Court Opinion

ID: 9791807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:23.859463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.697812
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that under Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County, et al., v. City and County of Denver, et al., 150 Colo. 198, 372 P. (2d) 152 the purported “final” judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims numbered two through eight must be reversed and the matter remanded with directions to dismiss those particular claims, but disassociate myself from the balance of the opinion, which I regard as not only dictum, but erroneous dictum! To demonstrate my point I would briefly recite the chronology of events as they have occurred in the instant matter.
*458In their complaint the plaintiffs set forth eight separate claims for relief, each seeking the invalidation of a completed annexation. The status of the first claim is that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the same was denied, the defendants have filed an answer which placed in issue certain factual allegations made in the first claim, the matter has not yet been tried, and needless to say no final judgment has been entered in connection therewith.
In connection with claims numbered two through eight, the trial court not only denied all motions attacking these claims but went further and entered a purported “final” judgment under Rule 54 (b) R.C.P. Colo, in favor of the plaintiffs and against all defendants on claims two through eight. All of these claims are said to present matters of law only, as opposed to the first claim, which with the answer thereto, poses a disputed issue of fact.
By the present writ of error the defendants seek reversal of the final judgment thus entered on claims two through eight, and I concur that this judgment must be reversed under Board of County Commissioners of Jefferson County v. City and County of Denver, supra, which incidentally was decided subsequent to the entry of judgment in this action by the trial court.
In my view reversal of the judgment entered on claims two through eight is all that can be decided by the present writ of error, and from a procedural standpoint I fail to perceive how the issue of whether the trial court was correct in denying defendants’ motion to dismiss the first claim, can be reviewed by us at this time under this writ of error. Hence, my firm belief that the rather all-inclusive dissertation as to who or what constitutes an “aggrieved” person under C.R.S. ’53, 139-11-6 is dictum.
In support of my further conviction that the dictum is erroneous, see by way of example, 13 A.L.R. (2d), pp. 1279-1305; School District No. 38 v. Rural High School *459District No. 6, 116 Kan. 40, 225 Pac. 732; Smith v. City of Emporia, 168 Kan. 187, 211 P. (2d) 101; Markos v. Cain, (Ohio) 154 N.E. (2d) 196; McClintock v. Cain, (Ohio) 142 N.E. (2d) 296; and Rice Consolidated Common School District No. 13 v. City of Tyler, (Texas) 219 S.W. (2d) 558.
Needless to say, the “error” which I perceive in this dictum is of a radically different nature than the alleged “error” pointed out by Mr. Justice Frantz.