Court Opinion

ID: 9855541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:27:09.589128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:11.431270
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge
dissenting.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(ll) (1999) requires the trial court in determining whether “an equal division is not equitable” to consider as a factor: “The tax consequences to each party.” I dissent from the majority holding and certify to our Supreme Court under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 (1999) the issue of whether the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(ll) should be judicially limited to apply only *260where such taxes are incurred as a direct result of the distributional award. See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 111 N.C. App. 541, 432 S.E.2d 891 (1993); Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App. 409, 324 S.E.2d 915 (1985).
“The law has long been that where the plain language of a statute ... is unambiguous on its face, the court is bound by the clear meaning.” Hamby v. Hamby, 143 N.C. App. 635, 645, 547 S.E.2d 110, 117, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 69, 553 S.E.2d 39 (2001). “When language used in [a] statute is clear and unambiguous, [the Court] must refrain from judicial construction and accord words undefined in the statute their plain and definite meaning.” Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996), (quoting Poole v. Miller, 342 N.C. 349, 351, 464 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1995)). “[W]here the Legislature has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is a general rule of construction that the courts have no authority to create, and will not create, exceptions to the provisions of a statute not made by the act itself.” Upchurch v. Funeral Home, 263 N.C. 560, 565, 140 S.E.2d 17, 21 (1965) (quoting 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 432, p. 453 (1944)). Here, the language of the statute is clear and it is not necessary for us to resolve an ambiguity.
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c)(ll) the legislature imposed no limitation on the trial court’s consideration of the tax consequences as a factor in the distribution of marital property. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(c) provides in pertinent part that:
There shall be an equal division by using net value of marital property and net value of divisible property unless the court determines that an equal division is not equitable, the court shall divide the marital property and divisible property equitably. Factors the court shall consider under this subsection are as follows:
(11) The tax consequences to each party.
Moreover, other jurisdictions have not been restrictive in determining when a trial court may consider tax consequences. See, e.g., In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800, 806 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993); Hogan v. Hogan, 796 S.W.2d 400, 408 (Mo. App. 1990); White v. White, 105 N.M. 600, 734 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1987); Barnes v. Barnes, 16 Va. App. 98, 428 S.E.2d 294, 300 (1993); see also Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: *261Consideration of Tax Consequences in Distribution of Marital Property, 9 A.L.R. 5th 568, 592, § 2[a] (1993).
Since the plain language of the statute provides no such limitation on the consideration of tax consequences in determining whether an equal division is not equitable, I certify to our Supreme Court the holdings of this Court to the contrary. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30.