Court Opinion

ID: 9403445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 08:10:38.247048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.082608
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00154-CR

           LLOYD ADAM TOLER, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

      On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                   Hunt County, Texas
              Trial Court No. CR2100144

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

        A Hunt County jury convicted Lloyd Adam Toler of driving while intoxicated (DWI),

and he was assessed a sentence of 180 days’ confinement. On appeal, Toler challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We find sufficient evidence supports the

jury’s finding. Because the judgment requires modification, we will affirm the trial court’s

judgment, as modified.

I.      The Evidence at Trial

        Hunt County Deputy Sheriffs Sam Stephens and Eddie Wade Jones responded to a report

of a reckless driver on Interstate 30 in the vicinity of Caddo Mills around 11:00 p.m. on

September 11, 2020. The recording from the deputies’ dash camera showed that, when the

pickup driven by Toler was first observed on the south service road of Interstate 30, it swerved

into the left, oncoming-traffic lane, then swerved back into the right lane as an oncoming

automobile approached. After the oncoming automobile passed, Toler’s pickup returned to the

oncoming-traffic lane for around ten seconds, swerved back into the right lane briefly, then

returned to the oncoming-traffic lane. At that point, the deputies engaged their overhead lights to

pursue Toler’s pickup. Toler then swerved to the left, grassy shoulder, where he drove for

around ten seconds, then swerved across the oncoming-traffic lane and into the right lane. Toler

then rolled to a stop in the right lane.

        As the officers approached the stopped vehicle, Toler opened the driver’s side door.

After a short conversation, the pickup began moving forward, and Jones reached into the pickup,

engaged the emergency brake, and turned the engine off. When Toler exited the pickup, he

                                                2
stumbled, and the officers assisted him to the side of the bed of the pickup, on which he leaned

for support. As he talked with the officers, Toler’s body swayed from side to side. Throughout

the stop, Toler had difficulty walking and standing, stumbled at times, and almost fell.

Eventually, he laid down on his back on the roadway, straddling the right lane and the shoulder.

At one point, Toler placed a cigarette in his mouth backward and attempted to light the filter.

       The deputies testified that Toler was lethargic, slow to respond, and very slow to answer

questions and that he had slurred, incoherent speech. Jones testified that Toler also thought that

he was in Greenville, rather than near Caddo Mills. Toler denied consuming alcohol but told

Stephens that he had taken too much of his prescription pills. Toler told them that he took

medication for bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and depression. Both officers opined that Toler

had lost the normal control over his physical faculties because of his inability to keep his

balance, his tendency to fall, his inability to walk without assistance, and his lack of simple

motor skills. They also opined that he had lost the normal control over his mental faculties

because of his inability to remember, his delayed responses to simple questions, and his

confusion as to where he was. Because they suspected Toler was driving while intoxicated, the

deputies contacted the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS) to conduct a DWI

investigation.

       TDPS Trooper Greg Joyner testified that he was called to assist the deputies with a

reckless, and possibly impaired, driver. After talking with the deputies, Joyner approached

Toler, who was laying on his back in the roadway. As he talked to him, Toler’s eyes were

closed. Joyner described his speech pattern as extremely slow and thick-tongued. Toler told

                                                 3
Joyner that he had taken too much of his medications for bipolar disorder and schizophrenia and

that he also took anti-depressants, including Seroquel. At one point, Toler stated that he was

trying to have some fun. Joyner performed a horizontal gaze nystagmus field sobriety test on

Toler after he was placed in an ambulance. Toler exhibited six out of six clues of intoxication.1

Joyner opined that Toler was intoxicated and that he had lost the normal use of his physical and

mental faculties based on the deputies’ description of the traffic stop and Toler’s driving

behavior; Toler’s laying lethargic on the street, red eyes, dilated pupils, and speech pattern; and

the clues observed in the HGN test. After Toler was taken to a hospital, Joyner obtained a blood

specimen from him at 1:09 the following morning.

        Taylor Schwartz, a forensic scientist at the TDPS Crime Laboratory in Tyler, analyzed

Toler’s blood specimen for the presence of alcohol. She determined that the specimen had 0.025

grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. Although she could not say whether Toler was

impaired without more information, she opined that it is possible that a person could be impaired

below 0.08 grams per 100 milliliters.

        Dana Baxter, a forensic scientist at the TDPS Crime Laboratory in Austin, analyzed

Toler’s blood specimen for the presence of drugs. She testified that, in her initial test for the

presence of ten broad categories of drugs, including such substances as amphetamine,

barbiturates, and opiates, none were detected.            She also performed a target qualitative test

because the TDPS trooper had listed Seroquel as a suspected drug. Baxter explained that the test

1
 The jury also viewed a recording from Joyner’s body camera that showed Joyner’s interaction with Toler in the
roadway and in the ambulance, which was consistent with Joyner’s testimony.
                                                      4
performed for the presence of Seroquel also tests for the presence of twenty-four other drugs,

including citalopram. When this test was performed, the presence of citalopram was detected.

       Baxter explained that the test for those twenty-five drugs will not yield the amount of any

drug in the system because they set the cutoff at the low end of the therapeutic range that a

physician would prescribe for his patient. As a result, it is at a concentration that can affect a

person. She explained that, if a doctor prescribes anti-anxiety medicine, then the therapeutic

range is enough to treat the patient’s anxiety.

       She also testified that citalopram is prescribed for depression and that it affects the body

by elevating the mood to lessen the depression. She noted that some possible side effects were

dizziness, drowsiness, and slowed reaction times. Baxter testified that the warning label for

citalopram says to avoid drinking alcohol while taking it because it can increase the effects of

alcohol. She opined that citalopram’s side effects of dizziness, drowsiness, and slowed reaction

times could be increased if taken with alcohol. She also opined that a person could lose their

mental or physical faculties while in the therapeutic range of the drug.

       Baxter acknowledged that impairment cannot be based solely on her laboratory report.

She also acknowledged that she did not know whether Toler experienced the drug’s side effects.

II.    Standard of Review

       “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

                                                  5
Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)). “Our rigorous legal sufficiency review focuses on the quality

of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)).

“We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference

to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence,

and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v.

State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

       “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

       “In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of

the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common

design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. at 297 (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not

required that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as

the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the

conviction.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct

evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be

established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809

(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the

                                                6
evidence admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Id. (quoting Fowler

v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d in part by 544 S.W.3d 844

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).

       The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is based on

an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008)). “We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the

fact [-]finder.” Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Williams v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “The court conducting a sufficiency

review must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative

force of all the evidence.” Id. at 733 (quoting Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017)). “Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries

are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is

supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Id. (citing Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016)).

III.   Analysis

       Toler challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for driving

while intoxicated. “A person commits Class B misdemeanor DWI if the person is intoxicated

while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540,

                                                 7
548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), (b)). As applied in this

case, “‘[i]ntoxicated’ means . . . not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by

reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, [or] a

combination of two or more of those substances . . . into the body.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 49.01(2)(A). Under the statute and the information, in order to convict Toler of DWI, the State

had to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Toler, (1) while operating a motor vehicle (2) in a

public place, (3) did not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties (4) by reason of

the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of

two or more of those substances into his body. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A),

§ 49.04(a) (Supp.). Toler does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he did not have

the normal use of his mental or physical faculties while operating a motor vehicle in a public

place. He only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he was intoxicated by reason of

the introduction of alcohol, a drug, or a combination of those substances. Toler argues that,

because Baxter could not identify the amount of citalopram that was in his blood, could not

identify how the known side effects of the drug specifically affected him, and could not testify

that he was intoxicated solely on the results of the test she performed, there was no evidence that

his intoxication was a result of the introduction of alcohol and citalopram into his body.

       The DWI statute contains two theories of intoxication. Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738,

743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). One is the per se theory, that is, “having an alcohol concentration

of 0.08 or more.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(B). To support a conviction for DWI

under this theory, the State must show that the defendant’s alcohol concentration was at least

                                                 8
0.08 at the time he was operating a motor vehicle, either by expert retrograde extrapolation

testimony or by the introduction of other evidence “that would support an inference that the

defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving.” Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745–46. This evidence

“includes, inter alia, erratic driving, post-driving behavior such as stumbling, swaying, slurring

or mumbling words, inability to perform field sobriety tests or follow directions, bloodshot eyes,

. . . in short, any and all of the usual indicia of intoxication.” Id. at 745. This theory of

intoxication focuses on both the intoxicant, alcohol, and the amount of that intoxicant’s

concentration. Nevertheless, indirect evidence of the defendant’s intoxication will support a

conviction under the per se theory of intoxication. Id. at 746

       The other theory of intoxication is the “impairment” theory. Id. at 743. The impairment

theory, which is applicable to this case, “focuses on the state of intoxication, not on the

intoxicant.” Ouellette v. State, 353 S.W.3d 868, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A)). Under this theory, “the substance that causes intoxication is not an

element of the offense.” Gray v. State, 152 S.W.3d 125, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Rather,

the intoxicant “is an evidentiary matter.” Id. However, there must be some evidence that the

intoxicant, or a combination of intoxicants, can cause symptoms indicative of intoxication and

some evidence from which the jury can reasonably infer that the intoxicant, or a combination of

intoxicants, caused the symptoms displayed by the defendant. See Ouellette, 353 S.W.3d at 870;

Burnett v. State, 541 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The jury is permitted to consider

whether a defendant was intoxicated from ‘any other substance’ when there is evidence that the

defendant ingested a substance that caused him to become intoxicated or there is sufficient

                                                 9
evidence for a rational juror to infer such.”). Nevertheless, expert testimony of the amount of

intoxicant in the defendant’s blood, or how the known side effects of the intoxicant specifically

affected him, is not required.2

         In Ouellette, the defendant was charged with DWI “‘by reason of the introduction of

alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, or a combination of two or more of

those substances into the body.’” Ouellette, 353 S.W.3d at 869. At the time of her arrest, the

defendant exhibited physical signs of intoxication and had the odor of alcohol on her breath. Id.

The arresting officer found a bottle of pills in the defendant’s vehicle containing Soma and

testified “that both alcohol and Soma [were] central nervous system depressants.” Id. at 870. In

upholding the judgment of conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that,

“[a]lthough there was no direct evidence that the defendant consumed the drug, there was

evidence from which a rational juror could have found that the defendant did so.” Id. Thus,

even in the absence of evidence of the amount of intoxicants in a defendant’s blood, the evidence

can be sufficient to show the intoxication was caused by the introduction of the intoxicants into

the defendant’s body.

         In Richter v. State, Richter was involved in a one-car accident around 4:00 a.m.

Responding officers found her in the driver’s seat and testified that she was glassy-eyed, had

slurred speech, and was disoriented. Richter v. State, 482 S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. App.—

2
 Under either theory of intoxication, the results of a test of the defendant’s blood specimen, without more, would be
insufficient to show the defendant was intoxicated at the time she was driving. Although the laboratory results may
be “highly probative to prove both per se and impairment intoxication,” the evidence must also “include[] either
(1) expert testimony of retrograde extrapolation, or (2) other evidence of intoxication that would support an
inference that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving as well as at the time of taking the test.” Kirsch,
306 S.W.3d at 745–46.
                                                         10
Texarkana 2015, no pet.). Richter was in possession of several prescription medications and

admitted that she took two Tramadol for pain, something for anxiety, and some other pills before

the accident. Id. The evidence showed that Richter yielded six clues of intoxication on the HGN

test and performed poorly on the other two field sobriety tests. “A urine drug screen . . . was

negative for all screened drugs” but indicated “an unknown amount of opiate.” Id. at 292. A

state trooper, who was a drug recognition expert, reviewed the accident reports, medical reports,

and the recording of the officers’ encounter with Richter at the accident scene and opined that the

medical records “suggested that ‘something [was] depressing her central nervous system’ and

that it was ‘possible that she [was] on CNS depressants or narcotic analgesics’ (either of which

would severely inhibit her ability to operate a vehicle safely).” Id. at 290, 293 (alterations in

original). Based on this evidence, we held that a reasonable fact-finder could have found that

Richter operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated.3 Id. at 295.

           Our sister courts have also found sufficient evidence of intoxication by alcohol, drugs, or

a combination of those causing intoxication even in the absence of evidence of the concentration

of the drugs in the defendant or direct testimony of how the drugs specifically affected him. In

Crouse v. State, officers stopped Crouse after observing erratic driving behavior. Crouse v.

State, 441 S.W.3d 508, 510 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). On questioning, he was confused

and disoriented, his speech was slurred, his eyes were dilated, and he did not know where he was

or what day it was. Crouse told the officers that he had been in the hospital that day for chronic

back pain and a depression check when they asked about medical release papers on the front seat

3
    Richter was charged under the impairment theory of intoxication. See Ritcher, 482 S.W.3d at 291.
                                                          11
of the car. Id. The release papers listed all his medications, all of which had warnings regarding

dizziness that could affect the operation of a motor vehicle, and some of which warned that they

could cause drowsiness when taken with alcohol or other kinds of medication. The officers also

observed six clues of intoxication while administering standardized field sobriety tests. Id. at

511. Laboratory results of Crouse’s blood specimen showed that he had 0.006 milligrams of

alprazolam per liter, 0.02 milligrams of lorazepam per liter, an unquantified amount of

cyclobenzaprine, and an unquantified amount of mirtazapine. Id. There was also evidence that

he had received intravenous morphine at the hospital a few hours before the traffic stop and that

he had taken Depakote and Neurontin the morning before the stop. Id. at 511–12. Crouse’s

expert opined that the combination, timing, and level of medications he took would not cause

Crouse to not have the normal use of his mental or physical faculties.             However, she

acknowledged that warnings not to operate a motor vehicle were associated with the use of

morphine, testified the morphine could have affected him, and testified that she did not know

whether his prescription medications also affected him. She also testified that the Depakote and

Neurontin could have negatively affected his performance on the HGN portion of the standardize

field sobriety test. Id. at 512.

        Regarding the evidence that supported whether a combination of drugs caused Crouse’s

intoxication, the Dallas court noted that Crouse admitted that he took numerous prescription

drugs, that the drugs had potential side effects of dizziness and inability to operate motor

vehicles, and that his expert “admitted the drugs could have an effect on some people, and she

had no personal knowledge of whether any of appellant’s prescription medications affected him

                                               12
in this manner.” Id. at 514. It also pointed to the evidence that showed Crouse had been given

morphine and a muscle relaxant while in the hospital, that both carried warnings against

operating a motor vehicle, and that they could cause drowsiness. Id. Based on this evidence, the

court of appeals held that the fact-finder could reasonably find that Crouse’s loss of the “normal

use of his mental or physical faculties result[ed] from the introduction of a drug or combination

of drugs.” Id. at 515.

       In Crouse, the Dallas court cited the opinions of several other courts of appeals that have

found sufficient evidence of intoxication by the introduction of a drug or a combination of drugs

without a showing of the quantity of drugs present in the defendant’s blood stream or how they

specifically affected the defendant. Id. at 513–15 (citing, inter alia, Delane v. State, 369 S.W.3d

412, 418 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d); Landers v. State, 110 S.W.3d 617,

620–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 108

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Paschall v. State, 285 S.W.3d 166, 177–78

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d)). In Paschall, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals noted

that the State only offered circumstantial evidence that Paschall’s loss of the normal use of his

mental or physical faculties was caused by the introduction of a drug or combination of drugs.

Paschall v. State, 285 S.W.3d 166, 177–78 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). This

evidence came from the testimony of a pharmacist who testified that two of the drugs that

Paschall admitted to taking, Thorazine and Trazodone, were “central nervous system depressants

that would cause a person intoxicated by use of the drugs to exhibit slurred speech, affected

balance, abnormal gait, and constricted pupils and that it would be dangerous for a person so

                                                13
intoxicated to drive.”    Id. at 178.    This testimony, combined with the arresting officer’s

testimony “that Paschall exhibited slurred speech, swaying, and constricted pupils,” was

sufficient to allow the fact-finder to infer that his loss of the normal use of his mental or physical

faculties was caused by the introduction of a drug or a combination of drugs. Id.

       In this case, Baxter testified that Toler’s blood specimen tested positive for the presence

of citalopram, which is prescribed for depression. Even though Baxter could not identify the

exact amount of citalopram in Toler’s blood, she testified that the amount was in the therapeutic

range and that a therapeutic amount can have an affect on the person taking it. She also testified

that citalopram could cause dizziness, drowsiness, and slowed reaction times and that the

warning label for this drug cautions not to drink alcohol because it can increase the effects of

alcohol. She also opined that citalopram’s side effects could be increased if taken with alcohol.

The evidence also showed that Toler’s blood specimen contained 0.025 grams of alcohol per 100

milliliters of blood. Finally, the evidence showed that Toler was stopped because he was

swerving between his lane and the oncoming-traffic lane and drove in the oncoming-traffic lane

and the grassy shoulder. When he was stopped, he was lethargic, slow to respond, and very slow

to answer questions, and he had slurred, incoherent speech. Toler also showed signs of dizziness

in that he had difficulty standing, stumbled at times, almost fell, and lay down on the roadway.

Although Toler denied that he had drunk alcohol, he admitted that he had taken anti-depressants

and, in his own estimation, perhaps too many.

       Based on this evidence, we find that a reasonable jury could infer that Toler’s loss of the

normal use of his mental or physical faculties was the result of the introduction of alcohol and

                                                 14
citalopram into his body. See Richter, 482 S.W.3d at 295; Crouse, 441 S.W.3d at 514–15;

Paschall, 285 S.W.3d at 178. For that reason, we find that sufficient evidence supports Toler’s

DWI conviction. We overrule Toler’s sole issue.

IV.        Modification of Judgment

           In the oral rendition of its judgment, the trial court noted that there was a fine of

$3,100.00 associated with the DWI conviction. The trial court then found that Toler was

indigent and that he did not have the resources to pay or otherwise discharge the fine, and the

court waived the fine. Nevertheless, the written judgment contains an entry of “$3,100.00”

under “Fines.” The judgment also indicates that $100.00 of the fine is for “EMS, Trauma

Facilities and Trauma Care Systems Fine . . . (CCP, Art. 102.0185)”4 and that $3,000.00 of the

fine is for “DWI 1st (Transportation Code § 709.001).”5

           Because fines are punitive and intended to be a part of the defendant’s sentence, they

“generally must be orally pronounced in the defendant’s presence.” Armstrong v. State, 340

S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.03, § 1(a);

Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). When there is a conflict between

the oral pronouncement of sentence in open court and the written judgment, the oral

pronouncement controls. See Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

(citing Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “This Court has the

4
    See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.0185(a) (Supp.).
5
 Section 709.001 of the Texas Transportation Code provides that, “[e]xcept as provided by Subsection (c), . . . a
person who has been finally convicted of an offense relating to the operating of a motor vehicle while intoxicated
shall pay a fine of: (1) $3,000 for the first conviction within a 36-month period.” TEX TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 709.001(b). Subsection (c) provides that, if the trial court “makes a finding that the person is indigent, the court
shall waive all fines and costs imposed on the person under [that] section.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 709.001(c).
                                                         15
power to correct and modify the judgment of the trial court for accuracy when the necessary data

and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27

(Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). “We have the authority to modify the judgment to make the record

speak the truth.” Minter v. State, 570 S.W.3d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

In this case, the trial court’s oral rendition found that Toler was indigent, and pursuant to

subsection (c) of Section 709.001 of the Texas Transportation Code, it waived the $3,000.00 fine

provided in subsection (b) of that section. For that reason, we modify the judgment by changing

the entry under “Fines” to “$100.00.”

       The record also shows that the trial court found Toler indigent before trial and appointed

him counsel. Because he was found indigent, he was presumed to remain indigent absent proof

of a material change in his circumstances. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 26.04(p),

26.05(g) (Supp.); Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet.

ref’d). Nevertheless, and even though the trial court found that Toler was indigent when it

rendered its judgment, it stated at rendition that Toler’s trial counsel would submit a bill for his

fees and that those fees would be added to reimbursement fees. Under “Reimbursement Fees”

the written judgment states “SEE BILL OF COSTS.” The certified bill of costs includes a

charge for “Court Appointed Attorney Fee” of $3,150.00, under “ADDITIONAL

REIMBURSEMENT FEES ASSESSED.”

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       Under Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a trial court has the

authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney fees only if “the judge

determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable the defendant to offset in part or

in whole the costs of the legal services provided . . . , including any expenses and costs.” TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay

are explicit critical elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering

reimbursement of costs and fees” of legal services provided. Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 765–66

(quoting Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). Further, “[c]ourt costs,

as reflected in a certified bill of costs, need neither be orally pronounced nor incorporated by

reference in the judgment to be effective.” Id. at 766–77 (citing Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364,

367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

       We have reviewed the appellate record and conclude that nothing showed that Toler had

the ability to pay attorney fees. We also note that the trial court found Toler indigent in its

rendition and in a subsequent order appointing him appellate counsel. As a result, we modify the

certified bill of costs by deleting the charge for “Court Appointed Attorney Fee,” changing the

“TOTAL REIMBURSEMENTS” to $150.00, and changing the “GRAND TOTAL” to

$570.00.

V.     Disposition

       We modify the trial court’s judgment by changing the entry under “Fines” to “$100.00.”

We modify the certified bill of costs by deleting the charge for “Court Appointed Attorney Fee,”

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changing the “TOTAL REIMBURSEMENTS” to $150.00, and changing the “GRAND

TOTAL” to $570.00. We affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.

                                                 Jeff Rambin
                                                 Justice

Date Submitted:      May 26, 2023
Date Decided:        June 16, 2023

Do Not Publish

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