Court Opinion

ID: 9898439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:42.297721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:06.985499
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                          June 27, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56596-0-II

                               Respondent,

        v.

 ANDREW KAYNE WINDROW,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                               Appellant.

       CRUSER, A.C.J. — Mary Rae Bettger was attacked early one morning. Bettger identified

Andrew Kayne Windrow as her assailant for the first time at Windrow’s trial for second degree

assault. A jury convicted Windrow.

       Windrow appeals. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his

objection to the in-court identification procedure. He also contends that the prosecutor committed

misconduct through the identification procedure and that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance. Windrow asserts that cumulative errors require a new trial. He also filed a statement of

additional grounds for review (SAG) arguing that a towing company unlawfully sold his vehicle.

       We affirm Windrow’s conviction. We decline to address Windrow’s SAG because it is not

a matter related to the decision under review.
No. 56596-0-II

                                             FACTS

                                        I. BACKGROUND

       Around 4:00 a.m. one morning, Bettger drove to the beach to look at the stars. When she

neared the beach, Bettger saw a vehicle approaching from the other direction and stopped to let it

pass. As it approached, the vehicle veered over and struck the front driver’s side of Bettger’s

vehicle. The vehicle then backed up and a man leaned out of the driver’s window. The man yelled

at Bettger and struck at her vehicle several times with what Bettger believed was a machete.

       Bettger turned her car around and fled. The vehicle pursued Bettger for several blocks

before ramming her and sending her off the road. By the time Bettger got out of her car, the other

vehicle was gone. Bettger sought help from residents in the area who called 911. While Bettger

sat in the emergency aid vehicle, she heard yelling outside that sounded similar to the man that

struck her vehicle.

       Deputy Nicholas Zimmerman investigated the incident. He observed damage to Bettger’s

vehicle that included several six-inch dents near the driver’s window. He also noticed debris

nearby that was different from the color and damaged parts of Bettger’s vehicle. At the beach

approach, Zimmerman found a damaged front bumper and a license plate. The bumper had

“Subaru” printed on it and was marred with blue paint the same color as Bettger’s vehicle. The

foam lining for the bumper matched the debris found near Bettger’s vehicle. Zimmerman traced

the license plate to a 1999 silver Subaru Legacy registered to Windrow.

       Later that day, Zimmerman found Windrow in the driver’s seat of a silver 1999 Subaru

Legacy. The car’s rear license plate matched one found at the beach approach. The car had

substantial front-end damage. Windrow asked Zimmerman for a jump start because his car’s

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No. 56596-0-II

battery was dead. The damage to Windrow’s car included missing the entire front bumper and the

alternator belt, which charges the car battery.

       After jumping Windrow’s car, Zimmerman obtained a statement from Bettger.

Zimmerman never showed Bettger a photo of Windrow or a photo lineup of her suspected

assailant. And he never confirmed with Bettger that she saw Windrow driving the Subaru.

Zimmerman then arrested Windrow. During the arrest, Zimmerman found an 18 to 20-inch-long

hatchet in Windrow’s car. The blade of the hatchet was consistent with the marks on Bettger’s car.

       The State charged Windrow with one count of second degree assault and one count of

second degree malicious mischief.

                                              II. TRIAL

       At trial, Bettger identified Windrow as her assailant for the first time:

              [PROSECUTOR:] Can you point to the person that you recognize as the
       person who assaulted you on that evening?
              [BETTGER:] (No audible response.)
              [PROSECUTOR:] Can you identify this person?
              [BETTGER:] I—I don’t know that I absolutely can, unless the hair cut and
       that—the positioning—
              [PROSECUTOR:] Is there anything—
              [BETTGER:] —were exactly the same.
              [PROSECUTOR:] Describe the person that you saw that night?
              [BETTGER:] Someone with brown-ish hair, a little shaggy, a little longer.
       Kind of a—I don’t know, a look of maybe rage on the face. That—
              [PROSECUTOR:] Do you recognize anyone here in the courtroom that you
       believe to be the person that assaulted you that night?
              [BETTGER:] I don’t—
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection; leading and asked and answered.
              THE COURT: I’ll sustain as to leading.
              [PROSECUTOR:] Do you see the man who hit you in the courtroom here
       today?
              [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection; asked and answered.
              [PROSECUTOR:] That you can identify?
              THE COURT: It’s been objected to. I don’t think the witness has had an
       opportunity to answer that question. I’ll overruled the objection.

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No. 56596-0-II

              [BETTGER:] The man at the bench?
              [PROSECUTOR:] Can you point?
              [BETTGER:] (Witness complies.)
              ...
              [PROSECUTOR]: And let the record reflect that the witness has identified
       the Defendant, Andrew Windrow.

Report of Proceedings (RP) at 73-74.

       On cross-examination, Bettger acknowledged that she never identified Windrow as her

assailant in the three months since the incident, at one point stating, “I had no idea who hit me.”

RP at 76. On redirect examination, she explained that she identified Windrow for the first time that

day because no one had ever asked her to identify her assailant before.

       After the State rested, Windrow moved to dismiss the malicious mischief charge. The court

granted the motion and dismissed the charge.

       In closing argument, defense counsel conceded that Windrow’s vehicle was used to assault

Bettger. But counsel argued that Bettger’s weak identification of Windrow as her assailant meant

the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Windrow was the driver. Through jury

instruction 11, which addressed factors affecting the weight the jury should give eyewitness

identification testimony, counsel argued that Bettger’s identification was not credible in part

because Bettger struggled to identify her assailant in the courtroom.

       The jury convicted Windrow of second degree assault and the trial court sentenced him to

50 months of confinement. Windrow appeals his conviction.

                                           ANALYSIS

                                     I. EVIDENTIARY RULING

       Windrow argues that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him his right to a fair

trial by overruling his “asked and answered” objection to Bettger’s in-court identification. Br. of

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No. 56596-0-II

Appellant at 3, 12-17. He reasons that the in-court identification procedure was impermissibly

suggestive and it was the only direct evidence that he was the driver. Because Windrow challenges

the identification on the ground that it was impermissibly suggestive for the first time on appeal

and has not demonstrated a manifest error affecting a constitutional right, we decline to review

this issue.

A.      Preservation for Review

        RAP 2.5(a) authorizes this court to “refuse to review” any alleged error not raised in the

trial court, unless the claimed error relates to a lack of trial court jurisdiction, the failure to establish

facts upon which relief could be granted, or a manifest error affecting a constitutional right.

        Windrow did not preserve the error below. He objected to the identification procedure on

the grounds that Bettger already answered that she could not identify her assailant in the courtroom.

At no point in our record of proceedings below did Windrow ever assert that the identification

procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Thus, we may decline to review this issue unless he

meets one of the RAP 2.5(a) exceptions. Windrow’s contention does not target the RAP 2.5(a)

exceptions of trial court jurisdiction or the failure to establish facts meriting relief, so he must

demonstrate a manifest error affecting a constitutional right.

B.      Manifest Error

        A party demonstrates manifest constitutional error by showing that the issue affects their

constitutional rights and that they “suffered actual prejudice.” State v. Guevara Diaz, 11 Wn. App.

2d 843, 851, 456 P.3d 869 (2020), review denied, 195 Wn.2d 1025 (2020). To demonstrate actual

prejudice, the defendant must make a plausible showing that the claimed error had practical and

identifiable consequences in the trial. State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 99, 217 P.3d 756 (2009).

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No. 56596-0-II

       The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I,

section 22 to the Washington Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to a fair trial. In

re Pers. Restraint of Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 703, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). In particular, “the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels exclusion of eyewitness identification

evidence” that was “obtained by an unnecessarily suggestive police procedure” and “lacks

reliability under the totality of circumstances.” State v. Derri, 199 Wn.2d 658, 673, 511 P.3d 1267

(2022); see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1977).

       Under Brathwaite, Windrow must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the

identification procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive.” Derri, 199 Wn.2d at 674. “Generally,

courts have found [out-of-court] lineups or montages to be impermissibly suggestive solely when

the defendant is the only possible choice given the witness’s earlier description.” State v. Ramires,

109 Wn. App. 749, 761, 37 P.3d 343 (2002). If Windrow fails to show that the identification

procedure was impermissibly suggestive, the inquiry ends. Id.

       Here, Windrow has not shown that the identification procedure was impermissibly

suggestive. Bettger never identified Windrow before his trial, so there was no prior description to

rely on where Windrow was “the only possible choice.” Id. Although Windrow is correct that at

trial he was “one of two people at the defense table,” Br. of Appellant at 24, both people were men,

and our record does not include a physical description of defense counsel or a description of either

person’s attire. It is standard practice to exclude witnesses from courtrooms before they testify,

see ER 615, so Bettger would not have known which person was the attorney until counsel began

making objections. As discussed above, there is no evidence in our record that Windrow objected

to the suggestiveness of the procedure either beforehand or at the time of the identification.

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No. 56596-0-II

Counsel could have requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury and raised the same

contention Windrow now asserts for the first time on appeal. He did not. Thus, Windrow failed to

develop the record below showing that the procedure was suggestive. Derri, 199 Wn.2d at 674.

       Windrow also cannot demonstrate prejudice. Circumstantial and direct evidence are

equally reliable. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 266, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). Because the

identification occurred in-court, Windrow cross-examined Bettger about the reliability of her

testimony and encouraged the jury to find reasonable doubt about her credibility in closing

argument. Bettger’s identification of Windrow was shaky at best. Even without Bettger’s

identification, the circumstantial evidence presented at trial supported a strong inference that

Windrow was the man who attacked Bettger. Defense counsel conceded that Windrow’s car was

used to assault Bettger. The day of the assault, police found Windrow in that car, which sustained

damage during the assault that would have made it inoperable shortly thereafter due to the lack of

an alternator belt to charge the battery. And police found a hatchet inside the car that was consistent

with the marks on Bettger’s vehicle. Windrow cannot show that he would have been acquitted

without Bettger’s identification, so he has not demonstrated practical and identifiable

consequences in his trial to establish a manifest error. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99.

       In sum, Windrow failed to preserve this issue for our review and cannot demonstrate a

manifest error affecting a constitutional right. We thus decline to reach this issue.

C.     Overruling Windrow’s Objection

       To the extent that Windrow argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling

his second “asked and answered” objection because Bettger previously answered the State’s

question, Br. of Appellant at 14, we also disagree. We review a trial court’s decision to admit

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No. 56596-0-II

evidence for abuse of discretion, which occurs when the decision is based upon untenable grounds

or was made for untenable reasons. State v. Gunderson, 181 Wn.2d 916, 922, 337 P.3d 1090

(2014). Bettger did not ever explicitly testify that she could not identify her assailant in the

courtroom. She first responded “I don’t know that I absolutely can,” and her second response was

interrupted by defense counsel’s objection. RP at 73. Neither response was an unambiguous

assertion that she could not identify her assailant. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in overruling Windrow’s second “asked and answered” objection.

                               II.     PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Windrow argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct because her questioning of

Bettger constituted an inadmissible, impermissibly suggestive identification procedure. We

disagree.

A.     Legal Principles

       To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the

prosecutor’s conduct was both improper and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278

P.3d 653 (2012). We will conclude that a defendant who did not object to the prosecutor’s conduct

at trial “waived any error, unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned

that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.” Id. at 760-61. We will “focus less

on whether the prosecutor’s misconduct was flagrant or ill intentioned and more on whether the

resulting prejudice could have been cured.” Id. at 762. The defendant must show that “(1) ‘no

curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury’ and (2) the misconduct

resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict.’” Id. at 761

(quoting State v. Thorgerson, 172 Wn.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43 (2011)).

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No. 56596-0-II

        We view a prosecutor’s conduct in “the context of the total argument, the issues in the case,

the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury.” State v. McKenzie,

157 Wn.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006). Eliciting facts to admit as evidence, then presenting

argument based on those facts, is the standard role of the prosecutor. In re Pers. Restraint of

Phelps, 190 Wn.2d 155, 166, 410 P.3d 1142 (2018) (“Facts are the responses to the ‘who, what,

where’ questions prosecutors ask at trial.”).

B.      Application

        As discussed above, Windrow objected to the identification at trial on the sole ground that

Bettger had already been asked and failed to identify her assailant. Windrow did not argue below

that it was improper for a prosecutor to elicit an identification that, it was later argued, was

impermissibly suggestive. We hold that Windrow fails to show that the prosecutor’s questioning

was flagrant, ill intentioned, or prejudicial.

        An in-court identification is admissible evidence if the State can establish by clear and

convincing evidence that the in-court admission has “an origin independent of [any] improper

identification procedure.” State v. Smith, 36 Wn. App. 133, 138, 672 P.2d 759 (1983). Here,

Bettger never even described the appearance of her assailant before Windrow’s arrest and she did

not participate in any pretrial identification procedure. Knowing this, the prosecutor asked Bettger

if she could identify anyone in the courtroom as the man who attacked her. Bettger explained that

she was not absolutely certain, stated that she remembered her assailant having “a little longer,”

“shaggy,” “brown-ish hair” and “a look of maybe rage on the face,” then pointed at Windrow. RP

at 73. As discussed above, Windrow has not provided a sufficient record for us to conclude that

the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. And it is proper for a prosecutor to

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No. 56596-0-II

elicit a witness’s version of events from the witness as long as the manner of questioning is not

flagrant or ill intentioned. Phelps, 190 Wn.2d at 166. Windrow fails to show that the prosecutor’s

questioning here was flagrant or ill intentioned, much less prejudicial. We hold that Windrow has

waived any alleged error.

                            III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Windrow argues that he received ineffective assistance because trial counsel failed to

support his objection to Bettger’s in-court identification of Windrow with proper authority. We

disagree.

       Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel under the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington

Constitution. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 32, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). To show ineffective

assistance, a defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 32-33. Counsel’s performance is deficient

if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 33. We strongly presume that

counsel’s performance was reasonable, but defendant may overcome the presumption by showing

that no conceivable legitimate tactic explains counsel’s decision. State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239,

247, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). When and how an attorney objects is a “classic example of trial tactics.”

Id. at 248. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Id. at 248. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails if a defendant fails to establish either

prong. Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33.

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No. 56596-0-II

       Even assuming without deciding that defense counsel provided deficient performance by

failing to object that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, Windrow cannot

show prejudice. As discussed above, the circumstantial evidence admitted at trial supports a strong

inference that Windrow was the driver who assaulted Bettger. There is not a reasonable probability

that, but for Bettger’s identification of Windrow, the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different. Accordingly, we hold that Windrow’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

                                      IV. CUMULATIVE ERROR

       Windrow argues that cumulative errors denied him a fair trial, warranting reversal of his

conviction. “[A] defendant may be entitled to a new trial when cumulative errors produce a trial

that is fundamentally unfair.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 766. Windrow fails to show any error, so the

cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

                                             V. SAG

       In his SAG, Windrow argues that a towing company unlawfully sold his vehicle. SAG at

1. RAP 10.10(a) provides that on direct appeal, “the defendant may file a pro se statement of

additional grounds for review to identify and discuss those matters related to the decision under

review that the defendant believes have not been adequately addressed by the brief filed by the

defendant’s counsel.” (emphasis added). Windrow’s SAG does not discuss a matter related to the

decision under review because it does not relate to the elements of second degree assault or call

his conviction into doubt. Windrow’s argument is better addressed in the civil realm. Accordingly,

we decline to address his argument.

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No. 56596-0-II

                                        CONCLUSION

      We affirm Windrow’s conviction.

                                                 Cruser, J.
 We concur:

Glasgow, C.J.

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No. 56596-0-II

       VELJACIC, J. (concurring) — I agree with my colleagues in the majority that under current

applicable law, in light of the arguments made by the parties, the conviction should be affirmed. I

write separately because I cannot help but be troubled by the in-court identification procedure

utilized here where it was the first identification procedure undertaken by the State.

       The typical in-court identification occurs after an identification procedure during law

enforcement’s investigation. The purpose of the in-court identification is to answer the relevant

question of whether the individual in court is the same individual previously identified. But when

the in-court identification is the first presentment of the alleged perpetrator to the eyewitness, the

procedure has a high likelihood of being impermissibly suggestive. In that context, with the

defendant sitting at counsel table, there is little mystery as to who the witness will identify—the

person in the defendant’s seat.

       It may be fairly argued that the witness will identify the person in the defendant’s seat

because they, in fact, committed the crime. But we would be better served in our credibility as a

court system were we to utilize defensible practices that recognize that the person in the

defendant’s seat may not have committed the crime and instead will be identified as the assailant

because the witness was provided only one choice of assailant—the person in the defendant’s seat.

       While we have historically been content to allow a first time identification procedure in

open court because it was tested by cross-examination in the presence of the jury and was,

therefore, as good as we could do, I disagree that continuation of this historical practice is the best

course in light of what we now know about memory and identification. See, e.g., Aliza B. Kaplan

& Janis C. Puracal, Who Could It Be Now? Challenging the Reliability of First Time In-Court

Identifications after State v. Henderson and State v. Lawson, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

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No. 56596-0-II

947, 959 (2015) (“Studies indicate that faces are often forgotten only a few hours after an event,

and that after one day, the recall of a ‘strangers' age, hair color, and height [is] usually inaccurate.’”

(alteration in original) (quoting Jessica Lee, Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent

Suspects from the Consequences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. REV.

755, 771 (2005))); Samantha L. Oden, Note, Limiting First-Time In-Court Eyewitness

Identifications: An Analysis of State v. Dickson, 36 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 327, 330 (2018) (stating

that more than 70 percent of wrongful convictions overturned by DNA testing in the nation are

attributed to eyewitness misidentification); Jennifer L. Overbeck, Note, Beyond Admissibility: A

Practical Look at the Use of Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 1895, 1905 (2005) (“Many eyewitnesses are telling the truth as they recall it; they are simply

mistaken. Because they believe they are telling the truth, they are somewhat less vulnerable to

cross-examination.”); Jack B. Weinstein, Eyewitness Testimony, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 443-45

(1981) (book review) (discussing that post-event information and interactions can impact

memory).

        To understand fully, one need only juxtapose an investigatory identification procedure with

an in-court identification procedure.       In one type of investigatory identification procedure,

moderately sized photos of similarly appearing individuals are sequentially presented with uniform

timing by a neutral administrator.1 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?

Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487,

1518-19 (2008) (discussing sequential photo arrays). The witness is given time to respond, can

1
  This procedure is the preferred method by the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police
Chiefs. See Washington Association of Sheriffs & Police Chiefs, Model Policies: Eyewitness
Identification—Minimum Standards (May 21, 2015).

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No. 56596-0-II

have the photos presented repeatedly, and is not pressured to make a selection. Washington

Association of Sheriffs & Police Chiefs, Model Policies: Eyewitness Identification—Minimum

Standards (May 21, 2015). Prior to the presentment, witnesses are advised, at minimum, that the

person who committed the crime may or may not be included in the photo lineup, they are not

required to make an identification, and the investigation would continue whether or not an

identification is made. Id.

       Here, the witness during the in-court identification was presented with a pool of one—the

defendant. (A possible pool of two—if we are counting defense counsel—does not assuage my

concern as two is still suggestive, but add that defense counsel is usually excluded from the range

of choices because they have a speaking part, which thereby reveals their role as counsel.) The

witness, in this case also the victim, is being questioned by the prosecutor—the one party in the

room that could fairly be characterized as vindicating the victim’s interests. The identification is

occurring months after the fact. There is no advice that the witness need not identify anyone in

the courtroom, leaving the opposite inference: that the perpetrator is in fact in the courtroom. All

this says nothing of the ability of the witness to observe the perpetrator at the time of the crime.

The witness was also making the selection in front of the entire court: gallery, jury, attorneys, and

judge. An uncertain witness might feel pressured to select the only option; rather than stop the

trial to assert that the State had the wrong perpetrator.

       A continuation of this practice when it is the very first identification procedure is unwise.

This is especially true when we consider the impact of a witness pointing an accusatory finger at

the person in the defendant’s chair in front of the jury. The gesture is powerful. See Oden, supra

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No. 56596-0-II

at 333 (“Some studies indicate that witnesses making eyewitness identifications are believed

79.8% of the time.”).

       Whether steeped in history or not, we should not sacrifice a low pressure, neutrally

administered, sequential lay down of photos comprised of similarly appearing individuals in favor

of a high pressure request for a witness to, not simply confirm a prior identification, but rather, for

the first time, select from a pool of one.

                                                               Veljacic, J.

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