Court Opinion

ID: 9776328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:30:43.804607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.258274
License: Public Domain

Paula Jamell Storeygard, Special Associate Justice, concurring. The Appellee’s petition for rehearing should be granted. Appellees correctly argue, for their first point, that the purported majority opinion actually consisted of only two votes. Appellees also correctly argue, for their second point, that the purported majority opinion contains an error of law in its interpretation of Ark. Const., art. 16, § 9. There is no need to address their third point regarding clarification of the purported majority opinion. Point I Of three Justices reported to have joined the original opinion of Justice Dudley, two actually dissented on grounds that the Court (a) had no jurisdiction to hear this case, (b) should not have reached the merits, and (c) should have dismissed the appeal. Their views on constitutionality should not have been counted with either the “majority” or “dissenting” opinion. This Court has previously recognized that a justice may dissent for lack of jurisdiction and not reach the merits of a case. See Amalgamated Clothing v. Earle Industries, Inc., 318 Ark. 524 (1994); Arkansas Association of County Judges v. Green, 232 Ark. 438, 338 S.W.2d 672 (1960). The decision in this case should originally have been reported as three to affirm, two to dismiss, and two to reverse. The case should, therefore, have been affirmed pursuant to the general rule that when no majority opinion can be reached, the case must be affirmed. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107 (7 Wall. 107) (1869); Richardson v. Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 763 P.2d 1153 (N.M. 1988); People v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n. of Springfield, 387 N.E.2d 305 (Ill. 1979); Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 259 N.E.2d 651 (Ind. 1970); In re Levine, 88 A.2d 104 (Pa. Super. 1952); Durbin v. Humphrey Co., 28 N.E.2d 563 (Ohio 1940); Fontaine v. Maineland Stages, 180 A. 314 (Me. 1935). This Court adopted that rule in Bernard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 77 Ark. 590 (1906), when it held that an equally divided court will leave the finding of the trial court in place. I would grant rehearing based on Appellee’s Point I. Point II The majority of the Court declines to grant rehearing based upon Appellant’s Point I. Therefore, in order to avoid any issue regarding the effect of a jurisdictional dissent when no majority can be reached on the merits, I withdraw my prior dissent and turn to the merits of this case. After reviewing the several briefs submitted in favor of rehearing, I find that the sales tax at issue is constitutional and that the Appellant has otherwise failed to demonstrate that the sales tax is invalid. The meaning of Ark. Const., art. 16, § 9, has previously been interpreted in a series of cases which had not been originally cited by any party. It is, therefore, unnecessary to engage in the tortuous process of constitutional construction. In City of Little Rock v. Prather, 46 Ark. 471 (1885), the Court interpreted this constitutional provision to “refer to limitations of taxation by the . . . county upon property as such, and [to] have no reference to license taxes.” Id., 46 Ark. at 478. That interpretation was generally repeated in Quapaw Central Business Improvement Dist. v. Bond-Kinman, Inc., 315 Ark. 703, 870 S.W.2d 390 (1994) and Holt v. City of Maumelle, 302 Ark. 51, 786 S.W.2d 581 (1990). According to the interpretation of Ark. Const., art. 16, § 9, which has consistently been made by this Court, that provision does not limit county sales tax rates. It is well established that constitutional provisions “should receive a consistent and uniform interpretation so that they will not be taken to mean one thing at one time, and a different thing at another.” O’Daniel v. Brunswick Balke Collender Co., 195 Ark. 669, 674, 113 S.W.2d 717, 719 (1938). I therefore join with Justice Brown to grant rehearing on Appellee’s Point II and to affirm the trial judge.