Court Opinion

ID: 9776186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:22:01.86775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:35.394733
License: Public Domain

FABE, Justice,
dissenting.
The court today finds Michael Nash to have satisfied the moral character requirement for admission to the Alaska Bar. The court's decision relies in significant part on its conclusion that "the record contains no confirmed instances of Nash lying, commit*149ting illegal acts, omitting information, or otherwise behaving dishonestly." 1 But like the Board of Governors, we have not heard directly from Nash on the issues in contention in this case. The only finding we have on Nash's honesty is from the hearing master, Mary K. Hughes, who heard Nash testify and found that "Nash's lack of memory re: the evaluation is not credible." Because this court is not well situated to overrule the hearing master's determination of Nash's credibility, I believe that this case should be remanded to the Board for a new hearing that would be free of any of the procedural shortcomings identified by the court's decision.2
I agree with the court that the Board's decision cannot be affirmed in light of the flaws in the Board's procedure and the erroneous findings that underpin its decision. But the record before the court does not allow us to conclude with confidence that Nash has met his burden of establishing that he is "one whose conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others."3 As the court recognizes, in Alaska, "the applicant [bears] the burden of proving the material facts upon which the applicant relies." 4 Although in disciplinary proceedings the Bar Association must prove the charges of attorney misconduct by clear and convincing evidence,5 it is the applicant for certification who bears the burden of demonstrating the requisite character to practice.6 In deciding to grant Nash's application to the Alaska Bar, the court emphasizes the lack of record support for the Board's factual findings that weigh against Nash's admission. There is a significant difference, however, between a record that fails to support the findings of the Board and a record that proves by a preponderance of the evidence that Nash has demonstrated the requisite character required by Bar Rule 2, section 1(d). The court's decision goes beyond identifying the problems with the Board's decision and procedure-it entirely releases Nash from his burden, simply admitting Nash to the Bar despite the existence of serious, unresolved questions regarding his honesty and candor during the application process.
The hearing master found that Nash's lack of memory on a critical issue of fact was "not credible." During its hearing, the Board did not hear testimony from Nash himself, but instead heard only from Nash's attorney. At this juncture, therefore, Nash has only testified before the hearing master, so we are left only with her finding that his purported lack of memory is not eredible. "Credibility determinations made by the trier of fact are generally left undisturbed by this court on review." 7 And the hearing master's finding is significant because it relates to Nash's purported lack of memory about his intake evaluation at the Jemez Springs treatment facility. The hearing master's finding that "Nash's lack of memory re: the evaluation is not credible and it is unfortunate that the records are not existent" is relevant to two factors listed by Alaska Bar Rule 2, section 1(d) "as cause for further inquiry" before a decision should be made on the question whether the applicant possesses the character and fitness to practice law: "(8) making of false statements under oath or affirmation, including omissions" and "(7) evidence of mental or emotional disorders." If Nash was not truthful in his testimony before the hearing master, as her credibility finding suggests, this lack of candor could itself constitute "[clonduct manifesting a significant deficiency in the honesty, trustworthiness, diligence or reliability of an applicant." 8
Honesty is perhaps the most important attribute of the moral character qualification for bar membership, and an applicant's failure to answer truthfully questions associated *150with his or her application to the bar weighs against admission.9 As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained: "It is not enough for an attorney that he be honest. He must be that, and more. He must be believed to be honest." 10 The hearing master's finding also casts doubt on Nash's assertion that he was not diagnosed with or treated for any psychological or personality disorders at the facility in Jemez Springs.11
The court focuses on the Board's mistakes in characterizing the record and concludes that Nash's "alleged lack of candor ... was based on factual assertions having no basis in the record."12 Yet the Board's finding did have factual support-the hearing master's credibility finding. Moreover, the court relies on its somewhat generous characterization of the facts in the record to conclude that Nash does possess "the moral character requisite to practice law in Alaska."13 The court, for example, calls the letters submitted to the Iowa Bar "compelling" and "impressive in their breadth and depth" and asserts that the letters make it "appear[ ] that Nash has been forthright regarding the allegations against him." 14 Thus, the court concludes, remand is unnecessary because of the extensive record that has been developed in this case.15 I disagree.
Given the posture of this matter, where there were procedural flaws in the Board's hearing and where its findings of fact were not adequately supported by the record, the proper remedy is not simply to admit Nash-any more than it is to deny him admission. Nash must be allowed the opportunity to meet his burden of proving that he satisfies the requirements set forth in the Bar Rules through a meaningful hearing before the Board.16 Remand is appropriate in this case because of the seriousness of the hearing master's credibility finding and because Nash is entitled to have the Board consider his application in an impartial hearing.17
When faced with a similar situation where a decision by the state bar examining committee was not supported by factual findings, a Connecticut appellate court declined to ad*151mit the applicant to the Connecticut Bar.18 The Connecticut court held that remand for further factual findings was the proper remedy because the bar examining committee had failed to make findings of fact that were essential to the appellate court's review of the decision.19 Similarly, in this case Nash must be given a fair hearing before the Board so that the Board can either adopt the factual findings of the hearing master or make its own findings.
On remand, the hearing before the Board could be free of any procedural deficiencies or potential biases identified by the court's opinion.20 The Board could make further findings of fact, including a finding on Nash's credibility supported by record evidence. Nash would have the opportunity to testify directly before the Board. In addition to allowing the Board to consider Nash's eredi-bility, remand would provide an opportunity for the Board to seek additional evidence to supplement the factual record on the allegations that Nash destroyed relevant doeu-ments and to contact the professionals at Jemez Springs who evaluated and treated him there.
Although I share the court's concerns regarding the Board's procedures and the lack of support for its factual findings in this case, I respectfully dissent from the court's decision to apply its independent judgment and admit Nash. I would remand to the Board for a further evidentiary hearing and additional findings by the Board.

. Op. at 148.

. Op. at 143 n. 18.

. Alaska Bar R. 2, § 1(d).

. Alaska Bar R. 6, § 3; see Op. at 138.

. In re Ford, 128 P.3d 178, 180 (Alaska 2006).

. See, e.g., Seide v. Comm. of Bar Exam'rs, 49 Cal.3d 933, 264 Cal.Rptr. 361, 782 P.2d 602, 604 (1989) (in bank); In re Bowen, 84 Nev. 681, 447 P.2d 658, 660 (1968).

. Municipality of Anchorage, Police & Fire Ret. Bd. v. Coffey, 893 P.2d 722, 728 (Alaska 1995).

. Alaska Bar R. 2, § 1(d).

. See, e.g., In re Green, 464 A.2d 881, 885 (Del.1983) ("Good moral character has many attributes, but none are more important than honesty and candor."); In re Stern, 403 Md. 615, 943 A.2d 1247, 1258 (2008) ("We have emphasized the importance of candor in ... the Bar application process."); In re Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 387 A2d 271, 275 (1978) ("[Nlo moral character qualification for Bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor."); Strigler v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 448 Mass. 1027, 864 N.E.2d 8, 11 (2007) ("An applicant's failure to answer all of the board's questions candidly, both on the application and at any hearing, is a powerful indication that the applicant lacks the good character required for admission to the bar.")

. Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Comm., 263 Conn. 39, 818 A.2d 14, 24 (2003) (quoting Scott v. State Bar Examining Comm., 220 Conn. 812, 601 A.2d 1021, 1026 (1992)).

. Municipality of Anchorage, Police & Fire Ret. Bd., 893 P.2d at 729 (citing Innes v. Beauchene, 370 P.2d 174, 177 (Alaska 1962)) (recognizing that "the witness's demeanor may convince the trier of fact that the truth lies directly opposite of the statements of the witness, especially where the witness is interested in the outcome of the case").

. Op. at 139-40.

. Op. at 147.

. Op. at 136-37. The court also quotes at length from the Iowa Supreme Court's decision that allowed Nash to sit for that state's bar examination. Op. at 137. But it is our responsibility to independently review the proceedings before the Alaska Bar Association to protect the Alaskan public. As we have noted, "[nlo matter how learned in the law [applicants] may be ... [they] can never be admitted to the bar until [they] can satisfy the court that [they] possess] that first requisite to admission to the bar, a good moral character." In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 55 n. 27 (Alaska 1986) (quoting Ex Parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 113, 152 So. 229, 238 (1933)).

. Op. at 147 n. 33.

. See In re Peterson, 459 P.2d 703, 706 n. 7a (Alaska 1969) ("[T}his court will not undertake to review the merits of an appeal until the unsuccessful applicant has been accorded a meaningful appellate hearing before the Board of Governors."); see also City of Nome v. Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 876-77 (Alaska 1985) (exercising the court's equitable power to remand portions of the case to an administrative agency to allow a party to submit additional evidence).

. See Alaska Bar R. 6, § 6; In re Robson, 575 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Alaska 1978).

. Friedman v. Connecticut Bar Examining Comm., 77 Conn.App. 526, 824 A.2d 866, 877 (2003).

. Id.

. Op. at 143 n. 18.