Court Opinion

ID: 9551744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:31.892525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:28.055779
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting.
It is difficult for me to understand the basis for affirming the trial court. Affirming the trial court leaves its judgment intact, yet the majority says that the court did not have jurisdiction to do what it did.
The majority suggests that the surviving spouse may pursue a quiet title action in the district court or ask that court to impose a “constructive” trust (technically, a resulting trust) for her benefit. I suppose it logically follows, according to the majority, that any title to property derived through a decree of distribution is untrustworthy and that proceedings in the district court are necessary to properly vest title. This will be a bonanza for lawyers. They can now collect a fee for probate, then another fee to quiet title. This will be difficult for clients to understand.
I agree with the introductory paragraphs and parts I and II of Justice Raper’s dissent. However, on the merits I would reach the same result but on a different theory.
The problem here is one concerning title to property and distribution of the property under the terms of the will, and because of that, it should be decided according to Wyoming law. It is a basic principle that the law of the situs controls as to real property. 5A Thompson on Real Property, § 2601, p. 275 (1978). Title to real property is governed exclusively by the law of the place where the land is situated. Brown v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 180 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1950). The rule exists because it is particularly important that there be certainty, predictability and uniformity of result and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied concerning transactions of land.
In this case, the decedent and spouse resided in and owned most of their property in Texas, a community property state. The title to the real property in Wyoming, however, was only m the decedent’s name; but it was stipulated that community funds were used to purchase the property.
It is an accepted rule of equity jurisprudence that when property is purchased in the name of one party and another has furnished consideration therefor, a trust results in favor of the latter. Culver v. Graham, 3 Wyo. 211, 21 P. 694 (1899). Such a trust is called a purchase money trust, which is a resulting trust. The rule is that, except in states where the rule has been abolished by statute, a resulting trust arises where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price or part of the purchase price is paid by another. Scott on Trusts, §§ 440, 454, (3rd Ed. 1967).
In the case where the person in whose name title is taken has intended no fraud, but has instead intended that the transaction be a fair one,
“ * * * a trust is implied or results in favor of the person for whom the equitable interest is assumed to have been intended, and whom equity deems to be the real owner. Intention and consideration are essential elements of a resulting trust. * * * ” Cacy v. Cacy, Okl., 619 P.2d 200, 202 (1980).
The intent can be actual, but it can also be inferred from the terms of the transaction, or from accompanying circumstances. A resulting trust, then, is an intent-enforcing trust.
This court said in Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, 64 Wyo. 55, 186 P.2d 548, 554 (1947):
“ ‘A resulting trust does not arise where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, if the person by whom the purchase price is paid manifests an intention that no resulting trust should arise.’ ” Citing Restatement of the Law of Trusts, § 441.
We went on in Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, supra, to cite § 442 of Restatement of the Law of Trusts:
“ ‘Where a transfer of property [oil royalties here] is made to one person [the *576husband here] and the purchase price is paid by another [the wife here] and the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object of bounty of the person by whom the purchase price is paid, a resulting trust does not arise unless the latter [pay- or] manifests an intention that the transferee should not have the beneficial interest in property.’ ”
The usual rule, then, is that a resulting trust does not arise unless the payor manifests an intention that a resulting trust should arise by indicating in some way that the transferee does not get a beneficial interest in the property. That rule is now set out in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 442, but “Comment a” states that the rule does not apply where the wife is the payor and the husband is the transferee, which is the case here. There is one majority rule when the wife is the payor, and a converse majority rule when the husband is the payor.
“ * * * The majority rule is that there is a presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the wife even though title may have been taken in the name of the husband. The reverse is true where the husband supplies funds for the purchase of property taken in the wife’s name. * * ” (Emphasis added.) Little v. Alder, 19 Utah 2d 163, 428 P.2d 156, 157 (1967).
The United States Supreme Court said in Stickney v. Stickney, 131 U.S. 227, 239, 9 S.Ct. 677, 680, 33 L.Ed. 136, 143 (1889):
“ * * * We think that whenever a husband acquires possession of the separate property of his wife, whether with or without her consent, he must be deemed to hold it in trust for her benefit, in the absence of any direct evidence that she intended to make a gift of it to him.”1
Many recent cases have followed this rule, although they seem to be based on the rationale of the older cases which assumed that the husband dominated the wife. The presumption “ * * * was a valiant effort to overcome the lowly position of the married woman in the law.” Tarkington v. Tarkington, 45 N.C.App. 476, 263 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1980). There is perhaps a question of the validity of such a presumption in contemporary marriages. One could, however, also question the validity of the presumption set forth in Nussbacher v. Manderfeld, supra, that the law will presume that a resulting trust in favor of the husband does not arise when the husband is the payor and the wife is the transferee. The presumptions are not necessarily determinative, since they can be rebutted, but they may carry too much weight:
“ * * * The presumptions, however, are given undue weight. Indeed, in some decisions it has been stated that they can be rebutted only by very strong, clear or even conclusive or indubitable evidence. Such a rule clearly gives too great weight to the relationship between the parties. The question is really one of intention as shown by all the circumstances. The notion that intention can be determined by the application of hard and fast rules of law is common in primitive systems of law, but it tends to disappear as courts and lawyers become more sophisticated.” Scott on Trusts, § 442 (3rd Ed. 1967).
In light of that reasoning, and in the context of the present day, some courts have done away with the presumption of a resulting trust for the benefit of the wife. Hogan v. Hogan, 286 Mass. 524, 109 N.E. 715 (1934); and Peterson v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829, 53 N.W.2d 912 (1952).
The presumption that the wife does not intend a gift is also based upon the proposition that under the common law the wife has no duty to support the husband, while the husband does have a duty to support the wife. Little v. Alder, supra. Wyoming sets out a statutory duty of the husband to support the wife in §§ 20-2 — 102 and 20-3-101, W.S.1977. One could argue that a duty also exists for the wife to support the husband under Art. 6, § 1 of the Wyoming *577Constitution, which states that male and female citizens are to enjoy equal rights under the law, including the right to protection by the laws. Ward Terry and Company v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213 (1956). Be that as it may, the facts of this case seem to offer no compelling reason to change this longstanding presumptive rule. A resulting trust has as its basic objective the recognition and protection of property rights that have arisen in an innocent party.
“ * * * The vital tenet is one of equity. Where the consideration for the property is provided by one party, but title is taken by another, and the circumstances negate the possibility of the consideration being a gift, equity will intervene to protect the rights of the first party. * * * ” Cummings v. Tinkle, 91 Nev. 548, 539 P.2d 1213, 1214 (1975).
Courts are sometimes reluctant to impose resulting trusts because of the easy possibility of the perpetration of a fraud, to the injury of creditors. For that reason, the evidence of payment by the beneficiary must be clear and convincing.
“ * * * The easy possibility of the successful perpetration of a fraud, to the injury of creditors when equitable interests are claimed by reason of a resulting trust, has led the courts of equity to * * the rule that the evidence of the payment by the beneficiary ‘must be clear, strong, unequivocal, unmistakable, and beyond doubt.’ * * * ” Culver v. Graham, supra, 21 P. at 695.
Here, there is no one to defraud. There are no unsatisfied creditors; the executors of the estate take a neutral position; no beneficiaries assert that there was any intent on appellant’s part to make a gift; appellant contended that she contributed 50 percent of the funds used to purchase the property, and both parties stipulated that community property funds were used. In view of the fact that there is no one who could be defrauded, and in view of the unrebutted presumption in favor of the appellant, the evidence in this case would seem to support a finding that there was no intention on appellant’s part to make a gift to her husband.
A resulting trust, therefore, should be imposed on the Wyoming property in favor of appellant. Imposing a resulting trust in favor of appellant seems to be the least complicated way to vest title in appellant.

. See Scott on Trusts, § 442, (3rd Ed. 1967), and McGean v. McGean, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 384 (1975); Braly v. Braly, 244 Ga. 773, 262 S.E.2d 94 (1979); Savell v. Savell, Miss., 290 So.2d 621 (1974); Ford v. Simpson, Tex.Civ.App„ 568 S.W.2d 468 (1978).