Court Opinion

ID: 9899017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 19:00:54.415679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:15.936706
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13973    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 11/15/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13973
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JORGE CHICA-GILER,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-14035-JEM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13973

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Appellant Jorge Chica-Giler appeals his total sentence of 262
       months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea for conspiracy to
       deal in firearms without a license, to smuggle firearms from the
       United States, and to fail to notify a common carrier of shipped fire-
       arms, and dealing in firearms without a license; smuggling firearms
       from the United States; delivery of a firearm to a common carrier
       without written notification; and possession of a firearm by an un-
       lawful alien. On appeal, Chica-Giler argues that the district court
       erred in denying him an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction un-
       der U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) because he pled guilty prior to trial, and he
       claims that the district court imposed a procedurally and substan-
       tively unreasonable sentence by failing to consider his mitigation
       evidence and imposing a sentence significantly higher than the sen-
       tences of his co-conspirators. Chica-Giler also contends that the
       court should remand his case with instructions that the district
       court correct the mathematical discrepancy between the district
       court’s intended total sentence and its count-by-count breakdown
       of his sentence. Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the
       record, we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part.
                                            I.
               We review for clear error “a district court’s determination
       that a defendant has not accepted responsibility.” United States v.
       Bates, 960 F.3d 1278, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). To be clearly erroneous,
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       22-13973                Opinion of the Court                          3

       the district court’s finding must leave us with a “definite and firm
       conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
       Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
       omitted). The district court’s finding that a defendant has not ac-
       cepted responsibility is owed “great deference on review” and it
       “should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.” Bates,
       960 F.3d at 1293-94 (quotation marks omitted).
               The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-
       level reduction “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance
       of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Appropriate
       considerations for an adjustment under § 3E1.1 include, among
       other things, whether the defendant: (1) truthfully admitted the
       conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and truthfully admit-
       ted or did not falsely deny any additional relevant conduct; (2) vol-
       untarily surrendered to authorities promptly after the commission
       of the offense; (3) voluntarily terminated or withdrew from crimi-
       nal conduct or criminal associations; (4) voluntarily provided assis-
       tance to the authorities in recovering the fruits and instrumentali-
       ties of the offense; and (5) timely manifested the acceptance of re-
       sponsibility. Id. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1). The acceptance-of-re-
       sponsibility reduction is “not intended to apply to a defendant who
       puts the government to its burden of proof at trial.” Id., comment.
       (n.2). See also United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1373 (11th Cir.
       1998), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by United States v.
       Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that in the con-
       text of an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, “pleas on the eve
       of trial are not timely” because pleas at that time do not help the
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13973

       government avoid trial preparation or the district court manage its
       docket).
              “The defendant has the burden of clearly demonstrating ac-
       ceptance of responsibility and must present more than just a guilty
       plea.” United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006)
       (internal quotation marks omitted). A party challenging a district
       court’s determination as to acceptance of responsibility “has some-
       thing of an uphill climb,” in part because the court’s “determina-
       tion of whether a defendant has adequately manifested acceptance
       of responsibility is a flexible, fact sensitive inquiry.” United States v.
       Coats, 8 F.4th 1228, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omit-
       ted). “As denoted by its plain language, the reduction is intended
       to reward defendants who express contrition for their wrongdoing
       and evidence a desire to reform their conduct.” United States v. Wil-
       liams, 627 F.3d 839, 844 (11th Cir. 2010).
               The record demonstrates that the district court did not
       clearly err in denying Chica-Giler an acceptance-of-responsibility
       reduction because it found that Chica-Giler did not timely manifest
       a clear acceptance of responsibility when he pled guilty on the
       morning that his trial was set to commence. And while Chica-Giler
       contends that his allocution was consistent with acceptance of re-
       sponsibility, the district court also did not clearly err in choosing an
       equally permissible interpretation of the allocution as an attempt
       to shift blame and an expression lacking contrition for his criminal
       conduct. Thus, because Chica-Giler fails to meet his burden of
       proof, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear
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       22-13973                Opinion of the Court                           5

       error in denying Chica-Giler an acceptance-of-responsibility reduc-
       tion under § 3E1.1(a), and we affirm as to this issue.
                                             II.
               We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
       cretion, which includes both substantive and procedural reasona-
       bleness. United States v Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2020). A
       defendant’s request of a particular sentence preserves his challenge
       to the substantive reasonableness of any sentence longer than his
       requested term. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S.
       ___, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766-67 (2020). However, where a defendant
       does not object to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence at
       the time of sentencing, we review for plain error only. United States
       v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). Under plain-
       error review, the defendant has the burden to show that there is (1)
       error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Id. If
       all three requirements are met, we then consider whether the error
       “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju-
       dicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted, alteration in
       original).
              A sentence is procedurally reasonable when the district
       court properly calculates a defendant’s guideline range, treats the
       guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory, duly considers the
       § 3553(a) factors, and adequately explains its chosen sentence. Gall
       v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Section
       3553(a) provides numerous factors the district court must consider
       when imposing a sufficient sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). While a
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13973

       district court must consider all the § 3553(a) factors in determining
       a sentence, it is not required to state in its explanation that it has
       evaluated each factor individually. United States v. Ortiz-Delgado,
       451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An acknowledgment by the dis-
       trict court that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient.
       United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2021). Ad-
       ditionally, district courts need not explicitly address all the mitigat-
       ing evidence, so long as the record reflects that the court consid-
       ered the sentencing factors and the parties’ arguments. Id.
              A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substan-
       tively unreasonable sentence when it (1) fails to consider relevant
       factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives a significant
       weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear
       error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
       United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
       We ordinarily expect a sentence within the guideline range to be
       reasonable. United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1309 (11th Cir.
       2018).
              We have emphasized that we must give due deference to
       the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing fac-
       tors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018).
       The district court also does not have to give all the factors equal
       weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one factor
       over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254
       (11th Cir. 2015). We will not reverse a sentence solely because we
       could reasonably conclude that a different sentence was more
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       22-13973               Opinion of the Court                         7

       appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The district
       court’s failure to mention specifically at sentencing certain mitigat-
       ing factors does not compel the conclusion that “the sentence
       crafted in accordance with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors was sub-
       stantively unreasonable.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873
       (11th Cir. 2010). A sentence is substantively unreasonable if a dis-
       trict court issued “a sentence that lies outside the range of reason-
       able sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at
       1190 (quotation marks omitted).
               A defendant may challenge his sentence as substantively un-
       reasonable due to an “unwarranted” sentencing disparity under §
       3553(a)(6), but a disparity in sentencing may only be “unwar-
       ranted” if other defendants receiving less severe sentences are sim-
       ilarly situated to the defendant challenging his sentence. United
       States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). “[D]efend-
       ants who cooperate with the government and enter a written plea
       agreement are not similarly situated to a defendant who provides
       no assistance to the government and proceeds to trial.” Id. More-
       over, “[t]he underlying facts of the crime and all of the individual
       characteristics are relevant” to a court’s evaluation of alleged sen-
       tencing disparities and its assessment of whether two defendants
       are similarly situated. United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048
       (11th Cir. 2015).
             The record here demonstrates that the district court im-
       posed a procedurally and substantively reasonable sentence. As ex-
       plained above, the district court did not procedurally err in denying
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       8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13973

       Chica-Giler an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. The district
       court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and sufficiently
       explained its chosen sentence. Additionally, the record demon-
       strates that the district court adequately considered Chica-Giler’s
       mitigation evidence, and it stated that it had “considered the state-
       ments of al the parties.” Moreover, the district court reasonably
       concluded that the sentencing disparity between Chica-Giler and
       his co-conspirators was not unwarranted because the record suffi-
       ciently supports a finding that Chica-Giler was not similarly situ-
       ated to his co-conspirators due to his leadership role in the conspir-
       acy, the volume of firearms trafficked, and the fact that he was the
       only defendant held responsible for removing the serial numbers
       from the firearms. Thus, we conclude that the district court im-
       posed a procedurally and substantively reasonable sentence, and
       we affirm as to this issue.
                                            III.
              The correction of a clerical error under Federal Rule of
       Criminal Procedure 36 is a legal issue that we review de novo. See
       United States v. Davis, 841 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2016) (review-
       ing de novo a district court’s correction of clerical errors in the ver-
       dict forms and the judgment under Rule 36). A district court may
       “correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the
       record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or
       omission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. Where there is any discrepancy
       between the written judgment and oral pronouncement, a district
       court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls. United States v.
       Khoury, 901 F.2d 975, 977 (11th Cir. 1990).
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       22-13973               Opinion of the Court                          9

              The record indicates a clear discrepancy between the court’s
       intent to sentence Chica-Giler to 262 months’ imprisonment and
       its count-by-count breakdown of his sentence, which totals 252
       months. Moreover, this error was repeated verbatim in the written
       judgment, further suggesting that this error resulted from an over-
       sight or omission in the district court. Correction of this error
       would allow the count-by-count breakdown of the sentence to
       align properly with the district court’s clearly intended total sen-
       tence of 262 moths. Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons,
       we affirm in part, and vacate and remand in part, with instructions
       to the district court to correct its clerical error in its judgment and
       remove the ambiguity in Chica-Giler’s sentence.
           AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
       PART.