Court Opinion

ID: 9928393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:10:24.46126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:06.364133
License: Public Domain

414                 January 31, 2024                No. 51

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                JOSHUA LONG-ELLIS,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
              Lincoln County Circuit Court
                    143040; A179424

  Amanda R. Benjamin, Judge.
  Submitted December 19, 2023.
  Austin J. Burke and Lohrke Law filed the briefs for
appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 414 (2024)   415
416                                        State v. Long-Ellis

        AOYAGI, P. J.

         In 2015, defendant was convicted of harassment
and sentenced to probation. One of his probation conditions
was to complete sex offender treatment and submit proof
of completion to the court. Although defendant apparently
did not complete treatment, the state never initiated any
probation-violation proceedings, and defendant’s probation
expired in 2020. In 2021, defendant moved to set aside his
conviction under ORS 137.225. The prosecuting attorney did
not object. The trial court denied the motion without a hear-
ing. Defendant moved for reconsideration, including assert-
ing that the court was required to hold a hearing before
denying the motion. The court held a hearing, and again
denied the motion, on two grounds: (1) that defendant had
not “fully complied with and performed the sentence of the
court,” an eligibility requirement under ORS 137.225(1)(a),
in that he failed to complete sex offender treatment; and
(2) that defendant’s failure to complete sex offender treat-
ment made him a threat to public safety, a ground for denial
under ORS 137.225(3)(a). Defendant appeals. We address
each ground for the court’s ruling in turn and, ultimately,
affirm.

        APPLICABLE VERSION OF ORS 137.225

          As a preliminary matter, we address which ver-
sion of the statute is at issue. Defendant filed his motion in
December 2021. Significant amendments to ORS 137.225
went into effect on January 1, 2022. Or Laws 2021, ch 486,
§ 1; Or Laws 2021, ch 207, § 1. The trial court issued its
initial order in March 2022 and its reconsideration order in
August 2022. The parties implicitly agree that the trial court
applied the current version of ORS 137.225—i.e., the version
in effect at the time of its rulings—and the text of the recon-
sideration order supports that understanding. There is also
no dispute that it was proper to do so. We therefore conduct
our analysis under the current version of the statute. All
citations and quotations are to the current version of ORS
137.225, unless otherwise specified.
Cite as 330 Or App 414 (2024)                                               417

            ELIGIBILITY UNDER ORS 137.225(1)(a)
         ORS 137.225 contains a detailed procedure for set
aside of certain criminal convictions. Regarding eligibility,
ORS 137.225(1)(a) provides:
       “(a) At any time after the person becomes eligible as
    described in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any person
    convicted of an offense who has fully complied with and per-
    formed the sentence of the court for the offense, and whose
    conviction is described in subsection (5) of this section, by
    motion may apply to the court where the conviction was
    entered for entry of an order setting aside the conviction.
    A person who is still under supervision as part of the sen-
    tence for the offense that is the subject of the motion has
    not fully complied with or performed the sentence of the
    court.”

(Emphasis added.) See also State v. Langan, 301 Or 1, 5, 718
P2d 719 (1986) (“A defendant is the movant in seeking to
have his conviction set aside under ORS 137.225, and it is his
burden to show that he meets the criteria of that statute.”).
         The only eligibility criterion at issue here is the
requirement that defendant had “fully complied with and
performed the sentence of the court” for the harassment con-
viction. In its initial order denying defendant’s motion, the
trial court stated, “Affidavit does not establish that defen-
dant successfully completed the terms of his probation. No
proof of such is on record with the court.” The court then
held a hearing at defendant’s request and, after the hearing,
reaffirmed that ground for its ruling.1 Emphasizing that it
was defendant’s burden to prove eligibility for set aside and
that defendant had declined to offer evidence or testimony
at the hearing, the court concluded “that defendant is not
eligible pursuant to ORS 137.225(1)(a) as he has not ‘fully
complied with and performed the sentence of the court’ for
the offense.” Specifically, the court explained, defendant had
    1
      The initial order also stated a second basis for denial of the motion, which
was lack of “proof of victim notification.” It was the prosecuting attorney’s duty
to notify the victim, ORS 137.225(2)(b), and the prosecutor represented at the
hearing that the victim had been notified and did not want to attend. The recon-
sideration order does not mention victim notification, and the parties treat the
reconsideration order as superseding the initial order, so we do not address fur-
ther that additional initial basis for denial.
418                                                    State v. Long-Ellis

failed to complete sex offender treatment and submit proof
of completion to the court. The court acknowledged that
defendant had never been found in violation of his probation,
but it viewed “[t]he failure of the state to take action on his
previous probation violations [a]s a separate issue which has
no impact on whether or not the defendant fully complied
with his probation.”
         On appeal, defendant argues that we should con-
strue “fully complied with and performed the sentence of the
court” in ORS 137.225(1)(a) as encompassing situations in
which a person completed a probationary sentence without
any found violations, regardless of whether the person actu-
ally fully complied with the probation conditions. To put it
another way, defendant argues that the trial court lacked
authority under ORS 137.225(1)(a) to find a probation viola-
tion after the fact. In support of that proposition, defendant
relies on two cases: State v. Branam, 220 Or App 255, 185 P3d
557, rev den, 345 Or 301 (2008), and State v. Granberry, 260
Or App 15, 316 P3d 363 (2013). In response, the state—which
took no position below—concedes the point, adopting defen-
dant’s reasoning on ORS 137.225(1)(a) without discussion.
         “The proper meaning and application of ORS
137.225 is a matter of statutory interpretation * * *.” Branam,
220 Or App at 258. We therefore review for legal error. State
v. Sylva, 314 Or App 661, 662, 500 P3d 49 (2021). We are not
bound by concessions and must independently assess their
legal correctness. State v. R. L. W., 267 Or App 725, 728, 341
P3d 845 (2014).
         Here, the issue is the meaning of “fully complied
with and performed the sentence of the court,” which raises
questions about both the meaning of “fully” and the differ-
ence, if any, between “complied with” and “performed.” Our
prior decisions in Branam and Granberry are potentially
relevant, but not controlling, on the issue. Branam involved
a defendant who was revoked from probation, completed a
jail sentence, then moved to set aside his conviction under
ORS 137.225 (2005).2 220 Or App at 257. Resorting to max-
    2
      ORS 137.225 has been amended repeatedly since 2005. The full citation
is ORS 137.225 (2005), amended by Or Laws 2007, ch 71, § 35; Or Laws 2009,
ch 360, § 1; Or Laws 2009, ch 560, § 1; Or Laws 2011, ch 547, § 29; Or Laws 2011,
Cite as 330 Or App 414 (2024)                                               419

ims of statutory construction to resolve an ambiguity, we
construed “the sentence of the court” in ORS 137.225(1)(a)
(2005) as referring only to the ultimate jail sentence and
not to the initial probationary sentence. Id. at 263-64.
Granberry involved a defendant who was put on probation
under a conditional-discharge agreement, without convic-
tion, pursuant to ORS 475.245 (2009).3 260 Or App at 16.
Construing the phrase “[u]pon fulfillment of the terms and
conditions [of probation]” in ORS 475.245 (2009), we con-
cluded that, because the defendant’s probationary term had
expired without any violation proceedings, he had fulfilled
the terms and conditions of probation, and the trial court
“lacked authority” to belatedly find probation violations and
thus avoid the discharge and dismissal otherwise required
by the statute. Id. at 20-24.
          Facially, Branam and Granberry are relevant but
not controlling. Moreover—although neither party mentions
it—since those cases were decided, the legislature has mate-
rially amended both ORS 137.225(1) and ORS 475.245. ORS
137.225(1)(e) now expressly addresses defendants who were
revoked from probation and then completed a term of incar-
ceration, essentially making them eligible for set aside but
requiring a potentially longer waiting period. See Or Laws
2015, ch 820, § 32a (adding that provision); Or Laws 2021,
ch 486, § 1 (amending and renumbering that provision). And
ORS 475.245(4) now expressly addresses the situation where
a conditional-discharge agreement expired without initia-
tion of any probation-violation proceedings “but the terms
and conditions of the probation agreement have not been ful-
filled,” essentially requiring an adjudication of guilt, unless
the court “[o]rder[s] a new period of probation to allow the
person to fulfill the terms and conditions of the probation
agreement[.]” See Or Laws 2015, ch 125, § 1 (adding that

ch 595, § 87; Or Laws 2011, ch 196, § 1; Or Laws 2011, ch 533, § 1; Or Laws 2012,
ch 70, § 4; Or Laws 2013, ch 390, § 1; Or Laws 2015, ch 820, § 32; Or Laws 2015,
ch 820, § 32a; Or Laws 2015, ch 235, § 1; Or Laws 2017, ch 338, § 1; Or Laws 2017,
ch 339, § 1; Or Laws 2018, ch 120, § 12; Or Laws 2019, ch 553, § 12; Or Laws 2021,
ch 207, § 1; Or Laws 2021, ch 486, § 1.
    3
      ORS 475.245 has been amended several times since 2009. The full citation
is ORS 1475.245 (2009), amended by Or Laws 2011, ch 524, § 2; Or Laws 2013,
ch 75, § 1; Or Laws 2015, ch 125, § 1; Or Laws 2016, ch 24, § 58; Or Laws 2017,
ch 21, § 23; Or Laws 2019, ch 445, § 1.
420                                            State v. Long-Ellis

provision); State v. Herrera, 280 Or App 830, 836 n 5, 383
P3d 301 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 852 (2017) (explaining that
ORS 475.245 was amended in response to Granberry, so as
“to provide the authority lacking in Granberry”). Those stat-
utory amendments undermine defendant’s arguments for
extending the reasoning of Branam and Granberry.
         Under the circumstances, and notwithstanding the
state’s concession, this is not the appropriate case in which
to decide as a matter of first impression whether trial courts
have authority under ORS 137.225(1)(a) to find historical
probation violations, despite a lack of probation-violation
proceedings, as part of deciding whether the defendant
“fully complied with and performed the sentence of the
court.” Whatever the merits of that issue, the trial court’s
alternative basis for denying the set-aside motion in this
case proves dispositive. We therefore proceed to the alterna-
tive basis and leave the construction of ORS 137.225(1)(a) for
another day.
 PUBLIC-SAFETY FINDING UNDER ORS 137.225(3)(a)
         As an alternative basis for denying defendant’s
motion to set aside his harassment conviction, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that defen-
dant’s failure to complete sex offender treatment made him
a threat to public safety. The court noted that defendant’s
conviction was “of a sexual nature involving a minor” and
that defendant failed to complete treatment despite agree-
ing to do so in his plea agreement and being ordered to do so
by the court.
         When a person moves to set aside a conviction under
ORS 137.225(1)(a), the prosecuting attorney has 120 days
to file an objection under ORS 137.225(2). ORS 137.225(3)
addresses how the court should then proceed, stating in rel-
evant part:
      “(a) If an objection is received to a motion filed under
   subsection (1)(a) of this section, the court shall hold a hear-
   ing, and may require the filing of such affidavits and may
   require the taking of such proofs as the court deems proper.
   The court shall allow the victim to make a statement at the
   hearing. If the person is otherwise eligible for relief under
   this section, the court shall grant the motion and enter
Cite as 330 Or App 414 (2024)                                     421

   an order as described in paragraph (b) of this subsection
   unless the court makes written findings, by clear and con-
   vincing evidence, that the circumstances and behavior of the
   person, from the date of the conviction the person is seeking
   to set aside to the date of the hearing on the motion, do not
   warrant granting the motion due to the circumstances and
   behavior creating a risk to public safety. When determining
   whether the person’s circumstances and behavior create a
   risk to public safety, the court may only consider criminal
   behavior, or violations of regulatory law or administrative
   rule enforced by civil penalty or other administrative sanc-
   tion that relate to the character of the conviction sought to
   be set aside. The court may not consider nonpunitive civil
   liability, monetary obligations and motor vehicle violations.
   * * *”
       “(b) The court shall grant a motion filed under subsec-
   tion (1)(c) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (1)(a) of
   this section if no objection to the motion is received, and
   shall enter an appropriate order containing the original
   arrest or citation charge, the conviction charge, if applica-
   ble and different from the original, the date of charge, the
   submitting agency and the disposition of the charge.”
(Emphasis added.)
           On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court
erred in denying his motion based on a public-safety find-
ing. He does not challenge the substance of the finding, but
instead contends that the trial court lacked authority to make
it at all. As defendant reads the statute, only if an objection
is received may the court hold a hearing pursuant to ORS
137.225(3)(a), and only if the court holds a hearing pursuant
to ORS 137.225(3)(a) may the court deny set aside based on
a public-safety finding. Here, no objection was received, so
it follows, defendant argues, that the hearing in this case
“could not have been held pursuant to ORS 137.225(3)(a).”
Defendant does not identify on what other authority he
believes the hearing was held. The state responds that defen-
dant invited the claimed error by requesting a hearing, that
defendant did not preserve any claim that it was error to fol-
low the procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a), and that the trial
court was acting in accordance with State v. Singleton, 317
Or App 49, 503 P3d 499 (2022), when it granted defendant’s
request for a hearing. Defendant rejoins that the hearing
422                                                    State v. Long-Ellis

was only to address eligibility under ORS 137.225(1)(a) and
was not a hearing under ORS 137.225(3)(a).
          At least at first blush, defendant appears to be cor-
rect that ORS 137.225 contemplates a hearing only in the
event that an objection is received. Compare ORS 137.225(3)
(a) (stating that, “[i]f an objection is received to a motion filed
under subsection (1)(a) of this section, the court shall hold
a hearing,” and providing hearing procedures), with ORS
137.225(3)(b) (stating that the court shall grant the motion
“if no objection to the motion is received”). That begs the
question, on what basis did the trial court hold a hearing in
this case? Defendant omits to mention that he requested the
hearing, and the trial court granted it, on the authority of
Singleton.
         In Singleton, the trial court denied an unopposed
motion for set aside under ORS 137.225 (2019).4 317 Or App
at 50. On appeal, we agreed with the parties that the court
had denied the motion on a legally incorrect ground, and
we remanded on that basis. Id. at 51. We then addressed
whether it was also error to deny the motion without a hear-
ing. Id. As a matter of statutory construction, we held that
ORS 137.225(3) (2019) required the court to provide a hear-
ing before denying the motion. Id. at 51-53. We explained
that, if the court was inclined to deny the motion, even
though the defendant “met the initial criteria” and the state
did not object, the court “was required to provide defendant
with the opportunity to engage in a hearing where relevant
evidence could be admitted and defendant could challenge,
rebut, or explain that evidence and submit contrary evi-
dence.” Id. at 53.
         In this case, after the trial court denied defen-
dant’s unopposed motion for set aside, defendant moved for
reconsideration, including asserting a right to a hearing.
Regarding the right to a hearing, defendant asserted, “The
District Attorney did not oppose the set aside. Even if the
court is inclined to deny the motion, a hearing must first be
held and the parties given an opportunity to engage with
the court.” Defense counsel extrapolated on that assertion
   4
       The amendment history of ORS 137.225 (2019) is included in footnote 2.
Cite as 330 Or App 414 (2024)                            423

in a supporting declaration, arguing that Singleton required
the court to hold a hearing before denying an unopposed
motion. The trial court agreed, held a hearing, and then
issued its ruling.
         Having asserted the right to a hearing and received
a hearing, defendant cannot now claim that it was error to
hold a hearing. See State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214,
203 P3d 274, rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009) (“Under the invited
error doctrine, a party who was actively instrumental in
bringing about an alleged error cannot be heard to com-
plain, and the case ought not to be reversed because of it.
* * * The goal of the rule is to ensure that parties who make
intentional or strategic trial choices do not later blame the
court if those choices prove to be unwise.” (Internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted.)). Therefore, instead,
defendant posits that the hearing that he received was not “a
hearing held pursuant to ORS 137.225(3)(a)” but some other
type of hearing, and that the trial court was not allowed
to make a public-safety finding at a hearing other than “a
hearing held pursuant to ORS 137.225(3)(a).” We are unper-
suaded. Even if some other type of hearing was theoreti-
cally possible, defendant’s motion could only be understood
as requesting a hearing under the statute, subject to the
statutory procedures.
        Defendant requested and asserted a right to a hear-
ing under the authority of Singleton. Given that decision’s
reasoning, there is no question that the hearing required
by Singleton is a hearing conducted in accordance with the
statutory hearing procedures. See Singleton, 317 Or App at
50-53 (construing ORS 137.225(2) and (3) (2019)). The trial
court therefore properly understood defendant to be request-
ing a hearing conducted in accordance with the statutory
hearing procedures. In the current statute, the hearing pro-
cedures are set forth in ORS 137.225(3)(a), and those are the
procedures that the court followed.
        It is possible that the trial court erred in granting
defendant’s hearing request. Neither the parties nor the trial
court addressed the fact that Singleton was decided under
a materially different version of the statute. See Singleton,
317 Or App at 50 & n 1 (construing ORS 137.225 (2019) and
424                                      State v. Long-Ellis

noting that “amendments to the statute went into effect on
January 1, 2022”). Unlike the current version of the stat-
ute, ORS 137.225(3) (2019) does not differentiate between
opposed and unopposed motions, simply setting forth pro-
cedures for a “hearing [upon] the motion.” One possible
reading of current ORS 137.225(3) is that hearings may be
held only on opposed motions and, by extension, that public-
safety findings may be made only as to opposed motions. If
so, it was error to hold a hearing on defendant’s motion—but
defendant invited such error.
         Once the trial court agreed to hold the requested
hearing, it did not err by applying the hearing procedures
in ORS 137.225(3)(a), or, if it did, the error was invited by
defendant when defendant requested the type of hearing
required by Singleton. To the extent that defendant intended
to ask for some other kind of hearing—one not subject to the
hearing procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a)—he failed to do so,
even assuming arguendo that the court would be allowed to
hold a hearing on a motion under ORS 137.225(1)(a) without
following the hearing procedures in ORS 137.225(3)(a).
         We therefore reject defendant’s challenge to the
trial court’s alternative basis for denying his motion and,
accordingly, affirm.
        Affirmed.