Court Opinion

ID: 9499355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:46:00.841898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:27.041214
License: Public Domain

POSNER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
A district judge is authorized to request a lawyer to represent an indigent party in a civil case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The statute sets forth no criteria for the exercise of this authority, but the case law in this circuit (1) requires that the indigent try to find a lawyer to represent him voluntarily, as it were, before he turns to the court, e.g., Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir.2004), and, the quest having failed, (2) entrusts the decision whether to request counsel to the discretion of the district judge, e.g., Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir.2006), (3) implying deferential review by the court of appeals. E.g., Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir.1993). As an original matter, one might have thought that if the indigent plaintiff couldn’t find a private lawyer to handle his case on a contingent-fee or other basis (the lawyer might be satisfied with the prospect of a fee award should the plaintiff prevail), this would show that his case had no merit and should therefore be dismissed out of hand. This is the preferred position of the majority, and I have considerable sympathy with it. But it is not the law, Gil v. Reed, supra, 381 F.3d at 657-58; Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir.1992), and it would probably require a revision of section 1915(e)(1) to make it the law. The statute implies that Congress is not content to leave the representation of indigents in civil cases, or even just in civil nonequity cases (for it would be particularly difficult for an indigent to obtain repre*490sentation in a case in which there were no monetary stakes), entirely to the market.
Deferential review of the district judge’s refusal to request a lawyer to take an indigent’s case makes sense not only because of the absence of statutory guidance and the quintessential^ judgmental character of a determination whether a litigant can represent himself effectively, but also because the district judge has the advantage over the appellate judges of having observed the litigant at first hand, which should be a considerable aid in assessing the litigant’s competence. Because of the huge number of prisoner suits, very few of which are meritorious, district judges are naturally and rightly reluctant to pepper the bar with requests to represent prisoners.
So Pruitt faces a steep uphill fight to get the district judge’s ruling denying him counsel reversed. But I am persuaded that the ruling should be reversed even under a highly deferential standard of appellate review.
I have not found any case in which a prisoner as poorly educated as Pruitt is was denied the assistance of counsel in a jury trial. The vast majority of prisoner civil rights cases are disposed of on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, and the prisoner should be able to establish without assistance of counsel that he has enough evidence of each element of his claim (and enough evidence to rebut any defenses raised by the defendant) to survive summary judgment. Pruitt, in his pretrial submissions, had the assistance of a “jailhouse lawyer,” but not at the trial. Rarely can a prisoner show a need at the pretrial stage for a lawyer that is so acute that the denial of his request can be thought an abuse of discretion.
This case is unusual because it survived the preliminary rounds and went to a jury. Pruitt renewed his request for assistance of counsel after the judge set the case for trial, and I think it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that, lacking as he does any education beyond the sixth grade and any employment or other experience that might rectify that deficit, he could not have been expected to be able to conduct a jury trial in which the defendants had competent lawyers, as they did. Nor can we assume that the district judge, having observed Pruitt’s conduct in the courtroom before the trial began, had insights denied to us into his ability to represent himself. Pruitt hadn’t been in the courtroom yet. He had participated in two pretrial conferences by video, but the record doesn’t indicate how long either conference lasted. His written pretrial submissions, some made with the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer, would not have revealed his forensic ability.
The trial of a jury case is an art, and a demanding one; the state’s lawyer conceded at the argument of the appeal that he was not himself competent to conduct a jury trial. He said, though, that this was an easy case, but he was wrong. It was a simple case, because it was a swearing contest between the plaintiff, who said he had been sexually abused by one of the defendants, and the defendants (the alleged abuser plus other guards), who said he hadn’t been. But difficulty and complexity are not synonyms. This was a difficult case because the outcome depended entirely on which side created the better impression in the eyes of the jury. Lawyers in our system coach their witnesses in advance of trial in an effort to make them seem more persuasive to jurors; Pruitt had no one to coach him. Lawyers cross-examine the opposing side’s witnesses; Pruitt had no experience in cross-examination. And not knowing the rules of evidence, he could not object to improper testimonial or documentary evi*491dence tendered by the defendants. He was unable to conduct a direct examination of himself (he is not a ventriloquist), so the judge had to question him, as in a Continental-type (“inquisitorial”) trial.
Pruitt proved incapable of giving a coherent opening or closing argument. After a good beginning to his opening statement (“Each one of my witnesses is going to verify that Officer Mesch just harassed me everyday”), he began to disintegrate. He said “At this time, the only thing I could say is that the witness they got now, I don’t know if they are going to verify that they seen me went to the washroom at the time or just been seeing me out — I mean coming to the chow. I’m sorry. I’m sorry. I’m kind of nervous. Let’s see. What do you want me to say now? What do you want me to begin? Like what?” The judge asked him whether he was going to tell the jury what the evidence would show, and specifically whether he had complained about the defendant’s conduct. Pruitt’s answer was incoherent: “No, they should have been charged me why they let the officers — why they do something to him. I ain’t looking to go to seg or try to go to Tamms or nothing like that. I am trying to go home. I ain’t trying to catch no time in the penitentiary. It’s just telling me put a lawsuit or something.” The judge then asked him whether that was his opening statement, and Pruitt replied: “I don’t know. Judge, I don’t know how to defend myself. I don’t know where to begin.”
The judge then conducted in effect a direct examination of Pruitt. The defense counsel then cross-examined him and after that conducted direct examination of the defense witnesses. Pruitt objected to their testimony only when prompted by the judge, and he conducted perfunctory cross-examination and did not object to any of the documentary evidence presented by the defense. He made no objections or suggestions at the instructions conference. His closing argument occupies only a page of transcript, though he did offer brief rebuttal argument as well; but his arguments amounted to no more than that the defense witnesses were lying. Defense counsel’s lucid and detailed closing argument occupies five and a half pages of the transcript.
Pruitt’s incompetence at playing lawyer doomed his case. Yet it is not as if his case were weak. The abuses that he alleged are not uncommon in prisons. Had the jury chosen to believe him, this would not have struck anyone as a miscarriage of justice, which is why at the close of the evidence the judge denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law. He said that if the jury believed Pruitt, “it would be a clear sexual assault.... I am going to give the case to the jury. No question about it.”
This case should help us understand why the Supreme Court does not allow a defense of harmless error to a claim of denial of the right to counsel in criminal cases. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986); Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n. 8, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). When a party is not represented, it is often impossible to determine whether he had a strong or a weak case. But since it is apparent that had Pruitt been represented by a competent lawyer he might well have won his case, it was a serious, though not an ill-intentioned, mistake to deny his request for counsel once the judge decided that the case was going to be decided by a jury.
I am not suggesting that a prisoner who survives summary judgment is always entitled to a lawyer, even if a jury trial is looming; for some prisoners are capable of conducting such a trial (I’ll mention one in *492a moment). I am not proposing a “per se” rule with an exception for disbarred lawyers. (The term “per se” appears seven times in the majority opinion; “per se” rule is a term from antitrust law, where it is a frequent source of mischief.) The majority opinion easts about for a suitable rule to govern the issue, and finding none concludes that the decision is a matter for the exercise of discretion by the district judge. I agree. But I do not agree that the exercise of that discretion is unreviewable, which is the tenor of the majority opinion. Ignoring the cases that hold that the inability of an indigent prisoner to interest a lawyer in his case is not an automatic basis for refusing to request a lawyer to represent him, the majority intimates at the end of its opinion that there might never be a case so difficult that the refusal of the district judge to request a lawyer to represent the plaintiff would be an abuse of discretion.
Many prisoners are better educated than Pruitt, or have extensive experience in the courtroom. Some are jail-house lawyers; some are disbarred lawyers; some have little education or experience but are articulate and have a knack for the adversary process; and some cases really are quite simple. So there will be some cases in which, though they are headed for a jury trial, the district judge would not be abusing his discretion to refuse to request a lawyer for the plaintiff. But this is not such a case.
Farmer v. Haas, supra, which my colleagues overread, was such a case. We were at pains to assure ourselves that Farmer was competent to represent herself. As we explained, “When Farmer moved for counsel in April 1991, a week before trial, she had been litigating since February 1988 and had prosecuted a successful appeal to this court.... Besides being an experienced litigator, Farmer has a history of fraud, arguing the possession of an intelligence superior to that of a criminal who relies on brawn rather than brains. The transcript of the trial discloses a shrewd cross-examination by Farmer of one of the defendants on the issue of forgery, bringing out all the contradictions and implausibilities in that defendant’s testimony. It is true, as her appointed counsel in this court points out, that Farmer had difficulty coping with the objections that the defendants’ counsel made to her direct testimony. But her counsel has made no effort to show that the objections were groundless, so that the presence of a lawyer to contest the objections would have made a difference.” 990 F.2d at 322-23. The difference in competence between Farmer and Pruitt is striking, but goes unremarked by my colleagues, who are content to quote language in Farmer v. Haas that supports their decision. It is a disservice to a court to wrench the general language in its opinions out of context.
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that a prisoner reasonably adjudged in advance of trial to be capable of representing himself should be entitled to a new trial, and thus a second bite at the apple, if he underperforms at trial. The judgment of competence is to be made before the trial begins; the relevance of my discussion of Pruitt’s performance at trial is merely to show that the error in failing to request assistance of counsel for him was not harmless, as it would have been had he done a tolerable job. I am suggesting only that a judge who has ordered a jury trial should request a lawyer for a prisoner who plainly lacks the educational or vocational background that would enable him to conduct such a trial with minimum competence. To insist that someone with a sixth-grade education, and nothing to suggest forensic competence beyond what so modest an educational attain*493ment implies, conduct a jury trial without a lawyer makes a travesty of the Seventh Amendment.
The cases that reject a right to counsel in civil cases, such as Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), are in-apposite. (Nor can those cases be read as holding that every civil litigant is capable of conducting a trial without the assistance of counsel. That would be absurd, as well as inconsistent with section 1915(e)(1).) Pruitt claims no such right. He is not asking the government to pay for a lawyer for him; he is merely asking the district judge to help him find a volunteer.