Court Opinion

ID: 9841002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:08:57.272137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:43.824210
License: Public Domain

09/19/2023

                                          DA 21-0202
                                                                                         Case Number: DA 21-0202

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                         2023 MT 172

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

SEIDEL PINE,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:            District Court of the Second Judicial District,
                        In and For the County of Butte-Silver Bow, Cause No. DC-18-330
                        Honorable Robert J. Whelan, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                        Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Deborah S. Smith, Assistant Appellate
                        Defender, Helena, Montana

                For Appellee:

                        Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Christine Hutchison,
                        Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                        Eileen Joyce, Butte-Silver Bow County Attorney, Kelli Johnson Fivey,
                        Deputy County Attorney, Butte, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: June 28, 2023

                                                               Decided: September 19, 2023

Filed:

                                        ir,-6x---if
                        __________________________________________
                                          Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     A jury convicted Seidel Pine (Pine) in the Second Judicial District Court, Silver

Bow County, of aggravated kidnapping, sexual intercourse without consent (SIWOC), and

partner or family member assault (PFMA). Pine appeals.

¶2     We affirm and restate the issues on appeal as follows:

       1. Is Montana Code Annotated § 45-5-303(2), MCA, facially unconstitutional
          because it permits a judge, rather than a jury, to find facts that reduce the
          maximum penalty?
       2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by designating Pine a level three sex
          offender?
       3. Was Pine’s counsel ineffective for failing to argue the maximum sentence for
          kidnapping was 10 years based on mitigating factors and for failing to object to
          Pine’s level three sex offender designation?

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3     The charges in this case arose following a report from a female, K.R., who stated

she had been in a relationship with Pine, and he had held her against her will while he

sexually assaulted her, including nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Pine and K.R. were

previously married and have four children together. In November of 2018, Pine and K.R.

reconnected and traveled from Missoula to Butte in K.R.’s Jeep Cherokee (Jeep) to a house

Pine was sharing with three other people. During their time in Butte, Pine and K.R.

consumed alcohol and used methamphetamine with Pine’s roommates and friends.

¶4     K.R. and Pine partied in town for about two weeks without any problems. However,

following an argument on November 17, during which Pine’s phone was broken, the

relationship began to deteriorate. K.R. testified that she unintentionally broke Pine’s phone

after swatting it out of his hand. Pine testified that K.R. intentionally broke his phone by

                                             2
slamming it on the street. Both agreed that after his phone was broken, Pine became angry

and slashed one of K.R.’s tires. They continued to argue until law enforcement intervened

after a neighbor called 911. The interaction did not result in any charges being brought

and Pine and K.R. ultimately returned to Pine’s house after Pine replaced K.R.’s tire with

a spare. Upon returning to Pine’s house, Pine took K.R.’s phone and car keys and forced

her to remain in his room.

¶5     From November 17 to November 23, Pine forced K.R. to undress and remain naked

and confined in Pine’s room. During this time, she was not allowed to shower or use the

bathroom without Pine’s permission. Pine would sleep next to the bedroom door to prevent

her from escaping. Pine denied that he ever forced K.R. to remain in the house and

maintained that she was always free to leave. On November 23, K.R. and Pine left Pine’s

house and traveled to Bozeman. On the way, they stopped at a gas station in Belgrade

where Pine entered the store and K.R. remained in the Jeep. K.R. explained that Pine left

the keys in the Jeep which enabled her to escape. However, she was pulled over by law

enforcement from Belgrade for having a broken tail light shortly after exiting the parking

lot.

¶6     When Pine exited the gas station, he noticed K.R. had left with the Jeep and was not

sure where she had gone. Pine observed “cop car lights going on and off” down the road

and walked towards them thinking it might be K.R. Upon arriving at the Jeep, Pine

attempted to peer into K.R.’s window but was stopped by the officers. Both Pine and K.R.

were detained and brought to the police station where K.R. made a statement. K.R. was

                                            3
allowed to return to her Jeep and Pine was later released to a homeless shelter. After

returning to her Jeep, K.R. drove to a hotel and asked to use a computer so that she could

message her sister on Facebook Messenger. While on Facebook Messenger she received

a message from Pine stating “Where are you baby?” and promising to give her gas money

to get back to Missoula if she would drive him back to Butte.

¶7     K.R. testified that she picked Pine up and they returned to Butte but that upon

returning Pine again brought her into the house and forced her to strip naked. She stated

that after their return to Butte, Pine was even angrier and he began using a “taser” on her.1

She estimated that Pine used the stun gun on her around 50 times prior to her ultimate

escape. K.R. testified that sometimes Pine would stun her quickly and other times he would

press it against her skin longer. Pine denied K.R.’s claims and stated that while he did own

a stun gun, it was also a flashlight and only the flashlight worked on the device.

¶8     On November 26, 2018, K.R. and Pine left the house to get food. While in the Jeep,

K.R. opened a beer and started drinking. This apparently upset Pine. Pine smacked the

beer out of K.R.’s hand, and K.R. testified she knew “[she] was probably going to get beat

up pretty bad.” K.R. attempted to grab the keys out of the ignition but because the Jeep

was still in gear, she was unable to remove them. This made Pine even angrier and, fearing

for her safety, K.R. grabbed the steering wheel and jerked it, hoping to cause an accident.

The Jeep sideswiped another vehicle, but Pine did not stop. Instead, Pine told K.R. to

1
  Throughout the trial the device was often referred to as a “taser,” but TASER is a brand of electric
shock weapons. It would be more accurately labeled a stun gun as it was a close-range weapon
that required skin contact and was incapable of firing projectile prongs.

                                                 4
remove her clothing and pulled off onto a secluded road. K.R. testified that she believed

Pine might kill her and so complied.

¶9     After stopping on a secluded road, Pine told K.R. to get out of the Jeep and fix the

tail light. As K.R. walked towards the back of the Jeep, Pine came up to her and punched

the side of her head––which caused K.R. to fall onto the snow-covered ground. Pine then

proceeded to kick K.R. while she curled into a ball. He then used the stun gun on her,

punched her, and used a knife to cut off portions of her hair. During trial, Pine admitted

he “backhanded [K.R.] a couple times” after she caused the accident and he did kick her

“two or three” times but denied using a stun gun on her or cutting her hair. K.R. testified

that after Pine finished beating her, he drove to a new location where he pulled over and

told K.R. to have sex with him while raising his hand as if to strike her. K.R. said she did

not want to, but Pine told her to “[s]it your ass up and fucking get on” and that he was

“going to take it” anyway. K.R. complied and got on top of Pine. However, Pine

complained that she was making no effort or participating and so ordered K.R. to turn

around and continued to sexually assault K.R. from behind and to have sexual intercourse

with her. Throughout the assault, K.R. told Pine she did not want to participate, but he did

not listen. Pine denied assaulting K.R. and maintained that the intercourse was consensual.

Afterwards, Pine told K.R. to get dressed and he drove to a liquor store and bought vodka.

K.R. described how Pine would use the stun gun in his pocket to scare and intimidate her

into compliance by activating it so she would hear the “snapping noise,” causing her to feel

she could not leave.

                                             5
¶10    Pine continued to confine K.R. in his home. On November 28, 2018, K.R. managed

to borrow a phone from someone in the house and messaged her sister stating that she

needed help and that she was trying to escape. That evening law enforcement came to the

house but after announcing their presence everyone in the house remained silent and Pine

ordered K.R. to be quiet and to go upstairs to his room. After law enforcement left, Pine

opened the front door and told K.R. she could leave but he had the stun gun in his left

pocket and a knife in his right pocket and K.R. believed that if she tried to leave, he “was

going to tase me and stab me.”

¶11    On November 29, 2018, K.R. made the decision she was going to escape or, if she

could not leave, was “going to kill myself because I [didn’t] want [Pine] to have the

satisfaction of taking my life.” That morning, police came a second time to the residence,

but Pine again prevented K.R. from answering the door. K.R. attempted to leave while

Pine was busy helping one of his roommates who had locked her keys in her car. However,

Pine noticed that K.R. was attempting to leave and brought her back into the house where

he made her take her clothes off and put on “some really dingy clothes.” Pine once again

grabbed the stun gun and knife, opened the front door, and told her that if she wanted to

leave, she could. This time K.R. left and began walking down the street with Pine

following behind her. While walking, she encountered a woman getting into her car and

K.R. asked for a ride, but Pine got into the car as well. The woman took K.R. and Pine to

Stokes Grocery store. K.R. testified that after the woman left, she began crying loudly in

                                             6
order to make a scene. Pine left and K.R. entered the store and asked the first person she

met to call law enforcement. Pine was later arrested at his residence.

¶12    K.R. was taken to the hospital where she was examined by Nadine Eikbush, a

registered nurse, and interviewed by Detective Sergeant Jeff Williams. Sergeant Williams

testified K.R. was visibly upset and had several injuries, including a black left eye and

bruising. Nurse Eikbush testified K.R. had a large bruise on her right posterior thigh and

buttock area and broken skin all over her body. K.R. indicated the broken skin marks were

from the stun gun. Detective Williams went to Pine’s residence and retrieved the stun gun

from an upstairs bedroom. He confirmed at trial that the stun gun worked and demonstrated

to the court and jury how it sounded when it was activated.

¶13    Following a three-day trial, Pine was convicted by a jury on all counts. The District

Court sentenced him to a term of 50 years in prison for aggravated kidnapping, 20 years

for SIWOC, and 1 year for PFMA. The Court ran the sentences for aggravated kidnapping

and SIWOC concurrently but suspended 15 years. Pine was designated a level three sex

offender based in part on the recommendation of the forensic examiner.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶14    We review a claim that a sentence violates the constitution and that a district court

violated a defendant’s rights at sentencing de novo. State v. Keefe, 2021 MT 8, ¶¶ 10-11,

403 Mont. 1, 478 P.3d 830. When reviewing “legislative enactments, the constitutionality

of a legislative enactment is prima facie presumed, and every intendment in its favor will

be made unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Sedler,

                                             7
2020 MT 248, ¶ 5, 401 Mont. 437, 473 P.3d 406. Furthermore, “the party challenging a

statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and, if

any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the statute.” Sedler, ¶ 5.

¶15    We review a district court’s designation of a sexual offender level for abuse of

discretion. State v. Hill, 2009 MT 134, ¶ 22, 350 Mont. 296, 207 P.3d 307. The district

court designates a sexual offender level in its discretion and is not required to accept the

recommendation of a psychosexual evaluation. Hill, ¶ 42. “A district court abuses its

discretion when it ‘acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or

exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice.’” Hill, ¶ 42. We generally

refuse to review on appeal an issue which the party failed to object to at the trial court

unless it is “a criminal sentence that is alleged to be illegal or in excess of statutory

mandates . . . .” State v. Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, ¶ 8, 335 Mont. 344, 151 P.3d 892. “[A]

sentence is not illegal if it falls within statutory parameters.” Kotwicki, ¶ 13.

¶16    Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims present mixed questions of law and

fact and are reviewed de novo. State v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 15, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d

955. If the claim is based on matters outside the record, we will not review it on direct

appeal, recognizing that the defendant may raise the issue in a postconviction proceeding

to develop a record as to the reasons for counsel's actions. Ward, ¶ 20. When considering

whether counsel was deficient, we do not analyze the conduct with hindsight but rather we

presume that counsel’s conduct falls within a range of acceptable professional assistance,

                                              8
and a defendant must overcome that presumption. State v. Schowengerdt, 2018 MT 7,

¶ 31, 390 Mont. 123, 409 P.3d 38.

                                        DISCUSSION

¶17 1. Is Montana Code Annotated § 45-5-303(2), MCA, facially unconstitutional
because it permits a judge, rather than a jury, to find facts that reduce the maximum
penalty?

¶18    We first note that Pine failed to raise a constitutional challenge to § 45-5-303(2),

MCA, in the District Court. Therefore, on appeal Pine may only challenge the facial

constitutionality of the statute. See State v. Ber Lee Yang, 2019 MT 266, ¶ 10, 397 Mont.

486, 452 P.3d 897 (“We differentiate between the types of constitutional challenges that

we will address for the first time on appeal . . . . [A] claim that a statute authorizing a

sentence is unconstitutional on its face may be raised for the first time on appeal, but the

exception does not apply to as-applied constitutional challenges.”) (internal citations

omitted). Pine asserts that § 45-5-303(2), MCA, is facially unconstitutional because it

allows a judge to determine facts which Pine claims must go to the jury.2

¶19    Pine argues that this Court’s holding in State v. Stewart, 175 Mont. 286, 573 P.2d

466 (1977), conflicts with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). Specifically, Pine claims that the “unless”

wording in § 45-5-303(2), MCA, relieves the State of its burden to prove each element of

the charged offense at trial. The statute in question provides that a person convicted of

2
 We note that the Court, pursuant to its Internal Operating rules, Section IV.1, is to determine a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute en banc. However, given the law on this issue is
settled, we deem it appropriate to resolve the question by a five-justice panel.

                                               9
aggravated kidnapping shall be sentenced to a minimum of two years and up to 100 years

in prison and fined up to $50,000, “unless the person has voluntarily released the victim

alive, in a safe place, and with no serious bodily injury . . . .” Section 45-5-303(2), MCA.

If all three of these factors are met, then the defendant’s sentence is limited to not less than

two years or more than 10 years.

¶20    We considered a similar issue in Stewart, when we addressed whether a statute was

“unconstitutional because it require[d] the trial court to make a finding of fact, thereby

violating [the] defendant’s right to have all facts submitted to and determined by the jury.”

175 Mont. at 299, 573 P.2d at 1145. The question was whether “an accused’s voluntary

release of or failure to release his victim in a safe place, alive and not suffering from serious

bodily injury, has any bearing on his guildt [sic] or innocence of the crime of aggravated

kidnapping.” Stewart, 175 Mont. at 299, 573 P.2d at 1145.

¶21    In Stewart, Stewart was arrested and charged with one count of deliberate homicide

and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. Stewart, 175 Mont. at 289-90, 573 P.2d at 1140.

Stewart, who was an airman stationed at Malmstrom Air Force Base near Great Falls, had

been involved in a court-martial proceeding and suspected that John K. Walsh, Jr., (Walsh),

a fellow airman, may have been the informant against him. Stewart, 175 Mont. at 288-89,

573 P.2d at 1140. Stewart and six other airmen discussed the possibility that Walsh may

have been an informant and the group decided to confront him. Stewart, 175 Mont. at

288-89, 573 P.2d at 1140. After being confronted, Walsh denied he was an informant. A

scuffle ensued and Walsh was subdued, wrapped in a blanket, and his mouth was taped

                                               10
shut. Stewart, 175 Mont. at 289, 573 P.2d at 1140. Walsh’s body was found at the Giant

Springs recreation center having been shot once in the chest and three times in the head.

Stewart, 175 Mont. at 289, 573 P.2d at 1140. Stewart was convicted at trial and sentenced

to 100 years in prison. Stewart, 175 Mont. at 290, 573 P.2d at 1140.

¶22    On appeal, Stewart argued that the statute for aggravated kidnapping3 was

unconstitutional as “it require[d] the trial court to make a finding of fact, thereby violating

defendant’s right to have all facts submitted to and determined by the jury.” Stewart, 175

Mont. at 299, 573 P.2d at 1145. Stewart argued that whether he released his victim alive,

in a safe place, and not suffering serious bodily injury were findings that have a bearing on

guilt and therefore the law requires a jury to decide. This Court concluded that “[c]learly

it does not.” Stewart, 175 Mont. at 299, 573 P.2d at 1145. We reasoned that the “intent to

restrain and the restraint” were the necessary facts that the jury must consider to establish

the crime of aggravated kidnapping and that the other factors were merely “facts that relate

only to the severity of punishment, once guilt has been established.” Stewart, 175 Mont.

at 300, 573 P.2d at 1146. This Court explained that “[n]o additional facts need be proved

in order to constitute the crime.” Stewart, 175 Mont. at 300, 573 P.2d at 1146.

¶23    Section 45-5-303(1), MCA, states that an individual commits the offense of

aggravated kidnapping if they “knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority

restrain[] another person by either secreting or holding the other person in a place of

3
  Stewart was convicted pursuant to § 94-5-303(2), R.C.M. 1947, which is virtually identical to
§ 45-5-303(2), MCA.

                                              11
isolation or by using or threatening to use physical force . . . .” As previously decided in

Stewart, the intent to restrain and the restraint itself, for any of the enumerated purposes,

are facts the jury must determine to establish the defendant’s guilt. Here, as in Stewart,

whether the Defendant voluntarily released the victim, in a safe place, and without serious

bodily injury are factual findings beyond what must be shown to prove aggravated

kidnapping. When a jury returns a verdict of guilty to aggravated kidnapping, the existence

of every element necessary to establish the offense has been established beyond a

reasonable doubt and a court may impose the sentence authorized by statute up to the

maximum penalty. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). Anything that

reduces the maximum penalty authorized by the statute does not have to be determined by

a jury.

¶24       Pine argues that the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Apprendi

conflicts with our holding in Stewart. In Apprendi, the Court held that “[o]ther than the

fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added). However, in Apprendi,

the Court specifically noted the distinction between facts in aggravation of punishment and

facts in mitigation, when it explained that if a defendant:

          can escape the statutory maximum by showing, for example, that he is a war veteran,
          then a judge that finds the fact of veteran status is neither exposing the defendant to
          a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to
          statute, nor is the [j]udge imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than that
          accompanying the jury verdict alone.

                                                12
530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2363 n. 16. Accordingly, in the present case, the District

Court’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum sentence authorized by

§ 45-5-303(2), MCA, and the statutory mitigating factors were not required to be submitted

to a jury for consideration.

¶25    Further, in Blakely v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court clarified its

holding in Apprendi stating “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum

sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may

impose without any additional findings.” 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537

(2004). “When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the

jury has not found all the facts ‘which the law makes essential to the punishment,’. . . and

the judge exceeds his proper authority.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. Here,

a jury convicted Pine after it found that the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt

all the elements of kidnaping; that is, Pine knowingly and without lawful authority

restrained K.R. in a place of isolation by using threats of physical force. The jury’s verdict

that Pine was guilty of aggravated kidnapping authorized the District Court to impose

sentence within the statutory parameters. Based on Apprendi, Blakely, and Stewart,

§ 45-5-303(2), MCA, is not facially unconstitutional because a judge, rather than a jury,

may apply factors that mitigate sentence.

¶26 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by designating Pine a level three sex
offender?

¶27    Pine argues for the first time on appeal that his level three offender designation

failed to meet statutory requirements.             Specifically, Pine argues that under

                                              13
§ 46-23-509(1)(c), MCA, a defendant cannot be designated as a level three offender

without the sexual offender evaluator or the court making specific findings that “the risk

of a repeat sexual offense is high, there is a threat to public safety, and the sexual offender

evaluator believes that the offender is a sexually violent predator.”                  Section

46-23-509(1)(c), MCA. Although § 46-23-509(1)(c), MCA, establishes criteria which

warrant a tier 3 designation, the statute contains no requirement that either the sex offender

evaluator or the court make specific findings on the criteria.

¶28    First, we must conclude that Pine has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. In

State v. Lenihan, this Court established that an appellate court can “review any sentence

imposed in a criminal case, if it is alleged that such sentence is illegal or exceeds statutory

mandates, even if no objection is made at the time of sentencing.” 184 Mont. 338, 343,

602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979). However, this exception was distinguished in the subsequent

case Kotwicki.

¶29    In Kotwicki, Kotwicki argued that his sentence which included a fine was illegal

because the district court did not inquire and make specific findings as required by

§ 46-18-231(3), MCA, on Kotwicki’s financial resources prior to imposing a fine.

Kotwicki, ¶ 7. Kotwicki failed to raise an objection at sentencing and argued that the

Lenihan exception applied allowing him to raise the issue on appeal. Kotwicki, ¶ 9.

However, this Court rejected that argument noting that “[w]e consistently have held that a

sentence is not illegal if it falls within statutory parameters.” Kotwicki, ¶ 13. Furthermore,

we noted “that a sentencing court’s failure to abide by a statutory requirement rises to an

                                              14
objectionable sentence, not necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan

exception.” Kotwicki, ¶ 13. In Kotwicki’s case, his fine fell within the parameters

authorized by § 46-18-231, MCA, and therefore was not illegal for the purposes of the

Lenihan exception. Kotwicki, ¶ 16. Similarly, in the present case, Pine’s designation as a

level three offender fell within the parameters authorized by § 46-23-509(1)(c), MCA.

¶30    Notwithstanding Pine’s failure to object to his tier designation, we note the statute

in question states that “[p]rior to sentencing of a person convicted of a sexual offense, a

sexual offender evaluator . . . shall provide the court with a psychosexual evaluation report

recommending one of the following levels of designation . . . .” Section 46-23-509(1),

MCA. While the three factors are present in the level three designation description, there

is nothing in the language of the statute requiring the evaluator specifically address all three

factors in their report. Rather, the statute clearly states that the evaluator’s role is to provide

the court with a level recommendation whereupon the court shall “review the psychosexual

evaluation report, any statement by a victim, and any statement by the offender” and then

“designate the offender as level 1, 2, or 3 . . . .” Section 46-23-509(2)(a)-(b). This indicates

that it is ultimately the decision of the sentencing court to determine which level a sexual

offender will be assigned and that the court may consider factors outside of the sexual

evaluator’s report when making this determination.

¶31    In the psychosexual evaluation report prepared by Christopher E. Quigley, LCSW,

Quigley provided the Court with his recommendation that Pine be designated a level three

sexual offender.     During sentencing, the State asked the District Court to consider

                                                15
everything it had heard over the course of the trial. Over the course of the trial, the Court

heard testimony of numerous instances in which Pine utilized a stun gun to control K.R.

and how he beat and sexually assaulted her. Additionally, the Court heard testimony that

Pine isolated K.R. from others by confiscating K.R.’s keys and phone to prevent her from

leaving or seeking help, that he forced her to strip naked in order to prevent her from

attempting to escape the house, and that he physically pulled her back into the house and

Jeep when she made attempts to leave. Thus, notwithstanding Pine’s failure to object, there

was abundant evidence to support the Court’s decision to designate Pine a level three

sexual offender.

¶32    We conclude that Pine’s level three offender designation was objectionable, not

illegal, and having failed to object to the designation during sentencing Pine did not

properly preserve it for appeal. Additionally, the evidence amassed during trial clearly

indicated that Pine met all the necessary criteria for a tier 3 designation.

¶33 3. Was Pine’s counsel ineffective for failing to argue the maximum sentence for
kidnapping was 10 years based on mitigating factors and for failing to object to Pine’s
level three sex offender designation?

¶34    Defendants “may raise only record-based ineffective assistance of counsel claims

on direct appeal.” State v. Meredith, 2010 MT 27, ¶ 51, 355 Mont. 148, 226 P.3d 571.

This Court “distinguish[es] record-based from non-record-based claims based on whether

the record fully explains why counsel took, or failed to take, a particular course of action.”

Meredith, ¶ 51. If we are unable to reference the record to determine “why” counsel did

or did not perform as alleged then “the claim is based on matters outside the record on

                                              16
appeal, [and] we will refuse to address the issue on appeal . . . .” State v. Kougl, 2004 MT

243, ¶ 14, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095. Instead, the defendant may “file a postconviction

proceeding where he/she can develop a record as to ‘why’ counsel acted as alleged, thus

allowing the court to determine whether counsel’s performance was ineffective or merely

a tactical decision.” Kougl, ¶ 14.

¶35    Pine argues on appeal that his trial counsel was deficient at sentencing when he

requested a sentence twice as long as the applicable statutory maximum. Additionally,

Pine argues that his counsel was ineffective when he “failed to challenge a plainly incorrect

Tier 3 sexual offender designation.”

¶36    This Court reviews IAC claims under the two-prong test articulated by the United

States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

A successful IAC claim “requires that the defendant show: (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” Avery v. Batista,

2014 MT 266, ¶ 26, 376 Mont. 404, 336 P.3d 924. The burden falls on the defendant to

overcome the presumption that counsel’s representation did not fall “within a range of

acceptable professional assistance . . . .” Schowengerdt, ¶ 31.

¶37    As we have already determined that Pine’s sentence did not exceed the statutory

maximum and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when designating Pine a

level three sexual offender, both of Pine’s IAC claims must fail under Strickland. Pine’s

counsel requested a 30-year sentence with 15 years suspended––a sentence well under the

100-year statutory maximum and much less than the State’s request for a total sentence of

                                             17
60 years with 20 years suspended. Additionally, although Pine’s counsel did not argue that

Pine should be designated a level one or two offender, there was ample evidence introduced

during trial for the District Court to find that Pine met the requirements for a level three

offender designation. Consequently, Pine’s counsel’s performance did not fall outside “a

range of acceptable professional assistance . . .” when he elected not to argue for an even

shorter sentence or lower offender designation. Schowengerdt, ¶ 31. Because a defendant

must meet both prongs of the Strickland test, “if an insufficient showing is made regarding

one prong, there is no need to address the other.” Adams v. State, 2007 MT 35, ¶ 22, 336

Mont. 63, 153 P.3d 601.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶38    We conclude that § 45-5-303(2), MCA, is not facially unconstitutional because a

judge, rather than a jury, may apply factors that mitigate sentence. Furthermore, Pine’s

level three offender designation was objectionable, not illegal, and having failed to object

to the designation during sentencing Pine did not properly preserve it and cannot now raise

it for the first time on appeal. Finally, both of Pine’s IAC claims fail under Strickland.

¶39    Affirmed.

                                                  /S/ LAURIE McKINNON

 We Concur:

 /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
 /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
 /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
 /S/ JIM RICE

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