Court Opinion

ID: 9822245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 08:54:20.827566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:03.113549
License: Public Domain

Acosta, J.,
dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: In analyzing and interpreting a prenuptial agreement to determine the parties’ intent, we must be guided by the plain language of the agreement. The majority eschews this basic principle of contract law in this matter, finding that an imprecise and murky waiver of maintenance in the prenuptial agreement nevertheless bars the defendant husband from an award of temporary maintenance. Since our precedent has long required waivers of temporary maintenance to be clear and unequivocal, and because the waiver here did not satisfy that standard, I respectfully dissent and part company with the majority’s finding that the motion court abused its discretion by awarding temporary maintenance to defendant.
For a quarter century, our jurisprudence has adhered to the principle that “[a] prenuptial agreement waiving any right to maintenance does not bar temporary relief prior to dissolution of the marriage” (Tregellas v Tregellas, 169 AD2d 553, 553 [1st Dept 1991]; see also Lennox v Weberman, 109 AD3d 703, 704 [1st Dept 2013]; Vinik v Lee, 96 AD3d 522, 522-523 [1st Dept 2012]; Solomon v Solomon, 224 AD2d 331 [1st Dept 1996]; accord McKenna v McKenna, 121 AD3d 864, 867 [2d Dept 2014]). This Court recently reaffirmed that rule in Lennox v Weber-man, where it held that “the [motion] court was entitled, in its discretion, to award pendente lite relief in the absence of an express agreement to exclude an award of temporary maintenance” (109 AD3d at 704). Although the majority acknowledges the general principle, it misapplies it by finding an express waiver of temporary maintenance where none was included in the agreement. Thus, while the motion court may have erred in applying Domestic Relations Law former § 236 (B) (5-a) (f) to the parties’ prenuptial agreement, it retained its discretion to award defendant temporary maintenance inasmuch as there was no clear waiver of that specific relief.
The majority ignores the significant distinction between maintenance and temporary maintenance, a distinction underlying the rationale of Tregellas and its progeny.1 Indeed, the Domestic Relations Law and our case law treat these two *589types of monetary spousal support as fundamentally different forms of relief. The purpose of maintenance, on the one hand, “is to give the [less-monied] spouse economic independence” (Cohen v Cohen, 120 AD3d 1060, 1065 [1st Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks omitted], lv denied 24 NY3d 909 [2014]) or “a sufficient period to become self-supporting” (Sheila C. v Donald C., 5 AD3d 123, 124 [1st Dept 2004]) after a marriage has ended. The purpose of temporary maintenance, by contrast, is to provide for the reasonable needs of the less-monied spouse during the pendency of a matrimonial action, allowing him or her to adequately litigate the matter without being forced to capitulate to the demands of the other spouse because of financial pressures (see Brenner v Brenner, 52 AD3d 322, 323 [1st Dept 2008]; see also 2 Tippins, New York Matrimonial Law and Practice § 17:15 [2015] [a temporary maintenance award is “designed to ensure the economic survival of the dependent spouse . . . until the case is reached for trial and to prevent the economically stronger spouse from starving the dependent party into submission”]). The current Domestic Relations Law also reflects this distinction, by dividing the two types of relief into separate subdivisions, each containing its own calculations and factors to be used in determining the amount of maintenance or temporary maintenance to be awarded (compare Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] with § 236 [B] [6]).
Affianced parties may opt out of the Domestic Relations Law’s provisions of both maintenance and temporary maintenance awards, through the use of prenuptial agreements (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [3]), provided, of course, that such agreements are not “the product of fraud, duress, overreaching resulting in manifest unfairness, or other inequitable conduct” (Gottlieb v Gottlieb, 138 AD3d 30, 36 [1st Dept 2016], citing Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63, 72 [1977]).
However, any waiver, including a waiver of temporary maintenance, must be clear. This standard, articulated most recently in this Court’s decision in Lennox (109 AD3d at 704), mandates that a purported waiver of temporary maintenance *590be “express” in order to effectively deprive the court of its inherent discretion to award such relief. In light of the unique purposes of temporary maintenance discussed above, this is an appropriate and rational requirement. The question, then, is whether the prenuptial agreement here satisfies our standard of clarity; that is, does the provision in which the parties agreed to waive “maintenance” contain an express waiver of temporary maintenance? I say “no.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “express” as “[c]learly and unmistakably communicated; stated with directness and clarity” (Black’s Law Dictionary [10th ed 2014], express). Although the parties agreed to “waive any and all claims for spousal support and/or maintenance . . . both now and in the future,” their omission of the term “temporary maintenance” or other language referring to pendente lite relief signals their intent to limit the scope of that language to maintenance (and to exclude a waiver of temporary maintenance). Considering the distinct usage of the terms “maintenance” and “temporary maintenance” in former Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (which was in effect at the time the parties executed their agreement) and in case law, the parties’ use of the term “maintenance” does not “[c]learly and unmistakably communicate [ ]” that the waiver is meant to encompass temporary maintenance.
The use of the phrase “any and all” does not create the clear and unmistakable waiver of temporary maintenance that is needed. The term is imprecise, demonstrates an element of carelessness, and has been criticized by several commentators (see Bryan A. Garner, Garner on Language and Writing at 316 [2009] [condemning as fallacious the argument “that superfluities seldom create unclarity”]; David S. Elder, “Any and All”: To Use Or Not To Use?, 70 Mich Bar J 1070, 1070 [Oct. 1991] [“any” can mean “one, some, or all,” and “ ‘all’ can mean any one”]). Yet, the majority’s interpretation depends on an inference that the phrase necessarily incorporates pendente lite relief.
Nor does the agreement’s temporal reference to “now and in the future” necessarily justify the inference that the parties intended to refer to temporary maintenance; the phrase could simply mean that neither spouse would seek an award for maintenance (i.e., what the current statute terms “[p]ostdivorce maintenance”) at any point after the execution of the prenuptial agreement or upon the marriage’s termination or dissolution.
The majority also makes much of the fact that the heading above the maintenance waiver mentions “termination of marriage” (emphasis omitted), which the agreement defines as oc*591curring, inter alia, when divorce proceedings are commenced. This, however, does not change the analysis. The result of the parties’ failure to expressly waive temporary maintenance, read together with the heading, only signifies that the parties agreed to refrain from raising claims for “maintenance” once these divorce proceedings were commenced. The provision’s silence on whether temporary maintenance is also waived makes the definition of “termination of the marriage” immaterial here.2 In addition, whether the parties stated their capability of being “self supporting” or whether they are in fact so capable is not dispositive, because any inequities in a temporary maintenance award are best resolved by a speedy trial (see e.g. Tregellas, 169 AD2d at 553).
Although no particular catechism is required to waive temporary maintenance claims, parties to a prenuptial agreement should use express language that includes terms such as “temporary maintenance” or “interim spousal support,” as distinct from terms like “maintenance” and “post-divorce maintenance,” if they wish to waive those claims. Only then will their intent be clear. The majority mischaracterizes my position by claiming that I would require the use of “magic words.” I do no such thing. Instead, I recognize, as the majority does, that the existing standard is one of clarity (see Strong v Dubin, 75 AD3d 66, 68 [1st Dept 2010] [parties’ intent “must be clearly evidenced by the writing” (internal quotation marks omitted)]), and provide above a nonexhaustive list of terms that may be used to expressly waive temporary maintenance. Rather than mandate a particular phrase, I would simply apply the standard of clarity, consistent with our precedent.
The majority essentially rewrites the parties’ agreement by inferring the inclusion of temporary maintenance in a waiver that addresses only claims to “maintenance.” Indeed, the final sentence of its opinion—stating that the parties “contracted to waive all claims of spousal support, both temporary and final” (emphasis added)—highlights how the majority strains to find express language that is not present in the agreement. Simply put, the parties, represented by able counsel, could have easily drafted their agreement to expressly include a waiver of *592temporary maintenance by employing the language that the majority now imputes to them.
Indeed, practitioners of matrimonial law ought to be aware of the standard of clarity that has been the law in the First Department since at least 1991 (Tregellas, 169 AD2d at 553 [“The prenuptial agreement waiving any right to maintenance does not bar temporary relief prior to dissolution of the marriage” (emphasis added)]). Significantly, the supplementary practice commentaries accompanying Domestic Relations Law § 236 state that while parties may waive temporary maintenance in a prenuptial agreement, “the agreement must do so explicitly or else temporary maintenance will not be waived. Language waiving maintenance, as distinguished from maintenance and temporary maintenance, will only result in a waiver of maintenance and not of temporary maintenance” (Alan D. Scheinkman, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:40; 45 NY Jur 2d, Domestic Relations § 188, citing Lennox [109 AD3d 703] and Tregellas [169 Ad2d 553]).
I agree with the majority that this appeal boils down to a simple matter of contract interpretation, and that a court interpreting a prenuptial agreement should consider “‘[p] articular words . . . not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby’ ” (Strong v Dubin, 75 AD3d at 69 [alteration added], quoting Kass v Kass, 91 NY2d 554, 566 [1998]). Nonetheless, the agreement must also be interpreted in light of our precedent holding that temporary maintenance is not waived absent express and unequivocal language to that effect. That the provision at issue is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation demonstrates a lack of clarity with respect to the parties’ intent (see Foot Locker, Inc. v Omni Funding Corp. of Am., 78 AD3d 513, 515 [1st Dept 2010]). Altogether, the purported waiver of temporary maintenance in the agreement before us was anything but clear and unmistakable.
I do not dispute our state’s “strong public policy favoring individuals ordering and deciding their own interests through contractual arrangements, including prenuptial agreements” (Matter of Greiff, 92 NY2d 341, 344 [1998]), but this policy does not direct courts to uphold prenuptial agreements (or other contracts) as unassailable when they employ language that fails to clearly express the intent of the parties. The majority unconvincingly attempts to distinguish our prior cases on their facts—for example, by stating that there is “no indication” that *593the parties used expansive language in Tregellas, despite our holding that the prenuptial agreement’s waiver of “any right to maintenance” did not bar a temporary maintenance award in that case (169 AD2d at 553 [emphasis added]). In doing so, it misapplies the broader principle first announced in Tregellas and followed by this Court until now (see e.g. Solomon, 224 AD2d at 331; Lennox, 109 AD3d at 704). The prenuptial agreement in this case failed to expressly waive temporary maintenance; consequently, the motion court was not stripped of its inherent discretion to award that form of pendente lite relief.
Accordingly, the order of Supreme Court should be affirmed in all respects.

. The terminology used herein, “maintenance” and “temporary maintenance,” reflects that which appears in the version of the Domestic Relations Law that was in effect when the parties executed their agreement and married in March 2010 (Domestic Relations Law former § 236 [B] [6] [a] [absent prenuptial agreement, “the court may order temporary maintenance *589or maintenance”]; see also Alan D. Scheinkman, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:35 [“Maintenance refers to the spousal support award made after trial; temporary maintenance is pendente lite spousal support”]).The current version of the statute and the version in effect when this action was commenced use the terms “temporary maintenance” and “post-divorce maintenance” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a], [6]; Domestic Relations Law former § 236 [B] [5-a], [6]). Although “maintenance” and “post-divorce maintenance” can technically be temporary, because they may be awarded for a definite period of time after a divorce, “temporary maintenance” continues to be used in reference to pendente lite maintenance awards.

. Moreover, I note that although the majority relies on two Second Department cases to support its contention on this point, those cases preceded that Department’s more recent decision in McKenna v McKenna (121 AD3d 864 [2d Dept 2014]), a case that approvingly cited our decision in Vinik, among others, for the proposition that a prenuptial agreement that contains a waiver of maintenance does not automatically result in a waiver of pendente lite relief (see id. at 867).