Court Opinion

ID: 9953457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:36.243311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:57:13.968664
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 363854
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
MARVIN ISADORE BROWN,                                                LC No. 21-008454-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals following his jury trial convictions of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I) (victim under 13 and defendant over 17), MCL 750.520b(2)(b), second-degree
criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II) (victim under 13 years old), MCL 750.520c(1)(a), and assault
with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration (AWICSP), MCL
750.520g(1). Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to 25 years and 1 day imprisonment for CSC-
I, 2 to 15 years’ imprisonment for CSC-II, and 3 to 10 years’ imprisonment for AWICSP, all to
run concurrently. We affirm.

        Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting the victim on two different days, resulting
in three convictions. The incidents occurred when the victim was under 13 years old. At trial, the
victim testified that, on an evening when she and her family were at defendant’s house, defendant
led her and two toddlers to the basement under the guise of giving them candy. While the children
were in the basement, defendant reached into the victim’s pants, touched her buttocks, and
continued “digging” in her pants. Next, defendant removed his hand, pushed the victim onto a
tote, and placed his penis near her face, attempting to make the victim perform fellatio. The victim
had to turn her face away to avoid defendant’s penis. Subsequently, on July 5, 2021, while
defendant was at the victim’s house, defendant told the victim to go to the basement and sit on the
stairs. Defendant followed the victim into the basement and proceeded to digitally penetrate her
while masturbating. The victim watched as defendant ejaculated onto the step next to her. The
other household members were sleeping at the time this occurred. Subsequently, the victim
revealed these incidents to her father, and her mother. Her mother called the police and Officer
Jamie Zack of the Detroit Police Department responded and conducted an initial interview with

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the victim. Officer Zack did not employ forensic interview techniques when she spoke with the
victim. Though defendant denied each of the victim’s allegations, the jury convicted defendant of
CSC-I, CSC-II, and AWICSP.

        On appeal, defendant argues he was denied a fair trial because he was convicted based on
the victim’s testimony, which was tainted and unreliable as a result of Officer Zack failing to
employ forensic interview techniques during the victim’s initial interview. We conclude that,
because Officer Zack only performed the victim’s initial interview, she did not err by failing to
employ forensic interview techniques. However, even if Officer Zack erred by not using forensic
interview techniques, defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced thereby.

          Defendant failed to preserve this issue because he did not object to the admission of the
victim’s testimony at trial. People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019) (“To
preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of evidence must object
at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal.”) (citation omitted). An
unpreserved issue is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. Id. (citation omitted).
To show plain error, a defendant must prove “1) an error occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, and 3) the plain error affected his substantial rights, meaning it affected the outcome
of the proceedings.” People v Jarrell, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket
No. 356070); slip op at 8-9. “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the conviction
of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010).

        In short, defendant argues that, because Officer Zack’s initial interview of the victim did
not follow the protocol typically used for a child’s forensic interview, the victim’s testimony was
tainted, and therefore, his conviction was unjust because it was based on the tainted testimony.
Defendant failed to demonstrate an error occurred, let alone a plain error, because Officer Zack
only performed an initial interview with the victim that was conducted in response to the 911 call,
not a forensic interview. This was not a full interview; it was only Officer Zack’s attempt to gather
information for the police report. MCL 722.628 requires counties to develop standard child abuse
interview protocols. Wayne County’s child abuse and neglect interview techniques are limited to
forensic interview techniques. See State of Michigan, Governor’s Task Force on Child Abuse and
Neglect and Department of Health and Human Services, Forensic Interviewing Protocol (4th ed.).1
Accordingly, it appears only forensic child abuse interviews are subject to specific protocols.
Because Officer Zack did not perform a forensic interview with the victim, she was not required
to employ the forensic interview techniques.

       But if Officer Zack erred by not employing forensic interview techniques, defendant failed
to show that the alleged error affected the outcome of the proceedings because he provided no
proof for his allegation that Officer Zack’s initial interview with the victim somehow tainted her
testimony at trial, or even resulted in a change to the victim’s testimony. See People v Smart, 304

1
  Available at < https://www.michigan.gov/mdhhs/-/media/Project/Websites/mdhhs/Adult-and-
Childrens-Services/Abuse-and-Neglect/Forms-and-Publications/DHS-PUB-
0779.pdf?rev=e616e91287f543219b1e7d1beb906248&hash=4ED9AF3BA70EB9F0323B2B895
7A213A7> (accessed December 21, 2023).

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Mich App 244, 251; 850 NW2d 579 (2014) (holding a defendant-appellant may not “merely
announce a position and leave it to this Court to rationalize the basis for the claim, or elaborate the
argument.”). Additionally, defense counsel had the opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the
victim, thereby giving defendant the opportunity to expose to the jury any inconsistencies or
unreliability in her testimony. The jury was also aware that Officer Zack was not trained to
perform forensic interviews. Moreover, the credibility of a witness is a matter that rests in the sole
discretion of the jury. People v Montague, 338 Mich App 29, 45; 979 NW2d 406 (2021) (“[I]t is
up to the jury to . . . evaluate the credibility of witnesses.”) (citation omitted).

        It is apparent that the jury believed the victim was credible because each of defendant’s
convictions rested on the truthfulness of the victim’s testimony. Given that the jury found the
victim to be credible, we will not override the jury’s credibility finding. Id. Furthermore, “a
reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in
support of the jury verdict.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240; 917 NW2d 559 (2018). Therefore,
particularly in the absence of any evidence from defendant suggesting otherwise, we conclude that
the victim’s testimony was reliable (not tainted), and thus, defendant was not denied a fair trial by
its admission.

      Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence to support each of his convictions.
We conclude that a rational trier of fact could find that the evidence proved defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

        “Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed de novo.” People v Xun Wang,
505 Mich 239, 251; 952 NW2d 334 (2020). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this
Court must view the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the
prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Kenny, 332 Mich App 394, 402-403;
956 NW2d 562 (2020). “[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and
make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” Oros, 502 Mich at 240.

        “[D]ue process requires the prosecution to prove every element beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Smith, 336 Mich App 297, 308; 970 NW2d 450 (2021) (citation omitted).
“Circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” Kenny, 332 Mich App at 403. “In
criminal sexual conduct cases, a victim’s testimony may be sufficient to support a defendant’s
conviction and need not be corroborated.” See People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 181; 891
NW2d 255 (2016) (citation omitted). Defendant was convicted of CSC-I, CSC-II, and AWICSP.

         First, defendant argues that his conviction for CSC-I was improper because the prosecutor
did not demonstrate, in response to defense counsel’s objection, that the digital penetration
allegation was part of the charged conduct. Preliminarily, defendant failed to provide any proof
that the evidence regarding digital penetration was not part of the CSC-I charge. Consequently,
this issue is abandoned. See People v King, 297 Mich App 465, 474; 824 NW2d 258 (2012) (“An
appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment
of the issue.”).

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        Moreover, defendant’s argument is without merit because the amended felony information
stated defendant committed CSC-I when he digitally penetrated the victim—clearly demonstrating
that the victim’s testimony about defendant digitally penetrating her was part of the charged
conduct. Furthermore, defendant’s argument hinges on his assertion that the prosecutor did not
adequately respond to defense counsel’s objection—that the penetration evidence was uncharged
conduct. But at trial, defense counsel only objected to the victim’s testimony that defendant licked
her, not the digital penetration testimony. Therefore, defendant’s claim, that the prosecutor failed
to properly respond to defense counsel’s objection about the digital penetration testimony, is
erroneous because defense counsel did not object thereto.

        Finally, the victim’s testimony was sufficient to support defendant’s CSC-I conviction.
“The elements of CSC-I in this case are: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration, (2) with
a person under 13 years of age.” People v Duenaz, 306 Mich App 85, 106; 854 NW2d 531 (2014).
“Sexual penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(r).
Additionally, defendant was convicted under MCL 750.520b(2)(b), which requires the perpetrator
be over 17 years old and the victim under age 13. The victim’s father testified that defendant had
just turned 40 at the time of trial, meaning he was over 17 years old before the victim was even
born, let alone when these incidents occurred.

        The victim testified that defendant pulled her pants down and put his finger inside her
vagina while masturbating. Although the victim did not identify the date when this took place, the
victim was only 12 years old at the time of trial, meaning this incident (and the others) took place
while she was under 13 years old. Accordingly, based on the victim’s testimony, a rational trier
of fact could have found defendant guilty of CSC-I. See Solloway, 316 Mich App at 181 (“In
criminal sexual conduct cases, a victim’s testimony may be sufficient to support a defendant’s
conviction and need not be corroborated.”) (citation omitted).

         Further, the victim’s testimony was also corroborated by her parents, who both testified
that defendant was at their house on July 5, 2021. Her father testified that he felt uneasy after
finding defendant upstairs by the bathroom with the victim five minutes after the victim and
defendant went into the house, suggesting there may have been something odd going on between
defendant and the victim. He also confirmed that everyone planned to take a nap on July 5, 2021,
and explained they did so because he and defendant had been up all night talking. Even defendant
testified that he was at the house on July 5, 2021, and that he laid down for a nap that day. In
summary, the evidence was more than sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty
of CSC-I.

         The victim’s testimony was also sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty
of CSC-II. “The elements of CSC-II are: (1) the defendant engaged in sexual contact, (2) with a
person under 13 years of age.” Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 106 (citation omitted). In this context,
sexual contact means “the intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the
intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim’s or actor’s intimate
parts, if that touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification, [or] done for a sexual purpose[.]” MCL 750.520a(q). Intimate parts include “the
primary genital area, groin, inner thigh, buttock, or breast[.]” MCL 750.520a(f).

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        Defendant argues that, based on the victim’s description of defendant touching her
buttocks, the touching was so fleeting that it could not have been done for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification. The victim testified that, after defendant led the victim and a couple
toddlers into the basement, defendant placed his hand inside her pants and underwear, directly
onto her buttocks. The victim did not describe how long defendant’s hand was on her buttocks,
but she said defendant was “digging” in her pants. The victim’s use of the word, “digging,”
especially when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, portrays a purposeful and
substantial fondling. See Kenny, 332 Mich App at 402-403 (holding appellate courts must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution when analyzing the sufficiency of the
evidence). Further, this touching was not an accidental or fleeting brush, as defendant describes
it, because defendant had to reach beneath the victim’s belt, pants, and underwear to touch her
buttocks. Stated differently, this was an intentional touching. See Oros, 502 Mich at 240 (holding
a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in support of the jury verdict).
Defendant’s subsequent actions, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
confirm that the purpose of this touching was sexual in nature because, after defendant removed
his hand from the victim’s buttocks, he pushed her down and tried to get her to perform fellatio.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty of
CSC-II.

        The elements of AWICSP include, “(1) an assault, meaning an attempt to commit a battery
or an unlawful act that places another person in reasonable apprehension of an imminent battery;
and (2) an intent to commit CSC involving sexual penetration.” People v Hoskins, 342 Mich App
194, 204; 993 NW2d 48 (2022). A battery is “an intentional, unconsented and harmful or offensive
touching of the person of another, or of something closely connected with the person.” People v
Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 614; 806 NW2d 371 (2011) (citations omitted). An assault is “an
attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of
receiving an immediate battery.” Id. (citations omitted).

         The victim testified that defendant pushed her down onto the tote and then put his penis
near her face in an attempt to get her to perform fellatio. Although there was some conflicting
testimony about how close defendant’s penis was to the victim’s face, defendant came close
enough to her face that she had to turn her face away to avoid defendant’s penis. The victim’s
testimony was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude defendant assaulted the victim by
attempting to commit a battery or by causing her reasonable apprehension that defendant was
going to commit a battery. Defendant tried to put his penis into the victim’s mouth, which, if
successful, would have amounted to an intentional, nonconsensual, and offensive touching, being
the victim tried to avoid having defendant’s penis in her mouth and was scared during the incident.
Id. The victim’s testimony was also sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude defendant
intended to “commit CSC involving sexual penetration” because sexual penetration includes
fellatio, which is what the victim testified defendant attempted to make her do. See MCL
750.520a(r) (explaining “sexual penetration” includes fellatio).

        Additionally, the facts relevant to defendant’s CSC-II and AWICSP convictions were also
partially corroborated by the victim’s parents, who both recalled being present on that day. The
mother confirmed that there were times when both the victim and defendant were gone from her
and the other adults on that day. The father remembered defendant asking if he could give the
children candy, and subsequently taking them to the basement—as the victim testified.

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Importantly, the victim included the minor detail that defendant never gave them candy, and her
father recalled that none of the children had candy when they returned upstairs. Even defendant
admitted that he took the children to the basement during a gathering when her family was present.
Accordingly, testimony from the parents and defendant corroborate various elements of the
victim’s testimony.

        The victim’s mother also testified that she believed the victim when the victim disclosed
the incidents related to defendant’s three convictions. And the father testified that he made the
victim repeat her stories seven times to determine whether she was telling the truth. After the
victim gave the same, unaltered stories seven times, he concluded she was telling the truth. The
victim gave her father many details about each incident. This was significant because he wanted
to find a hole in the victim’s story to exculpate his best friend, but he was unable to. Her father
asked her ten times if she was lying and also threatened the victim that she could go to jail if she
was lying, but she did not change her story, lending further credence to the truthfulness of the
victim’s testimony. Both parents also testified that the victim was petrified when defendant came
to their house after the incidents occurred, evidencing that something had happened between
defendant and the victim that caused her significant fear.

        Although defendant denied doing the things of which the victim accused him, it is apparent
that the jury determined the victim was credible since the defendant’s convictions rested on the
truthfulness of the victim’s testimony and there were no other witnesses who testified directly to
the charged conduct. Because the jury found the victim to be credible, we will not override the
jury’s credibility finding. See Montague, 338 Mich App at 45 (“[I]t is up to the jury to . . . evaluate
the credibility of witnesses.”) (citation omitted); see also People v Lowrey, 342 Mich App 99, 123;
993 NW2d 62 (2022) (“Differing versions of events merely establish that it is for the jury to
determine witness credibility and resolve inconsistencies of testimony.”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n criminal sexual conduct cases, a victim’s testimony may be
sufficient to support a defendant’s conviction and need not be corroborated.” Solloway, 316 Mich
App at 181. Therefore, because the jury determined the victim was a credible witness, and the
victim’s testimony contained facts sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of
CSC-I, CSC-II, and AWICSP, defendant’s argument fails.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                               /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                               /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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