Court Opinion

ID: 9698955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:04:51.882965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:44.848365
License: Public Domain

COLE, Judge,
dissenting:
The Court of Special Appeals. held that the relevant period of delay in this case, for speedy trial purposes, should be measured from the original charging document. Therefore, the delay from the indictment until trial was *425about two years. The intermediate appellate court further held that, under the circumstances of this case, the two-year delay violated Bailey’s constitutional right to a speedy trial.
The majority opinion in this Court proceeds upon the assumption that the entire period from the original charging document to the trial should be considered in determining whether Bailey was denied his right to a speedy trial. The majority, however, concludes that the delay of two years did not encroach upon Bailey’s constitutional rights. I think it did.
I agree with both the Court of Special Appeals and the majority that the relevant period in this case should be measured from the initial charging document. Essentially for reasons set forth in the Court of Special Appeals’ opinion, and quoted at pp. 405-409 of the majority opinion, I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Bailey was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The majority’s contrary conclusion is, in my view, inconsistent with several of this Court’s decisions. See, e.g., Brady v. State, 291 Md. 261, 434 A.2d 574 (1981); Brady v. State, 288 Md. 61, 415 A.2d 1126 (1980); Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96, 345 A.2d 62 (1975).
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge ADKINS has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.