Court Opinion

ID: 9403739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:09:15.547627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.180265
License: Public Domain

J-S03022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    STEVEN BURTON                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 263 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 22, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0007764-2015

BEFORE:       BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                              FILED JUNE 21, 2023

        Steven Burton (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the November

22, 2019, order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,

denying without a hearing his first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition.

Appellant seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of 10 to 20 years’

imprisonment, imposed following his jury convictions of aggravated assault2

and firearms offenses. His attorney, James Lloyd, Esquire (Counsel), has filed

a brief and petition to withdraw from representation, purportedly pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v.

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

2   18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1).
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Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).3               Counsel presents issues of: (1)

sentencing merger, for aggravated assault and carrying a firearm without a

license;4 (2) trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for not filing a post-sentence

motion to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence; and (3) trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness for not objecting to a jury instruction on the

witnesses’ identification of Appellant.        We conclude no relief is due, grant

Counsel’s petition to withdraw, and affirm the PCRA dismissal order.

                               I. Trial & Sentencing

        Appellant was charged with the attempted murder5 of Donovan Love

(the Victim), aggravated assault, and several firearms offenses. This matter

proceeded to a jury trial on January 5, 2016.            In an opinion previously

prepared for direct appeal, the trial court summarized the trial evidence as

follows. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/5/18, at 2-6. The Victim and his wife, Elaine

Boone (Wife) lived with Wife’s cousin, Ayonna, as well as Ayonna’s children.6

____________________________________________

3As we discuss infra, the proper framework for counsel to withdraw in a PCRA
proceeding and appeal is set forth by Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d
927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super.
1988) (en banc).

4   18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

5   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502.

6 Although the trial court opinion stated Ayonna was Wife’s daughter, Wife
stated at trial that they were cousins. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3; N.T. Trial Vol.
2, 1/6/16, at 100-01.

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Appellant was the father of two of these children and frequently visited the

home.

      On April 7, 2015, the date of the underlying shooting, Wife told a

detective the following. That morning, she and the Victim had an argument

on the ground floor of their home. Appellant, who was present, intervened

but the Victim told him to “mind his business.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Appellant

went upstairs while the Victim left. Appellant returned downstairs, pointed a

gun at Wife’s face, and said, “Where is your fucking dude at?” Id. Wife ran

outside and called the Victim, explaining what just occurred and telling him

not to return. Wife ran to meet him, but the Victim was running back toward

the house.    Id.   “Shortly thereafter, [Wife] heard a gunshot and . . . ran

back . . . home, where she discovered [the Victim] laying on the sidewalk[,]

bleeding.” Id. The Victim was shot five times — in both thighs and in his

arm. Id. at 2. Wife was shown a photo array and identified Appellant.

      On direct examination at trial, however, Wife testified she did not recall:

“providing the majority of her statement” to the detective; stating that

Appellant pointed a gun at her; nor identifying Appellant in a photo array.

Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Wife also did not recognize Appellant in the courtroom. She

stated “she was afraid to testify ‘[b]ecause of . . . several threats’ she received

. . . about ‘what happened to [her] husband.’” Id. Wife’s prior statement,

made to the detective, was read into the record. Id. at 3.

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      Meanwhile, the Victim gave a statement to a detective the day after the

shooting.    He stated the shooter was “Steve” (Appellant’s name) and

“Ayonna’s baby father.” Trial Ct. Op. at 4. The Victim also identified Appellant

in a photo array, although he “refused to sign below Appellant’s photo.” Id.

at 5. At trial, however, the Victim testified he had no recollection of being

shown a photo array nor of identifying Appellant as the shooter. He also stated

“he did not want to testify but had to come to the trial only because he ‘got

shot’ and was persuaded by the Commonwealth to appear.” Id.

      Finally, Philadelphia Police Officer Emmanuel Folly testified at trial to the

following. He was off-duty, on the same block as the shooting, when he was

woken by the sound of a gunshot.         The officer looked out a second-floor

window and saw Appellant “chasing another black male down the street,”

pointing his gun at the Victim, and firing multiple times. Trial Ct. Op. at 5.

The officer called 911, and later identified Appellant in a photo array. Officer

Folly also identified Appellant at trial. N.T., 1/6/16, at 49.

      Appellant did not testify, but presented a witness, Tanja Carter, who

owned or rented the home, but denied that the Victim or Wife lived there.

See N.T. Trial Vol. 3, 1/7/16, at 30, 51; Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Carter stated

Appellant was at the house “early in the morning” and left. Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

Subsequently, the Victim and Wife had an argument and the Victim

physically attacked Wife. Id. at 6. The Victim left, but Wife called him “and

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told him that Appellant ‘put a gun in her face,’ and a ‘little while after[,’] Carter

heard gunshots outside[.]” Id.

        The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder, but guilty of

aggravated assault, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying

firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and possessing

instruments of crime (PIC).7

        On March 14, 2016, the trial court imposed the following sentences: (1)

eight to 16 years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault; (2) a consecutive two

to four years for firearms not to be carried without a license; and (3) no further

penalty for PIC and carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia. The aggregate

sentence was thus 10 to 20 years.

        Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, but filed a timely,

counseled notice of appeal. On June 10, 2016, however, this Court dismissed

the appeal, docketed in this Court at 1141 EDA 2016, for trial counsel’s failure

to file a docketing statement.8

____________________________________________

7   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6108, 907(a), respectively.

      The trial court separately found Appellant guilty of a bifurcated charge
of persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. N.T. Trial Vol 4,
1/8/16, at 11. However, at the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth
moved to nol pros that charge, as Appellant in fact “didn’t qualify . . . for” it.
See N.T. Sentencing, 3/14/16, at 3-4.

8Appellant was represented at trial, sentencing, and this appeal by Richard
Bobbe, III, Esquire.

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       On May 31, 2017, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition,9 and

John Cotter, Esquire, was appointed to represent him. Attorney Cotter filed

an amended PCRA petition, seeking leave to file nunc pro tunc both a post-

sentence motion and direct appeal. The trial court granted relief as to a direct

appeal, but denied leave to file a post-sentence motion. Appellant thus filed

a counseled notice of appeal, as well as a counseled appellate brief at this

Court’s Docket 3831 EDA 2017.              On April 8, 2019, however, Appellant

withdrew the appeal, without providing a reason.

                                  II. PCRA Petition

       Three days later, on April 11, 2019, Appellant filed the underlying,

timely PCRA petition, pro se.10 He raised two claims — first, that the trial

____________________________________________

9 At this point in the proceedings, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became
final, for PCRA purposes, at the expiration of the 30-day period for filing a
petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court — Monday, July 11,
2016. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a).
Appellant then generally had one year, or until July 11, 2017, to file a PCRA
petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).

10 Because Appellant’s prior PCRA petition resulted in the reinstatement of his
direct appeal rights, we consider the April 11, 2019, petition to be his first
PCRA petition for timeliness purposes. See Commonwealth v. Turner, 73
A.3d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013).

     Furthermore, we note the petition was timely filed.          Appellant’s
judgment of sentence became final when he voluntarily discontinued his direct
appeal on April 8, 2019. See Commonwealth v. McKeever, 947 A.2d 782,
785 (Pa. Super. 2008). The filing of the petition, three days later, satisfied
the general one-year filing deadline of the PCRA.          See 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1).

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court’s jury instruction, regarding the witnesses’ identification of Appellant,

“improperly vouched for” those witnesses’ credibility. Appellant’s Petition for

Post Conviction Relief, 4/11/19, at 4. Second, Appellant asserted trial counsel

was ineffective for not objecting to this jury instruction.

      The PCRA court appointed Judge Hall, Esquire, to represent Appellant,

and he subsequently filed a Turner/Finley letter, averring there were no

issues of arguable merit. The PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing.      Nevertheless, it

conducted a brief hearing on November 22, 2019, where it orally granted

Attorney Hall’s request to withdraw and dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.

A written order, which set forth only the dismissal of the petition, was issued

the same day. Following the reinstatement of Appellant’s right to appeal from

this dismissal order, Appellant filed the instant appeal by present appointed

counsel, Attorney Lloyd.

               III. Reinstatement of PCRA Appeal Rights

      Although the convoluted, intervening procedural history does not affect

our review of the issues raised on appeal, we briefly review it, as it includes

two appeals to this Court and a second PCRA petition.

      First, we note that while the PCRA court orally granted leave for Attorney

Hall to withdraw, it did not issue a written order, and thus the attorney

remained counsel of record. Meanwhile, the written order dismissing the PCRA

petition did not advise Appellant of his appeal rights, nor indicate that service

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was made on him. On February 5, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se notice of

appeal. On June 4, 2020, this Court sua sponte quashed the appeal, docketed

at 701 EDA 2020, as untimely filed.

      Next, Appellant filed, on November 4, 2020, a pro se, 13-page “notice

of appeal,” which raised multiple claims of PCRA court error. On January 12,

2021, Attorney Hall filed a motion to withdraw, which the PCRA court formally

granted one day later. Present counsel, Attorney Lloyd, was appointed, and

on July 15, 2021, he filed a praecipe to discontinue the appeal that was

pending in this Court at 53 EDA 2021.

      On August 18, 2021, Attorney Lloyd then filed a petition to reinstate

nunc pro tunc Appellant’s right to appeal from the November 22, 2019, PCRA

dismissal order. We construe this filing to be a second PCRA petition, which

must comply with the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. See Commonwealth

v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396-98 (Pa. Super. 2002) (a petition for reinstatement

of PCRA appellate rights nunc pro tunc must be considered a second PCRA

petition, and PCRA court has no jurisdiction to hear an untimely petition). The

petition invoked the governmental interference timeliness exception, and

argued that neither the PCRA court nor Attorney Hall properly advised

Appellant of his appeal rights. Appellant’s Petition Under Post Conviction Relief

Act, 8/18/21, at ¶¶ 26-27, 46, 48; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i);

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1173 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(finding no error in PCRA court’s granting relief on a claim that clerk of court’s

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failure to serve a PCRA dismissal order on defendant and his attorney was

governmental interference). Appellant further averred he first learned of the

court’s and counsel’s failings on June 4, 2020, when the Superior Court

quashed his first appeal, but he could not file a PCRA petition until his second

appeal was discontinued. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d

359, 364 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (subsequent PCRA petition may not be

considered while appeal from prior PCRA order is pending).

      The Commonwealth did not oppose the petition. See Commonwealth’s

Letter, 1/21/22, at 1, 4-5 (unpaginated). On April 4, 2022, the PCRA court

reinstated Appellant’s right to appeal nunc pro tunc from the PCRA dismissal

order. Following the new notice of appeal, the court directed Appellant to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal.                  In

response,   however,    Counsel    filed   a   notice   of   intent   to   file   an

“Anders/McClendon Brief.” The PCRA court did not file an opinion; however,

as noted above, it had previously filed an opinion on September 5, 2018, in

preparation for Appellant’s direct appeal.

                IV. Anders Brief & Petition to Withdraw

      As stated above, Counsel has filed an Anders/McClendon brief with

this Court. We remind Counsel that Turner/Finley is the proper framework

for withdrawing from PCRA representation, which — while a “close

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cousin[ ]” — is distinct from Anders.11            See Commonwealth v. Wrecks,

931 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Pa. Super. 2007). Nevertheless, “because an Anders

brief provides greater protection to the defendant, we may accept an Anders

brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter.” Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866

A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004). See also Wrecks, 931 A.2d at 721-

22 (explaining similarities and differences between Anders and Turner/

Finley requirements). For ease of review, we cite Counsel’s brief with the

title that appear on its face and on our docket — “Anders Brief.”

       This Court has explained:

       Counsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must
       proceed . . . under [Turner and Finley and] . . . review the case
       zealously. [C]ounsel must then submit a “no-merit” . . . brief on
       appeal to this Court, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s
       diligent review of the case, listing the issues which petitioner
       wants to have reviewed, explaining why and how those issues lack
       merit, and requesting permission to withdraw.

       Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no
       merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw;
       and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro
       se or by new counsel.

Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted). If we determine counsel has satisfied these technical requirements,

this Court “must then conduct [our] own review of the merits of the case. If

____________________________________________

11Counsel also incorrectly refers to this appeal as “a direct appeal.” See
Anders Brief at 14. A direct appeal lies from the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 497 (Pa. Super. 2007).

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[we] agree[ ] with counsel that the claims are without merit, [we] will permit

counsel to withdraw and deny relief.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, which states he has:

“independently and conscientiously reviewed the record . . . with an eye to

uncovering appealable error[;]” communicated with Appellant about this

appeal; conducted legal research; and concluded that “all possible issues to

be raised [are] frivolous.”    Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw, 10/9/22, at 2

(unpaginated). Counsel further avers he sent a copy of the Anders brief and

petition to withdraw to Appellant, and attaches a copy of a letter he sent to

Appellant, which advises him of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro

se to raise any additional points.

      In light of the foregoing, we determine Counsel has complied with the

technical requirements of Turner and Finley, and thus we conduct our own

review of the merits of the issues raised.     See Doty, 48 A.3d at 454. In

addition to the jury instruction issue raised in Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition,

Counsel addresses two claims Appellant has raised in their communications:

the legality of the consecutive sentences and trial counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness for not filing a post-sentence motion to challenge the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Anders Brief at 34.

                           V. Sentencing Merger

      First, Counsel explains that Appellant wishes to present a claim that

“illegal consecutive sentences were imposed upon him.” Anders Brief at 38.

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Here, Appellant received sentences of eight to 16 years’ imprisonment of

aggravated assault and two to four years for carrying a firearm without a

license, to be served consecutively. Counsel correctly points out a trial court

has discretion to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively. See id.,

citing Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Counsel then states that if two sentences merge, a court would be precluded

from imposing consecutive sentences.         Anders Brief at 38.       Counsel

concludes, however, the two offenses above do not merge because each

includes a statutory element not present in the other. Id. at 39. We agree.

      “A claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing to

merge sentences is a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is

plenary.”   Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1028 (Pa. Super.

2017) (citation omitted). Our merger statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765, “prohibits

merger unless two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single

criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are

included in the statutory elements of the other.” Golphin, 161 A.3d at 1029

(citation omitted).

      Appellant was found guilty of aggravated assault under Subsection

2702(a)(1), which is defined as attempting to cause or intentionally,

knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to another.”    See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2702(a)(1). Carrying a firearm is defined, in pertinent part, as carrying “a

firearm concealed on or about [one’s] person, except in his place of abode or

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fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued license[.]”         18

Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

      We conclude that no element of either offense appears in the other. See

Golphin, 161 A.3d at 1029.          The offense of aggravated assault does not

contemplate carrying a firearm nor possessing a valid firearm license.

Meanwhile, carrying a firearm without a license does not require any causing,

or attempting to cause, serious bodily injury to another.          Accordingly, we

agree with Counsel that the imposition of separate or consecutive sentences

on these two counts was legal. See Anders Brief at 38-39. Our independent

review of the record reveals no other potential, meritorious challenge to the

legality of Appellant’s sentence.

                  VI. Trial Counsel’s Ineffectiveness for not

             Challenging Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      Next, Counsel raises the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective

for not filing a post-sentence motion and challenging the discretionary aspects

of sentencing.     Anders Brief at 47.     Counsel explained Appellant raised a

discretionary aspect of sentencing challenge in his direct appeal in 2018, which

he subsequently discontinued.        Meanwhile, the trial court’s opinion quotes

Appellant’s then-Rule 1925(b) statement as arguing the trial court: (1)

sentenced him “outside the sentencing guidelines[;]” (2) “did not take into

consideration [his] age, family history, medical condition and rehabilitative

needs[;]”   (3)    “only   considered     [his]   criminal   history   in   imposing

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punishment[;]”    and   (4)     imposed   an   excessive   sentence   “under   the

circumstances of the case.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

      In the Anders brief, Counsel points out the trial court considered the

presentence investigation report (PSI), as well as Appellant’s juvenile and

adult criminal history, prior violations “of his multiple probations/paroles,”

“persistent refusal to rehabilitate,” substance abuse, “dishonesty to the

presentence    investigator,”    employment     and   education   history,   family

circumstances, and “abhorrent crimes in this case.”         Anders Brief at 49,

quoting Trial Ct. Op. at 12. Counsel emphasizes that sentencing is vested in

the sound discretion of the trial court, and contends that had trial counsel filed

a sentence motion, the court would have denied relief. Anders Brief at 50-

51, citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (standard of review for discretionary aspects of sentencing).

Counsel thus concludes that any filing “of a timely motion for reconsideration

of sentence would not have resulted in a different outcome.” Anders Brief at

51. We agree that no relief is due on this ineffectiveness claim.

      This Court has explained:

      To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the petitioner has the
      burden to prove that (1) the underlying substantive claim has
      arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being
      challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions
      or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a
      result of counsel’s deficient performance. The failure to satisfy
      any one of the prongs will cause the entire claim to fail.

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Smith, 181 A.3d at 1174-75 (citation omitted).        “[C]ounsel is presumed

effective, and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must

demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such

deficiency prejudiced him.” Id. at 1174 (citation omitted).

      With respect to sentencing, we note: “Sentencing is a matter vested in

the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Antidormi, 84

A.3d at 760 (citation omitted). “The sentencing guidelines are not mandatory,

and sentencing courts retain ‘broad discretion in sentencing matters, and

therefore, may sentence defendants outside the [g]uidelines.’” Id. (citation

omitted). Furthermore:

      “[w]hen imposing sentence, a court is required to consider ‘the
      particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
      defendant.’” “In considering these factors, the court should refer
      to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal
      characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.” “Where pre-
      sentence reports exist, we shall . . . presume that the sentencing
      judge was aware of relevant information regarding the
      defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
      with mitigating statutory factors. . . .

Id. at 761 (citations omitted).

      In addition to Counsel’s above discussion, we consider this portion of

the trial court’s opinion:

      [T]he sentencing guidelines recommended a term of [66] to [84]
      months’ incarceration (+/- 12 months) on Appellant’s conviction
      for aggravated assault. This Court sentenced Appellant to 8 to 16
      years’ incarceration on this charge, which is within the aggravated
      guideline range.

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      This Court further sentenced Appellant to 2 to 4 years’
      incarceration on his conviction of carrying a firearm without a
      license.    This Court imposed no sentences on Appellant’s
      remaining convictions for carrying an unlicensed firearm on the
      public streets of Philadelphia and [PIC].

See Trial Ct. Op. at 12 (paragraph break added). The court further opined:

          With an already extensive criminal history that included [12]
      arrests, five convictions, and four commitments, [in this case]
      Appellant pulled the trigger multiple times at close range and shot
      [the Victim] 5 times. This Court can attest that absent some
      compelling fact or circumstance that was unknown to the Court at
      the time of sentencing, there was zero chance that Appellant
      would have prevailed in any post-sentence motion requesting a
      sentence more lenient than 10 to 20 years’ incarceration. . . .

Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).

      In light of the trial court’s reasoning, which is supported by the record,

Appellant could not show the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

sentence. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 760. Accordingly, he cannot establish,

in his ineffectiveness claim, that his underlying challenge to the discretionary

aspects of his sentence, has arguable merit. See Smith, 181 A.3d at 1174-

75. Accordingly, we agree with Counsel that this issue has no merit. See

Doty, 48 A.3d at 454.

          VII. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for not

       Challenging Jury Instruction on Witnesses’ Identification

      The final issue raised in the Anders brief is whether trial counsel was

ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s jury instruction regarding

witness identification.   At this juncture, we note the relevant standard of

review for the underlying claim:

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      [W]hen evaluating the propriety of jury instructions, [an appellate
      court] will look to the instructions as a whole, and not simply
      isolated portions, to determine if the instructions were improper.
      A trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and
      may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly,
      adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
      consideration. Only where there is an abuse of discretion or an
      inaccurate statement of the law is there reversible error.

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 754 (citation omitted).

      The jury instruction at issue concerned the Victim’s, Wife’s, and Officer

Folly’s identification of Appellant. The court stated:

      . . . In their testimony, [the Victim, Wife, and Officer Folly]
      identified [Appellant] as the person who committed the crime
      here. In evaluating their testimony, in addition to all the other
      instructions that I’m providing to you about judging the testimony
      of witnesses, in considering identification testimony, there are
      additional factors that you should consider when you decide
      whether or not to believe the identification testimony that they
      gave in regard to [Appellant]:

      No. 1, did the witness have a good opportunity to observe the
      perpetrator of this offense? No. 2, was there sufficient lighting for
      the witness to make their observations? No. 3, was the witness
      close enough to the individual to note facial and other physical
      characteristics, as well as any clothing the person was wearing?
      No. 4, has that witness ever made a prior identification of
      [Appellant] as the perpetrator of this crime at any other
      proceeding? No. 5, was the witness’ identification positive or was
      it qualified by any inconsistency? And finally No. 6, during the
      course of this case, did the witness ever identify anybody else as
      being the perpetrator of this crime?

      In considering whether or not to accept the testimony of [the
      Victim, Wife,] or Officer Folly, you should consider all of the
      circumstances under which those identifications were made.
      Furthermore, you should consider all of the evidence relative to
      the question of who committed this crime, including the testimony
      of any witness from which identity or non[-]identity of the
      perpetrator of this crime may be inferred.

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        You cannot find [Appellant] guilty unless you are satisfied beyond
        a reasonable doubt by all of the evidence, direct and
        circumstantial, not only that the crime was committed, but that it
        was [Appellant] who committed it.

N.T., 1/7/16, at 113-14 (paragraph breaks added).

        In his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant asserted this instruction was an

improper “presumption of truthfulness instruction” pursuant to Turner v.

United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), and the instruction “improperly vouched

for” the witnesses. Appellant’s Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 4/11/19, at

4, 5.    Appellant contended the court “directed the jury to find that the

prosecution’s witnesses had identified [him] as the person who committed the

crime, unless the presumption of truthfulness [was] overcome by” the six

factors set forth in the instruction.    Id. at 5.   In other words, Appellant

reasoned, “the court’s instruction clearly required the jury to believe a witness’

testimony until his or her untruthfulness [was] demonstrated by evidence

making it appear as likely as not that the testimony was false.” Id. at 6.

        In the Anders brief, Counsel states the jury instruction utilized the

language of then-Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction

4.07A (“Identification Testimony”). See Anders Brief at 46. Counsel denies

the instruction directed the jury to “presume that the identifications were

accurate,” and contends the instruction included “a complete and accurate

statement of the applicable legal principles.” Id. at 46, 47. Again, we agree

that no relief is due.

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      First, Appellant misconstrues the United States Supreme Court’s 1970

decision in Turner. In Turner, the defendant was charged under federal drug

trafficking laws of, inter alia, receiving, concealing or transporting heroin or

cocaine that he knew was illegally imported. Turner, 396 U.S. at 400. “[T]he

trial judge charged the jury in accord with the statute that the jury could infer

from [the defendant’s] unexplained possession of the heroin and cocaine

that [he] knew that the drugs . . . had been unlawfully imported.”           Id.

(emphasis added).

      At that time, “the inference authorized by the [statute and] the

prevailing judicial view [was] that heroin is not made in this country but

rather is imported from abroad.” Turner, 396 U.S at 409 (emphasis added).

See also id. at 416 (“To possess heroin is to possess imported heroin.”)

(emphasis in original). The High Court thus did not disturb the jury instruction

as to the possession of heroin. See id. at 417-18.

      With respect to cocaine, however, the Court considered that “much more

cocaine is lawfully produced in this country than is smuggled into this country.”

Turner, 396 U.S at 418 (footnote omitted). The Court thus held the jury

instruction, allowing a presumption that the defendant knew the cocaine was

illegally imported, could not stand. Id. at 423.

      Appellant’s PCRA petition did not address any of the above facts, or even

the holding, in Turner. We emphasize the Turner decision did not address

witness identification or even credibility, but instead a 1970 federal statutory

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presumption concerning the illegal importing of heroin and cocaine.

Accordingly, Turner does not afford Appellant any relief.

      Furthermore, we conclude the particular instruction at issue did not

direct the jury to presume any witness’ identification was accurate or any

witness’ testimony was credible. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 754. Instead,

the instruction properly charged the jury to consider certain “additional

factors,” along with “all of the evidence relative to the question of who

committed this crime,” when deciding whether to believe those witnesses’

identification of Appellant.   See N.T., 1/7/16, at 113-14.     As Appellant’s

underlying claim lacks merit, he cannot establish the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel for not objecting to this instruction. See Smith, 181 A.3d at

1174-75.

                               VII. Conclusion

      After independent review of the record, we conclude none of Appellant’s

desired claims have merit. Accordingly, we grant Attorney Lloyd’s petition to

withdraw from representation, and we affirm the November 22, 2019, order

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2023

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