Court Opinion

ID: 9480035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:35:54.742404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:26.374368
License: Public Domain

JERRE S. WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
Under the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), we do not have jurisdiction to decide the merits of this appeal. This is a multiparty case and as long as the judgment is final with respect to one or more of the parties of the case, the district court has, under that rule, a measure of discretion in authorizing appeal from that final judgment. That discretion is controlled in terms, however, by the words in the rule which require the court to make “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay” and in addition “an express direction for the entry of judgment.” The second of the two requirements was met, but there was a total failure of the district court to meet the first.
These two requirements are so completely separate and independent of each other that, Wright, Miller, Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, Yol. 10, in discussing 54(b) entitles the Section 2655 “Distinction Between Direction for Judgment and Determination of No Just Reason for Delay.” In contrast, the majority of the Court holds that the entry of a final judgment “pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of defendant, ...” constitutes “an express determination that there is no just reason for delay....” I cannot accept this reasoning.
The panel opinion relies upon our most recent case of Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Panama Canal Commission, 849 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir.1988). The Court said that the district court had not “expressly included the magical language in any of its orders.” But it went on to say that the motion contained the necessary language and the intent in issuing the October 1987 order could not be disputed. The Court then concluded that it declined to follow a “form-over-substance” approach to Rule 54(b) certification.
The opinion also cites Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.1983). In this case the panel upheld a Rule 54(b) appeal even though neither of the technical requirements of the rule had been met because not only had there been a failure to determine there was no just reason for delay, actually no judgment had been entered. The Court, however, extrapolated a judgment from the record. I cannot and do not accept this case as the law because it is belied by the later decision of the Court, Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d *9261243 (5th Cir.1985), in which the Court stated the two “expressly” requirements as the law. In Thompson, we also cited Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1374 (5th Cir.1980), in which this Court said that a district court must certify “appealability by making an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and then explicitly direct the entry of judgment on the order.”
Crowley itself is distinguishable because, in contrast to Crowley, there is no indication in this case that there was a specific request for certification which stated the requirements. Thus, the majority of this panel is left with the proposition that a district court need do no more than state that it is entering judgment under Rule 54(b) to authorize an appeal under that rule. Needless to say, the rule does not read that way. Certainly it is accurate to say that in general in instances where a district court is required to make specific findings we do not accept fulfillment of that requirement merely through a recitation of authorization.
There is no need to belabor this point by long string citations of other federal cases. It is sufficient to say that the overwhelming case authority is that Rule 54(b) means what it says. While some flexibility short of the precise language is permitted, the courts demand that the statement be sufficient to show that the express findings have been made. E.g., Bullock v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 817 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir.1987) (certificate must contain the specific findings “either in express words or by mistakably clear implication”). See also Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati TV 64 LTD Partnership, 845 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir.1988) (intent of district court irrelevant absent “express determination” in the certificate); Fort v. Roadway Express Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 745 n. 1 (11th Cir.1984).
I particularly emphasize the directly contra case of Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1415 (9th Cir.1985). In that case the district court’s order stated, “The Motion for 54(b) Certification ... is granted_ The Motion for Entry of Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) ... is granted.” The Court of Appeals held that this order was not adequate to constitute a “certificate” under Rule 54(b) and that hence the order was not appealable. The instant case is even weaker than Briscoe as far as compliance with Rule 54(b). In Briscoe there was a motion for 54(b) certification and the instant case is devoid of any indication of a motion asking for 54(b) certification.
It follows that contrary to the disposition of the panel majority this case should be remanded to the district court for the court to consider whether it is willing to certify this case for appeal based upon an express finding as required by Rule 54(b).
Neither party raised this issue before us. It is in the nature of the issue that in many cases both parties would prefer to have the appeal of their case heard on the merits. This raises a valid concern as to whether the cause of justice is disserved by remanding the case to the district court to require the court to give consideration to and make the specific finding required by the rule. The answer must be that it is not a disservice to require that such specific rules of procedure be followed. Without going into the details, I note that the ongoing development of Rule 54(b) was occasioned by the need to limit piecemeal appeals in multiparty and multi-issue cases so that the final and complete disposition of cases by the district court is not delayed.
The insertion into that rule in 1948 of the two “express” requirements was to eliminate continuing difficulties under the earlier rule as to what orders were final and also so separate and distinct that they could be treated as appealable. The rule was amended to create insurance that Rule 54(b) would be applied only in proper cases. This is an important principle in view of the fact that the parties often wish to pursue the appeal on the merits although there actually is not a final and separable judgment. Hence, the safeguards are within the rule itself to require the district court to make specific and careful inquiry as to the correctness of certifying a separable *927and final judgment as to the issue being appealed.
All the rule undertakes to do is to require that the court focus specifically upon the requisite findings. This in turn means that the court can have the issue argued and briefed if there is any real question with respect to it and can give it the full consideration it deserves. This is little enough to ask in enforcing a rule which constitutes an exception to an extremely basic and important policy against piecemeal appeals. If we do not remand when the requisite findings are not made, there is simply no enforcement of the rule. Then a rule which was designed with great care and with express requirements becomes simply a rule of boilerplate. That is not and cannot be what is intended by the rule.
The majority of the panel outvotes me and finds that there is jurisdiction to hear this appeal. That decision having been made, the merits of the appeal are before me as well as the other two members of the panel. On the merits, I concur fully in the opinion of the panel set out in Part II.