Court Opinion

ID: 9840767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 00:01:07.088961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:40.577606
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40665        Document: 00516900626             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                            FILED
                                                                                     September 19, 2023
                                      No. 22-40665                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                            Clerk

   Marlene A. Dougherty, doing business as Law Office of
   Marlene A. Dougherty,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   United States Department of Homeland Security;
   Unknown John and Jane Does, Employed by DHS,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:21-CV-154
                     ______________________________

   Before Davis, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Plaintiff-appellant, Marlene A. Dougherty, proceeding pro se, filed suit
   against Defendants-Appellees, the Department of Homeland Security
   (“DHS”) and unnamed DHS officers (“Unnamed Defendants”), alleging
   that Defendants unlawfully accessed and tampered with her computer
   network and telecommunications systems, in violation of her rights under the
         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40665     Document: 00516900626           Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                    No. 22-40665

   First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, the Electronic Communications
   Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
   18 U.S.C. § 1030, the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712,
   and state law. The district court dismissed Dougherty’s amended complaint
   for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. We
   AFFIRM but MODIFY THE JUDGMENT to dismiss without
   prejudice Dougherty’s claims over which we lack subject matter jurisdiction.
                             I.     BACKGROUND
          Dougherty is an attorney practicing immigration law in Brownsville,
   Texas. She characterizes her practice as focusing on the “lawful defense of
   undocumented immigrants” who are “victims of the unauthorized practice
   of immigration law.” As part of this work, Dougherty contends that she
   regularly appears before “the immigration agencies” and often is required to
   criticize “employees of the [a]gencies, including immigration judges.”
          In light of Dougherty’s advocacy, she contends that DHS has
   retaliated against her by “unlawfully monitoring . . . her electronic and aural
   communications” and interfering in her “right to practice law on behalf of
   undocumented immigrants.” As detailed in her amended complaint and
   attached exhibits, Dougherty alleges that she first became aware of this
   alleged unlawful monitoring in 2010 and continued to experience problems
   through 2021.
          Specifically, in 2010, Dougherty’s amended complaint implies that
   her phone conversation with a client about a filing fee payment was
   intercepted and resulted in her checks not being returned with a “receipt
   number” from DHS. In early 2018, Dougherty states that she mentioned her
   concern about these checks in conversation at her office and afterwards her
   checks “began to be blacked out.”         Also in 2018, Dougherty noticed

                                         2
Case: 22-40665         Document: 00516900626               Page: 3      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                          No. 22-40665

   “changes to information stored in her QuickBooks,” unauthorized edits to a
   legal brief, and the loss of computer access to her email account.
           From 2019-2020, Dougherty had repeated issues registering for and
   signing into DHS-run websites and accounts. In October of 2019, Dougherty
   alleges that she received an anonymous voicemail that noted “where [she]
   was going [and] mischaracterizing her private religious activities.” She
   further asserts that a year later an anonymous user posted on Twitter details
   from Dougherty’s private conversation with her mother. On June 14, 2021,
   Dougherty alleges she “inadvertently found that the Office of the Principal
   Legal Advisor (OPLA)[,] a division of ICE[,] was logged in to and was the
   control organization to [her] Office 365 and Outlook Mail.” And within the
   past two years, Dougherty alleges that she has received phone messages “in
   which law enforcement could be heard in the background.”
           Dougherty has reported the above issues several times throughout the
   years. In 2016, 2018, and 2020, she hired security experts to investigate the
   alleged unauthorized access and surveillance. Additionally, Dougherty has
   twice reported these issues to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),
   but no issues were found with her devices.
           On October 7, 2021, Dougherty filed her original complaint seeking
   damages, injunctive relief, and a temporary restraining order. After the
   district court denied her request for a temporary restraining order,
   Dougherty filed her amended complaint—the operative pleading for this
   appeal—reasserting claims against DHS and the Unnamed Defendants. 1

           _____________________
           1
             Dougherty’s amended complaint does not state whether she is asserting claims
   against the Unnamed Defendants in their official or personal capacities. However,
   Dougherty’s opening brief on appeal clarifies that she intended to sue the Unnamed
   Defendants in their individual capacities. To the extent she also intended to sue the officers
   in their official capacities, such claims would face the same fate as those brought against

                                                 3
Case: 22-40665          Document: 00516900626              Page: 4       Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                           No. 22-40665

   Specifically, Dougherty’s amended complaint asserts claims under the
   Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), the Computer Fraud
   and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), and the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)
   against DHS and the Unnamed Defendants. She additionally brings claims
   pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
   Narcotics 2 and a state-law antitrust claim against the Unnamed Defendants.
           On January 11, 2022, Dougherty issued third-party subpoenas to
   AT&T and Twitter in order to identify the Unnamed Defendants. In
   response, Defendants filed an emergency motion to quash these subpoenas
   as prematurely issued under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
   After giving Dougherty a chance to respond, the district court granted
   Defendants’ motion to quash and denied Dougherty’s request for expedited
   discovery.        On February 28, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss
   Dougherty’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
   state a claim.
           On March 1, 2022, the district court heard arguments on the
   Defendants request for a stay of discovery pending the court’s resolution of
   the pending motion to dismiss. The court granted the stay, citing the
   strength of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Dougherty’s lack of any
   allegation “that ties these particular defendants to the specific technological
   issues that . . . [she] allege[d].”
           The district court also granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under
   Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), dismissed Dougherty’s claims with
   prejudice, and denied her request for a temporary and permanent injunction.

           _____________________
   DHS. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in
   all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” (citation omitted)).
           2
               403 U.S. 388 (1971).

                                                 4
Case: 22-40665             Document: 00516900626             Page: 5       Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                             No. 22-40665

   Dougherty moved to amend the judgment, which the district court granted
   in part, agreeing with Dougherty that the dismissal of her SCA claims should
   have been without prejudice. As amended, the district court’s judgment
   dismissed with prejudice Dougherty’s ECPA and CFAA claims and
   dismissed without prejudice her SCA claims. 3 Dougherty timely appealed.
                                      II.     DISCUSSION
           On appeal, Dougherty reasserts her claims and argues that the district
   court erred by dismissing them with prejudice and by denying her early
   discovery to identify the DHS agents. We address these contentions in turn.
           A.         Rule 12(b)(1)
                      1.      Standard of Review
           A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
   of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard
   as the district court. 4 “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to
   dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” 5 “When a Rule 12(b)(1)
   motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should
   consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack
   on the merits.” 6

           _____________________
           3
             The district court again denied Dougherty’s request for injunctive relief in its
   amended order. Although Dougherty appeals this order, she does not brief the issue of
   injunctive relief. Accordingly, she has “waived or abandoned this issue on appeal.” Al-
   Ra’id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995).
           4
             Flores v. Pompeo, 936 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Musslewhite v. State Bar.
   of Tex., 32 F.3d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1994)).
           5
               Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citation
   omitted).
           6
               Id. (citing Hitt v City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)).

                                                   5
Case: 22-40665             Document: 00516900626            Page: 6      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                            No. 22-40665

                      2.      Sovereign Immunity
           The district court correctly dismissed Dougherty’s ECPA and CFAA
   claims against DHS because the Government has not waived sovereign
   immunity under either statute. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity
   shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” 7 And because
   sovereign immunity goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
   “Congress’s waiver of [it] must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text
   and will not be implied.” 8
           Here, Dougherty asserts that DHS violated the ECPA’s prohibition
   on the unauthorized interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
   communications, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Although “[s]ection 2511 is .
   . . primarily a criminal provision,” § 2520(a) “expressly allows private civil
   suits by any person whose electronic communication is intercepted in
   violation of ‘this chapter’ of the statute.” 9 Section 2520(a) states that an
   aggrieved party has a cause of action against “the person or entity, other than
   the United States, which engaged in that violation.” 10 Because Dougherty
   seeks relief under § 2520(a), which expressly bars relief against the United
   States and its agencies, the district court correctly dismissed her claim for
   lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 11

           _____________________
           7
               F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (citations omitted).
           8
            Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
           9
                DIRECTV, Inc. v. Bennett, 470 F.3d 565, 566-67 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
           10
                18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (emphasis added).
           11
               See Voinche v. Obama, 744 F. Supp. 2d 165, 175-76 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing
   plaintiff’s claims against federal agencies and officers because under § 2520 “the United
   States is specifically exempted” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

                                                  6
Case: 22-40665          Document: 00516900626            Page: 7     Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                          No. 22-40665

           However, as Dougherty points out, another section of the ECPA,
   titled the Stored Communications Act, does provide a cause of action for
   money damages against the United States. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2712
   permits suits against the United States for willful violations of the SCA and
   “chapter 119” of title 18. 12 However, like other courts, we determine that
   the express language of § 2520 prohibits claims against the United States
   brought under that section, regardless of whether immunity is waived for
   claims raised under § 2712. 13
           Dougherty has similarly failed to demonstrate that the United States
   has waived sovereign immunity for claims under the CFAA. The CFAA
   provides a civil cause of action to “[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss
   by reason of a violation of this section.” 14 Dougherty argues that because the
   statute defines “person” to include the United States and its agencies, the
   Government has waived sovereign immunity because DHS is a “‘person’
   ‘who’ can be sued for a violation of the statute.” We find this argument not
   only misreads the statute, but also falls short of the requirement that

           _____________________
           12
                Chapter 119 includes 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523.
           13
               See Thomas v. Seth, 317 F. App’x 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
   (unpublished) (“[T]he Wiretap Act exempts the United States . . . from liability, barring
   certain conditions not present in this case.” (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520(a) and 2712)); see
   also Lott v. United States, No. 4:10-2862, 2011 WL 13340702, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 31,
   2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-2862, 2011 WL 13340701 (S.D. Tex. June
   17, 2011) (“Although a person may bring a civil cause of action under the Federal Wiretap
   Act under some circumstances, the United States is specifically excepted as a permissible
   defendant.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)). Even assuming there was ambiguity between
   § 2520 and § 2712 regarding the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, we
   “construe any ambiguities in the scope of a waiver in favor of the sovereign.” F.A.A. v.
   Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012).
           14
                18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).

                                                7
Case: 22-40665              Document: 00516900626               Page: 8     Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                              No. 22-40665

   Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity be “unequivocally expressed in
   statutory text.” 15
           Accordingly, because the United States has not expressly waived its
   sovereign immunity for claims under § 2520 and § 1030, the district court
   correctly dismissed these claims against DHS for lack of jurisdiction.
                       3.       Administrative Exhaustion
           Dougherty alleges that DHS violated § 2701(a) of the SCA by gaining
   access to her electronic communications while the messages were in storage
   with her email providers. As noted above, although the SCA allows for suits
   against       the        United   States     for       willful   violations   of   the    Act,
   § 2712 preconditions such suits on compliance with an administrative
   scheme. Specifically, a plaintiff may file suit against the United States “only
   after a claim is presented to the appropriate department or agency under the
   procedures of the Federal Tort Claims Act.” 16
           Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), “a plaintiff must give
   notice of his claim to the appropriate federal agency.” 17 Such notice “is a
   jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under the FTCA.” 18 Dougherty’s
   amended complaint does not allege that she presented her claim to DHS prior
   to filing suit.          Instead, she asserts that she satisfied the jurisdictional
   prerequisite by serving DHS with notice on the same day she filed suit. We
   find this argument unavailing in light of § 2712’s explicit requirement that a

           _____________________
           15
             Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc.,
   503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)).
           16
                18 U.S.C. § 2712(b)(1).
           17
                Cook v. United States, 978 F.2d 164, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citations
   omitted).
           18
                Id.

                                                      8
Case: 22-40665             Document: 00516900626             Page: 9       Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                             No. 22-40665

   plaintiff can bring suit “only after a claim is presented to the appropriate
   department.” 19 Accordingly, the district court correctly held that it lacked
   subject matter jurisdiction over Dougherty’s SCA claim against DHS.
                      4.       Dismissal Without Prejudice
           The district court dismissed Dougherty’s claims against DHS for lack
   of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the court dismissed her ECPA
   and CFAA claims with prejudice and her SCA claims without prejudice.
   However, this Court has made “clear that a jurisdictional dismissal must be
   without prejudice to refiling in a forum of competent jurisdiction.” 20 Because
   “[t]his rule applies with equal force to sovereign-immunity dismissals,” 21 the
   district court erred when it dismissed Dougherty’s ECPA and CFAA claims
   with prejudice.
           B.         Rule 12(b)(6)
                      1.      Standard of Review
           We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. 22 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.” 23 In considering a motion to dismiss, “a
   district court must limit itself to the contents of the pleadings, including

           _____________________
           19
                18 U.S.C. § 2712(b)(1) (emphasis added).
           20
             Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Mitchell v. Bailey,
   982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020)).
           21
                Id. (citing Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996)).
           22
             Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th
   Cir. 2012) (en banc).
           23
                Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).

                                                   9
Case: 22-40665             Document: 00516900626             Page: 10   Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                             No. 22-40665

   attachments thereto.” 24 Although “pro se complaints are held to less
   stringent standards,” this Court has made clear that even for pro se litigants
   “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
   conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” 25
                      2.       Chapter 15 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code Claim
           Dougherty additionally alleges that Unnamed Defendants violated the
   Texas Business and Commerce Code § 15.05(a) by conspiring to “reduce the
   output” of her legal practice.                Under § 15.05(a), “[e]very contract,
   combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful.”
   The district court dismissed this claim on the grounds that Dougherty had
   failed to state a claim against the Unnamed Defendants “absent actionable
   identifying information” regarding the identity of the defendants or
   sufficient information to render it conceivable that discovery would prove
   fruitful in uncovering their identities.
           On appeal, Dougherty does not dispute that she has not plausibly
   alleged a state-law antitrust claim and instead argues that dismissal should be
   without prejudice, allowing her to refile and obtain discovery to identify the
   unknown officers. We agree that Dougherty’s amended complaint does not
   “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,” to state a Texas
   antitrust claim against the Unnamed Defendants. 26
           Even setting aside the fact that Dougherty’s amended complaint lacks
   any identifying information about the Unnamed Defendants, the complaint

           _____________________
           24
           Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
           25
             Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal
   quotation marks and citations omitted).
           26
                Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).

                                                   10
Case: 22-40665          Document: 00516900626           Page: 11      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                         No. 22-40665

   fails to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for the independent reason that it is
   devoid of any allegations that these officers were part of an antitrust
   conspiracy that resulted in significant market control over the relevant
   industry. The totality of Dougherty’s allegation under this claim is that
   “[t]he Doe Defendants violated . . . § 15.05(a) by acting in combination
   and/or conspiring in their acts to reduce the output of plaintiff’s lawful
   business activities which are in opposition to the unauthorized practice of
   immigration law and to remedy the injury thereby imposed.” Notably
   lacking is any allegation—plausible or otherwise—that the Unnamed
   Defendants were conspiring to unreasonably restrain trade, which is an
   essential element of the Texas antitrust statute. 27 Accordingly, Dougherty
   has failed to state a plausible state-law antitrust claim against the Unnamed
   Defendants.
                   3.       Bivens Claims
           Finally, Dougherty brings claims under Bivens against the Unnamed
   Defendants for violating her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments by
   “exceeding every state and/or federal statut[e] . . . which concerns wiretaps,
   protected information, and computer access.” The district court dismissed
   Dougherty’s Bivens claims after concluding there was no “compelling
   argument” to extend Bivens to this new context.

           _____________________
           27
              See In re Champion Printing & Copying, L.L.C., No. 21-51234, 2023 WL 179851,
   at *4 (5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2023) (per curiam) (unpublished) (analyzing claims filed under
   Texas Business and Commercial Code § 15.05(a) and noting that under that provision
   “plaintiffs cannot ‘demonstrate the unreasonableness of a restraint merely by showing that
   it caused [one person] economic injury.” (citing Regal Ent. Grp. v. iPic-Gold Class Ent.,
   LLC, 507 S.W.3d 337, 348 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)). Unpublished
   opinions issued in or after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited
   circumstances, but they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391,
   401 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).

                                              11
Case: 22-40665         Document: 00516900626                 Page: 12     Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                           No. 22-40665

          The Supreme Court has set forth a two-step inquiry to determine
   whether a cognizable Bivens remedy exists. At step one, the court must
   determine whether a claim “presents a new Bivens context.” 28 A Bivens
   claim arises in a “new context” if “the case is different in a meaningful way
   from previous Bivens cases decided by” the Supreme Court. 29 If a case arises
   in a new context, “a Bivens remedy is unavailable if there are ‘special factors’
   indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress
   to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.’” 30
          As to the first step, we agree with the district court that Dougherty’s
   claims arise in a “new Bivens context.” The Supreme Court has never
   recognized a First Amendment Bivens claim, and Dougherty’s Fourth and
   Fifth Amendment Bivens claims differ meaningfully from previous Bivens
   cases involving those constitutional provisions. 31 As recognized by the
   Fourth Circuit, “a claim based on unlawful electronic surveillance presents
   wildly different facts and a vastly different statutory framework from a
   warrantless search and arrest.” 32
          At the second step, we find that “special factors” counsel hesitation
   against recognizing a new Bivens remedy. Specifically, because “Congress
   has provided alternative remedies for aggrieved parties in [Dougherty’s]

          _____________________
          28
               Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139 (2017).
          29
               Id.
          30
               Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1803 (2022) (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136).
          31
             In Bivens, the Court created an implied damages remedy under the Fourth
   Amendment for an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure. 403 U.S. at 389. And in
   Davis v. Passman, the Court recognized a Bivens remedy in a Fifth Amendment gender-
   discrimination case. 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979).
          32
               Attkisson v. Holder, 925 F.3d 606, 621 (4th Cir. 2019).

                                                 12
Case: 22-40665             Document: 00516900626             Page: 13   Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                              No. 22-40665

   position,” that “independently foreclose a Bivens action.” 33 As evidenced
   by Dougherty’s federal statutory claims, “Congress has created several
   private causes of actions under various statutes governing the surveillance
   and the integrity of personal computing devices, including the SCA, FISA,
   and the CFAA.” 34 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
   Dougherty’s First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment Bivens claims with respect
   to the Unnamed Defendants.
                      4.       Dismissal With Prejudice
           Dougherty argues that the district court erred in dismissing her state-
   law antitrust claim and Bivens claims with prejudice given that she has not
   been able to conduct discovery into the identity of the Unnamed Defendants.
   Although the decretal language in the district court’s amended order did not
   explicitly dismiss these claims with or without prejudice, “a dismissal is
   presumed to be with prejudice unless the order explicitly states otherwise.” 35
           “Generally[,] a district court errs in dismissing a pro se complaint for
   failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without giving the plaintiff an
   opportunity to amend.” 36 However, dismissal without prejudice is not
   required “if the plaintiff has already pleaded his ‘best case.’” 37 We find that
   Dougherty has pleaded her “best case.” She has presented her arguments
   several times before the district court in both her initial and amended
           _____________________
           33
                Egbert, 142 at 1806.
           34
                Attkisson, 925 F.3d at 621.
           35
              Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (citations omitted).
           36
              Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing Moawad
   v. Childs, 673 F.2d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1982)).
           37
                Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation
   omitted).

                                                   13
Case: 22-40665          Document: 00516900626          Page: 14      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                        No. 22-40665

   complaint, as well as her opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss
   and her Rule 59(e) motion to “alter or amend” the district court’s order.
   Despite these opportunities, Dougherty remains unable to state plausible
   antitrust and Bivens claims against the Unnamed Defendants.
           Further, Dougherty’s appellate filings fail to identify “what facts [s]he
   would have added or how [s]he could have overcome the deficiencies found
   by the district court if [s]he had been granted an opportunity to amend.” 38
   Although Dougherty contends that she would not refile these claims without
   identifying the Unnamed Defendants, she does not explain how uncovering
   the identity of the officers would cure the deficiencies in her Bivens claims or
   her failure to even allege the basic components of an antitrust conspiracy.
   Therefore, because Dougherty has failed to show the district court erred in
   dismissing her Bivens and antitrust claims presumably with prejudice.
                   5.       Statute of Limitations
           Dougherty’s complaint also appears to assert violations of the ECPA,
   CFAA, and SCA against the Unnamed Defendants in their individual
   capacities. The district court dismissed these claims as time barred under 18
   U.S.C. § 2520(e) (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (CFAA), and 18 U.S.C.
   § 2707(f) (SCA). We find no reversable error in the district court’s dismissal
   of Dougherty’s ECPA, SCA, and CFAA claims against the Unnamed
   Defendants.
           C.      Entitlement to Discovery
           Finally, Dougherty asserts the district court abused its discretion in
   staying discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ motion to dismiss and

           _____________________
           38
            Goldsmith v. Hood Cnty. Jail, 299 F. App’x 422, 423 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
   (unpublished).

                                              14
Case: 22-40665          Document: 00516900626              Page: 15        Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                            No. 22-40665

   granting Defendants’ motion to quash her third-party subpoenas. The
   district court explained that the subpoenas were premature under the Federal
   Rules, and that the court had concerns about potential First Amendment
   issues as to the Twitter subpoena. We review a district court’s order to stay
   discovery pending a dispositive motion for abuse of discretion. 39 And we
   review a district court’s grant of a motion to quash a subpoena under the
   same standard. 40 As the party seeking discovery, Dougherty bears the
   burden of showing its necessity. 41
           A plaintiff is not entitled to jurisdictional discovery “if the record
   shows that the requested discovery is not likely to produce the facts needed
   to withstand” a motion to dismiss. 42 In this case, we are unable to see how
   discovery into the identities of the Unnamed Defendants would have
   impacted our dismissal of Dougherty’s claims on the grounds of sovereign
   immunity, exhaustion, timeliness, failure to plausibly state an antitrust
   injury, and the creation of a new Bivens context. Accordingly, we can discern
   no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to grant a motion to stay
   discovery and quash Dougherty’s third-party subpoenas.
                                      III. CONCLUSION
           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s amended
   judgment as modified. Specifically, we modify the judgment to state that
   Dougherty’s ECPA and CFAA claims against DHS are dismissed without
           _____________________
           39
               Davila v. United States, 713 F.3d 248, 263-64 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted);
   see also Petrus v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 581, 583 (5th Cir. 1987) (“A trial court has broad discretion
   and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose of the
   case are determined.”).
           40
                Tiberi v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994).
           41
                Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 341 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
           42
                Davila, 713 F.3d at 264.

                                                  15
Case: 22-40665    Document: 00516900626         Page: 16   Date Filed: 09/19/2023

                                 No. 22-40665

   prejudice.    We otherwise affirm the district court’s judgment that
   Dougherty’s SCA claims are dismissed without prejudice and the remainder
   of her claims are dismissed with prejudice.             AFFIRMED AS
   MODIFIED.

                                      16