Court Opinion

ID: 9642617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:04:25.018985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:57.797325
License: Public Domain

Prescott, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
The issue here involved is a narrow one, and, in my opinion, the Court has decided the case on a theory that has no application to the facts. The Court has reversed the trial court and held that although “[i]n the grantor index, however, there was a clerical mistake” (using the language of the majority concerning a fact admitted by the appellant) in indexing the right-of-way in dispute, the right-of-way was, nevertheless, covered by a certificate of title that provided, “[t]his certificate does not cover * * * easements * * * not properly evidenced by the public land records and not properly indicated by general indices at the date hereof”; and that the corporation issuing the certificate of title was liable for negligence in the performance of its contract. (Emphasis partly added.) It seems to me that we do not reach the question of negligence in the performance of the contract, but all that need be decided is whether or not the language employed in the certificate and quoted above excluded the right-of-way from the operation and effect of the certificate. If it did, the appellee is not liable; if it did not, the appellee is answerable for the breach of its contract, not for negligence. The trial judge held that the right-of-way was specifically excluded by the above language, and that he had no authority to add to, nor detract from, the contract made by the parties. The counsel for the appellee, an able and experienced lawyer, frankly conceded that if the right-of-way were not excluded from the coverage of the certificate by the quoted portion, his client was liable; consequently, it was only necessary to decide the one question: Was the right-of-way covered by the certificate or not?
As stated above, there is no issue of negligence or standard of care properly involved in the determination of this case. Every lawyer knows, as stated by the majority, that one who undertakes to examine a title for compensation is bound to *640exercise a reasonable degree of skill and diligence in the performance of his work; however this applies to cases where a lawyer or an abstracting company undertakes to search a title and furnishes a certificate of title, and the question in dispute is within the scope of the investigation by the abstracter as defined by the agreement of the parties. If there be specific exclusions in the certificate and the question involved is whether or not the unreported instrument comes within the purview of the exclusions, the issue is simply a construction of the agreement between the parties, and no question of negligence or degree of skill and diligence enters into the matter. The question is solely whether the abstracter performed his contract, or not. As stated in 1 C. J. S., Abstracts of Title, sec. 11, the liability of an abstracter is “measured by the nature, extent and terms of his undertaking or employment and he cannot be held liable for failing to do more than his agreement calls for.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also 1 Am. Jur. Abstracts of Title, sec. 17; Anno. 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449.
Let us now see whether or not the abstracter complied with the terms of its agreement. The majority admit “there was a clerical mistake” in the grantor index;1 a fact conceded by the appellant. The certificate stated that “according to the records as indexed in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court * * * the title * * * is considered good in fee simple” in the appellants, “[sjubject, however, to [certain liens not here pertinent] * * * and to such further limitations as are indicated herein.” The crucial limitation followed, and is: “This certificate does not cover * * * easements * * * not properly evidenced by the public land records and not properly indicated by general indices at the date hereof.” (All emphasis supplied.)
I think a fair and reasonable construction to be afforded this limitation is that the certificate did not purport to cover any easement unless it was both properly recorded and prop*641erly indexed in the general indices2 as of the date of the certificate. According to Funk & Wagnails New Standard Dictionary, (1952), the word indicate means to point out, and its modifier properly means “in a proper manner; with propriety, appropriateness or fitness; suitably; justly; rightly; exactly; correctly.” If we accept any of these definitions of properly (and the parties are entitled to make their own contract, without the Court making one for them by giving an unusual and strained interpretation to words), we see that “properly indicated” means “properly pointed out”; “appropriately or fitly pointed out; exactly pointed out; or correctly pointed out.” This makes the Court’s ruling difficult to reconcile with the conceded and acknowledged mistake in the general grantor index. However, the majority attempt to justify their holding by stating: “But in some contexts at least, the word [properly] may import an adequacy to accomplish the purpose intended, without nice distinctions as to the correct form of the entries.” Is this the proper test to be applied in construing the certificate ?3 The Court cites no authority for such a test, but says to compare the case of Jones v. Danforth, (1904), 98 N. W. 668, (Neb.). That case involved a statute that prescribed that in taking an appeal an appellant must file his transcript and have the same “properly docketed.” The Court stated that the appellant could not have a case “properly docketed” in the sense that he could compel the clerk to make the entries in proper form, and simply held that the “intention of the statutes must certainly be to require the appellant to do everything incumbent upon him to do, so that case may be properly docketed, and when he has done that he has done his part.” This seems to be poor authority—if, indeed, it be any authority at all—to justify a ruling that changes the ordinary and generally ac*642cepted meaning of terms of a contract, as well as the dictionary definitions of those terms.
The Court states that the case of Crook v. Chilvers, (1916), 157 N. W. 617, (Neb.), is the “closest case on the facts” that it has found. In that case there were no exclusionary limitations whatsoever. The abstracter certified that he was rendering “a full and complete abstract of all instruments on record or on file in the office of the register of deeds.” The ■register was required to keep general grantor and grantee indices and a numerical index. The abstracter relied upon the numerical index alone, and did not report a mortgage shown on the grantor index, for which he was held liable. While the case has little, if any, analogy to the case at bar because there were no exclusionary limitations in the certificate, the Court specifically points out (at page 619) that the abstracter could have limited his search to the numerical index alone, provided the certificate had so stated.
A case much closer in point is that of Thomas v. Carson, (Neb.), 65 N. W. 899. The suit was brought to recover on an abstracter’s bond. The certificate contained limitations. The Court held that the relation between abstracter and employer was “purely contractual”; that the abstracter’s “liability is measured by his employment”; and, in order for the plaintiff to recover, it was necessary to show “that the act of omission or commission alleged as the cause thereof is a breach of the conditions * * * of the particular engagement to which it relates.” Similar rulings or statements were made in the following cases: American Trust Invest. Co. v. Nashville Abstract Co., (Tenn.), 39 S. W. 877; Abstract & Title Guaranty Co. v. Kigin, (Ala.), 108 So. 626; McVeigh v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., (Ark.), 132 S. W. 638; Lee Lumber Co. v. Hetherwick Title Co., (La.), 107 So. 772; Wakefield v. Chowan, (Minn.), 4 N. W. 618; Chase v. Heany, 70 Ill. 268; Hillock v. Idaho Title & Trust Co., (Idaho), 126 P. 612. In the last case, the Court, after pointing out that an abstracter’s liability is measured by the terms of the certificate, stated: “The certificate annexed thereto [to the abstract] may be of such a nature that it would at*643tach little or no liability to the abstract company and be of as (sic) little use to the one who applied for it * *
For the reasons assigned above, I think the trial judge was correct in holding that the parties, by their agreement, had specifically excluded the error of the clerk from the responsibility of the abstracter, and that he had no right to make a contract for them; consequently he should be affirmed. In addition, I believe the decision of the Court renders it very difficult for abstracters to determine for what mistakes of the clerks they are to be held liable, and the ones for which they are not to be held responsible.

. Anyone who has had the least experience in, searching titles knows that this is the important index.

. It will be noticed this word is plural. The appellee concedes that had the mistake been in the grantee index, it would have been immaterial.

. Restatement does not so state. Rest., Contracts, sec. 235(a). Williston does not. 3 Williston, Contracts, (Rev. Ed.), sec. 618. And this Court has never before so stated.