Court Opinion

ID: 9831001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:41:28.64317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.181791
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Our holding supra on the measure of damages was based primarily upon the failure of the appellant to demonstrate in his brief that such charge was error under the particular facts of this case. In the light of appellant’s motion for rehearing and the entire record, we have concluded that the quoted charge was erroneous. Three elements are therein submitted as a basis for measuring the amount of damages in such way as is “calculated to confuse and mislead the jury into assessing double damages.” These are: (a) Physical pain; (b) permanent impairment of health and physical faculties; and (c) decrease in earning capacity. Without quoting it, we think the evidence in this case is such as to clearly show that loss of earning capacity resulted proximately from impairment of health and loss of physical faculties. Likewise, there was apparently no physical pain proven except that which came directly from these. These elements are so blended in the evidence that a jury could easily have been led to assess damages for the same thing twice. Appellee cites no authority which controls the precise record before us. Judge Sharp in International-G. N. Ry. Co. v. King (Tex. Com.App.) 41 S.W.(2d) 234, 235, reviews the authorities upon this question at length. *100The charge therein considered, and a por- ■ tion of his language, is as follows :
“(a) Bodily injuries, if any, physical pain and suffering, if any, and bodily inconvenience suffered by him, if any, from February 22, 1928, down to the date of this trial, and such as you may find he will reasonably and probably suffer in the future, if any.
“(b) Mental anguish suffered by him, if any, from February 22, 1928, down to the date of this trial, and such as you may find he will reasonably suffer in the future, if any.
“(c) The reasonable value of his decreased earning capacity from February 22, 1928, down to the date of this trial, if any.
“(d) The reasonable present value of his diminished capacity to perform labor and services in the future beyond this trial, if any. * * *
“ ‘The decreased capacity to labor and earn money would necessarily be a result of the impairment of physical and mental health, and would be embraced in the incapacity to follow the calling he might otherwise have chosen. Incapacity to earn money could result from nothing except physical or mental injury, and would be embraced in incapacity to pursue any desirable vocation.’ * * *
“Chief Justice James, in discussing the effect of the foregoing charge in the light of the rule announced by the Supreme Court, says: ‘The rule applied by the Supreme Court in the Butcher [(International & G. N. R. Co. v. Butcher), 98 Tex, 462, 84 S.W. 1052] and Nesbit [(Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Nesbit), 40 Tex.Civ. App. 209, 88 S.W. 891] Cases is understood to be that a charge is defective, not necessarily because it suggests to the jury the various subjects or elements' of damages they may consider, but where it mentions the subjects in such a way and in such a connection as is calculated to lead them to treat items that enter into the same subject as separate and distinct elements of damage. There could be no objection to a charge which authorizes recovery for physical suffering, which in the same connection properly presents and explains the different matters which would come under that head for consideration. So, also, with mental suffering or diminished earning capacity. But when these matters are presented in such a way as to appear' to treat them as distinct and '■independent items of damage, the charge is objectionable.’ * * *
“If the injuries received . by plaintiff from his ‘bodily injuries’ or ‘bodily inconvenience’ suffered- by him affected him before the trial and would reasonably and probably affect him after the trial and in the future, that would necessarily include the decreased earning capacity either before or after the trial and in the future,' and items (a), (c), and .(d) in the language of the Supreme Court ‘are so blended in their effects upon the sufferer that they are not capable of separation so as to admit of distinct compensation.’ ”
Appellant made- a statement at Dr. York’s office soon after the accident in substantial accord with his present defensive theory. He offered to prove by Dr. York that in reply. thereto witness Allred (mentioned in the original opinion) stated: “That is the way I saw it and I don’t blame you at all.” According to the appellant’s assignment of error this was offered as a whole. Thus measured, the court correctly excluded it, because it included the opinion of a bystander upon a controverted issue. The record is teeming with what in street parlance is called “boloney,” and it is difficult to separate and segregate this from other proper parts. Apparently, the bill of exception shows only the first clause of the above was offered; that is, the clause, “That is the way I saw it.” This statement alone and separated from the latter clause was, we think, clearly admissible as impeaching evidence. It was in effect the statement of a fact directly in conflict with Allred’s testimony on the trial.
We recognize that appellant was entitled to an affirmative presentation of all defensive theories, including a correct definition in this case of “unavoidable accident.” The one given above has been many times substantially approved. It is extremely difficult to phrase an inflexible definition applicable to and correct in all cases. The writer expresses doubt as to thé propriety of using the word “negligence” in the definition of such term in every case.
The present controversy over the proper definition of such term can and doubtless will be avoided on another trial.
Appellee raises the point that no motion for new trial was filed in this case. The confusion in the authorities on this question was pointed out by Judge Sharp on December 9, 1936, in the case of -Stillman *101v. Hirsch (Tex.Sup.) 99 S.W.(2d) 270, 276. Such a motion was therein held necessary as a' prerequisite to appeal, with certain exceptions, but it was further stated: “Therefore the holdings announced herein will not’be enforced in cases tried before this opinion is rendered and not until the bench and the bar have a reasonable time to become familiar with same.”
Motion for rehearing granted, and judgment of the trial court is reversed and cause remanded.