Court Opinion

ID: 9557704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:55:37.619148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.376185
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority’s decision affirming the district court’s summary dismissal of plaintiffs’ retaliation claims and in concluding the City of Ladue (City) exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing behavior. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998) (setting forth the Ellerth!Faragher affirmative defense). However, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrates the City had actual and constructive notice of Captain William Baldwin’s harassing behavior but failed to exercise reasonable care to promptly correct it. Accordingly, the City may not avail itself of the protections afforded by the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275.
For purposes of this appeal, there is no dispute the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of sexual harassment. Because Baldwin was the plaintiffs’ supervisor, the City is liable for his wrongful conduct unless it establishes by a preponderance of the evidence it 1) exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and 2) the plaintiffs unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the City or to avoid harm otherwise. Id.; Williams v. Mo. Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir.2005). The first element of the affirmative defense requires an employer to prove it 1) exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment (the “prevention prong”), and 2) promptly corrected any sexual harassment that did occur (the “correction prong”). Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Plaintiffs contend the City failed to meet its burden under the correction prong because it had actual and constructive notice of Baldwin’s harassing behavior and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action. I agree.
I.
As evidence of actual notice, the plaintiffs offer the City’s antiharassment policy and the observations of supervisors Sergeant John Wagner and Lieutenant William Baker.
The City’s antiharassment policy requires all supervisors to 1) monitor the police department’s work environment for any signs of harassment on a daily basis, 2) advise employees about the types of behavior prohibited and complaint procedures, 3) stop all observed acts of harassment regardless of whether the employees involved are under his or her supervision, and 4) take immediate action to limit the work contact between employees involved in a complaint of harassment pending investigation. Additionally, all employees are mandated to report harassment and *730subject to disciplinary action if they fail to report observed acts of harassment.
Wagner has been employed with the Ladue Police Department throughout the plaintiffs’ tenure. He was a detective when Weger and Murphy were hired and was later promoted to sergeant. As a sergeant, Wagner is a supervisor and subject to the duties imposed by the City’s antiharassment policy upon supervisors. In accordance with the policy, Wagner was trained to report sexual harassment. Appellants’ App. at A1556. Despite his training, Wagner conceded if the harassment involved a superior officer: “I guess technically I would — I should go over that lieutenan’s — you know. I should go above his head, but the reality of it is that’s not what you would do.” Id. at A1557. Wagner testified he believed reporting a superior officer would place his employment at risk. Id. at A1559.
It is against this backdrop of what Wagner heard or observed which included several instances of conduct perpetrated by Baldwin and were offered by the plaintiffs as sufficient to have afforded the City actual notice of sexual harassment.
The first instance occurred when Wagner was asked by Baldwin to assist in conducting interviews of Weger’s neighbors as part of her background check. While canvassing Weger’s neighbors, Wagner inquired about Weger’s qualifications. Baldwin responded by stating Weger used to have “big” breasts but had breast reduction surgery. Id. at A1562-63, Wagner testified the comments took him by surprise and Baldwin was giggling and told him not to tell anyone. Id.
Wagner had a strikingly similar conversation with Baldwin when Murphy was hired. On this occasion, Wagner, Baldwin, and Lieutenant William Baker (then a detective) were in the detective bureau discussing Murphy’s impending hire. Baldwin, in what Wagner characterized as a giggly and childish display, stated Murphy was not much to look at but she had large breasts.8 Id. at A1568-69. Despite finding Baldwin’s comments “strange” and “inappropriate,” Wagner testified he never considered reporting the incident as required by the City’s antiharassment policy, id. at A1570, because “it would be uncomfortable,” id. at A1572.
On another occasion, Wagner and Officer Richard Bonney were standing in a hallway at the police department and observed Baldwin walking behind Murphy rubbing her shoulders. Id. at A1573. As Murphy walked down the hallway, Baldwin followed behind her rubbing her shoulders telling her: “It’ll be okay.” Id. In response, Murphy grimaced, id. at A1734, and pulled away from Baldwin’s grasp, id. at A1573. Officer Bonney testified that upon observing Baldwin’s behavior, Wagner “looked at me and shook his head and said I can’t believe this or can’t believe that.” Id. atA1736.
The plaintiffs further allege Baldwin on occasion crawled under their desks and massaged their legs. Wagner testified he observed Baldwin crawl under the desks of female employees while they were working. Id. at A1576-77. Wagner initially testified he understood Baldwin was under the desks trying to repair something, id. at A1577, but later stated he did not really know what Baldwin was doing, id. at A1578. Still later, Wagner testified he heard from others in the department Baldwin crawled under female employees’ desks to rub or feel their ankles. Id.
Finally, Wagner testified he was aware employees in the department referred to *731Baldwin as “Tickle Me Elmo” and “Captain Tickles,” and the nicknames derived from Baldwin’s known propensity for tickling and touching female employees. Id. at A1580-81, A1583.
Lieutenant William Baker has also been employed with the Ladue Police Department throughout the plaintiffs’ tenure. Like Wagner, Baker was promoted to a supervisory position within the department after the plaintiffs were hired. During such time, Baker became aware Baldwin was engaging in offensive and puerile conduct directed towards female employees. Baker knew of Baldwin’s comments regarding Weger’s breasts and breast reduction surgery because Wagner conveyed them to him in a conversation. Id. at A1353. Baker was also present when Baldwin commented on Murphy’s breasts and general appearance. Baker testified Baldwin stated: “She’s not much to look at, but she has big tits.” Id. at A1350. Baker also observed Baldwin on two occasions tickling a female communications supervisor, and on a third occasion saw Baldwin kneeling next to the same supervisor with his arm around her and his face within an inch of her’s. Id. at A1362. Baker testified he believed the comments and contact were childish and improper. Id. at A1351, A1362. He did not, however, report the incidents.
There is no serious dispute over whether these incidents occurred or whether Wagner and Baker found them offensive. Moreover, there is no dispute they were required, as supervisors, to report their observations under the City’s antiharassment policy. Nonetheless, the majority concludes the City cannot be charged with actual notice of sexual harassment — observed first hand by supervisors charged with the responsibility of reporting such behavior — unless, in addition to actually observing the harassment, the targeted employee tells the supervisors that what they observed and understood to be harassment, was harassment. I cannot sign on to such a crabbed construction of actual notice.
An employer has actual notice of harassment when sufficient information either comes to the attention of someone who has the power to terminate the harassment, or it comes to someone who can reasonably be expected to report or refer a complaint to someone who can put an end to it. Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir.1999) (citations omitted). “[A]ctual notice is such notice as is positively proved to have been given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1061-62 (6th ed.1990) (emphasis added). In the context of sexual harassment claims, “[ajctual notice is established by proof that management knew of the harassment.” Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir.2003) (emphasis added). Whereas, constructive notice “is established when the harassment was so severe and pervasive that management reasonably should have known of it.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 183 F.3d 770, 772 (8th Cir.1999) (noting an employer is deemed to have actual notice of a dangerous condition if an employee created or was aware of the hazard).
Given Wagner’s and Baker’s first hand observations of Baldwin’s behavior, it simply cannot be argued they did not know the harassment was occurring.9 More*732over, as supervisors, Wagner and Baker were charged under the City’s antiharassment policy with the duty to report and stop any observed sexual harassment. Thus, notice of harassment to either of them constituted notice to the City. See Williamson v. Houston, 148 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir.1998) (“If the employer has structured its organization such that a given individual has the authority to accept notice of a harassment problem, then notice to that individual is sufficient to hold the employer liable.”). Despite this evidence, the majority • concludes neither Wagner, Baker, or the City can be charged with actual notice of harassment unless a formal complaint was tendered by the victim. In support of this unduly narrow view of actual notice, the majority cites Watson v. Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11th Cir.2003), and Minix v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 237 Fed.Appx 578, 582, No. 06-16094, 2007 WL 1828259, at *2 (11th Cir. June 27, 2007). Neither of these cases supports the majority’s conclusion that under Title VII, a supervisor, charged with the responsibility of reporting harassment, is free to ignore it unless a complaint is filed.
Watson, involved allegations by a female employee of a concrete company who claimed she was sexually harassed on the job. 324 F.3d at 1255. The plaintiff offered evidence of numerous incidents of verbal and physical harassment inflicted by male co-workers and customers. Id. at 1255-56. In reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on behalf of the employer, the court of appeals concluded there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer had actual notice of several of the alleged incidents. Id. at 1259. Among other evidence of actual notice, the court noted the plaintiff presented evidence showing her supervisor had observed her crying after one incident and had been told by other workers the plaintiff was upset by the harassing conduct. Id. Nowhere in the opinion did the court suggest the only means by which the employer could be deemed to have actual notice was if the plaintiff filed a formal complaint of harassment. Indeed, because the Watson court discussed evidence which might provide actual notice short of filing a complaint, it actually contradicts the majority’s narrow view of actual notice. Id.
Next, the majority relies on Minix, an unpublished per curiam opinion from the 11th Circuit. 2007 WL 1828259. In Mi-nix, the company had an antiharassment policy which designated certain employees to whom harassment complaints could be made. Id., at *2. A group of employees argued the company had actual notice of their harassment because it had been reported to a co-employee who was not listed among those designated to receive complaints. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment because the complaint of harassment had been delivered to the wrong person, i.e., not someone authorized under the policy to receive complaints. The court did not hold that the only way for an employer to, receive actual notice of sexual harassment is to be served a complaint.
Unlike Minix, a case from our court supports the plaintiffs’ position. See Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir.1988). In Hall, the plaintiffs were female employees of a construction company who alleged they were routinely subjected to sexual harassment by male co-employees. 842 F.2d at 1012. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs and the employer appealed, arguing, among other things, it did not have notice of the harassment. This court concluded the employer had actual notice — -knew of the harassment — because the plaintiffs informed their supervisor and the supervisor *733“observed many of the incidents.” Id. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Hall holds that when the agent of an employer observes harassment first hand the employer may be charged with actual notice.
Construing the evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, it is apparent Wagner and Baker knew Baldwin routinely subjected Weger, Murphy, and female employees generally, to loutish behavior which could reasonably be construed as sexual harassment. I am unable to uncover any cases to support the majority’s conclusion that the supervisors’ first hand observations of Baldwin’s conduct were insufficient to charge them and the City with actual notice of the harassment. Nor am I able to divine any principled reason for holding that, in the context of Title VII claims, actual notice should be defined to exclude knowledge gained by experiencing or observing wrongful conduct first hand. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s contrary conclusion.
II.
I also dissent from the majority’s holding as to Weger and Murphy failing to present sufficient evidence to prove the City reasonably should have known of Baldwin’s offensive conduct. In addition to the first hand observations of Wagner and Baker detailed above, the record contains the following evidence in support of plaintiffs’ claim the City should have known Baldwin was engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment.10
Weger and Murphy: Murphy testified Wagner told her, within a few months of her hire, that Baldwin had commented she “wasn’t much to look at, but ... had big tits.” Appellants’ App. at A159. Similarly, Weger testified she told Baldwin during her interview process she had undergone breast reduction surgery. Some months later, Wagner told her Baldwin informed him of her surgery during the background investigation. Id. at A276-79. Weger further testified she was uncomfortable when she realized the information had become known throughout the department and officers commented that “it didn’t even look like you had a procedure.” Id.
The plaintiffs also testified they were present when Baldwin harassed other female employees, and were subjectively aware of those incidents. For example, Murphy was present when Baldwin crawled under Goin’s workstation and then massaged her shoulders. Id. at A150-51. She was also privy to incidents involving Allison, the communications supervisor. Id. at 51. Weger testified she witnessed instances when Baldwin tickled Allison and hugged Murphy. Id. at A267.
Detective Chris Schmitz: Schmitz testified he heard Baldwin referred to by other members of the police department as “Captain Tickles” and “Tickle Me Elmo.” He stated the nicknames were in reference to Baldwin’s known propensity for tickling female employees. Appellants’ App. at A1619-22. Schmitz also described an incident involving Baldwin and a female employee, Kristin Goin. Schmitz stated he stopped by the dispatch workstations to speak with Murphy. While there, he noticed Baldwin lying on the floor underneath Goin’s workstation. After several minutes, Baldwin stood up and began massaging Goin’s shoulders, telling her everything would be alright and not to worry. Id. at A1626-27. Schmitz testified Baldwin only stopped after Goin said: “Sir, if you don’t mind.” Schmitz believed Baldwin’s actions were inappropriate but did not report them out of fear for his employment. Id. at A1627-28. Finally, Schmitz testified that when Baldwin conducted interviews of prospective female employees, *734he would come down to the detective bureau after the interviews and describe each applicant’s appearance to the officers present using terms like: “big tits, great ass, nice long legs or dick-sucking lips.” Id. at A1646-47.
Detective Glen Norman: Norman testified on one occasion he entered the communications area where Murphy worked and observed Baldwin with his arm around her shoulder, leaning close to Murphy’s face. Id. at A1664-66. Norman testified Murphy abruptly stood up and walked towards him. As she did, Murphy whispered: “I can’t stand him.” Id. Norman further testified he had heard from others that Baldwin stated Weger would be difficult to fit for a bulletproof vest because she had large breasts and “Murphy was not much to look at, but somebody would be f-ing that before long.” Id. at A1666-67. Norman indicated he discussed those comments with co-workers Schmitz and Bryan Lucas. Finally, Norman testified he was aware Baldwin was known throughout the department as “Captain Tickles” and “Tickle Me Elmo” because he frequently tickled female employees. Id. at A1680-81.
Detective Bryan Lucas: Lucas confirmed Baldwin was known throughout the department as “Captain Tickles” and “Tickle Me Elmo,” and acquired the nicknames because he was known to tickle female employees. Id. at A1701-02. Lucas testified he observed Baldwin tickle dispatcher Pat Allison. Lucas stated: “I heard her start to laugh, and then I heard her say, Captain Baldwin, quit it, sir, you’re so bad while she was laughing.” Id. at A1703-04. Lucas testified he found the incident odd and later mentioned it to Chris Schmitz. Id. On another occasion, Lucas entered the dispatch area and observed Baldwin standing by Weger rubbing her shoulders. As he walked by, Lucas observed Weger roll her eyes “[l]ike she was kind of putting up with it[.]” Id. at A1705. Lucas also testified he was present when Baldwin discussed female applicants or employees. He specifically recalled being in the detective bureau along with Schmitz when Baldwin described one applicant has having large “tits”. Id. at 1706. Lucas further testified he had discussed Baldwin’s inappropriate conduct with other members of the department, including Schmitz and Baker, who reported observing similar conduct. Id. at A1709-11. Notwithstanding the City’s antiharassment policy, Lucas stated: “I wouldn’t have been real thrilled about coming forward and saying anything.” Id. at A1713.
Officer Richard Bonney: Bonney testified he observed Baldwin come up behind Murphy when she was facing the copier, grab her around the waist, and tickle her. When Murphy told him to stop he let go of her but followed behind as she walked to her desk “with his hands out as if he was going to tickle her again, and she ... told him to leave [her] alone.” Id. at A1733. On another occasion, Bonney witnessed Baldwin rubbing Murphy’s shoulders as she walked down a hallway. Bonney stated: “[S]he grimaced and turned away from him like — as if to break his grip off of her shoulders.” Id. atA1734.
“Constructive notice ... is established when the harassment was so severe and pervasive that management reasonably should have known of it.” Watson, 324 F.3d at 1259. “[A]n employer may be charged with constructive knowledge of previous sexual harassment ... if the harassment was so broad in scope, and so permeated the workplace, that it must have come to the attention of someone authorized to do something about it.” Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Tr., 12 F.Supp.2d 870, 882 (N.D.Ind.1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
*735[T]here can be constructive notice in two situations: where an employee provides management level personnel with enough information to raise a probability of sexual harassment in the mind of a reasonable employer, or where the harassment is so pervasive and open that a reasonable employer would have had to be aware of it.
[T]hese standards strike the correct balance between protecting the rights of the employee and the employer by faulting the employer for turning a blind eye to overt signs of harassment but not requiring it to attain a level of omniscience, in the absence of actual notice ....
Kunin v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 175 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir.1999).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence establishes conclusively that Baldwin’s harassing behavior came to the attention of Wagner and Baker, and, as supervisors, they were authorized — in fact mandated — to do something about it under the City’s antiharassment policy. Such evidence alone is sufficient to prove actual notice — I cannot fathom how it also fails the majority’s constructive notice test.
Additionally, however, several other employees testified Baldwin’s antics were common knowledge within the department. He was known throughout as “Captain Tickles” and “Tickle Me Elmo” because of his affinity for tickling female employees. Employees talked openly with one another about Baldwin’s behavior, describing it as childish, odd, and offensive. Moreover, Baldwin’s offensive conduct was not reserved for the plaintiffs. The evidence demonstrates he harassed other female employees similarly. Considering all the evidence marshaled by the plaintiffs, a reasonable employer should have been aware of Baldwin’s sexual harassment. The harassment occurred frequently, continued over a period of years, was obvious to those who observed it, and would have been easily discoverable by the City’s representatives.
In its analysis of constructive notice, the majority considers only six incidents of harassment, thereby discounting or ignoring most of the incidents detailed within the record. For example, the majority does not mention incidents of harassment involving other female employees. The majority’s failure to consider this evidence is neither legally nor factually sound.
The plaintiffs did not offer evidence relevant to the City’s constructive notice to prove their substantive sexual harassment claims. If plaintiffs were unaware of these incidents, the evidence has no bearing on their subjective perceptions of the workplace. Conversely, the evidence is highly probative of whether the City, had it been paying as much attention as a reasonable employer, should have discovered Baldwin’s sexual harassment. When judging the severity and pervasiveness of workplace sexual harassment, our court has long held that harassment directed towards other female employees is relevant and must be considered. See Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014-15 (“We also reject appellants’ contention that the district court erroneously considered all of the women’s claims together in determining that the harassment was sufficiently pervasive and severe.... ”).
In Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d 790, 793-94 (8th Cir.2004), this court discussed the distinction between evidence offered to prove the substance of a plaintiffs hostile work environment claim versus evidence offered to prove the severity and pervasiveness of harassment in the workplace. In Williams, the plaintiff (Williams) offered the testimony of several co-workers detailing a host of ra-*736dally motivated harassment which occurred during his employment at Cona-gra’s plant. Id. at 793. Conagra objected because Williams conceded he was unaware of the incidents, and according to Conagra, the evidence could not be used to prove Williams found the workplace subjectively hostile. Id. at 794. This court, recognizing the evidence was irrelevant to Williams’s subjective perceptions of his workplace, nonetheless found the evidence highly relevant to prove, among other things, the type of workplace environment Williams was subjected to. Id. Therefore, evidence not relevant to prove a plaintiffs subjective perceptions may be relevant for other purposes.
The same reasoning applies here. Assuming plaintiffs were unaware of the incidents, they cannot be used to prove their substantive hostile work environment claims. The evidence is, however, relevant to the issue of constructive notice. In other words, taking into account the sum of Baldwin’s objectionable behavior, its frequency, duration, and blatancy, should a reasonable employer have discovered it?
Assume a supervisor discloses to a second supervisor his intention to engage in behavior towards female employees clearly constituting sexual harassment, or admits to having previously engaged in sexual harassment towards female employees. Such an admission would be compelling evidence of the employer’s actual and constructive notice, i.e., did someone with authority know or should someone with authority have known about the harassment. Under the majority’s reasoning, this clear evidence of notice would be disregarded because no complaint was made. Nothing in the cases I have uncovered suggests Title VII allows employers to turn a blind eye to what is discovered or reasonably discoverable in the workplace. The evidence offered by the plaintiffs which demonstrates the breadth of Baldwin’s offensive behavior is clearly relevant to prove whether the City acted reasonably in failing to discover what was occurring within the police department.
III.
The plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to show the City knew or should have known of Baldwin’s harassing behavior and failed to act promptly to correct the harassment. Therefore, the City has not proved the affirmative defense. Accordingly, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.

. Wagner testified he did not remember if Baldwin used the term breasts or an offensive term.

. There may be instances where notice is not conferred by the observation of a single isolated act of harassment or where the objectionable nature of the conduct may not be objectively apparent. Neither of these situations is present here. Wagner and Baker observed *732several instances of Baldwin's boorish behavior and knew it was harassment.

. The majority notes the district court considered six examples of alleged sexual harassment. We are limited by the record — not by what the district court chose to consider.