Court Opinion

ID: 2964520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:26:54.924973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:57.243625
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1117

                                MARY JANE KERR SELGAS,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                             AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., AND
                                WHADZEN CARRASQUILLO,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________
                      Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                           _____________________

                                 ____________________

            Howard  B. Comet  with whom  Andrew  B.  Steinberg and  Vicente J.
            ________________             _____________________      __________
        Antonetti were on brief for appellants.
        _________
            Judith  Berkan with whom  Rosalinda Pesquera  and Mary  Jo Mendez-
            ______________            __________________      ________________
        Vilella were on brief for appellee.
        _______

                                 ____________________

                                   January 13, 1997
                                 ____________________

               COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.  At issue in this case are the
                       ____________________

          equitable  remedies  awarded to  the  plaintiff,  Mary Jane  Kerr

          Selgas ("Kerr Selgas"), in a sex discrimination suit  against her

          employer, American  Airlines ("American").   A jury  awarded Kerr

          Selgas a lump sum award in that suit that included an unspecified

          amount for front pay.  In an earlier appeal,  this court affirmed

          the judgment.   See Kerr  Selgas v. American  Airlines, Inc.,  69
                          ___ ____________    ________________________

          F.3d  1205  (1st  Cir. 1995)  ("Kerr  I").    The district  court
                                          _______

          subsequently   ordered  Kerr   Selgas  reinstated   by  American.

          American   maintains  in   this   appeal  that   front  pay   and

          reinstatement are mutually exclusive equitable remedies, and that

          the court therefore erred  in allowing both  to Kerr Selgas.   It

          further  claims  that  the   district  court  erred  in  ordering

          reinstatement  without conducting  a hearing,  without permitting

          American  to conduct  additional  discovery,  and in  considering

          extra-record evidence submitted  by Kerr Selgas.   We affirm  the

          court's  legal judgment that both front pay and reinstatement are

          permissible, but we vacate the  district court's order and remand

          for a  hearing on whether reinstatement is  an appropriate remedy

          here.  

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

               The  facts of the underlying suit are discussed in detail in

          our opinion in  Kerr I;  accordingly, we relate  here only  those
                          ______

          facts relevant to the instant appeal.

               Mary Jane Kerr Selgas was fired by American Airlines in 1992

          after 18 years with  the company; she brought suit  under federal

                                         -2-

          and Puerto Rico law, alleging sex discrimination, harassment, and

          violation  of her local law right to  privacy.  At the conclusion

          of a  three week  trial, a  jury awarded her  over $1  million in

          damages; under Puerto Rico law, this was doubled automatically to

          over  $2 million.   A  remittitur and  the rejection  of punitive

          damages by this court in Kerr I resulted in a final damages award
                                   ______

          of $1.2 million. 

               While Kerr Selgas had requested reinstatement in her initial

          complaint, and also in subsequent motions, the district court set

          this issue aside  during the course of  the trial and  during the

          pendency of the  Kerr I  appeal.   One month  after this  court's
                           ______

          decision  in  Kerr I  on November  13,  1995, the  district court
                        ______

          ordered  American to  reinstate Kerr  Selgas.   The court  did so

          without holding a full hearing  on this issue, and its order  was

          based  on the  evidence  received  at  trial  and  on  additional

          materials submitted with motions by Kerr Selgas.  American claims

          that  this  reinstatement  order  is improper  for  two  reasons.

          First, it argues that reinstatement and front pay are alternative

          remedies and that Kerr  Selgas was fully compensated by  the jury

          award  including   front  pay.    Second,   if  reinstatement  is

          permissible,  it argues that it should not have been ordered here

          without  first  giving  American   additional  discovery  and  an

          opportunity  to be heard  on the issue,  particularly if evidence

          obtained after the trial was to be considered.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

               Our  review of the district court's decision that both front

                                         -3-

          pay  and reinstatement could be  awarded together as  part of the

          remedies available to  a Title  VII plaintiff is  de novo, as  we
                                                            __ ____

          review for legal error.  Compagnie de Reassurance d'Ile de France
                                   ________________________________________

          et  al. v. New England Reinsurance Corp.,  et al., 57 F.3d 56, 71
          _______    ______________________________________

          (1st Cir. 1995)  (review of legal rulings is de  novo).  However,
                                                       __  ____

          in  reviewing  a  district  court's decision  to  actually  award

          equitable relief,  we utilize  the abuse of  discretion standard.

          Lussier  v. Runyon,  50 F.3d  1103, 1111  (1st Cir.  1995).   Our
          _______     ______

          review is deferential, and we will not normally find an  abuse of

          discretion absent strong evidence of a lapse in judgment.  Texaco
                                                                     ______

          Puerto Rico v. Department  of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d  867, 875
          ___________    _______________________________

          (1st Cir. 1995).  In Title VII  cases, we must be mindful of  the

          statute's  dual purposes of eliminating discrimination and making

          its victims whole.  Id.  
                              __

          A.   Equitable Remedies Under Title VII:  Front Pay and
               Reinstatement.

               The  remedial  scheme in  Title VII  is  designed to  make a

          plaintiff who has been the victim of discrimination whole through

          the use of equitable remedies.  Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
                                          ___________________    _____

          U.S.   405,  418   (1975).     These   remedies  (which   include

          reinstatement, back pay, and  front pay) are accordingly intended

          to  compensate a plaintiff for the effects of the discrimination,

          both past and future, and to bring the plaintiff  to the position

          which s/he would have occupied  but for the illegal act(s).   See
                                                                        ___

          Shore v. Federal  Express Corp.,  777 F.2d 1155,  1159 (6th  Cir.
          _____    ______________________

          1985).  Under  Title VII, the  first choice is  to reinstate  the

          plaintiff at  the original  employer; this accomplishes  the dual

                                         -4-

          goals  of  providing  full  coverage  for  the  plaintiff  and of

          deterring such conduct by employers in the future.  See Scarfo v.
                                                              ___ ______

          Cabletron Systems, Inc., 54 F.3d 931, 954 (1st Cir. 1995).  
          _______________________

               Where  reinstatement  is  not  immediately  available  as  a

          remedy,  either  due  to  the plaintiff's  condition,  or  due to

          conditions at  the employer that preclude  the plaintiff's return

          (such  as  hostility  of other  employees,  or  the  need for  an

          innocent  employee  to be  "bumped"  in  order  to reinstate  the

          plaintiff),  front   pay  is  available  as   an  alternative  to

          compensate the plaintiff from the conclusion of trial through the

          point at which the plaintiff can either return to the employer or

          obtain comparable employment elsewhere.  See id.; see also Powers
                                                   ___ ___  ___ ____ ______

          v. Grinnell Corp., 915  F.2d 34, 42 (1st  Cir. 1990); Wildman  v.
             ______________                                     _______

          Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 616 (1st Cir. 1985) (front pay
          ___________________

          may be awarded in ADEA suits where reinstatement is impracticable

          or  impossible; circumstances  of  each case  to be  considered);

          Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998, 1006 (3rd  Cir. 1984).  It is this
          ______    _____

          context,  where the overarching  preference is  for reinstatement

          and front pay is  an alternative for finite periods  during which

          reinstatement is unavailable,1 which  is the key to understanding

          the construction of remedial  packages.  In this context,  it can

          be  seen  that front  pay  and  reinstatement  are  not  mutually

                              
          ____________________

               1    See, e.g.,  Scarfo v. Cabletron Systems,  Inc., 54 F.3d
                    ___  ____   ______    ________________________
          931, 953 (1st Cir.  1995)("Front pay refers to damages  for wages
          from  the  date  of  judgment  to  some  specified  date  in  the
          future.");  Thompson v.  Sawyer,  678 F.2d  257,  293 (D.C.  Cir.
                      ________     ______
          1982)("[F]ront pay should persist, however, only until the wrongs
          for which plaintiffs are owed backpay have been righted.")    

                                         -5-

          exclusive.    Front  pay  takes  a  plaintiff  to  the  point  of

          employability.   Reinstatement  at that  point would,  in effect,

          "perfect" the remedy because  the plaintiff would be back  in the

          very job she lost unlawfully.

               Trial courts have discretion to fashion the  awards in Title

          VII cases so as to fully  compensate a plaintiff in a manner that

          suits the specific  facts of the  case; this discretion  includes

          the  selection  of  the  elements  which  comprise  the  remedial

          recovery.2   Albemarle, 422 U.S.  at 415-16.   Traditionally, the
                       _________

          court determines the  whole remedial package  in one fell  swoop.

          Hybrid awards combining front  pay with other equitable elements,

          while rare, are not novel.  The Court of Appeals for the District

          of  Columbia in Thompson v. Sawyer, 678  F.2d 257, 268 (D.C. Cir.
                          ________    ______

          1982),   commended  a   district  court's   award   (although  it

          reformulated certain of the elements) which included back pay and

          front pay to be paid to  female bindery workers at the Government

          Printing  Office through such time as women comprised half of the

          litigated positions.  Reinstatement and front pay were explicitly
                              
          ____________________

               2    American claims that by  presenting her claim for front
          pay to the  jury in the  form of jury  instructions, Kerr  Selgas
          "elected" front pay as  a remedy, rather than reinstatement.   It
          is  clear that in  a Title  VII case, it  is the court  which has
          discretion to fashion relief  comprised of the equitable remedies
          it sees as appropriate,  and not the parties which  may determine
          which  equitable remedies  are available.   See  James v.  Sears,
                                                      ___  _____     ______
          Roebuck  & Co., 21  F.3d 989, 997  (10th Cir. 1994)  (decision to
          ______________
          award  reinstatement  or  front  pay is  at  court's  discretion;
          plaintiffs who refused  reinstatement where not impracticable  or
          impossible  may not elect front pay simply because they prefer it
          as  remedy).   Additionally, Kerr  Selgas' repeated  requests for
          reinstatement in her original complaint and in subsequent motions
          bely a  claim that  she elected  one  form of  recovery over  the
          other.

                                         -6-

          cobbled  together as part of the relief afforded the plaintiff in

          Valdez  v. Church's Fried Chicken,  Inc., 683 F.  Supp. 596 (W.D.
          ______     _____________________________

          Tx.  1988),  where reinstatement  to  a  managerial position  was

          ordered  as soon as a position became available and front pay was

          ordered  to  continue until  the  reinstatement  occurred.   This

          court,  while it  has  not previously  addressed this  particular

          issue,  has indicated a preference for a flexible approach in the

          construction  of remedial awards.   See Lussier, 50  F.3d at 1112
                                              ___ _______

          (remedial tapestry  is made up  of multiple strands  of relief).3

          The  district court therefore had the option here of combining an

          award of front pay  with reinstatement.  Its only  limitation was

          to avoid duplication.  See Scarfo, 54 F.3d at 955 (citing Dopp v.
                                 ___ ______                         ____

          HTP Corp., 947 F.2d 506, 516 (1st Cir. 1991)(duplicative remedies
          _________

          are to  be  avoided)).   Because  courts typically  consider  all

          remedies  at the  same time,  duplication most commonly  would be

          avoided by denying front  pay when an immediate  reinstatement is

          ordered.  

               Although the district  court was not explicit  about what it

          was  doing  in this  instance  (allowing American  to  argue that

          reinstatement  had been  excluded  as a  prospective remedy),  it

          appears to  have bifurcated the traditional  remedies analysis on

          the  assumption that, since Kerr  Selgas was unable  to return to

          work at  the time of  trial, pay  for some future  time --  i.e.,
                              
          ____________________

               3    We  note that  the cases  American has  cited from  our
          circuit merely support the  proposition that reinstatement is the
          preferred first remedy, and that where this is unavailable, front
          pay may  be awarded,  rather than precluding  a remedial  package
          which contains both elements. 

                                         -7-

          front  pay -- was necessary to compensate Kerr Selgas, whether or

          not reinstatement would be an appropriate additional remedy.4  It

          therefore reserved the reinstatement issue  for later resolution,

          and  sent the  compensatory elements  (back pay,  front  pay, and

          damages) to the jury for determination.5   By including front pay

          in its lump sum award, the jury fully compensated Kerr Selgas for

          the discrimination she had suffered from the point of the initial

          illegal  act to  the  point  at which  she  would  once again  be

          employable at her prior level.  The court then took up post-trial

          whether American was required to take her back.  

               Due to the  amorphous nature  of the  jury award  -- it  was

          simply a lump sum  with no distinctions made between  the amounts

          allocated  to  back  pay, front  pay,  or  damages,  and with  no

          statement as to the time  period which the front pay portion  was

          intended to cover -- it cannot be stated with any certainty which

          dates or figures  the jurors  determined were  applicable to  the

          front pay  issue.6  In  other words,  it is not  clear when  they
                              
          ____________________

               4    In  its  June  23,   1994  Order,  the  district  court
          explicitly  stated  that  the  issue  of  reinstatement  remained
          pending resolution by the court.  

               5     We would counsel district  courts in the future  to be
          explicit about  the procedures  they are following,  whether they
          choose to  reserve an equitable remedy  for future determination,
          or conclude that it is inapplicable in a particular instance.  

               6    Additionally, an award of front pay, constituting as it
          does, an  estimate of what a plaintiff might have earned had s/he
          been  reinstated  at  the  conclusion of  trial,  is  necessarily
          speculative.  See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1023 (1st
                        ___ ____    _____________
          Cir. 1979).   However, this speculative  aspect should not  deter
          courts from  fashioning awards that accomplish  Title VII's goals
          of making a wronged plaintiff whole.  See Barbour v. Mitchell, 48
                                                ___ _______    ________
          F.3d 1270,  1280  (D.C.  Cir. 1995)  (noting  courts  and  juries

                                         -8-

          thought  she would  be ready  to  return to  work.   Testimony at

          trial, however, put the longest date at 18 months after trial, or

          October  1995.7    Furthermore, in  its charge  to the  jury, the

          court specifically  limited any  damages to  those caused by  the

          defendants'  wrongful conduct.8    Reinstatement was  ordered  in

          December 1995.  The  front pay and reinstatement awards thus seem

          most reasonably to cover separate and  distinct periods of time.9

          Because  there is no  duplication, the two  equitable remedies of

          front pay and reinstatement  could be used in concert  to achieve
                              
          ____________________

          routinely engage in some  speculation based on factual record  in
          other situations such as personal  injury cases when valuing lost
          earning capacity).  

               7    American's expert testified that Kerr Selgas was fit to
          return to work  immediately after the  conclusion of trial;  Kerr
          Selgas' expert, on  the other  hand, testified that  it would  be
          eight to  18 months before she  would be able to  return to work.
          The  testimony  concerning  her  income  loss included  estimates
          presented by her expert  as to the losses she  would sustain were
          she  to return to work  immediately, six months  after trial, and
          one year after trial.  

               8    In  its instructions to the jury, the court stated that
          the jury could award damages only for injuries that the plaintiff
          proved were  caused by the defendants'  alleged wrongful conduct.
          The court then instructed the jury to consider as elements of any
          damages  award  back pay,  compensatory  damages  for any  future
          pecuniary  losses, and  damages  for  emotional pain,  suffering,
          inconvenience and  mental anguish.  It  specifically required the
          jury  to consider  two factors  relating to  damages for  loss of
          future earnings:  reduction of the  award by any amount that  the
          plaintiff  would  have expended  in  making  those earnings;  and
          secondly, reduction of the award by considering the interest that
          the plaintiff could earn on the amount of the award if she made a
          relatively risk-free investment.  

               9    Taken  at its  outside  possible limit,  the award  for
          front pay would  seem to have extended from the  date of judgment
          (4/13/94) through October  1995.    Reinstatement was ordered  by
          the district court on  December 13, 1995.  Accordingly,  there is
          no overlap between the time period covered by the front pay award
          and that covered by the reinstatement order.

                                         -9-

          Title  VII's  goal of  fully  compensating the  plaintiff.   This

          brings  us to  American's  second point  on  appeal: whether  the

          process used to reach the reinstatement decision was proper.  

          B.   Admission of Evidence and Lack of Hearing on Restitution.

               American  contends that  the trial  court erred  in ordering

          reinstatement  because it  impermissibly considered  evidence not

          adduced  at  trial,  and   because  American  was  not  permitted

          additional discovery or a hearing on the reinstatement issue.  

               In  considering   the  plaintiff's  post-trial   motion  for

          reinstatement, the court had before it both the evidence received

          at  trial, and  additional  evidence submitted  by the  plaintiff

          purporting to  demonstrate that some  of the  issues which  might

          have  earlier precluded  reinstatement  (including  hostility  of

          other employees and the plaintiff's  own inability to work)  were

          no  longer bars to her  return.10  The  district court explicitly

          relied  upon some  of  this evidence  in  its order,  citing  the

          information in a  newspaper article relating to the  departure of

          certain   individuals    from   American,   and    her   treating

          psychologist's statement that  Kerr Selgas was  fit to return  to

          work.    However,  the  court  also  noted  that  defendants  had
                              
          ____________________

               10   Specifically, the plaintiff produced news  reports that
          one of the chief offenders in her experience at American, Whadzen
          Carrasquillo,  had  left  the  company.    She  also  produced  a
          statement by her treating psychologist, Carlos Velasquez, stating
          he   believed  she  was  fit  to  return  to  work  at  American.
          Velasquez' affidavit,  however, speaks  only in the  most general
          terms: it states that on the basis of unspecified tests conducted
          at unspecified dates,  Kerr Selgas "is  currently[...]functioning
          adequately"  and that he therefore  believes she is  "now able to
          return  and to carry out her duties as Account Sales Executive at
          American Airlines." 

                                         -10-

          presented testimony at trial  that Kerr Selgas was fit  to return
                              ________

          to work in March 1994.11  

               The adversarial system's search for truth and the assessment

          of  remedies are  predicated upon  an open  and fair  exchange of

          ideas  and  information.   Lussier, 50  F.3d at  1113.   It  is a
                                     _______

          fundamental principle of this  system that a fact finder  may not

          consider extra-record evidence  concerning disputed  adjudicative

          facts.   Id. at  1114.  While  we have suggested in  at least one
                   ___

          case  that parties  might  possibly waive  a  deprivation of  the

          evidentiary  and  procedural guarantees  embodied in  the managed

          adversarial  system  with  regard  to  extra-record evidence,  or

          consent to a court's  consideration of it,  see id. at 1115,  the
                                                      ___ ___

          evidence  supporting such  a voluntary  and knowing  waiver would

          need to be significant and unequivocal.

               Such is not the  case here.  American repeatedly  stated its

          opposition to  Kerr Selgas'  reinstatement, and  more importantly

          repeatedly requested a hearing and discovery on the reinstatement

          issue.12    Kerr Selgas  herself requested  a  jury trial  on the
                                                         ____
                              
          ____________________

               11   Kerr  Selgas  suggested  at   oral  argument  that  the
          district court  could  have  reached  its  determination  without
          relying  on  the new  evidence; however,  this  is belied  by the
          language of the district court's order.

               12   American  opposed Kerr Selgas' motion for reinstatement
          in  a 12-page opposition filed on December 23, 1994, citing among
          other reasons, the need for an evidentiary hearing and additional
          discovery  due to  the lack of  sufficient information  in either
          the  evidence submitted  at trial  or the later  submissions with
          which to determine whether Kerr Selgas  was in fact fit to return
          to work.  In its July 27, 1995  Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed
          Request  for Reinstatement  and Related  Benefits, American  also
          opposed  Kerr Selgas' reinstatement.   Again, in  its December 8,
          1995  Opposition to  Plaintiff's  Request  for Reinstatement  and

                                         -11-

          reinstatement  issue  in  her  July 10,  1995  motion  requesting

          reinstatement.    Therefore,  there   is  no  indication  of  any

          intention  on either  party's  part to  waive  a hearing  on  the

          reinstatement issue.  

               Where the  district court  based its determination  at least

          partially  on information not properly  before it in  the form of

          evidence admitted at trial,  and where the remedy to  be accorded

          the plaintiff is as significant as reinstatement, we are hesitant

          to  applaud   anything  less  than  strict   adherence  to  those

          procedures which  accord each party the opportunity  to be fairly

          heard  on   key  issues.     Accordingly,  while  we   hold  that

          reinstatement  may  properly  be  awarded  in  a  Title VII  case

          together  with front  pay  as long  as  there is  no  duplication

          between the two awards, in this case we  believe a hearing should

          have   been  held   to   determine   whether  reinstatement   was

          appropriate.     Therefore,  we   vacate  the   district  court's

          reinstatement order and  remand for  proceedings consistent  with

          this  opinion   to  determine  whether  Kerr   Selgas  should  be

          reinstated by American.13 

                              
          ____________________

          Related Benefits,  American raised its objection to reinstatement
          being ordered without an  evidentiary hearing and the opportunity
          for further discovery.  

               13   We anticipate  a limited  hearing on  the reinstatement
          issue.  See Uno  v. City of Holyoke,  72 F.3d 973, 992  (1st Cir.
                  ___ ___     _______________
          1995) (on  remand, lower court may conduct hearing without having
          new trial  and permit parties  to supplement the  existing record
          with  additional facts).  As Kerr Selgas has been compensated for
          the time from the initial act to the point of  her employability,
          further  monetary  damages are  not  available  to  her, and  the
          damages question is no longer open.

                                         -12-

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

               Courts may properly combine  the equitable remedies of front

          pay  and reinstatement  in  order to  meet  Title VII's  goal  of

          providing  full   compensation   to  the   victims   of   illegal

          discrimination, as long as there is no  economic or chronological

          duplication   between  the  awards.    However,  the  protections

          inherent in the adversarial system demand  that full and complete

          hearings  be   provided  on  contested  issues   affecting  these

          equitable remedies. 

           

          Vacated and remanded.  No costs to either party.
          ________________________________________________

                                         -13-