Court Opinion

ID: 9900045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 18:10:38.335163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.807195
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00525-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MICHAEL CHAD WILSON,                                                     Appellant,

                                          v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee.

                  On appeal from the County Court at Law
                        of Navarro County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
                Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

      Appellant Michael Chad Wilson appeals his conviction for manufacture or delivery

of a substance in penalty group 1, four grams or more but less than 200 grams, a first-
degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(d). 1 Wilson pleaded guilty

to the offense charged in the indictment, reserving the right to appeal a prior denial of a

motion to suppress evidence by the trial court. After accepting his guilty plea, the trial

court sentenced Wilson to five years’ imprisonment. In his sole issue, Wilson argues that

the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

                                             I.      BACKGROUND

        A grand jury indicted Wilson with one count of manufacture or delivery of a

substance in penalty group 1, four grams or more but less than 200 grams, a first-degree

felony. See id. Wilson’s arrest was the result of a search of a residence in Barry, Texas,

pursuant to a warrant, in which he was an overnight guest. The affidavit filed in support

of the search warrant provides that affiant detective Michael Worthy of the Corsicana

Police Department has been a police officer for approximately five years and has

experience in narcotics investigations. Worthy averred that law enforcement had been

conducting surveillance of the residence “due to receiving information of narcotics being

sold at the location.” Worthy stated that he also received information that two wanted

subjects, Christopher Nash and Travis Vogel, lived at the residence. Worthy explained

that he is “familiar” with the residence “due to receiving information” that Nash and another

individual, Teresa Bartlett, had been “selling narcotics” “in the recent past[.]” Worthy stated

that he personally “conducted recent surveillance” on the residence “and observed

vehicles coming to the residence for a short amount of time and leaving.” Worthy further

        1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to a

docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 22.220(a)
(delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer
cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer).

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stated that he had “knowledge of . . . Nash and . . . Bartlett along with multiple subjects

stating that they are narcotics dealers,” and that he “is also familiar with the named

subjects due to recent information and their extensive criminal history involving narcotics.”

According to the affidavit, law enforcement observed a vehicle owned by Bartlett leaving

the residence, and a traffic stop was conducted after the driver, later identified as Nash,

failed to signal before turning. Worthy averred that after the traffic stop, passenger Amber

O’Daniel admitted to having drugs on her person and advised him that “Nash had handed

her the narcotics stating he was going to jail and to hide it.” O’Daniel had two small

baggies containing methamphetamine on her person and one baggie in her purse,

weighing a total of 3.2 grams.

       Wilson filed a motion to suppress evidence arguing that there was no probable

cause to support issuance of the search warrant. The trial court entertained the motion

by submission and denied it without entering findings of fact. 2 Wilson pleaded guilty to

the offense charged in the indictment. After a hearing, the trial court found Wilson guilty,

sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, and certified his right to appeal. This appeal

followed.

                          II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated

standard of review. State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); State v.

Patel, 629 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.). We give almost total

deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical fact and mixed questions of

       2 The record only contains a letter sent by the trial court to counsel announcing its decision to deny

the motion, saying that it would sign a proposed order once submitted. There is no formal order denying
the motion in the record before us.

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law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Lujan v. State, 331

S.W.3d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But we review de novo mixed questions of law

and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. When the trial court makes no

explicit findings of facts, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supported by the record.

Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

       The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates that a warrant

cannot issue “but upon probable cause” and must particularly describe the place to be

searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The core

principle of this clause and its Texas equivalent is that a magistrate cannot issue a search

warrant without first finding probable cause that a particular item will be found in a

particular location. State v. Duarte, 389 S.W.3d 349, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (first

citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV; and then citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9); see TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b), (c). “Typically, the warrant process involves presenting to a

neutral and detached magistrate an affidavit that establishes probable cause to conduct

a search.” Patterson v. State, 663 S.W.3d 155, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (citing Jones

v. State, 364 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

       “Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a

‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the specified

location” at the time the warrant is issued. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55,

60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “This is a flexible, non-demanding standard.” State v. Baldwin,

664 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022); see Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243–44

(2013) (“Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a

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preponderance of the evidence have no place in the probable-cause decision. All we have

required is the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal

technicians, act.” (cleaned up)).

       Where a residence is searched, a warrant affidavit must establish a nexus between

the residence to be searched and the evidence sought. United States v. Broussard, 80

F.3d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th

Cir. 1982)). “That nexus may be established, however, by direct observation or through

normal inferences as to where the articles sought would be located.” Id. (citations

omitted). “Moreover, though an affidavit may lack factual assertions showing direct

evidence of a criminal scheme or contraband, the magistrate is permitted to ‘draw

common sense conclusions’ from the facts alleged in making a probable cause

determination.” United States v. Chambers, 132 F. App’x 25, 30 (5th Cir. 2005).

       In assessing whether a search warrant is supported by probable cause, we are

constrained to the four corners of the supporting affidavit. Baldwin, 664 S.W.3d at 130

(citing State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Our duty is to

“ensure a magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.”

Id. In conducting our review, we give great deference to the magistrate’s determination,

including a magistrate’s implicit findings. Id. (citing McLain, 337 S.W.3d at 271–72).

“When in doubt, reviewing courts should defer to all reasonable inferences a magistrate

could have made.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61). We should “not invalidate a

warrant by interpreting an affidavit in a hyper-technical rather than commonsense

manner.” Id. Accordingly, the “‘substantial basis’ standard of review ‘does not mean the

reviewing court should be a rubber stamp but does mean that the magistrate’s decision

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should carry the day in doubtful or marginal cases, even if the reviewing court might reach

a different result upon de novo review.’” Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010) (quoting W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth

Amendment § 11.7(c) at 452 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2009–2010)).

                                      III.   DISCUSSION

       Wilson complains that the affidavit here was insufficient to support probable cause

for the following reasons: Worthy failed to provide sufficient information about his

unnamed sources; Worthy failed to sufficiently detail his training and experience; Worthy

failed to sufficiently corroborate the information he received; and Worthy provided

insufficient information establishing a nexus between the drugs seized during the traffic

stop and the residence searched.

A.     Insufficient Information

       Although Worthy’s affidavit could have been more detailed about his training and

experience, the source and nature of the information he received, or his attempts to

corroborate such information, when reviewing the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit

“[t]he proper analysis . . . is not whether as much information that could have been put

into an affidavit was actually in the affidavit.” Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 63–64 (noting that

because of the time-sensitive nature of criminal investigations, a law enforcement officer

cannot be expected to “compose a polished document that ‘dot[s] every i and crosse[s]

every t’”). Rather, “we are obliged to defer to the magistrate and uphold his determination

based upon all reasonable and commonsense inferences and conclusions that the

affidavit facts support.” Id.; see Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (faulting the court of appeals for failing to properly apply the substantial basis

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standard because it erroneously held that “it was improper to infer experience, proximity

to a residence, length of time spent outside a residence, or anything else that would show

the reliability of an officer’s suspicion from [the affiant]’s statement”); McLain, 337 S.W.3d

at 274 (faulting the court of appeals for choosing “the ‘hurried’ words of the officer over

reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made”). Such inferences may

include inferring the requisite training and experience of a law enforcement affiant. See

Martin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 749, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (finding probable cause to

search residence because it was reasonable for magistrate to infer that a law enforcement

officer is generally able to “distinguish between innocent behavior and criminal drug

activity” and can recognize “drug paraphernalia and signs of drug activity”).

       As to Wilson’s suggestion that the information from unnamed sources was

insufficiently detailed to support probable cause, there is no requirement that information

from a confidential source needs to establish the source’s basis for knowledge, veracity,

or reliability before courts can properly consider it as part of the probable cause

determination. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228 (1983). Rather, an informant’s

knowledge, veracity, and reliability “should be understood simply as closely intertwined

issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is

‘probable cause’ to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.”

Id. at 230. Further, Wilson’s argument that the information provided from confidential

sources was not sufficiently corroborated is misplaced; it was the totality of the

investigation, including the surveillance conducted and the drugs seized during the valid

traffic stop, that formed the basis for the search warrant, not any unnamed source’s

hearsay statements. See State v. Hill, 299 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009,

                                              7
no pet.) (“Hearsay from unnamed informants may be credited by showing the informant

has given reliable, credible information in the past. . . . Nevertheless, the absence of an

allegation of prior reliability is not necessarily prohibitive to a finding of probable cause if

the informant’s information is otherwise corroborated within the four corners of the

affidavit.” (citation omitted)); Duarte, 389 S.W.3d at 355 (finding no probable cause where

the “affidavit [was] based almost entirely on hearsay information supplied by a first-time

confidential informant” and law enforcement only corroborated the information by

confirming the defendant’s address).

       Accordingly, we review Wilson’s claim based on the totality of circumstances

presented to the magistrate and ask whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for

finding probable cause. Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 64. “It is not necessary to delve into all

of the facts that were omitted by the affiant, facts that could have been included in the

affidavit, or contrary inferences that could have been made by the magistrate.” Id.

B.     Nexus Between Residence & Drugs Seized

       To support probable cause, an affiant is not required to assert that he has direct

evidence linking seized drugs to a larger store of drugs located in a residence. See

Chambers, 132 F. App’x at 30. The nexus can also be established through “normal

inferences as to where the articles sought would be located.” Broussard, 80 F.3d at 1034

(citations omitted).

       The Fifth Circuit has recently noted that where a defendant is suspected of drug

trafficking, an affidavit will usually suffice to establish probable cause where there are

“observations connecting a defendant’s drug trafficking to a particular location,” and the

facts warrant reliance on “inferences regarding the tendencies of drug traffickers to keep

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contraband in their residences[.]” United States v. Bell, 832 F. App’x 298, 302 (5th Cir.

2020) (collecting cases); see United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 297–98 (3rd Cir.

2000) (“In the case of drug dealers, a number of other courts of appeals have held that

evidence of involvement in the drug trade is likely to be found where the dealers reside.”

(collecting cases)). The Fifth Circuit has also previously found a sufficient nexus to

establish probable cause where a suspected drug trafficker was observed leaving a

residence, drugs were then seized from the suspect as part of a traffic stop, and there

were otherwise no other factual links connecting the seized drugs to the residence. See

United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606, 613–14 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The affidavit provided a

nexus between Mendoza’s drug activities and his home, establishing a likelihood that

Mendoza’s home would contain evidence of criminal activity. It recited that Mendoza was

under surveillance by the DEA and had been arrested for carrying ‘substantial amounts

of cocaine’ and marijuana in his car immediately after leaving his residence and that [the

affiant]’s experience as an investigator confirmed that drug dealers are likely to keep

records of their trafficking activities in their homes.”).

       Similarly, in Rodriguez, an experienced narcotics officer received a tip from an

informant that the defendant’s uncle Eduardo Cantu was selling large amounts of cocaine.

232 S.W.3d at 57. Officers conducted surveillance, followed Cantu to defendant’s home,

observed Cantu go into the garage and exit with a package in his right hand, observed

him throw the package into his backseat, conducted a traffic stop, and seized three brick-

like objects of putative cocaine. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal of Appeals noted that

       it does not distort common sense or read additional facts into the affidavit
       to infer from this information that there were more drugs located at
       [appellant’s] garage. Although it is possible that there were really two
       different packages—one containing cocaine that had been in Cantu’s car

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       all along and another, innocuous package that Cantu carried with him out
       of appellant’s garage—that scenario is based entirely upon speculation as
       no second package was mentioned in the affidavit. And, although it is
       entirely possible that Cantu took all of the cocaine stored at the garage with
       him when he left, it is at least as likely that the three kilo package was just
       a small part of the whole cache.

Id. at 64 (citations omitted); see Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 703 (finding it reasonable to infer

that drug residue from a trash receptable found in front of a defendant’s home on two

separate occasions “originated” from the home, absent any direct evidence). As the court

found, even though it was possible that there were no drugs left in the appellant’s home,

it was “reasonable to conclude that where there was smoke (the original three-kilo

package of cocaine) there was fire (a larger cache of cocaine).” Id. at 63.

       Here, the affidavit sufficiently alleged that law enforcement had independently

come to suspect that Nash was engaged in drug trafficking and that he lived in the

residence. See United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding

that, in order to rely on the inference that defendants are likely to store evidence of

involvement in the drug trade where they reside, an affidavit must contain the

“independently corroborated fact that the defendants were known drug dealers at the time

the police sought to search their homes”); cf. United States v. Underwood, 725 F.3d 1076,

1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Here, the affidavit . . . provides no facts to support the conclusion

that Underwood is in the business of buying and selling ecstasy. Moreover, the affidavit

does not even assert that Underwood is a drug trafficker. Instead, the affidavit describes

Underwood as a ‘courier.’” (emphasis in original)). Thus, based on the drugs seized in the

vehicle driven by Nash, a suspected drug trafficker, it was reasonable for the magistrate

to have inferred that more drugs would be found where Nash was suspected of residing.

See Bell, 832 F. App’x at 302; Aguirre, 664 F.3d at 613–14.

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       Further, direct observation of the transfer of the package from the residence to the

car is not required where, as here, law enforcement had already come to suspect that

drug traffickers were using this particular location to sell drugs, and impliedly to store

them. See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 63 (finding probable cause even though defendant,

whose home was searched, was not himself suspected of drug dealing, because “it is

certainly ‘a fair probability’ that there was more cocaine stored where the first package

came from”); see also Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 703 (finding probable cause where there

was no direct evidence linking drugs to the defendant’s residence, nor any observations

by law enforcement of defendant possessing or otherwise being in the proximity of any

drugs).

       Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the facts in the

affidavit, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, were sufficient

to show that there was a “fair probability” that evidence of drug trafficking would be found

in the residence, and the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that such a

probability existed. See Bell, 664 S.W.3d at 130; Aguirre, 664 F.3d at 613–14.

       For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Wilson’s sole issue.

                                     IV.       CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                               L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                               Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
16th day of November, 2023.

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