Court Opinion

ID: 9853865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:32.26682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:12.142429
License: Public Domain

LINDER, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that police may enter a suspect’s home with an arrest warrant only if they have probable cause to believe that the person named in the warrant is present on the premises at the time. The majority arrives at that conclusion, not because it views that result to be required by Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, but because, in the majority’s view, prior Oregon Supreme Court cases already have so held. I disagree. The precise level of suspicion that police must possess in this circumstance — i.e., probable cause versus reasonable suspicion — is, in my view, an open question. I would resolve that issue by holding that reasonable suspicion is enough.
Contrary to the majority’s understanding, neither State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 605 P2d 646, cert den 449 US 846 (1980), nor State v. Davis, 313 Or 246, 834 P2d 1008 (1992), is controlling. In Jordan, the police had a valid arrest warrant for Sandra Jordan, the defendant’s sister, and went to the defendant’s residence to execute the warrant based on information that Sandra Jordan was staying there. 288 Or at 393. The officers entered the residence without exigent circumstances, without consent, and without a search warrant. The *62defendant was charged with hindering prosecution and moved to suppress evidence that Sandra Jordan was found in the home. Id. at 393-94. The Supreme Court identified the question before it as “whether a police officer may enter a private dwelling to execute an arrest warrant without obtaining a search warrant,” id. at 393, and held that a search warrant is not constitutionally required. Id. at 401-02.
The court cast its holding in terms that, I agree, at least can be understood to require that police have probable cause:
“We believe that constitutional rights will be protected as long as any arrest on private premises is supported by the judicial authorization of an arrest warrant and the police officer’s probable cause to believe that the arrestee is within the premises.” Id. (emphasis added).
But a secondary dispute in Jordan was whether the officers had probable cause to believe that Sandra Jordan would be found in the residence; the court concluded they did. Id. at 402-03. The reference to “probable cause” in the court’s holding, therefore, also can be understood as only reflecting the factual record that was before the court, and I believe it should be. The fact is that the court did not have to decide— and nothing in its opinion suggests that it viewed itself as deciding — whether some lesser quantum of suspicion was constitutionally sufficient. The same is true of the court’s later decision in Davis.1 In short, given the specific record before the court in Jordan, and the court’s narrow framing of the issue before it, Jordan should not be understood to have resolved the question presented in this case.
My primary disagreement with the majority is that it views the issue as foreclosed from examination and resolution when it is not. I do not know how the majority would resolve the legal issue if it considered itself free to do so, so I do not know if I disagree with the majority on that score. But *63I do believe that the answer the majority gives is wrong, and I will briefly explain why.
Jordan, although it does not squarely resolve the question, provides valuable guidance and suggests that the minimum standard should be reasonable suspicion. The court in Jordan identified the then-prevailing rule to be that “a police officer may enter private premises to execute a valid arrest warrant as long as the officer reasonably believes that the subject of the arrest warrant is on the premises.” Id. at 397 (emphasis added). The court’s discussion, considered in full, suggests that the court viewed itself as adopting that rule. Id. at 397-402. In fact, directly in support of its holding — and notwithstanding the “probable cause” language in that holding — Jordan cited three cases from other jurisdictions, all of which held that entry into a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant is constitutional if made with a “reasonable belief’ that the suspect will be found on the premises.2 Quoting from one of those three cases, Jordan specifically endorsed this statement in a footnote:
“An arrest warrant is validly issued only when a magistrate is convinced that there is probable cause to believe that the named party has committed an offense. This determination, together with the inherent mobility of the suspect, would justify a search for the suspect provided the authorities reasonably believe he could be found on the premises searched.” Id. at 401 n 8 (emphasis added; quoting United States v. McKinney, 379 F2d 259, 263 (6th Cir 1967)).
Thus, an examination of Jordan’s case-specific holding in combination with the analysis that led to that holding suggests that reasonable suspicion should suffice for the entry here. I believe that is the correct rule under Article I, section 9. In deciding the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, federal courts appear uniform in holding that reasonable suspicion, rather *64than probable cause, justifies entry into a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Route, 104 F3d 59, 62 (5th Cir), cert den 521 US 1109 (1997) (canvassing federal circuit decisions).3 They have so held for essentially the same reasons that the court in Jordan held, and later reaffirmed in Davis, that a search warrant is not necessary — i.e., that a valid arrest warrant provides judicial protection against indiscriminate and unjustified police conduct and carries with it implicit but limited authority to at least enter a person’s home where there is “reason to believe” that the suspect is within. Compare Route, 104 F3d at 62 with Jordan, 288 Or at 397-402.
That rule is persuasive and sound, and I would follow it for pin-poses of analyzing Article I, section 9.4 I therefore would reverse the trial court’s suppression order and remand for trial.
I respectfully dissent.

 In Davis, the court merely reaffirmed its prior holding in Jordan for purposes of an independent analysis under Article I, section 9. As was true in Jordan, the court in Davis held that the officers entered the suspect’s home with probable cause to believe he was there. 313 Or at 255-56. Thus, as in Jordan, the court in Davis neither needed to decide, nor said it was deciding, the minimum level of suspicion needed for a lawful entry into a suspect’s home to execute an arrest warrant.

 United, States v. Cravero, 545 F2d 406, on pet for reh’g 545 F2d 420, 421 (5th Cir 1976), cert den 430 US 983 (1977); United States v. Brown, 467 F2d 419, 423 (DC Cir 1972); United States v. McKinney, 379 F2d 259, 262-63 (6th Cir 1967).
The court in Jordan also discussed, with seeming approval, the approach of the ALI Model Penal Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedures, which similarly permits entry into a suspect’s home to execute a valid arrest warrant upon “reasonable cause” to believe that the suspect will be found there. Jordan, 288 Or at 398-99 n 6.

 Route identifies the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit that requires probable cause in this circumstance. Route, however, was wrong in that observation. The Ninth Circuit also holds that reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is on the premises suffices to permit entry to execute a search warrant. United States v. Litteral, 910 F2d 547, 554 (9th Cir 1990); United States v. Ramirez, 770 F2d 1458, 1460 (9th Cir 1985). Significantly, defendant does not cite any authority to the contrary, nor does he provide any analysis of why a probable cause standard better serves the values to be protected under Article I, section 9. Rather, defendant’s only argument is that Jordan and Davis resolve the question in his favor.

 In relying on federal cases decided under the Fourth Amendment, I do not suggest that Oregon should follow those decisions just because they are federal. See, e.g., State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 748, 653 P2d 942 (1982) (the court “has independent responsibility to interpret [A]rticle I, section 9”). But neither should Oregon disavow a rule adopted by federal courts just because the federal courts arrived at it first. If federal decisions are sound and appropriately reflect the values served by our own constitutional provisions — and here those decisions do — then the rule is appropriate for us to adopt as well.