Court Opinion

ID: 9705303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:01:42.907276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.069735
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in both the grant of a new trial and in the first paragraph of Part III of the majority’s opinion, relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence at sentencing. I do not agree, however, with the remainder of the majority’s opinion or with that portion of the judgment directing that the new trial be conducted in accordance with the majority’s opinion.
*97I.
The basis for the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s conviction was the court’s holding that the State had violated Maryland Rule 4-263(b)(2) by failing to disclose the defendant’s statement made to Detective Young. The first question presented in the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari was as follows:
“1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in concluding that Maryland’s discovery rule requires the State to disclose, upon defense request, statements made by the defendant to an undercover police officer during the commission of a crime, where evidence of that crime is offered as ‘other crimes’ evidence at the defendant’s trial?”
The majority deals with this issue in Part II of its opinion.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Jennings v. State, 303 Md. 72, 86-88, 492 A.2d 295, 302-303 (1985), I disagree with Part II of the majority’s opinion in this case. Furthermore, even if I had agreed with the Court’s holding in Jennings, I would dissent from the majority’s expansion of the Jennings holding in this case. As Judge Bishop pointed out for the Court of Special Appeals below (Brown v. State, 85 Md.App. 523, 532, 584 A.2d 164, 169 (1991)),
“[rnjoreover, ... Jennings concerned] statements made to State agents during the commission of the crime on trial, and not statements made during subsequent crimes.
“The case sub judice does not fall within the limited ... Jennings exclusion [ ]. The plain reading of Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2) requires the disclosure of ‘all statements’ made to State agents. ... Jennings ... excluded the ‘obvious’ statements in any illegal drug sale, the verbal acts necessary to effect a transaction. In ... Jennings the statements were negotiations for the purchase of illegal drugs. Further, the excluded verbal acts formed the crime for which the defendant was standing trial. To ensure that the accused will have the opportunity to *98prepare a defense free from unfair surprise, we will strictly construe every limitation upon Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2). Only those statements that pertain directly to verbal acts necessary to effect the commission of the crime for which the defendant is accused are excluded from Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2). Appellant’s statement was an extraneous remark made at the conclusion of a sale of cocaine conducted almost three weeks after the alleged transaction for which the defendant was on trial. It was discoverable under Md.Rule 4-263(b)(2), and should have been produced in response to the defendant’s request.”
II.
While the Court of Special Appeals ruled that the discovery violation was “dispositive of the appeal,” the intermediate appellate court “for the direction of the court on retrial ... responded]” to the defendant’s contention that the evidence concerning the March 7,1988, drug transaction was inadmissible “other crimes” evidence. The majority disagrees with the Court of Special Appeals’ suggestion that all of this evidence is inadmissible, and the majority feels “compelled to correct the intermediate appellate court’s instructions.” Maj. at 87-88.
The majority asserts that Brown’s statement during the March 7, 1988, transaction “was admissible because it had special relevance to a contested issue in this case, was not introduced simply to prove criminal character, and had probative force that substantially outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice.” Maj. at 86-87. In my view the Court of Special Appeals was justified in concluding that the evidence of the March 7th drug transaction was inadmissible under the rule which generally excludes evidence of other crimes or misconduct.
As acknowledged by the majority opinion, this Court in Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490, 597 A.2d 956 (1991), reaffirmed that other crimes evidence “is generally not admissible ... [unless] the evidence 1) has special relevance, i,e. *99is substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case and is not offered simply to prove criminal character, and 2) has probative value that substantially outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice____” Harris v. State, supra, 324 Md. at 500, 597 A.2d at 961. Moreover, we “conclude[d] that continued adherence to the ‘exclusionary’ approach [to other crimes evidence] is appropriate,” 324 Md. at 494-495, 597 A.2d at 959. Finally, we stated in Harris that “[t]he so-called exceptions [to the exclusionary rule] are helpful as classifications of those areas where evidence has most often been found admissible even though it discloses other bad conduct ...,” 324 Md. at 497-498, 597 A.2d at 960.
The majority engages in the Harris two-step analysis first by asserting, without explanation, that the evidence has special relevance. It then conducts the requisite balancing and concludes that the evidence is admissible. The majority makes no attempt to demonstrate the special relevance by reference to any of the categories of exceptions to the general exclusionary rule developed by our previous cases. See, e.g., State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 556-557, 489 A.2d 1119, 1122-1123 (1985); Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-670, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (1976).
In fact, somewhat inconsistently, the majority agrees with the Court of Special Appeals that the evidence concerning the March 7, 1988, incident does not fall within the modus operandi subset of the identity exception to the other crimes rule (maj. at 87). Yet no explanation is offered to demonstrate the special relevance of this evidence except that "Brown’s explanation of how he conducted his ongoing business was probative of how he conducted the same business 2V2 weeks earlier during the sale here charged.” (Maj. at 88). This seems to be part of the reasoning underlying the identity or modus operandi exception to the rule precluding evidence of other crimes. See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 638-640, 552 A.2d 896, 899-901 (1989). Furthermore, the only “special relevance” asserted by the State at trial, in the Court of Special Appeals, and in *100this Court, was that the evidence fell within the identity exception.
This Court in State v. Faulkner, supra, 314 Md. at 637-640, 552 A.2d at 899-900, discussed in detail the identity exception to the rule excluding other crimes evidence. The Court set forth ten subsets of the exception, one of which was “that a peculiar modus operandi used by the defendant on another occasion was used by the perpetrator of the crime on trial.” 314 Md. at 638, 552 A.2d at 900. As the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, the modus operandi subset is the obvious one involved in the present case. In fact, it is the statement by the defendant to Detective Young describing the defendant’s method of doing business, i.e., his modus operandi, that furnishes a basis for the State’s attempt to have the evidence concerning the March 7, 1988, drug transaction admitted under the identity exception to the other crimes exclusionary rule.
The majority’s rationale suggesting the admissibility of this other crimes evidence is unclear. If the majority is saying that the modus operandi or identity exception to the rule precluding other crimes evidence can be demonstrated in several ways, such as by the evidence of the common pattern offered in State v. Faulkner, supra, or by a description of how the defendant usually conducts business similar to that offered in this case, I would not disagree in principle.1 But, if the majority actually agrees *101with the Court of Special Appeals that this evidence does not fall within the modus operandi exception, I cannot comprehend how this evidence has special relevance. If the majority’s opinion is taken literally, it is internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent with our prior cases involving the rule precluding other crimes evidence and the exceptions to that rule. See Harris v. State, supra; State v. Faulkner, supra, 314 Md. 630, 552 A.2d 896; Ross v. State, supra, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680.
For the foregoing reasons, I would simply affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

. I note that the evidence offered here falls short of the requirements of modus operandi. The Faulkner opinion set forth the requirements for the modus operandi subset of the identity exception as follows (314 Md. at 638, 552 A.2d at 900, quoting McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 613, 375 A.2d 551, 556 (1977), quoting C. McCormick, Evidence § 190, at 479 (2d ed. 1972):
"In order to establish modus operandi, the other crimes must be ' "so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused____ The device [used to commit the crime] must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.””’
In Faulkner, the defendant had committed three armed robberies of Safeway stores, all on Friday nights, using a distinctive mask, gloves and bag each time, and jumping on the check-out stand each time, demanding large denomination bills. The facts of the instant case. *101involving testimony of one other drug transaction and the defendant’s statement that he does not deal with anybody new, can be distinguished from Faulkner. The mere statement in this case concerning how the defendant does business is not sufficient to show a modus operandi within the meaning of Faulkner. Despite the statement to Detective Young on March 7, 1988, about how the defendant does business, the defendant in fact dealt face to face with Detective Young on that day. His actions seem to negate his admission about how he usually conducts his business.