Court Opinion

ID: 9696687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:55:20.432644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:25.533194
License: Public Domain

White,, C. J.,
concurring.
I concur in the above opinion as to the result reached and the analysis of the evidence supporting the holding. I do not agree with the statement in the opinion or the *367syllabus relating to the applicable rule as to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to make a jury case.
The syllabus and opinion state that before a jury may consider an issue of negligence based on circumstantial evidence, not only the evidence must be such that a reasonable inference may be drawn showing negligence, but that “such inference is the only one that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule stated and followed in this opinion comes originally from the pronouncement in Blid v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 89 Neb. 689, 131 N. W. 1027, wherein it was stated that circumstantial evidence, sufficient for jury determination, must be such that “the conclusion reached is the only one that can be fairly and reasonably drawn therefrom.” (Emphasis supplied.) I submit that the above rule and holding in the Blid case were overruled and rejected in Davis v. Dennert, 162 Neb. 65, 75 N. W. 2d 112. The court held that the rule followed in civil cases should be that stated in Rocha v. Payne, 108 Neb. 246, 187 N. W. 804; Markussen v. Mengedoht, 132 Neb. 472, 272 N. W. 241; Taylor v. J. M. McDonald Co., 156 Neb. 437, 56 N. W. 2d 610; Shields v. County of Buffalo, 161 Neb. 34, 71 N. W. 2d 701; and Griess v. Borchers, 161 Neb. 217, 72 N. W. 2d 820.
There was a diversity of opinion on this point in the cases before Davis v. Dennert, supra, as that opinion points out. And, admittedly, there has been some deviation since Davis v. Dennert, supra.
It is not the purpose of this concurrence to go into a full discussion of the conflict of the cases in this respect and the considerations that bear on the merits of it. See, 32 C. J. S., Evidence, § 1039, pp. 1102, 1103; 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, § 1189, p. 1043, notes 12 to 15, and also a fine annotation in 97 Am. S. R. 821 (1904).
The error of the stated rule is that it excludes from jury consideration every other rational inference that can reasonably be drawn from purely circumstantial evidence. It does not permit choice by the jury. We *368have said many times that reasonable men may differ as to the reasonable inferences to be drawn from evidence, circumstantial or direct. I submit that after a determination on the part of the court that different reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is then for the jury to determine, as weigher of the facts, by a preponderance of the evidence, which of the reasonable inferences is chosen. In a criminal case, this choice by the jury must be beyond a reasonable doubt and must exclude all other rational inferences or hypotheses.
If we apply the rule literally as stated in the majority opinion, what is there left for jury determination in a case where all of the evidence is undisputed and circumstantial? Is jury function eroded to mere credibility determination? We have said many times that where the facts adduced to sustain an issue, either by circumstantial or direct evidence, are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question, as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.