Court Opinion

ID: 9564110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:30.064946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.943343
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
This appeal involves the interpretation of a decree of divorce. We should reverse and remand for modification pursuant to this opinion, with costs to appellant.
The decree ordered defendant-husband to pay plaintiff-wife $176.50 each month to be applied to the mortgage payments on a home awarded to plaintiff as her sole and separate property.
In March 1976, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce. In January 1977, the parties entered into an agreement entitled Stipulation, Waiver And Property Settlement For Divorce, wherein defendant agreed to make all mortgage payments on the parties’ home. A decree of divorce was subsequently entered in February 1977, wherein the essential elements of the property settlement were incorporated, the relevant provisions of the decree will be cited infra.
In July 1977, plaintiff sold her home for $60,000; the mortgage indebtedness was approximately $13,000. Plaintiff also remarried. Beginning in August 1977, defendant terminated his monthly payment of $176.50 to plaintiff. Plaintiff filed an order to show cause, seeking continuation of the mortgage payments. The trial court expressed the opinion the mortgage payments were in the nature of a property settlement. The trial court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the Property Settlement Agreement incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. The monthly mortgage payments were to be paid until such time as plaintiff had received payments equal to the outstanding principal balance on the home. (The amount of the monthly payment was reduced from $176.50 to $122.06 since there was no longer any responsibility to pay property taxes and fire insurance after sale of the home.)
I cannot agree with the construction of the decree by the trial court, nor by this court, viz., the proviso for defendant to pay the mortgage payments constituted a property settlement. Since the essential terms of the agreement entitled “Stipulation, Waiver and Property Settlement for Divorce” were incorporated into the decree, *1302by such incorporation the agreement was merged into the decree. Such a merger destroys the independent existence of the agreement, and the rights of the parties thereafter are determined solely by the decree.1 Thus, the nature of defendant’s obligation in regard to his payments on the mortgage must be determined under the terms of the decree.
“The interpretation or construction of a decree presents a question of law for the courts and a decree, like any other instrument, is to be construed reasonably. [Citation] When interpreting a decree, particularly in a divorce proceeding, the important object is to carry out the purpose and intent of the court that issued the decree.” [Citation]2
The second provision of the decree stated: “2. That the Plaintiff be and she hereby is awarded the parties’ home located at . . . , as her sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim or interest of the Defendant. Defendant be and he hereby is ordered to make all mortgage payments on said property and to pay off and satisfy any and all liens on the property, if any exist. The Defendant be and he hereby is additionally ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Dollars and Fifty Cents ($176.50) each month, commencing immediately, to be applied to the mortgage payments on said home.”
It is here the main opinion, in my view, departs from the reality of the situation, by quoting only part of paragraph 2, in stating, “. . . defendant should make ‘all mortgage payments on said property.’ ” No mortgage, no payments, as is seen in the concluding sentence of paragraph 2: “. . . ($176.50) each month . to be applied to the mortgage payments on said home.”
Defendant’s duty to make the mortgage payments was contingent on the existence of a lien. If the lien or liens were extinguished, his duty was excused by this event. It is significant that the decree specified a monthly payment, which is indicative of a support and maintenance obligation. If there had been an intention to provide for a property settlement, as the trial court ruled, the unpaid balance of the mortgage could have been easily calculated and a lump sum figure plus interest, insurance, and taxes, could have been awarded, payable in installments.
In Bowman v. Bowman,3 defendant was ordered to pay under the decree of divorce:
“(b) The sum of $54.05 on the first day of each month for payment to Syndicate Mortgage Company to be applied on the mortgage on the home place of the parties, until said Loan shall have been paid in full; . . . ”
The court ruled, since the mortgage payment provided the wife and child with unobstructed use of the home, it should be construed as a provision for support and maintenance.
In Arakaki v. Arakaki4 defendant-husband was ordered to assume and hold plaintiff-wife harmless from any and all liabilities and obligations under the existing mortgage on the family home awarded to the wife. The court ruled:
“Mortgage payments in the context of this decree constitute alimony or support and maintenance especially where the essential purpose of the payments is support.” 5
In reviewing the entire decree there emerges a clear intent to provide plaintiff with a means to enjoy unobstructed use of the home by assuring payment of any existing liens. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decree, defendant was ordered to maintain *1303certain insurance programs, designating plaintiff as the beneficiary. The provisions recited the purpose was: “so that Plaintiff will be provided with sufficient funds to insure the payment of alimony and other payments the Defendant has agreed to make to the Plaintiff . . . ”
There is an interesting comparison in the language in paragraphs 2 and 4 of the decree. In paragraph 2, defendant was ordered to make all mortgage payments on the home and “to pay off and satisfy any and all liens on the property, if any exist.” In contrast, in paragraph 4, defendant was ordered “to make the remaining payments on Plaintiff’s vehicle, . . . until such time as the vehicle is fully purchased and paid for.” The language of paragraph 2 appears to acknowledge the home might be sold and the mortgage discharged, or assumed by the vendee. Upon such a contingency the lien would no longer exist, and defendant’s obligation to pay would be discharged. The design of the decree was to assure plaintiff would be able to live in the home she was awarded by providing defendant should make the monthly mortgage payments. Such a provision is in the nature of an order for support and maintenance, and was discharged, when plaintiff conveyed her interest in the home.
In my view, the majority confuses those cases where a property settlement agreement is made in preparation for a divorce, but its terms do not become a part of the decree; and the myriad cases where such an agreement is merged in the decree. For an example of the former see Hagen v. Hagen, 193 Or. 369, 238 P.2d 747 (1951).
Confusing also is the interaction of the majority with our statute § 30-3-5, U.C.A., 1953. This statute, in its provisions pertinent here, has been with us since before statehood, with a large body of case law developing around it. The statute says the court has continuing jurisdiction to make “subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the distribution of property as shall be reasonable and necessary.”
However, in my view, we need not be confronted with that question, because that with which we deal here is nothing more than a periodic payment of support in the form of a mortgage payment.
Also, see my dissent in Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1980.

. Day v. Day, 80 Nev. 386, 395 P.2d 321 (1964); O’Leary v. O’Leary, 280 Or. 585, 571 P.2d 1260 (1977); Mickens v. Mickens, 62 Wash.2d 876, 385 P.2d 14 (1963); Hicks v. Hicks, Okl., 417 P.2d 830 (1966).

. Cain v. Cain, 59 Haw. 32, 575 P.2d 468, 474 (1978).

. 29 Cal.2d 808, 178 P.2d 751, 753 (1947).

. 54 Haw. 60, 298, 502 P.2d 380, 384 (1972).

. Also see Kinsey v. Kinsey, 143 W.Va. 574, 103 S.E.2d 409 (1958).