Court Opinion

ID: 9555750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 00:00:48.042062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:59.620440
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 21-2632
JEFFREY CHAITOFF,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.,
                                                 Defendant-Appellee.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 1:18-cv-7259 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
                     ____________________

   ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 14, 2023
               ____________________

   Before HAMILTON, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. In a nation of 330 million people, bil-
lions of pieces of credit information are generated each year.
Mistakes in compiling and reporting that information are in-
evitable. Jeﬀrey Chaitoﬀ sued under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act alleging that Experian made a mistake when it omitted a
fact from his credit report, then failed to correct its error.
Chaitoﬀ signed an agreement with his mortgage lender that
allowed him to make lower payments and avoid foreclosure.
2                                                    No. 21-2632

Rather than report the agreement, Chaitoﬀ’s credit report said
that he was delinquent.
    The district court determined that any dispute about the
agreement’s existence or eﬀect was a legal dispute, meaning
Experian was immune from FCRA liability for any errors re-
lated to it. We disagree. First, we hold that the omission of
material information is actionable under the FCRA. Second,
we hold that reporting the existence of the agreement did not
involve the application of law to facts, so was not a legal error.
We reverse the district court’s conclusion otherwise.
     The district court also concluded that Experian’s handling
of the situation was reasonable across the board, thus entitling
it to summary judgment on alternative grounds. We disagree
in part. Experian’s initial reporting eﬀorts were reasonable be-
yond any doubt, so it earned summary judgment on that
claim, and we aﬃrm that portion of the district court’s judg-
ment. But we disagree with the district court as to Experian’s
investigations after Chaitoﬀ alerted it to the discrepancy.
A reasonable jury could ﬁnd that there was a cost-eﬀective
step Experian could have taken that would have discovered
the agreement’s existence.
    Finally, we agree with Chaitoﬀ that Experian failed to note
his dispute in later reports, as the FCRA requires. We there-
fore aﬃrm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                I
   Consumers borrow money to fund expenses large and
small. Deciding who gets credit and on what terms falls to
what we will call furnishers—most people know them as
lenders or creditors. To facilitate their lending decisions,
No. 21-2632                                                    3

furnishers rely on credit reports generated by consumer re-
porting agencies, or CRAs. Furnishers send CRAs infor-
mation about consumers’ income, assets, liabilities, and pay-
ment history. CRAs then compile those data into standard-
ized reports and, in many cases, distill it to a number—a
credit score—that aﬀects whether, how much, and on what
terms a consumer can borrow. Because furnishers give credit
reports and scores extraordinary weight, they underpin the
national economy, and are thus the subject of federal legisla-
tion.
                               A
    Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act, codiﬁed
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., “to ensure fair and accurate credit
reporting, promote eﬃciency in the banking system, and pro-
tect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 52 (2007). To accomplish those goals, the FCRA tries to en-
sure that “consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for
the consumer’s right to privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
   One of the FCRA’s cornerstones is § 1681e, which de-
mands that CRAs “follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning
the individual about whom the report relates.” Accuracy is
not deﬁned in the statute, but it has long been understood that
“accuracy” encompasses both truth and completeness—a re-
port that is misleading or materially incomplete is inaccurate.
E.g., Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 39−42 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Seamans v. Temple Univ., 744 F.3d 853, 865 (3d Cir.
2014).
4                                                  No. 21-2632

    When a consumer contends that his credit report is inac-
curate or incomplete, he can dispute his report with the CRA
that prepared it. The CRA is then obligated to conduct a “rea-
sonable reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed in-
formation is inaccurate,” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A), consider-
ing “[a]ll relevant information submitted by the consumer.”
Id. § 1681i(a)(4). “If the reinvestigation does not resolve the
dispute,” § 1681i(b) allows a consumer to “ﬁle a brief state-
ment setting forth the nature of the dispute.” If a consumer
elects to do so, “unless there is reasonable grounds to believe
that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting
agency shall, in any subsequent consumer report containing
the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by
the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or
a clear and accurate codiﬁcation or summary thereof.” Id.
§ 1681i(c). Negligent violations of these provisions are action-
able under § 1681o; willful violations carry additional penal-
ties and are actionable under § 1681n.
                               B
    Jeﬀrey Chaitoﬀ bought a home in 1995. He reﬁnanced his
mortgage through Ocwen Loan Servicing in 2012. When he
lost his job in 2016, Chaitoﬀ fell behind on his payments, and
Ocwen began reporting the delinquency. Chaitoﬀ remained
at least six months behind from October 2016 until August
2017. Throughout that period, Chaitoﬀ tried diﬀerent things
to avoid foreclosure. First, Chaitoﬀ entered into an unemploy-
ment forbearance plan in August 2016 that allowed him to
make very low payments to avoid foreclosure. Then, in April
2017, Ocwen sent Chaitoﬀ an oﬀer to enter into a Trial Period
Plan (TPP). If Chaitoﬀ completed the Plan, his monthly
No. 21-2632                                                  5

payment would be reduced and his account would be
brought current—that is, he would no longer be delinquent.
    To adopt the Plan, Chaitoﬀ had to make three reduced
payments, one in each of May, June, and July 2017. Those pay-
ments, in turn, would be credited to his most delinquent
months. In other words, although Chaitoﬀ would write
checks in May, June, and July, he would not be making those
months’ payments because the funds would be applied to his
oldest delinquencies. Critically for our purposes, the Plan
documents made clear that Ocwen “would continue to report
the delinquency status of [Chaitoﬀ’s] loan to credit reporting
agencies as well as [his] entry into a Trial Period Plan in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act and the Consumer Data Industry Association require-
ments.” Ocwen warned Chaitoﬀ that entering into a Plan, es-
pecially if he was current on his payments, could adversely
aﬀect his credit score. Chaitoﬀ accepted Ocwen’s oﬀer, made
the Plan’s three reduced payments, and his loan was modiﬁed
accordingly. Chaitoﬀ eventually sold the home.
    Chaitoﬀ tried to obtain a mortgage to purchase another
home but was denied. A would-be lender informed him that
his denial was based on information in a credit report pre-
pared by Experian—one of the three major CRAs. When
Chaitoﬀ requested his Experian report, he discovered what he
believed were errors in his ﬁle related to his Ocwen mortgage:
His report noted that he was delinquent until August 2017,
and it never mentioned the TPP.
6                                               No. 21-2632

   Chaitoﬀ ﬁrst disputed those errors with Experian in May
2018. His dispute letter stated:
      The Ocwen trade line on my credit report is re-
      porting inaccurate, false, and misleading infor-
      mation. … As you can see from the attached
      documentation, in April 2017, the loan was
      modified after I came upon financial hardship,
      and my monthly payments were decreased.
                             ***
      Since the modification, and agreed decrease in
      amount due, I made each monthly payment on
      time consistently throughout 2017. In accord-
      ance with the modification agreement and my
      timely payments, the trade line should reflect
      that the payments were made timely. The fail-
      ure to report this information is misleading
      lenders into believing that I did not make pay-
      ments throughout 2017.
                             ***
      Please also review the attached April 17, 2018
      letter stating that my modification payments
      were being made timely. As you can see, there
      is reason to believe Ocwen is reporting errone-
      ously.
Chaitoﬀ attached Ocwen’s conﬁrmation that his “trial pay-
ments for the modiﬁcation were completed on time. The due
dates were May 1, 2017, June 1, 2017, and July 1, 2017.”
Chaitoﬀ also attached Ocwen’s original TPP oﬀer letter, but
he did not attach the TPP’s complete terms.
No. 21-2632                                                      7

    Experian processed the dispute through its Automated
Consumer Dispute Veriﬁcation (ACDV) system, which trans-
mitted Chaitoﬀ’s letter and attachments to Ocwen. See
§ 1681i(a)(2)(A) (requiring CRAs to transmit “all relevant in-
formation regarding the dispute” that it receives from the
consumer to the furnisher). Ocwen conﬁrmed that Experian’s
reporting was correct—it reported that Chaitoﬀ was six
months behind from January through July 2017. Experian
then reported the results to Chaitoﬀ and stood by its original
reporting.
    Chaitoﬀ ﬁled a substantially similar dispute letter in July
2018. He maintained that he “made each monthly payment on
time consistently throughout 2017.” Experian did the same
thing it did the ﬁrst time: sent an ACDV request to Ocwen,
which conﬁrmed exactly what it had reported all along. In
2019, Ocwen asked that the account be deleted from Chaitoﬀ’s
report.
                                C
    Chaitoﬀ then sued Experian alleging violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act. Chaitoﬀ made three claims. First, he al-
leged that Experian negligently and willfully failed to follow
reasonable procedures to ensure the maximum possible accu-
racy of its reports, in contravention of § 1681e(b). Second,
Chaitoﬀ alleged that Experian negligently and willfully failed
to reasonably reinvestigate the accuracy of its reporting after
his letters alerted it to the potential errors, in contravention of
§ 1681i(a). Finally, Chaitoﬀ alleged that Experian failed to in-
clude a statement of dispute in its subsequent reporting ex-
plaining Chaitoﬀ’s view that his Ocwen loan should be re-
ported, in contravention of § 1681i(c).
8                                                  No. 21-2632

     Experian moved for summary judgment, contending that
its reporting was accurate. It argued that the existence and ef-
fect of Chaitoﬀ’s TPP were both legal questions beyond its
competency to resolve. Even if its reporting were inaccurate,
Experian argued that it was entitled to summary judgment
because its policies and reinvestigation were both reasonable
beyond dispute. Experian’s ﬁnal argument was that Chaitoﬀ
hadn’t demonstrated any harm from the purported inaccura-
cies.
    The district court granted Experian’s motion. It concluded
that there was nothing inaccurate about Experian’s report be-
cause Chaitoﬀ’s dispute was with how Ocwen had reported
the TPP. The district court reasoned that Chaitoﬀ’s gripe was
“about the legal accuracy of his loan modiﬁcation, but not the
factual accuracy.” And since the FCRA does not require Ex-
perian to evaluate unadjudicated legal defenses to consum-
ers’ debts, there was nothing inaccurate about the report Ex-
perian prepared. The district court alternatively concluded
that the reasonableness of Experian’s procedures and reinves-
tigation was beyond dispute, thus entitling it to summary
judgment despite any inaccuracy. The district court said noth-
ing about Chaitoﬀ’s third claim. Nor did the district court
reach Experian’s third argument (about harm), so we say no
more on the subject. Chaitoﬀ sought reconsideration, which
the district court denied. This timely appeal follows.
                               II
    We give no deference to a district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment. And like the district court, we view the facts
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here,
Chaitoﬀ.
No. 21-2632                                                      9

    A CRA’s liability under both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i(a) de-
pends on inaccurate information—if the credit report is accu-
rate, the consumer has suﬀered no damages. See DeAndrade v.
Trans Union LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 66−68 (1st Cir. 2008); Chuluunbat
v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 4 F.4th 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A
threshold requirement for claims under both sections is that
there must be an inaccuracy in the consumer’s credit report.”).
Chaitoﬀ argues that his Experian report was inaccurate in two
ways.
    First Chaitoﬀ argues that Experian’s report was inaccurate
because it reported his Ocwen mortgage as delinquent in
May, June, and July 2017. We disagree. The TPP’s terms stated
that Chaitoﬀ’s account would be reported delinquent until
the TPP’s conditions were satisﬁed and that his payments un-
der the TPP would be applied to his most-delinquent months.
Although Chaitoﬀ may have sent Ocwen payments in each of
May, June, and July 2017, those payments were applied to ear-
lier delinquent months in accordance with the TPP’s terms.
Experian’s reporting of those three months as delinquent was
accurate beyond any doubt. The district court recognized as
much, and we agree. We therefore aﬃrm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment as it relates to Experian’s report-
ing of the May, June, and July 2017 payments.
    Chaitoﬀ fares better on his second alleged inaccuracy—the
omission of his TPP from his credit report. The district court
granted summary judgment after concluding that Experian
could not be liable for omitting Chaitoﬀ’s TPP from its report-
ing. After taking a fresh look, we disagree. Chaitoﬀ alleged
(1) an inaccuracy in his credit report that (2) adversely af-
fected his creditworthiness and (3) was within the compe-
tency of a CRA to identify and correct. We take each in turn.
10                                                    No. 21-2632

                                 A
    Experian concedes that the omission of material infor-
mation can render technically accurate information mislead-
ing and, thus, actionable under the FCRA. It is right to do so.
Courts have long understood that, when it comes to the
FCRA, “accurate” means more than just “technically correct.”
E.g., Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1984). But somehow we have never resolved whether an omis-
sion constitutes an inaccuracy under § 1681e(b) and
§ 1681i(a). We avoided the question in Henson v. CSC Credit
Services, 29 F.3d 280, 285 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994), but can no longer
do so: A credit report is inaccurate under § 1681e(b) and
§ 1681i(a) if it omits accurate information that could reasona-
bly be expected to adversely aﬀect a consumer’s creditworthi-
ness. (In the interest of brevity, at times we refer in this section
only to § 1681e(b); the analysis and conclusions are the same
as to § 1681i(a).)
    We recently adopted this materially misleading standard
for another of the FCRA’s provisions, § 1681s-2, which gov-
erns furnishers’ responsibilities when reporting information
to CRAs. In Frazier v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 72 F.4th 769
(7th Cir. 2023), we held that to sue under that section, a con-
sumer must show that his report was “(1) patently incorrect,
or (2) materially misleading, including by omission.” Id. at
776. We added that, “[b]y materially misleading, we mean
‘misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be
expected to adversely aﬀect credit decisions.’” Id. (quoting
Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir.
1998)). In adopting that standard, Frazier joined us with every
other circuit to consider the question. Id. at 776 n.5 (collecting
cases).
No. 21-2632                                                     11

    But Experian is not a furnisher, so § 1681s-2 is, by its own
terms, inapplicable. Chaitoﬀ’s claims against Experian is un-
der § 1681e(b), and the text of the two sections diﬀer. Sec-
tion 1681s-2 at times uses “incomplete or inaccurate.” E.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(E). Section 1681e, on the other hand,
speaks only in terms of “maximum possible accuracy.” One
might draw the inference, then, that accuracy and complete-
ness are diﬀerent, and that § 1681e is thus unconcerned with
omissions.
    We think not. While we acknowledge the textual diﬀer-
ences between § 1681s-2 and § 1681e, those diﬀerences do not
compel a rule allowing CRAs oﬀ the hook for omitting mate-
rial facts. Frazier and its counterparts addressing § 1681s-2 de-
ﬁne accuracy by reference to cases addressing § 1681e(b). See,
e.g., Gorman v. Wolpoﬀ & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1163
(9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1681s-2 case citing Sepulvado, 158 F.3d at 895,
a § 1681e(b) case); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d
876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010); Chiang v. Verizon New Eng. Inc., 595
F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2010) (treating “inaccurate” in § 1681i(a)
“essentially the same” as “incomplete or inaccurate” in
§ 1681s-2(b)). The Fourth Circuit recognized the overlap in
analysis and results:
       Although the majority of cases involve the duty
       of a CRA to report accurately under § 1681e,
       BB & T concedes that the same standard of ac-
       curacy applies to a furnisher’s response under
       § 1681s-2. Both § 1681e and § 1681s-2 serve the
       same purpose: ensuring accuracy in consumer
       credit reporting. A CRA can best fulfill its obli-
       gation to report accurately under § 1681e if it
12                                                  No. 21-2632

       receives accurate information from a furnisher
       under § 1681s-2.
Saunders v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. of Va., 526 F.3d 142, 148
n.3 (4th Cir. 2008). To be sure, courts cannot engage in textual
adverse possession, relying on a practice of misreading a stat-
ute to justify continued deviation from plain text. But the text
of § 1681e(b) is far from plain. The FCRA never deﬁnes “accu-
racy,” let alone “maximum possible accuracy.” Like our sister
circuits, we look to context to give meaning to the text of
§ 1681e(b). And however ambiguous the text may be, the con-
text is clear: material omissions render a credit report inaccu-
rate.
    One of the earliest cases to recognize the need to treat ma-
terial omissions as inaccuracies was Alexander v. Moore & As-
sociates, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948 (D. Haw. 1982). There, the court
explained the diﬀerence between “accurate” and “maximum
possible accuracy” by reference to a credit report stating that
a consumer was “involved” in a credit card scam without not-
ing that the consumer was a victim of the scam. Id. at 952. That
the consumer was a victim of a scam creates an impression
that is the polar opposite of that created by the statement that
she was “involved” in a scam. For a statute designed to pro-
mote accuracy, false impressions can be just as damaging as
false information. E.g., Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d
688, 709−10 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Congress surely did not intention-
ally weave an exception into the fabric of the FCRA that
would destroy its remedial scheme by allowing a credit re-
porting agency to escape responsibility for its carelessness
whenever misleading information ﬁnds its way into a credit
report through the agency of a third party.”). Section
1681i(a)(5)(A) conﬁrms this understanding; it requires CRAs
No. 21-2632                                                   13

to delete information if its reasonable reinvestigation of a dis-
pute ﬁnds the information “inaccurate or incomplete” (empha-
sis added). For the FCRA to make sense, then, “accuracy” un-
der § 1681e(b) must encompass both truthfulness and com-
pleteness. The alternative rule—that omissions are not action-
able—would dilute § 1681e(b)’s command for “maximum
possible accuracy” to a request for “minimal technical accu-
racy.” Thus, a credit report that creates a materially mislead-
ing impression of the borrower’s creditworthiness through
the omission of accurate information is not accurate under
§ 1681e(b). Of course, an inaccuracy is a necessary, but not
suﬃcient, condition for holding a CRA liable under
§ 1681e(b). We hold only that, as with § 1681s-2, a material
omission satisﬁes that condition.
                               B
   All agree that Experian’s report said nothing about
Chaitoﬀ’s TPP. The question then becomes whether that
omission is material—whether it “can be expected to ad-
versely aﬀect credit decisions.” Frazier, 72 F.4th at 776. Ex-
perian does not meaningfully contest the premise. And for
good reason: it requires little imagination to see how the omis-
sion of a TPP might aﬀect a consumer’s creditworthiness.
    Say two debtors have identical credit reports showing pat-
terns of delinquent payments. Neither is likely to obtain credit
on favorable terms, if at all. Now imagine one of the debtors
completed a TPP with her creditors, but that fact is not re-
ported in her credit ﬁle. The debtor without the TPP has no
evidence that she can make timely and complete payments,
but the debtor who completed the TPP does. The Sixth Circuit
recognized as much. Reporting that a consumer “was delin-
quent on his loan payments without reporting the TPP
14                                                    No. 21-2632

implies a much greater degree of ﬁnancial irresponsibility.”
Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., 901 F.3d 619, 639 (6th Cir. 2018).
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the ﬂip side of this rule in
Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1318−19 (11th Cir.
2018):“[I]t was not misleading for Wells Fargo to report that
[the plaintiﬀ] was not making payments under the Note as
agreed, particularly in light of Wells Fargo’s additional state-
ment that [the plaintiﬀ] was paying under a partial payment
agreement.” Because a TPP gives potential furnishers more
accurate information on a consumer’s creditworthiness, omit-
ting it precludes “maximum possible accuracy.”
                                C
    After clearing the ﬁrst two hurdles, Chaitoﬀ’s § 1681e(b)
and § 1681i(a) claim stumbled on the third. The district court
determined that Chaitoﬀ’s dispute “lies with Ocwen about
their reporting to Experian of his loan modiﬁcation.” From
this premise, the district court determined that Chaitoﬀ’s
claim is “about the legal accuracy of his loan modiﬁcation, but
not the factual accuracy.” We disagree. The existence of a TPP
is a factual, not legal, question within the competency of a
CRA to identify and correct.
   We have long held that CRAs are not well suited to adju-
dicate legal defenses to a debt, so they are not liable for re-
porting information that may be legally inaccurate. Put an-
other way, while “accuracy” may mean more than just “tech-
nically correct,” it never reaches beyond questions of fact.
   Although the line separating legal from factual questions
can be slippery, two of our recent opinions have sharpened it.
Denan v. Trans Union LLC, 959 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2020),
involved consumers who borrowed from Indian tribes at
No. 21-2632                                                   15

interest rates prohibited by state usury laws. Id. at 292−93.
They contended their credit reports were inaccurate because
they reported the debts even though the debts were (to their
minds) uncollectible (since they violated state law). Id. at 293.
We held that the alleged inaccuracies were legal, rather than
factual, because determining whether the debts were
enforceable required applying choice-of-law and sovereign-
immunity principles to an undisputed set of facts. Id. at 295.
“The power to resolve these legal issues exceeds the
competencies of consumer reporting agencies.” Id. Denan
reﬂects the classic case of a legal dispute: Everyone agreed
that the consumers borrowed the amounts reﬂected on their
credit reports, but the parties disputed whether the furnishers
could do anything about those debts. The CRA could not
resolve that dispute—only a court could. And since no
amount of investigation by the CRA could substitute for a
binding adjudication of the parties’ legal dispute, the CRA’s
reporting was accurate.
    In Chuluunbat v. Experian Information Solutions, 4 F.4th 562,
(7th Cir. 2021), consumers challenged the accuracy of their
credit reports by disputing to whom their debts were owed.
Id. at 564. We held that dispute to be legal. Id. at 565. “[A]s
with a pure challenge to a debt’s legal validity, the plaintiﬀs
here question the legal relationship of diﬀerent parties to
these debts, which is a task for a court.” Id. at 568. Chuluunbat
reaﬃrmed one of our seminal cases on the FCRA, Henson v.
CSC Credit Services, 29 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994), where we said
that CRAs could not be required “to go beyond the face of
numerous court records to determine whether they correctly
report the outcome of the underlying action.” Id. at 285. “Re-
quiring credit reporting agencies to look beyond the face of
every court document to ﬁnd the rare case when a document
16                                                 No. 21-2632

incorrectly reports the result of the underlying action would
be unduly burdensome and ineﬃcient.” Id. at 285−86. Without
notice from a consumer that a court document may be erro-
neous, a CRA “may rely on the accuracy of public court doc-
uments in preparing a credit report without being subject to
liability under the FCRA.” Id. at 286. Unstated but implicit in
Henson is that CRAs can read and understand legal docu-
ments.
     “The paradigmatic example of a legal dispute is when a
consumer argues that although his debt exists and is reported
in the right amount, it is invalid due to a violation of law.”
Chuluunbat, 4 F.4th at 567. In other words, legal disputes
amount to collateral attacks on the disputed debt. But while
“[t]aking notice of a previously resolved legal dispute in-
volves some knowledge of the legal impact of court decisions,
[ ] it does not require the consumer reporting agency to make
any legal determinations about the underlying claim.” Id. at
568.
    Whether Chaitoﬀ’s TPP existed is a factual question be-
cause Experian was not asked to apply law to facts. Nothing
in Chaitoﬀ’s complaint can be read to collaterally attack his
Ocwen mortgage. Rather, Chaitoﬀ asked that his credit report
reﬂect his TPP, something well within Experian’s capabilities.
It is, after all, a credit reporting agency. Nothing about
Chaitoﬀ’s alleged inaccuracy required Experian to investigate
beyond the face of the documents it was provided. Henson
held that CRAs act reasonably when they rely on legal docu-
ments of unquestioned authenticity. Chuluunbat recognized
the ﬂip side of the rule: a CRA might be liable if it ignores or
overlooks documents of unquestioned authenticity, even if
they relate to a legal dispute. Such is the case here. The
No. 21-2632                                                     17

existence of Chaitoﬀ’s TPP was a factual—not legal—dispute,
and the district court was wrong to conclude otherwise.
    We are not the ﬁrst to reach this conclusion. Pittman held
that “failing to report the existence of [a] TPP constitutes in-
complete reporting.” 901 F.3d at 639. Pittman involved a fur-
nisher’s, rather than a CRA’s, failure to report a TPP, and the
district court sought to distinguish Pittman along that line. It
narrowed Pittman to furnishers only: “Nothing in [Pittman]
could be construed to hold a consumer reporting agency lia-
ble for reporting accurate information regarding the TPP that
it received from the loan servicer.” That begs the question,
though. Whether a CRA is ultimately liable under § 1681e(b)
or § 1681i(a) is distinct from whether its reporting was accu-
rate. Experian tries to distinguish Mileva v. Trans Union, LLC,
No. 20-cv-123 2021 WL 1172704 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2021), on
the same grounds, but that opinion correctly recognized that
“the failure to report the existence of the Plan or the trial pe-
riod payments [can] create[] at least a triable issue of fact as to
whether the [CRA’s] credit report created a materially mis-
leading impression about Plaintiﬀ’s payment and credit his-
tory.” Id. at *7 (citing Pittman, 901 F.3d at 639). Given today’s
holding that a material omission is actionable under
§ 1681e(b) and § 1681s-2 alike, Mileva was prescient.
    While there may be a separate legal dispute about whether
the debtor in fact entered into a TPP with his furnisher, that is
not this case. See Brill v. TransUnion LLC, 838 F.3d 919 (7th Cir.
2016) (aﬃrming dismissal where consumer proposed that
CRA hire a handwriting expert to determine whether he
signed loan documents). Here, all agree that Chaitoﬀ entered
into a TPP and that Experian would have known about it
based on the documents Chaitoﬀ sent it. Given the FCRA’s
18                                                  No. 21-2632

command for maximal accuracy, the omission of Chaitoﬀ’s
TPP was a misleading factual inaccuracy that can give rise to
liability under § 1681e(b). The district court’s contrary conclu-
sion was incorrect. The FCRA may place diﬀerent investiga-
tive obligations on furnishers and CRAs, but the end goal is
the same: an accurate credit report. And a credit report that
omits a TPP is not accurate. We see no reason to treat a TPP
any diﬀerently than the myriad legal documents CRAs deal
with day in and day out.
    Experian argues that Chaitoﬀ never challenged the omis-
sion of the TPP from his credit report, but even a cursory
glance at his brieﬁng below and the district court’s opinion
shows that’s incorrect. We likewise reject Experian’s fallback
position on waiver—that Chaitoﬀ’s disputes should have
been more explicit about the alleged omission. The FCRA is a
remedial statute designed to protect consumers. See Sullivan
v. Greenwood Credit Union, 520 F.3d 70, 73 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008).
That Chaitoﬀ’s letters could have been clearer does not pre-
clude relief; it may make relief less likely given the statute’s
requirement for only “reasonable” procedures. But in the era
of notice pleading, Chaitoﬀ’s complaint alleging that Ex-
perian’s reporting of his Ocwen loan was “false, misleading,
and inaccurate” was more than enough to allow Experian to
defend itself. That it did so with the TPP’s own terms dispels
any notion of waiver.
                               III
    Even when inaccurate information makes its way into a
credit report, a CRA’s liability under both § 1681e(b) and
§ 1681i(a) turns on whether a CRA acted reasonably. Since
§ 1681e(b) asks whether a CRA adopted “reasonable proce-
dures to assure maximum possible accuracy,” summary
No. 21-2632                                                 19

judgment may be appropriate when a CRA adopted proce-
dures no jury could ﬁnd unreasonable. Similarly, § 1681i(a)
requires only “reasonable reinvestigations.” Chaitoﬀ alleges
that Experian neither enforced reasonable policies nor con-
ducted reasonable reinvestigations. We disagree with
Chaitoﬀ and agree with the district court that Experian’s pol-
icies were reasonable as a matter of law, so we aﬃrm its grant
of summary judgment as to Chaitoﬀ’s § 1681e(b) claim. But
we conclude that a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that, after being
put on notice of the alleged inaccuracy in Chaitoﬀ’s report,
Experian’s reinvestigations of his dispute were unreasonable.
We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment as to Chaitoﬀ’s § 1681i(a) claim.
                              A
    “The reasonableness of a reporting agency’s procedures is
normally a question for trial unless the reasonableness or un-
reasonableness of the procedures is beyond question.” Sarver
v. Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 2004). We
agree with the district court that Experian’s reliance on
Ocwen’s initial reporting was reasonable beyond dispute.
    Chaitoﬀ alleges a material omission from his credit report.
But to Experian, Chaitoﬀ’s TPP was an unknown unknown.
Without notice of the alleged omission, Experian had no rea-
son to suspect that Ocwen’s reporting was incomplete. Ocwen
is a major ﬁnancial institution, and Experian regularly relies
on its reporting. See Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972 (explaining that
requiring CRAs to engage in background research on infor-
mation furnished by ﬁnancial institutions would balloon the
costs of their services, which in turn would be passed to con-
sumers). Chaitoﬀ did not oﬀer any evidence suggesting that
Experian knew of the TPP based on the information Ocwen
20                                                  No. 21-2632

furnished or that there were systemic problems with Ocwen’s
data. Furnishers bear responsibility for accurately reporting
information to CRAs in the ﬁrst instance. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2; Denan, 959 F.3d at 294−95. Given Ocwen’s demon-
strated reliability, it was reasonable for Experian to trust that
Ocwen’s original information was complete and accurate. See
Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972 (CRA’s procedures not unreasonable
unless the agency has reason to believe a furnisher’s infor-
mation is unreliable); see also Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC,
995 F.3d 937, 945 n.6 (11th Cir. 2021) (aﬃrming summary
judgment under § 1681e(b) for reports prepared with reliable
information before CRA had notice of alleged inaccuracy).
    This is not to say that a material omission can never give
rise to liability under § 1681e(b). Whether a CRA’s procedures
are reasonable turns, predictably, on balancing the costs of a
marginal return to accuracy against the potential harm to con-
sumers from declining to incur those costs. See, e.g., Brill, 838
F.3d at 921 (“Forcing a credit reporting agency to hire a hand-
writing expert in every case of alleged forgery would impose
an expense disproportionate to the likelihood of an accurate
resolution of the dispute.”); Henson, 29 F.3d at 287 (“The credit
reporting agency’s duty will also depend on the cost of veri-
fying the accuracy of the source versus the possible harm in-
accurately reported information may cause the consumer.”);
cf. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947). But Chaitoﬀ never proposed an additional reasonable
measure Experian could have taken to detect the omission of
his TPP before he ﬂagged the issue; doing so might have
shown a dispute about the reasonableness of Experian’s cur-
rent procedures. Nor did Chaitoﬀ oﬀer evidence that Ex-
perian failed to follow its standard procedures in his case. On
the record before us, no jury could ﬁnd Experian’s procedures
No. 21-2632                                                  21

unreasonable, so we aﬃrm the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment as to Chaitoﬀ’s § 1681e(b) claim.
                               B
    When a consumer disputes an item in his credit report
with a CRA, the CRA’s ﬁrst step is to transmit that dispute to
the furnisher. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(2). The furnisher then in-
vestigates the consumer’s dispute and reports its ﬁndings to
the CRA. The CRA then must conduct a “reasonable reinves-
tigation” of the dispute. Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
    Chaitoﬀ argues that Experian did not reasonably reinves-
tigate either of his disputes. The district court rejected his
claims, concluding that Experian’s reinvestigations were rea-
sonable as a matter of law—that they were reasonable beyond
dispute. We disagree. On this record, a reasonable jury could
ﬁnd that either or both of Experian’s reinvestigations were
unreasonable. This is not to say that Experian cannot pre-
vail—only that reasonable juries might diﬀer.
    While Experian might not be liable for failing to notice the
missing TPP in the ﬁrst place, “[a] credit reporting agency that
has been notiﬁed of potentially inaccurate information in a
consumer’s credit report is in a very diﬀerent position than
one who has no such notice.” Henson, 29 F.3d at 286. Since rea-
sonableness is a question of costs and beneﬁts, “[w]hen a
credit reporting agency receives such notice, it can target its
resources in a more eﬃcient manner and conduct a more thor-
ough investigation.” Id. at 286−87. Thus, reasonable proce-
dures under § 1681e(b) are not proof of a reasonable reinves-
tigation under § 1681i(b). See id.; Cushman v. Trans Union
Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (recognizing that, be-
cause § 1681i(a)’s reinvestigation requirement mandates a
22                                                  No. 21-2632

more thorough investigation than § 1681e(b), a CRA’s liability
under the two sections may diverge depending on the facts).
“Although the parameters of a reasonable investigation will
often depend on the circumstances of a particular dispute, it
is clear that a reasonable reinvestigation must mean more
than simply including public documents in a consumer report
or making only a cursory investigation into the reliability of
information that is reported to potential creditors.” Cortez v.
Trans Union LLC, 617 F.3d 688, 713 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Cush-
man, 115 F.3d at 225).
    The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Col-
lins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 775 F.3d 1330 (11th
Cir. 2015). There, Experian used the Automated Consumer
Dispute Veriﬁcation process to verify a furnisher’s infor-
mation, but it conducted no independent investigation of the
consumer’s dispute. Id. at 1331−33. The Eleventh Circuit af-
ﬁrmed that “an issue of material fact remained as to whether
Experian’s investigation was reasonable when it disregarded
the … information [the consumer] provided and instead re-
lied solely on [the furnisher] to verify the debt.” Id. at 1333.
    The Eleventh Circuit reaﬃrmed Collins in Losch v. Nation-
star Mortgage, LLC, 995 F.3d 937 (11th Cir. 2021), which in-
volved a mortgage debt that at ﬁrst survived but was eventu-
ally extinguished by the consumer’s bankruptcy. Id. at 940−41.
Experian reported the debt long after the consumer earned
the fresh start that bankruptcy promises. After the consumer
alerted Experian to his fresh start, Experian resorted to the
ACDV process. Id. at 941. The once-creditor (incorrectly) con-
ﬁrmed that the debt was still owed, and Experian trusted it.
Id. The Eleventh Circuit vacated summary judgment in Ex-
perian’s favor on the plaintiﬀ’s § 1681i(a) claim. Id. at 940.
No. 21-2632                                                  23

Experian was not entitled to summary judgment as to the rea-
sonableness of its investigation because “[i]t did nothing, alt-
hough it easily could have done something with the infor-
mation that [the consumer] provided.” Id. at 946.
    So too here. There is a facial mismatch between the letter
Ocwen sent Chaitoﬀ and the ACDV response it sent to Ex-
perian. Ocwen’s letter to Chaitoﬀ stated that his trial pay-
ments were made on time and were due on the ﬁrst of May,
June, and July 2017; Ocwen’s ACDV response stated that
Chaitoﬀ was six-months delinquent in each of those months.
Once Experian had a copy of Chaitoﬀ’s TPP documents, it
could have cross-referenced them with Ocwen’s ACDV re-
sponse. Ocwen’s reporting was technically accurate, but Ex-
perian could not have known that at the time—it didn’t have
the portions of the TPP explaining that trial payments would
not be credited to the months in which they were made. Had
Experian asked Ocwen to explain the mismatch, Ocwen
might have reported the TPP’s existence. A reasonable jury
could conclude that Experian should have taken additional
steps to investigate the mismatch between Ocwen’s ACDV re-
sponse and its letter to Chaitoﬀ. Experian defends its resort to
the ACDV system alone by noting that Chaitoﬀ never pre-
sented proof of payment during the disputed months. That is
incorrect: Chaitoﬀ attached Ocwen’s letter conﬁrming that
timely payments were made in May, June, and July 2017.
Again, Experian could not know at the time—since it lacked
the TPP’s full terms—that those payments would not be cred-
ited in the months they were made. But Chaitoﬀ did present
evidence that he made timely payments in those months. A
reasonable jury could ﬁnd that Experian could have taken an-
other cost-eﬀective step that might have resolved Chaitoﬀ’s
dispute.
24                                                    No. 21-2632

     Experian’s second reinvestigation oﬀers Chaitoﬀ an even
stronger case. In response to Chaitoﬀ’s renewed complaint,
Experian repeated the same steps it took in response to his
ﬁrst dispute. It could not reasonably expect a diﬀerent out-
come. To be clear, a CRA’s reinvestigation does not have to
ﬁx the mistake to preclude liability—it need only be reasona-
ble. Still, a jury could ﬁnd that repeating the same ineﬀective
steps was not a reasonable response to Chaitoﬀ’s second let-
ter.
    A jury could not ﬁnd, however, that Experian willfully
failed to comply with § 1681i(a) with respect to its reinvesti-
gation of Chaitoﬀ’s ﬁrst dispute. Recall, the FCRA provides
diﬀerent remedies for negligent and willful violations by
CRAs. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (negligent); Id. § 1681n (willful).
Chaitoﬀ brought his claims under both theories. A willful vi-
olation is one committed in “reckless disregard of [its] statu-
tory duty.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 (2007).
Reckless conduct is that which creates a risk substantially
greater than that necessary to render the conduct negligent.
Id. at 69 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500); see
also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994) (discussing
“excessive,” “signiﬁcant,” “substantial,” and “intolerable”
risks). “But probability isn’t everything.” Boim v. Holy Land
Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 695 (7th Cir. 2008). Reck-
lessness also looks to the social utility (or lack thereof) of the
conduct at issue. Id.
    On this record, a jury could not ﬁnd that Experian will-
fully failed to undertake a reasonable reinvestigation of
Chaitoﬀ’s ﬁrst dispute. Chaitoﬀ’s claim, at its core, is that Ex-
perian failed to detect an omission. None of the facts Chaitoﬀ
oﬀers supports a ﬁnding that Experian was indiﬀerent to the
No. 21-2632                                                    25

harms Chaitoﬀ alleges. And it is uncontested that Experian
followed its normal procedures by transmitting Chaitoﬀ’s dis-
pute to Ocwen; it did not wholly ignore the dispute. Nor is
the discrepancy between Ocwen’s response and the docu-
ments Chaitoﬀ provided with his dispute letter so obvious
that Experian’s failure to pick up on it constitutes a gross de-
viation from what might be reasonable. Experian’s response
to Chaitoﬀ’s ﬁrst letter may have been negligent, but it was
not reckless. The record leaves no dispute that Experian was
entitled to summary judgment as to Chaitoﬀ’s willfulness
claim arising from his ﬁrst dispute letter.
                                 *
    We establish no hard and fast rules about what is or isn’t
a reasonable reinvestigation. Experian’s reinvestigations
might have been reasonable; they might not have been, too.
Likewise, the first might have been reasonable but the second
not. The reasonableness of a CRA’s reinvestigation is a ques-
tion for the jury unless reasonableness is beyond dispute. That
isn’t the case here, so we reverse the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Experian as to Chaitoff’s § 1681i(a)
claims. The district court did not address willfulness. As ex-
plained above, Experian is entitled to summary judgment as
to willfulness with respect to Chaitoff’s first dispute letter. On
remand, the district court is free to consider anew the ques-
tion of willfulness as to the second dispute letter.
                               IV
    A consumer may continue to believe that his credit report
contains a mistake even after a CRA undertakes a reasonable
reinvestigation of the purported mistake. To break that log-
jam, Congress enacted a provision that allows consumers to
add a “statement of dispute” to their credit reports—
26                                                No. 21-2632

§ 1681i(b). Those statements do not alter, but add to, the in-
formation provided by furnishers and transmitted to poten-
tial creditors. And because those statements can inform a con-
sumer’s creditworthiness, they help achieve the “maximum
possible accuracy” at the core of a CRA’s obligations. See Car-
valho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892 (9th Cir.
2010).
      If the reinvestigation [described in § 1681i(a)]
      does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may
      file a brief statement setting forth the nature of
      the dispute. The consumer reporting agency
      may limit such statements to not more than one
      hundred words if it provides the consumer with
      assistance in writing a clear summary of the dis-
      pute.
Section 1681i(c) operationalizes the preceding subsection by
requiring CRAs to “clearly note” nonfrivolous relevant dis-
putes in later reports “[w]henever a statement of a dispute is
ﬁled.” CRAs must note that the information “is disputed by
the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or
a clear and accurate codiﬁcation or summary thereof.” Id. Fail-
ure to comply with § 1681i(c) is an independent basis for lia-
bility.
    Chaitoﬀ alleges that Experian ignored his requests that
such a statement be added to his credit report to reﬂect his
understanding of the TPP, in violation of § 1681i(c). Ex-
perian’s defense—one the district court credited seemingly
without explanation—is that Chaitoﬀ never ﬁled a statement
of dispute in the ﬁrst place. Again, we disagree. Congress pre-
scribed no magic words a consumer must incant to request
the inclusion of a dispute statement.
No. 21-2632                                                    27

    The rights-creating language of § 1681i(b) is straightfor-
ward: “If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the
consumer may ﬁle a brief statement setting forth the nature of
the dispute.” Chaitoﬀ sent two letters to Experian explaining
his discontent with its reporting. The ﬁrst letter can’t trigger
§ 1681i(b) because that is what triggered Experian’s initial re-
investigation, and the statute only requires a statement of dis-
pute to be added if the reinvestigation “does not resolve the
dispute.” Experian could not know whether Chaitoﬀ believed
his dispute had been resolved until it heard back from him.
But it did, and Chaitoﬀ’s second letter satisﬁes § 1681i(b)’s
simple formulation. That was enough to trigger Experian’s
obligations to note the dispute under § 1681i(c).
    Experian leans on the use of the word “ﬁled” in § 1681i(c)
to suggest Chaitoﬀ had to do more. But what counts as
“more” Experian does not, or cannot, say. That alone is tell-
ing. Experian concedes that § 1681i(b) requires no magic
words. Still, it insists that the statute requires some formal no-
tice that the consumer wishes for his dispute to be reﬂected in
his report. We cannot square that assertion with its earlier
concession. Experian makes no model language or dedicated
form available to consumers. Neither Congress nor the Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau has undertaken such an ef-
fort. Nor is there a centralized system for ﬁling and distrib-
uting consumer disputes. None of this is surprising given the
remedial nature of the FCRA. See Cortez, 617 F.3d at 715 n.33
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Congress did not require that consumers sub-
mit disputes on speciﬁc forms, and any such technical re-
quirement seems inconsistent with the remedial focus of the
FCRA.”). All of this undermines Experian’s claim that “ﬁled”
can absolve it of liability under § 1681i(c) in this case.
28                                                  No. 21-2632

     To the extent Experian asks us to parse the word “ﬁled,”
we think it draws its meaning from the FCRA’s context and
purpose. Throughout the credit reporting industry, consum-
ers’ data are reported in “ﬁles.” See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(g)
(deﬁning “ﬁle” as “all of the information on that consumer
recorded and retained by a consumer reporting agency re-
gardless of how the information is stored”); § 1681i(a)(1)(A)
(describing “any item of information contained in a con-
sumer’s ﬁle” (emphasis added)). At the time of enactment, that
meant a physical ﬁle—Section 1681i(c) predates the internet
and most computerized data systems. Pub. L. 91-508 § 601, 84
Stat. 1114, 1132 (1970). Even today, we refer to computer
“ﬁles” stored in “folders.” The simplest reading of “ﬁled”
happens to be the best: Like every other piece of relevant in-
formation provided to it, the credit reporting agency places
the consumer’s statement of dispute in her ﬁle at the CRA, so
all a consumer needs to do is transmit that dispute to the CRA
in a reasonable fashion. Comparing § 1681i(c) to other provi-
sions reinforces that understanding. Other documents a con-
sumer submits, like a “notice of dispute,” see § 1681i(a), trig-
ger some action on the CRA’s part, but they are not neces-
sarily included in the consumer’s ﬁle for disclosure to pro-
spective furnishers. The statement of dispute, by contrast, re-
quires the CRA to do nothing other than include it in subse-
quent reporting. They may elect to shorten the statement or
seek clariﬁcation, but by the FCRA’s plain text, Experian
would have fulﬁlled its statutory obligations under § 1681i(c)
if it had copied Chaitoﬀ’s letter verbatim and included it in
later reports. Read alongside the FCRA’s other verbs and with
an eye towards the era of the FCRA’s enactment, “ﬁled” oﬀers
Experian neither the support nor illumination it hopes for.
No. 21-2632                                                   29

    Experian next argues that it provided Chaitoﬀ with all the
information he needed to clarify that he was ﬁling a statement
of dispute. It points to § 1681i(b)’s second sentence: “The con-
sumer reporting agency may limit such statements to not
more than one hundred words if it provides the consumer
with assistance in writing a clear summary of the dispute.”
But what a CRA may do in response to a statement of dispute
tells us nothing about what constitutes such a statement in the
ﬁrst place. Experian says that its responses to Chaitoﬀ’s letters
told him that he could ﬁle a statement of dispute if he wished.
Again, the FCRA contains no magic words requirement; Con-
gress placed the burden on CRAs to recognize a statement of
dispute and act accordingly. Chaitoﬀ’s letters provided more
than enough for Experian to fulﬁl its obligations. As best we
can tell, it simply chose not to. Finally, Experian suggests that
Chaitoﬀ had to propose the text of his own statement of dis-
pute—its proposed language is in its brief. This understand-
ing turns the language of § 1681i(b) on its head.
    After receiving Chaitoﬀ’s disputes, Experian had two op-
tions: it could include “either the consumer’s statement or a
clear and accurate codiﬁcation or summary thereof.”
§ 1681i(c) (emphases added). The onus was on Experian to
seek or author a clariﬁed version of Chaitoﬀ’s dispute if it be-
lieved his version was ambiguous or verbose.
                               V
    In sum, we hold that the omission of the TPP from
Chaitoﬀ’s credit report presents a factual question, not a legal
one. We also hold that it is disputable whether Experian’s re-
liance on an ACDV response that conﬂicted with other docu-
ments in its possession amounted to a reasonable reinvestiga-
tion. Finally, we hold that the FCRA’s statement-of-dispute
30                                                   No. 21-2632

provision does not require consumers to use any magic words
or speciﬁc form to request that such a statement be added to
her report. Rather, the burden rests with the CRA. It can either
accept a consumer’s statement of dispute as-is and add it to
her ﬁle, or it can initiate a collaborative process for synthesiz-
ing that statement into an accurate and complete synopsis of
the consumer’s concern.
    We aﬃrm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on Chaitoﬀ’s § 1681e(b) claim. But on the record before us,
there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ex-
perian’s reinvestigations were reasonable. We therefore re-
verse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
§ 1681i(a) and § 1681i(c) claims. The district court can struc-
ture the proceedings on remand as it sees ﬁt.
        AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED