Court Opinion

ID: 9538863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:42:53.768092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:12.734317
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge,
concurring in results.
I agree that Petitioner’s convictions should be affirmed. I write separately though to address two points. First, I concur, based on stare decisis, in the discussion dealing with ineffective assistance of counsel. See Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327, 330-31, 341-44 (OH.Cr.1997). Secondly, I also want to address the implication in Proposition II that Petitioner’s claim of juror misconduct is an issue we would have addressed if raised on direct appeal.
In support of his claim of jury misconduct, Petitioner presents numerous affidavits, which are viewed within the limited context of Rule 9.7(D), concerning conversations with Petitioner’s trial jurors. This Court has since statehood adhered to the general rule that a defendant cannot impeach a jury’s finding with testimony (evidence) of what transpired in the jury room. Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States has spoken on the very same subject. In McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915), the Court explained why impeachment of a jury’s verdict after the fact by a member of the panel is improper:
*111[A]ll verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.
Id. at 267-68, 35 S.Ct. at 784. See also Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121-22, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2748-49, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). This Court has adhered to the same philosophy. Hall v. State, 762 P.2d 264, 266-67 (Okl.Cr.1988); Lee v. State, 738 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Okl.Cr.1987); Weatherly v. State, 733 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Okl.Cr.1987); DeRonde v. State, 715 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Okl.Cr.1986); Wacoche v. State, 644 P.2d 568, 572-73 (Okl.Cr.1982); West v. State, 617 P.2d 1362, 1370 (Okl.Cr.1980); Killough v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 131, 135-36, 231 P.2d 381, 387-88 (1951); Ex parte Lewis, 92 Okl.Cr. 334, 336, 223 P.2d 143, 144 (1950); Martin v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 182, 218, 222 P.2d 534, 552 (1950); Williams v. State, 92 Okl.Cr. 70, 78-80, 220 P.2d 836, 841-42 (1950); Harrell v. State, 85 Okl.Cr. 293, 296, 187 P.2d 676, 677 (1947). And lest we forget, such impeachment is also prohibited by statute. 12 O.S.1991, § 2606(B).
I mention this because this appears to be a recurring argument among capital post-conviction petitioners. It is hoped that by mentioning it here, petitioners will adhere to the established holdings by this Court, and the United States Supreme Court, together with enacted statutory imperatives.