Court Opinion

ID: 9770236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:55:21.14488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:44.058624
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the Court’s opinion and judgment but I write separately to once again caution about the danger of our misuse of Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986) to circumvent our limited authority to review a factual insufficiency holding. See Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., Til S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.1989) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). The standard articulated by this Court in Pool, although legally justified, is susceptible to abuse unless exercised with the utmost caution and restraint. This Court has no constitutional authority to review a determination by the court of appeals that a jury finding is either supported by factually insufficient evidence or is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Our review of such a holding is limited to determining that it was lawfully made, not whether it was decided correctly. On rare occasions, I believe that our writings have exceeded this narrow authority. See Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1986) (per eu-*30riam) (remand for second factual sufficiency review); Lofton, 777 S.W.2d 884 (remand for third factual sufficiency review); See also William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and Insufficient Evidence,” 69 Tex.L.Rev. 515, 533 (1991).
This case, however, presents a textbook example of the appropriate exercise of our responsibility to direct the court of appeals, when reversing on insufficiency grounds, to “detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias.” Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635. At the close of the respondents’ oral argument before this Court, the following exchange occurred:
COUNSEL: I know that there is one other aspect of the testimony that Justice Peeples referred to. That is the one that comes to mind. He also referred to the ... you are right, your honor, that Mr. Swearingen had been told by Mr. Molberg that he [Mr. Molberg] had not exceeded the red line. The significance of that is that Mr. Swearingen had designed the plane for specific speed capabilities and there was testimony that the capabilities of the plane' had been exceeded by Mr. Mol-berg by over 100 mph.
JUSTICE HECHT: But then there is also testimony that he didn’t? And that is not in the court of appeals’ opinion. Would that be material?
COUNSEL: I would think that would be significant testimony, your honor. It is a statement of a party, Mr. Molberg_
JUSTICE HECHT: So then you do concede it has to go back?
COUNSEL: Well, I hate to put myself in that position, judge. But I would have to....
JUSTICE HECHT: It does seem inescapable. Is that right?
COUNSEL: If that testimony, your honor, was substantial testimony, I think that under any test this court here would have to send the case back with the direction to the court of appeals to consider that specific testimony.
JUSTICE HECHT: Do you think it was substantial?
COUNSEL: I will have to concede ... that in this court I would consider it to be substantial testimony, your honor. In the court of appeals, in light of the fact that there were only two experts who testified, I think that the argument would be that that would not be substantially sufficient enough to sustain the jury verdict. But that it is something the court of appeals should consider. I concede that your hon- or.
The respondents’ attorney made no argument against the applicability of Pool; to the contrary, he endorsed its precepts. His responses to the questions posed amount essentially to a confession of error, and virtually compel our judgment in this case.
With little effort, however, this Court could, in almost any case, discover some fact in the record which is not set forth in the opinion below. By labeling that fact as “material,” we could reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand for further proceedings. The respective jurisdictions of the courts of appeals and of this Court are best preserved when we exercise this power sparingly. With that caveat, I join in the opinion of the Court and in the judgment.