Court Opinion

ID: 989223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:03:33.935141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:12.461722
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 95-5087

DENNIS RAY FOUNTAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 95-5121

TONY EDUARDO FRAZIER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge.
(CR-94-52)

Submitted: April 15, 1996

Decided: April 29, 1996

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN,
Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Lawrence J. Fine, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; Fred J. Williams,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United
States Attorney, Paul A. Weinman, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dennis Ray Fountain and Tony Eduardo Frazier were both con-
victed of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and powder cocaine,
21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 1995).1 Fountain appeals his convic-
tion on the ground that items seized during a search of his residence
on January 7, 1994, were improperly admitted into evidence. Fountain
also appeals his 151-month sentence, alleging that the penalties for
crack cocaine offenses are unconstitutionally vague. Frazier appeals
his 360-month sentence, contending, first, that the district court
clearly erred in determining the amount of drugs attributable to him,
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2D1.1
(Nov. 1994), and second, that use of the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard at sentencing is unconstitutional. We affirm.

Although they did not know each other, Frazier and Fountain were
both participants in a conspiracy to distribute crack and powder
cocaine in Greensboro, Durham, and Reidsville, North Carolina. Fra-
zier supplied powder cocaine to Tom Farrington from the summer of
1991 until February 1993, when Farrington began getting cocaine
from another codefendant in Florida. In the spring of 1993, Fountain
_________________________________________________________________
1 Frazier was acquitted of possession of cocaine hydrochloride with
intent to distribute on August 16, 1993.

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began buying powder cocaine and crack from Farrington for resale in
Reidsville. His last purchase was made from one of Farrington's asso-
ciates in October 1993, after Farrington's arrest. In January 1994, a
search warrant was executed by state law enforcement authorities at
Fountain's residence. Recovered were a set of scales, a pager, $1738
in cash, and a plastic bag containing crack residue.

Fountain contends that none of these items were admissible rele-
vant evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 401, because they did not conclusively
establish his participation in the Farrington-Frazier conspiracy. The
district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discre-
tion. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 62 U.S.L.W. 3640 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1994) (No.
93-7067). Relevance is established by a showing, even if slight,
which makes it more likely than before admission of the evidence that
the defendant committed the crime charged. United States v.
Federico, 658 F.2d 1337, 1342 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1981). The items
recovered from Fountain's residence meet this threshold test for rele-
vance. The pager, the scales, the plastic bag with crack residue, and
the large amount of cash are all indicators of possible drug trafficking.
In isolation, none of them establishes Fountain's participation in the
Farrington-Frazier conspiracy; however, their presence in his house
makes more credible the testimony of the witnesses who described his
part in the conspiracy and we find that the court properly admitted
them into evidence.

Fountain also attacks the penalties for crack offenses, relying on
United States v. Davis, 864 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ga. 1994). We have
rejected the reasoning in Davis and will not revisit the issue. See
United States v. Fisher, 58 F.3d 96, 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1995) (No. 95-5923).

Frazier challenges the district court's determination at sentencing
that he was responsible for the distribution of 5.5 kilograms of pow-
der cocaine as not established by a preponderance of the evidence.
The district court's painstaking discussion of the trial testimony estab-
lished that Frazier was responsible for 5 kilograms and 4 ounces of
cocaine, if not 5.5 kilograms. A base offense level of 32 applies if the
offense involves at least 5 kilograms of cocaine. 2 Farrington testified
_________________________________________________________________
2 Because Frazier was a career offender, his base offense level of 32
was increased to 37, his criminal history category to VI, and his guide-

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at Frazier's trial that he purchased 4 kilograms and 4 ounces of
cocaine from Frazier. Tony Frazier's brother, Eric, testified that he
showed a kilogram of Frazier's cocaine to some friends who subse-
quently stole it. Eshawn Baker, one of the thieves, also testified about
taking the kilogram of cocaine. This evidence established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence Tony Frazier's involvement with more
than 5 kilograms of cocaine.

Last, Frazier suggests that a higher standard of proof is necessary
at sentencing. However, due process is satisfied by the use of a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
U.S. 79, 91 (1986); United States v. Vinson, 886 F.2d 740, 741-42
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990).

We therefore affirm Fountain's conviction and the sentences
imposed on both Fountain and Frazier. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED
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line range to 360 months to life. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A); USSG
§ 4B1.1.

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