Court Opinion

ID: 9514496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:57.597058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.352313
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 31.] I dissent. The trial court made two improper rulings by allowing inadmissible character evidence which painted Hart as a mean, tough drunk and Chips as a peaceable, innocuous man. The trial court compounded these errors by improperly refusing to allow
Hart to impeach and counter the unfair and prejudicial testimony -with evidence of Chips’ violent history. We should reverse and remand for a new trial.
[¶ 32.] The evidence erroneously admitted came in through the testimony of two witnesses during State’s case-in-chief. The State’s Attorney asked Olivia Hart, Defendant’s wife, who she thought was the “tougher of the two” between the victim and Hart. Defense counsel timely objected; the objection was overruled and Olivia answered, “I’d say Hart.” Later, the court allowed, over defense counsel’s timely objection, the following testimony from Beverly Brown:
Q: What are your observations as to [Hart’s] temper?
[Objection raised and overruled; question repeated]
A. Well, sometimes he’s mean.
[[Image here]]
Q. When does that usually happen?
A. When he is drunk.
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Q. Now, you stated for Mr. Hart [that] he gets mean when he has been drinking. Is that the same case for Mr. Chips?
A. No_ He is still quiet.
[IF 33.] The majority opinion does not address this issue, but instead unfairly and inaccurately characterizes the situation as one falling under the doctrine of “invited error.” See supra n.6. I agree with the majority opinion that this was error, but it was certainly not invited by Hart.
*869[¶34.] Generally, the doctrine of invited error provides that “a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. It has been held that for the doctrine of invited error to apply it is sufficient that the party who on appeal complains of the error has contributed to it.” Taylor Realty Co. v. Haberling, 365 N.W.2d 870, 873 (S.D.1985) (citation omitted). How can it be stated that Hart “induced,” “provoked,” or “contributed to” this error when he did not ask the questions and he objected immediately?8
[¶ 35.] Hart argues that this character evidence was improperly admitted under SDCL 19-12-4 (Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)), which provides in part:
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same[J
The improper evidence was not “offered by [the] accused,” nor “by the prosecution to rebut the same,” but by the State in its casein-chief. Hart is correct that the introduction of character evidence is prohibited and inadmissible unless the defense has “opened the door” by first presenting evidence of the victim’s bad character or evidence of the defendant’s good character. Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, ¶¶ 20-21, 560 N.W.2d 544, 549-50.
[¶36.] State responds that the door was opened as to the characters of both Hart and Chips during defense counsel’s opening argument. The portion of the defense opening statement which State claims opened the door to State’s introduction of evidence of Hart’s bad character is as follows:
The State also made reference in regards to Olivia Hart wanting a divorce. Wanting to leave William Hart that Thursday night, and what the State doesn’t mention is that William and Olivia had arguments like this before, and they had made up. And the evidence will show that two days later Olivia is back to William’s hotel room, and to this day they’re still married.
State claims, “The presentation of Defendant as one who could forgive unfaithfulness and who could handle the worst threats with equanimity opened the door to the prosecution argument that Defendant was sometimes mean.” Nonsense.
[¶ 37.] State’s claim that Hart opened the door to character evidence fails miserably. Additionally, it constitutes a mischaracterization of defense counsel’s statement; he never stated that Hart was “forgiving” or “equani-mous” nor did he even appear to be suggesting as much. In fact, the point he was trying to make is evidenced immediately after the portion cited by State:
Again, you’re going to have to consider if an alleged threat to ... divorce in which they get right back together within two days would serve as grounds for premeditated or [depraved] mind to kill.
[¶ 38.] The United States Supreme Court explains the rationale for prohibiting bad character evidence by State in its case-in-chief as follows:
Although “propensity evidence” is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged — or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment — creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance....
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a ■ presumption of good character, but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The state may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the *870law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, -, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650-51, 136 L.Ed.2d 574, 588 (1997) (emphasis added) (citations & internal quotations omitted).
[¶39.] State also claims the door was opened to the introduction of evidence of Chips’ good character. The portion of the defense opening statement which State claims gave the prosecution the right to show Chips was peaceable when drunk is as follows:
[Hart had a knife] for his own protection. ... Chips received injuries from a fight earlier that day[.] ... I believe the evidence will show that a combination of both that severe head injury and that blood alcohol content would make Craig Chips incapable [of] acting rationally.
[¶ 40.] Defense counsel did not state that Chips was tough or intimidating or make any other insinuation that shed unfavorable light on Chips’ character. Counsel stated that Hart carried a knife “out of concern, there may be some trouble, out of concern of not knowing what would take place and who would be there.” Furthermore, State takes the “incapable of acting rationally” statement out of context; Hart’s argument all along was that Chips was stabbed accidentally when he leaned into the knife as he stood. Defense counsel was trying to persuade the jury that standing and leaning into the knife happened because of Chips’ physical and mental imbalance brought about by the beating he took in an earlier, unrelated fight and the large amount of alcohol present in his system.
[¶ 41.] This opening statement was not, by any stretch of imagination, the “opening of the door” requisite to the admission of this character evidence. The majority opinion wholly fails to justify the admission of this improper evidence. See Black, 1997 SD 22 at ¶¶ 20-21, 560 N.W.2d at 549-50:
[T]he State’s adducement of evidence of Hymore’s character for peacefulness when he was drinking does not fall within the two limited exceptions, available to the prosecution in this case, to the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible. The State cannot introduce evidence of a victim’s good character unless and until the defendant has “opened the door” by first presenting evidence of the victim’s bad character.
“It is well settled that the prosecution cannot, in the first instance and as part of its evidence in chief, or before the character of the deceased has been attacked by the defense, introduce evidence of the reputation of the deceased for peaceableness or prove that he was a quiet and orderly citizen.” 40 .Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 308 (1968).
(Emphasis added).
[¶42.] An additional witness, Cleveland Broken Rope, testified to Chips’ good character during State’s case-in-chief:
Q: Okay. What kind of a guy is Craig Chips?
A: He is a nice guy. He is real nice.
Q: Tell the jury why you think Craig was a nice guy.
A: Minds his own business. He don’t mess with anybody else. He likes talking to people and no one will bother him.
Q: Was — would Craig be the kind of guy to go looking for a fight?
A: No, never did. It comes to him. He don’t go to them. The fights come to him all the time.
[¶ 43.] Hart sought to impeach Brown and Broken Rope by introducing Chips’ criminal *871record, which showed that he had been charged twice for drunken, violent behavior. In one case, a drunk Chips allegedly assaulted a girlfriend9 and in the other, Chips broke windows in an automobile and a house while drunk. The majority opinion claims that “[t]his was an attempt by Hart to elicit improper character testimony concerning the victim in this case.” Supra at ¶ 27. Obviously, Hart sought to impeach the evidence of Chips’ good character improperly introduced by the prosecution.
[¶44.] The trial court refused to admit specific instances of prior conduct to impeach the witnesses. State claims that defense counsel did not alert the trial court to the basis for his request to admit the evidence of these two convictions. The transcript of the hearing shows that assertion to be incorrect:
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: ■ Now, [Broken Rope and Brown’s testimony] is character evidence that we had not anticipated having to deal with in this case. I did not anticipate that there would be any such attempting to vouch for his character, and I don’t believe that anything we had done to the point where this first came in addressed directly Craig Chips’ character or that he was mean or a bad person when he was drinking or anything to that extent. So essentially what this testimony of these witnesses did was put us in a position where we felt an obligation to attempt to locate on a very short notice ... evidence to the contrary.
So we have those two additional things here that appear to be evidence which would directly rebut the evidence the State presented....
[THE COURT]: So you’re requesting only to put it in to rebut the testimony that you allege that the State has put on showing the victim’s good character?
[THE COURT]: Well, your [theory] of defense is not defensive and victim aggressive; is that correct?
[BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct. But at the same time they have opened up his peaceful character^]
[¶45.] The court’s refusal to admit the police record for impeachment purposes is error under SDCL 19-12-6 (Fed.R.Evid. 405(a)):
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(Emphasis added). Hart does not cite this statute, but relies upon SDCL 19-14-8 (Fed. R.Evid. 607) (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him.”). This statute does not foreclose the use of specific instances of Chips’ conduct to impeach or contradict the witnesses’ character testimony.
[¶ 46.] Furthermore, the trial judge stated that she “carefully reviewed” the following cases as the basis for excluding the evidence: State v. Knecht, 1997 SD 53, 563 N.W.2d 413; Black, 1997 SD 22, 560 N.W.2d 544; State v. Latham, 519 N.W.2d 68 (S.D.1994); State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493 (S.D.1986); and State v. Padgett, 291 N.W.2d 796 (S.D.1980). Since SDCL 19-12-6 was discussed in Knecht and Latham and the principle of impeachment with specific instances of conduct addressed in Black, and since defense counsel made it clear that he wished to impeach the inadmissible character evidence, Hart has not waived this argument simply because he relies on the wrong statute in his brief.
[¶47.] Even if a majority of the court concluded he waived this argument, we could still examine it under the “plain error” doctrine. SDCL 23A-44-15 (Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)) (“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of a court.”); cf. Gordon v. United States, 344 *872U.S. 414, 422-23, 73 S.Ct. 369, 375, 97 L.Ed. 447, 455 (1953):
We believe, moreover, that the combination of these two errors was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. The Government, in its brief, argues strongly for the widest sort of discretion in the trial judge in these matters and urges that even if we find error or irregularity we disregard it as harmless and affirm the conviction. We are well aware of the necessity that appellate courts give the trial judge wide latitude in control of cross-examination, especially in dealing with collateral evidence as to character. But this principle cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment which keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony. Reversals should not be based on trivial, theoretical and harmless rulings. But we cannot say that these errors were unlikely to have influenced the jury’s verdict. We believe they prejudiced substantial rights and the judgment must be reversed.
[¶ 48.] The trial court apparently misread our holdings in the above cases. In Knecht, we upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant could not introduce specific instances of the victim’s violent nature to bolster his self-defense theory unless those incidents were known to defendant at the time he shot and killed the victim. 1997 SD 53 at ¶ 15, 563 N.W.2d at 419. However, pertinent to this case is our statement regarding impeachment:
Knecht also argues specific instances of violent conduct should have been allowed to impeach any witness whose testimony downplayed Marshall’s violent nature. While we agree, see [SDCL 19-12-6] and Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, ¶¶ 19-23, 560 N.W.2d 544, 549-50, Knecht offers neither a specific instance nor a reference to the record to show he was denied that opportunity.
Id. n.4 (emphasis added); see also Black, 1997 SD 22 at ¶23, 560 N.W.2d at 550 (“Black would have been able to use this information during cross-examination of this witness, as well as support his theory of defense.”). The other cases relied upon by the trial court all primarily deal with the rules pertaining to a self-defense theory. Latham, 519 N.W.2d at 71; Dokken, 385 N.W.2d at 501-02; Padgett, 291 N.W.2d at 798-99. Defense counsel made it clear that he was not arguing a self-defense theory and the trial court’s reliance on these eases was clear error.
[¶ 49.] As noted, SDCL 19-12-6 expressly permits the use of specific instances of conduct for impeachment on cross-examination when a witness testifies as to reputation or opinion of a person’s character.
[¶ 50.] The trial court’s evidentiary rulings unfairly prejudiced Hart. State was allowed to disparage Hart’s character while glorifying that of Chips’ — all in its case-in-chief, an inherently unfair tactic. To compound that error, the trial court unfairly tied Hart’s hands by preventing him from employing a statutoiily sanctioned method of impeachment.
[¶ 51.] Contrary to State’s brief, this cannot constitute “harmless error.” This court has repeatedly stated that the harmless error rule ought never be used to justify unfairness at the trial. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 251 N.W.2d 687, 689 (S.D.1977):
We, however, are of the opinion that the harmless error rale ought never be used to justify unfairness at the trial. Every practicing attorney knows that where a prejudicial and improper question, such as the one here, is asked for the sole purpose of conveying to the jury information that counsel knows or should have known is excludable by the rales of evidence it is pure fiction to suppose that the damage done is eradicable by objection and/or cautionary instructions.
Accord State v. Weber, 487 N.W.2d 25, 29 (S.D.1992); Dokken, 385 N.W.2d at 500.
[¶ 52.] If this court affirms this case, it will overrule (without saying so) our most recent case on point, Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, 560 N.W.2d 544, a unanimous opinion.
[¶ 53.] We should reverse and remand for a fair trial.

. The State did not even attempt-to assert the invited error doctrine. It is asserted by the majority opinion here for the first time.

. Although not argued by State at trial or on appeal, this charge was dismissed for lack of probable cause after preliminary hearing and was likely inadmissible. Therefore, the exclusion of the simple assault file could be excused under the "right result, wrong reason” rationale. See, e.g., Kehn v. Hoeksema, 524 N.W.2d 879, 881 (S.D.1994).