Court Opinion

ID: 9745691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:18:05.574522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.183940
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I must part ways with the majority's determination that this cause should be *1034reversed upon the theory that Debro's plea agreement was void ab initio. I have no quarrel with the proposition that a plea agreement amounts to an explicit contract between the State and the defendant that is binding when accepted by the trial court. Op. at 1031 (quoting Lighty v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (Ind.Ct.App.2000)). I also embrace the notion that contracts made in violation of a statute are void and unenforceable. State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Marion County Superior Court, 275 Ind. 545, 552, 419 N.E.2d 109, 114 (1981).
However, it is my view that the majority's reliance upon King, Chissell and Robi-son for the result reached in Lighty as well as in this case that Debro's plea agreement must be set aside, is misplaced. To me, those cases may be fairly distinguished from the cireumstances presented here as well as those in Lighty. Both Debro and the defendant in Lighty entered pleas of guilty pursuant to agreements that sentencing would be deferred or that judgment would be withheld so long as the defendants would comply with various conditions in the agreements.
The first case upon which the majority relies for its determination that Debro's plea is void ab initio is Robison, where the trial made the following entry at the conclusion of a bench trial: "Finding of guilty as charged and judgment is now by the court withheld." Robison, 172 Ind.App. at 206, 359 N.E.2d at 924. On appeal, this court concluded that a "judgment withheld" entry is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. Id. Thus, an appeal by either party was thwarted in Robison when the trial judge refused to enter a judgment. Without a judgment, there can be no appeal. Absent the consent of the parties regarding a judgment withheld, I can certainly agree that such action in Robison was improper. Thus, because the trial court's action in Robison violated the defendant's constitutional right to take an appeal, entering a judgment withheld was error.
Similarly, the trial judge in King essentially changed a judgment that had already been entered, 720 N.E.2d at 1234, and the trial court in Chissell never entered a judgment on the jury verdicts. 705 N.E.2d at 503. Under such cireumstances, it is my view that those cases do not compel the same result here, or that reached in Lighty. Specifically, both Deb-ro and the Lighty defendant agreed to postpone the entry of the judgment in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. Therefore, I must disagree with the proposition that a trial court is absolutely prohibited from withholding judgment in accordance with the parties' negotiated plea agreement.
It has been held that it is the defendant's agreement to a delay that renders a delay permissible in some instances. See Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ind.1995) (recognizing that when a defendant refuses to waive his right to be sentenced within thirty days, the trial court may properly deny his motion for continuance of his sentencing hearing). That being said, I see no compelling reason for permitting a defendant to waive the right to be sentenced within a certain period of time while not permitting the parties to agree to a delay of judgment for a specific period of time. It is apparent to me that Debro's decision to have the judgment withheld inured to his benefit. He was not prejudiced by such action, and he has simply invited the error at this juncture. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court in all respects.