Court Opinion

ID: 9387091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 18:02:14.981151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.318365
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/14/23 P. v. Livingston CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                 B320053

             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Los Angeles County
                                                                             Super. Ct. No. TA146007)
             v.

 ARTURUS LEVELL
 LIVINGSTON,

             Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lynn D. Olson, Judge. Dismissed.
     Pensanti & Associates and Louisa Pensanti, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene
Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

     _______________________________________________

                     INTRODUCTION
       Generally, once judgment in a criminal case is
rendered and execution of a sentence begins, trial courts lack
jurisdiction to vacate or modify a sentence. (People v. King
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634 (King).) And this court
generally lacks jurisdiction to consider appeals from a trial
court’s denial of a request to vacate or modify a final
sentence. (Ibid.) Of course, exceptions apply, notably when
the Legislature has created a specific statutory avenue that
allows a defendant to seek resentencing. (Ibid.)
       In this case, all parties agree that at some point in the
future, appellant Arturus Levell Livingston will likely be
able to use a statutory avenue to modify his sentence. But
his time to do so has not yet come. The trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Livingston’s motion for sentencing
relief. We lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal of the
court’s order dismissing his motion. Accordingly, we dismiss
this appeal.

                               2
                      BACKGROUND
      In 2018, Livingston pled no contest to selling,
transporting, or offering to sell a controlled substance under
Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). He
admitted that his offense was gang-related for purposes of
former Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A), and
that he had suffered a prior prison term for purposes of
former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).1 Pursuant
to the parties’ plea agreement, the trial court sentenced
Livingston to 10 years in state prison. His sentence included
the upper term of five years, plus a four-year gang
enhancement and a one-year prior prison term
enhancement. Livingston began serving his sentence
immediately after his sentencing.
      In 2022, Livingston moved to strike his two
enhancements, based on recent changes enacted by the
Legislature. He invoked Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1–5), which amended the
gang-enhancement scheme. He also invoked newly enacted
section 1172.75, which retroactively invalidated certain prior
person term enhancements, including Livingston’s.2
      The People opposed Livingston’s motion. As to the
gang enhancement, the People argued it could not be

1    Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2     At the time of the proceedings below, current section
1172.75 was numbered section 1171.1. For simplicity, we refer
only to section 1172.75.

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stricken because Livingston’s judgment was still final and
had not been opened for resentencing. As to the prior prison
term enhancement, the People agreed that Livingston would
ultimately be entitled to relief under section 1172.5.
However, the People argued that the enhancement could not
be stricken at that time. The People noted that although
section 1172.75 established a procedure that would
ultimately result in resentencing Livingston, that procedure
had specific time limits and procedures, and had not been
initiated because the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) had not yet provided the court
with information regarding Livingston, as required by
section 1172.75, subdivision (b).
       At an April 2022 hearing on Livingston’s motion, the
trial court stated that his motion was “premature” because
the CDCR had not yet provided the necessary information
regarding Livingston. Although the trial court anticipated
ultimately resentencing Livingston, it concluded that it was
too early to do so at the time of Livingston’s motion.
Accordingly, after the hearing, the court dismissed
Livingston’s motion without prejudice. Livingston filed a
notice of appeal, invoking section 1237, subdivision (b).

                       DISCUSSION
     We conclude this court lacks jurisdiction over
Livingston’s appeal because the trial court’s order dismissing
Livingston’s motion was nonappealable.

                              4
      Section 1237, subdivision (b), the provision Livingston
uses to invoke our appellate jurisdiction, makes post-
judgment orders that affect a criminal defendant’s
substantial rights appealable. (§ 1237, subd. (b).) But post-
judgment orders denying motions to vacate or modify a
sentence are, at least ordinarily, not appealable under this
statutory section.
      “The general rule is that ‘once a judgment is rendered
and execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does
not have jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence.’
[Citations.]” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 634.) And, if
the trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion
to vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a
motion does not (by definition) affect the defendant’s
substantial rights. (King, supra, at 634, 639.) Such an order
is not appealable, and any appeal from such an order must
be dismissed. (Ibid.)
      The jurisdictional rule that bars trial courts from
modifying a final sentence is subject to exceptions. For
example, a trial court retains jurisdiction to resentence a
defendant pursuant to “specific statutory avenues” that
permit certain incarcerated defendants to seek resentencing.
(King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 637.) Section 1172.75 is one
such potential avenue. Section 1172.75, subdivision (a),
declares legally invalid any one-year prior prison term
enhancement under prior section 667.5, subdivision (b), that
was imposed before January 2020 and was not based on a
sexually violent offense.

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       However, section 1172.75 has statutory prerequisites
that apply before resentencing begins. Subdivisions (b) and
(c) of section 1172.75 establish a two-step resentencing
procedure for every incarcerated defendant subject to a
newly invalid enhancement. First, no later than July 1,
2022, the Secretary of the CDCR and the county correctional
administrator of each county were required to identify each
such defendant in their custody and to provide identifying
information about the defendant and the defendant’s case to
the sentencing court that imposed the enhancement.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Second, “[u]pon receiving the
information described in subdivision (b), the court shall
review the judgment and verify that the current judgment
includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision
(a). If the court determines that the current judgment
includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) The court’s review and
resentencing must be completed no later than December 31,
2023 (or earlier for defendants who have already served
their base terms and any other enhancements). (Ibid.)
       Notably, section 1172.75 does not provide that
resentencing pursuant to its terms can take place outside of
this statutorily imposed process. Section 1172.75 does not
contemplate relief initiated by a defendant’s request, via
motion or otherwise. (See People v. Burgess (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 375, 384 (Burgess) [“any review and verification
by the court in advance of resentencing is only triggered by

                             6
receipt of the necessary information from the CDCR
Secretary or a county correctional administrator, not by any
individual defendant. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(c).) Thus,
section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate resentencing
relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or
motion”].)
       Applied here, this law compels dismissal of
Livingston’s appeal.3 Livingston’s judgment was rendered
and its execution began in 2018, long before Livingston filed
his motion for sentencing relief. Thus, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to recall Livingston’s sentence at the time it
denied his motion, and we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from the denial of that motion. (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at 634.) To be sure, Livingston may, and likely will, be
entitled to have his sentence recalled and be resentenced
pursuant to section 1172.75—once the statutory
prerequisites have been complied with and the information
from the CDCR is received. At that time, he may be entitled
to resentencing, and to the striking of one or both of the
enhancements that he challenges. But that has not
happened yet. As the trial court found, Livingston is not
entitled to initiate the section 1172.75 process and recall his
sentence on his own motion, in advance of the process
contemplated by statute. (See Burgess, supra, 86

3      In a letter to the parties’ counsel, we invited supplemental
briefs addressing whether this appeal should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction because the trial court’s order was
nonappealable. We received no response from Livingston.

                                 7
Cal.App.5th at 384.) Without a statutory or other avenue to
recall his sentence, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear
Livingston’s motion, and we lack jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.
       Livingston asserts that during the pendency of this
appeal, the CDCR has provided the necessary information to
the trial court, implying that the section 1172.75
prerequisites have now been complied with and the trial
court would now have jurisdiction over his motion. But that
is not the issue before us. We are asked only to review the
trial court’s order denying Livingston’s motion. (See In re
Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“‘an appeal reviews the
correctness of a judgment as of the time of its rendition,
upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for
its consideration’”].) It is undisputed that when the trial
court denied Livingston’s motion, the CDCR had not
triggered the process for Livingston’s resentencing. The trial
court was therefore without jurisdiction to consider it at that
time.

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                       DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       DAUM, J. *

We concur:

COLLINS, J.

CURREY, Acting P.J.

*
      Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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