Court Opinion

ID: 9397775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:05:30.715329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.416575
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 19, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0099-MR

WILLIE SETTLE                                                         APPELLANT

             APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 20-CI-005507

JIMMY FRANCONIA AND
UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS                                                    APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

LAMBERT, JUDGE: Willie Settle appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order granting Jimmy Franconia’s motion to dismiss Settle’s claim for personal

injury. After careful review of the record and applicable statutory and case law,

we affirm.

             The incident leading to this litigation occurred on June 19, 2020,

when Settle tripped and fell on a sidewalk in Jeffersontown, Kentucky (the City),
and injured her leg and shoulder. On September 22, 2020, Settle filed suit against

Franconia (Jeffersontown’s Director of Public Works) and other unknown

defendants alleging that the cause of her fall was a defect in the sidewalk. Settle

claimed that Franconia’s failure to inspect for tripping hazards, failure to exercise

care to repair and remedy known defects, and failure to warn led to her injuries, for

which she was required to undergo surgery and incur multiple expenses. The

unknown defendants, she claimed, were “persons, corporations or unincorporated

associations who also had responsibility for maintenance and upkeep of sidewalks

in the City of Jeffersontown, Kentucky on June 19, 2020.”1

              In October 2020, Franconia filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

Settle had failed to provide written notice within 90 days to the City of any

defective condition of City property allegedly causing Settle’s injury, citing

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 411.110. In her response to the City’s motion,

Settle did not contest the failure but instead maintained that, by suing Franconia in

his individual capacity, she was not bound by the statute’s 90-day notice provision.

              The parties briefed the issue, and the circuit court granted Franconia’s

motion by order entered October 6, 2021, finding that Settle’s claim was only

1
  There was no response from any unknown defendants to the certified letter sent by the
appointed warning order attorney on October 2, 2020. The circuit court’s orders only speak to
Franconia’s motion to dismiss and do not include the unknown defendants; we mention this only
because Settle named the unknown defendants as appellees. Our Opinion, however, solely
addresses the dismissal against Franconia.

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brought against Franconia in his official capacity. Settle filed a motion to alter,

amend, or vacate the decision to order dismissal; she also requested leave to amend

the complaint and tendered such a document. An order denying relief was entered

on December 29, 2021, and Settle filed a timely notice of appeal, seeking reversal

of the order dismissing and requesting that this Court reverse and remand the

matter for a trial by jury.

              We begin by enunciating our standard of review. A motion to dismiss

may only be granted where “it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to

relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.”

Mitchell v. Coldstream Laboratories, Inc., 337 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Ky. App. 2010)

(citation omitted). Because “a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a reviewing court owes no

deference to a trial court’s determination; instead, an appellate court reviews the

issue de novo.” Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (footnote and citation

omitted).

              KRS 411.110 states, in its entirety:

              No action shall be maintained against any city in this
              state because of any injury growing out of any defect in
              the condition of any bridge, street, sidewalk, alley or
              other public thoroughfare, unless notice has been given
              to the mayor, city clerk or clerk of the board of aldermen
              in the manner provided for the service of notice in
              actions in the Rules of Civil Procedure. This notice
              shall be filed within ninety (90) days of the occurrence

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             for which damage is claimed, stating the time of and
             place where the injury was received and the character
             and circumstances of the injury, and that the person
             injured will claim damages therefor from the city.

(Emphases ours.)

             As we explained in City of Louisville v. O’Neill, the
             purposes of KRS 411.110 are:

                    to give the city an opportunity to investigate
                    the scene of an accident and correct any
                    defective condition, if such exists, to enable
                    the city to investigate and evaluate the case
                    so that if liability exists it might have an
                    opportunity to settle it without long and
                    expensive litigation, and to give the city an
                    opportunity to protect its funds against
                    unjust and illegal claims.

             440 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Ky. 1969).

Denton v. City of Florence, 301 S.W.3d 23, 25 (Ky. 2009).

             Settle concedes that no such notice was given to the City. Instead, she

insists that it was not a necessary element of her claim against Franconia, who she

continues to assert is liable for her injuries in his individual capacity. Yet at all

times, in the pleadings before the circuit court, Franconia was listed as “acting

within the course and scope of his employment as the Director of Public Works for

the City of Jeffersontown, Kentucky.” Her proffered amended complaint simply

drops Franconia’s title but is otherwise consistent with the original complaint. In

other words, Settle’s allegations remain the same: Franconia was acting in his

                                           -4-
official capacity as a City employee. As the circuit court stated in its order

dismissing, “the only duty which [Franconia] has been alleged to have breached is

that imposed upon him as a public official.”

             “This Court’s function is to draw a line where the statute clearly

requires notice prior to bringing an action, and where it clearly does not.”

Krietemeyer v. City of Madisonville, 576 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Ky. App. 2018). We

can discern no claim against Franconia in anything other than his official capacity

as Director of Public Works. Settle was subject to the notice provisions of KRS

411.110. The Jefferson Circuit Court properly so concluded, and we find no error.

Stepp v. City of Pikeville, 642 S.W.3d 741, 744 (Ky. App. 2022).

              The orders of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JIMMY
                                           FRANCONIA:
 Mat A. Slechter
 Louisville, Kentucky                      Patricia C. Le Meur
                                           Sean Ragland
                                           Matthew A. Piekarski
                                           Louisville, Kentucky

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