Court Opinion

ID: 9915461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 16:02:18.749718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:11.074722
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 5, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                 Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2023-0825
                                   _________________________

                                 Ex parte State of Alabama

                       PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                                   (In re: State of Alabama

                                                       v.

                                    Donnie Lee Abernathy)

                        (Cherokee Circuit Court, CC-16-256)

McCOOL, Judge.

        The State of Alabama filed this petition for a writ of mandamus

requesting that this Court direct Judge Andrew J. Hairston to set aside

his order granting Donnie Lee Abernathy's request for a 270-day
CR-2023-0825

extension of time to file his Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition for

postconviction relief. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     Abernathy was convicted of two counts of capital murder, and he

was sentenced to death on November 29, 2021. 1 Abernathy appealed.

Because Abernathy was sentenced to death after August 1, 2017, his

petition for postconviction relief is governed by the Fair Justice Act ("the

FJA"), which is codified at § 13A-5-53.1, Ala. Code 1975.          The FJA

requires that "a petition for post-conviction relief from a case in which

the death penalty was imposed" be "filed within 365 days of the filing of

the appellant defendant's first brief on direct appeal." § 13A-5-53.1(c).

     On August 19, 2022, the State filed a motion requesting that the

circuit court, "if the court has not already done so," appoint Abernathy

separate counsel for the purpose of seeking postconviction relief, as

required by § 13A-5-53.1(b). On September 21, 2022, the circuit court

issued an order stating:

     1Abernathy was also convicted of attempted murder, first-degree

criminal mischief, and attempting to elude, and he was sentenced to life
in prison, 10 years in prison, and 12 months in jail, respectively, for those
convictions.
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           "At the December 13, 2021, hearing in this matter,
     Attorney Matt Green was appointed as 'standby counsel' for
     all post-conviction matters. Mr. Green was appointed as
     'standby counsel' due to [Abernathy's] request to represent
     himself in all post-conviction matters.

          "After a proper inquiry on the record, the Court granted
     [Abernathy's] motion to represent himself in the post-
     conviction matters. However, out of an abundance of caution
     and pursuant to the FJA, standby counsel was appointed for
     [Abernathy] for all post-conviction matters."

     Abernathy filed his first brief on direct appeal on February 15,

2023, which would make his Rule 32 petition due on February 15, 2024.

That brief was filed by counsel Angela Setzer, James Hubbard, and

Sophia Henager. On October 10, 2023, Setzer and Hubbard moved the

circuit court to appoint counsel for Abernathy for the purpose of seeking

postconviction relief and to grant him a 270-day extension of time to file

his Rule 32 petition. They argued in the motion that, contrary to the

circuit court's findings in its earlier order, Abernathy did not move to

represent himself in all postconviction matters and that Matt Green was

not acting as "standby counsel" because he had been employed by the

District Attorney's Office "for the last several months." On October 11,

2023, Green moved to withdraw as "standby counsel." On that same day,

the State filed a motion in which it did not oppose the appointment of

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counsel for the purpose of seeking postconviction relief, but it did oppose

Abernathy's request for a 270-day extension of time to file his Rule 32

petition. On October 16, 2023, the circuit court entered an order that

appointed Angela Morgan to represent Abernathy for the purpose of

seeking postconviction relief and that granted Abernathy a 270-day

extension of time to file his Rule 32 petition, which would make the

petition due on November 12, 2024.2          However, the circuit court

specifically found that "direct appeal counsel's assertions that post-

conviction counsel was never appointed in violation of the Fair Justice

Act is without merit." After filing a motion requesting that the circuit

court reconsider granting the extension of time, the State filed this

petition for a writ of mandamus. Abernathy filed his answer to the

petition on November 27, 2023.

                               Discussion

     In its mandamus petition, the State argues that Judge Hairston

clearly did not have authority under the FJA to grant a 270-day extension

     2The 270th day following February 15, 2024, is November 11, 2024,

which is Veterans Day. Therefore, the petition would be due on
November 12, 2024. See Rule 1.3, Ala. R. Crim. P.
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of time and, thus, that he has an imperative duty to vacate that portion

of his order. We agree.

     In State v. Simpson, 354 So. 3d 1076 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021), this

Court stated:

          "In order to obtain mandamus relief, a party must
     establish four prerequisites:

                 " 'Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
           will be granted only where there is "(1) a clear legal
           right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
           imperative duty upon the respondent to perform,
           accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of
           another adequate remedy; and (4) properly
           invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Alfab,
           Inc., 586 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 1991). This Court
           will not issue the writ of mandamus where the
           petitioner has " 'full and adequate relief' " by
           appeal. State v. Cobb, 288 Ala. 675, 678, 264 So.
           2d 523, 526 (1972) (quoting State v. Williams, 69
           Ala. 311, 316 (1881)).'

     "Ex parte Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 872 So. 2d 810, 813 (Ala.
     2003). The State has a limited right of appeal in a criminal
     case. See Ex parte King, 23 So. 3d 77 (Ala. 2009).

                " 'The State's power to appeal from an
           adverse ruling in a criminal case is governed by §
           12-12-70(c), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that an
           appeal may be taken from a judgment declaring an
           ordinance or statute invalid); § 12-22-91, Ala. Code
           1975 (providing that an appeal may be taken from
           a judgment holding an indictment or information
           unconstitutional); and by Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim.

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           P. (providing that appeals may be taken from
           certain pre-trial orders).'

     "Ex parte Sullivan, 779 So. 2d 1157, 1160 (Ala. 2000).
     Therefore, the State does not have a right to appeal Judge
     Wiggins's order granting Simpson's motion for a new trial.
     The State has thus established that it lacks another adequate
     remedy."

354 So. 3d at 1079.

     First, we must determine whether the State has another adequate

remedy, which would make mandamus relief inappropriate. Although

any party, including the State, can appeal the circuit court's final

judgment on a Rule 32 petition, see Rule 32.10, Ala. R. Crim. P., the State

does not have a right to directly appeal Judge Hairston's order granting

Abernathy a 270-day extension of time to file his Rule 32 petition.

Relying on Ex parte Hutcherson, 847 So. 2d 386 (Ala. 2002), Abernathy

argues that the State has another adequate remedy because, according

to Abernathy, the State can raise this issue on appeal after the circuit

court rules on Abernathy's petition. Specifically, Abernathy argues that

"the Alabama Supreme Court has found mandamus relief inappropriate

for determinations regarding statutes of limitations in Rule 32

proceedings." Abernathy's answer at 14.         However, this argument

conflates the issue of whether the limitations period was violated with

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the issue of whether a trial court has the authority to create a limitations

period that is contrary to the limitations period set forth in a statute.

Indeed, in Hutcherson, the Alabama Supreme Court held that an appeal

from a circuit court's final judgment in the Rule 32 proceeding provided

the State with an adequate remedy by which to challenge the circuit

court's denial of the State's motion to dismiss the Rule 32 petition based

on an alleged violation of the limitations period and, thus, that the State

was not entitled to mandamus relief regarding the denial of the motion

to dismiss. 847 So. 2d at 388. However, in the present case, the State is

not arguing that Abernathy's Rule 32 petition should be dismissed based

on a violation of the limitations period. 3 In fact, it is undisputed that

even the original 365-day limitations period has not yet run. Instead, the

State is arguing that Judge Hairston did not have the authority to extend

the limitations period in a way that is contrary the FJA.             Thus,

Abernathy's reliance on Hutcherson is misplaced.

     Additionally, not allowing the State to raise the issue of whether

the limitations period was improperly extended by the circuit court until

     3That argument would not implicate the jurisdiction of the circuit

court, and it would be proper on appeal after the circuit court ruled on
the Rule 32 petition.
                                     7
CR-2023-0825

after the extension of time had passed and the circuit court had ruled on

the Rule 32 petition would frustrate the purpose of the FJA, which is to

pursue postconviction remedies "concurrently and simultaneously with

the direct appeal of a case in which the death penalty was imposed." §

13A-5-53.1(b).   Also, if the circuit court improperly extended the

limitations period and the State could not raise the issue until an appeal

of the circuit court's ruling on the Rule 32 petition, the petitioner would

not have notice of the proper date on which the limitations period expired

until it was too late to file a timely petition. Such a result would be

absurd. Thus, the State has established that it lacks another adequate

remedy.

     Having determined that the State lacks another adequate remedy,

we turn to the State's argument that Judge Hairston clearly did not have

the authority under the FJA to grant a 270-day extension of time and,

thus, that he has an imperative duty to vacate that portion of his order.

     The Alabama Supreme Court has stated:

           "In determining the meaning of a statute or a court rule,
     this Court looks first to the plain meaning of the words as they
     are written. See Tolar Constr., LLC v. Kean Elec. Co., 944 So.
     2d 138, 149 (Ala. 2006) (' " 'Words used in a statute must be
     given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly
     understood meaning, and where plain language is used a

                                    8
CR-2023-0825

     court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly
     what it says.' " ' (quoting other cases)); Alabama State Bar v.
     Caffey, 938 So. 2d 942, 948 (Ala. 2006) (' " ' "[T]he construction
     of rules of court [is] for the court which promulgated them." ...
     "We start with the basic premise that words used in court
     rules must be given their plain meaning." ' " ' (quoting other
     cases))."

Ex parte Ward, 957 So. 2d 449, 452 (Ala. 2006).

     Section 13A-5-53.1(c) provides that

     "[a] circuit court shall not entertain a petition for post-
     conviction relief from a case in which the death penalty was
     imposed on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1(a) of the
     Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure unless the petition,
     including any amendments to the petition, is filed within 365
     days of the filing of the appellant defendant's first brief on
     direct appeal of a case in which the death penalty was
     imposed pursuant to the Alabama Rules of Appellate
     Procedure."

     Concerning an extension of time to file the postconviction petition,

§ 13A-5-53.1 provides:

           "(d) A circuit court, before the filing date applicable to
     the defendant under subsection (c), for good cause shown and
     after notice and an opportunity to be heard from the Attorney
     General, or other attorney representing the State of Alabama,
     may grant one 90-day extension that begins on the filing date
     applicable to the defendant under subsection (c).

           "….

            "(f) If post-conviction counsel files an untimely petition
     or fails to file a petition before the filing date applicable under
     this section, the circuit court shall direct post-conviction

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     counsel to show good cause demonstrating extraordinary
     circumstances as to why the petition was not properly filed.
     After post-conviction counsel's response, the circuit court may
     do any of the following:

                 "(1) Find that good cause has been shown
           and permit counsel to continue representing the
           defendant and set a new filing deadline for the
           petition, which may not be more than 30 days from
           the date the court permits counsel to continue
           representation.

                "(2) Find that good cause has not been shown
           and dismiss any untimely filed petition.

                "(3) Appoint new and different counsel to
           represent the defendant and establish a new filing
           deadline for the petition, which may not be more
           than 270 days after the date the circuit court
           appoints new counsel. In the instance that this
           subdivision is applicable and new counsel is
           appointed, the circuit court in which the petition is
           pending shall issue a final order on the petition or
           appeal within 180 days of the filing of the petition."

     In the present case, under the plain language of the FJA, there is

no authority for Judge Hairston to grant the 270-day extension of time

that he granted to Abernathy. Before the applicable filing date, the

circuit court can, for good cause shown and after notice and an

opportunity to be heard from the State, grant one 90-day extension of

time. However, the circuit court can grant a 270-day extension of time

only "[i]f post-conviction counsel files an untimely petition or fails to file

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a petition before the filing date applicable under this section," good cause

demonstrating extraordinary circumstances is shown, and new counsel

is appointed. In the present case, it is undisputed that Abernathy's

counsel has not filed an untimely petition or failed to file a petition before

the applicable filing date. In fact, the original filing date of February 15,

2024, has not passed. Therefore, under the unambiguous language of the

FJA, the State has established that Judge Hairston clearly did not have

the authority to grant a 270-day extension of time in the present

situation, and, thus, he has an imperative duty to vacate that portion of

his order.

     Accordingly, this Court grants the State's petition for a writ of

mandamus and orders Judge Hairston to vacate that part of his order

granting Abernathy a 270-day extension of time to file his petition for

postconviction relief. That action will make the Rule 32 petition due on

February 15, 2024. Within its discretion, the circuit court may still grant

one 90-day extension of time from that date in accordance with § 13A-5-

53.1(d).

      PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

      Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.

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