Court Opinion

ID: 9493339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:05:39.930466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:47.594403
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully suggest the court used the incorrect standard to determine if 18 U.S.C. § 3109 was violated. Accordingly, I dissent.
I agree with the court that there must be “significant” federal involvement before section 3109 is implicated. However, under our precedent, ignored by the court in this case, that is not the end of the inquiry. This circuit requires us to look beyond the level of involvement to determine if the state warrant is just a ruse to cloak a federal investigation and circumvent the more stringent federal statutory requirements for a warrant. See United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 847 n. 3 (8th Cir.1992); see also United States v. McCain, 677 F.2d 657, 662-63 (8th Cir.1982).
As the court points out, a state officer sought the warrant and a state judge issued it. The state officer in charge of the investigation contacted the DEA agent as a courtesy to find out if the state search would interfere with an ongoing DEA investigation. DEA agents met with the St. Paul police after the warrant had been issued to determine if the DEA investigation would be affected. And, although federal agents participated in executing the warrant, they took no part in planning the search.
On the basis of this evidence, the district court found that there was no evidence that indicated the state warrant was used to circumvent section 3109. We review this finding for clear error. See United States v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 601, 603 (8th Cir.1999). This district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous and, therefore, the evidence should not be suppressed under section 3109.
I dissent.