Court Opinion

ID: 9693679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:56:51.472528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.710224
License: Public Domain

Eaton, D.J.,
¶ 44. dissenting. The power of a trial court to summarily punish an attorney or party for criminal contempt is unique, as this case demonstrates. It is the only circumstance I am aware of in which a court may deprive an individual of liberty with none of the procedural safeguards that normally attend such a deprivation. It is for precisely this reason that the power of summary punishment of contempt has been strictly limited by the courts.
¶ 45. To my knowledge, this is the first time in Vermont that an attorney has been criminally convicted and held in jail for efforts to protect a client’s rights. This is of even greater concern given that attorney in this case never had the opportunity for a hearing. Rather, *489he was subject to a criminal conviction and yet received less due process than someone who is charged with a noise complaint or a speeding ticket. While the trial judge must have the power to maintain order and preserve respect for the institution of the court, this cannot be done at the expense of procedural fairness.
¶ 46. Under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a), summary punishment may only be imposed where the misconduct constituting contempt occurs in the immediate presence of the court. In this case, there were two stages in the trial court’s decision: (1) finding that an act of contempt had been committed; and (2) deciding the scope and severity of punishment for the contempt. With regard to the first stage, the trial court arguably relied solely on attorney’s contemporaneous conduct (i.e., his disobedience of a court order on August 30, 2004) in finding that attorney had committed an act of contempt. But with regard to the second stage, the trial court explicitly stated that it considered and relied upon a wider array of alleged past conduct by attorney in deciding the scope and severity of attorney’s punishment. Under these circumstances, the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority in summarily punishing attorney without a hearing on his disputed past conduct. I would reverse and remand for such a hearing.10
*490I.
¶ 47. The trial court’s initial written certification of the contempt, entered the day after the trial court ordered attorney held in custody, focused on attorney’s conduct of that day, stating that attorney’s “direct refusal of the court’s order, along with the angry, confrontational, and disrespectful manner in which [attorney] did so, made it impossible to proceed with the case.” The court went on to note that “this [was] not the first time [attorney] has behaved inappropriately in the courtroom, as well as in chambers. The court has been extremely patient with his outbursts in the past, but this conduct cannot continue.”
¶ 48. The trial court elaborated on its reasoning in a much lengthier written order denying attorney’s motion to vacate. At the outset, the court stated that because the decision turned on conduct that occurred in the court’s presence, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. However, the discussion of the contempt finding leads off with the observation that “[t]he undersigned has never in twenty-two years in the legal profession ... seen an attorney behave in as disrespectful and angry a manner towards a judge as [attorney] has on repeated occasions, both in the courtroom and in chambers.” Further, an entire section of the order is devoted to discussion of “Past Inappropriate Conduct.” In this section, the court explains that while “[t]hese incidents were not the basis for the contempt finding, ... they contributed to the court’s decision that there was no less severe action that would adequately address the situation.” In conclusion, the court reiterates that it “had been faced over a period of months with repeated challenges to its authority, displays of anger, and other unprofessional conduct” by attorney. The court emphasizes that “[i]f the conduct on August 30 had been the first incident of oppositional and disrespectful behavior by [attorney], the court likely would not have taken the action it did,” but “the prior history” and “past experience” with attorney made it “apparent that a severe sanction was necessary to convey the message that such behavior was unacceptable.” Thus, the behavior being punished *491(“such behavior”) by all appearances includes the past misconduct referenced earlier in the same paragraph.
¶ 49. The trial court’s order supporting the finding of contempt and its punishment in essence characterizes attorney’s conduct on August 30, 2004 as the “last straw” in a series of encounters over an extended period of time where attorney was disrespectful of the court. Indeed, the tone and reasoning of the order are permeated with an awareness and condemnation of alleged past misconduct by attorney, undermining the court’s assertion that the contempt finding itself was not based, at least in part, on attorney’s past misconduct. However, even assuming that the contempt finding was based solely on attorney’s contemporaneous conduct of August 30, 2004, the court explicitly concedes that attorney’s past misconduct was determinative in the second stage of its decision: punishing attorney with 45 minutes in custody.
II.
¶ 50. Under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, the trial court’s admitted consideration of attorney’s past conduct should have entitled attorney to the minimal due process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard. As discussed by the majority, Rule 42 provides two distinct procedures for addressing contempt: summary disposition and disposition upon notice and a hearing. Under the language and structure of the rule, notice and a hearing is the default procedure that should be followed unless the special circumstances warranting summary disposition are present.11 See V.R.Cr.P. 42(b) (criminal contempt shall be prosecuted upon notice except where circumstances of 42(a) apply) & 42(a) (criminal contempt may be punished summarily where misconduct was committed in the actual presence of the court); see also State v. Lafayette, 152 Vt. 108, 111 n.2, 564 A.2d 1068, 1069 n.2 (1989) (characterizing summary punishment of contempt under Rule 42(a) as exception to general rule of notice and hearing).
¶ 51. Case law interpreting Rule 42 and the analogous federal rule has emphasized that: (1) summary disposition is an extraordinary and narrow power; (2) this power is necessary for courts to maintain order where misconduct threatens the administration of justice; and *492(3) the fact that the misconduct occurs in the presence of the court and that there is no delay in finding and punishing the contempt excuses the absence of normal due process protections.
Because the summary contempt sanction is not subject to the usual requirements of a jury trial or notice and opportunity to be heard, summary contempt is a rule of necessity, reserved for exceptional circumstances and a narrow category of contempt. [Rule 42] allows summary proceedings for criminal contempt based on misconduct in the court’s presence____Both the court’s role as an eyewitness and the desirability of a swift response militate against observance of the usual procedural safeguards.
United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations, footnote, and quotations omitted). In the absence of these circumstances, summary punishment of contempt is not available. See, e.g., Walker v. Walker, 123 Vt. 430, 432, 192 A.2d 460, 461 (1963) (holding that due process requirement of an opportunity to be heard applies where alleged contemptuous conduct took place out of presence of court) (superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized by Chaker v. Chaker, 155 Vt. 20, 29, 581 A.2d 737, 742 (1990)).
¶ 52. Thus, the justification for permitting the power of summary punishment is twofold: (1) because the misconduct is immediately observed by the court, evidentiary and procedural concerns are not at issue; and (2) in the absence of a summary procedure, the trial court would be unable to put an immediate end to misconduct disrupting the administration of justice. The justifications for summary punishment, in turn, define and limit the scope of the appropriate use of the summary punishment power. Stated another way, the power of summary punishment is necessary to remove obstacles to the administration of justice, but it must be used only to serve this end — not to punish past conduct. See Pounders v. Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 987 (1997) (recognizing that summary punishment of contempt is appropriate where “the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court”) (citation and quotations omitted); United States v. Cooper, 353 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that “[t]he summary contempt power is generally limited to cases in which immediate corrective steps are needed to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of the court”) (quotations omitted).
*493III.
¶ 53. The majority recognizes that the trial court considered past misconduct in exercising its discretion with respect to punishment, ante, ¶ 37, but justifies the trial court’s reliance on past misconduct in two ways. First, noting that “there will always be a context for a contempt sanction,” the majority draws an analogy between summarily punishing contempt and criminal sentencing. Id. The majority asserts that, just as a criminal sentence reflects not only the crime for which the defendant was convicted, but also surrounding circumstances, a trial court should be able to consider past misconduct in summarily punishing contempt. Id. The critical distinction the majority overlooks, however, is that a criminal defendant has already been afforded ample due process protections throughout the course of prosecution, conviction and sentencing. See, e.g., In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, ¶ 49, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281 (criminal defendant’s right to counsel); State v. Merchant, 173 Vt. 249, 258, 790 A.2d 386, 393 (2001) (criminal defendant’s right against self-incrimination); In re Cardinal, 162 Vt. 418, 419, 649 A.2d 227, 229 (1994) (criminal defendant’s right to jury trial); V.R.Cr.P. 32 (procedural protections during sentencing). Further, under Rule 32(c)(4), a criminal defendant has a right to comment and present evidence on sentencing issues.12
¶ 54. By contrast, a party or attorney subject to summary punishment enjoys none of these protections because the contempt finding is made on the spot. For example, attorney in this case vigorously disputes the trial court’s characterization of his alleged past misconduct. But unlike any other criminal defendant, who would be entitled to comment and present evidence relevant to sentencing under Rule 32(c)(4), attorney had no opportunity to contest these allegations. While summary process for contempt may be desirable for the reasons discussed above, the absence of due process protections at any stage defeats the analogy drawn by the majority to the process of criminal sentencing.
*494¶ 55. Second, the majority draws a comparison between the facts of this- case and those in State v. Allen, 145 Vt. 593, 496 A.2d 168 (1985). Specifically, the majority cites Allen for the proposition that “[t]he court may ... consider past behavior in fashioning an appropriate sanction.” Ante, ¶ 43. The Allen Court, however, did not squarely address this question, and the decision does not support such a broad or conclusive proposition. Rather, the Court in Allen reasoned that the severity of the penalty for contempt in that case was not excessive because (1) as a repeat offender, the defendant was on notice as to proper decorum in a courtroom, and (2) the defendant had been disruptive previously during the same hearing. See Allen, 145 Vt. at 602, 496 A.2d at 173. Here, there is no issue of whether attorney was aware of proper decorum, nor was consideration of his past misconduct limited to behavior during the same hearing (or even in the same case). Neither of the elements of the holding in Allen supports the proposition that an attorney’s or party’s past misconduct — on multiple earlier dates and during multiple different proceedings — may be considered in deciding the severity of punishment for contempt, especially where that conduct is disputed.
¶ 56. Finally, in addition to the above disagreements with the majority’s approach, I also believe the majority spends too much time examining the question of whether the trial court suffered from personal bias in this case. Ante, ¶¶ 23-34. This is understandable because attorney focuses on the same issue in his appellate brief. I believe, however, that the personal bias issue is beside the point here. In short, while personal bias on the part of the court must be shown to demonstrate entitlement to a hearing before a different judge, the presence or absence of personal bias has no bearing on the more fundamental question of whether attorney was entitled to the basic procedural protections of Rule 42(b). A lack of personal animus is not equivalent to due process. Under the rule, entitlement to notice and a hearing is assumed unless the trial court makes findings supporting imposition of summary punishment. Focusing on whether attorney made a showing of personal bias has the effect of suggesting that attorney must affirmatively demonstrate his entitlement to notice and a hearing, which is not the case.
¶ 57. As recognized in Allen, the fundamental distinction between situations where summary punishment is available and those where it is not is whether punishment is immediate or delayed, not whether the contempt is personal or impersonal in nature. See Allen, 145 Vt. at 601, 496 A.2d at 172-73 (holding that the trial court should be *495empowered to deal with some conduct immediately, to preserve authority of the court, even if contempt is personally directed at judge). The majority itself notes that the Offutt rule (i.e., disqualification of the presiding judge if contempt is personal in nature) does not apply where the trial court is acting under Rule 42(a) “the instant the contempt is committed.” Ante, ¶ 29 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463 (1971)). This further emphasizes that the narrow purpose of summary punishment is to put an end to disruptive conduct without delay — not to punish past behavior or even deter future misdeeds.
IV.
¶ 58. In my view, the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority in employing summary punishment under the facts of this case. The majority contends that “[i]f we found a due process right to a hearing on how the judge exercised her discretion, we would essentially eliminate the use of summary criminal contempt.” Ante, ¶ 38. I respectfully disagree. I believe for the power of summary punishment of contempt to be used effectively and fairly there must be a clear rule for when use of that power is permissible. The distinction between conduct that is observed and punished simultaneously and alleged past misconduct is a bright-line rule that would be easy to enforce and understand. Any time a finding of or a sentence for contempt relies on alleged past misconduct, and therefore requires factfinding beyond the scope of what the judge has immediately observed, the additional procedural protections of Rule 42(b) should apply.
¶ 59.1 am fully cognizant of the need and right of the trial judge to control the courtroom and maintain the dignity and authority of the court. In that regard, the presiding judge must be given the authority to determine and punish summary contempt when it occurs in the judge’s presence. Here, it is admitted that the trial court imposed a sentence that it would not have but for the alleged instances of past misconduct. These allegations should have been tested in the crucible of a hearing. Attorney here has been denied any opportunity to do so. I cannot in good conscience agree that he has been afforded the protections that due process requires.
¶ 60. For these reasons, the trial court should have allowed a hearing on the motion to vacate the contempt order, and I would remand to the trial court for that purpose. I respectfully dissent.

 While not the focus of this dissent, I also disagree with the majority that the collateral bar rule applies to preclude review of the merits of the trial court’s order. The collateral bar rule mandates that attorneys preserve for appeal their objections to a trial court’s order rather than simply disobey the order. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1975). As the majority recognizes, a necessary exception to this rule exists where effective appellate review is not available. See ante, ¶ 11. Yet the majority does not suggest how attorney in this case could have obtained review of the court’s order other than through his disobedience.
Here, attorney’s objection to consulting with his client would not be a basis for reversible error such that it could be reviewed in conjunction with an appeal in the underlying criminal matter. Neither was this a situation that would recur. cf. State v. Cherryhomes, 840 P.2d 1261, 1263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing contempt charge for attorney’s violations of dress code). Stated another way, there was no way for attorney to both obey the order and preserve the point for appeal. Because attorney would not otherwise have had an opportunity for appellate review, he should be able to address the merits of the trial court’s order in the appeal of his contempt conviction.
Upon reviewing the merits of the trial court order, I would first consider whether attorney was properly concerned about a potential violation of his client’s Fifth Amendment rights and whether his disobedience of the trial court’s order to consult was motivated by that concern. While compliance with the court’s order to consult may not have led directly to such a violation, continued participation in the plea process as *490interpreted by the trial court could have jeopardized the client’s rights indirectly. Second, upon reviewing the videotape of the hearing, I would conclude that attorney’s behavior was not so disruptive as to support a finding of contempt based on his tone and attitude alone. While attorney might and should have conducted himself with greater decorum, these events all took place in a few moments under escalating conditions. Many courts routinely hear far worse from pro se litigants.

 Rule 42(b) also provides for the right to a jury trial, but this would only be applicable to the finding of contempt, not the sentencing phase.

 Not only does an attorney subject to summary punishment for contempt receive less due process than a criminal defendant, he or she also receives less due process than an attorney sanctioned under the inherent powers of the court. In such eases, the sanctioning court must not only make a finding that the attorney acted in bad faith, but also provide notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Lawson v. Brown’s Home Day Care Center, Inc., 2004 VT 61, ¶ 14, 177 Vt. 528, 861 A.2d 1048 (mem.). If the sanction imposed is punitive in nature, additional due process protections may apply. Id.