Court Opinion

ID: 9839914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 17:05:13.468101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:05.434147
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                                In re the Matter of:

          DANIEL L. HARRIS, Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                         v.

        PERI RENEE HARRIS, Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 22-0564 FC
                              FILED 9-14-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FC2021-002669
                 The Honorable Monica Edelstein, Judge

                       VACATED AND REMANDED

                                    COUNSEL

Daniel L. Harris, Peoria
Petitioner/Appellant/Cross-Appellee

kdlaw, P.C., Scottsdale
By Sally M. Colton
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
                            HARRIS v. HARRIS
                            Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1            Daniel Harris (“Husband”) and Peri Harris (“Wife”) appeal a
superior court Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. Husband appeals the
division of the marital residence and a community Chase bank account,
while Wife cross-appeals the denial of spousal maintenance. For the
following reasons the superior court’s order is vacated and the case is
remanded for further findings.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           Husband and Wife were married in March 2014, during
which they had three children and obtained a marital residence. In April
2021, Wife obtained an order of protection against Husband granting her
exclusive use of that residence. Husband petitioned for dissolution of
marriage later that month. During the dissolution proceedings, Husband
continued to pay for community expenses, including the mortgage,
homeowners’ association fees, and taxes on the marital residence.

¶3             Prior to trial, Husband petitioned the court for separate
findings of fact and conclusions of law. After trial, the superior court issued
its Decree of Dissolution in June of 2022. The court found that Wife was not
eligible for, nor had affirmatively pled the issue of, spousal maintenance. In
the Decree, the court valued the community Chase bank account at $9,136
and divided it equally between the parties. The court awarded Wife the
marital residence as her sole and separate property but divided the equity
equally between Wife and Husband. The court also ordered Wife to
refinance the property by August 31, 2022, to remove Husband from the
debt obligation. The court also ordered that if she was unable to or failed to
refinance by the deadline, the property must then be listed for sale. The
order also mandated that Husband “make all payments associated with the
maintenance of the home” until refinancing or the sale was complete.

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                            HARRIS v. HARRIS
                            Decision of the Court

¶4            Husband and Wife separately moved the court to alter or
amend the decree, and the court denied both motions on July 13 and 15,
respectively. Husband timely filed a notice of appeal on August 12; Wife
timely filed notice of cross-appeal on August 25.

¶5          This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) and
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 9.

                               DISCUSSION

I.     THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DOES NOT SUPPORT THE
       COURT’S PROPERTY DIVISION.

¶6            Husband contends the superior court committed several
errors regarding its division of the marital estate. This Court reviews the
superior court’s division of property for abuse of discretion. Helland v.
Helland, 236 Ariz. 197, 199, ¶ 8 (App. 2014). In dissolution of marriage
proceedings, the court must seek an equitable division of community
property and may consider apportioning assets and obligations between
the parties. A.R.S. § 25-318(A), (B); Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 594 (1977).
Generally, the division must be “substantially equal[] unless sound reason
exists to divide the property otherwise.” Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221
(1997). The superior court’s discretion allows postponing the sale of
property until a reasonable time after the dissolution decree. Dole v. Blair,
248 Ariz. 629, 633, ¶ 16 (App. 2020).

       A. The Superior Court Failed to Make Required Findings of Fact.

¶7            Husband contends that he was entitled to reimbursement for
expenses paid during the dissolution proceedings and that the court made
no finding explaining why he should be required to pay such expenses.
When a party timely requests findings of fact pursuant to Arizona Rule of
Family Law Procedure 82(a), as Husband did, this Court “must be able to
determine the factual underpinnings of the” award and will not infer
findings to support the award. Stein v. Stein, 238 Ariz. 548, 550-51, ¶ 5 (App.
2015). Here, the sole finding regarding the marital residence was that “the
parties own or have an interest in the following real property: Marital
residence located at [address] which is community property.” The superior
court failed to provide any basis to support the disposition of the marital
home to Wife without reimbursing Husband for expenses relating to the
home. In so doing, the superior court failed to make required findings of
fact.

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                            HARRIS v. HARRIS
                            Decision of the Court

¶8              Generally, courts will presume a transaction between spouses
is a gift, based on the need to avoid spouses documenting transactions and
the belief that spouses should mutually support each other. Bobrow v.
Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 594-96, ¶¶ 8, 15 (App. 2017). But when one spouse
petitions for the dissolution of the marriage, terminating the community,
those justifications no longer exist, and courts will not presume a gift. Id. at
596, ¶ 15. The burden falls to the non-paying spouse to show such
contributions were gifts by clear and convincing evidence. Id. “The superior
court may account for such payments in a variety of ways to achieve an
equitable property division.” Huey v. Huey, 253 Ariz. 560, 565, ¶ 18 (App.
2022).

¶9             In the joint pretrial statement, Husband sought
reimbursement for contributing to community property during the
dissolution proceedings. Husband recalculated the value of his
contributions before trial, testifying to expending $10,769. But the decree
neither addressed Husband’s claim nor provided any factual finding for
dismissing it.

¶10            Wife contends that the court considered and rejected
Husband’s reimbursement claim, relying on the court’s statement in the
Decree that “the Court is not ordering that [Wife] repay half of the
community expenses related to the property.” But this comment is
immediately preceded by the court’s order that “[Husband] shall continue
to make all payments associated with the maintenance of the home.” The
court failed to explain why Husband remains responsible for expenses that
do not benefit him. Because the superior court made insufficient findings of
fact, this Court will not draw inferences favorable to upholding the award.
Stein, 238 Ariz. at 550-51, ¶¶ 5, 12. The superior court erred by failing to
account for Husband’s reimbursement claim and providing no factual
findings for doing so.

¶11          Wife argues, though, that any such error was harmless
because she was entitled to spousal maintenance, contending that rejecting
Husband’s reimbursement claim made up for denying spousal
maintenance. But “property division and spousal maintenance are two
separate and distinct considerations at dissolution” such that spousal
maintenance adjustments “cannot justify depriving a spouse of his or her
property right.” Koelsch v. Koelsch, 148 Ariz. 176, 182 (1986). Wife’s
argument is not supported by the superior court’s orders or law.

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                            HARRIS v. HARRIS
                            Decision of the Court

¶12           Husband also argues the superior court order improperly
required him “to expend his separate property to maintain Wife’s post-
decree separate property.” The superior court awarded Wife the marital
residence “as sole and separate property subject to any and all outstanding
liens and encumbrances,” divided the equity equally between the parties,
and ordered Husband to pay for the property’s maintenance, which the
court deemed “community expenses related to the property.” This
essentially awarded each party an equal portion of a community asset—
half the equity of the home offset by an allocation of debt. But the order
made Husband responsible for maintenance payments until the refinancing
or sale while Wife would be responsible for any remainder. In making this
award, the superior court failed to credit Husband for the amounts
expended on maintaining the property pending the refinance or sale of the
home post-decree. This, coupled with the failure to address the pre-decree
expenditures by husband, compound the need for the court to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the award.

       B. The Findings of Fact Do Not Support the Court’s Division of the
          Community Chase Bank Account.

¶13           Husband also contends that the superior court erred in
valuing the community Chase bank account on a different date than the
community’s termination. “[T]he superior court has wide discretion” when
selecting a valuation date for community property, but the resulting
outcome must be fair and equitable. Meister v. Meister, 252 Ariz. 391, 397,
¶¶ 16-17 (App. 2021). Property acquired “after service of a petition for
dissolution of marriage” is separate property. A.R.S. § 25-213(B).

¶14           The superior court’s complete findings regarding the account
were “that the parties do not agree to the distribution of the following
personal property: Chase Bank Account valued at $9136.00.” While
Husband admitted the Chase bank account was a community bank account,
he testified only some of the funds were community property. The court
acknowledged that the community ended on May 8, 2021, the day Wife was
served the petition for dissolution of marriage, yet it did not use this as a
valuation date. The balance of the account on May 7 was $6,306.60, yet the
court valued the account at the increased amount available on May 22
without explaining its reasoning.

¶15             Due to the superior court’s failure to make sufficient findings
of fact and its silence regarding Husband’s reimbursement claim, this Court
is unable to determine whether the superior court’s valuation date resulted
in a fair and equitable division as required by law.

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                            HARRIS v. HARRIS
                            Decision of the Court

II.    THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT’S
       SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE DETERMINATION.

¶16           On cross-appeal, Wife argues the superior court erred in
denying her a spousal maintenance award. This Court reviews spousal
maintenance rulings for abuse of discretion and will uphold the superior
court’s order if supported by reasonable evidence. Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz.
63, 65, ¶ 8 (App. 2012).

¶17           Wife first contends the superior court abused its discretion in
finding Wife failed to affirmatively plead spousal maintenance, and this
Court agrees. In her Response to Petition for Dissolution of Marriage Wife
explicitly prayed for spousal maintenance and alleged the following:
“Mother worked during the first year of the parties’ marriage so Father
could attend school. After the first year of their marriage, they agreed that
Mother would stay home, care for the children and conduct home school
for the children, which she has done up to this point.” Wife continued to
claim spousal maintenance in her Proposed Resolution Management
Conference Statement, her Pretrial Statement, and the Joint Pretrial
Statement.

¶18           Wife also contends the court erred in failing to determine the
necessary findings of fact. As a threshold matter, the superior court must
first determine whether a spouse requesting spousal maintenance is eligible
by meeting one of five criteria: (1) “[l]ack[ing] sufficient property, including
property apportioned to the spouse, to provide for that spouse’s reasonable
needs;” (2) “[l]ack[ing] earning ability in the labor market that is adequate
to be self-sufficient;” (3) “[being] the parent of a child whose age or
condition is such that the parent should not be required to seek
employment outside the home;” (4) “[h]a[ving] made a significant financial
or other contribution to the education, training, vocational skills, career or
earning ability of the other spouse or ha[ving] significantly reduced that
spouse’s income or career opportunities for the benefit of the other spouse;”
or (5) having “[h]ad a marriage of long duration and [being] of an age that
may preclude the possibility of gaining employment adequate to be self-
sufficient.” A.R.S. § 25-319(A).

¶19            Here, the court found “[n]o credible evidence presented”
concerning criteria (1), (3), or (5); and its only finding about criteria (4) was
“[t]he Parties have been married for almost 8 years.” For factor (2), the court
stated: “[Wife] is a registered nurse but the Parties mutually agreed [Wife]
would not work and be the primary caretaker and homeschool the
Children. [Wife] is enrolled in re-certification courses.” Because Husband

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                             HARRIS v. HARRIS
                             Decision of the Court

moved for specific findings of fact, the court was required to make specific
findings of fact, yet it did not do so for situations (1), (3), and (5). See Stein,
238 Ariz. at 550-51, ¶ 5. Because of the superior court’s insufficient findings
of fact, this Court cannot determine the evidentiary basis for the court’s
conclusion that Wife was ineligible under criteria (1), (3), or (5).

                                 CONCLUSION

¶20           For the foregoing reasons, this Court vacates the superior
court’s order and remands for further findings. Both parties seek attorneys’
fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the reasonableness
of the positions each party has taken and their financial resources, this
Court denies both requests.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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