Court Opinion

ID: 9954424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 13:07:46.624915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:11.958936
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Estate of Tomlinson v. Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1065.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1065
ESTATE OF TOMLINSON, APPELLEE, v. MEGA POOL WAREHOUSE, INC., ET AL.,
                                     APPELLANTS.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as Estate of Tomlinson v. Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., Slip
                           Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1065.]
Civil law—Civ.R. 38—Civil-jury-trial demands—Trial court’s local rule did not
        require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a jury deposit—Under
        Civ.R. 38(D), a party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand—Court
        of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to trial court.
  (No. 2023-0230—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided March 26, 2024.)
             APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Delaware County,
                        No. 22 CAE 03 0020, 2023-Ohio-229.
                                 __________________
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

         DETERS, J.
         {¶ 1} Katherine Tomlinson1 filed a complaint in the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas against Mega Pool Warehouse, Inc., and its president, Stephen
Gold (collectively, “Mega Pool”), regarding the installation of a swimming pool
and a deck. She included with her complaint a jury demand, and she later paid a
$500 jury deposit, which was required by a local rule of the trial court.
         {¶ 2} Eventually, Tomlinson withdrew her request for a jury trial; but Mega
Pool still wanted a jury trial. The trial court determined that Mega Pool had waived
its right to a jury trial because it had not paid a $500 jury deposit under the local
rule, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. But those
courts’ interpretation of the local rule conflicts with Civ.R. 38(D). Under Civ.R.
38(D), once a jury demand has been perfected under Civ.R. 38, it can be withdrawn
only upon consent of all the parties. Mega Pool never consented to the withdrawal
of the jury demand, so the trial court erred when it denied Mega Pool’s request for
a jury trial. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Fifth District.
                                     I. BACKGROUND
         {¶ 3} In June 2018, Tomlinson filed a lawsuit against Mega Pool regarding
the installation of a swimming pool and a deck. In her complaint, Tomlinson
alleged breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligent workmanship, and
violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. 1345.01 et seq. The specifics
of Tomlinson’s claims are not relevant to this appeal. What is relevant is that
Tomlinson included with her complaint a jury demand and that, in July 2019, she
paid a $500 jury deposit as required by Loc.R. 25.04 of the Delaware County Court
of Common Pleas. Mega Pool did not separately request a jury trial or pay a jury
deposit.

1. Tomlinson died while this matter was pending, and her estate was substituted as the plaintiff. The
appellee here is thus the Estate of Katherine Tomlinson, which is referred to herein as “Tomlinson.”

                                                 2
                                January Term, 2024

       {¶ 4} The trial was rescheduled several times. A magistrate of the trial court
held a teleconference with the parties on March 24, 2020. At that time, the
magistrate told the parties that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the jury trial
then scheduled for May 5, 2020, would have to be rescheduled. The trial was
rescheduled for September 8, 2020.
       {¶ 5} The magistrate held another teleconference with the parties on July
20, 2020, after which the magistrate issued an entry stating that “the [m]agistrate
discussed with the parties whether there had been any movement toward settlement,
as well as whether a jury trial was still necessary or whether the matter could be
resolved by a bench trial.” Regarding the jury-trial issue, counsel for Mega Pool
expressed that Mega Pool wanted a jury trial. But Mega Pool had not paid a jury
deposit. The magistrate told the parties that because of the pandemic, it was
unlikely that a jury trial could be held on September 8, as criminal jury trials would
be given scheduling priority. The magistrate suggested that if the parties agreed, it
might be possible to conduct a bench trial on September 8. According to the
magistrate’s entry, Tomlinson’s counsel “indicated [that Tomlinson] would be open
to this idea” but Mega Pool’s counsel wanted to discuss the issue with Mega Pool.
The magistrate rescheduled the jury trial for January 26, 2021. Additionally, the
magistrate ordered “the parties [to] notify the Court on or before August 3, 2020
whether they would be willing to waive jury trial and conduct a bench trial on
September 8, 2020.” (Boldface and underlining deleted.)
       {¶ 6} On July 28, 2020, the magistrate emailed the parties to let them know
that the court could “go forward with a trial on September 8 with a visiting judge.”
The magistrate told the parties, “It is the Court’s understanding that because [Mega
Pool] has not made a timely jury deposit as required by local rule, this would be a
bench trial; however, if [Tomlinson] does not object to a late jury deposit, we could
hold a jury trial on [September 8].”

                                          3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       {¶ 7} Mega Pool filed a “Motion to Maintain January 26, 2021 Jury Trial,”
arguing that it had not waived its right to a jury trial and that Tomlinson could not
withdraw her jury demand without its consent. Mega Pool also requested that the
court maintain the January 26, 2021 jury-trial date rather than proceed with a trial
on September 8, 2020. Tomlinson opposed Mega Pool’s motion, explaining that
“[p]rior to the September 24, 2019, trial date, [she] intended to try her case to a
jury, and at that time she submitted a jury deposit in compliance with the local rules
[but she] no longer wishes to exercise her right to a jury trial, and intends to seek a
refund of that deposit.” In Tomlinson’s view, because Mega Pool had not paid the
jury deposit required by Loc.R. 25.04, it had waived its right to a jury trial.
Tomlinson also objected to Mega Pool’s request to continue the trial date to
January 26, 2021. In denying Mega Pool’s motion, the court explained that because
Mega Pool had not paid a jury deposit under the local rule, it had waived its right
to a jury trial. The court also denied Mega Pool’s request to continue the trial date.
       {¶ 8} The case was tried to the bench on September 8 and 9, 2020. The trial
court entered verdicts in favor of Tomlinson on her claims for breach of contract,
breach of warranty, and violations of the Consumer Sales Practices Act and
awarded Tomlinson damages and attorney fees. After the trial court denied Mega
Pool’s motion for a new trial, Mega Pool appealed to the Fifth District Court of
Appeals.
       {¶ 9} On appeal to the Fifth District, Mega Pool challenged the applicability
of the Consumer Sales Practices Act to the case, challenged the awards of costs and
attorney fees under the Consumer Sales Practices Act, and argued that the trial court
had denied its right to a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
judgment in part and reversed it in part. 2023-Ohio-229, 206 N.E.3d 853, ¶ 48.
Relevant here, it concluded that the trial court had not erred in denying Mega Pool’s
motion for a jury trial. Id. at ¶ 41-47. The court of appeals agreed with the trial
court that Mega Pool was not permitted to “ ‘piggyback’ ” on Tomlinson’s jury

                                          4
                                 January Term, 2024

deposit and was required to pay its own deposit to invoke its right to a jury trial.
Id. at ¶ 46.
        {¶ 10} Mega Pool appealed to this court, and we accepted its appeal on one
proposition of law: “A civil litigant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is violated
where a trial court’s local rule permits a party to withdraw a demand for a jury trial
without consent of the parties.” See 170 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2023-Ohio-1665, 209
N.E.3d 713.
                                   II. ANALYSIS
        {¶ 11} Mega Pool contends that it was deprived of its right to a jury trial
because Loc.R. 25.04 of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas permitted
Tomlinson to unilaterally withdraw her jury demand.             But the language of
Loc.R. 25.04 itself does not address withdrawal of a jury demand. Instead, the
lower courts interpreted the rule to require payment of a jury deposit by each party
seeking a jury trial and to allow unilateral withdrawal of a jury demand. That
interpretation is not supported by the language of the rule and conflicts with
Civ.R. 38.
                             A. Civil-jury-trial demands
        {¶ 12} To invoke the right to a jury trial, the party seeking a jury trial must
serve a jury demand on the other party or parties “not later than [14] days after the
service of the last pleading directed to such issue.” Civ.R. 38(B). For parties to a
case in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Loc.R. 25.04 imposes an
additional requirement: “If a party is seeking a jury trial in a civil case, the party
must submit a $500 jury deposit to the clerk of courts at least 60 days prior to the
scheduled trial date. If the case is resolved after the jury has been assembled, the
deposit will be retained by the court. Failure to make the jury deposit will be
deemed as a waiver of the jury.” We have held that a local rule requiring a jury
deposit is “a moderate and reasonable regulation of the right of trial by jury, and is

                                           5
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

not an impairment of that right.” Walters v. Griffith, 38 Ohio St.2d 132, 133, 311
N.E.2d 14 (1974).
        {¶ 13} There is no question that Tomlinson properly invoked her right to a
jury trial. She complied with both Civ.R. 38(B) and Loc.R. 25.04. She included
with her complaint a jury demand, and as required by Civ.R. 38(B), the caption of
the complaint stated, “JURY DEMAND ENDORSED HEREON” (boldface,
capitalization, and underlining sic). The question is what was the legal effect of
her decision to withdraw her demand for a jury trial. Both the trial court and the
court of appeals determined that Tomlinson was permitted to unilaterally withdraw
her jury demand because Mega Pool had not paid a $500 jury deposit as required
by Loc.R. 25.04.
  B. Loc.R. 25.04 does not require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a jury
                                        deposit
        {¶ 14} Tomlinson maintains that the issue in this case is not whether she
was legally permitted to unilaterally withdraw her jury demand but whether Mega
Pool was required to pay its own jury deposit to invoke its right to a jury trial. In
her view, once she withdrew her jury deposit, no jury demand remained, because
Mega Pool had not paid a $500 jury deposit. The trial court and the court of appeals
agreed with that contention, concluding that if Mega Pool had wanted a jury trial,
it should have paid its own deposit. See 2023-Ohio-229, 206 N.E.3d 853, at ¶ 46.
        {¶ 15} For Tomlinson’s contention to be correct, we would have to read
Loc.R. 25.04 to mean that each party to a case who wants to invoke its right to a
jury trial must pay a jury deposit. But Loc.R. 25.04 refers to “a party [who] is
seeking a jury trial” and “the party [who] must submit a $500 jury deposit.”
(Emphasis added.) To find a requirement in the rule that each party seeking a jury
trial must pay a jury deposit would add language to the rule that is not there. Once
a party perfects a jury demand, the right to a jury trial is secured for all the parties.

                                            6
                                January Term, 2024

             C. A party may not unilaterally withdraw a jury demand
       {¶ 16} The lower courts’ conclusion not only wrongly reads Loc.R. 25.04
to require each party seeking a jury trial to pay a jury deposit but also would allow
a party to unilaterally withdraw a jury demand. That conclusion conflicts with
Civ.R. 38(D), which provides that “[a] demand for trial by jury made [under Civ.R.
38] may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.”              See also
Civ.R. 39(A).
       {¶ 17} During oral argument, counsel for Tomlinson maintained that
Tomlinson did not unilaterally withdraw her jury demand but instead simply
withdrew her jury deposit. That claim, however, is not borne out by the record. No
request to withdraw Tomlinson’s jury deposit was filed. And according to the trial-
court docket, the deposit was not refunded to Tomlinson until January 10, 2022—
three days after the trial court entered final judgment in the case. True, no
withdrawal of Tomlinson’s jury demand was filed. Rather, she stated in her
memorandum in response to Mega Pool’s motion to maintain the January 26, 2021
jury-trial date that she no longer wished to exercise her right to a jury trial. It
appears that the trial court treated this as Tomlinson’s withdrawal of her jury
demand. And allowing that withdrawal without Mega Pool’s consent violated
Civ.R. 38(D).
                               III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 18} Once Tomlinson filed a jury demand and paid the jury deposit
required by the trial court’s local rule, she could not withdraw the demand without
Mega Pool’s consent. Mega Pool was not required to pay an additional jury deposit.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the Fifth District Court of Appeals and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
                                                                 Judgment reversed
                                              and cause remanded to the trial court.

                                          7
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and
BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
                              _________________
       Hahn, Loeser & Parks, L.L.P., Marc J. Kessler, Michael R. Reed, and Elisé
K. Yarnell, for appellee.
       Young & Alexander Co., L.P.A., Jonathon L. Beck, Natalie M. E. Wais,
and Anthony V. Graber, for appellants.
       Janson & Riesen, L.L.C., and Kent D. Riesen, urging reversal for amicus
curiae, Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
                              _________________

                                         8