Court Opinion

ID: 9909508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:02:42.809345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:30.804587
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                      Opinion filed December 13, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-2092
                      Lower Tribunal No. F23-20767
                          ________________

                    Kenyata Jermain Roberson,
                                 Petitioner,

                                     vs.

                      James Reyes, etc., et al.,
                               Respondents.

     A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Habeas Corpus.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jennifer Thornton, Assistant
Public Defender, for petitioner.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant
Attorney General, for respondent the State of Florida.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
     Kenyata Jermain Roberson petitions for habeas corpus relief from a

trial court order denying Roberson’s motion for release pursuant to Florida

Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.134. 1 On October 17, 2023, during a traffic

stop, Roberson was arrested and detained after a search of the vehicle

revealed a semi-automatic rifle, several rounds of ammunition, and bags

containing suspected MDMA and oxycodone. On the 30th day following the

arrest and detention, noting the lack of a formal information or indictment,

Roberson alerted the court and the court, with notice to the State, set a

hearing for November 20, 2023, the 33rd day. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.134

(“If the defendants remain uncharged, the court on the 30th day and with

notice to the state shall: (1) Order that the defendants automatically be

released on their own recognizance on the 33rd day unless the state files

formal charges by that date” or (2) shows good cause).

     At the November 20, 2023 hearing, noting no charges filed by that time,

the 33rd day, the trial court found good cause for the delay in filing formal

charges based on the State’s representation that laboratory testing delays

prevented the filing of formal charges. By finding good cause, the State

would have until the 40th day to file formal charges. Id. (2). We review a

1
  We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P.
9.030(b)(3); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.134; see also Nelson v. Junior, 227 So. 3d
737, 738 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

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good cause determination for abuse of discretion. See Davis v. State, 162

So. 3d 91, 93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (explaining abuse of discretion standard

as applied to a good cause determination under rule 3.134).

      The State argues for good cause in the delayed filing of charges

because: (1) the substances were submitted at least by the log-in date of

October 30 (13 days after the arrest and detention), and (2) the lab is busy

and backlogged. A laboratory backlog and delay may constitute good cause.

See id. at 92–93. Roberson takes issue with the fact that the State couldn’t

say when it submitted the substances to the laboratory, and the only date

given, October 30, 2023, would mean that the State waited 13 days to submit

the substances to a lab that they knew was already backlogged. Such delay

caused (or exacerbated) by the State, Roberson argues, can’t form the basis

for good cause. 2

2
  The State in its reply offers that the substances were submitted to the lab
for testing significantly sooner than October 30, 2023, based on documents
ostensibly filed with the trial court after the November 20, 2023, hearing. Of
course, the trial court did not and could not consider evidence not presented
prior to or during the hearing. Because, based on the circumstances present
here, the subsequent filing of the information moots the relief requested, we
decline to decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding good
cause based on the information before the court. We caution the trial court,
however, that reliance on a generic assertion of lab delay in the face of what
was represented to the trial court as a significant, almost two-week delay in
submitting the substances to the lab, without more, may fail to take into
account “the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Davis, 162 So.
3d at 93 (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2003)).

                                      3
     The State argues that any error in finding good cause was cured by

the filing of an information on November 22, 2023, two days after the trial

court’s good cause hearing. The State relies on Ford v. Campbell, 697 So.

2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that the filing of an

information moots the relief requested. In Campbell, the State filed the

information more than 40 days after the arrest, but before the trial court’s

hearing on the defendant’s motion. Id. The First District held that “the

petitioner is not entitled to release on recognizance because she waited until

after the outer limit of forty days to file her motion and because the state

cured the error by filing an information by the time of the hearing on the

motion.”   Id. at 1303. Here, Roberson brought the issue to the court’s

attention on the 30th day, and the information wasn’t filed before the court’s

hearing on the 33rd day (although it was filed before the 40th day).

Therefore, Campbell isn’t directly analogous to our situation. Nonetheless,

on the record before us, because the information was filed before the 40th

day from arrest, and before our decision on the matter, we decline to grant

habeas relief.

     Petition denied.

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