Court Opinion

ID: 9767728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:24:30.66045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.649833
License: Public Domain

HUGHES, Justice.
Believing that this case should he reversed and remanded, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority in holding that the Court’s oral instruction to the jury was wrong. I do not agree that such instruction was harmless or that appellant has waived the error.
The Court had ruled, prior to his oral instruction, that appellant could not but that appellee could call Dr. Evans as a witness. Dr. Evans was not called to testify by either party.
Counsel for appellant properly and in a legitimate argument commented upon the failure of appellee to produce Dr. Evans and of his own inability to do so. The Court, however, without reason as far as the record shows, orally charged the jury as shown in the majority opinion, the effect of which was not only to destroy the force of appellant’s argument on this point but to put appellant’s counsel in a bad light before the jury.
I quote as apropos of this situation from the case of Dallas Consol. Electric St. R. Co. v. McAllister, 41 Tex.Civ.App. 131, 90 S.W. 933, 935, no writ history, where the Trial Court stated “If they (meaning counsel for defendant) won’t stand by what they have agreed to in open court, put the witness back on the stand” as follows:
“An attorney at law is an officer of the court, and as such is under special obligation to be considerate and respectful in his conduct and communications to the court or judge. He is also as such officer entitled to such treatment from the trial judge that the *850interest of his client will not be prejudiced. The trial judge is vested with large discretion in the conduct of the trial of causes, and an appellate court will not interfere to control the exercise of such discretion, unless there has been an abuse or most unwise use thereof. Enc.Pl. & Pr. vol. 21, pp. 974, 975. It must be conceded that the standing and reputation of counsel for fairness and honorable conduct and his real or apparent standing with the court has great weight with the jury in determining the importance to be attached to the evidence introduced by such attorney, as well as to his argument in discussing such evidence.”
This case quotes approvingly from an opinion by the Supreme Court of Michigan in McDuff v. Detroit Evening Journal, 84 Mich. 1, 47 N.W. 671, 674, 22 Am.St.Rep. 673, as follows:
“Appellate courts must presume that one occupying so important a position as that of circuit judge can influence a jury. It is their duty to follow his instructions as to the law. Whenever he expresses an opinion on any disputed fact, or of the character of a witness, or compliments one attorney at the expense of the other, or uses language which tends to bring an attorney into contempt before a jury, or uses any language which tends to prejudice them, he commits an error of law for which the verdict and judgment must be promptly set aside.” ,
See also Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Simon, Tex.Civ.App. Beaumont, 126 S.W.2d 674, no writ history, and cases therein cited.
The extent, cause and duration of appel-lee’s injuries were jury issues and the evidence bearing thereon was sharply conflicting.
In my opinion it would be less harmful for a Court to deny a party the right to argue to the jury than to permit him to make an argument and then improperly instruct the jury that the argument is without factual basis.
The error here, in my opinion, requires reversal under Rule 434, T.R.C.P., unless the error has been waived by failure to object to the oral instructions of the Court\ about which complaint is made.
It is undoubtedly the rule that errors in the trial which are curable must be objected to in order that the Trial Court may remove the error or its effect. The main error here, that of the Trial Court in giving the jury an erroneous instruction, is certainly one which could have been obviated by the Court, with or without objection, by reversing himself and withdrawing the erroneous charge. The record reflects, however, that the possibility of this occurring was very remote.
I believe that for at least two reasons the error here has not been waived by failure to object, the first of which is based upon the language used by the Court. It was that “without any further argument on the question” he was duty bound to advise the jury that appellant could have called Dr. Evans as a witness.
This statement made, after the matter had been under discussion by the Court and counsel, is, it seems to me, one which could have been interpreted by counsel, in the midst of trial, as forbidding any comment by counsel including the making of objections. Any doubt about this construction should be resolved in favor of the attorney thus encouraging respect for and obedience to the rulings of our courts. Certainly the statement implies that there had been arguments about the matter and that no more were needed. These arguments must have necessarily advanced the reasons for the Court to instruct or not instruct the jury about the matter discussed; if so they embraced the essentials of an objection.
Secondly, the record fails to show that time was given by the Court to appellant -for filing proper objections to the Court’s instruction. The Court instructed the jury *851orally. This is not authorized by our Rules of Procedure, although the giving of a correct oral charge is not reversible error. Denbow v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 143 Tex. 455, 186 S.W.2d 236. See Rules 272, 284, 285, 286 and 295, T.R.C.P.
Rule 272 provides that objections to the charge shall be in writing and that counsel shall have a reasonable time within which to “examine and present objections thereto.”
The oral charge here was given during the course of the arguments and at a time when counsel could not be expected to prepare and file written objections which he had the right to do. He was not required to orally object, in violation of the Rules, just because the Court had orally instructed the jury in violation of the Rules.
I would reverse.