Court Opinion

ID: 9687546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:34:36.748895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:54.119224
License: Public Domain

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I vigorously dissent.
Although the majority correctly states the standard upon which we must base our review of a trial court’s dismissal of a ease via summary judgment, the majority fails to follow its own directive. It is a basic tenet of appellate review that we will uphold a summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of materiál fact and only if either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn.1993). It also is a basic tenet of appellate review that a court can determine the existence of any issues of material fact only after the court first determines the proper rule of law to apply to the facts. Logic dictates that facts material to one rule of law might be completely irrelevant to another rule of law. This case is just such an example. Were we to hold that a landlord has no duty to exercise reasonable care to assure that his or her representations are factually accurate, the actual accuracy of the representations would become irrelevant, as would the potential tenant’s reliance upon those representations. But were we to hold that a landlord has a duty to exercise reasonable care to assure that his or her representations are factually accurate, then the actual veracity of the representations would be material, as would the potential tenant’s reliance upon those representations.
I am confused by the majority’s position. On the one hand, the majority refuses to state that it is imposing on landlords the duty of care enunciated in § 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), but on the other hand, it contends that there are no genuine issues of material fact in regard to any of the elements required by the § 311 standard.
If the majority does not want to impose such a duty on landlords, it should say so. Although we have recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentation in many other contexts, see Bonhiver v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 121-23, 248 N.W.2d 291, 298-99 (1976); Florenzano v. Olson, 387 N.W.2d 168, 176 (Minn.1986); M.H. v. Caritas Family Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn.1992), we have yet to recognize such a tort in the context of a landlord-tenant relationship. As such it is our duty as the highest court in this state to determine whether our law will recognize such a claim in this context. Tort liability in the first instance always depends on whether the party accused of the tort owes a duty to the accusing party. L & H Airco., Inc. v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d 372, 378 n. 3 (Minn.1989). No duty is owed unless the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 378. Whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct is a matter of public policy. Id. Consequently, our decision to recognize such a duty is a pure question of law.
The question before this court, therefore, is not whether the landlord in this case made a negligent misrepresentation to the plaintiff, but whether it is legally possible for a landlord to make a negligent misrepresentation to the plaintiff. The trial court has erred in concluding that our prior cases foreclosing a landlord’s duty to protect tenants from the intentional acts of third parties somehow foreclosed a landlord’s duty to exercise reasonable care in assuring that his or her representations are accurate. In addition, we have concluded that the court of appeals erred by holding that the duty of care enunciated in § 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), and adopted by us in Florenzano, 387 N.W.2d at 174 n. 3, reaches to those cases that result in physical injury. We are left with two questions: Whether to extend the already existing tort of negligent misrepresentation to the landlord-tenant context, and if so, the extent of that duty.
*416It is my contention that it would be good public policy to extend the tort of negligent misrepresentation to the landlord-tenant context, and that the extent of that duty follow that enunciated in § 311.5 One commentator has described negligent misrepresentation as follows:
If the defendant consciously misstates the facts in such a way as to lead the plaintiff to place himself or his property in danger of harm, which the defendant still does not intend, the defendant may nevertheless not be exercising proper care for the plaintiffs safety, and so be liable for his negligent use .of language. But even where the defendant is not consciously misstating the facts, he may still be liable for negligence in .speaking where he has not exercised proper care to ascertain the truth, or to communicate it.
W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 33, at 205 (5th ed.1984) (hereinafter Prosser). Unlike the claims for failure to warn or failure to protect, this tort does not require the defendant to protect the plaintiff from the acts of a third party, rather it requires the defendant to take objectively reasonable steps to assure that the information the defendant is providing to the plaintiff is accurate. A court’s determination of the duty to take objectively reasonable steps to provide accurate information is different than the determination of the duties to protect or warn. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.3d 728, 268 Cal.Rptr. 779, 782-83, 789 P.2d 960, 963-64 (1990) (finding duty for negligent misrepresentation claim despite lack of duty to protect). Whereas those duties are based upon a special relationship, the duty to take objectively reasonable steps to provide accurate information is based upon the foreseeability of the recipient’s reliance upon the information.
In all cases of negligent misrepresentation * * * the circumstances must be such that the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in giving the information, and that the reliance upon what he says, with resulting danger, is reasonably to be expected.
Prosser, supra, at 207 (emphasis added). In concluding that a police officer who had no duty to protect or warn the plaintiff still had a duty to take objectively reasonable steps to provide the plaintiff with accurate information, the California Supreme Court stated “the court’s search for a special relationship was unnecessary [in finding a duty under a claim for negligent misrepresentation].” Garcia, 268 Cal.Rptr. at 782, 789 P.2d at 963. The court went on to state that:
A special relationship is a prerequisite for liability based on a defendant’s failure to act. * * * In contrast, plaintiffs in this case assert that [defendant] is liable because his allegedly negligent representations about Morales’s physical safety induced her to be less careful. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to look beyond the ordinary rules that determine when misrepresentations are actionable.
Id. (Citations and footnote omitted). The question before this court, therefore, is not whether Woodridge’s lack of duty to protect or warn the Smiths from the criminal activities of a third party precludes their claim for negligent misrepresentation, but whether Woodridge had an independent duty to take objectively reasonable steps to provide the Smiths with accurate information concerning the safety of the apartment complex.
Were the majority to disagree with this contention and merely conclude that it would be bad public policy to extend negligent misrepresentation to this context, my dissent would be complete. But instead of deciding the issue squarely before it, the majority avoids its obligation by finding facts and then determining that the plaintiff could not possibly prove a negligent misrepresentation *417claim. Such a determination is terribly premature. This ease comes before us on a review of a trial court’s dismissal of a case via a summary judgment motion. Not only that, it comes before us on a review of a trial court's dismissal of a case via a summary judgment motion that failed to address the specific issue we now are considering. A quick review of the rather scant record shows that the defendant in this case based its summary judgment motion on the ground that a landlord had no duty to protect its tenants from the criminal acts of a third party. At no time did the defendant address the issue of whether it had a duty to exercise reasonable care in assuring that its representations to potential tenants were accurate. After a brief telephone conversation, however, the trial court dismissed the negligent misrepresentation claim because it determined that prior cases foreclosing a landlord’s duty to protect also foreclosed a landlord’s duty to exercise reasonable care in assuring that its representations were accurate. After both sides briefed the issue, the court of appeals correctly ruled that the trial court erred. Although the majority agrees that the trial court erred in concluding that a landlord has no duty to exercise reasonable care in assuring that its representations are accurate, it fails to answer the ultimate question: Whether a landlord has such a duty. Making matters worse, it concludes that even if a landlord had such a duty, the facts in this ease are not sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion on the issue.
Even if the majority is correct in asserting that the facts as they stand now are insufficient to show that the landlord could have made a negligent misrepresentation, so what? The issue of whether the landlord made a negligent misrepresentation never has been addressed. Although the defendant argues that it is not legally possible for it to make a negligent misrepresentation to a potential tenant, it never has brought a summary judgment motion stating that it did not in fact make a negligent misrepresentation to this potential plaintiff. The plaintiff has had no obligation to produce any facts concerning an actual negligent misrepresentation. Any perceived lack of facts, therefore, is irrelevant to the determination before us. Yet somehow the majority reaches the conclusion that the facts are not sufficient.
If the majority indeed wishes to invoke the §311 standard on a landlord’s representations to potential tenants, then it should do so. The defendant could then bring its summary judgment motion stating that its representations, as a matter of law, did not violate the § 311 standard. If the plaintiff at that time fails to produce facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the defendant made a negligent misrepresentation, then the trial court could dismiss the case. For us to dismiss the case at this time, however, is not only an injustice to the plaintiffs, it is an intolerable foray into the realm of fact finding. Predicting the future might be big business for soothsayers, but it is not a very equitable method of jurisprudence.

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 311 (1965) states as follows:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action taken. (2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.