Court Opinion

ID: 9561488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:10:28.622651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.057675
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority finds that certain provisions in an insurance contract issued by Shelter General Insurance Company (Shelter General) to Designer Spas and Hot Tubs (Designer Spas) are in conflict, maj. op. at 240, and that the insurance contract must be construed against Shelter General. Maj. op. at 242. However, issues of mootness and ripeness raised by the unique posture of this case bar those issues from this court’s consideration. I respectfully dissent.
I.
This case requires us to detail the histories of two proceedings — a tort action and a declaratory judgment action — which involve substantially the same parties. Both actions evolved out of the same set of facts.
In November 1987, Designer Spas took delivery of a hot tub in order to rebuild the equipment pack accompanying the hot tub. An employee of Designer Spas installed a thermostat manufactured by Eaton Corporation (Eaton) in the equipment pack. The thermostat indicated that the temperature of the hot tub would not exceed 115 degrees.
On November 17, 1987, Designer Spas delivered the hot tub and equipment pack to Marilyn and James Simons’ residence. On November 19, an employee of Designer Spas completed installation of the equipment pack onto the hot tub. The following morning, Marilyn Simon attempted to step onto the first submerged step of the hot tub. When her foot touched the water, she realized that the water was extremely hot. While withdrawing her foot, Marilyn Simon lost her balance and fell into the hot tub. The water in the hot tub had attained a temperature of approximately 160 degrees. Marilyn Simon sustained second- and third-degree burns to her legs and torso as a result of her fall.
The Simons subsequently filed a complaint against Eaton and Designer Spas, among others. In their complaint, the Si-mons alleged that Designer Spas had reconditioned a water temperature control unit manufactured by Eaton. The Simons asserted that “Designer Spas was negligent in its reconditioning of the water temperature control device.”
Designer Spas had contracted with Shelter General to insure Designer Spas in November 1987.1 On November 25, 1988, Shelter General filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that Shelter was not obligated to defend or indemnify Designer *243Spas in the Simons’ tort action. Designer Spas filed an answer to the complaint on January 4, 1989, contending that Designer Spas reasonably expected Shelter General to defend and indemnify Designer Spas, and that the exclusions in the insurance policy were ambiguous.
Designer Spas filed a brief regarding Shelter General’s duty to defend on May 8, 1989. Designer Spas petitioned the district court to enter an order stating that Shelter General had a duty to defend and indemnify Designer Spas in the Simons’ tort action. Shelter General filed an opening brief in the declaratory judgment action, asking the district court to enter a judgment declaring that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Designer Spas in that action. Designer Spas filed a reply brief, requesting the district court to enter an order requiring Shelter to defend and indemnify Designer Spas in the Simons’ tort action.
On August 8, 1989, the Simons intervened in the declaratory judgment action.2 Aligning themselves with Designer Spas, the Simons argued to the district court that Shelter General had a duty to defend and indemnify Designer Spas. On December 22, 1989, the Simons filed an opening brief in the declaratory judgment action, requesting the district court to enter a judgment finding that Shelter General has the duty to defend and indemnify Designer Spas. Shelter General filed an answer brief on January 4, 1990, again seeking a judgment that Shelter General has no duty to defend or indemnify Designer Spas in the Simons’ tort action.
On January 30, 1990, the district court entered a declaratory judgment stating that Shelter General had no duty under the insurance contract to defend or indemnify Designer Spas in the Simons’ tort action. The district court based its conclusion on its interpretation of the “completed operations hazard” and the “products hazard” exclusions in the insurance contract.
On February 13,1990, the Simons filed a notice of appeal of the declaratory judgment with the court of appeals. Approximately one month later, on March 16, Designer Spas sought to join in the Simons’ notice of appeal filed with the court of appeals. On September 24, 1990, the Si-mons filed an opening brief with the court of appeals, seeking an order reversing the district court, finding that the insurance policy issued by Shelter General provided coverage to Designer Spas in the tort action brought by the Simons. Designer Spas filed a motion to join in the Simons’ opening brief with the court of appeals.
While the declaratory judgment was pending in the court of appeals, the Si-mons’ tort action proceeded to trial. On July 31, 1991, the district court entered judgment on a jury verdict in the amount of $900,000, in favor of the Simons and against defendant Eaton in the Simons’ tort action. The jury found that, while Designer Spas was negligent, its negligence did not cause the Simons’ injuries or damages, and did not enter judgment against Designer Spas.
On August 1, 1991, the court of appeals found that the “completed hazard exclusion” applied to the facts as stipulated. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s declaratory judgment. The Simons and Designer Spas separately filed petitions for rehearing with the court of appeals which were denied.
On October 29, 1991, counsel for the Simons filed a petition for a writ of certio-rari on behalf of both the Simons and Designer Spas, with this court. In their statement of the case, counsel for the Simons identified the issue as “whether a policy of insurance issued by [Shelter General] ... to [Designer Spas] ... provides coverage to Designer Spas for certain tort claims brought by the Simons.” Counsel for the Simons did not then inform this court that a jury had returned a verdict in favor of Designer Spas.
This court subsequently granted certiora-ri to determine whether the court of appeals erred in its opinion. Counsel for the *244Simons filed an opening brief with this court on behalf of both the Simons and Designer Spas. In footnote 2 of their opening brief, counsel for the Simons informed this court that, on July 31, 1991, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Designer Spas. Counsel for the Simons contended that “the issues raised in this appeal are not moot since [Eaton] appealed the trial court judgment” and thus there is a possibility that the judgment may be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Counsel for the Simons additionally contended that the issues are not moot because “Designer Spas will be seeking its attorneys fees and defense costs under the policy.” (Emphasis added.)
Designer Spas did not appear before this court at oral argument. Counsel for the Simons did appear, and argued that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation of the insurance contract. Counsel for the Simons expressly stated during oral argument that they were not representing Designer Spas. Counsel for the Simons also stated that Shelter General paid for Designer Spas’ defense in the Simons’ tort action.
In light of the posture of this case, I find that resolution of the issues is not necessary because the issues raised in the petition for certiorari are moot.
II.
A.
Mootness
This court has followed the principle that “[ajppellate courts will not render opinions on the merits of appeals when issues presented in litigation become moot because of subsequent events.” American Drug Store, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 831 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo.1992) (citing Van Schaack Holdings, Ltd. v. Fulenwider, 798 P.2d 424, 426-27 (Colo.1990); Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo.1986)). “A case is moot when a judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy.” American Drug Store, 831 P.2d at 469 (quoting Van Schaack, 798 P.2d at 426).
In American Drug Store, we were called on to evaluate whether the notice provisions of a sales and use tax assessment issued by the City and County of Denver conformed to the requirements of section 29-2-106.1, 12A C.R.S. (1986). Id. at 468. We concluded that the issue was moot because the tax assessment at issue had become final as against the complaining party. Id. at 468-69. In other words, we declined to scrutinize the content of the notice because the tax assessment was binding on the complaining party, and thus there was no controversy between the complaining party and the City and County of Denver. Id.
In the present case, no judgment against Designer Spas exists as a result of the tort action. Thus, any determination by this court that Shelter General has a duty to indemnify Designer Spas has no legal effect. Similarly, any determination by this court that Shelter General had a duty to defend Designer Spas has no legal effect because Shelter General does not now seek to recover costs it incurred by defending the Simons’ tort action because Shelter General paid for Designer Spas’ defense under a “reservation of rights clause.” See infra note 3.
B.
Ripeness
Counsel for the Simons indicated in their opening brief that “Designer Spas will be seeking its attorneys fees and defense costs under the policy.” (Emphasis added.) The gravamen of this statement is that Designer Spas is not now before this court seeking to recover its costs.
Designer Spas did request reimbursement for its costs incurred in defending the declaratory judgment action in its motion to amend its answer filed on March 15, 1989, in the district court, well before the jury declined to enter a judgment against Designer Spas. Designer Spas did not, however, appear at oral argument before this court. Designer Spas joined in the *245briefs filed by counsel for the Simons, and did not individually assert any claims for costs with this court. Counsel for the Si-mons stated at oral argument that they do not represent Designer Spas. Accordingly, counsel for the Simons are not before this court seeking to recover the costs incurred by Designer Spas in defending the declaratory judgment action.
The present case stems from the declaratory judgment action filed by Shelter General against Designer Spas. The Simons are the "complaining party” currently before this court, who appear to be securing a “deep-pocket” defendant, Shelter General, in the event that the appeal perfected by Eaton results in a new trial. While Eaton’s appeal may result in a new trial wherein Designer Spas may be found liable, such potential for future injury to Designer Spas does not justify review on the merits in the present action where, based on the parties’ arguments, any determination by this court will have no practical legal effect on any dispute between Shelter General and Designer Spas.3 See Jones v. District Court, 780 P.2d 526, 533 (Colo.1989) (Vollack, J., dissenting). The court of appeals judgment should be vacated due to the issues of mootness and ripeness raised by the unique posture of this case.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice LOHR join in this dissent.

. In paragraph 20 of the parties' Agreed Statement of Facts, on or about November 24, 1987, Designer Spas tendered a premium payment to Shelter General. Shelter General accepted the payment and does not dispute the fact that Designer Spas’ policy was renewed on November 20, 1987, at 12:01 a.m. and thus covered Designer Spas at the time of the accident.

. The Simons filed a motion to intervene on August 1, 1989, and' the district court granted this motion on August 8, 1989.

. The majority contends that the issues raised in the present case are not moot because "Shelter provided a defense to [Designer Spas] under a reservation of rights " clause. The majority further contends that "we need not be concerned with the question whether these rights will indeed be invoked by Shelter.” Maj. op. at 238 n. 1. At oral argument, the following colloquy occurred:
COURT: Designer Spas paid for its own defense, is that — at the trial? Or did the insurance company—
COUNSEL: Shelter Insurance Company paid for its defense, under a reservation of rights.
COURT: And has Shelter sought recovery from Designer Spas for the cost of its defense?
COUNSEL: Not yet, not to my knowledge, no.
Shelter does not now seek an interpretation of the reservation of rights clause, as the majority notes; as such, the issues remain moot.