Court Opinion

ID: 9947662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:10:53.798339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:18.075265
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                            APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
  internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                     APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                     DOCKET NO. A-1487-22

IN THE MATTER OF DAVID
PETERSON, STOCKTON
UNIVERSITY.
_________________________

                Argued February 13, 2024 – Decided March 5, 2024

                Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

                On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
                Commission, Docket No. 2023-717.

                Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
                cause for appellant Stockton University (Matthew J.
                Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Sue Arons,
                Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rimma Razhba
                and Ian Michael Fiedler, Deputy Attorney General, on
                the briefs).

                Louis Michael Barbone argued the cause for respondent
                David Peterson (Jacobs & Barbone, P.A., attorneys;
                Louis Michael Barbone, on the brief).

                Timothy Patrick Malone argued the cause for
                respondent Civil Service Commission (Pashman Stein
                Walder Hayden, attorneys; Timothy Patrick Malone, on
                the brief).

PER CURIAM
      In this civil service matter, Stockton University (SU) appeals from the

December 7, 2022 final agency decision of respondent Civil Service

Commission (CSC).        The December 7 decision denied SU's motion to

reconsider the CSC's August 3, 2022 decision to suspend—rather than

terminate—respondent David Peterson from his job at SU. We affirm.

                                        I.

      In 2003, SU hired Peterson as a temporary repairer. He was elevated to

the position of senior repairer in 2007, and served in SU's Plant and Housing

Maintenance Department until 2020. Peterson had no disciplinary history with

SU until the 2020 incident giving rise to this appeal.

      In June 2020, when much of SU's campus was empty due to the COVID-

19 pandemic, Peterson and other repairers were instructed to clean out items

remaining in student housing units and place those items in storage units. On

June 12, 2020, while performing this task, Peterson removed a bicycle from the

Unit 1, D building area of campus and placed it in an SU van before transferring

it to his own vehicle. Peterson then took the bike home, refurbished it, and

purportedly gave it to a young girl who needed a bicycle.

      Peterson noticed the bike approximately two weeks before he removed it

from SU's campus. He saw it had two flat tires and was somewhat rusty.

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Additionally, he noted it was neither locked nor secured, but leaning against a

handrail. Given its condition, Peterson believed the bike was abandoned as

trash, much like other bikes left abandoned on campus that were routinely piled

up behind SU's Public Safety Building for disposal in the future.

      Peterson knew SU's policy was that personal items left behind in housing

and residential areas of the campus were considered trash. But he also was

aware such items could not be taken by employees for personal use or gain

without consent from the Director of Plant Management.           Admittedly, he

received no such consent before taking the bike.

      Five days after Peterson removed the bike from campus, an SU student

reported the same bicycle as missing. Officer James Heitzer from the Stockton

Police Department (SPD) commenced an investigation into the incident.

Following his review of campus surveillance footage from June 12, he

determined Peterson took the bicycle. In response to a communication from the

SPD, Peterson left a voicemail with the department, explaining he thought the

bike was abandoned. He also stated he wanted to apologize to the owner and

would pay restitution for the bike, adding this incident "was killing him inside."

Peterson then contacted Katherine Hibbert, SU's Associate Director of Plant

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Operations, told her he made a mistake by taking the bike, and explained he

could not get it back.

      On June 24, 2020, Peterson and Officer Heitzer spoke by phone. Peterson

again stated he took the bike thinking it was abandoned, and he gave it to a

young girl in need. Further, Peterson reiterated he wanted to pay restitution to

the bike's owner and hoped to apologize to her.

      On June 30, 2020, the SPD issued a criminal complaint against Peterson,

charging him with theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). That charge was subsequently

dismissed and expunged.

      On July 6, 2020, SU served Peterson with a Preliminary Notice of

Disciplinary Action, charging him with: (1) "Major Discipline," N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.2(a); (2) "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee," N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6);

and (3) "Other Sufficient Cause," N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12).        Following a

disciplinary hearing, SU issued a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action on March

18, 2021, sustaining all charges against Peterson and removing him from

employment as of July 9, 2020. Peterson appealed from this determination and

the matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL).

      On April 6, 2022, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted an initial

hearing.   SU called Heitzer and Hibbert to testify.    SU also produced the

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following witnesses: Robert Haviland, former Associate Director of Facilities

Management and Plant Operations; John Fritsch, Assistant Vice President of

Facilities and Operations; and Elen Manalang, Associate Director of Human

Resources at SU.     SU's witnesses testified about SU's policies and rules

regarding campus property and removal of items from campus.

      Peterson also testified at the hearing. He admitted to taking the bike,

placing it in an SU work van, and removing it from campus. However, he denied

selling the bike, despite having a side job salvaging scrap metal. Peterson

testified he refurbished the bike before giving it away to a young girl who needed

a bike. Although Peterson admitted he did not follow SU's procedure for

disposing of the bike, he explained he thought the bike was abandoned as trash

so he "saw no need to tell" a supervisor before removing it. He also testified

that while employed at SU, he had returned numerous other items he found on

campus that he thought were lost or abandoned, including a wallet, a ring, and a

pocketbook. Peterson stated he turned over these items either to the police or

the person in charge of campus housing.

      On June 24, the ALJ issued her initial decision. After outlining the

testimony of each witness, the ALJ found SU's witnesses were credible. Turning

to Peterson's testimony, she stated "Peterson candidly admitted he took the

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bicycle," claiming "he believed the bike to be abandoned," an assertion that

"m[ight] well be truthful given the apparent appearance of the bike, how he

found it not in the bike rack, and that the campus was virtually devoid of anyone

but a few workers." She also accepted Peterson's testimony that "[h]e made

restitution to the bicycle owner." However, the ALJ found "[h]is belief that he

thought he was doing something good . . . [for] a young girl in financial need[]

was not delivered in a confident nor believable manner." The ALJ noted that

Peterson "admittedly is a scrapper and takes trash or discarded items and sells

them," and because "[h]e was unable to get the bike back," this was "a situation

which len[t] itself more to him having sold the bike or scrapped it for cash ."

      Additionally, the ALJ referred to Peterson's testimony that he knew

"abandoned property is considered trash and that [SU's] policy does not allow

for taking home any items [an employee] did not bring to work with [them]."

Therefore, she found "[h]e was aware . . . such items could not be taken for

personal use or gain without advance . . . written consent of the Director of Plant

Management" and "[h]e did not have such written consent to take the bicycle."

      Based on these factual and credibility findings, the ALJ concluded

Peterson's conduct constituted "conduct unbecoming a public employee" and

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"other sufficient cause." However, she found the Major Discipline charge was

not a substantive disciplinary charge and should be dismissed.

      Turning to the issue of the penalty to be imposed, the ALJ stated

"Peterson's prior disciplinary history must be considered" in her "progressive

discipline analysis." She found Peterson "ha[d] no prior disciplinary history,"

which was "a substantial mitigating factor." Further, the ALJ determined "there

[was no] . . . finding of guilt of a criminal charge of 'theft'" against Peterson, but

rather "a finding of a violation of [SU's] policy from its Code of Conduct ."

However, because Peterson "knew he was not authorized to take the bicycle,

even if it was for a purpose he believed to be a good thing," the ALJ found the

applicable "mitigating factors [we]re not enough to overcome the egregiousness

of his action in taking the bicycle, knowing that any such property left behind

bec[ame] property of [SU] and is deemed trash, to be disposed of properly." The

ALJ further concluded "removal sh[ould] be the . . . discipline" imposed,

because "Peterson's conduct was egregious."

      On August 3, 2022, the CSC adopted the ALJ's findings to sustain the

charges of "conduct unbecoming a public employee" and "other sufficient

cause."    The CSC also concluded Peterson's "misconduct was clearly

inappropriate and serious, and absent any mitigating factors, worthy of removal

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from employment."       But the CSC found removal was not appropriate,

"considering that [Peterson's] conduct was apparently out of character for [him,]

based on his lack of any previous discipline over his long career."

      After finding Peterson's misconduct "was not so egregious to warrant

removal from employment," the CSC determined "a six-month suspension, the

most serious suspension that can be imposed, [wa]s appropriate." The CSC

found "[t]his penalty should impress upon [Peterson] the seriousness of his

misconduct and serve as a warning that any future misconduct may result in his

removal from employment." Finally, it ordered that Peterson "be granted back

pay, benefits, and seniority from six months after the first date of separation to

the actual date of reinstatement."

      SU moved for reconsideration of the August 3 penalty decision;

alternatively, it sought a stay pending appeal. On December 7, 2022, the CSC

denied SU's motion. In denying reconsideration, the CSC cited N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

1.6(b)1 and found SU "ha[d] not met the standard for reconsideration." Further,

the CSC rejected SU's argument that the agency "erred . . . in concluding that

1
   This regulation provides that when seeking reconsideration, the petitioner
must show: "(1) . . . new evidence or additional information not presented at
the original proceeding, which would change the outcome and the reasons that
such evidence was not presented at the original proceeding; or (2) [t]hat a clear
material error has occurred."
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Peterson's conduct was 'apparently out of character based on his lack of any

previous discipline over his long career' as there was no testimony regarding

[his] character." The CSC explained that it:

            modified Peterson's removal to a six-month's
            suspension based on the particular facts . . . and
            [Peterson's] lack of disciplinary history . . . with [SU].
            In other words, the [CSC] found that [Peterson's] lack
            of disciplinary history was evidence of his character[,]
            and testimony regarding [his] character was not needed
            to make this determination. Further, the [CSC] did not
            need to find that the ALJ's credibility determinations
            were "arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable" to come
            to this conclusion[,] as the [CSC] did not make this
            decision based on a credibility determination.
            Moreover, . . . the ALJ only ma[de] a recommendation
            concerning the penalty and the [CSC], based on the
            [ALJ's] [f]indings of [f]acts[,] . . . ultimately
            concluded . . . a six-month suspension was appropriate
            under the concept of progressive discipline after
            finding the conduct was not so egregious under the
            circumstances . . . [as] to warrant removal.

                   Concerning [SU]'s assertion that the [CSC]'s
            decision goes against its own "precedent," it is noted
            that while the [CSC] is guided by its prior
            decisions, . . . each case has its own unique facts and
            [is] decided on that basis. Further, contrary to [SU]'s
            statement that the [CSC] failed to consider its concerns
            if Peterson was reinstated, the [CSC] found "this
            penalty should impress upon [Peterson] the seriousness
            of his misconduct and serve as a warning that any future
            misconduct may result in his removal from
            employment." In other words, while the [CSC]
            acknowledged [SU]'s concerns by indicating that
            Peterson's conduct was "serious," it found that given

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            the particular facts[,] . . . Peterson's lack of disciplinary
            history, and the potential for future removal, he was
            unlikely to be a repeat offender.

      Next, the CSC rejected SU's request for a stay, finding the university was

"unlikely to prevail on the merits" of any appeal it filed. The agency also

concluded a stay was unwarranted because there was no "danger of immediate

or irreparable harm if Peterson [wa]s reinstated as it found . . . Peterson [wa]s

unlikely to be a repeat offender" and moreover, it was Peterson who suffered

harm, having "served more than a six-month suspension without reinstatement."

      On appeal, SU raises the following arguments: (1) the CSC's decision to

modify Peterson's removal to a 180-day suspension was arbitrary, capricious,

and unreasonable, and unsupported by the substantial, credible evidence in the

record; (2) the CSC mistakenly reduced the removal penalty to a 180-day

suspension despite the sustained charge of theft of student property; and (3) the

CSC's finding on Peterson's character is not supported by the record.

      "Our review of administrative agency action is limited." Russo v. Bd. of

Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 206 N.J. 14, 27 (2011) (citing In re

Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007)). An agency's final decision will be upheld

"unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or that it lacks fair support in the record." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 27-28. "The

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burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious[,] or

unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In

re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div. 2006).

      Our role in reviewing an administrative action is generally limited to three

inquiries:

             (1) whether the agency's action violates express or
             implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
             follow the law;

             (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to
             support the findings on which the agency based its
             action; and

             (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the
             facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion
             that could not reasonably have been made on a showing
             of the relevant factors.

             [Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
             Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 157 (2018) (quoting In re
             Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)).]

      We do not substitute our judgment for that of the agency's when

"substantial credible evidence supports [the] agency's conclusion." Greenwood

v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992). Instead, we "defer to an

agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field."            Ibid.

"Deference controls even if [we] would have reached a different result in the

first instance." Herrmann, 192 N.J. at 28.

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      "While we must defer to the agency's expertise, we need not surrender to

it." N.J. Chapter of Nat'l Ass'n of Indus. & Office Parks v. N.J. Dep't of Env't

Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div. 1990). Thus, we are not bound to

accept an agency's interpretation of a statute or a regulation, and we review

strictly legal questions de novo. Bowser v. Bd. of Trs., Police & Fireman's Ret.

Sys., 455 N.J. Super. 165, 170-71 (App. Div. 2018).

      Pertinent to this appeal, we review an agency's disciplinary sanction under

a deferential standard and only modify a sanction "when necessary to bring the

agency's action into conformity with its delegated authority." Herrmann, 192

N.J. at 28 (quoting In re Polk, 90 N.J. 550, 578 (1982)). When reviewing an

agency's disciplinary action, we consider "whether such punishment is so

disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be

shocking to one's sense of fairness." Id. at 28-29 (quoting Polk, 90 N.J. at 578).

      The CSC has long utilized the concept of progressive discipline when

considering the proper sanction. Progressive discipline is based on the notion

that "past misconduct can be a factor in the determination of the appropriate

penalty for present misconduct." Id. at 29.

      The CSC applies progressive discipline in two different ways: to "support

the imposition of a more severe penalty for a public employee who engages in

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habitual misconduct," id. at 30, or to reduce the penalty for "an employee who

has a substantial record of employment that is largely or totally unblemished by

significant disciplinary infractions," id. at 33. But the CSC is not required to

consider progressive discipline when employee misconduct is "so serious that

removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record." In

re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 484 (2007).

      Here, the CSC's decision to downgrade Peterson's penalty cannot fairly be

characterized as "so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the

circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." See Herrmann, 192

N.J. at 28-29. While recognizing Peterson's "misconduct was inappropriate" and

"serious," the CSC found Peterson had an unblemished disciplinary record from

the time he was hired in 2003 until the bicycle incident in 2020, and that his

"lack of disciplinary history was evidence of his character." The CSC further

concluded it did not need testimony about Peterson's character "to make this

determination," because its decision was not "based on a credibility

determination." Additionally, the CSC determined Peterson's "conduct was not

so egregious under the circumstances in this matter to warrant removal."

      These findings and conclusions are amply supported by the record.

Therefore, the CSC acted well within its authority in disagreeing with the ALJ's

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recommendation that Peterson should be terminated for his misconduct. Indeed,

the CSC was not bound by the ALJ's penalty recommendation because the

penalty decision remained subject to the CSC's de novo review. See Winters v.

N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212 N.J. 67, 81 (2012).

      In sum, based on our deferential standard of review of an agency's

disciplinary sanction, and for the reasons set forth by the CSC in its December

7 decision, we conclude the CSC did not abuse its discretion in reducing

Peterson's penalty from termination to a 180-day suspension.

      To the extent we have not addressed SU's remaining arguments, it is

because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).

      Affirmed.

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