Court Opinion

ID: 2963531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:33.533973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:42.685928
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          August 21, 1995   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1066

                                 ALBERT RIVA, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                        COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The  opinion  of this  court issued  on  August 4,  1995, is
          corrected as follows:

               1.  On page 2, line 15     delete "vacate" and  replace with
          "reverse".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1066

                                 ALBERT RIVA, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                        COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________
                              _________________________

                                        Before

                      Selya, Boudin, and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                                ______________

                              _________________________

               Raymond  C. Fay,  with whom  Bell, Boyd  & Lloyd,  Harold L.
               _______________              ___________________   _________
          Lichten, Bryan Decker and  Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger
          _______  ____________      ______________________________________
          &  Hiatt, P.C., were on brief, for appellants.
          ______________
               Cathy  Ventrell-Monsees and  Laurie A.  McCann on  brief for
               _______________________      _________________
          American Association of Retired Persons, amicus curiae.
               James R. Neely, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Gwendolyn Young
               ___________________                          _______________
          Reams, Associate General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant
          _____                             ____________________
          General Counsel, and Paul D. Ramshaw, Attorney, on brief for U.S.
                               _______________
          Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.
               Thomas O. Bean, Assistant  Attorney General, with whom Scott
               ______________                                         _____
          Harshbarger, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellees.
          ___________

                              _________________________

                                    August 4, 1995

                              _________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.    This case,  in  which  three
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          plaintiffs seek  a declaration that the  Massachusetts accidental

          disability retirement scheme  violates the Age Discrimination  in

          Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.    621-634 (1988), as amended by

          the  Older Workers Benefit  Protection Act  (OWBPA), Pub.  L. No.

          101-433, 104  Stat. 978,  presents two  questions  for review  on

          appeal:   a question of first  impression as to  the operation of

          the OWBPA's nonretroactivity provision; and  a situation-specific

          question concerning justiciability.   The district court resolved

          both of these  questions in  the defendants' favor.   It  entered

          summary judgment  against a pair of  plaintiffs, determining that

          the  OWBPA did  not  apply to  their  claims, and  simultaneously

          dismissed the third  plaintiff's claim  as unripe.   See Riva  v.
                                                               ___ ____

          Commonwealth of  Mass.,  871 F.  Supp.  1511, 1517-20  (D.  Mass.
          ______________________

          1994).   We affirm the  summary judgment ruling,  but reverse the

          dismissal  of  the remaining  plaintiff's  claim  and remand  for

          further proceedings.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          _

                                      The OWBPA
                                      The OWBPA

                    Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967 to prohibit age-based

          discrimination  in the  "terms,  conditions,  or  privileges"  of

          employment.  29 U.S.C.   623(a).  The law originally contained an

          exclusion for employee benefit  plans, providing that an employer

          could  continue to  "observe the  terms of  . .  . any  bona fide

          employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance

          plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade [ADEA's] purposes."  Id.
                                                                        ___

                                          3

             623(f)(2).   The Department  of Labor,  and, later,  the Equal

          Employment  Opportunity  Commission   (EEOC),  interpreted   this

          provision to require that age-based distinctions in benefit plans

          be  cost-justified in  order to  qualify for  the shelter  of the

          exclusion.  See 29 C.F.R.   1625.10 (1988).  When confronted with
                      ___

          the issue,  the Supreme Court  expanded the safe haven.   It held

          that, under the ADEA, an employee challenging a benefit plan must

          prove  that  "the  discriminatory  plan  provision  actually  was

          intended  to serve  the purpose  of discriminating  in some  non-

          fringe-benefit  aspect  of  the  employment  relation."    Public
                                                                     ______

          Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 181 (1989).
          ___________________    _____

                    On  October 16,  1990, Congress  enacted the  OWBPA and

          thus reconfigured the exclusion.   The amendments placed employee

          benefits  squarely within  the  protective custody  of the  ADEA,

          overturned Betts, and reinstated  the earlier view that age-based
                     _____

          distinctions  in  employee   benefits  must  be   cost-justified.

          Recognizing  the  potential  implications  of these  changes  for

          public employers,  Congress stipulated  that the OWBPA  would not

          take effect  as to states and their  political subdivisions until

          two years after its passage.   See OWBPA   105(c).   Moreover, in
                                         ___

          grappling with  the question  of retroactivity, Congress  decreed

          that the OWBPA  would not apply  at all to  "a series of  benefit

          payments made to an individual or the individual's representative

          that  began prior to the  effective date and  that continue after

          the  effective date pursuant to an arrangement that was in effect

          on the effective date . . . . "  Id.   105(e).
                                           ___

                                          4

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         __

                   The Commonwealth's Disability Retirement Scheme
                   The Commonwealth's Disability Retirement Scheme

                    In Massachusetts, public  employees who are injured  on

          the job  and  cannot  continue working  may  retire  and  receive

          accidental disability  benefits.  See Mass.  Gen. L. ch. 32,    7

          (1989).   Ordinarily, the amount  of an employee's  benefits will

          equal roughly  72% of her previous wages.  See id.   7(2)(a)(ii).
                                                     ___ ___

          But there  is a rub:   section  7(2)(b ), added in  1987, affords

          significantly  different treatment  for employees  who have  less

          than  ten years  of creditable  service and  who are at  least 55

          years old at the time  of accidental disability retirement. Under

          section 7(2)(b ), an employee  who fits this description receives

          her regular  disability retirement  benefits until she  turns 65,

          but her benefits are then refigured to equal the amount she would

          have received  if she  retired on  superannuation,  i.e., if  she
                                                              ____

          retired based on age and years of service.1

                              
          ____________________

               1As amended, the statute provides in relevant part:

                    The  normal yearly amount of the allowance of
                    any  member retired  under the  provisions of
                    this  section . . .  who at the  time of such
                    retirement had attained the age of fifty-five
                    and who  at the  time of such  retirement had
                    accrued  fewer than  ten years  of creditable
                    service shall be adjusted  on the last day of
                    the  month in  which  he attains  the age  of
                    sixty-five  to  that  to  which he  would  be
                    entitled . . .  if he were to be  retired for
                    superannuation  upon  the  attainment of  age
                    sixty-five . . . . 

          Mass. Gen. L. ch. 32,   7(2)(b ) (1989).

                                          5

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ___

                                    The Plaintiffs
                                    The Plaintiffs

                    Albert Riva  commenced his employment with  the City of

          Boston  in August  of 1982.   He retired  in April  of 1992 after

          experiencing  a permanently disabling injury.  At the time of his

          retirement, Riva  had not  yet accrued  ten  years of  creditable

          service.  On August  19, 1992, the Boston Retirement  Board (BRB)

          transmitted  a letter advising him that his benefits were subject

          to  reduction under  section  7(2)(b ).   Approximately one  year

          later, after  Riva had  celebrated his sixty-fifth  birthday, the

          Board  implemented  the  law  and reduced  Riva's  benefits  from

          approximately $2,130 per month to approximately $775 per month.

                    Nancy Pentland was employed by the Town of Andover from

          February  of  1981  until  she  retired  due   to  a  job-related

          disability  on November 30, 1988.  At the time of her retirement,

          she  was  61 years  old  but had  not  yet accrued  ten  years of

          creditable  service.    As  of  October  31,  1992,  the  Andover

          Retirement Board (ARB) recalculated her benefits according to the

          superannuation  guidelines, resulting in a substantial downsizing

          of her monthly stipend. 

                    Robert Keenan toiled as  a Boston school custodian from

          December of 1989 until  March of 1991.  At the  age of 56, having

          less  than  ten  years  of  creditable  service,  he  retired  on

          accidental  disability  and began  receiving a  monthly allowance

          effective February 20, 1993.  On June 22,  1994, the BRB notified

          him of the  prospective applicability of section 7(2)(b )  to his

                                          6

          case.  Keenan was born on August 10, 1937, so his monthly benefit

          is  not  scheduled  to  be  recalculated  until  the  year  2002.

          Nonetheless, subscribing to the adage that an ounce of prevention

          is  sometimes worth a pound  of cure, he  (like Riva and Pentland

          before him) filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

                    It  is significant  that, when  the OWBPA  took effect,

          both  Riva  and  Pentland   were  already  receiving   disability

          retirement benefits, but Keenan    whose retirement postdated the

          statute's effective date   was not.

                                         IV.
                                         IV.
                                         __

                                    The Litigation
                                    The Litigation

                    Riva and Pentland commenced the instant action against,

          inter   alia,  the  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts,  the  Public
          _____   ____

          Employee  Retirement  Administration,  the   BRB,  and  the   ARB

          (collectively,  "the  Commonwealth").    Their  complaint  sought

          declaratory, injunctive, and  compensatory relief, alleging  that

          the   Massachusetts   accidental  disability   retirement  scheme

          violated the  OWBPA  because it  arbitrarily  reduced  retirement

          benefits  based on  the  recipient's age.2   Keenan  subsequently

          joined the suit as an additional plaintiff.

                    The  parties   cross-moved  for  summary   judgment  on

          stipulated facts.  The  district court granted brevis disposition
                                                         ______

          in  the Commonwealth's  favor  vis-a-vis Riva  and Pentland,  and
                                         _________

                              
          ____________________

               2The  complaint also  included two  claims for  relief under
          state  anti-discrimination  laws.    Both of  these  claims  were
          dismissed  on the plaintiffs' motion, and have no bearing on this
          appeal.

                                          7

          dismissed Keenan's claim as  unripe.  See  Riva, 871 F. Supp.  at
                                                ___  ____

          1517-20.   The court ruled that even though Riva's and Pentland's

          benefits were recalculated after the effective date of  the OWBPA

          (when they reached age 65), the smaller payments were of the same

          class as the  original payments, were part of a  single series of

          benefit payments that straddled the effective date, and were paid

          pursuant to  a preexisting arrangement.  See id. at 1519.  Hence,
                                                   ___ ___

          section   105(e)  applied,   and  the   Massachusetts  disability

          retirement scheme,  as it  affected those plaintiffs,  eluded the

          OWBPA's grasp.  See id.
                          ___ ___

                    Keenan's case  easily vaults this hurdle.   Unlike Riva

          and Pentland, he began receiving benefit payments only  after the

          OWBPA  had become fully effective.  Thus,  his claim does not fit

          within  the confines  of section  105(e).   In the  trial court's

          view,  however, a  different obstacle  loomed.   Because Keenan's

          benefits  were  not  scheduled to  be  pared  for several  years,

          Keenan's  alleged injury  was  both remote  and contingent,  and,

          accordingly, his  claim was  unripe.   See id. at  1517-18.   All
                                                 ___ ___

          three plaintiffs now appeal.

                                          V.
                                          V.
                                          _

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review

                    A  district   court's  resolution  of  a   question  of

          statutory interpretation engenders de novo review in the court of

          appeals.  See  Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53,  65 (1st Cir. 1994),
                    ___  ________    ____

          cert. denied, 115 S.  Ct. 1959 (1995); United States  v. Gifford,
          _____ ______                           _____________     _______

          17  F.3d 462,  472  (1st Cir.  1994).   This  standard  of review

                                          8

          applies to the district court's application of section 105(e)  to

          the facts stipulated in the  instant case.  By the same  token, a

          trial  court's determination  on  a paper  record  that the  case

          before  it lacks ripeness presents  a question of  law subject to

          plenary  review.    See  Ernst  &  Young v.  Depositors  Economic
                              ___  _______________     ____________________

          Protection Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 534 (1st Cir. 1995);  Shea v. Rev-
          ________________                                     ____    ____

          Lyn Contracting Co., 868 F.2d 515, 517 (1st Cir. 1989).
          ___________________

                                         VI.
                                         VI.
                                         __

                                    The Exemption
                                    The Exemption

                    Both  Riva  and  Pentland  began  receiving  disability

          retirement benefits prior to the effective date of the OWBPA, and

          their benefits  were reduced  pursuant to section  7(2)(b ) after

          the  effective date.  For the reasons  that follow, we think that

          the payment  stream  is exempt  from scrutiny  under the  federal

          statute.3

                    We  start  with a  prosaic  precept:   "In  a statutory

          construction  case, the beginning  point must be  the language of

          the statute, and when a  statute speaks with clarity to  an issue

          judicial  inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most

          extraordinary circumstance,  is finished."   Estate of  Cowart v.
                                                       _________________

          Nicklos Drilling  Co., 112  S. Ct. 2589,  2594 (1992).   In other
          _____________________

          words,  the court need not  consult legislative history and other

          aids to  statutory  construction when  the words  of the  statute

                              
          ____________________

               3Since Riva  and Pentland are similarly  situated in respect
          to the question before us, we opt for simplicity and discuss only
          Pentland's  claim.   Our  reasoning  and  result, however,  apply
          equally to Riva.

                                          9

          neither  create   an  ambiguity  nor  lead   to  an  unreasonable

          interpretation.   See  United States  v. Charles  George Trucking
                            ___  _____________     ________________________

          Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987).  In searching a statute's
          ___

          text  for  a  pellucid  expression of  congressional  intent,  we

          attribute to words  that are  not defined in  the statute  itself

          their ordinary usage,  see Baez v. INS, 41 F.3d  19, 24 (1st Cir.
                                 ___ ____    ___

          1994), cert. denied, 63  U.S.L.W. 3900 (U.S. June 26,  1995) (No.
                 _____ ______

          94-1462), and make a commonsense concession that meaning can only

          be  ascribed to statutory language  if that language  is taken in

          context,  see  King v.  St. Vincent's  Hosp.,  502 U.S.  215, 221
                    ___  ____     ____________________

          (1991).   Applying  these  tenets, we  find  that section  105(e)

          unambiguously excludes  Pentland's benefits from  the application

          of the OWBPA.

                    As previously noted, Congress exempted from the OWBPA's

          grasp any "series  of benefit payments . . .  that began prior to

          [OWBPA's] effective  date and  that continue after  the effective

          date  pursuant  to  an arrangement  that  was  in  effect on  the

          effective date  .  . .  .  "   OWBPA    105(e).   A  "series"  is

          routinely defined as "a  group of usu[ally] three or  more things

          or  events  standing or  succeeding in  order  and having  a like

          relationship to  each other."  Webster's  Third New International
                                         __________________________________

          Dictionary  2073 (1986);  accord Webster's  Ninth New  Collegiate
          __________                ______ ________________________________

          Dictionary 1074 (1989) (defining series  to include "a number  of
          __________

          things or events of  the same class coming  one after another  in

          spatial or temporal succession");  The Random House Dictionary of
                                             ______________________________

          the English  Language  1748 (2d  ed.  1987) (defining  series  to
          _____________________

                                          10

          include  "a group  or  a number  of  related or  similar  things,

          events,  etc., arranged  or  occurring in  temporal, spatial,  or

          other   order   or   succession").4     Consistent   with   these

          definitions,  all the benefit payments  to Pentland form a single

          "series" as that word is used in section 105(e).

                    The  like  relationship  of  the  payments  is  readily

          apparent.     The  disbursements,  both  before   and  after  the

          recalculation, form a continuing stream of monthly payments, made

          on account of the same disability, and determined at the  time of

          inception under the same statutory scheme.  What is more, the ARB

          began to pay  these serial benefits before  the OWBPA's effective

          date, continued to pay them afterwards, and did so pursuant to an

          arrangement   the payment scheme established in the Massachusetts

          statute   that was in full flower when the OWBPA took effect.

                    To  be  sure,  the  size of  Pentland's  monthly  check

          diminished  when she turned 65, but her argument that the reduced

          benefits comprise a  new "series" because her payments  were then

          recalculated on the basis of  the superannuation tables is belied

          by the  text of the  Massachusetts statute.   It directs  that an

          affected  individual's benefits  shall  be adjusted  "to that  to

          which [s]he  would be entitled  under the  [statutory scheme]  if

          [s]he were to be retired for superannuation."   Mass. Gen. L. ch.

          32,   7(2)(b ).  This language makes it transpicuously clear that

          Pentland has  continuously received the  same kind of  benefits  
                              
          ____________________

               4Courts are  free to use standard  dictionary definitions to
          assist in determining the ordinary meaning of statutory language.
          See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001 (1994).
          ___  ____  ____    _____

                                          11

          accidental disability retirement benefits   both before and after

          the  OWBPA's  effective date.   Only  the  amount of  the monthly

          stipend,  not  the  nature  of  the  payments,  changed when  she

          attained age 65.

                    At  the expense of  carting coals to  Newcastle, we add

          that appellants' interpretation of  a "series" as comprising, for

          all intents and  purposes, a  "sequence of  identical items,"  is

          profoundly flawed.   To read section 105(e) in this  way would be

          totally at odds with ordinary usage and,  moreover, would lead to

          absurd results.  Carried  to its logical extreme, such  a reading

          would  gut the  exemption  by rendering  it  inapplicable to  any

          stream of benefits that changed after the OWBPA's  effective date

          by  reference to  an  external  source.    Thus,  even  the  most

          commonplace adjustments (such as cost-of-living  increases) would

          serve  to defeat the exemption.  We cannot conceive of any reason

          why Congress   which patently believed that employers should have

          a substantial degree  of protection against the application  of a

          new  rule to payment protocols already in use to sustain existing

          payment  schemes    would  have desired  to  take so  quixotic  a

          position.

                    Section   105(e)'s   reference    to   a    preexisting

          "arrangement"  is equally  unhelpful to  Pentland's quest.   Both

          section 7(2)(b ) and the  relevant superannuation guidelines were

          in existence at the  time that the ARB started  paying Pentland's

          retirement  benefits,  and  the  parties have  not  directed  our

          attention  to any  subsequent changes  in either  provision which

                                          12

          might  support  a  finding  that  the  Commonwealth  put  a fresh

          "arrangement" into  effect.   In Pentland's case,  therefore, the

          entire stream of  benefit payments  has been (and  will be)  made

          pursuant  to a single arrangement that was crafted in whole prior

          to  the OWBPA's  effective  date.   Consequently, section  105(e)

          applies unreservedly.

                    Although the plain language  of section 105(e)  carries

          the  day  and obviates  any need  for  a detailed  examination of

          extrinsic  sources,  we  note  in passing  that  the  legislative

          history  of the  OWBPA strongly  suggests that  Congress intended

          precisely   the  result  that   follows  from  a  straightforward

          rendering of section 105(e)'s plain language.  The original draft

          of  the  bill, submitted  to the  Senate  on September  17, 1990,

          contemplated that  the OWBPA provisions on  which Pentland relies

          would  apply retrospectively.  See 136 Cong. Rec. S13, 237 (daily
                                         ___

          ed. Sept. 17,  1990).  This  approach provoked stout  opposition,

          and  section 105(e) emerged as a  compromise.  See 136 Cong. Rec.
                                                         ___

          S13,603 (daily  ed. Sept. 24, 1990).  In responding to a question

          about  the  truncated  version  of  the  nonretroactivity clause,

          Senator Pryor, chairman of  the Special Committee on Aging  and a

          prime  sponsor of  the legislation,  indicated that  the drafters

          intended, through the  compromise, to ensure that the OWBPA would

          reach benefits  that were  discriminatorily structured  after the

          applicable  effective date,  leaving  other benefits  unaffected.

          See  id. at S13,609.  Senator Metzenbaum, whose original bill, as
          ___  ___

          we  have said,  featured broad  retroactivity, concurred  in this

                                          13

          interpretation of  the compromise language.5  So  did another key

          supporter, Senator Hatch.6

                    In sum, it appears  virtually certain that Congress did

          not  intend  the   OWBPA  to  apply  to  benefit  payments,  like

          Pentland's,  which were  structured  and commenced  prior to  the

          effective date  of the neoteric legislation.  The comments relied

          on  by the  appellants  in  urging  an  opposite  view     mainly

          statements  by legislators  who expressed  their desire  to avoid

          "disruptions" in ongoing benefits, such as the remarks of Senator

          Hatch, quoted supra note 6    are more plausibly read as  wishing
                        _____

          to  avoid  displacements that  would  be  caused by  wide-ranging

                              
          ____________________

               5Senator Metzenbaum stated:

                    We  also  clarify  the effective  date  as it
                    relates to a stream of benefit  payments made
                    to  an individual  that  began  prior to  the
                    effective  date.   We  exempt such  a benefit
                    stream  from  the requirements  of  the bill,
                    provided that the  employer has not initiated
                    the  stream pursuant  to a  modification made
                    after the  date of enactment, with the intent
                    to evade the purposes of the bill.

          136 Cong. Rec. S13,598 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990).

               6Senator Hatch  voiced his concern that,  under the original
          version, "all the  new requirements would  be applied to  ongoing
          benefit payments  that began  before the bill's  effective date."
          136 Cong.  Rec. S13,600 (daily ed.  Sept. 24, 1990).   Because he
          feared this result, Senator Hatch concluded that "it was critical
          to  amend  the  bill  to  remove  the  possibility  that  current
          recipients of  [disability,  severance and  retirement]  benefits
          could suffer disruptions in their payments."  Id.  He assured his
                                                        ___
          fellow  solons  that "[t]he  compromise"  embodied  in the  final
          version of  the bill  ensured "that  ongoing benefit  payments to
          individuals  that began prior to  the effective date  of the bill
          will not be affected by this  legislation."  Id.; see also id. at
                                                       ___  ___ ____ ___
          S13,607 (similar; statement of Sen. Grassley).

                                          14

          retroactive application of the  OWBPA rather than as guaranteeing

          level  benefit  rates, regardless  of  the  circumstances, or  as

          disfavoring  changes  in  benefits  compelled  by  the  unamended

          operation of preexisting retirement schemes.

                    We  have exhausted this  issue.   To conclude,  we hold

          that a stream  of benefits does not become a  new "series" in the

          contemplation  of  OWBPA     105(e) simply  because  the  monthly

          benefit amount  is adjusted  by reference to  an external  source

          pursuant to  a directive contained in  a preexisting arrangement.

          Riva and Pentland are, therefore, fishing in an empty pond.

                                         VII.
                                         VII.
                                         ___

                                The Ripeness Paradigm
                                The Ripeness Paradigm
                                _____________________

                    We  turn now  to  the more  vexing  of the  two  issues

          presented  in  this  appeal.   Since  section  7(2)(b )  will not

          directly  affect  Keenan's  stipend  until  the  year  2002,  the

          district  court determined  that  his claim  lacked the  ripeness

          necessary  to confer justiciability.   See Riva, 871  F. Supp. at
                                                 ___ ____

          1517-18.   Before  evaluating  this determination,  we scout  the

          legal landscape.   

                    When  a  litigant   seeks  relief  that   is  primarily

          prospective  in  character,  questions of  ripeness  are analyzed

          under  a familiar  framework that  considers the  fitness  of the

          issue for  immediate  review and  the  hardship to  the  litigant

          should review be postponed.  See Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
                                       ___ ___________    _______

          136,  148-49 (1967); Ernst & Young, 45  F.3d at 535.  The fitness
                               _____________

          branch  of the  paradigm  "typically involves  subsidiary queries

                                          15

          concerning  finality,  definiteness,  and  the  extent  to  which

          resolution of the challenge  depends on facts that may not yet be

          sufficiently  developed."  Ernst  & Young, 45  F.3d at  535.  One
                                     _____    _____

          critical component  is whether "the claim  involves uncertain and

          contingent  events that may not  occur as anticipated  or may not

          occur at all."   Massachusetts Ass'n of Afro-Am. Police,  Inc. v.
                           _____________________________________________

          Boston  Police  Dep't,  973 F.2d  18,  20  (1st  Cir. 1992)  (per
          _____________________

          curiam).   A second important  factor in the  fitness calculus is

          the extent to which  the claim is bound up in  the facts.  Courts

          are more likely to find a claim ripe if it is of an intrinsically

          legal nature, see, e.g., Pacific Gas &  Elec. Co. v. State Energy
                        ___  ____  ________________________    ____________

          Resources Conserv. & Dev.  Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 201  (1983), and
          _________________________________

          less  likely  to  do so  if  the  absence of  a  concrete factual

          situation seriously inhibits the weighing of competing interests,

          see,  e.g., California Bankers Ass'n  v. Shultz, 416  U.S. 21, 56
          ___   ____  ________________________     ______

          (1974).

                    A third salient factor  that enters into the assessment

          of  fitness involves the presence or absence of adverseness.  See
                                                                        ___

          State of R.I. v.  Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d  685, 692-93
          _____________     _________________________

          (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298 (1994).  In the context
                       _____ ______

          of prospective relief, this factor focuses on whether  "the facts

          alleged, under  all  the  circumstances, show  that  there  is  a

          substantial controversy,  between  parties having  adverse  legal

          interests,  of sufficient  immediacy and  reality to  warrant the

          issuance of a  declaratory judgment."   Maryland Casualty Co.  v.
                                                  _____________________

          Pacific Coal  & Oil Co.,  312 U.S.  270, 273 (1941).   Whether  a
          _______________________

                                          16

          particular case passes the test of adverseness may be  influenced

          by  a variety  of considerations,  such as  whether all  affected

          parties are before the court, see  Ernst & Young, 45 F.3d at 538-
                                        ___  _____________

          39,  and  whether the  controversy  as  framed permits  "specific

          relief   through  a   decree  of   a  conclusive   character,  as

          distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon

          a hypothetical state of  facts," Aetna Life Ins. Co.  v. Haworth,
                                           ___________________     _______

          300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).

                    The hardship prong of the Abbott Labs paradigm turns on
                                              ___________

          whether "the  challenged action creates a  `direct and immediate'

          dilemma for  the parties[.]"  W.R.  Grace & Co. v.  EPA, 959 F.2d
                                        _________________     ___

          360, 364 (1st Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).  Utility is the flip

          side of the same  coin, and an inquiring  court, in assaying  the

          hardship to the  parties, may  find it revealing  to ask  whether

          "granting relief  would serve a  useful purpose, or,  put another

          way, whether  the sought-after declaration would  be of practical

          assistance  in  setting  the  underlying  controversy  to  rest."

          Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d at 693.
          _________________________

                    Although it  is a  familiar bromide that  courts should

          not labor  to protect a party against  harm that is merely remote

          or  contingent, see,  e.g.,  Ernst  &  Young,  45  F.3d  at  536;
                          ___   ____   _______________

          Massachusetts  Ass'n of Afro-Am. Police,  973 F.2d at 20; Lincoln
          _______________________________________                   _______

          House v.  Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847 (1st Cir. 1990), there is some
          _____     _____

          play   in  the  joints.    For  example,  even  when  the  direct

          application  of a statute  is open to  a charge  of remoteness by

          reason of a lengthy, built-in time delay before the statute takes

                                          17

          effect,  ripeness may be found as long as the statute's operation

          is  inevitable (or nearly so).   See, e.g.,  Regional Rail Reorg.
                                           ___  ____   ____________________

          Act Cases,  419  U.S. 102,  142-43 (1974).   And,  even when  the
          _________

          direct application of such a statute is subject to some degree of

          contingency,   the  statute   may  impose   sufficiently  serious

          collateral  injuries  that  an  inquiring  court  will  deem  the

          hardship  component satisfied.   See  Erwin  Chemerinsky, Federal
                                           ___                      _______

          Jurisdiction     2.4.2, at  121-22 (2d  ed.  1994).   In general,
          ____________

          collateral  effects  can  rise  to  this  level  when  a  statute

          indirectly permits  private action  that causes present  harm, or

          when a party must decide  currently whether to expend substantial

          resources that would be  largely or entirely wasted if  the issue

          were  later resolved in an  unfavorable way.   See, e.g., Pacific
                                                         ___  ____  _______

          Gas,  461 U.S. at  201; Duke Power  Co. v.  Carolina Envtl. Study
          ___                     _______________     _____________________

          Group, Inc., 438  U.S. 59,  81-82 (1978).   We caution,  however,
          ___________

          that in such murky waters generalizations  are dangerous, and the

          weighing  of collateral effects is  for the most  part a judgment

          call, to be made case by case.

                                        VIII.
                                        VIII.
                                        ____

                                Applying the Paradigm
                                Applying the Paradigm
                                _____________________

                    Viewed against this backdrop,  we think that Keenan has

          made  a satisfactory showing under both prongs of the Abbott Labs
                                                                ___________

          paradigm.    Given  the   relative  certainty  of  the  statute's

          application,  the  purity  of  the  legal  issue  presented,  the

          presence of all necessary  parties before the court,  the dilemma

          that Keenan  currently  faces, and  the  hardship to  him  should

                                          18

          immediate  review be denied, we  conclude that he  has advanced a

          ripe claim.

                    The paramount  harm to Keenan    the eventual reduction

          in  his benefits  pursuant to  section 7(2)(b )    is  distant in

          time, but its incidence seems highly probable.   The Commonwealth

          has pointed  to three contingencies that might shield Keenan from

          ultimate harm  of this kind: (1) he might die before reaching age

          65, (2)  he might no longer be disabled when he reaches that age,

          or (3)  the challenged  statute might  be amended  prior thereto.

          There  is no evidence in the record  to suggest that any of these

          three contingencies are likely to eventuate.  The life expectancy

          of a man in his mid-50s is  roughly 20 years.  See, e.g.,  United
                                                         ___  ____

          States  Bureau of the Census,  Statistical Abstract of the United
                                         __________________________________

          States:   1994 Table 116, at 88 (114th ed.); Keenan's disability,
          ______________

          according  to state law, is permanent and total, see, e.g., Mass.
                                                           ___  ____

          Gen.  L.  ch.  32,     7(1)   (1989)  (providing  for  accidental

          disability retirement only when the affected employee is "totally

          and permanently incapacitated for further duty"); and, though the

          Commonwealth has drawn  our attention  to a bill  pending in  the

          Massachusetts legislature that would repeal section 7(2)(b ), see
                                                                        ___

          1995 Mass. H.B. 4007, 179th Gen. Court, 1st Sess., previous bills

          of a similar tenor have failed of enactment.

                    In  all events,  a  litigant seeking  shelter behind  a

          ripeness  defense  must  demonstrate  more   than  a  theoretical

          possibility  that harm may be averted.   The demise of a party or

          the repeal  of a statute will  always be possible in  any case of

                                          19

          delayed  enforcement, yet it is  well settled that  a time delay,

          without more,  will not  render a  claim of  statutory invalidity

          unripe   if  the   application  of   the  statute   is  otherwise

          sufficiently  probable.  See Regional  Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419
                                   ___ _______________________________

          U.S. at 143;  Lake Carriers'  Ass'n v. MacMullan,  406 U.S.  498,
                        _____________________    _________

          503-08  (1972).   The  degree  of  contingency  is  an  important

          barometer of ripeness in  this respect.  Compare, e.g.,  State of
                                                   _______  ____   ________

          Ariz. v. Atchison,  Topeka, and Sante Fe R.R. Co.,  656 F.2d 398,
          _____    ________________________________________

          402-03 (9th  Cir. 1981)  (finding challenge  to statute  ripe six

          months before its effective date due to the unlikelihood that the

          statutory scheme would change in the interim) with, e.g., Ernst &
                                                        ____  ____  _______

          Young, 45  F.3d at 538 (finding  claim unripe due in  part to the
          _____

          presence of a large  number of contingencies, many of  which were

          unlikely  to  materialize).    Here, the  relative  certainty  of

          Keenan's asserted injury indicates that his claim is suitable for

          contemporaneous judicial review.

                    Three other circumstances buttress the  conclusion that

          Keenan's claim is ready for adjudication.  In the first place, he

          mounts  a facial  challenge to the  state law,  and does  so on a

          stipulated record.  Thus, his claim is unabashedly legal, and the

          district court is capable of resolving it with no further factual

          exposition.   Second, and relatedly, the  controversy is narrowly

          defined  and  is  susceptible  to specific  relief,  adequate  to

          conclude  the  matter,   without  speculation  or  reference   to

          hypothetical  facts,  and  without  much risk  that  the  court's

          opinion  will prove superfluous.  Last but not least, the case is

                                          20

          fully adverse; all the proper parties are before the court.

                    We  are equally  convinced  that allowing  the case  to

          proceed, here and now, would serve a useful purpose, and would be

          of great practical assistance to all concerned.  See Narragansett
                                                           ___ ____________

          Indian Tribe,  19 F.3d  at 693.   Not  only is  the utility of  a
          ____________

          decree  obvious in  this  situation, but  this  utility also  has

          special force in the  context of a challenge to  a discriminatory

          retirement  system.  In  Lorance v. AT&T  Technologies, Inc., 490
                                   _______    ________________________

          U.S. 900 (1989), the Supreme Court considered the timeliness of a

          suit challenging a seniority system  that allegedly discriminated

          against women.7  The Court ruled that plaintiffs could sue at the

          time  the seniority system was put in place, without awaiting the

          adverse effects of  its operation.   See id. at  905-06.  In  the
                                               ___ ___

          bargain,  the Justices recognized  that the adoption  of the plan

          imposed a  "concrete harm"  on the  plaintiffs  even though  "the

          benefits  of  a seniority  system  .  .  .  are by  their  nature

          speculative    if only  because they depend  upon the  employee's

          continuing desire to work  for the particular employer."   Id. at
                                                                     ___

          907 n.3.  The Court then likened the harm imposed  by adoption of

          an illegal  seniority system to  that imposed "when  an insurance

          company  delivers an accident insurance policy  with a face value

          of $10,000,  when what  has  been paid  for is  a  face value  of

          $25,000."  Id.
                     ___
                              
          ____________________

               7Although  the holding  in  Lorance has  been superseded  by
                                           _______
          statute, see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114  S. Ct. 1483, 1489-
                   ___ ________    _______________
          90 (1994)  (describing provisions of  Civil Rights Act  of 1991),
          that  development does  not affect  the use that  we make  of the
          Court's opinion here.

                                          21

                    Even though Lorance addressed  a different issue   when
                                _______

          a  disparate impact violation of Title VII occurs for purposes of

          establishing the  limitations period    we find  guidance in  the

          Court's recognition  that the  adoption of a  discriminatory plan

          may itself impose an injury.  So it is here:  a ripeness analysis

          can take  into account not  only the  harm that  arises from  the

          reduced  value of Keenan's benefits,  but also the  harm from the

          state's  possible  endorsement  of  age  discrimination  and  the

          prejudice that underlies it.

                    Moreover, the uncertainty about the validity of section

          7(2)(b ) is also imposing a present hardship on Keenan apart from

          the specter of  reduced future benefits.  At  age 58, people must

          nail  down their  plans for  financial security  in  their golden

          years.  Thus, the most immediate harm to Keenan comes in the form

          of  an inability  prudently to  arrange his  fiscal affairs.   If

          Keenan anticipates that  his benefits  will not  be reduced,  and

          guesses  wrong,  he may  find  himself  inadequately prepared  to

          subsist on the unwanted birthday  present   a drastically reduced

          pension     that  will  accompany  his  attainment  of  age   65.

          Conversely, if  he anticipates that  the statute will  be upheld,

          and  guesses wrong,  he  may needlessly  deprive  himself in  the

          intervening seven  years, preparing  for a  rainy day that  never

          dawns.  We believe that  this uncertainty and the  considerations

          of utility that we have mentioned coalesce to show that Keenan is

          suffering a sufficient present injury to satisfy the second prong

          of the Abbott Labs paradigm.  See, e.g., Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at
                 ___________            ___  ____  ___________

                                          22

          201;  Pierce v. Society of  Sisters, 268 U.S.  510, 535-36 (1925)
                ______    ___________________

          (allowing  private schools  to  attack  statute requiring  public

          school attendance  at  a  later  date because  of  the  statute's

          tendency to  shift students immediately to  public schools); Crow
                                                                       ____

          Tribe of  Indians v. Montana, 819  F.2d 895, 903 (9th  Cir. 1987)
          _________________    _______

          (finding justiciability in challenge  to state tax on coal  based

          in  part on present difficulty  in leasing mine),  aff'd 484 U.S.
                                                             _____

          997 (1988); Bob's  Home Serv.,  Inc. v. Warren  County, 755  F.2d
                      ________________________    ______________

          625,  627-29 (8th Cir. 1985)  (finding ripeness based  in part on

          the reduced property value attributable to a land regulation).

                    Finally,  although we recognize  that courts  have some

          discretion to grant or withhold declaratory relief, and that this

          discretion must  be exercised  cautiously when matters  of either

          public import or constitutional  dimension are implicated, see El
                                                                     ___ __

          Dia,  Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 494 (1st Cir. 1992),
          __________    _______________

          the lower court  did not  squarely reject Keenan's  claim in  the

          exercise  of its discretion, nor should  it have done so.  Though

          the declaratory  judgment context  may serve  to relax  a federal

          court's storied obligation to  exercise the jurisdiction given to

          it by  Congress, see Fuller Co.  v. Ramon I. Gil,  Inc., 782 F.2d
                           ___ __________     ___________________

          306,  308 n.3  (1st  Cir. 1986),  the  decision not  to  exercise

          jurisdiction must  still  be  based on  a  careful  balancing  of

          efficiency,  fairness, and the  interests of both  the public and

          the  litigants.   See  Metropolitan Prop.  &  Liab. Ins.  Co.  v.
                            ___  ______________________________________

          Kirkwood,  729 F.2d 61,  62 (1st Cir.  1984).   In Keenan's case,
          ________

          this calculus strongly favors a contemporaneous adjudication.  In

                                          23

          addition  to   the  utility  of  a   present  determination,  the

          challenged statute  is free  of ambiguity and  straightforward in

          its  operation.    There   is  no  basis  to  suppose   that  any

          adjudication  will be hampered by  factual uncertainty.  There is

          no   need  to  await  clarification  by  a  state  court.    More

          importantly, Congress gave state  and local governments two years

          between the  passage of the OWBPA and its effective date to bring

          their retirement schemes into compliance.  The Commonwealth chose

          not to bestir itself during this period, and has still  not taken

          legislative action though  nearly five years  have elapsed.   Any

          deference  that might be owed under principles of comity has long

          since  been repaid.  The retirement scheme must now face judicial

          scrutiny.8

                                         IX.
                                         IX.
                                         __

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                    We need go  no further.   Although  the district  court

          appropriately granted summary judgment against Riva and Pentland,

          it improperly dismissed Keenan's claim as unripe.

                              
          ____________________

               8Keenan  invites us to direct the entry of a judgment in his
          favor on  the merits, noting  the district courts  statement that
          "Section  7(2)(b )  is  facially  discriminatory  towards certain
          state employees over the age of fifty-five."   Riva, 871 F. Supp.
                          ____                           ____
          at 1517.  We decline the invitation.  The district court's dictum
          was based in  part on  its assumption that  "[d]efendants do  not
          contest  that Section  7(2)(b ) is facially  discriminatory under
          the  ADEA as amended by the OWBPA."  Id. at 1517 n.5.  On appeal,
                                               ___
          the  Commonwealth vehemently  denies  that it  ever conceded  the
          point.  Under the circumstances, we  think that orderly procedure
          favors a remand so that the district court may fully consider the
          merits of Keenan's claim.

                                          24

                    Affirmed in  part, reversed  in part, and  remanded for
                    Affirmed in  part, reversed  in part, and  remanded for
                    _______________________________________________________

          further proceedings consistent herewith.
          further proceedings consistent herewith.
          _______________________________________

                                          25