Court Opinion

ID: 9664103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:02:57.878803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:30.596064
License: Public Domain

D. C. Riley, J.
(dissenting). Following a jury trial in Detroit Recorder’s Court, March 6 through 14, *141978, defendants, under separate counts, were all found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l); MSA 28.788(2)(1). Defendant Williams was sentenced to 1-1/2 to 10 years imprisonment; defendants Anderson and Respress were sentenced to terms of one year and one day to five years, the latter being given concurrent sentences for conviction under two counts; defendant Johnson was sentenced to 6-1/2 to 20 years in prison.
The evidence adduced at trial revealed that shortly after midnight on October 19, 1977, the complainant, Myrna Cage, entered the Moon Glow Lounge in the City of Detroit. Shortly thereafter she was accosted by defendants, who, she claimed, forced her at knifepoint out of the bar and to a house owned by two of the defendants. There, defendants engaged in the various sexual acts for which they were convicted.
Defendant Williams was the only one of the accused to take the stand. He testified that the complainant voluntarily left the Moon Glow Lounge with all four defendants; that she agreed at the bar to have sex with Williams and, upon reaching the house, agreed to have sex with the others. He reiterated that all the sexual acts were consensual and that the complainant responded willingly.
During opening argument, Williams’ attorney informed the jury that the defendants expected the evidence to show that the complainant and Williams had had previous sexual relations. Following objection and argument, the lower court ruled that the defendants were precluded from introducing this evidence because of their failure to comply with the notice requirements of the criminal sexual conduct statute, MCL 750.520j(2); *15MSA 28.788(10)(2). For the same reason, the court also rejected any evidence of prostitution by the victim.
The following day, after receipt of the complainant’s "rap sheet” which contained a recent accosting and soliciting citation, the defendants again argued for the admission of evidence of prior sexual conduct between complainant and Williams and for the introduction of evidence as to the complainant’s reputation for prostitution. The trial judge extended his original decision and further held that the "rap sheet” did not constitute newly discovered evidence under the statute in question so as to render it, or evidence of previous sexual contact, admissible at trial.
Defendants all appeal their convictions below, raising a plethora of evidential and constitutional allegations of error, none of which I would consider meritorious. Therefore, I dissent.
MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), enacted in 1974, controls the substantive and procedural admissibility of evidence relating to a victim’s previous sexual behavior.
"Sec. 520j. (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:
"(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.
"(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
"(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence de*16scribed in subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge' may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).”
Defendants Anderson and Johnson argue that the preclusion of evidence regarding prior instances of a victim’s sexual conduct with third persons is overbroad and unconstitutionally denies them the right of confrontation. Both Anderson and Williams advance a similar argument with respect to the victim’s reputation. The exclusion of evidence regarding prior instances of a victim’s sexual conduct with third persons has been held constitutional by different panels of this Court. People v Khan, 80 Mich App 605; 264 NW2d 360 (1978), People v Dawsey, 76 Mich App 741; 257 NW2d 236 (1977), People v Thompson, 76 Mich App 705; 257 NW2d 268 (1977), cf., People v Patterson, 79 Mich App 393; 262 NW2d 835 (1977). The validity of the exclusion of reputation evidence has not yet been ruled upon. However, I would not address this question inasmuch as the proffered evidence was clearly excludable because of defendants’ failure to comply with the notice requirements of the statute. Thus, a constitutional decision becomes unnecessary. People v Vanderford, 77 Mich App 370, 373; 258 NW2d 502 (1977), Stanek v Secretary of State, 33 Mich App 527, 530; 190 NW2d 288 (1971).
Defendant Anderson also questions on appeal whether the notice provision of MCL 750.520j has been superseded by the adoption of MRE 404(a)(3). *17This issue was not argued to the court below; hence, it has not been preserved for appellate review. See People v Stoudemire, 65 Mich App 664, 669; 238 NW2d 365 (1975), People v Phelps, 57 Mich App 300, 305; 225 NW2d 738 (1975).
Defendant Williams next maintains that, because the failure to give timely notice resulted from prosecutorial misconduct and the late appearance of retained counsel, the trial court nevertheless had the discretion, under the circumstances, to allow him to make an offer of proof concerning the excluded evidence at an in camera hearing. A review of the record discloses defendant Williams’ preliminary contentions to be without merit. Defendant Williams was represented by appointed counsel at the time of his arraignment on the information and for the 10-day period thereafter, even though retained counsel had not yet filed an appearance. The contention that prosecutorial misconduct concealed the excluded evidence evaporates in the light of that defendant’s personal knowledge of previous intimacy between himself and the complainant, knowledge which he possessed well before the notice deadline. Although per se excluded, the same may be said for defendant Williams’ self-admitted prior awareness of the victim’s reputation for prostitution. Moreover, the complainant’s accosting and soliciting citation would only reinforce, not establish, her alleged reputation.
Williams also asserts that the complainant’s "rap sheet” containing the recent arrest for prostitution constituted newly discovered information under MCL 750.520j(2). He reasons this information would have made evidence of prior sexual contact between himself and complainant more likely to be admitted at trial, and concludes that *18the trial judge therefore abused his discretion in refusing to conduct an in camera hearing on the matter. Even assuming, arguendo, that the "rap sheet” constituted newly discovered information, the statute clearly makes the decision to order a hearing discretionary as indicated by the word "may”. On these facts, given the dubious probative relationship between complainant’s arrest for prostitution and the asserted prior sexual conduct with this particular defendant, I would find no abuse of discretion.
Finally, Williams contends that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose certain promises made to the complainant in order to induce her to testify constituted misconduct sufficient to justify reversal. I disagree. No charges pending against the complainant were dismissed or even reduced. The date set for trial on the accosting and soliciting citation was merely adjourned and reset for a later date. Although a previous warrant for probation violation was taken off the LEIN (Law Enforcement Information Network) system, the violation charge was not dismissed, and a hearing thereon was held immediately following the complainant’s testimony in the present case. Significantly, at a post-trial hearing on a motion for new trial, the complainant stated that she testified solely to avoid having the instant case dismissed and further indicated that she was unaware of the above adjournment and the removal of the probation warrant until well into and after, respectively, her testimony in the case at bar. Contrary to those cases cited by defendant, no deals were made nor was there any evidence bearing directly on the charged offense undisclosed by the prosecution.
Defendants Respress and Johnson allege that *19their attorneys’ failure to file timely notice was a mistake serious enough to deny them a fair trial. People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 266; 247 NW2d 547 (1976). To the extent that these defendants’ claims depend on facts not of record, it was incumbent upon them to construct a supportive evidentiary record at the trial court level in connection with a motion for a new trial. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Inasmuch as these defendants have made no showing that either of their attorneys possessed any knowledge of evidence regarding the complainant’s past acts or reputation within the time frame in question, their claims are fatally deficient.
Defendant Johnson also asserts that his counsel’s failure to demand a Wade1 hearing was indicative of ineffective assistance of counsel. His defense counsel properly moved for such a hearing but the motion was dismissed based on defendant Johnson’s failure to appear. I would not allow defendant Johnson to profit from his own negligence and, thus, would reject his claim.
Finally, defendant Johnson contends that the trial judge improperly disregarded his duty in imposing sentence upon him. I find nothing in the record indicating that the trial judge disregarded his duty or considered any improper factors in sentencing defendant Johnson. See People v McIntosh, 62 Mich App 422, 443; 234 NW2d 157 (1975), rev’d on other grounds 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 (1977), People v LaPine, 47 Mich App 553, 555-556; 209 NW2d 726 (1973).
I would affirm the convictions of all four defendants.

 United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).