Court Opinion

ID: 9384881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 15:01:04.024149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.116044
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    HEPING LI, et al.,

                              Plaintiffs,                      Civil Action No. 20-2008 (JMC)

            v.

    KEQIANG LI, et al.,

                              Defendants.

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

           Three individuals filed suit claiming that the Chinese government illegally expropriated

tens of millions of dollars’ worth of property that they owned in China, with the Industrial

Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 2 serving as a conspirator-intermediary. Plaintiffs seek

damages, a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants violated international law, and either an

injunction barring the sale of any unsold properties or the disgorgement of profits from the sale.

Because the Court finds that Defendants Keqiang Li, Shengkun Guo, Xinshe Lu, Yaojun Meng,

and the John Does are immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),

Plaintiffs’ claims against those Defendants are dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. As for Defendant ICBC, the Court grants its Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

ECF 29. Having thus disposed of all Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court dismisses the case.

1
  Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of quoted materials has been modified throughout this opinion, for
example, by omitting internal quotation marks and citations, and by incorporating emphases, changes to capitalization,
and other bracketed alterations therein. All pincites to documents filed on the docket are to the automatically generated
ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

2
    Defendant represents that its correct name is Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited. See ECF 20 at 1.

                                                           1
I.     BACKGROUND

       There are three Plaintiffs in this case, each of whom is of Chinese origin and currently lives

in the District of Columbia. ECF 3 ¶¶ 29, 56, 81. Plaintiff Heping Li is a permanent resident of the

United States, but not a citizen. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff Yanlan Huang moved to the United States in

1999 and became a United States citizen in 2020. Id. ¶ 179; id. at 26 n.*. Plaintiff Xiaogang Shi is

a United States citizen, though the record does not indicate when he became one. Id. ¶ 56; ECF 37

at 8. Both Li and Shi were previously married to Huang. ECF 3 ¶¶ 93, 119.

       Defendants are four Chinese government officials in their official capacities, an

unspecified number of John Does, and the ICBC. Id. at 1. The John Does are Chinese officials

who orchestrated, participated in, or benefitted from the expropriation of Plaintiffs’ property. Id.

¶¶ 209–14. The ICBC is China’s state-owned bank. Id. ¶ 198. The ICBC has branches around the

world, including in New York City. Id. ¶ 198–99.

       The Amended Complaint alleges the following. On August 16, 2002, Plaintiff Li was

arrested in Shanghai on the grounds that he and his former wife, Plaintiff Huang, had embezzled

a large sum of money and used it to purchase dozens of apartments in Shanghai. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37. Li

was kept in “secret detention” by the People’s Procuratorate of Guilin City for 145 days, during

which time the authorities attempted (and failed) to coerce him into signing a false confession. Id.

¶ 34. Li was “brutally tortured” by his captors—subjected to sleep deprivation, solitary

confinement, dehydration, electric shocks, painful restraints, and involuntary drug use. Id. ¶¶ 34–

35. That left him with brain damage, renal failure, and permanent erectile disfunction. Id. ¶ 36.

       Also in August 2002, the Chinese government seized various properties from Plaintiff

Huang (Li’s former wife), who had relocated to the United States in 1999. Id. ¶¶ 124–25, 179.

Amongst the seized property was a corporation of which Huang was the majority owner, several

pieces of valuable real estate owned by that corporation, and Huang’s personal savings. Id. at

                                                 2
¶¶ 124–25, 127, 179. Huang’s share of the seized corporation—which was nationalized by the

Chinese government, id. ¶ 125—was worth approximately 45 million U.S. dollars. Id. ¶ 180.

        In February 2003, the government auctioned off, without Li’s consent and a for a fraction

of their value, nineteen of Li’s “best located apartments,” cumulatively worth around 26 million

U.S. dollars. Id. ¶ 38. That transaction was facilitated by Defendant ICBC, with the cooperation of

the Chinese courts. Id. ¶¶ 40, 204. In December 2004, Li was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id.

¶ 42. He appealed that conviction, and it was reversed for insufficient evidence. Id. ¶¶ 43–46. Li

petitioned the Intermediate Court of Guilin City for state compensation for his detention and

torture and for the confiscation of his property. Id. ¶ 47. The court agreed to compensate Li for his

wrongful imprisonment, but not for the torture or for the loss of his apartments. Id. ¶ 48. In 2017,

after considerable litigation, those proceedings were terminated. Id. ¶¶ 130–31.

        A second round of seizures took place in December 2016, when the People’s Procuratorate

of Guilin City seized twenty-one Shanghai apartments owned by Plaintiff Shi, who (like Huang)

was living in the United States at the time. Id. ¶ 60. Shi had purchased the apartments from Li in

February 2000, at which time Shi was married to Huang. Id. ¶¶ 57, 113. The stress from the seizure

of his property, along with the legal wrangling (and threats) that followed, caused Shi to suffer a

heart attack, leaving him “paralyzed, unable to walk, talk, eat, and completely disabled.” Id. ¶ 67.

The seizure was upheld in court, and on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 68, 76–77.

        Plaintiffs make the following claims against various Defendants: (i) illegal expropriation

of private property; (ii) torture; (iii) cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment; (iv) arbitrary arrest;

(v) forced labor; (vi) battery and assault; (vii) false imprisonment; (viii) distortion and

blackmailing; (ix) pain and suffering; (x) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (xi)

conversion and unjust enrichment; and (xii) civil conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 237–94. Defendant ICBC

                                                   3
moved to dismiss for, amongst other things, lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state

a claim. ECF 29. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition, ECF 37, and the ICBC filed a Reply, ECF 38. No

other Defendant has responded to the Amended Complaint.

II.    LEGAL STANDARDS

       A. Subject matter jurisdiction

       Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only hear cases over which

they have subject matter jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). “It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and that courts

may raise the issue sua sponte.” NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

       To establish subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s pleading must “affirmatively and

distinctly” demonstrate “the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction.” Smith v.

McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926). In evaluating whether a complaint establishes subject

matter jurisdiction, “the court must treat the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and afford the

plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Thomas v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 305 F. Supp. 3d 77, 81 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Jerome

Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, unlike with a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, when evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “may consider materials

outside the pleadings.” Jerome Stevens Pharms., 402 F.3d at 1253.

       B. Motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

       “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In

evaluating a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), a court “must treat the complaint’s factual

allegations as true, and must grant [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived

                                                  4
from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

That said, a court need not accept “inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are

unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). Nor must a court accept “legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Id.

III.   ANALYSIS

       The individual Defendants in this case—both the named government officials and the John

Does—are immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1602 et seq. Plaintiffs’ claims against those Defendants are therefore dismissed, sua sponte, for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the ICBC has not shown that it enjoys FSIA’s

presumptive immunity, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the

ICBC upon which relief can be granted, and therefore grants its Motion to Dismiss.

       A. The named government Defendants and the John Does are immune from suit
          under the FSIA.

       The FSIA affords the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state” in United

States courts. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989).

Under the FSIA, foreign governments are presumptively immunized from lawsuits brought against

them in the United States, though that immunity is “subject to certain enumerated exceptions” set

forth in the statute. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993). FSIA immunity extends to

both a foreign sovereign in its own name, and to its political subdivisions, agencies, and

instrumentalities. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). A court is obligated to determine whether immunity is

available under the FSIA, even where the foreign state does not enter an appearance in the case.

Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983)

       Once the Court determines that a defendant enjoys presumptive immunity under the FSIA,

the plaintiff bears the “initial burden” of “making out a legally sufficient case” that a FSIA

                                                 5
exception applies. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 743

Fed. App’x 442, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic

of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2013). After that, “the burden of persuasion rests with the

foreign sovereign claiming immunity, which must establish the absence of the factual basis by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 528 F.3d

934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

        Thus, in determining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’

claims against the individual Defendants, the Court’s analysis comes in two parts. First, the Court

determines—based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint—that the individual Defendants

are extensions of the Chinese state, and therefore enjoy presumptive immunity under the FSIA.

Second, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to plead facts that would

establish that any FSIA exception applies to their claims against the individual Defendants.

Therefore, those claims are dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

        1. The individual Defendants are extensions of the Chinese state, and therefore enjoy
           presumptive immunity under the FSIA.

        The question whether an officer of a foreign state enjoys presumptive immunity under the

FSIA is not always a straightforward inquiry. An individual official is not automatically covered

by the FSIA, even if sued in their official capacity for actions taken while acting on behalf of a

foreign state. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 322 (2010) (“[W]e do not doubt that in some

circumstances the immunity of the foreign state” under the common law “extends to an individual

for acts taken in his official capacity. But it does not follow from this premise that Congress

intended to codify that immunity in the FSIA”.). On the other hand, when “the state is the real

party in interest” to a suit, “it may be the case that some actions against an official in his official

capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself,” such that they are subject to

                                                   6
FSIA immunity. Id. at 325 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not

a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” (emphasis in

original))). Considering the above, other courts in this jurisdiction have applied the following

standard to determine whether the FSIA applies to a foreign official: “[T]o determine whether a

suit against a foreign official is governed by the FSIA, this Court must look to whether the suit is

against the official personally or whether the state is the real party in interest.” Odhiambo v.

Republic of Kenya, 930 F. Supp. 2d 17, 34 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 764 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014);

see also Nnaka v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 238 F. Supp. 3d 17, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d,

756 Fed. App’x 16 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

        With regard to the four named government officials, the Amended Complaint makes it

clear that the Chinese state is the real party in interest. Each of those Defendants is sued in their

official capacity. ECF 3 at 1. The Amended Complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations

that any of the named officials personally ordered or participated in Li’s arrest, imprisonment,

torture, or prosecution, or that they ordered, participated in, or profited from the expropriation of

Plaintiffs’ properties. Rather, each official is discussed solely in his capacity as the representative

of the government department they oversaw. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 133, 138, 163, 167. Indeed, the

Amended Complaint’s very first paragraph states that the case is about “crimes by the totalitarian

regime of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the [reign] of Chinese Communist Party

(CCP).” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs go on to describe, at some length, an alleged longstanding Chinese

policy of “expropriat[ing] real property from its land owner[s] through state organized violence.” 3

3
  Indeed, despite its caption, the Amended Complaint regularly refers to various government subdivisions as
defendants in the case. See, e.g., id. ¶ 29 (“Defendant Regional Branch of Chinese Communist Party”); id. ¶ 149

                                                      7
Id. ¶¶ 7–15. Finally, like in Odhiambo and Nnaka, there is no indication that Plaintiffs are seeking

damages directly from the pockets of the individual Defendants. See ECF 3 at 58–59; see also

Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“A plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an official-

capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.”). Thus, the Court concludes that

Plaintiffs’ suit is not really targeted at any of the named individuals, but at the state itself.

         The Court reaches the same conclusion with regard to the John Does. To the extent

Plaintiffs elaborate on the John Does’ identities, they make no suggestion that any are being sued

in anything other than their official capacities. 4 The John Does (some of whom are, paradoxically,

identified by name), are the “former acting Secretary of the CCP Branch of Guangxi Autonomous

Region of Zhuang Nationality,” id. ¶ 210, “the Chief ‘Justice’ of the Supreme People’s Court of

the ‘PRC,’” id. ¶ 211, the Intermediate People’s Court of Guilin (the institution), id. ¶ 212, and

“[a]ll terrorist attackers, uniformed or plain clothed street thugs, bouncers, police interrogators,

wards, prison guards, medical personnel in prison facilities, commercial auctioneers, bankers and

financiers involved in such illegal expropriations and tortures, who are accountable but their

liability was carried by their masters as the Defendants here under the theory of ‘respondeat

superior,’” id. ¶ 213. Given the lack of detail in the Amended Complaint about the specific actions

(“Defendant Central Committee”); id. ¶ 175 (“defendant People’s Procuratorate of Guilin City”). Those instances are
each further evidence that the true target of the suit is the Chinese government, not any particular individual.

4
  The one potential exception is “John Doe number 4,” identified as Hsow Hsiong Tsai, a Taiwanese citizen who
purchased the expropriated properties at auction. See ECF 3 at ¶ 213. As an initial matter, it is self-refuting to identify
a “John Doe” defendant by name; normally, if a plaintiff knows the identify of a defendant but chooses not to name
them in the complaint, that individual is not a defendant. Moreover, the same paragraph in the Amended Complaint
that introduces Tsai as “John Doe number 4” confirms that he is not a defendant in the case. See id. (stating that Tsai
“should have been named as [a] Defendant . . . but for his said to be deceased and/or become otherwise traceless”);
see also id. at ¶ 38 (suggesting that Tsai “will probably be sued in separate action”). The Court therefore reads the
Amended Complaint as laying down a marker that Tsai might be sued in a different lawsuit, and concludes for
purposes of this Opinion that he is not a party to this suit.

                                                            8
of the John Does as individuals, the invocation of respondeat superior (which requires that all

John Does are sued for actions taken “within the scope of their employment,” Boykin v. District

of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 561 (D.C. 1984)), and the lack of any suggestion that the John Does

should be held personally liable, the Court determines that the Amended Complaint is clear that

the true party of interest in the claims against the John Does is the Chinese state. Accordingly, the

Court concludes that all individual Defendants are entitled to presumptive immunity under the

FSIA. 5

          2. No FSIA exception applies to Plaintiffs’ claims against individual Defendants. Those
             claims are therefore dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

          The Court next considers whether any FSIA exceptions apply to abrogate presumptive

immunity. In both their Amended Complaint, ECF 3, and their response to the ICBC’s Motion to

Dismiss, 6 ECF 37, Plaintiffs point to three such exceptions: the “expropriation exception,” see 28

U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), the “terrorism exception,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, and the FSIA’s carve-out

for “international agreements to which the United States is a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The Court

concludes that none of those exceptions apply to Plaintiffs’ claims.

5
  Even if the FSIA does not apply to one or more of the individual Defendants in this case, common-law foreign
official immunity would still require the Court to dismiss the claims against those individuals for want of subject
matter jurisdiction. Although the D.C. Circuit has never formally adopted the standard for foreign official immunity
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 66(f) (1965), it has twice in
recent years assumed that standard applies in affirming decisions from the District Court. See Miango v. Democratic
Republic of Congo, No. 20-5244, 2022 WL 10219715, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2022); Lewis v. Mutond, 918 F.3d
142, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Under the Restatement’s standard, the Court may not hear any case against a “public
minister, official, or agent of the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of exercising
jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.” Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States § 66(f). That standard is undoubtedly satisfied here, where all individual Defendants are sued in
their official capacities, and the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims is that both the state-sanctioned arrest and imprisonment
of Li and its seizure of Plaintiffs’ property in China were unlawful.
6
  The ICBC moved to dismiss for, amongst other things, lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. See ECF
29-1 at 19–23. Although the Court determines that the ICBC does not enjoy the FSIA’s presumptive immunity, see
infra Part III.B.1, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ arguments on that point here.

                                                             9
                (a) The FSIA’s expropriation exception does not apply.

        Plaintiffs contend that the Court has jurisdiction to hear their claims involving the seizure

of their property under the FSIA’s expropriation exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). That

exception abrogates a foreign state’s FSIA immunity when a claim satisfies the following three

elements: “(1) rights in property are at issue; (2) those rights were taken in violation of international

law; and (3) a jurisdictional nexus exists between the expropriation and the United States.”

Schubarth v. Federal Republic of Germany, 891 F.3d 392, 398–99 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “A plaintiff

must make more than a nonfrivolous showing that FSIA’s expropriation exception applies.” Id. at

399.

        There is no question that Plaintiffs’ expropriation claims relate to their rights in property.

The Court therefore turns to the second element from Schubarth, whether the seizure of Plaintiffs’

property violated international law. To show that an alleged expropriation violates international

law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the expropriation violates a principle that has “crystallized

into an international norm that bears the heft of customary law.” Helmerich, 743 Fed. App’x at

449; see also id. at 450 (“In conducting this inquiry, we give substantial weight to the judgments

and opinions of national and international judicial bodies, scholarly writings, and unchallenged

governmental pronouncements that undertake to state a rule of international law.”). Under that

standard, the D.C. Circuit has said that it is a violation of international law when a state

expropriates “the property of a national of another state . . . without compensation.” Id. (emphasis

in original) (citing Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States

§ 712(1)(c)). However, under the domestic takings rule, international law is silent when a state

expropriates “property belonging to [that] country’s own nationals.” Federal Republic of Germany

                                                   10
v. Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, 711 (2021). In other words, where the domestic takings rule applies, the

expropriation exception cannot. See id.at 715.

         Thus, if Plaintiffs were Chinese nationals when their property was seized, then the seizures

did not violate international law, and the expropriation exception cannot apply. Plaintiffs have not

shown that they were nationals of any other country at the time of the seizures. The sole statutory

provision that “confers United States nationality upon non-citizens is 8 U.S.C. § 1408.”

Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015). That provision deals

exclusively with the circumstances of an individual’s birth and parentage; there is no suggestion

that those provisions apply to any Plaintiff in this case. Li is not a United States citizen, nor is he

a national of the United States. ECF 3 ¶ 28. Huang only became a United States citizen in 2020,

and neither the Amended Complaint nor Plaintiffs’ other motions make any allegation that she was

a national before that. Id. at 26 n.*. Nor is there anything to suggest that either Li nor Huang were

ever nationals of a country other than China or the United States. In summary, because neither Li

nor Huang have shown they were anything other than Chinese nationals at the time of the

expropriation, they cannot invoke the expropriation exception.

         Shi’s case is slightly different. Shi is a United States citizen. Id. ¶ 56. However, the

Amended Complaint is silent on when he became one. Moreover, Plaintiffs, even after confronted

with the argument that the timing of Shi’s citizenship would be dispositive, have refused to answer

that question. 7 ECF 37 at 8. Because Shi fails to “affirmatively and distinctly” allege facts that are

“essential to federal jurisdiction,” Smith, 270 U.S. at 459, the Court cannot find that the

7
  Plaintiffs justify that refusal based on the erroneous contention that Rule 8’s liberal pleading standard excuses them
from any requirement that they plead “detailed information regarding [Shi’s] citizenship.” ECF 37 at 8. But the Court’s
inquiry into subject matter jurisdiction is not governed by Rule 8. Rather, a plaintiff’s pleading must “affirmatively
and distinctly” demonstrate “the existence of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction.” Smith, 270 U.S. at 459.

                                                          11
expropriation exception is applicable to Shi’s claims. Moreover, even if the Court were to assume

Shi was a United States national when his property was seized, the expropriation exception to the

FSIA would still not apply because there is no commercial nexus between the Unites States and

Defendants. The expropriated property is not “present in the United States.” De Csepel v. Republic

of Hungary, 859 F.3d 1094, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Nor does the Complaint offer any non-

conclusory facts to suggest that an instrumentality of the Chinese state “own[s] or operate[s]” the

property. Id. Therefore, the expropriation exception cannot apply.

               (b) The FSIA’s terrorism exception does not apply.

       Plaintiff Li suggests that the Court has jurisdiction over his claims of wrongful

imprisonment and torture under the FSIA’s terrorism exception. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. The

terrorism exception abrogates immunity where a plaintiff seeks damages for injury or death caused

by “torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material

support or resources for such an act,” if those acts were “engaged in by an official, employee, or

agent” of a foreign country. Mohammadi, 782 F.3d at 14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1)). The

terrorism exception “further requires that (i) the foreign country was designated a ‘state sponsor

of terrorism at the time [of] the act,’ (ii) the ‘claimant or the victim was’ a ‘national of the United

States’ at that time, and (iii) the ‘claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity

to arbitrate the claim.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)).

       Here, because the State Department has not designated China a state sponsor of terrorism,

see State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-

terrorism (last visited April 5, 2023), and because Li has never been a national of the United States,

see supra Part III.A.2(a), the terrorism exception cannot apply.

                                                  12
               (c) None of the international treaties and agreements cited by Plaintiffs supersede
                   the FSIA to abrogate Defendants’ immunity.

       Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court has jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to five

separate international treaties and agreements. The Court disagrees. According to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1604, FSIA’s presumptive immunity is granted “[s]ubject to existing international agreements

to which the United States [was] a party at the time of enactment of this Act” in October 1976.

Therefore, for an international agreement to abrogate FSIA immunity, that agreement would have

to (a) either predate or supersede the FSIA and (b) create an independent cause of action.

       Here, Plaintiffs point to: (1) the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; (2) the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights; (3) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; (4) the Charter of the United

Nations; and (5) the International Labour Organization’s Convention No. 29 Concerning Forced

or Compulsory Labor. ECF 3 at 46 ¶ 238; id. ¶¶ 290–94. Because none of the cited agreements

creates an independent cause of action, the Court determines that they do not abrogate FSIA

immunity.

       The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment “was signed in 1988 by a representative of the President and ratified in 1990 by the

U.S. Senate.” Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011). It is “non-self-executing and

thus does not itself create any rights enforceable in U.S. courts.” Id. Nor does the Torture Victim

Protection Act—which was enacted in 1991, in part, to carry out the United States’ obligations

under the Convention, see Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 92

(D.C. Cir. 2002)—create a cause of action against individuals or entities that are otherwise covered

by FSIA immunity. See Belhas v. Ya'alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1288–89 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

                                                13
        Likewise, none of the other agreements cited by Plaintiffs creates an independent cause of

action. When the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in

1992, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004), it did so “on the express understanding

that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal

courts.” Id. at 735. Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “does not of its own

force impose obligations as a matter of international law.” Id. at 734. The Charter of the United

Nations “has been ratified by the United States, but nothing suggests that it was intended to be

enforceable in federal courts.” United States v. Khatallah, 160 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D.D.C. 2016);

see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008). Finally, the Convention Concerning

Forced or Compulsory Labor was never ratified by the United States and so cannot conceivably

be binding on United States courts. See 39 U.N.T.S. 55.

        Accordingly, the Court concludes that the individual Defendants in this case are immune

from suit under the FSIA, and therefore dismisses, sua sponte, all claims against those Defendants

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

        B. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the ICBC.

        There is however, one Defendant who is not immune from suit under the FSIA: the ICBC.

The ICBC filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims against it for, amongst other things, lack of subject

matter jurisdiction, ineffective service, and failure to state a claim. ECF 29. The Court finds that

the ICBC is not immune from suit under the FSIA, but dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims against the

bank for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6). 8

8
 The Parties dispute whether service was effective in this case. Because the Court dismisses the Amended Complaint
on the merits, it need not reach that issue. See Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[O]ther things
being equal, our jurisprudential preference is for adjudication of cases on their merits.”).

                                                        14
       1. The ICBC is not immune from suit under the FSIA.

       As an initial matter, the Court concludes that the ICBC does not qualify for presumptive

immunity under the FSIA. The FSIA explicitly contemplates that, under some circumstances, a

corporation may be considered part of a foreign state. A “foreign state” includes “an agency or

instrumentality” of the state, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), which is defined as:

           “[A]ny entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
           and (2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
           or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
           foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a
           citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created under the laws of
           any third country.”

Id. at § 1603(b). In its Motion to Dismiss, the ICBC cites to an affidavit from its own legal counsel,

stating that the ICBC is a “joint-stock limited company incorporated in the People’s Republic of

China under the laws of that country,” ECF 29 at 21 (citing ECF 20-3 ¶ 2), and that “[t]he two

largest shareholders of ICBC Limited are Central Huijin Investment Ltd. (a 100% state-owned

entity) and Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, which together own 65.85% of

ICBC Limited.” Id. But that evidence, even if credited, does not show that the ICBC is an

instrumentality of the Chinese state. That is because the FSIA requires that a company be majority

owned by the state itself (or a political subdivision of the state). See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson,

538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003). It is immaterial for purposes of the FSIA that Central Huijin Investment

Ltd., which owns shares of the ICBC, is itself state-owned. See id. (clarifying that “[c]ontrol and

ownership” of a corporation “are distinct concepts”). Therefore, the Court must conclude, on this

record, that the ICBC is not an instrumentality of the Chinese state.

       2. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs’ claims against the ICBC must be dismissed under the act of
          state doctrine.

       In its Motion to Dismiss, the ICBC urges that Plaintiffs’ claims against it must be dismissed

under the act of state doctrine. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Env’t Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S.

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400, 404 (1990). The Court agrees. The act of state doctrine is grounded in the “domestic

separation of powers, reflecting the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the

task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder the conduct of foreign affairs.”

Id. “The doctrine directs United States courts to refrain from deciding a case when the outcome

turns upon the legality or illegality . . . of official action by a foreign sovereign performed within

its own territory.” Riggs Nat’l Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r of IRS, 163 F.3d 1363, 1367 (D.C.

Cir. 1999). When the doctrine applies, it serves as a “rule of decision” requiring that such official

acts “shall be deemed valid” for purposes of deciding a case. World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v.

Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

       Here, Plaintiffs allege the ICBC played a “pivot[al] role in the conspiracy designed and

devised to illegally expropriate [Plaintiffs’] properties.” ECF 3 ¶ 200. Specifically, the Complaint

alleges that the Guilin Branch Office of the ICBC petitioned to serve as the court-appointed

receiver for Li’s seized properties, id. ¶¶ 204–06, and “initiated an illegal midnight auction to sell”

those properties for the “disproportionately low price . . . approximately a quarter in comparison

to then fair market value,” id. ¶ 204. In exchange, according to Plaintiffs, the ICBC received

“corrupted economic benefits for the dirty reward of their collusion with the corrupted Communist

regime they knew or should have known to be anti-humanity.” Id. The Complaint also asserts,

conclusorily, that the ICBC is legally liable for “aiding and abetting and/or ratifying” Li’s arrest,

detention, and torture, id. ¶¶ 250, 255, 265, 270, as well as the pain, suffering, and emotional

distress Plaintiffs suffered as a result of the government’s actions, id. ¶ 281.

       Of course, the Court may not credit Plaintiffs’ unsupported legal conclusions, even if they

are offered in the guise of factual statements. Browning, 292 F.3d at 242. Regardless, if the Court

assumes, as it must, that the seizure of Li’s properties, his detention, and the remedies granted him

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by the Chinese courts were valid, see World Wide Minerals, 296 F.3d at 1165, none of Plaintiffs’

claims survive. Even if the ICBC’s auction of the Li’s seized property was as deficient as Plaintiffs

claim, the ICBC’s failure to get a fair price for the properties harmed the Chinese government, not

Plaintiffs. As for the seizure of Huang’s property and Shi’s apartments, the Court notes that the

Complaint contains no non-conclusory allegations that the ICBC was involved in the seizure or

resale of those properties.

       Because the act of state doctrine requires the Court to assume the validity of all official

actions taken by the Chinese government within its own territory, and because the Complaint fails

to state a claim against the ICBC if the Chinese government’s actions were valid, the Court grants

the ICBC’s Motion to Dismiss all claims against it.

IV.    CONCLUSION

       Plaintiffs’ claims against Keqiang Li, Shengkun Guo, Xinshe Lu, Yaojun Meng, and the

John Does are DISMISSED sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore, the

Court GRANTS the ICBC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against it for failure to state a

claim. Having thus disposed of all Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants, the Court DISMISSES

the case.

       A separate order accompanies this opinion.

       SO ORDERED.

       DATE: April 5, 2022

                                                              Jia M. Cobb
                                                              U.S. District Court Judge

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