Court Opinion

ID: 9636771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:42:28.349552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:49.293502
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In the absence of Congressional history indicating an'intent to broaden the scope of judicial review so as to, include proceedings inherently political such as those here involved, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 1893, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905, I am of the opinion that the finality clause of the Immigration Act of 1917 is within the excepting clause with which Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act opens. As recently as February 9, 1948, the Supreme Court has said: “This Court long has held that statutes which employ broad terms to confer power of judicial review are not always to be read literally. Where Congress has authorized review of ‘any order’ or used other equally inclusive terms, courts have declined the opportunity to magnify .their jurisdiction, by self-denying constructions which do not subject to judicial control orders which, from their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the relation of judicial power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for review.” Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc., v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 1948, 68 S.Ct. 431, 433. I believe that the instant case calls for application of that principle.1
In Sunal v. Large, 1947, 332 U.S. 174, at 177, 67 S.Ct. 1588, at 1590, footnote 3, the Supreme Court recently said, “We therefore lay to one side cases such as Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2193; * * * where the order of the agency under which petitioner was detained was not subject to judicial review.”2 From the foregoing, it seems reasonable to me to infer that habeas corpus pro*463ceedings heretofore have not been considered “judicial review.” This analysis is strengthened by Ex parte Tom Tong, 1883, 108 U.S. 556, 559, 560, 2 S.Ct. 871, 872, 27 L.Ed. 826, in which it was stated that “The prosecution against him [petitioner for writ of habeas corpus] is a criminal prosecution, but the writ of habeas corpus which he has obtained is not a proceeding in that prosecution. On the contrary, it is a new suit brought by him to enforce a civil right, which he claims -s * Consequently, I am impelled to the conclusion that the statutory mandate according finality to the decisions of the Attorney General remains unimpaired.
Moreover, since judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act permits at least an inquiry into whether the decision is supported by "substantial evidence,” I find some difficulty in reconciling such inquiry with the finality mandate of Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 1917.
Accordingly, I think the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

 Cf. International Union v. Bradley, D.C., 75 F.Supp. 394.

 Cases denying forms of relief other than habeas corpus include: In re Ban, W.D. N.Y.1927, 21 F.2d 1009, petition for writ of certiorari); Fafalios v. Doak, 60 App.D.C. 215, 50 F.2d 640; bill in equity to cancel deportation order, certiorari denied 1931, 284 U.S. 651, 52 S.Ct. 31, 76 L.Ed. 552; Darabi v. Northrup, 6 Cir., 1931, 54 F.2d 70; bill in equity for declaratory judgment; Poliszek v. Doak, 1932, 61 App.D.C. 64, 57 F.2d 430; petition for writ of prohibition; Kabadian v. Doak, 1933, 62 App.D.C. 114, 65 F.2d 202; petition for writ of prohibition, cer-tiorari denied 290 U.S. 661, 54 S.Ct. 76, 78 L.Ed. 572; Impiriale v. Perkins, 1933, 62 App.D.C. 279, 66 F.2d 805; petition to compel return of evidence, certiorari denied 290 U.S. 690, 54 S.Ct. 126, 78 L.Ed. 594; Rash v. Zurbrick, E.D. Mich., 1934, 6 F.Supp. 390; bill in equity for injunction, affirmed on another ground, 6 Cir., 1935, 75 F.2d 934; and Bata Shoe Co. v. Perkins, D.C.D.C., 1940, 33 F.Supp. 508; bill in equity for injunction. See also Lai To Hong v. Ebey, 7 Cir., 1928, 25 F.2d 714, 716; Daskaloff v. Zurbrick, 6 Cir., 1939, 103 F.2d 579, 581; and Kessler v. Strecker, 1939, 307 U.S. 22, 34, 59 S.Ct 394, 83 L.Ed. 1082.