Court Opinion

ID: 9471000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:22:51.534231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:13.817095
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Today the majority has determined to take an Erie guess and “write upon the wind.” The majority predicts that Louisiana, if faced with the novel and distinct problems of asbestos related injury, would do nothing more than reflexively apply traditional tort doctrines. I am unwilling to arrogate to myself the decisionmaking duties and competence of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Rather than writing upon the wind, I would consult the chief meteorologists; this case of first impression is an ideal specimen for certification, and because the majority declines to do so, I must dissent.
I. ASBESTOS AND TORT LAW
Disease caused by exposure to asbestos presents monumental problems for tort law relating to causation. First, it is nigh impossible to point to a single fiber of asbestos as the cause of a cancerous lesion in the lungs of an asbestosis victim; asbestos related diseases usually develop after a period of exposure, perhaps from the products of many manufacturers. Second, even if the .period of exposure were known, the long time between exposure and onset of symptoms may make it impossible for the victim to remember the sources of exposure. Third, even if the victim has a photographic memory, that might be of no help — much exposure is the result of previously installed asbestos-containing material, so the victim had no chance to learn the source.
My point here is not to dramatize excessively the legal plight of asbestos victims, but to illustrate that the factual predicate giving rise to potential liability from asbestos exposure is simply different from those *584that generated most tort doctrines. Without enumerating all of the occasions, suffice it for me to note that tort law has been an area quite open to evolutionary, if not revolutionary, forms of liability in response to unanticipated factual paradigms. This has been particularly true in the area of causation, with a steady evolution, as circumstances demanded, from simple one-party negligence, to joint liability, to alternate liability, to burden-shifting presumptions such as res ipsa loquitur, to theories of market share and enterprise liability. Whether or not asbestos related injury is a circumstance calling for a doctrinal response is a weighty and difficult question; given the increasing inundation of the courts with asbestos related litigation, it is also a question of great consequence.
II. FEDERALISM AND CERTIFICATION
As I have briefly discussed, asbestos related injuries are different in legally important aspects from those types of injuries that present tort doctrines were designed to accommodate. Whether or not those doctrines will be extended to cover asbestos cases is a different sort of question from whether or not those doctrines will be applied to an automobile accident. In one instance a court writes upon a blank slate, in the other a court is closely hemmed in by precedent upon precedent.
In the case before us now, the majority affirmatively decides to apply traditional tort doctrines to a new and different species of injury. The majority notes that there’ are no Louisiana cases relying on market share or enterprise liability and justifies its result with a reluctance to impose a “radical” change in tort law upon Louisiana. What the majority chooses to ignore, however, is that there are no Louisiana cases refusing to apply market share or enterprise liability to similar factual situations. This deliberate blindness enables the majority to sub silentio impose upon Louisiana an equally radical extension of traditional tort doctrines to a case for which those doctrines are ill adapted. Asbestos related injuries are different and this is an important case of first impression.
One of the stellar virtues of Our Federalism is that it provides a hothouse in which fifty-one flowers may blossom. The federal courts, moreover, are not cast in the role of head gardener. Under Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity must follow state law. Occasionally, when the law of the state is not crystal-clear, a federal court may have to make an “Erie guess.” See, e.g., Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943). However, federal courts ought not necessarily assume the responsibility of deciding in the first instance important, unsettled questions of state law. E.g, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593, 88 S.Ct. 1753, 20 L.Ed.2d 835 (1968). Cf. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 1222, 4 L.Ed.2d 1170 (1960).
We have a powerful mechanism for avoiding unnecessary Erie guesses — certification. See generally Brown, Certification —Federalism in Action, 7 Cum.L.Rev. 455 (1977) (one of certification’s most ardent advocates, Circuit Judge John R. Brown, stating his case). When appropriate we may turn to the font of wisdom of Louisiana law for an authoritative statement. I can think of few cases more appropriate for certification than this one. The legal principles involved are unsettled and far-reaching. The rule established will have great impact on the well-being of the citizens of Louisiana. I am aghast at the possibility that after we deny this plaintiff relief, Louisiana will acknowledge enterprise or market share liability as a viable theory, but that is a risk the majority is willing to take.1
*585CONCLUSION
As the majority opinion clickety-clacks down the Erie tracks, I fear I hear the sound of the cross-ties splintering. Were I the switchman I would sidetrack this case to the Louisiana switching yards where a locomotive of sufficient power to pull the freight of the majority opinion might be attached. As it is, I remain alone in the caboose, dissenting.

. My primary objection with the majority opinion is not the outcome of the Erie guess, but the fact that it makes a guess. However, I am not sure that I would guess the same way, if forced to guess. First, I am not so sure that theories of market share of enterprise liability are such a radical departure from present tort doctrines as the majority suggests. Several *585manufacturers shipping asbestos related prod- ■ ucts into the state do not strike me as radically different from a group of hunters standing on the Texas side of the Sabine River and firing their shotguns east towards Louisiana — fibers of asbestos causing an injury are no more susceptible of identification than a shotgun pellet. Cf. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Nor does it seem inappropriate to me to shift the burden of proof to the asbestos manufacturer who shipped its products into Louisiana to show that its products did not contribute to an asbestos related disease contracted in Louisiana — when an individual is injured by asbestos, the facts speak for themselves, proclaiming that some manufacturer caused the injury. Cf. Ray v. Ameri-Care Hospital, 400 So.2d 1127 (La.Ct.App.1981). Second, the Louisiana courts have been most diligent in protecting their citizens from the hazards of unsafe products sold in the state, and might reasonably be expected to generate legal doctrines responsive to the factual problems posed by asbestos related injury. See generally Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 La.L.Rev. 414 (1980); Note, “Manufacturer” Warranty in Louisiana, 33 La.L.Rev. 724 (1973).