Court Opinion

ID: 9795659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:35:05.534191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:59.264337
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice,
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
[T17] I concur with the majority's interpretation of our prior decisions in McCoy v. Crook County Sheriff's Department, 987 P.2d 674 (Wyo.1999), and Keehn v. Town of Torrington, 834 P.2d 112 (Wyo.1992). I cannot agree, however, that the duty identified in Keehn may be imposed under the facts alleged in the Complaint.
[¶18] As the majority notes, Keehn held that "a peace officer's duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation during an unrelated traffic stop is dictated by what a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would do under like cireumstances." 834 P.2d at 115-16. Constitutionally, a "peace officer may temporarily detain an individual for the purpose of investigation only when he has a *1274reasonable suspicion, based on all the cireum-stances, that criminal activity 'may be afoot." 834 P.2d at 116 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911 (1968)). Clearly, a reasonable peace officer of ordinary prudence would not detain an individual in cireumstances inconsistent with constitutional dictates. Accordingly, whether a duty to investigate a potential DWUI violation has arisen is dependent upon the existence of a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was being committed.
[¶19] The existence of a reasonable suspicion is the critical difference between Keehn and this case. In Keehn, the duty arose out of a police-citizen contact during a traffic stop. In the course of the stop certain facts were observed that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the citizen was operating a motor vehicle while driving under the influence in violation of Wyoming statute. As alleged in this case, Towner was not operating a motor vehicle during the contact with Officer Mason. The Complaint contains no allegation that Towner informed Officer Mason that he had been driving that day or that he would be driving to the hospital. The Complaint does not allege that Officer Mason observed Towner approach, enter, or drive away in a motor vehicle. In short, there are no facts alleged that would have supported a reasonable suspicion that a DWUI had been or was going to be committed, which would have justified an investigatory detention of Towner.
[T20] I believe that application of the duty to investigate a DWUI under the facts alleged in this case would greatly expand the scope of the duty identified in Keehn. The death of Zachary Becker is unquestionably tragic. However, as we said in Keehn:
As to the factual realities, governments simply do not have the resources to protect all citizens at all times from the consequences of all illegal or tortious activity. Consequently, law enforcement agencies and personnel must be afforded some discretion as to how to marshall [sic] their time, talents, and assets to achieve the greatest overall good. That an intoxicated driver or other law violator causes injury to another does not, without more, necessarily mean that a governmental entity or public employee was negligent. See Wyo. Stat. § 1-89-102(b) (June 1988) (governmental entities or public employees are not subject to strict liability). Rather, the facts of each case must be independently examined.
834 P.2d at 116-17. The facts, as alleged here, do not give rise to a legally enforceable duty. I would affirm the district court's dismissal.