Court Opinion

ID: 9704978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:53:35.525694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.047883
License: Public Domain

O’HERN and STEIN, JJ.,
concurring.
We concur in the judgment of the Court. Although the majority does not reach the issue, we would expressly recognize this defendant’s right to move to withdraw his guilty plea “to correct a manifest injustice,” pursuant to Rule 3:21-1. Defendant asserts that he was advised by counsel that there would be no adverse impact on his employment as a consequence of his guilty plea. Moreover, the employment-forfeiture statute itself is ambiguous with respect to whether it applies to a conviction under the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, N.J.S.A. 24:21-1 to -53 (the C.D.S. Act). N.J.S.A. 2C:51-2a(l) requires forfeiture of public office or employment by an individual “convicted under the laws of this State * * * of a crime of the third degree or above * * *.” However, N.J.S.A. 24:21-19b(3) and 24:21-20a(4) classify the offenses for which defendant was indicted as high misdemeanors. While N.J.S.A. 2C:43-lb equates third-degree crimes and high misdemeanors for purposes of sentencing, that provision expressly excludes Title 24 offenses from its reach. Although it is unlikely that the Legislature intentionally excluded violators of the C.D.S. Act from the employment-forfeiture provision of the Code, the issue is not before us and has not been previously adjudicated.
We concur with the Court’s conclusion that the trial judge is required only to advise defendants of the penal consequences of a guilty plea. Nevertheless, the circumstances of this case lead us to conclude that defendant should not be precluded from obtaining relief under Rule 3:21-1. See State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 364-65 (1979).