Court Opinion

ID: 9549862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:25:45.625879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:00.101230
License: Public Domain

*155SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except parts IX B and IX C(2), and as to those portions I disagree and therefore dissent.
The majority holds that during the sentencing procedure a letter written by the father of the victim was improperly “admitted” in violation of the hearsay rule. This, although the report of the presentence investigator, is also hearsay and in fact hearsay upon hearsay. I believe the focus of the majority opinion, the hearsay rule, is inapplicable. In my view the letter, while “hearsay,” was at worst only duplicative of the oral testimony of that same witness at the sentencing hearing. That oral testimony taken in open court was subject to cross-examination. Hence the admission of the letter written by the father of the victim was at most harmless error.
The testimony of that witness, both oral and written, in essence related the well justified fear of the remaining members of the family of defendant Charboneau. In my view such evidence was particularly relevant since, as indicated by the majority opinion, the defendant Charboneau had accused his stepdaughter of the killing.
I also disagree with the majority holding that Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), requires the exclusion of the Arbaugh letter, and portions of the presentence report as being a “victim impact statement.” Booth was a jury setting death penalty case rather than a court setting death penalty case. That alone, in my view, makes Booth distinguishable from the instant case. Further, Booth was a 5-4 decision by the then membership of the then Court. In view of the vigorous dissents to Booth and the now changed membership of that Court, I am not persuaded that the now constituted United States Supreme Court would continue the view espoused in Booth.
I.C. § 19-5306 requires a sentencing court to consider the impact of the crime upon the immediate families of homicide victims. I perceive no constitutional invalidity of that statutory scheme since here we consider only Idaho’s mandated court setting of the death penalty.
I disagree with the conclusion of the majority in IX C(2). In my view the majority opinion, in its recitation of the facts, supports the language of the trial court in its sentencing. The testimony of Tiffnie supports the statement of the trial court.
I would affirm the conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.