Court Opinion

ID: 9520379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:38:26.668238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:08.364669
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I conclude that Dr. Sand’s affidavit fails to establish that he is competent in obstetrics. Thus, the affidavit does not create a genuine issue of material fact necessary to preclude summary judgment in favor of Dr. Minick.
When the non-movant presents expert testimony by way of affidavit, that affidavit must meet the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 56(E). Under T.R. 56(E), affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made upon the personal knowledge of the affiant, must affirmatively show that the affiant is competent to testify as to the matters covered in the affidavit and must set forth facts which would be admissible in evidence. Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass’n, 449 N.E.2d 276, 277 (Ind.1983). The assertion in a summary judgment affidavit of conclusions of law or opinion by one not shown to be qualified to testify to such will not suffice. Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Forister, 438 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). In carrying out the Rule’s requirement that supporting or opposing affidavits present admissible evidence, this court has held that such affidavits should follow substantially the same form as though the affiant were giving testimony in court. Id.
In addition, in order for expert testimony to be admissible, the proponent of such evidence must establish that (1) the subject matter of the expert’s opinion is so distinctly related to a science, profession, or occupation as to be beyond the knowledge of the average lay person; and (2) the witness has the sufficient skill, knowledge or experience to assist the trier of fact in its determination. Ind. Evid. Rule 702(a); See also Stackhouse v. Scanlon, 576 N.E.2d 635, 639 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (plaintiff non-movant must present sufficient foundation for admission of expert opinion), trans. denied.
Here, it was incumbent upon the Joneses as the non-movants to establish Dr. Sand’s competence by way of affidavit. “A witness’ competency is determined by his knowledge of the subject matter generally; his knowledge of the specific subject of inquiry goes to the weight to be accorded his opinion.” Vogler v. Dominguez, 624 N.E.2d 56, 60 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The majority holds that in order to qualify as an expert witness, Dr. Sand need only demonstrate his competence in general family practice. However, Dr. Minick argues, and I agree, that before Dr. Sand can express an opinion on the standard of care for family practitioners who perform obstetric procedures, he must first establish both that he maintains a family practice and that his practice includes obstetrics. See Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind.1992) (to show genuine issue for trial, plaintiff non-movant is required to present expert testimony that establishes “what other reasonable doctors similarly situated would have done under the circumstances.”). In this case, the general subject matter is not family practice, which encompasses a wide range of primary care, but obstetrics, and the specific subject of inquiry is the episiotomy performed by Dr. Minick.
Dr. Sand’s affidavit states that he is licensed to practice medicine in Indiana, that he specializes in family practice and that he currently practices at Parkview Hospital in *502Fort Wayne, Indiana. He also states that he is “familiar with the standard of care of family practice physicians who practice medicine in the Fort Wayne, Indiana area.” That is not enough. While the affidavit establishes Dr. Sand’s competence in family practice, it does not establish his competence in obstetrics. Neither does his affidavit state that he is familiar with the standard of care for those family practitioners who also practice obstetrics. In their brief, the Joneses assert that Dr. Sand performs obstetric procedures as part of his family practice. However, Dr. Sand does not make that representation in his affidavit, and no such representation was before the trial court when it made its ruling. Thus, the affidavit fails to demonstrate that Dr. Sand is “similarly situated” to Dr. Miniek. See Id.
Still, the Joneses argue that the trial court could reasonably infer that a family practice physician’s training and education includes obstetrics and, thus, that Dr. Sand would be familiar with such procedures. I cannot agree. We cannot assume that all family practitioners maintain an obstetrics practice. While the affidavit may support an assumption, it does not support the inference that Dr. Sand’s family practice qualifies him to testify concerning the standard of care for obstetric procedures. There is a material difference between an assumption and an inference, and an assumption cannot salvage the affidavit. Accordingly, Dr. Sand’s affidavit fails to establish that he is competent to render an expert opinion on the medical procedure at issue. The trial court acted properly in disregarding the affidavit. Thus, I would affirm the trial court.