Court Opinion

ID: 9452284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:35:36.542967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:08.882203
License: Public Domain

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
To me the present case presents a combination of factors that justifies the application of United States law rather than the municipal law of another nation. To be sure, the suit has been brought by a Greek alien seaman injured while serving aboard a vessel of foreign registry and ownership. But the accident occurred in the territorial waters of the United States while the S.S. Hellenic Spirit was berthed at the 57th Street pier, Brooklyn, New York. Furthermore, Hellenic Lines, Ltd., the foreign shipowner, has a substantial executive office in the United States, from which extensive ship operations are conducted. And, in my view, it is of the greatest importance that Callimanopoulos, the general manager of Hellenic Lines and the owner of more than 95% of Hellenic Lines stock, has regularly resided in the United States since 1945 and has enjoyed the status of a permanent resident alien here since 1956 or 1957.
United States courts have pierced through the facade of foreign registration and foreign incorporation and have applied United States law, including 46 U.S.C. § 688 application, when American-based shipowners who are United States citizens have sought the protection from seamen’s suits of less onerous laws of foreign states and have registered their vessels elsewhere than here. E. g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 and cases cited at 442 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000, 79 S.Ct. 1138 (1959). I would hold that here, in this case, where the injury occurred at dockside in the United States, United States law should be applied when the defendant shipowner, though an alien, has continued to register his vessels abroad while he currently enjoys the considerable benefits of permanent resident alien status here, a status deliberately sought by him.1 I cannot follow the *430argument that, in this respect, the application of United States law to this event that occurred in our territorial waters should depend upon whether the vessel upon which the event occurred is owned by a United States citizen or is owned by a United States resident alien. We accord a lawful permanent resident alien the same constitutional protections we accord a citizen of the United States. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953). Moreover, the duties and obligations of a resident alien have not been thought to “differ materially from those of native-born or naturalized citizens.” Leonhard v. Eley, 151 F.2d 409, 410 (10 Cir. 1945). To be sure, a resident alien in some respects does not have legal parity with a United States citizen; for example, the Constitution requires that only citizens may be candidates for election to the House of Representatives and to the Senate; and an alien may be sued in any U. S. judicial district. Nevertheless, established authority, see, e. g., Leonhard v. Eley, supra, suggests that any United States law, such as the Jones Act,- that imposes duties and obligations upon persons, should be evenly applied to United States citizens and resident aliens.
So, unless the same obligations that United States law imposes on shipowners who are United States citizens are imposed on resident alien shipowners, a resident alien shipowner like Callimanopoulos will be able to enjoy the considerable benefits of lawful permanent resident alien status in this country without being subject to the duties and obligations exacted of an otherwise similarly situated competitive shipowner who is an American shipowner. The statement of this last proposition would seem to be enough to require a reversal instead of an affirmance of the order below. Moreover, under these circumstances, I do not regard as significant the fact that when this Greek seaman signed on he agreed to limit his rights to those arising under Greek law. Surely we would not consider such to be decisive, or even important, if the shipowner behind the Greek-incorporated corporation was a United States citizen inasmuch as the accident occurred while the vessel was berthed at a New York harbor pier.
I repeat: Shipowners who are resident aliens and shipowners who are United States citizens should be subject to the same liabilities for injuries suffered by their employees on their vessels when the vessels are at United States piers. If a United States shipowner is liable under the Jones Act to a foreign seaman serving on a foreign-registered vessel injured in our territorial waters, a permanently resident alien should also be so liable.
I find no reported case denying a seaman his recovery in which the significant factors are enough similar to this case to require us to affirm the order below. In major part I agree with the exhaustive discussion of the authorities in the majority’s opinion. Unlike the majority, however, I am not persuaded that here the ship had enough contacts with Greece so that we should hesitate “before applying and foisting upon [Callimanopoulos] the heavy potential liabilities of the American law of maritime personal injuries.”
I would reverse the order below dismissing the action and remand for further proceedings.

. In the present case the fact that the defendant, Hellenic Lines, Ltd., is incorporated in Greece does not successfully disguise the fact that the corpora*430tion is almost solely owned by a single individual and that that individual is a resident alien in the United States. This case does not involve the applicability of our law to a corporation publicly owned by many individuals permanently residing in several different countries or even in one such country.