Court Opinion

ID: 9925355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:09:20.723793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:00.826984
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Wilkinson v. Dayton, 2024-Ohio-180.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 PATRICIA WILKINSON ADMN OF                           :
 ESTATE OF AISHA NELSON et al                         :
                                                      :   C.A. No. 29841
       Appellants                                     :
                                                      :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CV 05433
 v.                                                   :
                                                      :   (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
 CITY OF DAYTON et al.                                :   Court)
                                                      :
       Appellees                                      :

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                    Rendered on January 19, 2024

                                                 ...........

MICHAEL L. WRIGHT, ROBERT L. GRESHAM and KESHA Q. BROOKS, Attorneys for
Appellants

BRIAN L. WILDERMUTH and TABITHA JUSTICE, Attorneys for Appellees, Officer Moore
and Officer Santos

                                                .............

TUCKER, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Patricia Wilkinson appeals from a judgment of the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas which dismissed her complaint. For the

following reasons, we affirm.
                                                                                        -2-

                          I.     Facts and Procedural Background

       {¶ 2} This case arises from the shooting deaths of Aisha Nelson and her minor

daughter Harper Guynn. Because this case was resolved upon a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

to dismiss, the facts are gleaned from the allegations as set forth in the complaint.

       {¶ 3} At the time of the shooting, Nelson and Guynn resided at 337 Burleigh

Avenue in Dayton. Waverly “Dante” Hawes, with whom Nelson was in a relationship,

also resided at that address.

       {¶ 4} During the evening hours of June 22, 2022, Nelson contacted the Dayton

Police Department and reported that Hawes had “threatened her life.” She asked the

dispatcher to have officers meet her at a nearby store “so as not to arouse Hawes’

suspicions.”   “After waiting for some time,” Nelson again called the Dayton Police

Department and stated that “she had seen several police cars, [but] none of them had

stopped. She had her daughter in the vehicle[,] and it was late at night so she advised

that she was going to go home and would make a report the next day.”

       {¶ 5} During the early morning hours of June 23, 2022, “Hawes called police to the

home on Burleigh and stated he wanted [Nelson] to leave.” Dayton Police Department

Officers Kathryn Santos and Terrell Moore responded to the residence and spoke with

both Hawes and Nelson. During her interview, Nelson “informed Santos that Hawes had

made multiple threats to her life and that there was a weapon in the house that Hawes

had easy access to.” She further stated that Hawes had repeatedly “brandish[ed] a gun”

and “threatened violence against [her]” in the presence of Guynn and Hawes’s own
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daughter. Nelson stated “that Hawes was like a ‘[l]ion in a concrete jungle in here, but

it’s like he locked himself in that basement. He’s down in that basement with his gun

rocking in recliner [sic] back and forth.” Nelson further stated that Hawes had “cut up her

credit cards and emptied her accounts leaving her with no option of anywhere to go.”

Nelson asked the officers to remove Hawes from the home.

      {¶ 6} Moore and Santos left the residence at approximately 2:35 a.m. without

making an arrest or “taking a formal report.” At some point between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00

a.m., Hawes fatally shot both Nelson and Guynn. Hawes fled the scene, but he was later

found dead from a self-inflicted gunshot wound.

      {¶ 7} Patricia Wilkinson was appointed administrator of the estates of Nelson and

Guynn. Wilkinson filed this action on December 5, 2022. She filed a first amended

complaint the following day.     The suit named the City of Dayton, the Dayton City

Commission, the City of Dayton Commissioners, the Dayton Chief of Police, and Officers

Moore and Santos as defendants. The suit also named “John and/or Jane Doe(s) 1-10

individually and as agents of the City of Dayton” as defendants.

      {¶ 8} On March 6, 2023, Santos and Moore filed a joint motion to dismiss. The

other defendants also filed motions to dismiss. On April 12, 2023, Wilkinson filed a

motion for leave to file a second amended complaint along with the proposed amended

complaint. On April 14, 2023, she filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to

dismiss filed by Moore and Santos. On April 17, 2023, she voluntarily dismissed her

claims against all defendants except Moore and Santos.

      {¶ 9} On May 5, 2023, the trial court granted Moore and Santos’s motion and
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dismissed all pending claims against them. The trial court also overruled Wilkinson’s

motion for leave to file a seconded amended complaint.

       {¶ 10} Wilkinson appeals.

                           II.     Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss

       {¶ 11} The first assignment of error asserted by Wilkinson states:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING APPELLANTS’ I, III,

       IV, AND VI CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AS INSUFFICIENTLY PLEAD.

       {¶ 12} Wilkinson claims the trial court erred by granting the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion

to dismiss filed by Moore and Santos.

                                     A. Standard of Review

       {¶ 13} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted “is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex

rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378

(1992); Grover v. Bartsch, 170 Ohio App.3d 188, 2006-Ohio-6115, 866 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 16

(2d Dist.). “A motion made pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) only determines whether the

pleader's allegations set forth an actionable claim.” Ward v. Graue, 12th Dist. Clermont

No. CA2011-04-032, 2012-Ohio-760, ¶ 9, citing Pyle v. Ledex, Inc., 49 Ohio App.3d 139,

143, 551 N.E.2d 205 (12th Dist.1988). “In order for a complaint to be dismissed under

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim, it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.” Cincinnati v. Beretta

U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 758 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 5. In determining
                                                                                          -5-

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “[a] court must construe the complaint in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presume all of the factual allegations to be true,

and make all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Sheldon v. Kettering Health

Network, 2015-Ohio-3268, 40 N.E.3d 661, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.), citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk

Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). The court may look only to the

complaint and any material properly incorporated into the complaint to determine whether

the allegations are legally sufficient to state a claim. Boyd v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25950, 2015-Ohio-1394, ¶ 14.

       {¶ 14} “An order granting a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is subject to de novo

review.” Duer v. Henderson, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2009-CA-15, 2009-Ohio-6815, ¶ 68,

quoting Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d

44, ¶ 5. Thus, the appellate court “must independently review the complaint to determine

whether dismissal is appropriate.” Boyd at ¶ 13, quoting Ament v. Reassure Am. Life Ins.

Co., 180 Ohio App.3d 440, 2009-Ohio-36, 905 N.E.2d 1246, ¶ 60 (8th Dist.).

                                   B. Petition for Discovery

       {¶ 15} Wilkinson’s first cause of action, which seeks the production of certain

documents, is labeled as a “Petition for Discovery Against Defendants City, Commission,

and Afzal [the police chief].” Wilkinson does not state whether she relies on Civ.R. 34(D)

or R.C. 2317.48 as authority for the petition. Thus, we must examine both in determining

whether the decision to dismiss was appropriate.

       {¶ 16} R.C. 2317.48 states, in part:
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      When a person claiming to have a cause of action or a defense to an action

      commenced against him, without the discovery of a fact from the adverse

      party, is unable to file his complaint or answer, he may bring an action for

      discovery, setting forth in his complaint in the action for discovery the

      necessity and the grounds for the action, with any interrogatories relating to

      the subject matter of the discovery that are necessary to procure the

      discovery sought. * * *

      {¶ 17} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that an “action for discovery

pursuant to R.C. 2317.48 is limited solely to interrogatories specifically concerning the

facts necessary to the complaint or answer * * *.” Riverview Health Inst., L.L.C. v. Kral,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24931, 2012-Ohio-3502, ¶ 18, quoting Poulos v. Parker

Sweeper Co., 44 Ohio St.3d 124, 127, 541 N.E.2d 1031 (1989). Such “interrogatories

are to be limited and directed toward only those facts necessary to draft a complaint or

answer * * *.” Id. R.C. 2317.48 does not apply to a request for production of documents.

Riverview at ¶ 18. Because Wilkinson solely sought production of documents in her first

amended and proposed second amended complaints, she was not entitled to relief under

R.C. 2317.48.

      {¶ 18} Civ.R. 34(D) provides, in pertinent part:

      (1) Subject to the scope of discovery provisions of Civ.R. 26(B) and 45(F),

      a person who claims to have a potential cause of action may file a petition

      to obtain discovery as provided in this rule. Prior to filing a petition for

      discovery, the person seeking discovery shall make reasonable efforts to
                                                                                          -7-

       obtain voluntarily the information from the person from whom the discovery

       is sought. The petition shall be captioned in the name of the person seeking

       discovery and be filed in the court of common pleas in the county in which

       the person from whom the discovery is sought resides, the person's

       principal place of business is located, or the potential action may be filed.

       ***

       {¶ 19} Civ.R. 34(D) did not provide Wilkinson with a cause of action for discovery,

because it pertains to pre-suit discovery and limits the discovery to information that is

“necessary to ascertain the identity of a potential adverse party[.]” Cruz v. Kettering

Health Network, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24465, 2012-Ohio-24, ¶ 32.

       {¶ 20} Because Wilkinson cannot demonstrate she was entitled to maintain an

action for discovery under either R.C. 2317.48 or Civ.R. 34(D), we find no error in the trial

court’s decision to dismiss this cause of action.

                          C. Wrongful Death and Survivorship Claims

       {¶ 21} Wilkinson’s third and fourth causes of action assert claims for wrongful

death and survivorship.

       {¶ 22} A wrongful-death action is a special statutory action which does not exist at

common law. Keplinger v. Frederick, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 1989-CA-6, 1990 WL

56846, *1, citing Klema v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp. of Youngstown, 170 Ohio St. 519, 524,

166 N.E.2d 765 (1960).      A cause of action for wrongful death is governed by R.C.
                                                                                            -8-

Chapter 2125.01 et seq.1

       {¶ 23} “In order to prevail in a wrongful death cause of action, the personal

representative of the decedent must prove three elements: ‘1) a wrongful act, neglect or

default of defendant which proximately caused the death and which would have entitled

the decedent to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued; 2) that

a decedent was survived by a spouse, children, parents, or other next of kin; and 3) that

the survivors suffered damages by reasons of the wrongful death.’ ” Jordan v. Howard,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29190, 2021-Ohio-4025, ¶ 61, quoting Bishop v. Nelson Ledges

Quarry Park, Ltd., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2004-P-0008, 2005-Ohio-2656, ¶ 19, citing

McCormac, Wrongful Death in Ohio, Section 2.02. Further, “[w]here the action is based

on negligence, ‘a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty owing to plaintiff's

decedent, i.e., the duty to exercise ordinary care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3)

proximate causation between the breach of duty and the death.’ ” Id., quoting Bennison

v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213 (1966), paragraph one of the

syllabus.

       {¶ 24} In their motion to dismiss, Officers Moore and Santos argued that Wilkinson

1
  A wrongful death claim exclusively belongs to the decedent’s beneficiaries as set forth
in the wrongful death statute. The purpose of a wrongful death action is to compensate
the beneficiaries for the economic and emotional loss caused by the decedent’s death.
Cunning v. Windsor House, Inc., 2023-Ohio-352, 208 N.E.3d 246, ¶ 46 (11th Dist.).
Though almost always litigated in the same action, a survivorship claim, which is created
and governed by R.C. 2305.21, is a separate cause of action. A survivorship claim “is
simply the action the decedent could have brought for the injuries he suffered prior to his
death and is * * * for the benefit of the estate.” Id., citing Peters v. Columbus Steel Casting
Co., 45 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787, 873 N.E.2d 1258, ¶ 10; In re Estate of Craig,
89 Ohio App.3d 80, 84, 632 N.E.2d 620 (12th Dist.1993). Because wrongful death and
survivorship claims arise from the same facts and the dispositive duty analysis is the
same, we will discuss the issues within the context of a wrongful death claim.
                                                                                            -9-

had failed to establish they had a duty to prevent Hawes from harming Nelson and Guynn.

The trial court agreed.

       {¶ 25} “Duty, as used in Ohio tort law, refers to the relationship between the plaintiff

and the defendant from which arises an obligation on the part of the defendant to exercise

due care toward the plaintiff.” Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d 266,

2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 23, quoting Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 45 Ohio

St.3d 96, 98, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (1989). “ ‘The existence of a duty is a question of law for

a court to decide, even if resolving that question requires the court to consider the facts

or evidence.’ ” A.M. v. Miami Univ., 2017-Ohio-8586, 88 N.E.3d 1013, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.),

quoting Martin v. Lambert, 2014-Ohio-715, 8 N.E.3d 1024, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.).

       {¶ 26} “Ordinarily, under Ohio law, there is no duty to prevent a third person from

causing harm to another absent a special relationship between the parties or a duty

imposed by statute.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 34.2 “Such a ‘special relation’ exists

when one takes charge of a person whom he knows or should know is likely to cause

bodily harm to others if not controlled.” (Citations omitted.) Littleton v. Good Samaritan

Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449, 455 (1988). In Ohio, “[a] law

enforcement officer does not ‘take charge’ of another person unless the person is in

custody.” Bush v. Ashland Cty., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 09-CA-25, 2010-Ohio-1732, ¶ 34.

       {¶ 27} There is no allegation in the complaint that the officers took control or

custody of Hawes. And, as set forth below, they had no legal duty to arrest Hawes.

Without the existence of a duty, “no legal liability can arise on account of negligence.”

2
 Wilkinson alleges that Moore and Santo had a statutory duty to arrest Hawes.
However, as discussed below in relation to the sixth cause of action, this argument fails.
                                                                                          -10-

Jeffers v. Olexo, 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 142, 539 N.E.2d 614 (1989). Considering the facts

and law, and finding no that special relationship was demonstrated, we conclude that the

trial court did not err in dismissing Wilkinson’s claims for wrongful death and survivorship.

                      D. Civil Liability for Criminal Offenses – R.C. 2307.60

       {¶ 28} For her sixth cause of action, Wilkinson asserted an entitlement to damages

as provided in R.C. 2307.60. That statute “independently authorize[s] a civil action for

damages caused by criminal acts, unless otherwise prohibited by law[.]” Jacobson v.

Kaforey, 149 Ohio St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, 75 N.E.3d 203, ¶ 6. 10. In pertinent part,

the statute states:

       Anyone injured in person or property by a criminal act has, and may recover

       full damages in, a civil action unless specifically excepted by law, may

       recover the costs of maintaining the civil action and attorney's fees if

       authorized by any provision of the Rules of Civil Procedure or another

       section of the Revised Code or under the common law of this state, and

       may recover punitive or exemplary damages if authorized by section

       2315.21 or another section of the Revised Code.

R.C. 2307.60(A)(1).

       {¶ 29} In the first amended complaint, Wilkerson asserted that Moore and Santos

were guilty of the crime of dereliction of duty as proscribed by R.C. 2921.44. Specifically,

that complaint cited R.C. 2921.44(E), which states that “[n]o public servant shall

recklessly fail to perform a duty expressly imposed by law with respect to the public
                                                                                            -11-

servant’s office, or recklessly do any act expressly forbidden by law with respect to the

public servant’s office.” The first amended complaint then asserted that Santos and

Moore “wantonly, willfully, intentionally, maliciously, and not in good faith failed to perform

their duties * * *,” and that this failure was “a crime under R.C. 2921.44(F).” From this,

the first amended complaint asserted a right to recovery under R.C. 2307.60(A)(1).

       {¶ 30} In their motion to dismiss, Santos and Moore argued that, to avoid a Civ.R.

12(B)(6) dismissal, Wilkerson had to “identify a duty expressly imposed by law on * * *

Santos and Moore, the violation of which caused injury.” Santos and Moore then argued

that, if the first amended complaint asserted that they had a duty to arrest Hawes for

domestic violence under R.C. 2935.032, this assertion was incorrect because R.C.

2935.032 “only impose[s] an arrest obligation if an officer determine[s] that an offender

[has] committed felonious assault or aggravated assault”; the first amended complaint did

not contain this allegation.

       {¶ 31} The trial court determined that the sixth cause of action was subject to

dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), reasoning that R.C. 2921.44(E) requires the underlying

statute “to expressly impose a duty upon the accused; an implied duty is therefore

insufficient to support a charge of dereliction of duty.” (Emphasis sic.) Then, the trial

court concluded:

       [Wilkinson] argue[s] [Santos and Moore] had a duty to arrest [Hawes] and/or

       remove him from the premises but fail[s] to point to a duty expressly

       imposed by law. Instead, [Wilkinson] * * * mis-cite[s] laws not imposing an
                                                                                         -12-

       express duty to arrest or remove and * * * guideline policies3 created by [the

       Dayton Police Department] which, by their very nature, do not require arrest

       and removal. Therefore, [Wilkinson’s] sixth cause of action is dismissed.

(Emphasis sic.) (Footnote added.)

       {¶ 32} We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. Based upon the facts set forth

in the first amended complaint, neither the domestic violence statute nor the Dayton

Police Department domestic violence guidelines imposed an express duty upon Officers

Santos and Moore to arrest Hawes, to remove him from the premises, or to take any other

action. Instead, both the statue and the guidelines state that, under certain circumstances,

an arrest is the “preferred course of action.” This language clearly gives the officers

some degree of discretion in determining whether to make an arrest, and thus cannot be

considered an express legal duty. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in

dismissing the sixth cause of action.

       {¶ 33} Wilkinson also claims the trial court erred in dismissing this cause of action

because another section of R.C. 2921.44 provided a basis for liability. Specifically, she

argues that under R.C. 2921.44(A), a law enforcement officer commits the crime of

dereliction of duty when he or she negligently “[f]ail[s] to prevent or halt the commission

of an offense or to apprehend an offender, when it is in the law enforcement officer's

power to do so alone or with available assistance.”         Wilkinson contends that this

provision made the officers’ failure to take action against Hawes a crime.

3
 Dayton Police Department General Order 2.01-2, which articulates the department’s
domestic violence response guidelines, was attached to the first amended complaint as
Exhibit 2.
                                                                                          -13-

       {¶ 34} However, this argument was not raised by Wilkinson at any time in the trial

court. Indeed, she raised it for the first time in her appellate reply brief. “[A]rguments

raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by an appellate court.” Budz v.

Somerfield, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29550, 2023-Ohio-155, ¶ 30, citing Powell v.

Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4286, 202 N.E.3d 794, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). The rationale for this

conclusion is that a party should not be “given a second chance to raise arguments that

they should have raised below.” Id., citing Hamper v. Suburban Umpires Assn., Inc., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92505, 2009-Ohio-5376, ¶ 27, quoting Perlmutter v. People's Jewelry

Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1271, 2005-Ohio-5031, ¶ 29.

       {¶ 35} Wilkinson attempts to evade a finding of waiver by arguing that, because

Ohio is a notice pleading state, her general citation to R.C. 2921.44 was sufficient to place

the defendants on notice of her claims under R.C. 2921.44(A). We disagree. While

Wilkinson’s complaint did make a general reference to R.C. 2921.44, the pleadings

specifically relied upon subsection (E) as the basis for her right to relief. Furthermore, in

their motion to dismiss, consistent with the content of the first amended complaint, Moore

and Santos exclusively argued that subsection (E) did not create liability. If Wilkinson

intended to rely upon a different or additional section of R.C. 2921.44, she had an

obligation to make that argument in her motion in opposition to the motion to dismiss so

that the trial court could have considered the claim. See Budz at ¶ 31 (“if the nonmoving

party fails to raise an issue when responding to the moving party's motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party has waived that issue on appeal.”) Accord Tchankpa v.

Ascena Retail Group, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-760, 2020-Ohio-3291, ¶ 20
                                                                                           -14-

(failure to raise an argument in response to a motion for summary judgment waives the

argument for purposes of appeal). Because Wilkinson failed to raise this argument in

the trial court, we will not consider it. Again, we find no error in the trial court’s decision

to dismiss the sixth cause of action alleging civil liability for criminal actions.

       {¶ 36} Based upon the record before us, we find Wilkinson’s arguments regarding

the trial court’s decision to dismiss lack merit. Accordingly, the first assignment of error

is overruled.

                III.   Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint

       {¶ 37} Wilkinson’s second assignment of error is as follows:

                THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY OVERRULING APPELLANTS’

       MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT.

       {¶ 38} Wilkinson contends the trial court erred by denying her request for leave to

file a second amended complaint.

       {¶ 39} Civ.R. 15(A) provides that a party may amend its pleading once as a matter

of course within 28 days after serving it or within 28 days after service of a Civ.R. 12(B)

motion, whichever comes first. Absent compliance with these deadlines, a party may

amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or after obtaining leave

of court.   Civ.R. 15(A).     As to amendments requiring leave of court, Civ.R. 15(A)

demands that “[l]eave of court shall be freely given when justice so requires.” However,

a trial court may properly refuse to grant leave to amend when the amendment would be

futile. Cruz, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24465, 2012-Ohio-24, ¶ 34.
                                                                                           -15-

       {¶ 40} In general, a trial court’s decision to permit or deny an amendment is

reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Gilliam v. Crowe, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 27352, 2017-Ohio-5494, ¶ 8, citing Cruz at ¶ 34. “Where, however, the trial court's

denial of the motion for leave to amend ‘can fairly be read to have been based on a

determination that the amended complaint * * * would not withstand a motion to dismiss,

the denial is a legal question that is reviewed de novo.’ ” Id., citing Marx v. Ohio State

Univ. College of Dentistry, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APE07-872, 1996 WL 87462, *3

(Feb. 27, 1996), quoting Rainer v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 65 F.3d 169, *2 (6th

Cir.1995); Hollinghead v. Bey, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-99-1351, 2000 WL 1005205, *8 (July

21, 2000) (quoting Rainer).

       {¶ 41} Wilkinson argues that the trial court erred by denying her request to amend

her complaint because “multiple causes of action were and remain available to [her] to

add to the Amended Complaint, including, but not limited to, Due Process violations, prior

to the trial court’s decision.” She further notes that “the statute of limitations with respect

to potential federal causes of action against all Defendants has yet to lapse.” However,

we have reviewed the proposed second amended complaint, and it did not add any

causes of action that were not included in her first amended complaint.

       {¶ 42} Further, nothing in the proposed second amended complaint contradicted

the trial court’s finding that Wilkinson had failed to demonstrate the existence of a duty

that would save her claims for wrongful death and survivorship. The second amended

complaint also did not state any new theories for civil recovery under R.C. 2307.60.

Instead, it relied upon the same claim of dereliction of duty, R.C. 2921.44(E), and did not
                                                                                    -16-

add a claim for dereliction of duty under R.C. 2921.44(A).

       {¶ 43} From our review of the record, we conclude the trial court did not err by

denying Wilkinson’s request to file a second amended complaint.

                                      IV.    Conclusion

       {¶ 44} Both of Wilkinson’s assignments of error being overruled, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

                                    .............

WELBAUM, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.