Court Opinion

ID: 9375511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:12.029416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.462635
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SABRA V. GILLINS,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        CH-0353-14-0337-I-2

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: February 27, 2023
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sidney M. Fulwood, Supply, North Carolina, for the appellant.

           Roderick D. Eves, Esquire, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her restoration appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction . For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review , REVERSE the
     initial decision, FIND that the appellant has shown by preponderant evidence that

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                              2

     the agency arbitrarily and capriciously denied her restoration, and order the
     agency to conduct a search of the local commuting area for available positions
     within the appellant’s medical restrictions.          We REMAND the appellant’s
     disability discrimination claim to the regional office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2         The following facts, as further detailed in the initial decision, do not appear
     to be materially disputed.       The appellant most recently held a level 4 Mail
     Handler position. Gillins v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0353-14-
     0337-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1; Gillins v. U.S. Postal Service,
     MSPB Docket No. CH-0353-14-0337-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 60,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 2. 2 She injured her left shoulder in 2008 and again in
     2009. ID at 2; RAF, Tab 6 at 24-27. The Office of Workers’ Compensation
     Programs (OWCP) accepted the associated claim in 2009, and the appellant began
     working in a limited-duty capacity. ID at 2-3; RAF, Tab 6 at 27. She filed a
     separate OWCP claim in 2012, for a different injury, but the OWCP denied that
     claim. ID at 3; RAF, Tab 6 at 105.
¶3         The appellant periodically provided the agency with OWCP Forms CA -17,
     Duty Status Report, describing her restrictions stemming from the 2009 claim,
     and the agency provided her with work. ID at 2-3; e.g., RAF, Tab 6 at 110. After
     a period of absence for unrelated reasons, the appellant submitted another Form
     CA-17, in December 2012, and the agency provided her a limited -duty
     assignment of 1 hour per day. ID at 3; RAF, Tab 6 at 20-22, 112. The appellant
     worked in that assignment between December 20, 2012, and February 8, 2013, but
     then stopped reporting to work and requested unpaid leave. ID at 4; RAF, Tab 49

     2
       The appellant’s initial appeal was dismissed without prejudice and subsequently
     refiled, at the parties’ request, resulting in the separate docket num bers associated with
     this one matter. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 20; ID at 6-7.
                                                                                            3

     at 15-20.    On April 24, 2013, the appellant submitted another Form CA-17
     containing similar restrictions to others dating back to he r 2009 injury. ID at 4;
     RAF, Tab 6 at 113. Days later, she returned to work with documentation from a
     different physician, which described the appellant’s need for short breaks in case
     of an asthma attack, but did not discuss her accepted injury in any way.              ID
     at 4-5; RAF, Tab 6 at 98, 104.
¶4         In May 2013, the agency conducted a search but found no available work
     within the appellant’s restrictions.      ID at 5; RAF, Tab 6 at 102.           Also in
     May 2013, the agency denied the appellant’s bid for a Platform Operation
     position on the basis that she failed to provide medical certification showing that
     she was capable of performing that job. 3 ID at 5; RAF, Tab 6 at 97.
¶5         The appellant filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO) claim
     concerning these events, alleging that the agency engaged in improper disability
     discrimination or retaliation for prior EEO activity by ending her limited -duty
     assignment and denying her bid for the Platform Operation position in May 2013.
     RAF, Tab 6 at 44-45. In a final agency decision (FAD) denying her claim, the
     agency characterized the matter as a mixed-case complaint and informed her of
     the Board’s jurisdiction over restoration appeals. Id. at 44-45, 66-67. The instant
     appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1.
¶6         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction. ID at 1; RAF, Tab 46. Because the appellant withdrew her
     hearing request, the administrative judge issued the decision on the written

     3
       It is unclear what happened after May 2013. In the initial decision, the administrative
     judge indicated that the OWCP began providing the appellant with wage replacement
     benefits for 8 hours per day on June 15, 2013, and the appellant never requested
     restoration after that date. ID at 5. It appears that the administrative judge may have
     provided those facts based on a chronology included in an earlier prehearing summary,
     but we were unable to find clear evidentiary support for the chronology of events and,
     for reasons that are somewhat unclear, the appellant objected to that portion of the
     prehearing summary. Compare RAF, Tab 44 at 2-3, with RAF, Tab 46 at 1.
                                                                                             4

     record. RAF, Tab 47; ID at 1. She first found that the appellant was absent from
     her position due to a compensable injury during the relevant period. ID at 10 -12.
     Next, the administrative judge found that the appellant recovered sufficiently to
     return to work in a position with physical requirements less demanding than those
     required by her Mail Handler position. ID at 12-13. She also concluded that the
     agency denied the appellant’s request for restoration when the appellant appeared
     for work after her extended absence but the agency instructed her to go home
     because it did not have any available work.             ID at 13-14.      However, the
     administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove the final element of a
     restoration claim—that the agency’s denial of her restoration request was
     arbitrary and capricious. ID at 14-17.
¶7         Separately, the administrative judge also found that while the appellant
     presented allegations that the agency improperly denied her bid for a position in
     May 2013, that matter was not a valid restoration claim, nor was the denial
     improper.    ID at 17-18.      Based on these findings, the administrative judge
     dismissed the appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 19. The appellant
     has filed a petition for review.     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 4 The
     agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

     The administrative judge properly limited the scope of this appeal.
¶8         As previously discussed, this appeal followed a January 2014 FAD
     concerning    allegations   that   the   agency    engaged    in   improper    disability

     4
       With her petition for review, the appellant submitted evidence that the admini strative
     judge rejected below. Gillins v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. CH-0353-14-
     0337-I-1, Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 26-36; see RAF, Tab 58; ID at 7. However,
     the appellant has not explained, nor are we aware of, how the evidence is relevant to the
     instant appeal and the dispositive issue of whether the agency’s denial of her restoration
     requests during the pertinent period was arbitrary and capricious. See generally Russo
     v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (recognizing that the Board will
     not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of
     sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision).
                                                                                      5

      discrimination or retaliation for prior EEO activity by ending the appellant’s
      limited-duty assignment and denying her bid for the Platform Operation position.
      RAF, Tab 6 at 44-67; IAF, Tab 1.           Accordingly, the administrative judge
      construed this as a restoration appeal stemming from and limited to that FAD and
      the appellant’s compensable shoulder injury. E.g., IAF, Tab 11 at 1; ID at 6. At
      issue in the FAD was the agency’s alleged denial of restoration on May 20, 2013.
      RAF, Tab 6 at 45.    The appellant did not object to the administrative judge’s
      statement of her claims below, despite an opportunity to do so. IAF, Tab 15; see
      Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 14 (2016) (declining to
      consider alleged denials of restoration which did not fall within the time period
      identified in orders issued by the administrative judge, because the appellant
      failed to raise her objection to the scope of her claims below).
¶9          On review, the appellant appears to suggest that the administrative judge
      improperly limited the scope of her appeal and alleges that the agency denied her
      reasonable accommodation based on her “mental disability” beginning in 2007.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-15. We are not persuaded. The appellant has not presented
      any basis for us to conclude that her mental condition might be a compensable
      injury, cognizable in the context of a restoration claim.     See Hamilton v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 404, ¶ 14 (2016) (explaining that a compensable
      injury is defined as one that is accepted by OWCP as job-related and for which
      medical or monetary benefits are payable from the Employees’ Compensation
      Fund). Nor has she explained her prior failure to correct the administrative judge
      as to the scope of the appeal below when she had an opportunity to do so.
      Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge properly limited the scope of
      this appeal.

      The applicable burden of proof to establish jurisdiction in the appellant’s
      restoration claim is preponderant evidence.
¶10         To establish jurisdiction in a restoration appeal filed before March 30,
      2015, an appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that : (1) she was absent
                                                                                         6

      from her position due to a compensable injury; (2) she recovered sufficiently to
      return to duty on a part-time basis or to return to work in a position with less
      demanding physical requirements than those previously required of her; (3) the
      agency denied her request for restoration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary and
      capricious.     Bledsoe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 659 F.3d 1097, 1102,
      1104 (Fed. Cir. 2011).     Effective March 30, 2015, the Board adopted a lower
      jurisdictional standard in restoration appeals. Kingsley, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10;
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b). For those more recently filed appeals, jurisdiction
      and the merits are no longer satisfied by the same burden.                Kingsley,
      123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 10, 12; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(4). Instead, the nonfrivolous
      standard applies to jurisdiction and the preponderant e vidence standard applies to
      the merits. Kingsley, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶¶ 10, 12; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(a)(4), (b),
      (c)(4).
¶11         Because the appellant filed the instant appeal prior to March 30, 2015, the
      new standard does not apply in this case. IAF, Tab 1; see Rules and Regulations
      of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,489, 4,489 (Jan. 28, 2015).
      However, at times, the administrative judge mistakenly referenced the new
      jurisdictional standard. Compare ID at 7 (properly citing the old preponderant
      evidence standard), with ID at 8-9 (improperly referring to the new nonfrivolous
      standard). To be clear, the old standard applies, requiring that the appellant prove
      the elements of her restoration claim by preponderant evidence t o establish
      jurisdiction.
¶12         On review, the appellant suggests that it was improper to dismiss her appeal
      on jurisdictional grounds and not reach the merits becau se the administrative
      judge already had found jurisdiction over the matter. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4
      (referencing IAF, Tab 19 at 3). The appellant is mistaken, possibly due to the
      aforementioned confusion and changed standards. Although the admi nistrative
      judge did find that the appellant presented nonfrivolous allegations and was
      entitled to a hearing, if she wanted one, IAF, Tab 19 at 3, the administrative judge
                                                                                         7

      did not find that the appellant proved the elements of her restoration appeal by
      preponderant evidence, as required to establish jurisdiction in this case, ID
      at 18-19.

      The appellant met her burden of proving the merits of her claim that the agency
      arbitrarily and capriciously denied her restoration.
¶13         Because the appellant may establish both jurisdiction and the merits of her
      appeal by preponderant evidence as to the same four factors, we wil l proceed
      directly to a discussion of the merits of her restoration claim.       See Kingsley,
      123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10-12 (explaining an appellant’s burden of proof under the
      Board’s prior and amended regulations). As detailed above, the administrative
      judge found that the appellant met her burden for the first three elements of her
      restoration claim, and we discern no basis for concluding otherwise. ID at 10-14.
      However, the administrative judge found that the claim generally failed because
      the appellant did not prove the final element—that the agency’s denial of her
      restoration request was arbitrary and capricious.      ID at 14 -17.   Among other
      things, the administrative judge noted that the agency only denied the appellant’s
      restoration request after an unsuccessful search for available work within her
      extensive medical restrictions and commuting area.         ID at 15; RAF, Tab 6
      at 99-103. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.
¶14         We first recognize a change in the standard that applies in this appeal.
      While this appeal was pending review, we issued a decision clarifying the proper
      standard for the fourth prong of a partial restoration appeal such as this. Cronin
      v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 14. In Cronin, we clarified that a denial
      of restoration is arbitrary and capricious if, and only if, the agency failed to meet
      its obligations under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). Id. We explicitly overturned prior
      precedent, including Latham v. U.S. Postal Service, 117 M.S.P.R. 400 (2012), to
      the extent that such precedent held that a denial of restoration may be arbitrary
      and capricious based on an agency’s failure to comply with its self -imposed
      restoration obligations, such as those provided in the Postal Service’s Employee
                                                                                        8

      and Labor Relations Manual (ELM).          Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶¶ 15-20.
      Accordingly, an agency is only obliged to “make every effort to restore” a
      partially recovered employee “in the local commuting area” and “according to the
      circumstances in each case.” Id., ¶ 14; 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). To the extent that
      the administrative judge relied on Latham and considered whether the agency
      complied with ELM provisions, that analysis was improper in light of Cronin.
      See, e.g., ID at 12, 17, 19. Similarly, we decline to review the appellant’s claim
      that the agency violated the applicable collective bargaining agreement w hen it
      denied her a position on which she bid. IAF, Tab 7 at 36-37. Any such failure
      does not fall within the agency’s restoration obligation s under 5 C.F.R.
      § 353.301(d). See Cronin, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20.
¶15        Next, we find that the administrative judge erred in concluding that the
      agency conducted a proper search for available vacant positions.       Pursuant to
      5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d), the agency was obligated to search the local commuting
      area for positions. Yet, all of the documentation pertaining to the agency’s search
      in and around May 2013, when the appellant returned from her lengthy absence,
      suggests that the agency only searched its Youngstown facility, where she had
      previously worked.    RAF, Tab 6 at 99-103.      The documentation contains no
      indication that the agency expanded its search to include any other facility within
      the local commuting area.    At times, the agency appears to have conceded as
      much, arguing that the appellant failed to identify available work within the half-
      hour driving restriction her physician prescribed. RAF, Tab 53 at 9; see, e.g.,
      RAF, Tab 6 at 110-14. However, that half-hour driving restriction was prescribed
      in the context of the appellant’s workday, not her commute.           RAF, Tab 6
      at 110-14. Moreover, even if the appellant was restricted to a half hour of driving
      per calendar day, we discern no basis for concluding that the appellant was
      restricted from traveling throughout the local commuting area in some other way.
¶16        We further find the agency’s search improper for anoth er reason.         The
      appellant has argued that the Form CA-17 describing her medical restrictions
                                                                                        9

      during the relevant period did not preclude her from working an 8 -hour workday.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5.     The administrative judge disagreed, finding that the
      CA-17 Form explicitly stated otherwise.      ID at 2 n.2.   We conclude that this
      finding was in error.
¶17         The form at issue lists a variety of functional activities and the number of
      hours they are required for the appellant’s position, providing spaces in which th e
      appellant’s physician could indicate whether or to what extent the appellant’s
      condition prevented her from performing those activities. RAF, Tab 6 at 112 -13.
      For example, in the December 2012 and April 2013 forms, the physician’s
      markings indicated that the appellant could only twist for 1 of the 2 hours
      typically required of her position.   Id. The physician left blank the spaces in
      which he could describe any limitations on the appellant’s ability to sit, stand,
      and walk a total of 8 hours per day. Id.
¶18         Based upon the restrictions identified on these forms, the administrative
      judge concluded that the appellant could not complete an 8 -hour workday. ID
      at 2 n.2. However, on the Form CA-17, the appellant’s physician indicated that
      she required 3 minutes to stretch for every 20 minutes of repetitive work, but
      could work overtime within her restrictions. RAF, Tab 6 at 112-13. Because he
      indicated that the appellant could work overtime, it is evident that the physician
      had not concluded she was unable to complete an 8-hour workday. Id.
¶19         The distinction described above is particularly relevant because the record
      strongly suggests that the agency made the same mistake.          The limite d-duty
      assignment the agency gave the appellant in December 2012 was for on ly 1 hour
      of work per day. Id. at 106. Then, after her absence that began in February 2013,
      when the appellant attempted to return to work in May 2013, agency officials
      exchanged emails about her return, repeatedly alluding to an ability to work an
      hour or less. Id. at 99, 101. Additionally, in an affidavit submitted in concert
      with the appellant’s EEO claim, her supervisor repeatedly asserted that the
                                                                                        10

      appellant was only able to work an hour per day, with breaks and other
      restrictions. RAF, Tab 15 at 157-58, 161.
¶20         We were unable to locate any explanation for the agency’s belief that the
      appellant was only capable of working 1 hour per day. Instead, our conclusion
      that the appellant was not so limited is compounded by the fact that the
      appellant’s March 2011 CA-17 Form included virtually identical restrictions, to
      which the agency offered and the appellant seemingly accepted a full -time
      position. Compare RAF, Tab 6 at 110, with RAF, Tab 45 at 118-20. In other
      words, the record suggests that the appellant’s limitations remained the same
      between 2011 and 2013, but the agency conducted vastly more restricted searches
      for available work in 2013.
¶21         The Board considered similar circumstances in Scott v. U.S. Postal Service,
      118 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 13 (2012). In that case, the agency only searched for 2 hours
      of work per day based on medical restrictions indicating that the appellant was
      limited to 2 hours per day for certain tasks. Id., ¶¶ 8, 13. The Board found that
      the agency’s failure to search for tasks that could provide the appellant with a
      40-hour workweek was an improper search and an arbitrary and capricious denial
      of restoration. Id., ¶ 13. We reach the same conclusion here. The record shows,
      by preponderant evidence, that the agency conducted an improper search in
      May 2013, the period at issue in the FAD and this appeal. Accordingly, we find
      that the appellant met her burden of proving that the agency’s May 2013 denial of
      restoration was arbitrary and capricious.
¶22         In a case like this one, in which the denial of restoration was arbitrary and
      capricious for lack of a proper job search, the appropriate remedy is for the
      agency to conduct an appropriate search within the local commuting area
      retroactive to the date of the appellant’s request for restoration, and to consider
      her for any suitable vacancies. Scott, 118 M.S.P.R. 375, ¶ 14. The remedy of a
      retroactive search for available positions will be sufficient to correct the wrongful
      action and substitute it with a correct one based on the appropriate search . Davis
                                                                                       11

      v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 122, ¶ 14 (2013). It will not, however, put
      the appellant in a better position than she was in before the wrongful action
      because the agency may not find an appropriate available position. The appellant
      may be entitled to back pay only if the agency’s restorative search uncovers an
      available position to which it could have restored her. Id.

      The record must be further developed to address the appellant’s claim of
      disability discrimination.
¶23        As recognized in the initial decision, the appellant has, at times, presented
      allegations of harmful error, hostile work environment, and race discrimination.
      ID at 6.   On review, the appellant has not clearly identified anything in the
      voluminous record supporting those allegations. Therefore, we will not address
      them further.   See Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92
      (1992) (explaining that a petition for review must contain sufficient specificity to
      enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge
      justifying a complete review of the record); Weaver v. Department of the Navy,
      2 M.S.P.R. 129, 133 (1980) (finding that, before the Board will undertake a
      complete review of the record, the petitioning party must explain why the
      challenged factual determination is incorrect and identify the specific evidence in
      the record which demonstrates the error).
¶24        The appellant has, however, reasserted her allegation that the agency
      engaged in disability discrimination by failing to accommodate her. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 14-15. To the extent that this allegation pertains to the sole matter
      before us—the May 20, 2013 denial of restoration—we find that the record
      requires further development.
¶25        The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in
      connection with an otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of
      section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Pridgen v. Office of Management
      and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35. The Rehabilitation Act has incorporated the
      standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the
                                                                                      12

      Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 . Id. Therefore, the
      Board applies those standards here to determine if there has been a Rehabilitation
      Act violation.   Id.   In particular, the ADA provides that it is illegal for an
      employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
      disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability is one
      who can “perform the essential functions of the . . . position that such individual
      holds or desires” with or without reasonable accommodation.              42 U.S.C.
      § 12111(8). An employer is also required to provide reasonable accommodations
      to an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5).
      Therefore, an appellant may establish a disability discrimination claim based on
      failure to accommodate by showing that: (1) she is a disabled person; (2) she is a
      qualified individual with a disability; (3) the action appealed was based on her
      disability; and (4) to the extent possible, that there was a reasonable
      accommodation under which she believes she could perform the essential duties
      of her position or of a vacant position to which she could be reassigned. See
      Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 28-29. Because
      the agency did not conduct a proper search for available work, it would be
      premature to resolve the appellant’s claim of failure to accommodate.
      Accordingly, we must remand that claim for further adjudication.

                                           ORDER
¶26        We remand this appeal for further consideration of the appellant’s failure to
      accommodate claim after additional record development as described above. In
      light of this remand, the administrative judge should provide the appellant with an
      opportunity to request a hearing on her disability discrimination claim.     If the
      appellant requests a hearing, the administrative judge should convene the hearing
      to address the failure to accommodate issue. On remand, the administrative judge
      should issue a new initial decision that makes findings regarding the appellant’s
      disability discrimination claim.
                                                                                        13

¶27         In addition, we ORDER the agency to conduct a proper job search
      retroactive to May 20, 2013.      See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts,
      726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later
      than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶28         In the event that the agency’s restorative job search uncovers an available
      position to which it could have restored the appellant, we ORDER the agency to
      pay the appellant the correct amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and other
      benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal Service regulations, as appropriate,
      no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision. We ORDER the
      appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts to calculate the
      amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to provide all necessary
      information the agency requests to help it carry out the Board’s Order. If there is
      a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due, and/or other benefits, we
      ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed amount no later than
      60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶29         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶30         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the app ellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶31         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
                                                                               14

necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                      YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                     ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
     You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                         Jennifer Everling
                                         Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                                 2

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1.    Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2.    The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
      a.       Employee name and social security number.
      b.       Detailed explanation of request.
      c.       Valid agency accounting.
      d.       Authorized signature (Table 63).
      e.       If interest is to be included.
      f.       Check mailing address.
      g.       Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
      h.       Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
          collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1.       Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
     Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2.       Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3.       Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4.       If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address
     to return monies.
5.       Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6.       If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of
     the type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7.       If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual
     Leave to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
        a.      Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
        b.      Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
        c.      Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.