Court Opinion

ID: 9371791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 21:02:39.161352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.304065
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/23 P. v. Mantynen CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164997
 v.
 JOSEPH MANTYNEN,                                                       (Mendocino County
                                                                         Super. Ct. No. SCUK-CRCR-17-
             Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                         92736)

         Defendant Joseph Mantynen was charged with murder under the
provocative act doctrine. In 2018, defendant pleaded guilty to voluntary
manslaughter pursuant to a plea agreement. In 2022, defendant petitioned
for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (as amended by
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) (§ 1170.95).1 The trial court denied the petition on
the ground defendant failed to make a prima facie case for relief.
         On appeal, defendant contends the provocative act doctrine is no longer
a valid theory of murder liability. Alternatively, he claims a violation of
equal protection. We affirm.

        The Legislature has since renumbered Penal Code section 1170.95 as
         1

section 1172.6 without substantive change, effective June 30, 2022. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2 (Strong).)
Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying Murder Conviction
      Charges
      In January 2018, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed an
amended four-count complaint charging defendant with the murder of Mary
Elizabeth Windham, also known as Mary Elizabeth Mantynen2 (§ 187, subd.
(a); count 1), assault with a firearm on a Mendocino County Sheriff’s Deputy
(count 2) and a Sonoma County Sheriff’s Deputy (count 3), when defendant
knew or should have known the victims were peace officers performing their
duties (§ 245, subd. (d)(1)), and burglary in the first degree (§§ 459, 460, subd.
(a); count 4).
      The murder charge was expressly premised on the provocative act
doctrine.3 As to counts 1 through 3, it was further alleged that defendant
personally used a firearm, to wit, a Remington .22 caliber rifle (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b) (as to count 1); § 12022.5, subd (a) (as to counts 2 and 3)). In count
1, it was also alleged that a principal (presumably referring to Windham) was
armed with a Marlin .410 shotgun (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
      Plea Agreement and Factual Basis for Plea
      On March 1, 2018, the day before the scheduled preliminary hearing,
the parties reached a negotiated disposition under which the murder charge
was reduced to manslaughter, certain special allegations were dismissed, and
defendant agreed to a prison term of 26 years, four months.

      2   The parties and trial court all describe the victim as defendant’s wife.
      3It was alleged defendant “did willfully and unlawfully, with
deliberation, premeditation, and with malice aforethought, through
provocative act, murder a human being . . . .” (Italics added.)

                                          2
      Because there was no preliminary hearing, the trial court asked the
prosecutor to state the factual basis for the charges. In support of count 4,
the prosecutor said that, on December 20, 2017, defendant and his accomplice
Windham entered an inhabited dwelling in the town of Sonoma with the
intent to commit larceny and did commit larceny.
      The prosecutor continued, “The two of them then left Sonoma County
and came into Mendocino County, eventually landing in Ukiah. The
investigator for Sonoma County eventually located them at . . . the Sunrise
Inn here in Ukiah, and law enforcement officials from Sonoma County . . .
attempt[ed] to arrest these two at that hotel. [¶] The defendant originally
committed an assault on Sonoma County Sheriff's Deputy Scott McKinnon
with a firearm, knowing that he was a peace officer engaged in the
performance of his duties. That was at the time viewed as a provocative act.”
This was the basis for count 3.
      Count 2 “was a separate assault with a firearm, again with this
defendant pointing a firearm at Mendocino County Sheriff's Deputy James
Elmore, who the defendant knew or should have known was a peace officer
acting in the performance of his duties. That was a second provocative act
that caused the shot to be fired or shots to be fired which caused the death of
Mary Elizabeth Windham.”
      As to the original murder charge, the prosecutor stated, “The People
were proceeding under a provocative act theory of murder. We’ve accepted
the defense offer of a voluntary manslaughter. We believe that the
defendant’s statements are such that the provocative act was intended and
that this was a killing that was intentional, albeit by provocative act and law
enforcement.”

                                       3
      Defendant agreed to the factual statement by the prosecutor and
entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). He also
admitted he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5
and pleaded guilty to counts 2 through 4.
      At sentencing, the trial court imposed the agreed-to term of 26 years
and four months in state prison. Defendant submitted a letter to the court;
although the letter is not part of the record on appeal, according to the
descriptions by his counsel and the court, defendant described the killing as
the result of a plan between himself and his wife, Windham, to kill
themselves through “suicide by cop.”4
Petition For Resentencing
      On February 22, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1170.95. The same month, the trial court issued an order appointing
counsel for defendant and stating that it was “undertaking review of the
record to ascertain if the petitioner meets the prima facie showing
requirement of the statute,” as outlined in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952 (Lewis).
      In a letter brief, defense counsel argued that resentencing under
section 1170.95 was now available for provocative act murder because section
1170.95 had recently been amended to apply to any prosecution based on a
“theory under which malice is imputed” based solely on “participation in a

      4 Defense counsel stated that defendant took “responsibility for his
wife’s death” and, “He possibly could have persuaded her not to go down this
path of suicide by cop.” The trial court described defendant’s “heartfelt letter
explaining how his otherwise normal and productive life in the space of a
year devolved into a drug-fueled descent to the point where he and his wife
actually made a plan to end their lives by entrapping law enforcement
officers into shooting them . . . .”

                                        4
crime,” and malice may be implied or “imputed” in provocative act murder.
(Italics omitted.)
      At a hearing on April 11, 2022, the trial court ruled defendant failed to
make a prima facie showing he qualified for relief under section 1170.95 and
denied the petition. The court stated that defendant’s argument conflated
implied malice and imputed malice. The court explained, “[U]nder the
provocative act murder doctrine, . . . the requisite state of mind is not
imputed to the defendant. That’s what happens in felony murder, and that’s
what happens in the natural and probable consequences doctrine, when in
felony murder the intent to commit the enumerated felony is the mental state
that’s required. [But] with the provocative act doctrine, the defendant has to
personally harbor a mental state of malice.” (Italics added.)
                                  DISCUSSION
A.    Changes to the Murder Statute and Petitioning for Resentencing
      At all relevant times, section 187 has defined murder as an unlawful
killing with “malice aforethought” (§ 187, subd. (a)), and section 188 has
provided that malice “may be express or implied” (former § 188, as amended
by Stats. 1982, ch. 893, § 4; § 188, subd. (a)(2)).
      In 2018, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) (S.B. 1437), which amended sections 188 and 189 to limit the scope of
the felony-murder rule and to eliminate natural and probable consequence
liability for second degree murder. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 839.) S.B. 1437 added subdivision (a)(3) to
section 188, which now states in pertinent part, “Malice shall not be imputed
to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
      “Senate Bill 1437 also created a special procedural mechanism for those
convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as

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amended. [Citations.] Under newly enacted section 1172.6,[5] the process
begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
      Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a “person convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter” may file a petition to have
that “conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when
. . . the following [three] conditions apply.” First, “[a] complaint, information,
or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”;
second, “[t]he petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder”; and, third, “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)–(3).)
      “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the
petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].) If the petition and record in the case

      5As we have mentioned, section 1170.95 was renumbered 1172.6
without substantive change. We will discuss the current law, section 1172.6.

                                         6
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court
may dismiss the petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].)” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
B.    Relief Under S.B. 1437 is Not Available for a Conviction Premised
      Solely on Provocative Act Murder
      Defendant contends the provocative act doctrine does not defeat a
prima facie case for resentencing. We review de novo the denial of a petition
for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Ervin (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 90, 101 [denial of a petition under section 1170.95 at the prima
facie stage is a legal conclusion reviewed de novo].)
      1.    The Provocative Act Doctrine
      Our Supreme Court has described the provocative act doctrine as
follows. “When someone other than the defendant or an accomplice kills
during the commission or attempted commission of a crime, the defendant . . .
may . . . be prosecuted for murder under the provocative act doctrine. . . . A
variation on the law of transferred intent, the provocative act doctrine holds
the perpetrator of a violent crime vicariously liable for the killing of an
accomplice by a third party, usually the intended victim or a police officer.
[Citations.] . . . Under the provocative act doctrine, when the perpetrator of
a crime maliciously commits an act that is likely to result in death, and the
victim kills in reasonable response to that act, the perpetrator is guilty of
murder. [Citations.] ‘In such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to
the commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his
accomplice committed with conscious disregard for life.’ [Citation.]
      “A murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine thus requires
proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice, and
either the defendant or an accomplice intentionally committed a provocative
act that proximately caused an unlawful killing. [Citations.] A provocative

                                         7
act is one that goes beyond what is necessary to accomplish an underlying
crime and is dangerous to human life because it is highly probable to provoke
a deadly response. [Citations.] Although the doctrine has often been invoked
in cases where the defendant initiates or participates in a gun battle
[citation], it is not limited to this factual scenario. [Citations.] Malice will be
implied if the defendant commits a provocative act knowing that this conduct
endangers human life and acts with conscious disregard of the danger.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 654–655 (Gonzalez).)
      2.    Provocative Act Murder Remains a Valid Theory of Liability
      Murder under the provocative act doctrine requires proof that “the
defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice,” which “will be
implied if the defendant commits a provocative act knowing that this conduct
endangers human life and acts with conscious disregard of the danger.”
(Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655, italics added.) S.B. 1437 changed the
law of murder by generally prohibiting “imputed” malice “based solely on [a
person’s] participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) But implied malice
murder still exists. (§ 188, subd. (a) [“malice may be express or implied”].)
Provocative act murder, which requires malice, remains a valid theory of
murder liability.
      Defendant contends he made a prima facie case for resentencing
because he “could not now be convicted of murder under the provocative act
doctrine because it imputes malice as prohibited by section 188.” Defendant
acknowledges courts have uniformly rejected this argument. (See People v.
Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 867 (Mancilla) [collecting cases]; People
v. Swanson (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 604, 612–617 (Swanson) [rejecting
arguments that provocative act murder is a subset of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and that first-degree provocative act murder

                                         8
falls within the old felony-murder rule]6; People v. Johnson (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 257, 266–270 (Johnson) [rejecting argument that defendants
convicted under the provocative act doctrine were entitled to resentencing
under the “natural and probable consequences” provision of section 1170.95,
subdivision (a)(3)]; and People v. Lee (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 266 (Lee)
[rejecting argument that the provocative act murder in the petitioner’s case
was “ ‘a combination of felony murder and natural and probable consequence
murder’ ”].)7
      In Lee, the court explained that, prior to S.B. 1437, “the felony murder
rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine provided theories
under which a defendant could be found guilty of murder without proof of
malice.” (Lee, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 260, italics added.) But “[u]nlike
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, ‘[a] murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine . . .
requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of

      6 The California Supreme Court granted review in Swanson, but in
November 2021, it dismissed and remanded the matter, specifying that the
Court of Appeal opinion was “non-citable and nonprecedential ‘to the extent it
is inconsistent with’ [the high court’s] decision in Lewis,” supra, 11 Cal.5th
952. (People v. Swanson (S266262, Nov. 23, 2021) [286 Cal.Rptr.3d 704].) In
Lewis, the Supreme Court held (1) a petitioner is entitled to appointment of
counsel upon the filing of a facially sufficient petition and (2) the trial court
may consider the record of conviction in determining whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) We do not cite Swanson for any proposition
inconsistent with Lewis.
      7 As with Swanson, the California Supreme Court granted review in
Lee but later dismissed and remanded the matter, specifying that the Court
of Appeal opinion was “non-citable and nonprecedential ‘to the extent it is
inconsistent with’ [the high court’s] decision in Lewis,” supra, 11 Cal.5th 952.
(People v. Lee (S262459, Nov. 23, 2021) [286 Cal.Rptr.3d 703].) We do not cite
Lee for any proposition inconsistent with Lewis.

                                        9
malice . . . .” (Id. at p. 264.) Thus, a petitioner convicted of provocative act
murder could not make a prima facie case for relief under S.B. 1437 because
he could not “show that he ‘could not be convicted of first or second degree
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189’ as required for relief under
section 1170.95, subdivision (a)(3). Section 188, as amended, establishes that
‘in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought.’ Because [the petitioner] was convicted of provocative
act murder, the jury necessarily found he acted with malice aforethought.”
(Id. at p. 265.)
      Similarly, in Johnson, the court distinguished provocative act murder
from felony murder and liability under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine on the ground that provocative act murder requires
that the defendant personally harbor malice while the “ ‘ “felony-murder rule
generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the
offense of murder” ’ ” and the natural and probable consequences doctrine
“ ‘allows an aider and abettor to be convicted of murder, without malice.’ ”
(Johnson, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 and fn. 4, italics added and original
italics deleted.)
      Defendant argues the cases that have rejected his argument failed to
acknowledge that “implied malice is in essence imputed to the defendant
based on his participation in some other crime or as the natural and probable
consequence of his act.” But the provocative act doctrine does not impute
malice based on participation in a crime. Rather, malice is implied (not
imputed) under the provocative act doctrine when a defendant engages in

                                        10
conduct “knowing that this conduct endangers human life and acts with
conscious disregard of the danger.”8 (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655.)
      Nor does the provocative act doctrine impute malice as the natural and
probable consequence of a person’s act. “ ‘[M]urder includes both actus reus
and mens rea elements. To satisfy the actus reus element of murder, the act
of either the defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of
death.’ Consideration of the natural and probable consequence of the
defendant’s conduct in the context of provocative [act] murder, as with any
case of implied malice murder, relates to proximate cause—that is to the
actus reus element of the crime, not the mens rea element that was the focus
of Senate Bill 1437.” (Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 868, italics
omitted, fn. omitted.) As the court explained in Swanson, “[I]n any
provocative act case, where by definition an intermediary’s act killed the
victim, an important question will be whether the defendant’s conduct
proximately caused the death,” but “analysis of proximate cause in terms of
foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences of the defendant’s
malicious conduct does not somehow bring a provocative act killing within

      8 “ ‘A finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the
defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.’
[Citation.] Since rarely would a defendant provide direct evidence of that,
‘implied malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘The
very nature of implied malice . . . invites consideration of the circumstances
preceding the fatal act.’ ” (People v. Superior Court of San Diego County
(2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502.) In other words, implied malice may be
inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances, but this does not mean
a person can be convicted of provocative act murder based on a finding that
the person committed a crime alone. Implied malice requires the additional
determination that the person acted with conscious disregard of danger to
human life.

                                      11
the malice-free natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Swanson,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 614.)
      In short, defendant cannot make a prima facie case for relief because
provocative act murder is not a “theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)), and S.B. 1437’s changes to section 188 do not preclude a murder
conviction under the provocative act doctrine.
C.    There is No Equal Protection Violation
      Next, defendant argues S.B. 1437 violates equal protection by treating
persons convicted under the provocative act doctrine differently from those
convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
He argues these two groups are similarly situated as “persons who were non-
killers, who did not intend to kill, who were convicted of murder under a
theory of imputed malice.”
      This argument was rejected in Mancilla. There, the court reasoned:
“ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection
clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two
or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’ . . . [W]e ask at
the threshold whether two classes that are different in some respects are
sufficiently similar with respect to the laws in question to require the
government to justify its differential treatment of these classes under those
laws.’ [Citations.] If the two groups are not similarly situated, there can be
no equal protection violation.
      “Contending individuals convicted of murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and those convicted of provocative act murder
are similarly situated in terms of their culpability for murder—both groups,
[petitioner Mancilla] insists, involve defendants who were not the actual

                                       12
killers, who did not intend to kill the victim and who were convicted under a
theory of imputed malice—Mancilla argues the Legislature did not have a
constitutionally sufficient reason to exclude provocative act murder from the
scope of Senate Bill 1437 whether evaluated under either strict scrutiny or
rational basis review. The premise for Mancilla’s equal protection argument
is false.
       “As discussed, the People must prove a defendant personally acted with
implied malice to be convicted of provocative act murder. In contrast, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine required no proof of
malice. [Citation.] Given the express intent of Senate Bill 1437 ‘to more
equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in
homicides’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § l, subd. (b); [citation]), offenders who
acted with malice and those who did not are not similarly situated for
purposes of section 1170.95.” (Mancilla, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 869–
870, fn. omitted.)
       Likewise, in Johnson, the court rejected the same equal protection
claim, explaining the petitioner was “not similarly situated to persons
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine because ‘[u]nlike [these murders], “[a] murder
conviction under the provocative act doctrine . . . requires proof that the
defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice . . . .” ’ ” (Johnson,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at pp. 270–271.)
       We agree with the reasoning of Mancilla and Johnson and, therefore,
reject defendant’s equal protection claim.
                                 DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

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                                         _________________________
                                         Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J.*

A164997, People v. Mantynen

     *Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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