Court Opinion

ID: 9392316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:00:47.145072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.391150
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT F. KENNEDY, Jr., a citizen           No. 22-35457
of New York; JOSEPH MERCOLA,
MD, a citizen of Florida; RONALD               D.C. No.
CUMMINS, a citizen of Minnesota;            2:21-cv-01508-
CHELSEA GREEN PUBLISHING,                        BJR
INC., a Vermont corporation,
               Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                              OPINION
 v.

ELIZABETH WARREN, Senator,
United States of America, in official
and in personal capacity,
               Defendant-Appellee.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
      Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted January 9, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                      Filed May 4, 2023

Before: Paul J. Watford, Michelle T. Friedland, and Mark
                J. Bennett, Circuit Judges.
2                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

                 Opinion by Judge Watford;
                Concurrence by Judge Bennett

                          SUMMARY *

    Standing / Preliminary Injunction / First Amendment

    The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying
plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction that
challenged a letter sent by Senator Elizabeth Warren to
Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer requesting that the online
retailer modify its algorithms so that they would no longer
direct consumers to plaintiffs’ book titled The Truth About
COVID-19: Exposing the Great Reset, Lockdowns, Vaccine
Passports, and the New Normal.
    Plaintiffs sued Senator Warren, alleging that her letter
violated their First Amendment rights by attempting to
intimidate Amazon and other booksellers into suppressing
their publication. They sought a preliminary injunction
requiring Senator Warren to remove the letter from her
website, to issue a public retraction, and to refrain from
sending similar letters in the future. The district court
concluded that plaintiffs failed to raise a serious First
Amendment question and that the equitable considerations
did not weigh in their favor.
    The panel first considered whether the plaintiffs had
standing to seek a preliminary injunction. The panel held

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   3

that the alleged reputational harm to plaintiffs provided a
sufficient basis for standing. Senator Warren’s letter
disparaged the book by claiming that the book perpetuated
dangerous falsehoods that have led to countless deaths. It
also directly impugned the professional integrity of one of
the authors. The plaintiffs have shown that these remarks,
which Senator Warren broadcast to the public by posting the
letter      on      her      website,     damaged        their
reputations. Reputational harm stemming from an
unretracted government action is a sufficiently concrete
injury for standing purposes. In addition, the panel held that
the requested preliminary injunction would likely redress the
plaintiffs’ reputational injuries.
     Turning to the merits, the panel held that because the
plaintiffs did not raise a serious question on the merits of
their First Amendment claim, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying a preliminary injunction. The crux
of plaintiffs’ case was that Senator Warren engaged in
conduct prohibited under Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963), by attempting to coerce Amazon into
stifling their protected speech. Following Bantam Books,
lower courts have drawn a sharp line wherein a government
official’s attempt to persuade is permissible government
speech, while an attempt to coerce is unlawful government
censorship.
    The panel applied a four-factor framework, formulated
by the Second Circuit, and agreed with the district court that
Senator Warren’s letter did not cross the constitutional line
between persuasion and coercion. First, concerning the
government official’s word choice and tone, the panel held
that Senator Warren’s words on the page and the tone of the
interaction suggested that the letter was intended and
received as nothing more than an attempt to
4                  KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

persuade. Second, concerning whether the official had
regulatory authority over the conduct at issue, the panel held
that this factor weighed against finding impermissible
coercion. Elizabeth Warren, as a single Senator, had no
unilateral power to penalize Amazon for promoting the
book. This absence of authority influenced how a
reasonable person would read her letter. Third, concerning
whether the recipient perceived the message as a threat, the
panel held that there was no evidence that Amazon changed
its algorithms in response to Senator Warren’s letter, let
alone that it felt compelled to do so. Fourth, concerning
whether the communication referred to any adverse
consequences if the recipient refused to comply, the panel
held that Senator Warren’s silence on adverse consequences
supported the view that she sought to pressure Amazon by
calling attention to an important issue and mobilizing public
sentiment, not by leveling threats. Senator Warren never
hinted that she would take specific action to investigate or
prosecute Amazon.
    The panel concluded that the plaintiffs had not raised a
serious question as to whether Senator Warren’s letter
constituted an unlawful threat in violation of the First
Amendment. Accordingly, the panel held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction.
     Judge Bennett concurred in the judgment because the
district court did not misapply the law, clearly misconstrue
the record, or otherwise abuse its discretion in determining
that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their
First Amendment claim. He disagreed with the majority’s
holding that plaintiffs failed even to raise a “serious
question” going to the merits regarding Senator Warren’s
letter. He wrote separately to express his view that some
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                 5

aspects of Senator Warren’s letter could be interpreted as
coercive by a reasonable reader. Nevertheless, the district
court correctly determined that these coercive elements were
not sufficient to demonstrate the “likelihood of success on
the merits” necessary for a preliminary injunction.

                       COUNSEL

Jed Rubenfeld (argued), New Haven, Connecticut; Nathan J.
Arnold and R. Bruce Johnson, Arnold & Jacobowitz PLLC,
Redmond, Washington; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Sarah J. Clark (argued) and Michael S. Raab, Appellate Staff
Attorneys; Nicholas W. Brown, United States Attorney;
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General; United States Department of Justice; Washington,
D.C.; William B. Stafford (argued) and Lindsay McAleer,
Elias Law Group LLP, Seattle, Washington; Elisabeth C.
Frost and Melinda K. Johnson, Elias Law Group LLP,
Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee.
6                  KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

                         OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

    The plaintiffs in this case are the authors and publisher
of a book titled The Truth About COVID-19: Exposing the
Great Reset, Lockdowns, Vaccine Passports, and the New
Normal. They argue that Senator Elizabeth Warren crossed
a constitutional line dividing persuasion from intimidation
when she sent a letter to Amazon requesting that the online
retailer modify its algorithms so that they would no longer
direct consumers to the plaintiffs’ book. We conclude that
Senator Warren’s letter falls safely on the persuasion side of
the line and accordingly hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction.
                              I
    On September 7, 2021, Senator Warren sent a letter to
Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer raising concerns over the
company’s promotion of books that contain false or
misleading information about COVID-19 and the vaccines
designed to immunize against it. Her letter began:

       I write regarding concerns that Amazon is
       peddling misinformation about COVID-19
       vaccines and treatments through its search
       and “Best Seller” algorithms. This is the
       second time in six months that I have
       identified Amazon practices that mislead
       consumers about COVID-19 prevention or
       treatment: earlier this year, I wrote regarding
       concerns that the company is providing
       consumers with false and misleading
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   7

       information about FDA-authorized KN95
       masks.      This pattern and practice of
       misbehavior suggests that Amazon is either
       unwilling or unable to modify its business
       practices to prevent the spread of falsehoods
       or the sale of inappropriate products—an
       unethical, unacceptable, and potentially
       unlawful course of action from one of the
       nation’s largest retailers.

(Footnote omitted.)        After detailing the virus’s
disproportionate impact on the unvaccinated population,
Senator Warren claimed that “[c]onspiracy theories about
COVID-19 abound” and “have led to untold illnesses and
deaths.” These conspiracy theories, she wrote, are “often
facilitated by technology companies that refuse to curb
misinformation.” She explained that when her staff searched
for pandemic-related terms on Amazon’s platform, the top
results included “books based on falsehoods about COVID-
19 vaccines and cures.”
    One of these books was The Truth About COVID-19,
which the letter alleged “perpetuates dangerous conspiracies
about COVID-19” by disputing the safety and efficacy of
vaccines while promoting alternative treatments with limited
scientific basis. Senator Warren explained that the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) had instructed one of the book’s
authors, Dr. Joseph Mercola, to stop selling these ineffective
and unauthorized treatments on his website. She also noted
that Dr. Mercola had been the subject of multiple federal
investigations, including a false-advertising investigation
that led to a $2.95 million consumer settlement. Based on
these concerns, Senator Warren expressed alarm that The
Truth About COVID-19 appeared as a “Best Seller” on
8                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

Amazon and as the “#1 Best Seller” in the company’s
“Political Freedom” category.
    Senator Warren credited Amazon for not officially
sponsoring these search results, unlike its prior sponsorship
of unauthorized KN95 masks. Nevertheless, she insisted
that Amazon should do more to stop the spread of false or
misleading COVID-19 information. She noted that other
technology companies had implemented processes for
removing misleading posts about the virus and that Amazon
had been more proactive in taking down other forms of
misinformation. The letter concluded by asking Amazon to
“perform an immediate review of [its] algorithms and,
within 14 days, provide both a public report on the extent to
which Amazon’s algorithms are directing consumers to
books and other products containing COVID-19
misinformation and a plan to modify these algorithms so that
they no longer do so.” Senator Warren also asked Amazon
to answer four specific questions about its search algorithms
and its use of the “Best Seller” label so that she could “fully
understand Amazon’s role in facilitating misinformation
about COVID-19 and its actions to address the issue.”
    The following day, Senator Warren issued a press release
on her website in which she attached the letter just described.
See Senator Elizabeth Warren, Press Release, Warren
Investigation Finds Amazon Provides Consumers with
COVID-19 Vaccine Misinformation in Search Results (Sept.
8, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/oversight/letters/w
arren-investigation-finds-amazon-provides-consumers-with
-covid-19-vaccine-misinformation-in-search-results.
    Two months later, the plaintiffs sued Senator Warren,
alleging that her letter violated their First Amendment rights
by attempting to intimidate Amazon and other booksellers
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   9

into suppressing their publication.         They sought a
preliminary injunction requiring Senator Warren to remove
the letter from her website, to issue a public retraction, and
to refrain from sending similar letters in the future. The
district court denied the motion, concluding that the
plaintiffs had failed to raise a serious First Amendment
question and that the equitable considerations did not weigh
in their favor. The plaintiffs have appealed that ruling under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
                              II
    Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must first
determine whether the plaintiffs have standing to seek a
preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs have alleged three
injuries stemming from Senator Warren’s letter: (1) injuries
related to certain booksellers’ suppression of their
publication; (2) a chilling effect on their speech; and (3)
reputational harm. Because reputational harm provides a
sufficient basis for standing, we need not address the other
alleged injuries.
    Senator Warren’s letter disparages The Truth About
COVID-19 by claiming that the book perpetuates dangerous
falsehoods that have led to countless deaths. It also directly
impugns the professional integrity of one of the authors, Dr.
Mercola. The plaintiffs have shown that these remarks,
which Senator Warren broadcast to the public by posting the
letter on her website, damaged their reputations.
Reputational harm stemming from an unretracted
government action is a sufficiently concrete injury for
standing purposes. See, e.g., Foretich v. United States, 351
F.3d 1198, 1212–13 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This is true in the First
Amendment context even though reputational injury is not
itself a reason to prevent government officials from engaging
10                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

in the rough and tumble of political debate. See, e.g., Eaton
v. Meneley, 379 F.3d 949, 956 (10th Cir. 2004).
     The requested preliminary injunction would likely
redress the plaintiffs’ reputational injuries in two ways.
First, an injunction requiring Senator Warren to take down
the letter from her website would likely limit its reach and
thereby mitigate the damage. To be sure, the injunction
would not prevent Senator Warren from criticizing the book
or its authors in other ways. But an injunction does not need
to prohibit all forms of criticism to provide effective relief.
It is enough for standing purposes that an injunction could
enjoin the particular form of disparagement at issue here.
See Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1214–15 (citing Meese v. Keene,
481 U.S. 465, 477 (1987)); Turkish Coalition of America,
Inc. v. Bruininks, 678 F.3d 617, 622–23 (8th Cir. 2012).
Second, the plaintiffs contend that Senator Warren’s letter
accused them, and all those who facilitate the sale of their
book, of engaging in “potentially unlawful” conduct. For
reasons explained below, we are unsure that the letter
contains such an implication. But to the extent any reader of
the letter might come away with this impression, the
requested injunction would remove the unique stigma
associated with having a government official label someone
a law breaker and thereby cast a shadow over their activities
and affiliates. See Keene, 481 U.S. at 476–77; Parsons v.
U.S. Department of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 705–06, 712 (6th
Cir. 2015).
    Based on their reputational harm, the plaintiffs have met
their burden of showing an injury that Senator Warren
caused and that could be remedied by the requested relief.
See LA Alliance for Human Rights v. County of Los Angeles,
14 F.4th 947, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2021). We can now proceed
to the merits of their appeal.
                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                    11

                               III
    To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff “must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008). A plaintiff alternatively can meet his burden under
the first element by raising “serious questions going to the
merits” if “the balance of hardships tips sharply in [his]
favor.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Because the plaintiffs here do
not raise a serious question on the merits of their First
Amendment claim, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by denying a preliminary injunction. See Alliance
for the Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217, 1223 (9th
Cir. 2017).
    The crux of the plaintiffs’ case is that Senator Warren
engaged in conduct prohibited under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963), by attempting to coerce Amazon into stifling their
protected speech. In Bantam Books, the Rhode Island
legislature had created an entity called the Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality as a means of stopping
the distribution of indecent material to children. Id. at 59.
Pursuant to its mandate, the Commission sent letters to
distributors notifying them that it had sent the police a list of
inappropriate books and magazines (many of which were not
obscene) and requesting that distributors remove these
publications from circulation. Id. at 64. The notices thanked
distributors for their “anticipated cooperation” because it
would “eliminate the necessity of our recommending
prosecution to the Attorney General’s department.” Id. at 62
12                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

& n.5. Police then followed up with distributors to ensure
that they had complied with the notices. Id. at 68. The Court
held that this “system of informal censorship,” which was
“clearly [designed] to intimidate” distributors into removing
disfavored publications from the shelves, violated the First
Amendment. Id. at 64, 71.
     Following Bantam Books, lower courts have drawn a
sharp line between government officials’ “attempts to
convince and attempts to coerce” intermediaries not to
distribute a third party’s speech. Okwedy v. Molinari, 333
F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Under those
decisions, an attempt to persuade is permissible government
speech, while an attempt to coerce is unlawful government
censorship. For example, in Carlin Communications, Inc. v.
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 827 F.2d 1291
(9th Cir. 1987), we held that a deputy county attorney
violated the First Amendment by threatening to prosecute a
telephone company if it continued to carry a salacious dial-
a-message service. Id. at 1296. By contrast, in American
Family Association, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco,
277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002), we held that San Francisco
officials did not violate the First Amendment when they
criticized religious groups’ anti-gay advertisements and
urged television stations not to broadcast the ads. Id. at
1119–20, 1125. In doing so, we articulated the rule that
“public officials may criticize practices that they would have
no constitutional ability to regulate, so long as there is no
actual or threatened imposition of government power or
sanction.” Id. at 1125.
    Although the line between persuasion and coercion is
clear in theory, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish
between the two in practice. To assist in drawing that
distinction, the Second Circuit has formulated a useful non-
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   13

exclusive four-factor framework that examines: (1) the
government official’s word choice and tone; (2) whether the
official has regulatory authority over the conduct at issue;
(3) whether the recipient perceived the message as a threat;
and (4) whether the communication refers to any adverse
consequences if the recipient refuses to comply. National
Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, 49 F.4th 700, 715 (2d
Cir. 2022). Applying this framework in light of our case law,
we agree with the district court that Senator Warren’s letter
does not cross the constitutional line between persuasion and
coercion.
    Word choice and tone.           Senator Warren’s letter
denounces The Truth About COVID-19 and chastises
Amazon for “peddling misinformation about COVID-19
vaccines and treatments,” conduct that she contends has led
to countless illnesses and deaths. These are strong words, to
be sure. But our system of government requires that elected
officials be able to express their views and rally support for
their positions. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135–36
(1966). As our decision in American Family shows, this
principle includes allowing politicians to forcefully criticize
other speakers and the platforms that carry their messages.
277 F.3d at 1125.
    Senator Warren used strong rhetoric—along with her
references to peer companies’ efforts to limit false and
misleading information about COVID-19—in her attempt to
convince Amazon to be more proactive in suppressing
misinformation. In case Amazon remained unconvinced by
her argument, she posted the letter online for all to read. The
letter’s widespread dissemination may have put pressure on
Amazon to act, but not in a way that Bantam Books prohibits.
See R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 735 F.2d 85,
89 (3d Cir. 1984). Generating public pressure to motivate
14                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

others to change their behavior is a core part of public
discourse, and “[w]e are aware of no constitutional
right . . . [that] require[s] legislators to refrain from such
speech or advocacy.” X-Men Security, Inc. v. Pataki, 196
F.3d 56, 68 (2d Cir. 1999). In fact, any such right “would
stand the Constitution on its head” by cutting off political
discourse. Hammerhead Enterprises, Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707
F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1983).
    Senator Warren’s letter concluded by “ask[ing] that
[Amazon] perform an immediate review of [its] algorithms”
and issue a public report detailing its plans to modify the
company’s practices regarding COVID-19 misinformation.
This request was direct, but it was still framed as a request
rather than a command and is thus distinguishable from the
communications at issue in Bantam Books. There, the
Supreme Court recognized the reality that some “requests”
cannot really be refused when it noted that “[p]eople do not
lightly disregard public officers’ thinly veiled threats to
institute criminal proceedings against them if they do not
come around.” Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 68. Yet unlike
the notices in that case, which were “phrased virtually as
orders” and enforced by police and prosecutors, nothing in
Senator Warren’s call to action directly suggests that
compliance was the only realistic option to avoid
government sanction. Id.
    The plaintiffs agree with much of this analysis but insist
that two words in the letter’s opening paragraph change
everything—namely, Senator Warren’s suggestion that
Amazon was engaging in “potentially unlawful” conduct.
With these two words, the plaintiffs contend, Senator
Warren crossed the line between persuasion and coercion by
insinuating that Amazon’s promotion of The Truth About
COVID-19 could expose the company to legal liability. For
                   KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                 15

the reasons stated below, we do not think this is a plausible
interpretation of the letter.
     We must read the phrase “potentially unlawful” in
context, not in isolation. Senator Warren’s letter began by
noting that this was the second time she had written to
Amazon in recent months. Her prior correspondence, she
explained, expressed concern that the company was
providing consumers with false or misleading information
about unauthorized KN95 masks. In the next sentence, she
wrote that “[t]his pattern and practice of misbehavior
suggests that Amazon is either unwilling or unable to modify
its business practices to prevent the spread of falsehoods or
the sale of inappropriate products—an unethical,
unacceptable, and potentially unlawful course of action from
one of the nation’s largest retailers.” (Emphasis added.)
Placed in proper perspective, the phrase “potentially
unlawful” most likely refers to the “sale of inappropriate
products,” such as the unauthorized KN95 masks. Such a
business practice could potentially constitute unlawful
consumer fraud. By contrast, the letter does not explain
which law Amazon might be violating by selling The Truth
About COVID-19 or any other book.
    Even if we accept the plaintiffs’ reading of the letter,
however, referencing potential legal liability does not morph
an effort to persuade into an attempt to coerce. See VDARE
Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs, 11 F.4th 1151, 1165
(10th Cir. 2021). The relevant question remains whether the
communication can reasonably be construed as coercive, and
not every official’s legal opinion reasonably resembles a
threat. See Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 68–69 (distinguishing
between “mere legal advice” and an actual threat of legal
action). For example, it would not be coercive for a
government official to point out that a company’s conduct
16                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

could be the basis of a consumer class action. Nor would it
be coercive to warn a company that its practices could spur
other government officials to consider legal action. A First
Amendment problem arises only if the official intimates that
she will use her authority to turn the government’s coercive
power against the target if it does not change its ways. See
Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). Neither
the “potentially unlawful” language nor the letter’s reference
to past FDA investigations into Dr. Mercola’s commercial
enterprises suggests that Senator Warren planned to punish
Amazon if it continued to promote the plaintiffs’ book.
    The absence of a clear allegation of legal violations or
threat of specific enforcement actions distinguishes this case
from Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir.
2015), on which the plaintiffs heavily rely.                In
Backpage.com, Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart sent a
letter demanding that Mastercard and Visa “cease and
desist” allowing their customers to use their credit cards on
Backpage’s website, which contained an adult classified
advertisements section. Id. at 231. The letter claimed that
the website was integral to sex trafficking and reminded the
companies that they have a “legal duty to [report] . . . to
authorities in cases of human trafficking and sexual
exploitation of minors.” Id. at 232. In support of this point,
Sheriff Dart cited the federal money-laundering statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1956. Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 232. The
Seventh Circuit held that this letter—which the sheriff’s
department described as a “demand” and which explicitly
invoked Sheriff Dart’s position in law enforcement—offered
more than legal advice and instead threatened criminal
sanctions if the credit card companies did not sever ties with
the website. Id. at 231–33. We see no similar legal
intimidation in our case.
                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   17

    Finally, a full review requires us to analyze not only the
tone of the letter but also the tenor of the overall interaction
between Senator Warren and Amazon. An interaction will
tend to be more threatening if the official refuses to take “no”
for an answer and pesters the recipient until it succumbs. In
Bantam Books, for instance, the Commission sent repeated
notices and followed up with police visits. 372 U.S. at 62–
63; see also Zieper, 474 F.3d at 66–67. Here, the record
contains no evidence that Senator Warren followed up on her
letter in any fashion, even though Amazon continued to sell
The Truth About COVID-19 on its platform.
    The words on the page and the tone of the interaction
thus suggest that the letter was intended and received as
nothing more than an attempt to persuade.
    Regulatory authority. The second consideration is
whether the government official has regulatory authority
over the recipient in the relevant policy area. Although the
lack of direct authority is “not necessarily dispositive,” it is
“certainly relevant” for determining whether a message is an
act of persuasion or a threat of adverse consequences.
Okwedy, 333 F.3d at 343–44. This factor weighs against
finding impermissible coercion here.
    Elizabeth Warren, as a single Senator, has no unilateral
power to penalize Amazon for promoting The Truth About
COVID-19. This absence of authority influences how a
reasonable person would read her letter. A similar letter
might be inherently coercive if sent by a prosecutor with the
power to bring charges against the recipient, see Carlin, 827
F.2d at 1296, or if sent by some other law enforcement
officer, see Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 233 (speculating that
a letter sent by someone outside of law enforcement “would
be more likely to be discarded or filed away than to be acted
18                      KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

on”). The letter could be viewed as more threatening if it
were penned by an executive official with unilateral power
that could be wielded in an unfair way if the recipient did not
acquiesce. See Okwedy, 333 F.3d at 342. But as one
member of a legislature who is removed from the relevant
levers of power, Senator Warren would more naturally be
viewed as relying on her persuasive authority rather than on
the coercive power of the government to take action against
Amazon.
    Senator Warren’s lack of unilateral regulatory authority
distinguishes this case from Bantam Books. Although the
Commission in Bantam Books lacked prosecutorial power,
the Supreme Court held that the “want of power to apply
formal legal sanctions” was immaterial because the state
legislature had vested the Commission with the authority to
ban books, investigate violations, and recommend
prosecutions. 372 U.S. at 66. A letter from a single Senator
backed by no statutory mandate is far afield from this system
of “effective state regulation.” Id. at 69. Whereas it would
have been foolish for the distributors in Rhode Island to
ignore the Commission’s official notices, id. at 68, it would
have been unreasonable here for Amazon to believe that a
single member of Congress could bring to bear coercive
government power against it for promoting books on its
platform. 1

1
  In response, the plaintiffs contend that Senator Warren is differently
situated from other members of Congress because she has a track record
of targeting Amazon, especially in relation to alleged antitrust violations.
We fail to see how these acts, which Senator Warren performed as a
member of the Senate Finance Committee, make it any more likely that
she could cajole the relevant authorities to punish Amazon if it did not
limit the spread of COVID-19 misinformation.
                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   19

     Perception of the recipient. The third factor focuses on
how the recipient understood the communication. We do not
require an intermediary to admit that it bowed to government
pressure for the plaintiff to state a First Amendment claim.
See Backpage.com, 807 F.3d at 233. After all, the recipient
may wish to conceal why it agreed to the official’s request.
Indeed, it is not even necessary for the recipient to have
complied with the official’s request because a credible threat
may violate the First Amendment even if “the victim ignores
it, and the threatener folds his tent.” Id. at 231. But on the
margins, we are more likely to find impermissible coercion
if there is some indication that the recipient of the message
understood it as a threat. See Rattner v. Netburn, 930 F.2d
204, 210 (2d Cir. 1991).
     With respect to Amazon, there is no evidence that the
company changed its algorithms in response to Senator
Warren’s letter, let alone that it felt compelled to do so. The
plaintiffs point to the fact that, several weeks after receiving
the letter, Amazon notified Chelsea Green Publishing that it
would not advertise The Truth About COVID-19 even
though it had promoted other Chelsea Green books in the
past. This fact is unilluminating because no evidence
suggests that Amazon ever advertised the plaintiffs’ book
before receiving the letter. Absent such evidence, it is far
more likely that Amazon’s decision not to advertise the
plaintiffs’ book was a response to widespread concerns
about the spread of COVID-19 misinformation rather than a
response to Senator Warren’s letter. See Association of
American Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Schiff, 23 F.4th
1028, 1034–35 (D.C. Cir. 2022). And even if Senator
Warren’s letter did prompt Amazon’s refusal, the decision
still more plausibly reflected the company’s concern over
20                  KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

reputational risks in the court of public opinion rather than
fears of liability in a court of law.
    Beyond Amazon, the plaintiffs point out that Barnes &
Noble removed The Truth About COVID-19 from its online
platform one day after Senator Warren posted the letter on
her website. Even assuming that the letter caused this
change in policy, it is unlikely that the letter did so by way
of coercion. Senator Warren sent the letter to Amazon, and
the letter criticizes Amazon’s algorithms and its use of the
“Best Seller” label. We doubt that Barnes & Noble officials
would have read these critiques of another company’s
business practices and felt compelled to respond by pulling
a book from its own digital shelves—an action that Senator
Warren had not even requested of Amazon. Again, it is more
likely that Barnes & Noble reassessed its policies either
because it was persuaded by Senator Warren’s critique or,
alternatively, because it feared the letter might spark a public
backlash that would spread beyond Amazon. Either of these
effects is consistent with an elected official’s permissible
attempts to shape public discourse and change market
practices.
    Adverse consequences for non-compliance. The final
and perhaps most important consideration for distinguishing
between permissible persuasion and impermissible coercion
is whether the official’s communication refers to adverse
consequences that will follow if the recipient does not
accede to the request. See Vullo, 49 F.4th at 715. Senator
Warren’s silence on adverse consequences supports the view
that she sought to pressure Amazon by calling attention to
an important issue and mobilizing public sentiment, not by
leveling threats.
                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   21

     The most obvious cases of coercion occur when an
official explicitly refers to adverse consequences. In Carlin,
the deputy county attorney’s direct threat of prosecution
made clear that the letter was no mere act of persuasion. 827
F.2d at 1296. Although not as explicit, the Commission’s
notices in Bantam Books included “thinly veiled threats to
institute criminal proceedings” by warning that the
Commission would recommend prosecution if the
distributors did not pull the targeted publications. 372 U.S.
at 68. Senator Warren’s letter, by contrast, contains no
explicit reference to any repercussions Amazon would suffer
if it refused her request.
    To be sure, an official does not need to say “or else” if a
threat is clear from the context. In Backpage.com, for
instance, the Seventh Circuit held that, although Sheriff
Dart’s letter did not outright say that he thought the credit
card companies were accomplices to a crime, he had implied
as much by citing the federal money-laundering statute in his
demand letter. 807 F.3d at 234. Going a step further, Sheriff
Dart had “contacted the Inspector General of the United
States Postal Service and the FBI, urging them to investigate
the lawfulness of alternative payment methods for
Backpage’s sex ads.” Id. at 237. These actions left little
doubt as to what Sheriff Dart would do if the credit card
companies did not sever ties with the website.
    Here, by contrast, it is hard to fathom what the unspoken
“or else” would be. The plaintiffs argue that Amazon could
reasonably have construed the letter as implying that Senator
Warren could refer Amazon for criminal prosecution as an
accomplice to homicide (or perhaps some lesser crime). We
agree with the district court that this interpretation “requires
a vivid imagination.” A vast gap exists between implying
that an entity is morally complicit in causing deaths and
22                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

accusing it of being an accomplice to homicide. Our court
recognized this critical difference in American Family. The
Board of Supervisors’ letter in that case claimed that the
groups’ hateful rhetoric had a “direct correlation” with
“horrible crimes committed against gays and lesbians.” 277
F.3d at 1119. In particular, the letter stated that Matthew
Shepard’s brutal murder by anti-gay assailants was “in part
due to the message being espoused by your groups.” Id. We
did not read this as threatening criminal prosecution against
these groups. Rather, we held that the letter was a powerful
and permissible form of denunciation. The same is true here.
    To distinguish American Family, the plaintiffs again
insist that the words “potentially unlawful” make all the
difference. Once more, we disagree. These words appear in
a different paragraph from the reference to “untold illness
and death,” and Senator Warren never linked the two
concepts together. Although we must read the letter
holistically, we may not distort the text by melding together
pieces that do not fit. Regardless, as discussed above,
Senator Warren never hinted that she would take specific
action to investigate or prosecute Amazon based on a far-
fetched legal theory that Amazon’s book sales made it liable
for COVID-19 deaths or complicit in some unspecified other
offense.
                     *        *        *
     We conclude that the plaintiffs have not raised a serious
question as to whether Senator Warren’s letter constituted an
unlawful threat in violation of the First Amendment. Her
letter requested, but did not demand, that Amazon reevaluate
its business practices regarding COVID-19 misinformation
and report back any changes. The absence of a specific
demand is unsurprising given that Senator Warren lacks
                        KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                            23

direct regulatory authority over Amazon in this matter.
There is no evidence that Amazon or any other bookseller
perceived the letter as a threat, and the “potentially
unlawful” language does not fundamentally alter the
analysis because Senator Warren never stated or otherwise
implied that there would be any adverse consequences if
Amazon failed to comply with her request. As a result, we
hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.
    AFFIRMED.

BENNETT, Circuit Judge, concurring:

    The question before us is narrow: whether the district
court abused its discretion in denying a preliminary
injunction. I concur in the judgment because the district
court did not misapply the law, clearly misconstrue the
record, or otherwise abuse its discretion in determining that
plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their First
Amendment claim. 1 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consumer
Def., LLC, 926 F.3d 1208, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2019). But the
majority proceeds to hold that plaintiffs failed even to raise
a “serious question” going to the merits regarding Senator

1
  The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[a] preliminary injunction is
an extraordinary remedy.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008). “Our review of a decision regarding a preliminary
injunction is limited and deferential . . . . [O]ur inquiry is at an end once
we determine that the district court employed the appropriate legal
standards . . ., and correctly apprehended the law with respect to the
underlying issues in litigation.” Harris v. Bd. of Supervisors, L.A.
County, 366 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up).
24                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

Warren’s letter. Op. at 22. I write separately to express my
view that some aspects of the letter could be interpreted as
coercive by a reasonable reader.
    Applying the four non-exclusive factors relied upon by
the majority, plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that some
portions of the letter could be read as coercive. Op. at 12 –
13 (citing Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 49 F.4th 700, 715
(2d Cir. 2022)). For example, although I agree with the
majority that Senator Warren’s choice of the phrase
“potentially unlawful” is ambiguous in context, it could
plausibly be read as referring to a broader “pattern and
practice of misbehavior” that the Senator identified,
including the use of algorithms to promote The Truth About
COVID-19. Second, although a single Senator lacks
unilateral authority to impose direct government sanctions
on Amazon or other retailers, it is possible that Senator
Warren could have made a criminal referral to the
Department of Justice, advocated for Committee hearings
and investigative subpoenas targeting Amazon’s conduct, or
introduced legislation to retaliate against a lack of
compliance. 2
    Against this backdrop, a reader could interpret the letter
as implicitly threatening adverse action if Amazon did not
comply with the Senator’s request. Indeed, the letter:

2
  At the time Senator Warren sent the letter, she was a member of the
Senate majority and served on the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Protection, which exercises jurisdiction over
E-commerce activities. Subcommittees, United States Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, https://www.banking.senate.g
ov/about/subcommittees#financial-institutions-and-consumer-protection
(last visited Apr. 21, 2023).
                    KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN                   25

       ask[ed] that [Amazon] perform an immediate
       review of Amazon’s algorithms and, within
       14 days, provide both a public report on the
       extent to which Amazon’s algorithms are
       directing consumers to books and other
       products containing COVID-19 misinformation
       and a plan to modify these algorithms so that
       they no longer do so.

Senator Warren closed by asking Amazon to answer four
specific questions about the impact of its policies and
algorithms on the spread of misinformation. Although the
letter does not threaten specific consequences if Amazon
failed to comply with this request; as the majority notes, we
do not require a government official to list specific
consequences in order to find a constitutional violation. Op.
at 21. As in Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339 (2d Cir.
2003), where a veiled reference to “economic benefits”
enjoyed by billboard owners was enough to constitute a
coercive threat, id. at 342–44, Senator Warren’s request for
an “immediate” and “public” response could be read as
implying adverse action if Amazon failed to comply. Thus,
I believe plaintiffs have raised at least some questions as to
the potentially coercive nature of Senator Warren’s letter.
    Nonetheless, the district court correctly determined that
these coercive elements were not sufficient to demonstrate
the “likelihood of success on the merits” necessary for a
preliminary injunction. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the letter did not accuse Amazon of specific
unlawful conduct related to selling The Truth About COVID-
19 or other books. Moreover, Senator Warren lacked the
authority to unilaterally impose direct sanctions to the extent
her letter implied a threat of retaliation. The district court’s
26                 KENNEDY, JR. V. WARREN

conclusion that “[p]laintiffs are unlikely to successfully
demonstrate that the booksellers reasonably perceived
Defendant Warren’s letter as a threat” is supported by the
record and relevant caselaw. But I would stop short of the
majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs have not raised serious
questions about the coercive nature of the letter.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.