Court Opinion

ID: 9780962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 14:11:55.189563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:44.455446
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Cranberry                         :
                                              :
              v.                              :
                                              :
Randy J. Spencer,                             :    Nos. 568, 569 & 570 C.D. 2022
                     Appellant                :    Submitted: April 28, 2023

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                            FILED: August 30, 2023

               In these consolidated cases, Randy J. Spencer (Spencer) appeals from
orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County (trial court) dated May
10, 2022, denying Spencer’s post-trial motions following the trial court’s imposition
of the maximum statutorily authorized fines against Spencer for his longstanding
violations of ordinances of the Township of Cranberry (Township). Upon review,
we affirm the trial court’s orders.

                                      I. Background
              Spencer owns several parcels of real property in the Township on which
he stores a large number of junk vehicles. See Reproduced Record (RR) at 139a1
(2016 bid proposal for removal of “117 cars, 11 box trailers [“(some with brakes

       1
         The reproduced record page numbers are followed by a capital “A.” We use a small “a”
here as directed by Rule 2173 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2173.
frozen up & flat tires)”], 7 motorhomes, [and] 8 travel trailers . . .”).2 The Township
has been trying for over a quarter century to induce Spencer to remove the junk
vehicles.    See, e.g., id. at 135a (2016 letter from Spencer to the Township
acknowledging the Township’s expenditure of “large amounts of funds for legal
fees, costs and expenses over the past 20 years” and asserting that “Spencer has
likewise expended large amounts of funds for legal fees . . .”). Spencer paid a fine
for violations in 2007. See id. at 143a-44a (2018 letter from Spencer to the Township
proposing a resolution that would include reimbursement by the Township for the
2007 fine). However, the junk vehicles remained on the properties thereafter.
               In 2019, the Township’s zoning officer issued citations to Spencer for
zoning violations in operating junkyards on six properties. Twp. of Cranberry v.
Spencer, 249 A.3d 9, 11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Spencer I). The citation notices
informed Spencer that he must remove the junk vehicles or appeal the citations
within 30 days. Id. at 12. Spencer did neither. Id.
               Thereafter, the Township filed separate civil enforcement complaints
regarding the six properties with a magisterial district judge (MDJ), who imposed
fines and costs of $609.25 for each property. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 12. Spencer
appealed the MDJ’s judgments to the trial court, where the Township filed de novo

       2
          In Township of Cranberry v. Spencer, 249 A.3d 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Spencer I),
Spencer testified that he tried to “work with the Township” to resolve his zoning violations in
2016. Id. at 13. That effort consisted of a proposal to the Township in which Spencer offered to
move the junk vehicles if the Township would pay relocation costs estimated at over $100,000,
issue him two junkyard licenses for the proposed relocation sites, provide all necessary zoning and
code approvals “automatically granted without the necessity of application,” allow him 12 months
to complete the relocation, and reimburse him for his legal costs and previous fines. RR at 134a-
40a. Spencer also submitted a proposal in 2018 in which he again demanded reimbursement of a
fine he paid in 2007, along with two junkyard licenses, 180 days to move the junk vehicles from
specified properties, and an indefinite time thereafter to move the junk vehicles from the remaining
properties, subject also to delays based on future weather events and any potential health problems
he might suffer. Id. at 143a-44a.

                                                 2
complaints requesting fines of $500 per day for ongoing violations, totaling $21,200
at that point, plus costs and legal fees. Id. After a joint evidentiary hearing, the trial
court concluded that Spencer was improperly using each of the six properties as a
junkyard; however, the trial court treated certain contiguous tracts as single
properties and thereby reduced the amounts of some of the fines imposed by the
MDJ. Id. at 12-14. The trial court filed its order under each of the six case dockets.
Id. at 14.
                 Notwithstanding the trial court’s separate entry of judgment on each
docket, Spencer filed a single notice of appeal listing all six trial court docket
numbers, with a checkmark next to one of them. Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 15. This
Court quashed the appeal as to the other five cases. Id. at 18. We cited the Official
Note to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires
“separate notices of appeal” where one or more orders are entered resolving issues
on more than one docket. Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.3 We also relied on our

       3
           The Official Note to Rule 341 provides, in its entirety:
                 A party needs to file only a single notice of appeal to secure review
                 of prior non-final orders that are made final by the entry of a final
                 order, see K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870-71 (Pa. 2003) (following
                 trial); Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012)
                 (summary judgment). Where, however, one or more orders resolves
                 [sic] issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than
                 one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed. Malanchuk
                 v. Tsimura, 137 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. 2016) (“[C]omplete
                 consolidation (or merger or fusion of actions) does not occur absent
                 a complete identity of parties and claims; separate actions lacking
                 such overlap retain their separate identities and require distinct
                 judgments[.]”); Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 & n.3
                 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quashing appeal taken by single notice of appeal
                 from order on remand for consideration under Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 of
                 two persons’ judgments of sentence).
Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note (italics added).

                                                   3
Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), in
which the Court held that in future cases, “when a single order resolves issues arising
on more than one lower court docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed. The
failure to do so will result in quashal of the appeal.” Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 17
(quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 977) (additional quotation marks omitted). As we
observed in Spencer I, the rule announced in Walker is a “bright-line mandatory
instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal.” Spencer I, 249 A.3d
at 17 (quoting Walker, 185 A.3d at 976-77) (additional quotation marks omitted).
             As for the sixth notice of appeal in Spencer I, this Court found that the
single notice of appeal included an attachment that identified the appeal as relating
to a specific docket concerning the tract designated as the Deep Hollow Property.
249 A.3d at 18. Therefore, while we were constrained to quash the other five
appeals, we concluded that the appeal concerning the Deep Hollow Property had
been properly preserved. Id. at 18-19.
             On the merits, Spencer argued, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred
in the amount of the fine it imposed, in the absence of evidence concerning the
zoning violations. This Court rejected that argument, concluding that once the
Township offered evidence of Spencer’s failure to appeal the zoning officer’s
determination, “the trial court possessed discretion to determine the fines.” Spencer
I, 249 A.3d at 20. Observing that “Spencer has not cooperated with the Township”
in resolving the violation and that the trial court had reduced the amount of the fine
imposed by the MDJ, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination of the amount of the fine. Id. This Court ultimately affirmed the trial
court’s order regarding the Deep Hollow Property. Id. at 23.

                                           4
               Despite the finality of this Court’s decision in Spencer I, Spencer
persisted in failing or refusing to remove the junk vehicles from the properties at
issue. Accordingly, in July 2021, the Township filed three new civil enforcement
actions4 with the MDJ seeking to collect additional fines for the period after our
Spencer I decision. Following a hearing in September 2021, the MDJ entered a
judgment in the jurisdictional maximum of $12,000 plus costs, a total of $12,331.25,
in each of the three cases. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 1515(a)(3) (conferring jurisdiction on
MDJs over civil actions where the maximum amount sought is $12,000 exclusive of
interest and costs).
               The violations themselves had been finally adjudicated in Spencer I,
and Spencer still had not removed the junk vehicles. Thus, he had no substantive
defense against the Township’s enforcement complaints. Nonetheless, Spencer
chose to appeal the MDJ’s judgments to the trial court,5 thereby exposing himself to
a potential maximum judgment of $500 per day, plus costs and legal fees, for each
property, as statutorily authorized by Section 617.2(a) of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code (MPC),6 an amount far in excess of the MDJ’s
maximum jurisdiction. See 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a). After a de novo trial, the trial court
imposed the maximum fine, which by that time had reached $92,500 in each of the

       4
          Presumably, the Township filed three complaints rather than five in recognition of the
trial court’s decision in Spencer I treating some contiguous tracts as single properties for purposes
of calculating fines.
       5
          Spencer also claims to have tried, unsuccessfully, to settle with the Township. As the
Township had already obtained a final judgment against him in Spencer I such that he had no
substantive defense to the zoning violations, it is unclear what inducement Spencer could have
offered the Township that would have made any settlement attractive.
       6
       Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. Section 617.2 of
the MPC was added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329.

                                                 5
three complaints, for a total of $277,500. The trial court also imposed ongoing daily
fines in the maximum amount of $500 in each case.
               Spencer filed motions for post-trial relief. The trial court modified its
decision to eliminate the ongoing daily fines, but otherwise denied the post-trial
motions. These consolidated appeals followed.

                                            II. Issues
               In its order dated October 18, 2022, consolidating Spencer’s appeals,
this Court also questioned the propriety of filing a post-trial motion in a summary
appeal, citing Rule 720(D) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D), and observing that Spencer’s appeal might be untimely. We
directed the parties to address that issue in their briefs, along with the merits of the
appeal. In response to this Court’s directive to address the timeliness of his appeal,
Spencer argues that, notwithstanding the trial court’s inaccurate reference to this
case as a summary appeal, the Rules of Criminal Procedure are inapplicable here
because this is purely a civil proceeding. Hence, Spencer maintains that his appeal
within 30 days after the trial court’s order denying his post-trial motions was timely.
The Township took no position on this issue.
               On the merits, Spencer argues that the trial court abused its discretion,7
in that the trial judge showed ill will, bias, and hostility (designated collectively as
bias hereafter) toward him in various ways, including imposing the maximum

       7
          “In an appeal from a trial court’s decision in a zoning enforcement proceeding, our review
is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion or error of law.”
Spencer I, 249 A.3d at 19 n.12 (quoting Loganville Borough v. Godfrey, 58 A.3d 1149, 1151 n.2
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (additional quotation marks omitted)).

                                                 6
statutory fine and not considering Spencer’s alleged efforts to mitigate his zoning
violations.8

                                        III. Discussion
                            A. Timeliness of Spencer’s Appeal
               As described above, Spencer asserts that this case is a purely civil
enforcement proceeding, not an appeal of a summary criminal fine. Accordingly, he
contends that the post-trial proceedings are governed by civil rules, including the
requirement for a post-trial motion and the determination of the applicable appeal
deadline. We agree.
               Section 617.2(a) of the MPC provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny
person . . . who . . . has violated . . . the provisions of any zoning ordinance enacted
under this act or prior enabling laws shall, upon being found liable therefor in a civil
enforcement proceeding commenced by a municipality, pay a judgment of not more
than $500[9] plus all court costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred by a
municipality as a result thereof.” Borough of Bradford Woods v. Platts, 799 A.2d
984, 989 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (quoting 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a)) (additional
quotation marks omitted). The record indicates that this is an appeal in a civil
enforcement matter and that the fines at issue were imposed under the authority of
Section 617.2(a) of the MPC.

       8
         In his reply brief, Spencer also asserts that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by
imposing the maximum fine in the absence of harm to the Township.” Spencer’s Reply Br. at 1.
However, it is well settled that an issue raised for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief is
waived. Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 264 n.7 (Pa. 2015), cert. denied sub nom. Walter
v. Pennsylvania, 577 U.S. 1119 (2016); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 218 n.8 (Pa. 1999).
Accordingly, we will not consider that argument.
       9
        There is no dispute that the fine is imposed per violation and that each day the violation
continues is a separate violation. See 53 P.S. § 10617.2(a).

                                                 7
               Pursuant to Rule 1007(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
Governing Actions and Proceedings Before Magisterial District Judges, Spencer’s
de novo appeal to the trial court from the MDJ’s judgment was governed by the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.Civ.P.M.D.J. 1007(A).10 Under
Rule 227.1(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, a post-trial motion must
be filed to preserve an issue for appeal. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b). Thereafter, under
Rule 903(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal is timely
if the notice of appeal is filed within 30 days after the trial court rules on the post-
trial motion. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also Ross v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 714 A.2d
1131, 1133 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (explaining that “[i]t is the order of the trial court
disposing of a motion for post-trial relief that has been reduced to judgment which
comprises the final order in the case from which an appeal must be filed within [30]
days”) (italics omitted).
               There is no dispute that Spencer filed his notice of appeal within 30
days after the trial court’s disposition of his post-trial motion. Accordingly, we agree
that his appeal is timely.

                             B. Spencer’s Allegations of Bias
               As Spencer correctly observes, “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely
an error of judgment but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the
exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice,
ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Spencer’s Br. at 25-26
(quoting Commonwealth v. Carter, 861 A2.d 957 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc))

       10
          Rule 1007(A) provides, in full: “The proceeding on appeal shall be conducted de novo
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure that would be applicable if the action was initially
commenced in the court of common pleas.” Pa.R.Civ.P.M.D.J. 1007(A).

                                                 8
(emphasis added) (additional quotation marks omitted). Spencer argues that the trial
court’s decision should be overturned for abuse of discretion because the trial judge
based his decision solely on a bias against Spencer. We disagree.
                Spencer first alleges that the trial judge exhibited bias against him by
scheduling the trial with too little notice and while the pleadings were open, then
granting the Township’s continuance request, and then falsely stating, in response
to Spencer’s statement of errors complained of on appeal, that the trial date “was set
months in advance and the parties knew and understood the scheduling.” Spencer’s
Br. at 23.
                Our review of the trial court’s docket reveals that Spencer filed an
answer to the Township’s complaint on December 13, 2021. RR at 3a. On January
10, 2022, the trial court issued an order scheduling a “hearing” on February 2, 2022.
Id. On January 13, the Township filed an answer to Spencer’s new matter. Id. On
February 1, 2022, the trial court issued an order rescheduling the “hearing” for
March 1, 2022. Id. On February 22, 2022, the Township filed a motion for a
continuance, which the trial court granted on the same day, rescheduling the
“hearing” for March 29, 2022. Id. On March 3, after a motion to reschedule was
filed on March 2, 2022,11 the trial court issued an order moving the “hearing” up to
March 14, 2022, on which date the trial was apparently held. See id.
                Noticeably absent from the docket, and from Spencer’s argument, is
any indication that he filed a motion seeking a continuance at any time. See RR at
3a. Having failed to file any written request to extend the trial date, Spencer is in no
position to complain after the fact that the trial court’s timetable was too short.
Moreover, he has neither averred nor demonstrated any prejudice arising from the

      11
           The docket does not identify the filer of the motion to reschedule. See RR at 3a.

                                                 9
trial court’s scheduling of the trial. The most he alleges in his brief is that the trial
court refused to continue oral argument on his post-trial motions so that he could
wait for the outcome of his application for a junkyard permit. That assertion is
discussed below, but it has no relevance to any order scheduling the trial.
              Next, Spencer suggests that the fine was excessive as a result of the trial
judge’s bias. Spencer claims that the trial judge demonstrated that bias by ignoring
Spencer’s mitigating evidence of his efforts to correct his zoning violations and
rejecting his evidence of such efforts as not credible, without sufficient basis. He
alleges that he removed the junk vehicles from one property. He claims that the
Township offered insufficient evidence that his ongoing zoning violations were
intentional, and he implies that the trial judge was biased in crediting such evidence
because the Township based its argument solely on the imposition of a previous fine
in Spencer I. According to Spencer, “[t]hat citation involved six tax parcels of land,
including the Deep Hollow Road property . . . . The Deep Hollow Road property, it
is not disputed, has been fully remediated. How the Township can argue that the
Defendant has not undertaken remedial efforts is difficult to understand.” Spencer’s
Br. at 24. The fatal flaw in this argument is evident on its face: the previous citation
related to six properties, and even crediting Spencer’s assertion,12 he subsequently
remediated only one of them.
              Notably, in Spencer I, we upheld the amount of the MDJ’s fine based
in part on our observation that “Spencer ha[d] not cooperated with the Township” in
resolving his zoning violation. 249 A.3d at 20. Spencer continued to violate the

       12
          The Township disputes Spencer’s averment and maintains that the property referenced
by Spencer was the subject of this Court’s decision in a separate action, Twp. of Cranberry v.
Spencer (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 201 C.D. 2020, filed March 24, 2021) (Spencer II). Thus, the Township
contends that Spencer’s removal of the vehicles from that property had no connection to the
separate zoning violations at issue here, which related to different properties.
                                              10
zoning ordinance thereafter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Spencer’s removal of junk vehicles from only one property did not constitute a
mitigating effort at compliance with the zoning ordinance. Spencer’s ongoing
violations on the other five properties, which continued even after this Court’s
affirmance of the 2019 citations in Spencer I, weighed against a finding that Spencer
made a good faith effort to mitigate the violations.
             Spencer similarly charges that the trial judge displayed bias by ignoring
Spencer’s evidence of his offers to remedy his zoning violations. This argument is
likewise unavailing. As noted above, the record documents two written offers of
compliance by Spencer. In both, he demanded unreasonable concessions by the
Township. In 2016, Spencer offered to move the junk vehicles only if the Township
would pay relocation costs estimated at over $100,000, issue him two junkyard
licenses for the proposed relocation sites, provide all necessary zoning and code
approvals “automatically granted without the necessity of application,” allow him
12 months to complete the relocation, and reimburse him for his legal costs and
previous fines. RR at 134a-40a. In 2018, he dropped his demand for relocation
costs but again demanded reimbursement of the fine he paid in 2007, and again
demanded the issuance of two junkyard licenses; he also demanded that the
Township give him 180 days to move the junk vehicles from specified properties
and an indefinite time thereafter to move the junk vehicles from the remaining
properties, subject, moreover, to indefinite delays based on possible weather events
and any potential health problems he might suffer – in other words, no firm deadline
for compliance. Id. at 143a-44a. The Township could not reasonably have been
expected to accept such conditions. The trial court’s rejection of this evidence as
insufficient to prove mitigation efforts did not constitute a display of bias.

                                          11
              Spencer also alleges bias because the trial judge excluded evidence
concerning Spencer’s then-pending application for a junkyard permit on the basis
that no permit had been issued and there was no evidence that it was likely to be
issued. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of such evidence,
which was speculative. Accord Shao Bao Guan v. Phila. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment
(Appeal of Ford) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1546 C.D. 2014, filed June 17, 2015),13 slip op.
at 12 (concluding that the zoning hearing board abused its discretion by denying a
special exception, where the opponents’ testimony about future adverse results was
speculative and not supported by any evidence); Evers v. Clarks Summit
Borough/Borough Council (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 871 C.D. 2010, filed Sept. 22, 2011),
slip op. at 21-22 (concluding that the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion
by rejecting evidence opposing a conditional use, where the testimony at issue
asserted speculative potential future events “without any evidentiary support that
such an event had any reasonable likelihood of occurring”).
              In short, Spencer spent a quarter century resisting the Township’s
zoning enforcement efforts – much of that time after having already been cited and
fined. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion or demonstrated bias by
finding that Spencer’s token eleventh hour compliance efforts and empty offers of
cooperation lacked credibility as evidence of mitigation.
              Spencer further asserts that the trial judge displayed bias by refusing to
delay argument on his post-trial motions pending the outcome of his application for
a conditional use permit for a junkyard.             Spencer maintains that obtaining a
conditional use permit would have corroborated his testimony that he intended to

       13
           Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure Section 414(a), 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, may be
cited for their persuasive value.

                                              12
remedy the zoning violations. However, Spencer did not present the trial court with
any evidence that he was likely to receive such a permit. Moreover, there is no
record evidence that he ever succeeded in obtaining a conditional use permit.14
Spencer cites no authority, and this Court is aware of none, to support the proposition
that a court commits reversible error by refusing, as speculative, evidence of an
uncertain future event.
                Spencer also argues that the trial court showed bias by imposing an
illegal interest rate on the judgment against him in the form of ongoing daily fines,
which it subsequently vacated. According to Spencer, the improper interest rate
indicated an “abuse of discretion infecting this proceeding” that was not cured by
vacating the ongoing fines. Spencer’s Br. at 22. However, Spencer does not allege
that he ever paid any of the improperly imposed fines, which were vacated by the
trial court in ruling on Spencer’s post-trial motions. We fail to discern any prejudice
to Spencer from an error in an order that was vacated. Moreover, as we have found
no other display of bias by the trial court, we cannot conclude that this one error,
which the trial court promptly corrected, constitutes such an abuse of discretion as
to show bias infecting the entire proceeding.
                Finally, Spencer further insists that the trial judge had no factual basis
for positing that Spencer could afford to pay the maximum fine by selling or

        14
           Spencer asserts in a footnote in his brief that the Township has since issued him a
“permit.” Spencer’s Br. at 28 n.9. He does not state whether the alleged permit was a conditional
use permit or some other kind of permit, such as a business permit, to operate a junkyard. See id.
More importantly, Spencer fails to point to anywhere in the record where supporting evidence for
this assertion can be found. A bare averment of fact in a brief is not record evidence. See
Hollingsworth v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 189 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018)
(stating that “mere allegations are no substitute for record evidence . . . ” and, therefore, “this Court
cannot consider the averments of fact in [a party’s] brief . . .”).

                                                  13
mortgaging some property,15 and therefore, imposition of the maximum fine
“amounted to a judicial curb stomping of [Spencer] and was not motivated by a
desire for justice or undertaken in an effort to improve the lives of [] Township
residents, but simply to vindicate his dislike of [Spencer].” Spencer’s Br. at 24.
However, Spencer has failed to preserve this argument for appeal.
               In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised at every stage
of the proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 151 A.3d 121, 124 (Pa. 2016)
(stating that “an appellant waives any claim that is not properly raised in the first
instance before the trial court and preserved at every stage of his appeal”). Spencer
asserted in his post-trial motions that the trial court erred by failing to consider
whether he could pay the maximum fine; however, he did not claim that failure
resulted from bias. See RR at 93a-95a. In submitting a statement of issues for appeal
pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure
(Statement), Spencer did not renew his assertion of error in the trial court’s failure
to consider his ability to pay the maximum fine; what is more, he again neglected to
assert bias as the cause of that failure. See id. at 146a. The Statement, in its entirety,
set forth the following issues for appeal:
               1. Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in
               imposing the maximum possible penalty and attempting to
               impose post-judgment interest at the rate of 197% (which
               was later withdrawn) in light of [Spencer’s] comtinued
               [sic] attempts to resolve the issue with the Township that
               led to the ligitation [sic].

       15
         We note, however, that in a separate action relating to a property not at issue in this case,
Spencer insisted the vehicles parked on that property were not “junk” vehicles, but rather, were
worth “over six figures.” Spencer II, slip op. at 6.

                                                 14
             2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing to
             consider evidence of [Spencer] clearing another property
             of vehicles.
             3. Whether the Court abused its discretion in failing to
             consider [Spencer’s] application for a zoning permit.

Id.
             Although the Statement did not have to be detailed, it had to be
sufficiently specific to provide notice to the trial court of all issues fairly subsumed
within it. Rule 1925(b)(4)(i)-(ii) and (v)-(vii) provides, in pertinent part:
             (4) Requirements; waiver.
             (i) The Statement shall set forth only those errors that the
             appellant intends to assert.
             (ii) The Statement shall concisely identify each error that
             the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to
             identify the issue to be raised for the [trial] judge. The
             [trial] judge shall not require the citation to authorities or
             the record; however, appellant may choose to include
             pertinent authorities and record citations in the Statement.
             ....
             (v) Each error identified in the Statement will be deemed
             to include every subsidiary issue that was raised in the trial
             court . . . .
             (vi) If the appellant in a civil case cannot readily discern
             the basis for the [trial] judge’s decision, the appellant shall
             preface the Statement with an explanation as to why the
             Statement has identified the errors in only general terms.
             In such a case, the generality of the Statement will not be
             grounds for finding waiver.
             (vii) Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised
             in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4)
             are waived.

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i)-(ii) & (v)-(vii).

                                            15
                Spencer did not preface his Statement with any assertion that he could
not readily discern the basis for the trial judge’s decision, so that was not a
justification for his identification of the errors in only general terms. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vi). We cannot determine from the bare and general averments in the
Statement that Spencer was identifying as an issue that the trial court’s imposition
of the maximum statutory fine without considering Spencer’s ability to pay was the
result of bias. Further, Spencer had not raised the bias issue previously in the trial
court,16 so bias could not be deemed an included subsidiary issue under Rule
1925(b)(4)(v). Therefore, we conclude that the Statement failed to identify alleged
bias with sufficient detail to identify it as an issue for the trial judge as required by
Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii).
                The purpose of requiring inclusion of all issues in the Statement is to
allow the trial court an opportunity to address the issues in an opinion so that this
Court has a basis for meaningful review on appeal; as such, it is a “crucial component
of the appellate process.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Commonwealth v. Burton, 973
A.2d 428, 431 (Pa. Super. 2009). Similarly, “[o]ne of the main purposes of the
waiver doctrine is to ensure that the appellate court is provided with the benefit of
the trial court’s reasoning.” Commonwealth v. Metz, 633 A.2d 125, 127 n.3 (Pa.
1993). Spencer’s insufficient Statement deprived the trial court of the opportunity
to address the issue of bias in its failure to consider Spencer’s ability to pay the
maximum fine; in doing so, Spencer likewise deprived this Court of the benefit of

        16
          In that regard, we note that “[t]he purpose of [Rule] 1925(b) is not to give appellants one
last opportunity to raise issues they failed to raise previously before the trial court. This rule simply
allows the trial court to seek a clarification as to which of the issues already raised will be pursued
upon appeal.” Rutledge v. Dep’t of Transp., 508 A.2d 1306, 1307-08 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).

                                                  16
the trial court’s reasoning, and thus, of a basis for meaningful review of the issue.17
Accordingly, we conclude that Spencer waived this issue.

                                         IV. Conclusion
               Spencer’s entire abuse of discretion argument consists of an
impassioned, hyperbolic criticism of the trial judge’s alleged bias, even accusing the
trial judge of “curb stomping” him. Spencer’s Br. at 24. Spencer maintains that his
“claims of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality . . . appear on a dispassionate review
of the record.” Id. at 26. However, this Court’s dispassionate review of the record
has revealed no such bias, prejudice, ill-will, or partiality on the part of the trial
judge. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. The orders of the trial court are
affirmed.

                                               __________________________________
                                               CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

       17
          In this Court’s view, Spencer likewise did not identify bias sufficiently for the trial court
with regard to any of the other issues on appeal. Although all issues on appeal were arguably
waived as a result, we considered the other issues because the record was nonetheless sufficient to
allow us to provide meaningful review of those issues. See Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d
1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007) (declining to find waiver despite an unspecific statement pursuant to Rule
1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure where the issues presented on appeal
were “relatively straightforward” and the common pleas court had provided sufficient analysis to
allow meaningful review on appeal).

                                                 17
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Cranberry                 :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Randy J. Spencer,                     :   Nos. 568, 569 & 570 C.D. 2022
                    Appellant         :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 30th day of August, 2023, the orders of the Court of
Common Pleas of Venango County dated May 10, 2022 are AFFIRMED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge