Court Opinion

ID: 9556892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 22:05:17.638235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:15.721362
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23 In re D.L. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re D.L., a Person Coming                                  B321015
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                                (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MJ24058)

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 D.L., a Minor,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Brian C. Yep, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lynette Gladd Moore; Laini Millar Melnick, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________

       Appellant D.L., who was born in 2001, appeals from orders
sustaining a juvenile wardship petition and the court’s
disposition order. Appellant admits that he and Deonta Johnson
also known as “Fatboy” “planned to rob a neighborhood
convenience store called ‘the [D]airy.’ ” Appellant also admits
that Johnson would “rush in with a gun belonging to appellant
and demand the money.” It is undisputed that Johnson shot the
Dairy’s employee, John Ruh, three times and Ruh died of
multiple gunshot wounds.
       Appellant does not challenge on appeal that he was a major
participant in the robbery. He, however, challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support that he participated in the
robbery with reckless indifference to human life. We conclude
substantial evidence shows appellant acted with reckless
indifference to human life and affirm the order sustaining the
Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and the
dispositional order.

                        BACKGROUND
       As a preliminary matter, we note that in his appellate
briefing, appellant concedes he “provided the gun and induced
Ruh to open the cash register” and expressly assumes there was
sufficient evidence to support he was a major participant in the
robbery. We agree with appellant’s assumption that he was a
major participant in the underlying felony. As is evident from
our factual summary below, appellant participated in every

                                   2
phase of the robbery. He planned the robbery, induced Ruh to
open the cash register, supplied the lethal weapon used in the
robbery, and was present during the robbery. As his confederate
used lethal force, appellant watched and smiled. Appellant’s
participation in the robbery “was sufficiently significant to be
considered ‘major.’ ” (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 611
(Clark).)
      Our factual summary is accordingly focused on appellant’s
only appellate challenge, that is, to the sufficiency of the evidence
regarding reckless indifference to human life.

1.    Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition
      As later sustained, the second amended petition in count
one alleged appellant committed Ruh’s murder. The murder
occurred while appellant and Johnson were attempting to commit
a robbery. A principal was armed with a firearm.
      In count two, the People alleged, and the court sustained,
one count of attempted second degree robbery and that a
principal was armed with a firearm.1

2.    Evidence at trial
     The parties stipulated in the 2022 trial that Ruh died of
multiple gunshot wounds. Appellant did not call any witnesses.

      a.    M.H.’s testimony
      M.H. dated appellant and M.H.’s daughter referred to
appellant as dad. Appellant told M.H. that Fatboy proposed
robbing the Dairy. According to M.H., Fatboy was a member of

      1 Additional allegations, including three counts of
dissuading a witness, M.H., by force or threat, were dismissed.

                                     3
the 30 Crip Harlem gang. M.H. testified that appellant belonged
to a different gang.
       Appellant told M.H. that he and Fatboy planned a robbery.
They knew that Ruh worked alone. Appellant said he gave the
gun to Fatboy “right before” entering the Dairy. Appellant told
M.H. that Fatboy was supposed to scare Ruh with the gun.
       Appellant also told M.H. the robbery did not “go as
planned” because Fatboy shot the cashier and that “was not
supposed to happen.” Appellant said, “Fatboy had shot him
[Ruh] just for no reason.” Appellant reiterated to M.H.: “They
was just supposed to rob him and that was it.” Appellant told
M.H., “Fatboy had told the man to put his hands up” and
appellant was near the door “telling him [Fatboy] to come on, and
that’s when Fatboy had shot the man.”
       After the shooting, appellant and Fatboy went to
appellant’s house where Fatboy had been staying. Appellant told
M.H. the gun was “dirty” because Fatboy shot the cashier.
Neither appellant nor Fatboy obtained any money from the
robbery.
       Appellant told M.H. not to tell anyone about the attempted
robbery and shooting, and also told M.H., “ ‘I got to get out of
here.’ ” After the shooting, M.H. saw appellant carry the gun to
the “places we go” such as clubs. Appellant described the gun as
“ ‘dirty’ ” and said, “ ‘[I]t’s got a body on it.’ ”

     b.      Security footage
     Detective Steven Blagg described the video footage of the
robbery.2 “Mr. Ruh just accepted something from somebody

     2    This video footage is not in the appellate record.

                                      4
[appellant] on the other side of the counter. When he opened the
register another figure appeared [Johnson] . . . causing Mr. Ruh
to slam the door shut of the cash register. What appears to be
gunshots go off. And the person who was on the customer side of
the counter [appellant], . . . then starts to walk towards the door
while smiling.”
       Another video showed appellant asking Ruh, “ ‘Can I get a
Newport [cigarette]?’ ” Appellant hands something to Ruh
causing Ruh to open the cash register. After Ruh opens the cash
register, Johnson says, “ ‘Empty the register.’ ” Ruh slammed the
cash register shut. Ruh said, “ ‘What are you gonna rob me with
a pellet gun?’ ” Ruh opened the cash register because appellant
paid for the Newport cigarette. Appellant did not object to the
latter statement.
       Detective Blagg further testified that videos of the incident
showed Johnson firing the gun. He said that three shots can be
heard on the video. According to Blagg, “[T]here was a lull
between the first and second gunshot.” According to Blagg, each
time Johnson fired, appellant’s body twitched; Detective Blagg
explained that twitching is a typical response to a gunshot in
close proximity. Blagg further described that as the shots were
being fired, appellant was “[v]ery slowly moving” towards the
door. Appellant “continued to observe what was going on behind
the counter.” After the shooting, Johnson continued to try to
break open the cash register and appellant left the Dairy.
       From the video it appeared to Blagg that appellant was
about 15 yards ahead of Johnson as both traveled in the same
direction away from the Dairy.

                                    5
      c.     Other evidence
       Detective Scott Lawler testified that he interviewed
appellant. Appellant said he lived with Fatboy but when Fatboy
stole from appellant’s sister, appellant’s mother told Fatboy to
leave the home.
       When Lawler interviewed appellant, appellant said he
went alone to the Dairy to get a cigarette. Appellant said that he
“frequently” went to the Dairy.
       Appellant stated that “[w]hile inside getting the cigarette
somebody came in with a gun. He [appellant] ran, or attempted
to run out but that individual was blocking the door. He finally
made it outside and heard . . . two to three gunshots as he was
running away.”
       After Detective Lawler informed appellant that video
surveillance depicted appellant and Johson approaching the
Dairy, appellant then changed his story stating: “[O]n the
morning of the incident Deonta [Johnson] approached him . . . .
[Johnson] stated ‘Let’s go get a cigarette.’ That’s when both of
them left [appellant’s] house to go get a cigarette. Appellant said
that Johnson robbed the store. Appellant said that Johnson shot
Ruh. Appellant “saw” Johnson shoot Ruh with a black and
chrome semi-automatic firearm. Appellant said he did not call
the police. Appellant told Lawler he knew Ruh.

3.    Court findings and sentence
      The trial court found the following facts: Deonta Johnson
and appellant arrived at the Dairy around the same time.
Appellant entered the Dairy and asked Ruh to buy a cigarette.
“[T]his is part of a plan. . . . so that the victim will open the cash
drawer. And as soon as the victim opened the cash drawer

                                      6
Deonta Johnson rushed in from the side, gun drawn, and asked
the victim for money. The victim shuts the cash drawer and
refuses to give the money to Deonta Johnson. There’s a brief
verbal exchange. And then Deonta Johnson shoots the victim
three times.”
       The court continued: Appellant does not call “emergency
medical services, does not try to assist the victim, he does not call
911 for the sheriff’s [sic] to come.” Johnson unsuccessfully tries
to open the cash drawer and then Johnson and appellant run
“across the same open field, in the direction of the minor’s house.”
       The court found, “[T]here was clearly a plan . . . [a]nd the
gun had to be part of the plan, otherwise the robbery would not
be successful.” As soon as Ruh opened the cash drawer, “Johnson
rushed in from the side of the victim with the gun drawn. So
clearly, the gun was part of the plan that was hatched to rob the
Dairy.”
       The court further found, “The undisputed evidence is that
the minor chose the Dairy for the robbery. The minor had been
there many times before and he knew the victim. Clearly, the
victim must also have known or known of the minor. With this in
mind, how could the robbery have been successful unless the
victim was shot and killed? In other words, how could Deonta
Johnson and the minor have gotten away with the robbery if, in
fact, the victim knew who they were or at least knew who the
minor was.”
       The court found that appellant was a major participant in
the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The court then sustained the petition.

                                     7
      After a contested disposition hearing, the court sentenced
defendant to a secure youth treatment facility for a period of
25 years to life.

                         DISCUSSION

A.    Standard of Review
       Appellant’s sole challenge is to the sufficiency of evidence
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life and that he
had intent to kill.3 “[W]e determine whether substantial
evidence—‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value’—supports the juvenile court’s findings. [Citation.] We
view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution
and presume in support of the [findings] the existence of every
fact the [court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’
[Citation.] We ‘accept [all] logical inferences that the [court]
might have drawn from the . . . evidence’ [citation], but reject
inferences ‘ “based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work” ’
[citation].” (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.)

      3  Because appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting that he was a major participant in the
robbery and we conclude that there was substantial evidence
supporting he acted with reckless indifference to human life
sufficient to support the murder conviction, we need not consider
whether he also harbored the intent to kill Ruh.

                                    8
B.    Standard for Reckless Indifference to Human Life
       Senate Bill No. 1437 amended Penal Code4 section 189 to
provide that a defendant who was not the actual killer or did not
have an intent to kill is not liable for felony murder unless he
“was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3;
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 703.) Section 190.2,
subdivision (d) provides: “[E]very person, not the actual killer,
who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major
participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits,
requests, or assists in the commission of a felony [including
robbery] . . . which results in the death of some person or persons,
and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree . . . shall be
punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life
without the possibility of parole . . . .” (§ 190.2, subd. (d).) The
newly narrowed scope of felony murder is based on “preexisting
law governing felony-murder special-circumstance findings . . . to
determine whether the defendant may be sentenced to death or
life without possibility of parole.” (Strong, at p. 703.)
       Section 190.2 codified the rule announced in Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 (Tison). (People v. Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p.616.) Both Tison and a prior United States
Supreme Court case, Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782
(Enmund), permit imposition of the death penalty for a felony
murder when a defendant’s involvement is substantial and
demonstrates a reckless indifference to the risk of death. The
two cases “help define the constitutional limits for punishing

      4   Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

                                    9
accomplices to felony murder.” (In re Loza (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
38, 46.) “At one end of this Enmund-Tison continuum is ‘ “the
minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither
intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental
state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] At the other end are the ‘actual
killers and those who attempted or intended to kill. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘Somewhere between them . . . lies the constitutional
minimum’ showing required for the imposition of death or life
without the possibility of parole.” (Ibid.) That constitutional
minimum is the standard now incorporated into the definition of
felony murder. (§ 189.)
       Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. 782 involved a robbery and
murder of an elderly couple. (Id. at p. 784.) Enmund drove two
confederates to the scene and waited to help them escape. (Id. at
pp. 786, 788.) He was not present for the murder or robbery. (Id.
at p. 788.) The Supreme Court held that imposition of the death
penalty was inconsistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments when Enmund did not kill the victims, was not
present when they were killed, and did not intend they be killed
or anticipate that lethal force would or might be used. (Ibid.)
       The facts of Tison demonstrated a more culpable mental
state than that harbored by the defendant in Enmund. In Tison,
in an effort to help Gary Tison escape prison, the Tison family,
including sons Raymond and Ricky, “assembled a large arsenal of
weapons.” (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 139.) Family members
entered the prison carrying an ice chest filled with guns. (Ibid.)
They armed Gary Tison and his cellmate and left the prison.
(Ibid.) Gary Tison and his cellmate “brutally murder[ed]” four
“captives” who had stopped to try to aid the Tison family with a
flat tire. (Id. at p. 141.) “Neither [Raymond nor Ricky] made an

                                   10
effort to help the victims, though both later stated they were
surprised by the shooting.” (Ibid.) Raymond and Ricky were
convicted of felony murder for all four murders. (Ibid.)
       The United States Supreme Court upheld the death
sentence, finding Raymond and Ricky showed reckless
indifference to human life. (Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 152.)
The high court reasoned that Raymond Tison was prepared to kill
in furtherance of the prison break, flagged down the victims to
assist with the flat tire, robbed the victims and guarded them at
gunpoint while the group considered their fate. Raymond “stood
by and watched the killing, making no effort to assist the victims
before, during, or after the shooting. (Id. at p. 151.) “Instead, he
chose to assist the killers in their continuing criminal
endeavors . . . .” (Ibid.) Similarly, Ricky Tison brought guns into
the prison to arm the prisoners, participated in the kidnapping
and robbery, and watched the killing without aiding the victims.
(Id. at p. 152.)
       Our high court applied Enmund and Tison in People v.
Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks). Defendant Matthews
“acted as the getaway driver for an armed robbery in which Leon
Banks and others participated.” (Id. at p. 794.) “In the course of
escaping, Banks shot one of the robbery victims.” (Ibid.)
Matthews and two of his confederates were gang members, but
Banks was not a gang member. (Id. at pp. 795–796, 810.)
Although the gang’s primary activities included shootings,
attempted murders and murders, “[n]o evidence was presented
that Matthews” or his fellow gang members “had killed before, or
that Matthews knew any of the three had killed before.” (Id. at
p. 796.)

                                   11
      Our Supreme Court reversed the felony murder special
circumstance, finding Matthews no more culpable than the
getaway driver in Enmund. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 794.)
Our Supreme Court emphasized that “a defendant’s personal
involvement must be substantial, greater than the actions of an
ordinary aider and abettor to an ordinary felony murder such as
Earl Enmund.” (Id. at p. 802.) “Matthews, like Enmund and
unlike the Tisons, did not see the shooting happen, did not have
reason to know it was going to happen, and could not do anything
to stop the shooting or render assistance.” (Id. at p. 807.)
Although Matthews knew he was participating in an armed
robbery, “nothing at trial supported the conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt that Matthews knew his own actions would
involve a grave risk of death. There was no evidence Matthews
intended to kill or, unlike the Tisons, knowingly conspired with
accomplices known to have killed before. Instead, as in Enmund,
Banks’s killing of [the victim] was apparently a spontaneous
response to armed resistance from the victim.” (Ibid.)
      Subsequent to Enmund and Tison, courts have refined the
meaning of reckless indifference to human life. “ ‘[T]he culpable
mental state of “reckless indifference to life” is one in which the
defendant “knowingly engag[es] in criminal activities known to
carry a grave risk of death” [citation] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re
Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App..5th 1002, 1021.)
      The following nonexclusive factors are relevant to whether
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life: (1) the
defendant’s knowledge of weapons and use of a weapon even if
the defendant did not kill the victim; (2) the defendant’s presence
at the scene of the crime and failure to aid the victim; (3) the
duration of the felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s

                                    12
likelihood of killing; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize
risk of violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 618–623.) No single factor is “ ‘necessary’ ” or “ ‘necessarily
sufficient.’ ” (In re Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 1019.)
       Our high court explained in Clark that the mental state
comprising reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness to
kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even
if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the
outcome of his [or her] actions.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 616–617.) The required intent has “both subjective and
objective elements. The subjective element is the defendant’s
conscious disregard of risks known to him or her. But
recklessness is not determined merely by reference to a
defendant’s subjective feeling that he or she is engaging in risky
activities. Rather, recklessness is also determined by . . . what ‘a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 617.)
       In In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), our high
court held that a petitioner who planned an unarmed assault and
was not present when a confederate shot the victim did not act
with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at pp. 671, 672,
678–679.) Scoggins further held that “ ‘[a]wareness of no more
than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any [violent felony]
is insufficient’ ” to establish reckless indifference to human life;
“ ‘only knowingly creating a “grave risk of death” ’ satisfies the
statutory requirement. [Citation.] Notably, ‘the fact a
participant [or planner of] an armed robbery could anticipate
lethal force might be used’ is not sufficient to establish reckless
indifference to human life.” (Id. at p. 677.)

                                     13
C.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion That
      Appellant Acted with Reckless Indifference to
      Human Life
      Applying Clark’s factors (which Scoggins reaffirmed) here,
we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
order. (See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) In so
concluding, we consider the totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.)

      1.    Defendant’s knowledge of weapons and use of a
            weapon
      Appellant did not personally use a weapon. Appellant
knew a weapon would be used in the robbery and in fact,
provided the weapon to his confederate. Appellant acknowledges
that he “provided the murder weapon . . . .” M.H. testified that
appellant told her he gave Fatboy the gun so that Fatboy could
scare Ruh.

      2.    Defendant’s presence and failure to aid
       Appellant was present at the scene of the crime and did not
aid the victim. Appellant told law enforcement that he did not
call the police.

      3.    Duration of the felony
       Our record does not disclose the duration of the felony, but
it appears to have occurred over a short time period. Appellant
requested a cigarette; Johnson ordered Ruh to empty the cash
register; Ruh refused; Johnson shot Ruh three times, Johnson
tried to open the cash register; and both appellant and Johnson
left the Dairy, traveling in the same direction.

                                    14
      Notwithstanding the short duration, the felony lasted long
enough for appellant to have had an opportunity to intervene.
There was a “lull” between the first and second shooting.
Appellant did not try to stop Johnson from shooting again.
Instead he merely observed with a smile on his face. (See In re
McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1012, 1014 [even if felony
was brief, petitioner had opportunity to “say or do something”].)

      4.    Likelihood of killing
      There was no evidence of appellant’s knowledge of
Johnson’s likelihood of killing. Although Johnson was a gang
member, there was no evidence that Johnson previously killed or
attempted to kill anyone. We agree with appellant insofar as he
argues that there was no evidence he and Johnson agreed to kill
Ruh to avoid being identified by Ruh. However, no evidence
supports appellant’s alternate theory that Johnson’s decision to
shoot arose quickly was based on “ ‘[Ruh’s] unexpected
resistance’ ” to opening the cash register. The evidence was that
Ruh opened the cash register but then closed it, not that he
resisted opening it. More important, the record does not show
that Johnson’s decision to shoot was based on “ ‘unexpected
resistance’ ” because no witness supports that scenario.

      5.    Appellant’s efforts to minimize risk of violence
       Appellant knew that Johnson would use the gun to scare
Ruh. There was no evidence that appellant took any steps to
decrease the risk of violence created by such a threat. To the
contrary—he provided the loaded firearm to Ruh. This case
is not like Clark, where the defendant planned a robbery at a
store when it was closed and planned that the robbery

                                   15
involve only one unloaded gun. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 621–622.)
       Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant
was not “ ‘ “the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the
scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any
culpable mental state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Loza,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 46.) Except for the absence of any
evidence concerning Johnson’s proclivity to kill, all of the Clark
factors support the trial court’s finding that appellant acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Further, even if appellant
did not know of a likelihood Johnson would shoot Ruh before the
shooting, he was aware of the risk of death once the shooting
started and did nothing to assist Ruh during the lull between the
first and second shot. Substantial evidence thus supports the
trial court’s conclusion that appellant harbored reckless
indifference to human life.
       Appellant’s contrary argument does not view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. For example,
appellant states that “[t]he crime happened quickly and
[appellant] had no opportunity to restrain Johnson or aid the
victim.”
       Appellant’s similar statement that he had “no realistic
opportunity to intervene before Johnson opened fire” is not
supported by citation to the record. Appellant’s statements
ignore the evidence that he was near Johnson and the victim
during the shooting. He chose not to attempt to restrain or even
dissuade Johnson from shooting. Instead, he smiled as Johnson
shot Ruh. According to Detective Blagg’s description of the video
footage, appellant “just stands there observing the interaction
between Deonta Johnson and Mr. Ruh.” Appellant’s statement

                                   16
that he “left immediately when Johnson started shooting” also is
incorrect. The evidence showed that appellant did not leave until
after Johnson fired all three shots.
       Appellant’s reliance on People v. Ramirez (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 970 is misplaced. In Ramirez, Division Seven of
this court concluded that a petitioner seeking resentencing of a
murder conviction did not act with reckless indifference to human
life. (Id. at p. 975.) The court explained: “Ramirez did not
provide the murder weapon, instruct his confederate to shoot, or
know of his confederate’s propensity toward violence, and the
shooting occurred quickly without Ramirez having a meaningful
opportunity to intervene.” (Ibid.) In Ramirez, the 15-year-old
petitioner “did not want a gun to be used and did not want to be
involved” in a planned carjacking. (Id. at p. 979.) When his
confederate started shooting during the carjacking, Ramirez “
‘took off.’ ” (Ibid.) Additionally, Ramirez presented evidence that
he “did not want to hurt anyone.” (Id. at p. 981.) The shooter
was on the driver side and Ramirez was on the passenger side of
a vehicle during the shooting and Ramirez was not close enough
to restrain the shooter. (Id. at p. 989.) The rapid pace of the
crime also afforded Ramirez “no opportunity” to intervene. (Ibid.)
Ramirez did not know the victim was wounded by the gunfire.
(Ibid.) The court further found that there was evidence “Ramirez
was influenced by peer pressure” and his age (15 years)
“diminishes any inference he acted with reckless disregard for
human life . . . .” (Id. at p. 990.) “The evidence is not sufficient to
prove 15-year-old Ramirez was ‘subjectively aware that his
actions created a graver risk of death’ than any other armed
carjacking.” (Id. at pp. 990–991.)

                                     17
       The difference between Ramirez and the appeal before us is
patent. Appellant supplied Johnson with a loaded firearm. In
contrast to Ramirez, who did not want involvement of a gun,
appellant wanted Johnson to use a gun to scare Ruh. Whereas
Ramirez was on the other side of a vehicle, making it impossible
for him to intervene during the shooting, appellant was near
Johnson and Ruh, and did nothing to intervene. Instead, he
smiled as Johnson killed Ruh. Appellant presented no evidence
that he did not want to shoot anyone or that he was influenced to
participate in the robbery by peer pressure.
       In his reply brief, appellant relies heavily on People v. Keel
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546 (Keel), which is also distinguishable.
In Keel, 15-year-old Keel and an 18-year-old confederate robbed a
victim and one of them shot and killed the victim when the victim
resisted the robbery and tried to flee. (Id. at p. 550.) Both Keel
and his confederate were armed. (Id. at p. 552.) Both were
identified as the shooter by eyewitnesses, but the casings
recovered at the scene matched Keel’s confederate’s gun. (Id. at
p. 553.) Keel testified that he was “ ‘shocked and ‘surprised’ ”
when his confederate pulled out a gun. (Id. at p. 554.) Keel
further testified that he was “ ‘shocked,’ ” “ ‘scared,’ ” and
“ ‘surprised’ ” when his confederate fired the gun. (Ibid.) Keel
testified that his gun was not loaded and that he did not know his
confederate’s gun was loaded. (Id. at pp. 553–554.)
       The appellate court concluded that Keel did not act with
reckless indifference to human life because Keel did not provide
his confederate with the firearm or instruct the confederate to
use the firearm. (Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 559.) No
evidence contradicted Keel’s testimony that Keel did not know his
confederate’s gun was loaded. (Ibid.) Additionally, there was no

                                    18
evidence that Keel’s gun was loaded. (Ibid.) The appellate court
indicated that the decision to rob “ ‘was made quickly’ ” and the
“decision to shoot was apparently made even more quickly in
response to [the victim’s] unexpected resistance and efforts to
flee.” (Id. at p. 560.) Keel therefore had no “meaningful
opportunity to restrain [his confederate]” or intervene to stop
him. (Ibid.) Instead, the shooting was an “ ‘impulsive’ response
to the victim’s unexpected resistance, as opposed to the
culmination of a prolonged interaction that increased the
opportunity for violence.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 561.) Keel
offered testimony that his confederate did not have a “reputation
as a menace or a killer.” (Ibid.)
        The court also relied on Keel’s “ ‘youth at the time’ ” finding
it “ ‘greatly diminishes any inference he acted with reckless
disregard for human life’ during the armed robbery.” (Keel,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 562.) To that point, the court
explained: “[T]here was evidence suggesting Keel’s youth may
have rendered him especially vulnerable to outside pressures.
Keel associated with the East Side Crips street gang when he
was just six or seven years old. He received a moniker . . . at the
tender age of six from a gang member that, in Keel’s words, he
considered to be a ‘father figure.’ According to Keel, there was an
expectation among gang members that younger gang associates
would ‘instantly go do’ their bidding. Given this expectation, it is
reasonable to infer Keel would have felt pressure to ‘hit the block’
and go along with the robbery instigated by . . . a fellow gang
associate who was three years Keel’s senior.” (Ibid.)
        In contrast to Keel, the crime here was not “unplanned.”
Appellant and Johnson planned the robbery and selected the
Dairy because Ruh worked alone. In contrast to Keel, there was

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no evidence appellant knew the gun was unloaded. To the
contrary, he supplied the loaded weapon to his confederate.
There was no evidence that appellant felt peer pressure to
participate in the robbery or that appellant was especially
vulnerable to peer pressure. No evidence in this case requires
the conclusion that the shooting was an “impulsive response” in
contrast to Keel.
       Finally, both Ramirez and Keel considered the age of the
defendant when evaluating whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. In contrast to this case, in both
Ramirez and Keel the defendants presented evidence showing the
relevance of their youth to assessing their mental state. Here, no
witness presented evidence that appellant’s age (16) prevented
him from harboring reckless indifference to human life. In his
reply brief, appellant cites general principles indicating that
juveniles are less mature than adults. The only support for
applying this proposition to appellant is the unvarnished
statement that “[t]here can be no reasonable doubt that at age 16
[appellant] was neurologically immature and because of that
immaturity, like other adolescents of his age, he was prone to
take more risks and make poorer choices than an adult with a
f[u]lly developed prefrontal cortex.”
       Appellant’s argument that he was “neurologically
immature” has no evidentiary support in the record other than
appellate counsel’s mere argument. Although appellant’s age is a
“relevant factor” (In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454), it
is not dispositive (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470).
Appellant cites no case supporting the proposition that a 16-year-
old never can harbor reckless indifference to human life. The
totality of circumstances supports the court’s finding that

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appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life when he
planned a robbery, supplied the loaded firearm used in the
robbery, smiled rather than intervened when his confederate shot
the victim three times, and left the scene without any effort to
assist the victim.

                         DISPOSITION
      The court’s order sustaining the petition and the court’s
disposition order are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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