Court Opinion

ID: 9565500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:22:43.428692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:42.702699
License: Public Domain

TURSI, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent to Parts I and II of the majority opinion.
I.
Since the contracts of sale contemplated the use of the condominium units as security, it was not possible for the contract purchasers to obtain the commitments for the funds necessary to purchase the condominium units. This was caused by the developer’s failure to complete construction and retain title. In a breach of contract action, the plaintiff’s inability to perform is excused if the defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract makes the plaintiff’s performance impossible. See Spartans Industries, Inc. v. John Pillings Shoe Co., 385 F.2d 495 (1st Cir.1967); Cohen v. Kranz, 12 N.Y.2d 242, 238 N.Y.S.2d 928, 189 N.E.2d 473 (1963). See also American Industrial Leasing Co. v. Costello, 160 Colo. 588, 418 P.2d 881 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981).
The law does not require the doing of a useless or futile task. Poznik v. Urton & Co., 30 Colo.App. 475, 496 P.2d 1073 (1972), aff'd, 181 Colo. 15, 506 P.2d 741 (1973). Here it is implicit in the findings of the trial court that it would have been futile for the contract purchasers to have sought loan commitments to be secured by units in the developer’s project. Thus, since the developer’s breach excused the purchasers’ duties and prevented them from being able *1035to tender payments, the purchasers may sue for all damages arising from the breach of contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 243 (1981). The proper measure of damages was awarded by the trial court: the market value of the property at the time the conveyance was to take place minus the unpaid contract price. Bennett v. Moving, 33 Colo.App. 390, 522 P.2d 741 (1974).
I would therefore affirm the trial court’s award of damages to the contract purchasers.
II.
The sales contracts here did not specify a closing date but rather provided for closing “as soon as reasonably possible after construction of the premises is complete.” No closing was ever scheduled as the developers were unable to complete the project and lost title at the foreclosure action.
When a closing does not occur because of the fault of the seller, the seller cannot assert the failure of the sale to consummate as a defense to the broker’s action for commission. See Circle T. Corp. v. Crocker, 155 Colo. 263, 393 P.2d 744 (1964); Gerbaz v. Hulsey, 132 Colo. 359, 288 P.2d 357 (1955). Since the developer made it impossible for the purchasers to obtain financing commitments necessary for closing, the broker did not have to demonstrate that the purchasers were able to close. A party to a contract who is prevented by the other party from discharging his part of the obligation will be treated as though he has performed it. American Industrial Leasing Co. v. Costello, supra; Empson Packing Co. v. Clawson, 43 Colo. 188, 95 P. 546 (1908).
Here, the broker secured sales contracts along with down payments from seven prospective purchasers before the condominium project was completed. The broker did everything necessary to procure these buyers. It may not be denied its commission when the developer, because of its own inadequacies, lost the project by foreclosure.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment against the broker and would award it a commission consistent with the contract between the parties.