Court Opinion

ID: 9608116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:06:32.93934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:43.736776
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree that a party may initiate a divorce action only with the issuance of a summons and personal service of the summons and complaint in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-4. I do not, however, believe this result is mandated by the application of Georgia’s amendment rules under OCGA § 9-11-15 and subsequent service rules of OCGA § 9-11-5. OCGA § 9-11-15 permits the liberal amendment of actions, even allowing the wholesale striking of an original pleading and substitution of a new pleading by amendment.1 Additionally, OCGA § 9-11-5 expressly permits an amendment adding new claims for relief to be served by mail. Under these rules, the mere fact that an amendment raises different questions or seeks relief that replaces relief previously sought is insufficient to require personal service under OCGA § 9-11-4.2
Public policy, however, requires that divorce be treated differently because of the unique and important issues involved, including the severing of the marital relationship, custody and support of minor children, support of spouses, and division of property. Therefore, I agree that a party must initiate a divorce action with personal service of a summons and complaint under OCGA § 9-11-4 and may not serve a complaint for divorce under OCGA § 9-11-5 as an amendment to a separate maintenance action.

 See Stith v. Hudson, 231 Ga. 520, 525 (202 SE2d 392) (1973).

 See Stroud v. Elias, 247 Ga. 191, 193 (275 SE2d 46) (1981) (amendment to contract action adding claim in tort and for punitive damages could be served under OCGA § 9-11-5).