Court Opinion

ID: 9556190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:00:49.382277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:17.058891
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-2818
                         ___________________________

    Ashley Quinones, as Trustee for and Brian Jesus Quinones-Rosario, Brian,

                        lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant,

                                            v.

  City of Edina, Minnesota; City of Richfield, Minnesota; Benjamin Wenande, all
individuals being sued in their individual and official capacity; Nicholas Pedersen,
 all individuals being sued in their individual and official capacity; Joseph Carroll,
all individuals being sued in their individual and official capacity; Macabe Stariha,
 all individuals being sued in their individual and official capacity; Dylan Schultz,
          all individuals being sued in their individual and official capacity,

                      lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees.
                                       ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                          for the District of Minnesota
                                  ____________

                              Submitted: June 14, 2023
                               Filed: August 16, 2023
                                   ____________

Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

       This appeal concerns a use of deadly force by police officers against a man
wielding a large knife. Officers shot and killed Brian Quinones-Rosario as he
approached officers with the knife drawn. His widow Ashley Quinones, as trustee,
sued the officers and their employing municipalities. She alleged an excessive use
of force that resulted in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court* concluded that the officers did not commit a
constitutional violation, and granted judgment for the officers and the municipalities.
Quinones appeals, and we affirm.

                                          I.

       The episode began when Quinones-Rosario drove away from his home in
Edina, Minnesota, on a rainy night in September 2019. Officer Nicholas Pedersen
was on patrol, and he observed Quinones-Rosario driving above the speed limit and
turning at a red light without signaling or stopping. Pedersen activated his siren to
effect a traffic stop, but Quinones-Rosario kept driving. Pedersen called for
assistance.

      Quinones-Rosario drove into the neighboring city of Richfield, and several
Richfield officers joined the pursuit. Quinones-Rosario continued to drive erratically,
and almost crashed into another vehicle at an intersection. Officer Pedersen
witnessed this near collision, and he tried unsuccessfully to stop Quinones-Rosario
by bumping the back of his car. Quinones-Rosario then braked abruptly, and
Pedersen stopped his car next to Quinones-Rosario’s vehicle.

      *
       The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota.

                                         -2-
       Quinones-Rosario got out of his car and brandished a large kitchen knife.
Officer Pedersen exited his car and drew his firearm. Quinones-Rosario raised the
knife above his shoulder, pointed its blade at Pedersen, and approached Pedersen.

      Pedersen quickly contacted other officers by radio. He first said that Quinones-
Rosario had a gun, but promptly corrected himself to identify the weapon as a knife.
Pedersen kept his firearm aimed at Quinones-Rosario, repeatedly directed him to drop
the knife, and backpedaled away to a median in the road.

       Within seconds, Officers Stariha and Schultz of Richfield arrived on the scene.
They raced toward the encounter and heard Pedersen tell Quinones-Rosario to drop
his knife. Quinones-Rosario put his head down and sprinted toward the officers with
the raised knife.

      Officer Schultz shot his taser at Quinones-Rosario with no effect. When
Quinones-Rosario was approximately thirteen feet from Officer Pedersen, Pedersen
and Stariha fired their guns at him. When the first shot was fired, Quinones-Rosario
was running toward the officers at a speed of about 7.4 miles per hour, more than
twice an average walking pace.

       Meanwhile, Officer Carroll of Richfield and Officer Wenande of Edina arrived
on the scene. After Officers Pedersen and Stariha fired at Quinones-Rosario, he
slowed his pace, but did not drop the knife. He kept moving toward the officers, and
approximately two seconds later, Officers Stariha, Schultz, Carroll, and Wenande
fired their guns at him. In a period of about four seconds, the officers fired eighteen
shots. Seven shots hit Quinones-Rosario, and he died from his injuries.

      Ashley Quinones sued the five officers who fired shots. She alleged under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that they used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and she asserted tort claims under Minnesota law. She also sued the

                                         -3-
two cities that employed the officers, Edina and Richfield, alleging that each
maintained an unconstitutional policy of failing to train and supervise their officers.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

      The district court granted summary judgment for the officers and
municipalities. The court concluded that the officers’ use of force was objectively
reasonable. The court dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. Quinones
appeals the dismissal of her federal claims.

                                            II.

       When the officers shot Quinones-Rosario, they “seized” him within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Quinones argues that the seizure was
unreasonable because the officers used excessive force. The constitutional question,
then, is “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent
or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). To make that
determination, we consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the
suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396.
The use of force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.

       Applying those principles, and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Quinones, we conclude that the officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable.
Quinones-Rosario posed an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury to the
officers. He aggressively wielded a knife that he refused to drop despite repeated
commands to do so. He then charged at the officers with the knife. One officer
deployed a non-lethal taser against him, but it had no effect.

                                           -4-
       The officers began firing their guns only when Quinones-Rosario was thirteen
feet away from the nearest officer and moving toward him. The suspect was moving
rapidly and would have reached the officers within seconds. The officers reasonably
believed that Quinones-Rosario posed a serious threat to their safety. The officers
fired more rounds when Quinones-Rosario survived the first round of shots and
continued to approach the officers with the knife. Their actions were a reasonable
defensive response under the circumstances. We have repeatedly concluded that
“officers could use deadly force to stop a person armed with a bladed weapon if they
reasonably believed the person could kill or seriously injure others.” Kong v. City of
Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 993 (8th Cir. 2020).

       Quinones argues that the potential that her husband was attempting to commit
suicide creates a question of fact that must be resolved by a jury. She cites a
provision of Minnesota law requiring officers to exercise special care when
interacting with persons suffering from mental health disabilities. And she invokes
Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465 (8th Cir. 1995), where this court found genuine
issues of material fact as to whether a mentally disturbed man with a knife posed a
threat to others when an officer shot and killed him. But neither Minnesota law nor
our decision in Ludwig undermines the conclusion that the officers here acted
reasonably.

      The plaintiff in Ludwig was 150 feet away from the nearest bystander and
running further away when shot. The officer who shot the subject did not fear for his
own safety, and fired at the man only to keep him from “possibly attempting” to
approach the distant bystanders. Id. at 473. By contrast, as discussed, Quinones-
Rosario was wielding a knife within thirteen feet or fewer of a police officer and
approaching. Even assuming that he was mentally disturbed, and that officers should
have known of his condition, our “cases establish that mental illness . . . does not
reduce the immediate and significant threat a suspect poses.” Kong, 960 F.3d at 993;
see Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 489 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2007). There is no

                                         -5-
genuine dispute of material fact regarding the decedent’s mental state, because the
officers acted reasonably even assuming knowledge of a troubled condition.

       Also unavailing is Quinones’s suggestion that Minnesota imposes a “higher
legal standard” on law enforcement officers than “is known in most other American
jurisdictions.” Her federal claims are based on the federal constitution, and there is
one uniform standard of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. The officers
did not violate the Constitution, so they are entitled to judgment. The claims against
the cities for causing a constitutional violation likewise fail for lack of a violation.

       The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                     ______________________________

                                          -6-