Court Opinion

ID: 9529636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:49.675098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:52.388072
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Justice,
concurring in amended opinion.*
I agree with the majority that “Jackson received a fair trial, free from reversible error, and that sufficient evidence was presented by the prosecution to support his convictions.” Majority opinion at 74. I also agree with the majority that “the circuit court erred in concluding that the commencement of [Jackson’s] trial was within the time limits set forth in [Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) ] Rule 48,” and that, therefore, “we have no choice but to vacate Jackson’s convictions and remand for entry of an order dismissing the charges against him, with or without prejudice, in the circuit court’s discretion.” Id.1
I do not, however, share the majority’s apparent distaste — as if this court were self-administering a dose of castor oil — for the result that we reach today. Rather, I believe that we are simply following the wisdom of State v. Ikezawa, 75 Haw. 210, 857 P.2d 593 (1993), in which this court, citing HRPP 48(b)(1), unanimously acknowledged with approval the indisputable, self-evident, and long-recognized proposition that “[t]he language of HRPP 48 is clear and unambiguous. Criminal charges are to be dismissed if a trial on those charges does not commence within six months from the time of the arrest or of filing of the charges, whichever is sooner” — subject only to excluded periods in computing the time for trial commencement pursuant to HRPP 48(e) — because “[t]he purpose of HRPP 48 is to insure a defendant’s right to a speedy trial by requiring that the trial start within six months of the charge or arrest.” Id. at 214, 222, 857 P.2d at 595, 598.
I take particular issue with the majority’s belief that “by vacating Jackson’s convic*56tions[,] the purposes sought to be accomplished by HRPP Rule 48 will likely be subverted,” presumably because Jackson “received a fair trial.” Majority opinion at 74; see also id. at 32-38 (expressing the view that, although the pretrial “threat of dismissal of charges, with or without prejudice, furthers the purposes of HRPP Rule 48 ..., when cases have proceeded to trial and guilty verdicts have been returned, vacating [defendants’] convictions would not, in many cases, further any of the [rule’s] purposes”). I do so because the purposes underlying HRPP 48(b), as well as the reasons for vigorously enforcing the rule, have nothing whatsoever to do with the “fairness” (or lack thereof) of the untimely trials to which defendants are subjected when their HRPP 48(b) motions to dismiss are erroneously denied.
Accordingly, neither HRPP 48 in its present — and, in my view, beneficial — form nor its application in this case prompts any particular feelings of enthusiasm in me for the majority’s “request that the Permanent Committee on Rules of Penal Procedure and Circuit Court Criminal Rules reassess HRPP 48 and propose any amendments it deems necessary to prevent ... absurd result[s] in the future.” Id. at 74.2 There is nothing “absurd” about either HRPP 48 or the results that it generates, and, short of the rule’s outright repeal, it is unclear to me what “amendments” the majority has in mind.
I. PRIOR CASE LAW
Citing State v. Lau, 78 Hawai'i 54, 60, 890 P.2d 291, 297 (1995), the majority acknowledges that the “constitutional right to a speedy trial” is “the substantive right that HRPP 48, through a procedural mechanism that is ‘separate and distinct,’ ... seeks to protect[.]” Majority opinion at 34. Quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 29, 881 P.2d 504, 516 (1994), and citing State v. Coyaso, 73 Haw. 352, 356, 833 P.2d 66, 68 (1992), the majority further acknowledges that the purposes of HRPP 48 are “ ‘to ensure speedy trial for criminal defendants, ... to relieve congestion in the trial courts, and to advance the efficiency of the criminal justice process.’ ” Majority opinion at 85 (ellipsis points in original).
Consistent with the foregoing, the uniform precedent of the appellate courts in this jurisdiction has reflected the following point of view:
(1) HRPP 48(b) is a mandatory rule that, as a non-discretionary matter, obligates the trial courts to dismiss the applicable charges, with or without prejudice in their discretion, in the event of its violation. State v. Dwyer, 78 Hawai'i 367, 371, 893 P.2d 795, 799 (1995); Lau, 78 Hawai'i at 62, 890 P.2d at 299; Hoey, 77 Hawai'i at 28, 881 P.2d at 515; State v. Wasson, 76 Hawai'i 415, 418, 879 P.2d 520, 523 (1994); State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 330, 861 P.2d 11, 23 (1993); Ikezawa, 75 Haw. at 214, 222, 857 P.2d at 595, 599; Coyaso, 73 Haw. at 355, 833 P.2d at 68; State v. Caspino, 73 Haw. 256, 257, 831 P.2d 1334, 1335 (1992); State v. Hanawahine, 69 Haw. 624, 629, 755 P.2d 466, 469 (1988); State v. English, 68 Haw. 46, 47, 50, 705 P.2d 12, 13, 15 (1985) (hereinafter, English II); State v. Faalafua, 67 Haw. 335, 336-37, 686 P.2d 826, 828 (1984); State v. Nihipali, 64 Haw. 65, 71, 637 P.2d 407, 413 (1981); State v. Jackson, 8 Haw.App. 624, 629, 817 P.2d 130, 134 (1991); State v. Ho, 7 Haw.App. 516, 517, 782 P.2d 29, 30 (1989); State v. Mata, 1 Haw.App. 31, 41, 613 P.2d 919, 926, cert. denied, 62 Haw. *57690, 613 P.2d 919 (1980); see majority opinion at 82;
(2) The relief mandated by HRPP 48(b), which is designed to “ensure” defendants (including Jackson) a speedy trial, is triggered as a per se matter when the period of nonexcludable time from arrest or charging to trial exceeds six months (construed as one hundred eighty days), regardless of the reasons for the nonexcludable delays or whether a given defendant can demonstrate actual prejudice. Hoey, 77 Hawai‘i at 28, 32, 881 P.2d at 515, 519; Hutch, 75 Haw. at 330, 861 P.2d at 23; Ikezawa, 75 Haw. at 214, 857 P.2d at 595; Coyaso, 73 Haw. at 355, 358, 833 P.2d at 69; Caspino, 73 Haw. at 257, 831 P.2d at 1335; Hanawahine, 69 Haw. at 626, 629, 632, 755 P.2d at 467, 469-70; English II, 68 Haw. at 47, 50, 53, 705 P.2d at 13, 15, 17; Faalafua, 67 Haw. at 336-37, 686 P.2d at 828; Nihipali, 64 Haw. at 71-72, 637 P.2d at 413-14; State v. Soto, 63 Haw. 317, 320, 627 P.2d 279, 281 (1981); State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 268, 625 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1981); Jackson, 8 Haw.App. at 629, 817 P.2d at 134; Ho, 7 Haw.App. at 517, 519, 782 P.2d at 30-31; see majority opinion at 82, 85; and
(3) Defendants, including Jackson, are entitled to have the “substantive right,” which is codified in HRPP 48, enforced by the trial courts in the first instance, so that they will be protected against the possibility of an untimely trial, “fair” or otherwise. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i at 29, 881 P.2d at 516 (“HRPP 48 is intended not only to ensure speedy trial for criminal defendants, but also to relieve congestion in the trial court, to promptly process all cases reaching the courts, and to advance the efficiency of the criminal justice process. Consistent with these purposes, the language of HRPP 48(e) contemplates only those periods of time that postpone trial.... As the drafters of the modern version of HRPP 48 noted, ‘the proposed rule crystallizes the concept embodied in the present rule by explicitly stating the timetables to follow and causes which will he recognized as justifying delays.’” (Citations, footnote, some internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)); Hutch, 75 Haw. at 330 & n. 9, 861 P.2d at 22-23 & n. 9 (“Notwithstanding their status as pretrial motions, ... [HRPP 48 motions to dismiss are] unconstrained by the requirements of HRPP 12(e), inasmuch as a motion to dismiss for violation of a defendant’s Rule 48(b), HRPP speedy trial right may be filed at any time before the trial commences.... It would be absurd to require that an HRPP 48(b) motion to dismiss be subject to the requirement of HRPP 12(e) that pretrial motions be filed within twenty-one days after arraignment. HRPP 48(b) provides, inter alia, that a criminal charge must be dismissed if trial is not commenced within six months from the date of arrest or of filing of the charge, whichever occurs first- Obviously, no definitive determination can be made in that regard until trial actually commences.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)); Coyaso, 73 Haw. at 355-56, 833 P.2d at 68 (“Although Rule 48 is intended to ensure speedy trials for criminal defendants, its purpose is broader than the constitutional right to a speedy trial as found in the sixth amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 14 of the [Hawai'i] Constitution. The Rule’s purpose is also in furtherance of policy considerations to relieve congestion in the trial court, to promptly process all eases reaching the courts and to advance the efficiency of the criminal justice process. Unreasonable delay in the determination of criminal action subverts the public good and disgraces the administration of justice, and the power of a court to dismiss a case on its own motion for failure to prosecute with due diligence is inherent and exists independently of statute.” (Citation, internal quotation signals, and brackets omitted.)); English II, 68 Haw. at 53-54, 705 P.2d at 16-17 (“The purpose of Rule 48 is to ensure an accused a speedy trial, which is separate and distinct from his constitutional protection to a speedy trial.... And since the defendant was tried and convicted thereunder, we vacate the judgment of conviction and the sentence and remand the case for entry of an order of dismissal^]” (Citation and internal quotation signals omitted.)); Estencion, 63 Haw. at 268, 625 P.2d at 1043; State v. Johnson, 62 Haw. 11, 12 n. 1, 608 P.2d 404, 405 n. 1 (1980) (“ ‘[T]here need not be a deprivation of one’s constitutional right to a speedy trial before [Rule 48(b) ] may be properly invoked.” *58(Quoting State v. English, 61 Haw. 12, 23, 594 P.2d 1069, 1076 (1979) [English I ])); see majority opinion at 85 (“[I]t is apparent that the threat of dismissal of charges, with or without prejudice, furthers the purposes of HRPP Rule 48.” (Footnote omitted.)).
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
I read the majority opinion to imply that, until now, this court’s application of HRPP 48 to defendants similarly situated to Jackson has been essentially mindless, mechanical, and “without extended analysis.” Majority opinion at 84. Specifically, the majority appears to suggest that this court has never proffered a logical basis for vacating a defendant’s conviction and remanding his or her case for the entry of an order of dismissal, with or without prejudice, under circumstances where a trial court has improperly denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss for violation of HRPP 48 and the defendant has been accorded an otherwise fair trial. Id. at 85. Even more specifically, the majority appears to imply that vacating a defendant’s conviction following an otherwise fair trial— where the result is dismissal without prejudice, the reinstatement of the charges, and a retrial — is antithetical to the purposes underlying HRPP 48. Id. at 85-86. If my understanding is correct, then it would seem that the majority perceives no inherently logical relationship between the plainly mandatory language of the rule and the remedy of dismissal, with or without prejudice, for its violation.
Aside from the fact that the Hoey and English II courts cited the very purposes advanced by the majority as constituting the theoretical underpinnings of HRPP 48 on their way to vacating the defendants’ convictions for violation of the rule, the majority’s implied suggestions miss the mark because HRPP 48 is not designed to correct “unfairness” dumg trial; rather, its ultimate purpose is to preclude the commencement of untimely trials so that they do not occur at all — “fairly” or “unfairly.”3 In other words, the ultimate purpose of HRPP 48 is to foreclose the interposition of inexcusable periods of delay between the initiation of a criminal action and the subsequent commencement of trial. That is precisely why the English II court, quoting Estencion, 63 Haw. at 268, 625 P.2d at 1043, observed that “ ‘[ujnreasonable delay in the determination of criminal action subverts the public good and disgraces the administration of justice” when it vacated the appellant’s conviction because his trial — the “fairness” of which was utterly irrelevant to the court’s analysis — was untimely. English II, 68 Haw. at 58, 705 P.2d at 17. And that is also why HRPP 48(c) permits only the exclusion of time periods that excusably postpone or delay trial from the HRPP 48(b) six-month calculation. Hoey, 77 Hawaii at 29, 881 P.2d at 516.
In a nutshell, the majority mixes apples and oranges when it seeks to link the redress available to defendants whose “substantive” rights under HRPP 48 have been violated with events that occur during subsequent and untimely trials that never should have commenced in the first place. The injury *59lies in the untimeliness of the commencement of trial and is not undone by the lack of further aggravation.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION IMPLIES THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL, IN THE ABSENCE OF OF HRPP k8(b), WOULD ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS UNDER HAWAII LAW.
Further to its belief that vacating the convictions of defendants whose HRPP 48(b) motions to dismiss have been erroneously denied “will, in many cases, subvert the goals sought to be achieved by HRPP Rule 48,” majority opinion at 85, the majority offers the following observation:
Furthermore, we note that if [a defendant] can demonstrate that his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial — the substantive right that HRPP Rule 48, through a procedural mechanism that is “separate and distinct” therefrom, seeks to protect— was violated, the [defendant] will be entitled to have his or her convictions vacated and the charges dismissed with prejudice.
Id. at 86 (citations and footnote omitted). The only inference that I can draw from the majority’s observation is that it suspects, given the constitutional protection,4 that HRPP 48, in its present form, is at best unnecessary and at worst obstructive of the effective administration of criminal justice.
I will not undertake in this opinion to chronicle the development — with which the majority is as familiar as I — of HRPP 48 in its present form. I do, however, offer my own observation: obviously, this court perceived a need for the rule when it promulgated it, notwithstanding the provisions of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Ha-wai'i Constitution (1978), and did not intend to engage in a pointless exercise.
What I will undertake in this opinion, on the other hand, is to demonstrate that the appellate case law in this jurisdiction interpreting the parameters of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as it has evolved over time, has imposed almost insurmountable barriers to the establishment of a constitutional deprivation. I also suggest that this court’s construction of the constitutional right to a speedy trial would be considerably more expansive than it is, but for the presence of a robust and self-executing rule of court — of our own making — that vindicates the same substantive right. Cf. English I, 61 Haw. at 23, 594 P.2d at 1076 (“there need not be a deprivation of one’s constitutional right to speedy trial before [Rule 48] may be properly invoked”).
Recently, in Dwyer, we reaffirmed our adherence to the long-standing formulation of the core analytical framework within which we have evaluated claims of the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial:
[Wjhether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated is determined by applying the four-part test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 [92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101] ... (1972). The four factors to be considered are: (1) length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530 [92 S.Ct. at 2192.]
Dwyer, 78 Hawai'i at 371, 893 P.2d at 799. In English I, we quoted Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, for the proposition (the “Barker/English I proposition”) that “none of these four factors is to be regarded ‘as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial,’ but rather, ‘they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.’ ” English I, 61 Haw. at 16 n. 6, 594 P.2d at 1073 n. 6; see also Mata, 1 Haw.App. at 39, 613 P.2d at 925 (“The presence or absence of any single factor is not dispositive.” (Citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193)).
Notwithstanding the lip service paid to the Barker/English I proposition in Lau, 78 Ha-wai'i at 62, 890 P.2d at 299, and Wasson, 76 *60Hawai'i at 419, 879 P.2d at 524, the truth is that we abandoned it in Coyaso, 73 Haw. at 356, 833 P.2d at 68, by decreeing that “[prejudice to the defendant is a mandatory factor in determining whether dismissal is warranted on constitutional speedy trial grounds.” Thus, perhaps unwittingly, we sanctified the notion that a showing of actual prejudice is a necessary precondition to a finding of a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, and the results reached in our subsequent case law have been consistent with that premise. See Dwyer, Lau, and Wassora. Indeed, I am unaware of a single case in which this court has perceived a constitutional violation of the right in the absence of actual prejudice.
Moreover, even though the “length of delay serves as a triggering mechanism to the Barker analysis,” Nihipali 64 Haw. at 68, 637 P.2d at 411, and “delays of at least six months [are] sufficient to warrant an inquiry into the other Barker factors,” Lau, 78 Ha-wai'i at 63, 890 P.2d at 300, the length of the delay — the first Barker factor — is virtually insignificant with respect to the bottom line. See, e.g., Dwyer (finding no constitutional deprivation despite delay in excess of thirty-two months); Lau (finding no constitutional deprivation despite twenty-four month delay); Wasson (finding no constitutional deprivation despite delay of twenty-six and one-half months).
The second Barker factor — the reasons for the delay — is equally insignificant. See, e.g., Dwyer (finding no constitutional deprivation despite holding that application of the factor weighed in defendant’s favor); Lau (same); Wasson (same).
This court’s view of the third Barker factor — assertion of the right to a speedy trial— has undergone an especially curious metamorphosis. In Nihipali 64 Haw. at 70 n. 5, 637 P.2d at 412 n. 5, we articulated the intuitive notion that a defendant’s act of filing a motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy trial grounds is “tantamount to an assertion of his [or her] right to a speedy trial.” (Citations omitted.) That is no longer the case. Now, “‘unless the motion to dismiss is accompanied in some way by an alternative demand, even if made implicitly, for a speedy trial, it does not necessarily indicate that the defendant actually wants to be tried immediately.’” Dwyer, 78 Hawai'i at 371-72, 893 P.2d at 799-800 (quoting Wasson, 76 Hawai'i at 421, 879 P.2d at 526). In other words, if a defendant “fails to identify any other conduct evidencing a desire to be brought to trial immediately, we [will] not [be] convinced that his [or her] motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds [is] the equivalent of a demand for a speedy trial.” Id. at 372, 879 P.2d at 800. “Thus, in the absence of some other indication that a defendant making a motion to dismiss actually desires a speedy trial, the motion, standing alone, does not weigh in his or her favor.” Wasson, 76 Hawai'i at 421, 879 P.2d at 526.
We assess the fourth Barker factor — actual prejudice to the defendant by virtue of pretrial delay — in light of
“the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his [or her] case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.”
Lau, 78 Hawai'i at 64, 890 P.2d at 301 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193).
The first interest — preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration — speaks for itself.
As to the second interest — minimizing the accused’s anxiety and concern — , we have had the following to say: “ ‘[T]he government will prevail unless the defendant offers objective, contemporaneous evidence of anxiety, such as prompt and persistent assertion of the desire for a speedy trial coupled with a demonstrable basis for the court’s believing the delay is traumatic.’ ” Id. at 65, 890 P.2d at 302 (quoting State v. Ferraro, 8 Haw.App. 284, 300, 800 P.2d 623, 632 (1990)). In this *61connection, I note that, insofar as there can be no showing of prejudice based on the “minimization of anxiety” interest in the absence of “prompt and persistent assertion of the desire for a speedy trial,” the third and fourth Barker factors have been effectively folded together. And, as we have seen, the invocation of the right to a speedy trial in a motion to dismiss is no longer “tantamount” to the “assertion” of that right. Such being the case, it will be the titanically “anxious” defendant whose constitutional right to a speedy trial is deemed to have been denied on that ground.
With respect to the “most serious” interest — limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired — , we have held that the mere possibility or probability that “any witnesses will ... be unable to recall accurately the events preceding [a defendant’s] arrest due to the passing of time” does not demonstrate constitutionally prejudicial pretrial delay. Lau, 78 Hawai'i at 65, 890 P.2d at 302. It would be unhealthy, I think, to hold one’s breath while waiting for a case of constitutionally prejudicial pretrial delay based on this standard.
How likely is it, I ask, that this court would have construed the constitutional right to a speedy trial so parsimoniously if there had been no HRPP 48 on which to fall back? I believe that the question answers itself.5 And if this court renders HRPP 48(b) a rule without a remedy, as I fear that it is preparing to do, what will become of the “incentive for trial courts to design and implement efficient and fair procedures to decrease the potential for delay caused by chronic congestion and for the legislature to supply the necessary resources to ensure prompt processing of all criminal cases”? See State v. Kahawai, 9 Haw.App. 205, 210-11, 831 P.2d 936, 939, cert. denied, 73 Haw. 627, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992). And what will become of the prosecution’s “incentive to design screening procedures to ensure that as much as possible those cases ... are removed from the criminal justice system as quickly as possible”? See id. at 211, 831 P.2d at 939. I believe that these questions answer themselves as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, I oppose the dilution of the protections afforded by HRPP 48.

 This Amended Concurring Opinion corrects page references to the majority opinion filed on February 23, 1996.

. Because I agree with the majority’s holding, set forth at section II.A. of the majority opinion, that Jackson’s convictions were supported by substantial evidence, a dismissal of the charges without prejudice and a subsequent reinstatement of them would not compromise Jackson's constitutional right against double jeopardy. See State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai'i 126, 135, 906 P.2d 612, 621 (1995).

. For the reasons discussed in section III. of this 'opinion, I believe that outright repeal of HRPP 48 would be disastrous. See majority opinion at 87 n. 17. Although there are cogent policy considerations on both sides of the question, "amending HRPP Rule 48 to eliminate the possibility of dismissal without prejudice,” see id.-, provides food for thought. I have mixed reactions, however, to the "other accompanying amendments” suggested by the majority. See id. "[Requiring defendants to demonstrate that they suffered actual prejudice before being entitled to” an HRPP 48(b) dismissal, see id. would, in my view, substantially destroy HRPP 48 as an amelioration of the almost insurmountable barriers — which the majority agrees that the appellate case law in this jurisdiction has imposed, see id. at 86 n. 16 — to the establishment of a constitutional deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. See generally section III. of this opinion. On the other hand, there may be sound reasons for "lengthening the time limits within which cases must be brought, particularly with respect to more serious offenses, so that the societal interest in punishing law violators is not compromised.” See majority opinion at 87 n. 17.

. As the Intermediate Court of Appeals noted in State v. Kahawai, 9 Haw.App. 205, 210-11, 831 P.2d 936, 939, cert. denied, 73 Haw. 627, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992),
Rule 48(b)'s sanction of dismissal in criminal cases not tried within the prescribed time frame, unless excludable delay is shown, creates an incentive for trial courts to design and implement efficient and fair procedures to decrease the potential for delay caused by chronic congestion and for the legislature to supply the necessary resources to ensure prompt processing of all criminal cases. Additionally, Rule 48's speedy trial requirement also gives the prosecutor an incentive to design screening procedures to ensure that as much as possible those cases that may be disposed of [i.e., set-tied] by other means than trial are removed from the criminal justice system as quickly as possible.
(Footnotes omitted). Although I agree with the majority that “[o]ur role in the criminal justice system, both when we decide cases on appeal and when we promulgate rules pursuant to our statutory authority ..., is primarily to ensure that the process is fair,” majority opinion at 86 n. 14, the majority’s attribution to me of the notion that HRPP 48 "does ‘nothing whatsoever' to advance the fairness of the process,” id., is a clear distortion of my view of the rule's function. Contrary to the majority's insinuation, I believe that HRPP 48 is directly linked to "the fairness of the process," albeit not to the fairness of a defendant's trial.

. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[J" Article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution (1978) contains the identical language.

. Because I am regrettably alone in concurring separately, the majority is correct that I am expressing only my opinion in this regard. See majority opinion at 86 n. 16. Nevertheless, I hasten to add that I share the majority’s confidence that it has always "diligently attempted” in the past — as it will continue to strive in the future — to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation with integrity and in good faith. See id. I certainly do not imply that this court has ever "casually disregarded” its duty with respect to the construction of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. See id. As noted supra at 11 of this opinion, however, I do suggest that the presence of a robust and self-executing HRPP 48, which was designed to protect the "substantive” right to a speedy trial, has facilitated this court’s restrictive interpretation of the rule's constitutional parent. In offering this suggestion, I mean no offense, but merely undertake to state what I perceive to be the obvious.