Court Opinion

ID: 9883611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:56:54.816085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:25.316503
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
with whom OPALA, Chief Justice, and DOOLIN, Justice, join, dissenting.
Although the majority relies on Pavelic & LeFore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989), as the basis for its decision, such reliance is misplaced. Pavelic is factually distinguishable because it concerned whether a law firm, formed after the major portion of the litigation and the questioned action had occurred, could be sanctioned for the attorney’s conduct. Pavelic is also distinguishable because it was decided solely under federal law.
*256The meaning of federal statutes is to be determined by the federal courts, and we must follow United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal statutes. However, we are not bound by federal interpretations of federal statutes which are similar or identical to state statutes in our consideration of state law.1 Because this case involves the interpretation of a state statute and because it concerns an attorney who was associated with the same professional corporation throughout the proceedings, the majority should consider this case as one of first impression.
Title 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 2011 states that the court can impose sanctions on the “person” who signed the pleadings.2 The general statutory definition of “person” includes “bodies politic or corporate.” 3 The definition of person contained in 25 O.S. 1981 § 16 is applicable to human beings, as well as to bodies politic and corporate. Professional corporations fall within the ambit of § 2011. The logical analogy is to compare professional legal corporations with business corporations. A corporation may be liable for wrongdoing committed by its agent while the agent is engaged in the corporation’s business if the act would subject the agent to liability were he/she the principal — the agent’s action need neither be authorized nor ratified by the corporation.4 The same rationale should be applicable to an attorney who is associated with a professional corporation. Because a professional legal corporation acts only through its agents/lawyers, it should be responsible for the acts of such agents while they are engaged in the corporation’s business.5
Apparently, the majority believes that its position advances a measure of individual accountability by ensuring that someone bears direct responsibility for each filing. However, individual and firm accountability are not mutually exclusive objectives. Individual accountability may be heightened when a lawyer understands that the lawyer’s actions may subject both the lawyer and the professional corporation to liability. The premise that a person take direct responsibility for each pleading is not disserved by holding the professional corporation responsible in cases where the court determines that each are blameworthy. A trial judge should be given the discretion to impose sanctions on a professional legal corporation — a juridical person — for which a signing lawyer functions as agent.6
Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation renders § 2011 unconstitutional under Okla. Const, art. 5, § 51. It provides that “the Legislature shall pass no law granting to any association, corporation, or individual any exclusive rights, privileges, or immunities within this State.” The majority’s interpretation immunizes professional legal corporations by finding that such cannot be sanctioned under § 2011 while leaving business corporations liable for similar activities.7 I would find that a professional cor*257poration may be sanctioned for the improper use of pleadings by its members or agents under Oklahoma law.

. Graham v. Hudgins, Thompson, Ball & Assoc., 540 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Okla.1975); United States v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 418 P.2d 319, 325 (Okla.1966).

. Title 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 2011 provides in pertinent part:
"... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”

. Title 25 O.S.1981 § 16 provides:
“The word 'person', except when used by way of contrast, includes not only human beings, but bodies politic or corporate.”

. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155, 1160, 16 A.L.R.4th 1, 9 (Okla.1980); Hunt-Murry Co. v. Gibson, 157 Okl. 112, 11 P.2d 123, 125 (1932).

. See Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 143 Okl. 196, 288 P. 309, 312-13 (1930).

. Pavelic & LeFore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 110 S.Ct. 456, 461, 107 L.Ed.2d 438, 447 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting opinion).

. This interpretation disregards the well settled rule of statutory construction that a presumption of constitutionality must be applied. If a statute is susceptible of two constructions — one which will uphold the statute, and one which *257will strike it down — it is this Court’s duty to apply constitutional construction. State v. Goforth, 772 P.2d 911, 914 (Okla.1989); Bennett v. State, 147 Okl. 14, 294 P. 149-50 (1930).