Court Opinion

ID: 9519147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:10:25.049162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:49.785491
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing which, in addition to re-arguing points considered by the court in its original opinion, urged this court to consider the case of Illinois Bell Telephone v. Allphin (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737. It is suggested that we should follow Allphin and apply the “fundamental fairness” doctrine which we noted — by way of a footnote — in Head-On Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk (1st Dist. 1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 263, 267, 343 N.E.2d 534; and our decision in Saxon-Western Corp. v. Mahin (1st Dist. 1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 100, 349 N.E.2d 591. In summary plaintiff suggests it is grossly inequitable and unfair in resolving this appeal to apply the decision of Clarendon Associates v. Korzen (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299, as that case was not decided until after the trial court had ruled on the instant case. I. At the outset it is to be noted that the Allphin opinion was filed by our supreme court on March 24, 1975. Plaintiff filed its brief in this court on June 17, 1975. Oral argument was held on December 2,1975. At no time prior to the petition for rehearing did plaintiff note or suggest the applicability of Allphin. Parties cannot in a petition for rehearing raise points or arguments which could have been raised on or before oral argument of the appeal. See Arkley v. Niblack (1916), 272 Ill. 356, 363, 112 N.E. 67; Sobina v. Busby (1st Dist. 1965), 62 Ill. App. 2d 1, 25, 26, 210 N.E.2d 769. Notwithstanding the procedural deficiency, we prefer to analyze the merits of plaintiff’s argument. Allphin involved a declaratory judgment action by the telephone company concerning whether certain of its revenues were exempt from the Messages Tax Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 467.1 et seq.) A question arose as to whether the telephone company should have exhausted its remedies under the Administrative Review Act1 — a 20-day protest period — rather than seek declaratory and equitable relief. Concluding that the telephone company, in seeking relief by court action instead, had relied on Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin (1943), 385 Ill. 245, 52 N.E.2d 177, which preceded the 1945 adoption of the Administrative Review Act and its opinion in Calderwood Corp. v. Mahin (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 216, 311 N.E.2d 691, the supreme court held that fundamental fairness dictated that the telephone company was entitled to have the case decided on the basis of Owens. In Allphin, Owens, Calderwood, Head-on Collision, and Saxon-Western, the courts were dealing with either a message tax, retailer’s occupation tax, or a private car line tax, together with the question of whether the taxpayer should exhaust its administrative remedy from a final ruling by the Department of Revenue or proceed directly to court. On the other hand, as set forth in our opinion, the instant case involves a challenge to the 1971 real estate assessment and the statutory procedure for protesting such an assessment. Likewise, the following cases cited in our opinion as the authority for our conclusion deal with the propriety of real estate assessments: Clarendon; La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252; Hoyne Savings & Loan Association v. Hare (1974), 60 Ill. 2d 84, 322 N.E .2d 833; North Pier Terminal Co. v. Tully (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 540, 343 N.E.2d 507. We think there is a difference between the issue of the availability of equitable relief where a plaintiff seeks such relief from an adverse final tax determination of an administrative agency without complying with the condition precedent of exhausting his internal administrative remedies before resorting to the statutory legal remedy of judicial administrative review provided by the Administrative Review Act in administrative agency proceedings to which that Act is applicable (as illustrated by Allphin), and the issue of the availability of equitable relief where a plaintiff seeks such relief from an adverse final tax or assessment determination by an executive agency despite the fact that a statute provides a legal remedy for protesting the said determination (as illustrated by Clarendon). It is to be noted that plaintiff here has cited no cases of the latter type in which its theory of “fundamental fairness” has been applied. On the contrary, it was the very fact that the majority in Clarendon refused to apply that theory which compelled the minority to dissent (a refusal in which our supreme court thereafter persisted in both La Salle and Hoyne). In Clarendon, the taxpayer, relying on earlier supreme court decisions, proceeded to seek injunctive relief. The supreme court unanimously held that the taxpayer should have pursued its statutory relief under sections 194 and 235 of the Revenue Act of 1939; however, two justices held it was unfair to penalize the taxpayer for proceeding as it did, relying on prior language of the supreme court. But neither in Clarendon nor in any of the cases cited above which have followed it, has the supreme court indicated any relief for those who fail to follow the long existing statutory basis for protesting real property assessments. Plaintiff points out that Clarendon was not decided until October 1, 1973, whereas it filed its complaint on April 3, 1972 and the decree and judgment appealed from was entered on March 2, 1973. As it is noted above, the taxpayers in Clarendon were faced with the same problem, as were the taxpayers in La Salle and Hoyne in which the trial court rendered its judgment prior to the pronouncement of Clarendon. As stated in our original opinion, plaintiff failed to carry out the trial court’s order to pay the first installment of the property taxes due June 1, 1972. The “predicament” that it now complains of was in fact brought about by the course of action elected by the plaintiff. Plaintiff also suggests it “finds it impossible to reconcile the instant decision” with our decision in Stevens v. Protectoseal Co. (1st Dist. 1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 724, 327 N.E.2d 427. In Stevens we pointed out that the 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished the distinction between the courts of law and equity so that our State’s circuit courts have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters. Stevens involved an employment agreement dispute between employee and employer. No question was involved concerning failure of one party to follow well-established statutory procedures to seek relief as involved in the instant case. There is no deviation from our holding in Stevens; in fact the language of that case is equally applicable to the instant case. We adhere to our original opinion that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. II. Plaintiff asserts that the cause should be remanded to the trial court to consider Counts II and III of the amended complaint. In Count II plaintiff alleged a lack of uniformity in the assessments of its property with respect to other property of a comparative nature and use in the County, and that its property received a higher assessed valuation than other classes of property, e.g., certain residential properties. In Count III the plaintiff alleged that the board of appeals erroneously approved the assessments. The trial court did not rule on either of these two counts. All of these contentions in Counts II and III could have been raised by the plaintiff if it had pursued the statutory procedure for challenging assessments. In view of our holding that equitable relief was not appropriate, it would be improper to remand the cause to the trial court. Plaintiff having failed to follow the procedure set forth in sections 194 and 235 of the Revenue Act of 1939,2 there is no basis upon which the circuit court of Cook County — either in law or equity — at this time could timely consider the allegations in Counts II and III. Therefore a remand would be inappropriate. III. Keeping in mind that by holding equitable relief was inappropriate and statutory relief the proper remedy, it is not necessary in this opinion to respond to each of plaintiff’s contentions which allege certain technical errors in the 1971 assessments. We have reviewed each of the other points raised by plaintiff in its petition for rehearing and find that these merely re-argue points already decided or under our holding are not appropriate. For these reasons we adhere to our original opinion and deny the petition for rehearing. Petition for rehearing denied. STAMOS, P. J., and HAYES, J., concur.   Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, eh. 110, par. 264 et seq.    Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 120, pars. 675, 716.