Court Opinion

ID: 9371063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 08:10:27.551677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.106113
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                  No. 06-22-00057-CV

        IN THE MATTER OF C.C., A JUVENILE

        On Appeal from the County Court at Law
               Harrison County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 5078-J

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

           In 2020, the State filed a petition alleging that C.C. engaged in delinquent conduct. In

2022, when he was eighteen, C.C. pled true to the allegations in the State’s petition and

stipulated that he had engaged in delinquent conduct by committing three counts of aggravated

sexual assault of a child and one count of unlawful restraint. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 20.02, 22.021. A grand jury approved the State’s request to seek a determinate sentence,1 and

following a jury trial on punishment, the trial court committed C.C. to the Texas Juvenile Justice

Department (TJJD) for a period of twenty-one years for each count of aggravated sexual assault

and eight months for unlawful restraint.

           On appeal, C.C. argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on his

motion for new trial and by submitting a jury charge containing an incorrect parole law

instruction. We find that C.C. failed to preserve his first point of error because his motion for

new trial was not properly presented to the trial court. While we agree with C.C.’s argument

claiming jury-charge error, we find that he was not egregiously harmed by such error. As a

result, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I.         C.C. Failed to Preserve His First Point of Error

           C.C. filed a timely motion for new trial claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and

disproportionate sentencing. Because the motion for new trial raised matters not determinable

from the record, C.C. requested a hearing on the motion; however, it was overruled by operation

of law. C.C. argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on his motion for

1
    See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.045.
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new trial. The State argues that C.C. failed to preserve this complaint because his motion for

new trial was not properly presented to the trial court. We agree.

       Juvenile proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. See In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765

(Tex. 1999); In re D.B., 457 S.W.3d 536, 538 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.). For

this reason, certain aspects of juvenile proceedings are governed by the same rules that apply in

criminal cases. “A motion for new trial seeking to vacate an adjudication is . . . governed by

Rule 21, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(b-1)(2). Under

Rule 21, titled “New Trials in Criminal Cases,” the motion for new trial must be presented “to

the trial court within 10 days of filing it.” TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6. As a result, “[t]he Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals ‘consistently has held the filing of a motion for new trial alone is not

sufficient to show “presentment”’ and does not preserve an issue for appellate review in the

absence of a showing that the trial court has seen the motion.” Navarro v. State, 588 S.W.3d

689, 691 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (quoting Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 78

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)

(“[T]he mere filing of a ‘certificate of presentment’ will not suffice to establish that a motion for

new trial and request for a hearing has been presented to the trial court.”). Consequently,

complaints raised in a motion for new trial in juvenile cases are not preserved unless properly

presented. See In re C.A.G., 410 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.).

       “The purpose of the presentment rule is ‘to put the trial court on actual notice that a

defendant desires the trial court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling

or a hearing on it.’” Navarro, 588 S.W.3d at 691 (quoting Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21

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(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 78)); see Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d

228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“We have held that to present a motion in the context of a

motion for new trial, the defendant must give the trial court actual notice that he timely filed a

motion for new trial and requests a hearing on the motion for new trial.”).

       From our review of the appellate record, we find nothing demonstrating that C.C.’s

motion for new trial was presented to the trial court. The motion was delivered “to the Office of

the County Court at Law,” there is no notation on the motion indicating that the trial court saw it,

and there is no docket entry showing that the motion, which was overruled by operation of law,

was brought to the trial court’s attention.           See Navarro, 588 S.W.3d at 691 (finding

disproportionate sentencing claim was not preserved by an unpresented motion for new trial);

Hernandez v. State, 84 S.W.3d 26, 33 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d). As a result, we

find C.C.’s first point of error unpreserved and overrule it.

II.    C.C. Was Not Egregiously Harmed by Jury-Charge Error

       In his second point, C.C. complains of jury-charge error. “We employ a two-step process

in our review of alleged jury-charge error.” Murrieta v. State, 578 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994)). “Initially, we determine whether error occurred and then evaluate whether sufficient

harm resulted from the error to require reversal.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131,

138 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 731–32)). “[T]he jury

is the exclusive judge of the facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the court and be

governed thereby.” Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13). The purpose of a jury

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charge is to instruct the jury on the applicable law, and a charge must include an accurate

statement of the law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14.

       A.      The Jury-Charge Error

       In 2019, the Texas Legislature amended Article 37.07, Section 4, subsections (a) through

(c), of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 260,

§ 1, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 446, 446–48 (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 4(a)–(c)

(Supp.)). Those amendments apply to any defendant sentenced on or after September 1, 2019.

See Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, § 3, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 446, 448. C.C.

argues that the trial court erred by using an outdated version of the good conduct time and parole

instructions found in Section 4(a) of Article 37.07.

       The current version of Section 4(a) of Article 37.07 reads, in relevant part,

       “The length of time for which a defendant is imprisoned may be reduced by the
       award of parole.

       “Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of
       imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole until the actual
       time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or 30 years, whichever is
       less. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than four years, the defendant
       must serve at least two years before the defendant is eligible for parole.
       Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.

       “It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law might be applied to this
       defendant if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of that
       law will depend on decisions made by parole authorities.

       “You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to consider the
       manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.”

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (Supp.). There is no reference to good conduct

time in the current version of Section 4(a). See id. Yet, the trial court included references to
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good conduct time in the following portion of the jury charge, which we italicize to highlight any

meaningful deviation from the statutory language:

               Under the law applicable in this case, the juvenile, if sentenced to a term of
       imprisonment, may earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good
       conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who
       exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and
       attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities
       may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.

              It is also possible that the length of time for which the Juvenile will be
       imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.

              It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct
       time might be applied to this Juvenile if he is sentenced to a term of
       imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions
       made by prison and parole authorities.

             You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time.
       However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be
       awarded to or forfeited by this particular Juvenile. You are not to consider the
       manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular Juvenile.

               Under a determinate sentence, whether you recommend commitment to a
       criminal justice facility or community supervision, a separate hearing shall be
       held by the judge before the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday, to decide whether to
       transfer the juvenile into the custody of an adult criminal court. For community
       supervision, if the request for transfer is granted, the county’s adult probation
       department would supervise the juvenile for the remainder of his or her
       probation. For commitment to the Texas Department of Juvenile Justice, if the
       request for transfer is granted, the judge will then decide whether the youth
       should be transferred to adult prison to complete his or her sentence or whether
       the youth can be safely released on parole without putting the public safety at
       risk.

(Emphasis added).

       The State concedes that the trial court erred by including outdated language on good

conduct time. Because it deviated from the statutory language, the jury charge was erroneous.

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       B.      C.C. Was Not Egregiously Harmed

       Although the State concedes jury-charge error, it argues that C.C. was not egregiously

harmed by the error. We agree.

       “The level of harm necessary to require reversal due to jury charge error is dependent

upon whether the appellant properly objected to the error.” Murrieta, 578 S.W.3d at 555 (citing

Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 732). Here, “because [C.C.] did not object to the charge, we will not

reverse” the judgment “unless the record shows the error resulted in egregious harm, Ngo v.

State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d

157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g)), such that he did not receive a fair and impartial

trial.” Id. (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171; Loun v. State, 273 S.W.3d 406, 416 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2008, no pet.)).

       “Jury-charge error is egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives

the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.” Id. (quoting Stuhler v.

State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “In making this determination, we review

‘the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and any other relevant

information in the record as a whole.’” Id. (quoting Villarreal v. State, 205 S.W.3d 103, 106

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (citing Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171)).

“Direct evidence of harm is not required to establish egregious harm.” Id. (citing Hutch v. State,

922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

       In reviewing the entire jury charge, we note that the third and fourth paragraphs of the

charge stated above instructed the jury that it was not possible to predict how parole law and

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good conduct time might be applied to C.C. and that they were not to consider the extent to

which it might be awarded or forfeited. “We presume the jury followed the instructions given in

the charge.” Murrieta, 578 S.W.3d at 556 (citing Thrift v. State, 176 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005); Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “A curative

instruction, in combination with other factors, may cure any error.” Id. (citing Igo v. State, 210

S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)); see Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011) (observing that it is presumed jury followed court’s instructions).

       Even so, C.C. argues that the jury charge demonstrated egregious harm because “[a]n

accurately instructed jury would know that, whatever sentence it imposed, C.C. would be

required to serve half of that sentence before he would even be eligible for parole.” C.C.’s

argument does not apply to juvenile cases, and we find that the last paragraph of the trial court’s

charge correctly informed the jury of C.C.’s parole eligibility. “Once a juvenile attains the age

of nineteen, the TJJD loses control over that juvenile.” In re D.O.R., No. 06-20-00036-CV, 2021

WL 115772, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re

M.C., 502 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (citing TEX. HUM. RES.

CODE ANN. § 245.151(e))). Yet, under the Texas Human Resources Code, “the department may

not release the child under supervision without approval of the juvenile court that entered the

order of commitment unless the child has served at least” three years of his sentence in the TJJD.

TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 245.051(c)(2). Here, C.C. would not complete the required three-

year period of confinement by his nineteenth birthday. Accordingly, if given a “determinate

sentence, the trial court [w]ould either release [C.C.] to parole under TDCJ[]’s supervision or

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transfer him to TDCJ[] for continued confinement.” In re D.O.R., 2021 WL 115772, at *1 (third

and fourth alterations in original) (quoting In re M.C., 502 S.W.3d at 855). “[A] transfer/release

hearing conducted under Section 54.11 is a ‘second chance hearing’ that gives juveniles—who

have previously been sentenced to a determinate number of years—a second chance to persuade

the court that they should not be imprisoned.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.V., No.

11-18-00135-CV, 2020 WL 2836432, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 29, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (quoting In re D.L., 198 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied))).

The last paragraph discussed the second-chance hearing and properly informed the jury that the

issue of parole would be raised at that hearing. Consequently, we reject C.C.’s argument that the

jury charge contained any other error or otherwise demonstrated egregious harm.

           As for the state of evidence, C.C. admitted that he unlawfully restrained B.W., a child,

and that he intentionally and knowingly (1) “cause[d] the penetration of the vagina of B.W

. . . with [his] sexual organ,” (2) “cause[d] the sexual organ of B.W. . . . to make contact with

[his] mouth,” and “cause[d] the sexual organ of B.W . . . to contact [his] sexual organ.” At trial,

twelve-year-old B.W. testified that C.C.’s abuse began when she was five or six years old. B.W.

said that C.C. would confine her to a room and would not let her leave until he either performed

oral sex on her, penetrated her anus with his fingers, or penetrated her anus or vagina with his

penis. B.W. said that C.C. committed each of those acts and that at least one act was committed

against her weekly for four years. C.C. admitted his offenses against B.W. at trial.2 As a result,

the state of the evidence was strong and weighs against finding egregious harm.

2
    C.C. argued that B.W. fabricated the number of times he had abused her.
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       Next, C.C. argues that the following portion of the State’s argument “took advantage of

the misleading instruction and used it to urge the jury to assess a harsher sentence”:

       [B.W.] deserves to have the opportunity to finish her childhood, to finish growing
       up and reach the age of 18 without having to worry about [C.C]. Not having to
       worry about him being in a restaurant or on the streets or avoiding places where
       he might be. [B.W.] deserves the chance to finally be a kid. And the only way
       she’s going to get that is by incarceration. That’s why we would ask that when
       you sentence [C.C.], that you would sentence him to no less than 25 years. So
       that way there’s no possibility of him getting out before she reaches 18.

The State’s argument was made in response to C.C.’s plea for probation, and we see nothing in

this argument suggesting the imposition of a harsher sentence based on jury-charge error as

opposed to the facts of the case before the jury. Also, neither good conduct time nor parole was

mentioned during closing arguments. As a result, we find nothing in the jury argument that

would support a finding of egregious harm.

       Last, there is nothing else in the record indicating that the jury considered the application

of good conduct time. There were no jury notes regarding good conduct time and nothing in the

record supports a conclusion that it was applied in the assessment of C.C.’s sentence. See

Murrieta, 578 S.W.3d at 556. Even so, C.C. argues that harsh punishment was unwarranted

because he had no prior criminal history, received sex-offender treatment, and expressed remorse

for his actions, which began when he was eleven years old. While C.C. had no prior criminal

history, the jury heard of many extraneous acts of sexual abuse committed against B.W. over the

course of four years and was entitled to consider those extraneous acts in setting punishment.

Moreover, the jury assessed eight months’ confinement for unlawful restraint, and the jury’s

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verdict for each count of aggravated sexual assault of B.W. fell well below the maximum

sentence for each offense and assessed less punishment than the State recommended.

       After reviewing the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of counsel,

and the remaining record, we conclude that C.C. was not egregiously harmed by the jury-charge

error on punishment. Accordingly, we overrule his last point of error.

III.   Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Charles van Cleef
                                               Justice

Date Submitted:       January 26, 2023
Date Decided:         February 10, 2023

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