Court Opinion

ID: 9912796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:21.579888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:46.426523
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Harper CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                      B324324

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County Super.
                                                                 Ct. No. MA055372)
          v.

NICHOLAS HARPER,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Affirmed.
      Emry J. Allen, under Appointment by the Court of Appeal;
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie A. Miyoshi,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ___________________________
                                FACTS
       Defendant Nicholas Harper (Harper) appeals the trial
court’s denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage. We affirm.
1.     The Shooting1
       On February 7, 2012, Harper shot his roommate James
McElroy in the face, causing his death. Harper then threw his
gun off his apartment’s balcony and into the bushes below.
McElroy’s girlfriend was in the bedroom of the apartment and
entered the living room upon hearing the gunshot. She saw
McElroy sitting on the couch with blood gushing from his mouth,
and Harper on the phone requesting an ambulance. She ran into
the bathroom, locked the door, and called McElroy’s mother.
Harper “busted” into the bathroom, grabbed McElroy’s girlfriend
by her shoulders, and told her “two Black guys did it.” When
McElroy’s mother arrived, Harper told her that two Black guys
had shot her son, which he also reported to the police upon their
arrival. Specifically, he reported to the police who arrived at the
scene of the shooting that “two men had approached him in the
apartment complex” and “wanted to buy marijuana”; Harper
brought the men up to his apartment, and when they entered the
living room, one “pulled out a rifle and shot” McElroy. Harper
later confessed to shooting McElroy himself, but claimed it was
an accident that resulted from trying to force the loaded shotgun
closed.
       There was evidence that tension had been building between
Harper and McElroy in the weeks before the shooting; that

1     We draw these facts from our prior, unpublished opinion
affirming Harper’s conviction. (People v. Harper (Feb. 22, 2016,
B257355.)

                                2
McElroy was having an affair with Harper’s girlfriend; that the
men had recently argued about rent; and that McElroy was
afraid of Harper and was worried that Harper had kept a gun in
the apartment. Several witnesses testified that, in the months
before the shooting, they had heard Harper threaten to shoot
McElroy.
2.     Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing
       In 2012, the People charged Harper with McElroy’s murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), and alleged he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury and death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
       A jury found Harper not guilty of murder, but convicted
him of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter
(§ 192, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the allegation that
Harper personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)).
       The trial court sentenced Harper to 21 years in state
prison, comprised of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, and 10
years for the firearm enhancement.
3.     Direct Appeal
       Harper appealed his conviction, and another panel of this
court affirmed. (People v. Harper, supra, B257355.)
4.     Resentencing Petition
       On February 7, 2022, Harper filed a petition for
resentencing. The trial court appointed counsel, and the People
filed a response to the petition. Harper filed no reply. At the
hearing, the court took judicial notice of the case file and its
contents; neither the People nor Harper offered additional
argument. The trial court summarily denied Harper’s petition

                                3
because “the jury was not instructed on felony murder,” “on aider
and abettor liability,” or “on natural and probable consequences”;
rather, “[t]his was a straight murder where the defendant was
alleged to have been the actual killer.” Thus, the court
concluded, “even under the changes in the law [(§§ 1172.6, 188,
189),] he would still be convicted under the theories that were
presented to the jury.”
5.     Appeal
       Harper filed a timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       Harper concedes the jury was not instructed on felony
murder or natural and probable consequences. He argues that he
was nonetheless entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because
the prosecution could have proceeded on a felony murder theory,
although it admittedly did not. He also argues that he “was
covered by the plain language” of section 1172.6 merely by virtue
of “having been convicted of manslaughter.” Neither argument
has merit.
1.     Section 1172.6 (Former Section 1170.95)
       Under the ameliorative changes in the law effected by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 15), malice must be proved
to convict a principal of murder, except under the narrowed
felony-murder rule set forth in section 189, subdivision (e), and
may not be imputed based solely on an individual’s participation
in a crime (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating the natural
and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for convicting a
defendant of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
842-843, 847). The amended felony-murder law requires the
People to prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s
individual culpability: The defendant was the actual killer

                                4
(§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant
assisted in the commission of the murder with the intent to kill
(§ 289, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in
an underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and
acted with reckless indifference to human life (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)).
(See People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.)
       Section 1172.6 authorizes an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not now
be convicted of murder because of Senate Bill No. 1437’s changes
to the definitions of the crime. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis);
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) As amended by Senate Bill
No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), effective January 1, 2022,
these ameliorative changes to the law became expressly
applicable to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
       If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing
that he or she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is
eligible for relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).)
       The petitioner’s prima facie case consists of three elements:
       “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed
against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s

                                 5
participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences.
       “The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter following a trial . . . at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder.
       “The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder because of changes to Sections 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
       In determining whether the petitioner made the requisite
prima facie showing, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction, although the inquiry is limited and may not include
fact finding. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1261.) We
independently review the trial court’s determination that a
petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14;
People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
2.     The Trial Court Properly Denied Harper’s Petition at
       the Prima Facie Stage
       Harper is ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he
was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as the actual killer; the
jury was never instructed on theories of felony murder or natural
and probable consequences, and it found that Harper personally
used a firearm. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); § 189, subd. (e)(1); People
v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 [resentencing relief
under section 1172.6 is not available to an “actual killer”].)
       Harper argues that his petition should have survived the
prima facie stage because his initial statement that “two male
Blacks” killed McElroy after Harper brought them to the

                                 6
apartment to purchase marijuana, paired with evidence of his
animosity towards McElroy, “offered a factual basis for . . .
prosecution on a felony murder theory.”2 He urges that although
he ultimately admitted he shot McElroy, a prosecutor “could have
offered [t]he jury an alternative theory” (italics added), and that
section 1172.6 does not “require[] that such theory actually was
presented.” Harper fails to cite a single authority to support this
position. To the contrary, “[t]he question at the prima facie stage
. . . is whether, as instructed, it was possible for a jury to convict”
Harper of murder that was actually committed by someone else.
(People v. Harden (2022), 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 54-55 & fn. 7
(Harden); id. at p. 52 [if the “jury was not instructed on either the
natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines,
then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
         Harper asserts that he could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to sections 188
and 189 because the jury found Harper guilty of manslaughter,
which requires no malice. This argument ignores the plain
language of the statute: The question is not whether the jury in
fact convicted Harper of murder, attempted murder, or the lesser
crime of manslaughter, but whether Harper “could not presently
be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes”
to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3), italics added.)
Section 189 was amended to limit felony murder to three specific
categories of people, one of which is actual killers. (Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 51.) Harper was the actual killer.
Even though the jury found him guilty of manslaughter, he could

2     Neither the AOB nor the record on appeal reflect whether
the jury was presented with evidence regarding Harper’s initial
statement that two Black men shot McElroy.

                                  7
have been convicted of murder under the amendments to sections
188 and 189, because the jury was not instructed on felony
murder or natural and probable consequences. Instead he was
convicted of manslaughter.
       Harper also argues the denial of his petition violated his
state and federal due process and equal protection rights because
the prosecution failed “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that
Harper was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. The
reasonable doubt standard is irrelevant at the prima facie stage,
where the petition must “ma[k]e a prima facie case for relief.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Harper failed to make a prima facie case.
       Finally, defendant states that because similarly situated
petitioners, but not defendant, ‘are afforded relief if the
prosecutor fails to prove their ineligibility under section 1170.95,’
defendant’s sentence violates the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. Defendant does not develop the argument
in his brief, and it is forfeited. (People v. Guzman (2019)
8 Cal.5th 673, 683, fn. 7 [referencing a constitutional argument in
appellate brief without developing it results in forfeiture].)
                            DISPOSITION
       We affirm the order.

                                     RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                         BAKER, J.                      KIM, J.

                                 8