Court Opinion

ID: 9901849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 17:04:27.83389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.069101
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                No. 125,224

                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                            STATE OF KANSAS,
                                                Appellee,

                                                      v.

                                          GARET LEON DINKEL,
                                              Appellant.

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appeal from Ellis District Court; GLENN R. BRAUN, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed November 22, 2023. Affirmed.

          Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.

          Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., MALONE and PICKERING, JJ.

          PICKERING, J.: After the State charged Garet Leon Dinkel with driving under the
influence (DUI), Dinkel filed a pretrial motion to suppress his blood alcohol test results
and secure a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed.
2d 667 (1978). The district court denied Dinkel's motion to suppress and his motion for a
Franks hearing. Following a bench trial on stipulated facts, Dinkel was convicted of a
DUI. Dinkel now appeals, claiming the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion
to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. Finding no error by the district court, we
affirm.

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                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On August 18, 2019, around 12:22 a.m., Ellis County Sheriff's Deputy Andrew
Powers observed a white GMC Sierra in a ditch during "a severe thunderstorm with
torrential rain fall." As he approached the truck, he saw it try to "shift in and out of
reverse multiple times," but the truck remained stuck. Powers approached the truck's
driver, Dinkel, who told the deputy that his truck was stuck and he was attempting to get
out of the ditch. Powers detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Dinkel
and observed that Dinkel had bloodshot and watery eyes. At the scene, Powers arrested
Dinkel for DUI and took him to the police station.

       Once at the police station, Dinkel failed to answer whether he would consent to a
breath alcohol test. Instead, Dinkel repeatedly asked for the probable cause that justified
his arrest. Determining that Dinkel was refusing to consent to the breath alcohol test, the
deputy applied for a blood draw search warrant.

       In preparing the affidavit and application for the search warrant, the deputy
indicated that he had observed Dinkel operating or attempting to operate a vehicle and
that Dinkel admitted to operating or attempting to operate a vehicle. The deputy also
observed that Dinkel had an odor of alcohol; had bloodshot, watery, or glazed eyes; had
slurred speech; was swaying or unsteady or had balance problems; repeated questions or
comments; and had difficulty following the deputy's directions. Dinkel also appeared to
have constricted pupils. The deputy left the section regarding field sobriety tests blank.
The box to suggest Dinkel refused to perform the tests was also not checked. The boxes
indicating Dinkel refused to submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT) and refused an
evidentiary breath test were checked.

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       Once the search warrant was issued, law enforcement had a blood draw performed
on Dinkel. The blood test results indicated that Dinkel's blood alcohol content (BAC) was
0.26—over three times the legal limit.

       The State charged Dinkel with DUI, third offense. In pretrial motions, Dinkel filed
a motion and an amended motion to suppress the blood alcohol testing results and a
motion for a Franks hearing. The affidavit in support of the Franks hearing alleged that
the arresting officer "failed to include the information that the defendant did not refuse
field sobriety testing, but testing was unable to be completed due to the thunderstorm and
muddy conditions." It also alleged that Dinkel did not refuse to submit to a PBT.

       In May 2021, the district court held a hearing on the filed motions. The parties
agreed that the court should first determine if the warrant, without the alleged problems,
contained probable cause. The district court noted that the warrant itself made it clear that
no field sobriety tests were given. The district court found that there was no omission or
intentional misrepresentation due to the lack of an explanation on why no field sobriety
tests were performed. The district court then found sufficient facts existed to issue a
warrant even if Dinkel did not refuse the PBT. It denied the motion for a full Franks
hearing and denied Dinkel's amended motion to suppress.

       The parties then entered into a stipulation of facts and a waiver of jury trial. The
district court found Dinkel guilty of DUI, third offense. The court sentenced Dinkel to an
underlying jail term of 12 months but granted Dinkel probation for 12 months after
serving 48 hours in jail and 90 days on house arrest.

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                                         ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Dinkel argues that based upon his allegations that the affidavit omitted
relevant evidence and included false evidence, the district court was required, at a
minimum, to conduct a Franks hearing before ruling on his motion to suppress.

       In this type of case, the basis for our decision arises from the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV.
To secure that right, the Fourth Amendment requires warrants based on probable cause be
presented under oath to a judicial officer. Any warrant must describe, with particularity,
the places to be searched and the objects to be seized. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S.
326, 330, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001). Probable cause to search exists where
the known facts warrant a person of reasonable prudence in the belief that evidence of a
crime will be found. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 911 (1996).

       Because a search warrant requires an evidentiary foundation, law enforcement
officers may not rely on conclusory assertions or opinions unmoored from specific
factual representations. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 527 (1983) ("An affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause, and . . . wholly conclusory statement[s] . . .
[fail] to meet this requirement."). Judges should not consider allegations lacking factual
support in measuring probable cause to issue a search warrant. State v. Hicks, 282 Kan.
599, 615-16, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006).

       In most cases, the facts within the affidavit may not be disputed by the party
against whom the warrant is directed. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. In Franks, the United
States Supreme Court addressed a defendant's right to challenge the veracity of a search

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warrant and found such challenge could be made. The Franks Court noted that appellate
courts generally presume the validity of an affidavit in support of a search warrant.
Consequently, to prevail on a challenge to a warrant under the principles articulated in
Franks, a criminal defendant must prove law enforcement authorities employed
deliberate falsehoods or a reckless disregard for the truth to obtain the warrant. 438 U.S.
at 171; State v. Francis, 282 Kan. 120, 128-29, 145 P.3d 48 (2006).

       Our Supreme Court considered the parameters for holding a Franks hearing in
State v. Adams, 294 Kan. 171, Syl. ¶¶ 1-4, 273 P.3d 718 (2012). In Adams, the court
explained that the trial court does not automatically hold a Franks hearing. Rather, a
defendant who challenges the reliability of a search warrant's accompanying affidavit
may be entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he or she submits a sworn affidavit that "(1)
contains statements that are material to the issuance of the search warrant because the
statements were necessary to find probable cause and (2) the material statements (a) were
a deliberate falsehood, (b) were made in reckless disregard for the truth, or (c)
deliberately omitted a material fact." Adams, 294 Kan. at 179. In other words, to mandate
a hearing under Franks, a defendant must show that the affidavit submitted in support of
search warrant was unreliable.

       Under this process, should the defendant satisfy the prima facie showing of the
affidavit's lack of veracity, the trial court must remove the questionable portion of the
affidavit and determine whether the remaining affidavit contains sufficient evidence of
probable cause. If, however, the court finds probable cause despite the removal of the
statements, the trial court does not need to hold an evidentiary hearing under Franks. If
the trial court does not find probable cause without the excised portion of the affidavit,
the trial court should hold a Franks evidentiary hearing. Adams, 294 Kan. 171, Syl. ¶¶ 2-
3. As noted by the Adams court, at the evidentiary hearing, the defendant would be
allowed to prove that the affidavit included deliberately omitted material facts and that

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the affiant "deliberately made a false statement, or made a statement with reckless
disregard for the truth." 294 Kan. at 179.

       The standard of review for issues challenging the denial of a Franks hearing "is
the same as any case in which we review a trial court's determination regarding whether
undisputed facts establish probable cause for a search warrant." Adams, 294 Kan. at 180.
When analyzing a district court's ruling on whether an affidavit in support of an
application for search warrant is sufficient, our task "'is to ensure that the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed. . . . [T]he
standard translates to whether the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the
magistrate's determination that there is a fair probability that evidence will be found in
the place to be searched.'" 294 Kan. at 180.

       Here, in the affidavit attached to his motion for Franks hearing, Dinkel alleged
that field sobriety testing was not offered because of the muddy conditions and the deputy
should have included that fact in his affidavit for search warrant. Dinkel also alleged that
the deputy recklessly indicated that Dinkel refused a PBT. On appeal, Dinkel claims that
making these two allegations was enough to require the district court to conduct an
evidentiary Franks hearing to determine whether a Franks violation occurred.

       Yet as the State points out, Adams unquestionably refutes his argument. A hearing
is not required if "the remaining portions of the affidavit provide sufficient evidence of
probable cause." 294 Kan. at 179. As noted earlier: "'Probable cause is the reasonable
belief that a specific crime has been committed and that the defendant committed the
crime.'" State v. Regelman, 309 Kan. 52, 61, 430 P.3d 946 (2018). Because the warrant
contained sufficient evidence of probable cause without the extracted statements, no
Franks hearing was required.

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       Additionally, the evidence available to the deputy to support Dinkel's intoxication
was like that found to be sufficient in State v. Fullmer, No. 123,540, 2022 WL 4112688
(Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion). In that case, Fullmer claimed an officer lacked
probable cause for a search warrant because he included results of the horizontal gaze
nystagmus (HGN) test in the affidavit. The panel determined: "The validity of a warrant
is not determined by nit-picking discrete portions of the application. Rather, the totality
of the circumstances controls. That is, whether the issuing judge had a 'substantial basis'
for determining probable cause existed." 2022 WL 4112688, at *3. Even when removing
the contested HGN results from consideration, the Fullmer panel found probable cause to
believe Fullmer was driving under the influence. Specifically, the panel pointed to the
following facts:

       "Fullmer exhibited impaired driving, exuded a strong odor of alcohol, presented with
       bloodshot, watery eyes, labored under delayed motor skills, confused his vehicle
       registration for his insurance, admitted to drinking that evening, failed several
       [standardized field sobriety tests], and provided a preliminary breath sample that showed
       his BAC was .198." 2022 WL 4112688, at *4.

See also City of Dodge City v. Norton, 262 Kan. 199, 205, 936 P.2d 1356 (1997) (finding
probable cause of intoxication when defendant created disturbance, weaved in his lane,
nearly struck construction barrels, told officer he planned to drink that evening, had
bloodshot eyes, and had alcohol on his breath); State v. Johnson, 43 Kan. App. 2d 815,
823-24, 233 P.3d 290 (2010) (finding probable cause of intoxication when defendant
approached DUI checkpoint erratically, smelled like alcohol, admitted to drinking, had
bloodshot and watery eyes, and failed two standardized field sobriety tests); Campbell v.
Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 25 Kan. App. 2d 430, 431-32, 962 P.2d 1150 (1998) (finding
probable cause of intoxication when defendant was speeding at 1:10 a.m., smelled like
liquor, admitted to drinking, and had glazed and bloodshot eyes).

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       In this case, the district court specifically found that Dinkel had an odor of alcohol
and was slow to respond to the officer's questions. Dinkel was also swaying, unsteady,
and had balance problems. His eyes appeared glazed, bloodshot, and watery. He also
repeated questions and comments, slurred his speech, and struggled to get out of his
vehicle. Finally, he had difficulty following Powers' directions. Even after excising the
portions of the affidavit that Dinkel alleges were problematic, the evidence was more
than enough to afford the deputy the requisite probable cause to believe Dinkel operated
his vehicle while under the influence.

       The district court properly denied Dinkel's motion to suppress and his request for a
Franks hearing.

       Affirmed.

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