Court Opinion

ID: 9690096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:53:32.829242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.539267
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Judge
(dissenting)
I would annul the writ.
/.
The declaratory judgment entered by Judge Levin did not modify the dissolution decree, reverse another trial judge’s modification or modify a child support obligation retrospectively. The majority would determine the modification order of August, 1983, established Janee was not self-supporting and thus was entitled to child support at all times including June, 1982. The majority further held:
The determination that Janee was not self-supporting was necessary for the conclusion reached by the modification court that Janee’s child support would continue.
I fail to find, however, any such determination or holding in the August, 1983, modification order. The August, 1983, order modified the custody award of Christi and Marci and then provided:
Except as modified herein, the decree date July 28,1978, is in all other respects unchanged and remains in full force and effect.
That original dissolution entered on August 18, 1978 provided:
Gregory P. Vrban pay to Myrna J. Vrban ... child support for the children, Janee L. Vrban ... until such time as each becomes self-supporting, or through school, including college, whichever occurs first.
The original decree also held the support was to terminate when Janee became self-supporting. This provision of the decree was never modified. The point or points of termination of support were determined by the decree. The only issue was when these points were reached.
A determination of when those points are reached is not a modification. The issue is no different than a provision the support terminate at age 18. The issue then would be when the child was 18.
I recognize that respondent’s answer and counterclaim contained a prayer asking the court to state the two older children were self-supporting. However, it is very clear the modification decree did not address the issue nor should it have addressed the issue because the prayer was not in fact a modification issue. Therefore, the issue was a proper one for declaratory judgment because the action was for a determination of an existing right, not for the creation of new rights or the extinguishment of old rights.
Further, I would hold Judge Levin’s declaratory judgment action was not a modification. It did not modify either the support or the time of payment of support. Rather, since the original decree provided support should terminate when the child becomes self-supporting, the declaratory judgment action merely determined when the child became self-supporting. As such this case is clearly distinguishable from Gilliam v. Gilliam, 258 N.W.2d 155, 156 (Iowa 1977) where the trial court cancelled a judgment.

II.

I am also troubled by the majority’s statement “Judge Levin clearly overreached his authority by cancelling Gregory Vrban’s past due child support from that date.”
What the majority fails to realize is Judge Levin did not cancel past due child support, he merely made a determination as to when child support terminated. I quote from his ruling:
... decreed that the respondent’s child support obligation for Janee L. Vrban terminates the last week of May, 1982.”
*855The Iowa Supreme Court has held that a real and substantial controversy over the effect of a judgment presents ground for relief under declaratory judgment acts. See Whitworth v. Heinzle, 246 Iowa 1155, 70 N.W.2d 536 (1955).
Here we are dealing with the effect of the judgment. Judge Levin’s order was not a modification and it did not cancel accrued support because if Janee were self-supporting no support accrued.
Without addressing Janee’s standing in the certiorari action, I would determine she was not a necessary party to the declaratory judgment action. We are dealing here with a person who has reached her majority. The only legal obligation a parent has to help with the education of an adult child is that obligation which can be imposed under Iowa Code § 598 (1985). If Janee’s parents were still married to each other neither could be forced to contribute to Janee’s college support.
In In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 201-02 (Iowa 1980), the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 598, holding even well-intentioned parents, when deprived of the custody of their children, sometimes react by refusing to support them as they would if the family unit had been preserved.
The obligation to pay support to children of divorced parents beyond their 18th birthday is an obligation created solely by statute. Therefore, if the right for Janee to enforce a judgment against her father but in favor of her mother is to exist, the legislature not the courts should make this extension.
For the above reasons, I would annul the writ.
HAYDEN, J., joins this dissent.