Court Opinion

ID: 9390265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:08:05.050328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.773241
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Adoption of W.M., 2023-Ohio-1365.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE ADOPTION OF W.M.                              :
                                                              No. 111580
A Minor Child                                       :

[Appeal by Stepfather]                              :

                                                    :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Probate Division
                               Case No. 2021ADP09927

                                           Appearances:

                 Steven J. Trapp, for appellant.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                  Stepfather-appellant, J.M. (“stepfather”), appeals the trial court’s

dismissal of his petition for adoption. After a thorough review of the facts and the

applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Procedural History and Facts

             W.M. (“child” or “son”) was born on February 5, 2013. At the time, the

child’s mother was in a relationship with the child’s father, W.G. (“father”).1 When

the child was three years old, mother and stepfather married. On October 15, 2021,

stepfather filed a petition for adoption alleging that father’s consent was not

required because father had failed, without justifiable-cause, to provide more than

de minimis contact with the minor child and failed to provide for the maintenance

and support of the minor. Father objected to the application. In April 2022, the

trial court held a consent hearing at which the mother and father testified.

             Father testified to the following. He moved away from Cleveland when

the child was four or five years old. He was homeless for a time and lived between

Cleveland, Pennsylvania, and Columbus. At the time of the hearing, father lived and

worked in Columbus, which he testified was an “emotionally stable environment.”

             Father and mother initially had an informal system of visitation and

child support but that ended when a neighbor reported him to children protective

services (“CPS”) for allegedly abusing the child when the child was “about four years

old.” After mother received notice of the report, she refused to allow father to have

contact with the child until a judge ordered her to do so. After this occurred, mother

let him see their son twice and then they had “another falling out.” Since the falling

      1  Father established paternity by executing a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity with the Central Paternity Registry.
out, father had not tried to contact the child because “[mother] told me that I

couldn’t contact him * * *.”

               In 2018, father went to juvenile court to try and establish a child

support order, but he did not have the money for an attorney. On September 23,

2020, he filed an application to determine custody, shared parenting, and parenting

time (hereinafter “application for parenting time”) in Cuyahoga County Juvenile

Court. The matter proceeded through juvenile court and after several delays, father

had his first visitation with the child via Zoom on November 9, 2021. Since that

time, he has had two supervised visits and one therapy visit with his son.2

               According to father, he did not try to contact his son because mother

told him he would not be able to see him. When asked if he paid child support or

otherwise supported his son, father testified, “No, not since she told me that she does

not want anything from me. And I can’t see him up until the court says that I’m

allowed to.” Father also testified that he did not send the child a birthday card or

otherwise try to wish him happy birthday because he did not believe mother would

give the child anything he sent.

               Mother testified to the following. Father was invited to their son’s

fourth birthday party in February 2017, but did not show up. The last contact she

had with father was in April 2017. Since that time, father has made no effort to call,

mail, visit, or otherwise reach out to the child. Mother lived at the same address

      2   The case in juvenile court is still pending.
from November 2015 until July 2020, and father knew where they lived because he

was there in 2016 for trick-or-treating. Mother testified that when she moved with

stepfather and the child in July 2020, father knew the new address through his

attorney. Mother has had the same phone number for the last seven years and the

same email address for the last ten years. Mother denied telling father that he could

not see their son until a judge ordered her to let him visit, but acknowledged that

she told the father that he had to get the “issue” with CPS resolved.3

             In a journal entry dated April 28, 2022, the probate court found that

stepfather failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the father’s

consent was not required to proceed with the adoption petition; therefore, absent

father’s consent, the adoption petition could not proceed. Specifically, the trial court

found that father had supervised visits with the child in the year leading up to the

filing of the adoption petition, mother interfered with father’s access to the child,

and father attempted to establish a support order prior to stepfather’s filing of the

adoption petition.

             The trial court dismissed the petition for adoption. Stepfather filed a

timely notice of appeal and raises four assignments of error for our review:

      I. The trial court erred in finding that (father) was having court ordered
      contact with the minor child prior to the filing of the petition.

      II. The trial court erred in finding that “Through the juvenile court
      process, [father] has been able to have supervised visits with the child
      in the year leading up to the filing of the petition.”

      3 Neither party introduced additional evidence regarding an investigation or case
with a child protective services agency.
      III. The trial court erred in finding that within the one-year period
      prior to the filing of the adoption petition (father) was participating in
      court ordered visitation with the minor child as a result of an action he
      initiated long before the filing of the petition.

      IV. The trial court erred in finding that Petitioner has failed to establish
      by clear and convincing evidence that (father) failed without justifiable-
      cause to have more than de minimis contact with the child.

Failure to Comply with Appellate Rules

               As an initial matter, we note that appellant has failed to comply with

Loc.App.R. 3, App.R. 12 and App.R. 16. Loc.App.R. 3(B)(1) provides:

      The notice of appeal must individually name each party taking the
      appeal and must have attached to it a copy of the judgment or order
      appealed from (journal entry) signed by the trial judge and time-
      stamped with the date of receipt by the clerk. The subject attachments
      are not jurisdictional but their omission may be the basis for a
      dismissal.

               The original notice of appeal stepfather filed in this case was stricken

from the record for failure to comply with Loc.App.R. 13.2 because certain filings

contained the father’s and child’s name. Stepfather refiled his notice of appeal

redacting those names in accordance with Loc.App.R. 13.2, but stepfather failed to

attach the judgment from which he was appealing. However, as stated in Loc.App.R.

3(B)(1), the attachments are not jurisdictional; therefore, we will consider the

appeal.

               App.R. 12(A)(2) provides that this court may disregard an assignment

of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to identify in the record the

error on which the assignment of error is based or fails to argue the assignment

separately in the brief, as required under App.R. 16(A). Stepfather lists four separate
assignments of error, yet applies one argument to all four assignments of error. It

is not the reviewing court’s obligation to search the record for evidence to support

an appellant’s argument as to any alleged error, let alone four alleged errors lumped

into a single argument. However, because cases are best decided on their merits,

this court will employ its discretion to address stepfather’s assignments of error in a

consolidated fashion. See SHJ Co. v. Avani Hosp. & Fin., L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1173,

187 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).4

               We now turn to the assigned errors.

Law and Analysis

               A parent has a fundamental right to care for and have custody of his

or her child and those rights are terminated when a child is adopted. In re Adoption

of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562, 2023-Ohio-730, ¶ 6, citing In

re Adoption of M.M.R., 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2017-CA-12, 2017-Ohio-7222, ¶

5. However, R.C. 3107.07(A) provides that consent to adoption is not required of a

parent of a minor child

      when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court, after proper
      service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent has failed without justifiable-cause to provide more
      than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the
      maintenance and support of the minor * * * for a period of at least one
      year immediately preceding * * * the filing of the adoption[.]

      4 Counsel is admonished that future failure to comply withthe appellate rules could
result in striking of the brief or further sanctions. See SHJ Co. v. Avani Hosp. & Fin.,
L.L.C., at id.
               When applying R.C. 3107.07(A), the trial court considers the

following: (1) whether the parent has failed to communicate with or failed to support

a child for a minimum of one year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, and,

if so, (2) whether there was justifiable-cause for that failure. In re Adoption of M.B.,

131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 23.

               The probate court may examine any preceding events that may have

a bearing on the noncustodial parent’s failure to communicate with the child; the

court is not restricted to focusing solely on events occurring during the statutory

one-year period preceding the filing of the adoption petition. In re Adoption of

S.T.M., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2022 AP 09 0028, 2023-Ohio-38, ¶ 26, citing In

re: Adoption of Lauck, 82 Ohio App.3d 348, 612 N.E.2d 459 (9th Dist.1992); see

also In re Adoption of Hedrick, 110 Ohio App.3d 622, 627, 674 N.E.2d 1256 (8th

Dist.1996).

               The stepfather, as petitioner for adoption, had the burden of proving

by clear and convincing evidence that father failed to have more than de minimis

contact with the child for at least one year preceding the filing of the adoption

petition and the lack of contact was without justifiable-cause. In re Adoption of

Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 104, 515 N.E.2d 919 (1987). The probate court, as the

finder of fact, determines if justifiable-cause exists. In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18

Ohio St.3d 361, 367, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985), citing In re Adoption of McDermitt, 63

Ohio St.2d 301, 408 N.E.2d 680 (1980). “The probate court is in the best position to

observe the demeanor of the parties, to assess their credibility, and to determine the
accuracy of their testimony.” In re Adoption of Holcomb at id., citing In re Adoption

of McDermitt at id. Therefore, a probate court’s justifiable-cause decision will not

be disturbed on appeal unless that determination is against the manifest weight of

the evidence. In re Adoption of D.W.-E.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110705, 2022-

Ohio-528, ¶ 26, citing In re Adoption of M.B. To determine whether a judgment is

against the manifest weight of the evidence, this court reviews the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers witness credibility, and

determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact “clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that there must be a

reversal of the judgment. In re Adoption of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562,

2023-Ohio-730, at ¶ 8, citing In re Adoption of B.A.H., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2012-

CA-44, 2012-Ohio-4441.

               In its judgment entry dismissing the petition for adoption, the trial

court determined that father had more than de minimis contact with his son in the

year prior to the filing of the adoption petition. Specifically, the court found that

father had court-ordered supervised visits with the child in the prior year and court-

ordered contact with the child immediately prior to the petition’s filing. The court’s

findings are not supported by the record.

               Stepfather filed the petition for adoption on October 15, 2021. The

record reflects that father’s first visitation with the child since before February 2017,5

       5 Neither party testified when father’s last contact was with the child, but mother
testified that father did not appear at their son’s fourth birthday party, which was held in
February 2017, and she had little to no contact with father after the birthday party.
occurred on November 9, 2021, after the adoption petition was filed. Thus, father

failed to have any contact with his son, let alone more than de minimis contact,

within one year prior to the filing of the adoption petition.

               Next, we consider whether father had justifiable-cause for his failure

to provide more than de minimis contact with the child in the year preceding the

filing of the adoption petition. The trial court considered father’s previous attempts

to establish child support orders and visitation. Specifically, the court considered

father’s 2018 attempt to file for parenting time, but found that father was unable to

file paperwork because he was homeless and did not have mother’s then-current

address and his pending application for parenting time in juvenile court.

               Mother testified that she and their son lived at the same address from

November 2015 to July 2020 and father knew the address because he was there in

October 2016 for trick-or-treating. Father testified that he went to juvenile court in

2018 to establish a child support order and visitation with the child, but was told he

“could not file on himself.” He further testified he did not have the money to hire an

attorney. Father provided no documentation to support his claim. Presumably

father filed in Cuyahoga County, where the child resides. If he had tried to file in

our county’s juvenile court, he would have been directed to the court’s pro se clinic,

where he would have been advised to file an application to establish parental rights

and responsibilities, just as he did in September 2020.

               The trial court found that mother “admitted to interfering with

[father’s] access to the child,” and “prohibited [father] from seeing the child.” The
trial court acknowledged that “no evidence of any involvement by children’s services

was presented to the court.”

               Father testified that mother would not allow him to see the child until

a judge “tells her to.” Mother admitted that she told father he had to resolve the

“CPS issue” before he could see his son, but denied telling father he could not see

their son until he had a court order allowing visitation. Mother also testified that

she allowed father to see their son twice after the CPS issue arose, and he was invited

to their son’s fourth birthday party, but he did not come. After father failed to appear

at the birthday party, mother heard from him once more, in April 2017, and did not

hear from him again until she received papers from juvenile court in September

2020, “except for him asking for my new address.”

               In In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d at 367, 481 N.E.2d 613,

the Ohio Supreme Court held that a parent could establish justifiable-cause for

noncommunication if the other parent has created substantial impediments to that

communication. But to establish justifiable-cause, “significant interference by a

custodial parent with communication between the non-custodial parent and the

child, or significant discouragement of such communication, is required * * *.”

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 367-368.

               In one of two cases the court considered in In re Adoption of

Holcomb, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s decision reversing

the probate court’s decision granting a stepmother’s petition for adoption as being

unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 369. In the underlying case,
the father, unbeknownst to the mother, moved out of state with stepmother and the

children and refused to provide mother with his new address or phone number.

Mother tried numerous ways to contact her children including sending presents and

letters to the children’s grandmother to give to them and letters to an acquaintance

to give to the children at their school. Mother went as far as to travel out of state to

where she thought father and the children lived and drove around neighborhoods

looking for her children. Id. at 362-363. The court determined that father and

stepmother “significantly interfered with and discouraged respondent’s numerous

and varied attempts to establish communication with her children.” Id. at 369.

               In this case, we are not persuaded by father’s repeated excuse that his

lack of contact with his son was based on mother’s refusal to allow him contact until

a court ordered visitation. The trial court found that mother’s “reference” to a child

protective service case was “acknowledging that she prohibited [father] from seeing

the child.” However, as the trial court also acknowledged, the parties presented no

evidence of involvement by children services.        Moreover, father presented no

evidence that a court of competent jurisdiction ever issued an order prohibiting him

from visiting his son.

               Further, even if there had been a court order denying visitation, such

an order is not justifiable-cause for failing to contact one’s child in another manner,

such as phone call, email, letter, cards, or social media, unless the court order

specifically prohibits all contact. See In re Adoption of T.R.S., 7th Dist. Belmont No.

13 BE 43, 2014-Ohio-3808, ¶ 21 (Since the no-contact order did not prohibit all
forms of contact between the parent and child, the order is not justification for the

parent to fail to communicate with his child by another means.); but see In re A.K.,

168 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-350, 198 N.E.3d 47, ¶ 21 (a parent’s right to consent

to adoption is not extinguished when the parent did not have more than de minimis

contact with the child during the statutory period because the parent was acting in

compliance with a no-contact order prohibiting all communication and contact with

the child).

               In In re Adoption of F.D.H., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29562, 2023-

Ohio-730, the Second District Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s judgment

that father had had no contact with the child in the year preceding the filing of the

adoption petition was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. During most

of the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, the father was either in jail

or a treatment facility and had limited ability to see or call his child. The court noted

that the father made daily calls to his own mother while incarcerated, but made no

“purposeful effort” to contact his child. Id. at ¶ 13. Father also failed to show that

the mother interfered in any attempts he may have made to contact the child. Id. at

¶ 17. The court determined that father’s incarceration or stay at a treatment center

was not justifiable-cause to not contact his child. Id. at ¶ 13.

               In this case, father testified that he was currently living and working

in Columbus in an “emotionally stable environment.” In the year preceding the

filing of the adoption petition, and for several years prior to the filing, father failed

to have any contact with his son. He made no attempt to call, email, write, send a
gift or card, or otherwise communicate with his child. Other than stating that he

believed he could not see his child because mother told him he could not until a court

ordered visitation, father presented no evidence that mother prevented him from

contacting his son. Simply put, there is not competent and credible evidence in the

record that mother significantly interfered or discouraged communication between

father and son. From February 2017, (the child’s fourth birthday), to November

2021, (father’s first visit via Zoom), father could have called, emailed, sent a card or

gift, mailed a letter, or sent a note through a family member, but he chose not to do

so.

               That said, we recognize that father has tried to establish a relationship

with his son by filing an application for parenting time, and the numerous delays in

that case appear to be through no fault of his own. The fact that father’s consent will

not be required for the adoption does not automatically mean he approves of the

adoption or that his input does not matter. Father continues to be the child’s

biological father, and he is entitled to an opportunity to participate in the

proceedings to show that the adoption is not in the child’s best interest.

      [U]ntil the hearing on the merits of the petition and the best interest of
      the minor child has been determined the [biological] parent not only
      retains parental rights and responsibilities but retains an overriding
      interest in being heard relevantly on the issue of whether the proposed
      adoption would be in the best interest of the child. It is not difficult to
      imagine a scenario where a [biological] parent, even though he or she
      could not bar the adoption by withholding consent, could offer
      evidence of probative value that the adoption proposed would not be in
      his or her child’s best interest.
 In re Adoption of Jorgensen, 33 Ohio App.3d 207, 209-210, 515 N.E.2d 622
(3d Dist.1986).

              Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the manifest

weight of the evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that

stepfather failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that father failed

without justifiable-cause to have more than de minimis contact with the child.

              The assignments of error are sustained.

              Judgment reversed and case remanded for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLGHER, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR