Court Opinion

ID: 9717181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:59:46.031468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.912529
License: Public Domain

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dissenting.
Appellant was not present at the Chandler's deposition, but was represented by counsel, who cross-examined Chandler at the deposition. At the time of the deposition and at the time of trial, Chandler was physically unable to attend the trial, and the announced purpose of the deposition was to record her testimony for use at trial in lieu of her live testimony. Upon these bases, the criteria of Trial Rule 32 for admission of Chandler's deposition at appellant's trial in lieu of Chandler's live appearance and live testimony were satisfied.
1. The trial objection: At trial defense counsel objected to admission of the Chandler deposition because he claimed Chandler was not physically unable to attend the trial. Appellant was permitted to address the court in support of this objection and added that Chandler had information which should be heard by the jury and that she should be brought to the trial and subjected to cross-examination about that information. He also stated that his defense would suffer without this opportunity. This objection has a legal basis which is broader than the rule and is in my opinion sufficient to encompass the claim in appellant's brief that the admission of the deposition violated the right of confrontation.
2. The Constitutional right: Article 1, Section 18 grants the accused the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" at the trial. This deposition was part of the trial against appellant, and Chandler was a witness for the State against him. Therefore, it necessarily is to be concluded that appellant had the constitutional right to be personally present at the deposition of Chandler. Brady v. State (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 981.
3. Waiver of the right; The waiver of the right to meet the State's witness face to face at trial should be an express, intentional act of the accused with awareness of the nature of that right. Miles v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 312, 53 N.E.2d 779, There is no such waiver shown on this record. It should be noted that the State initiated this deposition of its witness, and not the accused. Therefore, the waiver imposed when the accused initiates a deposition is not applicable. Jones v. State (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 98.
4. Harmless constitutional error: Chandler testified in her deposition that appellant confessed his crime to her shortly after it took place. Appellant's defense was alibi, and he had several relatives who testified that he was in Cincinnati at the time of the crime. The evidence at trial was very much in conflict. Identification of appellant by the victim was based upon his view of his attacker at night as he approached the car. I am therefore unable to find that the constitutional error occurring at the time the trial court admitted the Chandler *624deposition over objection was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.