Court Opinion

ID: 9723678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:26:50.950986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:15.416283
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority that the trial court was without authority to amend the complaint but must dissent from that portion of the opinion which concludes that the State had the right to appeal in this matter. The majority’s conclusion relies upon the interpretation given our present Rule 604(a) by Love, Petropoulos and Finkelstein, yet all three of these cases are easily distinguished from the instant case. In each of the cited cases, the defendants filed a motion to quash, the motions were allowed and they were released without penalty. In the instant case, defendants took no action but the court, on its own motion, amended the complaint; defendants were not set free but were convicted and suffered a penalty. (Rotramel, Campbell and Peru paid their fines and costs; Campbell was additionally deprived of her driving privileges for one month; all, we assume, sustained a mark on their driving records). The majority reasons that the court’s amendment in effect amounted to dismissal of the complaint for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It is my view that the substantive effect of the court’s amendment was to reduce the charge under the original complaint, not to dismiss the complaint in toto. The defendants were not discharged or released but found guilty of a less offense. Now, after having fulfilled their sentences, the majority’s opinion requires that they again stand trial on the original charges, due to .error on the part of the trial judge. The majority concedes that the State could have re-filed the original charge but concludes that it would be a burdensome procedure and amount to a collateral attack on the court’s order. Were we to assume the procedure burdensome (an assumption I do not share), such burden would be minimal compared to that placed on the defendants herein. In any case, justice to the defendants cannot be weighed against an inconvenience to the State. I am of the opinion that, in this instance, it would have been appropriate and proper for the State to collaterally attack the unauthorized order by re-filing the original charge. The majority further concedes that the State could have filed a mandamus but was not required to do so “when the relief it seeks may be obtained on direct appeal.” Thus, with a conclusionary statement, the majority dispenses with the very issue raised on appeal and thereby begs the question. Such position fails to acknowledge that the issue, the question of the authority of the trial judge to act as he did, was never raised in or passed upon by the trial court. Under the circumstances here, believe that the State should properly have followed one of the procedures which it earlier suggested. I therefore would dismiss the appeal brought herein but would include in my opinion that portion of the majority opinion substantiating the trial court’s lack of authority to amend the complaint.