Court Opinion

ID: 9631023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:26:56.758041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:47.392033
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
Opinion by
Chief Justice MORRISS.
Counsel for Jeffrey Daniel Hughen has filed a motion for rehearing in which he raises two matters which we will address. He suggests that the new United States Supreme Court opinion in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, — U.S, -, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008), may affect our decision, and also that we erred by concluding that the trial court could alter a ruling despite counsel’s reliance thereon in his presentation of the case.
In our opinion, we focused our right-to-counsel analysis on the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has distinguished the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation from the Sixth Amendment right to representation during court proceedings. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (right to representation attaches when prosecution commences). To trigger the Fifth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation, there must be, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed as an expressed desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. The act of “requesting the assistance of an attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction.” McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178-79.
Rothgery reaffirms, clearly, that the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel appointed attaches when the defendant makes his or her initial appearance before a judicial officer. It does not, however, affect the analysis in this case, which deals with custodial interrogation, and we decline the invitation to revisit that matter.
Counsel also argues that our ruling about the trial court’s change of heart on enhancement is erroneous, because under our ruling, no attorney would ever be able to rely on any court ruling and could never have confidence that he or she is rendering effective assistance.
In addition to the reasoning stated in the main body of our opinion, in this case *487the State commented on the record, at the time of the initial trial court ruling at the beginning of the punishment phase of trial, that it would later ask the trial court to reconsider its ruling. It is clear from the record that all parties were made aware that the court might reconsider its decision later in the punishment phase of the trial. As the contention is essentially a due-process argument, the comments in Rogers v. Ricane Enter., Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 763 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.1994), also apply here. In the absence of any indication of an actual deprivation of due-process rights — especially in light of the failure to ask for a continuance when the trial court reversed itself — it has not been shown that the change in the ruling deprived Hughen of the due process of law.
We overrule the motion for rehearing.