Court Opinion

ID: 9947125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 18:13:11.878558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:47.736316
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00281-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ENRIQUE MORENO SANCHEZ
A/K/A ENRIQUE SANCHEZ,                                                     Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 206th District Court
                         of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                 Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

      Appellant Enrique Moreno Sanchez a/k/a Enrique Sanchez was found guilty by a

jury for one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young child (Count One), six counts of

indecency with a child (Counts Two through Seven), and six counts of aggravated sexual

assault of a child (Counts Eight through Thirteen). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02,
21.11, 22.021. By two issues, which we construe as one, Sanchez argues that his

convictions for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault of a child violate his

rights under the Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and his rights

under Article 1, § 14 of the Texas Constitution. The State concedes Sanchez’s issue. We

reverse and render judgment vacating Sanchez’s convictions for indecency with a child

and aggravated sexual assault of a child and affirm his remaining conviction for

continuous sexual abuse of a young child.

                                       I.      BACKGROUND

      Sanchez was indicted for continuous sexual abuse a child under the age of

fourteen for allegedly committing two or more acts of sexual abuse against Elizabeth1

during a period that began on June 1, 2017 and ended on July 17, 2019. This first count

generally alleged that the acts of sexual abuse included aggravated sexual assault of a

child and indecency with a child by sexual contact.

      The indictment also included twelve additional counts against Sanchez. Six of the

counts alleged different types and incidences of aggravated sexual assault of a child

against Elizabeth, and the other six counts alleged different types and incidences of

indecency with a child by sexual contact against Elizabeth. Each offense was alleged to

have been committed during the period of continuous abuse alleged in the first count.

      At Sanchez’s trial, after presentation of all the evidence and testimony by the

      1 We refer to the minor victim by a pseudonym to protect their identity.

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parties, the trial court read and provided separate charges for each offense alleged in the

indictment to the jury. After the parties presented closing arguments, the jury found

Sanchez guilty on all counts. The jury assessed punishment of ninety-nine years’

imprisonment for the continuous sexual abuse of a young child conviction, twenty years’

imprisonment for each of the six indecency with a child convictions, and ninety-nine years’

imprisonment for each of the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. The

jury also assessed a $10,000 fine for each conviction and ordered the sentences to run

concurrently. This appeal followed.

                                II.    DOUBLE JEOPARDY

      Sanchez argues that the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions and

the six indecency with a child convictions should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds.

The State agrees with Sanchez, as do we.

A.    Standard of Review & Applicable Law

      The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the

states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects a person from multiple punishments

for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Garfias v. State, 424 S.W.3d 54, 58

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “In the multiple-punishments context, two offenses may be the

same if one offense stands in relation to the other as a lesser-included offense, or if the

two offenses are defined under distinct statutory provisions but the Legislature has made

it clear that only one punishment is intended.” Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273, 275–76

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

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       “To obtain a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, the State must show

that the defendant committed at least two acts of sexual abuse against a child younger

than 14 years of age during a period of at least 30 days’ duration.” Ramos v. State, 636

S.W.3d 646, 651–52. (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b)).

Aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact are

among the predicate offenses listed as an “act of sexual abuse.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 21.02(c)(2), (4).

       Dual convictions for continuous sexual abuse and a predicate offense are

prohibited under certain circumstances. Id. § 21.02(e). “A defendant charged with

continuous sexual abuse who is tried in the same criminal action for an enumerated

offense based on conduct committed against the same victim may not be convicted for

both offenses unless the latter offense occurred outside the period of time in which the

continuous-sexual-abuse offense was committed.” Price v. State, 434 S.W.3d 601, 606

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (interpreting § 21.02(e)). Simply put, “the Legislature did not intend

to permit dual convictions for continuous sexual abuse and for an enumerated act of

sexual abuse unless the latter occurred during a different period of time.” Id.

B.     Discussion

       As the State acknowledges, Sanchez’s six convictions for aggravated sexual

assault of a child and six convictions for indecency with a child constituted acts of sexual

abuse that Sanchez committed against Elizabeth during the period of continuous abuse

alleged in the indictment, which spanned from June 1, 2017 until July 17, 2019.

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Accordingly, we agree with the State that the Legislature did not intend for Sanchez to be

convicted separately for all thirteen crimes. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(e); Price,

434 S.W.3d at 606.

C.    Remedy for Double Jeopardy Violations

      When multiple convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, we retain the

conviction for the “most serious” offense and set aside the others. Bien v. State, 550

S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Generally, “[t]he most serious offense is the

offense of conviction for which the greatest sentence was assessed.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citing Ex parte Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006)). In this case, Sanchez was assessed ninety-nine years’ imprisonment for the

continuous sexual abuse of a young child conviction, twenty years’ imprisonment for each

of the six indecency with a child convictions, and ninety nine years’ imprisonment for each

of the six aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. The jury also assessed a

$10,000 fine for each conviction. Sanchez’s convictions for indecency with a child are

unequivocally not the most serious offense as their associated twenty-year sentences are

lower than the ninety-nine-year sentences assessed for Sanchez’s continuous sexual

abuse of a young child and aggravated sexual assault of a child convictions. However,

because the assessed sentences for Sanchez’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse

of a young child and aggravated sexual assault of a child are the same, we cannot solely

rely on the “greatest sentence” factor to determine the most serious offense.

      When the most serious offense cannot be determined by the general rule, we may

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look to other distinguishing factors, such as parole eligibility. See Villanueva v. State, 227

S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Gunter v. State, 673 S.W.3d 335, 347

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg, 2023 pet. ref’d) (noting other distinguishing

factors). Here, the State has suggested that continuous sexual abuse of a young child is

the most serious offense because it has, among other things, the most serious parole

eligibility restrictions. We note that continuous sexual abuse of a young child carries

parole ineligibility as a penalty upon conviction. See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 508.145(a).

Aggravated sexual assault of a child also carries parole ineligibility as a penalty upon

conviction “if the offense is punishable under Subsection (f) of” penal code § 22.021. See

id. § 508.145(a)(3). In this case, none of Sanchez’s six convictions for aggravated sexual

assault of a child were punishable under § 22.021(f). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.021(f). 2 Under these circumstances, we will find that Sanchez’s conviction for

continuous sexual abuse of a young child is the most serious of his convictions. See

Villanueva, 227 S.W.3d at 749. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction for continuous

sexual abuse of a young child and vacate the convictions for indecency with a child and

aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Bien, 550 S.W.3d at 188. We sustain Sanchez’s

       2 Texas Penal Code § 22.021 provides that

       The minimum term of imprisonment for an offense under [§ 22.021] is increased to 25 years
       if: (1) the victim of the offense is younger than six years of age at the time the offense is
       committed; or (2) the victim of the offense is younger than 14 years of age at the time the
       offense is committed and the actor commits the offense in a manner described by
       Subsection (a)(2)(A).

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(f).

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sole issue.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

       We reverse and render judgment vacating Sanchez’s six convictions for

aggravated sexual assault of a child and six convictions for indecency with a child by

sexual contact (Counts Two through Thirteen). We affirm Sanchez’s conviction for

continuous sexual abuse of a young child (Count One).

                                                           NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                           Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of February, 2024.

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