Court Opinion

ID: 9464135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:25:53.242803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:28.527137
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority holding that upon the record in this case there is sufficient interstate commerce involved to confer jurisdiction upon the district court to permit the case to proceed to trial. Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743-745, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976), decided after the district court rendered its opinion compels this result.
I also concur with the majority holding that upon the record in this case the plaintiffs, the City, and the individual physicians have alleged sufficient pecuniary injuries to confer standing to sue and proceed to trial.
I respectfully dissent, however, as to the ruling regarding the state action exemption to the antitrust laws and would affirm the district court ruling granting summary judgment in the defendants on that basis.
First. The district court and the parties agreed that the record in this case at the time the motions for summary judgment were considered as adequate for a decision as to whether or not the IDA — FHA-CDH acquisition was exempt under the “state action” exemption to the antitrust laws set forth in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). I agree with the district court that the record is sufficient to decide that issue at this time and, therefore, I see no need to postpone a ruling *289meeting this issue pending a trial on the merits.
Second. I also dissent from that portion of the majority opinion regarding the “state action” exemption that does base its decision on the record as it is presently constituted, but nevertheless seeks to apply the standards set by the Supreme Court in the “state action” exemption cases in Parker, supra, Goldfarb, supra, and Cantor, supra, resulting in what is essentially advisory dicta regarding this court’s view of the “state action” exemption. If a reversal is in order, since Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 96 S.Ct. 3110, 49 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1976), and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977), were decided after the district court rendered its memorandum opinion and order, I would permit the district court to apply Cantor and Bates for itself in the first instance rather than have this court render what is essentially an advisory opinion.
Third. I disagree with the substance of the majority opinion which, to me, subject to possible correction,1 interprets the scope of the “state action” exemption to the antitrust laws much too narrowly upon the facts in this case. I would affirm the district court’s ruling granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on state action exemption grounds for the reasons succinctly stated by the district court in its opinion below. See City of Fairfax, Va. v. Fairfax Hospital Association, [1976-2] CCH TRADE CASES ¶ 60,999, at pp. 69,424 to 69,425 (No. 75-866A, May 3, 1976).
Lest there be any misunderstanding of the rule I would adopt in this case, I would not broadly hold that the mere participation by a governmental entity less than the state per se confers a “state action” exemption to the antitrust laws. What I would hold is that, although there was indeed a “blend of private and public decision making” in the facts of this case, the conduct of all the parties acting pursuant to legislative command as set forth in the district court opinion sufficiently deprived the private parties of their “freedom of choice to act” rendering it “unfair” not to exempt the defendants from the reach of antitrust laws. Cantor, supra, 96 S.Ct. at 3118, 3119. Other courts, in pre Cantor decisions, contra the majority have held somewhat similar type transactions exempt. See Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970) (passenger transportation facilities); Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F.Supp. 350 (N.D.Ill.1974), aff’d, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975) (municipality and exclusive cable T.V. franchise); E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 362 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947, 87 S.Ct. 320, 17 L.Ed.2d 226 (1966) (Port Authority created pursuant to legislative mandate to operate Boston’s Logan International Airport). See also Murdock v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, 361 F.Supp. 1083 (M.D.Fla.1973) (exclusive lease to private party by City of coliseum for wrestling matches — if not “state action,” then leasing was “official action directed by a state” under Parker v. Brown).
Finally, it should be noted that this case does not deal with regulation of agricultural competition in the private sector of the economy, as in Parker v. Brown, supra. Nor does this case concern antitrust regulation or exemption of the professions or their first amendment rights as in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975), and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). Nor does it involve an antitrust exemption assertedly arising out of private unregulated conduct which was a corollary to pervasively state-regulated conduct as occurred in the light-bulb exchange program assailed in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., supra.
Instead, I believe this case presents the issue left open by Justice Blackmun concur*290ring in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., supra, 96 S.Ct. at 3126 and 3128, and clarified by him in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, - U.S. --, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810. In Cantor, Justice Blackmun noted that considerations of “health or safety” would at. least weigh “forcefully” in his application of a “rule of reason” analysis in state action cases. In Bates, speaking for the entire Court, Justice Blackmun placed Cantor in context by noting that in that case “[tjhere was no suggestion that the [light] bulb program was justified by flaws in the competitive market or was a response to health or safety concerns.” - U.S. -,-, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697, 53 L.Ed.2d 810. See also City of Fairfax v. Fairfax Hospital Association, [1976-2] CCH TRADE CASES If 60,999 at p. 69,424 to 69,425; Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908 (Cir.Ct. S.C. 1895), at 911; Note: The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harv.Law Rev. 56, 237 (1976).
I therefore believe the district court correctly entered summary judgment for the defendants in this case on the state action exemption grounds, would determine that issue on this record at this time, and would affirm.

. At least one case presently pending before the Supreme Court could markedly alter this dissent. In City of Lafayette, La. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 430 U.S. 944, 97 S.Ct. 1577, 51 L.Ed.2d 791 (1977), the “state action” exemption to the antitrust laws as related to conduct of municipalities appears to be squarely before the court.