Court Opinion

ID: 9825864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:12:44.352833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:26.411833
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING. Wood, J. In the original opinion we said: “We do not decide which of these rules for the measure of damages is proper under the peculiar facts of this record, because the amounts of the respective judgments have not been challenged by the appellants. No issue has been raised or argued by counsel for appellants as to the rule for the measure of damages in such cases. Counsel for appellants have only insisted that the actions are premature, and that there is no liability on the bond.” Counsel for appellants insist, on rehearing, that the issue as to the amount of recovery was necessarily raised, by their allegations in the motion to dismiss the complaints, and also in their answer to the effect that they were not indebted to the appellees in any amount. We have concluded, on reconsideration, that we erred in holding that the issue as to the rule for the measure of damages was not raised. The contention .of appellant, that the actions were premature and therefore that there was nothing due on the policies, necessarily raises the issue as to whether or not there can be -a recovery on the policies in these actions, and, if so, what the amount of that recovery should be. It occurs to us therefore, upon a reconsideration of our original opinion, that it is proper to declare the rule for the measure of damages in such cases. As pointed out in the original opinion, because of the impossibility of determining with any accuracy the present cash value of the policies based uppn the mortality tables, the only correct rule for the measure of damages growing out of a breach of such contract of insurance, where the assured elects to treat the contract as rescinded, is that announced in Supreme Council A. L. H. v. Black, 123 Fed. 650-653, as follows: “According to the clear weight of authority, if an insurance company wrongfully cancels a policy or otherwise wrongfully renounces the contract, the insured may, at his election, treat the contract as rescinded, and recover back all the premiums he has paid. ’ ’ It should be added that the insured in such cases is entitled to recovery of the premiums, with interest thereon at the legal rate, from the day of each payment until the date of the repudiation of the contract by the association refusing to accept the premiums which were actually due under the contract. Authorities to support this view are cited in the above case and in the case of Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Ferrenbach, 144 Fed. 342, at page 344. See also 1 Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, vol. 1, page 746, § 361. The rationale of the rule finds expression in Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Pottker, 33 Ohio St. Rep. 459, 31 Am. Rep. 555, as follows, quoting syllabus: “If, in such case, the company wrongfully declares the policy forfeited, and refuses to“accept the premium when duly tendered, and to give the insured the customary renewal receipt evidencing the continued life of the policy, the assured is, in equity, entitled to demand a rescission of the contract and a return of the premiums paid thereon, with interest from the times of payment.” While the cases at bar are cases at law for damages, treating the contracts as rescinded, that can make no difference as to the above being the correct rule for the measure of damages growing out of breach of contract on the part of the association by refusing to accept premiums legally due thereunder and thus repudiating the contracts and treating the same as forfeited. There is nothing in the record to show what rule was adopted by the trial court in ascertaining the measure of damages, and-appellants do not bring into the record any testimony tending to prove that the amount of the judgments rendered by the trial court were excessive under the rule above announced. Indeed, the appellants, in their motions for a new trial, do not assign as error that the judgments of the court were excessive. The appellants did not, in the lower court, nor did they argue in their original brief, that the judgments of the trial court were excessive in amounts. They have, for the first time, in,their briefs on motion for rehearing, argued that the court erred in the amount of the .judgments, but they do not point out and demonstrate from the record wherein the judgments are excessive under the correct rule for measuring damages in such cases as above declared. Therefore the appellants do not show wherein the court erred in fixing the amounts of the several judgments. For the reasons expressed in the original opinion we hold that the appellees had a cause of action against the appellants and that the actions were not prematurely instituted. The motion for rehearing is therefore denied.