Court Opinion

ID: 9532047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:17:28.561557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:39.694164
License: Public Domain

McALLISTER, J.,
concurring.
This is not an instance of prior restraint such as censorship. No action was taken to restrain petitioner from obtaining additional copies of the films and continuing to show them. In the absence of any showing *335to the contrary we may assume that he was able to do so.
Neither is this a de facto censorship. If the petitioner has not shown the films during the pendency of this proceeding his restraint was self-imposed. On motion of the petitioner the circuit court on February 5, 1968, ordered the district attorney to retain custody of the seized films and not to show them to any person or use them for any purpose whatever until further order of the court. The alternative writ of mandamus discloses that a similar restraint was imposed on the district attorney in the district court.
The films involved in this case had been exhibited and this was a routine “after the event”① prosecution by the state in the usual course of its criminal justice procedure. The opportunity to show the films “and then raise the claim of nonobscenity by way of defense to a prosecution for doing so”② was afforded this petitioner. If he elected to have the criminal prosecution abated during the pendency of this proceeding he has waived any right to urge “prior re*336strain!” There is no need in this case for the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
I concur.

 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 US 205, 84 S Ct 1723, 12 L ed 2d 809 (1964). Harlan, J., dissenting, at 819-820, as follows:
“In the typical censorship situation material is brought as a matter of course before some administrative authority, who then decides on its propriety. This means that the State establishes an administrative structure whereby all writings are reviewed before publication. By contrast, if the State uses its penal system to punish expression outside permissible bounds, the State does not comprehensively review any form of expression; it merely considers after the event utterances it has reason to suppose may be prohibited.”

 Marcus v. Property Search Warrant, 367 US 717, 81 S Ct 1708, 6 L ed 2d 1127, 1139 (1961), quoted with approval by Brennan, J., in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra n 1, 12 L ed 2d at 813, in part as follows:
“* * * An opportunity ... to circulate the [books] *336. . . and then raise the claim of nonobscenity by way of defense to a prosecution for doing so was never afforded these appellants because the copies they possessed were taken away. * * *”

 The constitutional issue not raised on appeal is whether an adversary hearing is necessary prior to the seizure of an allegedly obscene motion picture. In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 US 205, 84 S Ct 1723, 12 L Ed2d 809 (1964) the court said that an adversary hearing was necessary prior to the seizure of certain books. Only four of the nine judges sitting on the case signed the opinion.
Some courts, relying upon A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra, have held that a hearing prior to seizure of a film is necessary to satisfy the First Amendment. See Cambist Films, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 292 F Supp 185 (N D Ill 1968) (magistrate issuing the warrant actually attended the film); People v. Kozak, 288 NYS2d 692, 56 Misc2d 337 (1968) (rule applied where peddler sold obscene pictures to policeman on street).
Some courts have refused to apply the rule where the problem of law enforcement would be acute. See Metzger v. Pearcy, 393 F2d 202 (7th Cir 1968) (police allowed to retain one copy of film for investigation despite fact that no adversary hearing had been granted). See also Flack v. Municipal Court for Anaheim-Fullerton J.D., 66 Cal2d 981, 59 Cal Rptr 872, 429 P2d 192 at footnote 10 (1967).
*337There is language in Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 US 636, 88 S Ct 2103, 20 L Ed2d 1313 (1968) indicating that the court might now be satisfied if the prior hearing is ex parte only. However, federal district court cases subsequent to the Lee decision have rejected this interpretation of the case. Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 294 F Supp 1330 (E.D. Va. 1969); Cambist Films, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 292 F Supp 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
It has been contended that a distinction should be made between prior restraints on written material and on movies. See Judge Lumbard’s dissent in United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled “491”, 367 F2d 889, 905 (2d Cir 1966), suggesting that the harmful potential of the film media justifies greater restraints. Cf., Flack v. Municipal Court, supra 66 Cal2d at 989, footnote 7. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51, 85 S Ct 734, 13 L Ed2d 649 (1965) the Supreme Court recognized that there are distinctions among the free speech protections to be afforded various media,' and suggested that some prior restraints might be more acceptable in the area of films.