Court Opinion

ID: 9398537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:11:05.411271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.326024
License: Public Domain

J-S16019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TYREEK DENMARK                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 917 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 3, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0006336-2013

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED MAY 31, 2023

        Tyreek Denmark (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act.1 We affirm.

        This Court recounted the underlying facts:

               On March 29, 2013, at approximately 11:00 a.m.,
        Philadelphia Police Officer Andrew Monroe and his partner
        responded to a call of domestic violence on the 5400 block of
        Regent Street in Philadelphia. The officers met with Erica Hood
        [(Hood)], the alleged victim of domestic violence.           While
        conducting a walk-through of Hood’s property to secure the
        premises, Officer Monroe discovered [Appellant] hiding in the
        basement. As Hood was uncooperative with police officers at that
        time, no further action was taken by police. Officer Monroe
        observed Thyeem Snipe [(Snipe)] … standing across the street as
        the officer participated in the investigation.         One week
        prior, Snipe and Hood had been in a physical altercation with each
        other[,] which was broken up by police.

____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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            After police left the scene, [Appellant], Jonathan Shaw
     [(Shaw)], co-defendant Paul Tucker Bennett, and Tyleal Denmark
     [(Tyleal)] ([Appellant’s] cousin), were hanging out on Regent
     Street outside of Bennett’s home. [Appellant] and Bennett were
     standing on the porch to Bennett’s home while Tyleal and Shaw
     were located on the sidewalk. Snipe was getting on the porch wall
     outside of 5519 Regent Street, which was located next door to
     Bennett’s home.       Bennett appeared to hand an object to
     [Appellant].       [Appellant], with a gun in his hand,
     approached Snipe and shot him multiple times. [Appellant] then
     left the scene in his car, parking it a short distance away.

          Snipe suffered a total of five gunshot wounds. … Each of
     these gunshot wounds was fatal on its own. As a result of a
     gunshot wound to the neck, Snipe’s cerebral spinal cord was
     severed, resulting in near instantaneous death.

           Police Officer Monroe, who had responded to the earlier
     domestic violence call, heard the shots fired by [Appellant] and
     responded to 5519 Regent Street at 12:09 p.m. Officer Monroe
     observed [Appellant] walking northbound on 55th Street towards
     Chester Avenue. Officer Monroe further observed Snipe lying on
     the porch of 5519 Regent Street.

           Eyewitness Jameel Starnes [(Starnes)] told police at the
     scene that [Appellant] was the shooter, and [Appellant] was taken
     into custody. Police never recovered the murder weapon.

Commonwealth v. Denmark, 144 A.3d 184 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished

memorandum at 2-3).

     The PCRA court summarized the procedural history that followed:

           On October 10, 2014, following a jury trial before this
     [c]ourt, [Appellant] was convicted of one count each of first-
     degree murder (18 Pa.C.S. [§] 2502) and possessing an
     instrument of crime (18 Pa.C.S. [§] 907) (“PIC”). The [c]ourt
     immediately imposed the mandatory sentence of life in prison for
     the murder charge (18 Pa.C.S. [§] 1102(a)(1)) and imposed no
     further penalty on the PIC charge. [Appellant] was tried with his
     co-defendant, … Bennett, who was acquitted of all charges….

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          … On March 1, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed
     [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence and on August 22, 2016, the
     Supreme      Court   of     Pennsylvania   denied    allocatur.
     [Commonwealth v. Denmark, 144 A.3d 184 (Pa. Super. 2016),
     appeal denied 156 EAL 2016 (Pa. filed August 22, 2016.)] ….

           On August 21, 2017, [Appellant] filed a pro se petition
     pursuant to the [PCRA].        David Rudenstein, Esquire, was
     appointed to represent [Appellant] on October 27, 2017. On June
     15, 2018, Mr. Rudenstein filed an amended petition (“First
     Amended Petition”) alleging that Commonwealth witness []
     Starnes was paid to testify falsely at [Appellant’s] trial. The
     Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the petition on December
     6, 2018. Shawn Page, Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf
     of [Appellant] on May 1, 2019. Mr. Page filed an amended petition
     (“Second Amended Petition”) on November 4, 2020, in which he
     adopted, by reference, the First Amended Petition and averred
     that [Appellant] intended to present testimony from Starnes’s
     mother to support the claim that Starnes’s trial testimony was
     false. The Commonwealth filed a second motion to dismiss on
     February 17, 2021.        [Appellant] filed a response to the
     Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss on April 12, 2021 (“Response
     to Motion to Dismiss”)[,] to which he appended a signed
     statement from Starnes’s mother, Darlene Oliver [(Oliver)],
     claiming that Starnes could not have witnessed the murder[;
     Appellant also appended] a photo of a signed and notarized
     affidavit from Starnes recanting his trial testimony ….

            On March 3, 2022, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on
     the issues related to the recantation of Starnes and the testimony
     of Oliver. At the conclusion of the hearing, the [c]ourt dismissed
     [Appellant’s] petition. [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal on April
     1, 2022. The [c]ourt issued an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
     1925(b) directing [Appellant] to file a Concise Statement of Errors
     Complained of on Appeal by April 26, 2022.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/13/22, at 1-2. Appellant and the PCRA court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

     Appellant presents the following questions:

     [1.] Did the trial court err in denying the Appellant relief under the
     [PCRA]?

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      [2.] Did the trial court err [or] commit an abuse of discretion by
      overruling a request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing
      to allow then-counsel the opportunity to present the testimony of
      [] Starnes regarding his location on the night in question,
      payments made to him by law enforcement and what, if anything
      he observed on the night in question[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

      This Court’s standard of review “is limited to examining whether the

PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d

1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The

PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are

binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the

PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d

1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). Our scope of review is limited to

the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA

court’s hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 959 A.2d 312, 316 (Pa. 2008).

      Appellant argues the PCRA court improperly denied his request for a

continuance to obtain evidence of the Commonwealth’s payment to Starnes.

Appellant’s Brief at 13, 16.   Appellant claims: “The document request had

been outstanding for several YEARS. Counsel for the Commonwealth

recognized that prior counsel had mishandled the request. This was the first

request for a continuance by the defense.”    Id. at 15.   (citation omitted).

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Appellant points out that the murder weapon was not recovered, and no

witnesses had come forward prior to Starnes’s statement.              Id. at 16.

Appellant asserts that while “the [PCRA c]ourt was correct that [there] would

be a delay, that needs to be balanced against the constitutional demand for a

fair trial.” Id.

      Appellant directs our attention to the “clear and unequivocal” testimony

of Oliver, Starnes’s mother. Id. at 17. Appellant asserts “the likelihood of

whether Oliver’s testimony would compel a different verdict is quite high.” Id.

      Pertinently, the denial of a motion for a continuance

      is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
      only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. An abuse of
      discretion is not merely an error of judgment; rather[,] discretion
      is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the
      judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
      partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or
      the record[.] … We will not reverse a denial of a motion for
      continuance in the absence of prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745-46 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      The PCRA court explained the context and rationale for its decision:

      [T]he [PCRA c]ourt’s denial of [Appellant’s] request for a last-
      minute continuance was entirely reasonable and well within its
      discretion. At 10:25 a.m. on the day of the evidentiary hearing,
      which was scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m., [Appellant’s counsel]
      informed the [c]ourt that his witnesses were on the way to the
      courthouse and requested additional time to get them there. N.T.
      3/3/2022 at 21-23. The [PCRA c]ourt recessed to allow the
      witnesses to arrive. Id. at 27. Following the recess, the defense
      called Oliver to the stand. Id. After Oliver [testified], [Appellant’s
      counsel] stepped out of the courtroom to check for Starnes and,
      not finding him, the defense rested.            Id. at 65.        The

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     Commonwealth then presented the testimony of Officer Riddick.
     Id. at 73-84.     After the Commonwealth rested, [Appellant]
     requested another recess to attempt to get Starnes to appear. Id.
     at 87-91.     The [PCRA c]ourt agreed to hear argument on
     [Appellant’s] remaining claims and then take a lunch break to
     accommodate [Appellant’s] request. Id. at 91, 104. When
     Starnes had still failed to appear after the lunch recess,
     [Appellant] requested that the [c]ourt bifurcate the hearing. Id.
     at 104. The [c]ourt denied the request on the grounds that the
     PCRA petition had been pending for over four years, and
     [Appellant] had many months’ notice of the hearing in order to
     line up his witnesses. Id.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/22, at 8-9. The PCRA court added:

           [I]t was obvious that Starnes was intentionally hiding, and
     that a continuance would not likely result in him appearing and
     rendering testimony helpful to the defense. At 10:45 a.m., on the
     morning of the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel advised the
     [c]ourt that he had spoken to [Appellant’s] mother, and that she
     had confirmed that she was with Starnes and Oliver (Starnes’s
     mother), and that they were on their way to the courthouse. N.T.
     3/3/2022 at 22-23. Only Oliver showed up[] and claimed to have
     no knowledge of Starnes’s whereabouts. Id. at 33. Moreover,
     Starnes had been the subject of substantial attempts at witness
     intimidation as a result of his testimony identifying [Appellant] as
     the shooter in this case.3 Importantly, defense counsel never
     represented that Starnes had been subpoenaed to testify at the
     evidentiary hearing, and he never requested the [c]ourt to take
     action to require Starnes to appear.

     3 Starnes testified at trial that he failed to comply with subpoenas
     from the Indicting Grand Jury in this case on numerous occasions
     because he was afraid of retaliation, scared of “getting killed[,]”
     and did not appear until he was detained prior to testifying. N.T.
     10/8/2014 at 32-33, 83. He testified that the only reason he came
     to court during the trial was because he did not want to be
     detained again. Id. at 34. Following Starnes’s trial testimony,
     the [c]ourt was informed of inappropriate behavior by spectators
     both inside the courtroom and immediately outside of the
     courtroom. Id. at 85. The [c]ourt was made aware that
     spectators were “making inappropriate threatening comments
     [and] acting in an inappropriate way.” Id. The [c]ourt warned

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      the gallery that the behavior would not be tolerated and that
      [identification] would be required to enter the courtroom from that
      time on. Id. at 85-86.

            Additionally, the resolution of [Appellant’s] petition had
      been delayed prior to the evidentiary hearing by 17 continuances
      that had been requested by the defense. Since [Appellant]
      declined to appear for this hearing via video during the Covid-19
      epidemic, the hearing was further delayed for nearly a year.
      Accordingly, the [c]ourt did not abuse its discretion when it denied
      [Appellant’s] request for another continuance in order for Starnes
      to testify. No relief is due.

Id. at 9-10 (footnote in original, remaining footnotes omitted).

      With regard to Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth withheld

evidence of its payment to Starnes, the PCRA court cited applicable law in

explaining:

             Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), exculpatory
      evidence not disclosed to the defense will give rise to a due
      process violation and will require a new trial if the exculpatory
      evidence is “material” either to guilt or punishment. [Id. at] 87;
      see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(a) (specifying, as mandatory
      discovery, “[a]ny evidence favorable to the accused that is
      material either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the
      possession or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth”).
      Therefore, to establish a Brady violation, [Appellant] must
      demonstrate that: “(1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2)
      which was either exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence
      favorable to him; and (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment.”
      Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 264 (Pa. 2013). …
      [T]o establish prejudice, [Appellant] “must demonstrate a
      reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
      the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
      different. A reasonable probability for these purposes is one which
      undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id. (internal
      quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, “Brady evidence
      may not be cumulative of other evidence, cannot have been
      equally available to the defense, and cannot have been

                                     -7-
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     discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id.
     (internal citations omitted).

     ….

            [Appellant] failed to produce any evidence to show that
     Starnes was promised or received any form of payment pre-trial,
     let alone that the Commonwealth withheld information regarding
     these alleged payments.2 At the evidentiary hearing, [Appellant]
     failed to present Starnes as a witness, even after the [c]ourt
     granted multiple defense requests for additional time during the
     day to locate him. N.T. 3/3/2022 at 21-22, 26, 87-90, 104. Since
     [Appellant] failed to prove that the Commonwealth concealed
     anything regarding payments or promises to Starnes, the [c]ourt
     properly rejected [Appellant’s] Brady claim premised upon such
     concealment.

     2 Before the evidentiary hearing, while addressing a preliminary
     issue regarding a defense motion for a continuance, [Appellant]
     provided the [c]ourt with a letter from the Pennsylvania Office of
     the Attorney General and a letter from the Philadelphia District
     Attorney’s Office detailing payments made to Starnes. N.T.
     3/3/2022 at 14-15. The Office of the Attorney General paid post-
     trial hotel expenses in the amount of $2,643.90 from its Witness
     Relocation Program. Letter from Office of the Attorney General
     dated 2/14/2022. The Philadelphia District Attorney made two
     post-trial per diem payments in the amount of $210 each. Letter
     from the District Attorney’s Office dated 2/25/2022. These letters
     were never made part of the record. In any event, they only
     document post-trial payments to Starnes, and fail to support
     [Appellant’s] claim that Starnes was promised anything prior to
     testifying.

            As to the claim that the Commonwealth withheld evidence
     regarding Starnes’s “whereabouts on the time and place of the
     incident,” Statement of Errors at ¶ 30(a), this claim was never
     raised in the PCRA court. Because [Appellant’s] counsel is raising
     this issue for the first time on appeal, the issue is waived. See
     Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived
     and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”) ….

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/3/22, at 5-7 (footnote in original, emphasis added).

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       In sum, the record supports the PCRA court’s findings and its legal

conclusions are proper. Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043. Appellant’s issues do

not merit relief.2

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

____________________________________________

2
  To the extent Appellant challenges the PCRA court’s credibility findings
regarding Oliver, the “PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported
by the record, are binding on this Court[.]” Commonwealth v. Mason, 130
A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). “We will not disturb the findings
of the PCRA court if they are supported by the record, even where the record
could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891,
911 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).

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