Court Opinion

ID: 9862882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:23:24.802618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:14.088968
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
This is an interlocutory appeal in a capital-murder case. The defendant, Keith Matulewicz, contests the prosecutor’s decision to try him for capital murder. The prosecutor relies solely on aggravating factor N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c) (“c(4)(c)”) as the basis for treating the case as a capital murder. In accordance with the pretrial procedure authorized by this Court in State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132 (1984), the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to support this aggravating factor.
I concur in the judgment of the Court that the evidence proffered by the State is altogether insufficient to prosecute this homicide as capital murder under aggravating factor c(4)(c). I once again write separately to express reservation over the lenient standard employed by the Court to test, in the pretrial stages of a capital case, the sufficiency and competency of the State’s evidence supporting an alleged aggravating *202factor that serves as the basis for prosecuting a homicide as capital murder.
I.
A capital-murder prosecution in New Jersey proceeds in distinct stages. In order for a defendant to be charged with capital murder and for the case to proceed as a capital-murder prosecution under the capital murder-death penalty act, three elements of death-eligibility must be satisfied: (1) the defendant must have purposely or knowingly caused the death of another, State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40 (1988); (2) he or she must have committed the murder by his or her own hand or paid someone else to do so, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(1); and (3) at least one of the aggravating factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3, subd. c(4)(a) to (h) must be present. These elements, while all critical in establishing that a defendant has committed capital-murder and is death-eligible, are established at different times and in different ways. The first two elements, involving culpability and causal responsibility, must be determined by a grand jury and charged in the indictment. They must also be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a petit jury in the actual trial of the guilt issue, before the defendant is exposed to the death penalty. In contrast, the third element, the presence of an aggravating factor, is determined initially and given legal effect by the prosecutor alone; this is accomplished not by any adjudicative process or hearing but simply by the prosecutor serving a notice of aggravating factors. Moreover, this aggravating factor is actually determined by a jury after the defendant has been found guilty and as part of the jury’s death determination in the trial at the sentencing phase.1 In sum, *203under the prosecutorial scheme of the capital murder-death penalty act, all of the elements that render the defendant eligible to be prosecuted as a capital offender must be charged, but only two must be supported by a grand jury’s determination of probable cause. With respect to the aggravating-factor element, only the prosecutor’s decision is needed; “[b]y such notice alone a homicide case is transformed into a capital proceeding ... triggering both the death qualification of a jury and a separate sentencing proceeding.” McCrary, 97 N.J. at 140.
In McCrary, this Court concluded that the prosecutor’s decision to serve a notice of aggravating factors could not be entirely insulated from judicial oversight because of the momentous consequences resulting from such a determination. Id. at 140. The Court recognized that since the notice of aggravating factors is the turn-key to a capital prosecution, such allegations must be founded on an evidential base. “The need to ensure that such a source exists compels some preliminary review to satisfy the interest of the public and the defendant that such charges not proceed to trial without a factual mooring.” Id. at 143.
The Court in McCrary thus authorized a pretrial proceeding to test the evidentiary sufficiency of aggravating factors alleged in a capital case. However, in determining the scope of such a proceeding, the Court’s avowed goal was to effect only a minimal intrusion into the area of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 142. Sensitive to the prosecutor’s charging discretion, the Court sought to constrain it only to the extent necessary to protect a defendant’s rights. Ibid. Therefore, in fashioning the standard of review, the Court analogized the situation in which a defendant moves to strike an aggravating factor to one in which he or she moves to dismiss an indictment in an ordinary criminal case. Pursuant to this standard, the defendant must demonstrate that evidence is clearly lacking to support the submission of the factor to the jury — that is, a reasonable fact finder could not conclude the factor exists. Id. *204at 142-44. In addition, the Court held that hearsay evidence may be admitted at such a pretrial proceeding to support the existence of alleged aggravating factors. Id. at 145-46.
A defendant must be assured that there is a reasonable, well-founded basis to prosecute him or her for capital murder. The slight evidentiary burden imposed on the prosecutor, in terms of both the quantity and competency of evidence is, in my view, insufficient to generate this assurance. This is particularly true when the aggravating factor alleged is, as in this case, the hopelessly overbroad and vague c(4)(c) factor, which fails adequately to guide jury discretion and prosecutorial discretion alike. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 405 (Handler, J., dissenting). Because a prosecutor’s decision to transform a murder case into a capital proceeding is almost limitless —uninformed by any uniform guidelines and unchecked by any guarantee of proportionality review — the standards that govern this critical, initial stage of a capital prosecution must be more exacting. It is essential that meaningful standards provide an effective check on this pivotal determination in order to guard against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The McCrary standard of review, which accords wide deference to the prosecutorial decision by requiring but a slight evidentiary showing in order to activate the capital-murder machinery, does not accomplish this crucial goal.
II.
The standard governing the dismissal of an indictment, which the Court adopts in capital cases to test the evidential sufficiency of aggravating factors, is a relatively easy one for the prosecution to satisfy. The charges set forth in the indictment enjoy a presumption of validity, requiring a defendant who challenges their sufficiency to demonstrate that evidence is clearly lacking to support the charges. McCrary, 97 N.J. at 142. In the ordinary criminal case, this is an entirely appropriate standard by which to determine whether a particular charge *205is grounded in a sound evidential basis. It enables the accused to rid himself or herself of meritless, unwarranted allegations while neither abrogating a prosecutor’s charging discretion nor requiring the presentation of proof of the entire case in advance of trial.
But a capital case is not an ordinary criminal case. The prosecutor’s decision to serve a notice of aggravating factors activates the heavy machinery of a capital trial. The process, once started, engenders tremendous costs in terms of time, expense, energy, and emotion. The increase in pretrial preparations, the proliferation of pretrial motions, applications, and hearings, the added complications attendant on jury selection and the death qualification of jurors, the heightened concerns surrounding the trial itself, the need for more extensive presentencing investigation and preparation, the separate sentencing procedure, and the mandatory appeal all command an enormous commitment and investment of judicial and executive resources. Moreover, there is an extraordinary and painful emotional toll that is exacted at a personal level, affecting not only the participants in the trial but also their families, particularly the family of the victim. Such effects may linger long after a defendant has been convicted of capital murder. See 128 N.J.L.J. 577, 580 (March 9, 1989) (father of murder victim claims the appeals process in a capital case is cruel and unusual punishment for the survivors). These considerations counsel that before the financial, temporal, and emotional commitments are made to the prosecution of a homicide as a capital cause, we must be convinced that such a prosecution is fully warranted and that the basis for such a determination is well-founded. Placing a more exacting evidentiary burden on the State and engaging in more stringent pretrial review of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the prosecutor’s alleged aggravating factors will go far toward reducing the personal and public costs and sacrifices of unwarranted capital prosecutions, and will help to ensure the ultimate reliability and appropriateness *206of capital convictions. The McCrary standard falls far short of generating these assurances.
In addition, another vice of the McCrary standard is its failure adequately to check the virtually unlimited discretion afforded prosecutors in choosing to charge a defendant with capital murder; consequently, this standard is unable to reduce the threat of arbitrariness and disproportionality in the imposition of the death penalty. In State v. Ramseur, I expressed the view that under constitutional and fundamental-fairness doctrines, our capital murder-death penalty statute did not provide sufficient guidance to overcome the genuine risk of arbitrary and capricious applications. 106 N.J. at 405-06. The global definition of capital murder, although somewhat narrowed by our subsequent decision in Gerald, in conjunction with the failure to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants through the consideration of aggravating factors, particularly the all-inclusive c(4)(c) factor, renders the jury’s discretion standardless. Id. at 404 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the risk of arbitrariness due to the lack of guided jury discretion remains great because of the absence of proportionality review at the other end of the death-penalty tunnel. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 459 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring); Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 167 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 264-71 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting). As I pointed out in dissent in Ramseur, proportionality review serves a unique and essential function in capital-murder prosecutions. It seeks to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case by comparison with the punishment received by others who have committed the same crime. 106 N.J. at 407 (Handler, J., dissenting). As such, proportionality review acts “as a check against the random and arbitrary imposition of the death penalty” by an aberrant jury. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2940, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 893 (1976)). Although our capital murder-death penalty statute, as originally enacted, required proportionality review, a subse*207quent amendment provides for such review only when requested. L. 1985, c. 478. In my view, abolition of mandatory proportionality review becomes a fatal constitutional flaw in that there is now no reliable way to correct a capricious or discriminatory death sentence. I cannot believe that our Court will not insist on mandatory proportionality review, just as it has with respect to the defendant’s entitlement to a direct appeal. See State v. Koedatich, 98 N.J. 553 (1984) (court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal filed on his behalf by the Office of the Public Defender). We can expect no less under our State Constitution and accepted precepts of fundamental fairness.
The virtually unfettered power of prosecutors to select who is to be prosecuted for capital murder further exacerbates the risk of arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty and creates a major flaw in this statutory scheme. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 459 (Handler, J., concurring); State v. Bey II, 112 N.J. 123, 131 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting); Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 276 (Handler, J., dissenting); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 404-08 (Handler, J., dissenting). Our decision in State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, which established that intent to kill is an essential element of capital murder, does channel prosecutorial discretion to some extent. Nevertheless, the problem remains, in part because the definition of capital murder, by incorporating “knowing” murder, is over-inclusive and fails effectively to winnow out those crimes committed with a reckless culpability, see id. at 145-53 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting), and, in part because a probable-cause determination is not required to support the prosecutor’s decision to allege aggravating factors. Even more problematic, however, is the absence of uniform statewide standards to guide prosecutors in making such a momentous determination. Without such uniform standards to guide the selection process, the arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty is inevitable because the very pool of people selected to endure a capital trial at the initial stage of the prosecution is an arbitrarily-composed lot, reflecting determinations by individual prosecutors that may be con*208scientious but are nonetheless often highly subjective and speculative. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 405 (Handler, J., dissenting).
The risk of arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty due to the lack of a uniform statewide standard to guide prosecutors in their selection of capital defendants is heightened considerably when c(4)(c) is the sole aggravating factor relied on to transform a homicide into a capital case. I have repeatedly stressed that aggravating factor c(4)(c) is vague and entirely insufficient to provide effective guidance for prosecutorial or jury discretion. Ibid. In addition to being vague, this Court’s interpretation of the c(4)(c) statutory terms of “torture,” “aggravated battery,” and “depravity of mind” acquires determinative status in only the most fact-sensitive type of case. Whether a defendant intended to inflict serious physical or mental pain in addition to the pain inherent in causing death can be proved or disproved only by the most searching inquiry into the particular facts of each case. The same fact-sensitive inquiry is required to determine whether the defendant had a motive for murder or was simply a sadistic pleasure-killer exhibiting depravity of mind. Other aggravating factors, such as whether a defendant has ever been convicted of murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a)), or paid for or received payment for the murder (N.J.S. A. 2C:ll-3c(4)(d) and (e)), or murdered a public servant (N.J.S. A. 2C:ll-3c(4)(h)), do not involve the comparable degree of indeterminacy or the possibility of being supported by such a wide or subjective variety of evidence as the c(4)(c) factor. It is particularly important that these fact-sensitive determinations be guided and influenced by uniform and consistent standards; otherwise, there is simply no way to avoid the arbitrary enforcement and capricious application of the death penalty.
Not surprisingly, arbitrary results are indeed emerging. In several capital-murder appeals, the Public Defender has brought to our attention statistical evidence gathered in analyzing the administration of the capital murder-death penalty statute. Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Allison & Mills, “The Reimpo*209sition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion,” 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27 (1988) (hereinafter Study). This study acknowledged by the Court in State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 256, reveals a clear differential in prosecutorial practices in our various counties; equally serious crimes are simply not prosecuted to equal degrees on a statewide basis.
For example, in this case, Keith Matulewicz was charged with shaking his infant daughter to death. The Somerset County Prosecutor sought the death penalty, alleging that “the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim.” Yet the Public Defender’s Study is replete with cases — all dealing with child abuse and child homicide, all determined to be supported by the c(4)(c) factor, and almost all far more gruesome than the sad death of Heather Matulewicz —in which the county prosecutor opted not to seek the death penalty.2 Study, supra, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. at 294-98. The empirical evidence indicates that if the Matulewicz family lived in a county other than Somerset County, the defendant would *210not have had to answer capital charges and face the death penalty for the tragic killing of his daughter. It is this inconsistency in the selection of those eligible for death that mandates not only a uniform statewide standard to guide prosecutorial discretion, but also a more conscientious judicial overview and the use of a standard of pretrial review more stringent than the one set forth in McCrary and followed in this case.
Especially troublesome are the lax standards governing the competency of evidence at a McCrary hearing — in particular, the ready admission of hearsay evidence. In light of the numerous deficiencies inherent in the capital murder-death penalty statute — a nonexhaustive list would include unguided jury discretion, unfettered prosecutorial discretion, and the lack of proportionality review — loose evidential standards can only reinforce the tendency toward the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. A more stringent standard regarding the competency of evidence should be adopted. At the very least, such evidence, when used to support an aggravating factor, should be “critically assessed by the court, and disregarded if too attenuated or only marginally reliable.” McCrary, 97 N.J. at 148 (Handler, J., concurring).
III.
Although I disagree with the standard of review set forth in McCrary, I concur with the majority that even under those permissive standards, the State has in this case failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the c(4)(c) factor to the jury. Although the State originally argued that the defendant’s conduct exhibited a depravity of mind, it relinquished that claim at oral argument, apparently conceding that the defendant had some motive for the assaultive acts that eventuated in the killing, or that the defendant was not a senseless or sadistic “thrill-killer.” Therefore, the only issue is whether defendant’s conduct constituted an “aggravated assault” or “torture” of the infant in his custody.
*211In order to satisfy constitutional standards, this Court adopted a narrowing construction of c(4)(c) in Ramseur, and in so doing, concluded that “society’s concern, the community’s concern, and the Legislature’s concern, is to punish most harshly those who intend to inflict pain, harm, and suffering — in addition to death.” 106 N.J. at 208. The focus of inquiry, therefore, is whether defendant intended to cause extreme physical or mental pain in addition to the pain inherent in causing death. Furthermore, in saying that the defendant must have “intended” such suffering, the state of mind required corresponds to the Code’s definition of “purposeful.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(l). Thus, the gratuitous physical or mental suffering must be precisely what the defendant wanted to occur in addition to death. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 208-09.
In order to satisfy c(4)(c) in this case, the State is therefore required to submit some evidence that the defendant wanted his daughter to suffer extreme physical pain in addition to the pain actually attendant to her death. As the majority points out, there is rarely ever direct evidence of a defendant’s state of mind; instead, the intent to inflict gratuitous pain may necessarily be inferred from the circumstances of the murder. Ante at 194. The majority also provides examples in which the intent to inflict gratuitous pain can be inferred: returning to a dying victim to renew a vicious attack, inflicting wounds different in nature from the lethal injuries, “smoking-gun” statements by the defendant evidencing his or her intent to inflict such pain, and, in some cases, the method of killing may itself evince an intent to inflict extra or gratuitous pain. Ante at 200.
None of these circumstances are present in this case. The State, however, points to evidence that on a previous occasion defendant had abused the infant. The fallacy in this argument is that even if the prior conduct were admissible under Evidence Rule 55, for example, to show that defendant’s shaking death of his daughter was not accidental or mistaken, it is in no way relevant to show that defendant intended to inflict extreme *212pain in addition to that entailed in causing his daughter’s death. It is in itself patently insufficient to convert this homicidal act into the aggravated form of murder that would warrant the death penalty. Thus, what is totally lacking in this case is any evidence of a distinct intent or state of mind necessary to escalate an assaultive killing to capital murder, namely, an intent to inflict extreme pain in addition to the intent to kill. Although Heather doubtlessly suffered physical pain at the hands of the defendant, nothing suggests that the defendant intended to inflict any pain other than that which inevitably occurs when murder is accomplished by shaking or battering.
I therefore concur in the majority’s judgment that there is insufficient evidence to support the submission of the c(4)(c) factor to the jury.
HANDLER, J., concurring in the result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.

The statutory scheme that allows death-eligibility to be determined and a jury to consider the imposition of the death penalty without each necessary element of death-eligibility first being proved beyond a reasonable doubt is, in my view, constitutionally deficient. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 402-04 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting).

Chapter VIII of the Study, entitled “Annotation of Death Possible Cases," identifies specific instances from a data base of 703 cases where the county prosecutor had a factual basis for serving a notice of factors and a discretionary decision was made not to serve such notice. The following cases dealt with child abuse, child homicide and aggravating factor c(4)(c): (1) Case No. 040 — Essex County — 22-year-old Puerto Rican woman killed nine-month-old daughter who died from either fractured skull or extensive burns from scalding: (2) Case No. 085 — Camden County — 20-year-old black woman with no prior record charged with death of her three-year-old son, the abuse of two other children, and the apparent death of a fourth infant whose body was never recovered; (3) Case No. 105 — Cape May County — 27-year-old white male with no prior record suffocated his three daughters; (4) Case No. 130 — Salem County — 25-year-old black male with no prior record hit two-year-old child with fist and switch causing liver and kidney damage, a ruptured spleen, and death; (5) Case No. 148 — Mercer County — 29-year-old white male shotgunned his wife and two children, age three and one years old, to death; (6) Case No. 257 — Gloucester County — 29-year-old white male struck fatal blow to head of two-year-old girl and suffocated her with doll. Evidence of previous child abuse was present.