Court Opinion

ID: 9408941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 13:06:49.26088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.930587
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
07/14/2023 08:06 AM CDT

                                                      - 698 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                 BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                                             Cite as 314 Neb. 698

                        Bruce Lavalleur, P.C., a Nebraska professional
                        corporation, and Bruce Lavalleur, third-party
                           plaintiffs, appellants and cross-appellees,
                          v. The Guarantee Group, L.L.C., third-party
                            defendant, appellee and cross-appellant.
                                                  ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed July 14, 2023.    No. S-22-622.

                 1. Directed Verdict: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court’s rul-
                    ing on a motion for directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the
                    motion as an admission of the truth of all competent evidence submit-
                    ted on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such
                    being the case, the party against whom the motion is directed is entitled
                    to have every controverted fact resolved in its favor and to have the
                    benefit of every inference which can reasonably be deduced from
                    the evidence.
                 2. Contracts: Statute of Frauds. The determination of whether a contract
                    falls within the statute of frauds is a question of law.
                 3. Contracts: Public Policy. The determination of whether a contract vio-
                    lates public policy presents a question of law.
                 4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently
                    reviews questions of law decided by a lower court.
                 5. Contracts: Parties: Intent. A meeting of the minds occurs when one
                    party accepts the offer of the other.

                 Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: Patrick
               M. Lee, Judge. Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and
               remanded for a new trial.
                    Siegfried H. Brauer, of Brauer Law Office, for appellants.
                 Tanya J. Hansen and Kevin P. Walsh, of Smith, Johnson,
               Allen, Connick & Hansen, for appellee.
                              - 699 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

   Papik, J.
   The Guarantee Group, L.L.C. (Guarantee Group), asked
Bruce Lavalleur to provide accountancy services related to
Guarantee Group’s development of a residential neighborhood.
According to Lavalleur, he provided such services, and then an
agent of Guarantee Group agreed to pay $205,000 for the work.
Guarantee Group never paid, however, and so Lavalleur’s
professional corporation sued for breach of an oral contract.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of Lavalleur’s
evidence, Guarantee Group moved for a directed verdict. The
district court granted the motion on the ground that the oral
agreement was unenforceable because it fell within a provision
of the statute of frauds requiring agreements “not to be per-
formed within one year” to be in writing. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 36-202(1) (Reissue 2016).
   In this appeal, we find that the district court erred by grant-
ing Guarantee Group a directed verdict on statute of frauds
grounds. We also conclude that Guarantee Group’s arguments
that the district court erred by not granting a directed verdict
on other grounds lack merit. We thus reverse the judgment in
part and remand the cause for a new trial.

                         BACKGROUND
Parties and Claims.
   Over the course of the life of this case, numerous parties
asserted numerous claims. All those claims were resolved in
the district court, but only certain parties and claims bear men-
tion in this opinion. We first discuss those parties and then
proceed to discuss the relevant claims.
   On one side of the dispute at issue in this appeal is
Lavalleur, a certified public accountant providing services
through Bruce Lavalleur, P.C., a professional corporation of
which he is the sole shareholder. For ease of reference, in
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

the remainder of this opinion, we refer to both Lavalleur and
Bruce Lavalleur, P.C., as “Lavalleur,” except where separate
identification is necessary.
   The other party involved in the dispute at issue is Guarantee
Group, a limited liability company. During the relevant time,
Guarantee Group was working to develop Copper Creek
Estates, a housing development in Grand Island, Nebraska.
Sean O’Connor held an ownership interest in Guarantee Group
and acted on its behalf.
   Several claims in this lawsuit were resolved before trial.
The sole claims that proceeded to trial were (1) a claim
by Lavalleur, individually, that Guarantee Group breached an
agreement to build, sell, and finance a home for Lavalleur
in Copper Creek Estates and (2) a claim by Bruce Lavalleur,
P.C., that Guarantee Group breached a contract to pay for
accountancy services related to the development of Copper
Creek Estates.

Trial Evidence.
   The primary evidence at trial was testimony of Bruce
Lavalleur. Because this appeal comes to us from a directed ver-
dict, we assume the truth of Lavalleur’s testimony and recount
the facts in that light, drawing all inferences in his favor. See
Alpha Wealth Advisors v. Cook, 313 Neb. 237, 983 N.W.2d
526 (2023).
   Lavalleur testified to interactions he had with Sean and
Raymond O’Connor. Lavalleur had performed accountancy
work for various business endeavors of Raymond since the
1980s. Lavalleur also provided accountancy services for Sean,
who was Raymond’s son.
   Lavalleur testified that in the summer of 2013, Raymond
asked Lavalleur whether he was interested in buying a home
in Copper Creek Estates. When Lavalleur expressed that he
might not qualify for a home loan, Raymond promised to
borrow the money himself so that Lavalleur could “make the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

payments to me instead of the bank.” According to Lavalleur,
he agreed to purchase a house under those terms.
   In January 2014, Sean approached Lavalleur about the
Copper Creek Estates development. Sean expressed con-
cerns to Lavalleur about the profitability of the development.
Worried that the development might lose money, Sean asked
Lavalleur if he “could figure out a way to save or increase the
profitability.” Lavalleur proposed that if he could “find a solu-
tion to this projected possible loss of $1,700,000,” he would
charge Guarantee Group $800 per hour for his accountancy
work. If Lavalleur could not “find[] anything,” then Lavalleur
told Sean that he would “shake [his] hand and go on.” Sean
expressed that he did not want Lavalleur “just running around
and running up $800 an hour.”
   Following this exchange with Sean, Lavalleur spent several
hundred hours analyzing the finances of the development.
Lavalleur testified that after analyzing the project, he made rec-
ommendations for timing certain aspects of the development,
and his associated financial projections “reflected what [he]
would consider a small profit.”
   The parties discussed Lavalleur’s compensation after he
made his recommendations. Lavalleur testified that Sean initi-
ated the conversation, asking Lavalleur “what he needed to
compensate” Lavalleur for his work. Lavalleur initially pro-
posed that Guarantee Group sign over the house that Raymond
had promised to build him, but Sean declined. Lavalleur then
suggested that Guarantee Group withhold $1,000 from the
closing of each of the 205 houses in Copper Creek Estates, so
that Lavalleur would be paid $205,000. According to Lavalleur,
Sean agreed to that arrangement.
   Later, after Guarantee Group had sold 42 homes, Sean
offered Lavalleur $42,000 to “move on and that would settle
it up.” Lavalleur rejected the $42,000 offer and insisted that
“the deal was for $205,000, period.”
   Lavalleur never received any compensation from Guarantee
Group for the work on the development at issue.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

Directed Verdict.
   At the close of Lavalleur’s case, Guarantee Group moved
for a directed verdict. Guarantee Group first argued that it was
entitled to a directed verdict on the claim asserted by Lavalleur
individually. Guarantee Group argued that this claim was unen-
forceable as a sale of real estate covered by the statute of
frauds. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 36-105 (Reissue 2016).
   Guarantee Group also sought a directed verdict on Bruce
Lavalleur, P.C.’s claim that Guarantee Group breached its
agreement to pay $205,000 for accountancy work related to
Copper Creek Estates. As to this claim, Guarantee Group
offered two alternative reasons it was entitled to a directed
verdict. It first contended there was no evidence of a meeting
of the minds to form an oral contract. Alternatively, Guarantee
Group argued that even if an otherwise enforceable contract
was formed, it was void as against public policy. Guarantee
Group’s public policy argument was that Lavalleur was seek-
ing recovery under a contingent fee agreement and that he
failed to comply with an administrative rule promulgated by
the Nebraska State Board of Public Accountancy pertaining to
such agreements.
   The district court granted a directed verdict for Guarantee
Group on the claim asserted by Lavalleur individually.
Lavalleur’s counsel conceded to the district court that a directed
verdict on that claim was proper.
   As for the claim asserted by Bruce Lavalleur, P.C., the
district court appeared to reject Guarantee Group’s argument
that it was entitled to a directed verdict due to a lack of evi-
dence as to a meeting of the minds, stating that “would prob-
ably be a factual issue for a jury to decide.” And the district
court did not mention Guarantee Group’s argument that it
was entitled to a directed verdict because the alleged agree-
ment was void as against public policy. But the district court
granted Guarantee Group a directed verdict on the basis of
§ 36-202(1), a portion of the statute of frauds requiring that
agreements “not to be performed within one year from the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

making thereof ” be in writing. Although Guarantee Group did
not move for a directed verdict on this basis, Guarantee Group
had asserted in its answer that § 36-202 barred relief.
   The district court concluded that the alleged oral agree-
ment—under which Guarantee Group was to pay Lavalleur
$1,000 per house for the closing of 205 houses—was not
capable of being performed within 1 year. In reaching this
conclusion, the district court relied on a spreadsheet prepared
by Lavalleur that was received into evidence. The spreadsheet
compiled financial data regarding the Copper Creek Estates
project. Included in the spreadsheet were closing dates for
homes within the project. Some of the closing dates were as
late as 2022.
   After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, Lavalleur
appealed. We moved the case to our docket. See Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Cum. Supp. 2022).

                  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   On appeal, Lavalleur assigns many errors, but we need
address only one: that the district court erred by directing a
verdict for Guarantee Group on Bruce Lavalleur, P.C.’s breach
of contract claim on the basis of the statute of frauds. We do
not understand Lavalleur to assign and argue any error in the
district court’s entry of a directed verdict in favor of Guarantee
Group on the claim asserted by Lavalleur in his individual
capacity. Accordingly, we do not discuss that claim and affirm
the district court’s entry of a directed verdict on it.
   On cross-appeal, Guarantee Group assigns that the district
court erred in rejecting alternative grounds for a directed ver-
dict on the breach of contract claim for accountancy services.
Specifically, Guarantee Group argues that the district court
erred (1) in failing to direct a verdict on the grounds that the
parties did not form an enforceable contract and (2) in failing
to direct a verdict on the grounds that the contract was void as
against public policy.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for
directed verdict, an appellate court must treat the motion as an
admission of the truth of all competent evidence submitted on
behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed; such
being the case, the party against whom the motion is directed
is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in its favor
and to have the benefit of every inference which can reason-
ably be deduced from the evidence. Alpha Wealth Advisors v.
Cook, 313 Neb. 237, 983 N.W.2d 526 (2023).
   [2] The determination of whether a contract falls within the
statute of frauds is a question of law. Linscott v. Shasteen, 288
Neb. 276, 847 N.W.2d 283 (2014).
   [3] The determination of whether a contract violates public
policy presents a question of law. Mays v. Midnite Dreams, 300
Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 71 (2018).
   [4] An appellate court independently reviews questions of
law decided by a lower court. Id.

                          ANALYSIS
Contract Formation.
   We first address whether and on what terms a reasonable
jury could have found that the parties entered an oral con-
tract. See Weyh v. Gottsch, 303 Neb. 280, 297, 929 N.W.2d
40, 53 (2019) (“[t]he disputed terms of an oral agreement are
questions of fact”); Gerhold Concrete Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins., 269 Neb. 692, 696, 695 N.W.2d 665, 670 (2005)
(“[w]hether a contract exists is a question of fact”). We must
do so because a directed verdict is proper only when reason-
able minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion
from the evidence, that is, when an issue should be decided
as a matter of law. In re Estate of Koetter, 312 Neb. 549,
980 N.W.2d 376 (2022). In other words, if reasonable jurors
could find facts that would allow the nonmoving party to
prevail, a directed verdict should not be granted. See John P.
Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure § 30:24 at 1355-56 (2023)
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

(“a directed verdict is proper when a reasonable jury could
only return a verdict for the moving party”). On this issue,
Guarantee Group argues that we should affirm the directed
verdict for a reason the district court appeared to reject—that
there was inadequate evidence by which a reasonable jury
could have found that Lavalleur entered an enforceable con-
tract with Guarantee Group.
   [5] Three things are needed to form an enforceable contract:
offer, acceptance, and consideration. See In re Estate of Ryan,
302 Neb. 821, 925 N.W.2d 336 (2019). A “meeting of the
minds” occurs, and the first two elements are satisfied, when
one party accepts the offer of the other. See Gibbons Ranches
v. Bailey, 289 Neb. 949, 953, 857 N.W.2d 808, 812 (2015).
We begin our analysis of whether a contract was formed
with whether there was adequate evidence of a meeting of
the minds.
   Lavalleur argues that an enforceable contract was formed
after he performed the accounting work at issue when Sean
agreed that Guarantee Group would withhold $1,000 from the
closing of each of the 205 houses in Copper Creek Estates
and pay it to Lavalleur as compensation. Lavalleur contends
that his testimony that he proposed such an arrangement and
that Sean agreed to it was sufficient evidence of an offer
and acceptance to withstand a motion for directed verdict.
Guarantee Group, on the other hand, argues that Lavalleur’s
testimony could not have supported a finding that there was
a meeting of the minds. It characterizes Lavalleur’s testimony
as “self-serving” and seems to argue that it should be weighed
against the totality of other evidence presented at trial. Brief
for appellee on cross-appeal at 36.
   Keeping in mind the governing standard of review, we must
agree with Lavalleur. Our inquiry is not whether Lavalleur’s
testimony is self-serving or even whether a jury is likely
to believe it. Rather, because Guarantee Group is arguing
it was entitled to a directed verdict, we must assume “the
truth of all competent evidence submitted” by Lavalleur, the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

nonmovant, and resolve “every controverted fact” in his favor.
Alpha Wealth Advisors, 313 Neb. at 243, 983 N.W.2d at 532.
Viewed through that lens, we must accept as true Lavalleur’s
testimony that Sean agreed to pay him $205,000 for the
accounting services he had performed by withholding $1,000
for Lavalleur from each house closing in Copper Creek
Estates. Once that testimony is accepted as true, Guarantee
Group’s argument crumbles. Reasonable jurors could find an
offer and acceptance on the basis of Lavalleur’s testimony;
thus, Guarantee Group was not entitled to a directed verdict
because of inadequate evidence of a meeting of the minds.
   Even if there was adequate evidence of a meeting of the
minds, whether a reasonable jury could find an enforceable
contract turns on an additional question—namely, whether
the agreement was supported by sufficient consideration. This
question is particularly salient in this case because of the
longstanding general common-law rule that past consideration
is no consideration at all. See 4 Richard A. Lord, A Treatise
on the Law of Contracts by Samuel Williston § 8:11 (4th ed.
2008). See, also, Chalupnik v. Brant, 134 Neb. 465, 279 N.W.
159 (1938). If the general rule that past consideration cannot
form a contract applied in this case, the contract Lavalleur
contends he formed would lack sufficient consideration. As
Lavalleur acknowledges, the only consideration provided for
Sean’s alleged promise to pay $205,000 was services Lavalleur
had already performed.
   There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that
a contract cannot be supported by only past consideration.
See 4 Lord, supra, § 8:11. Relevant here, English common-
law courts recognized such an exception by holding that “a
promise made in recognition of past services rendered at the
request of the promisor was enforceable.” Id., § 8:13 at 304.
See, also, Lampleigh v. Brathwait, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 255
(K.B). This exception was later recognized by a majority
of American courts. 4 Lord, supra, § 8:13. See, e.g., Reece
v. Reece, 239 Md. 649, 660, 212 A.2d 468, 474 (1965) (“a
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

present promise to pay in consideration of an act previously
done at the request of the promisor will be enforceable as
supported by sufficient consideration even though that con-
sideration consists of an act previously done”); Sargent v.
Crandall, 143 Colo. 199, 201, 352 P.2d 676, 677 (1960) (“a
promise is enforceable if supported by a past consideration
rendered at the promissor’s request”); Worner Agency, Inc. v.
Doyle, 133 Ill. App. 3d 850, 857, 479 N.E.2d 468, 473, 88 Ill.
Dec. 855, 860 (1985) (recognizing exception where “consider-
ation was rendered at the request of the promisor”).
   In the early years of this state’s history, this court applied
the common-law exception to an oral agreement similar to
the one at issue here. See Stuht v. Sweesy, 48 Neb. 767, 67
N.W. 748 (1896). In Stuht, a landowner asked his neighbor
to construct a wall dividing their property. The neighbor built
the wall; thereafter, the landowner promised to pay half the
construction costs. When the landowner later refused to pay,
the neighbor sued to enforce the oral agreement. This court
rejected the landowner’s argument that his promise to pay
was unenforceable on the grounds that “consideration for this
promise was past.” Id. at 772, 67 N.W. at 750. Instead, citing
the English authorities, we applied the “settled” common-law
rule that if someone performs an act at the “request of the party
that gives the assumpsit [i.e., promise],” then the promise to
pay is “bind[ing].” Id. at 772, 773, 67 N.W. at 750 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
   We see no reason not to follow Stuht here. And if we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to Lavalleur, sufficient
consideration could be found under Stuht. Lavalleur testified
that he performed accounting services related to the Copper
Creek Estates project at Sean’s request and that Sean later
promised to pay him $1,000 from the closing of each of the
205 homes in the project for those services.
   Because we conclude that a reasonable jury could find
the parties formed an enforceable contract that Guarantee
Group would pay Lavalleur $1,000 from the closing of every
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

home in the project for the accounting work, we decline to
affirm the district court’s directed verdict on that basis.

Statute of Frauds.
   We next address Lavalleur’s argument that the district court
erred by granting a directed verdict on the grounds that the
oral contract falls within the 1-year provision of the statute of
frauds. The statute of frauds makes certain agreements “void”
if they are not “in writing.” § 36-202. The text of Nebraska’s
statute of frauds covers every unwritten agreement that, “by its
terms, is not to be performed within one year from the making
thereof.” § 36-202(1).
   In applying the 1-year provision of the statute of frauds,
most courts follow the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Warner v. Texas and Pacific Railway, 164 U.S. 418, 17 S. Ct.
147, 41 L. Ed. 495 (1896), which itself followed the approach
of the English courts at common law. See 9 Richard A. Lord,
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts by Samuel Williston § 24:3
at 629 (4th ed. 2011) (calling Warner a “leading case”). In
Warner, the Court explained that to determine whether an
oral agreement fell within the statute’s 1-year provision, the
relevant “question is not what the probable, or expected, or
actual performance of the contract was[,] but whether the con-
tract, according to the reasonable interpretation of its terms,
required that it should not be performed within the year.” 164
U.S. at 434. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that this
rule applied even though the “parties may well have expected
that the contract would continue in force for more than one
year.” Id. Even if complete performance within a year “may
have been very improbable,” and even if performance of
the contract “did in fact continue in force for a much longer
time,” courts must consider whether the agreement “required”
perform­ance to last longer than 1 year. Id.
   Nebraska adheres to this interpretation of the statute
of frauds’ 1-year provision. And the case for doing so in
Nebraska is even stronger than it is in other jurisdictions
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

based on the specific text of our statute. Nebraska’s 1-year
provision voids an oral contract that, “by its terms, is not
to be performed within one year from the making thereof.”
§ 36-202(1) (emphasis supplied). Compare § 36-202(1), with
An Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2,
ch. 3, § 4 (1677) (original English statute of frauds) (“no
action shall be brought . . . upon any agreement that is not to
be performed within the space of one year from the making
thereof”). Thus, to determine whether an oral agreement falls
within the 1-year provision, we consider only the terms of
the agreement to decide whether the contract is “capable of
being performed within 1 year” of its formation. Linscott v.
Shasteen, 288 Neb. 276, 284, 847 N.W.2d 283, 291 (2014).
We, consistent with Warner, supra, do not ask whether the
contract “may, or probably will, not be performed within 1
year.” Linscott, 288 Neb. at 284, 847 N.W.2d at 291.
   A discussion in Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 246 Neb.
340, 519 N.W.2d 503 (1994), illustrates how the 1-year provi-
sion is applied. In Rath, we explained that an oral contract
for lifetime employment would not fall within the statute of
frauds. Even though the parties may expect such a contract to
last many years, it is theoretically possible that the employee
would die within a year, thus constituting full performance of
the contract within a year. We also explained, however, that an
oral contract with a specified term of more than 1 year would
be within the statute of frauds because it is not capable of per-
formance within the year. See, also, C.R. Klewin v. Flagship
Properties, 220 Conn. 569, 580, 600 A.2d 772, 778 (1991)
(holding that oral contract to complete large-scale develop-
ment project did not fall within statute of frauds’ 1-year provi-
sion even though full performance within 1 year was “realisti-
cally impossible”).
   Guarantee Group resists our longstanding interpretation
of the 1-year provision of the statute of frauds. It relies on
a statement we made nearly a decade ago that “[t]o be void,
the express terms of a contract must show that performance
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

was to occur outside of 1 year or the facts must show that the
parties could not have intended for performance to be com-
pleted within 1 year.” Linscott, 288 Neb. at 284, 847 N.W.2d
at 291 (emphasis supplied). Guarantee Group in effect sug-
gests that expectations of the parties not reflected in the terms
of the contract may bring the contract itself within the 1-year
provision of the statute of frauds.
   Unlike Guarantee Group, we do not understand our state-
ment in Linscott to depart from our well-established inter-
pretation of the 1-year provision. The reference in Linscott to
the parties’ intent does not refer to some unannounced, extra-
contractual intention or expectation. The case Linscott cites
in support of its statement confirms as much. See id., citing
Powder River Live Stock Co. v. Lamb, 38 Neb. 339, 56 N.W.
1019 (1893). In explaining how to interpret the 1-year provi-
sion in Powder River, this court noted that “there must be an
express and specific stipulation in the contract that it is not to
be performed within the year, or it must appear therefrom that
it was not the intention of the parties the agreement should
be performed within that period.” 38 Neb. at 348, 56 N.W. at
1021. “[I]t must appear therefrom” refers back to “the con-
tract,” so read in context, Powder River makes a very limited
claim: It must appear from the contract that the parties did
not intend the agreement to be performed within 1 year. The
parties’ intent is, in other words, expressed in the terms of
the contract. (Emphasis supplied.) And to the extent the refer-
ence in Linscott to “facts” implies that evidence besides the
terms of the contract bear on whether the contract “is not to
be performed within one year,” we reject that implication. See
§ 36-202(1). Only an agreement that “by its terms” cannot be
performed within 1 year is covered by § 36-202(1).
   With the foregoing principles established, it becomes
apparent that the district court erred by granting a directed
verdict on statute of frauds grounds. As we have discussed,
a reasonable jury could find that an oral contract was formed
with the following terms: Guarantee Group agreed to pay
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

Lavalleur $205,000 for accounting services he had performed
by withholding $1,000 for Lavalleur from the closing of
each of the 205 houses in Copper Creek Estates. No terms
of such an agreement required that it be performed in more
than a year. That is enough to remove the oral contract from
§ 36-202(1).
   In the spreadsheet relied upon by the district court, Lavalleur
did list closing dates for several homes that were several years
after the contract was formed. In addition, Lavalleur agreed
that Copper Creek Estates was a “long-term project” or, in
his words, a project of “[s]everal years.” But this evidence, at
most, establishes that the parties did not expect or that it was
realistically improbable that Guarantee Group would close on
205 homes within 1 year. It does not demonstrate that the terms
of the contract made it impossible for Guarantee Group to per-
form its obligations within 1 year.
   Because a reasonable jury could find the existence of an oral
contract, the terms of which were capable of being performed
within 1 year, the contract did not have to be in writing under
§ 36-202(1). The district court erred in concluding otherwise
and in granting a directed verdict on that ground.

Public Policy.
   This leaves only Guarantee Group’s argument that we should
affirm the directed verdict on the grounds that the alleged con-
tract was void as against public policy. As we will explain, we
find no basis to affirm on that ground.
   To begin, we emphasize that courts are disinclined to find a
contractual agreement void as against public policy. See Sinu v.
Concordia University, 313 Neb. 218, 983 N.W.2d 511 (2023).
We have said that a contract is void against public policy only
when it is “quite clearly repugnant to the public conscience”
and “only in cases free from doubt.” Id. at 229, 230, 983
N.W.2d at 522.
   Although we often observe that it is the function of the
Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, to declare
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

what is the law and public policy of this state, see, e.g., Mays
v. Midnite Dreams, 300 Neb. 485, 915 N.W.2d 71 (2018),
Guarantee Group argues that the alleged contract is contrary
to a public policy expressed in an administrative rule prom­
ulgated by the Nebraska State Board of Accountancy. The
Legislature has empowered that body to promulgate rules of
professional conduct that govern certified public accountants
in Nebraska. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 1-112 (Reissue 2022); 288
Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 5 (2010). One of those rules provides
that a certified public accountant “who accepts a contingent
fee or expects to be paid a contingent fee shall provide writ-
ten disclosure of such acceptance or payment and the basis for
determining such fee to the client.” 288 Neb. Admin. Code,
ch. 5, § 005.03B. Under that rule, a “contingent fee,” with
one exception not relevant here, includes an arrangement “in
which no fee will be charged” by the accountant “unless a
specified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount
of the fee is otherwise dependent upon the finding or result of
such service.” Id.
   Guarantee Group argues that Lavalleur is attempting
to enforce a contingent fee agreement for certified public
accountancy services and that he offered no evidence that he
provided Guarantee Group with the written disclosure required
by the administrative rule. In support of its argument that
Lavalleur is attempting to enforce a contingent fee agreement,
Guarantee Group points to his testimony that he asked to be
paid $800 an hour “if [he] could find a solution,” but that if
he was not “able to do [Guarantee Group] any help,” he would
not be paid.
   We disagree that Lavalleur is seeking to collect a contin-
gent fee for purposes of the administrative rule. Lavalleur’s
testimony that Guarantee Group relies upon pertained to his
discussions with Sean prior to his performing the account­
ancy work at issue. But Lavalleur is not now trying to
recover a fee based on those discussions. Rather, he is trying
to recover based on Sean’s alleged promise to pay $1,000
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
          BRUCE LAVALLEUR, P.C. V. GUARANTEE GROUP
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 698

from every home closing in Copper Creek Estates. This later
alleged promise to pay Lavalleur was not, in the words of
the administrative rule, a promise to pay only if a “specified
finding or result is attained.” 288 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 5,
§ 005.03B. Neither was the amount of the fee “dependent
upon the finding or result.” Id. Instead, at least according to
Lavalleur’s testimony, which must be credited as true at this
stage, Sean simply promised to pay Lavalleur $205,000 with-
out contingencies.
   As we have discussed, a reasonable jury could find that the
parties formed an enforceable contract when Sean promised
to pay Lavalleur $1,000 from every closing in Copper Creek
Estates for his accountancy work. Such a contract would not
even be covered by the administrative rule relied upon by
Guarantee Group. Accordingly, we see no basis to find that
the district court should have granted a directed verdict to
Guarantee Group on the grounds that the alleged contract was
void as against public policy.
                        CONCLUSION
   We reverse the district court’s directed verdict with respect
to Bruce Lavalleur, P.C.’s claim that Guarantee Group
breached an oral contract to pay for accounting services and
remand the cause for a new trial on that issue. Because no
challenge is raised on appeal to other aspects of the district
court’s judgment, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the
district court.
                  Affirmed in part, and in part reversed
                  and remanded for a new trial.