Court Opinion

ID: 9603783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:38.181247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:13.776760
License: Public Domain

FROST, Justice (dissenting). I dissent from Part III of the majority’s opinion because (1) we should not have granted certiorari to hear this appeal and (2) the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the detention of Werner was reasonable. The problem with granting certiorari stems from the fact that there was probable cause to arrest Werner, yet the parties stipulated to the legal conclusion that probable cause was absent. Probable cause to arrest Werner arose when Officer McNeal stopped Werner, looked into his car, and saw the brown knapsack thought to contain the stolen camcorder. At that time, Officer McNeal knew that Werner, while carrying a Fisher camcorder in a brown knapsack, had just attempted to purchase a battery pack necessary for operation of the recently-stolen Fisher camcorder, and that an employee of the store reporting the stolen item remembered having seen someone matching Werner’s general description in her store. This information was sufficient to establish probable cause. See State v. Affsprung, 115 N.M. 546, 549, 854 P.2d 873, 876 (Ct.App.) (defining probable cause), cert. denied, 115 N.M. 545, 854 P.2d 872 (1993). Thus, the search of Werner’s automobile was proper because there was probable cause to arrest Werner. The suppression motion should have been analyzed in terms of probable cause rather than in terms of an investigative detention pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). When we assume based upon the parties’ stipulation that there was no probable cause to arrest Werner, this case presents an artificial situation, and analysis of the search as an investigative detention is awkward and strained. This Court should not use a case involving a search justified by probable cause as its vehicle for delineating the scope of Terry investigative detentions. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 705-08, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1585-87, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Due to the oddity of this case, it does not involve a significant question of constitutional law nor an issue of substantial public interest, and it is outside our discretionary jurisdiction. NMSA 1978, § 34r-5-14(B) (Repl.Pamp.1990);1 cf. State v. Conn, 115 N.M. 99, 101, 847 P.2d 744, 746 (1993) (prohibiting this Court’s review by writ of certiorari when no conditions of Section 34-5-14(B) are present). Assuming arguendo that certiorari was properly granted and that probable cause was absent, I disagree with the majority’s application of the law of investigative detentions to the facts of this case. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the challenged evidence was admissible because Werner was subjected to a reasonable investigative detention rather than a de facto arrest. An investigative detention that is justified at its inception is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1878-79. In determining the proper scope of an investigative stop and distinguishing it from a de facto arrest, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 1574-75. Factors to consider in assessing the reasonableness of an investigative stop include the length of the detention, whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions or whether the police were dilatory or caused unnecessary delay in their investigation, and whether the police were acting in a swiftly developing situation. Id. at 686-88, 105 S.Ct. at 1575-77. The circumstances of this case are a classical example of why it is necessary for law enforcement officers to be allowed to graduate their response in investigative stops based upon the demands of a particular situation. Here, the police had obtained a large amount of compelling information which pointed to Werner as the perpetrator of the crime. When the police stopped Werner in his car, the brown knapsack containing the stolen camcorder was laying on the back seat in plain view. This discovery certainly justified further investigatory steps after Werner refused to consent to a search of the automobile, and the further steps taken by the police were clearly reasonable. The facts indicate that the officers worked diligently in the investigation to confirm or dispel their strong suspicions by quickly bringing witnesses to identify Werner. There is absolutely no indication that the police unnecessarily prolonged Werner’s detention. The majority’s opinion emphasizes that Officer McNeal knew Werner and where he lived. That knowledge, however, did not guarantee that Werner would be at his residence, locatable for further questioning, at any later time. More importantly, the majority’s opinion ignores the certainty that if Werner were allowed to leave, the knapsack containing the stolen camcorder would have disappeared, thereby depriving the State of its ability to realistically prosecute this case. The police officers had reasonable concerns regarding their safety (Werner had been carrying a knife) and Werner’s ability to flee and destroy evidence. Because the police officers were acting in a swiftly developing situation, we should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing of the police officers’ actions. Id. at 686-87, 105 S.Ct. at 1575-76. Given the circumstances here, placing Werner in the police car was reasonable. Because the police acted reasonably in conducting their investigation, they were not required to pursue the least intrusive means of investigation available. Id. “A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished.” Id. In conclusion, the police officers acted reasonably and within the scope of a permissible investigative stop. The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed this issue, and I therefore respectfully dissent. BACA, J., concurs.  . Section 34-5-14(B) states: B. In addition to its original appellate jurisdiction, the supreme court has jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari to the court of appeals any civil or criminal matter in. which the decision of the court of appeals: (1) is in conflict with a decision of the supreme court; (2) is in conflict with a decision of the court of appeals; (3) involves a significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United States; or (4) involves an issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court. It was not argued that certiorari should be granted based upon § 34-5-14(B)(l) or (2).