Court Opinion

ID: 9757664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:52:46.566413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:42.420971
License: Public Domain

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in Judge TIMBERS’ opinion .and would add only a brief statement. The great disparity between the effective weight of voters in choosing legislators in different senatorial districts and towns •shows a marked discrimination against those in the districts and towns of larger population. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, .82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) has established that such a discrimination raises a question of deprivation of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which it is the •duty of the federal courts to resolve if the legislature and the state courts fail to do so. On the showing made here, no compelling reasons for so wide a discrimination having been shown, the court must find that the discrimination is invidious and a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs. No case yet decided in the other states is fully comparable on the facts, although Sweeney v. Notte, R.I., 183 A.2d 296, which invalidated the Rhode Island legislative structure is perhaps the closest, since there the basic unit in the lower house was also the town. There it was suggested that the legislature set up districts composed of groupings of the smaller towns, or so increase the size of the House that proportional representation could be accomplished while retaining a representative for each town. The latter alternative would of course be impractical in our case because of the great increase of members required in a body already composed of 294 members. Districts can, however, undoubtedly be designed to assure representation of points of view of rural, urban and suburban electors, if indeed such separate points of view exist, while giving equal weight to the votes of individual electors in the choice of the membership of the House. I take it that while exact equality of population of every representative or senatorial district is not required, and some room remains for weighting other factors than population, such as contiguity and compactness, deviations from substantial equality are to be the exceptions, and the showing of necessity therefor plain. No convincing showing of necessity has been made. I would therefore follow the general outline for relief proposed by Judge TIMBERS and the late Judge CLARK.
APPENDIX
[OPINION OF THE LATE CIRCUIT JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK]
CLARK, Circuit Judge.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, opened a new era of federal judicial responsibility in its holding that an assertion of constitutional right as impaired by the malapportionment according to population of representatives in state legislatures presented a justiciable issue, to be passed upon by the federal courts. Prior to that decision it had been held or assumed that *767this was a “political question” not to be considered by the judiciary. The announcement of the decision, however, brought forth an immediate response from voters all over the country, so that already some 44 actions in 39 of the 50 states are pending to test the constitutionality of state legislative apportion-ments. This action tests the Connecticut system as instanced in both Houses of the Connecticut General Assembly. It is not merely new and strange territory into which we, in common with our federal judicial colleagues generally, must now venture; but it is an awesome responsibility, the difficulties and uncertainties of which we are fully conscious. But it is quite clear that it is one upon which we cannot turn our backs.
The plaintiffs are ten voters from six different urban towns1 of the State, suing for themselves and others similarly situated, who assert that they are denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by reason of the malapportionment, and consequent discrimination against them, of representatives in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The defendants are the Governor of the State and other high officials, including the Secretary of State, who is also the Commissioner of Elections and who is sued as representative of all officials, state and municipal, charged with duties pertaining to the holding of general elections. Relief sought is a declaratory judgment holding the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights violated by the malapportionment of both the House and Senate, together with injunctive relief against the holding of general elections, other than elections at large to the Senate and House in 1964, until such reapportionment is had as will not impair the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Attorney General answered on behalf of the defendants, but the real burden of defense has been assumed by intervenors whose petitions for intervention were allowed by this court. Jurisdiction in this court is clear under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3, 4). Since the action brings in question statutes as well as constitutional provisions of the State, a special statutory court of three judges has been convened by order of the Chief Judge of the Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 et seq., to hear the case.
In their complaint the plaintiffs make specific allegations of malapportionment of both the Senate and the House. Inter-venors Pinney, chairman of the Republican State Central Committee, and three-associates admit the malapportionment, of the Senate, but vigorously assert that, the election of members of the House is; legal and valid. Intervenor Bailey, chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee, admits the malapportionment of both Houses and essentially joins forces with the plaintiffs. The parties have followed the suggestion of the court to agree on the facts — which, indeed, are well known — and to present such expert and other evidence upon which they rely in written form, so that the case has been fully submitted on the merits and full oral argument had supplementing the briefs. The presentation has been of an unusually high order; and the court wishes to express its deep sense of obligation to counsel for so thoroughly and carefully initiating it into ground-breaking territory. As it turns out, the issue here becomes a comparatively narrow one, although of great importance; it appears in somewhat similar, although far from identical, form in some, though not all, of the cases pending elsewhere. As framed by the Pinney intervenors, it is whether or not the House may legally choose its representatives according to what they term the “unit principle,” relying on town areas, so long as in one body, here the Senate, there is followed the principle of equality of population.
Before we turn to a detailed consideration of this contention, it is well to state *768what appears to be common ground. First with respect to the Senate there is no question but that its apportionment is based primarily on population. This was established in 1901 by Article Third, Section 5, of the Connecticut Constitution, which raised the minimum number of Senate Districts to 24, and the maximum to 36. Power to redistrict was vested in the General Assembly convening next after the completion of a United States census. The last general redistricting was had in 1903, when the General Assembly divided the State into 35 districts, becoming 36 in 1941 with the addition of the district of Greenwich. Section 5 provides that “regard shall be had to population in the several districts, that the same may be as nearly equal as possible under the limitations of this section.” The limitations which follow are that senatorial districts shall always be composed of contiguous territory, that neither the whole nor a part of one county shall be joined to the whole or a part of another county to form a district, and that no town shall be divided unless for the purpose of forming more than one district wholly within the town. An attempt of the legislature in 1953 to redistrict the Senate was struck down by the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors in Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 103 A.2d 818, upon the ground that Section 5 allowed only that session of the General Assembly immediately following the taking of the census to redistrict. Outside of this abortive effort nothing has been done in sixty years, although legislative proposals have been numerous. The difficulties of following the constitutional formula are obvious; in addition there appears to have been an understandable reluctance of Democratic leaders to support redistricting the Senate while the Republican hold on the House through its rural vote continues. Admittedly the malapportionment of the Senate is now substantial.2
Turning to the House we find that it now numbers 294 — the largest state house except one, New Hampshire. And the malapportionment of representation based upon population is striking — indeed is said to be one of the most extreme of any state. Thus the Town of Union, with a population of 383, has 2 representatives, or the same number as the largest cities: Hartford (162,178) and Bridgeport (156,748). The vote of a resident and voter of Union is thus weighted 424.5 times as heavily as the vote of a resident and voter of Hartford. This striking disproportion is carried out generally through the 169 towns, as is more fully illustrated in the footnote.3 Indeed *769there can be little doubt, as is substantially conceded, that if equality of population is to be the test the House is grossly malapportioned. The real defense of the Pinney intervenors comes in their argument for the validity of the “unit principle.”
Now it should be noted that the unit principle in what we must assume as its purest form of one representative to each town has never been the law of this State. It has always been diluted in a substantial way because of history and because of population to achieve a result for which a theoretical basis is hard to discover. Going back in our history, the Fundamental Orders of 1638-9, Section 8, provided representation in the unicameral legislature according to population. The three original towns of Hartford, Windsor, and Wethersfield were to send “four of their Freemen” as their deputies to every General Court, and new towns were to send “so many deputies as the Court shall judge meet, a reasonable proportion to the number of Freemen that are in the said towns.” Colonial Records of Connecticut, 1636-1665, 20, 24. The Charter of 1662, granted by Charles II, set the basic pattern in existence today, providing that the General Assembly should have not more than two persons from each town. Statutes of Connecticut, 1808, 3. In 1698 the second house was added. The pattern for apportionment for the House continued until the Constitution adopted in 1818, which provided in Article III, Section 3, that in the House existing towns should have the same number of representatives “as are at present practised and allowed; new towns, formed after the adoption of the Constitution, should have one”. This is the forerunner of the present provision, Article Third, Section 3. Two modifications of the system have been made. By constitutional amendment in 1874 every town having more than 5,000 was given two representatives, while in 1876 the requirement was added that new towns must have a population of at least 2,500 before becoming entitled to one representative.
Thus it will be observed that the system of apportionment for the House goes back two centuries without fundamental change populationwise, although proposals by commissions and others for changes by constitutional conventions and otherwise have been too numerous to note here. And there has been no change of any kind since 1876, although the mal-apportionment according to population has steadily worsened. The provision that the towns shall retain the representation they had in 1818 explains why Union and some 32 other towns of present population under 5,000 still have two representatives, while 44 other towns of similar population have only one. The prohibition against more than 2 representatives per town shuts off more representation of the large cities; while the grant of one more representative when a town attains a population of 5,000 assures a constantly increasing house, as does the possibility of the legislative creation of new towns as soon as the new entity attains a population of 5,000. That is why the present number is 294, as compared to 279 in 1959, 255 in 1903, and 203 in 1821.
*770When, however, we turn to the alternative claim of one representative per town we have not made a significant advance. For it has no historical support in this State, and in fact none generally outside the State. Only two other states, Vermont and Rhode Island, have representations by towns; and in both these the system is under attack in pending litigation — indeed in Rhode Island it has been found unconstitutional. Sweeney v. Notte, R.I., 183 A.2d 296, 303. In New York representation in the House is by assembly districts; this is true in our other neighbor, Massachusetts, which, as pointed out in note 3 supra, has a high record for equality of representation. Accepting this alternative system would not change, but would only slightly rearrange, the present malapportionment. Thus Union and Hartford would each have one representative, so that each Union vote would be weighted 423.4 times as heavy as the Hartford vote, instead of 424.5 times as at present. Thus the potential rural veto of all urban proposals would still remain.
We have considered the possibility of building a reasonable plan of House apportionment upon rejecting only a part of the present requirements of the state constitution. But this amounts to so little and would be so disappointing to the reasonable expectations of those who have sought an outright vindication of their rights as hardly to justify the repudiation of the state constitution which it would definitely represent. Thus assume a plan of one representative for each town under 5,000 in population and two representatives for each town of 5,000 or over; this would give a slightly more favorable balance to the cities, but not enough to count materially in any practical sense. Truly the mountain would have groaned and groaned and brought forth a mouse.4
The Pinney intervenors have argued that this is but “a numbers game,” and that the arguments for the system lie deeper than statistics such as we have quoted. We will do well to look at these reasons. But we must first put them in the context of this actual case. And here it must be noted that we are dealing not with abstract principles of government, but with the plaintiffs’ claims that their constitutional rights have been impaired. Our American way of allowing practically all questions to turn into legal cases has at least the advantage of narrowing the issues and bringing individual rights into sharp focus, however much it may blur the more remote facets of the problem. So even if the rural despotism is a benevolent one, the plaintiffs may nevertheless insist that it deprives them of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. And we are constrained to say that application of the unit principle either in its pure form or in its present Connecticut adaptation results in such great disparities of voter representation in both the House and the Senate as to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
But since the Pinney intervenors have argued with force and indeed eloquence for the unit principle or principles, we think we should state why we have not found those arguments persuasive even as an abstract proposition of political or governmental science. For stripped of all historical support (which we have found most ambiguous) or support from the supposed “federal analogy” (which we do not find in point) 5 the contention *771comes to this that the towns represent important minority interests or values which should be conserved in one of the Houses. The argument is pressed by all four of the experts whose affidavits have been presented by the Pinney in-tervenors6 and is lucidly explained in a book by one of them, deGrazia, Essay on Apportionment and Representative Government, 1963.7 Against these expressions of view others of most persuasive nature can be adduced,8 and the many briefs filed in the several cases pending in the Supreme Court, together with the arguments therein, add to the store of at least theoretical reasoning. Of course that Court may give a precise answer which will be awaited by us all, but it seems more likely that according to custom and practice its views will be given ad hoc in each case adjudicated. Hence we find no ground for delaying our decision to await Supreme Court adjudications; we shall of course remain alert to any suggestions or help to decision which may come from that quarter.
Now there seem to us two major difficulties with the argument as presented. The first is that there seems no coherent minority group or opinion which the 169 towns can be assumed to represent— nothing at all comparable, for example, *772to labor union members or, indeed, to members of the Republican or Democratic Parties. On such matters as securing local appropriations for highways or schools their interests are quite competitive, and this we fear is likely to be true of most minority problems; there will be 169 objectives, rather than a single one. In fact experience suggests that about the only view upon which a consensus can be expected is the negative one of opposing change. And second, the concept of the duty of a representative to support the minority interest of his town seems a limited and a barren one, adding to the declining importance of legislative bodies in general and state legislatures in particular. The separate interests of the towns should be, and are, vigorously represented by their chief executive officers: the mayor or the first selectman, as the case may be. These can properly press for substantial highway and school appropriations or other favors for the cities or towns they represent.9 But the legislators should have a broader view; they should represent the people as a whole, and not confine themselves to purely parochial decisions based upon the supposed self-interest of their towns. Indeed, the decline of the two-party system and its significance in American life is often traced to these limited views. Whatever else the Baker-Carr case achieves, it should lead to experimentation in true democracy, with equal or nearly equal representation of the population. This cannot be truly tried if the members of the House represent only Union or Warren or Hartford or Bridgeport, and not the people of the State of Connecticut.
The conclusion to which we must come seems to us clear, namely, that the mal-apportionment of both the House and the Senate represents a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the plaintiffs; and they are entitled to a declaratory judgment to that effect. We realize that this is hardly more than the beginning of our task and that the more difficult portion of it lies before us as we try to implement this decision. Plaintiffs ask that we adjourn these proceedings for a time to give the Governor the opportunity to call the legislature in special session and to allow that body the opportunity to formulate plans for redistricting which will satisfy constitutional requirements. We accept this suggestion and are adjourning these proceedings for some time, which we shall be glad to extend if or when it appears that the General Assembly is disposed to function. But we are sensible of the long deadlock of many years’ duration over the issue, and even the lack of action at the session last spring, when we delayed action in this very case to await the rising of the General Assembly. As Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 260, 82 S.Ct. 691, 733, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, well puts it, we do not want to take the position of “blackjacking the Assembly into reapportioning the State.” And we are sensible that primaries for the fall elections will soon be coming up and that we should settle the issues as promptly as possible, to allow time for appeal — all before the fall elections. So, while still cherishing the hope of legislative action, we believe we must establish a schedule for ourselves in the event that it is not forthcoming.
At hearings to be held hereafter, we shall therefore expect counsel to propose and to consider appropriate decrees to execute the decision we have here stated. This will involve the development of formulas for the redistricting of both House and Senate along lines we shall now consider to secure a constitutional apportionment in each House. And we shall further discuss with counsel whether the court, acting under F.R.Civ.P. 53, should appoint a master to hold hearings and settle the details of the redistricting following the court’s instructions and to re*773port to the court with reasonable promptness as to the final decree to be entered.
In fixing the Senate and House formulas to be followed, the court is disposed to rely heavily on the plans suggested in the Report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, December 1962, on apportionment of State Legislatures, which we have referred to in note 8 supra, applying the allowance of permissible deviation from a state ratio somewhat less rigidly than the Commission recommends. This concession seems reasonable in view of the fact that we do have the division into towns and that these form convenient units for voting and in combination may well provide for appropriate districts to be represented in the General Assembly.
Some experimentation will be needed to see how the existing governmental units may be arranged to achieve the maximum results for comparable units of substantially equal units of population. We suggest here some purely tentative guide lines, subject to revision in later proceedings in this case. It would seem appropriate to have in mind a total membership of the House ranging somewhere from 200 to 300, with the ideal figure as low as is possible to secure a workable series of unit districts. Then it would seem desirable not to divide towns, though the crossing of the ancient county lines would seem appropriate so long as reasonable homogeneity of the units would be achieved. In result the cities would elect several representatives at large, while several small towns would be combined where appropriate ■ to make a single legislative district. On this basis a deviation from the state ratio quite a little in excess of the 10% maximum suggested by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations would not seem objectionable. And for the Senate a membership of from 30 to 36 would seem appropriate, with perhaps less deviation from the State ratio here expected than in the House. Here it is apparent, as seemingly all parties agree, that the restrictions stated in Article III, Section 5, of the State Constitution cannot be accepted as arbitrary limitations on the framing of new Senatorial districts.
In this connection it is to be noted that the Pinney intervenors, while accepting the overriding importance of federal constitutional principles to invalidate the state restrictions on redistricting the Senate, nevertheless assert the still binding force of the State Constitutional provisions, Article III, Section 3, as to the House. We have no hesitation in finding no such differentiation to exist and in concluding that local constitutional, as well as statutory, requirements of legislative apportionment must give way to federal constitutional principles. That, indeed, seems to be the teaching of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed.2d 663, itself, as well as the cases now following it. At any rate, it is clear that we have jurisdiction, as well as a constitutional duty, to act. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 3, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873; Sweeney v. Notte, R.I., 183 A.2d 296.
We realize that the course we have outlined involves extensive judicial action as to governmental matters hitherto considered beyond the ken of the judicial branch. But we conceive that this follows with inexorable logic from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. The House is grossly mal-apportioned; the Senate less so, but enough to impair the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. We have decided that we cannot turn our backs on the House situation because of historical or other reasons which seem to us unpersuasive. There are two general courses then open to us with regard to the House. One is to order redistricting anew and from the bottom up, without reference to existing town lines. But the confusion which would result — even the rejection of well known and operable systems of voting in the polls of the town, as well as in the primaries — causes us to reject this method as not so much illegal as overwhelmingly inconvenient. Accepting the *774towns as existing voting units and seeking reasonable equality according to population of such units, we must attempt reasonable means to effect reasonable population equality, with the possible deviation indicated above. This will involve, inter alia, some experimentation as to the size of the legislative body. To this we are forced if the legislature does not act hereafter. But we are convinced that, viewed as an experimental approach to reasonableness, results can be achieved which give effect to the principle of equal representation of the people without overviolent dislocation of existing governmental units.

. The towns are East Hartford, Fairfield, West Hartford, Manchester, Bridgeport, and New Haven, ranging in size popula-tionwise fror¿_ the 156th to the 169th or largest in the State.

. Taking the 1960 census with a state population of 2,535,234, the average or norm for the 36 districts is 70,423. But the average population of the five most populous districts (ranging from 175,940 down to 144,160) is 159,721 or 226.8% of the norm; while the average population of the five least populous districts (ranging from 21,627 up to 32,534) is 28,722 or 40.8% of the norm. Nineteen Senators — a majority — are elected by Senatorial Districts having a population of 811,242 or 31.9% of the total state population. Seventeen of the 36 districts have populations 25% or more below the norm; 8 districts have populations 25% or more above the norm, etc. It should be noted that it seems virtually impossible to obtain fairly equal districts if the constitutional limitations are to be observed. For example, Stamford is underrepresented and Waterbury is overrepresented; but attempts to change this seem likely merely to reverse this situation. And the county restriction adds its own complications. All the parties agree that redistricting of the Senate should be had without these hampering limitations.

. The population of the 10 most populous towns and cities, 988,818, represents 39% of the total population of the State and elects 20 representatives or 6.8% of the total number; while the population of the 10 least populous towns, 7,554, represents 0.3% of the total population and elects 12 representatives or 4.1% of the total. Towns having a population of 301,485 or 11.9% of the total elect 148 or a majority of the House. One hundred nineteen (119) of the 169 towns have populations per representative 25% or more below the “norm” (see note 2 supra) of 8,623. These towns have a population of 518,647 or 20.5% of the total, but elect 194 representatives, or *76966% of the House. Twenty-seven of the 169 towns have populations per representative 25% or more above the norm; they have a total population of 1,626,794 or 64.2% of the total and elect 54 representatives or 18.4% of the total.
In the New York Times for Nov. 11, 1963, Section 1, pp. 1, 36, Anthony Lewis has a summary of the apportionment situation in each state. He adds for each state figures showing the smallest percentage of the population that could elect a majority of the members in each house —a test which “Experts regard * * * as the best test of the representative quality of legislatures.” This shows Connecticut and Vermont at the lowest for House representation, namely, 12% (actually 11.9, as indicated above), with Senate representation of 33% and 47% respectively. There are some smaller percentages of Senate representation, as 7.6% in Nevada. Oregon is said to be the country’s most equitably apportioned state, with percentages of 48 for each house. Massachusetts ranks high, with percentages of 45 for each house.

. The assumed plan would reduce the House by 33, to 261, making the norm 9,714, instead of 8,623. Seventy-seven towns would have one representative each, while 92 would have 2. The 109 towns having less than 9,000 each and about 16% of the total population would elect a majority of the House. Wood-bridge and Southbury, which are slightly over balf the norm, would each have the same representation as Hartford, which has a population over 30 times theirs and 16.7 times the norm.

. The “Connecticut Compromise,” advanced by Roger Sherman, of two Senators from each State while the national House of Representatives reflected the distribution of population was of course *771not proposed or adopted as a method of apportionment; it was a compromise between nationalism and federalism to obtain approval of a constitution which then hung in doubt. It is thus not a system with any significance for this State today; moreover, the notable delay which affects the Congress, and particularly the Senate, does not suggest practical reasons for its emulation.

. Professors Alfred deGrazia, Malcolm Charles Moos, André Schenker and Wilfred Ellsworth Binkley.

. These experts can generate their own warm emotions. Cf. Professor deGrazia’s criticism, Essay on Apportionment and Representative Government, 1963, 92, of the argument of his New York University colleague Professor Robert B. McKay in The Eederal Analogy, 1962, as “groundless and unworthy of attention” historically ; also deGrazia, op. cit. supra at 161, 162, the criticism, as indicating “the kind of combined propaganda, wild wishing, and dubious jurisprudence that has been aroused by Baker v. Carr,” of the editorial in the National Civic Review, Oct. 1962, 481, based on an address before a joint session of the National Municipal League and the American Political Science Association by Charles S. Rhyne, past president of the American Bar Association and general counsel of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, who was of counsel in the Baker-Carr case. Such disagreements among the experts indicate the seriousness and difficulty of the problem the court is called upon to solve.

. In view of the wealth of material it is not practical to give more than selected general references. There are good discussions in the several articles appearing in A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 Yale L.J. 7-106 (1962) ; and the problem is given specific point in Baker v. Carr and Legislative Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 Yale L.J. 968, 992, 1040 (1963), proposing “a substantive standard — equal population as a norm with deviations limited by the requirement of responsiveness to the underrepresented interests within the total governing process.” Useful is “Apportionment of State Legislatures”: A Report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Dec. 1962. See p. 67: “ ‘Equal protection of the laws’ would seem to presume, and considerations of political equity demand, that the apportionment of both houses in the State legislature be based strictly on population”; and pp. 60 and A24 et seq., that the maximum allowable deviation from the State ratio obtained by dividing the total population of the State by the number of representatives in the legislative body should be only 10%. The Commission is a bipartisan continuing body charged by statute with studying and making recommendations in the field of Federal-State-loeal relations; it is made up of 26 members, including 6 members of Congress, 3 officers of the Executive Branch of the Eederal Government, 4 Governors, 4 Mayors, 3 State legislators, 3 elected county officials, and 3 public members. Sixteen members approved the above recommendations, 6 would have preferred the addition to the quoted statement of the words “unless the people directly determine otherwise,” 2 filed special concurrences calling for a statement in “less rigid terms”; and this seems to be the intent of 1 other concurrence, leaving only 1 outright dissent.

. Under the extensive “Home Rule” enactments of the legislature, there is less occasion than ever for separate, divisive action on the part of the towns. And traditionally under many local decisions education and the public schools are a state, and not a town, obligation.