Court Opinion

ID: 9948412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 23:00:37.607806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:33.280033
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50056            Document: 68-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/06/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________
                                                                                      FILED
                                    No. 23-50056                                   March 6, 2024
                                   ____________                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                        Clerk
United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                          versus

Sandra Maldonado,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 7:22-CR-172-2
                   ______________________________

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
       Sandra Maldonado claims two errors occurred concerning the
sentence she received in connection with dealing meth: (1) that the District
Court erred in its relevant conduct calculation by including amounts of meth
dealt by her boyfriend, Efrain Vela, and (2) that the District Court erred by
not giving her a two-level minor role reduction in her sentencing guideline
calculation. Maldonado did not raise either of these issues before the District

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-50056       Document: 68-1       Page: 2    Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                 No. 23-50056

Court, so we review for plain error. That review confirms that no clear or
obvious error occurred concerning either of these issues. We AFFIRM.
                             I. Background
       Maldonado moved to Odessa, Texas two years ago and began a
relationship with Vela, eventually moving into an RV together with their
child and Maldonado’s other two children from prior relationships. Vela
dealt meth out of the RV, and Maldonado admitted to knowing as much and,
at times, dealing it herself. One day, however, she sold meth to a confidential
informant (“CI”), leading to her conviction.
       Here’s what happened: On August 19, 2022, the Odessa Police
Department set up a controlled buy where a CI would purchase meth out of
the couple’s RV. The CI contacted Vela to set up the purchase, but upon
arriving received a text from Vela informing him/her that Vela could not
make it. Vela told the CI to instead purchase the meth from Maldonado. The
CI approached the RV and gave Maldonado $600 in exchange for just over
50g of meth as she held a child in her arms.
       This exchange served as the basis for a search warrant. Police soon
arrived and, after securing Vela (who returned by then), another woman, and
the children, conducted a search. Inside, they found Maldonado hiding in the
shower, about 150g of meth, drug paraphernalia consistent with meth usage,
packaging consistent with the receipt of approximately 1lb of meth from a
supplier, and over $2,400 in cash.
       Maldonado pled guilty two months later, and at her plea hearing
admitted the facts in the factual basis were “accurate, true, and correct.” She
also admitted that she sold over 50g or more of meth to the CI as well as to
helping Vela sell meth on other occasions. The District Court accepted
Maldonado’s plea without objections.

                                      2
Case: 23-50056        Document: 68-1       Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                  No. 23-50056

       She appeared for sentencing three months after that, affirming that
she and her attorney had reviewed, discussed, and did not object to the
presentencing report (“PSR”). The District Court stated that it reviewed the
PSR, found it to be accurate, and adopted its guidelines sentencing range of
87–108 months. Maldonado argued for a downward variance of 60 months,
which the government opposed. The District Court sentenced Maldonado to
the very bottom of the adopted PSR range: 87 months. She appealed.
                       II. Plain-Error Review
       As Maldonado concedes, she did not object to the District Court’s
sentence on either of her contested issues, so plain-error review applies.
United States v. Horton, 993 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2021). Plain-error review
involves four prongs, each of which must be satisfied before we may
intervene: (1) “there must be an error or defect . . . that has not been
intentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2) “the legal error must be clear
or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; (3) “the error must
have affected the appellant’s substantial rights”; and (4) “if the above three
prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error
— discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affect[s]
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett v.
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citations and internal quotations
omitted) (alterations and emphasis in original).
       “Relief under the plain-error standard ‘will be difficult to get, as it
should be.’” United States v. Figueroa-Coello, 920 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir.
2019) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9
(2004)). “The focus of plain error review should be ‘whether the severity of
the error’s harm demands reversal,’ and not ‘whether the district court’s
action deserves rebuke.’” United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 423

                                       3
Case: 23-50056       Document: 68-1       Page: 4    Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                 No. 23-50056

(5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (alterations and quotation omitted). Both of
Maldonado’s challenges fail at the second prong.
   III. The District Court did not Plainly Err in its
                Relevant Conduct Calculations
  A. We assume, Without Deciding, that the District
  Court Erred in its Relevant Conduct Calculation.
       To succeed in the first prong, Maldonado must show “an error that
has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned.” United States v.
Mims, 992 F.3d 406, 409 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United
States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016)). Maldonado first claims that the District
Court erred by holding her accountable for Vela’s drug sales as part of its
relevant conduct calculations without making requisite findings. Under
plain-error review, we need not decide whether the District Court did indeed
err because we can assume, without deciding, that an error occurred. See
United States v. Alvarado-Martinez, 713 F. App’x 259, 265–66 (5th Cir. 2017)
(unpublished) (assuming, without deciding, that error occurred and
addressing why the error was not plain); United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco,
741 F.3d 509, 518 (5th Cir. 2013) (addressing first and second prongs of plain-
error review together as one inquiry). We thus assume arguendo that the
District Court erred—meaning that Maldonado satisfied the first prong—
and continue with the remaining three prongs.
     B. But the Assumed Error is neither Clear nor
        Obvious, so Maldonado’s Challenge Fails.
       Maldonado argues that the District Court plainly erred by failing to
make the requisite findings to support its relevant conduct calculation, which
included holding her accountable for quantities of meth sold by Vela. We
determine a drug defendant’s base offense level by the quantity of drugs
involved in her underlying offense—here Maldonado’s conviction for

                                      4
Case: 23-50056         Document: 68-1       Page: 5     Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                   No. 23-50056

possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine.
See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3). That calculation includes both the drugs for
which a defendant is directly responsible and the drugs that can be attributed
to her participation in a conspiracy as relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines also provide that uncharged drug
quantities may be considered in determining a defendant’s base offense level.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.5 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). And relevant
conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts of coconspirators committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy. United State v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230, 241
(5th Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)).
       District Courts must make three factual determinations to support a
defendant’s sentence for participation in a drug conspiracy: (1) when the
defendant joined the conspiracy, (2) what quantities of drugs were within the
scope of the agreement, and (3) what quantities of drugs the defendant could
reasonably foresee being distributed by the conspiracy. Id. We “have allowed
district court[s] to make implicit findings by adopting the PSR,” where “the
findings in the PSR are so clear that the reviewing court is not left to
‘secondguess’ the basis for the sentencing decision.” Horton, 993 F.3d at 375
(quoting United States v. Carreon, 11 F.3d 1225, 1231 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Maldonado bears the burden of demonstrating that the information in the
PSR relied on by the District Court is materially untrue. United State v.
Alford, 142 F.3d 825, 832 (5th Cir. 1998). Maldonado’s challenge to the
District Court’s drug quantity/relevant conduct determination is a fact issue
that is not “clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as
a whole.” United States v. Horton, 993 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Jeffries, 587 F.3d 690, 692 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Johnson, 14 F.4th 342, 349 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that relevant conduct is a
fact issue).

                                        5
Case: 23-50056        Document: 68-1       Page: 6    Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                 No. 23-50056

       Here, Maldonado admitted that the facts in her factual basis were true,
accurate, and correct and that she did not object to the PSR which relied on
those facts. The PSR noted that Maldonado lived with Vela in the trailer
home from which she sold drugs to the CI, and knew Vela dealt meth. It also
included an admission by Maldonado to conspiring with Vela to distribute
meth by participating in the controlled purchase as well as other occasions. And
it included a description of what officers found in the couple’s home, such as
fresh drug wrappings, caches of meth, and $2,400 in cash in denominations
consistent with drug dealing.
       The PSR also noted that Vela admitted he messaged Maldonado for
her help in completing the controlled purchase from the CI. Alongside the
controlled purchase, Vela said he had distributed almost two pounds of meth
in the few days prior to the controlled purchase. Maldonado agreed these
facts were true, correct, and accurate in the factual basis she executed as part
of her guilty plea. The PSR thus held Maldonado responsible for this amount
as well.
       Maldonado claims that the District Court erred by not making
particularized findings of fact supporting her responsibility for this amount.
But she presented no evidence to refute the PSR’s facts (indeed, she
admitted to the factual basis that served as the PSR’s foundation and never
objected to the PSR), so the District Court properly adopted the PSR’s facts
and relevant conduct calculations without further inquiry. Alford, 142 F.3d at
832. Our review of the record confirms that the facts contained within the
PSR are supported by a preponderance of reliable evidence. See Carreon, 11
F.3d at 1241 (“[T]he government need only establish sentencing facts (unlike
the elements of the crime) by a preponderance of the evidence.”). And the
District Court’s findings do not leave us to “secondguess” the basis for its
relevant conduct decision. Horton, 993 F.3d at 375. Thus, the assumed error

                                       6
Case: 23-50056        Document: 68-1       Page: 7     Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                  No. 23-50056

concerning the District Court’s relevant conduct calculations is neither clear
nor obvious. Maldonado’s challenge fails.
      IV. The District Court did not Plainly Err in
       Denying Maldonado a Minor Role Reduction
       Maldonado next contends that the District Court erred by not
implementing a minor role reduction in her sentencing. Notably, the PSR did
not recommend this reduction and Maldonado failed to object to the PSR;
this appeal is the first time she raises this argument. As before, we will assume
arguendo that the District Court erred and move on to plain error review’s
second prong, asking whether the District Court’s assumed error concerning
this reduction was clearly or obviously erroneous. Supra III. It wasn’t.
       Like the relevant conduct calculation, the minor role reduction at
issue here is a finding of fact that is not “clearly erroneous as long as it[s]
exclusion” is plausible considering the record as a whole. Jeffries, 587 F.3d at
692; United States v. Gomez-Valle, 828 F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2016) (whether
a defendant is a minor or minimal participant is a factual determination
reviewed for clear error). Maldonado bears the burden of proving that a
downward adjustment based on minor or minimal role is warranted. See
United States v. Torres-Hernandez, 843 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2016).
       U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 provides for a mitigating role adjustment to a
defendant’s offense level calculation in two ways: (a) a four-point reduction
if the defendant was a “minimal” participant, or (b) a two-point reduction if
the defendant was a “minor” participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. A § 3B1.2
“minor participant” is defined as “a defendant . . . who is less culpable than
most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be
described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.5. A “minimal participant”
“plays a minimal role in the criminal activity . . . [and] cover[s] defendants
who are plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of

                                       7
Case: 23-50056         Document: 68-1       Page: 8     Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                   No. 23-50056

a group.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.4. A “defendant’s lack of knowledge or
understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the
activities of others is [therefore] indicative of a role as a minimal participant.”
Id.
       A review of “the totality of the circumstances controls the
determination of whether to apply a minimal participant, minor participant,
or intermediate adjustment.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.3(C). The
determination is thus “heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular
case.” Id. A 2015 amendment to § 3B1.2 added a list of non-exhaustive
factors for the sentencing court’s consideration in determining whether to
apply minor, minimal, or intermediate role adjustment. See Torres-
Hernandez, 843 F.3d at 207 (discussing same). These factors include:
       (i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and
       structure of the criminal activity;
       (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning
       or organizing the criminal activity;
       (iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-
       making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making
       authority;
       (iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in
       the commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the
       defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the
       defendant had in performing those acts; [and]
       (v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the
       criminal activity.
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).
       Maldonado argues that she should receive a minor role reduction,
claiming that she sold meth to the CI only at Vela’s request and that “nothing
suggests she was any more involved in those sales” where she admits having

                                        8
Case: 23-50056       Document: 68-1       Page: 9    Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                 No. 23-50056

assisted Vela. She further urges that she “simply followed her boyfriend’s
directive,” that there was “no evidence that [she] planned or organized any
transaction,” or that she benefitted from any of the sales. But the facts that
she admitted to in the factual basis, and later failed to object to when they
served as the PSR’s foundation, show otherwise.
       Maldonado admitted that she had the intent to distribute the meth
that she gave to the CI for $600. She also admitted that she “assist[ed] Vela
in distributing methamphetamine on other occasions but would not specify
how many times.” The factual basis also noted that, after Maldonado
completed the controlled purchase and officers served the warrant, she was
found hiding in the shower after Vela, another woman, and three children
exited the RV. The home contained drug wrapped, caches of meth, and
$2,400 in cash consistent with drug dealing. Vela, post-Miranda warning,
admitted that he told Maldonado to sell the meth to the CI and that he had
sold nearly two more pounds of meth just two days beforehand—facts
Maldonado confirmed in her admissions.
       Additionally, Maldonado had been unemployed for three years and
was caring for an infant, so it is plausible that she was home often enough to
be aware of the drug-dealing occurring there. Indeed, without Vela’s drug
distribution scheme and her role in it, she would have been without any other
means of support, thus deriving monetary and lifestyle benefits from meth
dealing.
       The PSR, which Maldonado did not object to, contained further
context: Maldonado conducted the meth transaction with the CI with a child
in her arms. And the meth caches in the home were “easily accessible to the
children” living there, placing them “in immediate danger.” In the end, the
PSR held Maldonado accountable for the meth she sold to the CI as well as
that contained in the home and sold by Vela two days before the arrest.

                                      9
Case: 23-50056       Document: 68-1         Page: 10   Date Filed: 03/06/2024

                                  No. 23-50056

       Overall, “[i]t is not enough that defendant ‘does less than other
participants; in order to qualify as a minor participant, a defendant must have
been peripheral to the advancement of the illicit activity.’” United States v.
Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 204 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 446–47 (5th Cir. 2001)) (emphasis added). And while
the District Court did not explicitly state its reasons for adopting the PSR’s
role calculation, it did not have to. The “requirement that the district court
articulate a sufficient factual basis for the denial of a minor role adjustment
can be satisfied through implicit findings, such as when the district court
adopts the presentence report.” See United States v. Bolanos, 480 F. App’x
756, 757 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Gallardo–
Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). Here, the PSR’s factfinding and
recommendations were plausible and supported by reliable and unrebutted
evidence, such as that discussed above. See Bolanos, 480 F. App’x at 757
(because the minor role adjustment is a finding of fact, clear error cannot exist
if the role’s exclusion is plausible considering the record as a whole). Thus,
the assumed error concerning the minor role reduction is neither clear nor
obvious. Maldonado’s challenge fails.
                             V. Conclusion
       The District Court neither clearly nor obviously erred concerning its
relevant conduct calculations and Maldonado’s desired minor role reduction.
We AFFIRM.

                                       10