Court Opinion

ID: 9819210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:18.283307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.400275
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GEIGER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds that the entry was two separate chargeable entries in the instant case. Instead, I believe that the defendant’s and Davis’ conduct constituted only one entry for purposes of the home invasion statute (720 ILCS 5/12—11 (West 1994)). I would therefore follow the holding of People v. Brown, 197 Ill. App. 3d 907, 919 (1990), and find that only one home invasion conviction can stand where there is only one entry, regardless of the total number of persons who enter. In People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 102 (1996), our supreme court interpreted the language of the home invasion statute (720 ILCS 5/12—11 (West 1994)) and concluded "that a single entry will support only a single conviction, regardless of the number of occupants.” On the basis of this principle, numerous courts have held that only one home invasion conviction can stand even where the defendant has injured multiple individuals during a single entry. See People v. Yarbrough, 156 Ill. App. 3d 643, 646 (1987); People v. Morrison, 137 Ill. App. 3d 171, 177-78 (1985). Therefore, had the defendant herein acted alone in inflicting the injuries suffered by Stewart and Edmonds, he could only have been convicted of one count of home invasion. Yet, because another individual entered the premises with him at the same time, the majority concludes that the defendant was properly convicted of two counts of home invasion. I agree with the courts in Brown, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 919, and People v. Smith, 275 Ill. App. 3d 207, 213-14 (1995), that these two results are irreconcilably inconsistent. For these reasons, I would vacate one of the defendant’s convictions of home invasion.