Court Opinion

ID: 9768543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:07:59.529187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.843746
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. Ms. Black’s deposition states with respect to the floor on which she allegedly slipped: “They had just waxed it .... I know they had just waxed it because you could tell, it was real-shiny.” In response, a store employee testified the concrete floor “does not contain any wax. .. .” That creates an issue of fact, and a summary judgment should not have been entered. The majority opinion engages in weighing Ms. Black’s deposition testimony against that presented by Wal-Mart. That should not be done at this stage of the case. Ms. Black’s allegation is that the floor had been made unsafely slippery; her testimony is that the condition of the floor was created because it had just been waxed. In National Credit Corp. v. Ritchey, 252 Ark. 106, 477 S.W.2d 488 (1972), we stated the obvious, i.e., if wax is applied to the floor, it must be in such manner as to afford reasonably safe conditions for invitees. We held summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of the property owner because the matter of whether a waxed floor is reasonably safe presented a question of fact. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish the evidence in that case from that now before us. In my view, again, Ms. Black’s observation that the floor had just been waxed is sufficient to raise a factual issue on that point. The majority opinion relies on J.M. Mulligan’s Grille v. Aultman, 300 Ark. 544, 780 S.W.2d 554 (1989), which is distinguishable. Ms. Aultman’s contention was not that the property owner had done anything to heighten the slipperiness of the floor on which she was injured. It was, rather, that the floor was composed of a material which was too slick. The only evidence she presented was her testimony that the floor was “slippery.” We noted that she offered no evidence that the materials of which the floor were constructed were in any way defective. A trial was held resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff. We held the Trial Court should have granted a directed verdict for the property owner as the evidence was insufficient to have gone to the jury. The question whether Ms. Black’s evidence will be sufficient to go to a jury is not before us. The question before us is whether it was error for the Trial Court to hold there was “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c). It was error. I respectfully dissent.