Court Opinion

ID: 9588806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:02.187885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:57.251994
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
A search of defendant’s premises was conducted by virtue of a warrant for gambling equipment. A bag and its contents (ratchet wrench, pair of pliers, bolts and a jack) were found in a coat closet. Defendant was indicted, tried and convicted of the offense of possession of tools for the commission of crime. The majority affirms.
I agree with Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, but I do not agree with Division 3 with reference to the sufficiency of the charge as to criminal intent in the possession of tools with intent to make use of them in the commission of a crime. I therefore dissent.
Code § 26-1602 makes it a crime to possess tools commonly used in the commission of buglary or theft with intent to make use of them in the commission of a crime, and the court so charged. The court immediately followed *902this statement with definitions of actual possession, constructive possession, sole possession, joint possession, burglary, theft and crime ("a union of joint operation of act and intention”) in that order, followed by the statement: "In order to establish the crime charged in this case, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive sole or joint possession of the alleged tools and had knowledge of their presence and characteristics.” This is all the court said on the subject on intention. It is mentioned here, not because it was enumerated as error, which the appellant failed to do, but because it easily bears the meaning that the intention referred to was intention to possess the tools, not intention to commit a crime by their use. The defendant submitted a number of requests to charge to the effect that the state must prove two elements for conviction, to wit: possession, and intent to use the tools in the commission of a crime, and that both elements are essential to a conviction. This is a correct principle of law. Hogan v. Atkins, 224 Ga. 358, 359 (162 SE2d 395). It was not given in charge. This constituted reversible error.
The request enumerated as request number 3 and the first sentence of request number 6, both with reference to intent, were also pertinent and should have been given in the charge.
I am authorized to state that Judge Clark joins in this dissent.