Court Opinion

ID: 9945604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 22:06:04.15699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:34.177903
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    DANIEL GOODE,1                             §
                                               §
          Respondent Below,                    § No. 39, 2024
          Appellant,                           §
                                               § Court Below—Family Court
          v.                                   § of the State of Delaware
                                               §
    SARINA GOODE,                              § File No. CN21-04778
                                               § Petition Nos. 23-23476
          Petitioner Below,                    §                23-17514
          Appellee.                            §

                               Submitted: February 2, 2024
                               Decided:   February 27, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; LEGROW and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                           ORDER

         After consideration of the notice and supplemental notice of appeal from an

interlocutory order, it appears to the Court that:

         (1)    The appellant (“Ex-Husband”) has petitioned this Court under Supreme

Court Rule 42 to accept an appeal from the Family Court’s orders dated November

30, 2023, and January 5, 2024, which (i) denied Ex-Husband’s motion to dismiss a

petition for specific performance filed by the appellee (“Ex-Wife”) and (ii)

addressed Ex-Husband’s motion for reargument of the denial of the motion to

dismiss and provided the rationale for the denial of the motion to dismiss.

1
    The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
      (2)    Ex-Husband filed for divorce in September 2021 and did not ask the

Family Court to retain jurisdiction over ancillary matters. The Family Court issued

a final divorce decree on November 30, 2022. In August 2023, Ex-Wife filed a

motion to reopen ancillary matters, stating that she had not previously asked the

court to resolve ancillary matters because the parties had reached their own

agreement as to such matters. She asserted that Ex-Husband had later stopped

complying with the parties’ agreement, prompting her to seek court intervention.

Ex-Husband opposed, and on September 12, 2023, a Family Court commissioner

denied Ex-Wife’s motion to reopen the proceedings. Ex-Wife did not file a request

for review of the commissioner’s order.

      (3)    On October 30, 2023, Ex-Wife filed a petition seeking specific

performance of the purported separation agreement. Ex-Husband moved to dismiss

the petition, arguing that res judicata barred Ex-Wife from seeking specific

performance because she had failed to request that relief in her motion to reopen.

Ex-Wife responded that res judicata did not bar her petition because the court had

not previously decided the issue of the enforceability of the separation agreement.

The Family Court denied the motion to dismiss in an order that did not provide any

reasoning.

      (4)    Ex-Husband moved for reargument. After briefing by the parties, the

Family Court provided the reasoning for its decision in an order dated January 5,

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2024. The court determined that Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance was

not barred by res judicata because Ex-Wife’s claim that the parties “had agreed to

and performed under a valid and enforceable contract had not yet been litigated” and

“the issue of enforceability of the parties’ separation agreement was not addressed

or litigated” in connection with the motion to reopen. Applying the five-prong test

for res judicata set forth in LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp.,2 the court

determined that Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance was “both legally and

factually separate and distinct” from the motion to reopen. The court further stated

that denying Ex-Wife the opportunity to litigate the enforceability of the alleged

separation agreement would contravene principles of equity and that the litigation

would afford Ex-Husband the opportunity to assert “any and all defenses” to the

validity or enforceability of the alleged agreement.

       (5)     Ex-Husband sought certification of an interlocutory appeal. He argued

that the Family Court’s decisions decided a substantial issue of material importance

because the issue raised—whether Ex-Wife’s petition for specific performance

should be dismissed—is potentially case dispositive. Similarly, Ex-Husband argued

that the potential benefits of interlocutory review outweigh the potential costs

because if he prevails on appeal the parties will save the expense of further litigation.

2
 970 A.2d 185, 192 (Del. 2009) (quoting the “elements of res judicata” as “recently reiterated” in
Dover Hist. Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 1084, 1092 (Del. 2006)).

                                                3
Addressing the Rule 42(b)(iii) factors, Ex-Husband argued that (i) the Family

Court’s decisions involve a question of first impression;3 (ii) the decisions sustained

the jurisdiction of the Family Court;4 (iii) the “practical effect” of the decisions was

to “set aside”5 or “vacate[] or open[]”6 a prior decision of the Family Court—

specifically, the resolution of the divorce proceedings without the court having

addressed ancillary financial matters; (iv) Ex-Husband’s success on appeal would

terminate the litigation;7 and (v) interlocutory review would serve considerations of

justice.8 The Family Court adopted Ex-Husband’s proposed order certifying the

interlocutory appeal.

       (6)     We conclude that interlocutory review is not warranted in this case.

Applications for interlocutory review are addressed to the sound discretion of this

Court.9      Although interlocutory review of the Family Court’s decision might

terminate litigation and therefore reduce the expense of litigation and promote

certain considerations of justice,10 that is almost always true when a trial court denies

3
  DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(iii)(A).
4
  Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(D)
5
  Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(E).
6
  Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(F).
7
  Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(G).
8
  Id. R. 42(b)(iii)(H).
9
  Id. R. 42(d)(v).
10
   A countervailing consideration of justice is the general preference that matters should be
resolved on their merits.

                                             4
a motion to dismiss. But we conclude that the Family Court’s decision applying

well-settled principles of res judicata, albeit in somewhat unusual or even unique

circumstances, does not raise a legal question of first impression or satisfy the other

factors for interlocutory review set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii)(A), (D), (E), or (F).11

Exceptional circumstances that would merit interlocutory review of the Family

Court’s decisions do not exist in this case,12 and the application for interlocutory

review does not meet the strict standards for certification under Supreme Court Rule

42(b).

         NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the interlocutory appeal is

REFUSED.

                                             BY THE COURT:

                                             /s/ N. Christopher Griffiths
                                             Justice

11
   Ex-Husband did not contend that the factors set forth in Rule 42(b)(iii)(B) or (C) applied, and
we agree that they do not.
12
   DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 42(b)(ii).

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