Court Opinion

ID: 9640423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:05:52.838414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.734788
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
On January 30, 1976, a majority of this Court sustained the facial validity of the Public School Education Act of 1975 (“the 1975 Act”), L. 1975, c. 212, N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-1 et seq. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N. J. 449 (Robinson V). The enactment of this statute on September 29, 1975, was the culmination of several years of litigation and of activity by the other branches of government consequent upon the adjudication by this Court of the unconstitutionality of the provisions of previous statutes governing the financing of public schools. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473, 480 (1973) (Robinson I).
Our determination in Robinson Y was reached on the assumption that “complete funding [would] be forthcoming to furnish the necessary means to put [the 1975 Act] into full operation” Robinson V, 69 N. J. at 454, n. 2, absent which funding that statute “could never be considered a constitutional compliance with the 1875 amendment to the New Jersey Constitution —■ adjuring the legislative establishment of a system of thorough and efficient education.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
We retained jurisdiction and stated that if the Legislature did not provide for such funding by April 6, 1976, we would issue an order to show cause why certain specific or other relief, including injunctive relief, should not be mandated. We accelerated the issuance of the order, and briefs were submitted and argument was held. To date there has been no final legislative action funding the financial aid provisions of the 1975 Act.
The continuation of the existing unconstitutional system of financing the schools into yet another school year cannot be tolerated. It is the Legislature’s responsibility to create a constitutional system. As we stated in Robinson I, supra, *16062 N. J. at 520, “The judiciary cannot unravel the fiscal skein.” The Legislature has not yet met this constitutional obligation. Accordingly, we shall enjoin the existing unconstitutional method of public school financing.1
We therefore order as follows:
On and after July 1, 1976, every public officer, state, county or municipal, is hereby enjoined from expending any funds for the support of any free public school. This injunctive order shall not apply to:
1. Payment of principal, interest and redemption of existing school bonds, anticipation notes and like obligations.
2. The cost of maintenance and security of school properties.
3. The payment of contractual obligations for capital construction, necessary repairs and like expenses necessary for the protection of school properties.
4. Contributions toward teachers’ pensions.
5. Payment of existing obligations for Blue Cross, Blue Shield, social security and similar commitments.
6. Payment of all insurance premiums.
Eurther applications for clarification of this injunctive order may be made to the Court.
*161This injunction will not become effective if timely legislative action is taken providing for the funding of the 1975 Act for the school year 1976-1977, effective July 1, 1976, or upon any other legislative action effective by that date providing for a system of financing the schools in compliance with the Education Clause of the Constitution.2
So ordered.

We recognize full well, along with Justice Mountain, the compelling force of Professor Cox’s assertion that an injunctive order is “no answer” to the dilemma created by legislative inaction. See Com, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 95 (1976). But Professor Cox hastens to acknowledge that “[n]ot to act would be to recognize judicial futility.” Id. He suggests that “[t]he Court will scarcely perform its historical function of protecting the individual in his relation with the State unless substantive constitutional rights and the processes of constitutional adjudication can be adapted so as retain vitality despite the difficulties of the new milieu.” Id. at 98.
However our decision today may be characterized — and we pause to observe that injunctive relief, a traditional remedy, can hardly be thought of as the product of unwarranted judicial “activism” in light of the history of this litigation or in contrast to the other remedies alluded to in our February 19, 1976, Order to Show Cause — our reluctance to issue it is far outweighed by the necessities of the situation before us.

It might be noted that Professor Cox delineates four possible remedies (none of which we pass upon presently as to possible constitutionality) which a legislature might adopt to finance public education:
Should public school education be centrally financed out of State revenues? Or should the State adopt the ingenious “district power-equalization” scheme, under which a district with a tax base per pupil above the State-wide average would contribute part of the school revenues it chose to raise to districts whose tax base per pupil was below the State-wide average? A third possibility might be to redraw school district lines to equalize the tax bases. A fourth would be to remove commercial, industrial, and mineral property from the local tax rolls, tax this property State-wide and use the proceeds to equalize inequalities resulting from the disparities in the remaining local tax bases. From a [federal] constitutional standpoint it would not matter what choice was made [so long as the constitutional objective was achieved]. [Cox, supra, n. 1, at 9A-95],