Court Opinion

ID: 9673102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:06:15.362361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.218103
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the views of the majority insofar as they hold that the verdict of the jury is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and that even conceding that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the collision, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover because there is no proof of actual damages.
The question as to whether the verdict of the jury is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence needs but little discussion since the admissions of the defendant Poster, who was driving the truck, clearly and without contradiction establish his negligence. He tes*18tified that when he was about 150 feet from the intersection he undertook to apply his foot brake and that the brakes grabbed but finally held; that when he had reached a point about fifty or sixty feet from the car, his foot brake went out entirely; that his truck was equipped with a foot brake and a hand brake and an emergency brake; that he did not attempt to stop the truck with the emergency brake; that when he was about fifty feet from the car and the brakes gave way, he did not try to stop his truck either Avith the hand brake or the emergency brake. He said: “I was looking for it to roll and completely stop; it rolled on up to about six feet and I thought I could dodge the car, but after it didn’t roll to a complete stop, I tried to dodge it.” Thus the defendant Poster admits that his brakes gave way when he was about fifty feet from the car and that he made no effort to stop his truck either with the hand brake or the emergency brake. It is manifest that at this time his truck was moving very slowly and that the application of the emergency brake would have stopped the truck and prevented the collision. In my opinion, it was negligence for Poster to permit the truck to roll without making any effort by the use of his emergency brake to stop the same. The jury, in the face of these uncontradicted admissions of Poster, was not warranted in exonerating Poster of negligence proximately causing the collision and its verdict in so doing was, in my opinion, not only contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence but contrary to the defendant’s own admissions, from which his negligence clearly appears.
But the majority say that even if it be conceded that the proof shows the defendants were guilty of negligence proximately causing the collision, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover in the absence of a showing of actual damages. In other words, the majority adopts the view that negligence is not actionable unless it proximately results in injury to one to whom the obligation of due *19care is owed; that even though an act or omission be negligent, no cause of action arises therefrom unless the person complaining has been injured in consequence thereof, and that in such case, there can be no recovery even for nominal damages. In support of this view the majority cites authorities from other jurisdictions and only one Mississippi case, namely, the case of Campbell v. Willard, 205 Miss. 783, 39 So. 2d 483, from which they quote the following: “While negligence is the failure to use reasonable care, it remains an abstract concept unless such negligence results proximately in injury to one to whom the obligation of due care is owed.”'
It is true that some of the Courts of other States hold that in an action based on negligence, if plaintiff fails to prove actual damages, he is not entitled to nominal damages. 25 C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 10, p. 468. This view, however, which is the view of the majority, is not in accordance with the general rule. 15 Am. Jur., Damages, p. 393, states the general rule as follows: ‘ ‘ The general rule, however, is that in any violation of one’s rights, whether actual damage is inflicted or not, whether the action sounds in tort for personal injuries or otherwise, in the absence of proof of actual damage, at least nominal damages may be recovered.”
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has adhered to this general rule in an unbroken line of decisions for more than three-quarters of a century.
The case of Thompson v. N. O., J. & G, N. R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 315, decided in 1874, was an action against the railroad company for damages predicated upon the negligence of the defendant in carrying the plaintiff beyond his station. There was a demurrer to the evidence of the plaintiff which the Court sustained and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The Court said: “Upon the evidence, the plaintiff acquired a technical right of recovery, but the rule as to punitive damages does not apply. Hence, although the damages are only nominal, nevertheless, the *20cause of action ought to have been sustained, and a writ of inquiry awarded, . . . .”
The case of Keirn v. Warfield, 60 Miss. 799, was an action for an alleged trespass in cutting and taking trees. The Court said: “Upon the count in the declaration for the actual value of the trees taken, plaintiff was at least entitled to a verdict and judgment for nominal damages, though no actual value was proved. Every breach of duty or violation of right entitles the party wronged to damages, and if none other be shown, nominal damages should be awarded. ’ ’
The case of McGhee v. Laurel Light and Rwy. Co., 113 Miss. 603, 74 So. 434, was an action of trespass upon the property of the plaintiff by going upon her property without her consent and cutting her ornamental shade trees standing thereon. The case was submitted to a jury who returned a verdict for the defendant. In reversing the judgment of the court below, this Court said: ‘‘ Prom the undisputed proof in the record it appears that the appellee, Laurel Light and Railway Company, through its agents and servants, trespassed upon the property of appellant by going upon her premises, without her consent, and cutting the limbs of her ornamental shade trees standing thereon. This act constituted an invasion of the rights of appellant, and renders appellee liable for nominal damages, even though no actual damages be shown. It is the invasion of the right which gives the cause of action.”
The case of Doherty v. Mississippi Power Co., 178 Miss. 204, 173 So. 287, was an action by Mrs. George Doherty against the Mississippi Power Company, seeking to recover actual and punitive damages for the alleged wilful and wanton wrong on the part of the Mississippi Power Company in disconnecting Mrs. Doherty’s electric lights. The trial court peremptorily instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. This Court, in reversing and remanding the case, said: “The *21only remaining question is whether or not, under the facts, the appellant was entitled to recover nominal damages. The law presumes damage from the infringement of a legal right. The appellant here sued for and established by her proof, the violation of her asserted legal rig’ht to have the interest due her offset against her light bill; and for the wrongful and negligent breach of duty on the part of the appellee in this regard, she was entitled to recover at least nominal damages. Therefore the peremptory instruction to the jury to return a general verdict for the defendant was erroneous, and the judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the cause remanded.”
The very recent case of Bush v. City of Laurel, 105 So. 2d 562, decided by this Court on October 13, 1958, was an action to recover damages for an alleged trespass upon plaintiff’s land. It was contended in that case that the declaration stated no cause of action in that it failed to allege any recoverable damages. The Court said: “The general allegation in the bill, however, is that the appellant committed a trespass in going upon the land of the appellant and if such be proven on the trial, then the appellants would be entitled to recover at least nominal damages even if the proof failed to show any actual damages. We therefore think that the declaration is sufficient to withstand the challenge that it fails to state a cause of action or any recoverable damages. ’ ’
Reference to the foregoing decisions of this Court make it readily apparent that the view adopted by the majority is contrary to the rule which has been adhered to by this Court in an unbroken line of decisions.
The case of Campbell v. Willard, supra, relied upon by the majority, affords no precedent in my opinion for overruling the unbroken line of decisions heretofore referred to. That involved an action for wrongful death and, of course, was a case in which actual damages were sustained. The language quoted from the decision in *22this case was, therefore, not necessary to a decision of the case and was pure dictnm, and is not to be followed as a precedent for overruling the many prior decisions of this Conrt holding to the contrary.
With deference, I am of the opinion that the views adopted by the majority are contrary to the prior decisions of this Conrt and should therefore not prevail. .
It is accordingly my conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the cause remanded.
Hall, Lee and Arrington, JJ., join in this dissent.