Court Opinion

ID: 9657645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:33:05.751018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:47.218648
License: Public Domain

CATES, Presiding Judge
(concurring specially).
This case illustrates the twilight zone between the control of the client and the control of counsel. Basically, the control of the client extends only into the area of constitutional rights. Thus, in Singleton, 48 Ala.App. 157, 262 So.2d 772, we find a waiver of a trial by jury in a felony case.
The court below was very careful to address the defendant personally and to explain to him the implication of not having twelve men or women to pass upon the facts of the case. This colloquy was addressed to the defendant directly and the waiver came out of the defendant’s own mouth.
But in the area of trial strategy counsel ordinarily has control of the case. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 452, 85 S. Ct. 564.
In Henry the twilight zone was described as circumstances which are exceptional relating to constitutional claims. In such cases the trial strategy, adopted by counsel without prior consultation with the accused, does not prevent a later assertion of those claims.
Henry was remanded to the Supreme Court of Mississippi for further proceedings. It is our understanding that the Mississippi court remanded the case back to its circuit court for an ultimate decision on the matter of the strategy employed — as to whether it was within the realm of constitutional protection or not.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function, contain the following :
“5.2 Control and direction of the case.
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testify in his own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his client.”
On balance, I believe, in this case that defense counsel should have gone ahead and brought out the self-defense theory even though it was inconsistent with the alibi defense.
Certain defenses, of course, take on the aspect of either/or. Thus, if a person pleads not guilty by reason of insanity he *580in effect is pleading guilty, but insane. When he pleads alibi it is either he was there, or he was elsewhere. Certainly counsel could not invade the province of the defendant as to whether he should testify in his own behalf, but counsel should, of course, warn him of the deleterious consequences of claiming alibi in a case such as this.
Certainly self-defense is as completely exonerating if proved to the required degree as alibi and, in this case, a great deal less “fishy”.
I would like to accord my agreement with the action of the trial judge in memorializing the record of the advice given by counsel to the accused. This in turn comports with Standard 5.2(c) of the ABA Standards, supra.
Finally, I look upon this, not as a case of inadequate counsel, but of counsel who was too solicitous of the goodwill of his client, even though this was an ill-deserved trust. The problem here is that the client’s actions forced the hand of counsel into non action on a matter which should not belong to the client. Accordingly, I concur in Judge Harris’ decision.