Court Opinion

ID: 9960831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 14:05:23.292288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:55.001989
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT

            HCA HEALTH SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC. d/b/a
                   ST. LUCIE MEDICAL CENTER,
                            Appellant,

                                       v.

                          JO ANN BERLIN, M.D.,
                                Appellee.

                              No. 4D2022-2652

                               [April 17, 2024]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Robert E. Belanger, Judge; L.T. Case No. 2018CA002142.

   Walter J. Tache, Magda C. Rodriguez, and Stefano Battistoni of Tache,
Bronis and Descalzo, P.A., Miami, for appellant.

  Richard H. Levenstein and Terry E. Resk of Nason, Yeager, Gerson,
Harris & Fumero, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

ARTAU, J.

   This is an appeal from a final judgment denying statutory trial and
appellate attorneys’ fees to HCA Health Services of Florida, Inc. d/b/a St.
Lucie Medical Center (“HCA”). In the order on review, the trial court
determined that, despite HCA’s prevailing party status in both the trial
court and a prior appeal, the delay in scheduling the hearing on the
amount of fees to be awarded deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to
award any fees to HCA. We disagree and reverse.

                                 Background

   Jo Ann Berlin, M.D. (“Berlin”) sued HCA. The trial court dismissed the
action with prejudice. HCA timely sought statutory attorneys’ fees from
Berlin in the trial court within thirty days of entry of the order of dismissal.
We later affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action. We also
conditionally granted HCA’s motion for appellate attorneys’ fees subject to
the trial court determining the amount of fees to be awarded for the appeal.
   On remand, HCA sought to have the trial court consider in a combined
hearing its claims to both trial and appellate level attorneys’ fees.
Thereafter, the parties jointly moved to bifurcate the trial court’s fee
entitlement determination from the issue of the reasonableness of the
amount of fees to be awarded. The trial court granted this joint request
for bifurcation and ordered the parties to schedule a fee entitlement
hearing within a set number of days. The trial court also ordered that, in
the event entitlement was determined in HCA’s favor, “the [p]arties will
have 90 days thereafter to conduct any discovery and set an evidentiary
hearing to determine the amount of the award.” The trial court later
granted the parties’ joint motion seeking an extension of time within which
to conduct the fee entitlement hearing, indicating that “[a]ll remaining
deadlines” in the bifurcation order “remain in full force and effect.”

   The trial court ultimately conducted a hearing and determined the
issue of fee entitlement in HCA’s favor. Over a year later, HCA set for
hearing the issue of the amount of trial and appellate attorneys’ fees to be
awarded.

   At the hearing, the trial court questioned its jurisdiction to consider the
issue because HCA had failed to set the hearing for that purpose “within
90 days” after the determination of fee entitlement as required by the prior
bifurcation order. Relying on this court’s opinions in Mihalyi v. LaSalle
Bank, N.A., 162 So. 3d 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), and McAskill Publications,
Inc. v. Keno Brothers Jewelers, Inc., 647 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994),
the trial court determined that “the jurisdiction of the court is not never-
ending” and HCA’s “unreasonable tardiness” in setting the hearing on the
amount of fees to be awarded deprived it of jurisdiction to award any trial
or appellate attorneys’ fees. The trial court therefore denied all attorneys’
fees requested by HCA, including the appellate attorneys’ fees which we
had conditionally granted.

                                  Analysis

    “Generally, a trial court’s ruling on a motion for attorney[s’] fees is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Laux v. Laux, 266 So. 3d 217, 218 (Fla.
4th DCA 2019). However, a trial court ruling with respect to either
jurisdiction, or the proper interpretation of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure, is reviewed de novo. See AmerUs Life Ins. Co. v. Lait, 2 So. 3d
203, 205 (Fla. 2009) (explaining that “the interpretation of the [supreme]
[c]ourt’s rules” are “question[s] of law subject to de novo review”); Giuffre
v. Edwards, 226 So. 3d 1034, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (concluding that
“a trial court’s determination on jurisdiction is reviewed de novo”).

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   Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, which became effective in 2001,
provides:

      Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys’ fees, or
      both shall serve a motion no later than 30 days after filing of
      the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service
      of a notice of voluntary dismissal, which judgment or notice
      concludes the action as to that party.

Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525 (emphasis added); see also Saia Motor Freight Line,
Inc. v. Reid, 930 So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 2006) (noting the January 1, 2001,
effective date of rule 1.525).

   Rule 1.525 “established a bright-line time requirement for motions for
costs and attorney[s’] fees which the Rules of Civil Procedure had not
previously contained.” Saia, 930 So. 2d at 600. As explained by our sister
court in Diaz v. Bowen, 832 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), rule 1.525
“establish[ed] a bright-line rule to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the
timing of these posttrial motions[.]” Id. at 201; see also AmerUs, 2 So. 3d
at 205 (“As the committee notes to rule 1.525 state, the new rule ‘[was]
intended to establish a time requirement to serve motions for costs and
attorneys’ fees.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525 note)).

    Here, the trial court concluded that it lost jurisdiction to determine the
amount of trial and appellate level attorneys’ fees to award HCA, given
HCA’s “unreasonable” delay in setting for hearing the matter of the amount
of fees to be awarded.

    However, rule 1.525’s only jurisdictional time limit is the thirty-day
time frame for filing a motion seeking fees or costs. Rule 1.525 imposes
no jurisdictional time limit for the scheduling of a hearing on the matter
of the amount to be awarded after a motion seeking fees or costs has been
timely filed. The trial court therefore erroneously determined that it lost
jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees to be awarded to HCA.

   The trial court’s reliance on Mihalyi and McAskill as support for the
denial of all fees to HCA on jurisdictional grounds was misplaced.

   McAskill predates rule 1.525’s promulgation. Accordingly, McAskill
has no bearing on the trial court’s ability to award fees in this case
pursuant to rule 1.525. See AmerUs, 2 So. 3d at 205 (noting that, “[p]rior
to the adoption of rule 1.525, the general rule was that a party seeking
attorneys’ fees and costs had to file a motion within a ‘reasonable time’
after entry of a judgment” (citing Stockman v. Downs, 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla.

                                        3
1991))).

   While Mihalyi postdates rule 1.525’s promulgation, we do not read
Mihalyi’s citation to McAskill as standing for the proposition that despite a
timely filed motion for attorneys’ fees or costs, proof as to the amount of
such fees or costs must be presented within a reasonable time after
judgment for the trial court to have continuing jurisdiction to award them.

   In Mihalyi, a prevailing defendant appealed the denial of her motion for
attorneys’ fees filed a week after the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed the
action. 162 So. 3d at 114 (noting timing of defendant’s fee motion). We
reversed, concluding the record revealed the defendant’s entitlement “to
prevailing party attorneys’ fees and to an evidentiary hearing on the
reasonableness of the amount of fees” given that the defendant’s motion
for attorneys’ fees was filed “within thirty days of the service of [the]
voluntary dismissal, in compliance with [rule] 1.525.” Id. at 115.

   Thus, Mihalyi recognized that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction
to determine a fee award if, as rule 1.525 provides, a motion for attorneys’
fees is timely brought within the thirty days.

   We acknowledge that a trial court may impose sanctions against a party
for not adhering to reasonable case management deadlines. However,
“Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1993), establishes the process
which a trial court must follow [to impose] a sanction for failure to adhere
to a deadline.” Massey v. Thomas, 342 So. 3d 680, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA
2022).

   The trial court’s denial of fees in this case cannot be construed as a
Kozel sanctions order because the record does not indicate the trial court
either considered the Kozel factors or made any explicit findings as to those
factors before denying all trial and appellate attorneys’ fees to HCA. See
Chappelle v. S. Fla. Guardianship Program, Inc., 169 So. 3d 291, 294-95
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reversing trial court’s entry of judicial default as a
sanction where trial court failed to consider Kozel factors or make explicit
findings as to each factor before imposing the sanction).

                                Conclusion

    We therefore reverse the denial of trial and appellate attorneys’ fees to
HCA because the delay in scheduling a hearing to determine the amount
of fees to be awarded pursuant to HCA’s timely filed motion did not deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction to award fees. On remand, the trial court is
directed to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                      4
   Reversed and remanded with instructions.

MAY and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                          *       *           *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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