Court Opinion

ID: 9496337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:23:46.429267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:30.430164
License: Public Domain

ERICKSEN, District Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the district court accepted Robert Head’s guilty plea three weeks before Head moved to withdraw the plea. As a result, Head was required to show “a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal,” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B), and the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Head failed to satisfy his burden, United States v. Gamble, 327 F.3d 662, 663 (8th Cir.2003) (standard of review).
The majority concludes that the district court did not accept Head’s guilty plea at the hearing on August 14, 2002, for two reasons. First, it cites a passage in which the district court indicated that it would defer its decision whether to accept the plea agreement between Head and the Government.5 By relying on this statement, the majority “equate[s] acceptance of the guilty plea with acceptance of the plea agreement, and deferral of the plea agreement with deferral of the guilty *632plea.” United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997). This approach runs contrary to the text of Rule 11, which indicates that “[gjuilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time.” Hyde, 520 U.S. at 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630.
Second, the majority notes that the district court did not make an explicit statement of acceptance, such as “I accept your plea of guilty.” The requirements for accepting a guilty plea are clear. The court must address the defendant personally in open court, inform him of various rights and the consequences of pleading guilty, determine that he understands those rights and consequences, and determine that the plea is voluntary. See Fed. R.Crim.P. ll(b)(l)-(2); Hyde, 520 U.S. at 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630. Once these steps are taken, the court “may, in its discretion, accept a defendant’s guilty plea.” Hyde, 520 U.S. at 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630. It is difficult to imagine a more thorough examination into the requirements for accepting a guilty plea than the one undertaken by the district court in this case. Perhaps because Head’s plea would bring an ongoing jury trial to a close, the district court’s inquiry was painstaking.
It is true, as the majority observes, that the district court referred to the government’s reservation of the right to withdraw from the plea agreement if the defendant committed new crimes before acceptance of the guilty plea. Unlike the majority I do not find the district court’s mere recitation of that provision of the plea agreement dispositive. The plea colloquy, as a whole, reveals that the determination of guilt would be final upon the colloquy’s conclusion and the jury’s discharge. The defendant himself acknowledged the conclusive nature of his plea:
THE COURT: All right. You understand that this ends the case with the exception of your sentencing on any issue about whether you’re guilty ... correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
Near the end of the plea colloquy, the district court reminded the defendant that his plea was definitive:
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Head. This is going to be final when you get off the witness stand, so I want to make sure this is what you want to do under the circumstances.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. And I’m going to ask you one more time and I don’t want you to play games with me.
Head swore he was entering a knowing and intelligent plea, and the district court told him several times that his decision would be final upon the jury’s discharge. Head swore that he understood that, and proceeded with his plea. Short of uttering the magic words, “I accept your plea of guilty,” the district court could have done nothing more to make it clear that it was accepting Head’s plea. I recognize that the district court in Hyde may have used similar language. In my view, though, neither Hyde nor Rule 11 accords talis-manic significance to the words “I accept your plea.”

. District courts rarely decide whether to accept a plea agreement without the benefit of a presentence report. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 6Bl.l(c) (2002) ("The court shall defer its decision ... to accept or reject any plea agreement ... until there has been an opportunity to consider the presen-tence report, unless [the court finds that] a report is not required.”).