Court Opinion

ID: 9607618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:00:48.922559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.250478
License: Public Domain

CRAIL, P. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the result, but I dissent as to the law above stated to this extent, that I believe it is the law of California that no right 'to avoid or rescind a subsisting insurance policy occurs from the violation of any provision thereof, even though it be an express warranty, unless such warranty is a material one, except in cases where the policy itself declares that such breach shall avoid it. (Secs. 2610 and 2611, Civ. Code, now secs. 447 and 448, Insurance Code; Solomon v. Federal Ins. Co., 176 Cal. 133 [167 Pac. 859] ; Victoria S. S. Co. v. Western Assur. Co., 167 Cal. 348, 357 [139 Pac. 807], and cases cited in 14 Cal. Jur. 493, 494.)
*647Nevertheless, in the instant case there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court that the warranty was a material one, including evidence that the defendant would not have issued the policy in question if it had known the falsity of the warranty, and also evidence to the effect that the policy which was canceled by the Aetna Insurance Company was canceled because it received confidential investigation reports which were of such nature and so unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the moral hazard that the company was compelled to and did make cancellation thereof. There was other evidence of the materiality of the warranty in question. Materiality of such a warranty is to be determined solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the party, to whom the communication is due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in making his inquiries. (Civ. Code, sec. 2565, now Insurance Code, see. 334.) Obviously, there was substantial evidence to sustain the finding that the warranty was a material one.
The plaintiff complains because the credit reports themselves, which were referred to above, were not presented by the defendant. But no objection was made in the trial court to the testimony with regard to the credit reports as given, although plaintiff admits, “that the record discloses that the defendant had available to it actual and definite evidence”, i. e., the reports themselves. Neither did the plaintiff on cross-examination ask for an inspection of the credit reports. Objection cannot be raised for the first time on appeal with regard to such evidence. The plaintiff also complains of a ruling of the trial court with regard to the admission of an answer made by one of the witnesses as an expert, but I am satisfied that there was no miscarriage of justice in this case arising out of said answer and that we should not interfere with the judgment in view of the admonition contained in article VI, section 4y2 of the Constitution.