Court Opinion

ID: 9853805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:55:17.740134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:08.315814
License: Public Domain

*65JON E WILCOX, J.
¶ 24. (concurring). Although I join the majority opinion, I write separately to emphasize that absent the .most unique set of circumstances, "a change in the judicial view of an established rule of law is not an extraordinary circumstance which justifies relief from a final judgment under sec. 806.07(1)(h), Stats." Schwochert v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 166 Wis. 2d 97, 103, 479 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1991). Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) (2001-02)1 allows a court to "relieve a party or legal representative from a judgment, order or stipulation" based on "[a]ny .. . reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Although this statute seems broad on its face, relief under § 806.07(1)(h) is appropriate only where there are "extraordinary circumstances" justifying equitable relief. State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 550, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985). See also Lenticular Europe, LLC v. Cunnally, 2005 WI App 33, ¶ 9, 279 Wis. 2d 385, 693 N.W.2d 302.
¶ 25. Wisconsin Stat. § 806.07(1)(h) is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Indeed, § 806.07 is based on the federal rule. See Mullen v. Coolong, 153 Wis. 2d 401, 407, 451 N.W.2d 412 (1990)(Mullen II). " '[C]ourts are generally agreed that a change in the law after entry of judgment does not alone justify relief under [Fed. R. Civ. E] 60(b)(6).'" Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 102 (quoting De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977)). See also Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720, 722-23 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1079 (1976) (cited in Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 103).
*66¶ 26. The rule announced in De Filippis was expressly adopted by this court in Schauer v. DeNeveu Homeowners Association, 194 Wis. 2d 62, 74-75, 533 N.W.2d 470 (1995). "The statute does not authorize relief from a judgment on the ground that the law applied by the court in making its adjudication has been subsequently overruled in an unrelated proceeding." Id. at 75.
¶ 27. As such, a litigant petitioning for relief under § 806.07(1)(h) must demonstrate " 'unique facts' which would make inapplicable the general rule that a change in the judicial view of an established rule of law is not an extraordinary circumstance ...Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 103. See also Schauer, 194 Wis. 2d at 76 ("Absent such 'unique facts,' relief [under § 806.07(1)(h)] will generally be denied.").
[Section 806.07(l)(h)], however, allows reopening of judgments based on intervening changes in the law only in "extraordinary circumstances"; and it should be invoked sparingly in such cases — -"only when the circumstances are such that the sanctity of the final judgment is outweighed by 'the incessant command of the court's conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.'"
Brown v. Mosser Lee Co., 164 Wis. 2d 612, 616, 476 N.W.2d 294 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting M.L.B., 122 Wis. 2d at 550).
¶ 28. Such "unique facts" were present in Mullen II:
The determinative fact in this case is that we denied a petition for review in Mullen I [Mullen v. Coolong, 132 Wis. 2d 440, 393 N.W.2d 110 (Ct. App. 1986)] at the very same time when the same issue was before us in Nicholson [v. Home Ins. Cos., 137 Wis. 2d 581, 405 *67N.W.2d 327 (1981)]. ... Subsequently, this court in Nicholson overturned the court of appeals' decision in Mullen I. ... In so doing, we reached the precise result Mullen advocated in her petition for review in Mullen I.
Mullen II, 153 Wis. 2d at 408.
¶ 29. Absent a similar unique set of facts, relief under § 806.07(1)(h) is not appropriate based on a change in the law. See Schwochert, 166 Wis. 2d at 102 ("The Schwocherts are no worse off than any other litigant who fails to benefit from a change in the statutory law or in the judicial view of the law after a final judgment has been entered."). As the court of appeals stated in Kovalic v. DEC International, 186 Wis. 2d 162, 165, 519 N.W.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1994):
[T]his appears to be a case where an unsuccessful litigant asserts that after his case was decided, the law changed, and he would like to have his case judged under the new law. But Kovalic cites no cases holding that if the law changes, all cases decided under the prior law may be relitigated. And such a rule would destroy the finality of many judgments. We do not accept such a notion.
¶ 30. Allowing for relief anytime a case was subsequently reversed, overruled, or called into question would grind the wheels of justice to a halt under the sheer weight of such requests. This recognition is especially important in an era where the rules of stare decisis are frequently ignored. There must be finality in our litigation.
¶ 31. Here, Badger Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223, was decided two years after the court of appeals' decision in Sukala v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Co., 2000 WI App 266, 240 Wis. 2d 65, 622 N.W.2d 457 (Sukala I). *68See majority op., ¶¶ 4-5. Thus, this case is entirely distinguishable from Mullen I, and presents no unique set of facts that would justify relief under § 806.07(1)(h). See majority op., ¶¶ 18-19. The Sukalas are no different than the host of litigants whose cases are decided under a rule of law that is subsequently overturned, modified, or called into question. Thus, even assuming Schmitz overturned Sukala I, or established a new rule of law, I would hold that the relief under § 806.07(1)(h) is unwarranted in this case.
¶ 32. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this concurrence.

 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise indicated.