Court Opinion

ID: 9881269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 21:04:11.440419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:11:40.411019
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Hill CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061690

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 09CF1955)

 CURTIS JAMES HILL,                                                    OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael J. Cassidy, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G. McGinnis and
A. Natasha Cortina, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  Convicted of special circumstances felony murder in 2011, Curtis James
Hill appeals the denial of his third petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) That law allows defendants who were convicted of felony
murder before 2019 to seek resentencing if 1) they were not the actual killer, 2) they did
not aid and abet the actual killer in the commission of first degree murder, and 3) they
were not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. However, in upholding the denial of appellant’s first petition,
we ruled he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the record of
conviction shows he was the actual killer. (People v. Hill (June 29, 2022, G060426)
[nonpub. opn.] (Hill I).) Appellant challenges that ruling in this appeal, but it is
controlling under the law of the case doctrine. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying his current petition for resentencing.
                                               BACKGROUND
                  The factual and procedural background are set forth in Hill I, which we
incorporate by reference. That opinion reflects appellant was sentenced to life in prison
without parole in 2011 after a jury found him guilty of murdering Cecil Warren during
the commission of a robbery. Although appellant was accompanied by John McKinney
during the murder, the record of conviction shows appellant personally punched and
kicked Warren in the face when he took his property. The record also shows the jury
found appellant’s actions were a substantial factor in Warren’s death, regardless of
anything McKinney may have done to Warren during the robbery. Therefore, in Hill I
we affirmed the summary denial of appellant’s initial petition for resentencing because he
was convicted of murder as the actual killer. (Hill I, supra, G060426, at pp. 6-8.)1

         1
                   Appellant’s initial petition was filed under former Penal Code section 1170.95. That section has
since been renumbered without substantive change as Penal Code section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) All
further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                         2
              While his appeal in Hill I was pending, appellant filed his second petition
for resentencing, on January 7, 2022. The trial court denied the petition for lack of
jurisdiction due to appellant’s pending appeal.
              Less than a month later, appellant filed his third petition for resentencing,
which is the subject of this appeal. In support of the petition, appellant’s attorney noted
that after appellant filed his initial resentencing petition in 2019, the Legislature passed
Senate Bill No. 775 (SB 775). (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) That bill
amended former section 1170.95 to clarify the rules for determining a defendant’s
eligibility for resentencing under that section.
              In their written response, which was filed in February 2022, the People
argued that none of the changes ushered in by SB 775 applied to appellant’s case.
Therefore, like his first petition, appellant’s third petition should be denied for failure to
state a prima facie case for resentencing.
              We issued our opinion in Hill I on June 29, 2022, roughly six weeks before
the hearing on appellant’s petition. At the hearing, the prosecutor argued that in light of
that decision, appellant’s petition was barred under collateral estoppel principles. The
trial court stated it was not inclined to consider that issue, since it had not been raised in
the parties’ briefs. Nevertheless, the court determined that nothing of substance had
changed from the time appellant filed his initial petition. As was the case then, appellant
was still ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law because the record of conviction
proved he was convicted as the actual killer. Therefore, it denied his petition for failure
to state a prima facie case.
              In its written statement of decision, the trial court noted appellant never
meaningfully addressed the fact his successive petitions were virtually identical.
The court stated, “Although petitioner filed his first petition prior to the passage of SB
775, the amendments . . . wrought by [that bill] do not impact petitioner’s case.
Petitioner was already afforded appointment of counsel and a hearing. The felony

                                               3
murder rule was already amended when petitioner filed his initial petition. Thus, the
Court of Appeal [in Hill I] considered petitioner’s case based on . . . the current state of
the law to hold that petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Petitioner does
not identify any intervening circumstances that would warrant deviating from the
appellate court’s decision.”
                                        DISCUSSION
              Appellant contends the record of conviction does not establish he was
convicted of felony murder as the actual killer. Therefore, not only is the trial court’s
ruling to the contrary incorrect, so was our prior decision in Hill I. In fact, the bulk of
appellant’s briefing is aimed at challenging Hill I’s holding that he is legally ineligible for
resentencing because he was convicted of murder for actually killing Warren during the
course of a robbery. However, we agree with respondent that the law of the case doctrine
forecloses appellant’s attempt to relitigate the merits of that decision.
              “[W]hen an appellate court ‘“states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be
adhered to throughout [the case’s] subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon
subsequent appeal . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.)
The law of the case doctrine “‘will not be adhered to where its application will result in
an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a “manifest misapplication of existing
principles resulting in substantial injustice” [citation], or the controlling rules of law have
been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate
determinations [citation]. The unjust decision exception does not apply [however] when
there is a mere disagreement with the prior appellate determination.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197, quoting People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th
764, 787; see also People v. Antonelli (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 712 [law of the case
doctrine applies in the context of a subsequent petition for resentencing under section
1172.6].)

                                               4
               Relying on People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), appellant
asserts it would be unjust to find Hill I binding under the law of the case doctrine, or the
related doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Strong, our Supreme Court refused to give
preclusive effect to a jury’s determination the defendant was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, which would have
rendered him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6, even though he was not
the actual killer. They did so because the major participant and reckless indifference
requirements had undergone considerable judicial refinement since the jury rendered its
verdict in that case. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 715-718.)
               However, Strong is inapt here because appellant’s eligibility for
resentencing does not turn on the major participant or reckless indifference requirements.
Rather, he was found ineligible because he actually caused Warren’s death. That is a
separate disqualifying circumstance that has not changed since Senate Bill No. 1437
modified the felony murder rule in 2019. Therefore, as the People rightly contend, there
is no justification for us to revisit our holding in Hill I.
               Appellant argues the People forfeited their right to argue law of the case by
failing to raise that issue in the trial court. However, the People filed their response to
appellant’s petition several months before Hill I was filed. And at the hearing on the
petition, which took place just after that filing, the People argued appellant’s right to
resentencing was foreclosed by that opinion. Under these circumstances, and considering
the applicability of the law of the case doctrine is a legal question subject to independent
review (Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1127), we reject appellant’s forfeiture
claim.

                                                5
                                    DISPOSITION
            The trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.

                                               BEDSWORTH, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

                                           6