Court Opinion

ID: 9897544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:56.461801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.017415
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                      State v. Barry Berry (A-8-22) (086838)

Argued February 28, 2023 -- Decided June 7, 2023

FASCIALE, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

       A jury found defendants Kenneth Daniels, Levell Burnett, and Barry Berry
guilty of being leaders of a drug trafficking network, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commonly
referred to as the “kingpin” offense. As to the four material elements of the kingpin
offense, the jury asked whether it was “possible” to be a supervisor (the third
element), but not to occupy a high-level position (the fourth element). The Court
considers whether the judge’s response to that question was error capable of
producing an unjust result. The Court also considers the Appellate Division’s
determinations that the trial judge should have modified element four of the model
kingpin charge by adding language from State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571
(1994), to further explain what constitutes a “high-level” member of a conspiracy
and that the judge needed to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs
admitted against each defendant, as well as its determination that Berry’s motion for
a judgment of acquittal should have been granted.

       Regarding the kingpin charges against defendants, the trial court’s
instructions closely tracked the model charge. The court explained that “the State
must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that the
defendant conspired with two or more persons. Two, that the purpose of the
conspiracy included a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture,
distribute, dispense or transport heroin in the state. And, three, that the defendant
was a financier or the defendant was an organizer, supervisor, or manager of at least
one other person. And number four, that defendant occupied a high level position in
the conspiracy.” During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court:
After pointing out that elements three and four seemed similar, they asked whether
element three could be found without finding element four.

        The judge announced that he would re-read the charge and then “explain it a
little bit.” The judge read the indictment and then re-read the instructions about the
offense and its elements. After reading the third and fourth elements of the offense,
the judge added: “All right, so you have the 4 elements, 3 and 4 on the surface do
they sound similar? Yeah, I would agree with you. They sound similar but they are

                                          1
4 separate elements to this offense and you have to consider each one separately.
And you have to [decide] whether each element has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt or not. If you find that [all] of the 4 elements ha[ve] been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict must be guilty on that charge.”

       At sidebar, Burnett’s counsel requested that the judge directly answer the
jury’s question by instructing them that a defendant can be a supervisor without
occupying a high level position. The judge responded that he would prefer to “just
stick with the model charge, try to elaborate on that a little bit and let them decide.”
Following deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict for each of the defendants
on the charge of being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network.

       Defendants appealed from their convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, in part
challenging the trial court’s instructions on the kingpin charge. 471 N.J. Super. 76,
89, 94-98 (App. Div. 2022). As to the kingpin charge, the Appellate Division
opined that it should have included language from Alexander further defining what
constituted a “high-level” member of the conspiracy. Id. at 105, 112-13. It also
found that the judge should have tailored the kingpin charge to the proofs as to each
defendant. Id. at 114. As to Berry, the appellate court found that the evidence
against him was insufficient to sustain a kingpin conviction. Id. at 102, 104. The
Court granted the State’s cross-petition for certification. 252 N.J. 97 (2022).

HELD:          *Judges are encouraged, when practical, to respond “yes” or “no” to
unambiguous and specific questions posed by juries during deliberations rather than
solely re-read sections of the final jury charge. In general, when a specific request
for clarification clearly calls for and is capable of a “yes” or “no” answer, like here,
then judges should respond accordingly. Here, the answer to the jury’s question is
indisputably “yes,” one can be a “supervisor” but not hold a “high-level” position in
a drug trafficking network. Instead of responding “yes” to the question, however,
the judge re-read the entire model kingpin charge; opined that those elements, three
and four, sounded similar; and may have implicitly suggested that being a
“supervisor” is sufficient to establish that a defendant held a “high-level” position
within such an organization. The response to the question was an error clearly
capable of producing an unjust result.

              *Regarding the appellate determination that it was error not to alter
portions of the model jury charge here, the trial court was under no obligation either
to mold the charge sua sponte by factually addressing the varying levels of authority
that each defendant played in the conspiracy or to modify the model charge by
adding further definitional language from Alexander. The trial judge properly
denied Berry’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.

                                           2
1. The Court reviews in detail the legislative history of the kingpin statute. After
upholding the statute as constitutional in State v. Afanador, 134 N.J. 162, 165
(1993), the Court addressed the adequacy of a jury charge in a kingpin prosecution
in Alexander, 136 N.J. 563. The Alexander Court concluded that, to be consistent
with the Legislature’s intent in enacting the kingpin statute, a trial court “should
instruct the jury that it must find that the defendant occupies a high-level position,
. . . and that in that position the defendant exercised supervisory power or control
over others engaged in an organized drug-trafficking network.” Id. at 570-71. The
Court added that “[a]n appropriate instruction should also amplify the other statutory
terms that are expressed as material elements of the crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3.”
Id. at 575. The model jury charge for the kingpin statute and then N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3
itself were revised in keeping with Alexander. The history of the statutory
amendment reveals that the Legislature considered including in the statute that a
leader is “an upper echelon member” of a trafficking network and other additional
language but declined to do so. Ultimately, by considering and declining to
incorporate into the statute itself a number of Alexander’s requirements, the
Legislature left in place the judicial elaboration of the kingpin statute through case
law and the model jury charge. Here, the jury charge thus tracked verbatim a model
charge that was explicitly addressed both by the Court and by the Legislature. There
was no plain error in the trial court’s general kingpin instruction, which comports
with the statute and interpretive case law. (pp. 15-23)

2. A trial judge is obliged to answer jury questions posed during the course of
deliberations clearly and accurately and in a manner designed to clear its confusion.
Here, the jury’s question was not ambiguous. The jury wanted to know whether it
was “possible” to find that the State proved element three but that it did not prove
element four. The jury did not probe generally the kingpin instruction. And its
reason for seeking clarification was also unambiguous: elements three and four
sounded “a little” bit similar. Since the jury question was not ambiguous, the judge
was obligated to “clear the confusion” about whether it was “possible” to find three
but not four by responding directly with “yes” or “no” to the specific inquiry posed.
The Court encourages judges, when the law is clear, to respond directly to
unambiguous and specific “yes” or “no” questions from juries during deliberations,
rather than simply re-read the final jury charge. Here, the answer should have been
“yes.” In declining to answer “yes,” the judge informed counsel that he would re-
read the entire charge then “elaborate on that a little bit.” Although the judge was
correct that each element of the offense must be considered separately, his statement
that he “agree[d] with” the jury that elements three and four “sound[ed] similar”
could easily have been interpreted to mean that the two require the same proofs,
which is not correct. The judge’s elaboration, therefore, amounted to plain error,
and it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result because such a suggestion --
that being a supervisor (element three) is sufficient to establish that a defendant
occupied a high-level position (element four) -- could have led the jury to find the
                                          3
State proved defendants were “high-level” leaders merely by proving they were
supervisors. If the jury had been told that it could find element three without finding
element four, its verdict on the kingpin charges against defendants might have been
not guilty. Defendants’ convictions must therefore be vacated. (pp. 24-27)

3. Turning to the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the trial court should have
molded “the jury instructions to address the varying levels of authority of each
individual defendant” in the drug trafficking network, 471 N.J. Super. at 110 n.5, the
Court finds such tailoring was unwarranted. The Court finds no basis for adding
further language from Alexander that a “high-level” or “upper-echelon” leader of an
organization is someone “who occupies a significant or important position in the
organization and exercises substantial authority and control over its operations.” Id.
at 110 (quoting Alexander, 136 N.J. at 575). And, in the circumstances of this case,
tailoring the charge to each defendant was not necessary. First, the Alexander Court
made it quite clear that under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, a drug trafficking network “need not
have any specific configuration or chain of command.” Alexander, 136 N.J. at 575.
It was unnecessary for the judge to mold the charge to address respective levels of
authority within a hierarchy among defendants in the criminal enterprise. Second,
this was not a protracted trial with substantial conflicting testimony about leadership
roles. There was no need to incorporate evidentiary facts into the kingpin charge .
In addition, the parties may have disagreed over the choice of which facts to
incorporate and whether the evidence of such facts was sufficient to be included in
the court’s charge. (pp. 27-29)

4. The Court disagrees with the appellate court’s reversal of the order denying
Berry’s motion for acquittal. The Court reviews the evidence presented to support
the State’s theory regarding Berry, including the contents of wiretapped phone calls,
and concludes that a reasonable jury could afford different weight to that evidence
than the Appellate Division did. The justification to acquit Berry was far from clear,
and the trial court properly denied his motion for acquittal. (pp. 29-32)

      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED and REMANDED for a new trial as to all
defendants on the kingpin charge.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE-
LOUIS, and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily
assigned) join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion.

                                          4
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-8 September Term 2022
             086838

      State of New Jersey,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                v.

          Barry Berry,

     Defendant-Respondent.

      State of New Jersey,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                v.

     Kenneth Daniels, a/k/a
       Kendal Burnett,

     Defendant-Respondent.

      State of New Jersey,

       Plaintiff-Appellant,

                v.

      Levell Burnett, a/k/a
        Lavelle Burnett,

     Defendant-Respondent.

                1
       On certification from the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
         471 N.J. Super. 76 (App. Div. 2022).

        Argued                      Decided
   February 28, 2023              June 7, 2023

 Stephen A. Pogany, Special Deputy Attorney
 General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for
 appellant State of New Jersey (Theodore N. Stephens, II,
 Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen A.
 Pogany, and Caroline C. Galda, Special Deputy Attorney
 General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on
 the briefs).

 Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
 argued the cause for respondent Levell Burnett (Joseph E.
 Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Marcia Blum,
 Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the
 briefs, and Tamar Y. Lerer, on the briefs).

 Stephen W. Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued the
 cause for respondent Kenneth Daniels (Joseph E.
 Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch,
 on the brief, and Kenneth Daniels, pro se, on the
 supplemental brief).

 David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for
 respondent Barry Berry (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
 Defender, attorney; David A. Gies, on the briefs).

 Marc Yenicag argued the cause for amicus curiae
 Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
 (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; CJ Griffin, of
 counsel, and Zachary Levy, on the brief).

JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.

                           2
      In this appeal, we focus primarily on the trial judge’s response to a

question posed by the jury during deliberations. A jury found defendants

Kenneth Daniels, Levell Burnett, and Barry Berry guilty of being leaders of a

drug trafficking network, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commonly referred to as the

“kingpin” offense. As to the four material elements of the kingpin offense, the

jury asked whether it was “possible” to be a supervisor (the third element), but

not to occupy a high-level position (the fourth element). That question

required a “yes” or “no” answer -- and the answer is indisputably “yes,” one

can be a “supervisor” but not hold a “high-level” position in a drug trafficking

network. Instead of responding “yes” to the question, however, the judge re -

read the entire model kingpin charge; opined that those elements, three and

four, sounded similar; and may have implicitly suggested that being a

“supervisor” is sufficient to establish that a defendant held a “high-level”

position within such an organization. The response to the question was an

error clearly capable of producing an unjust result.

      We hold that judges are encouraged, when practical, to respond “yes” or

“no” to unambiguous and specific questions posed by juries during

deliberations rather than solely re-read sections of the final jury charge. In

general, when a specific request for clarification clearly calls for and is

                                         3
capable of a “yes” or “no” answer, like here, then judges should respond

accordingly.

      Without concluding he should have answered “yes,” the Appellate

Division determined that the trial judge failed to adequately address the

“fundamental import of the jury’s question.” State v. Berry, 471 N.J. Super.

76, 112 (App. Div. 2022). It found that the trial judge should have modified

element four of the model kingpin charge by adding language from State v.

Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571 (1994), to further explain what constitutes a

“high-level” member of a conspiracy. And it determined that the judge needed

to tailor the kingpin charge to the evidential proofs admitted against each

defendant. The Appellate Division therefore reversed the kingpin convictions

as to defendants Kenneth Daniels and Levell Burnett. As to defendant Barry

Berry, however, the appellate court reversed an order denying his motion for a

judgment of acquittal and vacated his conviction.

      Regarding the appellate determination that it was error not to alter

portions of the model jury charge here, we hold that the trial court was under

no obligation either to mold the charge sua sponte by factually addressing the

varying levels of authority that each defendant played in the conspiracy or to

modify the model charge by adding further definitional language from

                                        4
Alexander. And we conclude that the trial judge properly denied Berry’s

motion for a judgment of acquittal.

      We therefore affirm as modified the Appellate Division’s judgment to

vacate the kingpin convictions as to Daniels and Burnett; and we reverse the

appellate court’s reversal of the trial judge’s denial of Berry’s motion for a

judgment of acquittal. We remand for a new trial against all defendants on the

State’s kingpin charge.

                                        I.

      The police arrested Daniels for car theft and incarcerated him for six

weeks. During that time, prosecutors recorded wiretapped jailhouse calls

between Daniels and his co-defendants about narcotics distribution. As

relevant here, the State intercepted twenty-four telephone conversations:

fifteen of the calls were from Daniels to Berry or Burnett; two were from

Daniels to others; two were from Burnett to Daniels; and five were from Berry

to others.

      Communication data warrants led to the arrests of Burnett and Berry.

Unlike many other kingpin cases, this case did not involve testimony from a

cooperating witness describing the organizational hierarchy of the criminal

enterprise. As supplemented by physical evidence gathered by investigators,

including money, narcotics, and weapons, the wiretapped conversations

                                        5
constituted the bulk of the State’s evidence against defendants. Berry, Burnett,

and Daniels were all indicted for multiple offenses, see Berry, 471 N.J. Super.

at 93-97, including first-degree being a leader of a narcotics trafficking

network in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3.

                                        A.

      Prior to trial, counsel for Burnett moved to dismiss the counts of the

indictment relating to the kingpin charge or, in the alternative, to edit the

model jury charge, including by adding that “[a]nother material element of the

crime is the . . . existence of a drug trafficking scheme, network or system.”

(citing State v. Ellis, 424 N.J. Super. 267 (App. Div. 2012)). Counsel asked

the judge to explain to the jury that, “[w]hile no particular form of

organization is required, there must be some form of structured relationship.”

      The court declined to dismiss the kingpin counts. The trial court also

rejected the challenge to using the model jury charge as is, noting that the

model charge was modified after changes to the statute and this Court’s

opinion in Alexander, and that, in State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351 (2016), this

Court “saw no reason to disturb the model jury charge or the amended statute

with the added language” proposed in that case.

      At trial, the State played for the jury the recorded twenty-four

conversations described above, and introduced testimony from an expert who

                                         6
interpreted the meaning of slang words and phrases utilized in the calls. The

State also introduced into evidence weapons, money, and drugs that further

implicated defendants.

      After the State rested, defendants moved for judgments of acquittal

pursuant to Rule 3:18-1 and State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967), arguing that

the phone calls and physical evidence produced by the State were insufficient

to establish that they were leaders of a drug trafficking organization.

      The trial court observed that

            [d]uring the calls, there are discussions that can be
            inferred to be regarding a drug trafficking network,
            such as collecting money from certain individuals;
            packaging and distribution of drugs; the mention of
            various individuals who appear to be under the
            authority of the defendants in the organization; orders
            being given out; discussion about firearms; supervision
            of lower level individuals and so forth.

“[V]iewing the State’s evidence in its entirety . . . and giving the State the

benefit of all its favorable testimony, as well as all of the favorable

inference[s] which reasonably could be drawn therefrom,” the trial court

determined that “a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a

reasonable doubt” and therefore denied the motions.

                                        B.

      After both the State and defendants closed their cases, the trial court

instructed the jury on its role. Regarding the kingpin charges, the trial court’s
                                         7
instructions closely tracked the model charge. See Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), “Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3)”

(rev. Oct. 23, 2000). The court first read the offense as set forth in N.J.S.A.

2C:35-3 and reprinted in the model charge, that “[a] person is a leader of a

narcotics trafficking network if he conspires with two or more other persons in

a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense,

or transport in this State” one or more of a list of specified controlled

dangerous substances “as a financier, or as an organizer, supervisor or

manager of at least one other person.”

        The court then told the jury that,

              [i]n order to convict a defendant of this charge, the
              State must prove each of the following elements beyond
              a reasonable doubt: One, that the defendant conspired
              with two or more persons. Two, that the purpose of the
              conspiracy included a scheme or course of conduct to
              unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense or
              transport heroin in the state. And, three, that the
              defendant was a financier or the defendant was an
              organizer, supervisor, or manager of at least one other
              person. And number four, that defendant occupied a
              high level position in the conspiracy.

Again, the court’s list of elements tracked the model jury charge verbatim, as

did the court’s more detailed explanations of the elements particularly relevant

here:

              The third element that the State must prove beyond a
              reasonable doubt for this charge, is that the defendant
                                             8
acted as a financier or as an organizer, supervisor,
manager of at least one other person. A financier is a
person who, with the intent to derive a profit, provides
money or credit or other thing of value in order to
purchase a controlled dangerous substance or an
immediate precursor or otherwise to finance the
operations of a drug trafficking network. The State
need not prove that any intended profit was actually
realized.

An organizer is a person who purposely arranges,
devises or plans a drug trafficking conspiracy. A
supervisor is one who purposely oversees the operation
of a drug trafficking conspiracy. A manager is one who
purposely directs the operation of a drug trafficking
conspiracy.

....

The fourth element that [the] State must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt on this charge is that the defendant
held a high level position in the drug trafficking
conspiracy. In other words, the State must prove that
the defendant occupied a position of superior authority
or control over other persons in a scheme or
organization of drug distribution or manufacture,
dispensing or transportation, and that in that position
the defendant exercised supervisory power or control
over others engaged in the drug trafficking conspiracy.

Defendant, however, does not have to be the only, or
even the primary financier, organizer, supervisor or
manager, and it is no defense that defendant was subject
to the supervision or management of another, nor that
another person or persons were also leaders of the
narcotics trafficking network.

                           9
                                        C.

      During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court. The

jurors did not probe generally into the kingpin instruction. They did not ask

that the judge re-read any part of the charge. Instead, their question was

precise. After pointing out that elements three and four seemed similar, they

asked whether element three could be found without finding element four. The

judge read the question at sidebar with counsel:

            With regards to the leader of narcotics trafficking
            network; in defining [the] high level element, number 4
            . . . , the wording seems similar a little to element 3.
            Clarifying question: Is it possible to be a supervisor,
            element 3, but not high level for element 4?

            [(emphases added) (quotation marks omitted).]

He then discussed with counsel how to respond. 1

      The judge expressed his initial intention to re-read all elements of the

kingpin offense -- not just three and four -- and asked for trial counsel’s input.

The assistant prosecutor and Daniels’ counsel agreed that the judge should re -

read the entire kingpin charge. Burnett’s counsel, joined by Berry’s counsel,

renewed her pretrial motion essentially requesting that elements three and four

be more fully defined.

1
  The lawyers for both parties in this appeal, who did not try the case, agree
that the answer to the question is “yes.”

                                        10
      The judge brought the jury back and announced that he would re-read

the charge and then “explain it a little bit.” The judge read the indictment

charging each defendant with “being a leader of a narcotics trafficking

network,” and noted that the language of the statute was “very similar” to that

of the indictment. The judge then re-read the instructions about the offense

and its elements. After reading the third and fourth elements of the offense,

the judge added:

             All right, so you have the 4 elements, 3 and 4 on the
             surface do they sound similar? Yeah, I would agree
             with you. They sound similar but they are 4 separate
             elements to this offense and you have to consider each
             one separately. And you have to [decide] whether each
             element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt or
             not. If you find that [all] of the 4 elements ha[ve] been
             proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then your verdict
             must be guilty on that charge. If you find that . . . any
             one of the four elements for this charge has not been
             proven beyond a reasonable doubt then your verdict has
             to be not guilty on this charge.

      At sidebar, Burnett’s counsel requested that the judge directly answer

the jury’s question by instructing them that a defendant can be a supervisor

without occupying a high level position, explaining her view that, if the jurors

“ask for a yes or no answer, . . . it’s . . . legally correct to say yes, it’s possible

to be guilty on 3 but not 4.” Then she explained, “I think that’s what they are

looking for. I think that’s simple and straightforward and it’s true and . . .

would be helpful for them.” The judge responded, “[l]et’s stick to what I just
                                          11
gave them. If they come back with more, I will try to [do] a little more but,”

he elaborated, “I don’t like going down a road of giving an exact answer. I’d

rather just stick with the model charge, try to elaborate on that a little bit and

let them decide. We’ll see how it is.”

      The jurors did not pose further questions about that instruction.

Following deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict for each of the

defendants on the charge of being a leader of a narcotics trafficking network.

                                         D.

      Defendants appealed from their convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, in

part challenging the trial court’s instructions on the kingpin charge. Berry,

471 N.J. Super. at 89, 94-98.

      As to the charge, the Appellate Division opined that reading verbatim

the model kingpin charge is ordinarily sufficient. Id. at 104. But the court

determined that here, where the State alleged three defendants were leaders,

the kingpin charge should have included language from Alexander further

defining what constituted a “high-level” member of the conspiracy. Id. at 105,

112-13. It also found that the judge should have tailored the kingpin charge to

the proofs as to each defendant. Id. at 114. As to Berry, the appellate court

found that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain a kingpin

conviction. Id. at 102, 104.

                                         12
      We denied petitions for certification by the defendants, 252 N.J. 80

(2022); 252 N.J. 87 (2022); 252 N.J. 96 (2022), but granted the State’s cross-

petition for certification, 252 N.J. 97 (2022). We also granted the motion of

the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) to

appear as amicus curiae.

                                       II.

      The State argues that the trial judge responded appropriately to the jury’s

“yes” or “no” question, although it now concedes that the answer to the

question is “yes” because it is in fact “possible” to be a “supervisor” (element

three) but not hold a “high-level” position (element four) in the conspiracy.

The State contends, however, that the current model kingpin charge, which has

existed for more than two decades, is adequate as it is, even in multi-defendant

cases, like this one, where there are multiple alleged leaders of a criminal

enterprise. It maintains that the Appellate Division erred by requiring the

judge to include in the kingpin charge more language from Alexander about

what constitutes a “high-level” position and by determining that the trial judge

should have molded the kingpin charge to the evidence against each defendant.

Finally, the State asserts the Appellate Division disregarded its proofs in

reviewing Berry’s Reyes motion.

                                       13
      Defendants contend the judge failed to answer the jury’s question by not

simply saying “yes,” and exacerbated the problem by giving his opinion that

elements three and four of the kingpin offense sounded similar. Defendants

argue generally that the judge was obligated to analyze the reason for the

jury’s question and that a further definition of “high-level” would have been

appropriate, especially in a multi-defendant case like this where each

defendant is charged with being a leader and where there is no testimony

explaining the inner workings of the criminal enterprise. Berry additionally

argues that the appellate court correctly applied Reyes to acquit him.

      The ACDL asserts that the model kingpin charge is fundamentally

flawed. It contends that the fourth element of the existing charge provides a

confusing definition of what it means to hold a “high-level” position in the

drug trafficking conspiracy. For that reason, it urges us to refer the matter to

the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges to study the issue and adopt

clarifying language from Alexander that the model charge currently does not

contain.

                                       III.

      The trial judge’s response to the jury’s question seeking clarification

requires us to briefly address the kingpin statute; determine whether the

longstanding kingpin model jury charge adequately instructs jurors on the law;

                                        14
determine whether, in elaborating on that charge in response to the jury’s

request for clarification, the trial court misstated the law; and, finally,

determine whether the judge should have molded the charge to the facts by

explaining defendants’ respective levels of authority in the drug trafficking

network. We begin with the adequacy of the model jury charge.

                                         A.

      The kingpin statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, was enacted as part of the

Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, L. 1987, c. 106. The Act contains

several “[d]eclaration[s] of policy and legislative findings,” including that,

             [i]n order to be effective, the battle against drug abuse
             and drug-related crime must be waged aggressively at
             every level along the drug distribution chain, but in
             particular, our criminal laws must target for expedited
             prosecution and enhanced punishment those repeat
             drug offenders and upper echelon members of
             organized narcotics trafficking networks who pose the
             greatest danger to society.

             [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c) (emphases added).]

The legislative history of the Act notes how its overarching policies are

furthered by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, which

             is designed to reach the upper echelon participants in
             an illegal narcotics conspiracy. This provision makes
             it a crime to conspire with others as an organizer,
             supervisor, financier or manager to engage in a profit-
             making scheme to manufacture, distribute or transport
             certain of the most dangerous drugs, such as heroin,
             cocaine, methamphetamine, LSD or PCP. This offense
                                         15
             distinguishes between lower-level dealers and “mules,”
             and higher-ranking drug profiteers. Persons convicted
             of this offense will be subject to a mandatory life term
             during which they shall be ineligible for parole for a
             term of 25 years.

             [A. Judiciary Comm. Statement to A. 3270 2 (Dec. 18,
             1986).]

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 makes it a crime of the first degree to be a leader of a

narcotics trafficking network. (“A person is a leader of a narcotics trafficking

network if he conspires with two or more other persons in a scheme or course

of conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or

transport in this State” any specified controlled dangerous substance. “Leader

of narcotics trafficking network is a crime of the first degree and upon

conviction thereof, . . . a person shall be sentenced to an ordinary term of life

imprisonment . . . .”).

      In State v. Afanador, the defendant challenged the kingpin statute as

unconstitutionally vague. 134 N.J. 162, 165 (1993). Specifically, the

defendant argued that the term “organizer,” as used within the statute, is

susceptible to a number of interpretations that would expand the reach of the

statute far beyond the Legislature’s intent. Id. at 171-72. The defendant

claimed that the plain text of the statute would apply to an individual who

merely brings together a willing buyer and seller, an outcome that runs

                                        16
contrary to the Legislature’s intent to target “upper-echelon members” of drug

trafficking organizations. Id. at 172.

      Although this Court noted that “the statute is hardly a model of precise

draftsmanship,” we reasoned that the “[t]he clear implication of ‘organizer,’

particularly in a statute dealing with a ‘leader’ of a drug-trafficking network, is

that the term describes a person who exercises some supervisory power over

others.” Id. at 169, 172. The Court observed that, when read in context with

the terms “supervisor, financier or manager,” “organizer” denotes authority to

direct the actions of others. Id. at 172-73. Accordingly, the Court concluded

that the kingpin statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 173.

      After upholding the kingpin statute in Afanador, this Court addressed the

adequacy of a jury charge in a kingpin prosecution in Alexander, 136 N.J. 563.

The Appellate Division in that case reversed the defendant’s conviction under

the kingpin statute, reasoning that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that

it must find that the defendant was an “upper-echelon member” of the network

and failed to define certain critical terms in the statute. Id. at 567. The

Appellate Division held that a proper jury instruction should define an upper

echelon member “as someone who stands on an upper level of the chain of

command of a drug trafficking network, exercising command authority over

                                         17
members of that organization whose status is subordinate to his.” Id. at 568

(quoting State v. Alexander, 264 N.J. Super. 102, 111 (App. Div. 1993)).

      This Court rejected the definition of “high-level” proposed by the

Appellate Division in Alexander because that definition suggested there must

be a vertical “chain of command” in a drug trafficking network, as part of

which an individual working at the street level or immediately above that

could not be “high-level.” Id. at 574-75. The Court explained:

            A “high-level” or “upper-echelon” “leader” of such an
            organization is one who occupies a significant or
            important position in the organization and exercises
            substantial authority and control over its operations.
            Neither the specific elements enumerated in the
            provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 nor the additional
            requirements extrapolated from the statute’s statement
            of purpose indicate that a drug operator exercising
            authority and controlling other people in an
            organization or network, even at the street level, could
            not be a “leader” or “drug kingpin” within the
            contemplation of the Legislature. Rather, the role of a
            defendant as a leader or drug kingpin turns more on the
            nature of that person’s authority, the magnitude or
            extent of control, and the number of persons over whom
            that power is exercised.

            [Id. at 575 (emphases added).]

      Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division that, in light

of the trial court’s instruction as to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, “the jury, although it had

convicted defendant, ‘did not determine whether defendant’s status and

activities warranted the punishment [that] the Legislature has reserved for a
                                        18
“leader of a narcotics trafficking network.”’” Id. at 570 (alteration in original)

(quoting 264 N.J. Super. at 111).

        This Court analyzed the kingpin statute and its “statement of purpose,”

and more specifically the Legislature’s intent to make a defendant’s “‘upper

level’ role in a drug network central to the activity criminalized.” Ibid.

Noting that the statute “does not include some of the important factors used in

the statutory statement of purpose to describe the drug-kingpin crime, and, to

that extent, does not completely convey the full legislative understanding in

creating this crime,” the Court remarked that the “status or the position of the

defendant in the drug trafficking network is a substantive part of the crime. ”

Ibid.

        Consistent with the Legislature’s intent, the Court concluded that

              a trial court, in a prosecution pursuant to N.J.S.A.
              2C:35-3, should instruct the jury that it must find that
              the defendant occupies a high-level position, that is, a
              position of superior authority or control over other
              persons, in a scheme or organization of drug
              distribution (or manufacture or dispensing or
              transporting), and that in that position the defendant
              exercised supervisory power or control over others
              engaged in an organized drug-trafficking network.

              [Id. at 570-71.]

The Court added that “[a]n appropriate instruction should also amplify the

other statutory terms that are expressed as material elements of the crime under

                                        19
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. Thus, the statutory terms ‘organizer, supervisor, financier

or manager’ should be explained so that the meaning of those terms is more

fully understood by the jury.” Id. at 575. “For example,” the Court wrote, a

trial

              court might define an “organizer” as a person who
              arranges, devises, or plans a drug-trafficking network;
              a “supervisor” as one who oversees the operation of a
              drug-trafficking network; a “financier” as one who is
              responsible for providing the funds or resources
              necessary to operate a drug-trafficking network; and a
              “manager” as one who directs the operations of a drug-
              trafficking network.

              [Ibid.]

        The model jury charge for the kingpin statute was revised in keeping

with Alexander. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Leader of Drug

Trafficking Network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3)” (rev. Feb. 26, 1996). Notably, a

fourth element was added to the description of the offense -- “[t]hat defendant

occupied a high level position in the conspiracy.” The definitions proposed in

Alexander for the terms “organizer,” “supervisor,” “financier,” and “manager”

were included in the new instruction’s detailed explanation of element three;

and the direction quoted above -- that a jury “must find that the defendant

occupies a high-level position, that is, a position of superior authority or

control over other persons . . . and that in that position the defendant exercised

supervisory power or control over others engaged in an organized drug-
                                        20
trafficking network” -- was included in the new instruction’s detailed

explanation of element four. See ibid.; Alexander, 136 N.J. at 570-71, 575.

      The Legislature, in turn, amended N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 in response to

Alexander. See Statement to A. 694 (L. 1997, c. 343) (“The bill is further

intended to clarify the recent New Jersey Supreme Court ruling State v.

Alexander (decided July 19, 1994). This decision held that in a prosecution

under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, the trial court should instruct the jury that it must find

that the defendant occupies an ‘upper echelon’ role and in that position

exercises supervisory power or control over others engaged in an organized

drug trafficking network. These amendments clarify that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 is

the exclusive source of definition for the offense.”).

      Before Alexander, the statute provided, as relevant here, that

            [a] person is a leader of a narcotics trafficking network
            if he conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor,
            financier or manager, to engage for profit in a scheme
            or course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture,
            distribute, dispense, bring into or transport in this State
            [one or more of the list of prohibited substances].

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (1995).]

As amended after Alexander, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 now reads:

            A person is a leader of a narcotics trafficking network
            if he conspires with two or more other persons in a
            scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully
            manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into, or
            transport in this State [one or more of the list of
                                        21
            prohibited substances] as a financier, or as an organizer,
            supervisor or manager of at least one other person.

The Legislature considered including in the statute that a leader is “an upper

echelon member” of a trafficking network, as well as definitions nearly

identical to those proposed in Alexander for the terms “organizer,”

“supervisor,” and “manager,” but declined to do so. See A. 694 Second

Reprint (L. 1997, c. 343) (noting phrases deleted through bill amendments).

The Legislature did, however, elect to provide its own definition of “financier”

as “a person who, with the intent to derive a profit, provides money or credit or

other thing of value in order to purchase a controlled dangerous substance or

an immediate precursor, or otherwise to finance the operations of a drug

trafficking network.” N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3; L. 1997, c. 343.

      Following the amendments to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, the model jury charge

for the kingpin statute was again revised. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal),

“Leader of Narcotics Trafficking Network (N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3)” (rev. Oct. 23,

2000). The section quoting the statute was updated, and the definition of

“financier” changed from that proposed in Alexander to that adopted by the

Legislature. See ibid. The final revised model charge was given nearly

verbatim by the trial court in this case as noted above.

      This Court has already recognized that the kingpin statute is not the most

precise, see Afanador, 134 N.J. at 169, and that jury instructions must provide
                                       22
guidance beyond the words of the statute itself to give effect to the legislative

intent behind the statute, as described in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c), see Alexander,

136 N.J. at 570-71, 575. The model jury charge was updated and expanded in

light of those determinations, and the revised charge was considered by the

Legislature when it revisited the statute. Ultimately, by considering and

declining to incorporate into the statute itself a number of Alexander’s

requirements, the Legislature left in place the judicial elaboration of the

kingpin statute through case law and the model jury charge.

      In general, “[i]t is difficult to find that a charge that follows the Model

Charge so closely constitutes plain error.” State v. Ramirez, 246 N.J. 61, 70

(2021) (quoting Mogull v. CB Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 466

(2000)). That is especially true when, as here, the jury charge tracks verbatim

a model charge that was explicitly addressed both by this Court and by the

Legislature.

      We also find no plain error in the trial court’s general kingpin

instruction, which comports with the statute and interpretive case law. We

turn our attention to the court’s response to the jury’s request for clarification.

                                         B.

      Our law is well-settled on jury questions seeking clarification. When a

jury requests clarification, a trial judge “is obligated to clear the confusion.”

                                        23
State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 372, 394 (2002) (citation omitted). If a jury’s

question is ambiguous, a trial judge “must clarify the jury’s inquiry by

ascertaining the meaning of its request.” Ibid. In other words, “the trial judge

is obliged to answer jury questions posed during the course of deliberations

clearly and accurately and in a manner designed to clear its confusion, which

ordinarily requires an explanation beyond rereading the original charge. The

court’s failure to do so may require reversal.” Pressler & Verniero, Current

N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7 on R. 1:8-7 (2023).

      Here, the jury’s question was not ambiguous. The jury wanted to know

whether it was “possible” to find that the State proved element three but that it

did not prove element four. The jury did not probe generally the kingpin

instruction. And its reason for seeking clarification was also unambiguous:

elements three and four sounded “a little” bit similar. Since the jury question

was not ambiguous, the judge was obligated to “clear the confusion” about

whether it was “possible” to find three but not four by responding directly with

“yes” or “no” to the specific inquiry posed.

      We appreciate the trial judge’s inclination to reiterate only the words of

the model jury charge. Depending on the question posed, many times it is

entirely appropriate to do so. But we encourage judges, when the law is clear,

                                       24
to respond directly to unambiguous and specific “yes” or “no” questions from

juries during deliberations, rather than simply re-read the final jury charge.

      Here, the answer should have been “yes.” For a defendant to be labelled

a kingpin, the State must prove each of the four elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3

beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 483 (2018)

(“[C]riminal convictions [must] rest upon a jury determination that the

defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,

beyond a reasonable doubt.” (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,

510 (1995))). Because the third and fourth elements of the offense must both

be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to find a defendant guilty under N.J.S.A.

2C:35-3 -- in contrast to the “financier or organizer, etc.” language within the

third element -- it is clear that, although both describe the role of the actor as

stressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1(c), they must be understood as discrete

elements, with element four requiring some proof beyond what element three

requires. A simple answer of “yes” in response to the jury’s clear-cut legal

question would have been appropriate here.

      Furthermore, in declining to answer “yes,” the judge informed counsel

that he would re-read the entire charge then “elaborate on that a little bit.”

Thus, after re-reading the four elements of the offense, the judge stated, “All

right, so, you have the 4 elements, 3 and 4 on the surface do they sound

                                         25
similar? Yeah, I would agree with you. They sound similar but they are 4

separate elements to this offense and you have to consider each one

separately.” Although the judge was correct that each element of the offense

must be considered separately, his statement that he “agree[d] with” the jury

that elements three and four “sound[ed] similar” could easily have been

interpreted to mean that the two require the same proofs, which is not correct.

As the appellate court insightfully pointed out, the judge “unwittingly

suggested that being a supervisor is sufficient to establish that a defendant

occupied a high-level position within the organization.” Berry, 471 N.J.

Super. at 112. The judge’s elaboration, therefore, amounted to plain error. Cf.

State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321, 329 (2019) (finding no plain error as to a

challenged jury instruction because it “accurately described the State’s burden

of proof with respect to the elements of” the charged offense and its lesser-

included offense).

      We conclude the error was clearly capable of producing an unjust result

because such a suggestion -- that being a supervisor (element three) is

sufficient to establish that a defendant occupied a high-level position (element

four) -- could have led the jury to find the State proved defendants were “high -

level” leaders merely by proving they were “supervisor[s].” See State v.

Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 213 (1986) (“Jury instructions must . . . adequately

                                       26
define the offense and cover all the essential elements . . . . The test for plain

error related to a jury charge is whether in the circumstances the error

possessed a clear capacity for producing an unjust result.” (quotation and

citation omitted)). If the jury had been told that it could find element three

without finding element four, its verdict on the kingpin charges against

defendants might have been not guilty. We therefore agree with the Appellate

Division that defendants’ convictions must be vacated, although for a different

reason.

                                        C.

      We next address the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the trial court

should have molded “the jury instructions to address the varying levels of

authority of each individual defendant” in the drug trafficking network. Berry,

471 N.J. Super. at 110 n.5. We conclude such tailoring was unwarranted.

      The Appellate Division noted that “the model charge does not include

language from Alexander that explains, ‘[a] “high-level” or “upper-echelon”

“leader” of such an organization is one who occupies a significant or important

position in the organization and exercises substantial authority and control

over its operations.’” Id. at 110 (quoting Alexander, 136 N.J. at 575). The

appellate court did “not go so far as to rule that this additional language from

Alexander must be charged to the jury in all leader cases” but stressed that

                                        27
“[t]he error in this case was not just the failure to read a few critical words

from Alexander but also the failure to mold the jury instructions to address the

varying levels of authority of each individual defendant.” Id. at 110 n.5. “In

the unusual circumstances of this case,” the Appellate Division “believe[d] this

additional explanatory language was necessary” and that it was plain error not

to add it to the charge. Id. at 105 n.3, 110.

      The court also

            recommend[ed] that the Model Jury Charge Committee
            consider the advisability of revising the model
            instruction for the leader offense to incorporate this
            language from Alexander or at least to include a
            footnote or notation explaining that this language in
            Alexander provides further instruction on what it means
            to hold a high-level position in the drug trafficking
            conspiracy.

            [Id. at 110 n.5.]

      We see no basis for that recommendation. Moreover, in the

circumstances of this case, we conclude that tailoring the charge to each

defendant was not necessary.

      First, the Alexander Court made it quite clear that under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

3, a drug trafficking network “need not have any specific configuration or

chain of command.” Alexander, 136 N.J. at 575. It was unnecessary for the

judge to mold the charge to address respective levels of authority within a

hierarchy among defendants in the criminal enterprise. The State charged all
                                        28
three defendants with being leaders. The final jury charge more than

sufficiently explained that the State had to prove each element of the kingpin

offense as to each defendant. Indeed, both in reading the kingpin charge and

after re-reading the charge in response to the jury’s question, the judge

accurately told the jurors,

            you must return a separate verdict for each defendant as
            to this charge. In other words, you’ll have to decide
            each case individually, whether the verdicts as to each
            defendant on this offense are the same or different,
            depends on the evidence and your determination as
            judges of the facts.

      Second, this was not a protracted trial with substantial conflicting

testimony about leadership roles. The trial took approximately one week ,

which can hardly be considered drawn out or prolonged. There was no need to

incorporate evidentiary facts into the kingpin charge. Cf. State v. Concepcion,

111 N.J. 373, 380 (1988) (“Incorporating specific evidentiary facts into a jury

charge is especially helpful in a protracted trial with conflicting testimony.”).

In addition, the parties may have disagreed over the choice of which facts to

incorporate and whether the evidence of such facts was sufficient to be

included in the court’s charge.

                                       IV.

      Finally, we disagree with the appellate court’s reversal of the order

denying Berry’s motion for acquittal. When reviewing a motion for acquittal,
                                        29
the question “is whether, viewing the State’s evidence in its entirety, . . . and

giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the

favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable

jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” Reyes, 50 N.J.

at 459. As this Court recently pointed out, “[g]iven the deference afforded a

jury verdict, the justification for the grant of a [motion for acquittal] should be

clear.” State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J. 116, 158 (2021).

      The State’s theory of the case against Berry was not that Berry

controlled Daniels or Burnett, but that Berry supervised the operation of the

narcotics trafficking conspiracy by overseeing at least one other person, that he

occupied a high-level position in the organization, and that, in that position, he

exercised supervisory power or control over others. The wiretap calls could

reasonably be construed to explain the operation of the criminal organization,

as well as how Berry supervised subordinates, relayed orders to foot soldiers

lower in the chain of command, and took on a supervisory leadership role in

light of Daniels’ absence. The physical evidence seized when Berry was

arrested (including a loaded 12-gauge shotgun, a loaded handgun, over 500

decks of heroin, and over $800 in cash), although not determinative, taken

together with the calls, could allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Berry

held a high-level position in the network.

                                        30
      Berry placed five of the twenty-four intercepted telephone calls. Those

calls show that Berry oversaw the drug trafficking work of at least one person

(Bob, who sold drugs and was not a customer) and that Berry exercised

supervisory power and control over Bob, Mod (another person who only sold

drugs), and Kiersten. In fact, in two different phone calls, Berry told Kiersten

that she could “work” another person Berry referred to as the “Indian” and

informed her about the price that he usually charged for various types and

quantities of narcotics. The calls not only show that Berry relayed orders to

foot soldiers lower in the chain of command, but also convey Daniels’

insistence that others involved in the criminal enterprise, such as Mod and an

individual named Wheezy, needed people “like us . . . that’s going to keep it

moving” and that Berry needed to “be on” Mod or Wheezy. A reasonable jury

could conclude that these conversations establish how Berry would supervise,

at a high level, subordinates in the criminal network while Daniels was not

around. Therefore, looking at the entirety of the calls a reasonable jury could

find Berry guilty of the kingpin charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

      The appellate court did not fully recognize the substance of the recorded

calls when it reasoned that “it appears that Berry’s role essentially was to

forward messages and instructions from Daniels, who was incarcerated and

thus had limited capacity to communicate directly with persons outside the

                                       31
jail.” Berry, 471 N.J. Super. at 103. The appellate court concluded that

“transmitting instructions from other conspirators” did not demonstrate a

“high-level supervisory or managerial role” and that the trial evidence “aside

from the jailhouse calls” did not support a reasonable inference that defendant

held a high level position of authority in the criminal scheme. Ibid. This

conclusion, however, reduces the calls to conversations solely about

transmitting information, while ignoring the concerns expressed by Daniels

that Berry needed to “keep it moving” and “be on” others involved in the

conspiracy. A reasonable jury may indeed afford different weight to this

evidence. In light of the full context of the calls, and the physical evidence

against Berry, the justification to acquit Berry was therefore far from clear,

and the trial court properly denied his Reyes motion.

                                       V.

      We affirm as modified the vacation of the kingpin convictions against

defendants because the entirety of the trial judge’s response to the jury’s

request for clarification was plain error. We reverse the appellate court’s

conclusion that Berry’s Reyes motion should have been granted. We remand

for a new trial as to all defendants on the kingpin charge.

                                       32
     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, and WAINER APTER; and JUDGE SABATINO
(temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion.

                             33