Court Opinion

ID: 9693183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:29:01.120449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:42.116837
License: Public Domain

HANDLER and POLLOCK, JJ.,
dissenting.
The issue is whether the Casino Reinvestment Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 5:12-144.1, violates Article IV, § 7, ¶ 2 of the New Jersey Constitution (the “Casino Amendment” or “Amendment”), which requires that all State revenues from casino gambling benefit senior citizens and disabled residents. Resolution of that issue depends on whether the CRA authorizes the expenditure of designated revenues for other purposes. We believe that the CRA dedicates revenues to such other purposes. Consequently, we respectfully dissent.
*542I.
In 1976, the State presented New Jersey voters with this question:
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
CASINOS IN ATLANTIC CITY FOR THE BENEFIT OF SENIOR CITIZENS AND DISABLED RESIDENTS OF THE STATE
Shall the Constitution be amended, as agreed to by the Legislature, to authorize the Legislature to establish and regulate gambling casinos in Atlantic City, with the State’s revenues therefrom being applied solely to reduce property taxes, rentals, and telephone, gas, electric and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of the State?
Following voter approval at the general election, the New Jersey Constitution was amended to read:
It shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law the establishment and operation, under regulation and control by the State, of gambling houses or casinos within the boundaries, as heretofore established, of the city of Atlantic City, county of Atlantic, and to license and tax such operations and equipment used in connection therewith. Any law authorizing the establishment and operation of such gambling establishments shall provide for the State revenues derived therefrom to be applied solely for the purpose of providing funding for reductions in property taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of, eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of the State, and for additional or expanded health services or benefits or transportation services or benefits to eligible senior citizens and disabled residents, in accordance with such formulae as the Legislature shall by law provide. The type and number of such casinos or gambling houses and of the gambling games which may be conducted in any such establishment shall be determined by or pursuant to the terms of the law authorizing the establishment and operation thereof.
[N.J. Const, art IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D) (emphasis added).]
Simply stated, the Casino Amendment requires revenues derived from the operation of casinos to be applied solely for the purpose of providing services or benefits for eligible senior citizens and disabled residents. The CRA, however, permits revenues paid by casinos to the State to be spent on miscellaneous purposes unrelated to senior citizens and the disabled. Although many of these purposes may be worthwhile, the Constitution does not *543permit the expenditure of State revenues derived from casinos for unauthorized purposes, commendable or not. The plain language of the Casino Amendment precludes the use of State revenues for purposes authorized by the CRA. Nothing more is needed to sustain the conclusion that the CRA is unconstitutional.
Although unnecessary to resolve this appeal, a fuller appreciation of the issue starts with the general prohibition on gambling in the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const, art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2. Only by means of a constitutional amendment, approved by a majority of voters, could the Legislature surmount that constitutional prohibition.
In 1974, the public rejected a referendum that would have permitted State-owned and -operated casinos throughout New Jersey. In commenting on the defeat of the 1974 proposal, Assemblyman (now Senator) Robert Littell stated that the public
felt that they would rather go to that type of casino [a charitable organization “Monte Carlo” night] where they know that the money is going for a charitable organization than to go to a statewide casino or state casino, because they don’t want the money going to the State Treasury, or whatever it is earmarked for.
[Public Hearing on Assembly Concurrent Resolution 126 (Apr. 14, 1976) (statement of Assemblyman Littell).]
In 1976, the Legislature again sought public approval of casino gambling. Article IX, ¶ 7 of the State Constitution stipulates that once voters have rejected a proposed amendment, the Legislature must wait until the third general election following the rejection before submitting a substantially similar amendment to the electorate. Here, the Legislature did not want to wait. Consequently, in 1976 it introduced concurrent resolutions in the Assembly and Senate for a modified proposal on casino gambling. The identical resolutions, Assembly Concurrent Resolution 126 (ACR 126) and Senate Concurrent Resolution 103 (SCR 103) differed from the 1976 proposal in several material respects. See Young v. Byrne, 144 N.J.Super. 10, 364 A.2d 47 (Law Div.1976) (1976 referendum sufficiently different from 1974 referendum that Constitution did not impose waiting period between proposals). First, the casinos were to be privately owned and operated. Second, *544they were to be confined to Atlantic City. Finally, and of critical importance to this appeal, the State revenues generated from casino gambling were to be used exclusively to benefit senior citizens and disabled residents.
Statements made at the public hearing on ACR 126 confirm that the revenues were to be used solely for senior citizens and disabled residents. Assemblyman Howard Kupperman, one of the sponsors of ACR 126, stated:
The State will have a take from the very top, and this money very specifically is set forth. The proceeds will be used not in the general treasury, so they can be lost, as has been done with proceeds from other revenue sources, and people years from now can come back and say, “What happened to the money,” but these proceeds will be specifically dedicated and I quote from the bill, “... for the reduction of property taxes, rentals, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of the State.... ” So the senior citizens and disabled persons will get the benefit, and this money will not be in a general fund, but will be specifically used for this purpose, and as such, whatever money is raised, whether it be $5 million or $10 million or $20 million or $50 million, it will have a definite impact on these areas.
[Public Hearing on ACR 126 (Apr. 14, 1976) (statement of Assemblyman Kupperman).]
Senator Joseph McGahn, who sponsored SCR 103, emphasized the importance of the dedication of casino revenues for the benefit of senior citizens:
Now, nationwide today there are any number of states that are exploring gambling by the State as a means of increasing revenue. We do not consider this, to be perfectly honest with you, as primarily a revenue producing measure. I can understand your concern about the dedication of these revenues to senior citizens, because it would be an attractive means to get senior citizens to support this. But I think also, by the same token, given the present fiscal situation in the State, and given the reluctance of the Legislature to give commitments for human services, for human needs, certainly there would be nothing wrong with this approach, and I assure you it is certainly not a ploy. I think it is a reasonable way of doing it. At the present time Pennsylvania is doing the same thing, as far as providing transportation to the senior citizens free and various other amenities to senior citizens. That was primarily the legislative intent in back of this.
[Id. (statement of Senator McGahn.)]
Comments of several concerned citizens confirm the public’s understanding that the purpose of the 1976 Amendment was to consign all State revenue from gambling to senior citizens and disabled residents: “ACR-[1]26 must be looked upon with favor, *545since the revenue derived from legalized gambling will be dedicated to our senior citizens.” Id. (statement of Charles Davis). “It seems to me [ ] that dedicating the revenues to help senior citizens is misleading. Everybody wants to help senior citizens, and many will vote for this amendment without realizing its implications.” Id. (statement of Mary Tanner).
Finally, pre-election newspaper editorials, both those opposed to approval of the referendum and those in favor of approval, substantiate that the public understood that the State’s revenues from gambling were to be dedicated to assisting senior citizens and disabled residents: “The referendum itself is slightly different this time too. It calls for casino gaming restricted to Atlantic City, run by private interests, with revenues dedicated to senior citizens’ needs.” Fred Hillman, Casinos Getting Better Odds This Time Around, Star-Ledger, Oct. 10, 1976, at 4. “Atlantic City might get a quick fix — some new hotels, some new ancillary businesses. The state treasury would get a modest amount of tax revenue, earmarked for senior citizens (a cynical ploy to milk votes if there ever was one).” Still No Dice, Trenton Times, Oct. 29, 1976, at A14.
We think [rejection of the referendum] would be too bad not just for Atlantic City, which has a chance for a new life, but the entire state as well, which would benefit directly and indirectly from the improved economy in Atlantic City. For one thing, the state’s share of proceeds will go to senior citizen assistance.
[Statewide Referenda: Seven Questions, Trentonian, Oct. 31,1976, at 36.]
Those who say the amendment is misleading in promising great rewards for the taxpayers of New Jersey are overlooking the fact that those who drafted the amendment and those who support it have never promised the people of New Jersey a bonanza as a result of casinos in Atlantic City. But in preparing the legislation they made realistic provisions to share eight per cent of the gross revenue from gaming with those with the greatest need — senior citizens and the disabled.
[Atlantic City’s Future: Casinos Yes, Press, Oct. 29, 1976, at 1.]
New Jersey voters overwhelmingly defeated legalized gambling casinos two years ago. New Jersey’s best interests will be served if they reject casinos again Tuesday despite the fact that the proposal would restrict the risks of casinos to Atlantic City and provide state tax revenue that would be “applied solely to reduce property taxes, rentals, and telephone, gas, electric and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of the state.” ... The dedication *546of gambling taxes to reduction of property taxes and utility bills for seniors and disabled citizens is a ploy to clothe the proposal with respectability and treat the seniors and disabled as pawns.
[Risks of Casino Gambling, Asbury Park Press, Oct. 29,1976, at A22.]
II.
In concluding that the proposed constitutional amendment contemplated the expenditure of State revenues for purposes other than assisting senior citizens and disabled residents, the majority commits three analytical errors. First, it ignores the plain language of the Casino Amendment as an ordinary person would understand it. Second, despite the lack of ambiguity in the Amendment’s language, the majority revisits the Amendment’s legislative history. In doing so, it conflates legislative statements made after the voters approved the constitutional Amendment with those made prior to obtaining that approval. It even uses the legislative history of the statute at issue to support its interpretation of a constitutional amendment adopted eight years before that statute. Finally, the majority confuses the anticipation of indirect economic benefit to Atlantic City from the arrival of casinos with an expectation of direct benefit from State revenues derived from the tax on those casinos.
A.
Under standard rules of constitutional interpretation, the Casino Amendment must be strictly construed. In State v. Apportionment Commission, 125 N.J. 375, 382, 593 A.2d 710 (1991), the Court explained the proper means of assessing the language of a constitutional amendment, relying on the approach used to assess the validity of an interpretive statement. That approach inquires whether the interpretive statement “sufferfs] from an ambiguity so fundamental that a voter could not intelligently understand [its] effect.” Kimmelman v. Burgio, 204 N.J.Super. 44, 52, 497 A.2d 890 (App.Div.1985) (citations omitted); cf. New Jersey Ass’n on Correction v. Lan, 80 N.J. 199, 208, 403 A.2d 437 (1979) (rejecting challenge to validity of interpretive statement because “[consider*547ing the question and Interpretive Statement on the ballot as to this bond issue, [ ] one would wonder how any literate voter could be misled or fail to have ‘an understanding appraisement of the project’ ”). In Apportionment Commission, the Court wrote that the critical question in interpreting the language of a constitutional amendment is: “[D]oes the public question ‘tell the ordinary voter what is involved’?” 125 N.J. at 382, 593 A.2d 710 (citing Gormley v. Lan, 88 N.J. 26, 37, 438 A.2d 519 (1981)). The Court explained:
“[T]hat the words employed [in the Constitution] have been carefully measured and weighed to convey a certain and definite meaning, with as little as possible left to implication” is presumed. We should therefore “inquire as to the meaning the symbols of expression would most naturally and plainly convey, the sense most obvious to the common understanding ... [for] [t]he Constitution was written ‘to be understood by the voters.’ ”
[Ibid, (citations omitted).]
Several years earlier, in Atlantic City Racing Ass’n v. New Jersey, 98 N.J. 535, 489 A.2d 165 (1985), the Court gave even more explicit instructions concerning the strict construction that is involved in the interpretation of an amendment:
While a constitutional limitation is in its very nature inflexible in meaning and immune to varying public opinion, social and economic needs arising from complexities of modern life call for new applications of the principle. It can be accommodated to new needs, however, only where it will not contravene the intent of the instrument. While it may be appropriate to give a liberal reading to what Justice Holmes referred to as the “great ordinances of the Constitution” as they may have relevance to the problems of the day, more literal adherence to the words selected in those clauses carefully defining the mechanics and administration of government is mandated. As Justice Mountain wrote in Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292[, 304-05, 370 A.2d 825] (1977):
Not all constitutional provisions are of equal majesty. Justice Holmes once referred to the “great ordinances of the Constitution.” Within this category would be included the due process clause, the equal protection clause, the free speech clause, all or most of the other sections of the Bill of Rights, as well as certain other provisions. The task of interpreting most if not all of these “great ordinances” is an evolving and on-going process____
But there are other articles in the Constitution of a different and less exalted quality. Such provisions generally set forth — rather simply — those details of governmental administration as are deemed worthy of a place in the organic document. Examples from our own Constitution might be the clause in Art. 4, § 4, ¶ 6 that requires bills and joint resolutions to be read three times in each house before final passage; or the provision in Art. 4, § 5, 113 declaring that *548upon a member of the Legislature becoming a member of Congress, his seat in the Legislature shall thereupon become vacant; or the requirement set forth in Art. 5, § 1, ¶ 2 that the Governor shall be not less than thirty years of age.
Such constitutional provisions as these, and others like them, important as they doubtless may be, are entirely set apart from the “great ordinances” mentioned above, and as a matter of constitutional interpretation should receive entirely different treatment. Where in the one case the underlying spirit, intent and purpose of the Article must be sought and applied as it may have relevance to the problems of the day, in the other a literal adherence to the words of the clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people can be assured fulfillment.
[Id. at 544-46, 489 A.2d 165 (citations omitted).]
As previously indicated, the Casino Amendment must be read literally and restrictively. That Amendment provides for State revenues derived from casino operations to
be applied solely for the purpose of providing funding for reductions in property taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric, and municipal utilities charges of eligible senior citizens and disabled residents of this State, and for additional or expanded health services or benefits or transportation services or benefits to eligible senior citizens and disabled residents.
[N.J. Const, art. IV, § 7,¶ 2.]
Accepted standards of constitutional interpretation do not support the inference that one of the Casino Amendment’s articulated purposes was to improve Atlantic City or any other area of the State. By the Amendment’s express terms, the State’s revenue was to be applied to the needs of senior citizens and the disabled.
Moreover, the constitutional language precisely delineates how casino revenues are to be used for senior citizens and disabled residents. The Amendment directs the Legislature to exercise a narrow discretion in determining how casino revenues may be spent in respect of senior citizens and the disabled. Application of those revenues on behalf of senior citizens and disabled persons is expressly limited to the reduction of property taxes, rental, telephone, gas, electric and municipal utilities charges, and for health and transportation services or benefits. Accordingly, even if the revitalization of Atlantic City were itself a “benefit” to senior citizens or disabled residents, the pointed language of the Casino *549Amendment does not authorize that funds be spent for that purpose.
B.
Despite the lack of ambiguity in the Casino Amendment, the majority interprets it by examining the legislative history of both the Amendment and the Casino Control Act (CCA), N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to 5:12-194. The Court engages in this analysis despite its acknowledgment of the
familiar rule of construction that where phraseology is precise and unambiguous there is no room for judicial interpretation or for resort to extrinsic materials. The language speaks for itself, and where found in our State Constitution the language is the voice of the people.
[Ante at 527, 734 A.2d at 1175 (quoting Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, 370 A.2d 825 (1977)).]
Even when an examination of legislative history is appropriate, statements made by supporters of a constitutional amendment during the course of its enactment and adoption must be scrutinized carefully. Statements that are part of the official legislative history of the amendment should be distinguished from those that are merely partisan and unofficial in nature. For example, in Dickinson v. Fund for the Support of Free Public Schools, 95 N.J. 65, 81-84, 469 A.2d 1 (1983), the dissent criticized the majority’s citation of statements attributed to various individuals in the course of the enactment and adoption of the Tidelands Amendment because the statements were reflective of a “partisan position based upon one possible interpretation of the amendment” and hence did “not define either the purpose of the constitutional amendment or the intent of the people in adopting it.” Id. at 94, 469 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting). Although the statements were made by administration officials, the dissent observed that they
should be accorded no determinative weight in ascertaining legislative intent of the amendment, absent an indication of an adoption of such expressions as the views of the framers or the adopters of the amendment. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 48.10 at 210 (4 ed. Sands 1973); State v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J.Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (Ch.Div.1977).
[Id. at 94-95 n. 2, 469 A.2d 1 (Handler, J., dissenting).]
In the present case, the majority oscillates between examining statements made in the Legislature before the election and state-*550merits made afterward. Pre-election, the legislators spoke extensively about aid to senior citizens and about revitalizing Atlantic City. They never spoke of using tax revenues to revitalize Atlantic City nor of using tax revenues to revitalize the rest of the State.
Similarly, before the election, the people were told that all of the money generated from casino gambling would go to senior citizens. Only after the election was a specific proportion of revenues, namely 8%, mentioned for use in the dedicated programs. Four months after approval of the referendum, during a public hearing on the CCA, Senator McGahn said:
I would like to make one point and that concerns the possibility of deriving some direct income from casinos, which we had not originally anticipated. Apparently, at the present time, there is a Federal Tax Stamp of $250 placed on each of the slot machines in any casino. The way it is worked in the State of Nevada is simply that $200 goes to the State and $50 goes to the Federal Government. The $200 that goes to the State is a matter of a tax credit against the tax revenue that is owed to the Federal Government.
... I would honestly anticipate that somewhere down the line — and I don’t think this will be in the very beginning — probably like Nevada has at the present time, there will be a tiered-tax type of situation and this is allocated back either to the city, the county, or the convention bureau — as the ease may be. When we realize our maximum potential as far as that is concerned, then I think under those circumstances there probably can be a different taxing system than we may be proposing in the beginning. So, part of the profits of this type of industry may be going back into bettering the cultural and recreational climate of this area and possibly helping to relocate people who may be dislocated by the impact of casino gambling in Atlantic City.
[Public Hearing on S1780 (Mar. 2, 1977) (statement of Senator McGahn).]
Many other statements cited by the majority as demonstrating a public and legislative understanding similarly were not uttered until after the election. See, e.g., ante at 518, 784 A.2d at 1169 (quoting 314 N.J.Super. 651, 668, 715 A.2d 1052 (Law Div.1997) (quoting N.J.S.A. 5:12-1(b)(4)(CCA))); ibid, (quoting 314 N.J.Super. at 668, 715 A.2d 1052 (quoting N.J.S.A. 5:12-1(b)(5)(CCA))); id. at 520-21, 734 A.2d at 1171 (quoting 314 N.J.Super. at 671-72, 715 A.2d 1052 (quoting R. Benjamin Cohen, Casino Gambling: The Elements of Effective Control, 6 Seton Hall Legis. J. 55 (1982))). Briefly stated, statements made after the 1976 general *551election are not part of the legislative “history” of the Casino Amendment.
Lastly, the majority uses the legislative intent behind and the words of the CRA to establish its constitutionality. The majority notes that N.J.S.A 5:12-144.1(i) states that any purchases of bonds pursuant to the act “are to be considered investments and not taxes owed or grants to the State or any political subdivision thereof.” Ante at 525, 734 A.2d at 1174 (quoting N.J.S.A 5:12—44.1(i)); see also id. at 533-34, 734 A.2d at 1178-79 (interpreting history of 1984 statutory amendment). As helpful as legislative history may be when interpreting a statute, that history cannot usurp the judicial obligation to determine the statute’s constitutionality.
C.
Even after the 1976 election, the Legislature recognized that the rehabilitation of Atlantic City was to occur through the investment of private funds. The statement accompanying Senate Bill 1780, which became the CCA, provides:
This bill is intended to implement the constitutional amendment, approved by the people at the general election of November 2, 1976, authorizing the Legislature to provide for casino gambling in Atlantic City.
The objectives of the bill and the persons and localities affected are set forth in subsection b. of section 1 as a statement of findings and declaration of policy by the Legislature. Revenues derived from the taxation of casinos established pursuant to this act will be devoted, pursuant to the constitutional amendment and Section 105 of this bill, to reduce senior citizens’ property taxes, rentals and utility expenses.
[Statement Accompanying Senate Bill 1780 (1977).]
Atlantic City would enjoy both a direct benefit and a “ripple effect.” As a leading text on the Casino Amendment states:
The local economy was supposed to boom in Atlantic City in a way that couldn’t help but benefit the merchants who have long comprised the core of the private sector.
It was called the “ripple effect,” and it was supposed to work something like this: The tourists come to the casino hotels, bringing in the dollars by the bushelful (dropping more than $2.1 billion in the 11 casinos in 1986). The dollars would then *552be recirculated into the pockets of employees, and into the bank accounts of businesses that supply the casinos. These employees and businesses would then purchase more goods, expand their own investments, and patronize local businesses. The local businesses would then do some expanding of them own, increase their inventories, and hire more employees. These employees would then patronize other merchants, who would then hire more employees who would patronize the casinos and the other merchants and then more employees would be hired, housing would be built, business would expand, and on and on.
[Michael Pollock, Hostage to Fortune: Atlantic City and Casino Gambling 155 (1987).]
Senator McGahn testified to the same effect at a hearing on the CCA:
To accomplish these purposes [a revitalized Atlantic City], my amendments will add language to the public policy statement of Section 1 of the legislation which specifies that legalized casino gaming in Atlantic City has been approved by the citizens of New Jersey as a unique form of urban redevelopment in language which considers the casinos as the catalyst to stimulate the redevelopment of existing blighted areas, the refurbishing and expansion of existing hotels, convention, tourist, entertainment, recreational, and cultural facilities.
... I would like to state that at the time we were selling this in the State, we were selling this to rebuild and redevelop Atlantic City. We were selling this and using casinos as an instrument and not as an end in and of itself, to attract investment capital, to attract new investment, to get 10,000 first class hotel rooms by 1985 so that the faltering convention business could be reinforced and so that there could be increased job opportunities, there could be increased jobs and an attempt to cut down on the unemployment rolls in Atlantic City which, incidentally, is one of the highest in the State.
[Public Hearing on S1780 (Mar. 2,1977) (statement of Senator McGahn).]
A leading scholar writes:
The centerpiece of the 1976 proposal was the use of casino gambling as a tool for the redevelopment of Atlantic City. Casino advocates argued that the legalization of casinos would be a major ingredient in the economic revitalization of the city, and they claimed that casino development would create between twenty and thirty thousand new jobs.
[Richard Lehne, Casino Policy 35 (1986).]
The Casino Control Act actually earmarked no state funds for development purposes. The statute assumed that investment in Atlantic City’s casinos and entertainment facilities would stimulate the redevelopment of the rest of the community, and it presumed that the economic activity generated by casinos would attract the non-state resources required to meet the community’s housing and infrastructure needs. In addition to the specialized tax obligations created by the casino act, casino companies were also obliged to pay the normal federal, state, and local taxes.
*553[Id at 153.]
Consistent with these analyses, the Casino Amendment never mentioned the use of State revenues for the redevelopment of Atlantic City. Indeed, the majority acknowledges that redevelopment, although a “primary objective” of the Amendment, was to be generated by the casinos’ direct investment in Atlantic City and from the resulting ripple effect.
[T]he rehabilitation of Atlantic City as a tourist and resort center was a fundamental if not the primary objective of the sponsors of the Casino Amendment and the Casino Control Act, even though the constitutional dedication of the proceeds of the tax on casino wagering for the benefit of senior and disabled citizens was a crucial element of the Amendment and the primary inducement used to solicit voter approval of the Amendment.
[Ante at 521, 734 A.2d at 1171-72 (emphasis added).]
In 1977, the public understood that State revenues derived from casinos were to be used solely for senior citizens and the disabled. For example, at a legislative hearing on the CCA, Mrs. Charles Fischer, an advocate for the Atlantic City Performing Arts Center, now the Stockton Performing Arts Center, stated:
I propose that upon investigation, perhaps some kind of fee or tax can be created which would supply a source of funds, which would be able to amortize the bonding of the [performing arts] center. Now, for example, there might be a resort tax levied as 1% of the payroll of non-gambling operations____ I believe that the revenues from gambling — the use of that — would be prohibited. It is unconstitutional. So, the source would have to come — the source of funds — from something that would benefit from the gambling indirectly. In other words, those funds would be created by gambling but not be direct gambling revenue.
[Public Hearing on S1780 (Mai-. 2, 1977) (statement of Mrs. Charles Fischer).]
Senator McGahn recognized that at some time, casinos might be obligated to contribute to Atlantic City’s recovery. He also recognized, however, that the source of the contribution could not be casino revenues:
Should the casinos, once they have reached maximization, as far as operation is concerned, be responsible to some degree for paying for basically the cost of benefits and improvements as far as the city is concerned]?] I think that is a reasonable concept and a reasonable assumption and certainly when it gets to that particular point, some revenues that would not be taken from the gross revenue or the gross pay that is dedicated to senior citizens could be considered, or as it is in *554Vegas at the present time, where the sales tax goes to the convention bureau and the revenues from slot machines go for education.
[Id, (statement of Senator McGahn).]
III.
To fulfill the promise made to obtain the public approval of casino gambling in Atlantic City, the CCA set the tax on casinos’ gross revenues at the annual rate of 8%, with all revenues to be used for the benefit of senior citizens and disabled residents. The proceeds of the tax were to be paid to a dedicated account known as the Casino Revenue Fund (CRF). As explained by Assemblyman Steven Perskie, 8% seemed like a “realistic figure” given the need to balance a requirement by the intended recipients of substantial sums with the higher overall tax structure in New Jersey versus Nevada. Public Hearing on A2366 (Dec. 15, 1976) (CCA) (statement of Assemblyman Perskie). Nothing in the constitutional Amendment or its history intimated that the seniors were due just 8% of the gambling take and that the State was free to use for other purposes any amount it collected beyond 8%. As Assemblyman Kupperman explained when introducing the resolution proposing the Casino Amendment:
[T]he senior citizens and disabled persons will get the benefit, and this money will not be in a general fund, but will be specifically used for this purpose, and as such, whatever money is raised, whether it be $5 million or $10 million or $20 million or $50 million, it will have a definite impact on these areas.
[Public Hearing on ACR 126 (Apr. 14, 1976) (statement of Assemblyman Kupperman) (emphasis added).]
In brief, the State’s commitment to use the revenues from casino gambling extended beyond its promise to the recipients that they would receive the funds. The promise extended to the general public.
To stimulate casino investment in Atlantic City, the CCA required casinos with gross revenues in excess of the value of then-cumulative investment in the State to invest 2% of their gross revenues in improved real estate. In the alternative, the casinos could pay the required 2% as a tax. Significantly, if remitted as a tax, the proceeds were to be paid to the CRF and dedicated to the seniors and disabled. N.J.S.A. 5:12-144(b), (e). The effective *555date of this provision was delayed for five years; as a practical matter, it never took effect.
Frustrated at the slow pace of Atlantic City’s economic recovery and at its inability to persuade the casinos to make sufficient voluntary investments in Atlantic City, the Legislature in 1984 enacted the CRA. The CRA’s investment requirements supplanted the 2% excess-profit assessment of the CCA. Under the CRA, casinos must either invest 1.25% of their gross revenues in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) bonds or in investments approved by the CRDA, or pay 2.5% of their gross revenues as a tax. If the casinos elect to pay the tax, the revenues are paid to the CRF and used for the constitutionally approved purposes of aid to senior citizens and disabled residents. In contrast, the proceeds from the sale of CRDA bonds are spent on a variety of projects throughout the State.
Those projects include a “Miss America Rosewalk, a 20-foot^ wide sidewalk lined with dozens of rose lights and with bronze plaques for every Miss America through the year 2000,” as well as minor league baseball stadiums, theaters, performing arts centers, improvements to streets leading to casinos, and, the project that produced this appeal, a tunnel leading to another casino. Mary Jo Patterson et al., CRDA Rolls the Dice—Casinos Cash In: Atlantic City Shell Game, Star-Ledger, May 4, 1997, at 1. In 1998, CRDA funding provided more than $341 million for new construction, urban renewal, transportation networks, and cultural projects within Atlantic City. Of that amount, over $127 million was used for the expansion of the casinos’ own facilities. 1998 funding also included more than $3.5 million for projects in South Jersey outside of Atlantic City and more than $20 million for projects in North Jersey. Casino Reinvestment Development Authority, Financial Statements & Supplemental Information with Report of Independent Auditors 21-23 (1999) (1998 Annual Report).
IV.
To circumvent the Casino Amendment, the majority characterizes the proceeds from the sale of CRDA bonds as something other *556than revenues. Until today, the judiciary interpreted the term “revenue” in the 1977 constitutional Amendment broadly. See Matthews v. State, 187 N.J.Super., 1, 7-8, 453 A.2d 543 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 93 N.J. 298, 460 A.2d 694 (1983). Matthews held that the State could not use the interest on the 8% gambling revenue tax, earned while the CRF funds were held in the State Treasury, for projects unrelated to senior citizens and disabled residents. In so holding, the Appellate Division interpreted “State,” “revenues,” and “derived” to determine that the interest could be spent for only dedicated purposes. The resolution of that case supports the proposition that the State’s constitutional obligation to senior citizens and the disabled is not limited to 8% of casino revenues. Significantly, interest earned on the 1.25% of casino gross revenues deposited quarterly with the Treasury does go to the CRF and is spent for dedicated purposes despite the fact that the principal is used to buy CRDA bonds.
Under the Matthews interpretation, the bond proceeds are revenue within the meaning of the constitutional Amendment. To hold, as the majority does, that the proceeds from the purchase of bonds do not constitute State revenue is to deny reality. The CRDA is a State agency. Like tax revenues, the proceeds from the sale of CRDA bonds are paid into the State Treasury, and the State decides how the money is spent. The casinos must pay the tax or buy the bonds. If they do not buy the bonds, they must pay the State twice as much in tax. That the casinos always choose the alternative that costs the least does not make the choice any less compulsory.
The majority admits that the State neither expected nor intended that any casino would pay a 2.5% tax in lieu of making a 1.25% CRDA bond “investment”: “Obviously, all casinos have elected to invest annually 1.25 percent of their ‘take,’ and none have elected to pay the alternative 2.5 percent tax.” Ante at 532, 734 A.2d at 1178. Curiously, the majority adds: “In that context [that the State never intended to collect the tax], we find highly theoretical the assertion that the 1.25 percent investment alternative improp*557erly diverted funds dedicated +by the Casino Amendment when, in reality, the Legislature never intended to collect additional revenue from the tax on casino winnings.” Ibid.
The original CCA requirement that the casinos invest 2% of excess profits in real estate mandated “coerced payments,” but not “State revenues.” Under the CCA, the casinos, not the Casino Control Commission, made the investment decisions. The casinos were not required to pay the money to the State Treasury; the money never came under State control.
Under the Casino Amendment, funds dedicated for senior citizens and disabled residents are limited to State revenues derived from the “establishment and operation of gambling establishments.” Like the majority, ante at 524, 734 A.2d at 1173, we conclude that taxes unrelated to casinos as casinos, for example corporate business, property, and sales taxes, do not constitute State revenues from gambling operations within the meaning of the Amendment. We do not agree, however, that excluding corporate and sales tax revenue from the purview of the Casino Amendment suggests that the Amendment is ambiguous. Corporate and sales taxes are not taxes on the “establishment and operation of gambling establishments.” They are not taxes on gambling and they are not peculiar to gambling establishments. By contrast, the 2.5% tax imposed by the CRA, and its alter ego, the 1.25% paid for CRDA bonds, derive from the establishment and operation of casinos.
We also agree with the majority that the $1.50 per day charge that casinos must pay to CRDA for each vehicle parked in a casino-operated parking facility does not produce revenue that must be dedicated. Ante at 539-40, 734 A.2d at 1182. As the majority explains, the parking fees do not derive from the operation of an “establishment,” “casino hotel,” or “casino hotel facility,” as those terms are defined in N.J.S.A. 5:12-19. See Garden State Racing Ass’n v. Cherry Hill Township, 42 N.J. 454, 201 A.2d 554 *558(1964) (holding that parking lots are not part of racetracks for purpose of statute exempting racetracks from municipal taxation).
V.
Ten years after adoption of the CCA, the State Commission of Investigation recognized the Legislature’s temptation to break faith with the public on the casino revenue issue:
The Commission wishes at this point to stress the necessity of properly programming one particularly important economic issue — the casino gambling proposal’s required distribution of casino tax revenues to ease the utility, property tax and rental costs of the elderly and disabled. Unless the industry wishes to stand accused of being spawned by a hoax, even as it tries to shape a reputable image, this casino referendum “campaign promise” to some one million people must certainly be fairly and adequately implemented.
[SCI, Report and Recommendations on Casino Gambling by the Commission of Investigation of the State of New Jersey at II, III (2d prtg. Aug. 1987).]
Perhaps the State should not have promised to use the revenues from casino gambling for the benefit of senior citizens and disabled residents. Maybe another promise would have made better public policy. Doubtless, the State has received greater revenues than it anticipated in 1976. Some might say that senior citizens and the disabled do not need all that money. Such an assertion, however, is belied by the fact that the dedicated tax proceeds, which go into the CRF, currently are insufficient to support the programs that were supposed to be sustained by gambling revenues. Those programs now are being funded from the State’s general operating budget. New Jersey’s fiscal year 2000 budget reveals:
Total Casino Revenue Fund revenues of $329.6 [million] are projected for fiscal 2000. It is estimated that appropriations will exceed available revenues by $317.9 million in fiscal 2000. Because programs supported by the Casino Revenue Fund have grown considerably faster than revenues, the General Fund has had to subsidize program spending____ For example, ... due to the insufficient resources of the Casino Revenue Fund, the Senior Citizens Property Tax Freeze appropriation of $23.7 million is being financed by the Property Tax Relief Fund.
[New Jersey FY 2000 Budget Proposal, (Jan. 25, 1999) Casino Revenue Fund, Overview.]
If the Legislature wishes to divert revenues to purposes other than those benefiting senior citizens and disabled residents, it *559should do again what it did in 1976; submit a referendum to the public.
Another possible alternative is legislative in nature. The Legislature could allow a deduction from “gross revenues,” as defined by the CCA, N.J.S.A. 5:12-24, for State capital improvement investments. Policy-based income exclusions, tax exemptions, and tax deductions are appropriate tools for government to use in encouraging socially desirable behavior. “By allowing deductions ... for certain activities, or by granting a specific statutory exclusion to gross income, [the legislature] is able to encourage certain activities and discourage others.” Christopher W. Schoen, The Family Savings Account: A Practical Tax Incentive To Stimulate Personal Savings Rates, 4 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 103, 106 (1991).
The Casino Amendment promised only that revenue would be dedicated to specific purposes; it did not promise to collect a certain percentage of the casinos’ gross revenues. Accordingly, the Legislature may amend the CCA to allow the casinos to take deductions from gross revenues prior to calculating the amount of tax due.
Tax policy can serve and augment other governmental policies. For example, public policy goals are effectuated through the definition of “gross income” in the Gross Income Tax Act. Compensation for injuries or sickness and scholarship and grant money are excluded from gross income. N.J.S.A. 54A:6-6, 6-8. Also excluded is the interest on obligations issued by the State or its subdivisions, N.J.S.A. 54A:6-14. Exemptions and deductions from gross income also are utilized to advance policy goals. For example, an exemption from gross income is allowed for some dependents under the age of twenty-two. N.J.S.A. 54A:3-1.1. A deduction is allowed for qualifying medical expenses. N.J.S.A. 54A:3-3.
The Legislature could similarly encourage the policy objective of investment in capital improvement projects by making the cost of *560those investments deductible. The Legislature already has carved some exclusions from the definition of casinos’ “gross revenues”:
For the purpose of calculating the tax, gross revenues are defined by N.J.S.A. 5:12-24 to include all receipts from gaming operations, including uncollected checks, less only two items. One is a deduction for uncollectible gaming receivables. The other deduction .. is “the total of all sums paid out as winnings to patrons.”
[In re Resolution of the N.J. Casino Control Comm’n, 262 N.J.Super. 572, 575, 621 A.2d 536 (App.Div.1993).]
The suggested approach provides an incentive for casinos to invest in capital development but does not constitute an unconstitutional supplanting of a tax with a tax credit. This suggestion merely illustrates the availability of legitimate ways to create incentives for community investment in Atlantic City.
VI.
The most disturbing feature of the CRA is that it breaks faith with the people of New Jersey. Great states, like great people, should keep their word. Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 S.Ct. 543, 567, 4 L. Ed.2d 584, 611 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting). By diverting revenues from senior citizens and disabled residents, the State has broken its promise to them and to the general public.
One might question the amount of fuss about a statutory scheme, such as the CRA. After all, the CRA spreads a lot of money around the State. The point, however, is not whether the CRA represents an acceptable public policy or a better one than that submitted to the people in 1976. Rather, the point is that the CRA breaks the promise that the State made to the people of New Jersey in 1976. That promise embodied a moral imperative, not a commitment to be honored only when convenient.
*561For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, GARABALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN — 5.
For reversal — Justices HANDLER and POLLOCK — 2.