Court Opinion

ID: 9546112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:03.895996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:00.701437
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice
(dissenting):
I agree that the juvenile court judge may have unnecessarily considered “parental rights” when he concluded that the “neglect of [A.H.] in the [H.] home did not justify permanent termination of their parental rights.” In his defense, however, I note that the DFS in its amended petition sought the termination of all “parental rights to said child including residual parental rights.” Thus the court in its ruling was simply responding to the amended petition which was before him. As will be seen below, any error in this regard was not prejudicial.
I dissent from the holding of the majority that the evidence compels the continued deprivation of custody of A.H. by the H.s. In reversing the juvenile judge, the majority violates our standard of review which accords to the juvenile judge wide latitude in finding the facts and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.
The majority places great significance on Mrs. H.’s admission to the neglect charge. Some background information will be helpful to understand her reasons for doing so. At the time the admission was made, A.H. had been away from the H.s for nearly a year. The expense of traveling 800 miles round trip to visit her more than once a month was beginning to tax the resources of the H. household. Support payments for A.H. in foster care were required. Attorney fees were mounting, and the H.s’ attorney told them that they would have to pay a $5,000 retainer to go to trial. At one point, the county attorney, who was representing the DFS, told the H.s that their decision to fight the allegations was only delaying the case and that if they would cooperate and allow the state to have custody, A.H. would be returned to the H. home within three months. The agreement among the parties at a pretrial hearing is of great procedural importance in this case:
THE COURT: Okay. Before accepting any admission, though, I want it clearly understood that the — under the law of neglect, of course, there are various degrees of neglect, going all the way from a borderline situation, that is censurable, but not sufficient to justify the State or the Court in severely interfer-ring [sic] with custodial rights or severely interferring [sic] with the free agency of the parents and the child regarding their association, all the way to very aggravated kinds of neglect, which, in the interests of the child and for the protection of the child, justify the Court in taking extensive measures. Now, this *289is not a case where there is a contention that the rights of the [H.s] with regard to this child be permanently terminated; but if the Court is to accept an admission on this matter, ... [and ] the Court wants it clear on the record and to all concerned, that the Court must treat the case as one where substantial deprivation of their rights would not be justified over an extended period of time, providing, and the Court’s in agreement with your understanding, providing that measures be taken that satisfy the State and Social Services, that the [H.s] are trying to rectify the circumstances that may have led to the situation that came to the Court’s attention initially.
Now, is there any question in that regard, Mr. Halliday? [the county attorney]
MR. HALLIDAY: No.
(Emphasis added.) After some discussion off the record and a conference with personnel from the DFS, the county attorney decided to proceed to trial instead of accepting an admission. At that same January 1983 pretrial conference, the judge told the DFS that the medical reports failed to indicate that the doctors were fully informed of A.H.’s history and of the H.s’ explanations of her injuries, and whether the injuries could not have occurred as the H.s had explained. Instead of going back during the intervening two months before the scheduled trial and remedying the deficiencies, the DFS decided just prior to the scheduled trial that it would accept an admission of neglect. The judge reminded the DFS of his position to allow only a temporary deprivation of the H.s’ rights, to which the county attorney consented. With this knowledge, the DFS agreed and accepted the admission of neglect.
Although the H.s consistently and strongly maintained that the allegations in the petition were untrue, in an effort to shorten the proceedings, Mrs. H. finally admitted that she could have watched A.H. more closely and taken extra measures to protect her from injury. The judge personally made his findings, covering seven full pages, and carefully explained his reasoning. Significantly, he found that the doctors’ reports cited by the majority “failed to disclose the results of any investigation other than medical examination of the child, if one was made, concerning explanations offered by Mr. and Mrs. [H.] that would tend to support or discredit them” and that no “evidence even slightly impugned their version of the history of the child in their care and their description of her condition, prior treatments, propensities, behaviors and accidents.” Although the court’s order clearly provided and the findings contemplated that' A.H. would be returned to the H. home, and although the court denied the DFS its request for a permanent deprivation of custody, the DFS chose not to appeal from that order. However, even if the DFS’s appeal were from that order, we should not overturn the juvenile court’s well-reasoned findings. The court was in a better position to weigh the evidence than we are able to do from the cold record.
The majority claims that there is: no conflict in the evidence which establishes that because of the injuries sustained by this child as a result of the neglect of her caretakers, A.H. is permanently and severely impaired (far beyond the handicaps she had upon her arrival in the H. home) in her intellectual capacity and physical development.
This statement misrepresents the record. Although A.H. suffered many injuries and diseases, nothing in the record completes the causal link to establish that her disabilities are now “greatly exacerbated” as a result of Mrs. H.’s negligence or A.H.’s stay in the H. home. Particularly, the doctors’ reports fail to distinguish between A.H.’s disabilities when she arrived in the H. home and when she was taken by the DFS. They do not indicate how the efforts of the H.s to help A.H. were negligent or were the cause of her disabilities. The medical evaluations were, for the most part, written in very general terms with qualifying statements indicating that the doctors did not have full information. None of the doctors indicated that A.H. had *290any “exacerbated disabilities” because of any negligence on the part of Mrs. H. This was never argued to the juvenile court, and that court made no finding that A.H.’s disabilities were in any way “exacerbated” as a result of anyone’s actions. Significantly, the medical staff at the hospital in Grand Junction, Colorado, where A.H. was treated for brain concussion, initially suspected abuse. Yet after conducting an investigation and apprising itself of the facts, it decided that although A.H.’s injuries were severe, there were no grounds to bring charges of abuse.
In light of A.H.’s diseased condition when she arrived in the H. home and Mrs. H.’s efforts to help her, the juvenile court committed no error in finding that Mrs. H.’s negligence did not justify keeping A.H. out of the home any longer than the sixteen months she had been kept in the protective custody of the DFS. At 5V2 years of age, A.H. weighed just 31 pounds upon placement in the H. home. Her numerous maladies were of the type that, if not properly treated, can cause serious physical and mental deficiencies, even death. Immediately after A.H. arrived, Mrs. H. arranged to have A.H. examined by the local doctor in their small town. His treatments, which lasted over three months, for A.H.’s parasites failed to eradicate the numerous parasites that were eating away her body and robbing her of life-sustaining nutrients. During these months, Mrs. H. repeatedly inquired about giving A.H. high calorie food supplements, but the doctor told her that it was not necessary. During these same three months, A.H.’s weight dropped to 27 pounds. We can only speculate as to the magnitude of harm that these delays had on A.H.’s physical and mental disabilities and development.
When the medical treatments proved unsuccessful in eradicating the parasites, Mrs. H. demonstrated her diligence in caring for A.H. by independently sending stool samples to Salt Lake City for evaluation and seeking more specialized treatment at Primary Children’s Hospital. If not for this further treatment, A.H. may well have died of complications attributable to the parasites. Mrs. H. also independently began feeding A.H. high calorie food supplements in addition to her regular three meals a day. Under this care, A.H.’s weight increased to 39 pounds.
Throughout the years that A.H. was in the H. home, Mrs. H. continually expressed to both her local doctor and medical personnel at Primary Children’s Hospital her concern about A.H.’s learning disabilities, difficulty in swallowing food, lethargy, lack of protective reflexes (especially when falling), glazed eyes, and dragging right leg. As late as two weeks before A.H. was hospitalized in Grand Junction, Colorado, Mrs. H. expressed concern to her local doctor regarding A.H.’s lethargy, glazed eyes, and dragging leg. She was told to not worry about them. Mr. and Mrs. H. made specific plans to relocate closer to Primary Children’s Hospital so that A.H. could receive specialized medical attention and training. Mrs. H.’s continued, diligent efforts to provide proper medical attention and therapy to A.H. demonstrate that any negligence on her part did not rise to the level which would justify this Court mandating that the H.s continue to be deprived of A.H.’s custody, even under the majority’s “good cause/best interests of the child” standard. Perhaps the H.’s could have provided better medical attention for A.H. if they had not lived in a small, remote town.
After the March 1983 hearing at which the court found jurisdiction, the court was faced with some widely conflicting evidence. The court wisely ordered that temporary custody remain with the DFS until an independent psychological evaluation could be performed on the H.s. This was agreeable to the DFS. However, the DFS changed its position when the psychological evaluations were favorable to the H.s. As part of the court’s established plan to allow only a temporary deprivation of custody, it ordered the DFS to formulate a treatment plan whereby both A.H. and the H. family could receive counseling prior to A.H.’s return to her home.
*291The record is barren of any indication that the DFS developed or submitted a treatment plan to the juvenile court in the months following the March hearing. After a June 21, 1983, petition was filed by the H.s for A.H.’s return, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition. Upon taking evidence and after reviewing the court-appointed psychologist’s evaluation, as well as a report from a licensed marriage and family counselor who had counseled with the H. family, the judge determined that A.H. should be returned to her home under the protective supervision of the DFS.
Although the evidence was extremely conflicting, the DFS had the burden of showing that continued deprivation of custody by the H.s was both in the best interest of A.H. and that there was good cause to do so. The majority incorrectly holds that as a matter of law that burden was met; the majority impermissibly requires that the H.s carry the burden to convince this Court that their explanations are acceptable. In so doing, it fails to give any weight to the juvenile court’s proximity to the evidence and the witnesses and his thoughtful findings and conclusions. Even though the DFS inveighs against the order returning A.H. to the H. home, it does not contend on this appeal that on the conflicting evidence presented to the court, his findings do not find support therein.
Finding no abuse of discretion, I would affirm.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HOWE, J.