Court Opinion

ID: 9394742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:12:50.541759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.280129
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Lorish
              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              BRINEATAY BROWNSON
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0988-22-1                                       JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
                                                                                   MAY 16, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                              Michelle J. Atkins, Judge1

                              J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                              Angelique Rogers, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a conditional guilty plea, the Norfolk Circuit Court (“the trial court”) convicted

              Brineatay Brownson (“appellant”) of carrying a concealed weapon (second offense), in violation of

              Code § 18.2-308, and obstruction of justice, in violation of Code § 18.2-460. Appellant’s guilty

              plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress

              evidence obtained during a search of his person. This Court affirms his convictions.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                     1
                     Although the Honorable Michelle J. Atkins signed the final order in this case, the
              Honorable Jerrauld C. Jones signed the order denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
                                            BACKGROUND2

        On September 22, 2021, after 4:00 p.m., Norfolk City Police Officers Curtis Anderson and

Clayton Evancho were sitting in their patrol car on Tyler Street in Norfolk when they saw appellant

walking in their direction. Officer Evancho noticed an “L-shaped” outline in the area around

appellant’s right pants pocket and suspected the outline was a possible firearm. Once appellant

made eye contact with the officers, he made a “U-turn” and started walking away from them and

toward the Lexington Park Apartments, where he lived. Appellant also pulled down his shirt and

turned the right side of his body away from the officers’ view.

        The officers followed appellant in their patrol car. Appellant reached an unoccupied

Porsche and entered the backseat behind the driver’s side. The officers parked their patrol car next

to the Porsche. Officer Evancho walked up to the right side of the vehicle, which had the windows

down, and Officer Anderson approached the left side where appellant was seated. One of the

officers asked appellant what he was doing; they then saw him reach toward the floorboard

underneath the front seat and then reach for his right hip. “[A]t least three times” the officers

instructed appellant, “Don’t reach for it.” But appellant continued to reach for that area and said, “It

is not my gun. I’m not reaching for it.” He also said the car did not belong to him.

        Officer Evancho instructed Officer Anderson to remove appellant from the car. Officer

Anderson grabbed appellant’s left arm and removed him from the Porsche. After they pulled

appellant from the car, he again insisted neither the gun nor the car belonged to him. Officer

Evancho began to “pat-down” appellant, and a “.22 Chiappa revolver” fell from appellant’s right

pants leg onto the ground.

        On appeal, this Court recounts the facts in the “‘light most favorable’ to the
        2

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Ray v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 291,
297 (2022) (quoting Yerling v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 527, 530 (2020)).
                                               -2-
       At a suppression hearing on February 23, 2022, appellant moved to suppress the evidence

obtained during the search, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of

illegal activity to justify stopping and detaining him. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to

suppress.

       On April 5, 2022, appellant pleaded guilty conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of

the motion to suppress. The trial court convicted appellant of carrying a concealed weapon and

obstruction of justice. On June 3, the trial court sentenced appellant to 3 years’ imprisonment with

2 years and 2 months suspended for the concealed weapon conviction; it suspended the entirety of

the 12-month sentence for the obstruction of justice conviction. This appeal followed.

                                              ANALYSIS

       Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the

officers did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and seize him. 3 His “claim that

evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and

fact that [this Court will] review de novo on appeal.” Daniels v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 422,

431 (2018) (quoting Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 573 (2002)). “When reviewing a

denial of a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth and ‘will accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable

inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.’” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 182, 186

(2019) (quoting Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 520 (2010)). On appeal, the burden

therefore lies with appellant “to show that the ruling, when the evidence is considered most

favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.” Daniels, 69 Va. App. at 431

(quoting Hill v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 610, 616-17 (2018)).

       3
           He does not challenge the subsequent pat down.
                                               -3-
        “Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968), and its progeny, a police officer ‘may

constitutionally conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable

suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016)

(quoting Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 385 (2012)). “In reviewing whether an

officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a seizure, a reviewing court

must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’” Mitchell v. Commonwealth,

73 Va. App. 234, 247 (2021) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). While “a

mere hunch” is not enough, “the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than

proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for

probable cause.” Id. at 246-47 (quoting Bland, 66 Va. App. at 413).

        The standard for “whether the conduct of a police office is reasonable ‘is judged from the

perspective of a[n objectively] reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of split -second

decisions and without regard to the officer’s [subjective] intent or motivation.’” McArthur v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 352, 360 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v.

Commonwealth, 54 Va. App. 1, 7 (2009)). This standard “permits an officer ‘to view the

circumstances confronting him in light of his training and experience.’” Hill, 68 Va. App. at 619

(quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 19 (2010)).

        Under the totality of the circumstances here, the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying

their stop of appellant. First, as soon as appellant made eye contact with the officers, he

immediately made a “U-turn,” started walking away from them, and entered the backseat of a

parked, unoccupied car that he admitted did not belong to him. See Branham v. Commonwealth,

283 Va. 273, 280 n.2 (2012) (“Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining

reasonable suspicion.” (quoting Whitfield v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 358, 362 (2003))).

                                                  -4-
        Second, Officer Evancho suspected appellant had a possible weapon because he noticed an

“L-shaped” outline in appellant’s right pants pocket. Appellant also pulled his shirt down and

turned the right side of his body away from the officers’ view after he saw them, in an apparent

attempt to conceal the outline. See Andrews v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 492 (2002)

(holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion when, inter alia, he saw Andrews “had a heavy

object in the center of his jacket and appeared to be trying to conceal it from the officer”). Cf.

Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 946 (1991) (holding that although Troncoso was

carrying drugs and not a weapon, the “bulge” in his clothing and his “efforts to conceal it” gave the

officer reasonable suspicion that Troncoso had a weapon).

        Finally, appellant’s actions in the car heightened the officers’ suspicion. As the officers

approached either side of the car, they saw appellant bend over and reach toward the floor and his

right side. Those “furtive movements” toward the possible weapon and appellant’s disregard of the

officers’ instructions further supported the officers’ suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal

activity. See Hill, 68 Va. App. at 622; see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 548, 557

(2008). Before his removal from the car, appellant also admitted the car did not belong to him.

Additionally, he confirmed the officers’ suspicions that he had a gun when he said, “It is not my

gun,” just before they seized him from the car.4 Based on the totality of the circumstances—and

viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth—the officers had reasonable,

articulable suspicion to then order appellant out of the car and detain him.

        4
          “A person is not seized according to the Fourth Amendment until he submits to a police
officer’s show of authority.” Hill, 68 Va. App. at 617 (citing Cochran v. Commonwealth, 258
Va. 604, 608 (1999)). Because appellant disregarded the officers’ commands, he was not seized
for Fourth Amendment purposes until the officers began to physically remove him from the car.
See id. at 618 (finding appellant was not seized when he ignored detectives’ commands but was
seized once they “physically removed him from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs”).
                                                -5-
                                             CONCLUSION

        This Court finds no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the

evidence because the totality of the circumstances gave the officers reasonable, articulable suspicion

of appellant’s criminal activity, justifying his detention. Therefore, this Court rejects appellant’s

arguments and affirms the convictions.

                                                                                        Affirmed.

                                                  -6-