Court Opinion

ID: 9554959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 16:03:55.30396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:39:20.197062
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/10/23 In re R.R. CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 In re R.R. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                          A167330
 SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
 SERVICES DEPARTMENT,                                                  (Sonoma County
                                                                       Super. Ct. Nos.
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                DEP-5958-02, DEP-
 v.                                                                 6041-02)
 R.R.,
           Defendant and Appellant.

         R.R. (father) appeals from orders terminating his parental rights to
now five-year-old R.R. and three-year-old G.R. (minors) and adopting a
permanent plan of adoption. He asserts the juvenile court erred by declining
to find the beneficial parent-child exception applicable and that the orders
should be reversed for a more appropriate permanent plan.
         We affirm.
                                                    BACKGROUND
Proceedings Before Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26 Hearing
         In May 2019, the Sonoma County Human Services Department
(Department) received a referral that mother, who was pregnant at the time,
was “suffer[ing] a drug-induced psychosis and attempted to jump off the

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apartment balcony.” Mother agreed to a voluntary family maintenance plan.
Father, however, refused to participate in these services despite struggling
“with his own mental illness and possible substance abuse” issues.
      Although R.R. was initially placed with maternal grandmother, the
child was later detained after grandmother was “unable to guarantee the
child’s safety.” Four months later, the Department returned R.R. to father as
the primary caretaker and both parents were offered maintenance services.
      By that point, mother had given birth to G.R. Initially, the Department
placed G.R. with paternal great grandmother, but after father “demonstrated
positive steps to mitigate safety issues,” G.R. was also placed with father as
the primary caregiver and maintenance services continued.
      In February 2020, the Department filed supplemental petitions as to
the minors. After the juvenile court sustained allegations that father was
using controlled substances and failing to provide adequate care and
supervision for minors placing them at substantial risk, the court took
jurisdiction of then one-year old R.R. and three-month old G.R. and removed
them from father’s care.
      At the disposition hearing, the court adopted the Department’s
recommendations of reunification services for father and visitation.
      Over the next 18 months, the Department recommended terminating
services to father at the six-month review hearing, continuing services at the
12-month review hearing, and terminating services at the 18-month review
hearing.
      Prior to the 18-month review hearing, father had been doing well and
the minors had been returned on “a Trial Home Visit,” in advance of the
hearing. However, that visit was “unsuccessfully terminated” because
shortly after the minors were returned to father, he relapsed. Father initially

                                       2
denied using, but when confronted with evidence that he had provided “fake
urine in a urinary analysis,” he admitted to “using methamphetamines one
time.” The minors were then “returned to their previous foster home.”
      At the 18-month review hearing, the court terminated services to
mother but ordered an additional 60 days of services for father.
      At the next review hearing, the court terminated father’s reunification
services and set the matter for a Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.261 hearing.
Section 366.26 Hearing
      In its section 366.26 report, the Department recommended termination
of father’s parental rights and making adoption the permanent plan.
      The Department provided a detailed account of visitation: Father had
visited consistently with minors, except for periods of time when he “was
testing positive for methamphetamines.” Initially, visits were via Zoom due
to the pandemic, but both father and minors had trouble “engaging and
staying connected via Zoom” and visits transitioned to in-person. Father was
eventually permitted unsupervised visitation. He then had a trial home visit,
which was unsuccessfully terminated. During the review period, father had
been scheduled for twice monthly in-person visitation but only “attended
visits at an average of once per month.” He had made the “judgment call” to
cancel one visit when he relapsed and “was ‘coming down’ from using
substances.” He cancelled a subsequent visit because he was “not feeling
well.” On another visitation date, he got the location wrong and “missed
much of the visit.” Thus, while father had “had periods of increased
attendance,” he had “struggled with attendance.” Given that inconsistent

      1 All further undesignated code sections are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                      3
visitation, the minors “no longer [were] told when they are going to have a
visit scheduled, so they are not confused.” Additionally, the minors no longer
asked for father in between visits.
        The social worker had “observed [father] . . . as being loving, playful,
and engaged with the boys.” The Department acknowledged he
“undoubtedly” loved his children, and it appeared the minors had a “positive
connection” with father. However, the minors did not “have a substantial,
emotional relationship that . . . would supersede the benefits of trust,
belonging, and stability that can be gained in an adoption.”
        In determining whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental, the Department took into consideration the length of time
minors had spent outside of father’s custody, noting R.R. had been initially
detained in July 2019, and until February 2020 had been “back and forth
between his parents’ care and relative care,” until he was placed in foster
care. In May 2020, he was placed in his current home with G.R., then six
months old. The minors had lived in that home until the trial visit with
father, which lasted less than three weeks. They were returned to their
concurrent home and remained there. This meant both minors had spent
over two and a half years, and “the majority of their lives,” out of father’s
care.
        The Department also noted, “It is clear,” that both minors “perceive the
caregivers (who are their potential adoptive parents) as their primary
caregivers, and the caregivers are meeting the boys’ physical and emotional
needs. The [minors] look to the caregivers when they are hungry, tired,
upset, or in need of comfort.” The Department concluded, although
interaction between father and the minors “could have some incidental

                                          4
benefit,” “termination of parental right would not be detrimental to the
minors.”
      Father asked for, and the juvenile court approved, a bonding study.
Psychologist Dr. Gloria Speicher performed the evaluation of “Bonding &
Attachment” between father and the minors. To perform the evaluation, Dr.
Speicher observed the minors and father in “different combinations” and
reviewed the court records, medical records, evaluations of the minors, and
“pertinent observations provided by others.”
      R.R. was born with “sepsis . . . meningitis of E. coli complicated by
seizures. These birth complications place him at high risk for . . . continued
delays in speech, fine motor and self[-]help skills.” He had been diagnosed
with “high frequency hearing loss,” and required multiple follow-up
appointments to monitor “various aspects of his development including [with
an] ophthalmologist, neurologist, cardiologist and developmental/behavioral
specialists.” When he was almost three years old, R.R. was “non-verbal” and
had to begin “learning sign language to communicate his needs.” He was
characterized as “energetic and happy,” although he “lacked ‘stranger danger’
and sought attention from any available adult.” At the time of the
evaluation, R.R. was four years old, and had problems articulating himself.
Thus, Dr. Speicher had difficulty understanding him but noted “foster
parents seem to have no difficulty and often interpret or repeat what he was
trying to convey.”
      G.R. was also born “with complications due to infection.” Additionally,
he had been “exposed to drugs in utero,” and after birth required “oxygen and
antibiotics.” G.R. had “great difficulties with self soothing and a very strong
need to be continually held by caretakers.” At the time of the evaluation,

                                       5
G.R. was three years old. He had “some difficulties with speech,” but
presented as “an active, social, inquisitive child.”
       Since the beginning of the dependency proceedings, R.R. had “been
moved six times,” and both minors had been in their current placement “for a
total of 29 months” minus the time they had been placed with father for the
trial visit.
       Dr. Speicher opined R.R. “has a strong positive emotional attachment
to [father]. Their bond is borne of familiarity and the protection that father
has provided. Records seem to paint a picture that portrays his father as a
figure of relative stability in [R.R.’s] early life. Father’s care, attention,
playfulness and joy in interacting with [R.R.] has helped [R.R.] see his father
as extremely important and someone who is there to focus on him and attend
to his needs.” Dr. Speicher thought R.R. “would benefit from continuing the
relationship with father.”
       However, continued Dr. Speicher, “Sadly, the strength of their
connection to each other is not sufficient to overcome the early physical and
emotional traumas and create a secure attachment style for [R.R.]” R.R.’s
treating physicians pointed out his birth complications “could have serious
life long repercussions,” which may not show up for years, and others which
had “already impacted his development. Those delays and traumas have, so
far, yielded an attachment style that tends toward withdrawing and avoiding
interactions and experiences.” R.R. had “very high needs for structure,
stability, consistency and predictability to mitigate those delays,” and he
would be “best served by placement in a setting that he associates with the
provision of these elements.” Therefore, it was Dr. Speicher’s opinion that
R.R.’s specific needs outweighed the potential detriment of severing the
positive emotional bond with father.

                                         6
      Next, Dr. Speicher opined G.R. did “not have a strong positive bond
with his father,” but did have a “strong bond with his foster parents, borne
primarily and easily from having spent the vast majority of his life in their
care. His relationship with his father is likely to be more confusing since
from [G.R.’s] perspective, he was removed from his primary (albeit foster)
parents and sent to live with his father (who until that time has been viewed
as someone with whom he played and visited occasionally).” Indeed, G.R.
“appeared to feel comfortable and enjoy his time with father,” and
“occasionally sought proximity and played with [him]. However, the foster
parents reported that in June 2021, [G.R.] was very clingy after visits. By
September 2021, he was having nightmares after visits. . . . Since June 2022,
[G.R.] is more settled and less clingy.”
      At the section 366.26 hearing, the court heard from father and counsel.
      Father testified that R.R. greeted him at visits by “running up” to him
and saying, “ ‘Dada, Dada,’ and he’s really happy to see me.” Father stated
the end of the visits had “gotten better since but usually he throws a fit. The
last visit, . . . [R.R.] started crying.” Father stated G.R. was “getting more,
you know, on me. He’s not as bonded as [R.R.], but he comes up and says,
‘Hi, Dada,’ and gives me a hug sometimes.” When asked about how R.R.’s
“special needs factor” into father’s bond, father maintained he did not think
R.R.’s “special needs . . . really affect the fact that I have that bond with my
son and the bond I have between me and [R.R.] is a lot more than [G.R.]”
Further, father stated he could “ask the County to support me with any kind
of extra help to understand what I don’t know or what I don’t know fully of
[R.R.’s] special needs that I can learn to also provide those skills to my life to
take care of him.”

                                           7
      Father recounted some of his own personal history, and stated, he did
not want his children to “have the same feelings” he had about his childhood.
Father stated, “deep down I know for [R.R.] he knows I am his dad and he
wants to be with me. [¶] And for that, he might end up growing up some type
of way that’s not good for him and . . . feel like maybe I abandoned him or
maybe I lied to him because I know that’s how I felt. And then I started
feeling as if I was not accepted and I don’t want him to feel that.”
      Counsel for the Department urged the court to terminate parental
rights and to find the beneficial parental-child relationship exception
inapplicable. Counsel addressed the three prongs of Caden C.2 As to the first
prong, the Department conceded there had been consistent visitation. As to
the second prong—whether there was a “positive emotional attachment to the
parent such that the continuation of that relationship would benefit the
child”—counsel stated the minors were “differently situated,” in that G.R. did
not have the same “positive emotional attachment to father” as R.R. G.R.
had “spent most of his life outside of father’s care,” while R.R. had spent a
“significant portion of his life . . . in father’s care,” although he had spent
more time outside of father’s care than in it. Counsel conceded there was a
“positive emotional attachment between father and [R.R.]” Finally, in regard
to the third prong—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child—counsel asserted that as to G.R. it was “very clear
that this would not be detrimental for him.” And, as for R.R., while it was
very clear father loved his children, R.R.’s needs and need for permanency
and stability outweighed any detriment to termination of parental rights.
      Minors’ counsel agreed with the Department, stating. “I think the
detriment is the main issue here.” R.R. “has special needs. He has

      2   In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).

                                         8
developmental delays. He has speech therapy. Occupational therapy.
Developmental therapy. All of these continue to be issues with him and
likely will be in the future. [¶] . . . [¶] And while there may be a relationship
between [R.R.] and dad, it is not such, so substantial as it would be
detrimental to sever that relationship due to the child’s need.”
      Father’s counsel argued it was “very clear father meets the first prong
of [Caden C.] consistent visitation and at the very least for—my client
believes for both children he meets the substantial positive relationship.”
Counsel pointed out Dr. Speicher’s evaluation had concluded there was at
“least for [R.R.], . . . there’s in fact a strong bond.” Regarding G.R., counsel
disagreed with Dr. Speicher’s conclusion, arguing “we do believe because of
the nature of the boys’ relationship with each other and their visits with dad,
that there is a strong positive connection.” As for the third prong, counsel
asserted the bond between the minors, and especially R.R. outweighed the
benefits of adoption, despite Dr. Speicher’s conclusion to the contrary.
Counsel maintained, “The detriment that [R.R.] would suffer by being
severed from again a parent that he has a strong bond to and one of two
things that obviously Dr. Speicher focused on was [R.R.’s] needs.” But,
continued counsel, “my client would like the Court to consider the fact . . .
continuing [father and R.R.’s] relationship, would provide [R.R.] with a
connection to someone who has had not only similar experiences, but maybe
has some similar needs.” Finally, counsel urged the court to not terminate
father’s rights and to adopt a permanent plan of legal guardianship.
      The court began by acknowledging the many obstacles father had
overcome and the progress he had made. But, while “a heartbreaking
situation,” the court had given father “every good opportunity and extended
services as long as could be extended to try to make this work.”

                                         9
      The court agreed father had been “consistent with visitation with the
children and the visits are positive.” The court, referring to “the very
detailed” bonding study, also concluded “there’s definitely a benefit to having
a relationship with dad. There’s no question about that.”
      As to the detriment element, the court began by observing that the
bonding study, “which is 45-pages, very detailed document, says that the
benefit does not outweigh the benefit that would be gained through the
permanency of adoption.” The court then reviewed the bases for that
determination, including R.R.’s “high needs” and the many doctor
appointments, programming and therapy he needed; the trial visit which
ended unsuccessfully “due to a relapse”; that both minors were “happy and
comfortable in their home,” and G.R. in particular was “strongly attached to
the caregivers”; the length of time the minors had spent outside of father’s
custody; that “[b]oth boys look to the caregivers for their needs to be met,
emotionally, physically and for comfort”; the social worker’s opinion that both
minors were “comfortable, secure and happy in the concurrent home”; the
social worker’s opinion that termination of parental rights would not be
detrimental; and the minors’ need for permanency.
      The court found the minors to be adoptable and terminated father’s
parental rights.
                                  DISCUSSION
      “At the section 366.26 hearing, the question before the court is
decidedly not whether the parent may resume custody of the child.” (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 630.) Instead, the purpose of a section 366.26
hearing, is to select and implement a permanent plan for the child. (Caden
C., at p. 630.) “[T]he court must first determine by clear and convincing
evidence whether the child is likely to be adopted. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)

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If so, and if the court finds that there has been a previous determination that
reunification services be terminated, then the court shall terminate parental
rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent shows that
termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically
enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and
select another permanent plan. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi), (4)(A).)”
(Caden C., at pp. 630–631.) One of those exceptions is the beneficial
parental-child relationship exception. (Id. at p. 631.)
      The proponent of the exception must establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that
(3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 637.)
      “ ‘The first element [of the exception]—regular visitation and contact—
is straightforward. The question is just whether “parents visit consistently,”
taking into account “the extent permitted by court orders.” ’ ” (In re
Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316 (Katherine J.), quoting Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
      “The second element, in which the court must determine whether the
child would benefit from continuing the relationship with her parent, is more
complicated. ‘[T]he relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as
“[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s
custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.” [Citation.]’ (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) ‘[C]ourts often consider how children feel about,
interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.’ (Ibid.) Caden C. instructs
us that ‘it is not necessary—even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise

                                         11
“quantitative measurement of the specific amount of ‘comfort, nourishment or
physical care’ [the parent] provided during [his or] her weekly visits.”
[Citation.]’ (Ibid.) Expert opinions or bonding studies provided by
psychologists who have observed and/or reviewed the parent-child
relationship are often ‘an important source of information about the
psychological importance of the relationship for the child.’ (Id. at pp. 632–
633, fn. omitted.) Ultimately, the court’s role is to decide whether the child
has a ‘ “significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent.]” ’ (Id.
at p. 633.)” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 316–317.)
      “The third and final element asks the court to ascertain whether
severing parental ties—and thus ‘terminating [the] parent’ relationship—
would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)
‘What courts need to determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.’ (Ibid.)
Because any harm caused by loss of this relationship may be significantly
mitigated by the child’s adoption into a stable, loving home, the court must
then perform a delicate balancing act. The ‘subtle, case-specific injury [that]
the statute asks courts to perform [is]: does the benefit of placement in a new,
adoptive home outweigh “the harm [the child] would experience from the loss
of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]” ’ (Ibid.)
‘When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination
would be “detrimental to the child due to” the child’s beneficial relationship
with a parent.’ (Id. at pp. 633–634.)” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317, fn. omitted.)

                                        12
      “In addition to these substantive clarifications, Caden C. also
establishes a hybrid standard of review for the beneficial relationship
exception. The first two elements, which require the juvenile court to ‘make a
series of factual determinations’ regarding visitation and the parent-child
relationship, ‘are properly reviewed for substantial evidence.’ (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) These determinations should ‘be upheld if . . .
supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the
contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a difference result
had it believed other evidence.’ (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212,
228. . . .)” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 317–318.)
      “But ‘the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his
parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.’
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Accordingly, we will not disturb the
juvenile court’s decision unless it ‘ “ ‘exceed[s] the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination.’ ” ’ (In re
Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318. . . .)” (Katherine J., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318.)
      There is no dispute that the trial court concluded father carried his
burden as to the first two elements.
      As to the final element—whether terminating the parental relationship
would be detrimental to minors—father maintains the juvenile court abused
its discretion “in finding father had not established the third element,
regarding the value of maintaining [R.R.’s] and [G.R.’s] relationships with
father.” He contends, “Losing their relationships with father will necessarily
cause trauma to the boys, particularly to [R.R.]” To support this assertion,
father points to his own testimony and portions of Dr. Speicher’s report.

                                         13
      However, selectively citing to his own testimony and portions of
Dr. Speicher’s report does not aid him in establishing an abuse of discretion
by the juvenile court. He is simply disagreeing with the court’s discretionary
conclusion based on all of the evidence before it, that terminating the
parental relationship would not be detrimental to minors and adoption would
greatly benefit them. This does not establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion
by the court.
      Father also contends, for the first time on appeal, that Dr. Speicher’s
evaluation was legally insufficient to support the court’s decision on the third
element. In his opening brief, he maintained that while Dr. Speicher
acknowledged G.R. enjoyed spending time with father, she went on to
inappropriately “advocate[] for the termination of parental rights on the basis
of what [G.R.] would need on an ongoing basis from a parent as a day-to-day
caregiver.” In his closing brief, however, he went further, suggesting Dr.
Speicher failed to even address the third Caden C. element in regard to G.R.
He also claimed Dr. Speicher erroneously compared father’s attributes to
those of the custodial caregivers, resulting in a no-detriment finding based on
a “misapplication of the law.”
      To the extent father is, for the first time on appeal, challenging the
adequacy of the report to support a no-detriment determination as to G.R.,
this contention is forfeited. (See In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407,
411–412 [mother’s challenge to sufficiency of assessment reports deemed
waived because she did not raise issue below]; In re Amos L. (1981)
124 Cal.App.3d 1031, 1038 [mother’s challenge to adequacy of social study
deemed waived because she did not raise issue below].) And to the extent he
is raising a new issue for the first time in his reply brief—that Dr. Speicher’s
opinion was based on an improper legal rubric leading the juvenile court to

                                       14
misapply the law—this contention is also forfeited. (Campos v. Anderson
(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3 [“Points raised in the reply brief for the
first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to
present them before.”]; Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 766
[“We refuse to consider the issues raised by defendant in his reply brief which
were not raised in his opening brief.”].)
      In any case, neither Dr. Speicher’s analysis nor the juvenile court’s no-
detriment determination was legally erroneous. Father is correct that
“ ‘[w]hen [the court] weighs whether termination would be detrimental, the
court is not comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative
to those of any potential adoptive parent(s).’ ” (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1157 (A.L.), quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 634; see ibid. [“section 366.26 hearing is decidedly not a contest of who
would be the better custodial caregiver”].) Rather, the court must decide
whether “the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the
security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss,” thus,
making termination of parental rights “ ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the
child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C., at pp. 633–634, first
italics added, second italics omitted.) Dr. Speicher, thus, discussed the
nature of the minors’ attachment to father —evidence directly relevant to the
third element assessment the court was required to make. (A.L., at p. 1157
[“The strength and quality of the parent’s relationship with the child,
including whether that parent has a parental role, is a relevant consideration
to the court’s detriment finding.”].)
      Furthermore, in making its assessment of the third element, the
juvenile court does not ignore, as father suggests, the benefits of a new home.
As the court stated in A.L., “the weighing function of the juvenile court in

                                        15
addressing the third prong is founded on the juvenile court asking this
question: ‘[D]oes the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh
“the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant,
positive, emotional relationship with [the parent?]” ’ ” (A.L., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1158, quoting Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) In
A.L., the juvenile court properly considered evidence that “the minor had
done extremely well in the 19-plus months she had been living with her
prospective adoptive family,” “that it was a stable and very loving home,” that
the “minor had made a good adjustment, and at a very early stage, the
caregivers had indicated their willingness to adopt the minor,” “[a]s time
evolved, the minor became very close to the caregivers’ goddaughter, whom
the minor saw frequently,” the minor “blossomed in the role of big sister in
February 2020, when the caregivers undertook the care of a safely-
surrendered baby,” the “minor had told social workers that she was very
happy living with the caregivers, whom she called ‘ “mommy,” “mom,” “dad,”
and “daddy,” ’ ” and she “had also expressed to the social worker that she did
not want to be moved.” (A.L., at p. 1158.) In short, the juvenile court can
consider the benefits of a new home.
      In this particular case, the ability of a new home to address and provide
for the minors’ significant physical, mental, and emotional difficulties was
necessarily part of the calculus. (See A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1158
[relevant evidence included “opinion evidence from social worker . . . that
father . . . had not been involved in the child’s medical decisions or issues”].)
Accordingly, Dr. Speicher’s discussion of these issues did not render her
report legally deficient.
      Finally, the record makes clear that the juvenile court was fully aware
of its responsibility under Caden C. It is also clear, the court considered all

                                        16
the evidence before it, which included not only Dr. Speicher’s report, but also
the Department’s reports, the entire case file, which the court took judicial
notice of, and father’s testimony. Thus, while father urges that the court
based its decision upon grounds identified in Caden C. as improper, the
record does not support that conclusion. “ ‘ “We must indulge in every
presumption to uphold a judgment, and it is [appellant’s] burden on appeal to
affirmatively demonstrate error—it will not be presumed.” ’ ” (A.L., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161, quoting People v. Tang (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 669,
677.) Father has not demonstrated error, and it will not be presumed here.
      While it is apparent father made significant efforts to reunify with his
children, it is clear the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding he did not establish the third prong of the parental-benefit
exception. The court, after weighing the benefits to the minors in receiving a
permanent adoptive home against any detriment to the children resulting
from the termination of the parental relationship, properly found father had
not shown that the minors’ relationship to them was “ ‘so important to the
child[ren] that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its
loss.’ ” (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1161, quoting Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.)
                                  DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court orders are AFFIRMED.

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                                 _________________________
                                 Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Margulies, J.

A167330, In re RR

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