Court Opinion

ID: 9837058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:10.97805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.117389
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
with whom
CRAWFORD, Judge,
joins (dissenting):
Appellant used the unknowing-ingestion defense in a court-martial for unlawful drug use some 4 years prior to his present military prosecution and he was acquitted. When appellant was being tried in the case at bar, *61he once again used this defense,1 and to bolster this defense, he took the stand and substantially asserted that he never knowingly used marijuana, and that he was “shocked, upset, [and] flabbergasted” to have received a positive-urinalysis result.2 After hearing
arguments out of the presence of the jury, the judge allowed the prosecution, on cross-examination, to rebut this testimony with one question only: whether Graham had a prior positive-urinalysis result?3
*62To specifically address the majority opinion, I note that it attempts to exclude this rebuttal evidence of appellant’s positive urinalysis, which occurred some 4 years before the charged offenses, under two rules of evidence. It first suggests that such evidence was not logically relevant to rebut his trial testimony suggesting a defense of unknowing ingestion. See Mil.R.Evid. 401. Then it cites this Court’s decision in United States v. Murphy, 23 MJ 310 (1987), for the proposition that evidence of a prior positive-drug test alone, without expert testimony and proper instructions, is not legally admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 403. I disagree for the reasons stated below.
On the Mil.R.Evid. 401 question, I initially note that relevance cannot be determined without regard to the purpose for which the challenged evidence was offered. Appellant’s defense of unknowing ingestion was supported by his assertion that “there’s no way [he] would knowingly use marijuana,” and his assertion that he was “shocked, upset, [and] flabbergasted” at the 1995 positive-urinalysis result. The evidence of an earlier positive urinalysis (1991) was offered to rebut this defense testimony. See United States v. Banks, 36 MJ 150, 166 (CMA 1992).
Rebuttal is a well-recognized evidentiary purpose. Judge Wiss, writing in Banks, succinctly defined this evidentiary purpose as follows:
We have stated in a whole series of cases: “It is well settled that the function of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by the opposing party.” United States v. Hallum, 31 MJ 254, 255 (CMA 1990); United States v. Cleveland, 29 MJ 361, 363 (CMA 1990); United States v. Wirth, 18 MJ 214, 218 (CMA 1984); United States v. Strong, 17 MJ 263, 266 (CMA 1984), all quoting or citing United States v. Shaw, 9 USCMA 267, 271, 26 CMR 47, 51 (1958)(Ferguson, J., dissenting). The scope of rebuttal is defined by evidence introduced by the other party. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); United States v. Baldwin, 17 USCMA 72, 37 CMR 336 (1967); United States v. Sellers, 12 USCMA 262, 30 CMR 262 (1961).
36 MJ at 166. Quite simply, the 401 question before us is whether the positive-urinalysis evidence is relevant “to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence introduced by” appellant. I think it is.
In my view, the above-noted question was fair rebuttal to the defense of unknowing ingestion which appellant was attempting to plant in the jury’s mind. See United States v. Holmes, 39 MJ 176, 180 (CMA 1994); United States v. Spata, 34 MJ 284-86 (CMA 1992). First, his broad and unequivocal testimonial denial of knowing drug use (“no way I would”) reasonably suggested appellant’s total non-involvement with illegal drugs. The prosecution was entitled to correct this misimpression by showing that appellant twice, not once, tested positive for drugs during his implied drug-free life. See United States v. Joyner, 29 MJ 209, 212 (CMA 1989); United States v. Trimper, 28 MJ 460, 467(CMA), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 965, 110 S.Ct. 409, 107 L.Ed.2d 374 (1989). The fact of a prior positive-drug test provided a more complete picture of appellant’s drug history and undermined his credibility with respect to his denial of the current charges. After all, the jury was entitled to know that appellant was in reality asserting that he was struck by lightning twice. See United States v. Walker, 42 MJ 67, 73 (1995)(“The doctrine of chances and the experience of conduct tell us that accident and inadvertence are rare and casual; so that the recurrence of a similar act tends to persuade us that it is not to *63be explained as inadvertent or accidental.” (Citation omitted)); see also United States v. Graham, 46 MJ 583, 586 (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.l997)(multiple-“dope fairy”-visits theory).
Second, evidence of the 1991 positive urinalysis was also admitted to rebut appellant’s testimony that he was “shocked, upset, [and] flabbergasted” at the 1995 positive urinalysis. His testimony concerning his highly agitated mental state after he received his 1995 positive-urinalysis result reasonably suggested that he never tested positive for drugs before and his current positive-test result should be attributed to unknowing ingestion. See 1A Wigmore, Evidence 174 (Tillers rev.l983)(conseiousness-of-innocence evidence). The Government was entitled to attempt to contradict this bolstering evidence by showing that he had tested positive before and, therefore, his testimony of extreme agitation was exaggerated or false. See also United States v. Trimper, supra. Accordingly, this evidence was logically relevant to circumstantially counter appellant’s testimony concerning his flustered mental state and its implications concerning his innocent-ingestion defense.
Turning to the Mil.R.Evid. 403 question, the majority’s rationale is also unpersuasive. First of all, appellant did not make this particular objection at trial or on appeal and, therefore, it should more properly be considered waived under Mil.R.Evid. 103. In any event, the challenged evidence was not offered to prove appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the uncharged misconduct, as in the Murphy line of cases. Instead, it was offered to show the uncharged misconduct probably occurred. United States v. Reynolds, 29 MJ 105, 109 (CMA 1989), sets the standard for admission of proof of uncharged misconduct, a far lesser standard than at issue in Murphy. Finally, in view of the restricted nature and use of the challenged evidence in this case and the judge’s limiting instructions, I must reject the majority’s rationale and uphold the judge’s discretionary decision. Cf. United States v. Holmes, 39 MJ 176, 182 (CMA 1994)(impermissible argument prejudicial despite proper instruction on limited use of evidence).
At the end of the day, this case comes down to a question of fair rebuttal. Appellant’s testimony gave the jury the false impression that he had no involvement whatsoever with illegal drugs and he had not tested positive for drugs before. The prosecution was allowed to bring in other evidence which prevented the jury from being misled in determining the truth of this case. Appellant’s own testimony opened the door to this government evidence, and basic fairness dictated that the jury be allowed to hear it. See RCM 913(c)(1)(C); see also Joyner, supra at 212 (rebuttal evidence not used to show guilt of charged offense but to correct erroneous implications of accused’s testimony).

. In my view appellant clearly attempted to raise the defense of unknowing ingestion in this case. He testified as follows:
Q: Sergeant Graham, did you do this? (Held the charge sheet up.)
A: No, Sir.
Q: Sergeant Graham, the Government is trying to say that the byproducts of marijuana are in your urine. Do you know how that happened?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Was the substance tested your urine?
A: After it left my sight, Sir, I have no idea where it went, and there’s no way I would knowingly use marijuana.
Q: Sergeant Graham, was your urine positive for the ... for marijuana?
A: I’m being told that, Sir. I have no way of knowing.
Q: Sergeant Graham, how were you notified by the lab saying your sample was positive?
A: I was called by the first sergeant over to the orderly room and taken on a trip down to the OSI office.
Q: Now, as you were driving down to the OSI building, did the chief tell you what was going on?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did you think you were in trouble at the time?
A: No, Sir, because I was an observer during this sweep and stuff, and I thought it might have had something to do with that.
Q: Now when were you eventually notified?
A: After we got down to the OSI building and the OSI notified me.
Q: And what was your reaction to that?
A: I was shocked, upset, flabbergasted.
(Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel also argued this defense to the members:
Even if you can rely upon Brooks Lab to say some sample we got from Seymour Johnson turned out positive for THC, even if you can rely on the chain back to Seymour Johnson, even if you rely on it back through UPS back to first class mail, however that happened, all the way back to Master Sergeant Graham’s body, ask yourself what evidence do we have of a knowing use. You have none. There was no one person that came in here and [sjaid, I saw Master Sergeant Graham use marijuana. There’s not one piece of evidence that was seized and shown to you, no drug paraphernalia, no drug, nothing. There was not one person that’s heard Sergeant Graham talk about using marijuana. You heard testimony that the OSI was involved in this case. Using your common sense and your knowledge of the ways of the world, you know how the OSI is[.]
* s¡« *
All I ask you to do is take into account that the OSI was involved in this case and that there are still no witnesses, no evidence seized, that were presented here today to show that there was a knowing use. What the evidence does say about knowingness of this use, you can look to Chief Porter. He told you Sergeant Graham wasn’t nervous. He was cooperative. He didn’t hesitate. He went in there and gave a sample. He was in a good mood. He was one of the first ones to give a sample. And ... Dr. Frederick told you that the creatinine level for this sample that purports to be Master Sergeant Graham's is a normal sample. He also told you a person can force fluid to get their level down, and that’s [sic] you do no notice testing. That's why you tell people, get over to the base gym and give a sample. He told you that in thirty to forty minutes, you can see the difference in the creatinine level. In two hours, you can see a significant difference. Well, how much notice did Master Sergeant Graham have. Not thirty to forty minutes, not two hours. Four hours. Four hours in which he could have force[d] fluid if he would have thought that he had knowingly used marijuana that he had to cover it. The bottom line is Master Sergeant Graham came in here today. We presented evidence of his outstanding military character. He put his integrity on the line. He looked you in the eye and said, "I did not knowingly use marijuana. ” “I do not know how this happened." If you look at it objectively, why would he knowingly use marijuana. At the time of this incident, he was retirement eligible. He has a wife and son. He owns a home. The bottom line is, there’s no evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of knowing use.
(Emphasis added.)

. In appellant’s initial court-martial for drug use, he defended himself on the basis that someone put marijuana in cake he had eaten. At his second court-martial, he served notice of an innocent-ingestion defense that his wife cooked marijuana in brownies which he ate "without knowledge of their contents.” His trial testimony, in the case at bar, again denied knowing drug use but without mentioning the brownies, i.e., the "brownie defense without the brownies.” (See n. 1, supra.)

. It was appellant who first informed the members of his prior court-martial results in the following colloquy:
*62Q: Overall, Sergeant Graham, would you agree with me that the drug testing program is reliable?
A: It’s not a hundred percent. It’s reliable, but it’s not a hundred percent.
Q: Now, Sergeant Graham, isn’t it true that on one occasion in the past, a sample of your urine was correctly tested or was tested correctly, detecting ingestion of marijuana by you?
A: Yes, but I was found not guilty.
(Emphasis added.) The military judge’s ruling permitted the defense to admit evidence to show additional circumstances surrounding that test. Thus the only mention of a prior court-martial was first brought up by appellant.