Court Opinion

ID: 9522806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:28.202633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:58.958264
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in the majority opinion as to Issues II through IV. However, I disagree with the conclusion under Issue I that the Davises are prohibited from challenging the overbreadth of I.C. 35-46-1-4(a). The statute is overbroad as to any person prosecuted under it. It is, therefore, over-broad as to the Davises. To say that the Davises may not assert the overbreadth because their alleged conduct actually endangered the child is to beg the question. The fact remains that the statute does not prohibit conduct which actually endangers, unless an interpretation more restrictive than the language would suggest is taken.
Furthermore, the statute is so vague as to provide law officers with no guidelines or standards for its enforcement. In my view, this would ordinarily constitute a fatal defect. Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903; People v. Berck (1973) 32 N.Y.2d 567, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 300 N.E.2d 411.
The defect, however, is not fatal in this instance. As indicated by Kolender v. Lawson, supra, state courts may place a limiting construction upon an otherwise overbroad statute and thus preserve its constitutionality. It is therefore within our prerogative and I would exercise it to construe the word “may” in I.C. 35-46-1-4(a) to mean “is likely to.” Corn Products Refining Co. v. F.T.C. (1945) 324 U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961, 89 L.Ed. 1320. As so con*141strued, the statute gains the requisite definiteness and properly subjects the defendants here to prosecution for the acts charged.
Subject to this qualification, I concur.