Court Opinion

ID: 9966251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:00:33.517411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.557666
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 6 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RICKY MENDOZA,                                  No.    22-15933

                 Petitioner-Appellant,          D.C. No. 3:18-cv-07160-SI

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM SULLIVAN, Warden,

                 Respondent-Appellee.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of California
                      Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted March 11, 2024
                            San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Ricky Mendoza appeals the district court’s order denying his 28

U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first-degree

murder. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them

here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253,

and we affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      The court reviews de novo the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Earp v. Davis, 881 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2018). Under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which governs this appeal, we cannot

grant habeas relief unless the state court proceedings resulted in a decision that

was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;”

or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C § 2254(d).

      1.     Mendoza argues the California Court of Appeal unreasonably erred by

concluding there was sufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder

because no rational trier of fact could credit the testimony of purported

accomplices Martin and Hellums. Evidence is sufficient under the Due Process

Clause when, upon “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

      “[U]nder Jackson, the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally

beyond the scope of review.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995). The court

“must presume” that the jury resolved conflicting inferences “in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. The

California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded, based on the testimony of

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Hellums and Martin and other corroborating evidence, that the jury could have

found Mendoza guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

      Mendoza nevertheless insists that the testimony of Martin and Hellums was

insufficient to convict him because it was uncorroborated and “incredible,

insubstantial, and inherently implausible.” For support, Mendoza relies on the

Ninth Circuit’s rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony is insufficient to

support a conviction if it is “incredible or insubstantial on its face,” Laboa v.

Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted), and the Supreme

Court’s statement in Lilly v. Virginia that accomplice confessions are

“presumptively unreliable,” 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (citation omitted). But the

Ninth Circuit precedent discussed in Laboa “does not constitute ‘clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’” and “therefore

cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA.” See Parker v. Matthews,

567 U.S. 37, 48-49 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). And Lilly concerns

the implications under the Confrontation Clause of introducing out-of-court

confessions by accomplices, not the sufficiency of in-court testimony by

accomplices. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131.

      We conclude the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Mendoza’s

Jackson challenge was not “objectively unreasonable.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566

U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

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      2.       Mendoza argues that Martin’s testimony was insufficiently

corroborated under California Penal Code § 1111.1 Although this corroboration

rule “is not required by the Constitution or federal law,” Mendoza may show that

he was deprived of his due process right to fundamental fairness if he establishes

that the state court “arbitrarily deprive[d] [him] of a state law entitlement.”

Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added) (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343,

346 (1980)).

      Mendoza was not arbitrarily deprived of a state law entitlement in violation

of due process. The California Court of Appeal examined the record evidence and

concluded that Martin’s testimony was adequately corroborated under § 1111. In

particular, the court recognized that Mendoza’s presence at the party was

corroborated by Hellums, who testified that Mendoza was with the Norteño group

earlier in the day and entered the party with them. It also noted that the text

messages between Mendoza and his girlfriend strongly indicated that Mendoza

was present when Navarro was killed. Moreover, Martin’s account was further

corroborated by forensic evidence concerning where and how Navarro was shot, as

well as expert ballistics testimony.

      Although the California Court of Appeal did not expressly discuss federal

1
  California Penal Code § 1111 provides that a “conviction can not be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as
shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.”

                                           4
due process, we may presume it adjudicated Mendoza’s due process claim on the

merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). By expressly

addressing § 1111 and holding it was satisfied, the court could have reasonably

determined that Mendoza received a fundamentally fair trial and was not arbitrarily

deprived of a state law entitlement.

      3.     Mendoza argues he was deprived of due process and his rights under

the Confrontation Clause because he was not permitted to cross-examine Martin

sufficiently. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits” on

cross-examination, and “[n]o Confrontation Clause violation occurs as long as the

jury receives sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the

witness.” Fenenbock v. Dir. of Corr. for Cal., 692 F.3d 910, 919-20 (9th Cir.

2012) (citation omitted).

      The California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Mendoza had an

adequate opportunity to cross-examine Martin and probe his credibility and

potential biases. For example, defense counsel elicited testimony on cross-

examination that: (i) Martin was originally charged with murder and attempted

murder in this case, and could have received a life sentence; (ii) after the first jury

deadlocked, Martin agreed to plead guilty to an unspecified violent crime with a

ten-year sentence and to testify in the retrial of Mendoza; and (iii) Martin had

repeatedly lied to police when first questioned about the shooting. Further, the trial

                                           5
court permitted defense counsel to read a stipulation that informed the jury that

Martin had been identified as the shooter in a separate unrelated murder, and that

he had been charged with that murder and several other serious crimes.

Accordingly, we agree that the limits on Mendoza’s cross-examination of Martin

did not violate Mendoza’s constitutional rights.2

      4.     Mendoza argues that he was deprived of due process because the trial

court failed to correctly instruct the jury about accomplice testimony. “[An]

erroneous jury instruction can rise to the level of constitutional error if it ‘so

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Brewer

v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S.

62, 72 (1991)). “[T]he fact that [an] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state

law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.

      Here, no such “infect[ion]” that violated due process occurred. Id. at 72.

California’s rules regarding accomplice testimony, including California Penal

Code § 1111, are not required by the Constitution or any holding of the Supreme

Court. See Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979. Accordingly, Mendoza is not entitled to relief.

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.

      5.     Because we conclude that no constitutional errors occurred, there is

2
  Because federal review of habeas relief under § 2254(d) is limited to the state
court record, Shoop v. Twyford, 596 U.S. 811, 819 (2022), Petitioner’s motion for
judicial notice (Dkt. 44) is DENIED.

                                            6
no cumulative prejudice. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Because we conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no

cumulative prejudice is possible.”).

      AFFIRMED.

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