Court Opinion

ID: 9857281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:27:33.045726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:24.473650
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin
joined by Justice Smith dissenting.
I find myself unable to agree that an owner of land renting the same for cash (or “standing” rent, as it is usually referred to) has no statutory landlord’s lien upon the crops grown upon *78the rented premises to secure the payment of such rent due for a current year. To hold that the existence of a statutory lien cannot be determined until all of the cotton and grain produced on the land during the rental year has been harvested, and then if one-fourth of the cotton and one-third of the grain is less in value than the standing rent agreed upon, the land owner has no statutory lien, is to make a holding not called for by the statute in question (Art. 5222, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes). The existence vei non of a lien (and by lien I mean a statutory lien) depends, among other things, upon the existence of the relation of landlord-tenant. This lien is held to attach at the time of the making of the contract, and in the case of crops, from the commencement of their growth, regardless of whether the rent is then due. 32 Am. Jur. 470, Sec. 579; 52 C. J. S. 464, Sec. 623. To hold that an efficient tenant may cause the landlord’s lien to be valid, whereas an inefficient tenant may defeat the lien, is to fail to apply the proper rule. At the beginning of a crop the landlord either has a lien, or he does not have a lien, and the vagaries of a tenant, the weather, or the market price of the product at the time it is marketed, should not affect the lien, or change the law protecting the landowner.
“Like any other contract, the validity of a rental contract must be tested by the law and the conditions existing at the time the contract is made. It is either valid or invalid at its inception. It is then that the contract rights of the parties are fixed and become vested. To make the validity of such contracts depend solely upon the success or failure of the tenant in the cultivation of the rented premises, regardless of what might affect that success or failure, would lead to unreasonable and embarrassing confusion in the making of rental contracts.” Lancaster v. Wheeler, Texas Civ. App., 266 S.W. 795 (3), no writ history.
See also Rumbo v. Winterrowd, Texas Civ. App., 228 S.W. 258, no writ history; Twentieth Century Associates v. Waldman, 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E. 2d 177, 162 A. L. R. 202. In the case at bar the lease contract was for a term of five years at an annual rental agreed upon. The facts show that the tenant planted only 100 acres to cotton. There was a total of about 300 acres covered by the rental contract. The year involved seems to have been a poor cotton year, and it is contended by respondent Bank that no lien was given. Had the year been a good cotton year, and the price equal to or more than the present price, a lien would have been good. Under the majority holding no lien would attach even though the remaining two hundred acres had been planted to fine producing, high-priced crop other than grain, which brought *79the tenant $100.00 per acre in crops. To uphold the majority-view is to hold that it could not be determined whether or not a lien was given to the landlord, who had rented his land for cash rent, until the end of the crop year and all the cotton and grain had been harvested and its value determined. At that time — the end of harvest of all crops — and at that time only would the landlord, tenant, or creditors of the tenant know whether or not the statutory lien was valid. Some grain crops come off in early spring and most of the cotton is not gathered until fall and winter. All crops which have been removed from the premises for more than one month are freed from the landlord’s lien by virtue of Art. 5223, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes. By the time all cotton had been gathered and the existence of a lien determined, there would be no grain on which the landlord could foreclose his lien — should it be determined under respondent’s contention to be a valid lien — on any of the grain. The Legislature, in passing the 1931 amendment to the landlord’s lien law, surely did not intend that the existence of a lien in favor of the landlord depend upon such uncertain foundation. If the statute is given this effect it would be void. To prevent it being void, it must be held that the statute does not except standing rent (cash rental) contracts from those under which the landowner has a lien to secure the rentals. I agree with the case of Culberson v. Ashford, 118 Texas 491,18 S.W. 2d 585, where it says: “* * * The amendment of 1915 to our Texas Statute, Article 5475, contains no provision whatever for giving consideration to the differences in value of property or the property rights involved. Said amendment fixes an arbitrary standard. It does not provide for fair or reasonable returns or take into account the value of a piece of property, the improvements upon it, or its location. * * *” Nowhere in this case (Culberson v. Ashford, supra) does the court pass upon the question here decided. That case did not involve a renting of lands for standing rent. The contract was on a crop basis for a large part of the land, and cash basis for only a portion of the farm. This Court did not hold that you must take the value of all crops and add them together, and then determine whether or not a landlord’s lien was valid. It specifically held that all of the 1915 amendment was unconstitutional and void, including the provision therein contained in the second paragraph setting aside the statutory lien in certain cases. That case was one that reached this Court through a certified question, and it is well settled that this Court only has jurisdiction of those questions contained in the certificate of the Court of Civil Appeals sending the case to this Court. Slater v. Ellis County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 9, 120 Texas 272, 36 S.W. 2d 1014(7), 3A Texas Jur. 359, Sec. 282. No question as to the *80validity of a standing rent contract was certified, nor could have been decided by this Court in the Culberson case. The Supreme Court, on certified questions from the Court of Civil Appeals, is limited to the precise matters involved in the questions. Snyder v. Baird Independent School Dist., 102 Texas 4, 113 S.W. 521; State v. Duke, 104 Texas 355, 137 S.W. 654, 138 S.W. 385; Clary v. Hurst, 104 Texas 423, 138 S.W. 566; Sims v. State, ex rel. Isensee, et al, Tex. Com. App., 12 S.W. 2d 540; Turman v. Turman, 123 Texas 1, 64 S.W. 2d 137. In Clary v. Hurst, supra, the Court said: “It will be understood that our answer will relate solely to the very question presented, and that neither by implication nor otherwise are we to be understood as expressing any opinion upon any other question which may arise from the facts stated.”
A check of each of the above cases in Shepard’s Southwestern Reporter Citations shows that none of the above cases has been questioned or overruled. In the face of this situation, I am unable to agree that Culberson v. Ashford is any authority whatever to support the application given it in the majority opinion. The reasoning in the Culberson case should be applied to the statutory lien, the same as a contract lien. The majority opinion says we would have the same question if a contract lien were involved because the statute was written into the present contract. If the majority holding is to the effect that had a contract lien been included in the rental contract, same would be void if the rental charged exceeded one-third the value of grain and one-fourth the value of the cotton, such holding, in my opinion, is directly opposed to our holding in Culberson v. Ashford, supra. I cannot make that case mean anything except that a contract seeking to limit rental charged to value of one-third of grain and one-fourth of cotton is unconstitutional, void and fixes an arbitrary standard. Unless Culberson v. Ashford held contract liens of the character under discussion unconstitutional and void, there was no need for the 1931 amendment. All of the majority’s reasoning as to the 1931 amendment falls, and throws no light on our problem of the validity of the statutory lien.
“The lien herein considered is said to be founded upon the broadest kind of policy to protect the landlord in the payment to him for the fruits and revenues issuing from the leasing of his property. ‘The courts ought not to refine his substantial rights away by giving effect to form, and denying it to substance.’ It ‘will not be subjected to a more rigid interpretation than that given by the courts to contract liens.’ ‘Whatever may be the view which the courts of other states take toward the *81statutes of those states fixing landlord’s liens, that lien has ever been a favorite of the courts of this state, and all persons dealing with tenants are charged with knowledge of the rights of the landlord in the premises which are to protect against the lienable goods of the tenant the payment to him of the consideration for which he leases the premises.’ ” 27 Tex. Jur. 103, Landlord and Tenant, Section 40.
The constitutionality of the 1931 amendment is not attacked, and we express no opinion upon that feature of the cause but must assume that it is constitutional for the purposes of this cause.
Art. 5222, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, in the first paragraph undoubtedly and unquestionably gives a landlord renting for standing rent a statutory lien upon the crops produced by the tenant upon the rented premises. The second and last paragraph purports to set aside the statutory lien in certain cases where the first paragraph gives the lien. In other words, this second paragraph describes a certain kind of rental contract which is excepted from the operation of the lien set out in the first paragraph. It exempts from the landlord’s lien only those rent contracts where the rental is paid in, cotton and grain. It would clearly not apply to a rent contract covering land, all of which was to be worked in alfalfa, black-eyed peas, castor beans, vegetables, or the many other crops now grown on present day Texas farms besides cotton and grain. Under present Federal control of prices in cotton and grain, government regulations limit the acreage in cotton and grain that may be grown on a tract of land. To refuse a lien to the landowner when government rules prevent sufficient cotton and grain to be grown on the land so that the one-third and one-fourth of these two crops equal the standing rental charged, would be to cause State and Federal government to be working at cross purposes. Likewise, there is no provision in the second paragraph of the statute dealing with a standing or cash rental contract and such a rental contract is not mentioned in the exception provision. It will be observed that in the first section of Art. 5222, a lien is given to “all persons leasing or renting land or tenements * * * whether the same (rental) is to be paid in money, agricultural products, or other property * * (Emphasis added.) In the exception paragraph wherein the Legislature defines those contracts which will not be secured by a lien, it is stated that the article shall not apply where the landlord “charges a rental of more than one-third of the value of the grain and more than one-fourth of the value of the cotton raised on said land * * The exception *82provision does not provide that those contracts for money rental shall be without the protection of a lien. In my opinion the omission of the Legislature to so provide is very significant. For this reason, the rental contract in the present cause comes within the general lien provisions of the first paragraph, and not within the exceptions mentioned in the last paragraph. As stated in 39 Tex. Jur. 194, Statutes, Section 102:
“A proviso contained in the same clause or in a subsequent clause’of a statute that is invoked is a matter of defense, and need not be negatived by a plaintiff seeking relief given by the statute.”
It is well settled that where a statute defines a general rule, and then provides an exception, or exceptions thereto, the statute shall apply in all cases not specifically set out in the exception. Federal Crude Oil Co. v. Yount-Lee Oil Co., 122 Texas 21, 52 S.W. 2d 56 (14) ; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Temple Grain & Hay Co., 122 Texas 288, 58 S.W. 2d _7 (3) ; Broughton v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex. Civ. App., 105 S.W. 2d 480 (5), writ refused.
It being stipulated in the trial court between the petitioner and respondent that the party having a superior lien should recover the proceeds of the sale of the cotton, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion delivered January 27, 1954.