Court Opinion

ID: 9653590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:49:28.549343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:00.212738
License: Public Domain

AKIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that this court lacks jurisdiction to review an order of the domestic relations court removing the mother as managing conservator and appointing the father temporary managing conservator. In my view, we have jurisdiction under Tex.Family Code Ann. §§ 11.11(b), 11.19 (Vernon 1975). Neither do I agree that the order prohibiting the mother from visiting with the children cannot be reviewed because even if we lack jurisdiction of the order changing custody, we still have jurisdiction of that part of the order denying the mother visitation rights under Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat.Ann. art. 4662 (Vernon 1952). In my view, these questions are separate and distinct, and, consequently, the answer to one does not determine our jurisdiction of the other. Accordingly, I must dissent.
*512With respect to the order terminating the mother as managing conservator and appointing the father temporary conservator, we have jurisdiction under section 11.11(b) which provides: “Temporary orders under this section are governed by the rales governing temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions in civil cases generally.” [Emphasis added.] Temporary injunctions in civil eases are appealable under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4662 (Vernon 1952) and the procedure for such appeals is set forth in Tex.R.Civ.P. 385. As I read this statute, it makes all of the rules, whether procedural, substantive, or statutory, governing temporary injunctions applicable to temporary orders within the ambit of section 11.11 of the Texas Family Code. Consequently, an order changing custody, even though designated as “temporary”, is also appealable. In Interest of Stuart, 544 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In my view, had the legislature intended the contrary view, it would have used the language “Rules of Civil Procedure” instead of just “rules.” The word “rules” is used in its broadest sense so that temporary orders under the family code are governed by all of the rules afforded temporary injunctions, including the right to appeal. Consequently, I do not regard Johnson v. Parish, 547 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ) as correctly decided and, thus, not sound authority for the majority’s view. In that case, the court correctly recognized that appealability turned on a construction of section 11.11(b), but narrowly construed the word “rules” to be limited to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure as opposed to the broad construction used by the Tyler Court of Civil Appeals in Stuart.
Neither do I regard as authoritative the holding of the Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals in Carpenter v. Ross, 534 S.W.2d 447, 448 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1976, no writ), also cited by the majority, that a temporary child custody order was not ap-pealable under section 11.19(b)(2). In arriving at its conclusion, that court set forth no basis for its holding nor did it even quote or discuss the language of the statute. Similarly, in Knipe v. Colpitts, 551 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, no writ) that court did not discuss the basis for its conclusion that an order denying visitation is not appealable nor did that court refer to any specific section of the Texas Family Code, but instead merely cited Carpenter v. Ross, supra, and Johnson v. Parish, supra.
The majority has interpreted the phrase “rule governing temporary injunctions” as pertaining only to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to notices, hearings, recital of the reasons for immediate action and the general rules of equity. I cannot accept this interpretation. Had the legislature intended this interpretation, it could have accomplished it by omitting the words “and temporary injunctions” since the interpretation given this section by the majority is accomplished by the use of the words “temporary restraining orders.” Under the majority’s construction, the language “and temporary injunctions” is rendered meaningless. It can only be given meaning by reading it to include the right to appeal afforded temporary injunctions by article 4662. Of course, under the rules of statutory construction every word is presumed to have some meaning or otherwise the legislature would not have used the words. E. g., Robertson v. State, 406 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
The majority’s primary reason for holding this order not appealable is that section 11.19 entitled “appeal” does not specifically state that all temporary orders are appeala-ble. I cannot agree that such a statement in section 11.19 is necessary since section 11.19 provides:
(a) Appeals from orders, decrees, or judgments entered in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, when a1-lowed under this section or under other provisions of law, shall be as in civil cases generally.
(b) An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit affecting the parent-child relationship from an order, decree, or judgment:
*513(1) entered under Chapter 13 of this code;
(2) entered under Chapter 14 of this code appointing or refusing to appoint a managing conservator; appointing or refusing to appoint a pos-sessory conservator; ordering or refusing to order payments for support of a child; or modifying any such order previously entered;
(3) entered under Chapter 15 of this code terminating or refusing to terminate the parent-child relationship; or appointing a managing conservator;
(4) entered under Chapter 16 of this code granting or refusing an adoption. [Emphasis added]
As I read the language, as used in (a), “when allowed under this section or under other provisions of law,” it permits an appeal from orders set forth in section 11.-19(b), such as the order here modifying a previously entered order granting managing conservatorship to the mother, and “under other provisions of law.” The latter phrase, of course, would include section 11.-11(b) pertaining to temporary orders and article 4662. Furthermore, the legislature chose not to use the words “permanent” and “final” or any other words of limitation in section 11.19. By its express terms, section 11.19 does not limit appeal only to final orders with respect to appointments of managing or possessory conservators. This legislative intent is even clearer when sections 11.19 and 11.11(b) are read together.
Consequently, I cannot accept the majority’s construction that section 11.19 merely codifies the law as it existed prior to the adoption of the Texas Family Code. In arriving at this conclusion, the majority correctly notes that section 11.19(b) makes specific references to Chapter 13, concerning legitimation; to Chapter 14, concerning conservatorship, possession, and support; to Chapter 15, concerning termination of parental rights; and to Chapter 16, concerning adoptions. Then the majority notes that final orders under those chapters would be appealable without regard to section 11.19(b) under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2249 (Vernon 1971) and concludes that section 11.19 was intended to be a comprehensive provision for appeals under the Code independent of other general statutes defining appellate jurisdiction. In arriving at its conclusion, the majority fails to give effect or meaning to subdivision (a) of section 11.19, upon which I predicate this dissent.
Furthermore, although the majority takes note of the mother’s contention that Chapter 17, pertaining to emergency suits for protection of a child, is not specifically mentioned in section 11.19 and section 17.07 provides that an appeal from an order under that chapter does not stay the order, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that an order under Chapter 17 is, nevertheless, “final” in the sense that it is for an indefinite duration. I find no language in Chapter 17 justifying that conclusion. Indeed, section 17.05 provides that if the child is not restored to its parent, guardian, or conservator, the court shall order such restoration of possession or direct that a new suit affecting the parent-child relationship be filed. Thus, under Chapter 17, the court’s order is necessarily temporary if a new suit affecting the parent-child relationship must be filed and can only be final if the child is restored to the parent. The fact that section 17.07 mentions an appeal from any order entered pursuant to Chapter 17 and is not specifically mentioned in section 11.19(b) reinforces my construction of sections 11.19(a) and 11.11(b) and negates the conclusion of the majority that temporary orders are not appealable under section 11.-19 because they are not specifically referred to as such by name. Moreover, section 17.-02 gives the state authority to act under section 11.11 as an alternative to Chapter 17. Indeed, it would be illogical to say that if the state chose to use section 11.11, the order would not be appealable, but if it chose to use Chapter 17, an appeal would be permitted.
I see no logical reason for ascribing to the legislature an intent to place a limitation on section 11.11(b) and construe it as not per*514mitting an appeal as in temporary injunctions. Under the holding of the majority, no provision is made to enforce section 11.-11(b) if a trial court refused to follow the rules pertaining to temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions because if these orders are not appealable, any complaint becomes moot when the matter is finally adjudicated on the merits. Thus, no relief is afforded an aggrieved party when a trial court ignores the mandate of section 11.11(b).
In addition to the clear language of sections 11.11 and 11.19, it appears to me that the better policy is to permit such appeals in these situations since a child’s life or welfare may be adversely affected even by a temporary order granting custody or denying visitation. Indeed, such orders may last for a period of many months, such as the order here, which was rendered in July of 1978 with final hearing scheduled in January of 1979. Even this trial date may be postponed due to the press of the trial dockets in this jurisdiction. Thus, even years may pass before a final determination is made and, in effect, the “temporary” order may indeed be a permanent order insofar as the child and parent adversely affected are concerned. In this regard, the underlying principle of the family code is that which is best for the child. Since temporary custody affects a substantial right with respect to the child’s best interest, I believe the legislature intended to change the common law and to make such temporary custody orders appealable. See Gordon v. Gordon, 33 Ohio App.2d 257, 294 N.E.2d 239, 241 (Ct.App.1973).
With respect to the appealability of that part of the order denying the mother the right of visitation, that order is appealable under the Texas Family Code, supra, and was appealable under case law prior to the adoption of the Texas Family Code. In Janelli v. Bond, 148 Tex. 416, 225 S.W.2d 824, 826-27 (1950), our supreme court held that a temporary injunction in a divorce case is appealable under article 4662 just as is any other injunction. Thus, apart from the clear language of section 11.11(b), read in conjunction with section 11.19(a), that part of the trial court’s order denying visitation right was appealable even prior to the adoption of the Texas Family Code.
In conclusion, since this court has jurisdiction of both the order removing the mother as permanent managing conservator and naming the father temporary managing conservator and the order denying the mother the right to visit her children during the pendency of the final hearing, I dissent from the order dismissing this appeal and adhere to the original opinion of this court.