Court Opinion

ID: 9790233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:23.895995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:12.108899
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the results reached by the majority but do so according to the following reasoning and under the authorities cited herein.
The facts necessary to my decision are these:
In connection with a murder investigation, Officer Hineman stopped the Park-hursts’ car by the roadside. Officer Dek-mar arrived immediately, drew his pistol, and aimed it at the Parkhursts. Hineman ordered the two subjects out of their car and to the front of it, where he questioned them concerning their recent whereabouts. Dekmar holstered his gun and walked over to the car area. On questioning, Derrick Parkhurst revealed that there was a .22 and a shotgun in the trunk of the car. The officers obtained permission to retrieve the weapons, and, after determining that the shotgun had been recently fired, placed both subjects under arrest.
Issues considered:
1. Whether the “stop” was actually an arrest or an unreasonable police action;
2. Whether the consent to search was legitimate;
3. Whether Miranda warnings were needed prior to the formal arrest; and
4. Whether testimony referring to the accuseds’ failure to answer prearrest questions violating their right to silence.
I agree with the majority opinion that none of the above points presents any grounds for reversal. The following discussion goes into my reasons for agreement, but points out areas where contrary conclusions are plausible.
*13831. WHETHER THE “STOP” WAS ACTUALLY AN ARREST OR AN UNREASONABLE POLICE ACTION.
The majority assumes that up until the formal arrest the police confrontation constituted the kind of investigation detention allowable without the probable cause requirements of a full-blown arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), talks about the factors which authorize this kind of detention, and also about the scope of permissible intrusion upon an individual’s privacy, calling for a balance between the degree of intrusion and the need to detain or search. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. The need to detain or search breaks down into two parts: (1) facts giving rise to “articula-ble suspicions,” Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80; and (2) the policeman’s interest in self-protection. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. In the present case, the majority found the police conduct reasonable and allowable in light of the above factors. I agree with the result for the following reasons: (a) Terry dealt with a prospective crime and an officer’s observance of suspicious behavior; in the present case the grounds for suspicion are stronger because the officers knew a crime had already been committed and had at least a minimal description of the suspects and their apparent locality; (b) the concern for protection of the officers is at least as great here as it was in Terry, since, as the majority points out, the police “knew” that the criminals they sought were armed and dangerous; and (c) the intrusion was minimal. However, this point is arguable, as discussed below.
It seems that to the extent Officers Hineman and Dekmar merely stopped the appellants’ car and ordered them outside for questioning, their conduct was completely reasonable. It constituted less of an invasion of privacy than the “frisk” in Terry. However, by wielding his gun, Dekmar added an element of coercion to the initial encounter which opens grounds for argument to the effect that the police behavior was either unreasonably intrusive or was an arrest.1
An arrest, as defined in Rodarte v. City of Riverton, Wyo., 552 P.2d 1245 (1976), occurs when an officer subjects a person to “some kind of control and detention amounting to a restriction upon his or her freedom,” but “[ejxcepting * * * where the officer temporarily detains for investigation.” Rodarte, supra, 552 P.2d at 1251. The accompanying discussion in Rodarte leaves room for further inquiry into the question of when a policeman has merely “temporarily detained” someone.
Some courts have held that the detention of a person at gunpoint amounted to an arrest. This holding follows from the notion that an arrest occurs when police have effectively restrained a person’s liberty of movement. See, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). When an officer points a gun at someone, he at least constructively restrains them. However, in light of Terry, this kind of absolute definition of an arrest becomes enigmatic and does not make much sense. Even an investigative stop contemplates enforced compliance, so that the subject really is not free to go. Otherwise, there would be little substance to the idea of investigative detention.
In any event, the cases employing this restraint argument are all distinguishable from the present case. In some cases, the police behavior was plainly excessive. See, e. g., State v. Werth, 18 Wash.App. 530, 571 P.2d 941 (1977) (police looking for escaped inmate, surrounded subject’s house, ordered her outside where she saw officer with shotgun, conducted warrantless search of house); Burns v. State, Okl., 595 P.2d 801 (1979) (officer pulled ear over to investigate in connection with an attempted armed robbery, because he had not seen the car in the locality before; ordered driver out of car at gunpoint). In others, probable cause or even a warrant already existed. See e. g., *1384United States v. Hensley, 374 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 388 U.S. 923, 87 S.Ct. 2139, 18 L.Ed.2d 1373, reh. denied 389 U.S. 891, 88 S.Ct. 25, 19 L.Ed.2d 210, (arrest occurred when detectives ordered suspect out of his car and into their car at gunpoint; court found probable cause in connection with immediately preceding attempted bombing); United States v. Lampkin, 464 F.2d 1093 (3rd Cir. 1972) (arrest when officers approached with guns drawn and asked for identification; outstanding warrant for subject’s arrest). Finally, some cases involved circumstances not suggesting fears for the officers’ safety. See, e. g., United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1974) (suspected dope deal; arrest occurred when police cars surrounded the suspect car and one officer aimed a gun at the occupants); United States v. Ramos-Zaraqosa, 516 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1975) (arrest completed when occupants of car got out at order and gunpoint; suspected of transporting heroin). While any of these factors might lend weight to the conclusion that an arrest took place, none is present in our case.
On the other hand there is abundant authority for the proposition that a policeman may point his weapon at the subject of an investigative stop without transforming the stop into an arrest or triggering the probable-cause requirements. See, e. g., United States v. Balsamo, 468 F.Supp. 1363 (D.Me.1979); United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed.2d 127 (1976); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 1118, 43 L.Ed.2d 393; State v. Goudy, 52 Hawaii 497, 479 P.2d 800 (1971). The cases I have found on this point all use the rationale alluded to in the majority opinion which is to the effect that, in a potentially dangerous situation, a policeman may reasonably draw his weapon for self-protection. I have not found any cases authorizing drawn weapons in the course of investigative stops where the police lacked any reasonable grounds to fear death or serious injury. However, I think the present case falls well within this limitation.2
It is sound policy that police, who have a duty to investigate crime, should be permitted to take steps to minimize the risks of bodily harm. In this case Dekmar kept his gun out only long enough to determine that there was no immediate threat. Thus, I agree with the majority holding that the police conduct was reasonable, and an arrest was not effected thereby.
2. WHETHER THE CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS LEGITIMATE.
The legality of a search by consent boils down to two questions: (a) whether the consent is tainted by prior illegality; and (b) whether the consent was voluntary. In the case before this court, the question of prior illegality is the same question as that which has been discussed above — namely— whether or not the police unreasonably detained or illegally arrested the Parkhursts. If they did, the prevailing view is that the consent and the resulting discoveries are all “fruits of the poisonous tree” and cannot be relied upon to sustain the judgment. People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713, 31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927 (1963); State v. Kennedy, 45 Or.App. 911, 609 P.2d 438 (1980) (unjustified “stop” tainted consent to search, so resulting evidence must be suppressed); see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).3
*1385In my judgment the majority opinion reaches the proper result in the voluntariness issue. I do not see any question but that the owner of the car, Dennis Park-hurst, voluntarily consented to the search under the standard set by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Portions of the record indicate that before the officers gained permission to look in the trunk, they had already apprised the Parkhursts of the nature of the investigation, and Dekmar had put away his pistol. They had also told Dennis that he could refuse.4
All of these factors support the trial judge’s finding that the officers obtained a legitimate consent before searching.
As to the effectiveness of Dennis’ consent to bind Derrick, the majority opinion reasons that a passenger could not reasonably have any greater expectation of privacy than that the car would be searched if consented to by the owner. The cases I have found all reach the same result, though generally under the rationale that the passenger does not have the authority to grant or to deny permission, so his consent is not needed to authorize the search. See Sergent v. People, 177 Colo. 354, 497 P.2d 983 (1972); State v. Gaines, 6 Ariz.App. 561, 435 P.2d 68 (1967); State v. Springer, 102 Ariz. 238, 428 P.2d 95 (1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 926, 88 S.Ct. 859, 19 L.Ed.2d 986 (1968).
3. WHETHER MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE NEEDED PRIOR TO THE FORMAL ARREST.
Miranda warnings are required only in circumstances of “custodial interrogation.” Sanville v. State, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1386 (1976). In Sanville, this court adopted the following definition from Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966):
“By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
In part 1 of this concurring opinion, I addressed the question of whether Dennis and Derrick Parkhurst were arrested at the outset of their encounter with the police. Concerning the need for Miranda warnings, four possibilities flow from that discussion:
1. The Parkhursts were initially arrested without probable cause.5 Lack of Miranda warnings would require exclusion of evidence,6 because they were “taken into custody.”
2. They were arrested with probable cause. The failure to give Miranda warnings would still give rise to the exclusion of at least some evidence.7
3. They were unreasonably detained by the officers. If so, they were probably “de*1386prived of [their] freedom in [a] significant way,” so the failure to give Miranda warnings would require the exclusion of some evidence.8
4. They were legitimately detained for questioning. Miranda may still apply, if the detention was “custodial” within the definition given above, i. e., if the Park-hursts were significantly deprived of their freedom.
This last possibility follows most logically from the discussion in part 1, and thus poses the question of whether the detention was “custodial,” as distinguished from the question which asks whether it was “an arrest.”
As noted in Sanville, supra, 553 P.2d at 1388, the Miranda rules ordinarily do not affect general on-the-scene questioning or other steps in the general fact-finding process. And, accordingly, they generally do not affect investigative stops outside the stationhouse. See, e. g., Allen v. U. S., 390 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1968); U. S. v. Gallagher, 430 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 956, 91 S.Ct. 353, 27 L.Ed.2d 264; People v. Rodney P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967). On the other hand, the Miranda definition cited in Sanville certainly implies that detention need not reach the level of arrest before it becomes “custodial.” See U. S. v. Thevis, 469 F.Supp. 490, 506 (D.C.Conn.1979), aff’d, 614 F.2d 1293 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 1834, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980). The question then is what factors differentiate a noncustodial stop from a custodial stop requiring Miranda warnings. The usual approach to this question seems to be one which uses an objective, reasonable-man kind of standard to determine whether the subject’s liberty was significantly attenuated. The test is whether, considering all relevant circumstances, a person might reasonably believe that he was not free to leave. United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978). Relevant circumstances include the number of officers involved in the stop, and the length of questioning. United States v. Kennedy, supra. Whether or not the officers would have stopped the subject from leaving is, under this view, less important than whether or not they have communicated the fact to him. State v. Ferrell, 41 Or.App. 51, 596 P.2d 1011 (1979).9
The facts of this present case leave room for argument as to whether or not a custodial stop occurred initially. Again, the argument revolves around Dekmar’s use of the gun. If Dekmar had held the Park-hursts at gunpoint throughout the length of the interview, I would want to call it a custodial situation requiring Miranda warnings. This was the holding in United States v. Balsamo, 468 F.Supp. 1363, 1385-1386 (D.Me.1979), where the court found that even though the stop was not an arrest, Miranda warnings were required. The continued presence of the gun would then provide the kind of coerciveness which is incident to a stationhouse interrogation, and to which Miranda was primarily addressed. However, under the facts of the case at bar, the use of the gun was temporary and of short duration. This and other factors lead me to the conclusion that an ordinary person under the circumstances would think that he/she was free to leave, or at least would be free to do so after a short period of detention.10 First, the officer who ap*1387proached (Hineman) did not display his weapon. Second, he promptly indicated to the subjects that he was investigating the possibility that their car matched the description of a car at the crime scene. Third, there is no indication that the questioning period preceding the formal arrest was unreasonably lengthy. Finally, the fact that Dekmar reholstered his gun before walking over confirmed the fact that the questioning was, at that juncture, still only investigative. For these reasons I do not think that the prearrest questioning of the Park-hursts constituted “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda.
Assuming, however, that a custodial interrogation did take place, there remain two important questions regarding the exclusion of evidence under the Miranda rule:
1. Whether the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine operates to exclude evidence found subsequent to a Miranda violation.
2. Whether consent to search, given while in custody, is valid in the absence of Miranda warnings.
In general the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” has been applied only in the context of Fourth Amendment violations. While I have found a few cases applying it to Miranda violations,11 I doubt the soundness of these decisions.12 I would therefore conclude that the argument that Miranda violations in the instant matter would require suppression of material evidence is without merit.
Finally, the great majority of courts have held that a consent to search given even while in custody is not invalid for lack of Miranda warnings, because “a consent to search, as such, is neither testimonial nor communicative of the Fifth Amendment sense.” People v. Thomas, 12 Cal.App.3d 1102, 91 Cal.Rptr. 867, 872 (1970); see Phillips v. People, 170 Colo. 520, 462 P.2d 594 (1969); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 132, 438 P.2d 275, 283 (1968); State v. Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 639-640, 456 P.2d 1, 2-3 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 947, 90 S.Ct. 966, 25 L.Ed.2d 120 (1970). Contra, State v. Williams, 248 Or. 85, 432 P.2d 679 (1967) (a request to search is a request that defendant be a witness against himself). In this view, assuming the Parkhursts were in custody, the officers’ failure to give Miranda warnings would not require suppression of the material evidence discovered pursuant to consent, even if it required suppression of the testimonial evidence.13
4. WHETHER TESTIMONY REFERRING TO THE ACCUSEDS’ FAILURE TO ANSWER PREARREST QUESTIONS VIOLATED THEIR RIGHT TO SILENCE.
Part III of the majority opinion concerns this issue, with reference to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and, more particularly, Art. I, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. The question turns on the rule stated in Clenin v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 844 (1978):
*1388“ * * * We hold that under this section of our state constitution any comment upon an accused’s exercise of his right of silence, whether by interrogation of the accused himself, or by interrogation of others inherently is prejudicial, and will entitle an accused to reversal of his conviction. Such a breach of the accused’s constitutional protections is plain error and prejudicial per se.” Clenin, supra, 573 P.2d at 846.14
In an apparent effort to temper the absoluteness of the rule as stated in Clenin, the majority analyzes it as follows:
1. The term “comment,” as used in the Clenin rule, means more than an innocent reference to the accused’s silence; it implies a possibility of the state exploiting the reference;
2. A mere reference to the accused’s silence will not call for reversal, absent a showing of prejudice.
I agree with the majority on both points, by way of the following line of reasoning. The reason for a rule of automatic reversal is deterrence; if the court decided case by case whether there was prejudice in commenting on an accused’s silence, the prosecution might be tempted to make more such comments, hoping they would pass as nonprejudicial. On the other hand, where the prosecution has made an innocent or inadvertent reference to the accused’s silence, without using it or intending to use it in any way to the state’s advantage, the rule of automatic reversal would have little or no deterrent effect. In such a case, a rule of harmless error would be more suitable, in light of the societal interest in upholding convictions where no prejudicial error has occurred.
Given that the material evidence was admissible on other grounds, and given that the victim’s wife, Christina Baird, identified Derrick Parkhurst at trial, I am comfortable with the majority’s conclusion that the testimonial references to the defendants’ silence were nonprejudicial.
I agree with the result in part III of the opinion on additional grounds, also. In the words of the majority opinion,
“[h]ere, failures to speak did not ‘compel’ the defendants to testify against themselves nor does there appear even an innuendo that the appellants were even unconsciously making any claim of right to silence in their unresponsiveness.” 628 P.2d at 1381.
Here the majority raises, though it does not answer, the question of what constitutes an accused’s “exercise of his right to silence.” It is my judgment that the exercise of the right to silence as a constitutional privilege arises only in the context of “custodial interrogation.” This view finds support in Abeyta v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 705 (1979), where the Wyoming Supreme Court said of Clenin and its supporting cases15:
“These cases all involve factual situations where custodial interrogation makes applicable Art. I, § 11, Wyoming Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and their prohibitions against self-incrimination to those cases, and the rule identified in Clenin is proper to apply under those factual situations.” Abeyta, supra, 592 P.2d at 707.
The court in Abeyta held that the Clenin rule did not apply where the silence commented upon was not a response to a law enforcement agent. I see no reason to distinguish a factual setting in which the silence was a precustodial response to a police officer. Of course, reference to the silence may be prejudicial in that it may create inferences, but this is true whether the response referred to was to a law enforcement agent or to any third party. Only when an officer’s questioning becomes coercive does it differ from the questioning of a nonofficer, in this context. The point where coerciveness arises should correspond *1389to the point when Miranda warnings become imperative; that is, when the interrogation has become “custodial,” as discussed in the text above. To hold otherwise would produce the questionable result that prior to “custody,” the subject’s silences are protected, yet he is not entitled to a warning that his statements may be used against him. Further, it is at least arguable that silence prior to Miranda warnings is less consistent with innocence than silence after the warnings have been given, and thus has greater probative value.16
For the reasons given, I would have affirmed and I do concur with the majority opinion.

. I don’t think the distinction makes a whole lot of difference, except that if you call it an arrest, a discussion of probable cause must follow.

. It is arguable that at the point of initial encounter Dekmar did not have sufficient cause to pull his gun because he did not have sufficient reason to believe that these suspects were indeed the armed killers. This is a fine line to draw, but see Burns v. State, supra, where the court found an arrest.

. There is an exception to this rule where the search is so distinguishable from the prior illegality as to be cleansed of the primary taint. State v. Kelgard, 40 Or.App. 205, 594 P.2d 1271 (1979) (whether consent to search is inextricably bound to prior illegal search or seizure depends on proximity in time or space); see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 487-488, 83 S.Ct. at 417.
Some courts have regarded the voluntariness of the consent to search as a distinguishing factor sufficient to “purge the taint.” This approach in effect ignores the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine and concentrates entirely on the voluntariness issue. See, e. g., State v. Petersen, 124 Ariz. 336, 604 P.2d 267 (1979) (even after unlawful arrest, search of car is *1385okay if consent given, but places voluntariness under heavy scrutiny); United States v. Bazinet, 462 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1010, 93 S.Ct. 453, 34 L.Ed.2d 303.
Assuming arguendo that we have an illegal arrest or stop in our present case, I do not think there are sufficient time or space factors to bring it under the exception, unless we adopt the voluntariness approach just mentioned. I do not recommend this approach because it confuses the issues and relaxes the “poisonous fruit” doctrine too much.

. I doubt that telling Dennis he could consent or refuse, without more, amounts to informing him of his rights in the matter; however, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth emphasized that voluntariness does not depend on knowledge of the right to refuse. 412 U.S. at 227, 229-230, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, 2048-49. Further, barring “inherently coercive tactics,” voluntariness does not depend on the presence or absence of Miranda warnings. 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. at 2058.

. Because 1 do not think there was an arrest, I do not reach the probable-cause issue in this opinion.

. Probably this would be only relevant to exclude testimonial evidence in case the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine was held inapplicable. Otherwise the “poisonous tree” doctrine would independently require the exclusion of this evidence, rendering moot the Miranda question.

. The scope of exclusion under Miranda is discussed in greater detail in the text of this concurring opinion.

. See n. 6 and n. 7, supra.

. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969), four officers arrived at the suspect’s boarding house at four a. m. and questioned him in his bedroom. The United States Supreme Court held this to be custodial interrogation because the officers testified that the subject was not free to go and was “under arrest.” If this indicates a test based on the subjective state of the officers, the test has apparently been seldom used; I have found no cases using it. I think the difficulties involved in proving the officers’ objective state make the test relatively impractical. In any event, the present case is distinguishable from Orozco because the officers there thought they were arresting the subject, not merely detaining him.

. To read the test as requiring Miranda warnings for even the most temporary of forcible detentions would go too far. Recall that the thrust of the test is whether the subject has been “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Emphasis added.) Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

. See United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Meehan, Mass., 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979); State v. Preston, Me., 411 A.2d 402 (1980) (the court reasoned that the deterrence in excluding statements made in violation of Miranda would be undercut if material evidence obtained as a result was admissible).

. The United States Supreme Court withheld judgment on this issue in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). However, the privilege against self-incrimination has generally been held to apply only to testimonial evidence. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

. With regard to Fifth Amendment violations, the Wyoming Supreme Court has employed a harmless-error rule. See Moss v. State, Wyo., 492 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1972) (held not reversible error where the incorrectly admitted testimony was not possibly damaging or incriminating); Jerskey v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 173, 182 (1976) (adopts the standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), that an error may be considered harmless only if it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless and did not contribute to the conviction).
In the present case, assuming that there was a Miranda violation, admission of the testimonial evidence would seem to constitute harmless error because of the innocuous nature of the questions asked and the answers received. This is, however, subject to two possible exceptions; (1) the consent to search; and (2) the comments on the subjects’ silence.

. This is clearly a broader rule than what would be required under the United States Constitution alone. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980).

. These are the same cases relied upon in part III of the majority opinion: Clenin v. State, supra; Jerskey v. State, supra; Irvin v. State, Wyo., 560 P.2d 372 (1977); Gabrielson v. State, Wyo., 510 P.2d 534 (1973); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).

. This is, however, an evidentiary and not a constitutional argument.