Court Opinion

ID: 9800515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:21:23.329862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:56.807099
License: Public Domain

MARING, Surrogate Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 48] I concur in the majority opinion in its conclusions that the trial court’s award of attorney fees must be reversed and remanded for findings of fact; that the amended judgment must be further amended to state correctly Brian Nieu-wenhuis’s yearly net income is $42,747 and to clarify that child support must be recalculated upon the oldest child reaching eighteen or graduating from high school whichever occurs latest but no later than age nineteen; and that the court’s decision to deny the petition for contempt is not an abuse of discretion.
[¶ 49] I, respectfully, dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion. I disagree that stipulations entered into by parties to a divorce and ultimately incorporated into a judgment are to be strictly construed under contract law as to their validity and enforceability. Our Court has said again and again that a stipulation is *141merged into the judgment. See Wagner v. Wagner, 1999 ND 169, ¶ 10, 598 N.W.2d 855 (holding “a contractual stipulation which is wholly incorporated into a divorce judgment ceases to be independently enforceable and is merged into the divorce judgment”). In Kopp v. Kopp, 2001 ND 41, ¶ 10, 622 N.W.2d 726 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted), our Court stated:
[R]ule [60(b)(vi), N.D.R.Civ.P.,] provides for relief when the movant demonstrates it would be manifestly unjust to enforce a court order or judgment, and provides an escape from the judgment, unhampered by detailed restrictions. When it is disclosed that a judgment is so blatantly one-sided or so rankly unfair under the uncovered circumstances that courts should not enforce it, N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(vi) provides the ultimate safety valve to avoid enforcement by vacating the judgment to accomplish justice. Relief under N.D.R.Civ[.]P. 60(b)(vi) is, by its very nature, invoked to prevent hardship or injustice and thus is to be liberally construed and applied.
A trial court, “in considering whether a settlement agreement between divorcing parties should be enforced, should make two inquiries: (1) whether the agreement is free from mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; and (2) whether the agreement is unconscionable.” Vann v. Vann, 2009 ND 118, ¶ 11, 767 N.W.2d 855.
[¶ 50] In the present case, I disagree with the majority opinion that the trial court found the stipulation unenforceable only on the basis of duress. The trial court also based its decision on the ground that it was unfair and unconscionable. The trial court held: “[T]he payment of $1,600 per month by [Lora Nieuwenhuis] based upon her earned income represented 53 percent of [her] net monthly income and exceeded a reasonable percentage for [her] contribution.” Although the trial court did not use the terms “unfair” and “unconscionable,” it clearly made findings that the amount of debt assigned to Lora Nieuwenhuis under the stipulation was so great that she could not have paid it at the time of the divorce based on her income and living expenses. I read the trial court’s decision as stating that the allocation of debt to Lora Nieuwenhuis under the stipulation made it unconscionable and “rankly unfair”; a basis on which the trial court can find a stipulation unenforceable.
[¶ 51] Our Court has recognized “[m]arriage involves a confidential relationship, and the law should not permit one marital partner to take ‘unconscien-tious advantage’ over the other through the trust which is part of that relationship.” Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D.1994). In Weber v. Weber, our Court cited as authority Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, Tentative Draft No. 2, A.L.I. § 4.01 comment (1996) for the premise “Agreements between spouses have traditionally been subject to various procedural and substantive rules beyond those which apply to contracts generally.” 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D.1996). We also cited to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. § 306 (1996) for the premise that “the terms of a separation agreement ... are binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that the separation agreement is unconscionable.” Weber, at 783.
[¶ 52] The Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, ch. 7, § 7.11, in comments a and b, (2002), points out how different the nature of divorce stipulations *142is in comparison to other agreements or contracts and states:
a. Scope and purpose. The subject of this section need not be treated by these Principles, but could instead be left to the law of judgments. However, divorce decrees that incorporate, by recitation or reference, an agreement of the parties generally do not share those characteristics of judgments that justify severe restrictions on reopening. In other areas of law, a judgment typically embodies a judicial resolution of a legal claim, or a judicially supervised settlement. The parties have had their day in court, and thus the grounds for reopening should be narrow and the period for their assertion should be brief. By contrast, the divorce court typically exercises little or no oversight of the terms of the agreement it incorporates into the decree of dissolution.... Thus, the topic of reopening agreement-based dissolution decrees should be treated with due regard to the realities of family-dissolution practice and the goals of the law of family-dissolution, as well as those of the law of judgments.
[[Image here]]
b. Setting aside one or more terms of a decree on standard contract and judgment grounds. Rules governing the setting aside of decree terms strike a balance between the competing values of finality and efficient administration of justice, on the one hand, and, on the other, procedural fairness and the important protective function of the law of family dissolution, which is intended to safeguard the interests of family members, particularly weaker family members.
In another treatise, the uniqueness of family law stipulations is pointed out:
[A] separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate an ordinary contract. Thus, for example, where a family’s economic circumstances are so substantial and complex that a spouse needs competent professional assistance for a good understanding of the separation agreement, the agreement may be set aside where such advice was not received.
24A Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 1043 (2014).
[¶ 53] Other courts have recognized the uniqueness of family law stipulations. See Lyons v. Lyons, 289 A.D.2d 902, 904-05, 734 N.Y.S.2d 734 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding “we first recognize that ‘separation agreements are held to a higher standard of equity than other contracts and may be set aside if manifestly unfair to one spouse because of overreaching by the other’ ”). The New York Court of Appeals stated:
Agreements between spouses, unlike ordinary business contracts, involve a fiduciary relationship requiring the utmost of good faith. There is a strict surveillance of all transactions between married persons, especially separation agreements. Equity is so zealous in this respect that a separation agreement may be set aside on grounds that would be insufficient to vitiate an ordinary contract.
Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 72, 396 N.Y.S.2d 817, 365 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y.1977) (citations omitted).
[¶ 54] In the present case, the parties were living together at the time the divorce was commenced by Brian Nieuwen-huis, which was on November 10, 2009; at the time the stipulation was signed by Lora Nieuwenhuis on November 16, 2009; and at the time the original judgment was entered on November 20, 2009. Clearly, a fiduciary relationship existed throughout the process.
*143[¶ 55] In accordance with the foregoing view of the unique character of divorce stipulations and the law that governs the enforceability of those agreements, I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s restrictive definition of duress in this case. We have recognized economic duress as a defense in a commercial contract case. See Mellon v. Norwest Bank of Mandan, 493 N.W.2d 700, 701, 703 (N.D.1992). Economic duress should also be applicable to the enforceability of a divorce stipulation.
[¶ 56] We said that in order for economic duress to be a defense in a contract action three elements must be present: “(1) that one side involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) that circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) that said circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite party.” Mellon, 493 N.W.2d at 703; see Murray v. Murray, 2011-Ohio-1546, ¶ 23, 2011 WL 1167177 (Ohio Ct.App.2011). Other courts have defined duress for the purpose of its application as a defense in the family law context. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama has held: “Duress has been defined as subjecting a person to improper pressure which overcomes his will and coerces him to comply with the demands to which he would not yield if acting as a free agent, and is a ground on which to support a setting aside of a divorce decree and underlying agreement.” Claybrook v. Claybrook, 56 So.3d 652, 656 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (quotation marks omitted). The Illinois Court of Appeals has held: “Duress has been defined as the imposition, oppression, undue influence, or the taking of undue advantage of another’s stress whereby that party cannot exercise his or her free will.” In re Marriage of Steichen, 163 Ill.App.3d 1074, 115 Ill.Dec. 234, 517 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1987). I am of the opinion that the trial court can apply economic duress as a defense to the enforceability of the divorce stipulation. Duress can be caused by economic coercion. The court should consider the extent of the financial control by one spouse over the other, together with the existence of the fiduciary relationship. Thus, I would define duress in the family law context broader than the majority opinion.
[¶ 57] I, also, respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred in vacating only part of the divorce judgment. The appellant, Brian Nieuwenhuis, never argued this point on appeal nor did he argue that to the trial court. Therefore, the parties never briefed this issue. Brian Nieuwenhuis argued that the evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of duress. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the judgment and was clearly erroneous in its findings concerning duress. I am of the opinion that our doctrine of law of the case should apply to this appeal. We described the law of the case doctrine in Beuchler Constr. v. City of Williston, 413 N.W.2d 336, 339 (N.D.1987):
Although, as generally used, the law of the case is defined as “the principle that if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the cause to the court below for further proceedings, the legal question thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain the same” [Black’s Law Dictionary (1979) ], we believe that the doctrine is broader than stated. Rather, the law of the case encompasses not only those issues decided on the first appeal, but also those issues decided by the trial court prior to the first appeal which were not presented for review at the first appeal.
Therefore, the trial court’s decision to vacate only certain provisions of the judg*144ment and the stipulation was never an issue raised by Brian Nieuwenhuis on appeal and never briefed.
[¶ 58] Furthermore, partial invalidity and severability of divorce agreements has been addressed by one treatise:
If different provisions in a separation agreement seem to carry within them their own consideration, and have no special reference to the consideration for other provisions of the contract, the elimination of particular provisions while others are retained does not impair the contract as a whole or in any way affect the other provisions.... Even a separation agreement stipulating that, if any provisions of the agreement are held invalid or unenforceable, others would nevertheless continue in full force, a provision of the agreement making an unconscionable property division can be declared null and void without a consequential effect on the remainder of the writing. However, it has also been held that an unconscionable provision of a separation agreement may be inseparable from the other provisions and render the entire contract void.
24A Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 1042 (2014).
[¶ 59] The settlement agreement between Brian Nieuwenhuis and Lora Nieu-wenhuis contained the following provision:
19. Modification. ... There can be no modification of this agreement, no waiver of its provisions or of any rights, conditions, or releases from obligation imposed here by except by written instrument mutually agreed and duly executed or as ordered modified by the court under the laws of the State of North Dakota. (Emphasis added.)
The settlement agreement also contained the following provision:
14....
NOTICE: The court may redistribute property in a post-judgment proceeding if a party has failed to disclose property and debts or a party fails to comply with the terms of a court order or judgment distributing property or debts.
These provisions indicate that the parties’ intent was to permit modification of some of the agreement’s provisions without affecting other provisions. I agree generally that, under the law of judgments, the entire judgment is vacated. However, when the agreement itself contemplates modification of some provisions or even unen-forceability of some provisions due to State law, the trial court should be permitted to determine the invalidity of provisions and whether they are severable from the rest of the agreement. I would instruct the trial court accordingly on remand.
[¶ 60] Finally, I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that because the parties both resided in the marital home post judgment, it was not against public policy to include in the agreement waiver of child support until the home was sold. The home was in both parties’ names and Brian Nieuwenhuis was to receive any equity when the home was sold as part of the property settlement. Lora Nieuwenhuis had every right to continue to live with the children in the home. The fact that Brian Nieuwenhuis also continued to reside in the home until it was sold does not relieve him of his child support obligation.
[¶ 61] Lora Nieuwenhuis received primary residential responsibility of the children during the school year, and Brian Nieuwenhuis received primary residential responsibility of the children during the summer. Under this arrangement, Brian Nieuwenhuis would owe child support to Lora Nieuwenhuis under the child support guidelines. See N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-04.1. The rationale for this “suspen*145sion” of child support was that the parties were living together until the house sold. However, the division of the debts reveals that Lora Nieuwenhuis was shouldering a payment of $1,600 a month which included payments toward the mortgage on the house, construction debt, property taxes, property insurance, electric bills, water bills, telephone bills, propane bills, dish network bills and waste management bills. Although her contribution to all of those living expenses was less than Brian Nieu-wenhuis’s contribution, that deficiency was made up by Lora Nieuwenhuis being required, under the agreement, to pay for “all household groceries and supplies (as a tradeoff for her payment of a lesser share of the regular monthly bills).” In addition, Lora Nieuwenhuis was to pay for any gifts for the children purchased by her, any magazine subscriptions for the children, all haircuts, health, and beauty items for the children except for those health care expenses for which Brian Nieuwenhuis would be responsible, and all entertainment or transportation costs associated with out-of-town travel or vacations while the children are with her. The trial court found that the $1,600 monthly payment alone was 53 percent of Lora Nieuwenhuis’s net monthly income.
[¶ 62] Although the parties stipulated to share the debt on the home until it was sold and the living expenses in this manner, our Court should not conclude the provision waiving child support is not contrary to public policy. Our Court has clearly held:
[W]e take a dim view of agreements purporting to sign away the rights of a child in support settings — not from a contractual background, but from a public policy one.... Due to the nature of domestic relations, we do not analyze transactions and compromises between the parties in a cold contractual frame— public policy plays a large role in determining the factors of which parties may contract in domestic relations settings.
Rueckert v. Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d 863, 867 (N.D.1993) (quotation marks omitted). Our legislature has codified a strong public policy in favor of ensuring minor children receive adequate support and maintenance from their parents. Hewson v. Hewson, 2006 ND 16, ¶ 9, 708 N.W.2d 889. If our Court is to instruct the trial court on remand, it should reference the equitable offset remedy, recognized by our Court in Rueckert and Hewson. As we stated in Hewson:
The equitable offset remedy under Rueckert should not be understood to supersede a child’s right to support. By its nature, the Rueckert remedy is only to be applied when it is “the most equitable means of granting the parties the benefit of their property settlement agreement, while at the same time recognizing the important public policy of placing on both parents responsibility for the adequate support and maintenance of their minor children.”
2006 ND 16, ¶ 11, 708 N.W.2d 889 (quoting Rueckert, 499 N.W.2d at 871).
[¶ 63] Under the equitable offset remedy, the trial court must evaluate the obli-gor’s contributions to the children while living with them, calculate the amount of child support that would have been correct from the original decree to the date of the children’s move from the home and offset the amount of the past contributions from the support owed.
[¶ 64] Because I cannot agree with the law set forth in the majority opinion concerning the foregoing issues, I respectfully dissent. I would remand the matter to the trial court to decide the case in accordance with the law I have set forth herein.
*146[¶ 65] MARY MUEHLEN MARING, S.J.