Court Opinion

ID: 9447368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:33:07.029438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:00.606889
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Believing that the result of the judgment in this case and its affirmance in this court run directly counter to the truth and right of the case, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion which approves such a result. Whether the personal interrogation by the judge, over the objections of plaintiff’s counsel, of defendant Delafield to obtain from him his intent and opinion as to the meaning and effect of the policy provisions in question,1 and of the insurance agent to *686obtain his view, was because the district judge thought the suit was one for reformation of the policy, or whether he thought that he had a right in law in interpreting the policy to seek out the intent and opinions of the parties to it as to what was meant and intended by it, is not clear.
It is quite clear, however, from this interrogation and from his findings: (1) that Delafield thought he was buying full coverage; (2) that Delafield was told by insurer’s agent that the policy of insurance afforded full coverage (this, in fact, was true); (3) that Delafield did not read all of the policy and did not read Par. 10 of the typewritten part of the policy containing the indemnity agreement, and he had no discussion with the agent of insurer as to whether or not in certain cases the insurance company might have to pay for a loss under the policy and then collect the amount of such payment from Delafield; (4) that a special agent of the insurer testified that no additional premium was charged the insured for extending the general common carrier coverage, that the court accepts this as true, and that there is no evidence that the insurer’s method of computing premiums was known to Delafield; and (5) that the agent also testified, over objection, that the consideration to support the additional coverage was the indemnity agreement on the part of the insured contained in Par. 10 of the rider and his finding. “We find as a fact that this is true but it is not shown that Delafield was informed or had any knowledge thereof.”; that the district judge mistakenly thought that if Delafield did not know and understand the meaning and effect of the paragraph 10, it could not be enforced against him.
It is also clear that his Conclusion of Law No. 5, that the liability of the insurer to the plaintiff, for which the insurer seeks indemnity, is not in consequence of the attachment to the policy of an endorsement which the insured Delafield was required by provisions of state and federal laws to file with the policy of insurance, is directly contrary to the facts, particularly those just above stated as Nos. 4 and 5.
If, as the district judge seemed to think, reformation was called for, it was the insurer which, charging no money premium for the extra coverage but extending it entirely in consideration of *687the inclusion of paragraph 10 of the typewritten rider, was entitled to a decree reforming the policy to give it the indemnity it had purchased by granting the insured full coverage. It seems clear to me, however, that this is not a case for reformation but one in which, under the undisputed facts and the findings of the court, judgment should have, as matter of law, gone for the insurer.
It seems clear to me, also, upon the record, that it would have gone for the insurer but for the district judge’s mistaken idea that because Delafield did not fully understand the meaning and effect of the agreement which he did not even read, he ought not to be bound by his contract, and this in the face of the fact, that Delafield stated that the negotiations were not conducted entirely by him but by others also, and of the law, that in law his intent or feeling could have no bearing on the case. The three cases cited by appellant, one from this court, Wheeler v. American Fidelity & Casualty Company, Inc., 5 Cir., 164 F.2d 590, Bennett v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York, 10 Cir., 192 F.2d 748, and Travelers Mutual Cas. Co. v. Herman, 8 Cir., 116 F.2d 151, establish the validity of the indemnity agreement and it cannot be the law that because the insured did not read or understand the provisions of his policy he should be saved from abiding by them.
The point, of which the majority makes so much, that the full liability on the bond required by the Interstate Commerce Commission was limited to $1000, is, in my opinion, without bearing on this case. The facts show that the insurer gave the insured full coverage beyond the terms of the original policy in exchange for the insured’s agreement to indemnify it for losses growing out of that coverage. The law ought to be, and I think is, that the insurer having carned out its part of the bargain, the m sured should be held to his.
Finally, the majority is in error in thinking and holding that because the suit was not brought for the purpose of reforming the contract for mutual mistakes, such relief could not be granted in the cause. This court has long held to the contrary.2 In addition, if the court is of the opinion that if the issue had been made below, reformation could or should have been granted, the court can and should reverse the cause with directions to try the issue under the governing legal rules.
Rehearing denied: HUTCHESON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. “The Court: Did you read this portion of tho policy, Mr. Delafield, that defines the word ‘collision’ and wherein a distinction is made to say this policy would not include a contact of any article or object being transported except as a result of a collision of the transporting vehicle?
“The Witness: No, sir, I did not read it.
*686“The Court: Did you actually negotiate this insurance contract yourself?
“The Witness: Well, part of it I did.
“The Court: Someone in the office got this contract for you?
“The Witness: Well, they helped out.
“The Court: Did you call up the man who wrote the policy for you?
“The Witness: I didn’t have to call him. He was there nearly every day.
“The Court: Did you discuss with him the meaning of this policy?
“The Witness: Yes, sir, I sure did.
“Mr. Porter: Judge, is it proper to object to a question of the Court?
“The Court: I think that is improper. X think the intent of the parties may be governed here in the final analysis. You have a right to call the insurance agent who wrote it.
“Mr. Porter: The insurance agent hasn’t a right to change a policy.
“The Court: Where do we go if there is ambiguity in the policy?
“Mr. Porter: I understand you read the whole policy and get your intent from that.
“The Court: If there is ambiguity after reading all of that, then what do we do according to your understanding of the law?
“Mr. Porter: You simply can’t ask a man who got the policy through one of his employees and never read it himself.
“The Court: I am trying to find out what the terms were of negotiating this policy. Of course, the law is pretty well settled that if there was ambiguity the ambiguity is resolved against the person who wrote the policy. I think if I could resolve it by the intent of the parties it would be better.
“Your objection is denied. Who did you discuss this policy with?
“The Witness: Walter Trahan.
“The Court: Had you had any previous losses similar to this loss?
“The Witness: Well, not to the extent of that loss. I had some minor losses from time to time.
“The Court: Judge Porter will object to this question.”

. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Rabinowitz, 5 Cir., 227 F.2d 300; Day v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 5 Cir., 67 F.2d 257; See particularly Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Springfield, Mass. v. Martin, 5 Cir., 77 F.2d 492. Cf. Northern Assur. Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass’n, 203 U.S. 106, 27 S.Ct. 27, 51 L.Ed. 109, and 45 Am.Jur., “Reformation of Instrument”, Sec. 11, p. 589.