Court Opinion

ID: 9678817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:33:08.460361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.146355
License: Public Domain

RICKHOFF, Justice,
concurring.
The concept of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction has been described as “a major innovation” of the Texas Family Code. Eugene L. Smith, Texas Family Code Symposium Supplement, Parent and Child, 8 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 19, 23 (1976). Before the Legislature enacted the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction provisions, suits affecting one child were decided by various judges in various courts, with the effect that “[¡Judges passing on some facet of a child’s welfare were cast into the position of a blind man touching and describing an elephant.” Id. “[Investing only one court with power to rule on issues affecting the child was predicted to be an effective way to give courts access to more information and leave them the widest latitude in dealing with the child’s best interests.” Id. This ease demonstrates that prediction fails when it confronts issues of court efficiency and convenience.
Yes, we do not wish to disturb Bexar County’s rotating docket system. But the district judges should make some attempt to implement the spirit behind the Family Code’s provisions for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over SAPCRs. See Alexander v. Russell, 699 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.1985); see also Pursley v. Ussery, 937 S.W.2d 566, *443567-68 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, no writ) (notwithstanding the exchange-of-benches provisions, only the court that rendered the judgment has jurisdiction to grant a bill of review). The current system renders the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction provisions meaningless. The majority’s determination of the court with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction is no more than an academic exercise because they ultimately conclude that by virtue of the rotating docket system, “any district judge assigned by the Presiding Judge to hear non-jury matters in SAPCR cases is actually acting for the court of exclusive jurisdiction....”1
I know our district judges individually need no lectures on their duties in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, but the comments of the children’s attorney/guardian-ad-litem, Michael D. Bowles, provide a valuable reminder that these cases are primarily about the best interest of individual children, not the convenience of the litigants and the courts generally. He reminds us that as we elevate the vaunted “efficiency” of the rotating docket system and other issues of particular concern to the courts’ operation, his clients’ childhoods pass quickly. He states that he “is more troubled by the length of time these children have been kept in limbo than whatever the ultimate outcome may be. Both of the parties appear to be good parents, but when dealing with each other they seem to lose sight of the best interests of the children.” He also notes:
This litigation is self-perpetuating. Each parent seems to honestly believe he/she is fighting for the children’s best interests, but the parents are liable to destroy the objects of their affection [and the] depths of bitterness in this case have sucked children, lawyers, witnesses, relatives, and even judges into a black hole of wasted money and broken hearts. Unfortunately, the course of recent history in this case may have now denied my clients their last chance at a life without stress, fear, and hate.
Judge Specia wisely recognized that the rotating docket system did not vindicate the interests of these children. Expressing concern about the effect of this protracted and bitter litigation on the children, Judge Specia assumed jurisdiction over the case to prevent it from “bouncing around between different judges.” He thus recognized the best interest/efficiency conflict and acted precisely in accordance with the existing policies underlying the Family Code’s provisions for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. See Trader v. Dear, 565 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex.1978) (“The Legislature by enacting the Family Code adopted a scheme for handling parent-child matters in a manner that avoids forum shopping, races to the courthouse, child snatching, and the harassment of a parent by the other parent’s filing suits in random courts.”). But Judge Speeia’s actions came after at least eight other judges had decided aspects of this case. One of these other judges presided over a four-week trial that resulted in a divorce decree giving Ismael sole managing conservatorship of the children. Still another judge subsequently determined summer possession of the children. Thus, we are confronted with a case that exemplifies why the Legislature enacted the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction provisions— a series of skirmishes between the parents were fought before whatever judge happenstance brought the parents to, before one judge finally recognized the need for some continuity. Understanding that “there is a need for one Judge to finish this matter,” Judge Specia suggests the all-too-natural temptation not to assume jurisdiction over a tiresome, extended custody case, when he elected to “retain jurisdiction ... against [his] better judgment.”
We must recognize that the constitution permits district judges to hold court for one another whenever they deem it expedient. But because judge shopping is a serious *444temptation for some parents and because we must focus on the children, SAPCRs should be determined not only in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, but also by the same judge. Before another ease like this one appears on this court’s docket, the district judges should implement the spirit of the Family Code by creating a rule requiring the presiding judge to consider assigning motions and actions related to custody and support of children to the same judge who rendered earlier decisions related to those children.
With these comments, I join the majority opinion.

. The only distinction between this case and Alexander is the absence in the record of a document expressly purporting to transfer the case from the 131st to the 225th. Instead, this record contains Judge Specia’s oral announcement that he wanted future motions to be filed "in this Court,” his written order stating that he would retain jurisdiction over subsequent SAPCRs, the parties’ subsequent motions filed in the 225th,' and an order on motions for enforcement signed by Judge Specia under the "225th” caption.