Court Opinion

ID: 9927060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 01:02:06.846819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:46.138313
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 In re Nathan B. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re NATHAN B., a Person                                   B329228
 Coming Under the Juvenile
 Court Law.                                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
                                                             20CCJP06644A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,

           v.

 VALERIE Z.,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.
     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Affirmed.

     Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                             ******
       In this juvenile dependency case, a mother challenges the
juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights over her
three-year-old son and prescribing adoption as his permanent
placement. Because the juvenile court did not err in determining
that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
termination of rights did not apply, and because adoption—not
legal guardianship—is the statutorily preferred option for
placement, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The Family
       Valerie Z. (mother) and Brannon B. (father) are the parents
of Nathan B. Nathan was born in February 2020.
       Mother first started using methamphetamine when she
was 14 years old, and by the time she was age 21, she was using
methamphetamine daily. She continued to use until she was
seven months pregnant with Nathan.
       Mother and father have a tense relationship. In November
2020, they had a heated argument during which mother yelled,
screamed, and struck the walls of their apartment, which

                                2
triggered a noise complaint to the police. Mother has also pulled
on father’s clothing to restrain him from walking away from her.1
II.    The Department Intervenes
       In December 2020, the juvenile court detained Nathan
from his parents and placed him with maternal aunt and
maternal uncle (the caregivers).
       A few days later, on December 17, 2020, the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert
dependency jurisdiction over Nathan on the basis of (1) the
parents’ history of domestic violence (rendering jurisdiction
appropriate under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)),2 and (2) mother’s substance abuse
(rendering jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, subdivision
(b)).3 At a combined adjudication and disposition hearing on

1     Mother and father also suffer from mental health
conditions: Mother was diagnosed with major depressive
disorder as a teenager and father, a military veteran, has post-
traumatic stress disorder and attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder. Because the parents’ mental health conditions did not
directly give rise to the exertion of dependency jurisdiction over
Nathan, we do not discuss them further.

2     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

3      The petition also alleged father’s failure to protect Nathan
from mother’s substance abuse as well as father’s own substance
abuse issues with methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol.
The juvenile court sustained those allegations, but because father
is not a party to this appeal, we do not further discuss the
allegations against him.

                                 3
February 22, 2021, the juvenile court sustained the allegations,
removed Nathan from his parents’ custody, granted the parents
monitored visitation, and ordered mother to (1) complete a
drug/alcohol treatment program, (2) undergo weekly drug testing,
(3) participate in a 12-step program with a sponsor, (4) join a
domestic violence support group, (5) complete a parenting class,
and (6) attend individual counseling.
III. Juvenile Court Supervision
      A.     The six-month review period
      By August 2021, mother had successfully completed a
parenting class and attended several online narcotics and
alcoholics anonymous meetings, but she was terminated from her
outpatient substance abuse program because she “did not comply
with [the] program, struggled with program rules and struggled
with her individual testing and random drug testing.” During
the six months between the combined adjudication and
disposition hearing and August 2021, mother tested negative six
times but failed to show for drug testing 12 times. She had not
joined any domestic violence support group or attended any
individual counseling sessions.
      However, mother’s visits with Nathan were “going well”
and he would “become distressed” when mother left a visit.
Nathan was also “thriv[ing]” with the caregivers, with whom he
shared “a healthy bond.”
      At the six-month status review hearing on August 23, 2021,
the juvenile court found mother’s progress on her case plan to be
“substantial” and continued her reunification services.

                                4
       B.    The six- to 12-month review period and
termination of reunification services
       By February 2022, mother was on a “discharge contract”
with her substance abuse program to encourage her to take
“responsibility in staying enrolled.” She had relapsed and
submitted to drug testing only by the program, but not by the
Department. The program reported that mother had four
positive tests for methamphetamine, five negative tests, and four
missed tests. Mother had recently enrolled in a domestic violence
program.
       During this period, mother’s visits with Nathan were
“inconsistent.” Although the caregivers tried to accommodate
mother’s schedule, she did not communicate and did not visit
every week. The Department was concerned that mother’s
visitation amounted to only “the bare minimum” and the
“quality” of her visits with Nathan were “poor” and “not
adequate.” Meanwhile, Nathan had “maintained a healthy bond
and relationship” with the caregivers.
       At the 12-month status review hearing on March 1, 2022,
the juvenile court found mother’s progress on her case plan had
“not been substantial.” The court terminated reunification
services and set a permanency planning hearing.
       C.    Reinstatement of reunification services
       On July 5, 2022, mother filed a petition under section 388
asking the juvenile court to reinstate reunification services or to
return Nathan to her custody. Since creating a written schedule
for visitation, mother’s visits with Nathan had become more
consistent. Nathan’s therapist and a Department social worker
observed that Nathan had an “attachment” to and “positive bond”
with mother. He would “scream[] with excitement” and “glow[]”

                                 5
when he saw mother and called her “mama.” Nevertheless,
Nathan was “very attached” to the caregivers, who provided him
a “strong, loving and safe” environment; he called maternal aunt
“mom.” The caregivers also reported that they suspected mother
was under the influence during some visits and that, in their
opinion, mother would “giv[e] up and wait[]” for maternal aunt to
step in and manage Nathan’s challenging behavior. Mother still
had not attended individual counseling.
       On October 4, 2022, the juvenile court granted mother’s
petition and reinstated reunification services. The court also
granted mother unmonitored visitation on the condition that she
test clean, get a sponsor, and comply with her case plan.
       D.    Second termination of reunification services
       The Department later discovered that on September 29,
2022—less than a week before the juvenile court had granted
mother’s section 388 petition—mother had tested positive for
methamphetamine. Five weeks later, mother told the
Department that she could not complete her drug test on
November 2, 2022; when she tested the next day, she tested
positive for PCP. Mother claimed the tests results were
“impossible,” yet she thereafter stopped attending her substance
abuse program. She still did not enroll in individual counseling.
       Based on mother’s noncompliance, the Department filed a
petition under section 388 asking the juvenile court to terminate
mother’s reunification services, set a permanency planning
hearing within 120 days, and limit mother to monitored visits
with Nathan. The juvenile court granted the petition on January
9, 2023.

                                6
       E.    Termination of parental rights
       At the permanency planning hearing on May 8, 2023, the
juvenile court found Nathan to be adoptable, identified the
caregivers as his prospective adopters, and terminated mother’s
(and father’s) parental rights. The court expressly found that the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply to bar
termination because, although mother “maintained regular
visitation” with Nathan and showed “affection,” she had “not
established a bond” with him and because any benefit to Nathan
from his relationship with mother was “outweighed by the
physical and emotional benefit” he would receive through
adoption—particularly “considering” mother had “not entirely
gotten [her] situation in order”—specifically, her “substance
abuse issues.”
IV. Appeal
       Mother filed this timely appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
       Mother challenges the juvenile court’s termination of her
parental rights over Nathan on two grounds: (1) the court should
have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception,
and (2) the court should have ordered a less severe option (rather
than adoption) as Nathan’s permanent plan.4

4      The Department makes the contention that mother
forfeited these arguments by failing to raise them at the
permanency planning hearing before the juvenile court. We
reject this contention. Although mother’s counsel did not invoke
the beneficial parent-child exception by name, counsel’s
argument obliquely referred to the exception’s elements. More to
the point, the juvenile court understood the gist of counsel’s
argument, as the court elected to rule on the applicability of the

                                 7
I.     The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
       Mother asserts that the juvenile court’s determination that
the beneficial parent-child relationship exception does not apply
is based on (1) insufficient evidence, and (2) defects in analysis.
       A.     Sufficiency of the evidence
       Once a juvenile court has terminated reunification services,
the court “shall terminate parental rights” if it finds, “‘by clear
and convincing evidence[,] that it is likely that the [child] will be
adopted’” within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subds. (a) & (c)(1);
Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249-250.)
Thus, a juvenile court must terminate parental rights and order
adoption unless the parent opposing termination proves that one
of six statutory exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1) &
(c)(1)(B); In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527, overruled
in part on other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010 & fn. 7.)
       The exception at issue here is the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception. Because this exception “applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child,” a court will find the exception
applicable only if the parent “establish[es]” “(1) regular visitation
and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which
would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021)
11 Cal.5th 614, 630, 631, 635 (Caden C.).) In assessing whether a
child would benefit from a continued relationship with the

exception. In any event, we possess the discretion to reach the
merits of forfeited arguments and exercise that discretion here.

                                 8
parent, the parent must show “that the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent” in light of several
factors, such as (1) “‘[t]he age of the child, [(2)] the portion of the
child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, [(3)] the “positive” or
“negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and [(4)]
the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at pp. 636, 632, quoting In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) In assessing
whether the termination of parental rights would be detrimental
to the child “when balanced against the countervailing benefit of
a new, adoptive home,” a court is to examine “how the child
would be affected by losing the parental relationship” entirely.
(Caden C., at pp. 633, 636-637.) This is necessarily a “subtle,
case-specific inquiry.” (Ibid.) We review a juvenile court’s
findings regarding the first two elements (visitation and
relationship) for substantial evidence, and its ruling regarding
the third element (balancing of detriment versus benefit) for an
abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639-641.) Because the parent
challenging the termination of parental rights bears the burden
of establishing the exception, that parent (here, mother) can
prevail on appeal only if (1) the evidence in the record compels a
finding in the parent’s favor as a matter of law as to the first two
elements of the exception (In re Luis H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
1223, 1227; Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family
Services v. Superior Court (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 962, 967); and
(2) the juvenile court’s conclusion that the termination of
mother’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Nathan was
irrational and arbitrary (In re M.L. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 210,
227-228). This is a notoriously heavy burden to sustain.
       Because the Department does not dispute the juvenile
court’s finding that mother had regular visitation and contact

                                  9
with Nathan during the two and a half years this dependency
case had been open, we focus on the last two elements of the
exception.
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that Nathan did not have “a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment” to mother, such that the two lacked a substantial
beneficial relationship. Most of the factors enumerated above as
relevant to this element support this finding. Nathan was just
over three years old at the time of the permanency planning
hearing, and spent more than two of those three years with the
caregivers. To be sure, Nathan did have a “bond” with mother:
He called her “mama,” expressed joy when seeing her,
experienced loving visits, and, during the period immediately
following his removal from mother’s custody, was upset when
their visits would end. But this bond—and even his love for
mother—do not alone translate into the existence of a
“substantial, positive, emotional attachment” that otherwise
“suffices to establish the exception overall.” (In re J.D. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 833, 857, fn. 17 (J.D.); In re M.V. (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1155, 1185 (M.V.) [“the second element is not, ‘Is
there a bond?’”].) Nathan also had particular behavior issues
that warranted therapy, yet the caregivers noted that mother did
not provide the type of supervision and intervention Nathan
needed during her visits. Mother’s ability or inability to occupy a
“parental role” in helping Nathan address these issues, while not
dispositive, is nonetheless relevant to the strength of the
relationship between the parent and child. (See In re B.D. (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1228-1231 (B.D.); J.D., at pp. 864-865; In re
M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 848, 851 (M.G.); In re L.A.-O.
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 210 (L.A.-O.); In re Katherine J.

                                 10
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 319-320 (Katherine J.); In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1157 (A.L.).) By highlighting only
that evidence in the record showing their love for one another
and ignoring the factors that cut against her, mother effectively
asks us to reweigh the evidence in her favor—this, we cannot do.
(B.D., at p. 1225.) At bottom, the record does not compel a
finding that Nathan had a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to mother.
       The juvenile court also did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the detriment Nathan would suffer from
terminating his relationship with mother was outweighed by the
stability and permanency that would come from adoption by the
caregivers. On the one hand, Nathan would not likely suffer
much detriment if his relationship with mother was terminated
given Nathan’s lack of a sufficiently emotional attachment to
mother. Although Nathan may have been upset when mother
would leave the visits during the first year of dependency
supervision, there is no evidence that this behavior by Nathan
continued thereafter or that Nathan would otherwise suffer
detriment—or even be upset—by the cessation of his monitored
visits with mother. On the other hand, and contrary to what
mother asserts is “not relevant,” the benefit of terminating
mother’s relationship and allowing Nathan to be adopted by the
caregivers—with whom Nathan has had a “strong, loving, and
safe attachment” for years—is substantial. On these facts, the
juvenile court did not act irrationally in concluding that the
benefit to Nathan outweighed the detriment.
       B.    Analytical defects
       Mother cites as defective three aspects of the trial court’s
analysis of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception.

                                11
       First, she argues that the trial court failed to make specific
findings in support of its ruling; more specifically, she assails the
court for not making findings regarding the elements and
subsidiary factors delineated in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th 614.
This argument is meritless. There is no “requirement . . . that [a]
juvenile court, in finding the [beneficial] parent[-child
relationship] exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings
relative to its conclusions regarding any or all of the three
elements of the exception.” (A.L., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p.
1156.) Mother asserts that, in the absence of express findings,
we cannot be “certain” the court properly applied the Caden C.
factors; for support, she cites J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p.
854 and B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1222. This argument
also lacks merit. Most fundamentally, mother’s assertion
effectively urges us to presume that the trial court got the law
wrong, which flies in the face of one of the cardinal rules of
appellate review—namely, that we presume lower courts “‘know[]
and appl[y] the correct statutory and case law’” absent “evidence
to the contrary.” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.)
J.D. and B.D. are not to the contrary. Those cases both dealt
with juvenile court rulings on the applicability of the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception made prior to Caden C., with
appellate review occurring shortly after Caden C.’s clarification of
the requirements of that exception; in this situation, an appellate
court may well have concerns—in the absence of express
findings—that the juvenile court may not have properly applied
the law that did not yet exist at the time of its ruling. But that is
not the situation here, where the juvenile court’s ruling occurred
years after Caden C., and where we may justifiably presume the

                                 12
court was aware of Caden C.’s nuances in the absence of any
indication to the contrary. Here, there was no such indication.
       Second, mother argues that the juvenile court expressly
relied on two improper factors. (See M.G., supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at p. 852 [“When a juvenile court bases its decision to terminate
parental rights on improper factors, the . . . court abuses its
discretion”].) Mother begins by pointing to the court’s reference
to mother’s ongoing substance abuse issues, but consideration of
a parent’s continued struggles is not always improper. Caden C.
and its progeny make clear that whether a parent has addressed
the issues giving rise to dependency jurisdiction may not be
relevant unto itself, but it is relevant to show the positive or
negative effect of the parent’s relationship on the child and, to a
lesser extent, to the balancing of whether termination of that
relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 639; B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1228; J.D.,
supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 865; L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 210; Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318; In re D.M.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 269-270.) Here, the juvenile court’s
reference to mother’s relapses was in reference to its analysis of
whether Nathan would suffer a detriment from his loss of contact
with mother, which was not improper. Mother next faults the
court for stating that it was “happy to hear that the caregivers
are open to allowing” mother to continue to visit Nathan, but the
context of the remark shows that it was also not improper. The
court made this remark after it completed announcing its
rationale on the inapplicability of the exception and made this
remark in connection with its decision to refer the case to the
Consortium for Children (for families to enter into postadoption
visitation agreements). The court’s ruling on the applicability of

                                13
the exception was not premised upon—and did not even factor
in—the possibility of continued visits; as such, there was no
error.
       Third and lastly, mother argues that the Department did
not fulfill a June 2022 order of the juvenile court to report on “the
quality and quantity of the parents’ visits” with Nathan as well
as “information regarding the bond between the parents” and
Nathan. (§ 366.21, subd. (i)(1)(B) [prior to permanency planning
hearing, the Department must “prepare an assessment” that
“review[s] . . . the amount . . . and nature of any contact between
the child and their parents . . . since the time of placement”].)
Mother ignores that the Department complied with this order
across several reports, and especially did so in an August 16,
2022 Last Minute Information report that stated “despite”
Nathan being “very attached” to the caregivers, he “has
developed a positive bond with the parents,” as demonstrated by
his excitement to see them and identifying them as “mama” and
“dada.” (See In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251
[juvenile court, like appellate court, is required to consider “the
entire record” in making its decision].) To the extent mother is
asserting, for the first time on appeal, that the juvenile court
should have conducted a bonding study before terminating her
parental rights, mother is wrong. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54
Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [“[t]here is no requirement in statutory or
case law that a court must secure a bonding study as a condition
precedent” to terminating parental rights]; In re M.M. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 61, 68-69, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276099.)
II.    Legal Guardianship
       Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in
selecting adoption as Nathan’s permanent plan—rather than a

                                 14
legal guardianship—because a legal guardianship would have
been in Nathan’s “best interest.” This contention lacks merit.
The juvenile dependency statutes do not treat all post-
termination options as equally viable, or leave it to juvenile
courts to choose which of those equally viable options is in a
child’s best interest. To the contrary, our Legislature has
explicitly mandated that “‘[a]doption is the . . . preferred
permanent plan’”; “[g]uardianship is not to be considered as a
permanent plan unless and until adoption . . . is not appropriate.”
(M.V., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1186.) It is not the court’s role
“to compare the pros and cons of adoption and legal guardianship
and then choose between them.” (Ibid.) Mother has not shown
that adoption is not possible; her sole argument that adoption is
not in Nathan’s best interest is that, on balance, children are
better off remaining in contact with their biological parents. This
is insufficient by itself, as it exists in just about every dependency
case; accepting mother’s argument would make adoption the
option of last resort rather than the preferred option. We are not
in a position to rewrite the dependency laws.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The order terminating mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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