Court Opinion

ID: 9939793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:09:14.223594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:56.144137
License: Public Domain

J-A03031-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRANDI SNOWDEN                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 402 WDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 8, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0005182-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                           FILED: February 12, 2024

       Brandi Snowden (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered following her non-jury conviction of possession of a controlled

substance.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts underlying this appeal:

       On June 6, 2022[,] at about 2015 hours, Officer [Ryan] Lawrence
       observed [Appellant] at a bus stop standing up, leaning on a trash
       can, nodding off. Officer Lawrence and Officer Kerr2 approached
       [Appellant], let her know their observations and asked if she was
       okay. [Appellant] responded that she was extremely tired. Officer
       Lawrence[,] concerned for her welfare[,] requested her ID.
       [Appellant] placed her purse on the ground and searched for her
       ID. While [Appellant] searched her purse[,] the Officer saw
       syringes in plain view. [Appellant] tossed the syringes to the side
       in her purse. Officer Lawrence placed her under arrest. The
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1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).

2 Officer Kerr’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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       Officer initially testified that he then asked to search [Appellant’s]
       purse and that she agreed. On cross[-examination], the Officer
       testified that the search of her purse was incident to arrest. …
       Upon search of [Appellant’s] purse, the Officer found the syringes,
       7 stamp bags of heroin and fentanyl marked “Popeye[,”] and a
       Ziploc bag containing methamphetamine. Upon retrieval of the
       suspected narcotics, [Appellant] was taken to the station.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 2-3 (unpaginated; some capitalization

modified; footnote added).3

       On January 25, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence.

Appellant argued she was unreasonably seized by law enforcement. Motion

to Suppress, 1/25/23, at ¶ 3(o). After an evidentiary hearing on February 2,

2023, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Trial Court Order, 3/8/23.

       Following a stipulated bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of

possession of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Appellant to

nine months of probation on March 8, 2023. Appellant timely appealed. Both

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents the following issue4 for our review:
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3 The trial court did not, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I), “enter on the
record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether the
evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” However, while
a Pa.R.A.P. “1925(a) opinion is no substitute for the failure to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the record at the conclusion of a suppression
hearing[,]” review is possible based on facts set forth in a Rule 1925(a)
opinion. Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66, 68 n.1 (Pa. Super.
2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super.
2002)).

4 In her 1925(b) statement, Appellant also claimed law enforcement
“unreasonably seiz[ed Appellant] without reasonable suspicion of criminal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Did the trial court err in denying suppression because police
       arrested [Appellant] without probable cause and, thereafter,
       conducted an unlawful search incident to arrest?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Preliminarily,

       [a]n appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
       to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
       whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct.5 Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
       the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are
       erroneous.     Where the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Prizzia, 260 A.3d 263, 266 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted; footnote added).

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activity.” 1925(b) Statement, 6/7/23, ¶ 10.a. This contention is not
addressed in Appellant’s brief and is, therefore, waived. See In Interest of
T.Q.B., 286 A.3d 270, 273 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that issues raised
in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement that are not developed in the
appellate brief are abandoned).

5 Pertinently, “[w]hen the suppression court’s specific factual findings are
unannounced, […] the appellate court should consider only the evidence of
the prevailing suppression party … and the evidence of the other party” that
remains uncontradicted. In Int. of M.W., 194 A.3d 1094, 1097 (Pa. Super.
2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa. 2005)).

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      In examining the totality of the circumstances, it is well-established that

      we must give due weight ... to the specific reasonable inferences
      the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
      experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test does not
      limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly
      indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of
      innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further
      investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted; emphasis added). Further,

      [w]e do not review the evidence piecemeal, but consider the
      totality of the circumstances in assessing whether probable cause
      existed…. If the evidence supports the findings of the trial court,
      those findings bind us and we may reverse only if the suppression
      court drew erroneous legal conclusions from the evidence.

Commonwealth v. El, 933 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

      Where a defendant files a motion seeking to suppress evidence, “[t]he

Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence and

of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of

the defendant’s rights.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H); see also id., Comment (stating

that the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence). Further, “a

defendant at a suppression hearing has the right to test the veracity of the

facts recited in the affidavit in support of probable cause.” Commonwealth

v. James, 69 A.3d 180, 187 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). When testing the

veracity of the facts recited in the affidavit, a defendant must make “a

substantial preliminary showing [that] the affiant knowingly and intentionally,

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or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement in the

affidavit.” Id. at 188 (citation omitted).

       We must address an additional preliminary matter concerning our scope

of review. Both the Commonwealth and the trial court maintain this Court

may not consider a police-worn body camera video that Appellant used when

cross-examining Officer Lawrence.6             At the suppression hearing, Appellant

played a portion of the officer’s body camera video that showed he had not,

contrary to his prior testimony, requested consent to search Appellant’s purse.

Rather, he effectuated an arrest and thereafter conducted the search. See

N.T., 2/2/23, at 13-14. On redirect examination, the Commonwealth relied

on the video to bolster its argument that Appellant made no effort to explain

the presence of syringes in her purse.               Id. at 15.   Although properly

authenticated, Appellant neither marked the video as an exhibit nor moved

for its admission into evidence. Id. at 13-15. The Commonwealth contended

during its closing argument that “the video and body cam footage is not

evidence, it has not been admitted as evidence, so it cannot be considered by

the Court.” Id. at 20.

       On November 21, 2023, the parties filed a “Stipulation Order to

Supplement Certified Record on Appeal” (Stipulation).               The Stipulation

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6 The trial court merely concluded “the [o]fficer’s body-cam video was never

offered nor admitted into evidence.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 5
(unpaginated). The Commonwealth’s argument is discussed infra.

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referred to and attached a section of the video the parties agreed “was played

in open court at [Appellant’s suppression hearing].” Stipulation, 11/21/23, at

1 (unpaginated). The Stipulation confirmed the video evidence “is necessary

for appellate review and the ultimate resolution of this case.”               Id. at 2

(unpaginated).         Significantly,    the     Stipulation   explicitly   stated   the

Commonwealth did not object to the video becoming a part of the certified

record. Id. The video evidence was thereafter transmitted to this Court as a

supplemental record.        Thus, the Commonwealth waived this issue.                See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating an issue cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal).

       Regardless, we conclude the video evidence is properly before us. We

are guided by this Court’s analysis in Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d

452 (Pa. Super. 2021).7           In Jones, we examined as a matter of first

impression whether we could consider a surveillance video not admitted in

evidence—but played at trial—in ruling on a defendant’s sufficiency of the

evidence challenge. See id. at 456. The defendant stipulated at trial that the

surveillance video was authentic, lodged no objection to the video being

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7 We acknowledge the procedural posture of Jones, which involved the
admissibility of evidence at trial, as opposed to a pre-trial hearing. This,
however, reinforces the applicability of the holding. See Commonwealth v.
Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 741 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“In making the determination
that these items are part of the certified record in this appeal, we are mindful
of the relaxed rules of evidence attendant to preliminary hearings and other
pre-trial criminal proceedings.” (citations omitted)).

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played, and the defendant cross-examined the witness who obtained the video

concerning its contents. See id. at 455. On appeal, the defendant argued

“this Court [could not] consider the video recording … because the video was

not admitted in evidence.”      Id. at 456.    The parties filed a “Limited Joint

Stipulation” stating, “the parties agree that the video was not formally

admitted into evidence at trial and that [a]ppellant does not waive his

contention that the video cannot be considered in ruling on the sufficiency of

the evidence.” Id. at 456 n.2 (emphasis added).

      In concluding the video was appropriate for review, we explained

      where the trial court, in fact, made a determination that the video
      was admissible before it was played, the video was in evidence
      and became part of the record once it was played without
      objection, even though no formal motion to admit it in evidence
      was made. Although it appears that there is no Pennsylvania
      precedent addressing this situation, courts in other jurisdictions
      have recognized that when a recording is played to the fact finder
      for its consideration, the recording is admitted in evidence and
      becomes part of the record even if no formal motion is made for
      its admission. Cull v. Commonwealth, 2000 WL 311169 at *3
      (Va. App. Mar. 28, 2000) (holding that “[i]rrespective of any
      characterization made by the trial judge, the contents of the tape
      were admitted into evidence when the jury viewed it”);
      Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 480 S.E2d 1, 4 (1996)
      (defendant admitted evidence where he played tape recording
      even though he did not move the recording into evidence).

Id. at 456-57 (footnote omitted); see also Huber v. Etkin, 58 A.3d 772,

780 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (“The decisions of courts of other states

are persuasive, but not binding authority.”).          We further observed the

defendant “not only failed to object that the video was admitted and failed to

object to the trial court’s consideration of it before the trial court’s verdict, he

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stipulated to the video’s admissibility and used it in his case and in argument

after the Commonwealth had rested.” Id. at 457.

       Instantly, Officer Lawrence’s body camera video was played without

objection. The Commonwealth’s statement after the parties rested “that the

video and body cam footage is not evidence,” see N.T., 2/2/23, at 20, did not

constitute a specific objection necessary to avoid waiver.8 Not only did the

Commonwealth waive this argument by failing to lodge a timely objection, it

also consented to our review of the body camera video in the Stipulation.

Unlike the defendant in Jones, the Commonwealth stipulated to the video

becoming a part of the certified record without any limitations.          See

Stipulation, 11/21/23, at 2 (unpaginated).

       Even if the Commonwealth had neither waived its contention, nor

consented to our review of the video by stipulation, we would conclude this

Court may properly consider the video in evaluating Appellant’s claim.

Although not formally admitted as evidence, both parties relied on information

from the video to advance their arguments.       Therefore, the video “was in

evidence and became a part of the record once it was played without

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8 See Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 227 A.3d 358, 374 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(deeming a claim waived where the appellant waited until after the witness
was excused before lodging an objection); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143
A.3d 955, 962 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding appellant waived claim where he
waited until after direct and cross-examination of the subject witness, and
after the next witness’s testimony, before raising objection).

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objection….” Jones, 271 A.3d at 456. Accordingly, this Court will consider

the police-worn body camera video in our review of the merits.9

       The parties agree that Officer Lawrence was required to have probable

cause to arrest Appellant and search her incident to arrest.

       Probable cause is made out when “the facts and circumstances
       which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the
       arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
       are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
       that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
       Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 585 A.2d 988, 990 ([Pa.] 1991).
       The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was “correct
       or more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
       742 (1983). Rather, we require only a “probability, and not a
       prima facie showing, of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Gates, 462
       U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). In
       determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a totality of
       the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (citations

modified). “Where probable cause to arrest does not exist in the first instance,

any evidence seized in a search incident to arrest must be suppressed.” In

Int. of O.A., 717 A.3d 490, 495 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted).

       Appellant argues her arrest was primarily based on Officer Lawrence’s

observation of a syringe in her purse. She maintains the other factors the

Commonwealth and trial court relied on in justifying her arrest did not

establish probable cause. Appellant’s Brief at 19. In support, Appellant relies

on Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), and Commonwealth

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9 Although we may consider the video, its limited usefulness to our analysis is

discussed further infra.

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v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa. 2019), as establishing why possession of an

otherwise lawful object, “without other indicia of illegal activity, does not

establish probable cause of criminal activity.” Appellant’s Brief at 17.

      In Hicks, the Supreme Court considered a claim involving possession of

a concealed firearm.    The Hicks Court concluded police cannot detain an

individual merely based on possession of a concealed firearm in public. Hicks,

208 A.3d at 936.       The Court criticized per se rules that obviate the

government’s obligation to establish reasonable, individualized suspicion:

      Unless a police officer has prior knowledge that a specific
      individual is not permitted to carry a concealed firearm, and
      absent articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a
      firearm is being used or intended to be used in a criminal manner,
      there simply is no justification for the conclusion that the mere
      possession of a firearm, where it lawfully may be carried, is alone
      suggestive of criminal activity.

Id. at 937.

      Subsequently, in Barr, the Supreme Court held “that the smell of

marijuana may be a factor, but not a stand-alone one, in determining whether

the totality of the circumstances established probable cause to permit a police

officer to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle.” Barr, 266 A.3d at 28.

The Court

      [e]mphasize[d] that the realization that a particular factor
      contributing to probable cause may involve legal conduct does not
      render consideration of the factor per se impermissible, so long as
      the factor is considered along with other factors that, in
      combination, suggest that criminal activity is afoot. … [T]he
      totality-of-the-circumstances analysis encompasses the
      consideration of factors that may arguably be innocent in
      nature.

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Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).

       The Commonwealth acknowledges possession of a syringe does not

establish probable cause as a standalone factor, but counters that Officer

Lawrence did not rely solely on his observation of syringes10 in Appellant’s

purse. Instead, he relied on several factors to support Appellant’s arrest: 1)

her presence in a high crime area, 2) her “nodding off” at a bus stop, 3) her

effort to “conceal” the syringe in her purse, and 4) her failure to explain her

possession of the syringes. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12-14.

       Both parties cite to the analogous case of Commonwealth v.

Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10 (Pa. Super. 2020), as supporting their respective

positions.    In Bumbarger, the defendant was driving a vehicle with a

passenger. See id. at 13. Trooper Murarik, who had prior experience with

the defendant, saw the defendant and confirmed he had an outstanding

warrant for his arrest. See id. After conducting a traffic stop and taking the

defendant into custody, the Trooper spoke with the passenger, who was also

a known drug user. See id. at 14. The Trooper believed the passenger was

under the influence of a controlled substance and asked her to step out of the

vehicle. See id. As she was exiting the vehicle, the Trooper observed two

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10 Appellant maintains that the body camera video evidences a single syringe,

while the Commonwealth cites to relevant portions of the suppression hearing
transcript establishing that the officer observed multiple syringes. Regardless,
the number of syringes viewed by Officer Lawrence is irrelevant to our
analysis.

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syringes under the passenger seat.             See id.   The Trooper conducted a

probable cause search of the vehicle11 and recovered a firearm and

methamphetamine. See id. at 14.

       On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s denial of his

suppression motion, following his convictions for drug and firearm offenses.

See id. at 15.      Relevantly, he claimed that law enforcement searched his

vehicle without probable cause.          See id.   The defendant argued “the two

syringes the Trooper claimed he observed when he had the passenger step

out of the vehicle did not possess an incriminating character that was

immediately apparent….” Id. at 15. In concluding his claim lacked merit, this

Court relied on the following relevant facts:

       Here, Trooper Murarik approached the passenger of the vehicle as
       part of the lawful stop. Trooper Murarik knew [passenger], and
       knew of her drug use and sales history. [Passenger’s] appearance
       reflected that she was under the influence of drugs. Moreover,
       when Trooper Murarik lawfully asked [passenger] to exit the
       vehicle in accordance with the lawful stop, he observed drug
       paraphernalia in plain view.     Accordingly, we conclude that
       Trooper Murarik did not unlawfully detain [passenger] or ask her
       to exit the vehicle.     Furthermore, given his observation of
       [passenger’s] appearance, his knowledge of [passenger’s] drug-
       use history, and the observation of the syringes, Trooper Murarik
       had reason to suspect criminal activity. Thus, Trooper Murarik
       had probable cause to search the vehicle.

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11 The Bumbarger case was decided prior to our Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 195 (Pa.
2020), that “warrantless vehicle searches required both probable cause and
exigent circumstances.”

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Id. at 18 (citations and footnote omitted). We further recognized “hypodermic

syringes are specifically included in the definition of ‘drug paraphernalia[,]’”

and “the circumstantial evidence in this case regarding the syringes supports

the conclusion that they were drug paraphernalia.”         Id. at 19 (citation

omitted).

      Furthermore, the location and unsecured nature of the syringes
      on the floor of the vehicle were not consistent with use of the
      syringes for medical purposes. Moreover, [passenger] appeared
      to be under the influence of drugs, and the syringes were in close
      proximity to her person in the vehicle. Upon having her attention
      directed to the syringes, [passenger] did not indicate that the
      syringes were for medical use. Also, [passenger] was known by
      Trooper Murarik to use and sell drugs. Given the totality of
      circumstances, it was reasonable for Trooper Murarik to believe
      that these syringes were being used for a criminal purpose. Thus,
      discovery of these syringes in connection with the other
      relevant factors suggesting illegal drug use constituted
      probable cause to search the vehicle.

Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added).

      Instantly, we conclude Appellant’s arrest, under the totality of the

circumstances, was supported by probable cause. See Barr, 266 A.3d at 41-

42.   On direct examination, Officer Lawrence testified that he observed

Appellant “nodding off” at a bus stop. N.T., 2/2/23, at 5. He elaborated on

cross-examination that, prior to police engaging her, Appellant was leaning on

a trash can for support. Id. at 11. Officer Lawrence testified that the area in

which he interacted with Appellant was a “high drug area.” N.T., 2/2/23, at

7. He further testified that syringes like those found in Appellant’s purse are

commonly used for the injection of illegal drugs, and that he believed

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Appellant attempted to move the syringes out of sight to conceal them. Id.

at 7, 12.

       Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Lawrence’s observations

support the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant’s arrest was lawful. See

also Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 627 (Pa. 2010) (indicating that

flight and concealment can constitute circumstantial proof of consciousness of

guilt); Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 97 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(same).

       We are not persuaded by Appellant’s contention that the body-worn

camera video supports her assertion that Officer Lawrence arrested her

without probable cause.         She maintains the video: 1) does not show her

“nodding off”; 2) “only showed one syringe”; 3) showed that it was daylight12

at the time of the interaction; and 4) showed that the interaction occurred “in

the area’s business district.”       Appellant’s Brief at 19-21.   While Appellant

draws conclusions from the body camera video, she did not question Officer

Lawrence regarding any of the above observations. Appellant effectively asks

this Court to supplant the trial court’s judgment regarding the record with our

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12 We note that neither party elicited testimony concerning the time of day at

the suppression hearing. Despite the trial court’s assertion that the police
interaction occurred “at about 2015 hours,” Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 2
(unpaginated), we do not consider this in our analysis. See Commonwealth
v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017) (“Our scope of review of
suppression rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
evidence elicited at trial.”) (citations omitted)).

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own. The trial court watched the video at the suppression hearing and listened

to the testimony of Officer Lawrence. “It is within the suppression court’s sole

province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542

(Pa. Super. 2019). Appellant failed to develop any testimony that would cause

this Court to conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it formulated

legal conclusions based on the record before it.

      Finally, in addition to arguing that the body camera video shows the

police interaction did not occur in a “high crime area,” Appellant claims that

Barr, above, “found a neighborhood’s ‘characteristics’ to be irrelevant to a

probable cause analysis.” Appellant’s Brief at 22. This claim mischaracterizes

the Barr holding, wherein the arresting officer “stated on at least two

occasions that he conducted a probable cause search of the vehicle in question

based upon the smell of marijuana.” Barr, 266 A.3d at 44. In Barr, the

defendant’s presence in a high crime area was irrelevant because “troopers

simply stopped a vehicle for a minor traffic violation and then smelled

marijuana.” Id. at 44; see also Commonwealth v. Joseph, 34 A.3d 855,

863-34 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[A] police officer’s observance of a defendant’s

conduct [in] a ‘high crime area’ may, along with other factors, contribute to a

finding of probable cause.”) (citation omitted)).

      For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s issue merits no relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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     Judge Bowes joins the memorandum.

     Judge Kunselman files a dissenting memorandum.

DATE: 02/12/2024

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