Court Opinion

ID: 9829450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:18:47.440975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.222343
License: Public Domain

BUCK, J.
We think that the court erred in admitting, over defendant’s objection, the following question propounded by plaintiff’s counsel to plaintiff, and the answer thereto: “What, in your opinion, is a reasonable time to run from Jasper to Bridgeport?” to which plaintiff answered, “Thirty hours.” What constitutes a reasonable time to make. a given trip is a mixed question of law and fact, and one of the questions which the jury, under proper instructions from the court, were to decide in this case, and it is not for a witness to invade the province of the jury in passing thereupon. Appellee urges that, even though it be conceded that it was error to permit this question to be asked and answered, yet, the trial being before the court, it was harmless, and that there was sufficient evidence before the court, independent of this testimony, to sustain the judgment. The plaintiff alleged rough handling and unreasonable delays in the shipment of 36 head of grown cattle and 7 calves from Jasper to Bridgeport, by reason of which 4 of the cows died and all of the cows were injured and depreciated in value. The court gave plaintiff a judgment for the full amount asked for, and all the evidence would sustain, to wit, $380. Plaintiff testified that the market value at Bridgeport of the cows, if transported with ordinary care and in due time, was $35 each, or $140 for the four which died; that the other 32 head were depreciated to the amount of $7.50 each, or $240, making, the full amount prayed for. Our attention has not been directed to, nor do we find, any other evidence tending to show what was the usual and customary time to make this run of 333 miles. Therefore we must conclude, both from the action of the court in overruling the timely and well-taken objection to the evidence, and the absence in the record of any other basis for a finding, that there were unreasonable delays en route; that very probably the court gave full weight to this improperly admitted testimony. Hence the assignment must be sustained. Wagoner v. Ruply, 69 Tex. 700, 7 S. W. 80; Moore v. Kennedy, 81 Tex. 144, 16 S. W. 740.
In view of another trial, we think that the trial court did not err in holding that the notice to one of the four defendant railway companies, within the time provided in the shipping contract, of the loss sustained, was notice to all of the connecting carriers. The notice to the Chicago & Rock Island Railway Company was notice to each of appellants, Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company and Texas & Pacific Railway Company. Article 31, Vernon’s Sayles’ Tex. Civil Statutes; Railway Co. v. Itule, 172 S. W. 1123; T. & P. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 438, 108 S. W. 760. We think that plaintiff’s petition was good as against the special exception urged, to the overruling of which the first assignment is directed. In the third assignment error is urged to the admission, over objection, of the following question to plaintiff and answer: “What, in your opinion, was the difference in the value of the 32 head that lived in the condition they did arrive and in the condition they would have arrived if they had had a reasonable run without any delay or rough handling?” *579—to which the witness answered, “$7.50 per head.”
While, as limited by the propositions under this assignment, we are inclined to think that no reversible error is shown, we suggest that upon another trial the question should he differently framed, as in the present form it seems to be subject to the objection raised in the first assignment discussed.
Since in the court below, judgment was rendered for defendants Chicago, Rock Island & Gulf Railway Company, and Texas & Pacific Bailway Company, and against the defendants Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company, the Texas & Gulf Railway Company, and the last two companies alone appealed, and no complaint is made as to the judgment in favor of the two first-named companies, the judgment as to such will remain undisturbed, but be reversed as to the appellants, and the cause remanded, and it is so ordered.
Beversed and remanded.