Court Opinion

ID: 9856177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:39:53.872428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:17.694257
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I am constrained to agree with the majority opinion not because I find the trial court rendered a correct ruling, but because the state failed to provide a proper record to enable this Court to review the trial court’s ruling.
As the majority points out, we must construe the record most favorably to uphold the trial court’s findings and judgments, and the applicable standard of review does not allow us to second-guess the trial court’s factual findings where they are based on testimonial evidence. This is especially true when the appellant’s assertion of error requires consideration of the evidence presented to the trial court. Here, each of the trial court’s orders recites that the trial court considered, inter alia, “evidence of the parties,” yet the appellant fails to file a transcript of the various hearings or attempt to reconstruct the proceedings in accordance with OCGA § 5-6-41 (g) and (i). When a transcript of the evidence is necessary, as it is here, and the appellant omits it from the record or fails to submit a statutorily authorized substitute, we must assume that the trial court properly exercised its judgment and discretion and that the evidence supported the trial court’s decision.12
That being said, I would like to point out that there were errors in the trial court’s legal analysis. First, the trial court incorrectly *783ruled that Hills v. State13 did not apply because Smiley requested the source codes under OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4), rather than under OCGA § 17-16-23. According to the trial court, OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4) mandates that “full information concerning the test or tests shall be made available” and does not require the information to be in the custody or possession of the state. This has never been the law. As the majority opinion correctly holds, it is well established that the state cannot be compelled to produce items which are not in its possession.14 “[W]hile a motion to produce may be filed and served on the state, such a motion will not reach material which is not in the state’s possession.”15 The use of the term “full information” elsewhere in the Code does not compel us to deviate from settled law. Nonetheless, despite this error, the lack of a transcript or other evidence in record compels us to find that the trial court must have ascertained from proper evidence that the source codes and other items requested were both relevant and were in the state’s possession, custody, or control. The trial court specifically noted in its order: “the State’s argument that it does not possess the documents is not persuasive.” This statement is ambiguous. It could be, and in the absence of a proper record probably must be, interpreted as a factual finding that the source codes and other requested documents were in the state’s possession and control, however unlikely that may be. The statement could also be interpreted, in light of other legal conclusions drawn by the learned trial judge, as a legal conclusion that the state was required to produce the items regardless of whether they were in the state’s possession or control, where the state correctly argued it was not required to produce requested items which were not within its possession.
Second, it appears from the record that the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the state in this case. We have previously found that before discovery will be ordered, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the requested material is within the possession, custody, or control of the state.16 Here, it appears that the trial court required the state to prove that it did not have possession, custody, or control of the source codes. However, once again, due to the lack of a transcript or admissions in the record to the contrary, we must presume that the trial court properly decided the issue.
It is important to note that the ruling in this case does not affect *784our decisions in Hills and Mathis. Our hands are simply tied in this case due to the state’s failure to provide us with a record sufficient to enable us to review the trial court’s decision.
Decided December 22, 2009.
Carmen D. Smith, Solicitor-General, R. Leon Benham, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellant.
George C. Creal, Jr., for appellee.

 See Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669 (2) (482 SE2d 403) (1997).

 291 Ga. App. 873 (663 SE2d 265) (2008).

 See Cornell v. State, 165 Ga. App. 594, 595 (2) (302 SE2d 133) (1983).

 Young v. State, 146 Ga. App. 167, 168 (2) (245 SE2d 866) (1978); see also Shults v. State, 195 Ga. App. 525, 528 (2) (394 SE2d 573) (1990).

 See Mathis v. State, 298 Ga. App. 817, 819 (2) (681 SE2d 179) (2009); Hills, supra.