Court Opinion

ID: 9693098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:22:15.508735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:02:44.195444
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Kerry Freedman (Freedman) is not entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal from a decision by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) to *501require Freedman to install ignition interlock devices on all vehicles owned by him before DOT would restore his operating privileges. For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
I. Nunc Pro Tunc
First, I join Judge Smith-Ribner in recognizing the need to consider this court’s holding in Hess v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 821 A.2d 663 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).
It is true that the trial court determined the nunc pro tunc appeal issue based on Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), and that Freedman’s brief does not ask this court to consider Hess in deciding this appeal by DOT. However, these facts do not prevent us from considering whether Freedman is entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal based on Hess. Indeed, our supreme court has stated that “a correct decision will be sustained if it can be sustained for any reason whatsoever; ... we will not reverse [a correct decision] ... even though the reason given by the Court below ... was erroneous.” Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110, 115, 117 A.2d 899, 901-02 (1955). Despite this admonition, the majority has reversed the trial court’s correct decision without considering the reason set forth in Hess for sustaining that decision.1
In Hess, this court held that a nunc pro tunc appeal of the ignition interlock requirement is justified where DOT’s notice of suspension does not state clearly that the licensee has the right to appeal the ignition interlock requirement.2 DOT’s notice of suspension to Freedman is no different from the notice to the licensee in Hess. The notice indicates that Freedman had the right to appeal the suspension but that Freedman would receive more information about the ignition interlock requirement. Thus, I would conclude that, as in Hess, Freedman is entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal.
I point out that, in Schneider v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 790 A.2d 363 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), allocatur granted, — Pa.-, 842 A.2d 408 (2004), DOT argued before this court that its notice of suspension was not a final order with respect to the ignition interlock requirement. Thus, if a licensee had contacted DOT to inquire about his or her appeal rights after receiving a notice of suspension with an ignition interlock requirement, DOT would have informed the licensee that he or she could not appeal the ignition interlock requirement. In other words, DOT’s notice was so ambiguous with respect to a licensee’s appeal rights, even DOT did not understand it. Nevertheless, the majority will not excuse *502Freedman for failing to understand DOT’s notice.
The situation created for licensees by the notice of suspension here is similar to that created by the notice of suspension in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Andrews, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 601, 600 A.2d 622 (1991). In Andrews, when the licensees’ insurance coverage lapsed, DOT sent them a notice stating that, to prevent the suspension of their registration, they were required to provide proof of financial responsibility. The licensees submitted proof, but DOT notified the licensees that their proof was insufficient. Unfortunately, the licensees received DOT’s second notice after the suspension appeal period had expired. This court held that DOT’s original notice was not a final order because it conditioned the suspension upon the licensees’ failure to submit acceptable proof to DOT.
Here, DOT’s original notice of suspension in April 2002 told Freedman that he would receive more information about the ignition interlock requirement thirty days before his eligibility date. The nature of the additional information was left to Freedman’s imagination. Because Freedman did not know any details about the requirement, he could not know all that he might wish to challenge in an appeal. From Freedman’s point of view, his desire to appeal might depend upon the new information. However, as in Andrews, by the time Freedman received the second notice from DOT in January 2003, the appeal period had expired.
II. Void Ab Initio
Second, like Judge Smith-Ribner, I do not believe that our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 575 Pa. 5, 834 A.2d 488 (2003), has the impact stated by the majority on this court’s holding in Watterson (holding that, inasmuch as DOT lacks statutory authority to impose the ignition interlock requirement, DOT’s imposition of the requirement is void ab initio).
The majority states that our supreme court rejected the Watterson rationale in Mockaitis. I disagree. Our supreme court never stated in Mockaitis that DOT has the authority to require the installation of ignition interlock devices in all vehicles owned by a licensee before DOT restores the licensee’s operating privileges.3 Thus, any attempt by DOT to require that a licensee install ignition interlock devices on his or her vehicles before issuing a restricted license is outside DOT’s statutory authority.
Our supreme court’s discussion of the equal protection claim in Mockaitis is proof that the court never intended to suggest that DOT can require the installation of ignition interlock devices in all vehicles owned by a licensee before issuing a restricted license. The trial court in Mockaitis concluded that requiring the installation of ignition interlock devices on all vehicles owned by the licensee prior to DOT’s issuance of a restricted license violated the equal protection rights of licensees who lease vehicles or own multiple vehicles.4 Id. Our supreme court stated further that there was no need to address *503this question because the statutory provisions requiring the installation of ignition interlock devices in all vehicles owned by a licensee have been severed from the law as violative of the separation of powers doctrine.5 Id. Thus, under Mockaitis, DOT still does not have authority to require the installation of ignition interlock devices on all vehicles owned by a licensee prior to DOT’s issuance of a restricted license.
In this case, DOT imposed such a requirement upon Freedman, and Freedman challenges that requirement in his appeal. Because DOT lacked authority to impose the requirement, it was void ab initio pursuant to Watterson. Thus, I would conclude that Freedman is entitled to a nunc pro tunc appeal and affirm.6
Judge SMITH-RIBNER joins in this dissent.

. I note that the majority cites Hess for the proposition that, to challenge the ignition interlock requirement, a licensee must file an appeal from a notice of suspension. (Majority op. at 498.) I also note that the majority never suggests that the nunc pro tunc analysis in Hess was incorrect when it was filed or that it has been overruled since then.

. In Hess, the licensee, like Freedman, did not file an appeal from DOT’s notice of suspension. However, upon examination of DOT's notice of suspension, this court observed that DOT (1) promises more information about the ignition interlock requirement, (2) states that the licensee has the right to appeal "this action” and (3) specifically states that "this is an Official Notice of Suspension.” Hess. This court stated that such notice was unclear as to whether the licensee’s right to appeal the suspension included the right to appeal the ignition interlock requirement. Id. As a result, this court concluded that there was a breakdown in the administrative process that justified a nunc pro tunc appeal. Id.

. Our supreme court stated only that: (1) "recidivist DUI offenders seeking restoration of driving privileges [must] apply to [DOT] for an ignition interlock restricted license"; (2) such a license "precludes the offender ... from operating any motor vehicle on a highway in the Commonwealth unless that vehicle is equipped with an approved ignition interlock system”; and (3) the enforcement of the restriction is pursuant to "the usual prosaic means of enforcing licensing restrictions in this Commonwealth.” Id. at 29-30, 834 A.2d at 502-03 (emphasis added).

. The trial court concluded that the requirement discriminates against non-owners of motor vehicles because it renders them incap*503able of securing a restricted license. See Mockaitis. In addition, the trial court apparently concluded that there was no rational basis for requiring all vehicles owned by a licensee to have an ignition interlock device when one specially-equipped vehicle would suffice.

. The court stated that "the bases for these challenges disappear” with the removal of the constitutionally infirm provisions from the statute. Id. at-, 834 A.2d at 503.

. Given the fact that the legislature now has given DOT independent authority with respect to violations occurring after September 30, 2003, to require the installation of ignition interlock devices, I see no reason to retroactively alter this court’s previous holdings, upon which trial courts and licensees have relied in rendering decisions and filing appeals.