Court Opinion

ID: 9655764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:21:13.6612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:21.648010
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). I'cannot agree with the conclusion of Justice Bushnell that there has been •no fraudulent concealment of a cause óf action as contemplated by CL 1948, § 609.20 (Stat Ann.§ 27.-612). The term “cause of action” means more than a *16known injury or a violation of a right. It must also include the identity of the person who is responsible for the injury or the violation. Damage or injury cannot constitute a cause of action except as it results from the wrongful or illegal act of another. A cause of action would be an utterly useless thing if there were no party against whom a remedy could be sought.
“The term ‘cause of action’ is generally understood as meaning the whole cause of action; that is, all the facts which together constitute plaintiff’s right to maintain the action; every fact which it is necessary to establish in order to support the right to judicial relief.” 1CJS, p 986, § 8g.
“The elements of a cause of action are, first, a breach of duty owing by one person to another; and second, a damage resulting to the other from the breach.” Post v. Campau, 42 Mich. 90, 96.
“The cause of action, as it appears in the complaint when properly pleaded, will therefore always be the facts from which the plaintiff’s primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty have arisen, together with the facts which constitute the defendant’s delict or act of wrong.” Pomeroy’s Code Remedies (4th ed), § 347.
“A cause of action implies that there is some person in existence who can bring suit and also a person who can lawfully be sued.” 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Rawle’s 3d Rev), p 436.
A party defendant being an essential component of a cause of action, it follows that the concealment of the existence or identity of such person is a concealment of the cause of action itself.
In the instant case, the record shows that Phil Wood, publisher of the Bangor Advance and defendant herein, joined with the proposed defendants, *17Jack Ely, Willard Kime, and Oscar Getz, in the publication of a full page advertisement in the Bangor Advance of October 25, 1950. The 4 persons named met on more than 1 occasion before the advertisement was published and made arrangements for Wood to prepare the advertisement and for the others to pay for its cost. Together they discussed the matter of keeping their names secret and they were told by Wood that their names would not be made public. While the record is not conclusive as to a promise on the part of Wood to maintain secrecy, the testimony of 2 of the 4 indicates that the matter was discussed. Wood testified, in part:
“Q. Well, during this discussion with them as to whether you would be obligated to give out the names, did you tell them that you would not be obligated to give out their names ?
“A. I told them that I felt I would not.
“Q. In other words, they asked you whether or not you’d have to give out the names ?
“A. My memory of the discussion is somewhat vague because it continued over a period of days, but I believe that. I was the one who originated the thought that the names would not have to be made public.
“Q. And, you so stated to these other 3 men?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Well, did your committee ever hold a meeting anytime ?
“A. Many times.”
He further testified that following the meetings he wrote the advertisement and that it was paid for by the other 3 persons. Following the publication of the advertisement, a representative of the plaintiff union called upon Wood and asked for the names of those persons responsible for its publication. Wood, publisher and owner of the newspaper and the person best informed as to matters concerning the news*18paper, not only refused to identify those responsible for the advertisement, but gave misinformation according to the testimony of a union representative.
“He told me there were approximately 15 people involved; 2 were teachers, 1 was a township supervisor, but he had promised not to reveal the names to anyone, and was going to keep that promise.”
With this record before us, it is apparent that the 4 worked in conjunction to publish the advertisement in the belief that their individual identities as members of the group would be kept secret. It is likewise apparent that Wood, as the only 1 of the group whose identity was known, carried out his part of the plan by refusing to divulge the names of the others until ordered by the court to do so and at the same time made misstatements of fact with the obvious intention of confusing the plaintiffs diligent efforts to discover the identity of the individuals involved.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Wood acted as an agent for the group. Rather it is conclusively established that' the 4 worked for a common purpose and under such circumstances, the concealment of one must be charged to all. Such is the holding in Holman v. Moore, 259 Mich 63. There, Moore, a businessman, was charged with having conspired with an officer of a bank to cheat and defraud the bank. The bank official, by manipulation of the records, concealed the nature of the transaction, but such concealment was charged to Moore as a fraudulent concealment under the statute.
“It was, we think, the purpose of Barker to ’have the entries on the books made in a way to conceal from its other officers and directors the nature of the transaction, and such act on his part was fraudulent concealment thereof, for which, under the circumstances, Moore is chargeable as well as himself.” Holman v. Moore, supra. *19The concealment of a cause of action by the defendants in this case resulted from more than mere silence. The accepted test in Michigan is stated in De Haan v. Winter, 258 Mich 293, 296, as follows:
“Fraudulent concealment means employment of artifice, planned to prevent inquiry or escape investigation, and mislead or hinder acquirement of information disclosing’ a right of action. The acts relied on must be of an affirmative character and fraudulent.”
Defendant Wood, by prearrangement with his associates, not only refused to disclose the identity of those who had cooperated in' the publishing of the advertisement in his paper but, in addition, gave misleading information as to the number of persons involved, their interests and their positions in the community. Such statements could have no other purpose than to confuse and mislead the plaintiff. Concealment was deliberate, planned and affirmative in character and was intended to prevent the plaintiff from discovering those who had committed the alleged wrongful acts.
The record is clear that the defendant Phil Wood and the proposed defendants, Jack Ely, Willard Kime and Oscar Getz, combined to fraudulently conceal an alleged cause of action from the plaintiff and, under such circumstances, plaintiff is entitled to commence an action within a period of 2 years after the identity of those who had committed the alleged •wrong was discovered.
The decision of the circuit judge denying plaintiff’s motion to add parties defendant should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in the circuit court in accordance with this opinion. Costs to await the outcome of the litigation.