Court Opinion

ID: 9740234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:30:35.658727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.058534
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SULLIVAN, dissenting: While I concur in the finding of the majority that the construction of the driving range in Jackson Park was a proper park purpose, I do not agree with its holding that the Inter-Agency Referral Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par 11 — 12—4.1) (IARA) should govern the outcome of the present case. The majority correctly points out that section 11 — 48.2—2 of the municipal code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 11 — 48.2—2) (1969 Act) continues to apply to the city, but it gives no indication as to how it reached the conclusion that the Lakefront Protection Ordinance (LPO) purports to apply to all State and municipal agencies. Neither does it reconcile the IARA with the language of the 1969 Act which gives express authorization to municipalities to enact ordinances such as the LPO and to regulate construction projects on specially designated lands. The 1969 Act provides in relevant part: The majority fails to explain how the IARA preempts the 1969 Act, upon which the city relied in enacting the LPO, nor does it justify its conclusion that IARA prevails over the LPO. It seems clear that the 1969 Act and the LPO are in harmony and that given their plain and ordinary meaning so as to give effect to legislative intent (Totten v. State Board of Elections (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 288, 403 N.E.2d 225; Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 361 N.E.2d 585), they are animated by the single purpose of granting open and explicit authorization to the Plan Commission, as the city’s duly constituted agency, to approve any proposed construction project in a Lakefront park by any State or municipal agency. The 1969 Act empowers the city to protect the lakefront parks through creation of the Plan Commission, which enforces the LPO as a city ordinance. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 11 — 48.2—3.) In essence, the IARA applies only to reports issued by plan commissions and is silent as to the power of the Plan Commission to enforce a city ordinance. The authority of the Plan Commission to issue a report that a proposed construction project is incompatible with the city’s comprehensive plan is quite distinct from the Plan Commission’s authority as a duly constituted agency of the city to reject the Park District’s proposals for construction or other alterations on park lands specially designated for protection by statute. The Park District did, in fact, file an application for Plan Commission approval in an effort to comply with the LPO, which application the City Commissioner of Planning recommended for approval, and the then Plan Commission Chairman expressed an opinion that the ordinance did not apply. However, their actions do not diminish the importance that should attach to the required prior approval, under the law, by the Plan Commission of public construction projects within the Lakefront Protection District. “The corporate authorities in all municipalities shall have the power to provide for the official designation by ordinance of areas, * * * having a special historical, community, or aesthetic interest or value; and in connection with such areas, “ * 0 so designated by ordinance, whether owned or controlled privately or by any public body, ” * e to impose regulations governing construction, alteration, demolition and use, * ° (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 11 — 48.2—2.) A principle of reciprocity underlies this rationale. The Park District should not be exempt from the city’s statutory authority to regulate the activities of state and municipal agencies in the Lakefront parks. By the same token, the city should not unilaterally preclude the Park District, in the exercise of its statutory authority, from implementing proper park purposes. Because of the often complex nature of government and the existence of many co-equal governmental units, it is necessary that cooperation among such units be encouraged particularly where conflicts over jurisdictional matters arise. Accordingly, the rights of co-equal governmental units must be balanced so as to give maximum effect to enactments under which they were created. (See City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 11, 15, 268 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting); Village of Swansea v. County of St. Clair (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 184, 359 N.E.2d 866. See also City of Highland Park v. County of Cook (1975), 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 344 N.E.2d 665.) Implicit in this principle, however, is the corollary that absolute discretion cannot be excised from one governmental body and engrafted upon another. Moreover, the courts will afford injunctive relief “where an exercise of power exceeds the statutory grant.” (City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 11, 14, 268 N.E.2d 428, 430.) In the present case, therefore, while the Plan Commission is obligated by law to make the ultimate decisions concerning the feasibility of construction projects in Lakefront parks, it should not withhold approval from Park District requests which, in light of the totality of the circumstances, are reasonable and consistent with the Park District’s statutory authority. The absence of all restraint on the Plan Commission would unnecessarily confine the Park District’s activities and ultimately thwart the objectives of the legislature. The majority’s finding that the IARA is dispositive effectively invalidates both section 11 — 48.2—2 of the 1969 Act and the Lakefront Protection Ordinance. That result would be avoided, however, by a holding that the IARA applies to reports of plan commissions but that section 11 — 48.2—2 of the 1969 Act applies to certain types of ordinances defined therein. Under that section, a municipality having the status of a home-rule unit (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(a)) may create a plan commission and approve, as part of a comprehensive plan, an area designated to have “a special historical, community, or aesthetic interest or value” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 24, par. 11 — 48.2—2). In that situation the 1969 Act applies, and consistent with that Act the city has authorized, the Plan Commission by means of the LPO as its agency to grant or withhold approval of changes due to construction. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 24, par. 11 — 48.2—3. It also is important to recognize the significant influence that public policy considerations exert on statutory interpretation. (See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction 401 (4th ed. 1973).) The holding that the Park District is not governed by the LPO invites it to disregard the wishes of the community as expressed through public participation at Plan Commission proceedings. Such a result denigrates the effective functioning of the democratic processes on which administrative agencies such as the Plan Commission are founded and curtails the ability of the public to assist the decision-makers both in the Park District and in the Plan Commission. The majority’s interpretation of the statutes in question is, therefore, inconsistent with the public interests here affected. See City of Philadelphia v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (1973), 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 280, 303 A.2d 247; also see Board of Education v. Board of Education (1957), 12 Ill. App. 2d 97, 139 N.E.2d 173. The majority suggests that it gives a common sense interpretation of the IARA as permitting plan commissions to render only advisory opinions, especially as the IARA is read in relation to the status of the Park District. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 105, par. 333.1 et seq.) However, it appears to me that its interpretation ignores not only the plain meaning of the 1969 Act but also the fundamental rule of statutory construction that two statutes on the same subject matter and parts of a comprehensive statutory scheme should be read in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent and avoid injustice. (Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp. (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 211, 319 N.E.2d 753; People ex rel Scott v. Illinois Racing Board (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 569, 301 N.E.2d 285; Petterson v. City of Naperville (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371; People ex rel. Community High School District No. 231 v. Hupe (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 434, 118 N.E.2d 328.) Moreover, the majority’s interpretation seems contrary to legislative intent since its statement that “[tjhis court will not give effect to an ordinance of one unit of local government which frustrates and contravenes the statutory authority granted to another” is precisely the consequence of its refusal to read the IARA in pari materia with the 1969 Act. Its statement that co-equal units of government should be encouraged to cooperate is not likely to be realized in view of its holding that the Park District may reject, in its discretion, any recommendation of the Plan Commission. The majority’s interpretation of the IARA invites the Park District to regard its decisions as inviolate, not only in dealing with the Plan Commission but also with the city and the community. It is also noteworthy that the cases cited by the majority for the proposition that the Park District exercises plenary power over park lands were decided many years prior to the 1969 Act, which is clearly contrary to those cases to the extent that it authorizes the city through the Plan Commission to regulate construction in Lakefront parks. In essence, by finding that the IARA governs, the city is stripped of its power to delegate authority to the Plan Commission to impose regulations or adopt other measures to preserve and protect areas on which cultural significance has been conferred. It is disingenuous to construe conflicting statutes in a manner detrimental to the city’s ability to achieve that goal. Finally, concerning the home-rule issue, while it may be technically correct to say that City of Des Plaines v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 29, 319 N.E.2d 9, holds that acquisition of home-rule powers does not alter pre-existing legal relationships between a municipality and another unit of government, that case is distinguishable from the instant case in that City of Des Plaines involved a city ordinance that would have had extraterritorial effect on other governmental entities. Such is not the case here with respect to the LPO. Extraterritoriality has been one of the traditional bases for our supreme court’s interpretation of the home-rule provision of the Illinois Constitution. Metropolitan Sanitary District v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 256, 347 N.E.2d 716. It would appear that the city has authority under the home rule provision of article VII, section 6 to regulate activity in the Lakefront parks, as such regulation clearly pertains to Chicago’s “government and affairs.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §6(a).) The LPO has no impact on any other municipalities or home-rule units and will not affect future developments in the region beyond the city. (See City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433; City of Highland Park v. County of Cook (1975), 37 Ill. App. 3d 15, 344 N.E.2d 665.) Also because of the 1969 Act, the city’s exercise of home-rule powers over Lakefront parks does not alter the legal relations between it and the Park District. It thus appears that the city could, under its home-rule powers, enforce the LPO through the Plan Commission, for in so doing the city would be exercising its authority over local affairs. Such action would achieve objectives pertaining exclusively to the city and would not affect any other unit of local government outside its jurisdiction. In summary, it is my belief that the trial court correctly determined the driving range to be a proper park installation and that the Park District was and remains subject to the provisions of the LPO under which approval of the Plan Commission was required for the project in question.