Court Opinion

ID: 9941072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 20:03:09.852481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:12.131525
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Ludwig CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081107

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD287753)

 KENNETH JAMES LUDWIG,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kenneth K. So, Judge. Affirmed.
         Kenneth James Ludwig, in pro. per.; and Lindsey M. Ball, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Kenneth James Ludwig pled guilty to one count of continuous sexual

abuse of a child (Pen. Code,1 § 288.5, subd. (a)) and eight counts of
committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). In accordance with the

1        Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
terms of his plea bargain, the trial court sentenced Ludwig to 22 years in
prison.
      Ludwig appeals. His appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief
raising no arguable issues and requesting that we exercise our discretion to
review the record for potential issues under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d
436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Ludwig
also filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.
      We have independently reviewed the record and find no arguable issue
that would result in a modification or reversal of the judgment. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In October 2020, Ludwig was charged by felony complaint with two
counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) and 25 counts
of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)) for molesting his
younger sisters when the girls were under the age of 14 years old. In July
2021, the trial court held a preliminary hearing. Two of Ludwig’s younger
sisters testified at the hearing that Ludwig had molested them (and others)
over the course of several years. Much of the abuse took place when Ludwig
was an adult and his sisters were between the ages of 7 and 13. The
prosecution also played a recording of a pretext call that took place between
Ludwig and one of his sisters, during which Ludwig admitted to molesting all
four of his younger sisters when the girls were children.
      In July 2022, Ludwig pled guilty to one count of continuous sexual
abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a)) and eight counts of committing a lewd act
upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). In exchange, the prosecution dismissed the
balance of the charges filed against him in the third amended information,
which included one additional count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and

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eight additional counts of committing a lewd act upon a child. The parties
agreed that Ludwig’s exposure at sentencing would range from probation to
28 years in state prison. The parties further agreed the factual basis of the
plea would be the third amended information’s allegations underlying each
count of conviction.
      The trial court accepted the plea agreement by its terms and ultimately
sentenced Ludwig to 22 years in prison.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief summarizing the facts and
proceedings below, arguing no specific contentions as grounds for relief, and
asking this court to review the entire record for error as mandated by Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. To assist the court in its review, and in compliance
with Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, counsel identified the following possible,
but not arguable, issues: (1) “Whether the sentence, in consideration of
appellant’s age at the time of the offenses and current health circumstances,
constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment”; (2) “Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
probation despite it being authorized by the plea agreement”; and
(3) “Whether appellant is entitled to credits for time spent on electronic
monitoring without court-ordered home supervision.” Some of these issues
overlap with the contentions raised by Ludwig in his supplemental brief.
      None of the issues identified has arguable merit. As to the first,
Ludwig’s guilty plea precludes him from attacking his sentence on the ground
that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Section 1237.5 provides that “[n]o appeal shall be taken by the
defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty . . . except
where” the trial court has issued a certificate of probable cause for the

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appeal. The prosecution agreed to a sentence of 0 to 28 years in prison in
return for Ludwig’s plea. Ludwig now claims that the sentence he received,
which was within that agreed-upon range, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. “By arguing that [his] sentence is unconstitutional, [Ludwig] is
arguing that part of his plea bargain is illegal and is thus attacking the
validity of the plea.” (People v. Young (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 827, 832
(Young); see also People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 770–771 (Shelton)
[same].) Ludwig did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, so he cannot
contest the validity of his plea. (§ 1237.5; Young, at p. 832; Shelton, at
p. 771.)
      As to the second issue, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
declining to grant probation. “A denial of a grant of probation generally rests
within the broad discretion of the trial court and should not and will not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” (People v. Edwards (1976)
18 Cal.3d 796, 807.) An appellate court should only interfere with the trial
court’s discretion in denying probation in “a very extreme case.” (People v.
Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 278, internal quotation marks omitted.)
This is not one of those cases. Ludwig pled guilty to nine counts of molesting
three of his younger sisters over the course of many years. The trial court
emphasized that Ludwig’s conduct had “caused incalculable damage to the
victims” and found several aggravating factors existed, including the
significant emotional injury to the victims, the fact that Ludwig took
advantage of a position of trust as the victims’ older brother, and the
vulnerability and young age of the victims at the time the abuse took place.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.414(a)(4), 4.414(a)(9), 4.421(a)(3).) These

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findings are supported by the record and establish that the court properly
exercised its discretion in denying probation.
      On the issue of custody credits, we also find no grounds for reversal.
Defendants are generally entitled to credit for days spent “in custody.”
(People v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 289.) This includes pretrial
and postjudgment detainees who participate in a home detention program.
(People v. Yanez (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 91, 93, 99–100; People v. Gerson
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1091.) Ludwig contends he is entitled to credit
for the period he wore an electronic monitor prior to sentencing. However,
there is no evidence that Ludwig was actually home-detained or that the
electronic monitor restricted his movements in any way. We therefore
conclude he was not “in custody” during the period he wore the electronic
monitor and is not eligible for custody credits. (See People v. Anaya (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 608, 613 [reversing an award of custody credits where the
defendant’s “electronic monitoring agreement did not restrict her
movements”].).
      Ludwig also filed his own supplemental brief raising additional
contentions. None has arguable merit. Ludwig contends that his sentence is
unconstitutional and the remainder of his sentence should be suspended
under section 1170, subdivision (a). He further asserts that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because the statute of limitations had
expired on certain of the charges against him to which he pled guilty and
because counsel failed to sufficiently inform him that only his sentence would
be appealable if he accepted a plea bargain, that he had the opportunity to
present additional facts to the court at sentencing under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(4), and that his Harvey waiver had significant consequences.

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      As we have explained, Ludwig cannot attack the constitutionality or
validity of his sentence because he did not obtain a certificate of probable
cause. (§ 1237.5; Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 832; Shelton, supra, 37
Cal.4th 759 at pp. 770–771.) To the extent Ludwig contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in sentencing him to 22 years in prison, we again
reject that contention. Ludwig entered a negotiated plea agreement and was
sentenced in accordance with that agreement. His sentence of 22 years was
within the parties’ agreed-upon range of 0 to 28 years and thus properly
imposed in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. We cannot say
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
      Finally, Ludwig’s claim that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding his plea ultimately attacks the validity of that
plea. Again, this claim cannot be raised on direct appeal absent a certificate
of probable cause. (§ 1237.5; Young, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 832; Shelton,
supra, 37 Cal.4th 759 at pp. 770–771.) Nor does the record demonstrate that
his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that Ludwig suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel’s
representation. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688.)
      We have reviewed the entire record, as required by Anders, supra, 386
U.S. 738, and Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and determined that there are no
arguable grounds for reversal. We have also determined that Ludwig
received competent representation in his appeal.

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                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

DO, J.

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