Court Opinion

ID: 9741891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:03:38.666103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:21.682411
License: Public Domain

CANE, P.J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority opinion until it concludes that there is substantial evidence to support the commission’s conclusion that Reimer’s budgetary duties were ministerial. I disagree with the conclusion that Reimer’s authority was limited to adopting an existing budget with adjustments for anticipated changes in the cost of supplies or level of existing services and that, consequently, her budgetary duties primarily involved projecting the cost of continuing current operations. Because Reimer’s authority to prepare her department’s budget was more than ministerial in nature, I would affirm the circuit court.
We are concerned only with the second test, i.e., whether the employee had the effective authority to commit the employer’s resources. I agree with the commission’s interpretation that this means the authority to establish an original budget or to allocate funds for differing program purposes from an original budget. I also agree that an employee does not qualify as a managerial employee when the authority to *360prepare the budget is merely ministerial in nature. Consequently, an employee whose duties are limited to projecting the costs of continuing current operations does not obtain managerial status under this test.
Here, the commission found that Reimer’s 1985 budget contained appropriations for the same kinds of expenditures as the 1984 budget that was prepared by the judge. It also found that the judge assisted her in preparing the 1985 budget. From these findings, it concluded that her budgetary duties were ministerial in nature because the decision to conduct the operations was made by the judge and her budgetary duties primarily involved projecting the cost of the continuing current operations. These findings are not supported by the evidence.
Reimer testified that she prepared her budget for the office of register in probate in 1985, which was a separate budget from the circuit court budget. She indicated that the judge had seen the budget because she had to work with him to get the breakdowns for some months prior to the time she started to work in this office. The commission’s factual finding that the judge assisted her in the preparation of the budget is unsupported by the evidence. Reimer’s asking the judge for information from previous years does not result in the judge "assisting” her or in the budget being prepared for another.
The judge operates the court but it is Reimer who has the independent responsibility to make certain the administrative functions are done to support the court. How and what manner she does that is her decision. Her budget, however, is not that of another or ministerial merely because her office operations are court related. Subject to county board approval, *361Reimer has the sole authority to determine the number and kind of employees to be utilized in providing these services, the kind and nature of any capital expenditures to be made, and the system by which the services would be provided.
The commission must determine only whether she has the authority to make these types of decisions in submitting the budget, not whether she in fact exercised this authority. For example, the fact that in 1985 Reimer did not provide for any large capital expenditures is not relevant. The undisputed fact is that she had the sole authority to decide what capital expenditures were necessary to operate her office.
Prior to 1985, the budget for the offices of register in probate, probate registrar, and probate court commissioner was included in the circuit court budget. Thus, the 1985 budget was the first separate budget for this office. The fact that many of the appropriations had similar accounts to the budget for the prior years is not unusual and should be expected. However, the appropriation amounts she requested for the various categories differed. For example, the 1985 budget contained an appropriation for the library for which no expenditure had been made in 1984. She did not simply fill in the blanks for the budget or extend the 1984 budget. Rather, she prepared an original budget that she deemed necessary to operate her office.
Admittedly, her budget is not a large budget when compared to the other county offices. However, the size of the budget is not what should be relied upon to determine whether the employee possesses authority to commit the county’s resources. The undisputed fact is that she had the authority to prepare an original annual budget for her office and she did exercise that *362authority when preparing a budget based on her forecasts. Therefore, I would conclude from the evidence that the commission had no alternative but to conclude that Reimer was a managerial employee. She had the effective authority to submit an original budget, and her budget duties were not ministerial in nature.