Court Opinion

ID: 9931355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:07:36.274514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:31.593535
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Woods v. Flemings, 2024-Ohio-460.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

DOUG WOODS,                                         :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                             No. 112749
                v.                                  :

SHARAE FLEMINGS,                                    :

                Defendant-Appellee.                 :

                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2024

                 Civil Appeal from the Garfield Heights Municipal Court
                                 Case No. CVG2202856

                                              Appearances:

                Doug Woods, pro se.

                The Legal Aid Society of Cleveland and Elizabeth A. Zak,
                for appellee.

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J.:

               Appellant Doug Woods (“Woods”) challenges the judgment of the

Garfield Heights Municipal Court, entering judgment against him on the claims

asserted in his complaint and appellee Sharae Flemings’s (“Flemings”)

counterclaim. After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court. However, we remand to the trial court for the issuance

of a nunc pro tunc judgment entry expressly setting forth the amount of damages

awarded to Flemings.

                       I. Factual and Procedural History

            Woods leased a residence on Mountville Drive in Maple Heights, Ohio

(“property” or “premises”), to Flemings.   The lease was for one year, commencing

in October 2018. The rent for the property was $925 per month.

            Flemings was a participant of the Housing Choice Voucher Program

administered by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (“CMHA”). In

order to facilitate Flemings’s lease under this program, Woods entered into a

Housing Assistance Payment (“HAP”) Contract with CMHA.

            At the start of the lease, under the HAP Contract, CMHA subsidized

$786 of the rent to Woods, and Flemings’s portion was the remaining $139. In

October 2021, Flemings’s portion of the rent was changed to zero, and CMHA

subsidized the entire $925.

            The HAP Contract set forth certain rights and responsibilities for

Flemings, the tenant, and Woods, the owner. In particular, the HAP Contract

required the owner of the property to be responsible for water and sewer costs. This

provision conflicted with a term in the lease, which stated that Flemings was

responsible for any water and sewer payment that was over $75 each month.
            Throughout the time that Flemings resided at the property, there were

plumbing issues. Flemings notified Woods of any clogs or leaks, and he usually sent

someone to repair them.

            In September 2022, Woods filed an eviction action against Flemings.

The complaint contained two causes of action — one for eviction and one for

damages. On October 1, 2022, Flemings vacated the premises, notified Woods that

she was leaving, and left her keys on the kitchen counter in the property, per his

instructions.

                The court held an initial first cause hearing, after which Flemings

moved to dismiss the action based upon Woods’s acceptance of payments after the

date of his three-day eviction notice. The trial court sought briefing on this issue

and scheduled an additional hearing. Woods then filed a notice of voluntary

dismissal of his first cause of action, noting that Flemings had delivered possession

of the premises.

            Woods’s second cause of action sought damages for “back rent and/or

damages.” Woods maintained that he was owed late fees, loss of rent for the three

months after Flemings was evicted, water and sewer charges, and charges incurred

for unclogging drainpipes and other repairs to the property after Flemings left. The

total damages sought by Woods was $20,178.86.

                 Flemings delivered a letter to Woods requesting the return of her

$1,000 security deposit. Woods responded by providing an itemization of charges

for damage to the property that he claimed Flemings was responsible for, toward
which he was applying the security deposit. The total amount of these damages was

$16,331.67.

              Flemings filed a counterclaim, alleging that Woods had wrongfully

withheld her security deposit and was negligent in his role as landlord. She sought

compensatory damages and attorney fees.

              The court held a bench trial, after which it ruled in favor of Flemings

and against Woods on Woods’s remaining cause of action, finding that Woods was

not entitled to (1) late fees because Flemings had deposited the funds within the

grace period; (2) loss of rent since the months sought were from after Flemings had

been evicted; (3) damages related to water and sewer bills since per the HAP

contract, Woods was responsible for water and sewer charges; (4) damages sought

for plumbing repairs because the evidence did not establish causation between the

disrepair and actions by Flemings; (5) damages for other renovations after Flemings

left the residence because the court found the receipt for repairs to be suspect and

there was no other evidence in support; and (6) damages for funds expended for a

furnace replacement because the evidence failed to establish causation between the

need for replacement and actions by Flemings.

              The court did award Woods $140 for replacement of blinds and $800

for the depreciation of the premises due to cracked tiles and carpet replacement.

The total amount of damages awarded to Woods was $940.

              With regard to Flemings’s counterclaim, the court found against

Flemings on her claim for compensatory damages and found that her security
deposit had not been wrongfully withheld since there was justification to withhold

funds for the blinds and the flooring. The court held that Flemings’s security deposit

should be returned to her, less the $940 of damages awarded to Woods.

              Woods then filed the instant appeal, raising seven assignments of

error for our review:

      1. The trial court’s failure to sanction Flemings or to allow the
      presentation of evidence or defenses not raised in her untimely answer,
      counterclaim or trial brief, was erroneous, prejudicial and an abuse of
      discretion.

      2. The trial court’s last-minute continuance of trial and denial of
      objection, to a date that Woods’s witnesses were not available, was
      prejudicial and an abuse of discretion.

      3. The trial court’s calculation of the security deposit, as it pertained to
      the remaining amount owed to Flemings was erroneous, prejudicial, an
      abuse of discretion and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      4. The trial court’s failure to award unpaid rent late fees and loss of
      income to Woods was erroneous, prejudicial, an abuse of discretion
      and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      5. The trial court’s failure to award unpaid water and sewer to Woods
      was erroneous, contrary to law, prejudicial, an abuse of discretion and
      against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      6. The trial court’s award of end of lease property damages in favor of
      Flemings was erroneous, contrary to law, excessive, inadequate to
      Woods, violative of fact and logic, prejudicial, an abuse of discretion
      and against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      7. The lower court’s final judgment entry created a miscarriage of
      justice pursuant to bias or prejudice and a cumulation of errors.
                                  II. Law and Analysis

                      A. First Assignment of Error

                  In his first assignment of error, Woods argues that the trial court

abused its discretion in failing to sanction Flemings and allowing the presentation

of evidence or defenses that were not raised in her untimely answer, counterclaim,

or trial brief.

                  Woods is essentially arguing that the trial court improperly denied his

motion for sanctions. His motion sought sanctions against Flemings for her failure

to timely file her trial brief. Flemings did not file her trial brief by the original date

set by the court. The court then continued the trial and allowed Flemings additional

time to file her brief. Flemings eventually filed her brief four days after this deadline.

Woods asserted that he was prejudiced by this delayed filing because the trial brief

“presented stipulations, defenses, and theories of recovery which were not presented

in [Flemings’s] initial [c]ounterclaim or until now.”         He asked that the court

preclude Flemings from presenting evidence “outside of common law negligence

and the return of the deposit.”

                  A trial court has broad discretion to control pretrial matters. Stross

v. Laderman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74686, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4452, at 2

(Sept. 23, 1999). This court has noted that a trial court may preclude a party from

presenting evidence in support of their claims as a sanction for failing to file a trial

brief. See Stern v. Rob Oldham Properties, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1232, 190 N.E.3d 63,

¶ 52 (8th Dist.); Stross. However, here, Flemings did file a trial brief, albeit four
days after the deadline. Woods cannot demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the

untimely filing.    The trial brief restated much of what was in Flemings’s

counterclaim and expounded on the law upon which she would rely in support of

her claims. Further, the trial brief listed only Flemings herself as her sole witness

and set forth her exhibits — none of which were unknown to Woods and included

exhibits that had been attached to her counterclaim, Woods’s discovery responses,

and his own deed reflecting the sale of the premises.

              We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Woods’s

motion for sanctions. Woods’s first assignment of error is overruled.

               B. Second Assignment of Error

              In his second assignment of error, Woods argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by continuing the trial to a date that his witnesses were not

available.

              After the trial was canceled at the last minute on the day originally

scheduled, Woods filed an objection and motion to reset the trial date. In this filing,

he objected to the court canceling the trial at the last minute and rescheduling it for

May 1, 2023. He stated that “the [b]ailiff rudely hung up” on him and said that

“she’d just choose her own date and send it in the mail.”

              In his appellate brief, Woods seems to imply that it was the judge,

rather than the bailiff, who was rude and hung up on him. He notes in his brief that

he asked for the trial to be held on April 17 rather than May 1, because his witnesses

would not be available then. However, there is nothing in the record that reflects
that the court was informed of any issue with witness availability. In his objection

to the continuance, Woods only stated that his witnesses “may not be available in

the future.” (Emphasis added.)

              “[A] court has supervisory control over its own docket and has the

inherent authority to manage its own proceedings and grant continuances.” R.J.L.

v. K.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108228, 2019-Ohio-3667, ¶ 19, citing State ex rel.

Buck v. McCabe, 140 Ohio St. 535, 537, 45 N.E.2d 763 (1942). Absent an abuse of

discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s regulation of its own

docket. Frebes v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109117, 2020-Ohio-

4750, ¶ 32, citing Bayview Loan Servicing, L.L.C. v. St. Cyr, 2017-Ohio-2758, 90

N.E.3d 321, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing 6750 BMS, L.L.C. v. Drentlau, 2016-Ohio-1385,

62 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).

              Woods has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion

in canceling the trial and continuing it until May 1, 2023. While he contends that

his witnesses were not available on that date, Woods does not point to anything in

the record demonstrating this or that the trial court was aware of any issues with

witness availability. Woods’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                 C. Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Assignments of Error

              Woods’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error all contend

that the trial court’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For

ease of discussion, we will address these assignments of error out of order, beginning

with Woods’s sixth assignment of error.
              In assessing whether a verdict in a civil bench trial is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, we examine the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, consider the witnesses’ credibility, and determine

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the verdict must be

overturned and a new trial ordered. Sonis v. Rasner, 2015-Ohio-3028, 39 N.E.3d

871, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717

(1st Dist.1983). “[A] reviewing court will generally uphold a trial court’s judgment

as long as the manifest weight of the evidence supports it — that is, as long as ‘some’

competent and credible evidence supports it.” Patel v. Strategic Group, L.L.C.,

2020-Ohio-4990, 161 N.E.3d 42, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting MRI Software, L.L.C. v.

W. Oaks Mall FL, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-2190, 116 N.E.3d 694, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

                      1. End of Lease Property Damages

              Woods’s sixth assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by

failing to award him property damages.

              Flemings testified that over the duration of the lease, there were

several clogs to various drains in the house that she reported to Woods, who then

had them unclogged. She stated that he did not charge her for these repairs at the

time they were performed.

              Woods maintained that Flemings put cooking oil, hair, or hair dye

down the sink, which caused all of the clogs. He also asserted that Flemings flushed

feminine hygiene products, that her children put toys down the toilet, and that
Flemings poured concrete into a sink. Flemings denied ever using any oils when she

cooked and was unable to think of anything that she may have put down the drain

that would have caused it to clog. She further denied that her children had ever

flushed any toys down the toilet or that she poured concrete down the plumbing.

She also denied that she ever dyed her hair while she lived at the property or flushed

any feminine hygiene products.

              Flemings went through each of the photos presented by Woods and

denied that she was responsible for any of the damage shown, with the exception of

several window blinds. She denied that the majority of the pictures reflected the

state of the property when she left. She stated that there was nothing that Woods

was seeking to charge her for that she actually owed.

              On cross-examination, Flemings admitted that Woods warned her to

stop clogging the drains with her hair and to stop letting the toilets run, but did not

admit that she did either of these things. She stated that she notified Woods right

away when the toilet was running.

              We cannot find that there was competent, credible evidence to

support Woods’s claim that Flemings caused all of the damage to the property

claimed by Woods. Based upon the pictures submitted and the testimony at trial,

the trial court properly found that Flemings was only liable for the window blinds

and the flooring.

              Woods’s sixth assignment of error is overruled.
                       2. Calculation of Security Deposit

              Woods’s third assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in

its calculation of the security deposit. Specifically, Woods points to this statement

in the judgment entry: “The Court finds for the Defendant on the return of her

security deposit, less damages owed in the Plaintiffs claim in the sum of $940.00.”

Woods construes this to mean that the court awarded Flemings $940.00.

              As set forth above, the security deposit in this matter was $1,000. The

court found that Woods had not wrongfully withheld the security deposit due to

damage to the premises as follows: $140 for window blinds, $400 for depreciation

of the property due to cracked tiles, and $400 for depreciation of the property due

to carpet runs. While not explicitly stated by the court, these damages total $940.

              The wording of the judgment is ambiguous, but we find that the total

award to Flemings is $60 ($1000 security deposit minus $940 in damages for the

blinds and flooring). Woods’s third assignment of error is overruled. However,

because the judgment entry does not clearly convey the amount of the award to

Flemings, we remand this matter to the trial court to correct the judgment entry to

explicitly state the same.

                      3. Failure to Award Damages of Unpaid Rent, Late
                      Fees, and Loss of Income

              Woods’s fourth assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by

failing to award unpaid rent, late fees, and loss of income. He asserts that he was

entitled to rent in the amount of $925 for the month of October 2022.
               Flemings argues that Woods failed to seek damages for future rent in

his complaint. Even if he had, she contends that she moved out on October 1, 2022,

pursuant to the notice to leave and eviction filing. Finally, she asserts that she is not

liable for the rent at all — the HAP contract dictates that CMHA was paying the full

contract rent of $925 per month.

              We find that Woods cannot recover any rent for October 2022 from

Flemings. Preliminarily, it is undisputed that Flemings vacated the premises on

October 1, 2022, following her receipt of the notice to leave and eviction filing.

Moreover, under the HAP contract, which Woods signed, Flemings is not

responsible for paying any portion of the rent.

               With regard to late fees, the trial court determined that Flemings

electronically submitted the payments for her portion of the rent1 prior to the end of

the grace period. The lease provided that rent was due on the first of the month, but

there was an eight day grace period before the rent would be considered late. The

lease noted a $50 late fee for payments received on the tenth of the month or after.

               Woods’s Exhibits 7A and 7B presented a ledger from the online

payment system showing that all of Flemings’s payments were “scheduled” before

the tenth of each month. The ledger further lists the “deposit” date of the payments.

This appears to be the day that the funds were deposited into Woods’s account.

      1 The online payment system ledger reflects payments of $5, $112, or $139 from

Flemings. The reasoning for these amounts is unclear since according to CMHA,
Flemings only owed either $139 or zero dollars. Regardless, this issue is not before us,
and we will assess the issue of the propriety of late fees with regard to the payments
actually made.
There was a lag of four to nine days between the date the payment was scheduled

and the date that the payment was deposited in Woods’s account.

              Woods asserted at trial that Flemings should have accounted for this

lag when making her payments.        We are not persuaded by this argument.

Regardless of when the online payment system ultimately provided the funds to

Woods, Flemings made all of her payments prior to the tenth of the month, which

rendered them timely. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that Woods

was not entitled to any late fees.

              Finally, Woods sought damages for his loss of income for the months

of November and December 2022. He argues that this loss of income was due to the

excessive damage to the property that rendered it unavailable for rent during those

two months.

              The trial court determined that Woods was not entitled to rental

income from November and December 2022 because Woods had evicted Flemings.

However, Woods’s argument is that he lost rental income because he was unable to

re-rent the property due to the damage caused by Flemings.

              The testimony demonstrated that after Flemings left, Woods

renovated the property and put it up for sale. Thus, there was no evidence in the

record that Woods intended to re-rent the property. Further, the evidence was

unclear as to when the renovations took place. Woods’s Exhibits 3A and 3B are two

“Repair Receipts” from Kason’s Remodeling, LLC. Exhibit 3A is dated October 3,

2022, and reflects a total of $7,857.75 in parts and labor to repair various items
throughout the property. The receipt shows that Woods paid $8,000 and received

$142.25 in change.

              Exhibit 3B is also dated October 3, 2022, and shows an additional

$397.19 in charges for two other repairs. The receipts further state that “[a]ll work

shall be completed within three months except as permitted by weather.”

              The trial court found these receipts suspect, in particular Exhibit 3A

where Woods paid $8,000 in cash and received change rather than paying $7,900

and receiving change. The trial court also questioned how so much work could be

performed in the two days since Flemings had vacated the premises. However,

Woods testified that he paid in advance and that the work was performed over the

month of October.

              We note that Woods’s evidence regarding the repairs made to the

property is meager. Even assuming arguendo that he had provided more substantial

evidence about the performance and completion of the repairs, we held above that

Woods has failed to provide competent, credible evidence to show that Flemings was

responsible for all of the damages for which he sought compensation. As such,

Flemings cannot be liable for Woods’s claimed lost rental income that he attributes

to the damage to the property.

              While we utilized different reasoning, we find that the trial court

correctly held that Woods was not entitled to lost rental income. Woods’s fourth

assignment of error is overruled.
                      4. Failure to Award Unpaid Water and Sewer Fees

               In his fifth assignment of error, Woods argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by declining to award him damages for portions of the water

and sewer bills for which he claims Flemings was responsible.

               The trial court declined to award Woods damages for water and sewer

bills, finding that

       the evidence established that [Woods] was billed for water and sewer
       by the utilities provider and that money was deducted from the on-line
       account established by [Woods]. The evidence established that
       [Woods] entered into the U.S. Department of Housing contract dated
       October 30, 2018 knowing that the contract established that the Owner
       was providing water and sewer. The evidence established that the
       aforesaid contract also provided that the Owner’s obligation to provide
       water and sewer could not be modified by the lease.

       ***

               Woods argues that the lease agreement between himself and Flemings

provides that Flemings was responsible for any amount of the water or sewer bill

that exceeded $75 each month. At trial, Woods submitted sewer bills reflecting

charges of $503.70 for February 2019, $1,425.69 for March 2019, $598.75 for April

2019, $693.80 for December 2019, and $131.94 for May 2020. He asserted that

after crediting Flemings with $75 per month, he was entitled to $4,881.47 for these

bills. While he acknowledges that the HAP contract does state that the “owner” is

responsible for water and sewer, he argues that the lease supersedes this language

and that the CMHA accepted the terms of the lease.
              We find that the trial court correctly enforced the terms of the HAP

contract. The HAP contract, which Woods does not dispute that he signed, provides

that the “owner,” in this case, Woods, “shall provide or pay for” water and sewer

charges. The HAP contract was signed after the lease was entered into between

Woods and Flemings. Woods clearly accepted the terms of the HAP contract.

              Within Part B of the HAP contract, Body of Contract, Section 5 states

that “Part A of the HAP contract specifies what utilities and appliances are to be

provided or paid by the owner or the tenant. The lease shall be consistent with the

HAP contract.”

              Accordingly, Woods was entirely responsible for the water and sewer

charges each month. The trial court did not err in declining to award Woods

damages for water and sewer charges.          Woods’s fifth assignment of error is

overruled.

                     D. Seventh Assignment of Error

              In his final assignment of error, Woods argues that the court’s

decision represented a miscarriage of justice due to its bias or prejudice and a

cumulation of errors.

              Woods asserts that the trial court was biased against him in several

prior cases; however, these are irrelevant to the instant appeal. Further, the record

reflects that Woods did not object or raise this issue in the lower court proceedings.

“It is well settled that an appellate court will not rule on an alleged error that could

have been brought to the attention of the trial court.” E. Cleveland v. Echols, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74941, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5706, 5 (Dec. 2, 1999), citing State

v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 499, 668 N.E.2d 489 (1996). R.C. 2701.031 mandates

that allegations of judicial bias must be raised in an affidavit of disqualification filed

at least seven days before the date of the hearing. No such affidavit was filed in this

case.

        “A court of appeals is without authority to pass upon disqualification or to
        void the judgment of the trial court upon that basis. * * * R.C. 2701.03 sets
        forth the procedure by which a party may seek disqualification. The statute
        requires the party seeking disqualification to file an affidavit of prejudice with
        the Ohio Supreme Court.”

Echols, quoting State v. Ramos, 88 Ohio App.3d 394, 398, 623 N.E.2d 1336 (9th

Dist.1993).

                Because Woods failed to properly raise the issue of the trial court

previously showing bias against him in other matters before the trial court in the

instant matter, he is precluded from raising the issue on appeal.

                As it relates to his allegations of bias in the present case, Woods’s

argument essentially rehashes all of the rulings that went against him, most of which

have been analyzed and upheld in this appeal. Thus, we cannot find that the trial

court demonstrated bias against Woods.

                Finally, Woods contends that the cumulation of errors prevented him

from having a fair trial. “Under the cumulative-error doctrine, a judgment can be

reversed when the cumulation of errors prevents a fair trial even if each individual

error alone does not justify reversal.” Daniels v. Northcoast Anesthesia Providers,

Inc., 2018-Ohio-3562, 120 N.E.3d 52, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.2018).
              We have determined that the trial court did not commit any error,

much less multiple errors. Therefore, the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply

here. Woods’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

                                 III. Conclusion

              The trial court did not err in denying Woods’s motion for sanctions

and continuing the trial. The trial court also did not err in declining to award Woods

late fees, loss of rental income, back rent, water and sewer fees, and damages beyond

those related to the window blinds and the flooring, or in its award of the remainder

of the security deposit to Flemings. The trial court’s verdict was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence, Woods has not demonstrated bias, and there was

no cumulative error.

              Finally, we remand this matter to the trial court for the issuance of a

nunc pro tunc entry explicitly stating that the amount of damages awarded to

Flemings was $60.00.

              Judgment is affirmed and remanded.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________________
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR