Court Opinion

ID: 9706459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:44:02.372205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:22.915027
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The Commission in its decision found: “The Commission further finds that it has continuing jurisdiction to hear and decide a timely filed Petition to apportion fees under § 16(a) of the Act. Here, Goldstein, Fishman and Romanoff filed their Petition for Fees immediately after their discharge by Petitioner and while the claim in 96WC66576 was still pending before the Arbitrator. They took the steps necessary to protect their claim by bringing it before Arbitrator Reichart December 2, 1997, when it was continued, and again on December 5, 1998, when Arbitrator Reichart entered an order directing that no payment be made on the claim without notice to Goldstein, Fishman, Bender and Romanoff. It is not unusual for a case to remain pending before the Commission for years before settlement or a final decision is made. Fees between successive claimant attorneys cannot be assessed until the case ends because they are paid on a contingent basis. Nonetheless, the Commission’s jurisdiction is continuing under the Act. *** The Commission notes that Petitioner signed a Representation Agreement with Ribbeck Maravi on March 31, 1997 when he was already represented by Goldstein, Fishman, Bender and Romanoff. *** Petitioner did not tell his former attorney that he had sought other counsel, instead, Goldstein, Fishman, Bender and Romanoff learned from Respondent that a new attorney had been retained. *** On the second application, Petitioner denied that a prior application had been filed, a representation which was false. In December, 2000, Petitioner signed a motion to dismiss his first application. When he presented this Motion to Arbitrator Reichart in January, 2001, he apparently failed to remind the Arbitrator of the pending fee petition, despite the Arbitrator’s order of December 5, 1998. On[e] month later Petitioner signed the settlement contract which was presented to the Arbitrator in March, 2001. Throughout this period Petitioner knew that his former attorney had an unresolved claim for attorneys’ fees and that Arbitrator Reichart had entered an order specifically requiring that Petitioner’s former attorney be informed of any settlement. These facts suggest that Petitioner was deliberately attempting to avoid his obligations to his prior attorney by filing a new Application for Adjustment of Claim and dismissing his first claim.” Support for jurisdiction of the Commission is also found in the Administrative Code, section 7080.10. 50 Ill. Adm. Code § 7080.10(a)(1) (2003). Section 7080.10(a)(1) provides in substance that when a dispute has arisen between the claimant and his former attorney concerning the payment of fees, the petitioner or his attorney or former attorney may file with the Commission a petition to fix fees setting forth the facts surrounding the dispute and the relief requested. I also note that the referral to ARDC by the Commission falls within its power under section 7090.10(c) (50 Ill. Adm. Code § 7090.10(c) (2003)). The Commission was properly authorized to enter the order for compensation. HOLDRIDGE, J., joins in this dissent.