Court Opinion

ID: 9664924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:34:08.577321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.711341
License: Public Domain

S. D. Borman, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly interfered with the charging power of the prosecutor by refusing to accept the original plea arrangement negotiated between himself and the prosecuting attorney.
The issue turns on whether the trial court can *81refuse to accept a guilty plea if it believes that the prosecutor’s charge is excessivley generous. The majority concludes that it can. I, however, would hold that the trial court cannot invade the province of the prosecuting attorney’s charging power absent a finding that that power has been abused.
The majority cites People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 211; 330 NW2d 834 (1982), as holding that a trial court may decide not to accept a guilty plea if it determines that such acceptance would not serve the interest of justice. This is not what Killebrew holds.
The Court in Killebrew granted leave to address one issue: "whether sentencing disposition is an appropriate subject for plea agreement; and, if so, what is the proper role of the court with respect to a sentence agreement”. 416 Mich 189, 194, quoting from the Court’s order granting leave, 408 Mich 958, 959 (1980). (Emphasis supplied.) The entire opinion is devoted to sentencing agreements, not plea or charge bargains. As stated in Killebrew, the practices of plea bargaining and charge bargaining, the latter being a species of plea bargaining, are well established and accepted practices in Michigan. Id., 198, citing Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672; 194 NW2d 693 (1972), as an example. The Court indicated that it did not intend to deviate from its earlier holdings to the effect that "[t]he decision to prosecute under one statute rather than another, or to prosecute at all, is an exclusively executive function, vested within the discretion of the prosectuor, Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, [supra]”. Killebrew, supra, p 199, fn 1 (emphasis supplied).
The Court explained in Killebrew that "[t]he judge’s bargaining strength * * * lies in his statutorily granted sentencing power, MCL 769.1; MCA *8228.1072. Judges can use this power to offer reduced sentences in order to persuade defendants to plead guilty.” 416 Mich 189, 199. On the other hand, the Court emphasized that the judicial role in the negotiation process must be limited in order to "minimize the potential coercive effect on the defendant, to retain the function of the judge as a neutral arbiter, and to perserve the public perception of the judge as an impartial dispenser of justice”. 416 Mich 189, 202. As I read the Killebrew opinion, it indicates the Supreme Court’s grave concern over the degree to which the trial court becomes involved with plea negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant:
"Due to the nature of the unequal bargaining positions of the judge and the defendant, any involvement in the negotiations transforms discussions into perceived coercion.
"Nor is it only the defendant who is harmed by allowing the judge to become involved in the negotiation of the plea bargain. The public perception of the judge as a neutral arbiter must suffer when the judge descends from the bench to barter with the defendant and prosecutor over the terms of the deal he advocates.
"Therefore, judicial participation must be limited in order to minimize the coercive effect of such participation on the defendant, to insure the voluntariness of [the] plea, and to preserve public confidence in the judicial system.” Killebrew, supra, pp 203-205.
Notwithstanding this concern, the Supreme Court recognized the need for, and the statutorily required involvement of, the trial court in the "sentence-bargaining process”. Id., 205. Thus, the Court struck a balance between these competing concerns:
*83"In balancing these competing considerations — that the degree of involvement must be kept minimal to avoid a coercive atmosphere and to retain public confidence in the judicial system and that judicial control of sentencing is required by statute — we now hold that a trial judge shall not initiate or participate in discussions aimed at reaching a plea agreement. He may not engage in the negotiation of the bargain itself. The trial judge’s role in the plea-bargaining procedure shall remain that of a detached and neutral judicial official. The judge’s involvement in agreements will therefore proceed along the format described in Part W’[1] Id., 205. (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.)
As I read the majority opinion, it ignores the balance established by the Supreme Court in Killebrew. The majority opinion permits the trial court to take an active role in the plea-bargaining procedure heretofore allowed only to be exercised by the prosecutor and the defendant. In short, the majority advocates that our trial courts no longer must remain detached and neutral judicial officials.
This case illustrates how a judge may take an active role in the plea negotiations. The trial court stated that its policy in plea-bargained guilty plea cases is to look behind each plea bargain to determine whether the bargain satisfies its view of what is or is not in the public interest. The original charge was assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278. The original plea-bargained charge was assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82; MSA 28.277. The only other charge to which defendant could "bargain” due to the trial court’s involve*84ment was assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. This latter plea arrangement represented a Hobson’s choice to the defendant: Either plead guilty to it or face the original charge. This choice was not something which defendant accepted willingly; it was something he was coerced into accepting because of the trial court’s feeling that the original plea-negotiated charge was "not within the public interest”. However, what is or is not in the public interest with respect to a criminal charge against the accused is not up to the judicial official, it is a matter left to the discretion of the prosecutor. Killebrew, supra, p 199, fn 1.
In Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115; 215 NW2d 145 (1974), the Court was quite explicit in stating that "[a] circuit judge does not enjoy supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney”. Id., 121. An excessively generous plea bargain, without more, is not an abuse of the power confided to the prosecutor.
"A circuit judge does not enjoy supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney. He may reverse a magistrate’s decision only for abuse of discretion. He may not properly substitute his judgment for that of the magistrate or prosecuting attorney as if he were reviewing the magistrate’s decision de novo or acting in a supervisory capacity with respect to the prosecuting attorney. He may reverse or revise their decisions only if it appears on the record that they have abused the power confided to them.” Genesee Prosecutor, supra, p 121. (Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted.)
GCR 1963, 785.7 explains what the trial court must consider in consenting to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. See, also, MCR 6.101(F). Nothing therein even remotely suggests that the trial court may consider whether a given plea bargain is too *85generous. Indeed, the trial court cannot consider the harshness of a charge, see, e.g., Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672; 194 NW2d 693 (1972); People v Curtis, 389 Mich 698; 209 NW2d 243 (1973); Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, supra; People v Ford, 417 Mich 66; 331 NW2d 878 (1982); therefore, it follows that the trial court cannot consider whether a plea arrangement is too generous. See and compare People v Matulonis, 60 Mich App 143; 230 NW2d 347 (1975).2
Accordingly, I would reject the trial judge’s policy of looking behind each plea bargain to determine whether it satisfies his unique view of what is or is not in the public interest. So long as the plea is understanding, voluntary and factually supported, the trial court is without authority to interfere with the prosecution’s function. Therefore, the plea in this case should have been accepted as bargained for because the requirements of GCR 1963, 785.7 were satisfied.
Defendant’s convictions and sentences should be vacated. This Court should enter convictions for felonious assault and larceny over $100 and the case should be remanded to allow the trail judge to sentence the defendant accordingly._

 In Part V of the Killebrew opinion, the Supreme Court outlined the procedure to be used if the prosecutor and defendant reach a sentence agreement or the prosecutor makes a sentence recommendation. The Court thereby circumscribed the judge’s statutorily granted sentencing discretion. If the judge rejects the proposed sentence, the defendant then may either affirm or withdraw his plea.

 Both People v Brent, (docket no. 64511, decided January 4, 1984 [unreported]), relied upon by the trial judge and the prosecutor, and People v Bryant, 129 Mich App 574; 342 NW2d 86 (1983), are distinguishable from the present case. In Brent, (bearing no precedential value because it is an unpublished opinion, see Moultrie v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exchange, 123 Mich App 403, 407-408; 333 NW2d 298 [1983] and MCR 7.215[C]), this Court found that the error was harmless because defendant testified that he did not commit the crime. In Bryant, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was no factual basis to support defendant’s plea under GCR 1963, 785.7(3)(a). Here, on the other hand, the question involves the trial judge’s role vis-á-vis the prosecutor’s charging power. In this latter circumstance, unless the record shows that the prosecutor abused the power confided in him in office with respect to the plea bargain, the trial judge’s discretion is limited to following the requirements contained in GCR 1963, 785.7.