Court Opinion

ID: 9383011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:14:13.134363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.077683
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

              JD RESTORATION, INC. a/a/o ERICK DENIVAL,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

             CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
                              Appellee.

                      Nos. 4D22-140 and 4D22-1033

                             [March 29, 2023]

   Consolidated appeal from the County Court for the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, Palm Beach County; Edward A. Garrison, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502021SC018676XXXMB.

   Carlos D. Cabrera of Florida Advocates, Dania Beach, for appellant.

   Maureen G. Pearcy of Paul R. Pearcy, P.A., Miami, for appellee.

LEVINE, J.

   JD Restoration, Inc., the assignee, appeals a final summary disposition
granted in favor of Citizens Property Insurance Corporation on the
assignee’s claim for breach of insurance contract and the subsequent
denial of the assignee’s motion to vacate the summary disposition order.
We agree with the assignee that it was not required to prove a meritorious
defense for the trial court to vacate the final disposition order. Thus, we
reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. On the remaining
issue, we affirm without further comment.

    Following a pretrial conference on the assignee’s claim for breach of
insurance contract, the trial court issued an order scheduling a summary
disposition hearing and instructing the parties that they “may file
affidavits prior to the Summary Disposition hearing . . . .” The assignee
did not appear at the summary disposition hearing, and the trial court
granted summary disposition in favor of Citizens, finding that “[b]ased
upon the evidence before the Court, there is no triable issue in this cause.”

    The assignee moved to vacate the final disposition order, alleging that
its firm’s paralegal failed to calendar the summary disposition hearing,
which constituted excusable neglect under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.540. At the hearing on the assignee’s motion to vacate, Citizens
conceded that the paralegal’s failure to calendar the summary disposition
hearing was “probably excusable neglect,” but argued that the assignee’s
motion to vacate failed because the assignee did not address why it did
not file any evidence in opposition to summary disposition. The trial judge
denied the assignee’s motion to vacate the final disposition order “for the
reasons stated on the record.” This appeal follows.

   “The standard of review of an order denying a motion for relief from
judgment is an abuse of discretion.” Larkin v. Grutman, 312 So. 3d 494,
496 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

   Florida Small Claims Rule 7.190, “Relief from Judgment or Order;
Clerical Mistakes,” states:

       (b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly
       Discovered Evidence; Fraud; etc. On motion and on such
       terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party’s
       legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
       proceeding for the following reasons:

       (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . .
       . .[1]

    At the hearing on the motion to vacate, Citizens argued that the trial
court should deny the motion because the assignee did not address why
it did not file any evidence in opposition. On appeal, Citizens argues that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the assignee’s motion
to vacate because the assignee did not present a meritorious defense. This
argument is incorrect.

   This court’s en banc decision in Pierre v. American Security Insurance
Co., 346 So. 3d 62, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), concluded that the

1 Florida Small Claims Rule 7.190 is nearly identical to Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.540. See L.W.T., Inc. v. Schmidt, 323 So. 3d 344, 347 n.4 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2021) (Lambert, J., concurring) (“Although Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.540(b) is not directly applicable to small claims cases, see Fla. Sm. Cl. R.
7.020(a), the text of rule 1.540(b) reads identically to that of Florida Small Claims
Rule 7.190(b), which provides the circumstances under which a party may seek
relief from judgments or orders entered in small claims proceedings.”). Thus,
caselaw utilizing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540 is instructive.

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requirement of a meritorious defense applies only to defendants seeking to
vacate a default judgment:

         Arriechi [v. Bianchi, 318 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021),] set
      forth this standard for the plaintiff’s attempt to set aside the
      final judgment of dismissal:

                To set aside the judgment the plaintiff was
            required to show: “(1) the failure to file a
            responsive pleading was the result of excusable
            neglect; (2) the moving party has a meritorious
            defense; and (3) the moving party acted with due
            diligence in seeking relief from the default.”

      Id. at 5 (quoting Hepburn v. All Am. Gen. Constr. Corp., 954
      So. 2d 1250, 1251-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)). Obviously, this
      statement of law cannot apply to a plaintiff seeking to avoid
      the dismissal of a case he filed; why would the plaintiff have
      to show that there is a meritorious defense to his own case?
      Although the case involved a dismissal arising from the failure
      of the plaintiff’s attorney to attend a case management
      conference, Arriechi’s quoted language was only applicable to
      a defendant’s attempt to set aside a default final judgment.

         We recede from the language in Arriechi in the block quote
      above that purports to set forth the standard to be applied
      when a plaintiff seeks to set aside a dismissal of a case.

(footnote omitted).

   Thus, because Citizens concedes that the assignee showed both
excusable neglect and due diligence, and the assignee need not prove a
meritorious defense, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
assignee’s motion to vacate. Further, it would be unreasonable to excuse
the failure to calendar the hearing, but not allow the assignee the
opportunity to submit affidavits in opposition of summary disposition. The
order setting the summary disposition hearing was the same order
directing the parties to submit affidavits. Logically, we can assume the
reason why the assignee did not submit evidence in opposition of summary
disposition was because the directive to do so was in the same order that
the paralegal failed to calendar. Thus, if the assignee excusably missed
the summary disposition hearing, its failure to submit affidavits was also
excusable.

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   Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary disposition and
the order denying the assignee’s motion to vacate, and remand with
instructions to conduct another summary disposition hearing, giving the
assignee the opportunity to submit affidavits in opposition of summary
disposition.

  Reversed and remanded with instructions.

WARNER and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                          *        *         *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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