Court Opinion

ID: 9796841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:06:41.154689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:50.217097
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, P. J.,
concurring.
I agree with the result in this case. I write separately because I believe that the majority unnecessarily overrules our holding in City of Portland v. One 1973 Chevrolet Corvette, 113 Or App 469, 833 P2d 1285 (1992).
*86This is an area of law that involves a number of cases from which conflicting legal rules could be drawn. My view of the existing law is that there are three general principles potentially in play. The first principle addresses the maintenance of an appeal by a prevailing party who is entitled to have the losing party perform some obligation under the judgment. The general rule is that a prevailing party will lose the right to appeal a judgment if the party accepts the benefit of the defendant’s performance. For example, if the plaintiff is awarded $5,000 by a judgment, the defendant tenders the $5,000, and the plaintiff accepts the awarded amount from the defendant, the plaintiff has lost the right t appeal on the ground that the award was not sufficient. See Portland Construction Co. v. O’Neil, 24 Or 54, 32 P 764 (1893);1 Moore v. Floyd, 4 Or 260 (1872).2
The second principle governs appeals by losing parties. The general rule is that a losing party will not lose the right to appeal if the party performs obligations required under the judgment, unless it appears that the party intended to either settle the case by satisfying the judgment or perform other obligations that would benefit that party. See Edwards v. Perkins, 7 Or 149 (1879).3 Whether a payment of a judgment is voluntary will also be affected by the ability of the other party to enforce the judgment. Cottrell et ux. v. Prier et ux., 191 Or 571, 231 P2d 788 (1951). Thus, if the *87judgment is paid under threat of execution, or if not paid to settle the case, an appeal is not barred. Coker & Bellamy v. Richey, 108 Or 479, 482, 217 P 638 (1923); see also Staiger v. Holman, 144 Or 67, 6 P2d 43 (1933); Cottrell, 191 Or at 575.
The third principle governs appeals by both prevailing and losing parties, when the judgment contains reciprocal obligations or multiple obligations of one party. An appeal is a renunciation of the entire judgment. Moore, 4 Or at 261. For example, the judgment in Cottrell ordered the appellants to deliver a deed to the respondents and the respondents to pay the purchase price of the property to the appellants. 191 Or at 571. The appellants delivered the deed and took the money from the respondents, but then appealed from the judgment. A statutory mechanism existed at the time that would have allowed the appellants to deliver the deed to the court and stay the execution of the judgment. The court said that, because the respondent’s ability to execute on the judgment could have been negated by the giving of the deed to the court, the choice made by the appellants barred their appeal. Gottrell, 191 Or at 575-76.
Similarly, in Lord v. Pettibon, 102 Or App 607, 795 P2d 607 (1990), the judgment imposed reciprocal obligations on Lord and Pettibon. Under the terms of the judgment, Pettibon was to execute certain documents and, in return, Lord was to give him a promissory note and deed. Because of a dispute over some of the terms, Pettibon refused to execute the relevant documents. The court ordered Pettibon to sign the documents, which he did, and then the court entered the judgment disposing of all claims. Pettibon took the deed and promissory note from Lord and assigned it to a trust of which he was trustee and appealed from the other portions of the judgment. Pettibon contended on appeal that he was forced by the court to execute the written settlement, so his appeal was not inconsistent with having performed some of the terms of the judgment. We held, relying on Cottrell, that Pettibon’s acceptance of the benefits of part of the judgment precluded his appeal from the other parts, because the judgment was not severable. Lord, 102 Or App at 610. Thus, the general rule in those cases is that, where the multiple parts of a judgment are dependent upon each other — in other *88words, not severable — then performance of part of the judgment, or acceptance of the benefit of part of the judgment, will bar an appeal on the entire judgment.
This case requires only application of the second principle. Plaintiffs, the losing parties, have appealed and also have paid the judgment because of the threat of execution. In contrast, our ruling in City of Portland, like the holding in Cottrell, is an application of the third principle, where the appellant, rather than renouncing the entire judgment, appeals from it while complying with part of it to the appellant’s benefit. The key to that understanding lies in the reference in City of Portland to Lord. The City had sought by its action to foreclose on property that it had previously seized. The judgment against it required it to deliver the seized property to the claimant and pay a judgment for attorney fees. While appealing the judgment, the City voluntarily returned the seized property and paid the judgment for attorney fees. One benefit that it derived from those acts was that it no longer had to store or maintain possession of the seized property that it was lawfully obligated to keep in order to preserve its rights to foreclose. See Or Laws 1989, ch 791, § 5(1) to (3).4 Had the City been successful on appeal, it would have been faced with the prospect of prosecuting a forfeiture proceeding on property that it no longer had in its possession, when its right to forfeiture depended on its possession. The City’s plight was further complicated by the fact that it voluntarily paid the attorney fee judgment when there were procedures available to stay its enforcement, not unlike what existed in Cottrell. The citation to Lord in the opinion demonstrates that we were applying the rules that apply to multi-part judgments. At the heart of all of the principles underlying this area of the law is the understanding that when a judgment is voluntarily performed before a decision is made on appeal, then there is nothing left upon which an appellate judgment contrary to the trial court judgment could operate. Eilers Piano House v. Pick, 58 Or 54, 56, 113 P 54 (1911). *89That is exactly the situation that the City found itself in after returning the seized property, thus resulting in our dismissal of the City’s appeal.
In summary, my differences with the majority are two-fold. First, we need not overrule City of Portland in this case because it does not involve multiple parts of a judgment. Rather, it involves solely the payment of the judgment to avoid execution. Second, I disagree with the majority that “[t]he facts we recited in the opinion do not suggest that the city [in City of Portland] had accepted the benefits of the judgment, as the appellant had in Cottrell or Lord.” 176 Or App at 83. In my view, the City received a benefit in that case by divesting itself of the responsibility for the property when it was required to maintain possession pending appeal. It may be that, on those facts, the majority disagrees that the City received benefits from returning the seized property, but that issue is not before us in this case, nor need it be decided in order to rule in this case. Because this area of law is not without its tension and sometimes conflicting rules, we are ill-advised to overrule precedent when the precedent is distinguishable on its facts from the case at issue. Given the importance of the role of stare decisis in our jurisprudence, the majority’s unnecessary overruling of City of Portland will erode the reliance that the bench and bar place on our decisions. Consequently, I do not join in the majority’s overruling of City of Portland.

 In Portland Construction Co., the prevailing party was awarded a monetary judgment, the amount of which the losing party paid to the court clerk. The prevailing party withdrew the sum awarded by the judgment from the clerk, held it for four days, and then returned it to the court. When the prevailing party appealed from the judgment, the court held that, as to the sum withdrawn by the prevailing party, “[t]he plaintiff was not bound to take it, but, having done so, his act is a termination of his right to further litigation.” Portland Construction Co., 24 Or at 57.

 In Moore, the court dismissed the appeal after the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment against the defendant for $500 plus costs and disbursements. The defendant paid the entire amount owed, and a full satisfaction was entered. Then the plaintiff attempted to appeal, and the court held that “the right to proceed on a judgment and enjoy its fruits, and the right of appeal, are not concurrent; on the contrary, they are totally inconsistent.” Moore, 4 Or at 261.

 In Edwards,- the defendant was ordered to pay $24.85 plus costs and disbursements. He satisfied the judgment on the day it was entered. He then filed an appeal. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had waived his right to appeal by paying the judgment, but the court reasoned that the defendant could have been forced by the plaintiff to pay the sum due notwithstanding the appeal, so his payment did not affect his right to appeal. Edwards, 7 Or at 154-55.

 In substance, the statute authorized the forfeiting agency to (1) store the property for safekeeping; (2) maintain the property so as to preserve its value; (3) transfer the property to another agency with forfeiture authority; or (4) sell, lease, rent or operate the property in a commercially reasonable manner and hold the proceeds pending forfeiture.