Court Opinion

ID: 9676205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:17:35.940268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:45.548967
License: Public Domain

FRANK C. PRICE, Justice
(Assigned), dissenting from the en banc opinion
The majority sets a bad precedent for permissible questions and acceptable strikes to eliminate prospective African American jurors in future criminal cases. Without reservation, the majority holds that it is proper, during voir dire, for the prosecutor to inquire of each prospective juror, without ever discussing or inquiring about legal concepts or personal motives, if he or she thinks the outcome of the O.J. Simpson verdict is right or wrong. Then the majority holds it permissible, ie., race neutral, for the State to peremptorily strike all prospective African American jurors who state the verdict is fair, so long as it strikes any white veniremembers who answer similarly.
Pursuant to a Batson1 challenge, appellant questioned the prosecutor’s motive for striking prospective African American jurors numbered five, 14, 32 and 44.
The record reflects that during voir dire, the following occurred:
[Prosecutor]: I’d like to know your opinion on the O.J. verdict. Not about — ■ [Defense Counsel]: I’m going to object to the reference to the O.J. verdict as it relates to homicide cases as it indirectly relates to this defendant, myself, or co-counsel.
The Court: Overruled.
[Prosecutor]: My point is not all about the politics and the media spectacle. Based on what you understand the evidence to be, did you think it was the right verdict, wrong verdict, or you just didn’t follow it? Just tell me what you think of that.
*226The last thing I’d like to ask—
[Defense Counsel]: I’m sorry, Judge. May I have a running objection with any question with regards to the O.J. verdict?
The Court: Yes.
As voir dire developed, the following occurred regarding the four minority panel members:
[Prosecutor]: Juror No. 5, Mrs. Eck-roth? Is that right, ma’am?
[Eckroth]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: What’d you think of the O.J. verdict?
[Eckroth]: Which one, criminal or civil?
[Prosecutor]: Criminal.
[Eckroth]: I thought it was fair.
[[Image here]]
[Prosecutor]: Juror No. 14, Mrs. Quil-ler?
[Quiller]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: What’d you think of the O.J. verdict?
[Quiller]: I didn’t watch it.
[[Image here]]
[Prosecutor]: Juror No. 32, Mr. Joli-vett? What’d you think of the O.J. verdict?
[Jolivett]: Not guilty.
[Prosecutor]: You thought he was not guilty?
[Jolivett]: (Shaking head.)
[[Image here]]
[Prosecutor]: Juror No. 44, Ms. Robinson?
[Robinson]: Correct.
[Prosecutor]: What’d you think of the O.J. verdict?
[Robinson]: It was a fair verdict.
At the conclusion of voir dire, both sides made their strikes. After the jury was seated, appellant made his Batson motion challenging the State’s reasons for striking African American panel members numbered five, 14, 32 and 44. During a discussion between the State, the defense and the court, the record reflects the prosecutor stated the following:
Judge, you’re not aware of this because we hashed this out with Judge Shaver on Friday. First of all, the victim in this case is black. Virtually all of the witnesses are black. I don’t see how a black person’s wife becomes an issue. Another thing you’re not aware of that we went over with Judge Shaver, I met and spoke with this defendant’s wife at length. One of the things this defendant’s — defendant was fascinated with the O.J. Simpson case. He took off work to watch the O.J. Simpson trial and he said it was unbelievable that he was able to beat the case when it was so obvious. Also, a lot of the circumstances is [sic] similar, attack against spouse, spouse who left him, brutal overkill.
The prosecutor thereafter gs,ve the following reasons for the peremptory challenges of the African American venire-members:
1. Ms. Eckroth, number five, was falling asleep, could not see the board even though she was on the first row and, “most important, indicated that the O.J. verdict was fair, indicating that if similar overwhelming scientific or circumstantial evidence exists, then she apparently believes that evidence is not enough to convict.”
2. Ms. Quiller, number 14, had been “handled” for hot checks, works for Goodwill; bad body language.
3. Mr. Jolivett, number 32, stated emphatically that O.J. was not guilty.
*2274. Ms. Robinson, number 44, stated that the O.J. Simpson verdict was fair.
The prosecutor, before the voir dire process had concluded, informed the trial judge that there were many factual similarities between the case he was presenting and the O.J. Simpson trial. When asked by a white veniremember why he was inquiring about the Simpson trial, the prosecutor stated that if that person was subsequently selected to serve on the jury, the question probably would make sense during trial. The prosecutor, however, made no effort during the interrogation of prospective jurors to discuss any aspect of the O.J. Simpson case from a legal or factual standpoint, or to pursue the reasons for the opinion each prospective juror expressed as to its outcome. He only alluded that the facts of the two cases were similar.
During his objections to the State’s reasons for making its strikes, appellant’s attorney complained that the O.J. Simpson case divided the nation based on race and stated it was wrong to allow the State to strike jurors along ethnic lines just because they agreed with the verdict. The trial court judge admitted that the O.J. Simpson case was well known, but nevertheless held that the State’s explanation for striking the African American panel members was a race neutral reason.
It is interesting that the prosecutor made a statement to the trial court that the victim was black, all witnesses are black and a black person’s wife should not be an issue, and then struck all African Americans to keep them off the jury. It should have been obvious to the trial court judge that this was the prosecutor’s intention all along, and the question and answer was the easiest and most consistent method for the prosecutor accomplishing his desired result.
The majority views this as a discretionary standard, according deference to the trial judge, “who was present to assess the credibility of the prosecutor and his explanations.” As such, it holds the prosecutor must have been telling the truth when he claimed his strikes were not racially motivated because the trial court did not grant appellant’s Batson challenge. During my 27 years of service presiding over criminal cases, I have yet to see a prosecutor, in the face of a Batson challenge, confess that his strikes were racially motivated.
One should examine the entire record to try to determine the prosecutor’s motive for asking the O.J. Simpson question, and whether it supports the trial judge’s decision that the question was race neutral, thus, allowing the State justification for striking African American panel members. The “supported by the record” standard is an analytical tool used in determining whether a trial judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous or should be accorded great deference. Vargas v. State, 838 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
We need not give deference to the trial court’s findings because they do not turn on the credibility of either the prosecutor’s stated motive for exercising his peremptory challenges on African American panel members, or such members’ reaction to the Simpson verdict. The prosecutor admitted he struck all panel members who expressed an opinion the Simpson verdict was fair. This does not require a credibility evaluation, whether or not the prosecutor believed it was a race neutral reason. The fact he did not inquire into the thought processes of the African American members to determine if their opinions were based on the quality of the evidence, or just part of a group bias caused by the polarizing effect that developed when the Simpson case received national attention in *228the media,2 is evidence, however, the prosecutor intended to eliminate all African Americans from the jury panel, regardless of how them opinions were formulated. The clearly erroneous standard, and not a discretionary standard, should be applied to determine if the trial judge erred when he declared that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the African American panel members were race neutral.
Regarding veniremember number five, Libbie Eekroth, the prosecutor informed the trial judge the most important reason for striking her was because she stated that the O.J. verdict was fair. He further stated that her opinion indicated if there was similar overwhelming scientific evidence or circumstantial evidence introduced in a case, she apparently would not consider it sufficient to convict. The prosecutor made this assumption without discussing with the panel generally or with Eekroth specifically the concept of circumstantial evidence, the significance of scientific evidence, and without ever asking her on what she based her opinion that the verdict was fair. The record does not support such an assumption by the prosecutor. The prosecutor informed the court he likewise struck panel members number 32, Earl Jolivett, and number 44, Robin Robinson, for merely stating the verdict was fair. The prosecutor further indicated he struck all panel members, white and black, who agreed with the Simpson verdict.
Because African American venire-member number 14, Deborah Quiller, told the prosecutor she had no opinion about the Simpson result, the prosecutor informed the court he had various other reasons for striking her. He stated he ran a criminal history on her, along with several other panel members. He claimed she either had been convicted or had been handled for hot checks. He apparently was unsure. He should have known that had she been convicted, this would have been considered a form of theft which legally would have disqualified her from sitting on the jury.
The record does not disclose whether the criminal history information the prosecutor claimed to have accessed applied to Quiller. He never said how he related the information to her and he never inquired of Quiller if the information was accurate, and if it was, whether there was an explanation. He merely used this general con-clusory reasoning, which may or may not have been true, to justify striking her.
He further informed the trial court he struck her because she was employed by Goodwill. The record is silent why Goodwill employees make bad jurors. The prosecutor then stated when he addressed her, her hands were folded, but neglected to indicate why this was significant.
The prosecutor complained that Quiller nodded vigorously when the appellant’s attorney spoke to the group. As justification for this comment, the prosecutor related that when appellant’s attorney was inquiring about police officers’ veracity, Quiller shook her head “no” before the people on her row were asked the question directly.3 The prosecutor could not have *229been upset that she answered the question properly, only that she answered prematurely by nodding her head.
It is no mystery the prosecutor was intending to present his case alluding to its similarities with the O.J. Simpson allegations. He informed the trial court before trial of the many similarities between the two crimes, he mentioned to a prospective juror that his reason for asking the Simpson question would become clear during trial, and he made several allusions to and comparative references with the Simpson case before the jury during trial. He was permitted, over objection, to prove through appellant’s wife that appellant was obsessed with watching the Simpson trial and made remarks that O.J. got away with murder. The prosecutor, in an effort to explain the missing weapon and bloody clothes, argued to the jury, without any support in the record, that anyone who followed the O.J. Simpson trial would know to get rid of the weapon and clothes.
In order to carry out his plan, the prosecutor had to eliminate all African Americans from the jury. Simpson was a hero to the African Americans, one of their most successful and recognizable members. He was revered as an icon.
Knowing that he was going to have to vilify Simpson and brand him a murderer in the face of his acquittal, the prosecutor could not take a chance by putting African Americans on the jury regardless of their attitude about the outcome of the Simpson verdict. The Simpson question was the vehicle through which he could strike most, if not all, of the African American panel members. It was not necessary for the prosecutor to explore the attitude of the prospective jurors about the Simpson acquittal. He knew he would be able to strike the majority, if not all, of the African Americans with just their answers to his question. And he was correct because 100 percent of the African Americans on the panel, who allegedly were familiar with the case, thought the Simpson verdict was fair.
It is common knowledge the Simpson trial had a polarizing effect on the American public. It is difficult to find an African American who publicly will admit disagreement with Simpson’s acquittal. Likewise, the majority of whites believe he is guilty.
The prosecutor’s question had its desired effect with all but one African American panel member. This member, Quiller, had no opinion about the Simpson verdict. Consequently, the prosecutor had to resort to reasons that were extremely weak and tenuous at best to excuse this person. It just goes to prove how necessary it was for the State to eliminate all African Americans from sitting on the jury.
The majority was persuaded by the State’s argument that the prosecutor’s strikes were not racially motivated because he struck two white prospective jurors who, he claimed, expressed opinions similar to those of the African Americans. Venireman Jordan stated, “If I was on the jury, from what I understood, I wouldn’t have found him guilty.” The key phrase in that statement is “from what I understood.” With this statement, even Jordan questions the validity of his knowledge about the facts in the Simpson case. Unfortunately, we do not know what he understood, or the origin of the source for establishing his opinion, because the prosecutor never explored with Jordan what he meant by his statement.
There is no way to accurately assess the meaning of Jordan’s comment. The prosecutor as well as the majority, without justification, just assume he meant something that would justify a strike.
The second white venireperson struck by the prosecutor was Belinda Pearce who *230stated, “I thought with the evidence that was provided to the jury that ‘it’ was adequate.” This statement obviously is capable of two interpretations. Again the prosecutor never inquired what Pearce meant the pronoun “it” to reference. Was it that the evidence was adequate to support guilt, or was it that based on the evidence the Simpson verdict was adequate? Without a clarification from Pearce, it would be unfair to interpret the statement either way. As before, the majority assumes “it” refers to “the Simpson verdict” and inserted that phrase in brackets after “it” to justify its position.
The majority then concludes, “What the prosecutor was apparently trying to do was to keep any prospective juror off the jury who would find appellant not guilty despite very strong circumstantial evidence similar to that in the O.J. Simpson case.” (Emphasis added.) This conclusion is reached without any knowledge of what any prospective juror knew or personally felt about Simpson or any aspect of his case. It just assumes the African Americans were knowledgeable about the evidence, which is all the more reason these strikes were not race neutral.
I have always thought that an opinion is supposed to be a rational, logical and intellectual analysis of the issues and the facts supporting them, not one based on clairvoyant conjecture interpreted by people who do not even claim to be mind readers.
If a question on its face is not race neutral, it does not become race neutral merely because whites who answer similarly to African Americans are subsequently struck by the prosecutor. The State’s argument applies only to comparative situations where the State strikes a minority for a reason that on its face is race neutral, then refuses to strike whites who fit the same profile. With the State intending to prosecute its case alluding to similarities with the Simpson case, it was equally important for the State to eliminate all white panel members who likewise were sympathetic with the Simpson outcome. The State found a convenient way to strike African Americans and, according to the majority’s interpretation, picked up two whites along the way.
The majority, in its conclusion, characterizes the evidence in the Simpson case as “very strong circumstantial evidence.” If the members truly believe that, then, in light of the makeup of the Simpson jury, predominantly African American, an argument can be made that the acquittal must be the result of a racial verdict. Therefore, if the Simpson verdict was racial, then the prosecutor’s reasoning for exercising his strikes in the present case also must be racial.
The concurring opinion presents an interesting perspective. While the writer totally agrees with the majority’s rationale and conclusion, he recommends limiting the number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases to conform to attitudes of other organizations around the country. Unfortunately, this is not a solution. Limiting strikes would have no effect on racial discrimination because only one incident of such inappropriate behavior would cause a conviction to be reversed.
I think the majority has done a disservice to Texas jurisprudence with this opinion. In the future, the State, especially in the context of a non-homicide prosecution, will be permitted to ask each prospective juror his or her opinion about the verdict in the O.J. Simpson case and legitimately strike all African Americans who say it is fair, so long as it strikes any white venire-person who answers similarly.
It is unfortunate that we ask African Americans to accept our system, of justice as a fair and unbiased application of legal *231principles, then refuse them the opportunity to serve on a jury because they claim, in their minds, the system worked.
I respectfully dissent.
I would remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor from using peremptory challenges against potential jurors solely on account of their race, or on the assumption that African American jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against an African American defendant.

. See U.S. News Story Page at http://cgi.cnn.com/US/9610/17/oj.trial (visited April 19, 2001): "The racial make-up of the jury [in the civil trial] could be crucial since opinion polls have consistently showed an America divided over the verdict in Simpson's criminal trial, with most blacks believing in Simpson’s innocence and most whites thinking him guilty."

. Appellant's attorney asked the following question: "Would you be inclined to believe a peace officer, as opposed to anyone else, whatever their testimony may be, simply because the person is a peace officer?"