may be considered along with all other evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” It is, of course, true that the authorities so far have only held such an instruction deprives a person of his constitutional right when he has failed to testify at his trial. But if the right means anything, and a constitutional right should, its exercise should be protected and not made costly whether it was exercised before or at the trial. In this instance the right is asserted here while on direct revieAV. It is timely. State v. Barton, 258 Iowa 924, 140 N.W.2d 886, and authorities cited therein.
In conclusion, we should adopt a rule of this court, and I predict it will be forced upon us, if we do not, excluding all “jail evidence” unless counsel for the accused is present, or until section 755.14 or section 758.1, Code, 1962, are fully complied with and the accused has been advised by the magistrate of his right to counsel, section 761.3, his right to remain silent and that *960anything he says will be used against him. This would eliminate the type of controversy we have here and insure every person, guilty or innocent, of the full enjoyment of his constitutional rights. This, of course, would require the police to obey the law while enforcing it. It would require them to> use proper investigation methods. And proper investigation does not mean continued interrogation until the desired answer is obtained as indicated in the majority opinion.
As sustaining this view see United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429; State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 487, 395 P.2d 557; People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, certiorari denied 381 U. S. 937, 85 S. Ct. 1765, 14 L. Ed.2d 702; People v. Ketchel, 63 Cal.2d 859, 48 Cal. Rptr. 614, 409 P.2d 694; and Meaning and Scope of Escobedo, by Hon. Robert Van Pelt, United States District Judge, District of Nebraska, before the Judicial Conference of the Eighth Circuit, 38 F. R. D. 441.
I would reverse the ease for a new trial.
Mason, Rawlings and Becker, JJ., join in this dissent.