Court Opinion

ID: 9811399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:16.544161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:19.354575
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting to opinions on en banc reconsideration.
Repeatedly throughout the motion for new trial hearing, appellant, E.L., testified that she would not have signed the affidavit of relinquishment as required by the mediated settlement agreement if she had known that the promised visitation would not continue. For this reason, I respectfully dissent to the plurality opinions on rehearing en banc and the resulting judgment.
The Law
“Implicit in the family code is the requirement that the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment be voluntarily executed.” In re D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d 281, 296 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pets. denied), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 263.405® (Vernon 2008). An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination decree based solely on such an affidavit. Id. (citing Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 759 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000), pet. denied, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex.2001)). The proponent of the voluntary affidavit of relinquishment has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the affidavit was executed in accordance with fam*833ily code section 161.103. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.103 (Vernon 2008); D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 296 (citing In re V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.), and Vela, 17 S.W.3d at 758). Previously, we have recognized that evidence that an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment was signed, notarized, witnessed, and executed in compliance with family code section 161.103 is prima facie evidence of its validity. See D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 296. The opponent of the affidavit may set it aside only upon proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the affidavit was executed as a result of fraud, duress, or coercion. Id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211(c) (Vernon 2008)).
Recently, however, this court has noted a shift in the way some Texas Supreme Court justices would handle reviews of terminations based upon a challenge to the voluntariness of an affidavit of relinquishment. See In re R.B., 225 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). In R.B., we noted that the supreme court “has opined that both the burden and standard of proof for setting aside an affidavit of relinquishment should be ‘reformulated.’ ” Id. (citing In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707 (Tex.2003), cert. denied., 541 U.S. 1043, 124 S.Ct. 2175, 158 L.Ed.2d 733 (2004)). In L.M.I., the plurality noted that when there is an issue on the voluntariness of an affidavit of relinquishment, due process requires that the proponent of the affidavit retain the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was executed voluntarily. Id. (citing L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 715-16 (Wainwright, J., concurring), 720 (Owen, J., concurring and dissenting), 739 (Hecht, J., dissenting)). According to L.M.I. — and likewise R.B., in which we looked with favor on the analysis in L.M.I. but declined to adopt it as unnecessary,
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that before a state can irrevocably sever the rights of a parent, the evidence of grounds for termination must at least be clear and convincing. Accordingly, when the basis for termination is an affidavit of relinquishment, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 716 (Owen, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted); R.B., 225 S.W.3d at 804-05.1 Neither our court in R.B. nor the Dallas court in N.P.T. specifically adopted the standard because it was unnecessary to the disposition of those cases — both courts held that the proponent of the affidavit would have been successful under either standard. R.B., 225 S.W.3d at 805; N.P.T., 169 S.W.3d at 680. Here, however, the answer is less clear. For that reason, we should adopt the L.M.I. standard in this case to ensure that all parents’ due process rights are protected; the plurality opinion on rehearing en banc in this case fails to shift the burden of proof back to the proponent of the affidavit to show by clear and convincing evidence that the affidavit was executed voluntarily. I dissent from the plurality opinion on rehearing en banc’s failure to apply this standard.
Preservation of Error
The plurality opinion on rehearing en banc also states that appellant has waived her complaint on appeal because it was not presented at trial and does not comport *834with any complaint she presented at trial. In particular, the plurality opinion on rehearing en banc contends that appellant did not raise the Rule 11 and mediated settlement agreements’ failure to comply with the family code at trial. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.2061(a) (Vernon 2008). However, appellant could not object or complain until she actually saw that the Order of Termination completely failed to incorporate the terms of the mediated settlement agreement or the Rule 11 agreement into it. See D.R.L.M., 84 S.W.3d at 297 (holding mother could not have pleaded in trial court the involuntariness of her affidavit on the ground that she believed the trial court was required to follow her choice of managing conservator and therefore had not waived right to challenge voluntariness of affidavit). Therefore, she clearly brought the issue to the trial court’s attention as soon as practicable. A review of the amended motion for new trial and the reporter’s record from the hearing on the motion for new trial show more clearly what occurred.
The amended motion for new trial attacks quite clearly the sole basis for the termination: appellant’s affidavit of relinquishment. The motion challenges the voluntariness of the affidavit, a fundamental prerequisite for temrination granted solely on this basis. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(K), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The voluntariness of her relinquishment is appellant’s sole complaint. The motion broadly claims coercion “through promises and threats” to induce appellant to sign the affidavit of relinquishment, along with fraud in the inducement to convince appellant that she had no choice but to sign the affidavit. While it does not mention the mediated settlement agreement’s failure to comply with specific provisions of the Texas Family Code, it clearly mentions promises, threats, or fraud being involved. Therefore, I would conclude and hold that E.L. preserved her challenge to the voluntariness of her affidavit.
Evidence of Voluntariness of Affidavit
Furthermore, as explained by the plurality opinion on rehearing en banc, appellant signed two documents at the end of the mediated settlement conference: a mediated settlement agreement and an attached Rule 11 agreement, which were properly filed as part of the record in the termination proceeding. The mediated settlement agreement and the Rule 11 agreement clearly provide for appellant’s post-termination visitation with her daughter. Additionally, the agreements state that it is the intent of the parties that the agreements shall be enforceable under sections 6.602 and 153.0071 of the Texas Family Code, both of which provide for the enforceability of such agreements as judgments in court. See id. § 6.602 (Vernon 2006), § 153.0071 (Vernon Supp.2009). The agreements also clearly contemplate the preparation of additional documents to effect the agreements and require the parties’ future cooperation in the preparation and execution of such documents. Moreover, throughout the hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial, appellant continuously and repeatedly testified to her main complaint, without objection: that she would not have signed any affidavit of relinquishment and would have gone to trial if she had not been given the promises of the continuous right to see and visit her daughter in the future.
For example, at the beginning of her direct examination, appellant testified without objection, “The agreement wasn’t done by my own will. The agreement, I did it because they told me, whether I signed or not, they were going to take my rights.” And she continued, “[Tjhey told me about the paper, it says that with this *835paper, neither the [foster parents] or me could break the plan that we made,” again without objection. And again, on redirect, appellant testified, “[I believed] that the [mediated settlement] agreement was going to be held. It was going to be in place forever.” The licensed professional counselor testified that appellant believed “she would be allowed to see her child for the rest of her life because there had been a judge who had overseen the mediation.”
Moreover, the mediated settlement agreement says that the parties will appear in court “to present evidence and secure rendition of judgment in accordance with [it]” and that “EITHER PARTY SHALL BE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THIS AGREEMENT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153.0071 OR SECTION 6.602 OF THE TEXAS FAMILY CODE.”
Further supporting the lack of voluntariness, the record shows that appellant is non-English speaking. She was not provided an interpreter prior to the hearing on the motion for new trial, although her tidal counsel and the Department’s caseworker were Spanish-speaking. However, a careful reading of the record shows— even with this help — the obvious problems with the language barrier and counsel’s ability to inform or examine appellant. Appellant had to rely on what her attorney told her because she could not understand what people were saying when they testified. The record also shows that appellant had numerous difficulties in terminology, both legal and otherwise.
For example, appellant testified on cross-examination that no one read the entire English Affidavit of Relinquishment to her: “Well, they explained it to me, but it wasn’t read to me.” No one was telling appellant what was being asked or said during questions in the hearing. And in support of her claim of pressure or coercion, appellant called her therapist to the stand, who said that appellant telephoned her during the actual mediation process because she was “very distressed” and “pressured” to sign the mediated settlement agreement or risk losing seeing her child forever. Her therapist, who spoke Spanish, said that appellant had a difficult time understanding English, especially in terms of the court or legal system. Ultimately, in the therapist’s opinion, appellant signed the agreement because she thought it was irrevocable and would ensure her lifetime visitation.
Of even greater concern is the testimony of the CPS specialist and caseworker, who, on direct examination by the assistant district attorney during the termination proceeding stated,
Q And it’s your understanding that [E.L.] has executed a Relinquishment of Parental Rights?
A Yes.
Q And in your knowledge, was it signed freely and voluntarily?
A Yes, it was.
Q Did the Department promise [E.L.] anything for signing the relinquishment? A No promises were made. [Emphasis added.]
While this was a technically correct response because the Department was not a signatory to the mediated settlement agreement or the Rule 11 agreement, at the very least the statement is misleading to the court; it ignores the actuality of the settlement negotiations and the Rule 11 agreement between the foster parents and the mother, despite the Department’s clear knowledge of the basis for the settlement. In final arguments at the motion for new trial hearing, the attorney for the Department even said that “[E.L.] was not misled into believing any promises were given to her from the Department at any point. *836We were not part of any of the mediation proceedings in that we were not in the room with her.” Thus, while the Department wants to rely upon the Affidavit of Relinquishment as the basis for termination of E.L.’s parental rights, it is unwilling to even recognize that at the very least she was misled about the permanence of the visitation rights after an adoption was complete. And more importantly, I would conclude that the Department’s testimony before the trial court at the hearing on the motion for new trial was incomplete at best. For all these reasons, I would hold that E.L. sufficiently submitted evidence showing her lack of voluntariness in the execution of the Affidavit of Relinquishment and the execution of the mediated settlement agreement and the Rule 11 agreement.
En Banc Review
This case was initially filed in our court on October 10, 2007; it was submitted to a panel of three justices on April 1, 2008. The original panel plurality opinion was authored by Justice Dixon Holman on December 4, 2008; the chief justice concurred without opinion while I dissented with opinion to the trial court’s denial of the motion for new trial. Appellant filed a motion for rehearing en banc on December 19, 2008. At the time appellant filed her motion for rehearing en banc this court was still composed of the same seven justices: Chief Justice Cayce, Justices Dau-phinot, Holman, Gardner, Walker, McCoy, and myself. On December 31, 2008, Justice Holman reached mandatory retirement.2
On January 1, 2009, Justice William C. Meier was sworn in to Place 2, Senior Justice Holman’s previously vacated seat. Thus, Justice Meier also participated in the court’s ruling on the motion for rehearing en banc as required by the rules. See Tex.R.App. P. 49.7. Our court granted the motion and resubmitted the case for oral argument on April 1, 2009, but by then the en banc court was composed of eight justices, instead of the regular seven justices.3
En banc consideration of a case is disfavored. See Tex.R.App. P. 41.2(c). It should not be ordered “unless necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions or unless extraordinary circumstances require” it. Id. (emphasis added). There have been several different interpretations of what constitutes extraordinary circumstances, but the Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that appellate courts have the right to “consider a case en banc if the circumstances require and the court votes to do so.” See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706, 708 n. 1 (Tex.2003); see also Unifund, CCR Partners v. Villa, 273 S.W.3d 385, 392 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008) (Marion, J., dissenting) (stating, “when there is no conflict among panel decisions, the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is required before en banc consideration may be ordered” (emphasis added)), rev’d, 299 S.W.3d 92 (Tex.2009); Ex parte Ellis, 279 S.W.3d 1, 30 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, pet. granted) (Henson, J., dissenting) (observing that need for en banc review must be balanced with court’s mandate to do substantial justice and to hear accelerated matters at the earliest practicable time, citing Tex.R.App. P. 31.2 and 41.2(c)); *837Rodriguez v. Cuellar, 143 S.W.3d 251, 263-64 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (Lopez, C.J., dissenting) (complaining of majority opinion granting en banc review because of the “high degree of public interest ... and to maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions,” and the impropriety of en banc review because the majority “simply disagreed with the result that the panel majority reached”).
A “plurality opinion” is an “appellate opinion without enough judges’ votes to constitute a majority, but having received the greatest number of votes of any of the opinions filed.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 419 (1987) (emphasis added). “Majority” is “a number that is more than half of a total.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1040 (9th ed. 2009). Thus, the opinion we issue today is not a majority opinion or even really a plurality opinion; it is merely a majority judgment, thus ultimately not justifying en banc submission, something we could not have known at the time we voted to go en banc.
The final plurality opinion on rehearing en banc reflects the following: four justices believe that appellant preserved her complaint at trial and on appeal regarding the voluntariness of her signing the affidavit of relinquishment, and four justices believe she did not. However, because three justices (those joining the concurring and dissenting opinion) also believe appellant has other remedies available to her to enforce her rights, seven justices join in the judgment only.
Conclusion
Therefore, I would hold that appellant timely and properly preserved her complaint as to the voluntariness of the affidavit of relinquishment by raising the issue in her motion for new trial, that she offered sufficient evidence to show the lack of voluntariness in the execution of the affidavit because the terms of the mediated settlement agreement and Rule 11 agreement were not properly incorporated into the Order on Termination as agreed, and that we should retain and ensure the application of the clear and convincing burden of proof on the proponents of the affidavit in conformity with the L.M.I. plurality. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for new trial, reverse the termination order, and remand this case for a new trial. Thus, I respectfully dissent to the result in this case for those reasons and also because there is no majority or even plurality opinion in this en banc case.

. We did, however, indicate agreement with the Dallas Court of Appeals's acknowledgment in N.P.T. that "there is considerable merit in applying" the standard proposed by the supreme court plurality in L.M.I. See R.B., 225 S.W.3d at 805 & n. 33 (citing In re N.P.T., 169 S.W.3d 677, 680 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied)).

. Justice Holman was appointed to sit on this case to hear and participate in the court’s decision on the motion for rehearing en banc while the motion was pending. See Tex. R.App. P. 41.2(a).

. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41.2(a) requires all members of the court to participate, as well as a prior justice who originally heard the case. Tex.R.App. P. 41.2(a).