Court Opinion

ID: 8309987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-17 13:47:06.256677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:44:41.390992
License: Public Domain

Hughes, J.
I am now to pass upon the question of constructive notice as affecting the state of Virginia. I refer to my opinion delivered on the original hearing of this cause on October, 6, 1882, filed in the papers of the cause, and reported in 4 Hughes, 545; S. 0. ante, 6UÜ, as showing the grounds on which I held that Alexandria was bound to deliver 3,500 shares of tlie canal stock in all, 2,000 in addition to those formerly deposited, to the United States. It will be seen that one of the questions at issue in that litigation was whether Alexandria, by depositing all the stock which she owned on the third of March, 1837, and at the time of the deposit, had not fully complied with the requirements of the statute ? This was a pretension strongly supported by the fact that the secretary of treasury, by not having demanded a deposit of more than 1,500 shares, had seemed to adopt and act upon that view of the subject. But I hold, on all the proofs, that the act had contemplated the deposit of 3,500 shares, and therefore that Alexandria was bound to make further deposit of the remaining 2,000 shares duo. I also declared in that case, which declaration, however, was then but a dictum, that Virginia could not be required, even if she were a party to the suit, to return any part of the 2,720 shares which she had purchased from Alexandria in 1817. The ground of this declaration was stated to be that Virginia was not made cognizant of the fact of Alexandria not having an equitable right to dispose of as many as 2,720 sharos of the canal stock as she did dispose of; that fact not having been brought home to the mind of the legislature of Virginia when it passed the act authorizing the exchange of state bonds for these shares, which was made.
Now that Virginia, in the corporate person of her board of public works, has been made a party to this suit, and that point is especially under litigation, and has been argued, I find no cause to change that opinion. Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the act of congress of March 3,1837, being part of a public act, did affect Virginia with constructive notice that the shares then held by Alexandria in the canal company, when delivered to the secretary of treasury, would be liable to the trust defined in the previous act of May 20, 1836; yet it is certain that such notice only embraced the express contents of the act, and such other facts as, upon reasonable inquiry, were suggested or implied by the act. As an instrument of constructive notification, interfering with the freedom of commercial dealing, the act was to be strictly construed. Third persons could not be expected to know all its history,—all the considerations which inspired its passage,—and its relations to all the bonds of Alexandria Canal *618Company, which at any time, however remote in the future, Alexandria might own; nor were third persons bound to look through a period of 44 subsequent years, and to-anticipate the litigation instituted in this court in 1881, to determine how many shares of canal stock congress had intended that Alexandria should deposit with the secretary of'treasury. The act gave notice that the stock then held by Alexandria should be deposited; inquiry would have developed that the number of shares then held was 1,500, and that these were deposited. The act gave notice that within 10 years from its date the secretary should sell all the stock which the act had required to be deposited; inquiry would have disclosed that .after the expiration of the 10 years Alexandria held-3,500 shares, more or less of it possibly-repurchased at the secretary’s sale. The reasonable inference was that stock held after March 3,1847, was not affected by the act of 10 years previous, nor by the trust which it defined and imposed. In short, it is plain to me that the act of March 3,1837, was not such in terms, nor the proceedings of the secretary such, under it, as to convey notice to Virginia that any part of the 2,720 shares which she purchased in 1847 from Alexandria was affected by a trust which could invalidate her title. Indeed, as before suggested, that question was not actually settled, even as against Alexandria herself, until the decree in this cause, before mentioned as having been entered on October 6, 1882. Such being the state of things as to constructive’notiee, there is no proof that the legislature of Virginia, or her board of public works, had actual notice of the status of the stock which she purchased from Alexandria, in its relation to the congressional act of March 3, 1837. I believe it is not pretended by counsel that there was actual notice in any degree or form. Virginia is therefore an innocent and bona fide holder, for full consideration paid, of the whole 2,720 shares of canal stock now held by her board of public works._ She has equitable title to it, and she has, besides, the legal title in and lawful possession of it.
Besides the foregoing consideration, it may be added that the deposit of stock provided for in the congressional act of March 3, 1837, was an executory contract. The trust established upon the stock was not to attach until it had been actually deposited, “with proper and competent instruments and conveyances in law to vest the same in the secretary of the treasury.” Until so deposited and legally transferred, Alexandria, though bound in equity to deliver a certain portion of it to the United States, was in law at liberty to transfer and sell it, and make good title to it to any bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration who was not cognizant of her obligations respecting it. As the case stands, the United States has an equity to have 1,220 shares of the canal stock once owned by Alexandria transferred to the secretary of treasury, unless they have lost their equity by sleeping for more than 40 years upon their rights. On the other hand, Virginia has an equity to have the whole 2,720 *619shares of the stock which she purchased in good faith and without adverse notice, from Alexandria, and has also the legal title derived hy legal transfer, and hy quiet possession of more than 30 years. Her right therefore must prevail.
Entertaining these views on the merits of the ease, it was useless for me to go into the question of jurisdiction raised at bar, or into the question how far governments and states are bound by the laches of their public offices, or by the lapse of time.
The petition of the United States must be dismissed.