Court Opinion

ID: 9848072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:12:25.401949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:00.574110
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting. The majority has held that a judgment for a divorce can be entered by the trial court after the death of one of the parties to the marriage. I disagree with the majority and respectfully dissent.
The death of one of the parties to a marriage ends the marriage relationship. A court cannot, by entry of a judgment in a divorce case nunc pro tunc, end that which has already been ended by death. The entry of such a judgment is an utter futility and, to my mind, is nothing more than judicial surplusage.
In this case the jury rendered a verdict on May 6, 1970 *603(filed June 5, 1970), granting appellant a divorce and also awarding her certain property. The verdict also provided that the appellee was to liquidate an indebtedness on the property awarded to the appellant, and it further provided that other property was awarded to the appellee. The court did not enter a judgment on this verdict prior to the death of the appellee. The appellee died April 28, 1971.
The record in this case does not disclose that there is any executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased appellee.
On March 17, 1972, the attorney for the deceased filed a motion for entry of judgment in the case. This motion recited that the appellee was deceased.
Based on the foregoing facts, it is quite apparent to me that a deceased person cannot be a party to an action in a trial court, and a deceased person cannot be a party to an appeal in an appellate court.
I am also of the opinion that after the death of a party to a divorce action a trial court does not have jurisdiction to render a judgment therein. In the case of Charles v. Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 225 Ga. 549, this court plainly held: "An action for divorce and alimony is personal. The death of one of the parties before the decree abates the action. Thereafter the court no longer has jurisdiction to render a judgment therein.” That language is plain, and I believe it means what it says. The attempt of the majority to distinguish that case based on that language from the case at bar is, again to my mind, a distinction without a difference.
In 24 AmJur2d 547, § 422, we find the following: ". . . where the court has not in fact 'rendered’ a decree of divorce on a certain date, even by an informal notation of its decision, and it later decides that a divorce should be granted, it cannot order that the decree be effective as of the prior date. The death of a party to a divorce suit before a final decree of divorce has been rendered precludes a nunc pro tunc entry of a decree.”
A deceased person cannot be a party in a trial court and cannot be a party to an appeal in an appellate court. The *604trial court in this case lacks jurisdiction to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc that it entered. The judgment entered below is, in my opinion, a mere nullity.
I would reverse the judgment.
I respectfully dissent.