Court Opinion

ID: 9940926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:14:19.391788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:02.715783
License: Public Domain

J-S40004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    ANDREW FERRERIA                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    WEST GERMAN MOTOR IMPORTS,                 :   No. 744 EDA 2023
    GLENROY HENDRICKS, AND JOSE                :
    ROMAN                                      :

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 2019-03182

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2024

       Appellant Andrew Ferreria appeals from the order entering judgment on

the pleadings in favor of West German Motor Imports (Appellee).1 Appellant

argues that the trial court erred in finding that Appellee was immune from suit

under the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA).2 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this matter as follows:

       [Appellant] was employed by [Appellee] as an automobile
       detailer. On March 23, 2017, co-defendants, Glenroy Hendricks
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant’s claims involving Glenroy Hendricks and Jose Roman were
resolved and dismissed following arbitration. See Trial Ct. Order, 5/5/23.

2Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1–1041.4, 2501–
2710.
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      and Jose Roman, who were also employed by [Appellee],
      physically attacked [Appellant]. As a result, [Appellant] sustained
      bodily injuries. [Appellant] filed a complaint against [Appellee]
      for negligence. Specifically, [Appellant] alleged that [Appellee]
      was negligent in allowing the co-defendants [Hendricks and
      Roman] to work in the vicinity of [Appellant, and that] Hendricks
      and Roman exhibited behavioral problems before the incident.
      [Co-defendants Hendricks and Roman] allegedly destroyed
      property and used derogatory racial and ethnic terms and
      exhibited poor anger management.

      [Appellant] alleged that [Appellee] was negligent by failing to
      timely intervene while the incident was in progress. [Appellant
      claimed that h]ad [Appellee] taken action sooner, the incident
      could have been prevented and because of [Appellee’s] inaction,
      [Appellant] sustained injuries. On July 24, 2020, . . . [Appellee]
      filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings arguing that
      [Appellant’s] claimed injury and negligence against [Appellee] was
      barred under the exclusive remedy provision of the [WCA].

      In [Appellant’s] memorandum of law in opposition [to Appellee’s]
      motion for judgment on the pleadings, [Appellant] argued that the
      motion should be denied because there is an issue of material fact
      that needs to be determined by the court. [Appellant] noted that
      the [WCA] is the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained in the
      workplace. However, [Appellant] argued that this case falls under
      the “personal animus” exception, which states that injuries that
      arise from personal conduct at the workplace are not compensable
      under the WCA. For the exception to apply, the assailant must
      have intended to inflict the injury for personal reasons unrelated
      to his employment.

      [Appellant] argued that the motivation of the two co-defendants
      was a question of fact that had to be determined by the trier of
      fact. In turn, [Appellee] filed a reply brief which argued that there
      was no issue of material fact because [Appellant’s] amended
      complaint failed to plead facts that would show animosity between
      [Appellant] and co-defendants. None of the allegations alleged
      established that the attack was for personal reasons. This court
      agreed and issued the order granting [Appellee’s] motion on
      September 28, 2020.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/23, at 1-2 (formatting altered and citations omitted).

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      The claims against the remaining defendants, Hendricks and Roman,

proceeded to arbitration. Appellant subsequently reached an agreement with

Hendricks and Roman and dismissed them from this matter.

      On March 7, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal challenging the

order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

      Did the [trial court] abuse [its] discretion or commit an error of
      law when [it] applied workers compensation immunity that was
      not caused in the course and scope of Appellant’s employment[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      Initially, we must address whether Appellant’s appeal from the order

granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee was timely.        See

Porter v. Nikita Lodging, Inc., 274 A.3d 1272, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2022). As

noted previously, on March 7, 2023, Appellant filed an appeal from the order

granting Appellee’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On April 25, 2023,

this Court ordered Appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be

dismissed because the docket did not reflect confirmation of the arbitration

award and entry of final judgment. Appellant filed a response stating that

following arbitration, judgment was entered on the trial court docket on May

5, 2023, confirming the arbitration award and dismissing the claims against

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Roman and Hendricks.           See Appellant’s Resp., 5/9/23; Trial Ct. Order,

5/5/23.3 This Court discharged the show-cause order on May 12, 2023.

       Because the September 28, 2020 order granting Appellee’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings did not dispose of all claims and all parties, it was

not a final appealable order. See Dahl v. AmeriQuest Mortg. Co., 954 A.2d

588, 592 (Pa. Super. 2008). It was not until the arbitration order involving

Roman and Hendricks and final judgment was entered on May 5, 2023, that

the underlying order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee

became final and appealable. See Dahl, 954 A.2d at 592 (holding that an

appeal was proper after the entry of judgment on the arbitration award); Seay

v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 543 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa. Super.

1988); see also Burkey v. CCX, Inc., 106 A.3d 736, 738 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(noting that “interlocutory orders dismissing various parties piecemeal” are

not appealable until the matter concluded as to final remaining party).

       We conclude that the May 5, 2023 order, which confirmed judgment on

the arbitration award, made final and appealable the prior order granting

judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellee. See Dahl, 954 A.2d at 592.

On this record, we deem Appellant’s premature March 7, 2023 appeal as

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that after the arbitration agreement and order were filed

on May 5, 2023, Appellant stipulated that Hendricks and Jose Roman were
dismissed from the case, and the trial court approved the stipulation.
Stipulation, 5/5/23; Trial Ct. Order, 5/8/23.

                                           -4-
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timely filed, and we conclude that jurisdiction is properly before this Court.4

See id.; see also Gruca v. Clearbrook Cmty. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 286 A.3d

1273, 1277 n.12 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting that although the notice of appeal

was premature and filed prior to the entry of judgment, the appeal was

deemed timely and related forward to the date judgment was entered);

Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (stating that “[a] notice of appeal filed after the

announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order

shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof”).5

       As noted, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that

his claims against Appellee were barred by the WCA. Appellant’s Brief at 7.

Specifically, Appellant argues that “personal animus” exception should apply

____________________________________________

4 The trial court opined that Appellant’s March 7, 2023 notice of appeal was

untimely because Appellant purported to challenge the order entered on the
September 28, 2020. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/3/23, at 3. Accordingly, the trial
court did not address the issues raised in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement. See id. As stated above, we conclude that Appellant’s appeal was
timely filed, and the absence of a trial court opinion on this issue does not
hinder our review.

5 We note that after the entry of judgment on the arbitration award on May 5,

2023, Appellant filed a second notice of appeal. The trial court again directed
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the trial court filed a
second Rule 1925(a) opinion. See Notice of Appeal, 5/17/23; Rule 1925(b)
Order, 5/17/23. In that Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court again concluded
that Appellant’s appeal was untimely. See Second Trial Ct. Op., 6/21/23, at
3. Appellant’s second appeal was docketed at Superior Court docket 1375
EDA 2023. However, the appeal at 1375 EDA 2023 was dismissed as
duplicative of the instant appeal at 744 EDA 2023. See Order, 1375 EDA
2023, 8/22/23.

                                           -5-
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and asserts that his injuries are not compensable under the WCA. See id. at

8-10.

        Appellee responds that the trial court correctly granted judgment on the

pleadings.     See Appellee’s Brief at 13.     Appellee argues that although

Appellant asserted that he was injured when two co-workers assaulted him,

Appellant did not plead or demonstrate that the attack was for personal

reasons unrelated to employment and that the co-workers possessed a pre-

existing personal animosity toward Appellant necessary to satisfy an exception

to the exclusivity of the WCA. See id. at 8-13.

        Our standard of review of the trial court’s order granting judgment on

the pleadings is de novo. Grabowski v. Carelink Cmty. Support Servs.,

Inc., 230 A.3d 465, 470 (Pa. Super. 2020). Further:

        Entry of judgment on the pleadings is permitted under
        Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034, which provides that
        “after the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to
        unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for judgment on
        the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). A motion for judgment on the
        pleadings is similar to a demurrer. It may be entered when there
        are no disputed issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to
        judgment as a matter of law.

        Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on
        the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same
        standard employed by the trial court. A trial court must confine
        its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The
        court must accept as true all well-pleaded statements of fact,
        admissions, and any documents properly attached to the
        pleadings presented by the party against whom the motion is filed,
        considering only those facts which were specifically admitted.

        We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving
        party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from
        doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.

                                      -6-
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Erie Ins. Exch. v. Backmeier, 287 A.3d 931, 935-36 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(some formatting altered and some citations omitted), appeal denied, 303

A.3d 421 (Pa. 2023).

      The WCA “makes an employer liable for paying the disability benefits

and medical expenses of an employee who sustains an injury in the course of

his or her employment. This liability attaches without regard to the employer’s

negligence.”   Whitmoyer v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

(Mountain Country Meats), 186 A.3d 947, 948 (Pa. 2018) (citing, inter alia,

77 P.S. §§ 431 (disability), 531 (medical)).     The WCA “generally bars all

common law suits against an employer, because the [WCA] is the exclusive

remedy for injuries sustained when an individual is acting within the scope of

his employment.” Neidert v. Charlie, 143 A.3d 384, 388 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citations omitted).

      “Accordingly, where an injury is covered by the WCA, workers’

compensation is the employee’s sole remedy against her employer and the

employee may not bring a tort action against [the] employer.” Grabowski,

230 A.3d at 471 (citations omitted).

      However,

      [t]he WCA excludes from its coverage injuries intentionally
      inflicted by third-parties for personal reasons that are unrelated
      to the employee’s employment. 77 P.S. § 411(1). Section
      301(c)(1) of the WCA provides in relevant part:

         The term “injury arising in the course of his employment,”
         as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by
         an act of a third person intended to injure the employe

                                       -7-
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          because of reasons personal to him, and not directed
          against him as an employe or because of his employment[.]

      77 P.S. § 411(1). Where an injury is excluded from workers’
      compensation coverage by this “personal animus” or “third party
      attack” exception, the employer is not immune from tort liability
      for the injury, but is also not liable for workers’ compensation
      benefits. Either an injury is work-related and the employee is
      entitled only to workers’ compensation or it falls within this
      exception and the employee’s sole remedy is a common law
      action; it cannot be both.

      If the employee was acting in the course of her employment when
      the injury occurred, the injury is presumed to be work-related and
      the burden is on the party asserting the personal animus/third
      party attack exception to prove that the exception applies and the
      injury is therefore not covered by the WCA.

Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 471 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered). “If the employee is simply an innocent victim of an attack, the attack

will be considered an unexpected happening that arose in the course of

employment that is covered by the WCA.” Id. at 474 (citation and quotation

marks omitted).

      After review, we discern no error in the trial court granting Appellee’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Erie Ins. Exch., 287 A.3d at

935-36.    In his amended complaint, Appellant asserted that while he was

working for Appellee, co-workers Roman and Hendricks physically attacked

him, and the attack caused him to sustain physical injuries, emotional injuries,

and financial damages. See Am. Compl., 5/6/19, at 3-5 (¶¶ 6-23), 5-7 (¶¶

24-41). Appellant also claimed that Appellee was negligent because Roman

and Hendricks allegedly had a propensity for fighting and violence, and

Appellee was negligent in permitting Roman and Hendricks to be in Appellant’s

                                     -8-
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vicinity. See id. at 7-9 (¶¶ 42-60). However, Appellant did not plead any

facts asserting that the attack was motivated by personal animosity that was

unrelated to his employment. As such, Appellant failed to satisfy the personal

animus exception to the exclusivity of the WCA. See Grabowski, 230 A.3d

at 475 (holding that the personal animus exception did not apply where the

plaintiff failed to allege any motivation for the attack in the pleadings and

judgment on the pleadings was proper based on WCA immunity); see also

Scantlin v. Ulrich, 465 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming judgment

on pleadings where the plaintiff asserted an intentional injury caused by co-

worker in the complaint but did not state that co-worker’s action was taken

because of personal animosity toward the plaintiff).

      For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm the order granting Appellee’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/15/2024

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