Court Opinion

ID: 9818582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 05:57:10.719304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:05.353841
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I write separately in dissent, not because I believe that the majority has departed from the prevailing view of the law in the current war on crime, but because I believe, in our zeal, that we are in danger of going seriously astray from the fundamental protections envisioned by the framers of both our state and federal constitutions.
Although the State is not required to plead a separate culpable mental state in its deadly weapon allegation, that does not mean that the State is not required to prove a culpable mental state. If a person is charged as a party to an offense involving a deadly weapon, the State must prove that he knew or should have known a deadly weapon would be used by a co-defendant to convict the party of the aggravated offense.1 In Tyra v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that everything that causes death is a deadly weapon, no matter what its intended use.2
The question raised by the case now before this court is whether the actor has the protection afforded to a co-defendant of a person who uses a deadly weapon and to the defendant in general, or whether use or exhibition of a deadly weapon is a matter of strict liability. That is, must the actor know or should the actor know that what he is using is a deadly weapon?
Clearly, in Tyra, the defendant was aware that his vehicle was capable of caus-*804mg death or serious bodily injury.3 But if a parent gives a child a medication prescribed by the treating physician and the child has an unanticipated allergic reaction and dies, has the parent used a deadly weapon to recklessly or negligently cause the child’s death? The medication was capable of causing death or serious bodily injury because it did. Applying the reasoning of Tyra, the parent has used a deadly weapon on his or her child.4
Suppose a high school tennis player gets angry because he believes his opponent has been intentionally making bad calls, so the angry player throws a small athletic bag at his opponent, and unknown to our angry tennis player, the bag contains explosives that explode when they hit the other boy, killing him. Clearly our angry player has committed assault, but has he really used a deadly weapon? The question, then, is does the actor have to know or should he know that he is using a deadly weapon?
In the case now before this court, nothing explains how Appellant was supposed to know that using his hand to push himself away from the complainant was turning his hand into a deadly weapon in the manner of its use. Nothing in the record reflects any intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. Indeed, the complainant’s fall resulted in death only because of his seriously compromised liver.
I believe that if an actor mistakenly thought that he was using a stage prop instead of a real revolver loaded with live rounds when firing at his antagonist in a play, he would be able to rely on the defense of mistake of fact.5 To me, that suggests that the actor must know or should have known that he was using a deadly weapon, not just something that could possibly be used in some manner to cause death or serious bodily injury. That is, he must know or should have known either that the object was a deadly weapon or that it was being used in such a way as to be a deadly weapon.
From the first day of law school, we learn that there must be not only the actus reus, but also the mens rea. We learn that statutes must be sufficiently specific to put the average person on notice of the prohibited conduct. Is the requirement of mens rea really becoming a relic of the past so that our offenses are strict liability crimes requiring no intent or even negligence? Are our offenses really becoming so vague that they are a question of how far the law can be stretched?
Clearly, Appellant knew that he was committing theft. Clearly, he knew that pushing the complainant with his hand and hitting him with the box were both forms of assault. And clearly, Appellant intentionally and knowingly committed robbery of the complainant. But aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon? Judge Onion and Judge Teague, where are you and your colors of amazement and concern?6
*805Because I believe that our federal and state constitutions require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a person found to have used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the commission of an offense did so knowingly or should have known that he was doing so, I respectfully dissent.

. See Stephens v. State, 717 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (stating State must prove defendant was criminally responsible for aggravating element to convict him as party to aggravated offense); Wooden v. State, 101 S.W.3d 542, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd); see abo Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (West Supp.2012) (providing trial court cannot grant community supervision to party who knew deadly weapon was going to be used or exhibited in commission of felony); Gray v. State, No. 02-08-00164-CR, 2009 WL 1905322, at *3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth July 2, 2009, pet. ref'd) (stating State had to prove Gray criminally responsible for principal’s use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the offense to convict Gray as a party to felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated robbery).

. 897 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

. See id.

. See id.

. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.02 (West 2011); Gerber v. State, 845 S.W.2d 460, 467 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (noting that mistake-of-fact defense jury instruction instructed jury to acquit Gerber of murder if it found he had reasonable belief gun he used contained blanks).

. See Port v. State, 791 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (Teague, J., dissenting) (stating that if Presiding Judge Onion had been asked whether opinion he had authored in past implicitly overruled 100 years of case law and repealed 100 years of statutory law, he "would have uttered that famous comment of his: 'If that occurs, color me amazed, one more time.' "); Ex parte McAfee, 761 S.W.2d 771, 775, 783 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) (noting that he was "dissent[ing] to express [his] concern" and stat*805ing, "My color is still amazed.”); Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) ("If you’ll pardon an expression I use[,] 'Color me amazed one more time.’ ”); Ex parte Johnson, 697 S.W.2d 605, 616 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Teague, J., dissenting) ("Presiding Judge Onion of this Court is often prone to utter, when he reads something in law that to him is without legal foundation: 'Color Me Amazed.' ... I am compelled to echo Judge Onion's exclamation.”); Ex parte Green, 688 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Teague, J., dissenting) ("To make the analogy that the majority opinion does causes me to exclaim, 'Color me amazed.’ "); King v. State, 687 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Teague, J., dissenting to majority op. written by Onion, P.J.) (“Color me amazed, but do it in chartreuse.”); McClain v. State, 687 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) (" ‘Color me amazed’ is not an adequate expression of concern here.”); Jenkins v. State, 689 S.W.2d 216, 216 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (Teague, J., dissenting) ("When a majority of this Court does something that is totally inconsistent with a prior decision or decisions of this Court, our presiding judge exclaims[,] ‘Color Me Amazed.’ ... I must echo the above statement.”) (citations omitted); Antunez v. State, 647 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) ("Color me amazed again, this time with a shade of deep concern.”); Malone v. State, 630 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (Teague, J., dissenting) (discussing P.J. Onion's views of idem sonans and stating that they "leave[] one to express, ‘Color Me Amazed One More Time.’ ") (citations omitted); Lawson v. State, 604 S.W.2d 91, 92 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) ("Color me amazed at least one more time.”); Taylor v. State, 508 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) ("Color me amazed once again.”); Aldrighetti v. State, 507 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (Onion, P.J., dissenting) ("Color me amazed.”).