Court Opinion

ID: 9884156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:40:13.733988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:35.995985
License: Public Domain

HUSPENI, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority’s determination that sufficient minimum contacts exist between the Rigenhagens and this state to sustain the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. I also concur with the determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rigenhagens’ requested stay. I respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion which recognizes the tort of intentional interference with custodial relations.
Initially I doubt the appropriateness of this court acting to recognize this tort. I believe instead that adoption of a cause of action which may so profoundly and permanently affect the intimate relationships between children and their parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles should be studied, debated, considered and announced by the legislature of this state or by this state’s philosophical and doctrinal court.
My second doubt follows from the first, and is expressed sensitively by the majority in its statement that “we are reluctant to add another weapon to the arsenal already available for use by family members against one another.” The majority answers its concern with the conclusion “the custody decree vests the custodial parent with a legally protectible interest in a relationship with the child [and] the tort * * * is an appropriate means of remedying interference with that relationship.”1 I *761would answer the concern of the majority by requesting that Minnesota proceed most cautiously and deliberately in considering adoption of this cause of action. Today not only are courts making anguishing decisions in countless marital dissolution actions involving minor children, but they are cautioned by thoughtful voices both inside and outside the judicial system that courts of law are not particularly well-suited to resolve family relationship issues and perhaps alternative fora should be explored. Ill-considered adoption of the tort of intentional interference with custodial relations could provide a vehicle through which many of the most divisive and psychologically and financially draining aspects of marital dissolution actions would be broadened, deepened, extended and exacerbated.
Examination of the facts of this case demonstrates how important it is that public policy concerns be thoroughly explored and sensitively considered. All of the defendants here are relatives of the minor child. Two of the defendants are her maternal grandparents. It is almost certain that the minor children around whom future tort litigation would swirl would be related to many or most of the defendants.
Even the Minnesota criminal code recognizes that in certain instances the importance of preserving family relationships must take precedence over enforcing penal laws. (See Minn.Stat. § 609.495 (1988) which excepts from prosecution for aiding an offender to avoid arrest the spouse, parent or child of that offender.) Preservation of those family relationships should also be considered in deciding whether this new tort should be adopted and if it is to be adopted, how broad it should be. Ultimately, perhaps it would even be of value to inquire whether adoption of this new tort would properly reflect Minnesota’s stated public policy of seeking always to serve the best interests of its minor children.

. Remedy for interference with the legally pro-tectible interest of a custodial parent in the *761relationship with the child is presently available, of course, through Minn.Stat. § 609.26 (1988; Supp.1989). To the extent that a civil cause of action for intentional interference with custodial rights is “retributive," the criminal sanctions already in place more than adequately provide for retribution.