Court Opinion

ID: 9394183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 17:01:27.609565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.707959
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                   ________________

                                      No. 22-1830
                                   ________________

                           22ND CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

                                             v.

                                       ILABS, INC.,
                                             Appellant
                                     _____________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of New Jersey
                             (D.C. Civil No. 3-22-cv-00717)
                      District Judge: Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi
                                   ________________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on February 6, 2023

     Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

                                  (Filed: May 12, 2023)

                                   ________________

                                       OPINION*
                                   ________________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

         Government contractor 22nd Century Technologies obtained a preliminary

injunction barring iLabs, its subcontractor, from working on certain U.S. Department of

Agriculture projects for a year. iLabs contends granting the injunction was an abuse of the

District Court’s discretion because its contract agreement with 22nd Century Technologies

is unenforceable and because 22nd Century Technologies cannot show irreparable harm.

We find no abuse of discretion. The parties’ contract is likely enforceable and 22nd Century

Technologies has demonstrated continuing harm: the potential loss of future projects and

frustrated relationships with both its government client and other government contractors.

We will affirm.

                                                I.

         The parties are government contractors actively soliciting work from the Farm Loan

Program Group of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. As we write for the parties, we will

not discuss the intricacies of the Farm Loan Program Group’s contractor solicitation

practices or the projects on which the parties worked.

         22nd Century Technologies (“22nd Century”) engaged iLabs as a subcontractor after

the Farm Loan Program Group awarded 22nd Century a contract for a series of IT

modernization projects in 2015. The parties executed an agreement (“the Agreement”) that

included confidentiality, non-solicitation,1 and exclusivity provisions. iLabs continued

1
    The Agreement defines “solicitation” as follows:
         [iLabs] agrees not to solicit, directly or indirectly, [22nd Century] clients for
         business, during the term of this agreement and for a minimum of one (1) Years
         after the termination of this agreement. In addition, [iLabs] also agrees not to solicit

                                                 2
working for 22nd Century under the Agreement after the series of projects concluded

because AttainX, 22nd Century’s business partner, was awarded a contract for related

projects. 22nd Century worked as AttainX’s subcontractor, and iLabs worked as 22nd

Century’s subcontractor. While work on these projects was underway, AttainX

unsuccessfully bid on a contract vehicle2 for additional related projects. The Farm Loan

Program Group awarded that contract vehicle to Creative Systems and Consulting

(“CSC”), a competitor.

       In 2021, CSC approached AttainX about the possibility of teaming up to prepare

bids for projects under the vehicle. CSC then approached iLabs with an offer to team up,

which iLabs accepted. iLabs, without 22nd Century’s knowledge, then helped CSC prepare

a successful bid. iLabs’ work for CSC on the bid included “read[ing] material scripted by

       directly or indirectly any business from companies (which includes the
       subcontracting company, with whom [22nd Century] has contracted, who directly
       placed the consultant at the client site as well as the direct client site companies as
       well as affiliates, subsidiaries, divisions, parent companies and [22nd Century’s] or
       subcontractors of these companies) which [22nd Century] has presented [iLabs]
       candidates during the term of this agreement and for a minimum of one (1) year
       after the termination of this agreement, irrespective of whether or not they are placed
       with said client. . . . The term client refers to the end client to whom [iLabs]
       personnel are going to provide services under this agreement . . . .
JA65 ¶ 5.
2
  A contract vehicle is a contract or group of contracts that a government agency uses to
pre-select vendors before soliciting bids for a particular product or service. A contractor
holding a contract vehicle is eligible to submit bids but is not guaranteed to be awarded a
contract. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Ways You Can Sell to
Government,        https://www.gsa.gov/sell-to-government/step-1-learn-about-government-
contracting/ways-you-can-sell-to-government#Contractvehicles (last updated Apr. 14,
2023).

                                              3
CSC to the potential government customer.” Appellant Br. 7. iLabs also recruited a 22nd

Century employee during the same time period.

       After the Agreement terminated in late January 2022, 22nd Century sued iLabs for

breach of contract, alleging that iLabs violated the Agreement’s confidentiality, non-

solicitation, and exclusivity provisions. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court

issued an injunction on the basis of the non-solicitation provision alone.3 The court found

that 22nd Century demonstrated irreparable harm in the form of lost client relations because

iLabs’ conduct would likely continue to harm its relationships with the Farm Loan Program

Group and other contractors. The court enjoined iLabs from working with CSC on projects

under CSC’s contract vehicle and from soliciting any other work from the Farm Loan

Program Group for a year, as measured from the termination of the parties’ Agreement.

The court ordered 22nd Century to post $750,000 as security. iLabs timely appealed.

                                              II.4
       Injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy.” Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v.

Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002)

3
  We focus on the non-solicitation provision as the District Court found that 22nd Century
did not make a sufficient showing that iLabs breached the agreement’s confidentiality and
exclusivity provisions.
4
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We review the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 85 v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 39 F.4th
95, 102 (3d Cir. 2022). In practice, this is a “‘tripartite standard of review’: findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the decision to
grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Del. Strong Families v.
Att’y Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono
Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3rd Cir. 2013)).

                                               4
(citation omitted). We have repeatedly held that a district court must weigh four factors

when considering a request for a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant has a

reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether irreparable harm would result

if the relief sought is not granted; (3) whether the relief would result in greater harm to the

non-moving party[;] and (4) whether the relief is in the public interest.” Amalgamated

Transit Union Local 85 v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 39 F.4th 95, 102–03 (3rd Cir. 2022)

(quoting Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 2002)). The first two factors

are the “most critical.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017)

(citation omitted). Only after the moving party makes a threshold showing that these two

factors are met will the district court determine “in its sound discretion if all four factors,

taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Greater

Phila. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Phila., 949 F.3d 116, 133 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation

omitted); see also ADP, LLC v. Rafferty, 923 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2019).

                                              A.

         We consider each of the factors in turn. First, a plaintiff must show “a reasonable

chance, or probability, of winning.” In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2015)

(citation omitted). A reasonable chance is “not necessarily more likely than not.” Reilly,

858 F.3d at 179; see also id. at 179 n.3. But plaintiffs must still demonstrate that they would

be able to prove each element of their claims. See Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 588 (3d

Cir. 1980) (observing that moving parties need not place their right to receive a preliminary

injunction beyond all doubt but still must carry their burden of establishing a prima facie

case).

                                              5
       A breach of contract claim requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of “a valid

contract, defective performance by the defendant, and resulting damages.” Globe Motor

Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016) (quoting Coyle v. Englander’s, 488 A.2d 1083,

1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)). We agree with the District Court that iLabs likely

breached the non-solicitation provision of its agreement with 22nd Century. The provision

bars iLabs from directly or indirectly soliciting (1) 22nd Century’s clients and (2) companies

that 22nd Century sent iLabs employees to as consultants, regardless of whether the

employees ever performed work for those companies, for “a minimum” of one year after

the end of the Agreement. JA65.

       There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that iLabs directly

solicited the Farm Loan Program Group, 22nd Century’s end client, as well as AttainX, 22nd

Century’s business partner and prime contractor.5 The relationship between 22nd Century

and iLabs ended on Friday, January 28, 2022. iLabs entered into a teaming agreement with

CSC in August 2021 and began helping CSC prepare its bid on January 31, 2022—the

Monday after its relationship with 22nd Century ended. iLabs also hired a former 22nd

Century employee on January 31, 2022. iLabs expressed an intent to continue working with

CSC on bids for Farm Loan Program Group projects. iLabs did not inform 22nd Century of

5
  Prime contractors are general contractors—they contract directly with the government
and manage subcontractors, who do not contract directly with the government. Some
government contracts require prime contractors to subcontract to small businesses. U.S.
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Prime and Subcontracting,
https://www.sba.gov/federal-contracting/contracting-guide/prime-subcontracting#:~:
text=Prime%20contractors%20work%20directly%20with,for%20Award%20Managemen
t%20(SAM) (last visited May 3, 2023).

                                              6
its relationship with CSC because it had signed a non-disclosure agreement. In addition, an

iLabs employee solicited AttainX, 22nd Century’s business partner, via texts and phone

calls in January 2022. Based on this evidence, 22nd Century could demonstrate that iLabs

breached the non-solicitation provision.

      iLabs argues that 22nd Century has no chance of prevailing on the merits because

the non-solicitation provision is unenforceable. Under New Jersey law, which governs the

parties’ contract, restrictive covenants such as the non-solicitation provision are

enforceable to the extent necessary to “protect [the employer’s] legitimate interests”

without causing “undue hardship on the defendant” or “impair[ing] the public interest.”

Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 61 (N.J. 1970); Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. Doyle,

274 A.2d 577, 581 (N.J. 1971). A restrictive covenant is unreasonable if it hinders

competition more than it protects legitimate business interests. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.

Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 895 (N.J. 1988).

      Protecting customer relationships is a legitimate business interest. Ingersoll-Rand

Co., 542 A.2d at 888 (“Solari and Whitmyer both recognize as legitimate the employer’s

interest in protecting trade secrets, confidential information, and customer relations.”).

Protecting customer relationships includes preventing disintermediation—i.e., customers

cutting out a middleman or subcontractor. See HR Staffing Consultants LLC v. Butts, 627

F. App’x 168, 172 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining how preventing disintermediation is a

form of protecting customer relations and citing Ingersoll-Rand). Government contractors

must make a more detailed showing of a need for protection than is generally required

because of the transparent character of the government contracting industry. The entire

                                            7
industry is “fully aware when public work is available” and government agencies generally

choose contractors based on “price rather than personal consideration.” Whitmyer Bros.,

274 A.2d at 583.

       iLabs understands Whitmyer Bros. to hold that government contractors, because of

the transparent nature of their industry, cannot claim protecting customer relationships as

a legitimate business interest unless they also identify a threat to their trade secrets or

confidential information. This bright line rule is not explicitly stated in the opinion. The

New Jersey Supreme Court mentions only that Whitmyer Bros. “may have legitimate

interests in protecting its customer relationships” before describing the transparent nature

of the government contracting industry and concluding that the defendant employee was

unlikely to “be in any position to harm the plaintiff’s relationships with the governmental

entities or with prime contractors doing work for them.” Id. at 583–84. We cannot find,

and iLabs does not offer, any cases interpreting Whitmyer Bros. as putting forth a bright-

line rule.

       New Jersey courts have embraced a flexible and case-specific approach to restrictive

covenants. Where possible, a court will tailor an overbroad covenant rather than

invalidating it. ADP, 923 F.3d at 122; see also id. at 120 (describing New Jersey courts

applying the Solari/Whitmyer test as “eschewing a dichotomous choice between

enforcement and invalidation”). There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that a

                                             8
court would decline to tailor the non-solicitation provision and instead declare it

unenforceable.6

       iLabs’ own description of its efforts to help CSC prepare a bid suggests government

contractors “expend great energy and money in soliciting clients and developing projects

for their benefit.” A.T. Hudson & Co. v. Donovan, 524 A.2d 412, 416 (N.J. Super. App.

Div. 1987). Because the industry is transparent and government agencies usually make

decisions based on price alone, Whitmyer Bros., 274 A.2d at 583, contractors cannot hope

to develop long-term exclusive relationships with their government customers. They may

rely on reputation or goodwill to maintain such relationships with other contractors, but

these relationships, too, may ebb and flow in response to government customer needs.

Accordingly, a government contractor may not be able to claim an interest in protecting

customer relationships on the ground it successfully bid on an agency project or

successfully teamed with another contractor in the past. But the lack of long-term

relationships in the industry means that shorter-term relationships—those associated with

ongoing or upcoming bids, projects, or teaming opportunities—are important to the

6
 The parties’ agreement includes the following severability provision:
      If any term or provision of this Agreement shall be found by a Court of competent
      jurisdiction to be illegal or otherwise unenforceable, the same shall that invalidate
      the whole of this Agreement but such term or provision shall be deemed modified
      to the extent necessary in the court’s opinion to render such term or provision
      enforceable and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and
      enforced accordingly, preserving to the fullest permissible extent the intent and
      agreements of the parties herein set forth.
JA66 ¶10.

                                            9
viability of a government contractor’s business and are “worthy of protection.” A.T.

Hudson & Co., 524 A.2d at 416.

       The record here is illustrative. 22nd Century first engaged iLabs as a subcontractor

on a project for which it was the prime contractor. iLabs then continued to work with 22nd

Century on separate, but related, bids and projects for which AttainX was the prime

contractor. iLabs now declares an intention to continue working with CSC on additional

bids and projects. These continued collaborations on work for a single end client strongly

suggest that the maintenance of customer relationships is valued in the government

contracting industry, even if those relationships are shorter-term than in other industries. If

they were not so valued, CSC would have had little incentive to request that iLabs sign a

non-disclosure agreement.

       Accordingly, a court considering the parties’ non-solicitation provision is unlikely

to find it unenforceable. Instead, a court would likely tailor it, as the District Court tailored

the preliminary injunction, to cover only 22nd Century’s customers with whom iLabs was

in contact. See ADP, LLC, 923 F.3d at 122 (“[I]f a restrictive covenant seeks to protect

client relationships, [New Jersey] courts have narrowed the covenant to clients with which

the employee interfaced.”). iLabs had direct contact with the Farm Loan Program Group

while working for both 22nd Century and CSC. For 22nd Century, iLabs “maintain[ed] the

currently operating USDA systems.” Appellant Br. 5. For CSC, iLabs “provid[ed] a high

level overview of the company” and had an employee “read material scripted by CSC” to

the Farm Loan Program Group during the bidding process. Id. at 7.

                                               10
       A court would likely find that the tailored non-solicitation provision is enforceable

because iLabs’ conduct put it in a “position to harm” 22nd Century’s relationships with the

Farm Loan Program Group and other government contractors. See Whitmyer Bros., 274

A.2d at 583. The government contracting industry may be transparent, but iLabs’ conduct

was not. iLabs, while still under contract with 22nd Century, teamed up with 22nd Century’s

competitor (and possible collaborator) without 22nd Century’s knowledge to solicit 22nd

Century’s current client. As the District Court pointed out, “iLabs eliminated one layer of

subcontract by dealing directly with [CSC].” JA18; see Butts, 627 F. App’x at 172

(identifying disintermediation as a form of interference with customer relations). Even if

22nd Century would not have chosen to team up with CSC, iLabs’ intent to continue

working with CSC at minimum prevents 22nd Century from enjoying the “open and even

playing field” iLabs suggests is characteristic of the government contracting industry.

Reply Br. 14. 22nd Century will likely be able to show harm in the form of lost teaming,

bidding, and project opportunities flowing from iLabs’ conduct.

       As the party moving for a preliminary injunction, 22nd Century does not have to

show a certainty of success on the merits—just a reasonable chance. 22nd Century has made

that showing.

                                            B.

       In addition to showing a reasonable chance of success on the merits, a plaintiff

seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm in

the absence of the injunction. Irreparable harm is “not merely serious or substantial”—it is

an injury that monetary compensation cannot cure. Siemens U.S. Holdings Inc. v.

                                            11
Geisenberger, 17 F.4th 393, 407–08 (3d. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Campbell

Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must

demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy

following a trial.”) (citation omitted). The harm must be “immediate” or a “presently

existing actual threat.” Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d

Cir. 1980) (cleaned up). This Court has long recognized that a preliminary injunction is

appropriate when a plaintiff’s injury is compensable by monetary damages but the amount

of those damages is difficult to prove with reasonable certainty. See Apollo Techs. Corp. v.

Centrosphere Indus. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157, 1210 (D.N.J. 1992) (collecting Third

Circuit opinions). “Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of control of reputation, loss

of trade, and loss of goodwill.” Pappan Enters., Inc. v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 143 F.3d

800, 805 (3d Cir. 1998).

       As noted above, 22nd Century has made a sufficient showing of harm flowing from

iLabs’ breach of the non-solicitation provision of their Agreement. It stood to lose teaming,

bidding, and project opportunities when iLabs accepted CSC’s offer, and it will continue

to do so as long as iLabs continues to work with CSC. 22nd Century’s losses are not

speculative, as both 22nd Century and iLabs intend to bid on upcoming Farm Loan Program

Group projects.

       The existence of actual harm is not hard to discern here—iLabs admits 22nd Century

could be entitled to damages should the court find iLabs in breach. But calculation of some

of 22nd Century’s damages will be difficult. At stake here is not only work from the Farm

Loan Program Group, the value of which is easily expressed in monetary terms, but also

                                             12
22nd Century’s reputation and goodwill, which are not. Because other contractors are also

competing for work, it will be challenging for 22nd Century to show what projects it may

have been awarded, or what it would have bid, in the absence of iLabs’ collaboration with

CSC. See Laidlaw, Inc. v. Student Transp. Am., 20 F. Supp. 2d 727, 767 (D.N.J. 1998)

(finding, in a case involving contractors submitting bids to a New Jersey agency,

irreparable harm because it was “impossible to calculate” the impact of defendant’s

interference on plaintiff’s contract awards and bidding practices).

As a result, 22nd Century can demonstrate irreparable harm.7

                                             C.

       The final two factors—whether the relief would result in greater harm to the non-

moving party and whether the relief is in the public interest—also weigh in favor of a

preliminary injunction here. iLabs does not seriously contest either factor individually, so

we take it that iLabs believes the District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering

either one.

7
   iLabs contends any harm 22nd Century has suffered is not irreparable because 22nd
Century did not file this case for six months and has no reasonable explanation for the
delay. The record shows that the parties attempted to resolve this matter out of court after
22nd Century sent iLabs a demand letter in November 2021. There is no requirement that a
plaintiff forego extrajudicial attempts to resolve a dispute in order to move for a
preliminary injunction. We do not, however, credit 22nd Century’s statement that it timed
its filings deliberately to protect the interests of its government client. 22nd Century and
AttainX filed suit against CSC and iLabs in the District of Maryland on January 4, 2022.
22nd Century and iLabs’ business relationship was not terminated until late January. The
Maryland case was voluntarily dismissed on February 1—a day before 22nd Century filed
this case in New Jersey state court. Regardless of 22nd Century’s reasons for its filing
decisions, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 22nd Century was dilatory in
pursuing relief.

                                             13
       First, a preliminary injunction would not result in greater harm to iLabs than the

harm it would prevent for 22nd Century. As the District Court found, iLabs’ harm is self-

inflicted. Instead of waiting a year or notifying 22nd Century of its intention to seek other

work, iLabs secretly teamed up with 22nd Century’s competitor. Harm resulting from the

willful breach of a valid restrictive covenant is not the sort of harm the law seeks to protect

against. Laidlaw, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 768; see also Pappan Enters., 143 F.3d at 806 (finding

the “self-inflicted nature of any harm suffered . . . weighs in favor of granting preliminary

injunctive relief”). And the harm iLabs would suffer if enjoined is minimal. It will still be

able to work with other contractors on bids and projects for other U.S. Department of

Agriculture groups—iLabs will only be unable to solicit the Farm Loan Program Group

and work with CSC, and it will only be enjoined from those endeavors for a year. Second,

again as the District Court found, enforcing restrictive covenants that balance the interests

of the parties involved is in the public interest.

                                              III.

       The District Court’s consideration of these factors and ultimate conclusion did not

“rest[] on an incorrect legal standard, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or a

misapplication of the law to the facts.” TD Bank NA v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir.

2019). 22nd Century has demonstrated a strong probability of success on the merits and that

it stands to suffer irreparable harm to its client relationships if iLabs is not enjoined. As

iLabs only stands to suffer self-inflicted harm, any injury an injunction would cause is

outweighed by the benefit to 22nd Century. In addition, it is in the public’s interest to

incentivize compliance with narrowly tailored restrictive covenants protecting legitimate

                                               14
business interests, such as the non-solicitation provision at issue here. Accordingly, the

District Court’s grant of 22nd Century’s preliminary injunction was not an abuse of

discretion, and we will AFFIRM the District Court.

                                           15