Court Opinion

ID: 9855045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:18:36.657208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:39.222569
License: Public Domain

Justice BURNETT:
(Concurring).
I concur with the conclusions reached by the majority opinion. I write separately because the majority bases the separation of powers violation on the “concerted efforts” of members of the executive branch. It is not disputed the events culminating in this constitutional violation were precipitated by a “request” from the Governor.
South Carolina Constitution Article I, § 8, provides:
In the government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.
The separation of powers mandate is followed by the delineation of powers, authority and functions of each branch of government. Article III, § 1 provides the legislative power of this State shall be vested in ... the “General Assembly of the State of South Carolina.”
The majority explains the General Assembly has “the duty and authority to appropriate money as necessary for the operation of the agencies of government and has the right to specify the conditions under which the appropriated monies shall be spent. This the Assembly traditionally does by way of the annual State Appropriations Bill.” State ex rel. McLeod *249v. McInnis, 278 S.C. at 312, 313-14, 295 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1982).
Upon passage of an appropriations, bill, the authority of the Governor extends to approving or vetoing items or sections of the bill. S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 21. The majority acknowledges South Carolina Code Ann. § 11-9-10 (1986) prohibits the expenditure of any monies for any purpose other than that for which the monies were appropriated and “no transfer from one appropriation account to" another shall be made unless such transfer be provided for in the annual appropriation act.” No authority to transfer the colleges and universities’ funds was authorized in the 2001-2002 Appropriation Act.
Through Article IV, § 1, the “supreme executive authority” of South Carolina is vested in the “Chief Magistrate,” the “Governor of the State of South Carolina.” A “simple request” from “the supreme executive authority” of South Carolina issued to an agency with the purpose of effecting changes in the appropriations act violates Article I, § 8. The “request” of the Governor is inconsistent with the “right and duty of the legislature to determine the appropriations of agencies and the programs undertaken.” State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, supra 278 S.C. at 314, 295 S.E.2d at 637.
The majority’s conclusion of a separation of powers violation appears to rest on the “concerted efforts” of members of the executive branch. Although this conclusion is correct, in my view, it is not merely the “concerted effort” of members of the executive branch which effects the violation of Article I, § 8, but it is the act of any member of the executive branch which effects an infringement of the legislative authority and duty to appropriate money. Id.
Justice PLEICONES:
I agree with the majority that the transfer of funds from the colleges and universities to the state treasurer contravened the budget process. I also agree that the governor is not required to exercise his veto power to effectuate a balanced budget. I write separately because I would pursue a different path in arriving at this result.
I have grave reservations regarding the majority’s decision which allows the attorney general to sue the governor, espe*250dally where the issue is whether one branch of government has encroached on the powers of another branch. The attorney general is the governor’s legal representative, and the office of attorney general is part of the executive branch of government. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-1-110 (Supp.2001) (office of attorney general is part of the executive department).
Here, the governor maintains that he has faithfully executed 12 the laws of the state. I do not believe the framers of our state constitution intended to make the attorney general the arbiter of whether his client, the governor, is or is not faithfully executing the law.
This case presents a separation of powers question and should be viewed only in that context. The branch of government aggrieved by the transfer of funds, the General Assembly, is a party to this suit, and is ably represented by its own counsel. In my opinion the Court need not address whether the attorney general may, consonant with the state constitution, ever bring suit against the governor. No one disputes that the General Assembly has the authority to maintain this action. The General Assembly is properly before this Court, and raises the same issues as the attorney general. I would not decide the constitutional issue of the attorney general’s authority to initiate an action against the governor because that decision is not necessary to the determination of this dispute.13
As to the governor’s personal involvement in the transfers, the undisputed facts establish that the governor merely requested the colleges and universities return certain funds to the general fund. The schools complied with the request. The governor neither transferred funds, nor ordered any entity to transfer funds. Cf. Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S.C. 559, 503 S.E.2d 455 (1998) (governor’s veto message does not have force of law). In my opinion the governor, like the attorney general, should be dismissed from this action.

. The state constitution provides that "[t]he Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed....” S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 15.

. See State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 552 S.E.2d 745 (2001).