Court Opinion

ID: 9785619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:14:15.256037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:30.690936
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s analysis of federal preemption of state law claims based on collateral employment agreements that differ from the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), I respectfully dissent.
I agree with most of the analysis contained in the majority’s opinion. First, I agree with the majority that ORS 652.140(5) requires a case-specific determination of whether a CBA provides for the payment of wages under circumstances specific to plaintiffs termination of employment. Second, I agree with the majority’s analysis that section 4.15 of the CBA does not include a payment provision pertaining to wages due on voluntary termination of employment and, therefore, the requirements of ORS 652.140(2) apply in this instance. Finally, I agree that we are not preempted by federal labor law from reaching that conclusion. I disagree, however with the majority’s collateral employment agreement analysis.
The federal circuits are split on the issue of federal preemption of collateral employment agreements. One view holds that state law claims are not preempted for promises made before employment, see, e.g., Anderson v. Ford Motor Company, 803 F2d 953, 957-58 (8th Cir 1986), cert den 483 US 1011 (1987), or when private agreements are more generous than the provisions contained in a CBA, see, e.g., Loewen Group Intern. Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F3d 1417, 1426 (7th Cir 1995). The other view holds that section 301 preempts state law claims based on any independent employment agreement that concerns a job position covered by a CBA. See, e.g., Beals v. Kiewit Pacific Co., Inc., 114 F3d 892 (9th Cir 1997), cert den 522 US 1108 (1998); Antol v. Esposto, 100 F3d 1111 (3rd Cir 1996). For the reasons stated below, I agree with the reasoning of the cases that hold that state actions are not always preempted. The majority follows the cases favoring preemption.
*670In J.I. Case Co. v. Labor Board, 321 US 332, 339, 64 S Ct 576, 88 L Ed 762 (1944), the United States Supreme Court said:
“Individual contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether under some circumstances they may add to them in matters covered by the collective bargain, we leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the laws of contract applicable, and to the Labor Board if they constitute unfair labor practice.”
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 US 386, 107 S Ct 2425, 96 L Ed 2d 318 (1987), the Court reinforced the proposition that individual employment contracts are not automatically subsumed into, or eliminated by, a CBA. There, the Court held that employees covered by a CBA may assert legal rights independent of that agreement so long as those rights do not arise from the CBA. Id. at 396.
Courts in other jurisdictions have applied those principles. In Anderson, an employer promised laid off workers, as an inducement for them to begin work immediately, that they would not be “bumped” in favor of more recently laid off workers. 803 F2d at 954-55. When the workers were later “bumped,” they brought an action under state law and the employer argued federal preemption. Id. at 955. The Eighth Circuit concluded that, when promises of permanent employment were made before individuals became employees and when the claims do not originate in rights and duties established by a CBA, an employer does not have the right either to misrepresent the terms and conditions of employment or to avoid contractual obligations based on those preemployment promises. Id. at 957-59. In Pauley v. Ford Electronics and Refrigeration Corp., 941 F Supp 794, 796-97 (SD Ind 1996), the plaintiff was induced to change jobs on the promise of a specified rate of pay but was actually paid substantially less, as provided by the terms of a bargaining agreement. There, the court held that the preemployment promise was an individual promise made before employment and that the CBA did not preempt enforcement of that promise. The court specifically rejected the employer’s argument that, merely because the CBA addressed wages, the right to a promised rate of pay asserted by the plaintiff was a right arising from the CBA. Id. at 802. In Loewen, the Seventh Circuit *671concluded that an individual agreement, negotiated between an employer and a future employee and that gives more rights to the employee than does the CBA, is “consistent with” the CBA. 65 F3d at 1424. The court added, “[A]s long as the employer is not attempting to circumvent a union or undermine a collective bargaining agreement * * * it is permissible to negotiate more favorable contracts with individual members.” Id. at 1426. The primary rationale for not preempting a state cause of action in those instances was perhaps summed up best by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Walton v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 93 NC App 368, 378 SE2d 427, 432, rev den 325 NC 230, 381 SE2d 792 (1989):
“Any other result might suggest that an employer could flout with impunity the restrictive provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement by making individual, independent promises to an employee, and then raise the collective-bargaining agreement as a defense when the employee seeks to have those promises fulfilled.”
That is the situation here.
An additional reason leads me to reach the conclusion that promises made independently of a CBA are not subject to preemption in all instances. Quite simply, that position reflects the reality of business practices. Employers at times provide pay scales and other benefits greater than those contained in collective bargaining agreements in order to attract and keep the best employees. To verify that assertion, one need look no further than the facts contained in Beals. There, a construction worker was induced to move from California to Hawaii by promises that he would be paid wages at a specific rate, paid a weekly subsistence allowance and moving expenses, and employed for the duration of the construction project. Beals, 114 F3d at 893. All of those terms were either better than similar terms contained in the existing CBA or not addressed by it. Id. The employer adhered to the terms of the promise, not the CBA terms, for five months before terminating the plaintiff. Id. The majority’s position ignores current business practices and makes these preemployment promises unenforceable. I would conclude that, if a collateral agreement between the worker and the employer concerning the worker’s rate of pay is reached *672before employment, federal labor law does not preempt enforcement of that agreement.
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that two genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether defendant paid plaintiff all wages due on termination of employment as required by ORS 652.140(2). The first issue is whether plaintiff was paid at the proper rate of pay. The second issue is whether plaintiff was paid within five working days after he quit. Therefore, summary judgment was improper in this instance and I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.