Court Opinion

ID: 9497593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:55:09.953821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:17.531793
License: Public Domain

Judge STRAUB concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant, Paul Palmieri, appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, /.), dismissing Palmieri’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims, asserting Fourth Amendment violations, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law trespass claim. The court determined that the defendants-appellees, Pamela Lynch and John Doe # l,1 employees of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”), did not violate Pal-mieri’s Fourth Amendment rights by traversing, without permission, the front and backyard of Palmieri’s residence in Babylon, New York in an attempt to perform a regulatory inspection. The areas to be inspected were a residential dock and adjacent areas located on tidal wetlands off the rear portion of Palmieri’s back yards. The site visit by the DEC and the aborted regulatory inspection attempt occurred in response to Palmieri’s application to extend his ninety-two-foot-long dock by an additional fifty feet and to add an additional boat lift to the two already in place.
Palmieri’s claim is one essentially sounding in trespass quare clausum fregit that has escalated into a constitutional claim of Fourth Amendment violations only because the trespassers were representatives of a state government regulatory agency. The very brief, albeit trespassory, entry of these state actors was responsive to Palmi-eri’s desire to obtain a necessary permit to conduct construction work on his property. That the agents were dispatched by Palmi-eri within minutes of their entry and that no damage was done might have justified the disposition of this case by application of the maxim de minimis non curat lex. Because of the constitutional issues raised, however, we are constrained to undertake the more elaborate analysis that follows.
BACKGROUND
Palmieri owns a parcel of residential waterfront property (the “property”), in Babylon, New York. The property is situated on Long Island’s Great South Bay and encompasses both New York State regulated tidal wetlands and a regulated adjacent area. It is bordered on the front (or “north”), by East Shore Drive; on the back (or “south”), by the Great South Bay; and on each side (“east” and “west”), by neighboring residential properties that are similarly sized and situated. Palmieri’s house (the “house”) sits roughly in the center of the property. Stockade fencing extends along the east and west property lines of the property, separating it from his neighbors’ lots physically, and, to a limited extent, visually. In addition, fencing extends from, and lies roughly perpendicular to, the sides of the house and connects to the fencing on the east and west property lines. Thus, this system of fences, along with the house itself, completely encloses the side and rear areas of the property physically on the north, east, and west sides. These areas include the backyard; a deck, connected to the back of the house and elevated approximately five to six above the backyard; and, bordering the property to the south, the bulkhead, dock, and waterfront. In the fence extending from the side of the house to the *76east property line is a gate (the “gate”), on which has been affixed a “PRIVATE PROPERTY — NO TRESPASSING” sign and a “BEWARE OF DOG” sign. The gate, which is typically kept closed but unlocked, provides physical access from the front of the property to the enclosed side and rear areas.
In March 1993, Palmieri submitted an application to the DEC for a tidal-wetland permit to extend his fifty-two-foot residential dock/pier (the “Dock”) by an additional 110 feet into the Great South Bay, as well as to build two elevator boat lifts. This application was denied by the DEC in November 1993. After Palmieri filed an administrative appeal, the parties reached a settlement, pursuant to which the DEC issued a tidal-wetland permit to extend the Dock by forty feet and to build one additional boat lift. The permit contained a condition providing that the property that was the subject of the permit was “subject to inspection at reasonable hours and intervals by an authorized representative of the DEC to determine whether the per-mittee is complying with this permit” and the New York State Environmental Conservation Law (“ECL”). A permit for the installation of a fence on the bulkhead (i.e., the barrier between the beach front and the backyard areas), which was issued to Palmieri in January 1999, contained an identical condition.
Palmieri refused to grant the DEC physical access to his property to perform the inspections, and he notified the DEC of his refusal to allow such access by letters dated October 8, 1997, May 11, 1999, and January 19, 2000. Initially, the DEC complied with Palmieri’s wishes, and its employees conducted inspections of the premises by boat without entering onto his property.
In May 1999, Palmieri submitted another application for a tidal-wetlands permit to extend his now ninety-two-foot-long Dock by an additional fifty feet and to add a third boat lift. In April 2000, Defendant-appellee Pamela Lynch, a DEC Marine Resource Specialist (“Specialist Lynch” or “Lynch”), was assigned to review Palmieri’s application. Specialist Lynch’s duties included making on-site inspections in connection with the review of applications for tidal-wetland permits. On March 10, 2000, Palmieri allegedly mailed a letter to Lynch restating his refusal to consent to a land-based inspection of the premises.2
Nevertheless, on April 3, 2000, Specialist Lynch and another person from the DEC (referenced in the complaint as “John Doe # 1”) visited the premises for the purpose of inspecting the Dock and the tidal wetlands in connection with the DEC’s review of Palmieri’s then-pending application. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether the plans submitted in connection with the application accurately reflected current conditions, to examine the current condition of the tidal wetlands on and near the site, and to evaluate the possible impact of the proposed project on those wetlands.
Once Specialist Lynch arrived at Palmi-eri’s property, she rang the front doorbell and knocked. Not hearing any response, Lynch walked around to the side of Palmi-eri’s house to gain access to the Dock and the shorefront and adjoining areas of the premises. To reach those areas, Lynch entered Palmieri’s enclosed rear yard through the closed gate bearing the “No Trespassing” and “Beware of Dog” signs. At that point, Palmieri, holding a video camera that was recording the scene on *77videotape, ran up to Specialist Lynch and asked who she was. Lynch showed Palmi-eri her DEC identification and told him that she had come to make an inspection in connection with his permit application. Palmieri then ordered her off his property, warning her that she was trespassing and that she would be arrested if she did not leave immediately. As he was physically escorting her off his property, Specialist Lynch explained that, if she could not complete her inspection, she could not complete her review of Palmieri’s permit application. Specialist Lynch then left without further discussion. The entire encounter between Lynch and Palmieri lasted no more than three minutes.
In June 2000, Palmieri filed an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, against Lynch and “John Doe # 1,” alleging a violation of Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights, a conspiracy to violate his Fourth Amendment rights, and common law trespass. Specifically, Palmieri alleged that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from a warrantless search had been violated by Lynch’s attempt to inspect the Dock by entering his property without his consent and that the entry also constituted a trespass. Shortly after Palmieri commenced this action, a DEC Permit Administrator advised Palmieri, by letter dated July 7, 2000, that his permit had been denied due to his failure to allow an inspection. Palmieri then requested an adjudicatory hearing on the denial of his permit application. In response, the DEC argued that its denial of the permit application should be affirmed without the need for an adjudicatory hearing, on the ground that Palmieri declined to consent to an on-site inspection.
While discovery continued in the District Court, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision recommending that the July 2000 Notice of Denial be vacated and replaced with a Notice of Incomplete Application in; light of Palmieri’s refusal to permit an inspection. The ALJ further recommended that Palmieri’s request . for a hearing be treated as void since such a request could not be made in response to a Notice of Incomplete Application. On February 1, 2002, the Commissioner of the DEC issued a, ruling adopting the ALJ’s recommendations. The Commissioner deemed Palmieri’s permit application to be incomplete because of his refusal to permit Specialist Lynch to inspect his property. Accordingly, the Commissioner refused to take further action on the application or to schedule a hearing on it until the inspection had occurred.
Palmieri then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the New York Supreme Court, Suffolk County, challenging the Commissioner’s decision. In his Article 78 petition, Palmieri argued that: (i) an on-site inspection by a DEC staff member was not required before a permit application could be deemed complete; (ii) an adjudicatory hearing was available for review of a permit denial based on the incompleteness of an application; (iii) DEC’S attempt to enforce a non-consensual, war-rantless site inspection violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and, (iv) his property did not come within' DEC’s wetlands permit jurisdiction, and therefore, he did not need a DEC permit to extend the Dock.
In October 2002, Specialist Lynch moved in the District Court for summary judgment at the close of discovery arguing that, asi a matter of law, Lynch had not violated Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights and that, even if it was determined that she had done so, she was entitled to qualified immunity. In opposing summary judgment, Palmieri argued that: (i) the inspection provisions in his previous per*78mits had not authorized the inspection of his premises because the permits had expired upon the completion of the projects that they had authorized; (ii) the current permit application did not require an on-site inspection; (iii) DEC did not have jurisdiction with respect to tidal wetlands within Suffolk County; and (iv) Lynch was not entitled to qualified immunity, given the letter she received telling her not to inspect his premises and the “NO-TRESPASSING” sign that was visible to her.
In May 2003, while Specialist Lynch’s summary judgment motion was pending, the Suffolk County Supreme Court granted Palmieri’s Article 78 petition. As an initial matter, the court rejected Palmieri’s arguments that the DEC lacked jurisdiction over his permit request and that the site inspection violated his Fourth Amendment rights. With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, the court determined that “an on-site inspection is a minimal intrusion and [Palmieri’s] project poses a diminished expectation of privacy and ... is a matter of significant governmental interest.” The court also determined, however, that the DEC could require an on-site inspection in connection with Pal-mieri’s permit application only if such an inspection was reasonably necessary to process his application. The state court, therefore, determined that Palmieri was entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on whether DEC’s demand for an on-site inspection was reasonably necessary.
In an eighteen-page, unpublished memorandum and order dated August 29, 2003, the District Court granted Specialist Lynch’s summary judgment motion, dismissed Palmieri’s federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his pendent trespass claim. First, the District Court concluded that DEC had jurisdiction over tidal wetlands in Suffolk County. Second, the District Court found that the activities relating to Palmi-eri’s purported Fourth Amendment violation fell under the “special needs” exception, given the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the DEC inspection was conducted. Third, the District Court found that Palmieri had a “diminished expectation of privacy in his backyard.” Fourth, the District Court concluded that the “level of intrusion presented in this case was minimal.” Fifth, the District Court found that New York State and the DEC had a “strong interest in protecting and regulating tidal wetlands” and that this governmental interest “outweigh[ed] the diminished expectation of privacy that [Palmieri] had, particularly in light of the minimal intrusion to which he was subjected to.” Finally, Judge Seybert found that Palmi-eri’s § 1985 claim failed as a matter of law because Palmieri had “offered absolutely no proof of a claim of class based animus” or of “any agreement ... between any individuals” that would establish the existence of a conspiracy.
Final judgment was entered on September 9, 2003, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
To prevail on his § 1983 claim, Palmieri must show that Specialist Lynch acted under color of state law and that she deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir.1994). Here, there is no dispute that Lynch was acting under color of state law when she arrived at Palmieri’s house to conduct the inspection. Thus, the question before the District Court — and now before us in this appeal — is whether Lynch violated Palmieri’s Fourth Amendment rights.
I. Special Needs Exception
A warrantless inspection of a private dwelling by a municipal administra*79tive officer without the consent of the owner is generally unreasonable absent specifically delineated circumstances. See Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 539-40, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (reversing an individual’s conviction for refusing to allow, a warrantless inspection of his residence by municipal building inspectors because the inspection was a significant intrusion and lacked “compelling urgency”); see also Sokolov v. Vill. of Freeport, 52 N.Y.2d 341, 343, 344-46, 438 N.Y.S,2d 257, 420 N.E.2d 55 (1981) (prohibiting the warrantless inspection of residential rental property to check on health conditions).3 However, “searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual requirements” where special governmental needs are present. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).' Thus, “in limited circumstances, a search unsupported by either [a] warrant or probable cause can be constitutional,” but only where “ ‘special needs’ other than the normal need for law enforcement provide sufficient justification.” Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001). Moreover, the Supreme Court has observed that, typically, such “special needs” will be recognized only where “the usual warrant or probable-cause requirements” have somehow been rendered impracticable. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
Warrantless searches have regularly been allowed when they were conducted pursuant to some legislated regulatory scheme in situations in which there was found to exist a diminished expectation of privacy.4 The special needs doctrine, in *80particular, has been applied in a number of cases involving the residences of parolees or probationers. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 870 (1987); Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2004). Application of the special needs doctrine, however, has not been limited to the heartland of cases in which the doctrine has its genesis. For example, in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987), the Supreme Court held:
Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a closely regulated industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search, have lessened application in this context. Rather, we conclude that, as in other situations of special need, where the privacy interests of the owner are weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 702, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
This Circuit, for example, recently applied the special needs exception in the employer-employee context to determine the constitutionality of the warrantless search of a government employee’s government-issued computer for non-standard software. See Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 68-69 (2d Cir.2001). There, we justified the warrantless search of the public employee’s office computer, despite the fact that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy, because we concluded that “the special needs of public employers” in “conducting [warrantless] workplace searches relating] to investigations of work-related misconduct” outweighed the employee’s expectation of privacy. Id. at 73; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (applying the special needs exception in a school setting where the “government has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school” and justifying excepting the school search from the warrant and probable-cause requirement after “balancing the relevant interests”); cf. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (concluding that the surprise “warrantless inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act do not offend the Fourth Amendment” because there is a strong governmental interest with regard to “improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation’s underground and surface mines”).
We think it is wise for courts to be cautious in applying the special needs doctrine, given that it allows for a degree of governmental intrusion into concededly private areas. But we cannot escape the conclusion that in cases such as the one at bar, the doctrine may be especially applicable, given its utility in providing a framework to balance important non-arbitrary governmental objectives against de minim-is intrusions in situations in which there is some degree of an expectation of privacy. Employing an analysis of the special needs *81doctrine to determine whether an application of the special needs exception is warranted is not outcome-determinative at the inception of the analysis, nor does such an inquiry into the applicability of the special needs exception make all other types of routine, regulatory inspections permissible. Rather, the inquiry into the special needs doctrine and the application of the special needs exception simply allows this court, or any reviewing court, to make a constitutional inquiry concerning the government’s challenged conduct and to balance or weigh the government’s regulatory interests against the individual’s protected privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment. Here, we utilize the special needs doctrine to analyze the environmental regulatory scheme that provides for warrant-less inspections pursuant to tidal-wetlands permit applications.
In applying the special needs doctrine, we must. weigh the governmental conduct — in light of the purported special need and against the privacy interest advanced — by analyzing three principal factors: (1) “the nature of the privacy interest allegedly compromised by the [challenged governmental conduct],” Earls, 536 U.S. at 830, 122 S.Ct. 2559; (2) “the character of the intrusion imposed by the [challenged conduct],” id. at 832, 122 S.Ct. 2559; and (3) “the nature and immediacy of the [state’s] concerns and the efficacy of the [governmental conduct] in meeting them,” id. at 834, 122 S.Ct. 2559.
A. The Nature of the Privacy Interest
“[A] Fourth Amendment search does not occur — even when the explicitly protected location of a house is concerned — unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search, and society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a merely “visual observation is no ‘search’ at all.” Id. at 32, 121 S.Ct. 2038; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (“A truly cursory inspection — one that involves merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it — is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore does not even require reasonable suspicion”).
(1) Subjective Expectation of Privacy
With regard to the first prong of the test for demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy, “the person challenging the search must demonstrate a subjective desire to keep his- or her effects private.” United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir.1988). Here, the District Court found that, by erecting a fence, posting a “No Trespassing” sign, and writing letters indicating his refusal to consent to a. search of his property, Palmieri “clearly exhibited] a legitimate ... subjective expectation of privacy.” We agree.
(2) Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy ■
In regard to whether, and to what degree or extent, Palmieri’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable, “the sanctity of private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection,” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), but, “[although society generally respects a person’s expectations of privacy in a dwelling, what a person chooses voluntarily to expose to public view ... loses its Fourth Amendment protection,” United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir.1997). Thus, “the route which any vis*82itor to a residence would use is not private in the Fourth Amendment sense.” United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 465 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the District Court found certain facts in the record to be undisputed. In particular, Judge Seybert observed:
Palmieri’s house faces a public street on the front and navigable waters and a beach accessible to the public at the rear. Even though he erected a fence, all of the space around Palmieri’s house is completely exposed to public view. [He] made a voluntary choice to live on this “exposed” property.
In light of these facts, the court concluded that Palmieri had a “privacy interest in his backyard” that was “severely diminished.” This finding stemmed also from the fact that (i) Palmieri had been “issued pervious permits, one of which had not yet expired at the time of this incident”; and (ii) “[t]he previous permits providefd] that, as a condition of receiving the benefit of the permit, the site was open to routine inspection by the DEC.” We concur in the District Judge’s determination and observe, as well, that Palmieri’s applications to permit construction on state-regulated wetlands further diminishes Palmieri’s privacy interest in the at-issue areas. Indeed, we find his privacy interest in these areas somewhat analogous to the diminished level of privacy interest typically recognized to reside in other regulated zones of activity in the public sphere. See supra note 4; see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972).
On appeal, Palmieri principally argues that the District Court resolved certain material factual disputes against him in concluding that this expectation of privacy was “diminished” to the point that it was unreasonable as a matter of law. Specifically, Palmieri charges the District Court with erroneously “finding” that (i) “there was no fence surrounding the perimeter of [his] property ... including the rear boundary”; (ii) his property “was completely exposed to public view”; and (iii) his “house face[d] a public street on the front and navigable waters and beach accessible to the public at the rear.” In so contending, however, Palmieri misconstrues the purpose of summary judgment, which is entirely appropriate where, as here, certain material facts are before the court but clearly not in genuine dispute. Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that when a party opposes a motion for summary judgment, this Court may disregard unsupported assertions and review the record independently).
For example, photographic evidence in the record unmistakably reveals that the “fence” along the bulkhead in the backyard is a single strand of heavy rope strung between upright posts several feet apart and provides virtually no obstruction to a view of the water from the backyard and, thus, no obstruction of the view of the backyard from the water. Furthermore, the drawings submitted by Palmieri in connection with his permit applications show a beach between the bulkhead and the mean low water line not crossed by fences. Moreover, while portions of the property are physically enclosed by stockade fencing, the video recorded by Palmieri demonstrates that much, if not all, of Palmi-eri’s backyard is clearly visible from the rear deck and backyard areas of at least one of his neighbor’s homes. The video shows that the east-side fence serves only as a physical barrier between Palmieri’s backyard and his neighbor’s backyard areas and that, because Palmieri’s rear deck is elevated, the east-side fence does not in any way restrict the line of sight between *83Palmieri’s deck and the deck in his neighbor’s backyard.5 In any event, Palmieri introduced no evidence in opposing summary judgment to rebut the record evidence.
We note that the Supreme Court has recognized that unusual circumstances can combine to create a zone of privacy interests that “can perhaps be seen as falling somewhere between ‘open fields’ and curti-lage, but lacking some of the critical characteristics of both.” Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236, 106 S.Ct. 1819, 90 L.Ed.2d 226 (1986); cf. United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir.2002) (recognizing the different levels or degrees of privacy interests between the inside of one’s home and other areas: “The protection of the Fourth Amendment, by necessity, exists in degrees.”). We, therefore, do not necessarily agree with the District Court that the privacy interest in the at-issue areas was objectively unreasonable merely because the areas are open to public view. It would seem indisputable, however, that Palmieri’s backyard and deck possess a considerably lesser degree of privacy than the interior spaces of his dwelling. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986); see also United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir.2000) (“No one in a place opened to public view can expect privacy in that place and at that time.”). In support of our conclusion that Palmieri possessed a diminished expectation of privacy in the relevant areas, photographic evidence in the record plainly shows that the rear areas of Palmieri’s home are freely observable to the public from the water and from the rear deck and yard of at least one of Palmieri’s neighbors. In sum, because of this ease of observability and because the intrusion was minimally intrusive and advanced a strong, countervailing government interest, Palmieri’s expectation of privacy, though present to some degree, is unquestionably diminished.
Palmieri’s asserted privacy expectation was diminished for other reasons as well. For one, he had applied for a construction permit and was on notice that the application process would involve some form of site inspection. The fact that the DEC had been able to accommodate his wishes in the past and inspect his property by boat was no guarantee that it would, or was required to, continue to do so. Further, there would be a number of undesirable practical implications were applicants allowed to dictate to the DEC how it could conduct inspections. We should not allow applicants to interfere, without good rea-r son, with the DEC’s ability to fulfill, its statutory and regulatory mandate in a reasonable manner of its choosing.
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that while Palmieri had an expectation of privacy that was to some degree objectively reasonable, that expectation of privacy was nonetheless diminished. While the expectation of privacy here weighs against applying the special needs exception, the fact that the expectation is a diminished one significantly mitigates the extent to which this factor weighs against applying the exception.
*84B. Character of the Intrusion
The second special-needs factor requires an analysis of the character of the intrusion imposed by the regulatory agency’s attempted visual inspection of Palmieri’s dock and backyard. Here, the District Court found that “the level of intrusion ... was minimal.” Specifically, Specialist Lynch sought to visually inspect Palmieri’s Dock and adjoining wetlands to evaluate his permit application. Lynch did not seek to inspect the interior of his house, his personal property, his person, or any closed containers. As the District Court explained, Lynch “at worst, committed a trespass.” Cfi Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 864-65, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974) (reversing a Colorado Court of Appeals decision that applied Fourth Amendment protection to private property that was open to public viewing, in the open-fields context, and that had been trespassed upon by a state inspector, and holding that such trespass entailed an “invasion of privacy ... if it can be said to exist, [that] is abstract and theoretical”); see also Reed v. Schneider, 612 F.Supp. 216, 221 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (“Technical trespasses have been found not to constitute unreasonable searches.”). That Lynch could have performed the inspection using a less intrusive means — for example, from the water (as had been done in the past) — does not alter the conclusion that the character of Lynch’s intrusion was de minimis.
A review of the relevant facts is illuminating. After ringing the front doorbell and getting no response, Lynch entered the backyard through the gate, intending to pass through the yard on her way to the waterfront areas of the property. Her intention, however, was merely to perform her duties relative to the evaluation of Palmieri’s most recent permit application — namely, to inspect the wetland, its adjacent areas, and the existing dock in connection with the review of the current application in order to determine the potential impact of the proposed construction project. As even Palmieri acknowledges, Lynch’s sole purpose in entering his property was to inspect the waterfront areas. The record further suggests that, even in her own mind, Specialist Lynch considered the inspection entirely routine, as evidenced by her obvious shock at being chased off the property by Plaintiff (at the barrel of a camera lens, no less). Moreover, Lynch’s brief intrusion came to an end before she was able to conduct the inspection of the dock and its adjoining areas. Indeed, Lynch departed the premises as soon as Palmieri instructed her to leave. Cf., e.g., Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110, 112-13, 118 (2d Cir.2004) (finding that the defendant officers, who entered the wrong house to conduct a warrantless search for an absconded parolee, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers’ conduct was reasonable, given that the officers left the house upon learning that the information relied upon to search that particular residence was incorrect). In light of the minimally-intrusive nature of the entry, and the fact that Specialist Lynch exited the premises immediately upon being told to do so, see id. at 118, and without even having performed the inspection of the dock and adjoining areas to ascertain the impact of the proposed construction on the state-regulated tidal wetlands, we find that the second special-needs factor weighs heavily against the Plaintiff.
C. Nature and Immediacy of Governmental Interest
The third special-needs factor requires an examination of the nature of the governmental interest at issue. Here, the District Court found that “the governmen*85tal interest ... in protecting the natural resources and the public beaches and waterways[ ] is serious.” We agree. Indeed, while there is no case law directly on point with respect to an environmental inspection of residential property, there can be no principled distinction made between the need to inspect commercial property and the need to inspect residential property where the residential property consists of protected tidal wetlands. Such wetlands are a well-regulated zone in the public sphere of concerns. It is axiomatic in this day and age that the state’s interest in performing regulatory inspections associated with applications to permit construction on protected tidal wetlands is unquestionably of the highest order. See generally Gazza v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 89 N.Y.2d 603, 611-12, 657 N.Y.S.2d 555, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (1997) (“[TJidal wetlands constitute one of the most vital and productive areas of our natural world, and ... their protection and preservation are essential.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the District Court observed; the state’s regulatory interest in protecting and regulating tidal wetlands is evidenced by the very existence of the DEC; by legislation and regulations pertaining to wetlands; and by the permit application process in general.
While the DEC’s need to perform the inspection at a given time, on a certain date, and in a specific manner may not be readily apparent, nothing in the record suggests that we should not credit the agency with diligently seeking to effectuate its statutory and regulatory mandate to inspect these areas and with attempting to afford expeditious consideration to Pal-mieri’s overarching goal of obtaining the construction permit. While the agency may have lacked an immediate need to inspect the at-issue areas, this does not mean that no inspection was required or appropriate. Indeed, it was Palmieri himself who set in motion the government conduct in question. Moreover, in Leven-thal, this Court recently applied the special needs exception to a situation where immediate governmental concern was lacking. See Leventhal, 266 F.3d at 73-76.
In addition, as suggested above, there are a number of practical reasons why the DEC had a strong interest in effectuating the inspection in the manner of its choosing. For example, inspecting the tidal wetlands in this case by boat would have unduly burdened the DEC staff in a number of ways. First, there is nothing in the record to suggest that boats were routinely, available to DEC marine biologists to use in conducting permit inspections. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that using a boat, as-opposed to driving to the property by.car and walking the site, would have entailed additional burdens of cost and time. Allowing applicants to overburden the DEC in this manner would backlog the entire application process for all applicants by reducing the number of inspections that DEC staff could effectively accomplish in a .given day. Second, an inspection by boat would have entailed technical complications as well. The DEC needed to determine whether the existing dock-and-lift structures were causing impacts that - could be compounded by increasing the length of the dock and the number of lifts. Since the existing structures extend from the upland, the DEC deemed it necessary to inspect the upland areas as well as the areas more easily accessible from the water. Accordingly, we find that the third special-needs factor weights entirely and heavily against Palmi-eri.
In sum, we hold that the special needs exception applies here because (i) the Plaintiff had a diminished expectation *86of privacy in the publicly-viewable areas outside his home, (ii) the character of the intrusion by Specialist Lynch was minimal and largely encompassed the same degree of observation that could be accomplished from the water by any member of the public; and (iii) the state’s interest in regulating construction on tidal wetlands overrode any asserted expectation of privacy in the outside areas of Palmieri’s home that were adjacent to the water. As a final point of clarification, in response to any concern that our application here of the special needs balancing test could be interpreted as making all other types of routine regulatory inspections permissible, we note that we are not holding that any warrantless visit to premises under any environmental regime is permissible. Rather, we hold merely that an environmental regulatory scheme involving war-rantless searches may be subject to a special needs “fact-specific balancing” test. See N.G. ex rel. S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize only that there are cases that fall within the “limited circumstances[ ] [where] the Government’s need to discover ... latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed ... without any measure of individualized suspicion.” Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 122 S.Ct. 2559; cf. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530, 87 S.Ct. 1727 (‘We may agree that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.”). Accordingly, our holding merely allows courts to use the balancing test to determine the reasonableness of particular search activity in the enforcement of environmental regulatory schemes. It may well be the case that other environmental regulatory search activity will fail to satisfy the special needs balancing test. In such eases where the special needs exception is not warranted, the governmental agency could simply deny the applicant his or her desired permit or license until the applicant permits an inspection. We also note that nothing in our opinion affects Palmieri’s right to pursue a state action for trespass.
II. Additional Discovery on the § 1985 Claim
Finally, we conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Palmieri’s § 1985 claim, as Palmieri failed to assert that there was “some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir.1999); see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Nor did Palmieri allege, “with at least some degree of particularity, overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy.” Thomas, 165 F.3d at 147; see Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 426 (2d Cir.1978). Indeed, Pal-mieri failed either to allege an agreement or to aver any factual details concerning the inception or operation of the claimed conspiracy. Moreover, his argument on appeal that dismissal of his § 1985 claim was premature because he was afforded no discovery must be rejected.6 Indeed, as Palmieri never contended that a class-*87based animus existed, nor alleged the existence of any circumstances indicating a conspiracy, there was simply no basis for discovery. See Ellentuck, 570 F.2d at 426 (dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for failure to “set forth facts showing some intentional and purposeful deprivation of constitutional rights” and to “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in which were reasonably related to the promotion of the claimed conspiracy”). Finally, Pal-mieri failed to pursue appropriate remedies below for inadequate discovery nor did he raise this argument in his opposition to summary judgement. Thus, this argument has been waived.
We have considered the Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. John Doe # 1 is presumably the intern who accompanied Lynch on her inspection. To date, John Doe has not been identified in this litigation, nor has he been served with a copy of the Complaint.

. Lynch denies ever having received this letter. For the purposes of summary judgment, the District Court assumed, as do we, that Lynch received this letter.

. The circumstances in which a warrantless search of a private dwelling is deemed constitutional are narrow and specific. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (holding that "an entry [into a building] to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze” without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment); accord United States v. Callabrass, 607 F.2d 559, 563 (2d Cir.1979) (upholding a defendant's conviction based upon evidence seized, — within three hours after the fire was extinguished — by fire fighters and a police detective because "entry into a burn[ed] building clearly presents an exigency of sufficient proportions to render a warrant-less entry reasonable” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871-73, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (allowing a warrant-less entry by a probation officer into a probationer’s residence to investigate the suspected presence of contraband because the "special needs” of law enforcement make the "warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable”); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (allowing a particular warrantless visit and entry by a social caseworker to determine compliance with welfare requirements).

. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995) (analogizing student-athletes to employees in closely regulated industry, who "have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy”); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (applying the same reasoning to students who participate in extracurricular activities); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602; 627, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (noting that railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy because they participate in a pervasively regulated industry); Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 379 (6th Cir.1998) (finding that teachers’ legitimate expectation of privacy is diminished by their participation in a heavily regulated industry); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. United States Nuclear Reg. Comm'n, 966 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1992) (upholding random testing of clerical workers in protected areas of a nuclear plant where "at least some” of the workers entered vital areas and "may have [had] safety-related responsibilities”); AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding the random testing of engineers who were required to hold top-secret access clearances, even *80though they might not ever have actually handled classified information); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Dept. of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir.1991) (upholding random drug testing of commercial truck drivers); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1245 v. Skinner, 913 F.2d 1454, 1458 (9th Cir.1990) (upholding random testing of all employees engaged in operations, maintenance, or emergency response functions on gas pipelines); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir.1990) (upholding FAA regulations requiring random drug testing of flight instructors and dispatchers).

. Palmieri recorded the video while standing in his backyard. It logically follows that if the line of sight in Palmieri's video recording can easily show his neighbor's backyard and elevated rear deck, then Palmieri’s neighbors, while sitting on their elevated rear deck in their backyard, can also easily view Palmieri’s rear deck and backyard. Further, the video shows that the side yards of the two residences are narrow and contiguous to each other. These details are highly relevant here, where we must consider what, if any, expectation of privacy Palmieri had in his backyard.

. Moreover, docket entries in the record reveal the filing of an order, signed April 16, 2002 by the magistrate judge, certifying that discovery had been completed, and a memorandum from the magistrate judge’s law clerk to the district judge’s courtroom deputy, dated July 11, 2002, noting that discovery had been completed and that the action was trial ready.