Court Opinion

ID: 9763559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:49:17.552234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:45.851307
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*670The majority holds that where (a) in a question to the trial court inquiring about certain testimony, the jury failed to state that it disagreed about a particular portion of the testimony, and (b) the trial judge inferred from the question that the jury was in actual disagreement over such testimony, then under Article 36.28 and Moore v. State, 874 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) the trial court abused its discretion in reading the testimony of the witness to the jury. Because I believe the majority has imposed a Procrustean1 standard based, in part, on the single word “disagree” in Article 36.28 and its absence ¡from the jury’s question in this case, I do not find the trial court abused his discretion by allowing the jury to hear certain evidence again.2
Under Article 36.28 the jury must disagree as to the statement of any witness before the testimony may be read back. The manner in which the trial court determines whether there is a factual dispute between the jurors is left to his sound discretion. Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, - U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2617, 132 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995). In Moore, the Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in reading the testimony without determining if a disagreement existed. 874 S.W.2d at 674. Here the trial court made that determination based on a question from the jury that plainly manifested a disagreement.
It is important, I believe, to distinguish the types of post-trial jury questions that fail the Article 36.28 test from the jury question under consideration here. In Moore, the jury asked a series of questions:
We would like to hear read the testimony of Moore, Ing (sic) and Schmidt describing what happened....
Later, another note states:
The jury requests to hear the earlier requested testimony of Officer Ing (sic) and then retire for further deliberation. If the other testimony is needed, we will request it.
The final note sent out by the jury stated:
We cannot progress any further until Officer fog’s (sic) testimony is read for us.
However, in the case sub judice, the jury’s note stated:
Did Officer Keener testify that Mr. De-graff told him that he hit Ms. Royer?
There is a critical difference between this inquiry and the series of questions in Moore. The questions in Moore were broad and generic in that they asked for all of the testimony of a particular witness without any attempt to identify the disputed part. Article 36.28 contemplates the reading of only “that part of such witness testimony or the particular point in dispute, and no other;.... ” A single witness can cover a variety of facts and a “request” for the entire testimony of that witness suggests a lapse in memoiy, not a dispute. Moore, 874 S.W.2d at 674. Such a request will not be honored, and should not, because the tenor of such a question manifests a memory lapse only.
However, the narrow focus of the jury’s question in the instant case is quite similar to the question in Pugh v. State, 376 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Crim.App.1964). In Pugh, the jury sent out a note asking “What was the date and hour the defendant was picked up by the Highway Patrolman?” The answer to the question was stipulated to and given to the jury. The Court determined however, that an abuse of discretion had occurred because the trial court sua sponte had other testimony reread to the jury, even though the testimony had no reference to the date or hour in dispute. It seems clear from Pugh that a very narrow question requiring a precise answer implies a dispute about the answer, while a broader request requires farther inquiry into and analysis of the existence of a dispute. See Fernandez v. State, 915 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, no pet. h.) (it is reasonable from the progression of notes and the language used in the second *671note for the trial court to conclude that members of the jury disagreed about the witness’ testimony).
I do not believe the majority opinion, which only briefly adverts to the Robison decision in the penultimate paragraph, has completed the analysis required for a decision in this case. In Robison, the court identified two competing concerns in answering questions for juries while they deliberate. On the one hand, there is concern that the trial court not comment on the evidence. However, on the other, the jury must be provided with the means to resolve any factual disputes the jury may have. 888 S.W.2d at 480. I believe the greater weight should be accorded the latter concern, in conjunction with the granting of wide latitude to the trial judge to determine if a dispute exists. Indeed, in Robison, the court considered the notes from the jury, which never used the word “disagree”, and the trial court’s responses, which did use the word “disagree”, and concluded that “it [is] not unreasonable to infer a disagreement among the jury regarding Dr. Price’s testimony.” 888 S.W.2d at 481. This conclusion was reached due to the highly specific nature of the jury’s request, not the use of the talismanic word “disagree” in the jury’s notes to the trial court.
The question to the trial court in this ease was a specific inquiry about one specific statement of a particular witness, and not a mere request for the entire testimony of that witness. A simple request for testimony does not, by itself, reflect disagreement, implicit or express, and is not a proper request under Art. 36.28. Jones v. State, 706 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The question here, however, isolated a single fact — did Officer Keener state that Mr. Degraff said he hit Ms. Royer? Indeed, this question appears to precisely track the mandate in Art. 36.28 — except that the word “disagree” is absent. The judge reasonably inferred from the note that there was a disagreement about the exact testimony of Officer Keener on this subject, and permitted the court reporter to read back to the jury the portion the court determined to be in dispute.3 The reasonableness of the trial court’s inference is bolstered by the fact that defense counsel failed to object to the reading of the testimony based on the absence of a clear manifestation of a disagreement. In Moore, the defendant specifically requested that the court answer the note from the jury by informing them that the testimony would be read if they reported a disagreement about the testimony. Here, and in Robison, no such objection was advanced.4
Moreover, in Brown v. State, the trial court responded to a jury question which stated the jury was in disagreement about a particular witness’ statement by having certain testimony reread. The appellant there timely objected to this action, stating that the “proposed answer by the Court is broader than the question_” 870 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). The Brown Court found no abuse of discretion based on the absence of any objection to the specific questions and *672answers appellant felt exceeded the bounds of the jury’s request. In this case, as in Brown, defense counsel’s objection (see note 4) did not specify the desired additional testimony that ‘"went before and after” the portion selected by the trial court.
Unlike Procrustes, I am unwilling to apply a single standard to every case involving post-trial jury questions to the trial court. There are other standards, such as the permissible inference sanctioned in Robison, which are better suited to the facts here. Accordingly, because the tenor of the question in this case implied a dispute, and the trial court’s concomitant inference that a disagreement existed does not lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree, I do not find an abuse of discretion.

. After Procrustes, a mythical Greek giant who stretched or shortened captives in a ruthless manner to make them fit his beds.

. A nial court abuses its discretion when its decision is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on reh’g).

. That testimony consisted of only six questions and answers that responded specifically to the question asked by the jury in the note.

. The defendant’s specific objection to the reading of Officer Keener’s testimony was as follows:
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I’m referring to the note sent out by the jury a few minutes ago in this case which asks a question: Did officer Keener testify that Mr. DeGraff told him that he hit Mrs. Royer, and signed by one of the jurors. In discussion before coming back, it was stated that certain testimony would be read back to the jury. And the Defense would like to object to the rereading of the testimony. And the reason for the objection is that it’s impossible to reach into the totality of the record and pull out a bit of testimony which the Court has already indicated would be read back to the jury that contains a reference to Mr. DeGraff hitting Mrs. Royer without bringing along testimony that went before and after so that that testimony can be made in context and I believe it would be prejudicial to cut out and read to the jury the small amount that’s already been designated by the Court. Further, and I would request and recommend that the answer to this question by the Court be to instruct the jury that they have heard the evidence and that they should continue their deliberations. Thank you, Judge.
The difference between the objection at trial and the complaint on appeal suggests waiver of the point of error, but waiver need not be addressed inasmuch as the trial court recognized the underlying issue to be whether the testimony was in dispute, and so advised the jury.