Court Opinion

ID: 9420199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:53:20.854389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:23.053039
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rutledge,
concurring.
Six members of the Court agree that the judgment of the Court of Claims must be reversed, but are equally divided in their groundings. Since I am in partial agreement with both groups, I state my own conclusions independently.
It may be, as my brother Reed and those who join with him think, that the ceiling price in a wartime controlled market should furnish the measure of constitutional just compensation for property of a highly perishable nature taken. Perhaps also this view should be qualified further, as by some limitation which would make adjustments beyond that price permissible when the circumstances of the taking are such that they would entail destruction of property values beyond those inherent merely in the property which the Government receives and uses.1
But I am also in agreement with my brother Frankfurter and those who concur with him that it is not necessary to reach these important constitutional issues in this case. For I think that, with reference to such perishable commodities taken under circumstances like these, the legal market or ceiling price furnishes at least *648presumptively the measure of just compensation, and that this measure should apply unless and until the owner sustains the burden of proving that he has sustained some loss for which he is entitled to a greater award.
That burden, I also agree, the respondent has not sustained in this case. The Court of Claims awarded respondent its "replacement costs,” in the view that “when property is taken the owner must be put in as good position pecuniarily as he was in before his property was taken.” 2 Payment of the ceiling price did not do this, since as the court pointed out respondent “felt obliged to furnish its customers a certain amount of products, although at a loss, in order to retain their good will and . . . hold its organization together.” 3 For this reason it became necessary for respondent to go into the market and purchase live hogs and process them, paying a higher price than it had paid for the hogs from which the products taken had been processed. In this way respondent incurred a loss it would not have incurred had those products not been taken.
On this basis, I agree with Me. Justice Reed that the loss is one for consequential damages. That is, it is one to compensate for loss incurred to preserve unimpaired *649respondent’s good will,4 not to compensate for any value lawfully obtainable for the articles then or prospectively within any reasonable future period, in view of the property’s perishable nature, from other sources.
But respondent asserts its claim to “replacement value” on a different theoretical basis, i. e., not as compensation for loss incurred in preserving good will, but as the proper measure of the value of the property when requisitioned. And if market price, here ceiling price, is not the measure of compensation, it is said “replacement cost” furnishes the best substitute or at any rate an appropriate element for consideration.
The difference in the present circumstances would seem to be highly verbal. For in any event the loss was actually incurred for the purpose of keeping respondent’s customers satisfied and thus preserving its good will unimpaired; in other words, to prevent the accrual of injury consequential to the taking.
It is true that in circumstances where there is no market value, “replacement cost” has been held appropriate for consideration in reaching a judgment concerning the value which is just compensation. But this seems to me a different thing from allowing such proof, when the loss it reflects has been incurred solely to prevent consequential injury, and there is a market value presumptively valid to compensate for all losses incurred except that loss. To allow that proof in these circumstances would be in substance if not in form to permit an award for elements of consequential damages entirely out of line with the policy of this Court’s prior decisions concerning compensation for such injuries.5
*650The considerations set forth by my brother Frankfurter respecting the difficulties, indeed the near impossibility, of proving costs in this case would seem to support this conclusion. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

 In some situations the Court has allowed compensation for the destruction of property as being equivalent to “taking” it, cf., e. g., United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333; Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U. S. 546; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 384; in others apparently what amounted in effect to destruction has been regarded as infliction of consequential injuries and thus as not compensable, cf. e. g., Bothwell v. United States, 254 U. S. 231; Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341.

 107 Ct. Cl. 155, 165. For this grounding the court relied upon citation of Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299; Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106, 125; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 374; Walker & Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 553. The quoted statement, of course, taken abstractly, is broad enough to permit the award of consequential damages, an effect contrary to this Court’s consistent rulings. See the authorities cited in note 4.

 107 Ct. Cl. 155, 165. The record before us contains no proof that replacing the requisitioned goods was essential to prevent respondent from going out of business or that the loss of. good will entailed by the taking, if not repaired by replacement, would have prevented continued employment of respondent’s employees or disrupted its organization.

 See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 378, and authorities cited; cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 383,

 See authorities cited in note 4.