Court Opinion

ID: 9455253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:16:23.655571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:31.589532
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by my brethren. However, I do not agree with their conclusion that the Supreme Court’s determination in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), that appellant’s rights were violated by “the [trial] judge’s failure to insulate the proceedings from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences”, 384 U.S. at 358, 86 S.Ct. at 1520 n. 11, necessarily precludes the possibility that his rights might also have been violated by a conspiracy to prosecute him without cause and to prevent a fair trial. Appellant has alleged that certain private persons engaged in publishing newspa*559pers and a public official conspired to corrupt the judicial process in order to obtain his conviction for murder, and, on a motion to dismiss, we must accept these allegations as true. The deprivation of constitutional rights which the Supreme Court found in Sheppard v. Maxwell and the deprivation alleged here are not mutually exclusive, and the fact that appellant chose one as the basis for his habeas corpus petition in 1963 should not prevent him from basing a damage suit on the other.1
Nevertheless, I agree with the District Judge who held that the allegedly actionable conduct of Coroner Gerber is insulated from liability under the Civil Rights Act by a doctrine analogous to that of judicial immunity. As the District Judge observed in his opinion, the Supreme Court has held that’the Civil Rights Act did not abrogate the common law immunity of certain public officials for actions within their jurisdiction.2 This doctrine applies not only to judges, but also to other officials whose duties are quasi-judicial. Kenny v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied sub nom. Kenney v. Killian, 352 U.S. 855, 77 S.Ct. 84, 1 L.Ed.2d 66 (1956). And the same immunity has been extended to coroners. Hebert v. Morley, 273 F.Supp. 800, 802-803 (C.D.Cal.1967). I agree with the District Court that the only conduct in which defendant Gerber is alleged to have engaged under color of law must be characterized, under the laws of Ohio and under the Civil Rights Act, as quasi-judicial. See State ex rel. Harrison v. Perry, 113 Ohio St. 641, 644-645, 150 N.E. 78 (1925). Since this action cannot be maintained against Gerber, the only defendant who acted under color of law, it must fail as to the others. Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1965).

. An action for malicious prosecution might have been filed in state court, but that does not render unavailable the remedies of the Civil Rights Act. Diversity is not alleged here, and therefore I do not consider whether appellant has a good cause of action for malicious prosecution under the Ohio tort law. See Sheppard v. The E. W. Scripps Co., 421 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1969).

. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872) (common law immunity). The immunity applies even to acts which are alleged, as are those here, to have been maliciously or corruptly motivated. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218. The policy behind this rule is not difficult to discern. As the Supreme Court expressed it, a judge “should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.” Id.