Court Opinion

ID: 9455304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:18:14.248541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:32.807743
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing

PER CURIAM:
Appellants have petitioned for rehearing of our decision in United States v. Wild, 34 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1969), claiming that we have overlooked an intervening decision of another panel of this court, that we have incorrectly stated their legal position and that the arrests of appellants were unlawful.
The intervening decision referred to is Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), decided after the date of argument in this case but some three weeks before our decision. Bethview grew out of a criminal prosecution for “Obscenity” under New York State Penal Law, McKinney’s Consol. Laws, c. 40, § 235.05(1), (2). Armed with search and arrest warrants, police officers arrested plaintiffs in that case and seized a print of an allegedly obscene motion picture film. Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and obtained an order requiring the return of the film. We affirmed on the *39ground that an adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity was necessary before the film could be seized by the police. Appellants claim that the decision in Bethview is “in irreconcilable conflict” with our decision here.
We do not agree with that conclusion. First, the Bethview court did not have before it an appeal from a conviction in which the seized film had been introduced into evidence; therefore, it did not hold that such a conviction would have to be reversed. While the panel there ordered the film returned, it did not say that the print could not be used by the prosecution in a trial on the outstanding criminal charge. In fact, the court in Bethview indicated precisely to the contrary, 416 F.2d at 412:
The appellants contend that a print of the motion picture is needed for purposes of prosecution. There are a number of ways in which this can be accomplished without seizure of the film. The court can direct that a print be made reasonably available to the prosecution; a subpoena duces tecum can be used.
Finally it is suggested that unless the police or other local authorities have actual possession of the film pending the required adversary proceeding, the distributor may take advantage of the delay, for example, by shipping the film out of the jurisdiction or by cutting out the offending scenes. If there is a real threat of such activity it can be controlled by an ex parte restraining order.
See Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 410 F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 985, 90 S.Ct. 478, 24 L.Ed.2d 449 (Dec. 15, 1969). In our case, the issue is whether a new trial must be ordered because some of the seized material was used as evidence.1 We do not believe that Bethview decided that question in the affirmative.
Second, the Bethview panel analogized “a single print of a motion picture film” to seizure of “a large number of books” because in both instances, without any prior adversary hearing, a large group in the community is denied access to material that may be entitled to first amendment protection. Thus, the Beth-view panel pointed out that a single motion picture print could be seen by over 4,000 people in one week. This is not true, of other kinds of allegedly obscene material, e. g., a single copy of a magazine or of an underground newspaper, cf. Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary, 305 F.Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y.1969), or a single copy of a slide similar to those involved here. The Bethview panel did not hold that it is improper, after a lawful arrest, to seize as evidence a few samples of this kind of allegedly obscene material, each of which can, by its nature, be seen by only a few people. In other words, the Bethview panel, as did we, looked to the rationale of A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210-211, 213, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961), which proscribed, as we pointed out, 38, “massive seizures of books under state statutes which authorized warrants for the seizure of obscene materials as a first step in civil proceedings seeking their destruction.” As we stated in our opinion, id., we do not believe that those cases “proscribe the application of the ordinary methods of initiating criminal prosecution to obscenity cases,” e. g., by seizing as incident to a lawful arrest evidentiary samples of allegedly obscene material. Accordingly, we conclude that our decision and Bethview are not in conflict.
In their petition for rehearing, supplemented by a motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix, appellants argue that “thousands of slides” were seized here, thus making this case a *40“massive seizure” within the rationale of Quantity of Books, Marcus, and Beth-view. However, the argument made to us on appeal was that “any seizure” 2— small or massive — was unconstitutional if made without a prior hearing. As indicated, we reject that contention. As to whether the search and seizure here was so “massive” as to be prohibited by the first amendment, we simply are not furnished with adequate facts. The proffered supplemental appendix may indicate what was taken but does not show what was left, nor can we tell whether the seizure included all — or merely some —copies of a particular slide, how many separate slides were involved, or whether they “were on the threshold of dissemination.” See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513, 86 S.Ct. 957, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966). In short, we do not think it appropriate to decide the issue now raised of “massive seizure” and the constitutional implications thereof on a belated argument and inadequate record. Accordingly, we deny leave to file the supplemental appendix.
The remaining issues in the petition for rehearing require little discussion. We did state twice in our opinion that appellants did not claim that the color slides had redeeming social value. Appellants point out, however, that their brief did make the claim. Accordingly, we amend the opinion by adding the phrase “at trial” at the end of the sentences beginning at 35 and 36. Despite what appellánts may claim, we adhere to our prior conclusion, implicit in our opinion, that the slides have no redeeming social value. Appellants’ last point that their arrests were unlawful was dealt with in our opinion and is concededly brought to our attention again only “to protect” the record.
The petition for rehearing is denied. The motion to stay the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, subject to the requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 41(b).

. We note that only appellant Wild raises this point. Appellant Corrado “would prefer to have the conviction affirmed as to him rather than to undergo a new trial.” Appellants’ brief, p. 25.

. Appellants’ brief, p. 21.