Court Opinion

ID: 9569432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:45.953785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:33.880546
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority as to Division 2, but I must respectfully dissent to Division 1 from this radical change in the law regarding the common law duty of railroads to install warning devices at public road grade crossings. The GCPT did not preempt or abolish railroads’ common law liability for the failure to install a protective device on a public grade crossing where the railroad has not been requested to do so by a governmental entity. To the contrary, GCPT reaffirmed the common law duty of railroads to maintain safe grade crossings; OCGA § 32-6-190 restates such duty:
[a]ny railroad whose track or tracks cross a public road at grade shall have a duty to maintain such grade crossing in such condition as to permit the safe and convenient passage of public traffic. Such duty of maintenance shall include that portion of the public road lying between the track or tracks and two feet beyond the ends of the crossties on each side of such crossings.
(Emphasis supplied.) See also Easterwood v. CSX Transp., 933 F2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 507 U. S. 658 (113 SC 1732, 123 LE2d 387) (1993).
Kitchen v. CSX Transp., 265 Ga. 206, 207 (453 SE2d 712) (1995) dealt with a county road that previously had a bridge crossing a railroad and that was closed by county action so that there no longer was a railroad crossing, which county action relieved the railroad of its common law duty to maintain the bridge and approaches. Kitchen did not hold that a common law duty for railroads as to crossings at overpasses had been abolished by statute; the opinion held that the particular facts and circumstances of that case gave rise to no common law duty.
Assuming arguendo that Nashville, Chattanooga [&c. R. Co. v. Cook, 177 Ga. 196 (170 SE 28) (1933)], imposes a common *269law duty of care which survived the GCPT, we do not construe it to impose an obligation on CSXT to erect signs or barriers to warn drivers of the hazard created by the terminus of County Road 77. . . . The hazard alleged here, i.e., the abrupt terminus of the public road without adequate warnings, was situated on the public road, and was neither created nor maintained by CSXT. . . . CSXT breached no common law duty of care owed to appellants in that it neither created nor maintained an artificial condition which gave rise to Kitchen’s injuries.
Id. at 209-210.
OCGA § 32-6-200 only gives the power and authority to DOT, a county, or a municipality to mandate the installation and maintenance by the railroad of protective devices at grade crossings over the objection of railroads; nowhere does the statute expressly or impliedly prohibit the railroad from voluntarily taking such action as a common law duty in the exercise of ordinary care to make the crossing safe. Since the purpose of OCGA § 32-6-200 is to empower governmental entities to force railroads to install and maintain safety devices at unsafe grade crossings, then the General Assembly did not intend to prohibit the railroad from voluntarily undertaking such safety measure. The General Assembly did not intend to lessen safety devices at dangerous crossings but to increase such measures beyond what railroads already had undertaken. The General Assembly was aware that railroads were reluctant to incur the cost of such measures voluntarily or to recognize for liability purposes that the crossing was extremely dangerous. The General Assembly intended to provide the governmental entities the power to compel railroads to undertake such action to correct the dangers to cure the existing evil. OCGA § 1-3-1; McGuire v. McGuire, 228 Ga. 782, 785 (187 SE2d 859) (1972).
The language of OCGA § 32-6-200 (a) does not prohibit the railroad from undertaking on its own judgment to install a protective device without prior judgment by the DOT, county, or municipality that it is necessary; the Act merely requires that DOT give final approval of any plan and specification for a protective device before the installation. DOT’s exercise of veto power over action by the railroad, county, or municipality is different from a prohibition of the railroad from seeking DOT’s permission to install a protective device.
“The common-law rule is still of force and effect in this State, except where it has been changed by express statutory enactment or by necessary implication. [Cits.]” Robeson v. Intl. Indem. Co., 248 Ga. 306, 307 (1) (282 SE2d 896) (1981). Statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed and never extended beyond plain and *270explicit terms. Duncan v. Entrekin, 211 Ga. 311, 312 (85 SE2d 771) (1955); see also Fayette County v. Seagraves, 245 Ga. 196, 197-198 (264 SE2d 13) (1980). Thus, preemption of the common law should not occur from such uncertain implications read into the statute.
The caption of GCPT is silent as to the abolition of common law duties of railroads at grade crossings as a purpose of the Act. Ga. L. 1973, pp. 947-958. The caption does state the purpose of the Act as “providing for maintenance of grade crossings . . . providing the authority of the Department, a county or a municipality to order the installation of protective devices and providing for the division of the costs of acquisition and installation.” Id. at 955. Prior to the Act, the governmental entities were unable to compel railroads to erect such safety devices.
This Court, in Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851, 853-854 (4) (410 SE2d 437) (1991), held that a common law duty existed at private railroad grade crossings:
[w]ith respect to persons rightfully using a private crossing, the duty of the railroad company is similar to its duty as to users of public crossings, and as to them, it must exercise reasonable or ordinary care, commensurate with the danger of the particular situation. Accordingly, [railroads] would have no less of a common law duty with regard to a private crossing than they would have with regard to a public crossing.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 853-854. If the General Assembly intended to preempt the field and to avoid an equal protection issue, then it would have done so uniformly. In the dicta of such opinion, such common law duty was implied to exist both in public and private railroad grade crossings. Id. at 854.
In Wall v. Southern R. Co., 196 Ga. App. 483, 485 (1) (396 SE2d 266) (1990), this Court held that having functioning safety devices at a railroad grade crossing did not absolve the railroad of the common law duty to exercise ordinary care, i.e., have a flagman present. Thus, the common law duty survived the GCPT; otherwise, how could the common law duty arise where the GCPT safety device had been installed and was functioning?
Finally, Southern R. Co. v. Kraft, 188 Ga. App. 623, 624 (5) (373 SE2d 774) (1988), was a full court opinion which rejected the argument that DOT must decide what warnings or safety devices were to be used at a crossing and held that railroads had a common law duty as to safety devices at grade crossings.
The majority would find that the General Assembly through the GCPT selectively abolished common law duties of railroads at public *271grade crossings for installing protective devices without governmental direction but not for other purposes, creating an equal protection issue.
Decided June 22, 1999
Reconsideration denied July 22, 1999
Jones, Cork & Miller, Carr G. Dodson, Thomas W. Joyce, for appellant.
Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, John S. Stewart, for appellee.
Cathey & Strain, Dennis T. Cathey, James E. Staples, Jr., Black-wood, Matthews & Steel, John D. Steel, John B. Briggs, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, Robert C. Lamar, David W. Davenport, Casey, Gil-son & Williams, Matthew D. Williams, Glenn C. Tornillo, James E Grubiak, amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in this opinion.