Court Opinion

ID: 9667770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:54:49.141905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:40.755102
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority’s decision to subject the remittitur orders of trial courts to factual sufficiency review makes yet another unnecessary change in the law. We have heard no outcry from the bar or the bench indicating that trial courts have been abusing their remittitur powers, nor has this court ever before questioned the propriety of the abuse of discretion standard approved in Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835 (1959). Flanigan struck a workable balance between the rights of litigants and the trial judge’s control of the case before him. Once again we summarily overturn a “rule with a reason.” See Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Tex.1987) (Hill, C.J., dissenting). Because none of the arguments advanced by the majority justify abandoning the reasonable balance struck by the Flanigan rule which has been so long followed in Texas, I dissent.
The majority relies heavily upon our decision in Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1986) to overrule Flanigan. This reliance is clearly misplaced. First, Pope v. Moore presented only the narrow question of the standard courts of appeals should apply when deciding whether to order an initial remittitur under the authority of TEX.R.CIV.P. 440 (now TEX.R.APP.P. 85(b)). Moreover, it is illogical to use Pope v. Moore to overrule Flanigan when Pope v. Moore itself cited to and rested largely upon the Flanigan decision.
A world in which. Pope v. Moore and Flanigan coexist is entirely reasonable, despite the majority’s fear that they are inconsistent.1 An appellate court occupies a completely different niche from a trial court when it considers remittitur. The appellate court must base its evaluation of the propriety of a damages award entirely upon a written record of the proceedings below, while the trial judge has had the benefit of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses and parties. It ignores reality to contend that juries may not be influenced by subjective factors when they determine damages. The judge who has conducted the trial of the case is in the best position to evaluate the extent to which improper factors may have unduly influenced the jury’s award.
Moreover, treating remittitur orders of trial and appellate courts differently is rea*643sonable in light of the trial court’s broad authority to grant a new trial. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.1985). The majority apparently concludes that it is somehow more offensive to a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial to condition the overruling of a motion for a new trial upon the plaintiff’s agreement to remit a portion of the damages than to simply grant a new trial. Yet, in Johnson, this court once again reaffirmed the almost unreviewable nature of the trial court’s power to, without explanation, grant a new trial. Id.
I cannot concur in the majority’s decision to overturn long-established precedent and hamstring our trial courts in the exercise of this traditional discretionary power when we have been presented no evidence that that authority is being abused. Accordingly, I dissent.
GONZALEZ, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. See Smith, Texas Remittitur Practice, 14 SW. L.J. 150, 163 (1960).