Court Opinion

ID: 9654035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:02:58.251205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.188276
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing
HUGHES, Justice.
We assumed for the purpose of deciding this case that the farm laborers employed by Mr. Bohls to pull cotton were his employees. It was not necessary for us to-decide whether such laborers were employees or independent contractors, as contended by appellees, because we were clearly of the opinion that they were not “engaged in the employment” when injured. In support of this conclusion we cited the Pass-more case.
Cited to the contrary by appellant are Lumber Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Stakes, 4 Cir., 164 F.2d 571, and Campbell v. American Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 8 Cir., 238 F.2d 284.
We have carefully examined these cases as well as some of the authorities they cite and there are many distinguishing features in them, such as differently worded exclusion clauses, other provisions of the *539policies, questions of fact etc., but primarily these cases turn upon the local law of the States in which the suits originated and this local law seems to stem not from insurance cases but from cases arising under either Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., or State Workmen’s Compensation Statutes, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. St., art. 8306 et seq.;1 A complete and thorough analysis of all these authorities and statutes would not be rewarding because we are convinced that no Texas decision requires the construction of this exclusion clause to coincide with the construction of our Workmen’s Compensation Statute. There are at least two sufficient reasons for not construing the statute and exclusion clause the same (1) the rules for construing the one are not applicable to the other (2) their wording is different.
The rules for construing insurance policies are stated thusly:
“It is a settled principle of insurance law, laid down in many decisions, that language of a policy which is susceptible of more than one construction should be interpreted strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of .the insured.” 24-B Tex.Jur. p. 104.
“As in the case of provisions for forfeiture, exceptions and words of limitation in the nature of an exception are strictly construed against the insurer, especially if of uncertain import ■or reasonably susceptible to a double ■construction.” 24-B Tex.Jur. p. 102.
In Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379, 381, the Court reiterated these rules in this language:
“It is a settled rule in this state that policies of insurance will be interpreted and construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. United Service Automobile Ass’n v. Miles, 139 Tex. 138, 161 S.W.2d 1048; Wood v. Southern Casualty Co., Tex.Civ.App., 270 S.W. 1055 (writ dism.); 24 Tex.Jur. p. 705, sec. 29. It is also well settled that exceptions and words of limitation will be strictly construed against the insurer. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., Inc., v. Williams, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S.W.2d 396, 402 (writ dism.); Norwood v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 16 S.W.2d 842 (no writ history) ; 24 Tex. Jur. p. 704, sec. 28. We will certainly not write a limitation of liability into a policy where none exists.”
The rule for construing our Workmen’s Compensation Statutes is stated in Federal Surety Co. v. Ragle, Tex.Com.App., 40 S.W.2d 63, 66, as follows:
“The courts, as a general rule, have given the compensation statutes a liberal construction. The purpose of the law was to do away with the issues of negligence, accident, assumed risk, contributory negligence, and other like issues, and to further provide that the amount recoverable be free of any *540uncertainty. Both employer and employee were dissatisfied with the old system of litigation, which was expensive. The compensation for injuries to an employee is no longer founded upon the fault or negligence of the employee, but is awarded upon broader and more humane rules. This rule has become a part of the industrial and economic structure created by modern conditions and development. This class of legislation rests upon the broad rule that the injured workman is entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in the service of an industry, regardless of the question of negligence or fault on his part. Our Supreme Court has announced the sound and humane rule that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is ‘a remedial statute which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.’ ”
The language of the exclusion clause of the policy, pertinent here, is “any employee of the insured while engaged in the employment.”
How different are the provisions of our Workmen’s Compensation Statute. Art. 8309, V.A.C.S., provides that “The term ‘injury sustained in the course of employment,’ as used in this Act, shall not include” certain named injuries but “shall include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere.”
These two observations seem obvious. (1) The farm laborers in this case were clearly within the course of their employment within the meaning of our Workmen’s Compensation laws when injured.2 (2) It does not necessarily follow that they were “engaged in the employment” within the exclusion clause when injured.
In addition to Passmore quoted from in our original opinion we desire to cite and quote from Eliott v. Behner, 150 Kan. 876, 96 P.2d 852, 854. In that case the policy excluded bodily injury “to any employee of the assured, except household servants other than chauffeurs, while engaged in any business or occupation of the assured.” The Court said:
“ * * * It will be noted that in order for this exemption to apply Elliott must not only have been an employee of the assured, but he must also have been killed while he was engaged in the business or occupation of the assured.”
The Court further said:
“It is clear that every one who is engaged in the business or occupation of the assured would be its employee but not every employee is engaged in the business or occupation of the assured all the time. * * * In this case Elliott had finished eight hours work for the county. The trip home in the truck was no part of his employment. He paid nothing for it and could ride in the truck or not as he saw fit. He was performing no service for the county when thus riding. * * * In the second place, the transportation could be an ‘implied condition of the contract of employment,’ and still Elliott would not be engaged in the ‘business or occupation’ of the county when he was killed.”
The holding was that Elliott, killed while riding home, was not within the exclusion clause.
To the same effect is Francis v. Scheper, 326 Mich. 441, 40 N.W.2d 214, 216.3 This case is directly in point. There the transportation to and from home in the em*541ployer’s car was part of the consideration for the employee’s services as a painter. The employee was injured on the way home. The insurance policy excluded employees “engaged in the employment.” The Court in holding the insurer liable said: “The phrase, ‘engaged in the employment,’ can fairly he construed as meaning, active in the work plaintiff was employed and paid to do.”
Appellant asserts that our decision here is in conflict with City of Wichita Falls v. Travelers Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 137 S.W.2d 170, writ dism. cor. judgm.
In this case an employee of the City was injured while being transported in a city truck after working hours to the city barn. Employees gathered there for work assignments in the morning and were delivered there after the day’s work was done. The employees’ job was cutting weeds.
The language of the exclusion clause of the policy involved was that the coverage did not apply to “an employee of the assured while engaged in the business of the assured.” According to the opinion of the Court the city “argued that Phillips’ (employee) work for the day was over at the time of his injury, and that he was a mile or more from the place where he had worked when injured, and therefore he was not, at the time of the injury, in the employ of the city.” (Italics ours.) In overruling this contention the Court said:
“We think the record before us shows that in connection with the work the city was giving Phillips, that it undertook to give him free transportation from the city bams to the place of work and return. The city had not fully discharged that obligation until the truck had arrived at the barns.”
The only cases cited to support this statement were Workmen’s Compensation cases which, as above indicated, we do not believe to be controlling in the interpretation of the exclusion clause in an insurance policy.
We have no doubt but that the employee in City of Wichita Falls was injured in the course of his employment under our Workmen’s Compensation Statutes. The Court there apparently assumed, as it did not discuss the question, that inclusion under such statutes would necessarily mean exclusion under the insurance policy. For the reasons above stated we do not agree that this is correct.
The Supreme Court approved the judgment in City of Wichita Falls. Upon what ground we do not know and have no way of knowing; hence we cannot know whether our decision is in conflict. Certainly we do not conflict with anything said by the Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion. Under these circumstances we do not believe we are required to follow the decision in that case. We remain convinced that our original opinion is correct.
The motion is overruled.
Motion overruled.

. In Gotlin v. Maryland Casualty Co., 9 Cir., 190 F.2d 249, 251, 50 A.L.R.2d 73, a case involving the interpretation of an exclusion clause in a liability insurance policy, the Court said:
“It is not surprising that this kind of .a question should have provoked litigation by claimants against insurance companies. Wording of many of these policies differs slightly and the facts of the various cases differ even more importantly. We should set aside at once the various cases involving workmen’s compensation acts in which courts have found that injuries to employees going to or returning from work arose out of and in the course of the employment. These eases involve the entirely justifiable effort on the part of the courts to bring cases under the coverage of the compensation act. They are not in point here. See for collection of decisions on this point [Stansberry v. Monitor Stove Co., 150 Minn. 1, 183 N.W. 977] 20 A.L.R. [316] 319; [Pattiani v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 199 Cal. 596, 250 P. 864] 49 A.L.R. [446] 454; 63 A.L.R. 469; [Beem v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 337 Mo. 114, 85 S.W.2d 441] 100 A.L.R. [1044] 1053.”

. Fritzmeier v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 131 Tex. 165, 114 S.W.2d 236.

. In speaking of these cases and those cited by appellant the Court in Getlin v. *541Maryland Casualty Co., 9 Cir., 196 F.2d 249, 251, 50 A.L.R.2d 73, said:
“Another class of cases which counsel have labored heavily in this case are situations in which employees, at the termination of a day’s work, are given gratuitous transportation by their employer back to the place from which they started their working day. In these situations the transportation is not part of the job; it may be accepted or not by the employee and it is not surprising to find holdings that during such transportation the employee is not engaged in his occupation. Even here, however, the authorities do not speak with one accord.”