Court Opinion

ID: 9840966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:56.607855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:57.767877
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 In re Theodore B. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re THEODORE B., a Person                                         B323495
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                  Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                              Super. Ct. No. 22LJJP00255A
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
           v.
 LAUREN G.,
           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Robin R. Kesler, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

     Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
       Lauren G. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s orders
exercising jurisdiction over Theodore B. and removing him from
her custody. Mother’s appeal rests on Family Code1
sections 3421 and 3427, which are part of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA,
§§ 3400-3425). Mother did not raise the UCCJEA issues below.
       Section 3421 sets forth the limited circumstances under
which a California court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination.” (Id., subd. (a).) Mother argues that, in
the face of evidence a different state may have had jurisdiction,
the juvenile court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to decide if it had jurisdiction. She contends
jurisdictional challenges may be raised for the first time on
appeal. We do not consider whether mother forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it below, since any error by the
juvenile court was harmless.
       Section 3427 gives a juvenile court which has UCCJEA
jurisdiction discretion to defer to the jurisdiction of a court of
another state on grounds of inconvenient forum. An inconvenient
forum claim is forfeited by failing to raise it below.
       Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
                          BACKGROUND
       We limit our recitation of the background facts to those
bearing on the juvenile court’s UCCJEA jurisdiction.
       Theodore is the son of mother and A.B. (father).
       Mother and father met online in 2019 when mother was
living in Texas and father was living in Kansas. Mother is from
Texas, where her three other biological children (two daughters

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

                                 2
and a son) reside with family members other than mother.
Father is from California but lived in various places due to his
family’s military background. Mother and father moved to
Arizona together, where, in 2020, mother became pregnant.
       Theodore was born in July 2021 in Arizona. He tested
positive for marijuana at birth, resulting in a child welfare
referral which was substantiated by Arizona social workers. The
referral was closed in October 2021 without issuance of any
family law orders pertaining to the family.
       In early 2022, the family was evicted from their apartment
in Arizona. They decided to move to California to live with
paternal grandparents in Acton until they could get their own
place. Father was attracted to California because he believed its
laws afforded greater protections to fathers than Arizona laws.
According to father, this was based on police in Arizona having
told him he had no right to take Theodore to a room away from
mother in the family home when mother was acting violently.
       The family moved in with paternal grandparents in
February 2022. Information reported by the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)
includes no indication that the parents intended to return to
Arizona when they left there. Upon arrival in California, mother
got a job. Theodore was later enrolled in Medi-Cal.
       A violent conflict between parents and paternal
grandparents in May 2022 led to an investigation by the
Department. In the course of this investigation, paternal
grandmother showed the Department text messages between her
and mother in which mother threatened to “leav[e] to Houston
with Theo.” Paternal grandmother told the Department she
thought mother planned to move to Texas and reunite with the

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father of her other son but did not have the money to leave.
Paternal grandparents refused to help her in doing so.
       The Department obtained from the juvenile court a
protective custody warrant against mother in June 2022. The
Department enforced the warrant by directing mother to leave
the family home. Mother complied and moved out on June 22,
2022.
       A few days later, the Department filed a petition with the
juvenile court alleging Theodore was subject to the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300. The petition included counts against both mother
and father.
       The juvenile court held a detention hearing in July 2022.
In connection with that hearing, mother filed a notification of
mailing address stating she had moved to Lancaster, California.
Father’s notice stated he was still living with paternal
grandparents in Acton.
       At the detention hearing, the juvenile court acknowledged
off-record statements from counsel indicating the parents had not
lived in California for the six months preceding the petition and
(erroneously) that they moved from Texas. The court observed
that this could implicate UCCJEA and directed the Department
to “locate the appropriate court in Texas so we can reach out to
see which state should have jurisdiction.” The court later
explained that it understood counsel had been incorrect and that
the family had moved from Arizona. Mother confirmed this in
her testimony to the court. The court did not revise its earlier
order directing the Department to determine which court in
Texas might be the “appropriate court” with which to address
UCCJEA jurisdiction.

                                4
       The Department filed a jurisdictional and dispositional
report in mid-August 2022. At the time, father and Theodore
were still living in Acton. However, mother’s whereabouts were
unknown. When the Department visited her address in
Lancaster, a person there said mother had packed her things and
said she was leaving California to move “back home,” but the
person doubted this was true and believed mother was “probably
somewhere around here.” The report described the family’s child
protection referral history in Arizona and stated there were “no
known Family Law order[s] for this family.”
       The juvenile court adjudicated the dependency petition
later in August 2022 without revisiting the question of UCCJEA
jurisdiction. It determined Theodore was subject to jurisdiction
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b),
based on the parents’ history of domestic violence, substance
abuse, and mental and emotional problems.
       A few days later, based on the same evidence, the juvenile
court ordered Theodore removed from mother pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c),
ordered him maintained with father (provided he remained with
the paternal grandparents), and ordered services for the parents.
In making its dispositional order, the juvenile court did not
address the question of UCCJEA jurisdiction.
       At no point in the proceedings below did mother, who was
represented by counsel, argue the juvenile court lacked UCCJEA
jurisdiction, or that it was under an obligation to investigate
UCCJEA jurisdiction, or that California was an inconvenient
forum.

                                5
      Mother timely appealed from the juvenile court’s
August 2022 Welfare and Institutions Code section 300
jurisdictional order and its September 2022 dispositional order.
                           DISCUSSION
      Mother describes her appeal as presenting just one issue,
but she actually argues two. The first is whether the juvenile
court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether it had UCCJEA jurisdiction under
section 3421. The second is whether it erred by failing to
consider whether, if it had jurisdiction, to decline jurisdiction in
favor of a more convenient forum (Arizona) under section 3427.
We consider the first claim of error and conclude it was harmless.
We deem the second claim forfeited and affirm.
1.    Any Error in Failing to Make Jurisdictional Findings
      Under Section 3421 Was Harmless
       “ ‘The UCCJEA is designed to avoid jurisdictional conflicts
between states and relitigation of custody decisions, promote
cooperation between states, and facilitate enforcement of another
state’s custody decrees.’ ” (In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th
508, 516 (Aiden L.).) Nearly every state in the United States has
adopted the UCCJEA. (See In re L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728,
735.)
       Section 3421 prioritizes jurisdiction for dependency
proceedings in a child’s statutorily defined “home state,” if any.
(Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) The UCCJEA defines
“ ‘[h]ome state,’ ” in relevant part, as “the state in which a child
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
child custody proceeding. . . . A period of temporary absence of

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any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.” (§ 3402,
subd. (g).)
       The court of a state that is not a child’s home state may
exercise jurisdiction if, among other things, the child has no home
state, or a court of the child’s home state declines jurisdiction, if
both (a) the child and at least one parent, or a person acting as a
parent, “have a significant connection with th[e] state other than
mere physical presence,” and (b) substantial evidence is available
in the state “concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and
personal relationships.” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).) If this test is
unsatisfied, additional grounds for asserting jurisdiction may
apply but are not relevant here. (See id., subd. (a)(3)-(4); In re
A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, 598.)
       Mother claims the juvenile court erred in failing to conduct
an evidentiary hearing to ascertain a basis for its jurisdiction
under section 3421. In support, she cites In re L.C., supra,
90 Cal.App.5th 728, which holds that “where the information
before a juvenile court objectively suffices to raise a genuine
question about whether another jurisdiction is the child’s home
state, a juvenile court must obtain additional information as
necessary to make a home state determination . . . .” (Id. at
p. 737.) To be clear, mother does not contend the juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction; she argues only that it failed to follow the
proper procedure to ascertain it.
       The Department argues mother forfeited this argument by
failing to raise it below. The court in In re J.W. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 347 held that an objection based on lack of
UCCJEA jurisdiction can be forfeited because the UCCJEA does
not implicate a juvenile court’s “fundamental jurisdiction.” (In re
J.W., at p. 355.) Mother argues In re J.W. was wrongly decided,

                                 7
and, in any event, we should exercise our discretion to consider
her appeal on the merits like the court did in In re L.C., supra,
90 Cal.App.5th 728. We do not consider whether mother could or
did forfeit her appeal as to UCCJEA jurisdiction under
section 3421 because it is obvious any error by the juvenile court
was harmless.
       Failure to “comply with the procedural requirements of the
UCCJEA is subject to harmless error analysis. [Citations.]
Before any judgment can be reversed for ordinary error, it must
appear that the error complained of ‘has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Reversal is justified ‘only
when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause,
including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (In re
Christian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1098-1099.) The
harmless error standard requires the appellant to show “merely a
reasonable chance” of a more favorable outcome, which is “more
than an abstract possibility.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior
Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.)
       Here, the record does not demonstrate a reasonable chance
that, if the juvenile court had made UCCJEA findings, it would
have concluded it lacked UCCJEA jurisdiction.
       The Department concedes California is not Theodore’s
home state because he did not live in California for the six
months preceding the commencement of the juvenile court
proceedings. Mother agrees.
       But mother disagrees with the Department that no other
state is Theodore’s home state. Mother does not contend that
Arizona is Theodore’s home state. Mother contends it is possible

                                  8
Arizona is his home state to the extent the family’s move to
California began only a “temporary absence” from Arizona.
Mother does not dispute that, to the extent the absence was not
temporary, and Theodore had no home state, the juvenile court
would have jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2).
Mother’s section 3421 argument requires that she show there
was a reasonable probability the juvenile court would have found
the family’s move to California was a “temporary absence” from
Arizona if it had considered the question. Mother has made no
such showing.
       What constitutes a “temporary absence” is not defined in
the UCCJEA. California Courts of Appeal have not uniformly
adopted a test to determine when an absence is “temporary.”
One considered only the duration of an absence—almost
17 months—to conclude it would be a “stretch of imagination” to
find such a long absence “temporary.” (In re Marriage of Sareen
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 371, 381.) Another looked only to the
parents’ intent to conclude the child’s time outside California
satisfied “any applicable standard” for “ ‘temporary absence,’ ”
citing three out-of-state cases: two that focused on parental
intent and a third that applied a totality of the circumstances
approach. (In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478,
493, fn. 12.) Another cited Nurie and said courts must consider
parents’ intentions, “as well as other factors relating to the
circumstances of the child’s or family’s departure,” when
determining whether an absence is temporary. (Aiden L., supra,
16 Cal.App.5th at p. 518.) The intent analysis focuses on the
parents’ intention at the time of departure, which may be
informed by their behavior subsequent to that departure and
remaining ties to the old state. (See Nurie, at p. 493, fn. 12

                               9
[assessing nature of absence based on circumstances when it
began]; Aiden L., at p. 521 [analysis should consider reasons for
leaving old state, plans upon arriving in new state, and familial
and legal ties to the old state].)
       Here, whatever standard applies, the record shows no
reasonable prospect that the juvenile court would have concluded
the family’s absence from Arizona was temporary, if it had
considered that question. Mother cites no evidence that the
family left Arizona with the intention of returning. The family
was evicted from their home in Arizona. They went to California
to live with paternal grandparents because they could not afford
to live on their own in Arizona. They hoped that, after staying
with paternal grandparents for a while, they could save enough
money to get their own place. Upon arrival in California, mother
took a job. Thus, at the time of their arrival in California, by all
appearances they intended to remain there.
       Their plans to live together as a family in California
quickly fell apart. Father explained that clashes between mother
and paternal grandparents and mother’s refusal to get mental
health help brought about the prospect of “eviction” by paternal
grandparents. Father’s use of this term implies the family
considered paternal grandparents’ home to be their home and not
a place they were just visiting. Indeed, they paid rent to stay
there. With their housing uncertain, limited income, and the
high cost of living, the family considered leaving California
together. But there is no indication they planned to return
together to Arizona.
       To the contrary, father deliberately left Arizona to protect
his paternal rights. And mother harbored a desire to return to
Texas, not Arizona.

                                10
2.      Mother Forfeited Any Claim of Error Pertaining to
        the Juvenile Court’s Failure to Conduct an
        Inconvenient Forum Analysis
        Mother argues that, even if Theodore has no home state,
the juvenile court was still obligated to consider whether
California or Arizona “should” exercise jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA. We decline to consider this argument on forfeiture
grounds.
        As noted above, mother does not dispute that, assuming
Theodore had no home state, the juvenile court had jurisdiction
under section 3421, subdivision (a)(2), because (A) Theodore “and
at least one parent”—father—“have a significant connection with
[California] other than mere physical presence”; and
(B) “[s]ubstantial evidence is available in [California] concerning
[Theodore’s] care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.” She merely contends Arizona “arguably” also had
jurisdiction, so the court was mandated to determine which state
was the more appropriate forum. For this proposition, mother
cites only section 3427.
        As a preliminary matter, section 3427 does not support the
proposition. Section 3427 is not mandatory. It permits a juvenile
court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction if it determines it is
an inconvenient forum. (Id., subd. (a) [“[a] court of this state that
has jurisdiction under this part to make a child custody
determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the
circumstances . . . .” (italics added)].) The issue “may be raised
upon motion of a party, the court’s own motion or request of
another court” (ibid.), none of which happened here.

                                 11
       But more importantly, section 3427 does not concern the
existence of jurisdiction; it concerns only its exercise. It is
premised on the juvenile court having jurisdiction and then
considering whether to exercise that jurisdiction. (Id., subd. (a).)
Mother argued we were bound to consider her entire appeal,
despite her failure to raise any of the issues below, because
section 3421 implicates the juvenile court’s “fundamental
jurisdiction” (the contrary holding of In re J.W., supra,
53 Cal.App.5th at page 355 notwithstanding). This argument
cannot apply to a claimed section 3427 error because, again,
section 3427 presupposes jurisdiction under section 3421 exists.
We decline to exercise our discretion to consider whether the
juvenile court erred in not performing a nonmandatory
inconvenient forum analysis because mother forfeited the issue
by failing to raise it below.
                            DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders
are affirmed.

                               GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                         STRATTON, P. J.

                         VIRAMONTES, J.

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