Court Opinion

ID: 9714293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:34:57.666418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.084317
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that DOT failed to meet its burden, before the trial court, of proving that Corporal Miller, as the arresting officer, had the legal authority to arrest McKinley for driving under the influence.
Herein, the only issue before the trial court was whether Corporal Miller had the authority to arrest McKinley and request that McKinley submit to chemical testing. The trial court determined that Corporal Miller was employed as a police officer for the Harrisburg International Police Department and was under the control of DOT.1 However, the trial court concluded that pursuant to section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, P.L. 469, added by Act of June 28, 1957, P.L. 435 (Act of May 21, 1943),2 the arresting powers of the airport police are limited to the extent that their powers do not include extraterritorial powers. Therefore, the trial court held that the question was whether sufficient grounds existed on airport property which would warrant Corporal Miller to reasonably believe that McKinley was driving under the influence. Upon reviewing Corporal Miller’s testimony, the trial court concluded that no such grounds existed. Accordingly, the trial court sustained McKinley’s appeal and rescinded the suspension of his operating privilege.
In order to sustain a license suspension under section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, DOT must prove that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving while under the influence; (2) was asked to submit to chemical testing; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that a refusal would result in a license suspension. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989). Where a licensee challenges the legal authority of the arresting officer, DOT bears the burden of proving that the officer has legal authority to make the arrest. Kline v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 706 A.2d 909 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Snyder v. Commonwealth, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 178, 640 A.2d 490 (1994). Unless DOT establishes that the arresting officer has such authority, this court shall reverse the suspension. Id.
Pursuant to section 5903 of the Vehicle Code, DOT is authorized to provide police protection for the Harrisburg International Airport in accordance with the Act of May 21, 1943. Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, entitled Certification of names of employes to act as police officers at buildings or installations; commissions; powers, provides as follows
[T]he head of each administrative department having under its jurisdiction any building or installation owned by the Commonwealth, or any building or in*1141stallation, for the protection of which the administrative department is responsible, shall certify to the Governor the names of employes of such administrative department who shall act as police officers at such buildings or installations. If the Governor shall approve the persons designated, he shall issue to each a commission under which each employe shall have and exercise full power to make arrests without warrant for all violations of law which they may witness upon any part of the premises of any such building or installation as aforesaid, and to serve and execute warrants issued by the proper local authorities for any violation of law committed thereon or thereat. For such purposes and generally on the premises of such building or installation, the persons so commissioned shall have all the powers and prerogatives conferred by law upon constables of the Commonwealth.
Accordingly, under the plain language of section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, the authority to make arrests by persons appointed and commissioned pursuant to this section is clearly limited. Corporal Miller, as a member of the Harrisburg International Airport Police Department, does not have the authority to make an extraterritorial arrest.3 The members of the Harrisburg International Airport Police Department are only authorized to make arrests for violations of the law that they may witness upon any part of the airport premises. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it determined that Corporal Miller was not authorized to arrest McKinley outside the jurisdiction of the airport premises.
Moreover, pursuant to section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, for the purpose of making arrests and generally on the airport premises, the members of the Harrisburg International Airport Police Department shall have all the powers and prerogatives conferred by law upon constables of this Commonwealth. Our Supreme Court has recently held that the constables of this Commonwealth do not have the authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws as no statutory authority exists and the authority cannot be derived from the common law. Commonwealth v. Roose, 551 Pa. 410, 710 A.2d 1129, 1130 (1998). In Roose, the Supreme Court stated that unless a statute empowers constables to enforce the vehicle laws, then they do not possess the legal authority to do so. Therefore, I would hold that the members of the Harrisburg International Airport Police Department commissioned pursuant to section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943 have no authority to enforce the motor vehicle laws of this Commonwealth whether such violation occurs on or off airport premises.4
In order to bestow the authority upon airport police officers to enforce the motor vehicle laws of this Commonwealth, the majority relies on Section 2416 of The Administrative Code of 1929 on the basis that Section 5903(b) of the Aviation Code provides that the powers and duties granted by the Aviation Code shall be exercised in accordance with The Administrative Code of 1929, Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 51-732, where not inconsistent with Chapter 59 of the Aviation Code, 74 Pa.C.S. §§ 5901-5920. As correctly cited by the majority, Section 2416 of The Administrative Code governs the powers and duties of capitol police, *1142Commonwealth property police and campus police.
The majority determines that because Section 2416 of the Administrative Code and Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943 relate to the same class of persons, the sections can be read in pari materia and construed as one statute if possible. However, the majority concludes that the two sections are irreconcilable. Therefore, because Section 2416 of The Administrative Code was enacted after Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, the majority holds that Section 2416 prevails. Accordingly, the majority holds that officers such as Corporal Miller at the Harrisburg International Airport at the time of the arrest in question are to be regarded as having the full powers of traditional police in the municipality in which the Commonwealth facility is located. I believe that this holding and the majority’s reasoning in support thereof ignores the clear statutory language found in Section 5903(b) of the Aviation Code.
As stated previously herein, Section 5903(b) provides that the powers and duties granted by the Aviation Code shall be exercised in accordance with The Administrative Code of 1929 where not inconsistent with Chapter 59 of the Aviation Code. It is undisputed that Section 5903(a)(10) clearly permitted DOT to provide police protection for the Harrisburg International Airport in accordance with the Act of May 21,1943. Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943 expressly confers upon those persons commissioned as airport police officers serving the Harrisburg International Airport “all the powers and prerogatives conferred by law upon constables of the Commonwealth.” 71 P.S. § 1791.1. Thus, Section 2416 of the Administrative Code, which bestows upon capítol police, Commonwealth property police and campus police the same powers exercised by municipal police officers, is clearly inconsistent with Section 5903(a)(10) of the Aviation Code. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 5903(b) of the Aviation Code, Section 2416 of the Administrative Code should not be considered when the powers and duties granted by the Aviation Code are exercised. Therefore, the majority’s holding that Section 2416 of The Administrative Code bestows additional powers and duties upon officers such as Corporal Miller is in contravention of the Aviation Code.
Moreover, if the General Assembly wished to broaden the powers of those persons commissioned as airport police officers pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, it could have expressly done so at the time it amended The Administrative Code in 1961. It did not. Accordingly, I would reject DOT’S contention that Corporal Miller had the full powers of traditional police pursuant to Section 2416 of the Administrative Code at the time he pursued and arrested McKinley for driving under the influence.
Thus, I would affirm the order of the trial court sustaining McKinley’s appeal and rescinding the one-year suspension of his operating privilege for refusing to take a chemical test pursuant to section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.
Judge FRIEDMAN joins in this dissenting opinion.

. ' See Section 5901 of the Aviation Code, 74 Pa.C.S. § 5901. At the time of McKinley’s arrest on January 4, 1997, the administration and control of the Harrisburg International Airport was vested in DOT pursuant to section 5901.

. 71 P.S. § 1791.1.

. Corporal Miller testified that he was certified by the governor of the Commonwealth, received a commission, and that his powers were legislatively defined. DOT did not present any evidence before the trial court to prove that Corporal Miller was hired in any capacity other than a police officer commissioned pursuant to Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943.

. I note that, in its brief, DOT conveniently omits this part of Section 1.1 of the Act of May 21, 1943, when discussing this section. In addition, DOT fails to mention to this Court our Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Roose.