Court Opinion

ID: 9795588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:32:00.012926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:58.056408
License: Public Domain

Gibbons, L,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur that the majority’s decision may be appropriate based upon the holding of this court in Leslie v. Warden.1 However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that we should address the merits of this case and affirm the district court’s grant of a new penalty hearing. It is undisputed that the petition before the court is successive, raising the same grounds as the prior petition.2 It is undisputed that the petition before the court comes *609eight years after the statutory deadline set by the Legislature elapsed.3 It is undisputed that “[o]ur determinations on direct appeal are the law of the case.’ ’4
Despite these undisputed procedural bars, the majority desires to address the merits of this appeal. I dissent as to those conclusions as well. Substantial evidence supported the “at random and without apparent motive” aggravator and the jury’s finding of a murder independent from the robbery.5 Bennett intended to go on a killing spree in addition to a robbery spree.6 His actions were premeditated and atypical of murders incidental to robbery. Thus, I would reinstate the death penalty.

Successive petitions

NRS 34.810(2) requires dismissal of a petition that “fails to allege new or different grounds for relief.” An exception to dismissal applies only if the district court determines good cause and actual prejudice exist.7
“To show ‘good cause,’ a petitioner must demonstrate that an impediment external to the defense prevented him from raising his claims earlier.”8 A petitioner must show “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available ... or that ‘some interference by officials’ made compliance impracticable.”9
Bennett claims that the State’s numerous Brady v. Maryland10 violations, combined with ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, demonstrate good cause for excusing the procedural defects. I disagree with the majority that the State violated Brady. Although the district court may have failed to allow Bennett’s first post-conviction counsel proper time to investigate, I do not consider the failure an “impediment external to the defense.”11 Bennett’s counsel delayed three years before filing a supplemental *610petition. Despite filing the supplemental petition, Bennett’s counsel did not request an investigator until several months later.
Brady violations
“[T]here are three components to a Brady violation: the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material.”12 A petitioner raising a Brady claim in a successive post-conviction petition must prove good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bars.13
Bennett raised eight pieces of evidence the State allegedly withheld. However, he presented specific evidence of the State’s withholding on only four pieces. Of those, only two pieces of evidence had potential to assist Bennett at his sentencing hearing. Neither of these pieces of evidence, Richard Perkins’ statement and the payment to Jeffrey Chidester, would have changed the outcome of the penalty hearing. Bennett’s failure to demonstrate how this evidence would have changed the result of the penalty hearing makes his assertion of Brady violations meritless.
Leslie v. Warden14
The majority affirms the grant of a new penalty hearing for Bennett in part because of the conclusion in Leslie that the ‘“at random and without apparent motive’ aggravator is misapplied to situations where the defendant unnecessarily kills another person in the course of a robbery.”151 disagree with the contention that the facts of this case are so analogous to Leslie that the result must also be the same.
This court concluded in Leslie that to use the “at random and without apparent motive” aggravator, the State must demonstrate that “the defendant selected his victim without a specific purpose or objective and his reasons for the killing are not obvious or easily understood.”16 It is insufficient to merely show the defendant unnecessarily murdered someone during a robbery.17
Despite a jury’s finding to the contrary, the court in Leslie held that insufficient evidence existed to support the “at random and without apparent motive” aggravator.18 Instead, the Leslie major*611ity discerned that Leslie had motives that were not even mentioned at trial.19
I prefer the reasoning of the dissent in Leslie.20 The Leslie dissent reviewed the decision from the direct appeal that “ ‘[e]vidence indicated that Leslie had received the money and could have left the store unfettered, but killed [the clerk] anyway.’ ’ ’21 The Leslie dissent concluded that “[n]othing has changed to warrant overturning that conclusion. If the Legislature’s intent were as clear as the majority suggests, it could have amended the statute to invalidate the use of the at-random aggravator in robbery situations.”22
Here, Bennett’s poetry indicates his “‘need to cause some death.’ ”23 He also told a friend about the “ ‘killing spree’ ” he and Joe Beeson were on.24 Bennett was convicted of murdering Michelle Moore “without a specific purpose or objective and his reasons for the killing are not obvious or easily understood.”25 Without any communication, Bennett simply pulled out a .45 caliber handgun and shot Michelle Moore in the face. I cannot find a reason for this murder that is “obvious or easily understood.”26
Perhaps more importantly, the Leslie dissent recognized the lack of authority to expand the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” standard to encompass invalidation of aggravators.27 “We have recognized only two situations which meet this standard, where a petitioner makes a colorable showing that he is actually either innocent or ineligible for the death penalty.’ ’28
The jury found four aggravating circumstances. Assuming, ar-guendo, that we eliminated the “at random and without apparent motive” aggravator, three valid aggravating circumstances remain. Thus, as the Leslie dissent concluded, “no fundamental miscarriage of justice exists which would permit this court to disregard procedural bars required by statute.”29

*612
Law of the case

The majority affirms the grant of a new penalty hearing based upon Leslie. Ironically, the issues Bennett raises in his petition are identical to the ones rejected on direct appeal. In Leslie, we stated that “[o]ur determinations on direct appeal are the law of the case.’ ’30 ‘ ‘The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.”31
Bennett first filed a petition for post-conviction relief in 1990, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After the district court appointed counsel for Bennett, no further activity relative to this petition occurred for more than three years. In 1993, Bennett filed a new petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative and prejudicial error. This new petition was allegedly a supplement to the first petition.
The district court properly dismissed the new petition. We then allowed review of the merits, despite agreeing with the State that the petition was procedurally barred, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal.32 The majority concludes that Leslie applies here and that the procedural bars do not. I dissent from that conclusion.

 118 Nev. 773, 59 P.3d 440 (2002).

 NRS 34.810(2).

 NRS 34.726.

 Leslie, 118 Nev. at 784, 59 P.3d at 447-48.

 See NRS 200.033(9).

 The poetry seized at Bennett’s home included the following: “ ‘My thirst for blood is now calm, but it shall rise again. My power is so strong I need to cause some death. I’m so [expletive omitted] powerful and my reigning just begun as I kill and kill again. Death is rising from the air as the thunderbolts strike. Blood is dripping from the wall. Someone gonna, someone’s gonna die.’ ” Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 138 n.1, 787 P.2d 797, 799 n.1 (1990).

 NRS 34.810(3).

 Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 886, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001).

 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953)) (internal citation omitted), quoted in Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 960 n.4, 964 P.2d 785, 787 n.4 (1998).

 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

 Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 886, 34 P.3d at 537.

 Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000).

 Id.; see also NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(3).

 118 Nev. 773, 59 P.3d 440 (2002) (4-3 decision).

 Id. at 781, 59 P.3d at 446.

 Id. at 782, 59 P.3d at 446.

 Id. at 781-82, 59 P.3d at 446.

 Id. at 782, 59 P.3d at 446.

 See id.

 Justice Shearing authored the dissent, with then-Chief Justice Young and Justice Agosti concurring.

 Id. (Shearing, J., dissenting) (quoting Leslie v. State, 114 Nev. 8, 22, 952 P.2d 966, 976 (1998)).

 Id. (Shearing, J., dissenting).

 Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 138 n.1, 787 P.2d 797, 799 n.1 (1990).

 Id. at 138, 787 P.2d at 798.

 Leslie, 118 Nev. at 782, 59 P.3d at 446.

 Id.

 Id. at 786-87, 59 P.3d at 449 (Shearing, J., dissenting).

 Id. (Shearing, J., dissenting).

 Id. at 787, 59 P.3d at 449 (Shearing, J., dissenting).

 Id. at 784, 59 P.3d at 447-48.

 Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975).

 Bennett v. State, 111 Nev. 1099, 1103, 901 P.2d 676, 679 (1995).