Court Opinion

ID: 9736334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:52:53.355728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:05.914770
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion of Hearing Board
Member RICHARD P. HOLME.
I agree with the findings and conclusions of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge in the case. Nonetheless, I concur separately because I feel the PDJ's Order does not and possibly cannot adequately convey the magnitude of my view of the impropriety of the Respondent's actions during her work on the litigation that lead to this proceeding. This is especially true with respect to the highly unprofessional rhetoric and vilification repeatedly employed by Respondent. The majority opinion declines to address this issue-see fn. 25, supra-but it is my view that the Supreme Court should speak to this issue in order to clarify what I hope is a misinterpretation of its decision in In the Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo.2000), relating to the role of the First Amendment freedom of speech as it relates to attorney discipline.
In my 48 years of practicing law, while I have been confronted with "pit bull" and "Rambo" tactics and have been in numerous large and hotly disputed cases, I have never seen or been exposed to the amount and level of repeatedly intemperate, unprofessional and vitriolic language in briefs and other court filings, directed at the trial judge, opponents and opposing counsel as has occurred in Respondent's filings. If the Colorado judiciary wishes to advance or even maintain the current level of civility and professionalism among lawyers, it is respectfully submitted that the activity in this dispute should be a leading example of the type of conduct that should not be acceptable. Most of my concerns are addressed in the PDJ's opinion. However, in my view the charges and language used by Respondent in her court filings must be deemed and declared to be unacceptable.1
*694I will limit my comments only to the most egregious example. This was Respondent's "Verified Renewed Motion to Recuse, Stating Additional Reasons," sworn to by Respondent (Exh. 25), which includes the following conclusory statements about the trial judge, Respondent's opponents and the opposing counsel of record in the litigation:
(p. 1) "In many of the court's legal rulings, he has acted as the advocate and attorney for the Defendants";
"Judge Lass has ... mischaracterized the record; and engaged in fraudulent legal reasoning";
(p. 2) "[He never mentions] the outrageous conspiracy and frauds perpetrated by the [defendants]";
"Lass"-using the judge's last name without being proceeded by "Judge," or "Mr." or even his first name-a lack of respect for the office of the court repeated frequently throughout the Motion;
"[A member of the law firm in which the judge had practiced 20 years earlier] having actively aided and abetted [a defendant] in his fraudulent takeover of the [homeowners association]";
(p. 8) "Lass's rulings against [Plaintiffs] have consistently ... demonstrated ill will";
"Repeatedly Judge Lass has mischarac-terized, even lied about, the facts or the law";
(pp. 3-4) "Lass has jiggered timelines; . made knowing mischaracterizations of the evidence or law; and supplied legal arguments to the Defendants, ... so he can rule for them, to enable them in ... their theft of [Plaintiffs' real property]";
(p. 4) "Judge Lass's last minute orders ... [were] grossly prejudicial to [Defendants]";
"[Opposing counsel's) statement was simply a lie";
"[The judge's ruling] shows a gross and reckless desire to see the [Defendants] succeed in their plans to steal [Plaintiffs'] properties";
"In later orders, however, Lass lied";
(p. 5) "[The judge bifurcated the trials of the equitable and legal issues] precisely in order to rule, himself, on the common factual issues, to effect issue preclusion. Although he said there would be a jury trial 'later,' he had no intention of actually holding a jury trial; there would be nothing for a jury to decide, at that point, This constituted a deliberate plan to swing the outcome to the [Defendants]";
"he is uninterested in applying the law fairly, or applying the law at all.";
"{the judge's ruling] was an outrageous abuse of power and discretion and clearly demonstrated favoritism towards the [Defendants]";
(p. 6) [The judge winked onee at one of the defendants' counsel which] shows a revolting level of cronyism all by itself";
"Lass's favoritism towards the racketeers he installed as the directors of [the homeowners association]";
"There could be no more hideous and frightening a situation imaginable that the one this judge has created and put into effect by his biased rulings";
"Lass hurriedly re-severed [two cases] so the [Defendants] could be sure and go get that property [owned by her clients]" (emphasis in original);
(p. 7) "Yet Lass's false statement-this lie-served as his excuse for denying [Respondent's prior] motion to recuse. This shows his unhealthy level of interest in remaining as the judge in charge of deciding this case, and constitutes sheer willful misconduct";
(pp. 7-8) "[The prior unappealed and final judgment in 99CV277] has been so severely prejudicial to [Plaintiffs], so unspeakably harmful and outrageous in its effect, it can scarcely be summarized. Lass, in handing down that judgment, stripped my clients of their commonly and individually owned assets and granted those assets to a criminal racket which was formed for the express pur*695pose of sequiring these people's homes in this illegal fashion. In numerous instances in 99CV2T7, Judge Lass lied about the evidence before him";
(p. 8) "Judge Lass has also made a number of outrageous evidentiary rulings"; "In his preposterous 66-page ruling denying the preliminary injunction, Lass several times knowingly and deliberately mischaracterized the evidence";
Respondent asserts that the foregoing rant is protected by the First Amendment right to free speech pursuant to the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling in In the Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo.2000). If Respondent is correct in this assertion, the Supreme Court may as well abandon all efforts to insist on or even attempt to advance civility and professionalism; give up any pretense that lawyers are professionals and bound to a higher standard of conduct than that of mudslinging politicians; and warn judges and lawyers that their only protection from venomous attacks is to reciprocate in kind. I sincerely hope the Respondent is not correct.
In Green the Supreme Court reversed discipline against a lawyer for statements he included in motions to recuse a trial judge statements that the judge was a "racist and a bigot." Specifically, Green had listed and objected to statements the trial judge had made that Green was only "competent;" and noted that the first time Green and the judge had met was when the judge came into the court clerk's office, looked at Green (who is African-American) and asked the clerk to tell him the name of the attorney for whom Green was reviewing the court file. Thus, Green asserted in his motion, the judge had racially stereotyped Green as unable to be a lawyer because he was black. Id. at 1081-82. The Supreme Court ruled that Green could not be disciplined for violating the Rules of Professional Conduct because the materials he attached to his motion to recuse "disclose fully the facts upon which Green based his opinion." Id. at 1085. The Court emphasized that "We view Green's statements that the judge was a 'racist and a bigot' and having a 'bent of mind as statements of opinion based upon fully disclosed and uncontested facts." Id. at 1086.
In contrast, here Respondent made numerous assertions for which there were no supporting facts disclosed. She made repetitive, unspecific and conclusory assertions such as:
"In many of the court's legal rulings, he has acted as the advocate and attorney for the Defendants";
"Judge Lass has ... mischaracterized the record; and engaged in fraudulent legal reasoning ";
"supplied legal arguments to the Defendants, ... so he can rule for them, to enable them in ... their theft of [Plaintiffs' real property]";
"[The judge's ruling] shows a gross and reckless desire to see the [Defendants] succeed in their plans to steal [Plaintiffs'] properties";
"In later orders, however, Lass lied ";
"[The judge bifurcated the trials of the equitable and legal issues] precisely in order to rule, himself, on the common factual issues, to effect issue preclusion. "[H]le had no intention of actually holding a jury trial; . This constituted a deliberate plan to swing the outcome to the [Defendants]";
[The judge winked once at one of the defendants' counsel which] shows a revolting level of cronyism all by itself";
"There could be no more hideous and frightening a situation imaginable that the one this judge has created and put into effect by his biased rulings";
"Lass hurriedly re-severed [two cases] so the [Defendants] could be sure and go get that property " (emphasis in original);
"In numerous instances in 99CV2T7, Judge Lass lied about the evidence before him";
"Judge Lass has also made a number of outrageous evidentiary rulings ";
"In his preposterous 66-page ruling denying the preliminary injunction, ... Lass several times knowingly and deliberately mischaracterized the evidence."
(Emphasis added, except as otherwise noted.)
One can closely examine Respondent's motions and Judge Lass's rulings but still be left in the dark as to which supporting facts, *696much less uncontroverted facts, Respondent is relying on to support this litany of vituperation.
If, under these circumstances, Green commands that the prosecution must still prove that each of these statements is false and that Respondent knew them to be false, it might as well invoke open season on judges and lawyers for any intemperate, unprofessional and unprincipled persons who have passed the bar. The reality is that disciplinary prosecutors have neither the resources nor the time to develop the facts necessary to meet that burden in a case such as this where the spewing of vitriol is so broadly gauged and endless. Nor is it likely that volunteer hearing panel members selected from the bar are going to have the time and inclination to sit through the weeks of testimony it would take to prove falsity of every statement and a respondent's knowledge of such falsity. Indeed, the disciplinary prosecutor candidly stated that because of Green her office concluded not to charge the Respondent with violations based on these voluminous attacks on the trial judge and opposing counsel.
The decision in Green, at least as argued by Respondent and applied by the Attorney Regulation Counsel, seems to negate the traditional and long-standing wisdom of cases such as In the Matter of Lester T. Vincenti, 92 N.J. 591, 458 A.2d 1268, 1275 (1983). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court said:
As applied to courtroom decorum, ..., we think the principles extracted from the foregoing passage translate into a requirement that lawyers display a courteous and respectful attitude not only towards the court but towards opposing counsel, parties in the case, witnesses, court officers, clerks-in short, towards everyone and anyone who has anything to do with the legal process. Bullying and insults are no part of a lawyer's arsenal.
The prohibition of our Disciplinary Rules against "undignified or discourteous conduct * * * degrading to a tribunal", DR 7-106(C)(6), is not for the sake of the presiding judge but for the sake of the office he or she holds. Respect for and confidence in the judicial office are essential to the maintenance of any orderly system of justice. This is not to suggest that a lawyer should be other than vigorous, even persistent, in the presentation of a case; nor is it to overlook the reciprocal responsibility of courtesy and respect that the judge owes to the lawyer. Unless these respective obligations are serupulously honored, a trial court will be inhibited in performing two essential tasks: sifting through conflicting versions of the facts to discover where the truth lies, and applying the correct legal principles to the facts as found. Under the best of cireumstances these tasks are difficult; without an orderly environment they can be rendered impossible.
Unless order is maintained in the courtroom and disruption prevented, reason cannot prevail and constitutional rights to liberty, freedom and equality under law cannot be protected. The dignity, decorum and courtesy [that] have traditionally characterized the courts of civilized nations are not empty formalities. They are essential to an atmosphere in which justice can be done. [Code of Trial Conduct § 17 (American College of Trial Lawyers 1983).]
Moreover, the present understanding of Green undercuts the Colorado Supreme Court's position in People v. Barnthouse, 775 P.2d 545, 550 (Colo.1989), which cited Vin-centi favorably. In Barnthouse the respondent had filed a 75-page motion for new trial which was:
[Rleplete with inappropriate, malicious, and seandalous accusations against the guardian ad litem and the respondent's former wife's attorney, as well as similar references to two witnesses who testified in the case. Among the statements contained in the motion for new trial which violated DR 7-102(A)(1) was the respondent's assertion that the "guardian ad Item perjured herself in the temporary orders hearing and in the final orders hearing the court seemed to approach the bench on the first day of the temporary orders with an unexplained predisposition against the respondent, possibly generated from the perjured pa*697per work previously filed by [wife's] attorney...."
(Id. at 547.) Here, Respondent's claims of lying were made about the judge.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that suspension of one's right to practice law:
[I]s also proper as a sanction when a lawyer interferes directly with the legal process. The court in In re Vincenti, 92 N.J. 591, 458 A.2d 1268 (1983), imposed a one year suspension until further order of the court when a lawyer made repeated insulting and degrading verbal attacks on the judge and substantially interfered with the orderly trial process. The Vincenti court was influenced by the numerous instances of impropriety that pervaded the proceeding over a period of three months.
(Id. at 550.) Here, Respondent's conduct lasted over a period of several years!
Thus, I strongly urge the Supreme Court to clarify Green and reiterate that conduct such as the foregoing is absolutely unacceptable, unprofessional and a violation of the lawyers' ethical obligations under at least Colo. RPC 8.4(d) and (h).2

. I concur with the other members of the Panel that a one-year suspension is appropriate in light of the Green decision. However, had Green allowed a finding that Colo. RPC 8.4(d) and (h) *694had been violated, a stronger sanction should have been imposed.

. Indeed, my view is that the Supreme Court should specifically authorize and even instruct trial judges who receive filings with gratuitous and unprofessional obloguy to stop reading them, strike the filings and return them to counsel with instructions promptly to file amended filings with the unprofessional language entirely removed before they will be considered, and to certify that the offending lawyer's client will not be charged any fees for the revised filings.