Court Opinion

ID: 9596219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:47:15.219856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:33.439050
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR EN BANC CONSIDERATION
Opinion by
PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
The motion for rehearing en banc filed by the attorney ad litem for the two minor children of the appellee Minerva Castillo is granted. Our opinion dated February 18, 2004, is supplemented with this opinion addressing the issue of the attorney ad litem’s fee. We withdraw our judgment dated February 18, 2004, and issue a new judgment reversing and rendering judgment that the appellees take nothing on *440their claim against Price Construction, Inc., and affirming the portion of the judgment ordering that appellees take nothing on their claims against Flasher Ltd. Additionally, we reverse and remand the award of $55,298 in attorney ad litem fees to the trial court for further proceedings.
The issue of the attorney ad litem’s fee was not addressed in the court’s opinion issued February 18, 2004, because the trial court’s judgment was reversed in favor of Price on the issue of liability; thus, as the prevailing party on appeal, Price is not required to pay the trial court costs, which include the $55,298 ad litem fee. See Tex.R. Crv. P. 131, 139. After the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Castillo family was reversed, the attorney ad litem for Castillo’s minor children submitted a document entitled “Attorney Ad Litem’s Pro Bono Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Minor Children’s Interest Under Umbrella of Appellees’ Motion for Reconsideration En Banc.” The brief requests affirmative relief on behalf of the ad litem in that it requests that Price be ordered to pay all or part of the ad litem fee. As stated in our order dated June 11, 2004, the brief is being treated as a separate motion for rehearing en banc filed by the ad litem. The ad litem’s motion for rehearing was filed while the appellees’ motion for reconsideration en banc was pending 1 before the court; thus, the court has plenary jurisdiction over the ad litem’s motion. See Tex.R.App. P. 19.1(b); see also Yzaguirre v. Gonzalez, 989 S.W.2d 111, 112-113 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (en banc) (motion for en banc review may be filed at any time within the period in which the court of appeals retains plenary power).
This supplemental opinion on rehearing is being issued to address: (1) whether the judgment awarding the attorney ad litem fee is void as alleged by Price on appeal; and (2) if not, whether “good cause” exists under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 141 to assess any portion of the ad litem fee against Price, the prevailing party on appeal. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 139,141.

1. Validity of Judgment Awarding Ad Litem Fee.

Price argued in its appellant’s brief that the judgment awarding the attorney ad litem fee of $55,298 is void because it is styled as a “judgment nunc pro tunc,” but does more than merely correct a clerical error in the original judgment; it adjudicates and assesses the ad litem fee as additional court costs. The purpose of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to correct a clerical' error in the judgment after the trial court’s plenary power has expired. Tex.R. Civ. P. 316, 329b(f); see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 482 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Because the second judgment was signed within the trial court’s plenary power,2 it is construed as a valid modified judgment even though it is misnamed as a judgment “nunc pro tunc.” Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.1978) (even if the court mistakenly *441names the second judgment a “judgment nunc pro tunc,” the judgment is not a judgment nunc pro tunc, but is a modified judgment); see also Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (if the court signs a corrected judgment during the time it still has plenary jurisdiction, it is a modified judgment, not a judgment nunc pro tunc); Go Leasing, Inc. v. Groos Nat’l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 143, 144-45 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
Price also argued in its appellant’s brief that the judgment awarding the ad litem fee is a nullity because it fails to recite that the prior judgment is vacated. Any change in a judgment made during the trial court’s plenary power is treated as a modified or reformed judgment that implicitly vacates and supercedes the prior judgment, unless the record indicates a contrary intent. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Wasiak, 883 S.W.2d 402, 410-11 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ). Here, the record indicates that the second judgment was intended to vacate the first judgment. The second judgment repeats the exact same language as the first judgment, with the only differences being the assessment of the ad litem fee as costs and the erroneous title of “final judgment nunc pro tunc,” indicating that it was intended to modify and replace the prior judgment. See City of West Lake Hills v. State, 466 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Tex.1971); Exxon Corp. v. Garza, 981 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (if the record shows an intent to vacate, the second judgment need not expressly state that the first judgment is vacated, although that is the preferable practice). Therefore, the second judgment awarding the attorney ad litem fee vacated the prior judgment and is a valid modified judgment.
2. Existence of “Good Cause” to Assess Costs Against Prevailing Party.
The attorney ad litem argues that “good cause” exists under Rule 141 to assess the ad litem fee, taxed as court costs, against Price even though Price is the prevailing party on appeal. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 141. The only reason cited by the ad litem as “good cause” is the inability of the minors and Castillo to pay the $55,298 ad litem fee. The ad litem asserts that it is unfair to make the Castillo family pay the fee because they do not have the resources, and it is equally unfair for the ad litem not to be compensated for services rendered. The ad litem acknowledges that the record contains no evidence regarding the ability to pay by the minors or Castillo, and the trial court has made no finding of their inability to pay the ad litem fee. Nevertheless, the ad litem argues that the appellees’ inability to pay is obvious and well known to the trial court and to Price. The ad litem urges this court to assess the $55,298 fee against Price,3 or alternatively, to remand the issue to the trial court for a determination of the Castillo family’s ability to pay and whether “good cause” exists to assess all or part of the fee against Price.
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that “good cause” to tax court costs against the prevailing party is an elusive concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.*4421985). “Typically ..., ‘good cause’ has meant that the prevailing party unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings, unreasonably increased costs, or otherwise did something that should be penalized.” Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Tex.2001); see, e.g., Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (affirming taxation of costs against successful party based on trial court’s finding that party’s trial strategy unnecessarily prolonged the trial); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied) (affirming assessment of costs against Department of Public Safety where it refused to mediate as ordered, and failed to file any objection to mediation). The argument that a losing party’s inability to pay court costs alone constitutes “good cause” for taxing all or part of the costs against the successful party has been rejected by the Supreme Court, although not in the context of ad litem fees. See Furr’s, 53 S.W.3d at 378 (holding that a party’s inability to pay court costs was not “good cause” under Rule 141). “If financial inability to pay was ‘good cause’ then, contrary to rule 131, the winner — not the loser — of a lawsuit would often be in a better position to pay the costs.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Stotts, 667 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1983, no writ)).
In the specific context of ad litem fees taxed as costs, the attorney ad litem cites two cases in support of his argument that the minors’ inability to pay justifies taxing the ad litem fee against Price. In Davis v. Henley, 471 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the appellate court affirmed taxation of a $900 guardian ad litem fee against the successful defendant based on the trial court’s finding after a hearing that neither the minor nor his father had funds to pay the fee. The appellate court held that, upon concluding that the minor plaintiff and his father could not pay the ad litem fee, the trial court was entitled to consider the following factors in determining “good cause” to assess the fee against the successful defendant: (1) the importance of the minor plaintiff having competent counsel who should be reasonably sure of receiving a fée for his services; (2) that a prevailing defendant also benefits from the ad litem’s services because it ensures that a judgment adverse to the minor will not be overturned for lack of a guardian ad litem; and (3) whether the record shows that the minor plaintiffs claim was frivolous. Davis, 471 S.W.2d at 885. The court in Davis concluded that the plaintiffs claim was not frivolous, the defendant also benefitted from the ad litem’s appointment, the ad litem was entitled to be paid for his services and the minor plaintiff and his father could not pay the fee; therefore, the court found “good cause” under Rule 141 to tax the fee against the prevailing defendant. Id. (citing Bruni v. Vidaurri, 140 Tex. 138, 166 S.W.2d 81 (1942), for the general rule that “... the fee for representing a minor defendant should be taxed against the minor personally served with citation when the judgment ... is unfavorable to him and it is shown that he has property ..., but that when the minor has no property or estate ..., the court should charge it against the successful plaintiff’).
In the other case cited by the ad litem, the appellate court reversed the assessment of the guardian ad litem fee against the prevailing defendant because the minor plaintiffs had the ability to pay the ad litem fee out of settlement proceeds received from other defendants. See Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 876 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ) (holding that plaintiffs could not create an inability to pay by placing settlement funds into an annuity to avoid paying the ad litem fees). The court stated, however, that if the record had shown both that the plaintiffs were *443unable to pay the fees and that the defendant benefitted from the ad ¡items’ services, it would have found “good cause” to assess the ad litem fees against the defendant. Dover, 876 S.W.2d at 170; see also Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Williams, No. 05-96-01485-CV, 1998 WL 436917 at *3-4 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (affirming portion of judgment taxing guardian ad litem fees against DART as prevailing party based on the plaintiffs’ inability to pay). The Dover court stressed that the benefit a prevailing defendant receives from an ad litem’s appointment protecting a favorable judgment cannot alone establish “good cause” under Rule 141. Dover, 876 S.W.2d at 171 (stating “[i]f this benefit to Dover, alone, constituted good cause, guardian ad litem fees could always be assessed against a prevailing defendant”). Finally, the Dover court stated its support for the policy that those who accept ad litem appointments should be reasonably sure of receiving a fee for their services. Id. (citing Cahill v. Lyda, 826 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex.1992)).
Finally, the ad litem argues that it would not be “fair” to force the minor plaintiffs or Castillo to pay the ad litem fee. The Texas Supreme Court recently rejected a fairness argument made as the “good cause” reason to split the guardian ad litem fee between the defendant physician and the parents in a medical malpractice case. See Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex.2003). The trial court had found that “because an ad litem is there for the benefit of all the parties, it is ‘fair’ to split costs between the losing and prevailing parties.” Id. The Supreme Court reiterated that a guardian ad litem does not serve for the benefit of all parties, but, rather, serves to protect the minor’s interests. Id. (citing Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Vandewater, 907 S.W.2d 491, 493 n. 2 (Tex.1995)). The Supreme Court noted the trial court’s finding of good cause was premised on its perception that the prevailing party incidentally benefitted from the ad litem’s services. The court stated, “[ajssuming that such an incidental benefit might in a particular case provide good cause, Rule 141 still requires that the trial court state its reasons ‘on the record’ and with more specificity than the court’s general notion of fairness [stated] here.” Id. (holding grounds of perceived fairness, without more, are insufficient to constitute good cause). The Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility that fairness may be good cause, but stated the record must substantiate the reasoning. Id.

Conclusion.

Generally, the trial court costs, including an ad litem fee, should be taxed against the plaintiff when the defendant prevails on appeal. See TexR. Civ. P. 131, 139. Because the attorney ad litem has raised an argument that “good cause” exists to assess all or part of the ad litem fee against Price, and the record contains no evidence on this issue, we reverse the award of ad litem fees and remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and ruling to determine: (1) whether the minor or adult plaintiffs have the ability to pay the ad litem fee; and (2) if not, whether good cause exists under Rule 141 to tax all or part of the ad litem fee against Price as the prevailing party. See TexR. Crv. P. 141. The attorney ad litem’s motion for rehearing en banc is granted.

. Appellees’ motion for rehearing en banc was timely filed on April 13, 2004, and was denied on June 23, 2004.

. The original judgment was signed on July 11, 2002. The trial court’s plenary power was extended by the timely filing of a motion for new trial by Price, which was denied by written order on September 16, 2002. While the motion for new trial was still pending, the ad litem filed a motion for payment of his fee, which was granted by written order. On September 23, 2002, within thirty days after denial of the motion for new trial, the court signed a modified judgment (styled a “judgment nunc pro tunc”) awarding the $55,298 ad litem fee as court costs. Therefore, the judgment was modified within the trial court’s plenary power. See Rule 329b(e), Tex.R. Civ. P.

. The attorney ad litem argues that this court should render judgment assessing the ad li-tem fee against Price based on good cause. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.4, however, authorizes us to tax the appellate costs, including the costs for the clerk's record and reporter’s record, against the prevailing party if warranted by good cause. Tex.R.App. P. 43.4. The ad litem's fee is not taxed as a cost of appeal, but as a cost of the trial court which falls within Rule 141. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 141.