Court Opinion

ID: 9858248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:19:16.446053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:40.990623
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Applicant contends he was entitled to represent himself on direct appeal. Because the majority, in its rush to deny relief, ignores the record and controlling authority, I dissent.
I.
Applicant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death on March 19, 1982. Thereafter, the transcript and statement of facts were filed with this Court. Applicant’s attorneys filed an appellate brief on December 11, 1984. Twenty-three days later, on January 3, 1985, applicant filed a “Motion to Strike Counsel’s Brief on Appeal,” and requested to proceed pro se on appeal. Four months later, on May 31,1985, we overruled the motion. On August 12,1985, over seven months after filing his motion to proceed pro se, applicant filed a pro se application for writ of habeas corpus. The Court affirmed applicant’s conviction on December 18, 1985, addressing some, but not all, of the allegations in the habeas application. Thomas v. State, 701 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
II.
The right to self-representation is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); and, Hawkins v. State, 613 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). This right extends to the appellate process. Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Applicant’s decision to proceed pro se need not be “wise,” only knowing and intelligent.1 Hathorn, 848 *26S.W.2d at 122-123. Generally, if a defendant’s assertion of the right to proceed pro se on appeal was clear and unequivocal, the defendant is entitled to proceed pro se. Id., 848 S.W.2d at 123.
The majority finds applicant failed to timely assert his right to self-representation as required by Hubbard v. State, 739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and Webb, supra. The majority holds the administration of justice would have been unduly hampered by allowing applicant to proceed pro se. Ante, 906 S.W.2d at 23-24. But neither Hubbard nor Webb support the majority’s holding. In Webb, the defendant’s motion to proceed pro se was filed “long after his appointed counsel had filed an appellate brief on his behalf.” Consequently, we held the assertion of the right to proceed pro se was untimely and would unduly hamper the administration of justice. Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 786. However, in Hubbard, the defendant asserted his right to proceed pro se fifty-five days after appointed counsel filed his brief. We held Hubbard’s assertion of the right to proceed pro se was timely. Hubbard, 739 S.W.2d at 344. While Hubbard and Webb hold that a defendant’s right to proceed pro se may be waived if not timely asserted, applicant’s assertion of this right, just twenty-three days after the appellate brief was filed, was not untimely. See, Ex parte Davis, 818 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Case remanded to Court of Appeals to consider applicant’s brief).
III.
The majority fails to explain how allowing applicant to proceed pro se would unduly hamper the administration of justice. Indeed, neither the record nor our case law supports such a holding. Applicant’s motion to proceed pro se was filed just twenty-three days after counsel’s brief — well short of the fifty-five day period we approved in Hubbard. Twenty-three days is not a long period when we consider that it took this Court more than four months to rule on applicant’s motion to proceed pro se and that eleven months passed from applicant’s motion until our opinion was delivered.2
IV.
The instant record contains no evidence that applicant’s assertion of the right to proceed pro se was not timely or would have unduly hampered the administration of justice. Indeed, the record compels a finding that applicant’s assertion of the right to proceed was timely, clear, and unequivocal. In such circumstances applicant has an absolute right to represent himself. Hathom, supra; and, Hawkins, supra. When the record and case law is considered together, it becomes clear the majority holding is a transparent attempt to reach the desired result of denying relief. I refuse to participate in such a practice.
I would permit applicant to proceed pro se and order him to file his appellate brief within sixty days. I would dismiss his Rig-gins allegations without prejudice so that they may be raised in his brief. Because the majority fails to do so, I dissent.
CLINTON, J., joins this opinion.

. In Hathorn, we stated:
It is well settled that a defendant has the right to prosecute his legal defense, both through trial and appeal, on his own, without the aid of counsel. A defendant’s choice of self representation need not be "wise” and, may *26ultimately be "to his own detriment.” However, if his choice is a result of an informed decision and is both knowingly and intelligently made, he must be allowed to proceed pro se.
Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 122-123.

. Additionally, the majority's holding is weakened by this Court’s opinion on direct appeal where we considered some of the allegations raised in applicant’s August 12, 1985, habeas petition. If allowing applicant to proceed on appeal pro se would have unduly hampered the administration of justice, then why were we able to consider and resolve some of applicant’s habe-as allegations in our original opinion? These allegations were filed seven months after appellant asserted his right to proceed pro se!