Court Opinion

ID: 9790784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:30.696671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.597731
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
dissenting.
I would affirm the trial court. My first disagreement with the majority is its conclusion that the lesser degree of proof regarding informant veracity that we allowed in State v. *74Prince, 93 Or App 106, 760 P2d 1356, rev den 307 Or 246 (1988), should also apply here. It contends that “[t]he facts in this case are similar in all material respects to those in Prince.” 137 Or App at 71. That is incorrect. The only similarity between Prince and this case is that in Prince information was supplied to the police by more than one unnamed informant. In Prince, the identities of each of the three informants were known to the police and the informants requested that they remain anonymous because they feared reprisals from the defendants. In this case, the affidavit states merely that the two informants “contacted [the affiant]. ” Nothing in the affidavit alleges facts from which the magistrate could infer that the affiant knew the identities of the informants. See State v. Carter/Grant, 316 Or 6, 12, 848 P2d 599 (1993) (particularized facts must be alleged that provide a basis for an inference).
It is true that informant reports made independently to the police are afforded some weight in establishing reliability. State v. Hasselback, 55 Or App 281, 286, 637 P2d 1316 (1981), rev den 292 Or 825 (1982). In Prince, each report was given independently to the police. The first informant initiated contact with the police and the others were contacted by the police in the course of their investigation. Prince, 93 Or App at 110. In this case, the informants contacted the affiant and the affidavit is silent about whether they made their reports to the affiant together or independently of one other.
In Prince, we could reasonably infer that the informants, who were known to the affiant, were not criminals or persons who were criminally involved and that they were “wholly disinterested citizen[s] providing information to the police at their request.” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 411, 657 P2d 1307 (1983).1
A careful reading of the affidavit in this case reveals that the informants were not disinterested citizens. The affidavit states that both informants had smoked marijuana in the past, an illegal act, and that one had assisted in growing marijuana, another illegal act. The affidavit further states *75that the two unnamed informants went onto defendants’ property, entered the interior of defendants’ barn, and climbed to the second-story loft to observe the alleged grow operation. The affidavit does not explain whether the informants were on defendants’ property with or without permission. Further, the affidavit is silent about whether the informants have a criminal history, whether they were involved in or connected with the crimes charged against defendants, and why the affiant withheld their identities from the magistrate. These facts put this case in stark contrast to Prince. The majority errs by allowing the lesser degree of proof regarding informant veracity than we allowed in Prince.
I also disagree with the majority’s contention that the information in this case was corroborated by the affiant. 137 Or App at 72. The affiant’s corroboration consisted only of going to the entrance to defendants’ property, describing the location of the driveway that the two informants told him extended for approximately 1/8 to 1/4 mile to defendants’ house and describing the mail box and a newspaper box located at the roadside near defendants’ driveway.2 He confirmed from the county tax assessor’s office the size of defendants’ property and that it contains three taxable buildings and he determined from the county assessor’s office, the electric company, and the Department of Motor Vehicles that defendants resided on the property described by the informants. None of that information helped to establish the reliability of the informants regarding their reports of a marijuana grow operation on defendants’ property. The affiant did not verify that the buildings were as described by the informants and provided no information about power consumption. Oregon appellate courts have consistently required an affiant to provide more by way of corroboration than was provided in this case. See State v. Milks/Sales, 127 Or App 397, 402, 872 P2d 988 (1994) (insufficient corroboration where officer verified only the defendant’s name, address and that apartment existed; verified that name on telephone bill matched name on PGE account; confirmed the defendant *76had been arrested that afternoon; and the informant had motive to lie). Compare State v. Coffey, 309 Or 342, 347, 788 P2d 424 (1990) (reliability established by officer confirmation of name and address of the defendant; informant’s description of packaging of cocaine and its slang name; and positive polygraph test results); State v. Binner, 128 Or App 639, 648, 877 P2d 642, rev den 320 Or 325 (1994) (officer substantially corroborated detailed and private information including the defendant’s address, that she was divorced, that her house had an unimproved attic and that the attic window was covered, and that she had an ongoing relationship with another defendant who repeatedly contacted a convicted drug trafficker); Prince, 93 Or App at 113 (police corroboration by personal observation that the shop had three roof vents, that it was entirely closed up; that the defendant’s car was parked in the driveway; and detailed records showing a dramatic increase in electrical power use); and State v. Dunning, 81 Or App 296, 302, 724 P2d 924 (1986) (verified that the defendant and another are co-owners of business, the business office is located in an unmarked cubicle inside another office, and the defendant lives with a named woman who works for a named company; provided source of telephone number).
In sum, I think the trial court was correct that, because the affidavit lacked an adequate showing of informant veracity, the informants’ statements must be excluded and, accordingly, that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. That conclusion was correct, because without the informants’ statements, the affidavit contains only the affiant’s experience and training in narcotics investigations, the fact that the affiant confirmed the location of defendants’ property and the existence of buildings on it, and that defendants lived there. Without the informants’ statements, the affidavit alleges no incriminating facts that would allow a magistrate to conclude that there was probable cause to believe that defendants were growing marijuana in their barn. Villagran, 294 Or at 408.
The trial court should be affirmed and we should not reach defendants’ cross-appeal.

 Although one of the three informants admitted to being familiar with and having seen marijuana growing, that, by itself, is not illegal.

 Because the informants did not refer to the mail box or the newspaper box in their report, the affiant’s observation of these items cannot be considered corroboration of those facts.