Court Opinion

ID: 9788848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:20:31.991088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:15.467847
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 38] I respectfully dissent. The district court correctly provided a substantive response to the jury questions as mandated by our decision in Heywood, 170 P.3d 1227. That substantive response did not “invade the province of the jury.” There was no plain error and the conviction should be affirmed.
[¶ 39] In order to establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The rule of law that governs this case was announced and applied in Heywood. That rule of law was not violated here.
[¶ 40] In Heywood, this Court reversed the defendant’s convictions on three counts of second degree sexual assault because the district court did not provide a substantive response to a jury question. In Heywood, the jury presented this question:
Are the three counts—
1. In the shed?
2. Use of the sex toys?
3. When removing the splinter?
Id., ¶ 18,170 P.3d at 1232. The court provided this response:
*518The Court is unable to further instruct on this. You must rely on your recollection of the evidence and argument and consider the Instructions.
Id., ¶ 19, 170 P.3d at 1232. We found that answer inadequate and reversed Mr. Heywood’s conviction. We explained:
The jury must be adequately instructed to allow it to apply the law to the facts.
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This jury question, if that is what it was, facially reflects the jury’s confusion. Instruction No. 3 informed the jury that “[e]ach count is a separate charge, and the proof as to each must stand on its own, so you must separately consider and determine what the evidence shows as to each count.” It is easy to surmise that, as the jury began its deliberations, it had no idea what the allegation in count I (or count II or count III) was, and therefore asked the judge for guidance. The judge’s answer-'T can’t tell you”-was inadequate. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-11-209 and 7-11-204 (Lexis-Nexis 2007) clearly permit the judge further to instruct the jury after deliberations have begun when a question arises as to the evidence or the law, and in numerous cases over the years we have addressed the exercise of that discretion. See, e.g., Carlson v. Carlson, 888 P.2d 210, 214-15 (Wyo.1995); In re CH, 783 P.2d 155, 158. (Wyo.1989); Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132, 1133-35 (Wyo.1987); Hoskins v. State, 552 P.2d 342, 349 (Wyo.1976).
Beyond the power to answer such questions is the duty to answer such questions: A number of courts have held that if the original instructions are incomplete or if the jury, or any of the individual jurors, express confusion or lack of understanding of a significant element of applicable law, it is the court’s duty to give additional instructions. The refusal of a jury’s request for an instruction may constitute reversible error. 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 944 (2007). The foregoing principles of law can be summarized for present purposes as follows: (1) instructions that leave doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime was committed are insufficient; (2) instructions that confuse or mislead the jury are insufficient; (3) jury questions revealing confusion or a lack of understanding should be answered.
Id., ¶¶ 26, 27, 28, 29, 170 P.3d at 1234-35 (footnote omitted).
[¶ 41] We concluded the opinion with this statement: “Reversible error occurred ... when the district court failed ... to provide the jury with a substantive response to its question concerning the charged offenses, because the question reflected obvious and understandable confusion as to how to apply the law to the facts.” Id., ¶ 33, 170 P.3d at 1236.
[¶ 42] When our holding in Heywood is applied to this case it is difficult to find a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The jury question “facially reflects the jury’s confusion.” Our holding in Heywood requires that such, a question be answered. In Heywood, we did not discuss the subtle distinctions that may exist between questions of law and questions of fact or indicate that those distinctions may be significant, as the majority opinion now holds. We did not say that jury questions must be answered substantively only if the answer.to the question is a “response to a question of law.” To the contrary, we unequivocally stated that “jury questions revealing confusion or a lack of understanding should be answered.” Id., ¶ 29, 170 P.3d at. 1235. In Heywood, we explicitly stated that a judge is permitted to answer jury questions “as to the evidence or the law.” Id., ¶ 27,170 P.3d at 1235.
[¶ 43] If the trial judge was not permitted to provide a substantive response to the jury question, one wonders what would have been the appropriate response. Clearly, the question should not have been ignored. The district court’s response to the jury question in Heywood appears to be the type of response that the majority is stating should have been provided here: “The Court is unable to further instruct on this. You must rely on your recollection of the evidence and argument and consider the Instructions.” Id., ¶ 19,170 P.3d at 1232. The problem, of course, for this trial judge, (who coincidentally was the trial judge who was reversed in Heywood) and other trial judges forced to deal on a time-sensitive basis with jury questions, is *519that we specifically rejected that response in Heyivood. The result we reach in this case simply cannot be squared with our decision in Heywood and provides no meaningful guidance to trial judges who will be confronted in the future with questions from the jury.
[¶ 44] Certainly, if a trial court provides a substantive response to a jury question, that response cannot invade the province of the jury. The response provided here did not do that. The response mentioned only “other incidents” and two specific types of conduct: “violation of protection order” and “telephone calls.” It was reasonable for the trial court to reference violation of the protection order in its response, because the jury question made specific reference to that item. I also see no harm in the district court’s limited reference to the “telephone calls.” “Telephonic” communications were referenced in one of the other jury instructions. Most significantly, however, the court throughout the instruction made it clear that it was the function of the jury to determine if any of those incidents had occurred. The district court reminded the jurors of the State’s burden of proof and referenced other jury instructions applicable to the case. There were only 11 jury instructions given in this case. Instruction 1 specifically advised the jury of their role as fact finder. It stated in pertinent part:
The role of the jury is different from that of the judge. Your function and purpose is to determine the facts. That job is exclusively that of the jury. I will not intentionally intrude upon your prerogatives as fact finders. So, if at any time I make a comment regarding the facts or otherwise indicate, directly or indirectly, how I might view the facts it will be unintentional and you may totally disregard my acts or comments.
I find nothing in the record or the instruction to indicate that the trial judge usurped the function of the jury or that Mr. Snow was prejudiced in any manner by the response to the question, a response, it should be emphasized, that was agreed to by Mr. Snow.
[¶ 45] In conclusion, Mr. Snow has failed to demonstrate that the district court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law by providing a substantive response to the jury question. Such a response was clearly and unequivocally required by our decision in Heywood. The substantive response did not invade the province of the jury, and Mr. Snow has failed to establish prejudice. There was no plain error.