Court Opinion

ID: 9645423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:24:12.674893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:28.170207
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant takes issue with the assertion in our original opinion that error was not committed when the prosecutor referred to appellant as a hoodlum and gangster. We will amplify our reasons for so holding. The state’s principal witness Johnny Green testified that he was a panderer, operated a house of prostitution, and for 48 hours before the homicide he and deceased had been looking for defendant, and that he was accompanying deceased because deceased was expecting trouble, and that both he and deceased were armed with pistols. It was further shown that appellant was armed and began shooting at deceased as he came within range. We have concluded that the references referred to above do not constitute error. Lott v. State, 164 Tex. Cr. Rep. 395, 299 S.W. 2d 145.
Appellant next complains of the court’s charge on the issue of surprise. The bill of exception recites that appellant objected because the jury was not told that the state was bound by its own witness unless and until it pleaded and proved surprise. Reliance is had upon three cases, Carroll v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. Rep. 269, 158 S. W. 2d 532; Wells v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. Rep. 336, 227 S. W. 2d 210; and Lawhon v. State, 284 S. W. 2d 730. All three cases support the rule that the state’s case cannot be made out by proof of prior inconsistent statements of the witnesses while their testimony at the trial does not inculpate the accused, and that where such evidence is introduced the jury should be instructed that such prior inconsistent statements might be considered by the jury only as impeachment in accordance with the form found in 1 Branch’s Ann. P.C. 203, 2nd, sec. *526p. 225. These cases and the rule cited have no application here. Green testified in direct examination that possibly he fired the first shot. On cross-examination, he admitted that he had testified at a prior hearing that he returned the fire after he was fired upon and that such was his testimony at this trial. While the prosecutor did not follow the procedure which was commended in Pelton v. State, supra, in claiming surprise, we do find that he secured from the witness the admission that he was now testifying that he fired after he was fired upon by the occupants of the other automobile.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this cause originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.