Court Opinion

ID: 9782215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:08:17.31818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:16.877344
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
specially concurring.
Because I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by providing a copy of the victim's videotaped interview to the jury, I generally concur with the majority's opinion. I write separately because I do not fully agree with the majority's broad approach, its criticisms, and suggestions.
Trial courts have discretion to manage a jury's access to evidence presented at trial. See Settle v. People, 180 Colo. 262, 264, 504 P.2d 680, 680 (1972); Crim. P. 57(b) (trial courts may proceed in any lawful manner when a procedure is not otherwise specified). However, trial courts are limited in the exercise of that discretion and charged with ensuring that when evidence is given to the jury for use during deliberations, it is "not so selected, nor used in such a manner, that there is a likelihood of it being given undue weight or emphasis by the jury." Settle, 180 Colo. at 264, 504 P.2d at 681. The court of appeals has followed our holding in Settle when reviewing trial court decisions to allow jurors' access to videotaped evidence or testimony. See People v. Montoya, 773 P.2d 623, 626 (Colo.App.1989) (holding that a trial court may allow jurors to review a videotape of a witness' previous statements, under circumstances that will assure that such statements are not given "undue weight or emphasis") (citing Settle, 180 Colo. at 264, 504 P.2d at 681).
While Montoya addressed Crim. P. 57(b)'s command to look to the rules of civil procedure when no rule of criminal procedure controls, and more specifically C.R.C.P. 47(m) (dealing with evidence juries may take into deliberations), it recognized that C.R.C.P. 47(m) did not address videotaped statements. 778 P.2d at 626. CRCP. 47(m) was later changed, but those later changes did not address videotaped statements. See People v. McKinney, 80 P.3d 823, 829 (Colo.App.2008), rev'd on other grounds, 99 P.3d 1038 (Colo.2004), (holding that permitting written statements into the jury room was not an abuse of discretion under the new CRCP. 47(m)). Though trial courts must look to the rules of civil procedure, C.R.C.P. 47(m) provides little guidance in determining the use of videotaped statements. Thus, Montoya, though criticized by the majority, does not suggest that there is an "automatic rule of exelusion for all testimonial exhibits." Maj. op. at 704. Rather, I find the court of appeals' decisions consistent with our holding here today: that trial courts have discretion to allow videotape evidence to be brought into the jury room so long as the court supervises the use of that evidence to guard against any unfair or prejudicial use. Here, the trial court issued an instruction that the videotape not be given special weight, required the jury to make a request to see the evidence before allowing it into the jury room, and conferred with counsel before permitting it to be given to the jury. I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exercise of its supervisory authority over the use of evidence by the jury.
Notwithstanding the majority's broad suggestion that "jury deliberations ... could never be directly 'supervised,'" maj. op. at 704, there are a number of ways that trial courts can supervise a jury's use of videotape evidence after the case has been submitted. Courts can allow the jury to view it in court or with a bailiff present. In addition, courts can limit the amount of time a jury has access to the videotape, or instruct the foreman that the videotape may only be viewed once or a limited number of times agreed upon by the parties. Ultimately, trial courts have the responsibility, authority, and discre*707tion to supervise the presentation of evidence to avoid undue influence or prejudice. Our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Settle 180 Colo. at 264, 504 P.2d at 681.
I do not agree, however, with the majority's expansive conclusion that discretion "must remain firmly within ... the trial court." Maj. op. at 704 (emphasis added). We have the power to issue rules of criminal procedure that can control what juries in criminal cases may take into the deliberation room. See § 18-2-109, C.R.S. (2006) (authorizing the Colorado Supreme Court to issue rules of criminal procedure); We have not promulgated a rule of criminal procedure controlling the introduction of videotaped statements, but instead have chosen to leave this issue to the sound discretion of the trial court. Crim. P. 57(b). Here we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using its authority to submit videotaped statements to the jury in the absence of a controlling rule.
Finally, I find a broad examination of the actions of the defense attorney unnecessary to justify upholding the trial court's decisions. See maj. op. at 705. The defense attorney unsuccessfully objected to the admission of the videotape at trial. Faced with a situation in which the jury was going to see the evidence, he then argued to the jury that the evidence supported his client's case. His arguments should not be confused or construed as acceptance of admission of the videotape. Further, he should not have to face the risk that his decision to argue evidence admitted over his objection will operate as a penalty to any later objections he might make to its admission or use. The significance to our review here of his lack of objection to the evidence going into the jury deliberation room is to determine the standard of review we would employ were we to find error. Here, had we found error, his lack of objection means we would employ a plain error analysis. People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 749 (Colo.2005). His lack of objection does not, however, inform our analysis of whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Because I agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion I specially concur.
I am authorized to state that Justice BENDER joins in this opinion.