Court Opinion

ID: 9717737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:09:40.55333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.010389
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(concurring in part). I agree with the majority’s holding that the Legislature intended the dramshop act to provide the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of the unlawful sale, giving away, or furnishing of intoxicants. However, the statute hampers our ability to administer justice by precluding actions for gross negligence. The dramshop act, as it currently exists, provides no cause of action for an intoxicated patron. In this case, the defendant tavern owner profited from the extremely intoxicated patron. On the other hand, he bore no liability for the resultant harm to the intoxicated patron. The heightened culpability of the dramshop owner and the resultant harm to plaintiff cry out for redress in the form of an *280action for gross negligence. The Legislature should consider amending the statute to afford a visibly intoxicated patron a remedy for the grossly negligent conduct of a tavern owner in selling, giving away, or furnishing intoxicants.
In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that (1) she is an alcoholic, (2) she had been a regular nightly customer at defendant’s bar for two years prior to her accident, and (3) during this two-year period, defendant knew that she was "helplessly addicted to alcohol.” Yet, on the evening of September 24, 1982, defendant served her drinks from 4:00 p.m. to approximately 2:30 a.m. the following morning. During this time she was served, and consumed, at least "two-fifths of rum, ten shot glasses of peppermint Schnapps and several shots of tequilla [sic] . . . .” In addition, defendant sold her two cases of beer as she was preparing to leave.1
On the basis of these facts, there should be a cause of action for gross negligence. After plaintiff became visibly intoxicated, defendant should have stopped serving intoxicants to her. At that point, defendant became the "least cost avoider” of the harm suffered by plaintiff. The "least cost avoider” theory has been explained as follows:
The theory of the least cost avoider asserts that the entity that can avoid the accident at the least cost to society should bear liability if an accident should occur. The logic behind this theory is that liability will encourage the least cost avoider to prevent the accident.
The least cost avoider initially is the intoxicated *281patron. He or she can prevent any alcohol-related accident by not drinking at all. However, after the patron has become intoxicated, the server becomes the least cost avoider. An extremely intoxicated person is no longer an "ordinary able-bodied m[a]n.” He cannot make a rational decision to stop drinking and cannot acknowledge the risk of his intoxication. On the other hand, the server is likely to recognize the signs of intoxication and can refuse to continue serving the intoxicated person. The server should be aware of the various indicators of intoxication. Those courts allowing intoxicated persons to recover have recognized that the intoxicated person is incompetent and helpless, is unable to care for himself, and has a subnormal capacity for self-control.
This dual aspect of the least cost avoider theory —the intoxicated patron and the server being least cost avoiders at different points in time — suggests that application of comparative negligence is the best approach to dramshop liability because it is the fairest way to apportion liability. Comparative negligence would encourage both parties to avoid the accident by making both of them liable for resulting injuries, according to each party’s degree of fault.[2]
According to this theory, plaintiff was initially the least cost avoider. However, after plaintiff became visibly intoxicated, defendant became the least cost avoider and, therefore, had a duty to stop serving intoxicants to plaintiff. It did not stop. Instead, it continued to profit from plaintiff’s lack of control.
If the statute were amended to afford a visibly intoxicated patron a remedy for the grossly negligent conduct of a tavern owner in selling, giving away, or furnishing intoxicants, then the courts could apply the ”least cost avoider” theory to *282produce an equitable and more efficient resolution of cases arising under these circumstances. In the instant case, the finder of fact could have apportioned liability by applying comparative negligence principles.3
CONCLUSION
The dramshop act requires that I concur. However, the Legislature should explore the wisdom of amending the statute to afford a visibly intoxicated patron a remedy for the grossly negligent conduct of a tavern owner in selling, giving away, or furnishing intoxicants._

 The trial court granted appellant’s motion for summary disposition. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests only the legal, not factual, sufficiency of the pleadings. In reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition we "accept[ ] as true all of plaintiffs factual allegations as well as any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the allegations.” Hoag v Paul C Chapman & Sons, Inc, 62 Mich App 290, 295; 233 NW2d 530 (1975).

 Harden, Dramshop liability: Should the intoxicated person recover for his own injuries?, 48 Ohio St L J 227, 243 (1987).

 Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638, 650; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).