Court Opinion

ID: 9607416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:58:26.914022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:31.661295
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that “the judgment of conviction should be modified so as to limit appellee’s sentences to the term of imprisonment that he has now served.”
After holding that the two consecutive one-year sentences were authorized by law, the majority has determined the sentence imposed by the district magistrate should be modified because “the two offenses were really part of one general transaction involving the unlawful sale of liquor.”
I am of the opinion that this important question relating to our appellate authority has not been adequately briefed. There is considerable precedent to the effect that appellate courts are without authority to review a sentence imposed in a criminal case, unless it exceeds the statutory limits.1 These same authorities hold that sentenc*344ing is within the “sole province and discretion of trial judge, and unless an imposed sentence exceeds statutory maximum, or is otherwise illegal, appellate courts are without authority to act.”2 In the case at bar there is a total absence of any discussion concerning whether a criminal sentence can be reviewed on an appeal from a denial of a Crim.R. 35(b) motion. I do not believe that this court should have reached the conclusion it did without the benefit of proper argument and without clearly articulating the basis for, and instances when, review of criminal sentences is obtainable in our court system.
Granting that such review authority is possessed by this court and that the matter is properly before us, I am not convinced that the trial judge’s discretion in sentencing should be interfered with in this case. Ap-pellee had a record of twenty-five prior misdemeanors convictions at the time of sentencing. The sentencing judge was informed of the fact that in 1961 appellee was convicted of ten counts of selling liquor without a license, and was also made aware of other relevant facts and circumstances at the time sentence was imposed.3 In short, I am of the opinion that the trial judge’s discretion in regard to the sentence imposed should remain undisturbed.
I concur in all other aspects of this court’s opinion.

. See authorities collected in United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703 (4th Cir.1965).

. Id. at 703. The Pruitt court then continues to say:
Even if we considered the sentences in this case unduly harsh or severe, which we do not, we would be powerless to review under innumerable decisions of this and other appellate courts which have held consistently that there is no power in an appellate court to review sentence imposed, so long as it is within statutory limit.

. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 310 (1932).