Court Opinion

ID: 9728104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:58:48.413108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:28.808774
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
It is conceded that on the tax day of 1958 plaintiff Continental was in possession of certain personal property belonging to the United States. It is conceded also that such personal property was not at the time taxable, by force or authority of Michigan law or otherwise. Assessment thereof—for 1958—was nonetheless made and levy confirmed under the forms and procedures of the general property tax act.  Plaintiff, under protest, paid (January 16, 1959) the tax as levied upon such personal property.2 This suit, to recover the amount paid, was instituted February 11, 1959. Trial to the court resulted in judgment for the plaintiff.
*17On appeal the defendant township, school district, and county pose this question:
“May a taxpayer, who has in his possession on tax day personal property which is exempt and also personal property liable to tax, who furnishes only a gross figure as to the value of the property to the assessing officer and who fails to appear before the board of review and segregate the taxable from the nontaxable property or otherwise protest the assessment, recover the portion of the tax paid under protest allocable to the nontaxable property?”
The issue in this case stems from United States v. City of Detroit, 355 US 466 (78 S Ct 474, 2 L ed 2d 424); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 US 484 (78 S Ct 483, 2 L ed 2d 436); City of Detroit v. Murray Corporation of America, 355 US 489, 495 (78 S Ct 458 and 486, 2 L ed 2d 441 and 460); and, in particular, Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Muskegon, 365 Mich 191. In Continental it was held that personal property in Continental’s possession, exempt because owned by the United States, could not be assessed validly for taxation under the general property tax act — as that act stood at the time.3
The Continental Case is controlling here. It determines that this 1958 assessment was unauthorized by. Michigan law at the time it was made. Being thus unauthorized, the assessment was void from the beginning.
When an assessment made and confirmed under color of the general property tax act is invalid for outright want of legal authority to make it, such assessment and its confirmation have no standing for any legal purpose whatever. No action or in*18action of the owner or possessor of the property thus assessed can be said to validate that which was invalid in the first place. Plaintiff accordingly proceeded within its rights when, as in the first Continental Case, it paid under protest and sued.
The presented situation is wholly analogous to those cases where, the original assessment being void for a specific legal reason, it has been held that, despite subsequent proceedings taken to decree, sale and confirmation pursuant to the general property tax act, any person or party aggrieved by such illegal assessment may attack it directly or collaterally. See discussion of the point in McQuade v. State Land Office Board, 321 Mich 235, 244, and review of the authorities in Reed v. Welsch, 358 Mich 579. Here, as in Reed v. Welsch, property in question was illegally assessed on assumptive but mistaken authority of the general property tax act. The result must be the same, regardless of plaintiff’s omission — as charged by appellants — of compliance with said act (Woodmere Cemetery Association v. Township of Springwells, 130 Mich 466; City of Detroit v. Mackinaw Transportation Co., 140 Mich 174; Township of Portsmouth v. Cranage Steamship Co., 148 Mich 230 [118 Am St Rep 578]; Rapid Railway Co. v. Schroeder, 190 Mich 684, and City of Detroit v. George, 214 Mich 664, citing additional authorities at 677).
Comstock v. City of Grand Rapids, 54 Mich 641, cited by appellants and quoted by Justice Adams, is not opposed to foregoing conclusions. In Comstock the questioned assessment was of the plaintiff’s own personal property. Both courts found and so held. Such personal property consisted of some 20 railroad freight cars which, of course, were transitorily out as well as in Grand Rapids. The Court ruled, as against Mr. Comstock’s objections, that such personal property was validly assessed to him in the *19first ward of the city, the findings below having disclosed :
“2d. That during all the time aforesaid he owned and occupied for business purposes a warehouse near the Central Railroad depot, in the first ward of said city, wherein he stored temporarily his manufactured articles for the purpose of convenient shipping.” (p 642.)
Validity of the assessment was specifically upheld for this reason (the following sentence completes the penultimate paragraph of the Court’s opinion on page 646, which paragraph Justice Adams has quoted in entirety save only as to such sentence):
“But we think the cars may properly be considered as appurtenant to the business in connection with which they were used, and taxable with the stock in trade.”
Our decision renders it unnecessary to treat an additional question presented by intervening plaintiff and appellee United States. Such question is:
“Is an action for refund of taxes, imposed on property owned by the United States in violation of the Federal Constitution and exacted under protest, subject to State administrative provisions?”
Judgment affirmed. No costs.
Dethmers, Kelly, and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Tlie principally assigned reasons for protest were:
“1. The property above referred to is the sole and absolute property of the United States of America and is exempt from taxation under the general tax act of the State of Michigan.
“2. The general property tax act of the State of Michigan does not authorize any taxing authority within the limits of the State of Michigan to assess, or to collect taxes against Continental Motors Corporation for any property not owned by Continental Motors Corporation.
“3. There is no authority under the general property tax act of the State of Michigan to make an assessment against or to collect taxes from Continental Motors Corporation on the claim that property owned by the United States of America can be assessed to the possessor, or the user of such property.”

 Continental Motors v. Muskegon Township, 365 Mich 191, was concerned with a 1959 assessment. Here we deal with a 1958 assessment. The fact is stressed in view of subsequently effective PA 1959, No 266 (OLS 1961, § 211.14 [Stat Ann 1960 Bev § 7.14]). Neither ease has presented any question which might arise under Act No 266.