Court Opinion

ID: 9958094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 07:10:47.028358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:47.321839
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 4, 2024

                                     In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00637-CR
                           ———————————
                   JOSEPH ANDREW BEACH, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 149th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 86276-CR

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Joseph Andrew Beach appeals from his conviction for soliciting the

murder of his ex-wife, Christine. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 15.03(a). For the reasons

explained below, we modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm as modified.
                                     BACKGROUND

      While Beach was serving time in prison, he befriended George O’Day,

another inmate. According to O’Day, who testified at trial, while he and Beach were

in prison, Beach talked to O’Day about wanting to have Christine killed. O’Day was

scheduled to be released on parole, and he testified that Beach asked O’Day to kill

Christine after he was released. O’Day said that Beach told him where Christine

lived, told him when their kids would be dropped off at school, and told him to ring

the doorbell and shoot Christine in the face. O’Day said that Beach offered him a

truck and half of Christine’s life insurance policy for killing Christine. O’Day

testified that he did not take statements like this seriously at first. He explained that

in prison, “[P]eople talk about all kind of different things. So, I mean, I just kind of

blew it off. I thought it was a joke.” O’Day acknowledged that in prison there is a

lot of embellishment and bragging about things that never happened.

      At some point, though, O’Day began to take Beach seriously and believed

Christine was in danger. O’Day wrote Christine a letter to warn her; the terms of the

letter were vague, however.1 Prison officials intercepted this letter and brought

1
      In this letter, O’Day wrote:

             I understand you are facing charges . . . . If you could get your lawyer
             to come visit with me and I’ll be glad[] to speak to him on your behalf.
             There’s a picture being painted about you by Mr. Beach which is not
             right! I’ve seen pictures of you and the children, nice family by the
             way!
                                            2
O’Day in for questioning. In that meeting, O’Day told the officials about Beach’s

plan to have Christine killed, and the officials asked O’Day to help them get

corroborating evidence. O’Day agreed to cooperate by wearing a recording device

and initiating a conversation with Beach. O’Day repeatedly testified that he did not

do so to help his chances at parole, nor was he offered anything in return for his

cooperation; he said he only wanted to do what was right. He also testified that prison

officials did not tell him what to say during the conversation with Beach.

      O’Day wore a recording device and went to an area known as “the church,”

where he ran into Beach. In the recorded conversation, which was played for the

jury, Beach discussed with O’Day several of his pending lawsuits. Beach talked

about suing Christine because the trial court awarded all of his property to her in

their divorce proceeding, trying to have criminal charges for tax fraud filed against

Christine, and having his nephew fabricate charges of child molestation against

Christine to bring criminal charges against her. Then, unprompted, Beach said:

      I’m going to demolish this [b____]. I’m going to demolish her and take
      everything away from this [f______] [w____] and put her in [f______]
      jail and you’re gonna stick ‘em up and walk up and put two slugs in her
      [f______] head any time you’re ready to do it. Any [f______] time, and
      I’ll pay you for it. The truck is already yours.

      Later in the recorded conversation, as Beach was discussing the ways in which

      O’Day explained that, if he had directly told Christine about the plot to kill her,
      prison officials would have stopped the mailing because they would have considered
      the letter a threat.
                                           3
he wanted to “demolish” Christine through his various lawsuits, the following

exchange occurred:

      O’Day: Okay so if I get out before you, you just want me to hold off on
      popping a cap in her [a ]?

      Beach: Dude, if you, if you, if you step, I . . . Okay, I gotta stop this. I
      gotta stop acting like this. I want revenge so bad, that I want her to see
      me slosh her in court. If you, with everything that’s going on right now,
      if you stepped out, and you popped a cap in this [b____]’s head, it
      would stop everything. I would get everything. Everything would be
      stopped, I would be awarded—

      O’Day: Everything’s yours.

      Beach: Everything’s mine. So do that. Let’s just stick with the game
      plan, and I will give you whatever the [f___] you could possibly
      imagine for the rest of your life. Period.

      After O’Day obtained this recording, prison officials asked O’Day to arrange

another meeting with Beach. O’Day again wore a recording device to this meeting

that was ostensibly to discuss legal paperwork, but the device’s battery died near the

beginning of the conversation. During that meeting, which took place in a small

holding cell separated by bars with slits so that two inmates can talk with each other

and share documents, Beach gave O’Day a picture of Christine with her name and

address written on the back.

      Beach did not call any witnesses at trial. In his closing argument, defense

counsel discussed several defensive theories of the case: he claimed that O’Day was

trying to scam or hustle Christine by writing the letter to her, and when he got caught,

he turned on Beach to shift the focus of the prison officials’ investigation away from
                                           4
himself because he was scheduled to be released on parole soon. Defense counsel

also pointed out that O’Day never took Beach’s claims seriously until O’Day himself

was investigated for his contact with Christine. Lastly, defense counsel did not deny

that the recorded conversations between Beach and O’Day occurred, but he said

Beach’s statements were only “prison talk,” and he had no intention of having

Christine killed.

      The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The jury also found the State’s

enhancement allegations of prior felony convictions to be true and assessed Beach’s

punishment at 55 years of imprisonment. The trial court ordered Beach to pay

reimbursement costs and attorney’s fees. Beach now appeals.

                                   DISCUSSION

A.    Voir Dire Limitation

      In his first issue, Beach argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s

objection to his counsel’s question during voir dire. In explaining the different

burdens of proof, defense counsel asked: “But as a juror, if there’s a conflict and you

find yourself, man, I don’t know which one to believe, has the Government met its

burden?” Counsel for the State objected to this question as an improper commitment

question, claiming defense counsel was trying to get the jurors to commit to a

definition of “reasonable doubt.” The trial court sustained the objection. Beach

argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection because that limited

                                          5
his ability to question the potential jurors and violated his federal and state

constitutional rights.

                                   Applicable Law

      We will assume, without deciding, that defense counsel’s question was a

proper voir dire question and thus the trial court abused its discretion by refusing the

question. E.g., Sells v. State, 121 S.W.3d 748, 755–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“A

trial court abuses its discretion when it prohibits a proper question about a proper

area of inquiry.”). Our next step is to conduct a harm analysis. E.g., Easley v. State,

424 S.W.3d 535, 541–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (conducting harm analysis after

concluding trial court erred in refusing proper voir dire question); see also Johnson

v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (explaining that appellate court is

responsible for determining whether trial court’s error resulted in harm).

      Generally, any error that is not structural falls into two categories:

constitutional error or non-constitutional error. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a), (b); see

also Carranza v. State, 980 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (explaining

different categories of error). Constitutional error is one that directly offends a

provision of the federal or state constitution. Tate v. State, 988 S.W.2d 887, 890

(Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. ref’d). We must reverse a conviction after finding

this type of error unless we determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did

not contribute to the conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Non-

                                           6
constitutional error is “[a]ny other error, defect, irregularity, or variance,” such as a

violation of a statute, and we must disregard this type of error if it “does not affect

substantial rights.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Substantial rights are affected when the

error has a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. Cook

v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

      Before Easley v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the right to

question potential jurors in order to intelligently use peremptory challenges a

constitutional right. See, e.g., Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 836 (Tex. Crim. App.

1979) (“The right to be represented by counsel . . . encompasses the right of counsel

to question the members of the jury panel in order to intelligently exercise his

peremptory challenges.”), overruled by Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541; Plair v. State,

279 S.W. 267, 269 ( Tex. Crim. App. 1925) (“[T]he right to appear by counsel carries

with it the right of counsel to interrogate each juror individually [to determine

whether the defendant] should exercise a peremptory challenge to keep him off of

the jury.”), overruled by Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541.

      But the Court reconsidered this view in Easley v. State and concluded that

earlier cases, like Mathis v. State and Plair v. State, incorrectly exalted the

questioning of potential jurors and use of peremptory challenges above all other

duties of counsel and most other types of error. Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 537–41. While

acknowledging there could be an instance in which a trial court’s limitation on voir

                                           7
dire “is so substantial as to warrant labeling the error as constitutional error,” the

Court said that any erroneous limitation on voir dire was not per se a constitutional

violation. Id. at 541. The error at issue in Easley—the same error we assume

occurred here—was the trial court’s prohibiting defense counsel from asking

potential jurors a proper question. Id. The Court concluded this was a non-

constitutional error subject to a harm analysis under Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(b), which requires a court to disregard any error that does not affect

substantial rights. Id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

      Beach argues the trial court’s refusal of his proper question in voir dire is

constitutional harm requiring reversal, claiming that his federal and state

constitutional rights to counsel include the right to question potential jurors and use

his peremptory strikes intelligently. He relies solely on cases such as Mathis that

held the right to question potential jurors was constitutional. But the Court in Easley

overruled that view. See Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541. Beach does not cite or

acknowledge Easley, and each case Beach cites for his argument predates Easley.

Beach does not state any other reason why this alleged error is of constitutional

magnitude. Thus, we disagree with Beach’s argument that this alleged error is

constitutional, and we apply the conclusion adopted in Easley that generally, a trial

court’s error in refusing a proper voir dire question is a non-constitutional error

subject to Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

                                            8
       In conducting Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis, we must determine whether the

error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In making

this determination, we consider “everything in the record, including any testimony

or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the nature of the evidence

supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might be

considered in connection with other evidence in the case, the jury instructions, the

State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, voir dire, and whether

the State emphasized the error.” Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 542 (quoting Rich v. State,

160 S.W.3d 575, 577–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). The error does not affect

substantial rights, and thus we need not reverse a conviction, if we have “a fair

assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not

influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Macedo v. State, 629 S.W.3d 237, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018)).

                                       Analysis

       In this case, the rest of the voir dire weighs against finding harm. See Easley,

424 S.W.3d at 542 (stating harm analysis includes consideration of voir dire).

Although Beach argues the trial court erred in refusing his proper voir dire question,

defense counsel asked substantially the same question after the trial court refused

his first question.

                                           9
      The trial court sustained the State’s objection to defense counsel’s first

question: “But as a juror, if there’s a conflict and you find yourself, man, I don’t

know which one to believe, has the Government met its burden?”

      Defense counsel then went on to ask: “So if you have a conflict of evidence,

okay, you don’t know the answer, as a juror you’re allowed to say the Government

didn’t meet its burden of proof. Okay? Does everybody understand that?” The State

did not object to this question. When a trial court erroneously refuses a proper voir

dire question but then allows defense counsel to ask essentially the same question,

any error is harmless. See Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004).

      Later, after emphasizing that reasonable doubt could come from the evidence

itself, from conflicts in evidence, or from missing evidence, defense counsel asked:

“So after hearing all of the evidence, you get back there and you say to yourself, I’ve

heard all the evidence. I don’t know. I don’t know if he’s guilty or not. Has the State

met its burden of proof?” An unidentified potential juror responded: “No.” Defense

counsel acknowledged that response and said: “That’s kind of an easy one, really.

Not guilty.” Considering the voir dire in its entirety, the alleged error here did not

influence the jury and thus did not affect Beach’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b); Cook, 665 S.W.3d at 599; Macedo, 629 S.W.3d at 240.

                                          10
      Further, there was significant, uncontroverted evidence from which the jury

could find Beach guilty. See Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 542 (stating harm analysis

includes consideration of nature of evidence supporting verdict). The jury heard the

recording in which Beach asked O’Day to shoot Christine and said he would give

O’Day a truck for doing so. Thus, there was strong evidence supporting the jury’s

verdict.

      Assuming the trial court erred in refusing Beach’s proper voir dire question,

any error was non-constitutional, did not affect Beach’s substantial rights, and was

therefore harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 541–42. We

overrule Beach’s first issue.

B.    Entrapment Instruction

      In his next issue, Beach argues the trial court erred in denying his requested

jury instruction on entrapment.

                                  Applicable Law

      Entrapment is “a defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct

charged because he was induced to do so by a law enforcement agent using

persuasion or other means likely to cause persons to commit the offense.” TEX.

PENAL CODE § 8.06(a). “Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to

commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.” Id.

                                        11
      A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a properly requested defense

supported by the evidence. Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 658 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007); Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). A defense is

supported by the evidence “if there is some evidence, from any source, on each

element of the defense that, if believed by the jury, would support a rational

inference that th[e] element is true.” Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 657–58. In other words, a

defense is supported if there is evidence in the record making a prima facie case for

the defense, even if the evidence is weak or contradicted. Id.

      To be entitled to an instruction on entrapment, the defendant has the burden

of producing a prima facie case of all of the elements of the entrapment defense,

which are: (1) “he engaged in the conduct charged”; (2) “because he was induced to

do so by a law enforcement agent”;2 (3) “who used persuasion or other means”; and

(4) “those means were likely to cause persons to commit the offense.” Hernandez v.

State, 161 S.W.3d 491, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      The entrapment defense includes both subjective and objective components.

Id. at 497 n.11. The subjective component requires evidence that the defendant “was

actually induced to commit the charged offense by the persuasiveness of the police

2
      A “law enforcement agent” in the context of entrapment includes “any person acting
      in accordance with instructions” from federal, state, or local law enforcement
      agency personnel. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.06(b). Thus, O’Day, who was acting in
      accordance with instructions from prison officials, was a law enforcement agent in
      this context.
                                          12
conduct.” Id. (quoting England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 913 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994)). The objective component asks “whether the persuasion was such as to cause

an ordinarily law-abiding person of average resistance nevertheless to commit the

offense.” Id. (quoting England, 887 S.W.2d at 914). Impermissible persuasion

includes “pleas based on extreme need, sympathy, pity, or close personal friendship,

offers of inordinate sums of money, and other methods of persuasion that are likely

to cause the otherwise unwilling person—rather than the ready, willing and anxious

person—to commit an offense.” Id. “[W]here the facts only indicate that the criminal

design originates in the mind of the accused and the law enforcement officials or

their agents merely furnish opportunity for or aid the accused in the commission of

the crime,” the evidence does not support an instruction on entrapment. Reese v.

State, 877 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

      Whether a defense is supported by the evidence is a question of law we review

de novo. See Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 658. If the evidence does not support a particular

defense, the trial court does not err in refusing the requested instruction. Muniz, 851

S.W.2d at 254.

                                       Analysis

      Beach argues the evidence supports an entrapment instruction because

without the involvement of prison officials, the recorded conversation would not

have occurred. O’Day agreed when he testified that if the prison officials had not put

                                          13
him up to it, the conversation between Beach and himself would not have occurred.

But entrapment entails a law enforcement agent’s use of persuasion or other means

to cause a person to commit an offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.06(a). “Conduct

merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute

entrapment.” Id.

      Beach does not identify in the record any persuasion by law enforcement or

O’Day. He argues the prison “atmosphere of self-preservation” created persuasion,

claiming that O’Day only told prison officials about Beach’s plan to have Christine

killed after O’Day was caught sending a letter to Christine. Beach argues that O’Day

turned Beach in to help himself and protect his eligibility for parole. O’Day worked

with prison officials, Beach argues, to initiate their conversation and record him

making incriminating statements for the sole purpose of entrapment. But again,

“merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute

entrapment.” Id. Even if Beach’s theory is correct that O’Day only turned Beach in

to protect his own eligibility for parole, this does not show that O’Day or prison

officials persuaded Beach to engage in criminal conduct.

      In the recorded conversation, after describing the ways in which he was trying

to “demolish” Christine through multiple civil and criminal lawsuits, it was Beach

who brought up the plan for O’Day to shoot Christine. This indicates the criminal

plan originated in his mind and the recorded conversation merely furnished an

                                        14
opportunity for him to commit the crime of solicitation. See Reese, 877 S.W.2d at

333. O’Day made no pleas based on extreme need, sympathy, pity, or close personal

friendship, or offers of inordinate sums of money, for example. See Hernandez, 161

S.W.3d at 497 n.11. Thus, the recording does not show any persuasion by O’Day or

prison officials.

      Beach has not identified, nor do we think the record shows, any evidence that

Beach was induced to solicit the murder of his wife by a law enforcement agent, that

the agent used persuasion or other means, or that those means were likely to cause a

person to commit the offense. See id. at 497 (stating that to be entitled to entrapment

instruction, defendant must produce prima facie case of each element of entrapment

defense). The only element of entrapment supported by evidence is that Beach

engaged in the charged conduct. See id. (listing elements of entrapment defense).

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Beach’s request for an entrapment

instruction. We overrule Beach’s second issue.

C.    Enhancement Allegations of Prior Convictions

      In his next issue, Beach argues that during the punishment phase of trial, the

trial court erred in admitting evidence of Beach’s prior convictions because the

evidence does not show that Beach’s guilty pleas resulting in those convictions were

knowingly and voluntarily made, and thus there is no evidence that he validly waived

                                          15
his right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the federal

constitution.

                                   Applicable Law

      Generally, to raise an issue on appeal, the appellant must have preserved error

in the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Rios v. State, 665 S.W.3d 467, 476 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2022). To preserve error in the trial court, the record must show that:

(1) the complaining party made a timely and specific request, objection, or motion;

and (2) the trial court either ruled on the request, objection, or motion or refused to

rule and the complaining party objected to that refusal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a);

Joyner v. State, 548 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.

ref’d). The complaining party must let the trial court know what he wants and why

he is entitled to it and do so clearly enough for the trial court to understand. Pena v.

State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

      A claim of error on appeal must comport with the complaint made at trial or

the error is waived. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012);

Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will

not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the

complaint made at trial.”); Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464 (“Whether a party’s particular

complaint is preserved depends on whether the complaint on appeal comports with

the complaint made at trial.”).

                                          16
                                       Analysis

      During the punishment phase of trial, the State offered Beach’s criminal

records from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The

records showed Beach had previously been convicted and imprisoned in California

for the felony offenses of sexual assault and escape. A fingerprint expert confirmed

that the fingerprints attached to the prior judgments of conviction matched Beach’s

fingerprints.

      Defense counsel objected to the records as hearsay and as violating the

confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

of Article 1 Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. When the State offered the criminal

records, defense counsel said:

      Object to hearsay. . . . I have additional objections besides hearsay, also.
      . . . Confrontation clause. This is clearly an item that was marked and
      made in a criminal investigation, criminal resolution, the whole
      criminal process. I have the right to confront anybody who took those
      fingerprints, made that document. While the business record affidavit
      may provide some authentication, it still does not satisfy the Sixth
      Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution,
      both of their rights to confrontation clauses. So in addition to the
      hearsay, the confrontation clause is really more appropriate—[.]

At that point, the trial court cut him off and overruled his objections. The trial court

then admitted the criminal records. The jury found the enhancement allegations of

Beach’s prior convictions to be “true.”

                                          17
      The record in this case shows Beach did not raise the violation of his federal

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial that he now asserts on appeal. Beach concedes

that the objection his counsel made in the trial court does not match his complaint

on appeal. Therefore, the error is waived. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Lovill, 319

S.W.3d at 691–92; Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464.

      He argues, however, that he did not need to object in the trial court because

the evidence of his prior convictions implicates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury

trial under the federal constitution. The prior convictions did not show on their face,

he argues, that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial; instead,

the records are silent. Denial of the right to a jury trial is an issue a defendant may

raise for the first time on direct appeal. Rios, 665 S.W.3d at 477 (stating appellant

can argue for first time on direct appeal that he was denied constitutional right to

jury trial); see also Samudio v. State, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)

(“[W]aiver of jury can never be presumed from a silent record, at least on direct

appeal.” (emphasis added)). But this is not a direct appeal of those prior convictions.

      Instead, Beach seeks to collaterally attack these prior convictions. In the trial

court, a defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction if the conviction is void

or “tainted by a constitutional defect.” Galloway v. State, 578 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). But the burden is on the party attacking the prior

conviction to offer evidence showing its invalidity and to preserve error. West v.

                                          18
State, 720 S.W.2d 511, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Sparks v. State, 809 S.W.2d

773, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d). Because this is not a

direct appeal of the prior convictions in which the right to jury trial is implicated,

Beach was still required to raise his objection in the trial court to preserve error on

appeal. See Sparks, 809 S.W.2d at 774. Even if he had preserved error, simply

pointing out that prior convictions, on their face, do not show a knowing and

voluntary waiver of a jury trial is not enough to meet the burden to show their

invalidity. See West, 720 S.W.2d at 518–19 (holding defendant did not meet his

burden to show prior convictions’ invalidity by relying on fact that incomplete

records were silent as to waiver of right to jury trial).

      We therefore overrule Beach’s third issue because he did not preserve error.

D.    Attorney’s Fees

      Lastly, Beach argues the trial court erred in ordering him to pay

reimbursement costs and attorney’s fees despite his indigence.

                                    Applicable Law

      A trial court may order a defendant to pay all or part of the costs of court-

appointed legal services that the court finds the defendant is able to pay. TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 26.05(g); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). “[T]he defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay are explicit critical

elements in the trial court’s determination of the propriety of ordering

                                           19
reimbursement of costs and fees.” Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 251 (quoting Mayer v. State,

309 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). But if the trial court has previously

determined the defendant is indigent, he is presumed to remain indigent for the rest

of the proceedings unless there is a material change in his financial circumstances.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p). The record must include the trial court’s

finding that the defendant’s financial circumstances have changed to support an

order to pay attorney’s fees after a finding of indigence. See Wiley v. State, 410

S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

                                      Analysis

      On January 16, 2019, the trial court determined Beach was indigent and

appointed counsel to represent him. In a docket sheet entry dated August 26, 2022—

after trial but before the final judgment—the trial court noted that Beach’s “indigent

status continues [and] waives all costs.” In the judgment of conviction, entered on

August 30, 2022, the trial court ordered Beach to pay $495 in reimbursement costs

and $20,875 in attorney’s fees. However, the record does not include any finding

that Beach’s financial circumstances had changed. See Wiley, 410 S.W.3d at 317.

Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering Beach to pay these costs and fees.

      The State agrees with Beach that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay

reimbursement costs and attorney’s fees, and the State agrees that we should modify

the judgment of conviction to delete the reimbursement costs and attorney’s fees.

                                          20
      Accordingly, we sustain Beach’s fourth issue and modify the judgment of

conviction to delete the assessment of $495 in reimbursement fees and $20,875 in

attorney’s fees. See Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 252 (modifying judgment to delete

attorney’s fees after defendant was erroneously ordered to pay fees).

                                 CONCLUSION

      We modify the trial court’s judgment of conviction to delete the assessment

of $495 in reimbursement fees and $20,875 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the

judgment as modified.

                                                Gordon Goodman
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Hightower.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           21