Court Opinion

ID: 9906309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 17:10:08.311706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:14.532196
License: Public Domain

J-S12034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 RYAN HO                            :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 19 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001076-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 RYAN HO                            :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 20 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001078-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 RYAN HO                            :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 21 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001079-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S12034-23

                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 22 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001080-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 23 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001081-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 24 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001085-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :

                                -2-
J-S12034-23

 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 25 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001100-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 26 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001102-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 27 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001110-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 28 MDA 2022

                                -3-
J-S12034-23

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001120-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 29 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001127-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 30 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001131-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RYAN HO                              :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 31 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County

                                -4-
J-S12034-23

           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001135-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 RYAN HO                               :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 32 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001231-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 RYAN HO                               :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 33 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001232-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 RYAN HO                               :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 34 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 23, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001233-2011

                                 -5-
J-S12034-23

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 01, 2023

       Ryan Ho appeals from the order denying his first petition filed pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. On

appeal, Ho contends that the lower court erred in dismissing his petition and

further asserts that he adequately demonstrated that his trial counsel

provided him with ineffective assistance. Specifically, Ho avers that counsel

failed to file a suppression motion predicated on two somewhat-related issues

that immediately preceded the time of his arrest. Ho also raises claims as to

the effectiveness of his prior PCRA counsel’s handling of these issues under

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). After a thorough

review of the record, we affirm the two discrete issues raised by appellate

PCRA counsel. However, for the reasons explained below, we remand for

further proceedings.

       Although Ho was charged and convicted at sixteen separate docket

numbers featuring offenses ranging from, inter alia, burglary to criminal

trespass to indecent assault, the only factual underpinnings relevant to the

present appeal are at docket number CP-14-CR-1100-2011, the events of

which directly led to his arrest on May 19, 2011. As best as can be gleaned

from the record, at 2:38 a.m., Centre County police officers were notified via

dispatch call on that date of a home invasion in State College, Pennsylvania,

which involved an almost entirely naked male wearing a black mask prying
____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

                                           -6-
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open a door frame and subsequently gaining access to an apartment. As

reported, upon entering, the perpetrator masturbated and sexually assaulted

the victim. After some period of time, which involved a struggle on the ground

between the victim and perpetrator, the perpetrator stood up and ran outside

of the apartment.

      Immediately thereafter and close in proximity to the apartment, at

around 2:40 that same morning, Ho was seized by a police officer on foot who

later would testify that he, as a nearby resident, was intimately familiar with

the layout of the apartment complex where the assault took place. At that

point, Ho appeared to be sweating and was wearing dark, but unzipped,

clothing. Moreover, his hair looked as though he had been wearing something

over his head. To that officer, Ho appeared to have been walking in a hurried

fashion on or towards the footpath, coming from hilly terrain, where he was

initially spotted. During this police interaction, Ho was ordered to stop. He was

then patted down, whereupon a screwdriver, black mask, surgical mask, and

latex gloves were found. In addition, the victim, who arrived with another

officer, requested, for identification purposes, that a mask be placed on Ho’s

head. This act resulted in the victim recognizing Ho as the individual who both

broke into her apartment and then proceeded to sexually assault her. Ho was

subsequently arrested.

      Eventually, on the afternoon following his arrest, Ho confessed to being

involved in all of the sixteen criminal cases in which he would ultimately be

found guilty. Specifically, among other admissions, Ho admitted to targeting

                                      -7-
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Asian females and acting in ways that would minimize his risk of getting

caught. Subsequent DNA analysis linked him to two of the sixteen crime

scenes.

      After being charged, Ho’s trial counsel filed a motion to suppress Ho’s

confession, alleging that it was involuntary, which was ultimately denied.

Following a three-day jury trial, Ho was convicted on all sixty-eight counts he

faced, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of twenty-six to fifty-two years

of incarceration.

      Ho’s trial counsel then concurrently filed post-sentence motions and a

motion to withdraw from representation. Thereafter, Ho’s trial counsel was

permitted to withdraw, and the court appointed the Centre County Public

Defender’s Office to represent him. Several months later, the court denied

Ho’s post-sentence motion.

      After this denial, Ho filed a notice of appeal to this Court, which resulted

in an affirmance of his judgment of sentence. Following our disposition, Ho

petitioned our Supreme Court for further review, but was denied an allowance

of appeal by that Court on May 29, 2014. Ho did not file a petition for certiorari

with the United States Supreme Court.

      On June 26, 2015, Ho, while counseled, filed a PCRA petition, his first,

alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On March 17, 2016, Ho filed an

amended PCRA petition, which, too, asserted ineffective assistance of counsel.

Despite including since-abandoned claims, the amended petition also raised

the two counseled issues that are currently in dispute.

                                      -8-
J-S12034-23

       On December 14, 2017, the PCRA court1 held an evidentiary hearing.

That hearing featured an examination into trial counsel’s reasons for not

challenging Ho’s initial investigatory detention and, separately, the seizure of

items that were uncovered from the police officer’s pat down. Following this

hearing, the court denied PCRA relief on November 7, 2018.

       PCRA counsel then sought leave to withdraw as counsel, which was

granted. Ho, in a pro se capacity, filed a motion for reconsideration of the

PCRA court’s dismissal of his petition. The court granted Ho’s motion on

December 3, 2018.2 Eventually, Ho, still pro se but apparently at that point

with the benefit of standby counsel, filed an amended PCRA petition on June

12, 2019. Finally, the court, on November 23, 2021, entered an order denying

PCRA relief without any further evidentiary hearing. Ho, while continuing to

be pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal from this decision. However, after

this filing, new PCRA counsel was appointed to represent him, and Ho

____________________________________________

1The judge overseeing PCRA proceedings was the same judge who sat for
Ho’s trial.

2 Although the PCRA court fully disposed of Ho’s PCRA claims in its November

7, 2018 order, the court did not lose jurisdiction over the PCRA proceedings
at that time because it granted reconsideration within thirty days of the date
of entry of its order. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505; Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3);
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 65 (Pa. 2007). Therefore,
notwithstanding the PCRA court’s statement in its most recent opinion that Ho
had “previously litigated,” Trial Court Opinion, 11/23/21, at 5, the claims at
issue in this appeal despite proceeding pro se with a subsequent amendment
after the November 7, 2018 dismissal, we agree with Ho that his PCRA claims
were not finally disposed of until the court filed its November 23, 2021 order
that is currently on appeal.

                                           -9-
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continues to be represented by this counsel in the present appeal. Ho, through

his current appellate PCRA counsel, filed an appellate brief raising two issues,

the first based upon the ineffectiveness of trial counsel and the second upon

the ineffectiveness of Ho’s prior PCRA counsel.

      On July 25, 2023, this Court issued a memorandum materially disposing

of those two claims. However, in a document dated July 31, 2023, and filed

August 3, 2023, Ho submitted a pro se “Application for Reargument and

Appointment of New Counsel”. In that filing, Ho purports to raise additional

ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Bradley, this time against his

current appellate PCRA counsel. Inter alia, Ho contends that appellate PCRA

counsel failed to raise meritorious issues before this Court that had been

allegedly raised by Ho before the PCRA court in a pro se capacity. See, e.g.,

Application for Reargument and Appointment of New Counsel, 8/3/23, at 8-9.

Normally, Ho’s application, filed while he was still represented by counsel,

would constitute a legal nullity, given this Court’s general prohibition on hybrid

representation. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623

(Pa. Super. 2016).

      In light of our Supreme Court’s Bradley decision, which allows for “a

petitioner to raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first

opportunity … even if on appeal,” 261 A.3d at 401 (emphasis added), this

Court granted panel reconsideration and withdrew the July 25, 2023

memorandum. Thereafter, on October 2, 2023, we issued an order directing

Ho and/or appellate PCRA counsel to: (1) file an application to proceed pro se,

                                     - 10 -
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(2) retain independent private counsel; or (3) file a petition to withdraw from

representation and request the appointment of new counsel. See Order,

10/2/23, at 6-7. On October 23, 2023, Ho’s appellate PCRA counsel filed a

petition to withdraw and simultaneously requested the appointment of new

counsel.

       In this memorandum, we initially address the two questions raised by

PCRA appellate counsel in his brief filed in this Court:

       1. Did the lower court err in dismissing his PCRA petition, which
          alleged the ineffectiveness of trial counsel for failing to have
          filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the
          investigative detention prior to his arrest was illegal given that
          law enforcement lacked a reasonable suspicion to seize him?

       2. Did the lower court err in dismissing his PCRA petition, which
          alleged the ineffectiveness of trial counsel predicated on
          counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress evidence given
          that the Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] frisk and
          subsequent search was illegal as law enforcement lacked a
          reasonable basis to believe that he was armed and dangerous?

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.3

       Substantively, as an appeal stemming from the denial of a PCRA

petition, our standard of review “is limited to examining whether the PCRA

court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is

free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court's credibility determinations,

____________________________________________

3 We note that Ho did not raise any claim as to effectiveness of current
appellate PCRA counsel’s presentation of these claims in his pro se “Application
for Reargument and Appointment of New Counsel.”

                                          - 11 -
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when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply

a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      Both of Ho’s counseled claims argue that he received ineffective

assistance from his trial counsel for having failed to file a suppression motion

as it related to both the initial stop, described as an investigative detention,

and the subsequent pat-down that was performed on him.

      Preliminarily,   this   Court   presumes   counsel’s   effectiveness.   See

Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 666, 678 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly, to

overcome this presumption, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) his

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel lacked a reasonable basis for

its actions or omissions; and (3) the petitioner resultantly suffered actual

prejudice. See Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015).

The failure of a petitioner to meet any one of these three prongs is fatal to an

ineffective assistance claim. See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409,

419 (Pa. 2009).

      In the context of a suppression motion,

      [t]his Court has previously found that “[t]he failure to file a
      suppression motion under some circumstances may be evidence
      of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v.
      Metzger, 441 A.2d 1225, 1228 ([Pa. Super.] 1981); see also
      Commonwealth v. Ransome, 402 A.2d 1379, 1381 ([Pa.]
      1979). “However, if the grounds underpinning that motion are
      without merit, counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to
      so move.” Metzger, 441 A.2d at 1228. “[T]he defendant must

                                       - 12 -
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      establish that there was no reasonable basis for not pursuing the
      suppression claim and that if the evidence had been suppressed,
      there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been more
      favorable.” Commonwealth v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 839 ([Pa.
      Super.] 1989).

Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016) (parallel

citations omitted).

      Ho first argues that trial counsel should have sought the suppression of

his initial detention on May 19, 2011—and any evidence collected as a result

of his detention—because when the officer encountered him at or around the

footpath and then proceeded to detain him, there was no reasonable suspicion

for the officer to engage him in that manner.

      The police are permitted to stop and briefly detain citizens only
      when they have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
      articulable facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.
      Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153, 1156 ([Pa.] 2000)
      (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968));
      Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226, 228 ([Pa.] 1996);
      Commonwealth v. Hicks, 253 A.2d 276, 280 ([Pa.] 1969). In
      determining whether reasonable suspicion exists for an
      investigative detention, or as it is also known in the common legal
      vernacular, a “Terry stop,” the inquiry is the same under both the
      Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
      1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v.
      Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 ([Pa.] 1999); Commonwealth v.
      Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 ([Pa.] 1997). “The fundamental
      inquiry is an objective one, namely, whether ‘the facts available
      to the officer at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man of
      reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
      appropriate.’” Zhahir, 751 A.2d at 1156 (citing Terry, supra, 392
      U.S. at 21–22). In order to determine whether the police had a
      reasonable suspicion to subject an individual to an investigative
      detention, the totality of the factual circumstances which existed
      at the time of the investigative detention must be considered. Id.
      (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
      “Among the factors to be considered in establishing a basis for

                                    - 13 -
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      reasonable suspicion are tips, the reliability of the informants,
      time, location, and suspicious activity, including flight.”
      Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Ayala, 791 A.2d 1202, 1208 (Pa. Super. 2002) (parallel

citations omitted). To ascertain whether an investigative detention, in fact,

occurred, the standard is whether “a reasonable person does not feel free to

terminate an encounter with the police and leave the scene[.]” Id. (citation

omitted).

      “To demonstrate reasonable suspicion, the detaining officer must

articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

hunch.” Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted). “To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, we

examine the totality of the circumstances through the eyes of a trained officer

and not an ordinary citizen.” Id. (citation omitted).

      None of the parties dispute that the initial officer’s encounter of Ho,

wherein Ho was prohibited from terminating the engagement with that officer,

constituted an investigative detention. Accordingly, the officer was required

to have reasonable suspicion to command Ho to cease all movement. Ho

contends that at the point of interception, the officer, based on his own

testimony, only knew, via a police radio call, that there had been “a trespass

and sexual assault” and that Ho was in the immediate area of where those

two criminal activities occurred. N.T., 5/30/12, at 20-21. Through the lens of

the other officer who had been with the victim, that second officer described

                                     - 14 -
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the radio call as a “trespass occurring” and containing “some information

about a male being in an apartment.” Id., at 9. As such, “no additional

information was given to responding officers by dispatch beyond the attacker

being a male[.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 32. Moreover, the victim indicated that

during the break-in and assault, she could “only see [her attacker’s] eyes and

mouth and nose.” Deposition of Li Wang, 4/30/12, at 10. The victim also noted

that her attacker was taller than her. See id., at 27-28.

      Ho implicitly asserts that the general information identified, supra,

cannot support an investigatory detention. Specifically, “even where the

circumstances surrounding an individual’s conduct suggest ongoing illegality,

the individual may not be detained unless his or her personal conduct

substantiates involvement in that activity.” Commonwealth v. Morrison,

166 A.3d 357, 365 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). In other words, there

must be “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular

person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. (citation and emphasis omitted).

      At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel, after some level of refreshing her

memory, stated that the police report “reflects that what [the first officer]

heard [prior to encountering Ho] was that there was a tall, thin Asian male

who was involved. The male had been wearing a mask.” PCRA Hearing,

12/14/17, at 8. In addition, counsel’s “understanding from the record [was]

that when [that officer] stopped … Ho, … Ho was the only male, Asian male in

the area[.]” Id. That officer, who noted the proximity to the apartment,

                                    - 15 -
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testified that Ho “was walking like he had a purpose, walking in a hurry.” N.T.,

5/30/12, at 22. In addition, Ho “had total hat head[,]” implying some level of

disheveled appearance. Id.; see also id., at 24 (stating that Ho’s “pants were

unsnapped at [the] time[]”); at 26 (reemphasizing that Ho’s pants “were

unsnapped and unzipped[]”).

      “[T]he totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an

examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,

even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant

further investigation by the police officer.” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 908

A.2d 924, 927 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The lower court, here, held that

      the totality of the circumstances indicates that officers had
      reasonable suspicion to detain [Ho]. The victim of a sexual assault
      gave a description of her attacker as a tall, thin Asian man wearing
      a mask. [Ho] was the only Asian male in the area, and was found
      only 400-500 yards away from the scene of the attack. Further,
      [Ho] was sweating and appeared to have just removed something
      from his head. He was walking away from the scene of the attack
      at a high rate of speed and his pants were unzipped. Under these
      facts, officers clearly had reasonable suspicion to detain [Ho] long
      enough to conduct an investigation to verify or dispel their
      suspicions[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/18, at 5.

      While Ho contends that “the radio description of the individual suspected

in the burglary … was simply that the alleged perpetrator was a male[,]”

Appellant’s Brief, at 36, the reasonableness of the initial investigatory

detention was not germane to the adjudication of Ho’s guilt at trial, and

                                      - 16 -
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therefore, there was no reason to delve into the specific contents of the

underlying radio report in that proceeding. As evidenced by the subsequent

testimony of trial counsel during PCRA proceedings, the broadcasted

description contained significantly more information than that the alleged

perpetrator was a male.

      This case is distinctly not a situation where Ho’s “mere presence” at a

“particular place” implied to the detaining officer that he had “engaged in

criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Hayward, 756 A.2d 23 (Pa. Super.

2000). Instead, even if all of the elements were construed as innocent in

isolation, Ho’s physical and temporal proximity to the crime scene, racial and

physical profile matching reported attributes of the attacker, unkempt

appearance, and hurried actions went beyond an unparticularized suspicion,

forming reasonable suspicion to inquire further into Ho’s presence and prior

whereabouts. As such, there is no merit to the assertion that a suppression

motion would have been meritorious on this basis, and trial counsel did not,

therefore, provide ineffective assistance by not raising a suppression claim as

to the grounds for his detention.

      Notwithstanding the fact that the officers, at trial, did not have any

inherent reason to delve into the contents of the police report identifying the

radio call that preceded his arrest, Ho seems to refute trial counsel’s ability to

provide evidence of her knowledge of that report’s contents at the subsequent

PCRA hearing, wherein more descriptive elements of the attacker were placed

                                     - 17 -
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on the record. Ho provides no authority to establish that the court was

prohibited from considering trial counsel’s post-trial recitation of the original

pre-interception police description of the assailant. To be clear, at the hearing,

it was unequivocally asked “what was the description that [the officer]

indicated was given to him for stopping … Ho?” PCRA Hearing, 12/14/17, at

8. Conversely, Ho’s claim that “the [PCRA] court considered among the totality

of the circumstances facts that were completely unsupported by the record[,]”

Appellant’s Brief, at 40, is itself erroneous based on, inter alia, trial counsel’s

testimony.

        Relatedly, Ho, through his current PCRA counsel, argues that his PCRA

counsel who represented him at the time of the PCRA hearing was ineffective

under our Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley. As Ho notes in his brief,

Bradley allows PCRA petitioners to “raise claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal[]” following

a PCRA court’s denial of relief and appointment of new counsel. 261 A.3d at

401. Ho faults former PCRA counsel’s lack of inquiry at the hearing into the

report trial counsel relied upon in identifying the description known to police

officers at the time of his investigative detention. He also argues that prior

PCRA counsel should have confronted trial counsel with the officers’ trial

testimony in which they stated that they stopped Ho based upon a report of a

male.

        While, certainly, the source of the report trial counsel relied upon at the

                                       - 18 -
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PCRA hearing could have been better illuminated for record purposes, it is

apparent from the transcript that trial counsel refreshed her recollection at the

hearing with a description of the perpetrator of the alleged assault that was

broadcast on radio and heard by the officer who stopped Ho. PCRA Hearing,

12/14/17, at 7-8 (when asked why she did not file a suppression motion as to

the detention, trial counsel asked whether she could “review a report that I

think would refresh my memory on that issue” and then described the

contents of the report). Ho has not alleged in his brief that the report identified

by trial counsel was absent from the discovery and other materials which she

had in her possession at the time she filed her suppression motion, nor does

Ho claim that the officer was not in fact in possession of the report at the time

he stopped Ho. Instead, Ho merely relies on the trial testimony of officers

regarding the stop, which, as discussed above, is in no way dispositive on the

question of whether a suppression motion challenging the stop would be

successful. Ho’s claim of prior PCRA counsel ineffectiveness is thus nothing

more than a “hindsight ‘gotcha’ scenario[]: i.e., [that] counsel should have

done this or [] should not have done that,” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 104

A.3d 267, 285 (Pa. 2014), and lacks any substantiation of how or whether

prior PCRA counsel’s actions in cross-examining trial counsel on the source of

the report detailing the suspect’s appearance or ensuring that the report was

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admitted into evidence would have resulted in a contrary result. 4 We

accordingly determine that Ho’s Bradley claim lacks merit and further that

Ho is due no relief on his first appellate issue.

       In his second claim, Ho asserts that trial counsel should have filed a

motion to suppress related to the Terry frisk that was performed on him, as

said frisk led to the discovery of incriminating items on his person. A Terry

frisk allows a police officer, during a valid investigatory stop, to perform a pat-

down of an individual’s outer garments to search for weapons if that officer

observes any sort of suspicious conduct that leads to a reasonable belief that

the individual may be armed and dangerous. See Commonwealth v. E.M.,

735 A.2d 654, 659 (Pa. 1999). “In order to justify a frisk under Terry, the

officer must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably

inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Such a frisk, permitted without a warrant

and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause, must

____________________________________________

4 Ho also argues that former PCRA counsel should have objected to trial
counsel’s testimony regarding the report as hearsay. However, trial counsel
did not rely on the report to establish its truth but simply to explain what she
relied upon in making the decision not to raise a suppression claim as to the
investigative detention. Therefore, counsel’s recitation of the contents of the
report at the PCRA hearing was not hearsay. Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84
A.3d 324, 336 (Pa. Super. 2014) (reports by detective and doctor admitted at
PCRA hearing were not hearsay where they admitted “not for the truth of the
matters set forth therein, but rather for the purpose of establishing counsel’s
strategic basis for not calling [a particular witness] to testify and the lack of
prejudice resulting from the decision not to do so”).

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always be strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of

weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If, during a Terry frisk,

officers come across contraband that is immediately apparent, then there is

no contravention of the warrant requirement. See Minnesota v. Dickerson,

508 U.S. 366, 375-77 (1993).

      In directly addressing Ho’s contention, the lower court held that

      it was immediately apparent based on the totality of the
      circumstances that the items seized were instruments of a crime.
      [Ho] was suspected of having committed a violent crime minutes
      prior to being detained; officers therefore had reasonable concern
      to believe [Ho] posed a threat to their safety. During the frisk,
      officers not only discovered the mask, gloves, and hood, but a
      screwdriver. The victim reported that her attacker was wearing
      the mask and gloves during the attack, and therefore, in light of
      the fact that [Ho] was found near the scene of the attack, it was
      objectively reasonable for officers to conclude the mask was
      contraband.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/18, at 6.

      Ho claims that the detaining officer “did not testify that at the time of

the stop, before frisking him, [Ho] was acting nervously or threateningly or

displayed any suspicious behavior other than walking quickly.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 50. In addition, that officer “did not testify as to how or why the

encounter in the instant case escalated from a detention to a reasonable basis

to believe that [Ho] was armed and dangerous.” Id.

      Ho is correct insofar as there is no direct trial testimony from the

detaining officer establishing that the officer believed Ho was likely to have a

weapon. However, as detailed above, we place no weight on his trial testimony

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as the officer’s basis for conducting the stop was not directly relevant to the

Commonwealth’s proof at trial. Rather, the record is abundantly clear that the

officer knew that a violent crime had just been committed, which involved

forcible access to the victim’s apartment. Consistent with what happened

here, “[t]he facts known to the officer prior to the frisk in question show that

a crime of violence was reported[.]” Commonwealth v. Prengle, 437 A.2d

992, 995 (Pa. Super. 1981). And, then, “within minutes of the reported crime,”

id., the officer, in the middle of the night in the immediate location of the

incident, saw a disheveled individual walking briskly, matching the reported

description of the assailant. Based on the known elements of the reported

crime in addition to Ho’s unusual gate and appearance, this Court is obligated

to “not ignore the probable existence of danger[.]” Id. It was therefore

permissible, if not his implicit reason, for the officer to believe that Ho was

armed and presently dangerous, and a Terry frisk stemming from that belief

was not unreasonable. Therefore, there is no merit to contention that trial

counsel was ineffective for having not filed a suppression motion as it

pertained to the Terry frisk.

      Furthermore, we conclude that Ho’s counseled Bradley claim lacks

arguable merit as former PCRA counsel was not ineffective where the

underlying ineffectiveness claim as to trial counsel’s inaction of the

suppression motion also lacks arguable merit. See Commonwealth v.

Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (“Where a petitioner alleges

multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a

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preponderance of the evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness

relevant to each layer of representation.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, Ho

did not demonstrate prejudice by his previous PCRA counsel where the only

allegation of deficient performance was former counsel’s misstatement of the

Terry legal standard in a brief submitted to the PCRA court, yet the lower

court    recited   the   correct   standard     and   appropriately   analyzed   the

constitutionality of the stop in its opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/18,

at 6.

        In seeing no merit to either of the issues raised by appellate PCRA

counsel in this appeal, we affirm the lower court’s order dismissing Ho’s PCRA

petition to the extent it rested upon its consideration of the two counseled

claims addressed above. However, we are required to remand this matter for

the PCRA court to address the additional Bradley claims Ho sought to raise in

his pro se “Application for Reargument and Appointment of New Counsel” as

well as appellate PCRA counsel’s petition to withdraw and request for the

appointment of new counsel, filed in response to our October 2, 2023 order.

While “[i]n some instances, the record before the appellate court will be

sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness claims[,]”

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402, in the present case the record is not fully developed

to allow for the consideration of the ineffectiveness claims Ho included in his

pro se filing. Therefore, we necessarily must “remand to the PCRA court for

further development of the record” and presentation of these claims and to

allow the PCRA court to address these issues in the first instance. Id.

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      Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/01/2023

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