Court Opinion

ID: 9532742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:27.399108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:49.973204
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I cannot understand the majority’s contention that the trial court did not, in fact, make a finding of not guilty on the armed robbery charge. The trial judge clearly stated on the record that she was granting defendant’s motion for a finding of not guilty as to the armed robbery charge as well as to the charge of murder. Her remarks could not have been more straightforward. She specifically said: “I simply cannot find based on the evidence that’s presented to me that the State even in the light most favorable to the State has met a prima facie case at this juncture so I’m going to grant the motion for a directed finding and finding of not guilty as to the armed robbery charge as well That this ruling constituted a finding of not guilty was certainly clear to the parties at the time of trial. Indeed, its effect as a finding of not guilty is precisely why the State moved to have it stayed pending further hearing. If the ruling did not constitute a finding of not guilty and was not intended to constitute such a finding, there would have been no need for the ensuing discussion between the State and the trial court as to whether the ruling should be held “in abeyance.” Accordingly, the real issue in this case is not whether there was a finding of not guilty. The real issue is whether double jeopardy considerations should have barred the trial court from subsequently reversing its position and finding defendant guilty. As the majority correctly notes, the prohibitions against double jeopardy mean, inter alla, that a defendant may not be prosecuted for an offense if he has already been acquitted for the same offense. People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 231 (1990). The statutory form of this rule is set out in section 3 — 4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961, which provides that “(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution: (1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction.” 720 ILCS 5/3 — 4(a)(1) (West 1992). What constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy-purposes is not necessarily controlled by the form of the judge’s action or what the judge calls it. People v. Rudi, 103 Ill. 2d 216, 224 (1984). A finding of not guilty will qualify as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes when there was insufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law some or all of the essential elements of the crime. People ex rel. Daley v. Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d 301, 311-12 (1985). If the defendant moves for a directed verdict or finding of not guilty at the close of the State’s evidence, as the defendant here did, and the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilty, as the trial court here determined it was, the law expressly mandates that the court “shall make a finding or direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.” 725 ILCS 5/115 — 4(k) (West 1992). The trial court has no authority to grant the defendant’s motion, find him not guilty, then change its mind. Allowing reconsideration of a finding of not guilty based on insufficiency of the evidence is analogous to permitting the State to reopen its case following an acquittal by the jury or to appeal from a judgment of acquittal following a trial on the merits. Both are clearly improper. Accordingly, once a trial judge makes a finding of not guilty based on the insufficiency of the evidence, double jeopardy prohibits him from rescinding the ruling and reinstating the charge. See People v. Brown, 227 Ill. App. 3d 795, 796-99 (1992). That is so even if the judge’s decision was based on a factual error or a mistake regarding the law. See People v. Poe, 121 Ill. App. 3d 457, 462 (1984). Where the court makes a directed finding of not guilty, but later attempts to vacate that finding and reinstate the charges, any conviction that results is constitutionally infirm and must be reversed. See Brown, 227 Ill. App. 3d 795; People v. Strong, 129 Ill. App. 3d 427 (1984); People v. Stout, 108 Ill. App. 3d 96 (1982); People v. Hutchinson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 368 (1975). There is no question that the trial court’s finding of not guilty in this case was based on the insufficiency of the evidence. As a matter of law, the judge’s decision therefore constituted an acquittal. Although the judge did not reduce her decision to writing, that was not necessary in order to trigger double jeopardy protections. An acquittal based on a finding of not guilty becomes effective when announced by the trial judge. Its validity does not depend upon whether a formal written judgment of acquittal is entered later. Stout, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 99-100. Contrary to the majority, I do not believe that the actions taken by the trial judge after making her finding of not guilty should be allowed to alter the legal effect of the court’s pronouncement. The situation here is directly analogous to People v. Stout, which our court has previously cited with approval (see People a. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 179 (1990)). In Stout, the trial judge entered a directed verdict of not guilty, but then advised the State: “If you wish to submit something, fine. That’s up to you.” The prosecutor then asked if he could submit a motion, and the court consented. Later in the day, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. That motion was allowed, and the directed verdict was withdrawn. On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed. It held that the trial court’s oral pronouncement directing a verdict for defendant barred further prosecution and that the trial court was prohibited from withdrawing its order directing a verdict. Stout, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 99. The same conclusion was reached in People v. Brown, 227 Ill. App. 3d 795 (1992), and People v. Hutchinson, 26 Ill. App. 3d 368 (1975), on similar facts. In Brown the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a finding of not guilty. Once the court announced that defendant was not guilty, however, the State contended that the judge had made a mistake. The court promptly rescinded its order, changed its position, and denied the motion for a finding of not guilty. Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. It held that the trial judge’s statement that defendant was not guilty was not equivocal, and because it was based on the insufficiency of the evidence, it could not be undone by the State’s subsequent claim of mistake. Brown, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 799. In Hutchinson, the circuit court granted the defendant’s motion for. a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State’s case, holding that an essential element of the case had not been established. The State asked for leave to reopen its proofs and sought a continuance. The court agreed to the continuance, delayed discharging the jury, and scheduled a hearing for the following day. At that hearing, the court announced that it had made a mistake. It therefore vacated its prior order and ruled that it would not grant a directed verdict. As in Stout and Brown, the appellate court reversed. It ruled that once the trial court dismissed the charges, double jeopardy precluded it from reinstating those charges. That was so even though the jury had not yet been discharged. In addition, the court rejected the State’s claim that the original order directing the verdict had, in effect, been suspended pending the hearing the following day. The appellate court ruled that the original order was decisive and that the circuit court’s attempted rescisión was a nullity. Hutchinson, 26 Ill. App. 3d at 370. In urging a different result here, the State relies on People v. Vilt, 119 Ill. App. 3d 832 (1983). In Vilt, the trial judge indicated he would allow a motion for a directed verdict, but immediately reversed his position and denied the motion when he realized that he had gotten the facts of the case confused. The defendant was subsequently convicted. He then filed a post-trial motion arguing, inter alla, that the conviction should be vacated on double jeopardy grounds. The circuit court agreed and vacated the conviction. The State appealed. The appellate court reversed. It held that because the trial court allowed then denied the motion for a directed verdict “virtually with the same breath,” the defendant was never really acquitted of the offense. Because there was no acquittal, the court reasoned, defendant’s subsequent conviction “did not have the effect of placing the defendant in jeopardy a second time.” Vilt, 119 Ill. App. 3d at 835. Although the appellate court in the present case was persuaded by the Vilt decision, it is inapposite. Unlike Vilt, the case before us does not involve a situation where the trial court corrected itself immediately and “virtually with the same breath.” Here, as in Stout, Brown and Hutchinson, the court clearly and specifically made a finding of not guilty based on the insufficiency of the evidence. Only after making that unequivocal finding and discussing the facts in greater detail did the court suggest that it might be willing to reconsider its position. Even then, the court did not attempt to qualify or condition its decision. It merely stated that it would be willing to consider additional authority. In contrast to Vilt, the court did not actually rescind its finding of not guilty until another hearing was held the following day. In assessing the effect of the trial court’s ruling here, the appellate court also took into account that defense counsel did not object to the trial court’s offer to entertain additional' authority at a subsequent hearing. Although the appellate court was correct that no objection was made, the absence of an objection is not relevant to the double jeopardy analysis. It was the trial court’s initial ruling, not counsel’s reaction to what followed, that triggered defendant’s double jeopardy rights. Defendant was acquitted, as a matter of law, as soon as the trial judge announced her directed finding of not guilty based on the insufficiency of the evidence. That being so, no additional action by counsel was necessary to give the finding of not guilty effect for double jeopardy purposes. Finally, the State urges us to uphold the circuit court’s actions on public policy grounds. The State contends that we should encourage judges to “make the absolutely correct decision” and that we should not “chill the efforts of conscientious judges who are unsure about the law or the facts and who wish to be certain before making a final decision.” The sentiments expressed by the State are sound. “The citizens of the State of Illinois deserve accurate legal determinations by the judiciary,” as the State asserts, and our court has previously acknowledged the public’s strong interest in the accuracy of the results of criminal prosecutions (People v. Franklin, 167 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1995)). The State must remember, however, that our criminal justice system and constitution protect other values in addition to the reliability of the guilt or innocence determination. Our system is accusatorial, rather than inquisitorial, and it affords defendants broad protections that do not have accuracy of truth-finding as their primary goal. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 356, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269, 291, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2528 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). These protections must be heeded even if it means that the accuracy of adjudication might sometimes be diminished. I note, moreover, that the State’s concern that a ruling against it here will “foster hasty, incorrect and unjust decisions” is unfounded. Upholding the principle that judges may not rescind a finding of not guilty based on insufficiency of the evidence should improve the quality of justice rather than diminish it. If judges are held to the consequences of their pronouncements regarding guilt or innocence, as our appellate court has long recognized they should be, they are apt to be more thorough and deliberate in issuing their rulings, not less. For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial judge’s finding of not guilty at the close of the State’s case was sufficient to bar the continued prosecution of defendant for armed robbery. I would further hold that the trial court’s attempt to rescind that finding was a nullity. The judgment of the appellate court affirming defendant’s armed robbery conviction should therefore be reversed. JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.