Court Opinion

ID: 9493192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:00:53.092317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:42.310342
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
On the first appeal, we reversed the district court’s decision granting Kelling-ton’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and “REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND FOR SENTENCING.” United States v. Kellington, 1998 WL 75695, *3 (9th Cir.1998) (Kellington I). On remand, Kellington renewed both his .motion for a judgment of acquittal and his motion for a new trial. The district court denied Kellington’s renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, but granted his renewed motion for a new trial. Because, in my view, the district court acted outside the scope of the mandate by granting Kell-ington’s motion for a new trial, I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of that order.
The district court’s compliance with a mandate is assessed by the rule of mandate. See United States v. Cote, 51 F.3d 178, 181 (9th Cir.1995). We have described the rule of mandate as similar to, but broader than, the law of the case doctrine. See id. (citing Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 12, F.3d 901, 904 (9th Cir.1993)). Under this rule, “[a] district court, upon receiving the mandate of an appellate *1102court ‘cannot vary it or examine it for any other purpose than execution.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895)). Thus, “a district court could not refuse to dismiss a case when the mandate required it.” Id. (citing Stamper v. Baskerville, 724 F.2d 1106, 1107-08 (4th Cir.1984)). Likewise, a district court may not decline to enter judgment for a party when the mandate so directs. See Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 1500, 1501-03 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that in case remanded “for entry of summary judgment in favor of the government” district court erred in failing to so enter judgment).
While it is true that the district court may act on “matters left open by the mandate,” Caldwell v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship and Training Trust, 824 F.2d 765, 767 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Sanford Fork, 160 U.S. at 256, 16 S.Ct. 291), here, the mandate left no matter open. The mandate was clear and unequivocal: it reversed the judgment of acquittal, and remanded for entry of judgment and sentencing. Where the mandate directs the entry of judgment, it is error for the district court to fail to so enter judgment. See Nguyen, 792 F.2d at 1501-03. Here, the language of the mandate — the remanding for entry of judgment and sentencing — does not leave open the alternative of granting Kellington a new trial on remand. See Stamper, 724 F.2d at 1108 (“Nor do we believe that In re Sanford should be read to permit a lower court to treat an issue not before the appellate court as ‘a matter left open.’ ”) (citation omitted).
Kellington contends that his case falls within the rule that “unless the reversing court indicates in its mandate or opinion that a retrial is prohibited because of double jeopardy or a similar infirmity, a second trial is appropriate.” Cote, 51 F.3d at 182. This argument is without merit. That rule speaks to the circumstances, present in Cote, where the appellate court reverses a jury conviction, but omits an explicit order remanding the cases for further proceedings. See id. at 180. Here, in contrast, Kellington I reversed a judgment of acquittal after the jury had rendered a guilty verdict and the mandate specifically directed the entry of judgment and sentencing. Accordingly, the rule Kellington attempts to invoke has no application here.
The majority cites a number of cases discussing the general principle of the rule of mandate; however, none is directly controlling. And, in applying that rule to this case, the majority ignores the controlling case directly on point. This case is directly controlled by Nguyen, which holds expressly that when, as here, the mandate directs the entry of judgment, it is error to fail to so enter judgment. See 792 F.2d at 1501-03; see also Sanford Fork, 160 U.S. at 255, 16 S.Ct. 291 (“a district court could not refuse to dismiss a case when the mandate required it”).
The majority also makes much of the fact that in Kellington I, “neither party briefed or otherwise raised the district court’s failure to enter a conditional ruling on the motion for new trial.” Maj. Op. at 1092. See also id. at 1094-95 (“the motion for new trial was not before the Kellington I court”). The majority even goes so far as to speculate that the prior panel “was not then aware of the mooted new trial motion.”1 Maj. Op. at 1092.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
If a motion for judgment of acquittal after verdict of guilty under this Rule is granted, the court shall also determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the grounds for such determination. If the motion for a new *1103trial is granted conditionally, the order thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. If the motion for a new trial has been granted’ conditionally and the judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. If such a motion has been denied conditionally, the appellee on appeal may assert error in that denial, and if -the: judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(d). After granting Kell-ington’s motion for judgment of acquittal, in spite of the requirement of. Rule 29(d) that it conditionally rule on the motion for a new trial, the district court denied Kell-ington’s motion for a new trial on the ground that it was moot, without reaching its merits.
Kellington did not move to have the denial of his motion for a new trial reconsidered, despite the fact that Rule 29(d) specifically provides that, if the district court grants a motion for judgment of acquittal, “the court shall also determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is thereafter vacated or reversed, specifying the grounds for such determination.” Id. Neither did Kellington appeal from the denial of his motion for a new trial as moot, nor did he, as appellee in the government’s appeal, “assert error in that denial” of his motion for a new trial, as he had the right to do under Rule 29(d).2
Kellington knew that the' district court had denied his motion for a new trial as moot, instead of reaching its merits and making a conditional ruling thereon. He had the right to-raise this erroneous ruling either as the appellee in the government’s appeal or to file a cross-appeal, but he did neither. Kellington’s .failure to raise this issue -on the first appeal waived it.3 See American Ad Management, Inc. v. General Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054 m 2 (9th Cir.1999) (“American waived its other antitrust claims in its prior appeal.when it did not challenge their dismissal by the district court.”); see also SIPC v. Vigman, 74 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that a party cannot revisit issues that it abandons on appeal). That waiver is the reason Kellington I did not address the issue; because Kellington did not raise it. Id. Not having raised it when he could and should have, Kellington has waived it. Thus, the fact that Kellington I did not address this issue does not mean it is not foreclosed by Kellington I’s mandate; on the contrary, it is foreclosed, just as any other issue that could have been raised on the first appeal is foreclosed. See United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir.1998) (“When a party could have raised an issue in' a prior appeal but did not, a court later hearing the same case need not consider the matter.”).'
Few precepts are more fundamental to the operation of a hierarchically structured judiciary than that the mandate of a higher court is “controlling as to the matters within its compass.” Sprague v. Ticonic *1104Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). The majority’s construction, besides being directly contrary to controlling precedent, considerably weakens the rule of mandate. I respectfully dissent because the district court erred in failing to follow the mandate in Kellington I, which required it to enter judgment and to sentence Kellington. I would reverse the district court’s order granting Kellington’s renewed motion for a new trial and remand for the entry of judgment and sentencing, as required by the mandate in Kellington I.4

. The majority, in effect, holds that the government cannot raise non-compliance with Rule 29(d) for the first time on appeal. See Maj. Op. at 1096-97 & n. 14. The government, however, was not required initially to raise it. As explained above, it was Kelling-ton’s obligation to raise it on the first appeal. Moreover, the argument inheres in the dictate of the mandate. Even assuming that the government had the obligation initially to raise it, this would be an appropriate case in which to consider the argument, regardless of the government’s failure to do so. The rule is one of discretion, see Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 E.3d 1082, 1085 n. 2 (9th Cir.1996), and the issue is purely a legal one, requiring no further development of the record. See RTC v. First Am. Bank, 155 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.1998).

. . The majority also appears to hold that , the rule of mandate cannot be applied unless “the Kellington I court [at least] implicitly disposed of the .merits of the motion for new trial.” Maj. Op. at 1094 (citation omitted). As explained above, however, Kellington’s waiver of this issue made it unnecessary for the Kellington I panel to address it.

. Because I would reverse the district court's order on the ground that it violates the rule of mandate, I would not reach the merits of Kellington’s motion for a new trial.