Court Opinion

ID: 9778253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:57:03.281046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.885630
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR

The Whaleys have filed a petition for rehearing. They argue that we failed to consider the fact that they did not learn that the Underwoods were underinsured until three years after the accident. The Whaleys also argue that we overlooked the case of Lee v. Lee, 732 S.W.2d 275 (Tenn.1987). They contend that under Lee their mailing of a copy of their complaint against the Underwoods to Preferred Risk approximately a month and a half or so after learning the Underwoods were underinsured complied with the policy requirement that a party seeking UM coverage must “[p]romptly send [Preferred Risk] copies of the legal papers if a suit is brought.”
*114Lee is not controlling. It does not involve the policy requirement at issue in this case. The Supreme Court in Lee addressed a policy provision requiring that the insurance company
must be notified promptly of how, when and where the accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names and addresses of any injured persons and of any witnesses.
That provision is also in the policy in the instant case; however, compliance with that provision was never an issue before us. Mr. Whaley clearly complied with that provision when, on the day after the accident, he called his Preferred Risk agent and gave him the details concerning the accident. We are concerned with a different condition precedent to coverage. While some of the principles enunciated in Lee are helpful in resolving the instant case, Lee does not require a result different from the one announced in our original opinion.
In the instant case, the Whaleys and Preferred Risk agreed in the contract of insurance that the Whaleys would “promptly” send the company “copies of the legal papers if a suit” were brought. Such a suit was brought on January 12, 1989. A copy of the complaint was not mailed to Preferred Risk until April 2, 1991, some 27 plus months later. We believe that a delay of approximately 27 months is facially unreasonable as a matter of law.
An insurance company that has issued a policy providing UM coverage has an obvious interest in any tort action filed by its insured. The defendant tortfeasor may be uninsured, thereby triggering the UM coverage; or the defendant may be underinsured, thus partially involving the UM carrier’s coverage; or the defendant may initially have adequate insurance coverage with a company that subsequently becomes insolvent. Since a UM claim is generally1 adjudicated in the tort litigation, an insurance company has something more than a pedestrian interest in that litigation. Early notice of the litigation will enable the UM carrier, should it so choose, to monitor the litigation in which it may later find itself embroiled. An insurer with UM coverage will be particularly interested if the underlying litigation involves a significant personal injury and significant liability exposure. In any event, the carrier will undoubtedly benefit from notice of the litigation before it is named as a UM coverage defendant. In the context of underinsurance, the company will be able to identify and possibly communicate with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier. One can think of many benefits to an insurance company that will be derived from early notice of the tort lawsuit.
We do agree with the observation of. the Supreme Court in Lee that the concept of “prompt” notice entails “notice within a reasonable time under the circumstances of the case.” 732 S.W.2d at 276. The undisputed facts upon which Preferred Risk’s motion for summary judgment was based show, as a matter of law, that the Whaleys did not act within a reasonable period of time. A 27-month delay is simply too long. The defendant’s motion and supporting facts shifted the burden to the Whaleys to show “that there are indeed disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue that needs to be resolved by the trier of fact and that a trial is therefore necessary.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 215 (Tenn.1993). The fact that they did not learn until mid-February, 1991, that the Underwoods were underinsured is not sufficient, standing alone, to condone a failure to notify the UM carrier. This is the clear teaching of Lee, upon which the appellants in this case rely so heavily. In Lee, the plaintiff did not determine definitely that the defendants were uninsured until after it filed suit; but the court in Lee held that notice of the accident ten months after the accident and before suit was filed was not reasonable. We agree with the Lee court that the question of reasonableness in these type cases is an issue for the court. 732 S.W.2d at 276. The Whaleys failed to show why it took so long before they determined that the Under-woods were underinsured. They offered no facts reflecting that they took reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that the Under-woods had adequate coverage. To defeat the insurance company’s motion, “it must be *115shown that the claimant exercised due diligence and reasonable care in ascertaining that there was coverage under the policy.” Id. The record before us does not reflect that the Whaleys did anything to make this determination.
The “notice of legal papers” requirement is a simple one. If one thinks he or she may want to invoke the UM coverage in the future because the defendant is uninsured or underinsured or the defendant’s company is or becomes insolvent, that person must “promptly” send the UM carrier a copy of the complaint against the tortfeasor. Obviously, a plaintiff, who is then usually being guided by counsel, knows when suit has been filed. Unlike an accident or loss that may or may not be an event triggering UM coverage, the filing of a suit, in which the insurance company has an obvious interest, is a known, concrete fact. One cannot wait 27 months, and expect an insurance company to provide UM coverage. The contract between the parties, by its plain and unambiguous terms, requires more. The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the Whaleys did not comply with this requirement within a reasonable time after suit was filed.
Costs associated with the petition for rehearing are taxed to the appellants and their surety.

. Cf. Bolin v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 614 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tenn.1981).