Court Opinion

ID: 9906091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 21:08:11.711521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.770621
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 50

                               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                         CARMEN SABATER, AN INDIVIDUAL;                                        No. 85161
                         AND VINCENT JAMES DESIMONE,
                         AN INDIVIDUAL,
                         Appellants,
                                                                                               FILED
                         vs.
                         SHAUN RAZMY, AN INDIVIDUAL,
                         Respondent.

                                    Appeal from a district court order dismissing a tort action for

                        failure to timely effect service of process. Eighth Judicial District Court,
                        Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
                                   Affirmed.

                        Feher Law, APC, and Andrew Alexandroff, Torrance, California,
                        for Appellants.

                        Christian, Kravitz, Dichter, Johnson & Sluga, LLC, and Gena L. Sluga, Las
                        Vegas,
                        for Respondent.

                        BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, CADISH, PICKERING, and BELL, JJ.

                                                        OPINION

                        By the Court, BELL, J.:
                                  Following a car crash, Appellants Carmen Sabater and Vincent
                        Desimone filed a lawsuit against Respondent Shaun Razrny for personal

                        injuries. Sabater and Desimone failed to serve the summons and complaint
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                   on Razmy within 120 days. As a result, the district court issued an order to
                   show cause. After that order issued, the summons and complaint were
                   served, and Razmy filed a motion to quash the service of process and to
                   dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the motion to dismiss,
                   denying Sabater and Desimone's late motion for an extension of time to

                   serve process. Sabater and Desimone appeal, arguing the district court
                   improperly denied their request for an extension of time to serve the
                   summons and complaint and Razmy's motion to dismiss was itself untimely.
                              When a party fails to effectuate service of process and fails to

                   request an enlarged period for service within 120 days of the complaint's
                   filing date, that party must show good cause for the initial delay in
                   requesting an extension before a motion to extend the time to serve can be
                   considered. Here, because Sabater and Desimone failed to plead good cause
                   for the delay in moving for an enlarged period for service, the district court
                   did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an extension of time
                   to serve the complaint.
                              After the period for service closes, a party may seek the
                   dismissal of an action under NRCP 12(b)(4) when there is insufficient
                   service. Although NRCP 12(b) does not permit the filing of a motion to
                   dismiss based on insufficient service after a responsive pleading has been
                   filed, the rule does not contain any other time limit for filing the motion to
                   dismiss. Here, no responsive pleading had been filed when Razmy filed his
                   motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint, so the motion was not
                   untimely. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when
                   it denied the request for enlargement of time to serve and dismissed the
                   action.

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                                  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            In 2019, Sabater and Desimone were involved in a car crash

                with Razmy. On August. 26, 2021, Sabater and Desimone filed a negligence
                complaint against Razmy. Per NRCP 4(e)(1), the summons and complaint
                needed to be served on Razmy within 120 days, or by December 24, 2021,
                but Sabater and Desimone neglected to calendar the date. As a result,
                December 24 passed without Sabater and Desimone serving the summons
                and complaint. Due to the lack of service, on February 23, 2022, the district

                court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed.
                Following the order to show cause, on March 15, Sabater and Desimone
                served Razmy with the summons and complaint and filed proof of service
                with the district court. Service occurred 81 days after the 120-day deadline.
                           One month later, on April 15, Razmy moved to quash the service

                of process as untimely and to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely
                serve. Any opposition to this motion was due by April 29, but Sabater and
                Desimone failed to file a timely opposition.        Razmy filed a notice of

                nonopposition on May 6, requesting the district court grant the motion as
                unopposed. An opposition was eventually filed on May 20.
                           In the opposition, Sabater and Desimone argued Razmy's motion

                to quash was untimely, as it needed to be filed within the 21 days provided
                post-service for defendants to file an answer. Sabater and Desirnone also
                denied being served with Razmy's motion to quash. Additionally; Sabater
                and Desimone sought leave to retroactively extend the 120-day period for
                service of the summons and complaint, having failed to request such an
                extension within the statutory period. Sabater and Desimone argued a
                clerical calendaring error and high rates of turnover at their counsel's office
                supported good cause to grant the extension.

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                          Razmy replied to the opposition, pointing out that Sabater and
                Desimone's counsel failed to register an email address with the district
                court and provide a Nevada address to the State Bar of Nevada. Without
                this required information, Razmy's attorney was forced to search prior
                email correspondence to locate an email suitable for service and sent notice
                to another lawyer at the firm.
                            After a hearing, the district court declined to grant Sabater and
                Desimone an extension, finding they did not prove good cause existed for
                their failure to file a motion to extend the service deadline before that
                deadline expired. Instead, the district court granted Razmy's motion to
                disniiss, finding that the motion was timely filed before the filing of any
                answer and that because Sabater and Desimone failed to serve the
                summons and complaint within the statutory time frame, dismissal was
                required. Sabater and Desirnone appeal the district court's dismissal of the
                complaint without prejudice.
                                            DISCUSSION
                            On appeal, Sabater and Desirnone .argue the district .court
                abused its discretion by denying their motion for an extension of ti.me to
                serve the summons and complaint. They also argue Razrny's motion to
                quash was untimely pursuant to NRCP 12 and should have been denied..
                The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an
                extension of time to serve the surnrnons and complaint or in granting
                Razrny's motion to disrniss
                            Sabater and Desimone claim. that the district court abused its
                discretion by denying their motion for an extension of time to effectuate
                service. We review a district court's denial of a motion for an extension of
                time to serve for an abuse of discretion. Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart
                Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 595, 245 P.3d. 1.198, 1200 (2010).
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            The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
retroactive request for an extension of time to serve Razmy, as Sabater and
Desimone failed to demonstrate good cause for their late motion. A request
for an extension of time to serve a summons and complaint must be made
within the initial 120 day-period for service, a threshold requirement for
relief under NRCP 4(e)(4) and Saavedra-Sandoval, 126 Nev. at 597, 245
P.3d at 1201. When a party fails to file a timely motion to extend time for
service, that party must demonstrate •good cause exists for the untimely

request before the court will considèr whether good cause exists for an
extension. Id. "Only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing
the motion to enlarge time should the court then engage in a complete
Scrimer analysis to determine whether good cause also supporth the request
for enlargement of time for service of process . . . ." Id.; see also Scrimer v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 507, 516-17, 998 P.2d 1190, 1195-96
(2000) (establishing various factors to determine whether good cause exists
to allow a plaintiff to serve process beyond the 120-day deadline).
            Sabater and Desimone did not request an extension of time for
service until 147 days after the period for service had closed. In thatmotion,
Sabater and Desimone addressed whether there was good cause for an
extension; however, they did not present separate argument regarding any
good cause for the failure to request this extension within the 120-day
deadline. When asked, counsel admitted being unfamiliar with our holding
in Saavedra-Sandoval. Therefore, Sabater and Desirnone have waived any
argument on appeal regarding possible good cause for their failure to make
a timely request for an extension. Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev.
49, 52; 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the tria). court, unless
it goes to the jurisdiction of that Court, is deemed to have been waived and

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                      will not be considered on appeal."). Moreover, we need not address the
                      district court's analysis of the Scrimer factors because Sabater and
                      Desimone's failure to show good cause for the untimely motion for an
                      extension rendered consideration of those factors moot. Scrirner, 116 Nev.
                      at 516-17, 998 P.2d at 1195-96. We conclude that the district court did not
                      abuse its discretion in denying the motion for an extension of time to serve

                      the summons and complaint.
                      The district court properly dismis,sed for failure to timely serve process
                                  Sabater and Desimone contend that the district court abused
                      its discretion by granting Razmy's motion to dismiss. We review lain order
                      granting a motion to dismiss for failure to effect timely service of
                      process . . . for an abuse of discretion." Abreu v. Gilmer, 115 Nev. 308, 312-
                      13, 985 P.2d 746, 749 (1999). We review the district court's interpretation
                      of NRCP 12(b) de novo. Marquis & Aurbach v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
                      122 Nev. 1147, 1156, 146 P.3d 1130, 1136 (2006). "When a rule is clear on
                      its face, we will not look beyond the rule's plain language." Morrow v.
                      Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. 110, 113, 294 P.3d 411, 414 (2013).
                                  The plain language of NRCP 12 provides no time restraint on a
                      defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of service before a responsive
                      pleading has been filed. NRCP 12(a)(1)(A)(i) requires that defendants serve
                      an answer to a complaint "within 21 days after being served with the
                      summons and complaint." Prior to filing an answer, a defendant may assert
                      certain defenses by motion. Those defenses include insufficient servi.ce of
                      process. NRCP 12(b)(4); see a,lso Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116
                      Nev. 650, 656, 6 P.3d 982, 986 (2000) (explaining that, under NRCP 12(o),
                      "before a defendant files a responsive pleading such as an answer, that
                      defendant• may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdictiori,
                      insufficiency of process, and/or insufficiency of service of process").
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                             While no other time limit governs a motion filed under NRCP

                12(b)(4), a defendant takes risks filing such a motion beyond the 21 days
                provided for answering the complaint—if the motion or an answer is not
                filed by 21 days after service, a plaintiff could obtain a default. NRCP 55.
                Even so, "[d]efault . .. is not automatic." Opaco Lumber & Realty Co. v.
                Phipps, 75 Nev. 312, 314, 340 P.2d 95, 96 (1959), superseded by .statute on
                other grounds as stated in Simmons Self-Storage Partners, LLC v. Rib Roof,
                Inc., 130 Nev. 540, 548, 331 P.3d 850, 855 (2014); see also Scheinwald v.
                Bartlett, 51 Nev. 155, 157-58, 271 P. 468, 468-69 (1928) (noting that where
                no default is entered, district courts have discretion to allow an untimely
                answer).
                             Here, Razmy did not file an answer. Instead, Razmy filed a
                motion to dismiss the complaint for insufficient service of process 31 days
                after the complaint was served. Razmy risked default by failing to make
                any defensive filing within 21 days of.service, but given the lack of a pre-
                answer deadline to file /notions under N.RCP 12(b)(4), the motion to dismiss
                was not untimely. We conclude the plain language of NRCP 12 supports
                the district court's ruling, and we find no error in the district court's decision
                to grant the motion to dismiss. Because Razmy's motion to dismiss was
                timely, Sabater and Desimone did not serve Razmy within 120 days, and
                the district court properly denied an extension of time to serve, the case was
                properly dismissed nnder NRCP 4(e)(2).

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                                               CONCLUSION
                             When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate good cause for failing to
                seek an extension of time to serve the summons and complaint within the
                120-day period prescribed by NRCP 4(e), the district court may properly
                deny an untimely motion for an extension of time. Additionally, under
                NRCP 12, a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process may be filed
                at any time before a responsive pleading is filed. Absent the filing of a
                responsive pleading or entry of a default, a motion to dismiss for insufficient
                service of process is not untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
                order dismissing the complaint.

                                                                                           , J.
                                                             Bell

                We concur:

                  6,“
                Cadish
                                              J.

                Pickering

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