Court Opinion

ID: 9675461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:54:42.631829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.792411
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
On original submission appellant’s sole contention was that the court erred in admitting into evidence the contraband seized from his automobile because of an illegal search and seizure.
Austin Police Officer Alexander testified that at 2 a. m. on November 30, 1974 he stopped appellant’s automobile for failure to signal intent to make a left turn from a public road into a parking lot. Alexander stated appellant’s vehicle was equipped with signal lights and he did not see the lights blinking when appellant turned. He could not testify that appellant failed to use a hand signal before making the turn.
The opinion on original submission stated:
“From Officer Alexander’s vantage point on Seventh Street at 2:00 a. m. he observed a vehicle turn left without any visible signal. He saw what appeared to him to be a violation of Section 68(a). He issued a traffic citation charging appellant with that offense. The fact that appellant may have used a hand signal which Officer Alexander could not see from his vantage point is certainly a defense to the charge that he committed the traffic offense, but it just as certainly would not negate the officer’s justification for stopping appellant’s vehicle in the first place.”
On rehearing appellant argues there can be no justification'for the stop if the officer did not observe all of the facts necessary to a traffic violation, and he did not see a violation because he could not ascertain whether appellant gave a hand signal.
He further maintains that the fact that a hand signal was given is not a defensive matter as stated in the opinion on original submission but rather it is the State’s burden to plead and prove that no type of appropriate turn signal was used in order to show the offense in question.
It is true that the State cannot prove a “no turn signal” case without proving that no appropriate signal was given. The giving or not of a hand signal is not fundamen*87tally a defensive issue, and the language in the opinion on original submission may therefore be somewhat misleading, but it should be borne in mind this is a prosecution for possession of hashish and not a prosecution on a “no turn signal” case. The sole question is whether the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle.
In Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), it was stated:
“Appellant’s second ground of error contends that an offense was not shown to have been committed in the officers’ presence and, therefore, the stopping of appellant was unlawful and the evidence seized thereafter illegally acquired. As stated above, proof of the actual commission of the offense is not a requisite. The facts above set out were sufficient observable facts by the officers to reasonably justify said belief and, thus, afford them probable cause for the stopping of appellant. * * * The primary purpose of the Exclusionary Rule is to deter police activity which could not have been reasonably believed to be lawful by the officers committing same. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). ...” See also Soileau v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 544, 244 S.W.2d 224 (1951).
It is significant that the record in the instant case reflects the following testimony by Officer Evans:
“Q In your own mind did you believe that the defendant had committed a traffic violation?
“A Yes, sir, that’s why I went after him.
“Q That’s why you pulled the car over?
“A Yes.”
The facts in the instant case were sufficient observable facts by Officer Evans to reasonably justify said belief and thus afford him probable cause for the stopping of appellant.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.