Court Opinion

ID: 9756845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:03:46.374472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.177255
License: Public Domain

Judge COHN,
concurring & dissenting. Respectfully, I dissent.
In this case, PennDot was not unilaterally imposing upon Licensee an ignition interlock requirement. Rather, PennDot was reiterating the requirements of Section 7003(1) of what is colloquially known as the Interlock Act.1 Under this Section of the statute, the burden is on the licensee whose repeat DUI conviction arose out-of-state, and who seeks restoration of his/her operating privileges, to obtain certification from a Pennsylvania court, presumably the court of common pleas of the county in which that person resides, that an interlock ignition system has been installed. To hold otherwise, would thwart the obvious intent of the legislature to control the licenses of individuals whose repeat DUI convictions or their equivalents occurred out-of-state.
The majority cites to Section 7003, highlighting the language that requires the court to certify to PennDot that each of the applicant’s vehicles has been fitted with an approved interlock system, but concludes that “nothing in this provision gives PennDot any authority whatsoever to do anything.” In a way, the majority is *112correct. Section 7003 does not authorize PennDot to do anything if an applicant fails to submit a certification from a trial court that the interlock system has been installed. In fact, the statute specifically precludes PennDot from issuing an operator’s license until this requisite is met. Far from being a requirement that Penn-Dot is imposing, it is rather a mandate from the legislature itself. A recidivist offender, such as Licensee in this case, must first have an interlock system installed before PennDot may issue the license.
This obligation, contained in Section 7003, is underscored by the language of 42 Pa.C.S. § 7002(a) which reads “Before the department may restore such person’s operating privilege, the department must receive a certification from the court that the ignition interlock system has been installed.” The legislature, in no uncertain terms, has itself limited the circumstances under which PennDot may issue a license. The majority does not focus on the very clear legislative intent, that a repeat offender is not to be issued a driver’s license without first having an interlock system installed on each of his vehicles.2
To the extent that the majority draws its analysis of Sections 7002 and 7003 from Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), I believe this Court’s analysis in Schneider to be incorrect and I refer to my dissenting opinion in Watterson v. Department of Transportation, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (Cohn, J. dissenting) for further explanation of my disagreement with the analysis in Schneider. Nonetheless, assuming ar-guendo, that the analysis in Schneider is correct, the factual circumstances of this case, nevertheless, distinguish it from Schneider.
In the present case, Licensee’s second conviction for driving under the influence occurred out-of-state. Schneider involved two in-state convictions for DUI. Section 7002(b) of the Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7002(b), specifically applies to in-state convictions, i.e., to “second or subsequent” violations of Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 3731. The decision in Schneider only considered Section 7002(b) of the Act. This Section, however, is not applicable to second or subsequent out-of-state DUIs. Instead, such out-of-state offenses are controlled by Section 7003(1) of the Act. When a second or subsequent DUI or “similar out-of-state offense” occurs, this Section specifically requires a court to certify to PennDot that “each motor vehicle owned by the person has been equipped with an approved ignition interlock system.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7003(1).3 In other *113words, this Section essentially prohibits PennDot from restoring a person’s operating privileges prior to receipt of such certification.
PennDot asserts that Schneider is not applicable to the case at bar, an argument that the majority opinion dismisses. (Majority Opinion at 109-10.) In effect, the majority applies the analysis of Schneider to the instant case, concluding that where the out-of-state trial court does not issue an order requiring installation of the interlock system, PennDot may not refuse to issue a license if the interlock system has not been installed.
The problem with applying the Schneider analysis to this case is manifest when viewing the facts of this case within the analytical framework established by this Court in Schneider. We stated there:
Although Schneider had two DUI offenses and pursuant to Section 7002(b), the trial court was required to order installation of an ignition interlock device, that failure does not mean that PennDOT has been given authority to override the trial court’s order and require installation. Section 7002 provides that only “the court shall order the installation of an approved ignition interlock device.... ” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7002(b). (Emphasis added). Because this provision gives a court the sole authority, PennDOT has no unilateral authority to impose ignition interlock device requirements if the trial court fails to do so. If the trial court fails to impose this requirement in a criminal proceeding, the district attorney can appeal the trial court’s failure to do so as it would if the trial court failed to impose any other mandatory sentence.
Id. at 366-67 (footnote omitted and emphasis in original). Applying this rationale to the instant case, the district attorney of the county in Pennsylvania in which Licensee resides, or the Pennsylvania driver’s licensing authority itself, would have had to pursue an appeal in the New Jersey court system of the New Jersey conviction that has prompted this case. Since, of course, neither can do so, PennDot is not able to fulfill its statutory mandate, but must, instead, issue the license.4 The majority has created a Catch-22 situation which requires a trial court order before PennDot may fulfill its statutory duty, but also requires a foreign trial court to issue such an order, which is something the foreign court simply lacks any authority to do.
The majority tacitly recognizes this absurdity, noting that:
we recognize the dilemma the Interlock Act creates, i.e., an individual who is convicted of a second DUI offense outside of Pennsylvania will likely escape the ignition interlock device while an individual convicted of a second DUI offense in Pennsylvania will not....
(Majority Opinion at 111) (emphasis added). More than just “likely,” the majority’s analysis absolutely insulates out-of-state violators from the obligation clearly intended and articulated by the legislature for such offenders.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the present statutory scheme is unworkable. The majority bases its conclusion on what it suggests is ambiguous statutory language hastily drafted in *114response to Congress’ urging — “Even though the general consensus is that the Interlock Act needs reform to be workable, that does not mean that we should place in PennDot powers not given to it by the statute.” (Majority opinion at 111.) Admittedly, the statutory language is not as clear as it could be; however, that does not render it ambiguous, unworkable or unconstitutional. The provisions themselves contain clear mechanisms for carrying out the policy and legislative goals of gradually returning recidivist DUI offenders to regular vehicle license operator status.
The suspension imposed is designed to protect the members of the public from the clear dangers imposed by recidivist violators. The interlock license provides an intermediate step, offering an opportunity to gradually return to full driving privileges, in a manner designed both to maximize the opportunity to eliminate further recidivism and to minimize the risk to the public of repeat DUI offenders returning to the road. By essentially requiring PennDot to restore Licensee’s license, the majority, unintentionally yet severely, undercuts the clear goals of the Interlock Act, and eviscerates this mechanism. The unwarranted effect is to place both the traveling public and the recidivist violator himself at great risk, a result clearly not legislatively intended.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I would affirm the trial court order as to the reinstatement of the one-year license suspension, but reverse the trial court to the extent that it affirmed Licensee’s appeal as to the interlock requirement.

. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7001-7003.

. The majority mentions constitutional concerns that may arise from the Interlock Act; however, such concerns were not briefed before this Court and, as such, are not appropriately addressed.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7003. Additional driver’s license restoration requirements
In addition to any other requirements established for the restoration of a person’s operating privileges under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1548 (relating to requirements for driving under influence offenders):
(1) Where a person's operating privileges are suspended for a second or subsequent violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), or a similar out-of-State offense, and the person seeks a restoration of operating privileges, the court shall certify to the department that each motor vehicle owned by the person has been equipped with an approved ignition interlock system.
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(5) A person whose operating privilege is suspended for a second or subsequent violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 or a similar out-of-State offense who does not apply for an ignition interlock restricted license shall not be eligible to apply for the restoration of operating privileges for an additional year *113after otherwise being eligible for restoration under paragraph (1).

. How either the district attorney or Penn-DOT would have even been aware of the foreign criminal proceedings in time to take an appeal, even assuming they could be deemed to have standing to do so, are other issues nowhere addressed by the majority.