Court Opinion

ID: 9811387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:10.11673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:18.642070
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting: In Weir v. Page, 109 N. C., 224, Davis, J., referring to the fact that “the Constitution of North Carolina secures to every married woman the sole and separate estate in her real and personal property, independent of her husband, as if she were a feme sole," commented upon the state of the law, as construed by the courts, which exempted her property from lien for work and labor done and material furnished thereon, and suggested, speaking for the full Court, that her liabilities in dealing with her separate estate should be made commensurate with her rights, and that “such alterations in the law would prevent much injustice and many frauds.” The Legislature of 1901, ch. 617, enacted what is now the last paragraph of Revisal, 2016, as follows: “This section shall apply to the property of married women when it shall appear that such building was built or repaired on her land with her consent or procurement, and in such case she shall be deemed to have contracted for such improvements.”
This statute does not contain any provision “except when *321the building or improvement shall have been put thereon by the husband.” The Legislature did not see fit to insert such provision, and the Court has no authority to amend the statute by inserting it. It was a sage remark of Mr. Justice Daniel, “The Court should not be wiser than the law.”
The Legislature knew enough to insert the exception if it had seen fit, for in the recent statute, ratified 6 March, 1911, the-General Assembly'enacted, “Every married woman shall be authorized to contract and deal so as to affect her real and personal property in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were unmarried,” adding the exception that it should not apply to contracts between a wife and her husband. Re-visal, 1907. The reason why the exception was incorporated in the last statute, and not in the former, is that Revisal, 1907, applies to contracts between the husband and wife affecting her estate generally where the transaction may be in secret; whereas Revisal, 2016, applies to betterments put upon her real estate in a public manner, where it still must be proven, to secure the lien, that they were placed on the land with the wife’s consent or procurement.
Argument can be made why the Legislature of 1901 should have excepted improvements placed by the husband upon the wife’s land. Such argument must necessarily rest upon the basis of the now obsolete conception of a wife, derived from more barbarous times, that she is a chattel belonging to her husband, and that hence, though a single woman is competent to control her property and make contracts, she loses her ability to do so upon becoming married, and only regains it when she becomes a widow.
The Constitution and laws of this and all other civilized States have abandoned that conception of a márried woman, and she is now held as a feme sole in relation to her property and contract rights except where expressly restricted by some antiquated and unrepealed statute.
The argument on the other side is that if-the wife’s property is not liable for betterments placed on it by her husband, when it is proven that it was done with her consent and proexxre*322ment, manifest injustice will often be done. In tbis very case the effect of denying this lien is that the wife and husband both being dead without leaving children,' his next of kin lose $700 which he had placed on this property with her consent and procurement and for which she gave a written acknowledgment to him, and that her next of kin obtained the $700 which she admitted in writing belonged to her husband.
But the overwhelming consideration in the whole matter is that the legislature did not write into the statute of 1901, now Eevisal, 2016, any such exception, and that the courts have no right to amend the statute to conform to what they may think the Legislature ought to have done.
"Writing provisions into a statute which the Legislature has not inserted is not only objectionable because it is beyond the just powers of the courts, but “judicial legislation” is necessarily retroactive and unjust, because it makes that to be the law which was not the law at the time the act was done. Had this exception been placed in the act of 1901 by the Legislature, and not by the courts now, the parties would. doubtless have acted in conformity to it. Its insertion now destroys the clear understanding between the husband and wife (as evidenced by the $700 note), is contrary to elementary justice, and not authorized by the statute. The courts should strictly observe the maxim, "Ne sutor ultra, crepidam" and not trench upon the province of the lawmaking department of the Government.
The Code, 1781, now Eevisal, 2016, gave a lien on “every” building built, repaired, or improved, for work done or material furnished. It contained no exception whatever. Nevertheless, the Court saw fit to write into it an exception in favor of married women. That proved so inequitable that the Legislature added chapter 617, Laws 1901, now the second clause of Eevisal, 2016. Now the Court is again asked to amend by writing another exception into the statute, excepting repairs furnished by a husband. In S. v. Fulton, 149 N. C., 485, where the word “every” was used, the Court refused to amend by writing into the statute the words “except a husband,” as is asked in this case, even though that was a criminal statute, to *323be construed strictly, and though to make such refusal the Court had to overrule the previous decision to the contrary in S. v. Edens, 85 N. C., 522. The words in this statute, “shall be deemed to have contracted,” simply conform to the meaning of Revisal, 2016, as to every one, by giving a lien upon an implied contract, a proceeding in rem, a lien upon the property for the betterment, and not creating a debt against the owner upon an express contract, unless that is shown outside of the lien.
The note for $100 is not a debt against the estate of the wife, because of noncompliance with the requirements of Revisal, 1907. But it is sufficient, together with the other evidence, to make it a lien upon the property upon which the building was placed, for all has been done that is required by Revisal, 2016.