Court Opinion

ID: 9959548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 05:05:41.244356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.074978
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to revision
                          until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                        UNPUBLISHED
In re A. R. WILLIAMS, Minor.                                            April 11, 2024

                                                                        No. 367165
                                                                        Oakland Circuit Court
                                                                        Family Division
                                                                        LC No. 22-884765-NA

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child, ARW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) (parental rights to siblings have been terminated
and parent failed to rectify conditions that led to prior termination) and (j) (reasonable likelihood
child will be harmed if returned to the parent’s home). Respondent pleaded no contest to the
statutory grounds for termination and on appeal only challenges the trial court’s best-interest
determination. As part of its best-interest ruling, the trial court relied on an outdated definition of
“relative,” which led to the court failing to consider whether termination was in ARW’s best
interests in light of her placement with a relative in contravention of established caselaw. We
accordingly vacate the order terminating respondent’s parental rights and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         I. BACKGROUND

        In May 2022, when ARW was about 10 months old, respondent and ARW were involved
in a single-vehicle accident. The accident occurred when respondent drove into a building with
ARW in the car. Respondent subsequently failed multiple sobriety tests, and it was determined
that she had a BAC of 0.26%.

        On July 27, 2022, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the
trial court to take jurisdiction over ARW and terminate respondent’s parental rights. The petition
alleged that respondent had an extensive criminal history, including multiple past convictions for
operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The petition further alleged that respondent previously had
her parental rights to two other children terminated in 2018 due to serious and chronic neglect. As
part of the previous case, the petition explained, respondent had been offered services including a
psychological evaluation, random drug and alcohol screenings, mental health services, and

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parenting classes. The petition asserted that, despite these services, respondent continued to
demonstrate poor decision-making skills and had still not rectified the conditions that led to the
previous termination of her parental rights.

        During the preliminary inquiry, the trial court found probable cause to authorize the
petition. At the time, ARW was in the care of her legal father. The trial court granted respondent
supervised parenting time, reasoning that a bond existed between ARW and respondent, and there
was no risk of harm.

       In October 2022, respondent was incarcerated after police responded to a call about a
domestic dispute involving respondent, and it was discovered that respondent had an outstanding
warrant related to the May 2022 incident.

         In December 2022, respondent pleaded no contest to the factual basis of the jurisdictional
and statutory grounds for termination. The trial court entered an order of adjudication, exercising
its jurisdiction and determining that statutory grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. The trial court ordered a separate hearing to determine whether termination of respondent’s
parental rights would be in ARW’s best interests.

         That best-interest hearing was held on February 6, 2023. Shannon Conz, a psychologist
for the Oakland County Court Psychological Clinic who interviewed and evaluated respondent,
opined that reunification with respondent was not in ARW’s best interests. Respondent had told
Conz that she did not feel her alcohol use was a problem. This led Conz to doubt whether substance
abuse treatment would benefit respondent because Conz believed that respondent had to first
acknowledge she had a problem before she could “gain insight from” treatment. Conz testified
that she also had “severe doubts” that respondent could provide a safe home environment for ARW
in light of respondent’s refusal to recognize her problem with alcohol.

        Kristin Karoub, a protective services worker with the DHHS, testified that she supervised
visits between respondent and ARW. According to Karoub, ARW was familiar with respondent
but looked to her father as a parental figure. When asked whether termination of respondent’s
parental rights would be in the best interests of ARW, Karoub opined that it would be because the
DHHS “still [had] the same concerns from” the previous termination proceedings in 2018. Karoub
also echoed Conz’s testimony that ARW’s safety could not be assured in respondent’s care so long
as respondent’s substance abuse continued to go unaddressed, and Karoub did not believe that
respondent’s issues with substance abuse could be adequately addressed until respondent
recognized that it was an issue.

          Respondent testified and denied telling Conz that her alcohol use was not a problem.
According to respondent, she acknowledged that she had an “alcohol problem” but did not believe
that it interfered with her parenting. When she is responsible for caring for her children, respondent
explained, she may “have a shot or two, but that does not stop [her] from” parenting appropriately.
Respondent further testified that she was willing to participate in substance abuse treatment but
emphasized that it was never offered as part of the current proceedings. Respondent believed that
she could refrain from further alcohol use if she was provided with appropriate “instruction and
therapy.”

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        After listening to all this evidence and hearing the parties’ closing arguments, the trial court
found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in ARW’s best interests. First
addressing respondent’s bond with ARW, the court reasoned that, while a bond existed between
them, it was not strong. As to respondent’s parenting ability, the court found that it was “extremely
low” particularly when respondent abused alcohol, which she had “a long history” of doing. That
history of substance abuse was one of the reasons that respondent’s parental rights to her other
children were terminated, the court opined, because it led to respondent’s incarceration which in
turn spurred the DHHS to file “the petition regarding [respondent’s] two other children.” The
court believed that respondent continued to lack insight into how serious her problem with alcohol
was based on Conz’s testimony. With respect to ARW’s current placement, the court opined that
ARW was “placed with a non-relative according to the statute and case law.” That placement, the
court reasoned, was currently providing ARW with the stability that the young child needed and
that respondent had thus far been unable to provide. The court surmised that the only factor
weighing against termination was ARW’s bond with respondent but “all the other factors severely
outweigh that.” The court accordingly held that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in
ARW’s best interests.

       This appeal followed.

                                   II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A trial court’s finding that termination is in a child’s best interests is reviewed for clear
error. In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 360; 948 NW2d 131 (2019). A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In
re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272-273; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

                                           III. ANALYSIS

         Before a respondent’s parental rights can be terminated, the petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Moss, 301
Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). The best-interest inquiry focuses on the child, not the
parent. In re MJC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 365616); slip op
at 9. Various considerations can factor into a trial court’s best-interest determination, including
the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, the parent’s history of substance abuse, and the child’s wellbeing while in
the parent’s care. In re Rippy, 330 Mich App at 360-361. Additional considerations include the
parent’s ability to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the parent’s psychological
evaluation, and the child’s age. In re MJC, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10.

        In In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), our Supreme Court explained
that “a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination” under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a),1

1
  When In re Mason was decided, MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) was located in MCL
712A.19a(6)(a). See 2008 PA 200.

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and this was “an explicit factor to consider in determining whether termination” was in a child’s
best interests. Failure to consider to consider this factor, the Court later elaborated, rendered the
factual record “inadequate to make a best interests determination.” In re Mays, 490 Mich 993, 994
(2012). Shortly after In re Mays, this Court in In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 43-
44; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), held that a trial court’s failure to explicitly consider a child’s placement
with a relative amounted to clear error requiring vacatur of the lower court’s best-interest analysis.

       In this case, ARW was placed in the care of her legal father. The trial court found that
ARW was “placed with a non-relative according to the statute and case law.” To reach this
conclusion, the trial court relied on a former version of MCL 712A.13a(1)(j), which did not include
biological parents in the definition of “relative.” See, e.g., In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406,
412-413; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (explaining that “relative” as used in MCL 712A.13a(1)(j), as
amended by 2015 PA 228, did not encompass the child’s “biological mother”).

       Effective October 7, 2022, however, the definition of “relative” was amended. 2022 PA
200.2 Under the updated definition, a “relative” includes an individual who is at least 18-years old
and is

       [r]elated to the child within the fifth degree by blood, marriage, or adoption,
       including the spouse of an individual related to the child within the fifth degree,
       even after the marriage has ended by death or divorce, the parent who shares
       custody of a half-sibling, and the parent of a man whom the court has found
       probable cause to believe is the putative father if there is no man with legally
       established rights to the child. [MCL 712A.13a(1)(j)(i).]

ARW’s father was clearly a “relative” under this definition. Yet the trial court mistakenly
considered ARW’s father a “non-relative.” This resulted in the trial court failing to explicitly
consider ARW’s placement with a relative as part of its best-interest analysis contrary to In re
Mason, 486 Mich at 164, rendering the factual record “inadequate to make a best interests
determination,” In re Mays, 490 Mich at 994, which requires us to vacate the court’s best-interest
analysis and remand for further proceedings, In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 44.

       The DHHS contends that the trial court was not required to consider ARW’s relative
placement because, unlike in In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors, termination in this case
was sought in the initial petition. This difference is significant, the DHHS claims, because In re
Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors relied on MCL 712A.19a(8)(a)3 which states:

              (8) If the court determines at a permanency planning hearing that a child
       should not be returned to his or her parent, the court may order the agency to initiate

2
  Because a statute is operational on its effective date, In re Request for Advisory Opinion
Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 479 Mich 1, 12; 740 NW2d 444 (2007), the
revised definition applied.
3
 To reiterate, when In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts Minors were decided, MCL
712A.19a(8)(a) was located in MCL 712A.19a(6)(a). See 2008 PA 200.

                                                 -4-
          proceedings to terminate parental rights. Except as otherwise provided in this
          subsection, if the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the state
          for 15 of the most recent 22 months, the court shall order the agency to initiate
          proceedings to terminate parental rights. The court is not required to order the
          agency to initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights if 1 or more of the
          following apply:

                 (a) The child is being cared for by relatives.

         While it is true that this case did not proceed to a termination hearing under this subsection,
the DHHS does not adequately explain why that is significant. In re Mason and In re Olive/Metts
Minors relied on MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) (previously subsection (6)(a)) because that subsection
makes plain that the Legislature considers a child’s placement with relatives to be a factor that can
strongly weigh against termination. The subsection states that, even if a trial court would otherwise
be required to initiate termination proceedings, it is not required to do so if the child is in a relative
placement. Both cases extrapolated from this that placement with relatives “was an explicit factor
to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.” In re Mason,
486 Mich at 164. See also In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 43. Nothing about the text
of MCL 712A.19a(8)(a) suggests that it is identifying a factor that is required to be considered
when determining whether termination is in a child’s best interests.4 That was simply a reasonable
inference that the courts drew from the statute’s text—if placement with a relative is so significant
that a trial court can decline to initiate termination proceedings that it would otherwise be required
to order, then trial courts should be required to take that placement into account when deciding
whether termination is in the child’s best interests. This reasoning holds true for any best-interest
analysis, regardless of the manner in which termination proceedings were initiated. Indeed,
nothing in either In re Mason or In re Olive/Metts Minors suggests that those cases cabined their
pertinent holdings to only cases proceeding to termination under MCL 712A.19a(8)(a), as the
DHHS contends. We accordingly reject the DHHS’s invitation to carveout an exception to the

4
    This fact was pointed out by the dissent in In re Mays:
          [T]he majority faults the court for not considering the children’s placement with a
          relative. However, the proposition that a court must always consider placement
          with a relative before termination, even after grounds for termination have been
          established and “best interest” findings made, lacks grounding in the law, which
          contains no specific factors that a court must invariably consider in deciding a
          termination case. . . . While placement with a relative may in many instances
          constitute a relevant consideration in the “best interest” determination, the failure
          to consider it in a particular case does not necessarily preclude the court from
          determining that termination is in the children’s “best interests.” [In re Mays, 490
          Mich at 996-997 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting).]

                                                   -5-
rule that a trial court must consider a child’s placement with relatives as part of its best-interest
analysis.5

                                        IV. CONCLUSION

        Regardless of factors weighing in favor of termination, we vacate the trial court’s best-
interest determination and remand for further consideration of ARW’s best-interests consistent
with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                              /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

5
  Briefly, as part of her best-interest argument, respondent contends that the DHHS failed
to provide reasonable efforts. To the extent that this argument presents a separate
substantive issue, it is waived because respondent failed to properly present the issue in her
statement of questions presented. See In re BKD, 246 Mich App 212, 218; 631 NW2d 353
(2001). Regardless, reasonable efforts were not required in this case because respondent
had her parental rights to ARW’s siblings involuntarily terminated and failed to rectify the
conditions that led to that earlier termination. See MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). See also In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 260; In re Smith, 291 Mich App 621, 623; 805 NW2d 234
(2011).

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                              Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

                                                ORDER
                                                                               Michael J. Riordan
 IN RE A R WILLIAMS MINOR                                                       Presiding Judge

 Docket No.     367165                                                         Colleen A. O’Brien

 LC No.         2022-884765-NA                                                 Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
                                                                                Judges

               Pursuant to the opinion issued concurrently with this order, this case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this Court. We retain jurisdiction.

                 Proceedings on remand in this matter shall commence within 28 days of the Clerk’s
certification of this order, and they shall be given priority on remand until they are concluded. As stated
in the accompanying opinion, this case is remanded to the trial court for further consideration of ARW's
best interests. The proceedings on remand are limited to this issue.

               The parties shall promptly file with this Court a copy of all papers filed on remand. Within
seven days after entry, appellant shall file with this Court copies of all orders entered on remand.

               The transcript of all proceedings on remand shall be prepared and filed within 21 days after
completion of the proceedings.

                                                             Presiding Judge

                                 April 11, 2024