Court Opinion

ID: 9956007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-30 09:15:46.415853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.461689
License: Public Domain

NO. 12-23-00200-CR

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

              TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                     TYLER, TEXAS

JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ,                            §      APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
APPELLANT

V.                                               §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE                                         §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Juan Carlos Martinez appeals from his conviction for injury to a child. In a single issue,
Appellant contends the trial court erred in not enforcing his first plea agreement with the State.
We affirm.

                                         BACKGROUND
       Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in
October 2021. At the conclusion of plea negotiations, the State sent Appellant’s counsel an email
on July 7, 2022, stating that the State would not be making a plea offer but that if Appellant
entered an open plea, the State would consent to the waiver of a jury trial. On August 19,
Appellant pleaded “guilty,” and the trial court deferred a guilt finding and set the case for a
sentencing hearing. Prior to the sentencing hearing, the State expressed its wish to withdraw its
consent to Appellant’s jury waiver because additional indictments arising out of the same
conduct were forthcoming. At a meeting in chambers, the trial court refused to allow the State to
withdraw its consent.
       At a status hearing on September 30, the State informed the trial court that Appellant had
been indicted for injury to a child arising out of the same incident as the aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon charge. Therefore, the State requested the aggravated assault case be “set off
for some amount of time until we can figure out what -- what we need to do on the injury to a
child case.” The trial court granted this request. Appellant then filed a motion for specific
performance and dismissal of the new indictment, claiming that the State breached its plea
agreement. After a hearing, the trial court determined the State had not promised to bring no
additional charges under the plea agreement and denied the motion. At the same hearing,
Appellant pleaded “guilty” to injury of a child pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court
accepted Appellant’s plea and sentenced him to the agreed forty years imprisonment. This
appeal followed.

                                               PLEA AGREEMENT
         In his sole issue, Appellant urges the trial court erred when it failed to enforce his first
plea agreement after the trial court had already accepted it.
Applicable Law
         It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that “a plea bargain is a contract between the
state and the defendant,” and “only the state and the defendant may alter the terms of the
agreement.” Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 331–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court’s
only role in the plea-bargain process is to advise the defendant whether it will accept or reject the
plea bargain. Id. at 332. If the court accepts the plea bargain, the State cannot withdraw its offer,
and the parties are entitled to specific performance of the bargain. See id.; see also Perkins v.
Court of Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial Dist. of Tex., at Austin, 738 S.W.2d 276, 283–
84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). If the court rejects the plea bargain, the defendant has the right to
withdraw his guilty plea, and then the State has the right to withdraw its offer. See Moore, 295
S.W.3d at 332.
Application
         At the open-plea hearing, the trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty plea to aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. However, it specifically stated that it deferred “making such a
finding,” and set the case for a punishment hearing.
         Prior to the scheduled punishment hearing, Appellant, counsel for the State, and the trial
court signed a series of documents commonly referred to as “plea papers.” 1 These included

         1
           The State argues that its consent to Appellant’s waiver of a jury trial was not bargained for, which negates
the existence of a plea agreement. The “Agreed Punishment Recommendation” indicates it was an “open plea” with

                                                          2
documents entitled agreed punishment recommendation, acknowledgement of admonishments,
waiver of jury trial, agreement to stipulate testimony, and stipulation of evidence. Although
these documents recite the terms of the plea agreement, the trial court’s signature indicates only
that it was accepting Appellant’s guilty plea, not that the court convicted Appellant or accepted
the terms of the plea agreement. See Ortiz v. State, 933 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
(concluding that trial court’s “acceptance” of guilty plea without ruling on plea agreement is
effectively conditional acceptance subject to final decision); see also Holland v. State, 112
S.W.3d 251, 255 n.2 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“It would have been error for the court
to find appellant guilty without first announcing whether it would follow the negotiated plea
agreement.”); State v. Villarreal, 418 S.W.3d 920, 923 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)
(trial court conditionally accepted guilty plea when signed plea papers, scheduled a later
punishment hearing, ordered pre-sentence investigation report).
         Appellant argues that when the trial court accepted the guilty plea to aggravated assault
with a deadly weapon, it necessarily accepted the plea agreement; therefore, the State could not
rescind its consent to the jury waiver. However, the trial court only accepted the plea, did not
make any finding on it, and did not accept or reject the plea agreement. See Ortiz, 933 S.W.2d at
104. Essentially, the trial court accepted the plea conditionally while deferring a final decision
until the sentencing hearing. It did not adjudicate guilt or accept the plea agreement. Because
the trial court never accepted the plea agreement, the contract of the plea agreement was never
binding on the parties. Id. Therefore, the trial court did not err in not enforcing the open plea on
the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charge. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

                                                  DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                                                    JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                       Chief Justice
Opinion delivered March 28, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

no promises from the State. However, because we determine that any plea agreement was not accepted by the trial
court, we need not address the State’s argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                                          3
                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                           MARCH 28, 2024

                                         NO. 12-23-00200-CR

                                   JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ,
                                           Appellant
                                              V.
                                     THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                           Appellee

                                Appeal from the 114th District Court
                         of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114-1887-22)

                        THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
                        It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.

                    James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.