Court Opinion

ID: 9559156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:23:35.23599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:52.978151
License: Public Domain

SHINN, J.
I concur. By the terms of section 2250 of the Civil Code, the succeeding sections of the chapter, including section 2280, apply only to express trusts created for the benefit of another than the trustor, and defendant argues that the provisions for revocation contained in the latter section are not applicable here because the trust was for the benefit of the trustor as well as for others. Under original section 2280, a trust could not be revoked by the trustor after its acceptance, except by the consent of all beneficiaries, unless the declaration of trust reserved the power of revocation by the trustor. The clear implication of the section was that a *401trust could be revoked by the consent of all beneficiaries, which is the law generally in the absence of statutory limitations (Perry on Trusts and Trustees, 7th ed., vol. 1, § 104), and there are none in California. If the trustor had been the sole beneficiary, she could have revoked the trust (Bradbury v. McClure (1892), 93 Cal. 133 [28 P. 777]; Fernald v. Lawsten (1938), 26 Cal.App.2d 552 [79 P.2d 742]), and consequently could revoke it as to her own interest as beneficiary, even though there were other beneficiaries. Under amended section 2280 she had the power to revoke it as to all other beneficiaries.
There are two additional grounds for affirmance of the judgment. The findings are subject to the construction that plaintiff executed the deed with the understanding, concurred in by defendant, that plaintiff, under the agreement, could direct a sale of the property at any time and that the entire proceeds would be paid to her. Consistently with plaintiff’s testimony on the subject, which was meager, the writings signed by defendant and the circumstances of the case tended strongly to prove that plaintiff had such an understanding and that both parties so understood the writings. As plaintiff had the right to require the property to be sold, she had a right to revoke the trust, since the sale of the property and the payment of the proceeds to her would revoke or terminate it.
The second ground is that the findings established defendant’s relation as trustee of a constructive trust. She refused to allow a sale of the property and thus violated her promise, which was a material inducement for the transfer of the property to her. Under these circumstances a court of equity will decree the property to be held in trust and direct that it be reconveyed. (Lyttle v. Fickling (1945), ante, p. 383 [164 P.2d 842].) Any and all adverse claims of defendant under the deed and the agreement were vitiated when it was established that her only interest in the property was that of a trustee under a constructive trust.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 26,1946, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 25, 1946.