Court Opinion

ID: 9521063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:56:16.458774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:35.682286
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HALL dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority in this case because I am of the opinion that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense in this case. The majority concludes that the testimony of the police officers that the buildings were CHA buildings and that their duties as CHA police officers were to patrol federally funded housing sites was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could infer that the defendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense in this case. At the outset, I agree that the State may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the defendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335, 701 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1998). However, “there must be some evidence giving rise to a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt; the State may not leave to conjecture or assumption essential elements of the crime. [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.) Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 335-36, 701 N.E.2d at 491. In Laubscher, the defendant, who had a gun on his person, had a confrontation with a Mr. Darvin on the lawn area of an apartment complex where they both resided. Subsequently, the defendant, armed with an SKS rifle, pursued Mr. Darvin, who eventually sought refuge in his apartment. The police were called and arrested the defendant. The supreme court upheld the appellate court’s decision reversing the defendant’s conviction, stating as follows: “In reversing defendant’s conviction, the appellate court noted a complete lack of evidence regarding the nature of defendant’s interest in the land encompassing the apartment building. The court concluded that, although it was not unreasonable for the trial court to assume defendant had no ownership interest in the premises, permitting such an inference without any evidentiary basis would effectively shift the burden to defendant to prove that he was on his land or that he otherwise fell within an exception to section 24 — 1(a)(4). We agree with the appellate court’s reasoning. The sole evidence offered by the State regarding defendant’s connection with the property was that he ‘lived in the building.’ There was no proof of his interest in his unit or the surrounding land, or as to the ownership of the property in general. Although on one occasion, Darvin loosely referred to occupants of the building as ‘tenants,’ this was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s particular interest in the premises.” (Emphasis in original.) Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d at 336, 701 N.E.2d at 491-92. The majority does not address the decision in People v. Hayes, 308 Ill. App. 3d 194, 719 N.E.2d 372 (1999). In that case, defendant was found guilty of unlawful use of weapons. The reviewing court, relying on Laubscher, concluded that the State had failed to prove that the defendant was not on his own land. The defendant, whose detached garage faced an alley, was arrested in the alley, which was open to the public. Neither party presented any evidence as to whether the defendant owned any part of the alley. The court concluded that, as in Laubscher, the State failed to introduce evidence of the defendant’s ownership interest in the alley and, as the trier of fact, the jury improperly inferred the negation of the “ ‘on his land’ ” exception from the absence of evidence regarding it. Hayes, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 719 N.E.2d at 375. The only evidence of “ownership or ownership interest” in this case was the testimony that the property was a CHA building. From that evidence, the majority concludes that it can be inferred that the CHA owned the property on which the offense in this case was committed. However, in Hayes, the court found that the State had failed to introduce evidence of the defendant’s ownership interest in the alley, even in light of testimony that the alley was referred to as “ ‘Tye Court’ ” and that several businesses abutted the alley. Hayes, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 196, 719 N.E.2d at 374. In the absence of testimony explaining who or what “CHA” was, merely referring to the property as “CHA” buildings or that they were federally funded does not denote ownership in any way and therefore, is not evidence from which ownership could be inferred.1  There is no evidence as to the defendant’s ownership interest in the property. The State offered no proof of the defendant’s interest in the land. The State merely argued that it was unreasonable to assume that an 18-year-old, such as the defendant, would have had an interest in the property in this case. Instead, the majority finds the inference that CHA owned the property sufficient to exclude the defendant from ownership. However, as the court in Laubscher observed, while it would not be unreasonable for the trier of fact to assume that an 18-year-old defendant did not have an interest in the property, permitting such an inference without any evidentiary basis effectively shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that he was on his own land. That, in effect, is what has happened in this case. Since it cannot be inferred that the CHA owned or had an ownership interest in the property in this case, there is no evidence from which the extent of the defendant’s ownership interest in the property could be inferred. The State offered no evidence that an 18-year-old could not own property or would be otherwise barred from having an interest in property, either public or private. While it might be reasonable to assume that an 18-year-old, such as the defendant, would not have an ownership interest in the property in this case, there has to be evidence to support such an inference. As in both Laubscher and Hayes, there is a complete lack of evidence regarding the nature of the defendant’s interest in the property on which the offense in this case took place. Therefore, “the jury improperly inferred the negation of the ‘on his land’ exception from the absence of evidence regarding it.” Hayes, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 719 N.E.2d at 375. Since the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not on his own land at the time of the offense in this case, the defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant’s conviction and sentence should be reversed. The remaining issues raised by the defendant need not be addressed.2  Therefore, I respectfully dissent.  Under that logic, our former governor is the owner of the “James R. Thompson Center” building.   I note that the State did not argue that the defendant’s possession of the gun while he was on Locust Street would have been sufficient to convict him of the offense in this case. See People v. Kelley, 338 Ill. App. 3d 273, 788 N.E.2d 775 (2003) (the defendant was guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon where circumstantial evidence proved that, while driving to the location where the shooting ultimately took place, the defendant carried a revolver on or about his person).