Court Opinion

ID: 9624307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:57:45.183726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:43.237732
License: Public Domain

'MOISE, Justice (dissenting). T?he majority recognizes as the law those •cases holding it libelous per se to refer to a person or organization in writing as being '“communist,” “a Communist sympathizer” -or as being “Communist oriented.” To rthese terms I would add “fellow traveler” of Communists held to be libelous per se in Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945), cited by the majority, and from that case I quote the following pertinent language: “The lower courts in New York have passed on almost the same question in three cases. In Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544, Pecora, J, held that it was not libellous to say that a man was a Communist; in the next year in Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148, Hofstadter, J, held otherwise. That perhaps left the answer open; but Boudin v. Tishman, 264 App.Div. 842, 35 N.Y.S.2d 760, was an unescapable ruling, although no opinion was written. Being the last decision of the ■state courts, it is conclusive upon us, unless there is a difference between saying that he is an agent for the Party or sympathizes with its objects and methods. Any difference is one of degree only: those who would take it ill of a lawyer ■that he was a member of the Party, might no doubt take it less so if he were •only what is called a ‘fellow-traveler’; but, since the basis for the reproach ordinarily lies in some supposed threat to our institutions, those who fear that threat are not likely to believe that it is limited to party members. * * * ” See also, MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co, 52 Cal.2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959); Hermann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co, 48 N.J.Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958), adhered to at 49 N.J.Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (1958); Annot, 33 A.L.R.2d 1196, 1212 (1954). Here, defendant stated that plaintiff was “following the Communist party-line.” If this is any different than calling him a fellow traveler, the distinction escapes me. Neither is the term softened by the statement that this is accomplished through “attacking patriotic organizations” or through supporting “Communist objectives.” “Fellow-traveler” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, as follows : “One that sympathizes with and often furthers the ideals and program of an organized group (as the Communist party) without membership in the group or participation in its activities.” What is the difference between saying a person “sympathizes with” or “furthers the ideals and program of the Communist party,” and saying he “supports” its objectives or follows the party-line? If there is any real distinction, it is certainly only one of degree. The letter even goes a step further and explains what the Communist conspiracy (party-line) is. If, as stated by the majority, accusing a person of being a “Communist sympathizer” or being “Communist oriented” is libelous per se, by what manner of reasoning can they conclude that asserting that one follows the “Communist party line” or supports “Communist objectives” is not equally libelous per se? Since, in my view, the explanation advanced in the opinion is unconvincing and the result reached as a consequence thereof in error, I respectfully dissent. Although not relying on it as a ground for dissent, I would make note of the question in my mind concerning the validity of the approach long since followed by this court wherein the “per se” and “per quod” distinction is drawn in libel cases, and would suggest that we should reexamine the problem with a view to correcting any errors of law present in our decisions. See 4 Nat. Res.Jrl. 590 (1965). This has been done in Oregon. Hinkle v. Alexander, 244 Or. 267, 271, 411 P.2d 829, 417 P.2d 586 (1966). CARMODY, J., concurs.