Court Opinion

ID: 9548971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:11:23.577477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:41.285454
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion destroys the intent and purpose of the notice provisions of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, RCW 43.21C, the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, RCW 90.58, and approves a proposed project that is contrary to the City of DuPont's shorelines master program.
*735Procedural Background
This case concerns the application of the Weyerhaeuser Company for a permit to build a large precast concrete dock, causeway, road, and associated developments along the shore of southern Puget Sound in the city of DuPont.
The proposed facility lies within the Nisqually Delta, " [s]horelines of state-wide significance" under RCW 90.58-.030(2) (e) (ii) (A). Shorelines of statewide significance are designated by the Legislature as those shorelines that have special economic, ecological, educational, developmental, recreational, or aesthetic values. RCW 90.58.310. The Nis-qually Delta is described by the Shorelines Hearings Board as follows:
The Nisqually Delta is one of the most biologically productive estuaries in Puget Sound, and is the most productive estuary in southern Puget Sound. Unlike many of the other deltas along Puget Sound, the Nis-qually Delta has been little altered since the turn of the century. It is the foremost and best protected in terms of its "integrity" as a delta.
The view of the waterfowl and shorebirds from the end of the dike in the NWR has been described as "primeval. " The Refuge appears to support wildlife without evidence of human impact. As the seasons come and go, different wildlife activities emerge.
The Nisqually Delta has been used as a natural laboratory to teach and demonstrate the behavior and survival needs of wildlife.
Clerk's Papers, at 10-11. Directly to the south of this proposed project is the Nisqually National Wildlife Refuge; on the north, Pierce County shorelines with a "conservancy" designation. A conservancy environment designation is for those areas which are intended to maintain their existing character. The objective of a conservancy environment is to protect, conserve and manage existing natural resources and valuable historic and cultural areas in order to ensure a continuous flow of recreational benefits to the public and to achieve sustained resource utilization. WAC 173-16-040(4) (b)(iii).
*736Physical Size of Dock and Support Area
The proposed dock is some 1,470 feet in length, including two "mooring dolphins" on either end. The dock is 140 feet in width and would be supported by 500 to 600 pilings, some of which will extend 100 feet downward from the dock itself. The applicant does not presently propose any cranes or other loading devices on the dock but admits that the dock is designed and engineered to permit their installation at some future date. The dock is built to accommodate single ships up to 1,010 feet in length, or two ships up to 610 feet each.
The dock is accessible from the shore over a causeway some 400 feet in length and 57 feet in width. The causeway is elevated and, like the dock, is supported by pilings.
The causeway is, in turn, connected to an upland staging area by a road which is approximately 3,000 feet in length, and 54 feet in width. It is built through the Sequalitchew Creek gorge.
The upland staging area would provide about 40 acres of storage for finished products and 55 acres for logs. This area would be cleared of vegetation and paved. This staging area will have new road and rail access built to the south toward the main lines of Burlington Northern, Inc. and Interstate 5.
Weyerhaeuser has stated that the purpose of the proposal is to allow it to assemble and load raw and finished forest products. These products will be transferred from the staging area to the dock over the road and causeway by use of large trucks, which will generally resemble logging trucks. During full operation, the dock will be used from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m., about 16 hours a day. If a ship is in port, the logs will be transferred onto the ships by use of ships' cranes. Weyerhaeuser estimates that there will be 2 to 4 Vi calls per month at the Weyerhaeuser dock. It will take 2 to 5 days to load a vessel, depending on its capacity.
The ramifications of the construction and operation of this facility in such a significant and sensitive environmental region of this state are apparent. The uproar and public *737concern over this potential development have twice brought issues, relating to this state's environmental legislation, to this court.
Judicial History
In Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. DuPont, 95 Wn.2d 563, 627 P.2d 956 (1981), a 5-member majority of this court held that only Weyerhaeuser and Burlington Northern, Inc. (the petitioners of the annexation) had standing to contest the Pierce County Boundary Review Board's approval of annexation of the proposed site of the facility to the City of DuPont. This decision effectively precluded those persons residing near the proposed facility from contesting a significant, integral step toward construction of the project. Nis-qually Delta, at 573 (Dore, J., dissenting). As a result of that annexation, Weyerhaeuser owns 3,200 acres of the approximately 3,300 acres comprising the city of DuPont.
DuPont's shorelines master program was adopted and approved without comment by the Department of Ecology in June 1975. It was not until 1976 that Weyerhaeuser announced the purchase of the DuPont property and its intention to construct the export facility. It is evident that the citizenry of DuPont did not have in consideration the construction and placement of this substantial project when enacting their shorelines master program and conditional use criteria.
In February 1979, DuPont issued and circulated the final environmental impact statement (FEIS) for the Weyer-haeuser export facility. However, prior to the filing of the required applications for substantial development and conditional use permits, Weyerhaeuser determined to alter and move the facility to a location different from that depicted in the FEIS as the proposed or alternate site. It is this alteration of the proposal and subsequent proceedings that give rise to this appeal.
Notice Provisions
The state environmental policy act's public comment and notice procedures are at the heart of the environmental *738review process. The act requires that all responsible opposing viewpoints be given an opportunity to be included in the decisionmaking process. The purpose of notice provisions is to fairly and sufficiently apprise those who may be affected by a proposed action of its nature and character so they may intelligently prepare for the hearing. Barrie v. Kitsap Cy., 84 Wn.2d 579, 585, 527 P.2d 1377 (1974). To preserve the efficacy of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, it is necessary that courts demand strict compliance with the disclosure and procedural provisions of the act. Courts must also insist on strict adherence to the regulations through which the act's mandate is administered. This ensures that the governmental body is cognizant of all the environmental trade-offs that are implicit in a decision.
The notice of application for the substantial development and conditional use permits referred the public to the final environmental impact statement for a "complete project description". It is undisputed that the FEIS issued in February 1979 described a "proposed" forest products export facility in a "preferred" location which is substantially different from the approved facility location. The project approved is much closer to the Nisqually National Wildlife Refuge and much farther offshore than the project depicted in the final environmental impact statement. In comparing the two locations, the Shorelines Hearings Board found that there were several disadvantages to the location finally approved compared to that described in the FEIS. The Board said:
First, it [the permitted dock] extends the dock some 1000 feet closer, about one third of the distance, to the Nisqually National Wildlife Refuge. Second, there will be increased disturbance of sediments during construction, due to thickening of the alluvial deposits at the permitted location. Third, there could be a more profound effect on the delta of Sequalitchew Creek and the important wildlife use of this area but this is difficult to quantify.
Clerk's Papers, at 33.
From the foregoing, it is manifest that the public notice *739put the project in the wrong place, and the project described in the notice (similarly described in the FEIS) was a more desirable project than that which was actually considered by the City. Thus, the two dock locations are not equivalent: the new dock location, from the public viewpoint, being inferior to the original project. An accurate description of the proposal undoubtedly would have engendered much greater opposition to this project. The notice issued was misleading; it did not accurately locate the facility that was, in fact, being proposed for approval.
The majority rationalizes this error in notice with a number of fallacious statements, all of which misconstrue applicable law. The majority states that the Shorelines Hearings Board found that there were "no significant differences" shown in the impacts between the facility location described in the FEIS and the location in the application. This hindsight determination by the Board begs the question. The question is whether the notice was defective, and concerned citizens, including the plaintiffs, were, in fact, misled. Barrie, at 583. Had the public been accurately informed, they would have had the opportunity to analyze the amended project and to intelligently prepare for, and present evidence at, the hearing. The Board's determination then may well have resulted in a directly opposite decision.
The argument that a recipient of the notice could go to the DuPont City Hall and ascertain for himself the true proposed location of the facility further ignores the realities of the situation. Those interested parties that had previously examined the FEIS which purported to show the proposed location of the facility would have no reason, without a new notice, to expect a different proposal being filed at DuPont City Hall. These concerned citizens would necessarily prepare themselves for a hearing on a proposed location that wasn't pending or, worse, not even attend the proceedings because the facility described in the FEIS tended to be a more acceptable project than that which was being considered by the City.
*740The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, RCW 43.21C, and implementing regulations, WAC 197-10-660, address the use of a previously prepared final environmental impact statement for a new proposed action. Two alternative ways of using the previous FEIS are permitted: (1) where the new proposed action will have an impact not adequately addressed in the previous FEIS, the agency must prepare a supplement or (2) where the new proposed action will not have an impact that is substantially different from the impacts of the earlier proposed action, the agency must send a notice of its intent to use the previous FEIS for the new proposal.
The Washington Administrative Code 197-10-660 provides in full:
(1) An agency may adopt and utilize a previously prepared EIS, or portion thereof, to satisfy certain of the EIS requirements applicable to a different proposed action, as set forth in (2) and (3) below. In such event, two requirements shall be met:
(a) The previous EIS or portion thereof, together with any supplement to it, shall meet the requirements of these guidelines applicable to an EIS for the new proposed action, and
(b) Where any intervening change in conditions would make the previous EIS misleading when applied to the new proposed action, a previous EIS shall not be used without an explanatory supplement.
(2) When the new proposed action will have an impact on the environment that was not adequately analyzed in the previously prepared EIS, the lead agency shall prepare a draft supplemental EIS and comply with the provisions of WAC 197-10-400 through 197-10-695. The contents of the draft and final supplemental EIS shall be limited to those impacts of the proposed action which were not adequately analyzed in the earlier EIS.
(3) When the new proposed action will not have an impact on the environment that is substantially different than the impacts of the earlier proposed action, the lead agency may prepare a written statement setting forth its determination under this subsection and circulate it as provided in WAC 197-10-600. The lead agency shall not be required to prepare a new or supplemental draft or *741final EIS on the new proposed action when this subsection is determined to apply. However, the provisions of WAC 197-10-480 through 197-10-490, relating to a public hearing on the environmental impact of a proposal shall apply.
The change in dock location was a new proposed action. Three factors support this proposition. First, there were differences between the old and new docks: the new facility was moved much closer to the Nisqually Wildlife Refuge and much farther offshore. Secondly, the dock, in its new location, resulted in different impacts on the environment. Thirdly, the Board concluded that there were measurable differences and detriments connected with the new proposed dock location from that of the old. The weight of the evidence and common sense clearly dictate this change in dock location requires the minimum compliance of sending a written statement under WAC 197-10-660.
WAC 197-10-660(3) allows the use of a previously prepared FEIS for a new proposed action when there are no substantially different impacts in the new proposed action. Where the new proposed action will not have an impact on the environment that is substantially different from the impacts of the earlier proposed action, this section gives the lead agency the discretion to either prepare a supplemental EIS or send the "written statement" of determination of nonsubstantial differences in impacts. The rule is clear that if the notice is not sent, procedural requirements will apply and a supplemental EIS must be prepared. The notice also preserves, as indicated in the third sentence of section 660(3), the right of the public to demand a public hearing on the new proposed action as provided in WAC 197-10-480(2) (b).
Although the Department of Ecology informed DuPont that it did not have to prepare a supplemental EIS, DuPont did not file the notice of intent to use the previous FEIS. A substantially different impact is not required in order for the change in location to be a new proposed action. The EIS process should serve both to alert the pub-*742lie of what the agency intends to do and to give the public enough information to be able to participate intelligently in the EIS process. Applied here, this general rule calls for a pragmatic judgment: whether the proposal finally selected by DuPont was within the range of alternatives the public could have reasonably anticipated. Common sense dictates that a proposal which is not the "proposed" or "alternate" action described in the FEIS is a "new proposed action". This is not a burdensome requirement with which to comply. The agency need only send notice that it is going to use a previously prepared FEIS for a proposal that is different from that described in the FEIS but which does not have substantially different impacts. By failing to disclose the change in location of the proposed facility, the City of DuPont insulated its decisionmaking process from public scrutiny.
The respondents failed to give notice that they were using the previous final environmental impact statement for the new proposal and, thus, they should be required to either prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement, or this case should be remanded for the circulation of the required notice.
The DuPont Shorelines Master Program
The majority cavalierly labels as "slight language differences" the dissimilarity between DuPont's conditional use provisions and the conditional use guidelines proposed by the Department of Ecology (DOE). In fact, there is a substantial difference in the language establishing the criteria for conditional use permits.
In WAC 173-16-070(1), DOE's criteria that "[t]he use will cause no unreasonably adverse effects on the environment or other uses" was changed by the deletion of the word "unreasonably" in DuPont's shorelines master program. Clerk's Papers, at 103. This change results in a wholly different meaning obvious to either a layman or a lawyer.
In subsection (2), DuPont made two changes from the *743DOE criteria regarding "interference" with shoreline use. First, DuPont added a colloquial modifier "will in no way interfere" to replace the declarative negative "will not interfere" in the DOE guidelines. Clerk's Papers, at 103. By adding "in no way", DuPont demonstrated a plain intent to strengthen this protection. The term "in no way” conveys the same determination to preserve shoreline values that the removal of "unreasonably" had in the modification to the first of the conditional use criteria. Secondly, the City deleted the word "public" as a modifier of "shoreline". By deleting the term "public", the City extends prohibitions against interference with public use to private, as well as public, shorelines.
In subsection (3), DuPont struck the words "and the master program" from the compatibility requirement. Clerk's Papers, at 103. By removing the words "master program", the City eliminates the DOE suggestion that consistency with the master program be retained in design of the site.
In subsection (4), the City adopted the DOE's suggested language in its entirety. Clerk's Papers, at 103.
DOE adopted these modifications without question or comment when it approved the shorelines master program in June 1975. This is significant in view of the fact that DOE had "full authority" to modify, change or adopt new provisions of conditional uses on these "shorelines of statewide significance" if the master program "does not provide the optimum implementation of the policy of this chapter to satisfy the state-wide interest." RCW 90.58.090(2). Three other aspects are also significant. First, Weyer-haeuser did not announce its purchase of the DuPont property and intention to construct the facility until a year after adoption of the DuPont shorelines master program. Secondly, no testimony was offered that suggested DuPont made a mistake in adopting its conditional use language. Thirdly, neither the City, Weyerhaeuser nor the Department of Ecology has proposed that the conditional use language be modified. This is significant because both DOE *744and the City are mandated to account for changing conditions in master programs in RCW 90.58.190:
The department [Department of Ecology] and each local government shall periodically review any master programs under its jurisdiction and make such adjustments thereto as are necessary.
The process for changing the master program is straightforward, uncomplicated and capable of expeditious completion. See WAC 173-19-060, -070.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the City (with DOE approval) changed the conditional use criteria suggested by the DOE. It is further inescapable that the City made its criteria more restrictive and, therefore, more protective of the environment than the DOE's suggestions.
The master program thus remains both the law of the city and of the state. With the adoption of strict conditional use criteria, DuPont adopted one of the strongest shorelines master programs in the state. It may be inferred that such strict conditional use criteria were adopted due to the statewide significance of the Nisqually Delta and the nature of adjoining shorelines.
At the outset, it is important to note that, without the application of the Board's "reasonableness" standard, the Board would find the development inconsistent with the conditional use criteria. Consider the Board's decision relating to the four conditional use criteria.
First, regarding the question of adverse impacts on the environment, the Board admits that there are adverse effects on the Sequalitchew Creek and on the Nisqually Delta which arise from this proposal. There is no serious argument on this score: the FEIS concludes that there will be a variety of impacts on the environment resulting from the Weyerhaeuser proposal. Some of these are concluded to be moderate to severe, including such matters as aesthetics, light and glare, erosion and noise.
Secondly, the Board does find interference with public use of the shorelines, including public use of the shorelines in the vicinity of the proposed dock, the dock access cause*745way and the access road. Clerk's Papers, at 22. Such interference is obvious: the proposed dock, particularly when large, oceangoing ships are present, will prevent the public from using the water and land areas in and around the dock. Similarly, the construction of a road along Sequalit-chew Creek to the dock will obviously interfere with shoreline use.
Thirdly, the Board admits that the design of the site is aesthetically incompatible with the surroundings. The Board said:
Aesthetics presently associated with the Nisqually Delta would be compromised by the activity at the proposed dock. Aesthetic losses and disturbing activity in the waters of Nisqually Reach would tend to move the delta away from its relatively natural condition.
Clerk's Papers, at 35. Again, the Board's conclusion is correct: the dock would be 120 feet wide and 1,555 feet in length (more than a quarter mile) in an area where the only commercial shoreline use is a small, largely unused dock.
The Shorelines Hearings Board conceded that the conditional use criteria language is unambiguous and the majority does not disagree. There is no basis for judicial or administrative interpretation of unambiguous language. The general rule as set forth in 2A C. Sands, Statutory Construction § 45.02 (4th ed. 1973) is as follows:
A rule of statutory interpretation which is frequently encountered asserts that a statute which is clear and unambiguous on its face need not and cannot be interpreted by a court and that only those statutes which are of doubtful meaning are subject to the process of statutory interpretation. As declared in a leading case: "Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
(Footnote omitted.)
A similar statement is made at section 46.01 as follows:
"There is no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation than that when language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean what it plainly expresses."
*746The same rule is true in the state of Washington: when the language of a statute or ordinance is clear and unambiguous, there can be only one meaning and there is no room for statutory interpretation. See Tacoma Telco Fed. Credit Union v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 666, 619 P.2d 363 (1980); In re Lehman, 93 Wn.2d 25, 604 P.2d 948 (1980); McCarver v. Manson Park & Rec. Dist., 92 Wn.2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362 (1979); Thompson v. Lewis Cy., 92 Wn.2d 204, 595 P.2d 541 (1979); Hatfield v. Greco, 87 Wn.2d 780, 557 P.2d 340 (1976).
Despite the clear language of the conditional use criteria, the majority holds that the Shorelines Hearings Board acted properly in applying a "reasonableness" standard as that applicable to Department of Ecology guidelines. The majority's acquiescence in this interpretation placed words hack into the statute which had been deliberately and specifically taken out.
The majority finds that a literal interpretation of the no-adverse-effects language would end any development of the DuPont shoreline, and defeat the overall purpose of the shorelines master program. The majority reasons that strict application of the criteria would mean that nothing would be permitted to be located on the DuPont shoreline, even the most minor uses.
This proposition is, of course, hypothetical and contrary to the present facts. The Weyerhaeuser project is a massive undertaking: the dock is as long as SVz football fields and has the potential for nearly continuous loading activity from a ship or ships aggregating 1,300 feet or more in length. Indeed, the environmental impact statement for the project identifies serious and substantial environmental effects which will result from the Weyerhaeuser project.
Aside from the hypothetical nature of the majority's argument, there is no support in the record for the proposition that nothing can be built on this shoreline if the conditional use criteria are applied. For the majority to rule that these provisions somehow result in absurd results is to *747say that citizen committees and local governments cannot adopt stringent programs to protect the environment. That certainly cannot be the case under the terms of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971. Here, a previous city council chose, on recommendations of a citizens advisory committee, to adopt strong protections for its shorelines. To those concerned with the protection of the Nisqually Delta, this was a considerable victory. However, now the same City (but a different city council) simply ignores what it has written into law and adopts a new standard, all because a certain project has arisen. Merely because Weyerhaeuser now has ownership of 3,200 acres of the approximately 3,300 acres comprising the city of DuPont does not permit the City to ignore the plain language of its own ordinances in order to accommodate the desires of Weyerhaeuser. This is ad hoc decisionmaking, ignoring and contradicting the terms of an adopted local ordinance and approved state regulations. The majority adopts a rule which allows local government to emasculate its own laws by circumvention.
Contrary to the position of the majority, the goals and policies of the DuPont master program support the restrictive conditions of the conditional use criteria. All the policy statements refer specifically to the "preservation" and "enhancement" of natural environment and "elimination" of shoreline pollution. This, combined with the general goal to develop only consistent with the natural resource values and the city's unique aesthetic qualities offered by water, topography, views, and maritime character, indicates that the conditional use criteria are an extension of, not a deviation from, the general goals and policies.
It is true that the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, RCW 90.58, does not purport to prohibit all development on the state's shorelines. But the act, as may be seen from its policies section (RCW 90.58.020), does evidence a strong bias toward a preservation and protection of natural shoreline qualities. Thus, it may be that the act, shorelines master programs or administrative determinations may *748prohibit certain uses. It is indeed inherent in any program of control of land uses that from time to time certain uses may be prohibited. Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 552 P.2d 1038 (1976) (affirmation of Shorelines Hearings Board's denial of a permit for a shoreline sanitary landfill). That this particular proposal may be prohibited does not warrant an interpretation of DuPont's shorelines master program which clearly is in contravention of its intent and meaning.
Conclusion
There are a number of substantial defects in the notice requirements for the Weyerhaeuser proposal. First, the statutorily required notice under the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 was false and misleading because it described a dock at a different location than the one proposed. Secondly, respondents did not circulate a written statement disclosing they were using the FEIS on the prior dock location to suffice for an environmental analysis on the new location.
Each one of these items is reversible error in itself because each violates plain, statutory, administrative and case law mandates. It is manifest that the necessary notice provisions for the dock change were grossly inadequate, and reversal on this ground should be mandated.
The City of DuPont adopted a shorelines management program which provides strong protection for the environment and for the preservation of public use of the shorelines, both of which are foundations for the shoreline management act. The Shorelines Hearings Board has emasculated these provisions by its interpretations which fly in the face of the obvious intentions of the City and the Department of Ecology.
In 1971, the Legislature enunciated its policy to protect the environment for the public by legislating RCW 90.58-.020.
It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. This policy *749is designed to insure the development of these shorelines in a manner which, while allowing for limited reduction of rights of the public in the navigable waters, will promote and enhance the public interest. This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto.
The legislature declares that the interest of all of the people shall be paramount in the management of shorelines of state-wide significance. The department, in adopting guidelines for shorelines of state-wide significance, and local government, in developing master programs for shorelines of state-wide significance, shall give preference to uses in the following order of preference which:
(1) Recognize and protect the state-wide interest over local interest;
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
(3) Result in long term over short term benefit;
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline;
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the shorelines;
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the shoreline;
(7) Provide for any other element as defined in RCW 90.58.100 deemed appropriate or necessary.
In the implementation of this policy the public's opportunity to enjoy the physical and aesthetic qualities of natural shorelines of the state shall be preserved to the greatest extent feasible consistent with the overall best interest of the state and the people generally. To this end uses shall be preferred which are consistent with control of pollution and prevention of damage to the natural environment, or are unique to or dependent upon use of the state's shoreline.
RCW 90.58.020, in part.
The mighty and majestic Nisqually Delta was designated by the Legislature as "shorelines of state-wide significance", an environmental sanctuary of unparalleled beauty and biological productivity. RCW 90.58.030(2)(e)(ii)(A). The Legislature performed its job well by decreeing a legis*750lative protective net over this priceless heritage. In Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. DuPont, supra, and the majority here, however, the Supreme Court has cut the net via unjustified and strained interpretation of law which negates the State's legislative mandate that the interest of all of the people shall be paramount in the management of shorelines of statewide significance.
I would reverse the decision of the Shorelines Hearings Board and remand for proceedings in accordance with provisions of this opinion.
Reconsideration denied May 16, 1985.