Court Opinion

ID: 9819400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:24:34.327281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:16.315171
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would address the State’s appeal on its merits. Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) allows the State to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The State is not allowed to appeal every such order, only those where the prosecutor can certify to the trial court that the suppression substantially impairs his ability to prosecute the case. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151-52, 676 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1997). The courts will not second-guess a prosecutor’s good-faith evaluation of the effect of a suppression order on his case, but the courts will make their own decision whether the order is one that has the effect of suppressing evidence. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152, 676 N.E.2d at 667 (order barring admission of written laboratory report, and requiring testimony of person who actually performed the analysis, did not suppress evidence). This court has amended Rule 604(a)(1) to say that a reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to hear a Rule 604(a)(1) appeal where the State files a motion in limine that seeks the admission of evidence and the trial court enters a ruling not reviewable as a matter of law. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304. “Interlocutory review delays a trial on the merits and consumes judicial resources.” Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 718 N.E.2d at 306. Today we further amend the rule to say there is no jurisdiction even where it is the defendant who files the motion in limine, and that motion is granted, barring the testimony of four witnesses. It is true that a trial court that grants or denies a motion in limine in advance of trial may change its ruling as it learns more about the case at trial. I do not understand why that should prevent a prosecutor from appealing a pretrial interlocutory ruling suppressing evidence. Every interlocutory ruling, even a ruling excluding evidence because of an illegal search and seizure, is subject to change at trial. Should a prosecutor who has received an adverse ruling on a motion in limine proceed with trial, try again to get the evidence admitted, and then attempt a midtrial appeal when it is not? Generally, the State’s right to appeal from suppression orders during trial is limited to orders entered pursuant to section 114 — 12(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/114 — 12(c) (West 1998)) in cases where defendant is excused from filing the motion before trial. People v. Flatt, 82 Ill. 2d 250, 264, 412 N.E.2d 509, 516 (1980). Even if such a midtrial appeal were possible, requiring the trial to begin before the appeal can be taken entails a tremendous waste of resources. “[T]he defendant’s interests are not affected to the same extent by the appeal of a pretrial order as they are by an appeal which interrupts an ongoing trial.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 244, 412 N.E.2d at 506. Nor do I understand why we limit State appeals of pretrial orders suppressing evidence to cases that we would review de novo. It is possible for a reviewing court to reverse a trial court’s determination if that determination is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or constitutes an abuse of discretion. In cases where the suppression of the evidence substantially impairs the prosecutor’s case, why should the prosecutor be deprived of his one opportunity to question the trial court’s ruling? The majority tells us that the determination of whether hearsay is admitted under the residual hearsay exception (725 ILCS 5/115 — 7.3 (West Supp. 1997)) lies in the discretion of the trial court. Cf. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 327, at 363 (5th ed. 1999) (where new statutes present confrontation clause questions, a greater control by appellate courts over trial courts has been suggested as a procedural safeguard). “[W]ithout the guidance and uniformity imposed by reviewing courts, erroneous interpretations and rulings may proliferate at the trial court level.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 246, 412 N.E.2d at 507. “The difficulties posed by allowing such appeals, we believe, are outweighed by the need to ensure the accurate interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions ***.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. The majority’s approach will result in the only section 115 — 7.3 and section 115 — 10.2 (725 ILCS 5/115 — 10.2 (West 1998)) cases reaching the appellate court being those where defendant has been convicted and the trial court has exercised its discretion in favor of admitting the evidence. As in Young, the development of the law will thereby be distorted. Allowing interlocutory appeals in cases like the present one may actually enhance the functioning of the judicial system. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 244, 412 N.E.2d at 506. The majority argues that in certain cases we should second-guess the State’s decision to appeal a pretrial suppression order. “[Sjurely any attempt by the State” to appeal an order barring impeachment by prior conviction “would be dismissed no matter how earnestly the State” asserts that its ability to prosecute is impaired. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 511. The majority analogizes the order in the present case to such an order. The supreme court, however, has refused to formulate a standard by which courts may determine the appealability of a particular order. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. “Instead we rely solely upon the good-faith evaluation by the prosecutor of the impact of the suppression order on his case.” Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. The burdens of applying such a standard are not justified by the marginal reduction in appeals such a procedure would produce. The State’s need to allocate its resources is a sufficient limitation on such appeals. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247-48, 412 N.E.2d at 507. We should follow Young. An important prosecution interest is at stake here. If the prosecution is not allowed an immediate appeal from an adverse interlocutory ruling, the State will have no opportunity for later appellate review. 5 W LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure § 27.3(c), at 890 (2d ed. 1999). Abandoning our jurisdiction in these cases is a major step, one that should be taken by the supreme court if it is taken at all.