Court Opinion

ID: 9442339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:44:18.150983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:03.939690
License: Public Domain

McCORD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot 'agree with my brothers that the evidence here adduced justifies an affirmance of the judgment against the United States. The proof as to the damages in this case fails to rise above mere speculation and guess, and for that reason 'alone the damages awarded should be disallowed. United States v. Huff, 5 Cir., 175 F.2d 678; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Ramsey, 261 Ky. 657, 88 S.W.2d 675, 103 A.L.R. 541; L. O. Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Company et al., 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 878, 78 A.L.R. 851.
In summing up the evidence the trial court expressed grave doubt as to the sufficiency of the proof offered in this wise: “The Court: I am not saying that you are not entitled to profit on it, but the point is what was the condition of these machines when they arrived there, and from that adduce what the market value was, because this guess that Graves gives is just the sketchiest kind of an estimate, because he just blankets 250 machines and says in his opinion they were only worth 35 or 50 dollars, and that is a little bit too loose and generous speculation with even the Government’s money even in this day and time, and I am not going to make any finding for you based upon a general estimate of that kind ■* * * the principal difficulty is the fact that all of these were pretty well used machines * * * the shipping records indicate that virtually all of these, or a great percentage of these machines were *962in heed, of repairs and were so at the time of sale. * * * I am just going to have to do some high powered guessing, but if you are right on your proposition of this being a right under contract instead of tort, it wouldn’t prejudice it. * * * the only testimony in the record which in my opinion would wa/rrant an estimate of damages is that of the witness Graves who testified in substance that there were approximately 250 of these machines which had sustained fresh damage through- shipment and that from his examination- and investigation of these he expressed the opinion that the value of the machines, the damaged machines as a lot ranged from $35 to- $50 per machiné. * * * based upon that testimony I am concluding that there is a difference in the market value of the machines between the time of loading on the cars at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and in the condition m which they arrived at Dallas of $30 per machine, and 250 machines, and that I am going to find for the plaintiffs in the total sum of $7,500; that is the best guess I can make about it, gentlemen. It is not satisfactory from the evidence, * * * I think that his estimate was high, but that is the best I can do about it * * * ” (Italics mine).
It is well settled that in a suit to recover unliquidated damages the burden is on the plaintiff to 'adduce some clear and convincing proof of specific loss resulting solely from the negligence of defendant, and it is prejudicial error to award judgment where, as here, the proof admittedly measures only to speculation, guess, or a wholly uninformed estimate. United States v. Huff, 5 Cir., 175 F.2d 678, 680; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Ramsey, 261 Ky. 657, 88 S.W.2d 675, 103 A.L.R. 541; L. O. Shannon v. Shaffer Oil & Refining Co. et al., 10 Cir., 51 F.2d 878, 78 A.L.R. 851; John A. McCoy et al. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Company, 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, 85 A.L.R. 1147. Moreover, the evidence here further fails to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that at least some of the damage alleged is chargeable to the carrier alone, and that the -manner in which the machines were loaded by the Government was therefore not the proximate cause of the damage to them in transit. There is evidence that when they were unloaded at their destination in Grand Prairie, Texas, the machines in seven or eight of the cars were badly jumbled together. Some of the machines, weighing several hundred pounds each, were on top of others three deep, as if they had been “humped” by the railroad in a switching yard, in spite of a warning placard which had been placed on all four sides of the ten box cars reading, “Do Not Hump”. Moreover, the welding machines in approximately two or three of the box cars reached their destination in good condition, even though these were all loaded and packed, braced, and blocked in the same manner as the machines in the other cars claimed to be damaged. While no presumption or inference of liability on the part of the railroad carrier may now be invoked by the government as a defense, since the railroad is no longer a party to the suit, nevertheless it was still incumbent on plaintiffs to prove that the alleged negligence of the government was the sole and proximate cause of the damage to this shipment, and this they have signally failed to do. United States v. Huff, 5 Cir., 175 F.2d 678, 680; 38 Amer.Juris. 973, Negligence, Sec. 285.
It is without dispute that every one of these welding machines claimed to have been damaged through negligent loading on the part of the government were sold to these plaintiffs as used machines on a strictly “as is” basis, and at but a small fraction of their purchase price when bought new by the government. Some of the machines were admittedly worthless except for parts, and all were in a second hand and partially damaged condition when shipped. The witness Graves, upon whose testimony alone the trial court admittedly bases its judgment, swore that he had never even seen these machines until they arrived at their destination in Grand Prairie, Texas, and that the only basis he had for computing their condition and value when shipped was by observing that "fresh damage” had apparently been sustained by them during *963transit.2 Although the evidence gives rise to strong inferences that the damage to this shipment, if any exists, may have been chargeable to the carrier, the railroad has been dismissed from the suit on motion of the government and the record fails to reveal the reason for this action. I do not believe the government should be penalized by 'an affirmance of the judgment with these errors manifest upon the record merely because the case may have been poorly tried. This court is entitled to know what the true situation really was, and justice requires that the case at least be reversed and remanded for a full and fair hearing to all parties.
I conclude that on the record here presented there is no sound legal basis for affirming the judgment, and I therefore respectfully dissent.

. In this connection, the sales agreement between the government and plaintiffs expressly provided:
“(9) The seller will not be responsible for damage to property incurred * * * (b) After delivery of possession to common carrier for transportation.”