Court Opinion

ID: 9791576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:13:51.652023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.939698
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority errs in concluding that the facts of this case bring it within the “Stone area.” Therefore, the trial court’s disposition of the defendant’s motion to suppress the credit card was proper.
In Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), this court set forth three requirements which must be satisfied before temporary detention for purpose of questioning and identification can be deemed to be constitutionally permissible. Only the first test raises an issue on the facts of this case. To detain a person without probable cause, “the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.”
Agent Janssen had no knowledge of any facts which would create a suspicion that Cruz had committed, or was about to commit, a crime. The elements listed by the majority do not create suspicion and are consistent with innocence. The officers knew only that a credit card had been stolen and that someone would appear to pick up the television set. The officer saw that Cruz had a credit card in his hand, a fact which is perfectly normal, considering that he was in the Sears store ostensibly to transact business. He also knew that *300Cruz had related to the clerk that he was there to obtain the television set for Duke. Agent Janssen did not know whether Duke had ordered the set.
The action taken by the police does not fall within the exception enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because nothing in the record would indicate that the stop was necessary to protect the officer, or to suggest even an inference that the defendant was armed and dangerous. People v. Montoya, 185 Colo. 299, 524 P.2d 76 (1974) (dissenting opinion); People v. Stevens, 183 Colo. 399, 517 P.2d 1336 (1973) (dissenting opinion); People v. Gurule, 175 Colo. 512, 488 P.2d 889 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly sustained.