Court Opinion

ID: 9545386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:11:10.633285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:38.950093
License: Public Domain

*670TROUT, Chief Justice,
concurring in the result.
I agree with the result reached in this case, but I write separately to express the opinion that the Court’s analysis of probable cause for each of the counts brought in the malpractice action goes beyond what was necessary to decide the ease. By discussing whether there was probable cause to support the action for malpractice under both the theories of lack of informed consent and failure to meet the community standard of care (negligence), the court indicates that an action for wrongful civil proceeding can be maintained if any of the theories used to bring the underlying action is found to be lacking probable cause. I do not believe this to be the law.
Sections 674 and 675 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) speak in terms of “civil proceedings,” not counts or causes of action. The use of the term “proceeding” indicates that the determination of probable cause must be made with regard to the action as a whole. Likewise, Idaho Jury Instruction 410 recites as an element of malicious prosecution that “the defendant caused a legal proceeding to be commenced.” Thus, as long as one of the theories under which the case was pursued is supported by probable cause, the proceeding is supported by probable cause and an action for wrongful civil proceeding must fail. To hold otherwise “would invite a multitude of unwarranted litigation arising from situations where a proceeding is instituted on the basis of inconsistent theories, or where theories are abandoned during the proceeding, and where the proceeding is terminated adversely to the plaintiff.” Zahorsky v. Griffin, Dysart, Taylor, Penner & Lay, P.C., 690 S.W.2d 144, 151 (Mo.Ct.App.1985)(holding that “plaintiff does not meet his burden by showing the defendant’s lack of probable cause in one of the number of theories underlying the proceeding where other theories are supported by probable cause”). Such a holding would also be incompatible with I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2) which specifically allows plaintiffs to plead claims “regardless of consistency.”
As the opinion points out, even Shannahan admits that the lack of consent claim was supported by probable cause until the patient changed her testimony at trial. This should have ended the analysis. The Court’s more lengthy analysis of whether there was probable cause to support the claim of negligence in performing the surgery is therefore unnecessary and incorrect to the extent that it implies that if any count in a proceeding is unsupported by probable cause, an action for wrongful civil proceeding can be brought. A defendant in the underlying action who feels that a particular cause of action has no basis, has other methods available in that action by which baseless claims can be eliminated (e.g. motions under Rules 12(b)(6) or 56). So long as there is .probable cause to pursue the remaining causes of action, a later lawsuit for wrongful civil proceeding is not available.