Court Opinion

ID: 9518167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:45:48.550167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:36.667702
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting: This is an important case in the field of defamation and libel law. I believe that the majority’s decision turns defamation law on its head. Today’s decision has serious ramifications with respect to our first amendment right of free speech, for it may pave the way for frivolous lawsuits whenever something caustic is written, even in a fictional story. I do not believe that is the purpose of our defamation law. The plaintiff in this cause is not a public figure or well known for any other reason. She does not allege or claim to be known or publicly recognizable for any reason. She is a domiciliary of Gallatin County, located in southern Illinois. Without even attaching a copy of the allegedly defamatory article to her complaint, the plaintiff claims that she was defamed by a fictional article in Seventeen magazine, which is published and widely distributed nationally. She alleged in her complaint that the fictional article referred to a character named Bryson (which is not plaintiff’s full name) in the article as being a slut. She claims that the fictitious character in the article was intended to portray her, and that she was' defamed because the article referred to the fictitious Bryson as a slut. Nowhere in the complaint does plaintiff establish her identity as the fictitious Bryson. It is only in her answer to interrogatories that plaintiff claims 25 similarities between the fictitious Bryson and herself. None of the similarities are unique or conclusive. For example, the author of the story describes the Bryson character as a "Brass Blonde” and a "Platinum Blonde.” According to plaintiff, "her mother owned a beauty salon” and she and "her friend, Susie Patton[,] were always changing their hair color.” Plaintiff also refers to one incident in the story wherein another character, Anita, is grounded for refusing to tell her father what she had done with his Willie Nelson tapes. Plaintiff claims that she had a friend named Anita, and that Anita’s brother was named Nelson. In my opinion, these are not similarities which establish the identity of plaintiff as the Bryson in the fictional story. Plaintiff did not allege any special damages in her complaint. She must, under the law, allege special damages in order to successfully prosecute her claim for defamation per quod. Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill. App. 3d 727 (1990). Indeed, plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories reveal that she had not been employed for four years prior to the publication of the article. Further, plaintiffs answers did not indicate that she was refused employment after the publication of the article. I disagree, then, with the majority’s decision to reinstate plaintiff’s claim for libel per se. In my view, the majority fails to properly consider the full impact of the innocent construction rule under the circumstances of this case. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the author’s use of the word "slut” in describing one of her characters is the equivalent of charging plaintiff with "having been guilty of fornication.” 740 ILCS 145/1 (West 1992). In addition, I also believe that the majority errs in relying on facts not found within the article itself in order to reinstate plaintiffs claim for libel per se. For these reasons, I respectfully but strongly dissent. I The innocent construction rule provides that an allegedly defamatory statement is not actionable per se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992). This rule "requires courts to consider a written or oral statement in context, giving the words and implications therefrom their natural and obvious meaning.” Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11. The focus of the rule is on whether the statement, when so considered, "may reasonably be innocently interpreted.” Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). That determination is a question of law for the court to decide. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352. In this case, the majority holds that the word "slut” is not susceptible to an innocent construction. 174 Ill. 2d at 92-96. The majority reaches this holding by noting the pejorative evolution of the word "slut.” In today’s parlance, the majority posits, the word "slut” connotes sexual promiscuity. Therefore, when viewed in context, "it is evident that the word 'slut’ was intended to describe [plaintiffs] sexual proclivities.” 174 Ill. 2d at 93. From this reasoning, the majority concludes that the article in question comes within the purview of the Illinois Slander and Libel Act. 740 ILCS 145/1 (West 1992) (making charges of fornication actionable). In my opinion, the majority’s holding not only fails to give due regard to the various meanings of the word "slut,” but also fails to fully appreciate the context in which it was expressed. I address each of these points in turn. As a general rule, it is not actionable to call a woman a "slut” unless the word is used in such a manner as to impute whoredom. See 53 C.J.S. Libel & Slander § 26 (1977) (cases cited therein); 13 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1967) (cases cited therein). This rule recognizes that the word itself does not always impute a breach of chastity, but carries with it such nonactionable connotations as brazen or shameless. Indeed, as defendants point out, and the majority concedes, the American Heritage Dictionary contains several definitions of the word "slut,” such as a "slovenly, dirty woman,” "a woman of loose morals,” a "prostitute,” "a bold, brazen girl,” or "a female dog.” 174 Ill. 2d at 92-93. See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2148 (1986). Consequently, because the word has many different meanings, most of which are not defamatory per se, context is crucial; for as noted above, if a word "may reasonably be innocently interpreted,” it is not actionable per se. Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982). We then, as the court, must consider how the word "slut” was used in the context of this article in order to determine whether the author intended to characterize the fictitious Bryson as a fornicator, or merely as an overbearing high school bully. In my view, this can only be done by considering the story in the context in which the word was used, something which the majority does not do. In the story, the Bryson character is introduced as a "platinum-blond, blue-eye-shadowed, faded-blue-jeaned, black-polyester-topped shriek” who is once again "after” the unnamed narrator. Both characters are in high school, although their mutual dislike has spanned several years. As the narrator relates, "We’ve never been friends. But she’s tracked my life since fifth grade, when I climbed on the school bus whose new route added my country stop to her section of town. Two grades ahead, she spent the next four years pelting spitballs at me until she got her driver’s license.” Returning to the present, the narrator relates that during one particular week Bryson had been slamming lockers, cutting classes and dropping water balloons. The narrator, bemoaning the fact that "[i]t was only a matter of time before her attention swung my way,” proceeds to describe the following scene, which takes place in the high school restroom in the presence of another girl, Sue Barton: ’T heard a voice behind me like I’ve heard a million times, in a high-pitched, brassy voice, 'Well look who’s here.’ Bryson had just walked in. Without turning around I knew she was talking straight to me. 'You usually got cigarettes.’ *** 'Not today.’ 'Not today?’ Bryson looked at Sue ... and didn’t say anything. Good. If she wasn’t saying anything, she wasn’t looking for a scene. I put my comb in my bag and edged for the door. 'Hey, I was talking to you.’ She placed one arm on the wall’s peeling green paint. *** Then, instead of doing what I’d always done — what I’ve learned was the only thing to do — stand there, quiet, looking at my feet until her attention went somewhere else, I walked straight up to her arm, put my hands together in a sort of hammer, and knocked it down. *** Then she smiled and said, 'So meet me by the baseball field after school today then.’ ” Later that morning, the narrator telephoned her friend Anita who was sick at home. Anita cautioned, "You can’t fight her. She broke Beth Harper’s two front teeth.” Then, the narrator states: "About two months ago Bryson was at a bonfire with these two guys that nobody knew. One had a tattoo, and they were all drinking. Lots. Who knows what guys like that made Bryson do. The next day she came into school with a black eye. Beth Harper looked at her too long, and Bryson slammed her up against a glass door and cracked her one clean in the mouth. Later that afternoon, as Bryson shouted down the hallways like always, I remembered what a slut she was and forgot about the sorriness I’d been holding onto for her.” The story eventually culminates with the fight between Bryson and the narrator. In this case, the majority submits that the "sexual implication underlying the use of 'slut’ is intensified with the commentary 'who knows what guys like that made Bryson do.’ ” 174 Ill. 2d at 94. I disagree. In my opinion, not only can the word "slut” as used here be construed in the nondefamatory sense connoting brazenness, it is the only way it can be construed. There is nothing lascivious or licentious in the word "slut” when used to describe the fictional Bryson’s less than decorous or mannerly behavior. Indeed, Bryson’s sexual drive is neither the focal point of the story, nor a digression. The appellate court in this case correctly observed that the word "slut” was merely an opinion uttered "by a fictional character about another fictional character” in a story that "creat[ed] a small snapshot of time, one moment in the lives of two fictional adolescents where one calls the other a name because she 'shouted down the hallways like always.’ ” No. 5 — 94—0328, slip op. at 7 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Like the appellate court, I believe that "[although it may be true that this word has a coarse effect on the ear, its use does not create the prurient image plaintiff avers.” No. 5 — 94—0328, slip op. at 7. On the contrary, the word "slut” in this context cannot be viewed as anything more than a literary embellishment intended to convey the brazen nature of a school yard bully. It is not, as the majority suggests, the functional equivalent of charging plaintiff with having engaged in fornication. Thus, if the author of the article did not intend to portray the fictitious Bryson as a fornicator, then she could not intend to characterize the plaintiff as one either. As a result, plaintiff cannot claim that the article in question is libelous per se. In light of the above, I also wish to emphasize that I believe that courts should not espouse a "naíveté” when applying the innocent construction rule. 174 Ill. 2d at 94. However, courts should not be overly sensitive whenever a vulgar or depraved word is used. This is particularly true where the word is found in a work of fiction, where authors typically use colorful language to describe characters and events. Because I believe that the word "slut” as used in this context is clearly capable of a nondefamatory construction, and because I also find that our defamation law is ill-served by the majority’s decision, I cannot join in the majority’s reinstatement of plaintiff’s claim for libel per se. II Defendants also contend that the statement in question cannot be defamatory per se because it does not mention the plaintiff by name, and therefore extrinsic facts must be pled to demonstrate that third persons reasonably understood that the statement referred to plaintiff. They add that the article was a work of fiction which did not purport to describe any actual person. I agree with defendants’ arguments. In rejecting these contentions, the majority points out that plaintiff "identified more than 25 alleged similarities between herself and the physical attributes, locations and events attributed to the character 'Bryson’ in the story.” 174 Ill. 2d at 98. The majority looks to these extrinsic, alleged similarities in order to bolster the connection between plaintiff and the fictional character. However, by relying on these alleged similarities, which are not found within the four corners of the allegedly libelous article, the majority contravenes established case law in this area. If additional facts are required to show the identity of the allegedly defamed person, then the statement cannot be said to be defamatory on its face. Our appellate court has repeatedly held that " 'the injurious character of the statement *** cannot be considered so obvious as to justify dispensing with proof of actual damages’ [z.e., the statement cannot be libelous per se] where additional explanation is required to establish a person’s identification with the publication.” Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill. App. 3d 727, 732-33 (1990) (holding that news broadcast which fell within several of the historical categories for per se defamation was not defamatory per se where plaintiffs identity was not shown on its face), quoting Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill. App. 3d 587, 598 (1989). See also Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388 (1995); Colucci v. Chicago Crime Comm’n, 31 Ill. App. 3d 802 (1975). In this case, I find it ironic and improper that the majority relies on the very extrinsic facts (z.e., the alleged similarities between plaintiff and the fictitious Bryson referred to in the article) that remove this case from per se defamation in order to reinstate plaintiffs claim for libel per se. Plaintiff cannot, on the one hand, rely on numerous facts not found within the article itself to show that she was the person intended to be defamed, and then, on the other hand, claim to have been libeled on the face of the article. That position, which the majority ultimately approves, is not only logically inconsistent, it is also legally unsound. For this additional reason, I submit that it is improper to reinstate plaintiffs claim for libel per se. III Finally, the position I espouse in this dissent regarding plaintiffs claim for libel per se requires me to address the propriety of plaintiffs claim for libel per quod. As with any action for defamation per quod, the plaintiff here must plead special damages in order to recover. Schaffer v. Zekman, 196 Ill. App. 3d 727 (1990). A review of plaintiffs complaint in the case at bar reveals that the allegations of special damages are factually insufficient and cannot withstand a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff summarily alleges that she suffered "pecuniary damages in that she lost business opportunities and/or lost employment as a result of the damage to her reputation.” She does not, however, allege either the nature of the purported lost business opportunities or the circumstances surrounding the loss of her employment. Our courts have consistently viewed such general, boiler-plate allegations as insufficient to state a cause of action for defamation per quod. Taradash v. Adeletl Scott-Fetzer Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318 (1993); see also Heerey v. Berke, 188 Ill. App. 3d 527, 532-33 (1989). IV For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice those counts in the complaint seeking relief for libel per se and libel per quod. I respectfully dissent.