Court Opinion

ID: 9623985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:48:12.933848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:37.528216
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I dissent from all portions of the majority opinion except those holding that habeas corpus is a proper remedy in the instant case. The sufficiency of the amended information upon which defendant was tried is not questioned. A jury *670was duly empanelled and sworn to try the case, and after introduction of the state’s evidence, defendant moved for a mistrial, which motion was by the court overruled. Thereafter the state rested its case. Defendant then interposed his motion for a directed verdict of not guilty and discharge. During argument on the latter motion, the court for reasons not provided by statute and on its own motion, without any request by either defendant or the state, declared a mistrial. Defendant’s former motion for. a mistrial had been overruled previously and was no longer before the court. Defendant did not object to the court’s ruling. However, the state requested that the court make a record of its reasons for declaring a mistrial and no statutory reason was given by the court for its action.
When a defendant has been placed upon trial on a criminal charge, the jury is empanelled and sworn before a court of competent jurisdiction, and defendant is tried upon a sufficient information, the court cannot arbitrarily discharge the jury before a verdict is returned, and a discharge in such case, unless an absolute necessity or for a reason provided by statute, will operate as an acquittal providing, of course, that the defendant has not waived his right to claim double jeopardy and has not joined the state in requesting a mistrial. (State v. Smith, 44 Kan. 75, 24 Pac. 84; State v. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, 37 Pac. 174; State v. Allen, 59 Kan. 758, 54 Pac. 1060; State v. Klauer, 70 Kan. 384, 78 Pac. 802; State v. Stiff, 118 Kan. 208, 234 Pac. 700; In re Rockwood, 146 Kan. 386, 69 P. 2d 703.) It is observed from the above decisions that the power to discharge a jury cannot be exercised arbitrarily by the court.
The majority opinion states that the remark made by defense counsel to the effect that “we will even assist them, if they want us to, in the description of the property,” constituted a waiver of jeopardy. In my opinion that statement was made in response to the court’s statement just prior thereto requiring the state to file a new information, and cannot be considered as referring to an earlier statement by the court as to its action in declaring a mistrial.
The constitutional right of a party charged with a crime is that he is not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, and the power of a court to discharge a jury which has been sworn to pass upon the question of his guilt or innocence must be exercised with the view of preserving inviolate his constitutional rights.
I am, of the opinion that the writ should be granted.
Parker and Wertz, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.