Court Opinion

ID: 9487929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:30:28.150793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:34.178608
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
My colleagues conclude that Weston did not consent to the mistrial declared in his first trial, and that the mistrial was not declared for manifest necessity. On the contrary, the record shows that Weston consented to the first mistrial without prejudice. Even if that were not so, the state judge properly exercised his discretion and declared the mistrial on the grounds of manifest necessity. Furthermore, because any improper comments made by the state judge in the second trial were not unduly prejudicial, I would reverse the district court’s issuance of the writ.
I
The circumstances surrounding a mistrial will dictate whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. If Weston consented to the mistrial, retrial is allowed. United States v. Bates, 917 F.2d 388, 392 (9th Cir.1991) (Bates). If Weston did not consent, retrial will be permitted only if justified by “manifest necessity.” Id. However, even if the mistrial was declared at Weston’s request, the Double Jeopardy Clause will still bar retrial if he “can show that the ‘conduct giving rise to the successful motion for mistrial was intended to provoke [him] into mov*640ing for a mistrial.’ ” United States v. Lun, 944 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir.1991) (Lun), quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982).
The majority considers Weston’s consent to a mistrial without prejudice as ambiguous, and states that the district court “wholly failed to determine whether the later written motion superseded and effectively revoked the earlier request.” Maj. op. at 637. The record does not support this analysis. Weston argues that he did not consent to the mistrial in this case unless it was to be with prejudice. But a fair reading of the entire record, in context, supports a finding that Weston did consent.
The first mention of any motion for mistrial comes where Weston’s attorney, Mr. Ada-chi, states:
I have a motion for a mistrial, your honor. As the court just heard the prosecutor elicited certain information ... [that] was totally extraneous to the case here ... and I assume [the prosecutor] had knowledge of what his witness was going to say before he put him up on this.
The charge here was that the prosecutor intentionally “goaded” Weston’s attorney into asking for a mistrial. A mistrial on those grounds, under Kennedy and Lun, would bar retrial. So at this point, what the defense was asking for was a mistrial with prejudice.
But the state judge quickly responded to that view of events by stating: “[The prosecutor] doesn’t do that sort of thing.” Weston’s attorney then replied, “I am not accusing [the prosecutor]” and went on to say:
[AJnyway in addition it was, I think also extraneous and unnecessarily] cumulative as well as prejudicial to have the parole officer come up here. Now the jury not only knows that when he is arrested he is involved in check fraud, but [that] he is on parole.
(Emphasis added.)
This was, in effect, a second basis for a mistrial, based on prejudice. Weston’s attorney then changes the direction of the conversation, stating that “my position is that the court ... declare a mistrial,” at which time the judge specifically told him that the court would not declare a mistrial unless it was on motion by the defense, otherwise “you’ve got double jeopardy.” After the discussion of the consequences of double jeopardy, the state judge said “anyway, you made a motion for a mistrial, am I correct?” Weston’s attorney replied “yes.”
At this point, Weston has moved for a mistrial on two grounds: goading by the prosecutor (which the state judge indicated will be unsuccessful), and on the basis of prejudice. At the end of the discussion, the state judge made sure that Weston’s attorney had made the motion. Certainly Weston knew from this discussion that the state judge would not grant the mistrial on his own motion.
Thus, before the recess, the state judge had clarified that the only issue he was considering was Weston’s motion for a mistrial based upon prejudice. This is what he took under advisement for decision the next day.
The following day, Weston’s counsel submitted a new written motion for mistrial on the grounds that the prosecution intentionally goaded the defense into making the mistrial motion. That motion asked for a mistrial with prejudice. The majority somehow takes this written motion as a withdrawal of the first motion, stating that the trial judge “wholly failed” to determine if this later motion revoked the earlier request. But the trial judge is not Weston’s lawyer. His lawyer had adequate time to withdraw his prior motion. He did not do so in writing or orally. Indeed, the record shows he did not intend to withdraw it.
What the majority fails to point out is that after this written motion was submitted, the court heard further argument before ruling on the mistrial. Here is what the transcript shows:
Court: I have before me a motion for mistrial along with a memorandum filed this morning.... Any further argument in this matter other than what I have already heard?
Mr. Cling (Prosecutor): Your honor, the allegations that I intentionally attempted to circumvent the court’s ruling I really *641think are preposterous_ I am perfectly aware of your honor’s reaction to Attorneys who attempt to do something that has been ruled inadmissible.
Mr. Adachi (Defense Counsel): Now if Mr. Cling were an inexperienced prosecutor the court could say that perhaps it was negligence or reckless. The statement itself I think speaks for Mr. Cling’s intent.
Mr. Cling: Can I just say one more thing?
Court: Sure.
Mr. Adachi: I’m not finished yet.
Mr. Cling: I thought you were.
Mr. Adachi: Now addressing the issue of prejudice, I think that any evidence of bad acts is always prejudicial to a defendant. The jury is going to think well he was a bad man on one occasion [so] he is a bad man on this occasion. And I really think that I had a really good shot in the case. And Mr. Cling by his question and by his answer robbed me of my chances in this case.
Court: All Right. First of all I am going to make an expressed finding so the record is crystal clear there was no attempt to goad.
Court: Secondly ... I do think that [the testimony] creates prejudice against the defendant.... This cumulative error so to speak is enough for me to grant the motion. The motion for mistrial will be granted.
(Emphasis added.)
This discussion shows a number of things. It shows that the judge was aware of the written motion and memorandum submitted that morning by the defense. It also makes it clear that the state judge had in mind and would consider the arguments made the day before which focused on Weston’s motion for a mistrial based upon prejudice. It further demonstrates that after the defense submitted the written motion, Adachi continued to argue to the court that the testimony was prejudicial, and that it robbed the defense of the chance for a fair trial. Of course, a mistrial granted on those grounds is without prejudice. It is clear that not only was the previous motion for a mistrial without prejudice not withdrawn by filing the written motion, but it was being pressed anew when Adachi again argued that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial. The judge found no prosecutorial goading, and this finding was not clearly erroneous. Lun, 944 F.2d at 644. The court then disposed of the motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct made the day before and argued for by Ada-chi on the second day. The judge held that the testimony about Weston’s parole and pri- or arrest “creates prejudice against the defendant” and granted Weston’s motion for a mistrial on this ground.
All this seems clear from the record. If there was any ambiguity, it occurred after the court granted the motion for a mistrial. It was only then that Adachi stated: “Judge, I wanted to talk to my client before the court [ruled].” Clearly, the judge was not under any obligation at that point to allow Adachi to withdraw his motion or to withdraw his ruling. The majority correctly points out that one of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to allow the defendant to keep control of his fate. But that does not mean that once a judge has held a hearing over two days regarding the prejudicial nature of the testimony, he is further obligated, after making his ruling, to allow the defense to withdraw its motion. There is no rule of law that requires a judge to allow a defendant to withdraw a motion for a mistrial once it has been granted.
Adachi’s statement that the prosecution had “robbed” him of his chance to win the ease simply underscores the extent to which the defense was arguing prejudice. So does his statement that the testimony was “devastating.” For the defense to come before us now and argue that Adachi might have gone to the jury with the first case is disingenuous in light of the assertion that the prejudicial conduct of the prosecutor was “devastating” and “robbed him” of his chances to win the case.
*642My reading of the entire record on this issue convinces me that Adachi made a motion for a mistrial based on two separate grounds, prosecutorial goading and prejudice, and that the judge granted the motion on the second ground. Because the motion was made by Weston, there was consent.
II
Since Weston consented to the mistrial, I would not get to the issue of whether the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. Nevertheless, I believe the majority’s analysis of this issue is also wanting.
The “degree of deference to be accorded the trial judge’s determination of manifest necessity varies with the circumstances of each case.” United States v. Jarvis, 792 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir.) (Jarvis), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 182, 93 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986). Both the Supreme Court and this court have expressly held that we must “accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment.” Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 511, 98 S.Ct. 824, 833, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) (Washington); Jarvis, 792 F.2d at 769. Indeed, we may reverse the declaration of a mistrial on those grounds only if the trial judge’s decision was “irrational or irresponsible.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 834-35; Jarvis, 792 F.2d at 769, 770.
It is eminently sensible for us to accord great deference to the trial court’s evaluation of the likelihood that an impermissible statement would affect the outcome of the trial. The trial judge is the expert when it comes to determining how a jury will react to potentially prejudicial statements. Moreover, because he has observed the entire trial, he is in a unique position to ascertain accurately whether the statement would affect the jury’s decision. Reviewing only portions of a cold record, divorced entirely from the context of the proceeding, we stand in a remarkably poor position to determine whether an improper comment may affect the jury’s decision. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[tjhere are compelling institutional considerations militating in favor of appellate deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the significance of possible juror bias.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. at 834. It is therefore doubly perplexing that the majority insists on not following the clearly established precedent of this court and of the Supreme Court which requires us “to accord the highest degree or respect” to the trial court’s decision in this case.
Finally, the majority ignores the perverse incentives its decision creates. The trial court is vested with the primary duty to protect the integrity of the trial and to ensure that the defendant gets a fair trial. While curative instructions and other sanctions often suffice to remedy prejudicial statements and testimony, “[ujnless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the trial judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases.” Id. By failing to accord deference to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the juror may have been prejudiced by the improper testimony, the majority’s opinion will unduly chill trial courts from exercising their discretion to declare mistrials when necessary. As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area” will deter trial courts from exercising their discretion to declare mistrials “by a concern that any time a reviewing court disagreed with its assessment of the trial situation a retrial would automatically be barred.” Id.
The majority correctly points out that because the error that arose in the first trial was not of the sort that would clearly require reversal, we may include in our analysis whether the judge: (a) heard the opinions of the parties regarding the propriety of a mistrial, (b) considered alternatives and chose the one least harmful to the defendant, (c) acted with deliberation and not abruptly, and (d) determined the defendant would benefit from the mistrial. Bates, 917 F.2d at 395-96.
As the majority concedes, the trial judge did hear from all of the parties on the mistrial motion (in fact, there were hearings over two days), and did act with deliberation (the judge took the motion under submission the *643first day and heard additional argument the next day).
The majority concludes, however, that the judge did “not properly consider alternatives to a mistrial and did not determine that the mistrial would be in the defendant’s best interests.” Maj. op. at 638. But the record shows that the judge did consider the alternative of giving a curative instruction, and decided that such an instruction would be insufficient. The judge explained to the jury: “The reason I granted [the mistrial] was [that] two things came into evidence that you shouldn’t hear and I think it is very hard to strike. ... I can tell you to forget about it but that is hard to do, forget about it. And that is the reason I granted a mistrial in the matter.” (Emphasis added.)
The record also shows that the judge did consider the impact of the mistrial on Weston. The judge stated: “[Weston] is not getting a fair trial under [the] circumstances because [the testimony] is terribly prejudicial.”
The trial judge apparently believed that the trial had been a fairly close one and that Adaehi had a good chance of obtaining acquittal for Weston before the prosecutor elicited the statement that Weston was arrested for check fraud and that he was on parole. Adaehi argued to the trial court that the improper comments were “devastating.” As Adaehi explained: “The jury now knows that the defendant was arrested for check fraud. I specifically kept Mr. Weston off the stand for the pin-pose of excluding prior bad acts as I made in my earlier motion in this court in his felony convictions, now they know. They also know that he is a parolee.” After pointing out that an “untouchable witness” had directly contradicted the testimony of the victim, and emphasizing that he was “[n]ow addressing the issue of prejudice,” Adaehi further exclaimed: “I had a really good shot in this case. And [the prosecutor] by his question and by his answer robbed me of my chances in this case.”
The trial court agreed that Weston had been unduly prejudiced, and his conclusion was certainly reasonable. In what may have been a very close ease, the jury was exposed to the prejudicial knowledge that the defendant had committed prior crimes and bad acts. Moreover, the defendant had forfeited his right to testify on his own behalf for the purpose of keeping this information from the jury. Thus, not only was Weston prejudiced by the jury’s knowledge of his past crimes and bad acts, but he was also effectively deprived of his right to testify, a right he apparently would have wanted to exercise but for his desire to keep his prior crimes and bad acts from the jury’s knowledge.
In a case like this where we review “the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment,” we are required to give the judge the “highest degree of respect.” Jarvis, 792 F.2d at 769. Because the trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial was not “irrational and irresponsible,” id. at 769, 770, but rather a thoughtful and considered exercise of his discretion in an attempt to secure for the defendant a fair trial, I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded Weston’s retrial.
III
Because of how I see the case, I must get to a third issue: whether the judge’s comments at the second trial rose to such a level that they deprived Weston of a fair trial. Because the scope of our review on habeas is very narrow, we must determine if the conduct rose to a level that predisposed the jury to find the defendant guilty. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-43, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871-72, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir.1994). The judge made comments to Weston’s lawyer that I believe should not have been made. However, the judge gave a curative instruction telling the jury not to be influenced by the comments from the bench. This is usually sufficient to dispose of the perceived unfairness. See United States v. Schoor, 597 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir.1979) (“any prejudice flowing [from court’s comments] was cured by the court’s timely and several cautionary instructions”). In addition, many of the comments that Weston points to were not even made in the presence of the jury. Furthermore, the jury did not convict Weston on every charge, indicating that it took seriously his counsel’s arguments. I would therefore reverse the dis*644trict court’s issuance of the writ on this ground as well.
IV
For the above reasons, I conclude that Weston consented to a mistrial without prejudice and, in any event, that manifest necessity has been shown. I also conclude that the trial judge’s comments at the second trial did not deprive Weston of a fair trial. Because I would reverse the district court’s issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on each ground relied upon by the district court, I respectfully dissent.