Court Opinion

ID: 9706510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:16.641996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:23.253554
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
INTRODUCTION
I agree 'with the majority’s holding that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to the federal law issues in this case and with the majority’s dismissal of Continental’s injunction issues for want of jurisdiction. I, however, write separately to dissent to the majority’s interpreting the commuter airlines exception in the Shelby Amendment and to the majority’s holding that the Bond Ordinance restrictions are preempted by the ADA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The history of this case is an especially disturbing picture of the tension between federal and local government authority. In the early 1960s, Dallas’s principal airport was Love Field, while Fort Worth’s principal airport was Greater Southwest International Airport (GSIA), which Fort Worth had recently constructed in a sparsely populated area equidistant between the two cities.
On August 20, 1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board (the CAB), the predecessor of the Department of Transportation (the DOT), began an investigation to determine whether public convenience and necessity required Dallas and Fort Worth to consolidate air passenger service at a single airport. The Federal Aviation Administration (the FAA) participated extensively in the proceeding and concluded that Love Field could not serve as the primary airport for the Dallas-Fort Worth area because of environmental and safety considerations:
because of its physical limitations, because of the intensely developed and highly valuable property surrounding Love Field; because of the obvious fact that any further lengthening of the run*114ways at Love Field would serve merely to compound the aircraft noise problem, and for other equally good reasons, it appears that Love Field cannot be developed economically into the type of facility needed to serve the future requirements of this area.... At Love Field, the close-in portion of all approach areas to all runways is over either residential, commercial, or industrial areas which are densely populated. The FAA has imposed restrictions to make these operations equal to the established minimum safety requirements. It is clear, however, [that] safety to the occupants of an aircraft and to the people on the ground is infinitely greater if the approaches to the airport are clear and the path that the aircraft is required to fly is not over highly populated areas. Accident statistics show that during the period from 1955 through 1962, 11% of air carrier accidents occurred within 5 miles of the approach end of the runway. More than half of this 11% occurred within 1 mile of the approach end of the runway. It is apparent that an accident of this nature at Love Field would be catastrophic. [Emphasis added.]
On April 7, 1964, the administrative law judge concluded that it would not be in the public interest to designate either GSIA or Love Field as the regional airport. On September 30, 1964, the CAB issued an order stating that it was “of the unanimous opinion that service to Dallas and Fort Worth should be required through a single airport” and giving Dallas and Fort Worth 180 days “within which to arrive at a voluntary agreement concerning the location of the airport to be used for the consolidated service.” The CAB’s order further provided that if the cities failed to reach an agreement, the CAB itself would designate the regional airport.
Because of the CAB’s order, on April 15, 1968 the cities entered into a contract and agreement (the Agreement) to build Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). Under the Agreement, the cities are joint owners of DFW, and the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board (the DFW Board) operates DFW on behalf of the cities. To finance the construction of DFW, the cities adopted the 1968 Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance (the Bond Ordinance) on November 12, 1968. Under the Bond Ordinance, the cities have sold approximately two billion dollars in DFW revenue bonds; approximately one billion dollars in bonds remain outstanding. Section 9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance requires the cities to
take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate, and legally permissible (without violating presently outstanding legal commitments or covenants prohibiting such action), to provide for the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out at Love Field, Redbird, GSIA and Meac-ham Field, of any and all Certificated Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities to [DFW]....
DFW was built in a location that overlapped the existing GSIA, thus requiring Fort Worth to demolish GSIA and to abandon GSIA as an airport. Dallas states that it “intended, to the extent legally permissible and without closing Love Field to all other aviation activities, to phase out virtually all, if not all, scheduled certificated air carrier traffic at Love Field, and to transfer such traffic to [DFW] upon its completion.” In accordance with this intent, Dallas required all CAB-certificated carriers at Love Field to sign letter agreements that they would move all of their Certificated Air Carrier Services serving the Dallas-Fort Worth area to DFW to the extent required under the terms of the Bond Ordinance.1 Despite the CAB-mandated Agreement and Bond Ordinance, Southwest Airlines (Southwest) refused to *115move from Love Field to DFW.2 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1977, thirteen years after the CAB’s order, that Southwest has a “federally declared right to the continued use of and access to Love Field, so long as Love Field remains open.”3
Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978 by enacting the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). The ADA’s preemption clause provides that a state, a political subdivision of a state, or a political authority of at least two states “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.”4 Southwest immediately applied for and was granted permission to provide interstate service between Love Field and New Orleans.5
To limit interstate service at Love Field, Congress enacted the Wright Amendment to the ADA. Although the Wright Amendment banned interstate flights at Love Field, it exempted from the ban: (1) commuter flights on aircraft with a passenger capacity of fifty-six passengers or less, and (2) flights between Love Field and points in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, if the airline did not provide through ticketing or service beyond Texas and the four states contiguous to Texas.6
When Astraea Aviation Services, Inc. (Astraea) announced plans to provide long distance flights from Love Field on jets reconfigured to hold no more than fifty-six passengers, the DOT determined that such service would not be within the scope of the commuter aircraft exemption and therefore would be barred by the Wright Amendment. Congress responded in 1997 by enacting the Shelby Amendment to the ADA, which expanded services at Love Field by: (1) including aircraft weighing less than 800,000 pounds that had been reconfigured to seat fifty-six or fewer passengers within the Wright Amendment’s fifty-six passengers or less commuter airlines exemption; and (2) expanding the Wright Amendment’s contiguous state exemption to include Kansas, Alabama, and Mississippi.7
On October 10, 1997, Fort Worth filed a declaratory judgment action against Dallas; the DFW Board; Jeffrey P. Fegan, DFW’s executive director (Fegan); Legend Airlines, Inc. (Legend); and Astraea in the 48th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas. Continental Airlines, Inc. and Continental Express, Inc. (collectively, Continental) and Mesa Airlines, Inc. (Mesa) were later added as defendants. Fort Worth sought a judgment declaring that:
(1) Dallas is prohibited, under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance, from permitting any scheduled interstate passenger service to and from Love Field, unless such service is restricted to turnaround service to the four contiguous states;
(2) Dallas has the contractual and fiduciary obligation to take all necessary and lawful action to ensure compliance with the *116Agreement and the Bond Ordinance, including, if necessary, phasing out all Love Field operations;
(3) if Dallas permits Legend, Astraea, Continental, or any other Certificated Air Carrier to provide scheduled interstate passenger service from Love Field other than restricted turn-around service to the four contiguous states, it will have placed Love Field in direct competition with DFW and thus will be in breach of its fiduciary and contractual duties relating to the purchase, construction, improvement, use, and development of DFW;
(4) the DFW Board may not, consistent with the Agreement, the Bond Ordinance, the DFW Board’s representations to those who invested at DFW and the owners of DFW Airport Revenue Bonds, and the DFW Board’s separate and independent fiduciary duties to develop and protect DFW, allow interstate passenger service from Love Field unless such service is restricted to turn-around service to the four contiguous states or the DFW Board allows such service only after making a determination pursuant to section 9.5 of the Bond Ordinance that such service is necessary in the interest of public safety, in the interest of prudent and efficient operations at DFW, or in the interest of satisfying an overriding public need for decentralized Certificated Air Carrier Services in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area considered as a whole;
(5) Fegan must, consistent with the Agreement, the Bond Ordinance, his and the DFW Board’s representations to the public, his and the DFW Board’s separate and independent fiduciary duties to develop and protect DFW, and his capacity as advisor to the DFW Board, act consistent with the trial court’s declaratory judgment that interstate passenger service from Love Field is permitted only if such service is restricted to turn-around service to the four contiguous states;
(6) the DFW Board and Fegan cannot waive the application and obligations of the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance except as expressly provided by the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance and only with the consent and agreement of the cities; and
(7)Mesa is bound by the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance covenants, which are expressly incorporated into the Use Agreement entered into by Fort Worth and Mesa, and cannot provide scheduled interstate passenger service from Meac-ham Airport.
American Airlines (American) intervened in the suit as a plaintiff on November 7, 1997, asking the trial court to declare the parties’ rights, status, and other legal relations under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance as follows:
(1) the Bond Ordinance requires Legend and Astraea to conduct their proposed scheduled interstate passenger operations to, from, and at DFW and precludes them from conducting such operations to, from, or at Love Field;
(2) absent agreement by Dallas, Fort Worth, and the DFW Board as provided in the Bond Ordinance, the Bond Ordinance requires scheduled interstate passenger service to and from states beyond the four states contiguous to Texas to be conducted from DFW, not from Love Field;
(3) Dallas, the DFW Board, and Fegan are required to enforce the Bond Ordinance and are estopped to deny the enforceability of the Bond Ordinance in the circumstances presented here; •
(4) Dallas may not permit, allow, or take action that would encourage, facilitate, or support operation of Certificated Air Carrier Services to, from, or at Love Field, except for the limited turn-around service to the four states contiguous to Texas to which the cities and the DFW Board agreed in 1980;
(5) permitting Certificated Air Carrier Services to operate to, from, or at Love Field, except for the limited turn-around service to which the cities and the DFW Board agreed in 1980 would be a breach of *117the cities’ agreement with the owners of DFW revenue bonds and, thus, would be prohibited by the Texas Constitution; and
(6) other declarations as may be necessary or appropriate to resolve the disputes and controversies between the parties.
On October 1, 1998, the trial court heard motions for summary judgment filed by Fort Worth, American, Dallas, Continental, and the DFW Board. On October 15, 1998, the trial court signed a partial summary judgment and order and made the following findings:
(FI) The Agreement and the Bond Ordinance are valid and enforceable and are not preempted by federal law.
(F2) Dallas and Fort Worth have agreed not to enforce the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance insofar as it related to scheduled passenger service to or from Love Field to points within Texas and the four contiguous states, and Fort Worth does not seek to enforce the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance with respect to scheduled passenger service within Texas and the four contiguous states.
(F3) As owner of Love Field and Redbird airports, and as co-owner of DFW, Dallas is a multi-airport proprietor with a federally reserved proprietary right and power to restrict scheduled passenger service at Love Field to points within Texas and the four contiguous states.
(F4) The ADA, the Wright Amendment, and the Shelby Amendment do not convey affirmative rights that allow interstate passenger service from Love Field to points beyond Texas and the four contiguous states.
(F5) No justiciable controversy exists as to Astraea and Mesa.
On December 16, 1998, the trial court entered its final judgment that:
(Dl) Dallas is obligated to prohibit scheduled interstate passenger service to or from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states, including the flights proposed by Legend and Continental.
(D2) If Dallas does not prohibit scheduled interstate passenger service to or from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states, including the flights proposed by Legend and Continental, Dallas will breach the Agreement, the Bond Ordinance, and the agreement referred to in (F2).
(D3) Section 9.5 of the Bond Ordinance prohibits Legend and Continental from offering scheduled commercial passenger service at Love Field, except within Texas and the four contiguous states.
(D4) The DFW Board and Fegan may not allow interstate passenger service from Love Field, unless such service is restricted to service to the four contiguous states or unless the DFW Board allows such service only after making a determination pursuant to section 9.5 of the Bond Ordinance that such service is necessary in the interest of public safety, in the interest of prudent and efficient operations at DFW, or in the interest of satisfying an overriding public need for decentralized Certificated Air Carrier Services in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area considered as a whole.
(D5) All taxable costs of court, excluding attorneys’ fees, are taxed against the defendants.
In August 1998, the DOT had begun a proceeding at the request of Fort Worth, Dallas, Legend, and several members of Congress. On December 22, 1998, the DOT issued a declaratory order, holding that:
(i) Fort Worth may not enforce any commitment by Dallas under the Bond Ordinance or other agreement to limit operations at Love Field authorized by federal law, and Dallas’s proprietary powers do not allow it to restrict services at Love Field authorized by federal law;
(ii) the ability of Dallas to limit the type of airline service operated at Love Field is preempted by the Wright and Shelby Amendments;
*118(iii) any airline operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of no more than fifty-six passengers and a gross aircraft weight of no more than 300,000 pounds may operate service with any type of equipment and flights of any length from or to Love Field, notwithstanding any claim that such service violates any agreement between Dallas and Fort Worth;
(iv). the DFW Board may not enforce any contract provision that allegedly bars an airline from operating interstate airline service at another airport in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area; and
(v) any airline may offer through service between Love Field and any other point to passengers using a flight between Love Field and another point within Texas operated under subsection (a) of the Wright Amendment, as amended by the Shelby Amendment.8
On January 6, 1999, Continental filed -a motion for new trial or to modify the judgment asking the trial court to . consider and follow the DOT’s order, which Continental had attached to its motion. On January 15, 1999, Dallas requested ■ that the trial court enter an order dismissing or abating the case in deference to the DOT’s primary jurisdiction and the Fifth Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction to review the DOT’s order or, alternatively, that the trial court modify its judgment to conform to the DOT’s' order. Also on January 15, 1999, Legend filed a motion for new trial or to modify the judgment based on the DOT’s order.
In three orders signed on January 27, 1999, the trial court stated that it had considered the motions, the responses and other filings, and the DOT’s order and denied the motions. Legend, Continental, and Dallas then appealed the trial court’s December 16, 1998 judgment to this court. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the DOT’s order on February 1, 2000.9
DALLAS’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT AND THE BOND ORDINANCE
This case presents significant issues that must be decided under state law.. The primary issue before the trial court was whether Dallas is contractually obligated under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance to prohibit interstate flights from Love Field to states other than Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. Dallas and the other defendants have not challenged the validity of the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance. Rather, they contend that Dallas’s ability to prohibit such flights is preempted by federal law. The trial court found that the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance are valid, enforceable, and not preempted by federal law. Thus, the trial court concluded that even in light of the DOT’s order, Dallas is contractually obligated to prohibit scheduled interstate passenger service to or from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states.
Even assuming that the DOT’s order and the Fifth Circuit’s decision are correct, I believe that the trial court was correct in its holding that Dallas is,obligated under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance to prohibit such flights. Specifically, even if the DOT’s order and the Fifth Circuit’s decision prohibit Dallas, from restricting routes at Love Field, they do not prohibit Dallas from closing Love Field to all Certificated Air Carrier Services, as originally contemplated by the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance.
Section 9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance reflects the cities’ original intent to phase out all Certificated Air Carrier Services at Love Field:
*119It is acknowledged and understood by the Cities that they, in Love Field, Redbird, GSIA and Meacham Field, own and operate airports which by their nature are potentially competitive with the operation of the Regional Airport. It is further acknowledged and recognized that the revenues to be derived from those airport facilities are not, under the terms of this Ordinance, pledged to the payment of the Bonds, except under the circumstances described in Section 6.3 hereof. Accordingly, the Cities, each with respect to its own individually owned airport facilities, as above named, hereby covenant and agree that from and after the effective date of this Ordinance, shall take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate, and legally permissible (without violating presently outstanding legal commitments or covenants prohibiting such action), to provide for the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out at Love Field, Redbird, GSIA and Meacham Field, of any and all Certificated Air Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities to the Regional Airport effective upon the beginning of operations at the Regional Airport. [Emphasis added.]
The Bond Ordinance defines “Certificated Air Carrier Services” as aircraft operations of the following types when operating on a regular and continuing basis:
(1) interstate services conducted by commercial air carriers according to published flight schedules and holding certificates of public convenience and necessity or similar evidences of authority issued by the CAB or any successor agency;
(2) services conducted by foreign air carriers according to published flight schedules holding permits or similar evidences of authority issued by the CAB or any successor agency or by any other agency or department of the United States; and
(3) intrastate services conducted by commercial air carriers according to published flight schedules and holding certificates of public convenience and necessity or similar evidences of authority issued by the Texas Aeronautics Commission or any successor agency.
Section 9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance further states:
From time to time hereafter, the Board may review the effect and application of such covenant, and, by concurring action of not less than eight (8) of its members, the Board may reasonably limit its scope and effect and may waive its application in specific instances if it shall first determine that such action is necessary (1) in the interest of the public safety; (2) in the interest of prudent and efficient operations at the Regional Airport; or (3) in the interest of satisfying an overriding public need for decentralized Certificated Air Carrier Services in the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan region considered as a whole.
The record does not reflect that the DFW Board has made any finding that interstate service from Love Field to states beyond the four contiguous states is necessary in the interest of public safety, the interest of prudent and efficient operations at DFW, or the interest of satisfying an overriding public need for decentralized Certificated Air Carrier Services. If the DFW Board makes such a finding, it can waive the Bond Ordinance’s application to interstate flights from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states.
In summary, I would hold that, notwithstanding the DOT’s order and the Fifth Circuit’s decision, if Dallas does not prohibit flights from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states, it will breach the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance. I would further hold that Dallas can comply with its contractual obligations under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance by either (1) pursuant to section 9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance, requesting that the DFW Board waive the application of the Bond Ordinance to interstate flights from Love Field to points beyond the four *120contiguous states, after finding that such flights are necessary in the interest of public safety, of prudent and efficient operations at DFW, or of satisfying an overriding public need for decentralized Certificated Air Carrier Services; or (2) as the owner of Love Field, closing Love Field to all Certificated Air Carrier Services. For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s holding that federal law relieves Dallas from its obligation under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance to prohibit interstate flights from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states.
DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
I further dissent because I believe that this case presents serious due process considerations that have not been addressed by the majority opinion. In this case, Dallas and Fort Worth entered into the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance before Congress passed the ADA. Therefore, applying the ADA to the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance results in retroactive application of a statute, thus creating potential due process ramifications.
The United States Supreme Court has held that retroactive legislation has to meet a burden not faced by legislation that has only future effects.10 “It does not follow ... that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can legislate retrospectively. The retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”11 To survive a due process challenge, it must be shown that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.12 While there may be a rational legislative purpose that justifies the retroactive application of the ADA to the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance, it has yet to be established.
In my opinion, retroactive application of the ADA to the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance presents two due process concerns. First, at the mandate of the CAB, Fort Worth entered into the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance. Then, in detrimental reliance on the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance and on the expected revenues from DFW, Fort Worth demolished GSIA and required all Certificated Air Carrier Services to move to DFW. There is summary judgment evidence that increased flights at Love Field will result in a decrease in revenue at DFW. Loss of revenue at DFW will result in less revenue for Fort Worth.
Second, as Appellees point out, the cities have sold approximately two billion dollars in DFW revenue bonds pursuant to the Bond Ordinance. Approximately one billion dollars in DFW revenue bonds remain outstanding. The potential effect of excluding Southwest from Love Field on holders of Love Field revenue bonds was one of the reasons stated by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for its 1973 holding that Dallas was prohibited from excluding Southwest from Love Field:
The exclusion of Southwest Airlines from Love Field would breach each of these covenants [with bondholders to maintain operations at Love Field]. The fact that circumstances may have changed and that Dallas would now like to ignore its prior covenants does not provide an adequate basis for the City’s proposed action. Such obligations are binding and the City must adhere to them.13
The purpose of section 9.5(A) of the Bond Ordinance is to ensure adequate rev*121enues from operations at DFW to cover the operating expenses of DFW and to repay the DFW revenue bonds. Section 9.5(A) requires the cities to compensate DFW for loss of revenues caused by Certificated Air Carrier Services at the cities’ other airports, if such services would result in the DFW revenues dropping below the amount needed to cover the operating expenses and to repay the bonds:
And in no event, by agreement with air carriers or otherwise, shall limitations or waivers of such covenant allowing a commencement or resumption of Certificated Air Camer Services at any other airport or airports be adopted if the result thereof would be the reduction in Pledged Revenues below the amount required to satisfy the provisions of Section 9.4 hereof, unless the City (or the Cities in the case of more than one airport) shall also pledge to the payment of all Bonds, by appropriate official action, such part of the revenues from the airport or airports to which such services are to be transferred, resumed or originally commenced, as will justly compensate the Regional Airport (at rates then in effect thereat for similar services), for the loss of such services and the gross Revenues therefrom.
Because the Bond Ordinance provides that Dallas and Fort Worth are to repay the bonds out of the revenues earned by DFW, a loss of revenue at DFW due to increased interstate flights at Love Field affects the ability of Dallas and Fort Worth to repay the bonds. The bondholders are not parties to this suit; consequently, there has been no determination as to what remedies they may have. In summary, I also dissent to the majority’s opinion because it does not address the due process ramifications that retroactive application of the ADA will have on Fort Worth and on the ability of Dallas and Fort Worth to repay the DFW revenue bonds.
COMMUTER AIRLINES EXCEPTION
In my opinion, the trial court was asked to determine whether Dallas was obligated under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance to prohibit flights from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states. In reference to the Shelby Amendment, the trial court found only that “[t]he ADA, ‘Wright’ or ‘Shelby1 Amendments do not convey affirmative rights which allow interstate passenger service from Love Field to points beyond Texas and its four contiguous states.” Because the trial court implicitly found that the Shelby Amendment did not preempt Dallas’s obligations under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance, the trial court did not specifically address the issue of whether the Shelby Amendment authorizes flights of any length from Love Field on aircraft reconfigured to seat less than fifty-six passengers. Because I agree with the trial court that Dallas is contractually obligated to prohibit interstate passenger service from Love Field to points beyond Texas and its four contiguous states, and because Dallas is fully capable of performing its contractual obligations as discussed above (notwithstanding the Shelby Amendment), I do not believe that it is necessary for this court to address the commuter airlines exception of the Shelby Amendment in this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because I disagree with the majority’s holding that federal law relieves Dallas from its obligation under the Agreement and the Bond Ordinance to prohibit interstate flights from Love Field to points beyond the four contiguous states and the majority’s addressing the commuter airlines exception of the Shelby Amendment, and because I believe that the due process ramifications of retroactive application of the ADA have not been adequately addressed, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s scholarly and well-reasoned opinion.

. See City of Dallas v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 735 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1987, writ denied).

. See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 298, 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991).

. Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 103 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832, 98 S.Ct. 117, 54 L.Ed.2d 93 (1977).

. 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).

. See Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1023; see also Kansas v. United States, 16 F.3d 436, 438 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 945, 115 S.Ct. 354, 130 L.Ed.2d 309 (1994).

. International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Act of Feb. 15, 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-192, § 29, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 35, 48-49 (1980).

. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, § 337, Act of Oct. 27, 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-66, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. (Ill Stat.) 1425, 1447.

. See Love Field Serv. Interp. Proc., DOT Decl. Order No. 98-12-27, 58 (1998).

. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 813 (5 th Cir.2000), petition for cert. filed, 68 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Mar. 3, 2000) (No. 99-1462), 68 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. May 1, 2000) (Nos.99-1739, 99-1745).

. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2718, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984).

. Id. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)).

. See id.

. City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F.Supp. 1015, 1034 (N.D.Tex.1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 773 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 668, 42 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974).