Court Opinion

ID: 9838042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 09:09:10.195227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:32.662144
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00165-CR
     ___________________________

        KEVIN NASH, Appellant

                     V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 211th District Court
         Denton County, Texas
      Trial Court No. F21-845-211

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       A jury convicted Kevin Nash of sexually assaulting his wife, F.O. (Remi)1 on

March 20, 2020. In three issues, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

permitting Remi to testify, that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury

to hear testimony about the contents of text messages sent by Nash to Remi, and that

the evidence is insufficient to support his guilt. We will affirm.

                                      Background

       Around 4:00 a.m. on April 17, 2020, Remi called 911 in Denton County to

report that she felt that her life was in danger from her husband, Nash. Remi told the

dispatcher that her husband had been physically and sexually assaulting her since the

previous day.

       Denton Police Department officers Jeffrey McAdams and Thomas Maloney

were dispatched to the address. McAdams testified at trial that when he and another

officer arrived, Remi seemed very “shaken up,” “like someone who had been through

something hard.” Based on what Remi told McAdams, the officers did not believe

that they could arrest Nash for anything that had happened that evening because any

assault that may have occurred had not caused any apparent bodily injury, but it

appeared to McAdams that a different offense had happened previously on March 20.

Specifically, Remi made an outcry of a prior sexual assault, and she showed McAdams

       1
         We use a pseudonym for the complainant to protect her privacy. See McClendon
v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

                                             2
some text messages from March 2020 that she said were from Nash. To McAdams,

the messages “indicated [that] an offense had occurred that corroborated what she

was saying.” McAdams said that in one of those messages, the sender referred to

himself by name (Nash) and as “your loving husband.” McAdams considered the

general nature of the messages to be threatening, and he became concerned for

Remi’s safety. He and Maloney connected her to a local shelter for domestic violence

victims so that she could stay somewhere away from Nash.

      Maloney testified that although the officers determined that whatever acts had

occurred that morning would have constituted a Class C assault, for which Denton

police did not make arrests as a matter of policy, Remi told them that she was scared

because of things that had happened before that evening. Maloney also saw the text

messages that Remi showed to McAdams, and Maloney believed those messages

corroborated what she had told them; Maloney “was shocked reading them.” After

the officers connected Remi with a shelter, they wrote up the information that they

had gathered in a report to be investigated by department detectives.

      Denton Police Detective Marquilla Curtis was assigned to investigate the sexual

assault that Remi had reported, and Curtis testified about her investigation. As part of

Curtis’s investigation, she interviewed Remi, and based on that interview, Curtis

believed that an offense had occurred on March 20. Remi allowed Curtis to examine

her cell phone, and a forensic examiner downloaded data from the phone; as

discussed in more detail below, the data included text messages sent from Nash’s cell

                                           3
phone number. In one of the messages, the sender apologized for forcing himself on

Remi. In another, the sender threatened her with sexual assault.

      After the grand jury indicted Nash for the March 20 sexual assault, the State

notified Nash that it intended to use for enhancement purposes his 2014 felony

conviction for assault causing bodily injury–family violence.

      At trial, the State called Remi as a witness. Remi initially refused to testify but

then admitted that on March 20, 2020, Nash had tried to have sex with her without

her consent. However, she initially denied that he had succeeded. At that point, the

prosecutor approached the bench and advised the trial court that he wanted to take a

break to allow Remi to watch the video from her interview with Detective Curtis so

that the State could impeach Remi’s testimony. In response, the trial court released

the jury for lunch, cautioned Remi that lying under oath is an offense, and appointed

an attorney to advise her of her rights.

      During the break, Remi was shown the video of her police interview. Then,

when the trial resumed, Remi opted to continue testifying and to correct her earlier

testimony. She admitted to the jury that Nash had sexually assaulted her.

      The jury found Nash guilty and assessed punishment at thirty-seven years’

confinement. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.

                                           4
                                       Discussion

I. Admission of Evidence

       A. Standard of Review

       Nash’s first two issues challenge the trial court’s admission of evidence. We

review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s admission of evidence, meaning that

we will uphold the trial court’s ruling as long as it falls within the “zone of reasonable

disagreement.” Kirk v. State, 421 S.W.3d 772, 781–82 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014,

pet. ref’d).

       B. Remi’s Testimony

       In Nash’s first issue, he asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it

allowed the State to call Remi for the sole purpose of placing otherwise inadmissible

evidence before the jury under the guise of impeachment.

               1. Background

       To properly address Nash’s arguments under this issue, we first set out some of

the prosecutor’s questions to Remi and her responses. Remi testified at trial only

because she had been subpoenaed by the State, and initially, she stated that she would

not testify at all. In response, the prosecutor asked the trial court to direct Remi to

answer his questions. Rather than simply ordering her to do so, the trial court

cautioned Remi outside the presence of the jury that her only obligation was to testify

truthfully and that if the court were to order her to answer questions and she refused,

she could be held in contempt.

                                            5
      When the jury was brought back in, the prosecutor began questioning Remi

about the events on March 20. During that testimony Remi first testified that on that

evening, Nash had tried to have sex with her without her consent, but that he had not

succeeded:

             [Prosecutor]. So that night, on March 20th, did he have sex with
      you—

             [Remi]. No.

             Q.—without your consent?

            A. He never—he didn’t have sex with me. He just was trying.
      He’s my husband.

            Q. So your testimony here today is that on March 20th, 2020, he
      did not actually penetrate, did not have sex with you that evening?

             A. I don’t think so.

             Q. Do you recall speaking to a detective in this case?

             A. I can’t remember that, no.

             Q. I’m sorry? Could you repeat that?

             A. I can’t remember.

            But that was not an okay thing that happened. The thing that
      happened wasn’t —was quite different from what you’re asking me. The
      reason why I called police . . . was not that case. It was—that was about
      a month apart.

           [Prosecutor]. But do you remember talking to police about what
      happened on March 20th when they came to your house a month later?

            A. Yeah, when I was in their custody. That was when—because
      he was sending some [text] messages to me, and the police was beside
      me, worried. And they—they saw that, and I have to explain it. I said it.

                                           6
       Q. So do you remember telling officers that you had been sexually
assaulted?

     A. I didn’t state it that way. I just explained his behavior and what
happened all along.

      Q. So I want to make sure I’m clear. Your testimony is you were
not sexually assaulted, he did not have sex with you, and you did not tell
any officers that, right?

       A. I can’t remember because—I can’t remember, but I remember
I said he forced me. But I kind of advised—I say that.

      ....

       Q. (BY [the prosecutor]) Do you remember meeting with the
detective, Detective Curtis, in this case?

      A. When was that, sir?

       Q. It was about—towards the end of April of 2020. A little more
than a month after March 20th.

      A. Yes, I think.

     Q. Do you remember going to the police department and sitting
down and having a conversation?

      A. Yeah.

      Q. And were you truthful during that conversation?

        A. I—I can’t remember most of it. I can’t remember most things,
because they were asking me questions. I can’t remember everything I
said. I can’t recall it.

      Q. Do you feel like you told the truth?

      A. Yeah. I told them whatever happened, yeah.

      Q. And do you recall a meeting with me and with other personnel
from the DA’s Office last week?

                                    7
             A. Yes. And you asked me the same question, and I think I—I
      remember I said—you asked me if he had sex with me that night, and I
      said no.

             ....

            Q. (BY [the prosecutor]) So your testimony is, in a meeting that
      we had in our office last week—

             A. Uh-huh.

            Q. —you did not claim that you had been sexually assaulted by
      Kevin Nash?

            A. You asked me the question that—what happened that night,
      and I—I said it. I came to the room, and he was trying to have the way
      on me[.] . . . So you asked me if he had his way that night, and I said I
      never say no. You asked me if he had sex with me that night. I
      remember I say no.

             ....

             [Prosecutor.] Your Honor, may we approach?

      At the bench, the prosecutor told the trial court that it had the video of Remi’s

interview with the detective that would be useful for impeachment, and therefore the

prosecutor wanted “the opportunity to [take a] break and allow [Remi] to review that”

before impeaching her testimony. At that, the trial court sent out the jury for lunch,

and Nash’s attorney made the following argument to the trial court objecting that

Remi should be struck as a witness:

      In the discovery we received from the DA, their notes specify some
      things that, when they asked her, her answers—which are different from
      her testimony today. And I think—and I understand the State has a
      witness now that’s an uncooperating witness, but at this point, I think
      she’s already—also became a witness that they can’t present if she’s—if
      they’re aware that she’s not telling the truth from their interview last

                                          8
      week regarding conflicts with her testimony today. And any further
      submission of this witness to questioning, she’s already shown herself to
      be a not truthful witness, and we move to strike this witness for those
      reasons.

            THE COURT: I understand your thoughts on that, and I’m not
      100 percent convinced based upon what I’ve heard today from the
      witness. I understand she doesn’t want to be here.

             And to be honest, I’m not sure I exactly—understood exactly
      what you were saying. I was having a tough time understanding you. . . .
      But I think what I’m going to do out of an abundance of caution, now
      that we’ve broken for lunch—but I need to ask [Remi] a few questions.

      The trial court proceeded to ask Remi if she had an attorney to represent her—

she answered that she did not—and if she understood that it is a criminal offense to

lie under oath, to which Remi responded, “I just understand now.” The court then

offered to appoint her an attorney to advise her of her rights before the trial resumed

again after lunch, and Remi accepted that offer.

      After the lunch break, Remi told the trial court that she had met with the

appointed attorney, who informed her that she had three options: to remain silent, to

stick to her previous testimony, or “if it is true, to clear up any misrepresentation

[from] anything that [she had] said th[at] morning and just to stick to the truth.” Remi

indicated that her choice was to clear up the misrepresentation.

      The trial court then asked her if she understood that she had the option to

assert her Fifth Amendment privilege. She answered, “Yes, I do.” After establishing

that Remi understood her right to remain silent, the court asked her if watching the

                                           9
video during the break had changed her testimony, and Remi said that it had. The trial

court then brought the jury back.

      When the State resumed its questioning, the prosecutor again asked Remi

about the events of March 20. In her answers, Remi changed her earlier testimony

about what had happened that day:

            Q. I want to ask you a few questions about, kind of, your earlier
      testimony. During the break, did you have an opportunity to review a
      video of you speaking with the detective in this case?

             A. Yes.

           Q. And based on that, is there a portion of your testimony that
      you would like to change?

             A. Yes.

             Q. And when I asked you, before lunch, on March 20th, you
      know, what had happened, just to review your testimony, was it your
      testimony at that time that Kevin Nash held you down but did not
      ultimately have sex with you? Is that what your testimony was before
      lunch?

             A. Yes.

             Q. And so I want to ask you again now. On March 20th, when
      you described him holding you down on the bed by your wrists, did he
      also penetrate—

             A. Yes.

             Q. —your vagina—hold on just one moment, please.

             Did he also penetrate your vagina with his penis?

             A. Yes.

                                         10
             2. Analysis

      Nash argues that Remi’s testimony should have been struck under Hughes v.

State because the State called Remi to testify, despite knowing that she would deny the

offense had occurred, in order to introduce otherwise inadmissible testimony. See

4 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The State counters that Nash’s objection to

Remi’s testimony did not preserve the complaint on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

We agree with the State that Nash’s trial objection appeared to be that Remi should be

struck as a witness because the State knew her testimony to be untruthful, rather than

the complaint based on Hughes that Nash now urges on appeal. However, even

assuming that the objection was sufficient to preserve this issue, we nevertheless

conclude that the issue is without merit.

      In Hughes, the complainant’s mother had testified at a pretrial hearing that her

daughter had not told her about any abuse by the mother’s husband, the

complainant’s stepfather. 4 S.W.3d at 2–3. However, the mother had previously

admitted to two caseworkers that not only had her daughter told her about the abuse,

but that her husband had confessed when she confronted him about it. Id. at 3. At

trial, the State was faced with no way to put before the jury that the defendant had

confessed to the complainant’s mother; the mother had already denied it under oath

at a pretrial hearing, and no hearsay exception would allow the caseworkers to testify

about what the mother had told them. Id. at 6. Undeterred, at trial the State called the

mother to testify so that when, as expected, she again denied being told about the

                                            11
abuse, the State could call the caseworkers to impeach the mother’s testimony,

thereby putting before the jury the caseworkers’ otherwise inadmissible testimony. Id.

at 3.

        On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the State had failed to

offer any explanation for why it expected the mother to testify differently than she

had at the pretrial hearing and that “the State elicited no favorable testimony from

[the mother],” which “suggest[ed that] the State was attempting to use [the mother’s]

prior inconsistent statements under the guise of impeachment for the primary

purpose of placing before the jury evidence [that] was not otherwise admissible.” Id. at

7. The court held that under those circumstances, the admission of the mother’s prior

inconsistent statements through the caseworkers’ testimony was more prejudicial than

probative and therefore should have been excluded. Id. The court concluded that “the

State’s knowledge that its own witness will testify unfavorably is a factor the trial court

must consider when determining whether the evidence is admissible under Rule 403”

of the Texas Rules of Evidence and that “a trial court abuses its discretion under Rule

403 when it allows the State to admit impeachment evidence for the primary purpose of

placing evidence before the jury that was otherwise inadmissible.” Id. at 5 (emphasis

added); cf. White v. State, No. 02-21-00059-CR, 2022 WL 623450, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Mar. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(distinguishing Hughes on the basis that the evidence complained of by the defendant

“was otherwise admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule”).

                                            12
      Here, on the other hand, the prosecutor did not use Remi as a work-around to

enable admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. As the State points out in its

brief, the prosecutor elicited favorable information from Remi. Even before the break

during which Remi watched her interview video, Remi testified that when Nash had

come home that evening, he tried to have sex with her and that she had asked him to

stop. After watching the video and consulting with an attorney, she further testified

that on that night, Nash had held her down and penetrated her vagina with his penis,

that she had told him to stop, and that he covered her mouth with his hand to stop

her from screaming. Further, the prosecutor did not seek admission of the video of

Remi’s police interview. The only previous statement referenced by the prosecutor in

front of the jury was when the prosecutor asked Remi if she remembered telling

officers that she had been sexually assaulted. Remi herself testified about the offense.

The record does not indicate that the State used Remi to admit otherwise inadmissible

evidence.

      Nash’s argument under this issue implicitly recognizes that this situation is

different from Hughes because Nash’s real complaint appears to be not that Remi’s

testimony allowed the State to introduce otherwise inadmissible statements that Remi

had made to police, but rather that Remi herself testified about the offense. Nash

acknowledges as much when he complains that Remi was “basically intimidated by

the State and the court to change her testimony again.”

                                          13
       To argue intimidation, Nash’s brief asserts that Remi “was required to consult

with an attorney regarding possible aggravated perjury charges.” Nash thus appears to

argue that by telling Remi that perjury was a crime and having an attorney advise Remi

of her rights, the trial court intimidated Remi into changing her testimony. See Davis v.

State, 831 S.W.2d 426, 437–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, pet. ref’d) (stating that it is

not per se improper for a trial court to advise a witness of the penalties for false

testimony but that warnings concerning the dangers of perjury cannot be emphasized

to the point where they intimidate the witness into changing testimony or refusing to

testify). We disagree.

       After Nash’s attorney objected to Remi’s testimony, the trial court asked Remi

if she understood that it was a crime to lie under oath, and Remi’s response indicated

that she had just learned that fact from the judge’s question. The trial court then

offered to appoint Remi an attorney to explain her rights to her, and she accepted that

offer. After the break, Remi told the trial court that she had learned that her options

were to remain silent, to stick to her previous testimony, or to “clear up any

misrepresentation.” The trial court then established that Remi understood her right to

remain silent and asked her whether watching the interview video changed her

testimony. After Remi admitted that the video had changed her testimony, the trial

court brought the jury back, the State resumed its questioning, and Remi testified that

Nash had committed the alleged offense. Nash did not object at any point during the

trial court’s asking Remi about her understanding of her options.

                                           14
       This was not a situation in which the trial court or prosecutor emphasized the

warnings concerning the dangers of perjury to the point that Remi was intimidated

into changing her testimony. The prosecutor did not threaten Remi with prosecution

if she did not change her story, and the trial court made sure that Remi was aware that

she could remain silent rather than change her testimony about the offense. The trial

court’s remarks to Remi were not overbearing or coercive. See Garza v. State,

248 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.). An attorney had

been appointed to advise her, and that attorney told her that in addition to remaining

silent, she could also choose to stick to her original story or to change her testimony,

if her changed testimony would be true. Under these circumstances, we cannot say

that the trial court or the prosecutor acted improperly. See id.; see also Lee v. State,

639 S.W.3d 312, 318 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.); Carranza v. State, No. 04-

93-00619-CR, 1996 WL 81937, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 28, 1996) (not

designated for publication), aff’d, 960 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We overrule

Nash’s first issue.

       C. Text Messages

       In Nash’s second issue, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

allowing admission of the text messages through witness testimony.2 He asserts that

       In one sentence in this section of his brief, Nash also argues that courts have
       2

found that a cell phone user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the user’s
phone’s contents. Nash does not challenge the evidence that the text messages were
recovered from Remi’s phone with her consent. Because Nash’s brief does not

                                          15
the trial court “failed to balance the admissibility of the hearsay testimony that

substantially prejudiced [Nash] in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 901,”

as well as in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution and the Sixth

Amendment of the federal constitution. He asserts that “by doing so, the court

lowered the State’s burden of proof.”3

      The State did not introduce copies of the texts as evidence, but Curtis read

some of the texts to the jury, including

          • July 2019 text messages calling Remi a bitch and an “African whore.”

          • A message threatening Remi with assault, stating, “Me and my dad

             gonna molest you for weeks, you African trash bitch.”

          • A message from the same time period stating, “Fun two years. LOL.

             After the divorce is final, I will be back in my seven-bedroom home with

             my real first love and kids’ mother. It’s been a long ten years.”

          • A message from the same time period saying, “I love you, [Remi].”

contain any further discussion of privacy rights, we do not read the brief to argue that
the messages should have been excluded on the basis that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when the police obtained the data from Remi’s phone, and he did
not raise any such argument in the trial court.
      3
       Nash also argues that the admission of the evidence violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the federal constitution and Articles 19 and 29 of the Texas
Constitution, but he did not object on these grounds in the trial court. See Tex. R.
App. P. 33.1.

                                           16
          • A message sent about an hour after the previous message, stating:

             “Immigration will find you before I ever come looking for a lowlife like

             my wife.[4] I’m reporting you to ICE in the morning. If I don’t hear from

             you, boo, welcome to America. LOL.”

          • A message saying that he would be filing for divorce the next morning

             and telling her that “they better deport you before we find you.”

          • Another message threatening Remi with immigration authorities: “Wake

             up, bitch. I’m back in Dallas. I put a GPS tracker on our black Toyota

             the first day you drove it. I know all your movements since you stepped

             foot in my country, you worthless slut. So don’t think you’re hard to

             find.” The text continued, “I will send ICE to pick you up at any time.

             I’m just not done with you yet, so don’t fret. GD morning, my love.”

          • A message stating, “Ask yourself, will you even be alive to see 45? Two

             days away. You better pray and pay. LOL. Only God knows that

             question, so don’t ask Nash. He just love cash. LOL. Bye.”

          • A text sent at 12:46 a.m. on March 21, 2020 (i.e., a few hours after the

             time at which Remi said the offense had occurred), stating, “I apologize

      4
       Some of the texts suggest that Remi and Nash were living separately at some
point and that Nash did not know where she was, but there was no testimony at trial
explaining those texts or, if the couple was in fact separated, why.

                                          17
             for forcing myself on you. I’m really not that typo [sic] guy. Excuse me,

             please.”

          • A message sent on April 22, 2020, stating, “No more, ever, abuse.” 5

             1. Authentication

      Nash argues that the text messages in this case were not authenticated because

the State offered them through the testimony of police officers and a detective but

relied only on hearsay evidence—Remi’s telling the officers that the messages had

come from Nash—to do so. 6 To authenticate or identify an item of evidence under

      5
       Officer McAdams testified that Remi showed him a text thread with Nash and
that in one of text messages, Nash had stated, “This is Kevin Nash, your loving
husband.” But no testimony established that the text thread seen by McAdams was
the same thread about which the detective testified, so we do not rely on that
testimony in our authentication analysis.
      6
        The State argues that Nash did not preserve his authenticity objection because
the trial court did not rule on the objection. However, Nash’s attorney repeatedly
objected that the text messages had not been authenticated, and the record indicates
that the trial court understood and acknowledged the objections. For example, after
the detective testified about determining from a database that the phone number
belonged to Nash, Nash’s attorney objected, “They don’t have a witness saying this—
I believe, they were coming from him. We’ve got a witness saying, I did a data check,
and it says my—Accurint, or whatever that company was . . . says this is listed to
him.” The trial court responded, “I agree[, but i]n my humble opinion, that goes to
weight versus admissibility.”

        Then, after Detective Curtis testified that the text messages came from the
number that had been confirmed as Nash’s, Nash’s attorney took her on voir dire,
during which the detective acknowledged that she had no way of knowing if someone
else had been using Nash’s phone to send the text messages. When the detective was
asked to read aloud a text message from Nash to Remi, the attorney objected “as to
hearsay[.] Assumes facts not in evidence, whether this is from a Kevin Nash.” The
trial court overruled the objection. For purposes of this opinion, we will assume that

                                         18
Rule 901, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the item is what the proponent claims it is. Tex. R. Evid. 901. “In a jury trial, it is the

jury’s role ultimately to determine whether an item of evidence is indeed what its

proponent claims,” and therefore “the trial court need only make the preliminary

determination that the proponent of the item has supplied facts sufficient to support a

reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.” Butler v. State,

459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633,

638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

      With a text message, the association of a cell phone number with a particular

person “may be quite strong,” but that association alone “might be too tenuous” to

link a text message to a purported author because “cell phones can be purloined.” Id.

at 601. Thus, one way a message’s authenticity may be shown is through a sponsoring

witness testifying to an association between a cell phone number and the purported

author of the message, combined with other circumstances that “bridge the logical

gap and permit a proper inference that the purported author sent the message.” Id. at

602. The “other circumstances” may include “the message’s ‘appearance, contents,

substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics,’ which considered in

conjunction with other circumstances support a conclusion that a message indeed

emanated from the purported author.” Id. (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(4)). “The trial

the trial court understood Nash’s objection to complain that the State had not put on
sufficient evidence to show that the texts were what they purported to be—messages
from Nash—and that the trial court overruled it.

                                            19
court’s determination of whether the proponent has met this threshold requirement is

subject to appellate review for an abuse of discretion and should not be

countermanded so long as it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. at

600.

       Detective Curtis testified about the text messages, explaining that Remi had

allowed examination of her phone and that the phone had been turned over to a

forensic examiner who extracted data from the phone and provided a report to Curtis

showing that data. After reviewing that report, Curtis became interested in text

messages on the phone from a specific phone number. As a law enforcement officer,

Curtis has access to Accurint Crime Center,7 and Curtis accessed that database to

determine that Nash was the subscriber for that particular phone number. Thus, the

detective’s testimony established that the text messages had come from a phone

number owned by Nash.

       As for whether it was Nash himself who had sent the text messages, as

opposed to someone else who might have had access to the phone, the messages

themselves “constituted additional circumstantial evidence” of their authenticity. See

       7
        LexisNexis Accurint “is a direct connection to public records to help verify
identities, conduct investigations[,] and detect fraud.” In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520,
529 n.39 (Tex. 2023) (quoting the Accurint website, https://www.accurint.com). It
describes its Virtual Crime Center service as assisting law enforcement agencies with
“[f]inding, identifying[,] and verifying identities.” LexisNexis Accurint Virtual Crime
Center,      https://risk.lexisnexis.com/products/accurint-virtual-crime-center    (last
visited August 14, 2023).

                                          20
id. at 603–04. Multiple messages stated that the sender intended to divorce Remi,

suggesting that the sender was Remi’s husband, Nash. One of the texts referenced

“our” vehicle. The March 21 message apologized for the sender’s “forcing [him]self”

on Remi, and that message was sent less than twenty-four hours after the alleged date

of the sexual assault. Further, Remi offered some corroboration that the March

21 text came from Nash; she testified that after what happened on the evening of

March 20, she “went to work, and [Nash] sent [her] a text message that he was sorry.”

      Nash argues that the State did not ask Remi about the text messages during her

testimony and that Remi is the only person who could say whether or not these text

messages met the standards for authentication established by the Court of Criminal

Appeals. But there is no evidence that Remi sent herself the texts from Nash’s phone,

and unless she watched the sender type the messages sent to her, which the evidence

does not support, she also would have to rely on the kinds of circumstances

referenced by the Court of Criminal Appeals to testify that the texts came from Nash.

In short, she was in no better position to authenticate the texts than Detective Curtis.

      The evidence that the number was registered to Nash combined with other

circumstances was sufficient to permit a proper inference that he sent the text

messages. See id. at 600–01. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its

                                           21
discretion in admitting the text-message testimony. We overrule this part of Nash’s

second issue. 8

              2. Rule 403

       Nash also challenges the text message testimony under Rule 403, but Nash did

not object at trial that any of the texts were more prejudicial than probative or

otherwise assert a Rule 403 objection. See Tex. R. Evid. 403. He states in his brief that

he raised a Rule 403 objection to the texts, but he does not cite any part of the record

       8
        Nash’s brief includes a paragraph referencing hearsay, which we read as
contending that McAdams’s and Maloney’s testimony that Remi showed them texts
from her husband was hearsay, and therefore the officers’ testimony could not have
been used to authenticate the messages. But their testimony was not necessary to
authenticate the texts, Curtis’s identification of the phone’s subscriber did not rely on
the two officers’ statements about the text messages or on Remi’s out-of-court
identification of Nash’s phone number, and as we have explained, other
circumstances linked the texts read by Curtis to Nash. To the extent that Nash argues
that the text messages’ content cannot be used to authenticate them because the
messages themselves are hearsay, we disagree. Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 602; see also Tex. R.
Evid. 801(e)(2); Jones v. State, 466 S.W.3d 252, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2015, pet. ref’d) (holding text messages from defendant were not hearsay because they
were statements of party-opponent); cf. Casas v. State, No. 08-22-00109-CR,
2023 WL 3737119, at *11 n.3 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 31, 2023, no pet. h.) (not
designated for publication) (holding same with respect to Facebook messages).
Finally, to the extent that Nash’s brief is separately arguing that the trial court abused
its discretion by not excluding as hearsay all of the testimony referencing the text
messages or Curtis’s testimony about the content of the text messages, (1) it is unclear
that the argument was preserved because, based on how he phrased his objections,
the trial court appeared to understand him to raise authentication and Confrontation
Clause objections, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; (2) to the extent the argument was
preserved, it is inadequately briefed on appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); Lucio v. State,
351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); and (3) regarding the texts themselves,
they were not hearsay. See Jones, 466 S.W.3d at 266.

                                             22
where he raised that objection, and our review of the record has not revealed a Rule

403 objection. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

      Nash did object that three texts from July 2019 were not relevant, 9 but he did

not object to all of the text messages on relevance grounds. Nash does not complain

on appeal that the texts were not relevant, and an objection to relevance is not the

same as an objection that the evidence’s relevance is outweighed by one of the

dangers listed in Rule 403. See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

Because Nash’s argument on appeal does not comport with his trial objection, he

failed to preserve his complaint for appeal. See id.; Stanley v. State, No. 02-17-00084-

CR, 2018 WL 3153542, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 28, 2018, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263,

273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g) (holding complaint not preserved when

      9
        Specifically, Nash’s attorney objected “as to these texts from 2019 July.
They’re . . . almost a year prior to this Indictment date, so we’d object as to the
relevance.” The trial court allowed the State to explain the purpose of the texts,
stating that “otherwise, [it would] tend to sustain the objection at this point.” The
prosecutor explained that the allegations in the case involved a delayed report, and so
the prosecutor was “trying to give the jury additional context into the relationship, as
to why [Remi] might not have wanted to report an assault immediately, and that’s
based on past threats that have happened throughout the relationship.” See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.371 (providing that in prosecution of offense for family
violence, each party may offer evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances
relevant in determining whether the actor committed the offense, including evidence
regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim). The
trial court then asked Nash’s attorney for his response, given the context provided by
the State. The attorney responded, “The time is pretty remote, a year prior, Your
Honor. . . . We’ll object to relevance.” The trial court overruled the objection.

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trial objection did not comport with complaint on appeal). We overrule this part of

Nash’s second issue.

              3. Confrontation Clause

       Finally under this issue, Nash argues that the text messages were testimonial

and that their admission violated his right under the Confrontation Clause. From his

brief, it is unclear whether he argues that the text messages had not been adequately

authenticated to show that they were his own and thus his confrontation right was

violated when he was not able to cross-examine the actual sender of the messages or

that the trial court violated his confrontation right by failing to hold a separate hearing

on the texts’ admissibility to allow him to cross-examine Remi about the texts.

       A defendant has the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses

against him or her. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 10. Accordingly,

evidence of out-of-court statements that are “testimonial” in nature are not admissible

unless (1) the witness who made the statement takes the stand to be cross-examined

or (2) the witness is unavailable, and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-

examine the witness. Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

Testimonial statements are “formal and similar to trial testimony. In other words,

testimonial statements are those ‘that were made under circumstances [that] would

lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available

for use at a later trial.’” Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S. Ct.

                                            24
1354, 1364 (2004)). We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on whether a statement

is testimonial. Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      In determining whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial, “the primary

focus is upon the objective purpose of the interview or interrogation, not upon the

declarant’s expectations,” and thus, generally speaking, a statement is testimonial

“when the surrounding circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of

the interview or interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant

to later criminal prosecution.” Crawford v. State, 595 S.W.3d 792, 803 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d); see also Nicholls v. State, 630 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). “Statements made to someone who is not principally

charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely

to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.” Ohio v. Clark,

576 U.S. 237, 249, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015). “Casual remarks made to friends are

generally not testimonial.” Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 709 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2008, pet. ref’d).

      The text messages here were sent to Nash’s wife, not to law enforcement

officers, and their circumstances do not indicate that their primary purpose was to

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.

Rather, the messages were sent to communicate to Remi the sender’s thoughts,

feelings, and threats. The messages “are informal, and their subject and method of

communication” weigh against concluding that they are testimonial. Walter v. State,

                                          25
581 S.W.3d 957, 981 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted). We

hold that the trial court correctly determined that the text messages were not

testimonial, and we overrule the remainder of Nash’s second issue.

II. Sufficiency

      Finally, in his third issue, Nash argues that the evidence is insufficient to

support the jury’s guilty verdict. He contends that Remi’s testimony is highly

unreliable and that “[t]here is no other evidence to support the State’s position that a

sexual assault occurred that is not hearsay evidence.”

      A. Standard of Review

      In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). When performing a sufficiency review, we must consider all the

evidence admitted at trial, even if it was improperly admitted. Jenkins v. State,

493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 489–

90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

      B. Evidence and Analysis

      A person commits sexual assault if the person intentionally or knowingly

“causes the penetration of the . . . sexual organ of another person by any means,

without that person’s consent.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). As noted

                                          26
above, Remi testified that on March 20, 2020, Nash held her down and, despite her

telling him to stop, penetrated her vagina with his penis. Although she had initially

denied that penetration happened, it was up to the jury to resolve conflicts in her

testimony, determine her credibility, and weigh her testimony’s probative value, and

we are required to defer to the jury’s determination. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

      Although Nash does not specify which evidence he contends was hearsay and

thus could not support the verdict, but see Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599 (noting

evidentiary sufficiency review includes inadmissible evidence), for purposes of

addressing his argument, we assume that he means the text message testimony.

However, the jury was entitled to believe that the March 21, 2020 text message

apologizing for the sender’s having forced himself on Remi was a message sent by

Nash, and thus the jury could have determined that the text corroborated Remi’s

testimony. The only evidence that Nash did not commit the assault was Remi’s initial

testimony, which she recanted after being informed that perjury is a crime. Viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have determined

beyond a reasonable doubt that Nash sexually assaulted Remi as charged. We overrule

Nash’s third issue.

                                     Conclusion

      Having overruled Nash’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

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                                  /s/ Mike Wallach
                                  Mike Wallach
                                  Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 31, 2023

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