Court Opinion

ID: 9536905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:09:15.11751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:29.907077
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice
(dissenting).
Reduced to its simplest terms, the issue before this court is to determine which of two conflicting statutes applies, when each purports to grant to a different court exclusive original jurisdiction.1
In approaching the problem thus presented, certain principles should be borne in mind relating to the interpretation and application of statutes. * * * a statute should be considered in the light of its background and purpose; and also in connection with other aspects of the law which have a bearing on the problem in order that its intent and purpose be fulfilled.2
*262The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 is clearly indicative of a legislative intention that all juvenile offenders are initially to appear before the juvenile court. This intent is clearly manifested by the mandatory character of the langauge in Sec. 55-10-79, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1965, the pertinent portion of which provides:
If during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in another court, including a preliminary hearing, it shall be ascertained that the person charged is under twenty-one years of age and was less than eighteen years of age at the time of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the juvenile cotirt, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any testimony connected therewith. * * * [Emphasis added.]
There are two other rules of construction that substantiate the foregoing conclusion. Sec. 78-4 — 16, U.C.A.1953, is a general statute dealing with all offenders, while Sec. 55-10-77, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1965, deals with a specific class of offenders. Where two statutes are in conflict,' the more specific takes precedence over the general.3 The other rule is that in case of a conflict, the later statute is controlling over the earlier enactment.4 Since the Juvenile Court Act is a subsequently enacted comprehensive legislative scheme to deal with the juvenile offender, the only logical inference is that the Legislature intended to curtail the prior exclusive original jurisdiction of the city courts.
HENRIOD, Justice:
I do not dissent or concur. I simply observe that the decision in this case represents no case law. In logic I cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the opinion that two courts have exclusive jurisdiction which is concurrent. I cannot subscribe to the concurrence in the result which seems to say one court has exclusive jurisdiction in one geographical area and the other court in a different area, while concurring with the trial court that both of the lesser courts have concurrent jurisdiction. With lachrymosal eyes I suggest that this case stands for nothing.

. See Sec. 55-10-77, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1965; 78-4-16, U.C.A.1953.

. Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 272, 421 P.2d 159 (1966).

. Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 233, 322 P.2d 381 (1958).

. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 Utah 2d 15, 19, 316 P.2d 549 (1957).