Court Opinion

ID: 9561933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:19:02.267259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.077136
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice:
(dissenting).
Plaintiffs appeal from a district court decision granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We should reverse and grant plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and specific performance under the contract of sale.
The stipulation of the parties shows plaintiff was the assignee of a “first right of refusal,” or a “preemptive right,” to which the real property owned by defendant Wilde was subject. This court recognized at an early date that a preemptive right is a valuable contract right and since “there is nothing unfair or unjust about such a provision” the court will enforce it.1 Further, this court has recognized that a preemptive right is not an option until such time as the promissor chooses to sell the land. At that time the promisee “has the first opportunity to purchase the property at the price at which the owner will sell to anyone.”2 (Emphasis is supplied.) A preemptive right is a valuable contract right because of the flexibility it allows. A preemptive right provision need state nothing *1056more than, if the promissor at any time chooses to sell, then the promisee has the right to purchase at whatever price and under whatever terms the promissor is willing to accept from a third party. This arrangement allows the seller to take advantage of price fluctuations while leaving the buyer free to decide whether he will exercise his preemptive right.
The flexibility of the preemptive right allows for differing interpretations of its exact terms but the courts have consistently disallowed attempts to deprive the holder of his right for which “a valuable consideration” has been paid.3 The specific language in question gave the holder (plaintiff) of the preemptive right the opportunity to purchase “at the lowest bona fide price and upon the same terms [that the promissors were] willing to accept from any other vendee.” Research does not reveal any pri- or case in which a party has attempted, or a court has found it necessary, to construe the above language to allow the promissor to accept a third party offer for consideration other than money. Granting, however, that a third party offer could be for value other than money it is painfully obvious the promissor, regardless of any motive of good or bad faith, cannot demand that the prom-isee, to exercise his right, must offer the exact item of value which the third party has offered. In other words “[w]here liability under a contract depends on a condition precedent one cannot avoid his liability by making the performance of the condition precedent impossible, or by preventing it.”4
Further, there is no doubt that since a preemptive right is a contract the promisee must “manifest a definite intention to accept the offer and every part thereof . .,” when confronted by a third party offer acceptable to the promissor.5 Considering the unique nature of the preemptive right which allows the exact terms of a contract to be fixed at an undetermined future point, by the offer of someone not a party to the preemptive right contract, the prom-isee has only the obligation to meet the third party offer by a corresponding offer equal in value. It is clear plaintiff (prom-isee) was ready and willing to match the third party offer, not only in monetary amount, but also by offering to purchase for defendant (promissor) any house equal (or greater by $2,000) in value to the house which the third party was offering. It seems quite clear from the factual setting the third party had control (an option to purchase) over the house which was included in its offer to Mrs. Wilde.
To require anything more of the promisee would in great measure destroy the evident purpose of the right of first refusal.

. Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622 (1912).

. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah, 1976).

.Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622 (1912). See also Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Texas Co., D.C., 113 F.Supp. 514 (1953); Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225 Md. 433, 171 A.2d 736 (1961); Barling v. Horn, 296 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. 1956); R. F. Robinson Co. v. Drew, 83 N.H. 459, 144 A. 67 (1928); Tamura v. De luliis, 203 Or. 619, 281 P.2d 469 (1955); Driebe v. Fort Penn Realty Co., 331 Pa. 314, 200 A. 62 (1938).

. Gulf Oil Corp. v. American Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 6 Cir., 282 F.2d 401, 404 (1960); 5 Williston, Contracts § 677 (3d ed. 1961).

. R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817, 819 (1952).