Court Opinion

ID: 9891336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:03:29.523908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:01.932966
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 456
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION IV
                                        No. E-22-373

                                               Opinion Delivered   October 18, 2023
 WANDA MCELROY
                               APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
                                         BOARD OF REVIEW
                                         [NO. 2021-BR-05581]
 V.

 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
                                               AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
 WORKFORCE SERVICES
                                               PART
                                  APPELLEE

                                RITA W. GRUBER, Judge

      Appellant Wanda McElroy appeals from the Arkansas Board of Review’s (Board’s)

May 23, 2022 decision affirming the notice of nonfraud-overpayment determination issued

by the Division of Workforce Services (Division) requiring her to repay $3,040 in

unemployment benefits. We affirm in part and remand in part for further findings for the

reasons we previously addressed in Rush v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 276, 668 S.W.3d 520,

and Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d 852.

      Appellant filed for unemployment benefits and received both state benefits and

Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) benefits, pursuant to the CARES

Act.1 On June 8, 2021, the Division issued a notice of agency determination to appellant

advising her that she had been disqualified from receiving benefits under Arkansas Code

      1
          Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 9021 to 9034.
Annotated section 11-10-513(a) (Supp. 2021) because, as a temporary-help worker, she did

not show good cause for failing to contact the temporary-help firm for reassignment upon

completion of her last assignment. Appellant ultimately failed to timely appeal from that

determination.

      After determining that appellant had been ineligible for the benefits she had received,

the Division issued a notice of nonfraud-overpayment determination on July 20, 2021,

finding appellant was liable to repay $3,040 in benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 11-10-532(b) (Supp. 2021). According to the “Review Claim

Transactions” form provided in this matter, appellant received $3,040, which included

$1,840 in regular state benefits and $1,200 in FPUC benefits before the Division determined

that she had been ineligible. Appellant filed a timely appeal of this determination to the

Arkansas Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). A telephone hearing was scheduled for September 21,

and appellant failed to appear. On September 22, the Tribunal affirmed the Division’s

determination that appellant was liable for the $3,040 overpayment.

      In affirming the Division’s determination, the Tribunal found that appellant had

filed continued claims for benefits for the weeks ending October 10, 2020, through January

23, 2021, and was subsequently found ineligible for the benefits because she quit her job.

Accordingly, appellant was liable to repay the benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated

section 11-10-532 unless the overpayment was the result of agency error, and it would be

against equity and good conscience to require repayment. The Tribunal concluded that the

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overpayment was not received as a direct result of Division error; therefore, appellant was

required to repay $3,040.

       Appellant timely requested that her case be reopened following her failure to appear

at the September 21 hearing, and the Tribunal conducted a reopening hearing on November

10. The Tribunal subsequently denied appellant’s request to reopen her case, finding that

she did not have good cause for failing to appear at the previously scheduled hearing, and it

left its September 22 decision in effect.

       Appellant timely appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board. Without taking

further evidence, the Board denied appellant’s request to reopen and affirmed the Tribunal’s

September 22 decision, which left appellant liable to repay $3,040 to the fund as a result of

a final disqualifying determination, not due to Division error.

       The Board did correct an error in the Tribunal’s decision, changing the amounts of

appellant’s weekly benefits from “between $115 and $5” to the accurate “between $115 and

$415.” Save for that correction, the Board adopted the Tribunal’s decision as its own,

specifically concluding that the Tribunal’s decision was correct as to its findings of fact and

conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

       On appeal of an unemployment-compensation case, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s

findings. Keener v. Director, 2021 Ark. App. 88, at 1, 618 S.W.3d 446, 448. The Board’s

findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence; even when there is

evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the scope of judicial

                                              3
review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have reasonably reached its

decision based on the evidence presented. Id. at 1–2, 618 S.W.3d at 448. Issues of credibility

of witnesses and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the Board to

determine. Id. at 2, 618 S.W.3d at 448.

       Where a claimant receives both state and federal unemployment benefits and the

state attempts to recover nonfraud overpayments, the Board must conduct a different waiver

analysis for the state-unemployment benefits received and the federal-unemployment

benefits received. Hill v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 418, at 2. For the repayment of state

benefits to be waived, the Director must find that the overpayment was a direct result of the

Division’s error, and it would be against equity and good conscience to require repayment.

See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2) (Supp. 2021).2

       The Board concluded that the $3,040 overpayment was a result of a final disqualifying

determination—that appellant voluntarily quit—and not due to an error by the Division. This

conclusion is a correct statement of the statutory standard in effect at the time as to the $1,840

in state benefits. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2); see also Rush, supra. Thus, after

reviewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the

Board’s findings, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s findings that

       2
        Although the statute has recently been amended by Act 197 of 2023, to revert to a
previous version of the statute, we must follow the statute in effect from October 1, 2019,
through March 5, 2023, that required the overpayment of state benefits to first be received
as a direct result of an error by the Division to waive repayment. See Rush, 2023 Ark. App.
276, at 4–5, 668 S.W.3d at 523.

                                                4
appellant failed to satisfy the first prong on the state-waiver analysis, and we affirm the

decision requiring appellant to repay the $1,840 in state-unemployment benefits.

       However, for the repayment of federal benefits to be waived, the Division must find

that the federal payments were made without fault on the part of the claimant and that

repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. See 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2). As

we observed in Rush, there is notably no requirement for a finding that the overpayment was

a result of Division error; the federal statute instead requires a determination that the

payment was without fault on the part of the worker. Rush, 2023 Ark. App. 276, at 6, 668

S.W.3d at 524 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

       Here, neither the Tribunal nor the Board performed the required federal-waiver

analysis to determine whether the $1,200 in FPUC must be repaid, and no findings were

made regarding the federal-waiver analysis. See Rush, supra. Whether sufficient findings of

fact have been made is a threshold question in an appeal from an administrative board. Id.

If adequate findings of fact are not made on the issue presented, we remand to the Board

for it to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which to perform proper

appellate review. Id. Therefore, we must remand for further findings as to, first, whether

appellant was at fault and, second, whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good

conscience before requiring her to repay the $1,200 in FPUC benefits.

       In sum, we affirm the decision requiring appellant to repay the $1,840 in state

benefits and remand for further findings regarding whether appellant is required to repay

the $1,200 in FPUC benefits for the reasons set forth above.

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Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

GLADWIN and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Wanda McElroy, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

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