Court Opinion

ID: 9810477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:51:09.247934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:57.522968
License: Public Domain

MerkiMON, J.
(concurring). It seems to be suggested, by implication, in the opinion of the Court in this case, that something, not specified, was decided in Brewer v. Chappell, 101 N. C., 251, and Coor v. Smith, Id. 261, inconsistent with what is decided in this case, and to that extent they are overruled. In my judgment, such suggestion is unfounded. Those cases were well considered by the Court, and, I think, *195correctly decided. The application of the law in them is sustained by reason and the authorities cited, and many others that might have been cited; and they are not inconsistent with, certainly, the substance of what is decided in this case.
In Bi-ewer v. Chappell, supra, it is held that a mortgagor, in possession of the land, after the condition of the mortgage is broken, had no right to give an “'agricultural lien” upon a prospective crop to be made on the land, as against the mortgagee, in the absence of a contract allowing, him to do so, upon the ground that, at law, the mortgagee is the owner of the land, and the mortgagor remaining in possession after condition broken, in. the absence of agreement to the contrary, is not in possession, as of right, but by permission of the mortgagee; his possession is that of the mortgagee, and the latter might turn him out of possession at his will and pleasure, without notice. Coor v. Smith, supra, rests upon the same principle. The equitable rights of the mortgagor were not adverted to in these cases, because it was not necessary to do so, and because such rights of the mortgagor are subject to the rights of the mortgagee, until the mortgage debt shall be discharged. Such is certainly the settled law of this State.
In Williams v. Bennett, 4 Ired., 122, Chief Justice Ruffin said, that “the mortgagor was concluded by his deed; and after its execution his possession is by consent of the mortgagee, and is, in law, his possession.” In Jones v. Hill, 64 N. C., 198, Justice Rodman said: “If a mortgagor remains in possession after the forfeiture of the property, he remains only by permission of the mortgagee. In such case, the mortgagor has been sometimes called a tenant at will or sufferance, and sometimes a trespasser, but he is properly neither; his position cannot be more correctly defined than by calling him a mortgagor in possession, but he may be ejected at any time by the mortgagee, without notice. The *196mortgagee is entitled to the estate with all the crops growing on it. There is no injustice in this, because the land, including all the products, is a security for the mortgage debt, and, to that extent, the property of the mortgagee. The mortgagor has no right to make a lease to the'prejudice of the mortgagee; the lease is void if the mortgagee elects to hold it so. If the mortgagor could lease, he might altogether defeat the claim of the mortgagee.” He cites many authorities in support of what he thus said. Fuller v. Wadsworth, 2 Ired., 263; Whitehurst v. Gaskill, 69 N. C., 449; Hill v. Nicholson, 92 N. C., 24; Johnson v. Prairie, 94 N. C., 773; Dail v. Freeman, 92 N. C., 351, recognize the same principle.
The same principle applies in the case of vendor and vendee — the latter in possession, being, in most important respects, on the same footing as the mortgagor in possession. Allen v. Taylor, 96 N. C., 37, and the cases there cited.
The decision in this case, as I understand it, does not contravene the rule of law as thus settled in this State. It plainly recognizes the right of the vendor, in the absence of any contract, express or implied, to the contrary, to take possession of the growing — the unsevered — crop made by the vendee, and the equitable right of the latter to have the same devoted to the payment of the debt of the former, so far as it may be adequate. It further decides that, when the vendor allows the vendee to remain in. possession of the land, and make a crop and sever the same, the former cannot recover the severed crop from the latter or third persons, and this rests upon the ground of the presumed assent of the vendor to allow the vendee to make and take the crop. The like rule applies to mortgagee and mortgagor. To allow the vendee or the mortgagor to encumber the crops at their will and pleasure, to the prejudice of the vendor or mortgagee, they might, as was said in Jones v. Hill, supra, “altogether defeat the claim of the mortgagee.”
*197The statute (Acts 1889, ch. 476) changes the law so as to allow vendees and mortgagors in possession of the land to give “agricultural liens” as against vendors and mortgagees. It does not give them the right to so mortgage their crops for other purposes.
Error.