Court Opinion

ID: 9525507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:04:27.493323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:11.477424
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. On this record the question whether defendant was one of the persons having “charge of the work” was for the jury. I find it anomalous that having consistently refused to define the term “having charge of” (Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 323; Warren v. Meeker, 55 Ill. 2d 108,111), and having refused to approve an instruction defining the term (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil No. 180.16 (2d ed. 1971) the majority, with almost equal consistency (see Van Dekerkhov v. City of Herrin, 51 Ill. 2d 374; Carruthers v. B. C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376), is so readily able to decide what it does not mean. The majority states: “Whether a defendant is a person ‘having charge of the work within the meaning of the Act is primarily a factual question. (Voss v. Kingdom and Naven, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 520, 525.) Since the term ‘having charge of is one of common usage and understanding, it has not been specifically defined by this court. (Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 323.) Moreover, we have not delimited those factors to be considered in any definition of the term. (Warren v. Meeker, 55 Ill. 2d 108, 111.) Nevertheless, before a defendant may be found to be in charge of the work, there must be a showing that he had some direct connection with the construction operations. (Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 324.) In addition, the defendant must have been in charge of the particular operations which involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose. Warren v. Meeker, 55 Ill. 2d 108, 111; Carruthers v. B. C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376, 378.” Unless this last statement means that one in overall charge also has charge of “the particular operations which involved the violation from which the alleged injury arose” it is clearly erroneous, finds no support in either Warren or Carruthers and states precisely the opposite of IPI Civil No. 180.02. In Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, the court said: “While it may be conceded that some of the decisions in this jurisdiction involving the Scaffold Act appear to have equated ‘having charge’ with ‘supervision and control’ in varying degrees, it is our opinion the language of the statute, and the legislative intent it reflects, do not permit the conclusion that the terms are the inflexible and unbending legal equivalent of the other. The term ‘having charge of’ is a generic term of broad import, and although it may include supervision and control, it is not confined to it. As was said of the word ‘charge’ in People v. Gould, 345 Ill. 288, 323: ‘The word does not necessarily include custody, control or restraint, and its meaning must be determined by the associations and circumstances surrounding its use. “To have charge of” does not necessarily imply more than to care for or to have the care of.’ Thus, while the actual exercise of supervision and control over the work and the persons doing it, or the retention of the right to so supervise and control, may be factors bearing on the ultimate factual question of whether an owner is ‘in charge,’ they are not necessary or conclusive factors, nor is either made a sine qua non for liability under the statute. Rather, consistent with its beneficent purpose of preventing injury to persons employed in the extra-hazardous occupation of structural work, the thrust of the statute is not confined to those who perform, or supervise, or control, or who retain the right to supervise and control, the actual work from which the injury arises, but, to insure maximum protection, is made to extend to owners and others who have charge of the erection or alteration of any building or structure.” 33 Ill. 2d 316, 321-22. The contract here involved does not support the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s supervisory duties were limited to determining “that the building when constructed meets the plans and specifications contracted for.” (65 Ill. 2d at 69.) The record shows that under the contract all work was to be done under defendant’s supervision, that defendant employed a full-time project inspector, and that the owner “upon the certificate of the Architect that sufficient cause exists to justify such action *** may *** terminate the employment of the contractor.” The contractor was required to observe the “safety provisions of applicable laws,” and under his authority to interpret the contract documents, defendant had the power to determine whether he was doing so. IPI Civil No. 180.02 provides: “Under the statute I have just read to you, it is possible for more than one person to ‘have charge of’ the work. One or more persons can have charge of the overall work, and other persons can have charge of the phase of the work in connection with which an injury occurs. In that event, all of them would ‘have charge of’ the work within the meaning of the statute. Who had charge of the work under the particular facts of this case is for you to decide.” The Committee Comment states: “More than one person may ‘have charge of’ the work. Both a person in charge of the overall work and a person in charge of a phase of the work may be liable under the Act.” Under Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, defendant could be a person “having charge of the work” and this record would support the finding that he had a “direct connection with the construction *** operations” (Larson at 324) and that he was in charge of the overall work.