Court Opinion

ID: 9492547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:43:51.968121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:21.764532
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Lynne Taylor and Keisha Johnson, both formerly employed as police officers at the Virginia Union University (“Virginia Union” or “University”), commenced separate actions against the University in which they sought relief under Title VII of the CM Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”). Taylor and Johnson allege employment discrimination based on sex. Johnson also claims that she was sexually harassed while working at the University. The cases were consolidated for trial.
The court dismissed Johnson’s sexual harassment claim on summary judgment, determining that the allegations had not *241been included in her original charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and were thus procedurally barred. With respect to Taylor’s complaint, the court granted the University’s motion under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law. Finally, the court submitted Johnson’s Title VII claim to the jury which rendered its verdict for the University.
Both Plaintiffs now appeal the district court’s determination. Because, contrary to the majority, I believe the court erred in its judgment, I dissent.
I.
I am in substantial agreement with the presentation of the facts as outlined in the panel decision for the case at bar and refer the reader to those portions of the decision. Taylor v. Virginia Union University, No. 97-1667(L), 1999 WL 98647, slip op. at 3-6 (4th Cir. February 19, 1999). I reiterate a few pertinent points below.
A. Lynne Taylor
Taylor began employment as a campus police officer at the University on August 17,1992. During the twenty-seven months that she was employed by the University, Taylor was not promoted to Corporal or sent to the Police Academy of the Virginia Commonwealth University (“Police Academy” or “Academy”) for training. For promotion to Corporal, the University required that the officer under consideration rate satisfactory or above in all areas of her most recent performance evaluation. Taylor scored below satisfactory in the “Communications” category of her performance evaluation. Such a rating presumably indicated that Taylor was unqualified for promotion, yet Taylor, at least in part because of her good performance, was appointed acting shift supervisor on a regular basis. Taylor asserts that she and Johnson were the only two persons to act as shift supervisor, on a regular basis without the rank of Corporal or higher.
It is undisputed that Police Academy attendance, while not decisive, positively impacted promotion opportunities. With that in mind, according to a former police officer who testified at trial, Chief Wells stated that “he was never going to send a female to the Academy.” Of the six male officers who were selected for the Academy while Taylor was employed by the police department, only three of them were hired before Taylor; three were selected for the Academy within twelve months of their date of hire; and one was selected within four months of his date of hire. While other officers who were senior to Taylor were never sent to the Academy, the reason for their non-selection is unclear. At least one such officer testified that he could not have gone to the Academy even if selected, because he did not have a high school diploma, as is required by the Academy.
The record reflects disputed testimony as to whether Chief of Police Eugene Wells alone could determine who would attend the ■ Academy. One University Vice-President testified that the Chief of Police had to concur with his supervisor before rendering a decision. In response to an interrogatory, however, the University stated that “the Chief of Police had sole discretion as to which individuals were selected to attend the Academy.”
In October 1994, two officers discovered Taylor during her off-duty hours at a fraternity party in an all-male dormitory. She was subsequently discharged by the University for fraternizing with male students, in apparent violation of University policy.
B. Keisha Johnson
Johnson was hired by the University in July 1993 as a campus police officer. Johnson rated “satisfactory” or “above average” in -all areas of her performance evaluation and, like Taylor, was often appointed acting shift supervisor. Also like *242Taylor, Johnson was never selected for Police Academy attendance.
On May 5,1994, Johnson wrote to Wells, indicating that she desired to participate in the promotion process and that she was applying for the position of Lieutenant. She participated in the promotion process, took a written and oral examination, and competed with several male candidates for the position. Quinton Terry, a male candidate whose examination scores exceeded Johnson’s scores by three points, was selected. Terry, who commenced employment at the University on the same date as Johnson, was attending the Police Academy during the promotion process.
On September 5,1994, Johnson resigned from the University.
C. Procedural History
Taylor and Johnson commenced separate actions against the University, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.1 Taylor alleges that she was denied the opportunity for training at the Police Academy, while male officers with less experience and/or seniority were chosen to attend the Academy; that she was denied promotional opportunities in favor of similarly situated male officers; and that she was wrongfully discharged for violating a University policy against fraternizing with students, whereas male officers violated the policy with impunity. Johnson similarly claims that she was wrongfully denied the opportunity to attend the Police Academy and, as a result, was improperly denied promotion. In addition, both Plaintiffs allege disparate treatment by the University in the issuance of their firearm. Johnson also claims that she was sexually harassed while working at the University.
The .University filed motions for summary judgment in both cases. Concluding that Johnson’s sexual harassment allegations had not been included in her charge filed with the EEOC and were not reasonably related to the allegations contained in the EEOC complaint, the court granted the University’s summary judgment motion with respect to Johnson’s sexual harassment claim only.
In addition, the University filed a motion in limine, requesting that the court preclude Plaintiffs from offering evidence that Chief Wells had been arrested in 1995 for solicitation of a prostitute. The court granted the University’s motion, determining that the admission of evidence of Wells’ solicitation would result in unfair prejudice to the University.
At the end of Plaintiffs’ case, the University moved under Rule 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Taylor’s complaint. The court denied the motion, and the University called its witnesses. At the conclusion of Defendant’s case, the University renewed its Rule 50(a) motion against Taylor’s claims, which the court then granted. Taylor now appeals that judgment.
The court submitted Johnson’s case to the jury which rendered its verdict for the University. Johnson moved to set aside the jury’s verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial, which the court denied. She appeals from the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.
II.
Taylor argues that the district court erred by granting Virginia Union’s Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law against her claims. We review a dis*243trict court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo. See Brown v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 18 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir.1994). A district court may grant a Rule 50(a) motion if “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court concludes that “ ‘a reasonable trier of fact could draw only one conclusion from the evidence.’ ” Brown, 18 F.3d at 248.
A. Direct Evidence of Sex Discrimination
If a plaintiff can present sufficiently direct evidence of discrimination, she qualifies for the more advantageous standard of liability applicable in mixed-motive cases. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1141 (4th Cir.1995). The contours of the mixed-motive inquiry were originally outlined in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court determined that if a -plaintiff showed by direct evidence that gender played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision, she became entitled to a shift in the burden of persuasion. 490 U.S. at 250, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Upon such a showing, the defendant-employer could then avoid liability only by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision absent any discrimination. Id. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 modified the Supreme Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m). Under the Act, an employer can no longer avoid liability simply by proving that it would have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons. Instead, liability attaches whenever sex “was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m); see also Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142. Proof by the employer that it would have reached the same determination in the absence of discriminatory animus only limits the remedies available to the plaintiff.2 See Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142.
•In order to recover under the mixed-motive inquiry, the plaintiff must present “ ‘direct evidence that decisionmakers placed a substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion.’ ” Id. Such a showing requires “evidence of conduct or statements that both reflect directly the alleged discriminatory attitude and bear directly on the contested employment decision.” Id.
With this standard in mind, Taylor should receive the benefit of the mixed-motive inquiry with respect to Virginia Union’s failure to afford her an opportunity to attend the Police Academy. Chief Wells reportedly told Officer Terry that “he was never going to send a female to the Academy.” Despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, Wells’ statement directly relates to his refusal to send Taylor to the Academy. The command that the evidence in question “bear directly on the contested employment decision” merely requires that there be some direct link between the challenged decision and the alleged discriminatory attitude; it does not bar the use of inferential deductions altogether. It is difficult to imagine more direct evidence than an unequivocal statement by Chief Wells that he would never send a woman to the Police Academy. Sure enough, consistent with his promise, *244Wells did not select Taylor to attend the Academy; nor did he select any woman to attend the Academy during his tenure as Chief of Police. Wells’ statement' both reflects his alleged discriminatory attitude, as the majority acknowledges, and bears directly on his decision not to send Taylor to the Police Academy. Such direct evidence of discriminatory intent justifies application of the mixed-motive analysis.
The University first argues that Appellant is not entitled to the mixed-motive analysis because Wells alone could not make decisions regarding Academy attendance. In response to an interrogatory, however, the University stated: “Prior to March, 1995, the Chief of Police had sole discretion as to which individuals were selected to attend the Academy.” In testimony, Walter Miller, Vice-president for University Services, contradicted the interrogatory response, insisting that “[t]he Chief of Police has never had sole discretion as to who attended the Police Academy. That was also put before the supervisor of the Chief of Police and they both concurred unanimously or together.” When considering a Rule 50(a) motion, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant. Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Taylor, a jury could reasonably conclude that Chief Wells was primarily, if not solely, responsible for selecting officers to attend the Academy. Since such a jury conclusion is plausible and would not be an unreasonable interpretation of the record evidence, it was improper for the district court to grant the Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Even assuming the veracity of the University’s claim, its reliance on the fact that Wells made decisions regarding Academy attendance in concert with other officials is misplaced. One need look no further than Price Waterhouse, where the employer’s decision to deny the plaintiff partnership was made by a policy board, for evidence that cooperative decision-making does not immunize an employer from liability. The board in Price Waterhouse received a recommendation regarding the plaintiffs promotion to partner from a committee that had, in turn, received comments from other partners in the firm. 490 U.S. at 232-238, 109 S.Ct. 1775. The fact that the employment decision was made in concert with others who may not have shared the discriminatory motivations did not matter. See id. at 256, 257, 109 S.Ct. 1775. Similarly, the fact that Chief Wells alone may not have made Academy decisions does not necessarily negate the substantiality of the University’s reliance on an illegitimate criterion, i.e., gender. Where, as here, Wells’ recommendation contributed significantly to the ultimate determination regarding Academy attendance and the University does not disclaim reliance on Wells’ recommendation, it is inconsequential that he did not make the decision alone.
Second, the University argues that there is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason that explains why Taylor had not yet been selected for the Academy: namely, Academy openings were few, and male officers more senior than Taylor had not yet been selected for the Academy. Under the modification to Price Waterhouse made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it does not matter that other legitimate reasons exist for not sending Taylor to the Academy. An employer cannot avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision for nondiscriminatory reasons. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m); see also Fuller, 67 F.3d at 1142. Therefore, the University’s questionable explanation that Taylor had not amassed enough seniority3 does not absolve the institution of liability.
Finally, Defendant hints that an isolated comment like the one made by Chief Wells is excluded from coverage under the mixed-motive analysis. To the contrary, there is no such requirement that a pattern of such discriminatory comments *245must be demonstrated before a claim is actionable. In fact, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse specifically refrained from deciding which specific facts would or would not establish a plaintiffs case. 490 U.S. at 251-252, 109 S.Ct. 1775.
Under the circumstances, Taylor is entitled to application of the mixed-motive analysis.4 Examining the evidence in a light most favorable to Taylor, a reasonable jury could find in her favor. The district court’s grant of the University’s Rule 50(a) motion was, therefore, improper.
B. Circumstantial Evidence of Sex Discrimination
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff can establish a presumption of unlawful discrimination through circumstantial evidence by demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the court must rule in favor of the plaintiff unless the defendant-employer provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See id. at 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the employer meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-805, 93 S.Ct. 1817.
1. Failure to Promote
Taylor alleges that she was denied promotion to the rank of Corporal because of her sex. Taylor insists that she was required to assume the duties of the position, but without the rank or usual pay increase. To establish a prima facie case for failure to promote, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she sought the position in question; (3) she was qualified; and (4) she was rejected under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir.1994); McNairn v. Sullivan, 929 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir.1991).
Elements (1) and (2) of the prima facie test are undisputed. Elements (3) and (4), however, are the subject of disagreement. With respect to the third element, Virginia Union argues that Taylor was not qualified for promotion to the rank of Corporal because, according to the police department’s promotion policy, no officer can be promoted if she does not rate satisfactory or above in all areas of her most recent performance evaluation. Taylor’s performance evaluation in April 1993 indicated that she received an unsatisfactory rating in the area of “Communications,” so, the *246University asserts, she was not eligible for consideration for promotion to Corporal.
Taylor, on the other hand, argues that the fact that she was required to perform many of the functions and responsibilities of Corporal and to supervise male officers who were arguably “more qualified” than her evidences that she was, in fact, qualified for the promotion. Taylor suggests that Chief Wells gave her an “unsatisfactory” rating “because of his animus towards women.” The evidence, particularly when considering the improperly excluded evidence of Wells’ derogatory comments about women and prior harassment of a female employee (see below), tends to suggest that Chief Wells may have had a discriminatory motive for giving her a negative evaluation. Moreover, the continuous appointment of Taylor as acting shift supervisor suggests that Chief Wells was satisfied with Taylor’s performance, notwithstanding his evaluation to the contrary. Indeed, most male officers who were consistently appointed as acting shift supervisor were promoted to Corporal. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, a reasonable jury might conclude that Taylor was qualified despite her “unsatisfactory” rating given the increased responsibility assigned to her.
To satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie test, Taylor must show that she was rejected for promotion under circumstances that raise an inference of unlawful sex discrimination. Toward that end, Taylor argues that she was denied opportunities for training by Chief Wells’ unwillingness to select a female for the Police Academy,5 which limited any possible promotion opportunities. In addition, Corporal Tommy Harrell testified that Chief Wells called Taylor “a stupid bitch” and asked him if he was sleeping with Taylor. While the evidence does not prove discriminatory conduct with respect to the promotion decision, it is strongly suggestive of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.Sd 693, 700 (8th Cir.1999) (noting that “gender-based insults, including the term ‘bitch,’ may give rise to an inference of discrimination based on sex”); Walsdorf v. Board of Commissioners for the East Jefferson Levee District, 857 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1988) (granting Title VII relief to female employee based upon evidence which included statement by supervisor that “ain’t no bitch gonna get this job”). Keeping in mind that the test to establish a prima facie ease is not intended to be onerous, see Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the facts as presented by Taylor sufficiently demonstrate that she was denied promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
The majority maintains that because Chief Wells played a role in hiring Taylor, he could not have acted discriminatorily when considering her for promotion. Under the cases cited by the majority, when the plaintiff is hired and fired by the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, “a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.” Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 797 (4th Cir.1991) (age discrimination case); see also Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir.1996) (extending “same actor inference” to Title VII gender discrimination). The majority insists that the “same actor inference” applies by analogy to the failure to promote at issue here. First, notwithstanding this Court’s suggestions in earlier cases, I am not convinced that the “same actor inference,” which is typically applied in the termination context, is equally powerful when applied to a *247charge of discrimination with respect to a decision not to promote an employee. But see Evans, 80 F.3d at 959 (noting, in panel decision, that because the person accused of discrimination was also the person who hired plaintiff, “there is a ‘powerful inference’ that the failure to promote her was not motivated by discriminatory animus”). The thought of an employer hiring an individual in a protected class and, for discriminatory reasons, keeping that person in an entry-level station, i.e., hindering the employee from advancing to the ranks of management or into a higher paying position, is not nearly as incredulous as the majority urges. It does not require a stretch of the imagination to discern such a possibility. Consequently, the fact that Wells hired Taylor does not necessarily mean that he did not act with discrimination in evaluating her or in considering her for promotion.
Second, even assuming the existence of a “strong inference” that discrimination did not motivate Wells, Taylor “still has the opportunity to present countervailing evidence of pretext.” Proud, 945 F.2d at 798. The inference is rebutted when the plaintiff presents sufficiently compelling evidence of discrimination. See id. For example, the inference does not apply when plaintiff presents evidence of overt discrimination in the form of derogatory comments about women. See Model v. FCI Marketing, Inc., 116 F.3d 1247, 1253 (8th Cir.1997) (declining to apply inference where plaintiff presented evidence of overt discrimination in form of derogatory comments about age). Evidence of such comments by Wells and his outright refusal to send a woman to the Academy weaken the presumption of nondiscrimination.
Since Taylor demonstrated that she was denied promotion under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, Virginia Union must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. By way of explanation, the University submits that Taylor was indeed unqualified, as evidenced by her evaluation. It further maintains that the number of available Police Academy positions is limited to two officers each year. Many male officers with more seniority than Taylor, the University explains, also were denied an opportunity to attend the Academy, while other officers were required to wait a period of three years. The record suggests otherwise, however. During Taylor’s employment with the police department (August 17, 1992 through November 7, 1994), six male officers were selected to , attend the Academy — thus, contradicting the University’s declaration that only two officers per year were selected for attendance. Only three of the six officers were hired before Taylor; three were selected for the Academy within twelve months of their date of hire; one officer was selected within four months of his hire date. As to the officers senior to Taylor who were never sent to the Academy, the reason for their non-selection is unclear. At least one of these officers testified that he could not have gone to the Academy even if selected because he did not have a high school diploma, which the Academy requires for participation.
On these facts, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Virginia Union’s explanation is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination and that Taylor was, in fact, denied training opportunities and promotion because of her sex. It was, therefore, inappropriate for the district court to grant the University’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
2. Discriminatory Disciplinary Measures
In October 1994, Taylor was discovered in attendance at an on-campus fraternity party by two other officers. The University discharged Taylor in November 1994 for allegedly violating Virginia Union’s policy that prohibits fraternization between campus police officers and students. Taylor argues that she was wrongfully discharged based upon a disparate application of the policy.
*248To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination in the enforcement of employee disciplinary measures, Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of the class protected by Title VII; (2) the prohibited conduct in which she engaged was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures enforced against her were more severe than those enforced against those other employees. See Cook v. CSX Transportation Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir.1993); Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1105-1106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 3489, 87 L.Ed.2d 623 (1985). Taylor obviously satisfies prong (1) of the test, but prongs (2) and (3) are in dispute.
Taylor maintains that male officers fraternized with female students, sometimes even engaging in sexual relations, but were not disciplined for their misconduct. Taylor’s contention that male officers engaged in more egregious violations of the policy in question is supported by Corporal Harrell’s testimony that male officers had contact with female students and were not disciplined. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, the testimonies of both Taylor and Harrell were sufficiently certain in their content that a reasonable jury could find that Taylor established a prima facie case. Harrell’s testimony was in direct response to a query from Taylor’s counsel regarding male officers’ fraternization with female students. Harrell testified unmistakably that such contact between male officers and female students had, in fact, occurred and that the male officers were not disciplined. I, perhaps, cannot conclude from Harrell’s testimony that these officers engaged in sexual relations with students, but I do find in his testimony indisputable support for Taylor’s contention that male officers engaged in misconduct for which there was no punishment. How that testimony is weighed is a jury decision that should not be resolved on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Taylor, her alleged violation of the non-fraternization policy was, at minimum, comparable in seriousness to misconduct by male officers. Yet, the disciplinary action enforced against her was more severe. On these facts, Taylor’s claim should have survived a Rule 50(a) motion. The district court erred in deciding otherwise.
III.
Johnson argues that the district court erred in refusing to admit certain evidence. The trial judge excluded evidence of Wells’ arrest for solicitation of a prostitute on the ground that it would be unduly prejudicial to Defendant. In chambers, the judge also declined to admit evidence of Wells’ alleged harassment of another female employee. Finally, during the trial, the judge sustained the University’s objection to questions from Johnson’s counsel regarding demeaning statements Chief Wells allegedly made regarding other female employees.6 We review the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. See Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1187 (4th Cir.1990). Where an evidentiary ruling affects the substantial rights of the parties, appellate intervention may be necessary. See Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 1130, 1131, 1135 (4th Cir.1988).
I find no error in the trial judge’s decision to exclude evidence of Wells’ arrest for soliciting a prostitute. Given the fact that the arrest occurred a year after Johnson’s resignation, its relevance is suspect. Since the arrest does not, in any way, make it more or less likely that Wells was influenced by discriminatory motivations in the workplace, its exclusion was appropriate.
*249However, the judge’s failure to admit evidence regarding Wells’ derogatory comments about women is erroneous. In order to demonstrate employment discrimination on the basis of sex, Johnson must show that illegitimate gender considerations were a motivating factor in the employment decision. Wells’ use of degrading language in reference to women is relevant in determining whether sex stereotyping supported the decision. See id. at 1133 (determining that “use of racially offensive language by the decision-maker is relevant as to whether racial animus was behind the [employment] decision, and was proper evidence for the jury to consider”). His statements reveal his state of mind, even if they do not relate to the specific employment decision at issue, and are admissible on that basis. See id. at 1134; see also Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) (noting that evidence of prior acts which would otherwise be inadmissible may be introduced to show motive, intent, or knowledge).
The University argues that the evidence was properly excluded since Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows the district court to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. I disagree. Johnson attempts to prove Chief Wells’ discriminatory intent, so the probative value of statements revealing Wells’ stereotypical view of women significantly outweighs any risk of prejudice against the University. See Mullen, 853 F.2d at 1133 (“Where a plaintiff seeks to prove discriminatory intent, the probative value of statements revealing the racial attitudes of the decision-maker is great. This is so because of the inherent difficulty of proving state of mind.”). Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has correctly noted that “Rule 403 simply erects no per se barrier to the introduction of customary mannerisms of speech that may shed light on the motives of a contested decision. Such evidence may be the only way in which discriminatory attitudes are revealed.... ” Id. at 1134. Here, since the evidence in question is central to a key element of Johnson’s case, we can only conclude that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice.
Similarly, evidence that Wells sexually harassed another female employee7 is also relevant to a determination of discriminatory intent. Contrary to the University’s assertions, it does not matter that sexual harassment was not an issue before the court. Evidence of prior sexual harassment, although not the subject of a distinct claim, may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which sex discrimination is at issue. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 963 (noting that while untimely filed “allegations [of sexual harassment] cannot stand as separate charges of discrimination for which [the employer] may be liable, they might be admissible- as evidence at trial to support [plaintiffs] properly asserted sex discrimination claim”). Consequently, it was improper for the trial judge to exclude outright such evidence.
I am persuaded that the exclusion of Wells’ derogatory statements and prior harassment of a female employee “‘affected] the substantial rights of the parties.’ ” Mullen, 853 F.2d at 1135. Admission of the evidence may have yielded a different result, since the jury had before it very limited corroborating evidence from which it could gauge Wells’ motivation in making certain employment decisions and the working conditions that led to Johnson’s departure. I, therefore, cannot say that the error was harmless. Reversal of the district court’s evidentiary decision is appropriate, and a new trial is warranted.8
*250IV.
Finally, Johnson asserts that she raised the issue of sexual harassment in her EEOC Charge of Discrimination, so the district court’s dismissal of her claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was erroneous. A review of the record reveals that Johnson did not mention her claim of sexual harassment in her initial administrative charge, but she did make the following statement in her affidavit filed in support of her charge:
On several times [Chief Wells] called me at home on thing that could wait until the next day. He has touched me on the arm on several times while talking to me. He stated he hire [sic] me because he liked me.... He has called me in his office for hours at a time, away from job to talked[sic] to me.
The district court found that “the affidavit accompanying the EEOC complaint is not sufficient to put the EEOC or Defendant on notice regarding Ms. Johnson’s sexual harassment claims. Her sexual harassment allegations in her Complaint are not reasonably related to her allegations in the EEOC Complaint.” I disagree.
The allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination dictate the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint. See Evans, 80 F.3d at 962-963. “Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent Title VII lawsuit.” Id. at 963. Any “reasonable investigation” of an EEOC complaint would surely include an investigation of facts alleged in an affidavit filed in support of the complaint. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider Johnson’s statements in her sworn affidavit. See Emmons v. Rose’s Stores, Inc., 5 F.Supp.2d 358, 363 (E.D.N.C.1997) (looking to both EEOC Charge and affidavit to determine whether sexual harassment claim filed with EEOC), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1158 (4th Cir.1998); see also Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir.1996) (considering both EEOC Charge and supporting affidavit to determine whether racial harassment claim sufficiently stated); Cheek v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 502 (7th Cir.1994) (determining that in assessing scope of EEOC Charge, court may consider statements in sworn affidavit); Clark v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 18 F.3d 1278, 1280 (5th Cir.1994) (considering affidavit in determining whether EEOC reasonably could be expected to investigate disparate treatment claim).
Construing Johnson’s EEOC Charge and affidavit “with utmost liberality,” Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College, 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir.1988), we believe that Johnson alleges conduct sufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment. The EEOC defines sexual harassment as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when ... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998). When construed liberally, the allegations that Wells told Johnson that he liked her, touched her, summoned her into his office for hours at a time, and called her at home may be considered to be of a sexual nature. Title VII does not require that lay complainants outline their charges with any greater precision. Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 460 (“ ‘EEOC charges must be construed with utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.’”). I, therefore, find that the district court erred in dismissing Johnson’s claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
V.
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the district court granted the Univer*251sity’s Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law against Taylor’s claims, excluded certain relevant evidence during Johnson’s trial, and dismissed Johnson’s sexual harassment claim in error. On these grounds, I believe the district court decision should be vacated.
Judges Michael, Motz and King join in this dissent.

. Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2a(1), (2).

. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), if an employer demonstrates that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court— (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).”

. As I explain below, the University's suggestion that Taylor simply did not have sufficiently senior status to attend the Academy is not supported by the facts.

. Even if we were to find the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive inquiry to be inapplicable to the instant case, I would reach the same result under the more rigorous test set out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). As the majority explains, to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, Taylor must demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to attend the Police Academy; (3) she was not selected to attend the Police Academy; and (4) other officers who are not members of the protected class were selected to attend the Police Academy under similar circumstances. See Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1383 (4th Cir.1995). The majority argues that Taylor cannot satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie test, since "[t]he evidence is overwhelming and uncontradicted that Taylor was not as qualified as the male officers” who were selected. I do not share the majority's enthusiasm regarding the strength of the evidence. Taylor completed two years of college at the University of Oklahoma and ultimately received a Bachelor of Arts degree in journalism from Norfolk State University. She then went on active duty in the military and, after a tour in Germany, completed the U.S. Army military police school at Fort Meade. The record evidence indicates that Taylor was, at least, as qualified as her male counterparts. Given Taylor’s credentials, the majority's suggestion that the evidence of Taylor's lack of qualification is "overwhelming and uncontradicted” is confusing, at best.

. As stated above, Wells proclaimed to another officer that he would never send a female officer to the Academy.

. The evidence suggests that Chief Wells often referred to women in derogatory terms, once stating that a certain woman "ha[d] good pussy.”

. The evidence indicates that Wells had frequently called a former female employee at home, touched her, and told her that he had looked down her blouse once when standing behind her — conduct strikingly similar to that charged by Johnson.

. I need not address Johnson’s contention that the district court's answers to certain jury questions constituted reversible error, since I already have suggested that we remand the case for a new trial.