Court Opinion

ID: 9954882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 13:02:30.97973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.367307
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                   FLORIDA PACE FUNDING AGENCY,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                           PINELLAS COUNTY,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D23-985

                             March 27, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; George M. Jirotka, Judge.

James C. Dinkins of CivForge Law, P.A., Orlando, and Bradley J. Ellis,
General Counsel of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A.,
Sarasota; and Anthony J. Manganiello, III, of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm,
Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., Sarasota (substituted as counsel of record), for
Appellant.

Kelly L. Vicari, Senior Assistant County Attorney, and Donald S. Crowell,
Chief Assistant County Attorney, Pinellas County Attorney's Office,
Clearwater, for Appellee.

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
     Florida PACE Funding Agency (FPFA) appeals the trial court's order
denying its motion to dismiss for improper venue. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.130(a)(3)(A) (permitting appeal of nonfinal orders concerning venue).
Pinellas County persuaded the court to apply the "sword-wielder"
exception to the home venue privilege to keep this lawsuit in Pinellas
County. Although we conclude that the County's claims do not trigger
that exception, we nevertheless affirm because the forum selection clause
in the interlocal agreement between the County and FPFA requires that
this dispute be litigated in Pinellas County.
                               Background
     FPFA is a local government entity created under section 163.01(7),
Florida Statutes (2010). It finances energy conservation and hurricane
"hardening" improvements on residential and commercial properties.
Property owners may use FPFA financing to cover 100% of the costs for
eligible projects, including equipment, materials, and labor. FPFA
approves the companies that install those improvements. Section
163.08(3) then authorizes an entity like FPFA to levy non-ad valorem
assessments to collect the cost of those improvements from the property
owner over time.
     The County (like other counties in Florida) has used its home rule
powers under article VIII, section 1(g), of the Florida Constitution to
adopt consumer protection ordinances that regulate the operation of
Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) local government entities such
as FPFA. To that end, the County adopted ordinance 17-37 in 2017.
That ordinance is codified at chapter 42, article XIV, of the Pinellas
County Code.
     Article XIV imposes important limitations on a PACE local
government's ability to operate in Pinellas County:
      A PACE local government may operate a program only if it
       has an interlocal agreement with the County (§ 42-445).
      Only nonresidential property owners are eligible to
       participate in a PACE program in the County (§§ 42-440,
       42-447).

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      Even as to nonresidential property owners, a PACE local
       government must still comply with a series of
       requirements, including using only authorized contractors
       to perform any work, ensuring that any work complies with
       code, and utilizing materials that conform with federal and
       state standards (§ 42-446).
      A PACE local government must also provide mandatory
       notices to nonresidential property owners on a variety of
       topics, including the total amount of the debt, that the
       PACE assessment will appear on the property owner's tax
       bill, and that the PACE assessment may hinder the sale or
       refinance of the property (§ 42-446).
                         The interlocal agreement
     Initially, FPFA recognized the County's right to regulate its
operations. Indeed, it entered into an interlocal agreement with the
County in 2019 that recited the following:
     Whereas, the County adopted an ordinance setting minimum
     standards for the operation of any Property Assessed Clean
     Energy [program] . . . . ;
     Whereas, the Agency [FPFA] intends to operate a non-
     residential PACE program within Pinellas County and
     recognizes that, in addition to the limitations and
     requirements of applicable state and federal law, it must also
     comply with the limitations and requirements of the PACE
     Ordinance.
     The agreement then expressly adopts those recitals: "The 'whereas
clauses' above are true, correct, and incorporated into this agreement."
In addition, the agreement provides that "[a]ll requirements and
conditions as defined for the conduct of a PACE Program within the
PACE Ordinance are in full effect as if fully laid out herein." Such
requirements and conditions necessarily include the ordinance's
prohibition of residential PACE financing, together with the ordinance's
requirement that a PACE local government entity like FPFA conduct its
program in the County under an active interlocal agreement. The

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agreement also provides that "venue for any legal or equitable action
involving the County arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the
Agency or its program in Pinellas County shall be in the appropriate state
court in and for Pinellas County." (Emphasis added.)
     For a little more than two years, FPFA operated peaceably under
the interlocal agreement. But that all changed in late 2022 after FPFA
obtained a broad final judgment from a Leon County circuit court in a
bond validation action.
                The bond validation judgment and FPFA's
            subsequent termination of the interlocal agreement
     In October 2022, a circuit court in Leon County validated a series
of FPFA bonds worth up to $5 billion. Significantly, that same judgment
includes language that seemingly permits FPFA to finance commercial
and residential improvements statewide, without regard to municipal or
county ordinances that regulate PACE local governments:1
     The power and authority of [FPFA] to independently engage
     and transact with private property owners, enter into
     financing agreements in the manner provided by the
     Legislature with private property owners throughout the State
     to accomplish compelling state interests and impose non-ad
     valorem assessments, issue its obligations to fund and
     finance qualifying improvements, all as provided by general
     law is separate, alternative, concurrent with, and in all
     respects independent from any other financing regime or
     program implemented by any other local government in Florida,
     unless in all respects voluntarily agreed otherwise by [FPFA]
     from time to time.
     The additional supplemental authority and nonderogation
     provisions of sections 163.08(1) and (16), Florida Statutes,

     1 The County was not a named party in the bond validation action

and contends that it had no notice of that lawsuit before the entry of the
judgment. We express no view on whether the County is bound by the
bond validation judgment or whether that judgment includes
determinations that exceed the permissible scope of such a proceeding.

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     (2022) relate to the authority and subject matter of the
     compelling state interest in enabling property owners to
     voluntarily finance qualifying improvements with local
     government assistance, and does not authorize regulation of
     one local government by another in the financing and non-ad
     valorem assessment process described by the Legislature
     which in the instance of the Supplemental Act and its
     consensual general law authority providing for voluntary
     imposition of assessments for qualifying improvements on
     private property, is within the reserved general law domain of
     the Legislature.
     The character of the Bonds and the nature of the [FPFA]
     entitle the [FPFA] to proceed in accordance with general law
     and the provisions of chapter 75, Florida Statutes, including
     the filing of the Complaint in this Court, for the purpose of
     obtaining the Court's determination of the power and
     authority of the Agency to issue the Bonds, the validity of the
     Bonds, the power and authority of the [FPFA] to independently
     and concurrently transact with property owners without
     interference or regulation from any other local government
     concerning the funding and financing of qualifying
     improvements, the imposition, collection and use of non-ad
     valorem assessments originated by the [FPFA] throughout the
     State as Pledged Revenues to repay the Bonds, and all
     matters in connection therewith.
(Emphases added.)
     With the bond validation judgment in its pocket, FPFA sent a letter
to the County on January 20, 2023, notifying the County that it was
terminating the interlocal agreement effective March 21, 2023, and
stating, "Henceforth, the [FPFA's] program will be conducted
independently, and not under the Agreement." FPFA asserted that the
"[judicial validation] process clarified that the [FPFA] has independent
authority to carry out its mission of offering PACE financing statewide,
without requiring additional efforts from individual counties or cities."
     FPFA's termination letter went so far as to attach a copy of a
proposed replacement interlocal agreement that, among other things,

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stripped out any language obligating FPFA to comply with County
ordinances. FPFA's counsel also prepared and attached to the
termination letter a synopsis of the judgment, stating bluntly:
     The [Leon County] judicial validation further clarifies that,
     because the Florida PACE Funding Agency derives its
     authority to impose assessments from state statute, it does
     not need further authority or permission from a general
     purpose local government to operate within any particular
     territory, and no local government has liability, responsibility,
     or authority relating to PACE programs of another local
     government.
     Clearly satisfied that the matter was closed, FPFA financed
improvements on at least twenty-two residential properties in
Pinellas County between the date of the bond validation judgment
and the effective date of the interlocal agreement's termination.
                   This lawsuit and the County's claims
     The County subsequently brought this two-count action against
FPFA in Pinellas County circuit court. Count one seeks declaratory relief
and asks that the court declare that the County may enforce its PACE
ordinance against FPFA, notwithstanding the bond validation judgment.
Count two seeks injunctive relief and asks that the court enjoin FPFA
from conducting any PACE business in the County unless it complies
with the Pinellas County Code—including the Code's prohibitions on
engaging in a PACE program without an active interlocal agreement and
on financing residential PACE improvements. Although it does not
assert a separate count for breach of the interlocal agreement, the
County nevertheless alleges as a predicate to its counts that FPFA
breached that agreement by financing residential improvements in
violation of the Code.
                     The trial court's ruling on appeal

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     FPFA moved to dismiss the complaint for improper venue, insisting
that the County may only bring this lawsuit in FPFA's home venue,
Sarasota County. The County responded that the bond validation
judgment violated its "home rule" powers under article VIII, section 1(g),
of the Florida Constitution. That section provides, in pertinent part, "The
governing body of a county operating under a charter [such as the
County] may enact county ordinances not inconsistent with general law."
To use "sword-wielder" parlance, the County argued that FPFA is
wielding the bond validation judgment as a "sword" against it and that
the County's lawsuit is merely a "shield." The trial court embraced the
County's argument and denied FPFA's motion, reasoning that the issue
of whether the County can enforce its ordinance against FPFA
"necessarily entail[s] a constitutional and statutory analysis of the rights
and powers of the parties."
     Although the County also invoked the interlocal agreement's broad
forum selection clause as another reason to keep venue in Pinellas
County, the trial court's order does not discuss this alternative ground.
                                Discussion
                The sword-wielder exception to home venue
     We discuss the sword-wielder doctrine first. Governmental
defendants in Florida are entitled, absent waiver or exception, to "home
venue privilege," i.e., to be sued in the county where their headquarters
are located. Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 354 So. 2d 362,
363–64 (Fla. 1977) (first citing Smith v. Williams, 35 So. 2d 844 (Fla.
1948); and then citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows
v. State, 295 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)). Absent an exception (such
as the sword-wielder doctrine), the home venue privilege is absolute.
Dep't of Agric. v. Middleton, 24 So. 3d 624, 627 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing

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Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1212 (Fla. 2006)). The sword-wielder
exception may be applicable when a plaintiff's constitutional rights are in
"real and imminent danger" of invasion by a governmental defendant.
Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Clay Cnty. Util. Auth., 802 So. 2d 1190, 1192
(Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting Barr v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 644 So. 2d 333,
335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
     FPFA bore the initial burden of proving its entitlement to the home
venue privilege. See Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n v. Wilkinson,
799 So. 2d 258, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). It met that burden by
establishing, among other things, that it is a Florida governmental
defendant based in Sarasota County. The burden then shifted to the
County to "plead and prove" that an exception to the home venue
privilege applied. See id. at 261. We hold that the County failed to plead
and prove sufficient facts to trigger the sword-wielder doctrine.
     "The type of constitutional invasions which have supported the
application of the sword-wielder doctrine have been asserted by a private
party and have been fundamental in nature." Jacksonville Elec. Auth.,
802 So. 2d at 1193. Indeed, the decisions in Florida applying this
doctrine to defeat home venue typically involve private plaintiffs (usually
individuals) seeking to protect fundamental constitutional rights. See,
e.g., Pinellas County v. Baldwin, 80 So. 3d 366 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)
(alleging a taking of private property without compensation); Barr v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 644 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (invoking free speech
rights); Graham v. Vann, 394 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement); see also Sch. Bd. of Osceola
Cnty. v. State Bd. of Educ., 903 So. 2d 963, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)

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("The 'sword-wielder' doctrine applies only where a state agency directly
threatens an individual's constitutional rights.").2
     The County analogizes its home rule "powers" under article VIII,
section 1(g), to an individual's fundamental constitutional "rights." But
that, we think, is a bridge too far, and we refuse to expand the protection
afforded by the sword-wielder doctrine to what is essentially a showdown
between two governmental parties.3 Further, the bond validation
judgment purports to apply statewide; it does not single out the County's
ordinance for special condemnation. The County, therefore, is situated
no differently with respect to that judgment than any other county or
municipality in Florida that lacks an interlocal agreement with FPFA.
See Sch. Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 2d at 967 (rejecting application of
the sword-wielder doctrine and concluding that "[f]inally, there was no
showing of particularized harm to OCSB separate and apart from the
generalized harm suffered by other school boards in Florida by the
operation or enforcement of this statute"); Worldwide Appraisal Servs. v.
Dep't of Bus. & Pro. Regul., 905 So. 2d 968, 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
(rejecting application of the sword-wielder doctrine and noting that "[t]he
rules and statutes being questioned are statewide in scope").

     2 Unlike the trial court and the County, we do not read School

Board of Osceola County to say that the sword-wielder doctrine is
implicated merely by a defendant threatening any type of constitutional
violation in the plaintiff's chosen forum; nor do we think that reading
consistent with the opinion. See Sch. Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 2d at
967.
     3 We do not mean to suggest, however, that government agencies

are categorically prohibited from invoking the sword-wielder doctrine.
That broad legal question is not before us, and we do not purport to
answer it.

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     Finally, it strikes us that the primary purpose of the County's
complaint is a collateral attack on the scope of the bond validation
judgment and that any contention by the County that FPFA is directly
violating the County's constitutional rights is secondary at best. See Sch.
Bd. of Osceola Cnty., 903 So. 3d at 967 ("Here, although OCSB's
complaint alleges that the State Board's action infringed on its
constitutional rights, the primary purpose of the lawsuit is to challenge
the constitutionality of section 1002.33.").
     Thus, we do not believe that the County met its burden to plead
and prove the applicability of the sword-wielder doctrine. For the
reasons that follow, however, we nevertheless affirm based on the
interlocal agreement's broad forum selection clause.
                        The forum selection clause
     We review de novo the application of a forum selection clause.
TECO Barge Line, Inc. v. Hagan, 15 So. 3d 863, 865 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)
(citing Am. Boxing & Athletic Ass'n v. Young, 911 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA
2005)).
     FPFA argues that it cannot be bound by the forum selection clause
because the County has not sued for breach of the interlocal agreement,
because none of the County's claims require that the trial court interpret
a provision in the agreement, and because FPFA terminated the
agreement before the County brought suit. We reject FPFA's arguments
based on the plain language of the clause and a close review of the
County's claims.
     Absent express language in an agreement to the contrary, forum
selection clauses are not extinguished by termination. See Baker v.
Econ. Rsch. Servs., Inc., 242 So. 3d 450, 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) ("A
forum-selection clause can survive an agreement's termination even

                                     10
without an explicit survival provision."). That is because "[u]nlike the
substantive rights and obligations in a contract, a forum-selection clause
is a structural provision that addresses the procedural requirements for
dispute resolution." Id. at 453; see also Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading
Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App'x 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2016) ("While
contractual obligations may expire upon the termination of a contract,
provisions that are structural (e.g., relating to remedies and the
resolution of disputes) may survive that termination." (citing Goshawk
Dedicated v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1300
(N.D. Ga. 2006))). A forum selection clause does not require a "savings
clause" to survive termination any more than does an arbitration clause.
Baker, 242 So. 3d at 453.
      Further, "[c]ontracting parties have the right to select the venue for
their disputes." Monarch Claims Consultants, Inc. v. Fleming, 372 So. 3d
758, 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (citing Baker, 242 So. 3d at 452). FPFA
and the County did so in this case. And here, with its use of the word
"shall," the forum selection clause is mandatory rather than permissive.
See Am. Boxing, 911 So. 2d at 865 ("Forum selection clauses stating that
litigation 'must' or 'shall' be initiated in a particular forum are generally
considered to be mandatory.").
      We construe forum selection clauses according to their plain
language, see Antoniazzi v. Wardak, 259 So. 3d 206, 209 (Fla. 3d DCA
2018), and enforce them unless they are unjust or unreasonable, see
Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mijares Holding Co., 76 So. 3d 1089, 1092
(Fla. 3d DCA 2011).4 In this instance, FPFA and the County contracted

      4 We need not consider whether the forum selection clause in this

case is unjust or unreasonable because FPFA does not suggest that it is
either.

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for a broad forum selection clause that is not limited just to claims
"arising under" the interlocal agreement or to claims requiring
interpretation of the agreement's substantive provisions. Rather, this
clause expressly covers "any legal or equitable action involving the
County . . . the Agency or its program in Pinellas County." And while we
would not go so far as to suggest that that provision applies ad infinitum,
we have no problem concluding that it applies, at the least, to legal or
equitable disputes that arose between the parties while the interlocal
agreement was still in effect.
     In this case the County has brought two quintessentially equitable
claims against FPFA—one for declaratory relief and another for injunctive
relief. Both claims concern FPFA's program in the County, and both
turn on events predating the interlocal agreement's termination.
Accordingly, we readily conclude that the forum selection clause applies
to the County's claims. Cf. 4 Am. Jur. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution §
59 (2023) ("The termination of the contract prior to a demand for
arbitration will generally have no effect on such demand, provided that
the dispute in question either arose out of the terms of the contract or
arose when a broad contractual arbitration clause was still in effect."
(emphasis added)); Monarch Claims Consultants, 372 So. 3d at 762
("Courts have often compared forum selection clauses to arbitration
clauses and have applied a similar enforceability analysis to both."
(quoting Baker, 242 So. 3d at 453 n.2)).
     A cause of action for declaratory relief accrues when the following
conditions have been met:
     [T]here is a bona fide, actual, present practical need for the
     declaration; that the declaration should deal with a present,
     ascertained or ascertainable state of facts or present
     controversy as to a state of facts; that some immunity, power,

                                     12
     privilege or right of the complaining party is dependent upon
     the facts or the law applicable to the facts; that there is some
     person or persons who have, or reasonably may have an
     actual, present, adverse and antagonistic interest in the
     subject matter, either in fact or law; that the antagonistic and
     adverse interest[s] are all before the court by proper process
     or class representation and that the relief sought is not
     merely giving of legal advice by the courts or the answer to
     questions propounded from curiosity.
Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400, 404 (Fla. 1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Santa Rosa County
v. Admin. Comm'n, Div. of Admin. Hearings, 661 So. 2d 1190, 1192–93
(Fla. 1995)). These conditions were easily satisfied here before the
interlocal agreement expired. FPFA wrote the County before expiration
that in light of the bond validation judgment, it would henceforth operate
without regard to the County's ordinance, that it would offer financing
for PACE improvements to both residential and commercial property
owners, and that it would do so in the future even if it never entered into
another interlocal agreement with the County. The County's declaratory
relief claim therefore arose while the interlocal agreement was still in
effect. See Ranucci v. City of Palmetto, 317 So. 3d 270, 274 (Fla. 2d DCA
2021) (holding that a claim for declaratory relief had accrued after a
homeowner's association had made it clear that it would challenge "the
City's efforts to compel annexation of any property within the
Amberwynd of Snead Island subdivision").
     The County's claim seeking injunctive relief likewise arose while the
interlocal agreement was still in effect. Specifically, the County pled that
FPFA began providing PACE financing to residential property owners in
violation of the County's ordinance immediately after the bond validation
judgment issued—and well before the interlocal agreement expired in
March 2023—and that "such operation of a PACE program within

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Pinellas County violates state law, local ordinance, and the provisions of
the Agreement during such time as it was effective." Nothing more
needed to happen for the County to seek injunctive relief against FPFA.
Cf. Polk County v. Mitchell, 931 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)
(reversing trial court's order denying county's motion for temporary
injunction where business owner had violated ordinance prohibiting
unauthorized business signs and threatened to do so in the future); P.M.
Realty & Invs., Inc. v. City of Tampa, 779 So. 2d 404, 406 (Fla. 2d DCA
2000) (affirming trial court's entry of temporary injunction against
operation of nightclub because the owner had opened the business
without the requisite permit).5
     Accordingly, although we reject the trial court's application of the
sword-wielder doctrine to the County's claims, we nevertheless affirm the
court's denial of FPFA's motion to dismiss for improper venue based on
the forum selection clause.
     Affirmed.

SLEET, C.J., Concurs.
ATKINSON, J., Concurs in result only.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

     5 We offer no view on whether the County is likely to prevail on

either count. We conclude merely that the County's claims fit squarely
within the broad forum selection clause in the parties' agreement.

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