Court Opinion

ID: 9915226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 21:01:15.97907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:58.874149
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 21-3248
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                               Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

BYRON PIERSON,
                                            Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 1:18-cr-00155-JMS-DML-1 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
                    ____________________

   ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 4, 2024
                ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and KIRSCH, Circuit
Judges.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury found Byron Pierson guilty
of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals from the judgment, contending
that the district court erred: (1) by failing to hold a hearing to
determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived
certain rights when he entered into a proffer agreement with
the government; and (2) by allowing a witness to testify about
2                                                   No. 21-3248

the course of the investigation that led to his arrest. Because
we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decisions,
we affirm.
                                 I.
     On April 15, 2018, Indianapolis Police Officer Matthew
Minnis responded to a 911 call at the home of a woman iden-
tified in the record only as “D.C.” D.C. reported to Minnis that
Byron Pierson, the appellant here, had threatened to “come
back and shoot the house up” at 10 p.m. that evening. She told
Minnis the make and model of the car that Pierson was driv-
ing and described the car’s distinctive wheel rims. Minnis
characterized D.C.’s demeanor as “very frightened.” In the
course of his investigation, Minnis learned that Pierson could
be armed and that he had a criminal record. Minnis also ob-
tained a description and photographs of Pierson. As a result
of this investigation, Minnis decided to return to D.C.’s home
that evening with additional officers in case Pierson returned
to carry out his threat. Minnis arrived at the home at 9:15 p.m.,
and soon saw the car that D.C. had described. After he briefly
lost sight of the car, other officers located it and initiated a
traffic stop. Minnis proceeded to the scene of the stop.
    A woman was driving the car, a child (Pierson’s daughter)
was in the front passenger seat, and Pierson was in the back
seat. Pierson told the officers his name, and Minnis, who rec-
ognized him from photos that he obtained in his investiga-
tion, asked him to step out of the car. Pierson did not imme-
diately comply but instead inquired why he was being asked
to step out of the car. Minnis told him that he would explain
once Pierson was out of the car, and again asked him to exit
the car. Minnis noticed that Pierson appeared hesitant and
nervous, and his hands were shaking. When Pierson stepped
No. 21-3248                                                               3

out of the car, he pressed his right hip out and stated that he
had a knife on his person. Another officer removed the knife.
When Minnis then attempted to place Pierson in handcuffs,
Pierson struck Minnis and fled on foot. The officers pursued
him into a nearby yard. When Pierson was blocked from fur-
ther escape by dense brush and trees, he looked back at the
officers and reached toward his waistband. Minnis believed
that Pierson was about to pull a firearm from his waistband.
The officers then deployed a taser and attempted to restrain
Pierson, who had fallen to the ground. During the struggle,
one of the officers saw a firearm under Pierson’s body and
shouted “gun” several times to alert the other officers. Minnis
was able to reach underneath Pierson and remove the gun.
Pierson was then taken into custody.
    Pierson was charged with one count of unlawful posses-
sion of a firearm by a felon. He initially entered into plea ne-
gotiations with the government, signing a Proffer Letter that
waived certain rights that we will describe below. After two
proffer sessions where he admitted possession of the firearm,
and after reaching a tentative agreement to plead guilty,
Pierson withdrew his plea and decided to go to trial. Prior to
the trial, he moved in limine to exclude statements that he
made during plea negotiations. He asserted that admission of
the proffer statements would violate his rights to due process,
to effective assistance of counsel, and to a fair trial.1 He also
argued that he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights, and that he had not understood that the Proffer Letter

    1 The district court later found that the claims regarding his rights to

effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial were conclusory, undevel-
oped, and unsupported, and therefore waived. R. 184, at 4 n.3. Pierson
does not challenge that finding on appeal.
4                                                  No. 21-3248

covered the second session in which he made the critical ad-
mission about possessing the gun. The government re-
sponded with legal support for the enforceability of the prof-
fer agreement and indicated that it did not intend to offer any
of Pierson’s proffer statements as evidence in the absence of a
triggering event as outlined in the Proffer Letter.
   The court ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether Pierson had been told that the terms of the Proffer
Letter applied to the second proffer session. R. 165. The court
specifically limited the scope of the evidence to the issue of
whether Pierson was advised before or during the second
proffer meeting that the Proffer Letter applied to that meet-
ing. The court also specified that if the government decided
that it would not seek to introduce evidence of statements that
Pierson made during that second session upon a “triggering
event,” it should inform the court so that the hearing could be
canceled.
    Pierson then moved to expand the scope of the evidentiary
hearing, asserting, among other things, that the government’s
reading of the Proffer Letter was so broad that it cast doubt
on the validity of the agreement. Specifically, Pierson claimed
that there had been no “meeting of the minds” necessary to
form a contract. He contended that the act of pleading “not
guilty” could violate the terms of the Proffer Letter and that a
hearing was required to determine the validity of the waivers
in the agreement. The government then submitted a signed
copy of the Proffer Letter, an affidavit from Jeffrey Baldwin
(Pierson’s former lawyer who had represented him during
the proffer process), and email correspondence between gov-
ernment counsel and Baldwin indicating the parties’
No. 21-3248                                                   5

understanding that the Proffer Letter covered the second
proffer session.
    The court then vacated the hearing and denied Pierson’s
motion in limine as well as his motion to expand the scope of
the hearing. The court noted that Pierson had signed the Prof-
fer Letter and had failed to identify any evidentiary basis for
his assertion that he had not entered into the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily. Nor had Pierson offered any fac-
tual basis for his claim that he did not know the Proffer Letter
would apply to the second session. Because the Proffer Letter
mentioned the possibility of multiple sessions and because
Baldwin confirmed that he had informed Pierson prior to the
second session that the Proffer Letter still applied, the court
found that Pierson’s proffer waiver was valid and applied to
both sessions. The court nevertheless required the govern-
ment to inform the court outside the presence of the jury if it
believed that a triggering event had occurred that would al-
low the introduction of proffer statements.
    The government also filed a motion in limine, seeking to
admit evidence regarding the course of the investigation, in-
cluding testimony regarding D.C.’s statements to the police.
Pierson opposed this motion, and the court ruled that the gov-
ernment could not offer evidence that Pierson came to D.C.’s
home, damaged her vehicle or threatened her. The court al-
lowed the government to elicit the following testimony from
the officers who conducted the traffic stop and the officers
who later arrived at the scene: “They were conducting an in-
vestigation related to Mr. Pierson; had a description of the ve-
hicle he was traveling in; were aware he had a criminal rec-
ord; and had been told that he may be armed.” R. 183, at 5.
The court noted that this ruling was provisional and subject
6                                                   No. 21-3248

to change under certain conditions. Specifically, if Pierson ar-
gued “whether through attorney argument or questioning of
witnesses—that the responding officers’ actions of question-
ing Mr. Pierson, getting him out of the car, chasing him and
using Tasers on him were improper or disproportionate to the
circumstances, the government may seek leave of Court out-
side the presence of the jury to offer additional evidence re-
garding Complainant’s report to the police to establish in
more detail what the responding officers knew at the time of
their interaction with Mr. Pierson.” R. 183, at 6.
    During opening statements, government counsel stated in
relevant part:
       You are going to hear a lot about this traffic stop
       during the course of this trial over the next day
       or so, and you will hear that this was not an en-
       tirely random traffic stop. Police officers here in
       Indianapolis were looking for Mr. Pierson spe-
       cifically. They were conducting an investiga-
       tion. They knew what the defendant looked
       like, they knew the particular type of car that he
       was likely to be in, they knew that the defendant
       had a criminal history, and they also had infor-
       mation that he was likely to be armed. And as a
       convicted felon, the defendant was not allowed
       to have that gun, and the police knew that when
       they were looking for him.
R. 271, at 12–13 (emphasis added).
    At the end of the government’s opening statement, de-
fense counsel objected to the government’s use of the word
“likely” in reference to Pierson being armed, because the
No. 21-3248                                                 7

court had ruled that the government could say only that he
“may” be armed. The court reserved ruling on the objection
and defense counsel then gave an opening statement in which
he said in relevant part:
      Go back to April 15, 2018. Byron Pierson is rid-
      ing, he is riding in his own vehicle, a car he has
      got. He is in the back passenger’s seat, his girl-
      friend, who stays with him, Necoles Adams, is
      driving. Necoles was close to Byron’s daughter,
      Serenity, age 11, who was in the front seat. He
      was letting Serenity ride in the front seat. All of
      a sudden, they’re lit up. Police, emergency si-
      rens, light them up, pull him over. Byron is
      stunned. What is going on? He didn’t know it,
      but there had been this complaint. This com-
      plaint was from an ex. Police say they pulled
      him over because of a complaint, which didn’t
      say he would likely be armed from the incident,
      it said he may be armed. They pulled him over,
      and they gave two other reasons for stopping
      him. They said the car was traveling 35, 38, 43,
      37. The speed limit was 35, so they said 8 miles,
      ladies and gentlemen, 8 miles over the speed
      limit. They said, too, that the license plate, you
      couldn’t see the month of expiration. We will
      show you a picture. You could see the month of
      expiration. They go in the car, they look. Mr.
      Pierson is in the back seat. They start saying get
      out of the car. What is going on? You need to get
      out of the car. Serenity is getting upset, Pierson
      is getting upset. What is going on here?
8                                                   No. 21-3248

       Finally, they will deny it, but what happened is
       they pull him out of the car, and at this point
       Byron Pierson is afraid, very afraid, and his
       daughter Serenity is afraid—and maybe most of
       us can’t relate to this, but maybe some people
       can—he is afraid for his safety. He panics, he be-
       gins to run a very short distance. They pursue.
       They Tase him. We are not alleging excessive
       force, but they Tase him. He goes to the ground.
       They Tase him again. He goes to the ground. He
       is still on the ground. They take his arm, they
       put his arm above his shoulders. He is still on
       the ground. At some point he is Tased a third
       time, and in the course of this at some point they
       claim, well, there is a gun.
       … The evidence will show when they pulled
       him out of the car, they didn’t see a gun. When
       he turned they didn’t say they saw a gun. When
       he ran they didn’t say they saw a gun. When
       they Tased him they didn’t see a gun. When he
       fell to the ground the first time they didn’t see a
       gun.
       After the arrest, you know, they file reports with
       supervisors about the use of force, but they have
       the gun. So obviously this [is] 2018. This should
       be easy for us to resolve.
R. 271, at 16–18.
    Following opening statements, the government asked the
court to reconsider its ruling limiting the course-of-investiga-
tion evidence, arguing that Pierson had opened the door to
No. 21-3248                                                      9

this testimony by referencing a complaint that had been made
by Pierson’s ex-girlfriend. The government also asserted that
Pierson had “borderline opened the door” on the use-of-force
issue. The government asked the court to clarify how much
background information it could introduce regarding the
threat that Pierson had purportedly made to D.C. The court
first addressed Pierson’s objection and motion for a mistrial
based on the government using the word “likely” rather than
“may” in reference to whether Pierson was expected to be
armed. The court admonished both government and defense
counsel “to closely h[ew] to my orders in limine that are en-
tered.” R. 271, at 27. The court then denied the motion for a
mistrial and indicated that it intended to give a limiting in-
struction to address the proper use of this evidence, in addi-
tion to the instructions the jurors had already been given in-
forming them that opening statements are not evidence.
    Turning to the government’s motion to reconsider the
court’s ruling on the motion in limine, the court noted that it
had sought under that ruling to balance the probative value
of certain evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court endeavored to avoid
having the circumstances leading up to Pierson’s arrest and
the arrest itself become a central focus of the trial. But because
of defense counsel’s opening statement, the nature and cir-
cumstances of the arrest had become “front and center” in the
case. Citing United States v. Taylor, 569 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2009),
the court concluded that the course-of-investigation evidence
was admissible as non-hearsay statements offered to prove
their effect on the listener, and specifically to explain why the
officers here took the steps they did when they pulled the car
over and arrested Pierson. The court indicated that it intended
to give a limiting instruction when the testimony came in, and
10                                                   No. 21-3248

in fact did so at the appropriate moment in the trial, as we will
discuss below. R. 271, at 33–38. The jury, as we noted, found
Pierson guilty, and he appeals.
                                 II.
    On appeal, Pierson asserts that the court abused its discre-
tion in failing to hold a hearing to determine whether he
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under the Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 11(f) when he signed the Proffer Letter. He also con-
tends that the court abused its discretion in allowing the gov-
ernment to submit the course-of-investigation evidence, in-
cluding D.C.’s statements to officers regarding threats he pur-
portedly made to her.
                                 A.
    We review the district court’s decision not to hold an evi-
dentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Simp-
son, 864 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2017). We review the district
court’s factual findings, including whether the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered into an agreement, for
clear error. United States v. Perillo, 897 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir.
2018) (evaluating an appeal waiver in a plea agreement).
    Statements made during plea negotiations are generally
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f). Rule 11(f) specifies that,
“The admissibility or inadmissibility of a plea, a plea discus-
sion, and any related statement is governed by Federal Rule
of Evidence 410.” Rule 410 in turn provides that, in a criminal
case, evidence of a statement made during plea discussions
with an attorney for the prosecuting authority is not admissi-
ble against the defendant who made the plea or participated
No. 21-3248                                                      11

in the plea discussions if the discussions did not result in a
guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.
Rule 410(a). But a defendant may waive the protections of
those rules. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203–04
(1995). See also United States v. Smith, 770 F.3d 628, 639 (7th Cir.
2014) (the provisions of Rule 11 and Rule 410 are presump-
tively waivable, and a defendant may waive his right to pre-
vent his statements from plea negotiations from being used
against him); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th
Cir. 1998) (same). “[A]bsent some affirmative indication that
the agreement was entered into unknowingly or involuntar-
ily, an agreement to waive the exclusionary provisions of the
plea-statement Rules is valid and enforceable.” Mezzanatto,
513 U.S at 210. “A waiver is voluntary in the absence of coer-
cion, … and is knowing if made with a full awareness of both
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon it.” Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1026 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Proffer Letter
that Pierson signed allowed the government to use his proffer
statements if certain “triggering events” occurred. For exam-
ple, if Pierson testified “differently from any statement made
or other information provided during the Proffer at any trial
or other legal proceeding … the government may use any
statement made or information provided by your Client … for
cross-examination and impeachment purposes.” R. 129-1, at
2. As we discuss below, the Proffer Letter also allowed the
government to admit Pierson’s proffer statements if he of-
fered testimony, arguments, positions, or other evidence that
differed from his proffer statements.
   The district court did not abuse its discretion here. An ev-
identiary hearing is necessary only if there is a disputed fac-
tual issue that will affect the outcome of the motion. See United
12                                                   No. 21-3248

States v. Juarez, 454 F.3d 717, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2006) (evaluating
the need for an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress).
A defendant seeking an evidentiary hearing must provide
sufficient information to enable the court to conclude that a
substantial claim is presented and that there are disputed is-
sues of material fact which will affect the outcome of the mo-
tion. Juarez, 454 F.3d at 719–20 (citing United States v. Coleman,
149 F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1998)). In this instance, Pierson pro-
vided the district court with nothing but conclusory state-
ments that he did not sign the Proffer Letter knowingly and
voluntarily. He did not contend that he was coerced, and he
offered no support for a conclusion that he did not under-
stand the rights that Rules 410 and 11(f) confer. See Krilich, 159
F.3d at 1026.
    The government submitted to the court an executed copy
of the Proffer Letter, signed by both Pierson and his attorney.
Pierson signed the agreement under a line stating, “I under-
stand the terms and conditions set out above, and I agree to
make a Proffer under those terms and conditions.” His lawyer
similarly signed under the declaration, “I am Byron Pierson’s
attorney. I have explained to him/her the terms and condi-
tions set out in this letter, and I am satisfied that he/she un-
derstands them and agrees to them.” R. 129-1, at 3. Pierson’s
attorney repeated that representation in his affidavit and fur-
ther confirmed that he had specifically discussed with Pierson
the applicability of the Proffer Letter to the second proffer ses-
sion prior to that session. In general, “signing a proffer letter
waiving rights concerning the admissibility of a plea or state-
ments made in conjunction with that plea is treated as a valid
waiver of a defendant’s rights not to have proffer statements
used against him.” Smith, 770 F.3d at 639.
No. 21-3248                                                    13

    In the face of that evidence and in the absence of anything
to the contrary, the court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
ing an evidentiary hearing. Pierson’s conclusory statement
that he did not understand the consequences of signing the
agreement is insufficient to justify the need for a hearing. He
did not, for example, deny that his lawyer explained the
agreement to him before he signed it; nor did he deny that his
lawyer explained that the Proffer Letter applied to the second
session. “A defendant’s understanding of the consequences of
his waiver need not be perfect; it was [the defendant’s] under-
standing of the rights being relinquished, not of all possible
repercussions of relinquishing them, that made his waiver
knowing.” Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1026. See also Smith, 770 F.3d at
639–40 (where the defendant failed to identify any eviden-
tiary basis for the assertion that he unknowingly or involun-
tarily entered into a proffer agreement, waiver will be en-
forced). In short, Pierson failed to give the court sufficiently
definite, specific information to discern what fact was in dis-
pute that required a hearing. Cf. United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d
558, 568 (7th Cir. 2019) (the burden is on the defendant to sup-
port his motion to suppress); United States v. Randle, 966 F.2d
1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1992) (a defendant seeking a hearing on a
motion to suppress must present definite, specific, detailed,
and nonconjectural facts that justify relief before a district
court will grant a suppression hearing; reliance on vague,
conclusory allegations is insufficient). Without any affirma-
tive indication that the proffer agreement was entered into
unknowingly or involuntarily, an agreement to waive the
protections of Rules 410 and 11(f) is valid and enforceable.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 210; Smith, 770 F.3d at 639.
   Moreover, we agree with the government that any error in
refusing to hold a hearing (and again, we find no abuse of
14                                                  No. 21-3248

discretion in the court’s decision here) was harmless. The gov-
ernment never sought to introduce any statements from the
proffer at Pierson’s trial. Pierson asserts that he was neverthe-
less harmed because the threat of those statements being ad-
mitted was enough to completely change the nature of the de-
fense strategy at trial. Pierson’s proffer agreement contained
a waiver clause specifying:
       If your Client offers testimony, arguments, po-
       sitions, or otherwise presents evidence at any
       trial or other legal proceeding … different from
       any statement made or other information pro-
       vided during the Proffer, the government may
       directly use any statements made or other infor-
       mation provided during the Proffer, as well as
       all evidence derived directly or indirectly there-
       from.
R. 129-1. Although Pierson does not specify what defense he
was prevented from mounting because of his fear that the
proffer statements would come in under this provision, his
argument implies that the unspecified defense would have
conflicted with the facts he admitted at the proffer sessions.
    But this is the way that proffer agreements are designed to
work. By authorizing the prosecutor to use his statements if
he contradicted himself at trial, Pierson made his representa-
tions more credible and strengthened his hand in plea nego-
tiations. Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1024. When engaging in plea ne-
gotiations, a “prosecutor needs assurance that the defendant
is being candid. A conditional waiver of the kind [Pierson]
signed tends to keep the defendant honest, which makes the
proffer device more useful to … both sides. For this strategy
to work the conditional waiver must be enforceable; its effect
No. 21-3248                                                   15

depends on making deceit costly.” Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1025. As
the Supreme Court noted in Mezzanatto, prosecutors require
the “reliability assurance” that accompanies a waiver agree-
ment, and a defendant seeking a favorable plea deal can max-
imize what he has to offer the prosecutor by conditionally
waiving his rights under Rules 410 and 11(f). 513 U.S. at 208.
Ultimately that means that a defendant who signs a proffer
waiver and later withdraws from plea negotiations will not
be able to mount a defense that factually contradicts his prof-
fer statements. Pierson was still able to put the government to
its burden of proof and robustly cross-examine the govern-
ment’s witnesses. That is the bargain he struck with the Prof-
fer Letter.
                                 B.
    Pierson next contends that the district court erred in allow-
ing the government to present evidence regarding D.C.’s
statements to the police, and other background information
about the course of the investigation. We review the court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Jarigese, 999 F.3d 464, 470 (7th Cir. 2021). The
court had initially declined to allow those statements to come
in, finding that the probative value of this evidence was out-
weighed by the unfair prejudice that might result. Fed.R.Evid.
403. In reaching that decision, the court very carefully parsed
the evidence that the government sought to admit and very
narrowly allowed the government to make the representa-
tions that we outlined above. As we also noted, government
counsel misspoke in opening statements and substituted the
word “likely” for the word “may” in reference to the likeli-
hood that Pierson would be armed. But defense counsel then
raised the specter of D.C.’s statements by revealing to the jury
16                                                 No. 21-3248

that the investigation involving Pierson was related to a spe-
cific complaint that an “ex” had made about him. Defense
counsel also described at length how the actions of the officers
making the traffic stop were aggressive, alarming to Pierson
and his daughter, and unexpected. Although counsel ex-
pressly disclaimed a charge of excessive force, he strongly
hinted that the discovery of the gun conveniently covered up
for the level of force applied during the stop.
    The court carefully considered the government’s motion
to reconsider the earlier ruling excluding evidence of D.C.’s
statements to the police. The court found that defense coun-
sel’s opening statement had indeed opened the door to recon-
sideration. Because of defense counsel’s statements, the “na-
ture and circumstances of the arrest [had] become front and
center in this case.” R. 271, at 34. The court decided to allow
the government to present additional evidence about the
background of the investigation, including allowing Officer
Minnis to testify regarding his conversation with D.C. and,
specifically, Pierson’s threat to come back and shoot the house
up.
    When the evidence came in, the court immediately in-
structed the jury on the proper and limited use of this evi-
dence:
       So, folks, I’m going to give you an instruction of
       law right now. Of course, as you know, you are
       obligated to follow instructions of law. That is
       the testimony from Officer Minnis regarding
       the background information you just heard, that
       is the reason why he responded to that run, the
       information he received from the person who
       had made the call that day, that that information
No. 21-3248                                                   17

       is being offered solely for the effect that it had
       on Officer Minnis. He doesn’t know it if is true
       or not true. He was just acting based on what he
       was told. It is not being offered for the truth of
       the matter asserted. It’s being offered for the
       limited purpose to explain the effect that it had
       on Officer Minnis. So I instruct you, you are not
       to consider his testimony regarding the back-
       ground information about the call and the com-
       plainant for its truth. And that ends my instruc-
       tion.
R. 273, at 59–60. We presume that the jury followed the court’s
instructions absent evidence of an overwhelming probability
that the jury was unable to follow the instructions as given.
United States v. Serfling, 504 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2007);
United States v. James, 487 F.3d 518, 524 (7th Cir. 2007). There
is no such concern here where the court gave a clear statement
to the jury limiting how it could use the evidence.
    True, we have expressed concerns about the use of such
non-hearsay course-of-investigation testimony in the past.
United States v. Marchan, 935 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2019) (not-
ing that we are reluctant to permit admitting evidence under
the “course of the investigation” rationale for fear of its abuse
or misuse); Carter v. Douma, 796 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2015)
(characterizing the course-of-investigation gambit as “so of-
ten abused and/or misunderstood that it is an evidentiary and
constitutional minefield”). And in this case, the government
may have “milked it a little bit” or “gilded the lily,” as one
panel member noted at oral argument, putting in more
course-of-investigation evidence than was strictly necessary
to clear up any issues created by defense counsel’s opening
18                                                 No. 21-3248

statements. In doing so, the government took the risk that we
might find the jury unable to follow the limiting instruction
as given. But we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in this instance. The court allowed this testimony
only after concluding that the defendant opened the door to
it in opening statements, and the court also immediately gave
a carefully crafted limiting instruction for the jury on the
proper use of this evidence. See United States v. Villegas, 655
F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2011) (when a party opens the door to
evidence that would be otherwise inadmissible, that party
cannot complain on appeal about the admission of that evi-
dence); Serfling, 504 F.3d at 677 (jurors are presumed to follow
limiting instructions). Finally, the evidence of Pierson’s guilt
was quite strong: three officers—Minnis, Hubner, and
Snow—testified to seeing the gun under Pierson after he fell
to the ground. Officer Snow was on top of Minnis trying to
secure him when he saw the gun and shouted a warning to
his fellow officers. Minnis then pulled the firearm from under
Pierson’s body, and Hubner saw the gun in the grass after
Pierson was secured. Two of those officers had seen a bulge
in Pierson’s waistband before he ran from the officers. The
testimony on the gun was completely one-sided. If admitting
the course-of-investigation evidence was an abuse of discre-
tion (and again, we have concluded that it is not), its admis-
sion would be harmless error in the circumstances presented
here. United States v. Parker, 11 F.4th 593, 596 (7th Cir. 2021)
(an error is harmless where there is overwhelming evidence
of guilt).
                                                  AFFIRMED.