Court Opinion

ID: 9955538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:02:59.321121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.726679
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Thomas CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                       B326905

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. VA061057
         v.

WILLIAM ARTHUR THOMAS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed.
      Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and Gabriel
Bradley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
       William Arthur Thomas appeals the order denying his
petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act
of 2012 (the Act), also known as Proposition 36. (See Pen. Code,
§ 1170.126; People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055, 1059
(Perez).) We affirm. Substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s ruling Thomas was armed with a deadly weapon during
the commission of the underlying crime. Undesignated statutory
citations are to the Penal Code.
                                   I
       We provide a brief overview of the extended proceedings
leading up to, and relevant to, this ruling. Instead of repeating
the facts from our earlier decision affirming Thomas’s
convictions, we incorporate them here. (See People v.
Thomas (May 6, 2002, B148325) 2002 WL 853848.)
       As noted in that decision, a jury convicted Thomas of
kidnapping a child under 14 (§ 208, subd. (b)), indecent exposure
(§ 314(1)), and evading an officer with willful disregard for safety
(Vehicle Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) The jury also found Thomas
had 20 prior robbery convictions.
       In 2001, the trial court sentenced Thomas under the Three
Strikes Law to consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison on
the kidnapping and evasion counts, and to 180 days in county jail
for the indecent exposure count. The court added 15 years under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for prior serious felony convictions.
       We affirmed Thomas’s convictions in 2002. Twelve years
later, Thomas filed his resentencing petition under the Act. Only
the evasion count is the subject of Thomas’s petition and this
appeal.
       The Act gives certain inmates serving a Three Strikes term
the potential for resentencing, provided the statutory eligibility

                                  2
criteria are met and no exclusion applies. (See § 1170.126, subd.
(e); People v. Cruz (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1109 (Cruz).)
       We first addressed Thomas’s petition in 2016, ultimately
reversing and remanding the matter to the trial court in light of
People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674. (See People v.
Thomas (Jan. 14, 2016, B263376) 2016 WL 193474.)
       After various delays, the district attorney opposed
Thomas’s resentencing petition on the basis of Perez, arguing
Thomas had been armed with a deadly weapon during the
commission of the current offense (evading a police officer). This
is one of the exclusions rendering an inmate ineligible for
resentencing under the Act. (See § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii);
Cruz, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.)
      After a hearing, the trial court found Thomas ineligible for
resentencing on this ground beyond a reasonable doubt. (See
Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1059 & 1062 [prosecution’s burden
is proof beyond a reasonable doubt].) The court denied the
petition in an eleven-page memorandum of decision. The court
explained it could not “be disputed that Petitioner was [driving]
in such a way that great bodily injury to one, or many, of the
pedestrian- and driver-bystanders was likely to occur.”
“Petitioner was driving at high rates of speed for most of the
chase, including 75 miles per hour in a residential area that
contained an elementary school, and 35 miles per hour over speed
bumps in a crowded shopping center parking lot with
pedestrians. Petitioner failed to yield to stop signs and red lights
where cross traffic had to [swerve] to avoid colliding with him,
and at one point cars collided with each other in an attempt to
avoid Petitioner’s car.” The court recognized only the
“attentiveness” of pedestrians and other drivers “saved them

                                 3
from suffering great bodily injury caused by Petitioner’s
egregious and erratic driving.”
      On appeal, Thomas contends the evidence was insufficient to
support this ruling.
                                  II
       Cars can be deadly weapons. This law is venerable.
(People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 458.)
       Perez applies this law to the context of resentencing
eligibility under the Act. There, the Supreme Court found
defendant Perez ineligible for resentencing where, in attempting
to flee from the scene of a robbery, he dragged a pursuing store
clerk with his truck. Perez reversed the truck for a ways at 10-20
miles per hour while the clerk’s arm was stuck inside the truck.
The victim pulled himself free when Perez drove forward. He
suffered a few scrapes. (Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1059–
1060.) A jury convicted Perez of assault with force likely to
produce great bodily injury. (Id. at p. 1060.) Our high court
found Perez ineligible for relief under the Act because he was
armed with a deadly weapon (the truck) during the assault. (Id.
at p. 1059.) The court held it was permissible to “rely on facts not
found by a jury” in making this determination. (Id. at pp. 1059 &
1063.)
       According to the court, “armed” means having a weapon
available for use, either offensively or defensively, whereas a
“deadly weapon” is an object used in a way that is capable of
producing and likely to produce death or great bodily injury.
(Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1065.) Cars, while not deadly per
se, may be used in this manner. A fact finder may consider the
nature of the object, how it is used, and all other relevant facts in
making the deadly weapon determination. (Ibid.)

                                 4
       Using Perez as our guide, we hold substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s ruling Thomas was armed with a deadly
weapon when he evaded police. (See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at
pp. 1059 & 1066 [reviewing court defers to trial court’s eligibility
determination if supported by substantial evidence].) We draw
from the trial testimony, and we present the facts in favor of the
prosecution. (See Cruz, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110 [trial
testimony is part of the record of conviction that may be
consulted in ruling on these resentencing petitions].)
     After releasing his kidnapping victim near a convenience
store, Thomas led police on a reckless, high-speed chase from La
Habra to Brea a little after 8:30 p.m.
     It started when Thomas abruptly pulled out of a parking lot
in front of police in an unmarked car. The police followed
Thomas as his car sped up, fishtailed, drove in a bicycle lane to
pass other cars, and ran a red light.
     A marked police car with lights flashing pulled in behind
Thomas. Thomas took off, reaching speeds of 70-75 miles per
hour. He entered a residential area—with a speed limit of 25
miles per hour—going at least twice the limit. Thomas flew
through a four-way stop and nearly hit a car with the right of
way. Another car had to drive onto a curb to avoid Thomas, who
was “all over the road,” driving erratically from one side to the
other.
     Thomas continued ignoring stop signs. Eventually, he pulled
into a busy shopping center. Despite speed bumps and
pedestrians in the parking lot, Thomas kept his speed at about 35
miles per hour. People were entering and leaving the center’s
movie theater at the time. They scattered and ran to avoid being
hit.

                                 5
     When Thomas got back onto a main street, he accelerated,
ran several red lights, weaved in and out of traffic, and reached
speeds of 80 miles per hour. At one heavily congested
intersection, Thomas slammed on his brakes. He sailed through
the intersection and avoided a collision “[b]y the grace of God.”
The pursuing officer thought “for sure [ ] we were going to have a
really big crash at that point[.]”
     Thomas kept going. He turned into oncoming traffic. Then
he hit the center median and blew out two tires. Two cars
swerved to avoid him and crashed into each other. Even then,
Thomas kept driving on the wrong side of the road.
     With the flat tires reducing his speed, Thomas pulled into a
church parking lot full of churchgoers leaving a service. Then he
fled on foot.
      Thomas used his car in a way that qualified it as a deadly
weapon. It was not necessary for Thomas to have struck a victim
or intended to hurt someone. Thomas’s prolonged escapade posed
an extreme risk of great bodily injury and made this injury likely.
That suffices. (See Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1065 & 1067;
see also In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 530 & 535 (B.M.) [“it is
appropriate in the deadly weapon inquiry to consider what harm
could have resulted from the way the object was actually
used. . . . [T]he evidence may show that serious injury was likely,
even if it did not come to pass”].)
      The extent of actual injury or lack of injury is relevant, but
“an aggressor should not receive the benefit of a potential victim
fortuitously taking a defensive measure . . . .” (B.M., supra, 6
Cal.5th at pp. 535 & 537.) Thomas’s conduct “could have resulted
in the wiping out of pedestrians or entire families lawfully

                                 6
crossing intersections on green lights . . . .” (People v. Aznavoleh
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1190.)
       It does not matter that only police witnesses testified about
his driving. The evidence showed Thomas put many lives at risk.
       Thomas emphasizes Perez involved a conviction for
aggravated assault, but this case has nothing like that; nor does
this case involve allegations Thomas was armed with a deadly
weapon or inflicted great bodily injury. But no particular offense
or enhancement is required to be disqualified from resentencing,
and a defendant need not be sentenced on a disqualifying factor.
(See People v. Hicks (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 275, 285.) Courts
ruling on these petitions may look beyond the elements of the
current offense and may consider all relevant, reliable, and
admissible parts of the record to determine whether disqualifying
factors exist. (Cruz, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.)
       Both the prosecution and the defense cite cases involving
cars or trucks, which they argue bolster their position. The
parties’ cases are factually distinct, and a discussion of those
different facts is unnecessary to resolve this appeal.
       Thomas argues for our independent review of the record
and for no deference to the trial court’s factual findings. Perez
decided substantial evidence—with deference—is the proper
standard. (Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1059 & 1066.)
       Thomas states a fear that to rule against him will mean all
police evasion convictions will result in ineligibility under the
Act. Perez made clear, and we reaffirm today, that
disqualification depends on the facts of the case. (See Perez,
supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 1059, 1065 & 1068.)

                                 7
                       DISPOSITION
     We affirm the order denying the resentencing petition.

                                        WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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