Court Opinion

ID: 9860435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:21:45.143599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:23:02.495712
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARTER, specially concurring: I specially concur with the conclusion reached by the majority that Rosewood, once Mildred was no longer a patient and was discharged, could no longer rely on the surrogates’ direction and decision. Thus, I agree that Rosewood erred in refusing to release Mildred’s records based on the surrogates’ refusal to consent. The Health Care Surrogate Act requires a health care facility, when the patient lacks decisional capacity, to make a reasonable inquiry as to the availability of a health care agent under the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law (755 ILCS 45/4 — 1 et seq. (West 2006)), and, when no agent is authorized or available, the provider must make a reasonable inquiry into the availability of possible surrogates. 755 ILCS 40/25 (West 2006). It also requires the facility to maintain any advance directives proffered by the patient or another authorized person, such as do not resuscitate orders, living wills, or a power of attorney for health care in the patient’s medical records for the duration of the patient’s stay. 755 ILCS 40/15 (West 2006). I agree with the majority’s position that the Surrogate Act ceases to apply once a patient is discharged and that a health care facility, at that point, can no longer rely on the direction of the surrogate. Obviously, there is an omission in the statute providing no statutory direction for requests by a patient who still might be disabled but is no longer receiving care at the facility. I would note that statutes such as this that impose limitations on an individual’s rights are to be strictly construed. See generally In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d 540, 552, 801 N.E.2d 565, 577 (2003). Thus, without a clear indication by statute of the extent of the duration of the appointment of the surrogate for postdischarge matters, I am compelled to find that the surrogates’ authority terminated with Mildred’s discharge. If the legislature desires to extend the authority of the surrogate’s appointment, it must explicitly do so. Thus, I concur with the conclusion of the majority that the facility in this case had to respond and acquiesce to the patient’s request for records without consulting with the surrogates. I also agree that the issue regarding the duration of the surrogates’ authority should be decided and that the standard of review is de novo. JUSTICE SCHMIDT, specially concurring upon denial of rehearing: I concur in the opinion only to the extent that it holds that “once a patient who lacks decisional capacity is no longer under the care of a health care provider, the Surrogate Act ceases to apply and the nominations for health care surrogates are terminated.” 382 Ill. App. 3d at 524. Furthermore, I concur in the judgment. I fear that the statement, “Therefore there was no basis to refuse a patient’s request for records” (382 Ill. App. 3d at 524) is overbroad. While the Surrogate Act would not provide a basis to refuse a patient’s request for records under the circumstances before us, I have no idea whether there was any other basis to refuse the patient’s request for records and, therefore, I do not concur in that language.