Court Opinion

ID: 9654227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:10:59.022161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:07.124895
License: Public Domain

MORRISON, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
My brethren assume but do not decide that the defense of entrapment applies in Texas. If it does not, then Texas finds herself aligned against the great weight of authority. Without some compelling reason, I would be reluctant to place this court in such a position.
In Peery v. State, 138 Texas Cr. Rep. 155, 134 S.W. 2d 283, we said:
“The word ‘entrapment’ Ms been defined legally as ‘the se*375duction or improper inducement to commit a crime, and not the testing by trap, trickiness, or deceit of one suspected/ U.S. v. Wray, D.C., 8 F. 2d 429. Mr. Webster defines the word ‘entrap’ as ‘to catch as in a trap by artifice.’ The ‘entrapment’ as used in a legal sense carries with it the presumption that the officer" or agent manufactures the offense and then incites accused to commit the offense for the purpose of prosecution.”
Entrapment has also been defined as “the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecution against him.” Sorrells v. U.S., 287 U.S. 435, 53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. Ed. 423, 86 A.L.R. 249; U.S. v. Wray, 8 F. 2d 429, 430
It is the general rule that where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused the fact that the officers furnish the opportunity for or to aid the accused in the commission of a crime constitutes no defense to such a prosecution Stevens v. State, 133 Texas Cr. Rep. 333, 110 S.W. 2d 906; Sorrells v. U.S., supra; State v. Marquardt, 89 A. 2d 219, 31 A.L.R. 2d 1206, 139 Conn. 1; 22 C.J.S. 99, sec. 45. However, if the criminal design originates' in the mind of the officer, and he or those working under his direction and supervision induce a person to commit a crime which he would not otherwise have committed except for such inducement, this is entrapment, and in law may constitute a defense to such crime. Sorrells v. U.S., supra; State v. Marquardt, supra; Butts v. U.S., 273 F. 35, 18 A.L.R. 143; O’Brien v. U.S., 51 F. 2d 674; Morei v. U.S., 127 F. 2d 827; 9 Texas Law Review 276; 41 Yale Law Journal 1249; 15 Am. Juris. 25; 22 C.J.R. 99, sec. 45.
Where the evidence raises an issue as to whether the intent to commit a particular crime originated in the accused’s mind or in the mind of the officer or those working under his direction and supervision and whether the accused was induced to. act in a manner in which he would not otherwise have acted except for such inducement, then the question of entrapment is one of fact and should be submitted to the jury. Sorrells v. U.S., supra; State v. Marquardt, supra; People v. Kazakis, 228 P. 2d 58 (Calif.) ; People v. Gallagher, 290 P. 504; U.S. v. Sawyer, 210 F. 169.
As I understand the majority opinion, they hold that the officer himself must be the entrapper. The fallacy in this reasoning,, as I see it, is that it would permit the officer to do indirectly what he could not legally do directly.
*376Bayly was Richards’ agent. It is undisputed that the appellant had never before sold narcotics. It is also undisputed that Bayly made the original suggestion that they acquire the narcotics in question, and it was Bayly who bought the narcotics.
It seems inescapable to me that Bayly induced this appellant to commit a crime not contemplated by him and that he did so for the purpose of supplying Officer Richards with evidence so that the appellant might be prosecuted. Whether Officer Richards was aware of this fact is not the question. The essential issue is whether or not the appellant was entrapped into committing this offense by the officers or their agents, and such an issue should have been submitted to the jury.
I respectfully enter my dissent.