Court Opinion

ID: 9676878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:36:47.32669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:52.032391
License: Public Domain

John E. Jennings, Judge, dissenting in part; concurring in part. My only disagreement with the majority is with its holding that the language of the “Roadway Easement Agreement” was inadequate to operate as a present conveyance. Even as to this point I agree with the general principles of law that the majority relies on — we disagree only on the application of that law to the facts of the case. It is true that an easement may only be conveyed by deed. And in order to be a deed an instrument must contain “words expressing the fact of a sale or transfer of the title.” Davis v. Griffin, 298 Ark. 633, 770 S.W.2d 137 (1989). American Jurisprudence Second fairly summarizes the holdings of the courts on this issue: In order to transfer title, an instrument must contain apt words of grant which manifest the grantor’s intent to make a present conveyance of the land by his deed, as distinguished from an intention to convey it at some future time. The absence of words of conveyance cannot be supplied, and if no words importing a grant can be found in the deed, it is void although in other respects formal and regular. However, no particular verbal formula is required to effect a present conveyance, nor is it essential that technical terms be used. If an intention to pass the title is disclosed, the court will give effect to such intention notwithstanding inaccuracy of expression or inaptness of the words used. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds §19(1983). This is what the supreme court is talking about in Davis v. Griffin, supra, when it says “formal words are not required.” Davis, 298 Ark. at 635. The instrument in issue here is either a deed or an executory contract. A deed, as the term is used with reference to the conveyance of property, is distinguishable from an instrument which contemplates that transfer of title is to be effected by a subsequent deed and which is therefore executory in its nature. However, technical words of grant are not essential in order to make an instrument operate as a deed if it contains words showing an intent to transfer title by the instrument; an instrument may be construed and operate as a present conveyance, that is, as a deed, although it does not contain technical words of conveyance. On the other hand, the presence of technical words of conveyance will not constitute an instrument a deed if it is plainly intended as an executory contract. The determination of this question is largely a matter of the ascertainment of the intention of the parties as derived from the contract or instrument and the surrounding circumstances where the instrument leaves their intention in doubt, or from the instrument itself read in the light of a contemporaneous agreement. 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 6 (1983). It is perhaps an understatement to say that the instrument here is inartfully drawn, but it is clear to me that the parties intended that the instrument operate as a present conveyance rather than as an executory contract. This view is consistent with the release, in the instrument, of the wives’ dower rights. The instrument does not reflect that the parties contemplated the necessity of any further action to create the easement, which has now been in existence since 1959. Although the parties’ use of the words “agree” and “agreement” might ordinarily lead to the conclusion that the instrument is an executory contract, there is authority for the view that they may be adequate to constitute a present conveyance of land. See Carman v. Athearn, 77 Cal. App. 2d 585, 175 P.2d 926 (1947). I would hold that the instrument in question is a valid easement and would affirm the chancellor’s decree in its entirety.