Court Opinion

ID: 9483738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:30:26.536727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:48.990982
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Ms. Jones has made allegations of discrimination on the part of the union which state a claim under the Elliott-Larsen Act, Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§ 37.2101-.2804 (1985), and which are not preempted under federal law. My view of the extent to which her claim is preempted was outlined in our previous examination of this case, Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 838 F.2d 856 (6th Cir.1988) (“Jones I’), and has since been supported by the Supreme Court decision in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Under Lingle, it is clear that claims of discrimination by a union which do not require direct interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement are not preempted. Ms. Jones’ allegations state such a claim.
My first area of disagreement with my colleagues arises over the issue of which aspects of this case are properly before this Court. I disagree that we have already ruled on the effects of the Lingle decision in our disposition of the parties’ motions for reconsideration in light of Lingle. In our opinion denying those motions we stated:
We deny plaintiff-appellees’ motion to reconsider further in light of Lingle, after our examination of the parties’ briefs regarding the panel’s authority to reconsider and Lingle’s impact on the present case.
Judge Merritt agrees that plaintiffs-appellees’ motion comes too late.
873 F.2d at 109 (1989) (Jones II) (emphasis added). The case was remanded and is back to us on appeal. We are now bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle. The majority errs in refusing to apply Lingle. When the Supreme Court clarifies the law during the pendency of a case, it is hornbook law that we must apply the Court’s latest interpretation.
In addition, I disagree with my colleagues regarding the scope of remand, and therefore the scope of this appeal. I noted in Jones I that, “I do not understand from the majority opinion what part of the plaintiffs’ claims the majority is remanding for reconsideration or precisely what it expects the District Court to do on remand. I do not understand what is to be done because the Court does not make clear what part of the plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims are preempted and what part are not preempted.” Jones I, 838 F.2d at 864. There is some language in the majority opinion implying that the lower court was limited to consideration of post-merger activity. This limitation was premised on the assumption that any claim based on premerger activity is preempted. Lingle makes it clear that this limitation is not the law.
In Lingle, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a state law claim of retaliatory discharge was preempted because the state claim required a factual analysis like the analysis required to decide the § 301 contract claim based on discharge without “just cause.” The Court said “we disagree with the [lower] court's conclusion that such parallelism renders the state-law analysis dependent upon the contractual analysis.” Id. 486 U.S. at 406, 108 S.Ct. at 1881. Instead the Court clarified the narrow scope of section 301 preemption,
*989even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one hand and state law on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is “independent” of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes. Id. at 409-410, 108 S.Ct. at 1883-84.
This holding contradicts the theory of the majority in Section III ante, that there is preemption of the similar language prohibiting discrimination contained in the state law. Just because a similar claim could be litigated under state law or arbitrated pursuant to the agreement does not establish preemption. As the Court in Lingle noted, section 301 was never intended to destroy the power of the states to provide substantive rights to workers which are not provided for by contract. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411, 108 S.Ct. at 1884.
Section 301 preemption is not warranted simply because the union points to contract provisions in its defense of plaintiffs claim. The union asserts that it behaved as it did because it was bound by the collective bargaining agreement’s valid seniority provision prohibiting “cross-bumping.”1 As a result, the union contends that a determination of their liability requires this court to interpret the agreement to decide whether another course of action was allowed. This argument is only valid to the extent that the union’s liability is premised on its refusal to allow office workers to “cross-bump” yard and line workers, as this charge alone would require an interpretation of the agreement. But this is not the only ground for plaintiff’s claim. As I stated in my earlier opinion, “No seniority plan forced the union to ignore, mislead, or segregate the female office workers.” Jones, 838 F.2d at 808. Plaintiffs’ claim includes other facts which if proved rise to the level of discrimination. Most notable among these allegations are those surrounding the meeting held in September, 1976 between the union; members of the yard and driver bargaining unit and representatives of Cassens. That meeting was never disclosed to the women, nor were they allowed to attend, even as observers. Their interests in the decisions made there were not represented by the union officials. This behavior cannot be explained on the basis of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs are not arguing that they had a contractual right to attend, but rather that general practice in the Teamsters allowed such meetings to be open. Plaintiff-Appellants Brief on Appeal, at 10-12. This allegation should be examined by the trial court. It does not require any consideration of the terms of the contract. These and other allegations presented by plaintiffs, if proved, are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Consequently, the majority is in error in refusing to apply the Lingle decision and in finding the Elliott-Larsen claim preempted by section 301.

. Cross-bumping is the term used to describe a situation wherein workers from different collective bargaining units are allowed to bid for the same jobs. Under such circumstances, a worker may be bumped out of a position by a more senior worker in another bargaining unit, or "cross-bumped.”