Court Opinion

ID: 9579040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:57.150805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:13.445302
License: Public Domain

*224Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I would not necessarily disagree with the majority’s contention that, as a matter of public policy, it might be preferable that punitive damages not be recoverable in an action for uninsured motorist benefits. It is the legislature, however, and not the courts, to which belongs the prerogative of incorporating public policy considerations into the laws which the courts are bound to uphold. It is what the law says, not what we might wish it to say, that is binding on the courts.
In the instant case the statutory language, when read according to the statutory directive, OCGA § 1-3-1 (b), plainly and unambiguously permits the recovery of “all sums” recoverable “as damages.” OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1). Thus to overrule State Farm Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 193 Ga. App. 557 (388 SE2d 393) (1989), which relies on the plain and unambiguous language of § 33-7-11 (a) (1), as the majority proposes to do, would be contrary to the letter and spirit of applicable law.
“In all interpretations of statutes, the courts shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly.” OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). “It has been held that the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the Georgia uninsured motorist statute was ‘to protect the insured as to his actual loss.’ State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, 714 (177 SE2d 257) (1970).” Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 10, 11 (372 SE2d 7) (1988). Punitive or exemplary damages are those awarded “over and above what will barely compensate him for his . . . loss, where the wrong . . . was aggravated [i.e., made greater or worse] by . . . the defendant.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1957), p. 467. It is axiomatic that aggravation of the original wrong results in additional — or greater — loss, so that damages awarded as “punitive” or “exemplary” serve the dual function of deterring the tortfeasor and of mitigating the aggravation. If the legislature had intended to exclude punitive damages from the scope of the Code section, it could have done so simply by specifying that uninsured motorist coverage would apply to “all compensatory damages” recoverable by the insured due to the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle, rather than to “all sums” recoverable by the insured “as damages.”
We find the “all sums” terminology to be as inclusive as any language that might have been used in expressing the legislative intent. See State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga., supra at 714. As noted in the concurring opinion, the subsequent language, “because of bodily injury” and “because of injury to or destruction of property of the insured,” appears in subdivisions (A) and (B), respectively, of § 33-7-11 (a) (1), dealing with the limits of the required coverage. When read in proper context, this terminology is merely a limit on the amount of coverage required to be made, such amounts differing in the two categories covered in (A) and (B). Thus properly construed, *225these limiting phrases provide a meaningful qualification of the requirement that coverage be provided for “all sums the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” To read this language as necessarily excluding punitive damages would require one to take the position that such damages do not arise “because of” bodily injury or property damage. In view of the plain language of the statute (and also of the well-settled principle that arguably ambiguous language must be resolved in favor of the insured), to take such a position would be patently absurd. Thus, although we recognize the validity of the time-honored principles expressed in the Latin maxims quoted in the majority’s analysis of § 33-7-11 (a) (1), we find them inapposite to the majority’s contention that the statute does not include punitive damages and that Weathers should therefore be overruled.
Further, careful analysis of Coker v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 Ga. App. 423 (388 SE2d 34) (1989) and State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kuharik, 179 Ga. App. 568 (347 SE2d 281) (1986), as well as of Weathers, reveals no conflict whatsoever between the rationale of Weathers and that of Coker and Kuharik. The holding in each of the three cases is appropriate in the fact situation of each. The fact that in Weathers the tortfeasor is known and is subject to the trial court’s personal jurisdiction clearly distinguishes Weathers from the other two cases and renders not only unnecessary, but incorrect, any notion that the holdings in Kuharik and Coker mandate a reversal of Weathers. Kuharik, in fact, expressly leaves open the question presented in the instant case and in Weathers: “Whether an uninsured motorist carrier could be held liable to its policyholder for punitive damages based on the misconduct of a known tortfeasor over whom the court had acquired personal jurisdiction.”
Moreover, like the author of the concurring opinion, I disagree with the majority’s assertion (Division 3 (a)) that “the purely technical application of the rules of statutory construction” would favor the conclusion that the legislature’s intention was to permit recovery only of compensatory, not punitive, damages. The majority’s public policy arguments are by no means unpersuasive or devoid of validity, as far as they go. A far more comprehensive and persuasive public policy analysis would be required, however, before I would feel compelled, in the face of the unambiguous statutory language, to adopt the extreme and essentially illogical position taken by the majority. Compare, e.g., Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 248 Ga. 391 (282 SE2d 903) (1981).
The worst-case scenario proposed by the majority (Division 3) — that “most uninsured motorists are judgment-proof” — is a risk inherent in the nature of uninsured motorist coverage and as such properly falls upon the insurer, not the insured. The insured, whose loss has been increased by the aggravating circumstances not only intangi*226bly but usually substantively as well, will find cold comfort in the majority’s bland assurance that “in the . . . event that there are assets to be levied on, the victim [insured] will have a judgment for punitive damages against the tortfeasor and can reach them.” What is the rationale of requiring the motorist to pay premiums for uninsured motorist coverage when in the end he himself will be put to the trouble and expense of attempting to collect on his judgment?
Decided March 16, 1990
Rehearing denied March 29, 1990
Scott Walters, Jr., for appellant.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Guerry R. Moore, William P. Claxton, for appellees.
Kathryn M. Weigand, William Q. Bird, Frank J. Beltran, amicus curiae.
Moreover, should the majority’s dire prediction that “the added liability would be passed along to the premium payers” be realized, this would be no new thing and arguably would leave the premium-payer no worse off than he was already. It is our observation that there has often been no readily ascertainable or predictable relationship between the insurer’s actual loss experience and the premiums charged the insured. Therefore, such a result as that predicted by the majority would be neither inevitable nor novel. In any case, a remedial statute must be construed to protect the insured (or victim) rather than the insurer.
In short, neither legislative intent, nor statutory language, nor the holdings in Kuharik and Coker, supra, dictates the result sought by the majority. I feel strongly that Weathers represents the correct approach to this complex of issues, and that that case should therefore not be overruled.
I must respectfully dissent.