Court Opinion

ID: 9726078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:30:06.520621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.368304
License: Public Domain

CHEZEM, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Clayton’s petition as to the trial court’s advisement. The suspension of one’s driver’s license is not a punishment imposed by the court as a result of a guilty plea, but a collateral consequence of the conviction. See Stoltz v. State, 657 N.E.2d 188 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995). As such, the trial judge need not have informed Clayton of the potential license suspension ramifications of a conviction.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the court’s summary denial of the ineffectiveness issue was erroneous. In general, to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Hinkle *787v. State, 605 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied. Where a defendant challenges counsel’s performance after pleading guilty, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 204. In Stoltz, we did not decide whether Stoltz’s counsel was deficient for failing to inform him about the administrative consequences of his plea. Rather, we based our holding upon the conclusion that Stoltz had “failed to establish that he would not have pleaded guilty but would, instead, have insisted upon going to trial” if he had been informed of the administrative consequences. Stoltz, 657 N.E.2d at 193.
The present case forces a decision on the question left unanswered in Stoltz. Unlike the majority, I would hold that a criminal defense attorney’s failure to advise his client of the civil or administrative consequences of a conviction does not rise to the level of deficient performance for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, assuming Clayton is correct that his trial attorney did not advise him of the civil or administrative consequences, that lack of advisement was not error on his attorney’s part. Clayton’s attorney represented him in the criminal matter only — not in the administrative matter. If that same attorney represented Clayton in the administrative proceedings and failed to inform Clayton of the administrative consequences, perhaps he would be ineffective in the administrative ease. However, the criminal case is separate from the administrative proceeding. To hold an attorney deficient for failure to inform a client of all the possible noncriminal, collateral consequences which could occur as a result of a criminal conviction would place a time-consuming, unnecessary burden upon an attorney who only agreed to represent his client in a criminal matter. I would affirm the lower court’s summary denial of this issue as well. Moreover, in view of my resolution of this issue, in this particular ease, I believe the court’s lack of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law is harmless error.