Court Opinion

ID: 9648166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:06:52.25406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:28.187384
License: Public Domain

Carney, J.,
(dissenting).
In my opinion there was sufficient evidence to take the plaintiff’s case to the jury and his suit should not be dismissed. There are several material conflicts between the *179testimony of the plaintiff and Ms witnesses and the testimony of the defendant and his witnesses:
(1) Plaintiff testified that he entered the defendant’s junk yard through the front gate and was authorized by one of defendant’s employees to look for a bumper for his car. The defendant’s theory is that the plaintiff entered the junk yard from the back side of the junk yard next to the Cumberland Biver, without permission and surreptitiously.
(2) The defendant’s witnesses testified that the plaintiff had been to the junk yard earlier on the same morning and had entered from the rear and carried off a tire and wheel and that he was removing the bumper on Ms second trip to the junk yard. The plaintiff denied tMs and insisted that he made only one trip to the junk yard on that day. He was corroborated by the testimony of his father as to the time he left home.
(3) The defendant, J. B. Cohen, and several of Ms witnesses testified that the plaintiff admitted to all of them that he had stolen the tire and wheel. The plaintiff admitted being charged with the theft of the tire but insisted that he denied the theft. From his testimony we quote as follows:
“Q. Then what happened after that, Howard? A. They said that the colored guy seen me steal a tire there that morning and carry it out the back way.
“The Court: "Who was talking? Who told you that?
“The Witness: Mr. Cohen was the one that was talHng, he said that a colored guy seen me take a tire out that morning at eight o’clock and go around *180by the side of the fence and get in my car and drive off.
“Q. Was there a back gate? A. I couldn’t say.
“ Q. Go ahead. A. That he had seen me get a tire and carry it through some bushes.
“Q. What time did he say that happened? A. Eight o’clock. He said it was around eight o’clock.
“Q. Eight o’clock that morning? A. Yes sir, and go away in my car and then I came back at about nine-thirty.
“Q. Did he say what kind of car you had been in? A. No, sir.
‘ ‘ Q. Go ahead. A. Then I told him that it wasn’t me and they asked me did I have any tires over at my house and I said, ‘Yes, sir’, and I carried them over there and showed them, I had two.
“Q. Now, who went over to your house? A. Mr. Cohen and two detectives.”
Plaintiff’s father consented for the defendant and the detectives to search his premises and the defendant, J. B. Cohen, did not identify either of the two tires found on the premises as being stolen from him.
(4) The plaintiff testified that Mr. Cohen told his father that if he would make the boy say he stole the tire he would drop the charge. Mr. Cohen denies this conversation but said that he merely told the boy’s father that he should insist on him telling the truth.
(5) Plaintiff’s father testified that when Mr. Cohen and the two detectives were searching his house for the tires, *181•with the father’s permission, Mr. Cohen made the following statement: “If yon don’t make that hoy say that he got some tires over at my place, I’m going to prose-ante him to the fullest extent and try to pnt him in the penitentiary.”
(6) Mrs. Fergnson, the mother of the plaintiff, testified that she had a conversation with the defendant, Mr. Cohen, in the hallway ontside of the city courtroom and that Mr. Cohen stated to her that he was sorry that the matter had come np about the boy and that all he wanted him to do was to say that he took the tire and there would be nothing further to the proceedings. Mrs. Ferguson also testified that prior to the trial of the plaintiff in criminal court on the indictment charging him with the attempted theft of the bumper she had a conversation by telephone with Mr. Cohen. From her testimony we quote as follows:
“Q. Did he identify himself? A. He did. He said, ‘ This is Mr. ’— He asked to speak to Mr. Ferguson and I said, ‘Mr. Ferguson isn’t at home.’ So he said, ‘Well, is this Mrs. Ferguson I’m talking to?’ And I said, ‘Yes’. He said, ‘Well, this is Mr. Cohen.’ And he asked me what we was going to do about the— He said the trial was to come up the next morning. I said, ‘Yes, sir, I know it is.’ And he said, ‘Well,’ was we going to let the trial go on or was we going to get it dismissed before it come up, he said, ‘All I want the boy to do is to tell that he got the tire, and I’ll have it dropped, the charges dropped,’ and I says, ‘Mr. Cohen, I can’t make the boy say he got something that he didn’t get,’ I says, ‘That’s not doing him right.’ And he told me, he *182said, ‘Well, if you don’t have him say he got the tire and we dismiss it,’ he said, ‘I’m going to produce five witnesses to prove in Court in the morning that he did get it, but I see I can’t do no business with you people.’ ”
(7) The plaintiff testified that his father had. given him $5 with which to buy the bumper and that it was in a pocket in his T-shirt and that when the detectives and Mr. Cohen brought him home to search for the tire he got permission to change shirts before being taken to City Court and left the $5 in his T-shirt. The plaintiff’s mother testified that she later found the $5 in the pocket of the T-shirt which the plaintiff had taken off.
In my opinion His Honor the Trial Judge properly submitted the cause to the jury and defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was properly overruled. However, for the reasons hereinafter given I feel very strongly that the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff should not be affirmed but that the cause should be remanded for a new trial.
I do not think there has been any valid jury verdict returned in this case upon which to base a valid judgment. It will be remembered that the jury reported to the court that it was hopelessly deadlocked and unable to agree. Thereupon, instead of declaring a mistrial, which I think he should have done, His Honor the Trial Judge, with consent of counsel for plaintiff and defendant, polled the jury and found that seven were for the plaintiff and five for the defendant. He dismissed the five jurors who had found in favor of the defendant and charged the remaining seven jurors to assess the plaintiff’s damages which they laid at $1,500.
*183Very probably, His Honor tbe Trial Judge and counsel for tbe parties were influenced in their action by the second paragraph of Section 1499 of Tennessee Procedure in Law Cases, 1937, by Higgins and Crownover. For convenience we quote the entire section:
“Sec. 1499. Unanimity As To Yerdict. — Where there has been no constitutional or statutory change in the common law rule requiring unanimity among jurors, the court is powerless to accept and record as a verdict the report of a fewer number than the twelve who compose the jury. Such a verdict is in general to be looked upon as absolutely void.
“But the litigants may expressly consent that the report of the majority may be received as the verdict of the jury, and such agreement and consent will be binding. If the records show the impaneling of a fewer number than twelve to try a case, and if this number appears in all minute entries pertaining to the functions of the jury, and if there is an entire absence of any objection to the participation of the smaller number, the presumption will be indulged that the parties consented that the case should be passed upon by the declared number of jurors.
“If there is a jury of twelve and one or more dissent from the report of the foreman at the time of his effort to declare the jury’s verdict, the court is constrained to enter a mistrial or send the jury from the court-room with directions to give the case further consideration.”
It is to be noted that no cases from any jurisdiction are cited by authors Higgins and Crownover to support *184their statement that the parties can agree that a verdict of the majority of a jury will be binding.'
In the case of McDonald v. McDonald, 1833, 13 Tenn. 307, onr Tennessee Supreme Court announced the rule that a verdict by eleven jurors was defective and that therefore, the judgment based on such a verdict was defective. This was a civil suit.
In the case of Bell v. The State, 1857, 37 Tenn. 507, and Bowles v. The State, 1858, 37 Tenn. 360, our Tennessee Supreme Court reversed convictions in criminal eases because the records in each case showed that there were only eleven jurors.
T. C. A. Section 20-1309 provides as follows:
“20-1309. Disability of juror. — If, after the jury is impaneled, and before verdict, a juror becomes sick or otherwise disabled so as to be unable to perform his duty, he may be discharged by the court; and, in such case, unless otherwise arranged by the parties, the vacancy may be filled and the trial commenced anew, or the court may, in its discretion, order the jury to be discharged and a new one impaneled. In case of the disability of a juror or jurors, under this section, the cause may be tried and determined, by consent of parties, by the remaining jurors. (Code 1858, secs. 2962, 2963 (deriv. Acts 1817, ch. 99, sec. 1); Shan., secs. 4687, 4688; Code 1932, secs. 8814, 8815.)”
Article 1, Section 6 of the constitution of Tennessee provides as follows:
“Sec. 6. Trial by jury — Qualifications of jurors.— That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, *185and no religions or political test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors.”
In the case of Willard v. State, 1938, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S. W. (2d) 99, 100, our Tennessee Supreme Court field unconstitutional Chapter 68 of the Public Acts of 1939 reducing the number of jurors from twelve to six in certain misdemeanor cases. From said case we quote as follows:
“Section 6, Article 1, of the Constitution of this State provides: ‘That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate * * V Our decisions hold that this constitutional provision protects the right of trial by jury only as it existed at common law in so far as it had been adopted and was in force in North Carolina, when the territory embraced in Tennessee was ceded by North Carolina to the Federal Government. Howard and Von Drake v. State, 143 Tenn. 539, 227 S. W. 36; Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 169 S. W. 558, L. R. A. 1915F, 531; State v. Sexton, 121 Tenn. 35, 41, 114 S. W. 494; Garner v. State, 13 Tenn. 160, 5 Yerg. 160, 176. The right of trial by jury is the right guaranteed to every litigant in jury cases to have the facts involved tried and determined by twelve jurors. Neely v. State, 63 Tenn. 174, 4 Baxt. 174, 180; Bowles v. State, 37 Tenn. 360, 5 Sneed 360.”
“At common law, the unanimity of the twelve jurors was an essential attribute of the verdict of a jury; and from the earliest period down to the time of the United States Constitution, unanimity of the twelve jurors alone constituted a legal verdict. The necessity of the unanimous concurrence of the twelve *186jurors in the verdict governs in both civil and criminal cases where, under the principles of common law, such a verdict would have been required.
“The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees the right of jury trial in the Federal courts, and similar guaranties are to be found in the state constitutions. The right of jury trial thus guaranteed is the right as it existed at common law at the time of the adoption of such constitutional provisions. The control which a state legislature has over the number of the jurors requisite to form a legal verdict in actions in the state courts depends upon whether right to trial by jury of twelve men in a particular case existed at the time of the adoption of the state constitution, and upon provisions of that constitution empowering the legislature to permit verdicts concurred in by less than all of the jurors. If at the time of its adoption the common-law rule requiring unanimity in the verdict was in force, the legislature cannot thereafter enact legislation permitting verdicts concurred in by less than all the jurors unless in the constitution itself there is some further warrant for the exercise of such legislative power * * *” 53 Am. Jur. — Trial —Section 1006 — Unanimity; Majority Verdicts.
Apparently our Supreme Court has never passed upon the constitutionality of that portion of T. C. A. Section 20-1309 providing that in case of the disability of one or more jurors by consent of the parties, the trial may continue and verdict be rendered by less than the original twelve jurors. The only jury recognized by the common law of Tennessee at the time of the adoption of our *187constitution was a twelve-man jury. Therefore, we doubt the constitutionality of that portion of Section 20-1309 providing for a trial by less than twelve jurors. However, it is not necessary to determine that question here because in this case there was a jury of twelve men.
The only jury verdict recognized by the common or statutory law of Tennessee at the time of the adoption of the constitution or subsequent' thereto is a unanimous verdict. At no time has either the legislature-or our Tennessee Supreme Court ever indicated any intention of departing to any degree from the common law rule requiring unanimity in jury cases. Time and time again this court has refused to weigh or consider the preponderance of the evidence because a jury of twelve men had unanimously reached a certain verdict and that verdict had been approved by the Trial Judge sitting as the thirteenth juror.
Contrast the force of such a verdict with the verdict in the present case which was agreed to by only seven jurors and diametrically opposed by five jurors. To allow such verdict to stand would necessarily, in my humble opinion, require the appellate courts to adopt a different rule for reviewing such cases on appeal and ultimately result in the appellate courts weighing the preponderance of the evidence.
We should be slow to change the ancient landmarks.
Every litigant in a civil case has the option to stand upon his constitutional right to a trial by jury or to waive such constitutional right. If he elects to have a trial by jury then the only legal verdict which that jury can return is a unanimous verdict. To permit the parties by agreement to have less than a unanimous verdict is *188not to permit them to waive any of their rights hut is, in effect, to permit them by consent to change and amend our judicial procedure. Such practices, if allowed to increase, could lead ultimately only to legal chaos. If the parties by consent could agree that a jury verdict could be less than unanimous, why could they not also agree that the clerk or sheriff could approve or disapprove the verdict as the thirteenth juror in the place and stead of His Honor the Trial Judge?
It is true that neither party in this case has assigned error on this question but the entire case is before this court upon an appeal in error duly perfected and this court must affirm, reverse or modify the judgment below. I think the judgment is void upon its face because based upon a void jury verdict and this court upon its own motion should reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
My two distinguished colleagues differ with me concerning the validity of the verdict of the jury. However, I feel that the question is of great importance to the bench and bar of Tennessee as well as to the public at large. "With great deference to the opinions of my learned associates, I have expressed my views on this question in the hope that if a petition for writ of cer-tiorari is presented the Supreme Court will rule upon the validity of a majority verdict. Especially do I think this question should be passed upon by the Supreme Court since Messrs. Higgins and Crownover cited no authority to sustain their opinion that a majority verdict is valid and binding when all the parties consent to be bound thereby.