Court Opinion

ID: 9551655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:56:48.793025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:21.007926
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(concurring) — The record shows issues of material fact as to whether the Hellands waived the April 2 deadline or are estopped from asserting it. Reading the affidavits in the light most favorable to the Robesons: on April 2, 1980 the Robesons' attorney called Ms. Chrey, the stakeholder, and requested an extension of time in which to raise the money. Ms. Chrey stated that she would check with the Hellands. Several days later, after the deadline had passed, Jean Robeson received a call from Mr. Helland asking what was happening. Mrs. Robeson told him that they were trying to get the money together as soon as possible. Neither Mr. Helland nor Ms. Chrey ever told the Robesons, prior to the tender of the full amount, that they would not permit an extension.
If these facts are found to be true, following an eviden-tiary hearing, then it could be found either that the Hel-lands waived the right to claim performance by April 2, or that the Robesons could reasonably rely on the acceptability of a later performance, giving rise to an estoppel of the Hellands to assert the deadline.
Of greater concern to me is the necessity that the trial court then sort out the rights to the disputed property as between the Robesons and Lashley and Klepper, the Hel-lands' successors in interest. To do so will require a determination of the factual background of the sale to Lashley and Klepper to see whether they were put on actual or constructive notice of the Robesons' claim and whether they acted in good faith. Open possession of the property by the Robesons may serve to put the intervenors on constructive notice of the Robesons' claims. So may the circumstances surrounding the sale: the conveyance of a valuable property by special warranty deed (with no meaningful warranty), the speed at which the Hellands' grantee turned around and resold the property, and the current *492payment of taxes and mortgage by the Robesons.
The standard as to notice is that
Notice to a purchaser of real estate that parties other than the seller (or encumbrancer) have a claim of interest in the property need not be actual nor amount to full knowledge, but it should be such information as would excite apprehension in an ordinary mind and prompt a person of average prudence to make inquiry; however, a circumstance which would lead a person to inquire is only notice of what a reasonable inquiry would reveal.
Glaser v. Holdorf, 56 Wn.2d 204, 209, 352 P.2d 212 (1960). See also Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn.2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968); Paganelli v. Swendsen, 50 Wn.2d 304, 311 P.2d 676 (1957). Had the intervenors inquired of the Robesons, who were obviously living at the property at the time, they would doubtless have learned of the Robesons' claims under the settlement agreement. Glaser v. Holdorf, supra.
On the other hand, the Robesons could have obviated the problem of subsequent bona fide purchasers by putting their claim to the property on the record before the sale, by filing a lis pendens or a motion to vacate the default judgment quieting title in the Hellands. By their failure to do so, they bring into question their equitable right to the property as opposed to the right of the intervenors.
At trial, presumably with all interested parties before the court, the rights of the Robesons, Hellands, and intervenors to the disputed property may be fully and fairly determined. Although I have doubts about the method of relief selected by the Robesons, absent a challenge to the procedure I join with the court and remand for trial.