Court Opinion

ID: 9452172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:31:52.899579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:05.833307
License: Public Domain

GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result):
Most of what is said in the scholarly, exhaustive, and extensive opinion of the majority is acceptable to me. I am in substantial agreement with what is said in Parts I, II, III, IV, VI and VII. I particularly applaud the judicial demise of Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5 Cir. 1964), on rehearing 335 F.2d 417 (5 Cir. 1965). I have difficulty with Parts V and VIII of the majority opinion.
While avowing to follow the teachings of Swain v. State of Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the subject, Sections V and VIII then proceed to explain, dilute and erode the Swain principles. Constitutional concepts which were made clear by the “mirror” of Swain, have become clouded and now we “see through a glass darkly.” The result is the creation of a veritable mystique in a field of constitutional law which had been clarified by Swain and other recent cases.
What is important to remember is the fact that most jury selection officials in both state and federal courts are laymen dedicated to the best performance possible of a rather difficult task. Jurors too are laymen so far as legal learning is concerned. It is good to have this mixture of laymen with the technical components of our court system. Constantly, laymen tend to draw us away from the technical thickets of the law to a more practical application of legal standards. The value of the jury system was recognized in the very beginning of American history, and constitutional provisions calculated to vouchsafe its preservation are prominent in our historical background as well as in the Constitution itself. The system has served us well. From the majority opinion I gain the very distinct impression that we are tinkering and meddling with it too much. What the majority says in Sections V and VIII creates an impenetrable and nebulous haze which obscures the constitutional duty of lay jury selectors rather than to furnish practical illumination for their guidance.
It is impractical to undertake to analyze all of the objectionable language in the mentioned sections; an example or two *31will suffice. Section V places too much emphasis on “startling statistics” and a duty to “search for.” Under the statistical and searching formula, an easy attack can be directed upon any jury selection system. Without difficulty, jury selection officials can be convicted of failing to do enough searching. No doubt, cases will arise in which statistics will prove a total absence of certain identifiable groups. For example, as to a particular jury it may be easy to prove that there are not enough, or not any, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, laborers, the wealthy, business executives, professionals, or other components of a particular community.
Likewise, in Section VIII the selection of jurors from broad lists such as “voter registration records, city directories, tax rolls, public utility customer lists, and the like” is not approved unless such lists “give a true picture of the community and its components.” The components are referred to and classified as “racial, economic, sociological, educational, etc.” Even the inclusion of the listed “components” is not sufficient. The jury selectors “must also ‘know’ the internal structure of such area groupings sufficiently to be able to determine identity and availability of those qualified to serve.” (Emphasis added) The foregoing standards constitute the best efforts of the majority to give lay jury selectors practical guidelines to follow. Such standards invite an attack on the jury roll or venire in practically every case. Those who launch the attack will have a ready made background of confusion and uncertainty overshadowing the jury roll or the venire. Furthermore, in practically every case a good mixture of testimony can be presented relating to the wide fields of race, economics, sociology, and education; and when considered along with the positive injunction that the jury roll or venire must have been prepared by those who “know” the “internal structure of such area groupings,” a holding that the jury selection process was not adequate will be impelled.
I regret to say that in my view our best effort to enlighten lay jury selection officials has only achieved the certain and inevitable result of creating confusion not only from their point of view; but in addition I suspect, there will be substantial confusion even amongst those who are charged with the duty of conducting the courts.