Court Opinion

ID: 9625680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:47:35.723831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:13.172381
License: Public Domain

Justice BUTTERFIELD
dissenting.
The majority’s holding sets a troubling precedent that mere proximity to hidden narcotics is sufficient to sustain a conviction. I take issue with such a precedent. The majority correctly found that the vehicle in which defendant was riding was not in the exclusive possession of defendant. As such, additional incriminating circumstances must exist for the trial court to properly deny defendant’s motion to dismiss. The majority asserts that there were additional incriminating circumstances. However, my review of the record leads me to the conclusion that there were no additional incriminating circumstances sufficient to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority found the following:
At the time of his arrest, defendant had been in the car approximately twenty minutes. According to both officers, there was an odor of marijuana in the car. The officers also found marijuana seeds and rolling papers inside the car. Accordingly, a juror could reasonably determine defendant knew drugs were in the car.
(Emphasis added.) I am not persuaded by the majority’s reasoning. Defendant was convicted of the offense of possession of cocaine. I do not believe that one can reasonably infer that defendant should have known of the existence of cocaine in the vehicle because he could have smelled the odor of marijuana and seen marijuana seeds and rolling papers. The evidence in this case could lead to a reasonable inference that there was marijuana in the vehicle, but not that there was an odorless substance such as cocaine in the vehicle. The majority stated that defendant must have known that there were “drugs” in the vehicle. The State’s burden was to specifically prove that defendant knew of the presence of cocaine, not “drugs,” in the vehicle.
I find it particularly difficult to accept any reasonable inference that defendant should have known of the existence of cocaine from *554the marijuana smell. One of the arresting officers testified that he did not believe this inference was possible. The prosecutor had the following colloquy with Officer Epps:
Q. And could you tell the jury why only Mr. Matias [defendant] was charged with [possession of cocaine]?
A. The location that I found the baggy of marijuana was under Mr. Matias’ seat along with the tinfoil. In my opinion I felt that, with the odor that Officer Qualls indicated to me that he detected and the odor that I detected and also seeing the baggy which I believed to be marijuana, I felt like everyone in the car had knowledge that there was marijuana in the car or being used in the car. The cocaine, however, to my knowledge, does not give off an odor that is detectable. So Mr. Matias was charged with [possession of] cocaine due to the fact of it being under the seat that he was sitting in.
Q. So in other words, Officer, based on the smell and other items that would lead you to believe that everybody else knew about the marijuana, they were thus charged with [possession of] marijuana?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you had no other evidence that anybody else would have known or knew about the cocaine?
A. That’s correct.
Clearly, since the officer did not believe the other occupants “would have known or knew about the cocaine,” the smell of marijuana and the presence of rolling paper could not have been the basis for his arrest of defendant. This testimony reveals that the officer’s only basis for charging defendant was his proximity to the bag of marijuana and cocaine that was hidden in the seat. When asked if either he or the other officer noticed anything unusual or any kind of surreptitious movements, Officer Epps responded, “No, sir, I would have remembered that if it had taken place.” This testimony satisfies me that there were no incriminating circumstances attributable to defendant. The officers found cocaine and simply charged the person sitting closest to it.
I do not believe the State is entitled to such an unreasonable inference as the majority has drawn from these facts. I believe that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant’s motion *555to dismiss. Therefore, I vote to reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Justice ORR joins in this dissenting opinion.