Court Opinion

ID: 9626801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:24:25.218221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:33.883482
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with majority’s conclusion that “there was an insufficient factual basis for Nafziger’ to be certain that the pre-test requirements had been met.” On these facts, I would hold that there was substantial compliance with the rule and that that is enough. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Not only does defendant make no contention that he in fact vomited or regurgitated, but it clearly appears in the record that he did not do so. Further, he has never challenged the accuracy of the test result.
Huntsman, the observer, testified that, knowing the purpose of his observation, he had observed defendant for 15 minutes. Huntsman knew what he was looking for — he had observed hundreds of DUII arrestees on prior occasions. In this context, a reasonable interpretation of the question that Nafziger put to Huntsman would be “Did you observe defendant for fifteen minutes and did he do anything that would invalidate the test?” A reasonable interpretation of Huntsman’s response would be “I did observe him, and he didn’t do anything that would invalidate the test.”1
The proper test to apply here is one of substantial compliance. See State v. Allen, 74 Or App 275, 702 P2d 1118, rev den 300 Or 111 (1985); State v. McClary, 59 Or App 553, 651 P2d 145 (1982); State v. Zipf, 54 Or App 305, 634 P2d 495 (1981); State v. Kacalek, 34 Or App 967, 580 P2d 205 (1978); State v. Hanson, 19 Or App 498, 528 P2d 100 (1974), rev den (1975). Nafziger substantially complied with the rule. His *317slight deviation in no way prejudiced defendant’s rights or compromised the validity of the test. There is no reason to believe and, indeed, defendant does not claim, that he would have done anything differently had Nafziger also asked Huntsman, “Did defendant vomit or regurgitate?” Had Nafziger asked that question, defendant still would have taken the breath-test, and the test result still would have been the same.
The majority’s hyper-technical application of the rule in this case reaches an absurd result that elevates form over substance. If the literal interpretation of a rule produces an absurd or unreasonable result, the rule must be construed so that it is reasonable and workable. See State v. Irving, 268 Or 204, 206, 520 P2d 354 (1974). We should not condone the suppression of highly relevant evidence on a technicality where no prejudice is even claimed, much less shown.2

 An analogy might be drawn here between the collective information of two officers conducting an investigation that adds up to probable cause, see State v. Groda, 285 Or 321, 591 P2d 1354 (1979); State v. Mickelson, 18 Or App 647, 526 P2d 583, rev den (1974), and the collective information of Nafziger and Huntsman that adds up to a satisfactory pre-test observation.

 I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Nafziger could delegate the responsibility.