Court Opinion

ID: 9707943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:25:36.354122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:40.424173
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion follows other jurisdictions which have construed the Uniform Illegitimacy Act in the same way. However, these cases read a limitation into the statute that is not there. The statute says, "Proceedings to enforce the obligation of the father shall not be brought after the lapse of more than two years from the birth of the child, unless paternity has been judicially established, * * By its very terms the statute acknowledges a difference between establishment of paternity on the one hand and enforcement of the obligation of the father on the other hand.
The argument might be made that such an interpretation means there is no statute of limitations as to establishment of paternity. This is answered by section 614.1 which provides a five-year statute of limitations on “all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect.”
*91The present Act was adopted by the legislature in 1925. It repealed old chapter 544, Code, 1924. It is interesting to note that the former action contained no statute of limitations. If the legislature had desired to impose a statute of limitations on the establishment of paternity, it could have done so in the same clear terms used in relation to “proceedings to enforce the obligation.”
Refusal to read a nonexistent limitation into the record would also be consistent with what is said in the Report of the Committee on Status and Protection of Illegitimate Children, Handbook, p. 227, which reveals the purpose of this Uniform Act:
“ * * * The changes proposed seek to advance the interest of the child in three directions: by recognizing every possible benefit not opposed by a strong adverse interest; by strengthening the support obligation which at present is lamentably inadequate; and by aiding enforcement by new remedial and coercive measures and by removing jurisdictional limitations which now unduly favor evasion of liability.”
I see no anomaly in this interpretation. All it means is that plaintiff’s action, if delayed more than two years after the birth, must first be brought to establish paternity, Code, 1966, § 675.33. Once paternity is established, a different action must be commenced to enforce support. In the second action plaintiff cannot go back more than two years. Code, 1966, section 675.3. Thus there is a hiatus which works to an unsuccessful defendant’s benefit by the literal interpretation of the statute.
Stated otherwise, I suggest that the legislature could have placed a two-year statute of limitations on the right to establish paternity (as distinguished from the proceedings to collect support). It did not do so. We should not read a statute of limitations into the statute for the benefit of the putative father.
I would reverse.
RAWLINGS, J., joins in this dissent.