Court Opinion

ID: 9893351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 18:00:38.509199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:30.736910
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30421     Document: 00516945543         Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/26/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                           FILED
                                                                 October 26, 2023
                                 No. 22-30421
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Curtis Johnson, Jr.,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:17-CR-201-3
                  ______________________________

   Before Graves, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          Curtis Johnson, Jr. appeals his convictions related to an armed robbery
   resulting in the death of Hector Trochez, an armored truck guard, making a
   bank delivery. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM.
                                         I.
          Johnson was charged with conspiracy to obstruct commerce by
   robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)); obstruction of commerce by robbery (id.
   § 1951(a)); and using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging firearms during
   and in relation to a crime of violence, causing death (id. §§ 924(c)(1)(A),
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   924(j)(1)).   Johnson was charged alongside: Jeremy Esteves; Robert
   Brumfield, III; Chukwudi Ofomata; Lilbear George; and Jasmine Theophile.

          We briefly describe the government’s trial proof. Ofomata stored
   firearms at the home of witness Cedric Wade and retrieved the firearms on
   the morning of the robbery. Esteves drove a stolen vehicle with Johnson,
   Ofomata, and George to the bank parking lot. George exited the vehicle,
   approached the guard, Hector Trochez, who was outside an armored truck,
   and began shooting. Ofomata then exited the vehicle and also began shooting
   at Trochez and, almost simultaneously, Johnson exited the vehicle and began
   shooting at the truck when it appeared a second guard was going to exit the
   truck. The assailants fled. Trochez died on the scene from a gunshot wound.
   The government never purported to be able to identify which of the three
   shooters fired the fatal shot.

          The government noticed its intent to seek the death penalty against
   the three defendants charged with firing firearms during the robbery—
   Johnson, George, and Ofomata—which it later withdrew. The district court
   severed the trial of the then-capital defendants. Johnson’s first trial, in July
   2021, ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict. At his retrial
   in March 2022, a jury convicted Johnson of each of the three counts charged.
   Johnson timely appealed.

                                          II.
          First, Johnson contends that the government, in closing, committed
   the “prosecutor’s fallacy” by equating the random match probability of a

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   partial DNA sample with the probability that the defendant was not the
   sample’s source.

          At Johnson’s second trial, the government introduced expert
   testimony about a partial DNA sample obtained from a bandana found in the
   vehicle used in the robbery. Testing yielded inclusionary match statistics
   capturing the probability that the sample was Johnson’s as compared to a
   coincidental match of an unrelated person, and the lowest inclusionary match
   statistic had an error rate of one in 4,100. That is, the expert explained, only
   one in 4,100 people would match the sample as strongly as Johnson did. But,
   in the government’s first closing argument, the prosecutor said that Johnson
   “left very little DNA, but he left just enough to prove that it was him in the
   front seat when you combine the 1 in 4,100 chance that it’s not him.”
   Johnson did not object.

          The prosecutor’s fallacy occurs when “a juror is told the probability a
   member of the general population would share the same DNA is 1 in 10,000
   (random match probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in
   10,000 chance that someone other than the defendant is the source of the
   DNA found at the crime scene (source probability).” McDaniel v. Brown, 558
   U.S. 120, 128 (2010). Conflating these two probabilities, as the prosecutor
   did here, yields “an erroneous statement that, based on a random match
   probability of 1 in 10,000, there is a 0.01% chance the defendant is innocent
   or a 99.99% chance the defendant is guilty.” Id.
          We review the unobjected-to remark for reversible plain error. See
   United States v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2008). “To

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   demonstrate reversible plain error, [Johnson] ha[s] to show that (1) there is
   error; (2) it is plain; and (3) it affected his substantial rights.” Id. at 600.
   There is no question that this remark was erroneous. To be plain, “the legal
   error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.”
   United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 2012).
   Establishing that it affected Johnson’s substantial rights requires showing
   that “there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings
   would have been different but for the error.” United States v. Montes-Salas,
   669 F.3d 240, 247 (5th Cir. 2012). “Even if he could meet that burden, [this
   court] still would have discretion to decide whether to reverse, which [it]
   generally will not do unless the plain error seriously affected the fairness,
   integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding.” Gracia, 522 F.3d
   at 600 (citations omitted).

          “[T]he determinative question is whether the remarks cast serious
   doubt on the correctness of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Anderson,
   755 F.3d 782, 797 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). The answer, here, is no. We “look at the comment in context.”
   United States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 495 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). The statistic was stated correctly by
   the prosecution, defense counsel, and the expert witness numerous times,
   and, after the government’s first closing argument, defense counsel properly
   stated the statistic and emphasized that this was significantly weaker than the
   DNA evidence presented against other defendants. Even in rebuttal, the
   prosecutor stated that “1 in 4100 actually has some significance,” explaining

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   “that there’s a probability that [Johnson] is someone who left that DNA
   behind” so “you have to be open-minded to the fact that, well, maybe it is
   Curtis Johnson who was there.” The prosecutor continued that “if you
   don’t like that statistic—and I don’t love the statistic—I’ve got to look at all
   the other facts.”

          Contrary to Johnson’s contention that “[t]he impact of the
   prosecutor’s    error   cannot    be    underestimated,    given    the   fairly
   incomprehensible nature of” the expert’s testimony, Johnson Br. 7, the
   expert clearly explained the relevant statistic. For example, she explained
   that the conclusion was that “it’s 4,100 people you would have to go through
   before you may find someone with that match statistic or higher.” The
   expert answered “yes” in response to defense counsel’s question that
   “[e]ven in a city like New Orleans, there could be hundreds of people with
   that same . . . partial DNA match that you were using, correct?”

          Furthermore, we reject Johnson’s assertion that his substantial rights
   were affected “because the government’s case was almost entirely premised
   on DNA evidence.” Johnson Br. 8-9. The government also presented eye-
   witness testimony that, on the morning of the robbery, Johnson helped
   Ofomata load a bag of firearms into the vehicle used in the robbery, and, as
   discussed below, the government properly introduced a statement from a
   non-testifying co-defendant that Johnson was one of the shooters who
   emerged from the vehicle.

                                          III.

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          Second, Johnson contends that the district court erred in admitting
   the statement of Johnson’s co-defendant, George, through testimony of
   government informant Jamell Hurst, because it was not within Federal Rule
   of Evidence 804(b)(3)’s hearsay exception for statements against interest by
   unavailable witnesses.

          At Johnson’s second trial, Hurst testified about a conversation he had
   with his friend George in early 2014 after a sketch of a person of interest was
   published. George asked Hurst whether the sketch looked like himself,
   Johnson, Ofomata, or Esteves. Hurst testified that George told him that:

          [W]hen he first was there and the armored truck arrived or
          whatever, he said they was in the car debating on who was going
          to jump out first. He was like “F it, I’m going to go first” and
          he jumped out and he said—he said he jumped out and told the
          guy, like letting him know he was getting robbed, and instead
          of the guy like trying to give up the money, he went straight for
          his gun and he said he started shooting and he was trying to like
          maneuver out the way, so he wouldn’t get shot while he was
          shooting; and he said that’s when [Ofomata] hopped out and
          started shooting at the guy, too. He was like I don’t know who
          killed him, me or [Ofomata], but both of us was shooting. One
          of us must have shot the person, too, and he said that’s when
          [Johnson] jumped out and started shooting at the truck, so the
          person in the truck wouldn’t get out and try to help.
   Johnson did not object.
          “[I]n the absence of a proper objection, we review only for plain
   error.” United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2004). Johnson
   contends that “it appears to be an open question as to whether Johnson’s
   pretrial objections and objection in his first trial preserved the issue for

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   appeal” following his second trial, Johnson Reply Br. 2 (emphasis added), but
   Johnson did not even object to the statement at his first trial.1 Johnson must
   therefore “show (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his
   substantial rights,” such that “there is a reasonable probability that the result
   of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.” Montes-
   Salas, 669 F.3d at 247. Even so, this court will exercise its discretion to
   correct a plain error “only if [it] seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
   public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
   alterations omitted).
           To be admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a
   statement against the penal interest of an unavailable declarant:
           (1) The declarant must be unavailable; (2) The statement must
           so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a
           reasonable person in his position would not have made the
           statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) The
           statement must be corroborated by circumstances clearly
           indicating trustworthiness.
   United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 133 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States
   v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1492 (5th Cir. 1995)).

           _____________________
           1
               Instead, Johnson objected at the first trial to Hurst’s testimony about the
   statement of a different co-defendant (Brumfield) at a different point, to the effect that
   Brumfield and unnamed others planned to commit a robbery. Separately, during pre-trial
   litigation for the first trial, Johnson moved to sever, based in part on Confrontation Clause
   grounds related to George’s statements, including those George made to Hurst that are
   now challenged on appeal. Johnson’s motion noted that “[t]hese statements are also
   inadmissible hearsay that do not qualify under a hearsay exception as to codefendant[]
   Johnson . . . .” The district court denied the motion to sever but explained that Johnson
   could re-urge the arguments in the motion at trial. He did not.

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          Johnson concedes George’s unavailability. As to the second prong,
   Johnson asserts only that “George, while admitting some personal
   responsibility, also placed blame on alleged accomplices.” Johnson Br. 10.
   George did not shift blame from himself: he subjected himself to criminal
   liability by stating that he was the first shooter at the crime scene, and, while
   George said that he did not know who fired the fatal shot, he did say that he
   was shooting.
          On the third prong, Johnson relies on Williamson v. United States to
   attack the trustworthiness of statements of co-defendants. 512 U.S. 594, 601
   (1994).2 Importantly, George did not make these statements in a custodial
   context—unlike the Williamson declarant—but rather made them as a friend,
   and thus there were not “the same set of incentives that create the risk of an
   unreliable statement.” Ebron, 683 F.3d at 133. Furthermore, there were
   various pieces of corroborating evidence, including George’s statement to
   Hurst in another conversation, after the publication of another article
   reporting that DNA evidence was found at the crime scene, that his “life
   [was] over”; Wade’s testimony that, approximately an hour before the
   robbery, Ofomata drove to Wade’s house to pick up a bag of firearms, which
   Wade saw Johnson assist Ofomata in loading into the vehicle used in the
   robbery before getting back into the vehicle; and the testimony of the second
   guard—confirmed by surveillance video—that three individuals emerged

          _____________________
          2
              Johnson’s arguments otherwise largely go to Hurst’s credibility as a witness.

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   from the vehicle, one rushing toward the money, another shooting at
   Trochez, and a third shooting at the truck.

          As to the effect on his substantial rights, Johnson contends only that
   “Hurst’s testimony related to George’s statements was essentially the only
   testimony that placed Johnson as a participant in the armed robbery.”
   Johnson Br. 12. But given the evidence just discussed, supra, Johnson’s
   vague assertion does not establish that “there is a reasonable probability that
   the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.”
   Montes-Salas, 669 F.3d at 247.

                                        IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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