Court Opinion

ID: 9618033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:05:19.828026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:22.562846
License: Public Domain

ARABIAN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The return alleged facts establishing the legality of defendant’s custody, i.e., the presumptively valid conviction of murder and sentence to state prison for 17 years to life. It admitted some of the allegations of the petition, denied others, and identified the specific factual allegations that are in dispute. As the majority ultimately holds, this was sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. I join in that holding.
I write separately to disassociate myself from the tortuous detour the majority takes from this straightforward path before finally arriving at the *487correct destination. Claiming to “clarif[y]” matters (maj. opn., ante, at p. 470), the majority, in dicta, declares unprecedented rules, creates exceptions for those new rules, invents rules for those exceptions to the new rules, and then, rather than enforce them, simply abandons them all in favor of a commonsense result that is consistent with prior decisions. Heretofore, factual and legal issues have been joined in a “relatively uncomplicated” manner. (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278 [152 Cal.Rptr. 528, 590 P.2d 383, 100 A.L.R.3d 823].) It should remain so.
I.
In response to the order to show cause (OSC), the Attorney General filed a 15-page document entitled “Return to order to show cause and memorandum of points and authorities in support of return.” It incorporated by reference the respondent’s brief in the direct appeal which, since this proceeding and the appeal have been consolidated and both raise the same claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, was certainly appropriate. It affirmatively alleged the judgment of this case, admitted the allegations of 12 paragraphs of the petition, and denied the allegations of 4 paragraphs. In addition, it contained a two-page section captioned in bold print: “In the event this court concludes that the petition cannot be rejected as a matter of law, the matter should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on disputed factual issues relating to deficient attorney performance and prejudice.” The facts in dispute were clearly identified. Respondent specifically denied “allegations based on the declaration of [defendant], who claims never to have discussed the matter of a mental defense with his attorney,” and specifically disputed the factual allegations of the investigator and the opinions of the defense expert.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, this was not a mere “general denial” under any definition of the term. In an uncomplicated manner, the respondent clearly set forth the factual dispute. Assuming arguendo that defendant has stated a prima facie case for relief, an issue that is not before us on review and upon which I express no opinion (see People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 745, fn. 12 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388]), respondent has both alleged facts justifying defendant’s custody (the judgment) and, by specifically denying the legal and factual basis for the claims, responded to the allegations of the petition sufficiently to warrant an evidentiary hearing on the disputed factual allegations. The majority correctly so holds.
II.
Before reaching this holding, however, the majority meanders considerably. It departs substantially from the existing requirements that the return *488“must allege facts establishing the legality of the petitioner’s custody” and “must be responsive to” the grounds for the claimed illegality. (People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738.)
The majority asserts: “Those facts are not simply the existence of a judgment of conviction and sentence when the petitioner challenges his restraint in prison. The factual allegations of a return must also respond to the allegations of the petition that form the basis of the petitioner’s claim that the confinement is unlawful. (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738; People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 877, 884 [174 Cal.Rptr. 820].)” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 476.) To the extent this language implies there must be an affirmative factual recitation beyond alleging the judgment and denying specific factual allegations of the petition, nothing in the cases the majority cites (see, e.g., the language from People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 738, quoted in the previous paragraph), or anywhere else, supports this statement.
Rather than applying the “prior rule” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 484), the majority invents new ones. From the language of People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 738, the majority divines the rule quoted in the previous paragraph and, worse yet, suggests—without claiming there is supporting authority or attempting to state a rational basis—that the return must “affirmatively . . . state facts that contradict the factual allegations in the petition,” or state “facts that would justify holding an evidentiary hearing,” or “allege additional facts that contradict those allegations.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 483, italics in original.) Neither law nor logic supports these requirements, which is undoubtedly why the majority is compelled to create exceptions to these new rules (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 484-485), invent rules for the exceptions (id. at pp. 485-486), and ultimately abandon them all in its actual holding (thus making the discourse mere dicta). (Id. at p. 486.)
The majority claims that “[previous decisions have explained that filing a return containing general denials indicates the People’s ‘willingness to rely on the record,’ ” and cites in support In re Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 278, In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 823, fn. 2 [21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391], and In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1252 [259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164]. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 479.) It concedes that “this rule results in the somewhat confounding situation of transforming a denial, albeit a general one, into an admission of sorts . . . .” (Id. at p. 479.) “Confounding” that would certainly be, but it has never been the rule, as an examination of the three cited cases shows. In fact, only the dicta is confounding.
In In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813, the petition alleged that the crimes for which the petitioner was convicted were committed the day before his *48916th birthday, and therefore he was improperly tried as an adult. The return did not deny that the crimes were committed on that date, but made legal arguments why the petitioner was nonetheless not entitled to relief. Because no facts were disputed, only the legal significance of those facts, obviously we were able to “ ‘resolve the issue without ordering an evidentiary hearing.’ ” (Id. at p. 823, fn. 2.) In In re Sixto, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 1252, the return did not “dispute[] petitioner’s material factual allegations,” and so we likewise were able to “resolve the issues joined by the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing.” These results are unremarkable, and do not “transformo a denial. . . into an admission . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 479.)
The majority relies most heavily on In re Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d 274. There, the defendant claimed that the trial court had relied on “improper considerations” at sentencing. (Id. at p. 277.) In their return, “the People offer[ed] nothing more in support of their claim that petitioner’s confinement is lawful than a general denial of his allegation that the judge improperly considered his election to stand trial rather than to accept the proffered plea bargain.” (Id. at p. 278.)1 We said that “[b]y alleging only a conclusionary statement of ultimate fact in their return, the People have indicated a willingness to rely on the record. . . . There being no disputed factual questions as to matters outside the trial record, the merits of petitioner’s claim can be reached without ordering an evidentiary hearing.” (Ibid.) We went on to decide whether what the trial court did at sentencing was improper, and concluded it was.
This, too, is unremarkable, and not in the least confounding. There was no dispute as to what the trial court did, only whether it was improper. The People were willing to rely on the trial record, which included, no doubt, a transcript of the sentencing hearing, and to argue whether that record showed an impropriety. Since the record established the historical facts, no evidentiary hearing was needed. The only disputed issue was the legal significance of those facts.
As the majority notes, in In re Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 278, footnote 2, we also “emphasize[d] our disapproval of the practice of setting out in a return to an order to show cause mere general denials of a habeas corpus petition’s allegations. . . . [T]he respondent should recite the facts upon which the denial of petitioner’s allegations is based, and, where *490appropriate, should provide such documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials as will enable the court to determine which issues are truly disputed.” I agree. The return and traverse must play a narrowing function, and identify the specific factual matters that are in dispute and may require resolution through an evidentiary hearing. Once an OSC has issued, we expect the People to conduct a reasonable investigation of the allegations of the petition that have resulted in the OSC, and to frame the return in light of the results of that investigation. (See People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 745, fn. 11.) If the People, after an investigation, do not, in good faith, contest a particular factual allegation, the return should make that clear so that an evidentiary hearing will not be needed on that fact. The return should also provide documentary evidence where appropriate. If a document exists that shows a court or other tribunal performed certain acts, that document should be provided. If a transcript can eliminate any factual questions, it should similarly be provided. Declarations of defense counsel explaining what was and was not done, and why, if available, are encouraged. Additionally, the return should specifically state what factual allegations are disputed, as was done here.
But what “should” be done “where appropriate” must not be encrusted into illogical and unprecedented procedural requirements—with a procedural default (or the need to seek and obtain leave to amend the return) the penalty for noncompliance. Nor should this court be compelled, as a result, to create exceptions and more rules for those exceptions to try to make the system workable and reasonably just. We have never suggested a denial is an admission, or that denying specific facts evinces a willingness to rely on the record.
The majority correctly recognizes that because a judgment is presumed valid, the person challenging its validity bears the burden of proof. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 474.) “The initial burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution, and the panoply of rights accorded an accused person prior to his conviction supports the presumption that he is innocent. Different considerations apply, however, to collateral review of a final criminal judgment. For purposes of collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them. Society’s interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and due process is not thereby offended. [Citations.].” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], italics in original.) The People may therefore deny the disputed facts, as they have done in this case, and force defendant to prove them at an evidentiary hearing where the witnesses’ credibility can be tested by cross-examination. At such a hearing, *491the People will have the opportunity, but not the obligation, to present their own evidence, including experts. They need not prove the judgment valid.
The majority nevertheless purports to impose a pleading requirement even though there is no proof requirement. Even the majority recognizes this is “anomalous.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 483, fn. 7.) It is not only anomalous, it is unprecedented in the entire realm of the law to require facts be pled that need never be proven. The majority asserts that this “awkward procedural mechanism is required, however, to assist the court in determining which material facts, if any, are in dispute.” (Ibid.) It states that “failure to allege facts in the return prevents a habeas corpus petitioner from controverting those facts in his or her traverse. The traverse becomes a useless pleading, unable to assist the court in sharpening the issues that must be decided in a reference hearing. It becomes impossible for an appellate court to determine whether or not to order a reference hearing, and if so, to specify the issues on which the referee should take evidence.” (Id. at p. 480.)
As this case illustrates, however, there is no such uselessness or impossibility under the existing uncomplicated law, and no need for new anomalous rules. The return here disputed specific factual allegations, the traverse reasserted those allegations, the issues were thus joined. The court can readily determine which material facts are in dispute.
The majority’s detour of dicta is unnecessary as well as unsupported by logic or authority. I am confident that after some initial confusion and consternation, future courts will simply follow the majority’s example, and consign it to a well-deserved oblivion.
III.
Because the majority ultimately finds the return sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing even though it was “technically deficient” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 486), I largely join in its holding. But it is too restrictive. Without explanation, the majority directs the Court of Appeal to appoint a referee and order an evidentiary hearing. That is one way to resolve the factual dispute, but not the only way. The OSC might be made returnable before the superior court, “a court designed for the trial of issues of fact . . . .” (In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 874 [87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1].) This would have the additional advantage that the matter could be assigned to the trial judge. “[Tjhere is no judge better suited for making a determination of the issues raised in petitioner’s petition than the original trial judge.” (Yokley v. Superior Court (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 622, 628 [166 Cal.Rptr. 657].)
The Court of Appeal here did not originally make the OSC returnable in the superior court, but there is no reason it should be prohibited from *492amending it should it so choose. The holding today does not prohibit future appellate courts from relying on the superior court to find the facts, rather than a referee, so little damage is done beyond this case. But I would merely vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand the matter without the restrictive language.
George, J., and Stone, J.,* concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 16, 1995. Werdegar, J., did not participate therein.

 The majority alters this sentence by adding the bracketed word “[factual]” and changing the word “allegation” from the singular to the plural. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 479.) The word “factual” is simply not there. Although the People denied the ultimate (and single) fact that the judge acted improperly, there is no hint the People denied any historical facts rather than their legal significance. Making these critical changes to the quoted language illustrates how far the majority is willing to go, and must go, to claim support for its dicta.

 Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.