Court Opinion

ID: 9571804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:19.723524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:02.113444
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Because I believe the challenge for cause should have been granted, I dissent to that issue.
It is not disputed that the juror in question had knowledge of damaging information regarding the defendant which would not normally be admissible in evidence in this case. People v. Goldsberry, 181 Colo. 406, 509 P.2d 801 (1973). Although this information might have been available to the jury under some circumstances, the trial court was not aware of that probability at the time the voir dire took place. See People v. Honey, 198 Colo. 64, 596 P.2d 751 (1979).
It is a matter of fundamental constitutional guarantee that both sides in a criminal trial are entitled to a fair and impartial jury. Nailor v. People, 200 Colo. 30, 612 P.2d 79 (1980); People v. McCrary, 190 Colo. 538, 549 P.2d 1320 (1976). The situation presented here is too fraught with danger to that right to ignore the constitutional protections. It is too much to ask of a potential juror, even though he vehemently professes an ability to overcome any possible prejudice, to both discipline himself not to let the extraneous knowledge affect his judgment, and also not to divulge the special information of which he is aware, to the rest of the panel.
*1380We are not so short of available jurors that we need to disregard constitutional protections and to require either the prosecution or the defense to accept a juror who has substantive knowledge of either the case or the defendant, which knowledge may not become part of the evidence at trial, and which could have a bearing on the outcome of the trial.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.