Court Opinion

ID: 9723624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:23:19.905448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:50.427879
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Kelley, C. J.
Appellants seek a rehearing of this cause on the ground that we have erroneously decided a new question of law in this state as applied to the facts of this case.
They say that the stipulation of the parties to this action that appellant, Leonard Niekamp, “was not made a party to said quiet title suit either as an unborn heir, or by representation, or by any other means or procedure” is binding on this and the trial court and exempts him from the effect of the 1909 decree of the Gibson Circuit Court,' he being then unborn. We considered this contention in our opinion. It is evident that said stipulation had reference to the fact that said appellant, not being then in esse, did not appear of record in said action as a party defendant and, of course, was not represented of record either by counsel or otherwise as were the other defendants, his brother and sisters.
*318*317However, the legal effect of the joinder and representation in said action of Leonard’s brother and sis*318ters, they then having the same and identical interests as did he and there being no fraud or impropriety involved, cannot be obviated by the stipulation referred to. A stipulation that a certain thing was done or that certain action was taken is not necessarily conclusive as to the legal effect thereof. 50 Am. Jur. 610, Stipulations, §9, note 6. In seeking the intent of the parties to a stipulation the language used will not be so construed as to give it the effect of admitting a fact obviously intended to be controverted. 50 Am. Jur. 609, Stipulations, §8, note 10. 83 C. J. S. 66, Stipulations, §25, note 91. 83 C. J. S. 27, Stipulations, Sec. 11, notes 7 and 8. To construe the stipulation as contended for by appellants would result in admission that Leonard is not bound by the rule of virtual representation and that the former judgment is not binding upon him. This is a fact obviously controverted by appellees.
Further, appellants undertake, in an indirect manner, to cast discredit upon the 1909 judgment of the Gibson Circuit Court by posing a question. They ask: “Does this court, . . . believe that in such a suit the minors and .their guardian ad litem were certain to bring forward the entire merits of the question, so as to give the contingent interest of Leonard Niekamp effective protection?” As pointed out in our main opinion, appellants neither alleged nor proved any fraud, collusion, or impropriety in connection with said judgment, nor did they in any way contest the legality of the proceedings leading to the same. We cannot presume that the Gibson Circuit Court and the guardian ad litem failed to perform and discharge their sworn duties. Nor can it be presumed that that court did not have the rights of the minors in mind. The presumption is that it did. Young et al. v. Wiley *319(1914), 183 Ind. 449, 463, 107 N. E. 278; McKern et al. v. Beck et al. (1920), 73 Ind. App. 92, 102, 126 N. E. 641.
Finally, appellants hint that we are more concerned with the stability of real estate titles than we are to protect the interests of the minor children. They say that appellant, Leonard Niekamp, has been deprived of his day in court and cite the case of Attica Building and Loan Association of Attica et al. v. Colvert et al. (1939), 216 Ind. 192, 23 N. E. 2d 483 as holding that a minor has a right to appeal from a judgment or to bring action for review thereof “within the time allowed after the removal of his disability.” We can and do readily recognize the holding in that case but we are at loss to perceive how it has any application to the matter at hand. This is not an appeal from the judgment of the Gibson Circuit Court, nor is it an action to review that judgment. This action was brought by appellants to quiet their asserted title to the real estate involved.
No pleadings, no issues, no proof, no contentions, were made at any time in this action relative to any right of Leonard to appeal from or have a review of said former judgment. The first time such contention has been suggested is in this petition for a rehearing. It comes too late.
Appellants have shown no valid reason for our granting a rehearing of this cause and their petition, therefore, is overruled.
Royse, P. J.—Concurs in result.
Pfaíf, J.—Not participating.
Note.—Reported in 123 N. E. 2d 204.
Rehearing denied 123 N. E. 2d 705.