Court Opinion

ID: 9373445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:06.533962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.465314
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARK WILLIAM TOWNSEND,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-0752-15-0050-I-1

                  v.

     ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION                        DATE: September 6, 2022
       AGENCY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mark R. Heilbrun, Esquire, Fairfax Station, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Alexandra Meighan and Caitlin Downs, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the p etitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant formerly was employed by the Environmental Protection
     Agency (EPA or agency) as a GS-15 Supervisory Biologist until he was removed
     after an Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigation concluded that he had
     entered and certified time and attendance records for a subordinate from 2008 to
     2012, despite knowing she was producing no work for the agency. Initial Appeal
     File (IAF), Tab 3 at 17, 80-83.     Following the OIG investigation, the agency
     proposed the appellant’s removal based on three charges:          (1) Intentionally
     Submitting False Time and Attendance Information; (2) Making False Statements
     In Connection with an Official Investigation; and (3) Failure to Perform
     Supervisory Duties as Required. Id. at 69-76.
¶3         Charge 1 alleged that between 2008 and 2012 the appellant entered or
     approved information on the subordinate’s timecards that reflected that she wa s
     working, despite knowing that she was performing little or no agency work.
     Id. at 70.   Charge 2 alleged that the appellant made various false statements
     during his OIG interview on July 3, 2012. Id. at 70-71. Charge 3 alleged that,
     during the relevant time period, the appellant had stopped assigning his
                                                                                          3

     subordinate any work, rated her fully successful for rating periods for which he
     knew she had performed little or no work, recommended her to receive a $1,000
     cash performance award, and failed to properly account for her leave.               Id.
     at 71-72.
¶4        Effective October 7, 2014, the agency removed the appellant.            Id. at 17.
     The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal and raising
     affirmative defenses of whistleblower reprisal, discrimination, retaliation for
     prior equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, and harmful procedural error.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 4-6, Tab 77 at 4-6. After holding the appellant’s requested hearing,
     the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the removal action.
     IAF, Tab 87, Initial Decision (ID).       The administrative judge found that the
     agency proved that the appellant had engaged in the charged misconduct based on
     the OIG report and testimony of Special Agent K, an OIG criminal investigator.
     ID at 4-13.
¶5        Regarding charge 1, she found that the record overwhelmingly showed that
     the appellant intentionally submitted false time and attendance information for his
     subordinate as charged.      ID at 4-9.   Regarding charge 2, based on an OIG
     memorandum of interview and the testimony of the OIG Special Agent, the
     administrative judge sustained all four specifications concerning instances in
     which the appellant made false statements during his OIG interview. ID at 9 -11.
     The administrative judge also sustained charge 3 based on the appellant’s
     admissions during his OIG interview.       ID at 11-13.   The administrative judge
     found that a nexus existed, and the penalty of removal was reasonable.              ID
     at 13-18.     Lastly, she found that the appellant failed to prove his affirmative
     defenses of harmful procedural error, whistleblower reprisal, discrimination based
     on age, race, or sex, and retaliation for prior EEO activity. ID at 18-28.
¶6        The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3. The appellant has
     filed a reply. PFR File, Tab 4.
                                                                                        4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         On review, the appellant does not identify any specific error regarding the
     administrative judge’s findings concerning the essential facts supporting the
     agency’s charges and the appellant’s affirmative defenses.            Although the
     appellant urges generally that full Board review of the entire record is necessary,
     he fails to identify specific errors the administrative ju dge made in evaluating the
     evidence or applying the law. Thus, the Board will not embark upon a complete
     review of the record. See Baney v. Department of Justice, 109 M.S.P.R. 242, ¶ 7
     (2008); Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992).

     The administrative judge did not abuse her discretion in her rulings on discovery
     or the admissibility of evidence.
¶8         The appellant contends that the administrative judge erroneously declined to
     admit into the record an OIG investigation concerning an alleged co mparator
     employee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, 18. It is well settled that an administrative
     judge has broad discretion to control the course of the hearing before her . Lopes
     v. Department of the Navy, 119 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 9 (2012). Rulings regarding the
     exclusion of evidence are subject to review by the Board under an abuse of
     discretion standard. Id., ¶ 11. The record reflects that the administrative judge
     excluded the report, which was dated April 17, 2014, because the appellant failed
     to show good cause for his late submission of the report for the first time at the
     hearing on December 3, 2015. ID at 17 n.1; Hearing Transcript (HT) at 4-7. In a
     prehearing order, the administrative judge informed the parties that, in presenting
     evidence at the hearing, they would be limited to their prehearing submissions,
     except for good cause shown. IAF, Tab 45. Despite this warning, the appellant
     did not submit the report until the day of the hearing. Thus, we find that the
     administrative judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the report.
¶9         The appellant next contends that the administrative judge ignored discovery
     abuse by the agency and improperly denied his motion concerning the agency’s
     improper invocation of the law enforcement privilege during Special Agent K’s
                                                                                       5

      deposition. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15-17. The record reflects that the appellant filed
      a “Motion for Production of Evidence for Which a Privilege is Claimed by the
      Agency,” in which he generally asserted that the agency improperly invoked the
      law enforcement privilege over 130 times to prevent his relevant “inquiry
      concerning EPA personnel that the Deciding Official included i n his Douglas
      Factor comparator analysis.” IAF, Tab 39 at 4. In his motion, he did not identify
      which questions were at issue or explain how such questions would have elicited
      relevant testimony but rather attached the entire 234-page deposition transcript.
      Id. at 7-240. The administrative judge denied the appellant’s motion as not in the
      proper format, lacking in specificity, and requesting irrelevant information. IAF,
      Tab 81. We find that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion in
      denying the appellant’s motion.
¶10         In any event, the appellant has not explained how the information he sought
      to discover would have changed the outcome of the appeal and, thus, has not
      provided a basis for reversal of the initial decision.     See Sanders v. Social
      Security Administration, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 10 (2010); Russell v. Equal
      Employment Opportunity Commission, 110 M.S.P.R. 557, ¶ 15 (2009).               On
      review, he argues that the information sought was relevant to show disparate
      penalty because it would establish that the OIG investigated another employee for
      alleged similar misconduct only for administrative purposes, with no pos sibility
      of criminal referral. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16. We fail to discern how such evidence
      is relevant to the issue of whether the appellant was treated disparately regarding
      the removal penalty.     See, e.g., Chavez v. Small Business Administration,
      121 M.S.P.R. 168, ¶ 19 (2014) (stating that a claim of disparate penalties focuses
      on whether an imposed penalty is appropriate for the sustained charges ).
¶11         Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge improperly
      denied his motion to compel depositions of four witnesses.       PFR File, Tab 1
      at 17 n.4.   The record reflects that the appellant filed a motion to compel
                                                                                            6

      depositions of R.M., A.W., J.D., and K.W. 2 IAF, Tab 15 at 9 n.i. In his motion,
      the appellant asserted that R.M. was a comparator who was treated more
      favorably than him despite her misconduct in supervising J.B., a former EPA
      employee who defrauded the Government by regularly failing to show up for
      work at the EPA and falsely claiming to have had a dual appointment with the
      CIA. Id. at 6. The appellant alleged that A.W. had provided false testimony
      about J.B. to Congress on several occasions. Id. at 7. He also sought to depose
      J.D. and K.W., EPA attorneys involved in his removal, regarding their contacts
      with witnesses and drafting of declarations for agency witnesses. Id. at 8.
¶12         The administrative judge denied the appellant’s motion, finding that he
      failed to show how the requested testimon y would lead to the discovery of
      relevant evidence. 3 IAF, Tab 23. In particular, she found that the appellant had
      not shown how the requested information was relevant to any argument he might
      make about disparate penalty or comparators and that he could seek such
      information through other witnesses.        Id.   She noted that the appellant had
      focused his appeal on the behavior of other employees at the agency when it was
      his own misconduct at issue. Id.
¶13         On review, the appellant contends that R.M.’s testimony was “essential”
      and that other witnesses were alleged to have “suborned false statements” with
      the purpose of undermining his credibility. PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, 17 n.4. We
      find that the administrative judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the

      2
        The appellant also appears to contend that the administrative judge improperly denied
      the deposition of the EPA Inspector General, PFR File, Tab 1 at 17 n.4; however, this
      individual was not included in his motion to compel depositions , IAF, Tab 15.
      3
        The appellant filed a Motion for Certification of Interlocutory A ppeal concerning the
      administrative judge’s denial of his motion to compel the depositions. IAF, Tab 30.
      The administrative judge denied this motion, finding that it did not meet the regulatory
      criteria under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.92. IAF, Tab 37. To the extent the appellant is
      challenging this ruling on review, PFR File, Tab 1 at 17 n.4, we find that the
      administrative judge properly denied the motion because a discovery dispute is not a
      sufficient basis for certifying an issue for interlocutory appeal. See Cooper v.
      Department of the Navy, 98 M.S.P.R. 683, ¶ 6 (2005).
                                                                                           7

      depositions of these witnesses. We fail to discern how the testimony of A.W.,
      J.D., or K.W. would have led to evidence relevant to this appeal, and the
      appellant has not explained how this evidence would have affected the outcome.
      See Sanders, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 10.
¶14         Further, even if the administrative judge abused her discretion in denying
      R.M.’s deposition, which the appellant contends was relevant to show she was
      treated more favorably, PFR File, Tab 1 at 13, any error did not affect the
      outcome here because the administrative judge properly found that the agency
      established legitimate reasons for the difference in treatment, ID at 17.          The
      administrative judge credited the deciding official’s testimony that he did not
      consider the appellant’s misconduct to be analogous to that of the supervisor
      involved in J.B.’s case because J.B. had deceived his supervisors into believing
      that he was an undercover CIA agent with a dual appointment to the EPA,
      whereas here, the appellant knew that his subordinate was doing no work because
      he was not assigning her any work. Id.

      The appellant’s remaining arguments do not provide a basis for reversal.
¶15         On review, the appellant reiterates his allegations below concerning due
      process violations, including claims that the agency subjected him to numerous
      illegal and unconstitutional investigations and that the deciding official and OIG
      Special Agent K engaged in criminal wrongdoing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-14. The
      administrative judge, however, considered such arguments but found that he
      failed to adequately explain how any such allegations constituted harmful
      procedural error in the context of his removal.       ID at 18-19.     Although the
      appellant contends on review that the administrative judge failed to consider due
      process violations that are “easily identified and evaluated,” he fails to explain
      such claims or identify any error in the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
¶16         Next, the appellant contends that the administrative judge improperly relied
      on the OIG report and various statements in the report, which he contends were
      fabricated by Special Agent K. Id. at 20-24. The administrative judge, however,
                                                                                            8

      found Special Agent K to be a straightforward and credible witness. ID at 6. In
      particular, she credited his testimony that both the appellant and his subordinate
      testified during their OIG interviews that the subordinate had done no work
      during the relevant time. Id. She also credited his testimony that the appellant
      had certified and approved the subordinate’s time and attendance during the
      relevant time period. Id. Additionally, she considered, but found unpersuasive,
      the appellant’s general testimony that the OIG report was flawed or enhanced,
      noting that when the appellant was asked by his own attorney if there was
      anything inaccurate in the report he responded, “No.” Id.
¶17         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge was b iased against
      him as evidenced by her “deplorable” and “legally tenuous” order, in which he
      contends she threatened him for raising legitimate arguments.               PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 19. We have reviewed the order denying the appellant’s motion for stay
      and for sanctions and find that it fails to establish a deep -seated antagonism
      towards the appellant that would make fair judgment impossible and, thus, does
      not overcome the presumption of honesty and integrity accorded to administrative
      judges.    IAF, Tab 81; see Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358,
      1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Oliver v. Department of Transportation, 1 M.S.P.R.
      382, 386 (1980).
¶18         Finally, the appellant argues that the initial decision failed to meet the
      requirements of Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587,
      589 (1980), in which the Board stated that an initial decision must identify all
      material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of
      credibility,   and   include   the   administrative   judge’s   legal   reasoning   and
      conclusions of law. PFR File, Tab 1 at 24-25. We disagree. In contrast to the
      initial decision in Spithaler, 1 M.S.P.R. at 589, the initial decision here contains
      approximately 24 pages of detailed factual background and legal analysis. ID
      at 4-27.   We find that the appellant’s arguments on review constitute mere
      disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained findings and thus do not
                                                                                            9

      provide a basis for reversal. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98,
      105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings
      when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate references, and
      made reasoned conclusions); see also Broughton v. Department of Health &
      Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Although the appellant
      contends that the initial decision is woefully incomplete, one-sided, cursory,
      biased, and ignores material facts and relevant issues, he does not identify any
      particular evidence or testimony that the administrative judge failed to consider.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 25.
¶19         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision, sustaining the appellant’s
      removal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        10

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                11

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, o r other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     12

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the     Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              13

                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit , you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor war rants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.