Court Opinion

ID: 9598976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:32.785819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:12.835425
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
The case presents an important issue involving the integrity of our jury system, namely, whether a verdict may stand despite proof that sitting jurors were permitted, during the presentation of evidence, to read books or work crossword puzzles. Through the sworn declarations of three named jurors (one of whom voted for plaintiff, one of whom voted for defendant, and one of whom did not vote) the following record was established:
Juror A declared that “over approximately one month ... [juror D] was reading ... a book in the jury box while witnesses and evidence were being presented,” and that three other jurors (L, G and V) “over a period of several weeks during the trial were doing crossword puzzles in the jury box while witnesses and evidence were being presented”; juror G declared, “During the course of the trial I observed [juror L] in the jury box, had open written material or material with figures, not having to do with the trial, which she was working on or doing something with while testimony and evidence were being presented. On many occasions during the trial I saw [juror D] reading a book in the jury box while evidence and witnesses were being presented”; juror W declared that “During the course of trial I saw jurors [L, G and V] doing crossword puzzles in the jury box while witnesses and evidence were being presented. I observed that [juror D] while sitting in the jury box during court sessions was reading a book. Her reading continued intermittently over a period of many days.”
*422The foregoing sworn declarations from three of the sitting jurors involved conduct of five of the twelve jurors. One of the jurors charged with having worked the crossword puzzles did not deny that she had done so. The other four, in identical language, denied that “I was reading extraneous material or doing crossword puzzles in any manner or to any extent, whereby I was not able to pay close attention to the testimony.” (Italics added.) The emphasized language is significant, containing an implicit acknowledgement that the misconduct occured. Although the jurors asserted that the misconduct did not prevent them from following the testimony, this claim of extenuation is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a).
The majority has frankly conceded that defendant “has made a prima facie showing of improper conduct by certain jurors. No evidence contradicted the declarations to the effect that some jurors engaged in distracting activities during the presentation of evidence at trial.” (Ante, p. 412.) The majority adds, further, that “It must be concluded that by failing to fulfill their duty of attentiveness, the jurors committed misconduct.” (Ante, p. 415.)
Fully acknowledging this misconduct, however, the majority nonetheless insists that there was “no substantial likelihood that actual prejudice may have resulted from the jurors’ activities. It was not clear what type of evidence was being presented while the misconduct occurred or even which side’s case was being presented.” (Ante, p. 417.) With due respect, I think the majority errs. It does not matter what kind of evidence was being offered or who presented it during these periods of improper inattention. The majority of this court held only five years ago that, whether in a civil or criminal case, “It is well settled that a presumption of prejudice arises from any jury misconduct. In an early case we said: ‘For, when misconduct of jurors is shown, it is presumed to be injurious to defendant, unless the contrary appears .... [1Í] Juror misconduct has occurred in several forms requiring reversal when prejudice is presumed in the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption.’” (People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal.Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050], italics added.)
The present majority ignores this long established presumption of prejudice by purporting to rebut the presumption because defendant has failed to show actual prejudice! However, as the majority itself has observed, the presumption of prejudice was intended specifically to assist those litigants “who are unable to establish by a preponderance of *423the evidence that actual prejudice occurred.” (Ante, p. 416, italics added.) Thus, the majority casts the burden of showing a “substantial likelihood” of actual prejudice upon the very party whose inability to prove such prejudice created the presumption in its favor. This reasoning cannot be the law and it surely has not been our previous position. For example, quite recently in a criminal context, People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199 [155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91], we said “jury misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice; and unless the prosecution rebuts that presumption by proof that no prejudice actually resulted, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. [Citations.]” (P. 207, italics added.) Similarly, in the case before us when jury misconduct is established, the burden is upon the plaintiff to demonstrate that no prejudice resulted from the misconduct. It is not the task of defendant, who has the benefit of the presumption, to show prejudice.
Nor is the misconduct trivial or inconsequential. A defendant’s right to a fair jury trial in civil litigation is of both federal and state constitutional significance. (Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654 [141 Cal.Rptr. 604]; Clemens v. Regents of University of California (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 356, 360 [97 Cal.Rptr. 589].) We should not countenance such a complete erosion of a constitutional command.
The fact, of course, if it be a fact, that the evidence against defendant on the issue of liability was, in the majority’s words, “overwhelming,” does not detract one whit from defendant’s right to the jurors’ careful independent evaluation of the damage aspect of the case. There was certainly no “overwhelming proof” of plaintiff’s entitlement to $11,570,719, the amount of the jury’s verdict, which the trial court itself voluntarily reduced. In my view, this is an exceedingly large verdict, and the jurors’ admitted inattention to the flow of the evidence may very well have occurred during the presentation of the damage phase of the case. We do not know. Moreover, my conclusion is not changed by defendant’s inability to identify and match the particular periods of the jurors’ distraction with the specific evidentiary presentation by one party or the other. That, of course, is not a critical point because oral or documentary evidence favorable to a defendant may be received during a plaintiff's presentation, and vice versa.
How, in fairness, is it possible for defendant which did not know of the misconduct, nor did anyone else outside of the jury box apparently, *424to prove that the jury’s inattention injured it, either as to the liability or damage issues in this case? The jury’s misconduct here was real, it was substantial and it is admitted. It is not an answer to say that because no one saw the misconduct, not judge, counsel, bailiffs or anyone else, therefore it must not have occurred. The record beyond doubt establishes that in fact it did occur ánd the majority freely acknowledges that it did. The fact that the jury misconduct may have been surreptitious does not dilute the force of the majority’s conclusion that, “by failing to fulfill their duty of attentiveness, the jurors committed misconduct.” (Ante, p. 415.) This misconduct was pervasive, involving five of the twelve jurors including the “forewoman.” It continued over an extended period of time, variously described as “approximately a one-month period,” or “over a period of several weeks,” or “on many occasions,” or “intermittently over a period of many days.” It occurred “while witnesses and evidence were being presented.” (Italics added.) The misconduct was not the momentary dozing of a single juror in an isolated incident. Rather, it involved almost half the jury in frequent, prolonged, intentional mental activity of a type that was diverting and that required thought and contemplation. I respectfully suggest that there are very few jurors, or anyone else to my knowledge, who can simultaneously read a book or work a crossword puzzle while following attentively the testimony in a courtroom. Such activities, in my opinion, were wholly incompatible with a juror’s duties and, with full respect to my esteemed colleagues, we delude ourselves if we think otherwise. The misconduct poisoned the verdict.
Thus, I am unable to square the degree of admitted jury misconduct in this record with what I have always believed was the sworn duty of a juror to “well and truly try the matter in issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 604.) This duty surely entails giving undivided attention to the evidence and court proceedings whether the trial lasts three hours, three weeks or three months. Litigants are entitled to no less.
Accordingly, I concur in the conclusion of the unanimous Court of Appeal herein that “A crossword-puzzle working juror attempting to ascertain the proper word has a closed mind, or at minimum, an interrupted attention span. Similarly a novel-reading juror cannot concentrate on both the flow of the plot and the flow of the testimony. Such inattention implies prejudgment of the case which is misconduct. [1i] Nothing admissible appears in the record herein to rebut the presumption of prejudice which arises from such juror misconduct. The inescap*425able conclusion is that the parties did not have 12 unbiased, impartial jurors.”
Believing that we should not approve as a standard for California litigants the jury conduct in this case, I would reverse the judgment.
The petition of appellant Ford Motor Company for a rehearing was denied November 15, 1982. Newman, J. and Kaus, J., did not participate therein. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the petition should, be granted.