Court Opinion

ID: 9568874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:14.949668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:14.579907
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: Counsel for the Wendlers by persistent suggestive questions put to witnesses during the trial deliberately injected before the jury the fact that the Botts were covered by liability insurance, thereby prejudicially affecting their right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal. By reason thereof the trial court should have granted the Botts’ motion for a mistrial.
This case takes on added significance when the trial strategy indicated by the record is disclosed. The three consolidated cases were tried and argued on appeal by H. Lee Turner of Great Bend, Kansas, and Evart Mills of McPherson, Kansas, who number among the legal giants of this state in the field of trial strategy and practice. The cases were heard by a capable and efficient trial judge.
*231Now,' when the trial judge in his pretrial order consolidated the three cases involved for trial and designated the court procedure and burden of proof, he ordered that the Wendlers, represented by Turner, should be considered and called plaintiffs, and that the Botts, represented by Mills, be considered and called defendants. The order states: “The Wendlers will be permitted to open the case and close the same. The plaintiff, Ruby A. Bott, as an individual and as administratrix of the estate of Henry A. Bott, deceased, will be treated as the defendant. The burden of proof, however, shall not be shifted from the parties asserting their respective claims.”
The pretrial order dealt with the listing of witnesses well before trial, the exchange of evidence and statements taken by persons other than counsel, and other matters.
It is not surprising then that Turner, in this advantageous position, sought and procured a protective order from the trial court during the cross examination of Wendler, to protect his clients from the possibility of “inadvertent” or “unintentional” injection of their liability insurance coverage. Under this protective order his clients and the witnesses who testified on their behalf presenting their evidence first were protected by the order from his adversary. But, when the plaintiffs’ evidence was all in and the plaintiffs rested, the well conceived plan to inject liability insurance coverage of the defendants before the jury was vigorously pursued. Turner argued when first called into chambers by the trial court:
“The Court: He’s trying to keep out the insurance angle—
“Mr. Turner: It’s just like a statement. If a statement is used, as the Court will knows, you can go all the way if you have a valid reason for using the statement, showing who took it and the reason for the person taking it, and I am certainly entitled to show who instructed him and I think I am entitled to show the jury what they were trying to do and what they are trying to accomplish.”
The Wendlers will be referred to as the plaintiffs and the Botts as the defendants, as they were designated in the court’s opinion.
On the motion for a new trial it was disclosed by Harold F. McFarland, the vice president of the Alliance Mutual Casualty Company, by affidavit, that H. Lee Turner, attorney for the plaintiffs in the instant case, had been regularly employed by that company for more than the past five years; that Turner had handled forty cases for the company from April, 1964, to February, 1967, and was *232presently employed by the company. He further stated that Dean Langhofer was field adjuster for Alliance Mutual Casualty Company and had charge of the Hays, Kansas, office, but spent a day each week in La Crosse, Kansas, to take care of claims arising in Rush County, Kansas, where this case was tried, and that Turner was well aware that Langhofer regularly went to Rush County.
By reason of Turner’s close connection with Alliance, he was aware or had reason to believe that if he established that Dean Langhofer did any work for Mrs. Bott, someone on the jury would be apprised that Mrs. Bott was insured by Langhofer’s insurance company.
McFarland’s affidavit disclosed that Dean Langhofer settled four different losses on four different dates in 1965 and 1966 with Gerald M. Bomholdt, one of the jurors, insured by Alliance. Langhofer settled on behalf of Alliance two different losses in 1965 and 1967 with Billy T. Allen, the husband of Alice M. Allen, one of the jurors. In 1966 Langhofer settled on behalf of Alliance a loss with Arnold L. Oaks, another member of the jury. Langhofer also settled on behalf of Alliance a loss in 1966 with Dechant Ford Motor Company, of which James L. Cooley, one of the jurors, was the bookkeeper.
Therefore, one-third of the members of the jury who heard this case had directly or indirectly dealt with Dean Langhofer in his capacity as an Alliance insurance company representative in the recent past.
Various incidents occurred during the trial. On cross examination of the defendants’ witness, John W. Smith, an engineer, Turner asked:
“Q. You were called on November 20th, 1965, to do this work?
"A. Yes.
“Q. Who called you, sir — look at your notes?
“A. Dean Langhofer.”
Thereupon counsel for defendants requested a short recess and retired into chambers with the court where objection was made to the injection of Langhofer’s name on the ground that Turner was deliberately trying to inject insurance into the case. The trial court’s attention was called to the fact that Turner had done a lot of work for Alliance and knew very well what he was doing. Turner argued as heretofore quoted.
Apparently the court’s admonition — “I think it is also close to a *233violation — ” of the protective order to keep insurance out of the case — was not enough warning for Mr. Turner and further incidents occurred. On redirect examination Smith, a witness for the defendants, stated that Mills had sent him a check for his services. On recross examination by Turner he was asked:
“Q. Was it Mr. Mills’ check or someone else’s check?
“The Court: All right, you may step down. We are not going to do anything further about that.”
On examination of Henry Schwartz, defendants’ witness, he was asked on recross examination by Turner:
“Q. A man came to see you out in the middle of the field, didn’t he?
“A. Yes, sir; I was bailing feed.
“Q. His name was Mr. Dean Langhofer, of Hays, Kansas, wasn’t it?
“A. I don’t remember his name.
“Q. He told you that he was there representing—
“The Court: Just a minute, Mr. Turner! I am going to deny you the right to go further in this regard.”
On cross examination of Jack Mendenhall, defendants’ witness, Turner asked:
“Q. And since that time you have talked to a number of people — for instance, that gentleman right back there (indicating) — right back there with the glasses? Did you ever talk to him?
“A. He was one of—
“The Court: Just a minute, Mr. Turner; I’ve asked you to stop that and I am not going to permit it any more. Now, let’s stop it. Don’t get me — you know what happened; now let’s proceed.”
Counsel for the defendants then moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the motion in accordance with the statement and findings quoted in the court’s opinion, finding in substance that Mr. Turner had not attempted to violate the prohibitive order willingly. It is not surprising that the trial court overruled the motion, because it wanted an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court on a record which squarely presented the issue.
After making the foregoing ruling the trial court stated:
“And, I don’t mind you taking it to the Supreme Court. I would like to-know just how far we can go, because I think we have gone a lot too far and I think the Court should have more — I should exercise more power of curtailing cross-examination.” (Emphasis added.)
The record discloses the jury clearly understood from the evidence the defendants carried liability insurance. After the jury retired to-the jury room, it asked only one question and that was how much *234insurance the parties had. It did not ask whether the defendants had any insurance. The question asked the court by the jury was as follows:
“Amount of liability Ins. of Mrs. Bott and Mr. Wendler. — There is a lot of money involved here and we do not want to leave either party penniless.
“This we need to know — Please.” (Emphasis added.)
It is equally clear liability insurance was being considered by the jury in its deliberations on a verdict. The jury awarded the Wendlers $27,213.84 for the death of their fifteen year old daughter, the exact amount they requested, and the jury also awarded Arthur Wendler $100,000, an exceptionally large verdict for a rural Western Kansas community.
This court has heretofore held that the deliberate injection of insurance into a case required a reversal of the judgment. In Witt v. Roper, 150 Kan. 722, 96 P. 2d 643, the court said:
“. . . The impropriety of implanting in the minds of the jury the likelihood that any damages assessed in a highway collision case will eventually be paid by some insurance company and not by a defendant in a lawsuit has often been considered and usually condemned by this and other courts. (Coffman v. Shearer, 140 Kan. 176, 181-182, 34 P. 2d 97; Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 40 P. 2d 396; Forsyth v. Church, 141 Kan. 687, 42 P. 2d 975; ‘Anno—Informing Jury of Liability Insurance,' 95 A. L. R. 388-417; id., 105 A. L. R. 1319-1338.) In Cannon v. Brown, 142 Kan. 700, 51 P. 2d 1007, we said:
“ ‘This court frowns on the practice of using one means or another to give the jury a hint that the defendant is covered by liability insurance, . . .’ (p. 704.)” (p. 725.)
In McGuire v. McGuire, 152 Kan. 237, 103 P. 2d 884, this court .said:
“This court has repeatedly stressed the impropriety of injecting the question of insurance into damage actions in which insurance companies are not parties, when it is obvious that the purpose is to produce prejudice in the minds of the ■jury. Where the offending party secures a verdict and opposing party by timely objection and otherwise has adequately protected the right of review, the offense is regarded as so inherently prejudicial as to require reversal unless unusual circumstances are shown which justify affirmance. (Witt v. Roper, 150 Kan. 722, 96 P. 2d 643; Jones v. Pohl, 151 Kan. 92, 98 P. 2d 175.)” (p. 240.) (Emphasis added.)
A statement made by this court in Thompson v. Barnette, 170 Kan. 384, 227 P. 2d 120, is most unfortunate. There the court said:
“. . . as we read this record, it is not made to appear that any prejudice resulted from what manifestly appears to have been an inadvertent reference on the part of plaintiff while on the witness stand. Indeed, the trial court in ■denying the motion for a mistrial and to discharge the jury commented that *235he was well satisfied there had been no intentional misconduct by counsel and that the mention of insurance was purely inadvertent. . . .” (p. 389.)
The trial court seized upon this statement to deny the motion for a mistrial, and this court on appeal has seized upon it to affirm such ruling. The trial court in the first instance found there had been no intentional misconduct by counsel for plaintiffs with respect to the injection of the name of Langhofer at the trial, when the motion was first asserted at the trial, but failed to mention other indirect references by counsel designed to inject insurance. In my opinion, the finding of the trial court was unwarranted by the record, but assuming that it was, the question put to the court by the jury and further disclosures at the hearing on the motion for a new trial should have dispelled any doubt, and a new trial should have been granted.
The court in its opinion quotes Thompson v. Barnette, supra, upholding the trial court’s finding that the misconduct of counsel for the plaintiffs was not intentional.
In Thompson v. Barnette, supra, the decision was by a divided court, and the statement made in the quotation was qualified by the fact that it was not made to appear that prejudice resulted from what manifestly appeared to have been an inadvertent reference on the part of the plaintiff while on the witness stand. There the plaintiff asked for $25,000 and the jury returned a verdict for $10,000.
I am convinced, had the same members of the Supreme Court been sitting on this case, they would have reversed the trial court on the point under consideration. Thompson does not stand for the proposition stated in the court’s opinion.
In my opinion, when the insurance feature is improperly brought to the attention of the jury, the prejudicial effect thereof is immediate whether innocently or designedly accomplished, if the party seeking recovery of damages or his counsel is responsible therefor. Under these circumstances, the rights of the adverse party are prejudicially affected. The failure of a trial court to declare a mistrial upon proper and timely motion where the question of insurance is improperly injected into the trial constitutes reversible error.
Under the rule stated by the court in its opinion — that unintentional injection of insurance into the case is excusable — the practice of law in damage actions for personal injury will develop into an art whereby a well conceived and calculated plan by ingenious *236counsel designed to inject insurance “inadvertently” or “unintentionally” will pay big dividends. This practice will penalize litigants who employ honest counsel, who observe the rules of legal ethics, and reward those who employ the dishonest, and also reward the dishonest practitioner. A decision of this nature by a court of last resort is subject to serious question, and brings the whole legal profession into disrepute with the public.
The court asserts as an additional reason for its holding that: “It is general knowledge that most drivers today have liability insurance, and neither party to a lawsuit should be prejudiced by a question which may be prompted by the jury’s own experience and common knowledge of the affairs of mankind.” This argument was answered in Walley et al. v. Williams, 201 Miss. 84, 28 So. 2d 579 (1947). The court there said:
“. . . Moreover, we must decline to consider that jurors are aware as a matter of current knowledge that all employers carry liability insurance; but if we should accept that proposition as true, we would be confronted with the •deeper question whether trials before jurors of personal injury cases would be valid under the due process clause of the federal constitution, the effect of which is to require that trials shall be [before] impartial tribunals of which -tribunals in common law cases the jury is an essential part, — unless waived by -the parties.” (pp. 90, 91.)
If the court is attempting to change Kansas law relative to the admission of liability insurance in evidence in a case of this nature, it is contrary to K. S. A. 60-454, which definitely prohibits the admissibility of such evidence on considerations of public policy. This .section, effective January 1, 1964, is consistent with prior Kansas •decisions, and provides:
“Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, ■insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is •inadmissible as tending to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.”
Prior decisions in this jurisdiction where the trial court was affirmed, after insurance was injected, were based on the proposition that the record disclosed no prejudice. In Dirks v. Gates, 182 Kan. 581, 322 P. 2d 750, the plaintiff sought judgment in excses of $25,000, .and the verdict was for $9,048.26. Also, in Caylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 189 Kan. 210, 368 P. 2d 281, decided by a divided •court, the suit was for $35,000 and the verdict was for $15,000.
The court’s opinion in an attempt to explain its decision and assign reasons therefor, says:
*237“Moreover, the record indicates that Langhofer was present throughout the trial and it would seem unlikely he would fail to advise counsel when the jury was being impanelled that he had made prior settlements with three proposed members. It cannot be argued that counsel for either side, in any kind of a lawsuit, would knowingly attempt to select jurors not favorable to their position. (Thompson v. Barnette, 170 Kan. 384, 389, 227 P. 2d 120.) Since the three jurors in question were allowed to remain on the jury, it is reasonable to assume the defendants anticipated they were happy with and loyal to their insurance carrier. But those facts were unknown to the plaintiffs. The defendants cannot now be heard to complain that because Langhofer’s name was twice mentioned during the trial, the three jurors were prejudiced thereby when the defendants had nine pre-emptory challenges to exercise but, instead, permitted the three jurors to remain on the panel. . .
This argument is frivolous. The jury is impanelled before the trial of a case. The court’s statement assumes counsel for the de^ fendants to be clairvoyant and obligated to anticipate that counsel for the plaintiffs will “inadvertently” or “unintentionally” inject the defendants’ liability insurance coverage into the trial of the case before the jury. Absent the injection of the name of Langhofer into the case, none of the jurors would know his insurance company was involved, and there is no reason whatever suggested in the record that the defendants or their counsel were obligated to anticipate or assume the jurors who settled insurance claims with Langhofer “were happy with and loyal to their insurance carrier” at the time the jury was impanelled. Under these circumstances failure to exercise preemptory challenges thereby permitting “the three jurors to remain on the panel” is irrelevant and immaterial.
The court in its opinion says: “. . . the defendants made no complaint in the court below, nor here, that the amount of the verdict was excessive, or that it was not supported by medical evidence.” If this statement is designed to infer that the defendants have failed to assert the amount of the verdict in each case as indicating that it was given under the influence of passion and prejudice, it is erroneous. Further in the opinion the court says: “As indicated, the district court and counsel did not consider the award excessive, and the defendants have never contended the verdict was not supported by the medical evidence. Against this background, the argument that the jury’s award was accelerated by the alleged insurance factor is not persuasive.”
The record discloses the defendants raised in their motion for a new trial, among other points, the following:
*238“1. Misconduct of the plaintiff in insinuating and suggesting that defendant had insurance and otherwise injecting defendant’s insurance into this matter.
“3. The verdict . . . was given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
“7. Failure of the Court to declare a mistrial.”
The trial court overruled the motion for a new trial and the defendants appealed from such order, among others. In the statement of points the defendants specified, among others, that “The Court erred in refusing to hear oral testimony in support of defendant’s motion for new trial,” and another to the effect that the trial court erred in refusing to declare a mistrial because plaintiffs conveyed to the jury the defendants’ insurance coverage.
The record discloses the amount of the verdict in each case was before the trial court, and before this court on appeal, as indicating passion and prejudice because the insurance feature was improperly brought to the attention of the jury by plaintiffs’ counsel.
The jury’s only question to the court shows it was more interested in the amount of insurance coverage of the respective parties than it was in determining the issues of negligence. The question specifically says the jury did “not want to leave either party penniless.”
Informing the jury that the defendants carried liability insurance in the manner heretofore indicated by counsel for the plaintiffs materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendants. The one question of the jury to the court indicated it knew there was insurance and that it was considering the defendants’ insurance in its deliberations. That such was inherent in the verdict is shown by the amounts awarded by the jury in each case.
Where a valid ground is asserted for the reversal of a judgment, which requires die granting of a new trial, consideration of other points asserted for reversal of the judgment is immaterial. Accordingly, I express no opinion concerning other points treated in the court’s opinion.
It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and a new trial granted.