Court Opinion

ID: 9662432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:37.645646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.417081
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, C. J.
(dissenting). The first problem I find in the majority opinion is that it holds that there was no defect here as a matter of law. I would hold that this was a factual determination to be tried out by the trier of fact. There is a question here for the trier to determine whether the swimming pool (which did not have a self-latching and closing gate) was unavoidably unsafe as, for example, knives, baseball bats, alcohol, small foreign cars, and, therefore, not defective. Then, too, it would be a question of fact whether rendering the product safe by incorporating other safety features would destroy the usefulness of the product, or would be far too costly. On this the defective swimming pool manufacturer ¡would have the burden of proof.
The additional holding of the majority ruling out liability where the defect is obvious and apparent — as here *334—is really based upon the concept of assumption of risk which Dippel, supra, held was not an absolute bar to recovery but rather a matter of contributory negligence. I would, therefore, drop the requirement that a product must be affirmatively shown to be unreasonably dangerous and I would regard the introduction of this element as a factor of contributory negligence to be compared with the negligence on the part of the manufacturer.
The requirement of showing “unreasonable danger” was dropped by the California Supreme Court in the 1972 companion cases of Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp.1 and Luque v. McLean.2 In Cronin the court held that a plaintiff no longer need show that the product injuring him was unreasonably dangerous, but rather merely that it was defective. The court did not precisely define what the term “defective” standing alone is now to mean,3 but it did explain its reasons for abandoning the “unreasonable danger” limitation:
“. . . Prosser, the reporter for the Restatement, suggests that the ‘unreasonably dangerous’ qualification was *335added to foreclose the possibility that the manufacturer of a product with inherent possibilities for harm (for example, butter, drugs, whiskey and automobiles) would become ‘automatically responsible for all the harm that such things do in the world.’ (Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 Hastings L. J. (1966), 9, 23.)
“The result of the limitation, however, has. not been merely to prevent the seller from becoming an insurer of his products with respect to all harm generated by their use. Rather, it has burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element which rings of negligence. As a result, if, in the view of the trier of fact, the ‘ordinary consumer’ would have expected the defective condition of a product, the seller is not strictly liable regardless of the expectations of the injured plaintiff. If, for example, the ‘ordinary consumer’ would have contemplated that Shopsmiths posed a risk of loosening their grip and letting the wood strike the operator, another Greenman might be denied recovery. In fact, it has been observed that the Restatement formulation of strict liability in practice rarely leads to a different conclusion than would have been reached under laws of negligence. . . . Yet the very purpose of our pioneering efforts in this field was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence . . . and warranty . . . remedies, and thereby ‘to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
“. . . We think that a requirement that a plaintiff also prove that the defect made the product ‘unreasonably dangerous’ places upon him a significantly increased burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court.
“We recognize that the words ‘unreasonably dangerous’ may also serve the beneficial purpose of preventing the seller from being treated as the insurer of its products. However, we think that such protective end is attained by the necessity of proving that there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the product and that such defect was a proximate cause of the injuries. Although the seller should not be responsible for all injuries involving the use of its products, it should be liable for all *336injuries proximately caused by any of its products which are adjudged ‘defective.’ ”4
In Luque the court held that in strict liability cases the obviousness of the defect is not a bar to recovery, but that this factor could be an element of contributory negligence or unreasonable assumption of risk.
Thus, I would conclude that the obviousness of a defect is not a total bar to recovery, but merely a matter pertaining to contributory negligence.
There is an additional difficulty here that the small child is less than seven years of age and therefore incapable of negligence on his own. In swimming pools of this type, which are obviously intended for adult use, their use by children is anticipated but always under the immediate supervision of adults. In a products liability case, as here, I would therefore consider the negligence on the part of the parents for improper supervision as a matter of contributory negligence to be imputed to the child, and accordingly offset against the negligence of the manufacturer.
Further, the manufacturer here would still have the additional defense of showing that its negligence in producing a' defective product was not causal.
But in any event, the complaint does state a cause of action and the demurrer should have been overruled and the defendants ordered to answer.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Heffernan joins in this dissent.

 (1972), 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 Pac. 2d 1153.

 (1972), 8 Cal. 3d 136, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 Pac. 2d 1163.

 The court said in a footnote:
“We recognize, of course, the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defectiveness standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, ‘there is now a cluster of useful precedents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation of sales and warranty law.’ ...” 8 Cal. 3d at page 134, note 16.
See: Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971), 4 Cal. 3d 379, 383, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 482 Pac. 2d 681, where the court suggested two of the possible formulations: “. . . product . . . which fails to match the quality of most like products . . . : the lathe did not like other lathes have a proper fastening device, the brakes of the automobile went on unexpectedly, the drive shaft of a new car became disconnected;” “. . . unfit for its ordinary purpose . . . a test based on merchantability, a contract principle.” 4 Cal. 3d at pages 383, 384.

 8 Cal. 3d at pages 132-134.