Court Opinion

ID: 9947288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 16:00:56.982253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.284017
License: Public Domain

21-6368-ag
     Gurung v. Garland

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                             SUMMARY ORDER

     RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
     CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
     PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
     32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
     IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
     FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
     “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
     COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
 3   City of New York, on the 4th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.
 4
 5           PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI,
 6                            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 7                            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 8                                    Circuit Judges.
 9           ------------------------------------------------------------------
10           GOVINDA GURUNG,
11
12                           Petitioner,
13
14                   v.                                                           No. 21-6368-ag
15
16           MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
17           STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
18
19                            Respondent.
20           ------------------------------------------------------------------
21
22
 1         FOR PETITIONER:                              Dilli Raj Bhatta, Bhatta Law &
 2                                                      Associates, New York, NY
 3
 4         FOR RESPONDENT:                              Brian Boynton, Principal
 5                                                      Deputy Assistant Attorney
 6                                                      General; Melissa Neiman-
 7                                                      Kelting, Assistant Director;
 8                                                      Giovanni B. Di Maggio, Trial
 9                                                      Attorney, Office of
10                                                      Immigration Litigation, United
11                                                      States Department of Justice,
12                                                      Washington DC
13
14         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

15   Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

16   AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

17         Govinda Gurung, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of a May 27,

18   2021 decision of the BIA affirming a June 27, 2018 decision of an Immigration

19   Judge (IJ), which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

20   relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We assume the parties’

21   familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to

22   which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to deny the petition.

23         We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See

24   Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards

                                              2
 1   of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he

 2   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

3    would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562

4    F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence

5    and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo).

6             The agency found that Gurung was persecuted when Maoists assaulted

 7   him in 2005 for his political opinion. When the agency has found past

 8   persecution, an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has a rebuttable

 9   presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the original

10   claim. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1), 1208.16(b)(1)(i). 1 The presumption may be

11   rebutted if the Government demonstrates that “[t]he applicant could avoid

12   future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of

13   nationality . . . and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect

14   the applicant to do so.” Id. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i); see also id. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B).

15            The record supports the agency’s conclusion that Gurung could avoid

16   future persecution by relocating within Nepal and that he had, in fact, done so.

17   After being beaten by Maoists in his home village in 2005, Gurung relocated to

     1   All citations refer to the regulations in place at the time of Gurung’s proceedings.
                                                      3
 1   Pokhara for about eight years, and then to Kathmandu for more than two years,

 2   without experiencing any physical harm in those places. Gurung testified that

 3   he continued receiving threatening phone calls during this period. The IJ found

 4   that on one occasion in November 2013, Gurung “was in Pokhara when he ran

 5   into Maoists he recognized from his local area. They threatened him verbally

 6   but did not physically harm him.” Certified Admin. R. 103. The agency did

 7   not err in finding that those threats fell short of persecution. The threats

 8   occurred years after the physical harm Gurung suffered in his hometown, and

 9   there was scant evidence that Gurung’s abusers intended to carry out their

10   threats. See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011)

11   (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of

12   treatment our society regards as offensive.” (quotation marks omitted)). The

13   fact that Gurung’s family in Pokhara has not been harmed by the Maoists in the

14   intervening time further undercuts his claim that he fears future persecution.

15   Cf. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999).

16         Although Gurung asserted that he was in hiding while in Kathmandu, the

17   agency reasonably disagreed. As the IJ explained, Gurung worked in a hotel—a

18   place open to the public and used by travelers. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d

                                               4
 1   160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Decisions as to . . . which of competing inferences to

 2   draw are entirely within the province of the trier of fact.” (quotation marks

 3   omitted)). The fact that Gurung continued working there for over two years

 4   without facing harm weighs against his contention that his abusers would harm

 5   him if he returned.

 6         Gurung also testified that he discontinued his political activities when he

 7   lived in Kathmandu, but the record does not compel the conclusion that doing so

 8   was necessary to avoid persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The country

 9   conditions evidence supports the agency’s finding that relocation was possible.

10   That evidence, including a report from the United States Department of State,

11   was consistent with the agency’s finding that periodic political violence in Nepal

12   was attributable to Maoist splinter groups rather than the national political party,

13   and that the Nepali government had made efforts to control these groups. The

14   evidence supports a finding that political violence in Nepal had sufficiently

15   decreased and was so localized that Gurung could express his political opinion

16   without harm, at least outside the immediate vicinity of the village and nearby

17   rural areas where he had drawn the attention of local Maoists.

18         For these reasons, the agency reasonably concluded that the Government

                                               5
 1   rebutted the presumption that Gurung has a well-founded fear or likelihood of

 2   persecution as required for asylum and withholding of removal by showing that

 3   he could safely and reasonably relocate within Nepal. See 8 C.F.R.

 4   §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (ii), 1208.16(b)(1)(i), (ii); Singh v. BIA, 435 F.3d 216, 219 (2d

 5   Cir. 2006). The agency’s conclusion was also dispositive of CAT relief because it

 6   prevented Gurung from establishing the requisite likelihood of torture. 2 See

 7   8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3); Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010)

 8   (holding that where the record does not demonstrate the likelihood of

 9   persecution required for asylum, it “necessarily fails to demonstrate” the

10   likelihood of harm for CAT relief).

     2 Because the agency’s finding that Gurung could safely and reasonably relocate is
     dispositive of all his claims for relief, we do not need to address the agency’s
     conclusions that there has been a “fundamental change in circumstances” in Nepal or
     that Gurung waived his CAT claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A); see INS v.
     Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
     required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
     they reach.”).
                                                    6
1                                   CONCLUSION

2         We have considered Gurung’s remaining arguments and conclude that

3   they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

4   DENIED, and all pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

5   VACATED.

6                                        FOR THE COURT:
7                                        Cathrine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
8

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