Court Opinion

ID: 9523496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:43:09.662138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:10.410752
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I fear the decision of this court has seriously invaded an area which the constitution of this State has reserved for the legislature. Section 5 of article X of the constitution of 1870 stated that the General Assembly shall provide by general law for township organization under which any county may organize, and that when a county adopts township organization the affairs of said county are to be transacted in such manner as the General Assembly provides. Pursuant to this authority the General Assembly adopted “An Act to revise the law in relation to township organization,” approved March 4, 1874. Article VII of that act related to the election of town officers. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 139, par. 60 et seq.) Section 1 of that article (par. 60) provided for the election of township collectors. In the Revenue Act of 1939 (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1969, ch. 120, par. 482 et seq.) the General Assembly set forth the tax collection procedure in detail, placing the primary responsibility for collecting taxes upon town collectors in townships having such an officer. In section 190 (par. 671) it was provided: “Every town collector, and every county collector, in cases where there is no town collector, upon receiving the tax book or tax books, shall proceed to collect the taxes mentioned herein.” Section 9 of the transition schedule of the 1970 constitution preserves the provisions of these statutes enacted under the constitution of 1870 and the officers elected thereunder. Following the adoption of the 1970 constitution the General Assembly has not abolished the office of town collector, nor has it removed from this office the duties specified in the Revenue Act of 1939. The statute still imposes upon town collectors, upon receiving the tax books, the duty to collect the taxes. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 671. In neither of the prior decisions of this court in Flynn v. Kucharski (45 Ill.2d 211 and 49 Ill.2d 7) has this court held that town collectors are permanently prohibited from performing their statutory duty of collecting taxes. Our second decision (49 Ill.2 d 7) held that town collectors were de jure officers but because of the practical inability of these officers to perform, the county collector was the proper person to assume the burden of collecting past and present taxes. We did not hold that this practice should continue indefinitely. Subsequent to the above decisions, the legislature has amended various sections of the statutes relating to town collectors and their functions and has not provided for the abolition of the office, nor has it relieved the town collectors of the duty to collect taxes. The very section of the statute which provides for the, election of town collectors was amended by Public Act 77-1610, effective September 21, 1971. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 139, par. 60; see also Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 120, pars. 653, 673, 680, 688, 691.) I view these amendments as a manifestation of the intent of the legislature that regardless of the prior decisions of this court town collectors are to be active, functioning public officials and are to perform the duties imposed upon them by statute. I cannot agree with the conclusion expressed in the opinion that there has been no change since the original injunction which warrants dissolving it. The purpose of the original injunction was to prohibit the diversion of the unconstitutional town collectors’ fees to the township funds. This has now effectively been accomplished both by the decisions of this court and by the 1970 constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 9(a).) There is therefore no reason for continuing the injunction against town collectors from performing the duties of their office. It appears from the opinion of the court that th'e change which is required to authorize the dissolution of the injunction is an appropriation and tax levy by the township for salaries and expenses of town collectors. I feel that the majority opinion has arranged priorities in reverse order. As a practical matter, it is doubtful if a governmental body would appropriate and levy for the payment of expenses of a function which is enjoined. As a legal matter, if such an appropriation and levy were made at a time when the town collector is enjoined from performing his duties, the levy would be the subject of serious legal objections because the validity of a tax levy is determined as of the date of the levy. (People ex rel. Toman v. Central Plaza Hotel Corp., 375 Ill. 114, 123; People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Siebel, 388 Ill. 98, 107.) At the time of such a levy the town collector would be prevented by the injunction from performing the duties, the expenses of which were to be paid by the levy. It appears to me that the court has by injunction made it impossible for the townships to provide the funds necessary for the collection of taxes and then has refused to dissolve the injunction because no such funds have been provided. Whether, as appellees argue, the procedure of collecting taxes through town collectors is a purely local and unnecessary function is not, of course, proper for judicial consideration. The legislature has provided that taxes be ' collected in this manner. Regardless of our personal views as to the wisdom of the procedure, the legislature, pursuant to constitutional authority, has acted, and within constitutional limits this procedure should be followed. As to the mandamus action, the county clerk had a clear statutory duty to deliver the tax collection books to the town collectors. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 120, par. 653.) The petition for writ of mandamus should have been allowed For these reasons I would reverse the orders of the trial court and direct that the injunction be dissolved and that the writ of mandamus issue.