Court Opinion

ID: 9449319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:07:58.200334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:29.181556
License: Public Domain

J-A15001-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.K., A MINOR             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.T., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1445 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 10, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
                      Orphans’ Court at C-63-OC-2020-778

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                              FILED: AUGUST 4, 2023

       J.T. (Mother) appeals from the order involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to J.K. (Child), who was born in September 2018.1 We affirm.

       Child was approximately one month old when he came to the attention

of Washington County Children and Youth Services (CYS). The orphans’ court

explained:

             On October 29, 2018, [CYS] first became involved with the
       family in response to a report of domestic violence between
       Mother and Father. [CYS] instituted a safety plan and [] Child was
       placed with two (2) independent and separate caregivers. Both
       caregivers subsequently indicated an inability to care for Child.

            On January 4, 2019, through [a] shelter order, [] Child was
       removed from Mother’s care, and on January 10, 2019,
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of M.N.K. (Father) by order

dated September 17, 2021.
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     adjudicated dependent. [Mother] stipulated to the adjudication
     which included findings that:

           ● Mother was an indicated perpetrator of abuse as to
           another child, under which circumstances she was arrested
           and pleaded guilty to the charge of Endangering the Welfare
           of Children.

           ● Concerns were raised regarding Mother’s mental health
           stability.

           ● Concerns were raised with [Mother’s] long history of
           domestic violence.

     At the time of adjudication, the [c]ourt ordered [that Mother]:

           ● Complete a psychological evaluation with risk of harm
           assessment, following all recommendations;

           ● Participate in mental health treatment through
           [Southwestern Pennsylvania Human Services (SPHS)];

           ● Maintain safe and appropriate housing; and

           ● Complete a nurturing parenting curriculum.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at 2.

     Mother had “inconsistent progress and compliance throughout the initial

case proceedings.” Id. at 3. In January 2020, CYS placed Child in his current

foster home. N.T., 9/22/22, at 14. The orphans’ court observed that “as a

result of some significant progress and completion of court-ordered services,

[Mother’s] visitation [with Child] was increased.”   Orphans’ Court Opinion,

11/10/22, at 3.

     On July 16, 2020, CYS petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

The orphans’ court denied the petition on September 17, 2021, as Mother was

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compliant with her permanency plan. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22,

at 3; see also N.T., 9/22/22, at 17-18, 38.      In the last months of 2021,

Mother stopped complying with her permanency plan. She was inconsistent

with drug and alcohol testing, and missed or was late to her visits with Child.

N.T., 9/22/22, at 31-40.

       Approximately one month after the orphans’ court denied termination,

Mother was incarcerated on charges of harassment and simple assault

involving her neighbor, who was also “her paramour.”2 See Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 11/10/22, at 3; see also N.T., 9/22/22, at 22-23; 154-55. Following

a review hearing on October 26, 2021, the court “found [Mother] to have

minimal compliance with the permanency plan and no progress toward

alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.”

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at 3.          The court changed Child’s

permanency goal from reunification to adoption, with a concurrent goal of

permanent legal custodianship. See N.T., 9/22/22, at 25. The court also

ordered Mother to participate in mental health treatment; random drug and

alcohol screens; and visitation with Child in jail and upon Mother’s release

from jail. Id. at 25-26, 38.

____________________________________________

2 Mother was incarcerated from October 24, 2021, to November 17, 2021.
The criminal charges were dismissed after the neighbor/paramour declined to
testify. N.T., 9/22/22, at 24.

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       On January 19, 2022, CYS filed another petition for termination pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held

a hearing on September 22, 2022. CYS presented testimony from caseworker,

Ashley Blake, and expert psychologist Michael Crabtree, Ph.D.         The Court

Appointed Special Advocate (CASA), Carol Schuck, testified on behalf of

Child.3 Mother testified in opposition to termination.

       CYS’s witnesses agreed that Mother had participated in services,

including mental health treatment and domestic violence programs, which the

court had ordered as part of Mother’s permanency plan. N.T., 9/22/22, at 50-

51, 53. However, Ms. Blake expressed concerns about Mother’s “ability to

identify” Child’s needs, and testified that Mother was unable “to demonstrate

her ability to apply what she has learned.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22,

at 9; see also N.T., 9/22/22, at 19, 53, 92.

       Ms. Blake testified that after the orphans’ court denied the first

termination petition in September 2021, Mother became inconsistent with

____________________________________________

3 The court determined there was no conflict in Erin Dickerson, Esquire,
representing Child’s legal and best interests. Thus, the mandate that counsel
be appointed “to represent the child,” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a), is satisfied.
See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1088, 1093 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted)
(“where a child’s legal and best interests do not diverge … an attorney-GAL
representing the child’s best interests can also fulfill the role of the attorney
appointed per Section 2313(a) to represent the child’s legal interests.”).

Like CYS, Attorney Dickerson has filed a brief in support of termination. See
Participant’s Brief at 7-18.

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attending supervised visits with Child; in June 2022, the court reduced

Mother’s visits to once weekly. Id. at 44-45, 59.

      At the time of the termination hearing, Child was one month shy of his

fourth birthday, and had spent nearly his whole life in the custody of CYS.

Child has resided in a pre-adoptive foster home since January 2020. N.T.,

9/22/22, at 14.    Ms. Blake testified that Child has been diagnosed with

expressive language disorder and developmental delays, and receives speech

and occupational therapy; Child also has a heart murmur which requires the

care of a cardiologist. Id. at 13-14.

      By order entered on November 10, 2022, the orphans’ court terminated

Mother’s      parental      rights       pursuant     to      23      Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and

concise statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

      Mother presents three issues for review:

      1.    Did the [orphans’] court err in finding that [CYS] submitted
      clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental
      rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8)?

      2.    Did the [orphans’] court err in failing to adequately consider
      domestic violence and Covid’s role in interfering with efforts of
      reunification?

      3.    Did the [orphans’] court err in failing to adequately consider
      the effect that termination of parental rights would have on [Child]
      and [his] emotional bond with Mother, as analyzed under 23
      Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 4.

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        In considering Mother’s issues, we examine whether termination is

supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343,

358 (Pa. 2021). Appellate courts must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of

fact    and   credibility     determinations     if   they   are   supported   by   the

record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the

trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court

may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law

or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021).

        Our Supreme Court has explained that an abuse of discretion “does not

result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion” or “the facts could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012). An appellate court may reverse

for    an   abuse   of      discretion   “only   upon   demonstration    of    manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826.            This

standard reflects our deference to trial courts, who observe the parties first-

hand, often in multiple hearings. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123–

1124.

        Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, the involuntary termination of parental

rights requires a bifurcated analysis. First, the orphans’ court must determine

whether the parent’s conduct provides grounds for termination under Section

2511(a). If the court finds that it does, it must then consider the child’s needs

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and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). The petitioner has the burden to

prove by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for

termination under both Section 2511(a) and (b) are valid. In re R.N.J., 985

A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence

that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts

in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles

E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

      In reviewing Mother’s issues concerning Section 2511(a), we need only

agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection. See In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze Subsection

2511(a)(2), along with 2511(b), which provide:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                       ...

          (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
          or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
          essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
          for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
          causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
          or will not be remedied by the parent.

                                       ...

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

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      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. …

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(a)(2) due to parental

incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include

acts of refusal and incapacity to perform parental duties. In re S.C., 247 A.3d

1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021). We have long recognized that a parent is

required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of

parental responsibilities. In re Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

      With respect to Section 2511(b), the court must “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The “emotional needs and welfare of

the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)

(citation omitted). A trial court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of

the child” under Section 2511(b). In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super.

2014).   Further, the “analysis of the parental bond is but one part of the

overall” Section 2511(b) analysis. In the Interest of K.T., --- A.3d ----,

2023 Pa.LEXIS 829, *54 (Pa. June 21, 2023); see also In re E.M., 620 A.2d

481, 484-85 (Pa. 1993). The court must examine the effect of severing a

bond, which includes “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and

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beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at *54-55.

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently explained:

      Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably
      cause more than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may
      occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of
      a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that
      would predictably cause “extreme emotional consequences” or
      significant, irreparable harm. See E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 (“a
      beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such
      that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme
      emotional consequences”).

Id. at *50 (some citations omitted). The High Court distinguished “extreme

emotional consequences” from “adverse impact”, and specifically cautioned

that a court “must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance based

solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.” Id. at

*50, 56.

      In reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the analysis, the

Supreme Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include

consideration ... [of] certain evidence if it is present in the record.” Id. at

*55 (emphasis in original); see also id. at n.28. The factors at issue in K.T.

related to the child’s need for permanency and the length of time she had

spent in foster care; the pre-adoptive nature of her foster home and her bond

with her foster parents; and whether the foster home met her developmental,

physical, and emotional needs.     Id.   The Supreme Court emphasized that

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these factors were not exhaustive. Id. at n.28. Rather, the circumstances of

each case determine the factors to be considered.

      Mindful of the foregoing, we turn to Mother’s first two issues, which

concern grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother primarily

argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion in weighing the October

2021 domestic violence incident against her. See Mother’s Brief at 25. Mother

states she was “attacked for ‘not preventing’ domestic violence. However, it

is impossible to ‘prevent’ domestic violence, particularly in regard to a

significant other ....” Id. at 23. Mother asserts:

      The [orphans’ court’s] sole focus seemed to be that Mother should
      have prevented any domestic violence from occurring. This is
      simply impossible. Mother is unable to control the actions of
      others.

Id. at 25.

      Mother claims the October 2021 incident was not indicative of her failure

to learn from her participation in domestic violence programs. Id. at 26. She

also claims the orphans’ court abused its discretion in weighing her domestic

violence history against her because Child was never present during the

incidents. Id. at 25. Mother’s claims are unavailing.

      The orphans’ court explained:

      [I]t is unrefuted that [Mother] has participated with many of the
      services recommended and ordered on her behalf. Nevertheless,
      despite such services, [Mother] is engaging in the same behaviors
      that led to the original shelter and adjudication of [Child]. These
      behaviors have a direct impact on her ability to provide strong and
      continuous parental ties to [Child] and to provide for his mental,
      emotional and educational well-being. Dr. Crabtree testified that

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       [Mother]’s participation in services has “done little to change her
       behavior,” and further opined that [Mother] “could not re-direct
       her behaviors after extensive treatment”[,] “is not in a position to
       parent a child”[, and] “her failure to progress reflects an
       inadequate ability for problem solving in conflict.”

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at 20. The record supports the court’s

findings.

       Dr. Crabtree conducted psychological evaluations of Mother in June

2020, January 2021, and February 2022. N.T., 9/22/22, at 79. He diagnosed

Mother with chronic stress disorder and personality disorder not otherwise

specified. Id. at 84. Dr. Crabtree testified that during his final evaluation,

Mother described the October 2021 incident as

       an arrest that was subsequent to a domestic dispute with a
       neighbor of hers with whom she had developed a relationship.
       And that from her description that the individual wanted to spend
       time with her. She was just interested in watching television, and
       he had damaged the television and she had physically ...
       confronted him in some fashion.

Id. at 87. Dr. Crabtree opined that the incident was “an egregious example

of [Mother’s] inability to redirect [her] behavior.” Id. at 88.

       Dr. Crabtree further testified that he had reviewed medical records from

Mother’s mental health therapist.4 Id. at 90. Dr. Crabtree testified that the

therapist’s records

____________________________________________

4 In her second issue, Mother baldly asserts that “Covid affected services,
particularly missing mental health appointments. Testimony established that
Mother’s therapist canceled at least 4 mental health appointments due [to]
Covid.” Mother’s Brief at 25. We conclude that Mother waived this argument
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       were just filled with . . . a reflection of . . . the problems [Mother]
       had this week. And . . . there’s a continual . . . inability to . . .
       handle [her] life circumstances in a fashion that would be typical
       of a normal emotionally healthy person.

Id. at 91.

       Dr. Crabtree opined that Mother’s personality disorder prevents her from

changing her behavior, “[g]iven the intensity of the services provided and

given that there has not been a dramatic change in behavior[.]” Id. at 95.

He stated that Mother “is not at the point where I think that she is an effective

parent.”     Id. at 92.    For instance, Dr. Crabtree testified that in his first

interactional evaluation between Child and Mother, Mother “did not have the

capacity to empathetically interact with [C]hild and give appropriate kinds of

emotional support and guidance to the play activity with [C]hild.” Id. at 97.

In his last interactional evaluation, he concluded Mother “still was not

exhibiting the level of sensitivity that would be typical of the average parent.”

Id. at 97-98. Dr. Crabtree stated that Mother “did not have the capacity to

see how her behavior was affecting [C]hild.” Id. at 98. Dr. Crabtree testified

that Child, due to his special needs, had “some sensory difficulties.” Id. at

____________________________________________

because she fails to develop it in any meaningful fashion or refer to anywhere
in the record that supports the argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c)-(d); see
also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted) (reiterating that claim is waived where an appellant fails to provide
any discussion with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue
in any other meaningful fashion capable of review). Waiver notwithstanding,
we would conclude this claim is without merit because the orphans’ court did
not find that Mother’s conduct warranted termination for failure to attend
mental health appointments.

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110. He explained that Child “is more vulnerable” and “less resilient than an

average child would be.” Id. at 96. He also observed that Child showed no

initial emotional reaction to Mother, and Mother did not say goodbye to Child

at the end of the evaluation. Id. at 110-13.

      With respect to Mother’s inability to change her behavior, Ms. Blake’s

testimony was consistent with Dr. Crabtree as to Mother not applying what

she has learned. Id. at 53. When Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) asked Ms.

Blake, “would it be fair to say [Mother] is not evidencing an ability to use good

judgment with respect to her actions and the individuals in which she chooses

to associate with?”, Ms. Blake responded: “That is correct.” Id. at 56.

      Ms. Blake also expressed concern that if Child was returned to Mother,

she would not be able to provide for Child’s needs. Ms. Blake stated:

      [Mother] was not participating in [Child’s] doctor’s appointments
      or any of his appointments for therapy, [and] if [Child] were to
      return home to her care, [Mother] would not understand the
      importance of those services and why it was important for him to
      continue to go ….

      When I had had conversations with [Mother] previously about
      [Child] possibly returning home[,] she had indicated that she was
      going to take [Child] and move across the state. She felt like he
      didn’t have any special needs. He didn’t need any of those
      services. So there were concerns that she wouldn’t follow through
      with those [services].

Id. at 21.

      When questioned by the GAL, Mother did not know Child’s diagnoses.

Id. at 165. To the extent she was aware that Child was diagnosed with a

speech impediment, Mother disagreed. Mother testified, “I think [Child] is

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fine. I just think that he just do[es] and say[s] things when he’s ready to do

and say things.” Id.

      Consistent with the above evidence, the record supports the orphans’

court’s determination that Mother’s continued incapacity has caused Child to

be without essential parental care, and Mother’s incapacity cannot or will not

be remedied. We thus discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ court in

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

      With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues CYS failed to satisfy its

evidentiary burden “that severing the bond between Mother and [Child] would

not cause detrimental harm to [C]hild.” Mother’s Brief at 27. Mother focuses

on “detrimental harm.”    Id.   However, as noted above, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court recently clarified that “a court conducting the Section 2511(b)

needs and welfare analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or

detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond.” K.T., supra at *54.

      Here, the orphans’ court properly analyzed “whether a natural parental

bond exists between [C]hild and parent and whether termination would

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 11/10/22, at 24 (citing In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753[, 760] (Pa. Super.

2008)). The orphans’ court explained:

      While not a constant or consistent presence in the life of [Child],
      the record establishes that [Child] enjoys seeing [M]other, gets
      upset when [M]other is late for visits, and calls [M]other,
      “mommy.” Nevertheless, as testified to by Dr. Crabtree, during
      both his initial and final interactional evaluations between
      [Mother] and Child, [Mother] failed to show “the capacity to

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         empathize and provide for Child.” [Dr.] Crabtree also testified and
         provided by report that he felt [Mother] had “no intimate
         connection” with [Child]. Finding a weak relationship between
         [Mother] and [Child], [Dr.] Crabtree opined that [Child]’s
         emotional and intellectual development would be enhanced by
         maintaining his bond with his foster parents.

         Dr. Crabtree emphatically testified that it would be psychologically
         damaging to break the bond between the foster parents and
         [Child], stating that it was Child’s “primary bond.” He opined
         that the bond between [Child] and [Mother] was not a
         necessary and beneficial bond.              Additionally, in a final
         statement on direct, Dr. Crabtree testified that adoption would
         best serve the Child’s needs and the benefit of adoption would
         outweigh any harm of severing the relationship with [Mother].

         CASA Carol Schuck testified that, in her opinion, [Child] should
         remain in his current placement with it being his “forever home.”
         Caseworker Ashley Blake testified that [Child] is busy and happy
         in his pre-adoptive placement and calls his foster parents Mommy
         and Daddy. Ms. Blake testified that [Child] looks to his foster
         family for his daily needs. On behalf of [CYS], Ms. Blake stated
         the opinion that [Child]’s best interests would be served by being
         adopted by his foster family where he has lived for the majority
         of his life, where he is loved, where his physical and emotional
         needs are met, and where he is stable and healthy. Th[e] [c]ourt
         agrees.

         Th[e] [c]ourt is tasked with not only determining whether
         a bond exists, but also the quality and value of the bond.
         Here, while the court acknowledges that a bond exists between
         [Mother] and [Child], th[e] [c]ourt finds little support that such
         bond is necessary and beneficial. Of greatest priority is th[e]
         [c]ourt’s evaluation of the needs and welfare of [Child,] and
         evaluation of the entire record of the dependency and the orphans’
         court proceedings supports the conclusion that [Child]’s needs and
         welfare are best met with a termination of [Mother]’s parental
         rights.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at 24-25.           Again, the orphans’ court’s

findings are supported by the record, and its application of the law is without

error.

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      Ms. Blake testified that Child calls Mother “Mommy,” and he “likes to go

to the visits and play with her.” N.T., 9/22/22, at 58. In response to question

by the GAL, Ms. Blake testified:

      Q. So it’s . . . like a playdate for him?

      A. Right.

      Q. And he doesn’t ask about visits; correct?

      A. He does not. He does get upset when he is brought to the visit
      and [Mother] doesn’t show and then he doesn’t get to play.

         So I don’t know if he looks forward to them, but when they tell
      him he’s going, he does get excited about being able to play.

      Q. And, in fact, that happened recently didn’t it . . . that the
      Agency transported [Child], took him out of school, [and school]
      is something he enjoys; correct?

      A. Something he enjoys and is recommended, yes.

      Q. Took him out of school to go to a visit with Mom, told him that
      he was going to that visit, and [Mother] confirmed and then never
      showed up?

      A. Correct.

      Q. And [Child] was emotional that he had been taken out of school
      and his day was disrupted; correct?

      A. That is correct. So we have gone to [] not taking him out of
      the car until she shows up now, so he doesn’t go into the visitation
      room and then get upset when he has to leave.

Id. at 58-59.

      Dr. Crabtree also testified that Child does not have a beneficial and

necessary bond with Mother.        Id. at 101.    Based on his observations and

psychological testing, he described Child and Mother’s relationship as “weak.”

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Id. at 99. He explained that Mother did not display affection toward Child and

did not demonstrate an emotional connection with him. Id. at 98-99. Dr.

Crabtree testified that he observed no bond between Mother and Child during

the first interactional evaluation in 2020, although he observed improvement

in 2021, which he did not further specify or describe. Id. at 115. Notably,

after his final evaluation in 2022, Dr. Crabtree determined that Mother and

Child’s relationship had regressed. Id. at 115-16.

      Dr. Crabtree also conducted interactional evaluations between Child and

his pre-adoptive foster parents. Id. at 99. Based on his observations and

testing, Dr. Crabtree opined that Child has a strong emotional connection with

his foster family. Id. at 100. He stated that foster parents “have the capacity

for receiving feedback and proving their ability to give guidance to [C]hild.

[This] indicates a richness of the relationship between the foster parents and

[Child] that … is not only admirable but … really essential for [C]hild’s

development.” Id. at 102. Dr. Crabtree reiterated, in response to further

questioning by counsel for CYS, that Child’s relationship with his foster parents

is essential for Child’s development. Id.

      Ms. Blake confirmed the bond between Child and his foster parents,

evidenced by Child displaying a “great deal of affection” for them, and the

foster parents being “very interactive with him.” Id. at 57. She stated:

      He is loved there. They are able to meet . . . every aspect of
      [Child]’s, not only basic needs[,] but emotional needs, behavioral
      needs, psychological needs.

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      They provide him with all of that stability, and that’s where [Child]
      calls h[ome]. He calls his foster parents Mommy and Daddy, and
      he knows that he is loved there.

Id. at 60. Ms. Blake confirmed that the foster parents are a pre-adoptive

resource for Child, and at the time of the hearing, Child had resided in the

foster home for 32 of the 44 months of placement. Id. at 45, 61.

      Likewise, the CASA supervisor testified that Child’s foster parents meet

Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.             Ms.

Schuck stated that foster parents

      have really tuned into [Child] as a human being and worked
      through all of those difficult times with him, which was very
      impressive to me.

      So every time something came up, they were very concerned
      about it, and they sought the advice of CYS that are there services
      that can be provided. And they inconvenienced themselves many
      times to make sure that those problems were addressed. And
      he’s really been reacting to those in a positive way.

      And they’ve just helped him to thrive. He has so much potential
      because . . . there are just things that he had to learn to cope
      with, and he has, and I’m so happy for his future in that sense.

Id. at 69. Ms. Schuck explained, “in the past, we’ve had a lot of issues with

[Child] sleeping and [having] night terrors. Lots of different things that he

has really worked through. So it has been a pleasure to see [Child] grow.”

Id. at 65. She further stated that Child “loves school[,] and he’s really getting

up on his own and ready to go to school.” Id.

      Based on the above testimony, we discern no abuse of discretion by the

orphans’ court in determining that Child’s needs and welfare are served by

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termination pursuant to Section 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’

court’s order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2023

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