Court Opinion

ID: 9876633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 15:27:08.592403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:13.220024
License: Public Domain

*725REIF, J.:
¶ 1 Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., sued the Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (County) for payment of medical services provided to prisoners and detainees in the Oklahoma County Jail. County admitted that Armor provided the medical services in - question pursuant to a contract for the period January 1, 2014 to June 30, 2014, and an extension of this contract for the period July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015. County did not dispute the accuracy of Armor’s monthly invoices for such services and admitted it had not paid some invoices totaling $3,302,297.04.
¶ 2 Despite these admissions, County argued that judgment could not be entered because Armor had not provided proof of the availability of funds as required by 62 O.S. 2001, §§ 3621 and 3632. In reply, Armor argued that the County’s obligation to pay for the medical services to the prisoners and detainees was not a claim founded on contract alone that is subject to the provisions of 362 and 363. Armor also argued that the obligation was not “indebtedness” as addressed in Article 10, § 263 of the Oklahoma *726Constitution. Armor asserted the County’s obligation to pay the medical services provided to prisoners and detainees was incurred in fulfillment of a governmental function mandated by the Oklahoma Constitution. As such, the County’s obligation was exempt from Article 10, § 26 as well as §§ 362 and 363.
¶ 3 The trial court ruled that Articlé 10, § 26 did apply, but that Armor’s summary judgment materials made a prima facie case1 of the availability of funds. The trial court concluded that- the burden shifted to the County- and that the County’s excuse of a revenue failure within the Sheriffs budget did not bar payment. In so ruling, the trial judge said “whenever there’s a failure of revenue within a particular department the County Commissioners look to their general revenue and do what they need to do in order to compensate vendors who are out there that they have legal obligations to.”
¶ 4 The trial court granted summary judgment to Armor in the amount of $3,302,297.04 and County has appealed. We have retained this appeal for de novo review of the summary judgment and the important constitutional issue presented. See Wathor v. Mutual Assurance Administrators, Inc., 2004 OK 2, ¶ 4, 87 P.3d 569, 561. Upon review, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Armor, albeit for a different reason than given by the trial court.
¶ 5 Article 17, § 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution established the office of sheriff for each of the seventy-seven counties, and Article 25, § 18 prescribed the duties of that office by reference to and incorporation of the duties of that office under territorial law.4 Smartt v. Board of County Commissioners of Craig County, 1917 OK 690, ¶¶ 3 and 4, 67 Okla. 141, 169 P. 1101, 1101. One such constitutional duty imposed upon a sheriff was “[t]he keeping of prisoners confided to his custody.” Id. at ¶ 4, 169 P. at 1102. Performance of this and other constitutionally prescribed duties “are made mandatory because necessary for the protection and well-being of the people composing the state.” Id. at ¶ 6, 169 P. at 1102.
¶ 6 In' the Smartt case, this Court held that expenses “incurred in the necessary discharge of his duties imposed ... by the imperative mandate of law, are not within the limitation imposed by section 26, art. 10.” Id. This Court, explained this holding by observing that “[i]n many instances the amount necessary for a proper performance of such duties could not be reasonably foreseen, for *727it is not always possible to tell in advance how much will be required.” Id. at ¶ 20, 169 P. at 1104.
¶ 7 Financial obligations for the fulfillment of constitutionally mandated functions are termed “compulsory” debts, as distinguished from those . based on contract alone. Board of County Commissioners of Caddo County v. Lawrence, 1938 OK 173, ¶ 11, 182 Okla. 485, 78 P.2d 669, 671. The appropriation of funding for such obligations occurs by the “force and vigor” of thé Oklahoma Constitution, and does not require'further fiscal action to be effective, although the better practice is to observe the formal appropriation process. Edwards v. Carter, 1934 OK 46, ¶¶ 20-21, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610, 613. The only limitation upon either an appropriation or a judgment directing payment for constitutionally mandated functions is that “the items and amounts are reasonable, proper, and necessary to the conduct of the government in accordance with [the pertinent] constitutional provisions.” Little v. County Excise Board of Marshall County, 1932 OK 833, ¶ 9, 161 Okla. 40, 16 P.2d 1080, 1082.
¶ 8 Nothing in the record suggests that the medical services provided by Armor for the prisoners and detainees in the Oklahoma County Jail were not “reasonable, proper, and necessary.” As those services and the charges therefor were in fulfillment of the sheriffs constitutional duty for “the keeping of prisoners confided to his custody,” Armor is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $3,302,297.04.
AFFIRMED
CONCUR: COMBS, C.J., KAUGER, WATT, WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, REIF, and WYRICK, JJ.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT: GURICH,, V.C.J. (By separate writing.)

.Section 362 provides:
Before final judgment in any suit based on contract, including but not limited to proceedings by the Commissioners of the Land Office to collect deficient payments plus interest and reasonable attorney fees related to bonds or other types of indebtedness guaranteed by the corpus of the permanent school fund for the support of common schools pursuant to Section 10 of this act, shall be rendered against any municipality by any court of any county in the State of Oklahoma, except in proceedings to refund any indebtedness of said municipality, proof shall be made to the court, of the existence, character and amount of the outstanding legal indebtedness of said municipality, which proof shall include a statement compiled by the various officers having custody of the records from which the information required in the statement is taken, under oath, showing the following:
1. An itemized statement of the bonded indebtedness of said municipality.
2. An itemized statement of the legal indebtedness of said municipality/exclusive of the bonded indebtedness and the alleged indebtedness proposed to be converted into a judgment.
3. An itemized statement of the indebtedness proposed to be converted into a judgment, so classified as to show, in separate exhibits, all items of questionable legality, if any, and the reasons of said officer or officers therefor:
(a.) The appropriations against which each warrant was drawn or claim accrued if in judgment, and if within the limits and purposes thereof as provided by law;
(b.) The income and revenue provided for the respective years, consisting of taxes levied and the actual collections of "estimated income”; the total warrants issued against the same or the accumulated accruals as the case may be, and the amount, if any, in excess of the total income and revenue of the year;
(c.) The condition of each fund from which such indebtedness is payable as of the close of the month next preceding the filing of application. Appeals from the judgment of the court shall be allowed as provided by law upon the giving of a bond for cost and damages in such sum as the court shall require; provided, that the county attorney of any county may, without the consent of the board of county commissioners of said county, take an appeal from said judgment on. behalf of said county and without bond for costs and damages.

. Section 363 provides:
No judgment shall be rendered against any municipality by any court until the'provisions of Section 2 hereof, have been fully complied with. Any judgment rendered in violation of the provisions of this act shall be void and of no effect.

. Section 26 of Article 10 states:
§ 26. Indebtedness of political subdivisions—Assent of voters—Annual tax—Computation of amount of indebtedness.
(a) Except as herein otherwise provided, no county, city, town, township, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of the state, shall be allowed to. become indebted, in any manner, or for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income and revenue .provided for such year without the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof, voting at an election, to-be held for that purpose, nor, in cases requiring suqh assent, shall any indebtedness be allowed to be incurred to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five percent (5%) of the valuation of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness: Provided, that if a school district has an absolute need therefor, such district may, with the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose, incur indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five percent (5%) but not exceeding ten percent (10%) of the valuation of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, for the purpose of acquiring or improving school sites, constructing, repairing, remodeling or equipping buildings, or acquiring school furniture, fixtures or equipment; *726and' such assent -to such indebtedness shall be deemed to be a sufficient showing of such absolute need, unless otherwise provided by law. Provided further, that if a city or town' has an absolute need therefor, such city or town may, with the assent of three-fifths of the voters thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose, incur indebtedness to an amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five percent (5%) but not exceeding ten percent (10%) of' tire valuation of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained from the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and such assent to such indebtedness shall be deemed to be a sufficient showing of such absolute need unless otherwise provided by law. Provided, further, that any county, city, town, school district, or other political corporation, or subdivision of tire state, incurring any indebtedness requiring the assent of the voters as aforesaid, shall, before or át the time of doing so, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof within twenty-five (25) years from the time of contracting the same, and provided further that nothing in this section shall prevent, under such conditions and limitations as shall be prescribed by law, any school district from contracting with:
(1) certificated personnel for periods extending one (1) year beyond the current fiscal year; or (2) a school superintendent for periods extending more than one (1) year, but not to exceed three (3) years beyond the current fiscal year.
(b) If a county approves an exemption of household goods of the heads of families and livestock employed in support of the family from ad valo-rem taxation pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 6 of this article, the percentage limitations on indebtedness as specified in subsection (a) of this section for political subdivisions or political corporations located in any such county shall be adjusted by multiplying the percentage levels specified in subsection (a) of this section by the millage adjustment factor as specified in subsection (b) of Section 8A of this article.
(c) If approved by the people, the amendment to this section shall become effective January 1, 1993.

. This provision is now found in Article 30, § 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution.