Court Opinion

ID: 9902385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:11.347305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.812231
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 In re J.M.L. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re J.M.L. et al., Persons                                 B324865
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County
Court Law.                                                   Super. Ct. No.
                                                             22CCJP00486A–C)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

D.E.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro Tempore.
Affirmed.
      Erin Riley Khorram, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

          _________________________________________

                    I.    INTRODUCTION

     D.E. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition
order removing her child C.C. (born 2021) from her custody.1 We
affirm.
       The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural
history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for
publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore
resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to
Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and
consistent with constitutional principles. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that
determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis
v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted
[three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies

1      Mother’s arguments on appeal also purport to apply to her
other children, J.M.L. (born 2008) and J.C.L. (born 2012). The
juvenile court’s removal order, however, applied only to C.C. At
the disposition hearing, the court terminated jurisdiction and
granted sole legal and physical custody of J.M.L. and J.C.L. to
their father. Accordingly, and although our holdings would apply
with equal force to J.M.L. and J.C.L., we will address mother’s
removal arguments as they pertain to C.C.

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constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in
reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the
reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based,
[an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by
counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)

                       II.   DISCUSSION

     Mother contends the juvenile court erred in ordering C.C.
removed from her custody. We disagree.

A.    Standard of Review

       “The applicable statute, [Welfare and Institutions Code]
section 361, subdivision (c), ‘“is clear and specific: Even though
children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not
be removed . . . unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a
substantial danger to the child’s physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no
‘reasonable means’ by which the child can be protected without
removal.”’ [Citations.] [¶] . . . [¶]
       “‘On appeal from a dispositional order removing a child
from a parent we apply the substantial evidence standard of
review, keeping in mind that the trial court was required to make
its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.’ ([In re] Ashly F. [(2014)] 225 Cal.App.4th [803,] 809;
see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005 [‘when
presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing evidence,
the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole,

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contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of
fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by
this standard of proof’].) ‘“‘The ultimate test is whether it is
reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in
light of the whole record.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520–521.)

B.    Substantial Danger

      Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding there was a substantial danger to C.C. if
he was returned to mother’s custody because she completed a 60-
day drug treatment program and tested negative consistently in
that program after her first positive test. Substantial evidence
shows that mother neither fully completed her drug program nor
tested negative consistently after she entered the program.
      Mother had a long history of substance abuse including
methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol. On April 25, 2022,
mother entered a residential drug treatment program at Tarzana
Treatment Centers (Tarzana). The day mother entered the
program she tested positive for amphetamines, marijuana, and
methamphetamine. The program was to last from 60 days to 120
days, based on mother’s needs. As part of the program, mother
was “expected to work with a counselor to develop a thorough
relapse prevention plan which will include transitioning to a safe
and structured sober living environment and engaging in [her]
recovery beyond completing treatment.”
      Mother remained in the Tarzana program for the minimum
60 days and received a certificate of completion on June 23, 2022.
On July 1, 2022, a social worker spoke with C.C.’s caregiver who

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reported that mother’s sister stated she was “done with mother
as she is back on drugs.” (See In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9 [“It is the nature of addiction that one
must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to show
real reform”].)
      As of July 13, 2022, the Department reported that after
completing the Tarzana program, “mother chose not to
participate in after care services through her drug treatment
program although aftercare was recommended.” Mother also did
not “ma[k]e herself available to continue drug testing” for the
Department. As of August 25, 2022, some three weeks before the
September 16, 2022, disposition hearing, Tarzana’s director
reported that mother “ha[d] not been active in aftercare . . . .”
      Although mother had six negative drug tests while in the
Tarzana residential program, those tests occurred over a 21 day
period from May 5, 2022, to May 25, 2022. After exiting the
program, mother failed to show for five drug tests from
August 4, 2022, to September 1, 2022. Each of those five missed
drug tests can “properly [be] considered the equivalent of a
positive test result” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1210, 1217, fn. omitted), especially in light of mother’s long
history of drug abuse.

C.    Reasonable Means

      Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s finding there were no reasonable means to protect
C.C. without removing him from her custody because the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) could have made unannounced visits to mother’s

                                 5
home and the court could have ordered mother to participate in
random drug tests.2 Mother’s recalcitrant attitude toward
complying with her aftercare program, drug testing, and court
orders is substantial evidence supporting the court’s no
reasonable means finding.
       As discussed above, mother did not comply with the
aftercare part of her Tarzana program and missed five drug tests
after she was discharged from the Tarzana program.
       On June 21, 2022, C.C.’s caregiver told a social worker that
mother “continued to ask” her to drop off C.C. with mother for
overnight visits at mother’s home even though mother knew it
was against juvenile court orders.3 While attempting to schedule
a visit around September 2022, mother asked C.C.’s caregiver if
she could bring C.C.’s father. When the caregiver told mother
that she and C.C.’s father could not visit together, mother
responded, “‘How the fuck will they know?’”
       On July 21, 2022, the juvenile court ordered the social
worker to conduct unannounced visits at mother’s home. On
August 18, 2022, social workers attempted an unannounced visit.
They knocked on mother’s front and back doors several times and
called mother’s name near windows. Even though the back door
and two windows were open, the social workers did not receive a

2     Mother also contends the Department could have
attempted to ensure C.C.’s father was not living in mother’s
home. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s
substantial danger and reasonable means findings concerning
mother’s drug abuse, we need not address mother’s contention
concerning C.C.’s father’s residence.

3     This conversation took place two days prior to mother’s
discharge from the Tarzana residential program.

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response. On August 25, 2022, social workers returned
unannounced to mother’s home and knocked on the front door
and windows without a response. One of the social workers
called mother on the telephone. Mother claimed not to be home.
Later, C.C.’s caregiver reported to the Department that mother
told her she was home on both occasions, but did not open the
door.

                      III.    DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

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