Court Opinion

ID: 9723282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:10:07.062156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:14.591035
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
I concur in the Court’s reasoning and result in the case of the People v Overby and in the result reached in People v Anderson. I write separately because I am unable to subscribe to the reasons assigned for affirming Anderson’s conviction.
After enunciating our newly defined test for dealing with requests by defendants to proceed pro *372se, my Brother Lindemer examines a portion of the colloquy between the defendant Anderson and the court and concludes therefrom that "the above exchange reveals that defendant was not competent to waive his right [to counsel] knowingly and voluntarily”.
I must disassociate myself from that conclusion because I believe it is an unwarranted factual determination.
In holding that the exchange between the court and Anderson, quoted in the majority opinion, reveals that the defendant is not competent to waive his right to an attorney, the Court appears to conclude that Anderson’s statements concerning a "so-called 'mask ruling of Jessie James’ case concerning the Supreme Court’ ” and other statements are so bizarre and nonsensical as to demonstrate that he is lacking in the requisite mental capacity to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to an attorney. That is indeed a momentous conclusion to reach solely upon a reading of the short colloquy quoted. There may well be justification for concluding therefrom that the remarks demonstrate that Anderson will be unable to capably and effectively conduct his own defense but, as the majority observes, competence does not refer to legal skills "[f]or his technical legal knowledge as such [is] not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself’. Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 836; 95 S Ct 2525; 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975).
To me, the exchange demonstrates no more than that Anderson did not understand that "new evidence” does not include a Supreme Court case and that he was incapable of expressing himself in an artful and articulate way in order to convey adequately to the court the point he was attempting *373to make. While it may be fair to characterize his remarks as inarticulate, confusing, lacking in clarity and even senseless, it is speculative indeed to conclude therefrom that they demonstrate Anderson’s incompetence, in the sense of lack of mental capacity, to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to the assistance of counsel.1
For a different reason, however, I conclude that the trial judge did not commit reversible error in refusing Anderson’s request to dismiss his counsel.
The colloquy between the defendant and the court was as follows:
"The Court: Mr. Anderson?
'Mr. Holst: Stand up.
"The Defendant: Your Honor, I would like to have Mr. Holst removed from this case for lack of evidence.
"The Court: Why?
"The Defendant: I mean, I have my own personal feelings about Mr. Holst.
"The Court: What are those, sir?
"The Defendant: I don’t think he has put forth every effort that he has to see that justice is being done in this case.
"The Court: Are you prepared to hire your own attorney, sir?
"The Defendant: No, I am not at this time.
"The Court: Are you prepared to represent yourself at this trial?
"The Defendant: Yes, that is what I—
"The Court: I beg your pardon?
"The Defendant: Yes.
*374"The Court: You wish to represent yourself?
"The Defendant: Yes. Not at this moment. I wish to represent myself and have a little more time to get affiliated with the case.
"The Court: Thank you, sir.
"The Court: Why didn’t you bring this motion to the attention of the Court before the morning of trial, Mr. Anderson?
"The Defendant: I just got aware of some evidence concerning this case and I can’t — I really don’t feel that justice can be held in this case.
"The Court: You say you are aware of new evidence?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: What is that?
"The Defendant: I mean, like, I came across a little piece of evidence of the Supreme Court.
"The Court: A case?
"The Defendant: Yes, a case.
"The Court: Some decision by the United States Supreme Court?
"The Defendant: That is correct.
"The Court: And what about that?
"The Defendant: I mean, the case concerned of Jessie James, the mask ruling of it.
"The Court: Would you stand up, sir? What?
"The Defendant: The mask ruling of Jessie James’ case concerning the Supreme Court, the waiving of the masked bandit.
"The Court: The waiving of a masked bandit?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: All right. Is that your only piece of new evidence?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: Have you talked to Mr. Holst about this case?
"The Defendant: Yes.”
When Anderson’s statements to the court are examined in context, it becomes evident that his *375request to proceed pro se was essentially an afterthought to an expressed desire that Mr. Holst be removed from the case. The idea of self-representation was suggested to the defendant by the trial judge and concurred in by the defendant but conditioned upon a concomitant request by the defendant for an adjournment to enable himself to become "affiliated with the case” and to find new evidence.
The request to proceed pro se was not unequivocal which, as the majority points out, is a traditional requirement for such a request. United States ex rel Maldonado v Denno, 348 F2d 12, 15 (CA 2, 1965). See, e.g., People v Payne, 27 Mich App 133; 183 NW2d 371 (1970).
Reluctance on the part of many defendants to face the reality on trial day morning that the moment of truth is at hand is a familiar fact of life in the criminal justice system. Experienced trial judges, such as the able judge in this case, are thoroughly familiar and regularly confronted with trial day adjournment requests, advanced for countless reasons and frequently coupled with parallel and conditional requests to discharge counsel and proceed pro se.
The trial judge recognized just such a circumstance before him in this case and, after examining both the defendant and his counsel, carefully concluded:
"The Court: All right, sir. Thank you. It appearing that we are now at the morning of trial, that Mr. Holst is one of the most competent and experienced defense lawyers available in this part of the state, he is thoroughly prepared to try this case, that Mr. Anderson is not prepared to proceed to try the case alone this morning, and that no good reason has been shown for relieving him from his responsibility to the court in this *376respect, the motion to remove Mr. Holst as defense counsel is denied.”
If Anderson’s request to proceed to trial pro se had been unequivocal, the trial judge’s observations about the preparedness and competence of defendant’s trial counsel would not have justified the denial of such request. However, the court correctly found that Anderson’s request to represent himself was contingent upon the allowance of additional time to prepare for trial, which the trial court did not, and was not obliged to, allow. Consequently, the defendant failed to invoke the procedures outlined by the majority and the trial judge’s refusal to dismiss defendant’s counsel was not error.
Levin, J., concurred with Ryan, J.

 It is interesting to note that in assigning his reasons for denying the defendant’s request, the trial judge did not, as does the majority, conclude that the defendant was not "competent” to knowingly and voluntarily waive the assistance of counsel. Instead, the court denied Anderson’s request for the reasons that his assigned counsel was "one of the most competent and experienced defense lawyers in this part of the state” and that Anderson was "not prepared to proceed to try the case alone this morning”.