Court Opinion

ID: 9916774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:08:32.123505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:59.212400
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard C. Hvizdak,                 :
                 Appellant          :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 1014 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Anthony G. Mastrangelo, Former      :
Mayor, City of New Castle, PA, a    :
natural person, Police Chief Robert :
A. Salem, and unknown number of :
John and Jane Does of the City of   :
New Castle, Police Department,      :
natural persons & City of New       :
Castle, PA, a Municipal corporation : Submitted: November 9, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                    FILED: January 10, 2024

      Richard C. Hvizdak (Hvizdak) appeals from the August 16, 2022 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County (trial court), which denied Hvizdak’s
request for pre-complaint discovery, granted Preliminary Objections (POs) filed by
the City of New Castle, Pennsylvania (City), Anthony G. Mastrangelo, the former
mayor of the City, Robert A. Salem, the Police Chief of the City Police Department,
and an unknown number of City police officer (Officers) (collectively, Appellees),
and dismissed Hvizdak’s complaint, with prejudice. The issues before this Court are
whether the trial court erred in concluding that Hvizdak, as beneficiary of a trust,
lacked standing to bring a claim on behalf of property owned by the trust and that
Appellees were immune from suit, whether the trial court erred in denying Hvizdak’s
request for pre-complaint discovery, and whether the trial court should have granted
Hvizdak leave to amend his complaint.1 After careful review, we affirm.

                                       I. Background

       Hvizdak is the manager of RCH Realty LP (RCH), which owns commercial
property located at 304 East North Street, New Castle, Pennsylvania (Property).
RCH is property of the 2007 Richard Hvizdak Irrevocable Trust (Trust), of which
Hvizdak is the sole beneficiary. On August 4, 2021, Hvizdak filed a Praecipe for
Writ of Summons to be served on Appellees for “gross negligence.” Original Record
(O.R.), Item No. 8. Hvizdak filed a praecipe for reissuance of the Writ of Summons
on September 3, 2021. On December 8, 2021, Appellees filed a Praecipe for Rule
to File Complaint, requesting entry of a rule against Hvizdak that would require him
to file a complaint within 20 days.

       By letter to Appellees’ counsel dated December 12, 2021, Hvizdak requested
pre-complaint discovery so that he might “ascertain the viability of a cause of
action.”2 O.R., Item No. 8 at 2. Hvizdak asserted he had a claim against Appellees
for “their gross negligence in permitting and condoning” damage to the Property.
Id. Therefore, Hvizdak sought copies of all police incident reports from 2010 to the
present that concerned individuals “found, identified[,] and later released without
charges” from the Property, as well as individuals charged for incidents connected
to the Property, including trespass and criminal mischief. O.R., Item No. 8 at 4a.

       1
           We have reordered Hvizdak’s arguments and consolidated them to the extent they
overlap.

       2
         Pa.R.Civ.P. 4003.8(a) provides that “[a] plaintiff may obtain pre-complaint discovery
where the information sought is material and necessary to the filing of the complaint and the
discovery will not cause unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden[,] or
expense to any person or party.”

                                              2
Hvizdak also requested fire incident reports involving the Property, complaints
about the Property made to any municipal authority, “a copy of the Notice of Intent
to Sue filed in connection with complaints to municipal authorities over . . . police
indifference to . . . criminal activities,” and the record of any action taken in response
to the alleged Notice of Intent to Sue. Id.

      Hvizdak filed his complaint on December 28, 2021, alleging that the Property,
which became vacant in 2008, attracted the “homeless of society as well as the
underworld, despite its close proximity to the [City Police Station.]” O.R., Item No.
7 ¶ 7. In 2018, thieves stole copper from the Property’s plumbing and wiring and
damaged the Property’s lighting, water, and electrical systems. The Property has
been further damaged by fire. Hvizdak also alleged that illegal activity on the
Property was reported to the City Police Department, resulting in the removal of
“five persons unknown,” who were released without further investigation or
prosecution. Id., ¶ 10. Hvizdak asserted that the City Police Department declined
to investigate and prosecute criminal activity occurring on the Property, which
constituted “gross negligence” and “reckless indifference” by Appellees. Id., ¶ 13.
Hvizdak reiterated the need for pre-complaint discovery, which he required to
determine the individuals responsible for the alleged “patterns of inaction and
misconduct[.]” Id., ¶ 14. As the necessary information was “exclusively in the
hands of the tortfeasors and do-nothings[,]” Hvizdak sought a 120-day stay of
proceedings until the requested discovery could be provided. Id., ¶¶ 16-17, 19.
Otherwise, Hvizdak alleged that Appellees conspired to deprive Hvizdak “of
federally protected civil rights to acquire property,” and to seek redress for
Appellees’ failure to train, supervise, and discipline City police officers. Id., ¶ 21.

                                            3
      Appellees filed their POs on January 19, 2022, which asserted that Appellees
were immune from suit under what is commonly referred to as the Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act),3 that Hvizdak’s complaint failed to
present the elements of a negligence claim, that reckless indifference was not a
recognized cause of action, and that Hvizdak’s complaint was “so devoid of factual
allegations” it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. O.R., Item
No. 9, ¶ 37. Appellees also asserted that Hvizdak lacked standing to pursue a claim
on behalf of RCH, as owner of the Property. While Hvizdak alleged that the Trust
assigned him the right to bring a cause of action on RCH’s behalf, Hvizdak failed to
attach documentation supporting such an assignment.          In addition, Appellees
asserted that the City Police Department was “merely an administrative arm of” the
City and was, therefore, not amenable to suit. Id., ¶ 49. Finally, Appellees noted
that pre-complaint discovery required that Hvizdak demonstrate he had probable
cause to believe pre-complaint discovery was necessary to form a legally sufficient
complaint. Because “no competent cause of action could conceivably arise” from
the facts alleged in Hvizdak’s complaint, Appellees argued that he had not
demonstrated probable cause to believe that the material sought in pre-complaint
discovery would advance his claims. Id., ¶ 54.

      Following oral argument, the trial court entered an order on August 16, 2022,
denying Hvizdak’s request for pre-complaint discovery and granting Appellees’
POs. In its opinion supporting the August 16, 2022 order, the trial court rejected
Hvizdak’s argument that he had standing to bring an action for damages to the
Property on behalf of RCH. That duty belonged to the Trust, which Hvizdak could
not represent, as he was not an attorney. While Hvizdak alleged that he assigned “to

      3
          42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564.

                                          4
[himself]” the right to bring claims regarding the Property, Hvizdak failed to submit
any documentation to substantiate the assignment. The trial court also questioned
whether Hvizdak could make an assignment in his capacity as a beneficiary of the
Trust. Finally, the trial court reasoned that an action regarding damage to the
Property was personal to its owner, RCH, and could not be assigned to another.

       Although the trial court determined that Hvizdak did not have standing to
bring the instant action, it reviewed whether the complaint properly pled the
elements of negligence. In that regard, the trial court noted that local agencies are
generally immune from suit, unless the claim involves one of the exceptions to
immunity set forth in Section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.§ 8542(b).
While Section 8542(b)(3) of the Tort Claims Act carves out an exception to
immunity for claims concerning the care, custody, or control of real property in the
possession of a local agency, the claims alleged by Hvizdak, if true, did not originate
on real property within the possession of Appellees. Thus, the trial court held that
Appellees were immune to suit from any alleged damage to the Property. Given that
Hvizdak did not have standing to bring a civil rights claim on behalf of RCH and
Appellees were immune from suit under the Tort Claims Act, the trial court
concluded that Hvizdak was not entitled to pre-complaint discovery, which is only
appropriate where the requested material would advance a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Hvizdak’s complaint, with
prejudice. This appeal followed.4

       4
        “Our scope of review of a trial court order granting preliminary objections is limited to
determining whether the trial court committed legal error or abused its discretion.” Bell v. Twp. of
Spring Brook, 30 A.3d 554, 557 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

                                                 5
                                           II. Issues

      On appeal, Hvizdak argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
Hvizdak lacked standing to bring a claim on behalf of RCH and that Appellees were
immune from suit, that the trial court erred in denying Hvizdak’s request for pre-
complaint discovery, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
without granting Hvizdak leave to amend.

                                    III.     Discussion

      Although Hvizdak’s appellate brief primarily addresses the trial court’s denial
of pre-complaint discovery, we must first address whether Hvizdak had standing to
bring negligence and civil rights claims for damage to the Property on behalf of
RCH. Prior to judicial resolution of a claim, the plaintiff must, as a threshold matter,
show that he has standing to bring the action. Scarnati v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 220
A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

      Hvizdak’s standing argument consists of a single sentence. He asserts therein
that whether a claim for damages to the Property was assigned “would have been
covered by an amended complaint that would have included [Hvizdak’s]
assignment[.]” Hvizdak’s Br. at 30. Because the trial court dismissed Hvizdak’s
complaint with prejudice, Hvizdak argues that he was unable to present the
necessary documentation.

      Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) provides that an appellate brief shall include “discussion
and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent” to the issue raised. Hvizdak’s
argument for standing falls woefully short of these requirements. In concluding that
Hvizdak lacked standing to pursue the instant claim, the trial court noted that
Hvizdak was not a trustee of the Trust. Moreover, the trial court reasoned that

                                             6
damages to the Property were personal to RCH, the entity that owns the Property.
As such, the trial court held that the claim was not assignable. Hvizdak has not
countered these conclusions with any argument. Instead, he indicates that he would
have submitted evidence to support the assignment of a claim to Hvizdak. This
Court has repeatedly held that an issue is waived where an appellate brief fails to
discuss a claim with citation to relevant legal authority or fails to develop the issue
in any other meaningful fashion capable of review. Com. v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915,
924 (Pa. 2009). As Hvizdak has failed to address standing to any reasonable degree,
this issue is waived.

      Even if Hvizdak had developed his standing argument, he would not be
entitled to relief. Civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are “best characterized
as personal injury actions[.]” Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) (internal
citations omitted). Pennsylvania law does not permit the assignment of a personal
injury cause of action. Hedlund Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, 539 A.2d
357, 358 (Pa. 1988). See also Sensenig v. Pa. R.R. Co., 78 A. 91 (Pa. 1910) (right
of action that is strictly personal is not assignable). The language of Section 1983
supports the trial court’s holding that Hvizdak’s civil rights claim was not
assignable, as Section 1983 provides that any person acting under color of law who
deprives a United States citizen “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C §
1983 (emphasis added). Instantly, the allegedly injured party is the Property, which
is owned by RCH, not Hvizdak.

      Leave to amend a complaint is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Simmons v. Twp. of Moon, 601 A.2d 425, 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). A trial court
should liberally grant leave to amend a complaint to permit the full development of

                                          7
a party’s legal theories and averments; however, leave to amend may be denied
where it appears that amendment is futile. Weaver v. Franklin Cnty., 918 A.2d 194,
203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Hvizdak acknowledges that Appellees are immune from
suit under the Tort Claims Act with respect to his negligence claim. As discussed
above, a Section 1983 claim brought on behalf of the Property is personal to the
Property and cannot be assigned to Hvizdak. Therefore, even if Hvizdak could
provide documentation to substantiate an assignment of the Property’s Section 1983
claim, the assignment would have no effect.

       Hvizdak likewise gives short shrift to issues regarding Appellees’ immunity
from suit and whether the trial court should have granted Hvizdak leave to amend
the complaint. Indeed, Hvizdak concedes that Appellees are afforded immunity
under the Tort Claims Act. Regarding his civil rights claim, Hvizdak simply states
that immunity does not apply “to suits under the Civil Rights Act [of 1964.]”5
Hvizdak’s Br. at 29. Hvizdak also argues that Appellees’ immunity defense should
have been raised in new matter and not in their POs to the complaint. Because
Hvizdak has not developed these arguments in any meaningful way, they are also
waived.

       Given that Hvizdak waived the issue of standing, we need not address whether
the trial court erred in denying his request for pre-complaint discovery. Even
without waiver, we are not persuaded by Hvizdak’s arguments. Alternatively, the

       5
          To maintain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff is only required to
establish that some person has deprived him of a cognizable federal right and that the person
deprived the plaintiff of a federal right while acting under color of state law. Urbanic v. Rosenfeld,
616 A.2d 46, 479-80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). While Hvizdak’s complaint arguably alleges the
deprivation of “federally protected civil rights to acquire property . . . and . . . to redress
grievances[,]” he has not alleged that any person or persons did so while acting under color of law.
O.R., Item No. 7, ¶ 21. Hvizdak has only asserted such a claim in his appellate brief.

                                                  8
Court could simply state that the issue is moot, as Hvizdak already filed his
complaint. Discovery matters, including pre-complaint discovery requests, are
within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the trial court’s
decision absent an abuse of discretion. Tullytown Borough v. Armstrong, 129 A.3d
619, 622 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (internal citations omitted). The trial court denied
Hvizdak’s pre-complaint discovery request because Hvizdak lacked standing to
bring a civil rights claim on behalf of RCH and because Appellees were immune
from suit under the Tort Claims Act. As a result, no claim existed that could be
advanced by pre-complaint discovery.               During oral argument the trial court
questioned the propriety of “asking for pre-complaint discovery” after filing a
complaint.6 Reproduced Record at 78a.

       In his appeal to this Court, Hvizdak has essentially argued that, without pre-
complaint discovery, he is unable to muster the facts necessary to support his claims,
such as the identity of Officers who allegedly failed to investigate and prosecute
crimes that occurred on the Property.              Although Hvizdak acknowledges that
Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading jurisdiction, he admits having filed a “bare-bones”
complaint because only pre-complaint discovery would enable him to marshal the
facts necessary to identify a viable cause of action. Hvizdak maintains that his pre-
complaint discovery request, which sought police records spanning more than a
decade, required “only a brief perfunctory effort[.]” Hvizdak’s Br. at 17.

       It is important to note that Hvizdak filed his Praecipe for Writ of Summons
on August 4, 2021. Approximately four months later, after Appellees filed their
Praecipe for Rule to File Complaint on December 8, 2021, Hvizdak requested pre-

       6
        Although the issue is not before this Court, we also question whether a request for pre-
complaint discovery may be filed contemporaneously with a complaint.

                                               9
complaint discovery in a letter directed to Appellees’ counsel. Thereafter, on
December 28, 2021, Hvizdak filed his formal request for pre-complaint discovery
simultaneously with the filing of his complaint. Hvizdak’s need to file a “bare
bones” complaint was the result of his own failure to request pre-complaint
discovery in a timely manner.        In other words, Hvizdak’s legally insufficient
complaint was the predictable result of his failure to act until Appellees forced his
hand. While the trial court denied Hvizdak’s request for pre-complaint discovery on
other grounds, we are unable to conclude that the denial itself was an abuse of
discretion.7

       Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court.

                                          __________________________________
                                          ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       7
        An appellate court may affirm on other grounds where other grounds exist. Martel v.
Allegheny Cnty., 216 A.3d 1165, 1168 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

                                            10
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard C. Hvizdak,                 :
                 Appellant          :
                                    :
      v.                            : No. 1014 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Anthony G. Mastrangelo, Former      :
Mayor, City of New Castle, PA, a    :
natural person, Police Chief Robert :
A. Salem, and unknown number of :
John and Jane Does of the City of   :
New Castle, Police Department,      :
natural persons & City of New       :
Castle, PA, a Municipal corporation :

                                ORDER

     AND NOW, this 10th day of January, 2024, the August 16, 2022 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                   __________________________________
                                   ELLEN CEISLER, Judge