Court Opinion

ID: 9377289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 16:00:36.627491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.278684
License: Public Domain

22-1445-cv
    Scherezade Momin v. Quantierra Advisors LLC

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                           SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                  At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 7th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                ROBERT D. SACK,
                ALISON J. NATHAN,
                      Circuit Judges.
                GARY R. BROWN,
                      District Judge. ∗
    _____________________________________

    Scherezade Momin,

                                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

                         v.                                                                       22-1445

    Quantierra Advisors LLC, DBA Scipre
    Analytics, Benjamin Carlos Thypin, individually,
    Sandip Trivedi, individually

                      Defendants-Appellees,
    _____________________________________

    FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                                             JESSENIA MALDONADO, Law
                                                                                         Office of Yuriy Moshes,
                                                                                         P.C., Brooklyn, NY

    ∗
        Judge Gary R. Brown, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                                              EVAN B. CITRON (Jessica R.
                                                                     Schild, on the brief),
                                                                     Ogletree, Deakins, Nash,
                                                                     Smoak & Stewart, P.C., New
                                                                     York, NY

       Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York (Koeltl, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the appeal is DISMISSED.

       In January of 2021, Plaintiff-Appellant Scherezade Momin sued her former employer and

two of its employees, alleging various state law harassment and discrimination claims as well as a

claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Approximately ten months later, on November 19,

2021, Scherezade Momin died.        Her attorney Jessenia Maldonado learned of the death in

December. However, neither Maldonado nor opposing counsel filed a suggestion of death with

the district court, which would have triggered a 90-day window to move to substitute a new party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Instead, the case continued to unfold with filings from both parties that

did not mention the death, and the district court apparently unaware that the litigant was dead. The

district court entered an order dismissing Momin’s claim on the merits on June 3, 2022.

       Meanwhile, after Scherezade Momin’s death, her mother Rubina Momin established

Scherezade Momin’s estate and was appointed as personal representative on June 21, 2022.

Maldonado claims to have taken Rubina Momin on as a client in either December 2021 or July

2022. Compare Supp. App’x 53 (Maldonado letter stating that on a December 15, 2021 call, her

firm “informed [opposing counsel] that our office represents Ms. Rubina Momin . . . as plaintiff

in this matter”), with Reply Br. 5 (stating that Maldonado’s firm “began formal representation of

Ms. Rubina Momin as of July 1, 2022”).

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       Despite this sequence of events, Maldonado submitted a notice of appeal naming

Scherezade Momin as the Appellant on July 6, 2022. No indication was provided to this Court

that the Appellant was in fact deceased. Soon thereafter, it appears that the district court was

alerted to the death because Judge Koeltl issued an order directing Plaintiff’s counsel to advise the

court as to whether the Plaintiff was dead. Maldonado responded to the order with a letter to the

district court confirming that Momin had died almost nine months earlier and noting an intent “to

file a motion pursuant to FRCP 25 seeking to substitute Ms. Rubina Momin as plaintiff in this

action.” Letter at 2, Momin v. Quantierra Advisors LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00612-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July

12, 2022), ECF No. 47. On July 13, 2022, Judge Koeltl admonished counsel for failing to promptly

file a suggestion of death and expressly directed “[t]he plaintiff’s counsel [to] bring the issue of

the plaintiff’s death to the attention of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.” Order at 1,

Momin v. Quantierra Advisors LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00612-JGK (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2022), ECF No.

48.

       But bringing Scherezade Momin’s death to the attention of this Court, as ordered by the

district court, was not Maldonado’s priority.        Counsel proceeded with the appeal without

referencing the death or moving for a substitution until after Defendants noted these omissions in

their October response brief and called for dismissal of the appeal. In November of 2022, nearly

a year after Scherezade Momin’s death and four months since Judge Koeltl’s order, Maldonado

filed a motion to substitute Rubina Momin as the appellant. For the reasons that follow, we deny

the motion to substitute.

         It is within this Court’s discretion to deny a motion for substitution, and a long delay

between a party’s death and the motion justifies the denial. When a party dies before filing a notice

of appeal, and a potential appellant moves to be substituted after the notice of appeal is filed,

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“substitution must be in accordance with Rule 43(a)(1).” Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(2). Rule 43(a)(1)

“describe[s] a procedure similar to the rule on substitution in civil actions in the district court.”

Fed. R. App. P. 43 advisory committee’s note to 1967 amendment (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)).

In the district court, such motions “may be denied by the court in the exercise of a sound discretion

if made long after the death—as can occur if [a] suggestion of death is not made or is delayed.”

Fed R. Civ. P. 25(a) advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment; see also Marentette v. City of

Canandaigua, 799 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (denying a motion to substitute

and dismissing the appeal under similar circumstances).

       Maldonado had many opportunities to be forthcoming with the district court and this Court

about her client’s death. She failed to take those opportunities. Moreover, at oral argument,

Maldonado was given additional opportunities to provide a reasonable explanation as to why she

declined to file a suggestion of death with the district court in the six months between the time she

learned of her client’s death and the district court’s dismissal of the claim. No satisfactory

explanation was provided. Nor could Maldonado explain why she filed the notice of appeal on

behalf of Scherezade Momin, even though Rubina Momin had been appointed representative by

that time. Her conduct violated Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a)(2), which permits a

decedent’s attorney of record to file a notice of appeal only “if there is no personal representative,”

and her filing error is even more perplexing in light of her assertion that she represented Rubina

Momin at the time of the appeal. Counsel did not disclose the death to the district court until

ordered to do so. Faced with a second order mandating that she disclose the death to this Court,

she instead filed a brief that excluded reference to the death and the district court’s orders in every

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way. 1 She waited until her opponents raised the issue of the death and district court’s order in

their own briefing, nearly a year after her client’s death, to file the motion for substitution. This

all amounts to an inexplicable delay, a failure to make a timely effort to comply with the district

court’s order, and a striking lack of candor and good faith on behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant’s

counsel. We therefore deny the motion to substitute Rubina Momin as Plaintiff-Appellant. 2

        Because we deny the motion to substitute, we are left with “no qualified representative to

prosecute this appeal.” As a result, we “find it necessary to dismiss this appeal ‘base[d] on the

inherent power of this Court to manage and control its docket.’” Marentette, 799 F. App’x at 50

(alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Morgenthau, 160 F.3d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1998)).

        For the above reasons, the appeal is DISMISSED.

                                                FOR THE COURT:
                                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1
  The only indication that Momin had died was in the district court docket sheet, which counsel was
required to include as part of the appendix.
2
  We also have serious doubts about whether we could have granted this motion to substitute. See Raley
v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J.) (“Without a timely notice of
appeal from someone we can be confident is a party to the appeal, we have no authority to hear a
challenge to the district court’s judgment, let alone grant a motion in such a (non-existent) appeal.”).

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