Court Opinion

ID: 9723106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:02:34.680673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:44.857190
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I concur in the result only. Our Supreme Court has declined to provide effective guidance to the juvenile court as to when to commit a youth who has engaged in acts of violence to the Youth Authority. (See In re John H. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 18 [145 Cal.Rptr. 357, 577 P.2d 177].)1 In the absence of such guidance, I cannot say that discretion has been abused. The legislative scheme, together with the lack of judicial guidance, has placed on the juvenile court a task impossible of performance.
We deal with a youngster who, at the time of the hearing, was 13 years old and weighed 95 pounds.
The statute declares that such a youngster cannot be committed to the Youth Authority without a finding on the part of the juvenile court that the incarceration is in the boy’s best interest. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 734.)2 The trial court has thus ruled that the minor will be benefited by such incarceration. The statute places the juvenile court in a position of deciding that it is in the best interest of a 13 year old to be incarcerated with older, criminally prone, juveniles in a setting where physical assaults, including sexual attacks, are all too common. How can this be?
The statutory scheme contemplates a Youth Authority very different from today’s reality. The Youth Authority was initially established to benefit youngsters of tender years who would benefit from the educational, rehabilitative, and other helpful efforts. In fact, today’s Youth Authority is reserved for “the most severely delinquent youths” (In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 564), many of whom reach the Youth Authority through the criminal courts rather than through the juvenile courts. The legislative ideal of rehabilitation has never been a reality, and it is far less so today than yesteryear.
*215The officials who enforce the law against juveniles have always been far more realistic than the statutes contemplate. Thus, juvenile court judges have traditionally viewed their priorities in dealing with youths as follows: first, rehabilitation; second, deterrence; third, protection of society; and fourth, punishment. When dealing with a crime of violence, even with a boy as young as Gregory, the probation department official tried to balance the interest of the child with the interest of protecting society. That is reality.
Let us examine the sad facts of this case. We deal with a black youngster who had gotten into the company of some older boys. With them he committed a series of crimes, some of violence. The youngster, according to the probation officer, was used as a mascot by the older boys.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court considered only those matters which were the subject of findings or admissions. The judge had before him for disposition the following:
(1) Petition dated April 18:
Count I—Battery (Pen. Code, § 242).
(2) Petition dated July 14:
Count III—Resisting arrest (Pen. Code, § 148).
(3) Petition dated October 18:
Count I—Kidnaping for purpose of robbery
(Pen. Code, § 209).
(4) Petition dated October 21:
Count I—Robbery (Pen. Code, §.211).
Count II—Burglaiy (Pen. Code, § 459).
Three witnesses testified at the dispositional hearing: (1) the probation officer, (2) a psychiatrist, and (3) a psychologist. The judge explained to the youth that, for practical purposes, three placement options were open to the court: sending him to (1) thé Youth Authority, (2) a boys ranch, or (3) a foster home. While the yo.uth had a propensity for assaultive *216behavior the probation department rejected the notion of committing him to the Youth Authority for three related reasons. No reason appears to explain why boys’ ranch option was not considered.
The first reason for rejection of Youth Authority by the probation department deals with rehabilitation. Gregory, the probation officer reported, would have a far better opportunity if placed with the Ezell James Group Home in Riverside, California. The probation officer had confidence that the home could control Gregory, that a male role model would be afforded, and that he would learn to deal with community standards. This ties to the testimony of the psychologist who found nothing emotionally wrong with Gregory but found that he was conforming to his concepts (rather than community norms) of what a young man growing into adulthood should do. Gregory had been living with his grandmother. What happened to his mother and father does not appear in the record. It does appear that Gregory appears to have had a mother who gave him a good, solid emotional foundation in the first few years of his life.
The second reason deals with the Youth Authority. Because of Gregory’s age and small stature, the probation department felt that he would be subject to assault, including sexual assault, in the Youth Authority facilities. Were he to avoid that result, he would do so only by aligning himself with some bigger, tougher youngsters with even greater criminal dispositions. That is, Gregory would learn to be a “better” criminal.
Third, the interest of society would be protected without resort to the Youth Authority. Gregory needed the close supervision at the group home. Perhaps society would be saved the further trauma of another life dedicated to crime. One of the problems with Gregory, all witnesses agreed, was that he lived in an unstructured environment where involvement in violent criminal behavior seemed to have its own rewards.
The probation office tried to balance the interest of helping the minor and that of protecting society. According to the probation officer, “unless there is such a threat to society that society’s welfare takes precedence over the potential treatment versus punishment of the individual,” the youngster should not be placed in a “purely punitive setting.”
Despite the problems of the “unsocialized aggressive behavior” on Gregory’s part, both the psychiatrist and the psychologist who testified *217recommended that Gregory be placed in the group home, rather than in a Youth Authority facility. They were not very well informed about the group home nor about the Youth Authority. The psychiatrist testified that his knowledge of the Youth Authority came “basically” from the newspapers. However, several matters were clear: (1) Gregory was to be punished, (2) Gregory needed a structured program, and (3) the structured program would be found at a site other than his home. The psychologist felt that ideally he should be in a 24-hour a day “lock up” situation for a couple of months before being placed in a home like the Ezell James Group Home. This would provide a better control of Gregory’s violent propensities. The record does not explain why a boys ranch placement followed by an Ezell Home placement could not be ordered. Thus, as between the two choices, the “negative learning experience” of the Youth Authority and the affirmative atmosphere of the group home, each was convinced that the group home was better. With respect to the youngster’s threat to run away if placed for a long term, the psychologist described that talk on the youngster’s part as “bravado.”
The prosecutor argued at the dispositional hearing that the type of facility that could be most beneficial to Gregory was simply not available. The prosecution argued: “We just don’t have anything available other than Youth Authority in that regard, at least in our county, or as far as I’m aware, statewide.” Thus, the prosecution’s recommendation was that the youth be sent to the Youth Authority “for protection of society.” There was no pretense that the youth would be benefited.
A youngster who violates the law by involving himself in a crime of violence expects to be punished. The record indicates that Gregory expected such punishment. Youngsters, however, have a greater capacity to change than do adults. Further, we as a society have a greater responsibility to attempt to socialize the young than we do with respect to adults. Finally, a youngster is far more subject to peer pressure in becoming involved in criminal behavior (as was Gregoiy); he can become involved in criminal behavior without yet being a hardened criminal (and Gregory was not a hardened criminal). Thus we cannot give up on the notion of rehabilitation.
The juvenile laws, since they found their way into the California statutes in 1915, support the commonsensical approach of rehabilitation and protection of society. Thus present Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 indicates that the purpose of juvenile law is “to secure for each minor” the care and guidance which will serve the “spiritual, *218emotional, mental and physical welfare” of that given minor. Deterrence is also mentioned, for another purpose is to protect the “best interest of the state” and to protect the public from “criminal conduct by the minors.” Also an aim is “the protection of the public from the consequences of criminal activity” of the minors and “to impose on the minor a sense of responsibility for his own acts.” It seems manifest that the best rehabilitative interest of the minor, together with the protection of society, demands punishment when a crime of violence has been committed. Only retributive punishment is proscribed.
Except in the most extreme case, the law, in the case of a 13 year old, should not contemplate giving up its rehabilitative aim. The juvenile court seems to have done just that.
The reasons given by the juvenile judge for commitment to the Youth Authority (schooling, discipline and control) could also be met by a placement in a boys’ ranch, or to a lesser extent, the home placement. But the In re John H. court, supra, has said that such a decision lies with the juvenile court.
There is a saving grace. The law contemplates that the Youth Authority may form its own judgment as to whether or not it will accept a youngster. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 736.) In rare cases, perhaps this one, the Youth Authority will refuse to accept the placement.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 24, 1978. Mosk, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The guidance of In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557 [121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65], that the Youth Authority is an institution of last resort has been considerably weakened.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 734 reads as follows: “No ward of the juvenile court shall be committed to the Youth Authority unless the judge of the court is fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of the ward are such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by the reformatory educational discipline or other treatment provided by the Youth Authority.”