Court Opinion

ID: 9381171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 00:00:23.274592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.485199
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30086        Document: 00516683896             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-30086
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                    ____________                                March 21, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jarvis Pierre,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:19-CR-286-1
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Jarvis Pierre was convicted by a jury of (1) two counts of possession of
   a firearm and ammunition after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
   § 922(g)(1), and (2) one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
   drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He was
   sentenced to concurrent 288-month terms of imprisonment for the § 922(g)

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30086      Document: 00516683896          Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/21/2023

                                    No. 22-30086

   convictions and a consecutive 60-month term of imprisonment for the
   § 924(c) conviction. On appeal, Pierre contends the evidence was insufficient
   to support his convictions, the district court erred in admitting evidence of a
   traffic stop that occurred in Texas, he was denied the right to confront
   witnesses against him, and the district court erred in determining that he was
   an armed career criminal.
          Pierre first argues that the Government failed to demonstrate he
   knowingly possessed a firearm in violation of § 922(g). Because he did not
   preserve this argument below, we review for plain error only. United States v.
   Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2018). To show plain error, Pierre must
   show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects his substantial
   rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). When reviewing the
   sufficiency of the evidence, “an error is clear or obvious only if the record is
   devoid of evidence pointing to guilt” or “the evidence on a key element of
   the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” Suarez, 879
   F.3d at 630–31 (cleaned up).
          Here, the evidence included testimony that when Pierre was arrested
   in October 2018, police found a firearm beneath his seat when he was the
   driver and only occupant of the vehicle. Additionally, when he was pulled
   over in December 2018, police found another firearm wedged between
   Pierre’s seat and the central console when again he was the driver and sole
   occupant of the vehicle. Because constructive possession may be
   demonstrated by showing dominion over the vehicle in which the contraband
   is located, Pierre is unable to demonstrate clear or obvious error. See id.; see
   also United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v.
   Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 631 (5th Cir. 1995).
          Pierre also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his
   conviction under § 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-

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                                     No. 22-30086

   trafficking crime because the Government failed to demonstrate that he had
   an agreement with another individual to engage in a drug-trafficking crime.
   Because Pierre filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal challenging the
   sufficiency of the evidence for his § 924(c) conviction, we review this issue
   de novo. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3); United States v. Allison, 616 F.2d
   779, 784 (5th Cir. 1980). We must determine whether a reasonable jury could
   have found that the evidence established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
   United States v. Barnes, 803 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2015).
          While Pierre asserts that there was no evidence he was engaged in
   drug trafficking, when he was arrested following the October 2018 traffic
   stop, police found a set of notebooks that contained records of drug sales and
   approximately $11,000. Moreover, evidence was put forth that Pierre
   discussed the distribution of drugs in recorded jail conversations, along with
   evidence that following an earlier traffic stop in Texas, police recovered 400
   oxycodone pills and over $11,000 in cash from Pierre’s vehicle. Finally, the
   firearm found during the October traffic stop was loaded, was easily
   accessible as it was under Pierre’s seat, was in close proximity to large sums
   of money, and was illegally possessed in light of Pierre’s earlier felony
   convictions. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
   Government, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
   Pierre possessed a firearm in furtherance of conspiracy to possess with intent
   to distribute a controlled substance or possession of a controlled substance
   with intent to distribute. See id.; see also United States v. Masha, 990 F.3d 436,
   442 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Moya, 18 F.4th 480, 483 (5th Cir. 2021).
          Next, Pierre argues that evidence of other acts should have been
   excluded. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
   discretion, but the standard is “heightened” when evidence is admitted
   pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) “because evidence in criminal

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                                    No. 22-30086

   trials must be strictly relevant to the particular offense charged.” United
   States v. Ramos-Rodriguez, 809 F.3d 817, 821 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
          Pierre claims that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
   evidence from the Texas traffic stop under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
   because it was not relevant to proving his alleged motive, opportunity, intent,
   or preparation. Despite Pierre’s assertions to the contrary, the evidence from
   the Texas traffic stop was relevant to demonstrate his motivation in
   possessing a gun. See United States v. Kinchen, 729 F.3d 466, 472 (5th Cir.
   2013) (holding that evidence of other act is relevant to establishing motive
   where the prior conduct helps establish why the defendant committed the
   charged offense). Moreover, the evidence that Pierre had previously been
   arrested with a large quantity of oxycodone was relevant to demonstrate his
   intent to engage in a drug conspiracy. See United States v. Jones, 930 F.3d 366,
   373–74 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding that evidence of a prior conviction was
   relevant in determining intent when defendant argued that he was merely
   obtaining drugs for personal use). Finally, because Pierre merely asserts in a
   conclusory fashion that evidence from the Texas traffic stop tainted the
   jury’s perception of him, he has abandoned any argument that the probative
   value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See United
   States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 698 (5th Cir. 2010).
          Next, Pierre argues that the introduction of certain evidence violated
   his right to confront witnesses against him. We generally review the district
   court’s admission of evidence that potentially implicates the Confrontation
   Clause for an abuse of discretion, subject to harmless-error review. United
   States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2011).
          Pierre asserts that he was deprived of the opportunity to confront
   witnesses against him when a police officer testified that a tow truck operator
   discovered drugs in Pierre’s vehicle following the Texas traffic stop.

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                                     No. 22-30086

   However, because Pierre did not object to the officer’s testimony as being a
   violation of the Confrontation Clause, we review this argument for plain error
   only. See United States v. Sharp, 6 F.4th 573, 581 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
   142 S. Ct. 1124 (2022). In this case, the statements made by the police officer
   do not violate the Confrontation Clause because officers may refer to out-of-
   court statements in order to provide context for their investigation or to
   explain its background. See United States v. Kizzee, 877 F.3d 650, 657–59 (5th
   Cir. 2017).
          Pierre also argues that the district court abused its discretion in
   admitting recordings of phone conversations between Pierre and other
   individuals that took place while he was in jail in Calcasieu Parish. See United
   States v. Cheramie, 51 F.3d 538, 540–41 (5th Cir. 1995). Although he argues
   that there was no evidence that he was one of the individuals on the recorded
   calls, the record shows that the calls were made or received with his unique
   inmate code at the jail, and Pierre stipulated that if a Calcasieu Parish
   Sheriff’s employee were to testify, he would state that he put Pierre’s jail call
   recordings on the thumb drive that was used at trial. Also, the recordings
   themselves belie Pierre’s contention that the Government did not show that
   the other person on the calls was his mother. Pierre fails to brief, and has thus
   waived, any other alleged Confrontation Clause problem with the admission
   of these calls. See Davis, 609 F.3d at 698.
          Finally, Pierre argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced
   when he was designated an armed career criminal. We review this issue de
   novo. United States v. Schmidt, 623 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2010).
          At the time of Pierre’s offense, a defendant convicted of violating
   § 922(g) was generally subject to a statutory maximum prison sentence of 10

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                                       No. 22-30086

   years. § 924(a)(2) (2021). 1 However, if the defendant had three or more prior
   convictions for a serious drug offense or a violent felony, he qualified as an
   armed career criminal and was subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years of
   imprisonment. § 924(e)(1). The district court determined that Pierre
   qualified as an armed career criminal based on his Louisiana convictions for
   possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, distribution of cocaine, and
   aggravated assault with a firearm. In light of our recent decision in United
   States v. Garner, 28 F.4th 678, 683 (5th Cir. 2022), Pierre was improperly
   designated as an armed career criminal because his conviction for aggravated
   assault with a firearm does not qualify as a violent felony. Therefore, the
   maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed for each of Pierre’s
   § 922(g) convictions was 120 months. See § 924(a)(2) (2021). Because
   Pierre’s concurrent 288-month prison terms for his § 922(g) offenses exceed
   the statutory maximum, they must be vacated. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).
          Pierre’s convictions are AFFIRMED, the sentence is VACATED,
   and the case is REMANDED for resentencing.

          _____________________
          1
             The pre-2022 version of the statute applies in Pierre’s case. A higher range
   applies after an amendment effective in 2022. See § 922(a)(8).

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