Court Opinion

ID: 9471447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:32:47.591323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:24.961311
License: Public Domain

BERTELSMAN, District Judge,
concurring.
Reluctantly, I find myself unable to endorse the majority opinion, both because I feel that the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity is a sufficient and more narrow basis on which to dispose of this case and because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), is applicable to the facts herein. Also, I find myself in disagreement with the majority’s analysis of Parratt.
The defendant prosecutor was clearly absolutely immune under the doctrine of Im-bler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), since all of his acts were well within the scope of his duties in prosecuting a criminal case. The defendant sheriff, having performed a ministerial function as directed by the prosecutor, shares in that immunity. See Timson v. Wright, 532 F.2d 552, 553 (6th Cir.1976) and cases cited therein; Denman v. Leedy, 479 F.2d 1097, 1098 (6th Cir.1973).
The fact that the sheriff failed to plead the affirmative defense of immunity is not fatal, since in a situation involving joint defenses one defendant can take advantage of the defenses asserted by his co-defendant. See Willis v. Fournier, 418 F.Supp. 265, 267 (M.D.Ga.), aff’d, 537 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir.1976); Capitol City Manor, Inc. v. Cul-berson, 1 Ark.App. 137, 613 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1981); Jackson v. District of Columbia, 412 A.2d 948, 951 (D.C.App.1980); Haddad v. Louisville Gas & Electric Company, 449 S.W.2d 916, 919-920 (Ky.1969); Kooper v. King, 195 Cal.App.2d 621, 15 Cal.Rptr. 848, 852 (1961); 78 A.L.R. 938, 939.
Therefore, I would reverse with directions to enter judgment for both defendants on the basis of immunity alone.
I am constrained to conclude that Parratt, supra, is not applicable to the situation here presented. First of all, this case does not involve merely a denial of procedural due process, as stated by the majority, but also a denial of just compensation for the taking of private property for public use. There is abundant authority that such a cause of action is cognizable under § 1983. Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979); Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed District, 586 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir.1978); Gordon v. Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir.1978).
Secondly, the Supreme Court of the United States has expressly limited the scope of Parratt to cases involving a property loss resulting from a “ ‘random and unauthorized act by a state employee ... not a result of some established state procedure.’ 451 U.S. at 541 [101 S.Ct. at 1916].” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (quoting from Parratt). The Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1960) that the existence of an adequate state remedy was not a bar to the pursuit of a § 1983 action. Parratt narrowed this somewhat, but not to the’ extent held by the majority opinion herein. I agree with the view of the Seventh Circuit that, in the light of Logan, Parratt cannot be extended to cases involving a loss of a property right as a result of intentional state action. Vail v. Board of Education of Paris Union School District No. 95, 706 F.2d 1435, 1440-1441 (7th Cir.1983).
As I stated at the outset, it is with some reluctance that I find myself at odds with the majority concerning its interpretation *1067of Parratt. I am in great sympathy with the desire of the majority to find some interpretation of § 1983 that will limit frivolous and de minimis actions brought under this statute, which in my opinion is employed in many situations never foreseen or intended by its framers. The statute was primarily intended to provide redress to victims of racial animosity, where state remedies were inadequate either de jure or de facto. See Monroe v. Pape, supra. I do not believe that the statute was ever intended in the absence of invidious discrimination as a remedy for disgruntled teachers or other public employees or for losses of property through state action.
Where I have felt myself at liberty to do so within the limits imposed by stare decisis, I have tried to confine the statute to what I believe to be its proper limits. See Reichert v. Draud, 511 F.Supp. 679 (E.D.Ky.1981), aff’d, 701 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir.1983); Stratford v. State-House, Inc., 542 F.Supp. 1008 (E.D.Ky.1982), aff’d, No. 82-5519 (6th Cir. October 27, 1983) (unpublished).
Therefore, my reluctance in disagreeing with the majority results from my agreement with its goals. Would that the law were as it says. However, for the reasons set forth above, I do not believe that it is, nor that we are at liberty under controlling Supreme Court precedents to expand Par-ra tt beyond losses of property due to unintentional acts. A narrowing of the scope of § 1983 to practicable limits may require a statutory amendment.