Court Opinion

ID: 9943589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:57.743709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.588151
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 Olson v. Aaronoff CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DIVISION TWO

 CURTIS R. OLSON,                                                 B321560
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           v.                                                     Super. Ct. No.
                                                                  19STCV46503)
 VIDALA AARONOFF,
           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Appellate Law Firm, Aaron Meyers and Mark Kuntze
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Buchalter, Robert Collings Little, Eric Michael Kennedy
and Robert M. Dato for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                    ______________________________________
        Vidala Aaronoff has pursued six appeals in nearly 10 years
of litigation against Curtis Olson. And another Aaronoff appeal
is pending. Olson has appealed once.1 This appeal, Aaronoff’s
seventh, arises from an order awarding Olson attorney fees
following Aaronoff’s unsuccessful anti-SLAPP motion2 under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.3 We affirm the order,
concluding Aaronoff’s challenges have been forfeited or waived.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        The following factual and procedural summary is primarily
taken from our opinion in Olson v. Aaronoff, supra, B315237.
I.      Facts
        In 2002, Aaronoff and Olson met and began working
together to convert an historic apartment building into a
condominium complex, where they resided as neighbors. Olson
was also the building owner and served as president of the
homeowners association.
        On January 1, 2012, Aaronoff purportedly created the ATW
Trust as a religious trust for the benefit of the Ancient Temple of

      1 See related appeals Aaronoff v. Olson (Jan. 24, 2023,
B295388) [nonpub. opn.] and Olson v. Aaronoff (Feb. 24, 2023
B315237) [nonpub. opn.].
      2 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against
public participation” and refers to a lawsuit which both arises out
of defendant’s constitutionally protected expressive or petitioning
activity and lacks a probability of success on the merits. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 425.16; S. B. Beach Properties v. Berti (2006) 39
Cal.4th 374, 377.)
       3 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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Wings Church. Aaronoff and two other individuals were the
three trustees.
II.    Procedural Background
       A.     Events Leading Up to Olson’s Award of
       Attorney Fees
       In 2015, Aaronoff and Olson had a falling-out and became
embroiled in litigation.
       In February 2017, Aaronoff transferred her one-time
residence, the condominium, to the ATW Trust with an effective
date of January 1, 2012.
       In September 2017, the parties filed dueling petitions for a
civil harassment restraining order. Both petitions were denied
by the trial court in November 2018.
       On April 15, 2019, Aaronoff, on behalf of the ATW Trust,
recorded a deed of trust against her condominium that secured
an $800,000 promissory note to her mother, Attorney Gloria
Martinez-Senftner, and her mother’s law firm, Martinez Law
Group, P.C. (MLG), as payment for legal fees.
       On April 17, 2019, the trial court awarded both Aaronoff
and Olson attorney fees for having successfully defended against
the other’s restraining order petition. Olson’s award was
approximately $80,000. Aaronoff resisted Olson’s efforts to
collect his fee award. To recover the award, Olson sued Aaronoff,
Martinez-Senftner, MPG, and others for fraudulent conveyance of
the condominium. Olson alleged Aaronoff had conspired with
Martinez-Senftner to fraudulently transfer Aaronoff’s interest in
her condominium to evade her debt to Olson. On this basis,
Olson alleged causes of action for violations of the Uniform
Voidable Transactions Act (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.) for

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conspiracy to defraud, for receiving stolen property, and for
related claims.
       In response, Aaronoff, Martinez-Senftner, and MLG filed
three anti-SLAPP motions directed to Olson’s complaint, first
amended complaint, and second amended complaint, respectively.
Following a hearing on July 23, 2021, the trial court ruled the
amended pleadings mooted the first and second anti-SLAPP
motions (relying on JKC3H8 v. Colton (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th
468). Olson’s second amended complaint was the operative
pleading. The court denied defendants’ third anti-SLAPP motion
as to that pleading. The court advised, as the prevailing party on
that anti-SLAPP motion, Olson was statutorily entitled to seek
attorney fees. (Olson v. Aaronoff, supra, B315237.)
       Aaronoff, Martinez-Senftner, and MLG appealed from the
order denying their anti-SLAPP motions. We affirmed the order.
With respect to the third anti-SLAPP motion, which is pertinent
here, we concluded defendants failed to show (1) that the transfer
of the condominium to Martinez-Senftner and MLG is protected
as litigation funding rather than solely intended to satisfy an
outstanding debt for past legal services; and (2) that Olson’s
claims arise from any identified protected speech activity by
Aaronoff and/or the ATW Trust because the Ancient Temple of
Wings Church is a purported religious entity.
       B.    Olson’s Attorney Fees Motion and Award
       On September 21, 2021, Olson moved under the anti-
SLAPP statute for an award of attorney fees.4 Olson argued at
length that the anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. His counsel’s

      4 Olson’s motion did not include a request for costs.

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declaration and billing records accompanied the motion. The
motion was unopposed.
      At the April 28, 2022 initial hearing, Attorney G. Scott
Sobel confirmed Aaronoff was his client based on a “notice of
limited scope representation” that encompassed the anti-SLAPP
motion and the attorney fees motion. Aaronoff told the court she
had not been served with the attorney fees motion and
understood she “was under limited scope with Mr. Sobel.” Sobel
acknowledged the motion was properly served and no opposition
had been filed. Sobel explained the failure to file opposition was
due to the defense’s “confusion,” “because there have been
multiple attorney fees motions.” Sobel requested relief under
section 473, subdivision (b) “attorney error,” so he could file
opposition to Olson’s motion.5 Olson’s counsel argued against the
request.
      The trial court found Aaronoff had “received notice, since
she’s acknowledging that Mr. Sobel was acting on her behalf as
well.” The court denied Attorney Sobel’s request for section 473,
subdivision (b) relief, in part because Olson was against it and no
written motion for such relief had been filed.
      The trial court briefly recessed the hearing to enable the
parties to review the tentative ruling, which was posted late.
When the proceedings resumed, the court, on its own motion,
continued the hearing to May 17, 2022. The court ordered
Olson’s counsel to file a supplemental declaration by May 4, 2022,

      5 Section 473, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part,
that a court “may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party
or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal,
order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his
or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”

                                 5
“address[ing] the computation” in the attorney fees motion. The
court invited the parties to “file a motion to fix any problems they
think exists” in that regard. The court required any responses to
be filed by May 11, 2022.
       The written order of the April 28, 2028 hearing shows the
trial court adopted its tentative ruling that defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion was “frivolous” within the meaning of section
425.16, subdivision (c)(1). In so ruling, the trial court agreed
with Olson’s arguments: (1) that defendants failed to show
Olson’s claims in his suit stemmed from any protected activity;
and (2) that defendants relied on “selectively cit[ed]” legal
authority to the effect that any transaction referred to as
“litigation funding” must be protected activity. Olson’s “claims
involve Aaronoff conspiring with Martinez-Senftner and MLG to
move Aaronoff’s assets in a way to protect [them] against
[Olson’s] collection efforts. This is not protected activity.” The
court was also persuaded by defendants’ failure to oppose Olson’s
motion for attorney fees.
       The April 28, 2022 order stated the supplemental
declaration required Olson’s counsel to explain how the requested
legal fees were calculated. The order also admonished the parties
that the “argument and evidence in the supplemental papers are
limited to the requested additional information, [the
supplemental declaration], and the response thereto. The parties
may not include any argument or evidence on any other issue.”
       At the continued hearing on May 17, 2022, only Olson’s
counsel appeared; there were no other appearances. According to
the written order of that date, Olson’s counsel timely filed the
supplemental declaration, which showed a miscalculation and a
correction of the requested attorney fees. No opposition was filed.

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The trial court granted Olson’s motion for $41,697 in attorney
fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. This timely appeal
followed.
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Forfeiture or Waiver of Challenges to Attorney Fees
      Motion
      Under section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), “If the court
finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award
costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on
the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5.” Under subdivision (a)
of section 128.5, “A trial court may order a party, the party’s
attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions
or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause unnecessary delay.” Subdivision (b)(2)
defines “ ‘Frivolous’ ” as “totally and completely without merit
or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.” (§
128.5, subd. (b)(2); see Crews v. Willows Unified School Dist.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1368, 1381.)
       “We review an order on a request for attorney fees under
section 425.16 for abuse of discretion.” (Workman v.
Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1056.)
       The state of the record following the April 28, 2022 hearing
was (1) that Aaronoff was represented at the time by Attorney
Sobel; (2) that Olson’s attorney fees motion was properly served
but unopposed; (3) that the trial court denied Sobel’s request for
section 473, subdivision (b) relief; (4) that the court found the
anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous; and (5) that the hearing was

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continued to May 17, 2022, solely to consider the amount of
Olson’s attorney fee award.
       Aaronoff challenges the attorney fees award on several
grounds, among them that the trial court “erred” in finding the
anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous. Aaronoff’s briefs do not
address the effects in the trial court and on appeal of her failure
to oppose Olson’s attorney fees motion: First, the lack of
opposition created an inference in the trial court that the motion
had merit. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1342 [“The failure of
the opposing party to serve and file a written opposition may be
construed by the court as an admission that the motion is
meritorious, and the court may grant the motion without a
hearing on the merits”]; Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410 [the inference applies only in the absence
of written opposition].) Second, the lack of opposition meant any
arguments against the attorney fees motion were forfeited or
waived in the trial court. (See Children’s Hospital and Medical
Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 776.) Because Olson’s
motion was unopposed, the trial court could infer it was
meritorious and/or any attempts to contest it were forfeited or
waived.
       Aaronoff’s failure to oppose Olson’s motion also has
ramifications on appeal. “It is well settled that the failure to
raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any
claim of error based on that issue.” (Howitson v. Evans Hotels,
LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489; Southern California Gas Co.
v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483, fn. 7 [party who “did
not file any opposition to the motions” in the trial court “waived
all arguments against the motions” on appeal]; Nazir v. United
Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 [same]; see

                                 8
generally Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264–265
[purpose of forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors
to the attention of the trial court “ ‘ “ ‘ “so that they may be
corrected or avoided and a fair trial had” ’ ” ’ ”].) Having failed to
oppose Olson’s attorney fees motion in the trial court, Aaronoff
cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, she has
waived or forfeited her claim the trial court abused its discretion
in finding her anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous.
II.    Other Grounds of Appeal
       A.    Collateral Estoppel
       Aaronoff urges our decision in Aaronoff v. Olson, supra,
B295388 collaterally estops Olson from enforcing all his attorney
fee awards, including this one.6 This is a specious argument.
       In the earlier appeal, we faulted the trial court for violating
the automatic stay provision of section 916 by amending Olson’s
attorney fees order against Aaronoff after she had appealed from
the original order.7 (Aaronoff v. Olson, supra, B295388.) Olsen
had incurred the attorney fees at issue by successfully defending
against Aaronoff’s restraining order petition.
       Collateral estoppel has no application here. To be sure,
collateral estoppel may be raised for the first time on appeal

      6 The elements of collateral estoppel are:    “ ‘ “ ‘ “(1) the issue
necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the
one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the previous [proceeding]
resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party
against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in
privity with a party at the prior proceeding.” ’ ” ’ ” (Daar &
Newman v. VRL International (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 482, 489.)
      7 Section 916 precludes the trial court from enforcing,
vacating, or modifying an appealed judgment or order.

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when the judgment or order in the other action becomes final
pending appeal and there was thus no opportunity to raise the
issue in the trial court. (Brake v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1986) 184
Cal.App.3d 930, 941.) However, as Aaronoff acknowledges, the
appealed from judgments and orders of B295388 are not final
because of Aaronoff’s pending petitions for review in the
California Supreme Court. (National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites
Prof. Law Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1718, 1726; Baker v.
Eilers Music Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 652, 655 [a judgment is not final
in California for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel if
an appeal is pending or could still be taken].)
       Nor do the current and former cases share identical issues
that would invoke collateral estoppel: The issue in the instant
case is whether Olson is entitled to attorney fees because
Aaronoff’s anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous; the issue in the
B295388 decision was whether the trial court violated the
automatic stay provision of section 916. Neither case concerns
Olson’s collection efforts or his enforcement of any attorney fees
awards in any litigation against Aaronoff.
       B.     Fraud
       Aaronoff asserts Olson has misled the courts in this
ongoing litigation by fraudulently representing that she owned
the condominium at issue, and premised his suit against Aaronoff
on a false alter ego theory. As a result, Aaronoff posits, this suit
by Olson and defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion were each moot.
       These arguments do not serve as a basis for rejecting the
trial court’s finding that Aaronoff’s anti-SLAPP motion was
frivolous. In any event, they are either forfeited or waived,
having never been raised in opposition to Olson’s attorney fees
motion.

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                         DISPOSITION
      The order granting Olson’s motion for attorney fees under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is affirmed. Olson is to
recover his costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                         LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     CHAVEZ, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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