Court Opinion

ID: 9945088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 01:00:32.987767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:22.066538
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-40580            Document: 49-1         Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/26/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                               February 26, 2024
                                     No. 20-40580                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                        Clerk

James Chad York, Individually; Sandy Lynn Winfrey York,
Individually; Loreal Fultz, as Independent Administrator of, and on behalf
of, The Estate of Chaz Logan York and his heirs-in law,

                                                                Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                          versus

Chase Aaron Welch; The City of Beaumont,

                                                               Defendants—Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 1:18-CV-522

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Davis and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge:*
       After an off-duty police officer shot and killed Chaz York, his family
and estate (collectively the Yorks) brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against
the officer and the City of Beaumont, the municipality that employed that
officer. The district court dismissed the case based on a Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Because the Yorks have not plausibly pleaded

       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                        No. 20-40580

a theory of Monell1 liability against the municipality, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal.
                                                    I
       This case presents tragic and unsettling facts. In October 2016, off-
duty Beaumont Police Officer Chase Welch shot and killed Chaz York in the
parking lot of Madison’s, a restaurant and bar. The Yorks allege the
following: An individual named Levi Severson assaulted Chaz without
provocation on the patio area of the bar at Madison’s. Madison’s employees
then expelled both Chaz and Severson from the premises, with Severson
exiting the front entrance and Chaz being escorted through the back. While
passing through the patio, Chaz encountered and began exchanging words
with his ex-girlfriend.          Madison’s employees separated the two, then
continued to escort Chaz from the premises, with one of the employees
pushing and verbally arguing with Chaz along the way. Meanwhile, another
individual appeared at the back of the bar, saying “Beaumont PD, Beaumont
PD,” but provided no further identification. That individual was Chase
Welch.
       After Chaz abandoned the confrontation at Madison’s and left the
premises accompanied by a friend, Welch and Madison’s employees
continued to follow Chaz around the building and to his vehicle. During that
time, both Madison’s employees and Welch engaged in verbal confrontations
and threats with Chaz. When Chaz and his friend reached the vehicle, his
friend helped Chaz into the backseat on the driver’s side before seating
herself behind the wheel. Once Chaz was inside, Welch continued to

       1
           Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

                                               2
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threaten and harass Chaz, yelling at Chaz to “get out you pussy” and banging
on Chaz’s car with his hands while taunting Chaz.
       As Chaz’s friend prepared to drive away, she noticed Chaz had exited
and was standing outside the vehicle. Chaz’s friend followed Chaz out,
grabbed him, and attempted to pull him back inside. As she did so, Welch
discharged his firearm three times. Chaz turned and ran away from Welch as
Welch continued to fire in Chaz’s direction. Welch discharged eight to ten
bullets in total, five of which struck Chaz—one in each arm, one in his right
thigh, one in his chest, and one in his back. The fatal shots struck Chaz after
he turned away from Welch. Welch then fled the scene. In contrast to the
Yorks’ allegation, Welch contends that he shot Chaz in self-defense after
Chaz opened his car trunk, grabbed a baseball bat, and charged Welch.
       The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint alleges that Beaumont
misrepresented to the public the events of the shooting by supporting
Welch’s version of events, and by describing the incident as a barroom fight
that spilled into the parking lot. Further, the Yorks aver, Beaumont engaged
in a cover-up of the shooting by failing to produce certain records requested
during discovery—instead launching objections to those requests—and by
accusing witnesses who claimed that Chaz was unarmed of “lying and
‘tampering with evidence.’” Critically, however, the Yorks did not follow
up on the discovery requests, failing to obtain rulings despite having ample
time to do so.
       Additionally, the Yorks highlight that Beaumont disciplined Welch for
certain acts of prior misconduct, suspending him for multiple episodes, but
did not discipline Welch for certain acts of misconduct involving allegedly
unreasonable or excessive force, including the shooting and killing of Chaz.
Welch received various promotions and salary increases despite this history,
and Welch was not disciplined for shooting and killing Chaz. More generally,

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the Yorks also highlight that from 2008 to 2018, Beaumont received 112
citizen complaints against the police department, thirty of which alleged
unreasonable or unauthorized use of force. Beaumont sustained only twenty-
one of the total 112 complaints. During that same period, roughly 8% of
administrative complaints (eighteen out of 229) concerned the use of force.
Finally, the Yorks underscore that Beaumont did not authorize its officers to
carry their tasers while off duty; instead, they could carry only their firearm.
       Chaz’s family and estate brought this § 1983 action against both
Welch and the City of Beaumont in October 2018, seeking relief for violations
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Welch ultimately settled with
the Yorks out of court, leaving only their theory of Monell liability against
Beaumont. In January 2019, the district court entered its scheduling order,
thus beginning discovery, and in April 2019, the Yorks filed their First
Amended Complaint. In response, Beaumont filed an untimely motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The district court converted the
motion into a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted
it, reasoning that municipal liability under Monell could not attach.
                                            II
       As an initial matter, the district court did not err when it construed
Beaumont’s untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings.2 In Jones v. Greninger,3 this court explained that
untimely Rule 12(b) motions “will be treated as a motion for judgment on the

       2
         See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Puckett v.
Comm’r, No. 99-20697, 2000 WL 554440, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 12, 2000) (per curiam)
(unpublished).
       3
           188 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1999).

                                            4
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                                         No. 20-40580

pleadings based on a failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”4
Accordingly, the district court committed no error when it treated
Beaumont’s untimely Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a Rule 12(c) motion.
        This court reviews a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion de
novo.5 The motion is subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6).6 Under that standard, set out by the Supreme Court in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,7 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’”8 “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”9
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”10
        A municipality cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat
superior.11 Rather, “[i]t is only when the execution of the government’s
policies or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable

        4
             Id. at 324.
        5
         Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th
Cir. 2002).
        6
             Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008).
        7
            550 U.S. 544 (2007).
        8
             Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
        9
             Id.
        10
             Id.
        11
           City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1988) (citing Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

                                                5
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                                        No. 20-40580

under § 1983.”12 Per Monell, “municipal liability under section 1983 requires
proof of three elements: [1] a policymaker; [2] an official policy; and [3] a
violation of constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or
custom.”13
        The second element—an official policy—includes “[a] policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and
promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to
whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority.”14 An official
policy may also be “[a] persistent, widespread practice of city officials or
employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and
promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy”15 and “practically have the force of
law.”16
        The third, “moving force” element requires that the plaintiff “show
that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability
and . . . demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.”17 The culpability prong requires that the
municipality be at least deliberately indifferent to the known or obvious

        12
           City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (internal quotation marks and
ellipsis omitted) (quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
        13
          Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 694).
        14
             Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per
curiam).
        15
             Id.
        16
          Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621-22 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)).
        17
             Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

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                                           No. 20-40580

consequences of municipal actions.18                   The causation prong requires
                               19
proximate causation.                “Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has
not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do
so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure
that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its
employee.”20
        “To proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s ‘description of
a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional
violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’”21 Here,
the Yorks allege six Beaumont policies that they argue give rise to Monell
liability:
        First, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City of Beaumont
        adopted a policy and/or custom in which its off duty officers
        were not allowed to carry tasers was a moving force behind the
        constitutional violations.        Second, Plaintiffs-Appellants
        identified that the City of Beaumont adopted a policy and/or
        custom in which its officers (whether off duty or not) were
        taught to shoot to kill, and not to shoot to injure was a moving
        force behind the constitutional violations. Third, Plaintiffs-
        Appellants identified that the City of Beaumont’s widespread
        and persistent use of excessive force by its officers, which
        became so common place as to constitute a custom and/or
        policy, was a moving force behind the constitutional violations.
        Fourth, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City of
        Beaumont’s failure to train its officers in non-lethal weapons

        18
             See id. at 407.
        19
             Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 305 (5th Cir. 1980).
        20
             Brown, 520 U.S. at 405.
        21
           Peña, 879 F.3d at 622 (quoting Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d
162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)).

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                                    No. 20-40580

       while off duty was a moving force behind the constitutional
       violations. Fifth, Plaintiffs-Appellants identified that the City
       of Beaumont’s policy of a “code of silence” in which a cover
       up of instances of excessive force was a moving force behind
       the constitutional violations. Sixth, Plaintiffs-Appellants
       identified that the City of Beaumont’s failure to
       discipline/ratification of Officer Welch’s excessive use of force
       was a moving force behind the constitutional violations.
       None of the Yorks’ six theories satisfy the Twombly standard for two
primary reasons: the alleged policies are not policies at all, or the alleged
policies were not “moving forces” behind the underlying constitutional
deprivation.
                                          A
       The Yorks do not plausibly plead that either the off-duty taser-carry
policy or the shoot-to-kill policy was a moving force behind the underlying
constitutional violation. The Yorks seek to impose Monell liability based on
Beaumont Police Chief Singletary’s post-shooting interview in which
Singletary stated Beaumont police officers do not carry tasers off duty, and
later commented, “Officers are not taught to shoot at an arm or a leg, because
it[’]s dangerous if our officers are trained to shoot an arm or a leg in a high
stress situation then they miss.”22 He explained, “these officers could get
hurt or killed and innocent bystand[e]r[]s could get hurt or killed.”23
       The Yorks’ argument concerning the off-duty taser-carry policy does
not satisfy the causation prong, for any causal nexus between Beaumont’s
policies and Chaz’s death is too attenuated to be considered a proximate

       22
          Ashley DeVriend, Police Chief supports officer after shooting, KFDM (Oct. 18,
2016, 10:28 PM), https://kfdm.com/news/local/police-chief-supports-officer-after-
shooting.
       23
            Id.

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cause of Chaz’s death. As the district court pointed out, no policy required
Welch to carry his firearm in lieu of his taser. The Yorks pled no facts tending
to show that Welch would have carried and used a taser had he been
permitted to do so. The district court properly dismissed this theory.
       Nor do the Yorks plausibly allege that the shoot-to-kill policy was a
moving force behind the constitutional violation. Shooting to kill and not
injure is standard police practice,24 and there is no allegation that the City
had a policy that authorized or encouraged the use of lethal force in all
encounters or in encounters like the one that allegedly occurred with Chaz.
                                              B
       The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont maintained a
policy of widespread and persistent use of excessive force. “If actions of city
employees are to be used to prove a custom for which the municipality is
liable,” our court has reasoned, “those actions must have occurred for so
long or so frequently that the course of conduct warrants the attribution to
the governing body of knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the
expected, accepted practice of city employees.”25
       In support of their theory that Beaumont adopted a custom of allowing
excessive force, the Yorks cite to statistics from 2008 to 2018, “which
showed 26% of all complaints”—thirty out of 112—“made about the City of
Beaumont by citizens related to ‘unauthorized use of force’ or ‘unreasonable
use of force’ claims.” This “substantial number of similar complaints,” the
Yorks contend, shows “a pattern and practice of excessive force by its

       24
          See Experts on Why Police Aren’t Trained to Shoot to Wound, ABC News (July 7,
2016,     6:46      PM),      https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-trained-shoot-wound-
experts/story?id=40402933.
       25
            Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984).

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officers.” Despite discovery beginning as early as January 2019, the Yorks
failed to obtain factual context and detail concerning the alleged 26% of
incidents of police misconduct. That failure brings this case within the
purview of Peterson v. City of Fort Worth.26
        In Peterson, the plaintiff sought to create a fact question to overcome
summary judgment by citing “to 27 complaints of excessive force between
2002 and 2005.”27 Those complaints, he argued, revealed “that the city
maintained an official policy that was permissive of excessive force.”28 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s theory due to the lack of factual development
behind those complaints, noting that “[a] pattern requires similarity and
specificity; ‘[p]rior indications cannot simply be for any and all “bad” or
unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.’”29
The plaintiff in Peterson provided no information concerning the size of the
police department or how many arrests that department made during the
relevant time period.30 The Yorks’ generic statistics are likewise devoid of
factual development and context.
        The fact that the court decided Peterson at the summary judgment
stage does not change our conclusion. At oral argument, counsel for the
Yorks conceded that the Yorks served Beaumont with requests for
production concerning those complaints against Beaumont and was met with
objections to those requests but failed to obtain rulings on those objections.

        26
             588 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2009).
        27
             Id. at 850.
        28
             Id.
        29
          Id. at 851 (quoting Estate of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of North Richland Hills,
406 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2005)).
        30
             Id. at 851-52.

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As a result of that failure, the Yorks’ theory of widespread use of excessive
force cannot succeed. The Yorks “failed to provide context that would show
a pattern of establishing a municipal policy” despite having the opportunity
to do so.31 Just as “27 incidents of excessive force over a period of four years
do not reflect a pattern that can be said to represent official policy,” so too
are thirty citizen complaints over a ten-year period insufficient to establish a
custom.32
                                             C
       The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont’s allegedly
inadequate training of Welch was a moving force behind the underlying
constitutional violation. To establish municipal liability under a failure-to-
train theory, the Yorks must prove three elements: “1) [Beaumont] failed to
train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is a causal connection
between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of
the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted
deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”33 The Yorks
argue that Beaumont failed to train its officers on non-lethal force while off
duty, and that this failure amounted to “deliberate indifference” to the
health and safety of the citizenry.

       31
            Id. at 851.
       32
            Id. at 852.
       33
            Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001).

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        In Littell v. Houston Independent School District,34 this court clarified
the two means of proving municipal liability under a failure-to-train theory
outlined by the Supreme Court in City of Canton v. Harris:35
        Sometimes . . . municipal employees will violate constitutional
        rights “so often” that the factfinder can infer from the pattern
        of violations that “the need for further training must have been
        plainly obvious to the policymakers.” This proof-by-pattern
        method is “ordinarily necessary.” But even absent proof of
        pattern, deliberate indifference can still be inferred if the
        factfinder determines that the risk of constitutional violations
        was or should have been an “obvious” or “highly predictable
        consequence” of the alleged training inadequacy.36
The Yorks rely on the latter single-incident theory of liability.
        The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead that
Beaumont was deliberately indifferent to the need, if any, for further training.
This court has explained that “the [single-incident] exception is generally
reserved for those cases in which the government actor was provided no
training whatsoever.”37 Moreover, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a
deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to
train.”38      The Yorks’ First Amended Complaint concedes that Welch
“received significant training relating to the physical aspects of being a police
officer.” The Yorks argue that Welch “did not receive any training that

        34
             894 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018).
        35
             489 U.S. 378 (1989).
        36
          Littell, 894 F.3d at 624 (ellipsis omitted) (first quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 390
n.10; then quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997); and then
quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409).
        37
             Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018).
        38
             Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).

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Plaintiffs[]-Appellants could find relating to using non-lethal weapons while
off duty by the Beaumont Police Department.” But Welch did receive
training about the use of non-lethal force, and the Yorks fail to allege how that
training should have differentiated between on- and off-duty situations.
       The Yorks’ framing of this issue runs afoul of the reasoning of our
decision in Peña v. City of Rio Grande City39 and therefore fails. That case
involved a minor suspect, Peña, who sought to hold a municipality liable after
one of its officers tased her as she fled.40 This court held that Peña could not
satisfy the Twombly standard, explaining that “the [single-incident]
exception is generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor
was provided no training whatsoever.”41 Peña’s complaint “acknowledge[d]
that [the officers involved in the incident] received taser training from other
officers, so her allegations [could not] satisfy the exacting test for the narrow
single-incident exception.”42 Even accepting the Yorks’ factual allegations
as true—that Welch did not receive training in the use of non-lethal force
while off duty—recovery on this theory is not plausible. The absence of
training while off duty constitutes the “sort of nuance [that] simply cannot
support an inference of deliberate indifference.”43                      The district court
properly dismissed this theory.
                                                D
       The Yorks have not plausibly pleaded a theory of ratification. They
argue that both Beaumont and Chief Singletary ratified Welch’s conduct by

       39
            879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018).
       40
            Id. at 616.
       41
            Id. at 624.
       42
            Id.; see also Littell v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.3d 616, 624-25 (5th Cir. 2018).
       43
            Connick, 563 U.S. at 67.

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failing to discipline his use of excessive force in both the shooting giving rise
to this suit and in past incidents.                 Additionally, the Yorks allege that
Beaumont itself, through its official policymakers, engaged in misconduct by
covering-up the details of the shooting through its denial and proffering of an
alternative version of events.
        However, this court has curtailed the applicability of a ratification
theory. In Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, the plaintiff argued ratification based
on the Police Chief’s post-investigation determination that the offending
officers’ conduct “complied with the department’s policies.”44 The court
rejected this theory, explaining, “our precedent has limited the theory of
ratification to ‘extreme factual situations.’”45                Further, “we have also
explained that a policymaker who defends conduct that is later shown to be
unlawful does not necessarily incur liability on behalf of the municipality.”46
        Whether a case presents an extreme factual situation—as in this
court’s opinion in Grandstaff v. City of Borger47—such that a theory of
ratification applies is a question of law.48 We hold that the facts of this case
do not present such an extreme factual situation. In Grandstaff, “officers and
a city police force failed, at great cost . . . [then] denied their failures and
concerned themselves only with unworthy, if not despicable, means to avoid

        44
             588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009).
        45
             Id. (quoting Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 1998)).
        46
           Id.; see also Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
precedent “does not stand for the broad proposition that if a policymaker defends his
subordinates and if those subordinates are later found to have broken the law, then the
illegal behavior can be assumed to have resulted from an official policy”).
        47
             767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985).
        48
           See Peterson, 588 F.3d at 848 n.2 (“On the contrary, our conclusion rests on a
legal determination that the facts here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Peterson,
do not satisfy the legal standard set out in our ratification caselaw.”).

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legal liability.”49 The officers had pursued a suspect onto the ranch of an
innocent third party, then recklessly “poured” gunfire on that third party,
killing him.50 “Following this incompetent and catastrophic performance,
there were no reprimands, no discharges, and no admissions of error.”51
Such striking misconduct, coupled with “the subsequent acceptance of
dangerous recklessness by the policymaker,” sufficed to support the jury’s
finding that the municipality had a custom of misconduct such that it could
be held liable under Monell.52
        Here, rather than “several officers in several episodes” engaging in
police misconduct as in Grandstaff,53 only a single officer was involved in a
single shooting. Further, the officers in Grandstaff “were evasive and
forgetful and self-contradictory,”54 while here, despite having ample time to
depose Beaumont policymakers and personnel and otherwise conduct
discovery, the Yorks have offered only vague and conclusory allegations,
devoid of factual enhancement, concerning Beaumont’s alleged cover-up.
The Yorks have not pleaded “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of [illegality],”55 in large part because
discovery has not revealed evidence of illegality.56

        49
             Grandstaff, 767 F.2d at 166.
        50
             Id. at 168.
        51
             Id. at 171.
        52
             Id.
        53
             Id.
        54
             Id. at 166 & n.1.
        55
             Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
        56
          Cf. Netto v. Amtrak, 863 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1989) (“As this Court has
previously stated, a plaintiff’s entitlement to discovery before a ruling on a motion for
summary judgment is not unlimited and may be cut off when the record shows that the

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        Moreover, at its core, in large part, the Yorks’ ratification theory seeks
to impose Monell liability on Beaumont based on Beaumont’s disagreement
with the Yorks’ factual allegations. In other words, the Yorks treat a factual
dispute as evidence of a more nefarious plot to cover up the shooting. For
example, the Yorks contend that the cover-up “was seen in [Beaumont’s]
post-shooting reporting of Chaz York, wherein it immediately went on the
defensive, stating that [Chaz] had a bat, and was a danger to the public.”
Though we must accept the Yorks’ factual allegations as true, we need not
accept their attempted bootstrapping of Beaumont’s denial of particular
factual allegations with evidence of a cover-up sufficient to survive a
judgment on the pleadings. Instead, the plaintiff must present some factual
allegations aliunde the defendant’s denial.57 The Yorks attempt to do so, but
the remainder of the allegations concerning a cover-up are conclusory and
devoid of factual enhancement and therefore insufficient to survive
dismissal.58 Under the Yorks’ reasoning, anytime a municipality issued a
press release, and something in that release turned out to be untrue, the
plaintiff would necessarily survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and be entitled to
discovery. We decline to expand Monell liability in so drastic a regard.

requested discovery will not be likely to produce facts he needs to withstand a summary
judgment motion.” (citing Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 694 F.2d 1017, 1029-30
(5th Cir. 1983))).
        57
          Cf. Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he statement does
not necessarily advocate or excuse the use of excessive force. Sheriff Ledbetter denied that
such a meaning was either intended or in context was so understood. This denial was not
rebutted by contrary evidence, and it follows that Jackson County could not be held liable
on the basis of the sheriff’s statement.”).
        58
             See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

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                                        No. 20-40580

                                               E
        Finally, the Yorks have not plausibly pleaded that Beaumont
maintained a code of silence through which the municipality covered up
instances of excessive force. The Yorks argue that Beaumont adopted a code
of silence under which Beaumont “cover[ed] up and/or fabricat[ed] stories
when officers used excessive force.” The Yorks support this theory by again
offering Beaumont police statistics, which detail that 74% of citizen
complaints resulted in a lack of disciplinary action being taken against
Beaumont officers. Only 18.75% of citizen complaints were sustained. The
Yorks then reallege that Beaumont engaged in a cover-up, fabricating
evidence and misleading the public about the circumstances of Chaz’s killing.
        On multiple occasions, our circuit has treated a code-of-silence theory
as identical to a ratification theory.59 For the same reasons the Yorks’
ratification theory fails, so too does the Yorks’ code-of-silence theory.
Additionally, we reiterate that the generic statistics the Yorks proffer lack the
context necessary to render their claim facially plausible. Moreover, the
Yorks’ attempted factual enhancements concerning Beaumont’s alleged
cover-ups of excessive force rely solely on the events surrounding Chaz’s
death, suggesting that any cover-up was an isolated incident and “not the
persistent, often repeated constant violations that constitute custom and
policy.”60 Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed this theory.

        59
           See, e.g., Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d 353, 365 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Quinn argues the
police engage in a code of silence. . . . A theory of ratification is limited to ‘extreme factual
situations.’” (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)));
Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 797-98 (5th Cir. 1998) (construing Grandstaff as a code
of silence case).
        60
            Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bennett
v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984)).

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Case: 20-40580     Document: 49-1          Page: 18   Date Filed: 02/26/2024

                                 No. 20-40580

                             *        *         *
      The circumstances behind Chaz’s death are troubling.          But the
Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished that we distinguish acts of the
municipality from those of its employees. The Yorks have not plausibly
pleaded that Beaumont’s conduct was a moving force behind Chaz’s death.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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