Court Opinion

ID: 9953474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:47.933113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:49.137712
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

CHERYL COX and FRANK COX,                                            UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v                                                                    No. 357588
                                                                     Oakland Circuit Court
AMERICA MULTI-CINEMA, INC.,                                          LC No. 2020-180668-NO

               Defendant-Appellee.

                                          ON REMAND

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and BOONSTRA and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         Plaintiffs appealed by right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. This Court affirmed the trial court’s order. Cox v America Multi-Cinema, Inc,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 10, 2022 (Docket No.
357588) (Cox I), vacated in part ___ Mich ___; 995 NW2d 331 (2023) (Docket No. 165126). In
lieu of granting leave to appeal this Court’s decision, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated the
introduction to Part III, and all of Part III-A, of Cox I and remanded to this Court for
reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; ___ NW3d ___ (2023)
(Docket Nos. 162907 and 163430), and its companion case. Cox v America Multi-Cinema, Inc,
___ Mich ___; 995 NW2d 331 (2023) (Docket No. 165126) (Cox II). We affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       The pertinent facts and procedural history leading to this appeal were set forth in Cox I:

               On December 4, 2018, plaintiff Cheryl Cox (Cheryl) purchased a ticket at a
       movie theater owned by defendant. She was using a wheeled mobility scooter as
       she entered the theater auditorium. Cheryl testified at her deposition that she was
       fully blind in her right eye and had 50% vision in her left eye, but did not tell any
       of the theater staff about her vision problems. After Cheryl entered the empty
       auditorium, she decided to turn around and exit the auditorium to ask staff for

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        assistance with parking her mobility scooter. She admitted at her deposition that
        she could have walked out of the auditorium to get help, but chose to remain in her
        mobility scooter. When Cheryl attempted to turn around, she accidentally backed
        the mobility scooter down some steps, resulting in her falling down and her
        mobility scooter landing on top of her, causing injury.

                Plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendant alleging claims of negligence
        and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs claimed that defendant had breached its duty to
        Cheryl by having poor theater design, low lighting, and inadequate staff training,
        and by failing to properly mark hazards and handicapped seating sections.
        Defendant denied that it breached a duty owed to Cheryl and moved for summary
        disposition, arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the open and obvious
        doctrine because steps—especially the steps at issue, which were lined with white
        handrails, lights, aluminum edges, and yellow and black stripes—are an open and
        obvious condition that do not present unreasonable danger. Defendant also argued
        that Cheryl's vision problems did not preclude application of the open and obvious
        doctrine.

               Plaintiffs responded by arguing for the first time that defendant had
        negligently violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et
        seq., when designing its theater auditorium. Plaintiffs also claimed that special
        aspects existed that negated the application of the open and obvious doctrine.

                After a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court issued a written
        opinion in which it concluded, as a matter of law, that the allegedly hazardous
        condition was open and obvious and that there were no attendant special aspects.
        As for the ADA argument, the trial court determined that plaintiffs had failed to
        timely raise a claim for violation of the ADA in their complaint. Finally, the trial
        court determined that plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim failed because it was
        derivative of the failed premises liability claim. [Cox I, unpub op at 1-2.]

        On appeal, plaintiffs again argued that there were “special aspects” of the hazard that
rendered the open and obvious doctrine, as formulated in Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich
512; 629 NW2d 384 (2001), and its progeny, inapplicable, including design flaws that violated the
ADA, inadequate lighting of the steps, the absence of appropriate signage, and confusing or
inadequate placement of hazard tape. Id. at 5-6. This Court disagreed, affirming the trial court’s
determination that the hazard was open and obvious. Plaintiffs also argued that the trial court erred
by failing to consider plaintiff’s arguments concerning alleged violations of the ADA; this Court
agreed with the trial court that plaintiffs had not alleged an ADA violation in their complaint. Id.
at 6.

        We now consider the issues anew following the Supreme Court’s remand in Cox II.
Because our Supreme Court did not vacate the portion of Cox I holding that plaintiffs had failed
to allege an ADA violation in their complaint, we leave that portion of the opinion undisturbed
and affirm the trial court’s order to the extent that it held that plaintiffs had failed to bring a separate
claim for violation of the ADA.

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                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 664; 685 NW2d 648 (2004). “A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich
109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). “In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under
this subsection, a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
evidence submitted by the parties, in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Id. at 119-120 (citation omitted). If the movant meets her initial burden of supporting her position
that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish
otherwise. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). “When the
burden of proof at trial would rest on the nonmoving party, the nonmovant may not rest on mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must, by documentary evidence, set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Campbell v Kovich, 273 Mich App 227, 229; 731
NW2d 112 (2006), citing Quinto, 451 Mich at 362. See also MCR 2.116(G)(4). A trial court may
not make findings of fact or credibility when deciding a motion for summary disposition. Arbelius
v Poletti, 188 Mich App 14, 18; 469 NW2d 436 (1991). However, “the court must be satisfied
that it is impossible for the claim asserted to be supported by evidence at trial.” Id.

       A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted when a
claim presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390, 398; 919 NW2d 20 (2018). “A genuine
issue of material fact exists when the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, leaves open an issue on which reasonable minds could differ.” Campbell, 273
Mich App at 229.

                                         III. ANALYSIS

        Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by holding that the open and obvious doctrine
barred their premises liability claim. In light of recent developments in the law, we agree that the
trial court’s decision on this issue must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

        In 2023, our Supreme Court revisited the open and obvious danger doctrine as it has been
understood for over two decades, and it overruled the framework announced in Lugo. Kandil-
Elsayed, 512 Mich at 143. The Court held that Lugo was wrongly decided, “generated a host of
practical-workability problems,” and that reliance interests were not strong enough to uphold the
Lugo framework. Id. That said, Kandil-Elsayed did not “abolish” the doctrine. Instead, it declared
that the open and obvious nature of a condition is relevant to the element of breach (rather than the
element of duty) and, assuming that an otherwise actionable premises liability claim has been
established, whether the plaintiff’s damages should be reduced on the basis of comparative fault.
Id. at 144. At the end of its analysis, the Supreme Court provided the following explanation of the
now-controlling framework:

               To summarize, a land possessor owes a “duty to exercise reasonable care to
       protect invitees from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition
       of the land.” If the plaintiff establishes that the land possessor owed plaintiff a
       duty, the next step in the inquiry is whether there was a breach of that duty. Our

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       decision does not alter the standard of reasonable care owed to an invitee, meaning
       that it’s not necessary for land possessors to heed the advice in Justice VIVIANO’s
       dissent to “immediately . . . rectif[y]” hazards on their property to avoid liability.
       Rather, as has always been true, a land possessor need only exercise reasonable
       care under the circumstances. As part of the breach inquiry, the fact-finder may
       consider, among other things, whether the condition was open and obvious and
       whether, despite its open and obvious nature, the land possessor should have
       anticipated harm to the invitee. If breach is shown, as well as causation and harm,
       then the jury should consider the plaintiff’s comparative fault and reduce the
       plaintiff’s damages accordingly. A determination of the plaintiff’s comparative
       fault may also require consideration of the open and obvious nature of the hazard
       and the plaintiff’s choice to confront it. [Id. at 148 (alteration in original).]

         Recently, in Gabrielson v The Woods Condominium Assoc’n, Inc, ___ Mich App ___, ___;
___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket Nos. 364809, 364813), slip op at 2, 8, this Court held that “the rule
of law announced in Kandil-Elsayed should operate retroactively and applies to all cases currently
pending on direct appeal.” Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition
with respect to plaintiff’s premises liability claim. Because of the significant change in the law
that occurred after the trial court’s ruling, we need not otherwise address plaintiff’s arguments that
the trial court erred in applying Lugo and its progeny to plaintiff’s claim.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola

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