Court Opinion

ID: 9568391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:03:07.981639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:42.204626
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(dissenting).
I construe the majority opinion as holding that a foreign corporation domesticated under the laws of this State may not be sued in a county in which it does not maintain an office for the transaction of its corporate business. The Court below so held and concluded that although appellant had an agent in Orangeburg County who was engaged in conducting its corporate business, it was not subject to suit in that county because it did not maintain an office. I disagree. It is my view that the venue may be laid in any county in which such corporation has an agent engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists.
*267While there are expressions in some of our cases to the effect that for venue purposes it must be shown that the corporation maintains an office for the transaction of business in the county in which venue is laid, all that was meant was that the corporation must have an agent in such county engaged in the transaction of its business. I find no case in this State holding that for venue purposes it is essential that an actual office be maintained. Nor is there any good reason for such a requirement. A corporation may have numerous agents and be extensively engaged in business in a county and yet maintain no office in the literal sense of the word.
In Tucker v. Ingram, 187 S. C. 525, 198 S. E. 25, 28, the Court stated that a domestic corporation “is a resident in any County in the State where it maintains an agent and conducts its corporate business and suit may be brought against it in any such County.” In Morris v. Peoples Banking Co., 191 S. C. 501, 5 S. E. 2d 286, 287, the Court said that a domestic corporation may be sued “in any county where it has and maintains a place of business, or an agent engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists.” The above statements were quoted with approval in the later case of Miller v. Boyle Construction Co., 198 S. C. 166, 17 S. E. 2d 312, 314. The Court there said the test is “whether the corporation has and maintains a place of business, or an agent engaged in conducting and carrying on the business for which it exists.”
The foregoing tests have been uniformly applied to foreign corporations domesticated in this State. In Willis v. Industrial Life & Health Insurance Co., 192 S. C. 304, 6 S. E. 2d 706, 707, the Court said: “In cases of foreign corporations doing business within the State, the same may be sued in any county in the State where such corporation maintains an agent and transacts its business.” To the same effect, see Chappell v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 194 S. C. 124, 9 S. E. 2d 592.
It will be noted that nowhere in the foregoing tests is there any suggestion of an additional requirement of the *268maintenance of an office. In fact, Willis v. Industrial Life & Health Insurance Co., supra, 192 S. C. 304, 6 S. E. 2d 706, strongly indicates that there is no such requirement. In that case suit was brought in Berkeley County against a domesticated foreign corporation. A motion was made by the corporation to change the venue to Florence County where its district office was located, upon the ground that it maintained no agent or office in Berkeley County. It appeared that the defendant had an agent residing in Florence County, who was engaged in writing insurance and collecting premiums for the defendant in an area consisting of a part of Berkeley .County and a part of Orangeburg County. Every Sunday afternoon or Monday morning this agent left his home in Florence and went to Moncks Corner, the county seat of Berkeley County, where he stayed in a local hotel until he returned to Florence on Friday afternoon. It was from this hotel room that he worked his territory. On these facts the Court sustained the venue in Berkeley County, although there is nothing in the opinion to show that the defendant maintained an office in that county.
I feel that the majority opinion adds a requirement for venue purposes in suits against corporations which is neither supported by any of our decisions nor by any sound reason. Accordingly, I dissent.