Court Opinion

ID: 9882508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:53.253167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:06.460757
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hill, 2023-Ohio-2813.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                              CASE NO. 9-22-58

        v.

DOMINIQUE DASHAWN HILL,                                  OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                             Trial Court No. 22-cr-360

                        Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded

                             Date of Decision: August 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        W. Joseph Edwards for Appellant

        Raymond A. Grogan, Jr and William J. Owen for Appellee
Case No. 9-22-58

ZIMMERMAN, J.

        {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Dominique Dashawn Hill (“Hill”), appeals the

September 29, 2022 judgment entry of sentence of the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

        {¶2} On June 22, 2022, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Hill on

Count One of the failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in

violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), (C)(5)(a)(ii), a third-degree felony; Count Two of

tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B), a third-degree

felony; Count Three of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),

(C)(4)(c), a third-degree felony; and Count Four of possession of marihuana in

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(3)(c), a fifth-degree felony. On June 27, 2022,

Hill appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment.

        {¶3} On August 30, 2022, Hill withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered

guilty pleas, under a written plea agreement, to Counts One and Two of the

indictment. In exchange for his change of pleas, the State agreed to dismiss Counts

Three and Four as well as to a joint-sentencing recommendation. The trial court

accepted Hill’s guilty pleas, found him guilty, and dismissed Counts Three and

Four.

        {¶4} On September 29, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hill (contrary to the

parties’ joint-sentencing recommendation) to 24 months in prison on each count,

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Case No. 9-22-58

respectively. The trial court ordered that Hill serve the prison terms consecutively

for an aggregate sentence of 48 months in prison. Further, the trial court ordered

Hill to serve the consecutive sentence imposed in this case consecutively to a 859-

day prison term imposed by the trial court for Hill’s postrelease-control violation,

which he committed at the time he committed the offenses in this case.

       {¶5} On October 28, 2022, Hill filed his notice of appeal. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

                               Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court Erred When it Failed to Inform Appellant of Its
       Authority Under R.C. §2929.141 to Terminate Postrelease
       Control and to Order Him to Serve a Prison Term Consecutively
       to Any Term of Imprisonment Imposed For the Felony Offense to
       Which He Was Pleading Guilty, Therefore Violating Appellant’s
       Due Process Rights By Preventing the Plea From Being Entered
       Knowingly, Intelligently, and Voluntarily.

       {¶6} In his assignment of error, Hill argues that his guilty pleas were not

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Specifically, Hill argues that his guilty pleas

were ineffective because the trial court failed to inform him that it could terminate

his postrelease control and convert it to additional prison time.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶7} “All guilty pleas must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently.” State v. Moll, 3d Dist. Defiance Nos. 4-14-17 and 4-14-18, 2015-

Ohio-926, ¶ 9, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “‘“Failure on

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any of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the

United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.”’” State v. Montgomery, 3d

Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-11, 2014-Ohio-1789, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Veney, 120 Ohio

St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 7, quoting Engle at 527. Crim.R. 11(C)(2), which

governs guilty pleas for felony-level offenses, provides:

       In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea
       of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
       without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the
       following:

       (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
       with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
       penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
       for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
       the sentencing hearing.

       (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
       understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
       court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
       sentence.

       (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
       understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
       trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
       process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
       require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
       doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
       against himself or herself.

       {¶8} “A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally

advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives the

defendant’s constitutional rights.” Montgomery at ¶ 11, citing Veney at ¶ 31.

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Case No. 9-22-58

“‘When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s plea is

invalid.’” Id., quoting Veney at ¶ 31. “A trial court, however, is required to only

substantially comply with the non-constitutional notifications in Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a) and (b).” Id., citing Veney at ¶ 14-17.

       {¶9} “An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based

upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and

determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the

rights he waived.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-

Ohio-509, ¶ 20. “‘Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the

basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a

prejudicial effect. * * * The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been

made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

                                       Analysis

       {¶10} On appeal, Hill argues that his guilty pleas were not knowing,

intelligent, or voluntary because the trial court did not comply with the notifications

required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires that a defendant

understand the ‘nature of the charges against him and the maximum penalty

involved’ in order for his plea to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v.

Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 19, quoting Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

       {¶11} In a recent plurality opinion, the Supreme Court

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       held that a trial court during the plea colloquy must inform a defendant
       who is on post-release control, and is pleading guilty to a new felony
       offense, of the trial court’s authority to revoke the defendant’s
       postrelease control in the prior case and impose a prison term
       consecutively to any term of imprisonment it imposes for the new
       felony offense.

(Emphasis sic.) State v. Myles, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-74, 2020-Ohio-3323, ¶

52, citing State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, ¶ 14-17. See also

State v. Battle, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2022-CA-0002, 2022-Ohio-2444, ¶ 8

(concluding that, under “‘any fair reading of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the potential R.C.

2929.141(A) sentence was part of the “maximum penalty involved” in this case’”),

quoting Bishop at ¶ 17, quoting Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). “Specifically, the Supreme

Court held that a trial court’s failure to inform the defendant that the court would be

required to impose the postrelease control sentence consecutively to the underlying

felony offense sentence is a violation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).” Myles at ¶ 52, citing

Bishop at ¶ 20.

       {¶12} Indeed, under R.C. 2929.141(A)(1),

       [w]hen a person who is on post-release control is convicted of or
       pleads guilty to a new felony committed while that person was on
       post-release control, [the statute] allows a court to terminate the post-
       release control term and instead impose a prison term for the post-
       release control violation in addition to any prison term for the new
       felony.

State v. King, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1205, 2022-Ohio-3359, ¶ 14. “This

additional prison term is also referred to as a ‘judicial sanction.’” Id., quoting

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Bishop at ¶ 13. “The maximum prison term that can be imposed for a violation of

the post-release control is ‘the greater of 12 months or the amount of time that

remained on the existing post-release-control term.’” Id., quoting Bishop at ¶ 13.

“This additional prison term is not mandatory, but if it is imposed, it must be served

consecutively to the prison term for the new felony.” Id. See also Battle at ¶ 8

(“‘Sentences imposed under R.C. 2929.141(A) cannot stand alone. The court may

impose the sentence only upon a conviction for or plea of guilty to a new felony,

making the sentence for committing a new felony while on postrelease control and

that for the new felony itself inextricably intertwined.’”), quoting Bishop at ¶ 17.

       {¶13} In this case, Hill argues that “the trial court completely failed to inform

[him] that a consecutive prison sentence under R.C. § 2929.141(A) was possible.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 6).     Specifically, Hill argues that, because he “was on

polstrelease-control [sic] at the time the offense was committed and had 859 days

remaining,” the trial court was required to inform him during its Crim.R. 11

colloquy “that he could face up to an additional 859 days * * * in prison, to be served

consecutively with the maximum possible 72 month sentence” of which the trial

court informed him. (Id. at 6-7). As a result, Hill contends that, “[b]ecause the court

completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11 when it failed to inform [him] that he

could face up to an additional 859 days * * * in prison, to be served consecutively

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Case No. 9-22-58

with the maximum possible 72 month sentence, [he] need not show prejudice.” (Id.

at 7).

         {¶14} The State does not dispute Hill’s argument “that the trial court did not

inform [him] of [the] potential for imposing postrelease control time.” (Appellee’s

Brief at 1). However, the State urges this court to follow the dissenting opinions in

Bishop and conclude that “‘a trial court does not need to advise a criminal defendant

on postrelease control for a prior felony, during a plea hearing in a new felony case,

of the trial court’s ability under R.C. 2929.141(A) to terminate the defendant’s

existing postrelease control and impose a consecutive prison sentence for the

postrelease-control violation’” under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). (Id., quoting Bishop at

¶ 91 (Fischer, J., dissenting). Contrary to the State’s position, we follow our sister

appellate districts that are adhering to the dictate of the Supreme Court’s plurality

opinion in Bishop. See, e.g., State v. Acosta, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-22-020, 2023-

Ohio-737, ¶ 23.

         {¶15} Thus, based on our review of the record, we agree that the trial court

failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

Specifically, at the August 30, 2022 plea hearing, the trial court discussed the

maximum penalties relating to Counts One and Two during its Crim.R. 11 plea

colloquy, including “the prospective requirements of postrelease control and the

consequences of [Hill] committing a new felony while on postrelease control.”

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Case No. 9-22-58

(Emphasis added.) Acosta at ¶ 21. However, even though Hill was on postrelease

control at the time he committed the offenses in this case, the trial court failed to

advise Hill of its authority to revoke his postrelease control (in the prior case) and

impose a prison term consecutively to any term of imprisonment impose for the new

felony offenses. In other words, even though the trial court apprised Hill of the

maximum sentence that he could receive for his new felony offenses, the trial court

failed to apprise Hill that he was further subject to a separate sentence for his

postrelease-control violation to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed for

his new felony offenses. See id.; Bishop at ¶ 16 (noting that “the trial court told

Bishop that he could receive a maximum sentence of 12 months for his fifth-degree-

felony conviction. But the trial court did not tell Bishop that he was also subject to

a separate consecutive 12-month sentence for his postrelease-control violation”).

       {¶16} Consequently, because we conclude that “the trial court completely

failed to inform [Hill] that a consecutive prison sentence under R.C. 2929.141(A)

was possible,” Hill “need not show prejudice.” Bishop at ¶ 20. Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial court did not substantially comply with the requirements of

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) since the trial court did not notify Hill “that the potential R.C.

2929.141(A) sentence was part of the ‘maximum penalty involved.’” Acosta at ¶

23. Therefore, Hill’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Id.

       {¶17} Hill’s assignment of error is sustained.

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       {¶18} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars

assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for

further proceedings.

                                                             Judgment Reversed and
                                                                  Cause Remanded

WALDICK, J., concurs.

MILLER, P.J., concurring separately.

       {¶19} I agree with the majority’s resolution of the assignment of error based

on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State v. Bishop, 156, Ohio St.3d 156,

2018-Ohio-5132 and its progeny; however, I write to emphasize that trial courts

may need to make an inquiry as part of the plea colloquy regarding whether the

defendant was on any type of supervision when the new offense was committed.

See Bishop at ¶¶ 59 & 62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Unless there is something in

the record advising the court that the defendant was under postrelease control at the

time of the new offense (such as a pretrial release bond investigation), the court will

not know that the R.C. 2929.141(A) judicial sanction is applicable. Id. If R.C.

2929.141(A) is to be considered at sentencing, the court is obligated to so advise a

defendant at the change of plea hearing.

/jlr

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