Court Opinion

ID: 9772259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:12:07.970099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.978954
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
Section 287.780 could not be more clear: “No employer or agent shall discharge or in any way discriminate against any employee for exercising any of his rights under this chapter. Any employee who has been discharged or discriminated against shall have a civil action for damages against his employer.” I can not understand how a jury’s finding that an employee was discharged “as a direct result” of filing a workers’ compensation claim does not make that employee one who was fired “for exercising her rights under” chapter 287. The section does not contain any language suggesting that an employee is entitled to an action when they have been discharged “solely” or “exclusively” because they sought the protection afforded by workers’ compensation. At a minimum, an employee has suffered discrimination when the employee is discharged even in part for filing a claim. To the degree that Hansome v. Northwestern Cooperage Co.1 compels a different result, it is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature and should no longer be followed.
*74The “exclusive” language in Hansome appears to have been plucked out of thin air. None of the cases relied upon by the Court use that word.2 Indeed, these cases use an entirely different mode of analysis than that adopted by the Court in Hansome. These cases held that, if an employee was fired for conduct that, when engaged in by an employee who had not filed a claim, would not lead to discharge, such a discharge was discriminatory and exposed the employer to suit under the statute.3 In other words, an action existed if any part of the reason why the employee was fired was due to the filing of a claim. Under these cases, a firing that was a “direct result” of exercising worker’s compensation rights would have been held to violate the statute, since they required merely a causal relationship, rather than an “exclusive” causal relationship.4
In short, Hansome was an aberration, and should be treated as such. The legislature has specifically directed that chapter 287 is to be liberally interpreted in favor of promoting the public welfare.5 As this Court has noted, this rule of construction was intended to prevent the judge-made rules limiting employer liability to their employees from operating to undermine the broad policy goal of protecting workers announced in Chapter 287.6 The “at will” doctrine is another common law rule that limits employer liability. Using that rule as a justification to narrowly construe the remedy provided in section 287.780 is perverse at best and, in any case, a direct violation of the liberal interpretive regime required by section 287.800.
I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. banc 1984).

. Davis v. Richmond Spec. Rd. Dist., 649 S.W.2d 252 (Mo.App.1983); Mitchell v. St. Louis County, 575 S.W.2d 813 (Mo.App.1978).

. Davis, 649 S.W.2d at 255; Mitchell, 575 S.W.2d at 815.

. id.

. Section 287.800, RSMo 1994.

. Bass v. Nat'l Super Markets, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Mo. banc 1995).