Court Opinion

ID: 9957453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:00:57.158433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.734102
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 4 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-10355

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:21-cr-00402-RS-2

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
VICTOR MAKRAS,

                Defendant-Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of California
                 Richard Seeborg, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 8, 2024
                            San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Victor Makras of two crimes: (a)

making, and aiding and abetting the making of, false statements to a bank in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1014 and 2; and (b) bank fraud and aiding and abetting bank fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. On appeal, Makras challenges the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

      We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal

conviction. United States v. Chang Ru Meng Backman, 817 F.3d 662, 665 (9th Cir.

2016). Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 667–68

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

      1.     Making False Statements to a Bank. Makras first contends that there

was insufficient evidence to convict him of making a false statement to a bank and

aiding and abetting the same. Specifically, he argues the Government failed to prove

“that he made a false statement” that he knew was false because, under California

law, it was true that the Kellys owed him $200,000.

      In California, a promissory note represents “an unconditional promise to pay

money signed by the person undertaking to pay.” Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist

Church, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 45, 58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). A note is invalid, however,

if it lacks consideration or if it was intended as a sham to fool a third party. Id. at

58–59. Although extending the time for repayment can constitute consideration for

a note, the extension of time must be based on an actual agreement by the parties.

See Levine v. Tobin, 26 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274–75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

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      Here, a rational jury could conclude that the amended note lacked

consideration because there was no agreement for an extension of time to repay. The

evidence at trial showed that Makras never demanded repayment from the Kellys

after they missed their June 2014 deadline nor did the Kellys seek an extension for

repayment. Cf. id. at 275 (extension contract drafted after plaintiffs demanded

performance from defendants and defendants requested an extension of time to

perform). The Government also presented evidence that the note was a sham because

Makras never loaned or intended to loan the Kellys more than $70,000,1 and

amended the note only after Harlan Kelly (Harlan) told Makras that he wanted to

increase his cash-out amount. Accordingly, a rational juror could have concluded

that the promissory note for $915,000—$130,000 more than Makras or the investors

ever lent to the Kellys—was invalid for want of consideration or because it was

intended to fool the lender, Quicken Loans, Inc. (Quicken). Moreover, even

assuming the Kellys owed $915,000, a rational juror could have found that Makras’s

statement that the entire principal was subject to 8% interest was false.

      A rational juror could have further concluded that Makras knew his statements

concerning the loan amount were false. In addition to the evidence regarding the

loan amount, the Government presented testimony that Makras had approximately

      1
       The Government introduced evidence that Makras wrote several checks for
approximately $130,000 to pay off various bills for the Kellys, but those payments
occurred after the lender disbursed—and Makras received—the loan proceeds.

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40 years of experience as a real estate professional, working on at least eight to ten

real-estate transactions per year.

      Alternatively, the jury could have determined that Makras aided and abetted

Harlan’s false statements to the lender. See United States v. Singh, 532 F.3d 1053,

1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (listing elements of aiding and abetting). Like his principal-

offender argument, Makras contends that Harlan did not make a false statement to a

bank because Harlan’s statements to Quicken about the loan amount were true. But

the Government presented sufficient evidence that Harlan also knowingly made a

false statement to a bank because Harlan’s statements that he owed Makras $200,000

were false for the same reasons that Makras’s statements about the loan amount were

false. Additionally, the Government introduced evidence that the Kellys had been

unable to repay the investors, that they owed Makras $70,000, and that their first

attempt to secure a refinance loan through their credit union was unsuccessful. The

Government also offered testimony from a Quicken underwriter that for large cash-

out loan applications, such as $130,000, Quicken requires the borrower to explain

how the cash will be used. From this evidence, a rational juror could have found that

Harlan knowingly lied to Quicken about owing Makras $200,000 to prevent any

difficulty or delay in receiving the desired refinance loan.2

      2
      Makras argues that the Government’s theory about why Harlan lied about the
debt on his loan application—to conceal unpaid construction costs—is illogical
because Harlan had no reason to lie. The Government, however, was not required to

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      The Government likewise proved that Makras had the requisite intent for

aiding and abetting where evidence at trial showed that Makras was heavily involved

in the Kellys’ efforts to secure a refinance loan, Harlan told Makras why he wanted

the note amount increased, and Makras prepared a revised note and stated that the

Kellys owed him $200,000 on multiple documents associated with the Kellys’ loan

application. A rational juror could have concluded that Makras knew that these

documents would be presented to Quicken, particularly given his extensive real-

estate experience. See United States v. Bellucci, 995 F.2d 157, 159 (9th Cir. 1993)

(per curiam) (explaining that a rational juror could conclude that the defendant knew

his loan application would be presented to a bank based on his “familiarity with

mortgage and construction lending”). Further, a rational juror could have found that

Makras intended to help Harlan make a false statement to a bank.

      2.     Bank Fraud. Makras argues that the Government failed to prove that

he committed bank fraud for the same reasons it failed to prove that he made a false

statement to a bank. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 provides two alternative methods for

establishing bank fraud. Section 1344(1) “criminalizes schemes to defraud financial

institutions,” while § 1344(2) “criminalizes schemes to obtain money or property in

the custody or control of a bank by deceptive means.” United States v. McNeil, 320

prove that Harlan’s reasons for lying made sense but only that he lied to the lender.
See United States v. Grasso, 724 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013) (reciting elements
for making a false statement to a bank).

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F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the Government presented sufficient

evidence to convict Makras under § 1344(2), we do not address § 1344(1).

      For the reasons explained above, a rational juror could have found that the

Kellys did not owe Makras $200,000 either because there was no consideration for

the promissory note or because the note was a sham to fool Quicken. Alternatively,

the jury could have convicted Makras under an aiding and abetting theory. As

previously explained, a rational juror could have found that Harlan knowingly lied

about owing Makras $200,000 to defraud and obtain additional money from Quicken

and that Makras intended to facilitate Harlan’s bank fraud.

      AFFIRMED.

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