Court Opinion

ID: 9541483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:25:55.496271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:57.758854
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Faulconer, J.
— Appellant has filed herein her petition for rehearing in four paragraphs.
Appellant’s first contention as to error in the court’s opinion consists merely of the stated conclusion, unsupported by citation of authority, that defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 16 was not cured by plaintiff’s Instructions Nos. 5 and 15. This argument is no more than a flat conclusion that the court erred in failing to decide the issue in favor of appellant.
In the second paragraph of her petition for rehearing appellant contends that “[t]he Court failed to give a statement in writing on each substantial question arising on the record by failing to give any statement in writing concerning Appellant’s objections to defendant’s tendered instruction No. 22.” With regard to this objection, the court viewed appellant’s objections to defendant’s tendered Instructions Nos. 16 and 22 as being, in effect and with regard to the issue presented, the same. From appellant’s petition for rehearing it is apparent that she is aware of this fact. Thus, the court having dealt in its written opinion with the single question presented, appellant’s second contention is without merit.
Appellant’s third contention in support of her petition for rehearing is the allegation that since defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 22 was a mandatory instruction, its omission of the element of ordinary care could not be aided by other instructions. In support of this state*344ment appellant cites Covert v. Boicourt, Exr. (1931), 93 Ind. App. 355, 168 N. E. 198. The Covert case does hold that the omission of an essential element presented by the issues from a mandatory instruction cannot be cured by other instructions. With regard, however, to the basic element of appellant’s third contention, i.e., that defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 22 was, in fact, mandatory, the court in the Covert case indicated, on page 364 of 93 Ind. App., that it regards an instruction as mandatory which “directs a verdict on certain facts to be found.” Such view is substantially in accord with that expressed in Vance v. Wells (1959), 129 Ind. App. 659, 159 N. E. 2d 586, and thus the Covert case is not in conflict with the conclusion that defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 22 is not mandatory under the definitive explanation of a mandatory instruction in Vance v. Wells, supra, at pages 666-667 of 129 Ind. App., as follows:
“A mandatory instruction unequivocally charges the jury that if they find from a preponderance of the evidence that a certain set of facts exists, they must render a verdict in accordance therewith, either for the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant. It positively directs the jury to find for one party and against the other.”
Appellant, in the fourth and final paragraph of her petition for rehearing raises the same objection to defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 3 as was raised on appeal, i.e., the instruction placed upon the plaintiff the burden of proving her freedom from contributory negligence. Appellant cites five Supreme Court of Indiana cases in support of her contention. Of these five cases, three were cited previously in appellant’s brief in support of the same proposition for which they are now cited. The language and reasoning found in the court’s written opinion is still applicable on this question of law.
*345The two cases cited by appellant in her petition for rehearing which were not cited on appeal are Harper v. James (1965), 246 Ind. 131, 203 N. E. 2d 531, and Deekard v. Adams (1965), 246 Ind. 123, 203 N. E. 2d 303. In each of these cases the language of the erroneous instruction is clearly distinguishable from that of defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 3.
In Harper v. James, supra, the court held that where an instruction, in an action for personal injury, required plaintiff “ ‘to prove by a fair preponderance of all the evidence . . . facts showing that the alleged misconduct of the defendant was the sole proximate cause of the . . . damages . . .’ ” such instruction was erroneous as imposing a burden upon the plaintiff of proving the absence of contributory negligence. Similarly, in Deekard v. Adams, supra, an action involving personal injury, the court held that an instruction “erroneously cast upon the plaintiff the burden of proving . . . that the plaintiff was free from contributory negligence.” The erroneous instruction stated, in part, “ ‘the burden is upon Carmen Deekard [the plaintiff] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . one or more of . . . [the defendant’s] negligent acts was the sole proximate and direct cause of injuries to plaintiff. . . .’ ”
As is readily apparent, the Harper and Deekard cases are concerned with the problem posed by instructions which require a plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the act or acts complained of were the sole cause of injury. The language contained in defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 3 is clearly dissimilar to that of the instructions found erroneous in the Harper and Deekard cases, and hence these cases in no manner compel the conclusion that defendant’s tendered Instruction No. 3 is similarly erroneous.
We are of the opinion that the court’s written opinion in this cause adequately dealt with all matters properly pre*346sented to us on appeal, and as appellant’s petition for rehearing is not meritorious, the same should be denied.
Petition for rehearing denied.
Carson and Prime, JJ., concur.
Wickens, P.J., not participating.
Note. — Reported 213 N. E. 2d 809. Rehearing denied in 217 N. E. 2d 165.