Court Opinion

ID: 9463046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:57:06.92971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:54.708906
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion for the reasons set forth just below.
In the instant case, the merits of the dispute were not appealed and, as such, that judgment is final. This being so, I am of opinion the Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), is controlling. There, the Court had before it the question of the propriety of an award of attorneys’ fees under a statute authorizing such an award adopted during the pendency of an action seeking to recover such fees. As stated by the Court:
“The question, properly viewed, then, is not simply one relating to the propriety of retroactive application of [the statute allowing attorneys’ fees] to services rendered prior to its enactment, but rather, one relating to the applicability of that section to a situation where the propriety of a fee award was pending resolution on appeal when the statute became law.” 416 U.S. at 710, 94 S.Ct. at 2015.
Barring any manifest injustice or statutory directive to the contrary, the Court concluded that “a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision.” 416 U.S. at 711, 94 S.Ct. at 2016. Thus, although the district court’s ruling on the merits of the matter now before us may have been erroneous at the time it was rendered, its reconsideration is closed to us, and I am of opinion we are bound by Bradley to apply § 14(e), 42 U.S.C. § 19737(e), of the 1975 Voting Rights Act amendments so as to sustain the award of attorneys’ fees.
Since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1907), affirmative relief has been available to require public officials to perform their duties in a constitutional manner. That being true, and since it has previously been decided in Lincoln County that counties are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the only other reasoning (than Bradley) necessary to support the decision reached here is § 14(e), 42 U.S.C. § 19737(e), of the Voting Rights Act, which specifically allows attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in “any action” to enforce the voting guarantees involved here.
With this in mind, although I am not in accord with many or all of the statements made in the majority opinion, I do not think a dissent would add anything to the case, especially because they are dicta. But I should not leave the subject without noting my particular disagreement with the suggestion in the opinion that Congress may limit the application of the Eleventh Amendment. It is for the courts, not Congress, to say how the Constitution should apply. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).