Court Opinion

ID: 9584474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:40.310551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:56.488551
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the grant of certiorari in this case as well as the judgment of reversal.
1. After his conviction, appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In his third enumeration, he asserted that the trial court erred in not permitting him to exhibit scars received in a prior incident. The Court of Appeals ruled adversely to appellant’s contentions, and he filed a motion for rehearing. Appellant’s motion for rehearing did not mention his third enumeration of error.
Appellant then filed an application for certiorari. Nowhere in his application did he mention his third enumeration of error. Appellant’s application for certiorari was denied, and he filed a motion for reconsideration. Only in his motion for reconsideration was the issue raised in appellant’s third enumeration of error presented to this court.
Supreme Court Rule 28 (Code Ann. § 24-4528) provides: “A review on certiorari is not a right. An application for the writ will be granted only in cases of great concern, gravity and importance to the *595public.” Rule 31 (Code Ann. § 24-4531) places a specific time limitation on the filing of an application for certiorari, and Rule 33 (Code Ann. § 24-4533) mandates that “[mjotions for reconsideration shall be filed within 10 days from the date of denial of the certiorari.” (Emphasis supplied.) I believe that the function of an “application” for certiorari is to provide a means by which a complaining party may set forth the rulings complained of, and that the function of a motion for reconsideration is to provide this court with an opportunity to review matters raised in the application for certiorari and previously ruled upon by this court. Appellant’s so-called “motion for reconsideration” is nothing more than a thinly disguised second certiorari application. (The time for filing applications for certiorari had long since expired.) The majority’s inexplicable acquiescence in appellant’s effort at circumventing our rules is disquieting. Not only is the majority’s action contrary to the tradition of this court (see, e. g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tomlin, 161 Ga. 749, 761 (132 SE 90) (1926)), it is also ill-conceived from a policy standpoint.
To permit a party to raise an alleged error , for the first time on motion for reconsideration of a previously denied certiorari application is to encourage laxity on the part of counsel and promote unnecessary delay in the resolution of legal disputes. Certainly the appellant did not consider the issue raised in Division 3 of the Court of Appeals opinion to be one of “public gravity” when he filed his motion for rehearing in the Court of Appeals or his application for certiorari in this court.
Absent compelling circumstances, I would require that the grounds upon which the grant of certiorari is based be presented in the application for certiorari.
2. The majority recognizes that Code Ann. § 26-902(a) “is a recodification of the reasonable belief test which is stated by former Code Ann. § 26-1012.” I fail to see how the exclusion of appellant’s scar evidence is reversible error under existing Georgia law.
“To justify a homicide, the fears of the slayer must be those of a reasonable man, one reasonably courageous, reasonably self-possessed, and not those of a coward. Teal v. State, 22 Ga. 76 (68 Am D. 482); Gallery v. State, 92 Ga. 464 (3) (17 SE 863); Dover v. State, 109 Ga. 485 (34 SE 1030); Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. 731 (5), 736 (82 SE 228); Williams v. State, 145 Ga. 177 (88 SE 958); Smoot v. State, 148 Ga. 306 (96 SE 561). Under these decisions the killing must be viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably courageous man. If the defendant happens to be a man not reasonably courageous, then the killing can not be viewed from his standpoint... A defendant may kill another honestly believing that it is necessary to kill to save his own life or to prevent the commission of a felony upon his person; *596and yet he would not be justified, if the circumstances surrounding him at the time were not sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man. A timid man may kill, honestly believing that his life is in danger or that a felony is about to be committed upon his person. Still he will not be justified unless his fears come up to the standard fixed by this section of the Penal Code.” (Emphasis supplied.) Vincent v. State, 153 Ga. 278, 299-300 (112 SE 120) (1922). “The standard of a reasonable man, by which the conduct of a particular person under given circumstances is to be judged, is one which the jury must determine from their own observation and their common knowledge and experience.” (Emphasis supplied.) Fudge v. State, 190 Ga. 340, 343 (9 SE2d 259) (1940).
Appellant’s scar evidence was offered to establish the “reasonableness” of his actions. I believe the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly determined that, given an objective standard of “reasonableness,” the evidence was not relevant for this purpose. While scars resulting from any prior incident may explain appellant’s timidity, appellant’s timidity is not in issue under Code Ann. § 26-902 (a).
However, even assuming appellant’s scar evidence was logically relevant to the issue of “reasonable belief,” I do not believe reversible error has been established. “If the defendant desired to complain of the [trial court’s refusal to allow an exhibition of his scars], he should have made [a proper offer of proof], in the absence of which this court cannot determine whether . . . rejection [of the evidence] was sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to warrant a reversal of the conviction. [Cit.]” Yeomans v. State, 116 Ga. App. 199, 200 (156 SE2d 658) (1967); Miller v. State, 158 Ga. 697, 699 (124 SE 195) (1924). From all that appears in the record, appellant could have been attempting to show that he received a minor scar as a child in an “attack” by a younger brother or sister. The only way the majority could have any idea that appellant received “numerous scars” is by viewing a photograph submitted in an appellate brief. Until today’s decision, I would have thought such a showing to be legally insufficient. In my view, the offer of proof at trial was plainly inadequate. Compare Milton v. State, 245 Ga. 20 (262 SE2d 789) (1980). Thus, “the exclusion ... was not erroneous.” Curtis v. State, 141 Ga. App. 36, 38 (232 SE2d 382) (1977).
I am authorized to state that Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.