Court Opinion

ID: 9625462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:41:44.390838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:32.931520
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
dissenting:
The United States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972) stated: “The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’ ‘basic civil rights of man,’ and ‘rights far more precious than property rights.’ ” 10 O.S.1971 § 58 should not be used to support a policy that flies in the face of this positive mandate.
In this case the trial court, who took Kitty’s appearance and consent to adoption, specifically found the evidence was clear and convincing that the adoption was procured through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, and without the jurisdictional prerequisite of a valid consent. The court also found the best interests of Lori would be served by returning her to Kitty and her husband. It concluded the common law remedy predicated on fraud survived the enactment of § 58 which should be limited to void and voidable decrees other than those obtained through fraud.
The decision of the trial court is in line with the reasoning of this court expressed in In re Adoption of Graves, 481 P.2d 136 (Okl.1971) and Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850 (Okl.1977), where we held adoption statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the rights of natural parents and that the welfare of the child is not to be ignored. In the Graves case the natural mother was attempting to withdraw her consent to the adoption of her child on the grounds it was procured by fraud. This court permitted the consent to be withdrawn in the face of 10 O.S.1961 § 60.10 which reads, “The entry of the interlocutory or final decree of adoption renders any consent irrevocable.” We held 12 O.S.1961 § 95(6), then in force, gave a trial court jurisdiction to allow consent to be withdrawn on the basis of fraud even after the final decree had been issued. Although 12 O.S.1961 § 95, subd. 6, was repealed in 1971, eliminating the specific statute of limitations for vacation of an adoption decree on grounds other than extrinsic fraud, the common law action for fraud should be available to natural parents for setting aside an adoption after entry of a final decree. Similarly § 58, like § 60.10, must not be considered to have limited this remedy.
A statute should be given a sensible construction, bearing in mind the evils intended to be avoided.1 The primary object of statutory construction is to ascertain legislative intent.2 The obvious intent of the Oklahoma Legislature in adopting the one year limitation of § 58 was to protect innocent adoptive parents. As recognized by the majority, this section certainly serves *223the purpose of curing technical defects that do not affect the basic rights of the parties and guaranties to adopting parents an undisturbed relationship. It is a desirable piece of legislation designed to assure adoptive parents that an unknown natural parent cannot come forward to “change his mind”. It was not designed with the intent to protect adoptive parents who act out a clear course of fraudulent behavior in intimidation and coercion and outright lies such as practiced by Bette in this case.
Here we are not concerned with the rights of “innocent” adoptive parents. Bette is not a blameless third person who, in good faith and with honesty, adopted a child. Bette not only defrauded her daughter Kitty, she lied and misled the trial court as to the basis of Kitty’s consent to the adoption. Because of the fraud she perpetrated, there are no public policy considerations which favor allowing this adoption to stand.3 There is no circumstance which necessitates Bette’s protection under the one year limitation of § 58. To the contrary, public policy would dictate that such grace period be extended if the decree is granted on the basis of fraudulently obtained consent. Where fraud exists, that would authorize a court to vacate an order, and when such fraud is discovered at a time when statutory remedies are unavailable, relief may be had in equity. Red Eagle v. Cannon, 198 Okl. 330, 177 P.2d 841 (1947).
No legal scheme is completely satisfactory in handling revocation of consent to adoption. Therefore it is essential the court apply its discretion wisely and well. Unless a mother has consented freely and understanding^, the court should not separate the child from its natural parent.4 The trial court acted in its wisdom and within its power in setting aside Lori’s adoption.
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.5 Society does not permit forfeiture of real estate, automobile, contract rights or other property if fraud is involved. Section 58 as applied by the majority transgresses the purpose of its enaction. That purpose is protection of the blameless. It is immaterial whether or not Kitty participated in the deception. Fraud was practiced on the court to the detriment of Lori. The trial court found her best interests were served by her return to Kitty. Lori is certainly blameless. Her welfare must not be ignored.6
Section 58 as applied by the majority denies a child or his parent a hearing upon the question of whether the child was fraudulently taken from her mother. Proper construction of adoption statutes is such as will promote the welfare of the child.7 The trial court’s interpretation does this. The majority’s does not.
12 O.S.1971 § 1038 allows an action to vacate an order on grounds of fraud to be commenced within two years after the judgment is rendered. Under this statute Kitty’s action was timely filed. This limitation should control,, not § 58.
I therefore dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAMS, Justice BARNES and Justice SIMMS concur in the views herein expressed.

. A. M. F. Tubescope Co. v. Hatchel, 547 P.2d 374 (Okl.1976).

. Midwest City v. Harris, 561 P.2d 1357 (Okl.1977).

. Adoption of Robin, 571 P.2d 850, 857 (Okl.1977).

. See generally “Revocation of Parental Consent in Adoption Proceedings: Recent Developments” 8 Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 156, 178 (1972).

. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).

. In re Adoption of Graves, 481 P.2d 136 (Okl.1971).

. See Nevelos v. Railston, 65 N.M. 250, 335 P.2d 573 (1959).