Court Opinion

ID: 9561513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:00.45275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.691012
License: Public Domain

Hall, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part. 1. While I concur in Division 3 of the opinion, in view of the fact there will be a new trial I will state for the record that in my opinion the trial court did not err in refusing to allow a non-expert witness to give his opinion on the cause of the damage to the pool. The *365ruling was proper for either of two reasons. First, while an expert may base his opinion on facts stated by other witnesses, a non-expert may not, but must base his opinion on his own observations. Brazil v. Roberts., 198 Ga. 477 (32 SE2d 171); Agnor, 11 Encyclopedia of Georgia Law 266, Evidence, § 15; Green, Georgia Law of Evidence, p. 276, § 112. The facts in the transcript show that the non-expert witness stated that there were no cracks in his pool on one day and that he discovered the cracks in the pool the following day. He did not testify that he heard explosions take place during this period. On the contrary he heard no blasting during this period. Testimony on the blasting came from another witness.
The other reason is that the question called for an opinion based upon an inference which the jury could draw as well as he. This is explained fully in Barron v. Chamblee, 199 Ga. 591, 595 (34 SE2d 828). As an example of a situation in which “the data could not be placed before the jury in such a way that they may draw the inference as well as he,” see Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Smith, 107 Ga. App. 384 (5) (130 SE2d 355). It could hardly be contended in this case that the jury could not draw the inference as well as this non-expert witness.
2. While I concur in Division 6 of the majority opinion, I will mention the difficulty of the trial judge and opposing counsel in this type of situation and the suggested remedy. The law prior to the Civil Practice Act of 1966 was that while the trial court is not bound to charge upon issues made solely by the evidence, it must charge upon issues made by the pleadings and the evidence. Crawford v. Noles, 90 Ga. App. 315 (83 SE2d 39); Wade v. Roberts, 89 Ga. App. 607, 608 (80 SE2d 728); Doggett v. Simms, 79 Ga. 253 (4 SE 909); Lewis v. Duggan, 85 Ga. App. 733, 737 (70 SE2d 66).
The Civil Practice Act of 1966 is substantially the same-as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The modern philosophy concerning pleadings is that they do little more than indicate generally the type of litigation that is involved.” 2A Moore’s Federal Practice (2d Ed.) 1613, § 8.03. See Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 118 Ga. App. 333-334 (163 SE2d 327); Hunter v. A-1 Bonding Service, Inc., 118 Ga. App. 498 (164 SE2d 246); Mar*366tin v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 551 (163 SE2d 885). An alarmist who views “loose pleading” as a vice must be told that pleadings are only part of the story. If a plaintiff pleads no more than is necessary to state a claim for relief under Code Ann. § 81A-108, the issues of law can and should be formulated by discovery and pre-trial procedure.
In the present case, the plaintiff has a very general allegation in his petition that would authorize him to prove his case under Code § 105-1401. He introduced evidence to support this allegation and as a result had the right to make a timely objection to the failure of the trial judge to charge on trespass. This issue could have been made more specific in a pre-trial conference and order which is mandatory upon the motion of any party or the court’s own motion. Code Ann. § 81A-116. Where there is no pre-trial order setting forth the issues and the pleadings are in general terms, the trial can become a ship without a rudder.