Court Opinion

ID: 9549716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:23:48.622656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:48.175097
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(dissenting)—I agree with the conclusion, inherent in the majority opinion, that respondents are entitled to the value of their stock as of September 29, 1958. I do not agree, however, with the implication that the valuation of the stock is too high. I dissent, therefore, from the conclusion that it is necessary to reverse and remand this case.
“. . . with instructions to reconsider all of the relevant factors established by the evidence before it and to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
This is not a situation where a corporation is “buying back” its corporate stock; nor is it one in which the corporation is redeeming its common stock. The question presented is the determination of respondents’ rights, as dissenting minority stockholders, under RCW 23.01.450, which provides:
“(1) If a corporation has . . . authorized an amend*324ment which . . . extends the duration of the corporation ... a shareholder who did not vote in favor of such corporate action . . . shall be paid the value of his shares as of the date of the authorization of such corporate action . . . ” (Italics mine.)
The word “value” has many connotations, but, as used in the statute, it is synonymous with monetary worth. The crux of the problem is the phrase “value of his shares.” In short, what is the amount of United States money that is equivalent to respondents’ stock as of September 29, 1958.
There are many types of “value”; there are many methods of determining value; there are many different elements that must be considered in its determination; but all must have a definite relationship to the particular instance being considered.
The factual situation of the instant case is unique. September 29, 1958, appellant corporation had net assets of $423,489.29, of which $419,781.20 was in cash. Other assets consisted of $22,100.29 of accounts receivable and office furniture valued at $746.15. In other words, 99.119 per cent of the corporate assets was in cash. Each of the one hundred sixty outstanding shares of stock had a monetary equivalent in corporate assets of $2,623.50 in cash.
The court-appointed appraiser and the trial court valued the stock at $2,646.86—$23.30 per share more than its cash equivalent.
Under no theory or method of evaluation that might be considered applicable to this case can I conceive of the value of the stock being less than $2,623.50 per share unless we are to discount United States money.
The trial court may or may not have given a value to the accounts receivable and the office furniture. The court found, however,
“That the court in fixing the value took into consideration the dividend record of the corporation, the fact that stock had not been traded on the market, the nature of the corporation’s business, the character and nature of the assets of the corporation, the fact that its future business prospects were good, the fact that the corporation pursuant *325to the statutes of the State of Washington under which it was incorporated would expire in 1963.”
It is true that the court’s valuation per share may be computed by dividing net assets by the number of outstanding shares of stock; but, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not, to my mind, “unduly emphasize liquidation value.”
There is nothing to be accomplished by the remand ordered by the majority opinion. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Rosellini and Ott, JJ., concur with Weaver, J.