Court Opinion

ID: 9372559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 21:08:15.597352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.380816
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Parsons, 2023-Ohio-502.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035
 TRAVIS PARSONS

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Delaware County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 21 CRI 03 0177

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        February 21, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 WILLIAM T. CRAMER                              MELISSA A. SCHIFFEL
 470 Olde Worthington Road – Suite 200          Delaware County Prosecuting Attorney
 Westerville, Ohio 43082
                                                MARK C. SLEEPER
                                                Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
                                                145 North Union Street, 3rd Floor
                                                Delaware, Ohio 43015
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                   2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Travis Parsons appeals the judgment entered by the

Delaware Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of no contest to two

counts of aggravated vehicular assault (R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a)) and two counts of

vehicular assault (R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b)), and sentencing him to an aggregate prison

term of thirty-six months. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   In September of 2020, Appellant was involved in a traffic accident which

seriously injured two occupants of another vehicle. As a result of the accident, Appellant

was indicted by the Delaware County Grand Jury with two counts of aggravated vehicular

assault   (R.C.   2903.08(A)(1)(a))    and   two    counts   of   vehicular   assault   (R.C.

2903.08(A)(2)(b)).

       {¶3}   Appellant’s blood was tested for alcohol at Riverside Methodist Hospital

following the crash. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the test results, arguing his blood

was improperly collected and analyzed.

       {¶4}   The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress.

Tabitha Bowen testified she was working as a phlebotomist at Riverside Methodist

Hospital on September 27, 2020, and withdrew blood from Appellant in the emergency

room of the hospital. She testified as part of the procedure to draw blood, she would wipe

a small part of the patient’s arm with a sterile cotton swab saturated with isopropyl alcohol

to disinfect the area where she intended to inject the needle.

       {¶5}   Dr. Nicholas Wongchaowart, director of the laboratory at the hospital,

testified hospital protocol provided an alcohol swab was not to be used when cleaning the

site of the area for a blood draw for alcohol testing. However, he testified the possibility
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                  3

of contamination of the sample from the alcohol swab was not certain, as some studies

found an issue with use of an alcohol swab, while other studies did not.

       {¶6}   The trial court acknowledged the use of the alcohol swab was not in

substantial compliance with the methods approved by the Ohio Department of Health.

However, the trial court found pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a), substantial compliance

with Department of Health regulations is not required when blood has been withdrawn

and analyzed by a health care provider. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress,

finding the potential problems with the blood draw caused by use of the alcohol swab

went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

       {¶7}   Appellant entered a plea of no contest to all four counts of the indictment.

The trial court merged the counts of vehicular assault with the counts of aggravated

vehicular assault, and the State elected to have Appellant sentenced on the two counts

of aggravated vehicular assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirty-six months

incarceration on each count, to be served concurrently.

       {¶8}   It is from the April 19, 2022 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes

his appeal, assigning as error:

              APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY

       THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OF

       A BLOOD-ALCHOL TEST WHERE THE NURSE USED AN ALCOHOL-

       BASED ANTISEPTIC.
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                   4

                                                 I.

       {¶9}   In his sole assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

failing to suppress the results of his blood-alcohol test because the use of an alcohol

swab by the phlebotomist violated hospital policy.

       {¶10} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988;

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142,

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). The application of the law to the trial court's

findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, supra. Moreover, due

weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local

law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663.

       {¶11} R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a) provides:
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                5

             (D)(1)(a) In any criminal prosecution or juvenile court proceeding for

      a violation of division (A)(1)(a) of this section or for an equivalent offense

      that is vehicle-related, the result of any test of any blood or urine withdrawn

      and analyzed at any health care provider, as defined in section 2317.02 of

      the Revised Code, may be admitted with expert testimony to be considered

      with any other relevant and competent evidence in determining the guilt or

      innocence of the defendant.

      {¶12} This Court has previously acknowledged this statute sets forth a different

standard of admissibility for admission of blood or urine tests withdrawn and analyzed by

a health care provider, and substantial compliance with Ohio Department of Health

regulations is not required. See State v. Schubert, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00040,

2021-Ohio-1478, 170 N.E.3d 1296, ¶¶10- 11, reversed on other grounds, 2022-Ohio-

4604, citing State v. Oliver,9th Dist. Summit No. 25162, 2010-Ohio-6306.

      {¶13} While Appellant concedes his blood was both withdrawn and analyzed by a

health care provider and therefore R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a) applies, he argues R.C.

4511.19(D)(1)(a) does not allow the admission of test results where the blood was not

drawn and analyzed in accordance with hospital policy.

      {¶14} Appellant cites State v. Harper, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105961, 2018-Ohio-

690, 107 N.E.3d 709, in support of his argument. In Harper, neither the person who drew

the blood nor the person who analyzed the blood testified at the suppression hearing.

The doctor who testified at the hearing had no firsthand knowledge of the testing and

analysis of the defendant’s blood, and no evidence was presented proper protocols were
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                    6

followed. The trial court suppressed the evidence, and the State appealed. The Court of

Appeals found R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a) provides the results may be admitted with expert

testimony, but the trial court was not required to admit the results with expert testimony.

The court found under the facts of the case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

suppressing the test results. Id. at ¶36.

       {¶15} The instant case arises from a different procedural posture than Harper, as

in the instant case, the trial court admitted the evidence. Further, in the instant case the

State presented the testimony of witnesses with firsthand knowledge of the blood draw

and testing procedures, and the record is therefore not devoid of evidence regarding

compliance with hospital protocols for drawing and analyzing the samples. Rather, in the

instant case, the only challenge to the test result is the use of an alcohol swab to clean

the area before drawing blood, in violation of hospital protocol.

       {¶16} The State cites this Court to State v. Mendoza, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-10-

008, 2011-Ohio-1971, in which the court found the blood alcohol test results admissible

pursuant to R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a) despite the fact the nurse who drew the blood used an

alcohol swab, in violation of Department of Health regulations. Appellant attempts to

distinguish Mendoza on the basis there was no evidence in Mendoza the use of the

alcohol swab violated hospital protocol. We find this to be a legally insignificant difference

at this stage of the proceedings. R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a) does not require the blood or

urine be analyzed in strict or even substantial compliance with hospital protocol to be

admissible; it simply provides if the sample is drawn and analyzed by a health care

provider, the result may be admitted with expert testimony. We agree with the conclusion

of the trial court in this case the possible shortcoming in the blood draw process goes to
Delaware County, Case No. 22 CAA 05 0035                                                  7

the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. As noted by the trial court, Appellant

would have been free to argue at trial the test results should have been given little weight

in light of the phlebotomist’s use of isopropyl alcohol at the site where the needle was to

be injected.

       {¶17} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Delaware County

Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Wise, J. and
Delaney, J. concur