Court Opinion

ID: 9534444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:39:54.575101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:40.253728
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(dissenting) — In this personal injury action arising out of a rear-end automobile collision, the plaintiff sought judgment in the sum of $38,100. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,550. The trial judge thought the verdict should have been $1,000 more and, upon the defendant’s refusal to pay the judge’s “verdict,” a new trial was granted. The court gave as its reason for setting aside the jury verdict, “Í don't think the jury gave any consideration or any allowance whatsoever for pain and suffering.” (Italics mine.)
This conclusion was pure conjecture. There was no request for special interrogatories to be answered by the jury, and the verdict for plaintiff was simply in the total sum of $1,550. I am of the opinion that the jury award constituted full payment to plaintiff for damage to the automobile, doctor and medical expenses, and pain and suffering, which could reasonably be attributable to this accident.
*743(1) The evidence disclosed that the impact was slight. The plaintiff testified that she stopped her automobile, with the motor running, preparatory to making a left turn on a busy arterial street in Seattle, and that the rear bumper of her vehicle was struck by defendant’s truck, which moved her automobile forward 3 feet. Her testimony relative to the force of the impact was contradictory in several material details, both in her pretrial deposition and in her testimony at the time of trial.
A disinterested witness testified that the impact was so slight he did not believe the plaintiff’s car had been moved forward any appreciable distance, and that “It moved, probably, both vehicles, I mean, her forward and him probably backward a little, I don’t know, but there was a distance after the impact between the two cars.”
The defendant testified he did not believe he had struck her automobile any more than a nudge.
The plaintiff did not complain of any physical injury immediately after the accident, and appeared to be “entirely normal” to disinterested witnesses. She contended only that there was a dent in the rear bumper resulting from this accident. She purchased either a new bumper or a replated one for $75 or $85. She did not remember the exact cost because she lost the repair bill.
The jury could have found that, as a result of this slight impact, only a fractional part of the neck and back injuries of which she complained was attributable to the accident.
(2) Deducting the $85 repair bill from the jury award, the sum of $1,465 was allowed for medical expense, and pain and suffering. In allowing this sum, the jury followed instruction No. 17, which provided in part:
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of liability, you must then fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate her for damages proved by the evidence to have been proximately caused by the accident. (Italics mine.)
The medical evidence clearly established that plaintiff had been suffering from a serious arthritic condition for more than 10 years prior to this accident. Both doctors *744testified that her arthritic condition did not result from this impact.
The plaintiff was an extremely nervous person. This nervous condition likewise was concededly not the result of this accident. For this condition, her own doctor had sent her to a psychiatrist because he felt that some of her complaints were psychosomatic.
Her total medical expense was $1,068.72. Applying instruction No. 17 to these facts, the jury could well have found that only a fraction of these medical expenses was attributable to or proximately resulted from this slight impact.
The trial judge and the majority of this court have considered the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff. This is not the rule when a jury verdict is being vacated.
The amount of damages is within the discretion of the jury, under proper instructions. It is only when the record unmistakably establishes passion and prejudice on the part of the jury that a trial court or a court of appellate review can vacate the jury’s determination. Guy v. Northwest Bible College, 64 Wn.2d 116, 390 P.2d 708 (1964); Teig v. St. John’s Hospital, 63 Wn.2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963); Malstrom v. Holland, 62 Wn.2d 732, 384 P.2d 613 (1963); Helman v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 62 Wn.2d 136, 381 P.2d 605 (1963).
When this jury’s verdict is given the evidentiary inferences to which it is entitled, the award of $1,550 “reasonably and fairly compensate [s] her for damages proved by the evidence to have been proximately caused by the accident.”
I do not find a scintilla of evidence in this record which establishes passion and prejudice on the part of the jury in reaching this verdict. Nor has the trial court or the majority of this court pointed to any such evidence.
In my opinion, the trial court, in increasing the verdict $1,000, was simply substituting its judgment for that of the jury and, in so doing, invaded the province of the jury. There is no statutory authority for granting a new trial *745when the court’s “verdict” in a jury trial is not acceptable to a litigant.
The order granting a new trial should be reversed, and the cause remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury.