Court Opinion

ID: 9547293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:44:45.385486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:34.620620
License: Public Domain

*234BURKE, J.*
I dissent, for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, ante, page 205 [118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570]. In the instant case the two-year moratorium upon further residential zoning constitutes a substantial restriction upon land use and could have a drastic effect upon property values in the area. Thus, due process principles would require that affected property owners be given notice and hearing before the moratorium goes into effect.
Real parties in interest urge that ordinance 16764 is a valid “interim zoning” provision which, under the cases, may be enacted on an emergency basis without the necessity of notice or hearing. Yet, assuming that an initiative-created ordinance can ever be characterized as an “emergency” measure, the applicable authorities recognize that if interim zoning (i.e., a zoning “freeze”) is accomplished without the benefit of notice and hearing, the freeze period must be of reasonably brief duration. For example, the state zoning law provides for a four-month period which may be extended only after public hearings have taken place. (Gov. Code, § 65858.) A provision which requires an unreasonably long prehearing restriction could constitute a denial of due process of law.
The interim zoning cases upon which real parties rely are, in large part, inapposite for they fail to address the question whether notice and hearing must be given in order to validate an interim freeze of substantial duration. It is, of course, the rule in this state that interim zoning in appropriate circumstances is a proper exercise of the police power vested in all municipal bodies. Thus, in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477 [234 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479], this court upheld an ordinance which temporarily prohibited the construction of multi-family apartments pending completion of a city-wide plan contemplating development of the affected area as residential. Although the ordinance in Miller was described as an. “emergency” measure, the court did not discuss the question whether notice and hearing was given or, if not, was required. (See also Lima v. Woodruff, 107 Cal.App. 285 [290 P. 480]; Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal.App.2d 511 [4 Cal.Rptr. 776].)
The first interim zoning case to approach the issue before us is Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 182 Cal.App.2d 93 [5 Cal.Rptr. 724], involving an ordinance which indefinitely prohibited the granting of *235certain building permits pending adoption of a permanent ordinance on the subject. A property owner complained that the ordinance was enacted without notice or hearing as required by the state zoning laws. The court, without considering the due process issue, noted that under the then-existing statutory provision (former Gov. Code, § 65806), the governing body was permitted to adopt “as an urgency measure, a temporary interim zoning ordinance” prohibiting uses in conflict with a proposed, but not yet enacted, zoning ordinance. The court explained that, under the record in that case, it was clear that the ordinance “was obviously intended to be limited in duration and to expire upon the adoption of the permanent ordinance as to which studies were in progress. Nothing in [former] section 65806 requires the fixing of a precise time limit . . . .” (P. 99.) The court stated further that “. . . a permanent zoning ordinance was in fact adopted within a reasonable time.” (P. 98.)
Thereafter, in 1961, the Legislature amended section 65806 (perhaps in response to the 1960 Mang decision) to provide that an emergency interim zoning provision could extend no longer than one year, unless notice and hearing were afforded. Subsequently, in Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal.App.2d 508 [35 Cal.Rptr. 480], the court upheld an emergency interim zoning ordinance which temporarily prohibited certain construction pending adoption of a comprehensive plan. The court, noting that the ordinance in fact had a “very brief life” (p. 517), stated that “When the permanent plan and a zoning ordinance thereunder are before the county for adoption, notice and hearing will be required as an essential part ofprocedural due process. [Citation.]” (Italics added; p. 518.) The court concluded that the adoption of the short-lived urgency ordinance was proper despite the lack of notice or hearing.
Following the Metro case, and in 1965, the Legislature once again amended the interim ordinance provisions of the state zoning laws. Section 65806 was repealed and section 65858 adopted in its place to provide that an interim ordinance “shall be of no further force and effect 90 days from the date of adoption thereof...” unless the legislative body by a four-fifths vote and after notice and hearing is given extends the ordinance for one year; not more than two such extensions are permitted. Subsequently, in 1971, the 90-day period was deleted and a four month’s period inserted, and provision was made for two subsequent extensions, following notice and hearing, of eight months and one year respectively. Thus, the Legislature presently considers four months a *236reasonable period to permit the operation of an emergency interim zoning ordinance.
Real parties urge that since charter cities are exempt from the provisions of the state zoning law, and particularly the four-month limitation of section 65858 (see Gov. Code, §§ 65803-65804), such cities properly may provide for a longer period of time before requiring notice and hearing to affected property owners. (Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal.App.2d 313, 325 [21 Cal.Rptr. 452].) Yet, as I have pointed out my dissent in the San Diego case, ante, page 205, although charter cities and counties are not bound by the specific provisions of the state zoning law, they are required to meet those minimum standards necessary to provide property owners with due process of law. Although it is difficult to specify the precise limitations which constitutional principles impose upon the power of a city to enact “emergency” interim zoning ordinances without notice and hearing, the four-month limitation set forth in section 65858 appears reasonable in light of the apparent ease of holding public hearings to authorize an extended “freeze” period. In any event, the two-year préhearing freeze period authorized by the subject ordinance seems clearly excessive; real parties make no effort to explain why property owners should be required to wait two years before they are afforded an effective opportunity to be heard.1 As stated by one commentator, “The duration of a charter city interim ordinance is controlled by the individual charter or municipal code. If there is no time limitation, or the ordinance will not terminate within a reasonable time by its own terms, an argument could be made that the ordinance is permanent. Due process would then suggest the need to comply with the more formal requirements necessary to enact permanent ordinances.” (Italics added; Cal. Zoning Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar) p. 122, § 4.30; see also Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d 508, 516; Comment, 18 Syracuse L.Rev. 837, 846-847, 850; Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1196, 1214-1217, and cases cited.)
*237I conclude that the ordinance at issue is invalid for lack of provision for notice and hearing. A writ of mandate should issue directing the trial court to order a preliminary injunction as requested by petitioner.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied February 19, 1975. Files, J.,* sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself disqualified. McComb, J., and Clark, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

I do not mean to suggest that, if the requisite notice and hearing were afforded, a two-year freeze nevertheless would be excessive. In view of the evident difficulties inherent in drafting comprehensive zoning plans, “we may take judicial notice of the fact that it will take much time to work out the details of such a plan and that obviously it would be destructive of the plan if, during the period of its incubation, parties seeking to evade the operation thereof should be permitted to enter upon a- course of construction which might progress so far as to defeat in whole or in part the ultimate execution of the plan.” (Miller v. Board of Public Works, supra, 195 Cal. 477, 496.) It has been suggested that one to three years may be required in order to complete the requisite studies necessary to draft an acceptable plan. (Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 5.15, p. 275.)

Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.