Court Opinion

ID: 9745687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:17:32.881736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.068599
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the trial court correctly granted the petition for adoption and therefore respectfully dissent.
In my view, the majority has cobbled together three discrete principles and fashioned thereby what amounts to a new bright-line rule of law. The three principles are: 1) Ind.Code Ann. § 31-19-9-S(a)(2)(B) (West 1998) requires that a petitioner for adoption must show not only that the natural parent did not provide support, but also that he or she was able to so provide; 2) SSI payments represent the absolute minimum necessary for the subsistence of an individual recipient; and 3) SSI, as a means-tested, public-assistance program, is excluded from a parent's income for the purpose of computing child support under Indiana Child Support Guidelines and, therefore, SSI recipients, as a matter of law, cannot be held in contempt for failing to comply with child support orders. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, *1049763 N.E.2d 480 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). The new rule created in the instant case dictates that, in the context of I.C. § 31-19-9-8, where a parent's income consists only of SSI payments, a court cannot find that the parent was capable of providing even token financial support for his or her children. In turn, this means that such a parent's consent is always required for adoption, regardless of the duration of the period of nonsupport, and without respect to any other factors. I do not believe that I am overstating the essence of the majority's holding, and I think it goes too far.
I believe it is a mistake to commingle the principles applicable to SSI in the context of child support with the principles applicable to SSI income under L.C. § 31-19-9-8. In the former cireumstance, the court is prospectively concerned with a parent's obligation and ability to pay child support. In such cases, the court must determine how much a parent will predictably be able to contribute toward the support of his or her child in the future. In the latter case, on the other hand, the court is attempting to assess the level of a parent's past involvement with a child, in order to determine whether that parent has, in effect, preserved a right to have a voice in a third party's effort to adopt the child.
When determining whether a natural parent has preserved the right to render or refuse consent under I.C. § 31-19-9-8, our courts have heretofore focused not so much on the amount of support paid as they have on whether the natural parent has contributed to the greatest extent possible. I believe the rule fashioned by the majority in the instant case departs from that approach. In so doing, the focus of the inquiry has been disconnected from its primary goal, which is to gauge the parent/child relationship by assessing the level of the parent's voluntary involvement with the child. I would adhere to an approach that requires courts to consider more than just the nature of the parent's resources, whatever that may be. I believe we should consider all of the facts, especially whether the natural parent had sufficient resources to purchase nonessential items for his or her own use. Such would focus not only upon the parent's own financial needs, but also upon the amount available for discretionary spending, if any.
Winters testified that SSI was her sole source of income. She claims upon appeal that such did not provide sufficient income to do more than provide for her own necessities. Yet, she also claimed that she would currently be able to support G.S.W. if he came to live with her. I am at a loss to understand how Winters would: be able to take G.S.W. into her home without the need to spend more than she currently spends on herself alone. To the contrary, Winters's representation means to me that she has money to spend on G.S.W., however much that may be, but opts instead to spend it on herself. In fact, she confirmed that she has discretionary income sufficient at least to support her cigarette habit. This means that, at a minimum, she had the ability to contribute money to G.S.W.'s support equal to that which she spent every month to continue smoking, but chose instead to spend it on cigarettes. That choice, and what it reveals, is at the heart of the inquiry that courts should conduct under I.C. § 31-19-9-8.
I note one final reason to reject strict adherence to the principle that a failure to offer even token financial support may not be considered under I.C. § 31-19-9-8 where SSI payments constitute a natural parent's only income: it is inconsistent with the guiding principle that overarches the entire adoption proceeding, viz., the best interests of the child. See LC. § 31-19-11-l(a)(1); see also Stout v. Tippeca*1050noe County Dept. of Public Welfare, 182 Ind.App. 404, 395 N.E.2d 444, 448 (1979) ("tlhe paramount consideration in any adoption proceeding is ... the best interest of the child"). I am aware that, in an adoption proceeding where parental consent has not been obtained, a consideration of the child's best interest does not occur until one of the statutory grounds for dispensing with parental consent has been proven. See In re Adoption of J.P., 713 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Yet, we must be mindful of the "best interests" consideration when we construe the meaning of 1.C. § 81-19-9-8 and decide how its terms are to be applied. Cf. In re Adoption of J.P., 713 N.E.2d 873 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (construing subsection (b) of I.C. § 31-19-9-8, which obviates the need for parental consent in the event that a parent abandoned a child or provided only token communication for the requisite time period). In In re Adoption of J.P., we observed, "A determination of abandonment justifying obviation of the requirement of consent to an adoption should receive liberal construction so that children who have been denied the benefits of a home and parental care may receive those benefits[.]1" In re Adoption of J.P., 713 N.E.2d at 876.
I believe that the record demonstrates that Winters had the ability to contribute to the financial support of G.S.W., but failed to do so for a period in excess of one year. Therefore, her consent was not required with respect to the adoption proceeding initiated by the Talleys. I would affirm the trial court.