Court Opinion

ID: 9682707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:15:03.835342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:40.791008
License: Public Domain

BURDOCK, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the court’s finding in regard to appellant’s first ground of error concerning the application of the rule of remoteness of a prior conviction used for impeachment purposes in cases where a defendant has been previously tried and is then awarded a new trial by an appellate court.
The majority opinion correctly states that the rule of remoteness of a prior criminal conviction for impeachment of a witness is governed by a ten year limitation. This rule has been firmly established by case law. McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) and Penix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
However, it is my opinion that the application of a rigid ten year limitation does not apply when the case tried is the result of the defendant being awarded a new trial pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. arts. 40.08, 44.29 (Vernon 1979).
In the instant case, appellant was first tried in 1980. At that time .appellant could attack the credibility of the State’s witness, Tolliver, because he had only been released *850from the penitentiary on his last conviction 8 or 9 years prior to the date of the trial. Appellant appealed his 1980 conviction which resulted in a reversal by a higher court. His second trial for the same offense did not take place until 1982. By 1982, approximately 11 years had passed since Tolliver had been released from the penitentiary.
Since the second trial occurred after a ten year lapse from the witness Tolliver’s release from prison, I believe the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit appellant’s attorney to impeach the State’s witness with the same conviction that could have been used in the 1980 trial.
Article 44.29 states:
Where the court of Criminal Appeals awards a new trial to the defendant, the cause shall stand as it would have stood in case the new trial had been granted by the court below.
Article 40.08 states in part:
The effect of a new trial is to place the cause in the same position in which it was before any trial had taken place .... (Emphasis supplied.)
Here the rigid application of the 10 year limitation rule of remoteness worked to deprive the appellant of a new trial under the terms prescribed by law.
Fundamental fairness would dictate that the appellant should not have to choose between his right of appeal under the law and the preservation of the. impeachment evidence of an important State’s witness.
I believe the trial court abused its discretion and for the reasons set forth above, I would reverse this case for yet another trial and permit the appellant to use the latest conviction for impeachment purposes.