Court Opinion

ID: 9779353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:47:54.589167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:25.652959
License: Public Domain

UTTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I join with Justice Kennedy in his conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow appellant’s trial amendment. I agree with his conclusion because in my opinion the trial amendment merely amplified or *621clarified the pleading upon which appellants went to trial.
In their Third Amended Original Petition, their live pleading at trial, appellants alleged that appellee was negligent due to:
1. The failure of THE UTILITY COMPANY to make proper inspections, appraisals and surveys of their transmission lines in the area in question, for unsafe conditions of a nature which were the proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell. (Emphasis added.)
Appellee neither objected nor excepted to these pleadings. In the absence of special exceptions, courts will liberally construe pleadings in favor of the pleader. Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804 (Tex.1982); J.M. Hollis Construction Co., Inc. v. Paul Durham Co., 641 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
“It is a general rule, so well established as to need no citation of authority, that the petition will be construed as favorably as possible for the pleader. The Court will look to the pleader’s intendment and the pleading will be upheld even if some element of a cause of action has not be specifically alleged. Every fact will be supplied that can reasonably be inferred from what is specifically stated.” Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Bliss, 368 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.1963).
In their trial pleading, appellants alleged the failure of CP & L to make proper surveys of the distribution lines in the area in question for unsafe conditions of a nature which were the proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell.
During the course of the trial, appellants offered the trial amendment in question which set forth:
1. Plaintiffs allege that CP & L owned and maintained the distribution line which came into contact with the spud pole in question, in and over lot 43 of the area in question, and that such constitutes negligence.
As reflected in the record, the trial court sua sponte denied appellant’s request for the trial amendment. Appellant was given no opportunity to explain the basis for the requested trial amendment, and appellee was given no opportunity to respond to the request.
In accordance with the commonly understood definition of the term “to survey,” the specific allegation in the trial amendment in question was that appellee failed to make proper surveys of its distribution lines. The obvious import of said allegation was that, if appellee had properly surveyed said lines, it would have discovered that the distribution lines were not confined to the right-of-way but extended eight and one-half inches over Lot 43, posing a potentially unsafe condition, which was the proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell. It is my opinion that the trial amendment should have been allowed to allow the pleadings to conform with the evidence which had been previously introduced.
However, I am further of the opinion that the allowance of the trial amendment was not necessary to support the submission of appellants requested issues which is the primary basis of appellant’s complaint. Mr. Keller testified without objection that, if the distribution line had been outside Lot 43, the accident would not have happened. Thus, we have the trial pleadings which support the independent introduction of such evidence and, therefore, it follows that there is sufficient evidence to support the submission of the requested issues.
At the close of the presentation of testimony, appellant requested the following special issues:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the distribution line which came into contact with the spud pole was owned and maintained by the Utility Company in and over lot 43 of the area in question?
Answer: “We do” or “We do not.”
We, the Jury, answer:-
*622If you have answered Issue No. _“We do”, then answer Issue No_; otherwise do not answer Issue No._,
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that erecting and maintaining the distribution lines in question over the rigging area constituted negligence?
Answer: “We do” or “We do not.”
We, the Jury, answer:_
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell?
Answer: “We do” or “We do not.”
We, the Jury, answer:_
PLAINTIFF’S SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light Company intended to install the high voltage wire in question over Lot 43?
It did so intend ______
It did not so intend
The majority opinion makes note of the fact that appellants’ first point of error reads as follows:
It is error for the trial court to refuse to submit plaintiffs’ trial amendment, to wit ... and to refuse to submit plaintiffs’ requested special issues in connection with such trial amendment. (Emphasis added [by the majority].)
The majority would have us view restrictively appellants’ first point of error as regarding only the requested special issues as they relate to the issue raised in the trial amendment, which issue, as the majority contends, was not sufficiently raised by the appellants’ trial pleading. However, since briefing rules are to be liberally construed in an effort to ascertain an appellant’s real basis for appeal, TEX.R.CIV.P. 418 and 422, In re Marriage of Greer, 483 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1972, writ dism’d), we need not restrictively view appellants’ first point of error as the majority does. The first requested special issue regards an uncontroverted fact issue and need not have been submitted, Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Miller, 596 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1980, no writ). All of appellants’ requested special issues, in my opinion, relate to a pleaded issue, to wit, “The failure of THE UTILITY COMPANY to make proper inspections, appraisals and surveys of their transmission lines in the area in question, for unsafe conditions of a nature which were the proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell.” (Emphasis added.) The reasonable intendment of the above-quoted pleaded issue in the trial pleading was that apellee CP & L was negligent in failing to survey its distribution lines, and that, if appellee had made proper surveys of said lines, it would have discovered that the lines were not confined to the right-of-way but extended eight and one-half inches over Lot 43, posing a potentially unsafe condition, which proximately caused the death of Lynn Wendell. Said pleaded issue pervaded the entire trial and was an issue controlling the disposition of the case.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 277 provides in part:
In all jury cases the court may submit said cause upon special issues without request of either party, and, upon request of either party, shall submit the cause upon special issues controlling the disposition of the case that are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence in the case, except that, for good cause subject to review or on agreement of the parties, the court may submit the same on a general charge. (Emphasis added.)
TEX.R.CIV.P. 279 provides in part:
When the court submits a case upon special issues, he shall submit the controlling issues made by the written plead*623ings and the evidence. (Emphasis added.)
Under TEX.R.CIV.P. 277 and 279, when the court submits a cause of action upon special issues, it shall submit the cause upon special issues controlling the disposition of the case that are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence in the case; and, failure to do so, under such circumstances, is reversible error. Chrysler Corporation v. McMorries, 657 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1983, no writ); First State Bank, Morton v. Chesshir, 634 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, writ refd n.r.e.). The trial court only has discretion in the manner in which the required special issues are submitted. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 277 and 279; Braugh v. Phillips, 557 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
In my opinion and in accordance with liberal construction of the trial pleading and related points of error and in view of the testimony set forth in the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s dissent, the trial pleading and testimony were sufficient to support the submission of appellants’ requested special issues. Furthermore, since the trial pleading and testimony sufficiently supported the requested special issues, the trial court was mandato-rily required under TEX.R.CIV.P. 277 and 279 and the above case authority to submit the requested special issues which involved controverted fact issues. The trial court erred in refusing the requested special issues. I would sustain appellants’ first point of error.