Court Opinion

ID: 9946286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:00:59.037134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.533211
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12826    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12826
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        EVERETT JEROME TRIPODIS,
        a.k.a. Everett Tripodis,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00240-TWT-LTW-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12826      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024      Page: 2 of 10

        2                        Opinion of the Court                22-12826

        Before WILSON, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        Wilson, Circuit Judge:
               Everett Tripodis appeals his sentence from the Northern
        District of Georgia. First, Tripodis argues that the government vi-
        olated his negotiated plea agreement by requesting imposition of
        supervised release when none was contemplated within the four
        corners of the agreement. Second, because the agreement is bind-
        ing on the government and the court once it is accepted, he also
        claims that the court erred in imposing supervised release as an ad-
        ditional punishment not considered in the plea agreement. After
        reviewing the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
        affirm.
                                  I.    Background
                Tripodis was engaged in a coordinated scheme of stealing
        and reselling luxury vehicles, including Audis, Bentleys, and Cor-
        vettes. To resell the vehicles without being caught, Tripodis would
        obtain vehicle registration information (VIN) for similar automo-
        biles to the ones that were stolen. Tripodis would use those VINs
        to gain access to the similar vehicles’ associated titles. These titles
        would then be presented with the stolen vehicles to legitimize
        them for selling.
              Tripodis was ultimately caught, and a grand jury returned a
        superseding indictment charging Tripodis with five counts: (1) one
        count of general conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) three
        counts of interstate transport of a stolen vehicle in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 2321; and (3) one count of tampering with a VIN in
USCA11 Case: 22-12826        Document: 38-1        Date Filed: 02/29/2024        Page: 3 of 10

        22-12826                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 511(a). After many pre-trial proceedings,
        Tripodis pled guilty to the conspiracy offense pursuant to a negoti-
        ated plea agreement. In exchange, the government agreed to dis-
        miss the remaining charges in the indictment.
               The plea agreement included a binding sentencing recom-
        mendation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C),
        requiring the district court to imprison Tripodis for 60 months “as
        the appropriate total custodial sentence in this case” if the court
        accepted the plea agreement. The agreement contained stock lan-
        guage regarding the statutory penalties that Tripodis was subject
        to under 18 U.S.C. § 371, including a supervised release penalty not
        to exceed three years. However, no other mention of supervised
        release was contained within the agreement. 1
               At the plea hearing, the court established that Tripodis knew
        he was under oath and must answer truthfully, that he was enter-
        ing a knowing and voluntary plea, and he would ask the court ques-
        tions if he did not understand. During questioning, Tripodis was
        asked if he understood that the plea agreement contained a waiver

        1 As is standard, the plea agreement contained a standard limited appeal

        waiver. The waiver states that Tripodis waives the right to appeal his convic-
        tion and sentence and to collaterally attack the same on any ground, except if
        (1) the district court conducted an upward variance in sentencing, or (2) his
        counsel was ineffective. Tripodis signed the agreement twice, confirming
        there were no other understandings or agreements outside the written plea
        agreement.
USCA11 Case: 22-12826      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024     Page: 4 of 10

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12826

        of appeal. Tripodis responded that he did and acknowledged that
        he was waiving his right to appeal.
               The court repeatedly notified Tripodis during the plea hear-
        ing that Tripodis could potentially receive supervised release as a
        part of his sentence. Regarding the statutory penalties, the court
        specifically asked if Tripodis understood that the court could sen-
        tence him to a three-year supervised release term. Tripodis af-
        firmed he understood. The court inquired again: “Do you under-
        stand that you may be sentenced to a term of supervised release,
        and that, if you violate the conditions of release, you can be sent to
        prison for the entire term of supervised release?” Tripodis again re-
        sponded in the affirmative. The court further clarified that it was
        only bound by the 60-month imprisonment condition within the
        plea agreement through the following exchange:
               THE COURT: Other than the provision of the Plea
               Agreement which gives you the right to withdraw
               your guilty plea if I should sentence you to more than
               60 months in prison, do you understand that if the
               sentence is more severe than you expect it, you will
               still be bound by your plea of guilty and will have no
               right to withdraw it?
               TRIPODIS: Yes, sir.
               ...
               THE COURT: Do you understand that if I do not ac-
               cept the sentencing recommendations in your Plea
               Agreement, you will still be bound by your plea of
               guilty and will have no right to withdraw it?
USCA11 Case: 22-12826     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024    Page: 5 of 10

        22-12826              Opinion of the Court                        5

              TRIPODIS: Yes, sir.
               Tripodis’ counsel interjected that, because the plea was
        binding, the court must accept the government’s recommendation
        or allow Tripodis to withdraw the plea. The court responded:
        “That’s as to the 60-month sentence only, though,” to which Trip-
        odis’ counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor. I’m sorry. I thought that’s
        what you asked.” Nothing more was mentioned regarding super-
        vised release at the plea hearing.
                At sentencing, the government argued for imposition of a
        three-year supervised release term. In response, Tripodis’ counsel
        requested foregoing supervised release since Tripodis was already
        receiving the statutory maximum prison sentence. Tripodis’ coun-
        sel gave no indication that it believed the government was breach-
        ing the plea agreement by requesting supervised release, or that the
        district court would be breaching the plea agreement by imposing
        such a sentence; counsel simply argued for no term of supervised
        release. Ultimately, the court decided to impose the maximum su-
        pervised release term of three years. After sentencing, Tripodis’
        counsel stated that Tripodis objected “simply on the basis that the
        binding plea did not contemplate supervised release,” which was
        overruled. Tripodis timely appealed.
USCA11 Case: 22-12826        Document: 38-1        Date Filed: 02/29/2024        Page: 6 of 10

        6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12826

                                     II.     Analysis
               Whether the terms of a plea agreement have been breached
        is reviewed de novo. United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1281
        (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 2
                        A. Government Breach of Plea Agreement
               To evaluate whether the government breached a plea agree-
        ment, we “determine the scope of the government’s promises” and
        ask “whether the government’s actions [were] inconsistent with
        what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his
        guilty plea.” United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir.
        2004) (quotations omitted). While plea agreements are interpreted
        in the same vein as contracts, we do not apply a “hyper-technical
        reading” or “a rigidly literal approach in the construction of the lan-
        guage.” United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1990)
        (quotations omitted). Notably, a plea agreement’s silence on an is-
        sue does not bind the government to any promise. In re Grand Jury
        Proceedings, 819 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1987). 3

        2 The government moved to dismiss this appeal based on the appeal waiver in

        Tripodis’ plea agreement. An appeal waiver does not bar a defendant’s claim
        “that the government breached the very plea agreement which purports to
        bar him from appealing.” United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1284
        (11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we deny the motion.
        3 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) support this reading, stat-

        ing that in a binding plea agreement, “the government and defense have actu-
        ally agreed on what amounts to an appropriate sentence or have agreed to one
        of the specified components.” (emphasis added); see Horenkamp v. Van Winkle &
        Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]nterpretations in the
USCA11 Case: 22-12826       Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024      Page: 7 of 10

        22-12826                Opinion of the Court                          7

               When the plea agreement language is ambiguous, it is con-
        strued against the government. Id. at 1105–06. We do so because a
        plea agreement is a “waiver of substantial constitutional rights re-
        quiring that the defendant be adequately warned of the conse-
        quences of the plea.” Jefferies, 908 F.2d at 1523 (internal quotations
        omitted). We examine extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent to
        help dispel the ambiguity and interpret the plea agreement lan-
        guage. Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1106. Therefore, we must first ask
        whether the agreement is ambiguous and, if so, we must decide
        whether to impose the agreement on the defendant. Id.
                If the district court accepts a plea agreement and a defendant
        is denied the benefit of his bargained-for agreement, he is constitu-
        tionally entitled to relief. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
        262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
        promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
        part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be ful-
        filled.”). Relief follows in one of two forms: (1) specific perfor-
        mance of the plea agreement, or (2) the ability to withdraw the
        plea. United States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532–33 (11th Cir. 1992).
              Tripodis argues that his reasonable understanding was that
        the government would recommend what was written in the plea
        agreement—60 months’ imprisonment (and his alleged underlying
        assumption that there would be no supervised release). Thus,
        when the government recommended more than what was

        Advisory Committee Notes are nearly universally accorded great weight in
        interpreting federal rules.” (quotation omitted)).
USCA11 Case: 22-12826      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 02/29/2024     Page: 8 of 10

        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-12826

        contemplated in the agreement, this constituted breach. For relief,
        Tripodis requests vacatur of his sentence and remand for specific
        performance of his plea agreement. In response, the government
        claims that the plea agreement was unambiguous as it only bound
        the parties to jointly recommend a “total custodial sentence,” and
        therefore should not be construed against it. The government fur-
        ther disclaims any breach because it followed through on its prom-
        ise of recommending 60 months’ imprisonment.
                Tripodis’ argument ultimately fails. The plea agreement was
        unambiguous as to the government’s promises, thereby satisfying
        first prong of our inquiry and foreclosing the second, dooming
        Tripodis’ argument. Even if we were to find the agreement ambig-
        uous, the record demonstrates Tripodis understood his plea agree-
        ment did not bar the government from recommending supervised
        release.
              Here, the plea agreement was unambiguous: the govern-
        ment promised to recommend a total custodial sentence of 60
        months. There is no promise within the plea agreement regarding
        supervised release. The agreement’s silence did not bind the gov-
        ernment to any promise regarding supervised release. Therefore,
        the government was free to recommend a supervised release term.
               Further, relevant extrinsic evidence demonstrates Tripodis’
        recognition that he could be subject to supervised release. Tripodis’
        and his counsel’s statements, both at the initial entry of the plea
        and at sentencing, evince that understanding. Importantly, the
        court asked Tripodis if he understood that the court could sentence
USCA11 Case: 22-12826       Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024      Page: 9 of 10

        22-12826                Opinion of the Court                          9

        him to a three-year supervised release term, which Tripodis stated
        he understood. The court clarified that it was only bound by the
        60-month recommendation for imprisonment. Further, when the
        government argued for supervised release at sentencing, counsel
        merely argued that Tripodis should not receive supervised release
        since he was serving the statutory maximum prison sentence. No-
        tably, counsel’s arguments were void of accusations that the gov-
        ernment was acting nefariously or breaching an agreed-upon un-
        derstanding.
              While the question of breach here is not frivolous, both
        Tripodis’ affirmations at the plea entry stage and the arguments
        brought by his counsel indicate that Tripodis understood (1) the
        consequences of pleading guilty and (2) that he could be subject to
        supervised release. If the government had stated in the plea agree-
        ment that it would not recommend supervised release, the recom-
        mendation of the same would qualify as breach. However, in the
        absence of a supervised release provision in the plea agreement,
        there was no obligation for the government to breach. Therefore,
        Tripodis’ claim fails.
               We pause to note that, in the future, the government should
        make it clear in these circumstances what it is promising—and
        what it is not—to the defendant. We have previously observed
        that, unfortunately, defendants can be “unintentionally misled”
        when the government does not explicitly state in the plea agree-
        ment the extent of its promises to or requirements of the defend-
        ant. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F.2d at 986; United States v. Al-
USCA11 Case: 22-12826      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 02/29/2024     Page: 10 of 10

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12826

        Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). As the gov-
        ernment is the drafter of the plea agreement, it should dispel any
        alleged ambiguities by clearly indicating whether it intends to rec-
        ommend supervised release.
                      B. District Court Breach of Plea Agreement
                The district court’s factual findings regarding the scope of a
        plea agreement will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.
        Al-Arian, 514 F.3d at 1191. In addition to the government and the
        defendant, the negotiated plea agreement is binding on the court.
        Yesil, 991 F.2d at 1532.
               Tripodis argues that the 60-month total custodial sentence
        was binding on the court, and the court impermissibly modified
        the plea agreement by adding a term of supervised release.
                For the reasons established above, Tripodis’ argument fails.
        As the district court noted in its questioning of Tripodis, it was only
        bound to impose the 60-month custodial sentence. Because super-
        vised release was not contemplated within the plea agreement, the
        government was free to recommend it. Similarly, because the dis-
        trict court was not bound by a supervised release provision within
        the plea agreement, it was within the court’s discretion whether to
        impose supervised release. Therefore, the district court did not
        clearly err, and Tripodis’ claim fails.
                                   III.   Conclusion
               For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Tripodis’ sentence.
               AFFIRMED.