Court Opinion

ID: 9663010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:50.634211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.798059
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). Defendant Charles R. *366Hackett, a black man, was convicted of assault with intent to commit sexual penetration.1 At the time of the offense, both Hackett and the complainant, a white man, were residents at a facility operated by the Michigan Department of Corrections. The complainant testified that Hackett awakened him one night at 2 a.m., placed a pair of scissors against his throat and ordered him to the barracks bathroom where, in a toilet stall, Hackett attempted an act of anal intercourse.
Hackett did not testify at trial. Several witnesses were called on his behalf, however, to testify in support of his theory that the alleged act never occurred or, if it did, that it was consensual and solicited by the complainant. Expert testimony demonstrated that the rear panel of the complainant’s shorts contained the seminal fluid of more than one person. Other defense witnesses testified that it was the complainant who had asked Hackett to accompany him to the barracks bathroom, that the complainant and Hackett had been seen together often and that the complainant and a black inmate had been observed "humping” in the complainant’s bunk.
Prior to trial, Hackett filed a written offer of proof that the complainant had an "established reputation as a homosexual among inmates at Camp Pugsley” and that he had "several close associations of a sexual nature” with black inmates. Hackett also offered to prove that the complainant traded homosexual favors for "benefits” such as marijuana. Hackett’s written motion for admission of the evidence asserted that it was relevant to show that the complainant would be likely to consent to or solicit sexual contact with Hackett, to rebut the assumption that a white *367man would not consent to or solicit sodomy by a black man, and to impeach the complainant’s preliminary examination testimony denying that he was a homosexual.
The circuit judge denied Hackett’s motion for admission without conducting an in camera hearing pursuant to §520j(2) of the Penal Code.2 It appears that the circuit judge considered § 520j(1)3 as an absolute bar to the admission of the proffered evidence. The jury found Hackett guilty of assault with intent to commit sexual penetration. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Defendant James Paquette and a codefendant were convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.4 The complainant, a married woman who was approximately five months pregnant at the time of the alleged rape, testified that, while driving alone, she ran out of gas on a state highway. Paquette and the codefendant stopped to push the complainant’s car to the side of the highway. The two men had an empty gallon jug in their truck and offered to take the complainant to a service station and then return her to her car. She testified that on the way to the service station, the two men could not find ten dollars that they had left in the truck. The men began to accuse her of stealing the ten dollars. After gasoline was dispensed into the truck and the gallon jug, the complainant was not returned to her car; rather, Paquette’s codefendant began driving along various roads in the area. Paquette was seated on the passenger side of the cab and the complainant was seated between the two men.
The complainant testified that Paquette, appar*368ently not satisfied that she had not taken the ten dollars, began to "help” her remove her clothing. Then, according to the complainant, Paquette grabbed her head and forced her to perform fellatio. She complied because of threats made upon her and her unborn child. Subsequently, she was forced to perform fellatio on the codefendant and submit to sexual intercourse with both men. She was then allowed to dress and leave the truck. The complainant walked to a nearby house and was permitted to use the telephone. She called relatives who came to pick her up. The police were notified of the incident and the complainant was taken to a hospital for a physical examination.
Defendant Paquette testified at trial. He confirmed that the complainant had engaged in fellatio and sexual intercourse with both men, but testified that such activity was initiated by her. Paquette testified that, after the gasoline was obtained, the complainant directed the codefendant to drive along certain roads in the area. The complainant unzipped Paquette’s trousers and commenced an act of fellatio. She did the same to the codefendant and both men subsequently had sexual intercourse with her. Although offered a ride back to her car, the complainant got out of the truck to walk to her uncle’s house, which she said was just down the road.
At trial, but out of the presence of the jury, Paquette sought to introduce evidence of the complainant’s reputation for unchastity, that she had engaged in consensual sexual relations with a stranger that she had met in a bar, and that she had made a statement to the effect that she was not obtaining sexual satisfaction from her husband. The evidence was offered as relevant on the issue of consent. The circuit judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible under § 520j. No in *369camera hearing was conducted. The jury found Paquette guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
I
The successful prosecution of criminal sexual offenders — and indeed all criminal offenders — is a vital state interest. Rape victim shield laws, such as § 520j, have been justified as a means of protecting victims from harassing cross-examination5 and embarrassing or humiliating revelation of prior sexual history, 6 thereby encouraging victims to cooperate in the prosecution of offenders. The defendants in the instant cases insist, however, that application of the statute must yield to their fundamental rights to confrontation of opposing witnesses7 and compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.8
A
The exclusion of the evidence proffered in the instant cases cannot be justified as a means of protecting the complaining witnesses from brutal or harassing cross-examination.
In Hackett, the defendant’s motion for the admission of evidence was introduced and denied before trial. In Paquette, the defendant’s offer of proof was made out of the presence of the jury.
*370The defendants in both cases were prepared to prove prior sexual history with the testimony of other witnesses; presentation of evidence was not dependent on cross-examination of the complaining witnesses. Thus a societal interest in protecting complaining witnesses from harassing cross-examination is not implicated in these cases.
B
Neither can the exclusion of the proffered evidence in the instant cases be justified on the ground that it will protect the complaining witnesses from exposure of embarrassing or humiliating prior sexual history to a spouse, relatives, friends, or the general public. The nature of a jury trial is such that when potential evidence is offered, albeit out of the jury’s presence, it becomes a matter of public record. The defendant has an absolute right to make an offer of proof and, if the judge refuses an oral offer, the defendant might make a written offer of proof. The court file and transcript are public records that cannot be suppressed from publication by the media.9 Thus whether offers of proof of prior sexual history become a matter of public notoriety depends on who happens to be in the courtroom and on the media rather than on a rule of law.
II
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.10 Prior sexual history generally is irrelevant. It may be assumed that most persons beyond their early teens are sexually experienced in one form or *371another. There is no need to tell a jury that a man or woman beyond a certain age is likely to have had sexual partners and sexual relations. Evidence that demonstrates only prior sexual experience is generally irrelevant and properly excluded.
The question is whether evidence of prior sexual history that shows more than sexual experience should be admissible. The people seek to exclude the evidence in the instant cases not because it is irrelevant or offensive but because the jury may misuse it. If the evidence were truly irrelevant and offensive, the people would probably not be harmed by its admission because the defendant, by offering harassing evidence, would lose the jury; the evidence would "boomerang.”
What is the misuse that the prosecution seeks to avoid? It is concerned that the jury in Paquette will conclude that this married, pregnant woman is a "loose woman” and, in Hackett, that this white man favors homosexual relations with black men and, on that basis, reject the charges of forcible nonconsensual sexual relations. The premise of the argument for exclusion is thus that the jury cannot be trusted not to characterize the complaining witness as a loose woman or consenting homosexual if they hear the evidence of sexual history, and that the jurors will incorrectly assume that if the complaining witness consented to sex in those circumstances, they cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that she or he did not consent to sex with the defendants.
The defendants must fear the same kind of superficial thinking on the part of the jury that the prosecutor fears. The defendants are properly concerned that the jurors will see the complaining witnesses as persons who are not likely to have consented to the sexual acts, not because they are chaste persons — chastity and unchastity being gen*372erally irrelevant and therefore evidence thereof being generally inadmissible — but because, albeit not chaste, the charged sexual behavior is, in the jurors’ experience, "aberrant.” It is "aberrant” for a married, pregnant woman to be looking for casual sex and it is "aberrant” for a white man to solicit or consent to a sexual relationship with a black man. At least that is what most jurors will think.
Without regard to whether the prosecutor in Paquette asked the jury11 to view the complainant as a married, pregnant woman and to draw the inference that it was improbable that she would be seeking impromptu, casual sexual relations or, in Hackett, that a white man does not consent to a homosexual relationship with a black man, the typical juror may so assume and draw those inferences. The defendant has at least the same need to have the evidence of prior sexual history admitted to counter juror assumption and characterization of the complaining witnesses as being unlikely to consent to "aberrant” sexual behavior the defen*373dants claim was consented to as the people may have need to exclude such evidence to avoid the jury assuming and concluding that because the complainant has engaged in "aberrant” consensual sexual behavior consent was given in the instant case, or at least that it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that consent was not given.
Ill
The procedures in the instant cases violated the defendants’ rights to confrontation and compulsory process and denied them fair trials and due process of law.
In Hackett, the proffered evidence was relevant to rebut jury assumption and inference that a white man would not solicit or consent to an act of sodomy by a black man.12 The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and remanding for a new trial should be affirmed.
In Paquette, the evidence was relevant to rebut jury assumption and inference that a married, pregnant woman does not seek to engage in casual sexual relations. Also, the proffered evidence of the complainant’s statement that she was not obtaining sexual satisfaction from her husband is not evidence of prior sexual conduct and is not within the terms of the rape victim shield law. The evidence of the statement is relevant as tending to make it more probable that the complainant consented to sexual activity than it would be *374without such evidence.13 The decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Cavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of Paquette.

 MCL 750.520g(1); MSA 28.788(75(1).

 MCL 750.520j(2); MSA 28.788(10)(2).

 MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1).

 MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).

 See Berger, Man’s trial, woman’s tribulation: Rape cases in the courtroom, 77 Colum L R 1, 12-13 (1977).

 See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape victim shield laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U Pa L R 544 (1980).

 Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400; 85 S a 1065; 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965).

 Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const, Am VI, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Washington v Texas, 388 US 14; 87 S a 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1967).

 See Globe Newspaper Co v Superior Court, 457 US 596, 610; 102 S Ct 2613; 73 L Ed 2d 248 (1982).

 MRE 402.

 Prior sexual history is relevant and should be admitted when sexual history is first raised by the prosecution. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape victim shield laws and the Sixth Amendment, fn 6 supra, p 583. If the prosecution offers evidence of the complainant’s chastity to show the improbability of consent, the defendant should be permitted to respond with competent and probative evidence.
There is a similar right to respond where the jury may infer improbability of consent apart from testimony or prosecutorial comment. Cf. People v Seaman, 107 Mich 348, 358-359; 65 NW 203 (1895) (similar acts of defendant held admissible to show guilty knowledge and intent):
"Upon principle and authority, it is clear that where a felonious intent is an essential ingredient of the crime charged, and the act done is claimed to have been innocently or accidentally done, or by mistake, or when the result is claimed to have followed an act lawfully done for a legitimate purpose, or where there is room for such an inference, it is proper to characterize the act by proof of other like acts producing the same result, as tending to show guilty knowledge, and the intent or purpose with which the particular act was done, and to rebut the presumption that might otherwise obtain.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 The Court declares that since the defendant was permitted to present some evidence of a past homosexual encounter between the complainant and a black prisoner, the right to confrontation was not denied. It is not proper, however, to exclude relevant evidence because other evidence tending toward the same factual conclusion has been admitted, unless the evidence is excluded as "needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” MRE 403. Because of the reasonable doubt standard, evidence tending to rebut an element — non-consent in this case — of a charged offense will rarely be "needless” or "cumulative.”

 MRE 401.