Court Opinion

ID: 9900055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 18:10:45.592995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.944409
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00142-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IAN SCHORRE,                                                               Appellant,

                                          v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 24th District Court
                          of DeWitt County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
                Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

      Appellant Ian Schorre appeals the trial court’s judgment adjudicating him guilty of

stalking, a third-degree felony, and sentencing him to five years’ confinement. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a), (b). By a single issue, Schorre argues that the judgment

does not accurately reflect that his sentence was to run concurrent with a separate
sentence for another conviction, which he contends voids the judgment. We affirm.

                                   I.     BACKGROUND

       On June 5, 2017, Schorre was indicted for stalking his ex-wife in trial court cause

number 17-06-12,688. On January 22, 2018, Schorre appeared in court and entered into

a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the agreement, Schorre would plead guilty

to the offense of stalking, and receive ten-years’ deferred adjudication community

supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 42A.101–.111. Schorre also agreed

to plead guilty to the offense of assault on a public servant, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.01(b)(1), for which he would be sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in trial court

cause number 17-06-12,687. Additional terms of the plea agreement included the State

dismissing charges for evading arrest in a motor vehicle, see id. § 38.04(a), (b)(1)(B), and

assault family violence. See id. § 22.01(a)(1). Finally, the State agreed not to pursue an

additional charge for unlawful possession of a firearm. See id. § 46.04(a).

       The terms of the plea agreement dictated that Schorre’s deferred adjudication

community supervision would run concurrent with his sentence for assault on a public

servant. As part of Schorre’s community supervision terms, he was to have no contact

with his ex-wife. The trial court approved the plea agreement and entered an order of

deferred adjudication community supervision for the offense of stalking in cause number

17-06-12,688. The trial court also found Schorre guilty of the offense of assault on a public

servant and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment in cause number 17-06-12,687.

       The State filed a motion to revoke Schorre’s community supervision and to

adjudicate his guilt on October 22, 2023, alleging that Schorre violated the terms and

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conditions of his community supervision by having contact with his ex-wife. After a

hearing, the trial court revoked Schorre’s deferred adjudication community supervision,

adjudicated him guilty of stalking and sentenced him to five years’ confinement. 1 This

appeal followed.

                                 II.     CONCURRENT SENTENCES

       By his sole issue, Schorre argues that the judgment does not reflect that his

sentence for stalking in cause number 17-06-12,688 is to run concurrent with his sentence

for assault on a public servant in cause number 17-06-12,687, rendering the judgment

void. Although the State agrees that the trial court orally ordered the sentences to run

concurrently when it sentenced Schorre, no such oral pronouncement can be found in the

record of the adjudication hearing.

       With certain exceptions not applicable here, “[w]hen the accused is found guilty of

more than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single

criminal action,” the sentences must be ordered to run concurrently. TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 3.03(a). Under this statute, “if the record establishes that the original offenses that

led to community supervision were part of the same criminal episode and the convictions

were obtained as part of the same criminal action, then any sentences imposed must run

concurrently.” Cazarez v. State, 606 S.W.3d 549, 562–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020, no pet.). “‘[C]riminal episode’ means the commission of two or more offenses,

regardless of whether the harm is directed toward or inflicted upon more than one person

       1 Schorre admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his deferred adjudication community

supervision by contacting and communicating with his ex-wife.

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or item of property,” when “the offenses are committed pursuant to the same transaction

or pursuant to two or more transactions that are connected or constitute a common

scheme or plan.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01(1). Moreover, for mandatory concurrent

sentences, the offenses must be “prosecuted in a single criminal action.” Id. § 3.03(a).

However, “a deferred-adjudication plea proceeding is not complete under the concurrent-

sentencing statute until sentence is imposed after adjudication.” Middleton v. State, 634

S.W.3d 46, 51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

       Here, Schorre argues that the trial court’s order that his deferred adjudication

community supervision in cause number 17-06-12,688 run concurrent to his sentence in

cause number 17-06-12,687 requires his subsequent conviction and sentence also be

concurrent to cause number 17-06-12,687. However, Schorre cites to no authority to

support a requirement that the sentences run concurrently, and we find none. To the

extent that Schorre argues the trial court’s failure to order the sentences run concurrently

renders the judgment void, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly concluded

otherwise. See Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“An

improper cumulation order may be remedied by reformation on appeal or, in the proper

circumstance, a judgment nunc pro tunc. Because the improper cumulation order is

subject to such remedies, the sentences cannot properly be declared void.” (internal

citations omitted)).

       Moreover, for the following reasons, we cannot modify the judgment to reflect the

sentence is to run concurrently with cause number 17-06-12,687. Although the State

suggests that the trial court orally pronounced at the revocation hearing that the two

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sentences would run concurrently, we find no such oral pronouncement in the record.

Additionally, Schorre’s deferred-adjudication plea proceeding was not complete under the

concurrent-sentence statute until he was convicted and sentenced, thus resulting in the

actions not being prosecuted in a single criminal action. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 3.03(a); Middleton, 634 S.W.3d at 51. Lastly, there is no evidence in the record to show

that the two offenses arose out of the same criminal episode. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 3.01, 3.03(a). Accordingly, § 3.03(a)’s mandatory concurrent-sentence requirement

does not apply here. Schorre’s sole issue is overruled.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                              CLARISSA SILVA
                                                              Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
16th day of November, 2023.

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