Court Opinion

ID: 9649503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:56:35.419166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:36.496816
License: Public Domain

*246OPINION
CAPPY, C.J.
On December 20, 2006, under the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act (“Gaming Act” or “Act”), 4 Pa.C.S. § 1101 et seq., the petitioner, the Pennsylvania Gaming Board (“Board”), approved two slot machine licenses for Intervenors, HSP Gaming, L.P. (“HSP”) and Philadelphia Entertainment and Development Partners, L.P., (“Philadelphia Entertainment”) in the City of Philadelphia (“Philadelphia” or “City”). As part of that decision, the Board approved the location of the licensed facilities that HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment proposed respectively to establish. On March 29, 2007, the City Council of Philadelphia (“City Council”) enacted an ordinance (the “Ordinance”) that submits a ballot question to Philadelphia’s qualified electors, asking them whether the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter should be amended to prohibit City Council and the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections from taking certain actions that would permit the use of gaming within designated areas of the City. The Board filed the above-captioned petitions against City Council, Patricia Rafferty, in her official capacity as the Chief Clerk of City Council, the Philadelphia County Board of Elections, and certain Acting County Commissioners in their official capacity as members of the Philadelphia Board of County Elections (collectively, “Respondents”), seeking to permanently enjoin them from submitting the ballot question to the Philadelphia electorate on election day. We conclude that the Ordinance is contrary to the Gaming Act because it allows the electorate to consider and nullify the decision the Board made as to the location of licensed facilities in Philadelphia and direct City Council and the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections to disregard those local laws by which the Board’s decision is to be implemented. Accordingly, we hold that the Board is clearly entitled to the relief it seeks, and order that Respondents are permanently enjoined from placing the question on the ballot.
*247I
The following material facts as set forth in the Board’s Petitions for Review and Briefs and the Briefs of HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment are not disputed. In July of 2004, the General Assembly enacted the Gaming Act, a statute of statewide concern that provides for slot machine gaming at a set number of licensed facilities within the Commonwealth. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1102. The Act established the Board, and gives it the “general and sole regulatory authority over the conduct of gaming or related activities as described in this part.” 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1201(a), 1202(a)(1). The Act defines the “[c]onduct of gaming” as “[t]he licensed placement and operation of games of chance under this part and approved by the [Board] at a licensed facilityf,]” and “[licensed facility” as “[t]he physical land-based location at which a licensed gaming entity is authorized to place and operate slot machines.” 4 Pa.C.S. § 1103. The Board is specifically empowered and obligated under the Act “to issue, approve, renew, revoke, suspend, condition or deny [the] issuance or renewal of slot machine licenses[,]” at its discretion. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1202(b)(12). The Act instructs the Board that the “location and quality of the proposed facility” is a factor that it may take into account when considering an application for a slot machine license. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1325(c)(1).
The Act provides for three types of slot machine licenses, designated by category. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1301. Each category permits an entity or person to apply to the Board for a license, and upon issuance, authorizes the placement and operation of slot machines at a licensed facility. Id. Under the Act, a Category 1 license authorizes the placement and operation of slot machines at existing horse racing tracks; a Category 2 license authorizes the placement and operation of slot machines in stand-alone facilities in cities of the first or second class or other tourism locations; and a Category 3 license authorizes the placement and operation of slot machines in resort hotels. 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1302-1305. The Act states that *248two Category 2 licensed facilities “shall be located by the [B]oard within a city of the first class.” 4 Pa.C.S. § 1304(b).1
As of December of 2005, the Board had received several applications for Category 2 licenses in Philadelphia. HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment were among the applicants. The applications that HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment respectively submitted identified and described the gaming facility each intended to establish in the City. The Board conducted public input hearings and public licensing hearings on the Philadelphia applications in April and November of 2006.
In March of 2006, the City enacted an Ordinance adding Chapter 14-400 to that part of the Philadelphia Code that governs zoning and planning. Chapter 14-400 is intended “to encourage the orderly development of major entertainment facilities,” and provides a regulatory framework for the establishment of “Commercial Entertainment District[s]” (“CEDs”) in Philadelphia. (Exhibits to the Petitions for Review at 7) Under Chapter 14-400, City Council designates a CED by ordinance in appropriate areas of the City. Upon CED designation, all underlying zoning classifications are superseded, and the owner of a lot in the CED may submit a plan of development to the City’s Planning Commission. The plan is reviewed for compliance with the regulations set forth in Chapter 14-400, which cover permitted uses, boundaries, height, off-street parking, signs, off-street loading, and design. Upon approval of the plan by City Council, the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections is authorized to issue the necessary building and zoning permits. As to gaming facilities, Section 14-405 of Chapter 14-400 provides that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall limit the right of the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board under the [Gaming] Act to identify the property on which it will permit a Category 2 licensed facility within the City[,]” and that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall be construed to prohibit any use that is exclusively regulated and *249permitted by the Commonwealth under the [Gaming] Act.” (Exhibits to Petitions for Review at 8).
On December 20, 2006, the Board held a public meeting to vote on all pending applications for Category 1 and 2 licenses. The Board approved two Category 2 licenses in Philadelphia, for HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment. As part of this decision, the Board approved the locations of the facilities HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment respectively proposed. In the Adjudication of the Pennsylvania Gaming Hearing Board in the Matters of the Applications for Category 2 Slot Machine Licenses in the City of the First Class, Philadelphia the Board issued, the Board observed that the location of HSP’s proposed site is in an area of the City zoned for uses compatible with or analogous to gaming, and that the location of Philadelphia Entertainment’s proposed site is fully compliant with the requirements of a CED district. The Board also took note of the ordinances that Philadelphia adopted for the creation of CEDs where gaming facilities are permitted, and anticipated that the process outlined in the Philadelphia Code for creating them would move forward.2
On or about February 14, 2007, Casino-Free Philadelphia, Inc., a community group, circulated a petition seeking to amend the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter to prohibit City Council and the Department of Licenses and Inspections from taking certain actions that would permit the use of gaming within designated areas of the City. See 53 P.S. § 13106.
On February 22, 2007, a member of City Council introduced Bill No. 070112, the precursor of the Ordinance, “[providing for the submission to the qualified electors of the City of Philadelphia of a proposed amendment to the Philadelphia *250Home Rule Charter relating to the location of licensed gaming facilities 'within the City, as proposed by a petition presented to Council and approved for submission to the electors by Resolution.... ” (Exhibits in Support of Petitions for Review at 2). That same day, a member of City Council introduced Resolution No. 070113, which set forth the proposed amendment. The proposed amendment would amend Article II, Chapter 3 and Article V, Chapter 10 of the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter to prohibit City Council from taking any action to create a district or otherwise permit gaming in certain areas of Philadelphia and the Department of Licenses and Inspections from issuing licenses or permits for gaming unless the applicant is located in certain authorized areas. The proposed amendment reads:
[Article II, Chapter 3]
* * *
(2) Because licensed gaming facilities cause a deleterious effect on the aesthetics and economics of the areas in which they are located and cause the areas in which they are located to become a focus of crime and anti-social behavior, in order to prevent the deterioration of communities and neighborhoods in the City of Philadelphia, and to provide for the orderly, planned future development of the City, the Council shall not enact any bill, approve the creation of any district, nor take any action permitting the use of Licensed Gaming as defined' and authorized by [the Gaming Act] and any other Amendments to Title 4 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes in any area or district of the City of Philadelphia:
(a) Within 1500 feet of any residentially zoned district (regardless of the actual uses contained therein), Institutional Development District or any of the following residentially related uses:
(i) Churches, monasteries, chapels, synagogues, convents, rectories, religious article stores, religious apparel stores, residential homes, legally occupied dwellings or apartment buildings, or Convention/Civic Center;
*251(ii) Schools, up to and including the twelfth (12th) grade, and their adjunct play areas;
(iii) Public playgrounds, public swimming pools, public parks and public libraries.
(3) This amendment shall take effect upon approval by the voters and shall render null and void any previous enactment, approval or action taken by the City in conflict with this amendment.
[Article V, Chapter 10]
* * sjs
(2) The Department of Licenses and Inspections shall not issue any license or permit authorizing Licensed Gaming as defined in [the Gaming Act] and any other Amendments to Title 4 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes unless the applicant is located within an area or district authorized for Licensed Gaming under Article II, Section 2-307(2)(a) of this Charter.
(Exhibits to the Petitions for Review at 3).
On March 2, 2007, City Council’s Committee on Law and Government held a public hearing and received testimony from those in favor of and those against Bill No. 070112 and Resolution No. 070113. HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment appeared and testified in opposition to both. The Committee approved the Bill and the Resolution.
On March 15, 2007, City Council adopted Resolution No. 070113 by unanimous vote.3 The Resolution provided for the submission of the following question to the Philadelphia electorate, to be answered “Yes” or “No”:
*252Shall the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter be amended to prohibit Council from taking any action that would permit licensed gaming within 1500 feet of a residentially zoned district, an Institutional Development District, or certain residentially-related uses, and to prohibit the Department of Licenses and Inspections from issuing any license or permit authorizing licensed gaming within such areas?
(Exhibits to Petitions for Review at 2). In addition, City Council unanimously passed Bill No. 070112.
Bill No. 070112 was sent to the Mayor of Philadelphia, The Honorable John F. Street. By letter dated March 29, 2007 to City Council, the Mayor vetoed the Bill. In his letter, the Mayor urged City Council to sustain his veto, stating that: gaming is crucial to the growth of Philadelphia’s hospitality and convention center; gaming will support unprecedented job creation in the City; gaming will raise substantial revenue for the City; the City is working to protect local interests; and that the City risks losing local control over the development of gaming sites, should the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter be amended as proposed.
On March 29, 2007, City Council reconsidered Bill No. 070112, and voted to override the Mayor’s veto. Therefore, Bill No. 070112 became law, and as an Ordinance of Philadelphia, ordained that the proposed amendment to the City’s Home Rule Charter and the above-stated question be submitted to the Philadelphia electorate. See 351 Pa.Code § 2.2-202. On March 30, 2007, the' Clerk of City Council certified an exact copy of the text of the proposed amendment to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, together with the question for the ballot, to City Commissioner Margaret Tartaglione. When certification occurs, under 53 P.S. § 13109, the Philadelphia County Board of Elections is obligated to cause a question to be printed on the ballot.
Under the proposed amendment that the Ordinance submits to the Philadelphia electorate, licensed facilities cannot be located on the sites that the Board approved, City Council cannot designate these sites as CEDs under Chapter 14-400 *253of the Philadelphia Code, and the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspection cannot issue the permits that would be needed to develop the sites into gaming facilities.
On April 5, 2007, at Docket No. 55 EM 2007, the Board filed an Emergency Petition for Review Concerning the Ordinance Passed by City Council for the City of Philadelphia on March 29, 2007 (“Petition I”), and an Emergency Application for Emergency Special Relief Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1532(a). At Docket No. 56 EM 2007, the Board filed an Emergency Application for Leave to File Original Process, an Emergency Petition in the Nature of a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (“Petition II”), and an Emergency Application for a Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1531(a). Respondents filed responses or answers to the Board’s filings. City Council and Patricia Rafferty (collectively, the “City Council Respondents”) filed an Application for Summary Relief as to Petition I and Petition II, challenging the Board’s invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction under the Gaming Act and the Board’s standing to seek relief. HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment were permitted to intervene at Docket No. 55 EM 2007.
By Order dated April 13, 2007, this Court granted the Board’s Application for Leave to File Original Process, granted the Board’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining Respondents from placing the question on the ballot in upcoming election and directed the parties to submit these matters on briefs.4
*254These matters are now ready for decision. In Petition I, the Board invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506, and asserts that the Ordinance is procedurally and substantively defective, and therefore, invalid. In Petition II, the Board invokes this Court’s jurisdiction under 4 Pa.C.S. § 1204, and seeks a ruling on the constitutionality of its powers under the Gaming Act relative to the actions taken by Respondents. In both Petitions, the Board requests that a permanent injunction be entered enjoining Respondents from placing the question on the ballot. To obtain this relief, the Board must establish that it has a clear right to relief. Buffalo Township v. Jones, 571 Pa. 637, 813 A.2d 659, 663 (2002).
II
We begin with Petition I, and address the threshold issues raised. The City Council Respondents first assert that § 1506 of the Gaming Act does not provide this Court with jurisdiction to review the Ordinance. The City Council Respondents contend that § 1506 gives this Court jurisdiction to consider appeals of a “final order, determination or decision.” See infra p. 12. Since the Ordinance is none of these, the City Council Respondent argue that this Court is without jurisdiction under § 1506 to consider the merits of Petition I. The Board and the Intervenors counter that § 1506 grants this Court the exclusive jurisdiction to review a wide variety of local actions involving licensed facilities, including ordinances that a city decides to enact.
Whether § 1506 gives this Court jurisdiction to review the Ordinance under Petition I is a question of statutory construction. Therefore, the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (“SCA”) controls. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et seq. Under the SCA, it is fundamental that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly[,] and that [ejvery statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In this regard, the SCA instructs that “[wjhen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded *255under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). When, however, the words of the statute are not explicit, the General Assembly’s intent is to be ascertained by considering matters other than statutory language. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).
The SCA provides that “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage[.]” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). If the General Assembly defines words that are used in a statute, those definitions are binding. Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 523 Pa. 107, 565 A.2d 426, 428 (1989). Under the SCA, a court may presume that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable; does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or that of Pennsylvania; and intends the entire statute to be certain and effective. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)-(3).
Based on these principles, we turn to § 1506’s language. Section 1506 states:
§ 1506. Licensed facility zoning and land use appeals In order to facilitate timely implementation of casino gaming as provided in this part, notwithstanding 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(2) (relating to appeals from government agencies), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals of a final order, determination or decision of a political subdivision or local instrumentality involving zoning, usage, layout, construction or occupancy, including location, size, bulk and use of a licensed facility. The court, as appropriate, may appoint a master to hear an appeal under this section.
4 Pa.C.S. § 1506.
Initially, § 1506 provides this Court with two instructions. In interpreting the statute, we are to remain mindful that § 1506 aims “to facilitate timely implementation of casino gaming,” and that 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(2) of the Judicial Code5 *256is set aside and has no significance in this context. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506; see Pleasant Hills Const. Co., Inc. v. Public Auditorium Authority, 567 Pa. 88, 784 A.2d 1277, 1283 (2001) (concluding that a “notwithstanding” clause is clear, means “regardless,” and explicitly preempts the subject mentioned in favor of the subject that follows).
Section 1506 then describes the jurisdiction it vests in this Court. Our jurisdiction is “exclusive” and “appellate” and authorizes us “to consider appeals of a final order, determination or decision of a political subdivision or local instrumentality involving ... [the] location of a licensed facility.” 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506. The SCA defines a “political subdivision” as “[a]ny county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district, vocational school district and county institution district.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. The dictionary defines a “determination” as “the act of coming to a decision or of fixing or settling a purpose[,]” and a “decision” as “the act or process of deciding; determination, as of a question or doubt, by making a judgment^] the act or need for making up one’s mind[;] something that is decided; resolution.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 517, 541 (2nd ed.1987).
Last, § 1506 advises us that the Court may appoint a master when it is deemed necessary for the proper disposition of the appeals the statute empowers us to consider.
In our view, § 1506 is clear and explicit in vesting this Court with jurisdiction over Petition I. By its terms, § 1506 creates an appeal that may be taken from local actions that amount to, inter alia, a determination or decision of a political subdivision involving the location of licensed facilities. Moreover, § 1506 places the resolution of the appeal created exclusively in this Court.
Here, the particular local action under challenge is the Ordinance. The Ordinance was enacted by the City in order to give its electorate the opportunity to consider a ballot *257question having to do with where in the City licensed facilities may be located. Based on the words in § 1506 and their plain meaning, we conclude that the Ordinance is a determination or decision made by a political subdivision involving, inter alia, the location of licensed facilities. Hence, we also conclude that the subject of Petition I falls squarely within the local matters the appeal created by § 1506 captures. Our conclusion, which interprets § 1506 to provide for this Court’s immediate and conclusive consideration of the questions raised regarding the Ordinance, adheres to and effectuates the General Assembly’s expressly stated aim in § 1506 to facilitate the timely implementation of gaming into the Commonwealth. Id. In addition, it is consistent with the presumption that the General Assembly does not intend an absurd result in its statutes. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). It would make no sense for us to conclude that at the same time the General Assembly gave this Court the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgments concerning the constitutionality of the Gaming Act, see 4 Pa.C.S. § 1904, and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals from the Board’s approval, issuance, denial or conditioning of a slot machine license, see 4 Pa.C.S. § 1204, it opted not to vest this Court with the exclusive authority to review an ordinance that impacts on an issue as fundamental as the actual establishment of the facilities in which licensed gaming will take place.
Accordingly, we hold that under § 1506, this Court has jurisdiction over Petition I.6
*258Ill
Relying on Mt. Lebanon v. County Board of Elections of the County of Allegheny, 470 Pa. 317, 368 A.2d 648, 649-50 (1977), the City Council Respondents also argue that because the Philadelphia electorate has not yet had the opportunity to vote on the question that the Ordinance enables it to consider, this Court’s opinion would be merely advisory because it would be rendered before the process is complete. They urge us to stay our hand, and consider the legality of the Ordinance if and when the voters approve the proposed amendment to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter. We disagree. The fundamental point that the City Council Respondents miss is that the Board and the Intervenors argue that the General Assembly has given the Board the sole. authority to locate licensed facilities in Philadelphia and does did not give the City’s electorate the right to consider or override that decision or to prevent the implementation of that decision under the City’s laws. In other words, the pending opportunity for the voters to pass upon this matter via the ballot question is as much a concern to the Board and the Intervenors as is the outcome of the vote, should it take place. Thus, our present opinion is neither theoretical nor abstract. Rather, it addresses the legality of the Ordinance on its face and the effect it has had already-to submit a question to the Philadelphia electorate that impacts on and could nullify the Board’s decision to locate licensed facilities in the City and the process of putting that decision in place. See Deer Creek Drainage Basin Authority v. County Board of Elections of Allegheny County, 475 Pa. *259491, 381 A.2d 103 (1977) (directing that all steps be taken to ensure that a referendum question that was invalid and would have no legal effect is not presented on the ballot so as to avoid unnecessary voter confusion and the unjustified expenditure of public' resources on an inoperative election, and to protect the interests of all parties).
IV
 The City Council Respondents also assert that the Board, as an administrative agency, is without a pecuniary or other real stake in this controversy, and thus, does not have standing. It is true that a party who does not have standing, that is, a party who is unable to show that he has been “aggrieved” by the matter he seeks to challenge, may not seek judicial relief. Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Commonwealth, 585 Pa. 196, 888 A.2d 655, 660 (2005). A party is aggrieved if he can demonstrate that he has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation. Id. This Court has explained that:
A “substantial” interest is an interest in the outcome of the litigation which surpasses the common interest of all citizens procuring obedience to the law. A “direct” interest requires a showing that the matter complained of caused harm to the party’s interest. An “immediate” interest involves the nature of the causal connection between the action complained of and the injury to the party challenging it.
In re Hickson, 573 Pa. 127, 821 A.2d 1238, 1243 (2003) (citations omitted).
Mindful of these principles, we observe that the Board asserts that the submission of the proposed amendment to the Philadelphia electorate, made possible through passage of the Ordinance, effectively allows the Philadelphia electorate to pass on and negate the decision it made on December 20, 2006 to locate licensed facilities in Philadelphia. This, the Board argues, thwarts the exercise of its statutory duty and authority under the Gaming Act, and gives it standing.
*260We agree. In asserting that the Ordinance diminishes the authority it is given under the Act to satisfy its statutory duty to locate licensed facilities in cites of the first class, the Board exhibits a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of these matters and is aggrieved. In this regard, we note that the Board’s interest in this litigation clearly exceeds that of “the common interest of all citizens procuring obedience to the law,” because the Board, unlike the general public, has the statutory obligation to approve the issuance of gaming licenses, which includes the obligation to approve the location of gaming facilities. 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1202(b)(12);1304(b)(1),1325(c)(1); Hickson, 821 A.2d at 1243. Moreover, it is indisputable that the Ordinance harms the interests the Board asserts it has in that it allows the Philadelphia voters the opportunity to override the decision the Board made as to where licensed facilities will be located in the City and the process of putting that decision in place. Finally, we observe that there is a clear and immediate causal connection between the Ordinance and the Board’s ability to exercise the statutory authority the Gaming Act gives it and fulfill the obligations the Gaming Act places upon it to locate Philadelphia’s licensed facilities. See id. Thus, we conclude that the Board is aggrieved, with standing to pursue this matter. See Dauphin County Public Defender’s Office v. Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, 578 Pa. 59, 849 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (2004) (concluding that the Public Defender had standing to challenge an administrative order that impacted on its ability to satisfy its statutory obligation to provide legal representation to financially eligible criminal defendants and stripped it of its discretion to make decisions regarding an applicant’s eligibility for its services).
V
Turning to the merits of Petition I, the validity of the Ordinance is challenged on several grounds. These grounds include the assertion that the Ordinance is invalid because it is inconsistent with the Gaming Act and amounts to *261an exercise of power by the City it does not have.7 In this regard, the Board and the Intervenors contend that in the Gaming Act, the General Assembly gave the Board the sole authority to locate the licensed facilities in which slot machines may be placed and operated when it issues a Category 2 gaming license in Philadelphia. Therefore, the Ordinance is invalid because it allows the Philadelphia electorate to consider the Board’s decision as to the location of licensed facilities in the City and it if so chooses, nullify the decision made.8
Like the question of jurisdiction over Petition I, the parameters of the Board’s authority to locate licensed facilities in Philadelphia is a question of statutory construction under the SCA. Sections 1304(b)(1) and Section 1307 are on point. Section 1304(b)(1) provides:
§ 1304. Category 2 slot machine license
* 4' *
(b) Location.—
(1) Two Category 2 licensed facilities and no more shall be located by the board within a city of the first class, and one Category 2 licensed facility and no more shall be located by the board within a city of the second class. No Category 2 licensed facility located by the board within a city of the first class shall be within ten linear miles of a Category 1 licensed facility regardless of the municipality where the Category 1 licensed facility is located. Except for any Category 2 licensed facility located by the board within a city of the first class or a city of the second class, no Category 2 licensed facility shall be located within 30 linear miles of any Category 1 licensed facility that has conducted over 200 racing days per year for the two calendar years *262immediately preceding the effective date of this part and not within 20 linear miles of any other Category 1 licensed facility. Except for any Category 2 licensed facility located by the board within a city of the first class, no Category 2 licensed facility shall be located within 20 linear miles of another Category 2 licensed facility.
4 Pa.C.S. § 1304(b)(1) (emphasis added). Section 1307 provides:
§ 1307. Number of slot machines.
The board may license no more than seven Category 1 licensed facilities and no more than five Category 2 licensed facilities, as it may deem appropriate, as long as two, and not more, Category 2 licenses are located by the board within the city of the first class and that one, and not more, Category 2 licensed facility is located by the board within the city of the second class....
4 Pa.C.S. § 1307 (emphasis added).
We conclude that the words of these statutory provisions are clear and explicit and reveal that the General Assembly intended for the Board to have the sole authority to locate Category 2 licensed facilities in cities of the first class. That is to say, only the Board makes the decision to locate a licensed facility. Section 1304(b)(1) repeatedly states without equivocation that “Category 2 licensed facilities[ ]shall be located by the [B]oard in cities of the first class,” and both Section 1304(b)(1) and 1307 refer to “Category 2 licenses” or “Category 2 licensed facilities” that have been “located by the [B]oard.” 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1304(b)(1),1307. We further observe that in these provisions, the General Assembly has not afforded the electorate of a first class city the right to consider, affect or override the Board’s location decision once it is made.
The Board does not, however, exercise its sole authority under the Gaming Act to fix the site of licensed facilities within Philadelphia in a vacuum. This is because the General Assembly has given Philadelphia the power to zone.. See Commonwealth, Department of General Services v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass’n, 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448, 451 (1984) *263(recognizing that Philadelphia, as a home rule city, derives its power generally to govern itself and to enact zoning regulations from the Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. § 13101, but that to the extent that provisions of the Zoning Enabling Act, 53 P.S. § 14752, are not inconsistent with Philadelphia’s zoning regulations, they remain in force.) Thus, while the Board and only the Board is authorized to decide where Philadelphia’s licensed facilities will be placed, the question as to whether the General Assembly intended the Board’s authority to locate to be exercised without any regard to the City’s authority to zone remains. See id.
We have confronted the interplay between local zoning and land use regulations and the Gaming Act before. In Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth (“PAGE”), 877 A.2d 383 (2005), we addressed the constitutionality of former § 1506, which as originally enacted expressly preempted local land use and zoning ordinances “as [to the] conduct of gaming ... including the physical location of any licensed facility! ]to the extent that the licensed facility [had] been approved by the Board”.9 The petitioners in PAGE asserted that former § 1506 violated Article II, Section *2641 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” Pa. Const, art. II, § 1. In their challenge, the petitioners did not take issue with the constitutionality of former § 1506 because of its preemptive effect over local zoning and land use regulations. Rather, they argued that former § 1506 was unconstitutional because the General Assembly had empowered the Board to act like a super-zoning board without providing definite, reasonable, and lawful standards to limit and guide it. PAGE at 415. The respondents countered that former § 1506 passed constitutional muster because the Board’s authority with regard to zoning and land use matters was not unfettered, but limited and guided by the standards set forth in other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 1102, 1802-1305, and 1325. Id. at 416-17.
This Court agreed with the petitioners, stating:
Section 1506 does not provide the Gaming Control Board with definite standards, policies and limitations to guide its decision-making with regard to zoning issues. While Section 1506 allows the Board in its discretion to consider local zoning ordinances when reviewing an application for a slot machine license and to provide a 60-day comment period prior to final approval, the Board is not given any guidance as to the import of the same. Although the eligibility requirements and additional criteria guide the Board’s discretion in determining whether to approve a licensee, we find that they do not provide adequate standards upon which the Board may rely in considering the local zoning and land use provisions for the site of the facility itself. We conclude that, as a matter of law, Section 1506 does not comply with the dictates of Article II, Section I insofar as the General Assembly has failed to provide adequate standards and guidelines required to delegate, constitutionally, the power and authority to execute or administer that provision of. the Act to the Board.
*265Id. at 418-19 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, this Court declared § 1506 as originally enacted to be unconstitutional and severed it from the Act. Id. at 419.10
In 2006, following PAGE, the General Assembly reenacted § 1506. Act of Nov. 1, 2006, P.L. 1243, No. 135 § 9. As discussed, Section 1506 now provides for judicial review of local final orders, determinations or decisions involving, inter alia, the location of licensed facilities. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506.
Accordingly, under the Gaming Act, the General Assembly obligates the Board to locate licensed facilities in first class cities and intends for the Board to make that decision alone. 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1304(b)(1),!307. After the Board’s decision on location is made, the General Assembly intends for it to be implemented under and according to the zoning and land use provisions a city has enacted. See Ogontz, 483 A.2d at 448. Should the Board’s decision on location be challenged, the General Assembly intends that any review of the final order, determination or decision a city makes in this regard take place in this Court. 4 Pa.C.S. § 1506. Under the Act, the General Assembly does not intend for the electorate of a first class city to be given the opportunity to consider, approve, disapprove, nullify or otherwise affect the Board’s decision once it is made or to prevent its implementation. 4 Pa.C.S. §§ 1304, 1307, 1506.
 Having thus resolved the General Assembly’s intent in the Gaming Act, we consider the Board’s and Intervenors’ assertion that the Ordinance is invalid. As a general matter, municipalities are creatures of the state and “possess only *266such powers of government as are expressly granted to [them] and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 580 Pa. 564, 862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Philadelphia v. Schweiker, 579 Pa. 591, 858 A.2d 75, 84 (2004)). A municipality is therefore powerless to enact ordinances except as authorized by statute, and ordinances not in conformity with the municipality’s enabling statute will be void. Id.
Like the powers of other types of municipalities, the powers of a home rule municipality, like Philadelphia, are largely constitutionally and statutorily determined. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[m]unicipalities shall have the right and power to frame and adopt home rule charters” and that pursuant to such charters, a home rule municipality “may exercise any power or perform any function not denied by this Constitution, by its home rule charter or by the General Assembly at any time.” pa. const, art. IX, § 2. The First Class City Home Rule Act provides that a city “taking advantage of this act and ... amending its charter thereunder shall have and may exercise all powers and authority of local self-government and shall have complete powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal functions ... [,]” subject to certain enumerated limitations. 53 P.S. § 13131. Among the limitations are that “no city shall exercise powers contrary to, or in limitation or enlargement of, powers granted by acts of the General Assembly which are ... [applicable in every part of the Commonwealth.” 53 P.S. § 13133(b). With respect to this second limitation, this Court has explained that ordinances enacted by home rule municipalities are negated when they conflict with a statute the General Assembly has enacted concerning “substantive matters of statewide concern.” Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 545 Pa. 279, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (1996).
In view of these principles and our determination regarding the Board’s authority to locate licensed facilities under the Gaming Act and the process by which that decision is to be implemented once it is made, we can only conclude that the Ordinance permits that which the Gaming Act forbids. There*267fore, the Ordinance is in conflict with the Act. The Act does not allow the Philadelphia electorate the right through any means whatsoever to consider or nullify the decision the Board made to locate two Category 2 licensed facilities in the City, as does the Ordinance. The Act does not give the Philadelphia electorate the right to direct City Council and the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections to disregard those portions of the Philadelphia Code or any other local law by which the Board’s decision is to be implemented. We hold accordingly, that the Ordinance is an unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of power, and invalid, pa. const, art. IX, § 2; 53 P.S. § 13133(b).11 We further hold that the Board has established a clear right to a permanent injunction enjoining Respondents from placing the question on the ballot under the Ordinance.
For these reasons, it is ordered that Respondents are permanently enjoined from placing the question on the ballot. It is also ordered that the Application for Summary Relief filed by the City Respondents as to Petition I is denied, Petition II is dismissed as moot, and the Application for Summary Relief filed by the City Respondents as to Petition II is dismissed as moot.
Justice EAKIN, Justice BALDWIN and Justice FITZGERALD join the opinion.
Justice BAER files a concurring opinion.
Justice CASTILLE files a dissenting opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion.

. Philadelphia is a city of the first class. In 1951, Philadelphia adopted a home rule charter under the terms of the First Class City Home Rule Act, 53 P.S. §§ 13101-13157.

. To date, the process set forth in Chapter 14-400 of the Philadelphia Code has not moved forward, despite requests from HSP and Philadelphia Entertainment for its implementation. We observe that in this regard, Philadelphia Entertainment has commenced proceedings in this Court at Docket No. 88 EM 2007. In these proceedings, Philadelphia Entertainment challenges a bill passed by City Council on May 10, 2007 that amends the City’s zoning maps and changes the designation solely on the Philadelphia Entertainment’s property from C-3 Commercial to R-10A Residential and the refusal of the City's Department of Licenses and Inspections to issue it a zoning and use registration permit.

. A petition was filed under 53 P.S. § 13108 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, objecting to the sufficiency of Casino-Free Philadelphia's petition and the validity of its signatures. Ultimately, the court determined that the petition lacked the number of genuine signatures of registered electors that 53 P.S. § 13106 required, granted the objectors’ petition and declared Casino-Free Philadelphia's petition null and void. Accordingly, City Council proceeded under 53 P.S. § 13106.

. Amici Curiae briefs have been filed by: The Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, the Philadelphia Convention & Visitors Bureau, and the Greater Philadelphia Hotel Association; and the Society Hill Civic Association, Neighbors Allied for the Best Riverfront, Bella Vista United Civic Association, Hilary Regan, Bruce Schimmel, John Dietel, Kathleen O'Neill, Bromley Palamountain, Queen Village Neighbors Association, Pennsport Civic Association, Whitman Council, Inc., Paul Neuwirth, Rita Gaudet deVecchis, Barbara Seiple, Kathleen Grann, Jethro Heiko, Chelsea Thompson-Heiko, Anne Dicker, Edmund Goppelt, Northern Liberties Neighbors Association, Mary Reinhart, and Diane Rizzetto, The International Longshoremen’s Association District Council of Philadelphia/Wilmington, AFL-CIO.

. In § 933(a)(2), the Judicial Code gives the court of common pleas the jurisdiction to hear " ‘[ajppeals from final orders of government agencies ... except Commonwealth agencies' under Subchapter B of Chapter 7 of Title 2 (relating to judicial review of local agency action) or otherwise." 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(2). Subchapter B of Chapter 7 of *256Title 2 is the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 551-555, 751-754. Under the Local Agency Law, local administrative actions that constitute adjudications are subject to review in the court of common pleas under § 933(a)(2). See 2 Pa.C.S. § 752; 2 Pa.C.S. § 101.

. Although we have concluded that as a matter of statutory construction that § 1506 vests this Court with jurisdiction over Petition I, we would remiss in failing to note that this matter also clearly merits the invocation of our King's Bench powers. 42 Pa.C.S. § 502 ("The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by the Constitution of Pennsylvania, including the power generally to minister justice to all persons and to exercise the powers of the court, as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes, as the justices of the Court of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May 22, 1722.”); In re Avellino, 547 Pa. 385, 690 A.2d 1138, 1140-41 (1997).
Petition I concerns tire Gaming Act, a statute that has widespread importance, and one that has generated and continues to generate substantial public attention. The issues raised are foundational. They *258relate to the parameters of the Board's authority to make and implement its decision on as basic an issue as the location of gaming facilities and the interplay between the Board’s authority in this regard and that of local authorities. Because the Act is so recently enacted, there is no body of case law to guide the resolution of these issues. Moreover and significantly, the questions are raised within the context of the election process, and concern the fundamental issue of whether a question may lawfully be placed on the ballot for the electorate to consider. All of these matters are of profound importance, and deserve prompt and conclusive judicial review. Under the circumstances, it is obvious that the invocation of our King's Bench powers is also the means by which we insure the judiciary's ability to decide these matters justly and expeditiously. Id.

. The question we address concerning the Ordinance’s validity is a pure question of law. We consider questions of law de novo.

. Respondents did not brief this issue. We do note, however, that Respondents Philadelphia County Board of Elections and its Members state that "[w]e continue to hold to the same position ... that the Charter change, if adopted, would be a nullity as it conflicts with State law....” (Brief of the Philadelphia County Board of Elections and the Members of the Board of Elections in their Official Capacity at p. 1.)

. Section § 1506 as originally enacted stated:
The conduct of gaming as permitted under this part, including the physical location of any licensed facility, shall not be prohibited or otherwise regulated by any ordinance, home rule charter provision, resolution, rule or regulation of any political subdivision or any local or State instrumentality or authority that relates to zoning or land use to the extent that the licensed facility has been approved by the board. The board may, in its discretion consider such local zoning ordinances when considering an application for a slot machine license. The board may, in its discretion consider such local zoning ordinances when considering an application for a slot machine license. The board shall provide the political subdivision, within which an applicant for a slot machine license has proposed to locate a licensed gaming facility, a 60-day comment period prior to the board’s final approval, condition or denial of approval of its application for a slot machine license. The political subdivision may make recommendations to the board for improvements to the applicant’s proposed site plans that take into account the impact on the local community, including, but not limited to, land use and transportation impact. This section shall also apply to any proposed racetrack or licensed racetrack.
4 Pa.C.S. § 1506 as originally enacted (amended Act of Nov. 1, 2006, P.L. 1243, No. 135 § 9.)

. To be clear, in this particular matter, Respondents have not raised that in making its decision to locate the City’s licensed facilities, the Board offended Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa Const, art. II, § 1, or acted in ways that are forbidden under PAGE. Nor have they asserted that either of the locations for licensed facilities the Board approved for Philadelphia is contrary to the City’s zoning and land use provisions. As we observed, when the Board announced its decision on the applications for licenses in the City, it noted that the location of HSP's proposed site is in an area of the City zoned for uses compatible with or analogous to gaming, and that the location of Philadelphia Entertainment's proposed site is fully compliant with the requirements of a CED district. See supra pp. 5-6.

. In Petition I, the Board also asserts that City Council committed a variety of procedural errors in approving the Ordinance; that the Ordinance improperly amounts to zoning by referendum; and that the Ordinance is de facto exclusionary in that it impermissibly excludes licensed zoning from Philadelphia. Due to our resolution, we need not address these other challenges. In addition, Petition II is rendered moot, as is the Application for Summary Relief filed by the City Council Respondents to Petition II.