Court Opinion

ID: 9619605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:30:11.218628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:42.752779
License: Public Domain

Undercofler, Presiding Justice,
dissenting as to Division 3.
In Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 61 (230 SE2d 869) (1976), it was stated, "A review of past decisions demonstrates a lack of explicit standards for weighing nonconstitutional errors in criminal cases. If the error is relevant to the issues in dispute, not cumulative of other evidence, not beneficial to the defendant and uncorrected by the trial court, then there is perhaps no reason for saying it is harmless, but it may nevertheless be harmless in the context of the entire case. This is the point where a standard for weighing the error is important.
"The standard we adopt is what is known as the 'highly probable test,’ i.e., that it is 'highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment.’ Traynor, What Makes Error Harmless, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970). 'The highly probable test avoids the evils of inadequate or excessive stringency by making affirmance conditional on high probability that error did not affect the judgment. The test compels a judge to go beyond a first glance for affirmance or a fleeting glimpse for reversal. It compels him to exercise his mind in the exercise of his discretion, to go beyond the appearances of the result to an examination of what causal links there may be between error and the judgment. It keeps judicial discretion within the ample bounds of reason. It can greatly improve the net *641worth of the judicial process as it thus holds down excesses either of affirmance that recklessly dampens assurance of a fair day in court or of reversal that needlessly calls for still another fair day at the expense of litigants who are still awaiting their first day in court.’ Id. at pp. 50-51.”
In my opinion that rule should apply here. At the time appellant complains of having to strike peremptorily a juror who should have been excused for cause, ten jurors had been accepted. The state had exhausted its peremptory strikes. Appellant had two peremptory strikes left. Appellant used his last two strikes to excuse the next two jurors. The next two jurors then completed the jury of twelve which tried the appellant. Appellant does not contend these last two jurors were disqualified for any reason. Indeed the voir dire shows they were fully qualified.
Appellant had been indicted for the malice murder of her ex-husband. The killing arose out of an argument which ensued when the ex-husband arrived at appellant’s residence to pick up the parties’ two minor children for a visit. Appellant admits she shot her ex-husband three times with a pistol to scare him because he said he was going to kill her and the children. She testified he grabbed at her face. The ex-husband was found lying on the walkway adjacent to the steps leading to the doorway of the kitchen. Appellant stated her ex-husband appeared to be in a rage when he arrived to pick up the children. She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to twelve years, with eight years to be served on probation.
Appellant was represented by an experienced attorney who defended the case in an extremely competent manner. The case was tried fairly.
In my opinion the homicide is a classic case of voluntary manslaughter. An impartial jury so decided. I am compelled to conclude that it is highly probable that the failure to excuse one juror for cause did not contribute to the verdict. I would apply the harmless error rule and affirm the judgment.
The majority has applied a per se rule of harmful error if a juror is not properly excused for cause where the defendant has excused that juror peremptorily and has *642exhausted his peremptory strikes. In my opinion that is contrary to established precedent. As was stated in Kemp v. State, 226 Ga. 506, 507 (2) (175 SE2d 869) (1970), "Even if the court erred in disallowing defendant’s challenge for cause of two traverse jury veniremen, such error would not be reversible, since the record shows that these two were stricken by defendant’s peremptory challenges and that the only two jurors impaneled after defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges were the twelfth juror and an alternate juror, about the inclusion of which there is no complaint. Cf. Bland v. State, 210 Ga. 100, 101 (78 SE2d 51) [1953] and cit. 'The burden is on him who asserts error to show it affirmatively by the record.’ Roach v. State, 221 Ga. 783 (4) (147 SE2d 299) [1966].” Similarly it was stated in Patterson v. State, 239 Ga. 409, 411 (1) (238 SE2d 2) (1977). "These two allegedly biased jurors did not sit on the jury which convicted appellant, nor has he shown that he was prejudiced or harmed because he used peremptory strikes to eliminate the two challenged jurors.”1 I respectfully dissent.

The original record shows appellant exhausted all of his peremptory strikes.