Court Opinion

ID: 9454959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:05:08.496596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:23.776600
License: Public Domain

FREEDMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
We are agreed that in the circumstances there existed an implied warranty of merchantability under § 2-314(2) (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 In my view the absence of a charge on the implied warranty was the result of the trial judge’s misapprehension of the *410nature of the warranty and not of appellants’ failure to make adequate objection under Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. I consider the error fundamental and therefore would notice it despite any failure to comply with Rule 51.2
It is true, as the majority opinion demonstrates, that appellants’ counsel incorrectly labeled the warranty as one of fitness for a particular purpose rather than of merchantability.3 I think this is not significant for a number of reasons.
1. Again and again in the colloquy, which is detailed in the majority opinion, appellants’ counsel made it plain that the fundamental basis of their contention was that an implied warranty existed that the machine would perform its normal work without being set afire. Their reference to the warranty as one of fitness for a particular purpose therefore was an insignificant error in name only and not a matter of any substance.
2. The trial judge was not misled by the wrong label put on the claim of breach of warranty. He would have arrived at the same result even under the correct label, for his refusal to charge on warranty was based on his misapprehension of the law. He believed that so long as the machine adequately set pins there could be no breach of warranty of merchantability, even if the machine was set afire. It is this erroneous view, rather than a misnaming of the warranty hy counsel, which led to the trial judge’s refusal to charge on any implied warranty.
3. The specific element of breach of warranty on which appellants relied, i. e., that the machine was, set afire by its normal operation, is one which would have been common to both warranties. The label under which this crucial element was described therefore did not mislead the trial judge nor did it fail to give adequate notice of the real nature of the plaintiffs’ claim.
It seems to me unjust to hold that one whose place of business was burned down by machinery which set itself on fire cannot rely on the breach of implied warranty because he called it one of fitness for a particular purpose instead of merchantability for general use, when in either case the fire would constitute a breach of warranty. This was especially true here, since the trial judge stated that he would not charge on the implied warranty of merchantability which we now say appellants were required to specify.
I therefore believe it was fundamental error to fail to charge on breach o'f the implied warranty of merchantability, and we should notice the error here, even if the requirements of Rule 51 were not met.
I have assumed, as has the majority, that the present transaction of lease falls within the Uniform Commercial Codé. Since I would remand the case for a new trial because of the failure to charge on implied warranty, the parties would have the opportunity to present any further evidence as to the nature of the transaction and to argue the applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code.

. Act of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3, § 2-314, as amended, 12A Purdon’s Pa.Stat.Annot. § 2-314.

. See, e. g., Paluch v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad Co., 387 F.2d 996 (3 Cir. 1968).

. Section 2-314(2) (c) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that to be merchantable goods must at least be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”
Section 2-315 of the Code provides that where the seller has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and the buyer relies on bis skill or judgment to sell or furnish suitable goods, there is an implied warranty “that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.”