Court Opinion

ID: 9877475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:24.603012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:11.982015
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 23-0229
                           Filed September 27, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DARRELL LYNN JONES
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, John R. Flynn,

Judge.

      A defendant appeals the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

      Jack Bjornstad of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., Badding, J., and Carr, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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BADDING, Judge.

         In June 2021, Darrell Jones pled guilty to one count of intimidation with a

dangerous weapon under Iowa Code section 708.6(2) (2020) and two counts of

possession of a firearm by a felon under section 724.26(1)—all class “D” felonies.1

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to a bond reduction and Jones’s

release with supervision. Following a hearing, the court accepted the pleas and

set the matter for sentencing.      Jones posted bond a few days later.       Come

September, the State moved to revoke Jones’s release on bond, alleging he had

been using controlled substances and participating in criminal activity. The court

granted the motion and issued an arrest warrant. Jones was arrested two days

later.

         Three days after his arrest, Jones filed a motion in arrest of judgment,

seeking to withdraw his pleas due to “defects in the plea proceeding.” One of the

defects identified by Jones was the court’s failure to inform him that intimidation

with a dangerous weapon under section 708.6(2) “is arguably a forcible felony such

that his plea was not knowing and voluntary.” Jones was appointed new counsel

after the motion was filed. At the hearing on the motion in October, that attorney

took a different position than his predecessor, arguing the charge was not a forcible

felony. The State agreed, as did the court. After resolving Jones’s other claimed

defects, and reaffirming his desire to plead guilty to the three charges, the court

denied Jones’s motion in arrest of judgment. The court also granted Jones’s

1 The amended trial information included a separate class “C” felony charge of

intimidation with a dangerous weapon under section 708.6(1), but the plea
agreement called to dismiss that charge.
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request to be released “under supervision to the Iowa Department of Correctional

Services, with the condition that he shall have an ankle-monitoring bracelet

secured to his person at all times.”

         In November, the State again moved to revoke Jones’s release on bond,

alleging multiple violations. The court granted the motion and issued an arrest

warrant. Another warrant issued after Jones failed to appear for the scheduled

sentencing hearing in January 2022. Jones was not arrested until roughly a year

later.   A sentencing hearing was held in February 2023, at which the court

sentenced Jones to indeterminate terms of imprisonment not to exceed five years

on each of the three counts, with two being served concurrently with one another

but the third being served consecutively to the others. The court did not impose a

minimum sentence of confinement and set bond on appeal.             Cf. Iowa Code

§§ 811.1(2) (denying bail to a defendant appealing a forcible felony conviction),

902.7 (imposing a minimum sentence of confinement for use of a dangerous

weapon while participating in a forcible felony).

         Jones now appeals, claiming his “guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary

because he had not been accurately informed he was pleading to a forcible felony

with enhanced penalties.” No matter how Jones tries to frame it, the ruling being

challenged is the district court’s denial of his motion in arrest of judgment to

withdraw his guilty plea to intimidation with a dangerous weapon.

         Anticipating a jurisdictional challenge from the State, Jones argues he has

good cause to appeal following his guilty plea because he filed a motion in arrest

of judgment. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (limiting right of appeal to convictions

following a guilty plea to class “A” felonies “or in a case where the defendant
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establishes good cause”); State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d 140, 153–54 (Iowa 2021)

(finding failure to file motion in arrest of judgment despite being adequately advised

of consequences of such failure precludes appellate relief and therefore negates

good cause). But the fact that he filed a motion in arrest of judgment makes

section 814.6(1) inapplicable; rather, “the proper vehicle for [Jones’s] challenge

lies under Iowa Code section 814.6(2)(f), which permits discretionary review from

an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment on grounds other than an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”2 State v. Nguyen, No. 22-0471, 2022 WL

5069582, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2022); accord State v. Tutson, No. 21-0990,

2022 WL 1236763, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2022) (“We conclude an

2 In his reply brief, Jones submits that because “he separately appeals his guilty

plea as unknowing and involuntary,” instead of only appealing the denial of his
motion in arrest of judgment, he has a right to appeal under section 814.6(1)(a)(3).
But there is no separate challenge to be had. The motion in arrest of judgment is
the middle man between an alleged plea deficiency and any relief on appeal. See
Iowa R. App. P. 2.24(3)(a)(2) (“A defendant’s failure to challenge the adequacy of
a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the
defendant’s right to assert such challenge on appeal.”). Once a defendant files a
motion in arrest of judgment, as Jones did, it opens the door for appellate relief.
At the same time, however, the motion sets the confines for appellate review from
an error-preservation standpoint. So the appellate court is only reviewing the
“order denying a motion in arrest of judgment,” which expressly falls under the
discretionary-review avenue for appellate jurisdiction.           See Iowa Code
§ 814.6(2)(f).
        Even if section 814.6(1)(a)(3) applied, we would conclude Jones failed to
establish good cause to challenge the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment.
Whether the variation of intimidation with a dangerous weapon Jones pled guilty
to is a forcible felony or not, he successfully convinced the court and prosecutor
that it wasn’t at the hearing on the motion in arrest of judgment. Appellate courts
will not provide relief when a litigant invites error in the district court and then
complains when the court accepts the invitation. See, e.g., Jasper v. State, 477
N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991); see also State v. Gordon, 943 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa
2020) (finding “substantial authority for the proposition that a criminal defendant
who enters a plea agreement with an illegally lenient sentence cannot benefit from
that sentence and then attack the plea bargain”). And the absence of available
relief precludes the establishment of good cause. See Tucker, 959 N.W.2d at 153.
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application for discretionary review is the appropriate vehicle to challenge a ruling

on a motion in arrest of judgment.”).

       Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.108 authorizes us to treat Jones’s

notice of appeal as an application for discretionary review, but “[n]othing in this rule

shall operate to extend the time for initiating a case.”         As noted, Jones is

challenging the order denying his motion in arrest of judgment, which was entered

in October 2021. His notice of appeal was not filed until February 2023—about

sixteen months later. “An application for discretionary review must be filed within

30 days after entry of the challenged ruling, order, or judgment of the district court.”

Iowa R. App. P. 6.106(1)(b). Because this jurisdictional deadline was not met, we

are without appellate jurisdiction and therefore dismiss the appeal.3 See State v.

Clausen-Klutse, No. 10-2128, 2011 WL 3196300, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

July 27, 2011) (properly treating notice of appeal as application for discretionary

review but dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because defendant “elected

not to seek timely discretionary review”).

       APPEAL DISMISSED.

3 From a practical standpoint, we observe that motions in arrest of judgment are

often considered and decided at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., Nguyen, 2022
WL 5069582, at *1; Tutson, 2022 WL 1236763, at *1. In that common scenario,
the timeliness of notices of appeal and applications for discretionary review would
run under the same general time constraints. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.101(1)(b)
(thirty days for appeals from final orders and judgments), .106(1)(b) (thirty days for
applications for discretionary review). As a result, the jurisdictional restraint
present under the unique facts of this case because of Jones’s failure to appear at
his sentencing hearing would not impede appellate jurisdiction.