Court Opinion

ID: 9889551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 17:10:15.441603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:44.788635
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 P. v. Murphy CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096868

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. 19CF01661)

           v.

 GARRETSON MATTHEW MURPHY,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         On December 22, 2020, defendant Garretson Matthew Murphy pled guilty to
allowing a place for preparation or storing of a controlled substance and admitted that he
was personally armed with a firearm in committing this offense. Nearly a year later, on
December 14, 2021, defendant requested a continuance of sentencing to potentially bring
a motion to withdraw the plea and find new counsel for that purpose. The court agreed to
continue sentencing to January 25, 2022. But the trial court warned defendant not to wait
until the last minute to come in with a new attorney and ask for another continuance.
Four days before the hearing, on January 21, 2022, defendant filed a substitution of

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counsel and moved for a continuance. At the January 25th hearing, a different attorney
appeared for the substituted counsel and told the court that new counsel “wishes to be
here in the next 60 days.” The trial court denied defendant’s request for substitution of
counsel and motion for a continuance. The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’
probation.
        Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s request for
substitution of retained counsel and motion to continue his sentencing hearing. We
disagree. Both the request and the motion were untimely. The judgment is affirmed.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        An October 2018 search pursuant to a warrant of defendant’s property found 304
marijuana plants, 508.6 pounds of “ ‘drying’ ” marijuana, and 14.22 pounds of processed
marijuana. Defendant had a .22-caliber revolver in his pocket loaded with three rounds
of ammunition.
        On December 22, 2020, defendant pled guilty to allowing a place for preparation
or storage of a controlled substance and admitted he was personally armed with a firearm.
At defense counsel’s suggestion, the trial court set a sentencing hearing for February 23,
2021.
        On December 14, 2021, defendant appeared with retained defense counsel,
Michael Rooney, who requested that sentencing be continued for defendant to evaluate
whether to move to withdraw his guilty plea. Defense counsel expressed concern that
defendant may not have understood the plea and its consequences given his mental health
issues. Rooney further noted that he could not represent defendant in that respect—and
had so informed defendant—because of an inherent conflict of interest. Rooney noted
that defendant was consulting other attorneys.
        The prosecutor responded that there had already been multiple continuances,
including for defendant to seek a mental health evaluation from Butte County Behavioral
Health. However, the evaluation did not result in a recommendation defendant found

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acceptable. Therefore, defendant was now attempting to find a private doctor. The
prosecutor expressed concern that the case was simply being delayed and requested that,
if the trial court granted a continuance, the case be set for sentencing as soon as possible.
       The court granted a continuance, explaining: “I’m going to give the defendant an
opportunity; he should have taken care of that opportunity by now, to either hire another
attorney to look at a Motion to Withdraw the Plea. Again, he should have done that long
before now. The plea was one year ago. [¶] I’m also going to give him an opportunity
to hire an expert on the mental health issue.”
       Advised by the clerk that January 11 or 25, 2022, was available for sentencing, the
court said: “I’m inclined to go to the 25th to give the defendant extra time, but I’m
making it very, very clear if a motion is not timely filed . . . to withdraw the plea or some
other motion for me to decide, we’re going to go forward with sentencing. And I’m
giving the defendant plenty of time and plenty of notice of that.”
       The trial court addressed defendant: “I’ve given you clear warning, sir. Don’t
wait until the last minute to do this because you’re not likely to get a continuance if you
wait until the last minute. If you come in on that day with a new attorney, you’re not
likely to get more time.”
       Defendant responded: “Yes, your Honor.”
       On January 21, 2022, defendant filed a substitution of counsel requesting that
Valery Nechay be substituted for Rooney as counsel of record. On the same day,
defendant filed a motion to continue sentencing set for hearing on January 25, 2022. The
grounds for the continuance were set out in Nechay’s attached declaration. Nechay
stated: “I have discovered a number of irregularities from previous counsel that
necessitate a close review and analysis of the entire case. As I was only very recently
retained by Mr. Murphy, my office will need more time to conduct this review and
analysis before determining what the best path forward for the defendant is.”

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       At the hearing on January 25, 2025, Nechay did not appear. Rooney appeared for
defendant and attorney Susan Hearne appeared for Nechay. The prosecutor objected to
the substitution as untimely. Rooney responded that defendant had only recently
obtained funds to retain counsel. The prosecutor also objected to Nechay not appearing
at the hearing.
       Hearne stated that she was only the “messenger” for Nechay and had no
information other than Nechay “wishes to be here in the next 60 days.” Rooney added
that defendant had retained a doctor “to look at this situation.”
       The trial court ruled: “The motion to substitute is denied. [¶] I made it very,
very, very clear last time we were in court. . . . I gave everyone fair warning . . . not to
wait to the last minute because you are not likely to get a continuance; coming in . . . with
a new attorney, you are not likely to get more time. [¶] . . . And I actually gave
[defendant] more time than he was asking for last time to take care of the business he
wanted to take care of. So I gave him fair warning. [¶] These issues have been pending
with regard to the evaluation and the possible motion for new trial for several court
appearances.”
       The court concluded: “Both sides have a right to due process. With that being
said, the motion is denied. We will proceed with sentencing.”
       Rooney argued for probation. The prosecutor agreed. The court suspended
defendant’s sentence and placed him on formal probation for two years.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                   Substitution of Counsel
       Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court violated
his constitutional right to counsel of his choice by denying his substitution request. We
conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny the request.

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       The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects a defendant’s
right to retained counsel of choice. However, the right is not absolute. (See People v.
O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 944, 1004.) A court may deny substitution of counsel if the
request is untimely; that is, if it will disrupt the orderly process of justice. (Ibid.; see also
People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 311; People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975,
983-984.) A trial court has “ ‘wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice
against . . . the demands of its calendar.’ ” (Verdugo, at p. 311, quoting United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 152; People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 208
[the right to counsel does not permit defendants “to abuse the patience of the court
through dilatory efforts to seek counsel”].)
       In making the determination whether to grant or deny substitution of counsel, the
trial court considers the totality of the circumstances. (See People v. Maciel (2013)
57 Cal.4th 482, 513.) We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1411.)
       We find no abuse here. In the year following entry of his plea, defendant
explored—evidently, unsuccessfully—withdrawing the plea or otherwise avoiding
sentencing based on mental health issues. At the December 14, 2022, hearing, the trial
court granted defendant a continuance to find new counsel with the express warning not
to be dilatory. Ignoring this advisement, defendant sought to substitute counsel within
days of the continued hearing and named as new counsel an attorney who declared she
had discovered “a number of irregularities from previous counsel” requiring a review of
the “entire case,” which would in turn require more time to determine “what the best path
forward for the defendant is.” In short, proposed substitute counsel did not indicate what
the “irregularities” might be or how long it would take to conduct a review of the case
and advise defendant. Thus, defendant proposed to substitute counsel who would delay
the case to raise unspecified issues.

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       We conclude defendant was dilatory in seeking new counsel and the proposed
substitution would disrupt the orderly process of justice. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying substitution of counsel.
                                              II
                                 Request for a Continuance
       Linked with defendant’s request to substitute counsel was defendant’s motion to
continue sentencing while new counsel reviewed the case. Defendant contends that
Vechay’s declaration established good cause for a continuance. We disagree.
       Whether to grant a continuance of sentencing rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court, including a continuance for a defendant to be represented by new counsel.
(People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646; People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d
840, 850.) A continuance may be denied if the defendant “is ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ in
obtaining counsel . . . .” (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790-791 (Courts).) The
party contending the trial court erred in denying a continuance bears the burden of
demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Strozier (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 55,
60; People v. Johnson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 851, 859.)
       In Courts, the appellate court held the trial judge erred in denying the defendant’s
request for a continuance made one week before trial, so that retained counsel could
represent defendant against a murder charge. The record showed defendant “engaged in
a good faith, diligent effort to obtain the substitution of counsel before the scheduled trial
date.” (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 791.) Defendant had contacted counsel two
months before trial and in the following weeks was attempting to raise the funds for a
retainer. (Ibid.) Counsel’s vacation occasioned a further delay for which defendant was
blameless. (Id. at p. 792.)
       Here, defendant made no showing of diligence and gave no reason for requesting a
continuance just days before January 25, notwithstanding the trial court’s express
warning on December 14 not to wait until the last minute to come in with a new counsel.

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Further, Vechay’s declaration did not state when defendant first contacted her or attempt
to account for the delay in substitution. Under these circumstances, the trial court could
find that defendant was “ ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ ” in finding new counsel and seeking to
substitute counsel at the last minute. (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.)
       Nor did defendant present compelling reasons supporting a late request to continue
sentencing. Vechay’s declaration did not mention the possibility of a motion for a new
trial based on defendant’s mental health issues. The stated purpose of the continuance
was simply for Vechay to conduct a general review of the case and advise defendant.
       We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s
motion for a continuance.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  /s/
                                                 MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /s/
DUARTE, J.

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