Court Opinion

ID: 9719141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:43:28.070511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.780850
License: Public Domain

MCFADDEN, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment only as to Division 2 (d). I concur fully in the remainder of the opinion.
The standard for granting a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel is distinct from the standard for granting a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. As detailed in the majority opinion, the two-prong standard for ineffective assistance is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). The standard for newly discovered evidence requires that six criteria be met:
(1) that the evidence has come to [the movant’s] knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness himself should be procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) that a new trial will not be granted if the only effect of the evidence will be to impeach the credit of a witness. All six requirements must be complied with to secure a new trial.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Merka v. State, 201 Ga. App. 471, 472 (411 SE2d 357) (1991); Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 491 (271 SE2d 792) (1980).
Because it is important that those two standards remain distinct, I do not concur in the majority’s analysis. But as the evidence adduced at the new-trial hearings was insufficient to satisfy either prong of the Strickland standard, I concur in the judgment.
*50Katherine M. Mason, Sam B. Sibley, Jr., for appellant.
Ashley Wright, District Attorney, Madonna M. Little, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.