Court Opinion

ID: 9581166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:12:11.136723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:45.178333
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
dissenting.
The majority is correct; we have stated, with many other courts, that one of the elements that the plaintiff must prove in a fraud action is, “That they [the statements] were made with intent to defraud.” Rolfes v. Russel, 5 Or 400, 402 (1875). I have found no decision of this court, however, in which a plaintiff lost although he had proved all the other elements of fraud except the intent to deceive.
In my opinion, the plaintiff should not have to prove such specific intent, and, further, the finder of fact must necessarily infer such an intent when the other elements of fraud are proved. In this case the *612-trial court found, and such findings were supported by the evidence, that the defendant made, a misrepresentation which either defendants knew was false or made recklessly without knowledge of its. truth or falsity, that such misrepresentation was material and the plaintiff relied upon it. In my opinion, this is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to damages:
“Some courts have gone very far in consequence of the doctrine that a guilty state of mind is a necessary element in order to make the defendant liable. The trend of the decisions is to the contrary.
& & * *
“If conscious dishonesty on the part of the defendant is a necessary element of tort or misrepresentation, these decisions [decisions that the defendant must have a guilty state of mind] are right, but they represent a distinctly lower standard of morality and justice than the contrary decisions. Moreover, the standard which they adopt is very difficult to apply.
“A defendant who is charged with false representations, and who can escape by making out that his intentions were honest although his words naturally understood were false, will rarely fail to testify to his own honesty of intention. The issue thus raised of the defendant’s state of mind is difficult to try, and attempts at its decision are quite as likely to promote perjury as justice.” 12 Williston, Contracts (3d ed) 474, § 1513.
Massachusetts is one of several jurisdictions which hold: “If a statement of fact which is susceptible of actual knowledge is made as of one’s own knowledge and is false, it may be the basis for an action of deceit without proof of an actual intent to deceive. # Pietrazak v. McDermott, 341 Mass 107, 167 NE2d 166, 168 (1960).
I would affirm.