Court Opinion

ID: 9477266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:18:50.948108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:47.185385
License: Public Domain

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge (Concurring).
Because I am bound by this court’s recent decision in United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642 ((1st Cir.1987), I concur. Had this panel not been prematurely preempted by Olmstead, I would have dissented because I am of the opinion that the failure to grant an instruction explaining the term “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is an error of constitutional dimension, striking at the very heart of the presumption of innocence. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Olmstead conclusion is particularly unpalatable when we consider that this court has indicated that “[discussion of the [reasonable doubt] concept is perhaps the most important aspect of the closing instruction to the jury in a criminal trial.” Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978).
The Olmstead panel, in what appears to me an obvious contradiction, indicates on the one hand that “[t]he term reasonable doubt itself has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror,” Olm-stead, at 645 (quoting Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475 (4th Cir.1985)), while at the same time states that “the term has eluded clear definition.” Id. at 645. Our panel apparently concludes that mere repetition of the allegedly “elusive” phrase is sufficient to enlighten the jury. Ante at 146. What to me is self-evident is that we would not be engrossed in this debate if the meaning of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” were as prone to common understanding as is claimed.
In fact as recently as December 9, 1987, the Massachusetts Appellate Court stated regarding the failure to instruct as to the meaning of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” that “it [was] too clear for argument that the omission constituted error.” Commonwealth v. Stellberger, 25 Mass. *152App.Ct. 148, 149, 515 N.E.2d 1207 (1987). In that case the appellant had failed to ask for the instruction or to object to the court’s omission, yet the court of appeals found it necessary to reverse defendant’s conviction to “avoid creating a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice.” Id. The Massachusetts court took notice of, but refused to follow Olmstead. Id. at 150, 515 N.E.2d 1207.
To my view, this is a particularly poignant issue in a circuit as diversified as ours — to conclude that there exists a homogeneous version of the meaning of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” among jurors with as widely varied backgrounds as those encompassed in the districts from Maine through Puerto Rico, is at best highly unrealistic. Particularly under those circumstances, the only way to approximate standardized treatment of defendants by jurors, an important element of due process, is for the courts to provide them with guidance by explaining the fundamental concepts relevant to their functions. Difficulty of definition is hardly a valid reason for putting in jeopardy due process.
The above leads me to conclude that Olmstead is wrongly decided and that this court should reconsider its ruling on this issue en banc.