Court Opinion

ID: 9911273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 19:07:06.328277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:04.456592
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0027-22

JESSICA WASHINGTON,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NEWARK BOARD OF
EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL,1 and CITY OF
NEWARK,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

                   Argued October 3, 2023 – Decided December 19, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Rose.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-4225-21.

                   David E. Maran argued the cause for appellant (Maran
                   & Maran, PC, attorneys; David E. Maran, on the briefs).

                   Sarah K. Delahant argued the cause for respondent
                   Newark Board of Education (Methfessel & Werbel,
                   attorneys; Sarah K. Delahant, on the brief).

1
     Improperly pled as University Hospital Medical Response.
PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Jessica Washington, seeking damages for the wrongful death of

her eight-year-old daughter, filed a complaint alleging multiple negligent acts,

some committed by her daughter's teacher and others by a school nurse. The

Newark Board of Education (Board) moved to dismiss the complaint for failure

to provide an affidavit of merit (AOM), per the Affidavit of Merit statute (AMS)

N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, arguing Washington's claim that her daughter was

overmedicated by a school nurse, a licensed professional as a registered nurse,

required an AOM. In opposition, Washington submitted a sworn statement,

claiming she was unable to provide an AOM because the Board had not

responded to her request for her daughter's school records. Washington also

claimed an AOM was not required for her allegations against the teacher, who,

unlike the school nurse, was not a licensed professional. The trial court entered

an order dismissing Washington's complaint with prejudice.

      Washington appeals, arguing the trial court erred in dismissing her

complaint against the Board because: (1) she was excused from providing an

AOM regarding the school nurse's conduct due to the Board's three-year delay

in providing her the requested school records; and (2) her allegations regarding

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the teacher's conduct did not require an AOM. We affirm in part and reverse in

part.

        We agree with the dismissal of Washington's claims attributed to the

school nurse's conduct because she failed to provide an AOM after the Board

provided her the requested records. We disagree, however, with the dismissal

of Washington's claims against the Board arising from the teacher's conduct

because an AOM was not required for the teacher, a non-licensed professional

under the AMS, and the Board could potentially be vicariously liable for the

teacher's conduct.

                                       I.

        Washington's daughter Karaji Samiyah Jones, who had asthma, died on

May 21, 2019, after going into cardiac arrest while eating in Washington's car

after school one hour after Washington picked her up from elementary school

and two hours class was dismissed. The next day, Washington went to school

and sought information about Karaji's death, including records of medical

treatment she received from the school nurse. Washington was unsuccessful.

        At Karaji's funeral on June 3, according to Washington, another teacher

told her the school nurse may have improperly medicated Karaji on the day she

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died. Washington thereafter made several more unsuccessful in-person records

requests.

      Almost two years after Karaji's death, Washington filed a self-represented

complaint against the Board, University Hospital, and the City of Newark.

Claims against the latter two defendants were dismissed.2           The complaint

alleged:

            Karaji Jones was in school 05-21-19 when negligence
            [occurred]. I'm asking the school for information about
            what took place in school to lead to my daughter['s]
            death. I was told from kids' parents that my daughter['s]
            teacher was [dragging] her in the hallway then left her
            alone in the [midst] of her having an asthma attack.

The complaint also alleged:

            1. On 05-21-19[,] Karaji S. Jones los[t] her life due to
            negligence on the behave [sic] of the school nurse and
            teacher. I was told by the teacher after her passing said
            the nurse gave my daughter 3 to many treatment[s].

            2. Karaji['s] twin sister also states that the teacher left
            my sickly daughter in the hallway crying after
            drag[g]ing her up and down the hallways.

            3. I was not notified of anything that took place 05-21-
            19. The nurse nor the teacher called to tell me my child

2
  Although Washington named University Hospital and the City of Newark in
her notice of appeal as respondents, they are not parties to this appeal. The City
of Newark withdrew its motion to dismiss after Washington and the City signed
a stipulation of dismissal. Washington did not oppose University Hospital's
motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.
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            was having any attacks. After school I picked my kids
            up from school and still wasn't aware of what took
            place.

The complaint did not name as defendants the school nurse, the teacher, or any

fictitious defendants.

      When the Board answered the complaint, it demanded an AOM per

N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. Washington filed a motion for additional time to obtain

an AOM. At a Ferreira3 conference, the court ordered Washington to provide

an AOM by a date certain.

      Washington did not submit an AOM. On March 21, 2022, the Board

cross-moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to provide an AOM. Eight days

later, Washington emailed the Board's attorney requesting Karaji's school

records.

      The trial court denied the Board's cross-motion after Washington

informed the court two nurses worked at Karaji's school on the day she died.

The court permitted discovery to determine if the nurse who treated Karaji was

3
  In Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, our Supreme Court mandated
a "case management conference be held within ninety days of the service of an
answer in all malpractice actions," at which "the court will address all discovery
issues, including whether an [AOM] has been served on [the] defendant" and
"whether [the defendant] has any objections to the adequacy of the affidavit."
178 N.J. 144, 154-55 (2003).

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                                        5
a registered professional nurse, subject to the requirements of the AMS.4 The

Board agreed with the court that an AOM was not necessary to substantiate

Washington's "claims against the teacher."

      On May 5, Washington provided the Board the necessary authorization to

release Karaji's records, leading to her receipt of the records nineteen days later.

The records included the school nurse's log showing Karaji "was given no

medication at the school on" the day she died. Washington provided these

records to Karaji's pediatrician, who told Washington she could not provide an

AOM against the nurse.

      The Board subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss the complaint

with prejudice for failure to provide an AOM. In support, each school nurse

certified she was "a [r]egistered [n]urse in good standing" when Karaji died.

Washington sent a letter to the trial court stating the Board had denied her

Karaji's school records and the records it had provided were incomplete and

unusable for obtaining an AOM. As such, she relied upon N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28

by submitting "a sworn statement in lieu of affidavit" to be relieved of her

obligation to provide an AOM.

4
  As opposed to a licensed practical nurse. See N.J.S.A. 45:11-23(b). The AMS
only includes "registered professional nurse[s]," rather than all nurses, as
licensed persons. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26(i).
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      During oral argument, Washington questioned "why she still [needed] to

get an [AOM] when the teacher don't need [one]." The trial court granted the

Board's motion. In its bench decision, the trial court ruled Washington was

required to provide an AOM because the nurse who allegedly treated her

daughter was a registered nurse and therefore a licensed person under the AMS.

Despite the court previously acknowledging an AOM was not necessary for

allegations based on the teacher's conduct, the court's order dismissed the entire

complaint with prejudice.

                                       II.

                                       A.

      Before us, Washington, now represented by counsel, repeats her claim that

she followed the AMS, by submitting "a sworn statement in lieu of affidavit"

after the Board repeatedly denied her in-person records requests. See N.J.S.A.

2A:53A-28. She concedes the Board gave her the requested records but argues

she may still submit a sworn statement in lieu of an AOM because the Board

took over three years to fulfill her requests and, when it finally gave her "some

records," it omitted many documents Washington expected to receive, such as

report cards and medical records Washington gave the school when her daughter

was alive. We disagree.

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      The AMS "imposes a special requirement upon plaintiffs bringing

lawsuits   claiming      malpractice   or       negligence   by   certain   enumerated

professionals." Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg

& Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1, 14 (App. Div. 2010). N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27

specifically provides:

            In any action for damages for personal injuries,
            wrongful death or property damage resulting from an
            alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed
            person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff
            shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the
            answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each
            defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed
            person that there exists a reasonable probability that the
            care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the
            treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the
            complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or
            occupational standards or treatment practices.

This requirement allows courts to "identify and eliminate unmeritorious claims

against licensed professionals and to permit meritorious claims to proceed

efficiently through the litigation process." Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216,

229 (2016) (citing Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 395 (2001)).

      The Legislature, however, did not seek to "create a minefield of hyper-

technicalities [that] doom innocent litigants possessing meritorious claims."

Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 151 (citation omitted). Thus, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 provides:

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            An affidavit shall not be required . . . if the plaintiff
            provides a sworn statement in lieu of the affidavit
            setting forth that: the defendant has failed to provide
            plaintiff with medical records or other records or
            information having a substantial bearing on preparation
            of the affidavit; a written request therefor along with, if
            necessary, a signed authorization by the plaintiff for
            release of the medical records or other records or
            information requested, has been made by certified mail
            or personal service; and at least 45 days have elapsed
            since the defendant received the request.

      Washington's complaint—albeit unartfully—pled two claims, each

addressing negligence by a different person's misconduct. A complaint can

contain multiple claims because "the plaintiff alleges that the harm was caused

by two or more independent torts that occurred at different times and are distinct

from one another." Glassman v. Friedel, 249 N.J. 199, 223 (2021). With respect

to the school nurse, Washington claimed the school nurse overmedicated her

daughter.

      Based on our de novo review of the trial court's order, Hoover v. Wetzler,

472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022), we agree with the court that

Washington did not meet N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28's sworn statement requirements

with respect to the school nurse's alleged conduct. Washington's claim that the

Board took three years to fulfill her records requests is irrelevant. To submit a

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sworn statement, forty-five days must follow "a written request"5 for records,

N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 (emphasis added), which excludes Washington's initial in-

person requests. The phrase "along with, if necessary, a signed authorization,"

id., suggests Washington must also authorize release before the waiting period

begins, see Hubbard, 168 N.J. at 396 (calling for a "practical common[-]sense

interpretation of the statute"). Accordingly, the forty-five-day waiting period

began when Washington submitted the authorization form on May 5, 2022.

      Because the Board provided the records nineteen days later, Washington's

sworn statement that she could not provide an AOM because the Board refused

her records request was hollow. See Scaffidi v. Horvitz, 343 N.J. Super. 552,

554 (App. Div. 2001) (holding "because the plaintiff in this action received all

the medical records required to prepare an [AOM] within forty-five days after"

submitting a proper records request, "the trial court correctly concluded that

plaintiff was not entitled to relief from the requirement of providing an [AOM]

within the time allowed under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27"). The doctor's inability to

5
  Although N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 requires "certified mail or personal service,"
there Washington's email satisfied the statute because there is no dispute the
Board received the request. See Aster ex rel. Garofalo v. Shoreline Behav.
Health, 346 N.J. Super. 536, 545 n.6 (App. Div. 2002).
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                                      10
provide an AOM after reviewing the school records Washington obtained from

the Board does not excuse Washington's failure to provide one. See id. at 559.

      N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-28 is not a loophole to avoid providing an AOM for

plaintiffs who cannot not find affiants willing to attest to their claims'

meritoriousness. See Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 350 (2001).

The statute is reserved for plaintiffs who cannot obtain an AOM because "a

recalcitrant defendant ha[s] failed to supply [the] required records." Davies v.

Imbesi, 328 N.J. Super. 372, 376 (App. Div. 2000). Moreover, there is no

indication there are additional unprovided records which would allow an AOM

to support Washington's claims against the school nurse. Thus, the trial court's

dismissal of claims related to the school nurse were properly dismissed with

prejudice because Washington never provided an AOM substantiating the

likelihood either school nurse "deviated from applicable standards of care" for

registered nurses. See McCormick v. State, 446 N.J. Super. 603, 607 (App. Div.

2016).

                                       B.

         As for the claims against the teacher, Washington alleged the teacher

dragged Karaji "up and down the hallways" during an asthma attack. She did

not need provide an AOM to support her allegations against the teacher, who is

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                                      11
not a licensed person under the AMS. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26. She claims she is

"entitled to discovery to find out if the teacher may have been negligent by

failing to see to it that Karaji went to the nurse" for any treatment she needed on

the day she died. During oral argument, the trial court and defense counsel

differentiated Washington's "claims against the teacher" from her allegations

against the nurse. The court, however, did not address the allegations against

the teacher when considering the Board's motion to dismiss.

      Because teachers are not licensed persons under the AMS, the court

should not have dismissed the complaint's allegations pertaining to the teacher's

alleged conduct. Given the Board's motion was based solely on Washington's

failure to supply an AOM, there was no basis to dismiss the entirety of her

complaint––particularly, allegations regarding the teacher.

      The Board contends we should affirm dismissal of the entire complaint

with prejudice because: (1) the complaint does not name the teacher as a co-

defendant and "neither includes a negligent supervision count nor articulates a

factual basis against [her];" (2) Washington cannot amend her complaint to add

them because the two-year statute of limitations to sue the Board for wrongful

death, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, was not tolled under the fictitious party rule, R. 4:26-

4; and (3) "discovery will not reveal a viable claim against [the Board]." We

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agree the fictitious party rule does not apply because the complaint names no

fictitious defendants.

      As to Washington's claim against the Board based on the teacher's

conduct, she apparently relies on a vicarious liability theory of negligence. The

complaint names the Board—the employer—but alleges negligent conduct by

the teacher—its employee. See Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 409 (2003)

(setting forth the test for vicarious liability as "(1) that [an employer-employee]

relationship existed and (2) that the tortious act of the [employee] occurred

within the scope of that employment"). Washington may sue an employer under

vicarious liability without naming the employee as a co-defendant. Walker v.

Choudhary, 425 N.J. Super. 135, 148-49 (App. Div. 2012).

       In reversing the trial court's order and allowing Washington to pursue

claims against the Board involving the teacher's conduct, we express no opinion

on whether the claims have sufficient merit to survive any future Board motions

or will prevail should this matter go to trial.

      Affirmed as to claims arising from the school nurse's conduct, reversed as

to claims arising from the teacher's conduct. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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