Court Opinion

ID: 9842136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:13:10.299789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:20.180651
License: Public Domain

Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Jill Brown brought a claim for damages against petitioner Bryan County under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged that a county police officer used *400excessive force in arresting her, and that the county itself was liable for her injuries based on its sheriff’s hiring and training decisions. She prevailed on her claims against the county following a jury trial, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the county on the basis of the hiring claim alone. 67. F. 3d 1174 (1995). We granted certiorari. We conclude that the Court of Appeals’ decision cannot be squared with our recognition that, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not intend to impose liability on a municipality unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978).
I
In the early morning hours of May 12, 1991, Jill Brown (hereinafter respondent) and her husband were driving from Grayson County, Texas, to their home in Bryan County, Oklahoma. After crossing into Oklahoma, they approached a police checkpoint. Mr. Brown, who was driving, decided to avoid the checkpoint and return to Texas. After seeing the Browns’ truck turn away from the checkpoint, Bryan County Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison and Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns pursued the vehicle. Although the parties’ versions of events differ, at trial both deputies claimed that their patrol car reached speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. Mr. Brown testified that he was unaware of the deputies’ attempts to overtake him. The chase finally ended four miles south of the police checkpoint.
After he got out of the squad car, Deputy Sheriff Morrison pointed his gun toward the Browns’ vehicle and ordered the Browns to raise their hands. Reserve Deputy Burns, who was unarmed, rounded the corner of the vehicle on the passenger’s side. Burns twice ordered respondent from the .vehicle. When she did not exit, he used an “arm bar” technique, grabbing respondent’s arm at the wrist and elbow, *401pulling her from the vehicle, and spinning her to the ground. Respondent’s knees were severely injured, and she later underwent corrective surgery. Ultimately, she may need knee replacements.
Respondent sought compensation for her injuries under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and state law from Burns, Bryan County Sheriff B. J. Moore, and the county itself. Respondent claimed, among other things, that Bryan County was liable for Burns’ alleged use of excessive force based on Sheriff Moore’s decision to hire Burns, the son of his nephew. Specifically, respondent claimed that Sheriff Moore had failed to adequately review Burns’ background. Burns had a record of driving infractions and had pleaded guilty to various driving-related and other misdemeanors, including assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness. Oklahoma law does not preclude the hiring of an individual who has committed a misdemeanor to serve as a peace officer. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 70, § 3311(D)(2)(a) (1991) (requiring that the hiring agency certify that the prospective officer’s records do not reflect a felony conviction). At trial, Sheriff Moore testified that he had obtained Burns’ driving record and a report on Burns from the National Crime Information Center, but had not closely reviewed either. Sheriff Moore authorized Burns to make arrests, but not to carry a weapon or to operate a patrol car.
In a ruling not at issue here, the District Court dismissed respondent’s § 1983 claim against Sheriff Moore prior to trial. App. 28. Counsel for Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore “was the policy maker for Bryan County regarding the Sheriff’s Department.” Id., at 30. At the close of respondent’s case and again at the close of all of the evidence, Bryan County moved for judgment as a matter of law. As to respondent’s claim that Sheriff Moore’s decision to hire Burns triggered municipal liability, the county argued that a single hiring decision by a municipal policymaker could not give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. Id., at 59-60. *402The District Court denied the county’s motions. The court also overruled the county’s objections to jury instructions on the § 1983 claim against the county. Id., at 125-126, 132.
To resolve respondent’s claims, the jury was asked to answer several interrogatories. The jury concluded that Stacy Burns had arrested respondent without probable cause and had used excessive force, and therefore found him liable for respondent’s injuries. It also found that the “hiring policy” and the “training policy” of Bryan County “in the case of Stacy Burns as instituted by its policymaker, B. J. Moore,” were each “so inadequate as to amount to deliberate indifference to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff.” Id., at 135. The District Court entered judgment for respondent on the issue of Bryan County’s §1983 liability. The county appealed on several grounds, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 67 F. 3d 1174 (1995). The court held, among other things, that Bryan County was properly found liable under § 1983 based on Sheriff Moore’s decision to hire Burns. Id., at 1185. The court addressed only those points that it thought merited review; it did not address the jury’s determination of county liability based on inadequate training of Burns, id., at 1178, nor do we. We granted cer-tiorari, 517 U. S. 1154 (1996), to decide whether the county was properly held liable for respondent’s injuries based on Sheriff Moore’s single decision to hire Burns. We now reverse.
II
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in*403jured in an action at jaw, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
We held in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S., at 689, that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. We also recognized that a municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Our conclusion rested partly on the language of § 1983 itself. In' light of the statute’s imposition of liability on one who “subjects [a person], or causes [that person] to be subjected,” to a deprivation of federal rights, we concluded that it “cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.” Id., at 692. Our conclusion also rested upon the statute’s legislative history. As stated in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U. S. 469, 479 (1986), “while Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others” (citing Monell, supra, at 665-683). We have consistently refused to hold municipalities liable under a theory of respondeat superior. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 818 (1985) (plurality opinion); id., at 828 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Pembaur, supra, at 478-479; St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 122 (1988) (plurality opinion); id., at 137 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378, 392 (1989).
Instead, in Monell and subsequent cases, we have required a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under §1983 to identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Monell, supra, at 694; Pembaur, supra, at 480-481; Canton, supra, at 389. Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts *404may fairly be said to be those of the municipality. Monell, supra, at 694. Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a “custom” that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law. 436 U. S., at 690-691 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 167-168 (1970)).
The parties join issue on whether, under Monell and subsequent cases, a single hiring decision by a county sheriff can be a “policy” that triggers municipal liability. Relying on our decision in Pembaur, respondent claims that a single act by a decisionmaker with final authority in the relevant area constitutes a “policy” attributable to the municipality itself. So long as a § 1983 plaintiff identifies a decision properly attributable to the municipality, respondent argues, there is no risk of imposing respondeat superior liability. Whether that decision was intended to govern only the situation at hand or to serve as a rule to be applied over time is immaterial. Rather, under respondent’s theory, identification of an act of a proper municipal decisionmaker is all that is required to ensure that the municipality is held liable only for its own conduct. The Court of Appeals accepted respondent’s approach.
As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, however, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.
Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightfor*405ward. Section 1983 itself “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation” of the underlying federal right. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 330 (1986). In any § 1983 suit, however, the plaintiff must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly, proof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.
Sheriff Moore’s hiring decision was itself legal, and Sheriff Moore did not authorize Burns to use excessive force. Respondent’s claim, rather, is that a single facially lawful hiring decision can launch a series of events that ultimately cause a violation of federal rights. Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee. See Canton, supra, at 391-392; Tuttle, supra, at 824 (plurality opinion). See also Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U. S. 257, 270-271 (1987) (per curiam) (dissent from dismissal of writ as improvidently granted).
In relying heavily on Pembaur, respondent blurs the distinction between § 1983 cases that present no difficult questions of fault and causation and those that do. To the extent that we have recognized a cause of action under § 1983 based on a single decision attributable to a municipality, we have done so only where the evidence that the municipality had acted and that the plaintiff had suffered a deprivation of federal rights also proved fault and causation. For example, Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622 (1980), and Newport v. *406Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247 (1981), involved formal decisions of municipal legislative bodies. In Owen, the city council allegedly censured and discharged an employee without a hearing. 445 U. S., at 627-629, 633, and n. 13. In Fact Concerts, the city council canceled a license permitting a concert following a dispute over the performance’s content. 453 U. S., at 252. Neither decision reflected implementation of a generally applicable rule. But we did not question that each decision, duly promulgated by city lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if the decision itself were found to be unconstitutional. Because fault and causation were obvious in each case, proof that the municipality’s decision was unconstitutional would suffice to establish that the municipality itself was liable for the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.
Similarly, Pembaur v. Cincinnati concerned a decision by a county prosecutor, acting as the county’s final decision-maker, 475 U. S., at 485, to direct county deputies to forcibly enter petitioner’s place of business to serve capiases upon third parties. Relying on Owen and Newport, we concluded that a final decisionmaker’s adoption of a course of action “tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions in later situations” may, in some circumstances, give rise to municipal liability under § 1983. 475 U. S., at 481. In Pembaur, it was not disputed that the prosecutor had specifically directed the action resulting in the deprivation of petitioner’s rights. The conclusion that the decision was that of a final municipal decisionmaker and was therefore properly attributable to the municipality established municipal liability. No questions of fault or causation arose.
Claims not involving an allegation that the municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, present much more difficult problems of proof. That a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the *407employee acted culpably. We recognized these difficulties in Canton v. Harris, where we considered a claim that inadequate training of shift supervisors at a city jail led to a deprivation of a detainee’s constitutional rights. We held that, quite apart from the state of mind required to establish the underlying constitutional violation — in that case, a violation of due process, 489 U. S., at 388-389, n. 8 — a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with “deliberate indifference” as to its known or obvious consequences. Id., at 388. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.
We concluded in Canton that an “inadequate training” claim could be the basis for § 1983 liability in “limited circumstances.” Id., at 387. We spoke, however, of a deficient training “program,” necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple employees. Id., at 390. Existence of a “program” makes proof of fault and causation at least possible in an inadequate training case. If a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for. Their continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action — the “deliberate indifference” — necessary to trigger municipal liability. Id., at 390, n. 10 (“It could ... be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are ‘deliberately indifferent’ to the need”); id., at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Municipal liability for failure to train may be proper where it can be shown that policymakers were aware of, and acquiesced in, a pattern of constitutional violations . . .”). In addition, the existence of a pattern of *408tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a particular incident, is the “moving force” behind the plaintiff’s injury. See id., at 390-391.
Before trial, counsel for Bryan County stipulated that Sheriff Moore “was the policy maker for Bryan County regarding the Sheriff’s Department.” App. 30. Indeed, the county sought to avoid liability by claiming that its Board of Commissioners participated in no policy decisions regarding the conduct and operation of the office of the Bryan County Sheriff. Id., at 32. Accepting the county’s representations below, then, this case presents no difficult questions concerning whether Sheriff Moore has final authority to act for the municipality in hiring matters. Cf. Jett v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 491 U. S. 701 (1989); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112 (1988). Respondent does not claim that she can identify any pattern of injuries linked to Sheriff Moore’s hiring practices. Indeed, respondent does not contend that Sheriff Moore’s hiring practices are generally defective. The only evidence on this point at trial suggested that Sheriff Moore had adequately screened the backgrounds of all prior deputies he hired. App. 106-110. Respondent instead seeks to trace liability to what can only be described as a deviation from Sheriff Moore’s ordinary hiring practices. Where a claim of municipal liability rests on a single decision, not itself representing a violation of federal law and not directing such a violation, the danger that a municipality will be held liable without fault is high. Because the decision necessarily governs a single case, there can be no notice to the municipal decisionmaker, based on previous violations of federally protected rights, that his approach is inadequate. Nor will it be readily apparent that the municipality’s action caused the injury in question, because the plaintiff can point to no other incident tending to make it more likely that the *409plaintiff’s own injury flows from the municipality’s action, rather than from some other intervening cause.
In Canton, we did not foreclose the possibility that evidence of a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation, could trigger municipal liability. 489 U. S., at 390, and n. 10 (“[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious . . . that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need”). Respondent purports to rely on Canton, arguing that Burns’ use of excessive force was the plainly obvious consequence of Sheriff Moore’s failure to screen Burns’ record. In essence, respondent claims that this showing of “obviousness” would demonstrate both that Sheriff Moore acted with conscious disregard for the consequences of his action and that the Sheriff’s action directly caused her injuries, and would thus substitute for the pattern of injuries ordinarily necessary to establish municipal culpability and causation.
The proffered analogy between failure-to-train cases and inadequate screening cases is not persuasive. In leaving open in Canton the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations, we simply hypothesized that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights could justify a finding that policymakers’ decision not to train the officer reflected “deliberate indifference” to the obvious consequence of the policymakers’ choice — namely, a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory right. The high degree *410of predictability may also support an inference of causation— that the municipality’s indifference led directly to the very consequence that was so predictable.
Where a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim premised upon the inadequacy of an official’s review of a prospective applicant’s record, however, there is a particular danger that a municipality will be held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself. Every injury suffered at the hands of a municipal employee can be traced to a hiring decision in a “but-for” sense: But for the municipality’s decision to hire the employee, the plaintiff would not have suffered the injury. To prevent municipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into re-spondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between the policymaker’s inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged.
In attempting to import the reasoning of Canton into the hiring context, respondent ignores the fact that predicting the consequence of a single hiring decision, even one based on an inadequate assessment of a record, is far more difficult than predicting what might flow from the failure to train a single law enforcement officer as to a specific skill necessary to the discharge of his duties. As our decision in Canton makes clear, “deliberate indifference” is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action. Unlike the risk from a particular glaring omission in a training regimen, the risk from a single instance of inadequate screening of an applicant’s background is not “obvious” in the abstract; rather, it depends upon the background of the applicant. A lack of scrutiny may increase the likelihood that an unfit officer will be hired, and that the unfit officer will, when placed in a particular position to affect the rights of citizens, act improperly. But that is only a generalized showing of risk. The fact that inadequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would make a violation of rights more likely cannot alone *411give rise to an inference that a policymaker’s failure to scrutinize the record of a particular applicant produced a specific constitutional violation. After all, a full screening of an applicant’s background might reveal no cause for concern at all; if so, a hiring official who failed to scrutinize the applicant’s background cannot be said to have consciously disregarded an obvious risk that the officer would subsequently inflict a particular constitutional injury.
We assume that a jury could properly find in this case that Sheriff Moore’s assessment of Burns’ background was inadequate. Sheriff Moore’s own testimony indicated that he did not inquire into the underlying conduct or the disposition of any of the misdemeanor charges reflected on Burns’ record before hiring him. But this showing of an instance of inadequate screening is not enough to establish “deliberate indifference.” In layman’s terms, inadequate screening of an applicant’s record may reflect “indifference” to the applicant’s background. For purposes of a legal inquiry into municipal liability under § 1983, however, that is not the relevant “indifference.” A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right can the official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant’s background constitute “deliberate indifference.”
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals directly tested the link between Burns’ actual background and the risk that, if hired, he would use excessive force. The District Court instructed the jury on a theory analogous to that reserved in Canton. The court required respondent to prove that Sheriff Moore’s inadequate screening of Burns’ background was “so likely to result in violations of constitu*412tional rights” that the Sheriff could “reasonably [be] said to have been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff.” App. 12B (emphasis added). The court also instructed the jury, without elaboration, that respondent was required to prove that the “inadequate hiring . . . policy directly caused the Plaintiff’s injury.” Ibid.
As discussed above, a finding of culpability simply cannot depend on the mere probability that any officer inadequately screened will inflict any constitutional injury. Rather, it must depend on a finding that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff. The connection between the background of the particular applicant and the specific constitutional violation alleged must be strong. What the District Court’s instructions on culpability, and therefore the jury’s finding of municipal liability, failed to capture is whether Burns’ background made his use of excessive force in making an arrest a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision. The Court of Appeals’ af-firmance of the jury’s finding of municipal liability depended on its view that the jury could have found that “inadequate screening of a deputy could likely result in the violation of citizens’ constitutional rights.” 67 F. 3d, at 1185 (emphasis added). Beyond relying on a risk of violations of unspecified constitutional rights, the Court of Appeals also posited that Sheriff Moore’s decision reflected indifference to “the public’s welfare.” Id., at 1184.
Even assuming without deciding that proof of a single instance of inadequate screening could ever trigger municipal liability, the evidence in this case was insufficient to support a finding that, in hiring Burns, Sheriff Moore disregarded a known or obvious risk of injury. To test the link between Sheriff Moore’s hiring decision and respondent’s injury, we must ask whether a full review of Burns’ record reveals that Sheriff Moore should have concluded that Burns’ use of excessive force would be a plainly obvious consequence of the *413hiring decision.1 On this point, respondent’s showing was inadequate. To be sure, Burns’ record reflected various misdemeanor infractions. Respondent claims that the record demonstrated such a strong propensity for violence that Burns’ application of excessive force was highly likely. The primary charges on which respondent relies, however, are those arising from a fight on a college campus where Burns was a student. In connection with this single incident, Burns was charged with assault and battery, resisting arrest, and public drunkenness.2 In January 1990, when he pleaded *414guilty to those charges, Burns also pleaded guilty to various driving-related offenses, including nine moving violations and a charge of driving with a suspended license. In addition, Burns had previously pleaded guilty to being in actual physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated.
The fact that Burns had pleaded guilty to traffic offenses and other misdemeanors may well have made him an extremely poor candidate for reserve deputy. Had Sheriff Moore fully reviewed Burns’ record, he might have come to precisely that conclusion. But unless he would necessarily have reached that decision because Burns’ use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision, Sheriff Moore’s inadequate scrutiny of Burns’ record cannot constitute “deliberate indifference” to respondent’s federally protected right to be free from a use of excessive force.
Justice Souter’s reading of the case is that the jury believed that Sheriff Moore in fact read Burns’ entire record. Post, at 426-427. That is plausible, but it is also irrelevant. It is not sufficient for respondent to show that Sheriff Moore read Burns’ record and therefore hired Burns with knowledge of his background. Such a decision may reflect indif*415ference to Burns’ record, but what is required is deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s constitutional right. That is, whether Sheriff Moore failed to examine Burns’ record, partially examined it, or fully examined it, Sheriff Moore’s hiring decision could not have been “deliberately indifferent” unless in light of that record Burns’ use of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision. Because there was insufficient evidence on which a jury could base a finding that Sheriff Moore’s decision to hire Burns reflected conscious disregard of an obvious risk that a use of excessive force would follow, the District Court erred in submitting respondent’s inadequate screening claim to the jury.
III
Cases involving 'constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for an injury that it did not cause. In the broadest sense, every injury is traceable to a hiring decision. Where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability. As we recognized in Monell and have repeatedly reaffirmed, Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights. A failure to apply stringent culpability and causation requirements raises serious federalism concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing particular hiring requirements that States have themselves elected not to impose. Cf. Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S., at 392. Bryan County is not liable for Sheriff Moore’s isolated decision to hire Burns without adequate screening, because respondent has not demonstrated that his decision reflected a conscious disregard for a high risk that Burns would use excessive force in violation of respondent’s federally pro*416tected right. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

 In suggesting that our decision complicates this Court’s § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence by altering the understanding of culpability, Justice Souter and Justice Breyer misunderstand our approach. Post, at 422; post, at 430, 433-434. We do not suggest that a plaintiff in an inadequate screening case must show a higher degree of culpability than the “deliberate indifference” required in Canton v. Harris, 489 U. S. 378 (1989); we need not do so, because, as discussed below, respondent has not made a showing of deliberate indifference here. See infra this page and 414. Furthermore, in assessing the risks of a decision to hire a particular individual, we draw no distinction between what is “so obvious” or “so likely to occur” and what is “plainly obvious.” The difficulty with the lower courts’ approach is that it fails to connect the background of the particular officer hired in this case to the particular constitutional violation the respondent suffered. Supra, at 412. Ensuring that lower courts link the background of the officer to the constitutional violation alleged does not complicate our municipal liability jurisprudence with degrees of “obviousness,” but seeks to ensure that a plaintiff in an inadequate screening ease establishes a policymaker’s deliberate indifference — that is, conscious disregard for the known and obvious consequences of his actions.

 Justice Souter implies that Burns’ record reflected assault and battery charges arising from more than one incident. Post, at 428. There' has never been a serious dispute that a single misdemeanor assault and battery conviction arose out of a single campus fight. Nor did petitioner’s expert testify that the record reflected any assault charge without a disposition, see 9 Record 535-536, although Justice Souter appears to suggest otherwise, post, at 428-429, n. 6.
In fact, respondent’s own expert witness testified that Burns’ record reflected a single assault conviction. 7 Record 318; see also id., at 320. Petitioner has repeatedly so claimed. See, e. g., Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc in No. 93-5376 (CA5), p. 12 (“Burns had one misdemeanor assault *414convietion stemming from a campus fight”); Pet. for Rehearing of Substituted Opinion in No. 93-5376 (CA5), p. 11 (same); 3 Record 927 (Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 10); Pet. for Cert. 16 (“Burns pled guilty to assault and battery” as a result of “one campus fight”).
Respondent has not once contested this characterization. See, e. g., 3 Record 961 (Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict 4); Brief for Appellee/ Cross-Appellant Brown et al. in No. 93-5376 (CA5), pp. 3-4; Brief in Opposition 1. Indeed, since the characterization is reflected in the county’s petition for certiorari, under this Court’s Rule 15(2) respondent would have had an obligation in her brief in opposition to correct “any perceived misstatement” in the petition. She did not. Involvement in a single fraternity fracas does not demonstrate “a proclivity to violence against the person.” Post, at 429, n. 6.