Court Opinion

ID: 9810480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:51:14.767139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:57.783086
License: Public Domain

BodmaN, J.
Two important questions are presented in this case:
1. Have the corporate authorities of the city of Charlotte a right to tax the bonds, solvent credits and stocks of incorporated companies belonging to the plaintiff, who resides within the city, and also his income %
2. Have they a right to levy and collect taxes for all or any of the purposes stated in the case agreed, unless by a vote of the qualified voters of the city ?
1. As to the first question: It is admitted by all that a municipal corporation has no power to lay and collect taxes unless such power be expressly or impliedly given by law, that is, either by its charter, or by some general law. In this case the amendment to the city charter, ratified January 25th, 1872, does undertake to give to the city, power to levy taxes “ on all real and personal property, trades, licenses, and other *754subjects of taxation, as provided in sec. 3, Art. Y, of the Slate . Constitution.” Among tlie subjects of taxation there mentioned, are “moneys, credits, investments in bonds and stock,” So that as far as the Legislature can give it, the city has the power to tax bonds, &c. But it is contended for the plaintiff, that the act of January 25th, 1872, is contrary to sec. 9, of Art. YU, of the Constitution, which reads as follows: “ All taxes levied by any county, city, town or township, shall be uniform and ad valorem, upon all property in the same, except property exempted by this Constitution.” It is contended for the plaintiff if we correctly understood his argument, that this action contains a grant of the power of taxation to municipal corporations, which the Legislature cannot increase, and that it is confined to property, which in the sense in which it is there used, means only tangible property, and excludes bonds, &c.
We do not concur with the plaintiff in this view of the intent and effect of the section quoted. The Constitution does not expressly provide for the division of the State into counties. In many places, however, it recognizes the existing division. In Art. VII, of sec. 3, it provides for the division of counties into townships. ( In sec. 4, of Art. VIII, (which obviously belongs under Art. VII,) it is expressly empowers and directs the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities, towns and incorporated villages. This is a direct grant to the Legislature of a power to incorporate cities, &c.
The grant of such a power carries with it, by necessary implication, the power to endow cities with the usual and necessary incidents of an incorporated city, one of which undoubtedly is to tax all lawful subjects of taxation within it for all lawful purposes.
What the power of a city would be in respect to a power to tax, if the Legislature should merely incorporate it and impose on its corporate authorities the usual duties, without *755making any express provision for taxation, we need not en-quire, as there is probably no instance of that sort.
The origin of the power of cities to tax, is not to be sought in the section of the Constitution quoted, sec. 9, Art. YII), but in the Act of the Legislature creating them, under the power for that purpose given by sec. 4, of Art. YIII. Section 9, of Art. YII, is not an enabling statute. It does not confer on cities, a power to tax, or on the Legislature a power to give them that power. Its purpose and intent was to restrain the power of the city by requiring an uniformity of taxation upon all property ad valorem, notwithstanding any possible attempt by the Legislature to give the power without such restraint. The terms of the section do not profess to give a power, but to regidate what it supposes to exist by virtue of a legislative act of incorporation. The existence of a power to tax in cities is also assumed in that clause of sec. 4, Art. YIII which requires the Legislature to restrict the power. If the power be not derived entirely from the charter of in corporation, either as expressly given, or by necessary implication, it cannot be derived elsewhere, for the Constitution nowhere confers this power on cities, either expressly or by necessary implication.
If this view be correct, it is not material for the present purpose, whether the word “property” in sec. 9, is confined to tangible property or not. For if it be so confined, it is a limitation of a restraint on the taxing power, and not on the power itself, and it would be competent to the Legislature to confer on a city a power to tax intangible property otherwise than uniformly and ad valorem.
We are of opinion however, that the word as here used, is not confined to tangible property. The word “property” is not such a technical one, that if properly used it has every where the same precise and definite moaning. Its meaning varies according to the subject treated of, and according to the context.
*756In its most general sense, it embraces every tiling which a man may have exclusive dominion over. In this sense it is used in section IT of the Declaration of Bights. “ No person ought * * * * to be deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the law of the land.” So in sec. 19. In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury ought to remain sacred. So in sec. 22. No property qualification ought to affect the right to vote or hold office. In sec. 35, the words “ lands ” and “ goods ” have a like extensive signification, including things in action.
Pipkin v. Ellison, 12 Ired. 61, which is cited to show that the word does not include bonds, &e., decided only that, where a testator bequeathed all his property to his wife for life, and after her death to he sold and the proceeds divided, <&(?., he did not intend to include his notes, as notes were not usually the subjects of sale for division. Any general remarks in the opinion of the court, as to the meaning of the-word, must be referred to tire facts of the case, or else they are merely dicta. There can be no doubt Tsuppose, that a bequest of “ all my property ” to A. would pass bonds belonging to the testator. In Pullen v. Commissioners of Raleigh, 68 N. C. Rep. 451, it was held in conformity with our present opinion, that the power of a city to tax is derived from its charter, and as the charter of Baleigh, in enumerating the subjects of taxation, did not use the word “property,” or any other word which could include securities for money, the city had no right to tax them. In Lilly v. Commissioners of Cumberland, 69 N. C. Rep. 300, it is held that solvent credits are property.
It is argued that as by sec. 3 of Art. Y, the Constitution, after saying that “ laws shall be passed taxing by an uniform rule, moneys, credits,” &c., says, “and also, all real and personal property, according to its true value in money;” it thereby defined “ property ” as not embracing moneys, credits, &c. Such an inference is hasty, and cannot be fairly drawn. *757The intent seems to have been to leave it to the Legislature, in taxation for State purposes, to tax moneys, credits, &c., at their face value, or by some other standard than their “true value in money,” whereas tangible property should be always taxed by the latter standard. If this construction be correct, and the words “ all property,” in sect. 9 of Art. YII include bonds, &e., then these, when tamed by cities, must be taxed ad valorem, that is, “according to their true value in money,” although for State purposes, they are not required to be.
Ve think that the city authorities had a right, under the amendment to the charter, to tax the bonds, &c., of the plaintiff, and also his income. There is no suggestion that the bonds, &c., are taxed otherwise than uniformly ad valorem.
2. As to the second question: The purposes for which the taxes complained of are laid, are to pay the interest and principal, in part at least, of certain debts owing by the city. These are described in sec. 4 of the case agreed, from which they will be copied by the Beporter, and they need not be repeated here. None of them were submitted to a vote of the people before being contracted. That the voters of the city rejected a proposition to fund them, we consider immaterial.
If the charter contains any restriction on the power of the city to contract debts in the performance of its usual duties, and to lay taxes to pay such debt, it is found in sections 24 and 25. It is argued that these sections gave to the city government the power to incur a bonded debt, not to exceed $200,000, for any purpose which, in its opinion, would promote the general good of the city provided the object be first approved by a vote of the citizens ; and that this proviso restricts the city from incurring debt, or at least from giving its bonds or notes to secure any debt without such approval. We think, however, that these sections relate only to the issue of city bonds in aid of railroads, and the restriction is confined to such bonds. It is only the surplus which may be raised by *758the sale of its bonds in aid of railroads tbat may be applied to other objects, if the citizens approve of them.
The restriction relied on by the plaintiff is in sec. 7, Art. VII of the Constitution:
“No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same, ex cejpt for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of a majority of the qualified voters therein.”
"We think the natural and proper construction of this section is, that the exception extends to every part of the preceding lines, to the prohibition to contract a debt, as vrell as to that against levying a tax. Ve are not at liberty to read it as if there were a period after the word credit, and a distinct sentence began after that. The effect of such reading would be to prohibit every municipal corporation from contracting any debt, absolutely and without qualification, and to make every debt contracted for whatever purpose, and under all circumstances illegal and void. Such a prohibition would be unreasonable. The duties of a county or city government cannot be performed without often contracting debts. Officers and servants of divers duties must be engaged, payable at some fixed interval daily, monthly, or quarterly, as the case may be. The contract for emyloyment creates a debt as soon as the service has been performed. .It must necessarily remain a debt for some space of time, however short; and if the debt be thus made illegal, the corporation cannot lawfully pay, und the creditor cannot recover it. So of contracts to execute a certain work. For example, to build a bridge. An absolute prohibition to contract a debt, is a prohibition to contract at all, for eveiy contract may and naturally does end in a debt. We- cannot suppose that the Constitution intended to deprive these great and necessary public corporations of a power which is usual to all corporations, which these have possessed, and which is necessary to their usefulness, if not to *759their very existence, except upon language which admits of no other meaning. It must sometimes happen that the city revenues for the year are insufficient to pay the necessary expenses ■of the year. This may happen accidentally or purposely for several years in succession, and thus a debt is contracted, made up of the several annual deficiencies. Such seems to be the origin of one class of the city debts, which the plaintiff contends are illegal. But if a debt be for necessary expenses and lawful in its origin, it cannot become unlawful, by a delay of the debtor to pay, which the creditor cannot prevent. Neither can it become unlawful because money is borrowed to pay the ■original creditors, and a note is given as a security for the loan. In such case the lender stands in the place of the original creditor.
The other class of debts objected to, are for the expenses of widening the streets of the city. It was argued that this was not a necessary expense. It would be difficult or impossible to draw a precise line between what are, and what are not, the necessary expenses of the government of a city. The analogy of the law of necessaries for infants is the only one that occurs to us. It is held, that if, considering the means and station in life of the infant, the articles sold to him may be necessaries under any circumstances, they come within a class for which the infant may be liable, and upon his refusal to pay, it is for a jury to determine whether under the actual circumstances they were necessary. If, however, the articles are merely ornamental, and such as cannot, under any circumstances, be necessary to one of the means and station of the infant, a court may, as matter of law, declare that the infant is not liable. We do not undertake to say that this analogy will furnish a rule which will admit of a close application. But if treated merely as an analogy, in the absence of other guides, it may be of some general use. It was held in Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. Rep., 244, that if the object for which the money was to be raised came within the class of *760such as might be necessary for the county, it was left to the county commissioners to decide whether in fact it was necessary or not, and their decision could not be reviewed by the court. This was also held in Mitchell v. School Committee, 71 N. C. Rep., 400.
No other rule could be adopted without inconvenience and injury. If no one could contract with a county for the building of a bridge, or with a city for the building of a market house, or other work coming apparently within- the class of necessaries, and which the government of the corporation has deemed necessary, exqept at the risk of having the contract avoided by the decision of a court, which may take a view of the actual necessity different from that of the city government ; then no one would contract without either charging an extra proportionate to the risk, or insuring safety by getting the opinion of the court if possible. The public business would be sacrificed or seriously obstructed, and the courts-would assume the duties of municipal government, for which they were not intended. To make and repair the streets of a city is a duty generally, if not always, imposed on its authorities by the charter. It is within the class of necessary expenses. Widening the streets must come under the same-class. The narrow and crooked ways which suffice'for a village, may be insufficient for the passage and traffic of a populous and flourishing city. Whether the widening was in fact needed was in the discretion of the city authorities, as the building of a bridge was held to be in Broadnax v. Groom.
Admittedly, this power is liable to abuse. But the same may be said of all power wherever lodged. The Constitution has enjoined upon the Legislature the duty of restricting tlie-power so as to prevent its abuse. If they neglect to do so,, it is beyond the power of the courts to give relief. The only remedy is in the ballot box.
There must be judgment against the plaintiffs according to the case agreed.