Court Opinion

ID: 9838062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 12:07:10.033089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:21.395923
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 31, 2023

                                   In The

                            Court of Appeals
                                  For The

                        First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                            NO. 01-22-00081-CV
                         ———————————
            JOHN P. GUILLORY AND PREIS PLC, Appellants
                                     V.
   HALLMARK SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, LESSLEY
  SERVICES, LLC, ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, and
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO
              POLICY NO. SCT 1011119, Appellees

                  On Appeal from the 151st District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 2021-33760

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Appellees Lessley Services, LLC, Hallmark Specialty Insurance Company,

ACE American Insurance Company, and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,

subscribing to Policy No. SCT 1011119 filed claims against Appellants John P.
Guillory and Preis PLC for legal malpractice stemming from their representation of

Lessley and ACE in an environmental cleanup case litigated in Louisiana state court.

Guillory and Preis PLC filed two special appearances, which the trial court denied.

In their sole issue, Guillory and Preis PLC contend the trial court erred in denying

their special appearances because they are not subject to specific jurisdiction in

Texas.

      We reverse the trial court’s orders denying Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s special

appearances and render judgment dismissing Appellees’ claims against Guillory and

Preis PLC.

                                      Background

      Appellee Lessley Services, LLC is a petroleum trucking company that

transports crude oil and other petroleum products for the oil and gas industry. It is

a Texas limited liability company with its principal office in Texas. Lessley does

business in Louisiana.1

      Blaise St. Clair works for SLLD Transport Company, LLC. In November

2019, he fell asleep for about four hours while transferring crude oil into his tanker

trailer from a storage tank located on property in Cameron Parish, Louisiana owned

1
      In its pleadings, Lessley Services, LLC states that its principal place of business is
      in “Texas” and the record reflects that Lessley has an office in “East Texas.”
      Although Hallmark Specialty Insurance Company’s pleading states that Lessley’s
      principal place of business is in Houston, Texas, the record does not support this
      assertion.

                                            2
by Domatti M.A. Management Trust. Lessley had leased the tanker trailer from

SLLD Transport. St. Clair reported the spill to Lessley who hired a containment and

remediation contractor to clean up the Domatti property in Louisiana.

      Lessley reported the incident to its primary commercial auto insurer, Appellee

ACE American Insurance Company. The insurance policy ACE issued to Lessley

provides $1,000,000 in coverage for bodily injury and property damage coverage.

Lessley also had two excess coverage insurance policies for bodily injury and

property damage claims, one issued by Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London,

subscribing to Policy Number SCT1011119 (“Underwriters”), and the other by

Hallmark Specialty Insurance Company.         The policy issued by Underwriters,

Lessley’s first-layer excess insurer, provided $2,000,000 in coverage for each

occurrence.   Hallmark, Lessley’s second-layer excess insurer, also provided

$2,000,000 in coverage for each occurrence.

                               Louisiana Lawsuit

      On February 10, 2020, Domatti filed suit against Lessley in the 38th Judicial

District Court for Cameron Parish, Louisiana for property damage caused by the oil

spill (“Louisiana Lawsuit”). Although ACE initially denied Lessley’s insurance

claim, ACE later accepted coverage and on May 5, 2020, ACE retained Appellants

Preis PLC and John P. Guillory to represent Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit. At

                                         3
some point in the litigation, Domatti also added St. Clair, SLLD Transport, and ACE

as defendants. Preis PLC and Guillory were retained to also represent ACE.

      Preis PLC, a Louisiana professional law corporation, has its main office in

Lafayette, Louisiana and a satellite office in Houston, Texas. Guillory, a Louisiana

resident, is an attorney with Preis PLC. He works in Preis PLC’s Lafayette,

Louisiana office and he is licensed to practice law in Louisiana and Texas. Neither

Guillory nor Preis PLC represented Lessley prior to the Louisiana Lawsuit.

      In November 2020, Guillory met with Lessley’s principals, Jimmy and Vivian

Lessley (the “Lessleys”), at Preis PLC’s Houston office to prepare them for their

depositions in the Louisiana Lawsuit. The depositions were scheduled to take place

the following day in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

      In March 2021, Guillory and Preis PLC, acting on behalf of ACE and Lessley,

entered into a Consent Judgment with Domatti and SLLD Transport. The Consent

Judgment stated that SLLD Transport had relinquished control of St. Clair to Lessley

when the spill occurred, and therefore, SLLD Transport was not vicariously liable

for any damages caused by St. Clair. The Consent Judgment further stated that

Lessley, as St. Clair’s “Special Employer,” was “solely liable for damages caused

by the alleged incident.”

      In April 2021, Guillory and Preis PLC, acting on behalf of ACE and Lessley,

entered into a Joint Stipulation with Domatti. Among other things, the Joint

                                         4
Stipulation stated that St. Clair, “an operator working in the course and scope of his

employment with Lessley,” fell asleep for four hours while pumping crude oil into

the tanker, “resulting in approximately 193 barrels of crude oil overflowing onto the

Domatti Property.”       The Joint Stipulation stated that ACE, Lessley’s insurer,

“originally wrongfully denied the claim.”

      In May 2021, the Louisiana Lawsuit proceeded to a jury trial in Cameron,

Louisiana. Guillory defended the claims on behalf of Lessley, ACE, and St. Clair.

The jury rendered a verdict of $4,751,594 against Lessley, ACE, and St. Clair,

jointly and severally.

                                   Texas Lawsuit

A.    Hallmark and Lessley

      1.     Pleadings

      In June 2021, Hallmark, Lessley’s second-layer excess insurer, filed an

Original Petition against Lessley, ACE, and Underwriters in Texas state court.

Hallmark sought a declaratory judgment against Lessley declaring it owed no duty

to indemnify Lessley “from or against liability sustained in the [Louisiana Lawsuit]”

or, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment against ACE and Underwriters

declaring “there is no coverage under the Hallmark Policy unless and until ACE and

Underwriters have each exhausted their policy limits under” their respective

policies.   Hallmark also asserted an equitable subrogation claim against ACE,

                                          5
alleging that “[t]o the extent Hallmark [was] found liable to Lessley,” it was “entitled

to equitable subrogation against ACE to the extent any such liability was caused by

ACE’s negligence or wrongful claim investigation, trial defense, [] failure to settle

. . . or negligent handling of the defense of Lessley” in the Louisiana Lawsuit.2

      In its First Amended Petition, Hallmark added Guillory and Preis PLC as

defendants.3 In addition to its claims against Lessley, ACE, and Underwriters,

Hallmark asserted a legal malpractice claim against Guillory and Preis PLC under

the doctrine of equitable subrogation “for [their] malpractice in handling [] the

defense of Lessley” in the Louisiana Lawsuit. According to Hallmark, Guillory and

Preis PLC committed legal malpractice by jointly defending Lessley and ACE in the

Louisiana Lawsuit despite a conflict of interest, failing to “adequately prepare for

trial,” failing to “file motions to limit Lessley’s liability,” and “most egregiously,

entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation.” Hallmark alleged that

2
      “Equitable subrogation ‘allows a party who would otherwise lack standing to step
      into the shoes of and pursue the claims belonging to a party with standing.’” Allstate
      Ins. Co. v. Spellings, 388 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
      pet. dism’d) (quoting Frymire Eng’g Co., Inc. ex rel. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jomar
      Int’l, Ltd., 259 S.W.3d 140, 142 (Tex. 2008)). “When equitable subrogation applies,
      ‘the insurer stands in the shoes of the insured, obtaining only those rights held by
      the insured against a third party, subject to any defenses held by the third party
      against the insured.’” Id. (quoting Mid–Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
      236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007)).
3
      Hallmark also named Edwin Preis, Jr., Guillory’s co-counsel, as a defendant. Edwin
      Preis, Jr. filed a special appearance, which the trial court granted. He is not a party
      to this appeal.

                                             6
but for the malpractice of Guillory and Preis PLC, “the amount of any judgment

against Lessley in the [Louisiana] Lawsuit would not have exceeded the combined

available limits of the ACE Policy and the Underwriters Policy.”

      In its First Amended Petition, Hallmark alleged Guillory is subject to specific

jurisdiction in Texas because:

      Guillory conducts business in Texas, and the claims in this action arise
      out of or relate to his purposeful contacts with Texas. Without
      limitation, Mr. Guillory engaged in acts and omissions in Houston,
      Texas, including meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Lessley, the principals of
      Lessley, in connection with his representation of Lessley in a lawsuit
      that is the subject of this lawsuit. Furthermore, Mr. Guillory has been
      licensed to practice law in Texas since 1992, is admitted to practice
      before all Texas state courts and the United States District Court for the
      Southern and Western Districts of Texas, and is an attorney with Preis
      PLC, which maintains an office in Houston, Texas.

Hallmark alleged Preis PLC is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas because:

      [Preis PLC] conducts business in Texas, and the claims in this action
      arise out of or relate to its purposeful contacts with Texas. Without
      limitation, Preis PLC maintains a law office in Houston, Texas, which
      was the situs of meeting(s) with Lessley where acts or omissions that
      are the subject of the claims in this lawsuit occurred, and employs
      several attorneys licensed to practice law in Texas.

      In October 2021, Lessley filed its Original Cross Claim against Guillory and

Preis PLC for legal malpractice.4 Lessley alleged that Guillory is subject to specific

jurisdiction in Texas because:

      [Guillory] conducts business in Texas, and the claims in this action
      arise out of or relate to his purposeful contacts with Texas. Without

4
      Lessley also named Edwin J. Preis, Jr. as a defendant.

                                           7
      limitation, Mr. Guillory engaged in acts and omissions in Houston,
      Texas, including meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Lessley, the principals of
      Lessley, in connection with his representation of Lessley in a lawsuit
      that is the subject, of this lawsuit. Furthermore, Mr. Guillory has been
      licensed to practice law in Texas since 1992, is admitted to practice
      before all Texas state courts, and the United States District Court for
      the Southern and Western Districts of Texas, and is an attorney with
      Preis PLC which maintains an office in Houston, Texas.

Lessley alleged Preis PLC is subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas because:

      [Preis PLC] conducts business in Texas, and the claims in this action
      arise out of or relate to its purposeful contacts with Texas. Without
      limitation, Preis PLC maintains a law office in Houston, Texas, which
      was the situs of meeting(s) with Lessley where acts or omissions that
      are the basis for the claims in this lawsuit occurred, and employs several
      attorneys licensed to practice law in Texas.

According to Lessley, Guillory and Preis PLC committed legal malpractice because

they provided “erroneous legal advice and/or failed to provide advice, opinions or

relevant information when legally obligated to do so, thereby breaching their duties

owed to Lessley.” Lessley alleged Guillory and Preis PLC breached their duty of

care to Lessley by:

         (a)    failing to provide notice to Lessley of Defense Counsels[’]
                conflict of interest in representing both Lessley and Ace;

         (b)    representing the interests of Ace above Lessley in the
                underlying lawsuit;

         (c)    entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation
                without providing any notice to Lessley or advising Lessley
                of the effect of the same;

         (d)    failing to timely file necessary motions to limit Lessley’s
                liability;

                                          8
           (e)     improperly preparing for and managing Lessley’s defense in
                   the underlying lawsuit;

           (f)     falling to seek an apportionment of liability among Ace and
                   Lessley in the underlying lawsuit; and

           (g)      failing to appeal the judgment.

Lessley also asserted that it was prejudiced by “a number of actions” Guillory took

“over the course of the defense” of the Louisiana Lawsuit. According to Lessley,

although Guillory attended the deposition of ACE’s corporate representative on

behalf of ACE, Guillory failed to “ask any questions or inquire as to how Ace's

actions negatively affected Lessley.” In addition to agreeing to “a verdict form that

placed responsibility for any verdict sums on all defendants rather than obtain a form

that apportioned fault between the defendants,” Guillory also failed to exclude

evidence at trial detrimental to Lessley.

      2.         Special Appearance

      Guillory and Preis PLC filed a special appearance contesting jurisdiction in

Texas. They argued Hallmark and Lessley had not pled facts establishing that

Guillory and Preis PLC had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of

conducting activities within Texas.         They also argued there is no substantial

connection between Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s Texas contacts and the operative

facts of the underlying litigation.

                                             9
      Guillory and Preis PLC argued that the “sum total” of their alleged contacts

with Texas consisted of Guillory’s Texas law license and Preis PLC “maintaining a

satellite office in Houston where Guillory met with Lessley to prepare for a

deposition in Louisiana.” According to Guillory and Preis PLC, none of these

contacts concern the operative facts of the litigation because all of the alleged

negligent conduct giving rise to the lawsuit occurred “in either Lafayette, Louisiana,

where Preis and Guillory exercised their professional judgment, or in the Underlying

Suit in Cameron Parish, Louisiana.”

      Among other evidence, Guillory and Preis PLC submitted affidavits from

Guillory and Edwin G. Preis, Jr.     Edwin Preis stated in his affidavit that, among

other things, he is the managing partner and founder of Preis PLC. According to

Edwin Preis, Preis PLC is a professional law corporation incorporated in Louisiana,

with its principal place of business in Lafayette, Louisiana. Preis PLC has a satellite

office in Houston, Texas. Edwin Preis and Guillory were Lessley’s and ACE’s

counsel of record in the Louisiana Lawsuit.

      In his affidavit, Guillory stated that he is a Louisiana resident licensed to

practice law in Louisiana and Texas. Guillory practices out of Preis PLC’s principal

office in Lafayette, Louisiana. Guillory stated that ACE retained Preis PLC to

represent ACE and Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit and he and Edwin Preis were

Lessley’s and ACE’s counsel of record. The claims in the Louisiana Litigation were

                                          10
tried to a jury and Guillory defended the claims on behalf of Lessley, ACE, and St.

Clair in Cameron Parish, Louisiana.

      Guillory further stated that he “met with Lessley’s principals, Mr. and Mrs.

Lessley on November 19, 2020, at Preis PLC’s satellite-office in Houston, for the

convenience of Mr. and Mrs. Lessley who live in Texas.” According to Guillory,

the “purpose of meeting with Lessley’s principals was to prepare them for their

deposition conducted on November 20, 2020 in Lake Charles, Louisiana.” Guillory

stated he did not give Lessley legal advice based on Texas law, represent Lessley

before any court in Texas, or represent Lessley in any other matter besides the

Louisiana Lawsuit.

      Lessley and Hallmark filed a response to Guillory and Preis PLC’s special

appearance. They argued “Guillory provided face-to-face legal advice to Lessley’s

principals[, Jimmy and Vivian Lessley] while physically present in the firm’s

Houston office, including by preparing Mr. and Mrs. Lessley for their crucial

depositions” in the Louisiana Lawsuit, and thus Guillory should have “reasonably

anticipate[d] being called into a Texas court to account for his malpractice in so

advising Lessley and in otherwise representing Lessley” in the Louisiana Lawsuit.

Hallmark and Lessley argued Guillory was subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas

because:

       •   Guillory engaged in “acts and omissions in Houston, Texas,
           including meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Lessley, the principals of
                                        11
            Lessley, in connection with his representation of Lessley” in the
            Louisiana Lawsuit.

       •    Guillory is licensed to practice in Texas and admitted to Texas
            state and federal courts.

       •    Guillory is a member in Preis PLC, which maintains a Houston
            office.

      Lessley and Hallmark further argued that during the November 2020 meeting

in Houston, Texas, “Guillory failed to spend the time necessary to adequately

prepare [the Lessleys] for their depositions” because Guillory “did not delve into the

relationship among St. Clair, SLLD, and Lessley” and when the Lessleys expressed

their belief that St. Clair and his employer SLLD Transport should bear some or all

of the liability for Domatti’s damages based on Lessley’s contract with SLLD

Transport, Guillory “dismissed it as unimportant.” They argued Guillory also failed

to “explore with Mr. and Mrs. Lessley the ramifications of his simultaneously

representing both Lessley and ACE in the Underlying Suit, including any potential

conflict of interest in such dual representation.”

      Hallmark and Lessley argued Guillory was subject to personal jurisdiction in

Texas because Hallmark and Lessley’s claims arise out of or relate to Guillory’s

“purposeful contacts with Texas.” And because Guillory is Preis PLC’s agent, they

further argued Guillory’s contacts should be imputed to Preis PLC for purposes of

establishing jurisdiction over Preis PLC.

                                            12
      In support of their opposition to Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s special

appearances, Lessley and Hallmark submitted an affidavit from Vivian Lessley. In

her affidavit, Vivian Lessley stated that she and her husband Jimmy Lessley are the

principals of Lessley and that ACE retained Guillory and Preis PLC to defend

Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit. She stated that Guillory contacted her and her

husband to prepare them for their depositions in the Louisiana Lawsuit. Guillory

gave them the option of meeting at Lessley’s office in East Texas or at Preis PLC’s

Houston office. The Lessleys chose to meet with Guillory at Preis PLC’s Houston

office.

      According to Vivian, the November 2020 meeting in Houston with Guillory

involved “perfunctory” preparation for her and her husband’s depositions in Lake

Charles, Louisiana, and discussion of other matters regarding the Louisiana Lawsuit.

Vivian stated that she and her husband told Guillory that “the plaintiffs’ property

was not suffering significant impact from any remaining crude oil,” but “Guillory

did not provide a substantive response to this point.” The Lessleys also discussed

with Guillory “the responsibility of Blaise St. Clair, the individual whose negligence

was directly responsible for the oil spill that led to the [Louisiana Lawsuit], and of

his employer SLLD Transport Company, LLC.” According to Vivian, she and her

husband discussed with Guillory their “belief that Mr. St. Clair and SLLD should

bear some if not all of the liability for the accident, including based on the contract

                                          13
between Lessley Services and SLLD, which [the Lessleys] showed to Mr. Guillory

at the meeting.” The Lessleys also “explained that Blaise St. Clair was employed

by SLLD, not by Lessley, but Mr. Guillory did not care about this fact.” Vivian also

stated that Guillory did not “take the time to discuss” with her and her husband “the

details of the relationships among Mr. St. Clair, SLLD, and Lessley, dismissing them

as unimportant,” and he was “dismissive” of the Lessleys’ “entreaties about holding

Mr. St. Clair and SLLD at least partly responsible for the accident.” Vivian stated

that based on “Guillory’s dismissive responses and his other interactions” with her

and her husband during their Houston meeting,” she and her husband “concluded

Mr. Guillory was not working to advance the interests of Lessley Services” in the

Louisiana Lawsuit and they “immediately” contacted their insurance broker “to

request that ACE provide Lessley Services with different counsel.” According to

Vivian, Guillory did not “explore with [Lessley] the ramification of his

simultaneously representing both Lessley and ACE in the Underlying Suit, including

any potential conflict of interest in such dual representation.” She further stated that

“[n]either Mr. Guillory, Mr. Preis, nor other lawyers of Preis PLC ever consulted my

husband or me before agreeing to the Consent Judgment” or met with the Lessleys

again before trial.

                                          14
      After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Guillory’s and Preis

PLC’s special appearance. Guillory and Preis appealed.5

B.    ACE and Underwriters

      During the pendency of this appeal, ACE and Underwriters also filed cross

claims against Guillory and Preis PLC.

      1.    Pleadings

      In its Original Cross Claim against Guillory and Preis PLC, ACE asserted

claims for legal malpractice, indemnity, and contribution stemming from Preis

PLC’s and Guillory’s representation of ACE and Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit.

ACE alleged that Guillory and Preis PLC committed legal malpractice by:

      (a)   Failing to inform ACE once a clear conflict of interest arose after
            entry of the Consent Judgment / Joint Stipulation.

      (b)   Entering into the Consent Judgment without ACE’s knowledge
            or approval.

      (c)   Entering into the Joint Stipulation without ACE’s knowledge or
            approval.

      (d)   Failing to properly prepare the ACE claim professional for his
            deposition.

      (e)   Failing to timely file necessary motions.

      (f)   Failing to adequately prepare for trial.

5
      Guillory and Preis PLC requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, but the
      trial court did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.

                                          15
      (g)    Generally, failing to adequately manage the defense in the
             [Louisiana Lawsuit], including keeping ACE reasonably
             informed.

      (h)    And other acts of negligence.

Relying on the trial court’s order denying Preis PLC’s and Guillory’s special

appearance, ACE alleged Guillory and Preis PLC were subject to specific

jurisdiction in Texas.

      In its Original Cross Claim, Underwriters also asserted claims for legal

malpractice against Guillory and Preis PLC, alleging it was “equitably subrogated

to Lessley’s rights for malpractice claims against” Guillory and Preis PLC.6

According to Underwriters, Preis PLC and Guillory committed legal malpractice

because, among other things, Preis PLC and Guillory “provided erroneous legal

advice and/or failed to provide advice, opinions or relevant information when legally

obligated to do so thereby breaching their duties owed to Lessley.” Underwriters

alleged that Guillory and Preis PLC committed legal malpractice by:

      (a)    failing to provide notice to Lessley of [Preis PLC’s and
             Guillory’s] conflict of interest in concurrently representing both
             Lessley and ACE;

      (b)    representing the interests of ACE above Lessley’s interests in the
             [Louisiana Lawsuit];

6
      Underwriters also filed crossclaims against ACE under the doctrine of equitable
      subrogation for ACE’s alleged failure “to properly investigate, defend, settle,
      protect, and indemnify Lessley in good faith for the [Louisiana Lawsuit]” and for
      breach of the Texas Insurance Code.

                                          16
      (c)    entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation without
             providing any notice to Lessley or advising Lessley of the effect
             of the same;

      (d)    failing to timely file necessary motions to limit Lessley’s
             liability;

      (e)    improperly preparing for and managing Lessley’s defense in the
             [Louisiana Lawsuit];

      (f)    failing to seek an apportionment of liability among ACE and
             Lessley in the [Louisiana Lawsuit]; and

      (g)    failing to appeal the excessive judgment rendered in the
             [Louisiana Lawsuit].

Like ACE, Underwriters relied on the trial court’s order denying Preis PLC’s and

Guillory’s special appearance to allege that Guillory and Preis PLC were subject to

specific jurisdiction in Texas.

      2.     Special Appearances

      Guillory and Preis PLC filed their second Special Appearance in response to

ACE’s and the Underwriters’ cross claims. Guillory and Preis PLC raised the same

arguments they advanced in their first Special Appearance against Hallmark and

Lessley.    The trial court denied Guillory and Preis PLC’s second Special

Appearance. Guillory and Preis PLC appealed from the denial of their second

special appearance. The two appeals were consolidated.

                                         17
                           Specific Personal Jurisdiction

      In their sole issue on appeal, Guillory and Preis PLC argue the trial court erred

in denying their special appearances because they are not subject to specific

jurisdiction in Texas.7

A.    Personal Jurisdiction

      A court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if

the Texas long-arm statute and due process requirements of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution are satisfied. See U.S. CONST. amend.

XIV, § 1; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042 (Texas long-arm statute); LG

Chem Am., Inc. v. Morgan, 670 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. 2023). The Texas long-arm

statute allows Texas courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant who is doing “business in this state” and “commits a tort in whole or in

part in this state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.042(2). Due process is

satisfied when the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the

7
      A defendant’s contacts with a forum state can give rise to either general or specific
      jurisdiction. See Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., ––– U.S. –
      –––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
      127 (2014). Appellees do not argue Guillory and Preis PLC are subject to general
      jurisdiction in Texas. Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127 (“[C]ourt[s] may assert general
      jurisdiction over [nonresident defendants] when [the defendant’s] affiliations with
      the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home
      in the forum State.”) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
      564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). The only question before us is whether Appellees
      established specific jurisdiction over Guillory and Preis PLC.

                                           18
forum state and the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant comports

with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See LG Chem Am., Inc.,

670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17

(1945)). A nonresident defendant’s minimum contacts with a forum are established

when the defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting

activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its

laws.” M & F Worldwide Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 512 S.W.3d 878,

886 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Moncrief Oil Intern. Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d

142, 150 (Tex. 2013)); Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., –––

U.S. –––, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024–25 (2021); see also LG Chem Am., Inc., 670 S.W.3d

at 346–47.

      The Texas Supreme Court has characterized the “purposeful availment”

requisite as the “touchstone of jurisdictional due process.” Michiana Easy Livin’

Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. 2005). There are three important

aspects of the purposefulavailment inquiry. Id. at 785. First, only the defendant’s

contacts with the forum state count. Id. This ensures that a defendant is not haled

into a jurisdiction solely by the unilateral activities of a third party. Id. Second, the

acts relied on must be purposeful; a defendant may not be haled into a jurisdiction

based solely on contacts that are “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Id. Third, a

defendant “must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by ‘availing’ itself of the

                                           19
jurisdiction.” Id. By “invoking the benefits and protections of a forum’s laws, a

nonresident consents to suit there.” Id.

      A defendant’s minimum contacts with a forum state can give rise to either

general or specific jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1024. General

jurisdiction arises when a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are so continuous

and systematic that the defendant is “essentially at home,” whereas specific

jurisdiction exists when the claims involved in the litigation relate to or arise from

the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state. Id.      Appellees do not

argue Guillory and Preis PLC are subject to general jurisdiction in Texas. Thus, the

only question before us is whether Appellees established specific personal

jurisdiction over Guillory and Preis PLC.

B.    Specific Jurisdiction

      Specific jurisdiction exists when the claims involved in the litigation relate to

or arise from the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Ford Motor

Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025; see LG Chem Am., Inc., 670 S.W.3d at 347. “This so-called

relatedness inquiry defines the appropriate ‘nexus between the nonresident

defendant, the litigation, and the forum.’” Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com,

LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg,

221 S.W.3d 569, 579 (Tex. 2007)). The plaintiff must demonstrate a “substantial

connection” between the defendant’s contacts and the operative facts of the

                                           20
litigation. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585).

The “substantial connection” standard is primarily concerned with whether the

defendant’s contacts will be “the focus of the trial,” “consume most if not all of the

litigation’s attention,” and are “related to the operative facts” of the underlying

claim. See TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 53 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Moki Mac,

221 S.W.3d at 585). “Specific jurisdiction must be established on a claim-by-claim

basis unless all the asserted claims arise from the same forum contacts.” M & F

Worldwide Corp., 512 S.W.3d at 886.

C.     Special Appearance

       A nonresident defendant may challenge a Texas court’s exercise of personal

jurisdiction over it by filing a special appearance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a. The plaintiff

and the defendant bear shifting burdens of proof in a challenge to personal

jurisdiction. See LG Chem Am., Inc., 670 S.W.3d at 346; Kelly v. Gen. Interior

Constr., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658–59 (Tex. 2010). The plaintiff bears the initial burden

of pleading allegations sufficient to bring a nonresident defendant within the

provisions of the Texas long-arm statute. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing

Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658). If the plaintiff meets its initial burden, the burden shifts

to the nonresident defendant to negate the plaintiff’s alleged bases for jurisdiction.

Id. The defendant can negate personal jurisdiction on either a factual or legal basis.

Id.   It can present evidence that contradicts the plaintiff’s factual allegations

                                          21
supporting the assertion of personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff can then respond

with its own evidence supporting its allegations. Id. Or the defendant can show that

even if the plaintiff’s alleged facts are true, the evidence is legally insufficient to

establish personal jurisdiction. Id.

      Trial courts determine a special appearance “on the basis of the pleadings, any

stipulations made by and between the parties, such affidavits and attachments as may

be filed by the parties, the results of discovery processes, and any oral testimony.”

TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(3); see Touradji v. Beach Cap. P’ship, L.P., 316 S.W.3d 15, 23

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“The plaintiff’s original pleadings

as well as its response to the defendant's special appearance can be considered in

determining whether the plaintiff satisfied its burden.”). Whether a trial court has

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is a question of law we review de

novo. LG Chem Am., Inc., 670 S.W.3d at 346.

D.    Analysis

      The jurisdictional facts in this case are undisputed. Specifically, the parties

do not dispute:

          • Guillory is a Louisiana resident who is licensed to practice law
            in Texas.

          • Guillory practices law from Preis PLC’s main office in Lafayette,
            Louisiana.

          • Preis PLC has an office in Houston, Texas.

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• ACE hired Preis PLC and Guillory to represent Lessley in the
  Louisiana Lawsuit.

• On November 19, 2020, Guillory met with the Lessleys in Preis
  PLC’s Houston office to prepare them for their depositions the
  following day in Lake Charles, Louisiana.

• Guillory proposed meeting with the Lessleys at Preis PLC’s
  Houston office or Lessley’s office in East Texas for the
  convenience of the Lessleys who reside in Texas.

• The Lessleys chose to meet with Guillory in Preis PLC’s
  Houston office, as opposed to its office in East Texas.

• In addition to preparing the Lessleys for their depositions,
  Guillory also discussed with them the Louisiana Lawsuit during
  the November 2020 meeting.

• During the November 2020 meeting, the Lessleys told Guillory
  that “the plaintiffs’ property was not suffering significant impact
  from any remaining crude oil,” and Guillory “did not provide a
  substantive response to this point.”

• During the November 2020 meeting, the Lessleys told Guillory
  the driver, St. Clair, and his employer, SLLD Transport
  Company, LLC, “should bear some if not all of the liability for
  the accident, including based on the contract between Lessley
  Services and SLLD,” the Lessleys showed Guillory the contract
  between Lessley and SLLD Transport Company, LLC, and they
  “explained that Blaise St. Clair was employed by SLLD, not by
  Lessley.”

• During the November 2020 meeting, Guillory did not discuss
  with the Lessleys “the details of the relationships among Mr. St.
  Clair, SLLD, and Lessley, dismissing them as unimportant.”

• During the November 2020 meeting, Guillory did not discuss
  with the Lessleys “the ramifications of his simultaneously
  representing both Lessley and ACE in the [Louisiana Lawsuit],

                               23
              including any potential conflict of interest in such dual
              representation.”

           • “Neither Mr. Guillory, Mr. [Edwin] Preis, nor other lawyers of
             Preis PLC ever consulted my husband or me before agreeing to
             the Consent Judgment.”

           • Guillory did not solicit Lessley’s business.

           • Guillory has never represented Lessley before a Texas court or
             in a Texas legal proceeding.

           • Guillory has never represented Lessley in any matter other than
             the Louisiana Lawsuit.

           • Guillory “performed no legal services on behalf of Lessley in or
             from the State of Texas,” aside from the deposition preparation
             meeting in Houston in November 2020.

           • The legal work Guillory performed on Lessley’s behalf pertained
             exclusively to the Louisiana Lawsuit.

           • Guillory “did not give Lessley legal advice based on Texas law.”

Guillory and Preis PLC argue these alleged contacts do not support the trial court’s

exercise of specific jurisdiction over Guillory, and by implication, Preis PLC,

because Guillory did not avail himself of the privilege of practicing law in Texas

and there is not a substantial connection between Guillory’s Texas contacts and the

operative facts of Lessley’s legal malpractice claims.

      1.      Guillory’s Contacts with Texas

      Lessley and Hallmark argue that Guillory purposefully availed himself of the

privilege of practicing law in Texas because Guillory is licensed to practice law in

                                          24
Texas, and he “provided face-to-face legal advice to his Texas-based client while

physically present in his firm’s Houston office, and Lessley is suing him based on

that advice (among other errors and omissions).”

      Purposeful availment is the “touchstone of jurisdictional due process.”

Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, 168 S.W.3d at 784; see also State v. Volkswagen

Aktiengesellschaft, 669 S.W.3d 399, 413 (Tex. 2023).           Courts employ three

guidelines when determining whether a nonresident defendant has availed himself

of the privilege of conducting activities in Texas: (1) we consider only the

nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum, (2) the contacts must be purposeful

as opposed to “random, fortuitous, or attenuated,” and (3) the nonresident defendant

must have sought “some benefit, advantage[,] or profit by availing itself of [Texas’]

jurisdiction,” thus, consenting to suit in Texas. See Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413

(quoting Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc., 414 S.W.3d at 151).

      The fact that Lessley, Guillory’s client, has its principal place of business in

Texas is not relevant with respect to whether Guillory purposefully availed himself

of the privilege of practicing law in Texas because the focus of the purposeful

availment analysis is on Guillory’s contacts with Texas, not Lessley’s contacts. See

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413 (stating defendant’s contacts with forum are only

relevant contacts with respect to purposeful availment); see generally Walden v.

Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014) (stating minimum contacts “looks to the defendant’s

                                         25
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who

reside there”). We further note that while Lessley is located in Texas, it is undisputed

that Guillory did not solicit Lessley’s business in Texas. Rather, ACE hired Preis

PLC and Guillory to represent Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit.

      Similarly, Preis PLC’s decision to maintain a satellite office in Houston,

Texas is irrelevant with respect to our purposeful availment analysis because we may

consider only Guillory’s contacts with Texas, not his law firm’s contacts. See

Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413 (stating defendant’s contacts with forum are only

relevant contacts with respect to purposeful availment). Moreover, while Preis PLC

has an office in Houston, Texas, the parties do not dispute that Guillory practices out

of the law firm’s Lafayette, Louisiana office and it is undisputed that Guillory was

not practicing Texas law or advising Lessley regarding Texas law when he met with

the Lessleys in Houston in November 2020. Thus, Guillory’s only Texas contacts

relevant to our specific jurisdiction inquiry are his physical presence in Texas in

November 2020 to prepare the Lessleys for their deposition in Louisiana, and the

fact he is licensed to practice law in Texas. See Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413.

      Even assuming Guillory’s limited contacts were “purposeful rather than

random, fortuitous, isolated, or attenuated” and that Guillory sought some “benefit,

advantage, or profit” by availing himself of the privileges and benefits of Texas’

jurisdiction, Texas may exercise specific jurisdiction over Guillory only if Lessley’s

                                          26
legal malpractice claims relate to or arise from the Guillory’s contacts with Texas.

See Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025; LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347. We

conclude they do not.

      2.     Substantial Connection

      Specific jurisdiction exists when the claims involved in the litigation relate to

or arise from the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state. See Ford

Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1025; LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347. In other words,

there must be a “substantial connection” between Guillory’s Texas contacts and the

operative facts of the litigation. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Moki Mac,

221 S.W.3d at 585). The “substantial connection” standard is primarily concerned

with whether the defendant’s contacts will be “the focus of the trial,” “consume most

if not all of the litigation’s attention,” and are “related to the operative facts” of the

underlying claim. See TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 53 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d

at 585).

             (a)    Lessley’s and Hallmark’s Legal Malpractice Claims

      The acts and omissions upon which Lessley’s legal malpractice claims against

Guillory are based, and Hallmark’s corresponding subrogation claim, span the

course of Guillory’s yearlong representation of Lessley in the Louisiana Lawsuit,

and encompass far more than what allegedly transpired at Guillory’s one-day

meeting with the Lessleys in Houston, Texas in November 2020.

                                           27
      Lessley alleged in its pleading that Guillory committed legal malpractice by

“provid[ing] erroneous legal advice and/or fail[ing] to provide advice, opinions or

relevant information.” Specifically, Lessley alleged Guillory committed legal

malpractice through the following seven acts or omissions:

      (a)    failing to provide notice to Lessley of [Guillory’s and Preis
             PLC’s] conflict of interest in representing both Lessley and Ace;

      (b)    representing the interests of Ace above Lessley in the underlying
             lawsuit;

      (c)    entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation without
             providing any notice to Lessley or advising Lessley of the effect
             of the same;

      (d)    failing to timely file necessary motions to limit Lessley’s
             liability;

      (e)    improperly preparing for and managing Lessley’s defense in the
             underlying lawsuit;

      (f)    falling to seek an apportionment of liability among Ace and
             Lessley in the underlying lawsuit; and

      (g)    failing to appeal the judgment.

Lessley also alleged that Guillory attended the deposition of ACE’s corporate

representative in Chicago, Illinois on behalf of ACE, not Lessley, and Guillory “did

not ask any questions or inquire as to how Ace’s actions negatively affected Lessley”

during the April 2021 deposition. In addition to agreeing to “a verdict form that

placed responsibility for any verdict sums on all defendants rather than obtain a form

                                         28
that apportioned fault between the defendants,” Guillory also failed to exclude

evidence detrimental to Lessley at the May 2021 trial in Louisiana.

      In its pleading, Hallmark asserted a legal malpractice claim against Guillory

and Preis PLC under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Hallmark alleged

Guillory committed legal malpractice by jointly defending Lessley and ACE in the

Louisiana Lawsuit despite a conflict of interest, failing to “adequately prepare for

trial,” failing to “file motions to limit Lessley’s liability,” and “most egregiously,

entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation.”

      Many of Guillory’s alleged acts and omissions constituting legal malpractice

occurred after the November 2020 meeting in Houston, including (1) entering into

the Consent Judgment in April 2021 without notifying Lessley, (2) entering into the

Joint Stipulation in May 2021 without notifying Lessley, (3) attending the April

2021 deposition of ACE’s corporate representative in Chicago, Illinois on behalf of

ACE and leaving Lessley without representation at the deposition, (4) failing to

exclude evidence detrimental to Lessley during the May 2021 trial in Louisiana,

(5) agreeing to a verdict form that did not apportion fault between the defendants,

including ACE and Lessley, and (6) failing to appeal the final judgment in the

Louisiana Lawsuit. Except for the deposition of ACE’s corporate representative,

which occurred in Chicago, Illinois, all of these acts and omission, as well as

Guillory’s failure to timely file necessary motions to limit Lessley’s liability,

                                         29
occurred in Lafayette, Louisiana where Guillory practices law, or in Cameron Parish,

Louisiana where the Louisiana Lawsuit was tried to a jury. None of the acts or

omissions bear any significant relation to the November 2020 meeting in Houston,

Texas.

      Lessley and Hallmark argue that the legal malpractice claims against Guillory

are substantially connected with the November 2020 meeting in Houston because

during the meeting (1) Guillory failed to inform the Lessleys of the ramifications of

his representation of both Lessley and ACE in the Louisiana Lawsuit, including any

potential conflict of interest, (2) Guillory placed ACE’s interests above Lessley’s

interests in the Louisiana Lawsuit, and (3) Guillory improperly prepared and

managed Lessley’s defense in the Louisiana Lawsuit by, among other things,

insufficiently preparing the Lessleys for their depositions the day after the meeting.

These are the only acts and omissions Lessley and Hallmark argue occurred during

the November 2020 meeting.

      Aside from the claim Guillory failed to prepare the Lessleys for their

depositions adequately, none of these alleged acts or omissions are exclusive to the

November 2020 meeting. Even if Guillory failed to inform the Lessleys of the risks

associated with his dual representation of Lessley and ACE at the meeting,

Guillory’s ongoing obligation to do so arose when ACE retained Guillory to

represent ACE in the Louisiana Lawsuit prior to the November 2020 meeting, and

                                         30
his obligation continued thereafter. Similarly, Guillory’s alleged deficient

preparation and management of Lessley’s defense, and his prioritizing of ACE’s

interests over Lessley’s interests in the Louisiana Lawsuit also occurred before and

after the Houston meeting. While one instance of these three acts or omissions

allegedly occurred during the meeting, the bulk of these acts or omissions would

have primarily occurred in Lafayette, Louisiana where Guillory practices law and in

Cameron Parish, Louisiana where the Louisiana Lawsuit was tried to a jury.

      Thus, the overwhelming majority of the events giving rise to Lessley’s legal

malpractice claims and Hallmark’s corresponding subrogation claim based on the

same alleged contacts bear little significant relation to the November 2020 meeting

in Houston. This includes the two acts Hallmark contends were Guillory’s most

egregious: entering into the Consent Judgment and Joint Stipulation without

notifying Lessley and obtaining Lessley’s consent. Furthermore, it is undisputed

that Guillory “did not give Lessley legal advice based on Texas law” at any time

during the course of Guillory’s representation of Lessley, including during the

November 2020 meeting, and none of the operative facts of the legal malpractice

claims involve Guillory’s use of his Texas law license.

      Guillory’s only contacts with Texas—his Texas law license and the

November 2020 Houston meeting where he allegedly committed some acts and

omissions underlying Lessley’s legal malpractice claims and Hallmark’s

                                        31
subrogation claim—will not be “the focus of the trial” on these legal claims, nor will

they “consume most if not all of the litigation’s attention.” There is thus no

“substantial connection between [Guillory’s] contacts [with Texas] and the operative

facts of the litigation.” TV Azteca, 490 S.W.3d at 52 (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d

at 585); see also Volkswagen, 669 S.W.3d at 413 (holding specific jurisdiction

involves “claim-by-claim” analysis focusing on “the relationship between the

defendant, the forum state, and the operative facts of the litigation”).8

      Because Guillory’s purposeful contacts with Texas are not substantially

connected to the operative facts of Lessley’s legal malpractice claims and

Hallmark’s corresponding subrogation claim—and the trial court’s jurisdiction over

Preis PLC is dependent upon the trial court having personal jurisdiction over

Guillory—the trial court erred in denying Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s first special

appearances, as set forth in the trial court’s February 1, 2022 order.

8
      The nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum must also be “related to the
      operative facts” of the underlying claim. See TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 53
      (Tex. 2016) (quoting Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585
      (Tex. 2007)). While the November 2020 Houston meeting is “related to operative
      facts” because some of Guillory’s acts and omissions allegedly occurred during the
      meeting, this factor alone does not establish a substantial connection between
      Guillory’s contacts and the malpractice claims against him because Guillory’s
      contacts are neither “the focus of the trial” on Lessley’s, Hallmark’s, and
      Underwriters’ legal malpractice claims, nor will they “consume most if not all of
      the litigation’s attention.”

                                          32
             (b)    ACE’s and Underwriters’ Legal Malpractice Claims

      Underwriters and ACE relied on the trial court’s February 1, 2022 order

denying Preis PLC’s and Guillory’s first special appearance with respect to

Lessley’s and Hallmark’s claims to allege that Guillory and Preis PLC were subject

to specific jurisdiction in Texas. Because the trial court erred by denying Preis

PLC’s and Guillory’s first special appearance, Preis PLC and Guillory have likewise

met their burden to negate Underwriters’ and ACE’s alleged bases for personal

jurisdiction. LG Chem Am., 670 S.W.3d at 346 (citing Kelly, 301 S.W.3d at 658).

Because Preis PLC and Guillory negated Underwriters’ and ACE’s alleged bases for

jurisdiction, the trial court erred by denying Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s second

special appearance with respect to Underwriters’ and ACE’s legal malpractice

claims as set forth in the trial court’s April 8, 2022 order.

                                           33
                                   Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s February 1, 2022 order denying Guillory’s and

Preis PLC’s special appearances and we render judgment dismissing Hallmark’s and

Lessley’s claims against Guillory and Preis PLC. We also reverse the trial court’s

April 8, 2022 order denying Guillory’s and Preis PLC’s special appearances and we

render judgment dismissing Underwriters’ and ACE’s claims against Guillory and

Preis PLC.

                                             Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

                                        34