Court Opinion

ID: 9694885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:59:33.011523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:06.614974
License: Public Domain

Justice BAER,
concurring.
While I join the Majority’s holding that the estates in question are controlled by In re Pollock’s Estate, 306 Pa. 301, 159 A. 555 (1932), I write separately to express my belief that this holding should have a limited impact on the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding the Majority’s comment to the contrary.
As noted by the Majority, this case involves testamentary gifts devised in 1945 from Constantine Stephano to his son, Stephen C.S. Stephano, and through Stephen C.S.’s estate, to Daniel T. Stephano, Stephen C.S.’s son (Appellant). Specifically, the gifts bequeathed to Stephen C.S. (and after his death, Appellant), were a number of shares of stock in a family-owned business. The stock was given on the condition, however, that certain portions of its proceeds be paid to Stephen C.S.’s sister (and, therefore, Appellant’s aunt) Penelope S. Blechstein (Appellee), for life. Appellant currently has control of the subject securities and the responsibility to pay the dividends from those securities to Appellee. Thus, the question presented in this appeal is whether Appellee is a creditor to the estates, with Appellant a debtor; or, whether the arrangement created a trust, with Appellant the trustee and Appellee the beneficiary.
In finding that these circumstances constitute a creditor-debtor relationship (also known as a equitable charge), the Majority cites as controlling In re Pollock’s Estate, 306 Pa. 301, 159 A. 555 (1932), and rejects the application of the Restatements of Trusts by the courts below. In Pollock’s Estate, this Court analyzed a situation analogous to the facts presented instantly. There, the testator gave 2,370 shares of closely-held stock to his son, provided that the son make payment of one-half of the dividends therefrom to his mother for the remainder of her life. Under those facts, this Court *536found that “[i]n all cases of acceptance of a gift made upon condition that the legatee pay certain debts or legacies, the legatee assumes a personal responsibility to pay. The relationship created is one of debtor and creditor.” Id. at 559.
As stated, I agree with the Majority that this case is in line with the facts of Pollock’s Estate, and thus join its conclusion that Pollock’s Estate controls disposition of this appeal. The Majority, however, in what may ultimately be construed as dicta, re-affirms the continued vitality of Pollock’s Estate.1 In doing so, the Majority declines to mention or examine what effect, if any, the newly enacted Uniform Trust Code2 has upon Pollock’s Estate. To that end, I respectfully take issue with the Majority because, as explained below, I believe that the outcome of this case could be different were the UTC applicable.
As noted by Senator Stewart J. Greenleaf, a supporter of Act 98, the primary purpose of adopting the UTC was to clarify the law surrounding trusts, and to make Pennsylvania probate law more uniform with our sister states, while simultaneously preserving our vast body of common law precedent. See Senate Journal, Jan. 24, 2006, at 1185 (comments of Sen. Greenleaf). To the extent, however, that caselaw is in conflict with the UTC, such caselaw has been expressly abrogated in favor of the newly-enacted statutory framework. 20 Pa.C.S. § 7706.
Specifically regarding the formation of trusts, pursuant to the UTC, before a conveyance can be deemed a trust, inter alia, it must be a *53720 Pa.C.S. § 7731. Such conveyance, however, constitutes a trust only if:
*536transfer of property under a written instrument to another person as trustee during the settlor’s lifetime or by will or other written disposition taking effect upon the settlor’s death.
*537(1) the settlor has capacity to create a trust;
(2) the settlor signs a writing that indicates an intention to create the trust and contains provisions of the trust;
(3) the trust has a definite beneficiary [...];
(4) the trustee has duties to perform; and
(5) the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust.
20 Pa.C.S. § 7732. Importantly, trusts are “created only if the trustee has duties” towards third parties. 20 Pa.C.S. § 7732, comment.
Of course, and as this appeal certainly exhibits, certain factual scenarios may present difficulties in determining whether a settlor created a trust, or some other legal relationship, such as an equitable charge. The UTC is clear, however, that it applies only to express trusts, the requirements for which are contained in Sections 7731 and 7732. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 7702, comment. More importantly, however, is that much of the UTC is taken or based upon the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) (Tentative Draft) of Trusts. Specifically, the comment to Section 7702 recognizes that the UTC “does not attempt to distinguish express trusts from other legal relationships with respect to property....” Rather, should a situation arise where distinctions must be parsed out, the comment directs that the Restatement (Second) Sections 2 and 5 through 16C, and Restatement (Third) (Tentative Draft) Sections 2 and 5, be consulted. Id.3
Relevant to this appeal, Section 10 of the Restatement (Second), and Section 5 of the Restatement (Third) each explicitly state that equitable charges are not trusts. The comments to those sections then explain the difference between the two, and the reasoning for such a rule. For *538example, comment h to Section 5 of the Restatement (Third) explains:
Ordinarily a transfer of property to another “subject to” the making of a payment or payments to a third person creates an equitable charge and not a trust, because the transferor does not thereby manifest an intention to impose a duty on the transferee to deal with the property itself for the benefit of the third person. If, however, property is transferred to another “with” or “subject to” a direction that the payment or payments are to be made to a third person out of the transferred property or its product or proceeds, a trust and not an equitable charge is created. This is because the transferor manifests an intention to impose a duty on the transferee to deal with the property, in part at least, for the benefit of the third person.
Comment b to Section 10 of the Restatement (Second) echoes this distinction.
Consistent with the rules and comments contained in the Restatements,4 the UTC directs that a devise constitutes a trust pursuant to Sections 7731 and 7732 when, inter alia: '(1) transferees are given property; (2) the instrument of transfer designated a definite beneficiary; (3) the transferee has affirmative duties regarding that property (exercised on behalf of the beneficiary); and (4) the same person is not sole transferee and sole beneficiary.
It appears that the facts of this case may well fit this framework. Indeed, Stephen C.S., and after his death, Daniel (Appellant), were given shares of stock in a family-owned business with the explicit obligation to pay proceeds from the securities to Appellee, Penelope Blechstein. To mirror the language of Sections 7731 and 7732, as to this life estate held by Appellee: (1) Appellant was given securities; (2) he was obligated to pay Appellee proceeds from those securities; (3) Appellee was the definite beneficiary of such a transaction; and (4) neither Appellant nor Appellee were the sole trustees and beneficiaries to the life estate.
*539Accordingly, had the devise in question been drafted on or after the effective date of Act 98, November 6, 2006,1 believe that this appeal could have been resolved differently. To me, the language of Sections 7731 and 7732, coupled with the statutory references to the Restatements, which are to be employed when distinctions between trusts and other circumstances must be made, suggests that under the UTC, the testamentary devise at issue herein may have created a trust for Appellee’s benefit. At the very least, the recent addition of the UTC to Pennsylvania statutory law undermines the Majority’s re-affirmance of Pollock’s Estate, and its conclusion that “[Wjhere property is bequeathed with a condition to pay a third party a certain sum from the property, and the will’s language and testator’s intent do not clearly create a trust, a debtor-creditor relationship will be presumed.” Maj. Op. at 534, 981 A.2d at 142. Thus, while I concur that, on the facts of this case and the status of the law as it existed in 1945 when the devise was created, a debtor-creditor relationship exists, I distance myself from the portion of the Majority Opinion that re-affirms Pollock’s Estate beyond the effective date of Act 98.
Justice SAYLOR and Justice GREENSPAN join this opinion.

. The Majority’s language is quoted infra, pages 532-33, 981 A.2d pages 141-42.

. Act 98 of 2006, July 7, 2006, P.L. 625, effective Nov. 6, 2006, as codified, 20 Pa.C.S. § 7701, et seq. In fairness to the Majority, neither party nor the lower courts reference this new statute.

. “The statutory text of the Uniform Trust Code is also supplemented by [the] Comments, which, like the Comments to any Uniform Act, may be relied upon as a guide for interpretation." 20 Pa.C.S. § 7706, comment. See also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939 (permitting the consultation and use of comments to a statute in the application of that statute).

. Again, I believe the use of the Restatements as at least instructive authority is proper when determining the nature of a devise under the UTC in light of the comment to Section 7702, supra p. 4.