Court Opinion

ID: 9631108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:29:28.571521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:48.962379
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Manderino :
I dissent. The appellant did not commit any crime. He walked into a hospital about twenty-five minutes after visiting hours were over. On the record before us, we must conclude that he did not break in. He did not unlock any locked doors. He walked to a door which opened into the stairway leading to the various floors of the hospital. The record uses the term “fire tower.” A “fire tower” is nothing more than the customary exit stairs required in most public buildings. The use of such stairs, particularly in a hospital, after visiting hours, is certainly not uncommon. The appellant did nothing except walk up to the third floor landing where he was arrested. A nurse heard bim making noise, but the record before us does not disclose any further information about the kind of noise which was heard. It could have been footsteps, or the opening and closing of doors, or coughing or sneezing. On this record, we cannot conclude that the noise heard gave rise *501to any reasonable inferences of criminal conduct by the appellant. When arrested, the appellant was alone. He had no tools or weapons in his possession. He did not have anything in his possession which belonged to the hospital. If every person, leaving or entering a hospital twenty-five minutes after visiting hours, who was found using the stairs and making any kind of noise, is guilty of criminal conduct, we must erect more jails.
The dissenting opinion in the Superior Court correctly said in this case:
“The statute requires loitering or prowling that is ‘malicious’. ‘Malicious’, as used in this context, has been defined to mean ‘an intent to do a wrongful act’, Commonwealth v. Williams, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 312, 315, 137 A.2d 903, 905 (1958); ‘[having] as its purpose injury to the privacy, person or property of another.’ Commonwealth v. Dial, 445 Pa. 251, 285 A.2d 125 (1971), citing Commonwealth v. DeWan, 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 203, 208, 124 A.2d 139, 141 (1956) . . . .
“In the instant case, all that was proved was appellant’s entry into and presence in a prohibited area of a hospital. These facts and circumstances do not give rise to a reasonable and natural inference that, beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant’s actions had as their purpose, ‘injury to the privacy, person, or property of another.’ There was no evidence of the presence of any accomplices, tools, weapons, or fruits of another crime. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 167, 240 A.2d 570 (1968); Commonwealth v. Nicholls, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 410, 217 A.2d 768 (1966). Nor was there evidence of conduct which would show the commission of, or preparation for an unlawful act, or of ‘peeping’ into the privacy of others. Cf. Commonwealth v. DeWan, supra, Commonwealth v. Nicholls, supra. This is a clear case of the facts presented being *502reasonably susceptible to explanation on a theory other than that of the appellant’s guilt. To allow a conviction to stand based on mere presence in a prohibited area, without more, would render the element of malicious intent or purpose of virtual nullity.
“The evidence in this case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the malicious nature of appellant’s conduct. As the Commonwealth has failed to establish an essential element of the crime, this conviction should not stand.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 553, 556 294 A.2d 907, 908-09 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
The majority does not address itself to the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence because of the limitations placed on our grant of the petition for allowance of appeal. The majority accurately points out that we limited our grant of the appellant’s petition, but this should not preclude our consideration of the issue. This Court has not hesitated in the past to dismiss a petition as improvidently granted when further study warrants such an order. In this case, we should hold that our grant was improvidently limited, and consider, either with or without additional oral argument, the issue of whether the evidence sustains the conviction. On the record before us, I am compelled to agree with the dissenting opinion of the Superior Court that the conviction must be reversed.
I must also dissent because of the interpretation given by the majority of the word “around” in the context of this statute. The statute in question is penal in nature and must, therefore, be strictly construed. Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. S. §1928(b). The majority grounds its decision today on the principle “that strict construction does not require ‘that the words of a criminal statute [be] given their narrowest meaning or that the legislative intent be thwarted.’ ” *503(Emphasis added.) This principle is only applicable if the narrowest meaning is unreasonable.
Many words are subject to numerous and varied meanings. In order to ascertain the intended meaning of a word, it must be viewed in the context in which it is used. Many definitions will then be excluded because, in context, they would be patently unreasonable. This Court in Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309, 112 A.2d 174 (1955), and the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Butler, 189 Pa. Superior Ct. 399, 150 A.2d 172 (1959), found certain proposed definitions to be so narrow as to be unreasonable when viewed in their statutory context. When, however, we have found several alternative definitions reasonable, we have stated that, “when a criminal statute calls for construction it is not the construction that is supported by the greater reason that is to prevail, but that one which, if reasonable, operates in favor of life and liberty . . . .” Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa. 155, 162-63, 89 A. 968, 971 (1914) (emphasis added); see Commonwealth v. Clover, 397 Pa. 543, 156 A.2d 114 (1959). Thus, the issue in the present case is whether appellant’s proposed interpretation of the word aroiond is reasonable in its statutory context. If it is reasonable, we must accept it.
Under the rules of statutory construction, we are to construe words “according to their common and approved usage.” Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. S. §1903(a). The rationale for such a rule is obvious. Due process requires that a statute be published in order that citizens be given notice of prohibited conduct. The word abound is frequently used with the meaning suggested by the appellant. That meaning is one of the “common and approved usages” of the word around. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 120 (1971). There are, as the prosecution argues, other “common and approved usages” of the *504word mound. See Id. The majority has chosen what it considers to be a more flexible definition — “in the vicinity or neighborhood.” Id. While such a definition may be a reasonable and commonly accepted one, it does not support the majority’s conclusion that mound means inside as well as outside. The same source defines vicinity as the “quality or state of being near” and “a surrounding area or neighborhood.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2550 (1971). Neighborhood is defined as “the quality or state of being immediately adjacent or relatively near to something.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1514 (1971). While I recognize that a battle of definitions may be endless, I think that there can be no doubt that an ordinary citizen could reasonably interpret the present statute as only prohibiting the malicious loitering or prowling outside of the enumerated buildings.
The majority also argues that even if the word mound in the statute is construed to be outside, the appellant would be covered by the statute because he was outside that pmt of the hospital building used for living quarters of hospital patients even though he was inside the hospital building. I cannot accept that interpretation of the statute. The statute does not say mound the pmt used for living or dwelling purposes. It says mound the place used in pmt for living or dwelling purposes. The place in this case is the hospital building. The result urged by the majority, therefore, is not warranted by the required strict construction of this penal statute.
No citizen, reading the statute in this case, could ever reasonably anticipate that it applies to one entering or leaving a hospital after visiting hours by means of the exit stairs. If the statute, therefore, applies to such a citizen, it must be considered unconstitutional because of vagueness.
*505The order of the Superior Court and the judgment of sentence of the trial court should be reversed and the appellant ordered discharged.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this dissenting opinion.