Court Opinion

ID: 9859876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:52:42.281979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:01.291344
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would reverse the conviction of possession with intent to deliver. In Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 407, 657 N.E.2d at 1026, the supreme court rejected the State’s argument that a trier of fact can convict anyone possessing a controlled substance of possession with intent to deliver. The quantity of controlled substance alone can be sufficient evidence to prove an intent to deliver. “However, when the amount of substance seized is an amount that may be considered consistent with personal use, our courts have properly required additional evidence of intent to deliver to support a conviction.” Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 411, 657 N.E.2d at 1028. Some factors, such as a quantity of controlled substance too large to be viewed as being for personal consumption or possession of large amounts of cash, have been identified as being probative of intent to deliver. Other factors are more neutral. The fact that a defendant is found in a “high drug-traffic area,” for example, is as consistent with defendant being a purchaser as it is with his being a seller. The same is true of the fact that the incident occurred late at night. I disagree with the majority’s argument that all the prosecution has to do is introduce evidence of a few neutral factors and then we will leave the matter to the jury. The State bears the burden of proving each element of the crime charged. In sustaining this burden, the State may rely upon circumstantial evidence, as long as it provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime charged. However, there must be some evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt; the State may not leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the crime. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335-36, 701 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). The majority concedes the 1.6 grams of crack cocaine involved here was consistent with personal use. The supreme court in Robinson determined that possession of 2.2 grams of PCP and 2.8 grams of cocaine could reasonably be viewed as being for personal consumption. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 413, 657 N.E.2d at 1029. The majority also rejects the State’s argument that the evidence showed intent to deliver. The State had argued, “[w]e know that it was possessed with the intent to deliver because there was no evidence to the contrary. So, what we have got is a dealer amount of cocaine.” Defendant was not required to admit he was a drug user in order to defend against the charge that he was a drug seller. So what evidence is there of intent to deliver? The majority mentions the fact that this was a “high drug-traffic area.” 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1104. As discussed above, that factor is neutral; it is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt. The majority mentions that defendant was in possession of a cellular phone, but that also seems innocuous. Robinson noted several cases that mentioned cellular phones, but they all seemed to involve additional equipment such as police scanners or beepers. The proliferation of cellular phones is such that the mere possession of one is unlikely to be probative of intent to deliver drugs absent phone records revealing a pattern of short calls or unless defendant had a pager or beeper as well. The majority finds it significant that no drug-user paraphernalia were found on defendant. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1103. Possession of paraphernalia associated with the sale of drugs is probative of intent to deliver; possession of paraphernalia associated with the use of drugs is probative of personal consumption; possession of neither is probative of nothing. The key factor for the majority seems to be packaging. The majority cites Ballard, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 541-42, 805 N.E.2d at 664, where “this court found the State proved intent to deliver based on the individually packaged units of crack cocaine and the lack of the usual indicators of apartment occupancy.” 358 Ill. App. 3d at 1104. In Ballard, however, there were 41 packages, totaling more than 13 grams of crack cocaine. Ballard, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 805 N.E.2d at 659. In the present case we have 1.6 grams in 12 packages. Packaging may be probative of intent to deliver in certain cases, such as in Robinson, where police found the defendant with 40 individual packets of cocaine and PCE Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 403, 657 N.E.2d at 1024 (also citing anonymous tips and the amount of late-night traffic at the defendant’s apartment building). But here, 12 packages of a user amount are equally consistent with personal consumption as with intent to deliver. In drug transactions, buyers receive the goods the way they are packaged by sellers. A buyer may ask a seller for as much of the drug as he can get for $100, or perhaps a buyer asks for a. particular amount. The seller’s division of the controlled substance into several packages allows the seller to negotiate how much the buyer will receive for his $100 without the seller carrying a scales and other equipment on the street with him. It is not logical to assume that a seller will refuse to sell or a buyer will refuse to buy because the amount requested by the buyer is not contained in a single package. The “expert opinion” of Officer Root that the packaging showed an intent to deliver is not helpful. Officer Root was simply testifying to matters of common sense, making an argument to the jury which the prosecution eventually chose not to make. No previous decision has done what the majority does here: hold that a user amount indicates sale because it is contained in so few packets. The majority’s decision overrules Robinson. A jury may now convict anyone possessing a controlled substance of the more serious offense, possession with intent to deliver. Some additional factor can always be found to justify the conviction.