Court Opinion

ID: 9945291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:03:23.207269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.887604
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 U.S. Bank v. Elstead CA1/2

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 U.S. BANK et al.,
      Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants
 and Respondents,                                                        A165202

 v.                                                                      (Alameda County
 JOHN CLIFTON ELSTEAD,                                                   Super. Ct. No. RG07346492)
      Defendant, Cross-Complainant
 and Appellant.

                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
         This is the fourth time we consider issues in the long-running dispute
between homeowner John C. Elstead and various financial institutions over
the defaulted home loan he took out nearly 40 years ago, in 1988, and which
he has been fighting for decades to have reinstated in order to avoid
foreclosure.1

         1We resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (Cal. Stds. of Jud.
Admin., § 8.1.) We do not recite the factual and procedural background
because our opinion is unpublished and the parties know, or should know,
“the facts of the case and its procedural history.” (People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851 [unpublished opinion merely reviewing correctness
of trial court’s decision “does not merit extensive factual or legal statement”].)
                                                               1
      Previously, in a separate case that Elstead initiated in April 2002
against the servicer of his home loan, JPMorgan Chase Bank (“Chase”), over
the alleged mishandling of his loan, we affirmed a grant of summary
judgment in Chase’s favor on all causes of action but one, and in a
subsequent appeal affirmed a judgment entered in Chase’s favor after a
bench trial on the remaining cause of action and an award of $744,204 to
Chase in prevailing party legal fees. (See Elstead v. JPMorgan Chase Bank
(Nov. 30, 2009, Nos. A1117521, A119606) [nonpub. opn.] (Elstead I); Elstead
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (Mar. 3, 2017, Nos. A140069, A141247) [nonpub.
opn.] (Elstead II.)
      Meanwhile, this case for judicial foreclosure was filed in 2007 by the
original lender’s successor, Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia). The case was
stayed for many years pending the outcome of Elstead’s 2002 lawsuit. After
the stay was lifted, Elstead filed a cross-complaint against Wachovia, Chase
and American Security Insurance Company, alleging they conspired to deny
him payment of homeowners’ insurance proceeds for damage caused by
falling trees. Later, U.S. Bank, National Association as Successor Trustee By
Merger to Wachovia Bank, N.A. (US Bank) was substituted as a party for
Wachovia.
      By the time of the summary judgment rulings at issue in this appeal,
the operative pleadings were the first amended complaint for judicial
foreclosure filed on September 27, 2007, and Elstead’s fifth amended cross-
complaint filed on December 27, 2019.
      On May 2, 2022, following the grant of summary judgment, the trial
court entered a judgment in favor of US Bank on its complaint for judicial
foreclosure and in favor of US Bank and Chase on all the claims in Elstead’s
cross-complaint. Likewise, on February 25, 2022, it entered a judgment in

                                        2
favor of American Security Insurance on Elstead’s cross-claims after granting
summary judgment. We then affirmed an order issued by the superior court
after judgment directing the clerk’s office of that court to issue a writ of sale
to effectuate the foreclosure judgment. (U.S. Bank v. Elstead, June 27, 2023,
A166583 [nonpub. opn.] (Elstead III.)
      Elstead timely appeals from the judgment of judicial foreclosure and
the judgments rejecting his cross-claims, arguing the court erroneously
granted summary judgment against him. We disagree and affirm the
judgments.
                                 DISCUSSION
      As was true in the prior appeals, Elstead has once again filed appellate
briefs that are challenging to understand.
      “ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC
(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 146.) “Mere suggestions of error without
supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do
not properly present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) Likewise, it is not sufficient simply to cite legal
authority without explaining how it applies. (Doe v. McLaughlin (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654; Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
41, 52.) Appellate courts are not required to “guess” how an appellant thinks
the trial court erred. (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co.
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 855, 869 (Lafayette Morehouse).) An appellant must
“convince us, by developing his arguments, stating the law, and calling out
relevant portions of the record, that the trial court committed reversible

                                        3
error,” and the failure to do so justifies us in rejecting the appellant’s
arguments on this basis alone. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910; accord, Lafayette Morehouse, at p. 869.)
      Furthermore, we will consider only those issues that are identified in
an argument heading of Elstead’s appellate brief, because the headings
define the issues on appeal. They serve to ensure that we are “ ‘ “advised, as
[we] read, of the exact question under consideration, instead of being
compelled to extricate it from the mass.” ’ ” (United Grand, Inc. v. Malibu
Hillbillies, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.) “ ‘Failure to provide proper
headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly
identified by a heading.’ ” (Tsakopoulos Investments, LLC v. County of
Sacramento (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 280, 310.)
      We conclude Elstead has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating
error. To a large degree, his briefs are devoid of comprehensible legal and
factual analysis; he makes conclusory assertions of error in a vacuum, leaving
us to guess at what the law is or how it applies; and fails to provide record
citations for many of the factual assertions supporting his claims of error.
      First, under argument heading II, Elstead contends that US Bank “has
not met its initial burden of production establishing each element of its
judicial foreclosure cause of action and lacks standing to foreclose.” Under
this generic argument heading he makes two points.
      The first concerns US Bank’s standing to pursue judicial foreclosure.
Citing legal authorities, Elstead contends that in order to initiate foreclosure,
US Bank was required to prove through an “unbroken chain
of . . . assignments,” that it owned the original promissory note. He contends
that proof that the deed of trust had been assigned to US Bank is insufficient,

                                         4
and even so US Bank did not produce evidence of an unbroken chain of
assignments of the deed of trust in support of its summary judgment motion.
      Elstead has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating error. His
factual analysis of these points is conclusory, and entirely lacking in citations
to the record.2 Because we disregard all statements of fact that are not
accompanied by a record citation (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 385, 408, fn. 14, review granted Aug. 30, 2023, S280598;
accord, East Oakland Stadium Alliance v. City of Oakland (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 1226, 1240, fn. 5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)), we
are left with nothing to analyze. “It is not our function to scour the record
and make [appellant’s] arguments for him.” (Billauer v. Escobar-Eck (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 953, 969.) Indeed, his legal analysis does not even mention
all the relevant evidence.3 (See Diaz-Barba v. Superior Court (2015)

      2
        One of the more egregious examples is this assertion: “Facts 20-28
conclusively show that [US Bank] failed to satisfy the element of judicial
foreclosure requiring it to prove ownership of the note and authority to
foreclose . . . .”
      3
        Illustrative is his assertion that US Bank failed to introduce evidence
of an unbroken chain of assignments of the deed of trust. Among other
evidence US Bank cites on this issue is a printout from the National
Information Center of the Federal Reserve listing information pertaining to
the dissolution of one of the financial institutions in the chain of title and
subsequent corporate reorganizations of the succeeding entities. Elstead does
not discuss that document in his opening brief much less explain why that
evidence is not sufficient. Only in his reply brief does he briefly address that
evidence. That is too late. It is improper to wait until the reply brief to fully
develop an argument. (Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065, fn. 3.) “ ‘[A]n appellant’s duty attaches at
the outset. It would be unfair to permit an appellant to wait to argue his
substantive points until after the respondent exhausts its only opportunity to
address an issue on appeal. As a general rule, points not addressed until a
                                        5
236 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1487 [“not accurately and fairly stating the critical
facts” is a violation of “basic principles of appellate practice”].) Nor has he
provided a comprehensible summary of the significant facts.4 (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Discussion of the law is therefore unnecessary.5
An appellant “ ‘must convince the court, by . . . calling relevant portions of the
record to the court’s attention, that the trial court decision contained
reversible error.’ ” (Lafayette Morehouse, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 869.)
When the appellant does not do this, we may reject a claim of error without
any further consideration. (Bishop v. The Bishop’s School, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 910.) We will do so here.6

reply brief will not be considered unless good reason is shown for failing to
address them earlier.’ ” (Ibid.)
      4
        In support of its summary judgment motion, US Bank filed nearly
1500 pages of evidence. Elstead identifies those evidentiary submissions in
his opening brief but does not summarize their substance in a manner that
enables us to understand the evidentiary record. Instead, his discussion of
the evidence submitted in connection with the summary judgment motions is
an argumentative, one-sided discussion framed as a presentation of “triable
issues of fact” concerning various subjects.
      5
        The law is far from clear. US Bank asserts that possession of the
note alone suffices to confer standing to foreclose, citing various provisions of
the Commercial Code. Elstead does not address that point in his reply brief;
he simply repeats the law stated in his opening brief, like a ship passing US
Bank’s in the night. That is not persuasive.
      6
        Even if Elstead had not waived the failure-to-show-standing
argument, there is a second reason for rejecting that argument, although US
Bank does not raise it. Elstead did not preserve the issue by raising it first in
the trial court. Initially, Elstead filed only a declaration and a separate
statement of disputed facts in opposition to US Bank’s summary judgment
motion, and neither addressed the sufficiency of US Bank’s evidence
concerning its right to pursue foreclosure except in a conclusory fashion
without any argument or authority. Although Elstead later filed an
untimely, three-page opposition to the motion, which the trial court
                                        6
      The second and related point Elstead makes under this generic
argument heading concerns the authenticity of the note, and it fails for much
the same reasons. He asserts that US Bank “did not even bother to address
the over-riding issue as to loss of the original note and deed of trust, an issue
that must first be resolved before the note and deed of trust produced by [US
Bank] can even be considered as evidence of note ownership and standing to
foreclose,” and he contends it is reasonable to infer that the copies of the note
and deed of trust produced by US Bank are forgeries. This argument is
unsupported by any discussion of law (other than a citation to the summary
judgment statute), minimal discussion of the facts, and no citations to the
record. It is wholly undeveloped, and we disregard it. Furthermore, the trial
court ruled that Elstead “is estopped to deny the authenticity of the Note and
Deed of Trust,” and Elstead has not challenged that ruling on appeal. So the
substantive question of the note’s authenticity is irrelevant.
      Next, under argument heading III, Elstead argues that unspecified
triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment for US Bank. In his

considered, that brief neither raised nor addressed the argument. Theories
not presented or fully developed in the trial court cannot be asserted for the
first time on appeal from summary judgment. (Magallanes de Valle v.
Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 914, 924
[disregarding argument not presented in written opposition to summary
judgment motion and not brought to trial court’s attention].) The argument
is thus forfeited. Although respondents do not raise this forfeiture point, as
we previously explained in Elstead III where we held an issue forfeited in the
same circumstance, “[a]n appellant’s burden to demonstrate prejudicial error
‘remains the same whether or not the respondent files a brief or provides
argument or authority on an issue.’ ” (Elstead III, supra, quoting Doe v.
McLaughlin, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at p. 655; see also S.M. v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712, 722 [deeming issue forfeited
even though respondent did not argue forfeiture].)

                                        7
argument, he explains this means that he “presented substantial evidence of
triable issues as to all material facts, the predominant ones being those
derived from the . . . allegations of default” US Bank alleged against him. We
summarily reject this argument. The trial court ruled that Elstead is barred
by res judicata from claiming that he was not in default on the loan in 2002
when the foreclosure action was filed, given the claims and issues resolved in
the prior litigation. Elstead has not addressed the subject of res judicata in
his appellate brief, and therefore has not demonstrated the trial court erred
in adjudicating the issue of default against him as a matter of law.
      Next, Elstead addresses the cross-complaint. He advances a two-page
factual argument under the heading “WB and Chase have not met their
burden of persuasion that there are no triable issues of material fact.” This
argument fails to establish a basis for reversal. It contains no discussion of
any law and thus is not a cognizable appellate argument. (See, e.g., Doe v.
Ledor (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 731, 748-749.)
      Finally, Elstead asserts that American Surety Insurance Company “has
not met its burden of persuasion that there are no triable issues of material
fact.” This argument fails for the same reason because it simply incorporates
the same factual argument just rejected, which is deficient because it
contains no legal discussion.
      Elstead also argues in the alternative that the court erred in ruling
that his claim against American Surety Insurance Company is barred by a
one-year contractual limitations provision, but it is unnecessary to address
that issue because it was merely an alternative ground upon which the trial
court granted summary judgment against Elstead. We presume the parties’
familiarity with the court’s ruling and do not repeat it here. Because Elstead
has demonstrated no error in the court’s substantive rejection of his cross-

                                       8
claims against American Surety Insurance Company the statute of
limitations issue is moot.
                              DISPOSITION
      The judgments are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs.

                                     9
                                             STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

U.S. Bank et al. v. Elstead (A165202)

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