Court Opinion

ID: 9514471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:48.201651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:18.137567
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶. 50.] I dissent.
[¶ 51.] In regards to the general inadmissibility of prior acts, this Court hit the nail on the head when it stated in Moeller:
Generally, evidence of crimes or acts other than the ones with which the defendant is charged are inadmissible, unless certain exceptions apply_ Under [SDCL 19-12-5], prior bad acts evidence is not admissible to show that, merely because a defendant committed a similar offense on another occasion, he has a propensity to commit the offense charged.
1996 SD 60, ¶ 12, 548 N.W.2d 465, 471 (citations omitted).
*880[¶ 52.] This general rule of excluding prior acts rests on sound policy and constitutional principles:
Introduction of evidence that the defendant committed other crimes and unwholesome acts may lead jurors to return a verdict of guilty for reasons other than finding all the elements of the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Although reasonable doubt of guilt exists on this occasion, the jury might conclude the defendant is a “bad man,” who deserves punishment regardless of his innocence of the crime charged and warrants imprisonment to prevent future maleficent acts. Such results defeat the letter and policy of substantive criminal law mandating conviction based upon a non-vague concrete statute; instead, jurors have found the defendant guilty based upon past unsavory acts without necessarily violating any criminal statute in the process. Alternatively, and just as improperly, upon learning that the accused committed other crimes or wrongs, jurors might infer that the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes and probably committed this crime as charged.
State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286, 295 (Amundson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Patterson, Evidence of Prior Bad Acts: Admissibility Under the Federal Rules, 38 Baylor LRev 331, 332-33 (1986)).
[1153.] In this case, the trial court found the prior acts relevant to show “motive, common plan or scheme, opportunity, absence of mistake or accident, and continuing course of criminal conduct.” However, there was never any showing why the prior acts, were needed to show a material element of the crime charged. Instead, the court merely listed possible uses creating a “smorgasbord” of choices in the hope that at least one would fit. I have previously expressed my less than enthused opinion of this “smorgasbord” approach to admission of other acts evidence. See, Werner, 482 N.W.2d at 296 (Amundson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). As stated in Werner:
Particularly to be deplored is what might be called the ‘smorgasbord’ approach to analysis of other crimes evidence in which the court simply serves up a long list of permissible uses without any attempt to show how any of them are applicable to the case at hand.... What is to be avoided is the mere listing of possible uses in the hope that at least one will seem to the reader to be applicable to the facts of the instant ease.
Id. (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 5240 at 479 (1978)). Under this guise, forbidden propensity evidence is allowed in.
[¶ 54.] The majority claims motive was relevant to prove intent in the present case. The Majority attempts to distinguish Moeller, 1996 SD 60, ¶ 36, 548 N.W.2d at 477, on the basis that forensic evidence was available to establish intent, while, in the present case there was no such forensic evidence. In Moeller, the victim, of course, was not available to testify. In the present ease, the victims were available to testify and did, in fact, testify. Such testimony serves the purpose the forensic evidence served in Moeller. The majority’s attempt to distinguish Moeller on such a basis is simply a ruse, the result of which is to allow in propensity evidence.
[¶ 55.] In the well-reasoned case of, United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 661 (8thCir.1997), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that evidence of prior acts was not admissible to establish motive when intent was not at issue because the defendant denied the criminal act. The court stated:
Motive, accident, and mistake were not at issue, because if the acts of abuse against [victim] occurred, there can be little doubt regarding [defendant’s] motive and the criminality of the acts.... The evidence therefore does no more than show that [defendant] has “a propensity to commit crimes, which Rule 404(b) prohibits.”
Sumner, 119 F.3d at 661 (citation omitted). In the present case, the defendant denied the acts occurred, thus, intent was not in dispute. To allow the prior acts in as relevant to *881establish motive does no more than show a propensity to commit crimes which SDCL 19-12-5 prohibits.
[¶ 56.] The other acts evidence was erroneously admitted and unlike the majority claims, it is far from harmless. By allowing in these prior acts, the defendant is forced to defend against numerous uncharged acts that deal only with propensity. There is no question the conduct charged is despicable, sickening and totally unacceptable. However, when the prior acts do not fit within an exception and serve only to establish propensity, admission of the evidence is erroneous.
[¶ 57.] I also join in the dissent of Justice SABERS.