Court Opinion

ID: 9786107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:47:31.716452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:07.023626
License: Public Domain

WALDRIP, D.J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 10] I respectfully dissent. The majority reads the pertinent part of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-301 (LexisNexis 2003) to exclude any requirement that a candidate for municipal office not be a municipal employee. In so concluding, the majority relies upon the plain language of the statute. However, § 22-23-301 specifically states: “In order to be eligible, a candidate must be a registered voter and a resident of the municipality and ward which he seeks to represent on the day the petition is filed, and shall not be an employee of the municipality.” Id. (emphasis added). “Candidate” is commonly defined as “one that aspires to or is nominated or qualified for an office.” Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary, at 165 (10th ed.2000) (emphasis added). Synonyms for “candidate” are “applicant,” “aspirant,” “hopeful,” “seeker.” Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, at 70 (3d ed.1998). The plain language of the statute clearly sets forth an employment (or lack thereof) requirement at the time of candidacy, not at the time of oath of office. The plain language of the statute does not require further inquiry into legislative history.
[¶ 11] I believe the parties “take for granted that this'statute requires that a person not be a municipal employee in order to be a candidate for municipal office” because the parties read the statute exactly as the legislature intended it to be read. I think the law in this state is clear: “It is our well-established rule that every law is presumed *462constitutional, and all doubts are resolved in favor of constitutionality.” Worcester v. State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 22, 30 P.3d 47, ¶ 22 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Smith v. State, 964 P.2d 421, 422-23 (Wyo.1998)). In this case, it seems to me that the majority works too hard to avoid this simple rule.
[¶ 12] Further, I am concerned that the evils the Wyoming Legislature meant to address via § 22-23-301 will now go unrestrained. “Resign to run” laws, like § 22-23-301, prevent any potential abuse of office before or after an election; minimize the possibility of disruptions and conflict in public office; and require individuals to concentrate on the duties of their current jobs. See Blair v. Harris, 98 Hawai'i 176, 45 P.3d 798, 803 (2002) (quoting Fast v. Cayetano, 752 F.Supp. 942, 951 (Dist.Haw.1990)); In the Matter of Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 222-24 (Del.1992); Acevedo v. City of North Pole, 672 P.2d 130, 133-34 (Alaska 1983); Bolin v. State, Dep’t of Public Safety, 313 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Minn.1981); Mortal v. Judiciary Comm’n of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978). These prohibitions are designed to protect those in public service from unjust campaign solicitations; to free them from political pressure; and to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of public employment. Oklahoma State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, 778 (Okla.1980).1
[¶ 13] At a minimum, § 22-23-301 serves to: 1) keep politics out of the government workplace; 2) guarantee job security free from political restraint; 3) avoid the appearance of impropriety; and 4) require individuals to concentrate on the duties of their current jobs. These can be and are very real problems in our small cities and towns throughout Wyoming, where employees should feel secure in their jobs, free from political constraints. In the event that a candidate for office exercises any sort of supervisory responsibilities, the employer must be allowed to protect its other employees from any bias or favoritism. Above all, municipalities must be able to maintain public confidence in the integrity of their governments and avoid the appearance of impropriety.
[¶ 14] For these reasons, I believe the Court should conclude that § 22-23-301 requires a candidate to resign from office and should proceed to address the constitutional ramifications, if any, of the statute.

. I also find persuasive the reasoning of the Michigan Supreme Court in Martin v. Itasca County, 448 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.1989):
[T]he United States Supreme Court recognized that our history as a democratic nation demonstrates that broadly prohibiting political activity by government employees is necessary to ensure that civil servants serve the public and not a political party. A legislative body may prohibit a government employee from becoming a candidate for elective office not only to prevent potential conflict in the workplace between the employee and the supervisor-incumbent during the campaign, but also to prevent any tacit coercion of fellow employees and subordinates to’assist in a political campaign. This policy promotes efficiency and integrity in government ranks and also prevents both “danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections.”
Martin, 448 N.W.2d at 371 (upholding the dismissal of a county employee who had announced his candidacy for county commissioner).