Court Opinion

ID: 9668105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:02:37.304026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:42.882490
License: Public Domain

M. E. Dodge, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion holds that the right to appointed counsel in parental rights proceedings in probate court does not arise until the final dispositional hearing. I respectfully dissent because I believe that adjudicative and statutory review hearings are hearings which may involve the termination of parental rights for which counsel must be appointed under JCR 1969, 6, and the due process clause, Const 1963, art 1, § 17.
JCR 1969, 8.2(C) requires the probate court to advise the parents of their right to counsel "as provided by rulo 6” at the outset of the adjudicative hearing. JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b) governs the appointment of counsel for parents in parental rights termination proceedings. Under this rule, counsel shall be appointed on the court’s own motion to represent indigent parents at "hearings which may involve termination of their rights * * JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b) also allows the court, upon request, to appoint counsel to represent indigent parents at other hearings conducted under provisions of the juvenile code or the Juvenile Court Rules. See In the Matter of Jones, 137 Mich App 152, 158; 357 NW2d 840 (1984).
The adjudicative hearing is the first and necessary step in termination proceedings.1 In the adjudicative phase, the probate court determines *618whether the child comes within the court’s jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b). JCR 1969, 8.1(A). If the court determines that it has jurisdiction, the court proceeds, often immediately as in the present case, with the dispositional phase. Thus, the adjudicative hearing — the step which begins termination proceedings and is necessary for the court to formally take jurisdiction — may lead to the temporary termination of the parents’ custody and placement of the child outside of the home.
The adjudicative hearing has been deemed such an important step in the termination process that trial by jury is provided for at this hearing. JCR 1969, 8.1(A). This strongly supports the conclusion that parents are entitled to appointed counsel at the adjudicative hearing. To read JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b) as not requiring appointed counsel at the adjudicative hearing would render the right to a jury trial at the adjudicative hearing meaningless for the great majority of parents facing termination of their rights. I can only conclude that in drafting JCR 1969, 8.1(A), providing the right to a jury trial for the hearing at which the probate court may formally take jurisdiction over a parent’s child, the Supreme Court considered the adjudicative hearing a hearing "which may involve termination of [parental] rights”. JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b).
In Reist v Bay Circuit Judge, 396 Mich 326, 346; 241 NW2d 55 (1976), three justices agreed that the requirement of JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b), that counsel be appointed for indigent parents "at hearings which may involve termination”, is constitutionally based "[b]ecause of the nature of parental rights termination proceedings and of the basic, fundamental nature of the parental relationship of our society * * In discussing the due process *619requirement that counsel be provided to indigent parents, Justice Levin’s opinion states the following concerns:
"The state is the moving force in neglect and termination proceedings. That this is a confrontation between the state and an individual is '[a] circumstance of great importance in determining a standard of fairness’. Danforth v State of Health & Welfare, [303 A2d 794, 798 (Me, 1973)].
"Parents most often involved in neglect and termination proceedings are usually the least equipped, in terms of intellectual and emotional resources, to respond in such proceedings. 'The indigent are frequently the least able to cope with government in its official functions. See Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 Cal L Rev 694 (1966). The case at bar was routine for the welfare workers and other juvenile court staff. For the indigent mother, however, the entire proceedings were incomprehensible.’ State v Jamison, 251 Or 114, 116-117; 444 P2d 15, 17 (1968).
"Studies indicate that termination of parental rights occurs less frequently when parents are represented by counsel. 'In a neglect proceeding the full panoply of the traditional weapons of the state are marshalled against the defendant parents. * * * The crucial issues in a neglect proceeding may be difficult to grasp and consequently difficult to refute for an uneducated and unsophisticated layman.’ Danforth v State Dep’t of Health & Welfare, supra, p 799.” 396 Mich 345 (footnotes omitted).
In Reist, the Court did not distinguish between the various phases of the hearing process leading up to the termination of parental rights, i.e., adjudicative, dispositional, or statutory review hearings, because the opinion dealt with the appointment of appellate counsel. In In the Matter of Kenneth Jackson, Jr, 115 Mich App 40; 320 NW2d 285 (1982), however, this Court stated that the due process right to appointed counsel attached at statutory review hearings:
*620"Appellant notes that the decision whether or not to file for termination of parental rights is often made at these statutory rehearings. Statutory rehearings are in fact a necessary step in termination proceedings where a child is within the temporary custody of the court and placed outside the home. In this sense, statutory rehearings fall within the meaning of a 'hearing which may involve the termination of [parental] rights’. Following the Reist rationale the due process requirement of right to counsel, therefore, should attach to such a hearing.” 115 Mich App 49-50.
While I am cognizant of the majority’s concerns with dicta and the doctrine of stare decisis, I believe that the cases relied on by respondents accurately state the law as it should be interpreted. That is, the due process clause and JCR 1969, 8.2(C) and 6.3(A)(2)(b) required the probate court to appoint counsel on its own motion to represent respondents at the adjudicative and statutory review hearings.2
Petitioner claims, however, that respondents waived their right to counsel by not requesting counsel at the adjudicative hearing. Respondents must be considered "children” under JCR 1969, 1.4(1) and MCL 712A.2; MSA 27.3178(598.2). JCR 1969, 6.2, which governs waiver of counsel, provides:
"A child may voluntarily and understandingly waive the right to counsel. If the parent, guardian, or custodian is the complainant or petitioner, the guardian ad litem must concur in the waiver; if not, a parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem must concur."
*621The requirements of JCR 1969, 6.2 were not met in the present case. JCR 1969, 6.2 requires the concurrence of a parent or guardian ad litem in any waiver of the right to counsel. This Court has not been provided with any record evidence that respondents’ parents concurred in the waiver or that guardians ad litem were appointed on their behalf.3 JCR 1969, 6.2 also requires a voluntary and understanding waiver.4 The absence of a request for counsel is not a voluntary and understanding waiver of the right to counsel. Under JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b), the probate court was required to appoint counsel on its own motion and respondents did not waive this right by not requesting counsel at the adjudicative hearing.
I also conclude that failure to appoint counsel for respondents was not harmless error.5 Respondents were both minors. DeShawn was removed from their custody before he was released from the hospital. It is readily apparent that termination was the goal from the day of the child’s birth when respondents were urged to put the child up for adoption. The petition seeking temporary wardship stated that the action could lead to termination of parental rights at some time in the future *622and each review summary stated that termination of parental rights was considered an appropriate plan. Yet, the record shows that respondents’ interests were never adequately safeguarded. Despite the fact that respondents were not accompanied by a parent at the time of the adjudicative hearing, neither a guardian ad litem nor counsel was appointed for respondents. Thus, respondents relied on the social workers, petitioner’s agents, for advice. As respondents point out, this placed the social workers in the difficult position of attempting to work with respondents while also being an integral part of the process and machinery whereby parental rights were terminated. The testimony of Barbara Eagle, one of the social workers assigned to DeShawn’s case, shows that respondent-mother did not understand the proceedings and had to rely on Ms. Eagle’s explanation of how DeShawn had been made a temporary ward of the court well into the termination process. Had respondents been appointed counsel, whose role was solely to protect respondents’ interests, they may not have shown a lack of understanding and participation during the termination process.
Moreover, probate courts consider all hearings conducted pursuant to MCL 712 A. 12; MSA 27.3178(598.12) (the initial hearing for a determination of neglect), MCL 712A.19; MSA 27.3178(598.19) (statutory review hearings), and MCL 712A. 19a; MSA 27.3178(598.19a) (termination proceedings) as a single continuous proceeding. In the Matter of LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973). The critical point in the present case is that evidence admitted at one hearing is to be considered evidence in all subsequent hearings. LaFlure, supra. Both respondents in the present *623case point to various inaccuracies between the petitions, reports, and testimony at the final dispositional hearing. Since all of the circumstances subsequent to the filing of the petition are considered by the probate court, I cannot conclude that respondents were not harmed by failure to appoint an attorney at the adjudicative and statutory review hearings.
I would reverse the probate court’s order terminating respondents’ parental rights and remand for further proceedings prior to which respondents would be provided with appointed counsel, pursuant to JCR 1969, 6.3(A)(2)(b), if determined financially unable to employ counsel.

 The preliminary hearing is normally the first hearing in a termination case. JCR 1969, 4.2. In the present case, since the child had not already been taken into custody, JCR 1969, 4.2 did not mandate that a preliminary hearing be held. See In the Matter of Kantola, 139 Mich App 23, 25-26; 361 NW2d 20 (1984).

 I note that the proposed rule, MCR 5.915, provides that "the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the respondent at all hearings conducted pursuant to these rules other than a hearing under MCR 5.973(C) [review hearings]”. (Emphasis added.) While the proposed rule is consistent with my position in that it clearly requires the appointment of counsel at the adjudicative hearing, it does not require appointed counsel for review hearings.

 See JCR 1969, 5.

 Although a verbatim transcript is not required for preliminary hearings, In the Matter of Bennett, 135 Mich App 559, 564-565; 355 NW2d 277 (1984), lv den 419 Mich 940 (1984), an adjudicative hearing is a hearing on the formal calendar which must be recorded under JCR 1969, 8.4, now MCR 5.908(D). In the present case, a tape recording of the adjudicative hearing was made in compliance with JCR 1969, 8.4. Neither the recording nor the form on which the probate court referee indicated that respondents had not requested an attorney is part of the record supplied to this Court. However, since the probate judge reviewed the recording and read pertinent portions of both the recording and the court file into the record supplied to this Court, I believe the record is sufficient for this Court’s review.

 Nor do I believe that respondents waived their claim of error. The issue of failure to appoint counsel was raised by respondents’ counsel at the first opportunity before the probate court after their appointment. Compare Jones, supra, p 155.