Court Opinion

ID: 9452595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:45:50.505495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:17.039470
License: Public Domain

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
For more than thirty-two years, from 1930 to 1962, Bethlehem Steel Company kept in continuous use a 9400 ton floating dry dock, moored at its Key Highway Yard in Baltimore, Maryland. In 1962, Bethlehem decided to install another dock of greater capacity and dispose of the old one. After investigating various alternatives, such as beaching and burning the old dock on nearby property, Bethlehem decided that it would be cheaper to employ Moran to tow it to sea and sink it there. The journey was undertaken in the early evening of October 17,1962 but, according to the District Court’s detailed findings, neither Bethlehem nor Moran had adequately inspected the dock to ascertain whether it was in condition to withstand the trip. Early on the morning of October 18, the dock began to ship water through one of its pontoons and it was decided to return it to Key Yard. On the way back, however, it filled and foundered and was eventually grounded near Sparrows Point.
The Government demanded removal of the wreck by Bethlehem, but Bethlehem declined. The United States then sued to compel Bethlehem to effect removal, and the District Court, after a full hearing, ordered Bethlehem to remove or pay the cost of removal. Since the hearing of this appeal, the United States, deeming the sunken dry dock a menace to navigation, did remove it at an expense of $163,000. In its present posture, therefore, the action is one for the recovery of these costs.
Although I differ in some respects with the District Court’s reasons, I think the result reached is entirely correct. I would affirm. I agree with the majority that the District Court erred in holding that the dry dock is not a vessel within the meaning of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The definition of a “vessel” is, as the majority points out, sufficiently broad to encompass the dock. I also agree that it was not intentionally scuttled so as to bring the case within the Hall exception. United States v. Hall, *67063 F. 472 (1st Cir. 1894). But this is by-no means dispositive of the case. To my mind, the controlling question on this appeal is whether it was the congressional purpose to immunize owners from liability for the cost of removing from navigable waterways vessels which have sunk as a result of their negligence. I cannot accept the view that Congress meant to bestow a beneficence on careless owners by nullifying the statutorily declared obligation of such persons to remove obstructions caused by them.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 80 S.Ct. 884 (1960), which, as my brethren recognize, has inspired a “fresh reappraisal” of the Act, two circuits have reached conflicting decisions on the question before us.1 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Cargill, Inc., 367 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1966), held that negligently sunk vessels are obstructions within the meaning of section 403 and that under section 406 their owners can be required to bear the reasonable cost of their removal. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (The Texmar), 319 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1963), over the strong dissent of Judge Browning, held that removal costs of carelessly sunk vessels must be shouldered by the Government. Judge Browning, differing in approach but agreeing in result with the Fifth Circuit, felt that, by analogy to Republic Steel, a remedy should be implied from section 409 sufficiently broad to reach the conduct interdicted therein.2 This diversity of opinion serves to highlight the fact that clarity of draftsmanship is not a hallmark of the Act. A reading of the statutory provisions, with particular attention to the overall purpose of the Act, is thus called for.
The broad objective of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.A. § 40 et seq., is to keep the nation’s waterways free from hazards to maritime commerce.3 Section 10, 33 U.S.C.A. § 403, prohibits the creation of unauthorized obstructions to navigation and section 15, 33 U.S.C.A. § 409, declares it unlawful “voluntarily or carelessly” to sink vessel in navigable channels. Sections 12, 19 and 20, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 406, 414 and 415, enable the United States to effect the speedy removal of hazards created in violation of these provisions. In comprehensively unfolding its “great design,” Republic Steel, supra 362 U.S. at 492, 80 S.Ct. 884, the Act thus brackets the careless owner with the willful one; the distinction drawn is between the innocent, on the one hand, and the deliberate or careless, on the other. While the Act nowhere specifically allocates, as between the Government and the shipowner, the cost of removing sunken vessels, the courts have, since Hall, consistently held owners who intentionally scuttle their craft for their private economic benefit personally responsible for removal costs. The statutory grouping of the negligent with the willful militates against different treatment of the two with respect to personal liability.4 This reading of the Act is identical *671to that given it by the Army Corps of Engineers, which has promulgated a long-standing regulation covering the exact situation presented here.
* * * a person who wilfully or negligently permits a vessel to sink in navigable waters of the United States may not relieve himself from all liability by merely abandoning the wreck. He may be found guilty of a misdemeanor and punished by fine, imprisonment, or both, and in addition may have his license revoked or suspended. He may also be compelled to remove the wreck as a public nuisance or pay for its removal.5 33 C.F.R. 209.410 (1962).
I am not persuaded that the separate and detailed treatment accorded sunken vessels in sections 414 and 415 requires the conclusion that the Government’s remedies are limited to removal of the wreck and recoupment of the salvage value of it and its cargo. In furtherance of the broad purpose of the Act, these sections are aimed at the vessels themselves and are designed to facilitate removal of wrecks thought to menace navigation. The turn of the language suggests not the grant of a personal immunity to the shipowner but the creation of a right in favor of the United States to eliminate obstructions to navigation. Appropriation of the salvage value of the vessels and their cargo merely gives a measure of protection to the Government against the contingency of an insolvent owner.
Nor is it convincing to argue that such separate treatment reflects a congressional purpose to exclude sunken vessels from the class of “obstructions” proscribed by section 403. The logic and common sense of the Act suggest that the elaborate removal procedures of sections 414 and 415 were intended to supplement the Government’s right in section 406 to enjoin the removal of structures threatening navigation. They provide a method whereby the Government may act without the need to secure prior judicial sanction, thus implementing the Act’s purpose to expedite the removal of hazards impeding the free flow of maritime commerce.
Further, while it is true that section 412 makes a person in command of a vessel who “willfully” obstructs a channel in the manner contemplated in section 409 guilty of a violation of section 403, this does not warrant the implication of a congressional purpose to limit the reach of section 403 to intentionally scuttled vessels only. The definition of an “obstruction” cannot reasonably be thought to turn on whether a person acts deliberately or carelessly. Navigation is impeded no less by a negligently sunk vessel than by one that has been intentionally scuttled, and it is illogical to ascribe to Congress an intent to exclude carelessly sunk vessels from section 403. Neither does it make sense to read into section 412 a congressional purpose to excuse owners who carelessly cause their vessels to sink, thereby creating obstructions in violation of section 403. Section 412 is aimed at an entirely new class of individuals, masters and pilots, not theretofore encompassed by the Act. Nothing in it supports an attenuation of section *672409’s explicit condemnation of both deliberate and careless sinkings and section 403’s prohibition against the creation of unauthorized obstructions.
We are not compelled to choose between the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Cargill and that of Judge Browning in Texmar. They are not antithetical; each harmonizes with the language as well as the purpose of the Act. Section 409’s proscription of both voluntary and careless sinkings seems, as the Fifth Circuit held, but an “emphatic restatement,” 367 F.2d at 975, of section 403’s prohibition against the creation of unauthorized obstructions. Yet even in the absence of section 403, the imposition in section 411 of criminal penalties for carelessly causing vessels to sink, coupled with the owner’s unquestionable section 409 duty to remove sunken vessels, provides a sufficient basis for implying a civil remedy in favor of the United States in its own right and as the representative of others engaged in maritime commerce. See United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir. 1964); Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 Harv.L.Rev. 285 (1963).
In sum, I have no quarrel with the majority’s observation that the Government has long followed policies of encouragement and support of water-borne commerce and has been generous in the provision of subsidies in various forms. But nowhere has Congress manifested such unrestrained benevolence towards owners so as to warrant the implication of immunity from responsibility for the negligent sinking of vessels. It is an unwarranted extension of these policies for courts to dilute the clear congressional condemnation in section 409 of carelessness causing obstructions to navigation and the equally clear command to remove. Since the District Court found Bethlehem and Moran negligent in failing adequately to inspect the dry dock, I would affirm the judgment below.

. Even before Republic Steel the precedents were far from consistent. Compare The Manhattan, 10 F.Supp. 45 (D.C.Pa.), aff’d, 85 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1935), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. The Bessemer, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S.Ct. 432, 81 L.Ed. 864 (1937) with In re Eastern Transportation Co., 102 F.Supp. 913 (D. Md.), aff’d sub nom. Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952).

. Judge Browning recognized that a negligently sunk vessel may be an obstruction within the meaning of section 403, but preferred to base his dissent on the express prohibition against careless sinking contained in section 409, 319 F.2d at 522 n. 1.
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964) carefully refrained from expressing an opinion on the issue before us.

. See United States v. Cargill, 367 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1966).

. Cf. The Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 183, which limits the liability of a vessel owner to his interest in the vessel and its cargo only where the owner is without “privity or knowledge” of the negligence causing the loss. See Austerberry v. United States, 169 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1948).

. This regulation follows an administrative interpretation by the Acting Secretary of War in 1901, only two years after the Act was passed. In response to an inquiry from an attorney regarding the burden of removing a sunken schooner which had been engaged in dredging the Black River for the City of Loraine, Ohio, the Secretary stated:
Replying to the question whether the burden of removing this boat rests upon the United States, upon the owner by whose negligence it was sunk, or upon the City of Loraine in whose service the boat was engaged, you are advised that as between the city and the owner of the boat it is not necessary for the War Department to decide, but that under the circumstances stated the burden of removing the boat does not rest upon the United States. It is believed the vessel constitutes an obstruction caused by the voluntary or careless acts of those owning or controlling the boat and that the burden of removal rests upon them.