Court Opinion

ID: 9572971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:46:21.663652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:51.738334
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
Initially I would like to point out that the majority’s application of the law of quasi contract is inappropriate. "A quasi contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for reasons of justice, without any expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of dissent. If this is true, it would be better not to use the word 'contract’ at all. Contracts are formed by expressions of assent; quasi contracts quite otherwise. The legal *229relations between contractors are dependent upon the interpretation of their expressions of assent; in quasi contract the relations of the parties are not dependent on such interpretation.” 1 Corbin on Contracts 44,46, § 19. In the case at bar, the conduct of the parties clearly demands the conclusion that they intended to form a contract, and thus the law of quasi contract does not come into play. In fact, a quotation from the majority opinion itself demonstrates that the instant relationship is the antithesis of quasi contract: "All parties appear to agree that an additional compensation plan offered by an employer and impliedly accepted by an employee, by remaining in employment, constitutes a contract between them . . .” Corbin offers the following illustrations as proper applications of quasi contract law: "Mistakenly believing that he owns Blackacre, A pays the taxes and makes permanent improvements thereon, without the knowledge or assent of the real owner B. When B is requested to reimburse A, he positively refuses. Nevertheless, the law will in some such cases make it B’s duty to reimburse A. B’s obligation is called quasi contract.
"B finds or steals A’s money and refuses restitution; he is under a quasi contractual duty to make such restitution.
"Under compulsion of law, or in order to protect his own interest in property, A makes payment of money that it was B’s legal duty to pay. In spite of any express refusal, B is under a quasi contractual duty to reimburse A.
"A finds B’s house afire and his cattle starving and renders service and incurs expense in saving and feeding them. In some states, B is under a quasi contractual duty of reimbursement.” Id., pp. 47-48. However, my disagreement with the majority’s use of quasi contract principles does not form the basis of my dissent, as both the majority and I believe that the appellant employer was obligated to pay appellee under its "Voluntary Compensation Plan.” Rather, the crux of this dissent is my belief that there remains no issue of fact concerning the adequacy of notice to appellee and, under the rules governing contractual construction, appellant is indebted to appellee as a matter of law under the terms of the *230voluntary compensation plan as set out in the booklet it distributed to its employees.
The section of appellant’s booklet entitled "Voluntary Compensation Plan” is explicit and without qualification: "Hercules pays to an employe absent from work because of an injury sustained in the course of employment, the difference between his normal wages and the amount of compensation provided by the Georgia Workmen’s Compensation Law. This plan becomes effective as soon as a person accepts employment with the company. The entire cost of this plan is paid by the company.
"Payments under this Plan will begin immediately to employes who have suffered a tabulable industrial injury. Payments to employes who have suffered a non-tabulable industrial injury will begin after a two day waiting period.
"Employees receiving payments under this Plan must cooperate fully with the Company in following the advice and directions of the Company Physician.” As the majority indicates, the voluntary compensation program is only one of several benefit programs set out in "Part III” of the booklet. The introduction to part three, four pages removed from appellant’s above description of its voluntary compensation plan, states in part: "These . . . Benefit Plans are presented here in a very brief form . . . You may obtain the full details of all Benefit Plans from your Foreman, Supervisor or the Personnel Department.” In my view that introduction does not suffice to notify employees that the voluntary compensation plan actually provided by appellant is completely different from what appellant’s booklet represents it to be.
It is significant that descriptions of other benefit plans in part three are themselves specifically qualified. For instance, appellant’s description of its "Group Hospital-Surgical Plan” contains the language: "Complete details of the Plan are available in the Personnel Office.” The summary of the "Group Life Insurance Plan” says: "Booklets describing the complete Plan are available from the Personnel Office.” Appellant’s characterization of its "Pension Plan” includes the language: "A booklet describing the entire *231Pension Plan is available upon request in the Personnel Office.” Finally, appellant’s description of its "Savings Plan,” found on the page just preceding the voluntary compensation plan, says: "When you approach eligibility [for the plan], the Office Manager will explain this Plan to you in detail.” No such language accompanies appellant’s description of its voluntary compensation plan.
"If the construction [of a contract] is doubtful, that which goes most strongly against the party executing the instrument, or undertaking the obligation, is generally to be preferred.” Code § 20-704 (5). The description of the voluntary compensation plan contained in appellant’s brochure is clear and unambiguous, and, even if the introduction to part three along with the foreword to the entire booklet (thirty-eight pages removed from the voluntary compensation plan) can be said to create any doubt as to the actual nature of the plan, that doubt cannot work in appellant’s favor. "[Defendant [employer] is bound by the terms of the Plan as embodied in the booklet it provided plaintiff [employee]. Although defendant is permitted to furnish its employees with a summary of its Plan, . . . such summary should not be misleading. Any discrepancy which exists between the Plan and its summary must be construed against its draftsman and in favor of plaintiff employee.” Gould v. Continental Coffee Co., 304 FSupp. 1, 3 (S.D. NY 1969).
It is undisputed that appellee had no actual notice of the existence of a master plan contradicting appellant’s brochure summary of its voluntary compensation program, and the vague, far removed, introductory statements as a matter of law did not suffice to place appellee on notice of such a plan. Appellant should not be permitted to make an unequivocal promise inducing a person into its employ and then to renege when it comes time to comply. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Deen and Presiding Judge McMurray join in this dissent.