Court Opinion

ID: 9589706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:47:34.924412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:34.870988
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that the trial court erred in ordering restitution without hearing evidence or entering specific findings addressing the factors set out in OCGA § 17-14-10. To this extent, I find nothing in the record supporting the majority’s conclusion that the trial court “considered all of the factors it was required to consider.” Further, I find no authority supporting the majority’s conclusion that a defendant must volunteer evidence (without inquiry from the trial court) pertinent to factors the trial court must consider in determining the nature and amount of restitution.
“ ‘OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in determining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount thereof.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bridges v. State, 208 Ga. App. 555, 556 (1) (431 SE2d 164) (1993). Section 17-14-10 sets forth the factors to be considered by the court in determining the nature and amount of restitution, including the offender’s present financial condition and future earning capacity and the amount of damages suffered by the victim.” Fonseca v. State, 212 Ga. App. 463, 464 (2) (441 SE2d 912). In the case sub judice, the majority states that “the trial court’s order demonstrates that the court properly considered all of the factors it was required to consider.” This conclusion is not supported by the record. Although the trial court conducted a restitution hearing, the court did not consider evidence or make inquiry as to defendant’s financial condition or her future earning capacity.
The majority does not refer to a scrap of evidence or material in the record (and I find none) indicating that the trial court actually considered any fact, evidence or report relevant to the present finan*219cial condition of defendant or her dependents (if there are any) and the probable future earning capacity of the defendant and her dependents. The majority simply quotes from a form order executed by the trial court which does not include findings of fact and does not refer to any evidence, report or inquiry supporting the conclusions contained therein. A complete and forthright reading of the restitution hearing transcript reveals that the trial court did not consider “all of the factors it was required to consider.” This hearing transcript clearly demonstrates that the trial court heard evidence as to the amount of restitution and then bypassed any inquiry into defendant’s present financial condition and her probable future earning capacity. To this extent, I am compelled to note that, after hearing evidence only as to the amount of the victim’s loss, the trial court ruled (in open court) as follows: “THE COURT: Well, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the restitution is in the amount of $4907 and that is the sentence of the Court along with ten years of probation at the Detention Center and the Diversion Center and restitution and a fine in the amount of $502.”
Finally, without citation of authority, the majority concludes that a defendant must volunteer evidence (without inquiry from the trial court) pertinent to factors the trial court must consider in determining the nature and amount of restitution. Strictly speaking, this suggests that the trial court has no duty to consider the factors prescribed in OCGA § 17-14-10 so long as the State presents evidence as to the amount of the victim’s loss. It is my view that this holding ignores well-established precedent.
As restated in Slater v. State, 209 Ga. App. 723 (434 SE2d 547), the law provides as follows: “It is not sufficient for the trial judge to consider only the amount of the victim’s damages. Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga. App. 285 (4) (287 SE2d 746) (1982). Pursuant to OCGA § 17-14-10, the court must also consider other factors, including ‘(1) The present financial condition of the offender and [her] dependents; (and) (2) The probable future earning capacity of the offender and [her] dependents. . . .’ ‘Because the record [in the case sub judice clearly] reveals that such factors were not considered, [I believe that] that portion of the sentence imposing restitution [should be vacated] and remanded for hearing in compliance with (OCGA § 17-14-10).’ Jarrett v. State, 161 Ga. App. at 287. [And pursuant] to Garrett v. State, 175 Ga. App. 400 (1) (333 SE2d 432) (1985), [I believe that] written findings of fact relating to the factors set forth in OCGA § 17-14-10 should also be made upon remand and rehearing.” Slater v. State, 209 Ga. App. 723, 725 (4), supra. See Thompson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 889, 890 (3) (449 SE2d 364); Bridges, 208 Ga. App. 555, 556 (1), supra; Woods v. State, 205 Ga. App. 500 (422 SE2d 670); Baker v. State, 183 Ga. App. 100 (357 SE2d 896); Williams v. State, 180 Ga. *220App. 854 (3) (350 SE2d 837).
Decided July 14, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995.
Howard J. Stiller, for appellant.
Britt R. Priddy, District Attorney, Kenneth B. Hodges, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.