Court Opinion

ID: 9735960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:37:54.314931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.070899
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor holding that as a matter of law the underlying tort claim by plaintiff against Dr. Miller must fail. That claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a finding that the conduct of Dr. Miller was outrageous. Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984). In ruling on the motion, the court is required to examine the evidence in its light most favorable to plaintiff in determining whether a jury question was engendered. Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 1981).
Plaintiff claims to be able to prove to a jury that Dr. Miller used his professional relationship as his wife’s dentist as a means to effect a seduction of her. He alleges Dr. Miller kissed and fondled her during dental examinations, arranged appointments for her when they would be alone in the office, and ultimately seduced her after delivering medicine to her home. The allegations are that he coerced her to continue the affair and remain silent about it by telling her she and the children would be hurt if they learned of it. Further allegations are that subtle threats occurred by Dr. Miller’s claiming he was a police com*580missioner, was connected with the fire department, and was important in various community organizations. Plaintiff claims Dr. Miller met his wife only because of the professional relationship as her dentist and used this relationship to maneuver her into having sexual relations with him.
It is for the court to determine in the first instance whether the relevant conduct may reasonably be regarded as outrageous. Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Iowa 1983). In making that determination, the court should consider the relationship between the parties:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position or a relation with the other which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other or power to effect his interest.
Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118.
Plaintiff alleges that the outrageous conduct arises from an abuse by Dr. Miller of his professional position in a doctor-patient relationship. I cannot say, as does the trial court and the majority here, that as a matter of law this conduct is not outrageous. I believe that judgment is for a jury to make as the trier of fact. That the court is to decide, as an initial matter, whether the conduct at issue may reasonably be deemed outrageous is not determinative. Such an observation merely states the question of whether the district court correctly made its determination; it hardly decides it. Our cases adopted the language providing for an initial determination by the court of the conduct’s nature from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment h (1965). See Roalson, 334 N.W.2d at 756. That comment goes on to state that “[wjhere reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” Reasonable members of a jury could find that Dr. Miller’s conduct as a professional person went beyond all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. See Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 119. I would reverse and remand for retrial of the plaintiff’s case that pertains to the underlying tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and for trial on the elements comprising that tort.
OXBERGER, C.J., joins this dissent.