Court Opinion

ID: 9784942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:58:08.649477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:01.283688
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
OLSON, J.:
Although I concur with the learned majority that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding the testimony of the 34 grand jury witnesses, I must respectfully dissent as I believe that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order of February 27, 2009 directing the Commonwealth to produce copies of grand jury transcripts prior to trial.
In considering any effort to obtain information from an investigating grand jury, we must be guided by the overarching maxim that “[gjrand jury proceedings have traditionally been conducted in secrecy.” In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. County, 496 Pa. 452, 437 A.2d 1128, 1130 (1981). Moreover,
[t]his secrecy, which is indispensable to the effective functioning of a grand jury’s investigation is designed (l)[t]o prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Id. (emphasis added; internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, our General Assembly passed the Investigating Grand *504Jury Act (Grand Jury Act), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4541, et seq., in part, to insure that grand jury proceedings remain secret by allowing only limited disclosure of matters that are the subject of any such investigation. Hence, the starting point of any analysis regarding the disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury is the Grand Jury Act, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure that were promulgated pursuant to the Act.
The Grand Jury Act provides that when a multicounty investigating grand jury is empanelled, the supervising judge “shall with respect to investigations, presentments, reports, and all other proper activities of said investigating multicounty grand jury, have jurisdiction over all counties in the jurisdiction of said multi-county investigating grand jury[.]” 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 4544(b)(2) (emphasis added). Section 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act identifies “the limited circumstances” in which matters occurring before an investigative grand jury may be disclosed. In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. County, 437 A.2d at 1131 (emphasis added). This section provides:
(b) Disclosure of proceedings by participants other than witnesses. — Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the Commonwealth for use in the performance of their duties. The attorneys for the Commonwealth may with the approval of the supervising judge disclose matters occurring before the investigating grand jury including transcripts of testimony to local, State, other state or Federal law enforcement or investigating agencies to assist them in investigating crimes under their investigative jurisdiction. . Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court. All such persons shall be sworn to secrecy, and shall be in contempt of court if they reveal any information which they are sworn to keep secret.
Id. at § 4549(b) (emphasis added).
Consistent with the Grand Jury Act, our Supreme Court promulgated procedural rules that clearly provide that the supervising judge of the statewide investigating grand jury has exclusive control over grand jury matters, including disclosure of grand jury transcripts.
Rule 229 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides “[ejxcept as otherwise set forth in these rules, the court shall control the original and all copies of the transcript and shall maintain their secrecy.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 229 (emphasis added). The reference to “the court” in Rule 229 means the supervising judge of the investigating grand jury, not the trial court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 229 (official comment). Rule 230, in turn, sets forth when and to whom the supervising judge may release transcripts of grand jury testimony:
Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury
(A) Attorney for the Commonwealth:
Upon receipt of the certified transcript of the proceedings before the investigating grand jury, the court shall furnish a copy of the transcript to the attorney for the Commonwealth for use in the performance of official duties.
(B) Defendant in a Criminal Case:
(1) When a defendant in a criminal case has testified before an investigating grand jury concerning the subject matter of the charges against him, upon application of such defendant the court shall order that the defendant be fur*505nished with a copy of the transcript of such testimony.
(2) When a witness in a criminal case has previously testified before an investigating grand jury concerning the subject matter of the charges against the defendant, upon application of such defendant the court shall order that the defendant be furnished with a copy of the transcript of such testimony; however, such testimony may be made available only after the direct testimony of that witness at trial.
(3) Upon appropriate motion of a defendant in a criminal case, the court shall order that the transcript of any testimony before an investigating grand jury that is exculpatory to the defendant ... be made available to such defendant.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(A) and (B).1 Again, “the court” referred to in this Rule is the supervising judge of the grand jury.
In construing the pertinent provisions of the Grand Jury Act, we must be guided by the Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 1921.
When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they are presumed to be the best indication of legislative intent.
Gaudio v. Ford Motor Co., 976 A.2d 524, 536 (Pa.Super.2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted), appeal denied, 605 Pa. 686, 989 A.2d 917 (2010). Moreover, “[i]n interpreting a statute, we are to give effect to all the language of the statute and we may not render any language superfluous or assume language to be mere surplusage.” Commonwealth v. Bailey, 986 A.2d 860, 863 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal denied - Pa. -, 995 A.2d 350 (2010). Additionally, in construing the relevant Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, we must “[t]o the extent practicable, [construe] these rules [] in consonance with the rules of statutory construction.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(C).
In applying these canons of statutory construction to the relevant provisions of the Grand Jury Act and the resultant rules, I believe that the Act and the rules are clear and unambiguous in providing that the supervising judge of the statewide grand jury has exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of a multicounty investigating grand jury, including the control of grand jury transcripts. Rule 229 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly provides that the supervising judge is to retain control of the original and all copies of grand jury transcripts and shall maintain their secrecy, unless otherwise provided by the rules. Pa.R.Crim.P. 229 and Comment to Rule. The only exceptions provided in the rules are set forth in Rule 230. Under said rule, the supervising judge shall 1) provide a copy of the transcripts to the Commonwealth’s attorney for “use in the performance of official duties”; 2) upon application of a defendant, order that the defendant be provided with the transcript of any testimony he or she gave before the grand jury; 3) upon application of a defendant, order that the defendant be furnished with copies of transcripts of grand jury testimony given by witnesses; and, 4) upon motion of a defendant, order disclosure of any *506transcript to the defendant of any grand jury testimony that is exculpatory. Pa. R.Crim.P. 230(A)-(B). There is nothing ambiguous about this language. Transcripts of grand jury proceedings shall remain secret and shall only be disclosed by order of the supervising judge under very limited circumstances.
The majority acknowledges that all applications and motions for the disclosure of grand jury transcripts are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the supervising judge. Majority Opinion at 496-97. However, the majority concludes that formal motions and applications to the supervising judge are not prerequisites to the disclosure of grand jury transcripts. Instead, the majority believes that counsel for the Commonwealth and counsel for the defendants may reach an agreement as to when and to whom grand jury transcripts are to be disclosed and that the trial court then has jurisdiction to reduce this voluntary agreement into a court order. Id. at 498. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies upon § 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act and Rule 280(A) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Specifically, the majority reasons that copies of grand jury transcripts are to be provided to the attorneys for the Commonwealth for use in the performance of their duties. Since one of the Commonwealth attorney’s “official duties” is to participate in pretrial conferences, “agreements reached therein [with respect to the timing of disclosure of grand jury transcripts] [] fall under the Attorney General’s ‘official duties’”. Id. I see nothing in the Grand Jury Act or the Rules of Criminal Procedure that supports this conclusion.
Under § 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act, disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury (including disclosure of transcripts) may be made to counsel for the Commonwealth “for use in the performance of their duties.” If, however, attorneys for the Commonwealth wish to disclose this information to any other law enforcement or investigating agency to assist in investigating crimes, the Commonwealth’s attorneys must get the approval of the supervising judge. Otherwise, the information must remain secret. Nothing in this statutory provision permits the attorneys for the Commonwealth to voluntarily agree to provide grand jury transcripts to counsel for defendants.2
Likewise, under Rule 280(A) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the supervising judge must furnish a copy of grand jury transcripts “to the attorney for the Commonwealth for use in the performance of official duties.”3 Again, however, nothing in the Rules authorizes the Common*507wealth’s attorney to unilaterally agree to provide transcripts to a defendant. Indeed, the plain language of Rule 230(A) states specifically that disclosure by the supervising judge must be made “to the attorney for the Commonwealth for use [not disclosure] in the performance of official duties.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(A) (emphasis added). Reading Rule 230(A) to permit only the Commonwealth’s use, but not disclosure, of grand jury transcripts in the performance of its official duties is entirely consistent with the text of Rule 230(B), which at every stage in referring to the production of grand jury transcripts to a defendant requires an application or motion to be filed with the supervising judge. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(B)(l-3). Relevant to this case, Rule 230(B)(2) makes it clear that, with respect to transcripts of testimony provided by witnesses before the grand jury, such transcripts may only be provided to the defense upon application of the defendant to the supervising judge. In addition, said testimony may be made available to the defendant by the supervising judge “only after the direct testimony of that witness at trial.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(B)(2) (emphasis added).4 Simply put, the majority’s conclusion that the Corn-*508monwealth may enter into, and — more importantly for present purposes — the trial court may enforce, a stipulated agreement to produce grand jury transcripts to a defendant finds no support in the language of § 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act or Rule 230(A).
Throughout these proceedings, the trial court made no secret that it found Rule 230(B)(2) unwieldy and inefficient. The court was concerned that if the rule were followed to the letter, this complex trial would be repeatedly delayed since defense counsel would need time to review the grand jury transcripts for each witness for the first time between direct examination and cross-examination. I can certainly sympathize with the trial court. However, I believe that our Supreme Court has made it clear in the promulgation of Rules 229 and 230 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that without prior authorization from the supervising judge, trial courts simply have no jurisdiction to order the disclosure of grand jury transcripts at any time.5 That subject matter is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the supervising judge of the grand jury, in this case the Honorable Barry F. Feudale. While the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County undoubtedly has subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal trial as a whole,6 I believe that this narrow subject matter falls under the jurisdiction of a different judge.
This is not to say that I am not deeply concerned with the Commonwealth’s inconsistent and somewhat puzzling treatment of this matter at the trial court level. Clearly, if the Commonwealth believed that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking, then the Commonwealth should have taken a more consistent position to that effect and refused to agree to disclosure of any transcripts absent an order from Judge Feudale. Instead, the record reflects that the Commonwealth complained about subject matter jurisdiction only with respect to the April 15, 2009 orders requiring the Commonwealth to turn over the transcripts within 10 days. The Commonwealth apparently had no quarrel with the February 27 order requiring the Commonwealth to turn over the transcripts by July 6. Indeed, it is clear from the record that the Commonwealth was willing to turn over the transcripts in accordance with that order, but simply failed to do so in a *509timely fashion based on inadvertence, mistake, and an overburdened schedule. At the trial court level, on the first day of trial, the Commonwealth argued the practicalities of compliance and noncompliance rather than any jurisdictional concerns. Only after the trial court issued the harsh sanction of witness preclusion did the Commonwealth revert to its present position that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.
Fortunately for the Commonwealth, subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable matter. Commonwealth v. Locust Twp., 600 Pa. 533, 968 A.2d 1263, 1269 (2009). Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent. In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d at 6. Thus, the prosecutor’s agreement to turn over the transcripts is legally irrelevant.
Finally, I must note that the issue in this case is not, strictly speaking, whether the Commonwealth can agree to disclose grand jury transcripts in the absence of an order from the supervising judge. I simply believe that when it chooses to enter into such agreements, it does so in violation of § 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act and Pa.R.Crim.P. 230, and at its own peril. Instead, the true issue in this case is whether the trial court may issue an order directing the Commonwealth to turn over the transcripts, in accordance with that prior agreement, and add penalties for noncompliance. I believe that the trial court may not. As noted above, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue such an order, because it pertains to a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of Judge Feudale. Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s order for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

. In addition to those instances set forth in Rule 230(A) and (B), the supervising judge may also order that a grand jury transcript be released to another investigative agency upon an appropriate motion and after a hearing into relevancy. Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(C).

. I find it difficult to reconcile the majority's decision with the express language of § 4549(b) of the Grand Jury Act. This section of the Act clearly provides that an attorney for the Commonwealth may not disclose matters occurring before the investigating grand jury, including transcripts, to other law enforcement or investigating agencies to assist them in investigating crimes without the approval of the supervising judge. If the Commonwealth’s attorney is expressly prohibited from providing grand jury transcripts to other law enforcement or investigating agencies who are investigating crimes without getting prior approval from the supervising judge, it is counterintuitive to suggest that an attorney for the Commonwealth is free to unilaterally disclose grand jury transcripts to a defendant who has been accused of or implicated in the commission of a crime.

. What is meant by "official duties” is not expressly defined in either the Grand Jury Act or the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, the Official Comment to Rule 230 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides some guidance: "It is intended that the 'official duties’ of the attorney for the Commonwealth may include reviewing investigating grand jury testimony with a prospective witness in a criminal case stemming from the investigation, when such testimony relates to the subject matter of the criminal case. It is not *507intended that a copy of such testimony be released to the prospective witness.” Pa. R.Crim.P. 230 (official comment) (emphasis added). Thus, upon review of the only "official duty” described in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it becomes clear that the Rules do not contemplate disclosure of grand jury transcripts when referring to the Commonwealth’s "use" of said transcripts in the performance of official duties. If the attorney for the Commonwealth may not give a copy of a witness’ grand jury testimony to the witness who gave the testimony, I do not believe that the attorney for the Commonwealth can voluntarily agree to give transcripts of witnesses' testimony to the defendants.

. The majority opines that Rule 230(A)(2) does not prohibit the disclosure of grand jury transcripts to the defendant until after the witness has testified on direct exam. Majority Opinion at 499-500, n. 7. In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on the use of the word "may" in the last phrase of the Rule. Specifically, Rule 230(B)(2) provides, in pertinent part, "upon application of such defendant the court shall order that the defendant be furnished with a copy of such testimony; however, such testimony may be made available only after the direct testimony of that witness at trial.” The majority finds that the use of the word "may” makes this a permissive provision and not a mandatory one. Id. Thus, the majority concludes that this rule "gives the supervising judge the discretion to control the timing of the dissemination of witness transcripts based upon the circumstances presented in the application for the transcripts." Id. I cannot agree with this interpretation. If the rule contemplates that the supervising judge shall have discretion in the timing of the transcripts, there would be no need for the last phrase following the semi-colon. Instead, to provide the supervising judge with discretion as to when transcripts may be provided to the defendant, the rule need merely provide that, upon a defendant’s application for disclosure of a grand jury transcript "the court shall order that the defendant be furnished with a copy of such testimony.” By limiting the language in this fashion, the rule would be silent as to the timing thereby providing the supervising judge with complete discretion. This is the type of language used in Rule 230(B)(1) and (B)(3). Under the express language of Rule 230(B)(1), upon application of a defendant, "the court shall order that the defendant be furnished with a copy of the transcript of [the defendant’s grand jury] [] testimony.” Moreover, under Rule 230(B)(3), upon motion of the defendant, "the court shall order that the transcript of any testimony before an investigating grand jury that is exculpatory to the defendant ... be made available to such defendant.” Only Rule 230(B)(2) contains the limiting clause: "however, such testimony may be made available only after the direct testimony of that witness at trial.” By adding that phrase, the supervising judge is not given unfettered discretion as to the timing of the disclosure. Instead, he or she may only make the testimony available after the direct testimony of that witness at trial. Under the rules of statutory construction, we must give effect to all the language of the statute and we may not render any language superfluous or as*508sume language to be mere surplusage. The last phrase of Rule 230(B)(2) would be superfluous and mere surplusage if interpreted in the manner suggested by the majority.
Moreover, as our Supreme Court stated in In re Investigating Grand Jury of Phila. County, the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings is designed, in part, "to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it.” Id., 437 A.2d at 1130. If the grand juiy testimony of a witness may be disclosed to the defendant at any time prior to that witness taking the stand during the criminal trial, this purpose for maintaining secrecy would be rendered meaningless.

. Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 230(B)(2), trial courts do not even have the authority to order the disclosure of grand jury transcripts after a witness testifies at trial on direct examination. Under the express language of the rule, only the supervising judge of the investigating grand jury may do so upon application of the defendant. As the majority notes, there are reported cases indicating that it is common practice for trial courts and counsel to agree to disclose grand juiy transcripts prior to a witness’s direct testimony. Majority Opinion at 497-98. Certainly it would be more efficient for the parties, and more strategically advantageous for the defendant, to proceed in this fashion and it would streamline the trial. However, even though it is a sensible practice and one that is followed in some courts in the Commonwealth, I believe that it is done in violation of the express language of the Rules.

. See In re Administrative Order No. 1-MD-2003, 594 Pa. 346, 936 A.2d 1, 6-7 (2007).