Court Opinion

ID: 9409284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 17:01:46.925682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.484558
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-12296    Document: 55-1      Date Filed: 07/17/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-12296
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        WASEEM DAKER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        NEIL WARREN,
        Sheriﬀ, Cobb County,
        COBB COUNTY,
                                                   Defendants-Appellees.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-02084-WMR
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       20-12296

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Waseem Daker, a Georgia inmate and serial litigant, ﬁled a
        pro se lawsuit that brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
        Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. 1 He alleged
        that several policies of the detention center in which he was incar-
        cerated violated his federal rights.
                Crucially, the district court permitted Mr. Daker to proceed
        in forma pauperis based on his assertion under oath that he is indi-
        gent and unable to pay the ﬁling fee. While the case was pending,
        Mr. Daker ﬁled several motions to recuse the district and magis-
        trate judges. Before ruling on the merits of any of the recusal mo-
        tions, and while an appeal of the magistrate judge’s order denying
        two recusal motions was pending, the district court dismissed the
        case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because it determined that
        Mr. Daker’s assertions of poverty were untrue.
                On appeal, Mr. Daker argues that the district court abused
        its discretion by (1) reassigning the case without ruling on the
        recusal motion, (2) dismissing the case without ruling on his recusal

        1According to the district court, Mr. Daker has initiated over 250 federal civil
        suits and appeals. Courts have repeatedly labeled Mr. Daker’s litigation tactics
        as malicious, abusive, or vexatious. See D.E. 419 at 2 (collecting cases). For
        our part, we have noted that Mr. “Daker is a serial litigant who has clogged
        the federal courts with frivolous litigation.” Daker v. Comm’r., Ga. Dep’t Corr.,
        820 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2016).
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        20-12296               Opinion of the Court                         3

        motion, (3) failing to recuse, and (4) dismissing the case. We agree
        that the district court should have ruled on the recusal motion be-
        fore dismissing the case, but we nevertheless aﬃrm. The recusal
        motion was meritless, and therefore the district court’s failure to
        address it before dismissing the case was harmless error. We also
        aﬃrm the district court’s dismissal of the case under § 1915(e)(2)
        because Mr. Daker’s allegations of poverty were untrue.
                                          I
               In his complaint, Mr. Daker alleged that Cobb County and
        its sheriﬀ violated his rights by denying him access to hardcover
        books, preventing him from accessing the prison law library, and
        preventing him from participating in religious services. Along with
        the complaint, Mr. Daker ﬁled an aﬃdavit requesting to proceed in
        forma pauperis, in which he stated “because of my poverty I am un-
        able to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give security thereof.”
        Mr. Daker stated that the only money he had received in the past
        year was $1,000, and that he did not have any cash in a checking or
        savings account. He also disclosed that he owned a house with a
        mortgage and that he has “not had any income since January 2010
        with which to make mortgage payments.” He claimed that he
        bought his home for $395,000, had a $345,000 mortgage, and that
        the home had lost value so he didn’t know if he had any equity in
        the home at all.
               In February and April of 2019, the district court issued or-
        ders asking Mr. Daker to show cause why the case should not have
        been dismissed because his assertion of poverty was untrue. The
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                20-12296

        district court also allowed Cobb County and the sheriﬀ to take dis-
        covery relevant to Mr. Daker’s ﬁnancial situation. Mr. Daker re-
        sponded to these orders, alleging that since ﬁling his complaint he
        had sold his house and paid oﬀ his debts, with $36,000 left. He also
        claimed that he did not have to list his annuity account because his
        brother falsely told him that the account had been sold, and he did
        not know the value of his other assets.
               The magistrate judge issued a report recommending dismis-
        sal and pointing to Mr. Daker’s continuing obligation to inform the
        court of any change of circumstances that would render a conten-
        tion meritless. The district court agreed and also found that Mr.
        Daker’s contention that his ﬁnancial status had recently changed
        was “not accurate” because he owned his home and his annuity
        account at the time that he ﬁled his complaint. Before Mr. Daker
        sold his home, he had equity in the house, and after selling, he had
        that amount in cash. The district court determined that he did not
        receive a recent windfall, but that he instead lied about the amount
        of equity he had in his house. The district court ultimately dis-
        missed the case pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).
               Throughout the litigation, Mr. Daker ﬁled a number of
        recusal motions. In September of 2018, Mr. Daker ﬁled a ﬁrst mo-
        tion to recuse Judge Story, the district court judge originally as-
        signed to the case. A few months later, in December of 2018, the
        case was reassigned to a diﬀerent district court judge, Judge Ray,
        before Judge Story ruled on the recusal motion. Judge Ray denied
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        20-12296                   Opinion of the Court                                  5

        the motion to recuse Judge Story as moot because he was no longer
        involved in the case.
              In April of 2019, Mr. Daker ﬁled a motion to recuse Judge
        Ray and to exceed the page limit, and the magistrate judge denied
        the motion without prejudice. In June of 2019, Mr. Daker ﬁled an-
        other motion to recuse Judge Ray, which the magistrate judge de-
        nied without prejudice for failure to attach a certiﬁcate of service.
                Mr. Daker then ﬁled, in October of 2019, two more motions
        to recuse (his fourth and ﬁfth)—one to recuse the magistrate judge
        and another to recuse Judge Ray—alleging that the judges were bi-
        ased against him based on rulings they made in another of his cases.
        The magistrate judge denied these recusal motions as “prema-
        turely ﬁled[,]” noting that Mr. Daker ﬁled these motions “in direct
        disregard of the [district c]ourt’s [o]rder to ﬁle no further mo-
        tions”—issued on August 16, 2019—until a speciﬁc issue (the dis-
        trict court was concerned that some of Mr. Daker’s signatures were
        forged) was resolved. D.E. 388 at 5. Mr. Daker objected to the
        magistrate judge’s order denying the recusal motions, and Judge
        Ray did not address his objections, construe them as an appeal, or
                                                       2
        otherwise rule on his recusal motions.
                Perhaps fed up with the large number of ﬁlings, the magis-
        trate judge ordered that no further motions be ﬁled until Judge Ray
        resolved whether Mr. Daker’s allegation of poverty in his IFP

        2
         A district court must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings. See Bilal v.
        Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12296

        aﬃdavit was untrue. Barred from ﬁling another recusal motion,
        Mr. Daker instead ﬁled a motion for leave to ﬁle another motion to
        recuse (his sixth) on February 24, 2020. That motion was never
        ruled on. Judge Ray dismissed the case, without ruling on the ap-
        peal of the magistrate judge’s order denying Mr. Daker’s fourth
        and ﬁfth recusal motions and without ruling on the motion for
        leave to ﬁle a sixth motion to recuse.
                                          II
                We review a district court’s denial of a recusal motion for an
        abuse of discretion. See In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.
        2008). We review the dismissal of the complaint under 28 U.S.C.
        § 1915(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion. Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t
        of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). We review the district
        court’s factual ﬁndings for clear error. FN Herstal SA v. Clyde Armory
        Inc., 838 F.3d 1071-1079-80 (11th Cir. 2016).
                                         III
                Mr. Daker argues that the district court abused its discretion
        by failing to rule on the merits of several of his recusal motions.
        We quickly dispose of his arguments relating to his ﬁrst and third
        recusal motions, which are meritless, and then we address his argu-
        ment regarding the appeal of his fourth and ﬁfth recusal motions,
        which requires more discussion.
                                          A
               First, Mr. Daker argues that the district court erred by reas-
        signing the case before ﬁrst ruling on his ﬁrst recusal motion. As
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        20-12296               Opinion of the Court                         7

        noted, Mr. Daker ﬁled a motion to recuse Judge Story, and a few
        months later (before Judge Story ruled on the recusal motion) the
        case was reassigned to Judge Ray because Judge Ray already had
        two of Mr. Daker’s cases. After the reassignment, Judge Story had
        no further connection with the matter, and therefore the motion
        seeking Judge Story’s recusal was correctly denied as moot. Cru-
        cially, Judge Story did not make any substantive or dispositive rul-
        ings in the case before it was reassigned. The denial of this motion
        was not an abuse of discretion. See In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d
        941, 949 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court did not err
        by reassigning the case to another judge without ﬁrst ruling on the
        recusal motion and calling this the “functional equivalent of rec-
        using”).
               Mr. Daker also argues that the district court erred in denying
        his June 2019 recusal motion without prejudice for failing to in-
        clude a certiﬁcate of service. But the district court’s denial of the
        June 2019 recusal motion was not an abuse of discretion. See Fed.
        R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1)(B)(i) (dictating that a paper that is not served by
        “ﬁling it with the court’s electronic-ﬁling system” must contain a
        certiﬁcate of service). See also Standing Order No. 19-01 (N.D. Ga.
        Apr. 15, 2019).
                                          B
               Finally, Mr. Daker argues that the district court ( Judge Ray)
        abused its discretion by dismissing the case without ﬁrst ruling on
        the appeal of the magistrate judge’s order denying his fourth and
        ﬁfth recusal motions. Although we agree that the district court
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  20-12296

        should have ruled on the appeal before dismissing the case, we nev-
        ertheless aﬃrm because the district court’s error was harmless—
        i.e. it did not aﬀect any of Mr. Daker’s substantive rights. See 28
        U.S.C. § 2111.
                                           1
               “Ordinarily, a judge should not delay ruling on a motion to
        recuse, grant a motion to dismiss, and then reject the recusal mo-
        tion as moot.” 13D Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
        Practice & Procedure § 3550 (3d ed. 2023 Update). See also Cochran v.
        U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 20 F.4th 194 (5th Cir. 2021)
        (“Given that disqualiﬁcation disputes concern the basic integrity of
        a tribunal, they must be resolved at the outset of the litigation.”);
        Daker v. Toole, 736 F. App’x 234, 236 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)
        (denying the motion to recuse as moot after dismissing the action
        is error). A district court is generally required to rule on the recusal
        motion before dismissing the case because, if it turns out that
        recusal is warranted, the district court is generally not permitted to
        take further action concerning the merits. See In re BellSouth Corp.,
        334 F.3d at 949 (explaining that, after triggering 28 U.S.C. § 455(b),
        the judge was prohibited from making further substantive rulings);
        United States v. Moody, 977 F.2d 1420, 1423 (11th Cir. 1992) (a district
        court judge who has recused may “perform ministerial acts” that
        do not have “any implication concerning the merits of the case”).
              Here, the district court dismissed the case while Mr. Daker’s
        appeal of his fourth and ﬁfth recusal motions was pending. Dis-
        missing a case under § 1915(e)(2) is not simply a ministerial act.
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        20-12296               Opinion of the Court                          9

        Rather it is an “exercise of substantive authority.” Moody, 977 F.2d
        at 1423. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its
        discretion in dismissing the case prior to ruling on the pending
        recusal motion. But, as discussed below, we nevertheless aﬃrm.
        The district court’s error was harmless because the recusal motions
        lacked merit.
                                          2
                The federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, requires
        “the court [to] give judgment after an examination of the record
        without regard to errors or defects which do not aﬀect the substan-
        tial rights of the parties.” Errors only “aﬀect a substantial right of
        a party if they have ‘substantial inﬂuence’ on the outcome of a case
        or leave ‘grave doubt’ as to whether they aﬀected the outcome of
        a case.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1268 n. 20 (11th Cir.
        2004) (en banc). See also Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co-
        lombia, 45 F.4th 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2022) (aﬃrming on an issue,
        despite possible errors because “appellants have failed to identify
        any real harm or prejudice”).
                Because Mr. Daker’s fourth and ﬁfth motions to recuse
        lacked merit, the district court’s error in dismissing the case before
        ruling on the appeal of those motions was harmless. Generally, a
        district court judge must recuse if he or she has “personal bias or
        prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). It is well es-
        tablished that merely ruling against a litigant in a case is not suﬃ-
        cient to warrant dismissal. See In re Evergreen Sec., Ltd., 570 F.3d
        1257, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Challenges to adverse rulings are
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   20-12296

        generally grounds for appeal, not recusal.”); Jaﬀe v. Grant, 793 F.2d
        1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1986) (“a motion for recusal may not ordinar-
        ily be predicated upon the judge’s rulings in the same or a related
        case”); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 884 (11th Cir. 1985) (the
        allegation of bias must be “personal as opposed to judicial in na-
        ture”).
               In his fourth and ﬁfth motions, Mr. Daker moved to recuse
        Judge Ray because of his previous adverse rulings—speciﬁcally his
        ruling issuing a permanent injunction and imposing sanctions in
        another case. See Daker v. Deal, Case No. 1:18-CV-05243, D.E. 35,
        D.E. 57 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2019). The injunction prevented Mr.
        Daker from ﬁling any new lawsuit without ﬁrst posting a $1,500.00
        contempt bond. See id at D.E. 57. The bond requirement ensures
        that if any of Mr. Daker’s future ﬁlings are deemed frivolous or
        duplicative, the court may impose contempt sanctions against Mr.
        Daker to be paid from the bond. In the event that Mr. Daker can-
        not aﬀord the bond, he may move for modiﬁcation, so long as his
        modiﬁcation motion includes “a comprehensive accounting of his
        assets and [an] aﬃrm[ation] that the accounting is true under pen-
        alty of perjury.” Id. Mr. Daker cannot base his recusal motion on
        the district court’s imposition of this injunction, and therefore his
        recusal motion would fail.
                Mr. Daker points to an “exception” to the general rule that
        a ruling cannot form the basis of a recusal motion, which occurs
        when “such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by otherwise ju-
        dicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party.” Jaﬀe, 793
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        20-12296               Opinion of the Court                         11

        F.2d at 1189. This exception only applies in “rare cases.” Loranger
        v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 780 (11th Cir. 1994). For the exception to
        apply, the adverse rulings must “stem from an extra-judicial
        source” and show a suﬃciently “pervasive bias” to necessitate
        recusal. Id. at 780–81.
               For example, in United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44, 47 (5th
        Cir. 1981), the former Fifth Circuit held that the district judge
        should have recused under § 455 due to the judge’s judicial actions.
        The judge increased the defendant’s sentence after remarking that
        the defendant had “broken faith” with the district court by appeal-
        ing an adverse ruling. The grounds for this ruling—a district
        court’s displeasure at the defendant challenging his rulings—
        stemmed from an “extra judicial source.” Id.
                Here, Mr. Daker does not point to any adverse ruling that
        rises to the level of “pervasive bias.” Although admittedly restric-
        tive, the injunction requiring Mr. Daker to post a contempt bond at
        the outset of any future litigation is restrictive for good reason. Mr.
        Daker has been repeatedly recognized as a serial litigator who has
        ﬁled more than 250 federal lawsuits, many of which have been dis-
        missed as frivolous. See, e.g., Daker v. Dozier, Case No. 5:17-CV-
        0025-CAR, 2017 WL 3037420 at *1 (M.D. Ga. July 18, 2017); Daker
        v. Bryson, Case No. 6:16-CV-57, 2017 WL 1053082, *6 (S.D. Ga. Mar.
        20, 2017). Given Mr. Daker’s history, issuing a permanent injunc-
        tion such as this one is not so egregious to suggest pervasive bias.
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                        20-12296

        Nor has Mr. Daker shown that Judge Ray’s grounds for the impos-
                                                                          3
        ing of the injunction stem from an extra judicial source.
                                             IV
                Mr. Daker also argues that the district court erred in dismiss-
        ing the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires the
        district court to dismiss a case any time if it discovers the plaintiﬀ’s
        allegation of poverty is untrue.
                As we have explained, Mr. Daker claimed indigence under
        penalty of perjury in his sworn aﬃdavits. The district court subse-
        quently issued two show cause orders requiring Mr. Daker to
        demonstrate why this matter should not be dismissed due to his
        false assertions of poverty. In response, Mr. Daker asserted that his
        ﬁnancial status had changed since he ﬁled this action because he
        sold his home and paid oﬀ his debts. He also asserted that he did
        not list his annuity account because he did not know its status at
        the time that he ﬁled suit.
              After considering his responses, the district court adopted
        the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, dismissing Mr.
        Daker’s case. See D.E. 419 at 4. The district court found that Mr.
        Daker’s assertions that he was indigent and that his ﬁnancial

        3
         The appropriate way to challenge a district court’s adverse rulings, like the
        order imposing the permanent injunction, is by filing an appeal, which Mr.
        Daker did. See Daker v. Gov. of Ga., 2022 WL 1102015 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2022).
        We held on appeal that imposition of this injunction “[t]o curb [Mr.] Daker’s
        abusive filings” was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at *1–2.
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        20-12296               Opinion of the Court                         13

        condition had changed since ﬁling the lawsuit were untrue. See
        D.E. 419 at 6. Mr. Daker “did not receive a windfall.” Id. He owned
        his home and his annuity account at the time that he ﬁled his com-
        plaint, and his assertions of poverty “were and remain untrue.” Id.
        Mr. Daker could argue that his access to liquid assets changed—
        before selling his house, he had equity in his house, and after sell-
        ing, he had cash—but the IFP determination is not based on a
        party’s access to cash. Id. at 6.
               Mr. Daker argues that he is not required to report any
        change in his ﬁnances, and if he is, he did not know of the require-
        ment. He is mistaken, see Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 612
        (11th Cir. 1997), and misses the point. The district court found that
        his original assertion in his IFP aﬃdavit was untrue at the time it
        was made, and therefore any change in ﬁnancial status is irrelevant.
        See D.E. 419 at 6. Mr. Daker does not argue that this ﬁnding of fact
        was clearly erroneous, and we do not believe it to be so.
                The district court detailed the reasons why Mr. Daker’s alle-
        gations of poverty were untrue, detailing sources of income that
        he failed to disclose in his IFP aﬃdavit, such as the annuity contract.
        See D.E. 419 at 3. It cited several other district courts that had de-
        nied him leave to proceed IFP because his assertions of poverty
        were untrue. See Daker v. Robinson, Case No. 12-CV-00118, D.E. 3
        (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2012) (denying request for IFP status because Mr.
        Daker’s aﬃdavits “indicate that he has over $50,000 in net assets”);
        Daker v. Dawes, Case No. 1:12-CV-00119, D.E. 3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 9,
        2012) (denying IFP status and noting that “[a]lthough [Mr.] Daker
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  20-12296

        was granted permission to proceed IFP in an earlier case, see Daker
        v. Warren” (i.e. this case), his “earlier-ﬁled IFP aﬃdavit concealed his
        true, substantial net worth”).
                Further demonstrating Mr. Daker’s ability to pay the ﬁling
        fee, the district court highlighted seven cases in which he paid the
        entire ﬁling fee after he was denied IFP status, and these fees from
        the seven cases totaled $3,220. See D.E. 419 at 11 n.3. And it also
        pointed to another court that dismissed Mr. Daker’s cases because
        his allegation of poverty was untrue. See Daker v. Deal, Case No.
        1:14-CV-3856, D.E. 8 (N.D. Ga. May 25, 2015) (ﬁnding that “his al-
        legation of poverty remains untrue” and dismissing the case pursu-
        ant to § 1915(e)(2)(A)). Indeed, in Daker v. Head, we aﬃrmed the
        dismissal of Mr. Daker’s case pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(A) based on
        his untruthful assertions regarding his ﬁnancial status in the IFP af-
        ﬁdavits that he ﬁled in that case. See Daker v. Head, 2022 WL
        2903410, *5 (11th Cir. Jul. 22, 2022).
               It is true that not every minor inaccuracy in an IFP aﬃdavit
        should be considered a false allegation of poverty so as to preclude
        in forma pauperis status and dismissal of the complaint. “For exam-
        ple, a petitioner who states he has only $20.00 is not appreciably
        less indigent if it is subsequently established that he has $20.30.”
        Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434, 438 n.3 (11th Cir. 1986). Rather, the
        purpose of § 1915 is to “weed out the litigant who falsely under-
        states his net worth in order to obtain in forma pauperis status to
        which he is not entitled.” Id. Mr. Daker appears to be such a liti-
        gant, as shown by his repeated ability to pay the ﬁling fee in other
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        20-12296                   Opinion of the Court                               15

        cases after his request for IFP status is denied. Moreover, a court
        may dismiss a case “for even minor misrepresentations on his IFP
        aﬃdavit if he has a history of misrepresenting his indigency[,]” and
        we have already held that Mr. Daker’s “history of misleading courts
        and pursuing vexatious litigation tactics was suﬃcient for the court
        to ﬁnd bad faith[.]” Head, 2022 WL 2903410 at *3-4 (citing Camp,
        798 F.2d 437–38). 4
                                               V
              We aﬃrm the district court’s order dismissing Mr. Daker’s
        case pursuant to § 1915(e).
                AFFIRMED.

        4 Mr. Daker also argues that the district court erred by failing to provide him
        with copies of the documents that it judicially noticed (namely, orders from
        other litigations involving Mr. Daker) and the cases that it cited. This argu-
        ment lacks merit. See Colbert v. Beto, 439 F.2d 1130, 1131 (5th Cir. 1971) (“an
        indigent [person] does not have a federally-protected right to a free copy of his
        transcript or other court records merely to search for possible error”). Addi-
        tionally, the district court determined that Mr. Daker is not indigent, and he
        therefore has the financial means to obtain copies of cases on his own. See
        D.E. 419 at 8.