Court Opinion

ID: 9946850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 17:01:13.473378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.986460
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 27, 2023             Decided March 1, 2024

                        No. 23-3045

                UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                        APPELLEE

                             v.

                  LARRY RENDALL BROCK,
                       APPELLANT

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                   (No. 1:21-cr-00140-1)

    Charles Burnham argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant.

     Eric Hansford, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief was Chrisellen R. Kolb,
Assistant U.S. Attorney.

   Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and
ROGERS, Senior Circuit Judge.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MILLETT.
                               2
     MILLETT, Circuit Judge: Larry Brock participated in the
violent January 6th riot at the United States Capitol that forced
the evacuation of members of Congress and their staff and
prevented Congress’s certification of the 2020 presidential
election until the next day. After a bench trial, the court
convicted Brock of six crimes, including corruptly obstructing
Congress’s certification of the electoral count under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(2). At sentencing, the district court applied a three-
level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s Section 1512(c)(2)
conviction on the ground that Brock’s conduct resulted in
“substantial interference with the administration of justice[.]”
U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2).

     Brock challenges both the district court’s interpretation of
Section 1512(c)(2)’s elements and the sufficiency of the
evidence to support that conviction. He also challenges the
district court’s application of the three-level sentencing
enhancement for interfering with the “administration of
justice.” Because the law and the record in this case foreclose
Brock’s legal and sufficiency challenges, we affirm Brock’s
Section 1512(c)(2) conviction. As for Brock’s sentence, we
hold that the “administration of justice” enhancement does not
apply to interference with the legislative process of certifying
electoral votes. For that reason, we vacate Brock’s sentence
for his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and remand to the district
court for resentencing.

                               I

                               A

     In early January 2021, Brock traveled from his home in
Texas to Washington, D.C., where he participated in the
January 6th riot at the United States Capitol. In the months
leading up to January 6th, Brock made a series of Facebook
                              3
posts and exchanges regarding what he referred to as the
“stolen” and “fraud[ulent]” 2020 presidential election. J.A.
276, 279, 289. For example, Brock warned that, absent
intervention by the Supreme Court or Congress to overturn the
election, there would be “revolution[,]” “rebel[lion,]”
“[i]nsurrection[,]” “civil war[,]” and “blood.” J.A. 275, 293,
297, 302, 319, 487. In a private Facebook exchange with an
Army special forces veteran, Brock proposed a “[p]lan of
action if Congress fail[ed] to act on 6 January” that included
“[s]eiz[ing]” political leaders, “national media assets[,]” and
“key personnel”; “using [interrogation] measures we used on
Al Qaeda to gain evidence on the coup”; “[e]stablish[ing]
provisional government in rebellious states”; and granting a
“[g]eneral pardon for all crimes up to and including murder
[for] those restoring the Constitution and putting down the
Democratic Insurrection.” J.A. 309−311. Brock also outlined
“[r]ules of engagement[,]” including avoiding killing law
enforcement officers “unless necessary[,]” “[a]ttempt[ing] to
capture Democrats with knowledge of [the] coup[,]” and
“[s]hoot[ing] and destroy[ing] enemy communication nodes
and key personnel.” J.A. 311–312. Throughout these posts
and exchanges, Brock made repeated references to winning the
“IO war,” a reference to the use of information operations “to
shape the battlefield[.]” J.A. 289–290.

     Brock attended then-President Trump’s “Stop the Steal
Rally” on the morning of January 6th, and then marched with
others to the United States Capitol. When he arrived, Brock
ascended the Upper West Terrace and entered the building
through the door to the Senate Wing. He entered the Capitol at
2:24 p.m.—approximately twelve minutes after the Senate
recessed, but five minutes before the House recessed. Once
inside, Brock—wearing a military-style helmet and tactical
vest—headed toward the Senate gallery doors, picking up a
pair of discarded flex-cuffs along the way. As Brock
                                4
approached the Senate gallery, he encountered a group of
rioters interfering with Capitol Police officers’ attempts to lock
the Senate gallery doors, with at least one of the rioters striking
an officer. Brock told the group to “calm down,” adding “that’s
not what we’re here for[.]” J.A. 227–228. Brock briefly
entered the Senate gallery. After exiting, he attempted to open
a set of secured doors marked “U.S. Senate” with an
unidentified set of keys. Brock ultimately reached the Senate
floor, where he spent approximately eight minutes walking
around and looking at paperwork on desks. During this time,
Brock told others not to sit in the Vice President’s chair or to
be disrespectful, explaining that the rioters could not afford to
“lose the IO war.” J.A. 403.

    Brock left the Capitol at 3:02 p.m. On his way out, he
deescalated an altercation between another rioter and Capitol
Police officers and guided the rioter out of the Capitol. In total,
Brock spent approximately 38 minutes inside the building.

                                B

     A federal grand jury indicted Brock on six counts: felony
obstruction of an official proceeding (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2))
(including aiding and abetting liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2);
misdemeanor entering and remaining in a restricted building or
grounds (18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1)); misdemeanor disorderly and
disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds (18
U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2)); misdemeanor entering and remaining on
the floor of Congress (40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(A));
misdemeanor disorderly conduct in a Capitol building (40
U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D)); and misdemeanor parading,
demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol building (40 U.S.C.
§ 5104(e)(2)(G)). Brock waived his right to a jury trial.
                               5
     Following a three-day bench trial, the district court
convicted Brock on all six charges. The district court noted
that there was “little dispute as to what * * * Brock said and
what he did on January 6th,” and that the questions before the
court “[we]re largely questions of [Brock’s] intent and whether
he acted knowingly in certain contexts.” J.A. 451. The district
court then proceeded to conduct an element-by-element
analysis of each count.

     The only count of conviction relevant to this appeal is
Count One, obstruction of an official proceeding under 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). For that offense, the district court found
four elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

     First, the district court found that Brock “attempted to or
did obstruct or impede an official proceeding” because he
“obstructed Congress’ election certification.” J.A. 456. The
district court noted that Brock “was part of the large crowd of
demonstrators who breached the Capitol on January 6th during
the election certification proceedings[,]” and that “this breach
caused Congress to adjourn its session because it was no longer
safe for members of Congress to be in the Capitol.” J.A. 456.
The court noted that the Senate—but not the House—had
recessed before Brock entered the Capitol. The district court
then found that Brock was “part of the greater mob that
breached the Capitol, which caused the proceedings to be
adjourned and not to be continued in the short term[,]” J.A.
456, and that Brock’s presence in the Capitol “continued to
obstruct the proceeding by preventing Congress from
reconvening[,]” J.A. 457.

     Second, the district court found that Brock “acted with the
intent to obstruct or impede the election certification when he
breached the Capitol building.” J.A. 458. In particular, the
district court found that Brock’s “Facebook messages show
                               6
that he intended to obstruct proceedings at the Capitol on
January 6th.” J.A. 458. The district court further found that
“Brock’s choice to outfit himself in tactical gear and a helmet
shows that he expected that events might get violent inside or
outside the Capitol on January 6th[,]” and that “there [wa]s no
evidence in the record that * * * Brock wore this gear to protect
himself from counter-protestors.” J.A. 460. The district court
also found it “implausible that * * * Brock’s intent was simply
to support Congress members in objecting to the election
results[,]” as such a purpose was not consistent with Brock’s
Facebook communications leading up to January 6th or with
his actions in breaching the Capitol, which prevented members
of Congress from objecting to or certifying the electoral votes.
J.A. 460–461. The district court added that “the law permits
the factfinder to infer that a person intends the natural and
probable consequences of their actions[,]” and that it “[wa]s
reasonable that * * * Brock would have expected that
breaching the Capitol during the election certification
proceedings would cause those proceedings to halt[.]” J.A. 461
(formatting modified).

     Third, the district court found that Brock “acted
knowingly”—that is, “with awareness that the natural and
probable effect of his conduct would be to obstruct or impede
the official proceeding.” J.A. 461. Referring back to its intent
analysis, the court ruled that “it [wa]s reasonable to conclude
that * * * Brock was aware that his actions in entering the
Capitol would have the probable effect of obstructing the
election certification that day.” J.A. 461–462.

    Fourth, the district court found that Brock “acted
corruptly.” J.A. 462. The district court explained that
“corruptly” “require[s] a showing of dishonesty, an improper
purpose, or consciousness of wrongdoing.” J.A. 462 (brackets
omitted) (quoting United States v. Puma, 596 F. Supp. 3d 90,
                               7
103 (D.D.C. 2022)). The district court concluded that “Brock’s
Facebook messages support that he knew obstructing the
election certification on January 6th was improper[,]” “he was
prepared to break the law to achieve his goals[,]” and he “knew
that some actions he contemplated were illegal[.]” J.A. 462.
The district court further noted that “Brock’s outfit of tactical
gear tend[ed] to show that he believed violence was a
possibility at the Capitol on January 6th.” J.A. 463. While
finding it “unlikely” that Brock intended to take all of the
actions referenced in his Facebook posts, the district court
found that Brock’s posts offered sufficient evidence “to
indicate that he clearly intended to take very purposeful actions
to interfere with any certification of the election, and even to
take actions that bordered on violent conduct and improper
steps to impede the Congressional action of certification of the
election.” J.A. 463.

     Finally, with respect to a related element of another count,
the district court found that Brock acted “with the intent to
impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of government business
or official functions.” J.A. 470. In support of that finding, the
district court concluded that “Brock could look around and
realize that he was part of a mob[,]” and that “he knew that
Congress was certifying the election that day, a proceeding
which would not be open to the public, and that he was not
allowed on the Senate floor[.]” J.A. 469. The district court
further found that, although Brock was not himself involved in
any altercations, “and in fact the evidence show[ed] that he
tried to calm the protestors[,] he nevertheless continued to walk
through the Capitol with full knowledge that law enforcement
and the protesters were clashing at various points.” J.A. 470.
On that basis, the district court concluded that Brock acted with
“full awareness” that his actions would disrupt the electoral
certification process. J.A. 471.
                                 8
                                 C

     At sentencing, the parties agreed that Section 2J1.2 of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines applied to Brock’s Section
1512(c)(2) conviction.1 Over Brock’s objection, however, the
district court added a three-level enhancement under Section
2J1.2(b)(2) for “substantial interference with the
administration of justice[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2) (2021).2
The district court noted that the application comments to
Section 2J1.2 define “substantial interference with the
administration of justice” to include “the unnecessary
expenditure of substantial government resources.” J.A. 666;
see U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. The court concluded that “only
a general causal tie is necessary between the defendant’s
actions and the unnecessary expenditures by the
government[,]” and so “the government only has to show a
causal line from the [January 6th] mob * * * [to the]
unnecessary expenditure of substantial government resources.”
J.A. 667. The district court then applied the enhancement on
the basis that Brock was both “convicted of obstructing an
official proceeding” and “was part of the mob that caused
substantial damage at the Capitol and large expenditure of
government resources[.]” J.A. 668.

    The district court rejected Brock’s argument that the
phrase “administration of justice” refers only to judicial
proceedings. The district court suggested that it would be
“odd” to interpret “‘administration of justice’ so narrowly as to

1
  Although the sentencing transcript appears in the parties’ sealed
joint appendix, the transcript is publicly available and is not under
seal.
2
  The U.S. Sentencing Commission issued a new Guidelines Manual
in 2023. All citations in this opinion are to the 2021 Guidelines
Manual in effect at the time of Brock’s sentencing.
                               9
be limited to judicial proceedings when all of the statutes
referred to and relevant to this provision of the guidelines go
well beyond that[.]”       J.A. 660.      Agreeing with the
“overwhelming view of the judges in [the district]” regarding
the applicability of Section 2J1.2(b)(2), J.A. 666, the district
court applied a three-level enhancement to Brock’s Section
1512(c)(2) sentence.

     The district court subsequently sentenced Brock to
concurrent terms of imprisonment of twenty-four months for
his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and six to twelve months for
each of his misdemeanor convictions, followed by twenty-four
months of supervised release.

                               II

   The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

     In general, we review questions of law de novo. United
States v. Verrusio, 762 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But in
criminal cases, we review objections raised for the first time on
appeal only for plain error. United States v. Pasha, 797 F.3d
1122, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). We
review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo,
asking whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, “any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Boyd, 803 F.3d 690, 692 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979));
see United States v. Bryant, 117 F.3d 1464, 1467 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (noting that this standard is the same for both jury and
non-jury cases). We also “review de novo [a] district court’s
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines in calculating a
                               10
defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range.” United States v.
Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam).

                               III

     Brock challenges both the district court’s interpretation of
Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus and “corruptly” elements, and
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under
that statute. He separately argues that the district court
improperly applied a three-level enhancement to his Section
1512(c)(2) conviction under Section 2J1.2(b)(2) of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines.

     While the law and the record in this case foreclose Brock’s
legal and sufficiency challenges to his Section 1512(c)(2)
conviction, the district court erred in treating Brock’s
obstruction of the electoral certification process as interfering
with the “administration of justice.”

                                A

                                1

     Brock first challenges the district court’s interpretation of
Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus element. To violate Section
1512(c), a defendant must be found to have either (1)
“alter[ed], destroy[ed], mutilate[d], or conceal[ed] a record,
document, or other object, or attempt[ed] to do so, with the
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in
an official proceeding[,]” or (2) “otherwise obstruct[ed],
influence[d], or impede[d] any official proceeding, or
attempt[ed] to do so[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).

    Brock argues that subsection (c)(2) applies only to
“obstructive acts [that] resulted in ‘evidence impairment[,]’” or
                                11
actions taken “with respect to a document, record, or other
object in order to corruptly obstruct, impede or influence an
official proceeding.” Brock Opening Br. 7 (quotation marks
omitted); see Brock Opening Br. 9–12.

     Circuit precedent says otherwise. This court has already
held that Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to evidence-related
acts. In United States v. Fischer, 64 F.4th 329 (D.C. Cir. 2023),
cert. granted, 2023 WL 8605748 (2023), we held that Section
1512(c)(2) prohibits “all forms of corrupt obstruction of an
official proceeding” that are not already captured by Section
1512(c)(1)’s prohibition against “‘corruptly’ tampering with ‘a
record, document, or other object’ to impair or prevent its use
in an official proceeding[.]” Id. at 336 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(1)); see id. at 336–337; United States v. Robertson,
86 F.4th 355, 374–375 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Under Fischer, then,
Section 1512(c)(2) serves as a “catch-all” provision “that
covers otherwise obstructive behavior that might not constitute
a more specific offense involving documents, records, or
objects under [Section] 1512(c)(1).” Fischer, 64 F.4th at 337
(formatting modified).3

     Fischer binds this panel and forecloses Brock’s proposed
evidence-impairment standard. See New York-New York, LLC
v. NLRB, 676 F.3d 193, 194–195 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“We are of
course bound by our prior panel decision[.]”). Brock himself
acknowledges as much, contending that he “advance[s] the
argument for an alternative definition of actus reus” in order
“to preserve the point for possible Supreme Court or en banc
review[.]” Brock Opening Br. 10–11. Because Brock does not
3
  After oral argument in this case, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Fischer to determine whether Section 1512(c)(2)
prohibits obstructive acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.
See Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572, 2023 WL 8605748 (Dec.
13, 2023) (mem.).
                                 12
contest that the district court applied the interpretation of
Section 1512(c)(2)’s actus reus element set forth in Fischer,
and agrees that Fischer governs our review, see Brock Opening
Br. 8, 10–11, we reject this legal challenge.

                                 2

     Brock next argues that there was insufficient evidence to
show that his conduct resulted in evidence impairment. We
need not decide that question because, as we just explained,
circuit precedent holds that Section 1512(c)(2) encompasses
more conduct than just evidence impairment. Brock cannot
sidestep our precedent by repackaging his argument as a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.        In United States v.
Reynoso, 38 F.4th 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2022), we held that “a
defendant cannot make out a sufficiency challenge as to
offense elements that the government had no requirement to
prove at trial under then-prevailing law.” Id. at 1091. That
holding is equally true as to elements that the law at the time of
appeal does not require the government to prove. See
Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243–244 (2016).
Under Fischer, the government satisfied the actus reus element
by proving that Brock was part of the mob that breached the
Capitol on January 6th and caused Congress to adjourn its
electoral certification proceedings, which the district court
found beyond a reasonable doubt.4

4
   The evidence of record may also satisfy Brock’s evidence-
impairment reading of Section 1512(c)(2). Central to Congress’s
electoral certification process “is the receipt, processing, and
verification of evidence”—that is, “the States’ certificates of the
votes cast for President by their respective electors.” United States
v. Brock, No. 23-3045, 2023 WL 3671002, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 25,
2023) (Millett, J., concurring). Brock’s participation in the January
6th riot caused Congress to adjourn this evidentiary process and
                                  13

                                   B

                                   1

     Brock also argues that the district court applied the
incorrect legal standard for Section 1512(c)(2)’s requirement
that a defendant act “corruptly” because it did not require the
government to prove that Brock acted with an intent to procure
an unlawful benefit for himself or another. See Brock Opening
Br. 13–14.

      Brock forfeited this unlawful-benefit argument by failing
to raise it before the district court. “A criminal defendant who
wishes a court of appeals to consider a claim that a ruling of a
trial court was in error must first make his objection known to
the trial-court judge.” Holguin-Hernandez v. United States,
140 S. Ct. 762, 764 (2020); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b).
That is not an onerous task. “[A]ll a defendant need do to
preserve a claim of error is inform the district court and
opposing counsel of the ruling he wants the court to make and
the ground for so doing.” United States v. Tate, 630 F.3d 194,
197 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (formatting modified); see United States
v. Obuszewski, 334 F. App’x 330, 331 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(applying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) in appeal
following a bench trial).

prevented members of Congress from accessing and reviewing the
certificates. As such, “Brock’s conduct necessarily obstructed the
handling, submission, processing, and congressional consideration
of the evidence of each State’s electoral votes. It did so just as much
as if Brock had grabbed a pile of state certificates and run away with
them.” Id. at *3. “In that way, Brock’s actions ‘impair[ed] the * * *
availability’ of the physical evidence of electoral votes ‘for use in an
official [congressional] proceeding[.]’” Id. (modifications in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1)).
                               14

     Whether Brock acted corruptly as required by Section
1512(c)(2) was a key issue at trial. Yet at no point did Brock
proffer the definition of “corruptly” for which he now
advocates. Quite the opposite, in his closing statement,
Brock’s counsel argued that the statute required Brock “to
know that his conduct was corrupt, meaning wrongful.” J.A.
441; see J.A. 441 (further explaining that Brock “d[id]n’t have
to know he was violating 1512, but he had to have the specific
intent to act in a wrongful way”). That definition of “corruptly”
is consistent with the standard that the district court applied in
denying Brock’s motion for judgment of acquittal. See J.A.
462 (“Courts in this district have construed ‘corruptly’ to
require a showing of dishonesty, an improper purpose, or
consciousness of wrongdoing.”) (brackets omitted) (quoting
Puma, 596 F. Supp. 3d at 103).

     Having himself argued for the same definition that he now
claims was error and having failed to raise before the district
court any objection to the district court’s interpretation of the
element, Brock has, at a minimum, forfeited his argument that
Section 1512(c)(2) requires a showing of unlawful benefit. See
Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 436–437 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).

     If a party does not properly preserve an error for review in
a criminal case, “appellate-court authority to remedy the error
* * * is strictly circumscribed.” Puckett v. United States, 556
U.S. 129, 134 (2009). Errors “not brought to the court’s
attention” are subject to review only if they are “plain[.]” FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52(b).

    Under the “difficult” plain-error standard, this court will
reverse the district court only if that court committed a “clear
or obvious” error that affected a defendant’s substantial rights
                               15
and “seriously affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135
(formatting modified). An error is not “clear or obvious” if it
is “subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. We evaluate the
plainness of an alleged error at the time of appellate review.
See United States v. Long, 997 F.3d 342, 359 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(citing Henderson v. United States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013)).

     Brock’s forfeited unlawful-benefit argument fails at the
first step of plain-error review because the district court’s
definition of “corruptly” did not constitute a “clear or obvious”
error. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Recently, in United States v.
Robertson, 86 F.4th 355 (D.C. Cir. 2023), we held that “there
are multiple ways to prove that a defendant acted
‘corruptly[,]’” id. at 368, including by “establishing that the
defendant acted with a corrupt purpose[,]” id. at 367, or acted
with “consciousness of wrongdoing[,]” id. at 368 (quotation
marks omitted). While we noted in Robertson that proof a
defendant intended to procure a benefit for himself or another
may be sufficient to establish that he acted “corruptly,” we held
that such proof is not necessary to satisfy Section 1512(c)’s
“corruptly” requirement. See id. at 371–374.

     Given Robertson, and the lack of any contrary authority in
this circuit or from the Supreme Court, the district court’s
application of the “corruptly” requirement survives plain-error
review. The district court stated that “corruptly” “require[s] a
showing of dishonesty, an improper purpose, or consciousness
of wrongdoing.” J.A. 462 (brackets omitted) (quoting Puma,
596 F. Supp. 3d at 103). Because each of these showings may
be sufficient to establish that Brock acted “corruptly” under
Section 1512(c), see Robertson, 86 F.4th at 373 n.8
(dishonesty); id. at 367 (corrupt purpose); id. at 369 n.5
(consciousness of wrongdoing), the district court’s
                                16
interpretation was not plainly erroneous, see Puckett, 556 U.S.
at 135.

                                 2

     Brock also raises two sufficiency challenges—one under
his proposed unlawful-benefit standard for “corruptly” and one
under the standard the district court applied. See Brock Br. 14–
18. The unlawful-benefit challenge is not preserved, and
Brock’s repackaging of the same argument as a sufficiency-of-
the-evidence argument fails because the government was not
required to prove at trial (under either then- or now-prevailing
law) that Brock acted to procure an unlawful benefit for himself
or another. See Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243–244.

     As for Brock’s argument that there was not sufficient
evidence to satisfy the district court’s definition of “corruptly,”
the evidence shows otherwise. Specifically, the evidence in
this case and the fact findings by the district court establish that
Brock acted with both an improper purpose and consciousness
of wrongdoing. The evidence showed that Brock participated
in a riot that sought to overturn the 2020 presidential election
by force, and that he was himself prepared to take violent action
to achieve that goal. In his social media communications
leading up to January 6th, Brock warned that there would be
“revolution[,]” “rebel[lion,]” “[i]nsurrection[,]” “civil war[,]”
and “blood[,]” J.A. 275, 293, 297, 319, 487, if the Supreme
Court or Congress did not take action to address the “rigged”
election, J.A. 294. He stated that he “want[ed] to actively
rebel[,]” J.A. 302, encouraged others to prepare their weapons
and body armor, J.A. 300, and proposed a military-like “[p]lan
of action if Congress fail[ed] to act on 6 January[,]” J.A. 309.
That plan included “[s]eiz[ing]” political leaders, “national
media assets[,]” and “key personnel”; “using [interrogation]
measures we used on Al Qaeda to gain evidence on the coup”;
                              17
“[e]stablish[ing] provisional government in rebellious states”;
and granting a “[g]eneral pardon for all crimes up to and
including murder [for] those restoring the Constitution and
putting down the Democratic Insurrection.” J.A. 309−311. He
outlined “[r]ules of engagement[,]” including avoiding killing
law enforcement officers “unless necessary[,]” “[a]ttempt[ing]
to capture Democrats with knowledge of [the] coup[,]” and
“[s]hoot[ing] and destroy[ing] enemy communication nodes
and key personnel.” J.A. 311–312. Brock’s actions on January
6th also confirm that “he expected that events might get
violent[.]” J.A. 460. Specifically, while inside the Capitol,
Brock wore a military-style helmet and tactical vest, and he
picked up and carried a pair of flex-cuffs throughout the
building.

     The evidence further shows that Brock entered without
permission an area that he knew was closed off to the public in
an effort to halt the electoral count. The district court found
that Brock’s social media posts established that “he knew any
attempts to enter the Capitol would require ‘storming’ it, which
would, of course, be illegal.” J.A. 463. To that same point, the
district court found that there was “no question” that Brock
“would have observed the toppled barricades, including snow
fences, bike racks, and the broken police lines that were
protecting the perimeter of the Capitol grounds on January 6th
as he approached the building.” J.A. 465 (discussing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1752(a)(1) count). The district court further found that, once
Brock “reached the Capitol building, he entered through doors
that had been forced open,” that “there were other
demonstrators entering through the broken glass windows on
either side of him as he entered through the door that had also
been broken open[,]” and that police officers were attempting
to prevent entry. J.A. 465–466 (discussing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1752(a)(1) count). Also, once inside, Brock attempted to
open a set of secured doors marked “U.S. Senate” with an
                              18
unidentified set of keys. Finally, the district court determined
that, although Brock was not himself involved in any
altercations, “he nevertheless continued to walk through the
Capitol with full knowledge that law enforcement and the
protesters were clashing at various points.” J.A. 470
(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) count).

     That evidence suffices to show that Brock acted with both
an improper purpose and consciousness of wrongdoing. While
merely attempting to “imped[e]” or “obstruct[]” an official
proceeding does not necessarily “proceed from corrupt
motives[,]” Robertson, 86 F.4th at 368 (quoting United States
v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see id. at 370–
371, such an attempt may be corrupt if it is done with a
“depraved, evil, or wrongful” purpose, id. at 367 (quoting
North, 910 F.2d at 942 (Silberman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). On January 6th, Brock participated in a
riot that sought to overturn the result of the 2020 presidential
election by force. His social media communications leading up
to that day and actions while in the Capitol “indicate that he
clearly intended to take very purposeful actions to interfere
with any certification of the election, and even to take actions
that bordered on violent conduct and improper steps to impede
the Congressional action of certification of the election.” J.A.
463. “Using force to obstruct, influence, or impede a
congressional proceeding is plainly wrongful and therefore
corrupt.” Robertson, 86 F.4th at 370. Where a defendant
announces his intent to use violence to obstruct a congressional
proceeding, comes equipped for violence, and then actually
obstructs that proceeding, the evidence supports a finding that
he acted with an impermissible purpose or knowledge of the
wrongfulness of his actions. That finding suffices to establish
that Brock acted corruptly under Robertson.
                              19
                               C

     Apart from those challenges to his conviction, Brock
argues that the district court improperly applied a three-level
enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines to his Section
1512(c)(2) conviction for “substantial interference with the
administration of justice.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(2); see Brock
Opening Br. 18–21. More specifically, Brock argues that
“substantial interference with the administration of justice” as
used in Section 2J1.2(b)(2) is limited to “judicial type
proceedings” and does not encompass the legislative electoral
certification process he was convicted of obstructing. Brock
Opening Br. 19; see Brock Opening Br. 18–19. The
government responds that “‘administration of justice’ * * *
refers to the proper administration of law by all three branches
of government.”        Gov’t Br. 42; see Gov’t Br. 51
(“[O]bstruction of the Electoral College certification vote on
January 6 falls comfortably within the meaning of
‘administration of justice’ as used in Section 2J1.2 because it
involved Congress’s performance of duties required by law.”).

     Several of our district courts have agreed with the
government’s view. See United States v. Wright, No. 21-cr-
341, 2023 WL 2387816, at *1 (D.D.C. March 4, 2023) (stating
that “the vast majority of judges in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia” have held that “the phrase
‘administration of justice’ in [Section 2J1.2] includes the
Electoral College certification”); id. at *7 (collecting cases).
But see United States v. Seefried, 639 F. Supp. 3d 8, 10 (D.D.C.
2022) (holding that Section 2J1.2 “d[id] not apply because the
electoral certification does not involve the ‘administration of
justice’”).

    With great respect to our district court colleagues’
thoughtfully reasoned efforts to apply this Guideline, we hold
                               20
that, for purposes of Sentencing Guideline 2J1.2, the phrase
“administration of justice” does not encompass Congress’s role
in the electoral certification process. Instead, Section 2J1.2’s
text, context, and commentary show that “administration of
justice” refers to judicial, quasi-judicial, and adjunct
investigative proceedings, but does not extend to the unique
congressional function of certifying electoral college votes.

                               1

    The plain, natural, and ordinary meaning of the phrase
“administration of justice” is the governmental process of
investigating, determining, and enforcing the legal rights of
persons.

     For nearly a quarter of a century, Black’s Law Dictionary
has consistently defined the phrase “administration of justice”
as “[t]he maintenance of right within a political community by
means of the physical force of the state” or “the state’s
application of the sanction of force to the rule of right.”
Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 45 (7th
ed. 1999); Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 47 (8th ed. 2004); Administration of Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 50 (9th ed. 2009); Administration
of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 53 (10th ed. 2014);
Administration of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th
ed. 2019). And it further defines “due administration of
justice” as “[t]he proper functioning and integrity of a court or
other tribunal and the proceedings before it in accordance with
the rights guaranteed to the parties.” Due Administration of
Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019).

   Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “obstructing the
administration of justice” and “interfering with the
administration of justice” as “[t]he skewing of the disposition
                               21
of legal proceedings, as by fabricating or destroying evidence,
witness-tampering, or threatening or intimidating a judge[.]”
Perverting the Course of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1383 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added); see id. (cross-
referencing these phrases). In fact, definitions for “obstructing
justice” and “obstruction of justice” have long focused on the
disruption of judicial and quasi-judicial administrative
processes.      See Obstructing Justice, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1228 (4th ed. 1968) (“Impeding or obstructing
those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or
powers of administering justice therein.”); Obstruction of
Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (7th ed. 1999)
(“Interference with the orderly administration of law and
justice, as by giving false information to or withholding
evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or
intimidating a witness or juror.”); Obstruction of Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (8th ed. 2004) (same);
Obstruction of Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (9th
ed. 2009) (same); Obstruction of Justice, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1246 (10th ed. 2014) (same); Obstruction of
Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2019)
(same); see also Obstruction of Justice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY OF LAW 337 (1996) (defining “obstruction of
justice” as “the crime or act of willfully interfering with the
process of justice and law[,] esp[ecially] by influencing,
threatening, harming, or impeding a witness, potential witness,
juror, or judicial or legal officer or by furnishing false
information in or otherwise impeding an investigation or legal
process”) (emphasis added); Obstructing Justice, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 972 (5th ed. 1979) (“Impeding or
obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have
duties or powers of administering justice therein. The act by
which one or more persons attempt to prevent, or do prevent,
the execution of lawful process. The term applies also to
obstructing the administration of justice in any way—as by
                                22
hindering witnesses from appearing, assaulting process
server[s], influencing jurors, obstructing court orders or
criminal investigations. Any act, conduct, or directing agency
pertaining to pending proceedings, intended to play on human
frailty and to deflect and deter [a] court from performance of
its duty and drive it into compromise with its own unfettered
judgment by placing it, through medium of knowingly false
assertion, in wrong position before public, constitutes an
obstruction to administration of justice.”); Obstructing Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (6th ed. 1990) (same).

     Those definitions show that the “administration of justice”
commonly involves the operations of a judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunal that applies the force of the state to determine
the legal rights of individuals and entities, as well as to related
investigations conducted by government officials.

     The commentary to Section 2J1.2 underscores that
“administration of justice” refers to judicial, quasi-judicial, and
adjunct investigative proceedings that apply the force of the
state to determine or maintain the legal rights of individuals and
entities.    The commentary explains that “‘[s]ubstantial
interference with the administration of justice’ includes a
premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an
indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon
perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the
unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court
resources.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1 (emphasis omitted).
Each of these examples centers the Guideline on judicial,
quasi-judicial, or related investigatory proceedings—
proceedings that apply the force of the state to determine or to
maintain individual legal rights. “And the commentary to the
Guidelines, unless it is inconsistent with the Guidelines’ plain
                               23
text (which no one argues here), is authoritative.” Long, 997
F.3d at 355.

     Other provisions of the Guidelines’ commentary bolster
this interpretation. Section 3C1.1—entitled “Obstructing or
Impeding the Administration of Justice”—applies to
defendants who “willfully obstruct[] or impede[], or attempt[]
to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect
to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the * * *
offense of conviction” when “the obstructive conduct related
to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant
conduct; or (B) a closely related offense[.]” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1
(emphasis added). Every example in the commentary to
Section 3C1.1 involves conduct that obstructs a judicial or
related investigative proceeding. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4. Other uses of the term throughout the Guidelines are
similarly cabined to judicial, quasi-judicial, and investigative
proceedings. See, e.g., id. § 2J1.3 (“Perjury or Subornation of
Perjury; Bribery of Witness”); id. § 2J1.5 (“Failure to Appear
by Material Witness”).

     Courts too have adopted that same natural understanding
of “administration of justice” when applying other legal
provisions. See Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600, 620 (2023)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“‘[A]dministration of justice,’
both historically and currently, refers to court proceedings.”);
id. at 603–607 (majority opinion) (concluding that a provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act regarding crimes
“relating to obstruction of justice” can apply in the absence of
a pending investigation or proceeding, as long as it has “a
connection with” investigative and adjudicatory matters).

     For example, Section 1503 of Title 18 prohibits certain
acts that “influence[], obstruct[], or impede[], or endeavor[] to
influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of
                               24
justice[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). The Supreme Court has held
that, to violate Section 1503, “[t]he action taken by the accused
must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury
proceedings[,]” evidenced by “a relationship in time, causation,
or logic with the judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). “In other words,” the
Supreme Court has explained, “the endeavor must have the
natural and probable effect of interfering with the due
administration of justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In
interpreting this provision, the Fifth Circuit has similarly held
that “obstructing the due administration of justice means
‘interfering with the procedure of a judicial hearing or trial.’”
United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 502–503 (5th Cir.
2012) (quoting United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1336
n.9 (5th Cir. 1978)).         And the Eleventh Circuit has
characterized Section 1503 as “employ[ing] the term ‘due
administration of justice’ to provide a protective cloak over all
judicial proceedings[.]” United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d
1267, 1280 (11th Cir. 1997).

     Similarly, Section 401 of Title 18 empowers federal courts
to punish “[m]isbehavior” of any person in or near the court
that “obstruct[s] the administration of justice[.]” 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(1). Circuit courts interpreting this power have broadly
stated that “obstruction of the administration of justice requires
* * * some act that will interrupt the orderly process of the
administration of justice, or thwart the judicial process.”
United States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 115–116 (4th Cir.
1984); see American Airlines, Inc. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 968
F.2d 523, 532 (5th Cir. 1992) (similar); Vaughn v. City of Flint,
752 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar).

    These statutes are not unique—Congress routinely uses
“administration of justice” in contexts involving courts and
court proceedings. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (prohibiting
                               25
“picket[ing] or parad[ing] in or near a building housing a court
of the United States” “with the intent of interfering with,
obstructing, or impeding the administration of justice”); 22
U.S.C. § 7513(a)(5)(B)(ii) (authorizing the President “to
provide assistance for Afghanistan” to support “improvements
in the capacity and physical infrastructure of the justice system
in Afghanistan, such as for professional training * * * to
improve the administration of justice, for programs to enhance
prosecutorial and judicial capabilities and to protect
participants in judicial cases, for improvements in the
instruction of law enforcement personnel (including human
rights training), and for the promotion of civilian police roles
that support democracy”); 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c)(1)
(empowering the Tax Court to punish “misbehavior of any
person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice”); 28 U.S.C. § 333 (empowering the
chief judge of each circuit to hold judicial conferences “for the
purpose of * * * advising means of improving the
administration of justice within such circuit”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 620(b)(6) (empowering the Federal Judicial Center “to
cooperate with and assist agencies of the Federal Government
and other appropriate organizations in providing information
and advice to further improvement in the administration of
justice in the courts of foreign countries”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 453 (setting forth the judicial oath of office, including the
affirmation that the justice or judge “will administer justice”
fairly and evenhandedly).

                                2

      Congress’s certification of electoral college votes does not
fit the “administration of justice” mold.
                                 26
                                  a

     To start, the congressional certification of electoral votes
must be set in context. Congress’s counting of the electoral
votes on January 6, 2021, was only one discrete step in a
lengthy, multi-stage process that involves state legislatures and
officials, as well as prescribed legislative processes within
Congress.

     The electoral college vote-counting process begins with
the appointment of electors on Election Day. See 3 U.S.C. § 1;
U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2.5 All 50 states and the District of
Columbia appoint electors through a popular-vote process in
which a vote for a party’s presidential candidate in the general
election is a vote to appoint electors supporting that candidate.
See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., 117TH CONG., REP.
ON THE ELECTORAL COUNT ACT OF 1887: PROPOSALS FOR
REFORM 2 & n.7 (2022). “[A]s soon as practicable after the
conclusion of the appointment of the electors,” the governor of
each state must send the Archivist of the United States a
certificate of the electors appointed. 3 U.S.C. § 6.

     The electors of each state meet on “the first Monday after
the second Wednesday in December” to vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President at a location determined by state
law. 3 U.S.C. § 7; see U.S. CONST. Art. II., § 1, cl. 3; U.S.
CONST. Amend. XII. After the electors have voted within their
State, they “make and sign six certificates of all the votes given
by them,” attaching to each certificate a list of the electors
provided to them by the Governor of the State. 3 U.S.C. § 9.
5
  Congress amended the Electoral Count Act in 2022. See
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, 136
Stat. 4459, 5233–5241 (2022). All citations in this opinion are to the
pre-amendment statute in force at the time of the events underlying
Brock’s conviction.
                                27
The electors then seal the certificates and certify that each
certificate contains “all the votes of [the] State” given for
President and Vice President. Id. § 10. The electors send one
certificate to the President of the Senate, two to the secretary of
their respective States, two to the Archivist of the United
States, and one to the judge of the district in which the electors
assembled to give their vote. Id. § 11.

     States may adopt procedures for resolving disputes
regarding the appointment of electors. 3 U.S.C. § 5. Congress
has afforded such procedures deference by treating them as a
“safe harbor” for election disputes: If, prior to election day, a
state passes laws providing for the “final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any
* * * electors[,]” and the process established by those laws
yields a “final determination” of a controversy or contest at
least six days before the national electors meet, that
determination “shall be conclusive” on Congress. Id.

     Once the States’ electoral college votes are submitted, the
Senate and House of Representatives meet to count the
electoral votes in a joint session on January 6th following the
presidential election. 3 U.S.C. § 15. At that meeting, the
President of the Senate opens “all the certificates and papers
purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes” in
alphabetical order by State, and then hands the certificates to
four previously appointed tellers to read them aloud in the
presence of both Houses. Id. The tellers also make a list of the
votes received. Id.

     After each certificate is read, the President of the Senate
“call[s] for objections[.]” 3 U.S.C. § 15. When all objections
to a State’s certificates have been made, the Senate and House
of Representatives must withdraw to their chambers to decide
upon the objections. Id.; see id. § 17; CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
                                28
RL32717, COUNTING ELECTORAL VOTES: AN OVERVIEW OF
PROCEDURES AT THE JOINT SESSION, INCLUDING OBJECTIONS
BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 6–9 (2020).

     Both chambers reconvene “immediately” after they have
voted, and the presiding officer then announces the decision on
the objection(s). 3 U.S.C. § 15. Congress may not proceed to
consideration of the next State’s votes “until the objections
previously made to the votes or papers from any State shall
have been finally disposed of.” Id. Congress does not dissolve
the joint session “until the count of electoral votes [is]
completed and the result declared[.]” Id. § 16.

     Considered in context, Congress’s counting and
certification of electoral votes is but the last step in a lengthy
electoral certification process involving state legislatures and
officials as well as Congress. Taken as a whole, the multi-step
process of certifying electoral college votes—as important to
our democratic system of government as it is—bears little
resemblance to the traditional understanding of the
administration of justice as the judicial or quasi-judicial
investigation or determination of individual rights.

     The certification process, we note, could be said to involve
“[t]he maintenance of right within a political community”
insofar as Congress ensures that the certified votes are
reviewed and counted in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution and by statute. Administration of Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019). But that is only
half the definition of administration of justice. Congress
imposes neither “the physical force of the state” nor “the
sanction of force to the rule of right” in certifying the electoral
votes. Id. To the extent that law enforcement is present, it is
there to protect the lawmakers and their process, not to
investigate individuals’ rights or to enforce Congress’s
                                  29
certification decision. After all, law enforcement is present for
security purposes for a broad variety of governmental
proceedings that do not involve the “administration of
justice”—presidential inaugurations, for example, and the
pardoning of the Thanksgiving Turkey.

     Similarly, while Congress could be conceived of as a
tribunal deciding the validity of electoral votes, it is not acting
in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity to adjudicate the legal
rights of any “parties” before it. Due Administration of Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 54 (11th ed. 2019). To be sure,
Members of Congress consider, review, and act upon evidence
in the form of the state certifications. But, in so doing,
Congress does not adjudicate the right of the President-elect to
be President, or the right of voters to have their elected
candidate declared President. Its role is limited to resolving
disputes regarding the evidence of electoral votes by
congressional vote.6

                                  b

     The government does not contend that Congress’s
certification of electoral college votes fits the normal or
dictionary understanding of “administration of justice.”

6
  In debating the Electoral Count Act as originally enacted, one
legislator explained that Congress would need to “judge” the legality
of electoral votes and considered “[t]he power to judge of the legality
of the votes [to be] a necessary consequent of the power to count.”
18 Cong. Rec. 30 (1886) (statement of Rep. Caldwell). That
legislative history, however, underscores that the power exercised
here is “to count[,]” not to administer justice to parties. Id.
Furthermore, that statement does not speak to the contours or scope
of “administration of justice” as used in the sentencing guidelines,
and the government has offered no argument based on that legislative
history.
                               30
Instead, the government engages in definitional divide and
conquer, dissecting the phrase “administration of justice” and
then invoking the most favorable meaning of each word in
isolation. See Gov’t Br. 42–43.

     The government starts by defining “justice” as including
“‘the fair and proper administration of laws,’” and “obstruction
of justice” as “‘interference with the orderly administration of
law and justice.’” Gov’t Br. 42–43 (brackets omitted) (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1033, 1296 (11th ed. 2019)). The
government then puts those two definitions together to
conclude that “administration of justice” means any and every
“performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties
[by government actors.]” Gov’t Br. 43 (quoting United States
v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977)). There are
multiple problems with that approach.

     To start, the government selectively truncates its
quotations. The full definition of “obstruction of justice” reads:
“Interference with the orderly administration of law and
justice, as by giving false information to or withholding
evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or
intimidating a witness or juror.” Obstruction of Justice,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis
added).      The excluded material contemplates that the
interference in question will occur in the context of an
investigation or adjudicative proceeding. And the government
similarly drops qualifying language from its quotation of
United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977). The full
quote from Partin, which itself was quoting without fully
embracing a jury instruction, reads: “The administration of
justice it should be pointed out means the performance of acts
required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as
a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.” Id.
at 641 (emphasis added). That language suggests a more
                               31
cabined understanding of the term “administration of justice”
than the government urges here.

     By carving language out of context in that manner, the
government effectively rewrites “administration of justice” to
mean “administration of laws.” That reading would vastly
expand the sentencing enhancement beyond the bounds of its
normal textual connotation and interpretive commentary. It
would, for example, make the State of the Union address,
which is required by the Constitution, U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3,
the administration of justice. Likewise, the government’s
reading would sweep within the “administration of justice” the
Social Security Administration’s monthly issuance of Social
Security checks pursuant to statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 402, and
the Postal Service’s receipt and delivery of mail, see 39 U.S.C.
§ 403(a).

     Relatedly, the government’s textual argument fails to read
the relevant language—“administration of justice”—as a
unitary phrase. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRIAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 356
(2012) (“Adhering to the fair meaning of the text * * * does not
limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text.”).
Courts “do not read statutes in little bites.” Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006). That is because “words
together may assume a more particular meaning than those
words in isolation.” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 406
(2011). Here, “justice” “does not stand alone[,]” ZF Auto. US,
Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd., 596 U.S. 619, 628 (2022), and the entire
phrase “administration of justice” connotes more than the sum
of its verbal parts, cf. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. at 406.

     The government admits as much, acknowledging that “the
term ‘administration of justice’ is more commonly used * * *
to refer to ‘interference with the pendency of some sort of
                               32
judicial proceeding.’” Gov’t Br. 43 (quoting In re Kendall, 712
F.3d 814, 828 (3d Cir. 2013)). The government points to
nothing in the text of Section 2J1.2(b)(2) or its commentary
that suggests the Sentencing Commission chose to depart from
that ordinary understanding of “administration of justice” and
broadly sweep in the “administration of laws” by all three
branches of government.

      The government counters that the commentary’s list of
judicial, quasi-judicial, and investigative activities covered by
Section 2J1.2(b)(2) is not exclusive. Gov’t Br. 48, 55–56.
True. But the Commission made the list illustrative by
prefacing it with “includes.” See Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 162 (2012) (introducing a
definition “with the verb ‘includes’ instead of ‘means,’ * * *
makes clear that the examples enumerated in the text are
intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive”); Dong v.
Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
word ‘includes’ normally does not introduce an exhaustive list
but merely sets out examples of some general principle.”)
(quotation marks omitted). Said another way, the illustrative
list illustrates what type of conduct is encompassed by the
definition, and so other unlisted forms of conduct must fit that
same mold. Expanding the phrase “administration of justice”
to capture the administration of all governmental actions
required by law breaks that mold.

                               c

     The government separately points to the list’s concluding
reference to “the unnecessary expenditure of substantial
governmental or court resources.” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.
“‘[G]overnmental’ resources,” the government argues,
“includes congressional resources.” Gov’t Br. 48. That may
well be correct in a generic sense. And congressional resources
                               33
expended on an adjudicatory or quasi-adjudicatory process like
impeachment or contempt proceedings may well fall within
Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s compass (an issue we need not
definitively resolve).       Cf. Contempt, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 313 (7th ed. 1999) (suggesting that contempt of
the legislature “interferes with the administration of justice”).

     But we must read the tail end of the commentary
consistently with the rest of the commentary’s illustrative
references. And those references indicate that the term
“governmental resources” is limited to the expenditure of
investigative, prosecutorial, or judicial resources in relation to
a potential or pending investigation or a judicial or quasi-
judicial proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d
873, 885 (2d Cir. 1997) (applying the Section 2J1.2(b)(2)
enhancement to the sentence of a defendant convicted of
unlawfully abducting his children from the United States
because “th[e] act prevented proper legal proceedings from
occurring by taking matters completely outside the purview of
the administration of justice”).

     Certainly nothing in the commentary’s wrap-up reference
to the expenditure of governmental or court resources suggests
that it was meant to sweep in all unnecessary expenditures of
government resources associated with the routine
administration of laws. A cybercriminal who hacks into the
State Department’s computer system, necessitating the swift
and substantial expenditure of governmental funds to protect
sensitive diplomatic communications, will no doubt have
broken many laws, but that person’s conduct, without more,
cannot be described as interfering with the administration of
justice.
                              34
                               d

     Finally, the government argues that Section 2J1.2’s
context favors a broad reading of “administration of justice” to
cover the administration of all laws. See Gov’t Br. 44–45. The
government notes in particular that “Section 2J1.2 applies to an
array of obstruction statutes, including many that do not
involve the ‘administration of justice’ in the narrow sense[.]”
Gov’t Br. 44 (citing U.S.S.G. Appendix A). But each of the
statutes the government cites includes a broad range of conduct
that sometimes could and sometimes will not include
investigations or judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. See
Gov’t Br. 44–45 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 551 (prohibiting both
concealing or destroying documents relating to imported
merchandise and concealing or destroying such documents
“for the purpose of suppressing any evidence of fraud
therein”); id. § 665(c) (prohibiting obstructing or impeding an
investigation under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity
Act); id. § 1505 (prohibiting obstructing congressional
investigations); id. § 1511 (prohibiting conspiring to obstruct
state criminal law to facilitate illegal gambling); id. § 1516
(prohibiting obstructing a federal auditor); id. § 1519
(prohibiting destroying documents in agency investigations);
26 U.S.C. § 7212 (prohibiting interfering with the
administration of internal revenue laws)). Contrary to the
government’s reading then, see Gov’t Br. 44–45, Section
2J1.2(b)(2)’s three-level sentencing enhancement would apply
to these statutes when the violative conduct implicates the
administration of justice. We hold only that it need not apply
to every form of obstruction under the pertinent statutes.

    That, after all, is the point of a sentencing enhancement.
Section 2J1.2’s base-offense level already covers all offenses
chargeable under the relevant statutes. The whole purpose of
Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s sentencing-enhancement provision then
                                35
is to identify those offenses within the broader Section 2J1.2
class that merit greater punishment than those covered by the
base-offense level because of their particular circumstances or
harm inflicted. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b) (enhancement applies
only to crimes under 2J1.2 having “specific offense
characteristics”) (capitalization modified). What matters under
the Guidelines is that some violations of the covered statutes
could trigger the 2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement, not that every
violation do so.

     Said another way, if we read every conviction punishable
under Section 2J1.2 to necessarily involve “interference with
the administration of justice,” Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s three-level
enhancement would be applicable to all Section 2J1.2 offenses
so long as the resulting interference is “substantial.” But if that
were the Commission’s goal, it could have specified that courts
should apply a three-level enhancement to all convictions
under Section 2J1.2 resulting in serious or substantial harm.
There would have been no reason to further specify that the
enhancement applies only in cases of interference with the
“administration of justice.”

     The government also notes that Part J of Chapter 2 of the
Guidelines is entitled “Offenses Involving the Administration
of Justice.” Gov’t Br. 42. The government, though, does not
develop this point further. It apparently reads the title as
indicating that all offenses to which Part J applies must involve
the administration of justice and reasons that, because Section
2J1.2 applies to convictions under Section 1512(c)(2),
convictions under Section 1512(c)(2) must necessarily involve
the administration of justice.

     That is not how the Sentencing Guidelines work. While
the title of a specific part or guideline may serve as an
interpretive tool, see United States v. Flores, 945 F.3d 687, 728
                               36
(2d Cir. 2019); United States v. Torrealba, 339 F.3d 1238,
1245 (11th Cir. 2003), it cannot stretch a guideline’s reach
beyond its textual bounds.

     Finally, the government objects that “[t]here is no sound
basis for assigning a significantly higher offense level to
someone who violently interferes with a court proceeding than
someone who violently interferes with a congressional
proceeding.” Gov’t Br. 46–47. Maybe. But that is a policy
argument the government can present to the Commission. It is
textually indisputable that the Guidelines confine the Section
2J1.2(b)(2) enhancement to those offenses that interfere with
the “administration of justice,” not the administration of
everything Congress does, or the administration of
government, or the administration of all laws broadly. We
must apply the Guideline as written, and Brock’s interference
with one stage of the electoral college vote-counting process—
while no doubt endangering our democratic processes and
temporarily derailing Congress’s constitutional work—did not
interfere with the “administration of justice.”

                           *   *    *

     Because Section 2J1.2’s text, commentary, and context
establish that the “administration of justice” does not extend to
Congress’s counting and certification of electoral college
votes, the district court erred in applying Section 2J1.2(b)(2)’s
three-level sentencing enhancement to Brock’s Section
1512(c)(2) conviction.

                               IV

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Brock’s conviction
under 18 U.S.C § 1512(c)(2), but we vacate Brock’s sentence
for his Section 1512(c)(2) conviction and remand to the district
                           37
court for resentencing without the application of Section
2J1.2(b)(2)’s sentencing enhancement.

                                              So ordered.