Court Opinion

ID: 9943502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:11:06.321223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:08.042960
License: Public Domain

J-A01030-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 ISAAC CARROLL                      :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 2893 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
         Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011983-2015

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 ISAAC CARROLL                      :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 2895 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
         Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011984-2015

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 ISAAC CARROLL                      :
                                    :
                   Appellant        :   No. 2896 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
         Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011995-2015
J-A01030-24

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  ISAAC CARROLL                                  :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 2897 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001212-2016

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2024

       Isaac Carroll appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on October 15,

2020. On appeal, Carroll challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence,

along with the discretionary aspects of his sentence. As we find Carroll has

waived all of his issues raised on appeal, we affirm.

       On January 10, 2020, following a bench trial, the trial court found Carroll

guilty under docket CP-51-CR-0011983-2015 of rape of a child, involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse ("IDSI"), corruption of minors, unlawful contact

with a minor, and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.

Under docket CP-51-CR-0011984-2015, the court found Carroll guilty of rape

of a child, IDSI, corruption of minors, and indecent assault of a person less

than 13 years of age. Under docket CP-51-CR-0011995-2015, the court found

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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Carroll guilty of attempted rape of a child, attempted IDSI, corruption of

minors, unlawful contact with a minor, and indecent assault of a person less

than 13 years of age. Finally, under docket CP-51-CR-0001212-2016, the

court found Carroll guilty of corruption of minors, indecent assault of a person

less than 13 years of age, and unlawful contact with a minor. Sentencing was

deferred for preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”).

      On October 15, 2020, the trial court sentenced Carroll to an aggregate

term of thirteen to thirty-six years' incarceration, to be followed by one year

probation. Carroll filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied.

Carroll subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. However, on

March 17, 2021, this Court dismissed Carroll’s appeal for failure to file a brief.

      Carroll filed a motion to file a nunc pro tunc appeal. The trial court

granted the motion and reinstated Carroll’s appellate rights. This timely nunc

pro tunc appeal followed.

      Carroll raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
      establish each and every element of the crimes of rape of a child,
      involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, unlawful
      contact with a minor, indecent assault of a child, attempted rape
      of a child, attempted involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with
      a child, and corruption of minors.

      2. Whether the jury verdict was against the weight of the
      evidence.

      3. Whether the sentencing court abused it’s [sic] discretion by
      imposing a sentence that was not based upon the gravity of the
      violation, the extent of appellant’s record, his prospect of
      rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and

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       aggravating factors as noted in 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9721 of the
       Sentencing Code.

Appellant’s Brief, at 8.

       In his first two issues, Carroll challenges both the sufficiency and weight

of the evidence supporting his convictions. We are constrained to conclude

both challenges are waived.

       It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. See Commonwealth

v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). Further, an appellant’s concise

statement must identify the errors with sufficient specificity for the trial court

to identify and address the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to

identify the issue to be raised for the judge”). A Rule 1925(b) concise

statement that is too vague can result in waiver of issues on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“a

[c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the

issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement

at all”).

       In relation to a claim that the evidence was in insufficient to sustain the

verdict, we have previously stated:

       If [an appellant] wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
       insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the
       element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.

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      This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
      [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly
      unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on
      appeal].

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). Further, waiver applies even where the trial court addresses the

issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and where the Commonwealth does not

object to the defective Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“The Commonwealth’s

failure and the presence of a trial court opinion are of no moment to our

analysis because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in a predictable, uniform fashion,

not in a selective manner dependent on an appellee’s argument or a trial

court’s choice to address an unpreserved claim.”) (citations omitted).

      Here, Carroll’s Rule 1925(b) statement simply includes a blanket

statement that the “evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a

conviction as a matter of law” and takes issue with the general lack of physical

evidence “to support the conviction”. Appellant’s 1925(b) Statement,

11/11/2022. The statement fails to “specify the element or elements upon

which the evidence was insufficient” to support Carroll’s conviction. The

statement does not even indicate which charges Carroll is challenging. As a

result, we must conclude Carroll’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is waived

on appeal. See Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257-1258.

      Further, a review of the record reveals Carroll did not properly preserve

a weight challenge before the trial court.

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      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A) requires a challenge to

the weight of the evidence to be raised with the trial court in a motion for a

new trial that is presented “(1) orally, on the record, at any time before

sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a

post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “Failure to properly preserve the

claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its

opinion.” Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

      In his post-sentence motion, Carroll raised only one issue as follows:

      The weight of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
      insufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty as to any of the charges.
      The testimony of the complaining witness/witnesses was
      incredible and uncorroborated by any credible and/or unbiased
      evidence. The Commonwealth failed to present any physical
      and/or scientific evidence to corroborate the incredible testimony
      of the complaining witness/witnesses.

Post-Sentence Motion, 10/26/2020, at ¶ 3. It has long been the law in

Pennsylvania that a boilerplate post-sentence motion merely stating the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence preserves no issue for appellate

review unless the motion specifies in what way the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 497

(Pa. Super. 2020).

      Further, it is unclear from this single-issue statement whether Carroll

meant to challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence. The avenue of

relief sought does not clear up this discrepancy either. Carroll simply titled his

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motion generally as “Post-Sentence Motion.” In the motion itself, Carroll

requested the trial court vacate his conviction and sentence. This remedy

would be applicable to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence only.

Compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 (specifying that the remedy for a challenge to the

weight of the evidence is a new trial) with Pa.R.Crim.P. 606, (specifying that

the remedy for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a judgment of

acquittal).

      This discrepancy occurs again in Carroll’s 1925(b) statement. While

Carroll includes an issue statement purporting to challenge the weight of the

evidence, he does so on the basis that “[t]he Commonwealth failed to

establish beyond a reasonable doubt each element of every crime for which

appellant was convicted.” Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, 11/11/2022. Again,

Carroll conflates the distinct issues of sufficiency and weight of the evidence.

“A true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient exists to

sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.”

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 310 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      In framing his issue as a challenge to the weight of the evidence, Carroll

conflates     two   distinct   claims   with   different   standards   of   review.

In Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000), our Supreme Court

highlighted the distinction between a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, which contests the quantity of the evidence presented at trial, and

                                        -7-
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a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which attacks the quality of that

evidence.

     The distinction between these two challenges is critical. A claim
     challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, if granted, would
     preclude retrial under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth
     Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I,
     Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas a claim
     challenging the weight of the evidence if granted would permit a
     second trial.

     A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
     law. Evidence will be deemed sufficiency to support the verdict
     when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
     and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
     doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the verdict is in
     contradiction to the physical facts, in contravention to human
     experience and the laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient
     as a matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court
     is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
     inferences to be drawn from the evidence.

     A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
     to the weight of the evidence, concedes that there is sufficient
     evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
     obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight
     of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A
     new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
     testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
     arrived at a different conclusion. A trial judge must do more than
     reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
     not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges,
     in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of
     the evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of
     the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
     certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
     or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751–52 (citations, footnotes, and quotation marks

omitted).

                                    -8-
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       In arguing that his convictions are against the weight of the evidence,

Carroll maintains that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a

reasonable doubt each element of every crime for which Carroll was convicted.

In doing so, Carroll misunderstands the nature of a challenge to the weight of

the evidence, which “concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the

verdict.” Id. at 752. Carroll’s contention that the Commonwealth failed to

establish every single element of every single crime for which he was

convicted presents a challenge to the sufficiency, rather than the weight, of

the evidence.1 Accordingly, Carroll has failed to preserve a weight challenge

for our review.

       Even if Carroll had preserved a weight challenge, we would nevertheless

find the issue without merit. “[W]e may only reverse the lower court’s verdict

if it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.”

Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003) (citations

omitted).

       In its initial opinion, the trial court makes it clear that the complainants’

testimony was credible. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/21, at 10. The trial

court indicates the children’s testimony was materially consistent and they

____________________________________________

1 It is worth noting that Carroll was convicted under four separate dockets
with multiple charges under each docket. Accordingly, such a vast claim
challenging every single element of every single crime for which he was
convicted, without offering specific reasons as to why those verdicts were
contrary to the weight of the evidence, or insufficient, is far too vague for
meaningful review under either standard of review.

                                           -9-
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identically testified about the assaults committed by Carroll. The court clarifies

that any minor imprecisions in the children’s testimony did not outweigh their

materially consistent testimony. After a comprehensive review of the record,

we cannot conclude the trial court’s reasoning constituted an abuse of its

discretion.

      Looking back at Carroll’s contentions regarding the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence, we again look to the review performed by the trial

court. In its Amended Opinion filed on February 3, 2023, the trial court

addressed Carroll’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and examined

the record in detail with reference to each charge. The trial court concluded

that his arguments were meritless. See Trial Court Amended Opinion, 2/3/23,

at 7 – 10. Additionally, as stated above, the trial court found the weight of the

evidence claim to be meritless. Id. at 11. Upon review of the trial court’s well

written and comprehensive Amended Opinion and the certified record, we

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court. Accordingly,

we additionally affirm on the basis of the trial court’s Amended Opinion with

regard to these issues.

      In his final issue raised on appeal, Carroll argues the trial court erred in

imposing a sentence that was not based on the gravity of the violation, the

extent of Carroll’s record, his prospect of rehabilitation, or an assessment of

the mitigating and aggravating factors. Carroll concedes this is a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. “A challenge to the discretionary

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aspects of a sentence must be considered a petition for permission to appeal,

as the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute.” Commonwealth v.

McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

      [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal
      defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
      question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
      the Sentencing Code, 42. Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

omitted; brackets in original).

      A defendant can only preserve a claim to the discretionary aspects of a

court’s sentence if he notes a specific objection at the sentencing hearing or

in a post-sentence motion. See id. Carroll did not object to any aspect of his

sentence at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, to preserve a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of his sentence, he was required to note specific

challenges to the court’s discretion in his post-sentence motion.

      In his post-sentence motion, Carroll only raised an issue blending the

issues of sufficiency and weight of the evidence. Carroll did not raise any issue

directly challenging his sentence. Because Carroll failed to raise the instant

discretionary sentencing issue in a post-sentence motion or at sentencing, we

find his issue waived. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 936 (Pa.

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Super. 2013) (“Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are

generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion

to   modify   the   sentence   imposed.”      (citation   omitted));   see   also

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (concluding substantial question was waived for failing to raise it at

sentencing or in post-sentence motion).

      Further, while counsel included the required Rule 2119(f) statement, we

find it would have been inadequate to raise a substantial question for our

review. We must examine a Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a

substantial question exists. See Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362,

365 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Our inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the

appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal, which are

necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. (citation and emphasis

omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).

      Carroll “must show that there is a substantial question that the sentence

imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” McAfee, 849 A.2d at

274 (citation omitted). That is, “the sentence violates either a specific

provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a

particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.” Tirado, 870

A.2d at 365. “Additionally, we cannot look beyond the statement of questions

presented and the prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a

                                     - 12 -
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substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148,

154 (Pa. Super. 2012).

      Finally,

      a Rule 2119(f) statement that simply “contains incantations of
      statutory provisions and pronouncements of conclusions of law” is
      inadequate.

         Rather, only where the appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement
         sufficiently articulates the manner in which the sentence
         violates either a specific provision of the sentencing scheme
         set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular fundamental
         norm underlying the sentencing process, will such a
         statement be deemed adequate to raise a substantial
         question so as to permit a grant of allowance of appeal of
         the discretionary aspects of the sentence.

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 868 A.2d 516, 529 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

      Limiting our review to Carroll’s Rule 2119(f) statement, we conclude he

has failed to raise a substantial question. Carroll has included what purports

to be a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his brief. However, that statement

consists of only a single paragraph of boilerplate pronouncements of

law. Nowhere in the statement does Carroll indicate anything specific to his

particular case. He includes no citation to authorities, nor does he cite to the

record at all. Carroll has therefore failed to set forth a substantial question to

justify our review of the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

      Even if we had not found Carroll’s issue waived, we discern no abuse of

the court’s discretion in imposing sentence. To constitute an abuse of

discretion, a sentence must either exceed the statutory limits or be patently

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excessive. Here, in its opinion on appeal, the trial court explained its process

in arriving at a proper sentence:

      As noted at sentencing, this court considered the gravity of the
      offenses as it related to the young victims, the protection of the
      public and [Carroll]’s rehabilitative needs. The court took into
      consideration that [Carroll] waived his right to a jury trial.
      [Carroll]’s mental health issues and learning disabilities were also
      considered. [Carroll] had family support as exhibited through the
      testimony of Aretha Carroll Wilson, Mary Reid and Marie Carroll.

      This Court also considered the character of [Carroll], the impact
      on the four (4) minor victims, the victim impact statement, and
      [Carroll]’s lack of remorse.

      Carefully reviewed and considered was the pre-sentence
      investigation, the mental health evaluation, the argument of both
      counsel and the Commonwealth's sentencing memorandum.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/21, at 11-12; Trial Court Amended Opinion,

2/3/23, at 11-12. Further, in concluding its sentence was appropriate, the trial

court explained:

      [Carroll]’s sentence of thirteen (13) to thirty-six (36) years'
      incarceration is singularly appropriate considering his depraved
      crimes. [Carroll] took advantage of the minors’ trust in him to
      heinously, repeatedly, abuse them in their own home. Given
      [Carroll]’s depraved conduct, this Court’s sentence was far from
      excessive, and [Carroll]’s appeal on this ground is frivolous.

Id. at 12.

      Contrary to Carroll’s assertions, the trial court considered the mitigating

circumstances Carroll claims it did not. Moreover, as the trial court specifically

noted, it had the benefit of a PSI report. Where a trial court has a PSI, “it is

presumed that the sentencing court was aware of the relevant information

regarding defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with

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mitigating statutory factors.” Tirado, 870 A.2d at 368 (citation and internal

quotations marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d

612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation omitted) (“It would be foolish, indeed, to

take the position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to apply

them to the case at hand”).

      As we find Carroll’s issues on appeal are all waived, and otherwise

without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/23/2024

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