Court Opinion

ID: 9561851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:17:27.202388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:36.931506
License: Public Domain

Benton, J., with whom Barrow, J. joins,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part II of the majority’s opinion which concludes that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction for distribution of heroin. I respectfully dissent, however, from Part I of the opinion which upholds the grand larceny conviction. The evidence in this record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, does not support the majority’s conclusion that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Kenneth Speight knew the property was stolen. The inference of guilty knowledge which the majority culls from a cumulation of circumstances that it deems suspicious is untenable. “[Suspicion is never enough to sustain a conviction.” Simmons v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 778, 783, 160 S.E.2d 569, 573 (1968).
It is well settled in Virginia that to justify conviction of a crime, it is not sufficient to create a suspicion or probability of guilt, but the evidence must establish the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt. It must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. The guilt of a party is not to be inferred because the facts are consistent with his guilt, but they must be inconsistent with his innocence.
Cameron v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 108, 110-11, 175 S.E.2d 275, 276 (1970).
The deficiency in the Commonwealth’s proof results from the inconclusiveness of Officer Spaulding’s testimony. Spaulding said only that he “met” Speight on October 13 and drove him to the West Grace Street apartment. He offered no explanation for the meeting with Speight or their reason for going to that particular address. The Commonwealth’s evidence did not negate the reasonable hypothesis advanced by Speight that Spaulding asked Speight to accompany him in order to provide an introduction to Saunders, not because Speight knew the property was stolen but because Speight knew Saunders. Spaulding’s testimony that the day after his purchase of the stolen items from Saunders he “paid Kenny [Speight] $20.00 for the introduction on the 13th to set up the deal to buy the stereo equipment” comports precisely with *92Speight’s testimony that Spaulding met Saunders through Speight’s introduction. The majority’s conclusion that this portion of Spaulding’s testimony proves that Speight “organized the transaction” is not supported in the record. Spaulding testified that he paid Speight “for the introduction.” The statement provides no basis to infer that Speight knew he was organizing a sale of stolen property.
The Commonwealth introduced no direct evidence that Speight told Spaulding that Saunders had property to sell. Furthermore, the Commonwealth introduced no evidence regarding the circumstances of Spaulding’s approach to Speight or Speight’s approach to Spaulding that culminated in the purchase of the stolen property. All of these facts were within Spaulding’s knowledge. The absence of proof provides only the opportunity for speculation. This record, however, provides evidence of facts which support a reasonable hypothesis explaining how Speight and Spaulding learned that Saunders had the property.
Speight’s unrebutted testimony was that he was drinking beer with Spaulding, whom he knew as Wolf, in the parking lot of the White Tower Restaurant on October 13, when Saunders approached Spaulding and him with an offer to sell stereo equipment. Speight testified that he was acquainted with Saunders but declined the offer because he had no money. According to Speight, “George Saunders told him at the White Tower parking lot he wanted to sell [Spaulding] some equipment and [Spaulding] told him that he wanted to see the equipment first.” Saunders told them to drive over to 1844 West Grace Street, and Saunders left on foot. Although the Commonwealth could have easily rebutted Speight’s version of the initial meeting with Saunders, if it was untrue, it did not do so.
It is well established in Virginia that Speight’s testimony may not be disregarded simply because he is accused of a crime.
While the . . . [trier of fact] is the judge of both the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses, it may not arbitrarily or without any justification therefor give no weight to material evidence, which is uncontradicted and is not inconsistent with any other evidence in the case, or refuse to credit the uncontradicted testimony of a witness, even though he be the accused, whose credibility has not been im*93peached, and whose testimony is not either in and of itself, or when viewed in the light of all the other evidence in the case, unreasonable or improbable, and is not inconsistent with any fact or circumstance to which there is testimony or of which there is evidence. There must be something to justify the . . .[trier of fact] in not crediting and in disregarding the testimony of the accused other than the mere fact that he is the accused, or one of them.
Spratley v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 854, 864, 152 S.E. 362, 365 (1930); see also Holland v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 32, 41, 55 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1949); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 896, 903, 15 S.E.2d 94, 97 (1941). There were no material conflicts in the evidence in this case, and the record does not support the majority’s conclusion that Speight “gave inherently incredible testimony.” With a few minor exceptions, the material facts as recited by Spaulding and Speight can be reconciled.
Where facts are established which are susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the jury or the judge trying the case cannot arbitrarily adopt the interpretation which incriminates him. The interpretation more favorable to the accused should be adopted unless it is untenable under all the facts and circumstances of the case.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 764, 772, 71 S.E.2d 73, 77 (1952) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 800, 821, 40 S.E.2d 273, 282 (1946).
Spaulding’s subjective belief that he was paying Speight for facilitating the purchase of stolen property is not inconsistent with Speight’s subjective belief that he was paid for directing Spaulding to the apartment, and provides no basis for concluding that Speight gave inherently incredible testimony. That Speight may have expected or accepted payment for directing Spaulding to the apartment or may have seized the opportunity to enrich himself at Spaulding’s expense is neither inherently incredible nor inconsistent with other evidence.
Although the trier of fact could have disbelieved Speight’s testimony that he received no money from Saunders, the possibility that Speight lied about not receiving money from one of the par*94ticipants while admitting receiving money from the other does not constitute evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hyde v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 950, 954-55, 234 S.E.2d 74, 77-78 (1977); see also Bishop v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 164, 169-70, 313 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1984); Stover v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 618, 624, 283 S.E.2d 194, 196-97 (1981). Even if we accept as true Spaulding’s testimony that Saunders paid two bills of unknown denomination to Speight after offering him $25, that fact, standing alone or with other circumstances proved, is insufficient to show guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. The payment is also consistent with payment for leading Spaulding to the apartment from the White Tower or assisting with carrying the equipment to the car.
The majority finds “unusual” the fact “that Speight did not take Spaulding directly up to Saunder’s apartment, but went up alone first,” and concludes from that circumstance that Speight must have had a “role in the transaction.” Apparently, the majority considers these “unusual” circumstances to be suspicious. To draw an inference of guilty knowledge simply because Speight entered the building prior to Spaulding is unwarranted. It is undisputed that Speight knew Saunders. Furthermore, the testimony reveals that Spaulding was the driver of the vehicle and that Speight was his passenger. We are left to speculate whether Spaulding was parking the automobile or whether there were other circumstances not disclosed by the Commonwealth’s evidence that explained the circumstances of the entry. Spaulding may have asked Speight to determine whether Saunders, who left the White Tower on foot, had arrived, or Spaulding may have availed himself of the opportunity to confer with his partner, whose presence is disclosed by the record only when he helped remove the stereo from the apartment after the sale. Spaulding’s testimony does not support a conclusion that the occurrence was either “unusual” or suspicious. In any event, if a conviction cannot be sustained where the circumstances proved are merely suspicious, see e.g., Cameron v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. at 110-11, 175 S.E.2d at 276, it cannot be sustained where the circumstances proved are “unusual.” The suggestion that Speight’s entrance into the building without Spaulding established guilty knowledge is without foundation because “[t]he facts are, at least, equally as susceptible of an interpretation which is consistent with the innocence of the defendant as with his guilt.” Holland v. Common*95wealth, 190 Va. at 41, 55 S.E.2d at 441.
Furthermore, whether Speight was or was not present in the room when Spaulding negotiated directly with Saunders for the purchase of the items is irrelevant. There is no evidence in this record that the discussion which occurred during the negotiations related to the nature or origin of the stereo. Thus, any conflict between Spaulding and Speight concerning Speight’s presence during the sale negotiations is immaterial.
Likewise, Speight’s return with Spaulding to meet Saunders the next day provides no basis from which to infer that Speight knew the property was stolen. Spaulding testified that he arranged to meet Speight on that day. Furthermore, it was Spaulding, not Speight, who arranged to meet with Saunders to complete the sale transaction. At most, the evidence proves that Speight was invited by Spaulding to accompany him when he again met with Saunders.
There is no evidence that Speight possessed or was aware of the existence of the handgun or the Sanyo radio which Spaulding purchased from Saunders on the second day. Spaulding negotiated directly with Saunders for the purchase of the handgun which was not in the apartment and which was delivered to him by Saunders the following day. When Saunders delivered the handgun to Spaulding, he also brought along the Sanyo radio which Spaulding did not expect. No evidence links Speight to either the handgun or the Sanyo radio.
The evidence in this record does not provide any basis for concluding that Speight knew that the property was stolen and participated in or facilitated its distribution. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the most that the trier of fact could have reasonably concluded was that Speight led Spaulding to a private residence where either Spaulding or Speight knew that a stereo component set was being offered for sale by Saunders. The sale of a used stereo component set at a private residence, however, is not a circumstance which is illegal or inherently suspicious. Speight neither purchased nor sold the items. There is no evidence which would support an inference or conclusion that Speight knew that any of the items were stolen or even knew that Saunders had the handgun or the Sanyo radio. For these reasons, I would reverse the grand larceny conviction because the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Speight possessed the guilty knowledge required to support a conviction.