Court Opinion

ID: 9823973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 10:20:00.352284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:28.781739
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.
Appellee’s “Motion for Rehearing and Motion for Certification to the Florida Supreme Court of this Court’s Opinion dated June 9, 2016,” dated June 24, 2016, is DENIED. Appellee’s “Motion for Rehearing En Banc of this Court’s Opinion dated June 9, 2016,” dated June 24, 2016, is DENIED.
B.L. THOMAS and LEWIS, JJ., concur; MAKAR, J., dissenting.
MAKAR, J., dissenting.
Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., asks that we certify conflict with the uniformly favorable decisions it has obtained in Third and Fourth District cases on the same issue presented in this case.1 Doing so would relieve the company from having to convince the Florida Supreme Court that “express and direct” conflict jurisdiction exists; certification results in per se jurisdiction. State v. Vickery, 961 So.2d 309, 312 (Fla.2007) (“The difference is that a certification of conflict provides us with jurisdiction per se.”). It is a small ask because the majority explicitly rejects the Third District’s decision in Garcia, which began the unbroken string of district courts (save for ours) that have upheld the clear language of section 702.06, Florida Statutes. The drum beat has gone on. The Fifth District recently held that the “plain language” of section 702.06 permitted the company to pursue the “deficiency judgment in a separate action, as opposed to reopening the original foreclosure proceeding[J” Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Rojas, 197 So.3d 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); indeed, in two recent cases it held that the “plain language” of the statute is “unambiguous” in allowing the company to bring a separate suit to recover a deficiency judgment, both certifying conflict with the decision in *169this case. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Hendrick, 200 So.3d 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Beckett, 200 So.3d 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016). And the Second District recently characterized section 702.06 as allowing the “filing of the statutorily permitted independent action to pursue the deficiency” at issue in that case, Aluia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., — So.3d —, 2016 WL 3766717, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1660 (Fla. 2d DCA July 15, 2016), and even more recently certified conflict with this case, finding the “plain language” of the statute that allows pursuit of an independent deficiency action. Gdovin v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 198 So.3d 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Indeed, even our court has allowed an independently filed complaint for a deficiency judgment under section 702.06 to proceed. See Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Huthsing, 181 So.3d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). Because all other districts are aligned against us, certifying conflict is appropriate; alternatively, we should grant the company’s motion to review this case en banc and alleviate the need for supreme court review altogether.

. See Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Weinberg, 190 So.3d 137, 138-39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing an order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction based on '‘unambiguous" and “plain language of the statute”); Garcia v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 178 So.3d 433, 436 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“When the clear and unambiguous language of a statute commands one result, as here, ... we must apply the statute so as to give effect to legislative intent.”); see also Cheng v. Dyck-O’Neal, Inc., 199 So.3d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (following holdings in Garcia and Weinberg). The Fourth recently certified the existing conflict with this case in Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. Stavola, 198 So.3d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), and Dyck-O’Neal, Inc. v. McKenna, 198 So.3d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).