Court Opinion

ID: 9580768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:44.591192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:30.716602
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
Having carefully reviewed the deposition and medical notes of Dr. Harris, I conclude that the majority has incorrectly applied the standard of review to finding of fact number 20. The crucial portion of the finding, which is quoted entirely in the majority opinion, says that “The greater weight of the evidence establishes that plaintiff’s ruptured disc was a result of his accident on April 8, 1999. Dr. Harris’ testimony, taken as a whole, establishes that it was ‘likely’ that the rupture occurred during the accident.” Because the evidence does support this finding, I respectfully dissent.
Although the quotations from the majority opinion do reflect testimony in the deposition, there are also more definite expressions of opinion in other parts of the testimony and records. At the beginning of the deposition, counsel stipulated that this particular physician, Dr. Toni Harris is an expert in pain management. She treated the plaintiff beginning in March of 2000 for his foot pain. During the treatment, she began to suspect that the pain might be radiating from the back, and ordered an epidural injection to test that hypothesis. After the injection, plaintiff began to exhibit symptoms of pain near the site of the injection in his spine, and continued to have foot pain. In much of the deposition, the exasperated doctor tried repeatedly to get defense counsel to grasp that it was her opinion that the foot pain was due in part to direct trauma to the foot, and in *572part to radiating pain from a disc problem, both of which she related to the work accident.
In the medical records, which the parties also stipulated into evidence, Dr. Harris states:
03/16/00
. . . The [plaintiff] was involved in a work-related injury in April 1999. He was working at Wal-Mart when his left foot was run over by a fork-lift. . . The forklift went over the posterolateral aspect of the left foot and up the ankle. The force was great enough to push him down to the ground . . . The patient reports that he has numbness, tingling and throbbing pain in the left foot, with intermittent, sharp, shooting pain . . . The patient also reports pain extending up the legs . . .
06/01/00
Addendum: I spoke to Melissa, the adjuster on the case ... I tried to explain that the back iniurv was a part of the problem from the beginning.... (emphasis added)
In addition, in her testimony, she explained as follows:
A. ... I think there was a — in the foot, I think part of the problem in the foot was from the direct trauma of the foot.
Q. Was that a foot injury?
A. It’s all a foot injury.
Q. Okay.
A. And part of it — you can’t separate the body like that.
Q. When you’re saying — are you saying there’s not an injury in the back?
A. There’s a herniated disk in the back. But it’s pressing on the nerves, that’s getting damaged—
Q. The pathology is in the back?
A. —that goes to the foot.
Q. Right. It’s the pathology in the back, though?
A. The pathology in the back causing the problem in the foot.
*573And, most directly, counsel asked the doctor whether her opinions were based on an “assumption” that plaintiffs disk was injured the fall. It is clear from Dr. Harris’ response that, in her opinion, it was “likely” that the foot pain started in the back.
The Commission’s finding that Dr. Harris’ testimony as a whole “establishes that it was ‘likely’ that the rupture occurred during the accident,” tracks this testimony exactly.
In reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority applies the standard of review in a manner contrary to the repeated instructions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has stated several times that the role of the Court of Appeals is “limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission’s conclusions of law.” Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). In reviewing a workers’ compensation claim, this Court “does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court’s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.” Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quoting Anderson v. Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)), reh’g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). If there is any evidence at all, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the finding of fact stands, even if there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Id. The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every inference in his or her favor, whether or not he or she prevailed in the Commission. Poole v. Tammy Lynn Ctr., 151 N.C. App. 668, 672, 566 S.E.2d 839, 841 (2002). The Full Commission is the “sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence,” and this Court may not second-guess those determinations. Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
Here, where the stipulated records and the testimony of Dr. Harris do support the Commission’s findings, when viewed in light of the standard of review, the finding should be upheld. I do not believe it is the role of this Court to comb through the testimony and view it in the light most favorable to the defendant, when the Supreme Court has clearly instructed us to do the opposite. Although by doing so, it is possible to find a few excerpts that might be speculative, this Court’s role is not to engage in such a weighing of the evidence. As demonstrated above, much of the evidence reveals that the doctor expressed her opinions repeatedly and without equivocation. Thus, I *574conclude that the Commission’s finding is supported, and that we should affirm the opinion and award.