Court Opinion

ID: 9763229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:12.671048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:31.159901
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, appellant MO-PAC contends that it was denied due process because the appellees, not the appellants, should have had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s granting of the post-verdict trial amendment was harmless. MOPAC cites a criminal case, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), to support its position.1
ERROR
The burden of proof in civil cases is, and always has been, on the party appealing from the trial court’s judgment to show error in the judgment. See Murray v. Devco, Ltd., 731 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex.1987); Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex.1968); Central Nat’l Gulfbank v. Comdata Network, Inc., 773 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ). Further, the standard of review for a trial court’s order granting leave to file a post-verdict trial amendment is “abuse of discretion.” See Bell v. Meeks, 725 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex.1987); Ro-*251well v. Piper Aircraft Corp.; 703 S.W.2d 630, 633-35 (Tex.1986); Shearer v. Allied Live Oak Bank, 758 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). The party alleging abuse of discretion has the burden to show abuse of discretion. See Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., Inc., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.1987); Allright, Inc. v. Van Scoyoc, 784 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex.App.—Houston [l4th Dist.] 1990, no writ). MOPAC was properly assigned the burden of showing the trial court’s abuse of discretion.
REVERSIBLE ERROR
It is not enough, however, for a party seeking reversal to show error. It must show reversible error—harm. The measure for reversible error in civil cases is set out in Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1) (emphasis ours):
No judgment shall be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered in any cause on the ground that the trial court has committed an error of law in the course of the trial, unless the appellate court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case, or was such as probably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court....
The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate 81(b)(1) harm. Wakefield v. Bevly, 704 S.W.2d 339, 348 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); see also Boatland v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 750 (Tex.1980). On appeal, MOPAC could not show harm by the trial court’s granting of the post-verdict amendment because the judgment was adequately supported by the pre-ver-dict pleadings; consequently, even assuming the trial court’s action was erroneous, the post-verdict amendment did not cause the rendition of an improper judgment. There simply was no harm. Again, the burden to show 81(b)(1) harm was properly placed upon appellant MOPAC. It just failed to meet its burden.
MOPAC also argues that the post-verdict amendment was in fact harmful under the second prong of the 81(b)(1) test, i.e., that the amendment prevented MOPAC from making a proper presentation of its case to this Court. Specifically, MOPAC contends that it had no way of knowing whether the trial court’s judgment would be reviewed under the theories pled before the verdict or the alleged “new” theories pled post-verdict. This argument is altogether untenable.
The purpose of the second prong of the 81(b)(1) harm test is to provide a new trial when a party, due to no fault of its own, is unable to develop the record below, resulting in the appellate court’s inability to consider the appellant’s arguments. See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 561 S.W.2d 172, 173 (Tex.1978) (appellant unable to obtain a statement of facts) (citing Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.1972)); Alvarado v. Reif 783 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1989, no writ) (no statement of facts); Mountain Corp. v. Rose, 737 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1987, writ denied) (no record made of default proceedings); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Boyles, 456 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 464 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.1971) (trial court denied appellant its right to perfect a bill of exceptions); Groves v. Rosenthal, 371 S.W.2d 792, 793 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (trial court failed to make additional findings of fact relating to ultimate and controlling issues).
There is nothing in the trial court’s action, allowing the post-verdict amendment, that in any way prejudiced MOPAC’s ability to have this Court review the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. MOPAC was not prevented from challenging the jury’s verdict under both sets of pleadings.
An 81(b)(1) harm analysis is the vehicle by which an appellate court determines the reversibility of the judgment, not the difficulty of the appeal. Although a trial court’s rulings may have the effect of generating a more burdensome appeal for the *252appellant seeking reversal, it does not follow that the appellant has been prevented from making a proper presentation of its case. An appellant has no inherent right to an easy appeal.
Out of an abundance of caution, we decline to hold unequivocally that a party could never present a situation where trial court error, unrelated to the ability to obtain and present a proper appellate record, reaches the point of preventing a proper presentation on appeal. Nonetheless, we hold that MOPAC was not prevented in any way from making a proper presentation of its case to this Court. MOPAC’s motion for rehearing is denied.

. The standard for reversible error in criminal cases is found in Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2) (emphasis ours):
lf the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or the punishment.
Because of its "beyond a reasonable doubt” language, Rule 81(b)(2) places the burden of proof upon the State in criminal appeals to demonstrate that the appellant suffered no harm in the trial court proceedings. Taylor v. State, 755 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).