Court Opinion

ID: 9638218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:37:46.312956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:04.795056
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with my colleagues that there was no error in the manner in which the trial judge dealt with defendant’s second request for dismissal of his attorney.
1. In discussing that treatment, it is desirable to note one fact which the majority opinion does not fully bring out: While the record indicates that the testimony of the wife was complete when that request was made, it by no means discloses that all of the testimony seriously damaging to defendant was then before the jury. Doubtless the wife’s testimony was “strong”; but we have no possible means of knowing whether the testimony given after that request was denied did or did not influence the jury in arriving at its verdict.
2. I agree with my colleagues that the trial court acted properly in originally appointing Mr. Brandenberg as defendant’s counsel. I also agree, arguendo, that, if defendant’s subsequent request for the dismissal of Mr. Brandenberg in the middle of the trial plainly meant that defendant was then asking for the appointment of another counsel, it would have been in the discretion of the trial court to have refused the request, since, had it been granted, considerable delay would have ensued, the trial would have been interrupted, and, in all probability, a mistrial would have been necessary. My colleagues concede (as they must) that defendant did not ask for the appointment of a new counsel. They say, however, that, as he did not disclose whether he wished (a) to continue without counsel or (b) expected to have new counsel assigned to him, the trial judge properly construed his unexplained request as meaning the latter.
If the trial judge had asked defendant what he meant, and if defendant had then remained silent, such an interpretation might have been justified. But the trial judge did not ask this ignorant defendant1 what he meant. Indeed, he gave the defendant no chance to explain. Instead, the judge peremptorily said, “Sit down,” and then added, “The jury will disregard this demonstration.” That regard for fairness in trials, and particularly in criminal prose*1012cutions, which is an inherent part of the administration of justice in a democracy, is not, I think, being adequately exercised when an ignorant defendant’s ambiguous expression of his intentions are as strictly construed as if they were made by skilled counsel, especially in the absence of an opportunity on the defendant’s part to explain his intentions.
Disregarding wholly that lack of opportunity, my colleagues make the surprising remark that “under these circumstances we think it proper at least to require that the defendant must show his hand,” and proceed to hold that defendant, not having advised the trial judge that he desired to proceed without counsel, must be deemed, because of his brief interrupted remarks, to have intended to say that he wanted new counsel. To my mind, in the circumstances, the defendant is entitled now to assert the other interpretation of his request, i. e., that, for the balance of the trial, he be allowed to represent himself.
Surely, if he had made such an explicit request, a refusal would have been reversible error. No doubt, it would have been proper — perhaps it would have been necessary — for the judge to point out that abandonment of counsel might jeopardize the defendant. After such a warning, however, the judge would have lacked the right to insist that the defendant continue to have his case conducted by a lawyer with whom he was dissatisfied. The relation of lawyer and client is almost a-s intimate as that of husband and wife; most states permit a dissolution of the marital relations, and I know of no case in the federal courts holding that dissolution of the other relation is not allowable as a matter of course.
3. My colleagues, however, intimate that, even had that explicit request been made, nevertheless its refusal would not have been reversible error, since to grant such a request would have necessitated a delay for so long a period as to compel a mistrial. But no such consequence would follow. In such a situation, the trial judge might have discretion to rule that, if the defendant desired to continue the trial conducting it on his own behalf, he must do so without delay; the judge, at a minimum, would be justified in ruling that, at most, a delay of a few hours would be permitted. That, however, is not what the trial judge did here. He did not exercise his discretion. What he did was to prevent defendant’s request from being articulated so that it could be ruled on informedly. That, I think, was substantial error.
4. My colleagues further intimate that, even if there was error, it should be ignored “in a case as strong as this against an accused.”2 Even assuming that the “harmless error” rule means that the substantiality of an error depends upon whether the judges of the appellate court, who have not heard or seen the witnesses, believe that, if they had constituted the jury, they would have found the defendant guilty — a position in which I do not concur3 —that rule has no application to such a case as this. It is probably true that there are no absolute legal rights, none which must not yield in some circumstances. But there are some legal rights which, under our Constitution, approach an absolute; at least they so far approximate it that they do not give way when confronted with so vague a concept as that of harmless error. Thus no one would think of saying that in the federal courts the denial of the right of trial by jury (when not waived) could ever be harmless. The rights of an accused to appear for himself and not to be represented by a lawyer he does not want is perhaps not so powerful, yet is not too dissimilar. Circumstances may be conceivable where its denial would be proper, but they did not exist here.

 My colleagues describe him as not too subtle.

 The majority opinion refers three times to the prosecutor’s “strong case”.

 See my dissenting opinion in United States v. Liss, 2 Cir., May 28, 1943, 137 F.2d 995, and cases there cited.