Court Opinion

ID: 9598994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:43.829857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:10.228661
License: Public Domain

Judge Harold R. Banke,
dissenting.
Because Williams failed to present any probative admissible evidence as to what caused his unwitnessed fall, I dissent. Before this *473case, it was a well-established principle of Georgia tort law that proof of the occurrence of a fall is not sufficient to establish negligence or give rise to liability. “Falling and injuring one’s self proves nothing. Such happenings are commonplace wherever humans go.” (Punctuation omitted.) Hall v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, 223 Ga. App. 88, 91 (1) (476 SE2d 789) (1996); Wilson v. Duncan, 211 Ga. App. 814, 815 (440 SE2d 550) (1994). See Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 624 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). Without some proof of what caused his fall, Williams’ recovery was precluded. Id. at 625; McGauley v. Piggly-Wiggly Southern, 170 Ga. App. 851, 852 (319 SE2d 15) (1984).
Williams could not and did not testify that he slipped on ice. In fact, repeatedly during his deposition, Williams denied ever seeing any ice before or after he fell. He further testified that he did not notice that his clothes were wet from rain or ice. Nor did Williams offer testimony from anyone else who saw him slip and fall on ice. Although ice may well have been present in the area where he fell, Williams could just as easily have slipped on oil, grease, or some other substance commonly found at a gasoline station like this one. In fact, the majority apparently concedes that something other than ice may have caused the fall.
Moreover, Williams’ affidavit testimony that at the time of the incident the temperature was at or below freezing is contradicted by his deposition testimony where he flatly denies knowing the outside temperature or knowing that it was below freezing. See Prophecy Corp. v. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27, 30 (2) (343 SE2d 680) (1986) (unexplained inconsistencies in testimony must be construed against an equivocator).
Notwithstanding the majority’s contention to the contrary, inferring that Williams slipped on ice is not warranted in light of Williams’ positive and unrebutted testimony that he did not know what caused his fall. Kenny v. M & M Supermarket, 183 Ga. App. 225, 226 (358 SE2d 641) (1987). Compare Shepherd v. Holmes, 184 Ga. App. 648, 649 (2) (362 SE2d 396) (1987). As in Kenny, supra, Williams did not see any substance, feel any substance, experience any substance on his clothing, and did not inspect the ground after his fall, all of which “leads inescapably to the conclusion that only a fall [of unknown origin] was involved.” Id. at 226. Thus, the circumstantial evidence, in view of Williams’ unrefuted testimony, does not demand a conclusion that ice caused the slip and fall.
Georgia courts have consistently held that speculation and conjecture as to the causation of an injury are legally insufficient. McGauley, 170 Ga. App. at 852 (defendant entitled to summary judgment in light of silent record as to why or how appellant slipped or upon what); see Alterman Foods, 246 Ga. at 625. The majority’s concession that ‘Williams may have slipped on something else and *474landed on the ice,” confirms that Williams failed to sustain his evi-dentiary burden.
Decided October 29, 1997
Reconsideration denied November 19, 1997
C. Victor Long, for appellants.
Carr, Tabh & Pope, Jan R. Kastanakis, Render C. Freeman, for appellee.
By allowing Williams to survive EMRO’s summary judgment motion without presenting probative evidence as to what caused his fall, the majority has rewritten the essential elements of tort law. Formerly, a prima facie case required a duty, breach of that duty, “a reasonably close . . . connection between the conduct and the resulting injury,” and actual damages. Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts, pp. 164-165, § 30 (5th ed.). Now, according to the majority, the revised elements are: I came, I slipped, I fell on what I cannot say, now pay me for my injuries. This reconfiguration of what a slip and fall plaintiff must prove is fundamentally unfair to defendants, like EMRO here, because it subtly shifts the burden of proof from plaintiffs to show evidence of the presence of a foreign substance/dangerous condition onto defendants to prove that their premises were “reasonably safe” from some unspecified, unknown danger. See OCGA § 51-3-1.
Despite the absence of evidence of causation, the majority has implicitly presumed that because a customer fell in a parking lot, that, EMRO, the proprietor, had somehow been negligent. See Perkins v. Peachtree Doors, 196 Ga. App. 878, 879 (397 SE2d 54) (1990) (physical precedent only). The majority’s holding essentially makes EMRO an insurer of its customer’s safety, a position unsupported by Georgia law. Pound v. Augusta Nat., 158 Ga. App. 166, 167 (279 SE2d 342) (1981). Because the record demonstrates that EMRO successfully pierced Williams’ prima facie case by showing the absence of the essential element of causation, EMRO was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). See Sullivan v. Quisc, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 114, 115 (427 SE2d 86) (1993). For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.