Court Opinion

ID: 9796972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:09:25.691781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:51.963106
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
specially concurring.
[T24] I coneur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately because I view the victim impact evidence differently than the majority.
[T25] Victim impact evidence, by definition, is evidence concerning the impact that the crime has had on the victim after the crime has occurred. The crime involved is larceny. Victim impact evidence in the context of this case would be evidence establishing the effect of the theft of the motorcycle on Mr. Jones. From my review, there is very little, if any, evidence of that nature in the record. The majority accurately points out that there was a great deal of evidence regarding Mr. Jones's health problems and sentimental attachment to his motorcycle. Viewed in context, however, that evidence is not victim impact evidence because it was relevant to explain why Mr. Jones limited his test drive permission to the confines of the K-Mart parking lot, and why he reported the loss of the vehicle within such a short time after its disappearance. Additionally, because the VIN on the vehicle did not match the number on the title, it was also relevant to bolster Mr. Jones's credibility regarding his identification of the vehicle when it was returned by the police. The relevance of this evidence is capsulized in this exchange between the prosecutor and Mrs. Jones, as referenced in the majority opinion:
Q. [Prosecutor]: Okay. So he kept it for two years when he couldn't ride it; is that right?
A. Right.
When he was unable to ride it? ©
Yeah, he would go out every day polishing it, wiping down the bike. It was like his baby, it got more attention than me. p
Q. All right. So did you feel that was something important in his life then?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Now-
A It gave him something to look forward to. His disease paralyzed him just overnight, but that bike was like a hope for him, yeah.
Q. So would you think he spent enough time to be able to recognize that bike pretty well?
A. Oh, yeah. I'm sure he would.
(Emphasis added.) This testimony was not victim impact testimony.
[T 26] Nevertheless, it is obvious from review of the entire record that the prosecutor treated this evidence as victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is improper because it is intended to "arouse the passions of the jury." Justice v. State, TIS P.2d 1002, 1010 (Wyo.1989). There is little doubt that the prosecutor intentionally emphasized Mr. Jones's physical condition and love of his motorcycle in an attempt to appeal to the jury's emotions. The prosecutor devoted a substantial portion of his relatively short closing argument to Mr. Jones's health condition and sentimental attachment to his mo-toreycle and never once attempted to tie those factors to any relevant issue in the trial,. In closing, the prosecutor stated:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury. You know, sometimes I struggle with this, I am not an actor and I don't bring up-I don't know when emotion is coming or not, so I apologize.
But you sat here yesterday with me and you heard Charlie Jones talk about that bike, talk about how it takes four or five hours to clean a Harley because you've got to-you've got to talk to a Harley first and you've got to approach it right. And, you know, you'd thought he was talking about his wife, she was kind of jealous of the Harley, you know, she said that.
The man spent his whole life working on big motors, big diesels, big generators and his hobby was the big bike, it's not a diesel but it about sounds like one. And then after spending a lifetime doing that he *212retired, as we all hope to do, and he wanted to enjoy his bike.
Shortly after retirement life took a turn on him and he wasn't able to enjoy the bike the way he wanted to. He could still go out and he could clean it, he could polish it. It's amazing to me that the guy spent four to five hours twice a week polishing that bike right there when nobody had ridden it since the last time he polished it, hadn't been anywhere. It was just sitting there, but he still spen[t] the time with his bike.
It's hard to imagine what it would be 'like to be bound to a wheelchair, but you would want to have some hope, hope for mobility, hope for freedom, hope for, you know, the dignity and the pride that you had when you owned your own business, drove your own Harley and people didn't have to do everything for you.
[[Image here]]
That bike meant a lot to Charlie Jones and then one day that man right there walked in and lied to him about who he was, lied to him about where he lived, lied to him about what he intended to do with the bike. Just a little test drive and he took it, he took Charlie's pride, took his baby.
[[Image here]]
Now [defense counsel] is going to have his turn to speak and then I'll get one more chance at rebuttal, but before I sit down I just want to ask you to think about Charlie Jones, the testimony he gave yesterday, and take a good look at Mark Javorina and think about what he did to Charlie Jones.
[127] I can conceive of no proper basis for these arguments. I am not willing, as the majority did, to excuse this conduct on the basis that these comments "found their origin in ignorance of the law." I am also unwilling to find these comments harmless. The comments were not isolated. They made up approximately 40 percent of the prosecutor's closing argument. The prosecutor emphasized Mr. Jones's medical condition and attachment to his motoreycle throughout the trial. The record reveals a concerted effort to focus the jury's attention on Mr. Jones's medical condition. In short, the prosecutor attempted to use sympathy for the victim as a basis for the jury's decision. Such conduct should be condemned, not ignored as harmless.
[128] The perplexing aspect of this issue is that there was no apparent need for the prosecutor to resort to these tactics. The case against Mr. Javorina was strong. Indeed, it is the strength of the case that allows the majority to find the error harmless. However, the pervasiveness of this evidence, so blatantly emphasized in the prosecutor's closing arguments, leads me to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Javorina was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial This evidence taints the entire trial and justifies a reversal of the larceny conviction. Additionally, although the "concealment" conviction is technically not before us, in light of the reversal of the larceny conviction and the unusual procedural posture of this case,6 I would grant a new trial on all counts.

. Mr. Javorina was found guilty by the jury on both counts, but the district court has not entered the concealment conviction, and has not sentenced Mr. Javorina on the concealment charge.