Court Opinion

ID: 9586293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:09:11.680507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:27:31.699332
License: Public Domain

Brailsford, Justice
(concurring and dissenting) :
I agree that appellant’s conviction should be affirmed and that the record does not establish that the trial judge erred in imposing a longer sentence on him for grand larceny than that imposed on his two co-defendants for the same offense. I also agree that Act No. 146 of 1973, approved April 6, 1973, under the facts of this case,1 requires that appellant be given credit, in the computation of time served against the sentences imposed upon him, for pre-trial jail time spent in Georgia as well as for that spent in South Carolina. However, I respectfully dissent from the limitation on the credit for jail time which the opinion of the Chief Justice imposes.
The 1973 amendment requires that “in computing the time served by a prisoner, full credit against the sentence shall be given for time served prior to trial and sentencing.” The statute bears upon the computation by penal authorities of time served on a sentence, rather than upon the terms of the sentence imposed by the court. The right to credit flows from the statute and need not be expressed in the sentence. Here, however, the sentence inappropriately provides credit for jail time from July 13, 1973 (date of transfer to South Carolina), only, impliedly negating any right to credit for time spent in Georgia under the South Carolina detainer. The opinion of the Chief Justice modifies the sentence by providing credit for Georgia jail time from April 6, 1973, *275the date of the approval of the Act, rather than from November 9, 1972, the stipulated beginning date of confinement under the Dorchester County detainer. This limitation is apparently on the theory that to apply the statute according to its plain language would be to give it prohibited retroactive effect. I respectfully disagree. The amendment became effective before the sentence was imposed or its service commenced. Hence, the computation of time to be served is controlled by the prospective application of the terms of the statute. By its terms, appellant will be entitled to full credit against the sentence for time served prior to trial, which, according to the stipulation, commenced November 9, 1972. In my view, it is immaterial that appellant’s pretrial jail time commenced before the effective date of the statute.
I would modify the sentence accordingly.
Bussey, J., concurs.

 It is stipulated that appellant’s detention in Georgia from November 9, 1972, to July 13, 1973, was due solely to a detainer from Dorchester County on the charges for which he was tried in the court below.