Court Opinion

ID: 9547880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:53:44.799585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:11.302444
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: I believe the majority opinion is overly technical in both its rationale and conclusions.
A crime was committed in Pratt county. A warrant was issued for the arrest of Debbie Hennessee as the perpetrator thereof. Ray McGuire, Pratt County Sheriff, knew Ms. Hennessee and also knew she lived in Stafford County, two miles from the *810county line. McGuire called Bill Christy, Stafford County Sheriff, to assist in serving the warrant. Two agents of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation were also involved at the request of McGuire.
McGuire and Gary Pettijohn (one of the KBI agents) stepped up on the porch to make the arrest. When Ms. Hennessee opened the door McGuire handed her the warrant and told her she was under arrest. At the time Pettijohn was beside Christy and was the man who subsequently read Ms. Hennessee her rights. Also on the porch, a short distance away, was Christy, who saw the whole process.
Three law officers were in the immediate arrest scene. Christy obviously was fully authorized to make the arrest as he was the local sheriff. Pettijohn had equal authority to make the arrest pursuant to K.S.A. 75-712 as follows:
“Each member of the bureau [KBI] shall possess all powers and privileges which are now or may be hereafter given to the sheriffs of the state of Kansas.”
Therefore, two of the three officers had full authority to make the arrest. All three men testified McGuire was the only one able to identify Ms. Hennessee. As Sheriff McGuire testified:
“Ray [McGuire] had called and said they had a — he had a warrant for Debbie Hennessee and that he knew her and I gave him permission to come into Stafford County and make the arrest, that I would meet him at the house.”
The arrest could logically be considered the joint effort of all three officers. At the very least it was the joint effort of McGuire and Pettijohn. When two law officers are jointly involved in making an arrest, I think it matters not which one actually says the words, “You are under arrest.” The authority of officers should be considered jointly and collectively in determining whether the arrest was lawful.
This court has never hesitated to consider arresting officers' conduct collectively if one of them makes an impermissible search, seizure or interrogation. The State, in such circumstances, is not permitted to isolate the erring officer and rely on the propriety of the actions of the other officers. Rather the actions of the officers are considered collectively.
Further, in determining whether an officer making a warrant-less arrest has the requisite probable cause, the knowledge of all other officers involved in the investigation is imputed to the arresting officer even though such other officers are not even in *811the area of the arrest. State v. Niblock, 230 Kan. 156, 631 P.2d 661 (1981); State v. Washington, 226 Kan. 768, 602 P.2d 1377 (1979).
In State v. Shienle, 218 Kan. 637, 545 P.2d 1129 (1976), we held a warrantless arrest by a Kansas officer of a man in Missouri was proper even though no hot pursuit was involved. A car had been stolen in Kansas. Five days later the Kansas officer investigating the crime saw the vehicle parked in Missouri. The Kansas officer arrested the thief as he reentered the vehicle. The Kansas officer had requested that local officers assist him. We held:
“When an arrest without a warrant is made by a Kansas police officer outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction the arrest may be a legal private citizen’s arrest when it is established that: (1) arrests by private citizens are recognized as legal in the state where the arrest is made; (2) a felony has been or was being committed in that state; (3) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe the person arrested is guilty thereof; and (4) the officer acted reasonably under the exigencies attending the arrest.” Syl. ¶ 4.
In the case before us we are not dealing with a warrantless arrest. A valid felony warrant had been issued for Ms. Hennessee’s arrest. An arrest with a warrant differs considerably from a warrantless arrest. Probable cause for the arrest has already been found by a magistrate. The officer serving the warrant has no discretion on whether to serve same and the actual service is rather ministerial in nature. An arrest without a warrant is a discretionary act on the officer’s part and obviously greater safeguards are necessary to prevent abuse. Certainly a police officer should not be permitted to arrest on whim.
Under the totality of the circumstances herein, I believe the authority for service of the warrant and arrest must be considered the collective or joint authority of the officers involved in the arrest — McGuire, Pettijohn and Christy. At the very least McGuire and Pettijohn were both directly involved. Pettijohn was so deeply a part of the arrest he could not even recall whether he or McGuire actually told Ms. Hennessee she was under arrest. Certainly Pettijohn or Christy had full authority to arrest Ms. Hennessee. It is unrealistic, unreasonable and overly technical to single out one of the jointly participating officers and invalidate an arrest because the one officer is not in his own county. It was wholly logical to have the only officer who could identify the person named in the warrant be in the forefront of *812the activity. The arrest was obviously the result of a reasonable and coordinated interdepartment plan approved by the local sheriff who was also present.
I would hold the arrest was lawful and reverse the trial court.
Miller, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.