Court Opinion

ID: 9929330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:05:07.160701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:03.817303
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-844
                   LT Case Nos. 2019-CF-8662
                                2019-CF-8663
                                2019-CF-8797
                 _____________________________

DEWAYNE FLOWERS,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Jeb Branham, Judge.

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and Teresa D. Sutton,
Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Daren L. Shippy,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                       February 2, 2024

PER CURIAM.
      This is an Anders appeal. 1 Appellant, Dewayne Flowers,
was charged, pled guilty, and was adjudicated guilty of armed
robbery (Case No. 2019-CF-8662), a second armed robbery (Case
No. 2019-CF-8797), and a third armed robbery and one count of
murder in the second-degree (Case No. 2019-CF-8663) (“8663”).
He was sentenced in each case and on each count to thirty-five
years in prison to be served concurrently. As a special condition of
his sentence, he was orally sentenced to serve the mandatory
minimum period of ten years in each case as to each count.

      The written judgments and sentences track the sentences
orally pronounced, with one exception: in 8663, the ten-year
mandatory minimum was imposed only as to Count 2 and not as
to Count 1. It is clear that the failure to include the ten-year
mandatory minimum in 8663 was a clerical or ministerial error, as
every person and every other piece of paper referring to the
sentences to be imposed specifically stated that Appellant was
facing and would be sentenced to the mandatory minimum as part
of the thirty-five-year term. We find no error on the face of the
record in any manner prejudicial to Appellant and affirm as to the
judgments and sentences imposed in the first two listed cases. We
affirm the judgment in 8663, but remand for entry of an amended
sentencing order in which the ten-year mandatory minimum
sentences are imposed as to both Counts 1 and 2 with the same
thirty-five years already imposed, all being served concurrently. 2
Appellant does not need to be present for entry of the amended
sentencing order. See Walton v. State, 106 So. 3d 522, 529 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2013) (“[A] defendant need not be present at resentencing if
the error to be corrected is ‘purely ministerial’ or clerical, and
involves no exercise of the court's discretion.”).

    AFFIRMED; REMANDED, for entry of an amended sentencing
order.

    1   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
    2 See Buchanan v. State, 355 So. 3d 543 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023);

Miles v. State, 343 So. 3d 131, 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022).

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EDWARDS, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.
EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, with
opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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                  _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D23-844
                    LT Case Nos. 2019-CF-8662
                                 2019-CF-8663
                                 2019-CF-8797
                     _____________________________

EISNAUGLE, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.

     In this Anders case, I agree that we must affirm the judgment
and sentence. However, I conclude that this court has no authority
to sua sponte take up the sentencing error at issue and remand for
a corrected sentence. Importantly, the majority concedes that this
error does not prejudice Appellant. Instead, remand benefits the
government. But the United States Supreme Court has held that,
in Anders cases, the Constitution requires appellate courts to
review the record for reversible error for a defendant’s benefit, not
to benefit the government. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 264
(2000) (“In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we held that, in order to protect indigent
defendants’ constitutional right to appellate counsel, courts must
safeguard against the risk of granting such requests in cases
where the appeal is not actually frivolous.”); see also State v.
Causey, 503 So. 2d 321, 322–23 (Fla. 1987) (“While courts should
not assume the role of appellate counsel, reversible error should
not be ignored simply because an indigent appellant or a public
defender failed to point it out.”).

     The government did not file a notice of appeal in this case, let
alone present this error to us in an initial brief. Cf. Goings v. State,
76 So. 3d 975, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“By not raising the point
in his initial brief, Mr. Goings waived the argument that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss merely because the
prosecution remained pending more than three years beyond the
four-year primary limitations period.”). In essence, the majority
creates a new type of reverse Anders review. I find no authority to
do so, and therefore dissent from that part of the disposition.

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