Court Opinion

ID: 9868387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:32:56.86305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:49.857367
License: Public Domain

ON Petition to Beheab.
The defendants', appellees, have petitioned the Court for'a rehearing, complaining that it was error (1) to order the sale of the corpus of a charitable trust and invest the proceeds in a hew church edifice, and (2) that they should not be taxed with the cost of the appeal.
The only question we have decided thus far is that a court of equity, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, could direct the sale of property (the corpus of a charitable trust) where it is for the best interest of all parties, the sale being highly desirable because of changes which the testator could not reasonably foresee.
The trustees have apparently construed our opinion to mean that the proceeds of said sale may be used to build a new church. The petitioners from the beginning-have challenged this right, although they have no interest in the property, contending that it violates the testator’s intention and operates to change the character of the trust. This exact question has not been decided.
*244We deem it unnecessary to review the authorities touching the right of the Court to order a sale of the property. In addition to many cases from other jurisdictions cited in the opinion, we have our own case of King College v. Anderson, 148 Tenn. 328, 255 S. W. 374, to the effect that the Court may direct the sale of lands, which constitute the corpus of a charitable trust, and reinvest in other lands, resulting in a change of location of the college. In that case the Court kept in mind the intention of the donor (as is our plain duty in the instant case) and speaking through Mr. Justice Chambliss said:
“The sale now being made so clearly comes within the evident thought and purpose of the grantor as expressed in the concluding lines of this paragraph — that is, ‘for the more successful and convenient prosecution of the objects.of this conveyance’ that we feel justified in giving a liberal construction to the paragraph as a whole, thereby carrying out that which all must concede would be the desire of the grantor if he were himself in position to speak.” Pages 335, 336 of 148 Tenn., page 376 of 255 S. W.
 We cannot by any known rule of construction construe a declaration of trust, whether made by deed or will, that will thwart the will of the donor. An examination of the testator’s will clearly shows that his one great desire was to give financial aid to his church. It is true he provided that the lands devised “should not be sold” and that the income be used to support the church. A sale of the lands, however, and investment of the proceeds in a church house, would not in any real sense be a departure from the testator’s wishes. The use of the money to build a church may be necessary for its very existence and, if the need is imperative, or highly desirable, we think the application of the proceeds of this *245sale to such a purpose gives every consideration to the wishes of the testator as expressed' in his will. He certainly would not want the church that was evidently near and dear to his heart to fail in its purpose for lack of a suitable house of worship. Moreover, there is no diversion of the corpus of the., trust estate in holding that it may thus he converted. The money derived from the sale of the land is impressed with the trust as well as the new church building, which is held in trust by the same trustees for use as a house of worship by "present and all succeeding members thereof.
It appears from the allegations in complainants ’ hill, which are taken as true, that there is a strong probability that the property in question may be entirely lost to the church because of a lack of sufficient funds to pay taxes, insurance, and keep the buildings in proper repair. The primary reason for sustaining the bill was to save the property from loss and thus preserve the trust. In 14 C. J. S., Charities, sec. 50, p. 511, it is said:
“It is a natural and necessary branch of the jurisdiction over charitable trusts that the means or details prescribed for their administration should be subject to be molded so as to meet any exigency which may be disclosed by a change of circumstances, and to relieve the trust from a condition which imperils or endangers the charity -itself or the funds provided for its endowment ■ and maintenance. ”
The Supreme Court of Alabama dealt with this question in Lovelace v. Marion Institute, 215 Ala. 271, 110 So. 381, wherein the trustees of a charitable trust sought the approval of the chancery court to mortgage the corpus of a trust, contrary to the expressed intention of the donor. In sustaining the bill the court repudiated the “Cy pres” doctrine and rested its decision upon the inherent juris*246diction of a court of chancery, citing with approval the above text from 14 C. J. S., Charities, sec. 50, p. 511.
Another interesting case found in a footnote to the text is. In re Y. W. C. A. of New York City, 96 N. J. Eq. 568, 126 A. 610, 613, in which it was held that under the statute of New Jersey, N. J. S. A., 15:14-7 “as well as under the general eqioity poioers,” the “Chancellor is authorized to order that lands conveyed to a religious, educational, or charitable association be sold, ivhen a sale ivill promote or benefit the trust. ¡Such sale may be made free from the limitations of the trust, and the trust will thereupon attach*to the proceeds of sale.” (See syllabus. Italics ours.) In thus construing the will the court considered the dominant intention of the testator, saying that, “had she foreseen the impracticabihiy of carrying out her dominant intention at the particular location, she would have made provision for carrying it out elsewhere at a more suitable place.” Page 612 of 126 A.
Responding further to the contention that petitioners should not be onerated with the cost of the appeal and that their counsel should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the land, we think it clearly appears that they have no vested interest in the lands in question for the reasons stated in this opinion. Moreover, by no stretch of the imagination can it be said that their coun•sel contributed any benefit whatever to the trust estate in this proceeding. The case of Carmack v. Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co., 180 Tenn. 571, 177 S. W. (2d) 351, has no application.
Since there was no provision in the will for a reversion of the property to the petitioners or a gift over for breach of trust, there was no occasion for employment of counsel to resist the efforts of the trustees to have a declaratory decree construing the will.
The petition is accordingly denied.