Court Opinion

ID: 9492071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:31:19.290849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:05.476426
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would hold that the practice of closing the state and county courts and offices of Kenton County, Kentucky, on Good Friday, a purely religious holiday, fails to satisfy both the secular purpose and secular effects prongs of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority asserts that the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is satisfied if there is “credible evidence of a significant secular purpose” behind the choice of Good Friday for the Kenton County spring holiday. Ante at-. As an initial matter, I believe that this formulation understates the burden that should be borne by the defendants in this case. Although “a totally secular purpose is not required,” ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 107 S.Ct. 421, 93 L.Ed.2d 371 (1986), it is clear that the “secular purpose ... requirement is not satisfied ... by the mere existence of some secular purpose, however dominated by religious purposes.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring). The Supreme Court has not declared how dominant the secular purpose must be under this test, but to avoid trivializing the requirement we should examine the primary or actual purpose that underlies the selection of Good Friday as an official holiday. See id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“purpose prong ... asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (same); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585, 590-92, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (addressing the “actual,” “predominate [sic],” “preeminent,” or “primary” purpose of statute); see also Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 783 (9th Cir.1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
However, even under the arguably more deferential standard followed by this court in Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1308, 140 L.Ed.2d 473 (1998), I would conclude that no legitimate secular purpose has been shown. We must focus, of course, not on the establishment of a spring holiday but on the selection of Good Friday for that holiday. Here, the purported secular purpose for closing on Good Friday is to accommodate the travel plans of employees, jurors, and others who use the courts. It is noted that many schools and other government offices *580are closed on this day, and the defendants have provided state highway statistics that demonstrate that Good Friday is, indeed, a very busy travel day. Closing to accommodate travel that is generated by other equally unconstitutional governmental observances of the Good Friday holiday does not constitute a legitimate secular purpose, however. If it did, a state government could observe any religious holiday without violating the secular purpose test, if it closed schools and offices throughout the state and enough citizens took advantage of the holiday to travel.
Moreover, I conclude that the selection of Good Friday as the spring holiday violates the secular effects test. The question, as the majority correctly observes, is whether “a reasonable observer would conclude that the message communicated is one of either endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 237. The majority and I disagree, however, on the message that is communicated in this instance. In the majority’s view, the message transmitted is one of local government officials choosing a holiday date that is convenient for employees and others, while'minimizing the religious significance of the holiday. I believe, on the other hand, that a reasonable observer (of either the O’Connor or Stevens persuasion) would discern state and local government and school officials agreeing to close on a date that has purely Western Christian significance and, thus, would perceive widespread governmental endorsement of religion. In my view, the reasonable observer would not conclude that convenience dictated the selection of Good Friday as a uniform spring holiday because she would realize that any given Friday or Monday in March or April would serve as well.
Likewise, I cannot agree with the majority’s view that it is constitutionally permissible for public schools with sizable Jewish student-bodies to close for Jewish religious holidays. In either case the religious needs of the observant can be accommodated without closing the public institution on the holiday and endorsing a particular religion. The closure of government offices on Christmas, Thanksgiving, and Sundays, is, I believe, easily distinguishable from a closure on Good Friday or Rosh Hashanah. Despite their religious origins, the former holidays are now secularized to a significant extent. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 & n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (secular dimensions of Christmas); id. at 631, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Thanksgiving a celebration of patriotic values); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (secular aspects of Sunday). The same simply cannot be said for the latter holidays.1
I recognize that requiring the defendants to adopt an alternative spring holiday, e.g., the last Friday in March, could create some temporary inconvenience.2 After all, the Kenton County Judge Executive cannot dictate a change in government holidays throughout the state. However, we cannot allow the decentralization of decision making within the state or county to insulate a governmental entity from its obligations under the Establishment Clause. Moreover, nothing precludes state and local officials from agreeing on an alternative uniform spring holiday, and were we to hold in favor of the plaintiffs, *581as I believe we should, I suspect that this is exactly what would happen.
The closure of the institutions of government in this country is a traditional mark of solemn observance and respect. Despite its widespread adoption, I can see no legitimate secular purpose in the government observing this purely sectarian holiday, and, because a spring date lacking religious significance would serve as well, I believe that a reasonable observer would perceive an endorsement of Western Christianity. Accordingly, I dissent.

. I am somewhat mystified by the majority's reference to the religious origins of the-names of the days. No government, to my knowledge, has dictated the names of the days, and, even if these names are officially recognized, no reasonable observer would sense in their use an endorsement of Roman or Norse mythology. Given the dominance of Western Christian belief in this country, it appears to me that the majority’s analogy trivializes the issue before us.

. It should go without saying that the fact that a spring holiday that is based on the secular calendar, such as the last Friday in March, occasionally coincides with Good Friday would not render the holiday unconstitutional.