Court Opinion

ID: 9759853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:30:28.781851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:05.573742
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that reversible error did not occur under the facts presented in this case and therefore concur in the judgment of the Court.
However, I cannot agree that the trial court had any affirmative evidence before it which would indicate appellant’s voluntary absence as opposed to his having suf*262fered a sudden medical emergency or other calamity.1 None of the circumstances cited by the majority opinion as evidence supporting the former, is inconsistent with the latter.
Rather than supply evidence, I would hold that as a matter of public policy, the trial judge’s ruling under the circumstances was justified: defense counsel testified that he had directed an unsuccessful search for appellant in the area hospitals; this seemed to significantly reduce the likelihood that appellant had been victimized by his heart condition since the preceding day when he appeared in court. Interests of both the State and the court in the speedy and orderly administration of justice justified the trial court’s refusal to continue the case under these circumstances.2
I agree with the majority that pertinent evidence developed after the trial court’s pretrial ruling should not be ignored in determining whether a new trial is required. But I wish to clarify and emphasize what the majority merely alludes to: if appellant had reappeared during or after trial and produced evidence on motion for mistrial or new trial to show his absence had not been voluntary, a new trial would have been mandated. See Article 40.03(1), V.A.C.C.P.
Because he was unable to do so (and, in fact, the evidence revealed he had absconded), I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. The trial judge himself observed: "I have no evidence before me as to why Mr. Moore is not here."

. See Fry v. State, 78 Tex.Cr.R. 435, 182 S.W. 331, 334 (1916).