Court Opinion

ID: 9531012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:19.55943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.356521
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not agree with majority’s conclusion that Smith’s proposed instruction number eighteen correctly states the law or that Smith’s proposed instruction seventeen is supported by the evidence. Instead, I *39would conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to tender Smith’s proposed instructions and would affirm his murder conviction.
Again, Smith’s instruction eighteen provides:
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 18
Possession of marijuana or dealing in marijuana by an accused standing alone is insufficient to constitute the “commission of a crime” as used within the-definition of self-defense sufficient to prohibit assertion of self-defense by an accused.
Harvey v. State, 652 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. App.l995)[.]
Appellants’ App. p. 184. In determining whether this instruction correctly states the law, I believe Smith’s reliance on Harvey v. State, 652 N.E.2d 876, 876 (Ind.Ct. App.1995) and Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind.2001), is misplaced.
Initially, I note that the trial court here did not give an instruction similar to the erroneously tendered instruction in Harvey, which on its face precluded the jury from considering the defendant’s claim of self-defense. Also, despite Smith’s citation to Harvey in his proposed instruction, I do not believe that Harvey supports the contention that the nexus between possession of or dealing in marijuana and a death is always insufficient, permitting a defendant to claim self-defense as a matter of law. I can imagine situations in which possession of or dealing in marijuana would not provide a sufficient nexus to preclude a claim of self-defense, such as where one is simply carrying a marijuana cigarette and is attacked unexpectedly. There are countless scenarios, however, including the facts of this case, in which possession of or dealing in marijuana would provide a sufficient nexus to preclude a claim of self-defense.
Furthermore, I do not read our supreme court’s recent opinion in Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind.2001), to support Smith’s contention that possession of marijuana or dealing in marijuana is insufficient to constitute the “commission of a crime,” which would prohibit a defendant from claiming self defense under Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2. Mayes did not involve the crimes of possession of marijuana or dealing in marijuana, but instead addressed the possession of an unlicensed handgun used in a shooting. Id. at 393. Further, Mayes does not address which offenses constitute the “commission of a crime” sufficient to preclude a claim of self-defense.
In my opinion, neither Harvey nor Mayes supports Smith’s contention in his proposed instruction eighteen that possession of marijuana and dealing in marijuana do not constitute the “commission of a crime” as a matter of law, which would preclude a claim of self-defense. I, therefore, do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that Smith’s proposed instruction correctly states the law.
I also believe that Smith’s proposed instruction seventeen is not supported by the evidence. To reiterate, Smith’s proposed instruction seventeen provides:
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 17
A person who is actively engaged in the perpetration of a crime may assert self defense if the criminal activity he was engaged in did not produce the confrontation wherein force was employed. Harvey v. State, 652 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. App.l995)[.]
Appellant’s App. p. 185. Although this instruction may have correctly stated the law, I cannot reconcile the majority’s conclusion with our supreme court’s holding in Mayes, in which our supreme court acknowledged that there must be an immedi*40ate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation. Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 394. Our supreme court concluded, however, that the trial court’s tendered instruction on self-defense, which did not include language concerning an immediate causal connection, was not erroneous. Id. at 394-95. The Mayes court observed, “[t]he question here is whether there was evidence presented to support giving the instruction. More specifically, was there evidence demonstrating that but for Mayes’ possession of an unlicensed handgun, the confrontation resulting in [the victim’s] shooting death would not have occurred?” Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
Here, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that Smith went to Chambers’ apartment to settle a disputed drug-related debt and to purchase additional marijuana. The evidence also indicates that Smith and Chambers began arguing over Smith’s drug-related debt. As in Mayes, the violent encounter that resulted in Chambers’ death arose directly from Smith’s criminal activity. See id. at 394. Moreover, because the deadly argument between Smith and Chambers arose directly out of Smith’s active pursuit of additional marijuana, the nexus is even more apparent than that in Mayes, which involved the passive possession of an unlicensed handgun used in a shooting. See id.
Because the evidence demonstrates that but for Smith’s disputed drug debt and attempt to purchase additional marijuana, the confrontation resulting in Chambers’ death would not have occurred, I believe that we are required to follow the precedent set in Mayes and affirm Smith’s conviction. See Jackson v. State, 657 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (recognizing that we are bound by precedent established by our supreme court.)
Additionally, in its analysis of whether Smith’s proposed instructions are supported by the evidence, the majority observes that Smith is entitled to an instruction on any defense that has some foundation in the evidence. Although I agree with this observation and concede that Smith’s claim of self-defense does have some foundation in the evidence, I must point out that Smith was not denied an instruction on his claim of self-defense. In fact, the trial court tendered a self-defense instruction that mirrored the language of Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-2 and was similar to the instruction approved by our supreme court in Mayes.
Smith’s proposed instruction seventeen suggests there was evidence that the criminal activity in which he was engaged did not produce the confrontation wherein force was employed. On the contrary, the evidence clearly indicates that Smith went to Chambers’ apartment to settle the disputed drug-related debt and to purchase additional marijuana. This is not a case where Smith merely possessed marijuana and was forced to defend himself due to Chambers’ unrelated aggressive behavior. Instead, the criminal activity in which Smith was engaged most certainly produced the confrontation resulting in Chambers’ death. In my opinion, there is no evidence to support Smith’s instruction seventeen. Additionally, I believe it would contravene public policy to hold that one who kills another during a “drug deal gone bad” is entitled to such an instruction.
Because I do not believe that Smith’s proposed instruction eighteen correctly states the law or that Smith’s proposed instruction seventeen is supported by the evidence, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to tender the proposed instructions. As such, I would affirm Smith’s conviction.