Court Opinion

ID: 9732952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:46:07.827528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.639250
License: Public Domain

John Mauzy Pittman, Judge, dissenting. I join in Chief Judge Stroud’s dissent. I write only to point out one additional problem with the majority opinion. The majority appears to rely heavily upon the idea that the car belonged to appellant’s passenger; the majority opinion states the proposition as fact more than once. In concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that appellant constructively possessed the methamphetamine found under the seat of a car that appellant was driving, the majority emphasizes that “appellant was in Darlene Ables’s car, and [other] methamphetamine was found on her person and not on appellant.” However, the only evidence that the car belonged to Ms. Abies is found in appellant’s own testimony. This case is unquestionably governed by the substantial evidence standard of review. That standard includes as an integral part the rule that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, in this case the State. Among other things, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State means that we consider only that evidence that tends to support the verdict and that we do not weigh it against evidence favorable to the appellant. Branstetter v. State, 346 Ark. 62, 57 S.W.3d 105 (2001); Smith v. State, 337 Ark. 239, 988 S.W.2d 492 (1999); Key v. State, 325 Ark. 73, 923 S.W.2d 865 (1996). Nor do we pass on the credibility of the witnesses; that duty is left to the trier of fact. Ford v. State, 75 Ark. App. 126, 55 S.W.3d 315 (2001); Hickson v. State, 50 Ark. App. 185, 901 S.W.2d 868 (1995). The trier of fact is not required to believe any witness’s testimony, especially that of the accused since he is the person most interested in the outcome of the trial. Ross v. State, 300 Ark. 369, 779 S.W.2d 161 (1989); Hickson v. State, supra. By accepting appellant’s testimony regarding ownership of the car as true, the majority has failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and has misapplied this court’s standard of review.1    For the reasons stated in Judge Stroud’s dissent, my opinion that appellant’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence would not change even were I to assume that the car belonged to Ms. Abies. However, to the extent that the majority relies upon such ownership for its decision to reverse, that reliance is misplaced.