Court Opinion

ID: 9918611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 11:09:02.022709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:52.470646
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-22-00238-CV

             The Attorney General of The State of Texas, Ken Paxton, Appellant

                                                 v.

            Mark Gonzalez, District Attorney for the 105th Judicial District, and
                 the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office, Appellees

               FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
      NO. D-1-GN-21-000130, THE HONORABLE GARY HARGER, JUDGE PRESIDING

                               DISSENTING OPINION

               Information that is made confidential by statute—and thus free from the Public

Information Act (PIA)—includes “information collected by the . . . prosecuting attorney during

the grand jury selection process about a person who serves as a grand juror.” See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. art. 19A.104(a); Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. When a prosecuting attorney collects the names

of grand jurors during the selection process, those names are thus information collected by the

prosecuting attorney during the selection process about a person who serves as a grand juror. The

names are thus confidential under the plain language of subsection (a) of Article 19A.104.

               Although the attorney general and majority’s arguments quote Subsection (a), they

do not apply it. They treat Article 19A.104 as if it instead said:

       (a) Except as provided by Subsection (c), information collected by the court, court
       personnel, or prosecuting attorney during the grand jury selection process about a
       person who serves as a grand juror that is confidential and may not be disclosed by
        the court, court personnel, or prosecuting attorney. (b) Information that is
        confidential under Subsection (a) includes a person’s: (1) home address; (2) home
        telephone number; (3) social security number; (4) driver’s license number; and
        (5) other personal information.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 19A.104(a)–(b) (struck-through material deleted from statute and

italicized word added). If that were the statute, then I would vote with the majority on this topic.

                But in the statute as the Legislature wrote it, Subsection (a) is not restricted by

Subsection (b). Subsection (a) is expressly restricted only “as provided by Subsection (c).” See

id. art. 19A.104(a). The Legislature’s choice to restrict Subsection (a) only by express mention of

Subsection (c) is strong evidence that it intended for Subsection (b) not to restrict Subsection (a).

See TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mex., LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694, 710 (Tex. 2023)

(“[I]n law the expression of one thing often implies the exclusion of other things.” (quoting Blanton

v. Domino’s Pizza Franchising LLC, 962 F.3d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 2020))); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v.

Schaefer, 572 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. 1978) (“When specific exclusions or exceptions to a statute

are stated by the Legislature, the intent is usually clear that no others shall apply.”).

                Subsection (b)’s plain language works in harmony with this understanding.

Subsection (b) says what the information made confidential by Subsection (a) “includes”—not

what it excludes. Plus, note how Subsection (a) and Subsection (b) use different terms, suggesting

that the Legislature meant something different when using the different terms. Subsection (a) uses

“information collected by the prosecuting attorney about a person who serves as a grand juror”—

with no use of the adjective “personal”—while Subsection (b) uses “personal information.” In all,

the plain language of Article 19A.104 requires that the names here be kept confidential.

                The attorney general and majority’s first workaround for these plain-language

problems is the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction. But it gets misapplied. Ejusdem

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generis limits the scope of statutory catchall language “to the same class or category as the specific

items that precede” the catchall language. In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tex. 2021) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Ross v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 504 (Tex.

2015)). This structure of specifics-then-a-catchall most often crops up in statutory lists like the

one in Subsection (b). For example, “[w]here the more specific items, [a] and [b], are followed by

a catchall ‘other,’ [c], the doctrine of ejusdem generis teaches that the latter must be limited to

things like the former.” Ross, 462 S.W.3d at 504. And “[w]hen general words follow specific,

enumerated categories, we limit the general words’ application to the same kind or class of

categories as those expressly mentioned.” City of Houston v. Bates, 406 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex.

2013) (citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)). Note the

ejusdem generis order: specifics first, then the catchall.1

                This shows why applying ejusdem generis using Subsection (b) cannot restrict

Subsection (a) under the mistaken view that Subsection (a) is the catchall language that

       1
           This is the rule beyond Texas as well:

       The ejusdem generis canon applies when a drafter has tacked on a catchall phrase
       at the end of an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other
       animals. The principle of ejusdem generis . . . implies the addition of similar after
       the word other.

        ....

       In all contexts other than the pattern of specific-to-general, the proper rule to invoke
       is the broad associated-words canon, not the narrow ejusdem generis canon.

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 199, 205
(2012); accord Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 223 (2008) (stating that ejusdem
generis is “the principle that ‘when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should
be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration’” (quoting
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991))).

                                                    3
Subsection (b) restricts. The specifics-then-catchall structure that triggers ejusdem generis here is

found only within Subsection (b)—its subdivisions (1) through (5). So while I would agree with

the attorney general and majority that Article 19A.104(b)(5) “other personal information” does not

encompass names, Subsection (b) plus ejusdem generis simply does not restrict Subsection (a),

which does encompass grand jurors’ names when those are collected by the prosecuting attorney

during the selection process.      And, again, Subsection (a) is expressly restricted only by

Subsection (c), not Subsection (b).2

               The other method deployed here to restrict Subsection (a) to less than what it says

is the argument that “looking solely to the plain and common meaning of the words in the phrase

‘other personal information’ results in an overbroad phrase that borders on being vague and

ambiguous and that would encompass nearly every fact about a person, including their name.” See

ante at 7–8. There are at least three problems with this argument. First, it defies the rule that “[i]n

the absence of ‘clear statutory language to the contrary,’ we presume that when the Legislature

chooses broad language, ‘the Legislature intended it to have equally broad applicability.’” See

Rogers v. Bagley, 623 S.W.3d 343, 353 (Tex. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Cadena Comercial

USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Tex. 2017)). Second, the

majority’s analysis still stops short of considering the statute to be vague and ambiguous; the

analysis claims only that the statute “borders on being vague and ambiguous.” Well, if it isn’t

ambiguous, then it should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, which here under

       2
          In fact, the statute’s arrangement of Subsection (a) before Subsection (b) suggests that
the former is specifically intended to be read unusually broadly: “Following the general term with
specifics can serve the function of making doubly sure that the broad (and intended-to-be-broad)
general term is taken to include the specifics. . . . [E]ven without those prefatory words [like
‘including without limitation’], the enumeration of the specifics can be thought to perform the
belt-and-suspenders function.” Scalia & Garner, supra note 1, at 204.

                                                  4
Subsection (a) extends to grand jurors’ names. Finally, the statutory phrase “other personal

information” is from Subsection (b), not Subsection (a). And nobody has shown why it cannot be

the case that the Legislature actually wanted Subsection (a) to “encompass nearly every fact about

a person, including their name.” Don’t we want to keep grand jurors safe as much as possible?

               The consequences of the attorney general and majority’s position show it to be

self-defeating. Their position would keep confidential only grand jurors’ home addresses, home

telephone numbers, and the like. It would do so presumably out of the same concern for keeping

grand jurors safe. But don’t we think that all those erstwhile-confidential facts about a grand juror

will be quickly discoverable once a bad actor knows the grand juror’s name and location within a

particular county or similarly small area?3 Modern methods make virtually all those facts

discoverable when starting from just the person’s name and location. Subsection (a), because it

protects a huge set of information about a grand juror, eliminates this modern-day concern.

               Subsection (a) sets the default rule for grand jurors’ information—anything

collected about them by the prosecuting attorney during selection is confidential.4 It is no response

then to say that their names often will be published during grand-jury organization. For a

government officer charged with keeping personal information confidential still bears that

responsibility—despite public-information statutes like Texas’s PIA—even when the same

       3
          A PIA requestor will know the grand juror’s county or judicial district when the requestor
is seeking information from a particular district attorney’s office.
       4
          This default rule meshes well with Texas’s overarching scheme of grand-jury secrecy.
See Harrison v. Vance, 34 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (discussing this
secrecy and citing Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (collecting authorities)). Maintaining grand-jury secrecy serves
goals like “prevent[ing] other persons subject to indictment, or their friends, from importuning the
grand jurors.” Stern, 869 S.W.2d at 621. Therefore, “Texas courts have permitted the veil of
grand jury secrecy to be pierced in only a few instances.” Id. at 622.

                                                 5
information might be available in public form otherwise. See Texas Comptroller of Pub. Accts. v.

Attorney Gen., 354 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. 2010) (quoting United States Dep’t of Def. v. Federal

Lab. Rels. Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994)).

               I thus conclude that the grand jurors’ names here are confidential under

Article 19A.104(a) and may not be disclosed via the PIA, under its Section 552.101 exception.5

See Harrison v. Vance, 34 S.W.3d 660, 662–63 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (reaching same

conclusion about PIA request that sought “disclosure of the names of the grand jurors”).

               My differences with the majority’s opinion and judgment do not end there. The

majority (1) renders judgment in the attorney general’s favor over the district attorney’s arguments

from the PIA’s uses of the term “judiciary” and (2) gives the attorney general the affirmative relief

of a judgment declaring “that the information at issue must be disclosed under the PIA,” see ante

at 11. Even setting aside my views about Article 19A.104, I still would not render judgment in

the attorney general’s favor on the merits. And I would not render an affirmative judgment in his

favor declaring anything at all because the pleadings here do not support one.

               First, the merits stemming from the PIA’s uses of “judiciary.” The PIA does not

apply to “the judiciary.” See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.002(a)(1), 552.003(1)(B)(i), 552.021. And

it does not give access to “information collected, assembled, or maintained by or for the judiciary”

because that information is available, if at all, only through other sources. See id. § 552.0035(a);

       5
         The majority rightly acknowledges that Barnhart v. State does not support its position.
See generally No. 13-08-00511-CR, 2010 WL 3420823 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Aug. 31, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court there was not even
purporting to analyze the statutory language here. But in another case, one in which the court did
analyze Article 19A.104’s similarly worded predecessor, the court recognized that the statute kept
grand jurors’ names confidential. See In re Jetter, No. 08-01-00387-CR, 2001 WL 1249259, at *1
(Tex. App.—El Paso Oct. 18, 2001, orig. proceeding) (not designated for publication).

                                                 6
Abbott v. State Bar of Tex., 241 S.W.3d 604, 608–09 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied).

Although the district attorney’s office is not part of the judiciary, the grand jury is an arm of

the judiciary. Compare Holmes v. Morales, 924 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (district attorneys),

with Harrison, 34 S.W.3d at 663 (grand juries), and Euresti v. Valdez, 769 S.W.2d 575, 577–78

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1989, orig. proceeding) (same). Therefore, if the district

attorney’s office collected, assembled, or maintained the list of grand jurors’ names for a judge or

the grand jury, then the names may not be disclosed via the PIA.

               The district attorney has raised a fact issue about whether his office collected,

assembled, or maintained the list of names for a judge or the grand jury. The record suggests that

the district attorney’s office gathered the names, compiled a list of the names alongside the grand

jurors’ mailing addresses and phone numbers, and sent the list to the Nueces County Auditor for

“jury processing.” (Formatting altered.) The district attorney points out his statutory obligations

on behalf of judges or grand juries, arguing that the obligations require his office to gather grand

jurors’ names. By statute, attorneys for the State must “prepare an order for the court” when a

grand juror has become disqualified or unavailable “identifying” the grand juror lost and “naming”

one of the alternates. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 19A.252(a)(1), (4). To accomplish these

tasks “for the” judge, the attorney necessarily must have “collected” the names of the grand jurors

“for the” judge’s order. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.0035(a). As for work “for the” grand jury,

this case would not be the first to recognize that a “prosecuting attorney is the servant of the grand

jury.” See Stern v. State ex rel. Ansel, 869 S.W.2d 614, 621 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

1994, writ denied). In acting as such a servant, the attorney must help the grand jury determine

who is qualified to serve, and the statute governing qualifications requires that grand jurors have

“never been convicted of misdemeanor theft or a felony,” are “not under indictment or other legal

                                                  7
accusation for misdemeanor theft or a felony,” and are “not a complainant in any matter to be

heard by the grand jury during the term of court for which the person has been selected as a grand

juror.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 19A.101(a)(7), (8), (11). Who helps the grand jurors

assemble information about these qualifications if not the district attorney’s office? That office is

the grand jury’s “servant,” see Stern, 869 S.W.2d at 621, for these matters. And how can the office

carry out the qualification statute’s directives without collecting the grand jurors’ names “for the”

grand jury?6 See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.0035(a). Still further here, the sending of the list of

names to the county auditor for “jury processing” gives rise to the reasonable inference that the

district attorney was helping the grand jurors receive some benefit for their service—whether their

juror fee, an excuse to hand to their employer for work absences, or something else. That would

thus be “maintain[ing]” the list of names “for the” grand jury, see id., as its servant. Whether for

this reason or the other statutory ones that the district attorney has identified, there is at least a fact

issue about why the district attorney’s office collected or maintained this list of grand jurors’

names, so rendering judgment for the attorney general is inappropriate.

                Nor is the rendition of the affirmative judgment in his favor supported by the

pleadings. The district attorney and his office sued the attorney general under the PIA, see id.

§ 552.324, pleading for a declaratory judgment about the list of names. The attorney general

answered and filed a jurisdictional plea but filed no other pleadings. The attorney general did not

plead any counterclaims.7

        6
           These statutory directives thus supply at least some of the express and implied authority
to act as agent that the majority opinion says is lacking.
        7
         The majority opinion seems to assert that the attorney general’s one-line request from
his answer’s prayer for a judgment declaring that the information must be disclosed suffices to

                                                    8
               Because judgments must conform to the pleadings, a party is not entitled to an

affirmative judgment in the party’s favor on a claim that the party has not pleaded.8 See Tex. R.

Civ. P. 301; Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[A] party may

not be granted relief in the absence of pleadings to support that relief.”). The part of the attorney

general’s answer in which he “prays for such other and further relief, both general and special, at

law and in equity, to which he may be justly entitled” cannot support an affirmative declaratory

judgment in his favor without fair notice that he was pleading an affirmative claim for relief. See

Davidow v. Inwood N. Pro. Grp.—Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988). The most that the

attorney general could be entitled to here based on the pleadings is a judgment that the district

attorney and his office take nothing on their claims. See Hunt v. Heaton, 643 S.W.2d 677, 679

(Tex. 1982) (stating that “the correct judgment” to render when plaintiff’s claim failed on the

merits was “that he take nothing”); see, e.g., Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKee, 943 S.W.2d

455, 456, 460 (Tex. 1997) (reversing and rendering judgment that claimant take nothing on his

declaratory-judgment claim in appeal in suit in which the parties had cross-moved for summary

judgment on the claim); Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Moss, No. 03-16-00879-CV, 2017 WL 2856750,

at *1–2, 5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 29, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); Charlie Thomas

Ford, Inc. v. A.C. Collins Ford, Inc., 912 S.W.2d 271, 272–73, 275–76 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995,

writ dism’d) (reversing declaratory judgment and rendering judgment that declaratory-judgment

plead a declaratory-judgment counterclaim. See ante at 3. Even if that one line from the prayer
sufficed to plead a counterclaim, there is no showing here that such a counterclaim could survive
the district attorney’s and his office’s governmental immunity from suit.
       8
         No one here argues that the parties tried any affirmative claim by the attorney general by
consent. The record supports only that the parties tried, via summary-judgment practice, the claims
pleaded by the district attorney and his office.

                                                 9
claimant take nothing on that claim). I thus disagree with the majority’s opinion and judgment

over rendering a judgment for the attorney general with the affirmative, declaratory relief “that the

information at issue must be disclosed under the PIA.”

               To sum up, the trial court’s summary judgment should be affirmed because the

grand jurors’ names are confidential under Article 19A.104. Failing that, we should not render

judgment for the attorney general because the district attorney has raised a fact issue on his

“judiciary”-based arguments from the PIA. Still further, no affirmative declaratory judgment

should be rendered here for the attorney general, who at most could be entitled to a take-nothing

judgment. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion and judgment.

                                              __________________________________________
                                              Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Theofanis

Filed: January 11, 2024

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