Court Opinion

ID: 9732664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:30:30.869154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:31.343829
License: Public Domain

DRAPER, P. J.
I dissent.
To me, the insurmountable problem is the absence of any evidence that plaintiff’s election to use the surface crossing was in any way occasioned by the unlighted condition of the subway.
The two boys who walked with plaintiff had no conversation with her or between themselves as to choice of routes. Neither noticed the unlighted condition of the subway on the ill-starred evening. Neither normally used the subway. One had used it a total of 5 times, none in that school year, and the other had used it less than 10 times in a calendar year. Lighting conditions were not shown to have any relation to this disuse. There is no indication that either consciously considered the subway route, and there is direct testimony that if either had done so he would have rejected it only because of possible embarrassment to plaintiff resulting from writings on the walls and the odor of urine, which fall far short of the “dangerous condition” prescribed by statute (Gov. Code, §§ 830, 835) as a condition to city liability.
It is, of course, the compulsion of or inducement to plaintiff, rather than to her companions, which is determinative. There is no testimony on this subject. There is evidence that plaintiff, three years earlier when she was in grade school, had been admonished by her mother to use the subway. But 'there is no evidence that she did use it customarily, or at all, in daylight or dark, and without regard to its lighting. Evidence that she had customarily or frequently used the subway would not be rendered unavailable by her loss of memory, but, if it were the fact, could readily be shown by testimony of *810schoolmates. None was produced. Nor is there evidence that the subway was much used by high school students generally. The testimony of school and P.T.A. meetings to encourage its use warrants inference that high school student use was at best sporadic and infrequent. Like inference could be drawn from testimony that subway use was required of students of the two nearby grammar schools, but not of high school students.
But, says plaintiff, the presumption that she exercised due care (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 4, now repealed) is evidence that she elected the surface route only because the subway was unlighted and therefore not useable. Yet that presumption is only that one ‘‘ takes ordinary care of his own concerns, ’ ’ or, as commonly said, takes ordinary care of his own concerns and “obeys the law” (B.A.J.I. 135-A; 135-A.l). The presumption relates only to the care which plaintiff exercises for her own safety. It negates contributory negligence. As to her conduct after she embarked upon the crossing, she is entitled to and obviously has had the benefit of the presumption.
Since the sole purpose of the presumption is to negate plaintiff’s negligence, it cannot have the effect urged unless her choice of the surface crossing, assuming full availability of the underpass, would constitute a lack of due care for her own safety. I find nothing to suggest such negligence. It is true that plaintiff, in using the surface crossing, was required to yield the right of way to vehicles (Veh. Code, § 21953). But this is by no means to say that the election shows negligence. The driver to whom the right of way is yielded remains obligated to exercise due care for the safety of the pedestrian, and to maintain a vigilant lookout (Biggar v. Carney, 181 Cal. App.2d 22, 28 [5 Cal.Rptr. 94]). The degree of care required is the same as to both driver and pedestrian, but even when he has the right of way the driver remains obligated to use a greater amount of care because of the greater danger from the instrumentality he controls (Rubalcaba v. Sweeney, 168 Cal. App.2d 1, 5 [335 P.2d 157]). Section 21953 does not prohibit a pedestrian’s crossing on the surface. Rather, it is clearly distinguished from prohibited crossings, as between adjacent intersections controlled by signal devices (Veh. Code, § 21955), or against posted prohibition (Veh. Code, § 21106, subd. b) or against a signal (Veh. Code, § 21462). It provides only, as does the statute dealing with crossing at other than a marked or unmarked crosswalk (Veh. Code, § 21954), that one so crossing shall yield the right of way. Crossing under such eir*811cumstances does not render the pedestrian contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The determinative question remains one of fact—“whether the required care has been exercised, and not merely whether or not the right of way has been actually yielded” (Shipway v. Monise. 59 Cal.App.2d 565, 571 [139 P.2d 60]). Contributory negligence does not turn upon the pedestrian’s merely embarking upon the surface crossing. Rather, it depends upon her care and watchfulness after she commences it.
Since the presumption of due care serves only to negate negligence, it cannot be extended to indicate motivation for choice of a course which is not itself negligent. Plaintiff’s argument is that she must be presumed to have crossed on the surface only because the subway was impassable. But whatever merit this reasoning might otherwise have, it fails utterly unless a wholly voluntary choice of the surface crossing would have been negligent.
The presumption is but that plaintiff exercised “ due care, ’ ’ “ordinary care,” or the care of the ordinarily prudent person. It cannot be extended to supply proof that, of two nonnegligent routes, plaintiff rejected the vehicle-proof route only because she recognized and was deterred by a condition of that route. A contrary view has been expressed (Stricklin v. Rosemeyer, 61 Cal.App.2d 359, 362 [142 P.2d 953]). But it was promptly and properly held to apply only when “defendants can show that no inference other than one of plaintiff’s negligence can reasonably be drawn from the facts” (Lagomarsino v. Market Street Ry. Co., 69 Cal.App.2d 388, 392 [158 P.2d 982]; Harris v. Joffe, 28 Cal.2d 418, 427 [170 P.2d 454]), i.e., when contributory negligence is shown as a matter of law.
Unless it would have been negligent for plaintiff to elect the surface crossing in preference to a fully lighted subway, the presumption of due care simply cannot come into play. But to view that election as negligence is to establish that any pedestrian who crosses a street other than at a crosswalk is negligent per se. Such a rule disregards decision (e.g., Shipway v. Monise, supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 565, 571) and relieves a driver of his established continuing obligation to be vigilant and to exercise due care (Biggar v. Carney, supra, 181 Cal.App.2d 22, 28). I share my colleagues’ concern for this plaintiff, but do not think it should blind us to the effects of this decision upon equally deserving pedestrians who, although exercising due care in negotiating a crossing, would be held negligent as *812a matter of law for electing to commence the crossing at a point where the right of way must be yielded.
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 26, 1967. Peters, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.