Court Opinion

ID: 9528287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:39:24.472582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:36.771836
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissents with opinion.
I respectfully dissent. I would follow the precedent established in Poynter v. Poynter, 590 N.E.2d 150, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). In Poynter the court considered whether a custodial parent's monthly payment of disability benefits should be ered-ited solely as support paid by her rather than used to reduce the total support obligation allocated between both parents. Id. We answered that question in the affirmative, rationalizing that "[disability] benefits are not gratuities but are earned, and they substitute for lost earning power because of the disability." Id. The same principle applies here. Disability benefits are not means-tested income; rather, disability benefits are awarded until the recipient recovers sufficiently from a disability, regardless of the recipient's income level. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ind.Ct.App.1004). To receive disability benefits, the recipient must show that the inability to work is medical in nature. Id. Moreover, disability benefits are included in the definition of "weekly gross income" for the purposes of determining child support amounts under Child Supp. G. 3{(A)(1), and Indiana courts have consistently held that disability benefits are the proper subject of child support orders. Id.
In Stultz, our supreme court considered whether it was clearly erroneous for the trial court to decline to reduce a noncustodial father's child support obligation *1229by the amount of social security retirement payments received by the children when the father retired. Stultz, 659 N.E.2d at 126. The trial court had declined to re-duee the father's child support obligation in light of its mandatory consideration of "the standard of living the children would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved." In other words, the trial court had determined that if the parents' marriage had not been dissolved, the children would have enjoyed the benefit of the father's income plus the retirement benefits. Id. at 127. Our supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling after noting Indiana's "strong emphasis on trial court discretion in determining child support obligations and our regular acknowledgment of the principle that child support modifications will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. at 128. In the instant case, the trial court was neither determining nor modifying Danny's monthly support obligations. Furthermore, even if we were to look to the standard of living G.B. would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved, this would not affect the outcome. Danny is receiving disability benefits because he is unable to work; hence, he is receiving disability benefits in lieu of, not in addition to, income.
I would hold that the lump sum payment of Danny's disability benefits to G.B. should not be applied to offset his child support arrearage. I find that Danny should only be permitted to use the disability benefits to satisfy that portion of the arrearage that accumulated after he became disabled. Once the date of disability has been determined and the arrearage appropriately credited, any overpayment may then be either credited to future child support payments or refunded by Ginger. See Drwecki v. Drwecki, 782 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (determining that the general rule that "child support payments cannot be applied prospectively to support not yet due at the time of overpayment" does not apply where the non-custodial parent did not voluntarily build up a substantial credit) (quoting Matson v. Matson, 569 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1991)).