Court Opinion

ID: 9605045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:29:47.285038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:42.583242
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in result). I concur in the result. My disagreement with Judge Lopez rests in the law—the meaning of the “Rescue Doctrine,” not with the facts. Neff v. Woodmen of World Life Insurance Society, 87 N.M. 68, 529 P.2d 294 (Ct. App.1974) did not formulate a statement of the “Rescue Doctrine.” Mitchell v. Pettigrew, 65 N.M. 137, 333 P.2d 879 (1958) did, but it was- not cited in Neff, not discussed in Judge Lopez’ opinion and unnoticed by the parties. In support of its opinion, Mitchell adopted the “Rescue Doctrine” as stated in Annot., Liability for death of, or injury to one seeking to rescue another, 19 A.L.R. 4, 5 (1922). The basis of this Annotation is the Wagner case quoted and relied upon by Judge Lopez. Mitchell quoted the following rule from the Annotation: “The rule is well settled that one who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the negligence of another cannot be charged with contributory'negligence, as a matter of law, in risking his own life, or serious injury, in attempting to effect a rescue, provided the attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. * * * [T]he fact that the injury is sustained in attempting to save human life is a proper element for consideration upon the question of contributory negligence, and * * the latter question ordinarily is one for the jury and not for the court.” [Emphasis added]. [Id. 65 N.M. 141, 333 P.2d 879.] Contributory negligence as an absolute defense disappeared with the adoption of comparative negligence. Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). Mitchell no longer correctly states the “Rescue Doctrine” rule and is not controlling. The “Rescue Doctrine” 'takes on a different form when applied to the rule of comparative negligence. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Korte, 357 So.2d 228 (Fla.App.1978). Ryder Truck said: We therefore hold that when the plaintiff in performing a rescue is himself negligent, he should recover only that portion of the entire damages sustained by him as the defendant’s negligence bears to the combined negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant. In the present case the trial court specifically found that “the plaintiff was injured while performing a humanitarian act in a reasonable manner.” The record supports the finding that the plaintiff was not negligent; therefore it was not necessary to apportion his damages. [Id. 230]. To “act in a reasonable manner” does not mean that plaintiff acted within the standard of ordinary care. The rule of ordinary care does not apply to plaintiff where he acts to save another from imminent peril brought about by the negligence of defendant. The legal standard of care which a party is required to exercise during a rescue attempt must be lowered. Such words as “rash,” “reckless” and “wanton” are used by courts in order to limit a rescuer’s right to intentionally expose himself to a known risk of danger. This rationale is based upon the fact that the rescue doctrine is one that envelopes a noble impulse which impels a man to deeds of heroism by rushing into danger to help his fellow man. He is negligent if he acted rashly, recklessly or wantonly. Hatch v. Globe Laundry, 132 Me. 379,171 A. 387, 392 (1934) said: The overwhelming weight of authority is that one attempting to rescue another under such circumstances is not, by exposing himself to imminent danger, to be held negligent unless his conduct is to be regarded as rash or reckless. In New York where Justice Cardozo initiated this rule in the Wagner case, to constitute contributory negligence, decedent’s actions on a highway in aid of another driver in an emergency situation would have to be found rash and wanton. Johnson v. Hickson, 43 N.Y.2d 906, 403 N.Y.S.2d 722, 374 N.E.2d 616 (1978). Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, to find that plaintiff was negligent under the “Rescue Doctrine,” the trial court would determine whether plaintiff acted in a reasonable manner or whether he was rash, reckless or wanton in the attempt to rescue another. In the instant case, the negligence of defendants is not questioned and plaintiff’s attempt to rescue was in a reasonable manner as a matter of law. Judge Lopez quotes at length the “Rescue Doctrine” as stated in 65A C.J.S. Negligence, § 124 (1966). Mitchell is cited as authority. This quotation should not be used to formulate the “Rescue Doctrine” in New Mexico. Generally, a rule of law purportedly established by a host of cases cited in support thereof, ordinarily, should not be summarily adopted unless the cases cited do not deviate from the rule, are uniform in language and accurately state the law. The host of cases cited in C.J.S., supra, 19 A.L.R. 4, supplemented in 15 A.L.R. 189, superceded in part in 166 A.L.R. 752 and 4 A.L.R.3d 558 will reflect emotional language ofttimes that make curlicues of the “Rescue Doctrine.” The result is that “negligence” of the rescuer takes on a different hue than that commonly denominated. In fact, negligence of the rescuer disappears. For example, Walters v. Denver Consol. Electric Light Co., 12 Colo.App. 145, 54 P. 960, 962, 5 Am.Negl.Rep. 5 (1898) said: The instincts of a mother, when she sees her child in distress, will lead her to rush headlong to its rescue, without stopping to count the cost or measure the risk which she is incurring; and to say that an act to which her affection irresistibly impelled her should be charged against her as something imprudent and unnecessary would be to shock a sentiment which is as universal as mankind. The law is not the creature of cold-blooded, merciless logic, and its inherent justice and humanity will never for a moment permit the act of a mother in saving her offspring, no matter how desparate it may have been, to be imputed to her as negligence, or at any time, or in any manner, used to her detriment. Scott v. John H. Hampshire, Inc., 246 Md. 171, 227 A.2d 751 (1967) held that the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk were inapplicable under the “Rescue Doctrine.” It said: [Njeither defense is applicable in this case where the conduct of the defendant appears to have created such a situation as to justify if not to compel the plaintiff to undergo the risk of being injured in order to warn others and avert their harm. [Id. 753]. Cited as authority is Restatement (Second) Torts § 472, ante. The Restatement of Torts is persuasive authority entitled to great weight. Moore v. Burn Const. Co., 98 N.M. 190, 646 P.2d 1254 (Ct.App.1982). Restatement (Second) Torts § 472 (1965) reads in pertinent part: It is not contributory negligence for a plaintiff to expose himself to danger in an effort to save * * * a third person * * from harm, unless the effort itself is an unreasonable one, or the plaintiff acts unreasonably in the course of it. If the word “contributory” were omitted, the rule would be applicable under the doctrine of comparative negligence. Judge Lopez cited as authority Calvert v. Ourum, 40 Or.App. 511, 595 P.2d 1264 (1979). Calvert refused to follow § 472 as stated in an instruction because it implied in part that plaintiff would not be held to the standard of reasonable care if plaintiff was engaged in an endeavor to save human life. An instruction on common law negligence was approved. Calvert is erroneous. Under the “Rescue Doctrine,” a difference should exist between an unreasonable effort of plaintiff to rescue and a reasonable person standard effort to rescue. The reasonable man standard is an anachronism. See, Anderson v. Welsh, 86 N.M. 767, 527 P.2d 1079 (Ct.App. 1974). Under the “Rescue Doctrine,” reasonable minds do not determine whether imminent peril, danger, emergency, or the extent of the risk exist or whether plaintiff acted reasonably under the circumstances. The reaction of the mind varies with each person confronted with this perilous situation. The standard is subjective, ingrained in the conduct of plaintiff. Marks v. Wagner, 52 Ohio App.2d 320, 6 Ohio Ops.3d 360, 370 N.E.2d 480, 484 (1977) said: [T]he issue of whether the proposed rescuer is thereafter contributorily [sic] negligent in attempting a rescue is determined, not by a consideration of the circumstance of the actual peril at that time of the person to be rescued, but by a consideration of the mental state of the rescuer, as to what he reasonably believed from the facts known to him the peril of the person to be rescued to be at that time. [Emphasis added.] See, dissenting opinion in an equally divided court. Furby v. Novak, 224 Pa.Super. 44, 302 A.2d 507 (1973). Section 472 is directed to the conduct of plaintiff, not to any objective standard of care. Otherwise, rash and reckless conduct would disappear from the meaning of negligence. To “act in a reasonable manner” as stated in Ryder Truck, supra, is the rule stated in § 472. Lane v. Neumann, 211 Neb. 97, 317 N.W.2d 779 (1982), cited by Judge Lopez, followed § 472. It would be applicable if contributory negligence as a defense were not present. Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson Company, 6 Cal.3d 361, 99 Cal.Rptr. 29, 491 P.2d 821 (1971), cited by Judge Lopez, absent the defense of contributory negligence, adopts the rash or reckless rule discussed supra. The court said: Although its precise limits are not yet fully developed, the rescue doctrine varies the ordinary rules of negligence in two important respects * * * (2) it substantially restricts the availability of the defense of contributory negligence by requiring defendant to prove that the rescuer acted rashly or recklessly under the circumstances. [Emphasis added.] [Id. 99 Cal.Rptr. at 33, 491 P.2d at 825]. Under the rule of comparative negligence, the “Rescue Doctrine” can be stated in this fashion in the instant case in one of two ways: (1) Plaintiff who sees a person in imminent and serious peril through the negligence of defendant cannot be charged with negligence in risking his own life or serious injury in attempting to effect a rescue provided the attempt of plaintiff to rescue is not recklessly or rashly made. If defendant proves that the plaintiff acted rashly or recklessly under the circumstances, plaintiff is negligent. or (2) It is not negligence for a plaintiff to expose himself to danger in an effort to save a third person from harm unless the effort itself is an unreasonable one, or the plaintiff acts unreasonably in the course of it. If defendant proves that plaintiff’s effort to save a person from harm was unreasonable or the plaintiff acted unreasonably in the course of it, plaintiff is negligent. There are other aspects of the “Rescue Doctrine” which affect the result to be de-' termined, but none are applicable to this case.