Court Opinion

ID: 9660229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:08:08.529094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:16.697995
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The equitable mechanic’s lien proceeding is designed for the purpose of enforcing multiple mechanic’s lien claims filed against the same real estate, together with an adjudication of the rights claimed under all conflicting liens, encumbrances or other interests in the property. § 429.270, RSMo 1978; Dierks and Sons Lumber Co. v. McSorley, 289 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Mo.App.1956). Once such an equitable suit is commenced it pre-empts the field of remedies for enforcement of mechanics’ liens on the real estate. Dierks & Sons Lumber Co. v. McSorley, 289 S.W.2d at 168. Accordingly, the equitable suit’s institution stays all other suits, whether legal or equitable, to enforce a mechanic’s lien on the property. § 429.300, RSMo 1978; Peerless Supply Co. v. Industrial Plumbing & Heating Co., 460 S.W.2d 651, 662 (Mo.1970).
The principal opinion goes too far. Garnishment may be inappropriate in this particular case. However, O’Dell’s action on the contract should not be declared a nullity. Sartorius paints with too broad a brush. It overstated the holding in Richards Brick Co. v. Wright, 231 Mo.App. 946, 957-958, 82 S.W.2d 274, 281 (1935) and misapplied it to what apparently was a non-mechanic’s lien suit. See State ex rel. Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. Sartorius, 249 S.W.2d 853, 854-855 (Mo. banc 1952). Relator Clayton Greens admits in its brief that plaintiff O’Dell did not sue to enforce a mechanic’s lien. Once a judgment on an account is obtained, it merges into the judgment. Wycoff v. Epworth Hotel Construction & Real Estate, 146 Mo.App. 554, 560-561, 125 S.W. 550, 551 (1910). Of course, a lien claimant can enforce a lien only on the basis of his account and therefore the unsatisfied judgment cannot be used to enforce a mechanic’s lien. Id. Thus, in this case, once O’Dell obtained the non-mechanic’s lien judgment, it could no longer be party to or benefit from the equitable mechanic’s lien suit.
Obviously, I do not interpret “demand” in § 429.300 as does the principal opinion. I read that word, in the context of Chapter 429, as a “mechanic’s lien demand.” For example, § 429.080 requires contractors, materialmen, etc. to properly file “a just and true account of the demand due him.” (emphasis added). Nor do I believe that § 429.290 means that an equitable mechanic’s lien suit, once filed, is the exclusive remedy for all disputes between parties involved in the construction from which the mechanic’s lien suit arises. Finally, a consolidation of a non-mechanic’s lien suit and a mechanic’s lien suit is unnecessary to prevent races to courthouses; two such suits are on different tracks and do not compete.
I respectfully dissent.