Court Opinion

ID: 9832810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:13:02.416038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:53.138453
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants filed a vigorous motion for rehearing, and we certified to the Supreme Cotirt certain questions as follows:
(1) Is the two-year statute of limitation a bar, in this case, to all items of expense accruing and paid for prior to two years before the filing of the suit?
(2) Should the item of $106.97 be added to the price for which the property was sold, and appellee awarded one-eighth thereof?
(3) Where the facts showed that, during some eight years subsequent to the death of Mrs. Sargeant, the income from the property exceeded the expenses thereon by more than $2,000, and the property was shown to be a business homestead, and, in the absence of any specific language in the Constitution or in any statute making such income the separate property of the plaintiff, and in view of the fact that there was no proof in the record that such excess was absolutely necessary to the support of the survivor (a) was such income the separate property of B. F. Sargeant; (b) was such excess the separate property of B. F. Sargeant?
(4) Are the principles of equity to be applied in deciding this case, or are merely questions of law involved?
The Supreme Court answered that the item of $106.97, taxes due on the property taken in part payment for the rooming house occupied by B. F. Sargeant and his wife, prior to his wife’s death, and thereafter by B. P. Sargeant, should not be considered as subject to partition; that said $106.97 were taxes due on the property taken in part payment, and said amount was necessary to make the property of the value of $20,000, at which it was taken by the appellants.
Question No. 3 was answered as follows: Under the various provisions-of our Constitution and the statutes of this state, all revenues, rents, and income derived from the homestead, as such, are the separate and individual property of the survivor, and that without any reference whatever to whether the same is rented out either in whole or in part by the survivor, or used by him in a business of his own. Under the plain provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this state, no other meaning is possible than to vest the survivor with all income of every character derived from the homestead so long as the homestead rights shall exist, as his separate and individual property. As to the item of $3,264.32, being the note paid by appellant, that siich item was a proper charge against, the community estate, and the survivor, having paid all of same out of his separate funds, should be reimbursed by the heirs of the wife for one-half thereof. The survivor was also personally liable for the payment of same. That the appellant, Ben P. 'Sargeant, had no right to charge the heirs of the deceased wife with expenses incurred by him in making ordinary repairs and paying current taxes on the one-half interest on the property. That the survivor should not be reimbursed for such taxes and expenses for upkeep.
Question No. 2 is answered “No”; question No. 3, both (a) and (b), are answered “Tes.”
Therefore, in obedience to the ánswer of the Supreme Court, we hold that the appellee, Mary Louise Sargeant, is not entitled to any part of the $106.97, paid to the purchaser of the homestead as accrued taxes on the piece of property taken in part payment at the valuation of $20,000. We further hold that the expenses incurred for the upkeep of the homestead during the time subsequent to Mrs. Sargeant’s death should be charged against said Ben P. Sargeant; that the excess ■ of revenue over the upkeep, including taxes during said period, should be set apart to Ben P. Sargeant; that the appellee should be charged with one-eighth of the amount of the note for $3,264.32, paid by Sargeant after his wife’s death, said item of indebtedness accruing prior to his wife’s death.
Therefore appellee, Mary Louise Sargeant, is properly chargeable with- one-eighth of $106.97 and one-eighth of $3,264.32, making a total of $421.41, which should be deducted from the amount awarded the appellee by the trial court, which judgment was affirmed by this court. •
The facts show that the receiver paid, under orders of the court, five items, consisting of taxes due on the property, to the city of Port Worth, and to the countyand state, aggregating $1,709.61. Under the answers of the Supreme Court, such taxes should have been paid by B. P. Sargeant. No objection *386was made by appelleé in the court below as to her being charged with one-eighth of this amount, and- there is. no assignment of error in the record presenting this question. • Under this state of-facts, have we the authority in reviewing the judgment below and here rendering such judgment as the facts and the law justify? Can we consider the question as to whether or not appellee should be relieved of one-eighth of this amount?
Rule 23, of the Rules for Courts of Civil Appeals, reads as follows:
“Said record should contain an assignment of error as required by the statute. If it does n'ot the Court will not consider any error but one of law that may be apparent from the record, if the judgment is one that could legally have been rendered in the lower court, and affirmed in the appellate court.”
The question involved is whether or not the mistake of the trial court in charging appellee with one-eighth of the amount of taxes paid, which the Supreme Court has held should have been paid by B. F. 'Sargeant, constitutes fundamental error.
In Searcy v. Grant, 90 Tex. 97, 37 S. W. 320,' 322, cited in Mills v. Mills, 265 S. W. 142, by the Commission of Appeals and approved by the Supreme Court, the court said:
“An error, not assigned, of which the Court of Civil Appeals may take cognizance, must be an error of law apparent on the record which necessarily affected the result, and it must plainly appear from the record that, in the absence of such error, the result might have.been different.”
In Foster v. Spearman Equity Exchange, 266 S. W. 583, 586, by the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, it is said:
“A fundamental error is one that is apparent of record; such error, as being readily seen, lies at the base and foundation of the proceedings, and affects the judgment necessarily. Oar v. Davis, 105 Tex. 484, 151 S. W. 794, and authorities therein cited.”
In Carroll v. Evansville Brewing Ass’n, 179 S. W. 1099,1100, by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, it is said:
“Notwithstanding the unequivocal terms of the written contract declared on and the foregoing findings of fact, the court concluded, as a matter of law, that said contract was not in violation of the anti-trust laws of this state. In so concluding we think the court erred and that such error and the rendition of the judgment, as a result thereof, is ‘an error in law apparent on the face of the record.’ ”
See Gibson v. Bierce (Tex. Civ. App.) 146 S. W. 983, 987, reversed by the Supreme Court in 108 Tex. .62, 184 S. W. 502, 1 A. L. R. 1675, but the Supreme Court's decision did not disturb this holding. The court said:
“We do not think, however, that the judgment rendered herein was a proper one, and that it should be in part reversed and remanded. What we deem to be of controlling effect in this case is not called to our attention in any manner by the plaintiffs in error. We think, however, that there is error in the judgment, apparent upon the face of the record, which is the determining question, and upon which the very right and justice of this case depends, and we deem it our duty to take cognizance of this error, though not assigned or presented in any manner. Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272, 60 S. W. 242; Harris v. Petty, 66 Tex. 514, 1 S. W. 525; Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S. W. 533, 124 S. W. 85; Coburne v. Poe, 40 Tex. 410; City of San Antonio v. Talerico, 98 Tex. 151, 81 S. W. 518; Adams v. Faircloth [Tex. Civ. App.] 97 S. W. 507; Bexar, etc., v. Newman [Tex. Civ. App.] ,25 S. W. 461; Hahl v. Kellogg, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 636, 94 S. W. 389.” .
AVe conclude that the failure of the trial court to adjudge the amount of taxes paid by the receiver against B. F. Sargeant alone was error apparent of record. Therefore Mary Louise Sargeant, appellee, should be relieved of the one-eighth of said amount adjudged against her. The amount of taxes as before stated was $1,709.61. But only $1,081.60 was adjudged against the estate before partition. One-eighth of this amount is $135.20, which should be deducted from $441.21, leaving a balance of $306.01.
The judgment in favor of appellee is therefore reduced in the amount of $306.01, and the judgment so reformed is affirmed.
The motion for rehearing is granted in part and overruled in part. The costs of this appeal are adjudged against appellee.