Court Opinion

ID: 9882336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 20:03:55.863608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:15.853717
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/5/23 P. v. Balbuena CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B317555

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. LA090364)
         v.

CHRISTIAN BALBUENA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed.

     Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                 _______________________
      Christian Balbuena was convicted by a jury of one count of
assault with a deadly weapon and one count of robbery, both
involving her on-again, off-again boyfriend, Freddy I. The trial
court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on
probation for three years. She appeals from the judgment of
conviction, contending the trial court erred in failing to instruct
on the lesser included offenses of simple assault and petty theft,
abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior uncharged
acts of domestic violence pursuant to Evidence Code section
11091, and erred in instructing the jury on how to use and
evaluate the prior acts of domestic violence. We affirm the
judgment of conviction.
                         BACKGROUND
       Appellant and Freddy met at the end of 2017, and at some
point thereafter began dating. There was an eight-year age
difference: he was 19 and she was 27. At first it was a friendly
and loving relationship, but after about a year, it changed.
Freddy described her behavior as “disrespectful,” by which he
meant that she said he should not be in the country and deserved
to be dead because he was an immigrant, and since he had come
to this country alone, it would be easy for her to get rid of him.
She told Freddy she had a weapons license and would kill him if
he did something wrong or talked to the police. Freddy stayed in
the relationship for another seven months because she
threatened him and said if he went with anyone else she would
kill him.

1       Undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence
Code.

                                 2
       About three months before the charged offenses in this case
occurred, the relationship ended but, as Freddy said, “she never
left me alone. She made my life impossible.” Freddy
acknowledged, however, that he would still see her for dates in
the three months before the incidents; he was trying to work out
the problems he was having with her.
       On April 16, 2019, appellant texted Freddy and told him to
come to the Midtown Inn where she was living. Freddy drove to
the location and parked across the street. He was finishing some
food when he saw appellant get out of the passenger side of a
white pickup truck. He approached appellant and asked her,
“Why don’t you leave me alone if you . . . have somebody else?”
Appellant did not say anything. Freddy turned around and went
back to his vehicle. Before he left, took photos of the pickup
truck.
       After leaving the Midtown Inn, Freddy drove straight home
and parked. As he was parking, the white pickup truck appeared
and parked next to the driver’s side of Freddy’s car. The driver
got out of the truck, followed by appellant. The driver, later
identified as Arturo Pelen, banged three times on Freddy’s car
window; Freddy perceived this as an attempt to break the
window. Pelen said to return appellant’s stuff to her, the stuff
that Freddy had taken from her. Freddy had not taken anything
from appellant and did not know what Pelen was talking about.2
Freddy got out of his car to resolve the issue.

2     The parties stipulated that at the preliminary hearing,
Freddy testified he took a container of marijuana from appellant
but had given her money to buy it.

                                3
       According to Freddy, once he was out of the car, both
appellant and Pelen started hitting him. They said they were
going to kill him. They said he was an immigrant and was
“worth shit,” and they were going to cut him up in pieces and
throw him away in Palmdale. Freddy did not fight back; he
hunched over and covered his head with his hands. At some
point, Pelen got a baseball bat from the truck and hit Freddy over
the top of the head with it. Appellant continued to hit Freddy
while Pelen was retrieving the bat.
       After being hit by the bat, Freddy’s head “kind of opened,
and it was gushing a lot of blood, and it wouldn’t stop.” Appellant
and Pelen began running back to the truck. Freddy gave
somewhat inconsistent accounts of what he said and did at this
point. He initially testified that he took out his phone and said
that he was going to call the police. After further questioning, on
re-cross-examination, he clarified that he was going to call the
police, but did not say so out loud.3
       Appellant then returned, hit Freddy in the head, and took
his cell phone from his hand.
       Freddy was taken to the hospital, where he received
treatment for his head wound. He had internal leakage in his
brain. He was in the hospital for three days. At the time of trial,
he continued to have headaches and back pain. He suffered from
panic attacks and had difficulty recalling numbers, words, and
past events.

3     On cross-examination, Freddy had testified he “was
pretending that [he] was about to get [his] phone out because [he]
was going to call the police.” On redirect he testified he did take
his phone out.

                                 4
       Pelen was apprehended by police a few days after the
attack and entered into a plea agreement.
       Pelen testified that he and appellant were in a dating
relationship on April 16, 2019; Pelen believed it was an exclusive
one. They had dinner plans that night. When he arrived at the
Midtown Inn to meet appellant, she came down to meet him, but
then went back to her room to get something. Freddy then
approached the truck and told Pelen that appellant was his
girlfriend. Pelen replied that he had been dating appellant for
several months. Freddy said he was going to talk to appellant.
       When appellant returned to the truck, she was upset and
crying, and said Freddy had hit her and had some of her
belongings. She told Pelen to drive to Freddy’s home.
       At Freddy’s house, Pelen saw Freddy in his car, approached
the car, and demanded that Freddy return appellant’s
belongings. Freddy responded by cursing and threatening to hurt
them if they did not leave.
       Appellant then got out of the truck and stood between the
two men as they argued. As she tried to hold Pelen back, Freddy
came up and punched Pelen in the face. Pelen “just snapped.”
He got his baseball bat from his truck and hit Freddy in the head
with it. Pelen then turned around and headed back to his truck,
saying to appellant, “Let’s leave.”
       Freddy said he knew where Pelen lived and was going to
kill him.
       Appellant then said she would be right back and went
toward Freddy. Two minutes later she returned with a cell
phone. She told Pelen it was Freddy’s phone. Pelen and
appellant then went back to the Midtown Inn.

                                5
       In her defense, appellant called Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) Detective Noah Stone. Detective Stone
spoke with Freddy telephonically a few days after the incident,
using one of Freddy’s relatives as an interpreter. Detective Stone
believed Freddy was in the hospital at the time. Detective Stone
remembered Freddy telling him a verbal argument preceded
Pelen hitting him with the bat. Freddy did not report that
appellant hit him at any time during the incident, including after
he was hit with the bat. Freddy told Detective Stone he fell to
the ground after being hit with the bat and as he “was retrieving
his cell phone to call for assistance, [appellant] took his cell phone
from him.”
                          DISCUSSION
I.    The Trial Court Committed Harmless Error in Refusing to
      Instruct the Jury on Petty Theft as a Lesser Included
      Offense of Robbery.
      Appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury on petty theft as a lesser included offense of
robbery. She contends the trial court erred because it had a sua
sponte duty to so instruct and because she requested the
instruction as her theory of the case. We agree.
      Petty theft is a lesser included offense of robbery. (People
v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 737.) A trial court is required to
instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense whenever it is
supported by the sufficient evidence. “[T]he existence of ‘any
evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions on a
lesser included offense, but such instructions are required
whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser
offense is ‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.

                                  6
[Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence’ in this context is ‘ “evidence
from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . .
conclude[ ]” ’ that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was
committed. [Citations.] [¶] In deciding whether there is
substantial evidence of a lesser offense, courts should not
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the jury.” (People
v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, overruled on another
ground by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 (Breverman);
see People v. Eid (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 859, 879 [instruction on
defense theory must be given if it is supported by evidence
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt if believed by the jury].)
       On appeal, we review de novo the trial court’s failure to
instruct on a lesser included offense, considering the evidence in
the light most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
       Here, as the parties at least implicitly agreed, a reasonable
juror could find that the intent to steal was formed after the
assault was over, when appellant was walking back to the truck.
In this scenario, the force used in the assault would not satisfy
the force or fear element of robbery. (See, e.g. People v.
Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351 [“If defendant had not
harbored a larcenous intent before or during the assault, the
taking was theft rather than robbery. [Citation] Although the
jury was not required to believe defendant’s testimony, it was
credible enough to have supported a verdict of theft instead of
robbery.”].)
       Further, based on Detective Stone’s testimony that Freddy
reported the cell phone theft but did not report appellant hitting
him, a reasonable juror could disbelieve Freddy’s testimony that
appellant hit him in the face right before taking his phone.

                                 7
        The trial court found an instruction on petty theft was not
required because Freddy had the phone in his hand and “there is
at least the force necessary to take it out of his hand.”
Appellant’s counsel argued that the phone could be taken from
Freddy’s hand without force or fear: “If he’s holding it in his
hand and she takes it, lifts it from his hand, like the taking from
the hand is the minimum if you believe it. . . . There is no
testimony that the hand was closed or that he gripped the
phone.” The court replied, “I think when you take it from
someone’s hand, it’s necessarily force.”
        Appellant’s counsel was correct. “Grabbing or snatching
property from the hand has often been held to be grand larceny,
and not robbery.” (People v. Church (1897) 116 Cal. 300, 303
[refusal of instruction on lesser offense of larceny not warranted
where evidence showed a watch and chain were suddenly
grabbed from the vest of its owner, but evidence it was
accomplished by force or fear was conflicting].)
        Indeed, so prevalent has been the idea that grabbing or
snatching property is theft, not robbery, that this District Court
of Appeal noted less than 15 years ago that “[t]here may be some
generalized impression that a purse snatch—grabbing a purse (or
similar object) from a person—is grand theft and nothing more.
Thus, it has been said that the purpose of Penal Code section 487
is to ‘guard against “the purse-snatcher.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1257 (Burns).)

                                 8
        The Court in Burns explained that whether a purse snatch
qualified as a robbery depended on the force used. (Burns, supra,
172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1258.) The Court noted that Church
remains “a leading decision on the issue” of snatching or grabbing
property, but cases after Church “have discussed the amount of
force required for robbery as opposed to grand theft.” (Burns, at
p. 1258) The Court in Burns looked to those cases. “In People v.
Morales [(1975)] 49 Cal.App.3d 134, the court observed that . . . ‘it
is established that something more is required than just that
quantum of force which is necessary to accomplish the mere
seizing of the property.’ ” (Burns, at p. 1259.) “An accepted
articulation of the rule is that ‘ “[a]ll the force that is required to
make the offense a robbery is such force as is actually sufficient
to overcome the victim’s resistance.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In People v.
Roberts (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 782, also discussed in Burns, the
court found force sufficient for robbery when the handle of the
purse was broken by the defendant. (Id. at p. 787.) In Burns
itself, “appellant came up to [the victim] and grabbed the purse
she was holding; she tried to hold onto it but his strength and his
act in stepping on her foot overcame her resistance, and he got
away with the purse. That was robbery, and there is no basis in
the record for a jury to find that it was nothing more than grand
theft from the person.” (Burns, at p. 1259.)4

4      Appellant also contends that given the inconsistencies in
Freddy’s testimony, a reasonable juror could have doubted that
she took the phone from Freddy’s person at all, but could have
decided that she took it from the seat of the car or the ground,
and thus did not use force or fear to take the phone. Freddy
testified that appellant took the phone from his hand. Appellant
points out Freddy testified at one point that he only pretended to

                                  9
      “[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to
instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and
theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be
reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818]. A conviction of the charged offense may be
reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, ‘after an
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence’ (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears ‘reasonably probable’ the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the
error not occurred.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 178.)
      Here, we see no reasonable probability that appellant
would have obtained a more favorable outcome if a petty theft
instruction had been given, or put differently, no reasonable
probability that the failure to give the theft instruction affected
the outcome.
      By convicting appellant of aiding and abetting Pelen’s
assault with a deadly weapon, the jury indicated that it found
Freddy’s account of the encounter credible. Pelen’s testimony, if
believed, would have shown that appellant attempted to prevent
the assault, rather than provide the assistance and
encouragement necessary for aiding and abetting. There was no
reason for the jury to believe Freddy’s testimony about
appellant’s conduct during the assault, but disbelieve his

take his phone out, but there is no evidence of the phone’s
location at that point, and it is pure speculation on appellant’s
part that the phone was inside the car. Similarly, although
Freddy was severely injured, there is no evidence he dropped the
phone to the ground at any point; this is simply speculation by
appellant.

                                10
testimony that appellant hit him, then took his cell phone.
Further, Pelen testified that it took appellant about two minutes
to go to Freddy and then return to the truck with the cell phone.
This is a fairly lengthy amount of time to travel the few feet from
the truck to Freddy’s car and back again. The elapsed time
suggests that appellant did not merely grab the phone from
appellant’s unresisting hand and walk away; it is more consistent
with Freddy’s account that appellant hit him and then took the
phone.
II.   The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Instruct on
      Simple Assault as a Lesser Included Offense of Assault with
      a Deadly Weapon.
      Appellant contends that even when instructions on a lesser
included offense would not be warranted for the principal
perpetrator, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a
lesser included offense “if the evidence raises a question whether
the greater offense is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
criminal act originally contemplated and aided, but would
support a finding that a lesser included offense committed by the
perpetrator was such a consequence.” (People v. Woods (1992)
8 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1578 (Woods).) Appellant claims the
evidence supports a theory that she should have reasonably
anticipated the encounter she instigated would render some sort
of minor touching foreseeable but she may not have reasonably
foreseen that her attempts to retrieve her missing property would
escalate into an assault with a deadly weapon.
      Woods involves the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and foreseeability in aiding and abetting liability is
relevant only when the prosecutor relies on that doctrine. The
doctrine only applies when a defendant intends to aid and abet

                                11
some crime. (See, e.g., People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
413, 422 [“ ‘under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended
crime, but also “for any other offense that was a ‘natural and
probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.” ’ ”].)
Appellant has not clearly identified a target crime which she
intended to aid and abet. She appears to be claiming that she
only intended to take the legally permissible action of retrieving
her property, and that it was foreseeable that Pelen would
commit only a simple assault. Put differently, she does not argue
that she knew Pelen intended to commit simple assault and
intended to aid and abet his commission of that crime.
       More importantly, the prosecutor did not rely on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and the jury was not
instructed on it. The trial court instructed the jury only on direct
aiding and abetting, which required the jury to find that
appellant knew of the perpetrator’s intent to commit the charged
crime and intended to aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission
of the charged crime. As the California Supreme Court has made
clear, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine “only when the
prosecution has elected to rely on the ‘natural and probable
consequences’ theory of accomplice liability and the trial court
has determined that the evidence will support instructions on
that theory.” (People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 269.)
There was no such reliance here.

                                 12
III.   The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
       Evidence of Prior Uncharged Domestic Violence Incidents
       Under Section 1109.
      Appellant contends the trial court erred prejudicially in
allowing the admission of uncharged past incidents of domestic
violence by appellant to prove propensity under section 1109.
Alternatively, appellant contends the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the use of that evidence.
       A.   Background and ruling
       On November 3, 2021, during voir dire, the prosecutor filed
a motion in limine seeking to admit Freddy’s testimony that
appellant had threatened and assaulted him in 2020; he had not
reported these incidents. The prosecutor contended that these
incidents were admissible under section 1109 as evidence of
uncharged acts of domestic violence. After a brief hearing that
same day on the motion, the trial court indicated it was inclined
to admit the evidence under section 1109 if the prosecutor
provided more details.
       On November 4, 2021, just before Freddy was set to testify,
the prosecutor provided an Investigative Action Statement form
from the LAPD reporting statements by Freddy. After a hearing,
the trial court found the prior incidents involved violence against
the same victim and so were relevant. The court also found the
charged offenses involved severe injuries and none of the prior
uncharged incidents were more egregious, so the prior incidents
survived a section 352 analysis. The trial court found the
prosecutor complied with the notice requirements of section 1109,
because the prosecutor disclosed the specific information as soon

                                13
as she learned of it.5 The court offered to provide the defense
with more time to investigate the information in the statement.
       Ultimately, the prosecutor asked Freddy if there had been
any physical violence in his relationship with appellant before
the April 16, 2019 incident. Freddy testified that about five or six
months before the baseball bat attack, appellant appeared at
Freddy’s house at about 5:00 a.m., poured a cup of coffee over
Freddy’s head, broke his television, and threw his shoes and
other belonging outside. She also hit him.
       In another incident about five months before the baseball
bat attack, appellant hit Freddy in his mouth, scratching his face
and causing a swollen lip. She also squeezed his arm so hard it
left a mark. Freddy offered photographs of these injuries.
       About two months before the baseball bat attack, appellant
picked him up from his house and then when the car sped up, she
told him she was going to take him to a place where they would
make him disappear. Freddy wanted to get out of the car, but it
was moving and appellant held onto him. When appellant had to
wait before making a left turn, Freddy took the opportunity to get
out of the car and flee. He hid while appellant looked for him.
      B.    Section 352 balancing test
      Section 1109 provides that “evidence of the defendant’s
commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible
by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to

5     The prosecutor suggested the defense was not completely
blindsided, because Freddy indicated in the police report that
there had been prior incidents and testified at the preliminary
hearing that there was some prior abuse or domestic violence.

                                14
Section 352.” (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) Appellant contends the trial
court abused its discretion in failing to exclude the prior incidents
pursuant to section 352, and the admission of this evidence
violated her constitutional right to due process.
        Section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.)
        Appellant attempts to create a “required” five factor
analysis for applying the balancing test of section 352, based on
the discussion in People v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520
(Johnson). She lists the five factors as 1) similarity of the
uncharged acts to the charged offense; 2) corroboration;
3) whether there are convictions for the past acts; 4) strength of
the evidence of the defendant’s guilt in the current case; and
5) whether the introduction of uncharged conduct will create a
danger that the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant
because she previously escaped punishment.
        We do not read Johnson as creating such a mandatory
formal analysis. The court in Johnson is essentially applying a
standard section 352 analysis to the specific facts before it. We
find the Johnson discussion helpful, but not in the format created
by appellant.
        Appellant contends the first and primary factor affecting
the probative value of an uncharged act of domestic violence is
“ ‘ “its similarity to the charged offense.” ’ ” (Johnson, supra,
185 Cal.App.4th at pp. 531–532.)

                                 15
      Section 1109 was intended to make admissible a prior
incident “ ‘similar in character to the charged domestic violence
crime, and which was committed against the victim of the
charged crime or another similarly situated person.’ (Assem.
Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1876 (1995–1996
Reg. Sess.) June 25, 1996, p. 5.)” (Johnson, supra,
185 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) The legislative history of section 1109
also recognizes that, in domestic violence cases, “ ‘[n]ot only is
there a great likelihood that any one battering episode is part of a
larger scheme of dominance and control, that scheme usually
escalates in frequency and severity.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 410, 419.)
      Here all the uncharged acts were committed against the
same victim by appellant. For those acts for which Freddy
provided details, the acts began with appellant seeking out
Freddy, and physical violence took place at Freddy’s home.6
While appellant is correct that these acts are not factually
identical to the charged act, they are broadly similar. More
importantly, they display the pattern of escalation characteristic
of domestic violence. They began with threats of violence alone,
then escalated to some violence against appellant (the coffee
pouring and hitting) then to more serious violence (the hitting
resulting in a split lip) then to what Freddy understood as an
attempt to kidnap and kill him. Initially, appellant acted alone,
but in the last uncharged act (the kidnapping attempt), she

6     If hitting resulting in a swollen lip was a separate incident
from the coffee pouring, it is not clear where that hitting
occurred.

                                16
appeared to indicate that she had assistance, telling Freddy that
she was going to take him to a place where “they” would make
him disappear. Viewed in this light, the charged acts
represented a further escalation of domestic violence, involving
actual assistance, a weapon, and the infliction of severe injuries.
Thus, the uncharged acts constitute exactly the conduct section
1109 was intended to make admissible, in order to prevent
further escalation. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th
at p. 419 [Quoting legislative history: “ ‘Without the propensity
inference [of section 1109], the escalating nature of domestic
violence is likewise masked. . . . Since criminal prosecution is one
of the few factors which may interrupt the escalating pattern of
domestic violence, we must be willing to look at that pattern
during the criminal prosecution’ ”].)
       Corroboration, the second “factor” listed by appellant, is
viewed by the Court in Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at page
533 as part of an assessment of the probative value of the
evidence, as discussed in People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380.
In Ewoldt, the Court explained that corroboration increases
probative value, but the lack of corroboration is “of limited
significance.” (Id. at pp. 404–405.) Put differently, the lack of
corroboration does not, as appellant suggests, weigh strongly
against admissibility.
       The remaining three “factors” identified by appellant all
involve the other side of the section 352 balancing test: the
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.
       The lack of a conviction for the prior acts may potentially
cause unfair prejudice to the defendant by requiring her “to
mount a defense against evidence of a long-past incident.”

                                17
(Johnson, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 533) Here, the incidents
were very recent and appellant’s defense to the uncharged acts
was fundamentally and necessarily the same as her defense to
the charged acts: Freddy was not credible.7
       The lack of a prior conviction can also raise concerns that
the jury will be tempted to punish the defendant for past
unpunished conduct. This prejudicial effect is diminished if the
evidence of current crime is strong, “for it is less likely the jury
will be swayed to convict the defendant based on his past
misconduct. (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405.)” (Johnson,
supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.)
       As the trial court recognized, “whatever the alleged victim
says, it’s really going to come down to that person’s credibility
whether or not he throws in these prior incidents.” Thus, the
potential prejudice from lack of prior convictions was not present
here. (See Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 405 [“The testimony
describing defendant’s uncharged acts, however, was no stronger
and no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the
charged offenses. This circumstance decreased the potential for
prejudice, because it was unlikely that the jury disbelieved
Jennifer’s testimony regarding the charged offenses but
nevertheless convicted defendant on the strength of [another
victim’s] testimony or Jennifer’s testimony regarding the
uncharged offenses, or that the jury’s passions were inflamed by
the evidence of defendant’s uncharged offenses.”].)

7     There is no indication, for example, that appellant could
have called witnesses who were relevant to the uncharged acts as
the incidents appear to have taken place in private.

                                 18
IV.   The Trial Court Committed Harmless Error in Ruling the
      Prior Domestic Violence Could Be Used Pursuant to Section
      1101 to Show an Intent to Permanently Deprive Freddy of
      His Property.
       During the discussion of jury instructions, the trial court
brought up CALCRIM No. 375 and stated: “I indicated
background as to the general background, but I think . . . to be
more specific for 1101(b), I’ll just say motive and intent because I
think the prior acts of domestic violence as described by Freddy
[as] controlling and abusive conduct . . . arguably . . . could make
it more likely that the Defendant meant to take his property or
had a motive to commit the offenses against him.”8 Appellant
objected. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion
so ruling.
      A.    Intent For Robbery
      We agree with appellant that the prior incidents are not
probative of whether she intended to take Freddy’s phone.
“Evidence of intent is admissible to prove that, if the defendant
committed the act alleged, he or she did so with the intent that
comprises an element of the charged offense.” (Ewoldt, supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 394, fn. 2.) Thus, to be admissible under section
1101, subdivision (b), the uncharged offenses, should “ be

8     We note that respondent contends that the uncharged acts
were relevant to show Freddy’s state of mind as to why he may
have been in fear when appellant stole his cell phone or during
the assault. We do not understand the trial court as making this
finding, and it is not reflected in CALCRIM 375 concerning the
use of uncharged acts (for purposes other than section 1109).

                                 19
‘sufficiently similar [to the charged offenses] to support the
inference that the defendant “ ‘probably harbor[ed] the same
intent in each instance.’ [Citations.] ” ’ ” (People v. Kipp (1998)
18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) The intent required for robbery is the
intent to steal. None of the uncharged acts of domestic violence
involved the taking of any of appellant’s property, and so there is
no basis to infer that appellant harbored the same intent to steal
in the charged offense of robbery as he did in those prior acts.
        The jury learned of the trial court’s ruling through
CALCRIM No. 375, which told the jury that the uncharged acts
could be considered in deciding whether “[t]he defendant acted
with the intent to permanently deprive Freddy I. of his property
in this case[.]”
       We see no reasonable probability that appellant would have
received a more favorable outcome in the absence of the
instruction on intent. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104,
1130 (Moore) [applying Watson harmless error standard to
instructional error; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 924–
925 [applying Watson standard to claim error in instructing jury
on proper use of propensity evidence].) Pelen testified that after
appellant returned to the truck with Freddy’s phone, he and
appellant drove away. Freddy testified he never got phone back.
This is every strong circumstantial evidence that appellant
harbored the intent to permanently deprive appellant of his
phone, and we see no reasonable probability that appellant would
have received a more favorable outcome in the absence of this
instruction. Even if the jury believed that appellant was
motivated to take the phone from Freddy to prevent him from
calling the police, that motivation is in no way inconsistent with
an intent to permanently deprive Freddy of the phone.

                                20
      B.    Motive
       CALCRIM No. 375 also told the jury that it could consider
the prior domestic violence incidents for the purposes of deciding
whether appellant “had a motive to commit the offenses alleged
in this case.” We see no abuse of discretion in the admission of
the prior acts to show motives for both offenses.
       Appellant suggested she pursued and attacked Freddy
because he took her belongings. Freddy denied taking any of
appellant’s belongings. Thus, her motive was at issue. Evidence
that she had threatened and assaulted appellant in the past,
particularly when he tried to distance himself from her showed
that appellant had a motive to control and dominate Freddy, both
by assaulting him and taking his phone to prevent him from
summoning assistance.
       Relying primarily on People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th
1009, appellant contends that the presence of the same motive on
two separate occasions may show a common plan or design, but a
common manner of committing misconduct does not show a
motive to commit the misconduct. Since Scheer was decided, the
law concerning other crimes evidence to prove motive has been
clarified. In general, other crimes evidence “is admissible to
establish two different types or categories of motive evidence. In
the first category, ‘the uncharged act supplies the motive for the
charged crime; the uncharged act is cause, and the charged crime
is effect.’ [Citation.] ‘In the second category, the uncharged act
evidences the existence of a motive, but the act does not supply
the motive. . . . [T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged
and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a
result of the same motive.’ ” (People v. Spector (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1381 (Spector).)

                               21
       “California case law allows the admission of other crimes
evidence to prove this second kind of motive. (See People v. Davis
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 604 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78]
[evidence of two prior sexual assaults on children involving
bondage tended to show defendant had motive for sexually
assaulting murder victim]; People v. Demetrulias (2006)
39 Cal.4th 1, 15 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229] [evidence of
prior assault and robbery of different victim tended to show
defendant had motive to rob victim killed in current case]; People
v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 803 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 257]
[in trial for murdering prostitute, evidence of prior sexual
assaults tended to show defendant’s ‘ “common motive of animus
against prostitutes resulting in violent batteries interrupting
completion of the sex act” ’]; People v. Pertsoni (1985)
172 Cal.App.3d 369, 375 [218 Cal.Rptr. 350] [in trial for
murdering man affiliated with Yugoslav government, evidence
defendant had previously shot at person he thought was
Yugoslavian ambassador tended to show that defendant’s hatred
of Yugoslav government impelled him to kill current victim].)”
(Spector, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1381–1382.) As the court
in Spector explained, Scheer “acknowledged the legitimacy of
category two motive evidence although they characterized it as
‘common plan’ evidence. [Citation.] The problem in Scheer,
where the defendant was on trial for voluntary manslaughter
arising out of a traffic accident, was that there had been only one
other incident and it was not particularly similar.” (Spector, at
p. 1382, fn. 17.) That is not a problem here.
       Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing the prior uncharged acts to be considered as evidence of

                                22
a motive, CALCRIM No. 375 properly instructed the jury of that
permitted use.
V.    The Trial Court Committed Harmless Error in Giving an
      Incomplete Version of CALCRIM 852A.
       CALCRIM No. 852A is the standard jury instruction for
using prior domestic violence incidents pursuant to section 1109
to show disposition or inclination. Section 1109 provides: “
‘Domestic violence’ has the meaning set forth in Section 13700 of
the Penal Code. Subject to a hearing conducted pursuant to
Section 352, which shall include consideration of any
corroboration and remoteness in time, ‘domestic violence’ has the
further meaning as set forth in Section 6211 of the Family Code,
if the act occurred no more than five years before the charged
offense.” (§ 1109, subd. (d)(3).)
       CALCRIM No. 852A provides both the Penal Code and
Family Code definitions as alternative definitions. The
instruction’s bench notes state: “If the court determines that the
evidence is admissible pursuant to the definition of domestic
violence contained in Penal Code section 13700, give the
definition of domestic violence labeled alternative A. If the court
determines that the evidence is admissible pursuant to the
definition contained in Family Code section 6211, give the
definition labeled alternative B. Give the bracketed portions in
the definition of ‘abuse’ if the evidence is admissible pursuant to
Family Code section 6211.” (Judicial Council of Cal., Crim. Jury
Instns. (2023) Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 852A)
       The trial court gave the jury an incomplete version of
CALCRIM No. 852A. The instruction as given told the jury that
it could consider evidence of prior domestic violence “only if the
People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the

                                23
defendant in fact committed the uncharged domestic violence.”
However, the instruction did not provide any definition of
domestic violence nor did it specify the prior acts of domestic
violence allegedly committed by appellant.
       Appellant did not object to the instruction, and this failure
ordinarily forfeits an appellant’s state law claims. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We may “review any
instruction given, refused or modified, even though no objection
was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of
the defendant were affected thereby.” (Pen. Code, § 1259; see
Mitchell, at p. 579.) Appellant contends the instruction violated
her right to due process, and this would affect her substantial
rights if true. (See Mitchell, at p. 579.) As we explain, we do not
find that her right to due process was implicated.
       Appellant analogizes the requirement that the People prove
a defendant committed a prior act which meets the definition of
domestic violence to the requirement that the People prove every
element of a charged offense. Thus, in her view, the omission of
the definition of domestic violence is the equivalent of the
omission of an element of a charged offense, violating her right to
due process under the state and federal constitutions. (Carella v.
California (1989) 491 U.S. 263–265 [105 L.Ed.2d 218, 109 S.Ct.
249].)
       She offers no legal authority to support this analogy, and
no reasoned argument of her own. She simply states: “The fact
that the past offenses were not charged should make no
difference.”
       “Every crime consists of a group of essential elements,
known as the corpus delecti, that are created by statute or law.
[Citation.] These elements define the crime, and each element

                                24
must be proven to establish an offense.” (People v. Solis (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 762, 779.) In addition, “[a]ny fact that, by law,
increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element.’ ” (Alleyne v.
United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99, 103 [186 L.Ed.2d 314, 133 S.Ct.
2151].)
      CALCRIM No. 852A describes the requirements for
admitting prior acts of domestic violence to show propensity
under Section 1109. Section 1109 is a rule of evidence, not a
crime. It does not increase the penalty for a crime. It simply
makes no sense to say that domestic violence is an “element” of
section 1109. Further, there is no crime called “domestic
violence” and so it does not have any essential elements of its
own.
      “Domestic violence” for purposes of section 1109 is not
defined by reference to specific statutorily defined crimes. Penal
Code section 13700 refers to categories of misconduct involving
“intentionally . . . causing or attempting to cause bodily injury”
and “placing another person in reasonable apprehension of
imminent serious bodily injury.” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a).)
Causing bodily injury can include a number of specific crimes,
including simple assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and
mayhem; each offense has its own set of essential elements. The
Family Code definition of domestic violence is even broader, and
includes behaviors which could be enjoined, such as harassing the
victim or disturbing his peace.9 (Fam. Code, § 6320.) For both

9     “Family Code section 6211 defines domestic violence to
require abuse and Family Code section 6203, subdivision (d)
defines ‘abuse’ to include ‘engage[ing] in any behavior that has
been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.’ ” (People v.

                                25
statutes, the definition of domestic violence does not refer to any
specific statutory offenses or list their elements, and nothing in
the instruction suggests that the prosecutor must prove that an
uncharged prior act satisfies all the elements of a specific offense.
Thus, the omission of the definition of domestic abuse did not
result in the omission of an element of any statutory offense.
      Although we do not agree with her characterization of the
error as involving the omission of an element, her claim can be
understood more broadly as a claim that the instruction is not
correct in law, and for this reason we will assume appellant’s
failure to object to this instruction at trial did not forfeit her
claim on appeal. (See Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1130, citing
People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 791 [a claim that an
instruction is not “correct in law” may be raised on appeal despite
the failure to object below].)
      We agree with appellant that it was error to omit the
definition of domestic violence, at least here where the specific
acts alleged to be domestic violence are not identified. This
creates the potential for a jury to treat non-qualifying conduct as
domestic violence. We review this error under the standard in
People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836. (People v.
Falsetta, supra,) 21 Cal.4th at p. 925 [applying Watson standard
to error in failing to instruct the jury on how to use the
propensity evidence].) We see no reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome if the jury had been instructed on the
definition of domestic violence. Put differently, we see no

Ogle (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144.) CALCRIM No. 852A
includes in its definition of domestic violence any behavior which
could be enjoined pursuant to Family Code section 6320.

                                 26
reasonable probability that the lack of a definition affected the
outcome.
       The trial court instructed the jury generally: “Some words
or phrases used during this trial have legal meanings that are
different from their ordinary meanings in everyday use. These
words and phrases will be specifically defined in these
instructions. . . . Words and phrases not specifically defined in
these instructions are to be applied using their ordinary everyday
meanings.” Thus, because domestic violence was not defined in
CALCRIM No. 852A, the jury would have given the term violence
its ordinary everyday meaning of physical force. CALCRIM No.
852A as given reinforces that common meaning by indicating
that count 2, the assault charge, is domestic violence.10 This
ordinary meaning is consistent with one type of domestic violence
found in the term’s formal definition: intentionally causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury.
       However, domestic violence covers a much broader range of
conduct than physical violence. It includes behavior which may
be enjoined under Family Code section 6320; that section permits
the enjoining of “molesting, attacking, striking, stalking,
threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, . . . harassing,
telephoning, including, but not limited to, making annoying
telephone calls . . . , destroying personal property, . . . or
disturbing the peace of the other party.” (Fam. Code, § 6320,
subd. (a).)

10    Specifically, the instruction states that prior acts may show
a disposition or inclination to commit domestic violence and tells
the jury it may conclude that the defendant was likely to commit
Count 2, thereby indicating that an assault is domestic violence.

                                27
       So, even if the jury did view Freddy’s testimony about
appellant’s non-violent behavior, insults, and threats as domestic
violence, this behavior clearly qualified as harassing and
threatening Freddy and disturbing his peace. We see no
reasonable probability that a properly instructed jury would have
found that this conduct was not domestic violence as defined in
Family Code sections 6211 and 6320.
       Appellant further contends that the instruction did not
prevent the jury from using appellant’s past insults or her act of
throwing Freddy’s shoes as proof that she had a propensity for
committing robbery. The instruction clearly told the jury that
evidence of domestic violence could only be used with respect to
count 2, which was the assault charge.
       Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing
to remove the criticized phrase “and did commit” from CALCRIM
No. 852A because that language increased the likelihood that the
instruction erroneously directed the jury to conclude that
appellant “did commit” at least the assault count based on her
prior acts of domestic violence, under a mere preponderance of
the evidence standard.
       This language has been criticized by People v. James (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357, fn. 8, and, to a lesser extent, by
People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 36. The California
Supreme Court, however, has rejected a similar challenge,
explaining that the problem with this argument “is that the
instruction nowhere tells the jury it may rest a conviction solely
on evidence of prior offenses. Indeed, the instruction’s next
sentence says quite the opposite: ‘if you find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant committed a prior sexual
offense . . . , that is not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a

                                28
reasonable doubt that he committed the charged crime.’ ” (People
v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007, 1013.) CALCRIM No. 852A
similarly told the jury in this case: “If you conclude that the
defendant committed the uncharged domestic violence, that
conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other
evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant
is guilty of Count 2. The People must still prove the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.”
VI.   There Is No Cumulative Prejudicial Error.
       Appellant contends that even if the errors considered
separately are not prejudicial, they are when considered
cumulatively. We see little to cumulate. Appellant relies heavily
on what she contends was the erroneous admission of the prior
acts of domestic violence to show prejudice. We have found no
error in that ruling, and so we do not consider it cumulatively
with the CALCRIM 852A error.
       Appellant also relies on her claim that the evidence to
support a robbery conviction was weak because the evidence as to
whether Freddy even had a phone was weak. We find the
evidence strong. Pelen, who generally testified favorably to
appellant, testified that appellant returned to the truck with a
phone which she said was Freddy’s. Appellant does not suggest
why Pelen would lie on this point. There is nothing of note to
cumulate with the CALCRIM 852A instructional error.

                                29
                          DISPOSITION
     The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                        STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

                              30