Court Opinion

ID: 9755374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:35:49.350886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.528291
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority when they hold “the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce any of the photographic evidence, with the exception of the Video’ evidence depicting the offense alleged in Cause No. 9137JD, and erred in permitting the State to introduce any evidence referring to or describing his pending federal charge.” Unfortunately, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that the error was harmless.1 The majority opines there “was certainly an abundance of properly admitted punishment evidence in support of such a verdict” [the maximum], yet we will never know because the properly admitted punishment evidence was intertwined with the erroneous admitted evidence. Unfortunately, under the appropriate standard of review, there must be some type of qualitative analysis of the evidence. As noted by the majority, the proper evidence consisted of testimony by other vic*162tims, Waltmon’s written statement where he described the photographs in State’s exhibit two and admitted committing various unlawful sexual acts with children plus a video of Waltmon performing oral sex on the victim.
While Waltmon’s written statement is repulsive, the photographs are not only repulsive but revolting. A comparison2 of the statements and photographs are at Appendix One.3
This case, in my view, epitomizes the old saying “A picture is worth a thousand words.”4 It is one thing to listen to or read Waltmon’s words and yet another to see the photographs. Courts have long recognized that pictures are powerful, demonstrative evidence.5 Just recently the Court of Criminal Appeals held the erroneous admission of a photograph of the murder victim and her unborn child lying in a casket was not harmless in the penalty phase of a capital murder prosecution. Reese v. State, 33 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)
The majority adopts the “grave doubt” standard of O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995), yet seems to focus on the common6 definition of the word “grave” rather than the definition supplied by the Supreme Court.7 Looking at all the record before us, I can have no fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.8 Reese, 33 S.W.3d at 244. At the very least, the question of whether the photographic evidence influenced the jury is evenly balanced, therefore within the “grave doubt” range. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new punishment hearing.

. My dissent is reluctant, but necessary; reluctant because appellant is a confessed pedophile who abused and exploited his infant daughter, but necessary because even atrocious acts must be proved by properly admitted evidence.

. I readily admit this is a highly subjective exercise, yet my descriptions of the photographs do not convey the images.

. Because of explicit, but necessary language, Appendix One is ordered "Do Not Publish."

. Fred R. Barnard, Printers’ Ink, Mar. 10, 1927, at 114 (Source: The Home Book of Proverbs, Maxims and Familiar Phrases, Burton Stevenson, ed., 1948)

. For an example of how one photograph can have an influential effect see Langford v. Blackman, 790 S.W.2d 127, 132 (Tex.App.-Beaumont), rev’d, 795 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.l990)(emphasis added).

. "Of importance; authoritative; weighty; sedate; serious.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 992 (3d ed.1981).

. "By 'grave doubt’ we mean that, in the judge's mind the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error." O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 994, 130 L.Ed.2d at 951.

. As noted by the majority, the State alluded to the photographs in closing arguments.