Court Opinion

ID: 9651097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:05:46.681839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:22.711404
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 After careful review, I am compelled to dissent as I find the issues raised by Appellant to be interlocutory, not collateral, and therefore, I would quash this appeal.
¶ 2 The trial court ably set forth the facts of this case as follows:
This underlying action arose from a[n] automobile accident which occurred on January 6, 2000, at Second Street near Erie Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The automobile was owned by Ed[r]a Crespo, and was driven by the owner’s sixteen year old son, [E.S.]. Crespo’s automobile was insured by AIIC. [E.S.] was driving without a valid Pennsylvania driver’s license when he struck and injured a young girl, [E.G.].
Plaintiff, [E.G.] filed a personal injury claim against Defendant, Crespo seeking compensation for the driver’s negligence in causing her injuries. Crespo’s insurer, AIIC, responded that the owner had never authorized the driver, her son [E.S.], to use the car, and that they were not responsible for insuring [E.S.] against the Plaintiffs claim.
Thereafter, AIIC brought the within Declaratory Judgment action against Cres-po and the [Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims] Plan, to determine whether AIIC did in fact have an obligation to insure Crespo, and her son [E.S.].
[The trial] court found upon petition by “The Plan”, that before the merits of the Declaratory Judgment action would be determined, AIIC was to first provide Crespo and [E.S.] representation in the Declaratory Judgment action. This decree was executed to protect against AIIC receiving a default judgment against Crespo and [E.S.], who most likely would not have been able to challenge that action, before the underlying case could be fully tried on the merits.
AIIC now appeals [the trial court’s] order directing them to provide representation to [E.S.] and Crespo if they choose to go forward with that action.
Trial Court Opinion, November 6, 2001, at 2.
¶ 3 The majority opines that this order constitutes a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.
¶ 4 Pa.R.A.P. 313 provides:
*395(a) General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.
(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.
Pa.R.A.P. 313. The courts of this Commonwealth have consistently stated that all three elements set forth in the definition of a collateral order must be present. Melvin v. Doe, 789 A.2d 696, 698 (Pa.Super.2001) (citing Kovatch Enterprises, Inc. v. Hazleton Electric Supply Company, 714 A.2d 464 (Pa.Super.1998)). Furthermore,
[t]he collateral order doctrine must be construed narrowly in order to ‘protect the integrity of the fundamental legal principle that only final orders may be appealed. To hold otherwise would allow the collateral order doctrine to swallow up the final order rule, ... causing litigation to be interrupted and delayed by piecemeal review of trial court decisions.’
Id. at 698 (citing McGourty v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Insurance Co., 704 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa.Super.1997)) (quoting Watson v. Philadelphia, 665 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Pa.Commw.1995)).
¶ 5 In narrowly reviewing the ‘stringent’ requirements set forth in Rule 313, I would look to determine whether the first of the three elements has been satisfied here. Melvin, supra (citation omitted). The first requirement is that the order must be separable from and collateral to the main cause of action and must not be of such “an interlocutory nature as to affect, or be affected by” the merits of the main cause of action. Smitley v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 707 A.2d 520, 525 (Pa.Super.1998) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). After review of the order I am convinced that the issues raised by Appellant are so intertwined with the merits of the Declaratory Judgment action that I cannot find the order to be collateral to or separate from the underlying action. Appellant brought this action for the court to determine that it had no duty to defend or indemnify E.S. In essence, the order here goes to the heart of the matter at issue. Therefore, unlike the majority, I cannot find that the order is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, and thus, I need not address whether the remaining requirements of a collateral order have been met.2 See Melvin, supra, at 699 (citing Gottschall v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 333 Pa.Super. 493, 482 A.2d 979 (1984)).
¶ 6 Because I believe that the order from which Appellant appeals is interlocutory, rather than a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313,1 would not entertain the appeal at this time. Therefore, because the Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, I would quash this appeal.

. Assuming for the sake of argument that the first prong was met, I also do not believe that either the second or third prongs have been satisfied. I am not persuaded there is an important right that must be reviewed at this time, nor that the claim will be irreparably lost.