Court Opinion

ID: 9940474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 16:11:20.981638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:54.562362
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Colley v. Crabtree, 2024-Ohio-437.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  SCIOTO COUNTY

MARJEAN COLLEY                                 :   Case No. 22CA3997
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE                    :
OF KYLE DANA COLLEY,                           :
                                               :
        Plaintiff-Appellant,                   :
                                               :
        v.                                     :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                               :   ENTRY
DANIEL TRAVIS CRABTREE, et. al.,               :
                                               :
        Defendants-Appellees.                  :   RELEASED: 02/02/2024
                                               :

                                        APPEARANCES:

James H. Banks, Dublin, Ohio, for Appellant.

Andrew N. Yosowitz, Teetor Westfall LLC, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Marjean Colley (“Colley”), appeals a Scioto County Court

of Common Pleas judgment entry that dismissed her complaint against appellees

because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellees

include Scioto County Sheriff’s Department/Scioto County, Ohio, and Scioto

County employees, Denver Triggs and Matthew D. Spencer. Pertinent to this

appeal are Colley’s claims against appellees for their roles in allegedly

conducting or permitting an “insufficient investigation” into the cause of her son’s

death and subsequent alleged cover-up of that investigation.

        {¶2} Colley first asserts that the trial judge erred in not recusing himself

from this case. Filing an affidavit of prejudice with the Ohio Supreme Court
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              2

pursuant to R.C. 2701.03 is the exclusive means of seeking recusal of a judge.

Because Colley never availed herself of this provision, we overrule her first

assignment of error.

       {¶3} In her second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Colley asserts

that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

After a de novo review of this case, we find that Colley’s complaint fails to state a

cognizable cause of action upon which relief could be granted against any of the

appellees. Therefore, we overrule Colley’s second, third, and fourth assignments

of error.

       {¶4} Accordingly, we affirm the trial courts judgment of dismissal.

                       PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       {¶5} On October 28, 2021, Colley filed a complaint that asserted ten

“claims” against Daniel Crabtree, Sydney Thompson, unknown agencies,

John/Jane Doe(s), and appellees.

       {¶6} Claims one through four alleged that on November 3, 2019, Crabtree

and Thompson went to Colley’s son’s (“decedent”) home located in McDermott,

Scioto County, Ohio intending to harm him. Crabtree and Doe(s) beat the

decedent, while other persons watched. As a direct and proximate result of the

beating, the decedent suffered injuries that resulted in his death. The complaint

alleged that Crabtree’s actions constituted assault and battery, and resulted in

the wrongful death of decedent. Assault and battery, wrongful death, along with

a survival claim were alleged by Colley against Crabtree, Thompson, and the

Doe(s), who are not parties to this appeal.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             3

      {¶7} The fifth claim alleged that after the decedent’s body was discovered

on November 3, 2019, Triggs and Spencer, employees of the Scioto County

Sheriff’s Department and Doe(s) arrived at the decedent’s home. It alleged that

Spencer was good friends with Crabtree’s brother and subsequently worked for

Crabtree’s brother. The fifth claim further contended:

        Without investigation, said [Appellees] determined that the cause
        of [the decedent’s] death was a self-injected drug overdose
        despite the following: (A) No needles were found in the house or
        in [decedent’s] arm; (B) No drugs were found near or in the house;
        (C) The house had been ransacked; (D) Furniture and belongings
        belonging to the decedent were broken and strewn about the area
        where [the decedent] was found; (E) There were blood splatters
        on the walls and floor; and (F) The couch upon which [the
        decedent] was found was soaked with blood, as was the floor
        beneath the couch.

      {¶8} The claim additionally alleged that to further support their

determination that the decedent died of an overdose, appellees canceled a

request for the Scioto County Coroner to come to the decedent’s home and

instead had the decedent’s body delivered to the Montgomery County Coroner’s

Office. Appellees also filed a report that concluded the decedent died of an

overdose.

      {¶9} Finally, the fifth claim alleged that the following facts were known or

should have been known and/or reported to the appellees:

        (A) In the photos of the home [the decedent’s] body had been
        repositioned on the couch from the position when his body was
        initially found to the time that [Triggs and Spencer] took pictures;
        (B) [Decedent’s body] was not examined for injury or damage, nor
        to determine whether he had been forcefully administered a “hot
        shot” or other drug to cause an overdose; (C) [Triggs and
        Spencer] refused to gather evidence regarding the blood splatters
        on the walls, couch and floor; (D) [Decedent’s] I-Pad was stolen
        and used by someone after his death to suggest that he was still
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                               4

        alive; (E) Money was missing from [the decedent’s] billfold despite
        the fact that witnesses confirmed that he had cash in the billfold
        on the day of his death and despite the fact that he allegedly had
        an additional $40.00 which defendant Thompson claimed she had
        paid him that day for a past debt; (F) Witnesses reported that there
        was “bad blood” between defendant Crabtree and [decedent] and
        a man believed to be Crabtree was seen near the back of
        [decedent’s] house on the date of the [decedent’s] death; (G)
        Defendant Thompson claimed she pulled a needle out of the
        [decedent’s] hand but no needle was found at the residence; (H)
        Witnesses with information regarding the [decedent’s] death were
        not questioned and/or their statements were taken as truth,
        without investigation or corroboration, to support [Triggs’ and
        Spencer’s] faulty determination of drug overdose as [decedent’s]
        cause of death[.]

       {¶10} The sixth claim alleged that the appellees conspired with each other

to cover up the true cause of the decedent’s death (beating), and the identity of

his killer (Crabtree). These acts were alleged to have been performed under the

direction and approval of the appellees acting in furtherance of each of their

business interests collectively or individually.

       {¶11} The seventh claim alleged that appellee, Scioto County Sheriff’s

Department/Scioto County, Ohio (hereinafter referred to as “Scioto County” or

the “County”), adopted policies “whereby misfeasance, malfeasance, negligence,

and cover-up” by its employees were “uncontrolled and unpunished.” The

County knew or should have known of these acts and taken corrective measures

to stop the wrongful conduct. These “extreme and outrageous” acts were

performed by Scioto County’s employees herein to the detriment of Colley.

       {¶12} The eighth and ninth claims alleged that the appellees’ actions

herein were performed “knowingly, wantonly, willfully, recklessly, and/or

intentionally, negligently, maliciously and without cause, justification or excuse.”
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              5

       {¶13} The tenth claim alleged that appellees’ actions herein constituted

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Colley and the

decedent’s beneficiaries.

       {¶14} As a direct and proximate cause of all the aforementioned claims,

the complaint alleged that Colley, the decedent, and decedent’s beneficiaries

suffered damages against appellees jointly and severally in excess of $25,000,

reasonable attorney fees, and any further relief the court might award.

       {¶15} On November 24, 2021, appellees filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to

dismiss Colley’s complaint alleging that it failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted.

       {¶16} Appellees first argued that Scioto County did not have the capacity

to be sued. Alternatively, appellees alleged that the County was immune from

liability under R.C. Chapter 2744.

       {¶17} The motion also maintained that the appellees took no part in any

actions that contributed to the decedents’ injuries or death. Rather, they were

allegedly committed by persons who were not employed with Scioto County.

Therefore, claims one through four for assault and battery, survivorship, and

wrongful death against Crabtree, Thompson, and Doe(s) failed to state a claim

upon which relief could be granted against the appellees.

       {¶18} The appellees further asserted that Ohio does not recognize a claim

for insufficient investigation as alleged in claim five. Thus, appellees argue that

Colley’s fifth claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              6

       {¶19} Appellees also argued that Colley’s sixth claim alleging conspiracy

was not pled with sufficient specificity, and instead made vague or conclusory

allegations and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted. Colley’s complaint lacked “any facts” that the trial court could interpret

as supporting a finding that Crabtree and Thompson engaged in a conspiracy

with appellees. Colley simply concluded that appellees acted in concert to

conceal the true cause of the decedent’s death without any factual support.

Therefore, appellees argued that Colley’s sixth claim failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.

       {¶20} Appellees argued that Colley’s seventh claim directed only at Scioto

County failed as a matter of law because even if Colley alleged a viable cause of

action against the County, it was immune from liability.

       {¶21} Colley’s eighth and ninth claims alleged that appellees acted

recklessly, wantonly, willfully, etc. Appellees argued such claims are not torts,

but instead “are levels of culpability needed to overcome” immunity of a viable

tort. For that reason, appellees contended that Colley’s eighth and ninth claims

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

       {¶22} Finally, Colley’s tenth claim alleging negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress also failed as a matter of law. For a claim of

negligent infliction of emotional distress, appellees cited High v. Howard for the

proposition that “Ohio courts have limited recovery to where the plaintiff is a

bystander to an accident or was in fear of physical consequences of his own

person.” 64 Ohio St.3d 82, 85-86, 1992-Ohio-125, 592 N.E.2d 818 (1992).
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                                 7

Colley was not a bystander to an accident and was not in fear of physical

consequences for her person. Thus, Colley failed to set out a viable claim of

negligent infliction of emotional distress.

       {¶23} Appellees further alleged that in order to recover for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant either

intended to cause emotional distress or knew or should have known that actions

taken would result in serious emotional distress to the plaintiff; 2) the defendant’s

conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency and it can be considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community;

3) that the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's emotional

distress; and 4) that the mental anguish suffered by plaintiff is serious to the

extent that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Pyle v. Pyle, 11

Ohio App. 3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 98 (8th Dist. 1983). The appellees argued that

Colley did not allege the type of serious mental anguish that Pyle requires.

       {¶24} Accordingly, appellees maintained that Colley’s claims for negligent

and intentional infliction of emotional distress also failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.

       {¶25} Additionally, appellees’ motion to dismiss claimed that Triggs and

Spencer, as employees of Scioto County, a political subdivision, were entitled to

statutory immunity under Chapter R.C. 2744. They argued that R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(b) provided that a political subdivision’s employees are immune

from liability, unless the employee’s acts or omissions were made with malicious

purpose, bad faith, or were committed in a wanton or reckless manner.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                           8

Appellees claimed that even if Triggs and Spencer were wrong about the cause

of the decedent’s death, there was no basis to argue that their actions were

reckless, malicious, or made in bad faith, which was the level of culpability

necessary to overcome immunity.

       {¶26} Therefore, the appellees sought dismissal of Colley’s complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

Attached to the motion was a copy of the deceased’s autopsy report.

       {¶27} On December 22, 2021, Colley filed a motion requesting the trial

judge to recuse himself from the case, and for an extension to respond to the

appellees’ motion to dismiss. Colley noted that the judge and appellees were all

employees of Scioto County. Colley also claimed that the trial judge was

previously a prosecutor for the City of Portsmouth, Ohio and during that time he

prosecuted the decedent on several occasions. Therefore, to avoid the

appearance of impropriety, Colley requested that the judge recuse himself from

this case. Colley also filed a motion to stay the proceedings until the judge ruled

on her motion for recusal.

       {¶28} On December 29, 2021, the appellees filed a motion opposing

Colley’s motion for recusal. They argued that the motion was an attempt to delay

the case, was procedurally improper because Colley did not comply with R.C.

2701.03, the judge’s prior professional activities are not grounds for recusal, and

the motion lacked legal merit.

       {¶29} On January 3, 2022, the trial court issued an entry that denied

Colley’s motion for a stay but granted her a 30-day extension to respond to the
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                               9

appellees’ motion to dismiss. The court also issued an additional entry that

requested Colley provide the court with a list of cases she believed would cause

a conflict by 4:00 p.m. on January 27. No pleading containing a list of such

cases can be found in the record.

       {¶30} On February 1, 2022, Colley filed a motion opposing the appellees’

motion to dismiss. Colley essentially restated her claims maintaining that if the

court accepted her allegations as true, then her complaint did state a claim upon

which she could recover damages. She also maintained that a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

motion to dismiss was limited to the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint so the

trial court could not consider the copy of the autopsy that was attached to the

appellees’ motion to dismiss.

       {¶31} On April 6, 2022, the court issued a judgment entry that granted the

appellees’ motion to dismiss. The court acknowledged that as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

motion its analysis was limited to the complaint and thus it could not consider the

copy of the coroner’s report that was attached to the appellees’ motion to

dismiss. The court then determined that Scioto County was capable of being

sued, but was immune from liability under R.C. Chapter 2744.

       {¶32} The court recognized that claims one through four were alleged

against Crabtree and Thompson, not the appellees herein. Consequently, the

trial court declined to address these claims in resolving appellees’ motion to

dismiss.

       {¶33} In addressing Colley’s fifth claim, the entry stated that the complaint

alleged “no facts that could be inferred to indicate that Triggs and Spencer did
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                          10

anything other than report to investigate a death.” The court also found that

because Ohio law does not recognize a claim for a “negligent investigation,”

Colley’s fifth claim failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and

should be dismissed.

       {¶34} In considering Colley’s sixth claim, the entry determined Colley’s

conspiracy action was not supported by any underlying tort, which is required for

a civil conspiracy action. The court also found the mere fact that Spencer was

friends with Crabtree’s brother was not enough to support the conspiracy claim

against appellees. Therefore, the entry concluded that Colley’s sixth claim failed

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

       {¶35} Although the entry did not expressly address claim seven, it

effectively held that Scioto County was not liable when it determined that the

County was immune from liability pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744.

       {¶36} The court then considered Colley’s tenth claim for negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against the appellees. The court found

that Crabtree’s alleged actions could have caused this type of severe mental

distress. However, the court found that there is no allegation which sets forth

any emotional distress caused by Triggs and Spencer in conducting their

investigation. Therefore, the court found that Colley’s tenth claim failed to set out

a claim upon which relief could be granted.

       {¶37} Finally, the court addressed Colley’s eighth and ninth claims when it

considered the liability of Scioto County employees, Triggs and Spencer. The

court began by stating “[a]lthough this Court has disposed of the claims against
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                         11

Triggs and Spencer above, this Court will also consider whether statutory

immunity applies, as requested in the motion to dismiss.” The court found that

employees of political subdivisions are immune from liability unless their actions

were conducted “ ‘with malicious purpose’ in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner.” The court determined that if Colley had stated a viable claim in this

case, Colley’s allegations for purposes of the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion would have

been sufficient to remove immunity from Triggs and Spencer.

       {¶38} The entry concluded that Colley’s claims against Triggs, Spencer,

and the County, were dismissed because they failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. It is this judgment that Colley appeals.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECUSE ITSELF FROM
       THE CASE AND IN REFUSING TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS ON
       DEFENDANT-APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BEFORE
       RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF RECUSAL

II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 12(B)(6) MOTION TO
       DISMISS FILED BY DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES DENVER TRIGGS,
       MATTHEW SPENCER, AND SCIOTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
       DEPARTMENT/SCIOTO COUNTY OHIO, OHIO ON PLAINTIFF-
       APPELLANT’S CLAIMS AGAINST THEM

III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT STATUTORY
       IMMUNITY UNDER R.C. CHAPTER 2744 SHIELDS DEFENDANT-
       APPELLEE SCIOTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT/SCIOTO
       COUNTY, OHIO FROM LIABILITY ON PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S
       CLAIMS

IV.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANTS-
       APPELLEES DENVER TRIGGS AND MATTHEW SPENCER ARE NOT
       PROTECTED BY STATUTORY IMMUNITY BASED UPON PLAINTIFF’S
       CLAIMS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS
       FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THEM
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              12

                               First Assignment of Error

       {¶39} Because the trial judge in this case had purportedly prosecuted the

decedent herein when he (the judge) was a prosecutor in Portsmouth, Ohio,

Colley moved the judge to recuse himself from this case. Colley maintains that in

the interest of justice and to avoid the appearance of impropriety, the judge

should have recused himself from this case. At minimum, Colley maintains that

the judge should have afforded her an opportunity to file an affidavit of

disqualification under R.C. 2701.03 before the trial court denied her motion for

recusal. The trial court’s failure to hold an oral hearing or rule on her motion for

recusal prior to dismissing the case deprived her of due process.

       {¶40} In response, the appellees claim that R.C. 2701.03 provides the

exclusive means for a litigant to have a judge removed for bias. The record

contains no evidence that Colley filed an affidavit of bias with the clerk of the

Supreme Court as required by R.C. 2701.03.

       {¶41} The appellees also claim that Colley has not overcome a judge’s

presumption of integrity. The appellees claim that the judge herein was involved

in only two prior cases with the decedent herein and that occurred more than 15

years before the instant case. The judge also maintained that he did not recall

either case and that he could be fair and impartial in the case at bar.

                                       A. Law

       {¶42} “[T]he Ohio Constitution ‘vests exclusive authority to pass on

disqualification matters in the chief justice or her designee.’ ” In the Matter of:

C.S., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 23CA12, 2023-Ohio-3754, ¶ 21, quoting State v.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                            13

Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d 131, 2014-Ohio-2966, 16 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 62, citing Beer v.

Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978). R.C. 2701.03

provides the process that a litigant must follow when seeking to disqualify a

judge. “Consequently, ‘any attempt to obtain a judge's recusal must be made in

consideration of the filing requirements of R.C. 2701.03 and other principles

underlying’ the disqualification process.” Id. quoting In re Navarre, 156 Ohio

St.3d 1208, 2019-Ohio-850, 124 N.E.3d 843, ¶ 5. In part, R.C. 2701.03 states:

        (A) If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is interested
        in a proceeding pending before the court, allegedly is related to or
        has a bias or prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding
        pending before the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly
        otherwise is disqualified to preside in a proceeding pending before
        the court, any party to the proceeding or the party's counsel may
        file an affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the supreme
        court in accordance with division (B) of this section.

       {¶43} Because “only the Chief Justice or his designee may hear

disqualification matters,” a court of appeals has no authority “to pass upon

disqualification or to void the judgment of the trial court upon that basis.” Griffith

at 441-442.

                                    B. Analysis

       {¶44} Colley’s exclusive remedy for seeking the trial judge’s removal was

filing an affidavit of prejudice with the clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court as

directed by R.C. 2701.03. However, Colley did not pursue this avenue of

redress.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              14

       {¶45} Colley also claims that she was not afforded an opportunity to file an

affidavit of prejudice because the trial court failed to hold an oral hearing or to

rule on her motion for recusal before it granted appellees’ motion to dismiss.

       {¶46} The trial judge was under no obligation to hold a hearing on Colley’s

motion to recuse, let alone rule on her motion for recusal. Colley filed her

complaint on October 28, 2021. Appellees did not file their motion to dismiss

until almost a month later on November 24, 2021. And the trial court’s decision

granting appellees’ motion to dismiss was not issued until April 6, 2022. Thus,

Colley had at least five months after filing her complaint to file an affidavit of

prejudice with the Supreme Court. Yet, she chose not to do so and instead filed

a motion with the trial judge seeking his recusal. Colley cannot now complain

that she was not afforded an opportunity to file an affidavit of prejudice. Her due

process rights were not violated.

       {¶47} Having no authority to review a trial court’s decision regarding a

party’s motion for recusal or disqualification, or to otherwise pass on

disqualification of a trial judge, we overrule Colley’s first assignment of error.

                              Second Assignment of Error

       {¶48} In her second assignment of error, Colley maintains that the trial

court erred in granting the 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss filed by appellees. She

claims that a review of her complaint demonstrates that her “claims could easily

be resolved in her favor.”

       {¶49} Colley asserts that her first two claims alleged that Crabtree and

Doe(s) beat the decedent to death while Thompson watched. This is the basis
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             15

for the damages that she seeks in the third and fourth claims for assault and

battery and her son’s resulting death.

       {¶50} Regarding the fifth claim, Colley maintains that she does not

challenge the “sufficiency of the investigation” as the trial court found. Rather,

she claims that appellees “manipulated and ignored evidence, made false reports

and did their best to cover-up” that the true cause of decedent’s death was a

beating, not a self-inflicted drug overdose as appellees concluded.

       {¶51} In her sixth claim, she alleges that the appellees conspired among

themselves and used their authority to cover-up that the decedent’s true cause of

death was a beating from Crabtree, not a self-inflicted overdose. She asserts

that Triggs and Spencer engaged in this conspiracy because they were “friends”

with Crabtree and wanted to protect him from “criminal charges.” She argues

that the underlying torts that support the conspiracy claim are “murder” and

“misuse of police power.”

       {¶52} In her seventh claim, Colley essentially alleges that Scioto County is

liable for the actions of its employees, i.e., Triggs and Spencer herein.

       {¶53} Claims eight and nine are similar both alleging that appellees’

actions herein were committed negligently, recklessly, willfully and wantonly, or

intentionally.

       {¶54} Regarding her tenth claim, Colley claims that it is “inconceivable”

that the murder of her son and the cover-up would not cause her emotional

distress. This is an issue that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage of a

case, but must be developed through discovery.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             16

       {¶55} In response, the appellees maintain that the trial court did not err in

dismissing Colley’s complaint. They first argue that Scioto County cannot be

sued in court. Alternatively, even if the County can be sued, it is entitled to

immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. For purposes of immunity, Scioto County is

a political subdivision engaging in the government activity of policing under R.C.

2744.01(C)(2)(a). Because the County was engaging in government activity, it

was immune from liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). And none of the five

exceptions to immunity listed in R.C. 2744.02 apply under the facts of this case.

Therefore, Scioto County would be immune from Colley’s complaint.

       {¶56} Even if the appellees are not immune from suit, Colley’s complaint

still fails to assert a viable claim against them. Regarding Colley’s fifth claim,

appellees maintain that a negligent, reckless, or even malicious investigation is

not a tort recognized in Ohio, so it was properly dismissed.

       {¶57} Regarding Colley’s sixth claim, appellees argue that the civil

conspiracy claim was not sufficiently pled. Colley’s complaint lacks any facts that

support a conspiracy existed between Crabtree and Thompson, and Triggs and

Spencer. Colley merely concludes that they acted in concert to cover-up the

death of decedent. Even accepting that Spencer is friends with Crabtree’s

brother this is not enough to support a conspiracy.

       {¶58} Appellees also claim that there is no underlying tort supporting the

conspiracy claim. They maintain that there is no allegation Triggs and Spencer

were involved in the decedent’s murder, and misuse of police power is not a tort

recognized in Ohio.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              17

       {¶59} Appellees assert that Colley’s eighth and ninth claims, which allege

that appellees acted wantonly, willfully, recklessly, etc., set forth no viable claim

or tort against appellees. Rather, they are “levels of culpability needed to

overcome a public employee’s statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).”

Consequently, the trial court properly dismissed both of those claims.

       {¶60} Appellees maintain that Colley’s tenth claim for emotional distress

also fails. Negligent infliction of emotional distress requires that the plaintiff is a

bystander to an accident that causes fear. Colley does not allege that she was a

bystander to any accident. Appellees also claim that Colley did not allege the

type of emotional distress, which is “severe and debilitating[,]” that is required for

a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

       {¶61} Accordingly, appellees urge this court to affirm the trial court’s

judgment entry that dismissed Colley’s complaint.

                                        A. Law

       {¶62} “Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of trial court decisions

granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.” Alexander Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ. v. Vill. of Albany, 2017-Ohio-8704, 101 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing

State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-

Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12. Therefore, in reviewing a trial court’s decision

regarding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, “we afford no deference to the trial

court's decision and apply our own, independent review to determine if the

requirements of Civ.R. 12(B)(6) were satisfied.” Estep v. State, 4th Dist. Ross

No. 09CA3088, 2009-Ohio-4349, ¶ 5.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             18

       {¶63} “ ‘[A] Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss tests only the sufficiency of

the allegations.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Student Doe v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389, 178

N.E.3d 947, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.), quoting Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 125

Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 9. This means that

“ ‘courts cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint to

determine a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.’ ” Billman v. Meintel, 4th Dist. Pickaway No.

22CA10, 2023-Ohio-922, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio

St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985 (1997), citing State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co.

v. Schroeder, 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 669 N.E.2d 835 (1996). “When a party

presents evidence outside the pleadings, the trial court bears the ‘responsibility

either to disregard [the] extraneous material or to convert [the] motion to dismiss

into a motion for summary judgment * * *.’ ” (Brackets and ellipses sic.) Lang v.

Enervest Energy Institutional Fund XI A LP, 2016-Ohio-4844, 68 N.E.3d 179, ¶

31 (4th Dist.), quoting Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599,

797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 18.

       {¶64} In reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, a “court must

presume that all factual allegations contained in the complaint are true and must

construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Varney v.

Allen, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3543, 2017-Ohio-1409, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel.

Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819

N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5. “ ‘This standard is consistent with Civ.R. 8(A), which provides

for notice pleading and requires only (1) “a short and plain, statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                           19

the relief to which he deems himself entitled.” ’ ” Alexander Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 2017-Ohio-8704, 101 N.E.3d 21, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), quoting State ex rel.

Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 549, 605 N.E.2d

378 (1992), quoting York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-

145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991). “Accordingly, a complaint is not ‘fatally defective

and subject to dismissal’ simply because it does not set forth each element of a

cause of action ‘with crystalline specificity.’ ” Id., quoting Border City Sav. & Loan

Ass'n. v. Moan, 15 Ohio St.3d 65, 66, 472 N.E.2d 350 (1984).

       {¶65} However, “the complaint must still allege sufficient underlying facts

that relate to and support the alleged claim, and may not simply state legal

conclusions.” Evans v. Ohio Att'y Gen., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3927, 2021-

Ohio-1146, ¶ 8, quoting Evans v. Shapiro, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3670, 2019-

Ohio-3209, ¶ 19, quoting Henderson v. State, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101862,

2015-Ohio-1742, ¶ 10.

                                     B. Analysis

       {¶66} For the sake of convenience, we address some of the claims in

Colley’s complaint out of order. We begin our analysis by addressing claims one

though four, five, six, and ten. Then we address eight and nine together and

finish with claim seven.

                                1. Claims One-Four

       {¶67} As recognized by the trial court, claims one through four of Colley’s

complaint were asserted against Crabtree, Thompson and possibly Doe(s), not

appellees. Therefore, the trial court declined to address those claims in its
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                              20

judgment entry of dismissal. Similarly, we decline to review those claims alleged

in Colley’s appeal.

                                     2. Claim Five

       {¶68} Colley’s fifth claim asserts that “[w]ithout investigation” the appellees

determined that the cause of [decedent’s] death was a self-injected drug

overdose despite [evidence to the contrary].” Although Civ.R. 8 requires a

plaintiff to only assert “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

party is entitled to relief,” a complaint must still set out a claim that is cognizable

or viable in the law. Recovery in tort requires “proof of duty, breach, proximate

cause and damages.” Simpkins v. Grace Brethren Church of Delaware, 2014-

Ohio-3465, 16 N.E.3d 687, ¶ 34 (5th Dist.), citing Abrams v. Worthington, 169

Ohio App.3d 94, 2006-Ohio-5516, 861 N.E.2d 920 (10th Dist.).

       {¶69} “If the alleged tortfeasor owes no duty to the claimant, no viable

cause of action grounded in tort exists.” Lockwood v. Larson, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. A-8200309, 1985 WL 8931, *3 (July 17, 1985), citing Visintine & Co. v. New

York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 155 N.E.2d 682, 686 (10th Dist. 1958). “Duty,

as used in Ohio tort law, refers to the relationship between the plaintiff and the

defendant from which arises an obligation on the part of the defendant to

exercise due care toward the plaintiff.” Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 45 Ohio

St.3d 96, 98, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (1989), citing Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Ry.

Co. v. Cox, 66 Ohio St. 276, 64 N.E. 119 (1902). “Typically, a duty may be

established by common law, legislative enactment, or by the particular facts and

circumstances of the case.” Chambers v. St. Mary's Sch., 82 Ohio St. 3d 563,
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                            21

565, 1998-Ohio-184, 697 N.E.2d 198, citing Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio

St. 367, 119 N.E.2d 440, (1954), paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶70} Colley’s complaint cites no statute or common law that supports a

tort for negligent and/or reckless investigation. Indeed, Ohio and other

jurisdictions have recognized that there is no cognizable cause of action for a

“negligent investigation.” See Lamson v. Firestone & Rubber Co., 9th Dist.

Summit No. 14692, 1991 WL 35098, *3 (Mar. 13, 1991); Stallworth v. Greater

Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73533, 1998 WL 774987,

*4 (Nov. 5, 1998); Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1994);

Lahm v. Farrington, 166 N.H. 146, 150-151, 90 A.3d 620 (2014); Laymon v.

Washington State Dep't of Nat. Res., 99 Wash. App. 518, 530, 994 P.2d 232,

239 (2000).

       {¶71} Therefore, we find that Colley’s fifth claim fails to state a viable

cause of action for an insufficient investigation upon which relief can be granted.

                                    3. Claim Six

       {¶72} In her sixth claim, Colley alleged that the appellees acted in concert

with each other “to conceal and/or cover up the true cause of the death of

decedent[.]”

       {¶73} “ ‘The elements of a civil conspiracy claim are: “(1) a malicious

combination, (2) involving two or more persons, (3) causing injury to person or

property, and (4) the existence of an unlawful act independent from the

conspiracy itself.” ’ ” Ogle v. Hocking Cty., 4th Dist. Hocking No. 11CA31, 2013-

Ohio-597, ¶ 14, quoting Cook v. Kudlacz, 2012-Ohio-2999, 974 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 90
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             22

(7th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Fatur v. Eastlake, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-037,

2010-Ohio-1448, ¶ 45; Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St. 3d 464, 475, 1998-

Ohio-294, 700 N.E.2d 859. “ ‘A civil conspiracy claim is derivative and cannot be

maintained absent an underlying tort that is actionable without the conspiracy.’ ”

Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger C L.P.A., 183 Ohio App.3d

40, 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d 696, ¶ 40 (10th Dist.).

       {¶74} Colley alleges that two torts underlie her conspiracy claim: murder

and misuse of police power. Notably, neither of these torts is expressly alleged

in the sixth claim of Colley’s complaint.

       {¶75} Colley’s complaint contends that Crabtree murdered the decedent,

which manifested in the tort of wrongful death. However, that claim is alleged

against only Crabtree, and possibly Spencer and Doe(s). But there are no

allegations connecting any of the appellees with causing the decedent’s death.

As a result, murder cannot be an underlying tort to Colley’s conspiracy claim

against appellees.

       {¶76} Finally, whether labeled a failure to investigate or misuse of police

power, as we found infra, the allegation fails to set forth a cognizable legal claim.

Therefore, misuse of police power cannot be an underlying tort to Colley’s

conspiracy claim against appellees.

       {¶77} Therefore, we find that Colley’s sixth claim fails to state a viable

cause of action for conspiracy upon which relief can be granted against

appellees.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                                 23

                                     4. Claim Ten

       {¶78} Colley’s tenth claim alleges that appellees’ actions resulted in

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

       {¶79} To set out a successful claim for negligent infliction of emotional

distress a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the plaintiff was a bystander, (2) the plaintiff

reasonably appreciated the peril that took place, whether or not the victim

suffered actual physical harm, and (3) the plaintiff suffered serious emotional

distress as a result of this cognizance or fear of peril.” Walker v. Firelands

Community Hosp., 170 Ohio App.3d 785, 2007-Ohio-871, 869 N.E.2d 66, ¶ 59

(6th Dist.), citing Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 80, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).

       {¶80} “A successful intentional infliction of emotional distress claim

requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly caused

the plaintiff serious emotional distress; (2) the defendant's conduct was ‘extreme

and outrageous’; and (3) the defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff

serious emotional distress.” Mender v. Chauncey, 2015-Ohio-4105, 41 N.E.3d

1289, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), quoting Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408,

410, 644 N.E.2d 286 (1994).

       {¶81} We find that Colley’s claims for negligent and intentional infliction of

emotional distress are derivative of her fifth and sixth claims (insufficient

investigation and civil conspiracy). Courts have held that when a claim is

dismissed, any derivative claim is dismissed as well. See e.g. Singh v.

Cleveland, Clinic Found., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99066, 2013-Ohio-2465, ¶ 14
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             24

(Where a medical claim is dismissed so is the derivative emotional distress

claim); Bahen v. Diocese of Steubenville, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 11 JE 34, 2013-

Ohio-2168, ¶ 9 (Where plaintiff’s defamation claim fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted for libel per se, the derivative claims for emotional

distress must be dismissed as well.) Because we have held that neither of the

fifth or sixth claims in Colley’s complaint state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and must be dismissed, their derivative claims of negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed as well.

       {¶82} Accordingly, Colley’s tenth claim fails to establish a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

                               5. Claims Eight and Nine

       {¶83} Claims eight and nine appear to allege that the appellees’ actions of

failing to investigate and conspiring to cover up the investigation were committed

with increased, alternative degrees of culpabilities from those alleged in claims

six and seven. In other words, claims eight and nine allege that appellees acted

negligently, recklessly, willfully and wantonly, or intentionally by failing to

investigate the decedent’s death (claim five), in conspiring to cover up the failed

investigation (claim six).

       {¶84} Alleging that the failure to investigate was intentional could be

construed as an action for fraudulent investigation. However, similar to our

analysis in claim five, which found there is no cause of action for a negligent

investigation, Colley’s complaint cites no statute or common law that supports a

cause of action for a fraudulent investigation. As courts have found, a “fraudulent
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                            25

investigation” is “not ‘grounded in any statutory or common law cause of action.’ ”

Hastings v. Shelby Cnty. Gov't, W.D.Tenn. No. 2:17-cv-02687-SHL-cgc, 2019

WL 3782198, *2 (Aug. 12, 2019), quoting the magistrate’s decision at 286. See

also Marble v. Missoula Cnty., D.Montana No. CV 20-89-M-DLC, 2020 WL

6043858, *6 (Oct. 13, 2020) (stating that under federal law, the court could “find

no indication that the Ninth Circuit has recognized anyone's claim to an adequate

police investigation—whether that person is the suspect, victim, or family

member of either.”) (Emphasis sic.).

       {¶85} Regarding claim six, we determined infra that Colley failed to allege

any viable underlying tort claims, which was fatal to her conspiracy claim. Merely

alleging that the conspiracy was committed with a heightened degree of

culpability does not change that Colley has failed to allege any viable underlying

tort to support her conspiracy claim, which is fatal to her conspiracy claim.

       {¶86} Therefore, we find that claims eight and nine fail to state any claim

upon which relief can be granted.

                                  6. Claim Seven

       {¶87} Finally, we address claim seven, which is against Scioto County

only. Similar to claims eight and nine, claim seven does not allege any culpable

conduct, but instead alleges that the County is liable for its employees’ actions

herein. However, as we recounted in the preceding paragraphs, Colley fails to

set forth any viable claims against Scioto County’s employees because there is

no underlying tort supporting her conspiracy claim, and there is no legally

cognizable claim for an insufficient or fraudulent investigation. Thus, Colley’s
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                           26

seventh claim against the County similarly fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.

   7. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon which Relief Can be Granted

       {¶88} Based on our de novo review, for all the aforementioned reasons we

find Colley’s complaint fails to set forth any claim upon which relief can be

granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in

dismissing Colley’s complaint. Accordingly, we overrule Colley’s second

assignment of error.

                            Assignment of Error III

       {¶89} In her third assignment of error, Colley maintains that the trial court

erred in determining that Scioto County was immune from liability under R.C.

2744.02(A)(1). Colley maintains that Scioto County’s immunity is removed

pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) because R.C. 2923.01, criminal conspiracy,

imposed liability on the County for conspiring to cover up Triggs and Spencer’s

insufficient investigation. Therefore, Scioto County is liable to Colley for the

damages that Triggs and Spencer’s insufficient investigation proximately caused.

       {¶90} In response, appellees admit that Scioto County is a political

subdivision, but maintain that it is immune from liability. The appellees claim that

under the facts of this case, the County is a political subdivision engaged in a

government service (providing police services) under R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a).

That afforded Scioto County immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). While R.C.

2744.02(B) sets out five exceptions to immunity, none of them apply here.

Contrary to Colley’s argument, R.C. 2923.01 does not remove the County’s
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                               27

immunity because R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) provides an exception to immunity only

“when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a

section of the Revised Code[.]” R.C. 2923.01 defines criminal conspiracy but

does not expressly impose civil liability on a political subdivision. Consequently,

because none of the R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions to immunity apply, Scioto

County remains immune from liability. Therefore, Colley’s allegations against

Scioto County fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

                                        A. Law

       {¶91} “Ohio counties are political subdivisions of the state that facilitate

the state's operations.” Est. of Fleenor v. Ottawa Cnty., 170 Ohio St. 3d 38,

2022-Ohio-3581, 208 N.E.3d 783, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Alexander v. Summit

Cty., 4 Ohio N.P. 481, 17 Ohio Dec. 451,1906 WL 810 (C.P. 1906). “R.C.

Chapter 2744 establishes a three-step analysis to determine whether a political

subdivision is immune from liability.” Student Doe v. Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389,

178 N.E.3d 947, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), citing Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d

266, 270, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 14.

       {¶92} “First, R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) sets forth the general rule that ‘a political

subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to

person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political

subdivision * * * in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.’

” Id. “A ‘governmental function’ includes * * * [t]he provision or nonprovision of

police * * * services.” R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(a).
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                            28

       {¶93} “Once the political subdivision demonstrates that it is immune from

tort liability under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden to show that

one of the R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions applies and removes the general grant of

immunity.” Adkins. at ¶ 23, citing Martin v. Payne, 3rd Dist. Paulding No. 11-20-

05, 2021-Ohio-1557, ¶ 40. R.C. 2744.02(B) removes a political subdivision’s

immunity for injury, loss, or death due to: (1) “negligent operation of a motor

vehicle”, (2) “negligent performance * * * with respect to proprietary functions” (3)

“negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to

remove obstructions from public roads[,]” (4) “negligence of [a political

subdivision’s] employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due

to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in

connection with the performance of a governmental function[,]” or (5) “when civil

liability is expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by a section of the

Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.).

       {¶94} If the plaintiff establishes one or more of the R.C. 2744.02(B)

exceptions that removes the political subdivision’s liability, the political

subdivision may then “assert one of the R.C. 2744.03(A) defenses to re-instate

immunity.” Adkins, 2021-Ohio-3389, 178 N.E.3d 947, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.), at ¶ 23,

quoting Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 270, 2007-Ohio-1946,

865 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 14.

                                      B. Analysis

       {¶95} We note that in overruling Colley’s second assignment of error, we

have already determined that Colley’s complaint fails to set forth any cognizable
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                           29

cause of action against appellees, including Scioto County. Therefore, our

consideration of the County’s immunity is an alternate basis for finding that

Colley’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against

the County.

       {¶96} Scioto County was engaged in “police” activities, so the County was

a political subdivision engaged in a government function pursuant to R.C.

2744.01(C)(2)(a). This afforded the County immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1),

unless one of the five exceptions in R.C. 2744.02(B) applied. Clearly, based on

the facts of this case, exceptions one through four do not remove Scioto County’s

immunity.

       {¶97} Colley maintains R.C. 2923.01 removes Scioto County’s immunity

pursuant R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). R.C. 2923.01 defines the criminal offense of

conspiracy. However, R.C. 2923.01 does not expressly impose civil liability on

political subdivisions for participating in a criminal conspiracy. Consequently,

R.C. 2923.01 does not remove the County’s immunity for Colley’s conspiracy

claim under R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). Because none of the exceptions under R.C.

2744.02(B) apply, Scioto County remains immune from liability under R.C.

2744.02(A)(1).

       {¶98} Thus, based on our de novo review, we also find that Colley’s

complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Scioto

County because under the facts of this case the County is immune from liability.

Accordingly, we overrule Colley’s third assignment of error.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                             30

                             Assignment of Error IV

       {¶99} In her fourth assignment of error, Colley claims that the trial court

correctly opined that Triggs and Spencer were not entitled to immunity, which

inferred that the court believed that they acted in bad faith and reckless disregard

in investigating the decedent’s death. However, this determination contradicts

the court’s finding that Colley’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted because acts of bad faith and recklessness overcome

immunity. Therefore, the trial court’s determination that Colley’s complaint

against Triggs and Spencer failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted was erroneous and must be reversed.

       {¶100} In response, the appellees maintain that employee immunity is not

relevant to this appeal. Appellees argue that the trial court determined that

Colley’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

because it failed to set out a viable claim against appellees. Therefore, immunity

does not even come into play and Colley’s fourth assignment of error should be

overruled.

                                           A. Law

       {¶101} “Immunity is also extended to individual employees of political

subdivisions.” Lambert v. Clancy, 125 Ohio St. 3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483, 927

N.E.2d 585, ¶ 10, citing R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). However, the three-tiered analysis

used to determine whether a political subdivision is immune is not used to

determine the liability of a political subdivision’s employees. Id., citing
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                           31

Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9, ¶

17.

        Instead, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides that an employee is
        personally immune from liability unless “(a) [t]he employee's acts
        or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's
        employment or official responsibilities; (b) [t]he employee's acts or
        omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a
        wanton or reckless manner; [or] (c) [c]ivil liability is expressly
        imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.”
        For these purposes, allegations of negligence are insufficient to
        overcome the immunity granted to an employee of a political
        subdivision who acts within his or her official duties.

Id., citing Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351, 356, 639
N.E.2d 31 (1994).

                                     B. Analysis

       {¶102} Similar to our analysis of Colley’s third assignment of error, we

again note that in overruling Colley’s second assignment of error, we have

already determined that Colley’s complaint fails to set forth any cognizable cause

of action against appellees, including Triggs and Spencer. We address Colley’s

fourth assignment of error only to explain why the trial court’s conclusion that

Colley’s allegations were sufficient to remove Triggs and Spencer’s immunity is

not inconsistent, as alleged by Colley, with its holding that her complaint failed to

state a viable claim against them.

       {¶103} In its analysis regarding whether Scioto County employees Triggs

and Spencer were immune from liability, the trial court stated that “[a]lthough this

court has disposed of the claims against Triggs and Spencer above, this court

will also consider whether Statutory Immunity applies, as requested in the motion
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                          32

to dismiss.” [9] (Emphasis added.) However, later the entry states that “if [Colley]

had stated a claim against Triggs and Spencer, then [Colley] has made sufficient

allegations as to exceptions to statutory immunity found in R.C. 2744.03.”

(Emphasis added). Based on the court’s language, it is clear that the basis for

finding that Colley’s complaint failed to set out a claim against Triggs and

Spencer was because Colley’s complaint failed to state any cognizable tort(s).

The court’s additional determination that Colley’s allegations against Triggs and

Spencer would have been sufficient to remove their immunity under R.C.

2744.03(A)(6) for purposes of appellee’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is

mere dicta.

       {¶104} “An appellate court is not required to * * * rule on a question of law

that cannot affect matters at issue in a case.” Bambeck v. Cath. Dioceses of

Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86894, 2006-Ohio-4883, ¶ 20, citing State v.

Bistricky, 66 Ohio App.3d 395, 397, 584 N.E.2d 75 (8th Dist. 1990). Therefore,

we overrule Colley’s fourth assignment of error.

                                    CONCLUSION

       {¶105} Having overruled all four of Colley’s assignments of error, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment entry of dismissal.

                                                          JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3997                                                            33

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

       Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                       For the Court,

                                   BY: ____________________________
                                      Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.