Court Opinion

ID: 9722818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:51:21.17392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:40.253740
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Tbe defendant bad a duty to keep its store premises reasonably safe for public *630use, and, if a condition caused by others made the premises unsafe, to correct that condition within a reasonable time after it learned or should have learned of the potential for harm. Hulett v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1941), 299 Mich 59, 67; Winfrey v. S. S. Kresge Co. (1967), 6 Mich App 504, leave to appeal granted (1967) 379 Mich 768.
As part of its program for maintaining reasonably safe store premises, the defendant provided a handrail on the right side of the staircase which plaintiff attempted to descend. Plaintiff asserts that the right railing was blocked at the top of the staircase by a crowd, that the assembling of the crowd and the resultant obstruction of the railing from ready access and creation of potential harm to the plaintiff should have been anticipated by the defendant, and constituted a condition on the premises which defendant was obliged to correct if the premises were to be reasonably safe. Plaintiff further testified that the defendant had customarily provided a supervisor who prevented formation of crowds at the staircase.
“Where a party has habitually or frequently taken certain precautions on prior occasions which were omitted on the occasion in question, this fact should be received against him as an admission that he perceived the risk and deemed the precaution appropriate and feasible.” 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 17.3, p 981.1
Prom plaintiff’s testimony, the jury could properly find a railing necessary to make the premises *631reasonably safe for her use,2 that the assembling of the crowd prevented her from using the railing,3 and that defendant should have anticipated the clogging of access to the railing and prevented the crowd from assembling by providing the supervision which, according to plaintiff’s testimony, was customarily provided. On the basis of such findings, the jury could conclude that the defendant’s failure to provide such supervision on this occasion constituted negligence.
Plaintiff testified that, not being able to grasp the right railing, she walked around the crowd and started down the staircase on the lefthand side and, while crossing to the right side and reaching for the right handrail, she lost her balance and fell. She said she was unable to use the lefthand railing, if there was one,4 because her left hand was loaded with packages and because the rules of the road and habit impelled her to the right side.
The trial judge granted the judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In my opinion, the plaintiff was not obliged as a matter of law to use the elevator or the escalator — she said she was afraid of the escalator. She could, as she did, use the staircase intended for that purpose as long as she exercised due care in doing so. Pollack v. Oak Office Building (1967), 7 Mich App 173, 186. Whether the risk of descending the staircase under the circumstances described by plaintiff, who was the only trial witness, was so great that a prudent *632person, would have foregone the right or privilege to use such staircase or would have sought an alternative route was a question for the jury.5 Plaintiff’s desire to reach the right side of the staircase does not necessarily evidence a lack of due care and, thus, was not contributory negligence as a matter of law. Her purpose, she said, was to exercise due care, to reach the righthand rail, the packages in her left hand preventing her from using any handrail on the left side.
“What constitutes due care for one’s own safety, like what constitutes negligent conduct towards others, is a question of fact and not of law. As such it must usually be left for determination by the jury, where a jury has been demanded.” Ingram v. Henry (1964), 373 Mich 453, 457.
The mere fact that plaintiff fell establishes neither that the fall was due to her negligence nor that it was due to defendant’s negligence. Her fall may have been accidental, not the result of failure to exercise due care. Handrails are provided because it can be anticipated that patrons may accidentally slip and fall. Defendant is not liable because plaintiff fell, but because a jury has found it failed to provide a reasonably safe place for the plaintiff. Had the plaintiff fallen and there been no obstruction of access to the railing, there would have been no negligence of the defendant upon which the plaintiff could have recovered.
The jury could rightfully conclude that the obstruction which allegedly prevented her from descending the staircase with her hand on the railing *633was a cause in fact6 of her fall, and, thus, the jury could properly conclude that plaintiff’s fall was causally related to defendant’s alleged negligence.
On various grounds, many cases have declined to find a duty on the part of proprietors to provide personnel to control crowds.7 Some have placed their holdings on the ground the plaintiff assumed the risk, a doctrine largely eliminated from our jurisprudence. Felgner v. Anderson (1965), 375 Mich 23. It cannot properly be said as a matter of law there is no duty on the part of a storekeeper to control crowds, or, to state it differently, that as part of his duty to provide reasonably safe premises he may not under given circumstances be obliged to provide supervisors to control crowds.
“Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor’s safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.” 2 Restatement, Torts, Second, § 344, comment (f),pp 225, 226.8
*634Whether in a specific case a careful store owner would have anticipated the need to provide supervisors and should have provided them is almost always a question for the jury, not the court. That is because it concerns the application of the law’s standard of conduct to the particular facts of the case at hand.9
In his oft-cited opinion, Mr. Justice Cooley, speaking on the question of when a trial judge may properly take from the jury the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, made observations applicable to either the issue of plaintiff’s or defendant’s negligence:
“The case, however, must be a very clear one which would justify the court in taking upon itself this responsibility. For, when the judge decides that a want of due care is not shown, he necessarily fixes in his own mind the standard of ordinary prudence, and, measuring the plaintiff’s conduct by that, turns him out of court upon his opinion of what a reasonably prudent man ought to have done under the circumstances. He thus makes his own opinion of what would be generally regarded as prudence a definite rule of law. It is quite possible that, if the same question of prudence were submitted to a jury collected from the different occupations of society, and perhaps better competent to judge of the common opinion, he might find them differing with him as to the ordinary standard of proper care. The next *635judge trying a similar case may also be of a different opinion, and, because tbe case is not clear, hold that to be a question of fact which the first has ruled to be one of law. Indeed, I think the cases are not so numerous as has been sometimes supposed in which a judge could feel at liberty to take the question of the plaintiff’s negligence away from the jury. The judge, it is said in one case, is not bound to submit to a jury the propriety of a particular course, when it is perfectly notorious that all prudent men conduct their own affairs differently. The uniformity of the conduct of businessmen becomes a rule of law.
“But, while there is any uncertainty, it remains a matter of fact for the consideration of the jury: Briggs v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 183. The difficulty in these cases of negligent injuries is, that it very seldom happens that injuries are repeated under the same circumstances; and, therefore, no common standard of conduct by prudent men becomes fixed or known.” Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg (1868), 17 Mich 99, 120, 121.
This is a close case, a doubtful case, but it is a case. "Where there is doubt, the issues should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions for their determination.10
“Since it is impossible to prescribe definite rules in advance for every combination of circumstances which may arise, the details of the standard must be filled in in each particular case. The question then is what the reasonable man would have done under the circumstances. Under our system of procedure, this question is to be determined in all doubtful cases by the jury, because the public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the man in the street rather than by lawyers, and the jury serves as a shock-absorber to cushion the impact of the law. *636The question usually is said to be one of fact, but it should be apparent that the function of the jury in fixing the standard differs from that of the judge only in that it cannot be reduced to anything approaching a definite rule.” Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed, 1964), p 208. (Emphasis supplied.)
I would reinstate the jury’s verdict.

 Accord: 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed), § 282; Lindquist v. Des Moines U. S. Co. (1947), 239 Iowa 356 (30 NW2d 120) (testimony should have been admitted to show that on other occasions a flagman had been stationed at a crossing to warn oncoming motorists). See, also, Restatement, Torts, Second, § 295A, p 63 (evidence is admissible to indicate “an understood standard of conduct, or the reasonable expectation of each party as to what the other will do”).

 See Branch v. Klatt (1912), 173 Mich 31, 40; Renfro Drug Co. v. Jackson (1935, Tex Civ App), 81 SW2d 101.

 Compare Donovan v. Bender (1960), 11 App Div 2d 735 (204 NYS2d 632; affirmed Donovan v. Bender (1961), 9 NY2d 854 (216 NYS2d 97, 175 NE2d 463) (imposing liability on a landowner who blocks the sidewalk forcing a pedestrian into the road).

 The plaintiff said she was uncertain whether there was a left-hand rail. She was the only witness.

 2 Restatement, Torts, Second, § 473, comment (d), p 525. See, also, §§ 443 and 446, pp 472, 477. See, also, Jaxon v. City of Detroit (1967), 379 Mich 405, 412 (“whether a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have waited in the doorwell until she could have made a more eareful observation before stepping down [was a matter] for the jury”).

 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, §20.2; see, also, footnote 5.

 Annotation: “Liability of store proprietor to customer by pushing, crowding, et cetera, of other customers.” 20 ALR2d § 13, p 32.

 See, also, Prosser on Torts (3d ed, 1964), p 344 et seq. Dor cases illustrating the principle, see Blakely v. White Star Line *634(1908), 154 Mich 635 (duty to provide watchmen to prevent the playing of baseball near dance pavilion); Lane v. Fair Stores (1951), 150 Tex 566 (243 SW2d 683); Booth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (S Ct, 1947), 68 NYS2d 26; Greenley v. Miller’s, Inc. (1930), 111 Conn 584 (150 A 500); Mears v. Kelley (1938), 59 Ohio App 159 (17 NE 2d 386); Quinn v. Smith Co. (CA 5, 1932), 57 F2d 784. Compare Gorby v. Yeomans (1966), 4 Mich App 339 (failure of bar owner to aid customer in a brewing altercation which ultimately fulminated).

 McKinney v. Yelavich (1958), 352 Mich 687, 691; Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hospital (1962), 366 Mich 596; Baker v. Alt (1965), 374 Mich 492; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, || 16.10, 174.

 See Cummings v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co. (1964), 372 Mich 695, 698.