Court Opinion

ID: 9599129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:14:37.477943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:22.433673
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with Presiding Justice Fletcher’s dissent, but write separately to express my concern with the majority’s approach in this case. Any time a lawyer undertakes to bill or charge for a service to a client or a third party, the attorney is acting in a fiduciary capacity to *901deal fairly with and to safeguard the client’s or third parties’ money.1 In the present case, Ruth Zaleon and her firm billed for recording fees in real estate closings in an amount greater than the actual fee. Ostensibly, she and her firm did so to cover unforseen rerecording and other costs for which her firm later had to pay. In essence, then, the firm was charging for business expenses related to the recordings. The ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 379 (1993), states that an attorney is obligated to charge no more than the direct cost associated with a service plus a reasonable allocation of overhead expenses. In this case, there is a legitimate question regarding whether the excess charges would constitute a reasonable allocation of overhead expenses. For this reason, as well as those given by Presiding Justice Fletcher, I decline to join the majority’s conclusion that the Investigative Panel’s recommendation of a public reprimand is an inadequate sanction.2
Decided January 26, 1998.
William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, K. Gene Chapman, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
Further, the majority’s conclusion has far-reaching implications. As has been stated, it is not unusual for law firms to charge its clients more than the firm’s costs for postage, copying, and Lexis and Westlaw services, to name but a few examples.3 Under the majority’s reasoning, firms that engage in such practices run the risk of facing severe disciplinary sanctions.
Although I believe lawyers should exercise restraint in passing overhead costs to clients and third parties, and should be careful to disclose those costs, for the reasons set forth above, I conclude that the Investigative Panel’s recommendation of a public reprimand is an appropriate level of discipline in this case. I therefore dissent.

 See ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-1521, p. 3 (1986). See also AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 353 (444 SE2d 314) (1994) (there is a “special fiduciary relationship created when an attorney represents a client”).

 I note, however, that it does not appear that Zaleon disclosed the extra recording expenses, a significant oversight on her behalf.

 Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The Ethics of Billing, 20 S. 111. U. L. J. 261, 270-271 (1996).