Court Opinion

ID: 9793337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:14.375037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:33.804376
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Holmes, J.:
Herbert E. Huser and Ethel M. Huser, his wife, appeal from an adverse decision in an action wherein they sought a writ of mandamus and a mandatory injunction against Duck Creek Watershed (Joint) District No. 59, Wilson, Montgomery and Elk Counties (hereafter Duck Creek) concerning the construction and maintenance of a flood control dam and lake on the appellant’s property. Appellants also sought a declaratory judgment establishing their right to appropriate water from the project for irrigation purposes. The trial court denied all relief sought and the Husers have appealed.
The dam and lake in question were constructed by Duck Creek pursuant to the Kansas watershed district act, K.S.A. 24-1201 et seq. Duck Creek was originally formed in 1963 and encompasses land in the Duck Creek watershed extending over portions of three counties. In 1969, Duck Creek adopted a general plan for the district which was approved by the chief engineer of the Division of Water Resources of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Kansas. The general plan was adopted for the purpose of flood control and contemplated the construction of a dam and water storage facility on property subsequently purchased by the appellants. On December 20, 1971, the fee owner of the property, Theodore Myers, executed an easement to Duck Creek. The easement provided, in pertinent part:
“[F]or or in connection with the construction, operation, maintenance, and inspection of a flood water retarding structure designated as Site No. 7-30(2) in the Duck Creek Watershed to be located on the above described land, And for the flowage of any waters in, over, upon, or through such structure, and for the permanent storage and temporary detention, either or both, of any waters that are impounded, stored or detained by such structure.
“There is reserved to the Grantor, his heirs and assigns, the right and privilege to use the above described land of the Grantor at any time, in any manner and for any purpose not inconsistent with the full use and enjoyment by the Grantee, its successors and assigns, of the rights and privileges herein granted.”
In December, 1974, the Husers purchased the property from *3Myers subject to the easement. Mr. Huser was fully aware of the easement, its terms and the general plan of Duck Creek for the development of the flood control project in the district, including Dam Site No. 2, which was to be located upon the property purchased from Myers. Dam Site No. 2 was constructed during 1978 and the spring of 1979 upon appellants’ property. This action was filed May 9, 1979.
K.S.A. 24-1201 et seq. provides for the establishment and function of watershed districts in this state. The general corporate powers and duties of a watershed district formed pursuant to the act are set out in K.S.A. 24-1209, which provides in pertinent part:
“Each watershed district incorporated under the provisions of this act shall be a body politic and corporate and shall have the power:
Fourth. To construct, improve, maintain and operate works of improvement including such facilities and appurtenances as necessary for the conservation of soil, prevention of floods, disposal of water and the conservation, development and utilization of water for domestic, municipal, agricultural, industrial, recreational purposes and such other uses as may be authorized by the provisions of K.S.A. 82a-701 to 82a-725, inclusive, and any amendments thereto.”
K.S.A. 24-1213 - 1218 set forth the procedures for undertaking watershed projects and improvements. Reference is made in those statutes to a “general plan” which must be submitted by the district for approval of the chief engineer of the division of water resources of the Kansas state board of agriculture. The “general plan” is defined in K.S.A. 24-1202(rn) to mean:
“[A] preliminary engineering report describing the characteristics of the district, the nature and methods of dealing with the soil and water problems within the district, and the projects proposed to be undertaken by the district. It shall include maps, descriptions and such other data as may be necessary for the location, identification and establishment of the character of the work to be undertaken and such other data and information as the chief engineer may require.”
The statutes make provision for the general plan to be modified as to the plan itself or as to its financing and for such modifications to be submitted to the chief engineer for subsequent approval. K.S.A. 24-1214. The statutes do not specify the degree of exactitude with which the district must comply with approved plans. K.S.A. 24-1216 calls for “detailed construction plans and specifications” for projects in the watershed district whenever *4the district determines such projects should be undertaken. The statute also requires that the project plans be in “conformance to the general plan and other applicable state laws on water use and control” and that the project plans also be submitted to the chief engineer for approval, disapproval or modification. Again, the statutes are silent as to any requirement for exact conformity or the degree of compliance with the general plan.
The act, itself, makes no provision for appeals to the district court from decisions of the watershed district board of directors. In the absence of a statutory provision for appellate review of an administrative decision, no appeal is available. However, relief from illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable acts of the district can be obtained using an extraordinary remedy like mandamus, quo warranto or injunction. Bush v. City of Wichita, 223 Kan. 651, 576 P.2d 1071 (1978); Ryan, Judicial Review of Administrative Action — Kansas Perspectives, 19 Washburn L.J. 423, 426 (1980).
The Husers, in their first claim for relief, assert that the dam and lake as constructed materially and substantially departed from the general plan and the construction plans. These contentions are based upon the size of the finished lake area and the location of the borrow areas from which earth was removed in order to construct the dam. Appellants sought a writ of mandamus directing the Duck Creek board of directors to specifically comply with the general plan.
K.S.A. 60-801 reads:
“Mandamus is a proceeding to compel some inferior court, tribunal, board, or some corporation or person to perform a specified duty, which duty results from the office, trust, or official station of the party to whom the order is directed, or from operation of law.” (Emphasis added.)
As long ago as 1888, it was said:
“The only acts of public functionaries which the courts ever attempt to control by either injunction or mandamus, are such acts only as are in their nature strictly ministerial; and a ministerial act is one which a public officer or agent is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed.” Martin, Governor v. Ingham, 38 Kan. 641, 17 Pac. 162. (Emphasis added.)
A writ of mandamus is discretionary and does not issue as a matter of right. Unless the defendant’s legal duty is clear, the *5writ should not issue. State, ex rel., v. Paulsen, 204 Kan. 857, Syl. ¶ 2, 465 P.2d 982 (1970).
Since the duty of the watershed district to strictly comply with the general plans for the watershed is not clear in the enabling statutes, mandamus would not be a proper remedy. The trial court found there was substantial compliance with the plans based upon the testimony of the construction engineers and district representatives. An examination of the record discloses that the court’s findings of substantial compliance are supported by the evidence and therefore, the decision of the Duck Creek board of directors was not arbitrary, illegal or unreasonable. The mandamus was properly denied.
Plaintiff next contends that the watershed district should be compelled to plant certain grasses which he desires on the dam and lake area, grasses which he contends would be more suitable for livestock grazing than the grasses actually planted.
The watershed district has the power, authority and duty, under K.S.A. 24-1209 Fourth to maintain the dam and lake project. Testimony offered at trial supported the conclusion that the grasses planted were chosen for their peculiar characteristics in holding the soil and retarding erosion. According to the expert testimony, the grass desired by the plaintiff does not have the same qualities and would not serve to maintain and preserve the structure as well as that utilized by Duck Creek. As the decision of the watershed board is supported by substantial competent evidence, the refusal to grant a mandatory injunction did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The granting or denial of an injunction is, generally speaking, discretionary. Absent an abuse of that discretion, the appellate court will not normally interfere. Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass’n v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 224 Kan. 357, 582 P.2d 1123 (1978).
Next the appellants sought a mandatory injunction to require the appellee to remove and relocate a fence which had been installed to protect the dam. The fence was installed along the same line as an earlier fence and appellants desired that it be moved and relocated as it “unnecessarily interfere[d] with plaintiffs’ full use and enjoyment of their property.” There was testimony that the appellee tried to place the fence where Mr. Huser wanted it placed, but for some reason failed to satisfy him. *6Mr. Huser admitted at trial that the fence did not actually prevent his use of the land, but rather hindered it.
The trial court found upon the evidence presented that the fence was placed for the purpose of protecting the dam. As it did not prevent plaintiff s use of the land, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order that the fence be moved. The decision to place the fence was not illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable, even though it might have been placed in a location more suitable to the appellants.
The final point raised by appellants concerns the claimed right to use water accumulated in the lake for commercial agricultural irrigation purposes. The watershed district refused to permit irrigation based upon advice of engineers that irrigation could adversely affect the lake level and thereby promote erosion and damage to the dam .by. wave action and wintertime freezing. Appellants sought a declaratory judgment that they had a right of access to use water from the lake for irrigation purposes. The court based its decision to deny the declaratory judgment on its finding of a potential for damage to the dam and the conclusion that no water rights were reserved for the plaintiff s benefit in the original easement granted to the watershed district. The stated purposes of the easement were flood control, water flowage and water storage. The reservation of rights in the original easement is for purposes “not inconsistent” with the grantee’s rights. The watershed district has the responsibility for the maintenance of the flood control project, including the dam in question. Costs of maintenance, as are other expenses, of the district, are borne by the taxpayers in the watershed district.
Although there was evidence to the contrary, a civil engineer with the soil conservation service testified that irrigation from the impounded water could cause damage to the dam structure for which the watershed district would be responsible. He also testified that the dam was not designed or constructed for purposes of irrigation. There was similar testimony from other witnesses. As there was competent evidence that irrigation might result in damage to the dam and increased maintenance at the cost of the taxpayers, the district’s action in denying access for irrigation purposes was not illegal, arbitrary or unreasonable. Based upon the evidence of potential damage to the dam, the *7trial court did not commit error in refusing to enter a declaratory judgment in appellant’s favor.
The judgment is affirmed.