Court Opinion

ID: 9954683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 19:02:51.822601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:11.647008
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 Zeng v. Wang CA1/5
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FIVE

 YING MAGGIE ZENG,
     Petitioner and Respondent,                                 A166681
 v.
                                                                (Sonoma County
 ALBERT HUAI-EN WANG,                                           Super. Ct. No. SFL089930)
     Defendant and Appellant.

        Pro per defendant Albert Huai-En Wang (Father) appeals from an
order entered on November 9, 2022, which denied his request for compliance
with child custody and visitation orders that were issued nearly a decade
earlier in Orange County. He contends he should have received due process
protections afforded to criminal defendants and parents in juvenile
dependency proceedings. He further contends the trial court should have
appointed an attorney for his daughter, ordered a child custody evaluation,
and awarded him attorney fees and costs. His contentions are without merit,
and we will affirm the order.1

        1 Father has filed other appeals arising out of his family law issues

with petitioner-respondent, Ying Maggie Zeng (Mother). In Case No.
A165473, we recently affirmed a custody order and domestic violence
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                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      Father and Mother married in 2005 and have a minor daughter
(Daughter). They divorced pursuant to a Judgment of Dissolution entered in
Orange County Superior Court in March 2013.
      After the divorce, Mother moved to Pennsylvania for work. Father
refused to let Daughter move to Pennsylvania with Mother unless Mother
signed a parenting plan that he proposed. Mother signed the plan, which
was filed in Orange County Superior Court in June 2014 as a stipulation and
order. After Daughter joined Mother in Pennsylvania, Mother and Father
began to modify the plan orally, and they have not followed it since.
      In 2017, Mother and Daughter moved to Sonoma County with Father’s
permission. Over the years, Daughter spent summer vacations and some
holidays with Father in San Diego.
      In July 2021, when Daughter was scheduled to return to Mother in
Santa Rosa, Father refused to return Daughter and instead unilaterally
enrolled her in a new school in San Diego. Mother filed an emergency
petition in Orange County Superior Court. By order dated August 13, 2021,
that court directed that Daughter be returned to Mother, that Daughter
attend school in Santa Rosa to maintain the status quo, that Father have
parenting time on Daughter’s school breaks and holidays, and that all other
orders not in conflict remain in effect.
      On August 16, 2021, Mother filed a Request for Order in Orange
County Superior Court for a change of venue to Sonoma County. In its
Findings and Order After Hearing entered on October 12, 2021, the Orange

restraining order entered against him. Case No. A168238 (appealing a
December 12, 2022 order) is pending. We dismissed Case No. A168859
(appealing a July 24, 2023 order) as an appeal from a non-appealable order.
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County court transferred the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 397.5 and 397 “because the ends of justice and the convenience of the
parties are promoted by the change.” The court reiterated that “[a]ll matters
before the [c]ourt are transferred to Sonoma County.” Father did not appeal.
The transfer to Sonoma County was not completed, however, until December
2021.
        Because of Father’s ongoing campaign of harassment and verbal abuse,
and because the dissolution case had not yet been transferred, Mother filed a
new case in Sonoma County Superior Court (Case No. SFL08959) on October
21, 2021, pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, §
6200 et seq.; DVPA).2 The trial court granted a temporary restraining order
protecting Mother and Daughter, set a hearing, and granted Mother full
custody pending the hearing without visitation to Father. On March 4, 2022,
after a four-day trial, the court granted Mother a two-year DVRO and
granted Mother “temporary” sole legal and physical custody of Daughter,
allowing Father visitation by video conference twice per week.3 Father
appealed (Case No. A165473), and we affirmed the orders.
        On July 18, 2022—roughly four months after the Sonoma County
Superior Court issued the DVRO and custody order in the DVPA
proceeding—Father filed a Request for Order in this case (the one transferred
from Orange County), seeking “[c]ompliance with Orange County Superior

        Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this
        2

opinion are to the Family Code.
        3The TRO and DVRO are not in the record, but Mother points out they
are in the clerk’s transcript in Case No. A165473. We construe the reference
to be a request for judicial notice and grant it.

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Court orders” concerning child custody and visitation, and attorney fees and
costs.
         In her declaration in response to Father’s filing, Mother set forth the
litigation history summarized above, urged that Father’s motion be denied
because the Sonoma County order superseded the Orange County orders, and
argued that Father inadequately pled his request for attorney fees and costs
because he did not ask for a specific amount or file the required Income and
Expense Declaration (FL-150), Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Attachment (FL-319), Supporting Declaration for Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Attachment (FL-158), or declarations containing the information sought by
those forms.
         The matter was heard on August 22, 2022, before the judge who issued
the DVRO and related custody order. The record does not contain a
transcript of the hearing. In her respondent’s brief, Mother represents that a
Settled Statement was approved by the trial court on July 24, 2023, but the
Settled Statement does not appear in the record either. According to the
court’s minute order, at the hearing “Father request[ed] a custody evaluation
be ordered,” “minor’s counsel be appointed,” “[a]ttorney’s fees and sanctions,”
and “custody of [Daughter,] stating he has not been able to have contact.”
         The trial court denied Father’s request to order Mother to comply with
the Orange County orders. In its minute order, the court explained that the
“Orange County orders from 8 years ago . . . have been superseded after
jurisdiction was transferred to Sonoma County” and “the past orders are no
longer in effect.” The court added: “Father’s other requests are not properly
before the Court today. [¶] Father may re-file but must meet and confer
with Counsel first.” The written Findings and Order after Hearing was
entered on November 9, 2022. Father filed a timely appeal.

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                               II. DISCUSSION
      Father contends the trial court should have taken “a flexible approach
to provide [him] a ‘minimum due process safety net,’ including an early
tripartite balancing [of] the defendant’s parental rights, the child’s best
interest/children’s rights, and plaintiff’s parental rights, before issuing a
temporary sole custody [order] that invalidates all pre-existing joint custody
court orders and parenting agreements.” (Footnote omitted.) He further
argues, among other things, that the court should have appointed counsel for
Daughter, ordered a child custody evaluation, and approved his request for
attorney fees and costs. We have considered all of Father’s arguments, and
none of them has merit.
      A. Request to Order Compliance with Orange County Orders
      The trial court concluded that the 2014 Orange County Superior Court
order was superseded by the Sonoma County Superior Court’s 2022 DVRO
and custody orders. The court was correct. In 2021, the Orange County
Superior Court transferred jurisdiction over all aspects of the parties’
dissolution action, including child custody and visitation, to Sonoma County.
By this order, the Sonoma County Superior Court obtained jurisdiction over
the entire dissolution case, including custody and visitation. (Cf. Thompson
v. Thames (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1303–1308.) Moreover, under the
DVPA, the Sonoma County court had authority to make custody orders along
with the TRO on October 26, 2021, and the DVRO on March 4, 2022.
(§§ 6323, subd. (a) & 6340, subd. (a); see also § 3040 [court may modify
existing custody order ex parte where parent committed recent or ongoing
acts of domestic violence].) In addition, other provisions in the Family Code
generally authorize the court to modify a prior custody order to promote the
best interest of the child. (§§ 3087 [“An order for joint custody may be

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modified or terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on the
court’s own motion if it is shown that the best interest of the child requires
modification or termination of the order”] & 3022 [“The court may, during the
pendency of a proceeding or at any time thereafter, make an order for the
custody of a child during minority that seems necessary or proper”].) Indeed,
in Case No. A165473, we affirmed the court’s DVRO and order regarding
custody and visitation.
      Father nevertheless argues that he was not afforded the same due
process and constitutional rights he would have had as a criminal defendant.
In particular, he claims the Sonoma County custody order violated the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
because it disproportionately deprived him of his parental rights when
compared to what he allegedly did. He also notes that in a criminal
proceeding he would have had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the
doctrine of “ ‘[f]ruits of the poisonous tree’ ” would apply, and the burden of
proof would be beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, Father argues that
he would have had more due process protections if Sonoma County Child
Protective Services had filed a juvenile dependency case against him. He
further claims that Daughter was deprived of her “unalienable rights to have
frequent and continuous contact with both parents.” He contends that both
he and Daughter have a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause against the Sonoma County Superior Court. He invokes a
child’s right to associate with both parents. And he adds that joint custody is
generally in the best interest of a minor child.
      Father’s arguments are unavailing. He fails to establish that he
received less process than what was due for his July 2022 request for an
order or the 2021 DVRO and custody order. (See, e.g., In re Sade C. (1996) 13

                                        6
Cal.4th 952, 991–992 [decision adversely affecting child custody does not
implicate the same due process rights as a criminal case]; In re Marriage of
Tara and Robert D. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 871, 887 [no due process right to
counsel in dissolution proceedings]; In re William M.W. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th
573, 588 [“parents in dependency proceedings are not generally entitled to
the same due process protections as criminal defendants”].) To the extent
that he is challenging the enforceability of the DVRO and custody order, yet
failed to raise these arguments in his appeal from those orders (Case No.
A165473), his arguments have been waived or forfeited. To the extent he did
raise the arguments in his prior appeal—such as the claim that he did not
receive due process—we have already rejected them in the prior appeal, and
nothing in his current briefs persuades us to rule otherwise now. He fails to
establish any constitutional violation.
      B. Minor’s Counsel and Child Custody Evaluation
      Father contends Daughter has the right to have an attorney appointed.
Without citation to the record, he represents the following: “Father has made
several formal FL-300 Requests for Order in Orange County and Sonoma
County, as well as oral motions recorded in Court’s Reporter’s Transcript
and/or Minute Orders in various court hearings. Father has tried his best to
bring his minor’s counsel appointment request before [the] Sonoma Court,
and does not really know how to satisfy Judge Ottenweller’s ‘properly before
this court’ exclusionary requirement. [The] Sonoma Court’s procedural
requirements set[] an insurmountable bar to access to justice for self-
represented defendants, who have substantive rights protected under the
United States Constitution as well as California laws.” In addition, Father
contends the trial court should have ordered a child custody evaluation under
section 3111 and a California rule of court. His contentions are meritless.

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      First, by failing to cite to the record concerning his “several” requests
for minor’s counsel, he has abandoned the argument and we need not
consider it. (WFG Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 881, 894; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)
      Second, there is no “insurmountable bar to access to justice” in
requiring a self-represented litigant to properly present a request for minor’s
counsel. The Request for Order (FL-300) that Father used in July 2022 to
seek compliance with the Orange County orders included a box for him to
check and an area for him to explain if he wanted counsel appointed for
Daughter or a child custody evaluation. Father did not do so. Instead, on
page nine of his 10-page declaration in support of his Request for Order, he
claimed it was “necessary” to have minor’s counsel appointed. He also
attached an exhibit, which appears to be a declaration he submitted in
support of a September 2021 request to the Orange County Superior Court, in
which he asked for appointment of minor’s counsel and a child custody
evaluation. Father does not adequately explain why those references should
be sufficient when he failed to request those orders on his Sonoma County
FL-300. He therefore fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in
concluding that the issues of minor’s counsel and a child custody evaluation
were not properly before it.
      Finally, even if the issues had been properly presented to the trial
court, the court was not required to appoint minor’s counsel or order a child
custody evaluation merely because Father asked for it. Section 3150,
subdivision (a) provides: “If the court determines that it would be in the best
interest of the minor child, the court may appoint private counsel to
represent the interests of the child in a custody or visitation proceeding,
provided that the court and counsel comply with the requirements set forth in

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Rules 5.240, 5.241, and 5.242 of the California Rules of Court.” (Italics
added.) Section 3111, subdivision (a) provides: “In a contested proceeding
involving child custody or visitation rights, the court may appoint a child
custody evaluator to conduct a child custody evaluation in cases where the
court determines it is in the best interest of the child.” (Italics added.) These
statutes grant the court discretion to appoint counsel for minor or a child
custody evaluator, and Father fails to demonstrate that the court abused that
discretion. (See Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 [absence of
reporter’s transcript frequently fatal to appeal because the trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct].) Nor does he establish any
reasonable probability that the appointment of minor’s counsel or a child
custody evaluator would have resulted in a different outcome on his July
2022 request for compliance with the Orange County orders.
      C. Attorney Fees
      Father contends the trial court should have awarded him attorney fees
so he could hire a lawyer to safeguard his parental rights. His argument is
meritless.
      Father urges that he is entitled to need-based attorney fees under
sections 2030 and 3121. But he provides no substantive argument in his
opening brief, instead referring us to his argument in Case No. A165473. We
rejected his argument in Case No. A165473, and we reject it here. Simply
put, Father did not provide the forms or information required to obtain an
order for attorney fees and costs.
      As a general rule, “to request attorney’s fees and costs [based on need
under sections 2030 or 3121], a party must complete, file and serve” a request
for the order (FL-300), a request for attorney’s fees attachment (FL-319) or a
comparable declaration addressing the factors in that form, a current income

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and expense declaration (FL-150), and a FL-158 or comparable declaration
providing the information covered by the FL-158. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.427(b)(1), italics added.) “The party requesting attorney’s fees and costs
must provide the court with sufficient information about the attorney’s
hourly billing rate; the nature of the litigation; the attorney’s experience in
the particular type of work demanded; the fees and costs incurred or
anticipated; and why the requested fees and costs are just, necessary, and
reasonable.” (Id., rule 5.427(b)(2).) The record shows that Father did not
provide a FL-319, a FL-150, a FL-158, or the requisite information with his
request for attorney fees. In his declaration, he merely asked the trial court
to order Mother to “pay [his] legal fees and expenses up to $50,000, in
monthly installments that may be billed by my lawyer (to be retained in
Sonoma County).” Although a court “may” order fees and costs in response to
an oral motion made in open court at the “hearing of the cause on the merits”
(see § 2031, subd. (b)(1)) without all the information required by rule
5.427(b), the party must still provide the court with sufficient information to
establish need and entitlement to the fees. Father failed to do so.
      In his reply brief, Father points out that the trial court “shall” rule on a
request for attorney fees within 15 days (§ 3121, subd. (f)). He also
emphasizes that the court “shall” ensure that each party has access to legal
representation (§§ 2030, subd. (a)(1), 3121, subd. (a)), “shall” make findings
when a request for attorney fees and costs is made (§§ 2030, subd. (a)(2),
3121, subd. (b)), and “shall” make a fee order if the findings demonstrate
disparity in access and ability to pay (§ 3121, subd. (b)). But those
obligations arise when the court is presented with a request supported by the
requisite financial information, which Father did not provide. In any event,

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Father’s failure to provide the information with the request would render any
error harmless.
      Father also claims he is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
pursuant to a 2013 Co-Parenting Agreement (Agreement) and the 2014
Stipulation and Order on Parenting Plan (Stipulation and Order) entered in
Orange County. He argues that the parenting agreement attached to the
stipulation and order should be enforced as a contract. But again, the FL-300
form by which he sought fees and costs required him to specify an amount he
was seeking and to file forms FL-150, FL-319, and FL-158 (or equivalents),
none of which he provided. Because Father’s FL-300 did not even specify an
amount he sought, the trial court did not err in concluding that the request
was not properly before it.
      Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that Father was entitled
to attorney fees or costs under the Agreement or Stipulation and Order.
First, we question whether the parenting plan can be enforced as a contract,
since it was incorporated into a stipulation and order. (See Marriage of
Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 656 [property settlement agreement
ceased to operate as an independent legal instrument].) Second, even if the
provisions of the parenting agreement regarding attorney fees could be
enforced as part of a court order (or a contract), they are not relevant here.
Section 8(a) of the Stipulation and Order states: “If Mother initiates any
court action relating to Daughter’s living arrangement or the Co-Parenting
Plan in Pennsylvania, Mother shall be financially responsible for paying all
reasonable legal fees” of Father and his travel expenses. (Italics added.)
Mother did not commence this case in Pennsylvania. Finally, any error in
not awarding fees and costs is harmless, because there is no reasonable

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probability that an attorney’s assistance would have changed the outcome of
the proceeding.
                              III. DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.

                                                                  CHOU, J.

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

Zeng v. Wang (A166681)

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