Court Opinion

ID: 9363297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 19:06:04.821675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.270393
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Dissolution of Marriage of Mongkollugsana, 2023-Ohio-25.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

 IN THE MATTER OF THE                                  :
 DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE                           :
 OF:                                                   :    C.A. No. 2022-CA-15
                                                       :
 ROCHIEL V. MONGKOLLUGSANA                             :    Trial Court Case No. 1993 DR 33
 (nka FOULK)                                           :
                                                       :    (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
       Appellee                                        :    Domestic Relations)
                                                       :
 v.                                                    :

  JACKRIT MONGKOLLUGSANA

       Appellant

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                     Rendered on January 6, 2023

                                               ...........

ZEBULON N. WAGNER, Attorney for Appellee

COURTNEY L. HANNA, DEBORAH L. MCNINCH, S. KYLE DODDERER, Attorneys for
Appellant

                                             .............

TUCKER, P.J.
                                                                                       -2-

        {¶ 1} Jackrit Mongkollugsana appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his

motion to modify or terminate his spousal-support obligation. Because we find no error,

we affirm.

                                 Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} Rochiel Mongkollugsana (nka Foulk) and Jackritt Mongkollugsana were

married in April 1975.    The marriage was terminated by decree of dissolution in April

1993.    Relevant to this appeal, their separation agreement, which was incorporated into

the decree of dissolution, stated:

        (2.) Spousal Support

              The husband shall pay spousal support in the amount of FOUR

        THOUSAND DOLLARS ($4,000.00) per month plus poundage payable in

        advance on or before the first day of each month beginning on or before

        November 1, 1992, through the Delaware County Child Support

        Enforcement Agency (CSEA) by assignment from and upon Account No.

        * * * at Bank One of Columbus, NA, in the name of Jackrit Mongkollugsana,

        DDS, Inc.    The husband’s spousal support obligation shall continue

        unabated unless and until the wife remarries or dies, or the husband dies.

              During the existence of the husband’s spousal support obligation

        under the terms of this Separation Agreement, the husband shall maintain

        the wife as the irrevocable beneficiary to New York Life Insurance Whole

        Life Insurance Policy No. * * * in the face amount of $500,000.         The

        husband shall provide the wife with proof of this designation within 45 days
                                                                                       -3-

       of the date of execution hereof.

              The husband shall maintain medical, dental, and optical insurance

       for the wife during the existence of his spousal support obligation. The

       husband shall furnish the wife with a medical provider card to secure this

       obligation. Further, the husband shall pay any and all of the wife’s medical

       expenses over and above the first $100 of uninsured medical expenses

       each year, during the existence of the spousal support obligation.

              Upon proof of the wife’s enrollment in any graduate or undergraduate

       educational program, the husband shall pay to the wife as and for spousal

       support, reimbursement for any and all tuitions and fees attributable to such

       enrollment, payable directly to the wife. The wife shall be responsible for

       her own ancillary expenses such as course books and equipment, not

       including regularly assessed classroom or course fees. This obligation

       shall continue for a period of ten years from the date of prospective

       dissolution of marriage envisioned by this separation agreement or until the

       wife dies or remarries or the husband dies.

       {¶ 3} The decree of dissolution stated that the separation agreement was

“approved and incorporated as part of this Decree.”        The decree further stated in

pertinent part:

              In addition to the terms and conditions set forth in the Separation

       Agreement, the following matters related to spousal support, and equitable

       property division pursuant to agreed valuations of marital assets are further
                                                                                        -4-

      defined.

             The husband shall pay spousal support in the amount of $4,000 per

      month plus poundage payable on or before the first day of each month

      beginning with the date of this entry, through the Champaign County Child

      Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) by assignment from Bank One of

      Columbus, Account No. * * *, in the name of Jackrit Mongkollugsana, DDS,

      Inc., which obligation shall continue unabated until the wife remarries or dies

      or the husband dies. The parties shall immediately report to the CSEA,

      and each party is under a continuing obligation to report any change in

      address, or any change in circumstance which will terminate the spousal

      support obligation.     The husband is restrained from making direct

      payments of spousal support to the wife, and the wife is restrained from

      accepting direct payments of spousal support, except as otherwise

      enumerated. Any direct payments of the $4,000 monthly spousal support

      shall be deemed a gift. The remainder of the terms and conditions of

      spousal support as set forth by the parties in their separation agreement

      and the modification thereof shall be dealt with by and between the parties

      subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Court to assure compliance.

      {¶ 4} On January 14, 2022, Jackrit filed a motion to modify or terminate spousal

support. In his motion, he noted he had retired from employment. Rochiel filed an

objection to the motion in which she asserted the trial court had not retained jurisdiction

to either modify or terminate Jackrit’s support obligation. The matter was submitted
                                                                                            -5-

without hearing on briefs filed by both parties.

       {¶ 5} The trial court issued an order denying the motion to terminate or modify

spousal support upon a finding that neither the separation agreement nor the decree of

dissolution “contain a provision specifically authorizing the Court to modify the amount or

terms of spousal support. The language ‘during the existence of the (or his) spousal

support obligation’ refers to the specific terms of when the obligation terminates, i.e. ‘until

the wife remarries or dies, or the husband dies.’ The Decree references ‘continuing

jurisdiction of the Court,’ but only to ‘assure compliance’ with the terms and conditions of

the spousal support obligation.”

       {¶ 6} Jackrit appeals.

             Trial Court’s Jurisdiction to Modify or Terminate Spousal Support

       {¶ 7} The sole assignment of error asserted by Jackrit states:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S

       REQUEST TO MODIFY SPOUSAL SUPPORT DESPITE THE DECREE

       RETAINING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY

       {¶ 8} Jackrit claims the trial court incorrectly concluded that it lacked continuing

jurisdiction over spousal support. In support, he argues that the terms of both the decree

and the separation agreement allowed for modification. Alternatively, he argues the trial

court improperly altered the terms of the separation agreement, thereby creating an

ambiguity, which must be construed against Rochiel given that her attorney drafted the
                                                                                          -6-

separation agreement.1

         {¶ 9} “A separation agreement is a contract between the parties. Its interpretation

is generally a matter of law, and it is subject to the same rules of construction that govern

other contracts.” (Citations omitted.) Condit v. Condit, 190 Ohio App.3d 634, 2010-

Ohio-5202, 943 N.E.2d 1041, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).           “The court's primary objective in

construing a separation agreement is to give effect to the parties' intent, which can be

found in the language they have chosen to employ.” (Citations omitted.) Id. “If the

terms of a separation agreement are unambiguous, a court must give the terms their

plain, ordinary meanings, and it need not go beyond the plain language of the agreement

to determine the parties' rights and obligations.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

         {¶ 10} R.C. 3105.18(E) pertinently provides:

         [I]f a continuing order for periodic payments of money as spousal support is

         entered in a divorce or dissolution of marriage action * * *, the court that

         enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of marriage does not have

         jurisdiction to modify the amount or terms of the alimony or spousal support

         unless the court determines that the circumstances of either party have

         changed and unless * * * [i]n the case of a dissolution of marriage, the

         separation agreement that is approved by the court and incorporated into

         the decree contains a provision specifically authorizing the court to modify

         the amount or terms of alimony or spousal support.

         {¶ 11} In this case, the separation agreement does not contain a provision

1
    Jackrit asserts he was not represented by counsel at the time of the dissolution.
                                                                                            -7-

permitting the court to modify the amount or terms of Jackrit’s spousal support obligation.

A plain reading of the separation agreement compels the conclusion that the trial court

did not retain jurisdiction to modify or terminate spousal support. Instead, as stated by

the trial court’s decision, the decree simply stated that the court had continuing jurisdiction

to assure compliance with the terms of the decree and separation agreement.

       {¶ 12} Further, we find the claim that the trial court improperly amended the terms

of the separation agreement to be without merit. We are cognizant of the facts that

Jackrit was not represented by counsel and that the separation agreement was drafted

by Rochiel’s counsel. However, we also note that Jackrit is well-educated and was

certainly capable of understanding the terms of that agreement. Importantly, Jackrit did

not file an appeal objecting to the terms of the decree, nor does he claim that he was

unaware of the differences between the decree and the separation agreement. Further,

at no time during the more than 28 years following the decree did Jackrit file any motions

raising this claim. Thus, we conclude this argument is barred by res judicata.

       {¶ 13} The plain terms of the separation agreement and decree state that the

monthly spousal support obligation “shall continue unabated unless and until the wife

remarries or dies, or the husband dies.” Because neither the decree nor the separation

agreement provides for continuing jurisdiction over the amount or term of the support

obligation, we find no error in the trial court’s decision.

       {¶ 14} Accordingly, the sole assignment of error is overruled.

                                             Conclusion
                                                            -8-

      {¶ 15} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                    .............

WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.