Court Opinion

ID: 9795428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:28:49.690614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:56.705912
License: Public Domain

McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting: I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s failure to suspend the proceedings and conduct a competency hearing was aviolation of K.S.A. 22-3302(1) and due process which mandates reversal of the defendant’s conviction.
The failure to hold a hearing to determine competency is a denial of due process where the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency. State v. White, 263 Kan. 283, 314, 950 P.2d 1316 (1997) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 86 S. Ct. 836 [1966]). K.S.A. 22-3302 protects a defendant’s due process right not to be tried while incompetent by requiring the suspension of proceedings and a competency hearing where the judge finds reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
K.S.A. 22-3302(1) only requires suspension of the proceedings and a competency hearing where the judge finds reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
“At any time after the defendant has been charged with a crime and before pronouncement of sentence, the defendant, the defendant’s counsel or the prosecuting attorney may request a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial. If, upon request of either party or upon the judge’s own knowledge and observation, the judge before whom, the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing conducted to determine the competency of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3302(1).
*186The order in this case made no such finding. Despite this, the majority still finds the order triggered suspension of tire proceedings by presuming the magistrate judge found reason to believe the defendant was not competent: “[W]hen tire magistrate judge ordered the competency determination — presumably because under the statute he found ‘reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial’-the statute commands that tire criminal proceedings should have been suspended.” (Emphasis added.)
From this presumption, the majority concludes that there was a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency; therefore, there was no jurisdiction to proceed in this case until a competency hearing was held. There is nothing in the record to support such a presumption.
There is nothing in the order itself to support the presumption that the motion was granted because the judge had reason to believe a competency evaluation and hearing were necessaiy. To the contrary, the language of the order shows it was granted merely because it was unopposed by the State.
There is also no basis for presuming that die motion seeking the competency determination had provided the judge with a factual basis for the order. The motion does not provide a single factual allegation which would support the need for a competency determination. It simply states: “COMES NOW, the Defendant, Jeffery Davis, by and through his court appointed attorney, Douglas S. Brunson, and moves the court for an Order to Determine Competency.” A motion seeking a competency determination should allege some facts that would indicate a legitimate question concerning the defendant’s competency. Good practice requires no less. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “judges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring issues [of competency] into focus.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176-77, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975).
I am aware that the attorney who filed the motion later testified that he assumed he had had a good faith basis for filing the motion to determine competency. However, he did not testify to any specific behavior or demeanor of the defendant that caused him to believe in the need for a competency hearing. In the absence of *187such specifics, counsel’s testimony that he had a good faith basis for the motion is not entitled to great weight, for counsel would have found himself in an ethical dilemma had he testified otherwise. See Bolius v. Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 989-990(5th Cir., 1979) (discounting trial counsel’s testimony at a retrospective competency hearing that his client was competent when his client entered a guilty plea because of the ethical dilemma counsel would have faced had he testified his client was not competent).
The record also fails to show that there was a hearing at which the judge was provided facts evidencing a concern about the defendant’s competency. The appearance docket does not show any scheduled hearing. The fact that the motion and order are all part of the same document and were filed with the clerk as a single document further indicates that no hearing was set on the motion.
The mere fact that a competency examination was ordered, standing alone as this order does, does not support a presumption that the magistrate judge found there was reason to believe that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Cf. McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 954 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (noting that the mere fact the trial court granted a motion for a competency hearing does not suffice to demonstrate a bona fide doubt that the defendant was not competent).
The next basis for my dissent is that, because there was no evidence demonstrating a bona fide doubt that the defendant was not competent to stand trial, the failure to suspend the proceedings and hold a competency hearing did not deny the defendant due process. See White, 263 Kan. at 314 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375) (The failure to hold a hearing to determine competency is a denial of due process where the evidence raised a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency.).
Nothing in this case demonstrates there was a bona fide doubt about the defendant’s competence. Tellingly, none of the defendant’s four attorneys expressed any concern about his competence (other than the factually unsupported motion). Douglas Brunson, the attorney who filed the motion to determine competency, permitted the defendant to proceed to preliminary hearing without having had a competency determination and testified that he had *188no concern about the defendant’s competency at that time. The defendant’s next attorney, Julie Fletcher Cowell, told the court at the defendant’s arraignment that she was confident he understood the nature of the charges and never raised any concern about the defendant’s competency. Andrew Brown, who represented the defendant in the preparation for trial and through the trial, never raised any concern about defendant’s competency. If any of those attorneys had any doubt about the defendant’s competency, he or she had a duty to either renew the motion or file a new motion to determine competency. None of them did so. The defendant’s competency became a nonissue in the proceedings.
There is also absolutely no evidence that the defendant behaved irrationally, nor is there anything in the record about his demeanor that would raise a doubt about competency. This complete absence of any evidence demonstrating a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence distinguishes the cases cited by the majority.
In People v. Ary, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1016, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (2004), the trial court had conducted a lengthy pretrial hearing on the effect of the defendant’s mental retardation on the admissibility of his confession. The evidence from that hearing constituted substantial evidence raising a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s competence. In the face of such evidence, the failure to suspend the proceedings and hold a competency hearing violated due process. 118 Cal. App. 4th at 1021-25.
Similarly, in Pate, the trial court had before it “uncontradicted testimony of Robinson’s history of pronounced irrational behavior.” 383 U.S. at 385-86. That evidence was sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competence, triggering the obligation to hold a competency hearing. 383 U.S. at 385-86.
The existence in both of those cases of evidence raising a “reasonable doubt” or a “bona fide doubt” about the defendant’s competence stands in stark contrast to the compete lack of such evidence in this case. Further, the record here overwhelmingly demonstrates that the defendant was competent in the months leading up to his trial and during the trial.
First, the defendant filed pro se pleadings and motions that compellingly demonstrate that he understood the nature and purpose *189of the proceedings against him and was capable of assisting in his defense. He filed a pro se motion requesting the dismissal of his attorney and the appointment of new counsel, in which he identified his right to assist his attorney in his defense, and alleged that his attorney had failed to obtain a new defense investigator after the one appointed by the court had died and had failed to respond to his requests for a copy of his file. He filed a pro se petition in federal court challenging the legality of his arrest, the search of his home, and the failure to allow him access to law books. He also filed a pro se habeas corpus action in the state court alleging that his arrest was without probable cause and the search of his home was illegal because it occurred prior to the time the warrant was issued, in violation of his 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendment rights. Moreover, in response to the court’s questions about his allegations, the defendant did a good job identifying the subject matter of most of the constitutional amendments he had cited.
Second, the defendant’s responses to the trial court’s inquiry about his understanding of his decision to enter into stipulations just 1 week before trial began demonstrate his competence. Also, in that same proceeding, the defendant brought to his counsel’s attention the fact that he was not bound over on the battery charge. Of course, that was because the battery charge was a misdemeanor. Nevertheless, the comment shows the defendant was capable of assisting his attorney in his defense.
Last, and most importantly, the defendant’s testimony at trial, which covers 35 pages of the transcript, demonstrates that he understood the nature of the proceedings, the charges against him, and his consent defense. He had great recall of the events, was cooperative with his attorney during direct examination, was not overly subject to suggestion or leading on cross-examination, and was generally clear, coherent, and intelligent. From the record, it is established the defendant actively and appropriately participated in the trial and pretrial proceedings. This is not the more typical situation where a defendant has made only minimal statements on the record, leaving his mental functioning a matter of speculation.
*190Due process is violated when a criminal defendant is tried and convicted while he or she is not competent to stand trial. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 378. Because a defendant’s competency status can change (Drope, 420 U.S. at 181), competency is determined by the defendant’s present ability to understand the charges and rationally assist in the defense. See State v. Brown, 204 Kan. 430, 433, 464 P.2d 161(1970). Thus, the defendant’s competency at the time of trial is the relevant time period when considering whether a due process violation occurred. In this case, even presuming there was a question of competency when the motion was filed, the record clearly shows that there was no competency issue at the time of the trial. In fact, seldom have I seen such a superior level of functioning and understanding of the judicial process by a defendant so clearly demonstrated in the record.
In summary, the failure to hold a hearing to determine competency is a denial of due process only where the evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to the defendant’s competency. In the absence of any such evidence, the sole fact that the magistrate judge ordered a competency determination is insufficient to raise such a doubt. In this case, not only is there no evidence demonstrating a doubt as to the defendant’s competency, this record compellingly demonstrates the defendant was competent at the time of trial. Therefore, I cannot agree that the failure to hold a competency determination and suspend the proceedings deprived the court of jurisdiction and violated the defendant’s due process rights.
I now turn to the issue of the retrospective competency hearing. I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the four McGregor factors to be applied in determining whether a meaningful retrospective competency determination can be made.
The four McGregor factors are (1) the passage of time, (2) the availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, including medical records and prior competency determinations, (3) defendant’s statements in the trial record, and (4) the availability of witnesses who were in a position to interact with defendant before and during trial, including tire trial judge, counsel for both the State and defendant, and jail officials. McGregor, 248 F.3d at 962-63.
*191In holding that a meaningful retrospective competency determination cannot be made in this case, the majority places great weight on the fact that there was no contemporaneous medical evidence presented at the retrospective competency hearing:
“[Although a competency evaluation may be made without a psychiatric or psychological evaluation,] [h]ere, however, the magistrate judge signed an order for a ‘determination of competency to be performed at the Lamed State Hospital, which would entail a psychiatric or psychological examination, or both. When a judge ‘finds that there is reason to beheve that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial’ (K.S.A. 22-3302[l]), finds that the competency concern is sufficient to warrant an order for a medical determination on the issue (K.S.A. 22-3302[3]), and die record is silent on why the judge did not pursue the medical determination, a retrospective judicial determination of competency based on no medical evidence whatsoever cannot stand.”
I disagree with this conclusion for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the mere fact that a competency evaluation was ordered does not provide a sufficient basis to presume that the judge had reason to be concerned about the defendant’s competency and, further, to presume that concern was sufficient to warrant an order for a psychiatric examination.
Second, in emphasizing the lack of medical evidence, the majority’s ruling essentially eliminates the second and fourth Mc-Gregor factors and elevates the third factor to a threshold requirement in cases where a competency determination was ordered but did not occur and there is no contemporaneous medical evidence.
Those factors deserve full consideration. The second factor— the defendant’s statements in the trial record — -should be given great weight in this case, as there was overwhelming evidence of competency in the defendant’s statements in the trial record.
As to tire fourth factor — availability of testimony of witnesses who were in a position to interact with defendant before and during trial — the hearing was so confused and mishandled that very pertinent witnesses were not called, although presumably available.
The State did not subpoena any witnesses for the hearing, apparently because it believed the defendant had the burden of proof. The defense issued subpoenas for Brunson (the attorney who filed the motion to determine competency), Brown (the de*192fendant’s trial attorney), and the trial judge, Judge Meeks. Service was had on Brown and Brunson; however, the subpoena for Judge Meeks was returned with no service. Then, a few days before the hearing, the defense attorney released Brown from his subpoena. It is not clear from the record why this was done.
The day of the hearing there was an issue about who had the burden of proof, and the court placed the burden on tire State by instructing tire prosecutor to go first and call witnesses. Because Brown had been released from appearing, Brunson was the only witness relevant to the competency issue who was present, so tire State called him to testify.
From this record, it cannot be said with confidence that the lack of relevant witnesses was due to their unavailability; rather, it appears to have been the result of confusion over who had tire burden of proof. The State, relying on the rule that the movant in a K.S.A. 60-1507 proceeding carries the burden of proof, was placed in the unfortunate position of having to go foiward with whatever witnesses happened to be out in the hallway. See State v. Duke, 263 Kan. 193, 196, 946 P.2d 1375 (1997) (motion to correct illegal sentence is handled procedurally as a 60-1507 motion); Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (2005 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 229) (60-1507 movant has the burden of proof).
Further, defense counsel’s action in excusing the witness who would likely have had the most relevant testimony on the issue of the defendant’s competency at tire time of trial must weigh in the State’s favor in considering this factor.
Although I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming tire district court’s denial of the motion to correct illegal sentence, the poorly coordinated manner in which the retrospective competency hearing occurred compels me to conclude that, alternatively, if any relief should be considered, the case should be remanded to the district court for another retrospective competency hearing with specific directions to determine, prior to tire hearing, the availability of all relevant witnesses and which party bears the burden of proof, and to prepare accordingly.
However, there is another compelling reason why I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and result. The linchpin of the majority’s *193decision is diat the suspension of proceedings language of K.S.A. 22-3302(1) must be strictly and rigidly applied regardless of evidence in the record that the defendant repeatedly established his competence to stand trial.
For convenience, the statute is set forth at this point:
“At any time after the defendant has been charged with a crime and before pronouncement of sentence, the defendant, die defendant’s counsel or the prosecuting attorney may request a determination of the defendant’s competency to stand trial. If, upon request of either party or upon the judge’s own knowledge and observation, the judge before whom the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing conducted to determine the competency of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3302(1).
It is incongruous to strictly apply K.S.A. 22-3302 to conclude the order in this case deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed when the order underlying that conclusion so utterly fails to conform to that same statute that it was not even capable of being carried out.
K.S.A. 22-3302(3) provides in pertinent part:
“The court may order a psychiatric or psychological examination of tire defendant. To facilitate the examination, the court may: (a) If the defendant is charged with a felony, commit the defendant to the state security hospital or any county or private institution for examination and report to the court, or, if the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor, commit the defendant to any appropriate state, county or private institution for examination and report to the court, except that the court shall not commit tire defendant to the state security hospital or any other state institution unless, prior to such commitment, the director of a local county or private institution recommends to the court and to the secretary of social and rehabilitation services that examination of the defendant should be performed at a state institution.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant was charged with felonies. By statute, the only state facility that could be lawfully ordered to conduct die examination was the Lamed State Security Hospital. In the order, defense counsel designated the Lamed State Hospital as the examining institution. This was appropriate only if the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor.
In its entirety, the order stated:
*194“WHEREUPON the court, after finding no objection from the State, orders that a determination of competency to stand trial should be conducted at the Lamed State Hospital to determine the same.”
The magistrate judge lacked authority to sign such an order. The order did not request “a psychiatric or psychological examination” at the “Lamed State Security Hospital” in accordance with the statute. Rather, the order directed the Lamed State Hospital to determine competency rather than provide a report to the court. The Larned State Hospital had no authority under the order to accept the defendant into its facility or to perform any testing on him. The order was wholly out of compliance with the statute as to purpose and the correct institution. The order is a nullity. The majority applies rigid and strict construction of the suspension of proceedings language but applies no such construction to the order itself. The majority holds the entry of the invalid order and failure to suspend further proceedings based thereon deprived the court of jurisdiction to try the defendant. I strongly disagree. The trial court, the State, and all three defense counsel recognized the defendant was competent to stand trial and acted accordingly.
It is interesting that the matter of failure to hold a competency hearing did not surface until 2 years after the defendant’s convictions — after the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions on his direct appeal. The issue surfaced in the defendant’s pro se motion to correct his sentence.and a later pro se motion to correct sentence. His well-established competence continues.
I would affirm the district court and the Court of Appeals.