Court Opinion

ID: 9661027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:26:59.517399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:24.508922
License: Public Domain

Peterson, Justice
(dissenting).
It has been well settled until today that the condemnor in the permanent taking of property is not obligated to pay the condemnee for the loss of going-concern value of his business. This general rule has been sustained under U. S. Const. Amends. V and XIV. Mitchell v. United States, 267 U. S. 341, 45 S. Ct. 293, 69 L. ed. 644.1 Minn. Const, art. 1, § 13, despite prior opportunity to do otherwise, has not been construed differently. See, e. g., Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N. W. (2d) 165. The condemnation statute, Minn. St. 117.02, subd. 2, contemplates no more than what is required by our constitution. Seabloom v. Krier, 219 Minn. 362, 18 N. W. (2d) 88.
The majority opinion does two things, to both of which I respect*417fully dissent: (1) Its immediate result is to carve out an exception from the general rule for the benefit of a liquor licensee;2 and (2) its language seems to forecast judicial extension of statute to award unlimited compensation for the going-concern value in other cases.
The basic premise for the result in this case is that the going-concern value of appellant condemnee’s liquor business was destroyed by the act of the state, as condemnor, a premise formulated from the parties’ stipulation that “there is no evidence that the condemnee could not have continued to operate its lounge at the premises in question.” I disagree with that premise. Appellant’s business was destroyed instead by act of the municipality, as licensor, in refusing to consent to its transfer to another location within the patrol limits. As the stipulation states, “the owner’s license expired inasmuch as he had been unsuccessful in transferring the license to another location and has subsequently gone out of the liquor business by virtue of that fact.’’’’ (Italics supplied.)
Neither constitutional nor statutory basis exists for establishing the exceptional rule in this case. The general rule concerning the status of a liquor licensee’s interest is summarized in 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 26.195:
“There is no vested right to or under a liquor license. There is at most a privilege, personal in character, which, it has been said, is merely to do what otherwise would be, or could be made, an offense, and which is subject to changing regulations, and even to legislative cancellation. A liquor license or permit creates neither a contract nor a property right, and denial of it by a proper authority with discretion in the matter deprives an applicant of neither liberty nor property.” (Italics supplied.)
Our own decisions are in harmony with this summary statement: *418Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N. W. (2d) 538; George Benz Sons, Inc. v. Ericson, 227 Minn. 1, 34 N. W. (2d) 725; Sabes v. City of Minneapolis, 265 Minn. 166, 120 N. W. (2d) 871; Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 61 N. W. (2d) 508, appeal dismissed, 347 U. S. 949, 74 S. Ct. 680, 98 L. ed. 1096.
Whether the state should compensate the owner of a business for the loss of its going-concern value as a result of a taking by eminent domain — either in the circumstances of this case or in any case — is in my view a matter for legislative determination; and, absent compelling constitutional considerations presented by such legislative determination, this court should not substitute its own judgment of what may be the more appropriate result.
I would affirm.

 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U. S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434, 93 L. ed. 1765, 7 A. L. R. (2d) 1280, achieved a different result where the governmental taking was temporary rather than permanent. I do not understand the suggestion that Kimball has overruled Mitchell, for the narrow majority in the Kimball case was achieved only with the concurrence of Mr. Justice Rutledge, who clearly limited his concurrence to the fact of temporary taking and stated his adherence to the general rule where the taking of complete title is permanent. The situation in the instant case, of course, is like Mitchell and unlike Kimball.

 The value of the liquor licensee’s business, it may be observed, is not so much the result of individual enterprise, but of his semimonopoly position “because of the restricted liquor patrol limits and other peculiarities of the Minneapolis licensing situation.”