Court Opinion

ID: 9530708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:02:52.762268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:13.586974
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice.
McKone, the vendor of real property under an executory contract for deed, appeals the district court’s order that he is the one responsible for the removal of the abandoned underground storage tanks located on the property.
We affirm.
McKone raises the following issues:
“1. Whether the District Court erred when it looked beyond the Contract for Deed to determine the responsibilities of the parties as to Fire Marshal’s request to remove underground fuel storage tanks?
“2. Whether the District Court erred when it looked beyond the Contract for Deed and the Fire Code to determine the responsibilities of the parties as to the Fire Marshal’s request to remove underground fuel storage tanks?
“3. Whether the District Court erred when it relied upon Olds v. Little Horse [Creek] Cattle Co., as authority when it determined the responsibilities of the parties as to the Fire Marshal’s request to remove underground fuel storage tanks?
“4. Whether Olds v. Little Horse [Creek] Cattle Co., 140 P. 1004, 22 Wyo. 336 (1914) should be overruled if it is determinative of the responsibilities of parties as to contracts for deed between individuals?”
In 1981, McKone agreed to sell real property located in the Town of Thermopolis to the Guertzgens. The parties drafted their agreement in the form of a contract for deed (also known as an installment land contract). It provided, inter alia, that the Guertzgens would have possession of the property, but that the warranty deed would remain in escrow until all the payments had been made under the contract. The final payment was scheduled for June 15, 1991.
The Guertzgens converted the property, formerly a service station, into a liquor store/lounge. In 1989, after the Guertz-gens had made substantial payments under the agreement, the Chief of the Thermopo-lis Fire Department ordered the removal of the property’s underground fuel tanks because they violated the Uniform Fire Code. The tanks were not in use when the Gu-ertzgens took possession of the property in 1981. The Guertzgens argued that McKone should pay for the removal of the tanks because, legally, he is still the owner of the property (the warranty deed remains in escrow until the full amount of the purchase price has been paid).
The parties submitted memoranda and exhibits, along with a set of stipulated facts, to the district court which ruled that McKone was the legal owner of the property and responsible for the removal of the tanks. We stated in True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991, 996 (Wyo.1978), that a district court’s “general finding and judgment for the successful party carries with it every finding of fact which can reasonably and fairly be drawn from the evidence.”
McKone contends that the provisions in the parties’ agreement for repair and risk of loss impose the responsibility for the removal of the tanks upon the Gu-ertzgens. Neither of these provisions, *730however, address this particular contingency. Thus, we look elsewhere to determine the responsibility for the removal of the tanks.
McKone also believes the Uniform Fire Code (1988 ed.) (Code) holds the Gu-ertzgens responsible for the removal of the tanks. McKone argues that the Guertz-gens “best fit the Code’s definition” of the person responsible for the abandoned tanks. He bases his argument on the Code requirement, found in § 3.102, that the “owner, operator, occupant or other person responsible for the condition or violation” must comply with the orders and notices issued by the fire marshall. McKone cites the Code’s definition of owner, which “includes his duly authorized agent or attorney, a purchaser, devisee, fiduciary and a person having vested or contingent interest in the property in question” to conclude that the Guertzgens are the ones responsible for the removal of the tanks.
In Matter of Estate of Ventling, 771 P.2d 388, 389 (Wyo.1989), we acknowledged that the purchaser under a contract for deed has an “equitable interest” in the property. Thus, we agree that the Guertz-gens fit the Code’s definition of owner because their equitable interest in the property is also a contingent interest, which the Code includes under the definition of owner. McKone, however, also fits the definition of owner. The parties’ agreement provides that the warranty deed remains in escrow until the Guertzgens have made all the payments under the agreement and the warranty deed is conveyed to them.
Professor Rudolph has summarized the legal principles of the contract for deed:
“The contract [for deed] typically provides for the payment of the purchase price in installments over a period of years and for retention of title in the seller until the purchase price is fully paid, but gives the buyer a right to possession from the execution of the contract.” Rudolph, E. George, The Wyoming Law of Real Mortgages, pp. 147-48 (1969).
See Matter of Estate of Ventling, 771 P.2d at 389, wherein we stated: “At all times prior to the final payment and the delivery of the deed, even though the buyer usually has possession, legal title remains vested in the seller.” Until there has been a conveyance of the warranty deed, McKone continues to hold legal title and remains the legal owner of the property.
Because both the Guertzgens and McKone fall within the Code’s definition of owner, we focus on the language “or other person responsible for the condition or violation” found in § 3.102 to determine who is responsible for the removal of the tanks. This language requires that — in addition to being the owner, operator, or occupant of the property — one must also be the person responsible for the condition or violation. Thus, who owned the property when the tanks were abandoned is an important factor in fixing the liability for their removal.
In a confusingly worded stipulation, the Guertzgens and McKone agreed “[t]hat pri- or to May 9, 1981 [the date of the agreement for warranty deed], the underground storage tanks had been decommissioned by a prior Contract for Deed person, not the the [sic] Plaintiffs or the Defendant, and have not been in use since that time.” We interpret this stipulation to mean that McKone was the vendor of the same property when the tanks were abandoned under a previous contract for deed. It may be that the person most responsible for the abandonment of the tanks (the previous purchaser under contract for deed) is not a party to this action. Nonetheless, given the facts and the parties now before us, we hold that McKone is the party responsible for the removal of the tanks because he was the owner of the property when they were abandoned.
The Code supports the district court’s general finding and judgment in favor of the Guertzgens; and accordingly, we do not address the other issues raised by McKone.
URBIGKIT, C.J., and GOLDEN, J., dissent with opinion.