Court Opinion

ID: 9558726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:16:03.704377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:33.377372
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority frames the issue as “whether there is authority to search premises other than those described in the warrant, when the officer has personal knowledge of the premises that were intended to be searched.” 106 Or App at 550. The answer to that is, “No, of course not” with a perfunctory citation to Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits general warrants. That is the majority’s opinion in a nutshell.
Now let us discuss the real issue: Did the warrant describe the house that was searched? The warrant described the house to be searched as a “green single story house located at 1837 SE Main Street.” That description was sufficiently particular; however, it was not completely accurate: one number in the address was incorrect. It is unrealistic and hypertechnical to hold that a warrant that does not describe a place 100 percent accurately, does not describe it all. The test is whether
“ ‘the officer with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain the identity of the place intended.’ The description must be sufficiently clear so that the property to be searched is recognizable from other neighboring properties.” State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 35, 511 P2d 381 (1973). (Footnotes omitted.)
*554In Blackburn/Barber, the description was partially inaccurate, but the Court determined that the officers reasonably could determine which place was intended. The majority quotes that test, but then never applies it.1 The Court did not hold that the officers had to get a new warrant when they discovered the error, as the majority urges now.
Like Blackburn/Barber, State v. Cole, 84 Or App 497, 734 P2d 393 (1987), involved an inaccurate warrant description. The warrant described the house to be searched as 1560 S.W. Avery Lane. The affidavit described it as 1560 S.W. Allen Lane, and police actually searched 1560 S.W. Allen Street. I agree with the majority that to the extent the case says that the officer’s subjective knowledge of which house was intended can validate an inadequate warrant description, it is wrong. However, I do not think that is the holding. The case holds that the description was adequate, because the officers could, based on objective criteria, ascertain the place intended. 84 Or App at 501. That was so, because the warrant description was detailed; Avery had no 1500 block and was mostly industrial; and Allen Street was only one of two streets in the area with a house numbered 1560 and the other house did not match the description. The case was decided correctly.
The cases on which the majority relies are inapposite. In State v. Ingram, 104 Or App 389, 802 P2d 656 (1990), we held that the description in the warrant of “occupants” did not particularly describe the defendant when he was identified individually in the affidavit. 104 Or App at 401. Here, the house was identified individually in both the warrant and the affidavit. In State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 768 P2d 913 (1989), the issue was whether a warrant authorizing a search of a house also authorized a search of an apartment located in a separate building on the same lot. The Supreme Court held that the warrant authorized only the search of one residence and, if the apartment was a separate residence, its search was not authorized. Here, there is no question but that the two houses were separate residences and the officers could not search both. The question is whether the warrant described the house that was searched.
*555The appropriate test for inaccurate warrant descriptions, as enunciated in Blackburn/Barber and followed in Cole, is whether an officer can with reasonable effort identify the place intended. State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra, 266 Or at 35. I would hold that the officers reasonably could identify the place intended. The warrant described the house as green and numbered 1837. The house numbered 1837 was not green. Thus, an officer who did not know which house was intended immediately would be alerted to a problem. The officer executing the warrant easily could have determined which house was intended by checking the affidavit. It described the house as
“located on the North East corner of SE Main and Marsters Street. It has an attached carport/garage and a large gravel and dirt parking area on the West side where Kading and her visitors park their vehicles.”
The house searched was the only green house on the block. It was located on the northeast corner of S.E. Main and Marsters and was the only house that otherwise fitted the detailed description in the affidavit.
Allowing an officer to consult the affidavit when a warrant description is facially valid but proves ambiguous because of an inaccuracy is consistent with the purposes of constitutional and statutory requirements. See Or Const, Art I, § 9; ORS 133.565(2)(b). The warrant requirement takes discretion out of the hands of the police, by requiring that determinations of probable cause be made by a neutral, detached judge. State v. Peller, 287 Or 255, 261 n 2, 598 P2d 684 (1979). The requirement that a warrant describe with particularity the place to be searched ensures that police actually search the premises for which the judge found probable cause. State v. Devine, supra, 307 Or at 341. A logical way to determine for which premises the judge found probable cause is to examine the affidavit on which the judge relied.
It is not sufficient, however, that the affidavit contain additional facts; there must also be some showing that the information was reasonably accessible to the executing officers. See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure 209, § 4.5(a) (2d ed 1987). Some courts in other jurisdictions have required that the affidavit be attached to the warrant when it was executed. See LaFave, supra; see also Annot, 11 ALR3d 1330, § 10 *556(1967). In this case, the record does not show whether the affidavit was attached to the warrant. That is not fatal, however, because the executing officer was also the affiant and, therefore, can be assumed to have been aware of the contents of the affidavit without a showing that he had the affidavit with him. It is not the officer’s knowledge of which house he, as affiant, intended to search that is relevant. The majority is right that an officer’s knowledge of information that is not in the affidavit cannot be considered. I would hold only that the officer’s knowledge of the contents of the affidavit is relevant to whether the affidavit was required to have been attached to the warrant.
I would uphold the search under the warrant, because the warrant was particular on its face and, although it was latently ambiguous because of an inaccuracy, the affidavit, the contents of which were known to the executing officer, provided objective information establishing for which house the judge had found probable cause. The majority contends that that analysis would “allow an officer to search the premises he meant to search, rather than restricting the scope of the search to the premises for which a neutral magistrate found probable cause.” 106 Or App at 552. That is not correct. My point is that an officer in this kind of situation ought to be able to examine the affidavit to determine for which premises the judge found probable cause.
I dissent.
Rossman, Deits and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.

 The majority does not assert that Blackburn/Barber is no longer valid. It has consistently been cited with approval. See, e.g., State v. Devine, 307 Or 341, 768 P2d 913 (1989).