Court Opinion

ID: 9957138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 19:02:39.642757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.223710
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE ARMED FORCES
                    _______________

                       In re B.M.
                        Appellant

                            v.

                  UNITED STATES
                      Appellee

                           and

Dominic R. BAILEY, Lieutenant Commander
  United States Navy, Real Party in Interest

                    No. 23-0233
              Crim. App. No. 202300050

 Argued December 5, 2023—Decided April 3, 2024

          Military Judge: Kimberly J. Kelly

For Appellant: Captain April P. McCroskey, USA
(argued); Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Murphy,
USA, and Major Rocco J. Carbone III, USAF (on
brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart,
USMC (argued); Colonel Joseph M. Jennings,
USMC, Major Candace G. White, USMC, and Brian
K. Keller, Esq. (on brief).

For Real Party in Interest: Captain Colin W. Hotard,
USMC (argued).
In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA

Amici Curiae for Appellant: Colonel Iain Pedden,
USMC, and Major Brian L. Farrell, USMCR (on be-
half of the United States Marine Corps Victims’ Le-
gal Counsel Organization) (on brief); and Captain
Daniel Cimmino, JAGC, USN, and Lieutenant Com-
mander Kimberly Rios, JAGC, USN (on behalf of the
United States Navy Victims’ Legal Counsel Pro-
gram) (on brief).

Amici Curiae for Appellant: Peter Coote, Esq. (on be-
half of the Pink Berets and Not in My Marine Corps)
(on brief).

Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge SPARKS,
Judge HARDY, and Judge JOHNSON joined. Chief
Judge OHLSON filed a separate concurring opinion.
Judge SPARKS filed a separate concurring opinion,
in which Judge JOHNSON joined.
                _______________

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

   Judge MAGGS delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The Judge Advocate General of the Navy certified the
following two questions arising from the decision of the
United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Ap-
peals (NMCCA) in In re B.M., 83 M.J. 704 (N-M. Ct. Crim.
App. 2023):
      I. M.R.E. 513 governs the procedures for produc-
      tion and in camera review of patient records that
      “pertain to” communications to a psychotherapist.
      The military judge applied R.C.M. 703 to order
      production and conduct an in camera review of
      Major B.M.’s diagnosis and treatment. Did the
      military judge err by applying the narrow scope of
      the M.R.E. 513(a) privilege defined in [United
      States v.] Mellette[, 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022),]
      to bypass the procedural requirements of M.R.E.
      513(e)?
      II. The Army [Court of Criminal Appeals] held no
      constitutional exception to M.R.E. 513 exists. The
      Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
      ruled the Constitution required production of
      mental health records. The resulting disparity in
      appellate precedent precludes uniform applica-
      tion of the law. Should [J.M. v.] Payton-O’Brien[,
      76 M.J. 782 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017),] be over-
      turned?
B.M. v. United States, 83 M.J. 463, 463 (C.A.A.F. 2023). For
reasons that we will explain, we cannot fully answer either
of these questions because of the unusual procedural pos-
ture of this case. We conclude, however, that the decision
of the NMCCA should be affirmed.
                       I. Background
   A convening authority referred charges against Lieu-
tenant Commander Dominic R. Bailey (the accused) to a
general court-martial. These charges included two specifi-
cations alleging that the accused did acts constituting abu-
sive sexual contact and three specifications alleging that he
did acts constituting assault consummated by a battery in
violation, respectively, of Articles 120 and 128, Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920, 928

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

(2018). All the specifications alleged that the victim of
these offenses was Major B.M. (the named victim).
    At the accused’s request, the military judge ordered a
military health facility to produce nonprivileged portions of
the named victim’s mental health records that were limited
to her diagnoses and treatments. In issuing this order, the
military judge relied on the general procedure for ordering
the production of evidence in Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 703 instead of the special procedure for determin-
ing the admissibility of patient records or communications
in Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 513(e). The military
judge explained that “diagnoses, prescriptions, and treat-
ment are not covered by [the psychotherapist-patient priv-
ilege in] M.R.E. 513 and if that is the case then the appli-
cable rule is R.C.M. 703 for the production of these
records.”
    The military health facility attempted to comply with
the military judge’s order by producing certain records. In
reviewing these records in camera, the military judge
learned that, contrary to her order, the documents were not
limited to diagnoses and treatments but also contained
some communications protected by the psychotherapist-
patient privilege established by M.R.E. 513(a). The mili-
tary judge further determined that, if the accused were
tried by court-martial, disclosure of certain portions of
these records would be “constitutionally required” in order
“to guarantee the accused a meaningful opportunity to pre-
sent a complete defense.” The military judge asked the
named victim if she would waive her privilege with respect
to the documents that contained exculpatory information
so that the accused could see the documents. The named
victim declined to waive her privilege. In response, the mil-
itary judge abated the court-martial proceeding and or-
dered the records sealed.
    The named victim then petitioned the NMCCA for ex-
traordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus and
a stay of proceedings. In re B.M., 83 M.J. at 706. She asked
the NMCCA to order the military judge to (1) seal or de-
stroy her mental health records; (2) lift the abatement

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

order; and (3) disqualify herself so that another military
judge could preside over the court-martial. Id. The Govern-
ment did not file an appeal seeking to overturn the abate-
ment order. Id. at 708 n.17.
   The NMCCA determined that it could not provide the
named victim with any relief. It denied the named victim’s
request for an order directing the military judge to seal or
destroy the mental health records, explaining: “[B]ecause
the records are now sealed in accordance with the military
judge’s order, we find no further remedy is necessary.” Id.
at 711. The NMCCA also refused to lift the abatement or-
der, explaining:
      [T]he military judge did not abuse her discretion
      when she abated the trial in light of information
      learned while reviewing the records over which
      Petitioner asserted a privilege. Her inadvertent
      review of privileged material did not, in any re-
      spect, waive Petitioner’s privilege, but it did alert
      the military judge to the fact that the records con-
      tained evidence of both confabulation and incon-
      sistent statements made by Petitioner which
      would be constitutionally required to be produced
      because the records were exculpatory . . . . [W]e
      find that the military judge’s decision was within
      the range of choices reasonably arising from the
      applicable facts and the law.
Id. at 717 (footnote omitted). The NMCCA further denied
the named victim’s request for an order disqualifying the
military judge, explaining that “this matter is not ripe for
consideration because the case is abated.” Id.
    The named victim filed a petition for review in this
Court, but this Court dismissed the petition for lack of ju-
risdiction. B.M. v. United States, 83 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F.
2023). Following this Court’s dismissal of the named vic-
tim’s petition, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy cer-
tified for review the two questions quoted above.
                       II. Jurisdiction
   Although this Court did not have jurisdiction to con-
sider the named victim’s petition for review, see M.W. v.

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

United States, 83 M.J. 361, 362, 364-65 (C.A.A.F 2023)
(holding that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a peti-
tion filed by a victim of an offense), this Court does have
jurisdiction to review questions certified by a Judge Advo-
cate General, pursuant to Article 67(a)(2), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 867(a)(2) (2018). This Court, however, does not is-
sue advisory opinions even if it has jurisdiction. United
States v. Chisholm, 59 M.J. 151, 152 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (ex-
plaining that this Court “generally adhere[s] to the prohi-
bition on advisory opinions as a prudential matter”). An ad-
visory opinion is a ruling on a legal question “which cannot
affect the rights of the litigants in the case before [the
court].” St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943)
(per curiam); see also Chisholm, 59 M.J. at 152 (“An advi-
sory opinion is an opinion issued by a court on a matter
that does not involve a justiciable case or controversy be-
tween adverse parties.”). Similarly, this Court does not an-
swer questions that are not ripe for decision or that have
become moot. United States v. Wall, 79 M.J. 456, 459
(C.A.A.F. 2020) (explaining that this Court generally ad-
heres to the principle that issues not ripe for appeal cannot
be decided); United States v. McIvor, 21 C.M.A. 156, 158,
44 C.M.R. 210, 212 (1972) (declining to decide a moot certi-
fied question). Finally, as a prudential matter, this Court
follows the principles of standing that apply to Article III
courts. United States v. Wuterich, 67 M.J. 63, 69 (C.A.A.F.
2008). In accordance with these principles, this Court only
addresses claims raised by parties who can show “an injury
in fact, causation, and redressability.” Id. (citing Sprint
Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273
(2008)).
                       III. Discussion
                     A. Certified Question I
   The first certified question asks in relevant part
whether “the military judge err[ed] by applying the narrow
scope of the M.R.E. 513(a) privilege defined in [United
States v.] Mellette[, 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022),] to bypass
the procedural requirements of M.R.E. 513(e).”

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

    Four preliminary points of explanation may help to
clarify the meaning of this question. First, the referenced
M.R.E. 513(a) creates a privilege allowing a patient “to re-
fuse to disclose . . . a confidential communication made be-
tween the patient and a psychotherapist . . . if such com-
munication was made for the purpose of facilitating
diagnosis or treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional
condition.” Second, this Court held in the referenced Mel-
lette decision that while the privilege in M.R.E. 513(a) pro-
tects certain communications between a patient and a psy-
chotherapist, “diagnoses and treatments contained within
medical records are not themselves uniformly privileged
under M.R.E. 513.” 82 M.J. at 375. Third, the referenced
M.R.E. 513(e) establishes a “Procedure to Determine Ad-
missibility of Patient Records or Communication” that are
or may be protected by the privilege established in M.R.E.
513(a). Fourth, as described above, the military judge in
this case decided not to follow the special procedures set
forth in M.R.E. 513(e), but instead followed the general
procedures for ordering the production of evidence in
R.C.M. 703.
    The procedural posture in which we confront this
certified question is unusual and perhaps unprecedented.
Although the Judge Advocate General certified the
question, the Government asks this Court to answer the
question in the negative and to affirm the NMCCA’s
decision. The Government does not seek any relief from
this Court based on this certified question. The named
victim has submitted briefs “in support of the U.S. Navy
Judge Advocate General’s Certificate for Review,” but her
position differs from that of the Government. The named
victim argues that this Court should answer the first
certified question in the affirmative, and she further
requests three specific remedies. First, the named victim
asks this Court to reverse the NMCCA and to lift the
military judge’s abatement order. Second, the named
victim asks this Court to disqualify the military judge from
further proceedings in this case based on her erroneous
actions and exposure to privileged material. Third, the

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

named victim asks that “her mental health records [be]
returned to a privileged and protected status.” We consider
the victim’s arguments for each of these remedies in turn.
                1. Lifting the Abatement Order
   In support of her request that this Court lift the abate-
ment order, the named victim contends that the military
judge should not have looked at her medical records with-
out following the procedures in M.R.E. 513(e). She asserts
that any potentially exculpatory evidence that the military
judge may have seen therefore came from “improperly di-
vulged” privileged communications. (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) (Citation omitted.) Finally, she argues
that the military judge had no authority under either
M.R.E. 513 or R.C.M. 703 to abate the court-martial pro-
ceedings based on such privileged communications.
   Before addressing the merits of these arguments, we
must consider a preliminary issue: whether the named vic-
tim initially had standing to challenge the abatement order
by filing an extraordinary writ in the NMCCA. On this
point, we observe that Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 806b(e)(1), authorizes the victim of an offense to seek a
writ of mandamus from a CCA only in specified circum-
stances. The provision states:
      If the victim of an offense . . . believes . . . a court-
      martial ruling violates the rights of the victim af-
      forded by a section (article) or rule specified in par-
      agraph (4), the victim may petition the Court of
      Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus to re-
      quire . . . the court-martial to comply with the sec-
      tion (article) or rule.
Article 6b(e)(1), UCMJ (emphasis added). 1 The referenced
“paragraph (4)” includes protections afforded by Article
6b(a), UCMJ, and by “M.R.E. 513, relating to the psycho-
therapist-patient privilege.” Id. § 806(e)(4)(A), (D).

   1 Article 6b, as amended in 2021, applies to this appeal. This
version is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 806b (2018 & Supp. III
2019-2022).

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    In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                     Opinion of the Court

    We first consider whether the “court-martial ruling vio-
lates the rights of the victim afforded by” M.R.E. 513. The
named victim argues that the military judge violated
M.R.E. 513 by not following the procedures in M.R.E.
513(e), when she was required to do so, before examining
her records. But the named victim does not argue, nor could
she argue, that the abatement order—which she is asking
this Court to lift—itself violated either the privilege af-
forded by M.R.E. 513(a) or the procedures in M.R.E. 513(e).
The abatement order served only to stop the court-martial
proceedings; it did not vitiate her privilege or require her
to waive the privilege. The abatement order is thus not “a
court-martial ruling [that] violates the rights of the victim
afforded by” M.R.E. 513. 2
    We next consider whether the “court-martial ruling vi-
olates the rights of the victim afforded by” Article 6b(a),
UCMJ. This article grants victims certain rights, including
a “right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay” and
a “right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
dignity and privacy of the victim of an offense.” Article
6b(a)(7), (9), UCMJ. We hold that these rights, while im-
portant, do not provide the named victim with standing to
challenge the military judge’s abatement order.
    In reaching this holding, we draw guidance from the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). In that case, a state pros-
ecutor declined to prosecute a father for not paying child
support for his illegitimate child. Id. at 615-16. The mother
of the child sued the prosecutor, requesting from the Court
a declaration that the practice of not bringing criminal
charges against the fathers of illegitimate children was un-
lawfully discriminatory. Id. at 616. The Supreme Court

   2 The Government argues that the abatement order “force[d]

the Victim to choose between waiving her privilege or facing
abatement of charges.” But that does not make the abatement
order “a court-martial ruling [that] violates the rights of the vic-
tim afforded by” M.R.E. 513.

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      In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                       Opinion of the Court

held that the mother lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.
Id. at 619. The Supreme Court explained:
        [I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private cit-
        izen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the
        prosecution or nonprosecution of another. Appel-
        lant does have an interest in the support of her
        child. But given the special status of criminal
        prosecutions in our system, we hold that appellant
        has made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus
        between the vindication of her interest and the en-
        forcement of the State’s criminal laws.
Id.
    Although the Linda R.S. case arose in a different con-
text, and specifically concerned the standing of a plaintiff
to bring a civil lawsuit against a prosecutor, we find that
the general principles described by the Supreme Court pre-
clude us from lifting this abatement order at the named
victim’s request. Under Article 6b(a), UCMJ, the victim of
an alleged offense has a right to be treated with fairness
and respect and a right to proceedings free from unreason-
able delay. But we are not convinced that these rights give
the victim “a judicially cognizable interest” in the ultimate
question of whether the government will or will not prose-
cute the accused. Because the abatement order is not “a
court-martial ruling [that] violates the rights of the victim
afforded by” Article 6b(a), UCMJ, the named victim there-
fore lacked standing to challenge the abatement order be-
fore the NMCCA, and she lacks standing before this Court.
    Our decision does not mean that abatement orders are
unreviewable. On the contrary, this Court has recognized
that Article 62(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C § 862(a) (2018), author-
izes the government to take an interlocutory appeal asking
for the lifting of an abatement order. In United States v.
True, the Court reasoned that an “abatement order . . . is
the functional equivalent of a ‘ruling of the military judge
which terminates the proceedings’ under Article 62(a),
[UCMJ,]” and held that such a “ruling is a proper subject
for appeal by the Government under this statute.” 28 M.J.
1, 2 (C.M.A. 1989) (quoting Article 62(a), UCMJ). But in

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                     Opinion of the Court

this case, although the Government now says that it sup-
ports the named victim’s arguments for lifting the abate-
ment order, the Government did not file an Article 62,
UCMJ, appeal asking the NMCCA to lift the abatement or-
der. In re B.M., 83 M.J. at 708 n.17. Based on the language
of Article 6b, UCMJ, and the principle established by the
Supreme Court in Linda R.S., the named victim cannot as-
sume the role of the Government and lacks standing.
           2. Disqualification of the Military Judge
    The named victim’s second requested relief is disquali-
fication of the military judge. Given our decision not to lift
the abatement order, we agree with the NMCCA’s determi-
nation that this request is not ripe for decision. In re B.M.,
83 M.J. at 718. This conclusion does not preclude the
named victim from challenging the military judge if the
abatement order is lifted in the future, but we express no
view on the issue of disqualification in this opinion.
  3. Returning Records to a Privileged and Protected Status
   Finally, we cannot grant the named victim’s request to
have her medical records returned to a privileged and pro-
tected status because, in our view, this remedy is moot. Any
communications in the records that were privileged remain
privileged. The named victim did not waive the privilege
because she did not “voluntarily disclose[] or consent[] to
disclosure of any significant part of” the privileged commu-
nications. M.R.E. 510(a). On the contrary, the named vic-
tim expressly declined to waive her privilege. Like the
NMCCA, we therefore see no basis for concluding that the
military judge’s in camera viewing of privileged communi-
cations—even if done erroneously—diminished the victim’s
right to assert her psychotherapist-patient privilege. In re
B.M., 83 M.J. at 717 & n.67. The military records are also
already protected from disclosure because the military
judge ordered them sealed and neither this Court nor the
NMCCA has ordered them unsealed.

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                     Opinion of the Court

                     B. Certified Question II
   The second certified question concerns a disagreement
between the United States Army Court of Criminal Ap-
peals (ACCA) and the NMCCA about whether there is a
constitutional exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in M.R.E. 513. The question asks whether the
NMCCA’s decision in J.M. v. Payton-O’Brien, 76 M.J. 782
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017), should be overturned. Both the
Government and the named victim ask us to answer this
certified question in the affirmative.
    Four preliminary points of background may also help
clarify this question. First, the original version of M.R.E.
513, as promulgated in 1999, contained a constitutional ex-
ception that stated: “There is no privilege under this
rule . . . when admission or disclosure of a communication
is constitutionally required.” M.R.E. 513(d)(8) (2000 ed.). 3
Second, the President deleted this constitutional exception
in 2015. 4 Third, the ACCA and the NMCCA have disagreed
about the effect of the deletion of the constitutional excep-
tion. In United States v. Tinsley, the ACCA held that “the
military courts do not have the authority to either ‘read
back’ the constitutional exception into M.R.E. 513, or oth-
erwise conclude that the exception still survives

   3 The President created M.R.E. 513 in the 1999 Amendments

to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order
No. 13,140, § 2(a), 64 Fed. Reg. 55,115, 55,116-17 (Oct. 12, 1999).
This was first included in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2000 ed.) (MCM).
   4 In 2014, Congress directed that M.R.E. 513 be amended

“[t]o strike the current exception to the privilege contained in
subparagraph (d)(8) of Rule 513,” i.e., the constitutionally re-
quired exception. See Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub.
L. 113-291, § 537(2), 128 Stat. 3292, 3369 (Dec. 19, 2014). The
President then amended M.R.E. 513 in the 2015 Amendments to
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, Exec. Order No.
13,696, Annex § 2(e), 80 Fed. Reg. 35,783, 35,819 (June 22,
2015). This amended version of M.R.E. 513 first appeared in the
MCM (2016 ed.).

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                     Opinion of the Court

notwithstanding its explicit deletion.” 81 M.J. 836, 849 (A.
Ct. Crim. App. 2021). But in Payton-O’Brien, the NMCCA
reached a different conclusion. 76 M.J. at 788. The NMCCA
held that the “removal of the constitutional exception is in-
consequential insofar as its removal purports to extinguish
due process and confrontation rights.” Id. The NMCCA
then provided a non-exhaustive list of several situations in
which it asserted that the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege must yield to the constitutional rights of the accused.
Id. at 789. Certified Question II asks us to resolve this dis-
pute between the ACCA and the NMCCA.
    We recognize the general importance to the military
justice system of resolving such conflicts among the Courts
of Criminal Appeals. See C.A.A.F. R. 21(b)(5)(B)(iii). In this
case, however, any decision that we would render on Certi-
fied Question II would be an advisory opinion because it
would be a ruling on a legal question “which cannot affect
the rights of the litigants in the case before [the court].” St.
Pierre, 319 U.S. at 42. Regardless of whether we answered
the question in the affirmative or in the negative, we could
not provide any relief requested by the named victim (i.e.,
lifting the abatement order, disqualifying the military
judge, and protecting the medical records). In our discus-
sion of Certified Question I, we have already concluded on
the basis of principles of standing, ripeness, and mootness,
that we cannot grant this requested relief. Our decision did
not turn on whether a constitutional exception to the priv-
ilege in M.R.E. 513(a) still exists. Because this Court does
not issue advisory opinions, we therefore cannot answer
Certified Question II in this case.
                       IV. Conclusion
  For these reasons, the decision of the United States
Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

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     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA

   Chief Judge OHLSON, concurring.
    I join the Court’s opinion in full. As Judge Maggs clearly
explains, the principles of standing, ripeness, and moot-
ness constrain this Court from answering the certified is-
sues. But despite the “unusual and perhaps unprece-
dented” procedural posture of the instant case, the
substantive issues raised therein will most assuredly arise
in future courts-martial. B.M. v. United States, __ M.J. __,
__ (7) (C.A.A.F. 2024). Therefore, I write separately to ex-
press my thoughts on how military judges, going forward,
might address the challenges that arise when a victim’s
mental health records are at issue.
                     I. Additional Facts
   The Court’s opinion nicely identifies the basic facts of
the case so I will not repeat them here. I will simply add a
few key details that are helpful for the purposes of this
discussion.
    First, in the military judge’s order to the mental health
provider, she directed the facility to produce documents
“ONLY to the extent those records reflect” diagnoses, men-
tal health prescriptions, and mental health treatments of
Major B.M. (the named victim). She further instructed:
      The appropriate records custodian shall NOT pro-
      vide any portion of a written mental or behavioral
      health record that memorializes or transcribes ac-
      tual communications made between the patient
      and the psychotherapist or assistant to the psy-
      chotherapist. The custodian of the records shall
      produce only records containing no actual commu-
      nications and indicating a diagnosis, medication,
      and/or treatment, the date of diagnosis, prescrip-
      tion, and/or treatment, and the date the diagnosis
      was resolved, if applicable.
(Footnote omitted.) The order also stated that the military
judge would conduct an in camera review of the records to
determine if disclosure was required.
   Second, after receipt of the named victim’s records, the
military judge noted in an email to the named victim and
the parties that the clinic included material “encompassed
by” Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 513, and she asked
the named victim if she continued to assert her M.R.E. 513
     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
privilege over this material. The named victim, through
counsel, stated that she was “continuing to invoke her priv-
ilege under M.R.E. 513 and [was] not waiving that right.”
    Third, the military judge subsequently issued an ex
parte order to the named victim regarding her mental
health records. In the order the military judge stated: “Not-
withstanding the court’s attempt to limit its review to sec-
tions addressing diagnoses, medications, and treatment,
the court read items that appear to constitute ‘actual com-
munications’ within the meaning of United States v. Mel-
lette,” 82 M.J. 374 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
   Fourth and finally, the military judge concluded that
some of the privileged records were constitutionally re-
quired to be disclosed to the defense under J.M. v. Payton-
O’Brien, 76 M.J. 782, 787 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2017).
When the named victim continued to assert her privilege,
the military judge abated the proceedings and sealed the
mental health records.
                      II. Applicable Law
    M.R.E. 513 governs the military’s psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. “Broadly speaking, [M.R.E.] 513(a) estab-
lishes a privilege that allows a patient to refuse to disclose
confidential communications between the patient and his
or her psychotherapist if those communications were made
for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient’s men-
tal or emotional condition.” United States v. Beauge, 82
M.J. 157, 159 (C.A.A.F. 2022). However, as always, the
devil is in the details. To begin with, in Mellette this Court
held that “diagnoses and treatments contained within med-
ical records are not themselves uniformly privileged under
M.R.E. 513.” 82 M.J. at 375.
   In addition, M.R.E. 513 itself recognizes seven excep-
tions to the broad psychotherapist-patient privilege. See
M.R.E. 513(d)(1)-(7). As explained in the Court’s majority
opinion, there used to be an eighth enumerated exception
under M.R.E. 513 which was commonly referred to as the
“constitutionally required exception.” 1 B.M, __ M.J. at __

   1 The exception read as follows: “There is no privilege under

this rule . . . when admission or disclosure of a communication is

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     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
(12 & n.4). However, in 2015, consistent with congressional
legislation, the President deleted this exception. Subse-
quently, in Payton-O’Brien the United States Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) sought to rec-
oncile the revised provisions of M.R.E. 513 with the rights
afforded to an accused under the Constitution. The
NMCCA explained that (1) by promulgating the new ver-
sion of M.R.E. 513, Congress and the President were im-
plementing a “policy decision” to protect the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege “to the greatest extent possible,” 76
M.J. at 787, but (2) this privilege, however meritorious,
cannot “prevail over the Constitution,” id. at 787-88. Ac-
cordingly, the NMCCA held that when M.R.E. 513 prohib-
its the production of privileged records, and when this pro-
hibition implicates the constitutional rights of an accused
to obtain a fair trial, “military judges may craft such rem-
edies as are required to guarantee [an accused] a meaning-
ful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Id. at 783.
The remedies contemplated by the NMCCA notably in-
cluded abating the proceedings. Id. at 791. As the NMCCA
succinctly put it, these remedies were “precise judicial tools
necessary to balance [a victim’s] privilege against [an ac-
cused’s] constitutional rights.” Id. at 792.
                       III. Discussion
                     A. Certified Issue I
   In regard to the instant case, I believe the military
judge was placed in an unenviable position. Although she
was assiduous in ensuring the clarity and accuracy of her
order to the mental health provider, the facility still
“dumped in her lap” nonresponsive mental health records
that were privileged. Upon conducting her in camera re-
view of the documents and discovering privileged infor-
mation, the military judge had two options. First, she could
have halted her review and invoked the procedures re-
quired under M.R.E. 513(e), which deals with determining
the admissibility of patient records or communications.
Second, she could have halted her review and returned the

constitutionally required.” M.R.E. 513(d)(8) (2000 ed.). This
Court has yet to “decide the precise significance of the removal
of this express exception.” Beauge, 82 M.J. at 167 n.10.

                                 3
     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
records to the mental health facility as nonresponsive and
ordered compliance with the terms of the order. What the
military judge could not do was continue to examine the
privileged records, as she did here. Such a step contravened
her authority and the provisions of M.R.E 513. In light of
this misunderstanding, I offer the following guidance to
those military judges who are confronted with a similar co-
nundrum in the future.
    If, in the course of conducting an in camera review of
the mental health records of a victim, a military judge dis-
covers that privileged material is commingled with
nonprivileged material, he or she should immediately stop
reviewing those records. If up to that point, the military
judge has not discovered any impeachment material in the
records that he or she believes the accused is entitled to
receive in furtherance of his right to a fair trial, the mili-
tary judge should return the records to the mental health
facility and order compliance with the order to produce re-
sponsive, nonprivileged records. If, however, the military
judge has already uncovered impeachment material within
the records necessary for the accused to receive a fair trial,
the military judge must inform the victim of this discovery
and then ask whether the victim wishes to waive the priv-
ilege regarding that material. If the victim agrees to the
waiver, the military judge should then disclose that mate-
rial to the parties for potential use at trial. If the victim
does not agree to the waiver, the military judge should fol-
low the procedures articulated by the NMCCA in Payton-
O’Brien, 76 M.J. at 789-92.
    The discussion above concerns those situations where a
military judge has ordered a mental health facility to pro-
duce responsive medical records. However, I am not con-
vinced that this approach to obtaining mental health infor-
mation is optimal. Simply stated, mental health
professionals typically do not have the time to go through
sometimes voluminous mental health records and cull out
responsive material that is not privileged, and any person
to whom they may delegate this task may not possess the
required expertise. Because of this unfortunate reality, it
is not unusual for commingled records to be produced in
response to even clear and narrowly constructed document

                                 4
     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
requests. As a result, military judges who are confronted
with the task of ensuring that an accused has proper access
to the nonprivileged mental health records of a victim
should perhaps consider alternative approaches.
    One approach would be to encourage the victim, the ac-
cused, and the government to enter into a stipulation of
fact that would address the victim’s diagnoses, medica-
tions, and treatments. This method presumably would be
the quickest and easiest way of ensuring that no privileged
material is released in contravention of M.R.E. 513, while
also ensuring that the accused has access to information he
is entitled to receive in furtherance of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. I have my doubts, however, about the
extent to which an accused would be willing to rely upon
the bare assertions of a victim about the scope and nature
of the mental health issues involved, particularly if the ac-
cused has no independent means of ensuring the accuracy
of the victim’s representations. Nevertheless, it still is
worth a try.
    If efforts to have the victim, the accused, and the gov-
ernment enter into a stipulation of fact is unavailing, an-
other option would be for the military judge to order the
victim’s psychotherapist to submit an affidavit to the trial
court that explicitly and solely addresses the victim’s diag-
noses, medications, and treatments. (A related approach
would be for the military judge to pose interrogatories to
the psychotherapist that are narrowly tailored to elicit in-
formation only about the victim’s diagnoses, medications,
and treatments.) This is not a foolproof method, particu-
larly in those instances where the psychotherapist is not
affiliated with a government mental health facility. How-
ever, it may be making the best of a bad bargain. 2

   2 Presumably, a psychotherapist working in a government-

operated treatment facility will comply with a military judge’s
order to provide an affidavit or response to interrogatories as
discussed above. However, I recognize that enforcement mecha-
nisms in the civilian sphere can be tricky. In those situations
where a civilian psychotherapist practicing in the private sector
balks at responding to an order of this nature issued by a mili-
tary judge, the named victim would have an interest in

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     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
    Just to tie up loose ends, I would like to make two addi-
tional points. First, military judges should not hesitate to
place the responsibility on the victim, the accused, and the
government to take the initiative in finalizing a stipulation
of fact or, in the alternative, drafting the order or the inter-
rogatories that are designed to obtain the necessary infor-
mation from the psychotherapist. And second, military
judges should not hesitate to require the victim, the ac-
cused, and the government to raise—and to resolve—issues
regarding mental health records early in the court-martial
process to ensure that the trial is not unnecessarily de-
layed. I am hopeful that if this guidance is followed, the
chances of encountering a similarly perplexing case where
a military judge concludes that it is necessary to abate the
proceedings will be significantly reduced.
                    B. Certified Issue II
    I now would like to turn my attention to the second cer-
tified issue. Although I want to underscore from the outset
the obvious point that my views are not binding on this
Court, I believe it may be helpful to note the following: I
conclude that (a) the NMCCA’s decision in Payton-O’Brien
properly held that M.R.E. 513 is still subject to the Consti-
tution, and (b) in seeking to protect the accused’s constitu-
tional rights, the NMCCA did not improperly create court-
made procedures and remedies. I briefly set forth my rea-
soning below.
    First, the Payton-O’Brien case did not reinsert the “con-
stitutionally required” exception that Congress and the
President expressly removed. This is apparent in the lan-
guage of the opinion: “[A]ny application of the former Mil.
R. Evid. 513(d)(8) constitutional exception . . . . would force
us to ignore the plain language of the rule, the obvious in-
tent of both Congress and the President, and binding prec-
edent. We cannot.” Payton-O’Brien, 76 M.J. at 787. How-
ever, the NMCCA in Payton-O’Brien did properly recognize
an iron-clad fact: the Military Rules of Evidence cannot
supplant or supersede the Constitution of the United
States. Id. at 787-88. Accordingly, M.R.E. 513 cannot limit

encouraging compliance by the psychotherapist to avoid the po-
tential specter of abatement.

                                 6
     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
the introduction of evidence that is required to protect the
constitutional rights of an accused during trial, such as un-
der the Due Process Clause. See United States v. Romano,
46 M.J. 269, 274 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (discussing the military’s
scheme of hierarchical rights with the Constitution as the
highest source and noting that lower sources on the hierar-
chy may not conflict with a higher source); see also Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979) (“[e]videntiary privi-
leges . . . must give way in proper circumstances”).
    As a result of this fact, in each case a military judge
must make an individualized determination of whether the
constitutional rights of the accused outweigh the interests
of the victim that are intended to be protected under
M.R.E. 513. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319,
324-25 (2006) (A rule of evidence abridges the constitu-
tional right to present a defense when the rule “ ‘infring[es]
upon a weighty interest of the accused’ and [is] ‘arbitrary’
or ‘disproportionate to the purposes [the rule is] designed
to serve.’ ” (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,
308 (1998))). I recognize that the Supreme Court in Jaffee
v. Redmond “reject[ed] the balancing component of the
[psychotherapist] privilege” by noting that “[m]aking the
promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s
later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s
interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”
518 U.S. 1, 17 (1996). However, that pronouncement by the
Supreme Court came in a civil case with respect to balanc-
ing privacy interests against an evidentiary need. In the
context of the military justice system, this Court and the
lower courts are concerned with the constitutional rights of
an accused in a criminal case. See Romano, 46 M.J. at 274.
The Supreme Court has not decided this issue. See Swidler
& Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 n.3 (1998) (de-
clining to answer whether piercing the attorney-client priv-
ilege is appropriate in “exceptional circumstances implicat-
ing a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights”).
Moreover—and this is an important point that I want to
emphasize—if the NMCCA’s Payton-O’Brien approach is
followed, then a victim’s privileged material will never be
disclosed without the consent of the patient/privilege

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     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                 Chief Judge Ohlson, concurring
holder. Therefore, I believe Payton-O’Brien provided the
appropriate framework concerning M.R.E. 513 and an ac-
cused’s constitutional rights.
    And second, it is true that the lower court in Payton-
O’Brien set forth procedures and remedies that a military
judge may employ when handling this type of issue, despite
the fact that M.R.E. 513 is silent on this point. However, it
is an unremarkable proposition that courts must some-
times develop mechanisms to protect an accused’s consti-
tutional rights at trial if no mechanism is provided in ap-
plicable statutes or rules. 3 Otherwise, the accused’s
constitutional rights would be hollow.
    Despite my views on these issues, I agree with the
Court’s majority opinion that we cannot provide the relief
that the named victim seeks due to standing, ripeness, and
mootness grounds. I therefore join the Court’s opinion in
full.

   3 This Court has created procedures and remedies when a
statute or rule does not. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 63
M.J. 129, 142-43 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (establishing prospective rules
setting forth timelines for post-trial processing and identifying
the remedies “depend[ing] on the circumstances of the case”);
Toohey v. United States, 60 M.J. 100, 101-02 (C.A.A.F. 2004)
(recognizing that servicemembers have a due process right to
speedy appellate review and adopting factors to evaluate
whether appellate delay violates an appellant’s due process
rights).

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     In re B.M. v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA

   Judge SPARKS, with whom Judge JOHNSON joins,
concurring.
    I agree with the Court’s disposition of this case. I write
separately only to remind military trial judges that they
have the tools available to them in the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, to address the issues arising from
a request for records of diagnoses or treatment plans of
victim witnesses who have been or are being treated by a
mental health provider. In United States v. Mellette, this
Court held that “diagnoses and treatments contained
within medical records are not themselves uniformly
privileged under M.R.E. 513.” 82 M.J. 374, 375 (C.A.A.F.
2022). The Court’s majority went on to clarify that
“documents that are not themselves communications may
be partially privileged to the extent that those records
memorialize or otherwise reflect the substance of
privileged communications.” Id. at 379.
    Before pursuing a determination on a motion to compel
records of diagnoses and treatment, the military judge
must be mindful that, although such records might not be
privileged, they touch upon a patient’s medical privacy in-
terests. Considering such interests, the military judge
should first look to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.)
703(e)(1): “Each party is entitled to the production of evi-
dence which is relevant and necessary.” Thus, the party re-
questing production must first establish that the requested
records exist and that they are relevant, not cumulative,
and would contribute to the presentation of the party’s case
in some positive way on a matter in issue. R.C.M. 703(e)(1)
Discussion. Assuming the defense can shoulder this bur-
den, the military judge must determine where the records
are located and a process for obtaining them. At this point,
it may not yet be known whether the records requested are
partially privileged or not privileged at all as described in
Mellette. The military judge may wish to consult the regu-
lation of discovery guidance provided in R.C.M. 701(g)(2).
There she may find authority to deny, restrict, or defer dis-
covery or inspection of records “or make such other order
as is appropriate.” Id. Further, “upon motion by a party,
the military judge may review any materials in camera,
     In re B.M v. United States and Bailey, No. 23-0233/NA
                   Judge SPARKS, concurring
and permit [a] party to make a showing . . . in writing to be
inspected only by the military judge in camera.” Id.
    This guidance suggests that the privilege holder, with
the assent of a party, might simply ask the military judge
to examine the health records to determine whether there
are nonprivileged records of diagnoses and treatment.
However, the hope would be to proceed in a manner that
relieves the military judge of the burden of wading through
what might be a high volume of mental health documents.
Other, more efficient means might be available. For
instance, the military judge may ask the parties and the
privilege holder whether they can reach a stipulation of
fact concerning any mental health diagnoses or treatment
the patient may have received. In the alternative, the
parties could be amenable to a stipulation of expected
testimony of the therapist. Finally, the military judge could
explore the parties’ interest in developing interrogatories
for the therapist.
   It is not my intent to mandate how military trial judges
should approach the issue of mental health records in light
of Mellette. Nor can I pretend to anticipate the innumerable
issues that might otherwise arise in a given case. I simply
wish to reiterate that, whatever process is decided upon, it
should remain sensitive to the fact that mental health pa-
tients have a medical privacy interest beyond whether cer-
tain information is privileged.

                                2