Court Opinion

ID: 9602211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:31.335237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.566183
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
The term “his household,” when used in automobile liability insurance policies has often been construed by the courts. In general, the courts have drawn a distinction between temporary absences from the family home and permanent removal from that home. We recognized that distinction in Lumbermen’s Mutual casualty Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 387 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1963), although on the facts of that case we held in favor of insurance coverage.
In the case at bar it must be determined whether there was any genuine issue as to the permanency of Robert Wainscott’s absence from the erstwhile family home. In my view, the facts here strongly support the superior court’s conclusion that Robert Wainscott did intend his removal from the home to be permanent.1
It is undisputed that the Wainscotts separated in March, 1976, and that they never again lived under the same roof.2 When Robert moved out he took virtually all of his possessions and, except for the week of Deborah’s funeral, did not return to the family home even for a visit. Apparently, no attempt at reconciliation was ever made. Finally, Juanita stated that it was her understanding that Robert intended the separation to be permanent.3 Significantly, Robert did not attempt to contradict this statement. The only fact offered on the other side of the scale which might indicate that Robert did not intend his departure to be permanent is that Robert continued to provide financial support for his wife and children during the period of separation. I believe that the trial judge properly discounted this factor in arriving at his conclusion. Such facts tend to show only that Robert Wainscott recognized his continuing obligation to support his family, not necessarily that he intended to continue the marriage.
Because I can find no evidence that Robert Wainscott intended his separation from his wife to be other than final, I conclude that summary judgment in favor of State Farm was proper.
Appellant attempts to distinguish Lumbermen’s on the ground that “his household” does not have the same meaning as “same household,” the phrase interpreted in Lumbermen’s. According to appellant, “his household” imports ownership.4 My review *246of the cases, however, leaves me unconvinced.
First, other courts appear to treat these phrases interchangeably, not out of carelessness but from a conviction that they convey roughly the same meaning in the context in which they are used.5 What the cases indicate — and they are legion — is that the courts have placed no particular emphasis on the qualifying words “his” and “same.” Instead, courts tend to regard “same household” as meaning “the insured’s household.”6 In National Farmer’s Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Maca, 26 Wis.2d 399, 132 N.W.2d 517 (1965), for example, the court construed the phrases “resident of the household of the named insured” and “member of the family” and commented upon the use of such phrases, as well as similar phrases, in automobile liability insurance policies:
“Although the purposes differ, these phrases are used in all cases to describe a common type of close relationship, varying greatly in detail, where people live together as a family in a closely knit group usually because of close relationship by blood, marriage or adoption and deal with each other informally, and not at arm’s length.”
Id. 132 N.W.2d at 520-21.7
Second, I find persuasive the case of Schehen v. North-West Ins. Co., 258 Or. 559, 484 P.2d 836 (1971). There the insurance policy extended coverage to the named insured or a “resident relative member of his household.” The facts showed that the insured was a dentist who resided in Eugene where he maintained a duplex with his wife, adult daughter and two grandchildren. In 1964 he moved his practice to Klamath Falls where he bought a house and established residence with his wife, the daughter remaining in Eugene with her two children. The insured continued to provide the financial support for his daughter and visited her once every four to six weeks. In addition, he maintained club memberships in Eugene, continued to receive some mail there and testified that he always considered Eugene his home and intended to return to live in the duplex with his daughter and grandchildren. He in fact did return in 1968. In 1967 the daughter was injured while operating one of the insured vehicles and sought to recover under her father’s policy as a “resident relative member of his household.”
The court acknowledged that it was theoretically possible to maintain two households but nevertheless denied coverage because the insured had not shown that he had divided his time evenly between the two households on a “regular basis.” Id. 484 P.2d at 838. In so ruling, the court explicitly rejected the ownership theory urged by appellant in this case:
“Although the term' ‘household’ may be somewhat elastic, all of the definitions seem to have a common factor. They require that the members of the ‘household’ dwell or live together . .. Regardless of the facts that [the named insured] maintained his daughter and her family in a residence in Eugene and he considered it his home and intended to return there, he and his daughter did not *247live together and could not form a household.”
Id.8
Appellant asserts that even if we rely on Lumbermen’s and hold that intent to permanently separate controls, we must nevertheless reverse because the trial court focused on the wrong intent. Appellant claims that since the question was whether Deborah, not Juanita, was an additional insured, the permanency of Robert’s separation from Juanita was irrelevant; instead, the court should have focused on the permanency of Robert’s separation from Deborah. I disagree.
Appellant’s contention seems to be premised on an incorrect reading of the cases construing “household.” The focus of those cases seems to be on whether the household, as a family entity, has been terminated. To this question the courts have uniformly responded that if the departing spouse intends not to return the family residence ceases to be “his household.”9
Appellant correctly maintains that, even in the absence of ambiguity, the insurance policy must be construed “so as to provide that coverage which a layman would reasonably have expected given his lay interpretation of the policy’s terms.” Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 497 (Alaska 1979); Stordahl v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d 63, 66 (Alaska 1977); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bussell, 498 P.2d 706, 710 (Alaska 1972). However, appellant has offered no extrinsic evidence to support his alleged expectation of coverage. Thus there is a lack of specific facts which would make the expected coverage reasonable.
Appellant contends that even if Deborah was not a resident of his household, he is nevertheless entitled to coverage under paragraph (3) of the State Farm policy. That paragraph defines an “insured” as:
“Any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies sustained by an insured under (1) or (2) above.”
Appellant concedes that on its face the above language requires that Deborah be an insured under either paragraph (1) or (2) before coverage is allowed. He argues, however, that paragraph (3) was intended to comply with the mandatory requirements of AS 28.20.440(b)(3) and should be ignored to the extent it attempts to restrict coverage only to injuries sustained by an insured. AS 28.20.440(b)(3) provides:
“(b) The owner’s policy of liability insurance shall

(3) contain coverage . . . for the protection of the persons insured under the policy who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury or death arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. .. . ”
Accordingly, appellant argues that in order to recover under the terms of his policy he need only show that he is an insured and that he is “legally entitled to recover damages” from the uninsured motorist on account of Deborah’s death. Since AS 09.-55.580 10 and AS 09.15.010 11-expressly permit a parent to bring a cause of action for *248the death of a minor child, appellant maintains that he is “legally entitled to damages” within the meaning of the statute.
Appellant’s argument finds support in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N.W.2d 789 (1971), where the Nebraska superior court held, on facts similar to those in the present case, that since the insured was legally entitled to recover for the death of his child under Nebraska law, he was entitled to coverage under the provisions of his insurance policy. Selders was rejected in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wainscott, 439 F.Supp. 840 (D.Alaska 1977), the declaratory judgment action which preceded this case. I agree with the soundness of that decision.
In Wainscott, the court reasoned that in Alaska a parent may only maintain an action for wrongful death of a minor child in a representative capacity, the potential recovery to be distributed as the decedent’s personal property. Accordingly, since Wainscott cannot bring such an action in an individual capacity it cannot be said that he is “legally entitled to recover damages” within the meaning of AS 28.20.440(b)(3).
I think this was a correct application of Alaska law. In Matter of Estate of Pushruk, 562 P.2d 329, 330-31 (Alaska 1977), we said:
“AS 09.55.580 authorizes the personal representative to bring an action against a party whose wrongful acts or omissions have caused the death of the deceased. . . . [I]f the decedent is survived by a spouse, child or dependent, the action is brought on behalf of the statutory beneficiary and damages are measured by the loss to the survivors. The personal representative is then a nominal party only and holds the recovery in trust. On the other hand, if the • deceased is not survived by the beneficiaries named in the statute, the personal representative is the real party in interest in the wrongful death action. Damages are limited to the loss to the estate and are distributed as other personal property of the deceased.” (footnotes omitted).
See also Horsford v. Estate of Horsford, 561 P.2d 722, 727 (Alaska 1977). As regards AS 09.15.010, I think the federal court was correct in characterizing this statute as “of a procedural nature creating no independent right of recovery in the parent.” 439 F.Supp. at 843. Therefore, I find this branch of appellant’s argument unpersuasive.
For the reasons given, I would affirm the judgment of the superior court.

.For the purposes of summary judgment, the only sworn testimony before the superior court was the deposition of Juanita Wainscott and the affidavit of Robert Wainscott. Although appellant refers in this brief to an unsworn statement given by Robert Wainscott to State Farm investigators, we should not consider that statement on appeal. We have previously held that “assertions of fact in unverified pleadings and memoranda” should not be reliedon in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Libby v. City of Dillingham, 612 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1980); Jennings v. State, 566 P.2d 1304, 1309-10 (Alaska 1977).

. Juanita filed for divorce in late April. At the time of the accident no divorce decree had been entered; nor had any determination been made as to the custody of Deborah. A final decree of divorce was entered in December, 1976.

. In determining whether household ties have been severed, we should look only to the intent of the departing spouse. Juanita’s intent is therefore irrelevant. However, Juanita’s understanding of the situation, especially when not contradicted by Robert, is at least circumstantial evidence of Robert’s intent.

. Appellant would define “his household” as: “A house and appurtenances thereto owned by a person in which his family resides where that person provides the necessary support for the family.”

. In the following cases interpreting “his household” the court either relied upon cases interpreting “same household” or applied definitional language found in those cases. Crossett v. St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 289 Ala. 598, 269 So.2d 869 (Ala.1972); Boisseranc v. Cal-Farms, 151 Cal.App.2d 775, 312 P.2d 401 (Cal.App.1957); State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N.W.2d 789 (Neb.1971); Schehen v. North-West Ins. Co., 258 Or. 559, 484 P.2d 836 (1971).

. See, e. g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Selders, 187 Neb. 342, 190 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1971) (interpreting identical language in a State Farm policy); American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1971); St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 209 Va. 18, 161 S.E.2d 694, 697 (Va.1968); Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co. v. Federated American Ins. Co., 13 Wash.App. 7, 534 P.2d 48, 51 (1975).

. See also Belling v. Harn, 65 Wis.2d 108, 221 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1974) (applying the above language to “same household”).

. Schehen was held to be controlling in Waller v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 272 Or. 69, 535 P.2d 530, 531 (1975), which construed a “same household” clause, the court treating the question as “whether one was a resident of the household of a named insured.”

. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 387 P.2d 104, 106-07 (Alaska 1963); Reserve Ins. Co. v. Apps, 85 Cal.App.3d 228, 149 Cal.Rptr. 223, 244 (Cal.App.1978); American Cas. Co. v. Harleysville Ins., 238 Md. 322, 208 A.2d 597, 598-99 (1965); Boon v. Premier Ins. Co., 519 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.App.1975); Hawaiian Ins. & Guaranty Co. v. Federated American Ins. Co., 13 Wash.App. 7, 534 P.2d 48, 53 (1975).

. AS 09.55.580(a) provides:
“Action for wrongful death, (a) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter for an injury done by the same act or omission. The action shall be commenced within two years after the death, and the damages therein shall be such *248damages as the court or jury may consider fair and just, and the amount recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent’s husband or wife and children when he or she leaves a husband, wife or children, him or her surviving, or other dependents. When the decedent leaves no husband, wife or children surviving him or her or other dependents, the amount recovered shall be administered as other personal property of the deceased person but shall be limited to pecuniary loss. When the plaintiff prevails, the trial court shall determine the allowable costs and expenses of the action and may, in its discretion, require notice and hearing thereon. The amount recovered shall be distributed only after payment of all costs and expenses of suit and debts and expenses of administration.”

. AS 09.15.010 provides:
“Parents or guardian may sue for injuries or death to child. A father or, in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of a child below the age of majority. A guardian may maintain an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of his ward."