Court Opinion

ID: 9645630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:30:30.177453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:28.614231
License: Public Domain

“WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion because the allegations of error in this ease were not so pervasive or prejudicial as to deny the defendants a fundamentally fair trial or due process of law. An exhaustive review of the record in this very lengthy case indicates that reversal is not required. Although there are enumerated errors in the Majority Opinion which form the basis for reversal, the thread of alleged prosecutorial misconduct knits them together. Any consideration on appeal of alleged prosecutorial misconduct must center on the overall fairness of the entire trial. Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 844 S.W.2d 417 (1992); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 744 S.W.2d 407 (1987); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.1979). The conduct of the prosecutor in this ease was not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendants of a fundamentally fair trial.
I
On appeal and at trial, Michael KariaMs and Chumbler both objected to testimony and evidence presented to allow the jury to draw an inference that the two had maintained a homosexual affair for a period of time. They claim that this evidence was not relevant. Relevant evidence tends to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable. KRE 401. The jury is entitled to draw an inference from the evidence to establish a motive for the killing. See Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 942 (1990).
The pair next argue that even if relevant, the evidence was prejudicial and should have been excluded. Evidence may be admitted if the danger of unfair prejudice is substantially outweighed by its probative value. KRE 403. Both men denied having homosexual involvement. Pretrial motions attempted to stipulate to the fact that the men engaged in a “strong” or “close relationship”. During voir dire, counsel emphasized that they were being tried for murder and not for their lifestyle. The Commonwealth was entitled to present this evidence because it tends to explain why the murder was committed.
The ugly parts of a case may not be stipulated away. Gall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 607 S.W.2d 97 (1980). Prejudice is that which is unnecessary or unreasonable. Romans v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 547 S.W.2d 128 (1977). Here, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. The prosecution offered proof of homosexuality in order to establish motive for the murder. It was offered to explain the hold that KariaMs had over Chumbler and to show the length to which Chumbler was prepared to go to maintain the relationship. The trial judge did not abuse Ms discretion in controlling the nature and amount of evidence introduced at trial.
The homosexual relationsMp of the two men was used by the Commonwealth to establish motive for the murder. Chumbler’s former wife and a former student testified in rebuttal that they witnessed Chumbler engaged in sexual activities with males. This testimony was not presented during the prosecution’s primary presentation of the case. It was properly withheld as pertaining to a collateral matter. It was only after Chum-bler denied the events that the witnesses were called to provide evidence of Chum-bler’s misstatements of fact. There was no error.
II
The next argument involves a series of uncharged criminal acts. TMs kind of evidence may be admitted if offered to prove motive, and it is not intended to prove a general criminal disposition. Funk v. Com*501monwealth, Ky., 842 S.W.2d 476 (1992); KRE 404(b). Evidence otherwise admissible is not made inadmissible merely because it tends to show the commission of an unrelated crime. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 363 (1977). Here the prosecution met the burden of establishing that the need for the evidence and the probative value outweighed any inflammatory effect before the allegedly improper evidence was introduced. Jones, supra; Cf. Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1991).
Evidence that KariaMs stole numerous items from the victim’s home was relevant to explain the ongoing relationship between the two men. Chumbler basically supported and provided money to Kariakis. The testimony did not show any criminal activity by Chum-bler and was not error as to him. See Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380 (1990). The evidence showed the ongoing need by Kariakis to utilize Chumbler as a provider of financing. The motive in this case was murder for profit. The evidence of theft was properly used to show the lengths to which Kariakis would go in order to support his lifestyle. There was no error. KRE 404(b).
Kariakis provided false information on federal forms involving the purchase of firearms. Objection to this testimony was not timely and the error was not preserved. Bell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 473 S.W.2d 820 (1971). Testimony and evidence were also presented which showed that Kariakis sent a letter to Chumbler where he said he loved him and asked him to wait until he was “out.” The objection was overruled as getting “out” could have referred to school or the military. Additionally, Kariakis and his mother both previously provided testimony that he had been in jail at a prior time. There was no error.
Objection was raised concerning unresponsive testimony that Kariakis had previously tendered bad checks. Counsel objected and moved to strike. The court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony and no further relief was requested. All relief that was requested was provided. There was no error. West v. Commonwealth, Ky., 780 S.W.2d 600 (1989). Additionally, Kariakis provided testimony concerning bad checks himself. Any error was harmless. RCr 9.24.
Kariakis appears to have fantasized that he was a character in a television show who was portrayed as a killer for some mythical secret society. Testimony was provided where he indicated to others that he was a “hit man” or that he “iced” people for a living and that he made it look like an accident. He also stated that Chumbler was to marry and that Kariakis would “waste” Chumbler’s wife with an unregistered firearm. This evidence was properly allowed to show intent, identity and the absence of accident. See Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1991).
Kariakis was married to three different women yet never obtained a legal dissolution. A motion in limine was granted which prohibited evidence of the uncharged crime of bigamy. Evidence was presented, however, that indicated that Kariakis was married to multiple women. This evidence was presented to show why Kariakis would confide in these women about his fantasy of being a killer. Although a violation of the motion in limine, it was not a significant factor in the convictions. The other evidence presented outweighed the minor prejudicial effect of this testimony. It is inconceivable that the jury found guilt because Kariakis was a bigamist based on two references during a three-week trial. Such harmless error is not cause for reversal.
Ill
Michael Kariakis claims that the testimony of a police officer regarding the collection of a cigarette butt from the scene of the crime was hearsay. This was first brought into issue by questioning from the defense. It was not admitted for the purpose of proving what was said but rather as an explanation of the details of what transpired. It was not error. See Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 475 (1986). A detective’s statement that he told Chumbler’s parents he was a good detective and would be fair in the investigation was of insignificant weight during the three-week trial, caused no substantial prejudice and is not reversible error.
*502Michael Kariakis seeks reversal for a statement during closing argument regarding a cigarette butt found at the scene. This issue is not preserved. A cigarette butt was found near the shed and seized as evidence. It was determined by lab analysis that it was one of 12 brands produced. Two of these brands are the same as smoked by Michael Kariakis, the only significant difference being the length of the cigarette. There was also evidence presented that Mehael Kariakis seldom did anything without smoking a cigarette. Laboratory analysis determined that this cigarette had been smoked by a Type A secretor. Mehael Kariakis is among the 40% of the population who have Type A blood. Type A secretors comprise 32% of the population.
Evidence was presented that 29% of the adult population smoke cigarettes. A tobacco company employee testified that over 2 percent of the cigarettes sold are the brand smoked by Mehael Kariakis. Using these numbers and statistics, the prosecutor then told the jury that “It’s real simple” and proceeded to explain the percentages. He ultimately arrived at a probability of 2 in 1000 that Mehael Kariakis was in the shed.
The calculations were unfortunately completely unfounded and in error. This type of statistical method has been condemned in the past. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). It was not a fair comment on the evidence. Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 644 S.W.2d 335 (1982). There is nothing within the record to indicate whether this analysis was provided through sheer mathematical incompetence or as a planned deceit. However, it was not evidence. It was closing argument and the jury had been admonished that the statements were not evidence. Although we deplore such tactics, there was sufficient evidence in the ease so that the jury could have drawn its own inferences of guilt. There is no showing of manifest injustice. RCr 10.26. Although error, it does not mandate reversal.
A prosecutor is provided wide latitude during summation. Lynem v. Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 141 (1978). Statements must be considered within the context of the entire trial. United, States v. Young, supra. Chumbler described the prosecution’s case as “circumstantial nothing.” This invited a response and the response is not a basis for reversal. Clayton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 786 S.W.2d 866 (1990). There was no error.
The prosecutor drew a reasonable inference that because the gun was never found, it tended to prove murder. Holly Kariakis testified that the gun was purchased as an investment. Mehael Kariakis stated the gun was purchased for Chumbler to give to his daughter as a present. Chumbler denied discussing the gun with Kariakis and denied taking the weapon from the Kariakis car. Mention of the gun was not error.
IV
Another issue presented by Chumbler involves alleged improper hearsay evidence. One witness testified that he knew “money was a problem.” An objection was sustained but no further relief was requested. West, supra. Other statements referring to what the victim said about financial conditions resulted in objections and admonitions to disregard the testimony. See Charles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 407 (1982). There was no error.
Another witness was just about to respond in a manner which indicated how the victim felt about the title to a car she had recently purchased. Before an answer was provided an objection was sustained and no further relief was requested. There was no error. A third witness was asked about his mother’s statement that she did not want Kariakis coming to their house. An objection was sustained and no further relief was requested. The witness was then asked if he learned of this decision from his mother and he responded affirmatively. On a motion to strike, the jury was admonished and no other relief was requested. There was no error. West.
V
The most troubling aspect of this trial is the issue involving prosecutorial misconduct. Although all of the defendants raise numerous examples of alleged misconduct, most are *503not preserved by objection as required by RCr 9.22.
During the opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that Chumbler’s 5 year-old grandson would testify that he thought the gunfire came from the shed. A competency hearing was held in the middle of the trial and it was found that testifying would be unduly detrimental to the child. The trial court, and not the prosecutor, caused the opening statement regarding the child’s testimony to be a misstatement.
At a prior bond hearing, there was testimony that the child referred to both the barn and the shed as the barn. There is no indication that the prosecutor deliberately misled the jury in this regard. See Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 602 S.W.2d 148 (1980). Opening statements are not evidence and these jurors were aware of that definition. There was no error. Kroth v. Commonwealth, Ky., 737 S.W.2d 680 (1987). The prosecutor also stated that two video tapes of the crime scene were prepared. A review of the testimony indicates that was correct.
The defendants next argue that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument that he “proved the footprints going into the shed” were those of Michael Kariakis requires reversal. This was an overstatement of the case. There was, however, sufficient evidence introduced to allow the jury to draw an inference that these footprints were left by the killer. There was also evidence introduced which allowed the jury to draw an inference that these footprints were those of Michael Kariakis. Although an exaggeration, it was not error requiring reversal. Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 644 S.W.2d 336 (1982).
The defendants next contend that the Commonwealth purposely failed to disclose evidence required to be turned over in pretrial discovery. It is arguable that this alleged error was waived when these matters were not brought to the attention of the trial judge. Sargent v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 801 (1991). Although error caused by purposeful deceit may be waived under certain circumstances, we are not required to determine that issue in this case. The alleged surprise statements were in fact disclosed prior to trial. RCr 7.24 and 7.26 are designed to give an accused a reasonable chance to defend against the charges. Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 119 (1988). There is nothing to indicate that the defense was not provided this opportunity. There is nothing to indicate deceit on the part of the prosecutor. There was no error.
Chumbler sought pretrial suppression of certain testimony pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The law in that ease governs joint trials where statements are attributed to a defendant who does not testify. In the current ease, all three defendants testified. The trial court correctly determined that there was no error.
Chumbler and Holly Kariakis also claim it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to them as liars during closing arguments. Chumbler’s own testimony admitted that he told a lie. Holly Kariakis first denied being in Kentucky but evidence and identification by a motel clerk showed this was a misstatement of fact. Other examples of misstatements of fact were submitted to the jury through testimony and other evidence. A prosecutor may comment on the veracity of witnesses. Cavins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 272 S.W.2d 656 (1954). Reliance on Scott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 184 (1984), is unfounded because Scott did not testify and place his character in issue. The characterization was not improper and was not error.
VI
The final issue presented by Michael Kar-iakis is also not preserved and involves the footprint evidence. Footprints in the snow indicated that someone who appeared to have been in a hurry, parked a car in the road and went to the shed. Photographs of the scene were taken which disclosed these footprints. The emergency personnel who responded to the scene testified they were not in the area where the footprints were discovered. The integrity of the evidence itself is unquestionable. Vanover v. Commonwealth, Ky., 237 S.W.2d 539 (1951).
*504The footprints were not matched to Michael Kariakis. This alone does not preclude their introduction as evidence. Cissell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 555 (1967). The jury was entitled to infer that, coupled with the description of a car linked to the scene, Michael Kariakis shot the victim while he was in the shed. The footprints are some evidence that this is true. The defense argued that they were made by an agent who was investigating the shooting. The weighing of the factual disputes is a matter for the jury. There was no error.
Review of the entire trial in context indicates that Chumbler and Michael Kariakis received a fundamentally fair trial. A perfect trial is never required. All that is necessary is a proceeding that is fundamentally fair. Dean, supra; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974); McDonald v. Commonwealth, Ky., 554 S.W.2d 84 (1977). None of the claimed errors require reversal, and the ultimate result upon any retrial will be the same.
I concur in reversing the conviction of Holly Kariakis but would affirm the convictions of Chumbler and Michael Kariakis.
REYNOLDS, J., concurs in this dissent.