Court Opinion

ID: 9781124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:08:48.039762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:10.468240
License: Public Domain

J-S25024-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 EDDIE BELL                               :
                                          :
                   Appellant              :   No. 1708 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 1, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0003381-2013

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 30, 2023

     Eddie Bell (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–

9546. We affirm.

     This Court previously explained:

            On March 19, 2014, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-
     degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime, and two
     violations of the Uniform Firearms Act. The convictions were
     premised upon the following events. At approximately 5:30 a.m.
     on May 27, 2012, [] Sirmar Morris [the victim], and Dante Hines
     [Hines], Appellant’s brother, had an argument at an after-hours
     establishment in Philadelphia. [The victim] purportedly displayed
     a gun during the incident. Hines then went to Appellant’s house,
     where Hines had arranged to obtain a ride to his own home from
     Will Duncan [Duncan]. Hines told Appellant about the argument
     with [the victim].

           Appellant, who had a gun, informed Hines that he was going
     to take care of the situation. [] Duncan, accompanied by Martinez
     Green [Green], arrived at Appellant’s home in a tan minivan.
     Appellant and Hines entered the van. As Duncan was driving down
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     23rd Street, Hines saw [the victim] walking down the same street
     and pointed him out to Appellant. Duncan stopped the vehicle so
     that Appellant could exit. Hines then heard shots, and Appellant
     came running back toward the van. Duncan drove away.

            At that time, Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Bimble was
     in his cruiser just outside the police headquarters located about
     one block away from the crime. He heard the gunshots fired by
     Appellant and immediately drove to the location of the shooting.
     Officer Bimble saw Duncan’s van speeding from the scene, started
     to follow it, and broadcasted his location to other police units. The
     van continued driving at a high rate of speed but was spied by
     other officers. Appellant was soon apprehended by Philadelphia
     [police officers]. A 9 mm Smith & Wesson handgun was found
     near the location of Appellant’s detention. Appellant’s DNA was
     on the weapon. The other individuals in Duncan’s van were
     apprehended by other Philadelphia police officers. [At the time of
     his arrest, Green was in possession of a 9 mm Glock 17. However,
     ballistics testing excluded it as the murder weapon.]

            [The victim] was shot with a 9 mm Smith & Wesson
     handgun; three bullets entered the victim. [The victim] also
     sustained shrapnel gunshot wounds, and a graze wound at the top
     of his left shoulder. Appellant shot at the victim a total of eight
     times. [The victim] was transported by ambulance to the Hospital
     of the University of Pennsylvania, where he was pronounced dead.
     The bullet that killed the victim entered the right side of his chest,
     and it traveled through his liver, aorta, and both lungs.

           Immediately after the jury rendered its verdict, the trial
     court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment[.]

Commonwealth v. Bell, 125 A.3d 438 (Pa. Super. 2015) (1235 EDA 2014,

unpublished memorandum, at 1-3).

     On July 7, 2015, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on March 9,

2016. Commonwealth v. Bell, 134 A.3d 53 (Pa. 2016).

     The PCRA court explained:

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            [Appellant subsequently] filed a timely pro se PCRA petition
     on September 20, 2016, [and] a supplemental addendum on
     January 12, 2017[. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed
     an] amended PCRA petition on July 6, 2017. [Appellant] filed a
     second supplemental addendum to his pro se petition on
     September 15, 2017, and his third on October 6, 2017. On
     September 29, 2017, [Appellant] filed pro se correspondence
     entitled “Opposition to PCRA Counsel’s Deletion of Claims from the
     Original PCRA Petition.”

            [On] November 22, 2017, the Commonwealth filed its
     motion to dismiss. On May 24, 2018, [the PCRA c]ourt issued a
     [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 907 Notice and, on October 18, 2018, dismissed
     [Appellant’s] PCRA petition. [Appellant appealed to the Superior
     Court, and, at the request of Appellant and the PCRA court, the
     dismissal order] was subsequently vacated on May 20, 2019[. The
     case was] remanded to the PCRA court, and [Appellant] filed
     numerous amended petitions thereafter. On October 25, 2019,
     Coley Reynolds[, Esquire,] was appointed as PCRA counsel, and
     on January 30, 2020, Reynolds filed [a no-merit letter pursuant to
     Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
     Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
     banc),] and motion to withdraw. [The PCRA c]ourt ordered
     counsel to conduct additional review of the issues raised by
     [Appellant], after which counsel filed a supplemental Finley letter
     on November 20, 2020. [The PCRA c]ourt issued a Rule 907
     Notice on December 22, 2020. [Appellant] filed a pro se response
     to the court’s [Rule] 907 Notice on January 6, 2021, at which point
     counsel was again ordered to conduct additional review of the
     issues raised by [Appellant]. Counsel then filed an amended
     [PCRA] petition and supporting brief on April 15, 2021. The
     Commonwealth filed its answer to the amended petition on
     September 17, 2021.        On April 7, 2022, [the PCRA c]ourt
     submitted [Rule] 907 [notice], to which [Appellant] filed a
     Response on April 22, 2022. On June 1, 2022, [the PCRA c]ourt
     filed an order formally dismissing the PCRA petition.

           [Appellant] filed a timely notice of appeal to the Superior
     Court on June 24, 2022, and on July 14, 2022, [the PCRA c]ourt
     issued an order requesting [Appellant] file a concise statement of
     [errors] complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/22, at 2-3 (capitalization modified, footnotes

omitted).

     Appellant retained new counsel, who filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on

August 10, 2022.    Counsel raised numerous layered claims of ineffective

assistance of prior PCRA counsel and trial counsel. The PCRA court issued an

opinion addressing the merits of the new claims on October 28, 2022.

     Appellant raises the following issues:

     I. Did the PCRA court err when it found that trial counsel was not
     ineffective, violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, for
     1) failing to properly object to the instruction given by the court
     on [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 6104 in relation to the charge of murder
     and/or for 2) failing to ask the court to additionally instruct the
     jury that they could use the gun[-]related evidence as one item
     of circumstantial evidence in determining whether Appellant was
     guilty of the crime of voluntary manslaughter[]; was PCRA counsel
     ineffective for failing, to properly develop, present and argue this
     claim?

     II. Was PCRA counsel ineffective for failing to properly plead,
     argue, and preserve multiple meritorious claims that Appellant
     specifically asked PCRA counsel to assert in his PCRA petition and
     which PCRA counsel ineffectively omitted/abandoned?

            A. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
            Fourteenth Amendment[s] for advising the Appellant
            to reject the plea offer from the Commonwealth of 25
            to 50 years (20 to 40 years from Third Degree Murder
            and 5 to 10 on the gun charge)?

            B. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
            Fourteenth Amendments for failing to amend the pro
            se motion to suppress and/or file a counseled motion
            to suppress challenging the credibility and reliability
            of the evidentiary basis for the vehicle stop?

            C. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
            Fourteenth Amendments for advising the Appellant to

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          not testify in his own defense as to the Appellant’s lack
          of specific intent, including but not limited to his
          mental and physical state at the time of the incident
          and his belief that he needed to act in self-defense?

          D. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments for not objecting and
          seeking a continuance after Appellant advised the
          court and counsel during the colloquy of the Appellant
          that he was at that time under the influence of drugs,
          alcohol, and other intoxicants, rendering him impaired
          and his waiver of his constitutional right to testify on
          his own behalf involuntary and unknowing?

          E. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments for failing to object, move to
          suppress and give a curative instruction to the trial
          testimony of the victim[’]s mother, Kathy Morris[,]
          when Ms. Morris had previously violated the
          sequestration order imposed at the preliminary
          hearing?

          F. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments for failing to ask for a
          continuance in order to retain and consult with a
          gunshot sound expert after the Commonwealth,
          without providing any advance notice to the defense,
          elicited speculative testimony from Police Officer
          B[]imble as an expert in the sound of gunshots
          opining as to the number of guns that were fired?

          G. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments for failing to timely object,
          move to strike, seek a mistrial or a curative instruction
          after the Commonwealth introduced evidence that []
          Green had been charged with unrelated gun offenses?

          H. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments for failing to have the
          victim’s clothing and hands tested for [gunshot
          residue (GSR)] when it was alleged that the victim
          possessed a gun, was acting aggressive with it and
          fired it at the Appellant?

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            I. Was trial counsel ineffective under the Sixth and
            Fourteenth Amendments for failing to object to the
            jury being given the same instruction in relation to the
            inference portion of the first degree (intent) and third
            degree (malice) murder crimes?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-5 (capitalization and punctuation modified).

      We review the PCRA court’s denial of relief by “examining whether the

PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

      [T]he PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition without
      a hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by any further proceedings.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2). “[T]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” Commonwealth v.
      D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).

       Instantly, Appellant claims trial and PCRA Counsel were ineffective. It

is well-settled that

      counsel is presumed to have been effective and [] the petitioner
      bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.
      Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A.2d 655, 664 (Pa. 2007). To
      overcome this presumption, a petitioner must establish that: (1)
      the underlying substantive claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel
      did not have a reasonable basis for his or her act or omission; and

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      (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
      deficient performance, “that is, a reasonable probability that but
      for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would
      have been different.” Id. A PCRA petitioner must address each
      of these prongs on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Natividad,
      938 A.2d 310, 322 (Pa. 2007) (explaining that “appellants
      continue to bear the burden of pleading and proving each of the
      [foregoing ineffectiveness prongs] on appeal to this Court”). A
      petitioner’s failure to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the
      claim. Cooper, 941 A.2d at 664.

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144 (Pa. 2018) (citations

modified).   “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a

baseless or meritless claim.”    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035,

1042 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme

Court held “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after

obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at

401. This is Appellant’s first PCRA petition. Because he raised his claims at

the first opportunity following the dismissal of his PCRA petition and the entry

of appearance of new counsel, Bradley applies.

      “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is

required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the

three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of representation.”

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022).

      In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical
      inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts
      was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

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      counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel
      cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying
      issue.

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to properly object to the following jury charge:

            Now, in this case if you find that the defendant used a
      firearm in committing the acts constituting the violation of the
      offense of murder and that the defendant did not have a license
      to carry that firearm as required by law[] you may regard that
      as one item of circumstantial evidence on the issue of
      whether the defendant intended to commit the crime of
      murder. It is for you to decide what weight, if any, you will
      give to that item of circumstantial evidence. Evidence of
      non-licensure alone is not sufficient to prove that the
      defendant intended to commit the offense of murder.

N.T., 3/18/14, at 130 (emphases added).          Although trial counsel took an

exception to the non-licensure charge, Appellant contends counsel was

ineffective for

      failing to properly object to [this jury] instruction … and/or for []
      failing to ask the [trial court as part of its charge on voluntary
      manslaughter] to additionally [give the jury the same instruction];
      PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to properly develop,
      present and argue this claim.

Appellant’s Brief at 11; see id. at 11-19.

      Appellant did not raise this claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement; instead,

he claimed trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to object to the instruction

given by the [trial c]ourt[.]” Statement of [Errors] Complained of on Appeal,

8/10/22, at 2 (unnumbered). Consequently, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the

PCRA court did not address whether trial counsel made a “proper objection”

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to the inference, but only whether trial counsel made any objection to the jury

instructions. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/22, at 9; N.T., 3/18/14, at 9-

10.1

       An appellant cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.      See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).      Moreover, issues not raised in a court-ordered 1925(b)

statement are waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); see also Commonwealth

v. Given, 244 A.3d 508, 510 (Pa. Super. 2020) (appellant waived all issues

on appeal by failing to raise them in his Rule 1925(b) statement);

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (Pa. 1998), superseded by

rule on other grounds in Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 431

(Pa. Super. 2009). Appellant has waived his issue regarding trial counsel’s

“proper objection” to the jury charge.

       Even if not waived, the claim would not merit relief. Appellant failed to

demonstrate that an objection to the inference would have been successful.

Crimes Code Section 6104 provides:

       In the trial of a person for committing or attempting to commit a
       crime enumerated in section 6105 (relating to persons not to
       possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms), the
       fact that that person was armed with a firearm, used or attempted
       to be used, and had no license to carry the same, shall be evidence
       of that person’s intention to commit the offense.

____________________________________________

1  The PCRA court found trial counsel had taken an exception to the non-
licensure charge. Id.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6104. Our Supreme Court has concluded that an instruction

incorporating Section 6104 is constitutional. See Commonwealth v. Hall,

830 A.2d 537, 549 (Pa. 2003). Moreover, our review discloses the charge

tracked the language of the standard jury instruction. See Pa. SSJI (Crim), §

15.6104 (2019). It is settled, “Where the trial court’s instructions track the

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, it is presumed

such instructions are an accurate statement of the law.” Commonwealth v.

Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 321 (Pa. Super. 2019). Thus, Appellant failed to

plead and prove a different objection by trial counsel would have succeeded.

Even if not waived, this claim would lack merit.

      Appellant also claims trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a

similar instruction to the charge of voluntary manslaughter. Appellant argues

“giving this instruction in the context of the murder charge but not the

voluntary manslaughter charge could easily [have] led to confusion among

the jury.” Appellant’s Brief at 14 (emphasis in original). Appellant argues:

      If the jury followed the [trial c]ourt’s express instructions and
      found that Appellant used an unlicensed firearm, they had no
      other option but to find Appellant guilty of murder rather than
      voluntary manslaughter. Murder was the only charge they had
      been told about which also incorporated the unlicensed firearm.
      In other words, if they found that Appellant had an unlicensed
      firearm, they had no other option but to find him guilty of murder
      and that voluntary manslaughter was “off the table.”

Id. at 15 (emphases in original).

      As described above, the trial court instructed the jury that they “may”

regard evidence Appellant was carrying an unlicensed gun as “one item” of

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circumstantial evidence with respect to the intent to commit the murder. N.T.,

3/18/14, at 130. The trial court did not require the jury to consider this as

evidence of intent. Id. The trial court also instructed the jury it was up to

them to decide “what weight, if any” to give to that piece of evidence. Id.

Lastly, the court charged the jury, “Evidence of non-licensure alone is not

sufficient to prove that the defendant intended commit the offense of

murder.” Id. (emphasis added).

      Our review discloses the trial court explicitly charged the jury that they

could not find Appellant guilty of murder merely because he possessed an

unlicensed firearm. N.T., 3/18/14, at 130. “It is well settled that the jury is

presumed to follow the trial court's instructions.”        Commonwealth v.

Becher, 293 A.3d 1226, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2023). Appellant does not point to

anything in the record to support his claim that the jury was confused or failed

to follow the trial court’s instruction. Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to request the Section 6104 instruction as part of the

voluntary manslaughter charge does not merit relief. Moreover, as Appellant

has not shown arguable merit to his underlying claim of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness, his layered ineffectiveness claim as to PCRA counsel fails.

Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270; Appellant’s Brief at 19.

      In his second issue, Appellant alleges PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise nine claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant’s Brief

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at 19-57. For the reasons discussed below, none of the underlying claims of

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness merit relief. Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270.

       Appellant argues trial counsel was ineffective for “advising Appellant to

reject the plea offer from the Commonwealth of 25 to 50 years[.]” Appellant’s

Brief at 23; see id. at 23-30. Appellant claims he informed trial counsel that

he wanted to accept the guilty plea, but trial counsel “vehemently advised

[him] not to accept the offer. Counsel proceeded to advise [him] that there

is no evidence of first[-]degree murder and that [he] will not lose the case[.]”

Id. at 24.

       The PCRA court explained its rejection of this claim:

       The requirements of trial counsel in advising a client regarding
       plea offers is well-settled. Trial counsel has a duty to inform his
       client of any plea offers, and to communicate not only the terms
       of the offer, but also the relative merits of the offer compared to
       his client’s chances at trial. Commonwealth v. Bazzley, 237
       A.3d 459 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum, at 7-
       8).[2] Moreover, a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the
       basis that counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him or her to reject a
       guilty plea must demonstrate the following:

              [B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
              reasonable probability that (1) the plea offer would
              have been presented to the court (i.e., that the
              defendant would have accepted the plea and the
              prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
              intervening circumstances); (2) that the court would
              have accepted its terms; and (3) that the conviction
              or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

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          have been less severe than under the judgment and
          sentence that in fact were imposed.

     Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super.
     2015). The trial record reflects that counsel advised [Appellant]
     of the Commonwealth’s offer and had sufficient communications
     with [Appellant] regarding what the consequences would be if he
     rejected the offer:

          Trial counsel: Should you be found guilty of murder in
          the first degree, do you understand. . . that you would
          be facing a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment
          and that would be life without the possibility of parole?

          [Appellant]: Yes.

          ….

          Trial counsel: Do you understand that the district
          attorney has extended an offer of a guilty plea. . . if
          you’re willing to admit to or plead guilty to a charge
          of murder in the third degree and the weapons
          offenses, the Commonwealth is prepared to
          recommend a sentence to the court of 25 to 50 years
          in jail. Do you understand that sir?

          [Appellant]: Yes.

          Trial counsel: Have you and I discussed the offer
          that’s been extended to you by the Commonwealth?

          [Appellant]: Yes.

          Trial counsel: Have you rejected that offer, sir?

          [Appellant]: Yes.

          Trial counsel: And is it your decision and your
          decision alone, sir, to go to trial on this case?

          [Appellant]: Yes.

     (N.T., 3/12/14, 70-85).

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     Trial counsel also acknowledged that he forewarned [Appellant] of
     the likelihood of his case proceeding immediately to sentencing
     following any conviction due to the mandatory penalty involved.
     (N.T., 3/19/14, 7-8). [Appellant] clearly understood the risks that
     he was up against when he made the decision to reject the
     Commonwealth’s plea offer.

            Nonetheless, even if counsel had been ineffective in
     explaining the relevant risks and benefits of the Commonwealth’s
     offer, [Appellant] cannot establish a reasonable probability that
     he would have accepted the plea in the absence of his trial
     counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. Notably, the trial court offered
     [Appellant] additional time to consider, for himself, whether to
     accept or reject the offer:

           Trial court: Before I get your final decision, I’m going
           to let you think it over during lunch. . . when we come
           back, I’ll ask you again... if you want to accept the
           offer, the offer will still be open at that point.

           [Appellant]: I don’t need no time. That’s still life [25
           to 50 years]. That’s pretty much still life. I can’t
           accept that.

           Trial court: So[,] you are satisfied? Have all [] your
           questions about the offer been answered?

           [Appellant]: Yes.

           Trial Court: Do you want additional time to think it
           over?

           [Appellant]: No.

           Trial court: So[,] you are satisfied that you do not
           wish to accept the offer of 25 to 50 years; is that
           correct?

           [Appellant]: Yes.

     (N.T., 3/12/14, 83-85).

           The above exchange establishes that [Appellant] weighed
     the relative risks of rejecting the offer against the benefits. He

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      perceived the Commonwealth’s offer as essentially being the
      equivalent of a life sentence, and rejected the offer based on this
      assessment. Moreover, it was only after this thorough and
      comprehensive exchange that the court entered its finding that
      the Commonwealth’s offer had been fully explained and that
      [Appellant] rejected it knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
      (N.T., 3/12/14, at 85). Therefore, the fact that [Appellant]
      decided to reject the Commonwealth’s offer and now regrets his
      decision to do so does not lead to the conclusion that his trial
      counsel was ineffective. Bazzley, 237 A.3d at 459.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/22, at 13-16 (citation formats and capitalization

modified; some emphasis added, some omitted; footnote added).

      The record and law support the PCRA court’s reasoning and we agree

with its conclusion. See id. “A defendant is bound by the statements which

he makes during his plea colloquy and cannot assert challenges to his plea

that contradict his statements when he entered the plea.” Commonwealth

v. Jamison, 284 A.3d 501, 506 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).

Appellant cannot obtain relief by claiming that he lied during his colloquy. This

issue does not merit relief.

      Appellant next claims trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to amend

the pro se motion to suppress and/or file a counseled motion to suppress

challenging the credibility and reliability of the evidentiary basis for the vehicle

stop.” Appellant’s Brief at 30 (capitalization modified); see also id. at 30-

33; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 12-13.

      While Appellant alludes to the three-part test for determining counsel’s

ineffectiveness, he does not discuss the first two prongs other than to state,

“Counsel had no objectively reasonable basis for not at least filing a counseled

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motion” to suppress. Appellant’s Brief at 32. Appellant does not articulate a

legal basis for such a motion, other than baldly asserting “the encounter was

not supported by reasonable suspicion.”         Id. at 32; see id. at 30-33.

Appellant also provides no factual basis for this claim, other than his allegation

that “it was unlikely if not impossible for [the police officers] to have witnessed

what they alleged they saw including that the van was traveling at a high rate

of speed.” Id. at 31. Because Appellant has not discussed the first two prongs

of the test or provided legal support, his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

fails. See Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 406 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(where appellant fails to prove any one prong of the ineffectiveness test, he

does not meet his burden, and counsel is deemed constitutionally effective).

      Moreover, the claim lacks arguable merit. We have long held:

      To conduct an investigative detention, police must have
      reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In reviewing whether
      reasonable suspicion ... exists, we must ... examine the totality of
      the circumstances to determine whether there exists a
      particularized and objective basis for suspecting an individual [ ]
      of criminal activity. Even innocent factors, viewed together, may
      arouse suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Moreover, in
      determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such
      circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
      unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but to specific reasonable
      inferences he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
      experience.

Commonwealth v. Knupp, 290 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      At trial, Philadelphia Police Officer Thomas Bimble testified that at

around 6:00 a.m. on May 27, 2012, he stood with two other police officers

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outside the police station at 24th and Wolf Streets in Philadelphia.      N.T.,

3/13/14, at 111-12. Officer Bimble heard 8-9 gunshots “about a block away.”

Id. at 112. He and his partner jumped into their police car, activated lights

and sirens, and drove toward the sounds. They arrived at the scene within

ten seconds of hearing the shots. Id. at 113. They saw a “brown minivan

back up and then [it pulled] off at a high rate of speed.” Id. The van led

multiple police cars on a high-speed chase through South Philadelphia. Id. at

114-17; see also N.T., 3/14/14, at 10-12, 18-23. While pursuing the van,

Officer Bimble observed an individual, later identified as Appellant, jump out

of the passenger side of the van. N.T., 3/13/14, 118, 121.

      Philadelphia Police Sergeant Richard Crawford, who joined in the pursuit

of the van, saw a second individual, later identified as Green, jump out of the

still-moving van.   N.T., 3/14/14, at 21-24. Philadelphia Police Officer Earl

Bonner, who also joined in the pursuit, testified the police discovered the van

abandoned, with the doors opened, and saw two men, later identified as Hines

and Duncan, running away from the van. N.T., 3/13/14, at 64; 3/14/14, at

25, 30-32; 3/17/14, at 92-93.

      Police found a gun, later identified by ballistics testing as the murder

weapon, abandoned on the street near where Appellant had jumped from the

van; Appellant’s DNA was on the gun.         N.T., 3/13/14, at 43-44, 182-85;

3/14/14, at 80-91; 108-11; 3/17/14, at 11, 41.          Forensics testing also

revealed Appellant’s fingerprints in the van. N.T., 3/17/14, at 9-10.

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      The record reflects Appellant abandoned both the van and the gun. A

defendant has no “standing to complain of a search or seizure of property that

he has voluntarily abandoned.” Commonwealth v. Shoatz, 366 A.2d 1216,

1220 (Pa. 1976). See Commonwealth v. Pizarro, 723 A.2d 675, 679 (Pa.

Super. 1998) (“A criminal defendant has no privacy expectation in property

that he has voluntarily abandoned or relinquished.”).

      Although abandoned property may normally be obtained and used
      for evidentiary purposes by the police, such property may not be
      utilized where the abandonment is coerced by unlawful police
      action.

Shoatz, 366 A.2d at 1220. In Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (Pa.

1996), our Supreme Court held that, under Article 1, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, “a police officer’s pursuit of a person fleeing the

officer was a seizure” and therefore, “any contraband discarded during the

pursuit was abandoned by coercion,” unless the officer had the requisite

reasonable suspicion to stop or probable cause to arrest the fleeing suspect.

Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 675 (Pa. 1999), (citing Matos, 672

A.2d at 771).

      Instantly, police possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify

their pursuit of the van. Within thirty seconds of shots being fired, the police,

with lights and sirens activated on their vehicle, observed the van reverse and

speed away from the immediate area of the shooting.           The van then led

multiple police cars on a high-speed chase through South Philadelphia. See

Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 894-95 (Pa. Super. 2012)

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(concluding police possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify an

investigatory detention where the defendant, who generally matched

description of the suspect, fled from a police officer within minutes of and near

to the location of a report of a man with a gun); see also Commonwealth

v. Allen, 279 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum, at

**8-10) (concluding officer possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify

pursuit of defendant where officer heard a gunshot, observed a man fleeing

from the vicinity holding his arm in a manner suggesting a concealed weapon,

and saw the man jump into a vehicle and speed away from the scene). Under

the circumstances in this case, Appellant failed to establish prejudice resulting

from trial counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion. This issue does not

merit relief.

      Appellant next maintains trial counsel ineffectively advised Appellant to

not testify about “Appellant’s lack of specific intent, including but not limited

to his mental and physical state at the time of the incident, and his belief that

he needed to act in self-defense.” Appellant’s Brief at 33; see id. at 33-40.

Appellant argues that because his sole defense was a claim of self-defense,

his testimony was necessary “for the jury to determine if Appellant actually

acted in self-defense or with premeditation[.]” Id. at 39.

      This claim is belied by the record. The trial court conducted an on-the-

record colloquy with Appellant concerning his right to testify.        Appellant

confirmed three times, under oath, that he had discussed his right to testify

                                     - 19 -
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with trial counsel, and had decided to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to

testify.   N.T., 3/18/14, at 25-28.   Trial counsel advised Appellant on-the-

record of his right to testify; advised Appellant the decision to testify was his

alone; and Appellant stated that he understood. Id. at 26-27. Trial counsel

asked Appellant if he had been threatened or coerced into deciding not to

testify; Appellant responded, “no.”    Id. at 27.   A defendant “who made a

knowing, voluntary, intelligent waiver of testimony may not later claim

ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to testify.” Commonwealth v.

Lawson, 762 A.2d 753, 755 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Cappelli, 489 A.2d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 1985)

(defendant may not “postpone the final disposition of his case by lying to the

court and later alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting of

counsel[.]”).

      Appellant also contends his waiver of his right to testify was not

knowing, intelligent and voluntary because he was under the influence of

marijuana and Xanax. Appellant’s Brief at 41-42. When asked during the

colloquy if he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, Appellant replied,

“Yes.” N.T., 3/18/14, at 26. Appellant offered no explanation. Id. Neither

trial counsel nor the court inquired further. Id. Appellant continued to answer

every colloquy question, and engaged in a discussion with the trial court and

counsel about a witness he had been unable to locate. Id. at 26-29.

      As the PCRA court explained:

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     While guilty pleas and jury trial waivers expressly require a trial
     court to conduct a colloquy to determine whether a defendant’s
     waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, a trial
     court is not required to conduct such a colloquy where a defendant
     waives his right to testify. Commonwealth v. Todd, 820 A.2d
     707, 712 (Pa. Super. 2003); See also Commonwealth v. Duffy,
     832 A.2d 1132, 1141 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“we note that there
     is no requirement that the trial court conduct an on-the-record
     colloquy when a defendant waives his right to testify”)[;
     Commonwealth v. McCamey, 240 A.3d 187 (Pa. Super. 2020)
     (unpublished memorandum, at 4)]; Contra Pa. R.Crim.P. 590 and
     620. The only requirement is that the defendant understands his
     decision not to testify [─] if not by colloquy, then by the presumed
     competent advice of counsel. Todd, 820 A.3d at 712. The
     exchange between trial counsel and [Appellant] at trial, …
     adequately demonstrates that [Appellant] understood his decision
     not to testify and made his decision after a full consultation with
     counsel.     [Appellant] responded appropriately to all of trial
     counsel’s questions and, notably, asserted that he did not wish to
     testify three separate times. (N.T., 3/18/14, at 27).

            Relatedly, [the Superior C]ourt has specifically held that the
     mere fact that a defendant was under the influence of a controlled
     substance at the time of entering a guilty plea does not entitle him
     to withdraw the plea. See [Commonwealth v.] Jackson, 569
     A.2d [964, 966 (Pa. Super. 1990)] (holding that although
     defendant was under the influence of medication at the time of his
     nolo contendere plea, he was not permitted to withdraw his plea
     where he responded to all plea colloquy questions appropriately
     and thus demonstrated his understanding of the proceedings);
     Commonwealth v. Hazen, 462 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. 1983)
     (holding that the defendant, who was under the influence of a
     tranquilizing drug at the time of his guilty plea, was not entitled
     to withdraw his plea where defendant’s counsel opined that he
     was competent and court found that he cogently participated in a
     lengthy plea colloquy). … [Appellant’s] intelligent and coherent
     answers during his exchange with trial counsel belie his
     contention. Thus, [Appellant] knowingly, voluntarily, and
     intelligently waived his right to testify and cannot now claim that
     his counsel was ineffective, especially considering there is no
     requirement of a colloquy in the first place.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/22, at 19-20.

                                    - 21 -
J-S25024-23

       Again, the record and the law support the PCRA court’s reasoning.

Appellant’s claims that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to

testify and/or for not requesting a continuance because Appellant was under

the influence do not merit relief.

       Appellant next argues trial counsel was ineffective

       for failing to object, move to suppress and give a curative
       instruction to the trial testimony of the victim[’]s mother, Kathy
       Morris[,] when Ms. Morris had previously violated the
       sequestration order imposed at the preliminary hearing.

Appellant’s Brief at 43.         Appellant avers that prior to the start of the

preliminary hearing, the municipal court judge issued an order sequestering

witnesses. Id. Appellant claims that despite the order, Ms. Morris remained

in the courtroom throughout the preliminary hearing. Id. at 43. Appellant

asserts that trial counsel should have moved to suppress Ms. Morris’s

testimony at trial, or requested a cautionary instruction, due to her alleged

violation of the sequestration order.          Id. at 44-45.3   Appellant maintains

prejudice resulted because Ms. Morris “was able to mold her trial testimony.”

Id. at 46. Appellant suggests that Ms. Morris may have fabricated her trial

____________________________________________

3 To the extent Appellant complains counsel should have objected to Ms.
Morris’s presence at the preliminary hearing, see Appellant’s Brief at 44-45,
the claim lacks merit. Once a defendant has pled guilty or gone to trial and
been found guilty, he cannot establish prejudice based on alleged errors that
occurred at a preliminary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82
A.3d 943, 984 (Pa. 2013).

                                          - 22 -
J-S25024-23

testimony that the victim did not carry a gun, based on what she heard at the

preliminary hearing. Id. at 46-47.

       Appellant acknowledges the transcript of the March 13, 2013,

preliminary hearing is not in the certified record. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 19

n.2. Appellant claims he rectified the omission by attaching a copy of the

transcript to his reply brief. Id. This Court has stated repeatedly that copying

material and attaching it to the brief does not make it part of the certified

record. First Union Nat. Bank v. F.A. Realty Investors Corp., 812 A.2d

719, 724 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2002); In re M.T., 607 A.2d 271, 275 (Pa. Super.

1992). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1926 delineates the proper

method for supplementing the record. Accordingly, we cannot consider the

transcript attached to Appellant’s Reply Brief.

       In any event, the claim lacks arguable merit.        Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 615 provides for sequestration of witnesses.          Pa.R.E. 615.    If a

sequestration order is violated, the trial court has discretion to order a mistrial,

prohibit the witness from testifying, or issue a cautionary instruction. Id.,

cmt.   “In exercising its discretion, the trial court should consider (1) the

seriousness of the violation, (2) its impact on the testimony of the witness

and, (3) its probable impact on the outcome of the trial.” Commonwealth

v. Mokluk, 444 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Super. 1982). The court should also

consider whether the violation was intentional and whether the party calling

the witness instigated the violation. Id.

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J-S25024-23

         Here, Appellant claims the municipal court ordered sequestration of

witnesses testifying at the preliminary hearing. Appellant’s Brief at 43.

Appellant then acknowledges Ms. Morris was not a witness at the preliminary

hearing. Id. at 46. Rather, she was a witness at Appellant’s trial, which took

place approximately one year later. There is no order of record directing the

sequestration of non-testifying witnesses, or restricting those present at the

preliminary hearing from testifying at trial. Given that trial counsel moved for

sequestration of the trial witnesses, there is no indication that counsel

believed that the prior sequestration order remained in effect.4 N.T., 3/12/14,

at 87.

         In Commonwealth v. Fickling, 3965 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Jan. 11,

2019) (unpublished memorandum), a panel of this Court addressed the effect

of a municipal court’s sequestration order on later trial proceedings.         In

Fickling, two police officers violated the municipal court’s sequestration order

by briefly speaking with each other as they passed entering and exiting the

courtroom.     Fickling, at 3-4.       The municipal court found the officers had

violated its sequestration order but imposed no further penalty. Id. at 4. The

municipal court bound one of the three defendants over for trial but dismissed

the charges against the remaining two. Id. The Commonwealth later refiled

charges against those two defendants. Id. at 6. However, because of the

____________________________________________

4 Appellant does not claim Ms. Morris violated the trial court’s sequestration

order. Appellant’s Brief at 43-47.

                                          - 24 -
J-S25024-23

prior violation of the sequestration order, the trial court prohibited the officers

from testifying at the defendants’ joint trial.       Id.   The Commonwealth

appealed. This Court held that the ruling was error. Id. at 10. We stated:

      [T]he imposition of a sanction for purported violation of another
      judge’s sequestration order, thereby precluding witnesses from
      testifying in a subsequent jury trial when the prior order did not
      impose such a sanction, constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 11. While Fickling is not binding, we its reasoning to be persuasive.

      Instantly, unlike Fickling, there was no finding or indication that Ms.

Morris violated a sequestration order.         Under these circumstances, trial

counsel had no reasonable basis to seek to preclude Ms. Morris’s trial

testimony or to ask for a cautionary instruction.

      Further, Ms. Morris’s testimony that the victim did not carry a gun was

cumulative. Kimyatta McGuffie, the victim’s girlfriend, also testified that the

victim was not armed.       N.T., 3/12/14, at 130.      Appellant thus failed to

establish prejudice from Ms. Morris’s testimony. Commonwealth v. Davis,

704 A.2d 650, 653 (Pa. Super. 1997) (Appellant was not prejudiced by

testimony that was merely cumulative). This ineffectiveness claim does not

merit relief.

      Appellant next contends trial counsel was ineffective for

      failing to ask for a continuance in order to retain and consult with
      a “gunshot sound” expert after the Commonwealth, without
      providing any advance notice to the defense, elicited speculative
      testimony from Police Officer Bimble as an expert in the sound of
      gunshots[,] opining as to the number of guns that were fired.

                                      - 25 -
J-S25024-23

Appellant’s Brief at 47; see id. at 47-52. Appellant complains Officer Bimble

was permitted to testify that he had been in situations where multiple guns

and/or different types of guns had been fired at the same time. Appellant’s

Brief at 49; N.T., 3/17/14, at 204-06. However, Officer Bimble confirmed he

heard only one gun fired the morning of the murder. Id. Appellant argues

that Officer Bimble testified as both a fact and expert witness, and trial counsel

should have made a contemporaneous objection and/or requested a

continuance to consult an expert for the defense. Appellant’s Brief at 49.

      The record demonstrates trial counsel objected to Officer Bimble’s

testimony, but the trial court overruled the objection. N.T., 3/17/14, at 205-

06.   On direct appeal, counsel claimed the “trial court improperly allowed

Officer Bimble to offer” expert testimony. Bell, 125 A.3d 438 (unpublished

memorandum at 8). This Court concluded Officer Bimble properly testified as

a lay witness about his perception of events. Id. at 8-10. Appellant’s claim

that Officer Bimble testified as an expert has been litigated and is baseless.

      As to Appellant’s claim regarding a defense expert, “[t]o establish

ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure to present an expert witness,

appellant must present facts establishing that counsel knew or should have

known of the particular witness.” Commonwealth v. Millward, 830 A.2d

991, 994 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Further, “the [appellant] must

articulate what evidence was available and identify the witness who was

                                     - 26 -
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willing to offer such evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 855 A.2d 726,

745 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Appellant admits uncertainty that such expert existed. Appellant’s Brief

at 50-51 n.33. Because Appellant failed to identify an expert witness willing

to testify, his claim fails.     See Bryant, 855 A.2d at 745; see also

Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 943 A.2d 940, 945 (Pa. 2008) (when defendant

claims counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce expert testimony at trial,

he must articulate “what evidence was available and identify a witness who

was willing to offer such [evidence].”) (citations omitted).

      In his next claim, Appellant asserts trial counsel was ineffective for

      failing to timely object, move to strike, seek a mistrial or a curative
      instruction after the Commonwealth introduced evidence that []
      Green had been charged with unrelated gun offenses.

Appellant’s Brief at 52; see id. at 52-54.         Appellant also maintains the

admission of evidence regarding a Glock 17 that belonged to Green “made it

appear to the jury that Appellant was in a conspiracy with Green.” Id. at 53.

      “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by

law. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. Evidence

is relevant if “(a) it has the tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in

determining the action.”     Pa.R.E. 401.      “The court may exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of one or more of

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

                                      - 27 -
J-S25024-23

undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

Pa.R.E. 403.

      While Appellant claims the Commonwealth improperly introduced

evidence that Green was charged with unrelated gun offenses, Appellant fails

to cite, and we have not located, any place in the trial transcripts where this

occurred. Also, other than the mention of this claim on page 52 of his brief,

Appellant fails to develop this claim. Id. at 53-54. This Court will not act as

counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007); Bombar

v. West Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 94 (Pa. Super. 2007). When briefing

deficiencies hinder our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may

deem the issues waived.       Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Hardy, supra.         Appellant’s

undeveloped claim hinders our review. Accordingly, we deem it waived.

      With respect to Appellant’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the admission of the Glock 17, the PCRA court properly

rejected this claim, explaining:

      First, the Glock 17 is certainly relevant to [Appellant’s] case. The
      trial testimony indicated [] Green was with [Appellant’s] brother
      and [Appellant] in the car that was used to find the victim. That
      [] Green eventually was arrested with a 9mm firearm [the same
      caliber as the murder weapon], which subsequently was excluded
      as the firearm used to kill the complainant, is a fact that is more
      probative than prejudicial. (N.T., 3/14/14, at 91). …

           [Appellant’s] second point [─] that the introduction of the
      Glock 17 made it appear to the jury that he and Green had
      conspired to murder the victim [─] is nothing more than pure
      speculation and it is irrelevant. The existence of a conspiracy was

                                     - 28 -
J-S25024-23

      neither suggested, implied, nor argued by the Commonwealth.
      Further, as [Appellant] himself acknowledges … conspiracy was
      not even an offense with which he was charged. He was only
      charged with those offenses that could be substantiated with
      evidentiary proof. [Appellant] therefore cannot present any
      information demonstrating that a conspiracy was at all
      contemplated by the jury during its deliberations. Moreover, in
      light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, [Appellant] cannot
      establish a reasonable probability that either excluding the Glock
      or requesting a limiting instruction would have changed the
      outcome of his trial.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/22, at 26-27. The record and the law support the

PCRA court’s reasoning. This issue does not merit relief.

      Appellant next claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have the

victim’s clothing and hands tested for GSR.        Appellant’s Brief at 54-56.

Appellant argues, “Had the testing been done and GSR found on the victim’s

clothing it would have fully supported the Appellant’s claim that the victim had

been armed [] and fired a gun at him.” Id. at 55.

      At trial, the medical examiner testified that none of the victim’s

garments had any visible GSR, which demonstrated the victim was shot from

at least two-and-a-half feet away. N.T., 3/13/14, at 86-87, 105. The medical

examiner also stated that the victim’s hands were not tested for GSR because

the medical examiner’s office does not do that specific testing. Id. at 106.

      Both the victim’s girlfriend and his mother testified that the victim did

not carry a weapon. N.T., 3/12/14, at 130; N.T., 3/13/14, at 7. Also, no gun

was recovered from the scene. Id. at 14-16; 85, 88, 91-92, 94-98, 124-25.

Ballistics testing showed that the eight fired cartridge casings at the scene, as

                                     - 29 -
J-S25024-23

well as the bullets that hit the victim, came from Appellant’s gun.         N.T.

3/13/14, at 33-35, 180-83; 3/14/14, at 80-91, 109-11; 3/17/14, at 11, 41.

Although Hines testified that one of the men he was arguing with pulled a gun

on him, he acknowledged the argument with the men broke up when police

arrived. N.T., 3/17/14, at 71-72. Hines never informed police that one of the

men had a gun. Id.

      On direct appeal, this Court rejected Appellant’s claim of self-defense:

      [S]elf-defense… was inapplicable herein. Appellant did not act to
      defend himself. To the contrary, Appellant declared that he was
      going to resolve the situation between Hines and [the victim],
      armed himself, and entered a vehicle to hunt for the victim. After
      Appellant observed the victim walking down the street, Appellant
      exited the van and gunned him down. The victim was not in
      possession of a gun and fired no shots. Appellant’s argument,
      which is that he acted in self-defense, is wholly unsupported by
      the events in question. The evidence establishes specific intent to
      kill in that Appellant searched out [the victim while] armed with
      his weapon[,] and then [] used that gun to shoot the victim in the
      chest.

Bell, 125 A.3d at 438 (unpublished memorandum, at 5).

      Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable basis for trial counsel to

request GSR testing of the victim’s hands and failed to demonstrate prejudice

resulting from counsel’s failure to do so. This claim does not merit relief.

      Finally, Appellant complains trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting to a jury charge. Appellant’s Brief at 56. Appellant asserts the trial

court improperly gave “the same instruction in relation to the ‘inference’

portion of the first degree [murder] (intent) and third degree (malice) murder

                                     - 30 -
J-S25024-23

crimes.” Id. Appellant’s argument consists of the following sentence, in which

Appellant states the trial court

      instructed the jury identically as to the inference they could draw
      from the use of a gun on a vital body part, to find specific intent
      necessary for a verdict of first-degree murder, and the malice
      necessary to establish third degree murder.

Id. (record citation omitted).

       “When an appellant’s argument is underdeveloped, we may not supply

it with a better one.”   Commonwealth v. Deible, --- A.3d ---, 2023 WL

4715187, at *8 (Pa. Super. July 25, 2023) (citation omitted).               The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently found waiver where an appellant

submits

      only “generalized assertions[,] ... not arguments, much less
      reasoned and developed arguments supported with citations to
      relevant legal authority.” [Commonwealth v. ]Spotz [610 Pa.
      17], 18 A.3d [244,] 326 [(2011)]; see also id. at 262 n.9[.] This
      type of mere issue spotting without sufficient analysis or legal
      support precludes appellate review. See In re Beach's Estate,
      324 Pa. 142, 188 A. 108, 108 (1936) (per curiam) (an “appellant
      must not only specifically assign as error any rulings complained
      of, but, further, must point out wherein the error lies and reasons
      therefor, or they will be deemed to have been waived”).

Commonwealth v. Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 378 (Pa. 2023).

      As Appellant has failed to develop an argument to support his claim, he

has waived his challenge to counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to challenge a

jury charge.

      For the above reasons, Appellant’s challenges to trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness are either waived or meritless. Because none of these claims

                                     - 31 -
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merit relief, Appellant’s claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance also

fail. Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270. Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA’s dismissal of

Appellant’s first PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/30/2023

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