Court Opinion

ID: 9889783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 17:01:19.711161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:03.432474
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 11 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALFONZO RAMIREZ-SANTIAGO,                       No. 21-807
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A078-755-201
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted October 6, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: BYBEE, BENNETT, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Alfonso Ramirez-Santiago, a native and citizen of Mexico,

petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing

his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his motion to suppress, and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review de novo constitutional questions

and the denial of a motion to suppress. Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d

1029, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011). We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial

evidence. Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2021). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      1.      Ramirez-Santiago asserts that the immigration court lacked

jurisdiction because his Notice to Appear (“NTA”) failed to list the time or date of

his proceedings, and that we should therefore terminate his immigration

proceedings. This argument is foreclosed by our case law. See United States v.

Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (“[T]he failure of

an NTA to include time and date information does not deprive the immigration

court of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

       2.     The BIA and the IJ (together, “the agency”) did not err in denying

Ramirez-Santiago’s motion to suppress the Form I-213. “[A]lthough as a general

matter the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation . . . hearings, under the

clearly established law of this circuit evidence must be suppressed if it was

obtained through an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Orhorhaghe

v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994). Ramirez-Santiago argues that the officers

egregiously violated his Fourth Amendment rights by stopping him solely because

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they “suspect[ed] [him] to be illegal” based on his Hispanic appearance. However,

the officers had “a particularized and objective basis” for suspecting that he was

unlawfully present in the United States. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417

(1981). The officers identified Ramirez-Santiago as someone with prior

immigration and criminal history through a routine database check, obtained an I-

200 warrant for his arrest, and conducted surveillance around his last known

address. The officers saw “an adult Hispanic male matching the target’s

description” leaving his last known address in a vehicle registered to Ramirez-

Santiago’s spouse. Therefore, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop him,

and Ramirez-Santiago did not make a prima facie showing of an egregious Fourth

Amendment violation.

      Ramirez-Santiago further argues that the Form I-213 should have been

suppressed because the statements that form the basis for the Form I-213 were

obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. However, because we have held “that

Miranda warnings are not required before questioning in the civil deportation

context,” United States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1997), the

agency did not err in denying his motion and considering his statements.

       3.    Ramirez-Santiago argues that he was denied a full and fair hearing in

violation of his right to due process because he was denied an evidentiary hearing

on his motion to suppress, and he was unable to cross-examine the preparer of the

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Form I-213. We disagree.

      We will reverse an agency’s decision “on due process grounds if (1) the

proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the [noncitizen] was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the [noncitizen] demonstrates prejudice,

which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the

alleged violation.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620–21 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because he was afforded a

deportation hearing, had an “opportunity to be represented by counsel, to prepare

an application for . . . relief, and to present testimony and other evidence in support

of the application,” Ramirez-Santiago has not shown the proceedings were

fundamentally unfair. Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir.

2007).

      Ramirez-Santiago similarly fails to show how his inability to cross examine

the preparer of the Form I-213 constitutes a due process violation. “Form I-213 is

probative on the issue of entry, and its admission is fair absent evidence of

coercion or that the statements are not those of the petitioner.” Espinoza v. INS, 45

F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, “[t]he [IJ] was not required to permit cross-

examination of the form’s preparer” because Ramirez-Santiago did not put forth

any probative evidence contesting the facts in the I-213. See id. at 311.

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      4.     We find no error in the agency’s determination that Ramirez-Santiago

was ineligible for asylum because he failed to establish an extraordinary

circumstance to warrant an exception to the one-year asylum filing period.

Ramirez-Santiago last entered the United States in 2015; he did not file his asylum

application until 2019. He contends that he did not know the asylum process or the

law, but this is not an extraordinary circumstance under our precedent. See

Alquijay v. Garland, 40 F.4th 1099, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2022) (rejecting petitioner’s

argument that “ignorance of the legal requirements for filing an asylum application

is an ‘extraordinary circumstance . . .’”).

      5.     Ramirez-Santiago further argues that the agency erred in denying

withholding of removal because the IJ incorrectly found his testimony not credible.

However, the BIA found that he waived his withholding of removal claim by

failing to argue “with particularity, that he faces a clear probability of persecution

in Mexico on account of his membership in a particular social group.” On appeal,

Ramirez-Santiago neither addresses the BIA’s decision nor raises the merits of his

withholding of removal claim in his opening brief. We therefore deem this issue

forfeited. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996)

(finding a party forfeits an issue by failing to meaningfully discuss it in the

opening brief).

      6.     Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief.

                                          5                                       21-807
Ramirez-Santiago argues that the country reports show that Mexican law

enforcement and its government are willfully blind to persecution and torture, and

he is therefore entitled to CAT relief. Without more, his argument fails because

“evidence that a government has been generally ineffective in preventing or

investigating criminal activities [does not] raise an inference that public officials

are likely to acquiesce in torture, absent evidence of corruption or other inability or

unwillingness to oppose criminal organizations.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755

F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Ramirez-Santiago fails to show how he will be

subjected to a “particularized threat of torture” that is different than the general

population of Mexico. Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008).

      The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

      PETITION DENIED.

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