Court Opinion

ID: 9382867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 21:02:31.107838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.201337
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/23 P. v. Lynex CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B321620

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. PA034126)
           v.

 TOMMIE LAWSON LYNEX,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Reversed.
      Steven S. Lubliner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
       In October 2000, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
Tommie Lawson Lynex of first degree murder. The trial judge
sentenced him to 50 years to life in prison. More than 20 years
later, Lynex filed a motion in the superior court pursuant to
Penal Code section 1203.01, subdivision (a),1 seeking to correct
and supplement his postconviction record in advance of his
June 2022 parole hearing. The prosecution did not file any
response. Reasoning that it lacked authority to consider Lynex’s
request, the superior court denied the motion without a hearing.
Lynex appeals the denial.
       The Attorney General concedes that the superior court
erred in determining that it lacked authority to entertain the
motion, and we agree. We therefore remand the matter to the
superior court with instructions that it hold a hearing to consider

      1  Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
       Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
“Immediately after judgment has been pronounced, the judge and
the district attorney, respectively, may cause to be filed with the
clerk of the court a brief statement of their views respecting the
person convicted or sentenced and the crime committed, together
with any reports the probation officer may have filed relative to
the prisoner. The judge and district attorney shall cause those
statements to be filed if no probation officer’s report has been
filed. The attorney for the defendant and the law enforcement
agency that investigated the case may likewise file with the clerk
of the court statements of their views respecting the defendant
and the crime of which they were convicted. Immediately after
the filing of those statements and reports, the clerk of the court
shall mail a copy thereof, certified by that clerk, with postage
prepaid, addressed to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation at the prison or other institution to which the
person convicted is delivered.” (§ 1203.01, subd. (a).)

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Lynex’s motion. We, however, decline to address the Attorney
General’s arguments concerning the scope of relief to which
Lynex may be entitled on remand because we deem it best that
the superior court decide the merits in the first instance.

  FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
       In August 1999, Lynex shot and killed Steven Parsee.
The district attorney charged Lynex with first degree murder
and alleged a personal firearm-discharge enhancement. The
district attorney alleged further that Lynex had suffered a prior
conviction in a 1994 Fresno County case. Consistent with the
district attorney’s allegations, Lynex’s preconviction probation
report states that he served a two-year prison term in connection
with his 1994 conviction.
       Lynex pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial in October
2000. The jury convicted Lynex of first degree murder and found
true the firearms enhancement allegations. At the October 30,
2000 sentencing hearing, the trial court dismissed the allegations
concerning the 1994 prior conviction and sentenced Lynex to
50 years to life in prison, with the possibility of parole.
       Two decades later, the parole board (the Board) scheduled
a June 30, 2022 hearing to assess Lynex’s eligibility for parole.
Acting in propria persona, Lynex filed the motion giving rise
to this appeal—titled, “motion to correct the record/supplement
record transmitted to the Department of Corrections pursuant to
Penal Code [section] 1203.01 and under Code of Civil Procedure
section 187 and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 460 [(Cook)]”—
in the superior court on May 26, 2022. (Capitalization omitted.)

      2We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

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Lynex’s motion sought a court order (1) directing the probation
office to remove the reference to the 1994 prior conviction
from his preconviction probation report, and (2) compelling
the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel in his October
2000 murder trial to provide statements of their views about
him and the case, for use at his parole hearing. In addition
to the authorities enumerated in its title, Lynex’s motion cited
to the recent decision in People v. Crites (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
494 (Crites), in which the First District concluded that
section 1203.01, subdivision (a) provided a trial court with
authority to consider a defendant’s postjudgment motion to
correct a purported error in his probation report.
       The prosecution did not oppose or otherwise respond to
Lynex’s motion, and the superior court denied the motion without
a hearing. The court’s June 2, 2022 minute order explained:
       “The motion is denied for the following reasons: The court
lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested; the authorities
cited in the motion do not apply to petitioner’s case; and the
motion, coming over 20 years after the court pronounced
judgment in this case, is untimely and not reasonably likely to
produce fruitful evidence.” Lynex timely appealed the court’s
order.
       The Board denied Lynex parole at the June 30, 2022
hearing, and tentatively has scheduled Lynex’s next parole
hearing for September 12, 2023.3

      3 Lynex points to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation’s inmate locator website as evidence of the
dates of his past and future parole hearings. We exercise our
authority to take judicial notice of those dates. (See, e.g., People
v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 750, fn. 3 [granting request

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                           DISCUSSION
       Lynex contends, and the Attorney General concedes,
that the superior court erred in concluding it lacked authority
to consider his motion. We agree.
       In Cook, our Supreme Court clarified that “section 1203.01,
augmented by the court’s inherent authority to craft necessary
procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 187,4
authorizes [the trial court] to preserve evidence as promptly as
possible for future use by the Board.” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 455, fn. added.) “[O]ffenders with final convictions
[therefore] may file a motion in the trial court for that purpose,
under the authority of section 1203.01.” (Cook, supra, at p. 447.)
Significantly, Cook explains that the court retains authority
to consider such motions even outside the statutorily prescribed
time frame for submission of section 1203.01 statements
from the trial judge and prosecutor. (Cook, supra, at p. 453
[“Section 1203.01, subdivision (a) does specify that any
statements by the judge and prosecutor should be filed
‘[i]mmediately after judgment has been pronounced.’ As
California Rules of Court, rule 4.480 explains, a section 1203.01

for judicial notice of parole hearing dates reflected on printout
from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s inmate
locator website].)
      4  Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides: “When
jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other
statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means
necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise
of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically
pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this Code.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.)

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statement ‘should be submitted no later than two weeks after
sentencing . . . .’ There is no indication, however, that the
statute’s requirement deprives the court of authority to act at
a later time.”].)
       We acknowledge that Cook involved a youthful offender
seeking to supplement his postconviction record pursuant to
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. And Lynex does not
contend that he is a youthful offender, nor that he is entitled
to Franklin’s expanded evidentiary preservation procedures.
We, however, agree with the First District’s conclusion in Crites
that Cook’s holding applies with equal force to adult offenders
seeking more limited relief. (Crites, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 499.)
       In Crites, a defendant “whose judgment for conviction
for murder ha[d] been final for over 40 years” moved to correct
information contained in his presentencing probation report.
(Crites, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 496.) The trial court
determined that it lacked authority to consider the motion.
(Id. at p. 497.) The First District reversed the trial court’s
determination, explaining: “Cook does not carve out an exception
for youthful offenders but instead relies on the plain language
of section 1203.01 in finding authority for the motion.” (Crites,
supra, at p. 499.) We find this reasoning persuasive, and like
the Crites court, “[w]e see no reason why [Cook’s] holding would
not apply in the present situation.” (See ibid.)
       Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court erred
in ruling that Cook and Crites “do not apply to [Lynex’s] case.”
And given the applicability of these cases, we conclude further
that the court erred in determining that it lacked authority to
entertain Lynex’s requests. We therefore remand the matter

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to the superior court with instructions that it consider Lynex’s
motion.
        We, however, decline to resolve the parties’ disagreement
concerning the scope of relief available on remand—namely,
whether, as the Attorney General contends, the preconviction
probation report filed in Lynex’s case is a bar to compelling the
trial judge and prosecutor to file section 1203.01 statements for
use at his next parole hearing. (See § 1203.01, subd. (a) [“[T]he
judge and the district attorney, respectively, may cause to be
filed . . . a brief statement of their views respecting the person
convicted or sentenced and the crime committed . . . . The judge
and district attorney shall cause those statements to be filed
if no probation officer’s report has been filed.”].) Because the
superior court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction, the most
appropriate resolution of the appeal is to remand the matter for
reconsideration.

                                    7
                        DISPOSITION
       We reverse the June 2, 2022 order and remand with
directions that the trial court consider Lynex’s motion.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

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