Court Opinion

ID: 9635325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:47:11.571174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:24.084793
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide the court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Stefan Kruszewski, with Appellant’s relevant mental health and school records and for otherwise failing to adequately investigate and prepare a diminished capacity defense.
Notably, the majority agrees with Appellant that his claim in this regard has arguable merit and that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to provide Dr. Kruszewski with the relevant records. Moreover, I note that such a conclusion is clearly supported by the record, which includes Dr. Kruszewski’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that had he been provided with Appellant’s records at the time of trial he would have concluded that Appellant was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill at the time of the murder, see N.T., 2/19/2003, at *522173-183,1 as well as trial counsel’s admission that he had no reason for failing to investigate the extent of Appellant’s mental health problems or for failing to provide Dr. Kruszewski with Appellant’s school and hospital records. See N.T., 2/11/03, at 89-91.
However, the majority then determines that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s inactions here. In reaching that conclusion, the majority chiefly relies upon Commonwealth v. Stevens, 559 Pa. 171, 739 A.2d 507 (1999), where trial counsel, like counsel here, failed to provide the appellant’s evaluating psychiatrist with the necessary background documents, resulting in the psychiatrist’s conclusion that the appellant did not qualify for a diminished capacity defense. However, after being provided with the appellant’s mental health records, the same psychologist testified at the appellant’s PCRA hearing that, had she seen the appellant’s background documents at the time of trial, she would have been able to offer expert testimony in support of a diminished capacity defense. Id. at 514. Despite this testimony, a majority of this Court concluded on appeal that the appellant had not been prejudiced by counsel’s failure to provide the psychiatrist with the appellant’s mental health records. In support of its conclusion, the majority relied on the PCRA court’s statement that, as the trier of fact at the appellant’s trial, the court would not have accepted a diminished capacity defense in light of the other evidence presented by the Commonwealth that had, in the court’s view, definitively established the appellant’s specific intent to kill. Id. at 515.
Here, the majority relies on Stevens in determining that Appellant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to provide Dr. Kruszewski with Appellant’s mental health records because the PCRA court below, like the PCRA court in Stevens, essentially stated that, based on the actions and statements of Appellant at the time of the murder, it still would have found *523that Appellant had the specific intent to kill regardless of any testimony by Dr. Kruszewski that Appellant was unable to formulate such an intent or any other additional evidence of Appellant’s diminished capacity. I am as troubled by this reasoning as I was in Stevens. In Stevens, I also filed a dissenting opinion, which essentially expressed agreement with the dissent filed by Justice Zappala. There, Justice Zappala stated:
The PCRA court determined that Appellant suffered no prejudice by his counsel’s failure to pursue [a diminished capacity] defense. It held that it would have found that Appellant had, and exhibited, the specific intent to kill despite [the psychiatrist’s] revised diagnosis as presented at the PCRA hearing. I believe that the PCRA court as well as the majority fails to consider the full effect of counsel’s error in failing to provide the documents needed to correctly diagnose Appellant. Rather, their consideration is limited to whether [the psychiatrist’s] testimony during the PCRA hearing would have been sufficient to establish reasonable doubt when set against the evidence offered by the Commonwealth at trial. This may have indeed been the proper analysis had Appellant presented [the psychiatrist’s] revised diagnosis as after-discovered evidence. However, the [psychiatrist’s] revised diagnosis, set against her testimony at trial, is offered to show counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to pursue a vigorous and viable defense. Counsel’s failures precluded not only [the psychiatrist’s] correct testimony at trial, but also any other evidence, which was not discovered due to counsel’s failure. Since it is impossible for the trier of fact to fully anticipate and properly weigh a defense that was [not] ... presented, it is impossible for the PCRA court to state that Appellant was not prejudiced by such failure.
Id. at 531 (Zappala, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
This reasoning is equally applicable here. Accordingly, in this case, as in Stevens, I would remand to the PCRA court for reconsideration of Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to provide Dr. Kruszewski with Appellant’s *524mental health and school records and for otherwise failing to adequately investigate and present a diminished capacity defense at his degree of guilt hearing.

. At his PCRA hearing, Appellant also presented the testimony of clinical psychologist Harry D. Kropp to corroborate Dr. Kruszewski’s expert opinion with regard to Appellant’s diminished capacity at the time of the offenses. See N.T., 2/11/03, at 11-41.