Court Opinion

ID: 9678616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:25:47.899266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:48.559788
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice COOPER.
Appellee Juanita Merrill, an Ohio resident and the real party in interest in this appeal, was injured in Whitley County, Kentucky, while attempting to enter a bus owned by Appellant Seymour Charter Buslines, Inc. Seymour is a Tennessee corporation with no corporate offices in Kentucky. On June 23, 2000, Merrill filed a civil action for damages against Seymour in the Laurel Circuit Court. On July 11, 2000, Seymour filed an answer in which it did not object to venue. On July 25, 2000, Merrill served interrogatories and requests for production of documents on Seymour. Seymour took discovery depositions on September 8, 2000, and December 17, 2001. Merrill took a discovery deposition on July 16, 2002. Thereafter, on August 8, 2002, pursuant to a motion filed by Merrill to which Seymour objected, the *390trial judge entered an order transferring venue from the Laurel Circuit Court to the Whitley Circuit Court. Seymour then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition to prohibit enforcement of that order. The Court of Appeals denied the petition and this appeal ensued.
Generally, a motion to dismiss or transfer for lack of venue may not be made by the plaintiff who selected the forum. “The plaintiff, by bringing the suit in a district other than that authorized by the statute, relinquished his right to object to the venue.” Olberding v. Illinois Centr. R. Co., Inc., 346 U.S. 338, 340, 74 S.Ct. 83, 85, 98 L.Ed. 39 (1953). See also Manley v. Engram, 755 F.2d 1463, 1468 (11th Cir.1985) (noting general rule that plaintiff waives objection to venue by selecting forum with filing of suit). “Venue is a personal privilege of the defendant.” 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: § 3826, at 73 (2002 Supplement) (emphasis added).
In most instances, the purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial. For that reason, Congress has generally not made the residence of the plaintiff a basis for venue in nondiversity cases.... So long as the plain language of the statute does not open the severe type of “venue gap” that the amendment giving plaintiffs the right to proceed in the district where the claim arose was designed to close, there is no reason to read it more broadly on behalf of plaintiff.
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 2710, 2716-17, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979) (emphasis in original). Thus, by selecting the forum in the first place, and being assured of the opportunity to litigate in the forum where the claim arose, plaintiffs enjoy all the protection they need. Allowing a plaintiff to select one venue and then to change its mind mid-proceeding would encourage forum shopping of the worst kind. (If Judge Hopper had made certain rulings against Merrill, could she have then moved to transfer the case in order to obtain a “more friendly” judge?)
The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure reflect this fundamental principle of law. An objection as to venue must be made according to CR 12.02(c), which clearly labels a venue objection as a “defense.” So, too, does CR 12.08(1), which provides that such “defenses” are waived if not made in a responsive pleading or by Rule 12 motion. Although KRS 452.010(2) provides that a change of venue may be had because of the “odium” attending a party’s “cause of action,” that refers to a counterclaim or crossclaim pursuant to CR 13. The sole exception occurs when the plaintiff has been duped into selecting the initial forum by some deception or omission of the defendant. See Manley, supra, at 1468-69 (permitting plaintiff to object to venue when defendant concealed its actual residence and plaintiff could not in “due diligence” have discovered true residence; “[o]nly in Wonderland could it be said that a plaintiff in this situation ‘knowingly’ waives her objections to venue merely by fifing suit where the defendant appears to reside.”). Kentucky’s “saving” statute, KRS 413.270, applies to extend the limitations period in that circumstance. See D & J Leasing, Inc. v. Hercules Galion Prods., Inc., Ky., 429 S.W.2d 854, 856 (1968). Nevertheless, no deception or omission of Seymour induced the choice of forum here, “and the plaintiff as master of [her] ease is stuck with [her] choice.” Nat'l Adver. Co. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 789 F.2d 571, 574 (7th Cir.1986).
*391The majority opinion also errs in its analysis of KRS 452.105, viz:
In civil actions, when the judge of the court in which the case was filed determines that the court lacks venue to try the case due to an improper venue, the judge, upon motion of a party, shall transfer the case to the court with the proper jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.) This statute was enacted by the 2000 General Assembly. 2000 Ky. Acts, ch. 420, § 1. Although the majority opinion posits that the purpose of the statute was to abrogate our decision in Beaven v. McAnulty, Ky., 980 S.W.2d 284 (1998), Beaven was a case in which the trial judge transferred an action that had been brought in a proper venue to another venue on grounds of forum non conve-niens. Id. at 285. Beaven held that a finding of forum non conveniens is grounds for dismissal, not transfer. Id. at 288. Thus, KRS 452.105, which addresses a situation where an action is brought in the wrong venue, has no effect on our holding in Beaven.
I agree, however, that prior to the enactment of KRS 452.105, actions brought in the wrong venue could not be transferred but could only be dismissed on timely motion of the defendant. Latta v. Sandifer, 13 Ky.L.Rptr. 973 (1892) (no rule of practice or statutory provision permits transfer of an action from one county to another). Typically, prior to the enactment of KRS 452.105, motions to transfer occurred in transitory actions and were made by a plaintiff creditor who had sued a defendant debtor in a county in which the defendant did not reside. Such motions were made after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of venue. Transfer was obviously preferable to outright dismissal because dismissal meant payment of an additional filing fee in the circuit court having proper venue.
Of course, it is still the law of this jurisdiction that venue can be established by waiver. CR 12.08(1).
The provision ... that a personal injury action must be brought in the county in which the defendant resides, or in which the injury was done, is not an absolute requirement, but is one that must be invoked by the defendant if he wishes to compel compliance with it. If he does not invoke it by proper pleading, the question of venue becomes immaterial.
James v. Holt, Ky., 244 S.W.2d 159,159-60 (1951).
In Licking River Limestone Co. v. Helton, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 61 (1967), it was held that “[ujnless the venue was waived, KRS 452.460 fixed Morgan County as the proper place for an action against both defendants, for that was where the collision occurred.” Id. at 63 (emphasis added). Obversely, if venue is waived, it is fixed as the county where the action was brought.
As noted, here, the issue of improper venue was waived when Merrill brought her suit in Laurel Circuit Court and Seymour did not timely object.
The issue of lack of venue was first raised as to Kenneth by the amended answer which was filed after counsel for Company participated in taking depositions, answering interrogatories and moving for summary judgment. This was too late and appellant does not contend as to the claim of Kenneth that venue was not waived.
Id. at 63. Having become, by waiver, the proper venue, the Laurel Circuit Court did not “lack[ ] venue to try the case due to an improper venue” and KRS 452.105 did not apply.
“[Bjecause the trial court acted beyond its jurisdiction when if transferred the instant case on [improper venue] grounds, *392the writ is an appropriate remedy.” Beaven, supra, at 285. Accordingly, I dissent and would order that the writ be issued.
GRAVES and KELLER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.