Court Opinion

ID: 9552820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:17:37.228998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:05.772297
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
I
*217I.
The majority in this case affirm a robbery conviction even though at trial no witness was able to identify appellant and the prosecution presented no independent evidence linking him to the crime.
In reaching this conclusion, the majority ignore a crucial aspect of this court’s decision in People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334 [161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401] which precludes application of the Chavez holding to this case.
Prior to Chavez, a line of cases stretching back over 20 years held that an extrajudicial pretrial identification was not sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction. (In re Johnny G. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 543 [159 Cal.Rptr. 180, 601 P.2d 196]; People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865].)
In Chavez, this court found that a prior in-court identification could support a conviction where there was credible evidence that the identification was more trustworthy than the failure to identify at trial. The jury in Chavez was told that the witness had been reluctant to testify throughout the proceedings, and he had indicated that he preferred to settle the case “in the streets.” Chavez distinguished Johnny G. and Gould on this basis, stating that the records in those cases “afforded no basis for concluding that the prior statement’s probative value was any greater than the probative value of the witness’ testimony in court.” (Chavez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 363.)
In this case, as in Johnny G. and Gould, the jury was given no evidence from which it could conclude that the identification at the preliminary hearing was more reliable than the witness’ inability to identify at trial. In fact, the witness, Walter Lane, repudiated at the trial his prior identification and asserted that he had not meant to give a positive identification at the preliminary examination. He said that he had intended only to say that appellant looked like the photograph he had previously selected at a photographic display.
The majority assert that the transcript of Mr. Lane’s identification at the preliminary hearing belies his claim that he had not intended to identify the appellant. Although his testimony on direct examination appears unequivocal, on cross-examination at the preliminary hearing he did indicate that he was identifying appellant as the man whose pho*218tograph he had selected.1 This conforms to his explanation at the trial of his preliminary examination testimony.
In the final analysis, the witness’ exact words at the preliminary examination are largely irrelevant. More important than the particular words used is his own explanation of what he was trying to say. Mr. Lane was a neutral citizen, a victim of a crime. His credibility was unimpeached. He asserted at trial that he was unable to identify appellant and had been unable to identify him at all stages of the proceedings. The witness had no motive to lie and every reason to assist the judicial system in apprehending the man who robbed him.2
On this record, there was absolutely no reason to disbelieve this unbiased witness, and no reason to trust the cold transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony rather than his insistent assertion at trial that he could not say that appellant was the robber of his store.
With no independent evidence to connect appellant with the robbery of Walt’s Plant Store, no reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had committed that crime. I would reverse the judgment on that count for insufficient evidence.
II.
I must also write separately to question whether this court has fulfilled its obligations under the Constitution of this state. The court is *219required under article VI, section 14 to issue its decisions in writing with reasons.3 When this court alludes to a nonexistent Court of Appeal opinion for the basis of its opinion, it is not giving to the litigants and the public a method by which they will be able to discern the decision and legal reasoning of this court. The Court of Appeal opinion was vacated when this court granted a hearing in this case. Yet, the majority opinion alludes to that nonexistent Court of Appeal opinion for a resolution of a number of issues raised by the appeal.
How can the public know what the other issues were and how they were decided? How do future litigants cite the decision in this case? These are but a few of the questions this new method of disposition raises.
Since the court is violating the strictures of the Constitution in adopting this procedure, I must respectfully disassociate myself from this questionable practice.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 16, 1981. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Mr. Lane was asked, “And you recognize this man as being the man who was depicted in the picture you saw; is that right?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Is that right?
“A. I recognize the man as what?
“Q. As being the man in the picture that you saw; is that correct?
“A. Yes.”

The record indicates that the day before Mr. Lane testified at trial he conversed with the appellant and appellant’s wife in the hallway outside the courtroom. At oral argument, the Attorney General suggested that the jury might have concluded from this evidence that Mr. Lane had been intimidated, and that the jury therefore reasonably could have decided to discount his testimony at trial.
However, the transcript of Mr. Lane’s trial testimony indicates that he described his encounter with the appellant in the most innocuous terms. He said, “I think everybody was talking. We were trying to get on the elevator to go down. Everyone that came down was full, so she [appellant’s wife] said, ‘You have to go up, probably, to get one going down.’ [It] We started to do that when we finally got one that was going down.
“Q. Did you go down in the same elevator as Mrs. Ford?
“A. Yes.”
This was the total of Mr. Lane’s description of his encounter with appellant.

Article VI, section 14 of the state Constitution provides in pertinent part, “Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”