Court Opinion

ID: 9556810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 18:01:19.523047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:21.375824
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13043     Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 08/18/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13043
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL I. ROIG,
       by and through its Personal Representative Gail Olivera,
       KYLE ROIG,
       an individual,
       SAM ROIG,
       an individual,
       GAIL OLIVERA,
       an individual,
                                                    Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
       versus
       UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.,
       a business entity,
       THOMAS O'MALLEY,
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13043

       an individual,
       ROMAINE SEGUIN,
       an individual,

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60811-AMC
                           ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and BRASHER, Cir-
       cuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Gail Olivera, individually and on behalf of the estate of Sam-
       uel Roig, and Roig’s children, Kyle and Sam, appeal the denial of
       their motion to vacate the final judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4),
       against their complaint of employment discrimination and tortious
       conduct under Florida law. We affirm.
              In 2018, the Roigs, citizens of Florida, sued United Parcel
       Service, an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in
       Georgia, and Thomas O’Malley, a Florida citizen, in a Florida
       court. United and O’Malley removed the case to the district court,
       28 U.S.C. § 1332, and argued that the Roigs fraudulently joined
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       22-13043               Opinion of the Court                          3

       O’Malley to defeat diversity jurisdiction. The Roigs voluntarily dis-
       missed their complaint without prejudice. Seven months later, the
       Roigs unsuccessfully tried to amend their original complaint in
       state court by adding United manager Juan Vicente as a defendant,
       but the state court struck the complaint.
              In 2020, the Roigs filed a second lawsuit in state court against
       United and O’Malley and added United employee Romaine Seguin
       as a non-diverse defendant. The defendants removed the second
       lawsuit to the district court and argued that the Roigs fraudulently
       joined defendants O’Malley and Seguin to defeat diversity jurisdic-
       tion. The Roigs moved to remand.
              A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
       that the district court deny the motion to remand because O’Mal-
       ley and Seguin were fraudulently joined as defendants. The district
       court adopted the report and recommendation over the Roigs’ ob-
       jections and denied their motion to remand. Because the denial of
       a motion to remand is not an appealable final order, 28 U.S.C.
       § 1291, we dismissed the Roigs’ appeal from that order for lack of
       jurisdiction.
              The Roigs moved the district court to enter a “consent final
       judgment” to create an appealable final order so they could chal-
       lenge the denial of their motion to remand. The district court
       warned the Roigs that, under Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324
       (11th Cir. 1999), they would not be able to appeal the denial of their
       motion to remand after requesting a consent judgment. The Roigs
       and United later submitted a joint proposed judgment for dismissal
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13043

       with prejudice. The district court entered the proposed judgment
       as requested. We dismissed the Roigs’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction
       because they lacked standing to appeal the final judgment they re-
       quested. Roig v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 21-11915, at *1 (11th
       Cir. Sept. 1, 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Est. of Roig by & Through
       Oliveira v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 142 S. Ct. 2679 (2022).
               Seven months later, the Roigs filed a “motion for relief from
       final judgment and to remand to state court,” under Fed. R. Civ. P.
       60(b)(4). They argued that the district court lacked an arguable ba-
       sis for subject-matter jurisdiction because their complaint stated
       valid claims against O’Malley and Seguin. The district court denied
       the Roigs’ motion.
               We review the denial of a motion under Federal Rule of
       Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) de novo. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263
       (11th Cir. 2001). Rule 60(b)(4) allows a party to seek relief from a
       final judgment that “is void,” but only in the “rare instance where
       a judgment is premised either on a certain type of jurisdictional er-
       ror or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice
       or the opportunity to be heard.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
       Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270–71 (2010). So “courts considering Rule
       60(b)(4) motions that assert a judgment is void because of a juris-
       dictional defect generally have reserved relief only for the excep-
       tional case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked even
       an ‘arguable basis’ for jurisdiction.” Id. at 271.
              The Roigs argue that the final judgment is premised on a
       “jurisdictional error” by the district court in denying their motion
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       22-13043               Opinion of the Court                          5

       to remand, but they fail to explain how the district court lacked an
       “arguable basis” for exercising jurisdiction. See id. We have held
       district courts must “ignore the presence of [a] non-diverse defend-
       ant and deny any motion to remand” if a plaintiff has named a
       non-diverse defendant solely to defeat diversity jurisdiction. Still-
       well v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011). This
       inquiry enforces a jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the erro-
       neous application of which will not render a resulting judgment
       void. Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270; Oakes v. Horizon Fin., S.A., 259 F.3d
       1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is well-settled that a mere error in
       the exercise of jurisdiction does not support relief under Rule
       60(b)(4).”). Relief under Rule 60(b)(4) requires a total want of juris-
       diction; only a clear usurpation of power renders a judgment void.
       See Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319–20 (citing United States v. Boch Oldsmo-
       bile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661–62 (1st Cir. 1990)). Because the district
       court had at least an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction, the Roigs
       failed to establish the “rare instance” in which “exceptional” relief
       is warranted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 270–71;
       Oakes, 259 F.3d at 1319–20.
              We AFFIRM the denial of the Roigs’ motion for relief from
       the final judgment and DENY their motion to vacate as moot.