Court Opinion

ID: 9442676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:55:43.54962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:11.125375
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
As I interpret the original opinion filed after the rehearing, in which we reversed our original decision, it was predicated on two grounds. First, that Oklahoma perhaps would hold to the strict rule of construction requiring that such contracts as we have under consideration must contain specific reference to one’s own negligence in order to relieve one thereform, and second, that in any event the language in this contract was not sufficiently explicit to bring it within the more liberal rule as announced by this court in Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Thornley, 10 Cir., 127 F.2d 128.
As I interpret the opinion on file, as now amended, it is not predicated on the ground that Oklahoma has, or, as we conclude, would adopt the strict rule of construction, but rather on the ground that the language of this contract is not sufficiently explicit to bring it within the more liberal rule announced by us in the Sinclair case, supra. Since my special concurring opinion was predicated on the first ground alone, I find myself unable to concur in the opinion as now constructed.
It is my conclusion that the language in this contract is sufficiently broad and explicit to bring it within the liberal rule. There are two> well recognized rules of construction, only one of which is emphasized in the majority opinion. They are: (1) That such stipulations as the one in question are not favored and will be strictly construed against the person relying upon the same, and (2) that in construing a contract, we will seek to give consideration and meaning to each and every part thereof. In my view, the majority gives no consideration to this second rule of construction. In fact, as I read the opinion, nowhere is reference made to this principle. All the opinion states is that the language is not sufficiently explicit to bring it within the liberal rule.
No meaning, weight, or consideration is given to the phrase, “at second party’s risk.” What did the parties intend when they agreed that Rumley was to furnish everything to be used by Ashland at Rum-ley’s risk. Must we assume that they reached into a bag of words, took a handful therefrom and broadcast them as we broadcast seed in a field, and inadvertently and by mistake got the word “risk” as one might by accident broadcast a weed with the seed? Neither does the majority opinion ascribe or attempt to ascribe any meaning to the word “risk”. So the prevailing party *49at the time of argument made no attempt to give it any meaning. In fact, it was assumed that the word was inadvertently used.
Rumley agreed to furnish this equipment to Ashland at his (Rumley’s) risk. By this agreement between Ashland and Rumley, Rumley assumed the risk incident to the furnishing of the equipment, and released Ashland therefrom because of his use thereof. In other words, Rumley released Ashland from liability with regard to the use of the equipment which he could have held him to but for sttch assumption. Ashland could not have become liable to Rumley with respect to- the equipment for wear and tear thereon, loss from unavoidable accident, acts of 'God, or for any other cause. In fact no one has been able to point out what liability Ashland had with respect to its use of the equipment as far as Rumley was concerned, save for that resulting from its negligence. Unless this was what the parties intended that Ashland should be relieved of and that Rumley should assume, the word “risk” was meaningless and was inadvertently used.
The majority seeks to distinguish this case from other cases which are predicated on the more liberal doctrine on the ground that the language in this contract is not as broad as in those cases. Thus, it is pointed out that those contracts contained language such as: “All risk of loss or damage.” “From any and all loss, damage or injury.” “From any and all liability.” I see no difference in legal effect of such language and the language in this contract. In fact, I can see no difference between saying that I will assume the risk resulting from the use of my equipment by another as between him and me, and saying that I will assume all the risk to such equipment resulting from such use. Without qualifying the word “risk”, its natural meaning is that I assume all the risk when I state that I shall alone be liable for the risk resulting from the use of the equipment. Adding “all” or “any and all” does not expand its meaning or increase the obligation assumed thereunder. Since the only liability Ashland could have incurred toward Rumley resulting from the use of Rumley’s equipment by Ashland was liability for its negligent use thereof, we should conclude that when Rumley agreed that he would furnish the equipment for Ashland to use and assume the risk, that they intended that Rumley assume the risk for loss of the equipment resulting from Ash-land’s operation, for which Ashland would be liable only for such assumption. Since the only liability of Ashland from its operation of the equipment would be that resulting from its negligent acts, this is what Rumley assumed and relieved Ashland of. Any other construction would render the term meaningless.
I find myself unable to subscribe to an opinion which to me seems to be predicated on the assumption that the phrase, “at * * * (Rumley’s) risk” is meaningless and was inadvertently used. I would hold that the language of the contract was clear and explicit and that it was the intent of the parties to relieve Ashland of its own negligence with respect to the use of this equipment.
For these reasons, I am forced to respectfully dissent.