Court Opinion

ID: 9385645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 18:00:57.407211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.571077
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60349         Document: 00516704720             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                      April 7, 2023
                                        No. 22-60349
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                           Clerk

   Robert Chambers,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Officer Kenneth Short, individually and in his official capacity,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-58

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Officer Kenneth Short brings an interlocutory appeal of the denial of
   his motion for summary judgment. He contends that qualified immunity
   (“QI”) precludes Robert Chambers’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of excessive
   force arising from an incident in which Chambers’s femur was broken after a
   traffic stop. We dismiss the appeal in part for want of jurisdiction, affirm the
   denial of summary judgment to the extent it asks the legal question, and

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60349      Document: 00516704720           Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                     No. 22-60349

   remand for further proceedings.
                                          I.
          The parties provide disparate accountings of the facts. According to
   Chambers, who was then seventy years old, he and his friend, Anthony
   Thornton, were “hanging out” at a gas station when several police officers,
   including Short, approached them. Short told Chambers and Thornton that
   both needed to leave the premises. Without seeing Short, Chambers replied,
   “yes, ma’am,” alleging that he did not realize Short was a man and that he
   had a “higher-pitched, feminine sounding voice.” Thornton posits that
   Short became upset after this misunderstanding. Thornton and Chambers
   then left, and as Thornton was walking away, he saw Chambers driving from
   the gas station with a police car following him.
          Shortly afterward, Thornton arrived at the block where he and Cham-
   bers lived, about half a mile from the gas station, and saw approximately five
   police cars near Chambers’s house. Multiple other neighbors came out of
   their homes to observe the fracas. Chambers was sitting in his car, parked in
   his carport. Short was standing next to the driver’s side door. Chambers
   made no moves to flee, assault an officer, or otherwise resist Short or the
   other nearby officers.
          According to all the neighbors, Thornton, and Chambers, Short
   opened the car door, lifted Chambers, and slammed him into the concrete
   driveway, causing injury. Next, an officer handcuffed Chambers while he
   was on the ground. Several officers gathered for a brief discussion, after
   which one approached Chambers, who was still lying on the ground, and
   according to Thornton, ordered Chambers to get up. Chambers could not do
   so because of his injury. The officers instead carried Chambers, placed him
   into a police car, and drove him to the police precinct. An ambulance then
   took him to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with a broken femur.

                                          2
Case: 22-60349      Document: 00516704720          Page: 3   Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                    No. 22-60349

   Chambers contends that he is now permanently handicapped and continues
   to experience extreme pain and difficulty walking.
          In contrast to Chambers’s account, Short alleges that he and the other
   officers noticed several persons drinking and smoking marihuana at the gas
   station, including a “heavily intoxicated” Chambers. Short avers that he
   instructed Chambers not to drive home, and Chambers agreed, got out of his
   vehicle, and locked his car before walking away. Short then continued his
   patrol and only minutes later witnessed Chambers driving. He then alleges
   that he turned on his lights and attempted to make a traffic stop. Chambers
   did not comply and drove off.
          Short followed Chambers to Chambers’s home. On arrival, Chambers
   exited his vehicle and attempted to flee. The officer ordered Chambers to
   stop, but Chambers ignored these orders. Unfortunately for Chambers, he
   fell while trying to escape and injured himself. Short then put Chambers,
   who smelled of alcohol, in handcuffs, informed him he was under arrest, and
   called for a DUI officer. While the DUI officer was en route, Chambers com-
   plained of pain but refused medical assistance.
          The DUI officer took Chambers into his custody, and eventually, after
   he was transported to the police precinct, Chambers was sent to the hospital.
   At the hospital, Short issued Chambers four traffic citations for “(1) Failure
   to Yield for blue lights and sirens; (2) Driving with an expired or no driver’s
   license; (3) Driving on the wrong side of the road; and (4) No Insurance.”
   As Short was leaving, Chambers apologized to him and said, “I’m sorry man
   I should have listen [sic] to you. I shouldn’t have done that. I’m sorry.”
          No breathalyzer test was performed on Chambers. According to
   Short, the DUI officer said no breathalyzer was performed because “the test
   is not performed when someone is in pain.” At the hospital, Chambers’s
   alcohol level on arrival was “somewhat elevated at 136,” and the hospital

                                         3
Case: 22-60349       Document: 00516704720             Page: 4      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                        No. 22-60349

   diagnosed him with a right femur fracture.
          Chambers sued Short under § 1983, alleging that the officer had vio-
   lated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force. Short moved
   for summary judgment based on QI. The district court denied Short’s
   motion, reasoning that Chambers had offered sufficient evidence to create a
   genuine fact dispute regarding whether Short’s conduct was objectively
   unreasonable. Short appeals the denial of summary judgment.

                                             II.
           A denial of summary judgment based on QI is “immediately appeala-
   ble to the extent that the appeal turns on a question of law.” 1 Cooper v. Brown,
   844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016). Such denials are reviewed de novo. See Orr
   v. Copeland, 844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016).
          When considering an appeal of this nature, “we can review the mate-
   riality of any factual disputes, but not their genuineness.” Wagner v. Bay City,
   227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000). “[W]e review the complaint and record
   to determine whether, assuming that all of [the plaintiff’s] factual assertions
   are true, those facts are materially sufficient to establish that defendants
   acted in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Id. “We have no jurisdiction
   to hear an interlocutory appeal . . . when a district court’s denial of qualified
   immunity rests on the basis that genuine [disputes] of material fact exist.”
   Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir. 2005). In sum, our “review
   is limited to evaluating only the legal significance of the undisputed facts.”
   Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 2018).

          1
             The district court is required to draw facts and inferences in the light most
   favorable to the nonmoving party. Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 193–94 (5th Cir.
   2002) (per curiam). Here, that is Chambers.

                                              4
Case: 22-60349        Document: 00516704720              Page: 5       Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                         No. 22-60349

                                               III.
           Short purports that we have jurisdiction because of the district court’s
   characterization of Chambers’s alleged drunk driving. The officer contends
   that Chambers’s intoxication was indisputably established by “uncontra-
   dicted and unimpeached testimony.” Accordingly, he asks us to assess the
   district court’s determination that this fact was in dispute.
           The officer’s contention is colorable. Chambers never directly con-
   tradicts that he was intoxicated at any point in his sworn testimony or by
   pointing to other evidence. Instead, Chambers primarily relies on the fact
   that neither Short nor the DUI officer performed a breathalyzer test as proof
   that he was not intoxicated. Furthermore, the hospital’s laboratory results
   showing that Chambers had an elevated alcohol level is some evidence that
   he was indeed drunk. 2 Still, when the facts and inferences are construed in
   the light most favorable to Chambers, the court was entitled to hold that there
   was a factual dispute over the issue of Chambers’s purported intoxication.
           Thus, because the district court expressly concluded that “Chambers
   offer[ed] summary judgment evidence sufficient to create a genuine fact [dis-
   pute] as to whether Short’s conduct . . . was objectively unreasonable in light
   of clearly established law,” we lack jurisdiction over Short’s arguments on
   this point. See Michalik, 422 F.3d at 257. 3

           2
              That being said, no party submitted testimony or evidence explaining the lab
   results, the units of measurement, or any confounding variables the court should be aware
   of, so we put little weight on the results.
           3
             In support of his theory that we do have jurisdiction, Short directs us to Orr, in
   which we addressed whether a video is required to determine a lack of a factual dispute.
   844 F.3d at 490–91. Orr did not address Wagner. In any case, even if Orr conflicts with
   Wagner, we must follow the earlier decision. See H&D Tire & Auto.-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney
   Bowes Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2000) (“When panel opinions appear to conflict, we
   are bound to follow the earlier opinion.”).

                                                5
Case: 22-60349        Document: 00516704720          Page: 6    Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                      No. 22-60349

          Short also submits a legal question: Whether slamming an allegedly
   intoxicated driver to the ground to execute an arrest constitutes excessive
   force. Although Short’s contentions as to this point are predicated on dis-
   puted facts, we have jurisdiction to consider this legal question. See Cooper,
   844 F.3d at 522.
          When a police officer invokes QI, the summary judgment burden of
   proof shifts to the plaintiff to show that the officer is not entitled to immunity.
   Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, we still
   “view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw
   all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 164
   (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). When deciding whether the defendant is enti-
   tled to QI, we determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a
   constitutional right” and “whether that right was clearly established at the
   time of the incident.” Orr, 844 F.3d at 492 (cleaned up).
          First, Chambers posits that Short used excessive force by slamming
   him into the ground. “To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must
   show: (1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that
   was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unrea-
   sonable.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 751 (5th Cir. 2005). The
   excessive-force calculus is fact-intensive, and our review is informed by the
   Graham factors: “[T]he severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
   poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
   he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham
   v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
          Chambers has sufficiently demonstrated an excessive-force claim
   when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to him. First, there is no

                                           6
Case: 22-60349        Document: 00516704720             Page: 7      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                         No. 22-60349

   dispute that Chambers suffered a broken femur because of Short’s actions. 4
   Second, there is little indication that Chambers could have reasonably been
   viewed as a threat to any officers or other persons, at least based on the facts
   as found in genuine dispute by the district court. 5 Nor, according to those
   facts, did Chambers attempt to flee or resist Short. The use of force was
   clearly excessive and unreasonable.
           Even if we assume Chambers was intoxicated and modify our review
   to reflect the seriousness of a DUI offense, the answer does not change. In
   Cooper, we determined that it was objectively unreasonable for an officer to
   allow a police dog to attack a suspected drunk driver when the driver did not
   attempt to flee or resist, and the officer had no reason to believe the driver
   posed a threat. 844 F.3d at 522–24. The present case is quite similar.
           In Cooper, the court concluded that the first Graham factor—the
   severity of the crime—weighed in favor of the police because the offense
   involved a DUI. Id. at 522. Turning to the second factor, the court stated,
   “[n]o reasonable officer could conclude that Cooper posed an immediate
   threat.” Id. He “was not suspected of committing a violent offense,” and
   there was no indication he “might be violent.” Id. Moreover, the officers
   “could see [his] hands and knew he had no weapon.” Id. at 522–23. Only
   one officer was in pursuit of Cooper, and only that officer testified to being
   able to see Cooper’s hands. Finally, as to the third Graham factor, the court

           4
             See Tarver, 410 F.3d at 752 (“Tarver’s summary judgment evidence adequately
   establishes that his injuries that day were caused solely by the conduct of Officer Bubela
   rather than from a preexisting condition or an action of a third party.”).
           5
             We disagree with the officer’s contention that Chambers was a risk to other
   motorists. Chambers was not resisting arrest or behaving aggressively, and his car was
   surrounded by approximately five police cars. See Cooper, 844 F.3d at 522–23. Moreover,
   Chambers was parked in his carport and could not have driven forward without crashing
   into his own home.

                                               7
Case: 22-60349        Document: 00516704720             Page: 8      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                         No. 22-60349

   noted that although “Cooper was not actively resisting arrest or attempting
   to flee or to strike [the police dog biting him],” the officer “subjected Cooper
   to a lengthy dog attack that inflicted serious injuries, even though [the officer]
   had no reason to believe that Cooper posed a threat, and without first
   attempting to negotiate.” Id. at 523.
           Though the first Graham factor favored the police officer in Cooper,
   that court concluded that “the other factors push heavily for Cooper,” id.
   at 522, and, accordingly, determined that “[t]he undisputed facts establish
   that Brown’s use of force was objectively unreasonable,” id. at 524. The
   similarities between Cooper and the instant case support our conclusion.
           Therefore, even if we assume Chambers was intoxicated, the Graham
   factors as a whole weigh in his favor, such that if a jury found the facts as set
   out by Chambers’s side, the use of force was a constitutional violation. 6
           We therefore turn to the second prong and consider whether Cham-
   bers’s constitutional right was clearly established when he was injured. To
   establish this prong, “we must be able to point to controlling authority . . .
   that defines the contours of the right in question with a high degree of particu-
   larity.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
   “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have
   placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v.
   al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
           Chambers’s right was clearly established. “Our caselaw makes cer-
   tain that once an arrestee stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can

           6
             It is worth noting that Chambers was not charged with DUI. Instead, he was
   issued citations for “(1) Failure to Yield for blue lights and sirens; (2) Driving with an
   expired or no driver’s license; (3) Driving on the wrong side of the road; and (4) No
   Insurance.” These citations were all dismissed or remanded.

                                               8
Case: 22-60349         Document: 00516704720               Page: 9       Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                           No. 22-60349

   employ is reduced.” 7 Cooper, 844 F.3d at 524. Like the plaintiff in Cooper,
   when construing the facts in Chambers’s favor, he was not attempting to
   resist arrest or flee at the time of the confrontation. And during the alter-
   cation in the driveway, Short had no reason to believe that Chambers posed
   an immediate threat.
           Short attempts to compare his case to Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308
   (5th Cir. 2016). There, an officer conducted a traffic stop after Griggs ran a
   red light. The officer smelled alcohol and attempted to arrest Griggs midway
   through a field sobriety test. Griggs refused to comply with orders and
   lurched to the side, forcing the officer to place Griggs in a chokehold and
   body-slam him to the ground. On those facts, our court ruled that the offi-
   cer’s conduct was not constitutionally unreasonable, and he was protected
   by QI. Id. at 313–14, 316.
           The comparison is inapt. Although Griggs concerned a motorist who
   was pulled over for suspected intoxication, the motorist displayed “erratic
   behavior” and overtly resisted during the arrest. Id. at 316. Additionally, the
   motorist was actually arrested for DUI, which is not the case here.
           So Griggs is not sufficiently similar: At no point do undisputed facts
   show that Chambers resisted arrest when pulled over. Nor do they indicate
   that he was a threat to Short’s or others’ safety when in his carport. Finally,
   Short did not even arrest Chambers for DUI.
           Accordingly, the second prong is also satisfied, and, assessing solely
   the legal question and not the genuineness of the dispute, the district court
   did not err in denying QI.

           7
             See also Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding it was unrea-
   sonable for an arresting officer to slam the plaintiff’s head into a vehicle when the plaintiff
   was not resisting arrest or fleeing).

                                                 9
Case: 22-60349       Document: 00516704720        Page: 10   Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                   No. 22-60349

          Based on the foregoing, we DISMISS Short’s appeal in part for lack
   of jurisdiction as to the factual issues and AFFIRM in part the order denying
   summary judgment on QI. The case is REMANDED for further proceed-
   ings as needed.

                                        10