Court Opinion

ID: 9854192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:31.912111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.993441
License: Public Domain

ROSS, J. pro tem., Dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion herein.
By its special verdict in this case the jury found that the defendant was not negligent in the parking of his tow car, and a general verdict was expressly waived and judgment entered in favor of defendant. The motion for a new trial was granted solely because of the failure to give said Instruction No. 7, and the question here is, as stated by appellant in his opening brief:
“In a case where a tow car rendering assistance to a disabled vehicle was doing so off the traveled portion of the highway, within an area exclusively maintained, used and intended for parking purposes, without either actually obstructing the free flow of travel along the highway or necessitating any such obstruction, was it proper to instruct a jury concerning the law requiring placing of warning signals by a tow car rendering assistance under conditions necessitating an obstruction of the highway?”
Respondent contends that, notwithstanding the tow car was off the main traveled portion, it was on the highway, and that whether or not it was obstructing the highway was a question for the trial court. Any contention that the tow car was obstructing the highway by its lights only was determined adversely to respondent by the verdict of the jury.
Admittedly “highway” means “a way or place of whatever nature, publicly maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel” (sec. 81, Vehicle Code) while “that portion of a highway improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel” is the “roadway” (sec. 83, Vehicle Code).
*602The tow car was on the highway, hut it was not obstructing any portion of the highway as contemplated by section 586.5 of the Vehicle Code. It was occupying space, but so would any vehicle, tow car or otherwise, which might lawfully park in said space while the occupants viewed the mountain scenery. If a car lawfully parked in the parking space has a fiat tire and another pleasure ear parks near it and the occupants assist in changing the tire on the first car, there would be no obstruction of the traffic. Under the same circumstances, however, the majority opinion would mean that a mechanic in a tow ear would have to put out his warning signals before he changed the tire.
Section 586.5 of the Vehicle Code is contained in chapter 13 of division IX, which chapter is entitled, “Stopping, Standing or Parking, ’ ’ and is devoted to offenses which come under that heading. Among other things vehicles are prohibited from parking on the paved or improved or main traveled portion of the highway (sec. 582, Vehicle Code). Exception is made for a disabled vehicle (sec. 584, Vehicle Code), a tow ear for which proper warning signals have been placed (sec. 586.5, Vehicle Code) and a commercial vehicle, disabled, and for which proper flares or signals have been placed (sec. 590, Vehicle Code).
The provision for warning signals in section 586.5 therefore applies only to eases where, -without them, the tow ear would be illegally parked, and the “obstruction of any portion of the highway” in said section has reference to such illegal parking.
In this case the tow car was parked with its nearest part at least eight feet from the edge of the pavement or main traveled portion of the highway. Conceding that it was taking up space on the highway, it was not obstructing any portion of the highway within the meaning of section 586.5 of the Vehicle Code. Instruction No. 7, concerning said section 586.5, was inapplicable to the facts here and was properly refused and the order granting a new trial was erroneous, and should be reversed.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 17, 1942. Ross, J. pro tem., voted for a rehearing.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 16, 1942.