Court Opinion

ID: 9660475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:14:18.138699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.866766
License: Public Domain

DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.
¶ 61. {concurring). I agree with the mandate of the majority in this case. However, due to the majority's treatment of the important issue of front pay as a possibility in future cases, I write separately solely to further discuss the issue of front pay. In keeping with the spirit of the employment-at-will doctrine, I note that the availability of front pay must be limited to cases in which the employee has been discharged in violation of a fundamental and well-defined public policy. Additionally, I write to further explain some of the situations in which front pay will and will not be available as a remedy instead of reinstatement. Finally, I write to stress that *137the employee has a duty to mitigate all damages, including those awarded as front pay, and to explain the employee's duty to mitigate.
f 62. The employment-at-will doctrine recognizes "that where an employment [is] for an indefinite term, an employer may discharge an employee 'for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong.'" Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 567, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). However, over the years, exceptions have been carved out of this rule through both legislative and judicial action. See id. It is now unlawful to discharge an employee, even an employee-at-will, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; Wis. Stat. § 111.31—111.395. In Brockmeyer, this court also held that it is unlawful to terminate an at-will employee if "the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law." 113 Wis. 2d at 573.
¶ 63. As with discriminatory discharges where front pay may be available only in limited circumstances,1 this court held in Brockmeyer that "reinstatement and backpay are the most appropriate remedies for public policy exception wrongful discharges." Id. at 575. Based on Brockmeyer, then, I *138stress that the majority opinion must be limited to extremely rare cases when an employee-at-will has been discharged in violation of a fundamental and well-defined public policy. Generally, however, reinstatement and back pay are the preferred remedies and front pay should be available only when reinstatement is "not feasible." Majority op. at 121.
¶ 64. The majority opinion provides some examples of when reinstatement would and would not be feasible. Id. However, I feel that it is important to expand on these examples and to stress that they are only examples. There will be numerous other situations in which reinstatement is required as a remedy and front pay is not an option. Reinstatement is not impossible in a situation where the discharged employee's former position is not available, but a substantially similar position in terms of job duties and salary is available. Reinstatement is not impossible simply because the employer and the employee do not get along, or the employee claims that he or she is not comfortable working for someone who previously terminated him or her. There are laws already in place to prevent an employer or its employees from retaliating against such an employee. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Following the law as it is stated in Brockmeyer, I feel that front pay will only be properly awarded if the employer has no positions (or no positions substantially similar to the employee's pre-discharge position) available, or if the employer simply refuses to rehire the discharged employee.
¶ 65. Finally, I write to stress that a plaintiff who is awarded front pay necessarily has a duty to mitigate damages. This is a long-standing principle in Wisconsin law. See Klug v. Flambeau Plastics Corp., 62 Wis. 2d 141, 155, 214 N.W.2d 281 (1974) (requiring that the *139injured party in an employment situation "must make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages"); Gauf v. Milwaukee Athletic Club, 151 Wis. 333, 335, 139 N.W. 207 (1912) (damages in a wrongful discharge case are "subject to mitigation by the amount the employee earnfs], or might by the exercise of reasonable diligence [earn]"). See also Marten Transport v. DILHR, 171 Wis. 2d 147, 155, 491 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1992); Hale v. Stoughton Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 267, 279, 376 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1985); Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 123 Wis. 2d 490, 503, 368 N.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1985). Mitigation has always been required in employment cases. Consequently, I stress that a discharged employee has a duty to mitigate damages and to actively seek other employment if reinstatement is not possible. To hold otherwise would be to discourage the employee from seeking other employment entirely to the detriment of the employer.
¶ 66. The majority opinion touches on all of the aspects of front pay raised in this opinion. I write separately simply to further discuss these important issues and to provide guidance in future cases.
¶ 67. For the foregoing reasons, I write separately.

 See Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 398 (7th Cir. 1991) ("the very possibility of front pay under Title VII is uncertain" though some courts have imposed it). See also Griffith v. Colorado, Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1994) (front pay may be appropriate where reinstatement is simply not reasonable); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d. 1317, 1333 (6th Cir. 1988) (back pay and reinstatement are the favored remedies for discrimination claims under Title VII, though front pay may be appropriate at the trial court's discretion).