Court Opinion

ID: 9645235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:17:33.640226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:25.499347
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I agree with the analysis employed in the majority opinion. Given the fact that prior to the 1963 amendment all support orders for out of wedlock children were entered pursuant to criminal convictions,1 *490that the 1953 act is silent on the issue of whether a jury trial is required and that our cases demonstrate that a jury trial is a right not lightly dispensed with, the conclusion is required that a putative father may demand a jury trial.
However, I wish it clearly understood that in my view the majority opinion, one which rests solely on the conclusion that the 1963 amendment does not evidence a legislative intent to abolish jury trials in out of wedlock cases, does not constitutionally foreclose legislative action which evidences such an intent. Without expressing any view on the constitutionality of a legislative decision to abolish jury trials in cases of this type, I do not think it inappropriate to note that a variety of techniques would be available. (1) The Legislature could amend the 1953 act in such a manner that it becomes clear that jury trials are not available in out of wedlock cases. (2) The New Jersey system could be adopted in which under N.J.S.A. 9:16-1 et seq. the mother may institute a summary proceeding before a magistrate against the alleged father or under N.J.S.A. 9:17-1 et seq. the director of welfare of the appropriate county may institute a similar proceeding. See Tuohy v. Boynton, 5 N.J. Super. 265, 68 A. 2d 851 (1949) ; Kopack v. Polzer, 5 N.J. Super. 114, 68 A. 2d 484 (1949). Any of the three possible parties — the mother, the alleged father or the welfare agency — may, under N.J.S.A. 9:17-20, appeal the determination below and demand a jury trial. See M v. F, 55 N.J. Super. 548, 151 A. 2d 222 (1959).2 Nor do *491I regard this list exhaustive. Simply, the majority opinion does not hold that the Legislature is powerless to promulgate measures which will make the utilization of the jury system more attuned to modern conditions.
As emphasized by the majority, the 1953 act is “in addition to and not in substitution of proceedings provided by law where there is desertion or a failure of duty to support.” Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 431, §3, 62 P.S. §2043.33. Both the 1953 act and the 1963 amendment are a sort of overlay placed upon the procedure which existed prior to adoption of this legislation. Thus, it would not be inconsistent, in my view, for this Court to hold that under existing legislation in the out of wedlock situation a jury trial is available upon demand while in an action brought by a wife against her husband a jury trial is not required. It seems conceded that prior to 1953 a support order could be entered for an in wedlock child in a non jury, summary proceeding under authority of the Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §733, as amended, 18 P.S. §4733, see Commonwealth v. Widmeyer, 149 Pa. Superior Ct. 91, 26 A. 2d 125 (1942), and its predecessor, the Act of April 13, 1867, P. L. 78, §§1-4, see Commonwealth v. Smith, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 318, 178 Atl. 335 (1935).3 Again, while I wish to express no definitive view on this issue, I also wish it understood that my reading of the majority opinion indicates that its holding does not purport to adjudicate *492the validity of in wedlock non jury proceedings under the 1953 act.

 The Commonwealth concedes this point in its brief at 5-6: “There is no doubt that prior to the 1963 amendment to the Civil Procedural Support Law . . . actions seeking to obtain an order for support of an illegitimate child had to be brought by criminal prosecution, either under Section 506, of the Penal Code . . . (fornication and bastardy), or under Section 732 of the Penal Code. .. (wilful neglect or refusal to support a child horn out of lawful wedlock). And, in proceedings under either section, since fornica*490tion and neglect or refusal to support a child born out of lawful wedlock are designated to be misdemeanors, a defendant, disputing paternity, was entitled to a jury trial, unless that right be waived.”

 A variant of the New Jersey procedure is apparently presently utilized in the County Court of Allegheny County. See Commonwealth v. Pewatts, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 22, 186 A. 2d 408 *491(1962), construing the Act of May 5, 1911, P. L. 198, §6, as amended, 17 P.S. §626(g). Furthermore, both the New Jersey approach and that of the County Court appear analogous to our statutes providing for compulsory arbitration. See Smith Case, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A. 2d 625 (1955).

 It may well be that at common law the right to jury trial did not exist in support controversies between husband and wife. See 8 Stat. at Large of Pa. 93 (Mitchell & Flanders 1902).