Court Opinion

ID: 9654109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:06:16.403299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:05.970364
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. MoFaddin, Justice (concurring). This case was carried over the summer recess so that further study might be given to it.1 Also Ave invited a brief amicus curiae,2 which is both scholarly and concise and has proved most helpful. To even list the cases, textbooks, and Law Review articles consulted would require pages. Therefore this concurring opinion is merely a summary of my individual conclusions. Water has become one of the major problems confronting Arkansas today: the lowering of the water table, the year of insufficient rainfall,- and the recent use of water in irrigation ■ — ■ these combine to make the water problem very acute. We are faced with the necessity of legislation, certainly as to surface water and possibly also as to subterranean water. : There is no common law regulating the appropriation of water by riparian owners; and in the matter of riparian rights our Arkansas cases have never definitely stated whether we follow exclusively the rule of “reasonable use” or the rule of “uninterrupted flow”. -Neither have our Arkansas cases stated the extent of riparian rights. All of these matters should receive legislative attention in order to forestall conflict of claimed rights under various theories. In the present case, the City of Conway has been getting its water supply from the Cadron Creek since 1912. Until this litigation, there had been no question raised about such appropriation, because no one other than Conway had any occasion to use the water. But when we had the dry seasons plus the lowering of the water table and the beginning of irrigation, land owners along the Cadron Creek began to complain. Because Conway had used the water from Cadron Creek for so many years without question, Conway saw no occasion to invoke the Statute that gave it the right of eminent domain. (§ 35-403 et seq. Ark. Stats.) Now Conway finds that long continued use and unquestioned appropriation do not constitute limitations or estoppel. So Conway loses in the present case .because it was the-plaintiff and its case was without .equity. Yet it must, be pointed out that the appellants herein have not proved their rights to take water from Cadron Creek: they have-merely proved that Conway had no such right. It is important that this fact be emphasized.- I summarize some of my personal conclusions on riparian rights: (1) It is possible for riparian rights to exist on both sides of the stream up to the farthest extent of the water shed. But this riparian right is an ever contracting right and never an expanding right: that is, the riparian right may grow smaller by conveyances, but can never grow larger. Suppose the Sovereign of the soil conveys a tract of 160 acres adjacent to the stream. The extent of the Sovereign’s grant limits the riparian use of the water; and a tract lying immediately behind the 160-acre conveyed tract has NO riparian rights because the grant has cut off such other land from the stream. If the grantee of the 160-acre tract should convey the 80 acres immediately adjacent to the stream, the riparian rights contract to the conveyed tract; and the remaining 80-acre tract — not adjacent to the stream — loses all riparian rights. Should the riparian owner of the 80-acre tract on the stream later purchase the land behind the 80-acre tract such purchased land would not re-acquire riparian rights. I go into details with this illustration to explain thoroughly what I mean by riparian rights being “ever contracting and never expanding”. In the case at bár, none of these appellants has proved that his lands are riparian to Cadron Creek in keeping with the above illustration. Appellants have not proved that they are riparian because they have not proved the extent of their conveyances and their boundaries. The decision of the majority does not settle such point. (2) As previously mentioned ,there is a conflict3 between the “reasonable use” theory and the “uninterrupted flow” theory. If the “reasonable use” theory should prevail in Arkansas, the waters from Cadron Creek might be used by a real riparian owner for the irrigation of a rice crop. But if the “uninterrupted flow” theory prevails in Arkansas, then even a real riparian owner cannot use the water of Cadron Creek for the irrigation of a rice crop; because under the “uninterrupted flow” theory, a real riparian owner can use the water from the stream only for domestic uses: that is, for his household uses, his cattle uses, and the irrigation of his garden for his own household use. He cannot use the water — if any other riparian owner complains —for the irrigation of crops for sale, or for selling of the water (as Conway has been doing in the case at bar). When we understand such limited use of the water even by a true riparian owner, we see that none of the appellants in this suit has been using the water for a truly riparian use, and so they cannot prevail if any real riparian owner should complain, and if we should adopt the “reasonable use” theory. I could point out other problems about water in Arkansas, but those stated show our difficulties and emphasize the fact that Conway lost in the case at bar, but the appellants did not establish any riparian rights.   During the summer recess, I had the pleasure of discussing water problems with Honorable Wells A. Hutchins, of California, the author of the volume, “Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West,” and another volume soon to be published. He is a recogniezd authority. To list the cases and texts furnished at my request by Mr. Hutchins would unduly extend this opinion.    This brief was by Honorable Joe C. Barrett of the Jonesboro Bar.    This conflict is discussed in Restatement of the Law, Volume 4 on Torts, at page 339 et seq.