Court Opinion

ID: 9689254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:26:28.524158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:46.483782
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result in part; dissenting in part).
First of all, I am astounded by the majority opinion in that it fails to rule upon the issues created by the briefs. Appellant and appellee, although couched in different language, each presented this Court with three issues. The first issue centers around a civil service retirement plan and military retirement plan; the second issue addresses a supposed abuse of discretion on alimony; and the third issue addresses discretion in awarding tangible personal property.
Examining this opinion, in its opening paragraph, I note that this Court is “reverse in part and remand.” There is apparently no “affirm in part.” As I understand it, when one reads the final page of this opinion, this Court decides one issue: That the trial court must now make a finding of the present value of pensions as marital property. Surprisingly, it then leaps one step further in logic and decision-making power by expressing (a decision which should be totally in the control of the trial court), if not mandating, that a certain division must be made, telling the trial court that it has two alternatives. Then, shockingly, it decides that it will decide nothing further until such time that (apparently) it learns what the trial court has done on a mandate (concerning a discretionary power of a trial judge). For, does not this opinion say, that it will “reserve judgment on the other issues until the trial court has divided the marital property in accordance with this opinion”? It is not for this Court to find the facts. It is not for this Court to divide the property. It is not for this Court to tell the trial court how it divides property. If, indeed, that is the case, then all divorce cases will end up in the Supreme Court of South Dakota, then and there to be decided de novo. Perhaps this decision is an indicia of why this Court is literally swamped with divorce cases and, particularly, cases involving alimony awards.
As long as we continue, in this Court, to have decisions such as this, the flood of domestic relations cases will continue. We must look back at some of our older cases for guidance and to help us out of the morass that we now find ourselves in.
On the issues briefed, I would affirm the alimony award and the property award on the tangible personal property. I concur in the result of reversing and remanding this case on the pensions, for the reason, as expressed in Caughron v. Caughron, 418 N.W.2d 791, 793 (S.D.1988): “Again, a retirement plan has been recognized as a divisible marital asset because it represents consideration in lieu of a higher present salary.” Id. (citing Stemper, Stubbe, and Hansen).
Although Stemper v. Stemper was modified, this statement was not modified: “A claim or theory not mentioned in the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is deemed abandoned. Turley v. Union Carbide Corp., 618 F.Supp. 1438 (S.D.W.Va.1985).” Stemper, 415 N.W.2d 159, 160 (S.D.1987). Appellant submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the very core of the majority opinion, which is to return this case to determine valuations on pension plans, should, perhaps, fall because of the prior statement made by this special writer. Appellant wife did not present any evidence of the present cash value of the husband’s civil service or military retirement. Appellant wife did not propose any findings of fact or conclusions of law as to the present value on retirement plans of the husband. She did, however, in her conclusions of law, suggest that the trial court should award her 36% of the husband’s civilian and military pensions. She owed a duty, by a preponderance of a proof, being the plain*174tiff, to adduce evidence on the valuations of these retirement plans or pension plans. But she failed in her proof and she failed in submitting proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court should not, arguably, permit her a second bite of the apple. This Court should not, arguably, permit her to retry what she has failed to do in the first trial. It is the function of the trial court to find facts. Not this appellate Court. Kittelson v. Kittelson, 272 N.W.2d 86 (S.D.1978). It is true that valuations, determined by the trial court, must be within the range of evidence before the court. Hersrud v. Hersrud, 346 N.W.2d 753 (S.D.1984); Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878 (S.D.1983). We do not have a problem, in this case, of a trial court failing to do its duty; we have before us a failure of a plaintiff to adduce evidence to establish a case, namely, to have an expert or experts or someone familiar with these retirement plans or pensions to come forward and testify as to their value. This was never done. I fully appreciate that “a retirement plan has been recognized as a divisible marital asset because it represents consideration in lieu of a higher present salary.” See Caughron, 418 N.W.2d at 793. Whose responsibility is this to come forward with this proof? Surely, that is not the province of the judge who is supposed to be a neutral judicial officer. It should not be the responsibility of the Supreme Court to reverse a trial judge because he or she has acted on the record presented to him/her. On the other hand, if evidence has been presented, and it is very cloudy and uncertain, concerning the present value of retirement accounts, a trial judge must rule on the evidence before him/her. However, when no evidence is before him/her, what is he/she to do? For a trial judge to award a retirement plan or pension, he/she must have evidence in the record upon which he/she may reasonably act. A trial judge can only act on facts presented. And he/she must also act on the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law which are presented to him/her. SDCL 15-6-52(a) sets forth the proper procedure for serving proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and proposed judgment. Thereafter, a procedure is set forth, statutorily, concerning the withholding by the court of the entering of findings for a period of five days after service. Thereupon, the court enters findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment as it deems proper. Conceding that the appellant tried the theory and claim that these pension plans were a divisible marital asset, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law should have been prepared and served. It is noted that appellant did recite, in her proposed findings of fact, the yearly amounts that husband would receive upon his retirement, via two pensions; however, the proposed conclusion of law theorized (from some type of a dreamed-up formula) that she should be awarded 36% of her husband’s total civilian pension through the Air Force and a military pension from the Air National Guard. This is a far cry from placing a present monetary value or valuation upon pensions. Therefore, I believe that a great deal of additional legal expense and time lie at the door of the appellant, who failed in her proof below.
In Caughron, the failure of proof and the failure of findings of fact and conclusions of law were not argued by appellee. In this case, appellee has vigorously argued that the civil proof and civil procedure of plaintiff is quite faulty. I believe that although it is faulty, and albeit very weak, appellant did have a claim or theory, i.e., the 36% theory. Under the 36% share theory of appellant’s, she would be paid a monthly installment of approximately $702.00 per her Exhibit No. 7.
It is wrong to totally segregate alimony and property division. This is exactly, in my opinion, what the appellant seeks to achieve. If this opinion stands for a total dissection of marital property being divided on the one hand and alimony being granted also on the other hand, with judicial blinders to obfuscate equity, I firmly dissent to such an equitable holding. Old cases. Good cases. Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1984), instructs us that in order to determine if the trial court has abused its discretion, this court reviews the award the *175alimony and property division together. Booth, id. Krage, cited above, stands for the same proposition. Do we mean what we say? Over and over again, in this Court, we have talked, discussed, discoursed upon, and written that the trial court has broad discretion in awarding alimony and making a property division. We pronounce that judgment will not be set aside, in such instances, unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion. Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192 (S.D.1984). We should not, from our appellate perch in Pierre, instruct this trial judge on the specifics of his decision. For, to do so, is to expunge and eradicate his discretion. Below, as the trial judge now struggles to determine these valuations, I would remind him that we have said: “While we do not require exactitude, valuations must be within the range of evidence before the Court.” Pennock v. Pennock, 356 N.W.2d 913, 914 (S.D.1984). I appreciate that it will be a difficult task for the trial court to determine the division of marital property and alimony under the state of the present record. Surely, there must be some evidence produced to determine, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the valuations of these pension plans. The balancing, between the alimony and the property division award, in my opinion, must take place, under the numerous decisions of this Court. Property division of the appellee’s retirement plan/pensions cannot be considered in a vacuum. It is noteworthy that appellant is on her way to a pension plan but that seems to be totally immaterial. If his pension plans go into the marital pot, so likewise for her plan.
Lastly, I wish to simply express that, in my opinion, the trial judge gave a very thoughtful consideration to this case. There is no abuse of discretion on the alimony award and the tangible personal property assets were divided $46,245.11 to the husband and $40,004.94 to the wife. No abuse of discretion on the latter decision.