Court Opinion

ID: 9619002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:20:33.920998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:37.530824
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The evidence is undisputed that Jackson had knowledge of the condition of the parking lot, as she unequivocally admitted her knowledge, before she fell, that “[i]t seemed to be in terrible condition.” She also testified that the entire parking lot was “slanting and slopey” and “awfully rough,” and that walking in it was not comfortable. The condition of the parking lot was obviously a static defect, open and obvious to Jackson for a period of time prior to her fall. Under these circumstances, she has not shown that Waffle House had superior knowledge of any defect. Instead, the record shows that she had knowledge of the condition of the parking lot at least equal to that of Waffle House. See, e.g., Gaines v. Ingles Markets, 241 Ga. App. 302, 304 (2) (524 SE2d 766) (1999); Tanner v. Larango, 232 Ga. App. 599, 600 (2) (502 SE2d 516) (1998);14 Denham v. Young Men’s Christian Assn. &c., 231 Ga. App. 197 (499 SE2d 94) (1998). Consequently, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Waffle House.
*376Decided July 12, 2000
Reconsideration denied July 27, 2000
Thomas J Gustinella, for appellant.
Karsman, Brooks & Callaway, Stanley Karsman, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 As pointed out by the majority, Tanner does cite to Freyer v. Silver, 227 Ga. App. 253 (488 SE2d 728) (1997), a case that was later vacated. See Freyer v. Silver, 234 Ga. App. 243 (507 SE2d 7) (1998). But this fact does not dispense with the general rule that an invitee who has equal knowledge of a hazard cannot recover for his or her injuries. See Gaines, supra at 304 (2). See also Wright v. JDN Structured Finance, 239 Ga. App. 685, 686-687 (522 SE2d 4) (1999).