Court Opinion

ID: 9852816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:37:20.860916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:35.070865
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with almost all of the majority opinion, except for the result. Were it not for Cohen v. Baxter,7 I would concur fully. However, pretermitting what I, as a former trial judge, may believe to be “the better practice,” as an appellate judge, I must follow different *262rules. One such rule is that of stare decisis. Indeed, this principle serves as the bedrock of our common law system. I recognize that stare decisis is commendable where appropriate and that it serves a useful purpose in our jurisprudence. Moreover, I recognize that we should not become prisoners of precedent and that stare decisis should be a guide, not a goal. However, while we may be free to jettison stare decisis in our own precedent, we do not enjoy the luxury of such license with precedent established by our Supreme Court. Here, I firmly believe that the majority has ignored controlling Supreme Court precedent in deciding this case.8 Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
In order to understand why this case is controlled by Supreme Court precedent, one first must look to what actually transpired during voir dire. After one of the jurors informed the court that she worked as a nurse at the same hospital where Dr. Kim worked, the following exchange then occurred between Walls’ attorney and the prospective juror:
Q: And you know Dr. Kim; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you, in your work at [the hospital], had occasion to work in the emergency center with the doctors?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Given that experience with the emergency center doctors at [the hospital] and the fact that this is a case arising out of an emergency center visit by Patricia Walls, the deceased, without knowing anything about the case, because of your working at [the hospital] and knowing Dr. Kim, as you sit here now knowing nothing about the case, would you be leaning to [the hospital] side or the Dr. Kim side simply because of your work experience?
At this point, the defense attorney objected to the question as the hospital was not a party to the case, and the plaintiff’s attorney rephrased the question.
Q: Given your relationship with Dr. Kim, would you, knowing nothing about the case, hope that things came out Dr. Kim’s way?
A: Probably.
Q: So, as you sit here now, representing [sic] the plaintiff, who you don’t know, against a doctor that you do know, we *263don’t start off with the scales equally balanced because of your professional relationship with Dr. Kim. Is that a fair statement?
A: That’s a fair statement.
Walls’ attorney then moved to strike the juror for cause. Prior to ruling on the motion, the trial court asked the juror whether she would be able to put aside her personal feelings and base her decision upon the evidence as presented and the law as given. The juror responded affirmatively, and the plaintiff’s attorney continued asking questions.
Q: [I]s it fair to say that representing the plaintiff, which I do, you have already candidly stated we don’t start off even with the defendant; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I’ve got to come up to even and then go above that to convince you; correct?
A: I don’t think so.
Q: Well, you said we don’t start off even.
A: It’s only because I know Dr. Kim; I mean, I’ve worked with him, met him. I’ve never met the defendant [sic].
Q: But as you sit here today, you favor one side over the other without having heard anything about the evidence; is that correct?
A: No, sir.
At this point, the trial court instructed the plaintiff’s attorney to “proceed with another question, and the attorney began asking questions of another juror.” The trial court declined to excuse the nurse for cause, and this appeal ensued.9
The law presumes that potential jurors are both fair and impartial, and Walls bears the burden of rebutting that presumption.10 “A juror is not disqualified if he or she can lay aside whatever opinions or impressions he or she may have had and decide the case based upon the evidence presented in court.”11 It is axiomatic that the decision of whether to strike a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.12 On appeal, we should not disturb that dis*264cretion unless this Court finds that it has been manifestly abused.13 Here, the majority finds manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to excuse a juror, which it characterizes as “clearly biased and partial.”
Initially, I note that the record does not bear out this characterization of the juror, who unequivocally stated that she would decide the case solely based upon the evidence and the law as given by the judge. Evidently, the majority is troubled by the fact that the juror — a nurse — worked in the same hospital as the defendant — a doctor. According to the majority, the juror “had a personal interest in the result [of the case] due to her professional relationship with the defendant doctor; and based on ordinary and general human experience, it is more than probable that her interest produced bias.” Thus, having summarily dismissed the juror’s sworn statement that she could decide the case based upon the evidence, the majority advocates creating a rule excluding all such jurors as “understandably” biased.
While it is almost certainly true that many potential jurors enter the jury pool with certain biases, that does not justify creating per se rules excluding broad classes of jurors, such as co-workers. In Cohen v. Baxter,14 the Supreme Court addressed this very issue in the context of potential jurors who were patients of a doctor who was the defendant. The Supreme Court concluded that
the reality [is] that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the credibility of the juror and, therefore, trial courts have traditionally had significant discretion to retain or dismiss a juror. The fact that the doctor-patient relationship exists between a juror and a defendant does not justify removing this discretion from the trial courts. Trial courts are often faced with jurors who have close relationships with parties in both civil and criminal cases. We have confidence that trial courts can ascertain whether a juror is partial because of a doctor-patient relationship with a defendant just as well as the trial court can determine bias arising from other sources. A per se rule cuts too broadly and is inconsistent with the traditional discretion given trial courts in this area. Furthermore, there are various close and confidential relationships that a juror may have with a party and the establishment of a per se rule to the doctor-patient relationship will open the door to the expansion of the per se rule to these other numerous categories. Finally, a per se *265rule may render it extremely difficult to obtain a full panel for a medical malpractice trial in some rural counties.15
Decided June 4, 2001
Reconsideration denied June 29, 2001
Del Percilla, Jr., Billy C. Mathis, Jr., Thomas W. Malone, for appellant.
McCall, Finney & Phillips, W. Earl McCall, Paul G. Phillips, for appellee.
Butler, Wooten, Scherffius, Fryhofer, Daugherty & Sullivan, James E. Butler, Jr., Joel O. Wooten, Jr., Conley, Sacks & Griggs, Richard A. Griggs, amici curiae.
The same reasoning applies here. Indeed, in terms of creating a per se rule, the argument in Cohen was far more compelling. Patients place their very lives in the hands of their doctors. Given this tremendous degree of trust, I certainly understand why patients of defendant doctors might be considered “understandably biased.” Here, however, the potential juror and defendant doctor merely worked at the same facility. There is no suggestion that the prospective juror was a subordinate of the doctor.16 Where a prospective juror is a mere co-worker, I fail to see how the majority can justify creating a per se rule excluding all such jurors. More importantly, I believe the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cohen bars this Court from creating such a rule. Where, as here, we are guided by clear Supreme Court precedent, we are bound to follow it, irrespective of whether we agree with that Court.17 Accordingly, I dissent.

 267 Ga. 422 (479 SE2d 746) (1997).

 Indeed, although the majority cites Cohen v. Baxter for general principles of law, it does not discuss how this case differs from Cohen.

 The portion of the transcript provided does not contain an actual ruling on Walls’ motion, but both parties concede that the trial court did not strike the juror for cause.

 See Stewart v. Stewart, 240 Ga. App. 573, 577 (3) (524 SE2d 267) (1999).

 (Punctuation omitted.) Hardy v. Tanner Med. Center, 231 Ga. App. 254, 256 (4) (499 SE2d 121) (1998).

 See Stewart, supra; Smith v. Folger, 237 Ga. App. 888, 889 (2) (517 SE2d 360) (1999); Hardy, supra at 256-257 (4), (5); Luke v. Suber, 217 Ga. App. 84, 85-86 (1) (456 SE2d 598) (1995).

 See Stewart, supra.

 Supra at 423 (1).

 (Footnote omitted.) Id.

 See Page v. Janko, 200 Ga. App. 547, 548 (1) (409 SE2d 48) (1991) (“ ‘This is not a case wherein the prospective (juror was an employee) of appellant or any other party to the case.’ ”) (emphasis in original).

 See Eady v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 232 Ga. App. 711, 714 (502 SE2d 514) (1998).