Court Opinion

ID: 9389384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 16:08:11.438054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:26.765811
License: Public Domain

J-S05044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ROBERT KARL BARGER                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 440 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 31, 2020
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                      at No(s): CP-65-CR-0002109-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                           FILED: APRIL 25, 2023

        Robert Karl Barger appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his guilty plea to failure to comply with registration requirements of

Subchapter I of the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.2(a)(1). Barger’s counsel filed in this Court

an Anders1 brief and a petition to withdraw as counsel. We grant counsel’s

petition to withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

        In January 2006, Barger pled guilty to indecent assault of person less

than 16 years of age, indecent exposure, and unlawful contact with a minor.2

He committed the offenses in 2005. Following his conviction, Barger was

required to comply with the registration requirements of Megan’s Law III, 42

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1   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(8), 3127(a), and 6318(a)(1), respectively.
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Pa.C.S.A. § 9795.1(b)(3) (expired Dec. 20, 2012), which was the current law

requiring individuals convicted of certain offenses to register as sexual

offenders.3

       In March 2019, the police filed a criminal complaint charging Barger with

one count of failure to comply with registration requirements of Subchapter I

of SORNA (“Subchapter I”) for failure to timely register with the Pennsylvania

State Police from January 4, 2019 to January 13, 2019. Barger entered a

negotiated guilty plea and was sentenced to four to eight days’ incarceration

with credit for time served. Barger filed a timely appeal.

       Before we assess the substance of the Anders brief, we must first

determine whether counsel’s request to withdraw meets certain procedural

requirements. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290

(Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc). An Anders brief must:

          (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
          with citations to the record;

          (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
          arguably supports the appeal;

          (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
          frivolous; and

          (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
          frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
          record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
          have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

____________________________________________

3 The court found Barger to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). See
Commonwealth v. Barger, Nos. 503 & 504 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 499834,
at *1 (Pa.Super. filed Feb. 18, 2022).

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Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

      Counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders brief to the client, and

a letter that advises the client of the right to “(1) retain new counsel to pursue

the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points that the

appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to the points raised

by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877,

880 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349,

353 (Pa.Super. 2007) (alteration omitted)). If counsel has satisfied these

requirements, we then conduct “a full examination” of the record “to decide

whether the case is wholly frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187

A.3d 266, 271 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744).

      Here, in the Anders brief, counsel states he reviewed the record and

summarizes the history and facts of the case. He refers to matters in the

record arguably supporting the appeal and explains his reasons for concluding

the issue was wholly frivolous. Counsel supplied Barger with a copy of the

Anders brief and petition to withdraw and advised him of his right to retain

new counsel or to proceed pro se. Counsel complied with the technical

requirements of Anders and Santiago. We will therefore address the issue

raised by counsel and review Barger’s pro se response.

      In the Anders brief, Barger’s counsel lists the following issue: “Did the

Court err in applying SORNA registration requirements for a conviction of a

sexually violent offense that was committed prior to the enactment of

SORNA?” Anders Br. at 5. Counsel notes that the sole contention is that

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pursuant to Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), it was

unconstitutional to apply SORNA registration requirements to Barger for

crimes that pre-dated SORNA’s enactment. Counsel points out that the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed this argument in Commonwealth v.

Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020), wherein it recognized that Subchapter I

“served as the mechanism for retroactive enforcement of SORNA for sex

offenses that occurred between April 22, 1996 and December 20, 2012,” and

held that Subchapter I did not impose criminal punishment and therefore its

retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 8.

      Counsel states that Barger’s conviction that triggered registration

occurred in 2006 and therefore Subchapter I applied, and he failed to register

in January 2019, after Subchapter I was enacted. Counsel therefore concludes

that LaCombe’s analysis applies and application of Subchapter I to Barger

does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.

      Barger filed a pro se response to the Anders brief. He argues application

of Subchapter I to a pre-SORNA crime is unconstitutional, as it violates the Ex

Post Facto and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and

violated his right to a good reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution.

He focuses on the LaCombe Court’s discussion of one of the ex post facto

factors, wherein it found the provisions of Subchapter I were historically

considered punishment. He claims that LaCombe is a “guide[]post,” and

should not be followed because the legislative intent of Subchapter I was to

impose criminal punishment. See Barger’s Pro Se Response at 7. He argues

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he is being punished twice for his underlying crime. He further claims it is

cruel and unusual punishment to force him to register because the registration

is public shaming and similar to a probation and parole sentence. He also

argues that Megan’s Law III, under which he originally was required to

register, was found to be unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84

A.3d 603, 615 (Pa. 2013). He argues because Neiman found Megan’s Law III

to be void, his duty to register never existed. He argues the General Assembly

cannot revive what did not exist. He claims he was not put on notice that it

would be a crime to fail to register.

       We agree with counsel that Barger’s ex post facto claim is frivolous. In

LaCombe, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality

of Subchapter I, which was enacted in 2018 and applies to defendants, like

Barger, who committed the underlying crime between 1996 and 2012.

LaCombe, 234 A.3d at 615; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.52, 9799.54, 9799.55.

The Court found the General Assembly’s intent was to enact a civil scheme

and then applied the Mendoza-Martinez4 factors to determine whether the

law had a punitive effect. LaCombe, 234 A.3d at 618. As Barger points out,

in discussing the second factor, whether Subchapter I’s requirements have

historically been regarded as punishment, the Court found the requirements

were “akin” to public shaming and to probation and found the factor weighed

in favor of finding Subchapter I punitive. Id. at 623. However, when the Court

____________________________________________

4   Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

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balanced all factors, it found Subchapter I was non-punitive, reasoning that it

found three of the five factors weighed in favor of finding Subchapter I

nonpunitive, and noting it “g[a]ve little weight to the fact that Subchapter I

promotes the traditional aims of punishment and g[a]ve significant weight to

the fact Subchapter I is narrowly tailored to its nonpunitive purpose of

protecting the public.” Id. at 626. It concluded that, because it had “not found

the requisite ‘clearest proof’ Subchapter I is punitive, [it] may not ‘override

legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy

into a criminal penalty[.]’” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, Barger was convicted in 2006 for a crime he committed in 2005.

He failed to register in 2019, after the enactment of Subchapter I. Therefore,

like the defendants in LaCombe, Subchapter I applied to Barger and, when

he failed to appear for his registration, he could be found criminally liable for

the failure.

      We reject Barger’s claim based on Neiman as frivolous. In Neiman,

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Megan’s Law III unconstitutional

because it violated the single-subject rule of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

84 A.3d at 605. However, Subchapter I provides that “[n]othing in this

subchapter shall be construed to relieve an individual from the obligation to

register with the Pennsylvania State Police under this subchapter if the

individual . . . (1) committed a sexually violent offense within this

Commonwealth . . . and (2) . . . would have been required to register with the

Pennsylvania State Police under [Megan’s Law III] . . . but for the decision by

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the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603

(Pa. 2013).” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.75(a)(1),(2) (footnote omitted).5

       Moreover, we conclude that Barger’s claims based on his claim

Subchapter I violated his right to reputation and constituted cruel and unusual

punishment, are frivolous. In Commonwealth v. Morgan, this Court held

that the SVP provisions of Subchapter I did not violate the constitutional right

to reputation. 258 A.3d 1147, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2021). Further, because in

LaCombe the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found Subchapter I to be non-

punitive,   it   cannot    constitute     cruel   and   unusual   punishment.   See

Commonwealth v. Lankford, 164 A.3d 1250, 1252 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(discussing the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and pointing

out it “forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the

crime” (emphasis omitted)).

       We have reviewed the record and have not found any non-frivolous

claims for our review.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

____________________________________________

5In issuing its decision in Neiman, the Supreme Court held its decision for
90 days, to allow the General Assembly “to consider appropriate remedial
measures.” 84 A.3d at 616. Within the 90 days, the General Assembly
amended SORNA to provide that it would apply to persons required to register
with the state police at any time before SORNA’s effective date.
Commonwealth v. Derhammer, 173 A.3d 723, 726 (Pa. 2017).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/25/2023

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