Court Opinion

ID: 9792314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:27:02.129186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.984271
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA,
concurring in result only:
I agree that the trial court erred in suppressing the cocaine found on the defendant. However, I do not agree with the majority opinion’s interpretation of section 18-18-406(2), 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) and the distinction it draws between custodial and noncustodial arrests.
The majority opinion holds a police officer may place a suspect under non-custodial arrest, as opposed to a custodial arrest, when issuing a written notice or summons to a person possessing one ounce or less of marihuana under section 18-18-406(2). The court defines the scope of a search incident to a non-custodial arrest as (1) a pat down for weapons, and (2) a search for instrumentalities of crime.
The distinction between custodial and noncustodial arrests has appeal to justify the result here because of the ambiguity of section 18-18-406(2) which juxtaposes arrest with the issuance of a summons. I believe it is an unworkable distinction.
I
Section 18-18-406(2), 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) provides that whenever a person is arrested or detained, the arresting or detaining officer shall prepare a summons for that person to appear in court. The ambiguity in section 18-18-406(2) results from the use of the words “arrest or detention” in reference to action that may be taken against a person for possession of one ounce or less of marihuana and the requirement that the arresting or detaining officer “shall” prepare a written notice or summons. The majority interprets section 18-18-406(2) to allow only a non-custodial arrest under the premise that a custodial arrest is inconsistent with mandatory issuance of a summons.
The majority’s distinction between custodial and noncustodial arrest has no statutory foundation. In interpreting a statute, the court must give effect'to the General Assembly’s intent and give consistent and sensible effect to all of its language.
Nowhere in the Colorado Revised Statutes is the term “arrest” defined nor is there any indication that the legislature intended to divide arrests into specific categories. Section 16-3-102, 8A C.R.S. (1986) grants a peace officer the power to arrest a person in three distinct situations.20 Furthermore, section 18-18-406(2)’s employment of the word “arrest” does not designate any special category of arrest. Reading the criminal statutes as a whole, it is obvious that an arrest pursuant to section 18 — 18—406(2) is allowed when an officer has probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the person arrested.
By contrasting a custodial arrest with a detention for the purpose of issuing a summons, the majority suggests the courses of action are mutually exclusive.21 However, *324the two terms also appear in section 16-3-105, 8A C.R.S. (1986) which provides for the release of an arrested person if an officer is satisfied the arrested person will obey a summons. Other states have statutes specifically allowing officers to arrest and release persons after they receive a summons without making the custodial/non-eustodial distinction.22 These statutes suggest an arrest and the issuance of a summons are not incompatible. Therefore, although issuing a summons may be mandated, it does not preclude an officer from arresting a person by taking the individual into custody, conducting a lawful search incident to the arrest and subsequently issuing the requisite summons.
II
The need for the eustodial/non-custodial distinction hinges on the majority’s definition of custodial arrest. The majority explains that a custodial arrest is defined as an arrest for the purpose of taking the person down to the stationhouse for booking procedures. Maj. op. at 316. The majority distinguishes a non-custodial arrest on the basis that such an arrest involves only a temporary detention while an officer issues a summons. Id. Both must be supported by probable cause. Id. at 317.
I do not agree with the majority’s narrow definition of custodial arrest or its attempt to draw a distinction with a non-custodial arrest. The majority cites to People v. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660, 664-65 (Colo.1986) for support of its custodial arrest definition. Maj. op. at 316. However, the authorities cited in Bischofberger, 724 P.2d at 662 n. 4, in support of this definition state that an arrest usually means a trip to the stationhouse, but they do not divide arrest into custodial/noncustodial categories. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); People v. Tottenhoff, 691 P.2d 340, 343-44 (Colo.1984). Black’s Law Dictionary defines custodial arrest as “[cjonfinement or detention by police or government authorities during which a person is entitled to certain warnings • as to his rights when questioned” (emphasis added) but it does not require a suspect to be taken to the station. Black’s Law Dictionary 384 (6th ed.1990).
Courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have added descriptive adjectives to the term arrest.23 Those adjectives include: custodial arrest, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264, 94 S.Ct. 488, 491, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973); full custody arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221, 94 S.Ct. 467, 470, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); full-fledged, albeit informal arrest, United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir.1988); formal arrest, People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1178 (Colo.1992); and full-scale arrest, People v. Severson, 39 Colo.App. 95, 98, 561 P.2d 373, 375 (1977). These distinctions turn on the concept of custody and not on whether an officer transports a suspect to the station even though that may occur. They do not create new categories of arrests with different standards to be applied.
Ill
Custody is determined by whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.24 Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1178; People v. Harper, 726 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Colo.1986). The Supreme Court has held custody attaches whether or not an officer brings a person to *325the station. “An arrested person is not invariably taken to a police station or confined; if an arrestee is taken to the police station, that is no more than a continuation of custody inherent in the arrest status.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2609, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). A custodial arrest occurs regardless of whether a person is eventually brought to the station. All arrests are inherently custodial.
The majority opinion relies heavily on United States v. Robinson, United States v. Gustafson and People v. Bischofberger to uphold the custodial/non-custodial distinction.25 A California court reviewed both Robinson and Gustafson and rejected the contention that a custodial arrest could only result upon the arresting officer’s intent to book the defendant. In re Demetrius A., 208 Cal.App.3d 1245, 256 Cal.Rptr. 717, 719 (1989). The court held that the Robinson-Gustafson rule for searches incident to custodial arrests was applicable where the defendant was lawfully arrested and taken into custody by the officer in order to transport the defendant to his home. Id. “[T]he lawfulness of the search turns not on whether the officer intended to release the defendant after having him in custody, but on whether the officer was justified in arresting the defendant and taking him into custody in the first place.” Id.
The distinction between custodial and noncustodial arrests is nebulous at best. The majority’s definition of custodial arrest is incorrect, thus making it unnecessary to distinguish it from a non-custodial arrest.
IV
This case may be analyzed under existing Fourth Amendment principles without further confusing an already complex area of law. Officer Bolte had probable cause to arrest the defendant for violating section 18-18 — 406(2) after the defendant pointed out the marihuana filled cigars. Considering the officer’s observation of the handgun, it was lawful to thereafter arrest Bland, search him incident to that arrest and upon finding cocaine, transport him to the police station. The defendant was obviously in custody because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an officer’s presence when handcuffed in a motel room.26 The fact the statute required a summons be issued for the marihuana violation does not nullify the lawfulness of the custodial arrest allowed by statute and the search incident to it.
“[W]e must resist ‘the understandable temptation to be responsive to every relevant shading of every relevant complexity’ lest we end up with ‘a fourth amendment with all the character and consistency of a Rorschach blot.’” Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Ct.Rev. 127,142 (citing Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.Rev. 349, 375 (1974)). The majority bifurcates arrest law solely to rectify the ambiguity of this statute.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the court stated
[The] Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclusionary rule is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions are almost impossible to apply by the field officer. Id. at 458,101 S.Ct. at 2863 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” versus “Standard*326ized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. 127, 141).
The majority’s definition of custodial arrest and the distinction drawn between it and non-custodial arrest, the cornerstone of the opinion, does not withstand careful scrutiny. By establishing distinct categories of arrest, the majority has created a tenuous and burdensome distinction, one extremely difficult for practical application by the police who must comply with Fourth Amendment law.
The officers in this case did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. I would not suppress the cocaine found on the defendant, and therefore, I concur with the majority’s result only.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOL-LACK and Justice MULLARKEY join in this concurrence.

. Section 16-3-102, 8A C.R.S. (1986) allows a peace officer to arrest a person: 1) when a warrant has been issued; 2) a crime was committed in the officer’s presence; and, 3) the officer has probable cause to believe an offense was committed and the suspect committed the offense.

. The majority cites to § 16-2-201(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1993 Supp.) and People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 414-15, 541 P.2d 71, 72-73 (Colo.1975) for support of this contention. Maj. op. at 317. Section 16-2-201(1) gives an officer the option of issuing a penalty notice or taking a suspect before a county court judge. This is different from the procedure in section 18 — 18— 406(2) which commands issuance of a summons. A summons requires the person to appear before a judge. § 16-1-105(17), 8A C.R.S. (1986).
Furthermore, Clyne is the only case I am aware of which actually uses the term non-custodial arrest. Even the cases discussing Clyne do not use the phrase "non-custodial arrest” but rather refer to the stop as a temporary detention. People v. Meredith, 763 P.2d 562 (Colo.1988); People v. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660 (Colo.1986). Bischofberger limits Clyne's applicability *324to temporary detentions for minor traffic or ordinance violation. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d at 664.

. See Cal.Penal Code § 849 (1985) (an officer may release any person arrested without a warrant after giving a summons); Del.Code Ann. tit. II § 1908 (1987) (peace officer may release from custody anyone arrested without a warrant); Mich.Stat.Ann. § 9.2427 (1994-95 Supp.) (an officer may release a person from custody).

. Wayne LaFave explains that the seemingly redundant phrase "custodial arrest” is distinguishable from those arrests that are followed by release at the scene. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(a) at 395 (2d ed.1987) (hereinafter LaFave). He states the distinction is important in terms of the incidental searches which follow the arrest. Id.

.Custodial arrest has been described as a situation in which the officer and arrestee are going to be in close proximity for some time as a consequence of the arrest. LaFave § 5.2(g) at 463.

. The majority stresses the use of the phrase "custodial arrest” in each of these cases.

. It is axiomatic that the majority points out that the handcuffs by themselves do not result in a custodial arrest. The fact that an officer chooses to use handcuffs will not by itself result in an arrest, see e.g., United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir.1993), however, it is inarguable that such a situation necessarily entails a custodial situation. Id. at 1464.
Although a custodial situation will not automatically give rise to an arrest, I fail to comprehend how an arrest may be. had without the arrestee inherently being in custody.