Court Opinion

ID: 9497536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:34.109845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:15.177482
License: Public Domain

*624JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, when Judge Clunk filed a criminal complaint against Brookings for falsification under Ohio law, he was performing a non-judicial act in the absence of all jurisdiction. I therefore dissent.
Absolute judicial immunity should “be confined to situations where such immunity is not merely convenient but essential.” Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 659-60 (7th Cir.1986) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev’d, 484 U.S. 219, 230, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). The purpose of absolute judicial immunity is protection of judges from the fear of future litigation brought by disgruntled litigants unhappy with judicial decision-making. Traditionally, absolute judicial immunity does not extend beyond judicial rulings. Id. at 661.
Today the majority extends absolute immunity protection to a judge performing an admittedly non-judicial act that was not in any way related to the case-deciding process. In doing so, the majority expands the availability of an absolute immunity defense to virtually any situation in which judges perform non-judicial acts ostensibly undertaken to protect the integrity of their courts, an expansion without support in history or in case law. Moreover, even if I agreed with the majority that judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity’s broad protection when their acts arise, not in the context of a pending case, but under a generalized duty to report conduct detrimental to the integrity of the judicial system, Clunk did not simply report criminal conduct (an act that was completely unnecessary in this case since Alfera had already reported Brookings’ conduct to the proper authorities). Instead, he himself initiated a criminal prosecution. Thus, the majority’s holding is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Clunk did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction when he initiated criminal proceedings against Brookings.
Absolute judicial immunity does not shield judges from liability on all occasions when they act in their official capacities. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229-30, 108 S.Ct. 538 (no absolute immunity for decision to discharge probation officer); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) (no absolute immunity when promulgating a code of conduct for attorneys). When a judge is performing a non-judicial act or acting in the absence of all jurisdiction, absolute judicial immunity does not apply. Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir.1997) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991)). Granting immunity to judges performing non-judicial acts or acting in the absence of all jurisdiction would be contrary to the purpose of judicial immunity. The doctrine of judicial immunity does not exist to make life easy for judges or to foster judicial peace of mind. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 660 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judicial immunity is intended to protect judicial independence, so that judges can decide cases without fear that they will be personally liable for their decisions. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225, 108 S.Ct. 538; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). As the Supreme Court noted in Forrester:
[T]he nature of the adjudicative function requires a judge frequently to disappoint some of the most intense and ungovernable desires that people can have .... [T]his is the principal characteristic that adjudication has in common with legislation and with criminal prosecution, which are the two other areas in which absolute immunity has most gen*625erously been provided. If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits.
484 U.S. at 226-27, 108 S.Ct. 538.
The “touchstone” for judicial immunity, then, has been the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)). When an action taken by a judge is not an adjudication of disputes between parties, it is less likely that the action will be considered judicial. Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir.1997). This is not to say that judicial immunity cannot be granted for any action other than the actual deciding of a dispute between parties. It is to say that when we are distinguishing between judicial acts for which immunity is appropriate and acts that simply happen to have been performed by judges, we should remember that “immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. 538 (emphasis in original). The function judicial immunity protects and serves is fearless and independent judicial decision-making. Id. at 225, 108 S.Ct. 538; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213; Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1121. When that function is not implicated, the protection of absolute immunity is not justified. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934.
The filing of a criminal complaint, accompanied by the affidavit of a complainant, normally has nothing to do with the performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties. It is unsurprising, then, that this court and other courts have repeatedly held that absolute judicial immunity does not protect judges performing the purely prosecutorial functions involved in initiating criminal prosecutions. Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1118; Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir.1984); Lopez v. Vanderwater, 620 F.2d 1229, 1235 (7th Cir.1980). Yet, a judge can still be acting in his judicial capacity for immunity purposes when undertaking a seemingly prosecutorial action if it “relates to a function normally performed by a judge or [if] the parties are dealing with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Barnes, 105 F.3d at 1119.
The majority holds that Clunk’s act of filing a criminal complaint against Brook-ings relates to a function normally performed by a judge because judges have a duty to protect the integrity of their courts. It reasons that Clunk was acting pursuant to that duty when he reported Brookings’ conduct (which according to the majority occurred “in a case then pending before him”) to the proper authorities. Leaving aside for the moment the facts that Clunk did not simply report conduct, that Brookings’ conduct had already been reported to the proper authorities and that there was no case involving Brookings then pending before Clunk, the majority’s holding that an otherwise non-judicial act is somehow transformed into a judicial one whenever judges are acting to protect the integrity of their courts is contrary to established precedent. In Supreme Court of Virginia, the court held that judicial immunity does not apply to judicial promulgation of a code of conduct for attorneys, even though the issuance of such a code is an action undoubtedly undertaken by judges to protect the integrity of the courts. 446 U.S. at 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967. *626In explaining why legislative, and not judicial, immunity furnished the appropriate standard, the court said, “Although it is clear that under Virginia law the issuance of the Bar Code was a proper function of the Virginia Court, propounding the Code was not an act of adjudication, but one of rulemaking.” Id. at 731, 100 S.Ct. 1967. It was the nature of the function performed (rulemaking), not the identity of the actors who performed it (judges), that informed the court’s immunity analysis. Similarly, in Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64-65 (9th Cir.1974), the Ninth Circuit held that a judge was not entitled to judicial immunity for his decision to forcibly expel a plaintiff from the judge’s courtroom, even while acknowledging that judges have an obligation to protect “the sanctity and dignity” of courtroom proceedings:
The decision to personally evict someone from a courtroom by the use of physical force is simply not an act of a judicial nature, and is not such as to require insulation in order that the decision be deliberately reached.... Judge Thompson’s choice to perform an act similar to that normally performed by a sheriff or bailiff should not result in his receiving absolute immunity for this act simply because he was a judge at the time.
The above cases demonstrate that while judges may have a duty to perform certain acts, the existence of a duty does not necessarily mean any action taken in furtherance of that duty is “related to a function normally performed by a judge,” thus entitling the judge to the protection of absolute judicial immunity. After all, judges normally perform the function of hiring and firing probation officers, and yet in Forrester, the Supreme Court held that immunity was not appropriate for those types of administrative decisions, even though they are “essential to the very functioning of the courts,” because the decisions themselves “were not ... judicial or adjudicative.” 484 U.S. at 228-29, 108 S.Ct. 538. “To conclude that, because a judge acts within the scope of his authority, such employment decisions are brought within the court’s ‘jurisdiction,’ or converted into ‘judicial acts,’ would lift form above substance.” Id. at 230, 108 S.Ct. 538. In this case, the majority opinion lifts form above substance by holding that, because Clunk has a duty to protect the integrity of his court, his actions in carrying out that duty somehow converted his prosecutorial act of filing a criminal complaint into a judicial one. This holding ignores the requirement that we examine the functions protected and served by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity and consider whether those functions are furthered by granting immunity for the act in question. See id. at 224, 108 S.Ct. 538.
In each of the four principal cases relied upon by the majority to hold that Clunk’s act of filing a criminal complaint was judicial in nature—Barnes, Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911 (11th Cir.1986), Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.1985), vacated and remanded by Tyus v. Martinez, 475 U.S. 1138, 106 S.Ct. 1787, 90 L.Ed.2d 333 (1986), and Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir.1997)—the courts considered the nexus between the otherwise prosecutorial acts at issue and the role of judges in deciding cases brought before them independently by the parties. Each court concluded that the function of judges deciding cases fearlessly and independently was served by granting judicial immunity for the act in question. These cases thus do not stand for the broad proposition suggested by the majority that judges are entitled to the protection of absolute immunity whenever they undertake an act intended to protect the integrity of the judicial system. Instead, they stand for the much narrower proposition that a *627judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity only when such immunity is necessary for the effective performance of the judge’s function of deciding cases fearlessly and independently.
In Barnes, this court held that a judge was entitled to the protection of absolute immunity when, after being presented with a criminal complaint independently by two plaintiffs, he (1) directed that the charges be changed to allege a different crime, (2) notarized one of the plaintiffs complaints, (3) prepared or assisted in the preparation of one or both of the complaints, and (4) maliciously refused to dismiss the complaints after the prosecutor determined they were frivolous. 105 F.3d at 1119. In reaching that decision, we distinguished Sevier and Lopez, two cases in which courts had refused to grant judicial immunity for the performance of prosecutorial acts, by noting that, unlike the judges in those cases, the judge in Barnes was not responsible for the initial decision to file criminal charges. Id. The criminal charges thus did not belong to the judge; they belonged to the parties who had previously invoked the jurisdiction of the municipal court by setting the judicial process in motion. Id. Because the actions the judge undertook “were all related to general functions involved in presiding over cases brought before him independently by the parties,” recognizing absolute judicial immunity in such circumstances furthered the “central policy justifications” behind the doctrine.
Primarily because [the judge] was seated in his official capacity and deciding matters with respect to independent parties who invoked the jurisdiction of his court, the integrity and independence of judicial decision-making would be impaired if [the judge] were now called upon to account for his official decisions in a suit of this type.... In the underlying criminal prosecutions against [the defendant], her estranged spouse and his former wife brought allegations of criminal conduct before [the judge], calling upon the judge to act. Undoubtedly, this scenario would rouse intense feelings in the parties. It is precisely when an issue facing a judge sparks intense emotions that the judge’s fidelity to independent and fearless decision-making is of the utmost importance. To render a judge liable to answer in damages to every litigant who feels aggrieved during the course of judicial proceedings, “would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.”
Id. at 1121-22 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As the preceding discussion should make clear, the focus in Barnes was on the relationship between the judge’s seemingly prosecutorial actions and his function of deciding cases brought to him independently by the parties. Because that function would have been impaired if the judge later had to explain his conduct in a civil lawsuit for money damages, we held that judicial immunity shielded his otherwise prosecutorial actions from liability. Harris and Martinez also both involved situations in which judges had performed pros-ecutorial acts while presiding over cases brought to them independently by the parties. Harris, 780 F.2d at 915; Martinez, 771 F.2d at 435.
By contrast, Clunk was not deciding a case brought to him independently by the parties when he filed the criminal complaint against Brookings. Brookings had not been a party in Clunk’s court since he obtained his last marriage license in 1994. Although Brookings’ conduct was brought to Clunk’s attention by an attorney, Clunk was not presiding over a case brought to him independently by the parties at that *628time. Clunk’s decision to file a criminal complaint was in no sense judicial or adjudicative. Here, the criminal allegations contained in the complaint belonged to Clunk and to Clunk alone. Clunk was the person who set the judicial process in motion when he swore to the affidavit supporting the criminal complaint and filed the complaint and affidavit. He was not an official who, when presented with a case by independent parties, went beyond his judicial authority and performed certain prosecutorial acts during the process of deciding the dispute. And, most importantly, the unavailability of judicial immunity to Clunk will not impair his fearless and independent judicial decision-making, since his filing of the complaint occurred in no decision-making context.
The only case relied upon by the majority holding that a judge was entitled to judicial immunity for the performance of a seemingly prosecutorial act that did not occur in the context of a case brought to the judge independently by the parties is Barrett. Even in that case, however, we were careful to emphasize the relationship between the prosecutorial act and the integrity of the “case-deciding process.” Barrett considered whether judges are entitled to judicial immunity when they write letters to prosecutors reporting the threatening conduct of disgruntled former litigants. 130 F.3d at 259-60. As the majority notes, Barrett had been a frequent litigant in Judge Harrington’s courtroom, and Judge Harrington had ruled against him on several occasions. Id. at 249-50. She believed him to be a likely party in future cases due to his ongoing dispute with the Codes Department. Id. at 249. After being warned by other judges and court personnel that Barrett had made threatening remarks about her, Judge Harrington wrote a letter to prosecutors on her judicial letterhead requesting that they investigate Barrett because she felt he was attempting to obstruct justice by harassing her and her family. Id. at 259. The majority opinion selectively quotes from language in Barrett to arrive at its proposition that judges are entitled to the protection of absolute immunity whenever they are acting to protect the integrity of their courts. A close reading of the ease, however, reveals that once again, our emphasis was on the nexus between the particular act in question and the judicial function of deciding cases independently. While Judge Harrington’s conduct did not concern whether Barrett would win or lose a case, her letters did involve the “ease-deciding process” because she “wrote to express her fear that the harassment would cause her to have to recuse herself from future cases involving [Barrett],” and recusal “is undoubtedly an act that concerns judicial decision-making.” Id. at 258. We found that the general function of Judge Harrington’s conduct in writing to the prosecuting authorities therefore was “to protect the integrity of the judicial decision-making process” because “there was a direct relational nexus between [Judge] Harrington’s judicial decisions, Barrett’s response in ‘investigating’ and threatening her, and [Judge] Harrington’s response in contacting the prosecuting authorities.” Id. at 259. Barrett’s entire course of conduct was focused on Judge Harrington in her role as a judge. His actions were taken in direct response to her judicial decisions and conduct. Id. at 260. Under those circumstances, we concluded:
If the judge were not free to address this conduct by complaining to law enforcement without fear of liability, the judge’s freedom of action in insuring the integrity of his or her decision-making process, and indeed, his or her decisions themselves, will be jeopardized. Any result which did not extend immunity to *629judges acting to protect the integrity of the judicial decision-making process would seriously undermine judicial independence, a cornerstone of a judge’s capacity to sit and decide cases.
Id. The entire focus of Barrett, then, is protection of the independent and fearless decision-making process.
Unlike the danger to Judge Harrington’s independent decision-making posed by Barrett’s threats, Brookings’ conduct in no way affected Clunk’s exercise of judicial independence in present or future cases. At most, Clunk acted to redress a falsification that perhaps affected the result in a' case that came before him and was concluded six or seven years previously. Clunk was not acting to protect himself from future action by a disgruntled former litigant, as was the case in Barrett. Even if he was acting to protect the integrity of the court when he filed the criminal charge against a former party in his court, his purpose does not transform his otherwise prosecutorial act into a judicial one. To transform this prosecutorial act into a judicial act and thus grant absolute judicial immunity would be contrary to the mandate that the applicability of absolute judicial immunity is determined by the functions it protects, most particularly that of independent judicial decision-making. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225, 108 S.Ct. 538.
Even if one accepts the majority’s premise that a judge’s duty to protect the integrity of the judicial system renders each act performed in the furtherance of that duty judicial in nature, one does not inevitably reach the conclusion that Clunk is entitled to absolute immunity in this case. The majority concludes that “[bjecause Judge Clunk had information indicating that Brookings had falsified his application for a marriage license ... he had a duty to report Brookings’ conduct to the proper authorities,” and his actions therefore constituted “a judicial act taken to protect the integrity of the judicial system.” Op. at 15. Unfortunately, as the majority’s own recitation of the facts makes clear, Brook-ings’ conduct had already been reported to the prosecuting authorities when Clunk filed the criminal complaint against him. Clunk was aware of this because the letter informing Clunk that Brookings had given false information in order to obtain a marriage license was also addressed to the Stark County Prosecuting Attorney. Op. at 2. Despite the knowledge of “proper authorities,” Clunk concluded that he himself should initiate the criminal proceedings against Brookings and thus went well beyond any duty to report. In doing so, he performed a purely prosecutorial act for which he is not entitled to the protection of absolute judicial immunity.
The majority offers one remaining reason to justify its conclusion that Clunk acted in his judicial capacity and is thus entitled to absolute immunity. The majority says that Clunk was acting in his judicial capacity when he filed the criminal complaint against Brookings because the complaint was based on Brookings’ dealings with him in his role as a probate judge, and not in his role as a private citizen. While Clunk may have acted in his official capacity when he filed the criminal complaint against Brookings, this does not mean that he was acting in his judicial capacity for purposes of the absolute immunity analysis when he did so. The absence of a personal stake in this matter does not render Clunk’s conduct judicial or dictate that the parties in this case were dealing with him in his judicial capacity. In fact, the parties were not dealing with Clunk at all at the time that he initiated the criminal complaint because there was no case involving Brookings currently pending before him. Moreover, as previously discussed, acting in an official capaci*630ty, taken alone, does not entitle a judge to judicial immunity.
Finally, the majority concludes that Clunk had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the underlying action in this case because “[a]s a probate judge ... he had [the] authority to issue a marriage license if he deemed it appropriate or to deny the license if he determined 'that there was a legal impediment.” Op. at 17. Acting in the absence of all jurisdiction deprives a judge of absolute immunity. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13, 112 S.Ct. 286. A judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction “only when the matter upon which he acts is clearly outside the subject matter of the court over which he presides.” Johnson, 125 F.3d at 334. The underlying action in this case is not the issuance of Brookings’ marriage license; the decision to issue a marriage license was made long ago. The underlying action is the criminal prosecution for falsification, and, as a probate judge, Clunk did not have jurisdiction over that action under any circumstances. See DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 785 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)) (“[A] criminal court judge would be immune from liability for convicting a defendant of a nonexistent crime, an act taken in excess of jurisdiction, whereas a probate court judge would not be immune for trying a criminal case, an act for which the probate judge clearly lacked all subject matter jurisdiction”). In support of its determination that Clunk had jurisdiction over the underlying action in this case, the majority once again notes Clunk’s “obligation to report potentially obstructive conduct to the proper authorities.” This view glosses over the posture of this case and assumes that Clunk’s duty to protect the integrity of the judicial system somehow has the effect of bringing criminal prosecutions under his jurisdiction.
In conclusion, I note that the Supreme Court has been “quite sparing” in its recognition of absolute immunity, Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, and with good reason. The decision to hold certain officials absolutely immune from liability for the performance of certain discretionary functions is not without cost. An official granted such immunity cannot be sued, even for acts of deliberate wrongdoing. This is a high price to pay for “a society that prides itself on subjecting even its highest officials to the restraints of law.” Forrester, 792 F.2d at 659 (Posner, J., dissenting). The availability of qualified immunity, a doctrine not mentioned by the majority, makes this unwarranted extension of the doctrine of absolute immunity as unnecessary as it is inappropriate. As judges, we must, be especially sensitive to the potential charge that we are extending judicial immunity beyond the protection other types of immunity give to “officials whose peculiar problems we know less well than our own.” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226, 108 S.Ct. 538. Absolute judicial immunity is justified only when the danger that a judge will be deflected from the performance of his function of deciding cases “fearlessly and independently” is very great. See id. at 230, 108 S.Ct. 538. No such danger, great or small, exists here.
For all the reasons stated above, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.