Court Opinion

ID: 9914933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 18:12:43.141655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:26.729995
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                      Washington State
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Division Two

                                                                                       January 3, 2024

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
    In the Matter of the Marriage of:

    CHEYNE C. PARHAM,                                              No. 57919-7-II

                          Appellant,

           v.
                                                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    MARY JOY PARHAM,

                          Respondent.

          PRICE, J. — Cheyne C. Parham appeals the superior court’s order granting Mary Joy

Parham’s motion to vacate the order of default and final orders entered in their dissolution. 1

Cheyne argues the superior court abused its discretion by granting Mary Joy’s motion to vacate.

We disagree and affirm.

                                              FACTS

          On August 4, 2021, Cheyne filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Mary Joy.

Cheyne also filed a proposed parenting plan. Mary Joy was served with the summons and petition.

A trial setting hearing was noted for December. Mary Joy did not file a response.

          On November 17, 2021, the superior court emailed the parties and informed them that no

response to the petition had been filed so the December trial setting hearing was cancelled. The

1
 Because it appears from the record that the parties have the same last name, we use their first
names for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
No. 57919-7-II

email also stated that a trial date would not be set unless a response was filed or the petitioner

moved for an order of default. Still no response to the petition was filed.

       About two weeks later, Cheyne moved for an order of default. On December 14, 2021, the

superior court entered an order of default. Based on the default, the superior court did not assess

Cheyne’s proposed orders, but merely entered final dissolution orders that were consistent with

his petition and proposed parenting plan.

       After the final dissolution orders were entered, Cheyne and Mary Joy took steps to comply

with the final dissolution orders. Mary Joy identified and obtained personal property from the

family home that she wanted. Mary Joy also cooperated with Cheyne to transfer the title of the

vehicle that was awarded to her in the dissolution.

       However, eleven months later, on November 28, 2022, Mary Joy, with the assistance of an

attorney, filed a motion to vacate the final dissolution orders.       The motion was based on

CR 60(b)(1) and CR 60(b)(11). In her motion, Mary Joy stated the grounds for relief:

       Respondent was never provided an opportunity to review final orders and was pro
       se and understood that December 10, 2021 was her opportunity to appear in court.
       Upon informing [Mary Joy] that the hearing originally set for December 10, 2021
       was cancelled, [Cheyne] failed to inform [Mary Joy] of the motion for default and
       did not provide her with final orders until September 2022. The final orders do not
       make a just and equitable distribution of assets and debts. The final parenting plan
       and order of child support are not in the children’s best interests . . . .

Clerk’s Papers at 104.

       Cheyne objected to the motion to vacate, arguing that Mary Joy failed to show that the final

orders do not make a just and equitable distribution of property or that the parenting plan was not

in the best interests of the children. In response, Mary Joy claimed that she was a non-native

English speaker and pro se litigant and she did not understand she needed to file a response to the

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No. 57919-7-II

petition. Mary Joy’s lawyer also filed a declaration stating that she used a language line interpreter

in order to meet with Mary Joy.

       In a supplemental declaration, Cheyne declared that, although Mary Joy was born in the

Philippines, English is an official language of the Philippines and Mary Joy was proficient and

fully-functional speaking in English. Cheyne also documented all the steps Mary Joy had taken

to comply with the final dissolution orders since they were entered, including transferring title to

property and taking pieces of personal property from the family home.

       At the hearing on Mary Joy’s motion to vacate, Mary Joy argued that she mistakenly

believed that she did not have to take any action except to show up at the trial setting hearing

(initially scheduled for December 2021) because she was acting pro se. And she also argued that

the language barrier contributed to her failure to respond. She contended that the final orders did

not make a just and equitable distribution of property because Cheyne’s military pension was

awarded entirely to him. Finally, she alleged the parenting plan did not take into account Cheyne’s

military service or Mary Joy’s history of being the primary parent during his military service.

       The superior court noted that default judgments are generally disfavored and the motion to

vacate was brought within one year of the default. The superior court also emphasized that the

language barrier was a significant barrier that could not be overlooked. VRP 17. The superior

court said,

       So I don’t necessarily want to vacate the divorce unless you both agree on that. But
       I think the court needs -- the court needs to hear the fair and equitable division of
       the property and if there [are] any parenting plan issues. Because the court is the
       ultimate, even if the parents agree on a parenting plan, once there is some
       knowledge of, you know, agreement then the court must make the final decision on
       a parenting plan.

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No. 57919-7-II

Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 17.

          Ultimately, the superior court granted Mary Joy’s motion and entered an order vacating the

order of default and the final dissolution orders. However, the superior court ordered that the

parties’ marital status remained dissolved. Cheyne filed a motion for reconsideration, which was

denied.

          Cheyne appeals.

                                              ANALYSIS

          Cheyne argues that the superior court erred by granting Mary Joy’s motion to vacate the

order of default and the final dissolution orders. We disagree.

          We review the superior court’s decision to set aside a default judgment for an abuse of

discretion. Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 702, 161 P.3d 345 (2007). “A [superior] court abuses

its discretion by making a decision that is manifestly unreasonable or by basing its decision on

untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” VanderStoep v. Guthrie, 200 Wn. App. 507, 518, 402

P.3d 883 (2017), review denied, 189 Wn.2d 1041 (2018). “[W]e are more likely to find an abuse

of discretion when the [superior] court denies a motion to set aside a default judgment than when

the [superior] court grants such a motion.” Id. “[D]efault judgments generally are disfavored

because courts prefer to resolve cases on their merits.” Id. at 517.

          CR 60(b)(1) provides for relief from a judgment for “[m]istakes, inadvertence, surprise,

excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.” Courts apply a four-pronged

test to determine if a default judgment should be vacated under CR 60(b)(1):

          (1) that there is substantial evidence supporting a prima facie defense; (2) that the
          failure to timely appear and answer was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
          excusable neglect; (3) that the defendant acted with due diligence after notice of the

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No. 57919-7-II

       default judgment; and (4) that the plaintiff will not suffer a substantial hardship if
       the default judgment is vacated.

Little, 160 Wn.2d at 703-04. The first two factors are the primary considerations in whether to set

aside a default judgment. Id. at 704 (“Factors (1) and (2) are primary; factors (3) and (4) are

secondary.”).

       The test is not mechanical; whether to set aside a default judgment is ultimately a matter

of equity. Id. “Our primary concern is whether justice is being done.” VanderStoep, 200 Wn.

App. at 517. We must determine whether the superior court’s decision is ultimately just and

equitable. Id. “What is just and equitable must be determined based on the specific facts of each

case, not based on a fixed rule.” Id. at 517-18.

       Applying each of the four-prongs of the test, especially the first two “primary factors,” the

superior court did not abuse its discretion by granting Mary Joy’s motion to vacate. As to the first

factor related to a prima facie defense, dissolution cases are different from other types of civil

cases in that there are not formal claims and defenses. Instead, the superior court is mandated to

make a just and equitable distribution of property and enter a parenting plan that is in the best

interests of the children. RCW 26.09.002, .080. Here, Mary Joy raised concerns about the just

and equitable distribution of property, specifically concerns related to the award of Cheyne’s

military pension to Cheyne in its entirety. Mary Joy also identified concerns about the parenting

plan not being in the best interests of the children due to her history of being the primary parent

during Cheyne’s periods of military service. Therefore, Mary Joy presented evidence establishing

the equivalent of a prima facie defense to the final dissolution orders.

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No. 57919-7-II

       As to the second factor related to whether the failure to respond was due to a mistake,

Mary Joy alleged that as a pro se litigant and non-native English speaker, she mistakenly believed

that she only had to appear when the superior court set a hearing date. The parties contested Mary

Joy’s fluency, but regardless, her pro se status combined with the fact that English was not her first

language made it a reasonable conclusion that Mary Joy failed to appear due to a mistake.

       As to the third factor related to delay, we recognize that 11 months is a significant period

of time to wait to bring a motion to vacate. But there is evidence in the record that Mary Joy did

not receive copies of the final orders until September 2022 and that it took some time for Mary

Joy to obtain an attorney and determine there was reason to pursue a motion to vacate. And as to

the fourth factor related to substantial hardship, there is obvious inconvenience to Cheyne in the

potential redistribution of property when the final dissolution orders had been in place for almost

a year. However, in light of the focus on equities involved in dissolution proceedings, this

inconvenience does not, on balance, necessarily translate into a substantial hardship.

       Although we may not have made the same decision as the trial court, we cannot say that

the superior court’s decision was based on untenable grounds or reasons. It is true that not all of

the factors of the 4-pronged test clearly weigh in favor of Mary Joy. But the first two factors—

factors to which we give primary consideration—do weigh in her favor. And we cannot ignore

both the foundational principle that default judgments generally are disfavored and the

considerable deference we give to superior courts on these questions. See VanderStoep, 200 Wn.

App. at 517-18. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s order vacating the order of default

and the final dissolution orders.

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No. 57919-7-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    PRICE, J.
 We concur:

 LEE, P.J.

 VELJACIC, J.

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