Court Opinion

ID: 9782745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:11:05.472263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:10.425474
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I once again respectfully dissent. As in Dorothy J.N., I would affirm because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing administration of involuntary treatment. The common-law record includes the signed petition for administration of authorized involuntary treatment and a treatment plan that states respondent had been delivered a written notice of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment. That petition includes the following language of affirmation: “I have read and understood this [pjetition and affirm that the statements made by me are true to the best of my knowledge. I affirm that I advised the individual, in writing, of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment.” Dr. Patibandla, the treating psychiatrist who testified at the petition-for-administration-of-involuntary-treatment hearing, signed that petition. That notice alone is sufficient compliance with section 102 (a—5) (405 ILCS 5/2—102(a—5) (West 2008)). See In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 964, 785 N.E.2d 46, 52 (2003) (petition and treatment plan indicated written notice given was sufficient compliance). The majority disregards the written-notice affirmation, the oral notice testified to, as well as the contents of the petition, which again reiterate: “13. I have explained the risk and the intended benefits of the treatment to the patient/respondent and also have provided that information in written or printed form to the patient/respondent. YES 14. The patient/respondent objects to the administration of the requested psychotropic medication(s) and/or the range of dosages. However, the patient/respondent lack[s] the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment for the following reasons: She relates that she does not have a mental illness and does not need medication. She claims T don’t want to be hooked onto a medication.’ 15. Other less restrictive treatment services, such as counseling, therapy, education, activities, and rehabilitation, have been explored. YES However, such treatment services have been found to be inappropriate to treat the patient/respondent without use of psychotropic medication for the following reasons: She is unable to participate in any non-pharmacological treatments that are available due to her disorganized thought processes.” Further, the majority ignores the language in the Mental Health Code that requires written notice only “to the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient’s ability to understand the information communicated” (405 ILCS 5/2—102(a—5) (West 2004)). Respondent clearly exhibited an inability to understand the information communicated. Concededly, the supreme court reversed this court on the written-notice requirement in In re Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d 604, 801 N.E.2d 947 (2004) (nonprecedential supervisory order), in a terse supervisory order. However, this appellate court had based its decision on the respondent’s forfeiture of the written-notice requirement. The record was silent on any written or oral attempts to notify the respondent of the medication’s side effects. Moreover, the supervisory order specifically exercised its supervisory authority “in light of the People’s factual and legal concessions,” to which this court is not privy. Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d at 604, 801 N.E.2d at 947. Moreover, supervisory orders are not precedential. “As the State pointed out, supervisory orders are unpublished, recite no facts, and provide no rationale upon which the principles of stare decisis may attach.” People v. Jackson, 154 Ill. App. 3d 320, 324, 507 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1987). Our record is not so silent. Not only was the written notice pleaded and affirmed in the petition, but Dr. Patibandla also testified he had verbally notified respondent of the potential side effects: “Q. Have you had occasion to discuss with Miss [K.] the benefits and side effects of the treatment that you’re seeking in this Petition? A. Yes, I have. Q. What does she say? A. She did not believe that she would need medication and said, T don’t want to be hooked onto medicine.’ Q. Has she been handed a written list of the side effects? A. Yes, she was. Q. Did she take them in her hand? A. Yes, she did. Q. Did she have any questions for you, Doctor, about the side effects? A. She did not.” The doctor was very specific about the side effects: “Patients may gain weight, there is metabolic syndrome to be concerned about, and there is tardive dyskinesia with Haldol medication and white cell suppression with Clozapine.” Further, the majority’s strict compliance with written notice is not mandated by the statute or in Steven P. where, as here, the respondent exhibited an inability to understand the written information. She clearly lacked the capacity to give informed consent. Dr. Patibandla testified: “She has a lot of fixed false beliefs, which are delusional thoughts she possesses. She’s charged with two counts of forgery from Madison County, and she was sent to us as unfit to stand trial because of this fixed and false beliefs. She believes that she went through some sort of appeal process.” In addition, the following exchange occurred: “Q. Does she have the capacity to give informed consent? A. She does not. Q. Does she acknowledge having a mental illness? A. She does not. Q. Does she have any understanding of her mental illness? A. She does not. Q. Does she have any insight at all into her illness? A. She does not.” For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.