Court Opinion

ID: 9581046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:11:15.15768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:40.176850
License: Public Domain

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially and in the judgment only.
Based on our standard of review and the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility in this case, we must conclude that, based on the evidence of record and under the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Smith lacked sufficient facts to develop any reasonable, articulable suspicion that Hester had committed any crime prior to having him stopped. As such, Hester’s stop was constitutionally infirm at its outset, and our analysis need go no further. For this *507reason, I regrettably cannot concur with all that is said in the analysis of the majority opinion and must write separately.
The standard of review in this case is well established.
When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s order concerning a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court should be guided by three principles. First, the trial judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support the findings. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the trial court’s findings and judgment.
(Footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State.23
Here, Sergeant Smith testified unequivocally that, without obstruction, he witnessed Hester make a U-turn “in the curve on a hill crest,” thereby making the U-turn illegal pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-121. Sergeant Smith further testified that the only reason he had Hester stopped was because he had committed this purportedly illegal U-turn. Hester, on the other hand, testified that he made his U-turn on a straight portion of the road which was both flat and level in such a way that the driving maneuver would have been legal.
After weighing this directly conflicting evidence, the trial court chose to believe Hester and disbelieve Sergeant Smith and found that, since no illegal U-turn occurred, Sergeant Smith had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity on which to base the initial stop of Hester’s car. In accordance with our longstanding standard of review, we must accept, unless clearly erroneous, both the trial court’s determination of Sergeant Smith’s credibility and its finding of fact that no illegal U-turn occurred. As there is no evidence showing that the trial court acted erroneously, we must conclude that the initial stop of Hester was improper.
In drawing this conclusion, we need not and cannot reach questions regarding the honesty of Sergeant Smith’s belief that an illegal U-turn occurred because, under the facts as found by the trial court, there were simply no reasonable grounds for Hester’s stop. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and rulings, Sergeant Smith saw no crime being committed, and there is no *508evidence of record which, under the totality of the circumstances, would render any suspicion of criminal activity he harbored regarding Hester’s actions otherwise reasonable. See, e.g., In the Interest of B. C. G.24 (physical precedent only).
Decided July 15, 2004.
Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor-General, Jeffrey P. Kwiatkowski, Wanda L. Vance, Jason R. Samuels, Assistant Solicitors-General, for appellant.
Monte K. Davis, for appellee.
As a result, although I understand the noble motives of the majority, we are not authorized to reach or overrule this Court’s prior decision in State v. Stokes.25 This opinion does not turn on the honesty of Sergeant Smith’s beliefs, which the trial court has already implicitly decided in any event. The trial court’s ultimate determinations of whether Sergeant Smith honestly believed that a crime had been committed and whether reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to initially stop Hester rested on the trial court’s resolution of credibility issues and contradictory testimony. For these reasons, Stokes is simply not applicable in the case presently before us.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Smith joins in this opinion.

 Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 627, 628-629 (1) (580 SE2d 348) (2003).

 In the Interest of B. C. G., 235 Ga. App. 1, 5 (2) (508 SE2d 239) (1998).

 State v. Stokes, 185 Ga. App. 718 (365 SE2d 477) (1988).