Court Opinion

ID: 9711607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:35:15.330769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.281250
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
Bunting was convicted of four (4) counts of terroristic threats.1 Appropriate post-verdict motions were filed and subsequently denied. On December 7, 1978, appellant was sentenced to a probationary term of twenty-three (23) months and fined fifty dollars ($50) on each of the four (4) counts. This appeal followed.
Appellant poses several questions for our consideration. As we see it, they are: First, whether 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706 is, on its face, unconstitutionally vague?2 Second, was there sufficient evidence to convict Bunting of the crime of terroristic threats? Third, was appellant’s request for a mistrial improperly denied?
The circumstances out of which the charges against Bunting arose involved two public officials and two of his neighbors. All hostility was related to what appellant perceived as an intolerable zoning violation. The first incident involved John Whiteside, the township zoning officer, who— when unable to resolve Bunting’s problems—was confronted by appellant’s statement: “I am going to get a gun, I am going to get Harry Peace and then I am coming after you.” The second incident occurred during a telephone conversation with Girard Stapleton, a township supervisor, to whom—after Bunting felt his problem was unresolved—ap*454pellant said: “I am going to come over and blow up your house and see if you would like all that noise.”
The third incident involved Joel Zook—a neighbor—and one of Zook’s sons. When Bunting confronted Zook about the zoning problem, Zook’s son claims appellant said he had a “high-powered rifle and it’s going to be used.” And:
He said that if he catches either me or my dad halfway up in the field it won’t be good for our health . . . He said that he is going to shoot Harry Peace and then before he gets himself he is going to come down and get my dad.
The final incident focused on Ms. Zook—Joel’s wife— about whom Joel’s son, Christian, claims appellant said: “He said he sees my mother going up and down the road with her horse and buggy—going to cause a legal accident to wipe her out—[.]”
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated if a criminal statute is so vague that it fails to provide reasonable notice to a person who purportedly fails to act in accordance with it.3 The standard upon which we review a statute for vagueness is:
A criminal statute “that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954), or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,” Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972), is void for vagueness. See generally Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390, 99 S.Ct. 675, 683, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). It is also clear, however,
*455The fact that [the legislature] might without difficulty have chosen “clear and more precise language” equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which is in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague.” United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 316, 320, 46 L.Ed.2d 228, 235 (1975). Rather, the requirements of due process are satisfied if the statute in question contains reasonable standards to guide the prospective conduct.
Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 6, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (1976). As appears in Commonwealth v. Burt, 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 89 (1980). See, Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926).
We are also mindful that allegedly terroristic threats are frequently made by spoken word. Our First Amendment rights are given greater shelter than all our other rights. Accordingly:
where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the doctrine [of void-for-vagueness] demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contents.4
The provisions which Bunting asserts are so vague as to violate due process state:
A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of causing such terror or inconvenience.
Emphasis added.
We review this record mindful that the disputed position of this statute is that which concerns terroristic threats against another individual.
*456We hold that portion of the statute when viewed in light of the requirement that a terroristic threat be made to an individual infers that the threatened action be one which is susceptible to immediate action, credible in nature, and made with the intent to cause an apprehension of fear. With this understanding we find:
This section does not employ “ambiguous” words, “archaic classifications,” or words with “numerous and varied” meanings. Compare Colautti v. Franklin, supra (“viability” determination requirement of statute regulating physicians’ performance of abortions void), Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, supra (“vagrancy” ordinance drafted in terms of archaic English poor laws invalid), and Lanzetta v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939) (voiding statute making it crime to be member of “gang”). Accordingly, any vagueness challenge must be rejected. See United States ex rel. Almeida v. Rundle, 383 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 1967) (upholding former felony-murder statute).
Commonwealth v. Burt, supra, 490 Pa. at 178, 415 A.2d at 92.
Consequently, the language in the statute under consideration is not vague and is therefore constitutional.
Appellant next claims there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to convict him of the crime of terroristic threats. We shall review the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, in conjunction with all reasonable inferences therefrom, to determine if that evidence was sufficient to prove Bunting’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Ilgenfritz, 466 Pa. 345, 353 A.2d 387 (1976); Commonwealth v. Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 318 A.2d 327 (1974).
The evidence clearly indicates that the appellant intended to terrorize individuals. It can be reasonably inferred from his statement that he sought to frighten the persons listening to him. The evidence presents a description of actions which were capable of immediate action, made under circumstances assuring their credibility and of a nature which indicates an intention to create an apprehension of fear.
*457Appellant contends his actions did not warrant a conviction of terroristic threats because all his statements did not cause his listeners to fear for their own safety. Messrs. Whiteside and Stapleton feared their family’s safety and allegedly not their own. This claim has no merit because— as common sense tells us—one may be placed in a state of fear as a result of terrorist remarks directed at their own person or at those persons about whom they care. All other remarks caused reactions indicating the listeners feared for their own physical well being.
We do not by any means wish to diminish the harshness of statements required to be called terroristic by our opinion. Rather, we hold that, after a review of the totality of the evidence, these statements were credibly terroristic.
Finally, Bunting asks us to determine whether his request for a mistrial was improperly denied. The Supreme Court has declared it reversible error to admit evidence concerning the silence of a defendant after an arrest. Commonwealth v. Greco, 465 Pa. 400, 350 A.2d 826 (1976). However, this error if curable by cautionary instructions will not be grounds for a mistrial. Commonwealth v. Quartman, 253 Pa.Super. 460, 385 A.2d 429.
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 252 Pa.Super. 435, 439, 381 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1978), the following testimony was admitted involving a police officer and Williams after the arrest was completed:
Q. What did you do having met Mr. Williams?
A. I asked him for his personal identification, name, address, date of birth, inquired as to how he came into possession of a vehicle that he was operating, that of Mr. Rigney’s.
Q. Did he tell you how he came in possession of it?
A. He said that on the date prior to that, the 16th, he had found the car parked along a street with the keys in it and took it for a ride.
Q. Then what happened?
A. After that he elected to remain silent.
*458We held that corrective instructions could not cure the error presented.
The exchange between the arresting officer and appellant in the instant case does not present us with serious error. Officer Carl S. Harnish gave the following testimony when examined by the Commonwealth:
Q. What was the nature of his statement?
A. This statement was taken as much verbatim as possible.
Mr. Hunting stated, I had spoken to Gerald Stapleton at least twenty times last winter. The thing that caused me to call him was that he lied to me twenty times. I don’t have a telephone in my house to call him, so I had to go to a pay phone. Each time Stapleton told me that he was giong to do something about my problems, which involved these buildings next door to me, but he never did. So one time I said to Mr. Stapleton, can you tell me the difference if I was to come down and bomb your house, or if someone with a bulldozer comes down outside your house window. I never said anything more than that to him about bombing his house. I never made any heated statements to Mr. Whiteside at all. I only talked to him about business.
That is the extent of the statement.
I asked him about his conversations with Book—I am sorry, with the Zooks; however, there was nothing said pertaining to those conversations.
Emphasis added.
Following objection from defense counsel, Harnish then stated:
Q. Corporal Harnish, was there any subsequent conversations with Mr. Bunting relative to this matter?
A. Nothing of significance.
Q. Thank you.
We hold the error presented us was not so severe as to require a mistrial. The error could have been corrected by cautionary instructions. Such instructions were not request*459ed. Accordingly, this issue has been waived. Commonwealth v. Quartman, supra.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.

. The Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County has held 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706 unconstitutionally vague in a decision which was not appealed written by Judge Chalfin. Commonwealth v. Howell, 1 Pa. D. & C. 3d 644 (1976).* Contra: Commonwealth v. Perry, 9 Pa. D. & C. 3d 13 (1978).

 In that opinion, the court focused on the statutory provision involving threats to commit violence with the intent to cause public inconvenience.

. The appellant properly preserved the question of the constitutionality of this provision on appeal. See contra: Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 269 Pa.Super. 279, 409 A.2d 888 (1979); Commonwealth v. Holguin, 254 Pa.Super. 295, 385 A.2d 1346 (1978).

. As appears in the opinion of Judge Chalfln at 1 Pa. D. & C. 3d 647.