Court Opinion

ID: 9376477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 19:06:25.456133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.016392
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Snyder v. Northcoast Research Holdings, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-612.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ED SNYDER, JR.,                                       :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                   :
                                                                           111632
                v.                                    :

NORTHCOAST RESEARCH                                   :
HOLDINGS, LLC,

                Defendant-Appellant                   :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 2, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-20-941506

                                            Appearances:

                Witschey Witschey & Firestine Co., LPA, Frank J.
                Witschey, and Jay E. Krasovec, for appellee.

                McDonald Hopkins LLC, Richard H. Blake, Thomas T.
                Lampman, and Karina R. Conley, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

                  Defendant-appellant             Northcoast          Research      Holdings,   LLC

(“Northcoast”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

plaintiff-appellee Ed Snyder, Jr. (“Snyder”). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.   Background and Facts

              The issue in this breach-of-contract action is whether Snyder, as a

Class C unit employee-member of Northcoast “is entitled to a ‘put option’ under the

terms of the Operating Agreement” defined below. Journal entry No. 122790324,

p. 2 (Apr. 18, 2022). Northcoast explains that a put option allows the holder to

compel Northcoast to repurchase the holder’s membership units.

              Northcoast is an Ohio limited liability company based in Cleveland.

Northcoast provides investment research and diversified investment management

services to institutional broker-dealers of publicly traded securities. On June 1,

2009, original members Martini Rizzo (“Rizzo”) and Ancora Partners, LLC,

(“Ancora”) entered into the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of

Northcoast Research Holdings, LLC, pursuant to Northcoast’s Amended and

Restated Operating Agreement (“Original Agreement”).1 The agreement sets forth

the rules, structure and operation of the business, and the rights and obligations of

member owner interests.

              The initial capitalization clause, Article 3.1, provides that Ancora

contributed $125,000 for 50 Class A membership units that constituted a 12.5

percent interest in the company. Rizzo is listed as the holder of 50 Class C units for

a $125,000 contribution, an 87.5 percent interest in the company. The parties

      1   Owners of limited liability companies are known as members. R.C. 1705.01(G).
A membership interests “means a member’s share of the profits and losses of a limited
liability company and the right to receive distributions from that company.”
R.C. 1705.01(H).
anticipated additional contributions by prospective members who would pay the

same purchase price per Class C unit as paid by Rizzo, for an anticipated total capital

of $1,000,000. There were no holders of the Class B units. Pursuant to Article 3.2,

the board of managers at its discretion had the right to offer certain employees of

Northcoast, and a nonparty Northcoast-owned company, the opportunity to

purchase Class B units under the terms set forth in Article 3.

               On September 21, 2009, the parties entered into the First Amended

Restated Operating Agreement (“First Amendment”) (the Original Agreement and

First Amendment are collectively referred to as the “Operating Agreement.”) The

initial capitalization clause is restated in its entirety.   Capitalization is “to be

completed on or before October 21, 2009 to Rizzo and a select group of principals

who have indicated their intention to purchase Class C Units.” Also, “[e]ach

prospective purchaser shall be offered 60 Units at $150,000 each. Ancora and Rizzo

will increase their initial capital contributions to $150,000.” The number of Class B

units is zero, however, the amendment adds authority to issue 60 Class B units.

               Snyder is an Ohio resident who specializes in data collection and

research of certain business sectors and companies engaged in those sectors. Snyder

stated Northcoast was interested in his expertise and business portfolio in the dental

industry. Snyder and several other specialists in various business sectors entered

into separate joinder agreements with Northcoast in October 2009 to become

employee-owners. The joinder agreements entitled each signee to 60 Class C units

of membership in Northcoast for an investment of $150,000 each.
              The two-paragraph joinder agreement provides:

      The undersigned hereby acknowledges and agrees that the 60 Class C
      units of membership interests of NorthCoast Research Holdings, LLC,
      an Ohio limited liability company (the “Company”), being purchased
      by the undersigned are subject to the terms and conditions of an
      Operating Agreement dated as of May 1, 2009 [sic], and First Amended
      & Restated Operating Agreement dated as of October ___, 2009 (the
      “Operating Agreement”) by and among the Company and its members.
      The undersigned acknowledges receipt of an execution copy of the
      Operating Agreement and further acknowledges that the undersigned
      has read the Operating Agreement and understands its terms,
      conditions and provisions.

      The undersigned, as a condition to his admission as a member of the
      Company, hereby agrees to be bound by the Operating Agreement. The
      undersigned acknowledges and understands that for purposes of the
      Operating Agreement, he shall have the same rights and obligations
      under the Operating Agreement as the Company’s other members,
      proportionate to his membership interest as between the undersigned
      and the Company’s other members, unless otherwise agreed in writing
      between the Company and/or the undersigned by the Company’s
      members (including the undersigned).

              Snyder terminated his employment with Northcoast in July 2018.

Shortly after Snyder’s resignation, Class C member Chuck Cerankosky, Jr.

(“Cerankosky”) provided written notice to the company of his retirement and

proposed a plan to be compensated for his equity in the company taking into

consideration Northcoast’s financial situation. On October 2, 2020, through his

attorney, Snyder issued a “notice of put option” to managing member Rizzo

exercising his option “with respect to Northcoast purchasing and redeeming all of

his 60 Class C Membership Units.” Journal entry No. 122790324, p. 2 (Apr. 18,

2022). Northcoast did not agree, and Snyder filed the instant action for breach of

contract.
               The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial

court denied Northcoast’s motion and granted Snyder’s. The trial court held that

the language was clear and unambiguous and any ambiguity would be construed

strictly against the drafter. Graham v. Drydock Coal Co., 76 Ohio St.3d 311, 667

N.E.2d 949 (1996); Clifton Steel Co. v. Trinity Equip. Co., 2018-Ohio-2186, 115

N.E.3d 10 (8th Dist.). Snyder was awarded $294,064.04 plus prejudgment interest

(“PJI”).

               Northcoast timely appeals.

II.   Assignments of Error

               Northcoast assigns three errors:

      I.     The clear and unambiguous language of the amended operating
             agreement did not grant Snyder a “put option” in his Class C
             units.

      II.    Snyder was not entitled to have the amended operating
             agreement strictly construed in his favor.

      III.   Extrinsic evidence wrongfully ignored by the court below
             reinforced that the intent of the parties was to not grant a “put”
             option to holders of Class C units. The trial court erred in
             granting the appellee’s motion for summary judgment because
             disputed material issues of fact exist regarding the appellee’s
             contractual obligations towards the appellant.

III. Discussion

               Northcoast’s overarching argument is that the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment was in error because (1) the Operating Agreement does not

clearly grant the put option; (2) Snyder was not entitled to strict construction in his

favor; (3) extrinsic evidence should not have been ignored to determine intent; and
(4) genuine issues of material fact exist regarding construction of the Operating

Agreement. We combine the assigned errors for ease of analysis.

       A. Standard of Review

               “We review a trial court’s decision on summary judgment under a de

novo standard of review.” Elam v. Woodhawk Club Condominium, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 107092, 2019-Ohio-457, ¶ 7, citing Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d

1, 7, 746 N.E.2d 618 (8th Dist.2000). “We accord no deference to the trial court’s

decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary

judgment is appropriate.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Michko, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 101513, 2015-Ohio-3137, ¶ 11.

       Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) no
       genuine issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for
       summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and
       (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party,
       reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the
       nonmoving party.

Id. at ¶ 12.

               “On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an

initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate its

entitlement to summary judgment.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d

280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996).

       If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary judgment is not
       appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving
       party has the reciprocal burden to point to evidence of specific facts in
       the record demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material
       fact for trial. Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party
       fails to meet this burden.
Williams v. AVI Food Sys., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109222, 2020-Ohio-5001, ¶ 11,

citing Dresher at 293.

      B.    Analysis

              “Contract formation requires an offer, acceptance, consideration, and

mutual assent between two or more parties with the legal capacity to act.” Widok v.

Estate of Wolf, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108717, 2020-Ohio-5178, ¶ 52, citing

Kostelnik v. Helper, 96 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-2985, 770 N.E.2d 58, ¶ 16. “A

meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of the contract is a requirement to

enforcing the contract.” (Emphasis sic.) Kertes Ents., LLC v. Sanders, 2019-Ohio-

2237, 137 N.E.3d 733, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), quoting Kostelnik at ¶ 16.

              The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained the application of

primary and secondary interpretive rules to contract interpretation.

      Rules of contract interpretation are tools that we use to give meaning
      to disputed terms or provisions so that the contract as a whole will
      reflect the parties’ intent. See Skivolocki v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio
      St.2d 244, 313 N.E.2d 374 (1974), paragraph one of the syllabus. These
      rules can be broken down into two basic categories: primary
      interpretive rules and secondary interpretive rules. In all cases
      involving contract interpretation, we start with the primary
      interpretive rule that courts should give effect to the intentions of the
      parties as expressed in the language of their written agreement. See
      Sunoco, Inc. (R&M) v. Toledo Edison Co., 129 Ohio St.3d 397, 2011-
      Ohio-2720, 953 N.E.2d 285, ¶ 37.

Sutton Bank v. Progressive Polymers, L.L.C., 161 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-5101,

163 N.E.3d 546, ¶ 15.

              The court continued,

      Other primary interpretive rules assist the court in doing this by giving
      guidance on how to interpret the meaning of certain words. For
       example, one rule is that “[c]ommon words appearing in a written
       instrument will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest
       absurdity results, or unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced
       from the face or overall contents of the instrument.” Alexander v.
       Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978),
       paragraph two of the syllabus. Another more specific, but also at times
       very helpful, rule is that technical terms are to be given their technical
       meaning “unless a different intention is clearly expressed.” See Foster
       Wheeler Enviresponse v. Franklin Cty. Convention Facilities Auth., 78
       Ohio St. 3d 353, 361, 1997-Ohio-202, 678 N.E.2d 519 (1997).

Id.

               Secondary rules of interpretation come into play only if the primary

tools fail.

       Other rules are secondary, rather than primary, interpretive tools and
       do not operate unless the primary rules of interpretation fail to resolve
       the contract’s meaning. The rule that a contract provision should be
       strictly construed against one party and liberally construed in favor of
       the other — either due to the type of contract or contract provision at
       issue, inequality in bargaining power, or the fact that one party is the
       drafter and the other is not — is a secondary rule. See Malcuit v. Equity
       Oil & Gas Funds, Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 236, 239-240, 610 N.E.2d 1044
       (9th Dist.1992). Accordingly, it does not come into play unless the
       intent of the parties cannot be deciphered because the contract
       language is reasonably susceptible of two different interpretations. See
       id.

Id.

               An appellate court’s primary role in reviewing a breach-of-contract

claim is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. “We presume that

the intent of the parties to a contract is within the language used in the written

instrument.” (Citations omitted.) Saunders v. Mortensen, 101 Ohio St.3d 86, 2004-

Ohio-24, 801 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 9. “If we are able to determine the intent of the parties
from the plain language of the agreement, then there is no need to interpret the

contract.” Id.

                 Northcoast argues there is no clear and specific contract provision

that grants put options to Snyder so extrinsic evidence must be considered. “A

contract is ambiguous if its terms cannot be clearly determined from a reading of

the entire contract or if its terms are susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation.” Militiev v. McGee, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94779, 2010-Ohio-6481,

¶ 30, citing United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 129 Ohio

App.3d 45, 716 N.E.2d 1201 (2d Dist.1998). “If the terms of the contract are

determined to be ambiguous, the meaning of the words becomes a question of fact,

and a trial court’s interpretation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing

of an abuse of discretion.” Id., citing Ohio Historical Soc. v. Gen. Maintenance &

Eng. Co., 65 Ohio App.3d 139, 147, 583 N.E.2d 340 (10th Dist.1989).

                 Snyder maintains that Article 3 and Article 8 clearly provide a put

option for Class C units. The trial court relied on portions of those articles in

granting judgment.

                 The Operating Agreement provides for Class A, Class B, and Class C

members. No Class B units were issued at the time of the commencement of the

First Amendment.        As noted herein, Article 3.1 of the Operating Agreement

addresses initial capitalization of the company and anticipates issuance of Class C

units to Rizzo and others who indicated an intention to purchase units.
              Article 3.2 is entitled “Class B Purchase and Redemption Options.”

Articles 3.2.2 through 3.2.5 govern the redemption option and put rights logistics

for Class B members. The record does not reflect that there were Class B units issued

though the Operating Agreement provided authority to do so. Instructive here:

      3.2.2 Redemption Option (Put Right).

      Each Class B Member shall have the right (“Class B Put Option”),
      exercisable upon written notice to the Company (“Put Notice”), to
      require the Company to redeem of all or any portion of his Class B Units
      subject to the terms and conditions set forth in this Section 3.2. The
      Class B Put Option shall survive the termination of a Class B Member’s
      employment with the Company or NCRP, as applicable; provided,
      however, that if a Class B Member’s employment with the Company or
      NCRP is terminated for Cause (as defined in his employment
      agreement), he shall have no right to exercise the Class B Put Option.

              Article 3.2.3 adds:

      3.2.3 Purchase and Redemption Price. The purchase and redemption
      price for Class B Units shall be determined as follows:

      (a) For Fiscal Year ending December 31, 2009, Seven Thousand Five
      Hundred Dollars per Class B Unit;

      (b) For Fiscal Year ending December 31, 2010, Ten Thousand Dollars
      ($10,000) per Class B Unit; and

      (c) For Fiscal Years ending December 31,2011 and thereafter, a price
      per Class B Unit equal to forty percent (40%) of the Company’s Gross
      Revenues during the immediately preceding Fiscal Year divided by the
      total number of Units outstanding as of December 31 of such Fiscal
      Year.

              Article 8 addresses transfers of membership interests. Article 8.3 is

entitled “Disposition of Membership Interests Upon Occurrence of Certain Events.”

Article 8.3.3 gives the company a call option to purchase Class B and Class C units

upon the member’s termination of employment or due to another event. A call
option is the right, but not the obligation, of the company to require a Member to

sell his or her Class B and Class C units to the company subject to the terms set forth

in 8.5 upon certain triggering events. Other members may purchase units in the

event the company does not purchase all of the subject member’s shares.

                Article 8.5 covers “purchase price; terms of payment of purchase

price of membership interest; redemption limitation (annual payment ceiling.

Article 8.5.3 is pivotal here.

      8.5.3 Purchase Price. The purchase price for Class B Units will be as
      set forth in Section 3.2.3 except that if a Class B Member’s employment
      with NCRP is terminated for Cause, the purchase price will be reduced
      by thirty-three percent (33%). With respect to Class C Units, if the Call
      Option or Put Option is exercised prior to May 1, 2014, the purchase
      price per Class C Unit shall be an amount equal to the Book Value of
      such Member’s Interest. Thereafter, the purchase price per Class C
      Unit shall be determined in the manner set forth in Paragraph
      3.2.3(c). With respect to Class A Units that are the subject of the
      exercise of a Call Option upon the occurrence of an Involuntary Event
      the purchase price for such Units and the terms of payment will be as
      the Board of Managers of the Company and the holder of such Class A
      Units may agree and, if they cannot agree within thirty (30) days
      following the occurrence of such Involuntary Event, the purchase price
      will be based on Book Value and payable in the manner set forth in
      Section 8.5.1.

(Emphasis added.) Journal entry No. 122790324, p. 3 (Apr. 18, 2022), quoting

Operating Agreement. The language was not modified in the First Amendment.

                Company co-founder Rizzo’s affidavit submitted in support of

summary judgment provides in pertinent part:        “It is clear to me as a holder of

Class C units that I do not have the right to a put option under the” Operating

Agreement. “Rather, holders of Class C units are subject to a call option but not
entitled to a put option.” “The Class C units were intended to represent permanent

capital of Northcoast. Granting members of Class C units a put option could cause

financial instability with potentially catastrophic results.” Rizzo also averred that

Snyder never discussed the right of put options for his Class C units but that Class C

member Cerankosky approached the members “amicably and engaged in a mutual

negotiation over the price and terms of his sale.”

               The affidavits of five then-current Class C unit holders contain

averments that mirror those of Rizzo.        The affidavit of Cerankosky primarily

contains averments identical to the others except the last paragraph states that he

“wished to sell my Class C units, however, I did not claim that I had a legal right to

do so. Rather I approached the members amicably and engaged in a mutual

negotiation over the price and terms of my sale.”

               Snyder’s affidavit in support of summary judgment declares reliance

on the call and put options that allowed “Northcoast or myself to opt for a sale of the

Units back to Northcoast if we parted ways, thereby allowing the member to at least

obtain some of his equity back. I relied on this in making my decision to become a

member.” Thus, the options served as “an enticement for Snyder’s decision to invest

$150,000 and become a member in Northcoast.” Motion for Summary Judgment,

p. 11.

               Northcoast is correct that an unsupported, self-serving affidavit,

“‘standing alone and without corroborating materials under Civ.R. 56, will not be

sufficient to demonstrate material issues of fact.’” Davis v. Cleveland, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 83665, 2004-Ohio-6621, ¶ 23, quoting Bell v. Beightler, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 02AP-569, 2003-Ohio-88, ¶ 33. However, the same may be said for

the affidavits submitted by Northcoast affiants. Both parties have an economic

interest in their positions. Both parties rely on the Operating Agreement in support.

              Snyder adds that, despite Cerankosky’s affidavit, when placed in

context, the Cerankosky letter referenced by Northcoast and Rizzo supports

Snyder’s understanding of the Operating Agreement.             Cerankosky advised

Northcoast of his retirement decision and stated in part:

      Regarding the value of my equity in the firm, and realizing the firm’s
      financial situation, I propose valuing it at $100,000. Further, after my
      employment ends (about December 31, 2018) such equity value would
      be conveyed to me through ongoing payments of my family-plan health
      insurance plan and cell phone reimbursement, plus $1,000 per month.
      I’m guessing those items would total about $2,500 per month.

      My loan to the firm would be on the same terms as the other partner
      lenders. I would still receive financial statements until the monthly
      payments total $100,000 or the loan is repaid in full, whichever occurs
      last.

      Should Northcoast Research be sold within 18 months of my last day of
      employment at a value that exceeds $800,000, net, to the original 8
      employee partners I would receive my pro rata share in excess of
      $100,000.

              Snyder offers that Cerankosky “did not propose selling his interest, he

proposed only a concession on the price from section 3.2.3(C) and more palatable

payment terms since he ‘realized’” the company’s financial situation. Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 13. The letter expresses an understanding that Northcoast

was obligated to purchase the interest.
              It is also observed that the heading of Article 8 references Class B

units. However, this court has explained, “a heading is merely directional and for

the ease of the reader.”    Washington v. GEICO Ins. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 100527, 2014-Ohio-4375, ¶ 14; citing King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d

208, 212, 519 N.E.2d 1380 (1988); Inchaurregui v. Ford Motor Co., 9th Dist. Lorain

No. 98CA007187, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2380, 8 (June 7, 2000); Westfield Ins.

Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 11. “[T]he

nature of a given provision is determined not by the label the parties give it, but

rather by the legal effect of the provision as expressed by the parties in their

agreement.” Worth v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 238, 241, 513 N.E.2d

253 (1987).

              The trial court reasoned:

      Pursuant to Article 3 — Capitalization, subsection 3.2.2, holders of
      Class B Units have the Class B Put Option right to exercise upon written
      Put Notice to the Company to require the Company to redeem all or any
      portion of the holder’s Class B Units subject to the terms and conditions
      of the Operating Agreements. While holders of Class B Units are again
      addressed relating to Put Options rights in subsection 8.5.3, this
      secondary reference regarding Put Options does not dilute the Put
      Option rights of holders of Class C Units referenced in subsection 8.5.3.

      ***

      Neither the language nor the terms composing the contract contradict
      or redact the holders of Class C Units’ Put Option expressly stated in
      subsection 8.5.3. The Operating Agreements expressly state in two
      different subsections, to wit, 3.2.2, infra, and 8.5.3, infra, that holders
      of Class B Units have a right of Put Option where the Operating
      Agreements express the right of Put Option for Class C Unit holders
      only once in subsection 8.5.3. Nevertheless this singular expressed
      right of Put Option for Class C unit holders does not diminish the clear
      and unambiguous language of 3.2.2 granting said Put Option right to
      holders of Class C Unit [owners] expressly.

Journal entry No. 122790324, p. 32 (Apr. 18, 2022).

                We reiterate that it is this court’s role to give effect to the intent of

the parties and “[w]e presume that the intent of the parties to a contract is within

the language used in the written instrument.” (Citations omitted.) Mortensen, 101

Ohio St.3d 86, 2004-Ohio-24, 801 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 9. “If we are able to determine the

intent of the parties from the plain language of the agreement, then there is no need

to interpret the contract.” Id.

                Based on our de novo review of the record, and viewed in a light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the

plain language of the Operating Agreement unequivocally provides call and put

options to Class C Units:

      With respect to Class C Units, if the Call Option or Put Option is
      exercised prior to May 1, 2014, the purchase price per Class C Unit shall
      be an amount equal to the Book Value of such Member’s Interest.
      Thereafter, the purchase price per Class C Unit shall be determined in
      the manner set forth in Paragraph 3.2.3(c).

               Also, as the trial court recognized, in the event the language was

deemed ambiguous, though that is not this court’s finding, the rule that a contract

provision should be strictly construed against one party and liberally construed in

favor of the other, the outcome would be the same. Progressive Polymers, L.L.C.,

161 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-5101, 163 N.E.3d 546, ¶ 15.

      2 The reference to “Class C” in the last line is an apparent typographical error and
should say “Class B” pursuant to the trial court’s full opinion.
               The assigned errors lack merit.

IV. Conclusion

               The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCURS;
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., DISSENTING:

               I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case and would

reverse the judgment of the trial court. The majority opinion finds that the plain

language of Article 8.5.3 of the Operating Agreement “unequivocally provides call

and put options to Class C Units.” I disagree. “A court has an obligation to give plain

language its ordinary meaning and to refrain from rewriting the contractual

agreement of the parties.” Miller v. Marrocco, 28 Ohio St.3d 438, 439, 504 N.E.2d

67 (1986). Further, when reviewing contract language, we have found that courts
“may not read language or terms into a contract.” Gray-Jones v. Jones, 137 Ohio

App.3d 93, 105, 738 N.E.2d 64 (10th Dist.2000), citing Miller, supra.

              Within the Operating Agreement, the sole reference to Class C Unit

put options is contained in Article 8.5.3, which reads:

      With respect to Class C Units, if the Call Option or Put Option is
      exercised prior to May 1, 2014, the purchase price per Class C Unit shall
      be an amount equal to the Book Value of such Member’s Interest.

              Article 8.5.3 details the method to determine the purchase price of

Class C options that are exercised. It does no more. As to put options, the Operating

Agreement expressly creates Class B Unit put options in Article 3.2.2; however, it

contains no provision creating Class C Unit put options. To interpret Article 3.2.2

as creating Class C Unit put options would require additional terms to be read into

the contract that do not exist. Gray Jones, supra. Accordingly, I would refrain from

finding that Article 3.2.2 provides call and put options to Class C Units.