Court Opinion

ID: 9589013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:40:58.399156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:40.782544
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The law to be charged is determined by the evidence presented at trial.1 The trial judge must charge the jury on a lesser included offense if evidence is present to sustain a conviction for a crime of a lesser degree.2 The judge should *179refuse to charge a lesser included offense only if no evidence exists showing the defendant committed the lesser rather than the greater offense.3
Coleman was indicted for ABIK. ABIK is an unlawful act of a violent nature to the person of another -with malice aforethought, either express or implied.4 ABIK also requires the intent to kill.5 This intent need only be a general intent demonstrated by acts and conduct from which a jury may naturally and reasonably infer intent.6
By contrast, ABHAN requires an unlawful act of violent injury accompanied by circumstances of aggravation.7 Such aggravating circumstances include the use of a deadly weapon, the infliction of serious bodily injury, the intent to commit a felony, great disparity between the ages and physical conditions of the parties involved, and the difference in the sexes.8
In determining whether the evidence required the judge to charge the jury on ABHAN, an appellate court must view the *180facts in the light most favorable to the defendant.9 The issue in this case, then, is whether a jury could reasonably infer Coleman lacked the requisite intent to kill Victim, thereby justifying a jury charge on ABHAN.10
Upon examining the evidence of intent in the light most favorable to Coleman, I would conclude a reasonable juror could infer Coleman intended to commit assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature while lacking any intent to kill. First, ample evidence of aggravating circumstances necessary for a conviction of ABHAN were present in this case, including the use of a deadly weapon, the infliction of serious bodily injury, and the intent to commit a felony.11
Second, the State’s own witness, Erick Rodgers, testified Coleman intended to rob someone that day. Another State witness, Travon McCoy, testified Coleman told him when he robbed Subway, he panicked and shot Victim when Victim failed to turn over the money. Likewise, the statement Coleman gave police prior to his arrest for this incident indicates no intent to kill Victim. He told police that he got scared, started to run, and heard a shot. Hence, all testimony indicated Coleman intended to rob Subway and only shot Victim when he panicked.
“Panic” is defined as “a sudden, overpowering terror.”12 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. Stewart13 that terror-stricken panic may negate the mens rea *181element of murder in the first degree. I, too, would hold that a person who panics could lack the capacity to form an intent to kill.14 Whether a jury would believe Coleman’s statement that he panicked and shot Victim is not for us to say. By denying Coleman the charge of ABHAN where the State presented evidence that he panicked, the majority deprives him of a fundamental right.15
I believe the facts of this case are more analogous to those in State v. Hilton.16 In Hilton, this court held appellant was entitled to a jury charge of aggravated assault and battery where, like this case, the nature of appellant’s intent was very much in dispute. Appellant and victim were standing on a sidewalk beside a railroad crossing. Two witnesses testified appellant pushed victim in front of an oncoming train, but appellant maintained victim fell onto the tracks. The trial judge refused to charge aggravated assault, stating that the evidence either showed that appellant pushed victim onto the tracks with the intent to kill him or that it was an accident. This court disagreed:
Since the same physical assault and battery could legally constitute either the offense of [ABIK] or [ABHAN], it became a jury question as to whether [appellant] entertained the specific intent to kill [victim] at the time of the assault. Here, the jury was given only two choices, a verdict of guilty of [ABIK] or acquittal. Where, as here, the jury obviously finds that the physical act charged ... was committed, they had no alternative but to convict of the *182only crime placed before them. What their decision might have been if confronted with the choice of two crimes, both of which involved guilt of the act itself, but differed as to the intent with which the act was committed, cannot be known.17
Because the jury in Coleman’s case faced the same dilemma as the jury in Hilton, i.e., convicting him of ABIK or acquitting him, I would hold the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the lesser included offense of ABHAN as there exists evidence a reasonable jury could have determined Coleman lacked the intent to kill.
I would reverse and remand.

. State v. Gourdine, 322 S.C. 396, 472 S.E.2d 241 (1996).

. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (lesser included offense instruction is required by due process if the evidence warrants such an instruction); Gourdine, 322 S.C. at 398, *179472 S.E.2d at 242 (1996) (the trial judge is to charge the jury on a lesser included offense if there is any evidence from which it could be inferred the lesser, rather than the greater, offense was committed); State v. Cooney, 320 S.C. 107, 463 S.E.2d 597 (1995) (lesser included offense instruction is required when the evidence warrants such an instruction); State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E.2d 302 (1987) (the presence of evidence to sustain a conviction for the crime of a lesser degree determines whether it should be submitted to the jury), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).

. See State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 265, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1999) (to warrant a court’s eliminating the lesser included offense, it must "very clearly appear that there is no evidence whatsoever” tending to reduce the crime from the greater offense to the lesser) (emphasis original); State v. Johnson, 333 S.C. 62, 508 S.E.2d 29 (1998); State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 446 S.E.2d 411 (1994).

. State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 479 S.E.2d 50 (1996); State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970).

. Foust, 325 S.C. at 15, 479 S.E.2d at 51.

. Id.

. State v. Sprouse, 325 S.C. 275, 286 n. 2, 478 S.E.2d 871, 877 n. 2 (Ct.App.1996).

. State v. Murphy, 322 S.C. 321, 471 S.E.2d 739 (Ct.App.1996).

. See State v. Byrd, 323 S.C. 319, 474 S.E.2d 430 (1996) (stating a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to a defendant when determining whether evidence required a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter alongside the charge of murder).

. ABIK requires a showing of malice. Foust, 325 S.C. at 15, 479 S.E.2d at 51 (1996). The absence of malice is not an element of ABHAN. State v. Pilgrim, 326 S.C. 24, 482 S.E.2d 562 (1997). Malice, however, could have been inferred in this case from Coleman’s use of a deadly weapon, State v. Friend, 276 S.C. 552, 281 S.E.2d 106 (1981), hence it is only necessary for us to ascertain the intent with which the act was committed.

. See State v. Young, 319 S.C. 33, 459 S.E.2d 84 (1995) (armed robbery is a felony under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-1-10 (Supp.1999)).

. The American Heritage Dictionary 897 (2d ed.1985).

. 461 Pa. 274, 336 A.2d 282 (1975).

. "[A]mple tíme for reflection may exist, and a [person] may seem to act in his right mind, and from a conscious purpose; and yet causes may affect his intellect, preventing reflection, and hurrying onward his unhinged mind to rash and inconsiderate resolution, incompatible with ... deliberation and premeditation....” Stewart, 336 A.2d at 285 (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403, 406 (1874)).

. See Brown v. State, 674 P.2d 46 (Okla.Crim.App.1983) (recognizing that because appellant’s testimony of panic and self-defense could have led jury to reasonably infer an absence of an intent to kill, the court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of Assault with a Dangerous Weapon deprived accused of a fundamental right).

. 284 S.C. 245, 325 S.E.2d 575 (Ct.App.1985), affirmed, 291 S.C. 276, 353 S.E.2d 282 (1987), and overruled on other grounds by State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 479 S.E.2d 50 (1996).

. Id. at 249, 325 S.E.2d at 577 (citations omitted).