Court Opinion

ID: 9963869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:06:50.873829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.454070
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0778-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH ZACCARINO and
MJZ, LLC,

     Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________

                   Submitted February 27, 2024 – Decided April 26, 2024

                   Before Whipple, Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Morris County, Municipal Appeal No.
                   22-009-A.

                   Lavery, Selvaggi, Abromitis & Cohen, PC, attorneys
                   for appellants (Lawrence P. Cohen, on the briefs).

                   Mason Thompson, LLC, attorneys for respondent
                   (Brian W. Mason, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

          Defendants MJZ, LLC (MJZ) and MJZ's owner, Joseph Zaccarino, appeal
from an October 20, 2022 order finding them guilty of violating Mount Olive

Township (Township) Land Use Ordinance § 550-101D (Ordinance).                   We

affirm.

                                         I.

      Defendants own property at 172 Smithtown Road (Property) in the

Township. The Property is situated in the Township's RR-A zone, which permits

residential and agricultural uses. The Property sits on approximately eleven

acres and consists of a residence, a farm assessed area managed by a tenant

farmer, and a 5,000 square foot pole barn that houses an office, bathroom, and

four service bays.

      In May 2021, the Township's Planner and present Zoning Officer, Charles

McGroarty, received a complaint from one of defendants' neighbors about noise

on the Property. McGroarty inspected the Property and issued a notice of

violation to defendants for operating what he believed to be a landscaping

business, in violation of the Ordinance. Three months later, defendants received

a summons from the Township for the violation.

      The case proceeded to trial before the municipal court in October 2021.

During the five-day trial, the State called multiple witnesses to testify, including

McGroarty. McGroarty stated he inspected the Property on multiple occasions

                                                                              A-0778-22
                                         2
after receiving a noise complaint from one of defendants' neighbors, as well as

complaints there was "a lot of truck traffic . . . [and] constant activity on the

site." He also testified that when he visited the Property on August 3, 2021, he

saw large construction equipment and employees working there. McGroarty

stated "the activities . . . on the [P]roperty" were consistent with "a landscape

business" because "there were . . . vehicles parked there, which [he] took to be

employee parking," because "there were no customers walking around." He also

noted dump trucks and a backhoe on the site, as well as "concrete bins," which

were "typical of what one would find . . . on a landscape business property."

Concluding defendants were violating the Ordinance by operating a landscaping

business on the Property, a use not permitted in the RR-A zone, McGroarty

"hand delivered a summons" "to one of the two . . . women . . . working inside

[defendants'] office" on August 3, 2021.

      When McGroarty visited the Property several more times in August 2021,

he saw large construction equipment, concrete storage bins, and employees

working in the office inside the barn. He inspected the Property again in October

2021, and saw two men "working . . . in the bay area" of the barn. McGroarty

introduced himself to the men, and "[t]hey directed [him] to [defendants']

                                                                           A-0778-22
                                       3
office," where McGroarty "hand delivered a[nother] . . . violation notice for

subsequent violations . . . [he] believed [we]re occurring on the site."

      Once McGroarty's testimony concluded and the State rested, the defense

moved to dismiss the case. The municipal judge denied the motion, finding "the

State . . . sustained its burden at th[at] stage of the proceeding [to show] . . .

defendant[s were] using the [P]roperty for a landscape business."

      The defense called Frank Holzworth, the prior Property owner. Holzworth

testified that he applied to the Township Planning Board (Board) in February

1979 for site plan approval to construct a pole barn on the Property and

represented to the Board he intended to grow nursery stock there. By then,

Holzworth started his own landscaping business off site, so he also proposed

storing his landscaping equipment in the pole barn.         There were no other

structures on the Property at that time.

      On cross-examination, Holzworth admitted that when he and his attorney

appeared before the Board in February 1979, his attorney assured the Board

members that Holzworth had no intention of using the Property for his

landscaping business. Holzworth testified he "did[ not] interrupt" or "correct"

his attorney when counsel made this representation before the Board, even

though "it was [his] intention to use the [P]roperty for [his] landscape business."

                                                                             A-0778-22
                                           4
        Further, Holzworth testified the Board adopted a resolution in March

1979, allowing construction of the pole barn for his proposed nursery.

Holzworth acknowledged the resolution stated, in part:

             The applicant testified that he proposes to use this
             property for the establishment of a nursery for shrubs
             and flowers, which nursery shall not be operated as a
             retail outlet, but solely for the purpose of use in his
             landscape business. The garage building is to be
             utilized for the storage of equipment utilized in the
             operation of the nursery. Some of the equipment also
             will be utilized in the landscaping business.

             [(Emphasis added).]

        Notwithstanding the terms set forth in the resolution, as well as the

representations he and his attorney made to the Board in 1979, Holzworth

testified that he interpreted the resolution as permitting him to run a landscaping

business on the Property. He stated on cross-examination that he "knew all

along what [he] was going to do . . . with the building. [He] was going to use it

for [his] landscaping business and . . . for the nursery." However, he testified

he "abandoned the plan" to cultivate nursery stock within a year after the

resolution passed and ran his landscaping business from the Property until 2018,

when he sold the Property to defendants pursuant to a 2018 written contract of

sale.

                                                                             A-0778-22
                                        5
      During his testimony, Holzworth conceded that paragraph thirteen of the

2018 contract for sale provided, in part:

            The property is presently used as a residential single-
            family home; nursery and landscape material and
            equipment storage facility; and agriculturally. The
            Seller states that to the best of his knowledge and belief
            the use that exists does not violate any applicable
            Zoning Ordinance, building code, or any other state or
            federal law.

            [(Emphasis added).]

Further, Holzworth admitted the contract of sale stated he would "obtain and

pay for all inspections required by law," and he would pay up to $1,000 for a

certificate of occupancy if required by the Township. The contract further

included a provision that defendants had "a [sixty-]day inspection period to

confirm that [their] proposed use of the [Property] in the same manner as

[Holzworth wa]s in accordance with all [m]unicipal regulations." Holzworth

testified he did not know if defendants ever checked with the Township to see

if its regulations permitted them to operate a landscaping business on the

Property.

      Zaccarino also testified at trial. He stated that when he offered to buy the

Property, Holzworth "mentioned that he ha[d] a resolution that [went] with the

[P]roperty." Accordingly, before finalizing the contract of sale, Zaccarino and

                                                                            A-0778-22
                                        6
his attorney reviewed the resolution. Zaccarino testified he interpreted the

resolution as permitting Holzworth "to run a landscape business out of [the

Property]," so Zaccarino concluded it would not "be an issue" for him to "use . . .

the [P]roperty the way . . . Holzworth had been using it."         Zaccarino also

admitted he did not apply for a certificate of occupancy before the closing and

did not receive one from Holzworth.

      Additionally, Zaccarino stated that in September 2018, he began operating

his landscaping business under the trade name, PMZ Landscaping. He testified

he employed approximately thirteen to fifteen workers during the spring season

and ran his business no differently than Holzworth had run his business for

approximately forty years. But Zaccarino also stated he added concrete bins and

other improvements to the Property after purchasing it, and employed more

individuals than Holzworth did.

      Following rebuttal testimony from McGroarty and one of defendants'

neighbors, the testimonial hearing concluded.         On March 21, 2022, the

municipal court judge heard summations from counsel before issuing his

decision. The judge prefaced his findings and legal conclusions by stating he

had "two decisions . . . to make," specifically, "whether [defendants'] use of the

[P]roperty [wa]s in violation of the . . . [O]rdinance," and if so, "whether the

                                                                             A-0778-22
                                        7
Township [wa]s estopped from asserting a zoning ordinance violation,"

considering Holzworth's prior use of the Property. As to the first inquiry, the

judge found defendants guilty of the Ordinance violation, concluding that

McGroarty credibly testified "with regard to his knowledge of the use of the

[P]roperty," and that defendants' "use of the [P]roperty, . . . as a landscaping

business[] [went] beyond the 'permitted use.'" The judge found "not only . . .

Zaccarino, but also . . . Holzworth[,] testified . . . that the [P]roperty was . . .

used to operate, among other things, . . . [a] landscaping business."

      Next, the judge found the remuneration Holzworth "stood to gain by the

sale of the [P]roperty . . . definitely affect[ed] . . . Holzworth's . . . credibility."

Additionally, the judge concluded Holzworth "testified inconsistently . . . at

various points . . . during the trial, as to whether . . . he thought it was okay to

run his landscaping business from this [P]roperty, as opposed to just storing . . .

vehicles that would be used . . . for [his] landscaping business on the [P]roperty."

Further, the judge expressed concern about "what was put into the contract [of

sale]" between Zaccarino and Holzworth, finding the terms of the contract

"seem[ed] to be put in just for th[e] purpose[ of] get[ting] around" the issues that

ultimately had to be resolved in municipal court. The judge added, "I do[ no]t

believe that . . . [was] proper."

                                                                                 A-0778-22
                                           8
      Lastly, after crediting McGroarty's testimony regarding when he

discovered the current use of the Property, the judge found "there [wa]s no basis

for [defendants'] estoppel argument, as the State had no knowledge and did not

permit the operation of a landscape business on the [P]roperty." Accordingly,

the judge imposed a $500 fine plus court costs for defendants' Ordinance

violation, and warned that if their violation persisted, he might impose

additional fines "for each day . . . there [wa]s a continued violation."

      Defendants appealed from their conviction to the Law Division. On

October 20, 2022, following his de novo review, Judge Ralph E. Amirata found

defendants guilty of the Ordinance violation and imposed the same fine and

court costs imposed by the municipal judge. In his accompanying oral opinion,

Judge Amirata found the evidence, including testimony from Zaccarino,

Holzworth, and McGroarty, showed the Property contained an office building

and was used for conducting defendants' landscaping business. Judge Amirata

also concluded defendants employed three or more workers at the Property and

some employees left their personal vehicles at the Property when they performed

landscaping duties offsite.

      Moreover, Judge Amirata found that when Holzworth appeared before the

Board in 1979, the meeting's minutes showed "no use variance was being sought

                                                                           A-0778-22
                                         9
and . . . Holzworth [did] not seek[] to use the [P]roperty for his landscaping

business." Further, the judge observed that when Holzworth sold the Property

to Zaccarino in 2018, "[i]n paragraph [thirteen] of the contract, . . . Holzworth

represented to . . . defendant that the Property [wa]s [being] used as a residential

single[-]family home, nursery[,] and landscape material and equipment storage

facility[, as well as] agriculturally." The judge also found Holzworth "provided

in the contract that to the best of his knowledge and belief, the [present use of

the Property] d[id] not violate any applicable zoning ordinance."

      Next, Judge Amirata determined that after the 2018 contract was finalized,

"neither . . . Holzworth[,] nor . . . defendant[s] ever sought a certificate of

occupancy or a zoning permit to obtain a use variance allowing for commercial

use" of the Property. The judge also found Zaccarino "admitted at trial that PMZ

Landscaping is located at the . . . [P]roperty," and his "filings with the State," as

well as "emails between . . . [Zaccarino] and the Township planner, . . . and [the]

PMZ Landscaping website . . . were all entered into evidence," showing "PMZ

Landscaping [wa]s located at the . . . [P]roperty." The judge added, "essentially

every witness that testified on behalf of the State and . . . defendant[s] agreed

that the . . . [P]roperty was being used in connection with PMZ Landscaping[,]

which is owned and operated by [Zaccarino]." Based on these findings, the

                                                                              A-0778-22
                                        10
judge concluded "the State . . . met its burden of proof [by] showing . . .

defendant[s were] operating . . . PMZ . . . at the . . . [P]roperty," and the

"commercial use [wa]s clearly contrary to the Township's land use ordinance [§]

550-101D[,] which provide[d] that commercial uses are not permitted in [the]

RR-A zone."

      Further, Judge Amirata rejected defendants' argument that their motion to

dismiss should have been granted at the close of the State's case. The judge

explained:

                    The State certainly is entitled to the benefit of . . .
             all favorable inferences at the close of the State's
             case. . . . As previously discussed, . . . McGroarty
             testified . . . he visited the . . . [P]roperty on several
             occasions on different days and at different hours and
             observed multiple personal vehicles, large construction
             equipment, concrete material bins, and an office inside
             the building with three or more employees present.

                   On this testimony and the inferences drawn
             therefrom, this [c]ourt finds . . . the testimony of . . .
             McGroarty did[,] in fact[,] satisfy the State's burden of
             proving defendant[s'] use of the . . . [P]roperty as
             nonconforming at the close of the State's case.

      Next, Judge Amirata noted that "[a]t trial and on this appeal[,]

defendant[s] argue[d] that even if the State . . . met its burden of proof, the

Township [wa]s nevertheless equitably estopped from asserting a violation of

the land use ordinance." The judge rejected this contention, explaining:

                                                                              A-0778-22
                                         11
            The simple fact remains that neither . . . defendant[s]
            nor . . . Holzworth ever obtained a land use variance
            from a department or a representative of the Township
            with the authority to grant one. Accordingly, there was
            certainly no voluntary conduct [] which the
            defendant[s] could in good faith rely upon[,] such that
            the doctrine of equitable estoppel should apply.

                  The [c]ourt finds that the Township is not
            estopped from asserting defendant[s] violated the . . .
            [O]rdinance.      I also note when assessing . . .
            Holzworth's testimony[,] which the [municipal] court
            found lacking [in] credibility[,] . . . this [c]ourt, even
            giving deference to same, can see based upon the record
            why the [municipal c]ourt found [Holzworth's]
            credibility lacking.

      Continuing his analysis, Judge Amirata also found the 2018 contract of

sale "le[ft] out the language that the [P]roperty [wa]s being used as a landscaping

business" and, instead, "mirror[ed] the limited use that was granted to the

[P]roperty in . . . 1979." Further, he concluded the terms of the 1979 resolution

attached to the contract of sale militated against applying the doctrine of

estoppel because the resolution stated the Property was "to be used as a nursery"

and "for the limited use of the storage of equipment that would overlap between

the nursery and the landscaping business." (Emphasis added).

      After Judge Amirata sentenced defendants, defense counsel asked for

"clarification" regarding whether the judge "found . . . defendants guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt." The judge responded:

                                                                             A-0778-22
                                       12
            I have. The burden of proof was agreed upon by all
            parties that it is beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and no
            one has argued that it is any other burden of proof. And
            considering all the elements that were contained
            therein, I have found . . . the State . . . satisfied the
            elements [of] the [violation] beyond a reasonable
            doubt.

      Judge Amirata entered a conforming order the same day to reflect

defendants' conviction and sentence.

                                       II.

      On appeal, defendants raise the following arguments:

            POINT I

            THE STATE MUST PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF
            THIS OFFENSE, EVEN THOUGH IT IS AN
            ALLEGED   VIOLATION   OF   A   ZONING
            ORDINANCE, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

            POINT II

            THE MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF
            THE STATE'S CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            GRANTED.

            POINT III

            THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION HAD RECEIVED
            APPROVAL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 5,000
            SQUARE-FOOT STORAGE BUILDING FOR THE
            PURPOSE    OF    STORING    EQUIPMENT,
            MAINTAINING EQUIPMENT, AND STORAGE OF
            MATERIALS TO BE USED IN A LANDSCAPING
            BUSINESS.

                                                                        A-0778-22
                                       13
              POINT IV

              IN THE EVENT THAT IT IS DETERMINED THAT
              THE PLANNING BOARD, PURSUANT TO ITS
              DECISION IN 1979, MADE A MISTAKE, OR THAT
              SOMEHOW DEFENDANT[S] AND [THEIR]
              PREDECESSOR VIOLATED THE APPROVAL
              GRANTED IN 1979, THE DOCTRINE OF
              EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE INVOKED.

      Because the "argument" set forth in Point I is simply a factual statement

that was undisputed during the municipal court trial and de novo Law Division

hearing, we need not address it. The balance of defendants' arguments lack

merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Accordingly, we affirm defendants' conviction and

sentence, substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Amirata's thoughtful

and comprehensive oral opinion. We add the following brief comments.

      The scope of our review of a de novo conviction in the Law Division

following a municipal court appeal is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto,

157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). "Our review is limited to determining whether there

is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to support the findings of

the Law Division judge, not the municipal court." State v. Clarksburg Inn, 375

N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005) (citing State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-

62 (1964)).     Therefore, we consider "whether the findings made could

                                                                           A-0778-22
                                      14
reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the

record." State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 49 (2012) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471).

      "[T]he rule of deference is more compelling" when the municipal and Law

Division judges make concurrent findings. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. "Under

the two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter

concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower

courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." Ibid. However,

"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow

from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

      "[M]unicipal court proceedings to prosecute violations of ordinances are

essentially criminal in nature . . . ." Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156,

171 (1999). Thus, as Judge Amirata acknowledged during the de novo hearing,

the municipality must prove each element of the violation beyond a reasonable

doubt. City of Trenton v. Calvary Apostolic Temple, Inc., 166 N.J. Super. 145,

146 (App. Div. 1979). "[D]oubt engendered by the closeness of the question

should be resolved in defendant's favor." Id. at 147.

      Here, it is undisputed the governing Ordinance states:

            RR-A: Rural Residential District. The purpose of this
            district is to recognize and preserve the predominant

                                                                            A-0778-22
                                       15
            rural, agricultural[,] and low[-]density residential
            pattern of development largely brought about by an
            absence of public sewer and water services.

            (1) Permitted principal uses shall be as follows:

                  (a) Detached dwellings.

                  (b) Farms and farm buildings.

                  (c) Public uses.

                  (d) Antennas for wireless
                  telecommunication services.

                  [§ 550-101D of the Township Code.]

Thus, as McGroarty confirmed at trial, commercial uses, such as defendants'

landscaping business, are not permitted in the RR-A zone, where the Property is

located. Accordingly, based on the plain language of the Ordinance and the

significant proofs adduced at trial regarding defendants' use of the Property for

their landscaping business, we are convinced Judge Amirata correctly found the

State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants violated the Ordinance.

      Similarly, we reject defendants' argument that their motion to dismiss

should have been granted after the State rested. We review a trial court's

decision to deny a motion for acquittal de novo. State v. Williams, 218 N.J.

576, 593-94 (2014) (citing State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 548-49 (2004)). When

a motion is made at the close of the State's case, the trial judge must deny the

                                                                           A-0778-22
                                      16
motion if "viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be that evidence direct or

circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all" reasonable inferences, "a

reasonable jury could find guilt . . . beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes,

50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); see also State v. Jones, 242 N.J. 156, 168 (2020).

      Under Rule 3:18-1, a court "is not concerned with the worth, nature, or

extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed

most favorably to the State." State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App.

Div. 1977). "If the evidence satisfies that standard, the motion must be denied."

State v. Spivey, 179 N.J. 229, 236 (2004).

      Governed by these standards, we are persuaded Judge Amirata properly

considered the State's evidence at the conclusion of its case-in-chief—including

McGroarty's testimony about his multiple inspections of the Property—and the

judge appropriately afforded the State the benefit of all reasonable inferences

flowing from its proofs, consistent with the Reyes standard. Thus, we have no

reason to disturb the denial of defendants' motion to dismiss.

      Finally, we disagree with defendants' contention that Judge Amirata erred

in rejecting their equitable estoppel argument. "The essential principle of the

policy of estoppel . . . is that one may, by voluntary conduct, be precluded from

taking a course of action that would work injustice and wrong to one who with

                                                                             A-0778-22
                                       17
good reason and in good faith has relied upon such conduct." Bonaventure Int'l,

Inc. v. Borough of Spring Lake, 350 N.J. Super. 420, 436 (App. Div. 2002)

(omission in original) (quoting Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Bd. of Trs., Police &

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 340 N.J. Super. 473, 484-85 (App. Div. 2001)). The

doctrine may be invoked against a municipality "where the interests of justice,

morality[,] and common fairness clearly dictate that course." Id. at 436 (quoting

Ranchlands Inc. v. Twp. of Stafford, 305 N.J. Super. 528, 538 (App. Div. 1997),

aff'd, 156 N.J. 443 (1998)). However, the doctrine is "rarely invoked against a

governmental entity, particularly when estoppel would interfere with essential

government functions." Ranchlands, 305 N.J. Super. at 538 (quoting O'Malley

v. Dep't of Energy, 109 N.J. 309, 316 (1987)).

      "[A] party asserting equitable estoppel may rely upon 'conduct, inaction,

representation of the actor, misrepresentation, silence, or omission.'" Ridge

Chevrolet-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Scarano, 238 N.J. Super. 149, 154 (App. Div.

1990) (quoting Fairken Assoc. v. Hutchin, 223 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (Law Div.

1987)). But "[p]rior tolerance of a use in violation of a zoning ordinance . . .

will not estop the municipality from later enforcing the ordinance." Universal

Holding Co. v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 55 N.J. Super. 103, 112 (App. Div. 1959);

                                                                           A-0778-22
                                      18
see also E. Wind Realty, Ltd. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 218 N.J. Super. 412, 416-

17 (App. Div. 1987).

      Guided by these principles, we are satisfied Judge Amirata correctly found

there was "no voluntary conduct" by the Township, " which . . . defendant[s]

could in good faith rely upon[,] such that the doctrine of equitable estoppel

should apply."

      To the extent we have not addressed defendants' remaining arguments,

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

                                                                          A-0778-22
                                      19