Court Opinion

ID: 9409002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-14 16:08:50.446958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:48.156244
License: Public Domain

J-S18035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RASUL JOHNSON                              :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1412 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered April 29, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0005831-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED JULY 14, 2023

        The Commonwealth appeals from the April 29, 2022, order entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which granted the pre-trial

suppression motion filed by Appellee Rasul Johnson (“Johnson”).1        After a

careful review, we reverse the order granting the suppression motion, and we

remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

        The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: On June 29,

2021, a criminal Information was filed against Johnson charging him with

firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106, and carrying

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified it took this interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), and the suppression court’s ruling
terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution. See Commonwealth
v. Holston, 211 A.3d 1264, 1268 (Pa.Super. 2019) (en banc).
J-S18035-23

firearms in public in Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108. On April 25, 2022,

Johnson sought to suppress the physical evidence seized by the police on the

following basis:

             [Defense seeks] a motion to suppress any and all physical
       evidence in this case based on the Fourth Amendment of the
       United States Constitution, as well as the broader protections
       afforded by the PA Constitution Article 1, Section 8 under
       Commonwealth v. Alexander,[2] Your Honor.
             We argue that there’s no reasonable suspicion to stop the
       car in this case. There was no probable cause and exigent
       circumstances or a search warrant to search the car in this case
       and that the stop was unreasonably extended[.]

N.T., 4/25/22, at 3-4 (footnote added).3

       At the April 25, 2022, suppression hearing, Philadelphia Police Officer

Kwaku Sarpong testified that on April 14, 2021, at approximately 6:42 p.m.,

he and his partner were on patrol in their police vehicle. Id. at 5-7. At this

time, it was raining heavily “on and off,” and it was “pretty dark outside.” Id.

at 7-8. As they were patrolling the area of Morris Street, the officers observed

a white Subaru traveling eastbound with no headlights activated. Id. at 6.

____________________________________________

2There is no dispute defense counsel’s reference was to Commonwealth v.
Alexander, ___ Pa. ___, 243 A.3d 177 (2020).

3 We note the certified docket entries do not contain a notation that a pre-trial
suppression motion was filed in this case, and the record does not contain a
pre-trial suppression motion. However, no party has objected to these
irregularities. Further, there is no dispute the issues as stated by defense
counsel at the beginning of the suppression hearing are the bases upon which
Johnson sought suppression of the handgun.

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Officer Sarpong testified that, “[a]t this time, I activated lights and sirens and

initiated a vehicle investigation on 28 Morris for [a] motor vehicle violation

[of] headlights required in adverse weather conditions[.]” Id. at 6-7.

       Officer Sarpong testified the driver, later identified as Johnson, stopped

the Subaru, and Officer Sarpong approached the driver’s side door. Id. at 7.

When he did so, he noticed the Subaru contained a female in the front

passenger seat and “had expired emission stickers of 2/21.” Id.            Officer

Sarpong asked Johnson for his driver’s license, registration, and insurance;

however, Johnson was unable to provide any of these documents.                Id.

Johnson told Officer Sarpong that his name was “Russell Johnson.” Id.

       Officer Sarpong testified he returned to the police vehicle and ran the

name “Russell Johnson” through the police’s department of motor vehicle

database (“the database”).4 Id. The database returned no results for the

name “Russell Johnson.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, Officer Sarpong returned to

the driver’s side door of the Subaru and asked Johnson again for his name.

Id.   After Johnson replied, “Russell Johnson,” Officer Sarpong spelled the

name back to him to ensure he had the correct spelling. Id. at 9. Johnson

confirmed the spelling, so Officer Sarpong returned to the police vehicle to run

the name “Russell Johnson” through the database for a second time.            Id.

____________________________________________

4Sergeant Andrew Power clarified Officer Sarpong used the Philadelphia Crime
Information Center (PCIC) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
databases. Id. at 33.

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Officer Sarpong explained he was attempting to identify Johnson since he was

the driver, and the police verify driver identification information as part of a

“normal” traffic stop. Id.

      Officer Sarpong testified that, again, the name “Russell Johnson”

returned no results in the database, so he reapproached the driver’s side door

of the Subaru and spelled the name back to Johnson. Id. Again, Johnson

confirmed the spelling was correct. Id. Again, the name “Russell Johnson”

yielded no results in the database. Id. at 9-10.

      Officer Sarpong testified that, when he returned to the Subaru for a third

time, he approached the front passenger’s side door and asked the female

passenger for her identification. Id. at 10. She provided the officer with a

Pennsylvania driver’s license, as well as a permit to carry a firearm.       Id.

Officer Sarpong indicated that, for the officers’ safety, he asked the female

passenger if she was carrying a firearm, and she responded in the negative.

Id.

      Officer Sarpong testified that, at this point, Johnson offered to write his

name on a piece of paper. Id. Thus, Officer Sarpong gave Johnson the piece

of paper on which Officer Sarpong had written “Russell Johnson.”          Id. As

Johnson began to write his name, Officer Sarpong noticed that Johnson’s hand

was shaking, and he observed that Johnson “momentarily paused and looked

at the spelling of Russell.” Id. Johnson then wrote the name “Rasol Johnson.”

Id.

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      Officer Sarpong testified he returned to the police vehicle where he ran

the female passenger’s name, as well as the name “Rasol Johnson,” through

the database.    Id.   The female passenger’s name returned information

indicating she had a valid permit to carry a firearm; however, the name “Rasol

Johnson” returned no results. Id. Officer Sarpong concluded Johnson was

“not being forthright about his name,” so he radioed for his fellow officers to

bring a fingerprint scanner, which is a mobile identification scanner, to the

scene.   Id. at 10-11.    Officer Sarpong’s sergeant indicated a fingerprint

scanner was on its way. Id. at 11.

      Officer Sarpong testified he then returned to the driver’s side door of

the Subaru, and he asked Johnson to “step out of the vehicle.” Id. Johnson

initially refused to comply; however, eventually, Johnson stepped out of the

Subaru. Id. at 12. When he did so, “[Johnson] had his back towards the

vehicle and attempted to walk away from the vehicle, which [resulted in the

officer] detain[ing] him.”       Id. Officer Sarpong testified that “[a]t this

point,…my sergeant alerted there was a firearm at the driver floorboard. I did

not see the firearm initially.    My sergeant made the observation.” Id. He

clarified his sergeant did not verbally indicate the discovery of the firearm;

but rather, he made a motion, which conveyed to the officers that a firearm

had been discovered. Id. at 13.

      Officer Sarpong testified he attempted to place Johnson in custody, but

Johnson resisted with a brief struggle ensuing until the officer could gain

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control. Id. Officer Sarpong placed Johnson in the back of the police vehicle,

and, at this time, Johnson provided the correct spelling of his full name, “Rasul

Johnson.” Id. Officer Sarpong ran the name through the database, and he

discovered Johnson did not have a permit to carry a gun. Id. Officer Sarpong

indicated Johnson was arrested for the weapons violation. Id.

      On cross-examination, Officer Sarpong clarified he and his partner were

patrolling while in uniform and a marked police vehicle on April 14, 2021. Id.

at 14-15. He also clarified the officers were sitting on 29th Street and observed

the Subaru drive across 29th Street on Morris Street without its headlights

activated. Id. at 17. Officer Sarpong noted the first time Johnson gave the

name “Russell Johnson,” Officer Sarpong wrote it on a piece of paper without

showing it to Johnson to confirm the spelling.        Id.   However, after the

database returned no findings for “Russell Johnson,” the officer showed

Johnson the piece of paper with the name “Russell Johnson” written on it, and

Johnson confirmed the spelling. Id. at 18. Officer Sarpong reiterated that,

the third time he asked for the spelling, he handed the paper to Johnson, who

momentarily looked at the spelling of “Russell Johnson” and then wrote “Rasol

Johnson.” Id. Officer Sarpong confirmed that “Rasol Johnson” returned no

results in the database, so he radioed for the fingerprint scanner. Id. at 19.

      Officer   Sarpong   indicated   on    cross-examination    that   it   took

approximately two minutes for a fellow officer to bring the fingerprint scanner

to the scene, at which point Officer Sarpong reapproached the driver’s side

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door and asked Johnson to exit the vehicle. Id. at 20-21. Officer Sarpong

confirmed Johnson initially refused to exit the Subaru, but he eventually

complied. Id. at 22. However, as soon as Johnson exited the vehicle, he

immediately “attempted to walk away but [the officer] detained him.” Id. at

23. Officer Sarpong noted he did not handcuff Johnson at this time, but he

did so after his sergeant saw the firearm on the driver’s floor and motioned to

the other officers that there was a gun. Id. Officer Sarpong testified Johnson

resisted by refusing to give his hands, but the officer was able to handcuff him

and place him in the back of his police vehicle. Id.

      Officer Sarpong testified the officers “never had a chance to use” the

fingerprint scanner since, after Johnson was placed in the back of the police

vehicle, he provided his actual name of “Rasul Johnson.” Id. at 21-23. Thus,

Officer Sarpong clarified he did not use the fingerprint scanner or otherwise

fingerprint Johnson at the scene. Id. at 21. He noted the female passenger

was also asked to exit the Subaru, and she complied. Id. at 23.

      Sergeant Andrew      Power   testified   he   responded to   the   vehicle

investigation at issue on April 14, 2021, and he observed Johnson “refusing

to exit the vehicle as [the officer] had been asking.” Id. at 31. He testified

that, after Officer Sarpong requested the fingerprint scanner, a fellow officer

radioed that he was responding to the location with the scanner. Id. at 32.

Thus, since Johnson was still refusing to exit the Subaru, Sergeant Power also

approached the driver’s side door and asked Johnson to exit the vehicle. Id.

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He noted Johnson, who was being “uncooperative” and “evasive,” refused to

provide his actual name, and, in fact, he provided the officers with false names

for which they could find no record in the database. Id. at 33. Sergeant Power

testified the police “couldn’t find a record of [Johnson,] who’s demeanor was

way more nervous than anyone should be in that context because of a vehicle

investigation. He was shaking. His voice was pitching…just uncomfortably

nervous[.]” Id. Sergeant Power noticed that Johnson was “sort of shuffling

around with his legs” while the police were asking him to exit the vehicle. Id.

      Sergeant Power indicated that “after multiple requests, and after a

couple of minutes,” Johnson exited the Subaru. Id. Sergeant Power testified

that as soon as Johnson stepped out of the vehicle he saw in “plain view” a

full-sized pistol on the floorboard near where Johnson’s right foot had been.

Id. at 34-35. He noted he was merely standing outside by the driver’s side

door when he saw the pistol, and the pistol was not under the seat. Id. at

35-36.

      Sergeant Power testified “[i]t didn’t seem like [Johnson] had notice[d]

that [the sergeant] had seen it.” Id. Sergeant Power indicated he made eye

contact with Officer Sarpong, as well as a head motion towards the firearm.

Id. He indicated that, as soon as Johnson exited the vehicle, he “immediately”

tried to walk away, so the officers put their hands on Johnson to stop him. Id.

at 35. He confirmed that Johnson then provided his correct name, and the

police determined he did not have a license to carry a handgun. Id. at 36.

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       Sergeant Power testified that, with the handgun still in the Subaru, he

closed the door and directed an officer to remain with the vehicle. Id. at 38.

He noted the Subaru’s doors could not be locked because Johnson did not

have a key; but rather, he used an app on his cell phone. Id. at 40.

       On cross-examination, Sergeant Power confirmed he did not observe

the handgun until after Johnson exited the Subaru. Id.

       Detective Sanna Chang testified she was on duty on April 14, 2021, and

she spoke to the arresting and investigating officers. Id. at 44. Thereafter, at

approximately 11:45 p.m., she went to the vehicle’s location and saw the

black handgun on the floor of the Subaru. Id. She seized the handgun.5 Id.

       By order entered on April 29, 2022, the suppression court granted

Johnson’s motion to suppress the firearm.6 In so doing, the suppression court

stated the following in open court:

             This is a case that I held under advisement on April 25th and
       had counsel brief this matter. This was due to the fact that during
       the motion itself, the [suppression] court learned that this case
____________________________________________

5 Detective Chang testified that, in response to talking to the arresting and
investigating officers, she prepared and executed a search warrant on the
Subaru. Id. at 43. However, following an objection by defense counsel, the
suppression court excluded the testimony about the search warrant because
the Commonwealth failed to turn the search warrant over to the defense
during discovery. Id. at 45-46. Thus, the suppression court held the
Commonwealth witnesses were permitted to testify they saw the handgun in
plain view; however, the Commonwealth witnesses were not permitted to
testify they executed a search warrant and seized the handgun pursuant to
the search warrant. Id. at 46.

6 The suppression court filed a written order on April 29, 2022, as well as
verbally announced its findings and conclusions in open court.

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     involved a search warrant, which was never turned over in
     discovery. Not only was it not turned over in discovery, the
     Commonwealth also did not have a copy of the search warrant for
     themselves before initiating the hearing on that date.
           In light of that, any mention of a search warrant and the
     search pursuant to the search warrant were precluded from the
     testimony. So, the [suppression] court asked that counsel brief
     the issue because this motion was tried under the presumption
     that this was a case where a search warrant existed. And the
     [suppression] court was listening from that viewpoint before
     learning that this search warrant was never obtained [by the
     Commonwealth] and passed over.
           The [suppression] court asked counsel to address the issue
     of whether there was any other lawful reason for this search. I
     got both of your briefs. I’m going to put the findings of fact on
     here first:
          On April 14, 2021, Officer Sarpong testified he was in the
     area of 2800 Morris Street at 6:42 p.m. when he pulled
     [Johnson’s] car over for driving without headlights. At the time it
     was—he described it as a rainy day. It was getting dark out, so
     [Johnson] would need to be driving with headlights, which he
     wasn’t.
           The stop was made. And after initiating the stop, Officer
     Sarpong said he approached [Johnson], asked for his
     documentation, and he had none. He had no license, registration,
     or insurance.   He gave his name to the officer as Russell
     Johnson[.] The officer ran that name and did not get any results.
           He came back, and he asked for the name again, and [he]
     was given that name again; still had no results in running that
     name. He returned a third time, and he asked [Johnson] to write
     the name down. [Johnson] wrote down “Rasol Johnson”, R-A-S-
     O-L Johnson[.] And the officer ran it the third time, still found no
     DMV results.
            There was a female passenger who he spoke with. She
     provided information—her information. She had—also had a
     license to carry a firearm; [however], she told the officer she had
     no firearm on her.
           Because the officer could not determine [Johnson’s] name,
     he asked [Johnson] to step out of the car so he could conduct a
     fingerprint scan. [Johnson] initially declined or refused to step out
     of the car. He said that the—Officer Sarpong said that he had to

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     ask several times for [Johnson] to step out. Eventually, [Johnson]
     did agree to step out of the vehicle.
           At that time, Sergeant Andrew Power noticed, when
     [Johnson] stepped out of the vehicle, what he believed to be a
     firearm on the floor of the vehicle. He—the officer—I mean,
     Sergeant Power saw the firearm near where [Johnson’s] feet were
     located. [Johnson] was then handcuffed and placed in the back
     of the police vehicle. The passenger was also removed from the
     vehicle and handcuffed as well.
           The vehicle was held at that location in order for the officers
     to obtain a search warrant to search and seize from the vehicle;
     specifically, to seize the weapon from the vehicle. However, as
     noted earlier, the search warrant was never obtained by the
     Commonwealth prior to the motion to suppress, and it was not
     passed to [the] defense.
            The issue here is not whether there was—the [suppression]
     court finds that this was a lawful stop of a motor vehicle. And that
     [Sergeant] Power could see the firearm from a lawful vantage
     point. The issue is whether he was allowed to seize that item from
     a lawful vantage point. The [suppression] court, quite frankly,
     wasn’t sure, which is why I asked the two [parties] to brief the
     issue.
           It does seem the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of
     Pennsylvania has repeatedly held that seizure requires a warrant,
     which is likely why Sergeant Power went through the trouble of
     getting the warrant. It’s unfortunate because this is a case where
     they did what they were supposed to do. However, because the
     ball was later dropped—I don’t know why this warrant was never
     turned over, why it wasn’t uploaded to the system, but it seems
     that the Sergeant got the warrant because he knew he needed the
     warrant.
           Because seeing it does not allow you to seize it, unless
     there’s exigency, which, here, we did not have exigency. He was
     already in custody. And he didn’t have a license to drive, so it
     was very likely that he wasn’t going to be allowed to drive off with
     that vehicle. It was being held and the warrant was needed.
           [T]he Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has set out a test for
     when you can seize an item without the warrant. And the last
     prong of the test is that you have to not only be at a lawful point
     to see the item, but that for the plain view—for a plain view
     seizure, it requires you to also be able to lawfully access the item.

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           So, the police in this case, they could lawfully see the item.
     They did lawfully—the [suppression] court finds that they did
     lawfully see the item in plain view. However, they didn’t have
     lawful access to seize the item, which is a prong that the Supreme
     Court of Pennsylvania has set out.
           [The Supreme Court has] state[d] that under the Fourth
     Amendment, an officer may not seize contraband in plain view
     unless a prior justification provided the officer a lawful right of
     access to the item. So, the issue is the right of access. It’s not
     seeing it. It’s accessing the item. Such as somebody giving them
     permission to go ahead and get it out, which is why, in cases
     where the defendant says, yeah, you can search my car, they
     don’t get the warrant, because they have the lawful right of access
     at that point, but this wasn’t a case where that occurred.
           [The Supreme Court has also stated] the Fourth
     Amendment requires a federal constitutional threshold of whether
     the police had a lawful right of access to the contraband seen in
     plain view. And we, therefore, hold under both the Fourth
     Amendment and Article 1 Section 8 is the plain view exception to
     the warrant requirement—requires the determination of whether
     the police had a lawful right of access to the object seen in plain
     view.
           So, this whole case is the right of access issue. The
     [suppression] court finds that there was no exigency, so that is an
     exception to obtaining a warrant, but it didn’t exist here. And
     that’s because there was no lawful right of access, so the item
     could not be seized. So, I am going to grant the motion to
     suppress.
           This wasn’t an invalid search because it wasn’t a search.
     The item was in plain view. The stop was good. There was no
     unlawful search, but there was an invalid seizure. So, that’s the
     basis for [the suppression court’s] ruling.

N.T., 4/29/22, at 3-9.

     On May 3, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a timely motion for

reconsideration in which it requested the suppression court consider the

search warrant, which it attached to the motion for reconsideration.          The

suppression   court   denied   the   motion,   and   on   May   24,   2022,   the

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Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal to this Court. The suppression court

ordered the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and the

Commonwealth timely complied. On September 19, 2022, the suppression

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion indicating it suppressed the firearm since

(1) the evidence of the officers obtaining a search warrant was inadmissible

at the suppression hearing due to a discovery violation, (2) without evidence

of a proper search warrant, and absent probable cause combined with exigent

circumstances, the police were unable to seize the handgun from the vehicle

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Alexander, ___ Pa. ___, 243 A.3d 177

(2020), even though it was observed in “plain view.”7 See Suppression Court

Opinion, filed 9/19/22, at 3-4.

       On appeal, the Commonwealth sets forth the following issue in its

“Statement of the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

       Did the lower court err by suppressing a firearm that could
       properly be seized in plain view from a vehicle where the police—
       in the excess of caution—nevertheless obtained a search warrant?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 3 (suggested answer omitted).

       Initially, we note that when this Court reviews a Commonwealth appeal

from an order granting a suppression motion, as we are tasked to do here, we

may consider only the evidence produced at the suppression hearing, and then

____________________________________________

7 The suppression court noted it concluded there was probable cause to search
the vehicle, but it concluded there were no exigent circumstances.
Suppression Court Opinion, filed 9/19/22, at 3-4.

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only that evidence which comes from the defendant’s witnesses, along with

the    Commonwealth’s       evidence     which     remains     uncontradicted.

Commonwealth v. Barr, ___ Pa. ___, 266 A.3d 25 (2021).                We must

determine, in the first instance, whether the suppression court’s factual

findings are supported by the record, and if they are, we are bound to those

findings. See id. We must always keep in mind that the suppression court,

as the finder of fact, has the exclusive ability to pass on the credibility of

witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Fudge, 213 A.3d 321, 326 (Pa.Super.

2019). Therefore, we will not disturb a suppression court’s credibility

determinations absent a clear and manifest error. Id. at 326-27.

      We must also determine whether the legal conclusions the suppression

court drew from its factual findings are correct. See Barr, supra, 266 A.3d

at 39. Unlike the deference we give to the suppression court’s factual findings,

we have de novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 606 Pa. 198, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (2010).

      On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that, assuming, arguendo, the

suppression court properly excluded evidence of the search warrant, the police

nevertheless were permitted to seize the handgun from Johnson’s vehicle

pursuant to the plain view doctrine. The Commonwealth asserts that, contrary

to the suppression court’s conclusion, Alexander is not applicable to the

instant case since Alexander did not disturb the applicability of the plain view

doctrine. That is, the Commonwealth asserts Alexander did not import an

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exigency requirement into the plain view doctrine or otherwise require a

warrant prior to the police’s seizure of items in plain view during a valid traffic

stop.8 After a careful review, we agree with the Commonwealth’s assertions.

       Recently, this Court held as follows:

              Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
       Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution protect individuals and their effects and possessions
       from unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v.
       Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 502 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc)[.]
       “As a general rule, ‘a warrant stating probable cause is required
       before a police officer may search for or seize evidence.’” Id.
       (citation omitted). Regarding automobiles, “Article 1, Section 8
       affords greater protection to our citizens than the Fourth
       Amendment, and…the Pennsylvania Constitution requires both a
       showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify a
       warrantless search of an automobile.” Alexander, [supra,] 243
____________________________________________

8 We agree with the suppression court that the initial stop of Johnson’s Subaru
was valid. See Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(holding for a stop based on an observed violation of the vehicle code or
otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have probable cause to
make a constitutional vehicle stop); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4302 (periods for required
lighted lamps); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303 (general lighting requirements). Further,
in the context of a vehicle stop, an officer may conduct “mission related”
inquiries into the vehicle violations that prompted the stop and incidental
matters concerning the safe operation of the vehicle, such as checking the
driver’s licensure status, the vehicle’s registration and insurance status, or
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver. Commonwealth
v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa.Super. 2021) (citing Rodriguez v. U.S.,
575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). Thus, in the instant case, the officers properly
sought to determine Johnson’s identity. Moreover, an officer may ask whether
there are weapons in the vehicle and order the occupants of the vehicle to exit
the vehicle as a matter of course without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id.; Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Thus, the officers properly asked Johnson to exit the vehicle. With these legal
precepts in mind, we examine the Commonwealth’s issue on appeal.

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      A.3d at 177[.] “Absent the application of one of a few clearly
      delineated exceptions, a warrantless search or seizure is
      presumptively unreasonable.” Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 502
      (citation omitted).    Such exceptions include “the consent
      exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search
      exception, exigent circumstances, the automobile exception…the
      stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest
      exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797
      (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth argued in the suppression

court, as well as on appeal, that the handgun was properly seized by the police

pursuant to the plain view doctrine.

      The plain view doctrine is an established exception to the warrant

requirement and applies where an object in a vehicle is visible to a law

enforcement officer from a lawful vantage point outside the vehicle.

Commonwealth        v.   Smith,   285    A.3d   328,   332   (Pa.Super.   2022);

Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. 2022); Heidelberg,

267 A.3d at 504. As we have long observed, there is no legitimate expectation

of privacy shielding the portion of the interior of an automobile that may be

viewed from outside the vehicle by either an inquisitive passerby or diligent

police officers. Commonwealth v. Jones, 978 A.2d 1000, 1005 (Pa.Super.

2009) (citation omitted). See Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 504 (“There can be

no reasonable expectation of privacy in an object that is in plain view.”).

      Three requirements must be satisfied for a warrantless seizure to be

constitutional under the plain view doctrine: (1) a police officer must view the

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object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it must be immediately apparent to

him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer must have a lawful

right of access to the object. Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 471

(Pa.Super. 2022); Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 504.

      Here, the suppression court suggested, and we agree, that the

Commonwealth met the first two prongs of the plain view doctrine. That is,

when Johnson exited the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop, Sergeant Power

observed the firearm on the floor of the driver’s seat by looking in the open

door from outside the car on a public street. Standing outside a vehicle on a

public street and observing an object in the interior of the vehicle by looking

in an open door satisfies the requirement that the object be seen from a lawful

vantage point. See Smith, 285 A.3d at 333 (observing interior of a vehicle

through a window from outside the vehicle constitutes observation from a

lawful vantage point); Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 504.

      Further, the suppression court found credible Sergeant Power’s

testimony that he recognized the object on the floor as being a handgun, and

prior to seizing the handgun, the police determined Johnson did not have a

license to carry a handgun. Also, although Johnson’s passenger had a license

to carry a handgun, she denied that she was carrying a handgun at that time.

Thus, the incriminating nature of the firearm was immediately apparent to the

police.   See Davis, 287 A.3d at 469-70 (indicating the incriminating nature

of a firearm is immediately apparent where police observe a firearm in the

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driver’s seat area and a record check shows that the driver does not have a

license to carry a firearm).

      However, the suppression court found the Commonwealth did not prove

the police had a lawful right of access to the handgun so as to meet the plain

view doctrine. In this regard, the suppression court imported an exigency

requirement into its plain view exception analysis. That is, the suppression

court determined that, under Alexander, a warrantless automobile search is

unconstitutional unless the search is supported by probable cause and exigent

circumstances. Thus, the suppression court reasoned that, in order to have a

“lawful right of access” under the plain view doctrine to seize the handgun,

the police needed exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search

under Alexander.       The Commonwealth argues the suppression court’s

analysis is flawed. We agree with the Commonwealth.

      This Court has held that Alexander did not alter the availability of the

plain view doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement or the

application of the plain view doctrine. Davis, 287 A.3d at 472-73; Smith,

285 A.3d at 332; McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073-74. Relevantly, we have held:

           Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the
      warrant requirement, not the plain view exception. Alexander,
      supra, supra, 243 A.3d at 181[.]
            Our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that
            incriminating objects plainly viewable [in the] interior
            of a vehicle are in plain view and, therefore, subject
            to seizure without a warrant. This doctrine rests on
            the principle that an individual cannot have a
            reasonable expectation of privacy in an object that is
            in plain view.

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      Commonwealth v. Turner, 982 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa.Super. 2009)
      (citations and quotation marks omitted). The Pennsylvania
      Supreme Court has distinguished the limited intrusion of the
      seizure of evidence in plain view from the greater intrusion of an
      automobile search. Commonwealth v. McCree, [592 Pa. 238,
      924 A.2d 621 (2007) (OAJC)].
                                   ***
            As discussed above, Alexander did not involve plain view.
      [There is] nothing in Alexander which modified the plain view
      doctrine, and we decline to apply Alexander.

McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073-74.

      In the case sub judice, we agree with the Commonwealth that the

suppression court erred in importing an exigency requirement into its plain

view analysis.   Simply put, Alexander is not applicable here because the

police did not seize the handgun “upon the analytical underpinnings of the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an

application of the plain view exception.”     McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073

(quotation and quotation marks omitted).

      Further, with regard to the final prong of the plain view exception, we

agree with the Commonwealth that the police had a lawful right to access the

interior of Johnson’s vehicle to seize the handgun. Under the circumstances

described above, the police’s observation of the handgun on the driver’s side

floor, as well as the confirmation that Johnson did not possess a valid license

to carry a handgun, created probable cause to believe that a crime had been

committed. “Probable cause, in this case, arose suddenly and without any

advance warning that [Johnson] or his vehicle would be the target of a police

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investigation.” Commonwealth v. Liddie, 21 A.3d 229, 236 (Pa.Super.

2011) (en banc). Thus, the police were permitted to seize the handgun, which

was in plain view on the floor of the driver’s seat area of the vehicle. 9 See

McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1074; Smith, supra (applying McMahon and finding

the plain view exception applied where, following a motor vehicle stop, a

firearm was observed and retrieved from the back seat of the defendant’s

car).

        Based on the aforementioned, we conclude the police observed the

handgun in Johnson’s vehicle during a valid traffic stop, and the handgun was

properly seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Accordingly, we reverse

the order of the suppression court and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this decision.10

        Order reversed; Case remanded; jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

9 To the extent the suppression court suggested the handgun should be
suppressed since Sergeant Power did not personally seize the handgun at the
scene, we disagree. The undisputed facts reveal the arresting and
investigating officers, including the sergeant, conveyed to Detective Chang
that the police saw a handgun in plain view during the traffic stop, “the vehicle
was held,” Detective Chang went to the vehicle, and Detective Chang seized
the handgun. Suppression Court Opinion, filed 9/19/22, at 2. Our Supreme
Court has recognized that an officer with the requisite probable cause may
instruct another officer to act in his or her stead. Commonwealth v. Yong,
644 Pa. 613, 177 A.3d 876 (2018).

10In light of the aforementioned, we need not address the Commonwealth’s
contention the suppression court erred in failing to consider the search
warrant.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/14/2023

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