Court Opinion

ID: 9498447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:17:32.68133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:50.102156
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion that affirms the forfeiture of Juluke’s house. The evidence is insufficient to determine that Juluke’s home was “used ... in any manner or part ... to facilitate the commission of such violation[s]” of which he was convicted. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2). The majority’s result goes further than any other I have found allowing the forfeiture of a home with so little demonstrated connection to the offenses of conviction.
The record indicates only that Corey Juluke received a shipment of heroin, placed the heroin in his car, and ultimately parked his ear containing the heroin in his open driveway. While fleeing law enforcement, Juluke disposed of the heroin by throwing it out the car window. There is no evidence that Juluke ever brought the heroin into his home, and it is unknown how long he had been in possession of the heroin. Based on this evidence alone, the majority holds that the Juluke home may be ordered forfeited.
In order for property to be eligible for forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853, the government must first demonstrate a requisite nexus between the property to be forfeited and the offense charged. “Incidental or fortuitous connection [of the property] to the drug business” is not sufficient to warrant its forfeiture. United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Commonly knotun as 916 Douglas Ave., Elgin, Ill, 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir.1990) (construing identical language in civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).). See also Fed. R.Crim. PROC. 32.2(b)(i). The cases cited by the majority all concern situations where the property to be forfeited was the situs of the charged drug crime. See United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir.1995) (forfeiture of home proper where home phones used to conduct drug business in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Premises known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., Minneapolis, Minn., 869 F.2d 1093, 1095-97 (8th Cir.1989) (forfeiture of home proper where drugs were processed and sold therein); United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th Cir.1987) (forfeiture of farm proper where marijuana cultivated on land). The homes in all the aforementioned cases clearly played at least some role in the crimes committed by their owners, so finding the requisite nexus was not a difficult task.
The instant case does not compare favorably with the cases cited by the majority. Indeed, the Juluke home does not appear to have played any role in Juluke’s crimes. No drugs were found anywhere in the Juluke residence after law enforcement searched his property. The search turned up no drug paraphernalia that might suggest Juluke had been processing heroin for distribution. Finally, the Government presented no evidence that Ju-luke had sold drugs from his home, held *330drug-related meetings at his home, or used his home phones to conduct his business.
As there is no evidence that the Juluke home was the situs of any of the crimes of which he was convicted, the district court and majority base forfeiture on the fact that Juluke “stored” heroin on his property. Even assuming the heroin never left Juluke’s car, the district court found that the Juluke home had facilitated Juluke’s crimes, as the location of the home in a moderately affluent neighborhood enabled him to conceal his crimes. This theory of concealment strains credulity. In United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045 (6th Cir.1992), a case cited by the Government, forfeiture of a tract of land was held to be proper where property was used to “actually physically conceal ” the crimes on the owner’s adjacent land. Id. at 1055 (emphasis in original); see also Plescia, 48 F.3d at 1462 (phone calls made within home helped to conceal crime). Again, the property in these cases played a role in the commission of the underlying crimes, and drug crimes took place on the property to be forfeited. By comparison, it is difficult to see how Juluke’s open driveway concealed his crimes. Juluke did not place his car in a covered garage, behind a secure fence, or even in a wooded area. That Juluke lived in an upper middle class neighborhood is of little import here, given that the car was parked away from the home in plain view.
In a criminal forfeiture case for drug crimes, it is not “[t]he quantity” of drugs involved but “the quality of the relationship between the property and the crime” that is at issue. Premises known as 3639-2nd St., N.E., Minneapolis, Minn., 869 F.2d at 1098 (Arnold, J., concurring). Further, to “facilitate” means “to make easier or less difficult.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dict. The quality of the relationship between property and crime in this case is weak. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Juluke’s illegal activities were “made easier or less difficult” by his having a car parked in his driveway at home. The drugs were no more concealed or contiguous to him than they would have been in a car parked on the street. The broad facilitation theory advanced today extends an already broad statute beyond the scope of its language. There is no evidence to suggest that Ju-luke’s decision to park his car in his driveway on the day of his arrest is anything other than incidental or fortuitous. Forfeiture of Juluke’s home is not warranted by the facts on record, and I therefore respectfully dissent.