Court Opinion

ID: 9699106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:10:49.539524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.602884
License: Public Domain

Garrett, J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in its entirety and therefore respectfully dissent.
*493Mr. Lockwood, husband of plaintiff and driver of the car in which she was riding, had driven automobiles for forty years without an accident, was in normal health and his Mercury car Avas, so far as the record shows, in good mechanical condition. The crushed rock which hit his car did not cause his vision to be obstructed. Some of the rock, in evidence as an exhibit, was examined by us. It fell far short of being the size of a small hen’s egg. Merely sliding off the truck in the small amount involved here, it did not go through the windshield or cause appreciable damage to the car, other than some slight damage to the right side of the windshield.
The question is whether the rock or aggregate striking the passing ear was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s damage. There would be no problem here if the Mercury had traveled only a few car lengths after it was struck by the gravel and before it collided with the Franke wagon, but that was not the ease.
Lockwood’s negligence would not be imputed to his wife. That he was negligent cannot be questioned. It cannot be denied that he was driving at an excessive speed, greater than permitted him to bring his car to a stop within the assured-eleardistance ahead, failing to have his car under control, passing another vehicle when approaching the crest of a hill, and passing on a yellow line. If he had not been negligent in said respects there would have been none of the injuries complained of. His negligent and unlawful acts were the proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages. Not much time expired but it was sufficient to permit Lockwood to get his car under control.
There may be, of course, more than one proximate cause and the question here is whether or not the rock striking the Mercury’s windshield was also a proximate cause of the injuries. “* * * there must be a causal connection between the negligence charged and the resulting injury. By ‘proximate cause’ is meant the moving or producing cause. Negligence is the proximate cause of an injury which follows such negligent act, if it can be fairly said that in the absence of such negligence the injury or damage complained of would not have occurred.” Buchanan v. Hurd Creamery Co., 215 Iowa 415, 424, 246 N.W. 41, 46.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the truck driver was negligent in permitting rock and aggregate to fall off of his *494truck, can it be fairly said that but for such negligence the injuries would not have occurred ? Plaintiff cannot recover upon a case which does not show more than a possibility that the injury is chargeable to the defendant’s negligence. There is some evidence that plaintiff was startled by the crushed rock striking the windshield but the rock did not go through the glass, she was not hurt and there is no evidence she did anything to cause her husband to lose control of his car. Her husband would not say she fainted or suffered any injury at that time. Lockwood had 500 to 600 feet — a block and a half — to bring his car under control. He offered no sufficient explanation for his failure to do so. Without adequate time or opportunity to avoid the collision it might fairly be said defendant’s negligence, if any, had a causal connection with the damage sustained, but where Lockwood drove his car at high speed for one and a half blocks after the gravel or rock episode before running into the wagon-tractor, it must be said any negligence of the truck driver was too remote to amount to a proximate cause. There is no evidence in the record that says or infers defendants created a situation requiring Lockwood to keep his foot on the throttle, driving his car at a high speed, or his hands on the steering wheel guiding his car into the loaded wagon. Such conduct on the part of Lockwood could not have been foreseen or anticipated. If plaintiff had any evidence which would tend to explain, excuse or justify driving the Mercury that great distance after á small quantity of rock hit the windshield without breaking it, and then running into another vehicle traveling the same direction, she should have brought it forth. If there was for a moment confusion due to the rock, Lockwood could have slowed down, fallen back, taken the shoulder, kept the left side of the pavement or stopped and thus avoided the collision.
How can it be said that anything- defendants did caused him to drive such a great distance at a high rate of speed and into a collision at such distance from the original incident.
In this case, if it could be said defendants set in motion a force which might, in a short distance, cause damage, that force had to expire and did expire within a few feet. Thereafter the operation of the Mercury was in the hands of the competent *495driver and whatever he did was no longer controlled or dominated or influenced by any negligence of the defendants.
“Where a number of factors are operating, one may so predominate in bringing about the harm as to make the effect produced by others so negligible that they cannot be considered substantial factors.” 65 C. J. S., Negligence, section 107b, page 661.
“Many authorities have held or declared that only injuries which are the natural and probable consequences of negligence, unbroken by any intervening independent agency, can be said to have been proximately caused thereby, and that a person is not responsible for injuries which do not flow naturally from his negligence, or for merely possible consequences of his negligence, since consequences which are merely possible cannot be regarded as either probable or natural.” 65 C. J. S., Negligence, section 108, page 662.
See also Dennis v. Merrill, 218 Iowa 1259, 257 N.W. 322.
“ Tf an injury has resulted in consequence of a certain act or omission, but only through or by means of some intervening cause, from which last cause the injury followed as a direct and immediate consequence, the law will refer the damage to the last or proximate cause, and refuse to trace it to that which was the more remote.’ Cooley, Torts (2d ed.) p. 73. Tf the original wrong only becomes injurious in consequence of the intervention of some distinct and wrongful act or omission by another, the injury shall be imputed to the last wrong, as the proximate cause, and not to that which was more remote.’ ” McClure v. Richard, 225 Iowa 949, 954, 282 N.W. 312, 315.
For the reasons stated I would affirm.
Hays, J., joins in this dissent.