Court Opinion

ID: 9849990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:34.092048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.973631
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting. Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E. 2d 673, which supports the present decision, is contrary to the weight of authority. 30A Am. Jur., Judgments § 411; 50 C.J.S., Judgments § 819; Annotations: 101 A.L.R. 104; 142 A.L.R. 727; 152 A.L.R. 1066; Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc. (Va. 1955), 85 S.E. 2d 364; Clark’s Adm’x v. Rucker (Ky. 1953), 258 S.W. 2d 9; Casey v. Balunas (Conn. 1955), 113 A. 2d 867; Kimmel v. Yankee Lines (C.A. 3rd 1955), 224 F. 2d 644.
*594Ill the cited Virginia ease, the opinion states: “The ease of Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone, 235 N.C. 619, 70 S.E. 2d 673, appears to be at odds with the general rule, . . .” In my opinion, our decision in Coach Co. v. Stone, supra, is erroneous and should be overruled.
The rule supported by the weight of authority is illustrated in the Restatement of the Law of Judgments, § 82, .as follows: “A and B are driving automobiles, which collide. C, a passenger in B’s oar, sues A and B. Whether -the judgment is in favor of or against C as to either or both A and B, the issues as to negligence or other element of the cause of action are not res judicata in a subsequent action by A against B for damage to his oar.”
In the cited Kentucky case, the opinion, citing authorities, states: “The rules of res judicata are based upon an adversary system of procedure designed for the purpose of giving persons an opportunity to litigate claims against each other. As a consequence, persons who have not had an opportunity of litigating between themselves the correctness of a determination which is the basis of a judgment for or •against them are not concluded by such a dieterminaton in a subsequent action between -them. Unless they were adversaries in the action in which the judgment was entered, the judgment merely adjudicates the rights of the plaintiff against each defendant, leaving unadjudioat-ed the rights of the defendants between themselves.”
Where two defendants are sued as alleged joint tort-feasors, they have no legal right to prosecute their respective claims inter se in the plaintiff’s .action. Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E. 2d 833, and cases cited. The 'consent judgment, now pleaded as res judicata, is a compromise settlement, with court approval, of a minor’s alleged claim. It was entered in an action in which the alleged joint tort-feasors filed a joint answer, .consisting of ia general denial of the plaintiff’s allegations, raising issues between -the plaintiff and the defendants. No issues were raised as between the defendants. They did not attempt to prosecute in said action their respective claims inter se.
Tarkington v. Printing Co., 230 N.C. 354, 53 S.E. 2d 269; Herring v. Coach Co., 234 N.C. 51, 65 S.E. 2d 505, and Snyder v. Oil Co., 235 N.C. 119, 68 S.E. 2d 805, cited in Coach Co. v. Stone, supra, involved essentially different factual situations. In these cases, there had been a settlement or adjudication, to pursue the above illustration, of issues raised as between A and B.
In Stone v. Coach Co., 238 N.C. 662, 78 S.E. 2d 605, defendant’s bus driver (Parker) had sued Stone. Stone pleaded the contributory negligence of Parker. A consent judgment was entered under which Stone paid Parker a compromise consideration. Since plaintiff’s right to recover from the Coach Company was grounded solely on the al*595leged negligence of Parker, it was held that the judgment, determinative as between Parker .and Stone, precluded Stone’s recovery from defendant, Parker’s employer, on principles stated in Leary v. Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E. 2d 570.
Here, if the plaintiff in the .prior action had been sui juris, and the defendants, j ointly or singly, had compromised her claim and obtained a release, without court action, such settlement with plaintiff would not be a bar to subsequent litigation to determine the rights of the defendants inter se. Dixie Lines v. Grannick, 238 N.C. 552, 78 S.E. 2d 410; Mercer v. Hilliard, 249 N.C. 725, 107 S.E. 2d 554.
Under the present decision, the result is this: An automobile collision occurs in which a passenger is injured. The two drivers, both or either, may compromise the claim of the injured passenger, pay the compromise consideration and obtain a full release without impairing their respective rights inter se. However, if the passenger happens to be a minor, and no valid compromise may be effected without the approval of the court, the drivers may not compromise the alleged claim of the injured passenger without sacrificing their rights to have determined in subsequent litigation their respective rights and liabilities inter se.
Our law encourages “out of court” compromise settlements. Dixie Lines v. Grannick, supra; Mercer v. Hilliard, supra. For like reasons, “in court” compromise settlements should be encouraged.
'W'hether ia judgment in accordance with a verdict establishing that the passenger was injured by the negligence of the operators of both vehicles involved in a collision should be held determinative of the rights and liabilities of the defendants inter se, while the subject of the authorities cited above, is not presented by this appeal. Here, there was no adjudication of the issues raised as between the plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants did not acknowledge, but denied, liability to -the plaintiff. The defendants simply offered to pay a stipulated amount by way of compromise of plaintiff's alleged cause of action. In my opinion, the essential nature of a compromise settlement is not affected by the circumstance that it is made (necessarily so when plaintiff is a minor) with the sanction of the court.
As I see it, a fallacy in Coach Co. v. Stone, supra, lies in this statement: “The fact of its negligence was judicially determined.” This is a misapprehension of the nature of a consent judgment.
“A judgment by consent is the agreement of the parties, their decree, entered upon the record with the sanction of the court. (Citation) It is not a judicial determination of the rights of the parties and does not purport to represent the judgment of the court, but merely records the pre-existing agreement of the parties.” (Our italics) McRary v. *596McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E. 2d 27; Owens v. Voncannon, 251 N. C. 351, 111 S.E. 2d 700.
I vote to overrule Coach Co. v. Stone, supra, andi to affirm Judge Huskins’ order.
PARKER, J., joins in this dissent.