Court Opinion

ID: 9854930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:08.897134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.790031
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the holdings of Divisions 1, 3, and 4 of the majority opinion and join the majority’s judgment of affirmance, I write separately because I believe that the enumeration of error addressed in Division 2 (the failure of the trial court to give jury instructions requested by the defendant) can be affirmed under existing law without the necessity of narrowing the circumstances in which a defendant may rely on the battered person syndrome.
Citing the legal determination that battered person syndrome is not a discrete defense but serves only as evidence supporting the defendant’s claim that he/she was justified in using force against the victim, this Court has repeatedly rejected defendants’ assertions that the trial court erred by failing to give requested jury charges on the battered person syndrome. See Smith v. State, 265 Ga. 495 (2) (458 SE2d 347) (1995); Pugh v. State, 260 Ga. 874 (401 SE2d 270) (1991); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706 (4) (386 SE2d 129) (1989); Chapman v. State, 258 Ga. 214, 216 (367 SE2d 541) (1988). See also Motes v. State, 192 Ga. App. 302, 305 (384 SE2d 463) (1989) (written by Chief Judge, now Justice, Carley). In Pugh, supra, the defendant requested a charge which, like the charge requested by appellant, consisted of quoted language from this Court’s opinion in Chapman, supra, 258 Ga. at 216. This Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to give the requested charge, and we again today affirm a trial court’s refusal to give the requested charge because a separate charge on the syndrome is not authorized.
Expert testimony concerning the syndrome is admissible because the subject is complex (Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385 (3) (283 SE2d 479) (1981)), and the testimony supplies an interpretation of the facts which differs from the ordinary lay perception, which questions why victims of the syndrome do not leave an abusive person or seek help, by showing that the syndrome’s victims believe they are responsible for causing the abusive behavior, have low self-esteem, and are powerless. Smith v. State, supra, 247 Ga. at 618-619. Testimony concerning the syndrome is relevant to show that the defendant had the mental state necessary for a justification defense, i.e., that he/she reasonably believed force was necessary to prevent the victim’s imminent use of force against the defendant. Chapman, 259 Ga. 706 (4), supra. See also Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 74 (303 SE2d 13) (1983), where this Court noted that testimony concerning the syndrome was appropriate in certain cases as evidence of whether the defendant acted in fear of his/her life. The testimony *14also is relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant’s fears concerning the threat the alleged abuser posed. See Cox v. State, 216 Ga. App. 86 (453 SE2d 471) (1995) (Pope, C. J., concurring specially). Testimony of the syndrome seeks to explain to the jury that the defendant reasonably believed he/she was in imminent danger even though no threat of harm immediately preceded the defendant’s act against the abuser. Chapman, supra, 259 Ga. at 708. Thus, a complete charge on justification, coupled with a closing argument which sets out for the jury how the defendant personifies the syndrome and thus was justified in taking the action which forms the basis of the charge against him/her, is sufficient. The trial court did not err when it refused to give additional charges which, “in essence, argumentatively emphasized such evidence as may have supported appellant’s theory that [he] had acted in self-defense.” Motes v. State, supra, 192 Ga. App. at 305.
Thus, the decision of the trial court on this issue can be affirmed without narrowing the scope of the admissibility of battered-person-syndrome evidence. This Court has stated again and again that battered-person-syndrome evidence is admissible to support the theory that the defendant was justified in taking the action he/she did. Since one is justified in using force to prevent the threat of physical force against one (OCGA § 16-3-21; Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 43, § AA (1991)), a defendant who asserts that he or she was the target of threats of physical violence should have the benefit of using battered-person-syndrome evidence.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.