Court Opinion

ID: 9618597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:14:01.77518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:38.169735
License: Public Domain

RULAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendants under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
The record reflects that plaintiff’s claim against White Wing was predicated upon alleged negligence in failing to clean and maintain the bathroom floors. White Wing was obligated by contract with Colorado College to clean the bathroom floor Monday through Saturday. Plaintiff’s unfortunate accident occurred at approximately 4:00 a. m. on a Tuesday morning, but the floor had not been cleaned for several days prior to that time.
Plaintiff’s claim against Colorado College was based upon alleged negligence in failing to insure that the bathroom floor was cleaned after a clogged toilet was reported to the College on the Saturday preceding plaintiff’s accident. In addition, plaintiff asserted that the College was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged negligence of White Wing.
The mere happening of an accident does not establish a presumption of negligence pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur. See Aurora v. Weeks, 152 Colo. 509, 384 P.2d 90 (1963). In my view the trial court was correct in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against both defendants because she failed to carry the burden of producing evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the negligence which caused the accident was more likely attributable to the defendants than to someone else. Branco Eastern Co. v. Leffler, 173 Colo. 428, 482 P.2d 364 (1971); Gordon v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Colo.App., 599 P.2d 953, cert, granted (1979). This burden was not sustained because there was no evidence or legitimate inferences from any evidence as to what chemical caused plaintiff’s injury or when that chemical was placed on the bathroom floor.
Assuming that White Wing was guilty of negligence in failing to clean the bathroom floor in compliance with its contract, and, that the College was negligent in not insuring that the floor was cleaned after it was notified of the clogged toilet, to impose liability on these defendants one must assume that the chemical was placed on the floor before White Wing was scheduled to clean the bathroom floor during the day on Monday. However, the bathroom facilities were provided for and accessible to numerous students and their guests at the dormitory after the floor was cleaned each day. Yet, even if that assumption may be characterized as a “probability” under the guise of res ipsa loquitur, yet another assumption must be made, namely, that the cleaning compounds used by White Wing would have removed whatever chemical was placed on the floor. There is no evidence or legitimate inference from any evidence with which to label this assumption as a “probability” because we do not know what chemical was on the floor.
Where two equally plausible inferences can be drawn as to the likelihood of a defendant’s negligence being or not being the cause of plaintiff’s injury, res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied. See Hamilton v. Smith, 163 Colo. 88, 428 P.2d 706 (1967); *86Schmaltz v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 33 Colo. App. 351, 521 P.2d 787 (1974), rev’d on other grounds, 188 Colo. 353, 534 P.2d 781 (1975).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff’s claim.