Court Opinion

ID: 93402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:07:19+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.223943
License: Public Domain

145 U.S. 512 (1892)
DOWLING
v.
EXCHANGE BANK OF BOSTON.
No. 349.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 29, 1892.
Decided May 16, 1892.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN.
*514 Mr. Michael Brown (with whom was Mr. J.C. Fitzgerald on the brief) for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Mark Norris (with whom was Mr. Lyman D. Norris on the brief) for defendant in error.
*516 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not disputed that the execution by Edward P. Ferry, in the name of F.H. White & Co., of the notes in suit, was without express authority of his partners, and that neither of the notes was given or used in the business of that firm. The primary question, therefore, is, whether, for the protection of the plaintiff a bona fide purchaser for value, it will be conclusively implied, as matter of law, from the nature or course of the firm's business, that Edward P. Ferry had authority from his partners to make those notes or either of them.
Mr. Justice Clifford, speaking for the court in Kimbro v. Bullitt, 22 How. 256, 268, said that "wherever the business, according to the usual mode of conducting it, imports, in its nature, the necessity of buying and selling, the firm is then properly regarded as a trading partnership, and is invested with all the powers and subject to all the obligations incident to that relation," citing, among other cases, Winship v. Bank of United States, 5 Pet. 529, 561. Mr. Justice Story said that the doctrine that each partner may bind the firm by bills of exchange, promissory notes and other negotiable instruments is generally limited to partnerships in trade and commerce, and does not apply to other partnerships unless it is the common custom or usage of such business to bind the firm by negotiable instruments, or it is necessary for the due transaction thereof. Story on Partnership, § 102, a.
In Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 505, Mr. Justice Matthews, speaking for the court, said: "The liability of one partner, for acts and contracts done and made by his copartners, without his actual knowledge or assent, is a question of agency. If the authority is denied by the actual agreement between the partners, with notice to the party who claims under it, there is *517 no partnership obligation. If the contract of partnership is silent, or the party with whom the dealing has taken place has no notice of its limitations, the authority for each transaction may be implied from the nature of the business according to the ordinary and usual course in which it is carried on by those engaged in it in the locality which is its seat, or as reasonably necessary or fit for its successful prosecution. If it cannot be found in that, it may still be inferred from the actual though exceptional course and conduct of the business of the partnership itself, as personally carried on with the knowledge, actual or presumed, of the partners sought to be charged." Again: "What the nature of that business in each case is, what is necessary and proper to its successful prosecution, what is involved in the usual and ordinary course of its management by those engaged in it, at the place and time where it is carried on, are all questions of fact to be decided by the jury, from a consideration of all the circumstances which, singly or in combination, affect its character or determine its peculiarities, and from them all, giving to each its due weight, it is its province to ascertain and say whether the transaction in question is one which those dealing with the firm had reason to believe was authorized by all its members. The difficulty and duty of drawing the inference suitable to each case from all its circumstances cannot be avoided or supplied by affixing or ascribing to the business some general name, and deducing from that, as a matter of law, the rights of the public and the duties of the partners."
It is very clear that the articles of agreement between Ferry, White and Dowling did not create a partnership, each member of which had, under the settled rules of commercial law, and as between the firm and those dealing with it, authority to give negotiable paper in its name. The firm was of the class denominated in many adjudged cases as non-trading or non-commercial firms, the members of which could not be held, as matter of law, and by reason of the nature of the partnership business, to have authority to execute negotiable instruments in the name of the firm.
We quite agree with the learned judge who presided at the trial, that the liability of a partnership upon negotiable instruments *518 executed by one partner in the name of the firm, exists not only where the firm is a trading or commercial partnership, but "where the actual course of business pursued adopts the practice of issuing the mercantile paper of the firm to accommodate its necessities or convenience whenever the occasions occur." But the difficulty in this case is that the jury were not permitted to determine, from a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, what, in view of the admitted nature of the business of F.H. White & Co., was necessary and proper to its successful operation, what was involved in the usual and ordinary course of its management by those engaged in it, or what should be inferred from the actual course and conduct of the partnership, so far as it was known, or ought reasonably to have been known, to the parties sought to be charged with liability on the notes in suit. We do not deem it necessary to make a detailed statement of the numerous facts disclosed by the evidence, or to suggest what inference might be drawn from them. It is sufficient to say that the issue as to whether the defendants were estopped to dispute the authority of Edward P. Ferry to make the notes in suit, in the name of F.H. White & Co., was one peculiarly for the jury, under all the facts indicating the nature, necessities, and course of business of the firm, and under proper instructions from the court as to the legal principles by which they should be guided in determining the case.
We think the court erred in holding, as matter of law, that the jury were not at liberty, under any view of the facts, to find for the defendants. It seems to us that a verdict in their favor would not have been so palpably against the evidence as to have made it the duty of the court to set it aside and grant a new trial.
The judgment is reversed as to the defendant Dowling, who alone prosecutes this writ of error, with directions to grant him a new trial.