Court Opinion

ID: 9369184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 23:05:14.631519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:13.463844
License: Public Domain

02/07/2023

                                          DA 22-0173
                                                                                        Case Number: DA 22-0173

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2023 MT 22N

KELLI JONES, f/k/a KELLI PARKER,

               Petitioner and Appellee,

         v.

KEVIN PARKER and STACY SNAVELEY,

               Respondents and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Park, Cause No. DR-2009-106
                       Honorable Robert G. Olson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellants:

                       Karl Knuchel, Karl Knuchel, P.C., Livingston, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Kevin S. Brown, Erin E. Harris, Paoli & Brown, P.C., Livingston,
                       Montana

                                                  Submitted on Briefs: November 30, 2022

                                                            Decided: February 7, 2023

Filed:

                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited, and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2     Kevin Parker and Stacy Snavely appeal from the January 31, 2022 Order of the

Sixth Judicial District Court denying their Motion for Hearing to Convert Orders of

Protection to Civil No Contact Orders, and awarding Kelli Jones her attorney fees and

costs. We affirm the District Court’s Order denying the motion and the award to Jones of

her attorney fees and costs. We further order Parker and Snavely to reimburse Jones for

the attorney fees and costs she has incurred in responding to this appeal.

¶3     In September of 2009, Jones and Parker divorced. On January 25, 2010, the District

Court granted Jones a Temporary Order of Protection against Parker. Approximately three

weeks later, the District Court held a hearing and extended the Temporary Order of

Protection to six months. During the period of this protection order, Parker continued to

verbally and physically harass Jones, going so far as to hire one of his employees to

repeatedly destroy Jones and her partner’s personal property. On March 4, 2011, Jones

obtained another Temporary Order of Protection against Parker as well as his long-time

partner, Snavely. Ten days later, the District Court held a hearing and found cause to issue

Permanent Orders of Protection against Parker and Snavely.

¶4     On April 1, 2011, Parker was criminally charged with one misdemeanor count and

one felony count of stalking. On November 18, 2011, pursuant to a plea agreement, Parker
pled no contest to the misdemeanor stalking charge and the felony stalking charge was

dismissed. Parker was sentenced on February 21, 2012. On March 13, 2012, the District

Court issued its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and an accompanying

judgment and order of sentence. In its findings of fact, the District Court noted that “while

the [stalking] offense is a misdemeanor, it is a serious misdemeanor. The offense involves

several instances and several means of purposely or knowingly causing substantial

emotional distress through repeated harassment and intimidating conduct.” The District

Court imposed a one-year suspended sentence and ordered restitution in a total amount of

$5,475.10.

¶5     Parker, and sometimes Snavely, repeatedly moved to modify the Permanent Orders

of Protection. In December of 2011, less than one month after his stalking conviction,

Parker filed his first motion to modify the Permanent Order of Protection. Parker withdrew

the motion on February 28, 2012, but less than three months later, on May 16, 2012, Parker

and Snavely filed another motion to modify the Permanent Orders of Protection. After a

hearing, the District Court granted the motion to modify the orders, but only to the extent

that the modifications would affect the shared parenting of Jones and Parker’s son.

¶6     During this 2012 hearing, the District Court noted that Parker’s behavior was not

the “hallmark[] of a stable” individual and his repeated violations of the Permanent Order

of Protection was “indicative of [Parker]’s continuing animosity toward [Jones],” and his

“refusal to follow the Orders of [the] Court.” The District Court warned Parker that “[a]ny

further request to modify the Order of Protection is hereby denied” and it would “give due

consideration to [Jones’s] request that [Parker] pay her attorney’s fees for future requests
to modify the Order of Protection.” (Emphasis omitted.) On May 31, 2017, Parker and

Snavely moved to modify the Permanent Orders of Protection for a third time. The District

Court denied the motion without conducting a hearing.

¶7     On December 21, 2021, Parker and Snavely moved to modify the Permanent Orders

of Protection for a fourth time. Parker and Snavely filed a motion entitled: “Motion for

Hearing to Convert Orders of Protection to Civil No Contact Orders.”             Parker and

Snavely’s motion was utterly devoid of any substance. The motion cited no legal authority

or any facts in support of granting the motion. The entirety of Parker and Snavely’s motion

was as follows:

       Come now Respondents, Kevin T. Parker and Stacy Snavely, by and through
       their attorney of record, Karl Knuchel, and hereby requests that the Court set
       a hearing on the matter of converting the order of protection to a civil no
       contact order.

       Kevin Brown, attorney for Petitioner has been contacted but has not stated
       his position on this motion.

       Wherefore, Respondents respectfully request that a hearing be held on the
       matter of converting the permanent orders of protection to civil no contact
       orders.

¶8     The District Court denied the motion, noting: “[Parker and Snavely] have provided

no legal authority or factual support for their request. As such, the Court declines to set a

hearing or otherwise entertain the request to amend or modify the Permanent Order of

Protection.”

¶9     We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s “decision to continue, amend,

or make permanent an order of protection.” Bardsley v. Plugar, 2015 MT 301, ¶ 9, 381

Mont. 284, 358 P.3d 907. “A district court’s award of attorney’s fees is a discretionary
ruling which we review to determine whether the court abused its discretion.”

Bardsley, ¶ 12. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without

conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice.

Bardsley, ¶ 10.

¶10    Parker and Snavely contend the District Court abused its discretion by denying their

motion to modify the Permanent Order of Protection without holding a hearing because

this denied them an “opportunity to be heard” and violated their due process rights. Parker

and Snavely’s contention is meritless.

¶11    The District Court declined to set a hearing or otherwise entertain Parker and

Snavely’s request to amend or modify the Permanent Order of Protection because Parker

and Snavely “provided no legal authority or factual support for their request.” This alone

would have warranted summary denial of the motion. See MUDCR 2(c). But the District

Court did not just summarily deny the motion. In fact, the District Court’s Order was far

more substantive than the motion itself. In relevant part, the District Court noted:

       The level of harassment, stalking, and intimidation [Parker and Snavely]
       have engaged in is incredible.
                                        . . . .

       There is nothing in the file which would indicate [Parker and Snavely] have
       ever taken responsibility for their actions. . . . [Parker and Snavely] have
       caused [Jones] and her husband to live in constant terror for the past eleven
       (11) years.

       If [Parker and Snavely] had voluntarily done anything to deal with their
       irrational hatred for [Jones], the Court would entertain their request for a
       hearing. Mental health counseling and treatment, along with anger
       management classes would be a start. There is no indication that [they] have
       done any of this, although the Court assumes Respondent Kevin Parker
       would have completed any court-ordered counseling resulting from his
       stalking conviction. [Parker and Snavely] have not even advised this Court
       that they have taken the basic step of showing remorse for their conduct.

¶12    At its most fundamental, due process requires “notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case.” In re Adoption of K.L.J.K., 224 Mont. 418, 421, 730

P.2d 1135, 1137 (1986) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.

306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950)). In civil protection order actions, the Legislature has statutorily

ensured respondents have a threshold opportunity to be heard. See In re Adoption of

K.L.J.K., 224 Mont. at 421, 730 P.2d at 1137. Specifically, § 40-15-202(1), MCA, states

that “[a] hearing must be conducted within 20 days from the date that the court issues a

temporary order of protection. . . . At the hearing, the court shall determine whether good

cause exists for the temporary order of protection to be continued, amended, or made

permanent.” But there is no corresponding requirement that a district court must hold a

hearing every time a respondent moves to modify an existing permanent order of

protection, and Parker and Snavely cite to no authority for that premise. Beyond the

facially abject lack of merit to Parker and Snavely’s motion, due process did not entitle

them to a hearing in any event.

¶13    Parker and Snavely’s arguments on appeal are no more substantive than their

arguments to the District Court. They completely fail to address the District Court’s

ultimate reasoning for denying their motion—that they “provided no legal authority or

factual support for their request.”     But even if we were to consider the ostensible

“substance” of their brief, it is little more than bald assertions that they were entitled to a

hearing and that the District Court denied them due process by denying them a hearing.
The brief contains no substantive legal analysis or argument.1 This Court does not

“conduct legal research on appellant’s behalf, [] guess as to his precise position, or []

develop legal analysis that may lend support to his position.” State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71,

¶ 22, 331 Mont. 471, 133 P.3d 206 (internal citations omitted). The District Court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Parker and Snavely’s Motion for Hearing to Convert Orders

of Civil Protection to Civil No Contact Orders.

¶14    Parker and Snavely contend the District Court abused its discretion when it awarded

Jones her attorney fees and costs. A district court may award attorney fees under its

equitable powers in circumstances where “a party has been forced to defend against a

wholly frivolous or malicious action.” Lewis and Clark County v. Hampton, 2014 MT 207,

¶ 47, 376 Mont. 137, 333 P.3d 205 (internal citation and quotation omitted). As the District

Court correctly noted in denying their motion, they “provided no legal authority or factual

support for their request.” Parker and Snavely’s motion was, at a minimum, frivolous. The

District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Jones her attorney fees and costs.

¶15    Jones requests that this Court grant her attorney fees and costs incurred in

connection with this appeal. This Court may “award sanctions to the prevailing party in

an appeal . . . determined to be frivolous, vexatious, filed for the purposes of harassment

or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.” M. R. App. P. 19(5).

1
  Regarding their due process argument on appeal, Parker and Snavely’s legal analysis entails a
citation to In re Adoption of K.L.J.K. for the general proposition that due process requires notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case; a citation, without explanation,
to § 40-15-204(7), MCA; and a general citation to all of Title 40, Chapter 15, Part 2 of the Montana
Code Annotated.
Generally, the Court “will only impose sanctions where the appeal is entirely unfounded

and intended to cause delay, or where counsel’s actions otherwise constitute an abuse of

the judicial system.” Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, 2018 MT 300, ¶ 22, 393 Mont.

435, 431 P.3d 342 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

¶16    In addressing Jones’s request for attorney fees and costs on appeal, we begin by

noting that Parker and Snavely’s argument that the District Court abused its discretion is

based, in part, on a blatant misrepresentation to this Court. At page five of their opening

brief, Parker and Snavely assert:

       [T]he District Court’s Order constitutes an abuse of discretion because it is
       based on extraneous and false information that was not made part of the
       record and that is not supported by the record. In its Order, the Court referred
       to “stalking convictions” against Parker, yet Parker has never been convicted
       of “stalking.” After being charged and investigated by the Park County
       Attorney, those charges were dismissed. This finding is clearly erroneous
       and thus constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. [(Emphasis added.)]

As detailed above at ¶ 4, Parker was, in fact, convicted of misdemeanor stalking on

November 18, 2011, upon his plea of no contest to that charge. The felony stalking with

which he was also charged was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement, not “[a]fter

being . . . investigated by the Park County Attorney,” as Parker and Snavely represent.

¶17    That Parker and Snavely would make such a blatant misrepresentation to this Court

is, to say the least, egregious. The attempt to capitalize on this misrepresentation as a basis

for reversing the District Court’s Order is “an abuse of the judicial system” that certainly

warrants an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal. See Little Big Warm Ranch, ¶ 22.

But beyond this egregious misrepresentation, as we noted above, Parker and Snavely’s

arguments on appeal are no more substantive than their meritless arguments to the District
Court. Jones is entitled to all her attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with this

appeal. M. R. App. P. 19(5).

¶18    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it

denied Parker and Snavely’s motion for a hearing to modify the Permanent Orders of

Protection and awarded Jones attorney fees and costs. We affirm and grant Jones all

attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with this appeal.

                                                 /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

Justice Laurie McKinnon did not participate in the decision of this case.