Court Opinion

ID: 9676105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:15:01.29173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.684174
License: Public Domain

GREEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Rosanos failed to establish that they were damaged as a result of any conduct on the part of Gunn Buick in the sale to the Rosanos of a new automobile. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and rendered in favor of appellant.
The trial of this ease centered on whether or not the Rosanos received a $2500 discount on the purchase of their new Buick Century automobile as promised by Gunn Buick in its advertising. Indeed, virtually all of the evidence introduced in trial was directed to that issue. The answer to that question thereupon determines whether or not the Rosanos sustained damages entitling them to a recovery in this case. The jury was not asked to resolve that controlling question directly; rather, the case was submitted broadly.1
In its first point of error, appellant raises legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the jury’s finding of damages. The majority erroneously reduces the evidentiary analysis to a question of the credibility of the witnesses. The relevant question before this Court, however, is not whether the jury was entitled to believe the testimony of the Rosanos above that of appellant’s witnesses; it is whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the Rosanos’ claim of damages.
It should be pointed out that this case is not about whether the amount of the discount given was as advertised — the Rosanos make no claim that they received a smaller discount than the advertised amount. They contend instead that they received no discount at all. If it is true they received no discount, their damages are established at $2500; however, if they did receive the discount, the Rosanos have not been damaged. For our legal and factual sufficiency review, then, the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record that the Rosanos did not receive the advertised discount.
When considering a legal sufficiency, or “no evidence”, challenge, we may consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the decision of the trier of fact and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). Utilizing this standard, the record reveals no competent evidence that the Rosanos were deprived of the advertised $2500 discount.
Mr. Rosano testified that he did not receive the discount. But his testimony is based solely on the fact that the discount was not specifically identified in the installment contract. The testimony is conclusory and is not probative on the question of whether the discount was, or was not, actually given. Mr. Rosano’s subjective belief does nothing more than create a mere surmise or suspicion and, in legal effect, constitutes no evidence. See Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179, 182 (April 1, 1995); Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.*6341983). Mrs. Rosano s testimony was also of no assistance — she did not know, one way or the other, whether she and her husband received the discount. No other evidence was offered that the Rosanos did not receive the advertised discount.
Finding the evidence legally insufficient to support the Rosanos’ damages finding, I would sustain appellant’s first point of error and would reverse and render the judgment in favor of appellant.

. The case was submitted to the jury on two liability theories. In Question No. 1, the jury was asked if Gunn Buick failed to state to the Rosanos the "true cash sale price” of the vehicle sold to them. This question relates to the Rosa-nos’ claim under TExiREV.Civ.SrAr.ANN. art. 5069-7.02(6)(a) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.1995), a provision of the Texas Consumer Credit Code regulating motor vehicle installment sales contracts. To recover under this provision, the Rosanos were required to prove that they suffered an "actual economic loss" as a result of its violation by appellant. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-8.01(b)(1) (Vernon 1987 & Supp.1995).
Question No. 2 asked the jury if Gunn Buick engaged in any false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice that was a producing cause of damages to the Rosanos. This relates to the Rosanos’ claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 17.46, et seq. (Vernon 1987).