Court Opinion

ID: 9462155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:33:11.431753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:25.756785
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
While I concur in Judge Moore’s handling of the prompt-disposition issue in this case, I think it appropriate to comment on an argument raised by the government, but not considered by Judge Moore. The government contends that Rule 5(a) could be used in this case to toll the running of the six-month period while state charges were pending against Oliver in the state of Michigan from October 13, 1972, to June 25, 1973. I disagree. As this issue has arisen in other cases and will surely be raised again, it may be helpful to meet it now.
Rule 5(a) provides for the exclusion of the time while proceedings concerning the defendant are pending.1 We had occasion to interpret this language in United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906, 909 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 904, 95 S.Ct. 188, 42 L.Ed.2d 149 (Oct. 22, 1974). There we held that the entire period of time during which a pri- or federal charge was pending in the same district against Cangiano could be excluded under Rule 5(a).2 Cangiano does not control this case, however, because we are here concerned with charges pending in different jurisdictions, not two federal charges in the same jurisdiction.
The prompt-disposition rules of the federal courts are designed to ensure that a federal defendant will receive a prompt trial on federal charges against him. Thus if only federal crimes in one district are involved, as in Cangiano, it is arguable that, even if the time an initial charge is pending is excluded in calculating the time by which the government must be ready to try a subsequent *261charge, the defendant will still receive a prompt trial on the later charge.3
The situation is quite different when, as here, the government seeks to use the pendency of state proceedings to excuse delay in the trial of a federal case. The federal courts ordinarily can do little to ensure that pending state charges are promptly tried. Since the disposition of criminal proceedings in state court may require far more than six months, Rule 5(a) must be read narrowly when the “proceedings pending” are in state court. Accordingly, except for the period when the defendant is actually on trial in a state court, I think that Rule 5(a) does not extend the time in which the government must be ready to try a federal defendant by that period of time during which state criminal proceedings are pending against that defendant, unless the government has made reasonable efforts to ensure the presence of the defendant.
This interpretation of the Prompt Disposition Plan is appropriate since the pendency of state criminal proceedings does not affect the federal government’s ability to try different charges in federal court, except insofar as the defendant may be in state custody and therefore unavailable. To ensure the speedy trial of federal defendants, it makes sense to require that the government be ready for trial within the normal six-month period envisioned by the Plan unless it shows that it has made diligent, but unsuccessful, efforts (see Rules 5(d) and 5(f)) to obtain a defendant’s presence for his federal trial.4

. Rule 5 provides in part:
“In computing the time within which the government should be ready for trial under rules 3 and 4, the following periods should be excluded:
“(a) The period of delay while proceedings concerning the defendant are pending, including but not limited to proceedings for the determination of competency and the period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, pretrial motions, interlocutory appeals, trial of other charges, and the period during which such matters are sub judice.”

. Cangiano did not pass on the question of whether the filing of a subsequent charge would toll the time by which the government had to be ready to try the initial charge.
If such time was excluded and a subsequent charge was filed within six months of the first charge, the government would not have to be ready to try the first charge until after disposition of the subsequent charge. At the same time application of the direct holding of Cangiano would mean that the government would not have to be ready to try the second charge until six months after the first charge was tried. By allowing the government to take advantage of both exclusions, the Plan could be nullified completely. Thus, a subsequent charge should not be allowed to toll the time by which the government must be ready to try a prior charge.
The government, of course, is not precluded from trying a subsequent charge first, but it cannot use the subsequent charge as an excuse for failing to prepare its first case. If a defendant is on trial on subsequent charges, the trial days alone would be excludable under Rule 5(a). There is no reason to exclude any other time related to the subsequent charge from the time when the government must be ready to try the first charge.

. I do not see why the government should not be required to be ready to try a second set of charges prior to a date six months after the first trial. Such a result would be more in accord with the purposes of the Prompt Disposition Plan.
Indeed, it can be argued that Rule 5(a) only allows the time during which a defendant is actually on trial on a prior charge to be excluded from the determination of when the government should be ready to try a subsequent case. Except for the phrase “trial of other charges,” the Rule seems to be directed at proceedings in the case in which the government’s readiness time is being calculated. The other examples given in the Rule concern competency proceedings, pre-trial motions, and interlocutory appeals. The government obviously could not be ready to try a case if, where competency has been challenged, a defendant had not yet been found competent to stand trial, if pre-trial motions in the case had not been decided, or if an appeal was pending in the case. However, the existence of outstanding motions or appeals in one case would ordinarily have little bearing on the government’s ability to be ready to try another case apart from the need to secure defendant’s presence at trial, a subject covered by Rules 5(d) and (f).
Unfortunately, the drafting history of the ABA Standards, the Second Circuit Rules, the Southern District Plan and the new Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub.L.No.93-619 (Jan. 3, 1975) (a provision similar to Rule 5(a) is now contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)) do not explain the drafters’ intentions with respect to this question. However, the new Act sets a maximum of thirty days on the time excludable because “any proceeding concerning the defendant” is actually under advisement. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(G). This limitation suggests that Congress intended section 3161(h)(1) to be read more narrowly than other speedy-trial rules containing no such limitation. 4 U.S.Code & Ad.News, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 1974, at pp. 7425-26 (H.R.Rep.No.93-1508).