Court Opinion

ID: 9839259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:09:06.876475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.297326
License: Public Domain

J-S28019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
  EDWARD D. WILSON                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1364 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 7, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-03-CR-0000647-2018

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: September 12, 2023

       Appellant, Edward D. Wilson, appeals from the order entered on

November 7, 20221 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common Pleas of

Armstrong County that denied his petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to

the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546. We affirm.

       This Court previously summarized the historical facts of this case on

direct appeal.

       On the evening of July 8, 2018, Chad Bennett (“Bennett”), his ex-
       girlfriend, Crystal Johns (“Johns”), and friend, Justin Batten
       (“Batten”), were drinking at the Hot Spot bar in Kittanning,
       Pennsylvania. At approximately 1:30 a.m. on July 9, 2018,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We have amended the caption to reflect that an appeal properly lies from

the entry of a final order, which in this case is the order that dismissed
Appellant’s petition for collateral relief as untimely. See Commonwealth v.
Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc).
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     Bennett, Batten, and Johns left the Hot Spot and drove to the
     house of Johns's aunt. When they arrived at the house, Johns
     went inside while Bennett and Batten waited for her to return.

     At some point, Johns exited the house and began looking for
     something in her car. While Bennett and Batten were waiting,
     [Appellant] arrived at the house on a tractor. [Appellant] got off
     of the tractor, ran towards Johns, and struck Johns in the face
     several times. Bennett saw [Appellant] strike Johns, shouted at
     [Appellant] and walked towards him. [Appellant] and Bennett
     approached each other and began fighting. Sometime thereafter,
     Batten broke up the fight. Batten and Bennett discovered that
     Bennett had suffered a large gash wound from his sternum to his
     stomach, and Bennett's intestines were visible. No one saw any
     weapons or sharp objects, and none were recovered. Bennett was
     transported to the hospital[, where medical personnel removed
     several feet of his intestines due to] his injuries.

     A jury subsequently convicted [Appellant] of [one count each of
     aggravated assault and simple assault]. The trial court deferred
     sentencing [to allow preparation of] a pre-sentence investigation
     report. On April 12, 2018, prior to sentencing, [Appellant] filed a
     [post-trial motion] alleging that the Commonwealth committed a
     BradyFN1 violation and requesting a new trial. Specifically,
     [Appellant] argued that the Commonwealth [] failed to disclose
     the “Agreement to Classify Case as Inactive” (“Inactive
     Agreement”),FN2 which the Commonwealth used to secure
     Bennett's testimony against [Appellant].           The trial court
     considered the [m]otion to be a premature post-sentence motion
     and deferred ruling until after [Appellant’s] sentencing.

       FN1 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding

       that the prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the
       accused that is material either to guilt or punishment).

       FN2 In its memorandum and order, the      trial court explained
       the unique practice of inactive status and inactive
       agreements in Armstrong County. “In Armstrong County,
       inactive status operates a[s a] general continuance of a case,
       pending some action that causes the case to be placed back
       on active status.” See Post-Sentence Motion Memorandum
       and Order, 9/20/19, at 3. Further, “[i]nactive agreements
       are not a matter of public record.” Id. The original copy of

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       the agreement is retained by the Court Administrator until
       active status is resumed, at which point the Court
       Administrator discards the original agreement.          Id.
       Additionally, the Commonwealth keeps a physical copy of any
       inactive agreements. Id.

       On July 21, 2017, prior to the filing of charges against
       [Appellant] in the instant case, Bennett was charged in a
       separate     case    with  drug-related   offenses.       The
       Commonwealth and Bennett subsequently entered into the
       Inactive Agreement. As a result, Bennett's case was placed
       on inactive status pending the outcome of [Appellant’s] trial.
       The trial court found that, pursuant to the Inactive
       Agreement, Bennett waived his Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy trial
       rights and his right to assert the applicable statute of
       limitations “as consideration for being placed on [i]nactive
       [s]tatus.” Id. at 3. The Inactive Agreement further specified
       that Bennett's case would remain inactive “until [Appellant’s]
       matter is finalized.” Id. At some point, the Commonwealth
       provided discovery materials to [Appellant], but did not
       include a copy of, or otherwise mention, the Inactive
       Agreement. Id. at 3-5. Ultimately, [Appellant] was not
       made aware of the Inactive Agreement until post-sentence
       proceedings. Id.

     On July 18, 2019, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to a term
     of 10 to 20 years in prison for the aggravated assault conviction,
     with credit for time served, plus fines and costs. The trial court
     imposed no further penalty for [Appellant’s] conviction of simple
     assault.

     On July 24, 2019, [Appellant] filed a supplemental post-sentence
     motion, in which he incorporated the Brady claim, and included a
     list of witnesses to testify about the Inactive Agreement. The trial
     court conducted a post-sentence motion hearing on September 6,
     2019.      On September 20, 2019, the trial court issued a
     memorandum and order denying [Appellant’s] motion for failure
     to establish the prejudice requirement of Brady. Thereafter,
     [Appellant timely appealed].

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 239 A.3d 110, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum) (footnotes in original).

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       On July 29, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence.

See id. at *3. Specifically, we agreed with the trial court that, although the

Inactive Agreement constituted an undisclosed benefit conferred on Bennett,

Appellant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by nondisclosure in view

of the overwhelming and highly corroborated quantum of evidence that

established his guilt.2 See id. Appellant did not petition for review by our

Supreme Court.3

       On September 14, 2020, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition,

his first. The court appointed PCRA counsel who filed an amended petition on

December 11, 2020.         The amended petition alleged that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to have meaningful conversations with Appellant, in failing

to raise an alternative theory of defense, and in refusing to allow Appellant to

____________________________________________

2 Appellant withdrew a challenge to the legality of his sentence.   See Wilson,
239 A.3d 110, at *3 n.4.

3 Appellant needed to file his petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme

Court no later than August 28, 2020. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (petition for
allowance of appeal to Supreme Court shall be filed within 30 days of entry of
Superior Court order). As it shall become relevant below, after we affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 29, 2020 but 10 days before
Appellant’s petition for allowance became due, our Supreme Court filed its
decision in Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075 (Pa. 2020). In its
August 18, 2020 opinion, the Bagnall Court held, inter alia, that a homicide
defendant was entitled to a new trial due to the prosecution’s Brady violation
where an undisclosed cooperation agreement between the Commonwealth
and a witness constituted impeachment evidence that was material to the
defendant’s case since the defendant established a reasonable probability of
a different trial outcome if the agreement had been disclosed. See Bagnall,
supra.

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testify at trial. The amended petition did not allege that direct appeal counsel

was ineffective in failing to petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme

Court on the strength of Bagnall.

       The PCRA court convened a hearing on January 21, 2021, at which

Appellant and trial counsel testified. On February 4, 2021, the PCRA court

dismissed Appellant's petition.         We affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s

petition on November 16, 2021 and the Supreme Court denied further review

on May 3, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 268 A.3d 427 (Pa. Super.

2021) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 277 A.3d 1108 (Pa. 2022).

       Appellant filed a second petition, through counsel, on June 23, 2022.4

This petition alleged that direct appeal counsel was ineffective in failing to

seek further review before the Supreme Court in August 2020 after the Court

issued its decision in Bagnall. The petition also alleged that PCRA counsel

who filed an amended petition on December 11, 2020 was ineffective in failing

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s June 2022 petition was preceded by two pro se filings submitted

on February 24, 2022 and March 29, 2022. Litigation of Appellant’s pro se
submissions could not proceed given the pendency of appellate review on
Appellant’s first PCRA filing. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585,
588 (Pa. 2000) (“when an appellant's PCRA appeal is pending before a court,
a subsequent PCRA petition cannot be filed until the resolution of review of
the pending PCRA petition by the highest state court in which review is sought,
or upon the expiration of the time for seeking such review”), rev’d on other
grounds, Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020).

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to raise the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel. The PCRA court dismissed

Appellant’s petition on November 7, 2022 and this appeal followed.5

       Appellant’s brief lists two claims for our review.

       Whether Appellant has timely filed the instant PCRA petition?

       Whether Bagnall supports Appellant’s claim that he entitled to
       collateral relief on his Brady claim?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up).

       In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to an

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”       Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.         Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

____________________________________________

5 Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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      It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional, and if a PCRA petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the claims and cannot grant relief. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d

1120, 1124 (Pa. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d

118, 121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding, courts do not have jurisdiction over an

untimely PCRA petition). To be timely filed, a PCRA petition, including second

and subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date a

petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

“A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including

discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of the time for seeking

the review.”   42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).       The PCRA’s jurisdictional time

restriction is constitutionally sound. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287,

292 (Pa. 2004).

      Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on August 28, 2020.

Therefore, Appellant had until August 28, 2021, in which to file a timely PCRA

petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (stating, a PCRA petition, “including a

second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the

judgment becomes final” unless the petitioner alleges and proved one of the

three enumerated exceptions set forth herein). The order currently subject

to review denied a petition filed on June 23, 2022. Therefore, the instant

petition is patently untimely.

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       If a PCRA petition is untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only

be overcome if the petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory

exceptions, as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 171 A.3d 675, 678 (Pa. 2017). The three narrow statutory exceptions

to the one-year time-bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government

officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly[-]discovered facts; and (3)

an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51

A.3d 231, 233-234 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii).

A petition invoking an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar must be filed

within one year of the date that the claim could have been presented. 6 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2) (effective Dec. 24, 2018). If a petitioner fails to invoke

a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to

review the petition and provide relief. Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676.

       It is well-established that, to invoke the newly-discovered facts

exception, the petitioner must plead and prove facts that were “unknown” to

him or her, and that he or she could not uncover such facts with the exercise

of “due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1274 (Pa.

____________________________________________

6 We note that effective December 24, 2018, the time-period in which to file

a petition invoking one of the three exceptions was extended from 60 days to
one year. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). This amendment applies to claims
arising one year prior to the effective date of the amendment; i.e. December
24, 2017, or later. Act. 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3. Because
Appellant filed his PCRA petition on June 23, 2022, this amendment applies,
and Appellant had one year in which to file a petition that validly invoked any
of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar.

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2007); see also Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1271 (Pa. 2020)

(stating that, the newly-discovered facts exception “renders a petition timely

when the petitioner establishes that the facts upon which the claim is

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence”). Our Supreme Court recently

reiterated the well-established principle that a judicial decision does not

constitute a “fact” for purposes of the newly-discovered facts exception.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1147 (Pa. 2020).

      Appellant does not expressly invoke any of the timeliness exceptions set

forth in Section 9545. Instead, Appellant notes initially that nunc pro tunc

reinstatement of appellate rights is an appropriate remedy where a timely

PCRA petition has been filed and a deprivation of effective assistance of

appellate counsel has occurred. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. Appellant

next suggests that Bagnall represents a change in the law and that “manifest

injustice” would result if he were precluded from litigating his claims of

ineffective assistance under the new standards.      See id. at 12.    Appellant

concludes that he has “timely preserved” his claims since the ineffectiveness

of PCRA counsel could not have been raised until the Supreme Court denied

his petition for allowance of appeal on May 3, 2022. See id. at 13.

      Appellant ignores fundamental principles of Pennsylvania law in

advancing his claims that his June 23, 2022 petition was timely, that our

Supreme Court’s decision in Bagnall somehow extended the time for filing a

petition for collateral relief, and that a manifest injustice permits us to reach

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the merits of Appellant’s untimely collateral claims. As we stated above, Lark

precluded the filing of a subsequent petition until appellate review of

Appellant’s first petition had concluded.    Hence, Appellant’s June 23, 2022

petition, filed more that 21 months after his judgment of sentence became

final, was patently untimely.

      Moreover, Appellant has not validly invoked any of the statutory

exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar which are set forth at Section

9545. Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that judicial opinions are

not new facts under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). See Reid, 235 A.3d at 1148;

Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011) (subsequent

decisional law does not constitute a new fact under Section 9454(b)(1)(ii)).

Accordingly, the issuance of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bagnall does not

implicate the timeliness exception found at Section 9454(b)(1)(ii).

      Appellant also cannot rely upon the new constitutional right exception

found in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). This provision is triggered only when “the

right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme

Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the

time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply

retroactively.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Our review of Bagnall leads

us to conclude that the decision neither announced a new constitutional right

nor contained an express pronouncement of retroactive application.      Thus,

Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) does not apply in this instance.

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      In short, everything Appellant needed to know in order to litigate the

alleged ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel was available when Appellant

filed his initial timely petition; he cannot now cite the claimed ineffectiveness

of original PCRA counsel as grounds for circumventing the PCRA’s one-year

time bar.   See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.

2003) (“[t]he PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc

equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions

expressly   delineated   in        the    Act[]”)    (citation   omitted);    see    also

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 406 (Pa. 2021) (Justice

Dougherty concurring) (“Importantly, our decision today does not create an

exception to the PCRA's jurisdictional time-bar, such that a petitioner

represented by the same counsel in the PCRA court and on PCRA appeal could

file an untimely successive PCRA petition challenging initial PCRA counsel's

ineffectiveness   because     it    was    his   ‘first   opportunity   to   do   so[.]’”);

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“Nothing

in Bradley creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA's

one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or

permits recognition of such a right.”).

      For each of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the PCRA court

correctly dismissed Appellant’s June 23, 2022 petition as untimely and not

subject to any statutory exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time bar.

Because we lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims for

collateral relief, we need not discuss the second issue Appellant raises on

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appeal. We therefore shall affirm the order entered by the PCRA court on

November 7, 2022.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2023

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