Court Opinion

ID: 9760887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:21:26.161284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.281763
License: Public Domain

COOK, Justice,
concurring.
Today the court adopts a reasonable and practical approach to the problem of determining primary use of a place of religious worship. It is a fair approach, one which does not stretch the exemption beyond the constitutional limit or beyond the intent of the legislature. It is an approach which offers appraisal districts common sense guidance to the task of applying the concept of “primary use.” And it does not, as the dissent would do, confine the exemption so narrowly as to eradicate it altogether.
Many states have grappled with the definition of “use” in statutes similar to ours. Most of these states apply a rule of strict construction to their exemption statutes. See, e.g., Church Divinity School v. Alameda County, 152 Cal.App.2d 496, 314 P.2d 209, 211-12 (Cal.Ct.App.1957). Entities claiming the exemption must show that they clearly come within the terms of the exemption. Id. 314 P.2d at 212. Yet, even in the states which grant exemptions based only upon “exclusive use,” the courts have recognized that a relentlessly narrow interpretation of the term “exclusive use” would destroy the exemption. Consequently, these states have adopted a statutory interpretation based upon reasonableness. See, e.g., id. at 212-14 (construction of statute must be reasonable one with due regard for ordinary meaning of language employed and object sought to be accomplished); Lutherans Outdoors in South Dakota, Inc. v. South Dakota Bd. of Equalization, 475 N.W.2d 140, 143 (S.D.1991) (whether property is used exclusively for religious purposes is to be construed reasonably).
The constitution and the statutes of our own state “evince a liberality in the exemption from taxation of property for educational or religious purposes.” Harris v. City of Fort Worth, 142 Tex. 600, 180 S.W.2d 131, 133 (1944). This liberality is particularly evident in the current statute granting a tax exemption for real property used primarily as a place of regular religious worship, as long as it is reasonably necessary for engaging in religious worship. Tex.Tax Code Ann. § 11.20(a)(1) (Vernon Supp.1992). Section 11.20(a)(1) grants the exemption based on primary use, not exclusive use. That the legislature chose the word “primarily” intentionally and carefully is made clear by comparison to section 11.20(a)(3), which grants an exemption based on exclusive use to real property used as a church residence. Id. at § 11.-20(a)(3).
Notwithstanding our state’s consistent historical support of tax exemptions for religious organizations, the dissent displays a hostile attitude toward the tax exemption at issue in this case. The dissent’s unfor-givingly narrow construction of the word “use,” demands that “use” of a parking space can mean only that the space be actually occupied for religious purposes. Such a construction would surely result in loss of an exemption for almost every church facility in the state. For no church actually occupies its real property twenty-four hours a day, either for strictly religious or any other purpose. Every church sanctuary, every adjoining church building, and every church parking lot are vacant many hours during the week.
Are we really to say that these facilities should lose their exemptions because they are not actually used for religious purposes most of the hours of the day? Are we really to demand that church parking spaces be actually occupied for religious purposes most of the time? That kind of thinking would demand that the church in this case either pay taxes or resort to extraordinary measures to insure that each parking space be not only reserved, but actually used for church purposes only. I have an image of the church fencing the lot to prevent unauthorized use by the work force of a congested downtown area. And I can see tax appraisers standing over a set of parking spaces, calculating the number of hours each space is occupied for reli*113gious purposes, commercial purposes, or not used at all. Surely we must reject any statutory interpretation which logically concludes in such impractical demands.
I believe it far more sensible to follow the approach of our court in today’s opinion. In it, we echo the logic and the sentiments of the Florida Supreme Court in a case remarkably similar to the one we now face. Central Baptist Church of Miami Florida, Inc. v. Dade County, 216 So.2d 4 (Fla.1968). In Central Baptist Church, the court explained that the church owned an entire city block in downtown Miami. A large part of the church facility was devoted to parking. Some parking spaces were reserved at all times for church personnel, and all parking was dedicated for use by church members during the evenings and on Sundays. During weekday business hours, the rest of the parking area was rented out as a commercial parking lot. The net income from the lot was devoted by the church to its world missions and its education program.
The controlling Florida statute in Central Baptist Church was consistent with the state constitution in providing for tax exemptions for “houses of public worship.” Id. at 5. The statute expressly prohibited exemptions for “any building being a house of worship which shall be rented or hired for any other purpose except for schools or places of worship_” Id. at 5-6. These facilities, continued the statute, “shall be taxed the same as any other property.” Id. at 6. The court focused on use in interpreting the statute, deciding that it granted a general statutory exemption of property “used for church or religious purposes. Id.
In deciding how the statute should affect the peculiar problem of the downtown church, the court asked what the legislature tried to do when drafting the statute. The court focused on the limited nature of the rental and on the fact that the portion of the lot rented did not place that portion beyond the regular and customary church use. Id. The court distinguished between the situation presented by the case and hypothetical situations where church property might be held by private persons for speculative purposes or rented for a non-worship or nonschool purpose. These situations would represent significant diversions from church use and would justify loss of the exemption. “However,” stated the court, “lesser and more limited divergent uses of church property are apparently not deemed by the Legislature sufficiently inconsistent with church purposes to lift the exemption, provided the funds derived from such uses are not diverted to purposes not contemplated by [the constitution].” Id. The court added:
[T]he limited part time rental of a portion of the church lot for commercial parking on weekday business hours is reasonably incidental to the primary use of the church property as a whole for church or religious purposes and is not a sufficiently divergent commercial use that eliminates the exemption as to the commercial parking lot portion of the property.

Id.

1

I wish to suggest why the people of our state have insisted, in both constitution and statute, on granting tax exemptions to *114churches such as the one in this case. Churches, and downtown churches in particular, do something more than occupy valuable downtown real estate. Downtown churches offer a source of calm and hope to the frenzied workers of the commercial district. They often serve the poor and the homeless of poverty-stricken downtown areas, providing shelter, food for the hungry, and counseling. Downtown churches are often beautiful to behold. They uplift. They are frequently ancient, serving as historical reminders of the courage which sustained our forebears as they constructed our cities. For the services they provide, these churches do not charge the public, nor do they make a profit. Instead, they dedicate all funds into the church and its work.
For many years, these factors have contributed to the public’s decision to spare churches from the burden of taxation. It is not unreasonable for us, given the people’s preference, to offer this downtown church every opportunity to prove that it complies with the terms of the statute and is entitled to the exemption.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the court.

. The statute which this opinion construes is no longer in existence. The statute was altered by the Florida legislature after litigants challenged the statute in a lawsuit based on federal constitutional grounds. The statute was never stricken by the federal courts. In fact, the statute’s constitutionality was sustained in federal district court. See generally Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 316 F.Supp. 1116 (S.D.Fla.1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 412, 92 S.Ct. 574, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 (1972). The suit was awaiting decision by the United States Supreme Court when the legislature made the change. That Court remanded the case to the district court so the litigants could amend their pleadings to attack the new statute. 404 U.S. at 415, 92 S.Ct. at 576.
The Florida Supreme Court’s Central Baptist Church opinion construes the law of Florida as it existed at the time and, to that extent, the opinion remains good law. Our current statute is similar to the old Florida statute. The facts we face today bear a remarkable resemblance to those the Florida court faced. And, like that court, we face no federal constitutional challenge. The thoughtful reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court helps understand the particular problems facing us as we consider the meaning of our own statute and the facts of our own case.