Court Opinion

ID: 9698649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:56:32.227972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.203943
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Tolbert, 492 Pa. 576, 424 A.2d 1342 (1981), reaffirming the constitutional requirement that the affidavit supporting a search warrant be based upon fresh information, I would reverse.
Contrary to the assertion of Mr. Justice Kauffman, the two incidents mentioned in the search warrant affidavit clearly do not reveal “on-going possession” of heroin by appellant up to the time the search warrant was issued. The Commonwealth has utterly failed to establish that these two independent occasions of criminal activity at a prior time are connected to continuous criminal activity. These two incidents are: (1) at some time at least four days, and perhaps as many as fourteen days, prior to the execution of the search warrant an informant observed “10 bundles of alleged Heroin” in appellant’s apartment which were to be sold and removed within half an hour of the informant’s observation; and (2) on an unspecified date, this same informant saw appellant leave appellant’s apartment with three bundles of heroin to sell to two individuals at a bar.
The remaining facts alleged in the affidavit in no respect link these two occasions of alleged possession of heroin to a continuous period of possession. These facts simply are: (1) the phone number alleged by the informant to be appellant’s was in fact appellant’s phone number; (2) customers “always call” the number before arriving at appellant’s home (no specific incidents of customer calls are alleged); and (3) *543during a twenty-minute period on the morning of February 23, 1976, two persons were seen entering and leaving the building in which appellant lives. It must be obvious that these insubstantial, additional facts (of which only the second fact is even relevant), together with the two incidents recounted, are insufficient to provide probable cause to believe that appellant was in possession of narcotics at the time the search warrant was issued. See Commonwealth v. Tolbert, supra.
Where no evidence of present criminal activity is offered to the issuing authority, the issuance of a search warrant is constitutionally invalid because, without such information, it is impossible for a neutral and detached magistrate to determine whether there is probable cause to search. Commonwealth v. Tolbert, supra, 492 Pa. at 580, 424 A.2d at 1344. Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 325, 312 A.2d 398, 400 (1973). As this Court stated, “ ‘[a] search warrant must issue, if at all, upon an existing cause. A search warrant is no general arm for ferreting out crime, but a special proceeding, based on present cause, hedged by strict constitutional provisions. . . Commonwealth v. Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 114, 281 A.2d 897, 899 (1971) quoting People v. Cippewa Circuit Judge, 226 Mich. 326, 328, 197 N.W. 539, 540 (1924). Accord, Commonwealth v. McCants, 450 Pa. 245, 249, 299 A.2d 283, 286 (1973).
The opinion of Mr. Justice Kauffman relies on United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (plurality). Contrary to its assertion, this case did not involve an affidavit “similar to the one now before us.” There, the affidavit alleged not only that illegal liquor sales had occurred “within the past two weeks” but also that “these recent purchases were part of a history of purchases over a two-year period.” Id. at 579, 91 S.Ct. at 2079-80. Similarly, in United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972), also relied upon in the opinion, the affidavit revealed a recent four-month history of illegal sales of non-tax-paid liquor. No similar history establishing a continuity of criminal activity is contained in the affidavit before this Court.
*544Here, as in Commonwealth v. Tolbert, supra, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 461 Pa. 632, 337 A.2d 582, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999, 96 S.Ct. 432, 46 L.Ed.2d 376 (1975), Commonwealth v. Eazer, supra, Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa. 624, 301 A.2d 819 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Shaw, supra, the requirement of establishing criminal continuity has not been satisfied. Indeed, in a closely related context, this Court held invalid, for lack of probable cause, a search warrant executed fifteen days after its issuance. Commonwealth v. McCants, 450 Pa. 245, 299 A.2d 283 (1973). Our Court recognized that
“[t]here are times when the facts and circumstances presented to the magistrate remain unchanged long after the warrant is issued. However, once it is recognized that it is possible for the facts and circumstances to change with the passing of time, a redetermination of probable cause is constitutionally required.”
Id., 450 Pa. at 249, 299 A.2d at 286 (emphasis in original). Accord, Commonwealth v. Eazer, supra, 455 Pa. at 326, 312 A.2d at 401; Commonwealth v. Shaw, supra, 444 Pa. at 113-14, 281 A.2d at 899. As this Court observed,
“ ‘[i]t is one thing to expect the magistrate to give a commonsense reading to facts set forth and to draw inferences from them. It is quite another thing to expect the magistrate to reach for external facts and to build inference upon inference in order to create a reasonable basis for his belief that a crime is presently being committed’ [Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310, 317 (1st Cir. 1966)] (emphasis added).”
Commonwealth v. Simmons, supra, 450 Pa. at 631, 301 A.2d at 823.
In the absence of facts establishing the required element of continuity, the affidavit submitted to the magistrate did not provide probable cause to believe that narcotics were then on appellant’s premises. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a constitutionally deficient warrant. To conclude otherwise is to permit the circumvention *545of the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement by the use of a stale search warrant. See Commonwealth v. Eazer, supra; Commonwealth v. McCants, supra.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed and a new trial granted.