Court Opinion

ID: 9729131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:27:01.16445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.543061
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion bt
Mb. Justice Bell:
Plaintiff, of course, has the burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of her injury: Gayne v. Carey Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 618, 123 A. 2d 432; Finnin v. Neubert, 378 Pa. 40, 105 A. 2d 77. Furthermore, plaintiff must also make out a case free from contributory negligence: Fries v. *190Ritter, 381 Pa. 470, 112 A. 2d 189; Lewis v. Quinn, 376 Pa. 109, 101 A. 2d 382.
The evidence showed clearly and indisputably that plaintiff in broad daylight with nothing to obstruct her view stepped and slipped on a banana peel and fell as a result of that slip! After she had started falling, one foot slipped on the grease spot which she saw and of which defendant had constructive notice. Had plaintiff not slipped on the banana peel it is clear beyond the possibility of a doubt that the accident could not have happened (unless she was guilty of contributory negligence) because she admitted that she saw the grease spot and knew it was dangerous and must be avoided. As Judge Weiss, the trial Judge, convincingly said: “The testimony of the wife plaintiff is replete with statements that it was the banana peel on which she first slipped, and it is clear that but for that slipping on the banana peel, there would have been no accident.” There was no evidence how long the banana peel had been there and admittedly defendant had no actual or constructive notice of its existence.
Chief Justice Stern’s language in DeLuca v. Manchester Ldry. & Dry Cl. Co., 380 Pa. 484, 488-489, 491, 112 A. 2d 372, is equally applicable in this case: “... assuming, arguendo, that the Laundry Company was guilty of a violation of the provisions of the statute and therefore negligent per se, such negligence was not a ground of liability unless it was the proximate and efficient cause of the accident in question: Hayes v. Schomaker, 302 Pa. 72, 77, 152 A. 827, 829; Hutchinson v. Follmer Trucking Company, 333 Pa. 424, 427, 5 A. 2d 182, 183; Shakley v. Lee, 368 Pa. 476, 478, 84 A. 2d 322, 323; Purol, Inc. v. Great Eastern System, Inc., 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 341, 344, 345, 197 A. 543, 544, 545; Vunak v. Walters, 157 Pa. Superior Ct. 660, *191662, 43 A. 2d 536, 537. This is because an act of negligence which creates merely a passive background or circumstance of an accident does not give rise to a right of recovery if the accident was in fact caused by an intervening act of negligence which is a superseding cause: Stone v. Philadelphia, 302 Pa. 340, 153 A. 550; Schwartz v. Jaffe, 324 Pa. 324, 332, 188 A. 295, 298; Kline v. Moyer and Albert, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A. 43; Ashworth v. Hannum, 347 Pa. 393, 397, 398, 32 A. 2d 407, 409; Venorick v. Revetta, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 455, 33 A. 2d 655.
. . ‘Where a second actor has become aware of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original tortfeasor, and thereafter, by an independent act of negligence, brings about an accident, the first tortfeasor is relieved of liability, because the condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause.’* ...
“Ordinarily the question whether the negligence of a defendant is a proximate cause of the accident is for the fact-finding tribunal (Landis, Administratrix v. Conestoga Transportation Company (No. 1), 349 Pa. 97, 100, 36 A. 2d 465, 466), but where the relevant facts are not in dispute and the remoteness of the causal connection between defendant’s negligence and plaintiff’s injury clearly appears from the evidence the question becomes one of law and, as such, is within the scope of appellate review: Rugart v. Keebler-Weyl Baking Co., 277 Pa. 408, 414, 121 A. 198, 200; Leoni v. Reinhard, 327 Pa. 391, 396, 194 A. 490, 492; Irwin Savings & Trust Company v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 349 Pa. 278, 283, 37 A. 2d 432, 434; Frisch v. Texas Company, 363 Pa. 619, 621, 622, 70 A. 2d 290, 291, *192292; Rocbe v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 169 Pa. Superior Ct. 48, 57, 82 A. 2d 332, 337.”
Furthermore, plaintiff’s evidence showed she was clearly guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of lav/; failure to see the banana peel because she was looking at the grease spot cannot, factually or legally, excuse her failure to see and avoid the banana peel. For each of these reasons I would affirm the judgment non obstante veredicto entered by the lower Court.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this Dissenting Opinion.

 Italics ours.