Court Opinion

ID: 9454768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:58:40.170488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:18.019573
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
While I concur in the result reached by Judge STAHL, I find it appropriate to set forth the basis for my vote for reversal in this separate opinion.
I think a preliminary injunction should issue in this case on the ground that there is a reasonable probability that after final hearing the district court might find that the merger would create a market structure conducive to unlawful reciprocal dealing in the rolling mills area. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (1963). I base my conclusion on the following recital in the affidavit of Thomas L. Dineen, an Allis-Chalmers General Manager:
“Allis-Chalmers’ purchase of steel from the ten leading Blaw-Knox customers during the past four years have averaged $30,000,000 a year. None of the other three of the four principal suppliers of metal rolling mills * * purchases anywhere near this quantity of steel from these steel producers. Furthermore, none of the other three of the four principal suppliers of metal rolling mills purchases anywhere near as much steel from the steel industry as a whole as does Allis-Chalmers.”
White Consolidated Industries challenges the affidavit as “the general, unsupported opinion of an Allis Chalmers General Manager * * * ” While attacking the lack of factual specificity in the affidavit, nowhere does White Consolidated in its brief challenge the accuracy of the statements contained therein. I think the affidavit was sufficiently explicit to constitute for present pur*527poses the basis for concluding that Allis-Chalmers in a more substantial buyer of steel than all or most of the competitors of Blaw-Knox.
White Consolidated also contends that a comparison should be made between the yearly steel purchases by Allis-Chalmers from the principal buyers of rolling mills from Blaw-Knox, a White Consolidated subsidiary, and the total amount of steel sold by these buyers and that such a comparison shows that the 30 million dollars a year of steel purchases by Allis-Chal-mers is not a significant amount (% of one per cent). It is my view, however, that there is a reasonable probability that the district court after final hearing may find that the proper comparison is between the steel purchasing power of Al-lis-Chalmers and that of the competitors of Blaw-Knox in the rolling mills field and that it would show that Allis-Chal-mers is a substantial buyer of steel in comparison to them.
Under these circumstances a preliminary injunction should be issued because I am satisfied that the record contained the requisite showing of “probability of a lessening of competition and a showing of a reasonable probability of success on final hearing.” United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra, at 525.
Because of my conclusion on the reciprocity issue I find it unnecessary to pass upon the other grounds developed in Judge STAHL’S opinion, nor do I express any opinion as to whether this court is entitled to take cognizance of the proposed Federal Trade Commission complaint, which was not issued until after the district court decision.
I note finally that we are now concerned only with the propriety of preliminary relief, and, as Judge Biggs noted in United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., supra, at 523:
“the facts, after final hearing, when the defendants have had a chance to consummate their defense or defenses in full, may appear of different substance and texture and possess very different legal effects.”
I accordingly concur in the reversal of the order of the district court denying Allis-Chalmers injunctive relief and join in Judge STAHL’S direction that a preliminary injunction be issued by the district court in the form set forth in his opinion.