Court Opinion

ID: 9442260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:41:25.181969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:01.850596
License: Public Domain

BARKSDALE, District Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority that, as a general rule, an action for malicious prosecution is barred if the dismissal of the criminal prosecution was brought about by the voluntary agreement of the parties, but I am constrained to differ with the conclusion of the majority that this rule requires a reversal here and the entry of a final judgment for the defendants. Speaking of this rule, the following statement appears in 34 Am.Jur. 726: “The reason for this rule where the termination of the case is brought about by a compromise or settlement between the parties, understandingly entered into, is that in such case there is such an admission of probable cause that the plaintiff cannot afterward retract it and try the question waived by the settlement.”
The same thought is expressed by the quotation in the majority opinion from White v. International Text Book Co., 156 Iowa 210, 136 N.W. 121, 42 L.R.A.,N.S., 346, and in the quotation from Lord Tenterden, Wilkinson v. Howell, Moody & M. 495.
It would seem that when the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule should not be applied. In the instant case, as stated in the majority opinion, “There is evidence that, at the time of the settlement and dismissal of the criminal case, plaintiff protested his innocence of the crime charged and stated that he was being held up and was making payment under protest because he had to get away.”
Taking this evidence as true, as the jury did, I hardly see how it can be held as a matter of law that the settlement constituted an admission of probable cause, or that defendants were deceived by plaintiff’s consent to the settlement.
I agree with the statement of the law in White v. International Text-Book Co., supra [156 Iowa 210, 136 N.W. 128] (last par. of opinion), to the effect that, in order for a settlement to bar an action of malicious prosecution, it must appear “that the one accused voluntarily procured his release, that his payment was in full settlement of his accounts and for the purpose of extinguishing a conceded indebtedness, and that this payment was freely and voluntarily made; that is to say, not wider protest or by reason of duress. Any other rule would encourage resort to the criminal law for the purpose of enforcing a debt and the greater *316wrong the less the liability to punishment. * * * ” (Italics supplied.)
I think the question of whether or not plaintiff voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement was for the jury. . It was submitted to the jury under instructions quite favorable to the defendants, the jury found for the plaintiff, and the trial court accepted the jury’s verdict and entered judgment thereon.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.