Court Opinion

ID: 9735991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:38:50.488112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.190201
License: Public Domain

FOURT, J.
I dissent.
As heretofore indicated the complaint for wrongful death in this case set forth two separate causes of action. The first cause charged that the owner of the business in question negligently instructed Levizon on how to remove the part from the car, negligently supplied Levizon with unsuitable equipment and negligently supervised the deceased’s removing of the part from the old automobile. The second cause *285charged that the defendant wantonly and recklessly instructed the deceased on how to remove the part in question and ivantonly and recklessly supervised the deceased, and wantonly and recklessly provided him with unsuitable equipment.
The “Joint Statement Under Pre-trial Hules” provides in part: “. . . (2) the action is one for wrongful death of Fred Levizon arising out of the failure of faulty equipment and jack furnished to decedent by the defendant” and “ among the matters in dispute and at issue are: 1. Negligence of defendant; 2. Contributory negligence of the decedent; 3. Amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff; 4. Assumption of risk.” It is noted that no reference is made to any charge of willful misconduct, wantonness or other claim as is set forth in the asserted second cause of action.
The cause went to trial on Monday, January 18, 1960. The plaintiffs completed the presentation of their ease toward the end of the afternoon session on Tuesday, January 19, 1960. On the morning of Wednesday, January 20, 1960, and before the defendant proceeded with his case in chief, the defendant made a motion for a judgment of nonsuit as to both causes of action. Citations of authority were given to the court by the plaintiffs, and great reliance was placed on Cawog v. Rothbaum, 165 Cal.App.2d 577 [331 P.2d 1063]. Discussion was had in chambers as to the holding in the Cawog case and it was pointed out to the court by the plaintiffs’ counsel that the instructions submitted by the plaintiffs on willful misconduct were taken from the Cawog case. Counsel for the plaintiffs advised the judge: “I’d like to have some more law on it.” The judge shortly thereafter stated in effect that during the noon hour he would again read the cases which previously had been cited to him and that he would, and he did then and there, take the motion for the nonsuit as to the second cause of action under submission. It is to be noted that the motion was submitted at the conclusion of the testimony of the plaintiffs’ ease, and before any evidence was taken upon the defendant’s ease in chief. The motion for the nonsuit on the asserted first cause of action was denied. It appears to me that the procedure adopted by the trial judge was not “rather unusual” as indicated by the majority of this court. In fact the judge was simply saving time in permitting the cause to proceed before the jury during the morning session with the expectation that he would spend a part of his lunch hour again reading the cited cases and thereafter would rule upon the motion with reference to the *286asserted second cause of action. At the conclusion of the presentation of the defendant’s case the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict. The motion for a directed verdict was denied. The motion for a nonsuit was granted as to the second cause of action.
The judge specifically stated at the time of his ruling on the granting of the nonsuit motion with reference to the second cause of action that he considered only the testimony which had been given up to the time of the making of the motion and in effect stated that he had not considered any of the testimony which was given after the plaintiffs’ ease was closed.
The majority opinion sets forth in part the testimony of ITeeter after the motion for the nonsuit was made, that is, his testimony as a witness in the defendant’s side of the cause. To me it appears unfair and improper for this court to consider testimony which the trial judge stated in effect that he did not and would not consider in ruling upon the motion. This court should place itself in exactly the position that the trial court was in when the matter was submitted, namely at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case, and should not inject into the case a great deal of testimony and inferences therefrom which properly were not considered by the trial judge.
The opinion of the majority states that the testimony of ITeeter establishes the elements necessary to constitute willful misconduct. The testimony of Heeter up to the time the motion for a nonsuit was made does not establish the so-called required elements of willful misconduct, and in my view the majority, in order to bolster the opinion, have relied upon testimony from a part of the record which we cannot with propriety consider. In other words, the trial judge properly considered certain limited testimony and that testimony only, whereas the majority of this court have improperly considered the testimony which is contained in the entire record.
At the time of the argument before the trial judge upon the motion for a nonsuit as heretofore indicated, plaintiffs relied heavily upon language in the Gawog ease, which was written in this division. In Gawog the facts were that a driver of a truck proceeded toward a pedestrian in a narrow alleyway and although the driver of the truck saw that there was no place for the pedestrian to go safely he “bore down on him,’’ did not apply his brakes, did not slow down or attempt to stop and apparently paid no attention to the frantic shouting and running of the pedestrian in his effort *287to avoid being run down. The trial judge submitted the issue of willful misconduct to the jury. Under the circumstances it was proper to do so as this court pointed out. The facts of that case and the facts of the present case present no similarity. In Cawog the driver of the truck saw the pedestrian in the narrow alleyway, saw the pedestrian frantically waving his shopping bags and shouting out to the driver to slow down, and in spite of the circumstances the truck driver continued on, ignored the pedestrian’s predicament and caused the truck to strike the pedestrian. Any language used in an opinion must necessarily be interpreted with reference to the facts of the particular case in which the language is used. It was stated in Lovett v. Hitchcock, 192 Cal.App.2d 806, 813 [14 Cal.Rptr. 117, 121], “We caution the trial bench and bar that eases warranting instruction on wilful or wanton misconduct will seldom arise. By its very definition, such misconduct is rare. The recent decision applying the rule (Cawog v. Rothbaum, supra, 165 Cal.App.2d 577 [331 P.2d 1063]) presented an extremely aggravated situation . . . But wanton or wilful misconduct is much more than negligence or gross negligence. It should but rarely be resorted to by the trial courts. ...”
At the very most the facts of this case as gathered from the testimony up to the time the motion for a nonsuit was made are that the defendant knew that the deceased, who was an adult, had deliberately placed himself in a dangerous position and the defendant did not take affirmative action to override the judgment of the deceased in placing himself in such position, to eliminate any danger.
The majority opinion states that there is a conflict in the evidence presented by the defendant, to the effect that “defendant gave decedent two stands or blocks to put under the car.” I have read the entire record in this case and the testimony of the defendant was not impeached. There is no evidence in conflict with the defendant’s statement to the effect that he did provide Levizon with stands or blocks to put under the car upon which he was to work. True it is that an ambulance attaché stated in effect that he did not see any stands when he first observed the situation, but it is also true that the ambulance attaché was not looking for such stands or blocks, that he was interested only in Levizon under the car, and nothing else, at the time he was there. The ambulance attaché did not say that there were no stands or blocks there and in fact he stated in effect that he did not look to *288see if there were any such present when he first arrived, but that after the body had been removed from under the car he did notice some stands a short distance from the car. His powers of observation were not too alert for he did not even notice the make of the car upon which Levizon was working. Such testimony is not evidence under the circumstances that the defendant did not do as he positively testified.
To say that the facts of this case constitute willful misconduct is in my opinion wholly unreasonable. There may have been negligence, but negligence and willful misconduct are inherently incompatible. (Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 40 Cal.2d 102, 120, 125 [251 P.2d 955].)
The charging allegations of the first and second asserted causes of action are substantially the same except that in the first cause of action it is charged that the defendant negligently instructed Levizon—defendant negligently supplied Levizon with unsuitable equipment and negligently supervised Levizon’s removing the part. In the second cause of action the charge is that the defendant did the same things as charged in the first count but that he acted “wantonly and recklessly.”
A close reading of the record demonstrates that the evidence is to the effect that the defendant did not in any respect or ever instruct Levizon on how to remove the particular automobile part, nor did he supply him with unsuitable equipment, nor did he supervise him in any respect as to removing the automobile part. The evidence is clear to the effect that Levizon thought he knew how to take the part off of the automobile without any instructions and that he was supplied with the proper stands and blocks had he but used them.
The trial judge should not be convicted of error upon testimony which properly he did not even consider. The majority of this court in my opinion have misconstrued' the law and have added to and distorted the facts upon which the case ought to be determined. It is serious enough to construe too liberally the limited facts which ought to be considered under the circumstances, but to add deliberately to the basic facts upon which the motion was submitted by the trial judge results in a miscarriage of justice.
Wantonness is the key word in the asserted second cause of action. In California Words, Phrases and Maxims it is stated:
“A tort having some of the characteristics of both negligence and wilfulness occurs when a person with no intent to cause harm intentionally performs an act so unreasonable and dangerous that he knows, or should know, it is highly *289probable that harm will result. Such a tort has been labeled ‘wilful negligence,’ ‘wanton and wilful negligence,’ ‘wanton and wilful misconduct,’ and even ‘gross negligence.’ It is most accurately designated as ‘wanton and reckless misconduct.’ It involves no intention, as does wilful misconduct, to do harm, and it differs from negligence in that it does involve an intention to perform an act that the actor knows, or should know, will very probably cause harm. Wanton and reckless misconduct is more closely akin to wilful misconduct than to negligence, and it has most of the legal consequences of wilful misconduct. Donnelly v. Southern Pac. Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 863, 869, 870, 118 P.2d 465; Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 102,116, 251 P.2d 955.”
An injury, to be ‘‘wanton,” must have been caused by one conscious of his conduct and that injury would likely result therefrom, and such person, with reckless indifference to consequences, must have intentionally committed a wrongful act or omitted a known duty which produced the injuries resulting. Admittedly in this case the defendant did nothing affirmatively which under any circumstances could be interpreted as being wanton. Query—What known duty did he, the defendant, omit to perform. In my opinion there was none.
A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose, or in malicious disregard of the rights of another. A high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another is an essential ingredient of wanton and reckless conduct.
There is no proper evidence to the effect that the defendant exhibited a conscious indifference to consequences so far as Levizon was concerned.
It is my belief that it is not the duty or the province of this court to mold the law to the end that in effect the court creates what is tantamount to absolute liability upon the part of an invitor to an invitee who is pursuing a course of his own without direction from the invitor and who by reason of his own carelessness is either hurt or killed.
The majority opinion renders any distinction between negligence and willful misconduct more theoretical than real.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 12, 1962. Fourt, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 14, 1962. Schauer, J., and Dooling, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.