Court Opinion

ID: 9745126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:36:10.111466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:56.399308
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: The majority correctly concludes “that the prosecutor improperly commented upon the defendant’s *** failure to testify in his own defense at trial.” (137 Ill. 2d at 214.) However, the majority refuses to consider whether the prosecutor’s comments mandate reversal in this case because the majority concludes that such comments do not constitute plain error. (137 Ill. 2d at 215-16.) Because my review of the record indicates that the plain error rule is applicable in this case, I would review the defendant’s claim concerning the prosecutor’s improper comments and reverse the defendant’s conviction. The plain error rule may be invoked in criminal cases to review an error which has not been properly preserved for review (1) where the evidence is closely balanced, or (2) where the error is of such magnitude that the defendant was denied a fair trial. (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 576-77.) As I will explain, both prongs of the test have been met here. A primary purpose of the plain error rule is to guard against the “possibility that an innocent person may have been convicted due to some error which is obvious from the record, but not properly preserved.” (Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 576.) In criminal cases where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, it is unlikely that the defendant’s conviction could be attributable to a relatively “minor” error that occurred at trial. On the other hand, where the evidence in support of guilt is less conclusive, i.e., where the evidence is “closely balanced,” there is a much greater probability that even a so-called “minor” error at trial was a causal factor in the defendant’s conviction. Thus, in cases where the evidence of guilt is closely balanced, this court will invoke the plain error doctrine to determine whether an unobjected-to error at trial constituted reversible error. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 576. I fail to understand how the majority can conclude that “[t]he evidence here cannot reasonably be regarded as closely balanced” (137 Ill. 2d at 210). According to the majority, the store clerk’s uncertain identification testimony, the fact that the defendant was with a man who matched the description of the white robber one hour after the robbery occurred, and the fact that the defendant did not introduce any evidence to contradict the State’s claim that the defendant was guilty all point to the “convincing” conclusion that the defendant is guilty. (137 Ill. 2d at 210.) I am not convinced. As the majority recognizes, the store clerk’s testimony is far from conclusive. On cross-examination, the clerk admitted that he only saw the black robber’s face for one or two seconds and that the light in the pawnshop at the time he saw the black robber was “kind of dim.” The clerk also testified that, two or three days after the robbery occurred, he was unable to positively identify the black robber from a series of photographs he was shown. Instead, all that the clerk could say at that time was that the black robber was either the defendant or another man shown in the photographs. Even at trial, the clerk was not certain of his identification as he testified that he was only “ninety percent sure” that the defendant was one of the men who robbed him. It is true that “the fact that a witness does not positively identify a defendant at trial *** does not render his testimony invalid” (137 Ill. 2d at 204), and that such uncertain testimony can establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Slim (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 302, 309). However, as the majority recognizes, the fact that an identification is uncertain does have an effect upon the weight that should be accorded the identification. (137 Ill. 2d at 204; see also People v. Strother (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 95, 100-01; People v. Jackson (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 573, 584.) As I have described, the clerk in this case was never certain in his identification of the defendant. All that he could say with any certainty is that one of the robbers in this case was a black man. Such uncertain identification testimony, I believe, should not be accorded the weight attributed to it by the majority in determining whether the evidence in this case is closely balanced. The majority opinion also finds it significant that the defendant was found one hour after the robbery at a house with a man who fit the description of the white robber. (137 Ill. 2d at 210.) Also found at the house were the stolen jewelry and the car that was used in the robbery. The circumstantial evidence in this case, even when viewed in conjunction with the clerk’s uncertain identification, is far from conclusive. I note that the stolen money and the gun used in the robbery were not found at the house where the defendant was found. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the defendant possessed the stolen property or even knew that it was in the house. The majority also bases its conclusion that the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was convincing on the fact that “[t]here was no evidence to contradict the conclusion that [the defendant] was guilty.” (137 Ill. 2d at 210.) This statement, however, is not entirely correct. It is true that the defendant did not introduce any evidence that directly contradicted the State’s case. However, defense counsel, through cross-examination, established that the clerk’s identification of the defendant could have been erroneous. Defense counsel also established that the stolen cash and the gun used in the robbery were not found. Both lines of cross-examination support the conclusion that a black man other than the defendant committed the crime, and therefore “contradict the conclusion that [the defendant] was guilty.” The evidence in this case, in sum, only establishes the following with any certainty: (1) a black man and a white man committed the robbery; (2) one hour later, the defendant, a black man, was present at a house with the white man who committed the robbery; (3) some of the stolen property and the car used in the robbery were also at the house; and (4) the victim of the robbery thought, but was not sure, that the defendant could have been the black robber. While I agree with the majority that the evidence here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, I think that it is certainly a close case. I therefore would address the defendant’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s comments under the first prong of the plain error doctrine. Even if the evidence in this case was not closely balanced, this court’s prior decisions make clear that the prosecutor’s comments in this case concerning the defendant’s failure to testify constitute plain error under the second prong of the plain error test. Under this second prong, this court will review trial errors, despite the absence of objection, that are “of such magnitude that the commission thereof denies the accused a fair and impartial trial.” Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 576-77. The majority concludes that the second prong of the plain error rule is inapplicable in this case because, according to the majority, “this court [in People v. Whitehead (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 425, 448] has held that an improper reference to the accused’s failure to testify in his own behalf at trial is not an error which is so substantial that it deprives the accused of a fair and impartial trial.” (137 Ill. 2d at 215.) Unfortunately, the majority’s reading of Whitehead is incorrect. What this court actually held in that case was “we do not believe that the prosecutor’s remarks in the context in which they were made would have been construed by the jurors as comments on the defendant’s failure to testify.” (Whitehead, 116 Ill. 2d at 448.) Thus, the holding in Whitehead was that the prosecutor’s comments did not constitute error, and so this court did not consider whether the error created by such comments, had the comments been improper, would have been of sufficient magnitude to constitute plain error. In People v. Burton (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 53, 56, and People v. Wollenberg (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 480, 488, however, this court held that prosecutorial comments which call attention to a defendant’s failure to testify do constitute plain error. (See also People v. Morgan (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 437, 441.) Although not explicitly stated, it is apparent that the holdings in Burton and Wollenberg were based on the second prong of the plain error rule, as neither case involved closely balanced evidence. Accordingly, this court’s decisions in Burton and Wollenberg make clear that the prosecutor’s comments in this case should be reviewed under the second prong of the plain error rule. Having concluded that the prosecutor’s comments concerning the defendant’s failure to testify constitute plain error, I turn now to the question of whether the defendant’s conviction should be reversed. Prosecutorial references to a defendant’s failure to testify, such as the comments made in this case, violate the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. (Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 613-14, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 109-10, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1232-33.) Because the prosecutor’s comments in this case constituted Federal constitutional error, the defendant’s conviction must be reversed unless the comments were “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-11, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828. As I have explained, the only facts of which we can be relatively certain in this case are that one of the robbers was a black man and that the defendant, a black man, was with the other robber, a white man, one hour after the robbery occurred, at a house where some of the items taken during the robbery were present. The store clerk thinks that the defendant might be the black man who committed the crime. Defendant’s defense is that he did not commit the crime. He claims that the fact that a black man was involved in the robbery, and that he, a black man, happened to be at the house with the white robber one hour after the crime occurred does not prove that he committed the crime. Such a defense is consistent with the store clerk’s uncertain identification. It is also quite plausible that the defendant could have been at the house where he was found for any number of reasons other than that he had gone there with the white robber after committing the crime. The prosecutor’s improper comments in this case called attention to the fact that the defendant did not testify. In particular, the comments emphasized the fact that the defendant did not explain why he was at the house. Such comments were improper in that they may have caused the jury to infer that the defendant’s failure to testify constituted an admission of guilt. See Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 613-14, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 109-10, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 1232-33. In this case, the only evidence directly tying the defendant to the crime was the store clerk’s suspect identification. Thus, the State’s case depends ' largely upon the assumption that the reason the defendant, a black man, was at the house one hour after the crime was committed was that he had been involved in the crime. In this context, I do not believe that the prosecutor’s comments, which implied that the defendant’s failure to provide an explanation for his being at the house constituted an admission that he was there because he was involved in the robbery, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial.