Court Opinion

ID: 9518896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:30.939908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:11.871457
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GARMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with Justice Fitzgerald’s conclusion that Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 is barred from obtaining judicial relief because of its failure to strictly comply with section 3 — 105 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000)). However, I also agree with the majority’s determination that section 3 — 105 addresses service, not joinder. Accordingly, it is the school district’s failure to serve the committee of 10 and its members, rather than its failure to join them, that mandates dismissal of this action. As both the majority and Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent note, a party seeking review of an administrative decision must strictly comply with the procedures established by the Review Law. ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26, 30 (2000); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349, 353 (1990). Strict compliance must begin with section 3 — 103 of the Review Law, entitled “Commencement of Action”: “Every action to review a final administrative decision shall be commenced by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of summons within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the party affected by the decision[.]” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103 (West 2000). Section 3 — 105 goes on to establish how summons, once issued, must be served: “Summons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided in Section 7 — 6 of the School Code, and in such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). Thus, sections 3 — 103 and 3 — 105 require summons to be issued within 35 days for the administrative agency and each of the other defendants, except in cases where a committee of 10 has been appointed. Where there is a committee of 10, the Review Law requires issuance of summons for the administrative agency and each member of the committee of 10. As the majority correctly notes, this provision says nothing about whether the committee and its members should be joined as defendants. 218 Ill. 2d at 188. However, it does require that they be served with summons properly issued within 35 days, regardless of whether they are joined. Section 3 — 107, in contrast, speaks solely to joinder. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107 (West 2000). In addition to establishing who must be joined, it allows petitioners a second chance to join defendants who were not named as parties of record in the final administrative order. 735 ILCS 5/3— 107 (West 2000). However, the district’s failure to join the committee of 10 was not the district’s critical shortcoming. Rather, the district failed to strictly comply with the Review Law when it failed to obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within the 35 days mandated by section 3 — 103 (735 ILCS 5/3— 103 (West 2000)). Although the application of section 3 — 107 allows the belated joinder of certain parties, it cannot excuse the district’s failure to timely serve the committee of 10 and its members in accordance with the requirement of sections 3 — 103 and 3 — 105. The consequence for this failure to comply is dismissal of the review proceeding. McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 165 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1995). Most petitioners for administrative review will not find themselves in the school district’s position. The section 3 — 105 requirements for service are unique and specific only in their treatment of cases involving a committee of 10 under the School Code. Other petitioners are merely required to serve “the administrative agency and *** each of the other defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3— 105 (West 2000). As the majority notes, a party is made a defendant by being named in the complaint. 218 Ill. 2d at 191. Thus, in most cases section 3 — 105 does not require service until a defendant is named. When petitioners fail to name a party of record who was not named in the agency’s final order, most will be able to fall back on the section 3 — 107 exception that allows extra time to join and then to serve that defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107 (West 2000). However, when a committee of 10 is involved, the Review Law requires issuance of summons within the 35-day limit of section 3 — 103 no matter whether or when the committee is named as a defendant. 218 Ill. 2d at 203 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). In cases where the appellate court has properly applied the language at issue in the section 3 — 107 exception, the facts suggest legitimate confusion about the appropriate defendants to join. In United Methodist Village Retirement Communities, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 321 Ill. App. 3d 456 (2001), the petitioner taxpayer appealed a notice of assessment change to the county board of review. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458. He then appealed the board of review decision to the Property Tax Appeal Board, which did not name the board of review as a party in its final order. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 458-59. On appeal of the Appeal Board’s decision, the petitioner joined only the Appeal Board. The appellate court applied section 3 — 113(b) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 — 113(b) (West 1998)), which contains language identical to the section 3 — 107 exception, and allowed amendment of the petition for review to add the board of review as a defendant. United Methodist, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 460-61. In an earlier property tax case, the petitioner appealed directly to the Appeal Board, bypassing the board of review entirely. Villa Retirement Apartments, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750-51 (1999). Holding that the board of review was nevertheless a party of record, the appellate court determined that the petitioner was entitled to amend its complaint to add the board of review as a defendant. Villa Retirement, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 751-52. In each of these cases, it was unclear whether the Board of Review was an appropriate party to join and serve. But no confusion as to service exists in the instant case. Section 3 — 105 precisely informed the district of whom to serve when appealing a decision of the regional school board of trustees. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). In contravention of this explicit language, the district did not obtain issuance of summons for the committee of 10 and its members within 35 days. The section 3 — 107 exception allowing belated joinder cannot excuse this failure to comply with the Review Law’s service requirements. In this regard, I join Justice Fitzgerald’s dissent.