Court Opinion

ID: 9551389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:52:36.927656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:40.905554
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I concur in the judgment of reversal on the ground that, as the majority opinion indicates, evidence which should have been considered by the trial court but obviously was not requires a new trial on the issue of whether the defendant is able to contribute anything to the support of the minor son of the parties or the plaintiff, or to pay the balance of court costs and attorney’s fees.
I dissent from that portion of the opinion which overrules and disapproves Estate of Magerl, 201 Cal. 162, 168 [256 P. 204], and Jennings v. Day, 7 Cal.App.2d 555, 558 [46 P.2d 193], and necessarily other cases not expressly mentioned. Language in those cases to the effect that a motion for new trial based on the first four grounds of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be supported by affidavits merely followed the mandatory provision of section 658 of that code where it is said: “When the application [for a new trial] is made for a cause mentioned in the first, second, third and fourth subdivisions of the last section, it must be made upon affidavits; otherwise it must be made on the minutes of the court.” Although the motion here was made for causes stated in the first ground of section 657 it was also made for causes specified in subsections 6 and 7 of said section, namely, insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision, that the decision is against law, and errors in law occurring at the trial as to which affidavits are not required. The motion in this case was based on the minutes of the court, the pleadings and orders, documentary evidence, and the record *166of the proceedings on the trial. When so based the record of the trial proceedings and the sufficiency of the evidence may be considered on the motion (Code Civ. Proc., § 660; Chambers v. Farnham, 39 Cal.App. 17 [179 P. 423]) and is properly before the reviewing court on appeal.
It is entirely unnecessary to overrule cases supporting the mandatory effectiveness of the statute in order to bring about the result desired by the majority in this case. To adhere to the requirements of the statute and the cases supporting it certainly is not “slavish adherence to the letter of the statute. ’ ’ On the contrary the cases overruled evidence a wholesome respect for valid statutory enactments. Refusal to follow the statute and the supporting cases can only result in confusing the established practice.
In Estate of Magerl (at p. 165), it was expressly noted that there.was no contention that the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision of the trial court. It was held that the motion for new trial on the ground of misconduct of the judge not presented on affidavits was properly denied because not sufficiently supported. In Jennings v. Day the judgment against the appellant was based upon sufficient evidence. No motion for a new trial was made on any of the first four grounds of section 657 as to which affidavits are required. It was properly concluded on that state of the record that if the appellant wished the reviewing court to consider the asserted claims of passion and prejudice on the part of the trial judge it was his duty to make the motion on the appropriate ground supported by affidavits.
There is no provision of law, mandatory or otherwise, which would foreclose an appellate court from reviewing the entire record when, as here, the motion and the contentions on the appeal include insufficiency of the evidence and errors of law occurring at the trial. When on review it appears that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings and judgment, an appellate court will not hesitate in a proper case to consider the effect of misconduct of the trial judge as a controlling factor in preventing a party from making a proper showing by the introduction of evidence, or in inducing a judgment contrary to the evidence. In view of the record in this case it is clear that the trial judge closed his mind to the provisions of section 139 of the Civil Code which requires the court to consider the circumstances of both parties in determining to what extent the guilty husband should contribute to the maintenance and support of the minor son and *167Ms wife. The reversal is therefore proper because of insufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment in those respects and of the error of law in failing to be guided by the provisions of section 139.