Court Opinion

ID: 9672979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:03:49.790082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.511558
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). This case involves a provision in section 4.4 of the charter of the city of Plymouth that “to be eligible to hold an elective office, a person shall also have been, for a period of two years prior to the date of his election or appointment to office, the owner of property located within and assessed for taxes by the city.” Plaintiff Peter D. Schweitzer, a candidate for the office of city commissioner, failed to meet the property ownership provision. The remaining plaintiffs claim the right to vote for the candidate of their choice.
It is necessary to examine the duties and responsibilities of a city commissioner to determine whether section 4.4 of the city charter of the city of Plymouth has a reasonable relation to city government necessary to sustain such a constitutional classification in the exercise of the elective franchise. Defendants’ brief states:
*495“The members of the city commission have the power to borrow money and issue bonds the payment of which is dependent on tax revenue; specially assess real property; zone the property of the city; adopt a budget and in point of fact, physically tax the property in the city of Plymouth in order to operate local government. It should also be noted that the city commission has the power to condemn private property for public purposes, as well as to control the use of property under its police powers.” (Charter references omitted.)
Defendants candidly admit that the classification which is under attack has for its objective “the protection of the citizens of the city of Plymouth, in and the preservation of their property.” (Emphasis added.) They state:
“A complete view of the powers of the city commission demonstrate the tremendous effect that body can have on Plymouth property; condemnation of private property by the exercise of the power of eminent domain; establishment of the use to which property may be put by adoption and amendment of zoning laws; the control of the occupancy and manner of use by regulatory police power ordinances ; all this coupled with the power to tax, either generally by the establishment of the ad valorem tax, annually, as the city commission adopts its budget or specially as it undertakes public improvements; is a powerful rationale for the establishment of the property requirement for the office of city commissioner. And, as affidavits filed in this cause indicate, an average of 62.6 per cent of the revenue for the providing of services to the city comes from property tax.”
The circuit judge found:
“The city of Plymouth has a ‘strong commission’ form of government, The commission of the city *496of Plymouth, wields the entire legislative power vested in the city. Chapter 5, Plymouth Charter.
“In addition, the commission of the city of Plymouth wields great, albeit indirect, executive power. One of its members serves as mayor. The commission selects the mayor, who presides over commission meetings and is also the titular and ceremonial head of city government.
“More importantly, the commission selects and at its pleasure removes the city manager, who is the day-to-day administrative head of the executive branch of city government.
“The commission also appoints the city attorney, board of review, personnel service appeal board, and certain other boards and commissions. The city manager appoints other important city officials, but only with the advice and consent of the city commission. Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7, Plymouth Charter.
“Thus in barring Reverend Schweitzer from running for the city commission, the charter has excluded him from an important repository of governmental power.
“There are other effects of section 4.4 of the Plymouth charter which should be briefly examined. Two effects are obvious.
“First, those Plymouth residents who are substantially without property are prevented from running for public office within the city.
“Second, they are also prevented from electing representatives, who, like themselves, are substantially unpropertied. One would not be surprised to find a belief on the part of unpropertied persons that they could be most adequately represented in government by persons as poor and unpropertied as themselves.
“Poor people are not the only ones who feel the bite of the Plymouth charter. All residents of Plymouth, rich, poor, or in between, are deprived of a free choice of public representatives. All the voters of Plymouth, regardless of wealth, are denied the opportunity to have as a representative on the city *497commission any person who fails the property test of section 4.4 of the city charter.
“For example, if such a person should emerge who had statesmanlike potential, who was popular with the electorate and anxious to serve his city, he could not run and the voters could not elect him. All voters, regardless of wealth, would be denied an opportunity to support such a candidate.
“Moreover, there may be people of substantial property whose opportunity to run for office is destroyed by the charter. The charter test is ownership of property assessed for taxes in Plymouth. Many forms and kinds of property are not subject to assessment or taxation by municipal units of government. For example, intangible personal property such as bank deposits, corporate stocks, and bonds are not assessed or taxed by the city of Plymouth. CL 1948, § 205.131 et seq., as amended by PA 1964, No 134 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 7.556[1] et seq.).
“Also much of the tangible personal property located in Plymouth is not assessed or taxed there. CL 1948, § 211.9, as amended by PA 1967, No 259 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 7.9) exempts from taxation various kinds of personal property. For the most part, chattels, which are held for personal consumption and enjoyment, are not taxed.
“For example, the seventh paragraph of CL 1948, § 211.9, as amended by PA 1967, No 259 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 7.9) exempts ‘household furniture, provisions and fuel to the value of $5,000 to each household.’
“And other paragraphs in this particular section of our statutes go on to exempt personal property as follows:
“ ‘Sixth, the library, family pictures, schoolbooks, one sewing machine used and owned by each individual or family, and wearing apparel of every individual.’
“Apparently this exemption is without monetary limit.
*498“The eighth paragraph of this particular section goes on to exempt ‘the working tools of any mechanic not to exceed in value the sum of $500.’
“Also the eleventh paragraph exempts ‘personal property of the value not to exceed $500 used by a householder in the operation of a business in his dwelling, or at one other location in the city, township or village where the householder resides.’
“Under CLS 1961, § 257.801, as amended by PA 1967 (Ex Sess), No 3 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 9.2501), automobiles held for personal use are exempt from assessment or taxation by city government. So are most boats, particularly pleasure boats. See CLS 1961, § 207.51 (Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 7.281).
“Speaking generally, these exemptions cover much tangible personal property which is not held for commercial use but for the consumption and enjoyment of the owner.”
The circuit judge concluded that the property requirement not only disqualified unpropertied persons but persons owning a substantial amount of property in Plymouth which was exempt to them or not taxable.
The only eligibility requirements for the office of governor or lieutenant governor are that a person must have attained the age of 30 years and have been a registered elector in this State for four years next preceding his election.1 One of the responsibilities of the chief executive of this State is to protect and preserve the property of her citizens.
The basic right to participate in government in Michigan is set forth in article 1, § 1, and article 2, § 1, of the Constitution of 1963. Article 1, § 1, provides :
*499“All political power is inherent in the people. G-overnment is instituted for their equal benefit, security and protection.” (Emphasis added.)
Article 2, § 1, provides:
“Every citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector and qualified to vote in any election except as otherwise provided in this constitution. The legislature shall define residence for voting purposes.” (Emphasis added.)
If the sole concern and purpose of the government of the city of Plymouth was the protection and preservation of property, it might be conceded that the property ownership requirement has some reasonable relationship to that city’s governmental objectives hut the concern of the city for its citizens does not end at the door of the property owner. It is responsible for the welfare of all its citizens in numerous areas of local governmental activity.
In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966), 383 US 663 (86 S Ct 1079, 16 L Ed 2d 169), Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. He wrote (p 666):
“We conclude that a State violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”
And again:
“To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.” (p 668.)
On November 1,1968, in the case of Pierce v. Village of Ossining (SD NY, 1968), 292 F Supp 113, a *500three-judge court of the United States district court for the southern district of New York declared unconstitutional a State statute that disqualified the plaintiffs from voting in a village election on the question of a change in village government from a mayoral system to a village manager system because they were not owners “of property in the village assessed upon the last preceding assessment roll thereof.”
The language of the Court in Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 US 533 (84 S Ct 1362, 12 L Ed 2d 506), is especially pertinent to this case:
“But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies.” (p 565.)
“And history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” (p 555.) (Emphasis added.)
For an application of the above case at the level of local government, see Landes v. Town of North Hempstead (1967), 20 NY2d 417 (284 NYS2d 441, 231 NE2d 120).
In the recent case of Williams v. Rhodes (1968), 393 US 23 (89 S Ct 5, 10, 21 L Ed 2d 24, 31), Mr. Justice Black in the opinion of the Court, wrote (p 30):
“The state laws [Ohio’s] place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights — the right of individuals to associate for the advance*501ment of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank among our most precious freedoms. We have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment. And of course this freedom protected against Federal encroachment by the First Amendment is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the same protection from infringement by the States. Similarly we have said with reference to the right to vote: ‘No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.’ ”
Constitutional rights are not subject to legislative interference. The proposition was stated by Justice White in the recent case of Hunter v. Erickson (1969), 393 US 385 (89 S Ct 557, 561, 21 L Ed 2d 616, 623) in this fashion: “The sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.” (p 392.)
I am unable to find any reasonable or rational relationship to the governing of a city that permits the requirement of ownership of property assessed for taxes in order that a person be eligible for the office of city commissioner. Plaintiff Schweitzer has been denied the opportunity to present himself to the voters as a candidate for the governing body of the city of Plymouth. The remaining plaintiffs have been completely debarred from their right to associate for the advancement of political beliefs  and to cast their votes effectively. In this respect, the violation of constitutional rights here is even *502more flagrant than in Williams where upon compliance with State law those rights could be asserted.
Section 4.4 of the city charter of the city of Plymouth violates the equal protection clauses of the Constitution of the United States and of this State, as well as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. I vote to affirm the trial judge.
No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Kavanagh, J., concurred with Adams, J.
T. Gr. Kavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Const 1963, art 5, §22. See, also, Const 1963, art i, §§ 7, 8, for eligibility requirements for State legislators.