Court Opinion

ID: 9846974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:51:33.359541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:58.109939
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I concur in Divisions 1 and 2, but not in Division 3.
Even applying the heightened standard of care to these facts, we should reverse, since O’Shields has not presented any evidence to suggest that MARTA or Millar were even slightly negligent. He was required to do so, because the legal presumption of negligence which he seeks to marshal to his aid is no longer valid. The case he relies on, Piller v. Hanger Cab Co., 115 Ga. App. 260, 263 (154 SE2d 420) (1967), overlooked this Court’s rejection of this substitute for proof which is explained in Darlington Corp. v. Finch, 113 Ga. App. 825, 828-829 (149 SE2d 861) (1966). The uncontroverted expert’s affidavit states, “The very occasional failure of a step roller tire is inevitable on an escalator and cannot be avoided by proper maintenance. The tires have relatively long lives but their failure life is quite variable and cannot be predicted.”
O’Shields contends that if Clark had made a visual inspection by opening the pit and shining a light on the rollers as they moved by, rather than just walking on each step, he might have seen that the step roller was about to fail at the time he made his last inspection before the incident. Marcusky, the MARTA employee responsible for monitoring the Millar contract, testified at deposition that either method can successfully detect a defective step roller, and that one method is not more effective than the other. As for being able to determine if the roller was about to break by visual inspection, the only evidence even remotely supporting O’Shields’ contention is *460Lauer’s comment that “[v]isual inspection rarely will indicate that the bond between the tire and roller is about to fail.” Lauer also stated, “The very occasional failure of a step roller tire is inevitable on an escalator and cannot be avoided by proper maintenance. The tires have relatively long lives but their failure life is quite variable and cannot be predicted. . . . [The rollers] normally give no warning that they are about to fail. When one hears a noise or feels a rumble, the tire has already failed.”
O’Shields offers nothing but unsupported conjecture contradicting Lauer’s testimony that an escalator step roller’s failure “cannot be predicted.” Furthermore, Linsey testified that the rubber on the broken roller “looked fairly strong” and “hadn’t been worn very badly as opposed to others,” and that he had no idea why the step roller casing separated from the wheel. Visual inspection on September 21 would have revealed nothing more than visual inspection did on the day of the incident.
O’Shields’ contention does not create a factual dispute dependent on evidence; his assertion of “might have seen” is mere unsupported conjecture. Nor is there any evidence that the nature of the stop was the result of negligence. Since plaintiff O’Shields has the burden of putting forward some evidence of slight negligence which is unmet, his theory of liability necessarily fails. James v. Otis Elevator Co., 854 F2d 429 (II) (11th Cir. 1988).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong, Judge Andrews and Judge Smith join in this dissent.
Order of the Court.
On July 22, 1996, the appellants, Millar Elevator Service Company and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s opinion dated June 28, 1996. The appellants contend that their motion is timely as this Court issued a substituted opinion on July 12, 1996. However, the appellants’ first motion for reconsideration was denied, and our substituted opinion merely revised the original opinion and did not change the judgment or the issue date. See Court of Appeals Rule 37 (f). Therefore, the appellants’ motion is untimely as a first motion for reconsideration, and appellants have failed to obtain an order of this Court allowing a second motion for reconsideration. Based on the foregoing, the appellants’ motion is hereby DISMISSED.