Court Opinion

ID: 9777036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:52:14.719495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:46.428112
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I feel constrained to address the following portion of the majority opinion which states:
“There was no qualified psychiatric testimony as to appellant’s psychiatric makeup, which has been held to have probative value as to special issue No. 2 under 37.071, supra; Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robinson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), nor did the State offer other evidence of aggravating factors bearing on this issue such as personal history of violence, that appellant lacked respect for human life, etc.”
Ante at 476.
The above quotation, in my opinion, improperly implies that had the State introduced qualified psychiatric testimony as to the appellant’s psychiatric makeup, the evidence would have been sufficient to support an affirmative finding by the jury as to Article 37.071(b)(2). Since there was no evidence of past violence and no evidence that violence was initially intended during the burglary, it is inconceivable that psychiatric testimony concerning the appellant’s psychiatric makeup could alone be sufficient to support an affirmative finding as to Article 37.071(b)(2). Therefore, even if the State had introduced qualified psychiatric testimony as to the appellant’s psychiatric makeup, the evidence would have been insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative finding as to Article 37.071(b)(2).