Court Opinion

ID: 9525533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:04:40.176263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:19.850866
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARMAN, specially concurring: Although I agree with the lead opinion that section 6 — 206(a) (43) of the Vehicle Code is constitutional, I believe that People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174 (1989), was wrongly decided to the extent that it requires any statutory provision that mandates or permits the revocation or suspension of a driver’s license to directly serve the public interest in ensuring that “drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive” (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182) by tying revocation or suspension “to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle” (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82). In Lindner, this court found the public purpose of section 6 — 205 of the Vehicle Code by examining “the statement of purpose in section 6 — 204(a)” and “the substantive provisions of section 6 — 205.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. In my opinion, Lindner defined the public purpose of section 6 — 205 of the Vehicle Code too narrowly and failed to recognize that different public purposes might be served by different statutory provisions that mandate or permit the revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, whether those provisions are contained in section 6 — 205, section 6 — 206, or elsewhere in the Vehicle Code. Chapter 6 of the Vehicle Code is the Driver Licensing Law. Article II of chapter 6 governs the “Cancellation, Suspension, or Revocation of Licenses and Permits.” This article does not contain a provision expressly stating an overarching purpose. Rather, it enumerates the circumstances in which the Secretary of State is required to cancel a driver’s license (625 ILCS 5/6 — 201 (West 2008)), required to impose a mandatory revocation (625 ILCS 5/6 — 205 (West 2008)), and permitted to suspend or revoke a driver’s license as a matter of discretion (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206 (West 2008)). In addition, article II contains procedural provisions, including section 6 — 204, which is entitled “When Court to forward License and Reports.” Section 6 — 204 directs that when a person is convicted of one of the offenses enumerated elsewhere in article II, the judge shall require the person to surrender his driver’s license or permit to the clerk of the court, who shall forward the license or permit and a report of conviction to the Secretary of State. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 204(a)(1) (West 2008). In Lindner, this court first considered “the statement of purpose in section 6 — 204(a).” Lindner, 127 111. 2d at 181. Yet this section does not contain language that can be identified as an express statement of the purpose of article II as a whole. Rather, section 6 — 204 sets out procedures “[f]or the purpose of providing to the Secretary of State the records essential to the performance of the Secretary’s duties” under article II. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 204(a) (West 2008). This section further provides that the Vehicle Code recognizes that convictions of certain offenses or traffic violations and adjudications of delinquency are “evidence relating to unfitness to safely operate motor vehicles.” 625 ILCS 5/6 — 204(a) (West 2008). This is the language that Lindner found to be a “statement of purpose.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. In my opinion, this court in Lindner gave entirely too much weight to this single phrase in section 6 — 204(a). While a conviction of a certain offense or traffic violation or an adjudication of delinquency may be evidence revealing unfitness to safely operate a motor vehicle, a conviction or adjudication having nothing to do with the individual’s operation of a vehicle may also be a reasonable basis for the revocation or suspension of the individual’s driver’s license. Thus, one’s license may be revoked or suspended for permitting “an unlawful or fraudulent use of a driver’s license” (625 ILCS 5/6— 206(a)(5) (West 2008)); for making a false statement or knowingly concealing a material fact in an application for a driver’s license (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(9) (West 2008)); for possessing, displaying or attempting to fraudulently use the license of another person (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(10) (West 2008)); or for altering or attempting to alter a license or possessing an altered license (625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(26) (West 2008)). None of these offenses relate to the individual’s ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. In each instance, however, the legislature has determined that the individual who commits such an offense may forfeit his right to drive, at least temporarily. Section 6 — 204’s mention of “unfitness to safely operate motor vehicles,” therefore, cannot be viewed as the legislature’s expression of a single overarching purpose for all of the provisions of article II, chapter 6, of the Vehicle Code. It is entirely possible that sections 6 — 201, 6 — 205, and 6 — 206 are intended to serve different purposes, or that some of the 43 subsections of section 6 — 206 are intended to serve different or multiple purposes. Lindner should be overruled to the extent that it so narrowly defines the public purpose of this article and, thereby, limits consideration of other public purposes that may be served by a challenged provision. In addition to relying on section 6 — 204, Lindner inferred the public purpose of section 6 — 205 as a whole from the fact that with the exception of the challenged section, “every subsection of sections 6 — 205(a) and (b) has some affinity with a motor vehicle — either the operation or ownership of the vehicle, or the paperwork connected to such operation or ownership.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. Thus, even while acknowledging that section 6 — 205(b)(2) provided for revocation of a driver’s license “regardless of whether a vehicle was used in their commission” of the crime, the court nevertheless concluded that “section 6 — 205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature’s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. That is, this court determined that when two sections of the same statute reflected different legislative intents, one section was a true expression of purpose and the other section was not a true expression of purpose. As the dissenting justice pointed out, this conclusion defies logic. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190-91 (Miller, J., dissenting) (the presence in section 6 — 205 of subsection (b)(2), which requires revocation for offenses not related to the operation of a motor vehicle, demonstrates that “the statutory scheme must actually serve at least one additional purpose not specified in the general statement of intent” that the majority found in section 6 — 204). Thus, by including a provision within section 6 — 205 that required license revocation on some basis other than an offense involving the use of a motor vehicle, the legislature clearly had another purpose in mind. In my opinion, the Lindner court’s “unnecessarily crimped view of the purpose of the legislation and the interests served by it” (Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 188 (Miller, J., dissenting)) led directly and inevitably to its finding the challenged provision unconstitutional. Had the legislative purpose been viewed more broadly, as the plain language of the statute required, the court could then have determined whether that purpose was a legitimate legislative purpose and whether the challenged provision was rationally related to that purpose. Instead, that analysis was short-circuited by the court’s answer to the threshold question. I have no opinion on whether the Lindner court reached the correct result in that case. It is possible that section 6 — 205(b)(2) may have been found unconstitutional even if the legislative purpose had been properly defined. This court might have found that the legislative purpose was not legitimate or that the provision was not rationally related to that purpose. In keeping with the doctrine of stare decisis, this court does not overrule a prior decision absent good cause or a compelling reason. Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 505 (2006). We do not depart from established precedent, such as our decision in Lindner, merely because we might have decided otherwise if we were writing on a blank slate. However, good cause to depart from stare decisis exists when “serious detriment prejudicial to public interests is likely to result” and when a governing decision is “unworkable or [is] badly reasoned.” Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 505-06. This court is now faced with the precise situation envisioned by the dissenting justice in that case. By continuing to adhere to Lindner’s “unnecessarily crimped view” of the purpose of section 6 — 205, we find ourselves constrained in our consideration of the constitutionality of a provision in section 6 — 206. We must either acknowledge that Lindner was badly reasoned on this point, producing a result that is detrimental to the public interest, or affirm the trial court, which found section 6 — 206(a)(43) unconstitutional. Rather than expressly overruling Lindner, the lead opinion applies its rule in such a way as to render it almost meaningless. Lindner contains four statements in which this court identified the purpose of the statute. First, “We think section 6 — 205(a)(3) clearly reflects the legislature’s intent that revocation be tied to offenses involving the use of a motor vehicle.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181-82. Second, “The stated purpose is to ensure that drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. Third, “[W]e conclude that the public interest the statute was intended to protect is the interest in keeping the roads free of two kinds of drivers: those who threaten the safety of others, and those who have abused the privilege to drive by doing so illegally ***.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. And fourth, “In short, the public interest is the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. The lead opinion finds that section 206(a)(43) “unquestionably furthers the public interest in the safe and legal operation of motor vehicles” (238 111. 2d at 9), but does not acknowledge that the offense of possession of alcohol by a person under the age of 21 (235 ILCS 6/6 — 20 (West 2008)) is not tied to an offense involving the use of a vehicle, or that individuals who commit this offense have not demonstrated that they are unfit to safely operate a vehicle, or that such persons have not threatened the safety of others or abused the privilege of driving by doing so illegally. In effect, the lead opinion chooses the broadest and most expansive statement of purpose from Lindner, while ignoring the substance of Lindner. The trial court, however, properly applied Lindner and found that the very narrow purpose expressed in the first three of the four passages quoted above was not met. The lead opinion then finds this broader public purpose served based on the legislature’s possible belief “that a young person who has a driver’s license and consumes alcohol illegally may take the additional step of driving after consuming alcohol. It is reasonable to believe a young person disobeying the law against underage consumption of alcohol may also lack the judgment to decline to drive after drinking.” 238 Ill. 2d at 9. This conclusion may reflect the lead opinion’s effort to resolve all doubts in favor of finding the provision constitutional and to give effect to the strong presumption of constitutionality. In re Marriage of Miller, 227 Ill. 2d 185, 195 (2007). However, by reaching so far to find a rational relationship between the now more broadly defined legislative purpose and the challenged statute, the lead opinion has saved Lindner by rendering it meaningless. In essence, the lead opinion concludes that because an individual may commit one crime, he may lack the judgment to decline to commit another crime. Under this reasoning, the legislature could provide that a conviction of domestic battery is grounds for the suspension of the offender’s driver’s license because his anger issues make him likely to succumb to road rage; or that a person who has been found liable in a civil action for negligence causing the death or injury of another person, even if no motor vehicle was involved, should have his license suspended or revoked because he has demonstrated that he cannot be counted upon to exercise ordinary care. Indeed, the statute at issue in Lindner would likely survive this analysis because an individual who would commit acts of sexual assault against his minor stepdaughters cannot be trusted to resist the temptation to lure a child into his car. In addition, if this court were to overrule Lindner to the extent I suggest, it could also correct an imprecise statement in that case. In defining the rational basis test, this court stated that the legislative enactment must bear a “ ‘ “reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.) Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180, quoting People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 65-66 (1985), quoting Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 453 (1979). Immediately thereafter, this court cited Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 368 (1986), for the proposition that a “statute will be upheld if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.” (Emphasis added.) The Lindner court improperly shifted its focus from discerning whether there might have been a legitimate legislative purpose for the challenged provision to the question of whether the provision served the public interest the statute as a whole was intended to protect and then set about finding that purpose. The difference is subtle, but significant. In People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 203-04 (2004), we stated that the “rational basis test is satisfied where the challenged statute bears a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature intended to achieve in enacting the statute.” Thus, if the legislature has identified a purpose for its enactment of a statute, and if that purpose is legitimate, the rational basis test is satisfied if the statute bears a rational relationship to that purpose. However a challenged statute will still satisfy the rational basis test if it bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, we said in People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007), that “[u]nder the rational basis test, our inquiry is twofold: we must determine whether there is a legitimate state interest behind the legislation, and if so, whether there is a reasonable relationship between that interest and the means the legislature has chosen to pursue it.” Further, “[t]he rational basis test is highly deferential; its focus is not on the wisdom of the statute. [Citation.] If there is any conceivable set of facts to show a rational basis for the statute, it will be upheld.” Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d at 585. See also Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 307 (2008) (“a legitimate legislative purpose”); Davis v. Brown, 221 Ill. 2d 435, 450 (2006) (“a legitimate state interest”); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 310 (2005) (“a legitimate state interest”); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000) (“a public interest to be served”); People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991) (“a public interest to be served”). Taking a broader view of the legislative purpose portion of the inquiry is consistent with due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Defendants’ constitutional challenge to section 6 — 206(a) (43) invoked the due process clauses of both the United States and the Illinois Constitutions. The lead opinion does not distinguish between the two, treating the due process protections of the state and federal constitutions as coextensive. This is consistent with our past practice when the language of the two constitutions is identical or nearly identical. People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 335 (2006). Thus, in Miller, we discerned “no reason to construe our due process clause differently than the federal due process clause on the specific issue before us,” and therefore treated the two clauses as coextensive and were guided by federal precedent. Miller, 227 Ill. 2d at 196. Under federal precedent, a court will not strike down a statute under the rational basis test even if the reasonable relationship between the statute and a legitimate legislative purpose is hypothetical. It is entirely appropriate for the court to consider what purpose the legislature might have intended to serve or what the legislature “might have concluded” (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487, 99 L. Ed. 563, 572, 75 S. Ct. 461, 464 (1955)) about the relationship between its intent and the method chosen to effectuate it. “[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-88, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. A court will not strike down a law on due process grounds merely because the law may be “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488, 99 L. Ed at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464. In such instances, if the people seek change in the law, they “ ‘must resort to the polls, not to the courts.’ ” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 48, 99 L. Ed. at 572, 75 S. Ct. at 464-65, quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L. Ed. 77, 87 (1876). I note that section 6 — 206(a)(43) was enacted in 2007 and took effect on January 1, 2008, decades after the enactment of the provision that is now codified at section 2 — 206. Later additions to section 2 — 206 do not necessarily share the same legislative purpose as earlier enactments or, if they share the same general purpose, they may be intended to serve an additional purpose as well. See Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 190 (Miller, J., dissenting). The decision to codify this provision in section 6 — 206(a) may be a result of the organizational scheme of chapter 6 rather than an expression of identical purpose. With this in mind, and guided by the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Williamson, I would look beyond sections 6 — 204 and 6 — 205 of the Vehicle Code to discern the evil that the legislature might have intended to address by enacting section 6 — 206(a)(43). In 2002, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 92 — 804, which amended section 4 — 4 of the Liquor Control Act and added subsection (a)(38) to section 6 — 206 of the Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver’s license of a person “convicted of a violation of Section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act of 1934 or a similar provision of a local ordinance.” (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(38) (West 2008). Section 6 — 20 defines the offenses of illegal transfer, possession and consumption of alcoholic liquor by an underage person. 235 ILCS 5/6 — 20 (West 2008). In 2007, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 95 — 166, entitled “AN ACT concerning transportation.” Pub. Act 95 — 166, eff. January 1, 2008. Again, the Act amended the Liquor Control Act and the Vehicle Code. The effect of these amendments was to provide discretionary authority to the Secretary of State for the suspension or revocation of the driver’s license of a person who received a disposition of court supervision for a violation of section 6 — 20. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 206(a)(43) (West 2008). During the third reading of the bill in the House of Representatives, its chief sponsor, Representative Tom Cross, spoke: “This is a Bill that deals with drinking by teenagers, specifically minors. As we all know, the law says if you’re under 21, you cannot drink in the State of Illinois. This Bill provides that in the event of a court supervision, which I think is a good concept *** that you would lose your driver’s license for a period of three (3) months. That has not been the case when someone receives court supervision. We had a rather tragic incident in Oswego, a couple of months ago, where five (5) young children lost their lives. Alcohol was involved. This is an attempt to address that issue and it has unfortunately been a problem around the state.” 95th 111. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 27, 2007, at 22 (statements of Representative Cross). Representative Cross did not specifically state that the driver who caused this accident was a teenager who was then under court supervision for a violation of section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act, although this fact seems to be implied by his remarks. Nevertheless, we are not constrained by the language of the statute or by the legislative history (of which there is very little) when discerning what “evil” the legislature might have been addressing. We may ask ourselves, in light of the overall legislative scheme and common sense, what the legislative purpose might have been for the enactment. One purpose of adding subsections (a) (38) and (a) (43) to section 6 — 206 may have been to encourage compliance with section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act, which is specifically referenced in both provisions. The purpose of the Liquor Control Act is that “the health, safety and welfare of the People of the State of Illinois shall be protected and temperance in the consumption of alcoholic liquors shall be fostered and promoted by sound and careful control and regulation of the manufacture, sale and distribution of alcoholic liquors.” 235 ILCS 5/1 — 2 (West 2008). Sections 6 — 206(a) (38) and (a) (43) may be intended to effectuate this legitimate legislative purpose by giving persons under the age of 21 an incentive to resist the peer pressure to drink by conditioning their continued ability to drive on compliance with section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Code. In the absence of an express statement of the intent of our own legislature, we can also look to similar enactments in other states, for our own legislators may have had a similar purpose. The California legislature made specific findings when it enacted a statute that suspended the driving privileges of persons under the age of 21 who committed offenses involving controlled substances. “(a) The Legislature finds and declares as follows: * * ‘(3) Individuals who abuse drugs or alcohol demonstrate a dangerous disregard for the safe legal operation of motor vehicles. The risk is particularly acute for individuals under the age of 21. ‘(4) The increased potential for teenage death in vehicle collisions and other nondriving accidents, homicides, and suicides, while being under the influence of drugs or alcohol, requires special attention in order to reduce the statewide youth fatality rate and to control unlawful and unsafe driving practices. ‘(b) It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature to enact this measure in,an attempt to reduce the incidence of young drivers on the highways and roads of this state who, because of their use of alcohol or other illegal drugs, pose a danger to the health and safety of other drivers by all or a combination of the following methods: ‘(1) To prevent use of motor vehicles by drivers under the age of 21 years by suspending their driving privileges for one year from the date of conviction, because a one year suspension of these drivers’ privileges may provide a means of deterring use of alcohol, and other illegal drugs by these young persons.” People v. Valenzuela, 3 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 6, 9-10, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 493 (1991), quoting Stats. 1988, ch. 1254, §1, at 4175-76. These legislative findings are entirely consistent with the concerns expressed by the sponsor of the bill that resulted in the enactment of section 6 — -206(a)(43). I would find that the legitimate legislative purposes of the enactment were to encourage compliance with section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act and to protect the individual young person and the public by suspending the driving privileges of those young persons who, by violating section 6 — 20, have demonstrated that they should not be entrusted with the operation of a motor vehicle. If the means chosen — suspension of the driver’s license — bears a reasonable relationship to this purpose, the statute may not be struck down. Johnson, 225 111. 2d at 585. The lead opinion acknowledges that the statute “must be upheld if there is a conceivable basis for finding it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest” and that the legislature’s judgment is “not subject to judicial fact finding and ‘may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.’ ” 238 Ill. 2d at 7, quoting Arangold, Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147 (2003). It is entirely rational for the legislature to conclude that the possible suspension of one’s driver’s license may serve as an incentive to comply with a law or court order. For example, section 6 — 201(a)(3) of the Vehicle Code provides that the Secretary of State may cancel a license or permit for failure to pay fees or civil penalties owed to the Illinois Commerce Commission. 625 ILCS 5/6— 201(a)(3) (West 2008). Section 6 — 201(a)(9) provides that the Secretary may cancel the license of any person who “has been convicted of a sex offense as defined in the Sex Offender Registration Act,” and that the license shall remain cancelled until the person registers as required and has otherwise complied with the requirements of the Registration Act. 625 ILCS 5/6 — 201(a)(9) (West 2008). Section 6 — 103(14) provides that the Secretary “shall not issue, renew, or allow the retention of any driver’s license nor issue any permit under this Code *** [t]o any person who is 90 days or more delinquent in court ordered child support payments or has been adjudicated in arrears in an amount equal to 90 days’ obligation or more and who has been found in contempt of court for failure to pay the support.” 625 ILCS 5/6 — 103(14) (West 2008). Under the reasoning of Lindner, these provisions would be unconstitutional because they do not relate directly to the narrowly defined public interest in ensuring that “drivers who have demonstrated they are unfit to safely operate vehicles are not allowed to drive.” Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 182. However, it is clear that the legislature, on occasion, uses the provisions of the Vehicle Code to advance broader public purposes. I would find that section 6 — 206(a)(43) bears a rational relationship to the legitimate public purposes of encouraging compliance with section 6 — 20 of the Liquor Control Act and of protecting young drivers and the public from the potentially fatal consequences that may follow when a young person whose judgment is impaired by alcohol gets behind the wheel of a car. JUSTICE THOMAS joins in this special concurrence.