Court Opinion

ID: 9540005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:12:11.224692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:31.247725
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur with the majority's affirmation of the trial court's grant of a restricted driving permit to Hernandez, I respectfully dissent from the majority's reversal of the order providing that Hernandez may drive her children to and from school and doctor's appointments in emergencies. In my opinion, the majority too narrowly construes the term "employment" as used in Indiana Code section 9-24-15-2(2).
"Employment" is not defined in the context of Indiana Code section 9-24-15-2. However, the majority assumes the term encompasses only services performed outside the home for which monetary compensation is received. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. T.W. Thom Constr, Inc. v. City of Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 824 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Absent a clearly manifested purpose to do otherwise, words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning. Id. Presumably, in contemporary society, the services of a parent inside the home constitute employment on an equal par with services performed outside the home. It is unduly restrictive, and punitive to the family unit, to differentiate between employment inside and outside the home when determining what services must necessarily be accommodated to avoid "undue hardship."
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 9-24-15-2, an individual may petition for a driving permit to allow the individual to drive "to and from work and in the course of employment." (emphasis added.) Clearly, a single parent such as Hernandez, the sole custodian of two children, is required "in the course of employment" to provide transportation in emergencies to the children for whom she is a caregiver. The duty to provide emergency transportation would necessarily exist whether her role was that of a salaried child care worker or that of a parent performing the same function.
Additionally, I consider the majority's reliance upon State ex rel. Van Natta v. Marlett, 266 Ind. 571, 365 N.E.2d 763 (1977) misplaced. In Marlett, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked authority to grant a restricted drivers license under Indiana Code section 9-4-13-10 [now repealed] to the defendant, an adjudicated habitual traffic offender who had accumulated nine offenses including speeding, reckless driving and driving while under the influence. Here, Hernandez's license was suspended from March 24, 2001 to June 22, 2001 because she had failed to provide proof of financial responsibility as requested by the BMV. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not lack authority to grant a restricted license.
Moreover, Marlett should not be construed to suggest that the trial court is wholly lacking in discretion to designate the terms of the employment-related restricted license. Clearly, Indiana Code section 9-24-15-2(2) confers upon the trial court the discretion to determine what constitutes an "undue hardship and burden" upon the individual's family or dependents. As a corollary, the trial court is afforded some discretion to determine what is "in the course of employment." Just as the trial court was empowered to determine that an undue hardship would *258befall Hernandez's minor children if she were unable to report to her paid employment at the Olive Garden Restaurant, the trial court was empowered to determine that an undue hardship would befall the children if their sole caregiver were unable to transport them in a medical or educational emergency. Finally, the trial court could reasonably determine that such transportation duties were within the course of Hernandez's employment as an unpaid caregiver.