Court Opinion

ID: 9772333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:01.441307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:06.956372
License: Public Domain

J-S23031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A., A             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
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 APPEAL OF: T.A., MOTHER                 :        No. 506 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered February 1, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000868-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: R.A., A             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
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 APPEAL OF: T.A., MOTHER                 :        No. 507 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered February 1, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000869-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                           FILED AUGUST 29, 2023

     Appellant, T.A. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the dependency

petitions filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) and transferred legal and physical custody of her minor children, R.A.
J-S23031-23

(daughter) and M.A. (son) (collectively, “Children”), to I.W. (“Father”). We

affirm.

      The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and Father are the natural parents of R.A., who was born in January

2012, and M.A., who was born in June 2013. Shortly after M.A.’s birth, Mother

and Father’s relationship deteriorated. While Father moved to Ohio, Children

remained in Pennsylvania with Mother.

      On September 1, 2022, DHS received a General Protective Service

(“GPS”) report alleging that Mother had been hospitalized after suffering a

bone infection.   (See Dependency Petition for M.A., filed 10/3/22, at ¶b).

After Mother was discharged from the hospital, she “had physical limitations

that affected her ability to care for” Children. (Id.) The report also alleged

that Mother might have been abusing prescription pain medication, and she

had not enrolled Children in school for the 2022-2023 academic year.

      On September 2, 2022, DHS employees went to Mother’s residence for

further investigation. Upon arrival, DHS employees observed Mother “to be

confused and disoriented[.]” (Id. at ¶c). Although Children appeared to be

safe, the home was cluttered with “multiple cigarette butts strewn on the

floor” and “cigarette burns on [Mother’s] sheets[.]” (Id.) Mother kept open

pill bottles within Children’s reach. Mother also confirmed that she had yet to

enroll Children in school, and Children “had not attended school since the

family moved to Philadelphia [from Johnstown] in December 2021.”         (Id.)

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While the DHS employees spoke with Mother, her “behavior became

increasingly erratic, and she became verbally abusive toward DHS.” (Id.)

       DHS subsequently contacted D.L. and T.L. (“Maternal Grandparents”),

who agreed to care for Children while Mother “addressed the condition of her

home and sought appropriate services for herself.” (Id. at ¶d). Mother’s in-

home services commenced on September 7, 2022. On September 9, 2022,

during a “Crisis Rapid Response Family Meeting,” DHS determined that Mother

had untreated mental health issues. (Id. at ¶g). DHS also confirmed that

Mother was abusing her prescription medications.        Considering Mother’s

condition, DHS contacted Father on September 14, 2022. At that time, Father

stated “that he shared custody of the children with [Mother]; that he was in

agreement with [Children] residing with [Maternal Grandparents] through a

Safety Plan; and that he wanted to seek full custody of the children.” (Id. at

¶i).

       On October 3, 2022, DHS filed separate dependency petitions for

Children. The court conducted an adjudicatory hearing on February 1, 2023.

At the hearing, the court received testimony from the DHS social worker, the

Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager, Father, and Mother.

Additionally, the guardian ad litem entered Father’s “secure criminal court

summary” into evidence. (N.T. Hearing, 2/1/23, at 144). At the conclusion

of the hearing, the court found that DHS presented clear and convincing

evidence to warrant an adjudication as to Mother. (See id. at 151). The court

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also found that Father “is ready, willing, and able to care for these children.”

(Id. at 152). Thus, the court entered an order dismissing the dependency

petition and transferring legal and physical custody of Children to Father. On

February 27, 2023, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal and concise

statements of errors.    This Court consolidated the matters sua sponte on

March 22, 2023.

      Mother now raises two issues for our review:

         Whether the trial court committed reversible error when the
         trial court did not adjudicate [Children] dependent and
         commit them to [DHS], where an adjudication of
         dependency and [commitment] to DHS was supported by
         clear and convincing evidence under the Pennsylvania
         Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6365.

         Whether the trial court committed reversible error when the
         trial court placed [Children] in the legal and physical custody
         of [Father], where such determination was not supported by
         clear and convincing evidence under the Pennsylvania
         Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6365.

(Mother’s Brief at 8).

      Mother’s issues are related, and we address them together. Initially,

Mother concedes that she “is not appealing the adjudication of dependency as

to her,” and her arguments are “limited to the transfer of the physical and

legal custody of” Children to Father. (Id. at 12). Regarding custody, Mother

insists that the record did not support the court’s decision to transfer custody

of Children to Father. Mother emphasizes a DHS policy requiring that each

child should have their own bedroom. Nevertheless, Father testified that he

lives in a two-bedroom apartment. Although Father testified that he is willing

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to sleep on a sofa for Children to have separate bedrooms, Mother maintains

that there is no way to ensure this will happen where the record does not

mention whether “the State of Ohio and the appropriate county agency was

going to pick this case up for supervision[.]” (Id. at 14). Mother also argues

that: 1) DHS did not obtain Father’s criminal history from Ohio; 2) Father

failed to provide specific testimony about his plans for childcare; 3) Father’s

relationship with Children was fractured due to Father’s move to Ohio; and 4)

Children did not want to live with Father. Under these circumstances, Mother

asserts that the transfer of custody to Father is not in Children’s best interests.

Mother concludes that this Court must reverse the order that transferred

custody. We disagree.

      The applicable scope and standard of review for dependency cases is as

follows:

           [T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
           appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
           determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
           record, but does not require the appellate court to accept
           the [trial] court’s inferences or conclusions of law.
           Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa.

9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)).

           We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge
           because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule
           upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who
           appear before [the court]. Relying upon [the court’s] unique
           posture, we will not overrule [its] findings if they are
           supported by competent evidence.

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In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa.Super. 2000).

     The Juvenile Act defines a dependent child, in pertinent part, as follows:

        § 6302. Definitions

                                 *    *    *

        “Dependent child.” A child who:

        (1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
        education as required by law, or other care or control
        necessary for his [or her] physical, mental, or emotional
        health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of
        proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence
        of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that
        places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk,
        including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other
        custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that
        places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

     A court may adjudicate a child as dependent if the child meets the

statutory definition of a dependent child by clear and convincing evidence.

See In re E.B., 898 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2006).

        If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court
        may make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect
        the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare, including
        allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to
        supervision, transferring temporary legal custody to a
        relative or a private or public agency, or transferring
        custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. §
        6351(a).

        The definition of a dependent child contained in section 6302
        clearly states that a child must lack a parent, guardian or
        other legal custodian who can provide appropriate care to
        the child. A child whose non-custodial parent is ready,
        willing and able to provide such care does not meet this
        definition.

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                                       *       *   *

          The plain language of the statutory definition of a dependent
          child compels the conclusion that a child is not dependent if
          the child has a parent who is willing and able to provide
          proper care to the child. When a court adjudges a child
          dependent, that court then possesses the authority to place
          the child in the custody of a relative or a public or private
          agency. Where a non-custodial parent is available and
          willing to provide care to the child, such power in the hands
          of the court is an unwarranted intrusion into the family.
          Only where a child is truly lacking a parent, guardian or legal
          custodian who can provide adequate care should we allow
          our courts to exercise such authority.

In re M.L., 562 Pa. 646, 649-50, 757 A.2d 849, 850-51 (2000). “In other

words, if a dependency petition is filed against the custodial parent and there

is sufficient evidence for the court to adjudge the child dependent but for the

intervention of the non-custodial parent who is willing and capable of caring

for the child, the trial court may properly grant custody to the non-custodial

parent in a dependency proceeding.” Interest of J.B., 247 A.3d 447, 453

(Pa.Super. 2021).

       Instantly, Father testified regarding his current circumstances, as well

as his history with Mother and Children. Father explained that he and Mother

separated in 2013 or 2014, after the birth of M.A. In 2016, Father sought

custody of Children. The court initially provided Father with supervised visits.1

____________________________________________

1 Father mentioned that the court had ordered supervised visitation because

“the allegations came up about me.” (See N.T. Hearing at 87). These
allegations were addressed in greater detail by Calli Hagan, the DHS social
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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When Children failed to appear for the visits, the court issued a bench warrant

for Mother.       Although the warrant remained active, Father moved to

Cincinnati, Ohio and kept tabs on Children by calling other family members.

       At the time of the hearing, DHS had confirmed that Father lived in an

apartment, which was across the street from the school that Children would

attend. Authorities in Ohio conducted a home assessment and “cleared it” for

Children to occupy. (N.T. Hearing at 20). Although Father did not have the

necessary furniture to furnish Children’s rooms, he “talked about buying beds

and dressers for them.” (Id. at 21). Father also testified that: 1) he did not

have a criminal record for child abuse; 2) he held a steady job; 3) he was

willing to take custody of Children; 4) Children could be added to his health

insurance plan; and 5) he would take Children to all medical and dental

appointments.

____________________________________________

worker. Specifically, DHS received a report on October 25, 2022, which
alleged that Father had raped R.A. in 2017. (See id. at 17). Although DHS
investigated in 2017, Ms. Hagan investigated the matter again in 2022.
During the 2022 investigation, R.A. was interviewed by the Philadelphia
Children’s Alliance (“PCA”). In this interview, R.A. “did disclose that it
happened, but she would not give any other details regarding the incident.”
(Id.) Ms. Hagan also reviewed R.A.’s 2017 PCA interview, where R.A. “also
said that it did happen, but she didn’t give any further information.” (Id.)
DHS interviewed Father, who denied the allegations. Father believed that
Mother told R.A. to make the allegations in 2017, because Mother and Father
“had a falling out and they didn’t have a very good relationship at the time.”
(Id. at 19). Ultimately, DHS found the report to be unfounded. Ms. Hagan
expressed concerns that Mother had coached R.A., because R.A. “said that
mom told her what to say.” (Id. at 22-23).

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      On cross-examination, Father stated that DHS had recently facilitated

visitation for him with Children. Prior to DHS’s involvement, however, Father

had not seen Children for approximately six years. (See id. at 95). Father

indicated that Maternal Grandparents permitted him to have telephone contact

with Children “about once or twice a week[.]” (Id. at 94). In speaking with

Maternal Grandparents, Father developed the following plan for reuniting with

Children:

           So the kids are in school for the first time in their life, and
           they seem to be doing better with the help of ya’ll, [the CUA
           case manager and DHS Social Worker]. They helped my
           children get in school for the first time along with [Maternal
           Grandparents]. I consented for [Maternal Grandparents] to
           get [Children’s] birth certificates and their socials so they
           can enroll them in school.

           So as a father I love my children. I don’t want to disrupt
           my children’s life anymore that it already is. So my plan
           with [Maternal Grandparents] is that the kids stay there
           until the end of the school year. You know what I’m saying.

                                    *    *    *

           But if there’s any complications because of them staying
           out, I’m willing to take my children right now.

(Id. at 96).

      At the conclusion of testimony, the court received argument from

counsel.    The child advocate expressed Children’s preferences.        Regarding

M.A., the child advocate asserted that “[h]e has told me actually on two

separate occasions today that he would be willing to go to Ohio.” (Id. at 142).

M.A. “also vacillated and said … ‘I want to be with my dad and my mom.’”

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(Id.) Regarding R.A., she initially told the child advocate “she was all right to

go to Ohio.” (Id. at 143). R.A. “quickly recanted,” and she indicated a desire

to stay in Philadelphia. (Id.) R.A. remained “willing to visit” Father in Ohio.

(Id.)

        Thereafter, the guardian ad litem entered a summary of Father’s

Pennsylvania criminal history into evidence. The summary revealed a juvenile

adjudication for a drug charge, a 2013 conviction for driving under the

influence of alcohol, and several arrests that did not result in prosecution.

(See id. at 144-45). Based upon these arrests, the last of which occurred in

2015, the guardian ad litem argued that Father lacked the ability to parent

Children:

          But what disturbs me and what indicated to me that [F]ather
          doesn’t have the present ability to care for these children is
          his arrest record. We deal with behaviors in this court. We
          have a different standard of proof. We don’t have to prove
          these allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.             Past
          behaviors are an indication. They are indicia of a present
          ability to care for children.

          Now I wouldn’t be making this argument except for the
          sheer number of arrest[s] that the father has had and for
          the different types of crimes he’s had.

(Id. at 145).

        The court analyzed the record and concluded that Father was available

and willing to care for Children:

          Notwithstanding the court’s determination of present
          inability on the part of Mother, the trial court heard credible
          clear and convincing evidence to establish that Father was
          ready, willing and able to care for the children. Father is

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         employed and supplied the CUA case manager with his proof
         of income. Father’s home was assessed and deemed
         appropriate for the children, and Father is willing to accept
         voluntary services for the children if needed. Father lives
         directly across the street from the children’s potential school
         and has maintained consistent contact with the CUA case
         manager. Father did not present an inability to care for the
         children and is willing, ready, and able to maintain proper
         care and control over the children. To the contrary, Father
         demonstrated the ability to immediately care for the
         children and the absence of any dependency issues in his
         home.

         [The guardian ad litem] moved into evidence, Father’s
         secure criminal court summary. [The guardian ad litem]
         argued Father’s arrests from 2002, 2009, 2010, and 2015
         displayed a pattern for arrests and criminal activity.
         However, each of these arrests were withdrawn or
         dismissed.     The court found this argument to be
         unpersuasive and egregious. Father’s arrest record is not
         evidence of an inability to care for these children. Father’s
         only conviction of driving under the influence was nearly ten
         years ago. The legal system is built on the foundation that
         people are innocent until proven guilty.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/29/23, at 9) (internal citations omitted).   The

court also found “sufficient evidence supported the finding that the children

should be placed with Father and that it would be contrary to their welfare

and best interests to commit them to DHS at this time.” (Id. at 10).

     Here, the court credited the testimony demonstrating that Father is

willing and capable of caring for Children. Our review leads us to conclude

that competent evidence supported the court’s findings.        See In re A.H.,

supra.   Therefore, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by

placing Children in Father’s custody after it found sufficient evidence to

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adjudge Children dependent as to Mother. See Interest of J.B., supra; In

re A.B., supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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