Court Opinion

ID: 9662090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:59:22.602918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.384803
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.
I dissent.
A traded his car to B, a licensed dealer. A retained possession of the car. A made an incomplete assignment of his certificate and delivered it with a power of attorney to B to complete the assignment. Apparently it was never actually done. We held in Bank of Keystone v. Kayton, 155 Neb. 79, 50 N. W. 2d 511, that title passed from A to B.
Here C assigned his certificate and delivered it to D, together with the keys to the car. The car being stolen and its whereabouts unknown, it could not be delivered. The court holds that title did not pass from C to D. The only difference between the two cases is that B. was a licensed dealer, and D was an insurer paying a contract loss. The court holds that these results are in accord with the “legislative intention.” I disagree. As I see it, these two decisions can only be reconciled by reading into the provision of section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, following the words “no person” the words “except a licensed dealer,” so as to make it read “no person, except a licensed dealer * * * shall acquire * * *” etc. I know of no authority for such a judicial amendment of the law. The statutes negative such a construction.
*160Our present statutes with reference to the title of motor vehicles was initially enacted in 1939. Laws 1939. c. 81, p. 328. I agree with the court that prior to the enactment of our present statute, title to an automobile could be transferred between living persons only by compliance with sections 60-310 and 60-325, Comp. St., 1929, relative to such a transfer. In re Estate of Wroth, 125 Neb. 832, 252 N. W. 322; Mackechnie v. Lyders, 134 Neb. 682, 279 N. W. 328; In re Estate of Nielsen, 135 Neb. 110, 280 N. W. 246. Those decisions rested on the provision in section 60-325, Comp. St., 1929, that: “* * * upon the transfer of ownership of any motor vehicle the title shall not pass until the certificate of registration properly executed, shall be filed in the Department of Public Works as required in this article.” The above decisions are consistent with the above-quoted provision.
A year after the filing of the opinion in In re Estate of Nielsen, supra, the Legislature in the 1939 act amended section 60-325, Comp. St., 1929, by striking out the above-quoted provision that title did not pass. Laws 1939, c. 81, § 15, p. 348. The court in Loyal’s Auto Exchange, Inc. v. Munch, 153 Neb. 628, 45 N. W. 2d 913, quoted the provision of section 60-325, Comp. St., 1929, in its quote from In re Estate of Wroth, supra. The court did not poipt out there that the provision quoted had been repealed. The court now quotes section 60-326, R. R. S. 1943 (formerly section 60-325, Comp. St., 1929), and does not point out the repeal of the proviso. The court does not mention the amendment of section 60-325, Comp. St., 1929, although it does state that section 60-310, Comp. St., 1929, was not amended until 1947.
The Legislature not only repealed the provision prohibiting title passing but put no comparable provision in the 1939 act.
In Hurley v. Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 147 Neb. 781, 25 N. W. 2d 29, we quoted, with approval, this rule from Campbell v. Youngson, 80 Neb. 322, 114 N. W. 415: “In considering an amendatory or substituted *161statute, it is proper to consider the provisions of the law which was repealed in connection with the law Which takes its place, in order to ascertain the legislative intent, and all provisions of the original statute which are not carried forward into or repeated in the new law are annulled by the repealing statute ” (Emphasis supplied.)
The court does not explain the effect of the amendment repealing the proviso that title shall not pass, but ignores it.
Not only did the Legislature strike out the above language of the old law, but it made certain positive provisions that show a contrary intent to that which the court now announces.
It provided in section 60-104, R.. R. S. 1943, that: “No person, * * * shall sell * * * a motor vehicle, * * * without delivering to the purchaser * * * a certificate of title with such assignment thereon as may be necessary to show title in the purchaser, * * In effect, the court construes this language to mean “as may be necessary to show a right to get a title in the purchaser.” The language of the statute clearly imports title passing with the delivery of the assigned certificate, for otherwise how can the assignment show “title in the purchaser”?
Again in section 60-106, R. R. S. 1943, with reference to securing a certificate of title where, as here, a certificate had previously been issued, it provided that the assigned certificate should be presented to the county clerk. The act then requires the county clerk to be satisfied that the “applicant is the owner of such motor vehicle.” The court, in effect, now construes this to mean that the county clerk shall be satisfied that the “applicant is entitled to become the owner of such motor vehicle.” The court now says the applicant is not the “owner” at that time. It follows the county clerk cannot be “satisfied that the applicant is the owner.”
The Legislature further provided in section 60-106, *162R. R. S'. 1943: “In- all cases of transfers of motor vehicles, the application for certificates of title shall be filed within three days after the delivery of such motor vehicles; Provided,-licensed dealers need not apply for certificates of title for motor vehicles in stock or acquired for stock purposes, but upon transfer of the same they shall give the transferee a reassignment of the certificate of'title on such motor vehicle, or an assignment of a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate.”
This obviously relates to a transfer of ownership. The'court now holds that ownership does not pass until a new certificate of title is had by the transferee; and that the transferor remains the -owner until a new ceiv tificate of title is secured by the transferee (or for him if the transferor is a dealer), notwithstanding the fact that the transferor has delivered possession and assigned certificate of title to the transferee. The ownership is made to depend on, not what the seller does, but what the purchaser does after purchase, full payment, and delivery to him of the motor vehicle. Suppose the transferee does not apply within the three-day period, or never does apply for a new certificate of title. Under the court’s holding, ownership remains in the transferor. Such the court holds to be the Legislature’s intention. I would hold that the new certificate is evidence of title which the buyer had previously acquired by virtue of the assignment and transfer to him of the original certificate. The failure to apply for the new certificate within the period does not divest the rights of the purchaser. See, Crawford v. General Exchange Ins. Corporation (Mo. App.), 119 S. W. 2d 458; Wilkison v. Grugett, 223 Mo. App. 889, 20 S. W. 2d 936.
The court says that statutes in pari materia must be construed together. I agree. What statutes do the court “construe together”? Apparently reference is to the provision that licensed dealers need not apply for certificates of title for motor vehicles in stock or acquired for stock purposes (section 60-106, R. R. S. 1943); to the *163provisions of section 60-320, R. R. S. 1943, to the effect that dealers “in lieu” of registering motor vehicles may, under certain circumstances, operate them under dealers’ licenses; and to the provision in section 60-106, R. R. S. 1943, that: “In the case of the sale of a motor vehicle'by a dealer to a general purchaser or user, the certificate of title shall be obtained in the name of the purchaser by the dealer upon application signed by the purchaser, and in all other cases such certificates shall be obtained by the purchasers.” In the instant case the “in all other cases”, provision is applicable.
I submit that the fact that when selling, the dealer must get the certificate for his buyer and, in the other instance, the buyer must get it himself “within three days” does not show a legislative intent that title passes at once in the first instance and does not pass in the second instance until a new certificate is issued in lieu of the assigned certificate. Had the Legislature so intended, it could have said so, as it did in the earlier act, which was repealed when this act was passed, as shown above. The court in effect now puts the repealed provision back into the act.
I am mindful of the provision of section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, which provides: “No person, * * * acquiring a motor vehicle, * * * from the owner thereof, whether such owner be a manufacturer, importer, dealer or otherwise, shall acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in or to such motor vehicle, * * * until he shall have had issued to him a certificate of title to such motor vehicle, * * * or delivered to him a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for the same; nor shall any waiver or estoppel operate in favor of such person against a person having possession of such certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate for such motor vehicle, * * * for a valuable consideration. No court in. any case at law or in equity shall recognize the right, title, claim or interest of any person in or -to any motor-vehicle, * * * sold or disposed of, or mortgaged or en*164cumbered, unless evidenced by a certificate of title or manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate duly issued, in accordance with the provisions of this act.”
This section taken out of context and standing alone presents difficulties. When put into chronological context, and analyzed in relation to the legislative plan as evidenced by the whole act, the difficulties disappear. For the purpose of this analysis, I go to the original act, Laws 1939, c. 81, p. 328.
The act was a comprehensive one, to apply to motor vehicles required to be registered (with exceptions not important here). Section 1, page 329. By its title, it is an act relating to the ownership of motor vehicles “providing manner of originating title to motor vehicles by manufacturers and importers” and “prohibiting sale or transfer of motor vehicles unless accompanied by assignment of certificate of title.” (Emphasis supplied.) There, in the title to the act, is a legislative construction providing that on a sale or transfer, it be “accompanied by assignment of certificate of title.” Nothing is said about a sale being prohibited unless and until a new certificate is issued to the purchaser.
Section 2, page 329 (now as amended section 60-103, R. R. S. 1943) required that “a new motor vehicle” delivered to a dealer for purposes of display and resale be accompanied by a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate “with such assignments thereon as may be necessary to show title in the purchaser.” Section 3, page 329 (now as amended section 60-104, R. R. S. 1943), excepting transactions covered by section 2, provided that “no person” should sell or otherwise dispose of a motor vehicle without delivering a certificate of title with such assignments as “may be necessary to show title in the purchaser.” It further provided that no person should purchase, acquire, or “bring into this state” a motor vehicle “except for temporary use” unless he obtains a certificate of title as provided in the act.
The Legislature clearly provided that new motor ve*165hides in the hands of a dealer must be accompanied by a manufacturer’s certificate and other motor vehicles must be accompanied by a certificate of title issued in Nebraska. This also was necessary to make the vehicle eligible for “initial registration” in this state. See section 3, page 329 (now section 60-104, R. R. S. 1943). The Legislature required that Nebraska cars have Nebraska certificates of title. To enforce that intent and purpose, the Legislature enacted section 4, page 329 (now as amended section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943).
Consistent with that purpose, it was provided in section 5, page 330 (now section 60-106, R. R. S. 1943) that applications for a certificate of title should be accompanied (1) by a certificate of title, duly assigned, if one had previously been issued in this state; or (2) if no certificate of title had previously been issued in this state, then by a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate; or (3) by a bill of sale or sworn statement of ownership; or (4) by a certificate of title or other evidence of ownership required by the state from which the motor vehicle was brought into this state. Upon any one of these four showings, the county clerk is required to find “ownership” in the applicant. In the same section, the Legislature further provided that a dealer selling to a general purchaser or user should obtain the certificate of title in the name of the purchaser. Why? Obviously because as to a new motor vehicle title prior thereto was not evidenced by a certificate of title but by a manufacturer’s or importer’s certificate. As to all cars sold by a dealer, it prevents fraud on the part of licensed dealers. In all cases the application for certificate of title was to be filed “within three days after the delivery.” And by the provision of section 3, page 329 (now section 60-104, R. R. S. 1943) the purchaser (except from a dealer) is required to have had delivered to him a certificate of title with “such assignment thereon as may be necessary to show title in the purchaser.” Obviously the seller (other than a dealer) of a car which *166does not have a certificate of title issued in this state must first secure one in. his- name in order to "make a sale in compliance with the act.
I would construe the provisions of section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, to be applicable to the “initial” and originating title in Nebraska. So construed, it is consistent with other provisions of the act. As construed by the court, it puts provisions of . the' act in conflict and creates repugnancy. ■
Section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, was the law when the court decided Bank of Keystone v. Kayton, supra. The court, does not recede from the holding in that case that title passed, although no new certificate of title had been, secured. . •
■ That section was also the-law when the court decided Loyal’s Auto. Exchange, Inc. v. Munch, supra. ■ In that, case plaintiff had received an assignment of a certificate of' title and' a certificate of title had" thereafter been issued to .plaintiff. • The intervener-had possession without a certificate. The question here presented was not the issue in the Loyal’s Auto Exchange case. However, there the court approved the following from Anderson v.. Arnold-Strong Motor Co., 229 Mo. App. 1170, 88 S. W. 2d 419: “It is well settled that unless the certificate, is assigned and. passed to the buyer of the motor vehicle at the time of its delivery, the sale is absolutely void and no title to the vehicle passes.”
Again from the decision in In re Estate of- Wroth, supra, the court quoted as “particularly applicable” the following: “No title passes unless certificate is assigned buyer at time of delivering motor vehicle * * While these rules may come from other states where the legislation is not like ours, as the court now points out, the fact remains that this court quoted those rules in construing our statute.-
The court refers to our decision in Snyder v. Lincoln, 156 Neb. 190, 55 N. W. 2d 614.
The court quotes:- “A certificate of title is essential *167to convey the title of an automobile, but it is not conclusive of ownership.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Not quoted by the court are these two sentences which precede the above quote. • Referring to the Loyal’s Auto Exchange case we said: “We did not say that the possession of a certificate of title was an absolute muniment of title. A thief with a certificate of title to a stolen auto-, mobile does not divest the owner of his right . to take it wherever he can find it.”
This - court is committed to the' doctrine thát the Uniform Acts- are to be' construed so as to make uniform the laws of those states- which have enácted similar legislation. Bainter v. Appel, 124 Neb. 40, 245 N. W. 16; Behrens v. State, 140 Neb. 671, 1 N. W. 2d 289; Krepcik v. Interstate Transit Lines, 154 Neb. 671, 48 N. W. 2d 839.
I do not contend that our act'has been classified as a Uniform Act, yet the reason for the rule applies here. At least in Florida (1 Florida Statutes. 1953. § 319.22 (1), p. 11.98), Idaho (9 Idaho Code, § 49-404, p. 51), and Ohio (4A Page’s Ohio General Code, § 6290-4, p. 59Ó), legislation similar to our section 60-105, R. R. S. 1943, has been enacted. For all practical purposes our statutes, as far as we are concerned here, are exactly like the Code' of Ohio which was passed by that state in 1937. See Laws of Ohio 1937-38, p. 373. Our act was obviously copied from the Ohio act, changed only in detail as to operation.
In testing the constitutionality of a part of this provision in the Loyal’s Auto Exchange case, the court relied heavily upon decisions of the Ohio courts. In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court of Ohio has spoken on the matter, since our opinion in the Loyal’s Auto Exchange case, the court again relies here on a decision of an intermediate appeals court of Ohio.
In Garlick v. McFarland, 159 Ohio St. 539, 113 N. E. 2d 92, decided June 3, 1953, the court quotes their stat*168utes at length. To copy the quote would be in effect to copy our statutes.
The court there reviewed their previous decisions. They will not be referred to or discussed here, as they are available in the cited case.
After analyzing its statutes and decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio announced the rule: “* * * where endorsement and delivery of a certificate of title for an automobile are made, title passes even though there is a failure on the part of the recipient to secure the issuance of a new certificate in his name.” See, also, Johnson v. Bennion, 70 Idaho 33, 211 P. 2d 148.
The above quote is this case. If this transaction had occurred in Ohio, plaintiff would be held to be the owner of the automobile involved here. Occurring in Nebraska under exactly the same circumstances and same statutes, plaintiff is held not to be the owner of the automobile. This is a commercial transaction. It has none of the elements of a local question where there should be a local policy. The court contributes not to uniformity, but to confusion. Consistent with my analysis of the statute; our decision in Bank of Keystone v. Kay ton, swpra; and in the interest of uniform construction of laws dealing with commercial problems, I would follow the Supreme Court of Ohio and hold that title passed here to the plaintiff and that its proof sustained its allegation of ownership. I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.
I am authorized to say that'Yeager, J., joins in this dissent.