Court Opinion

ID: 9887655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 18:04:00.351297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:14:48.999364
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 P. v. Phonsongkham CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080131

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD281869)

ANDY CHANH PHONSONGKHAM,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Melinda Lasater, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.
         Patricia J. Ulibarri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
Mandel and Seth Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                               INTRODUCTION
         Andy Chanh Phonsongkham, an active member of the Oriental Killer
Boys (OKB) criminal street gang, opened fire upon a group of four teenage
members of a rival gang, killing one boy. Although the trial court granted
the defense motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations (Pen. Code,
§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4) & (5)), it permitted the prosecution to introduce gang
evidence to prove Phonsongkham committed the shooting to retaliate against
the rival gang for their assault of a fellow OKB member the same day. The
jury convicted Phonsongkham of a special circumstance murder, among other
charges. Phonsongkham’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion and violated newly-enacted Penal Code section 1109 and
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352 by admitting the gang evidence at the
bifurcated trial on the substantive crimes. Finding no error in his contention,
we affirm the judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                       I.
                            The Drive-By Shooting
      Linda Vista 13 (LV13) is a criminal street gang that claims territory in
the Linda Vista neighborhood of San Diego. Kelly Street is in the heart of
LV13’s territory; the sidewalks, walls, and fences that border the street are
covered in LV13 gang graffiti. Tiny Locos (TLS) is a subset of LV13.
      The OKB criminal street gang operates in Southeast San Diego, in an
area that includes 49th Street. OKB is affiliated with a rival gang of LV13.
Phonsongkham and his friend, Anthony L., are OKB members.
      At around 5:30 p.m. on May 23, 2019, Anthony was standing in front of
a smoke shop in LV13 territory when a van pulled up. Someone in the van
said “Chino” and “go get him.” Several juvenile LV13 members (including
C.L. and C.C.) exited the van, walked up to Anthony, and asked if he knew
where he was. Anthony answered, “I’m from OKB” and “yeah, I’m in your
turf.” The juveniles beat up Anthony and fled.

                                       2
      Minutes after the beating ended, Anthony called Phonsongkham and
sent texts to him with a geographic “pin” that pointed to a location just
behind the strip mall where Anthony had been assaulted. Phonsongkham
texted back, “On my way!” Phonsongkham then drove from Southeast San
Diego to Linda Vista—a drive that takes about 15 minutes—and arrived just
before 6:00 p.m.
      At the same time, shortly before 6:00 p.m., 16-year-old Carlos V. left his
house in Linda Vista and joined his friends, C.L., C.C., and J.C., outside.
Three minutes later, as Carlos, C.L., J.C., and C.C. were walking together
down Kelly Street, Phonsongkham drove up to them in a car, screeched to a
halt, yelled “fuck TLS,” and started shooting. C.L., J.C., and C.C.
immediately threw themselves to the ground. Carlos, who had remained
standing with his back to the street, fell as shots were fired. Phonsongkham
fired five shots, then sped away.
      As the boys were getting up, Carlos told his friends that he had been
shot. They took Carlos’s jacket off and pulled up his shirt to see a bullet
wound in the middle of his chest. Carlos lost consciousness. A concerned
passerby, who heard the gunshots and saw that Carlos was bleeding, pulled
up to the boys in his pickup truck and told them to put Carlos inside. The
passerby drove Carlos and the boys to the nearest hospital, but by the time
they arrived, Carlos had already died. He had been struck with a single
bullet that entered his body through the left side of his back, traveled
through his left lung and heart, and exited through the right side of his chest.

                                       3
                                       II.
                           Investigation and Arrest
      The shooting happened in daylight, and several neighbors called 911 to
report it. Police officers responding to the scene found four spent 9-
millimeter bullet casings in the middle of the street.
      One neighbor told a responding officer that his house had been hit by a
bullet. When detectives examined the house, they concluded that three
bullets had hit the structure, including at the fence, gate, and an exterior
window. One detective described the bullet holes as “spread out.”
      Eyewitnesses who saw the shooter told officers he was a heavyset Asian
male in his 20s wearing a white t-shirt and red-brimmed baseball cap. They
described his vehicle as a small, older, gold or metallic-colored sedan of
Japanese make—either a Honda, Toyota, or Mitsubishi.
      After learning the decedent and his friends were LV13 gang members,
investigating officers suspected the shooting was gang related. A detective
checked law enforcement databases and determined that Phonsongkham had
prior law enforcement contacts while driving a vehicle that matched
eyewitness descriptions of the shooter’s vehicle.
      Another detective reviewed video footage from the surveillance cameras
of a neighbor’s home and a nearby school, which showed a vehicle that
matched witnesses’ descriptions driving down Kelly Street near the time of
the shooting. The detective observed that in addition to having the features
identified by eyewitnesses, the vehicle also had 10-point rims, a spoiler, and a
white sticker on one window.
      A detective staked out a house on 41st Street associated with
Phonsongkham. When the detective arrived at the house, it was dark and
there were no vehicles in the driveway. While the detective waited, he

                                        4
received information that Phonsongkham had prior law enforcement contacts
in a 1993 Honda Accord registered to someone at the 41st Street address. He
also received a screenshot of a Facebook photograph of a group that included
Phonsongkham wearing a red baseball cap.
      At around 9:45 p.m., the detective saw Phonsongkham pull into the
driveway of the 41st Street house in an older gold Honda Accord. He was
wearing a red baseball cap and a white t-shirt. He got out of the car, walked
to the trunk and opened it, reached inside and appeared to rack a handgun.
He took a dark-colored bag from the trunk, closed it, and entered the house
through the front door. After a few seconds, lights inside the garage were
turned on.
      As the detective continued to wait, he received screenshots of
surveillance video of the crime scene. The vehicle in the screenshots
appeared to match the car Phonsongkham was driving when he arrived at
the 41st Street house.
      Phonsongkham remained inside the house for around 40 minutes.
When he emerged, he had changed his clothing. He got in his Honda Accord
and drove a few blocks before police pulled him over and took him into
custody. A spent bullet casing was found inside his car on the floorboard in
front of the driver’s seat.
      An eyewitness to the shooting was brought to Phonsongkham for a field
identification. She positively identified Phonsongkham as the shooter and
said she recognized his Honda Accord as the shooter’s vehicle.
      The Honda Accord was impounded and a crime scene specialist who
processed the car collected the spent bullet casing from the floorboard as well
as two cell phones that were inside the car.

                                       5
      Police searched the 41st Street house. They determined that
Phonsongkham had been living in the garage. They found a 9-millimeter
Glock handgun with a box of 9-millimeter ammunition between the box
spring and mattress of Phonsongkham’s bed. They also found a cell phone,
red baseball caps, and several white t-shirts in the garage bedroom.
Phonsongkham’s DNA was on the handgun.
      A criminalist from the San Diego Police Department examined ballistic
patterns on the four spent bullet casings recovered from the crime scene and
the fifth casing found on the floorboard of Phonsongkham’s car. She
determined that all five casings had been fired from Phonsongkham’s
handgun.
                                        III.
                          Charges, Trial, and Sentence
      Phonsongkham was charged with the murder of Carlos V. (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1) with the special circumstance it was an intentional
murder perpetrated by means of intentionally discharging a firearm from a
motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(21); attempted first degree
murders of J.C., C.C., and C.L. (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), 189; counts
2‒4); and shooting at an inhabited dwelling house (Pen. Code, § 246; count 5).
All five counts included firearm enhancement allegations (Pen. Code,
§ 12022.53, subds. (b)−(d)) and were alleged to have been committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (5);
counts 1–4; id., subd. (b)(1) & (4); count 5)
      The case went to jury trial in October 2021. In a pretrial hearing, the
trial court granted a defense motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement
allegations from the trial on the substantive charges, special circumstances
and firearm enhancement allegations.

                                         6
      At the bifurcated trial, the prosecution’s theory was that
Phonsongkham committed the shooting against rival LV13 to retaliate for the
earlier assault of his fellow OKB gang member. Over 10 days, the
prosecution established the facts (as set forth above) through a total of 40
witnesses, including C.L., J.C., C.C., and more than a dozen neighbors who
lived near the crime scene and witnessed the shooting, as well as numerous
law enforcement witnesses who investigated the shooting. At the conclusion
of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defense rested without calling
witnesses.
      In closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor argued Phonsongkham
was the shooter and had committed murder and attempted murders of the
first degree. The prosecutor told the jury LV13’s four-on-one assault of
Anthony was a sign of disrespect Phonsongkham would not tolerate, so he
decided to retaliate with the “death of a rival.” Pointing to the evidence that
Phonsongkham had traveled from Southeast San Diego to Linda Vista with a
loaded gun, she argued he had the duration of the drive to deliberate and
premeditate a killing—to “think about death.”
      Defense counsel sought to persuade the jury that the percipient
eyewitnesses were not credible, and that the prosecution had fallen short of
its burden of establishing that Phonsongkham was the shooter. Defense
counsel argued that if Phonsongkham was the actual shooter, there was
insufficient evidence he had intended, premeditated, or deliberated on
shooting the victims. He claimed the prosecution’s theory that the crimes
were gang-motivated was unfounded because there was no evidence Anthony
was a gang member. Referring to Phonsongkham’s gang moniker “Temper,”
defense counsel told the jury Phonsongkham “had a temper” and shot at the
juveniles because he was provoked and angry after learning “what happened

                                       7
to his friend.” Defense counsel also characterized the shooting as a “wild
spraying” of bullets, and argued the lack of “aiming” showed Phonsongkham
lacked intent to kill.
      After deliberating for less than two days, the jury convicted
Phonsongkham of first degree murder and returned a true finding on the
special circumstance allegation. It convicted Phonsongkham of the
attempted murders of J.C., C.C., and C.L. as charged in counts 2 through 4,
but was unable to reach a unanimous decision as to whether the attempted
murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The jury also found
Phonsongkham guilty of shooting at an inhabited dwelling as charged in
count 5 and found true the firearm enhancement allegations attached to all
five counts. The bifurcated gang enhancement allegations were dismissed on
the prosecution’s motion due to the unavailability of an essential witness.
      Phonsongkham was sentenced to an indeterminate term of life without
the possibility of parole for the special circumstance murder in count 1; the
midterm of seven years for the attempted murder in count 2; two years, four
months (one-third the midterm of seven years) on each of the other attempted
murders in counts 3 and 4; and one year, eight months (one-third the
midterm of five years) on the shooting of an inhabited dwelling in count 5.
The court imposed five consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement allegations under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
attached to each of the five counts; the court stayed sentence on all of the
remaining firearm enhancement allegations. The total sentence was 13 years
and four months, plus 125 years to life, plus life without the possibility of
parole.

                                        8
                                 DISCUSSION
                                       I.
           Phonsongkham’s Claims of Evidentiary Error Lack Merit
A.    Additional Background
      The parties brought three motions in limine that are relevant to
Phonsongkham’s appellate claims of evidentiary error.
      As previously noted, the defense moved to bifurcate the Penal Code
section 186.22 gang enhancement allegations from the trial of the substantive
crimes. The defense argued the predicate crimes the prosecution would use
to demonstrate a “pattern of criminal gang activity” under subdivisions (b)
and (f) of section 186.22 would be highly inflammatory if admitted during the
trial of the substantive offenses.
      The prosecution also moved to admit gang evidence to establish motive,
identity, intent, and premeditation relevant to Phonsongkham’s commission
of the substantive crimes; to explain witnesses’ fear about testifying; and to
prove the elements of the Penal Code section 186.22 gang enhancement
allegations. The prosecution sought an order permitting it to introduce the
following nine categories of gang evidence: (1) gang expert testimony on the
existence of OKB, including number of members, territory, and common
signs; (2) gang expert testimony on the primary activities of OKB members;
(3) certified copies of court records from three criminal cases to prove the
predicate crimes necessary to establish a “pattern of criminal gang activity”
under section 186.22; (4) testimony and photographs related to the gang
participation of individuals whose convictions would be used to establish the
pattern of gang activity; (5) gang expert opinion on Phonsongkham’s
membership and active participation in OKB, including interpretation of his
tattoos, associations with other OKB members, photographs indicating gang

                                        9
allegiance, and correspondence with other OKB members; (6) gang expert
testimony on the rivalries and alliances of OKB; (7) gang expert testimony on
the role of respect in Asian criminal street gangs and the expected responses
to disrespect; (8) gang expert testimony on the culture and habits of Asian
criminal street gangs; and (9) gang expert opinion in response to hypothetical
fact patterns on how and whether certain crimes would be committed in
association with or for the benefit of a criminal street gang.
       The defense filed a competing motion in limine to exclude evidence of
Phonsongkham’s OKB gang membership and activities in which it objected to
the introduction of gang evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and
352.
       A hearing on the motions in limine took place in October 2021. At that
time, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021‒2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), had
passed but was not yet effective. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)
Among other things, Assembly Bill 333 created Penal Code section 1109,
which requires bifurcation of section 186.22 gang enhancement allegations
upon the defendant’s request.
       During the hearing, defense counsel and the prosecutor recommended
that the trial court grant bifurcation in accordance with the soon-to-be-
effective Penal Code section 1109. The prosecutor told the court the
imminent change in law made it “wise to bifurcate the predicates” since the
judgment, if any, would not be final by the time the new law went into effect;
granting bifurcation would avoid a possible appellate reversal for failure to
comply with its mandate. The court granted the bifurcation motion.
       The trial court then considered whether the prosecution’s gang
evidence would be admissible during the trial of the substantive crimes. The
prosecutor argued gang evidence was relevant to the murder and attempted

                                        10
murder charges because it tended to establish Phonsongkham’s identity as
the perpetrator of the shootings as well as his motive for killing and intent to
kill. She explained the prosecution’s theory that OKB and LV13 were rival
criminal street gangs, and Phonsongkham was a member of OKB who
committed the shooting in retaliation for LV13’s earlier assault on his fellow
gang member. The prosecutor asserted that gang evidence was “baked into
this case,” and the offenses would not be understandable to the jury without
evidence of the gang context in which they were committed.
      Defense counsel sought to limit the scope of gang evidence that would
be admitted. He appeared to argue that the gang evidence was only relevant
to the bifurcated gang allegations, not to the substantive crimes. The trial
court responded that notwithstanding its decision to bifurcate the gang
allegations, “there is evidence that can and is admissible . . . for identity,
motive, and intent to kill . . . . [I]t’s grounded in the gang overtones to this
entire situation.” Defense counsel conceded the “entire case is baked with
gang issues,” meaning that “parsing them out becomes very difficult.”
      The trial court engaged in an extended discussion with counsel for both
sides about the nature and admissibility of the proposed gang evidence.
When the prosecutor discussed her intent to introduce a variety of evidence to
prove Phonsongkham was an OKB member, including field interviews, cell
phone evidence, and a jail incident in which fresh OKB graffiti was found in a
holding cell after Phonsongkham left it, defense counsel objected that this
evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352.
The court ruled it would admit “limited” evidence to support the theory that
Phonsongkham was an OKB member, but left the specifics for future
determination because it had not yet heard the evidence. It suggested the
defense had the option of stipulating to gang membership to avoid

                                        11
introduction of the evidence, and that if no stipulation was forthcoming, it
would “have to do [a] 352 evaluation.”
      After the hearing, the trial court issued a minute order granting the
prosecution’s motion to admit gang evidence in part and denying the defense
motion to exclude gang evidence in part. In this order, the court made the
following rulings regarding the admissibility of gang evidence during the first
phase of the bifurcated trial: gang expert testimony was admissible on the
existence of the OKB criminal street gang, including the number of its
members, its territory, and “common name/sign/symbol”; gang expert
testimony on the rivalries and alliances of the OKB gang was admissible,
except that the history of how the rivalry between OKB and LV13 developed
was not; gang expert opinion testimony regarding Phonsongkham’s
membership and active participation in OKB, including interpretation of his
tattoos, prior admissions of membership to officers on the street, associations
with other OKB members, and possession of gang paraphernalia, including
social media postings and phone content demonstrating association or
membership in OKB was admitted “subject to possible stipulation or 352
analysis” (emphasis omitted); gang expert testimony on the culture and
habits of Asian criminal street gangs, the role of respect within Asian
criminal street gang sub-culture, including the forms disrespect can take and
expected responses to disrespect, was admitted “when relevant to the gang
dynamics” (emphasis omitted).
      The remaining categories of evidence identified in the prosecution’s
motion (predicate gang crimes, gang expert testimony on the primary
activities of OKB, and gang expert opinion on hypothetical crimes) were
deemed admissible “as to the bifurcated gang allegation only.” (Emphasis
omitted.)

                                         12
B.    Gang Evidence Challenged on Appeal
      Relevant to this appeal, the following gang evidence was admitted

during the initial phase of the bifurcated trial:1
      (1)   Detective Eddie Escamilla, an expert on Linda Vista gang sets,
            identified two active gangs in the area: LV13, and its rival gang,
            the Linda Vista Crips. The juveniles who assaulted Anthony
            were known or suspected LV13 gang members. He explained the
            importance to a gang of defending gang territory; targeting rival
            gang members who enter a gang’s claimed territory; “ ‘putting in
            work’ ” by backing up fellow gang members who are assaulted;
            and avoiding any appearance of cooperating with law
            enforcement, also known as “snitching,” such as by talking openly
            with the police or testifying in court.

      (2)   Detective Dan Caropreso, an expert on Asian gangs including
            OKB, described OKB’s hand signs and tattoos, and testified that
            OKB claims territory in an area of Southeast San Diego that
            included 49th Street. He was shown five screenshots from
            Phonsongkham’s Facebook account and testified they showed
            Phonsongkham “throwing” gang signs or standing next to others
            who were throwing gang signs, and they included an image of
            49th Street.

      (3)   Detective Nestor Hernandez described the mission of the gang
            suppression unit of the San Diego Police Department. He
            explained that law enforcement collected information about gang
            members because “they are usually involved in some type of
            criminal activity, either at the time that they were contacted or
            sometime later on.”

      (4)   The jury was shown numerous photographs from the cell phones
            recovered from Phonsongkham’s garage bedroom and 1993
            Honda Accord. They included at least one image of him holding a
            gun, possibly a Glock.

1     Phonsongkham did not stipulate to his membership in the OKB
criminal street gang.

                                       13
      (5)   The jury also heard the following testimony about field
            interviews of Phonsongkham: (i) in October 2018, Officer
            Michael McGruder stopped Phonsongkham after seeing him with
            another person apparently spraying gang graffiti that said
            “OMC” for Oriental Mafia Crips, a sister gang of OKB (two
            officers testified about this field interview: Officer McGruder and
            his partner, Officer Adam Schrom); (ii) in November 2015, Officer
            Christina Berg stopped and interviewed Phonsongkham, who
            said he was living on 44th Street within known OKB gang
            territory; (iii) in April 2017, Officer Gerald Perrin conducted a
            traffic stop of Phonsongkham and saw that he had a 49th Street
            tattoo on his left hand signifying OKB territory as well as a hat
            that may have been associated with OKB.

      (6)   Deputy Sheriff John Barrios, who is assigned to the superior
            court in downtown San Diego, testified that in July 2020 (i.e.,
            after Phonsongkham’s arrest for the instant offenses), he found
            fresh OKB graffiti carved in the wall of a holding cell after
            Phonsongkham was placed in it alone while he was being
            transported to court.

C.    Standard of Review
      Phonsongkham contends the trial court erred and violated Penal Code
section 1109, Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352, as well
as his federal and state constitutional rights to due process of law, by
admitting the six categories of gang evidence listed above. We review a trial
court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358 (Thomas); People v. Chhoun
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 31 (Chhoun).) “We do not disturb the trial court’s ruling
unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made in a ‘ “patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (Thomas, at p. 358.)
D.    No Violation of Penal Code Section 1109
      Phonsongkham’s first challenge to the admission of the gang evidence
relies on newly enacted Penal Code section 1109. He contends section 1109 is
retroactive under the rule of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 because it

                                       14
benefits criminal defendants. Although he believes the trial court complied
with section 1109 insofar as it granted bifurcation of the gang allegations, he
argues the scope of gang evidence admitted to prove the substantive crimes
violated section 1109. He claims that by requiring bifurcation of gang
allegations upon defense request, the Legislature has “given a clear
indication of its concern of the prejudice inherent in gang evidence.”
      Appellate courts are currently divided on whether Penal Code section
1109 applies retroactively, and this issue is now before the California
Supreme Court. (Compare People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550,
566−567, review granted July 13, 2022, S274743 [§ 1109 applies retroactively
under Estrada]; People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1128−1131
(Ramos) [same]; People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 105−108
(Montano) [same]; with People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207,
review granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275090 [§ 1109 is not retroactive]; People v.
Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 65, review granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275341
[same]; People v. Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948, review granted Dec.
14, 2022, S277103 [same].) In People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1208,
our Supreme Court declined to resolve this split.
      We do not need to decide this issue. Even if we assume Penal Code
section 1109 is retroactive, it did not disturb existing case law holding that
gang evidence may be admitted to prove substantive crimes. Prior to the
enactment of Assembly Bill 333, the California Supreme Court repeatedly
affirmed that gang evidence is admissible to prove crimes even in cases in
which no gang allegations have been asserted. “The People are generally
entitled to introduce evidence of a defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if
it is relevant to the charged offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s
gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership,

                                       15
signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the
like—can help prove identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means
of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged
crime.’ ” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 31.)
      The enactment of Penal Code section 1109 did not change this rule.
Section 1109 creates a procedure for bifurcating section 186.22 gang
enhancement allegations. It states, in relevant part, “If requested by the
defense, a case in which a gang enhancement is charged under subdivision (b)
. . . of Section 186.22 shall be tried in separate phases as follows: [¶] (1) The
question of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying offense shall be first
determined[;] [¶] (2) If the defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense
and there is an allegation of an enhancement under subdivision (b) . . . of
Section 186.22, there shall be further proceedings to the trier of fact on the
question of the truth of the enhancement. Allegations that the underlying
offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with, a criminal street gang and that the underlying offense was committed
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by
gang members shall be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.” (Pen.
Code, § 1109, subd. (a).)
      This statutory text is devoid of language limiting the scope of evidence
admissible to prove the substantive crimes underlying any gang allegations.
The absence of any such limitation is meaningful, as we are required to
derive the Legislature’s intent from the words of the statute it enacted.
(People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1007; see ibid. [“ ‘When the language of
a statute is “clear and unambiguous” and thus not reasonably susceptible of
more than one meaning, “ ‘ “ ‘there is no need for construction, and courts
should not indulge in it.’ ” ’ ” ’ ”].) Moreover, “ ‘ “[t]he Legislature is presumed

                                        16
to know the existing law and have in mind its previous enactments when
legislating on a particular subject.” ’ ” (Montano, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 113.) Despite its presumed awareness of prevailing precedent holding
gang evidence admissible to prove substantive criminal charges, the
Legislature did not alter this rule when it enacted Penal Code section 1109.
We may not rewrite section 1109 to conform to an unexpressed legislative
intent. (Hale v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 268, 276 [courts must
avoid “ ‘rewriting statutes to find an unexpressed legislative intent’ ”].)
“ ‘Doing so would violate the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions
to a statute.’ ” (Montano, at p. 113.)
      Moreover, other courts have interpreted Penal Code section 1109 not to
create new limitations on the admissibility of gang evidence to prove
substantive crimes. “[N]othing in Assembly Bill 333 limits the introduction
of gang evidence in a bifurcated proceeding where the gang evidence is
relevant to the underlying charges.” (Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1132.) The California Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed this view. In
People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at page 1208, our high court rejected the
defendant’s claim that failure to bifurcate gang enhancement allegations
under section 1109 constitutes structural error, reasoning that it “ha[s] held
that gang evidence, even if not admitted to prove a gang enhancement, may
still be relevant and admissible to prove other facts related to a crime.”
      For these reasons, we reject Phonsongkham’s claim that Penal Code
section 1109 required exclusion of gang evidence in the bifurcated trial on the
substantive crimes.
E.    No Violation of Evidence Code Section 1101, Subdivision (b)
      Phonsongkham’s next claim of evidentiary error under Evidence Code
section 1101 is directed at the gang evidence described in categories (5)(i) and

                                         17
(5)(iii) (the testimony of Officers McGruder, Schrom, and Perrin) and (6) (the
testimony of Deputy Barrios) in part B above. He maintains that in each
instance, “officers described [him as] being involved in some type of gang
activity that amounted to criminal conduct such as illegally tagging graffiti or
vandalism.” He also contends that “at one point, Officer Perrin testified that
[he] was arrested, thus leaving the jury to surmise about what caused the
arrest.” He argues the prior criminal or bad acts reflected in this testimony
were not similar enough to the charged offenses to be admissible under
section 1101, subdivision (b). We are not persuaded by these contentions.
      “With certain exceptions not relevant here, Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (a), provides that ‘evidence of a person's character’—whether in
the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of conduct—‘is inadmissible when offered to prove [the person’s]
conduct on a specified occasion.’ This prohibition, however, does not preclude
‘the admission of evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or
other act when relevant to prove some fact . . . other than [the person’s]
disposition to commit such an act,’ including ‘motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, [or] plan.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 129.) “In
other words, [section 1101] allows the admission of evidence of criminal
activity other than the charged offense ‘ “ ‘when such evidence is relevant to
establish some fact other than the person’s character or disposition.’ ” ’ ”
(Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 358.)
      First, Phonsongkham is incorrect that Officer Perrin’s testimony about
an arrest left the jury to imagine what Phonsongkham did to get arrested.
According to Perrin’s testimony, the arrest took place “on May 23rd into the
early morning hours of May 24th, 2019[.]” Plainly, the arrest was for
Phonsongkham’s commission of the current shooting offenses, not an

                                       18
uncharged or unidentified act of misconduct. Perrin’s testimony created no
danger of juror speculation about the conduct that precipitated the arrest.
      Second, Phonsongkham relies on flawed reasoning and inapposite cases
to the extent he claims the testimony of Officers McGruder, Schrom, and
Deputy Barrios was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b), because the bad acts to which they testified (graffiti or
vandalism) were insufficiently similar to the charged homicide offenses. This
argument incorrectly assumes the prosecution offered the evidence to prove
that a similarity between the prior and current offenses existed.
Phonsongkham relies on cases such as People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380
(Ewoldt), and People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, that addressed the
admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct under subdivision (b) of
section 1101 “[t]o establish the existence of a common design or plan.”
(Ewoldt, at p. 403; Balcom, at pp. 424‒425.) Under this theory of
admissibility, “evidence that the defendant has committed uncharged
criminal acts that are similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these
acts demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed the charged
offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she used in committing the
uncharged acts.” (Ewoldt, at p. 403.) But here the prosecution was not
trying to prove the existence of a “common design or plan.” (Ibid.) Rather, it
offered the evidence of Phonsongkham’s field interviews (which included
references to his possible spraying of gang graffiti) and the incident when he
carved OKB graffiti in the holding cell not to prove the shooting was a
recurrence of earlier, similar incidents—plainly, there was no such
similarity—but to prove he was a longstanding OKB member. It was this
gang affiliation which, in turn, assertedly supplied Phonsongkham with both

                                       19
the motive to retaliate against LV13 for its assault of his fellow gang member
by committing a shooting at LV13 gang members, and the intent to kill them.
      This was a different factual theory from the common plan or scheme
theory discussed in Ewoldt, but it was no less viable to support admission
under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). It is settled that the
prosecution may offer evidence of uncharged misconduct to prove issues of
motive or intent. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) When offered for this
purpose, “ ‘the probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the issue of motive
does not necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and
uncharged crimes, so long as the offenses have a direct logical nexus.’ ”
(Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 361–362, italics added; see People v.
Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1381 [admission under § 1101,
subdivision (b), is permissible where “ ‘the uncharged act evidences the
existence of a motive, but the act does not supply the motive. . . . [T]he
motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects.
Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive.’ ”].)
      Such a direct logical nexus between the officers’ testimony,
Phonsongkham’s OKB membership, and Phonsongkham’s commission of the
charged offenses exists here, as our discussion of the prosecution’s factual
theory has already established. Indeed, in his opening brief on appeal (albeit
in a different section from the one in which he challenges admission of the
gang evidence under Evidence Code section 1101), Phonsongkham implicitly
concedes the existence of a logical connection between the challenged
evidence and issues of motive, identity, and intent. He states: “The court’s
bifurcation of gang evidence [sic] meant that the People’s case would be
hamstrung without an ability to prove an underlying gang basis. Therefore,
in order to prove motive, identity or intent, evidence of appellant’s gang

                                       20
membership or association with a gang, gang culture, or ‘gang dynamics’ as
the court framed it was relevant to these matters. In this respect, courts
have repeatedly held it is proper to introduce evidence of gang affiliation and
activity where such evidence is relevant to an issue of motive or intent.”
      The conclusion that the prosecution’s theory of admissibility under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), was a sound one is supported by
People v. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th 82, in which our high court considered the
propriety of the admission of gang evidence to prove motive and identity
under a factual theory akin to the one pursued by the prosecution here. In
Valdez, “the prosecution’s theory was that the Mexican Mafia had directed
the Sangra gang to kill Dido Moreno because he had dropped out of the
Mexican Mafia, and that Sangra gang members—including defendant and
[his confederate]—obeyed that order because of their own gang allegiances.”
(Id. at pp. 130‒131.) The Court held evidence of the defendant’s and his
confederate’s “membership in and level of commitment to [the] Sangra
[gang]” was admissible under section 1101, subdivision (b), to prove the
identity of the murderers as well as their motive to commit a gang-related
killing. (Ibid.)
      We conclude the testimony about Phonsongkham participating in
spraying gang graffiti and carving the OKB gang name in a holding cell was
not inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), for the
purposes of proving motive, intent, and identity, even though the acts of
misconduct were not similar to the charged offenses.
F.    No Violation of Evidence Code Section 352
      Finally, Phonsongkham contends the gang evidence described in
categories (1) through (6) above was prejudicial and should have been
excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because it was cumulative. He

                                      21
claims the trial court exceeded the point of “ ‘just enough, but no more’ ” that

is the “tipping point beyond which prejudice outweighs probity.”2 He
contends the defense theory regarding his mental state—that Anthony’s text
message that said “ ‘I love you’ ” with “a big emoji with the arms out” showed
his relationship with Anthony was not a gang relationship, and that
Phonsongkham acted in a heat of passion—was “all but obliterated from
serious jury consideration by the overlay of gang evidence.” He also appears
to contend that section 352 is an ineffective safeguard to protect criminal
defendants against the prejudice created by the admission of gang evidence.
      “The People are generally entitled to introduce evidence of a
defendant’s gang affiliation and activity if it is relevant to the charged
offense. [Citation.] ‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—including
evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and
practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or
fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime.’ [Citation.] Even
when it is relevant, however, ‘courts should carefully scrutinize evidence of a
defendant’s gang membership because such evidence “creates a risk the jury
will improperly infer the defendant has a criminal disposition and is
therefore guilty of the offense charged.” ’ ” (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 31.)

2     Within his arguments advancing an Evidence Code section 352
challenge to the trial court’s admission of gang evidence, Phonsongkham
appears to reassert his earlier position that Assembly Bill 333 limits the
scope of gang evidence that can be introduced during the trial of criminal
offenses other than Penal Code section 186.22 gang enhancement allegations.
Because we have already considered and rejected this position, we do not
readdress it here.

                                       22
      To comply with Evidence Code section 352, “[t]he trial court must find
that the evidence has substantial probative value that is not outweighed by
its potential for undue prejudice.” (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
587, 610 (Williams).) “When the evidence has probative value, and the
potential for prejudice resulting from its admission is within tolerable limits,
it is not unduly prejudicial and its admission is not an abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Tran (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1040, 1049 (Tran).)
      Cumulative evidence “may be inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 352.” (Williams, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.) “Although no
bright-line rules exist for determining when evidence is cumulative, . . . the
term ‘cumulative’ indeed has a substantive meaning, and the application of
the term must be reasonable and practical.” (Ibid.) “The prejudicial effect of
evidence defendant committed a separate offense may, of course, outweigh its
probative value if it is merely cumulative regarding an issue not reasonably
subject to dispute.” (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1049.)
      As we discuss next, Phonsongkham fails to establish that the trial
court’s admission of the challenged gang evidence, either individually or
cumulatively, violated these standards.
      1.    The Challenged Gang Evidence Was Not Prejudicial When
            Considered Individually
            i)    Detective Escamilla⎯Category (1)
      The People argue that Phonsongkham forfeited his appellate challenge
to Detective Escamilla’s testimony about LV13 and the victims’ membership
in LV13, because his motion in limine only sought to exclude gang evidence
related to him, not the victims, and defense counsel did not object to
Escamilla’s testimony at trial. We agree. (See People v. Holmes, McClain
and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 773 [claims of error in admission of gang

                                       23
evidence forfeited where defendant did not raise an objection under Evid.
Code, § 352].)
      Phonsongkham responds that he preserved his evidentiary challenge to
the detective’s testimony by requesting bifurcation of the gang allegations.
But his bifurcation motion sought different relief on a different legal basis. It
was therefore inadequate to preserve his current claim of evidentiary error
under Evidence Code section 352. “[N]umerous decisions by [the California
Supreme Court] have established the general rule that trial counsel’s failure
to object to claimed evidentiary error on the same ground asserted on appeal
results in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46
Cal.4th 731, 756, italics added.) Phonsongkham asks us to exercise our
discretion to overlook the forfeiture. However, we are not authorized to do so
where, as here, the forfeited issue involves the admission of evidence. (People
v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6; Evid. Code, § 353.)
      The vast majority of Detective Escamilla’s testimony addressed the
territory of LV13, its subsets and rival gangs, and the LV13 gang
membership of Anthony’s assailants. As Phonsongkham has forfeited his
appellate challenge to the admission of this testimony, we do not consider
whether it was prejudicial.
      To a lesser extent, Detective Escamilla also explained gang dynamics,
including concepts of defending gang territory, targeting rival gang members
who enter a gang’s claimed territory, “ ‘putting in work’ ” by backing up
fellow gang members, and avoiding the appearance of cooperating with law
enforcement. This testimony was highly probative of issues relevant to
determining Phonsongkham’s guilt of the charged crimes, including his
motive and intent in committing the shooting. It was also relevant to explain
why certain percipient witnesses (particularly J.C. and C.C.) were reluctant,

                                       24
even hostile, when questioned by counsel at trial. Phonsongkham fails to
establish that the probative value of this testimony was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
               ii)    Detective Caropreso⎯Category (2)
      Detective Caropreso’s testimony about OKB’s territory, common gang
tattoos, and gang signs, including his testimony that certain images showed
Phonsongkham “throwing” OKB gang signs, was relevant for the jury’s
interpretation of photographs and testimony offered as circumstantial
evidence of Phonsongkham’s membership in OKB and was not unduly
prejudicial.
               iii)   Detective Hernandez⎯Category (3)
      Detective Hernandez participated in investigating the current crimes.
His background with the San Diego Police Department included assignments
with its street gang unit. The only part of Hernandez’s testimony that
Phonsongkham challenges on appeal is his statement that gang members
“are usually involved in some type of criminal activity, either at the time that
they were contacted or sometime later on.”
      Detective Hernandez made this statement in response to the
prosecutor’s question asking why the San Diego Police Department’s gang

unit collected information about gang members.3 Hernandez’s answer was
responsive to this question and was relevant to explain the purpose of
conducting field interviews of apparent gang members. Although this

3      Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s question or move to
strike Detective Hernandez’s statement. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 81‒82 [failure to object or move to strike testimony
forfeits the argument the testimony was inadmissible].) Although counsel’s
inaction forfeits Phonsongkham’s current appellate challenge, we address the
challenge on the merits because the People have not asserted forfeiture.

                                        25
statement arguably imputed a criminal disposition to gang members, its
prejudicial impact was mitigated by evidence of the specific field interviews
involving Phonsongkham. The only crime disclosed in the testimony
describing his field interviews was that of spraying graffiti, and one in which
his only role involved serving as a lookout while his companion did the actual
spray painting. When considered in context, Hernandez’s testimony was “no
stronger and no more inflammatory than the [evidence] concerning the
charged offenses.” (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405.)
            iv)   Cell Phone Photos⎯Category (4)
      As for the admission of what Phonsongkham describes as “numerous
photos over a period of years that included [him] holding guns, in one
possibly a Glock [i.e., the same model of gun as the handgun found under his
mattress], gang graffiti with the word ‘Temper’ (his aka) and screen shots of
[him] making gang signs alone or with others,” he fails to establish the

photographs were unduly prejudicial.4

4     We are impeded in our ability to determine whether the photographs
were prejudicial because we have not been provided with a record revealing
what they showed. The photographs were marked as Exhibits 226 through
263 and were shown to the jury during the testimony of Detective Marco
Perez. Except for one instance that we discuss below, Perez was not asked to
describe what the photographs depicted. Phonsongkham did not request the
transmission of Exhibits 226 through 263 to this court for consideration and
review as required by California Rules of Court, rules 8.320 and 8.224. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.320(e) [“Exhibits admitted in evidence . . . are
deemed part of the record, but may be transmitted to the reviewing court
only as provided in rule 8.224.”], 8.224(a)(1) [“a party wanting the reviewing
court to consider any original exhibits that were admitted in evidence . . . but
that were not copied in the clerk’s transcript under rule 8.122 or the
appendix under rule 8.124 must serve and file a notice in superior court
designating such exhibits”].) It is the appellant’s burden to present a record
adequate for review and to affirmatively demonstrate error. (People v.
Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 85; see ibid. [where defendant fails to supply a
                                       26
      The photographs were recovered from the three cell phones found in
Phonsongkham’s garage bedroom and Honda Accord. They were introduced
in evidence through the testimony of Detective Perez, who testified about law
enforcement’s collection of evidence from the cell phones. According to Perez,
the photographs were taken between 2014 and 2018.
      After 10 of the cell phone photographs were shown to the jury, defense
counsel objected that the photographs were cumulative. The prosecution
responded that they were admissible to support the gang expert’s anticipated
opinion that Phonsongkham was an OKB member, and to show that
Phonsongkham was a longstanding member of OKB. The trial court
overruled the objection. It explained that it did not find the contents of the
photographs to be unduly prejudicial to the defense, and that the number of
photographs was arguably helpful to the defense because it showed “the
degree of [his] gang involvement” which was “important” to the heat of
passion defense because “that’s why he had such a strong reaction.” Defense
counsel agreed, saying “You are on the right track.”
      Phonsongkham does not challenge this reasoning, which both
establishes the probative value of the photographs and tends to refute his
appellate claim that the photographs were prejudicial. Nor are we persuaded
there was any such prejudice. Even if we assume, as he claims, that the

record adequate to review his claim of error, “[the claim] fails”].) We cannot
determine whether the photographs were prejudicial without knowing what
they revealed. Phonsongkham’s failure to compile an appellate record
allowing this court to consider the content of all of the challenged photos
forfeits his claim they were cumulatively prejudicial. In any event, his
challenge also fails on the merits.

                                       27
photographs “included [him] holding guns,[5] in one possibly a Glock, gang
graffiti with the word ‘Temper’ (his aka) and screen shots of [him] making
gang signs alone or with others,” the photographs were relevant to establish
his membership and dedication to the OKB gang and were not more
inflammatory than the current offenses. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405.)
The photo of gang graffiti that said “Temper” could not have prejudiced the
defense; Phonsongkham’s gang moniker of “Temper” was one of the pillars of
its heat of passion theory. The fact that Phonsongkham made gang hand
signs tended to establish him as a member of OKB and was not unduly
prejudicial.
               (v)   Law Enforcement Testimony About Field Interviews and
                     Holding Cell Graffiti⎯Categories (5) and (6)
      As we have discussed, four officers testified about three field interviews
with Phonsongkham that took place in November 2015, April 2017, and
October 2018. One crime—spray painting graffiti—was revealed during this
testimony. Deputy Barrios testified about his July 2020 discovery of the OKB
gang name carved in the holding cell after it was occupied (alone) by
Phonsongkham. The evidence of the field interviews and holding cell graffiti
was relevant to show he was a longstanding member of OKB who not only
remained a gang member at the time of the May 2019 offense, but was
sufficiently committed to his gang and entrenched in gang culture that he
would react violently to the news of a rival gang’s assault of an OKB gang

5      Exhibits 226 through 263 were shown to the jury as Detective Perez
testified. The only photograph he described in his testimony was a single
photograph introduced as Exhibit 253. Perez testified the individual in this
photograph was Phonsongkham, and that he “appear[ed]” to have “a
handgun, maybe a Glock handgun,” in his hand. Perez testified he located
additional photos of Phonsongkham with firearms, but it was not clear these
photos were shown to the jury.

                                       28
member. Although crimes were revealed during this testimony, they were no
more inflammatory than the charged crimes. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 405.)
      2.    The Challenged Gang Evidence Was Not Prejudicial When
            Considered Collectively
      In addition to determining that no undue prejudice resulted from
introduction of the individual items of evidence Phonsongkham challenges,
we also are not persuaded they were impermissibly cumulative or unduly
prejudicial in the aggregate.
      In Williams, the case on which Phonsongkham principally relies, the

defendant was charged with four counts of nonviolent substantive offenses,6
a fifth count of participation in a criminal street gang under Penal Code
section 186.22, subdivision (a), and gang enhancement allegations under
section 186.22, subdivision (b), attached to the first four counts. (Williams,
supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.) In the course of the defendant’s
unbifurcated trial, the trial court admitted evidence of three prior crimes
involving the defendant; 15 additional crimes and law enforcement contacts
involving the defendant; as well as eight gang-related crimes, two of which
involved the defendant, that were designated as predicate offenses. (Id. at
pp. 598−602.) Some of the crimes were introduced multiple times and for
multiple purposes, “including (1) under Evidence Code section 1101,
subdivision (b), (2) as predicate crimes for the gang enhancements and [the]

6      Felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, former § 12021, subd.
(a)(1)) and ammunition (Pen. Code, former § 12316, subd. (b)(1)), possession
of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and possession
of a controlled substance while armed (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1).
(Williams, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 595.)

                                       29
substantive gang crime, and (3) as the basis for expert opinion testimony.”
(See id. at p. 598, fn. 5.)
      The appellate court concluded it was “an abuse of discretion to admit
cumulative evidence concerning issues not reasonably subject to dispute. The
sheer volume of evidence extended the trial—and the burden on the judicial
system and the jurors—beyond reasonable limits, and the endless discussions
among the trial court and counsel concerning the admissibility of such
evidence amounted to a virtual street brawl.” (Williams, supra, 170
Cal.App.4th at p. 611.)
      Phonsongkham does not contend the evidence he challenges concerned
issues not reasonably subject to dispute. To the contrary, in his opening brief
on appeal, he explicitly acknowledges that “[t]o prove an underlying gang
motive and intent, it was essential that the jury understand: (1) that the
OKB and LV13 are rival gangs, (2) that [Phonsongkham] and [Anthony] were
OKB gang members or associates, while [Carlos] and the group he was with
were gang members or associates, (3) that rival gangs will fight and defend if
one of their members is hurt or risk consequences from the gang, and (4) that
witnesses are recalcitrant to testify, fearful of retaliation if they cooperate
with police.” (Italics added.) We agree. And the gang evidence in categories
(1) through (6) above tended to prove one or more of these points, which in
turn served to establish Phonsongkham’s motive and intent in committing
the shooting, which were the critical issues in dispute at trial. And although
the evidence in categories (4), (5), and (6) were admitted for the same
purpose—to prove Phonsongkham’s membership and degree of commitment
in the OKB gang—each individual item of evidence, on its own, was relatively
weak. There were no outright admissions of gang membership by
Phonsongkham. It was only in the aggregate that the evidence tended to

                                        30
support the prosecution’s position that Phonsongkham was a longstanding,
committed gang member and remained affiliated with OKB at the time of the
shooting. Defense counsel’s questioning of law enforcement witnesses elicited
that Phonsongkham had covered over his 49th Street tattoo, suggesting
Phonsongkham may have withdrawn or at least distanced himself from the
gang before the May 23, 2019 shooting. Thus, the issue and depth of his
commitment to the gang was reasonably in dispute, and the quantity of
evidence offered on these points was not unreasonable.
      Phonsongkham’s chief complaint is that while the challenged gang
evidence was probative, not all of it was necessary. In his view, the jury
would have been equally capable of evaluating his motive and intent, among
other relevant issues, with only a subset of the evidence. But
Phonsongkham’s capacity to imagine an effective trial presentation on a
lesser showing does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting a broader scope of evidence. “[T]he prosecution cannot be
compelled to ‘ “present its case in the sanitized fashion suggested by the
defense.” ’ ” (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1049, quoting People v.
Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 147.)
      Phonsongkham’s other arguments are equally unavailing. His
complaint that the defense theory that his relationship with Anthony
transcended gang membership was “all but obliterated from serious jury
consideration by the overlay of gang evidence” does not establish the type of
prejudice Evidence Code section 352 was designed to prevent. “ ‘ “The
prejudice that section 352 ‘ “is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or
damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative
evidence.” ’ ” ’ ” (Tran, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1048.) “[T]hat the evidence

                                       31
tended to establish elements of the prosecution’s case did not render it
prejudicial for purposes of Evidence Code section 352.” (Id. at p. 1050.)
      Phonsongkham complains that Detective Escamilla’s testimony took up
65 pages of the trial record and Detective Caropreso’s testimony took up 33
pages of the trial record. However, the vast majority of Escamilla’s testimony
pertained to LV13, and (as we have discussed) Phonsongkham has forfeited
any objection under Evidence Code section 352 to the admission of this
testimony. Also, the “length of [a] gang expert’s testimony alone” does not
establish it to have been cumulative or unduly prejudicial. (People v. Coneal
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 951, 964.) In comparison with the 1,856 pages of
witness testimony in the reporter’s transcript, Escamilla and Caropreso’s
testimony was not excessive and did not exceed reasonable limits. Nor did
the volume of the challenged evidence as a whole approach anything near the
circumstance that led the Williams court to declare the admission of evidence
impermissibly cumulative. (See Williams, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 611.)
      And to the extent Phonsongkham argues that Evidence Code section
352 is not an effective safeguard “against a fundamentally unfair trial,” our
role is to apply section 352 as written, not to expand upon it. (See In re J.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1201, 1207 [“ ‘Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to
determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the
Legislature.’ ”].)
      Finally, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, which mitigated any
potential for prejudice created by introduction of the gang evidence. “As part
of the [Evidence Code] section 352 prejudice analysis, courts consider
whether the trial court gave a limiting instruction. A limiting instruction can
ameliorate section 352 prejudice by eliminating the danger the jury could
consider the evidence for an improper purpose.” (People v. Hendrix (2013)

                                       32
214 Cal.App.4th 216, 247; see People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1332
[where the jury was instructed not to consider prior crimes evidence to prove
that defendant was a person of bad character, thus “ ‘minimizing the
potential for improper use’ ”].) The court instructed the jury pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 1403 that it could not consider the gang evidence to prove that
he was “a person of bad character” with “a disposition to commit crime.” We
presume the jury followed the court’s instruction. (Ramos, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.)
      In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 by admitting the gang evidence summarized in
categories (1) through (6) above. Because there was no state law evidentiary
error, Phonsongkham’s state and federal constitutional rights to due process

of law were not violated.7 (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1010
(Hovarter) [“The ‘routine application of state evidentiary law does not
implicate [a] defendant’s constitutional rights.’ ”].)
                                        II.
We Do Not Consider Phonsongkham’s Withdrawn Claim That He Is Entitled
             to an Additional Day of Presentence Custody Credits
      At sentencing, the trial court gave Phonsongkham credit for 1,009 days
of presentence custody credits, a calculation that was based on a confinement
date of May 24, 2019. In his opening brief on appeal, Phonsongkham took the
position he was deprived of one day of presentence credits because he was
arrested on May 23 at 11:00 p.m., not May 24. He withdrew this claim,
however, in response to the People’s counterargument that credits begin to

7    Because we find no error in the admission of the challenged evidence,
we need not and do not address the merits of the parties’ competing
arguments regarding the harmlessness of the asserted error.

                                        33
accrue when a defendant is booked into jail, not when he is arrested (People
v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 919‒921), and the evidence indicates
Phonsongkham’s booking could have taken place no sooner than May 24. As
this claim of error has been withdrawn, we do not consider it.
                                         III.
                 The Abstract of Judgment Must Be Corrected
      The parties agree the trial court made a mathematical error when it
pronounced sentence. As noted above, the trial court sentenced
Phonsongkham to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of
parole for the special circumstances murder in count 1, and a total
determinate term of 13 years and four months for the attempted murders and
shooting at an inhabited dwelling in counts 2 through 5. It also imposed and
executed five 25-year-to-life terms, one for each of the firearm enhancement
allegations under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), attached to
counts 1 through 5. It ordered all of the terms to run consecutively.
      In aggregating the terms, the trial court stated the total sentence was
13 years, four months, plus 150 years to life, plus life without the possibility
of parole. The parties agree (as do we) that this was incorrect, because five
25-year-to-life sentences equals 125 years to life, not 150 years to life.
      Both parties take the further position that this mathematical error was
not carried over into the abstract of judgment. In this respect, however, they
are incorrect. Although the abstract of judgment correctly identifies each of
the individual terms imposed by the trial court, it also contains the
inaccurate aggregation of the terms. Specifically, section 16 of page two of
the abstract of judgment states, “Total term: 13.4 Years + 150 Years to Life +
Life without Parole.” (Italics added.)

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      The trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment controls over the
abstract of judgment. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185–188.)
There is no dispute the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence resulted
in a total term of 13 years, four months, plus 125 years to life, plus life
without the possibility of parole, which is not the total term set forth in the
abstract of judgment. “It is, of course, important that courts correct errors
and omissions in abstracts of judgment.” (Id. at p. 185.) We will remand to
the trial court with directions to correct the error.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect that Phonsongkham’s total term is 13 years,
four months, plus 125 years to life, plus life without the possibility of parole.
The court shall forward a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                                              DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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