Court Opinion

ID: 9473403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:28:53.679647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:30.556299
License: Public Domain

*1154JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge
dissenting:
The rule of law announced in this case is sound. See Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512 (11th Cir.1983). I believe, however, that its application upon the facts of this record is misplaced. I therefore dissent.
The confrontation clause serves to guarantee both a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness, and the opportunity of the jury to observe witnesses and to judge for themselves the credibility of this testimony. Hutchins v. Wainwright, 715 F.2d 512, 516 (11th Cir.1983). At stake is a “practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials — ” Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 220, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). Moreover, even if a violation of the confrontation clause is established, it may be harmless error if the remaining evidence in the case establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Demps v. Wainwright, 666 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. Unit B.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 844, 103 S.Ct. 98, 74 L.Ed.2d 89 (1982); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 161, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980) (quoting Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). Thus, the manifest concern of the confrontation clause is that all criminal convictions be established upon, and only upon, a conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This determination is a practical, rather than theoretical one.
Under the facts of the instant case it is undisputed that the perpetrator of this crime arrived in a yellow Cadillac. It is undisputed that this same yellow Cadillac was abandoned on a public thoroughfare. It is undisputed that a person, unknown, informed Officer Jaeger of these facts, and that upon receipt of this information, Officer Jaeger pursued his own investigation of the crime. Under these circumstances I am not persuaded that the testimony of the officer that he did the obvious — commenced his work by investigating the Cadillac — played a significant role in the appellant’s conviction. Thus, as a practical matter, I believe either that the confrontation clause was not violated or, if it was, that any violation was harmless error. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.