Court Opinion

ID: 9440290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 15:01:44.956439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.008605
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1089    Document: 35     Page: 1   Filed: 08/03/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                  JOSHUA E. BUFKIN,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2022-1089
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 20-3886, Judge Michael P. Allen.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: August 3, 2023
                 ______________________

    KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter
 Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

     SARAH E. KRAMER, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,
 LOREN MISHA PREHEIM; CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, BRIAN D.
 GRIFFIN, Office of General Counsel, United States Depart-
 ment of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.
                   ______________________
Case: 22-1089     Document: 35     Page: 2    Filed: 08/03/2023

 2                                     BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, HUGHES and STOLL, Circuit
                           Judges.
 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
     Joshua Bufkin appeals the final decision of the United
 States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims denying ser-
 vice connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. Be-
 cause we find no legal error in the Veterans Court’s
 interpretation of its standard of review and the benefit of
 the doubt rule, we affirm.
                               I
     Mr. Bufkin served in the U.S. Air Force from Septem-
 ber 2005 to March 2006. In July 2013, he filed a claim for
 service connection for several conditions, including an ac-
 quired psychiatric disorder. In support, he submitted VA
 medical records reflecting his visits with a VA psychiatrist,
 Dr. Robert Goos, between February 21 and June 21, 2013.
 In his notes, Dr. Goos stated that “in every aspect he meets
 [the] criteria for [post-traumatic stress disorder
 (“PTSD”)],” J.A. 20, but he could not identify the specific
 stressor or whether the stressor relates to Mr. Bufkin’s mil-
 itary service. In March 2014, a VA regional office denied
 service connection for PTSD because “[t]he available medi-
 cal evidence [was] insufficient to confirm a link between
 [his] symptoms and an in-service stressor.” J.A. 23.
     In July 2014, Mr. Bufkin submitted a lay statement for
 his service connection claim for PTSD. Subsequently, VA
 scheduled an examination with a VA psychiatrist, who
 opined that his “symptoms do not meet the diagnostic cri-
 teria for PTSD.” J.A. 26. In an August 2015 decision, VA
 continued the denial of service connection for lacking a
 PTSD diagnosis. Mr. Bufkin filed a notice of disagreement,
 arguing that Dr. Goos’ favorable 2014 opinion and the VA
 examiner’s unfavorable 2015 opinion were in equipoise,
 and therefore, VA was legally obligated to grant service
 connection.
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 BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH                                        3

     In April 2018, Mr. Bufkin underwent another VA ex-
 amination with a different examiner. The second examiner
 also concluded that his symptoms “do[] not meet [the diag-
 nostic] criteria for PTSD.” J.A. 54. In May 2018, VA issued
 a statement of the case, continuing the denial of service
 connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. He ap-
 pealed that decision to the Board. While his appeal was
 pending, VA received a statement from another VA psychi-
 atrist. The third examiner opined that in addition to a se-
 vere anxiety disorder, he “suffers from chronic PTSD due
 to a number of issues, but . . . [s]ome examiners do not con-
 sider this to be PTSD.” J.A. 103.
      In February 2020, the Board issued a decision denying
 service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. The
 Board found that the preponderance of evidence supported
 a finding that Mr. Bufkin does not have PTSD.
      The Veterans Court affirmed. The Veterans Court
 found no error in the Board’s application of the benefit of
 the doubt rule under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). Section 5107(b)
 provides that “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of
 positive and negative evidence regarding any issue mate-
 rial to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall
 give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” In other
 words, if the competing evidence is in “approximate bal-
 ance” or “nearly equal,” then the benefit of the doubt rule
 requires the Board to rule in favor of the veteran. Lynch v.
 McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 781 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc).
 The Veterans Court explained that the Board considered
 conflicting medical statements but found Dr. Goos’ diagno-
 sis of PTSD less persuasive than the conflicting June 2015
 opinion “because the June 2015 opinion provided a more
 comprehensive review of appellant’s military and medical
 history.” J.A. 8. The Veterans Court concluded that this
 “finding is not clearly erroneous. And thus, the benefit of
 the doubt doctrine does not apply here.” Id. (footnote omit-
 ted).
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 4                                     BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH

     Mr. Bufkin now appeals.
                              II
      We review de novo the Veterans Court’s interpretation
 of law. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
 Unless an appeal from the Veterans Court decision pre-
 sents a constitutional issue, this Court may not review “a
 challenge to a factual determination,” or “a challenge to a
 law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular
 case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)(A)–(B).
     Because Mr. Bufkin argues that the Veterans Court
 wrongly interpreted 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), we have juris-
 diction.
                              A
     This case is another in a series challenging various as-
 pects of the benefit of the doubt rule. See, e.g., Mattox v.
 McDonough, 56 F.4th 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2023); Roane v.
 McDonough, 64 F.4th 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2023). In Mattox, we
 held that “when conducting a benefit-of-the-doubt-rule
 analysis, as in other settings, the Board is required to as-
 sign probative value to the evidence” rather than simply
 identifying and labeling each piece of evidence as positive
 or negative. Mattox, 56 F.4th at 1378. In Roane, we held
 that the Veterans Court reviews “the Board’s factual deter-
 minations for clear error while taking due account of the
 Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule.” Roane,
 64 F.4th at 1311 (emphasis added).
      Here, Mr. Bufkin raises two related legal arguments:
 first, whether § 7261(b)(1) requires the Veterans Court to
 take due account of the Secretary’s application of the ben-
 efit of the doubt rule without consideration of the Board’s
 application; and second, whether § 7261(b) requires a de
 novo, non-deferential review of how the benefit of the doubt
 rule was applied.
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 BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH                                         5

       Mr. Bufkin first argues that the Veterans Court erred
 by taking due account of the Board’s application of
 § 5107(b) rather than taking due account of the Secretary’s
 application of § 5107(b). Pet. Br. 9. In support, he points to
 the plain text of § 7261(b)(1), which states “the Court shall
 . . . take due account of the Secretary’s application of sec-
 tion 5107(b) (emphasis added).” Section 5107(b), as quoted
 above, codifies the benefit of the doubt rule. He contends
 that § 7261(b)(1)’s use of the term “Secretary,” not Board,
 requires the Veterans Court to review how the benefit of
 the doubt rule was applied throughout the claims process,
 rather than the Board’s consideration of that issue.
     When construing the plain meaning of the statute, we
 “must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as
 well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”
 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
 Here, reading the statutory text in a broader context, we
 hold that the term “Secretary” in § 7261(b)(1) includes the
 Secretary acting in his capacity as the Board for the pur-
 pose of making a final agency decision.
     The term “Secretary” in § 7261(b)(1) simply mirrors the
 same term in § 5107(b), which states “the Secretary shall
 give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant (emphasis
 added).” See Atl. Cleaners & Dryers, Inc v. United States,
 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (“[T]here is a natural presumption
 that identical words used in different parts of the same act
 are intended to have the same meaning.”). Under § 5107(b),
 “the Secretary” reviews the record to determine whether
 the benefit of the doubt rule should apply. We have long
 interpreted “the Secretary” in § 5107(b) to refer to the
 Board. See, e.g., Lynch, 21 F.4th at 781 (holding that the
 application of the benefit of doubt rule under § 5107(b) de-
 pends on whether the Board is persuaded by the evidence);
 Roane, 64 F.4th at 1310–11 (explaining that the “take due
 account” language in § 7261 requires the Veterans Court to
 review the Board’s application of the benefit of doubt rule).
 Hence, when § 7261(b)(1) refers to “the Secretary’s
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 6                                       BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH

 application of section 5107(b),” the term Secretary encom-
 passes the Board acting on behalf of the “Secretary” in
 § 5107(b). Curiously, in parts of his brief, Mr. Bufkin con-
 cedes that the “Secretary” in § 7261(b)(1) refers to the
 Board. Pet. Br. 13 (“[W]hen Congress refers in § 7261(b)(1)
 to ‘the application of the provision of § 5107(b)’ this Court
 must assume that Congress was referring to the Secretary
 acting in his capacity as the Board.”).
     This understanding is also consistent with how the
 term Secretary was defined in the jurisdictional statute,
 § 7104(a). Section 7104(a) reads, “[a]ll questions . . . subject
 to decision by the Secretary shall be subject to one review
 on appeal to the Secretary (emphasis added).” When we pre-
 viously considered the meaning of “one review on appeal to
 the Secretary,” we understood it to mean a review by the
 Board acting on behalf of the Secretary. Disabled Am. Vet-
 erans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 327 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed.
 Cir. 2003). “By statute, the Board is an agent of the Secre-
 tary,” id., and its jurisdictional authority stems from dele-
 gation by the Secretary. Hence, “the Secretary” is an
 umbrella term that encompasses the Board in certain con-
 texts.
      Apart from the statutory text of § 7261(b)(1),
 Mr. Bufkin also points to a different statutory provision,
 § 7252(b), as evidence that Congress intended the Veterans
 Court to review the entire records before the Secretary, not
 just the Board. Pet. Br. 13–14. Section 7252(b) reads,
 “[r]eview in the [Veterans] Court shall be on the record of
 proceedings before the Secretary and the Board (emphasis
 added).” He argues that the review by the Veterans Court
 necessarily includes the application of the benefit of doubt
 rule, and therefore, the Veterans Court erred by only re-
 viewing the record of proceedings before the Board. How-
 ever, his interpretation reads out the rest of § 7252(b),
 which states “[t]he extent of the review [under § 7252(b)]
 shall be limited to the scope provided in section 7261 of this
 title.”
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 BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH                                         7

     The Veterans Court clearly can review the entire rec-
 ord as long as its review is confined to the scope prescribed
 in § 7261. See Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1331–
 32 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Bowling v. McDonough, 38
 F.4th 1051, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2022); Euzebio v. McDonough,
 989 F.3d 1305, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2021). For instance, in Buck-
 linger v. Brown, the Veterans Court reviewed the entire
 record, including those parts not explicitly relied on by the
 Board, to determine if a plausible basis existed for the
 Board’s factual determination. 5 Vet. App. 435, 439 (1993).
 Unable to find one, the Veterans Court reversed the
 Board’s decision, explaining that a reversal is warranted
 under both the benefit of the doubt rule and clearly errone-
 ous standard applied to a finding of fact under § 7261(a)(4).
 Id. This interpretation is consistent with our understand-
 ing of the Veterans Court’s review in a parallel provision,
 § 7261(b)(2), which also directs the Veterans Court to take
 due account of the Board’s application but for rule of prej-
 udicial error. There, we explained that “the take due ac-
 count” provision authorizes the Veterans Courts to “consult
 the full agency record, including facts and determinations
 that could support an alternative ground for affirmance.”
 Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1334.
     So we agree with Mr. Bufkin that the Veterans Court
 can review the entire record of proceedings before the Sec-
 retary in determining whether the benefit of the doubt rule
 was properly applied. Where we part ways is with his ex-
 pansive interpretation of § 7261(b)(1) that would require
 the Veterans Court to sua sponte review the entire record
 to address the benefit of the doubt rule even if there was no
 challenge to the underlying facts found by the Board or to
 the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule. Sec-
 tion 7261(a) explicitly prohibits such an expansive inter-
 pretation of the Veterans Court’s jurisdiction. It states, in
 relevant parts, that the Veterans Court “shall decide” is-
 sues only “when presented.” § 7261(a). We similarly ob-
 served that this express jurisdictional limit in § 7261(a)
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 8                                       BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH

 shows Congress’s intent not to “grant the Veterans Court
 sua sponte powers that would set it apart from other [Arti-
 cle III] courts.” Dixon v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 799, 803 (Fed.
 Cir. 2016). Therefore, if no issue that touches upon the ben-
 efit of the doubt rule is raised on appeal, the Veterans
 Court is not required to sua sponte review the underlying
 facts and address the benefit of the doubt rule.
     Section 7252(b) cannot serve as an independent basis
 to expand the Veterans Court’s scope of review beyond
 what is prescribed in § 7261. All that is required under
 § 7261(b)(1) is for the Veterans Court to review the Board’s
 application of the benefit of the doubt rule. Of course, in the
 context of that review, the Veterans Court can review the
 entire record, but it does so in the context of whether the
 Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule was cor-
 rect. The Veterans Court did not err by refusing to examine
 independently how the benefit of the doubt rule was ap-
 plied during the claims process at the regional office.
                               B
     Mr. Bufkin next argues that § 7261(b) requires the Vet-
 erans Court to conduct a “de novo, non-deferential” review
 of the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule.
 We recently addressed the same issue in Roane. There, the
 veteran also argued that the “take due account” language
 in § 7261(b) requires the Veterans Court to conduct an “ad-
 ditional and independent non[-]deferential review” of the
 Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule. Roane,
 64 F.4th at 1309. We specifically “decline[d] to adopt [such
 a] far-reaching interpretation of the phrase ‘take due ac-
 count.’” Id. We explained that the scope of the Veterans
 Court’s review is limited by § 7261(c) and § 7261(a):
 § 7261(c) expressly prohibits de novo review of material
 facts by the Veterans Court; and § 7261(a) allows the Vet-
 erans Court to review facts only under the clearly errone-
 ous standard. Id. at 1310. Accordingly, we held that the
 Veterans Court properly reviewed the Board’s factual
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 BUFKIN v. MCDONOUGH                                        9

 determination for clear error while taking due account of
 the Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule. Id.
 at 1311.
     Here, the Veterans Court properly considered the
 Board’s application of the benefit of the doubt rule. The
 Veterans Court explicitly noted the Board’s consideration
 of conflicting medical opinions and the Board’s conclusion
 that “the June 2015 opinion [finding that he did not have
 PTSD] [is] more persuasive than the opinions showing a
 diagnosis of PTSD.” J.A. 8. The Veterans Court concluded
 that the Board did not misapply the benefit of the doubt
 rule, because, as the Board explained, “the June 2015 opin-
 ion provided a more comprehensive review of
 [Mr. Bufkin]’s military and medical history.” J.A. 8; Lynch,
 21 F.4th at 781 (holding that the benefit of the doubt rule
 “does not apply when [the Board] is persuaded by the evi-
 dence to make a particular finding”). The Veterans Court
 also found that the underlying facts supporting the Board’s
 conclusion are not clearly erroneous. J.A. 8. Hence, the Vet-
 erans Court applied the appropriate standard of review,
 clear error, and properly took account of the Board’s appli-
 cation of the benefit of the doubt rule.
                              III
     Because we conclude that the Veterans Court did not
 err by taking due account of the Board’s application of the
 benefit of the doubt rule and applied the appropriate stand-
 ard of review under § 7261(b)(1), we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.