Court Opinion

ID: 9771538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:46:51.176206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:32.711994
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the principal opinion which affirms the trial judge’s action in treating defendant-respondent’s motion to set aside the default judgment on equitable grounds as a petition in equity to set aside the default.
In this connection, the dissenting opinion of Crist, J., Court of Appeals, Eastern District, is adopted and made a part hereof and appended and marked as Appendix A hereto. I also concur in the dissent of Donnelly, J., filed herein.
I dissent from all of the remainder of the principal opinion which would reverse the trial court’s order setting aside and vacating the default judgment. I dissent for the reason that the principal opinion ducks rather than decides the gut issue which appellant asks us to decide. That issue is whether appellant’s default judgment shall be reinstated. This Court is Missouri’s highest Court, its Court of last resort. The buck should not be passed from here, the buck should stop here. This decision is our responsibility.1
I am deeply concerned when the principal opinion so carefully avoids identifying the attorneys while purporting to decide the case based on the rights of the parties. I am even more concerned when the opinion then passes the buck back to a trial judge saying:
defendant [defendant’s attorney] claims that its failure to answer resulted from mistake, inadvertence, mischance or accident. Plaintiff does not concede that defendant’s failure proceeded from ‘accident, mistake, inadvertence, or unavoidable circumstance mixed with neglect or inattention.’ _ Whether defendant [defendant’s attorney] had a good cause or excuse for its inattention is a factual matter_ Further proceedings are required.
Sprung, 727 S.W.2d 883, 890 (Mo. banc 1987).
*895Clearly the principal opinion directs the trial judge to decide the issue based upon the conduct of the unnamed attorneys. If the conduct of the attorneys is to be decisive, then maintaining public confidence in the judiciary requires full and complete public disclosure of the identity of all of the players.
The file reflects that Padberg, McSwee-ney, Slater and Merz (Padberg) is the attorney for the plaintiff and Kortenhof and Ely (Ely) was the original attorney for defendant. Defendant-respondent’s present attorneys were employed after the default became final and were not involved in the litigation prior to that time. Padberg and Ely have offices in the same building. The last major default case, a case involving a default for $300,000 against a dentist, Barney v. Suggs, 688 S.W.2d 356, (Mo. banc 1985), was also brought to this Court by attorney Padberg. Godfrey Padberg has been a member of the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges,2 since its creation in 1972, serving as its Chairman in recent years.
The true sensitivity of this case was pointed up by Padberg’s partner Merz, who argued the case in our Court. He told the Court that, in view of the fact an issue had been raised as to whether Padberg should have told Ely of the default sooner, Pad-berg felt that it was best someone else make the appearance in our Court on his behalf.
We are powerless to undo those things which create the extremely sensitive nature of the matters coming before us. We can only recognize that the more sensitive the issue before us, the greater is our obligation to openly, promptly and directly decide the matter in this Court. Maintaining public confidence in the judiciary demands that we do no less.
Two things appear extremely clear from the record before us. One is that we presently have before us all of the facts which are relevant and necessary for the determination of the default issue. Second, it is clear that the plaintiff, Sprung, would not be prejudiced by this Court affirming the trial judge’s order setting aside the default and ordering trial on the merits.
There is nothing that defendant-respondent could add to the affidavits filed by its attorneys. Plaintiff-appellant was offered an opportunity to file counter affidavits and declined to do so. I do not believe that appellant could add anything to his statement made in brief and clearly set forth in the court of appeals principal opinion. Upon learning of respondent’s attorney’s appearance in the proceeding on the eighteenth day of the thirty day period provided for by Rule 75.01, Padberg discussed with his client the respondent’s appearance in the case and “[t]he plaintiff specifically instructed his attorney not to communicate with the defendant until a final default judgment had been obtained.” There is not the slightest possibility or suggestion that either side has withheld relevant facts justifying its position. There is no possibility that a hearing on remand will develop relevant facts not now known by this Court.
It is equally clear that there is not one line of evidence in the record before us that plaintiff could be hurt, damaged or prejudiced by the passage of the brief period of time involved in the trial court’s setting aside the default and ordering the matter tried on its merits. All other delay has resulted from plaintiff’s voluntary choice to gamble time on the possibility of reinstating and affirming the default.
While members of this Court may not agree with the conclusion of the trial court, it is not the role of this Court to replace trial judges’ decisions with its own merely because some of its members might have reached a different conclusion had they been the trial judge. “The Supreme Court has many times stated and enforced the proposition that large discretion rests with the trial court in acting on motions to set aside judgments by default. [Iron Mountain ] Bank v. Armstrong, 92 Mo. 265, 280, *8964 S.W. 720, and authorities cited.” Harkness v. Jarvis, 81 S.W. 446, 448 (Mo.1904), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Conant v. Trimble, 311 Mo. 128, 277 S.W. 916 (1925).
According to the views expressed in a number of decisions of this court from the earliest reports to the latest, there is nothing in this case which takes it from under the operation of the general rule that this court will not interfere with the discretion of the trial court, unless it manifestly appears that injustice has been done, and that the discretion has been arbitrarily exercised. (Meechum vs. Judy, 4 Mo. 361 and 540; Faber vs. Bruner, 13 Mo. 541; 55 Mo. 342; Eidemiller vs. Rump, 61 Mo. 340; Obermeyer vs. Einstein, 62 Mo. 341; Jacob vs. McLean, 24 Mo. 40).
State ex rel. Reid v. Griffith, 63 Mo. 545, 551 (1876). “[The trial court’s] decision on the issue should be disturbed only if there is a showing of great abuse of its discretionary power. Fulton v. I.T. & T. Corp., 528 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo.App.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 [96 S.Ct. 1111, 47 L.Ed.2d 317] (1976).” Robyn Marketing, Inc. v. Fjelstead, 693 S.W.2d 239 (Mo.App. 1985). See MISSOURI: Whitledge v. Anderson Air Activities, 276 S.W.2d 114 (Mo.1955); Harkness v. Jarvis, 182 Mo. 231, 81 S.W. 446 (1904); Robyn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 127 Mo. 385, 30 S.W. 130 (1895); Pry v. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co., 73 Mo. 123 (1880); Obermeyer v. Einstein, 62 Mo. 341 (1876); Griffin v. Veil, 56 Mo. 310 (1874); Florez v. Uhrig, 35 Mo. 517 (1865); Kribben v. Eckelkamp, 34 Mo. 480 (1864); Brolaski v. Putnam, 34 Mo. 459 (1864); Ridgley v. The Reindeer, 27 Mo. 442 (1858); Jacob v. McLean, 24 Mo. 40 (1856); Christy’s Adm’r v. Myers, 21 Mo. 112 (1855); Wagemann v. Jordan, 19 Mo. 503 (1854); Faber v. Bruner, 13 Mo. 541 (1850); Crockett v. Morrison, 10 Mo. 515 (1847); Laurent v. Mulliken, 10 Mo. 312 (1847); First Missouri Bank of St. Francois County v. Patterson, 696 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.App.1985); ALABAMA: J & P Constr. Co. v. Valta Constr. Co., 452 So.2d 857 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Anderson, 4 So.2d 420 (Ala.1941); ALASKA: Allen v. Allen, 645 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1982); Alaska Truck Transport, Inc. v. Inter-Alaska Credit Service, Inc., 397 P.2d 618 (Alaska 1964); ARIZONA: Hirsch v. National Van Lines, Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 666 P.2d 49 (1983); Central Bank of Willcox v. Willcox-Pima Overland Co., 188 P. 133 (Ariz.1920); ARKANSAS: Burrs v. Madden, 271 Ark. 572, 609 S.W.2d 55 (1980); Davis v. McBride, 247 Ark. 895, 448 S.W.2d 37 (1969); CALIFORNIA: Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal.2d 251, 62 Cal.Rptr. 12, 431 P.2d 636 (1967); Haight v. Green, 19 Cal. 113 (1861); COLORADO: Credit Inv. & Loan Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 166 Colo. 471, 444 P.2d 633 (1968); Connell v. Continental Casualty Co., 87 Colo. 573, 290 P. 274 (1930); CONNECTICUT: Manchester State Bank v. Reale, 172 Conn. 520, 375 A.2d 1009 (1977); DELAWARE: Battaglia v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., 379 A.2d 1132 (Del.1977); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Waxler v. Levin, 131 A.2d 294 (D.C.1957); Madden v. Horigan, 66 A.2d 525 (D.C.1949); Bush v. Bush, 63 F.2d 134 (App.D.C.1933); FLORIDA: Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla. 551, 8 So.2d 9 (1942); Russ v. Gilbert, 19 Fla. 54 (1882); GEORGIA: Cheeks v. Barnes, 241 Ga. 22, 243 S.E.2d 242 (1978); Thornton v. Hollis, 36 Ga. 595 (1867); IDAHO: Sysco v. InterMountain Food Serv. v. City of Twin Falls, 109 Idaho 88, 705 P.2d 548 (1985); Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 Idaho 341, 528 P.2d 903 (1974); ILLINOIS: Borman v. Oetzell, 382 Ill. 110, 46 N.E.2d 914 (1943); Greenleaf v. Roe, 17 Ill. 474 (1856); INDIANA: Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind.1983); Carlisle v. Wilkinson, 12 Ind. 91 (1859); IOWA: Gateway Transp. Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Phillips Co., 261 N.W.2d 175 (Iowa 1978); Harrison v. Kramer, 3 Iowa 543 (1856); KANSAS: Celco, Inc. of America v. Davis Van Lines, Inc., 226 Kan. 366, 598 P.2d 188 (1979); Haight v. Schuck, 6 Kan. 192 (1870); KENTUCKY: Zimmerman v. Segal, 288 Ky. 33, 155 S.W.2d 20 (1941); Algee v. Algee, 182 S.W. 197 (1916); LOUI*897SIANA: Surgi v. McDonough Motor Express, 187 So. 693 (La.Ct.App.1939); MAINE: Cutillo v. Gerstel, 477 A.2d 750 (Me.1984); Maiorino v. Morris, 367 A.2d 1038 (Me.1977); MASSACHUSETTS: Kravetz v. Lipofsky, 294 Mass. 80, 200 N.E. 865 (1936); MICHIGAN: Seifert v. Keating, 344 Mich. 456, 73 N.W.2d 894 (1955); Federspiel v. Bourassa, 151 Mich.App. 656, 391 N.W.2d 431 (1986); MINNESOTA: Lyon Development Corp. v. Ricke’s Inc., 296 Minn. 75, 207 N.W.2d 273 (1973); Perrin v. Oliver, 1 Minn. 202 (1854); MISSISSIPPI: Stanley Home Products Co. v. Holmes, 308 So.2d 918 (Miss.1975); James v. Hall, 197 So.2d 226 (Miss.1967); MONTANA: Graham v. Mack, 699 P.2d 590 (Mont.1984); Davis v. Hubbard, 120 Mont. 45, 179 P.2d 533 (1947); NEBRASKA: Lincoln Welding Supply Co. v. Inhalation Plastics, Inc., 213 Neb. 862, 331 N.W.2d 804 (1983); Mulhollan v. Scoggin, 8 Neb. 202 (1879); NEVADA: Sealed Unit Parts Co., Inc. v. Alpha Gamma Chapter of Gamma Phi Beta Sorority, Inc. of Reno, 99 Nev. 641, 668 P.2d 288 (1983); Howe v. Coldren, 4 Nev. 171 (1868); NEW HAMPSHIRE: Jamieson, Inc. v. Copeland Coating Co., Inc., 126 N.H. 101, 489 A.2d 613 (1985); d’Agincourt v. Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc., 119 N.H. 476, 402 A.2d 1340 (1979); NEW JERSEY: Benedetto v. Fleckenstein, 108 N.J.L. 184, 154 A. 769 (1931); Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J.Super. 313, 202 A.2d 175 (App.Div.1964); NEW MEXICO: New Mexico Educators Federal Credit Union v. Woods, 102 N.M. 16, 690 P.2d 1010 (1984); Bourgeious v. Santa Fe Trail Stages, 43 N.M. 453, 95 P.2d 204 (1939); NEW YORK: Markoff v. South Nassau Comm. Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 461 N.E.2d 1253 (1984); Ramsey v. Gould, 4 Lans. 476 (N.Y.1871); NORTH CAROLINA: Bank of Statesville v. Foote, 77 N.C. 131 (1877); Williams v. Jennette, 77 N.C.App. 283, 335 S.E.2d 191 (1985); NORTH DAKOTA: Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Lillehaugen, 370 N.W.2d 517 (N.D.1985); First State Bank of Crosby v. Thomas, 54 N.D. 108, 208 N.W. 852 (1926); OHIO: Terwoord v. Harrison, 10 Ohio St.2d 170, 226 N.E.2d 111 (1967); City of Middletown v. Campbell, 21 Ohio App.3d 63, 486 N.E.2d 208 (1984); OKLAHOMA: Chesnut v. Billings, 452 P.2d 138 (Okla.1969); Nave v. Conservative Loan Co., 117 Okl. 85, 245 P. 65 (1926); OREGON: Fleetwood Inv. Co., Inc. v. Thompson, 270 Or. 580, 528 P.2d 518 (1974); White v. Northwest Stage Co., 5 Or. 99 (1873); PENNSYLVANIA: Schultz v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 505 Pa. 90, 477 A.2d 471 (1984); Horner v. Horner, 145 Or. 258, 23 A. 441 (1892); RHODE ISLAND: Phoenix Constr. Co. v. Hanson, 491 A.2d 330 (R.I. 1985); Lebanon Steel Foundry v. Efco Hydraulics, Inc., 100 R.I. 749, 219 A.2d 478 (1966); SOUTH CAROLINA: McCall v. A-T-O, Inc., 276 S.C. 143, 276 S.E.2d 529 (1981); Messervey v. Hillier, 12 Rich. 483 (S.C.1860); SOUTH DAKOTA: Squires v. Meade County, 59 S.D. 293, 239 N.W. 747 (1931); Evans v. Fall River County, 4 S.D. 119, 55 N.W. 862 (1893); TENNESSEE: Moore v. Palmer, 675 S.W.2d 192 (Tenn.Ct.App.1984); TEXAS: Johnson v. Edmonds, 712 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.Ct.App.1986); Thomas v. Goldberg, 283 S.W. 230 (Tex.Civ.App.1926); UTAH: Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984); Enright v. Grant, 5 Utah 334, 15 P. 268 (1887); VERMONT: Greene v. Riley, 106 Vt. 319, 172 A. 633 (1934); WASHINGTON: Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979); Livesley v. O’Brien, 34 P. 134 (Wash.1893); WEST VIRGINIA: Dotson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 341 S.E.2d 832 (W.Va.1985); Higgs v. Cunningham, 71 W.Va. 674, 77 S.E. 273 (1913); WISCONSIN: Maier Constr., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis.2d 463, 260 N.W.2d 700 (Wis.1978); Crebler v. Eidelbush, 24 Wis. 162 (1869); WYOMING: Annis v. Beebe & Runyan Furniture Co., 685 P.2d 678 (Wyo.1984); Barrett v. Oakley, 40 Wyo. 449, 278 P. 538 (1929); see also, 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error § 854 (1962); 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1632 (1958); cf. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976);
Cases everywhere recognize that more deference should be given to the trial judge’s action in setting aside a default *898judgment than is given in cases where he declined to do so.3 “[Jjudgments by default are not favored.... The entry of a default judgment against a party litigant is a harsh and drastic remedy.” Lambert Bros. Inc., v. Tri-City Constr. Co., 514 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Mo.App.1974).
It has been said that an appellate court is less apt to interfere when a judgment is set aside than when it is not. This because when the judgment is set aside, the case is reopened and justice will yet be done by a trial on the merits_ It is also thought that there are no certain rules which will fit any and all cases— the facts and circumstances of each case should be taken into account ...
Whitledge v. Anderson Air Activities, Inc., 276 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Mo.1955) (emphasis added).
Padberg’s statement that his client directed him to refrain from telling defendant or his counsel, Ely, of the default until after the default had become final and non-appealable and Padberg’s statement that he was bound by his client’s directions merits additional comment.
In 1985, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Supreme Court Rule 4, governed the ethical standard of the Bar.4
The Preamble of the Code provides, in part:
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct.
[[Image here]]
The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.
(Emphasis added.)
DR 7-101 of the Code provides, in part:
DR 7-101. Representing a Client Zealously
(a) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means, permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule, however ... by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
[[Image here]]
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client.
The Ethic Considerations also provide guidance in this context:
*899EC 7-38 A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should follow local customs of courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so.
EC 7-9 [W]hen an action in the best interest of his client seems to him to he unjust, he may ask his client for permission to forego such action.
EC 7-10 The duty of a lawyer to represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.
In one of the oldest and best known treatises on Legal Ethics, G. Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics (1896), Judge Sharswood discusses the fine line between advocating for your client and concealing something from your fellow lawyer:
It is not only morally wrong but dangerous to mislead your opponent, or put him on a wrong scent in regard to the case. It would be going too far to say that it is ever advisable to expose the weakness of a client’s case to an adversary, who may be unscrupulous in taking advantage of it, but it may be safely said that he who sits down deliberately to plot a surprise on his opponent, and which he knows can only succeed by being a surprise, deserves to fall, and in all probability will fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid.... There is one more caution to be given under this head. Let him shun most carefully the reputation of a sharp practitioner. Let him be liberal to the slips and oversights of his opponent whenever he can do so, and in plain cases not shelter himself behind the instructions of his client. The client has no right to require him to be illiberal — and he should throw up his brief sooner than do what revolts against his own sense of what is demanded by honor and propriety.
G. Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics 73-5 (1896).
The mark of a professional and the mark of a profession is that the members of the profession set for themselves a higher standard of conduct than is required of them by the law. The official position in the legal profession held by plaintiff’s attorney requires of him an especially high standard of conduct.
In this proceeding, whether canons of ethics were violated or not is not an issue. Comments on this subject are relevant only to the extent that they might respond to plaintiff’s attorney’s statement that he was bound by the canons to carry out his client’s direction that he not tell defendant or its attorney of the default until after the default became final.
I am in total agreement with Donnelly, J. In this case, equity should look to the conduct and interests of the parties, not the conduct of the attorneys. The action of the trial judge in vacating the default can and should be sustained upon the ground that equity will relieve the defendant-respondent from the default where the plaintiff, Sprung, directed his attorney to conceal from and not tell defendant or its attorney about the taking of the default until the passage of time made the default become final.
This is an extremely sensitive case. The text of the principal opinion affirmatively suggests to the trial court that it should further examine the conduct of the parties and rule on the matter “consistent with” the principal opinion, which neither overrules our much criticized existing case law 5 *900nor sets an alternative standard for doing equity.
Facing the reality of the disciplinary position in which plaintiffs attorney serves, passing the buck by asking a circuit judge to decide this issue for us again will forever brand us an intimidated court.
It is this Court which should affirm the trial court’s order setting aside the default judgment and direct that the case be tried on its merits.
APPENDIX A
I dissent.
A default judgment taken after a defendant has negligently failed to file responsive pleadings becomes a valid, enforceable judgment absent a timely appeal and absent unusual circumstances. I believe there was an unusual circumstance in this case — plaintiff’s knowledge and concealment of defendant’s negligence within sufficient time to have prevented the judgment from becoming final. Plaintiff had the “last clear chance” to prevent defendant from being in default. A plaintiff should not be unjustly enriched by defendant’s negligent failure to plead where plaintiff has actual knowledge of such negligence and has the means to avoid the finality of a default judgment. I believe the consequences to this defendant of a final, default judgment, when compared to the consequences to this plaintiff of having to prove his case, demand a trial on the merits.
Further, I would dismiss plaintiff’s petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rule 55.05 requires plaintiff to state “the facts showing [he] is entitled to relief[.]” Contrary to the majority opinion, the facts pled by plaintiff establish an attempt to plead a cause of action against defendant for negligently furnishing a dangerous instrumentality. Among the elements necessary to state a cause of action under this theory are: (1) Plaintiff did not know and by using ordinary care could not have known of the dangerous condition of the cart, (2) defendant, knew or by using ordinary care could have known of the dangerous condition, and (3) defendant failed to warn plaintiff of this condition. See MAI 25.06. Plaintiff eschewed any reliance on this theory for good reason; viewing his petition in its most favorable light, the facts alleged by plaintiff are not sufficient to state a cause of action for negligently furnishing a dangerous instrumentality as plaintiff has not alleged any of these elements of that action. Therefore, the facts essential to a recovery are not pleaded. Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 263[3] (Mo.App.1984).
Neither do I believe plaintiff has stated a cause of action upon his claimed general or common law negligence theory. The petition affirmatively alleges defendant leased the cart to plaintiff’s employer. This fixes defendant’s status as that of a “bailor for hire.” Jones v. Taylor, 401 S.W.2d 183, 186[2] (Mo.App.1966). Under the common law of negligence, defendant’s duty was not “to provide a reasonably safe cart.” Rather, defendant’s liability is limited to defects of which he had actual or constructive knowledge. See e.g., Polovich v. Say*901ers, 412 S.W.2d 436, 439 (Mo.1967); Price v. Seidler, 408 S.W.2d 815, 820 (Mo.1966); Gilpin v. Pitman, 577 S.W.2d 72, 78 (Mo.App.1978); Whitney v. Central Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo.App.1969). Cf. Ridenhour v. Colson Caster Corp., 687 S.W.2d 938, 944 (Mo.App.1985). Plaintiff alleges defendant was “negligent and careless in renting a defective cart”; he does not allege defendant had any notice, actual or constructive, of the putative defect. He has, once again, failed to allege a. fact essential to his recovery, Green Quarries, supra; therefore, his petition fails to state a cause of action and should be dismissed.
s/ Robert E. Crist, Judge

. It should be noted that the trial judge ordering the default vacated was Hon. George Adolph, now deceased, and any remand will be to another circuit judge.

. Mo. Const. art. V, § 24.

. See Harkness v. Jarvis, 182 Mo. 231, 81 S.W. 446 (Mo.1904), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Conant v. Trimble, 311 Mo. 128, 277 S.W. 916 (1925); First Missouri Bank of St. Francois County v. Patterson, 696 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.App.1985); Murray v. Sanders, 667 S.W.2d 426 (Mo.App.1984); Kollmeyer v. Willis, 408 S.W.2d 370 (Mo.App.1966); Karst v. Chicago Fraternal Life Ass'n, 22 S.W.2d 178 (Mo.App.1930); Savings Finance Corp. v. Blair, 280 S.W.2d 675 (Mo.App.1955); Hartle v. Hartle, 184 S.W.2d 786 (Mo.App.1945); Goodwin v. Kochititsky, 3 S.W.2d 1051 (Mo.App.1928); Marsh v. Riskas, 73 Ariz. 7, 236 P.2d 746 (1951); Bonfilio v. Ganger, 60 Cal.App.2d 405, 140 P.2d 861 (1943); Johnson v. McIntyre, 80 Idaho 135, 326 P.2d 989 (1948); Edgar v. Armored Carrier Corp., 256 Iowa 700, 128 N.W.2d 922 (1964); Sewell v. Beatrice Foods Co., 145 Mont. 337, 400 P.2d 892 (1965); Nelson v. Lennon, 222 Mont. 506, 206 P.2d 556 (1949); Beliveau v. Goodrich, 185 Neb. 98, 173 N.W.2d 877 (1970); Urwin v. Dickerson, 185 Neb. 86, 173 N.W.2d 874 (1970); Rochester v. Holiday Magic, Inc., 253 S.C. 147, 169 S.E.2d 387 (1969); Ingalls v. Arbeiter, 72 S.D. 488, 36 N.W.2d 669 (1949); Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc., 92 Wash.2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979); In re Marriage of Campbell, 37 Wash.App. 840, 683 P.2d 604 (1984); 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1632 (1958); see also, 4 C.J. Appeal & Error § 2825(b) (1916).

. Rule 4 was amended by the substitution of The Rules of Professional Conduct on August 7, 1985, effective January 1, 1986.

. See, e.g., N. Laughrey, Default Judgments in Missouri, 50 Mo.L.R. 841 (1985), to which the majority cites, and its continuation in N. Lau-ghrey, Balancing Finality, Efficiency, and Truth: A Proposed Reform of the Missouri Default Judgment Provision, 51 Mo.L.R. 63 (1986). Lau-ghrey finds Missouri’s default judgment law to be confusing, fragmented, mechanical, rigid and *900punitive. She proposes the consolidation of all the remedies into one rule to streamline the process. The new rule would allow greater leniency and flexibility prior to final judgment, including allowing the judgment to be set aside for excusable neglect. Excusable neglect would also be a ground to set aside the judgment after final judgment when the defendant had no notice of the default prior to the finality of the judgment. This consolidation and modification of the rules would bring Missouri from rigidity to the flexibility of leniency which other jurisdictions embrace. The law in this area is a balancing of the goals of efficiency, finality and truth. Allowing notice and alleviation for excusable neglect promotes truth and fairness without sacrificing efficiency and the certainty of finality. Without these changes "[t]he ripple effects of the system cannot be precisely measured but it is logical to assume that default judgments may precipitate bankruptcies, wipe out a life time of savings, or be passed on to consumer through increased prices.” N. Lau-ghrey, Balancing Finality, Efficiency, and Truth: A Proposed Reform of the Missouri Default Judgment Provisions, 51 Mo.L.R. 63, 90 (1986).