Court Opinion

ID: 9689021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:16:40.375064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:27.817710
License: Public Domain

Krivosha,. C.J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. In the first instance, I have some difficulty concluding that the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury on a charge of aiding and abetting the possession of burglar’s tools. In my view, the evidence falls short of being sufficient to show the necessary knowledge on the part of the defendant to convict him of aiding and abetting the possession of burglar’s tools.
But that is not the basis upon which I find the greatest conflict between myself and the majority in this case. I believe that the tape offered in evidence purporting to consist of a conversation between Kulakofsky and Gitchell was not only inaudible in places but, where audible, was unintelligible insofar as it could in any way be interpreted to concern a conversation about the defendant. The difficulty with the majority’s position, as I view it, is twofold. I know of no basis upon which one may be an expert in the unintelligible. To be sure, there are experts with regard to the inaudible. The police *595officer in this case did not possess the necessary criteria to be considered an expert in discerning and sifting out inaudible sounds on a tape recording. Rather, he simply supplied the missing terms in order to make understandable what was otherwise an unintelligible sentence.
In Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 202 Neb. 300, 305-07, 275 N.W.2d 77, 81 (1979), we said: “That rule [§ 27-705], however, does not in and of itself permit anyone to qualify as an expert upon his own declaration or to render any opinion he desires.
“Before an expert opinion can be rendered, it must be shown that such opinion is of a scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge which will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and that the witness qualifies as such expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. § 27-702, R.R.S. 1943. There is no exact standard for fixing the qualifications of an expert or skilled witness. Mathine v. Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co., Inc., 189 Neb. 247, 202 N.W.2d 191. Such a witness will be deemed qualified if and only if he possesses special skill or knowledge respecting the subject matter involved so superior to that of men in general as to make his formation of a judgment a fact of probative value. Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601.
“The record is this case is totally devoid of any evidence that an expert in weather would attempt to render an opinion such as that sought to be tendered by appellant’s expert herein; or that the information relied upon by the expert was of such type that an expert on weather would rely upon such information in rendering an opinion. In the absence of such evidence we agree with the trial court that any opinion tendered by the expert in this case would be based on pure speculation and be solely without any basis or foundation.”
To the same effect, it would appear from the record herein that one does not become an expert on the unin*596telligible simply by having listened to a particular tape over 50 times. The evidence, as I view it, fails to establish that the officer in question had any more ability to understand the tapes than any other lay person. The simple fact of the matter is that the tape was clearly inadmissible and should have been excluded, based upon lack of foundation in addition to the fact that it was plain error to permit its introduction on the basis of hearsay.
The majority has in part resolved this problem by suggesting that the introduction of the tape, even if inadmissible, was harmless error due to the fact that there was sufficient other evidence to convict the accused. I do not believe we can say that the introduction of a tape which is apparently relied upon by the State for the purpose of establishing the credibility of a State’s witness where there is a conflict in the evidence can be considered as harmless error. We have no way of looking into the minds of the jury to determine what bit of evidence may have been the deciding factor. Certainly a tape purporting to be a discussion by the witnesses whose testimonies are in conflict is significant.
Though the accused may be guilty, he is nevertheless entitled to a fair trial. I am unable to say that the introduction of the tapes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Being unable to say that, I would have granted a new trial.
I am authorized to state that McCown, J., joins in this dissent.