Court Opinion

ID: 9396648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 15:00:31.39903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.631083
License: Public Domain

22-636
United States v. Coleman

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                    SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 23rd day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

       PRESENT:            Amalya L. Kearse,
                           Dennis Jacobs,
                           Steven J. Menashi,
                                  Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Appellee,

          v.                                                   No. 22-636

TAJIE COLEMAN,

                 Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________

For Appellee:                               NEGAR TEKEEI, Assistant United States
                                     Attorney (David Abramowicz, Assistant
                                     United States Attorney, on the brief), for
                                     Damian Williams, United States Attorney
                                     for the Southern District of New York, New
                                     York, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant:             VANESSA C. RICHARDSON, Willkie Farr &
                                     Gallagher LLP, New York, NY (Elizabeth P.
                                     Gray, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP,
                                     Washington, DC, on the brief).

       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Daniels, J.).
    Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
      Defendant-Appellant Tajie Coleman appeals from a judgment entered on
March 10, 2022, denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
                                        I
      On July 11, 2013, while being chased by New York City detectives, Coleman
threw a gun into traffic on the Major Deegan Expressway. After he was arrested,
Coleman stated that he had retrieved the gun from an incinerator and was being
paid to deliver it to the River Park Towers in the Bronx.
      Coleman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced Coleman to a term of 180 months
of imprisonment, based on a mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), to be followed by five years of supervised release.
      On June 8, 2021, Coleman moved for a sentence reduction pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), commonly known as a motion for compassionate release.
He argued that he presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence
reduction given his unstable family history, his youth when he committed the

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felonies that resulted in a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA, the severity
of his mandatory minimum sentence, and the risks that COVID-19 posed to
inmates generally. Coleman also contended that his release would be consistent
with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
      The district court denied the motion and Coleman appealed.
                                         II
       We “review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020). “A
district court has broad discretion when considering a motion for compassionate
release,” and “[m]ere disagreement with how the district court balanced the
§ 3553(a) factors therefore is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
       After “considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a),” a district court
“may reduce” a defendant’s term of imprisonment if it concludes that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and that “such
a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Application of the § 3553(a)
factors may provide an independent ground for denying a motion for
compassionate release, even if the court assumes the existence of extraordinary
and compelling circumstances. United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 374 (2d Cir.
2021).
       Coleman argues that the district court erred because it “creat[ed] a per se
rule that facts that were considered at sentencing cannot constitute extraordinary
and compelling reasons for compassionate release.” Appellant’s Br. 14. To support
his argument, Coleman cites the following paragraph from the district court’s
memorandum decision and order denying his motion:
      While the Court has full discretion under the First Step Act,
      Defendant’s youth at the time of the underlying offenses and his
      difficult childhood trauma do not constitute extraordinary and
      compelling reasons for compassionate release. See United States v.
      Moye, 16 CRIM. 250 (GBD), 2020 WL 6273905, at *2 (SDNY Oct. 26,

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      2020) (Mitigating factors such as childhood trauma and loss do not
      constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate
      release when factors were taken into consideration at the time of
      sentencing). Defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180
      months imprisonment was lawfully imposed under controlling
      statutory and Second Circuit authority and his difficult childhood
      circumstances were also taken into consideration at the time of
      sentencing. (Gov’t. Opp’n, at 13.) However difficult and troublesome
      Defendant’s youth was, it does not give rise to the type of
      “extraordinary and compelling circumstance” that warrants release.
App’x 130.
       We disagree that the district court created a per se rule. The district court
determined that the “Defendant’s youth at the time of the underlying offenses and
his difficult childhood trauma do not constitute extraordinary and compelling
reasons for compassionate release.” App’x 130. It then cited an analogous case in
which—despite the defendant’s “difficult childhood fraught with violence,
trauma, and loss”—“[n]othing in the Defendant’s submission has lessened the
need for a significant sentence.” Moye, 2020 WL 6273905, at *2. Far from creating a
per se rule, the district court explained that the same mitigating factors previously
considered at Coleman’s sentencing—considered again in connection with his
motion for a sentence reduction—did not constitute extraordinary and compelling
circumstances warranting release. We do not understand the district court’s
observation that such factors were taken into consideration at sentencing to imply
that the district court could not again consider those factors in the context of
Coleman’s motion.
       Next, Coleman challenges the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a)
factors. Appellant’s Br. 20. We presume that a sentencing court has considered “all
relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.”
United States v. Smith, 982 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Rosa,
957 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2020)). These factors include, among other things, the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to
provide just punishment, the need to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among

                                           4
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
      The district court concluded that the § 3553(a) “sentencing factors strongly
counsel against the Defendant’s release” because the defendant “committed
multiple violent felonies and pled guilty to illegally carrying a loaded firearm,”
and he committed “repeated disciplinary infractions while in custody, including
possessing a dangerous weapon in the facility in June 2019.” App’x 131. Given
Coleman’s “history of criminal conduct, reducing his sentence would undermine
the gravity of the offense and the need for deterrence.” Id. at 131-32.
       Coleman has not identified any factual errors in the district court’s
assessment of his criminal record or disciplinary history. Nor has he shown that
the district court applied the wrong legal standard. Instead, Coleman argues only
that the district court should have considered other facts and weighed the
§ 3553(a) factors differently. But “[m]ere disagreement with how the district court
balanced the § 3553(a) factors ... is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse of
discretion.” Halvon, 26 F.4th at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district
court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the § 3553(a) factors did not
support Coleman’s release.
                                   *      *     *
       We have considered Coleman’s remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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