Court Opinion

ID: 9945942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 20:02:56.698058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:20.916644
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 P. v. Avila CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          B328330

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. TA122217)
           v.

 MARVIN AVILA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Pat Connolly, Judge. Dismissed.
         Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and
Marvin Avila, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      In 2013, defendant Marvin Avila pled no contest to two counts of
robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).1 He admitted to two firearm use allegations
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b))2 and a gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(c)), as
well as two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced
Avila to 29 years, 4 months in state prison.
      Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75 rendered legally invalid all
section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements not imposed for prior convictions
for sexually violent offenses. Section 1172.75 also established a procedure to
ensure resentencing of all individuals subject to invalidated enhancements.
Under this procedure, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) is obligated to identify eligible inmates, and the superior court is
obligated to resentence them. Notwithstanding the statutory procedure,
Avila filed a petition in the superior court, seeking resentencing under
section 1172.75 and various other statutory provisions. The superior court
denied the petition.
      Avila appeals from the court’s denial order. His appointed counsel filed
a brief that summarized the procedural history with citations to the record,
raised no issues, and asked this court to independently review the record
pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Avila
filed a supplemental brief.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.
2     We note that the minute order states one of the firearm enhancements
was imposed under section 12022.5. However, the abstract of judgment
states both firearm enhancements were imposed under section 12022.53,
subdivision (b). There is no reporter’s transcript available, and no indication
in the record on appeal that this discrepancy was clarified by the trial court.

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        We dismiss the appeal. Generally, once judgment in a criminal case is
rendered and execution of a sentence begins, trial courts lack jurisdiction to
vacate or modify a sentence. (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634
(King).) None of the contentions in Avila’s supplemental brief alters this
conclusion or entitles him to relief.

                                 DISCUSSION
   I.      Recent Changes in the Law
        Because Avila’s petition for resentencing involves several recent
legislative enactments, we provide the procedural backdrop for ease of
reference.

        A. Senate Bill No. 620
        In 2017, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (SB 620). SB 620 amended sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to give the
superior court discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements imposed
under those sections in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1 & 2;
§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h); see People v. Baltazar (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 334, 337.) “[T]he authority to strike or dismiss a firearm
enhancement applies only to nonfinal judgments or to final judgments where
the defendant is being resentenced under some other law.” (Baltazar, supra,
at p. 341.)

        B. Senate Bill No. 136
        Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2018-2019 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 136) amended section 667.5, subdivision (b) regarding prior prison term
enhancements. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 590.) Former section 667.5, subdivision

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(b) imposed an additional one-year term for each prior separate prison term
or county jail felony term, except under specified circumstances. However, as
amended by SB 136, section 667.5, subdivision (b) now imposes an additional
one-year term only for prior prison terms served for convictions of sexually
violent offenses. (See § 667.5, subd. (b).) SB 136 rendered prior prison term
enhancements imposed for non-sexually violent offenses legally invalid, but
applied retroactively only to cases not yet final on January 1, 2020. (People v.
Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).)

      C. Senate Bill No. 483
      In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) (SB 483). This bill made the changes implemented by SB 136
retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1 [“it is the intent of the Legislature to
retroactively apply . . . Senate Bill 136 of the 2019-20 Regular Session to all
persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these
repealed sentence enhancements”].) SB 483 took effect on January 1, 2022,
and added former section 1171.1, now section 1172.75, to the Penal Code.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.)
      Section 1172.75 provides, “Any sentence enhancement that was
imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a
sexually violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) “The
statute further establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants a
remedy for those legally invalid enhancements.” (Burgess, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 380.) That mechanism is section 1172.75, subdivision (b),
which requires the CDCR to identify all persons in custody to whom the

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provision applies and provide their information to the courts that sentenced
them “[b]y March 1, 2022, for individuals who have served their base term
and any other enhancements and are currently serving a sentence based on
the enhancement,” and “[b]y July 1, 2022, for all other individuals.”
(§ 1172.75, subds. (b)(1) & (b)(2).) For purposes of the statute, “all other
enhancements shall be considered to have been served first.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b)(1).) Sentencing courts are required to resentence persons in the
March 1, 2022 group by October 1, 2022, and the July 1, 2022 group by
December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2).)

      D. Assembly Bill No. 1540
      Prior to January 1, 2022, “[f]ormer section 1170 [, subdivision] (d)(1)
authorized a trial court, at any time upon the recommendation of the
Secretary [of the CDCR], to ‘recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater
than the initial sentence.’” (People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035,
1040.) Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719,
§§ 1-7) (AB 1540) moved the recall and resentencing provisions from section
1170, subdivision (d)(1) to former section 1170.03, which has since been
renumbered without substantive change as section 1172.1. (See Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 9.)
      Section 1172.1 retained the recall and resentencing language of section
1170, subdivision (d)(1). It also added several requirements to the superior
court’s consideration of a recall and resentencing recommendation made by
CDCR or other entities, not a defendant himself or herself. (See § 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) These include appointing counsel for the defendant and holding

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a status conference within 30 days of the resentencing request. (§ 1172.1.
subd. (b)(1).)

         E. Assembly Bill No. 333
         Effective on January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) amended section 186.22, by, among other things, modifying the
definitions of “pattern of criminal activity” and “criminal street gang,” as well
as clarifying what is required to establish that an offense “benefit[s],
promote[s], further[s], or assist[s]” a criminal street gang. (Stats. 2021, ch.
699, § 3.) Assembly Bill No. 333 is retroactive to nonfinal judgments. (People
v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 343–344.)

   II.      Analysis
         We conclude this court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because
Avila’s resentencing petition is not an appealable order.
         Section 1237, subdivision (b) makes post-judgment orders affecting a
criminal defendant’s substantial rights appealable. (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
However, post-judgment orders denying motions to vacate or modify a
sentence generally are not appealable under this statutory section.
         “The general rule is that ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of
the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ [Citations.]” (King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.)
When the superior court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to
vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion cannot affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. (Id. at p. 639.) The unauthorized sentence
doctrine does not provide a jurisdictional loophole “for a trial court to rule on
an incarcerated defendant’s motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence after

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the conviction is final and after the execution of the sentence has begun.” (Id.
at pp. 641–642.)
      There are limited exceptions to this general rule. For instance, the
superior court retains jurisdiction to resentence a defendant where “specific
statutory avenues” authorize defendants to seek resentencing. (King, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 637.) Although it provides a procedure for resentencing,
section 1172.75 does not authorize a defendant to initiate a request for
resentencing via motion or other means. “[A]ny review and verification by
the court in advance of resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the
necessary information from the CDCR Secretary or a county correctional
administrator, not by any individual defendant.” (Burgess, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 384.) The same is true of section 1172.1, which permits
recall and resentencing only at the request of CDCR and other entities. (See
§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) The superior court accordingly lacked jurisdiction over
Avila’s petition for resentencing, and we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal
from the denial of that motion.
      We note that once the statutory prerequisites have been complied with
and the pertinent information is received from the CDCR, Avila may, and
likely will, be entitled to have his sentence recalled and be resentenced
pursuant to section 1172.75. At that time, he may be entitled to
resentencing, and to the striking of one or more of the enhancements he
challenges. 3 However, Avila is not entitled to initiate the section 1172.75
process and recall his sentence on his own motion, in advance of the process

3     In his supplemental brief, we note that Avila includes a letter from
appellate counsel, dated July 13, 2023, stating that Avila had been “placed on
the CDCR list distributed to the Superior Court as mandated by Senate Bill
483. Thus, based on the CDCR referral, he was and is entitled to have his
case set for a resentencing hearing. (Pen. Code, § 1172.1.)”

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contemplated by statute. (See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 384.)
Without a statutory or other avenue to recall the sentence, the superior court
lacked jurisdiction to hear Avila’s motion, and we lack jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.

                                 DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           ZUKIN, J.

      WE CONCUR:

      COLLINS, Acting P. J.

      MORI, J.

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