Court Opinion

ID: 9747220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:04:10.317403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:21.396280
License: Public Domain

COLINS, Judge.
Petitioner, Arthur Heckman,1 petitions this Court to review a Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) decision denying his request for administrative relief. Petitioner contends the Board erred by revoking his parole for violation of two special parole conditions: one relating to *372failure to successfully complete the required outpatient sex-offender therapy and the second relating to no contact with any child under the age of 18 for any reason. Petitioner contends the record lacks substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that petitioner violated the above special conditions. We disagree with the assertions set forth by petitioner, and affirm the order of the Board.
This Court’s scope of review of Board decisions is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Zazo v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 198, 470 A.2d 1135 (1984). Under Pennsylvania law, an offender has no right to a grant of parole; rather parole is a matter of legislative grace. United States v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3rd Cir. 1968); Rogers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 555 Pa. 285, 724 A.2d 319 (1999); Reider v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 100 Pa. Cmwlth. 333, 514 A.2d 967 (1986). Since an offender on parole is serving a sentence of imprisonment outside the prison walls, both the sentencing court and the parole board, have broad discretion to fashion appropriate conditions of parole since those conditions of parole are intended to effect the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration into society as a law-abiding citizen. Reider.
Petitioner contends the Board’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. McCauley v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 28, 510 A.2d 877 (1986). Much discussion in the notes of testimony concerns the personal computer located at petitioner’s residence, and the fact that the “history” feature on the computer reveals that someone visited various internet “chat rooms.” Without disregarding that evidence of record, it is incumbent upon the Court to look at that which is dispositive to resolution of the issues at hand. Dispositive herein is not petitioner’s intent to do wrong, but whether petitioner violated a condition of parole. Here, the evidence is petitioner’s own admission that he spoke “on-line” with a person under the age of 19.2 The Board’s parole conditions were explicit: contact with any person 18 or under was forbidden. That condition was violated, and proof of violation is petitioner’s own admission. That admission is the requisite substantial evidence needed to support the Board’s order.
The second issue is resolved in the same manner. The second condition of parole required petitioner to successfully complete a mandatory sex offender treatment program. The uncontested evidence of record is that petitioner was discharged from the treatment program. What petitioner attempts to challenge are the program and the manner in which it was administered. Petitioner also challenges the director and her reasons for discharging petitioner from the program. However, those issues are not for consideration. In this case the parole condition required petitioner to successfully complete a sex offender treatment program. The uncontested fact of record is that petitioner did not complete the program. Ms. Simmons, a psychotherapist involved in petitioner’s treatment program testified as follows:
We believe that individuals who have a strong history of inappropriate sexual contact with children should not be around children. And Mr. Heckman, whether he had any sexual contact with children, was on many occasions around children, which he shouldn’t have been, to the point where there were suspicions *373about his behavior, regardless if [they] were unfounded or not
Notes of Testimony, pp. 10 — 11. In her report to the Court, Ms. Simmons wrote that “Mr. Heckman is being discharged from sexual offender treatment unsuccessful due to his reported possession and use of pornographic material in additional to his consistently deceptive behavior regarding his thoughts or behavior in relation to sexually inappropriate targets.” Whether or not petitioner’s alleged possession of pornographic material was proven by hearsay is of no moment, since his discharge from the program was not substantially based on the possession of such material. Thus we conclude that there was no error in the Board’s conclusion that petitioner violated the conditions of his parole.
Accordingly, the order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is affirmed.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13 th day of January 2000, the order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.

. Heckman wees sentenced in Berks County to an aggregate term of 6 years, 6 months to 17 years, 11 months for the offenses of Involuntary Sexual Deviate Intercourse, Corruption of Minors and Indecent Assault. He was released on parole on October 26, 1990.

. Mr. Heckman testified as follows: "... You asked me have I had any contact with anybody under 18 and I said yes, a 17 year old.” (Notes of Testimony, p. 50.)