Court Opinion

ID: 9642116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:48:48.951461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:43.182660
License: Public Domain

W. C. DAVIS, Judge,
dissenting.
Using Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971) as its sole authority, the majority reverses these aggravated rape convictions because the trial court refused to provide appellants with a free transcription of the testimony of their trial which ended in a hung jury. Appellants contended they needed the transcript for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of the prosecutrix by showing prior inconsistent statements.
*563A review of the facts of this case makes it clear that the result reached by the majority is not mandated by Britt, supra. To the contrary, the majority opinion in effect holds that a transcript of the testimony at a mistrial is always needed for an indigent defendant’s defense and consequently must always be furnished free upon request, thereby completely ignoring the principle of law upon which the conviction in Britt was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
Appellants’ first trial ended May 26,1977. On June 6,1977, a motion was filed requesting the transcription of the court reporter’s notes. The second trial, with the same attorneys representing each appellant, began on August 22,1977, slightly less than three months from the end of the first trial. During cross examination of the prosecu-trix, appellants’ counsel sought to impeach her by showing discrepancies in her testimony between the first and second trial regarding the number of times she was raped and which appellant held the knife on her. Subsequently, appellants’ counsel were allowed to read to the jury a stipulation of evidence by the court reporter at appellants’ first trial concerning the prosecutrix’s testimony as to who held the knife on her during the rapes and the number of times she was raped.
In deciding the question of whether the state court properly determined that the transcript requested was not needed for an effective defense, the Supreme Court, in Britt, supra, identified two factors relevant to the determination of need:
“(1) the value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the appeal or trial for which it is sought, and
(2) the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.”
In Britt, it was concluded that the defendant did have an alternative that would have been substantially equivalent to a transcript:
“At oral argument in this case, however, it emerged that petitioner could have obtained from the court reporter far more assistance than that available to the ordinary defendant, or to the defendant in Wilson. (Citing Wilson v. McMann, 2 Cir., 408 F.2d 896). The trials of this case took place in a small town where, according to petitioner’s counsel, the court reporter was a good friend of all the local lawyers and was reporting the second trial. It appears that the reporter would at any time have read back to counsel his notes of the mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had simply made an informal request.”
A look at the alternatives available to the appellants in this case convinces me that the same result as reached in Britt should also be made here.
First, although there is no showing in the record how well known to appellants’ counsel the court reporter who reported the first trial was, the record does reflect that she was known to them by name. Further, the stipulation obtained by appellants’ counsel, is to what Ann Meredith, the court reporter at the mistrial, would testify to, thereby showing that appellants’ counsel had obtained and/or gone over the victim’s testimony at the first trial with the court reporter in enough detail to be able to obtain these discrepancies.1 Appellants’ only request for the court reporter’s appearance was made during the trial, which was prop*564erly refused by the trial court. However, the fact that they were able to stipulate what she would testify to shows that they had been in contact with her prior to the second trial.
Secondly, in the instant case, appellants were represented at both trials by the same attorneys. Appellant Billie’s counsel stated that he had recorded at least part of the first trial, which had ended less than three months earlier.2 In Britt, supra, the Supreme Court again rejected the suggestion that “in order to render effective assistance, counsel must have a perfect memory or keep exhaustive notes of the testimony given at trial,” and cited Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269 (1958) for the proposition that “While trial notes might well provide an adequate substitute for a transcript, the failure to make such notes does not bar an indigent prisoner from claiming the right to a free transcript.” (Emphasis added) In answering the argument of the prosecution that the defendant might have utilized notes compiled by someone other than the official court reporter, the Supreme Court wrote 357 U.S. at page 215, 78 S.Ct. at page 1062, 2 L.Ed.2d at page 1271:
“Assuming that under some circumstances such notes could be an adequate substitute for a court reporter’s transcript there is nothing in this record to show that any were available to petitioner, and the Washington courts appear to have proceeded on the assumption that he could not effectively prosecute his appeal unless the motion for a free transcript was granted.”
In the present case, there is evidence that at least one of the attorneys for the appellants made and used recorded notes for the purpose of cross examination.
The holding of the majority far. exceeds that of the United States Supreme Court. In every case of mistrial, the trial court will be compelled to furnish the indigent defendant a free transcript. Even though there is a stipulation as to what the court reporter’s notes would show, the majority would hold that inadequate since “there is no viable way of knowing just how many more inconsistencies existed for impeachment purposes.”
In this case, where the trials were less than three months apart, where the same lawyers represented appellants at both trials, where the counsel for at least one appellant kept notes of the first trial, where there is a stipulation of the claimed inconsistencies read to the jury, and where the attorneys were acquainted with the court reporter who reported the first trial, it would appear to me that there were more alternatives available than were held sufficient in Britt, supra.
As to the concept of “fundamental fairness” cited by the majority requiring the furnishing of a free transcript to these appellants, this does not comport with the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Eskridge, supra:
“We do not hold that a State must furnish a transcript in every case involving an indigent defendant.”
Nor has there been a single case decided by this Court before or after Britt requiring the furnishing of a free transcript for impeachment purposes in spite of the lofty ideal that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”
And finally, it is noted that regardless of who held the knife on the victim in this case, and how many times she was raped, the evidence showed conclusively that both appellants participated in raping her and *565that their only defense was consent, which was rejected by the jury.
I dissent.
DOUGLAS, J., joins in the dissent.

. “The State of Texas, Defendants Johnny Billie and Daniel Billy hereby stipulate that if Ann Meredith were present to testify at this trial, she would testify as follows:
She was the Court Reporter at the prior hearing of this case, May 23-26, 1977.
A. D_M_, the Complainant testified under oath to the following:
1)She thought that Johnny Billie put the knife to her throat in the parking lot.
2) She was raped four times, twice by each Defendant.
3) She could not remember if there was a knife in the Defendant’s hand in the back seat of the car.
B. Investigator T. M. Holmes testified at the prior hearing of this case.”

. “Q. (By Mr. Lesser, Defense Counsel) .... did you say at the trial the last time you testified to this on the 24th day of May, 1977, that on a question from Mr. Whaley that you thought Johnny was the individual that put the knife to your throat?
MR. WHALEY (Prosecutor): Judge, even that’s an improper question. He’s got to ask the question, then give the answer to set it up for impeachment.
MR. LESSER (Defense Counsel): Mr. Wha-ley, I recorded your question, I recorded her answer ...”