Court Opinion

ID: 9881308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-30 06:10:01.066278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:14.267765
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed September 29, 2023

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00101-CR
                                  __________

                 DON DEL REAL HERRERA, Appellant
                                       V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 142nd District Court
                            Midland County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CR51729

                                   OPINION
      Appellant, Don Del Real Herrera, was indicted for capital murder and murder.
Pursuant to an agreement between the State and Appellant, the State abandoned the
capital murder charge and Appellant pleaded guilty to murder. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02(b) (West 2019). Appellant elected to have a jury assess his
punishment following his plea of guilty. The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment
at life imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the
jury’s verdict. See PENAL §§ 12.32(a), 19.02(c).
       Appellant asserts three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court’s
instructions to the jury incorrectly assigned him the burden of proof regarding the
issue of sudden passion. Second, he argues that the State misstated the law on
sudden passion during closing argument and that it made improper comments
regarding Appellant’s unadjudicated offenses. Third, he argues that the trial court
should have “issued” a mistrial after the State “mishandled” evidence, Appellant’s
cell phone, which violated his due process rights. We affirm.
                              Factual and Procedural History
       On April 13, 2018, Appellant left work around 5:30 p.m. He texted Francisca
Ybarra (Francis), his romantic partner of twelve years, regarding dinner plans, but
Francis responded that she was working late.1 After Appellant sent a series of text
messages accusing Francis of being with another man, she told Appellant to not pick
her up after her shift ended. Around 1:00 a.m., Francis sent Appellant three texts in
quick succession: “Come get me,” “Ya or nah,” and “Never Mind.” According to
Appellant, he called Francis and told her that he would come by and pick her up.
When Appellant arrived at Detour Bar where Francis worked, he went inside to get
Francis. One of the bar patrons, Vincent Sandoval (Vince), told Appellant that
Francis had left with a man, and that the two had gone to Vince’s house.
       Appellant drove to Vince’s house and walked in on Francis and Steven Ramos
naked on the bed. Steven testified that Appellant kicked in the door and began to
approach Francis. Francis told Steven to leave, and he hurriedly left for his brother’s

       1
        When asked if he was married to Francis, Appellant responded “they say it’s common law, but I
don’t know how that works.”

                                                 2
house across the street from which 9-1-1 was called. When police arrived at Vince’s
house, they saw Appellant on the front lawn, covered in blood, standing over
Francis’s body.2 Police observed that Appellant held a knife in his hand. When
police approached, they observed multiple wounds on Francis’s body, including a
severe neck laceration. An officer noted that despite her injuries, Francis was still
breathing; she was later pronounced dead at the scene.
        I.      Sudden Passion - the trial court’s charge included an appropriate
                instruction that was consistent with Texas law
        In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court gave erroneous
instructions on the law of sudden passion because it improperly shifted the burden
of proof to Appellant.
                1. Standard of Review
        Appellate review of alleged charge error is a two-step process. Kirsch v. State,
357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d
726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). First, we must determine whether charge error
exists. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Kirsch,
357 S.W.3d at 649). Second, if error does exist, we must then conduct a harm
analysis to determine whether the error resulted in sufficient harm to require
reversal. Id.; Phillips v. State, 463 S.W.3d 59, 64–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Ngo v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ybarra v. State, 621 S.W.3d
371, 384 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d).
        The trial court has the responsibility to provide the jury with “a written charge
distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

        2
         In Appellant’s interview with law enforcement, he claims that he “just lost it,” and that he did not
remember everything that happened. But his story evolved throughout the interview. Although Appellant
claimed to not remember everything, he admitted certain things when asked directly, such as “trying to”
cut Francis, cutting her throat, or stabbing her stomach.

                                                     3
art. 36.14 (West 2007). Charge error may stem from the denial of a defendant’s right
to have the trial court provide the jury with instructions that correctly set forth the
“law applicable to the case.” Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (quoting CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14). Therefore, because the trial court is
obligated to correctly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, it is
ultimately responsible for the accuracy of its charge and the accompanying
instructions. Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing
Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). As such, when the
charge is inaccurate, the trial court errs, and the error is subject to a harm analysis.
See Bell, 635 S.W.3d at 645.
                2. Analysis
        The punishment charge correctly described the burden of proof. In relevant
part, the charge read: “The burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that he acted under the influence of sudden passion.” Through
Section 19.02(d) of the Penal Code, the legislature placed the burden of proof
squarely on the defendant, stating:
        At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as
        to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden
        passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the
        issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense
        is a felony of the second degree.
PENAL § 19.02(d); see Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(“The defendant has the burden of production and persuasion with respect to the
issue of sudden passion.”). 3 Because the punishment charge was correct, the trial
court did not err.

        3
         We note that, while the defendant has the burden of proof with respect to the issue of sudden
passion, the evidence that raises the issue may be from any source and during either phase of trial. Wooten,
400 S.W.3d at 605.

                                                     4
         In his reply brief, Appellant argues for the first time on appeal that “Texas’s
voluntary manslaughter scheme,” is unconstitutional.4 Appellant contends that,
when the Texas Legislature amended Sections 19.02 and 19.04 thirty years ago to
include “sudden passion” in the murder statute, it “unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of proof and persuasion for voluntary manslaughter onto defendants.” See
Act of June 19, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586,
3613–14 (codified at PENAL §§ 19.02(a), (d), 19.04(a)). He argues that “such burden
flies in the face of analogous federal law and is contrary to traditional notions of
fairness, justice[,] and due process.” As Appellant describes the issue, he attempts
to present a complaint that Section 19.02(d) is facially unconstitutional. A complaint
that a statute is facially unconstitutional may be forfeited if appellate review is not
properly preserved. Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)
(holding that “a defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a facial challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute”); Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1995)).
         Even if his argument were properly presented for our review, we note that—
nearly fifty years ago—the Supreme Court declined to adopt a constitutional
imperative that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact that
constitutes any and all affirmative defenses relating to the culpability of the accused.
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). As the source of authority for his
proposition, Appellant relies on a Supreme Court case that was discussed and
distinguished by the court in Patterson for the same reason it is distinguishable
today.

        Appellant’s argument is in response to the State’s argument that “[i]t is constitutional to shift the
         4

burden of mitigation issues to a criminal defendant.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.3.

                                                      5
      Specifically, Appellant relies upon Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
In Wilbur, the statute at issue included an element of the offense, malice, that was
presumed and could only be rebutted by a defendant “proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that he acted with heat of passion upon sudden provocation.” See
Patterson, 432 U.S. 216. In contrast, the murder statute at issue in Patterson, as it
does in this case, did not “presume” or “imply” any fact against a defendant that he
or she needed to disprove “in order to constitute the crime.” Id. at 205–06, 216.
Instead, the murder statute in Patterson required three elements: (1) death, (2) intent
to kill, and (3) causation. Id. at 205. The statute also provided an affirmative defense
that could reduce the offense to manslaughter if the defendant proved that he acted
“under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation.” Id. at 206.
      Section 19.02(d) equally does not require defendants to disprove any elements
of the offense of murder. Instead, it provides a defendant with the opportunity to
present mitigating circumstances during the punishment phase of trial that, if proved,
would reduce a convicted murder defendant’s range of punishment to a second-
degree range. PENAL § 19.02(d); Beltran v. State, 472 S.W.3d 283, 293 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015) (“Sudden passion is a mitigating circumstance that is relevant to
determining the appropriate punishment of a defendant.”); Barron v. State, 630
S.W.3d 392, 402 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (a “sudden passion”
finding, when the defendant is convicted of murder, reduces the punishment for the
convicted offense to a second-degree punishment range); see Dwelle v. State,
No. 11-20-00237-CR, 2022 WL 2720445, at *3 (Tex. App—Eastland July 14, 2022,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (the issue of sudden passion is
akin to an affirmative defense); Gonzales v. State, No. 11-17-00245-CR, 2019 WL

                                           6
3727509, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 8, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (same). The Supreme Court in Patterson was clear:
      We thus decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative, operative
      countrywide, that a State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt
      every fact constituting any and all affirmative defenses related to the
      culpability of an accused. . . . We therefore will not disturb the balance
      struck in previous cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires
      the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
      included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
      charged. Proof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has
      never been constitutionally required; and we perceive no reason to
      fashion such a rule in this case and apply it to the statutory defense at
      issue here.
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added). As to the current Texas murder statute,
Patterson settles the issue. Sudden passion is not within the definition of the offense
of which Appellant was charged or convicted. See PENAL § 19.02(b).
      “Before September 1, 1994, the Penal Code defined voluntary manslaughter
as causing the death of a person under circumstances that would constitute murder,
except that the person acted ‘under the immediate influence of sudden passion
arising from an adequate cause.’ So at that time, sudden passion was a
guilt/innocence issue.” Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d 232, 236 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003); Sanchez v. State, 23 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“[T]he existence
of sudden passion was an element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter (a lesser-
included offense of murder) to be determined by the jury at the guilt/innocence
stage.”). Effective September 1, 1994, the Legislature removed this definition of
“voluntary manslaughter” from the Texas Penal Code and defined manslaughter as
it does today: “recklessly causing the death of an individual.” Act of June 19, 1993,
73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3613–14 (codified at
PENAL §§ 19.02(a), (d), 19.04(a)).

                                          7
      A new provision, subsection (d), was added to Section 19.02, which permitted
the defendant to raise the issue of whether he caused the death under the immediate
influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause at the punishment stage of
trial. PENAL § 19.02(d); Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(discussing the legislative change to move the issue of sudden passion from the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial to the punishment phase). The legislature has not
amended Section 19.02(d) since its enactment. Thus, under the current statutory
scheme, the question of whether a defendant killed another while under the
immediate influence of sudden passion is a punishment issue. PENAL § 19.02(d);
Beltran, 472 S.W.3d at 293. And if the defendant proves sudden passion by a
preponderance of the evidence, the punishment to be determined falls within
the range of punishment for a felony of the second degree. PENAL § 19.02(d).
Accordingly, the State does not have the burden to prove the “nonexistence” of the
facts underlying the mitigating circumstance of sudden passion; under Patterson,
compelling the State to do so is not “constitutionally required.” Patterson, 432 U.S.
at 210. Instead, under the statute, the defendant has the burden of production and
persuasion with respect to the issue of sudden passion. PENAL § 19.02(d); Wooten v.
State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Patterson supports the Texas
legislature’s 1993 amendments and its statutory scheme as it relates to the mitigating
circumstance of sudden passion. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205–10; Wooten, 400
S.W.3d at 605.
      Relying heavily upon Frascarelli v. United States Parole Comm’n, 857 F.3d
701, 707 (5th Cir. 2017), Appellant contends that the government typically “bears
‘the burden of proving absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt.’” See
Frascarelli, 857 F.3d at 707 (quoting United States v. Delaney, 717 F.3d 553, 559
(7th Cir. 2013)). Frascarelli makes no constitutional argument or holding regarding

                                          8
the burden imposed by the federal statutes it interprets—18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 (Murder)
and 1112 (Manslaughter)—as opposed to those imposed by the law of any sovereign
state, including Texas. Id. at 703, 705–08. Appellant provides no legal authority
holding that, since Patterson, the law of any state has been held to be
unconstitutional due to that state’s allocation of the burden of proof for sudden
passion. Frascarelli is not based upon the same statutes nor similar facts to that
which Appellant presents in his appeal under Texas law. See id. at 703, 705–06.
Frascarelli dealt with a prisoner convicted in Mexico that, pursuant to a treaty with
the United States, requested a transfer to serve his term in the United States. Id. at
702–03. The court in Frascarelli was required to “take into account the offense
definition under foreign law” and then apply the federal murder statutes. Id. at 705
(quoting Lizama v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 245 F.3d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Appellant makes no argument as to why under the current Texas statutes there is
anything unconstitutional about placing the burden upon the defendant to prove
sudden passion. And he cites no authoritative law holding same.
      The trial court’s punishment charge plainly instructed the jury on the
applicable Texas law when it stated that the burden of proving sudden passion by a
preponderance of the evidence was upon the defendant. Even if Appellant had not
waived his constitutional argument, we conclude that our statutory scheme on
sudden passion comports with Patterson and Section 19.02(d) and is not facially
unconstitutional. See PENAL § 19.02(d); Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205–10.
      Moreover, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has squarely addressed the
issue multiple times and affirmed that “the burden of production and persuasion with
respect to the issue of sudden passion” is upon the defendant. See Wooten, 400
S.W.3d at 605; McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);
see also Swearingen v. State, 270 S.W.3d 804, 820 (Tex. App.—Austin. 2008, pet.

                                          9
ref’d) (“The jury was properly instructed that to prove sudden passion, Swearingen
had the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he caused
Stephanie’s death ‘while under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising
from an adequate cause.’”). The trial court correctly instructed the jury on the law
applicable to the case. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
        II.     Improper argument issues were not preserved
        In his second issue, Appellant argues that the State made improper arguments
“about [Appellant’s] past charges” because it referenced two “unadjudicated
misdemeanors that should not have been introduced at trial” and an incident “that
allege[d] aggravated assault.”5 Appellant asserts that the State’s arguments about
Appellant’s offenses or bad acts was improper because evidence of such acts should
not have been introduced in the first instance. In support, Appellant attaches the
“relevant portions of [the] transcript” in an appendix that includes a conference on a
motion in limine and other pretrial matters, opening statements, a witness’s
testimony, and a hearing on trial counsel’s objections to a myriad of extraneous
offenses. Within his second issue, Appellant also argues that the State made
improper arguments during its closing statements when it “misstat[ed] the law on
sudden passion.”
        In his brief on his second issue, Appellant commingles three separate and
wholly distinct sub-issues: (1) did the State make improper arguments during its
closing statements regarding Appellant’s bad acts or other offenses; (2) were the bad
acts or offenses properly admitted over Appellant’s Rule 403 objection; and (3) did

        5
         From his cited authority, we conclude that Appellant takes issue with the offenses that the State
discussed during the State’s closing arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307,
320 (5th Cir. 1999) (analyzing prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments); United States v. Munoz,
150 F.3d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1998) (analyzing prosecutor’s statements made in part during closing
argument); United States v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 599, 603 (5th Cir. 2008) (analyzing remarks made by
prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument).

                                                    10
the State make improper arguments during its closing statements regarding the law
on sudden passion, and if so, whether the misstatement was harmful. Because only
the second sub-issue was preserved for our review, we address the first and third
sub-issues together.
              1. Standard of Review
       A trial court’s ruling on an objection to improper jury argument is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. See Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). Permissible jury argument generally falls into one of four categories:
(1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction of the evidence; (3) answer
to opposing counsel’s argument; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Davis v. State,
329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d
205, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). Counsel is also entitled to argue the law correctly,
even when it is not included in the jury charge. Molina v. State, 587 S.W.3d 100,
109 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019), aff’d, 632 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021). We examine rulings on alleged improper argument in light of the facts
adduced at trial and in the context of the entire argument. Thompson v. State, No.
01-14-00862-CR, 2015 WL 9241691, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec.
17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing McGee v. State,
774 S.W.2d 229, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)). Even if an argument is improper,
reversal is only necessary if the statements deprived Appellant of a fair and impartial
trial. Id. at *2.
              2. Applicable Law and Analysis
       Errors in closing argument require a specific and timely objection. See
Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see Archie v. State,
221 S.W.3d 695, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Kennedy v. State, 255 S.W.3d 684,
690 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). While Appellant made multiple objections

                                          11
during the State’s closing argument, he did not object to the State’s references to the
extraneous offenses themselves—ostensibly because evidence of the offenses had
already been admitted at trial and the State was answering opposing counsel’s
arguments. As a result, Appellant has not preserved this issue for our review and
has waived his right to complain about the State’s use of Appellant’s extraneous
offenses during closing argument. See Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 670
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Appellant’s first sub-issue is overruled.
        Similarly, Appellant’s argument on appeal regarding the State’s alleged
improper statements on the law on sudden passion is not preserved for our review.
While Appellant’s trial counsel did object to the State’s alleged mischaracterizations
of the law on sudden passion in its closing argument, he did not object or take issue
with the specific issue Appellant asserts on appeal—that Appellant did not (or should
not) hold the burden of proof on the issue. 6 Specifically, the State concluded its
argument with a statement that the burden was on Appellant:
        [THE STATE]: The main thing that I want you to keep in mind is that
        this is not the State’s burden. It is the default in a murder case for the
        punishment to be 5 years to 99, or life. It is up to the Defendant to
        prove by a preponderance of the evidence, by the greater weight of
        credible evidence, that he acted in sudden passion, and that an ordinary
        person would have done the same.
Appellant’s counsel did not object to the State’s closing argument. As such,
Appellant presents nothing for our review.7 Appellant’s third sub-issue is overruled.

        As detailed in our analysis on Appellant’s first issue, Texas law places the burden of proof squarely
        6

on a defendant with regard to the mitigating circumstance of sudden passion. See PENAL § 1902(d);
Wooten, 400 S.W.3d at 605.
        7
         We note that Appellant cites to Gracia, 522 F.3d at 600, and other federal case law to describe the
analytical framework for improper statements and examples of plain error. The Court of Criminal Appeals
recently declined to extend the federal plain-error standard provided by Gracia, and instead reaffirmed that
an appellant forfeits the ability to complain about improper statements if he or she does not object to the
arguments, when made, at trial. Mosley v. State, 666 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (citing

                                                     12
       III.    Admission of the extraneous offenses - no abuse of discretion
        In his second sub-issue, Appellant argues that bad acts or offenses “fail[]
under the Gigliobianco-test” and “the Montgomery-test,” thereby asserting an
argument under Rule 403. See Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 640 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Appellant’s trial counsel raised a specific Rule 403 objection to one offense or bad
act at trial, namely an incident at Whataburger where it was alleged that Appellant
committed an aggravated assault against Francis. Therefore, although Appellant
risks waiving these arguments by failing to describe (with one exception, the
“Whataburger incident”) with particularity the extraneous offenses to which he
refers, we will review his Rule 403 argument as it relates to the incident he has
identified on appeal. See Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010).
                1. Standard of Review
        We review the trial court’s admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard. Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A trial
court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules and
principles or when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Id. at 669 (citing Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d at 380). Therefore, we uphold a trial court’s ruling on admissibility if
it is within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d
749, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001)).

Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89). Further, Rule 38.1(i) requires the appellant’s brief to include appropriate
citations to authorities. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

                                                  13
                2. Preservation of Error: Identifying the Scope of Our Review
        Given Appellant’s broad record citation of 149 pages to identify the
“unadjudicated” offenses, our first task is to determine to which offenses Appellant
is referring. As stated above, from his cited authority, we conclude that Appellant
takes issue with the offenses that the State discussed during its closing argument.
There are three different offenses. First, Appellant threw a large block at Francis’s
car, breaking a window. Second, Appellant engaged in reckless driving while
Francis was in the car. Third, Appellant and Francis engaged in a domestic dispute
outside of a Whataburger restaurant. 8 There was also a fourth extraneous offense
not mentioned in the State’s closing argument—an arrest for driving while
intoxicated (DWI) four days before the murder.
        Next, we must determine whether Appellant preserved any alleged error under
Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, in regard to these three offenses.
Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the admission of these offenses at trial, but on
different grounds. Appellant objected to the breaking of the car window incident on
Rule 404(a) and 404(b) grounds. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(a), 404(b). He did not
object to the reckless driving incident itself but objected to the testifying officer’s
statements as hearsay. See generally id. R. 801–806. Appellant objected to the
incident at Whataburger under Rule 403. Appellant’s only objections to the DWI
were hearsay and that the offense was a misdemeanor. The trial court overruled the
objections to the first three incidents and did not rule on the objections to the DWI.
        To preserve error for review, the objection at trial must correspond with the
issue on appeal. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “An

        8
          We note that Appellant’s characterization of all offenses as “unadjudicated” is incorrect. To the
first two offenses, Appellant pled no contest to criminal mischief. Only in the Whataburger incident did
Francis decline to press charges, and the evidence does not show whether Appellant was convicted of an
offense stemming from that incident.

                                                    14
objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different legal theory
on appeal.” Edwards v. State, 97 S.W.3d 279, 287 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, pet. ref’d). Appellant’s brief provides cursory analysis for the offenses
collectively and does so under Gigliobianco and Montgomery—cases that analyze
admissibility under Rule 403. 9 See Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 640; Montgomery,
810 S.W.2d 372. However, his objections at trial to the car window incident and the
reckless driving incident do not correspond to his issue on appeal. As to objections
made to testimony regarding the DWI arrest, Appellant did not obtain a ruling, nor
did the trial court refuse to rule on its admissibility. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2);
Dority v. State, 631 S.W.3d 779, 786 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.).
       However, Appellant’s trial counsel stipulated to Appellant’s DWI arrest. And
testimony regarding Appellant’s DWI arrest by the arresting officer was offered
without objection. As a result, Appellant’s objection to DWI testimony was not
preserved for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Moreover, Appellant is limited on
appeal to the contention he makes on appeal: that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting the other unadjudicated offenses under Rule 403. Turner, 805 S.W.2d
at 431; Edwards, 97 S.W.3d at 287. And, because Appellant’s only objection at trial
under Rule 403 for an unadjudicated offense is related to the extraneous-offense
evidence of the Whataburger incident, we limit our review to that incident.

       9
        Appellant’s “analysis” consists of single-word conclusions in parenthesis after repeating the
Gigliobianco factors:
                The 404(b)(2)-evidence fails under the Gigliobianco-test because: (1) the inherent
       probative force of each (line of evidence) along with (2) the State’s need for the evidence
       was nonexistent when placed against (3) any tendency of the evidence to suggest decision
       on an improper basis (great), (4) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the
       jury from the main issues (great), (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue
       weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence
       (great), and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate
       amount of time or merely repeat evidence already admitted. See Gigliobianco v. State, 210
       S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

                                                   15
             3. Applicable Law
      “Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence and carries a presumption
that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Hayes v. State, 85
S.W.3d 809, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 376);
see Martin v. State, 570 S.W.3d 426, 437 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d).
“Rule 403 requires exclusion of evidence only when there exists a clear disparity
between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value.”
Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). Therefore, in
reviewing a trial court’s Rule 403 determination, we will reverse the trial court’s
ruling only if a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841,
847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 392; Martin, 570 S.W.3d
at 437.
      When undertaking a Rule 403 analysis, a trial court must consider several
factors (the Gigliobianco factors) and balance:
      (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence along
      with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency
      of the evidence to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis, (4) any
      tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main
      issues, (5) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a
      jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the
      evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the evidence will
      consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence
      already admitted.
Garcia v. State, 630 S.W.3d 264, 268 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) (citing
Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42). These factors guide our analysis.
             4. Analysis
      The specific events that comprise the “Whataburger incident” are unclear.
The evidence presented at trial does not describe the entire incident, the timeline of
the incident, or its outcome in detail. The evidence adduced on the Whataburger

                                         16
incident consisted of (1) testimony from Chance Doyle Rainer, a Midland Police
Officer at the time of the incident, (2) text messages between Appellant and Francis,
and (3) Appellant’s interview with police after he was taken into custody for the
instant offense.
      Appellant stated that he took Francis to get food at Whataburger after
Francis’s shift ended. Appellant stated that, when Appellant did not want to eat as
well, Francis became angry and punched him while they were in the drive-thru.
Francis then exited the vehicle. In a text to Francis, Appellant claimed that Francis
got out while he was pulling forward, but Francis’s response suggested he
intentionally hit her with his vehicle.
      “The first two Gigliobianco factors focus on the probative force of and the
State’s need for the evidence.” Garcia, 630 S.W.3d at 269. “Probative value” refers
to the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—how strongly it serves to
make the existence of a fact of consequence more or less probable—along with the
proponent’s need for the evidence. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. The first two
factors weigh in favor of admission.           The State introduced evidence of the
Whataburger incident to establish Francis’s prior relationship with Appellant. As
evidence of Appellant’s prior relationship with Francis, the incident was probative
of his state of mind at the time of the offense. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36 (West
2018). The State also needed the evidence. While other extraneous offenses shed
light on Appellant’s behavior in his relationship with Francis, only the Whataburger
incident appeared to involve direct assaultive conduct against Francis herself. The
Whataburger incident had probative value that none of the other “unadjudicated”
offenses exhibited.
      The remaining Gigliobianco factors focus on the potential negative effects of
the proffered evidence. Garcia, 630 S.W.3d at 269. The third factor, the tendency

                                          17
of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis, weighs in favor of
admission. Rather than suggesting an improper decision, evidence of the aggravated
assault against Francis provided relevant context on the facts and circumstances
surrounding the murder and the previous relationship existing between Francis and
Appellant and provided relevant facts and circumstances to show the condition of
Appellant’s mind at the time of the offense. See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.36. Further,
the jury charge instructed the jury not to consider any acts or transactions committed
by Appellant unless the jury found and believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant committed such actions. The instructions equipped the jury to properly
weigh the extraneous offense evidence and minimized the risk of the jury improperly
relying on such evidence in reaching its verdict. See Kersh v. State, No. 02-22-
00088-CR, 2023 WL 3643235 at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2023, pet.
ref’d). We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions in the charge.
Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
      The fourth factor, any tendency to confuse or distract the jury, weighs in favor
of admission. “Confusion of the issues alludes to the likelihood that the evidence
would confuse the jury or distract them from the case’s central issues.” James v.
State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 550 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Because
Appellant pleaded guilty, the central issue at trial was the punishment to be assessed.
Because sudden passion was raised, Appellant’s state of mind at the time of the
murder was also an issue at trial. The discrete focus of trial made it less likely that
the extraneous incident distracted the jury from the central issues of the case.
      Factor five, the potential for undue weight, weighs in favor of admission. See
Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641. Undue weight considers whether the jury was
equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence; for example, scientific
evidence might mislead a jury if they are not given the tools to evaluate it. Id. The

                                          18
Whataburger incident was neither complex nor scientific in nature. The jury was
equipped to evaluate the testimony and evidence of the aggravated assault.
          The final factor, the potential for the evidence to consume an inordinate
amount of time at trial or is merely cumulative, weighs in favor of admission. See
Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641–42. We cannot say that the admission of this
offense represented an inefficient use of the jury’s time. The time spent on the
incident at trial was not short, but we cannot describe it as “inordinate.” Id.
Therefore, the sixth factor weighs in favor of admission.
          We have considered the Gigliobianco factors and conclude that the factors
weigh in favor of the admission of the Whataburger incident. The incident was
probative on the issue of sudden passion. The incident did not serve to distract the
jury or suggest a decision on an improper basis, and the jury was equipped to
evaluate its probative force. The time taken to admit the Whataburger incident was
not inordinate. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence
of the Whataburger incident under Rule 403. Appellant’s second sub-issue is
overruled. Having overruled each of Appellant’s sub-issues, we overrule his second
issue.
          IV. Any error regarding the State’s alleged mishandling of Appellant’s cell
              phone was not preserved
          In Appellant’s third issue, he argues that the trial court should have “issued”
a mistrial after the State “mishandled” evidence, which violated his due process
rights.     The State responds that this issue was not preserved for our review.
Appellant contends that despite this “lapse in preservation,” we should consider this
point in the “interest of justice.”

                                             19
                1.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
          Generally, to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must make a
contemporaneous objection in the trial court. See Burg v. State, 592 S.W.3d 444,
448–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)). As noted by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, there are two general policies for requiring
specific objections: “First, a specific objection is required to inform the trial judge
of the basis of the objection and afford him the opportunity to rule on it. Second, a
specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity to remove
the objection or supply other testimony.” Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517
(Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (footnote omitted). “[O]bjections promote the prevention
and correction of errors. When valid objections are timely made and sustained, the
parties may have a lawful trial. They, and the judicial system, are not burdened by
appeal and retrial. When a party is excused from the requirement of objecting, the
results are the opposite.” Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002); Sanchez v. State, 418 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet.
ref’d).
          “All but the most fundamental rights are thought to be forfeited if not insisted
upon by the party to whom they belong.” Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262,
264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Fundamental errors fall into “two relatively small
categories of errors: violations of ‘rights which are waivable only’ and denials of
‘absolute systemic requirements.’” Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 888. A party is not
required to preserve a complaint for the violation of these two categories or rights.
Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279; see also Burg, 592 S.W.3d at 449.
          A waivable-only right is one that the trial court has an independent duty to
implement unless the record reflects that it has been “‘plainly, freely, and

                                             20
intelligently’ waived at trial.” Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017) (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280). Examples of waivable-only rights
are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a trial by jury. Saldano, 70
S.W.3d at 888.
        “[A]bsolute requirements and prohibitions,” such as personal jurisdiction,
subject-matter jurisdiction, and a penal statute’s compliance with the Texas
constitution’s Separation of Powers provision are “systemic” and “essentially
independent of the litigants’ wishes.” Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 792 (quoting Marin,
851 S.W.2d at 279); see Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 888. Absolute requirements and
prohibitions cannot be forfeited or validly waived. Proenza, 541 S.W.3d at 792;
Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279.
                2. Analysis
        Appellant concedes that his third issue is not preserved. Appellant’s trial
counsel did not object to, let alone request a mistrial for, the State’s alleged
mishandling of Appellant’s cell phone. Because Appellant did not timely object to
the alleged “mishandling” of the cell phone, he has waived his argument on appeal.10
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 279.
        In his reply brief, Appellant requests that we address the issue notwithstanding
his failure to preserve the alleged error because the case “reveal[s] constitutional
error.” Even nonfundamental error that relates to due process may be waived absent
a timely and specific objection. See Jenkins v. State, No. 11-19-00272-CR, 2021
WL 3557566 at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 12, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Woodrome v. State, No. 13-21-00036-CR, 2022

        10
           Even if Appellant had timely asserted the alleged mishandling of the evidence by the State, it is
unclear whether error or mishandling occurred at all. The only incident Appellant asserts to support
“mishandling” is that the cell phone was taken out of evidence and given to defense counsel. At trial,
Appellant’s trial counsel argued that the contents of the cell phone should have been extracted. Appellant
raises a separate concern that the State “mishandled” this evidence that is unsupported by the record.

                                                    21
WL 480246 at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Teixeira v. State, 89 S.W.3d 190,
192 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)); Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 282
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (failure to object specifically on due process
grounds waived issue on appeal).         We decline to excuse Appellant from the
preservation requirements imposed by Texas law. We overrule Appellant’s third
issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
         We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE

September 29, 2023

Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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