Court Opinion

ID: 9656402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:47:48.548252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:32.223635
License: Public Domain

DAY, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. As set forth in my concurrence in State v. Lee, 108 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 321 N.W.2d 108 (1982), a companion case to this one, I interpret the offense of manslaughter-heat-of-passion, as it is set *30forth in sec. 940.05(1), Stats., as involving the taking of a life “without intent to kill.”1
Section 939.32(2), Stats. 1979-80, sets forth the elements of the offense of attempting to commit a particular crime:
“939.32 Attempt .... (2) An attempt to commit a crime requires that the actor have an intent to perform acts and attain a result which, if accomplished, would constitute such crime and that he does acts toward the commission of the crime which demonstrate unequivocally, under all the circumstances, that he formed that intent and would commit the crime except for the intervention of another person or some other extraneous factor.” (Emphasis added.)
In State v. Melvyn, 49 Wis. 2d 246, 250, 181 N.W.2d 490 (1970), this court held that, under the law of this state, a person cannot “attempt” to commit a crime which does not require as one of its elements, the specific intent to commit the criminal act.
The above statute and case law cannot be reconciled with the majority’s conclusion that the offense of “attempted manslaughter-heat of passion” has a place in Wisconsin criminal jurisprudence. Section 940.05(1), Stats., explicitly states that manslaughter-heat-of-passion is the causing of a death “without intent to kill.” To convict someone of attempting to commit a crime, under sec. 939.32(2), requires a finding that he intended to commit the crime, but was unable to do so because of the intervention of some extraneous factor. The statutes are .mutually exclusive.
*31In State v. Carter, 44 Wis. 2d 151, 155, 170 N.W.2d 681 (1969), a defendant convicted of attempted first-degree murder appealed his conviction to this court, arguing that the trial judge should have instructed the jury-on the lesser offenses of attempted second-degree murder, attempted third-degree murder and attempted manslaughter. This court affirmed the conviction, stating:
“The court’s reason for refusing to instruct on [those lesser offenses] was its belief that such crimes do not exist. Such belief is warranted by sec. 939.32(2), Stats.:
“Clearly intent as defined in sec. 939.23 is not an element of any of these crimes. The language of secs. 940.-02, [second-degree murder] 940.03, [third-degree murder] and 940.05, [manslaughter] is not reconcilable with the concept of attempt.”
As the elements of the offense of manslaughter-heat-of-passion defined in sec. 940.05(1), Stats., remain today as they were when this court decided Carter, I would hold that that decision is controlling. Any change to allow “heat of passion” as a mitigating factor in an intentional killing should be done by the legislature rather than this court. The legislature is presumed to know that unless it changes a law the construction put upon it by this court will remain unchanged. State v. Banks, 105 Wis. 2d 32, 46, 313 N.W.2d 67 (1981). Once this court has authoritatively construed a statute, well-established principles of judicial decision-making requires that that construction be maintained until the legislature changes the statute. Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980). Since the legislature has not seen fit to change the manslaughter statute so as to permit heat of passion to be a mitigating factor in a case of intentional killing, it follows that Wisconsin has no offense of attempted manslaughter. This court’s 1969 decision in Carter was the law at the time this offense was committed.
*32I accordingly would reverse the judgment convicting defendant of attempted manslaughter for the reason that no such crime exists.
I am authorized to state that Justice William G. Callow joins in this dissenting opinion.

 “940.05 Manslaughter. Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class C felony :
“(1) Without intent to kill and while in the heat of passion, . . .” (Emphasis added.)