Court Opinion

ID: 9778485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:08:08.256245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:10.152367
License: Public Domain

*1051Justice COATS,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I agree that the defendant would not be entitled to the addresses he seeks, even if they were the addresses of prosecution witnesses being offered against him at trial, I concur in the majority's conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in dissolving its protective order. For that very reason, however, I consider wholly gratuitous, and I therefore decline to join, the majority's dicta concerning the scope of a capital defendant's right to discovery in post-conviction proceedings.
We have previously held that notwithstanding a criminal defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses presented against him at trial, his right to discover their addresses must be tempered by consideration for their safety. See People v. Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 22, 25 (Colo.1997); People v. Thurman, 787 P2d 646, 653 (Colo.1990); People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist. Court, 177 Colo. 429, 432, 494 P.2d 841, 843 (1972). Although placing a witness in his surroundings is long-acknowledged to be of some significance for cross-examination, a witness's address is not inherently exculpatory, and its materiality, or relevance, under the cireum-stances of any particular case must therefore be weighed against the grounds for anticipating that disclosure will endanger his safety. We have found a defendant entitled to witness addresses on the basis of such a balane-ing, however, only against the backdrop of an existing constitutional right to the confrontation of adverse witnesses. See Thurman, 787 P.2d at 655.
Today, this court is faced with a vastly different problem, involving a defendant's demand for addresses, not in furtherance of confronting the witnesses being offered against him but as an aid to the development of a case of his own. In the context of a defendant's right to exercise subpoena powers, we have previously, and quite recently, made clear that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case and, more specifically, that the right to confrontation is a trial right-not a constitutionally compelled rule of pre-trial discovery. See People v. Baltazar, 241 P.3d 941, 943-44 (Colo.2010); People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d 662, 670 (Colo.2010). As the majority notes, various federal courts have found eriminal defendants in post-conviction proceedings not even constitutionally entitled to be present and personally confront the witnesses against them. See Oken v. Warden, MSP, 233 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir.2000) (collecting authorities). As the majority also acknowledges, however, under the cireumstances of this case we need not, and expressly do not, address the applicability of the defendant's constitutional right to confront. Maj. op. at 1048 n.7.
The majority disapproves of the trial court's order under the facts of this case, where the defendant has been convicted of the capital murder of one witness, shooting another witness five times, and threatening still others not to testify, simply because he has not demonstrated sufficient need to overcome the threat to witness safety and satisfy the balancing test of our Sixth Amendment confrontation jurisprudence. Where the balance of need and danger could not support disclosure under this standard, it is not only unnecessary to determine whether the defendant's constitutional right of confrontation is applicable to post-conviction proceedings. Unless the defendant could be entitled to an even more favorable standard for disclosure, which neither the majority nor the defendant suggests to be the case, it is also unnecessary to decide precisely what standard should apply. The salient point is that the defendant cannot be entitled to disclosure under these cireumstances, even if he in fact has a constitutional right to confront. Without any explanation or attempt at justification, however, the majority simply announces that "(tlhe framework of these personal safety cases has continuing applicability in the context of post-conviction review of a death sentence." Maj. op. at 1049.
Were the prosecution in possession of constitutionally material exculpatory evidence, it would of course be obligated to disclose that evidence to the defense. See People v. Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 1079, 1081-82 (Colo.1989); of. Crim. P. 16(M(a)(2); 82.1(d)(5). And unless the prosecution could demonstrate a compelling interest in non-disclosure, it would be obligated to disclose even constitu*1052tionally immaterial exculpatory evidence. See Rodriguez, 786 P.2d at 1082. However, no one suggests that the witness addresses demanded here are themselves exculpatory. Similarly, although the criminal rules in this jurisdiction permit discretionary orders of disclosure where reasonable, even assuming those provisions apply with equal force to capital post-conviction proceedings, see Crim. P. 32.2(b)(8)(III), they authorize nondisclosure for reasons other than the risk of physical harm, including such things as the risk of intimidation, bribery, economic reprisals, or even unnecessary annoyance or embarrassment. See Crim. P. The majority, however, offers no justification, constitutional or otherwise, for its capital-post-conviction-proceedings-personal-safety balancing test.
Because the majority concludes that the defendant would not be entitled to the addresses in question, even if the Confrontation Clause were to extend to post-trial defense investigations, I consider the majority's announcement of a special capital post-convietion standard to be unnecessary dicta. To the extent the majority opinion could be read not only to prohibit disclosure where considerations of witness safety outweigh the defendant's need but also to imply that disclosure of witness addresses is required except where considerations of witness safety are sufficiently weighty, I disagree.
Because I nevertheless agree with what I consider to be the holding of the case-that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure of the witnesses' addresses under these cireumstances-I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice EID join in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.