Court Opinion

ID: 9742096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:42.569417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.500437
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: The appellate court viewed this case as presenting the question of whether a police officer should receive a line-of-duty pension where injuries arising from an act of duty were one cause of his disability, but not the sole cause. If that view were correct, resolution of this case would be straightforward. There is no "sole cause” requirement. The Illinois Pension Code states simply that the disability must have resulted from sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty. 40 ILCS 5/3 — 114.1 (West 1992). Under this statute, the duty-related incident need not have been the originating or primary cause of the disabling injury. Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814, 818 (1993). In order to qualify for a line-of-duty pension, a police officer need only show that a duty-related injury contributed to his disability (Wilfert v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543 (1994)), i.e., that the injury was a cause of the disability (Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 545). The matter before us today poses a more fundamental question. The real issue here, as my colleagues correctly recognize, is whether any part of the injury that caused plaintiffs disability can be characterized as having resulted from performance of an "act of duty.” There is no dispute that what disabled plaintiff was psychological stress. There is likewise no dispute that the stress is causally related to plaintiffs employment as a police officer. The reason the Pension Board and my colleagues nevertheless conclude that plaintiff is ineligible for a line-of-duty pension has to do with the source of plaintiffs stress. The majority correctly holds that for a police officer to qualify for a line-of-duty pension based on psychological stress, the disability must result from a "special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life” (40 ILCS 5/5 — 113 (West 1994)). 177 Ill. 2d at 542. The majority is wrong, however, in the way it applies that limitation to the facts of this case. The majority asserts that the statute was not satisfied here because what disabled plaintiff is anxiety over job performance, an affliction "civilians regularly suffer.” 177 Ill. 2d at 544. At first blush this characterization appears entirely reasonable. Working for a police department can pose many of the same challenges and demands as working in any other hierarchical organization. In terms of factors such as bureaucracy, paperwork, dealing with supervisors, competition for promotion, lack of recognition, and dissatisfaction with scheduling, little may differentiate law enforcement from civilian occupátions. The problem is that the plaintiff’s problems here involved more than these generic organizational stressors. Difficulty keeping up with reports and criticism over the timeliness and accuracy of those reports unquestionably played a role in plaintiff’s condition. At the heart of plaintiff’s problem, however, was something far more serious. What precipitated plaintiff’s disability was his transfer back to patrol duty. The dangers and physical demands of patrol duty have no analogue in civilian life. They are qualitatively different from those attendant to civilian occupations. Civilians may be concerned about their ability to perform their jobs and how well they are keeping up with their coworkers, but how many of them have the power to save or to take lives, as patrol officers do? How many face the possibility of being shot every time they go to work, as patrol officers do? How many are required to confront disaster and violence and tragedy and death, as patrol officers are? These were not abstractions for plaintiff. He had faced death on the job, and the evidence established that the continuous exposure to possible violence was something he could no longer tolerate. To dismiss this as the kind of job performance anxiety that "civilians regularly suffer” diminishes the scope of the pressures facing plaintiff and is an affront to law enforcement professionals. Even if my colleagues’ comparison were apt, which it is not, their analysis would still be flawed. The fact that a police officer was disabled as the result of factors common to other occupations is not dispositive of his right to a line-of-duty pension. Rather, "[t]he crux is the capacity in which the police officer is acting.” Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518, 522 (1986). As long as the disabling events occurred while the officer was performing his duties as a patrolman, the provisions of section 3 — 114.1 of the Pension Code apply, and the officer qualifies for a line-of-duty pension. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522. Such a conclusion does not ignore the statutory requirement that "special risk” be involved. Rather, it acknowledges that "special risk” inheres in all police work. Even the most mundane activities, such as crossing the street, have an added dimension when done in the context of law enforcement. That is why we adopted the view, taken in other jurisdictions, that " '[a] policeman is actually engaged in the performance of his duty for the protection of life and property whenever he is carrying out the official orders or requirements of his office.’ ” Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 523, quoting Blanchard v. New Orleans Police Department, 210 So. 2d 585, 588 (La. App. 1968). See also 40 ILCS 5/3 — 114.1 (West 1994) (police officer considered "on duty” while on any assignment approved by the chief of police). As an additional basis for its decision, the majority suggests that plaintiff is ineligible for a line-of-duty pension because his disability cannot be traced to any single, specific incident. Although this approach has support in the line of appellate court decisions represented by Trettenero v. Police Pension Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58 (1994), which the majority cites, there is nothing in the Pension Code itself imposing such a requirement. To engraft this restriction on the Pension Code is beyond our authority as judges and would yield results that make no sense. Under the majority’s "single incident” rule, if a police officer was involved in a particular incident that was so traumatic that he could no longer perform his work, the officer could collect a line-of-duty pension. If, however, the officer’s debilitating trauma did not come until after a series of lesser events, none of which was significant by itself, but whose cumulative effect was every bit as serious, a line-of-duty pension would be denied. Underlying the majority’s view is the notion that line-of-duty pensions are appropriate only where an officer has been wounded in a shoot-out, or injured during a high-speed pursuit, or otherwise incapacitated during some obviously dangerous clash with criminal elements. What my colleagues forget is that we have previously addressed this view and specifically rejected it as "overly restrictive and unrealistic.” Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522-23. I see no reason to take a contrary position now. The principle that pension laws are to be construed liberally in favor of those to be benefitted (see, e.g., Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521; Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 217 (1983)) should be the cornerstone of the majority’s analysis. Instead, it did not merit even a passing reference until the very end of the majority’s opinion. This omission is a telling one and is indicative, I think, of a fundamental hostility to plaintiff’s claim. On any given day at any given place or time, a policeman on the beat has more power over the citizens he encounters than the President of the United States. This is an awesome and profound responsibility. Inevitably some will find the pressure overwhelming. When that happens, when they can no longer go on, the General Assembly has seen to it, through the Illinois Pension Code, that they will be afforded some measure of relief for their efforts. We should be grateful to them for their service and happy to see that they receive as much as the law allows. Donnie Robbins should receive the line-of-duty pension to which he is entitled. I therefore dissent.