Court Opinion

ID: 9960364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 23:17:44.745797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:24.183544
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  April 15, 2024
                                                                                  C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re M.B.-1, M.B.-2, M.B.-3, D.B., E.B., and I.B.

No. 23-153 (Wirt County CC-53-2020-JA-5, CC-53-2020-JA-6, CC-53-2020-JA-7, CC-53-2020-
JA-8, CC-53-2020-JA-9, and CC-53-2020-JA-10)

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

        Petitioner Mother M.B.-41 appeals the Circuit Court of Wirt County’s February 13, 2023,
order terminating her parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to M.B.-1, M.B.-2, M.B.-3, D.B.,
E.B., and I.B.,2 arguing that the court erred in denying her a post-adjudicatory improvement period,
terminating her parental rights when the conditions of abuse and neglect were correctable, and
denying her post-termination visitation. Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is
unnecessary and that a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate.
See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        In October 2020, the DHS filed a petition alleging that petitioner and the father abused and
neglected the children by subjecting them to uninhabitable conditions in the home and by failing
to protect them from sexual abuse. According to the petition, the home was covered in trash, feces,
roaches, mold, bedbugs, and fleas. Several children stated that they wanted to leave the home and
would frequently sleep at a neighbor’s home “because of being bitten by bugs at their home.”

       1
        Petitioner appears by counsel Keith White. The West Virginia Department of Human
Services appears by counsel Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Deputy Attorney General
Steven R. Compton. Counsel Michael D. Farnsworth Jr. appears as the children’s guardian ad
litem.

       Additionally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 5F-2-1a, the agency formerly known as
the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources was terminated. It is now three
separate agencies—the Department of Health Facilities, the Department of Health, and the
Department of Human Services. See W. Va. Code § 5F-1-2. For purposes of abuse and neglect
appeals, the agency is now the Department of Human Services (“DHS”).
       2
        We use initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See
W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e). Further, because several children and petitioner share the same initials,
we use numbers to differentiate them.

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Further, another child in the home, K.B.,3 reported to the DHS that petitioner’s father “sexually
molested [her] for over a year.” Finally, the petition noted that the parents had a history with Child
Protective Services in Arizona. The DHS later amended the petition to allege that the father
physically abused the children through inappropriate discipline.

        After a series of continuances, the court held an adjudicatory hearing in October 2021,
during which petitioner stipulated that she exposed the children to inappropriate individuals,
thereby seriously endangering their health and wellbeing, and that the father used inappropriate
discipline. Based on petitioner’s stipulation, the court found that she abused and neglected the
children.

        The court then held a series of dispositional hearings, during which it heard from multiple
witnesses. Relevant to the resolution of this appeal, the court heard testimony during a February
2022 hearing from a psychologist who evaluated the parents. According to the psychologist, the
parents admitted that “there have been multiple instances of sexual abuse by multiple
perpetrators.” The psychologist testified that the prognosis for petitioner to attain minimally
adequate parenting was “poor,” based, in part, on petitioner’s minimization of the children’s sexual
abuse. In regard to the father’s physical abuse of the children, the psychologist indicated that
petitioner claimed there had been no abuse in the home by either parent. Finally, when questioned
about whether petitioner’s participation in services would impact her opinion on petitioner’s ability
to parent, the psychologist stated that petitioner had “not demonstrated sustained behavioral
change and sustained improvement in [her] supervisory tactics and [her] parenting style over long
periods of time.” During that hearing, the court also heard testimony from two visitation
supervisors. According to one visitation supervisor, the children eventually refused to attend visits
with petitioner. The other visitation supervisor testified that the children did not have a bond with
petitioner, and she stated that several of the children “didn’t really seem like they cared to see [her]
or not.” Based on the evidence, the court ultimately found that there was no reasonable likelihood
that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future,
especially since she “did not take the sexual abuse seriously,” and that termination of her rights
was necessary for the children’s welfare. Accordingly, the court terminated petitioner’s parental,
custodial, and guardianship rights to the children.4 It is from the dispositional order that petitioner
appeals.

         On appeal from a final order in an abuse and neglect proceeding, this Court reviews the
circuit court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, In re
Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Before this Court, petitioner first argues that the
circuit court erred in denying her a post-adjudicatory improvement period. However, petitioner
fails to include citation to the record to demonstrate that she filed a written motion to this effect.
As we have explained, “[a] circuit court may not grant a post-adjudicatory improvement period

       3
         K.B. reached the age of majority during the proceedings and was dismissed prior to
disposition. As such, K.B. is not at issue in this appeal.
       4
        The father’s parental rights were also terminated. The permanency plan for the children is
adoption.

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under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2) (eff. 2015) unless the respondent to the abuse and neglect
petition files a written motion requesting the improvement period.” Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. P.G.-1
v. Wilson, 247 W. Va. 235, 878 S.E.2d 730 (2021). Because petitioner has failed to comply with
the applicable Rules of Appellate Procedure, she is entitled to no relief. See W. Va. R. App. P.
10(c)(7) (requiring that briefs “must contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on
appeal, including citations that pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were
presented to the lower tribunal” and permitting this Court to “disregard errors that are not
adequately supported by specific references to the record on appeal”).

        Next, petitioner argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because she
could have corrected the conditions of abuse and neglect. In support, petitioner cites to various
evidence to argue that she addressed the physical conditions in the home, moved to a larger
residence, and participated in parenting and adult life skills. However, petitioner ignores the fact
that the psychologist who evaluated her indicated that petitioner minimized the children’s sexual
abuse and affirmatively denied that any abuse occurred in the home. As we have explained, such
failure to acknowledge renders conditions of abuse and neglect untreatable. See In re Timber M.,
231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (“Failure to acknowledge the existence of the
problem, i.e., the truth of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect . . . results
in making the problem untreatable . . . .” (citation omitted)). Regardless of the evidence upon
which petitioner relies, her refusal to acknowledge the physical abuse to which she previously
stipulated and her minimization of permitting multiple individuals to perpetrate sexual abuse on
the children constitute a situation in which there is no reasonable likelihood she could correct these
conditions. Further, the court correctly found that the children’s welfare required termination,
based on their need for, among other things, continuity of care and caretakers and the older
children’s wishes. Accordingly, we find no error in the termination of petitioner’s parental,
custodial, and guardianship rights to the children. See W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (permitting
circuit court to terminate parental, custodial, and guardianship rights upon finding no reasonable
likelihood that conditions of abuse and neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future and
when necessary for child’s welfare); see also Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712
S.E.2d 55 (2011) (permitting termination of parental, custodial, and guardianship rights “without
the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable
likelihood . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected” (citation omitted)).

         Finally, petitioner argues that the court erred in denying her post-termination visitation
with the children. As we have explained, when considering whether post-termination visitation is
appropriate, “the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has been established
between parent and child.” Syl. Pt. 11, in part, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147
(2002) (citation omitted). While petitioner argues that she had a close bond with the children,
visitation supervisors testified to the contrary, indicating that no bond existed and many of the
children displayed disinterest in visiting petitioner. In denying post-termination visitation, the
court clearly weighed the credibility of the witnesses, and we decline to disturb this determination.
See Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201 W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997) (“A reviewing
court cannot assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is uniquely situated to
make such determinations and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such
determinations.”). Accordingly, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief.

                                                    3
       For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its
February 13, 2023, order is hereby affirmed.

                                                                                      Affirmed.

ISSUED: April 15, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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