Court Opinion

ID: 9391599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 18:03:32.429738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.710374
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/2/23 In re A.N. CA2/4
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 In re A.N., a Person Coming Under                                    B319059
 Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                      (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP06259A)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 SABRINA M. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
         William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Sabrina M.
         John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ignacio N.
        Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.

                              INTRODUCTION
        In this dependency case, appellants Sabrina M. (Mother) and
Ignacio N. (Father) raise only one issue. They argue an inadequate
investigation by respondent Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) into their daughter A.N.’s status
as an Indian child under California’s version of the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) requires us to reverse the juvenile court’s
termination of their parental rights, as well as its denial of their
Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions.1 We conclude that
the ICWA error, although admitted, was harmless. We therefore
affirm.
        Our Courts of Appeal are divided on how harmlessness is assessed
in the context of an inadequate initial ICWA inquiry. That issue is
currently pending before the California Supreme Court. While we wait
for guidance from our higher court, we continue to apply the standard
articulated by our colleagues in Division Two in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 769, 776, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.),
for the reasons explained in that opinion.

1       Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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                       PROCEEDINGS BELOW
     In September 2019, DCFS filed a non-detention petition on behalf
of one-month-old A.N. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging
that A.N. was endangered by Mother and Father’s substance abuse.
     The petition stated that an Indian child inquiry had been made,
and that A.N. was potentially a member of the Fernandeño Tataviam
Band of Mission Indians (Tataviam Tribe)—a non-federally recognized
tribe. Mother filed an ICWA-020 form claiming both she and A.N. were
or could be members of the Tataviam Tribe. The Tataviam Tribe later
confirmed Mother’s membership. The juvenile court also confirmed
Mother’s claim of Indian ancestry in the Tataviam Tribe, and a tribal
representative appeared at the hearing on the petition. The court found
no further ICWA notice necessary due to the representative’s presence.
     The parties agree that the Tataviam Tribe is not federally
recognized. Thus, the parties agree that Mother’s membership in the
Tataviam Tribe did not make A.N. an “Indian child” under ICWA.
However, the juvenile court had discretion to permit the Tataviam
Tribe’s participation in the proceedings, and, as further described
below, it did so. (See § 306.6.)
     The case culminated in a termination of parental rights. The
reasons for termination are not pertinent to this appeal and we discuss
them only briefly. In October 2019, the court ordered A.N. detained
from Mother. In November 2019, Mother pled no contest to an
amended petition, admitting that she was a “recent” abuser of
methamphetamine, placing A.N. at risk of serious physical harm. A.N.
remained placed with her maternal great-aunt, and Mother was

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granted monitored visits and ordered to participate in a drug program
with random weekly drug testing.
     At a March 2021 hearing, the court terminated the parents’
reunification services and expelled the parents from the hearing after
they began threatening the court.
     In May 2021, the court issued a restraining order against the
parents at A.N.’s request, based on an incident in which Mother took
A.N. from her aunt and brought her to her car. In November 2021,
Father filed a section 388 petition to lift the restraining order. In
January 2022, Mother filed a section 388 petition to reinstate
reunification services, reinstate and increase visitation, and to lift the
restraining order. The court heard both petitions in a March 2022
hearing. The court denied both petitions and subsequently terminated
both parents’ parental rights.
     Notably, the court allowed the Tataviam Tribe the opportunity to
participate in these proceedings, and the tribe took advantage of that
opportunity. For example, in addition to the appearance at the hearing
on the initial DCFS petition, a tribal representative appeared at
hearings in October 2019, November 2019, and at the March 2022
hearing after which parental rights were terminated. In October 2019,
the court ordered DCFS to give tribal representatives access to its
reports, and DCFS thereafter consistently included the tribal
representative when giving notice of hearings. The Tataviam Tribe
approved A.N.’s placement with her maternal great-aunt in November
2019. During the March 2022 hearing, a representative of the
Tataviam Tribe confirmed to the court that “many of the parties to this

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case have kept consistent communication with the tribe in updating us”
and explained the tribe was “monitoring this case and helping with
longstanding permanency for the child.”
     Beyond Mother’s membership in the Tataviam Tribe, the record
discloses no claim from Mother of any other potential source of Indian
heritage for A.N. Father filed an ICWA-020 form indicating that A.N.
was or could be a member of the “Tataviam Band of Mission Indians—
through the mother,” but Father did not claim any other potential
source of Indian heritage for A.N. No other indication in the record
suggests that either Mother or Father had any other source of Indian
heritage.
     Throughout the proceedings, DCFS spoke with several extended
family members. But there is no evidence that it inquired any further,
at any time, about A.N.’s potential Indian heritage.
     When it terminated parental rights, the court concluded that A.N.
was not an Indian child under ICWA because the Tataviam Tribe was
not federally recognized but noted the tribe’s presence and participation
in the proceedings.
     Both parents timely appealed the denial of the section 388
petitions and the termination of parental rights. On appeal, neither
Mother nor Father has made any proffer of evidence suggesting that
A.N. is an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.

                            DISCUSSION
     On appeal, both Mother and Father argue—their only argument—
that DCFS’s failure to make a sufficient initial ICWA inquiry into

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A.N.’s status as an Indian child requires reversal. There is no dispute
that DCFS’s inquiry was inadequate. Under California’s version of
ICWA, DCFS had a duty to ask A.N.’s extended family members about
any potential Indian heritage. (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 776,
rev.gr. [“the initial duty of inquiry mandated by California’s version of
ICWA obligates the Department to question ‘extended family members’
about a child’s possible American Indian heritage”].) Nothing in the
record indicates that DCFS did so. Relying in part on that inadequate
initial inquiry by DCFS, the juvenile court found that A.N. was not an
Indian child under ICWA.
     The question is whether DCFS’s inadequate initial inquiry
requires reversal. Answering that question requires us to apply a
standard for assessing whether DCFS’s error in the initial inquiry was
harmless. We note that our appellate courts are divided on this issue,
which is currently under review by our Supreme Court. (See, e.g., In re
A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1011; In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 735, 744; In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 323;
Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 769, rev.gr.)
     Here, unless the Supreme Court determines otherwise, we follow
the rule articulated in Dezi C., for the reasons articulated therein.
Under that rule, “an agency’s failure to conduct a proper initial inquiry
into a dependent child’s American Indian heritage is harmless unless
the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the
child may be an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of ICWA, such that
the absence of further inquiry was prejudicial to the juvenile court’s
ICWA finding. For this purpose, the ‘record’ includes both the record of

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proceedings in the juvenile court and any proffer the appealing parent
makes on appeal.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, rev.gr.)
     Applying that rule compels affirmance here. A.N.’s parents both
claimed Mother was a member of the Tataviam Tribe, and the
Tataviam Tribe agreed. But (as all parties admit) because the
Tataviam Tribe is not federally recognized, Mother’s status in the
Tataviam Tribe did not make A.N. an “Indian child” for purposes of
ICWA. Nothing in the record suggests that either parent was a member
of any federally recognized tribe. Nor, particularly given that both
parents were aware of Mother’s membership in the Tataviam Tribe, is
there any suggestion in the record that either Mother or Father might
“unknowingly be [a] member[] of a [federally recognized] Indian tribe.”
(Cf. In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1015.) Nor does either
parent proffer, even on appeal, any specific reason to believe that A.N.
might be an Indian child for ICWA purposes. Nothing else suggests
that inquiry to A.N.’s extended family might have revealed that A.N.
was an Indian child under ICWA, or that such inquiry would have
changed the juvenile court’s conclusion that A.N. was not an Indian
child under ICWA. Thus, we hold that the ICWA error was harmless,
and affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
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                              DISPOSITION
     The court’s orders are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          DAUM, J.*
     WE CONCUR:

     CURREY, Acting P. J.

     COLLINS, J.

*
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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