Court Opinion

ID: 9673894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:11.828734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.604185
License: Public Domain

Kavanagh, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). The question before the Court is whether the Michigan criminal obscenity statute, MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1), violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Const 1963, art 1, § 5. We all agree that the statute as written and heretofore construed is unconstitutional and therefore reverse the defendant’s conviction. The majority, however, "authoritatively construes” the statute to prospectively incorporate the minimum constitutional standards set forth in Miller v California, 413 US 15; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973).
We dissent from the Court’s prospective interpretation of the statute because we find no clear legislative intent to preserve the criminal obscenity statute as applied to consenting adults or any principled basis on which this Court can choose between various acceptable definitions of what *369depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct are hereafter to be deemed obscene under the statute.1
I
In Miller v California, supra, pp 23-24, the United States Supreme Court set forth the minimum requirements of the First Amendment in the area of obscenity regulation, stating:
"State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. [Citation omitted.] As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be speciñcálly deñned by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Michigan statute, as the majority points out, is unquestionably inadequate. The statute neither specifically defines the conduct forbidden to be obscenely depicted or described, nor is the statute carefully limited in its application. It is, in short, both vague and overbroad. The statute is vague because people of "common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application”. It is overbroad because the wide sweep of its proscription infringes upon free speech rights. Zwickler v Koota, 389 US 241, 249-250; 88 S Ct 391; 19 L Ed 2d 444 (1967).
*370Nonetheless, the majority "with some reluctance” finds support for its preservation of the criminal obscenity statute "in view of previously expressed legislative public policy”. In essence, the Court adheres to a position that the obscenity statute manifests a clear legislative intent to proscribe obscenity to an extent consistent with constitutional limitations, thereby allowing the Court to find legislative approval for whatever interpretation is necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the statute.
Legislative intent with respect to obscenity was not frozen as of 1957, the date of passage of MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1).
This Court has twice specifically mentioned that the Legislature could "supplement the state’s statutory scheme proscribing the dissemination of obscene materials” in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller. People v Llewellyn, 401 Mich 314, 322, fn 3; 257 NW2d 902 (1977); People v Bloss, 394 Mich 79, 81; 228 NW2d 384 (1975). The subsequent legislative inaction with respect to the dissemination of obscene material to consenting adults is particularly important in light of this Court’s decision in Bloss.
In Bloss the Court found that the defendant’s conviction could not stand under the act because the Court had not construed the obscenity statute, in accordance with Miller, to proscribe such conduct. The Court then proceeded to decline the request to so construe the statute, stating, "[w]e are divided as to whether such statutes can properly be construed by us without further legislative expression as proscribing the dissemination of 'obscene’ material to consenting adults.” People v Bloss, supra, p 81. As a result, for over three years Michigan has had no effective obscenity statute *371applicable to consenting adults. Nevertheless, and despite this Court’s notice, the Legislature has chosen to abide this situation.
The legislative inaction over such a sustained period weighs heavily on any interpretation of legislative intent. See Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co (On Rehearing), 380 Mich 513, 520; 158 NW2d 473 (1968). This long period of legislative inaction contrasts not only with the situation in other jurisdictions in which courts have chosen to "authoritatively construe” their obscenity statutes, the majority of such decisions following closely on the heels of the Miller decision and before the Legislature had any substantial period in which to act, but, also, with the Legislature’s own usual promptness in responding to court decisions affecting the constitutionality of its obscenity statutes. Indeed, MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1) was enacted within less than a year of the invalidation of the state’s previous obscenity statute in Butler v Michigan, 352 US 380; 77 S Ct 524; 1 L Ed 2d 412 (1957). Similarly, the amendments to the criminal obscenity statute contained in 1964 PA 143, § 1, effective August 28, were a direct response to the Court’s decision in People v Villano, 369 Mich 428; 120 NW2d 204 (1963), and were enacted shortly after the decision in that case.
The Legislature has enacted a new statute aimed at preventing dissemination of obscene materials to minors, 1978 PA 33. That statute contains precise definitions of the types of sexual conduct the depiction or description of which may be deemed obscene. Its passage demonstrates that the Legislature is not at a loss for innovative responses to the problems posed by the decision in Miller. The new statute, however, so clearly designed to avoid any constitutional problems exist*372ing under former MCL 750.343e; MSA 25.575(5), applies only to minors. The legislative inaction with respect to the regulation of sexually oriented materials disseminated to consenting adults assumes a telling significance in light of the specificity which the Legislature has demonstrated in its effort to devise a constitutional regulation of obscenity with respect to minors.2
Whatever the legislative policy may once have been, the Legislature’s intent as presently manifested is sufficiently ambiguous to warn this Court against trying to rescue the statute by reluctantly adopting an interpretation allegedly mandated by a clear legislative purpose. The Court’s decision supplies a legislative intent which the Legislature itself was unwilling to express despite this Court’s advice and our previous refusal to construe the statute with respect to consenting adults.
II
Running through the majority’s attempt to salvage this obscenity statute is the concept that this Court has a duty to "construe” it, to whatever extent necessary, so that it conforms to minimal constitutional requirements. The majority’s reasoning derives from this Court’s opinion in People v Bricker, 389 Mich 524; 208 NW2d 172 (1973).
Bricker involved the issue of the constitutionality of Michigan’s abortion statute, which was enacted to "prohibit all abortions except those required to preserve the health of the mother”. Id., p 529. The constitutionality of the statute was questioned as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S *373Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973), where it was held that first trimester abortions authorized by the attending physician could not constitutionally be prohibited.
The only question involved in Bricker was whether the statute should be interpreted to include Roe’s first trimester exception. The Court held that when faced with two competing interpretations, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, it was under a duty to preserve the constitutionality of the statute by choosing the constitutional interpretation.
We are convinced that Bricker is inapplicable. It is one thing to judicially construe legislation that legitimately and by fair inference admits of but two constructions, one constitutional and the other not. We will rightly opt for the former. But that is not what we are asked to do in this case.
The United States Supreme Court in Miller has determined that statutes regulating sexually oriented material must specifically define the sexual conduct depicted or described in "obscene” materials. The Michigan obscenity statute does not enumerate specific kinds of sexual conduct, but proscribes obscene depiction or description of all sexual conduct. In an effort to save the statute, the majority chooses which depictions or descriptions of various types of sexual conduct are to be read into the statute and does so without legislative guidance. The danger of such an exercise of judicial power is suggested in United States v Reese, 92 US 214, 221; 23 L Ed 563 (1876):
"We are, therefore, directly called upon to decide whether a penal statute enacted by Congress, with its limited powers, which is in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial *374construction so as to make it operate only on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish. * * * The question, then, to be determined, is, whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only.
"It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. * * *
"To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not to enforce the old one. This is no part of our duty. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
See, also, Marchetti v United States, 390 US 39, 58-61; 88 S Ct 697; 19 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
The majority, on the authority of Miller, Hamling v United States, 418 US 87; 94 S Ct 2887; 41 L Ed 2d 590 (1974); Ward v Illinois, 431 US 767; 97 S Ct 2085; 52 L Ed 2d 738 (1977), and various state court decisions, adopts what Miller suggests were only "a few plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation”, Miller, supra, p 25, as part of its definition of obscenity under the statute. Being examples, the Miller definitions are not constitutionally mandated nor intended to be binding upon the states’ interpretation of their statutes. "We emphasize that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes for the States.” Id. Although the United States Supreme Court in Miller indicated that states could construe their obscenity statutes along the lines of the Miller definitions without violating the Federal Constitution, see Ward v Illinois, supra, the Court did not require state courts to follow such a path. That choice is left to each state.
*375It is unclear why the majority adopts the Miller definitions. Although they were approvingly set forth in its decision, it appears the Miller Court also gave qualified approval to the obscenity statutes adopted by Hawaii (Hawaii Penal Code, title 37, §§ 1210-1216; 1972 Hawaii Sess Laws, act 9, ch 12, part II, pp 126-129) and Oregon (Or Laws 1971, ch 743, art 29, §§ 255-262). Miller, supra, p 24, fn 6. As these statutes appear to be approved by the Court and seem, in their definitions of sexual conduct, to be broader than the Court’s examples are, there is no apparent reason to choose the Court’s definitions over the definitions in these statutes. Yet the majority does so without articulating the rationale for its decision. See State v Shreveport News Agency, Inc, 287 So 2d 464, 472 (La, 1973) (Calogero, J., concurring).
There being no principled basis for choosing between the many and varied constitutionally acceptable definitions of sexual conduct, it is particularly inappropriate for the judiciary to make an unguided, arbitrary choice. The choice should be made by the Legislature and this Court should not usurp its prerogative. This Court should refuse to enforce MCL 750.343a; MSA 28.575(1) until the Legislature complies with the Miller mandate and, as it has done with the obscenity statute relating to minors, explicitly defines that sexual conduct which may not be obscenely depicted or described.
Levin, J., concurred with Kavanagh, J.

 Inasmuch as we find the majority’s construction of the statute harmonizing it with the standards of Miller v California, 413 US 15; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973), unwarranted, we do not reach the question whether that construction comports with Const 1963, art 1. § 5.

 We express no view as to the constitutionality of 1978 PA 33, MCL 722.671 et seq.; MSA 25.254(1) et seq.