Court Opinion

ID: 9372530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 20:02:24.118469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.974101
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/23 In re T.B. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re T.B., a Person Coming                                 2d Juv. No. B316027
 Under the Juvenile Court                                  (Super. Ct. No. MJ24402)
 Law.                                                        (Los Angeles County)

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 T.B.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       T.B. challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional order
committing him to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (“SYTF”)
after he admitted committing murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a)), an offense enumerated under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 707, subdivision (b).1 Appellant contends the juvenile
court abused its discretion because substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that SYTF was appropriate to
meet his needs or that a less restrictive alternative was not
appropriate. We affirm.
                Factual and Procedural Background
       On June 18, 2015, around 1:30 a.m., appellant broke into
the home of an 86-year-old, non-ambulatory woman, as she slept
in her bed. Once inside, appellant retrieved a kitchen knife and
began walking through the hallway towards the victim’s
bedroom. When he bumped into a fire extinguisher, the victim
awoke and began screaming. Appellant entered her bedroom and
stabbed her more than 40 times, killing her. He then ran out of
the house and down the street where he waited approximately
five minutes to see if anyone called the police. When no one
responded, he returned to the victim’s home and took the victim’s
laptop computer.
       Appellant was arrested after he was found hiding near a
bush and acting suspiciously. He admitted that he entered the
victim’s home looking for money and valuables to steal and
claimed that he stabbed the victim “five or six times.” He also
told police that he chose the victim’s home because he knew she
was elderly and lived alone.
       When he was arrested, appellant had the victim’s blood on
his clothes. He also had her laptop computer in his backpack.

      1  All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
      The People filed a wardship petition pursuant to section
602 alleging appellant committed murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a), count 1), and two felony counts of burglary with person
present (id., § 459, counts 2 and 3).2 At the time of the murder,
appellant was on informal probation for thefts of cell phones and
an iPod from his school office. He also had an active bench
warrant for his arrest after he violated probation by running
away from home and refusing to participate in court-ordered
services.
      In October 2021, appellant, who was then 20 years old, had
been detained at juvenile hall for more than six years. He
admitted the murder allegation and affirmed his understanding
that the charged offense was an offense enumerated in section
707, subdivision (b), and that he could potentially be committed
to SYTF up to the age of 25. The juvenile court then set the
matter for a contested disposition hearing.
                   Contested Disposition Hearing
      In advance of the disposition hearing, the probation
department prepared a report recommending appellant be
declared a ward of the court and committed to SYTF. The report
provided a detailed evaluation of appellant’s suitability for
placement in a secure facility and considered several criteria.
For example, the report noted the severity of the offense and
observed that appellant showed an escalation in his criminal
behaviors. Despite multiple intervention efforts leading up to his

      2 Appellant’s case was initially filed in adult criminal court,
but due to several changes in the law, it went back and forth
between the criminal and juvenile courts before it was eventually
adjudicated in the juvenile court.

                                 3
current offense, appellant demonstrated a lack of compliance and
an unwillingness to participate in services.
        Probation officer Wanda Falls, who prepared the report,
testified that while appellant had participated in many services
during his time at juvenile hall, and even described him as a
“model resident,” she did not believe he had fully rehabilitated
because his programming addressed his prior offenses, not his
current offense of murder.
       Probation officer Falls explained that a less restrictive
alternative disposition was not appropriate due to appellant’s age
and the severity of the offense. On the other hand, she believed
SYTF was appropriate because it would provide for public safety
as well as the services that appellant needed to achieve his
rehabilitative goals. Additionally, within 30 days of the juvenile
court’s placement order, appellant would meet with a multi-
disciplinary team who would evaluate his needs and prepare an
individual rehabilitation plan for him.
       Probation director, Suzanne Lyles, also testified that
additional programs were still being developed as SYTF was in a
transitional phase, but available programming included
education services, mental health services including individual
and family treatment, alternate programming such as Jail House
guitars, Anti-Recidivism Coalition (ARC) mentorship and
transitional planning, communication skills, art therapy,
substance abuse counseling, religious services, and creative
writing classes.
       Appellant’s defense counsel argued that appellant had
suffered from trauma, ADHD, and substance abuse issues as a
youth, but that he had availed himself of every program available
to him in juvenile hall and had addressed those issues. Counsel

                                4
also argued that appellant was no longer the same person and
that he had grown into a mature young man. Numerous
witnesses testified on appellant’s behalf as to his many
accomplishments while at juvenile hall, including graduating
from high school, achieving his associate degree, and becoming a
trusted leader and positive influence among his peers. Defense
counsel concluded SYTF was not appropriate and urged the
juvenile court to impose the less restrictive alternative of
community release.
                     The juvenile Court’s Ruling
       After hearing testimony and considering the evidence, the
juvenile court declared appellant a ward of the court and ordered
that he be committed to SYTF for the baseline term of seven
years with a maximum confinement of 15 years to life. The
juvenile court found that this commitment would address the
goals of appellant’s rehabilitation and public safety, and that a
less restrictive alternative of camp, suitable placement, home on
probation, or Magnolia House, which is a youth-focused
transitional program offered through ARC, was not appropriate.
       In making this finding, the juvenile court noted the
severity of the offense and the harm done to the victim, her
family, and the community; appellant’s previous delinquent
history and numerous unsuccessful attempts to rehabilitate him;
appellant’s treatment opportunities at SYTF; and that there were
no limitations for appellant’s treatment at SYTF regarding his
age or mental and emotional health.
                              Discussion
       Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
in ordering him committed to SYTF because substantial evidence
does not support the finding that the programming, treatment,

                                5
and education services offered there will meet his needs or that a
less restrictive alternative is not appropriate. Appellant’s
contentions are meritless.
       A juvenile court may order commitment to a secure facility
if each of the following criteria pursuant to section 875 is met:
“(1) The juvenile is adjudicated and found to be a ward of the
court based on an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707
that was committed when the juvenile was 14 years of age or
older. [¶] (2) The adjudication described in paragraph (1) is the
most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated.
[¶] (3) The court has made a finding on the record that a less
restrictive, alternative disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§
875, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
       We review the juvenile court’s placement decision for an
abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1154.) The juvenile court abuses its discretion “‘“‘when the
factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence.’”’” (In re Carlos J. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1, 5.) We will
not disturb the juvenile court’s findings when there is substantial
evidence to support them. (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) “‘“‘In determining whether there was
substantial evidence to support the commitment, we must
examine the record presented at the disposition hearing in light
of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Law,’”’” which includes
public safety as well as the rehabilitation of the juvenile offender.
(In re Carlos J., at p. 5, quoting In re Calvin S. (2016) 5
Cal.App.5th 522, 527-528; § 202.)
       Appellant contends the programming, treatment, and
education offered at SYTF is not appropriate for him because he
has already availed himself of these programs while he was at

                                  6
juvenile hall. Moreover, he contends Probation officer Falls’s
testimony that appellant had not addressed his current offense
during his six-plus years of therapy was speculative, and
therefore not substantial evidence.
        But Probation officer Falls was competent to give her
opinion that appellant’s programming up to that point had not
addressed his current offense of murder because he had not
entered a plea as to that offense and to require him to address it
would be a violation of his constitutional rights. Moreover, the
evidence shows that appellant will have the opportunity to meet
with a multi-disciplinary team who will evaluate him and
prepare an individualized rehabilitation plan for him, which will
include additional programming.
        While appellant acknowledges that SYTF will offer a “few
additional programs once it is ‘up and running,’” he contends
there is no indication when those programs will be implemented.
According to appellant, SYTF’s “plans for the future, without
information as to when those plans would be implemented,
cannot be considered actual, concrete evidence.” (See In re Carlos
J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)
        Appellant’s contention ignores evidence in the record that
“some programming” is currently available to SYTF youths,
including mental health services, substance abuse counseling,
education services, religious services, and alternate
programming. Although the program will be more “robust” once
it is fully developed, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that
appellant would benefit from the available programming
currently offered at SYTF, as well as programming that will be
offered in the “near future.”

                                 7
       Appellant next contends substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that Magnolia House was
inappropriate. For example, he contends that unlike SYTF,
Magnolia House was immediately available. He also contends his
conduct over the past six years demonstrates that he does not
need to be in a locked facility.
       In order to commit a minor to a secure treatment facility,
the juvenile court must make a finding that a less restrictive
alternative disposition is unsuitable. (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).)
       In making this determination, “the court shall consider all
relevant and material evidence, including the recommendations
of counsel, the probation department,” and each of the following
criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or offenses for which the
ward has been most recently adjudicated, including the ward’s
role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and harm done to
victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent history, including
the adequacy and success of previous attempts by the juvenile
court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the programming,
treatment, and education offered and provided in a secure youth
treatment facility is appropriate to meet the treatment and
security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the goals of
rehabilitation and community safety can be met by assigning the
ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition that is
available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age, developmental
maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation,
gender identity and expression, and any disabilities or special
needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing the ward to
a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment facility.” (§
875, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).)

                                 8
       Here, the record shows that the juvenile court carefully
considered all the relevant evidence and each required criteria in
determining that a less restrictive placement was not suitable for
appellant. The juvenile court expressly found that the less
restrictive alternatives, including camp, suitable placement, and
home on probation, were not suitable because of appellant’s age
and maturity. Additionally, the juvenile court expressed concern
that Magnolia House did not provide sufficient security for the
community. Although the evidence showed that appellant was
doing well in juvenile hall, and the juvenile court believed he was
“on the road to recovery and rehabilitation,” it observed there was
no evidence of how appellant would do in a less structured
environment or that he had sufficiently rehabilitated enough to
be released back into the public. We agree.
       It is indisputable that appellant’s crime was severe. He
targeted the elderly victim based on her vulnerability. He
entered her home late at night to commit theft from her and once
inside, he armed himself with a knife. When she cried out, he
stabbed her over 40 times. He was the sole actor exercising a
degree of sophistication and callousness in carrying out the
murder.
       Moreover, appellant’s prior delinquent history
demonstrated that numerous intervention efforts had been made,
but, as the juvenile court observed, nothing had impacted
appellant in a positive way. Instead, he ran away, refused to
participate in court-ordered rehabilitative services, and continued
to engage in criminal behavior.
       Based on our review of the record, we conclude substantial
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that appellant
would benefit from the programming, treatment, and education

                                9
services offered and provided at SYTF and that a less restrictive
alternative disposition would not be suitable for appellant. This
determination is also consistent with the purpose of the juvenile
court law, which provides for the protection and safety of the
public, as well as appellant’s rehabilitative objectives. (See In re
Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1154-1155; In re Carlos
J., supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 5-6.)
       Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in ordering appellant committed to SYTF.
                             Disposition
       The judgment (findings and order) is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                  YEGAN, J.
We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                 10
                     Mario Barrera, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

     Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.