Court Opinion

ID: 9613318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:07.756404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:27.980341
License: Public Domain

Judge WHICHARD
concurring in the result.
I concur in the result reached, but I believe the opinion unnecessarily premises the decision on the mutuality of obligation *408doctrine. It observes that defendant-husband could not have delivered a warranty deed conveying fee simple marketable title without the signature of defendant-wife and that one of the terms of the alleged contract was to provide such a deed. It reasons from these observations that “plaintiffs would not have been liable on the contract if [defendant-husband] had sued them. There was not a mutuality of obligation.” Based on this reasoning it holds that because defendant-husband could not have enforced the alleged contract against plaintiffs, plaintiffs accordingly cannot enforce the contract against defendant-husband.
I believe it is unnecessary to consider the performance obligations of plaintiffs to determine whether the alleged contract is binding on defendant-husband. Defendant-husband’s uncontro-verted affidavit establishes that when he signed the alleged contract all parties agreed that he would have to discuss the matter with his wife before he could enter a binding agreement. It further establishes that he informed plaintiffs that he did not believe his wife would agree to some of the terms in their written offer, and that she in fact refused to sign.
Like the author of the opinion, I find no North Carolina authority directly on point. I believe the following is an accurate statement of the general law, however:
It has been held in numerous cases that, where an instrument has been executed by only a portion of the parties between whom it purports to be made, it is not binding on those who have executed it. . . .
The question as to whether those who have signed are bound is generally to be determined by the intention and understanding of the parties at the time of the execution of the instrument. The reason for holding the instrument void is that it was intended that all the parties should execute it and that each executes it on the implied condition that it is to be executed by the others, and, therefore, that until executed by all it is inchoate and incomplete and never takes effect as a valid contract, and this is especially true where the agreement expressly provides or its manifest intent is, that it is not to be binding until signed.
Where these reasons do not apply, it is usually held that a party who signs and delivers an instrument is bound by the *409obligations therein assumed, although it is not executed by all the parties named in it, as, for example, where all the parties recognize the validity of the contract and acquiesce in its performance. Usually, however, a party may, on signing, impose an enforceable condition that the agreement is not to be binding until signed by others.
17 C.J.S., Contracts Sec. 62 at 734-36. As stated in Skinner v. Haugseth, 426 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Fla. App. 1983): “In the final analysis, the question almost always seems to turn upon whether the signing party manifested the intent not to be bound by the contract unless all of the other parties joined in its execution.” And, as stated in Bank of United States v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 140 Misc. 394, 396, 246 N.Y.S. 595, 598 (Sup. Ct. 1930): “When the intent is manifested that the contract is to be executed by others than those who actually signed it, it is inchoate and incomplete and does not take effect as a binding contract unless executed by all parties.”
The uncontroverted forecast of evidence here establishes that defendant manifested an intent that the alleged agreement was not to be binding unless his wife became a party by agreeing to it, and that his wife refused to sign and become a party. The alleged agreement thus remained inchoate and incomplete and never took effect as a binding contract. I would hold that the plaintiffs cannot enforce the alleged agreement on this account and would not invoke the mutuality of obligation doctrine on the facts presented. See Calamari, et al., Contracts, Sec. 4-14 at 157 (2d ed., 1977) (while doctrine may have core of validity, it has been over-generalized and used as a mistaken premise for decisions).