Court Opinion

ID: 2964965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:35.60968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:42.684667
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 97-1287
        No. 97-1382

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                        Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

                                          v.

                        MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,

                        Respondent-Appellant, Cross-Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                  [Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                             Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                         and Pollak,** Senior District Judge.
                                       _____________________

                                 ____________________

            Jeffrey Swope  with whom Matthew P.  Schaeffer and Palmer &  Dodge
            _____________            _____________________     _______________
        LLP were on brief for respondent.
        ___
            Sara S.  Holderness, Tax  Division,  Department  of Justice,  with
            ___________________
        whom Loretta C.  Argrett, Assistant Attorney General, Donald K. Stern,
             ___________________                              _______________
        United  States Attorney,  and  Charles  E.  Brookhart,  Tax  Division,
                                       ______________________
        Department of Justice, were on brief for petitioner. 

                                 ____________________

                                  November 25, 1997
                                 ____________________
                            
        ____________________

        *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

        **Of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.  This case concerns an attempt by
                         _____________

            the  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology to  assert  the

            attorney-client  privilege   and  work-product   doctrine  in

            response  to a  document  request  by  the  Internal  Revenue

            Service.  The most important issue presented is whether MIT's

            disclosure  of certain of the documents to another government

            agency caused it to lose the privilege.  The background facts

            are essentially undisputed.

                 MIT  is a famous university with tax-exempt status under

            26  U.S.C.    501(c)(3).    In  1993,  the IRS  conducted  an

            examination of MIT's  records to determine whether  MIT still

            qualified for  exempt status and to determine  whether it was

            complying with  provisions relating  to employment taxes  and

            the reporting of  unrelated business income.  In  aid of this

            examination, the IRS requested from MIT copies of the billing

            statements of law firms that had represented  MIT and minutes

            of  the  MIT  Corporation  and  its  executive  and  auditing

            committees.

                 In  response, MIT  supplied the documents  requested but

            redacted information claimed  to be covered by  the attorney-

            client privilege or  the work-product doctrine  or both.   In

            mid-1994 the IRS  requested that the redacted  information be

            supplied, and MIT declined.  At this point the IRS sought  to

            obtain the same documents in unredacted form from the Defense

                                         -2-
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            Contract  Audit Agency ("the audit agency"), the auditing arm

            of the Department of Defense.

                 It appears that the same billing statements and possibly

            some or all of the minutes sought by the IRS had earlier been

            provided  to the audit  agency pursuant to  contracts between

            MIT and components  of the Department of Defense.   The audit

            agency helps  entities in  the Department  of Defense  review

            contract performance  to be sure  that the government  is not

            overcharged for services.  Not surprisingly, the audit agency

            often reviews the private contractor's books and records.  

                 In November 1994, the audit  agency advised the IRS that

            it would not turn  over the documents  provided to it by  MIT

            without the  latter's consent,  which MIT  declines to  give.

            The audit  agency had made  no unconditional promise  to keep

            the  documents  secret,  but its  regulations  and  practices

            offered  MIT  some   reason  to  think  that   indiscriminate

            disclosure   was  unlikely.     The   IRS   then  served   an

            administrative  summons  on  MIT  in  December  1994  seeking

            specific  unredacted  minutes  of nine  meetings  of  the MIT

            Corporation and auditing and executive committees in 1990 and

            1991,  and attorneys' billing statements for almost all legal

            expenses paid or  incurred by MIT from July  1, 1990, through

            June 30, 1991.  26 U.S.C.    7402(b), 7604(a).

                 When  MIT  declined to  comply,  the IRS  in  early 1996

            petitioned  the district court  to enforce the  summons.  The

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                                         -3-

            district   court  obtained   briefs,   heard  arguments   and

            considered the matter  without an evidentiary hearing  on the

            basis of  the declaration filed  by the IRS and  an affidavit

            submitted by MIT.  In January 1997, the district court issued

            a memorandum  and  order  enforcing  the  IRS  administrative

            summons  as to the unredacted  legal bills and the unredacted

            versions of most of the minutes sought by the IRS.

                 The district court held that the disclosure of the legal

            bills  to  the  audit  agency forfeited  the  attorney-client

            privilege.  As  to the minutes, the district  court said that

            the privilege  remained available because  the government had

            not proved that  the minutes had been disclosed  to the audit

            agency.   After reviewing  the minutes  in camera,  the court
                                                    _________

            found that  three contained  privileged material  and ordered

            MIT to  turn over the  others as unprivileged or  because MIT

            had  lost the privilege  by disclosing  the substance  of the

            minutes in its now unprivileged legal bills. 

                 The  district   court  followed  a   different  path  in

            resolving  MIT's work product objection.  The court held that

            neither the  legal bills  nor the  minutes were  "prepared in

            anticipation of  litigation or for  trial."  Fed. R.  Civ. P.

            26(b)(3).  It ruled that  they were therefore discoverable as

            ordinary  business records.   Accordingly, the court  did not

            discuss  whether  work  product  protection  was   waived  by

            disclosure to the audit agency.

                                         -4-
                                         -4-

                 MIT  now appeals, arguing that disclosure of the billing

            statements  to  the  audit  agency  should  not  forfeit  the

            privilege; MIT no  longer claims work product  protection for

            the billing  statements.  The  government has  cross-appealed

            from the district court's refusal to order production  of the

            three remaining minutes;  it says that the burden  was on MIT

            to prove that the minutes had not been disclosed to the audit

            agency.  MIT responds that  the privilege was not waived even

            if the minutes  were disclosed to the audit  agency, and that

            the minutes remain protected by the work product doctrine.

                 On  an appeal respecting a privilege claim, the standard

            of  review depends  on the  issue.   Rulings by  the district

            court on  issues of law  are reviewed de novo;  fact findings
                                                  _______

            are  tested under a  clear error standard;  and discretionary

            judgments  such as evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse

            of discretion.   See United  States v. Wilson, 798  F.2d 509,
                             ___ ______________    ______

            512  (1st Cir.  1986).   On the  principal issue  before us--

            forfeiture  by disclosure--this  case goes  about  as far  as

            possible in  posing an  abstract issue of  law and  review is

            plenary.

                 The  question  whether   MIT  forfeited  protection   in

            disclosing documents to  the audit agency is  not governed by

            any  federal constitutional  provision,  federal statute,  or

            rule prescribed by the Supreme Court.  Nor is the enforcement

            of  an IRS summons  a matter with respect  to which state law

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            supplies a rule  of decision.  Accordingly, the  scope of the

            privilege is "governed by the principles of the common law as

            they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in

            the light of reason and experience."  Fed. R. Evid. 501.  See
                                                                      ___

            also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
            ____ _____________    _____

                 MIT's  Appeal.     We  begin  with  the  attorney-client
                 _____________

            privilege.  That privilege has  been familiarly summed up  by

            Wigmore in a formula that federal courts have often repeated:

                      (1)   Where legal  advice of any  kind is
                      sought  (2)  from  a  professional  legal
                      adviser in his capacity as such,  (3) the
                      communications relating to  that purpose,
                      (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
                      (6)  are  at   his  instance  permanently
                      protected (7) from  disclosure by himself
                      or by the  legal adviser, (8) except  the
                      protection be waived.

            8 J. Wigmore, Evidence   2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
                          ________

            The government argues, and the district court agreed, that by

            its disclosure to the audit agency, MIT  waived the privilege

            to whatever extent that it might otherwise have protected the

            billing statements and various of the minutes.

                 The  attorney-client privilege  is well-established  and

            its  present  rationale  straightforward:    by  safeguarding

            communications  between  lawyer  and  client,  it  encourages

            disclosures by client to lawyer that better enable the client

            to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and  to

            present legitimate claims or defenses when litigation arises.

            See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981).
            ___ __________    _____________

                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            Waiver  issues aside,  the  contours  of  the  privilege  are

            reasonably stable.

                 Quite a different  scene presents itself when  one turns

            to the problem of "waiver,"  a loose and misleading label for

            what is in fact a  collection of different rules addressed to

            different  problems.    Cases  under  this  "waiver"  heading

            include situations as  divergent as an express  and voluntary

            surrender  of   the  privilege,   partial  disclosure   of  a

            privileged document, selective  disclosure to some  outsiders

            but not  all,  and inadvertent  overhearings or  disclosures.

            See McCormick on  Evidence   93, at 341-48  (J.W. Strong ed.,
            ___ ______________________

            4th ed. 1992).

                 Even where  the cases are  limited to those  involving a

            deliberate   and  voluntary   disclosure   of  a   privileged

            communication to someone  other than the attorney  or client,

            the case  law is far from settled.   But decisions do tend to

            mark  out, although  not with  perfect  consistency, a  small

            circle  of   "others"  with  whom information  may  be shared

            without   loss   of   the   privilege   (e.g.,   secretaries,
                                                     ____

            interpreters,  counsel  for  a  cooperating  co-defendant,  a

            parent present when a child consults a lawyer).1

                                
            ____________________

                 1See, e.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp.
                  ___  ____  _____________    ___________________________
            Rental Serv., Inc.,  874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st  Cir. 1989); Kevlik
            __________________                                     ______
            v. Goldstein, 724  F.2d 844, 849 (1st Cir.  1984); Indian Law
               _________                                       __________
            Resource Center v.  Department of the Interior, 477  F. Supp.
            _______________     __________________________
            144, 148 (D.D.C. 1979); J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
                                                              ___________
            Federal Evidence    503.08[2], at 503-36 (J.  McLaughlin ed.,
            ________________
            2d ed. 1997).

                                         -7-
                                         -7-

                 Although the decisions often describe such situations as

            ones in which the client  "intended" the disclosure to remain

            confidential, see, e.g.,  Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724  F.2d 844,
                          ___  ____   ______    _________

            849  (1st Cir. 1984),  the underlying concern  is functional:

            that the lawyer be able to  consult with others needed in the

            representation  and that  the  client  be  allowed  to  bring

            closely  related persons  who are  appropriate,  even if  not

            vital, to  a consultation.   Cf. Westinghouse Elec.  Corp. v.
                                         ___ _________________________

            Republic of the  Philippines, 951  F.2d 1414,  1424 (3d  Cir.
            ____________________________

            1991).  An  intent to maintain confidentiality  is ordinarily

            necessary to continued protection, but it is not sufficient.

                 On  the  contrary,  where the  client  chooses  to share

            communications  outside this  magic circle,  the  courts have

            usually  refused  to  extend the  privilege.2    The familiar

            platitude  is that the privilege is narrowly confined because

            it hinders the courts in the search for truth.  See Fisher v.
                                                            ___ ______

            United States, 425 U.S. 391,  403 (1976); 8 Wigmore, supra,  
            _____________                               _______  _____

            2291, at 554.   Fairness is also a concern where  a client is

            permitted to  choose to  disclose materials  to one  outsider

            while  withholding them  from another.    See, e.g.,  Permian
                                                      ___  ____   _______

            Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
            _____    _____________

                                
            ____________________

                 2In addition to the cases cited  in note 3 below, see In
                                                                   ___ __
            re Grand Jury Proceedings, 78  F.3d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1996);
            _________________________
            United States v. Jones, 696  F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982);
            _____________    _____
            In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793,  818 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re
            _________________                                       _____
            Horowitz, 482 F.2d  72, 81 (2d Cir.), cert.  denied, 414 U.S.
            ________                              _____________
            867 (1973); McCormick on Evidence, supra,   93, at 347-48.
                        _____________________  _____

                                         -8-
                                         -8-

                 Should  this  inclination  not  to  protect  a  document

            disclosed  outside the  circle  apply  where,  as  here,  the

            initial disclosure was to and  at the request of a government

            agency?  This  problem has presented itself  to six circuits.

            The  most common  cases have  been  disclosures of  otherwise

            privileged attorney-client  communications to  the Securities

            and  Exchange  Commission  by corporations  during  voluntary

            internal investigations or in response to SEC subpoenas.  The

            Eighth Circuit, en banc but  without more than a paragraph of
                            _______

            analysis, treated this kind of disclosure as not comprising a

            total waiver of the privilege.   See Diversified Indus., Inc.
                                             ___ ________________________

            v. Meredith,  572 F.2d  596, 611 (8th  Cir. 1978)  (en banc).
               ________

            Subsequently,  the Second,  Third, Fourth,  Federal  and D.C.

            Circuits  took the opposite view and  ruled that such limited

            disclosures do destroy the privilege.3

                 The  primary argument  in favor  of  the Eighth  Circuit

            position  is that  loss of  the privilege may  discourage the

            frank exchange between  attorney and client in  future cases,

            wherever the  client anticipates  making a  disclosure to  at

            least one government agency.  We put to one side the interest

            of the government agency  in obtaining voluntary disclosures;

                                
            ____________________

                 3See Genentech,  Inc. v. United States  Internat'l Trade
                  ___ ________________    _______________________________
            Comm'n,  122  F.3d  1409,  1417  (Fed.  Cir.  1997);   In  re
            ______                                                 ______
            Steinhardt  Partners, L.P., 9  F.3d 230, 235  (2d Cir. 1993);
            __________________________
            Westinghouse,  951 F.2d  at 1424-26;  In  re Martin  Marietta
            ____________                          _______________________
            Corp., 856  F.2d 619, 623-24  (4th Cir. 1988),  cert. denied,
            _____                                           ____________
            490 U.S. 1011 (1989); Permian, 665 F.2d at 1220-21.
                                  _______

                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            such  agencies usually have  means to secure  the information

            they need  and, if not,  can seek legislation  from Congress.

            By  contrast,   the  safeguarding   of  the   attorney-client

            relationship has largely been left  to the courts, which have

            a comparative  advantage in  assessing  consequences in  this

            sphere.

                 But MIT, like any client, continues to  control both the

            nature  of its communications  with counsel and  the ultimate

            decision  whether  to disclose  such communications  to third

            parties.  The only constraint imposed by the traditional rule

            here  invoked by the  government--that disclosure to  a third

            party waives the privilege--is to limit selective disclosure,
                                                    _________

            that is, the provision of otherwise privileged communications

            to one outsider while withholding them from another.  MIT has

            provided  no evidence  that respecting  this constraint  will

            prevent it or anyone else from getting adequate legal advice.

                 Admittedly, the arguments on the other side are far from

            overwhelming.   The IRS'  search for truth  will not  be much

            advanced if MIT  simply limits or recasts its  disclosures to

            the audit agency.  But  the general principle that disclosure

            normally  negates the  privilege is  worth  maintaining.   To

            maintain it here makes the law more predictable and certainly

            eases  its  administration.   Following the  Eighth Circuit's

            approach  would require,  at the  very  least, a  new set  of

                                         -10-
                                         -10-

            difficult line-drawing exercises that  would consume time and

            increase uncertainty.

                 MIT says that even if we are not  prepared to follow the

            Eighth Circuit onto new ground, MIT's disclosure to the audit

            agency  should be  regarded as  akin to  the disclosure  by a

            client's lawyer to another lawyer representing another client

            engaged in a common defense.  Invoking the concept of "common

            interest," MIT  seeks to compare its situation to cases where

            disclosure   has   been  allowed,   without   forfeiting  the

            privilege, among separate parties similarly aligned in a case

            or  consultation (e.g.,  codefendants,  insurer and  insured,
                              ____

            patentee and licensee).4

                 In a rather abstract sense,  MIT and the audit agency do

            have  a "common interest" in the  proper performance of MIT's

            defense  contracts and  the proper  auditing  and payment  of

            MIT's bills.  But this is not the kind of common  interest to

            which the  cases refer in recognizing that allied lawyers and

            clients--who are working together in prosecuting or defending

            a   lawsuit  or  in  certain  other  legal  transactions--can

            exchange  information among  themselves without  loss  of the

                                
            ____________________

                 4Compare In re  Regents of Univ. of Cal.  101 F.3d 1386,
                  _______ _______________________________
            1390-91  (Fed. Cir.  1996),  cert. denied,  117  S. Ct.  1484
                                         ____________
            (1997), and Hewlett-Packard  Co. v. Bausch &  Lomb, Inc., 115
                    ___ ____________________    ____________________
            F.R.D.  308,  310 (N.D.  Cal. 1987),  and Roberts  v. Carrier
                                                  ___ _______     _______
            Corp., 107  F.R.D. 678, 687-88  (N.D. Ind. 1985), with  In re
            _____                                             ____  _____
            Grand  Jury Subpoena Duces  Tecum, 112 F.3d  910, 922-23 (8th
            _________________________________
            Cir.), cert.  denied,  117  S. Ct.  2482  (1997),  and  Linde
                   _____________                               ___  _____
            Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C., v. Resolution Trust
            ________________________________________     ________________
            Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
            _____

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            privilege.  To  extend the notion to MIT's  relationship with

            the   audit  agency,  which   on  another  level   is  easily

            characterized  as  adversarial,  would  be  to  dissolve  the

            boundary almost entirely.

                 MIT  further argues  that the  disclosure  to the  audit

            agency was not "voluntary" because of the practical pressures

            and  the legal  constraints  to  which it  was  subject as  a

            government contractor.   The  extent of  those pressures  and

            constraints  is far from  clear,5 but assuming  arguendo that
                                                            ________

            they existed, MIT  chose to place itself in  this position by

            becoming a government contractor.  In short, MIT's disclosure

            to the  audit agency resulted from its  own voluntary choice,

            even if that choice was made at the time it became  a defense

            contractor  and subjected itself to the alleged obligation of

            disclosure.  See In re John Doe  Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d
                         ___ _____________________

            Cir. 1982).

                 Anyone  who chooses to disclose a privileged document to

            a third  party, or does so  pursuant to a  prior agreement or

            understanding, has an incentive to do so, whether for gain or

            to avoid  disadvantage.   It would  be perfectly  possible to

            carve out some  of those disclosures  and say that,  although

            the  disclosure itself is  not necessary to  foster attorney-

                                
            ____________________

                 5MIT's main citation for its  duty to disclose is not to
            a statute or regulation but to a procedures manual maintained
            by  the audit agency.   There is no  actual evidence that MIT
            would have been denied payment  if it had sought to negotiate
            some lesser disclosure.

                                         -12-
                                         -12-

            client communications, neither does it forfeit the privilege.

            With rare  exceptions, courts  have been  unwilling to  start

            down this path--which has no logical terminus--and we join in

            this reluctance.

                 We add, finally, a word about reliance and fair warning.

            MIT  may have had some reason  to think that the audit agency

            would not disclose  the documents to the IRS  (and the agency

            did not do so).  But MIT had far less reason to think that it

            could  disclose documents  to  the  audit  agency  and  still

            maintain   the  privilege  when  IRS  then  sought  the  same

            documents.  See  note 3, above.   The choice to disclose  may
                        ___

            have been reasonable but it was still a foreseeable gamble.

                 The IRS Appeal.  We  turn now to the government's cross-
                 ______________

            appeal.   Here,  the  IRS  challenges  the  district  court's

            refusal to  require MIT  to produce  three specific  minutes.

            The  refusal reflected  the district  court's  view that  the

            documents  contained privileged material,  and that there was

            no waiver  because MIT had  not been shown to  have disclosed

            those minutes to the audit agency.   On the latter point, MIT

            effectively concedes error, and properly so.

                 Where  privilege is claimed  and the opponent  alleges a

            specific disclosure, the burden of proof is upon the claimant

            to  show nondisclosure  wherever  that  is  material  to  the

            disposition of the  claim.  Cf. United States  v. Wilson, 798
                                        ___ _____________     ______

            F.2d 509, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1986).  Here, MIT concedes that it

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                                         -13-

            cannot  prove that the minutes in question were withheld from

            the audit agency.   Instead, it proffers  alternative grounds

            for  sustaining the  district court's  judgment  as to  these

            minutes,  namely, that the  minutes were protected  under the

            attorney-client privilege and  the work product  doctrine and

            that  these protections  were  not  waived  even  though  the

            minutes were turned over to the audit agency. 

                 A  party may  defend  a  judgment in  its  favor on  any

            legitimate ground without appealing from the judgment on that

            issue.   Martin v.  Tango's Restaurant, Inc.,  969 F.2d 1319,
                     ______     ________________________

            1325  (1st  Cir.  1992).    Our  discussion  of  the  billing

            statements  disposes of MIT's argument that the protection of

            the  attorney-client  privilege  survived disclosure  to  the

            audit  agency.    We  therefore  turn  to  the  work  product

            doctrine.  In doing so, we reject the government's claim that

            MIT waived this  work product argument by only  raising it in

            its  reply brief;  MIT's "reply"  brief  was effectively  its

            answering brief  on the  government's cross  appeal, and  the

            government filed its own "reply" in turn.

                 The district  court assumed that work product protection

            did  not  apply because  the  minutes were  not  prepared "in

            anticipation of litigation,"  as required by Fed.  R. Civ. P.

            26(b)(3).   MIT argues that the minutes contained substantive

            information  that did represent attorney work product even if

            the minutes had a more general function.  There is little law

                                         -14-
                                         -14-

            in  this area--partly,  one  suspects,  because work  product

            usually remains embodied in documents unquestionably prepared

            for  litigation  or, if  given  to the  client,  in documents

            independently protected by the attorney client privilege.  

                 The  government has chosen in its  brief to assume that,

            to   the  extent  that  the  minutes  contained  "the  mental

            impressions,  conclusions, opinions,  or  legal theories"  of

            MIT's attorneys,   Fed.  R. Civ.  P.  26(b)(3), the  district

            court   erred  in  concluding  that  work  product  lost  its

            protection when repeated in another confidential document not

            prepared  in anticipation  of litigation.    A Third  Circuit

            precedent supports this assumption, which MIT presses and the

            government does not resist.   See In re  Ford Motor Co.,  110
                                          ___ _____________________

            F.3d  954, 967 (3d  Cir. 1997).  In  view of the government's

            concession, we will take the  point as settled for this case.

                 Nevertheless,  the  government  claims  that  any   such

            protection was lost when the  minutes were turned over to the

            audit agency, MIT  having conceded that it cannot  prove that

            the minutes were not so disclosed.  One might wonder  why the

            standard of  waiver for  the attorney-client  privilege--that

            any voluntary disclosure outside the magic circle constitutes

            waiver--would  not also apply  to the work  product doctrine.

            Equivalent waiver standards would make easier  the resolution

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

            of  evidentiary disputes  where, as  often  happens, the  two

            objections are raised together.  

                 Nonetheless, the cases  approach uniformity in  implying

            that work-product protection  is not as easily  waived as the

            attorney-client privilege.   The  privilege, it  is said,  is

            designed to protect confidentiality,  so that any  disclosure

            outside  the magic circle is inconsistent with the privilege;

            by  contrast, work  product  protection  is provided  against

            "adversaries,"  so  only   disclosing  material   in  a   way

            inconsistent  with keeping it  from an adversary  waives work

            product protection.  At least five circuits have adopted this

            rule  in some form.6   See also 8  C. Wright, A.  Miller & R.
                                   ________

            Marcus,  Federal Practice  and Procedure     2024, at  368-69
                     _______________________________

            (1994) (citing cases).

                 Perhaps such formulations  simply beg the question.   If

            one  wanted to explain  the discrepant outcomes,  it might be

            more  persuasive  to  say  that  the  privilege  is  strictly

            confined  because  it is  absolute; on  the other  hand, work

            product  protection  (with  certain  qualifications)  can  be

            overcome by  a sufficient showing of need.   See Fed. R. Civ.
                                                         ___

            P. 26(b)(3).  In all events, it would take better reason than

                                
            ____________________

                 6See  Westinghouse,  951  F.2d  at  1428-29;  Steinhardt
                  ___  ____________                            __________
            Partners, 9 F.3d at 234-35;  In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738
            ________                     ___________________________
            F.2d 1367, 1371-75  (D.C. Cir. 1984); Martin  Marietta Corp.,
                                                  ______________________
            856 F.2d  at  625;  In re  Chrysler  Motors  Corp.  Overnight
                                _________________________________________
            Evaluation Program  Litig., 860  F.2d 844,  846-47 (8th  Cir.
            __________________________
            1988).

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            we have to depart from the prevailing rule that disclosure to

            an  adversary,  real  or  potential,  forfeits  work  product

            protection.

                 MIT's disclosure to the audit agency was a disclosure to

            a potential adversary.  The disclosures did not take place in

            the context of a joint  litigation where the parties shared a

            common legal interest.  The audit agency  was reviewing MIT's

            expense submissions.  MIT doubtless hoped that there would be

            no  actual controversy  between  it  and  the  Department  of

            Defense,  but the potential  for dispute and  even litigation

            was certainly there.   The cases treat this  situation as one

            in which the work product protection is deemed forfeit.  See,
                                                                     ____

            e.g., Steinhardt Partners,  9 F.3d at 234;  Westinghouse, 951
            ____  ___________________                   ____________

            F.2d at  1428-31; In  re Subpoenas Duces  Tecum, 738  F.2d at
                              _____________________________

            1372 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

                 In  closing,  it  may be  helpful  to  stress that--with

            regard to  both the  attorney-client privilege  and the  work

            product doctrin
                      ine--we are concerned only with loss of  protection

            as to  the  very documents  already  disclosed to  the  audit

            agency.  Nothing  in this opinion is intended  to be directed

            to  the different and  difficult question when  disclosure of

            one  document   warrants  forfeiture  of  protection   for  a

            different but related document.  That issue was touched on in

            the district court but has not been pursued on appeal.

                                         -17-
                                         -17-

                 Similarly, even  where work  product can  be discovered,

            the  governing rule  directs that  "the  court shall  protect

            against disclosure  of the  mental impressions,  conclusions,

            opinions,  or  legal   theories  of  an  attorney   or  other

            representative of a  party concerning the litigation."   Fed.

            R.   Civ.  P.  26(b)(3).    Conceivably,  the  strong  policy

            underlying  this  reservation  might serve  to  protect  such

            materials,  even  if  protection  of  ordinary  work  product

            materials were deemed waived because of selective disclosure.

            This possibility has not been briefed or argued to us; it may

            or may not  be pertinent in this case; and we mention it only

            to stress that we are not deciding the issue.

                 Accordingly,  on  MIT's  appeal,  the  judgment  of  the

            district  court  is  affirmed.   On  the  government's cross-
                                 ________

            appeal, the judgment  of the district court refusing to order

            production of  three specified  minutes is  vacated, and  the
                                                        _______

            matter   is  remanded  to  the  district  court  for  further
                         ________

            proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                 It is so ordered.
                 ________________

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                                         -18-