Court Opinion

ID: 9475427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:27:10.970261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:42.984536
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Our decision in Mann v. United States, 218 F.2d 936 (4th Cir.1955), on indistinguishable facts, comes to the opposite conclusion to that reached by the majority today.
In Mann, this court stated that Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not limit the power of the federal district courts to modify a defendant’s sentence from incarceration to probation at any time prior to the defendant’s entry into service on his sentence. Id. at 939. Accord United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.1968), “The running of the 120 day period provided in Rule 35 has no effect whatsoever upon the power to suspend sentence and to grant probation.” See also Phillips v. United States, 212 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.1954); cf. United States v. Karp, 764 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1985). In an attempt to distinguish Mann, the majority emphasizes the fact that the defendant in Mann did not make a motion for reduction in sentence under Rule 35, but rather sought probation under the Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651, et seq. The majority then distinguishes this case from Mann because it says Jackson made his initial motion for reduction in sentence pursuant to Rule 35 and not under the Probation Act. That motion is found at JA43. What the majority overlooks, however, although the motion is quoted in the majority opinion, is that Jackson made a subsequent motion for probation under the Probation Act. The denial of that motion is the order appealed from and is found at JA89. Thus, I conclude that this case is virtually indistinguishable from our previous decision in Mann and believe the majority’s attempted distinction of this binding precedent to be unpersuasive.
In its opinion, the majority today also emphasizes the 1979 amendment to Rule 35(b) which added to the Rule 35(b) which existed in 1954 only that “[cjhanging a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction in sentence under this subdivision.” FED.R.CRIM.PRO. 35(b). The majority concludes that as a result of this amendment, an order modifying a sentence of incarceration to one of probation is a reduction in sentence that is subject to the time limitation set forth in Rule 35(b). Thus, in essence, the majority concludes that the 1979 amendment to Rule 35(b) limited a district court’s jurisdiction under the Probation Act to modify a sentence of incarceration to one of probation.
If this were a civil case, it is clear that the majority could not decide that a rule of procedure limits the statutory jurisdiction of a federal district court because Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states that those rules can neither extend nor limit the district courts’ jurisdiction or the venue of actions therein. FED.R.CIV.PRO. 82; Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 2400, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978): “ ... it is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction.” Although there is no comparable rule in the criminal context, I find the civil rule (among other things) persuasive, and I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that by the mere addition of one sentence to Rule 35(b) the Court intended to limit (even if it could) the federal district courts’ jurisdiction under the Probation Act.
*718In the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1979 amendment to Rule 35(b), the Committee explicitly noted the extent to which its amendment modified existing law, that is to say the law as set forth in Mann. Thus, the Committee stated:
Rule 35 is amended to make it clear that a judge may, in his discretion, reduce a sentence of incarceration to probation. To the extent that this permits the judge to grant probation to a defendant who has already commenced service of a term of imprisonment, it represents a change in the law.
Advisory Committee Notes on 1979 Amendment to Rule 35, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE & RULES 112 (West 1986) (emphasis added).
Significantly, the Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 35, quoted above, explicitly note, as set forth, that the amendment represents a change in the Rule to permit a judge to change a sentence of incarceration to one of probation for a defendant who has already commenced service of his term. The committee notes do not note any change in existing law for a defendant who has not commenced the service of his sentence. The existing law in this circuit is that set out by Mann, and I think that Mann must be followed absent its overruling by an en banc court.
Also of significance, the Advisory Committee did not state that it considered the 1979 amendment to Rule 35(b) to limit in any way the jurisdiction of a federal district court under the Probation Act. Indeed, although the majority correctly points out that a statement in United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 189, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 2242, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979), indicates that Rule 35(b)’s 120-day limitation is jurisdictional, in its notes accompanying the 1985 amendment to Rule 35(b), the Committee expressly rejected what it correctly calls the “Addonizio dictum”1 relied upon and quoted by the majority, thereby further reinforcing my conclusion that Rule 35 does not affect federal district courts’ substantive jurisdiction under the Probation Act. See Advisory Committee Note to 1985 Amendment to Rule 35, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE & RULES, supra, at 113.
Because I believe that the majority’s conclusion unjustifiably limits the federal district courts’ jurisdiction as established by Congress to consider motions under the Probation Act at any time prior to the movant’s incarceration, a rule previously recognized by this court in Mann, I respectfully dissent.

. "The time period, however, is jurisdictional and may not be extended.” Addonizio, at p. 189, 99 S.Ct. at p. 2242.