Court Opinion

ID: 9572508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:19.759734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:17.474742
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(dissenting). The question before the Court is whether the State Tenure Commission has the authority to reduce or otherwise modify the penalty of discharge or other discipline imposed upon a teacher by a local school board. I would conclude that the function of the commission in reviewing the discharge or discipline of a teacher is limited to determining whether the local board’s action was for "reasonable and just cause” as required by the teacher tenure act, MCL 38.101; MSA 15.2001, and that the commission lacks the statutory authority to fashion its own sanctions for a teacher’s misconduct. However, rather than affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, I would remand this matter to the Tenure Commission for a determination of whether the plaintiff’s discharge in this case was for reasonable and just cause.
i
Whether the Tenure Commission has the authority to modify a penalty imposed by a local *359board is a question of law, requiring interpretation of the commission’s enabling legislation, the teacher tenure act, MCL 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq. See Const 1963, art 6, § 28. While we must accord some deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own enabling act, particularly longstanding administrative precedent, Southfield Police Officers Ass’n v Southfield, 433 Mich 168, 176-177; 445 NW2d 98 (1989), ultimately it is this Court’s duty to construe statutes and to determine the legislative intent underlying them. See U of M Regents v Employment Relations Comm, 389 Mich 96, 102-103; 204 NW2d 218 (1973). We are bound to set aside any decision of the commission that exceeds its statutory authority. MCL 24.306(l)(b); MSA 3.560(206)(l)(b).
We are not presented in this case with a well-settled construction of the tenure act by the commission or lower courts. In fact, just the opposite is true. The commission appears to have concluded only recently that it has the authority to reduce or otherwise modify the discipline received by a teacher following a board hearing. Private Decision, STC No. 82-69, decided in 1984, was the first time in the commission’s nearly fifty-year history that it exercised that power. We must carefully examine the commission’s change of direction in light of our constitutional and statutory duty to interpret the tenure act, and adopt its conclusions only if they represent a reasonable and defensible reading of the act. I am not convinced that they do.
ii
There is, obviously, no express authority granted to the commission in the statute itself to reduce or otherwise modify a penalty imposed by a local board. The statute gives the local board the right *360to discharge or demote1 a teacher for "reasonable and just cause.” MCL 38.101; MSA 15.2001. The teacher has the right to appeal the board’s action to the commission, which conducts its own hearing on the matter, in the same manner as the local board. MCL 38.121; MSA 15.2021. On appeal, the commission acts as a "board of review,” MCL 38.139; MSA 15.2039, and is vested with "such powers as are necessary to carry out and enforce the provisions” of the act. MCL 38.137; MSA 15.2037.
The plaintiff and the commission contend that this statutory scheme impliedly vests the commission with the authority to modify the decisions of a local board regarding the severity of the penalty imposed on a teacher. They rely on various decisions of this Court to establish that authority. In my view, such reliance is misplaced.
A
This Court first discussed the extent of the commission’s authority in reviewing the discharge or discipline of a teacher in Rehberg v Melvindale Bd of Ed, 330 Mich 541; 48 NW2d 142 (1951) (Rehberg I). In Rehberg I, the Court considered the question whether the commission, acting as a board of review, "hears cases de novo or only for the purpose of determining whether the original proceedings before the controlling board were proper, without error, and in accordance with the provisions of the tenure act.” Id., p 542. The plaintiff in Rehberg I objected to the school superintendent’s *361introduction into evidence, before the commission, of the record made at the board level, contending that the proceeding before the commission was to be a review de novo. The commission agreed with the plaintiff and refused to consider the record, stating that it would arrive at a decision " 'from the testimony produced’ ” before it, not that before the local board. Id., p 544.
On appeal, this Court held that the commission can, and indeed must, consider the record from the board hearing:
The tenure act places an additional safeguard upon the arbitrary or unreasonable dismissal of teachers and is designed for their protection. It does not, however, otherwise diminish or interfere with the administrative power of the local controlling board, nor require it to indulge in idle ceremonies.
The tenure commission should review and consider the record made before the controlling board, but is not precluded from taking such additional testimony as in its discretion may be required, [id., p 548.]
The Court then remanded the case to the commission for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Because the Court’s opinion in Rehberg I did not answer the question of the scope of the commission’s review authority in the same stark terms in which it had been posed, i.e., whether such review is de novo or deferential, the case returned to this Court after remand. Rehberg v Melvindale Bd of Ed, 345 Mich 731; 77 NW2d 131 (1956) (Rehberg II)- The question on remand concerned the commission’s "right to make findings of fact and thereby substitute its opinion for that of the board of education.” Id., p 739. In somewhat clearer *362terms than in Rehberg I, the Court concluded that since the commission had the right, under MCL 38.121; MSA 15.2021, to subpoena witnesses and hear new evidence, it also had the right to consider that evidence upon the issue involved. Thus, "the commission, after hearing the new testimony together with the testimony presented to the school board, may make an independent finding of facts, opinionate upon the same, and enter an order accordingly.” Id., p 740. As in Rehberg I, however, the Court in Rehberg II failed to identify the commission’s review of the local board’s action as review de novo.
Shortly after Rehberg II, the Court decided Long v Royal Oak Twp Bd of Ed, 350 Mich 324, 326; 86 NW2d 275 (1957), attempting one last time to clear up any "misapprehension[s] of the statutory function of the commission . . . .” The Court held that "an appeal to the commission under . . . article 6 operates to subject all questions of fact decided by the controlling board, as well as all requisite questions of law, to review and determination de novo by the commission.” As in Rehberg II, the Court in Long relied on the authority of the commission to conduct hearings in the same manner as the local board:
Our stated view of the commission’s administrative function stems particularly from language appearing in section 1 of said article 6, by which the commission is directed to conduct its hearing on appeal "the same as provided in article 4, section 4 of this act.” Said section 1, considered with section 4 of article 4, discloses clear legislative intent that the commission—following appeal by a teacher under said article 6—be vested with duty and authority to determine, anew and as original questions, all issues of fact and law theretofore decided by the controlling board. [Id., p 327.]
*363According to the commission and the plaintiff, the review de novo explained in Long and, to a lesser extent, the Rehberg cases necessarily encompasses a review of the penalty imposed, and provides the basis for the commission’s right not only to determine whether the board’s penalty is for reasonable and just cause, but also to independently impose a different penalty. I disagree.
B
None of these cases, or any of the statutory provisions upon which they rely, establishes the authority the commission seeks to assert. Rehberg I emphasizes the retention of local control over administrative matters, which certainly include the discharge and discipline of teachers. If anything, that case cautions against an overly broad reading of the commission’s powers. As the Court stated in Rehberg I, the Legislature did not intend to "deprive local governing bodies of administrative control of teachers,” and the act does not "otherwise diminish or interfere with the administrative power of the local controlling board . . . .” Id., pp 547-548.2
Rehberg II lends no greater support to the commission’s position. The Court’s statement that the commission "may make an independent finding of facts, opinionate upon the same, and enter an order accordingly,” id., p 740, does not answer the question presented in this case, which concerns the extent, not the existence, of the commission’s authority to render an opinion regarding the facts *364and enter an order accordingly. In other words, Rehberg II does not resolve the question whether the commission’s "opinionat[ingj” and "ordering]” is limited to concluding that reasonable and just cause did not exist for a discharge or other discipline and consequently ordering that a teacher be reinstated or granted back pay, or whether it includes determining that a particular penalty other than that imposed by the local board is proper and then ordering it imposed.
Long similarly fails to resolve the question in this case. It recognizes the commission’s "duty and authority to determine, anew and as original questions, all issues of fact and law theretofore decided by the controlling board.” Id., p 327. Whether to discharge or discipline a teacher for misconduct, however, is a question neither of law nor of fact; it is, essentially, a question of policy, one within the sole discretion of the locally governed school board. While the question whether the misconduct was in fact engaged in is one of fact, and the question whether there exists reasonable and just cause to impose a particular penalty for such misconduct is one of law, the decision to actually do so is a policy decision involving the consideration of factors in addition to reasonableness, such as the precedential effect of the kind of discipline imposed and its effect on the other teachers.3 It is not inconceivable, for example, that a school board *365might decide that, if discharge is unreasonable, it would prefer some other alternative to an unpaid suspension, such as a demotion, a transfer, a prohibition from conducting particular extracurricular activities—or a host of other options involving considerations other than simply reasonableness and just cause. The point is, even if the commission determines that a one-semester suspension is justified under the circumstances, it remains a policy decision, uniquely suited to the board and for which the commission is not particularly qualified, whether to in fact impose that lesser penalty.* **4
The statutory provisions upon which the commission and the plaintiff rely likewise fail to support their position. MCL 38.139; MSA 15.2039 empowers the commission to sit only as a "board of review.” Under Long, the commission’s review of the penalty imposed by the local board, to determine whether it was for reasonable and just cause, is de novo. However, the mere fact that the commission has the authority to review the penalty imposed, to determine whether it is for rea*366sonable and just cause, does not necessarily mean that it has the right to alter that penalty if it concludes otherwise. In altering the penalty, the commission goes beyond reviewing the decision of the local board and imposes a penalty of its own.
The premise of the commission’s recent determination that it has the authority to modify the penalty imposed by the local board, and of the plaintiff’s argument, is that the commission’s review de novo must necessarily encompass the right to review the penalty, otherwise it is not a truly de novo review. Thus, in Private Decision, STC No. 82-69, October 5, 1984, p 8, the commission concluded that "where a tribunal is required to act de novo, deference to the initial decision-maker’s determination regarding the severity of the penalty is error.” The plaintiff contends that this is particularly true in teacher tenure cases, in light of the legislative purpose to " 'strip the school boards of their autocratic power and to prescribe for them rules of administrative action which would ensure a greater degree of security to their employees.’ ” Wilson v Flint Bd of Ed, 361 Mich 691, 694; 106 NW2d 136 (1960).
This argument flatly mischaracterizes the issue in this case. Not even the school district suggests that "deference” to the local board is either desirable or permissible. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the commission does not review the penalty imposed. The commission is clearly required to make an independent determination regarding whether the penalty imposed meets the reasonable and just cause standard. MCL 38.101; MSA 15.2001. Rather, the Court of Appeals held that, having reviewed the penalty and having found it not to be for reasonable and just cause, the commission’s only recourse is to order the teacher reinstated, or, if the teacher has returned *367to work, to order back pay. MCL 38.103; MSA 15.2003. In short, the commission can indeed exercise meaningful review of the local board’s decision without improperly "deferring” to that body, even in the absence of any authority to impose its own desired discipline on the teacher.
Another of the statutory provisions cited by the plaintiff and the commission, and relied upon by the Court in Long as evidence of a legislative intent that the commission have all the same powers and duties as the local board, MCL 38.121; MSA 15.2021, in fact provides only that "[n]otice and conduct” of the hearing before the tenure commission shall be the same as that provided before the local board by MCL 38.104; MSA 15.2004. In any event, while MCL 38.104; MSA 15.2004 grants the parties certain rights, such as the right to choose either a public or private hearing before the board, the right to counsel, the right to subpoena witnesses, etc., it is not the basis of the board’s right to discharge or discipline a teacher. That right is inherent in the board’s authority to manage its school system, MCL 380.1201 et seq.; MSA 15.41201 et seq., and is found in particular in various provisions of the tenure act.5
Only one provision of the tenure act expressly addresses the remedial powers of the commission. MCL 38.103; MSA 15.2003 provides that "if the decision of the controlling board is appealed and the tenure commission reverses the decision of the controlling board, the teacher shall be entitled to all salary lost” if the controlling board exercised *368its right to suspend the teacher without pay pending the commission’s decision. Thus, the single section of the act actually to address the commission’s remedial power in the event of improper local action speaks only of the right to back pay, and the concomitant right to reinstatement from the suspension.
c
Ultimately, the question in this case is one of legislative intent. I disagree with the commission that the Legislature intended, when it created the commission to act as a "board of review” to oversee the actions of the local boards, to give it the power to determine not only whether the local board’s action was for reasonable and just cause, but also to modify that action, thus imposing its own form of discipline upon the teacher. The Legislature did not intend to create a "super-school board” in the commission, as this Court’s opinions in the Rehberg cases in particular make clear, and as the statute itself makes clear, by identifying the commission as a board of review.
I agree with Commission Member Gibson, writing in dissent in Private Decision, STC No 82-69, May 7, 1984, p 3, that
[i]f this Commission is permitted to "fine tune” the penalty imposed, all semblance of local administrative control would be lost. This Commission, far removed from the values and sentiments of the community, could interpose its views for those of the representatives of the local electorate. This Commission would be the entity with the ultimate power to make employment-related decisions, thereby rendering any proceedings prior to the filing of a tenure appeal the very essence of idle ceremony. Thus, it is no accident that the statute *369only provides this Commission with authority to order one remedy—reinstatement with payment of lost salary. MCL 38.103; MSA 15.2003.
While it may be overstatement to say that the board’s function would be reduced to "idle ceremony” if the commission in fact retained this authority,6 the point is well taken. As the Court of Appeals stated on remand, by modifying the plaintiff’s dismissal, the commission "took it upon itself to decide how best to discipline the teacher. There is no provision in the act which expressly or impliedly grants this power to the [commission].” Lakeshore Bd of Ed v Grindstaff (On Second Remand), 177 Mich App 225, 228; 441 NW2d 777 (1989).
The majority contends that it would not be "consistent” with the purposes of the teacher tenure act to require the reinstatement of a teacher with back pay, without the imposition of any discipline, where the commission finds that the charges against the teacher have been proved but the discipline imposed is not reasonable. Yet, this construction of the act is undoubtedly more consistent with its purposes and its language than is the majority’s decision to allow the commission to impose its own sanction on the teacher, thereby "depriv[ing] local governing bodies of administrative control of teachers . . . .” Rehberg I, supra, pp 547-548. While the statutory scheme suggested by the majority, allowing the commission to exercise such authority, may in fact be a plausible one, I am not convinced that it is the one that the Legislature intended when it established the commission to act as a board of review, with the *370authority to determine anew only "issues of fact and law,” Long, supra, p 327, of which whether to impose a particular penalty on a teacher is neither.
A final argument against the existence of a legislative intent to grant the commission full authority to modify the penalty imposed by the local board is the fact that, taken to its logical extreme, it would require us to conclude that the Legislature intended that the commission have the power not only to reduce the discipline imposed, but also to increase it. There is simply no support for that proposition either in the statute itself or in the case law. Indeed, such an interpretation would be contrary to the very purpose of the act— to give teachers greater employment security—as well as the commission’s directive to carry out that purpose. Yet, such authority is unquestionably within the scope of the commission’s view of its de novo review authority.7
hi
I agree with the Court of Appeals that the commission exceeded its statutory authority by reducing plaintiff’s discharge to a one-semester suspension. The commission may not decrease, increase, modify, or adjust the penalty imposed by *371the local school board on review. Where the teacher’s misconduct does not warrant the discipline imposed, i.e., where the penalty imposed is not for reasonable and just cause, the commission is empowered only to order the teacher’s reinstatement, with back pay. I would, therefore, set aside the decision of the Tenure Commission to reduce the plaintiff’s discharge to a one-semester suspension.
However, I am not prepared to affirm the initial decision of the Court of Appeals in this case reinstating the plaintiff’s discharge.8 The commission found that the charges against the plaintiff were proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but reduced the discharge to a suspension because it found discharge " 'simply too severe for the conduct of this particular teacher.’ ” Ante, p 346, n 8 (emphasis added). Since the commission proceeded under the assumption that it did have the authority to modify the penalty imposed, it never squarely addressed the question whether the plaintiff’s discharge could survive scrutiny for reasonable and just cause, although it did specifically conclude that " 'a serious penalty is appropriate here.’ ” Ante, p 346, n 8. I would, therefore, remand this matter to the commission for further consideration of the question whether the plaintiff’s discharge was for reasonable and just cause in light of the above discussion. I would not retain jurisdiction.
Brickley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, C.J._

 The act defines "demote” to mean "to reduce compensation or to transfer to a position carrying a lower salary.” MCL 38.74; MSA 15.1974. This definition is sufficiently broad, as Justice Levin points out (ante, p 356), to encompass certain discipline short of discharge, such as a temporary suspension without pay. In such cases, all of the protections of the act apply with the same force as in discharge cases.

 The Court also stated that "[s]chool districts, though State agencies, are governed locally and their controlling boards are chosen by the electorate. (See [1927 PA 319, 1948 CL 341.1 et seq. (MSA 15.1 et seq.)].) If the legislature intended to deprive local governing bodies of administrative control of teachers, that intent should have been definitely stated in the tenure act.” Id., pp 547-548.

 Other courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that the decision to impose any penalty is one of policy, not fact or law. For example, in Clark v Central Kitsap School Dist, 38 Wash App 560, 564-565; 686 P2d 514 (1984), the question was whether the trial court, which reviewed de novo the disciplinary decisions of the school district, had the authority to impose a lesser discipline once it found that sufficient cause existed for discharge. The appellate court concluded that it did not have such authority:
Consequently, evidence in mitigation is not relevant and should not be admitted. Once sufficient cause for discharge has been found, the question of whether discharge is appropriate is *365a policy decision. That decision requires consideration of a number of factors such as the employee’s work history, safety, effect on other employees, prior decisions and the precedential impact. Such matters involve polity considerations within the exclusive purview of the board, not the trial court or jury. Neither judge nor jury is entitled to usurp the powers and authority of the duly elected board members once the board has satisñed the laws respecting discharge. [Emphasis added.]
See also MacKenzie v School Committee of Ipswich, 342 Mass 612; 174 NE2d 657 (1961); In re Fulcomer, 93 NJ Super 404; 226 A2d 30 (1967) (Kolovsky, J., dissenting).

 The majority mentions an "alternative” construction of the act which would allow the commission to remand to the board to allow it to impose a lesser discipline. Ante, p 357, n 43. Although there is no provision in the act for such a "remand,” I express no opinion as to the authority of the local board to impose a different penalty upon notification by the commission that the penalty originally imposed was not reasonable.

 MCL 38.101; MSA 15.2001 provides that discharge or demotion may be made only for reasonable and just cause, MCL 38.102; MSA 15.2002 gives the controlling board the right to decide whether to proceed upon the charges brought by the school superintendent, and MCL 38.103; MSA 15.2003 allows the local board to suspend a teacher pending a decision by it as to discharge or demotion.

 For example, a record is still made, upon which the commission relies at least in part, the teacher might not appeal to the commission.

 The majority points out that the school board may not appeal its own decision to the commission, and thus concludes that there is "no basis on which the Tenure Commission might impose a greater discipline than that imposed by the school board.” Ante, p 357, n 42. The majority misses the point. The fact that the commission is unlikely ever to exercise that authority does not answer the charge that its reading of the act would allow it to do so. The commission and the plaintiff contend that the commission’s authority and duty to review the matter on appeal require it to determine "anew and as [an] original question[]” what penalty to impose. Thus, under their reading of the act, the discipline imposed could conceivably be so unreasonably slight (although still appealed by the teacher) as to require modification upward. The majority’s reading of the act would not preclude such action by the commission.

 In Lakeshore Public Schools Bd of Ed v Grindstaff, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided March 11, 1988 (Docket No. 98748), the Court held that the commission’s decision to reduce the plaintiff’s discharge to a suspension was "not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” Ante, p 343. On remand, the Court of Appeals addressed only the question of the commission’s authority to reduce the discipline imposed.