Court Opinion

ID: 9546815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:35:39.710949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:53.134226
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I think the jury could reasonably have found as it did on the evidence adduced in the case without the court giving instruction No. 11 or any other instruction respecting the presumption of the exercise of due care by the decedent which it is claimed arises by virtue of the instinct of self-preservation. I am of the opinion that this presumption has little or no use in automobile accident cases, especially in those involving collisions between two or more automobiles. I think a fair study of cases dealing with collisions would reveal that in the very great majority, if not in practically all cases, no device is needed to get them off dead center and that there is no necessity for the use of the presumption of the exercise of due care by persons killed. This is true whether the plaintiff claims *91that the defendant was negligent or the defendant claims that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or both. The presence of the presumption has brought confusion and has apparently led trial courts needlessly into error in their instructions.
What Mr. Justice Wade is discussing in his treatment of the due care presumption is in reality, in great part at least, only a means of advancing the trial. I agree with his statement that “such a presumption deals only with the burden of going forward with or the production of evidence.” The upshot of my thesis is that we seldom need such devices. There are some rare cases where there are no competent witnesses to testify to the nature or cause of the accident or the manner in which it happened. In those cases a rule of procedural law is needed in order to determine liability. For instance, suppose the insured under an accidental death insurance policy which excludes designed death dies from a fall out of a window. No one is available who can testify how or why the deceased fell; no one knows whether it was suicidal or accidental. There is no evidence regarding despondency or expression of suicidal intent or of deep emotional disturbance such as comes from marital or business upsets. In such case liability may depend upon who has the burden of proof. He may lose who cannot proceed. The presumption of due care may aid the beneficiary because the insurer cannot show that the insured did not exercise due care, and self-destruction is not presumed.
This is the third case in recent months to come before this court on the matter of the office and nature of the due care presumption and the extent of its reach.1 We have been divided on the question whether the presumption becomes non-existent on the presentation of any evidence or only when the court concludes there was sufficient evidence to overcome it. I have contended for the idea that the presumption evaporates when there is some or any evidence presented of negligence on the part of the deceased person, who is presumed to have used due care. There usually is such evidence. Under my theory the court would determine whether any or some such evidence is presented. I think Mr. Justice Wade is of the view that the presumption disappears only when a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the person who is presumed to have used due care which contributes to the accident has been presented by the other party. But I think he is giving the presumption too great vitality. It is based on the idea that the instinct of self-preservation will cause persons to be careful of their lives and limbs, • which idea could be made to support a presumption of due care in every accident case because if instinctive regard for one’s life and safety *92caused one to be careful, he would be continuously careful of his person. As a matter of fact, people are also very careless and I do not think that the so-called instinct of self-preservation should be given much vitality. It should not be used except as a procedural device to further the trial of the case. It would employ it only for such purposes. And that I think would be in very few cases. Mr. Justice Wade seems at times to mean just that but at other times he seems to be giving the presumption a substantive quality. But as he has announced, the presumption deals with a rule of law. It is a procedural device and nothing more. It disappears when any evidence contrary to the presumption enters the case regardless of the quantum or sufficiency of that evidence. Mr. Justice Wade says: "From the basic fact that a human being was accidentally killed a presumption arises which requires the trier of the facts [1] to assume the presumed facts, that decedent used due care for his own safety, in the absence of a prima facie showing to the contrary, but in this kind of a presumption [2] upon the making of such showing [prima facie showing], the presumption disappears from and becomes wholly inoperative in the case, and the trial from then on should proceed exactly the same as though no such presumption ever existed, or had any effect on the case.”
I think the narrow point on which we differ, as I said before, is whether any or some evidence of negligence on the part of the deceased will make the prima facie showing or whether the judge must determine whether the evidence of negligence is-“sufficient.” While this may seem to be a very narrow difference and an unimportant one, it could in rare cases be very important. But since the upshot of my conclusion! is that in the very great majority of accident cases and especially automobile accident cases the course of the trial rolls along without the need of any procedural device-to keep it going, I think for practical reasons it is unwise to introduce in reference-to the presumption occasion for nicety of appraising evidence. In most cases no instruction concerning this frail “due care”' presumption would be necessary. Consequently, I think it unnecessary and unprofitable to determine whether the burden of establishing the non-existence of the presumption is to be met by “some” or “sufficient” evidence.
Turning now to another part of the majority opinion, I am in accord with the statement therein that the presumption is not evidence, but the statement of a rule of law. But I cannot agree with the following excerpt:
“The instruction further stated that ‘this presumption arises from the instinct of self preservation and the disposition of man to avoid personal harm.’ This points out the logical tendency * * * of the basic facts, in the light of human experience, to■ prove the presumed facts. This tend*93ency should not he confused with the presumption, for although they come from the same evidence, one is a rule of law which fixes the burden of going forward with the evidence and has no tendency to prove the fact in question, and so cannot be weighed with other evidence, the other is an evidentiary fact which may have some tendency to prove the issue, it is probative evidence which can be weighed for what it is worth with all other evidence on that subject. This evidence does not disappear with the presumption.” (Emphasis mine.)
The basic error of Mr. Justice Wade’s position is revealed by the italicized portion of his comments above noted. I do not think the “instinct of self preservation and the disposition of man to avoid personal harm” point out the logical tendency of the basic fact in the light of human experience, to prove the “presumed facts.” The opinion has just said that “such a presumption deals only with the burden of going forward with or the production of evidence” and that “from the basic fact that a human being was accidentally killed a presumption arises which requires the trier of the facts to assume the presumed facts, that decedent used due care for his ozvn safety, in absence of a prima facie shozving to the contrary, but in this kind of a presumption upon the making of such showing, the presumption disappears and becomes wholly inoperative in the case, and the trial from then on should proceed exactly the same as though no presumption ever existed, or had any effect on the case.” (Emphasis mine.) But if the presumption is ruled out of the case except for the purpose of advancing the trial only, how does it get in by masquerading as an inference? The subject is abstruse. I realize it is permissible for the jury to consider any inferences which flow from the manner in which the accident occurred which may throw any light on whether it was caused by the defendant’s negligence or by the concurring negligence of the defendant and the decedent. But is not the real difficulty that we use the very general rule that men instinctively tend to protect their person from harm as evidence “for what it is worth” and thus make it the basis for an inference and permit it to come in as such after we have excluded it as a presumption. This seems to be a legerdemain of words to accomplish what we said could not be done under name of a presumption. I think it is only confusing to say that the presumption of due care in case of accidental death exists only by virtue of a rule of law, whilst an inference is actually derived from the evidence, that is from the facts, especially in view of the real truths that what is called evidence is nothing but a broad truism. Herein we get close to the fallacy that the presumption rests on exactly the same base as the inference, viz. the broad general theory that man acts instinctively to save himself from harm. It is fallacious because inferences should be derived from the evidence in the *94particular case and not from some broad general principle which may or may not be true in the particular case under inquiry. In each individual case it is for the jury to determine under the particular facts of the case under inquiry whether the plaintiff or defendant was negligent.
I do not think it correct to infer anything from the principle that men act in accordance with measures to protect themselves from harm when that is certainly not always the case and when the true inquiry is, how did the participants in this accident act? Mr. Justice Wade is to my mind incorrect in stating that the fact of death by accident may give rise to an inference that it was caused by negligence because men have the urge to save themselves from harm. It would indeed be very weak and farfetched and I think involve a complete nonsequitur to argue that negligence could be ascribed to the defendant because of the supposed universal principle (which is anything but universal) that men act to avoid harm to themselves. The inquiry is whether in this case the evidence reveals that decedent was negligent and therefore did not act. One cannot take as evidence the general disposition of men to save them-' selves from harm to infer that the decedent was free from negligence, even though such inference may be said to be very weak, any more than in a larceny case, the accused’s innocence could be inferred because of the truism that there are more honest men than dishonest men. Of course, neither negligence nor criminal guilt is presumed. It must be proved by the party alleging it. But from the mere fact of accidental death, there can be no inference that the deceased was not negligent. From the fact that a person is killed accidentally, a jury can no more logically infer that the deceased was free from negligence than it can infer that other actors in the accident who were not killed were not negligent. If the jury infers that the deceased used due care because men usually act to protect themselves, they should by the same token infer that the actors who survived the accident were not negligent.
It may be true in certain cases as stated by Edmond M. Morgan in his comment on presumptions in Chapter 8 of the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Evidence, page 226, referred to in footnote 5 of the opinion of Mr. Justice Wade, “that when once the basic fact is established in an action it continues to have throughout the action at least that probative value which it would have had, had no presumption ever become operative in the action * * Such statement is true when there is some logical connection between the basic fact and the inference sought to be drawn, e. g. the presumption that a person is dead who is not heard from for seven continuous years by those who would normally hear from him. Even though the trial court ruled chat the presumption had become dissipated, the jury could logically draw an inference from the fact that a person had not *95been heard from for seven years by those who would normally hear from him, that he was dead. There is some logical connection between the fact and the inference drawn. But the fact that a person is accidentally killed is not probative on the question of whether that person was exercising due care at the time of his death. There is no logical connection between the fact and the inference sought to be drawn.
Whether instruction No. 11, although erroneous, prejudiced the defendants depends upon what meaning the jury gave that instruction. The accident occurred because one of the vehicles was on the wrong side of the highway. If from the instruction that the deceased is presumed to have used due care, until the contrary is proven, the jury presumed that the deceased was on his own side of the highway and that therefore the defendants must have been on the wrong side, it requires no argument to demonstrate that prejudice resulted. Under that interpretation of that instruction, the defendant would be presumed to have been negligent; the burden was cast on him to prove himself free from negligence. That, of course, is not the law; the burden rests upon the plaintiff to prove the defendant’s negligence.
On the other hand, if the jury only understood instruction No. 11 as stating in another way that the burden of proving negligence on the part of the deceased was on the defendant, as contended for in the opinions of Mr. Justice Wade and Mr. Justice Crockett, then that instruction was not prejudicial. Not being convinced that the erroneous instruction would probably be given this latter meaning by the jury, I dissent from the result reached by the majority. I would reverse the case for a new trial.
It is interesting to speculate what would be the decision of this court had the parties in the instant case been reversed; that is, had the defendants been suing the personal representatives of the deceased for personal injuries sustained, and had the court instructed that there is a presumption that the deceased used due care, until the contrary is proven. (See Chapter 30, Laws of Utah, 1953, providing for the survival of a cause of action for wrongful death or personal injuries against a wrongdoer.) Would we hold that such an instruction was harmless because it merely stated in effect that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the deceased? Or would we hold it prejudicial because the jury would be likely to understand that there is a presumption that the deceased was on his own side of the road and hence the plaintiff must have been on the wrong side? Could the jury infer from the fact that the deceased was killed that he was -exercising due care?
Much of what has here been said arguendo has been said by me in other words in the debate which raged in the case of Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Company, Utah, 242 P.2d 764, and Gibbs v. Blue *96Cab Company, Utah, 249 P.2d 213 (affirmed on rehearing July 15, 1953, Utah, 259 P.2d 294). Hence, much of what Mr. Justice Wade and I say in this opinion is like threshing old straw. But the matter which deals with the analysis of the validity of the “inference” supposedly arising from the fact that a person was killed in an accident and because of the “presumption” that men instinctively act to protect themselves from harm is new in this opinion. I am not aware that such matter has been so analyzed in this court before.

. See Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Exp. Co., Utah, 242 P.2d 764; Gibbs v. Blue Cab Co., Utah, 249 P.2d 213.