Court Opinion

ID: 9664617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:22:51.523807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:07.703650
License: Public Domain

MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, appellant contends that the jury’s finding that Hicks was the procuring cause of the sale by Knight to Joe Bob Johnson must be predicated on a conclusion that Herschel Johnson was acting as agent for Joe Bob Johnson in conducting the negotiations in question and that such a conclusion in turn would necessarily be based solely on statements which appellee testified Herschel Johnson made to him concerning Her*645schel’s purpose in looking for the land. In this connection, appellant cites the rule that mere declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are incompetent to establish either the existence of the alleged agency or the scope and extent of the alleged agent’s authority. This principle is fundamental and well established. Latham v. Pledger, 11 Tex. 439, 446 (1854); Empire Gas & Fuel Co. v. Muegge, 135 Tex. 520, 143 S.W.2d 763, 769 (1940). However, that principle does not apply to the facts of the case before us.
The question here is whether Joe Bob Johnson’s interest and involvement in the negotiations with Hicks were such as to make Hicks’ efforts the procuring cause of the sale in question. Joe Bob Johnson, himself, testified that he was the one interested in the purchase of the Fleming land which he and his father, Herschel, looked at as a result of Herschel Johnson’s inquiry of Hicks concerning a place for Joe Bob to buy. Hicks testified that Joe Bob was present during the conversation at the barn when the possibility of Hicks getting a listing on the Knight land was discussed, as well as Joe Bob’s possible participation in the purchase; that he, Hicks, personally told Joe Bob that he had the listing on the Knight land shortly after he got the oral listing; and that he, Hicks, told Knight that Joe Bob was interested in the negotiations that he, Hicks, was conducting before Knight ever discussed sale of the land with Joe Bob. It is undisputed that Herschel Johnson and Joe Bob Johnson both went with Knight to the lawyer’s office to prepare the contract of sale, and that Hicks was not present at either the preparation or execution of the sales contract.
Even though there is some conflict in the evidence and there is testimony from which the jury could have reached a different conclusion, the jury, as trier of the facts, found that Hicks was the procuring cause of the sale from Knight to Joe Bob Johnson. We have again reviewed the evidence in its entirety, including that in conflict with that which supports this jury finding, and hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding and that that finding is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Goodwin v. Gunter, 109 Tex. 56, 185 S.W. 295 (1916), 195 S.W. 848 (1917) and Shepard v. Wesson, 266 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1953, no writ).
The remaining points of error contained in the motion for rehearing have been carefully considered. We conclude that a correct and adequate disposition of each point was made in the original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.