Court Opinion

ID: 9830817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:31:27.833808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:27.194938
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
We have heretofore refused to consider any of the appellant’s assignments of error, and therefore could not do otherwise than affirm the judgment of the trial court. Unwilling, however, to permit the mere failure of counsel to conform to the rules in presenting assignments to defeat a meritorious appeal, we have again carefully examined the record before us and have reached the conclusion that the trial court should not have instructed a verdict for the appellees. If the will of Mrs. Delilah Dearks was admissible in evidence, it was sufficient, prima facie, to establish a title in J. R. Neely, the father of Mrs. Drumwright, from whom the latter inherits. The objection is urged that the judgment of the county court admitting the will to probate had been appealed from, and that appeal was still pending at the time the will was offered. This objection would be good if the facts relied on were shown to be true. The only evidence of those is the following agreement: “It is agreed that the Houston Oil Company of Texas, defendant herein, tender and proffer to tender in evidence, which was waived by attorney for plaintiffs, the record of the court to show action which was taken in cause No. 1196, the estate of Delily Deark, deceased, on appeal from the county court of Newton county to the district court at the time of the introduction of the certified copy and probate of the will of Delily Deark, deceased, offered for evidence by the plaintiffs in this cause, which record includes all of the actions taken by the court upon the trial of said cause and the appeal bond filed therein by the appellant, Houston Oil Company of Texas, the dismissal by the district court thereof; and it is admitted by the parties that the appellant, Houston Oil Company of Texas, filed therein on February 29, 1912, a supersedeas bond, which bond was approved and filed by the clerk of the district court of Newton county, Texas, prior to the offering of certified copy of the will of Delily Deark and probate thereof.” Before this court can say that a case in which a judgment has been rendered is still pending on appeal, the record must show some evidence of that appeal and that it was seasonably perfected. Eor one party merely to waive the introduction of the evidence tending to show those facts, without being followed by an admission full enough to supply the facts, leaves the record incomplete. In this record the admission refers merely to case No. 1196. We have no means of knowing whether that is a proceeding to probate the will of Mrs. Delilah Dearks, or is some other matter pending in the court. In the present state of the record, the objection to the introduction of the will of Mrs. Dearks is untenable. That instrument alone was suffi-*1014eient to invest Mrs. Drumwriglit with a good title if Mrs. Dearks had not parted with the land before her death in 1852.
 Appellant offered in evidence a deed containing the following recital: “All that tract or parcel of land situated in Zavalla’s grant on the river in Sabine, Texas, it being the same which was granted to Delilah Dearks by the commissioner, Geo. A. Nixon, on the 3d day of October in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-five, and by her conveyed to William English by deed bearing date the 3d day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, and by said English conveyed to the present vendor by deed bearing date the 3d day of August in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six.” The above recital is contained in a deed, from A. Hotchkiss to Stewart Newall, which was dated the 18th day 4 of October, 1837. There were similar recitals in two other deeds offered; one from Stewart Newall to James A. Mason dated the 10th day of February, 1845; another from Mason to John Herman dated the 28th day of June, 1851. The deeds were offered as links in appellant’s chain of title, and the recitals as circumstances tending to show that a deed had previously been executed by Delilah Dearks to William English, under whom the appellant claims, that deed being missing. It must be conceded that, if the facts were sufficient to show that Delilah Dearks had executed a deed to William English, as seems to be indicated by the recitals tendered in evidence, then the appellant had a complete chain of title originating many years prior to the death of Mrs. Dearks. These recitals were excluded by the court on the ground that they were hearsay and self-serving and were not evidence of title. It is here insisted by counsel for appellees that no sufficient predicate was laid for the introduction of this character of evidence. But that objection was not made in the court below, and cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. The deeds in which those recitals appeared were in the appellant’s chain of title and were considerably over 60 years of age. The records where the deed from English would likely be found had been burned many years ago. According to the testimony of appellees, J. R. Neely had owned this property under the will or by inheritance since 1852, but there is no evidence that he made any claim to it or had paid any taxes, although much of his life was spent in this state at no great distance from the land. The record shows that numerous transfers of the land had been made between 1845 and 1900, when Neely died. Mrs. Drumwright admitted that during all that time neither she nor her father made any pretense of claiming this land. Uhder this state of facts, the recitals should have gone to the jury for what they were worth, as circumstances tending to show that Mrs. Dearks had executed the deed to English. The principle upon which this rule rests is so fully discussed in the case of Brewer v. Cochran, 45 Tex. Civ. App. 179, 99 S. W. 1033,' that we deem it unnecessary to add anything to what is there said. In granting this rehearing, we have deviated from our former holding in regard to considering the assignments of error merely for the purpose of correcting the ruling of the trial court upon this one question.
The remaining assignments will not be considered. The motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the trial court in its entirety is reversed, and the cause remanded.