Court Opinion

ID: 9362929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:10.063178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.530175
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals

                                NO. 2021-CA-0190-MR

ESTATE OF TAYLOR COLE, BY
CARLA MCDONOUGH,
ADMINISTRATRIX AND ESTATE
OF BRAXTON FIELDS, BY CARLA
MCDONOUGH, ADMINISTRATRIX                                                 APPELLANTS

                  APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 20-CI-002271

TAYLOR BAREFOOT; BAREFOOT
CONSULTING, LLC; NAKED BY
SUNDAY, LLC; SAZERAC NORTH
AMERICA, INC.; AND SAZERAC OF
INDIANA, LLC                                                                 APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                          VACATING AND REMANDING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND K. THOMPSON,1 JUDGES.

1
 Judge Kelly Thompson authored this Opinion before his tenure with the Kentucky Court of
Appeals expired on December 31, 2022. Release of this Opinion was delayed by administrative
handling.
THOMPSON, K., JUDGE: The Estate of Taylor Cole, by Carla McDonough,

Administratrix and the Estate of Braxton Fields, by Carla McDonough,

Administratrix (collectively the Estates), appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order granting the motions to dismiss with prejudice for forum non conveniens and

failure to join indispensable parties filed by Taylor Barefoot, Barefoot Consulting,

LLC, Naked by Sunday, LLC (NBS), Sazerac North America, Inc. (Sazerac NA)

and Sazerac of Indiana, LLC (Sazerac IN) (collectively the appellees). We vacate

and remand as the circuit court acted prematurely in cutting off discovery and then

dismissing the case in light of the very incomplete record before us which

prevented the Estates from being able to adequately represent their position.

Additionally, it is intolerable for two cases involving the victims of the same car

crash to ultimately be litigated in two different states when they were both

originally filed in Kentucky.

                   FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

             On March 7, 2020, Sazerac IN hosted a Mardi Gras party in

Jeffersonville, Indiana, for its Crews C and D of its Northwest Ordinance Distilling

plant. Sazerac IN rented the Carriage House, purchased the alcohol and contracted

                                         -2-
with NBS to provide bartending services. NBS employed or contracted with

bartenders2 to serve drinks at the party.

              Sazerac NA is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in Kentucky. Sazerac IN is limited liability company which at the

relevant time was a Kentucky corporation. Both Sazeracs produce alcohol

beverages but their exact relationship to one another is unclear at this juncture.

The Carriage House is owned and operated by the Clark County Historical Society

and Howard Steamboat Museum, Inc, an Indiana nonprofit corporation. NBS is an

Indiana limited liability corporation.

              Barefoot, a Kentucky resident, attended the party. Barefoot was a

recruiter for Sazerac NA’s New Albany plant. Barefoot was allegedly overserved

at the party, became highly intoxicated and was allowed to drive her vehicle,

leaving the party at around 9 p.m. At around 9:14 p.m., witnesses began calling

911 to report a vehicle driving north in the southbound lanes of I-65. The vehicle

then exited and drove west in the eastbound lanes of I-265.

              A collision occurred on I-265 in Indiana, in Floyd County, near New

Albany, between Barefoot’s vehicle and Cole’s vehicle. In Cole’s vehicle were the

2
 Whether these bartenders are employees of NBS or independent contractors has yet to be
established, although NBS and the circuit court repeatedly referred to them as independent
contractors. We do not even know if it was one bartender or more than one bartender.
Therefore, we simply refer to them as the bartenders.

                                              -3-
driver, twenty-one-year-old Cole (who was twelve weeks pregnant at the time), her

three-year-old son, Fields, her friend Leah Onstott Dunn, and Dunn’s child, T.J.

All were transported to Louisville hospitals, where Cole, Fields, and Dunn were

pronounced dead.

             Cole and Fields had been living in Kentucky since December 2019.

On the day of the accident, Cole, Fields, Dunn, and T.J. had visited the Mall St.

Matthews. At the time of the accident, Cole was taking Dunn and T.J. to meet

Dunn’s husband at a Walmart in Clarksville, Indiana.

             Cole and Fields were previously domiciled in Indiana and Cole

retained her Indiana license and voting status. It was disputed where they were

domiciled when the collision occurred. Dunn, her husband, and T.J. were Indiana

residents, as was Field’s father.

             Barefoot was later charged by the State of Indiana with three counts of

causing death when operating a vehicle while intoxicated, three counts of causing

death when operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentrate equivalent (ACE) of

.08 or more, and involuntary manslaughter (for the death of the fetus). She pled

guilty to multiple criminal charges and was sentenced to a total of twenty years,

twelve years in prison and an additional eight years probated.

             McDonough, a Kentucky resident, who was the mother of Cole and

the grandmother of Fields, filed probate actions in Jefferson District Court on the

                                         -4-
basis that they were Kentucky residents. McDonough was appointed as

Administratrix of their Estates. On April 1, 2020, she then filed wrongful death

lawsuits on behalf of the Estates in Jefferson Circuit Court against Barefoot and

Sazerac NA.

              The Estates alleged that Barefoot was negligent in driving the wrong

way on a one-way divided highway while intoxicated and caused the head-on

collision which killed Cole and Fields. The Estates alleged that Sazerac NA

through its agents was negligent in over-serving Barefoot and allowing her to drive

away while intoxicated. The Estates further alleged that Barefoot should be civilly

liable for violating criminal statutes and both defendants should be liable for

punitive damages.

              Sazerac NA answered and denied employing Barefoot, being

responsible for the Mardi Gras party, and all other allegations against it. Sazerac

NA then moved for an order of dismissal, or a stay based on forum non conveniens,

and separately asked that all discovery be stayed in the interim. An order for the

discovery stay was entered.

              Sazerac NA argued in its motion to dismiss that Indiana was a

superior forum because the accident and all alleged tortious activity occurred in

Indiana, the state had significant public and private interests and was an

appropriate forum that holds personal jurisdiction over all defendants and potential

                                         -5-
defendants, including the Carriage House and NBS (and its employees) with venue

being appropriate where the motor vehicle accident occurred. It further argued that

all occupants of Cole’s vehicle were Indiana residents, all the first responders were

Indiana residents, as were the three witnesses listed in the police report, and the

overwhelming majority of the material evidence was in Indiana, including the

vehicles and blood tests of Barefoot. It noted that Kentucky could not subpoena

non-party witnesses from Indiana, deferring to the Estates’ choice of forum as less

reasonable when the decedents were Indiana residents, and opined that Indiana was

the jurisdiction with a significant public interest in this litigation. In the

alternative, Sazerac NA argued that Indiana law should apply. Sazerac NA sought

dismissal without prejudice.

               In May 2020, Barefoot also filed a motion to dismiss under the

doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that because all operative facts alleged

in the complaint occurred in Indiana, either an Indiana or federal court3 was the

3
  Unfortunately, because the parties do not have complete diversity of citizenship, the case could
not be filed in or removed to a federal court in either state. 28 United States Code (U.S.C.) §
1332(a)(1). This is regrettable as many of the difficulties with evidence being present in both
Indiana and Kentucky, although within a relatively small geographic area between their southern
and northern borders, would be alleviated as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P.)
45(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2)(A) provide federal district courts with the subpoena power to: “command
a person to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition . . . within 100 miles of where the person resides,
is employed, or regularly transacts business in person” and “command . . . production of
documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a place within 100 miles of
where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person[.]”

                                                 -6-
more convenient forum. In support of this motion, Barefoot explained that Indiana

would have jurisdiction over the named defendants, allegations relating to

violations of the Indiana State Code would require interpretation of Indiana law,

and proof would come from Indiana law enforcement. She argued that all relevant

factors favored dismissal in that the accident occurred in Indiana, arguing: (1) all

the occupants of Cole’s vehicle being Indiana residents, the operative events

regarding the Mardi Gras party occurred in Indiana, and the eyewitnesses,

investigators, and authorities at the accident scene were all located in Indiana; the

defendants might need to implead third-party defendants; and NBS and others

might not be subject to the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts; (2) the Estates’ choice

of Jefferson Circuit Court as a forum should be afforded little weight as according

to the accident report, Cole, Fields, Dunn, and T.J. were residents of Indiana and

Fields’s father is an Indiana resident.

             On July 23, 2020, the Estates filed their first amended complaint,

naming the additional defendants of Barefoot Consulting, Sazerac IN (which they

argued was a wholly owned subsidiary of Sazerac NA), and NBS. Barefoot

Consulting and Sazerac of IN were incorporated into the original negligence claims

and they and NBS were incorporated into the punitive damages claim. A new

dram shop claim was added against NBS and both Sazeracs. The Estates argued

that Barefoot Consulting was a Kentucky company; Sazerac of Indiana was a

                                          -7-
Kentucky company with its principal place of business in Louisville, Kentucky,

and that although NBS was an Indiana company, it publicly holds itself out as a

mobile bartending service which serves Indiana and Kentucky, with the majority of

its business taking place primarily in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The Estates

argued that Cole and Fields were residents of Jefferson County, Kentucky.

             After the circuit court granted the motion to amend, Sazerac NA filed

a supplemental brief in support of its motion to dismiss, arguing that the Estates

had failed to establish that Cole and Fields were residents of Kentucky, had failed

to join the Carriage House as a necessary party, and had not yet established that

Kentucky had personal jurisdiction over NBS. It reiterated that Indiana remained a

superior forum.

             The new defendants, after answering and raising defenses including

those based on lack of jurisdiction, failure to join necessary parties, and

inconvenient forum, filed motions to dismiss in November 2020. NBS argued that

while it “does occasionally contract with Kentucky businesses to provide

bartending services in Kentucky, NBS does not have any physical locations in, nor

does it conduct business in Kentucky.” NBS joined in Barefoot’s and Sazerac

NA’s motions to dismiss and additionally argued that dismissal should be granted

because the amended complaint: (1) fails to state a claim as a matter of law

because the Estates are void for lack of domicile in Kentucky; (2) should be

                                          -8-
dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens; (3) does not establish personal

jurisdiction over NBS in Kentucky as (a) it is not subject to general jurisdiction in

Kentucky because it does not have “continuous and systematic” contact with

Kentucky; and (b) it is not subject to specific jurisdiction in Kentucky under the

long-arm statute because the tortious injury did not occur in Kentucky.

             Sazerac IN filed two different motions to dismiss, one to dismiss or

stay for forum non conveniens, and another to dismiss pursuant to Kentucky Rules

of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02. In each motion, Sazerac IN adopted Sazerac NA’s

arguments and argued that if NBS should be dismissed, its absence would be

highly prejudicial to Sazerac IN. Sazerac IN also argued it believed that NBS had

hired an independent contractor bartender to work the Mardi Gras event and given

the dram shop claims against both Sazeracs and NBS that the independent

contractor bartender is also a necessary party.

             On December 21, 2020, the opinion and order was entered. The

circuit court considered the evidence and arguments in detail in determining

whether Kentucky was a forum non conveniens based on residency and domicile of

Cole and Fields, the availability of an alternative forum, the private interests of the

parties and public interests. It concluded that Cole and Fields were Kentucky

residents, and that Indiana offered a superior forum under every factor it

considered. As to failure to join indispensable parties, the circuit court concluded

                                          -9-
that the Carriage House and the bartenders were indispensable parties, and the

action could not properly proceed without them.

             The circuit court thereupon granted the motions to dismiss for forum

non conveniens and for failure to join indispensable parties. The circuit court

declined to rule upon NBS’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as moot. In

dismissing, the circuit court specifically ruled that “[a]ll claims against all

Defendants are dismissed with prejudice.”

             The Estates timely filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate. The

Estates expressed their concern that the case was “dismissed with prejudice.” To

ensure there was no issue with refiling in Indiana, as the circuit court had

repeatedly stated in the opinion and order that they could do, the Estates asked that

the circuit court “amend or clarify its Order changing the language from ‘dismissed

with prejudice’ to ‘dismissed without prejudice’ to ensure there are no legal issues

created upon refiling in Indiana should the Plaintiffs chose to do so.”

             Barefoot opposed this motion, reasoning it would allow the Estates

“to refile their claims in Kentucky in direct conflict with this Court’s determination

that Indiana is the appropriate forum.” Therefore, it requested that any amendment

state “‘Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in Kentucky and this

Order shall not preclude Plaintiffs from filing in a different forum in Indiana’ to

ensure Plaintiffs are precluded from refiling in Kentucky thereafter.”

                                          -10-
             On January 12, 2021, an order on the Estates’ motion to alter, amend,

or vacate was denied in part, but the circuit court stated it “shall amend the

language of the Order to indicate Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed with prejudice

in Kentucky and this Order shall not preclude Plaintiffs from filing in a different

forum in Indiana.”

             Meanwhile, later in 2021, a separate lawsuit was filed in Jefferson

Circuit Court by Leah Onstott Dunn’s Estate (which was opened in Indiana) and

Aaron Dunn, Leah’s husband (the Dunn case), Case No. 21-CI-001414. This case

was assigned to a division different from that of the case before us.

             In the Dunn case, Sazerac NA and Sazerac IN filed a joint motion to

dismiss pursuant to CR 12.02, Sazerac NA filed a motion to dismiss for forum non

conveniens, and Sazerac NA and Sazerac IN filed a joint motion seeking to transfer

the Dunn case to the same division as the case before us, or alternatively stay the

Dunn case until resolution of the instant appeal. Following a hearing, the circuit

court summarily denied all of these motions.

             The parties requested and we granted them oral argument. During

oral argument, the Estates noted that in the Dunn case, despite the Dunns’ being

Indiana citizens, the circuit court denied the motions to dismiss pursuant to CR

12.02 or forum non conveniens and the motion to transfer/stay. The Estates

requested that we take judicial notice of these orders in the Dunn case, arguing

                                         -11-
what would be truly inconvenient would be to have part of the matter litigated in

Kentucky and part in Indiana. A formal motion that we take judicial notice of

three orders in the Dunn case was submitted and we granted that motion.

                                      APPEAL

             The Estates argue that the circuit court abused its discretion by: (1)

dismissing for forum non conveniens where Cole and Fields were Kentucky

residents and other factors were in favor of Kentucky’s continuing jurisdiction; (2)

it was premature to order dismissal for failure to join indispensable parties based

on specious assumptions about whether they were necessary and amenable to

Kentucky jurisdiction; and (3) any order granting dismissal should have been

without prejudice. However, we are stymied from being able to adequately

address these issues due to the fact that discovery was prematurely halted in this

matter.

   I.     Forum Non Conveniens

             We review dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens for

abuse of discretion. Williams v. Frymire, 377 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Ky.App. 2012).

“The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                                         -12-
             “Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a stay or a dismissal

without prejudice may be appropriate where the chosen forum has jurisdiction and

venue, but where another court also having proper jurisdiction and being a proper

venue would be a more convenient forum to hear the case.” Stewart v.

Kentuckiana Medical Center, LLC, 604 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Ky.App. 2019). Despite

having jurisdiction, Kentucky courts have “not only . . . a right, but also a duty to

consider the doctrine and to decline jurisdiction, if appropriate.” Williams v.

Williams, 611 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Ky.App. 1981). This is based on the

consideration that trial in another forum would be “more convenient for the

litigants and witnesses[.]” Roos v. Kentucky Educ. Ass’n, 580 S.W.2d 508, 508

(Ky.App. 1979).

             “While, even in the ordinary action, the residence of the suitor will not

fix the proper forum without reference to other considerations, it is a fact of ‘high

significance.’” Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,

525, 67 S.Ct. 828, 832, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947) (quoting International Milling Co. v.

Columbia Transportation Co., 292 U.S. 511, 520, 54 S.Ct. 797, 799, 78 L.Ed. 1396

(1934)).

             The convenience vel non of a given forum is not
             determined by a fixed set of rules, but is arrived at by a
             consideration of various factors on a case by case basis.

                                         -13-
                     In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct.
               839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947) [(superseded by statute)4], the
               Court noted that:

                             (i)mportant considerations are the relative
                      ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
                      compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
                      and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing
                      witnesses; possibility of view of premises if view
                      would be appropriate to the action; and all other
                      practical problems that make trial of case easy,
                      expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. at page 508, 67
                      S.Ct. at page 843.

Roos, 580 S.W.2d at 508-09.

               However, “unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the

plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at

508, 67 S.Ct. at 843. See Stipp v. St. Charles, 291 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Ky.App.

2009) (favorably quoting this provision). “[A]bsent compelling or unusual

circumstances, a court is duty bound to hear cases within its vested jurisdiction.”

Roos, 580 S.W.2d at 509.

4
  As explained in American Dredging Company v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2, 114 S.Ct. 981,
986 n.2, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994), “[s]uch a dismissal [as occurred in Gulf Oil Corp.] would be
improper today because of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)[;] . . . [a]s a
consequence, the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application only in
cases where the alternative forum is abroad.” Similarly, in Dollar General Stores, Ltd. v. Smith,
237 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Ky. 2007), the Kentucky Supreme Court noted “[w]ith enactment of KRS
452.105, the General Assembly made it clear that venue should be transferred in a proper case,
and that the action should not be dismissed” and “[held] that the same rule applies where the trial
court determines that another forum [in Kentucky] would be a more convenient place for the
litigation.”

                                               -14-
             A. Whose Home Forum is Paramount?

             Although the parties and the circuit court all seem to have assumed

that Cole’s and Field’s domicile is paramount in considering whether Kentucky is

the home forum, this is incorrect and overly simplistic. In fact, it is the home

forum of McDonough which is paramount. She is not only the party who filed suit

but is a real party in interest given that Cole died intestate along with her child, and

McDonough as Cole’s mother stands to inherit from Cole’s estate given our

intestacy laws. While Kentucky cases do not clarify this matter, federal cases do.

             Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70

L.Ed.2d 419 (1981), is instructive. In that wrongful death case, a plane crash in

Scotland killed the pilot and five passengers. All of the decedents were Scottish

subjects and residents, as were their heirs and next of kin. Id. at 239, 102 S.Ct. at

257. However, a California probate court appointed Gaynell Reyno, the legal

secretary of the attorney who ended up filing a wrongful death action on their

behalf, as administratrix of the estates of the five passengers. As the Court

observed, “Reyno is not related to and does not know any of the decedents or their

survivors.” Id. In considering the plaintiff’s choice of forum as a factor in its

inconvenient forum analysis, the district court determined that in this instance the

plaintiff’s choice of forum was entitled to little weight even though a plaintiff’s

choice ordinarily deserves substantial deference. The district court

                                         -15-
             noted . . . that Reyno “is a representative of foreign
             citizens and residents seeking a forum in the United
             States because of the more liberal rules concerning
             products liability law,” and that “the courts have been
             less solicitous when the plaintiff is not an American
             citizen or resident, and particularly when the foreign
             citizens seek to benefit from the more liberal tort rules
             provided for the protection of citizens and residents of
             the United States.”

Id. at 242, 102 S.Ct. at 259 (quoting Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 479 F. Supp. 727,

731 (M.D. Pa. 1979)). In the district court case, the court specifically emphasized

the fact that the case “does not involve Americans as real parties in interest.”

Reyno, 479 F. Supp. at 731.

             In considering the district court’s decision as to home forum, the

Supreme Court agreed with its holding that the presumption that a plaintiff’s

choice of forum is entitled to substantial deference “applies with less force when

the plaintiff or real parties in interest are foreign” and determined that its

“distinction between resident or citizen plaintiffs and foreign plaintiffs is fully

justified.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255, 102 S.Ct. at 266. The Supreme

Court further explained:

             When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable
             to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
             plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less
             reasonable. Because the central purpose of any forum
             non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is
             convenient, a foreign plaintiff’s choice deserves less
             deference.

                                          -16-
Id. at 255-56, 102 S.Ct. at 266 (footnote omitted). In doing so, the Supreme Court

accepted the premise that because the real parties in interest were foreign, that the

fact that an American citizen was appointed to be the estates’ representative was

not entitled to much weight, simplifying the matter of citizenship to make its

general point.

             However, the converse is also true. When the representative is a real

party in interest, that representative’s choice of her home forum is entitled to

substantial deference. See Nandjou v. Marriott International, Inc., 985 F.3d 135,

141-42 (1st Cir. 2021) (recognizing that the wife and mother of the decedents who

served as the representative for their estates, was entitled to great deference when

pursuing suit in what was her home forum district in Massachusetts at the time of

the decedent’s deaths even though the deaths occurred in Canada); Wilson v. Island

Seas Investments, Ltd., 590 F.3d 1264, 1267, 1269 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing

the importance to be given to the home forum of Florida which was the residence

of the decedent, where the decedent’s estate was being probated, is the residence of

the decedent’s sister and cousins who witnessed the accident and the residence of

the plaintiff who represented the estate and was the decedent’s daughter, noting

“[a] plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference, and there is a presumption

in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum, particularly where the plaintiffs are

citizens of the United States.”).

                                         -17-
             The record below indicates that no one questioned that McDonough is

domiciled in Kentucky. Therefore, her choice of her home forum to litigate this

matter is entitled to substantial deference. That does not mean that Cole’s and

Fields’s home domiciles are irrelevant to the overall analysis, but that they simply

have less weight than McDonough’s domicile.

             B. Where Were Cole’s and Field’s Domicile?

             As to the factor of whether Indiana or Kentucky was Cole’s and

Fields’s home forum, there is ample law on how domicile is determined. “A

person may have many residences, but can have but one domicile[.]” Wheeler v.

Burgess, 263 Ky. 693, 93 S.W.2d 351, 353 (1936). “A domicile once acquired

continues until a new one is acquired. The burden of showing the acquisition of a

new domicile is on the one asserting it. Two things must concur to establish a new

domicile, actual physical residence at the new location and the intention of

remaining there.” Id. at 354.

             As for Fields’s domicile, it is well established that a minor’s domicile

may be changed by the person having legal custody. Boyd’s Ex’r v.

Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 764, 149 S.W. 1022, 1023 (1912). Therefore, as Cole

had primary physical custody of Fields, her domicile is his.

             “[W]hen one acquires a domicile, it cannot be changed without the

acquisition of another domicile, which, as seen, must be done by acts, conduct, and

                                        -18-
intention.” Semple v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 675, 205 S.W. 789, 791 (1918).

“[T]here must be an intention to abandon the old domicile and not to return to it

and an intention to acquire a new residence as a permanent home; the intention

being coupled with a corresponding act evidencing those purposes.” Appleton v.

Southern Tr. Co., 244 Ky. 453, 51 S.W.2d 447, 449 (1932). “The intention to stay,

to make the new establishment their home for good, is what makes it their

domicile.” Wheeler, 93 S.W.2d at 353. Therefore, an existing domicile is not

changed by a prolonged, indefinite stay elsewhere, when coupled with definite

intent to return to the existing domicile. Id.

             Intention is the dominant factor. Ellison v. Smoot’s Adm’r, 286 Ky.

768, 151 S.W.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1941); City of Ashland v. City of Catlettsburg,

172 Ky. 364, 189 S.W. 454, 454-55 (1916). However, “[e]xpressions of intent are

not alone sufficient; there must be some evidence supporting these declarations of

intent.” Boyd’s Ex’r, 149 S.W. at 1023.

             As discussed in Wheeler, in the case of Baker v. Baker, Eccles and

Company, 162 Ky. 683, 173 S.W. 109, 119 (1915), which was affirmed by the

United States Supreme Court in 242 U.S. 394, 37 S.Ct. 152, 61 L.Ed. 386 (1917),

our highest Court found it to be extremely significant in determining Baker’s

domicile, that not only did Baker move to Paducah and conduct business there

                                         -19-
until his death but he registered to vote there, and did not vote in Tennessee after

his removal to Kentucky, with the Court in Wheeler noting:

             Each vote he cast and each of his registrations as a voter
             was a most solemn declaration, he possessed all those
             qualifications set out in section 145 of the Kentucky
             Constitution, and that he was not domiciled elsewhere. If
             Baker were domiciled in Tennessee, then each time he
             voted in Kentucky he committed a felony punishable by
             one to five years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

Wheeler, 93 S.W.2d at 355.

             Regarding Cole’s and Fields’s residence being in Kentucky or

Indiana, the circuit court cited appropriate law and determined that Cole’s

intentions could be deduced by her actions that showed she intended to remain an

Indiana resident. The Court emphasized that Cole had an Indiana driver’s license,

was required to change her license to Kentucky within thirty days after moving to

Kentucky and chose not to do so, which was evidence of her intent to maintain a

domicile in Indiana. The circuit court also heavily relied on the fact that Cole:

             [M]aintained her voter residence in Indiana. Further, she
             went so far as to update her voter registration in
             December of 2019, to reflect that she would vote in
             Crawford County, Indiana. In order to maintain the
             registration, she had to swear that she would remain in
             the Indiana precinct for at least 30 days prior to the next
             election in May of 2020.

The circuit court noted that all public records supported Cole’s having an intent “to

reside in Indiana. And she is the one who caused by her actions the creation of

                                         -20-
those records.” The circuit court also noted that Cole attended church in Indiana,

her visitation and funeral took place in Indiana, and she and Fields were buried in

Indiana. While the circuit court acknowledged the contrary evidence and opined

that Cole “appeared to desire to move to Kentucky,” it resolved that she was

domiciled in Indiana.

             On appeal, the Estates argue that Cole’s residence was of paramount

importance in the circuit court’s decision to dismiss for forum non conveniens, and

the circuit court’s decision that Cole was an Indiana resident was clearly erroneous.

The Estates argue that it is more appropriate to discern Cole’s intent as to her

domicile based upon her actions regarding living in Kentucky as shown through

the affidavits of McDonough, Andrew Wilson, and the father of Fields. They

argue that Cole moved to Kentucky with the plan of raising her new child with

Wilson and her actions regarding failing to change her driver’s license and voter

registration were explained by Cole’s not wishing to have to change her residential

address multiple times before she was finally settled in independent housing with

Wilson. The Estates point to Cole’s having grown up in Kentucky; having lived in

both Kentucky and Indiana; and having returned to Kentucky – combined with her

action of looking for a new job and daycare for Fields in Louisville; moving in

with Wilson and his parents in Kentucky and then her mother and stepfather in

                                         -21-
Louisville; planning to live with Wilson in Louisville; and storing her belongings

in Kentucky.

             The Estates object that the circuit court put far too much weight on

Cole’s retention of her Indiana driver’s license and voting registration. They point

out that in the affidavits, Cole’s mother explained what Cole told her about why

she had not yet changed her license and Cole made statements about her intent to

remain in Kentucky and raise her new baby with Wilson. They emphasize that

Wilson stated he was unwilling to relocate to Indiana and that he and Cole agreed

that Louisville would present the best opportunities for their family. They note

that Cole’s conduct was consistent with her statements of intent as she remained

living in Kentucky after she moved until she passed away. The Estates also argue

it was inappropriate for the circuit court to consider where Cole’s and Fields’s

services and burials took place because Cole had not provided any direction as to

where this should occur in the event of her death.

             We acknowledge that there was evidence from which the circuit court

could determine that Cole’s (and thereby Fields’s) domicile had changed from

Indiana to Kentucky, but there was also contrary evidence. We note that even the

Estates’ evidence was that Cole had switched her residences in Kentucky, first

residing with Wilson and his parents, then residing with her mother and stepfather,

had plans to reside with Wilson separately but did not yet have a separate residence

                                        -22-
with him, had not yet acquired employment in Kentucky and had not yet obtained

childcare in Kentucky. There was certainly evidence to support the circuit court’s

decision that while Cole apparently did not have a residence to return to in Indiana,

she had maintained her legal affiliations there and had not yet changed her

domicile to Louisville, Kentucky, and had not acquired a permanent residence

there. See Wheeler, 93 S.W.2d at 353; Appleton, 51 S.W.2d at 449.

             However, it was improper for the circuit court to consider the location

of Cole’s and Fields’s funeral and burial as evidence of Cole’s intention to remain

an Indiana citizen, given that she left no directions as to her burial. We are

uncertain of how much this consideration swayed the circuit court’s ultimate

decision on their domicile. Given how close this issue was, we believe the circuit

court should have allowed the parties to gather and present additional information

on this issue. Therefore, we vacate the circuit court’s ruling as to the domicile of

Cole and Fields.

             We additionally observe that whatever the circuit court’s ultimate

decision on the issue of Cole’s and Field’s domicile, given how close this issue is

and given Cole’s strong connections to both Indiana and Kentucky, in a relatively

small area near the adjoining borders of both states, we do not believe the issue of

the decedents’ domicile is entitled to as much weight given that Kentucky is

                                         -23-
McDonough’s domicile and the probate actions were opened in Kentucky.5 While

the circuit court indicated that its ruling on the decedents’ domicile was not

controlling as to its ultimate conclusion that Kentucky was an inconvenient forum,6

we believe this portion of its analysis was important enough that this alone would

warrant vacating its decision.

               C. Additional Factors in Determining Forum Non Conveniens

               Regarding its overall analysis of forum non conveniens, the circuit

court concluded Indiana offered a superior forum after considering the Gulf Oil

factors. The circuit court noted that Indiana was an appropriate alternative forum

based on the party and collision having occurred there, and Indiana having

jurisdiction over all of the defendants and potential defendants.

               The circuit court weighed the private interests of the parties and

concluded Indiana was a superior forum based on: (1) the relevant ease of access

to sources of proof, including physical proof and the availability of personal

jurisdiction in Indiana over The Carriage House and independent contractor

5
  Our decision that the circuit court could ultimately determine that Cole was domiciled in
Indiana should not be viewed as controlling as to whether the probate action was properly filed
in Louisville. We are confident that McDonough filed there in good faith and there was an
adequate basis for opening the estates there.

6
  The circuit court concluded its analysis on the forum non conveniens by stating that “[e]ven if
this Court had personal jurisdiction over all existing defendants and indispensable parties, which
it does not, and even if Cole and Fields were Kentucky residents, which they were not, Indiana
offers a superior forum.”

                                               -24-
bartenders, noting “the majority of the relevant evidence is located in Indiana, and

this factor weighs heavily in favor of Indiana being a superior forum”; (2) the

availability of subpoena power over Indiana witnesses in Indiana; (3) the

possibility of viewing the scene in Indiana; and (4) the practical problem that Leah

Onstott Dunn’s case might take place in Indiana and the practical expenses of

defending in Kentucky and compelling Indiana witnesses to appear in Kentucky

courts when there were relatively few Kentucky witnesses. As to this final factor,

the circuit court emphasized that:

             If Onstott’s case is brought in Indiana, the four
             defendants currently in this case, along with The Carriage
             House, could be subject to defending the case in both
             Kentucky and Indiana. This would result in extra
             expense to the defendants and would not be considered
             an expeditious manner to handle the cases.

             In considering the public interest, the circuit court determined this

also weighed in favor of Indiana because the tort and crime occurred within

Indiana’s borders. The circuit court again emphasized:

             Onstott’s case will likely proceed in Indiana, as she is not
             a Kentucky resident, and the relevant factors weigh
             heavily in adjudicating her case in Indiana. To have the
             defendants defend this case in two separate jurisdictions
             at the same time would be costly to the defendants and
             could result in inconsistent verdicts.

The circuit court also noted it was appropriate to have Indiana adjudicate and

interpret its own dram shop law.

                                         -25-
             The Estates argue that although specific evidence is located in

Indiana, it is available in Kentucky through the Uniform Interstate Depositions and

Discovery Act (UIDDA), Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 421.360. They argue

that Kentucky courts have retained control of cases where automobile accidents

have occurred in other states, even when there were fewer contacts with Kentucky

than in the case before us. They also argue the witnesses that the Estates desire to

call are all either Kentucky residents or employed by one of the Sazerac companies

and could be called by them. The Estates argue that the corporate defendants are

properly before Kentucky courts based upon their connections to Kentucky,

whether they are Kentucky corporations or not. Finally, the Estates argue that it is

appropriate for Kentucky courts to apply Kentucky law when at all possible, and if

made to litigate in Indiana, the Estates will be limited in the amounts they may

recover under Indiana law, which would violate the Kentucky Constitutional

prohibition against placing a cap on the recovery, explaining this provides a public

policy reason why Kentucky should maintain jurisdiction and apply its own law.

             We also consider additional arguments the Estates made in their brief

in the section devoted to the grant of dismissal for failure to join indispensable

parties, as we believe those arguments equally apply to the analysis of whether

Kentucky was an inconvenient forum. The Estates argue that the circuit court

erred in finding that the Estates’ case should be dismissed for failure to join

                                         -26-
necessary parties when they were prohibited from obtaining discovery determining

the residence of the bartenders and it is not clear the Carriage House is a necessary

party. They argue it was inappropriate for the circuit court to conclude that the

bartenders were likely Indiana residents when there was no evidence (and only

argument) to support this conclusion.

             Finally, we consider that during oral argument, on the basis of

subsequent developments in the Dunn case, which was that the case would not be

dismissed, the Estates also argued that what would be truly inconvenient would be

for these cases to be litigated in two different states. We believe this point is

paramount, given the emphasis the circuit court gave to this factor.

             We agree with the Estates that the circuit court appears to have failed

to adequately consider all the connections this case has with Kentucky and the

means by which relevant evidence could still be admitted. We agree that evidence

can be obtained from out-of-state witnesses through UIDDA, which limits the

importance of the factor relating to the lack of Kentucky’s subpoena power over

Indiana witnesses. Additionally, we do not discount that possibly out-of-state

witnesses would consent to voluntarily travel to give testimony, testify by video

deposition, or testify virtually over an internet platform such as Zoom, Facetime, or

Microsoft Teams, or via telephone.

                                         -27-
             There are certainly some factors which may favor a decision being

made in Indiana, such as that the alleged overserving of Barefoot and motor

vehicle accident both occurred in Indiana, that witnesses to these events reside in

Indiana, and compulsory process to bring them into court is available in Indiana.

We also agree that there is a public interest in addressing the consequences of these

Indiana crimes in Indiana before an Indiana jury.

             However, there are also factors that favor the continuation of this

action in Kentucky, such as the majority of the parties’ being Kentucky residents

or businesses. Given that Barefoot has pled guilty to her criminal charges, the

evidence regarding the motor vehicle accident itself is less relevant than it would

have otherwise been. Her conviction also lessens the importance of obtaining

witnesses as to the accident itself. Therefore, the situs of the accident and any need

to view that scene would be lessened.

             As to the issue of the substantive law being less favorable to the

Estates in Indiana, as explained in Piper Aircraft Company, 454 U.S. at 247, 102

S.Ct. at 261, “[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not

be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens

inquiry.” However, that does not mean that it should not be given any weight at

all, as the Supreme Court observed: “We do not hold that the possibility of an

unfavorable change in law should never be a relevant consideration in a forum non

                                        -28-
conveniens inquiry.” Id. at 254, 102 S.Ct. at 265 (footnote omitted). We do

believe that in a close case, the limitation of the potential damage award does merit

consideration along with other factors.

             But of greater importance to our analysis as to whether the circuit

court’s decision was an abuse of discretion is that the circuit court prematurely

determined the bartenders were likely Indiana citizens and made an assumption as

to what would occur in Dunn’s case which was ultimately proven to be incorrect.

This makes the circuit court’s ultimate conclusion regarding forum non conveniens

suspect.

             With the available evidence, it is completely unknown whether there

was personal jurisdiction over the bartenders. The appellees made bare statements

in support of their motions to dismiss which assumed that the bartenders were

Indiana residents. However, such an assumption was unwarranted. NBS failed to

identify which bartenders were serving that evening or their residences prior to

discovery being halted, and the circuit court lacked any knowledge of whether they

were Indiana or Kentucky citizens. An issue was at least raised by the Estates that

these bartenders could have been Kentucky citizens as the Estates alleged that NBS

conducted the majority of its bartending events in Kentucky and provided evidence

below to support such contention. In the absence of evidence as to the citizenship

                                          -29-
of the bartenders, it should have been assumed that the bartenders could be

Kentucky residents as it was up to NBS to prove otherwise.

             As was discussed during oral argument, the Dunn case was filed in

Jefferson County, Kentucky, ending up before another division of the Jefferson

Circuit Court. When the defendants sought dismissal in the Dunn case, the circuit

court in that division denied the motions to dismiss based on an inconvenient

forum and failure to join indispensable parties. The Dunn case continues to

proceed before the circuit court.

             While it is still possible that the Dunn case could be dismissed in the

future, should another motion be submitted once further discovery has been

completed, at this juncture affirming the circuit court’s order of dismissal would

result in overlapping cases being litigated in two different forums and we agree

that would be very inconvenient for all concerned, especially the appellees. See

Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 259, 102 S.Ct. at 268 (observing that it is “far more

convenient . . . to resolve all claims in one trial.”) This is a very significant factor.

             We believe vacating the circuit court’s decision on forum non

conveniens is appropriate. The circuit court needs to consider the relevant factors

again once further discovery has taken place.

                                          -30-
               It may ultimately be appropriate to consolidate this case with the

Dunn case in either division,7 so that, hopefully, inconvenience to all the parties is

lessened and the cases remain pending together before the same judge and forum.

As explained in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 42.01: “When actions

involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may

order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may

order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning

proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” See Massie

v. Salmon, 277 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Ky. 1955) (discussing that while consolidation is a

matter for the discretion of the trial court, if the common questions of law or fact

principally involve the issue of negligence, they “should properly be tried together

to advance the convenience of the court and the parties and to avoid unnecessary

expense or delay”). While the Dunn case is not before our Court, and we could not

order consolidation in any event as that is a matter within the trial court’s

discretion, we believe it is appropriate to order that the division of the circuit court

before us consult with the other division of the circuit court as to whether these

7
 While the Estates’ case was filed first, the Dunn case may have proceeded further as it has
continued while the Estates’ case pended before us on appeal. So, it would not necessarily be
better for the Dunn case to be consolidated with the Estates’ case in the division in which it is
currently pending, rather than the other way around.

                                               -31-
cases should be consolidated before either judge.8 Therefore, we order that such

consultation take place.

    II.    Failure to Join Indispensable Parties

               As to dismissal for failure to join indispensable parties, this is also

premature. We cannot properly evaluate this ruling on its merits given the lack of

development of the record. Simply put, we do not know at this juncture whether

these parties are truly indispensable and not amenable to suit in Kentucky.

               The circuit court concluded dismissal was appropriate for failure to

join indispensable parties, explaining: (1) while NBS and Sazerac IN are now

joined, NBS has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, but

would have no basis to dispute jurisdiction in Indiana; (2) Kentucky courts did not

appear to have jurisdiction over the unnamed bartenders who were thought to be

Indiana residents and they would be indispensable parties to the dram shop action;

(3) Kentucky courts did not appear to have jurisdiction over the Carriage House,

which was the venue in the dram shop case and “its acts or omission, along with

8
  When consolidation was requested before, the appellees sought to consolidate the Dunn case
with this case before the division of the circuit court which had already granted dismissal of this
case, which arguably had a stronger basis for being heard before Kentucky courts than the Dunn
case. Under those circumstances, knowing how the judge had ruled in this case, granting
consolidation logically was likely to result in the dismissal of the Dunn case (although of course
both dismissals were subject to appeal). While the judge in the other division previously
declined to consolidate the Dunn case with this case, we do not know whether the judges ever
discussed the matter and whether consolidation might be more appropriate and palatable at this
juncture now that discovery will continue.

                                               -32-
contract terms with the other defendants, is likely very relevant to their issue of

liability[;]” and (4) all four factors favor dismissal as: (a) failure to add the venue

and bartenders is highly prejudicial to the other defendants “as a judgment may be

inconsistent with actual liability[;]” (b) there are no protective provisions which

would result in less prejudice; (c) a judgment rendered without the Carriage House

cannot be adequate; and (d) an adequate alternative remedy is to refile the action in

Indiana.

             As we noted in our prior discussion, the Estates argued it could not be

established that the bartenders were Indiana residents and not amenable to suit in

Kentucky in the absence of any evidence about who they were. They also argued

that it was unclear that the Carriage House needed to be made a party.

             The Estates argue that pursuant to CR 19.01, if an indispensable party

has not been joined then the court “shall order that he be made a party.” Therefore,

they argue that the circuit court should have allowed the Estates to conduct their

requested discovery and amend their complaints to include the bartenders and the

Carriage House if appropriate. They also argue that the circuit court applied an

improper standard by considering facts and evidence outside of the pleadings as to

the citizenship of the bartenders that was evidently believed in the absence of any

proof and this alone merits reversal.

                                          -33-
             We agree that it was inappropriate for the circuit court to conclude

that the bartenders were Indiana citizens and not amenable to suit in Kentucky. At

this juncture, without more discovery, it is simply impossible to conclude that the

unnamed bartenders are indispensable parties that are not amenable to suit in

Kentucky, or to even know if the Carriage House must be joined.

             We additionally agree that dismissal for failure to name indispensable

parties is not appropriate. As explained in Cabinet for Human Resources v.

Kentucky State Personnel Board, 846 S.W.2d 711, 714 (Ky.App. 1992): “When

one litigant believes there to be an indispensable party it should request the court to

order joinder by the simple expedient of filing a motion. If the court concurs then

service of process shall issue[.]” The rules do not allow the parties and court to fail

to try to join indispensable parties on the basis that they cannot be sued in our

courts. Therefore, if these unnamed bartenders and the Carriage House are

ultimately ruled to be indispensable parties, it would be appropriate to order them

joined and then let them argue that the Kentucky courts do not have jurisdiction

over them, rather than assuming that to be the case. Therefore, we vacate the

decision granting dismissal on the basis that indispensable parties were not joined

and remand for additional discovery.

                                         -34-
   III.   Dismissal with Prejudice

             Finally, the Estates argue that it was inappropriate for the case to be

dismissed with prejudice where its merits were never reached, and this could

prevent them from bringing their claims in Indiana. While our vacation of the

previous rulings renders any discussion of this matter moot at this time, we briefly

address this issue so as to provide guidance should the circuit court ultimately

dismiss this action again.

             We believe this argument is well taken as the appropriate remedy if

the forum is inconvenient is to stay the action or dismiss without prejudice as

specified in Stewart, 604 S.W.3d at 270. See Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery

Inc., 828 F.3d 488, 501 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining “[i]t is well established that the

appropriate disposition of a granted forum non conveniens motion is dismissal

without prejudice to filing in the alternative forum”). See also Prevent USA

Corporation v. Volkswagen AG, 17 F.4th 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2021) (noting a

dismissal without prejudice for forum non conveniens has no res judicata effect

and “may be refiled in federal court if the alternative forum itself declines to

exercise jurisdiction”).

                                  CONCLUSION

             Accordingly, we vacate the Jefferson Circuit Court’s decision to

dismiss for forum non conveniens and for failure to join indispensable parties. On

                                         -35-
remand, the circuit court will order discovery to be recommenced and will consult

with the other division of the circuit court which has the Dunn case before it. Once

ample discovery is completed to clarify these issues, the appellees may refile their

motions.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -36-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE TAYLOR
                            BAREFOOT:
Mark Gabriel Hall
Gary Richard Adams, Jr.     Gregg Edward Thorton
Darren C. Wolff             Betsy R. Catron
Louisville, Kentucky        Lexington, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR           BRIEF FOR APPELLEE NAKED BY
APPELLANT:                  SUNDAY, LLC:

Mark Gabriel Hall           Van Thomas Willis
Louisville, Kentucky        Crystal Gates Rowe
                            New Albany, Indiana

                            BRIEF FOR APPELLEES SAZERAC
                            NORTH AMERICA, INC. AND
                            SAZERAC OF INDIANA, LLC:

                            Jill Fran Endicott
                            Anne Katherine Guillory
                            Louisville, Kentucky

                            ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                            SAZERAC:

                            Jeremy Rogers

                            ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                            APPELLEE NAKED BY SUNDAY,
                            LLC:

                            Crystal Gates Rowe
                            New Albany, Indiana

                          -37-