Court Opinion

ID: 9852347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:28:59.413433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:26.064607
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Although the facts of this case are heart wrenching and tragic, I do not believe that the plaintiffs established that Purcell’s actions or inactions proximately caused the suicide of Jonathan Breese.
*478A plaintiff seeking to impose liability for medical malpractice must show that the defendant breached the duty inherent in the doctor-patient relationship by failing to exercise the requisite degree of skill and care and that this breach was the proximate cause of the injury. Anthony v. Chambless, 231 Ga. App. 657, 659 (1) (500 SE2d 402) (1998). And
[n]egligence alone is insufficient to sustain recovery. It must be proven that the injury complained of proximately resulted from such want of care or skill. A bare possibility of such result is not sufficient. Additionally, there can be no recovery for medical negligence involving an injury to the patient where there is no showing to any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the injury could have been avoided.
(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id.
The professional affidavit attached to the complaint in this case does recite that Purcell breached the standard of care of the medical profession generally in his care and treatment of Jonathan Breese. Missing from the affidavit, however, is a showing that Jonathan’s death was proximately caused by any breach of duty by Purcell. And more importantly, the record does not otherwise show to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the suicide could have been avoided or that Purcell proximately caused the suicide. The suicide occurred two months after Jonathan’s release, during which time he expressed suicidal thoughts to his mother, who had been encouraged to seek psychiatric help for Jonathan. She failed to do this and even left him alone for two nights after he mentioned the prospect of suicide. At best, the plaintiffs established only a possibility that Purcell’s actions were the proximate cause of Jonathan’s death. This was not enough. It is true that we have stated that “the phrase ‘reasonable medical certainty’ ... is neither magic nor particularly helpful.” (Citation omitted.) Abdul-Majeed v. Emory Univ. Hosp., 225 Ga. App. 608, 609 (484 SE2d 257) (1997), overruled on other grounds, Ezor v. Thompson, 241 Ga. App. 275, 279 (526 SE2d 609) (1999). Instead, “[wjhat courts and juries need from medical experts is not a simple recitation of these words, but a realistic assessment of the likelihood that the alleged negligence caused the injury or death.” Abdul-Majeed, supra. Here, the record falls short of showing such a “realistic assessment” of causation, and summary judgment in Purcell’s favor was warranted.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Blackburn and Presiding Judge Andrews join in this dissent.
*479Decided July 9, 2001
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Sender & Stair, Mary Katherine Greene, Alwyn R. Fredericks, for appellants.
Orlando & Kopelman, Richard Kopelman, Browning & Tanksley, Henry D. Green, Jr., for appellees.