Court Opinion

ID: 9547099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:41:44.868431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:19.619847
License: Public Domain

*490ARGUELLES, J.
I fully concur with the majority’s reasoning and disposition with one exception. Instead of concluding, as does the majority, ante, at pp. 486-487, that the jury instructions regarding the special circumstance allegations were adequate under People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], I would decline to reach that question. While the trial court’s instructions were clearly adequate under Anderson for Robert since the evidence showed he fired the murder weapon, I believe there is a serious question whether the instructions satisfactorily informed the jury it must find Woodrow intended to kill before sustaining the two special circumstance allegations against him. Since one may intentionally aid a killer without necessarily harboring the intent to kill (cf. People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318]), it is arguable that the trial court’s instructions, so far as they apply to Woodrow, did not fully satisfy the dictates of Anderson.
However, we need not resolve that question since even assuming arguendo the instructions were inadequate, reversal would not be warranted in this case. On this record, it is clear no reasonable jury could have concluded Woodrow intentionally aided the crime without intending to kill. (Cf. People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 13-14 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392].) Most significant is the evidence showing Woodrow answered in the affirmative when Robert asked “Can I shoot?” This evidence clearly betrays Woodrow’s intention not merely to aid in the criminal enterprise but to kill as well. Inasmuch as we need not pass on the adequacy of the jury instructions on the facts of this case, I would decline to do so.
With this one reservation, I concur in the majority decision.
Broussard, J., concurred.