Court Opinion

ID: 9686848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:09:15.036653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:22.511142
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Justice.
The respondent appeals from a decree for complainant in a proceeding for declaratory decree to determine the owner of a certain interest in the oil, gas, and miner*173als in, on, and under certain land in Choctaw County.
Determination of the issue presented requires consideration of two deeds. The first is a warranty deed, dated December 23, 1939, executed by J. C. Bolinger, Trustee, as grantor, to James C. Martin, the respondent, as grantee. The deed will be referred to as the Bolinger deed. By its terms, grantor conveys to grantee the lands described. Immediately following the description of the land conveyed, the deed recites :
“The grantor herein except (sic) and reserves from this sale, the oil gas and mineral rights in and to said lands, with rights of ingress and egress thereon and all necessary rights for exploring, prospecting drilling mining and removing the oil, gas and minerals therefrom, and with the exclusive right to the grantor or his assigns to make and enter into such oil, gas and mineral leases as they may deem advisable, and for such bonuses and royalties as may be acceptable to them; however it being understood and agreed that the grantee, his heirs or assigns shall be entitled to receive the equal one-fourt (sic) (44) of all bonuses and royalties under any such contract, payment to be made direct to such party or deposited in such bank as may be designated by him.”
The right to receive one-fourth of all bonuses and royalties, which passed to the grantee as set out in last quoted proviso in the deed beginning with the word “however,” is the subject matter of this suit. The right thus acquired by the grantee will sometimes be referred to as a non-participating royalty. A discussion of the nature of such an interest may be found in Texas Law Review, Vol. XXVI, page 569, in an article by Lee Jones, Jr. We express no opinion as to the nature of such an interest.
Martin, the respondent, who is the grantee in the Bolinger deed, subsequently conveyed the same land to Knight, the complainant, by warranty deed dated December 27, 1939. The question is: Did the respondent, by executing the second deed, convey the non-participating royalty to complainant; or, did the respondent retain the non-participating royalty for himself?
The second deed recites that respondent and wife, for recited consideration, do grant, bargain, sell, and convey to complainant the described land. Immediately following the description of the land, the deed recites:
“TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said party of the second part, her heirs and assigns in fee simple.
“It is agreed and understood that there is reserved from this conveyance, oil, gas and mineral rights, with the same provisions as contained in that certain conveyance from J. C. Bolinger Trustee to James C. Martin dated December 23, 1939, wherein the grantee in said conveyance, his heirs and assigns, would be entitled to received (sic) the equal one-fourth of all bonuses and royalties under any lease contract.
“It is further agreed and understood that the grantor, James C. Martin, Jr., herein named, reserves the title to all timber eight inches and up twelve inches from the ground standing, lying and being upon said land, with all necessary rights of ingress and egress over and across said land for the purpose of cutting, manufacturing and removing said timber, and the right to go on and across said land with wagons, trucks, or any other appliances necessary for said purpose, and the right to construct and operate thereon a saw mill for the purpose of manufacturing said timber, for a period of two years from the date hereof, and it is agreed and understood that all the rights, privileges and easements herein reserved shall expire at the end of the said two year period.”
*174The remainder of the deed sets out the covenants of warranty and the testimonium clause.
It is noted that the grantee named in the Bolinger deed is James C. Martin, and the grantor named in the second deed is James C. Martin, Jr. It appears without dispute that James C. Martin and James C. Martin, Jr., are one and the same person.
In support of his contention that he retained the non-participating royalty, respondent argues to the following effect. He says that there is no problem in construing the Bolinger deed and we are inclined to agree. Referring to the second deed, respondent says:
“ . . .In this latter deed the first two lines of the paragraph in question state:
“ ‘It is further agreed and understood that there is reserved from this conveyance oil, gas and mineral rights
“Thus, to that point, there would be no doubt that all oil, gas and mineral rights were reserved to the grantor-Appellant.
The word “all” does not appear before the words, “oil, gas and mineral rights.” If it had been the intention of the respondent to reserve “all” the oil, gas, and minerals, he could have inserted the word “all,” but he did not do so. Instead, the respondent proceeded to describe the reservation by referring to the Bolinger deed.
Respondent says that the rule is that in deeds, where two clauses are inconsistent, the earlier prevails over the later clause. We are not inclined to apply that rule, but if we did, respondent could not prevail. Prior to the reservation provision in the second deed, the granting clause and the habendum clause recite that respondent conveys the land, without reservation or exception, to “ . . . the said party of the second part, her heirs and assigns in fee simple.”
Respondent appears to attach some importance to the fact that the word “reserved” is used instead of the word “excepted.” There appears to be some technical difference between reservations and exceptions, and we do not disregard that difference but find no significance in that difference or distinction in the instant case. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has said and we agree that:
“ . In drawing deeds, the words ‘reserve’ and ‘except’ are frequently used interchangeably when applied to minerals . . . ” Merchants & Manufacturers Bank v. Dennis, 229 Miss. 447, 91 So.2d 254, 256.
The respondent contends for a construction of the second deed favorable to him. He was the grantor in said deed. A different construction favors the grantee.
It must be conceded that the grantor in the Bolinger deed did reserve and except all the oil, gas, and mineral rights in the land except the one-fourth non-participating royalty which was conveyed to respondent. Respondent did not own any interest in three-fourths of the oil, gas, and minerals in the land. In order to protect his warranty and in order to convey only what he did own, it was necessary for him to make some reservation or exception of oil, gas, and mineral rights. This he did. He did so by reciting in the second deed that “ . . . there is reserved from this conveyance, oil, gas and mineral rights, with the same (Emphasis Supplied) provisions as contained in that certain conveyance from . . . Bolinger . . . wherein the grantee in said conveyance . would be entitled to received the equal one-fourth of all bonuses and royalties under any lease contract.”
The second deed recites that the reservation provisions in the deed to complainant are “. . . the same provisions as contained in . . . ” the Bolinger deed. Respondent does not stop there. He goes on to point out that part of the Bolinger provisions “ . *175wherein the grantee in said conveyance would be entitled to received one-fourth of all bonuses and royalties . . .” By the provisions of the Bolinger deed, the grantee therein, the respondent, received the non-participating royalty. If the “same provisions” are to control in the second deed, then the grantee therein, the complainant, must receive the same non-participating royalty.
If respondent intended to retain the non-participating royalty for himself, he could have said so. As was said by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas with respect to a mineral reservation:
“ . . . The wording of reservations and exceptions in conveyances is not difficult.
“ . . . If their purpose had been to reserve a Vstfi of the minerals that they owned in the east 10 acres for themselves, we think they would have made such intent an express feature of the reservation provision. ...” Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 67 S.W.2d 911, 916, 917.
In the paragraph of the second deed immediately following the paragraph dealing with the mineral reservation, respondent had no difficulty in clearly reserving to himself the title to and right to remove certain timber from the land for a period of two years.
The last construction of the second deed is favorable to the grantee therein; i. e., the complainant. The last construction favoring the grantee is at least as reasonable as the construction contended for by the grantor. This court has said:
“[2] We think that the interpretation or construction placed on the so-called reservation clause by the grantees, the appellees here, is as plausible as the construction placed thereon by the appellant. In other words, we are clear to the conclusion that the words used in the so-called reservation clause are ambiguous and that the meaning of that clause is doubtful.
“We must therefore construe the so-called reservation clause so as to resolve the doubts in favor of the grantees and against the grantor. May v. Bedsole, 245 Ala. 323, 16 So.2d 703; Milner Land Co. v. Houston, 225 Ala. 223, 142 So. 410; Martin v. Consolidated Cone Co., 216 Ala. 551, 114 So. 37; Webb v. Jones, 163 Ala. 637, 50 So. 887; Jacobs v. Roach, 161 Ala. 201, 49 So. 576; 16 Am.Jur. 615, Deeds, § 309; 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 140, p. 450.” Crump v. Crump, 261 Ala. 504, 509, 74 So.2d 713.
Following the foregoing authorities, even if it be conceded that the reservation provision of the second deed is ambiguous, it follows that the deed must be construed in favor of the grantee and against the grantor.
Testimony was taken ore tenus before the trial court whose province it was to consider the same and determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom; and the findings of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed unless plainly and palpably wrong. Under this rule, the decree of the trial court is due to be affirmed.
Affirmed.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MADDOX, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
MERRILL, HARWOOD and BLOOD-WORTH, JJ., and LAWSON, Supernumerary Justice, dissent.