Court Opinion

ID: 9844595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:10.07277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:38.526710
License: Public Domain

WASTE, C. J., Dissenting.
I dissent. I am unable to agree with the judgment of reversal ordered by the majority opinion on the ground that the instruction was so far prejudicial that the conviction amounted to a miscarriage of justice. I also quote from the former opinion of this court in this cause as follows:
“The argument against the constitutionality of the statute establishing the presumption rests upon the many cases which, in effect, hold that a law which provides that certain facts are conclusive proof of guilt are unconstitutional, as are those laws which would make an act prima facie evidence of crime which has no relation to a criminal act, and no tendency whatever to establish a criminal act. Such an authority is State v. Beach, 147 Ind. 74 [36 L. R. A. 179, 43 N. E. 949, 46 N. E. 145, 146]. The reason for this rule is that ‘in judicial investigations the law of the land requires an opportunity for a trial; and there can be no trial if only one party is suffered to produce his proofs’. (2 Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 8th ed. [Carrington], pp. 768, 769.) ‘If, however, the legislature, in prescribing the rules of evidence in any class of cases (as, for instance, here, felonies against the person of another), leaves a party a fair opportunity to establish his case or defense, and give in evidence to the court or jury all the facts legitimately bearing on the issues in the cause to be considered and weighed by the tribunal trying the same, such acts of the legislature are not unconstitutional. ’ (State v. Beach, supra.) As was said by the Supreme Court of Ohio: ‘ It may be conceded that, within proper constitutional limits, the legislature has the general power to prescribe rules of evidence and methods of proof—to determine what may or may not be competent evidence in a particular case—and with certain qualifications, has, perhaps, the power to enact and prescribe that in criminal prosecutions certain facts, when duly established, shall be held to be presumptive or prima facie evidence of guilt. ’ (Hammond, v. State, 78 Ohio St. 15 [125 Am. St. Rep. 684, 14 Ann. Cas. 732, 15 L. R. A. *196(N. S.) 906, 84 N. E. 416].) Mr. Justice Lurton, in the ease of Mobile etc. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42, 43, [Ann. Cas. 1912A, 463, 32 L. B. A. (N. S.) 226, 55 L. Ed. 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 136, 137], has this to say: ‘Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous. ’
“If, in the present case, the presumption declared by the statute was made ‘ conclusive, ’ the objections to its constitutionality would be sound. The ‘prima facie’ presumption here involved does not in any way preclude defendant from establishing his innocence in opposition to it. The legislature here has merely prescribed a rule of evidence in a class of cases, felonies against the person of another, and yet leaves the defendants in such cases a full and fair opportunity to establish their defense. In the case at bar, the defendant, by his own admissions, committed a voluntary homicide. (Pen. Code, sec. 192, subd. 1.) In committing the crime he used one of the weapons which, by the terms of the act, he was forbidden to carry without a license, which he did not have. We are of the view that the inference to be drawn from the fact that the defendant was in the unlawful possession of the revolver he carried at the time was not so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. The defendant accepted the challenge of the deceased to meet him outside the place where they were playing cards. He was the first to go out and, being in possession of the revolver, no doubt felt he was ready for the anticipated fray. It was therefore not error for the court to read to the jury the provision of the act relating to the intent of one charged with a felony against the person of another, under the circumstances of this case.”
In my opinion, the judgment should be affirmed.
Seawell, J., and Shenk, J., concurred.