Court Opinion

ID: 9469121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:32:43.503156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:14.150520
License: Public Domain

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The actions and antics of the federal officials in this case should not be condoned. *305They were egregious, and constituted not only a clear abuse of whatever discretionary powers the officials possessed but also constituted intentional and malicious torts. These officials should be personally liable for their unauthorized and illegal acts. The public purse, however, should not be called upon to finance the carrying on of personal vendettas. Thus, I believe that the “intentional torts” exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976), bars Gross’s recovery in this case, and therefore I dissent. I would simply reverse the district court rather than remand this action.
Section 2680(h) specifically excepts from the coverage of the FTCA assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. The majority errs in allowing the drafting of Gross’s complaint to determine whether his action falls within the exceptions. I would look at the wrongful acts underlying the action, and in this case I conclude that the acts complained of are within the exceptions in § 2680(h).
Unless a court looks at the acts giving rise to a complaint, the applicability of the FTCA will depend on the ingenuity of counsel in drafting the complaint. Courts have held that the determination of whether an action is barred by § 2680(h) depends on the act or acts complained of, rather than the legal theory under which the action is brought. The Tenth Circuit has stated: “We must then look beyond the literal meaning of the language to ascertain the real cause of complaint.” Hall v. United States, 274 F.2d 69, 71 (10th Cir. 1959), quoted with approval in United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 703, 711, 81 S.Ct. 1294, 1298, 1302, 6 L.Ed.2d 614 (1961). See also Johnson v. United States, 547 F.2d 688, 691-92 (D.C.Cir.1976); Gaudet v. United States, 517 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1975); Klein v. United States, 268 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1959).
These cases are consistent with Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531, 540 — 41 (D.C.Cir.1977), cited by the majority at p. 304, ante. The majority here and the Black court correctly point out that it is the wrongs complained of, rather than the damage that results, that is controlling for § 2680(h). However, the cases I have cited stand for the proposition that in analyzing those underlying wrongs, a court should look at the nature of the acts rather than the plaintiff’s characterization.
In the instant case the nature of the acts complained of is such that the acts fall within the exceptions to § 2680(h). For purposes of argument we can assume that Gross made out a case of intentional infliction of emotional distress under South Dakota law as that law is outlined in Chisum v. Behrens, 283 N.W.2d 235 (S.D.1979), cited by the majority at n.22, ante. However, the South Dakota Supreme Court held in Chisum that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress “cannot be sustained where there has been no accompanying physical injury .. . unless there has been some conduct on the part of defendant constituting a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, seduction, or other willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct.” Id. at 240, quoting State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 367, 368, 122 N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963) (emphasis added).
Therefore, if Gross has succeeded in making out a complaint under South Dakota law, he must have shown a direct invasion of his rights such as that involved in the torts listed in § 2680(h). Such invasions in this case include interference with contract rights (because, Gross alleges, the Government failed to fulfill its obligation to pay him money), misrepresentation, libel, and slander (because, Gross alleges, the Government solicited false statements to make him appear ineligible for the feed grain program), and malicious prosecution or abuse of process (because, Gross alleges, his injury stems from misuse of the administrative appeals process). At the very least, South Dakota law requires Gross to show an invasion of rights closely analogous to those invasions of rights listed in § 2680(h), and therefore we should find that the South *306Dakota version of intentional infliction of emotional distress is implicitly included in § 2680(h).
Accordingly, I dissent.