Court Opinion

ID: 9920884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:02:33.831774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:34.965139
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Banks CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                    B330260

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA501795)
           v.

 DAVID BANKS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________
                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1
      A jury convicted defendant David Banks of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and carjacking (id., § 215,
subd. (a); count 2). Trial evidence showed another unknown
individual participated with Banks in committing these crimes.
Banks argues we should reverse his conviction because his trial
counsel failed to request a pattern instruction telling jurors not to
speculate whether the “other perpetrator” of the crimes was or
would be prosecuted. We reject Banks’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and affirm his judgment of conviction.
A.    The Evidence at Trial
      In December 2021, Fernando A.2 was 17 years old and
made money by selling chips and candy at his school. He used
his earnings to buy a “pocket bike,” which is a miniature
motorcycle. On December 5, 2021, after Fernando bought chips
and candy for resale, he stopped to get gas for his pocket bike
before going home.
      At the filling station, a gray SUV pulled up behind
Fernando. Surveillance video showed that the SUV initially
drove past the station, but then reversed and backed up to stop
next to Fernando. An unknown man wearing a ski mask (Doe)
got out of the SUV, approached Fernando, and asked where

      1 Pursuant to California Standards of Judicial
Administration, section 8.1(1), we address this matter by
memorandum opinion. Accordingly, we discuss only those facts
necessary to our resolution.
      2 Because he is a victim in a criminal proceeding, we use
Fernando’s first name and the initial letter of his surname. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

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Fernando was from. Fernando understood this to be a gang-
related challenge and responded that he was not from anywhere.
Doe stated his gang affiliation, and Fernando said something like
“What’s that” or “I don’t know what that [is].” This comment
visibly bothered Doe, who became more aggressive and crept
towards Fernando, making Fernando nervous.
       Fernando heard someone else say, “Get off the bike.”
Fernando then saw Banks, who was standing a couple of feet
away. Banks lifted his jacket to reveal the outline of a gun under
his shirt, tucked into his waistband; Fernando did not see the
gun itself. Afraid, Fernando immediately put his hands in the air
and got off his pocket bike.
       As soon as Fernando dismounted, Banks ordered Doe to get
on the bike. Banks asked Fernando what was in his duffel bag.
Fernando showed Banks that it was just chips and candy; Banks
was not interested. Banks demanded to know what else
Fernando had. Fernando said he had an iPhone but pleaded with
Banks not to take it. Throughout this encounter, Banks rested
his hand on top of the bulge of his gun. Fernando kept his hands
up in the air; he was scared and shaking, and obeyed Banks’s
directions out of fear.
       Meanwhile, Doe struggled to start the pocket bike.
Fernando eventually told Doe how to start it because Fernando
was scared, knew the motorcycle was going to be stolen, and did
not want to risk his life because Banks had a gun. Once Doe
started the motorcycle, Banks (in the gray SUV) and Doe (on
Fernando’s pocket bike) drove off at the same time and in the
same direction.
       Surveillance footage from the gas station captured the
incident as well as the SUV’s license plate number. About one

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week later, a police officer saw an SUV that appeared to match
the one from the robbery. When the SUV was pulled over, Banks
was driving. When interviewed, Banks admitted being at the gas
station on the night of the robbery, but said he was there trying
to get gas, had nothing to do with the robbery, and did not know
Doe’s name.
       At trial, Banks testified that he knew Doe from the
neighborhood but reiterated he did not know Doe’s name. Doe
asked Banks for a ride but did not tell Banks where Doe was
going. Banks agreed but needed to fill up first and stopped at the
gas station. At the gas station, Banks and Doe got out of the
SUV and approached Fernando. When Doe initially asked Banks
for a ride, Doe did not have a ski mask on. Although they sat
three feet apart in the SUV, Banks did not notice when Doe
donned the ski mask. Banks only listened to Doe speaking to
Fernando; Banks testified he wanted nothing to do with what
Doe was saying. Banks denied speaking to Fernando or looking
at him. The surveillance footage showed Banks’s mouth moving,
but Banks said that was because he spoke to Doe. Banks denied
lifting his clothing to show a gun. He said the surveillance
footage showed him lifting his clothing because Banks took his
cell phone out from his pocket.
B.     Discussion
       Banks claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his trial attorney failed to request the court instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 373, “Other Perpetrator.” That jury
instruction provides: “The evidence shows that (another
person/other persons) may have been involved in the commission
of the crime[s] charged against the defendant. There may be
many reasons why someone who appears to have been involved

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might not be a codefendant in this particular trial. You must not
speculate about whether (that other person has/those other
persons have) been or will be prosecuted. Your duty is to decide
whether the defendant on trial here committed the crime[s]
charged.” (CALCRIM No. 373 (March 2023 ed.).)
      A trial court must give CALCRIM No. 373 if requested but
has no sua sponte duty to give the instruction absent a request.
(See People v. Sanders (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 350, 359
[discussing parallel CALJIC instruction].) No such request was
made. Banks contends his counsel’s failure to make such a
request amounted to constitutionally deficient representation,
and that this deficient representation prejudiced him.
      1.    Standard of Review
       To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must prove: (1) counsel’s representation was
deficient, and (2) counsel’s representation subjected him to
prejudice, meaning there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable.
(People v. Montoya (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 980, 998.) “A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 694 [104 S.Ct. 2025, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].)
       A defendant bears a heavy burden to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal. (People v. Garcia (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 887, 900.) In assessing whether a defendant has
met this burden, we first determine whether the record contains
any explanation for the challenged aspect of representation.
(People v. Jackson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1170, 1188.) The record here
contains no such explanation.

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       When as in this case the record sheds no light on “ ‘why
counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be
ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and
failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal.’
[Citations.]” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
1003.) Stated differently, we will reverse a conviction on
ineffective assistance of counsel grounds “ ‘ “only if the record on
appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational
tactical purpose for [her] act or omission.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052.)
      2.    Banks Fails to Demonstrate No Rational Tactical
            Purpose for Failing to Request CALCRIM No. 373
       Banks asserts that, absent CALCRIM No. 373, “it is likely
the jury convicted [him] not based solely on the evidence, but
because of their disgust that the ‘other perpetrator’ was not being
held accountable” and because of Banks’s mere “association with
the other perpetrator.” He therefore concludes his counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for failing to request the instruction be
given.
       We disagree. The defense sought to blame Doe alone for
what happened. Banks testified that he had nothing to do with
what Doe said and did to Fernando, and that Banks just stood by
and listened. Defense counsel argued Banks was a victim of
circumstance, someone who had “a very poor taste in friends” but
could not be found guilty for having failed to “stop [Doe’s] taking
of the bike.”
       Defense counsel rationally could be concerned that jurors
would interpret CALCRIM No. 373 as telling them not to focus on
Doe (which is where defense counsel wanted them to focus) and

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instead to focus solely on Banks’s actions (which strongly pointed
to his guilt). After all, the instruction would have told jurors not
to speculate about any prosecution of Doe and instead focus on
“whether the defendant on trial here,” namely Banks, “committed
the crime[s] charged.” (Ibid.) Counsel also could have been
concerned that the instruction would lead jurors to give
disproportionate weight to Banks’s refusal to identify Doe. While
telling jurors not to speculate whether Doe had been or would be
prosecuted, the instruction notes, “There may be many reasons
why someone who appears to have been involved might not be a
codefendant in this particular trial.” (Ibid.) Defense counsel
could rationally worry that the instruction would highlight the
primary reason Doe was not a codefendant was Banks’s refusal to
identify him despite the defense claim that Doe was solely
responsible for the theft. In short, Banks’s counsel could
rationally conclude CALCRIM No. 373 would not advance the
defense but instead undermine it.
      3.    Banks Fails to Establish Prejudice
       Even if we were to agree that defense counsel was deficient
in not requesting the court give CALCRIM No. 373, Banks has
not shown the failure to give this instruction prejudiced him.
Banks claims that without the instruction, “the jurors were likely
distracted from their consideration of [his] guilt . . . because they
were wondering why [Doe] was not on trial as well,” and “it is
likely the jury convicted [Banks] not based solely on the evidence,
but because of their disgust that the ‘other perpetrator’ was not
being held accountable.”
       Defense counsel’s alleged deficiency cannot be evaluated
based solely on unsubstantiated speculation. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1018.) The jury instructions as given

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made clear that the jury was to hold Banks responsible for his
own conduct; the prosecutor’s closing argument did not suggest
anything different. The instructions as given did not, as Banks
speculates, permit the jury to find him guilty as a means to hold
someone accountable independent of Banks’s own actions. Jurors
are presumed to follow the court’s instructions (People v. Chhoun
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30), and we decline Banks’s invitation to
speculate to the contrary.
      In addition, the evidence against Banks was extremely
strong; it showed Banks was a boss and not a bystander.
CALCRIM No. 373 “merely says the jury is not to speculate on
whether someone else might or might not be prosecuted.” (People
v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 918 [discussing parallel CALJIC
instruction], italics omitted.) Even if the jury had been told not
to speculate whether Doe was or would be prosecuted, the
evidence showed Banks initially drove past the gas station, then
backed up to stop next to a 17-year-old victim standing by
himself. Banks ordered Fernando off the motorcycle, showed
Fernando that Banks was armed with a handgun, and kept his
hand resting on the gun throughout the encounter. Banks
directed Doe to take the motorcycle. Banks demanded to know
what else Fernando had and checked the duffel bag to see if it
contained anything valuable. Banks waited for Doe to start the
motorbike before Banks left in his SUV in the same direction.
Surveillance video corroborated Fernando’s testimony; the jury
understandably found Banks’s explanation of what occurred not
credible. Given this overwhelming evidence, there is no
reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different
verdict if CALCRIM No. 373 was given.

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                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                        WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

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