Court Opinion

ID: 7364411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-27 23:50:11.597259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:20:43.293882
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
The checks were drawn for the Samson Lire Stock Company, a firm composed of Morris and Edge, by Griggs, the bookkeeper of said firm, and who was also assistant cashier of the plaintiff bank, and upon the order and direction of one of the partners, Edge. It was therefore immaterial as to the instructions given Griggs by Morris, as between the firm and third persons, as Edge had as much authority to direct the bookkeeper as his copartner, Morris, and, when the checks were drawn upon the direction of one of the partners and were paid by the bank, they became a valid claim against the firm and each member thereof, regardless of the previous instructions from Morris to Griggs.
It was also immaterial that the firm had been dissolved when the last check was drawn and paid by the bank, unless the bank had notice of the dissolution, as it had been dealing with said firm, and the individual partners were liable for the debts contracted, even after dissolution, unless the bank had notice of said dissolution. True, the defendants proposed to show that Griggs had notice of the dissolution; but Griggs occupied a dual position, and the notice he may have acquired as bookkeeper of the defendants could not be imputed to the bank. — Traders’ Ins. Co. v. Letcher, 143 Ala. 400, 39 South. 271; Cen. Ry. of Ga. v. Joseph, 125 Ala. 319, 28 South. 35; Patterson v. Irvin, 142 Ala. 401, 38 South. 121. The defendants did not propose to prove that the hank had notice of the dissolution, or that Griggs got notice while acting for the bank. If he knew of the dissolution because of being bookkeeper for the defendants, notice thus acquired was not binding on the hank. To have put the trial court in error, defendants should have proposed to show that the bank, or that Griggs, as agent of the bank, had notice of the dissolution, as notice to Griggs, who was also bookkeeper of the defendants, was *305not of itself sufficient to charge the bank with notice. Nor can the defendants complain of not letting Morris testify that the officers of the bank authorized him to lend the money to the stock company at 8 per cent., as that would exonerate the bank from responsibility for the usurious feature of the transaction, inasmuch as Morris was dealing with himself, and, if he saw fit to charge himself or his firm with a greater interest than the officers authorized or required, he is estopped from charging the hank with usury. Not only did Morris have the authority, as a partner, to bind or estop the firm, but Edge was also estopped from questioning Griggs’ authority to draw the checks in question, as they were drawn at his instance.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
. Dowdell, C. J., and McClellan and Sayre, JJ., concur.