Court Opinion

ID: 9682289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:01.505761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.635888
License: Public Domain

JUNELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the evidence is sufficient to support the jury finding that the speed of the Texas Brine Corporation truck driven by Morris Wayne Johnson was a proximate cause of the collision in question. The accident occurred at night under extremely foggy conditions, reducing visibility and requiring extra precautions. There was evidence that the road was damp, thus creating a longer stopping distance for the Texas Brine eighteen-wheel truck which, with its load, weighed 70,000 pounds. There was evidence that the truck was travelling at a speed between 40 and 50 miles per hour. Although the truck driver testified he did not see the Lofton car until he was within six feet of it, there was evidence from an accident reconstructionist that justified the jury in believing the truck driver saw Lof-ton when he was between 150 and 180 feet away. Johnson testified-he first saw Lof-ton’s headlights and as soon as he saw the headlights he saw them move out across the highway.
The jury found that Johnson was driving the truck at a greater rate of speed than a person using ordinary care would have driven. This finding is unchallenged by the appellant. Appellant challenges only the proximate cause finding on both legal and factual insufficiency grounds. The majority of this court holds that there is some evidence of proximate cause but that the evidence on proximate cause is insufficient.
It seems to me that the majority is saying that evidence is insufficient to support a finding of proximate cause unless the truck driver could foresee the particular accident complained of. In my opinion that is not the law. Texas courts have long recognized that proximate cause does not require that a negligent party foresee the exact manner in which his negligence may result in injury to another. Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351, 303 S.W.2d 359 (1957); Sullivan v. Flores, 134 Tex. 55, 132 S.W.2d 110 (1939); Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847 (1939).
I think there is ample evidence that the speed of the appellant’s truck was a proximate cause of the collision in question. I, therefore, respectfully note my dissent.