Court Opinion

ID: 9474984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:14:09.981191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:26.641986
License: Public Domain

SCALIA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I would reach the merits of the present appeal.
Subparagraph (1) of Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a) sets forth the line delimiting the period during which the plaintiff in federal district court can automatically achieve voluntary dismissal — the filing of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Once that line has been crossed, subparagraph (2) provides that dismissal can be effected only by “order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.” I do not agree with those decisions in other circuits which assert that the district court must grant this 41(a)(2) dismissal unless it would result in substantial prejudice to the defendant other than a second lawsuit or some tactical disadvantage. In my view, the Rule suggests that the work involved in filing an answer or developing a motion for summary judgment is alone enough to eliminate any right to voluntary dismissal — so that the district judge can for that reason alone deny the motion instead of merely conditioning it upon the payment of fees and expenses. If there is any restriction implicit in subparagraph (2), it is that the order cannot issue unless there is some affirmative reason why, despite the filing *355of the answer or motion for summary judgment, voluntary dismissal is appropriate.
But whatever the reasons that can justify the district court’s denial of a Rule 41(a)(2) order of dismissal, those reasons need not be specified in the denial, which can be made without explanation. See Bodecker v. Local Union No. P-46, 640 F.2d 182, 186 n. 5 (8th Cir.1981). Not all exercises of discretion must be supported by statements of reasons. This court issues innumerable orders — on motions to file pleadings not explicitly permitted by our rules, on motions for extension of time, on motions for rehearing, on agency motions for remand of the record, to name only a few — without any explanation of reasons. I see no basis for demanding more of the district court here. If (still assuming, contrary to my view, that “substantial prejudice” must be shown) no reasonable judge could have found substantial prejudice on the facts of this case, we can reverse for abuse of discretion; if not, the order should stand. That is not, to be sure, the sort of fail-safe, superabundant protection against error that we accord to more prejudicial determinations; but it seems to me entirely adequate when what is at issue is whether the plaintiff shall be required to persist in a course that he himself voluntarily undertook but now wishes to abandon over the objection of a defendant who has already been put to appreciable expense — and a course no more heinous than submitting the parties’ dispute to adjudication by the fair and impartial procedures of a federal court.
Finally, even if “substantial prejudice” were required and even if a statement of the reasons establishing prejudice were necessary in the circumstances here presented, I would still not hear the objections of this appellant, who proceeded to take depositions and to contest the motion for summary judgment after his motion to dismiss had been denied. I would treat a plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal like a defendant’s motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case: the movant’s objection to denial is waived if he is unwilling to rest on his objection (enabling him to appeal the ensuing adverse judgment) but instead proceeds to litigate on the merits. See Alston v. Bow-ins, 733 F.2d 161, 163-64 (D.C.Cir.1984). Cf. Holiday Queen Land Corp. v. Baker, 489 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir.1974) (denial of voluntary dismissal reviewed where plaintiff did not go forward); Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1967) (same). There is every reason of policy for treating the two situations alike — if indeed there is not even stronger reason for applying a waiver rule to the less egregious and less harmful error of wrongfully denied voluntary dismissal. I am aware that, as the majority opinion points out, Moore’s Federal Practice states the rule to be otherwise, with no discussion other than citation of authority. See 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas & J. Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 41.05[3] (rev. 2d ed. 1985). But none of the cases cited either discusses the waiver point, or constitutes a holding rejecting waiver, since the denials of dismissal were uniformly upheld. See Holmgren v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 516 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1975); Standard Industries, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 475 F.2d 220 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 829, 94 S.Ct. 56, 38 L.Ed.2d 63 (1973); Armstrong v. Frostie Co., 453 F.2d 914 (4th Cir.1971); La-Tex Supply Co. v. Fruehauf Trailer Div., 444 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942; 92 S.Ct. 287, 30 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971); Gamer v. Missouri-Pacific Lines, 409 F.2d 6 (6th Cir.1969). It seems to me that once the plaintiff has pursued the matter to judgment, a mistake that in no way affects the fairness of the outcome or the court’s jurisdiction over the parties should not be invocable to make the court’s later work, retroactively, a waste of time — leaving the claim, already fairly adjudged here, to be litigated again elsewhere. Such a squandering of judicial resources should not be allowed.