Court Opinion

ID: 9863306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:22:29.635854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:50.769436
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The offense is failure to stop and render aid under Article 6701d, §§ 38 and 40, V.A. C.S. At once appellant’s vehicle struck and killed two persons, and he has been twice convicted. In holding that appellant committed two distinct offenses and thus there was no double jeopardy problem, the court of appeals relied on part One of the “landmark case” of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Spradling v. State (Tex.App.—Beaumont No. 09-82-158-CR, September 7, 1983).1
Part One of Blockburger addressed a contention that “two sales charged in the second and third counts as having been made to the same person constitute a single offense.” Id., 284 U.S. at 301, 52 S.Ct., at 181.2 As had Blockburger, the Beau*558mont Court quoted from Wharton’s Criminal Law (11th Ed.) § 34, and examined Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915). But neither Mr. Wharton nor Ebeling v. Morgan tend to solve our problem here; the former is expounding on the abstract subject of “definition and analysis of crime,” whereas the latter is determining whether Congress exhibited an intent to punish for successive acts.3
Returning to Blockburger, we find the Supreme Court applying Mr. Wharton’s dictum as follows:
“In the present case, the first transaction resulting in a sale, had come to an end. The next sale was not the result of the original impulse, but of a fresh one— this is to say, of a new bargain.”
Id., 284 U.S. at 303, 52 S.Ct., at 181. Then it discussed Ebeling v. Morgan, supra, quoting that part of the opinion demonstrating legislative intent “to protect each and every mail bag from felonious injury and mutilation,” see note 3, ante, at 558. It cited a string of cases and, significantly, most are habeas corpus proceedings seeking release from further punishment on such grounds as the convicting court was without jurisdiction, exceeded its authority, imposed cruel and unusual punishment, and the like — none based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e.g., the latest cited, United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 46 S.Ct. 156, 70 L.Ed. 309 (1926).4
*559The foregoing analysis of part One of the Blockburger opinion leads to the firm conclusion that the Supreme Court found the statute underlying two counts in one indictment did authorize a jury to convict for each sale of morphine on different days to the same person, and the trial court to impose sentence on each count and order the terms of imprisonment to run consecutively, in that each sale was the result of a “fresh” impulse and thus a separate offense. Id., 284 U.S., at 301-303, 52 S.Ct., at 181.5
But, as pointed out ante, the Supreme Court did not decide that issue on principles of jeopardy. Therefore, the reasons given for the decision below are not supported by part One of Blockburger.
Ultimately, however, because it opined that the Court “has also approached the issue of whether particular conduct constitutes separate and distinct offenses by examining the applicable statutory language,” from its reading this statute the Beaumont Court believed “the legislative intent is that the offense in issue be completed each time a person fails to stop and render aid to an individual.” 773 S.W.2d, at 555.
The approach may be supported generally by part Two of Blockburger (where only one act — a single sale of morphine to the same person — appeared to be proscribed by two statutory provisions), in that the Supreme Court adopted a rule of statutory construction to determine whether there are two offenses or only one. Id., at 304, 52 S.Ct., at 182.6 Clearly, however, that rule is not applicable here because we are not dealing with “two distinct statutory provisions.” Ex parte Rathmell, 717 5.W.2d 33, at 35 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton, J., dissenting, at 55, n. 6). Indeed, the State seems to recognize as much, while at the same time looking for benefit in Block-burger and Ex parte Mike, 632 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), following Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).7 That rationale is inapposite' here.
*560Article 6701(d), § 38(b) does not in terms provide a culpable mental state. However, in Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr. App.1979), this Court held that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.02 applies to the offenses denounced by § 38(b), and further that the applicable culpable mental state is “knowledge of the circumstances surrounding his conduct (V.T.C.A. Penal Code Sec. 6.03(b), i.e., had knowledge that an accident had occurred.” Id., at 784, 785; accord: Steen v. State, 640 S.W.2d 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (plurality opinion by Judge McCormick that culpable mental states are “intentionally and knowingly,” id., at 917).8
The plurality opinion in Steen v. State, supra, states that § 38(a) “sets out the duty of the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to another.” Except that there be an injury, its predecessor statute imposed a similar duty. See former article 1150, P.C. 1925. The duty under the latter was to stop and render aid, and the duty was violated either by failing to stop or, having stopped, by failing to give information or render aid to all injured persons.9
*561Under § 38(b), identified by the Steen plurality opinion as “the penal section,” the breach of duty is either “failing to stop or to comply with said requirements,” and it is to either breach that the requisite culpable mental state attaches. Id., at 915 (original emphasis by Judge McCormick).
That is to say, as Goss held, the driver of a vehicle has to know it was “involved in an accident” in order that any duty attaches. Id., at 785: “[T]he essential point that the accused must know an accident has occurred before the duty to stop and render aid arises, and before he may be held culpable for failure to stop and render aid, is as sound today as then. ” The phrase “injury to or death of any person” in § 38(a) is but descriptive of circumstances surrounding *562conduct, the existence of which a driver must be aware in order that there be a duty to stop. Y.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.02(b).
The public duty thus imposed in those circumstances on all citizens by former article 1150 and § 38(a) is humanitarian in nature and purpose. Scott v. State and People v. Thompson, both supra. But though there be a putative duty to act, criminal culpability does not lie in merely being involved in an accident producing prescribed results. When a driver knows that a person is injured and regardless of how many more persons are injured, the legislative objectives are twofold: first, to cause an “involved” driver to stop; second, to cause an “involved” driver who does stop to remain at the scene and, among other things, to render to all injured persons such reasonable assistance that appears necessary or is requested by the injured. Ibid., § 38(a) and 40. The “forbidden conduct” is “knowingly” failing to stop in those circumstances or, having stopped, failing to provide information and assistance. And a failure to stop is a complete offense, as is stopping but then failing to provide information or to render reasonable assistance to every injured person.
A prosecution under the statute is not for injuring or killing “any person,” but “for the neglect or failure to do that which the dictates of humanity would have demanded, and which [the Legislature] required to alleviate the suffering of [every person injured in such accident]. The statute [does] not contemplate punishment for the injury or for the death.” Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 310, 234 S.W. 914, at 916 (1921). Requiring that a driver who knows his vehicle is involved in an accident resulting in injury of or death to a person provide certain information along with reasonable medical assistance to the injured does not mean that he has committed an offense or that the accident and its consequences constitute a crime. Id., 92 Tex. Cr.R. 354, 243 S.W. 990 (1922).10
In this light, the language of §§ 38 and 40 does not demonstrate legislative intent to allow successive prosecutions, on account of such phrases as “injury to or death of to any person,” or render aid “to any person.” More clearly, in context of §§38 and 40, and the legislative intent, purpose and objectives and nature of the offenses ever since 1917, see ante, at 560 -562, the gravamen of one offense is that knowing there has been an accident, an “involved” driver violates a public duty by failing to stop; the duty to stop is single, a failure stems from one volition.11
The other offense is that with the same knowledge and stopping, an “involved” driver, unless excused by circumstances, violates a duty by failing to provide prescribed information or to render reasonable assistance indiscriminately to every injured person; here the duty may be divisible into providing information or rendering aid, yet a failure to perform the whole duty is still a single volitional omission.
The requisite culpable mental state globally embraces an accident and its consequences. That two or more persons were injured in the accident does not make but one knowing failure to act a separate, distinct violation of the statute as to each. Its provisions have always contemplated that a *563good Samaritan is ready and generous in helping all those in distress.12
Accordingly, a correct construction of the statutory provisions is that when required to do so under the circumstances, an “involved” driver knowingly failing to stop and render aid commits but one offense even though more than one person- may he injured. We should so hold.
Therefore, the Beaumont Court of Appeals erred in concluding that “the number of victims ... can dictate the number of allowable trials, convictions and punishments against a defendant.” The second trial of appellant was barred by the double jeopardy clauses in the Fifth Amendment and in Article I, § 14, codified as Article 1.10, Y.A.C.C.P.
The majority here causes this Court to err as well. State v. Hartnek, 146 Wis.2d 188, 430 N.W.2d 361 (App.1988), is inappo-site. Pretermitted by the majority is that “a multiple victim accident could invoke several of the differing penalties,” varying according to extent of injury or death of a person. Id,., 430 N.W.2d at 363.
MILLER, J., joins this opinion.

. Part One of Blockburger did not make it a “landmark case;" that was part Two (test for legislative intent as to whether a single act viola-tive of two distinct statutory provisions is more than one offense for purposes of multiple punishments).

. All emphasis is supplied by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. While Mr. Wharton’s Eleventh Edition is not readily available to us, both the Ninth and Twelfth are, and each contains substantially the same textual language quoted in those opinions. Mr. Wharton is discussing whether under common law "a particular offense is divisible ... susceptible of being divided into two or more offenses, each to be open to a separate prosecution.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (9th Ed.) § 27, at 38; (12th Ed.) § 33, at 50. He classifies "diversity” into subgroups such as "time" and "object." It is with respect to "time” that he writes that which is quoted, viz:
"... [W]hen the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie."
(9th Ed), at 40; (12th Ed.) § 34, at 52, the latter stating in note 3, "The test is whether the individual acts Eire prohibited, or the course of action they constitute. If the former then each act is punishable separately. * * * * If the latter, there can be but one penalty,” citing English cases except Friedebom v. Com., 113 Pa. 242, 6 A. 160, 57 Am.Rep. 464 (1886) (error to hold every business act done on Sunday is separate offense).
Mr. Wharton may have alluded to, but he was not discussing directly the law of jeopardy, for he extensively treats that doctrine in another chapter under “defenses.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law (12th Ed.) 531, § 393 ff.
In Ebeling v. Morgan, supra, accused had been convicted of six counts in a single indictment of mutilation of mail bags, and was sentenced to serve several terms of three years consecutively; at the end of the first three year term, he sought a writ of habeas corpus ordering his release from further confinement on the ground that he "had endured all the punishment that could be legally imposed by imprisonment under said indictment." 237 U.S., at 628, 35 S.Ct., at 711. The issue was as described by the Beaumont Court, and the Supreme Court discerned from the statute that "it was the intention of the lawmakers to protect each and every mail bag from felonious injury and mutilation," so that although in a single transaction one might cut into several mail bags successively, the offense as to each "was complete when that bag was cut.” Id., at 629, 35 S.Ct., at 711.
The Supreme Court distinguished “continuous offenses” and cases that were "attempts to cut up a continuous offense into separate crimes in a manner unwarranted by the statute making the offense punishable.” Id., at 630, 35 S.Ct., at 712.

. While not a habeas proceeding, Daugherty is still illustrative of the point that part One of Blockburger did not decide whether consecutive punishments are barred by jeopardy.
An indictment of three counts charged accused violated the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act by making an unauthorized sale of cocaine to each of three different persons on different days. He was found guilty as charged, and the trial court assessed punishment at confinement for a term of five years on each count, adding in the judgment: "Said term of imprisonment to run consecutively and not concurrently.” Id., 269 U.S., at 361, 46 S.Ct., at 156.
On direct appeal Daugherty maintEuned the trial court "exceeded its jurisdiction" in imposing sentence of fifteen years, his essential contention being that "each sale should be taken as resulting from one and the same criminal intent and therefore the three counts charge only one crime.” The circuit court of appeals rejected his contention, holding that “because each count charges a different sale to a different person on a different day, and if the sales were made as charged they constituted three separate offenses.” However, it applied a rule that sentences imposed to multicounts run concurrently *559"in the absence of specific and definite provision therein that they be made to run consecutively by specifying the order of sequence," and it interpreted the judgment to mean that the sentence was for five years only. Id., at 361-362, 46 S.Ct., at 156.
On certiorari, finding the circuit court was "clearly right” in denying the “one crime” contention, but that it erred in holding the sentence was for only five years, from its own reading the Supreme Court concluded that “the reasonable and natural implication from the whole entry” is to impose imprisonment for fifteen years, made up of three five year terms to be served consecutively in the same sequence as counts were alleged. Id., at 363, 46 S.Ct., at 157.

.That aspect of Blockburger may be contrasted with the three decisions relied on by appellant. In each, the ambiguous statute in question, without illuminating legislative history, required the appellate court to choose between two readings of what conduct Congress intended to be punishable more than once. "In that circumstance the [Supreme] Court applies policy of lenity and adopts the less harsh meaning.” Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, at 177, 79 S.Ct. 209, at 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199, at 205); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, at 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, at 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); United States v. Dea-ton, 468 F.2d 541 (CA5 1972), follows both Lad-ner and Bell. Thus none is based on the Double Jeopardy Clause, only statutory construction and lenity.

. Editing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, at 434 (1871), the Supreme Court formulated the “Blockburger test,” viz:
"... fWJhere the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.”

. The approach is similar to that taken by the Beaumont Court in its opinion, 773 S.W.2d at 554-555, believing that this Court has recognized an examination of the applicable statute may reveal that "particular conduct" may constitute separate and distinct offenses during the same transaction, citing Jones v. State, 514 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and Ward v. State, [148 Tex.Cr.R. 186], 185 S.W.2d 577 (1945). Let us review the cases better to comprehend what each does “recognize.”
Taking Ward v. State first, by agreement two causes — aggravated assault with a motor vehicle and driving while intoxicated — were consolidated for trial with an understanding that evidence from both parties going to both offenses would be introduced at the same trial. The trial court found defendant guilty of aggravated assault and assessed punishment; defense counsel then pleaded former jeopardy to any conviction for "drunken driving;" trial court overruled the plea, found him guilty, and assessed punishment. Appeal concerned primarily the jeopardy question, and on original submission the Court *560found several procedural faults but did also find, "The two offenses here are separate and distinct offenses." However, it went on to point out that in misdemeanor offenses under existing law the State was permitted to charge separate offenses in separate counts and obtain convictions on the different offenses so charged. Because the agreement to try both cases at the same time created a situation- so similar to that legal procedure, there was no problem at all. Id., 185 S.W.2d, at 578. (That situation, not so incidentally, is much like the federal practice reflected in part One of Blockburger whereby the government is permitted to allege separate offenses in a single indictment, and trial courts are authorized to convict on each, so long as none is the "same offense" as another. See ante, at 554-556.)
On rehearing, however, the Court took the issue more seriously and considered its merits, fínding no double jeopardy, viz;
"Suffice it to say in this instance, we affirm that striking a man with an automobile and carrying him on the fender for approximately 140 feet, and striking another car and being drunk both times could not be called one transaction under one volition. An assault with an automobile and driving while drunk are two separate and distinct transactions, animated by two separate and distinct volitions.
Id., at 579. Thus Ward is not a "same transaction" case.
Jones v. State involved a conviction for rape and a second prosecution and conviction for burglary with intent to commit that rape. The Court did make the general statement that double jeopardy has no application “where separate and distinct offenses occur during the same transaction.” To determine whether they were separate and distinct offenses, the Court relied on, e.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 35 S.Ct. 712, 59 L.Ed. 1153 (1915) (test is whether "separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are such as are made punishable by the act of Congress"). Id., at 640, 35 S.Ct., at 714. But, as to a jeopardy bar, the Jones decision rests on the circumstance that former articles 1399 and 1400, P.C.1925, "explicitly provide[d] that a person may be prosecuted for burglary and for any offense which he commits after entry," and thereby distinguishing Price v. State, 475 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), viz:
"... Conversely, in Price convictions for false imprisonment and aggravated assault against the same person were held to constitute double jeopardy and to violate the doctrine of carving. But in Price, unlike Morgan and the instant case, there was no statute specifically establishing two separate crimes.”
Jones, at 256. Pena v. State, 442 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), cited by the Beaumont Court, also upheld convictions for burglary with intent to commit theft and the actual theft, because articles 1399 and 1400 expressly provided for successive punishments.
Manifestly, neither Ward, Jones nor Pena provide a rationale for finding a legislative intent that Article 6701d, § 38(b), authorizes as many successive prosecutions and punishments as there are injured persons. Indeed, in each case there was just one victim.

. "A person acts intentionally ... when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result.” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.03(a). Because one cannot intend "circumstances surrounding his conduct," id, § 6.03, "intentionally" is not an appropriate culpable mental state, especially since “knowledge” is sufficient to hold an accused culpable for failure to stop and render aid. Goss, supra, and Steen, supra (Clinton, J., joining judgment, at 916).

. The provision in the initial “Highway Law" on "failure to stop and render aid" applied "whenever" a motor vehicle "strikes any person or collides with any vehicle containing a person”— regardless of whether injury resulted. The offense was divisible. May v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 115, 171 S.W.2d 488 (1943) (Opinions on Rehearing, at 490-491, 492) (offense complete upon failure to stop; failure to render aid another form of violation); Morgan v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 276, 167 S.W.2d 765 (1943) (gist of offense is failure to stop after having struck something or someone, and such failure alone is *561a violation). See Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 100, 233 S.W. 1097, at 1098 (1921), and 4 Branch’s Ann.Penal Code (2nd Ed.) 147-148, Art. 1150, § 1767:
“The gist of this article is the failure of the motorist to stop after he has struck someone or a vehicle.... Such a driver must stop after the collision and comply with the terms of this article.... The driver must not only stop and render such aid and help as would appear necessary to any ordinary person at the time, but he must stop and render all necessary assistance and information which may be asked of him under said article, irrespective of how the collision occurred or who was to blame for it.”
While an indictment need not allege accused had knowledge an accident had occurred, the nature of the former statute was such that "absence of knowledge on the part of the driver that his car struck some person or vehicle would entitle him to an acquittal." Goforth v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 200, 241 S.W. 1027, at 1028 (1922); Stalling v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 310, 234 S.W. 914 (1921). Moreover, even with knowledge the duty to render aid is not absolute. Thus an "involved” driver might conclude his duty is to take an injured companion for treatment rather than remain at the scene, Woods v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.App. 540, 121 S.W.2d 64 (1938); one who stops is not under any legal obligation to render aid “when injured party’s husband chose to carry her to the hospital,” Bowden v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 578, 361 S.W.2d 207, at 208 (1962); "which others present with means at hand considered not necessary or proper,” Powell v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 415, 341 S.W.2d 915, at 916 (1961); "when all aid was being given by others,” Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 32, 102 S.W.2d 212 (1937).
In Scott v. State, supra, constitutionality of the law was challenged in that it was not sufficiently specific in defining the offense sought to be denounced. Noticing that in many other states similar laws had been enacted, construed and upheld against various attacks, the Court believed this one could be upheld without doing violence to principles upon which other provisions had been held void for indefiniteness. Id., 233 S.W. at 1098-1099.
Among considerations that led the Court to uphold the statute, the following are still germane here, viz: ,
“A party operating an automobile which may injure another in collision ought to be
impelled by humanitarian motives, in the absence of any law, to tender aid in an effort to minimize the result of the injury. In doing this he would naturally and instinctively do the thing which to him, under the circumstances, appeared to be proper to alleviate suffering. If his own car was uninjured so that it might still be operated, perhaps the most natural thing for him to do would be to try and get the injured persons to a physician or surgeon as quickly as possible.
The statute ought not to be given such a construction as would or might result in manifest harm to a person accused of violating it. ***** That the statute contains a humane provision cannot be gainsaid. If it can be construed to require that to be done which ought to be done even in the absence of law, ... it ought, as so construed, to be upheld.” Id., at 1099. Accordingly the Court concluded:
"We have reached the conclusion that a fair and reasonable construction of the statute in question is that the party should render all the aid that would reasonably appear to him as an ordinary person at the time to be necessary, including taking the injured persons to a physician or surgeon, if so requested by them, or if it reasonably appears to accused that medical treatment be necessary. The jury ought to be so instructed ... that, if accused gave all aid which under the circumstances reasonably appeared to him to be necessary, he should be acquitted, and that, if under all the circumstances it did not appear to him to be necessary to carry the injured parties to a physician or surgeon for treatment, he could not be convicted for failure to do so, unless he was requested by them to be so taken and declined.”
Id., at 1100.
That construction was confirmed in, e.g., Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 32, 102 S.W.2d 212 (1937):
"... In other words, in cases of collision of cars, it appears plain that the parties must not fail to stop, but must do so, and also render to the person struck, or the occupants of the car collided with, all such help and assistance as the facts and circumstances would dictate to a person of ordinary temperament, disposition, and feeling under like circumstances.”
Id., 102 S.W.2d, at 212. See also People v. Thompson, 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W. 857 (1932); 16 ALR 1425; 66 ALR 1228; 101 ALR 911; 23 ALR2d 497.

. In discussing a contention that requiring a driver give number of his vehicle and name and address of owner seeks to compel a citizen to give evidence against himself, the Court pointed out:
"... It would not appear that the mere fact of a collision of an automobile with the person or vehicle of another would ipso facto constitute a crime, and the right to refuse self-incrimination would not per se arise from the fact of such collision. There seems nothing in the statute under consideration which is based upon the hypothesis that either party to a collision is thereby committing a crime. The legal duties sought by said statute to be imposed in such case are apparently only those which humanity and necessity would dictate. Scott v. State, 90 Tex.Cr.R. 100, 233 S.W. 1097, 16 A.L.R. 1420.”

. See Spradling v. Texas, 455 U.S. 971, 975, 102 S.Ct. 1482, 1484, 71 L.Ed.2d 686 (1982) (Justice Brennan dissenting from denial of petition for certiorari: “Spradling’s striking and failing to render aid to the two women was but a single act[.]”

. Except that the indictment assigned fault for causing an accident to accused when till the statute requires is that one be the driver of "any vehicle involved in an accident,” see n. 8 ante, at 560, the plurality opinion in Steen seems to be in accord. Speaking of requisite allegations in a charging instrument, Steen says, “The proper allegation is that the accused culpably failed to comply with the requirements of Section 38(a), a known duty," and "to require more [aver-ments] would amount to an exercise in semantics." Id, at 915. Then it lists "the elements of an offense" under § 38(b), vfe:
1. a driver of a vehicle
2. involved in an accident
3. resulting in injury or death of any person
4. intentionally and knowingly
5.fails to stop and render reasonable assistance.

Ibid.

(As to propriety of the underscored culpable mental state, see n. 8 ante, at 560.)
The indictment was held adequate in that it alleged, inter alia, accused ‘knowingly failed to stop and render all reasonable assistance;” that "necessarily and sufficiently notifies the accused that he failed to perform a known duty [under § 38(a)].” Ibid. Despite the facts that appellant did not stop and there were three occupants in the other vehicle, a mother who was injured and her two minor children who were killed, there is no hint in the opinion that accused owed a separate and distinct duty as to each; it was enough that he wholly failed to stop and render any assistance.