Court Opinion

ID: 9954680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:01:09.35322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:11.543194
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12421       Document: 59-1    Date Filed: 03/26/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                  No. 22-12421
                             ____________________

       HENRY LOSCH,
       a.k.a. John Losch,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC
       d.b.a. Cooper, Mr.,

                                                              Defendant,

       EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                22-12421

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00809-MRM
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             In Losch v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 947–48
       (11th Cir. 2021) (Losch I), we reversed the district court’s grant of
       summary judgment in favor of Experian on Henry Losch’s claims
       under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e & 1681i
       (“FCRA”), and remanded for a jury trial. The jury found in favor
       of Experian, and Mr. Losch now appeals.
              Following oral argument and a review of the record, we af-
       firm. Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity
       with the record and set out only what is necessary to explain our
       decision.1
                                          I
               Mr. Losch argues that the district court erred in a number of
       its evidentiary rulings. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, see Gen.

       1As to any arguments not discussed, we summarily aﬃrm.
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       22-12421                Opinion of the Court                          3

       Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997), we discern no reversible
       error.
               First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
       ting some of the filings from Mr. Losch’s bankruptcy proceedings.
       Mr. Losch contends that the filings were irrelevant, but we disa-
       gree. “Rule 401 adopts a very broad concept of relevance,” Roger
       C. Park & Aviva Orenstein, Trial Objections Handbook 2d § 2:1
       (Sept. 2023), and the filings were relevant to whether Experian’s
       policy—to not review bankruptcy court dockets when faced with
       a consumer’s claim of a bankruptcy discharge—was reasonable.
       Although it is undisputed that Experian did not look at the record
       in Mr. Losch’s bankruptcy case, the purported complexity of bank-
       ruptcy filings to some degree supported Experian’s contention that
       its do-not-review policy was reasonable under the FCRA. Moreo-
       ver, given that the district court told the jury that the Nationstar
       debt had been discharged, and that Experian’s reporting was incor-
       rect, Mr. Losch was able to argue to the jury that the bankruptcy
       filings did not matter with respect to reasonableness.
              Second, the district court did not err in admitting into evi-
       dence Mr. Losch’s second amended complaint, which was the op-
       erative pleading. As a general matter, the pleading of a party (in-
       cluding allegations or statements in a plaintiff’s complaint) may be
       offered against him as the admission of a party opponent. See, e.g.,
       Continental Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir.
       1971). Here, Mr. Losch was unable to recall whether he had sued
       Nationstar Mortgage, and his recollection was not refreshed when
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12421

       he was shown his operative complaint. That pleading was relevant
       to whether Mr. Losch had sued Nationstar, and to whether it was
       Nationstar or Experian (or both) which failed to act reasonably. It
       was therefore admissible.
              Third, we reject Mr. Losch’s argument that the district court
       erred in failing to conduct Rule 403 balancing with respect to the
       admission of the second amended complaint. Mr. Losch may be
       right that Experian used that complaint for all it was worth (and
       maybe even more), but a litigant is generally bound by the admis-
       sions in his pleadings. See Dos Santos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 982 F.3d
       1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2020). Under the circumstances, we do not
       think that the complaint’s probative value was substantially out-
       weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Luxottica Grp., S.p.A.
       v. Airport Mini Mall, LLC, 932 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Fourth, the district court did not err in instructing the jury
       on judicial notice with respect to the complaint. A court may, of
       course, take judicial notice of a pleading. Cf. Bryant v. Avado Brands,
       Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278, 1278 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999). That means
       that the court takes judicial notice that (a) the pleading was filed
       and (b) the pleading contains certain allegations. The court does
       not take judicial notice of the truth of the allegations contained in
       the pleading. We have held, for example, that when a court takes
       judicial notice of a judicial order, it does not do so for the purpose
       of accepting what is stated in the order as true. See United States v.
       Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[A] court may take no-
       tice of another court’s order only for the limited purpose of
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       22-12421                 Opinion of the Court                              5

       recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject
       matter of the litigation.”). And our sister circuits have come to a
       similar conclusion with respect to the judicial notice of a party’s
       complaint. See, e.g., Beauvoir v. Israel, 794 F.3d 244, 248 n.4 (2d Cir.
       2015); In re Omincare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 468–69 (6th Cir.
       2014).
              Mr. Losch’s counsel agreed that there was no “legitimate ba-
       sis” for opposing judicial notice, and therefore acquiesced to the
       taking of such notice. And though the judicial notice instruction
       pertaining to the complaint might have at first been a bit loose, we
       conclude that there is no reversible error, especially given the final
       instruction. The final instruction told the jury that the court “did
       not take judicial notice that any facts alleged in the Second
       Amended Complaint have been proven,” only that the complaint
       was filed. See Tr. Vol. V. at 108. 2
              Fifth, we agree with Mr. Losch that the district court erred
       in ruling that evidence that other credit reporting agencies
       (“CRAs”) had accurately reported on the status of his debt was ir-
       relevant. The evidence was relevant to whether Experian—itself a
       CRA—had acted reasonably. But we can affirm an evidentiary rul-
       ing on a ground present in the record even if that ground was not
       relied upon by the district court. See, e.g., United States v. McGlothin,
       705 F.3d 1254, 1266 n.17 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Provenzano,
       620 F.2d 985, 993 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d

       2 Given this instruction, we also fail to see how Mr. Losch was prejudiced by

       the admission of the complaint.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12421

       705, 711–13 (2d Cir. 1973). And here Experian correctly argued that
       the proposed testimony would have constituted hearsay because it
       sought to reveal the contents of reports by the other CRAs that
       were not in evidence and that were not within Mr. Losch’s personal
       knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Shiver, 414 F.2d 461, 463–64
       (5th Cir. 1969) (testimony by detective that a car was stolen from
       Miami Beach, Florida, was hearsay because it was based on a report
       and not his own knowledge). If Mr. Losch wanted to introduce the
       reports of the other CRAs, he should have tried to move them in
       as business records or tried to call representatives of those CRAs as
       witnesses.
                                         II
               Mr. Losch also asserts that the district court erred in failing
       to give certain jury instructions and in not preventing Experian’s
       counsel from denigrating his counsel. Conducting abuse of discre-
       tion review as dictated by cases like Brink v. Direct General Ins. Co.,
       38 F.4th 917, 922–23 (11th Cir. 2022), we again find no basis for re-
       versal.
              First, we reject the argument that the district court erred in
       instructing the jury that Mr. Losch had the burden of establishing
       that Experian acted unreasonably. As we explained in Losch I, to
       “state a claim under § 1681e, the plaintiff must show that the
       agency’s report contained factually inaccurate information, that
       the procedures it took in preparing and distributing the report
       weren’t ‘reasonable,’ and that damages followed as a result.” 995
       F.3d at 944. And our sister circuits similarly have held that it is the
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       22-12421                Opinion of the Court                           7

       plaintiff in an FCRA case who must demonstrate that the agency’s
       procedures were not reasonable. See Wright v. Experian Info. Sols.,
       Inc., 805 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015); Dalton v. Cap. Assoc. Indus.,
       Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2001); Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs.,
       Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1998).
              Second, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
       discretion in failing to give the jury a curative instruction with re-
       spect to the alleged disparagement of Mr. Losch’s counsel by Ex-
       perian’s counsel. Mr. Losch is correct that Experian’s counsel had
       no business highlighting the fact that his trial counsel had also been
       his bankruptcy counsel, and we suspect that Experian’s counsel en-
       gaged in this tactic to argue—as they did expressly at closing argu-
       ment—that it was Mr. Losch’s counsel who were somehow re-
       sponsible for Experian’s own inaccurate report. The better course
       of action would have been for the district court provide an instruc-
       tion, as it initially said it would do, that the jury should disregard
       any suggestion by Experian that Mr. Losch’s counsel were to blame
       for the error in the report. But the abuse of discretion standard
       gives a district court a “range of choice,” and under that deferential
       standard “there will be occasions in which we affirm the district
       court even though we would have gone the other way had it been
       our call.” In re Rasbury, 24 F.3d 159, 168 (11th Cir. 1994). That is
       the situation here.
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       8                     Opinion of the Court                22-12421

                                       III
              Mr. Losch has not established reversible error. We therefore
       affirm the district court’s entry of judgment on the jury verdict in
       favor of Experian.
             AFFIRMED.