Court Opinion

ID: 9680615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:35:12.050749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.677837
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, the appellant urges that we erred in holding that the appeal related only to that portion of the judgment dated August 16, 1965, dismissing the bill of review, because the judgment not only dismissed the bill of review for lack of prosecution but also permanently enjoined appellant from interfering with, or going on, the lands awarded appellees in the partition decree. Appellant seems to take the position that we intentionally ignored the fact that the judgment also granted an injunction against appellant. Contrary to appellant’s contention, we did not overlook or ignore this facet of the case. Our reason for failing to discuss the in-junctive feature of the case was because we were unable to find any point of error in appellant’s brief specifically attacking that portion of the judgment. Although appellant’s original brief contained nine lengthy, argumentative and multifarious points of error, all in violation of Rule 418, T.R.C.P., none of the points related to the injunctive feature of the case. In fact, the word “injunction” is not even mentioned in the points of error. Most of appellant’s brief appears to have been devoted to an attack upon the decree of partition dated January 19, 1965, the validity *821of which is not before us on this appeal. Be that as it may, however, the default judgment of August 16, 1965, in addition to dismissing the bill of review, also enjoined appellant as follows:
“ * * * It further appearing to the court that Plaintiffs are entitled to the possession and use of 18.08 acres of land according to the judgment heretofore entered by this court in this cause on the 19th day of January, 1965, said 18.08 acres of land being shown on the plat made a part of such judgment and designated as Plat No. 2, and that the Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction, enjoining the Defendant, Leon Finley from molesting, harassing or inflicting any physical violence upon the Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ agents and employees when they enter upon or occupy or use said 18.08 acre tract of land, and from interfering in any manner with the Plaintiffs’ use of such land and the fencing of same; it is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the court that the temporary injunction heretofore issued by this court on the 19th day of April, 1965, be and the same is hereby made permanent, and Defendant is hereby perpetually enjoined from and he shall desist from such acts.”
In view of the fact that the above judgment disposes of both the suit for bill of review and the suit for injunction, perhaps it should be pointed out that both suits were filed under the same docket number as that given the original suit for partition. As a result, both the bill of review and the injunction were disposed of in one judgment.
As we understand appellant’s contention on motion for rehearing, he asserts that the judgment enjoining him from going on the land is void because there is fundamental error apparent on the face of the record. In this connection he argues that the decree of partition dated January 19, 1965, is not a final judgment because at the time the judgment was rendered, he had on file a pleading in the case setting up a cause of action in trespass to try title and that the effect of this pleading prevented the rendition of a judgment of partition, or at least prevented the judgment from ever becoming final. Consequently, he reasons that at the time of the injunction, the title to the land was in dispute and therefore the action of the court in enjoining him from going on the land amounted to an adjudication of title and since these matters are apparent on the face of the record, fundamental error is presented. This contention appears to us to be without merit.
In the first place, the record does not reveal whether the petition in trespass to try title was filed in the case before the rendition of the judgment of partition. In the second place, we do not believe it would make any difference whether such partition was filed either before or after the rendition of the judgment. The fact remains that the trial court rendered a decree of partition on January 19, 1965, and insofar as this record shows appellant never filed a motion for new trial or perfected an appeal from that judgment. The judgment therefore became final at the expiration of thirty days from the date thereof. Rule 329-b, T.R.C.P.
As pointed out in our original opinion, this case is before us without a statement of facts and without findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is well settled that where there is no statement of facts, it will be presumed that there was evidence to support the trial court’s judgment, Burnett v. Meletio (Tex.Civ.App.), 351 S.W.2d 912; Gelfond v. Levit (Tex.Civ.App.), 398 S.W.2d 659, and every presumption must be indulged in favor of the trial court’s findings and judgment. Commercial Credit Corporation v. Smith, 143 Tex. 612, 187 S.W.2d 363.
We find nothing in the record indicating fundamental error, and there being no statement of facts, we must presume *822that there was evidence before the court to support the judgment for injunctive relief as prayed for by appellees.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.