Court Opinion

ID: 9717495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:04:37.199829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.497582
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring.
When one agrees to commit a crime, and does, he may argue that he was induced to do so by prosecuting authori*314ties. How one may proceed with such argument is the primary issue in this case.
Entrapment is the inducement of the commission of a criminal offense by one who would not have done so but for the deception, persuasion, or fraud of law enforcement officers or their agents. The defense was not known at common law, but in one form or another has been universally accepted by the states through judicial decision and legislation. It is an affirmative or positive defense, in the nature of confession and avoidance, which must be raised by the defendant. See generally 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 202 (1981). As a rule it is not an available defense to an offense which involves violent conduct; one cannot be heard that he was weak enough to agree to another’s injury. However, it exists for most other offenses. Its shortest definition of policy is that one ought not be induced or encouraged to do what he did not himself conceive or originate: there is enough crime without suggesting more to otherwise innocent persons merely to test their resistance to temptation.
The defense has been recognized and refined in many decisions by the federal judiciary. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). However, the defense is not of constitutional dimension. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at 433, 93 S.Ct. at 1643. Accordingly, policy choices regarding the defense and the standards governing entrapment are left to state judiciaries and legislatures. See State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 435 A.2d 517 (1981).
The availability of the defense functions as a restraint on law enforcement officials in that it prohibits them from instigating the commission of criminal acts by otherwise innocent persons. Russell, supra, 411 U.S. at 423, 93 S.Ct. *315at 1639. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa.Super. 303, 363 A.2d 1281 (1976). As a result it places the conduct of the police at issue. Immoral and or illegal police conduct is that at which the defense is directed. Although artifice and deceit in some measure are recognized as the only practical means of apprehending criminals in certain circumstances, the distinction between conduct that constitutes entrapment and that which does not lies in whether the conduct in question merely provided an opportunity to the defendant, as opposed to providing inducement to commit the act.1 Russell, supra; Sherman, supra; Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa.Super. 38, 57 (1910); 21 Am.Jur.2d, supra, § 202.
Jurisdictions are sharply divided over the elements that constitute the defense. The minority of jurisdictions, reasoning that the purpose of the defense of entrapment is to deter misconduct by the police, focus solely on whether the conduct of the law enforcement authorities was such as would have induced the commission of the crime by an ordinary law abiding citizen. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); People v. Barraza, 23 Cal.3d 675, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947 (1979); State v. Anderson, 59 Hawaii 479, 572 P.2d 159 (1977); State v. Cooper, 248 N.W.2d 908 (Iowa 1976); People v. D’Angelo, 401 Mich. 167, 257 N.W.2d 655 (1977); State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.1978); State v. Wilkins, 144 Vt. 22, 473 A.2d 295 (1983). The defendant’s character, predisposition and his conceded factual guilt are considered irrelevant to this analysis, because as a matter of policy the law will not countenance the manufacture of crime by the police. This analysis has been referred to as the objective test. See *316Sherman, supra, 356 U.S. at 380, 78 S.Ct. at 824-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
On the other hand, the majority of jurisdictions focus on two elements: whether egregious conduct of the police or their agent induced the criminal conduct; and whether the defendant was not otherwise predisposed to engage in that criminal conduct. See Sorrells, supra; Sherman, supra; Russell, supra; Hampton, supra; Matthews, supra. See also State v. Mendoza, 109 Ariz. 445, 511 P.2d 627 (1973); Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062 (Colo.1981); State v. Whitney, 157 Conn. 133, 249 A.2d 238 (1968); State v. Lopez, 522 So.2d 537 (Fla.1988); State v. Royal, 247 Ga. 309, 275 S.E.2d 646, on remand 158 Ga.App. 405, 280 S.E.2d 427 (1981); People v. Thornton, 125 Ill.App.3d 316, 80 Ill.Dec. 703, 465 N.E.2d 1049 (1984); Maynard v. State, 174 Ind.App. 202, 367 N.E.2d 5 (1977); State v. Batiste, 363 So.2d 639 (La.1978); Comm. v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969); Simmons v. State, 8 Md.App. 355, 259 A.2d 814 (1969); State v. McCrillis, 376 A.2d 95 (Me.1977); State v. Ford, 276 N.W.2d 178 (Minn.1979); Ervin v. State, 431 So.2d 130 (Miss.1983); State v. Hartman, 49 N.C.App. 83, 270 S.E.2d 609 (1980); State v. Parks, 212 Neb. 635, 324 N.W.2d 673 (1982); Hill v. State, 95 Nev. 327, 594 P.2d 699 (1979); State v. Hogervorst, 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828 (1977) cert. den’d, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977); People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430, 282 N.E.2d 322 (1972); Lee v. State, 655 P.2d 1046 (Okla.1982); State v. Murphy, 21 Or.App. 630, 535 P.2d 779 (1975); State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676 (R.I.1980); State v. Nelsen, 89 S.D. 1, 228 N.W.2d 143 (1975); State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn.1980); Altman v. State, 666 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.1983); State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975); Dorchincoz v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 33, 59 S.E.2d 863 (1950); State v. Smith, 93 Wash.2d 329, 610 P.2d 869 (1980), cert. den’d, 449 U.S. 873, 101 S.Ct. 213, 66 L.Ed.2d 93 (1980). See also 52 A.L.R. 4th 775. Since this test requires an inquiry into the predisposition of the defendant, it has been termed the subjective test.
*317In summary, the objective test focuses not on whether one is otherwise disposed to commit the offense, but on the conduct of the police authorities: specifically, whether the inducement offered was such that it would overpower the resistance of the hypothetical reasonable man. If found to be so, the person subjected to the inducement was entrapped, notwithstanding that he may have been more than willing to commit the crime. On the other hand the subjective test focuses on two elements: whether the inducement was an intolerable temptation, and whether it was practiced upon one not disposed to commit the proposed offense.
In 1959 the drafters of the Model Penal Code proposed two different formulations of the defense:
Section 2.10 Entrapment (1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense he solicits, encourages, or otherwise induces another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense when he is not then otherwise disposed to do so.
Alternative formulation of Subsection (1)
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he solicits or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves that his conduct occurred in response to an entrap*318ment [the issue of entrapment Shall be tried by the court in the absence of the jury].
(3) The defense afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for a crime involving conduct causing or threatening bodily injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (Tent.Draft No. 9, 1959). The American Law Institute subsequently adopted and endorsed the alternate formulation, which is generally considered as a statement of the objective test. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Final Draft, 1962).
As noted by the majority, in 1973 this formulation, with minor modification, was incorporated into our Crimes Code by the General Assembly. The text of our entrapment defense provides:
(a) General Rule. — A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either:
(1) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(b) Burden of proof. — Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.
(c) Exception. — The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a *319person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
18 Pa.C.S. § 313.2
Arguably, the General Assembly’s adoptions of the Model Penal Code’s alternative formulation, which is generally considered to embody the objective test, would indicate that the legislature intended the objective standard to be employed in Pennsylvania. Appellees, Clapps and Weiskerger, have basically argued that the entrapment defense, as codified in section 313, constitutes an unambiguous statement of that standard. However, upon closer examination I believe a different criterion was intended.
Bearing in mind that the objective test looks only to the conduct of the police, while the subjective test looks to both the police conduct and the defendant’s predisposition, one must examine the statutory language to see if one or two elements are stated.
Subsection (a) of section 313 provides in relevant part that a police officer “perpetrates an entrapment if for purposes of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense____” 18 Pa.C.S. § 313(a). Without question this section focuses solely on the actions of the police, and if this were the sole reference to establishing the defense I would agree that only one factor was relevant. However, subsection (b) of section 313, which defines the defendant’s burden of proof, states:
“a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.”
18 Pa.C.S. § 313(b) (emphasis added).
This language is contrary to a pure objective view in that it requires the defendant to show that his conduct was not self-motivated. This, in effect, requires the defendant to *320place his own conduct in issue. Therefore, according to the statute, a defendant must show that he was solicited or encouraged by the police and that but for the encouragement he would not have committed the offense with which he is charged. This is decidedly different from merely focusing on the actions of the police.
I fully recognize what is involved in an objective test. Also, I acknowledge that the commentators seem to agree that the Model Penal Code sought to announce an objective standard of entrapment. However, I do not believe that their formulation of an objective standard was without ambiguity. A true objective test would not have stated the burden of proof in terms of the subjective response of the individual who seeks to raise the defense. Therefore, because the statute is not explicit, a resort to statutory construction is mandated.3
The Statutory Construction Act of 19724 provides that the object of all interpretation and construction is to ascertain the intention of the General Assembly, and that statutes shall be construed if possible to give effect to all their provisions. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In ascertaining legislative intent we must first look to the words of the statute. However, where, as here, the words do not explicitly convey the intent, we may consider other factors such as: the circumstances under which the statute was enacted; the object to be attained by its enactment; the former law upon the same subject; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and the contemporaneous legislative history. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c). Finally, as an aid in construing statutes we are permitted to make certain presumptions, among them is *321the presumption that the General Assembly intended the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922.
Turning now to section 313, it is important to bear in mind that it was adopted as part of the codification of the entire criminal law of Pennsylvania. One of the purposes of the legislature in adopting the Crimes Code was to make certain the definition of what conduct would constitute an offense. There is no statement in the Crimes Code that the legislature intended its adoption as a sweeping change of the definition of crimes and/or defenses. Rather, the overriding tone of the stated purposes of the legislature was to clarify the law, and to more clearly define the conduct which merits the imposition of punishment. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 104(3); (4); (5).
In the area of entrapment, prior to the adoption of the Crimes Code, the law of this Commonwealth utilized the subjective analysis of the defense. See Commonwealth v. Klein, 222 Pa.Super. 409, 294 A.2d 815 (1972); Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa.Super. 97, 173 A.2d 776 (1961); Commonwealth v. Werner, 188 Pa.Super. 509, 149 A.2d 509 (1959); Commonwealth v. Kutler, 173 Pa.Super. 153, 96 A.2d 160 (1953); Wasson, supra. Prior to the adoption of the entrapment section here at issue it was reviewed by the Joint State Government Commission, which was an ad hoc body comprised of various members of both houses of the legislature for the purpose of making recommendations on the various sections of the proposed Code. The Commission’s comments in proposing adoption of section 313 are illuminating:
This section is derived from Section 2.13 of the Model Penal Code and is generally in accord with existing law.
Existing law of entrapment is set forth in Commonwealth v. Conway, 196 Pa.Superior Ct. 97 [173 A.2d 776] (sic) (1961), where the court briefly discussed the Model Penal Code provision and concluded at page 103 [173 A.2d 776]:
“The defense of entrapment in Pennsylvania, as derived from our cases in the light of the other authori*322ties just mentioned, arises only when a law enforcement officer, by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that persons not otherwise ready to commit the criminal act will do so, actually induces such a person to commit the act.” The court went on to say that the defense is available where there is a defendant not disposed to commit the crime and “police conduct likely to entrap the innocently disposed.” Under Pennsylvania law, the defense is submitted to the jury when the foregoing elements are present. Commonwealth v. Conway, supra, (sic)
Joint State Government Commission Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania, § 213 Comment, at 51 (1967) (emphasis added).
Given the state of our law at the time of the adoption of the Crimes Code, and the Commission’s evaluation of the content of MPC section 2.13, I believe that in adopting section 313 our General Assembly did not intend to change prior law, but merely intended a codification of that prior law.5 Since that prior law unquestionably embodied the subjective test, and the jury instructions in this case were consistent with that prior law, the chosen instructions were technically correct.
Nevertheless, despite my disagreement with the majority analysis, I agree with the decision to grant a new trial. My *323concurrence in the grant of a new trial is based on the fact that the trial judge’s instructions, though correct in my view, were nonetheless contrary to the extant law of entrapment. See Commonwealth v. Jones, supra; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 299 Pa.Super. 113, 445 A.2d 174 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 289 Pa.Super. 163, 432 A.2d 1103 (1981); Commonwealth v. Danko, 281 Pa.Super. 97, 421 A.2d 1165 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 264 Pa.Super. 515, 400 A.2d 204 (1979); Commonwealth v. Manley, 252 Pa.Super. 77, 380 A.2d 1290 (1977); Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 243 Pa.Super. 522, 532-3, n. 8, 366 A.2d 276, 281 n. 8 (1976).
In our hierarchical scheme of courts, the courts of common pleas are bound by the Superior Court’s interpretation of the law when there is no Supreme Court statement on the issue. Assuming the existence of relevant appellate authority the courts of common pleas are not free to interpret the law independently. They must follow the law as announced by the appellate courts. Thus, the appellees and their attorneys were entitled to rely on the existing state of the law in formulating their defense.6 However, since the trial judge misconceived the existing appellate authority the trial was marred, and a new trial is warranted.7
NIX, C.J., joins this concurring opinion.

. For example, persistent resorts to sympathy directed at a recovering drug addict, which overcame the defendant’s initial refusal to procure drugs for a government informant was enough to make out entrapment. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). On the other hand, where an agent provided the defendant with some of the raw material for the production of methamphetamine and eventually received some of the product, his conduct was not enough to constitute entrapment. Russell, 411 U.S. at 423, 93 S.Ct. at 1639.

. Act of December 6, P.L. 1482, No. 334 § 1, effective June 6, 1973.

. Interestingly, the majority does not seem convinced that the statute is unambiguous since their ultimate conclusion is that ‘‘[t]he Superior Court’s unambiguous interpretation of section 313 is a legitimate legislative construction'' P. 14. This conclusion admits of the existence of another "legitimate legislative construction," and in such a case we are duty bound to ascertain the true legislative intent.

. Statutory Construction Act of 1972. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, No. 290, § 3.

. This view was apparently taken by the Superior Court in the early challenges to this statute. See Commonwealth v. Proietto, 241 Pa.Super. 385, 361 A.2d 712 (1976); Commonwealth v. Mott, 234 Pa.Super. 52, 334 A.2d 771 (1975). See also George, Entrapment: The Myth of the Model Penal Code in Pennsylvania, 86 Dick.L.R. 115 (1981).
Then, in 1976, the Superior Court augured a change in its view, and in the case of Commonwealth v. Jones, 242 Pa.Super. 303, 310-11, 363 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1976), the court began to embrace the objective analysis of the entrapment defense. With occasional exceptions, most notably Commonwealth v. Clawson, 250 Pa.Super. 422, 378 A.2d 1008 (1977) , and Commonwealth v. Lee, 262 Pa.Super. 218, 396 A.2d 724 (1978) , the Superior Court has applied the objective analysis since that time. See e.g. Commonwealth v. McGuire, 339 Pa.Super. 320, 488 A.2d 1144 (1985); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 335 Pa.Super. 332, 484 A.2d 159 (1984).

. I note that both appellees declined to take the witness stand, decisions entirely consistent with the rule of the cases cited: Since the objective inquiry was limited to the behavior of the police, appellee’s predispositions were irrelevant. However, when the trial court, subsequent to the close of the parties’ cases, gave an instruction requiring a factual determination on their predispositions their reliance on the law was ill-placed. Thus they were denied the opportunity to conform their defenses to the charges which the jury eventually received. Under the facts of this case that sequence arguably denied them the chance to enter evidence on the issue which was to prove determinative of their entrapment claims. They were, in effect, entrapped by the ambiguous state of the extant law of entrapment.

. Regarding the additional issues which are present in this appeal, I agree with the majority’s analysis.