Court Opinion

ID: 9730785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:23:55.553601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.267112
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
concurring. I concur in Parts II and III of the Court’s opinion and the result which it has reached. There were no circumstances here present which justified the impoundment of defendant’s motor vehicle. The inventory conducted subsequent to this seizure therefore constituted an unlawful search. Hence, the fruits of that search must be suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961).
*50I am also in general agreement with much of the Court’s reasoning in Part I of its opinion. However, for reasons to be discussed below, I believe that the manner in which the Court has phrased its "test” of the legality of vehicular impoundments may be misleading to law enforcement officials. I therefore write separately to make clear my position on that subject. Finally, I wish to comment upon a matter explicitly left unresolved by the Court — the validity of a routine police inventory subsequent to a legal impoundment. My views are based upon an interpretation of Art. I, par. 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.
I
As my Brother Conford forcefully notes, motor vehicles "constitute areas of privacy of persons and effects within the general protection of the Fourth Amendment and our own Constitution.” See State v. Slockbower, 79 N. J. 1, 7 (1979). Absent the driver’s consent or the presence of a search warrant, a "substantial police need” must therefore exist before a vehicle can he seized (impounded) by law enforcement officials. See ante at 33; State v. Slockbower, supra, 79 N. J. at 8.
The Ercolano vehicle was lawfully parked at the time' of its seizure. The police have not maintained that they had probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of or constituted an instrumentality or fruit of a crime. Being legally parked, it did not constitute a public nuisance. Nevertheless, over the objection of defendant, who was operating the vehicle with the permission of its owner, the police subjected the vehicle to impoundment and thereby impermissibly invaded defendant’s justifiable expectations of privacy.
This seizure was unnecessary to the attainment of any lawful police objective and hence was illegal. Since the evidence here at issue was uncovered through a search of the vehicle subsequent to this illegal seizure, that evidence must he sup*51pressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 485-486, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).1
My only reservation with respect to the Court’s opinion in this regard is the manner in which it has phrased its “impoundment test.” According to the Court, “[impoundment is impermissible] unless the driver either consents or is given a reasonable opportunity to make other arrangements for the custody of the vehicle.” See ante at 29; State v. Slockbower, supra, 79 N. J. at 4 (emphasis supplied). This phraseology, when considered in conjunction with the Court’s mention of the residential and well-trafficked character of the area in which defendant’s vehicle was seized, see ante at 31-32, 34 may give the impression that a lawfully parked vehicle can be impounded if police reasonably believe that the vehicle will be vandalized if not removed and the driver cannot arrange for a third party to pick up the vehicle. Although I do not believe that the Court subscribes to such a result, I write separately lest there exist any ambiguity as to my position.
So long as the only potential danger that might ensue from non-impoundment is danger to the safety of the vehicle and its contents, no “substantial police need” exists justifying seizure of the vehicle over the objection of its owner (or one operating the vehicle with the owner’s permission). Since the vehicle is legally in his custody, the driver — even though arrested — is competent to decide whether to park the vehicle in a “bad” neighborhood and risk damage through vandalism or allow the police to take custody. Only when the vehicle, if not removed, poses a danger to other persons, property or the public safety does there exist a “substantial police need” justifying impoundment if the driver is unable to arrange for a third party to provide for the vehicle’s removal.
*52Thus, absent a warrant, impoundment of a vehicle subsequent to its driver’s arrest is permissible in only four types of situations: (1) the driver consents to the impoundment; (2) the vehicle, if not removed, constitutes a danger to other persons or property or the public safetj', and, the driver cannot arrange for alternate means of removal; (3) the police have probable cause to believe both that the vehicle constitutes an instrumentality or fruit of a crime and that absent immediate impoundment, the vehicle will be removed by a third party; or (4) the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and that absent immediate impoundment, the evidence will be lost or destroyed. See, e. g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51-52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970).
II
A more difficult question — one explicitly left unresolved by the Court, see State v. Slockbower, supra, 79 N. J. at 15-16 — is the legality of a routine police inventory of a vehicle subsequent to a lawful impoundment. Although not necessary to the disposition of this case, the state of the law on this question is sufficiently confused as to compel me to address the issue.
Mere legal custody of an automobile by law enforcement officials does not automatically create a right to search its interior. See, e. g., Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 484 P. 2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1971); State v. Bradshaw, 41 Ohio App. 2d 48, 322 N. E. 2d 311 (Ct. App. 1974). A routine police inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle constitutes a substantial invasion into the owner’s zone of privacy — an invasion additional to the intrusion upon his privacy interests occasioned by the impoundment itself. Consequently, such an inventory is impermissible unless the driver consents or a "substantial police need” justifies the search.
*53If a vehicle is legally impounded and its owner (or one who is operating the vehicle with the owner’s permission) is present or otherwise known at the time the vehicle is seized, no such need is manifest. If the driver does not consent to a routine inventory, he will assume the risk that items contained in the vehicle will be lost or stolen. The police in such 'a case should merely lock up the vehicle and leave it in place until the owner makes suitable arrangements for its removal. Concomitant with this right to prevent a routine inventory is the driver’s right to have a representative present during any inventory that is authorized and his right to limit the inventory to only specified portions of the vehicle (e. g., the trunk).
If the police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence or constitutes a fruit or instrumentality of a crime, they must procure a warrant in order to conduct a search over the driver’s objection. In such a case, the police can prevent the driver from arranging for the removal of the vehicle until a reasonable time has elapsed in which a warrant can be secured. Since the vehicle is under police custody, there is no danger that any evidence it contains will be lost or stolen, and hence no necessity to depart from the warrant requirement. If a warrant cannot be obtained, no inventory can be undertaken unless the driver consents.
In the present case the driver of the seized vehicle was present at the time of the impoundment. Since neither a search warrant nor his consent was obtained prior to the routine inventory, the inventory would have constituted an illegal search even had the car been lawfully impounded. Hence, an additional reason exists for suppressing the evidence thereby uncovered.
A determination of the circumstances under which there would exist the “substantial police need” to justify an inventory of a lawfully impounded vehicle whose driver is not present or known at the time of impoundment is a matter which should await a future case.
*54Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the Court.

 I concur in the Court’s decision that the evidence uncovered during the search cannot be upheld under the plain view doctrine for substantially the reasons given by Judge Conford. See ante at 34-35.