Court Opinion

ID: 9890244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 17:11:23.0854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:36.991956
License: Public Domain

J-A03031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE FOR                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
  MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I                 :
  INC. TRUST 2007-HE2, MORTGAGE                :
  PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,                   :
  SERIES 2007-HE2                              :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  KENNETH TAGGART                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 627 EDA 2021

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 15, 2021
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
                     Civil Division at No(s): No. 2018-05654

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023

       Appellant, Kenneth Taggart, appeals from the order entered in the Bucks

County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the motion for summary

judgment filed by Appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as

trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2007-HE2, Mortgage Pass-

Through Certificates, Series 2007-HE2, and entered judgment against

Appellant in the amount of $835,182.13. We affirm.

       The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this

case as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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         On October 1, 2018, [Appellee] initially filed this action in
         mortgage foreclosure against [Appellant] due to an alleged
         payment default and against the United States of America
         due to federal tax liens filed against the mortgaged
         premises. The matter went to mediation at the Bucks
         County Bar Association on October 24, 2018, concluding on
         January 16, 2019. No agreement was reached between the
         Parties and leave was granted for the Parties to proceed with
         this foreclosure action. [Appellant] was represented by his
         counsel of record throughout.

                                  *    *    *

         In 2006, [Appellant] entered into a mortgage and loan
         agreement with Decision One for a loan in the amount of
         $382,500 ("the Decision One mortgage”). As security for
         the loan funds he received, [Appellant] agreed Decision One
         would have a lien on his property located at 45 Heron Road,
         Holland, Bucks County, Pennsylvania 18966. Under the
         terms of the mortgage agreement Decision One named
         Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) as
         its nominee and mortgagee. On July 13, 2010, MERS
         assigned the Decision One mortgage to [Appellee]. Thus, in
         2010, [Appellee] became the mortgagee under the Decision
         One mortgage.

         On June 27, 2018, [Appellee] gave notice to [Appellant] of
         its intention to foreclose on the Decision One mortgage
         because of [Appellant]’s default and failure to make timely
         payments in accordance with the loan terms. As of June 27,
         2018, [Appellee] claimed [Appellant] was in default for
         $392,303.52.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/22/21, at 1-3).

      On January 31, 2019, Appellant filed preliminary objections to Appellee’s

complaint, which the trial court overruled on March 22, 2019. Appellant filed

an answer with new matter and counterclaims on April 11, 2019. Appellant

withdrew all his counterclaims on May 31, 2019. Appellant filed a motion to

dismiss on November 23, 2020, and Appellee filed a motion for summary

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judgment on December 16, 2020. On February 22, 2021, Appellant filed a

motion for extension of time to respond to Appellee’s motion for summary

judgment despite having already filed responses in opposition on January 19,

2021, February 8, 2021, and February 19, 2021. The court denied Appellant’s

motion for extension of time on March 2, 2021, and Appellant filed a notice of

appeal on the same day. Appellant filed an additional response in opposition

to Appellee’s motion for summary judgment on March 4, 2021.

      The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss on March 12, 2021,

and Appellant filed a second notice of appeal on the same day. On March 15,

2021, the court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant

filed the instant notice of appeal on March 17, 2021. The court subsequently

ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal and Appellant complied on March 25, 2021, April 5,

2021, and April 7, 2021, in relation to each order from which he appealed. On

June 29, 2021, this Court quashed Appellant’s first two appeals, noting that

they were taken from interlocutory and unappealable orders.        This Court

specified that Appellant may raise all preserved issues relating to the

interlocutory orders in the instant appeal taken from the final order granting

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

         1. Did the court err when it denied an extension of time to
         Appellant on March 2, 2021?

         2. Did the court err when it denied discovery requests of

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       Appellant on June 22, 2019?

       3. Did the court err when it [overruled] preliminary
       objections on March 22, 2019?

       4. Did the court err when it concluded it had jurisdiction and
       authority to pronounce judgment on March 15, 2021
       pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701 after the order of March 12,
       2021 was “deemed final” and appealed the same day?

       5. Did the court err when it concluded it had jurisdiction and
       authority to pronounce judgment on March 15, 2021?

          a) as Appellee failed to evince admissible evidence of
         debt pursuant to Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v.
         Wicker, [651 Pa. 545,] 206 A.3d 474 [(2019)] and U.S.
         Bank, N.A. v. Pantenis, [118 A.3d 386 (Pa.Super.
         2015)]?

          b) as Appellee failed to produce evidence that they sent
         a “Notice of Intent to Accelerate” the loan pursuant to 15
         and 22 of the mortgage and the Note at 7(c) prior to the
         acceleration of the loan in June 2010?

          c) as Appellee failed to produce evidence that they sent
         a “Notice of Intent to Accelerate” the loan pursuant to “Act
         91”?

          d) as Appellee failed to produce evidence that they sent
         a “Notice of Intent to Foreclose” the loan pursuant to 15
         and 22 of the mortgage and the Note at 7(c) prior to the
         acceleration of the loan in June 2010?

          e) as Appellee failed to produce evidence that they were
         the owner of the note and mortgage despite Appellee’s
         admission that the loan was not in the trust, nor could
         provide evidence of a valid transfer of the note and
         mortgage.

       6. Did the court err when it concluded that Appellee’s claims
       were not barred by applicable defenses to claims, including
       the statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel,
       the statute of frauds, defenses under article three of the
       Pennsylvania UCC [not a party entitled to enforce] and

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         failure to mitigate claims and rescind loan?

(Appellant’s Brief at 6-7) (sections of repetition omitted and reordered for

purpose of disposition).

      Preliminarily, we recognize that appellate briefs must materially conform

to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Regarding the argument section of an appellate brief, Rule

2119(a) states:

         Rule 2119. Argument

             (a) General rule.—The argument shall be divided into
         as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall
         have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or in type
         distinctively displayed—the particular point treated therein,
         followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
         deemed pertinent.

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Importantly, where an appellant fails to properly raise or

develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief is wholly inadequate to present

specific issues for review, a court will not consider the merits of the claims

raised on appeal.    See Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000)

(holding appellant waived claim where she failed to set forth adequate

argument concerning her claim on appeal; appellant’s argument lacked

meaningful substance and consisted of mere conclusory statements; appellant

failed to cogently explain or even tenuously assert why trial court abused its

discretion or made error of law). See also Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21

(Pa.Super 2006) (explaining appellant’s arguments must adhere to rules of

appellate procedure, and arguments which are not appropriately developed

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are waived on appeal; arguments not appropriately developed include those

where party has failed to cite any authority in support of contention); Estate

of Haiko v. McGinley, 799 A.2d 155 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating rules of

appellate procedure make clear appellant must support each question raised

by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority; absent reasoned discussion

of law in appellate brief, this Court’s ability to provide appellate review is

hampered, necessitating waiver of issue on appeal).

      Instantly, Appellant’s brief entirely fails to proffer any argument to

support his first three issues on appeal. Appellant’s brief does not have a

specific section in his argument addressing these claims, fails to explain how

the trial court abused its discretion or made an error of law in relation to these

claims, and fails to discuss the merits of these claims or cite to relevant

authority to support them. Accordingly, Appellant has waived his first three

issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); Glosser, supra; Estate of Haiko,

supra; Butler, supra.

      In his fourth issue on appeal, Appellant contends that he filed a notice

of appeal to the court’s March 12, 2021 order denying his motion to dismiss

prior to the court’s grant of summary judgment. Appellant asserts that he

“filed a praecipe to deem the order as final of March 12, 2021, and a

contemporaneous appeal the same day.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9). Appellant

concludes that thereafter, the court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary

judgment on March 15, 2021 pursuant to Pa.Ra.A.P. 1701, and this Court

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must vacate the court’s grant of summary judgment. We disagree.

      The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure set forth the authority of

the trial court after an appeal is filed as follows:

         Rule 1701. Effect of Appeal Generally

         (a) General rule.—Except as otherwise prescribed by
         these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a
         quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
         government unit may no longer proceed further in the
         matter.

         (b) Authority of a trial court or other government unit
         after appeal.—After an appeal is taken or review of a
         quasijudicial order is sought, the trial court or other
         government unit may:

                                    *    *    *

            (6) Proceed further in any matter in which a non-
            appealable interlocutory order has been entered,
            notwithstanding the filing of a notice of appeal or a
            petition for review of the order.

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a), (b)(6).     Therefore, the trial court retains jurisdiction to

enter judgment if an appeal is taken from a non-appealable interlocutory

order. See Melani v. Northwest Engineering, Inc., 909 A.2d 404, 406

(Pa.Super. 2006) (holding that appeal before entry of judgment did not divest

trial court of jurisdiction where appeal was from interlocutory order).

      An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as

a final order; (2) an interlocutory order as of right; (3) an interlocutory order

by permission; or (4) a collateral order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, 311, 312, and

313, respectively. An appeal may be taken as of right from an order sustaining

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jurisdiction over the person or over real property if: “(1) the plaintiff,

petitioner, or other party benefiting from the order files of record within ten

days after the entry of the order an election that the order shall be deemed

final; or (2) the court states in the order that a substantial issue of venue or

jurisdiction is presented.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(1), (2).

      Instantly, Appellant attached to his notice of appeal from the court’s

March 12, 2021 order a notice stating that Appellant deemed the order

denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss as final pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(1)

and (2).   Nevertheless, Appellant has no authority to deem an order final

pursuant to Section 311(b)(1), as it only permits an appeal as of right if the

plaintiff, petitioner or other party benefiting from the order files an election

that the order shall be deemed final. Appellant did not benefit from the March

12, 2021 order denying his motion to dismiss in any way and as such, his

attempted election to deem the order final did not perfect our jurisdiction.

Additionally, the court did not state in its order that a substantial issue of

jurisdiction was presented. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(b)(2). As Appellant does not

assert that the March 12, 2021 order was appealable on any other grounds,

we agree with the trial court’s assessment that the March 12, 2021 order was

a non-appealable interlocutory order.        Accordingly, the court retained

jurisdiction to pronounce judgment on March 15, 2021, notwithstanding

Appellant’s filing of a notice of appeal on March 12, 2021.      See Pa.R.A.P.

1701(b)(6); Melani, supra.

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      In his fifth and sixth issues combined, Appellant asserts that the court

did not have jurisdiction to enter summary judgment because Appellee failed

to establish that it was the successor in interest of the debt, failed to present

admissible evidence of payment history, and failed to send the required

notices prior to filing the foreclosure action.   Specifically, Appellant argues

that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Appellee is the

successor in interest to the mortgage because Appellee did not produce any

evidence to demonstrate that a valid transfer of the mortgage took place in

compliance with the pooling and servicing agreement.            Appellant further

contends that a genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether Appellee owns

the note because the note was transferred after Decision One Mortgage, LLC,

the originator of the note, was no longer in business. Additionally, Appellant

alleges that Appellee failed to present any reliable evidence of the amount of

indebtedness because Appellee was unable to authenticate the documents

containing payment history and the records on their face were untrustworthy

and incomplete. Appellant also alleges that Appellee failed to send notices to

Appellant as required by the mortgage, note, and pursuant to Act 6, Act 91,

and 13 Pa.C.S.A. 3503.

      Appellant also contends that the court failed to consider the affirmative

defenses that he raised as new matter in his complaint and in opposition to

Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant asserts that Appellee’s

claims are barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel,

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the statute of frauds, the doctrine of laches, and defenses pursuant to 13

Pa.C.S.A. § 3202(b).     Appellant concludes the court erred in granting

summary judgment when Appellee failed to establish standing and Appellant

raised genuine issues of material fact and applicable defenses, and this Court

should vacate the order granting summary judgment. We disagree.

     Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires

us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an

error of law.   Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 908 A.2d 344, 347

(Pa.Super. 2006).    Our Supreme Court has clarified our role on appellate

review as follows:

        [T]he issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to
        any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore,
        on that question our standard of review is de novo. This
        means we need not defer to the determinations made by
        the lower tribunals. To the extent that this Court must
        resolve a question of law, we shall review the grant of
        summary judgment in the context of the entire record.

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152,

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).

     In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment,

        [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
        all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
        a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
        light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts

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        as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
        be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
        no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
        the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
        law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
        existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
        resolved against the moving party.

        Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
        implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
        action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
        completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
        the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
        bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
        evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
        which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
        to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine
        issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
        cause of action or defense, which could be established by
        additional discovery or expert report and the moving party
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
        judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
        summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
        undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to
        make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

        Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
        conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     In an action for mortgage foreclosure, the mortgagee is entitled to

summary judgment if:

        the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that
        they have failed to pay interest on the obligation, and that
        the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount. This is
        so even if the mortgagors have not admitted the total
        amount of the indebtedness in their pleadings.

Cunningham v. McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal

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denied, 557 Pa. 653, 734 A.2d 861 (1999) (internal citations omitted).

      “In response to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party

cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts

demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.”     Bank of Am., N.A. v.

Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 631 Pa. 722,

112 A.3d 648 (2015). General denials of averments in a pleading have the

effect of an admission.    Pa.R.C.P. 1029(b).     Additionally, “in mortgage

foreclosure actions, general denials by mortgagors that they are without

information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of averments as to the

principal and interest owing must be considered an admission of those facts.”

First Wisconsin Tr. Co. v. Strausser, 653 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa.Super. 1995).

      Additionally:

         Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2002 provides,
         “[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... all actions shall be
         prosecuted by and in the name of the real party in interest,
         without distinction between contracts under seal and parol
         contracts.”   Pa.R.C.P.2002(a); see also J.P. Morgan
         Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1258
         (Pa.Super. 2013) (finding a debtor’s claim that appellee
         bank was not a real party in interest to bring foreclosure
         action was a challenge to appellee’s standing)…

         In a mortgage foreclosure action, the mortgagee is the real
         party in interest.    This is made evident under our
         Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure governing actions in
         mortgage foreclosure that require a plaintiff in a mortgage
         foreclosure action specifically to name the parties to the
         mortgage and the fact of any assignments. Pa.R.C.P. 1147.
         A person foreclosing on a mortgage, however, also must
         own or hold the note….       [T]o establish standing in [a]
         foreclosure action, [the mortgagee] ha[s] to plead
         ownership of the mortgage under Rule 1147, and have the

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         right to make demand upon the note secured by the
         mortgage.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Barbezat, 131 A.3d 65, 68 (Pa.Super. 2016) (some

internal citations omitted).

      A note secured by a mortgage is a negotiable instrument, as that term

is defined by the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code (“PUCC”). See J.P.

Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1263 (Pa.Super.

2013). “Pursuant to the PUCC, a debtor who satisfies his obligations under a

negotiable instrument cannot be required to do so again, even if the recipient

of the debtor’s performance is not the holder of the note in question.” Id.

(citing 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3602(a)). “Under the PUCC, a borrower is not in peril

of double liability or injury by an allegedly defective assignment, for if the

assignment to the foreclosing party had been defective, the borrower would

not have to pay on the note to another party.      Thus, … a borrower lacks

standing to challenge the validity of the assignment.” Gerber v. Piergrossi,

142 A.3d 854, 862 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 641 Pa. 179, 166 A.3d

1215 (2017) (holding that mortgagee was entitled to summary judgment

despite mortgagor’s claim that assignment of mortgage and note were invalid

when mortgagee averred that it was the holder of mortgage and produced

copies of recorded mortgage, note, and recorded assignment).

      Instantly, the trial court found that Appellee was entitled to summary

judgment based on the following findings:

         The evidentiary record showed [Appellant] entered into a

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          mortgage agreement with Decision One on September 16,
          2006 for $382,500. There was also an accompanying
          promissory note in which [Appellant] promised to pay back
          the $382,500 loan. Additionally, [Appellant] agreed to pay
          a yearly interest rate of 7.94% on the loan and a late charge
          fee of 5% of the overdue principal and interest. Initially,
          Decision One named MERS as the assignee of the Decision
          One mortgage. However, on July 13, 2010, MERS assigned
          the Decision One mortgage to Deutsche Bank. Thus, the
          evidentiary record clearly proved that as of July 13, 2010,
          [Appellant] was the mortgagor under the Decision One
          mortgage and [Appellee] was the mortgagee.

          On June 27, 2018, [Appellee] sent [Appellant] a Notice of
          Intention to Foreclose the Mortgage because of [Appellant]
          defaulting on the payments due under the terms of the
          mortgage.         According to the evidentiary record,
          [Appellant]’s last mortgage payment was on February 27,
          2009. Furthermore, the evidence showed [Appellant] had
          accumulated substantial late fee charges and unpaid
          interest because of his failure to make timely payments on
          his mortgage. Thus, the evidentiary record clearly showed
          [Appellant] had defaulted on the Decision One mortgage by
          virtue of failure to make the required monthly payments due
          from 2009 to the present. As of this appeal, [Appellant] has
          not paid the mortgage payments due for over twelve years.

(Trial Court Opinion at 9-10).

       The court’s findings are supported by the record. Appellant does not

allege that the documents proffered by Appellee are forgeries.            Rather,

Appellant denies Appellee’s claim of ownership to the mortgage and note

based on allegations that the assignment was invalid. Nevertheless, Appellant

lacks standing to challenge the validity of the assignment.1      See Gerber,

____________________________________________

1 On March 4, 2023, Appellant filed an application for relief with this Court
requesting that we take judicial notice that the challenge raised by Appellant
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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supra. Accordingly, Appellant’s general denials and allegations of deficiencies

in the assignment are insufficient to overcome Appellee’s averments and offer

of proof establishing that Appellee rightfully holds the mortgage and note and

as such, has standing to pursue this foreclosure matter. See CitiMortgage,

Inc., supra; Gibson, supra; Cunningham, supra; First Wisconsin Tr.

Co., supra.

       Regarding     Appellant’s    claim      that   Appellee   did   not   proffer   any

trustworthy evidence of the amount of indebtedness, Appellant cites to

Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v Wicker, supra and U.S. Bank, N.A. v.

Pantenis, supra to support his argument.                   In both cases, this Court

considered the extent of knowledge required for a witness to authenticate a

mortgagee’s records of loan history to satisfy the business records exception

____________________________________________

to the assignment of the mortgage and note is a matter of first impression.
To support this claim, Appellant asserts that his challenge is distinguishable
to that in Gerber because Appellant is claiming that the transfer of the
mortgage and note was an impossibility. Nevertheless, Appellant fails to
distinguish this Court’s holding in Gerber in any meaningful way. Appellant
further fails to explain how he would be in peril of double liability or injury as
a result of an invalid assignment, which was the basis for this Court’s
conclusion that a mortgager lacked standing to challenge the assignment of a
mortgage. Additionally, in support of its holding in Gerber, this Court cited
with approval In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2012), in which the
Bankruptcy court specifically held that a borrower lacks standing to “request
a judicial determination that a loan assignment is invalid due to noncompliance
with a pooling and servicing agreement, when the borrower is neither a party
to nor a third party beneficiary of the securitization agreement.” Id. at 285.
This is precisely the issue that Appellant raises in this matter. Accordingly,
Appellant has failed to establish that the instant matter is outside of the
purview of this Court’s holding in Gerber and we deny Appellant’s request for
relief.

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to the hearsay rule under Pa.R.E. 803(6).2            In both cases, the mortgagee

attempted to authenticate loan history documents that were created by a prior

servicer with an authenticating witness who was a representative of the

current servicer. In Pantenis, the authenticating witness testified that he

had no knowledge of how the prior servicer maintained their records and

whether those records were reliable and could not account for records that

were missing for a period of over a year and an unexplained increase of

$6,000.00 in the principal amount.             The mortgager also testified that she

made payments that were unaccounted for in the records presented. On those

____________________________________________

2 Rule 803(6) provides an exception to the general exclusion of hearsay
evidence in permitting the admission of a recorded act, event or condition if:

          (A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from
          information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;

          (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
          conducted activity of a “business,” which term includes
          business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
          and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for
          profit;

          (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

          (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
          custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification
          that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute
          permitting certification; and

          (E) neither the source of information nor                   other
          circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Pa.R.E. 803(6).

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facts, this Court held that the records were untrustworthy and excluded the

records as hearsay.     In Bayview Loan Servicing, our Supreme Court

confirmed that a third-party witness outside of the organization that created

the loan records could provide sufficient testimony to demonstrate the

trustworthiness of the records depending on the specific facts of the matter.

In that case, the loan history documents presented were admitted because

the authenticating witness testified that he was familiar with the recording

process used by the prior servicer, that the records went through an extensive

“boarding” process when acquired by the current servicer, and the mortgagor

did not identify any facial lapses or errors in the documents.

      Here, Appellant deposed Giovanni Amaya and Nicholas Raab, both of

whom were designated record custodians of Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC

(“SLS”), the servicer of the loan at the time of the foreclosure proceedings.

Mr. Amaya and Mr. Raab testified that the loan was originated by Decision

One and subsequently serviced by Wells Fargo until February 1, 2017, when

SLS became the servicer. Mr. Amaya and Mr. Raab stated that the archived

loan data from Wells Fargo underwent an extensive “boarding” process when

SLS received the data, which involved multiple reviews to ensure accuracy.

Mr. Amaya and Mr. Raab further testified that although SLS does not use the

same recording system as Wells Fargo, they were very familiar with the

system that Wells Fargo used and interacted with it quite often. Mr. Raab

elaborated that Wells Fargo’s recording system is substantially similar to the

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system used by SLS.

      Both parties acknowledged that they did not have loan history data from

Decision One, which spans approximately the first four months after the loan’s

origination. During this time period, one loan payment would have become

due. Mr. Raab testified that although they do not have Decision One’s record

of this payment, the archived loan data from Wells Fargo, which begins at the

second payment that became due, demonstrates that the first payment was

paid without the accumulation of any fees or credits to the account. On this

record, we find no error in the trial court’s reliance on the payment history

documents submitted by Appellee to grant summary judgment. Appellee’s

record custodians testified to facts that were similar to those our Supreme

Court deemed sufficient to satisfy the business records exception to hearsay

in Bayview Loan Servicing. Although Appellee’s records are missing data

of one payment, the subsequent data showed that the payment was made,

and Appellant does not allege any facial errors in the payment history or allege

that any specific payments were unaccounted for. Accordingly, we find no

error in the court’s reliance on the payment history produced by Appellee.

See Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, supra; Cunningham, supra.

      Regarding Appellant’s claim that Appellee failed to send notices required

by the note, mortgage, Act 6, Act 91, and 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503, Appellee

averred and provided payment history documents to show that the mortgage

has been in default since March 1, 2009.       Accordingly, Appellee was not

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required to send an Act 91 notice because the loan has been in default for

more than 24 months. See 35 P.S. § 1680.403c(f)(1) (stating that notice

under Act 91 is not required “to any mortgagor who is more than twenty-four

(24) consecutive or nonconsecutive months in arrears on the residential

mortgage in question, no matter what the reason therefor”).3 Additionally,

Appellant failed to provide any authority to demonstrate that Appellee was

required to send a notice of dishonor pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503 prior to

initiating a foreclosure proceeding.4              Appellant further failed to rebut

____________________________________________

3 On February 28, 2023, Appellant filed an application for relief in this Court

requesting that we take judicial notice of the adjudicative facts in In re
Whitfield, 578 B.R. 273 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2017).            Specifically, Appellant
requests this Court to take notice that the court in In re Whitfield found that
an Act 91 notice was a condition precedent to a mortgage foreclosure action.
Based on our determination that an Act 91 notice was not required in this case
due to the length of time the loan was in default, In re Whitfield is not
applicable here and as such, we deny Appellant’s application for relief.

4 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503 provides in relevant part:

          § 3503. Notice of dishonor

          (a) Requirement of notice.—The obligation of an indorser
          … and the obligation of a drawer … may not be enforced
          unless:

              (1) the indorser or drawer is given notice of dishonor of
              the instrument complying with this section; or

              (2) notice of dishonor is excused under section 3504(b)
              (relating to excused presentment and notice of
              dishonor).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellee’s claim that it sent a notice as required by Act 6 and the provisions

of the mortgage and note by certified mail on June 27, 2018.                Appellee

attached a copy of the notice to its complaint. The notice gives a breakdown

of the total amount due, informs Appellant of his right to cure the default, and

discloses that Appellee intends to initiate foreclosure proceedings if the default

is not cured within the allotted time period. Appellant’s unsubstantiated denial

that the notice was sent is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material

fact. See Gibson, supra; Chenot, supra.

       Additionally, we see no merit to Appellant’s claims that the June 27,

2018 notice was insufficient because Appellee sent the notice after it

accelerated the loan. In support of this claim, Appellant notes that Appellee

previously initiated two foreclosure proceedings against Appellant based on

the same mortgage and note in 2010.                In both prior complaints, Appellee

alleged that it accelerated the loan in 2010. Appellant claims that the loan

was never deaccelerated after the prior proceedings were withdrawn and/or

dismissed because Appellee never sent Appellant a notice of deacceleration.

____________________________________________

          (b) Manner of notice.—Notice of dishonor may be given
          by any person; may be given by any commercially
          reasonable means, including an oral, written or electronic
          communication; and is sufficient if it reasonably identifies
          the instrument and indicates that the instrument has been
          dishonored or has not been paid or accepted. Return of an
          instrument given to a bank for collection is sufficient notice
          of dishonor.

13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503.

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Nevertheless, Appellant fails to provide any authority to support his contention

that Appellee was required to send a notice of deacceleration.

      Additionally, all the evidence of record suggests that Appellee

deaccelerated the loan. Mr. Raab stated during his deposition that the loan

was deaccelerated after the prior proceedings were withdrawn and/or

dismissed.    The payment history shows that the payments continued to

become due and late fees continued to accumulate after the prior proceedings

were concluded. Additionally, the notice sent on June 27, 2018 states that

Appellant has the ability to cure the default for an amount less than the total

amount demanded in the instant complaint when Appellee claims the loan was

accelerated. Appellee failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that the

loan was not deaccelerated and as such, has failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact. See Gibson, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we see no

error with the court’s conclusion that Appellee’s June 27, 2018 notice was

properly sent. See Mee, supra.

      With respect to Appellant’s affirmative defenses, Appellant failed to

allege any meritorious defenses to prevent the entry of summary judgment.

Appellant’s claim that the instant action is barred by res judicata and collateral

estoppel based on the prior two actions filed by Appellee merits no relief

because Appellant failed to establish that the prior actions were adjudicated

on the merits. See Matternas v. Stehman, 642 A.2d 1120, 1123 (Pa.Super.

1994) (explaining that doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel serve

                                     - 21 -
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to preclude litigation, respectively, of claims and issues for which final

judgment on merits has previously been entered by court of competent

jurisdiction). Additionally, the instant action is based on an additional period

of default with a new sum for damages. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n as Tr.

for Citigroup Mortg. Loan Tr. 2006-WFHE3, Asset-Backed Pass-

Through Certificates, Series 2006-WFHE3 v. Davis, 232 A.3d 952, 958

(Pa.Super. 2020) (holding that mortgagee’s subsequent foreclosure action

was not barred by res judicata because new action was based on different

span of time and different period of default). Appellant also failed to establish

that he is entitled to relief based on the doctrine of laches because Appellant

did not plead any specific prejudice suffered as a result of the delay. See

Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating: “The party

asserting laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice

from the lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness

has died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or

destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation that

the opposing party has waived his claims”).

       Additionally, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that he is entitled to

rescind on the loan pursuant to 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3202 because the original

lender failed to disclose all the terms of the loan within three days.5 Section

____________________________________________

5 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3202 provides:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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3202(b) specifically states that this remedy cannot be asserted against a

subsequent holder in due course. See 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 3202(b). Appellant also

failed to establish that Appellee’s claims are barred by the statute of frauds

because Appellant merely reasserts his argument that Appellee failed to

present reliable documents to demonstrate that it owned the mortgage and

note.   Finally, Appellant’s claim that the action is barred by the statute of

limitations also fails. The statute of limitations for a negotiable instrument

under seal is 20 years and Appellee filed the instant action within that

proscribed time period.6 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5529(b)(1) (stating: “an action

____________________________________________

          § 3202. Negotiation subject to rescission

          (a) General         rule.—Negotiation    is   effective   even   if
          obtained:

              (1) from an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers or
              a person without capacity;

              (2) by fraud, duress or mistake; or

              (3) in breach of duty or as part of an illegal transaction.

          (b) Rescission or other remedies.—To the extent
          permitted by other law, negotiation may be rescinded or
          may be subject to other remedies, but those remedies may
          not be asserted against a subsequent holder in due course
          or a person paying the instrument in good faith and without
          knowledge of facts that are a basis for rescission or other
          remedy.

6 Appellant filed an application for relief with this Court on June 7, 2023.
Therein, Appellant asks this Court to dismiss the action because the applicable
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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upon an instrument in writing under seal must be commenced within 20

years”). See also Valley Nat'l Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1223

(Pa.Super. 2019) (holding that mortgage with acknowledgement that it was

signed, sealed and delivered was constructively under seal). Based on the

foregoing, we agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to raise any

genuine issues of material fact to rebut Appellee’s foreclosure claim.7 See

Gibson, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

statute of limitations to this matter is four years, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5525(a)(8), which sets the statute of limitation for an action upon a contract,
obligation or liability founded upon a writing not otherwise specified at four
years. Appellant alleges that the mortgage and note in this matter are not
subject to the 20-year statute of limitations as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5529(b) because at the time the contract was entered into on September 15,
2006, the 20 year statute of limitation was set to expire on June 27, 2018,
under the version of the statute then in effect. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5529(b)(2)
(stating this subsection shall expire June 27, 2018) (effective until June 24,
2018). Appellant acknowledges that the statute was amended on June 25,
2018, deleting the portion of the statute which set forth an expiration date.
Nevertheless, Appellant insists that because the expiration date was in place
at the time Appellant entered into the mortgage, the 20-year statute of
limitation “expired” for purposes of the enforcement of this mortgage and
reverted to the four-year statute of limitation set forth in Section 5525(a)(8).
Nevertheless, a plain interpretation of our legislature’s action in removing the
expiration provision indicates that the 20-year statute of limitations was in
place at the time Appellant entered into the mortgage and continues to be in
effect today. Accordingly, we deny Appellant’s application for relief.

7 On February 16, 2023, this Court entered an order denying Appellant’s
application to stay proceedings or supersedes pending resolution of this
appeal. On March 1, 2023, Appellant filed an application for reconsideration
of this order. In support of his request, Appellant reiterates the same claims
he raised on appeal regarding the impropriety of the trial court’s entry of
summary judgment. Based on our disposition, we deny Appellant’s request.

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Date: 10/12/2023

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