Court Opinion

ID: 9740584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:37:56.050531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.038417
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(concurring in issuance of writ). Whether one agrees with the construction of the so-called grandfather provision of CL 1948, § 338.481 (Stat Ann 1956 Rev § 14.771) contended for by Justice Dethmers or by Justice O’Hara, the statute, in my opinion, is unconstitutional.
I.
I agree with Justice Dethmers that the sale of drugs and poisons can very directly affect public health, safety and general welfare. Any reasonable exercise of the police power in this field must be upheld but the test of rationality still applies to the method of regulation employed by the legislature.
I am not unmindful of the strictures of the United States Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa (1963), 372 US 726 (83 S Ct 1028, 10 L ed 2d 93, 95 ALR2d 1347), against courts substituting their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies. However, I do not read that case or any of the cases leading up to it as permitting the type of so-called regulation of business practices which the legislature has here attempted.
In Ferguson the United States Supreme Court upheld State legislation which prohibited any person other than an attorney from “debt adjusting.” This was a direct regulation of “debt adjusting” similar to a regulation of the drug business by prohibiting the practice of pharmacy except by registered pharmacists, or similar to the situation in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry (1963), *461374 US 424 (83 S Ct 1759, 10 L ed 2d 983), where State regulation forbade price-advertising by optometrists, or like the case of Olsen v. Nebraska, ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Association, Inc. (1941), 313 US 236 (61 S Ct 862, 85 L ed 1305, 133 ALR 1500), which upheld a Nebraska statute requiring the licensing of private employment agencies and limiting maximum compensation for services.
In Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Co. (1949), 336 US 220 (69 S Ct 550, 93 L ed 632, 10 ALR2d 945), a South Carolina statute forbade life insurance companies and their agents to engage in the undertaking business and forbade undertakers to serve as agents for life insurance companies. Here again, the prohibition was a direct one and it was held that the statute did not contravene the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the case of Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. (1949), 335 US 525 (69 S Ct 251, 93 L ed 212, 6 ALR2d 473), which involved a Nebraska constitutional amendment and a North Carolina statute providing in effect that no person should be denied an opportunity to obtain or retain employment because he was or was not a member of a labor organization, Justice Black wrote (p 536):
“This Court beginning at least as early as 1934, when the Nebbia case [Nebbia v. New York, 291 US 502 (54 S Ct 505, 78 L ed 940, 89 ALR 1469)] was decided, has steadily rejected the due process philosophy enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases [Adair v. United States, 208 US 161 (28 S Ct 277, 52 L ed 436); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US 1 (35 S Ct 240, 59 L ed 441, LEA1915C 960)]. In doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that States have power to legislate against what are found to be in*462jurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific Federal constitutional prohibition, or of some valid Federal law.” (Emphasis supplied; bracket citations added.)
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Missouri (1952), 342 US 421 (72 S Ct 405, 96 L ed 469), upheld a Missouri statute which provided that an employee entitled to vote might absent himself from his employment for four hours between the opening and closing of the polls on election day, and that any employer who deducted wages for that absence would be guilty of a misdemeanor. In discussing legislative power in that case, the Court through Mr. Justice Douglas said (p 423):
“The legislative power has limits, as Tot v. United States, 319 US 463 (63 S Ct 1241, 87 L ed 1519), holds. But the State legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare ; they may within extremely broad limits control practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific constitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts with valid and controlling Federal laws are avoided.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. (1955), 348 US 483 (75 S Ct 461, 99 L ed 563), where a State statute making it unlawful for an optician to fit or duplicate lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist was upheld, the Court said (p 488):
“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”
In all these cases, once the United States Supreme Court was satisfied that the public welfare was in*463volved, it upheld the regulation which in each case reasonably and rationally either forbade an evil or regulated a business or profession.
The requirement of rationality was reiterated by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Ferguson wherein he agreed with the judgment “on the ground that this State measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally permissible objective.” (p 733)
Turning to Michigan cases, the same principle of rationality has been stated by this Court. Carolene Products Co. v. Thomson (1936), 276 Mich 172, involved a statute which attempted to forbid the sale of milk to which had been added any fat or oil other than milk fat. The statute was declared unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under article 2, § 16, of the Michigan Constitution of 1908. In his opinion, Justice Fead said (p 178):
“But the police power of regulation does not include the absolute prohibition of trade in useful and harmless articles of commerce. * * *
“The principles involved are well settled and do not need extensive citation of authorities. The Constitution guarantees to citizens the general right to engage in any business which does not harm the public. People, ex rel. Valentine, v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 124 Mich 664 (50 LRA 493, 83 Am St Rep 352). The constitutional right to engage in business is subject to the sovereign’police power of the State to preserve public health, safety, morals or general welfare and prevent fraud. In the exercise of the police power there must be not only a public welfare to be conserved or public wrong to be corrected, but there mtist be also a reasonable relation between the remedy adopted and the public purpose. 12 CJ p 929.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Michigan cases which have followed the holding in Carolene Products are People v. Victor (1939), *464287 Mich 506 (124 ALR 316); Ritholz v. City of Detroit (1944), 308 Mich 258; Levy v. City of Pontiac (1951), 331 Mich 100; Shakespeare Company v. Lippman’s Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co. (1952), 334 Mich 109; Arlan’s Department Stores, Inc., v. Attorney General (1964), 374 Mich 70; and Grocers Dairy Company v. Department of Agriculture Director (1966), 377 Mich 71.
In People v. Victor, the Court held unconstitutional a State statute which prohibited the giving of premiums with the sale of petroleum products. Justice Dbthmebs, writing in Shakespeare Company v. Sporting Goods Co., described the holding in Victor as follows (pp 112, 113):
“We there held a statute forbidding the giving of a premium with the retail sale of gasoline unconstitutional under Constitution 1908, art 2, § 16, as constituting a deprivation of property without due process of law for the reason that the legislation was outside the scope of the police power of the State inasmuch as it bore no reasonable relation to public morals, health, safety or the general welfare. Whether the statute prohibits, despite the absence of any contractual inhibition, the giving of such premium with a retail sale or prohibits the sale, by a nonsigner, of an article below the price fixed by the manufacturer is of small moment. The principle involved and the effect are the same.”
In Grocers Dairy Company v. Department of Agriculture Director, supra, the latest pronouncement by this Court, a State statute was held unconstitutional which prohibited the sale of milk in one gallon containers. The regulations of the statute were held to be unreasonable and capricious, leading to the inevitable conclusion that there was no reasonable relationship between the public purpose and the remedy adopted.
*465In Taber v. State Board of Registration and Examination in Dentistry, decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1948, 135 NJL 255 (51 A2d 250), reversed on other grounds, 137 NJL 161 (59 A2d 231), conforming opinion, 137 NJL 392 (60 A2d 290), modified, 1 NJ 343 (63 A2d 535), appeal dismissed, 337 US 922 (69 S Ct 1172, 93 L ed 1730), a New Jersey statute authorized the suspension of a license of a dentist because he was leasing office equipment. The Court held the statute to he void and said (pp 255, 256):
“The statute so far as subdivision (h) is concerned is unconstitutional. In the interest of the public, the practice of dentistry may he regulated. The public has no interest in the financial arrangements a dentist may make as to his office and equipment. It is requisite that those practicing a profession have skill. A leased chair and drill are as useful in the hands of a skilled dentist as the same articles covered by a chattel mortgage which the act permits. Many a professional man has his start in the use of another’s office and equipment.
“The legislation in question is an encroachment upon the liberty of the individual which cannot be upheld on the ground of a valid exercise of the police power.”
In the case Berry v. Summers (1955), 76 Idaho 446 (283 P2d 1093), operators of dental laboratories who were not dentists hut dental mechanics or technicians brought action against the commissioner of law enforcement of the State of Idaho for a declaratory judgment seeking declaration of unconstitutionality of a statutory amendment which included in the definition of the practice of dentistry the constructing, correcting, and repairing of dental prosthetic appliances or dentures. The dental mechanics or technicians undertook no work on a patient and did not fit the dentures into the mouth. Their work was en*466tirely undertaken in their laboratories and consisted of making dental plates and repairs and additions to dental plates. Under the 1953 amendment to the Idaho law the practice of dentistry was by definition enlarged to include constructing, correcting, repairing or relining a dental appliance or denture. The act further provided that the practice of dentistry as so defined should not be construed to prohibit a person, (1) in the employ of a dentist, (2) engaged under an authorization from a dentist, or (3) in the employ of a person engaged under an authorization from a dentist, from performing or supervising the mechanical operations involved in the construction, correction, repair or relining of a dental prosthetic appliance, or denture, but only if such person returned the appliance or denture to his employing dentist or to the dentist who issued the authorization. The court found that the amendment also required the dental mechanic or technician who performed mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental laboratory direct for wearers of dentures to have the education and training of a dentist and to be licensed as a dentist. The court held the 1953 statutory amendment violated the Constitution of Idaho  and the Fourteenth Amendment. It said any such educational requirement and licensing as a dentist as a prerequisite for performance of such services as the dental mechanics or technicians performed was not a reasonable regulation and not reasonably necessary for the protection of the public.
The legislation involved in this case is neither reasonable nor rational because there is no necessary or consequential relationship between ownership of 25% of the stock of a corporation and the control, management and operation of the business and property of that corporation. Stock of a corporation is issued to provide capital, not management. A stock*467holder, as such, has no control over the conduct of a corporate business nor is he required or permitted to engage in the activities of a corporation by virtue of stock ownership.
While it is true that a stockholder may indirectly exercise some influence upon corporate operations, this result is not assured unless he owns over 50% of the stock. Insofar as all of his actual incidents of stock ownership go, he can be completely removed from the corporate operation to the extent of living in Timbuktu just as well as in Michigan.
Undoubtedly, because of the public interest involved in the proper operation and control of drug stores, and pharmacists, the legislature can license, control and regulate the drug business and the operation of drugstores; but such a result is not accomplished by this statute. In Liggett Co. v. Baldridge (1928), 278 US 105 (49 S Ct 57, 73 L ed 204), where .the attempt was to require 100% ownership of corporations by pharmacists, the United States Supreme Court said (p 113):
“mere stock ownership in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or substantial relation to the public health.”
See, also, Evans v. Baldrige, 294 Pa 142 (144 A 97); Pratter v. Lascoff, 261 NY 509 (185 NE 716); State v. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., 36 Del 120 (172 A 257); Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., v. State Board of Pharmacy, 268 Minn 8 (127 NW2d 682). The above words of the United States Supreme Court and its reasoning in that case are fully applicable here.
While I am of the opinion that the requirement of 25% stock ownership by pharmacists in a corporation carrying on a drug business as a matter of law bears no reasonable or rational relationship to the regulation of the business, nevertheless I cannot agree with Justice Dethmebs that the record in this *468case contains facts which will support an opinion that there is a reasonable relationship between the statute’s stock ownership requirement and public health and safety. Judge Creighton Coleman, appointed by this Court to take the proofs in this case, specifically found to the contrary. His finding of fact is as follows:
“On the basis of the testimony and record in this case, it is clear that the basic protection to the public in the practice of pharmacy is through the individual pharmacist. A 25% stock ownership does not, in Michigan, give any significant management control. While one can theorize about professional conduct, stock ownership and codes of ethics, the basic protection to the public is the conduct of the individual pharmacist.
“On the basis of the record before this court, the court does not find that an act requiring that registered pharmacists hold 25% of the stock of a corporation owning a drug store bears a reasonable relation to the health, safety and morals of the people of the State of Michigan.”
An examination of the testimony of the experts reveals that while they had extensive backgrounds in pharmacy they readily confessed their ignorance of stock ownership, of corporate control, structure, or management. Consequently, they failed to qualify as experts with regard to the point at issue. The finding of Judge Coleman is amply supported by the record.
II.
Even if it should be conceded that the 25% stock ownership requirement is valid, the statute cannot be upheld because it carves out from the 25% stock ownership requirement a favored, self-perpetuating and expanding class of corporations that need never fulfill this requirement. It provides:
*469“* * * except that any corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Michigan, or any other State of the United States, authorized to do business in the State of Michig-an and empowered by its charter to own and conduct pharmacies, drug stores or apothecary shops and which, at the time of the passage of this act, owns and conducts a drug store or stores, pharmacy or pharmacies, apothecary shop or shops in the State of Michigan may continue to own and conduct the same and may establish and own additional pharmacies, drug stores or apothecary shops in accordance with provisions of this article.”
Equal protection of the law and the full extent of its sweep was recently stated by Justice Souris in Brouwer v. Kent County Clerk, 377 Mich 616, 643, as follows:
“The equality clause, as our judicial history tells us, is not limited only to the protection of those fundamental rights that are granted by the Federal Constitution or otherwise protected by it; rather, it extends its protective cover to all rights, whether granted by Federal or State Constitutions, congressional or legislative enactments, executive order or otherwise, and against all forms of State action, executive, legislative, or even judicial. Ex Parte Virginia (1880), 100 US 339 (25 L ed 676); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee (1933), 288 US 517 (53 S Ct 481, 77 L ed 929, 85 ALR 699); Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell (1946), 326 US 620 (66 S Ct 445, 90 L ed 358); Shelley v. Kraemer (1948), 334 US 1 (68 S Ct 836, 92 L ed 1161, 3 ALR2d 441); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander (1949), 337 US 562 (69 S Ct 1291, 93 L ed 1544); Dowd v. United States, ex rel. Cook (1951), 340 US 206 (71 S Ct 262, 95 L ed 215, 19 ALR2d 784); Barrows v. Jackson (1953), 346 US 249 (73 S Ct 1031, 97 L ed 1586); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), 347 US 483 (74 S Ct 686, 98 L ed 873, 38 ALR2d 1180); Pennsylvania v. *470Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Philadelphia (1957), 353 US 230 (77 S Ct 806, 1 L ed 2d 792); Morey v. Doud (1957), 354 US 457 (77 S Ct 1344, 1 L ed 2d 1485).”
The above cited case of Morey v. Doud (1957), 354 US 457 (77 S Ct 1344, 1 L ed 2d 1485), is of particular significance here. The Illinois community currency exchanges act provided for licensing, inspection, bonding and regulation of currency exchanges engaged in the business of issuing or selling money orders. It forbade them to do business on the premises of any other business. The act exempted from all of its provisions money orders sold or issued by the American Express Company. In holding that the act denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to persons operating a currency exchange and issuing and selling money orders, the Court said (p 466):
“The provisions in the Illinois act, such as those requiring an annual inspection of licensed community currency exchanges by the State auditor, make it clear that the statute was intended to afford the public continuing protection. The discrimination in favor of the American Express Company does not conform to this purpose.”
In Morey v. Doud the Court cited with favor Mayflower Farms, Inc., v. Ten Eyck (1936), 297 US 266 (56 S Ct 457, 80 L ed 675), in which case a statute granted a differential from the regulated price at which dealers could sell milk, to those dealers in a specified class who were in business before April 10, 1933. In that case the Court said (pp 273, 274):
“We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regmlatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physi*471cians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding-slaughter houses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date.”
In Stimson v. The Muskegon Booming Company, 100 Mich 347, by statute, the dividend for stockholders of booming companies was to be 12% but if the corporation had sustained losses in previous years, or had not made profit equal in amount to 12% on its capital stock, the corporation could charge a sum sufficient to yield a profit of 24% on its capital stock. Such a company was permitted to receive from its patrons a rate of toll sufficient to equal a profit of 24%, while another company doing business upon the same stream but which had had prudent management would realize only 12%. Speaking of the constitutionality, the Supreme Court said:
“This is class legislation. * * *
“It is not possible that * # * the legislature * * * confer upon one corporation rights which, under precisely similar circumstances, it denies to another, or greater rights and privileges upon one than are conferred upon another. It will not do to say that the past prosperity of the company organized under the law is a sufficient reason for denying to such corporation the privileges which are vested in another. This is, in effect, to deprive the company of rights because, by its thrift and good management, it has been prosperous.”
*472The Court held the statute unconstitutional as being class legislation.
In Brown v. Judge of Superior Court of Grand Rapids, 145 Mich 413, the Court declared unconstitutional a State statute providing for licensing transient merchants, which included corporations and which authorized the city council or the council of any village to suspend the operation of the statute in any particular case where they saw fit so to do.
In Woodward v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 312 Mich 67, a statute requiring railroad companies to furnish employees, whose duties related to the immediate transportation of passengers or their baggage, with a uniform, hat or cap and distinguishing badge, but which did not impose a like burden upon competing public carriers, was summarily condemned as being class legislation.
In Sullivan v. Graham, 336 Mich 65, a statute provided for the licensing of residential builders and maintenance and alteration contractors, but specifically exempted from licensing provisions were operations by or for trustees, banks, trust companies, building and loan associations, or savings and loan associations. The Court, in reviewing a number of important out-of-State decisions, said (pp 69-71):
“The principle concerning unjust discrimination contended for by plaintiff has been considered in other States.
“ ‘That part of the act of April 21, 1896, entitled “An act to promote the public health and regulate the sanitary construction of house drainage and plumbing,” which requires any plumber, whether master or employing plumber or journeyman, before engaging in the business, to undergo an examination as to fitness, and obtain a license, but permits all members of a firm to pursue the business where one only has procured such license, and all members of a corporation to pursue it where the manager only has *473procured such license, does not operate equally upon all of a class pursuing the calling under like circumstances, and is invalid.’ State v. Gardner (Syllabus by the court.), 58 Ohio St 599 (51 NE 136, 41 LRA 689, 65 Am St Rep 785).
“The supreme court of Georgia, in reference to an ordinance of the city of Atlanta, in regard to licensing persons who engage in or work at the business of plumbing,
“ ‘Held, (a) that this ordinance, in case of a firm or corporation, where one member, of the firm or the manager of the corporation has been licensed, permits others than the member or manager so licensed, by virtue of such license, to engage in or do the work of plumbing in the city of,Atlanta without standing an examination as to fitness and obtaining a license, but does not permit a like privilege to persons other than those referred to in the 2 instances above stated.
“‘(b) The ordinance referred to is discriminatory in character, and is therefore unconstitutional.’ Henry v. Campbell, 133 Ga 882 (67 SE 390, 27 LRA NS 283, 18 Ann Cas 178).
“The supreme court of Mississippi held invalid an ordinance of the city of Vicksburg, concerning which, among other things, the court says (City of Vicksburg v. Mullane, 106 Miss 199, 217 [63 So 412, 50 LRA NS 421]):
“ ‘This ordinance imposes special restrictions and burdens on some and grants special privileges to others engaged in the same work in Vicksburg. All the plumbers in that city are not required to stand the examination and incur the expenses of a license fee. This burden is not placed on those working for a corporation where an officer qualifies or on a firm where one member procures license. It is imposed-upon those like Mr. Mullane, laboring alone, doing his work by his own hands.’
“The court further says, page 218:
*474“ ‘This ordinance does not operate equally upon Mr. Mullane and all other plumbers in that city. It is discriminatory as to him.’
“ ‘Chapter 356, p 575, Laws 1901, which requires journeymen plumbers to take an examination and procure a certificate of competency, held unconstitutional, being in contravention to sections 33 and 34, article 4, of the Constitution. An arbitrary basis of classification is adopted in restricting the application of the act to cities of 10,000 inhabitants, or more, which have a system of sewer or waterworks, and an arbitrary and unjustifiable distinction is made between master plumbers and journeymen plumbers.’ State, ex rel. Chapel, v. Justus (Syllabus by the court.), 90 Minn 474 (97 NW 124).
“ ‘The equal protection of the law is denied by Laws 1897, c. 338, requiring licenses for plumbers on examination, but providing, “in the case of a firm or corporation, the examination or licensing of any one member of the firm or the manager of the corporation shall satisfy the requirements of this act.” ’ State, ex rel. Winkler, v. Benzenberg, 101 Wis 172 (76 NW 345, syllabus).
“It was held in effect in State v. Hinman, 65 NH 103 (18 A 194, 23 Am St Rep 22), that a license fee cannot in view of the constitutional objection be imposed upon certain persons where others of the same class and profession are exempt under similar circumstances and conditions.”
The Court held that since corporations within the named groups were entirely exempted from obtaining a license before they built on any property to which they held title or had an equitable title, or in which they had a financial interest, the statute unjustly discriminated in their favor and violated the equal protection clause and due process clause of the Federal Constitution, and the due process clause of our State Constitution.
*475In Palmer Park Theatre Company v. City of Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, Justice T. M. Kavanagh, writing for a majority of the Court, dealt with the problem we face here in some detail which merits repeating (pp 345-348):
“The first question is: Is the ordinance arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, unconstitutional by reason of failing to treat all within the class equally?
“The legislation in this instance was aimed at water conservation, a perfectly legitimate objective for the legislative body. Following the drought situation in 1955, the legislative body was confronted with a very perplexing problem. It had not only a right but a duty to deal with the problem, hut its power was not unlimited. This power was governed by constitutional restrictions, including the equal protection of the law provisions of the State and Federal constitutions. The actions could not he arbitrary, unjust and discriminatory with reference to the classification to which the penalty provisions of the ordinance were to apply.
“Let us consider the facts as they existed. At the time of trial, of the total 3,000 tons of water-cooled nonrecirculating air-conditioning equipment in Highland Park, 1,200 tons — 40% — was within the untaxed and unrestricted category of less than 5 tons. Admittedly, ton for ton, the smaller units consumed just as much water as the larger units. The ordinance thus applied its punitive features to only a part of the users of water-cooled nonrecirculating equipment, while permitting a substantial portion of that group or class of users of non-recirculating air-conditioning equipment to be free from the penalties of the ordinance.
“We are not discussing here or deciding whether there ought to be included in this class a myriad of other water-consuming and nonconserving equipment (swimming pools, dishwashers, laundry ma*476clames, et cetera) neither are we making reference to the fact that lawn sprinkling alone in Highland Park consumes double the water used by the air-conditioning equipment here in question, nor that it operates without bearing a similar burden to that imposed by this ordinance. Parenthetically, it might be pointed out that shifting of lawn sprinkling periods or the elimination of lawn sprinkling would impose no great, irreparable injury or pecuniary damage.
“This Court, speaking of the equal protection of the laws provisions of the State and Federal constitutions, stated in Cook Coffee Co. v. Village of Flushing, 267 Mich 131, 134:
“ ‘These constitutional provisions do not mean that there can be no classification in the application of statutes and ordinances, but only that the classification must be based on natural distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“In Peninsular Stove Co. v. Burton, 220 Mich 284, this Court held invalid as class legislation a statute regulating the installation of warm-air heating plants enclosed in galvanized sheet iron. The Court pointed out (p 287):
“ ‘We have, therefore, not only the selection of a class of heating plant but of a class of this class. To justify such action it must appear that some substantial reason existed for the regulation of this particular kind of heating plant not equally applicable to the'others.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“As to this classification within a classification, the Court concluded (p 288):
“ ‘It seems clear to us that the classification here made is not based upon any real or substantial distinction.’
“The general rule is stated in Mulloy v. Wayne County Board of Supervisors, 246 Mich 632, 638, where this Court quoted with approval the following language:
*477“ ‘ “The classification must be based upon substantial and real differences in the classes, which are germane to the purpose of the law and reasonably suggest the propriety of substantially different legislation, the legislation must apply to each member of the class, and the classification must not be based on existing’ circumstances only, but must be so framed as to include in the class additional members as fast as they acquire the characteristics of the class.” Bingham v. Board of Supervisors, 127 Wis 344 (106 NW 1071).’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“In Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich 138, 141, 142 (LRA 1918D, 233), this Court said:
“ ‘It is elementary that legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose for the common good, is limited by reasonable and justifiable differentiation to a distinct type or class of persons is not for that reason unconstitutional because class legislation, if germane to the object of the enactment and made uniform in its operation upon all persons of the class to which it naturally applies; but if it fails to include and affect alike all persons of the same class, and extends immtmities or privileges to one portion and denies them to others of like kind, by unreasonable or arbitrary subclassification, it comes within the constitutional prohibition against class legislation.’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“The attempt to regulate a portion of the class under the ordinance in the instant case constitutes an arbitrary and discriminatory classification and denies the equal protection of the laws.”
Beauty Built Construction Corporation v. City of Warren, 375 Mich 229, involved a classification adopted in a home-rule-city ordinance and a resolution passed on January 13, 1959, whereby no sewer tap-in fee would be required as to structures in existence but not connected at the time of the adoption of the ordinance, but a graduated fee would be charged for those thereafter erected. Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh, writing for the Court, said:
*478“In the case before ns no reasonable or rational foundation has been submitted to support the exemption and classification created by the ordinance. The date January 13,1959, seems to have been chosen simply because it was the date defendant city decided to begin raising additional revenues. It certainly was not chosen because it formed a reasonable or rational date for establishing a division of a class.”
The resolution and the ordinance were held to create an arbitrary and discriminatory classification of persons contrary to the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the State Constitution.
Persons, as distinguished from corporations, who are benefited by the grandfather clause in this case must in time go out of existence. Individuals who were not registered pharmacists when the act went into effect, or their widows, will die; administrators, executors or trustees of estates of deceased owners must eventually wind up those estates; but the life of a corporation is in no way limited by the statute and' Michigan corporations are free to perpetuate themselves in perpetuity under PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 26 (CL 1948, § 450.371 [Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp §21.284(1)]). The statute cannot ever achieve what it sets out to accomplish — 25% stock ownership in corporations by pharmacists — because those corporations that aire accorded favored treatment not only can perpetuate themselves but can expand and proliferate their operations without limit. -
III.
The statute does not achieve its purported purpose. It creates an unfair and discriminatory classification. The statute is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the *479United States. It is also unconstitutional under the equivalent provision of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 (art 1, § 2). Since the pharmacy hoard does have supervisory and licensing powers under the law, I cast my vote for issuance of the writ of mandamus for the reasons set forth by Justice O’Hara.
Souris, J., concurred with Adams, J.