Court Opinion

ID: 9911601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:01:20.845238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:06.081020
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 1

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           December 20, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  FARM BUREAU PROPERTY &
  CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                            No. 22-4118
                                                      (D.C. No. 4:21-CV-00082-DBB)
  BRIAN CLEAVER; SUNDAELEE                                       (D. Utah)
  CLEAVER; JILL CLEAVER; ERIC N.
  CLEAVER,

        Defendants - Appellants.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        This appeal arises from a dispute between Brian Cleaver, Sundaelee Cleaver, Jill

 Cleaver, and Eric N. Cleaver (collectively “the Cleavers”) and their homeowner’s

 insurance provider, Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance (“Farm Bureau”). The

 Cleavers sought coverage under their homeowner’s insurance policy (“the Policy”) for

 injuries sustained by E.C., a minor child, in an all terrain vehicle (“ATV”) accident on the

        *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
 Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 2

 unpaved public road connecting the Cleavers’ property to a nearby gravel pit, where the

 Cleavers would drive their ATVs to recreate. Pursuant to the Policy, Farm Bureau does

 not provide coverage for damages or medical expenses arising from the use of a

 recreational motor vehicle, including an ATV, “while not on an insured location.” App. at

 129. The Policy further defined ‘insured location’ to include the Cleavers’ residence and

 “[a]ny premises used by [the Cleavers] in connection with [the residence].” Id. at 131.

 Farm Bureau denied coverage and initiated this action, seeking a declaration of no

 coverage. Id. at 13. Farm Bureau then moved for summary judgment, arguing the

 roadway where the accident occurred was not an ‘insured location’ under the Policy and,

 accordingly, there was no coverage for the ATV accident. The district court agreed and

 granted summary judgment for Farm Bureau. The Cleavers timely filed this appeal.

        Because we agree that under the four corners of the Policy, and the common

 definition of ‘premises,’ the public roadway connecting the Cleavers’ property to the

 gravel pit is not an ‘insured location,’ we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

 judgment in favor of Farm Bureau.

                                              2
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716            Date Filed: 12/20/2023   Page: 3

                                     I.   BACKGROUND

                                   A.      Factual History 1

        The Cleavers owned a home located

 at 905 North 800 East, in Delta, Utah. The

 Cleavers had six minor children, including

 B.C., age ten, and M.C., age eight. North

 of the Cleavers’ property was a gravel pit.

 The Cleavers owned two ATVs, which

 they would often drive to the gravel pit for

 recreational purposes. But the Cleavers did

 not have any ownership interest in the

 gravel pit or the road connecting it to their

 home. The road connecting the Cleavers’

 property to the gravel pit, 1000 East, was

 an unpaved, county-owned road open to

 the public.

        The Cleavers purchased a homeowner’s insurance policy, issued by Farm Bureau,

 covering the period from October 24, 2018, through October 24, 2019. The Policy

 “cover[ed] ‘damages’ that result from ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ ‘caused by’

        1
          The facts in this matter are undisputed and are drawn from the evidence and
 stipulations presented at summary judgment. They are taken as true solely for the
 purposes of this appeal.

                                                 3
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023        Page: 4

 an ‘occurrence’ to which the[] coverages apply.” Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). However, the Policy provided “no coverage for any ‘damages’ or ‘medical

 expenses’ ‘arising out of’ the ownership, operation, occupancy, maintenance, use,

 entrustment to others, loading or unloading of . . . [a]ny ‘recreational motor vehicle’

 while not on an ‘insured location’” (the “off-location recreational motor vehicle

 exclusion”). Id. at 129. The Policy defined ‘recreational motor vehicle’ as “[a] golf cart,

 snowmobile, two or three wheel motorcycle, motorscooter[], moped, dirt bike, or all

 terrain vehicle of a utility or recreational nature.” Id. at 132. The Policy defined an

 ‘insured location’ to include “[a]ny premises shown in the Declarations under Insured

 Locations” and “[a]ny premises used by you in connection with the ‘insured locations’

 listed above.” Id. at 131. The Policy Declarations listed the Cleavers’ property, at “905 N

 800 E, Delta, UT 84624” as an “Insured Location.” Id. at 113.

        On June 17, 2019, B.C., M.C., and their fifteen-year-old cousin, E.C., were riding

 the Cleavers’ ATVs at the gravel pit. One of the ATVs broke down, and the children used

 the functioning ATV to tow the broken one from the gravel pit back to the Cleavers’

 property. B.C. was driving the functioning ATV, while E.C. steered the broken ATV.

 While the children were driving on 1000 East, the broken ATV overturned, ejecting and

 injuring E.C.

        E.C. sent Farm Bureau a demand for coverage of her injuries under the Policy.

 Farm Bureau denied the claim because “[o]nce the ATV drove off Mr. Cleaver’s

 property, the ATV became uninsured.” Id. at 176. E.C. maintained that Farm Burau’s

                                               4
Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 5

 denial was based on “an incorrect, incomplete analysis of [the] [P]olicy language” and

 sought settlement related to her personal injuries directly from Mr. Cleaver. Id.

                                 B.     Procedural History

        Farm Bureau initiated this action against the Cleavers, filings its Complaint for

 Declaratory Relief in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Farm

 Bureau sought declarations “that there is no coverage under the Policy for the accident

 which occurred on June 17, 2019” and “that it has no duty to defend or indemnify with

 respect to any lawsuit brought as a result of the accident.” Id. at 13. The Cleavers’

 Answer admitted to the factual allegations of Farm Bureau’s Complaint but maintained

 that “the accident happened on an ‘insured location’ as defined in the [P]olicy as it

 occurred on the common area of the insured’s location.” Id. at 80 Thus, the Cleavers

 contested Farm Bureau’s entitlement to declarations of no coverage and no duty to

 defend or indemnify.

        Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment, arguing the public roadway where

 the accident occurred was not an ‘insured location’ under the Policy and, accordingly,

 there was no coverage for the ATV accident. Farm Bureau contended the weight of

 authority supported finding a public roadway is not an insured location for purposes of a

 homeowner’s insurance policy. Farm Bureau further argued the Cleavers’ proposed

 interpretation of ‘insured location’ would render the off-location recreational motor

 vehicle exclusion meaningless by extending coverage to anywhere the Cleavers chose to

 drive their ATVs to-or-from their property. The Cleavers responded that the Policy is

 “fairly susceptible” to their interpretation of “insured location” to include the road where

                                              5
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 6

 the accident occurred because the Policy “does not use clear and unmistakable language

 to communicate that a public road is not an ‘insured location.’” Id. at 180. The Cleavers

 specifically argued the Policy defines ‘insured location’ broadly, to include “[a]ny

 premises used by you in connection with the [property],” id. at 181 (emphasis added),

 and does not limit its definition of ‘recreational motor vehicle’ to vehicles “designed for

 recreation off public roads,” id. at 185. Thus, the Cleavers contended that ambiguity or

 uncertainty in the off-location recreational motor vehicle exclusion must be construed in

 favor of coverage.

        The district court granted Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment,

 concluding the public road where the accident occurred was not an ‘insured location’

 under the Policy. Looking to the Policy’s definition of an insured location as ‘premises,’

 the court found that “premises generally means either land in which the insured has an

 ownership or possessory interest or else some structure.” Id. at 234. While the court

 expressly “d[id] not find that the term ‘premises’ in the Policy is necessarily limited to

 land in which the insured has an interest or to a structure,” it concluded that, “given the

 specific policy language here, it would not be reasonable to interpret the homeowner[’]s

 policy to cover a recreational motor vehicle accident on a public road.” Id. at 231. The

 court found this interpretation was reinforced by the common definition of ‘premises’ and

 by persuasive caselaw from the Utah Court of Appeals and other jurisdictions. Thus, the

 court held the Policy was not reasonably susceptible to the Cleavers’ proposed

 interpretation and granted summary judgment for Farm Bureau.

                                               6
Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 7

                                 II.       DISCUSSION

        On appeal, the Cleavers raise three arguments for reversing the district court’s

 order granting summary judgment for Farm Bureau. 2 First, the Cleavers argue the court

 erroneously read specificity into the phrase ‘any premises’ as used in the Policy

 definition of ‘insured location.’ Second, the Cleavers contend the court failed to liberally

 construe ambiguity and uncertainty in the usual meaning of ‘premises’ in favor of

 providing coverage to the Cleavers. And third, the Cleavers argue the court erred by

 failing to strictly construe the off-location recreational motor vehicle exclusion against

 Farm Bureau where the Policy definition of ‘recreational motor vehicle’ includes

 reference to several vehicles “designed for use on public roads.” Cleaver Br. at 11.

        We agree with the district court that the Policy language is not reasonably

 susceptible to the Cleavers’ proposed interpretation and there is no ambiguity to liberally

 interpret in favor of coverage. Based on the plain language of the Policy and the common

        2
          The Cleavers also moved to certify the following question to the Utah
 Supreme Court: “Can a residential public road constitute an ‘insured location’ under
 an insurance policy that defines ‘insured location’ as ‘any premises used by you in
 connection with the “insured locations” listed above’?” Appellants’ Motion to Certify
 a Question of State Law at 1. We deny certification because there is ample guidance
 from the Utah Supreme Court regarding insurance contract interpretation and the
 issue at hand is not so novel or unprecedented as to warrant troubling our sister state
 courts. See Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Under our
 own federal jurisprudence, we will not trouble our sister state courts every time an
 arguably unsettled question of state law comes across our desks. When we see a
 reasonably clear and principled course, we will seek to follow it ourselves.”); Armijo
 v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Certification is not to be
 routinely invoked whenever a federal court is presented with an unsettled question of
 state law.”).

                                               7
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 8

 understanding of ‘premises,’ an ‘insured location’ does not include the public roadway

 connecting the Cleavers’ property to the gravel pit. Thus, we affirm the district court’s

 order granting summary judgment for Farm Bureau.

                                 A.      Standard of Review

        We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Bird v. W.

 Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we stand in the same

 shoes as the district court and “must view the factual record and make reasonable

 inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary

 judgment.” Id. We will uphold the decision to grant summary judgment only if “there is

 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A dispute is genuine when ‘the evidence is such

 that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,’ and a fact is

 material when it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive]

 law.’” Bird, 832 F.3d at 1199 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

 248 (1986)).

        Likewise, “we review the district court’s interpretation and determination of state

 law de novo.” ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,

 494 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). “When interpreting Utah’s law, we must look to

 rulings of the highest state court, and, if no such rulings exist, must endeavor to predict

                                               8
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716           Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 9

 how that high court would rule” if faced with the same facts and issue. 3 Marcantel v.

 Michael & Sonja Saltman Fam. Tr., 993 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal

 quotation marks omitted); see also ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 494 F.3d at 1243 (“Where

 the state’s highest court has not addressed the issue presented, the federal court must

 determine what decision the state court would make if faced with the same facts and

 issue.”). In making such a prediction, we may consider decisions from Utah’s

 intermediate court of appeals, “appellate decisions in other states with similar legal

 principles,” and “the general weight and trend of authority in the relevant area of law.”

 Marcantel, 993 F.3d at 1222.

                B.      Insurance Contract Interpretation Under Utah Law

        Under Utah law, “[i]nsurance policies are contracts between the insurer and the

 insured and must be analyzed according to principles of contract interpretation.”

 Compton v. Houston Cas. Co., 393 P.3d 305, 310 (Utah 2017). We first look to the policy

 and “construe its terms to give effect to the intentions of the parties” as “gleaned from . . .

 the text of the contract itself” and “in the light of existing circumstances, including the

 purpose of the policy.” Id. We look to the language of the policy and “consider each

 contract provision . . . in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to

 all and ignoring none.” Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263,

        3
          “Because this is a diversity action, we apply the substantive law of the forum
 state.” Marcantel v. Michael & Sonja Saltman Fam. Tr., 993 F.3d 1212, 1221 (10th
 Cir. 2021). Both parties agree Utah law applies to the interpretation and application
 of the Policy here.

                                                9
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 10

  267 (Utah 2009). We consider terms’ meaning as “to a person of ordinary intelligence

  and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance with the usual

  and natural meaning of the words.” Compton, 393 P.3d at 310. If, based on this analysis,

  the policy terms are unambiguous, we adhere to the language’s plain meaning. See id.;

  Encon Utah, LLC, 210 P.3d at 267; Quaid v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 158 P.3d 525, 527

  (Utah 2007); Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 133 P.3d 428, 434 (Utah 2006).

         We adhere to the same principles when interpreting exclusions from coverage. See

  Quaid, 158 P.3d at 528–29 (“Exclusions from coverage are interpreted no differently

  when the policy language is clear.” (citing S.W. Energy Corp. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 974 P.2d

  1239 (Utah 1999) (holding that unambiguous language is given its ordinary meaning

  regardless of whether the specific provision works to affirm or deny coverage); Alf v.

  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Utah 1993) (rejecting the argument

  that an exclusion was ambiguous and unenforceable because it was inconsistent with the

  expectation of coverage); Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 803

  (Utah 1992) (concluding that even though “an insurance contract is adhesive [that] is no

  reason, in itself, to enforce what might be found to be the reasonable expectations of the

  insured when those expectations conflict with the plain terms of the policy”)). “We will

  not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for themselves . . . [or]

  avoid the contract’s plain language to achieve an equitable result.” Bakowski v. Mountain

  States Steel, Inc., 52 P.3d 1179, 1185 (Utah 2002).

         However, if we determine the terms are ambiguous, we will resolve “any

  ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of an insurance policy . . . in favor of coverage.”

                                               10
Appellate Case: 22-4118       Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 11

  Compton, 393 P.3d at 310; Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Versaw, 99 P.3d 796, 798 (Utah 2004)

  (“[A]mbiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that is fairly susceptible to

  different interpretations should be construed in favor of coverage.”). A term is ambiguous

  if it is “unclear, it omits terms, or the terms used . . . may be understood to have two or

  more plausible meanings.” Quaid, 158 P.3d at 528; see also Compton, 393 P.3d at 310

  (“An ambiguity exists when a provision is capable of more than one reasonable

  interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial

  deficiencies.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To be plausible, the proposed

  interpretation “must be based upon the usual and natural meaning of the language used

  and may not be the result of a forced or strained construction.” Saleh,133 P.3d at 433.

  While “both readings might appear in isolation to be permissible constructions, if all but

  one of the meanings is rendered unreasonable by context, the provision is unambiguous.”

  Compton, 393 P.3d at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). Policy terms will “not

  qualify as ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them with a different

  interpretation according to his or her own interests.” Saleh,133 P.3d at 433.

                         C.      ‘Insured Location’ Under the Policy

         The Policy expressly forecloses coverage “for any ‘damages’ or ‘medical

  expenses’ ‘arising out of’ the ownership, operation, occupancy, maintenance, use,

  entrustment to others, loading or unloading of . . . [a]ny ‘recreational motor vehicle’

  while not on an ‘insured location.’” App. at 129. The parties agree the ATV ridden by

  E.C. qualifies as a ‘recreational motor vehicle’ under the Policy. The sole interpretative

  issue presented at summary judgment and on appeal then is whether the location of the

                                               11
Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 12

  accident was an ‘insured location’ under the Policy. Both parties look to the Policy

  definition of ‘insured location’ as including “[a]ny premises used by you in connection

  with the [premises shown in the Declarations].” Id. at 131. Thus, we ask whether “[a]ny

  premises used by [the Cleavers] in connection with [their residence]” can be reasonably

  understood to include the location of the accident, north of the Cleavers’ property on

  1000 East. Id.

         The Cleavers contend the district court erred by interpreting ‘any premises’ as

  unambiguously excluding the accident location because (1) the Policy does not define

  ‘any premises’ and the term should be read broadly to include the accident location,

  (2) ambiguity in the meaning of ‘premises’ should be construed in favor of providing

  coverage; and (3) the Policy does not limit ‘recreational motor vehicles’ to those

  designed for use off public roads. 4 Farm Bureau responds that the district court correctly

  concluded the accident location was not an ‘insured location’ by interpreting the term

         4
           The Cleavers also argue the district court erred because it “never considered
  that the location was ‘used in connection’ with the Cleavers’ property.” Cleaver Br.
  at 14. The Cleavers contend the road connecting their property to the gravel pit was
  ‘used in connection’ with their property because “[t]hey visited the area often.”
  Reply at 8. But, because the Policy defines insured location as “any premises used by
  you in connection with [your insured property],” even if the accident location was
  ‘used in connection’ with the Cleavers’ residence, it is not an insured location under
  the Policy if it is not a ‘premises.’ App. at 131 (emphasis added); see id. at 230–32
  (“[B]ut the ‘in connection with’ language matters only if the place where the accident
  occurred was a ‘premises.’”). Because we conclude the term ‘premises’ cannot
  reasonably be understood to include the public road where the accident occurred, we
  need not address whether that road was ‘used in connection’ with the Cleavers’
  residence.

                                              12
Appellate Case: 22-4118       Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 13

  ‘premises’ consistent with dictionary definitions, its other uses in the Policy, and the

  Policy’s purpose.

         We also conclude that the term ‘premises’ is unambiguous as used in the Policy

  and “in accordance with [its] usual and natural meaning.” Compton, 393 P.3d at 310.

  Thus, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment for Farm Bureau.

  1.     ‘Premises’ in the Policy

         When interpreting the Policy’s terms, we begin with “the text of the contract

  itself.” Compton, 393 P.3d at 310. We look to the Policy’s language and “consider each

  . . . provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and

  ignoring none.” Encon Utah, LLC, 210 P.3d at 267. The Policy does not define

  ‘premises’ but does specifically define ‘farm/ranch premises’ and ‘residence premises.’

  ‘Farm/ranch premises’ is defined as: “[l]and (including private approaches) you own,

  rent, or lease primarily for agricultural use; and . . . [f]arm/[r]anch structures, including

  residences on such land.” App. at 130. ‘Residence premises’ is defined as: “[a] one to

  four family dwelling in which you reside, including the grounds, structures and private

  approaches; or . . . [t]hat part or unit of any condominium, townhouse, apartment, or

  other building in which you reside.” Id. at 132.

         The Cleavers argue the district court erred by imputing specificity from these

  defined terms to the term ‘any premises’ in the Policy definition of ‘insured location.’

  The Cleavers construe the district court’s order as holding that ‘any premises’ “was

  limited to land with structures, or in which the Cleavers had an ownership or possessory

  interest.” Cleaver Br. at 12. They contend that, by looking to the Policy definitions of

                                                13
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 14

  ‘farm/ranch premises’ and ‘residence premises,’ the court “read[] additional requirements

  into the definition of ‘any premises’ and disregard[ed] a purposeful omission.” Id.

         But, as Farm Bureau points out, the district court explicitly “d[id] not find that the

  term ‘premises’ in the Policy is necessarily limited to land in which the insured has an

  interest or to a structure.” Farm Bureau Br. at 15 (quoting App. at 231). Rather, the court

  looked to other usages of the undefined term, ‘premises,’ in the Policy to understand how

  the term was used throughout the Policy. The court found “nothing in the Policy itself

  suggesting the possibility that a public road could be a ‘premises.’” App. at 231. On our

  own review of the Policy and its use of the term ‘premises,’ we agree.

         The difference between the term ‘any premises’ as used in the ‘insured location’

  definition and in the defined terms ‘farm/ranch premises’ and ‘residence premises’ is not

  the term ‘premises’ but the modifiers ‘any,’ ‘farm/ranch,’ and ‘residence.’ Across its

  defined uses in the Policy, ‘premises’ is consistently used to mean land or structures,

  including the grounds and private approaches, which the insured owns, rents, leases, or

  occupies. The modifiers attached to ‘premises’ at different points in the Policy are

  purposeful in distinguishing between “[a]ny premises,” id. at 131, premises that are

  “primarily for agricultural use,” id. at 130, and premises “in which you reside,” id. at 132.

  The Policy draws distinction between the use of the premises. But in both defined terms,

  ‘farm/ranch premises’ and ‘residence premises,’ ‘premises’ consistently refers to land, its

  structures, and private approaches that are owned, rented, leased, or used by the Cleavers.

         The Cleavers argue that ‘any premises,’ is not restricted to premises in which the

  insured has a legal interest because “‘[a]ny’ means ‘any.’” Cleaver Br. at 13 (quoting

                                               14
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023         Page: 15

  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Drumheller, 185 F. App’x 152, 161 (3d Cir. 2006) (unpublished)). But

  just as “[a]ny means any,” Cleaver Br. at 13, ‘premises’ means ‘premises.’ We may no

  more read additional requirements into the Policy than we may ignore the effect of the

  terms used. See Encon Utah, LLC. 210 P.3d at 267 (“We . . . consider each contract

  provision in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and

  ignoring none.” (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted)). The term ‘premises’

  must be interpreted to have a consistent meaning throughout the Policy.

  2.     Usual Meaning of ‘Premises’

         Although the term ‘premises’ appears in other defined Policy terms, it is not itself

  a defined term. Therefore, we look to its meaning as understood by “a person of ordinary

  intelligence . . . , in accordance with the usual and natural meaning of the word[].”

  Compton, 393 P.3d at 310. “The starting point for discerning such meaning is the

  dictionary.” Hi-Country Prop. Rts. Grp. v. Emmer, 304 P.3d 851, 856 (Utah 2013)

  (discussing interpretation of terms’ “ordinary meaning” in the context of statutory

  interpretation); see also Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp., 367 P.3d

  994, 1002 (Utah 2016) (using Black’s Law Dictionary to define contract terms); Glenn v.

  Reese, 225 P.3d 185, 189 (Utah 2009) (using Webster’s II New College Dictionary to

  define contract terms).

         The Cleavers argue that “[p]remises is an elastic and elusive term, and it does not

  have one definite and fixed meaning.” Cleaver Br. at 20 (quoting Fremont Ins. Co. v.

  Izenbaard, 820 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Mich. 2012) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.

  1990))). According to the Cleavers, ‘premises’ may mean “simply an area of land.” Id.

                                               15
Appellate Case: 22-4118     Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 16

  They argue the district court erred by failing to recognize ambiguity in the meaning of

  ‘premises’ and construe such ambiguity in favor of coverage.

         In construing ‘premises,’ the district court looked to Meriam-Webster Dictionary

  and the 11th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. According to Meriam-Webster

  Dictionary, ‘premises’ means “a tract of land with the buildings thereon” or “a building

  or part of a building usually with its appurtenances (such as grounds).” Premises,

  Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/premise (last

  visited Oct. 8, 2023). According to the 11th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published

  in 2019, ‘premises’ means “[a] house or building, along with its grounds; esp., the

  buildings and land that a shop, restaurant, company, etc. uses.” Premises, Black’s Law

  Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 5 Farm Bureau additionally points to the American Heritage

  Dictionary, which defines ‘premises’ as “[l]and, the buildings on it, or both the land and

  the buildings on it[;]” or “[a] building or particular portion of a building.” Farm Bureau

  Br. at 17 (quoting premises, American Heritage Dictionary,

  https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=premise (last visited Dec. 1, 2023)).

         The Cleavers look instead to the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of

  ‘premises’ in Izenbaard, 820 N.W.2d at 903. In Izenbaard, the Michigan Supreme Court

  interpreted ‘premises’ by looking to Random House Webster’s College Dictionary and

         5
          The 10th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 2014, was the most
  recent edition at the time the Policy took effect, in 2018. The 10th edition’s definition
  of ‘premises’ is identical to that in the 11th edition. Compare Premises, Black’s Law
  Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) with Premises, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

                                              16
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 17

  the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. Izenbaard, 820 N.W.2d at 903. According to

  Izenbaard, Random House Webster’s College Dictionary defines ‘premises’ as “a tract of

  land including its buildings.” Id. (quoting Random House Webster’s College Dictionary).

  Izenbaard also cites the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, published in 1990, for the

  definition of ‘premises’ as “[l]and with its appurtenances and structures thereon.” Id.

  (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). Izenbaard further quotes commentary

  from the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, stating “[p]remises is an elastic and

  inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and fixed meaning; its meaning is to be

  determined by its context and is dependent on the circumstances in which used, and may

  mean a room, shop, building, or any definite area.” Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

  (6th ed. 1990)). The 10th and 11th editions of Black’s Law Dictionary include no such

  commentary. See Premises, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); Premises, Black’s

  Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

         In the context of the Policy, these definitions of ‘premises’ do not demonstrate that

  the term “may be understood to have two or more plausible meanings,” Quaid, 158 P.3d

  at 528, or has “uncertain meaning[],” Compton, 393 P.3d at 310. All the cited sources

  affirmatively define ‘premises’ as an area of land and its buildings, structures, or other

  appurtenances. This definition reaches broader than the Cleavers’ residence, as indeed it

  must for the inclusion of “[a]ny premises used by you in connection with the [residence]”

  in the definition of ‘insured location’ to have any meaning. App. at 131. But it is not

  fairly susceptible to the Cleavers’ proposed interpretation of ‘premises’ as including a

  location, some distance away from their property, on a public road, connecting a nearby

                                               17
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 18

  recreational area to their property. Such an interpretation would amount to rewriting ‘any

  premises’ to mean ‘anywhere’ or ‘any location.’

  3.     Purpose of the Policy

         Additionally, the Cleavers’ interpretation would “blur[] the distinction between

  homeowner’s and automobile insurance.” Farm Bureau Br. at 22 (quoting Hudnell v.

  Allstate Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 363, 367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997)). When interpreting Policy

  terms, we view their ordinary meaning “in the light of existing circumstances, including

  the purpose of the policy.” Compton, 393 P.3d at 310. “The primary purpose of a

  homeowner[’]s policy is to provide package coverage for exposures incidental to home

  ownership . . .” Fire Ins. Exch. v. Alsop, 709 P.2d 389, 390 (Utah 1985); see also Allen v.

  Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 808 (Utah 1992) (J. Stewart, concurring)

  (“As a general rule, the purpose of homeowner’s insurance is to protect the owner from

  property loss due to a disaster, such as fire, and from liability if someone is injured on the

  premises.”). And “[t]he purpose of a vehicle exclusion in a homeowner’s policy is to

  require the insured to obtain specific liability insurance on motor vehicles except under

  the limited exceptions enumerated in the policy.” Hudnell, 945 P.2d at 366. Contrary to

  these purposes, the Cleavers’ proposed interpretation of ‘premises’ would extend the

  definition of ‘insured location’ under the Policy to permit coverage for incidents

  occurring anywhere they might drive their recreational motor vehicles to-or-from their

  residence. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 695 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (D. Ariz.

  2010) (denying coverage under a homeowner’s policy for an ATV accident because

  “[t]here is no persuasive distinction between the public cul-de-sac in front of Jones’s

                                               18
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023      Page: 19

  house [where the accident occurred] and an ordinary public street” and granting coverage

  would increase Nationwide’s risk “beyond that which it assumed when it issued the

  policy” and “‘blur[] the distinction between homeowner’s and automobile insurance.’”

  (quoting Hudnell, 945 P.2d at 367)). This would effectively convert the exception to the

  exclusion of recreational motor vehicles for incidents occurring on an insured location

  into a broad grant of liability coverage for recreational motor vehicles. Thus, the

  Cleavers’ proposed interpretation of ‘premises’ is inconsistent with the context and

  purpose of the Policy as a whole and the off-location recreational motor vehicle

  exclusion.

         Furthermore, as Farm Bureau observes, the Cleavers’ proposed interpretation

  includes no limiting principle and would result in unbounded liability coverage for

  recreational motor vehicles used anywhere the Cleavers drive them to-or-from their

  property. The Cleavers assert their proposed interpretation would not create such

  boundless coverage because they do not contend “coverage should be afforded for an

  incident involving a recreational motor vehicle used for a non-recreational purpose some

  distance from the property, like a trip to the grocery store.” Reply at 8. But the Cleavers

  do not indicate how the Policy definition of ‘insured location’ distinguishes between a

  road used to access a grocery store and one used to access a nearby recreation area. Nor

  do the Cleavers suggest any limitation on how far from their residence their interpretation

  of ‘any premises’ would stretch to cover their use of the ATVs, so long as such use began

  or ended at their residence. ‘Any premises’ cannot reasonably mean anywhere a

  recreational motor vehicle may travel between the Cleavers’ residence and recreational

                                               19
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716          Date Filed: 12/20/2023       Page: 20

  areas. Such an interpretation is unmoored from the Policy language and contrary to its

  purpose.

  4.     ‘Recreational Motor Vehicles’ in the Policy

         Last, the Cleavers contend the Policy could reasonably be interpreted to cover an

  ATV accident on a public road because the Policy definition of recreational motor

  vehicles includes vehicles designed for use on public roads. Indeed, the Policy defines

  ‘recreational motor vehicle’ to include vehicles commonly understood to operate on

  public roads, namely a motorcycle, motorscooter, or moped. See App at 132 (defining

  ‘recreational motor vehicle’ as “[a] golf cart, snowmobile, two or three wheel

  motorcycle, motorscooter[], moped, dirt bike, or all terrain vehicle of a utility or

  recreational nature”). But the Policy’s coverage for recreational motor vehicles is based

  on their presence on an ‘insured location’, not their foreseeable area of use. The Cleavers’

  argument to the contrary bypasses the Policy definition of ‘insured location’ and would

  extend coverage for ‘recreational motor vehicles’ beyond the Policy’s terms.

         The Policy definition of ‘insured location’ does not reference or incorporate the

  defined term ‘recreational motor vehicle.’ App. at 131. And while the off-location

  recreational motor vehicle exclusion does reference ‘insured location,’ it does so to

  provide an exception to the exclusion of recreational motor vehicles—not to expand the

  definition of insured location based on the foreseeable presence of recreational motor

  vehicles. Id. at 129. The Policy provides limited coverage for “recreational motor

  vehicle[s]” on an “insured location”—that is, on a “premises used by the [Cleavers] in

  connection with the [residence].” Id. at 129, 131 (emphasis added). It is immaterial

                                               20
Appellate Case: 22-4118      Document: 010110971716         Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 21

  whether the location is one where a “golf cart, snowmobile, two or three wheel

  motorcycle, motorscooter[], moped, dirt bike, or all terrain vehicle” may foreseeably be

  driven. Id. at 132. Because the Policy definition of ‘insured location’ is not connected to

  or dependent on the definition of ‘recreational motor vehicle,’ we are unpersuaded by the

  Cleavers’ argument for invoking the latter to expand the former. 6

         6
           The Cleavers also cite to caselaw from other jurisdictions, holding that policy
  language defining ‘recreational motor vehicles’ as limited to vehicles designed for
  use off public roads, contrary to the language of their Policy, weighs against finding
  such vehicles were covered when used on public roads. See Hudnell v. Allstate Ins.
  Co., 945 P.2d 363, 367 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Dreiman, 804 N.E.2d
  815, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gardner, 79 Pa. D. & C.4th
  150, 163 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 715 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa
  Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished). The Cleavers contend that, if recreational motor vehicles
  designed for off-road use are not covered when operated on roads, it would stand to
  reason that vehicles designed for on-road use would be covered when used as such. But
  none of the Cleavers’ cited cases relied exclusively on the off-road designation for
  recreational motor vehicles in denying coverage for occurrences on public roads. See
  Hudnell, 945 P.2d at 366–67 (finding coverage for incident on a public road would
  contravene the purpose of a vehicle exclusion in a homeowner’s policy and unreasonably
  extend coverage); Dreiman, 804 N.E.2d at 820–21 (finding coverage for incident on
  public road would contravene the plain meaning of ‘premises’ and the general principles
  of premises liability); Gardner, 79 Pa. D. & C.4th at 163–64 (finding coverage for
  incident on public road was not encompassed by policy definition of ‘insured location’
  and would contravene laws prohibiting operation of ATVs on public roads); Davis, 715
  N.W.2d at *6–7 (finding coverage for incident on public road would contravene the
  purpose of a homeowner’s policy vehicle exclusion, “remove any reasonable geographic
  limitation on coverage,” and exceed the definition of ‘insured location’). Moreover, other
  courts’ finding that ‘recreational motor vehicles’ which are limited to off-road vehicles
  are not covered on public roads does not support the inverse proposition that defining
  ‘recreational motor vehicles’ to include street-legal vehicles means they must be covered
  when operating on public roads. Indeed, the Cleavers have identified no case from any
  jurisdiction that has extended homeowner’s policy coverage to a motor vehicle accident
  on a public road used to access a recreational area owned by a third party.

                                               21
Appellate Case: 22-4118    Document: 010110971716        Date Filed: 12/20/2023     Page: 22

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

        Because the term ‘premises,’ as used in the Policy and in accordance with its plain

  meaning, unambiguously excludes the public roadway connecting the Cleavers’ property

  to the gravel pit, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting summary judgment for

  Farm Bureau.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Carolyn B. McHugh
                                              Circuit Judge

                                            22