Court Opinion

ID: 9915417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 15:07:12.619492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:00.331451
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
01/05/2024 09:07 AM CST

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                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        315 Nebraska Reports
                                                   STATE V. TURNER
                                                   Cite as 315 Neb. 661

                                        State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
                                        Bernard R. Turner, appellant.
                                                     ___ N.W.2d ___

                                          Filed January 5, 2024.   No. S-23-225.

                 1. Convictions: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of a criminal conviction,
                    an appellate court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to
                    the prosecution.
                 2. Criminal Law: Motions for Continuance: Appeal and Error. A deci-
                    sion whether to grant a continuance in a criminal case is within the
                    discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent
                    an abuse of discretion.
                 3. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a
                    trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unrea-
                    sonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
                    and evidence.
                 4. Trial: Evidence: Prosecuting Attorneys: Due Process. The nondisclo-
                    sure by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the defendant,
                    requested by the defendant, violates due process, irrespective of the
                    good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. But due process is not vio-
                    lated where the evidence is disclosed during trial.
                 5. Motions for Continuance: Evidence: Waiver. If a continuance would
                    have been a sufficient remedy for a belated disclosure in violation of
                    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1912 (Cum. Supp. 2022), a defendant who fails to
                    request a continuance waives any rights he or she may have had pursu-
                    ant to § 29-1912.
                 6. Convictions: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a criminal
                    conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evi-
                    dence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard
                    is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evi-
                    dence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence,
                    and such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question for an
                    appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                               STATE V. TURNER
                               Cite as 315 Neb. 661

      favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
      the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
 7.   Criminal Law: Evidence: Confessions: Proof. A voluntary confession
      is insufficient, standing alone, to prove that a crime has been com-
      mitted, but it is competent evidence of that fact and may, with slight
      corroboration, establish the corpus delicti as well as the defendant’s
      guilty participation.
 8.   Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
      Error. When a defendant’s trial counsel is different from his or her
      counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any
      issue of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to the
      defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the issue will be
      procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.
 9.   Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim of inef-
      fective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a
      question of law.
10.   ____: ____. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
      direct appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed
      facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively deter-
      mine whether counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and
      whether the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged
      deficient performance.
11.   Effectiveness of Counsel: Postconviction: Records: Appeal and
      Error. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct
      appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance with enough par-
      ticularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of whether
      the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district court
      later reviewing a petition for postconviction relief to recognize whether
      the claim was brought before the appellate court.
12.   Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof: Appeal and Error. When a claim of
      ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal, the appel-
      lant is not required to allege prejudice; however, an appellant must make
      specific allegations of the conduct that he or she claims constitutes defi-
      cient performance by trial counsel.
13.   Effectiveness of Counsel: Proof. To prevail on a claim of ineffective
      assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
      104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that
      his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient
      perform­ance actually prejudiced the defendant’s defense.
14.   ____: ____. To show that counsel’s performance was deficient, the
      defendant must show counsel’s performance did not equal that of a law-
      yer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. TURNER
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 661

15. ____: ____. To show prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance,
    the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for
    counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different.
16. ____: ____. Assignments of error on direct appeal regarding ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel must specifically allege deficient perform­
    ance, and an appellate court will not scour the remainder of the brief in
    search of such specificity.

  Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J
Russell Derr, Judge. Affirmed.
  Megan E. Shupe and Steven M. Delaney, of Reagan, Melton
& Delaney, L.L.P., for appellant.
  Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and P. Christian
Adamski for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
                      I. INTRODUCTION
   In this direct appeal, Bernard R. Turner challenges his con-
viction, pursuant to jury verdict, for first degree murder. He
contends that the district court erred in granting the State’s
motion to continue trial, that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction, and that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. Finding no merit to his appeal,
we affirm.
                      II. BACKGROUND
   In November 2020, the State charged Turner with first
degree murder, a Class IA felony, 1 arising from a shooting that
occurred on October 18, 2013, in Omaha, Nebraska. Earlier in
2020, law enforcement received information that Turner was
responsible for the shooting and had confessed to murdering
the victim, Julius Vaughn.
1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. TURNER
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 661

   Turner pled not guilty, and the court set the case for a jury
trial.

            1. State’s Motion to Continue Trial
   Shortly before the scheduled trial date, the court held a
hearing, during which the State orally moved to continue trial.
Turner objected to the motion.
   The following day, the court held a hearing on the motion.
The State asserted that the prior afternoon, the Omaha Police
Department “made [it] aware” that a cell phone had been
seized at or around the time of the 2013 shooting and that
that cell phone had belonged to Turner. It explained that the
cell phone had been “seized in a separate investigation, which
is why we were not aware of it until yesterday.” Due to its
belated discovery, the State argued that it needed additional
time to analyze the cell phone. It asserted that there may be
“not only inculpatory information or evidence, but exculpatory
information or evidence” related to it. In this regard, a lengthy
exchange took place on the record.
   After hearing the parties’ arguments and considering Turner’s
speedy trial rights, the court sustained the motion.

           2. Disclosure of Cell Phone Evidence
   Prior to trial, the State disclosed the general contents of the
seized cell phone, a redacted affidavit and search warrant used
to obtain it, and redacted law enforcement reports regarding it.
Turner conceded on the record that the State disclosed those
materials, which the court received as exhibit 2 for purposes
of a hearing.
   Following the State’s disclosure, Turner did not file a motion
for continuance. Nor did he file a motion to suppress the evi-
dence or otherwise object to its admission.

                       3. Jury Trial
   The court held a 7-day jury trial, during which both par-
ties presented evidence. We summarize testimony and facts
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. TURNER
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 661

pertinent to the instant appeal, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the State.
                    (a) State’s Evidence
   The State offered the testimony of multiple witnesses,
including Vaughn’s family members and neighbors, criminal
investigators, and Kevin Johnson (Turner’s friend and the
recipient of his confession). The State also offered nearly
200 exhibits.
                  (i) Vaughn’s Family’s Testimony
   Two of Vaughn’s family members testified at trial. Vaughn’s
sister, Jalisa Vaughn, testified that Vaughn and Turner were
friends and frequently spent time together prior to the shoot-
ing. She stated that around that time, Turner had just been
released from prison and Vaughn had just purchased a vehicle.
When asked whether Vaughn was “the one that was kind of
driving [Turner] around,” Jalisa answered, “Yes.”
   Jalisa testified that on October 18, 2013, Vaughn and Turner
spent most of that day together, hanging out at a barbershop
with Jalisa and others. She left the barbershop around 5 or 6
p.m. to go home and get ready for a night shift at work. Jalisa
stated that Vaughn called her after she arrived home—at the
apartment where she, Vaughn, and their mother lived—and
told her that he was still with Turner and that he would be
arriving to retrieve some money. The apartment was located
near 22d and Vinton Streets in Omaha.
   Jalisa testified that at approximately 8 p.m., Vaughn arrived
at the apartment. He then asked her for money, she declined,
and Vaughn left. Shortly thereafter, Vaughn returned and
appeared to be “real nervous.” At this point, their mother
gave him some money. Before leaving the apartment the
second time, Vaughn placed a call on his cell phone, during
which Jalisa heard him say, “‘Here I come, bro. I’ll be out in
a minute.’”
   Jalisa further testified that when she left for work later that
evening, she saw Vaughn’s vehicle with the lights on in the
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. TURNER
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 661

parking lot and “a lot of police.” Jalisa stated that she “didn’t
know what was actually going on” but did not want to get
involved because “they [were] gang affiliated.” On her way
to work, she received a phone call from Vaughn’s girlfriend,
who informed her, “‘[Turner’s] in the closet. He just said
that your brother is dead.’” After speaking with Vaughn’s
girlfriend, Jalisa called her mother and told her to go outside,
because “‘[s]omething’s not right.’”
   Vaughn’s mother also testified regarding the evening of
October 18, 2013, and generally recounted the same events.
                    (ii) Neighbors’ Testimony
   The State adduced the testimony of two individuals who
lived in nearby apartment buildings at the time of the shoot-
ing. The first individual testified that she heard “[m]ultiple
gunshots” fired in a row on the evening of October 18,
2013. She testified that based on the sound of the gunshots,
she did not know “exactly where they came from,” but she
“kn[e]w it was very close.” She did not observe these gun-
shots being fired.
   The second individual testified that around 8:30 p.m., she
heard what she believed to be “knocks” on the door of her
apartment. She testified that these “knocks were particularly
hard.” She opened her apartment’s door, which faced a park-
ing lot that joined the lot of the Vaughns’ apartment build-
ing, and observed Vaughn’s vehicle parked there, next to her
vehicle, with the lights on. At that point, she saw movement
within his vehicle, and “it was obvious that there was a person
in there.”
   That individual further testified that at around 9:25 p.m.,
she left her apartment and walked to the parking lot. As she
approached her vehicle, she observed Vaughn alone, unre-
sponsive and reclined in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, with
the lights still on and the passenger door open. She further
observed that the driver’s side rear window of the vehicle was
shattered. Believing that Vaughn was “unconscious or dead,”
she called the 911 emergency dispatch service.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                        STATE V. TURNER
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 661

                  (iii) Investigators’ Testimony
                       and Related Exhibits
   A medical responder testified that within minutes of receiv-
ing the 911 call, he arrived at the parking lot where Vaughn’s
vehicle was located. He observed that Vaughn had no pulse,
was not breathing, and appeared to have a gunshot wound
below his right ear. It was readily apparent to him that Vaughn
was dead. The medical responder further observed that there
were “brass shell casings” on the pavement outside the passen-
ger side of Vaughn’s vehicle, on the floor of the vehicle below
the front passenger seat, and on the front passenger seat. He
testified that the front passenger door was open. This testi-
mony was corroborated by the testimony of other investigators
who arrived on the scene and various exhibits.
   The State presented shell casings recovered inside and
around Vaughn’s vehicle, video footage and photographs show-
ing the scene of the shooting, and testimony regarding an
autopsy that indicated Vaughn died as a result of the shooting.
The autopsy revealed that Vaughn sustained a total of 10 bul-
let wounds to his head, neck, torso, arms, and hand. Although
only seven bullets were recovered from his body, a medical
examiner testified that Vaughn was shot 9 or 10 times.
   The State also presented exhibits linking Turner to the
scene of the shooting. Forensic investigators identified a latent
fingerprint recovered from the front passenger doorframe of
Vaughn’s vehicle as belonging to Turner. They also found his
DNA on a cigarette butt recovered from inside the vehicle.
Additionally, the State presented evidence adduced from cell
tower metadata, which placed Turner near Vaughn’s apartment
building from approximately 8:13 to 8:33 p.m. on the day of
the shooting.

                  (iv) Johnson’s Testimony
                      and Gun Retrieval
   The State adduced the testimony of Johnson, who testi-
fied that Turner was responsible for the shooting and had
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                       STATE V. TURNER
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 661

confessed to killing Vaughn. Johnson testified that he received
a phone call from Turner on the evening of October 18, 2013,
during which Turner requested a ride and asked Johnson to
pick him up near 21st or 22d and Elm Streets. Johnson tes-
tified that this location was “[a] couple blocks away” from
Vaughn’s apartment building. Once Johnson arrived, Turner
ran up to his vehicle. He appeared to be “[o]ut of breath”
and sweating “[a] little bit.” After Turner got into Johnson’s
vehicle, they left. Turner then told Johnson, “‘That [racial
epithet] gone.’”
    Understanding this statement to mean that Turner had shot
someone, Johnson asked Turner if “he still ha[d] a gun on
him.” Turner responded, “‘Yes,’” and Johnson told him to
“get it out of my car.” Johnson then “pulled over and told
him to throw the gun out.” According to Johnson, Turner got
out of the vehicle and threw what Johnson believed to be
a firearm down a storm drain located near 29th Street and
Ellison Avenue. Turner then got back into the vehicle, and
Johnson dropped him off where he was staying with “[h]is
kids’ mom.”
    Johnson testified that 2 years after the shooting, in 2015,
Turner finally confessed to him that he had killed Vaughn.
Johnson stated that Turner told him, at that time, that he
believed Vaughn had killed his cousin and that Vaughn had lied
about it, and therefore, Turner said that he “would feel like a
bitch if he wouldn’t have did something.”
    In 2020, while Johnson was facing pending federal charges,
he informed law enforcement about Turner’s confession and
that the murder weapon was located in a particular storm
drain. Law enforcement later recovered a firearm from that
storm drain, which was located near 29th Street and Ellison
Avenue. The firearm was corroded and covered in leaves
and other debris, indicating that it had been there for “quite
some time.”
    Ballistics evidence established that the bullets used in
Vaughn’s murder could have been fired only from 1 of 13
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                             STATE V. TURNER
                             Cite as 315 Neb. 661

different firearm models. The firearm recovered from the storm
drain was consistent with being one of those models.

               (v) Other Corroborating Evidence
  The State presented additional evidence corroborating
Johnson’s testimony. Turner’s cell phone records showed that
on October 18, 2013, he called Johnson six times between 8:13
and 8:36 p.m. Turner and Johnson also exchanged text mes-
sages a few days after the shooting. Turner stopped responding
when Johnson sent text messages stating, “All them [racial
epithet] think it’s u.”
  At the conclusion of the State’s case, Turner moved to dis-
miss the charge against him, arguing that the State failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support his conviction. The court
overruled his motion.

                     (b) Turner’s Defense
   Turner presented the testimony of two witnesses. He adduced
alibi evidence from the first witness, who was pregnant with
his child at the time of the shooting. The second witness,
purported to be a former crime analyst, opined that she could
not “precisely pinpoint a location” based on the State’s cell
tower metadata.
   After resting Turner’s case, his trial counsel renewed his
motion to dismiss the charge against Turner. The court over-
ruled the motion.

                 4. Verdict and Sentencing
  Following trial, the jury convicted Turner of first degree
murder, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment.
  Turner filed a timely appeal, and the court appointed differ-
ent counsel to represent him. Because of the imposition of life
imprisonment, the appeal was placed on our docket. 2
2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(1) (Cum. Supp. 2022).
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. TURNER
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 661

                III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Turner assigns four errors, which we reorder for discussion.
First, he assigns that the district court erred by allowing the
State to continue trial based on evidence in the possession
of the Omaha Police Department but not provided or exam-
ined until the week prior to the original trial date. Second, he
assigns that the evidence presented at trial lacks the proba-
tive value to sustain a guilty verdict because, he asserts, no
rational trier of fact should have found him guilty of first
degree murder.
   Turner’s other two assignments allege ineffective assist­ance
of trial counsel. He assigns that his trial counsel’s perform­ance
was deficient for (1) “failing to zealously advocate for [him]”
and (2) “failing to present an adequate defense.” He asserts that
but for his trial counsel’s deficient performance, the result of
the proceeding below would have been different.
                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1] In an appeal of a criminal conviction, an appellate court
reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the pros-
ecution. 3 Additional standards of review will be set forth, as
appropriate, in the analysis.
                          V. ANALYSIS
                 1. Motion to Continue Trial
   Turner first assigns that the district court erred in sustaining
the State’s motion to continue trial “based on evidence in the
possession of the Omaha Police Department but not provided
or examined until the week prior to the original trial date.”
                   (a) Standard of Review
  [2,3] A decision whether to grant a continuance in a crimi-
nal case is within the discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 4
3
    State v. Hammond, ante p. 362, 996 N.W.2d 270 (2023).
4
    State v. Abligo, 312 Neb. 74, 978 N.W.2d 42 (2022).
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                   315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. TURNER
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 661

An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision
is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or
if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason,
and evidence. 5
                         (b) Discussion
   Turner presents two arguments, which are premised on
Brady v. Maryland 6 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1912 (Cum.
Supp. 2022). Regarding Brady, Turner generally argues that the
timing of the State’s disclosure of the cell phone and its admis-
sion at trial violated his constitutional right to due process.
Regarding § 29-1912, he seems to suggest that the timing of
the State’s disclosure violated the court’s discovery order and
argues that the appropriate remedy was to exclude the pertinent
evidence at trial.
   We address both arguments. Then, we consider whether
the district court abused its discretion in sustaining the State’s
motion to continue trial.
   [4] First, we conclude that neither the timing of the State’s
disclosure nor the admission of the evidence at trial violated
Turner’s right to due process. Under Brady, the nondisclo-
sure by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the
defendant, requested by the defendant, violates due process,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecu-
tion. But due process is not violated where the evidence is
disclosed during trial. 7 Here, it is undisputed that the State
disclosed the pertinent evidence before trial, and defense
counsel was given an opportunity to cross-examine the State’s
witnesses about it. The timing of the State’s disclosure and
5
  State v. Ezell, 314 Neb. 825, 993 N.W.2d 449 (2023).
6
  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
7
  State v. Parnell, 294 Neb. 551, 883 N.W.2d 652 (2016); State v. Smith, 292
  Neb. 434, 873 N.W.2d 169 (2016). See, State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135, 892
  N.W.2d 112 (2017); State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998),
  modified on denial of rehearing 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999).
  See, also, U.S. v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363 (8th Cir. 1996).
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                           STATE V. TURNER
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 661

the admission of the evidence at trial did not violate Turner’s
right to due process.
   [5] Second, we must determine whether the timing of
the State’s disclosure violated § 29-1912. That section is
Nebraska’s principal discovery statute in criminal cases, which
sets forth a list of evidence that may be subject to discov-
ery at the discretion of the trial court. 8 Another section 9 sets
forth various remedies the court may employ when there is a
claimed violation of a discovery order: The court may (1) order
such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials
not previously disclosed, (2) grant a continuance, (3) prohibit
the party from calling a witness not disclosed or introducing
in evidence the material not disclosed, or (4) enter such other
order as it deems just under the circumstances. Importantly, we
have held that if a continuance would have been a sufficient
remedy for a belated disclosure in violation of § 29-1912, a
defendant who fails to request a continuance waives any rights
he or she may have had pursuant to § 29-1912. 10
   Turner argues, without elaborating, that “a continuance
would not cure the prejudice caused” 11 and that the proper
remedy was to exclude the pertinent evidence. We are not
persuaded. While a court may order that a party not be per-
mitted to offer evidence at trial which it failed to disclose,
this court has stated a preference for a continuance in such
situations. 12 Turner fails to explain with any specificity how
a further continuance would not have cured any prejudice
to him, and in any event, he did not request one. Therefore,
we conclude that Turner waived his right to relief from the
State’s belated disclosure.
8
   See State v. Case, 304 Neb. 829, 937 N.W.2d 216 (2020).
9
   Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1919 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
10
   State v. Case, supra note 8.
11
   Brief for appellant at 23.
12
   State v. Case, supra note 8.
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                       315 Nebraska Reports
                                STATE V. TURNER
                                Cite as 315 Neb. 661

   Having determined that Brady and § 29-1912 were not vio-
lated, we must now consider whether the district court abused
its discretion in sustaining the State’s motion to continue the
trial. We conclude that it did not.
   As noted above, Turner relies on Brady in challenging the
trial court’s ruling. Because Brady applies to exculpatory
evidence, we read his argument to concede that the pertinent
evidence was, at least in part, exculpatory. That said, it is dif-
ficult to see how the trial court’s decision was based upon rea-
sons that are untenable or unreasonable or that its action was
clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. 13
   To the contrary, the court’s decision allowed the State to
evaluate whether the pertinent evidence was exculpatory and,
therefore, needed to be disclosed under Brady. Moreover, the
continuance gave the State an opportunity to disclose any
exculpatory evidence before trial, and it is undisputed that
the State did so. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s
motion to continue trial.
   For completeness, we note that Turner makes an additional
argument suggesting a categorical rule should apply based on
the timing of a party’s request for continuance. Because the
circumstances of each case differ and are pertinent, we decline
to adopt such a rule. The determination is appropriately within
the trial court’s discretion.

                  2. Sufficiency of Evidence
   Turner’s second assignment of error challenges the suf-
ficiency of the evidence to support his first degree murder
conviction. In Nebraska, a person commits first degree murder
if he or she kills another person purposely and with deliberate
and premeditated malice. 14
13
     See State v. Ezell, supra note 5.
14
     § 28-303.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                            STATE V. TURNER
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 661

                    (a) Standard of Review
   [6] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of
the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circum-
stantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An
appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass
on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence, and
such matters are for the finder of fact. The relevant question
for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. 15
                           (b) Discussion
   Turner presents several arguments, all of which seem to
revolve around Johnson’s testimony. For example, Turner
asserts that Johnson’s testimony was the “only evidence pre-
sented” to establish his mental state and that no other evidence
supported a finding of premeditation. 16 Then, to the extent
that other evidence tended to corroborate Johnson’s account
of events, Turner proposes other explanations. He next high-
lights his alibi evidence, the lack of DNA evidence on the
firearm, and other possible “suspects.” 17 Finally, he argues that
Johnson’s testimony was “riddled with discrepancies” and that
he “lacks credibility.” 18
   In sum, Turner contends that Johnson’s testimony was the
“only evidence linking [him] to the crime” and that Johnson’s
testimony was inconsistent and not corroborated by other wit-
nesses. 19 We disagree.
   [7] As the State points out, a voluntary confession is
insufficient, standing alone, to prove that a crime has been
15
   State v. Lorello, 314 Neb. 385, 991 N.W.2d 11 (2023).
16
   Brief for appellant at 15.
17
   Id. at 22.
18
   Id. at 20.
19
   Id. at 22.
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                            STATE V. TURNER
                            Cite as 315 Neb. 661

committed, but it is competent evidence of that fact and may,
with slight corroboration, establish the corpus delicti as well
as the defendant’s guilty participation. 20 Here, the State pre-
sented evidence regarding the events leading up to the shoot-
ing, Vaughn’s cause of death, the scene of the crime, forensics,
cell phone records, cell tower metadata, and tangible physi-
cal evidence. This evidence corroborated Turner’s confession
to Johnson.
   Turner’s remaining arguments are contrary to our standard
of review. On appeal, we do not resolve conflicts in the evi-
dence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the
evidence, because such matters are for the finder of fact. 21
The relevant question here is only whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. 22
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
Turner’s conviction.

             3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
   [8] Finally, Turner assigns two claims of ineffective assist­
ance of trial counsel. As a preliminary matter, we note that he
is represented by different counsel on appeal. When a defend­
ant’s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct
appeal, the defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue
of trial counsel’s ineffective performance which is known to
the defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the
issue will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postconvic-
tion proceeding. 23
20
   State v. Figures, 308 Neb. 801, 957 N.W.2d 161 (2021).
21
   See State v. Lorello, supra note 15.
22
   See id.
23
   State v. Dap, ante p. 466, 997 N.W.2d 363 (2023).
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   The State contends that both claims are insufficiently spe-
cific and should not be considered.
                    (a) Standard of Review
   [9,10] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
may be determined on direct appeal is a question of law. 24 In
reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct
appeal, an appellate court decides only whether the undisputed
facts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively
determine whether counsel did or did not provide effective
assistance and whether the defendant was or was not preju-
diced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance. 25
   [11,12] An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised
on direct appeal when the claim alleges deficient performance
with enough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make
a determination of whether the claim can be decided upon
the trial record and (2) a district court later reviewing a peti-
tion for postconviction relief to recognize whether the claim
was brought before the appellate court. 26 When a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised in a direct appeal,
the appellant is not required to allege prejudice; however,
an appellant must make specific allegations of the conduct
that he or she claims constitutes deficient performance by
trial counsel. 27
                     (b) General Principles
   [13-15] Before addressing Turner’s articulated claims, we
set forth general principles that govern ineffective assistance
of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 28 the defendant must
24
   State v. Mabior, 314 Neb. 932, 994 N.W.2d 65 (2023).
25
   Id.
26
   State v. Lorello, supra note 15.
27
   State v. Miranda, 313 Neb. 358, 984 N.W.2d 261 (2023).
28
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
   (1984).
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show that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and
that this deficient performance actually prejudiced the defend­
ant’s defense. 29 To show that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient, the defendant must show counsel’s performance did
not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in
criminal law. 30 To show prejudice from counsel’s deficient per-
formance, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable prob-
ability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result
of the proceeding would have been different. 31
                          (c) Discussion
                (i) Failure to Zealously Advocate
   Turner first claims that his trial counsel was deficient in
“failing to zealously advocate for [him].” We agree with the
State that this assignment is insufficiently specific.
   [16] Assignments of error on direct appeal regarding inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel must specifically allege
deficient performance, and an appellate court will not scour
the remainder of the brief in search of such specificity. 32 We
recently rejected a similar assignment in State v. Miranda,
noting that it “d[id] not specifically allege any deficient
conduct by [the defendant’s] counsel.” 33 Likewise, Turner’s
assignment lacks the specificity we demand on direct appeal.
Therefore, we decline to address it.
            (ii) Failure to Present Adequate Defense
   Turner next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to “present an adequate defense.” According to Turner,
he retained only one of the two attorneys who represented
him at trial, and he asserts that he did not consent to that
29
   State v. Galindo, ante p. 1, 994 N.W.2d 562 (2023).
30
   State v. Dap, supra note 23.
31
   Id.
32
   State v. Garcia, ante p. 74, 994 N.W.2d 610 (2023).
33
   State v. Miranda, supra note 27, 313 Neb. at 376, 984 N.W.2d at 276.
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attorney’s associate “doing the majority of trial.” 34 However,
Turner fails to specify how the associate’s performance was
deficient. Instead, he broadly contends that his trial counsel
was deficient in “delegating the majority of trial responsibili-
ties to another attorney.” 35
   We read Turner’s argument to suggest that a trial counsel’s
delegating duties to his or her associate is presumptively defi-
cient conduct by counsel. We disagree. Although we have not
previously addressed this precise issue, 36 similar arguments
have been rejected by other courts. 37 This claim lacks merit.
                      VI. CONCLUSION
   We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in sustaining the State’s motion to continue trial based
on its belated discovery of pertinent evidence. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
further conclude that Turner fails to show that no rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first
degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Turner also fails to
sufficiently allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
                                                    Affirmed.
34
   Brief for appellant at 29.
35
   Id.
36
   But see, State v. Vanderpool, 286 Neb. 111, 835 N.W.2d 52 (2013)
   (rejecting per se determination of ineffective assistance of counsel in other
   context); State v. McCroy, 259 Neb. 709, 613 N.W.2d 1 (2000) (same).
37
   See, e.g., Young v. State, 473 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. 1971); Bass v. State, 713
   S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App. 1986). See, also, Rocha v. U.S., No. 92-2024, 1993
   WL 57479 (6th Cir. Mar. 4, 1993) (unpublished disposition listed in table
   of “Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 986 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir.
   1993)); Lynch v. State, No. 42299, 2015 WL 6604290 (Idaho App. Oct. 30,
   2015).