Court Opinion

ID: 9398585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 19:04:39.931485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.811949
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/31/23 Shang v. Jin CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 HONGHUA SHANG,                                                       B315232

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                         21PSCV00187)

 JING JIN et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gloria White-Brown, Judge. Affirmed.
     Demler, Armstrong & Rowland, Robert W. Armstrong and
Pennie P. Liu for Defendants and Appellants.
     Honghua Shang, in pro. per.; RELAW, Jennifer Felten and
Timothy S. Camarena for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiff Honghua “Harry” Shang entered into a listing
agreement to sell a home belonging to the father of defendant
Jing Jin. Seven months after the closing, Jin posted multiple
negative reviews of Shang and his business on several websites
including Yelp, Facebook, CCYP.com (CCYP), and Google. Jin’s
husband, defendant Benjamin Lee, also posted a negative review
about Shang. Shang sued Jin and Lee for defamation.
Defendants moved to strike plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure section 425.16,1 California’s “anti-SLAPP”
statute. After continuing the hearing so the parties could depose
Jin’s parents, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to strike,
finding that plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the claim. Defendants appeal from the order
denying their motion. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. The parties and the real estate transaction
       Shang is a licensed real estate broker and the principal of
Great Wall Realty and Echain Escrow. In March of 2020, Great
Wall Realty entered into a written listing agreement with Jin’s
father to sell his home in Azusa. The listing price was $499,900.
The agreement provided for a 2.5 percent commission to the
buyer’s agent and no commission to plaintiff, but it also required
the sellers to open escrow with Echain Escrow, Shang’s escrow
company. Jin overheard a telephone conversation between her
parents and Shang, in which Shang explained he could afford to
take no commission on the sale of the house because he earned
his fee through Echain Escrow. Jin also attached an exchange of

1    All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                 2
text messages with plaintiff in which he confirmed that he would
charge no commission.
       Jin asserts that her parents “do not speak or read English
fluently.” Shang is fluent in Chinese and markets his services to
the Chinese-speaking community, advertising on websites and in
Chinese-language media targeted to that community. According
to Jin, because her father “cannot read English,” he asked her to
review the listing agreement. From time to time Jin’s mother,
who called herself “Sunny,” communicated with Shang by email
in English. For example, Jin’s mother sent the following e-mail
that was both written in English and contained a link to an
English-language website: “Can we please get someone to take
photos today? Tomorrow [it] will start raining again and it may
affect quality of the photos. [¶] I don’t think my son-in-law can
write the description as professional as you are, and he’s very
busy with his work and most importantly, he’s not our agent.
Writing descriptions, taking photos, putting up signs, hosting
open houses, reviewing offers, pretty much everything related to
marketing the house should be seller agent’s responsibility by
standard and as we had discussed over the phone. [¶]
https://www.moneycrashers.com/real-estate-agent-
responsibilities-duties/ [¶] Thank you, [¶] Sunny.” The record
contains other examples of brief emails, ostensibly sent by Jin’s
mother, written in English and sent in response to e-mails from
Shang transmitting transactional documents written in English.2

2     On April 10, 2020, Jin’s mother replied as follows to an e-
mail from plaintiff: “Hi Harry, [¶] Please see attached the file of
signature documents escrow. [¶] Thanks! [¶] Sunny.” On May
17, 2020, Jin’s mother emailed signed documents for the pest

                                 3
       Jin’s father also completed and signed several English-
language transactional documents in connection with the sale of
the house. These documents include a Real Estate Transfer
Disclosure Statement that was signed by Shang and by Jin’s
father on March 29, 2020. The form includes a number of
English words filled in to describe features of the house. For
example, the word “bathrooms” is added to describe the location
of exhaust fans; the words “outside house” to describe the location
of a gas starter, and the word “shingle” to describe the type of
roof on the house. Elsewhere on the form, after checking the box
“yes” stating that the seller’s awareness of “significant
defects/malfunctions” on the property, the words “Fence, Drive
Way, Concrete, Kitchen, Cabinet, Toilet, painting inside and
outside” are added. On the same date Jin’s father signed and
returned to Shang a “Seller Property Questionnaire” on which
the words “Fence, Drive Way, Concrete, Kitchen, Cabinet, Toilet,
painting inside and outside” are written in response to a question
about repairs or alterations to the property. Jin’s father also
signed a “Residential Earthquake Hazards Report” form that has
boxes checked (Yes/No/Doesn’t Apply/Don’t Know) responding to
a series of questions about the construction of the house.
       Jin’s father accepted an offer to purchase the home for
$525,000, an amount in excess of the listing price. According to
Shang, Jin’s father was pleased with the results and offered to
pay him what amounted to a bonus equal to 1 percent of the
purchase price, or $5,250. Jin’s parents deny agreeing to the
commission. Jin states that she and her parents were “extremely
upset with plaintiff’s misrepresentation and failure to abide by

control contractor with the following message: “Hi Harry, [¶]
Please see signed documents. [¶] Thanks! [¶] Sunny.”

                                4
the terms of the original agreement.” Regardless, the record
confirms that at an in-person meeting on June 18, 2020, prior to
the closing on June 24, 2020, Jin’s father signed a “Seller’s Final
Settlement Statement” showing a “commission” payable to Great
Wall Realty in the amount of $5,250, in addition to the
commission payable to the buyer’s broker and the escrow fee
payable to Echain Escrow. The next day plaintiff emailed Jin’s
father an escrow instruction providing for a commission of $5,250
payable to Great Wall Realty at the time of closing. According to
Jin, she did not have an opportunity to review the documents and
was not present when her father signed them. Jin does not offer
any explanation for why neither she nor her father objected to the
commission between June 18, when her father signed the
settlement statement and June 24, when the transaction closed.
      At the closing, Jin’s father received the amount shown on
the escrow statement he had agreed to on June 18, 2020. In
February of 2021 – more than seven months after the sale of Jin’s
parents’ home closed – Shang became aware of posts on various
websites criticizing him and his business.3 On February 10,
2021, using the pseudonym “Jean J.,” Jin made the following post
on Yelp: “Harry/Great Wall/Echain Realty is the worst possible
realtor anyone could ever work with. The reason my mom found
him was because of his so-called ‘free commission’ promise, and
nope, there was no free lunch and his attitude and behavior

3     We rely on the actual posts themselves, rather than on
plaintiff’s description of those posts in his complaint. However,
we have not considered posts included as exhibits to Jin’s
declaration in support of defendants’ special motion to strike that
are written entirely in Chinese, and are not accompanied by the
translation required by rule 3.1110(g) of the California Rules of
Court.

                                 5
proved that. Dealing with him was the worst nightmare. He
took advantage of people who spoke little English like my parents
and made many promises but failed to deliver. [¶] If you want to
work with someone who is unprofessional and dishonest and still
charges the sugar coated ‘service fee’ at the end, he is the one. If
you want to listen to someone who is full of lies, he is the one. Do
yourself a favor, don’t believe the positive comments listed by
other agent or his friends. LOOK FOR SOMEONE ELSE! Being
his customer is the biggest mistake I have made in life!” Jin
repeated this post on Yelp and on CCYP, using the pseudonym
“Harry’s Victim.”
       Also on February 10, 2021, Jin made the following post on
the Facebook page for Great Wall Realty, using the pseudonym
“Mandy Lau”: “Harry Shang is the worst possible realtor anyone
could ever work with. The reason we found him was because his
so called ‘free commission’ ad, and yes, it was a complete lie. If
you want to work with someone who is unprofessional and also
charges commission, he is the one. If you want to listen to
someone who is full of lies, he is the one. If you want to do
yourself a favor, don’t believe any positive comments listed by
other agents or his friends and look for someone else. I was a
client of his and this is one of the biggest mistakes I made in life!”
The same posting was repeated on CCYP under the pseudonym
“Harry’s Victim,” on a Google review for Great Wall Realty by “JJ
World,” and on Yelp under the name “Jean J.”
       On February 13, 2021, using the pseudonym “Wendy L.,”
Jin posted the following on Yelp and CCYP: “This review is for
Harry and his business Great Wall Realty and Echain Realty. I
hate writing negative reviews, but he is such a dishonest,
unfaithful, and unprofessional person to work with. I 100% agree

                                  6
with all the negative reviews, and he could be worse than their
descriptions. Not sure how this business can even last.”
        On February 20, 2021, Jin posted as follows on Yelp: “The
only reason my family hired Harry Shang/Honghua Shang (the
owner of Echain Realty/ Great Wall Realty) was because he told
us he would have 0 percent commission for selling our property.
We were skeptical at first, but he told us he wouldn’t charge
because he could still make money by us using his own Escrow
company. We took his word and went with him. The fact is, he
still charged commission at the end although he promised he
would not. [¶] *Attention* If anyone has similar experience, you
can submit a complaint to California Department of Real Estate:
https://www.dre.ca.gov/Consumers/FileComplaint.html (you can
select multiple languages at the bottom of the page). We need to
work together to prevent this from happening again!”
        Shang alleges that on January 12, 2021, Jin’s husband Lee
published the following post on CCYP: “ ‘Tell you the truth and
lies/lie. He poses a threat to the Chinese community. He uses
his people, especially those who only speak a little English or
even no English all. He never answered the phone and claimed
that “I did not receive those emails.” He also produced a digitally
signed document to convince you that the agreement and terms
are legal.’ ”
        The week of February 17, 2021, a sales agent who works
with Shang received a telephone call from a man complaining
that Shang was “ ‘dishonest’ ” and “ ‘unprofessional,’ ” and who
wanted to gather evidence of Shang’s “dishonesty and
unprofessionalism.” On approximately February 19, 2021, one of
Shang’s recent clients received a similar telephone call, this one
asserting that Shang was “ ‘unprofessional’ ” and warning that

                                7
the client would be “ ‘in deep trouble’ ” if represented by Shang in
the sale of his property. Both calls came from the same telephone
number, which belongs to Lee.
       B. Shang’s complaint and defendants’ motion to
          strike
       On March 5, 2021, Shang filed a complaint against
defendants, among others, alleging a single cause of action for
defamation per se. The complaint set out the posts quoted above
but did not mention the telephone calls attributed to Lee. Shang
requested an award of compensatory and punitive damages.
       On May 13, 2021, Jin and Lee filed a motion to strike
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Their motion
alleged that Jin’s internet postings were protected conduct
because they were made in a public forum and concerned a
matter of public interest and discussion. In addition, Jin
asserted that the postings contained her “truthful opinions
formulated based on her and her parents’ interactions with
plaintiff as a real estate agent,” and that the sole purpose of her
postings “was to share her and her family’s experience with other
consumers.” Specifically, Jin averred that her parents were
unable to speak or understand English, and denied that they had
ever agreed to pay one percent of the sales price of the home to
plaintiff. Rather, her parents contended that Shang sprung the
commission on them when they came to Shang’s office to sign
escrow documents, and that Jin’s father only signed the escrow
instruction paying a commission to Shang because he told them
that if they refused to do so they would not receive the proceeds
of the sale of their home. For her part, Jin stated that it was not
until February of 2021 that she learned her parents had paid a
commission to plaintiff. According to her parents, they had been

                                 8
“afraid” to tell Jin they paid the commission. According to Jin,
when she contacted Shang about the commission he “did not
provide a further explanation and instead implied that since Jin’s
father had already signed the document, there was nothing they
could do.”
       Shang opposed Jin’s and Lee’s motion to strike. Shang
argued that Jin’s statements that he is “dishonest,
unprofessional, ‘the worst possible realtor,’ ‘took advantage of
people who spoke little English,’ ‘made promises but failed to
deliver,’ and ‘full of lies’ ” are all defamatory per se. Moreover,
Shang argued that these statements not only were not opinions,
but implied that Jin was privy to facts not known to those
reading her posts and thus should be taken as authoritative.
Finally, Shang pointed out that Jin “made the posts over several
days” and that she used five different pseudonyms on five
different platforms “to echo her false statements.” In support of
his opposition, Shang attached declarations from the recipients of
Lee’s telephone calls, as well as screenshots of the allegedly
defamatory posts, the e-mails from Jin’s mother written in
English, and copies of the transactional documents signed by
Jin’s father.
       At the hearing on defendants’ motion, the court issued a
tentative decision to deny defendants’ motion and noted that
defendants had not submitted declarations by either of Jin’s
parents regarding their dealings with plaintiff or their ability to
speak and understand English. At defendants’ request, the court
continued the hearing for a month to enable the parties to depose
Jin’s parents. The depositions were taken on July 8, 2021, and
thereafter both sides submitted excerpts from the depositions in
support of their respective positions. Jin’s parents both testified

                                 9
that they were not fluent in English. Jin’s mother stated she was
the more fluent of the two. Jin’s father testified that he felt he
had no choice but to accede to Shang’s request for a commission
because he was told if he did not agree, he would not receive the
proceeds from the sale of his home. He also testified that he had
been “afraid” to tell his daughter about the commission, which is
why she only learned about it seven months after the closing.
       The hearing on defendants' anti-SLAPP motion resumed on
July 27, 2021. This time, the court's tentative ruling was to
grant the motion. Following brief argument, the court took the
matter under submission and indicated that she would further
consider whether Jin's posts were susceptible of a defamatory
reading. At the end of the hearing, the court took defendants’
motion under submission. On August 4, 2021, the court issued a
minute order denying defendants’ motion. In its order, the court
found “that the statements at issue are reasonably susceptible to
a defamatory interpretation” and “that a reasonable fact finder
could conclude the published statements declare or imply a
provably false assertion of fact regarding Jin’s several
statements, that might imply or state assertions that are simply
not true.” The order was served on the parties on August 4, 2021,
and defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on September 1,
2021. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(13).
                           DISCUSSION
       A. Section 425.16 Special Motions to Strike and the
          Standard of Review
       The anti-SLAPP statute “provide[s] for the early dismissal
of unmeritorious claims filed to interfere with the valid exercise
of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for

                               10
the redress of grievances.” (Club Members for an Honest Election
v. Sierra Club (2008) 45 Cal.4th 309, 315.) “When served with a
SLAPP suit, the defendant may immediately move to strike the
complaint under section 425.16.” (Hansen v. Department of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1543
(Hansen).) “To determine whether this motion should be granted,
the trial court must engage in a two-step process.” (Ibid.)
       At the first step, “the court decides whether the defendant
has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action
is one ‘arising from’ protected activity.” (City of Cotati v.
Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 76.) If the court determines the
defendant has made the requisite showing, “it must then
determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability
of prevailing on the claim.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 88.) “The plaintiff can carry his burden by making a prima
facie showing of facts that would, if proved, support a judgment
in his favor.” (Midland Pacific Building Corp. v. King (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 264, 271.) “The plaintiff need only establish that his
or her claim has minimal merit to avoid being struck as a
SLAPP.” (Hansen, supra, 171 Cal.App. 4th at p. 1543.)
       A claim must satisfy both prongs to be stricken under the
anti-SLAPP statute. (Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022)
13 Cal.5th 859, 872 (Serova).) An order granting or denying a
motion to strike made under section 425.16 is reviewed de novo.
(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2
Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
       B. Shang established a probability of prevailing
       In denying the defendants’ motion, the trial court did not
explicitly address whether the contested posts satisfied the first
prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. Although on appeal Shang

                                11
disputes this issue, he did not raise it in his briefs or at argument
before the trial court. Because we conclude that the trial court
correctly denied defendants’ motion under the second prong, we
need not address this issue. (Serova, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 872
[“. . .we may conclude a contested portion of an anti-SLAPP
motion should be denied solely based on a plaintiff's showing of
merit, as a sufficiently meritorious claim cannot be struck
regardless of whether it arises from activity the anti-SLAPP
statute protects”].) We shall assume, without deciding, that the
challenged statements accusing Shang in a public forum of lying
to and taking advantage of Chinese clients who spoke limited
English in connection with his work as a real estate agent
address an issue of public interest and therefore are protected
activity within the meaning of section 425.16—thus satisfying the
first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.4
        We thus turn to the issue of whether Shang has met his
burden to establish a probability of prevailing on his defamation
claim. The trial court denied defendants’ motion because it found
that the statements attributed to defendants are “reasonably
susceptible to a defamatory interpretation.” On appeal,
defendants argue that the court erred because defendants’ posts
are a mixture of truthful statements and nonactionable opinion.
We disagree.
        “The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication
that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a

4     Shang contends on appeal that defendants’ statements,
while made on a public forum, do not concern a matter of public
interest. He argues that defendants’ posts amounted to private
dispute over a one-time transaction and did not pertain to “any
widespread practice” that he employed at his business.

                                 12
natural tendency to injure or causes special damage.” (Wong v.
Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1369.) “ ‘The sine qua non of
recovery for defamation . . . is the existence of falsehood.’
[Citation.] Because the statement must contain a provable
falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and
statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability.
Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel,
statements of opinion are constitutionally protected.” (McGarry
v. University of San Diego (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 97, 112.) That
said, “[a] statement of opinion may be actionable if it implies the
allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the
opinion.” (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 902–
903.)
       The “crucial question of whether challenged statements
convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of
law for the court.” (Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 798, 810.) “Only once the court has determined
that a statement is reasonably susceptible to such a defamatory
interpretation does it become a question for the trier of fact
whether or not it was so understood.” (Smith v. Maldonado
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 647.)
       Defendants argue that the court erred when it determined
that Shang had established a probability of prevailing because
the statements at issue were made online. They argue that
online sites have been recognized as forums that invite
“ ‘exaggerated and insulting criticisms of businesses,’ ” a context
that defendants’ assert renders their statements properly
characterized as nothing more than hyperbolic rhetoric.
       “[T]he mere fact speech is broadcast across the Internet by
an anonymous speaker does not ipso facto make it nonactionable

                                13
opinion and immune from defamation law.” (Bently Reserve LP v.
Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 429 (Bently).) In any
event, the cases cited by defendants are readily distinguishable.
For example, defendants rely on Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 1138, 1149 (Chaker), a case which held that
statements made in the context of a paternity dispute were not
defamatory in part because they were “made on Internet Web
sites which plainly invited the sort of exaggerated and insulting
criticisms of businesses and individuals which occurred here.”
The comments at issue included statements that Chaker
“pick[ed] up streetwalkers and homeless drug addicts and is a
deadbeat dad,” comments that the court interpreted as “name
calling.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the “overall thrust of
the comments attributed is that Chaker is a dishonest and scary
person. This overall appraisal of Chaker is on its face nothing
more than a negative, but nonactionable opinion.” (Ibid.)
Notably, the court found that the comments lacked specificity as
to the time and place of the alleged behavior, a fact that the court
found would signal to the reader that there was “no factual basis
for the accusations.” (Id. at p. 1150.)
       Similarly, in ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93
Cal.App.4th 993, 1013 (ComputerXpress, Inc.), the defendant’s
comments on an internet message board included, among others,
one accusing the promoters of a company as caring “nothing
about generating a genuine business, and everything about
selling the stock,” and another foretelling that “ ‘[w]hen the
people who have . . . been duped into this stock realize the scam
they were coaxed into, my guess is there will be hell to pay.’ ”
(Ibid.) Nonetheless, the court found that these posts could not
reasonably be read as factual because “their tone and content

                                14
identified them as statements of opinion and not
fact. . . . Moreover, they were replete with explicit statements of
opinion, such as ‘IMO [in my opinion],’ ‘what I think is a fraud,’ ‘I
firmly believe,’ ‘is that fraud?’ and ‘my guess is.’ ” (Ibid.) The
court also described the assertion that the promoters only cared
about selling stock rather than forming a genuine business as
“too vague to be taken as fact by a reasonable reader.” (Ibid.)
         Unlike Chaker and ComputerXpress, Inc., here defendants’
statements include detailed accusations about a specific real
estate transaction. And even if some of the statements at issue
fall into the category of “ ‘rhetorical hyperbole,’ ” such as Jin’s
assertion that plaintiff is the “worst possible realtor anyone could
ever work with,” other portions contain statements that a
reasonable fact finder could conclude are declared or implied
assertions of fact. Jin wrote, for instance, that “[t]he only reason
my family hired Harry Shang . . . was because he told us he
would have 0 percent commission for selling our property. We
were skeptical at first, but he told us he wouldn’t charge because
he could still make money by using his own Escrow
company. . . . The fact is, he still charged commission at the end
although he promised he would not.” She also wrote, “[Shang]
. . . is the worst possible realtor anyone could ever work with.
The reason my mom found him was because of his so called ‘free
commission’ promise, and nope, there was no free lunch. . . . He
took advantage of people who spoke little English like my parents
and made many promises but failed to deliver. [¶] If you want to
work with someone who is unprofessional and dishonest and still
charges the sugar coated ‘service fee’ at the end, he is the one for
you.” These statements contain detailed factual assertions,
including Shang’s agreement to forgo a commission, and Jin’s

                                 15
parents limited English-speaking ability, that distinguishes them
from mere name calling or negative opinion. Taken in context,
the statements could be “reasonably perceived as containing
actionable assertions of fact.” (Bently, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at
p. 431.)5
       Defendants concede that Jin made some factual statements
in her online posts but argue that the statements were “basically
true,” and thus not defamatory. Defendants point to evidence
that (1) Jin’s parents asked her to help them with the real estate
transaction because they struggled with English; (2) Shang made
statements in the listing agreement and by text message that he
would not charge a commission; (3) Shang surprised Jin’s parents
by including the commission at the close of escrow; and (4) Jin’s
parents acquiesced to Shang’s demand because they were worried
if they did not agree they would lose the proceeds from the sale.
But in opposing the motion to strike, Shang offered evidence that
tended to prove each of defendants’ statements were false. Shang
offered evidence that Jin’s parents understood and communicated

5      Even defendants’ characterizations of plaintiff as
“dishonest” and a “liar” are not pure expressions of opinion,
because they imply that defendants are privy to facts that prove
plaintiff’s dishonesty. For example, Jin urges readers “not to
believe” favorable reviews posted by “other agents or his friends.”
The implication is that she was not only posting about her own
experiences but suggesting that her posts were the only unbiased
ones. “[I]f the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his
assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a
false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms
of opinion does not dispel these implications.” (Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co. (1990) 497 U.S. 1, 18–19.)

                                 16
in English, in the form of e-mails from Jin’s mother and
transactional documents completed in English and returned by
Jin’s father. In his declaration opposing defendants’ motion,
Shang testified that Jin’s father agreed to pay a commission
because he was happy with plaintiff’s service. Rebutting Jin’s
assertion that the commission was a surprise to her father,
Shang’s evidence shows that the escrow instruction to pay a
commission was e-mailed to Jin’s father almost a week prior to
the closing, not at the last minute when her father might
reasonably fear it was too late to refuse for fear of not receiving
the sales proceeds. And far from being a complete presentation of
the facts of the dispute, nowhere in Jin’s posts does she
acknowledge that her mother communicated with plaintiff in
English, that her father added English words to blank spaces in
documents written in English, that he signed an escrow
instruction agreeing to pay plaintiff a 1 percent commission, or
that Shang sold the house for more than the listing price.
       Section 425.16, subdivision (b), requires the trial court to
consider plaintiff’s affidavits for the purpose of determining
whether sufficient evidence has been presented to demonstrate a
prima facie case. “ ‘In making this judgment, the trial court’s
consideration of the defendant’s opposing affidavits does not
permit a weighing of them against plaintiff’s supporting evidence,
but only a determination that they do not, as a matter of law,
defeat that evidence.’ ” (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle
Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 867, original italics.)
Shang need only show that his defamation claim has at least
“ ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 884.) Shang met that burden by making “ ‘ “ ‘a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable

                                17
judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is
credited.’ ” ’ ” (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 482, 488.) Thus, the trial court properly denied
defendants’ special motion to strike.
       C. The trial court did not err in denying the special
          motion as it pertained to defendant Lee
       Defendants also argue that Shang failed to show a
probability of prevailing in his case against Lee because the
evidence was “uncontroverted” that “he was not the author of any
of the communications. . . .” Lee specifically denies posting the
review attributed to him in Shang’s complaint or doing anything
to encourage or assist Jin with her reviews. Shang introduced
evidence, however, that tends to show that Lee participated in
the negative campaign against Shang. The post Shang attributes
to Lee in his complaint is authored by someone identified as
“Ben”, Lee’s first name. Lee’s post was made within weeks of
Jin’s posts, and contained specific details about a real estate
transaction that closely track the allegations Jin made in her
online posts. Additionally, in opposition to the motion to strike,
Shang offered into evidence declarations from two of Shang’s
associates who stated that they received calls from Lee’s phone
number, in which the caller complained that Shang was “
‘unprofessional’ ” and that he was “collecting proof of [Shang’s]
dishonesty and unprofessionalism.” Although not alleged as part
of Shang’s defamation cause of action, the evidence that Lee
placed calls to Shang’s associates is further proof of a nexus
between Lee and Jin, and of Lee’s involvement in the negative
reviews. Based on this evidence, a trier of fact could reasonably
infer that Lee posted the review that Shang attributed to him.
Moreover, the post is susceptible of a defamatory interpretation

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for the same reason Jin’s posts are—it both accuses plaintiff of
taking advantage of non-English speaking clients and suggests
that he relies on false signatures as a means of taking advantage,
facts that Shang disputed in the evidence he introduced in
opposition to the motion to strike.
                           DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendants’ special motion to strike is
affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover his costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           HEIDEL, J.*

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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