Court Opinion

ID: 9957702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 21:03:24.789306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:34.379090
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U
                      Nos. 2-24-0035 & 2-24-0036 & 2-24-0037 cons.
                                 Order filed April 4, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                          IN THE

                           APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of McHenry County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) Nos. 21-CF-169, 22-CF-1039, 22-CF-684
                                       )
JONATHAN B. SAWYER,                    ) Honorable
                                       ) Tiffany E. Davis,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

      JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Birkett and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

                                         ORDER

¶1    Held: The evidence supported the trial court’s findings that defendant committed a
            detainable offense and is a willful flight risk. The trial court did not abuse its
            discretion in ordering defendant’s detention.

¶2                                  I. BACKGROUND

¶3    This consolidated appeal is born of three separate sets of criminal charges against

      defendant, Jonathan B. Sawyer.

¶4                                A. Case No. 21-CF-169
2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

¶5      On March 15, 2021, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, less

than 15 grams of cocaine (720 ILCS 570/402(c)), possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS

600/3.5(A)), and possession of methamphetamine, less than 5 grams (720 ILCS 646/60(a)(1)).

Defendant posted bond on March 23, 2021, and was released from custody. On May 21, 2021, he

failed to appear for court. His bond was forfeited and a bench warrant was issued. Defendant was

subsequently arrested in Wisconsin and bond was reinstated at $20,000. Defendant did not post

bond.

¶6      On May 2, 2022, defendant was admitted into the Drug Court Program. He pleaded guilty

to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced to 30 months’ probation. Defendant failed

to appear before the court on August 4, 2022. A bench warrant for his arrest was issued and bond

was set at $30,000. On September 14, 2022, the state filed a motion to discharge defendant from

the Drug Court Program citing seven positive tests in July 2022 for methamphetamine and cocaine.

¶7                                  B. Case No. 22-CF-1039

¶8      On December 2, 2022, defendant was charged with two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS

5/16-25) for stealing $820.81 worth of clothing and a vacuum from a Walmart in Johnsburg; one

count of driving while license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a)); one count of fleeing or attempting

to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-204); and one count of failure to signal when required

(625 ILCS 5/11-804(b)).

¶9                                   C. Case No. 23-CF-684

¶ 10    On July 14, 2023, defendant was charged with (1) deliver or possess with intent to deliver

methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1)), 15 grams but less than 100 grams;

(2) manufacture/deliver controlled substance-cocaine (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A)), 15 grams but

less than 100 grams; (3) manufacture/deliver controlled substance-fentanyl (720 ILCS

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

570/401(a)(1.5)(A)), 15 grams but less than 100 grams; (4) possession of methamphetamine (720

ILCS 646/60(a)), 15 grams but less than 100 grams; (5) possession of controlled substance-cocaine

(720 ILCS 560/402(a)(2)(A), 15 grams but less than 100 grams; (6) possession of controlled

substance-other drug (720 ILCS 570/402(c)), less than 200 grams of any substance containing

fentanyl; (7) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (720 ILCS 600/3.5(a)); and (8) resisting

officer, firefighter, or correctional employee (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(1)).

¶ 11                               D. Facts of Detention Hearing

¶ 12   Defendant filed a motion for hearing for release on conditions related to all three case

numbers. The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release on case No. 23-CF-684, stating

that the no conditions set forth in 725 ILCS 5/110-10(b) could mitigate (1) the real and present

safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case

or (2) defendant’s willful flight for class 3 or greater felony offenses.

¶ 13   The trial court held a pretrial detention hearing on all of the case numbers on January 3,

2024. The State proceeded by way of proffer on case No. 23-CF-684, and recounted to the trial

court as follows:

               “On July 14th of 2023, Detective Nicholas Clesceri *** with the McHenry County

       Sheriff’s Narcotics Task Force received information from a source that he indicated was

       credible who advised that [defendant] would be conducting a narcotics transaction at the

       Thorntons gas station on Illinois Route 120 in McHenry. This source of information

       advised that [defendant] would be showing up with a ball of crack cocaine, which is

       approximately 3.5 grams of cocaine, and that he would be utilizing a cellphone number

       ending in 3323 to arrange that deal.

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             Officers were able to determine that [defendant] had two active failure to appear

      warrants out of both McHenry and Lake County at that time and they were valid and within

      the geographical limitations.

             Members of the task force set up surveillance around the gas station and adjacent

      parking lots at that Thorntons gas station I previously mentioned. And while they were

      surveilling that location, a white in color Kia sedan pulled into the gas station and that

      vehicle parked on the south side of the lot. The passenger’s door opened and a male exited

      the vehicle who was positively identified by the detectives involved as [defendant]. And

      actually, I’m sorry, he exited the vehicle prior to the vehicle finding a parking space.

      [Defendant] began walking northbound through the parking lot and was on his phone and

      looking around. The Kia parked in front of the Thorntons gas station store entrance, and

      the driver exited the vehicle and walked towards the front door.

             Detective Clesceri was the front seat passenger in a department-issued vehicle that

      was being driven by a Sergeant Roehrkasse *** and Sergeant Roehrkasse drove up behind

      defendant and the emergency lights on the vehicle were activated. When the defendant saw

      the emergency lights, he immediately fled on foot northwestbound behind the Thorntons

      gas station. Detective Clesceri gave chase at that time, and Detective Clesceri began issuing

      commands for [defendant] to stop and to get on the ground. The defendant did not respond

      to the commands to stop and get on the ground and attempted to jump over the fence on

      the northern part of the property but was unable to get over the fence.

             Ultimately [defendant] was taken into custody and secured with handcuffs and a

      search of his person was performed. In the defendant’s right front pocket in a clear plastic

      baggy was an off-white chunky substance that based on Detective Clesceri’s training ***

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

      appeared to be approximately 3.5 grams of crack cocaine. There was also a glass smoking

      pipe with a bulb at the end in his right front pocket with a white residue, and that pipe

      appeared to be a pipe that would be used for the ingestion of methamphetamine into the

      body based on Detective Clesceri’s training.

             Detectives were able to make contact with the driver of the vehicle who is identified

      as the codefendant in this case, a Michael Mantor. Ultimately Mantor was also found to

      have crack cocaine on his person. The vehicle the defendant and his codefendant arrived

      in was searched after a narcotics detecting canine was deployed indicating the presence of

      narcotics within the vehicle.

             The search of the vehicle yielded suspected cocaine that field tested positive for

      cocaine and Fentanyl, suspected methamphetamine that field tested positive for

      methamphetamine, suspected LSD, suspected Vicodin, multiple digital scales with a white

      residue, large amounts of packaging materials, drug paraphernalia, and cutting agents. And

      most of the illicit substances and packaging material and cutting agents and scales were

      found near the center console of the vehicle that would have been immediately accessible

      to defendant and his codefendant ***.

             Detective Clesceri was able to obtain a search warrant for the defendant’s phone.

      And in manually looking through the phone, he observed several text messages and various

      other message applications where the defendant was arranging for the sale of illicit

      substances, and there were prices and weights talked about as well as delivery. There were

      also pictures of what appeared to be illicit substances in the photograph history.

             All and all recovered *** on [defendant’s] person was approximately 3.2 grams of

      what field tested positive for Fentanyl and cocaine.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

                                             ***

             There were four individual plastic bags each with a white crystalline material

      removed from a black zippered case that was found in the vehicle. That was approximately

      4.9 grams, and it field tested positive for both methamphetamine and Fentanyl.

             There was a plastic bag containing a white in color powdery material in the driver’s

      side of the vehicle. The approximate weight of the was 3.7 grams, and it field tested positive

      for the presence of cocaine and Fentanyl.

                                             ***

             There was a plastic bag containing a white powder material located in the cup

      holder of the vehicle that had approximately 2.7 grams that field tested positive for the

      presence of cocaine and Fentanyl.

                                             ***

             There was also a plastic clear crystalline material removed from the center console

      area with an approximate weight of .6 grams which tested positive for methamphetamine

      and Fentanyl.

             There was another black zipper case with a plastic bag in the center console with

      an approximate weight of 1.1 grams that field tested positive for the presence of

      methamphetamine.

             There was a Ziploc plastic bag containing a clear crystalline material that was also

      found in the vehicle and had an approximate weight of 11.4 grams and field tested positive

      for both methamphetamine and Fentanyl.

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               There was a plastic bag containing a white powder material with an approximate

       weight of 7.4 grams that field tested positive for the presumptive presence of cocaine and

       Fentanyl.

               And finally, there was a melted plastic bag containing a beige in color rock-like

       material that weight approximately 1.5 grams and field tested positive for the presence of

       cocaine and Fentanyl.”

¶ 14   The State offered a proffer with respect to case No. 22-CF-1039 as follows:

               “[T]hat incident occurring on December 2nd of 2022, an officer with the Johnsburg

       Police Department *** responded to a reported retail theft. That this defendant was

       observed fleeing the location of that retail theft and entering into his vehicle. That the

       officer in that case *** did give pursuit to the defendant. Once the defendant got into his

       vehicle, that officer did activate his emergency lights and attempt to effectuate a traffic

       stop on the defendant’s vehicle, and the defendant failed to stop for the emergency lights

       and sirens that were activated on the officer’s vehicle and fled the scene in his vehicle and

       did not stop upon the request of that officer by way of his lights and sirens.”

¶ 15   The State then recounted defendant’s lengthy criminal history and pattern of failure to

appear for court dates. To wit:

               “[I]n 1996 he received conditional discharge for possession of drug paraphernalia.

               In 1999 he received two years in the department of corrections for a domestic

       battery.

               In 2002 he received probation for disorderly conduct.

               In 2003 he received probation for domestic battery.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

             In 2004 he received 30 months in the department of corrections for driving under

      the influence. And also in 2004, he received a concurrent time of 30 months in the

      department of corrections for driving under the influence.

             In 2005 *** there was a misdemeanor resisting charge where a bond forfeiture and

      bench warrant were issued.

             In 2005 there was another felony DUI where the defendant received two years and

      six months in the department of corrections.

             In 2007 there was a criminal trespass to residence where the defendant received

      180 days in jail and conditional discharge, and there was also a bond forfeiture and bench

      warrant issued during the life of that case.

             In 2009 there was a theft probation and also a bond forfeiture and a bench warrant

      issued during the course of that case.

             In 2011 there was possession of a controlled substance where he received probation.

      It was a Lake County case. However, that probation was revoked and he ultimately

      received three years in the department of corrections. There was a bond forfeiture and

      bench warrant that did issue during the life of that 2011 possession case.

             In 2016 there was an aggravated domestic battery where he received three years in

      the department of corrections. There was a bond forfeiture and bench warrant that issued

      while that case was pending.

             In 2020 there was possession of a controlled substance out of Round Lake Beach.

      It’s a Lake County case. I don’t have a disposition for that, but there was a bond forfeiture

      and a bench warrant issued in the life of that case.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

                 In 2021 with respect to [21 CF 169], which is on our call, he received drug court

       probation on that case. However, he was discharged from drug court on March 16th of

       2023 for unsuccessfully complying with the terms and conditions of drug court.

                 *** [I]n 2022 he received conditional discharge and 180 days in jail on a driving

       while license suspended, a felony charge.”

¶ 16   The trial court granted the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release to defendant on

case No. 23-CF-684, and denied defendant’s motion for hearing for release on conditions related

to all relevant case numbers. The trial court found that the State met its burdens under both the

dangerousness and willful flight standards. Regarding defendant’s dangerousness, the trial court

found as follows:

                 “The Court further finds the dangerousness determination has been made. The

       drugs found within the vehicle, *** [the] majority of which contain the presence of

       Fentanyl. The Court has numerous cases pending before it and is aware in the community

       Fentanyl with other combination of drugs is fatal, can be fatal, not always, but can be, and

       the fact that drug dealers continue to put Fentanyl in things is really mind blowing.”

¶ 17   Regarding willful flight, the trial court found as follows:

                 “In this case the defendant is charged with fleeing a police officer in 22 CF 1039.

       He’s also charged with fleeing in 23 CF 1213.1 He’s also fled from the officers on foot in

       23 CF 684 attempting but unsuccessful in jumping a fence. Furthermore, his criminal

       history indicates a history of failing to come to court when required to come to court. And

       1
           Case No. 23-CF-1213 is not subject to the issues raised by defendant in this appeal.

However, the State did recount the facts of that case to the trial court by way of proffer.

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2024 IL App (2d) 240035-U

       so for all these reasons that detention petition is heard and granted and defendant’s motion

       to be release with pretrial conditions is denied.”

¶ 18   In its written January 3, 2024, order, the trial court explained its decision to detain

defendant as follows:

              “The court considers all conditions under 110-6.1 including those in subsection g

       and all other relevant statutory factors and considers that this defendant has 4 pending

       felonies in this County one of which defendant was on drug court probation and discharged

       from drug court probation. While out on bond in 21CF169 and 22CF1039 and 23CF1213,

       defendant committed the offenses outlined in 2023CF684. The Court takes judicial notice

       of defendant's extensive criminal history dating back to 1991. Defendant has had numerous

       bond forfeiture bench warrants that have issued under the prior bail law. Defendant has

       numerous driving violations and does not have a valid driver’s license and has been

       charged with driving with a revoked license numerous times. The Court finds that

       defendant is charged with a class 3 or higher offense. The State has met its burden of

       establishing that no reasonable conditions can mitigate the threat of willful flight, due to

       defendant allegedly being involved in the sale of narcotics containing fentanyl, his being

       charged with fleeing and alluding a peace officer and fleeing from the officer in 23CF684,

       his extensive criminal history with a history of failing to appear in court, and his failure to

       comply with the terms and conditions of the Drug Court program.”

¶ 19   Defendant filed notices of appeal for all case numbers using the form notice promulgated

under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(d) (eff. Oct 19, 2023). He filed Rule 604(h) memorandum

for case Nos. 21-CF-149 and 22-CF-1039, but submitted a declination letter notifying this court

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that he would not be submitting Rule 604(h) memorandum with respect to case No. 23-CF-684.

The State submitted memorandum on all case numbers.

¶ 20                                        II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21    In this appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him detained for

case Nos. 21-CF-169 and 22-CF-1039 because the State did not file a verified petition to detain in

those cases. Additionally, defendant contends that in case No. 23-CF-684 the State (1) failed to

meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that he committed the offenses charged and (2) failed to meet its burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the

safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the

case.

¶ 22    This appeal is brought pursuant to Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023),

commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act). 2

See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v.

Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date of Act as September 18, 2023).

The Act abolished traditional monetary bail in favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance

or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2022).

¶ 23    In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code of Criminal

        2
            The Act has been referred to as the “SAFE-T Act” or the “Pretrial Fairness Act.” Neither

of those names is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statute or the public act.

Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1.

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Procedure of 1963 (Code) as amended by the Act. Id. § 110-1 et seq. Under the Code, as amended,

a defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations. Id.

§§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e).

¶ 24   Upon filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden

to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great

that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)), (2) the defendant’s

pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and (3) no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate

the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or prevent the defendant’s

willful flight from prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)).

¶ 25   We begin with defendant’s contention with respect to his detainment in case No. 23-CF-

684. He contends that the State failed to prove the first two requirements by clear and convincing

evidence. “Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the

trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human

Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74. We review whether the trial court’s findings were against the

manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13; People v.

Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 10. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence

when it is unreasonable. People v. Sims, 2022 IL App (2d) 200391, ¶ 72. We review the trial court’s

ultimate decision regarding pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d)

230317, ¶ 13.

¶ 26   Defendant’s argument that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the

offenses charged is meritless. The State’s proffer in case No. 23-CF-684 (see supra ¶ 13) presented

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clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the offense of possession with intent to

deliver methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/55(a)(1)), 15 grams but less than 100 grams. That

offense qualifies for pretrial detention under the Act (see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)). The trial

court’s finding as such was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 27   Defendant next argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case.

¶ 28   In making a determination of a defendant’s dangerousness, a trial court may consider, but

“shall not be limited to” (emphasis added): (1) the nature and circumstances of any charged

offense, including whether it is a crime of violence or a sex crime, or involved a weapon; (2) the

defendant’s characteristics and history, including any criminal history indicative of violent,

abusive, or assaultive behavior, and any psychological history indicative of a violent, abusive, or

assaultive nature, and the lack of any such history; (3) the identity of the person believed to be at

risk from the defendant and the nature of the threat; (4) statements by the defendant and the

circumstances of such statements; (5) the age and physical condition of the defendant; (6) the age

and physical condition of any victim or complaining witness; (7) the defendant’s access to any

weapon; (8) whether the defendant was on probation, parole, or the like at the time of the charged

offense or any other arrest or offense; and (9) any other factors that have a reasonable bearing on

the defendant’s propensity for violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior, or the lack of such behavior.

Id. § 110-6.1(g).

¶ 29   The evidence supports a finding of defendant’s dangerousness to the community under

multiple factors enumerated in section 110-6.1(g). Defendant is a 50-year-old man with a lengthy

criminal history including multiple instances of domestic violence. He has exhibited repeated

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defiance of bond and probation requirements, including failure to adhere to the requirements of

drug court. While section 110-6.1(g) does not specifically list possession or intent to deliver

Fentanyl to the members of our community as a factor to find dangerousness, it does specify that

the trial court “shall not be limited to” (emphasis added) the enumerated factors. See 725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g). The trial court’s finding that defendant poses a danger to our communities by

intending to deliver a substantial amount of a fatal substance is not in contradiction to the language

of section 110-6.1(g), and certainly not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 30   As defendant concedes that that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that he

constitutes a willful flight risk, we need not examine that requirement. Based on the foregoing, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State’s motion for pretrial detention in case

No. 23-CF-684.

¶ 31   We now turn to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in ordering him detained

for case Nos. 21-CF-169 and 22-CF-1039 because the State did not file a verified petition to detain

him in those cases. Defendant argues that because his motion to be release on conditions was made

pursuant to section 110-7.5(b) and 110-5 of the Act, he should have had a hearing under section

110-5(e) of the Act which directs the trial court to consider if any conditions of release can ensure

defendant’s appearance in court, but does not allow the trial court to order detention. We disagree.

¶ 32   Section 110-7.5(b) of the Act states that “On or after January 1, 2023, any person who

remains in pretrial detention after having been ordered released with pretrial conditions, including

the condition of depositing security, shall be entitled to a hearing under subsection (e) of Section

110-5.” 725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b).

¶ 33   Section 110-5(e) of the Act states:

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                “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered

       released with pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for

       continued detention. If the reason for continued detention is due to the unavailability or the

       defendant's ineligibility for one or more pretrial conditions previously ordered by the court

       or directed by a pretrial services agency, the court shall reopen the conditions of release

       hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure the

       appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of

       compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The inability of the

       defendant to pay for a condition of release or any other ineligibility for a condition of

       pretrial release shall not be used as a justification for the pretrial detention of that

       defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e).

¶ 34   Here, defendant was in custody at the time he filed his motion for release with conditions

because he did not post bail under our previous cash bail structure. As such, he was entitled to a

hearing pursuant to section 110-5(e), and he received one on January 3, 2024.

¶ 35   Section 110-5(a) of the Act states that

       “(a) In determining which conditions of pretrial release, if any, will reasonably ensure the

       appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community

       and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release,

       the court shall, on the basis of available information, take into account such matters as:

            (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged;

            (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, except that the court may consider

            the admissibility of any evidence sought to be excluded;

            (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including:

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               (A) the defendant's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,

               employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community

               ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, history criminal history, and

               record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and

               (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on

               probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or

               completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any

               other state;

            (4) the nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to the safety of any person

            or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, that

            would be posed by the defendant's release, if applicable, as required under paragraph

            (7.5) of Section 4 of the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act;

            (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the

            criminal justice process that would be posed by the defendant's release, if applicable

            ***. 720 ILCS 5/110-5(a).

¶ 36   Defendant received the hearing he was entitled to after filing his motion. At that hearing,

defendant was afforded the opportunity to present the trial court with any and all evidence that he

should have been released with conditions. Before ruling on defendant’s motion with respect to

case Nos. 21-CF-169 and 22-CF1039, it specifically stated that its consideration was made

“[u]nder 725 ILS 5/110-5” to determine what, if any, conditions of pretrial release applied to

defendant. The trial court considered (1) the nature and history of the offenses charged; (2) the

weight of evidence against defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of defendant; (4) the

nature and seriousness of the specific, real and present threat to any person that would be posed by

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defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to

obstruct the criminal justice process. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a). The trial court did hear evidence

that defendant has exhibited a nearly uninterrupted pattern of criminal conduct since 1991. The

trial court heard evidence that defendant has been in violation of bond conditions, necessitating

forfeiture and the issuance of bench warrants, on at least seven occasions since 2005. The record

indicates that the trial court considered the State’s petition to detain under section 110-6.1 of the

Code, and defendant’s motion for release with conditions under section 110-5 of the Code. To

adopt defendant’s argument would be tantamount to holding that the mere filing of a motion for

conditional release, in the absence of the State’s petition to detain, operates as the proverbial “get

out of jail free card.” While it may have been best practice for the State to file a petition to detain

defendant with respect to case Nos. 21-CF-169 and 22-CF1039, such a filing would be treated as

a responsive pleading to defendant’s motion for conditional release. See People v. Davidson, 2023

IL App (2d) 230344, ¶ 18. However, the absence of such a filing does not preclude the trial court

from finding that no conditions of pretrial release applied to defendant under section 110-5(a). As

such, we can find no error with the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for pretrial release

with conditions under case Nos. 21-CF-169 and 22-CF1039.

¶ 37                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38   We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County.

¶ 39   Affirmed.

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