Court Opinion

ID: 9593241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:20:51.339344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:19.155679
License: Public Domain

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the balance of the majority’s opinion, I disagree with the majority’s determination that, when the facts and all reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to Michael — as required on review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment — Chief Locke’s use of force against Michael was objectively reasonable and did not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part II. A.1 of the majority’s opinion, affirming the dismissal of Michael’s excessive force claim on that ground.
As the majority acknowledges, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [Michael] [as] the nonmoving party.” Merriam v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 572 F.3d 579, 583 (8th Cir.2009). In my view, the majority’s statement of the facts underlying Michael’s excessive force claim is incomplete in light of the standard of review and neglects to “view[ ] all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to” Michael, as we must. See id.
Based on the facts as alleged by Michael, Michael witnessed Chief Locke touching Diane in a way that Michael believed to be inappropriate. When Chief Locke began moving his hands underneath Diane’s shirt toward her breast area, Michael exited the vehicle. Michael stated, ‘To, dude, what’s the problem? You can’t be touching her thataway.” When Michael made those comments, he was standing beside the car. Chief Locke told Michael that Chief Locke would talk to Michael in a minute. Michael remained where he was, smoking a cigarette. Chief Locke then walked Diane to where Michael was standing. Michael took one step toward Chief Locke. Chief Locke told Michael to “[g]et back in the fucking car” and, at the same time, Chief Locke tasered Michael. Michael never saw the taser. The taser darts hit Michael in the chest and shoulder. Michael fell to the ground. At that point, Diane informed Chief Locke that Michael had medical problems, including a history of heart attack, a severely injured back, and two neck surgeries. ’
After handcuffing Diane, Chief Locke returned to Michael, who remained on the ground. Chief Locke pulled Michael up off the ground (Michael weighed 112 pounds at the time) and slammed his body into the side of the car. Chief Locke then handcuffed Michael. While holding both of Michael’s hands, Chief Locke took Michael by the neck and pushed him against the side of the car, splitting open the skin above his right eye. Chief Locke then walked Michael back to the patrol car. Chief Locke told Michael to get into the patrol ear and began forcing him into the car. Diane told Chief Locke that Michael had neck and back injuries. Michael asked Chief Locke to give him a minute to get into the vehicle because it was difficult for Michael to bend sideways to get into the car. Instead, Chief Locke took Michael by the back of his head and pushed his head into the vehicle, causing it to strike the side of the door frame. This resulted in a cut on the back of Michael’s head. Chief Locke then pushed Michael into the back seat, and Michael fell into the seat. In assessing the reasonableness of Chief Locke’s conduct, we “focus[ ] on factors such as ‘the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or *859others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’ ” Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 602 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)).
As to the seriousness of the offense, Chief Locke arrested Michael for resisting arrest and interfering with an officer. Although the offense of resisting arrest could certainly pose a risk to an arresting officer, here the facts, viewed in favor of Michael, indicate that he was not meaningfully engaged in this offense. The only instance of resistance by Michael, other than Michael yelling at Chief Locke to stop touching Michael’s wife in a way that Michael believed to be inappropriate, is Michael’s failure to comply with Chief Locke’s command that Michael get back in the car. However, given the simultaneous nature of the issuance of that command and the application of the taser, Michael’s failure to comply cannot be deemed resistance. With regard to Michael’s yelling at Chief Locke, “a reasonable officer would not discharge his Taser simply because of insolence.” Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2008). The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Michael, support the conclusion that Michael’s resistance, if any, was de minimis such that he was not engaging in a serious offense which itself would justify the use of force.
With regard to the second factor, the facts, construed in favor of Michael, do not suggest that Michael posed an immediate threat to Chief Locke’s safety. After Michael exited the car and yelled at Chief Locke, Chief Locke told Michael that Chief Locke would talk to Michael in a minute. According to Michael, he complied with the command and stood there waiting. Chief Locke came toward him, and Michael took a step in Chief Locke’s direction. There is no indication that Michael was engaging in a “ ‘dramatic’ threatening move.” See id. at 9. Thus, the facts do not indicate that Michael posed an immediate threat to Chief Locke’s safety. The fact that Michael had been insolent or frustrated does not change this conclusion.
Finally, as to the third factor, nothing in the record demonstrates that Michael was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Rather, Michael was generally compliant.
In addition, as the majority observes, “the injuries sustained by Michael are relevant in measuring the reasonableness of the force used by Chief Locke.” Ante at 850. However, as the majority points out, “[i]t remains an open question in this circuit whether an excessive force claim requires some minimum level of injury.” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Namanny, 219 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir.2000) (citations omitted)). In analyzing an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim,5 this court stated that a *860taser “inflicts a painful and frightening blow, which temporarily paralyzes the large muscles of the body, rendering the ■victim helpless.” Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir.1993). Indeed, Michael was knocked to the ground by the taser (which left puncture marks) where he remained until Chief Locke pulled Michael to his feet. The Hickey Court described the pain of being tasered as “exactly the sort of torment without marks ... which, if inflicted without legitimate reason, supports the Eighth Amendment’s objective component.” Id.; accord Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir.2008). Therefore, assuming that Michael must make a showing of some minimum level of injury in order to make out a claim for excessive force, the pain and puncture marks inflicted by the taser are sufficient to do so.
In sum, the facts construed in the light most favorable to Michael show that the degree of force used against him was not objectively reasonable, and, in turn, constituted a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In his motion for summary judgment and before this court, Chief Locke asserted that, even if Michael demonstrated a constitutional violation, Chief Locke was entitled to qualified immunity because his alleged conduct did not violate clearly established law.6 In light of its determination that Michael did not make out a constitutional violation, the district court did not address whether Chief Locke’s use of force violated a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s grant of Chief Locke’s motion for summary judgment as to Michael’s excessive force claim and remand the matter for a determination of whether, in the specific context of this case, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct at issue violated a clearly established constitutional right. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent from Part II.A.1 of the majority’s opinion.

. "The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person applies to excessive-force claims that 'arise[] in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen,’ while the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies to excessive-force claims brought by convicted criminals serving their sentences.” Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir.2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). While we analyze a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under a solely objective standard, Hayek v. City of St. Paul, 488 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir.2007), Eighth Amendment excessive force claims involve both an objective and subjective component, Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir.2008). “In [Eighth Amendment] excessive force claims, the subjective inquiry is whether the force was used in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. (quotation omitted).

. "Qualified immunity involves the following two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496, (8th Cir.2009). The Supreme Court has held that courts may exercise their discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first. Pearson v. Callahan, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).