Court Opinion

ID: 9762394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:22:14.911654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:34.155259
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s affirmance of appellant’s conviction. I must again stress my continued objection to the death qualification process, which produces juries which are both prosecution prone and unrepresentative of the community. See Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 470, 490 A.2d 811, 826 (1985) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 260, 484 A.2d 1365, 1382 (1984) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. *74Maxwell, 505 Pa. 152, 170, 477 A.2d 1309, 1319, cert. denied, — U.S —, 105 S.Ct. 370, 83 L.Ed.2d 306 (1984) (Nix, C.J., dissenting). While the United States Supreme Court, as I noted in my dissent in Commonwealth v. Colson, supra, is moving in the opposite direction, see Witt v. Wainwright, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 1415, 84 L.Ed.2d 801 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution, joined by Brennan, J.); Wainwright v. Witt, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), fundamental fairness impels me to urge my colleagues to discard the death qualification process as a matter of state constitutional law.1
I must also dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the jury’s sentencing verdict. I cannot condone the trial court’s failure to orally explain to the jury the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances they might find on the basis of the evidence received. Merely providing the language of the statute without the benefit of the trial court’s explanation of the meaning of the language contained therein or its relationship to the evidence properly before the jury is totally inadequate. Just as it is essential at the guilt determining phase that the jury be fully instructed as to the elements of the crimes charged, it is crucial to a valid sentencing determination that there be no misconception on the part of the jurors in interpreting the statutory definitions or in determining what ^evidence may legitimately support the finding of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the statutory language furnished to, the jury is “unambiguous,” many of the statutory terms employed by the legislature are indeed open to more than one interpretation. This is borne out by the fact that it has been necessary for this Court to deter*75mine the meaning of several of these terms. See Commonwealth v. Beasley, 505 Pa. 279, 479 A.2d 460 (1984) (“convicted”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10)); Commonwealth v. Frey, 504 Pa. 428, 475 A.2d 700 (1984) (“age of the defendant at the time of the crime”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(4)); Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 467 A.2d 288 (1983) (“convicted”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10)); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982) (“witness to a murder or other felony” and “committed by the defendant”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(5)). Moreover, the proper interpretation of other statutory terms is an issue in a number of appeals presently pending before the Court. See Commonwealth v. Dehart, Nos. 77-78 M.D. Appeal Docket 1984 (J-103-1985; argued May 17, 1985) (“while in perpetration of a felony”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6)); Commonwealth v. Frederick, No. 85 W.D. Appeal Docket 1983 (J — 31—1985); argued March 4, 1985 (“significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9)); Commonwealth v. Goins, No. 30 E.D. Appeal Docket 1984 (J — 8—1985; argued January 22, 1985) (same); Commonwealth v. Pursell, No. 15 W.D. Appeal Docket 1984 (J-127-1984; argued September 11, 1984) (“torture”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8)); Commonwealth v. Cross, No. 64 W.D. Appeal Docket 1982 (J-126-1984; argued September 11, 1984) (“significant history”; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9)); Commonwealth v. Holcomb, No. 41 W.D. Appeal Docket 1983 (J-122-1984; argued September 10, 1984) (same).
Given the ambiguities inherent in the statutory language, it is essential to meaningful appellate review that the record reflect the interpretation employed by the jury of relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This is best achieved by a full and accurate charge to the jury. Without the guidance of the trial court, the jurors in the instant case were left to formulate their own interpretations of the statutory language. We have no way of determining how those terms were interpreted or even whether the jurors *76agreed as to their meaning. Thus the appropriateness of the sentencing judgment must forever remain in question.

. I would note also that the federal Court of Appeals Circuits are now split on this issue. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985). The United States Supreme Court' has nevertheless declined to consider the question. See Witt v. Wainwright, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 141584 L.Ed.2d 801 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of stay of execution,, joined by Brennan, J.).