Court Opinion

ID: 9680322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:29:14.636632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:27.778759
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
There has been filed herein a courteous, forceful and dignified petition to rehear.
This petition brings to our attention some authorities that were not considered in the original opinion, and argues very forcefully that we have taken in this opinion, and established it as the law of this State, the contrary to what the Court of Appeals held in Mink v. Majors, 39 Tenn.App. 50, 279 S.W.2d 714, and that the case of Marcher v. Burbank, as cited in our opinion as supporting our position is not the law to be applied in this State, because this Court in Byrd v. Crowder, 166 Tenn. 215, 60 S.W.2d 171, has rejected the Massachusetts rule with reference to covenants not to sue.
*222In support of the argument in the Mink case, supra, that it governs the proposition here, counsel cites an article by Dean Wade of Vanderbilt University, as appearing in 9 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1137, 1154. Dean Wade, citing the Mink case, says, among other things, it “is apparently unique to the state of Tennessee. Courts elsewhere all disagree with it. ’ ’ Then he cites the case of Terry v. Memphis Stone and Gravel Co., which we rely upon in our opinion as really the sound principle to be applied under circumstances as are in this case. He says, too, that the Terry case seems to be inconsistent with the Mink case. After further consideration of the matter, and upon a careful reading of the Mink case, we are forced to the conclusion that insofar as the Mink case disagrees with what we have said herein we disapprove its holding. The question herein determined was not stressed in the Mink case. Judge Wade says in his article that in view of the Mink case that it seems to be necessary to have legislation on the matter. The holding in our original opinion will obviate any such legislation, as we deem it for reasons therein stated the sound, reasonable and logical conclusion under such a state of facts.
In Byrd v. Crowder, supra, this Court reached a conclusion that certain language in a purported covenant not to sue was in fact a release, and thus sustained the lower court in dismissing it as such, and said:
“ * * * The reason for excluding a mere covenant not to sue from this rule was stated to be that the covenant does not ‘have the effect, technically, of extinguishing any part of the cause of action. ’ ’ ’
This quotation within the quote above is clearly the rule in this State. The covenant in the instant suit though *223does Rave the effect of extinguishing the cause of action against the wrongdoer and since this is true it clearly has the effect of extinguishing the cause of action against his superior.
After a very careful consideration we must overrule the petition to rehear.