Court Opinion

ID: 9401238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 15:01:17.884879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.513808
License: Public Domain

20-4105
     Morraz Diaz v. Garland
                                                                                 BIA
                                                                           Conroy, IJ
                                                                         A216 207 299
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 12th day of June, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 9            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   RUBEN ALFONSO MORRAZ DIAZ,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                      20-4105
18                                                             NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Bruno Joseph Bembi,
25                                       Hempstead, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                       Attorney General; Holly M. Smith ,
 1                                 Assistant Director; Aric A.
 2                                 Anderson, Trial Attorney, Office
 3                                 of Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                 States Department of Justice,
 5                                 Washington, DC.

 6         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is GRANTED.

10         Petitioner   Ruben    Alfonso   Morraz   Diaz,    a   native   and

11   citizen of Nicaragua, seeks review of a decision of the BIA

12   affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

13   his motion to rescind his removal order and reopen his removal

14   proceedings.    In re Ruben Alfonso Morraz Diaz, No. A 216 207

15   299 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2020), aff’g No. A 216 207 299 (Immig.

16   Ct.   N.Y.C.   Feb.   24,    2020).     We     assume   the   parties’

17   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

18         We have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented

19   by the BIA.    See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

20   Cir. 2005).    We review the agency’s denial of a motion to

21   rescind a removal order entered in absentia for abuse of

22   discretion.    Alrefae v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.

23   2006).   An abuse of discretion “may be found if the decision

24   provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from
                                  2
 1   established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains

 2   only     summary     or     conclusory      statements,” id.         (internal

 3   quotation marks omitted), or if the agency “has misunderstood

 4   or misapplied the governing law,” Abu Hasirah v. DHS, 478

 5   F.3d 474, 477 (2d Cir. 2007).            We review de novo the agency’s

 6   “underlying conclusions of law.”                  Mardones v. McElroy, 197

 7   F.3d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 1999).

 8          Here, we find an abuse of discretion.                 A noncitizen may

 9   be ordered removed in absentia if, “after written notice . . .

10   has been provided to the alien or the alien’s counsel of

11   record,    [he]    does     not   attend      a   proceeding.”       8    U.S.C.

12   § 1229a(b)(5)(A).           The agency may rescind an in absentia

13   removal order “if the alien demonstrates that the failure to

14   appear    was     because    of     exceptional         circumstances.”      Id.

15   § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).                    However,

16   “a brief, innocent lateness does not constitute a failure to

17   appear”     and     thus     does     not     require       demonstration    of

18   exceptional       circumstances,        and       the     agency   abuses    its

19   discretion when it issues an in absentia order based on such

20   tardiness.      Abu Hasirah, 478 F.3d at 477–78.

21          Morraz Diaz was 35 minutes late to his 8:30 a.m. hearing

                                             3
 1   due to transit delays on New York City’s subway system.        His

 2   attorney was present, he had attended previous hearings, and

 3   he had pending applications for relief from removal.             He

 4   submitted a detailed affidavit describing when he arrived at

 5   the train station and the trains he took.       Given the absence

 6   of any evidence of intentional or lengthy delay, the agency

 7   erred in concluding that he had failed to appear.          See id.

 8   We have jurisdiction to consider Morraz Diaz’s argument on

 9   this point because issue exhaustion is not jurisdictional.

10   See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480 F.3d 104, 121–22

11   (2d Cir. 2007); see also generally Santos-Zacaria v. Garland,

12   143 S. Ct. 1103, 1111–16 (2023).           Moreover, his specific

13   legal argument is not barred by court-mandated principles of

14   issue exhaustion given its relation to the arguments he raised

15   below.     See Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e

16   have never held that a petitioner is limited to the exact

17   contours of his argument below.”).

18       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

19   GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is

20   REMANDED     for   further   proceedings   consistent   with   this

21   order.

                                      4
1   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

2   VACATED.

3                             FOR THE COURT:
4                             Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
5                             Clerk of Court
6

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