Court Opinion

ID: 9411253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 14:09:14.39325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.598307
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francisco Sanchez,                 :
                                   :
                        Petitioner :
                                   :
          v.                       : No. 1350 C.D. 2021
                                   : Submitted: October 21, 2022
Pennsylvania Parole Board,         :
                                   :
                        Respondent :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                            FILED: July 26, 2023

             Francisco Sanchez (Parolee) petitions for review from an order of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) that denied his request for administrative review
challenging the Board’s detainer and its calculation of his maximum sentence date.
Also before us is a petition to withdraw as counsel filed by Parolee’s court-appointed
attorney, Meghann E. Mikluscak, Esquire (Counsel), on the ground that Parolee’s
appeal is without merit. For the reasons that follow, we grant Counsel’s petition to
withdraw as counsel, and we affirm the Board’s order.

                                   I. Background
             On March 14, 2016, Parolee was sentenced to two to five years in
prison, with a consecutive year of probation (original sentence) after pleading guilty
to one count each of escape and resisting arrest in the Westmoreland County Court
of Common Pleas (trial court). Certified Record (C.R.) at 2-3, 73. Parolee’s
minimum sentence date was January 5, 2017, and his maximum sentence date was
January 5, 2020. Id. at 2. On January 29, 2017, the Board released Parolee on parole.
Id. at 11, 14, 17, 22. At the time, Parolee owed 1,071 days on his original sentence,
which is referred to as “backtime.” Id. at 61.
             On June 7, 2017, while on parole, Parolee was arrested and charged
with possession with intent to deliver and possession of controlled substances and
drug paraphernalia. C.R. at 20-21. That same day, the Board issued a warrant to
commit and detain Parolee for parole violations. Id. at 11. The trial court set bail at
$25,000, which Parolee did not post. Id. at 25, 27. Parolee was confined at the
Westmoreland County Prison pending disposition of the new criminal charges. Id.
at 43. On July 8, 2017, the Board confirmed its detainer during the pendency of the
new criminal charges. Id. at 12.
             Prior to the trial on the new criminal charges, Parolee filed an omnibus
pre-trial motion to suppress the Commonwealth’s evidence, which, by order dated
November 20, 2018, the trial court granted (suppression order). C.R. at 24, 27. The
Commonwealth appealed the suppression order. Id. at 28. During the pendency of
the appeal, counsel for Parolee requested the Board to lift the parole detainer. Id. at
74. The Board denied the request and reaffirmed its July 8, 2017 action keeping the
parole detainer in place pending disposition of the new criminal charges. Id. at 75.
On December 3, 2019, the Superior Court reversed the suppression order and
remanded the matter to the trial court. Id. at 29.
             Thereafter, on December 10, 2019, Parolee pleaded guilty to the new
charges. C.R. at 29. On May 4, 2020, the Board voted to recommit Parolee as a

                                          2
convicted parole violator (CPV) to serve 24 months of backtime owed on the original
sentence, when available, pending sentencing. Id. at 64. On June 16, 2020, Parolee
was sentenced and returned to Board custody to begin serving his backtime. Id. at
55, 61. By order dated February 1, 2021, the Board recommitted him as a CPV and
calculated his new maximum sentence date as May 23, 2023. Id. at 61. The Board
did not award credit for time spent at liberty on parole, citing early failure on parole
and unresolved drug and alcohol issues. Id. at 39, 64, 66.
             Parolee, representing himself, requested administrative review of the
Board’s decision on the basis that the Board miscalculated his maximum sentence
date and erred by reaffirming its detainer. C.R. at 72. Parolee asserted that his new
criminal case was “closed” between the date of the suppression order, November 20,
2018, and the date that the suppression order was reversed, December 3, 2019, based
on the suppression order. Id. Consequently, Parolee maintained that the Board
should have lifted its detainer during this period.
             By decision dated November 3, 2021, the Board denied Parolee’s
request for administrative review upon determining that the Board did not err or
miscalculate his maximum date and affirmed its recommitment decision. C.R. at
77-78.
             From this decision, Parolee filed a pro se petition for review in this
Court reasserting that the Board erred by refusing to lift his parole detainer following
the entry of the suppression order and by miscalculating his new maximum sentence
date. Shortly thereafter, Counsel entered her appearance as counsel on Parolee’s
behalf. Following her review of Parolee’s case, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw
as counsel along with a no-merit letter based on her belief that Parolee’s appeal is
without merit. This matter is now before us for disposition.

                                           3
                                   II. Petition to Withdraw
               Counsel seeking to withdraw as appointed counsel must conduct a
zealous review of the case and submit a no-merit letter to this Court detailing the
nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the case, listing the issues the
petitioner wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack merit,
and requesting permission to withdraw.1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927,
928 (Pa. 1988); Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d
19, 24-26 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (en banc); Zerby v. Shanon, 964 A.2d 956, 960 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2009).          The no-merit letter must include “‘substantial reasons for
concluding that a petitioner’s arguments are meritless.’” Zerby, 964 A.2d at 962
(quoting Jefferson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 705 A.2d 513,
514 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998)).
               In addition, court-appointed counsel who seeks to withdraw
representation must: (1) notify the petitioner of the request to withdraw; (2) furnish
the petitioner with a copy of a brief or no-merit letter; and (3) advise the petitioner
of his right to retain new counsel or raise any new points that he might deem worthy
of consideration. Turner, 544 A.2d at 928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 22. If counsel
satisfies these technical requirements, this Court must then conduct an independent
review of the merits of the case. Turner, 544 A.2d at 928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 25.

       1
            Where there is a constitutional right to counsel, court-appointed counsel seeking to
withdraw must submit a brief in accord with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), referred
to as an Anders brief, that (i) provides a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
to the record; (ii) refers to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(iii) sets forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (iv) states counsel’s reasons
for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa.
2009); Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 977 A.2d 19, 25-26 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009) (en banc). Where, as here, the petitioner has only a statutory, rather than a constitutional,
right to counsel, appointed counsel may submit a no-merit letter instead of an Anders brief.
Hughes, 977 A.2d at 25-26.
                                                   4
If this Court determines the petitioner’s claims are without merit, counsel will be
permitted to withdraw, and the petitioner will be denied relief. Turner, 544 A.2d at
928; Hughes, 977 A.2d at 27.
             Upon review, Counsel’s no-merit letter satisfies the technical
requirements of Turner. Counsel states that she conducted a conscientious and
thorough review of the certified record, criminal docket, applicable statutes, and case
law. She sets forth the issues Parolee raised in his petition for review: he was
improperly incarcerated on a detainer that should have been lifted and his maximum
sentence date was miscalculated. Counsel provides a thorough analysis as to why
these issues lack merit, and she cites to applicable statutes, case law, and the certified
record in support.
             With regard to the detainer, Parolee contends that the Board erred by
keeping a detainer lodged against him from November 20, 2018 until December 3,
2019, because his new criminal case was closed as a result of the suppression order.
Parolee believes the suppression order, in effect, dismissed his new charges, thereby
removing the basis for the detainer. The Commonwealth appealed the suppression
order, and the appeal was decided in favor of the Commonwealth on December 3,
2019. Counsel verified the dates on the dockets provided within the certified record,
and on the docket itself. According to Counsel, there is no indication, anywhere,
that Parolee’s case was ever “closed” on November 20, 2018. If it ever appeared so,
that mistake has since been corrected as evidenced by additional docket entries after
November 20, 2018.
             Counsel asserts that the Board had the authority to detain him, based on
the new charges, which remained pending during the suppression order appeal, until
his original maximum sentence expired (January 5, 2020) or until the new charges

                                            5
were disposed, whichever occurred first.                  Choice v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 357 A.2d 242, 243-44 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976). Parolee’s new
charges were disposed of on December 10, 2019, when he pleaded guilty, which was
before the expiration of his original maximum sentence.
                With regard to the calculation of his new maximum sentence date,
Counsel offers the following explanation:

                On March 14, 2016, [Parolee] was sentenced to [2] to [5]
                years (effective January 5, 2015), so his minimum was
                January 5, 2017[,] and his maximum was January 5, 2020.
                There was also reference to an additional consecutive year
                of probation, but for the sake of this calculation, I excluded
                that as it was unclear in the record. [Parolee] was released
                on parole on January 29, 2017, having served [2] years and
                [24] days; there were [2] years and [341] days (or 1,071
                days total) left unserved. His new charges occurred, and
                he was detained, on June 7, 2017; there was never bond
                posted on these new charges. In essence, that tolled the
                time on [Parolee’[s] original case until he was sentenced
                on the new case because that is when he became available
                to serve his backtime. June 16, 2020 plus [2] years and
                [341] days is May 23, 2023. Therefore, according to my
                calculation, the new maximum on [Parolee’s] original
                sentence is correct.
No Merit Letter, 3/22/2022, at 2.
                Based on her review, Counsel concludes that Parolee’s appeal to this
Court is without merit, and she requests permission to withdraw. Counsel provided
Parolee with a copy of the no-merit letter and her request to withdraw. She advised
Parolee of his right to retain new counsel or proceed by representing himself. 2 As
we are satisfied that Counsel has discharged her responsibility in complying with the

      2
          Parolee did not retain new counsel or file a brief in support of his petition for review.

                                                  6
technical requirements to withdraw from representation, we shall conduct an
independent review to determine whether Parolee’s petition for review lacks merit.3

                                 III. Independent Review
               Parolee claims that the Board erred by not lifting the detainer against
him while his case was “closed” between November 20, 2018, and December 3,
2019, as a result of the suppression order. Petition for Review at 1. He maintains
that there were no charges pending against him during this period. As a result, there
was no legal basis for the Board to keep its detainer in place during this period. He
also contends that the Board erred by recalculating his new maximum sentence date
to May 23, 2023.
               The Board is authorized to detain a parolee pending disposition of new
criminal charges.         37 Pa. Code §71.3; see 61 Pa. C.S. §6132(a)(1)(i); 61
Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(1); Choice, 357 A.2d at 243-44. The Board’s authority to detain
remains in effect until the expiration of the parolee’s original maximum sentence or
until the new charges are disposed, whichever occurs first. Choice, 357 A.2d at 243-
44.
               Here, on June 7, 2017, Parolee was arrested, and the Board issued a
warrant to detain Parolee for parole violations. C.R. at 11. The criminal process for
the new criminal charges began. In advance of the trial, Parolee filed an omnibus
pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, which the trial court granted. Contrary to
Parolee’s assertions, the suppression order did not dismiss the charges against him
or otherwise “close” the case. Rather, the suppression order merely resolved a pre-

       3
         Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether
the adjudication was in accordance with law, and whether necessary findings were supported by
substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704; Miskovitch
v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 A.3d 66, 70 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
                                                7
trial motion precluding the Commonwealth’s evidence, and as such constituted an
interlocutory order.
               The Commonwealth appealed the suppression order. Our review of the
docket entries in Superior Court at No. 1745 WDA 2018 confirms that the
Commonwealth asserted its right of appeal under Pa. R.A.P. 311(d).4 Section 311(d)
provides:    “In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the
Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the
entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order
will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.”                  Pa. R.A.P. 311(d)
(emphasis added). The Superior Court accepted the appeal and, by order dated
December 3, 2019, reversed the suppression order and remanded the matter to the
trial court. During the entire appeal process, the new criminal charges against
Parolee remained pending. The question on appeal was whether the Commonwealth
could proceed with or without the evidence. The Board’s authority to detain Parolee
pending disposition of the new criminal charges continued until either his original
maximum term expired (January 5, 2020) or until the new charges were disposed,
whichever occurred first. Thus, the Board did not err or abuse its discretion by
refusing to lift the detainer because the new criminal charges remained pending
during the appeal of the suppression order.
               As for the calculation of his new maximum sentence date, Section
6138(a)(2) of the Parole Code authorizes the Board to recommit CPVs to serve the
remainder of the term they would have been required to serve had they not been

       4
         This Court may take judicial notice of information contained in the publicly available
criminal dockets in these matters. See Moss v. SCI-Mahanoy Superintendent Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole, 194 A.3d 1130, 1138 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018); see also Pa. R.E.
201(b)(2) (permitting courts to take judicial notice of facts that may be “determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”)
                                                8
paroled, except as provided under subsection (2.1). 61 Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(2).
Subsection (2.1) grants the Board discretion to award credit to a CPV recommitted
to serve the remainder of his sentence, except when the CPV is recommitted for the
reasons stated in subsections 6138(a)(2.1)(i) and (ii). 61 Pa. C.S. §6138(a)(2.1);
Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 159 A.3d 466, 473 (Pa.
2017). In the exercise of this discretion, the Board must “articulate the basis for its
decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time served at liberty on parole.” Pittman,
159 A.3d at 473. Where the Board denies credit for time served at liberty on parole,
this time is applied to the original maximum expiration date to create a new
maximum date. Armbruster v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 919
A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
             In addition, “where an offender is incarcerated on both a Board detainer
and new criminal charges, all time spent in confinement must be credited to either
the new sentence or the original sentence.” Martin v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 840 A.2d 299, 309 (Pa. 2003); accord Gaito v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole, 412 A.2d 568, 571 n.6 (Pa. 1980); see Smith v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 171 A.3d 759, 769 (Pa. 2017)
(holding Martin and Gaito remain the rule in this Commonwealth for how credit is
applied). As our Supreme Court held in Gaito:

             [I]f a defendant is being held in custody solely because of
             a detainer lodged by the Board and has otherwise met the
             requirements for bail on the new criminal charges, the time
             which he spent in custody shall be credited against his
             original sentence. If a defendant, however, remains
             incarcerated prior to trial because he has failed to satisfy
             bail requirements on the new criminal charges, then the
             time spent in custody shall be credited to his new sentence.
412 A.2d at 571.

                                          9
            Applying the foregoing here, Parolee was released on parole on January
29, 2017, with a maximum sentence date of January 5, 2020, which left an unserved
balance of 1,071 days on his sentence. C.R. at 61. While on parole, Parolee was
arrested on new criminal charges and detained by the Board on June 7, 2017.
Because Parolee did not post bail, Parolee was not available to begin serving
backtime until June 16, 2020, when he returned to Board custody following
sentencing on the new criminal charges. The Board denied Parolee credit for time
spent at liberty on parole citing Parolee’s “early failure” and unresolved drug and
alcohol issues. Id. at 39, 64, 66. Adding Parolee’s unserved balance on his original
sentence of 1,071 days to his return of custody date of June 16, 2020, results in a
maximum sentence date of May 23, 2023. We, therefore, conclude that the Board
did not err in calculating Parolee’s maximum date.

                                 IV. Conclusion
            Upon review, we agree with Counsel that Parolee’s claims are without
merit. Accordingly, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel, and we
affirm the order of the Board denying Parolee’s request for administrative review.

                                      MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

                                        10
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Francisco Sanchez,                 :
                                   :
                        Petitioner :
                                   :
          v.                       : No. 1350 C.D. 2021
                                   :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,         :
                                   :
                        Respondent :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 26th day of July, 2023, the order of the Pennsylvania
Parole Board, dated November 3, 2021, is AFFIRMED, and the petition to withdraw
as counsel filed by Meghann E. Mikluscak, Esquire, is GRANTED.

                                    __________________________________
                                    MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge