Court Opinion

ID: 9838183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 16:12:09.786479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:10.637528
License: Public Domain

J-A15041-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    JACK DUNCAN AND JEFFREY                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    DUNCAN                                     :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHARTIERS NATURE CONSERVANCY,              :
    INC.                                       :   No. 402 WDA 2022
                                               :
                       Appellant

                 Appeal from the Order Dated March 7, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                           No(s): No. GD-18-1327

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                      FILED: September 5, 2023

       Chartiers Nature Conservancy, Inc. (the Conservancy) appeals from the

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court)

ordering it to file an action in ejectment against Jack Duncan and Jeffrey

Duncan (the Duncans), the plaintiffs in the underlying action to quiet title by

adverse possession.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  The Duncans maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the
Conservancy has appealed from a non-appealable interlocutory order.
However, in Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. King, 344 A.2d 641, 643 (Pa.
Super. 1975), this Court concluded that an order compelling a defendant to
bring an action of ejectment or be forever barred from asserting any right,
lien, title or interest inconsistent is “a final order, as to those proceedings,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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                                               I.

       The Duncans “have been or are the owners of certain property located

in the Borough of Crafton, Allegheny County, designated as Lot 105-H-200”

(the Duncan Property). (Second Amended Complaint, at ¶ 3). On April 1,

2016, the Conservancy obtained a deed from the Artingers for Lot 105-M-202

(hereinafter the Artinger Lot) and it obtained a quit claim deed from PNC bank

for Lot 105-M-198 (hereinafter the PNC Lot) on May 25, 2000. (collectively,

Property).     On January 2, 2020, the Duncans filed a second amended

complaint to quiet title by adverse possession2 of the Artinger Lot and the PNC

Lot.

____________________________________________

from which appeal lies.” Seven Springs Farm, 344 A.2d at 643 n.4.
Moreover, although the order does not expressly rule on the Conservancy’s
preliminary objections, the order was issued as the result of a hearing held on
the allegations contained in them.

2 “Adverse possession is an extraordinary doctrine that permits one to achieve

ownership of another’s real property by operation of law.” Freed v. Guilday,
287 A.3d 880, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 20, 2022) (unpublished
memorandum) (citation omitted). “The doctrine is dependent upon an
individual’s possession of another’s property for an enumerated period of time
authorized by statute.” Id. (citations omitted); see also 68 P.S. §§ 81-88
(governing claims by adverse possession); and 42 Pa.C.S.. § 5530 (setting
forth a 21-year limitations period in actions for the possession of real
property). “Through these statutes, the General Assembly ‘encourages those
who diligently develop and improve the land as against those who are content
to hold the bare legal title inactively. . . . Thus, in Pennsylvania, one who
claims title by adverse possession must prove actual, continuous, exclusive,
visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one
years.” Freed, 287 A.3d 880, at *3 (citing Northern Forests II, Inc. v.
Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, 35 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Baylor v.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The Duncans averred that “[f]or more than 40 years, since 1977 [they]

have been in open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted adverse

possession of [the Artinger and PNC Lots] and have used them exclusively in

their business” “of sorting, shredding, blending and selling soil, gravel and fill

materials as well as storing tools and equipment” to the exclusion of all other

parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11). According to the second amended complaint, the

Conservancy “has not entered onto the properties nor attempted to exclude

or eject the [Duncans] from [the Lots].” (Id. at ¶ 10).

       The second amended complaint averred that the Duncans “are entitled

to a judgment quieting title in them, declaring them as the sole owners of the

[the Property] by adverse possession” “[a]s a result of the [their] continued,

uninterrupted and exclusive use of the premises to work on the sorting,

blending, storing and shredding of soil and gravel into fill material and storing

tools and equipment[.]” (Id. at ¶ 11).

       The Conservancy filed unverified preliminary objections to the second

amended complaint arguing that there was a factual issue about whether the

Duncans are in possession of the Artinger Lot and the PNC Lot and that the

Duncans’ sole remedy is to file an action in ejectment.              (Preliminary

____________________________________________

Soska, 658 A.2d 743, 744-45 (Pa. 1995)) (one internal citation omitted;
reformatted).

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Objections, 1/14/20, at ¶¶ 10-14).3            The court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on the possession issue on October 13, 2021, at which time the parties

admitted evidence and multiple witnesses testified. The Conservancy filed a

post-hearing brief in support of the preliminary objections in which it

maintained that the evidence proved that the disputed the Artinger Lot and

the PNC Lot were unenclosed woodlands and the Duncans did not establish

adverse possession of them. (See Conservancy Brief, 11/16/21, at 9-14) The

Duncans filed a post-hearing brief in opposition to the preliminary objections

arguing that the issue before the court at that stage of the proceedings was

only whether to overrule or sustain the preliminary objections and that, not

only had they sufficiently pleaded an action to quiet title by adverse

possession in the complaint, but the evidence at the hearing also established

____________________________________________

3  In this case, a question of jurisdictional fact was raised in preliminary
objections as to whether the Duncans could maintain a quiet title action
because they were not in possession. Where preliminary objections raise
issues of fact, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “the court shall
consider evidence by depositions or otherwise.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2); see
also Devarmin v. Consol. Rail Corp., 931 A.2d 1, 14 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(“[I]f an issue of fact is raised by preliminary objections ... the [trial] court
may not reach a determination based upon its view of the controverted facts,
but must resolve the dispute by receiving evidence thereon through
interrogatories, depositions or an evidentiary hearing”). Our scope of review
where evidence is taken in resolving preliminary objections is the same as in
reviewing jury trial verdicts which is to determine whether the findings of the
trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in any application of the law. See Stephan v. Waldron
Elec. Heating & Cooling, 100 A.3d 660, 664–65 (Pa. Super. 2014).

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that they were in actual possession of the Artinger Lot and the PNC Lot. (See

Duncans’ Brief, 12/03/21, at 2-8).

      On March 7, 2022, in resolving the preliminary objections’ factual issues,

the court entered an opinion and order that found the Duncans possessed the

Artinger Lot and the PNC Lot because they exercised dominion over the

subject property by erecting gates limiting access to the Property, and ordered

the Conservancy to file an action in ejectment pursuant to Rule 1061(b)(1).

(Order, 3/07/22). (Trial Court Opinion, 3/07/22, at 6).

      On March 22, 2022, the Duncans filed a motion for reconsideration,

arguing that the preliminary objections raised an issue of fact and were not

verified pursuant to the local rule; therefore, they could not supplement or

contradict the facts raised in the complaint.      (See Duncans’ Motion for

Reconsideration, 3/22/22, at ¶ 14). The Duncans noted that the complaint

set forth the elements necessary for an action to quiet title by adverse

possession; namely, that they had actual physical possession for at least 21

years. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 15). Therefore, the only appropriate action by the trial

court was to overrule the preliminary objections and order the Conservancy

to file an answer to the complaint.    (See id. at ¶ 10).    It also noted that

because a claim of adverse possession arises at the expiration of the time

within which the Conservancy could have brought an action in ejectment, i.e.,

21 years, the time for it to file an action in ejectment had expired. (See id.

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at ¶ 16). The Duncans did not request that the Conservancy file an action in

ejectment. (See id. at ¶ 21). The court did not rule on the motion.

      On April 6, 2022, the Conservancy timely appealed the court’s March 7,

2022 order and filed a court-ordered statement of errors complained of on

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      The Conservancy raises three questions for our review challenging the

trial court’s decision: (1) whether the trial court “expressly ignore[d] the legal

definition of ‘possession’ applicable to woodland properties in favor of what

the lower court calls ‘the common understanding’ of the word possession[;]”

(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law

“when it failed to apply the legal presumption that the Conservancy possessed

the properties at issue upon a finding that … possession was ‘less than clear’

or … plaintiffs were in possession of at least a portion of both parcels[;]” and

(3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ignoring photographic

evidence to conclude that the Duncans possess the property through

commercial activity conducted thereon that does not exist on the photographs.

(Conservancy’s Brief, at 3).

      On appeal, the Duncans do not challenge the trial court’s ordering that

the ejectment action be brought even though it did not seek such relief.

Instead, they contend that the trial court’s determination that they had

possession was unnecessary because all that was necessary for the

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Conservancy to have to bring an action in ejectment was that they plead in

their complaint that they exerted dominion over the Property.

                                       II.

      Before addressing the Conservancy’s contentions, we will address the

Duncans’ argument that they made out possession merely by averring those

facts in their complaint.    Our consideration of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure 1061 is necessary. It provides, in relevant part, that a quiet title

action may be brought:

      (1) to compel an adverse party to commence an action of
      ejectment; [or]

      (2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any
      right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity or
      discharge of any document, obligation or deed affecting any right,
      lien, title or interest in land[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1)-(2).

      Rule 1061 unified into a “single procedure all of the diverse procedures

by which clouds on title were formerly tried[,]” but “neither creates a new

action nor changes the substantive rights of the parties or jurisdiction of the

courts.” Siskos v. Britz, 790 A.2d 1000, 1007 (Pa.2002) (citations omitted).

A “plaintiff in an action to quiet title must be in possession of the land in

controversy; if he is not in possession, his sole remedy is an action in

ejectment.”   Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(citation omitted).

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      In Siskos, our Supreme Court addressed that when the determination

is made of whether a plaintiff is in possession is a jurisdictional requirement

necessary to bring quiet title action. In that case, seeking to block defendant’s

access to the private road, plaintiff brought a quiet title action alleging that

she possessed the disputed property and, among other relief, sought to

require the defendants to file an ejectment action or be barred from asserting

any interest in the disputed property. The defendants answered denying that

plaintiff owned the disputed land but did not assert that they had possession

of the disputed property; rather, they asserted that they had title, or

alternatively, adverse possession. See Siskos, 790 A.2d at 1003-04.

      Because plaintiff’s possession was not challenged, the trial court held

that because the disagreement centered on ownership and not possession, it

could decide the matter as part of the quiet title action even though plaintiff

had asked the defendants to file for ejectment. On appeal, we affirmed but

our Supreme Court “granted allocatur to consider whether [we] erred in

concluding that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine who had title to

the disputed property without first ascertaining who had possession of the

land” and reversed. Id. at 1005.

      In holding that it did, our Supreme Court distinguished an ejectment

action from a quiet title action under Rule 1061(b)(1) and (2), as follows:

      Ejectment is an action filed by a plaintiff who does not possess the
      land but has the right to possess it, against a defendant who has
      actual possession. Pursuant to Rule 1061(b)(1), “[a] possessor of
      land is entitled to bring an action against one who, although not

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      in possession, has some claim or interest in the land, compelling
      that person to assert his or her interest by bringing an action of
      ejectment, or be forever barred from attacking the title of the
      possessor.” A party will file a Rule 1061(b)(2) Action to Quiet Title
      when she is not in possession, does not have the right to possess
      the land, and wishes to determine all rights in the land. “The
      purpose of an ejectment action as opposed to quiet title is not to
      determine the relative and respective rights of all potential title
      holders, but rather the immediate rights between plaintiff and
      defendant involved in that particular litigation.”

Id. at 1006 (citations omitted). It then went to hold that in an action to quiet

title, “the existence of possession on the part of the plaintiff at the time of the

institution of the proceeding is an essential jurisdictional fact.” Id. at 1010.

“Thus, if a plaintiff requests relief pursuant to both (b)(1) and (b)(2), a court

cannot properly address the (b)(2) claim without first determining whether,

under (b)(1), a Rule 1061 Action in Ejectment will lie.” Id. at 1008.

      Because possession is a jurisdictional prerequisite for such an action,

where there is a dispute regarding possession in an action to quiet title in

which the plaintiff requests an order to compel an adverse party to bring an

action in ejectment, “the trial court cannot proceed to the merits of the action

without first determining whether the plaintiff is in possession.” Id. at 1007

(citations omitted). Whether a party has possession is dependent upon the

facts of each case and, “actual possession of land” for purposes of determining

whether the plaintiff is out of possession and, thus, may not maintain an action

to quiet title, means “dominion over the property; it is not the equivalent of

occupancy.” Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation

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omitted). If the plaintiff is in possession, then the defendant can be ordered

to file an action in ejectment.

       While that was a long way to go to answer the Duncans’ contention that

as long as possession is pled it satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisite for

possession as set forth above, possession is required to be established after a

hearing where the parties present evidence as to whether the plaintiff is in

possession. Accordingly, the Duncans’ contention that it made out possession

just because it was pled in its complaint is without merit.

       Now to the Conservancy’s issues.

                                           III.

                                               A.

       The Conservancy first contends that the trial court erred in finding that

the Duncans had possession under the common understanding of that term

rather than the more technical definition applicable to “enclosed woodlands.”4

While possession generally requires demonstration of a claimant’s “dominion

over the property,” actual possession of woodlands requires proof that a

claimant actually occupied the land or engaged in some active use of the land.

“Whether property is considered a woodland is a threshold factual question

____________________________________________

4 A “woodland is an area of land that trees and bushy undergrowth cover,
synonymous with a forest.” Williams v. Taylor, 188 A.3d 447, 454 (Pa.
Super. 2018). In adopting the definition, this Court relied on prior cases
involving large tracts of heavily forested land. Gruca v. Clearbrook Cmty.
Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 286 A.3d 1273, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2022).

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for the trial court to decide in the first instance.” Recreation Land Corp. v.

Hartzfeld, 947 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).            The

question here then is where it is alleged that the property is woodlands, is the

trial court required to determine if the property is woodlands and, if so,

whether the standard for determining possession is “dominion” over the

property or “occupancy of the property” and the plaintiff has the requisite

“possession” necessary for jurisdictional purposes to maintain a quiet title

action.

      We agree with the trial court that whether the property is enclosed

woodlands does not go to whether the Duncans had requisite possession for

jurisdictional purposes but rather goes to what is needed to make out a claim

of adverse possession. Whether a person is in possession determines the form

of the action and the relief that can be granted. If a plaintiff is in possession,

a court could not order a defendant ejected from the property, even if the

property was considered woodland; that would result in ordering the

defendant to file an action in ejectment. That is why it is improper for the

trial court to make any finding in the quiet title action other than whether the

plaintiff is possession, a necessary finding to order defendant to file an

ejectment action. See Roberts v. Est. of Pursley, 700 A.2d 475, 481 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1997).    Because whether the property was enclosed woodlands

does not go to whether the Duncans had possession but whether they can

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make out a claim of adverse possession, the trial court did not err in applying

the ordinary definition of possession.

                                         B.

      The Conservancy’s next two issues go to its contention that the trial

court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in finding that

possession had been made out because the legal presumption that the

Conservancy possessed the Property was not overcome where the trial court

found that possession was “‘less than clear or … plaintiffs were in possession

of at least a portion of both parcels[.]” (Trial Ct. Op., 3/07/22, at 6). The

Duncans testified that they have been using the land for soil mining, have

stored equipment on the Property, and have gates that control access to the

Property. (See R. 98-101a, R. 103-104a, R. 119-120a, R. 121-25a, R. 132a,

R. 138-141a, R. 150-151a).

      The Conservancy disputes each of those findings in detail, as well as

making a separate argument that the trial court ignored photographic

evidence that commercial activity on the Property does not exist in the

photographs. At the core of the Conservancy’s argument is that the court

should not have relied on the Duncans’ evidence and that we should reweigh

the evidence in their favor.   What that ignores is that it is within the trial

court’s exclusive purview to accept or reject any evidence. See Voracek v.

Crown Castle USA, Inc., 907 A.2d 1105, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2006). It also

ignores that we cannot reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Stephan, 100

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A.3d at 664-65.      Of course, when the merits of the Duncans’ adverse

possession claim are heard, the trial court is free to make new findings based

on a full hearing that takes place after pleadings are closed and then apply

the applicable adverse possession standard.

      Accordingly, because the trial court found the Duncans established by

competent evidence possession for jurisdictional purposes to maintain a cause

of action, its order is affirmed.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/5/2023

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