Court Opinion

ID: 9717844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:11:26.167409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.393106
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring specially).
ALIMONY
For posterity, the alimony cases in this Court for nearly a decade have been collected by this special writer and are noted below including any special writings pertaining thereto.
MAJORITY OPINIONS WRITTEN BY THIS AUTHOR
(1) Caughron v. Caughron, 418 N.W. 2d 791 (S.D.1988).
(2) Tesch v. Tesch, 399 N.W.2d 880 (S.D.1987).
(3) Straub v. Straub, 381 N.W.2d 260 (S.D.1986).
(4) Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 N.W. 2d 264 (S.D.1984).
(5) Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192 (S.D.1984).
(6) Plucker v. Plucker, 338 N.W.2d 842 (S.D.1983).
(7) Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905 (S.D.1980).
CONCURRENCES JOINING MAJORITY OPINIONS
(1) Stemper v. Stemper, 415 N.W.2d 159 (S.D.1987).
(2) Stemper v. Stemper, 403 N.W.2d 405 (S.D.1987).
(3) Thomerson v. Thomerson, 387 N.W. 2d 509 (S.D.1986).
(4) Garnos v. Garnos, 376 N.W.2d 571 (S.D.1985).
(5) Lambertz v. Lambertz, 375 N.W.2d 645 (S.D.1985).
(6) Pennock v. Pennock, 356 N.W.2d 913 (S.D.1984).
(7) Moller v. Moller, 356 N.W.2d 909 (S.D.1984).
*590(8) Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1984).
(9) Oesterling v. Oesterling, 354 N.W. 2d 735 (S.D.1984).
(10) Rousseau v. Gesinger, 330 N.W.2d 522 (S.D.1983).
(11) Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878 (S.D.1983).
(12) Morrison v. Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 877 (S.D.1982).
(13) Rykhus v. Rykhus, 319 N.W.2d 167 (S.D.1982).
(14) Gassman v. Gassman, 296 N.W.2d 518 (S.D.1980).
(15) Talbert v. Talbert, 290 N.W.2d 862 (S.D.1980).
(16) Price v. Pnce, 278 N.W.2d 455 (S.D.1979).
(17) Braaten v. Braaten, 278 N.W.2d 448 (S.D.1979).
SPECIAL CONCURRENCES/CONCURRENCES IN RESULT BY THIS AUTHOR
(1) Arens v. Arens, 400 N.W.2d 900, 902 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
(2) Marquardt v. Marquardt by Rempfer, 396 N.W.2d 753, 755 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
(3) Tate v. Tate, 394 N.W.2d 309, 311 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
(4) Wegner v. Wegner, 391 N.W.2d 690, 695 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring in result in part, concurring in part).
(5) Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 263 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
(6) Moore v. Moore, 354 N.W.2d 732, 733 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
DISSENTS AND CONCURRING IN PART/DISSENTING IN PART TO MAJORITY OPINIONS BY THIS AUTHOR
(1)Lodde v. Lodde, 420 N.W.2d 20, 22 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(2) Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879, 883 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(3) Wilson v. Wilson, 399 N.W.2d 890, 892 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(4) Kelley v. Kirk, 391 N.W.2d 652, 660 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(5) Lampert v. Lampert, 388 N.W.2d 899, 904 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(6) Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312, 318 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(7) Stubbe v. Stubbe, 376 N.W.2d 807, 809 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(8) Temple v. Temple, 365 N.W.2d 561, 569 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(9) Connelly v. Connelly, 362 N.W.2d 91, 92 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(10) Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 800 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(11) Hanks v. Hanks, 334 N.W.2d 856, 859 (S.D.1983) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(12) Watt v. Watt, 312 N.W.2d 707, 712 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(13) Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 919 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(14) Meinders v. Meinders, 305 N.W.2d 404, 407 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(15) Herrboldt v. Herrboldt, 303 N.W.2d 571, 573 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
(16) Lanphear v. Lanphear, 303 N.W.2d 576, 578 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
(17) Balvin v. Balvin, 301 N.W.2d 678, 681 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., concurring *591m part, concurring specially in part, dissenting in part).
(18) Currier v. Currier, 296 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
This author disqualified in Lien v. Lien, 420 N.W.2d 26 (S.D.1988), and Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436 (S.D.1979).
History, and hopefully students of the Law, will judge my attempts to distinguish the merit of alimony awards in the above bibliography of cases. These cases represent hundreds of hours of reading records, perusing briefs, researching the evolution of alimony since its birth in England, attempting to glean/distinguish the types of alimony this Court has awarded, and always, in the end, believing that the merits of each award of alimony should stand or fall depending upon the facts of the case. Alimony has not ebbed in South Dakota, notwithstanding the “liberation of women” and their increased role in the marketplace of employment. This has been the subject of comment by this special writer before. Contrary to the social and economic changes wrought by the great divorce revolution, and the resulting demand for more jobs in the marketplace, alimony has grown by leaps and bounds in South Dakota. With a state known throughout the High Plains, via statistics gathered by the United States Department of Commerce and Bureau of Business Research at the University of South Dakota, as one of the most economically poor states in the Union, with attending low pay checks, and a sparse population, this is a domestic paradox of giant proportion. Furthermore, the growth of alimony awards in South Dakota does not parallel the spirit/holdings of most jurisdictions in this Nation. During the course of my writings, there have been many changes of personnel on this Court. Changes in law often spring from changes on the Bench. One, given to writing and attempting to spin good cloth in the domestic relations loom, considers past writings of himself as well as the Court’s holdings with deep reflection.
With that background in mind, I join the opinion, written by a well-respected, seasoned trial judge of this state. I join it because it basically makes good sense. Marital assets herein were properly valued by the trial court and exactitude was.not required by the trial court, in these valuations, which I note is language used by this special writer in writing Goehry, cited by the majority writer. Concerning the equitable distribution of the marital assets, the ex-wife was awarded approximately one-half of the assets, notwithstanding that the ex-husband was, throughout the marriage, an architect who earned the vast majority of income in this marriage. Surely, the trial judge, Judge Hurd, did not, from a standpoint of equity, mistreat the ex-wife.
This takes me to a very short dissertation on the alimony aspect in this case.* Perhaps the bibliography of cases is triggered by the dissent in part of Justice Miller, who joined this Court in December 1986. Throughout my long and almost tortured labors, now almost ten years, to distinguish the rightness or wrongness of alimony, as well as the different types of alimony, I have likewise believed, as does Justice Miller, that there might well be confusion among the trial bench and bar as to the distinctions in alimony. And I say that I have, to the best of my ability, attempted to not only decide each case on the particular merits, but also to specify the variations of alimony and to apply the facts to the basic principles of the type of alimony attempted to be awarded by the trial court. This author has, in numerous writings, defined rehabilitative alimony. It is suggested that a certitude in definition prevailed therein. See Tesch v. Tesck, 399 N.W.2d 880, 885 (S.D.1987). See also Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879, 884-85 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Stubbe v. Stubbe, 376 N.W.2d 807, 810 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 801-02 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Saint-Pierre v. *592Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 263 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., concurring specially). It is regrettable if confusion persists notwithstanding these efforts. Properly applying facts of the case to the concept of rehabilitative alimony should be less elusive than finding a pearl in an oyster.
Laboring in the legal vineyard, lo these many years, I have attempted to distinguish rehabilitative alimony from other types of awards; examples:
A. Temporary Alimony. Arens v. Arens, 400 N.W.2d 900, 902-03 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., specially concurring).
B. Reimbursement Alimony. Martin, 358 N.W.2d at 803 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
C. Permanent Support. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d at 885 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
D. Restitutional Alimony. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 263 (Henderson, J., concurring specially).
E. Property Awards, Separate Maintenance Awards. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d at 885-86; Saint-Pierre, id.
F. Child Support. Meinders v. Meinders, 305 N.W.2d 404, 407-08 (S.D.1981) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Conceptually, then, rehabilitative alimony is distinct. It is, however, awarded after consideration of several factors as found in other alimony awards set out in Caughron v. Caughron, 418 N.W.2d 791, 793 (S.D.1988); Tesch, 399 N.W.2d at 884; Straub v. Straub, 381 N.W.2d 260, 261 (S.D.1986); Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192, 194 (S.D.1984). However, it cannot be of long duration nor excessive in amount. See Tesch, 399 N.W.2d at 885 (unanimous opinion).
In this case, the majority writer, with whom I fully concur, reasons that the additional $400 per month award for nine years is not rehabilitative. This is totally commensurate with my past writings, and most particularly pertinent to my dissent recently filed in Hautala. There, I did not believe that it was conceptually sound to approve a ten-year rehabilitative alimony award, and here it is likewise wrong to have a $400 per month, nine-year rehabilitative alimony award. See my reasoned elaboration in Hautala, together with authorities therein mentioned. Justice Miller now quotes the Saint-Pierre case in his special writing and I submit that in my dissent in Hautala, I compacted the correct holding therein as written by our ex-Chief Justice, Roger Wollman. The ink is barely dry in Hautala, and I ask the students of domestic relations law to review my concurrence in part, dissent in part, and my distinguishing of former cases in this Court, and then apply those distinctions to the holding of the majority opinion in the instant appeal.
This Court has the facts before it, as did the trial court. We need not remand this case to the trial court for a further adjudication based upon hypothetical fears. The trial court’s decision is sound and it should be affirmed. This Court can examine its decisions and the decisions of other jurisdictions to arrive at proper concepts of law for the benefit of the practicing lawyers and the trial bench of this state. In the end, we determine if the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding alimony of $400 per month for nine years, be it an award of “alimony” or “rehabilitative” alimony; the standard of review is abuse of discretion; the abuse of discretion exists not herein.

The history of alimony and philosophical basis for it is set out in Connelly v. Connelly, 362 N.W.2d 91, 92-93 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., dissenting).