Court Opinion

ID: 9382991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 14:17:09.567385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.966788
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Deloney, 2023-Ohio-1013.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                               :   APPEAL NO. C-220433
                                                  TRIAL NO. B-1303726
         Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :

                                              :     O P I N I O N.
   VS.
                                              :

 JOHN DELONEY,                                :

       Defendant-Appellee.                    :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W.
Springman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Faulkner & Tepe, LLP, A. Norman Aubin and Richard G. Wendel II, for Defendant-
Appellee.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}   Charged with aggravated murder with death penalty specifications,

defendant-appellee John Deloney has sat in the Hamilton County Justice Center,

waiting for trial, for a decade. Following a hearing in 2022, the trial court determined

that Mr. Deloney is intellectually disabled and thus constitutionally ineligible for the

death penalty. The state appealed, generally asserting that the trial court somehow

erred in making this determination. But the state fails to address, or even mention,

any of the findings made by the trial court in its 13-page decision. For the reasons

explained below, the state’s appeal is meritless, and we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                            I.

       {¶2}   After a man was shot to death inside his own pizza restaurant, Mr.

Deloney was indicted in June 2013 for one count of aggravated murder with death

penalty and firearm specifications and one count of aggravated robbery with a firearm

specification. The facts underlying Mr. Deloney’s charges are not relevant to our

analysis, as the state appeals only the trial court’s decision to preclude the death

penalty in his case after finding him intellectually disabled.

       {¶3}   In December 2013, following the indictment, Mr. Deloney filed a

“Motion for Suggestion of Mental Retardation,” citing to a psychological evaluation in

which he obtained a full-scale IQ score of 63. In August 2015, the trial court conducted

an Atkins hearing on the motion during which both sides presented expert testimony

and submitted exhibits. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153

L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). A central theme of this hearing was Mr. Deloney’s refusal to

cooperate with the experts or his attorneys. In September 2015, the trial court issued

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

a 22-page entry finding, “by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant suffers

from intellectual disability. Accordingly, * * * Defendant John Deloney is excluded

from facing a possible death sentence herein.”

       {¶4}   The state appealed that decision to this court, and in State v. Deloney,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150619, 2017-Ohio-9282, this court reversed the trial court’s

decision and remanded the cause for further proceedings. We held that the trial court

erred in its determination of an intellectual disability under the governing case law of

Atkins, and State v. Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011,

because Mr. Deloney failed to establish through expert testimony a sufficient causal

link between his intellectual disability and any significant adaptive limitations.

       {¶5}   A couple of years after our decision, in late 2019, the Ohio Supreme

Court issued its decision in State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140

N.E.3d 616, which restructured the framework for consideration of an intellectual

disability under Atkins in Ohio. Both sides agreed that Mr. Deloney’s potential

intellectual disability needed to be re-examined in light of the new legal standard, and

the trial court accordingly convened a second Atkins hearing in March 2022. The same

experts testified at this second hearing, and Mr. Deloney continued to refuse

psychological testing, cooperate with counsel, or cooperate with the experts. But the

experts had access to more details about Mr. Deloney’s employment history, a

deposition taken of his partner, and further information regarding his adulthood

academic and intellectual performance, including his records from Cincinnati State

Technical and Community College, indicating that he needed to take certain

developmental classes before qualifying for admission (which he never took). The

experts also had the opportunity to interact with Mr. Deloney over a greater time

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

period and accounted for the changed legal standard in rendering their analyses at this

second hearing. In August 2022, the trial court found that Mr. Deloney satisfied the

new standard set forth in Ford, thus rendering him ineligible for the death penalty.

        {¶6}     In October 2022, this court granted the state leave to appeal. In its sole

assignment of error, the state asserts that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

finding Mr. Deloney to be intellectually disabled.

                                                  II.

        {¶7}     We must begin our analysis by noting that the state fails, anywhere in

its brief, to identify any error committed by the trial court. In Ford, the Ohio Supreme

Court required trial courts to make express findings reflective of their analyses. Ford

at ¶ 100 (“The trial court shall make written findings and set forth its rationale for

finding the defendant intellectually disabled or not intellectually disabled.”). The

reason for this directive is to facilitate appellate review in these very serious cases,

where a person’s life hangs in the balance.

        {¶8}     The trial court here followed that mandate, issuing 13 pages of detailed

findings assessing the evidentiary record. The state does not address any of those

findings in its appellate brief, nor does it address the relevant standard of review,

violating various provisions of App.R. 16 and 1st Dist. Loc.R. 16.1 See App.R. 16(A)(3);

1st Dist. Loc.R. 16.1(A)(4)(c)-(d).

1As best we can tell, the state merely cut and pasted the analysis it submitted to the trial court for
a post-hearing (pre-decision) brief into the analysis section of its brief on appeal, which would
explain the absence of references to the trial court’s decision, the failure to discuss the standard of
review, and the like.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶9}    We accordingly begin where the state’s brief should have, with the

standard of review.    It is well-established that “[t]he trial court’s decision on a

postconviction Atkins claim should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.” State v.

Williams, 2021-Ohio-241, 167 N.E.3d 527, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.), citing State v. White, 118

Ohio St.3d 12, 2008-Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 45.              Because pretrial and

postconviction Atkins claims are governed by the same authorities, we see no reason

to depart from the standard of review for postconviction Atkins claims when reviewing

a pretrial claim. And upon being questioned at oral argument, the state agreed with

this position. We therefore review a trial court’s decision on a pretrial Atkins claim for

an abuse of discretion. And we will not overturn a trial court’s findings that are

supported by some competent, credible evidence. See Williams at ¶ 33 (“A reviewing

court should not overrule the trial court’s finding [on an Atkins claim] that is

supported by competent and credible evidence.”); State v. Hill, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-100554, 2011-Ohio-3920, ¶ 29 (“The determination that a defendant is not * * *

mentally retarded will not be disturbed on appeal if it was supported by some

competent and credible evidence.”); Deloney, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150619, 2017-

Ohio-9282, at ¶ 29 (Where the court reversed the trial court’s decision to grant

defendant’s Atkins motion because it was “not supported by competent, credible

evidence.”).

       {¶10} In Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, the United

States Supreme Court held that the execution of intellectually disabled individuals

violates the ban on cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. The Court provided some guidance for determining

whether an individual suffers from an intellectual disability, id. at 308, fn. 3, but

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

ultimately it designated “the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce” the

Atkins holding to the states. Id. at 317.

       {¶11} Mr. Deloney’s first Atkins hearing, in 2015, was governed by the

standard established by the Ohio Supreme Court in Lott, 97 Ohio St.3d 303, 2002-

Ohio-6625, 779 N.E.2d 1011. Lott relied on the guidance provided by Atkins, and

required a finding of: “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2)

significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-

care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at

¶ 12. Lott also held that there is a “rebuttable presumption” that a defendant with an

IQ score above 70 is not intellectually disabled. Id.

       {¶12} In 2019, the Ohio Supreme Court in Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-

Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, at ¶ 100, rejected this approach as outdated, overruling

Lott and setting forth a new standard for determining whether a defendant suffers

from an intellectual disability. The Ford test requires a court to consider three core

elements: “(1) intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score

approximately two standard deviations below the mean—i.e., a score of roughly 70 or

lower when adjusted for the standard error of measurement[)], (2) significant adaptive

deficits in any of the three adaptive-skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical), and

(3) the onset of these deficits while defendant was a minor.” Id. In making an

intellectual disability determination, “[t]he trial court may consider expert testimony

and * * * shall make written findings and set forth its rationale for finding the

defendant intellectually disabled or not intellectually disabled.” Id. At the outset, we

note that the trial court began its analysis by explaining that defense expert Dr. Smith

testified to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that Mr. Deloney is

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

intellectually disabled under Ford, and that prosecution expert Dr. Dreyer was unable

to conclude whether he suffered from an intellectual disability due to his refusal to

cooperate.

       {¶13} At the beginning of the March 2022 Atkins hearing, the state asserted

that it contested all three of the Ford criteria. But as the hearing unfolded, it became

apparent that the state’s only concrete arguments aimed at the second prong. We will

nevertheless discuss all three prongs.

       {¶14} Under the first prong of the Ford test, which considers whether the

defendant suffers from intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score

approximately two standard deviations below the mean; or, in other words, a score of

roughly 70 or lower when adjusted for the standard error of measurement), the trial

court concluded that Mr. Deloney’s childhood standardized intelligence tests satisfied

this requirement. He achieved a composite IQ score of 63 and a Vineland composite

score of 68, confirmed by both Dr. Dreyer and Dr. Smith.            His low academic

achievement scores remained consistent upon subsequent evaluation at 19 years old.

The trial court noted that both Dr. Dreyer and Dr. Smith testified, consistent with the

records before the court, that Mr. Deloney was assessed to have extremely low IQ

scores. The trial court also found, based on the report of a second defense expert, Dr.

Schmidtgoessling, and the testimony of Dr. Smith, that the administered tests were

valid and reliable. And the trial court relied on the consensus among the testing

psychologists that IQ scores remain stable throughout an individual’s life from

childhood into adulthood. Therefore, it does not appear disputed that Mr. Deloney

satisfied the first part of the Ford test.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} Next, with respect to the second prong of the Ford calculus, which

requires the court to find that the defendant demonstrates significant deficits in one

of three adaptive skillsets (intellectual, social, or practical), the trial court concluded

that Mr. Deloney demonstrated significant adaptive deficits in all three categories.

The court emphasized Mr. Deloney’s 1998 Vineland ABS, which is a standardized test

that specifically assesses for adaptive deficits. The trial court found that Mr. Deloney’s

extremely low composite score of 68 demonstrates his significant deficits with respect

to various adaptive skillsets. And the trial court referenced Dr. Smith’s testimony that

Mr. Deloney suffered significant adaptive deficits in all three areas: social,

intellectual/conceptual, and practical.

       {¶16} With respect to the social realm, the trial court viewed Mr. Deloney’s

failure to cooperate with his attorneys and with the experts as a reflection of his

significant deficits in this domain.      And the court observed that Mr. Deloney’s

paranoia—demonstrated by his motions for new counsel and accusations against his

attorneys and the court—reflects significant social deficits in adaptive functioning.

The trial court had ample opportunity to observe Mr. Deloney’s conduct in this respect

over the course of several hearings and court appearances.

       {¶17} In determining whether Mr. Deloney suffered from a significant deficit

in the intellectual or conceptual domain, the trial court noted that his syntax and

semantics are stunted, and his academic records indicate that he received low

academic achievement scores and otherwise struggled throughout his academic

career: “Deloney’s academic record indicates low academic achievement scores and an

overall record of academic struggle.” The court found that Mr. Deloney reads and

writes at about a fifth or sixth grade level. And his placement tests at Cincinnati State,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

administered when he was 25 years old, confirm significant ongoing intellectual

deficits.

        {¶18} As to the practical domain, the trial court found that Mr. Deloney never

held any stable job, as he was fired from the only two places he ever worked—at

Frisch’s and Long John Silver’s—after between one and three months. The court

emphasized that Mr. Deloney was fired from Long John Silver’s for “failure to

perform.” The trial court also made findings that Mr. Deloney has never had a driver’s

license, and his partner paid his bills, purchased items for the household, and filed

taxes for the household. He also gave his partner power of attorney to manage his

finances. Accordingly, copious evidence supported the trial court’s determination that

Mr. Deloney suffers from significant adaptive deficits in all three domains, satisfying

the second prong of Ford.

        {¶19} Finally, when analyzing the third prong of the Ford test—whether the

onset of these deficits occurred while the defendant was a minor—the trial court found

that Mr. Deloney demonstrated significant subaverage intellectual functioning before

he reached the age of 18. To reach this conclusion, the trial court referenced Mr.

Deloney’s childhood IQ test results—the validity and reliability of which were

confirmed by Dr. Smith and Dr. Schmidtgoessling—as well as the continued academic

intervention   throughout    his   schooling.    The    court   noted   that,   in   Dr.

Schmidtgoessling’s report, she also concluded that Mr. Deloney suffered from a “mild

intellectual disability” before the age of 18. Moreover, the court found that Mr.

Deloney was qualified for special education classes throughout high school and was

denied admission to Cincinnati State until he completed certain developmental

courses (which, as mentioned earlier, he never took). And the court relied on Dr.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Smith’s testimony that his review of Mr. Deloney’s records and history established the

necessary basis to find that he exhibited significant adaptive deficits prior to age 18. It

is clear that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the onset of Mr.

Deloney’s intellectual deficits occurred when he was a minor.

       {¶20} Against this backdrop, the state’s brief does not identify any factual

findings by the trial court that are not supported by competent, credible evidence. The

state’s assignment of error indicates that the “trial court erred as a matter of law by

finding Deloney intellectually disabled.” But its brief contains no argument or analysis

to explain how any error “as a matter of law” occurred. Indeed, the trial court here

applied the correct legal standard from Ford and analyzed the facts in light of that

standard.

       {¶21} The requirements for precision in identifying and explaining arguments

on appeal exist for a reason—a party must explain to us why it believes the trial court

erred in order for us to conduct the appropriate analysis. And these rules assume even

greater significance in cases like this one, where the Supreme Court mandated that a

trial court make particularized findings. Nor is this a case where we can glean the

state’s position from the substance of its brief. Since it does not address any of the

trial court’s findings, we do not understand how the state believes the trial court

abused its discretion or which of the findings it believes lacked evidentiary support.

And we do not think it our task to conjure up arguments that the state fails to identify:

“An appellate court is not obliged to construct or develop arguments to support [an]

assignment of error and ‘will not guess at undeveloped claims on appeal.’ ” State v.

Debose, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109531, 2022-Ohio-837, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Jacinto,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

2020-Ohio-3722, 155 N.E.3d 1056, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.), and State v. Piatt, 2020-Ohio-

1177, 153 N.E.3d 573, ¶ 39 (9th Dist.).

       {¶22} Rather than identifying errors on the part of the trial court, the

substance of the state’s brief attacks the credibility and reliability of Dr. Smith and

advocates instead for reliance on the testimony of Dr. Dreyer. The state expresses

concern that Dr. Smith, unlike Dr. Dreyer, is not a forensic psychologist, and that he

changed his opinion regarding whether Mr. Deloney is intellectually disabled since the

first Atkins hearing. But the trial court conducted an exhaustive review of the record,

and based its findings on a number of facts, including school records, intelligence tests,

basic life skills, the testimony and reports of three experts, and interactions with

counsel, experts, and the court.      Dr. Smith’s testimony was just one of many

evidentiary considerations discussed by the trial court in rendering its decision, and

notably, his testimony comported with much of the other evidence in the record. The

trial court also acknowledged Dr. Dreyer’s concessions in support of its conclusion that

Mr. Deloney is intellectually disabled—that Mr. Deloney had educational deficits as a

child, was consistently tested as below average, and tested in the “extremely low range”

on IQ tests and the Vineland Adaptive test. Although the trial court noted that Dr.

Dreyer was “unable to express an opinion that Deloney met the requirements of Ford,”

the court did acknowledge that Dr. Dreyer’s “testimony and reports [aided] the Court

in its understanding of intellectual disability and the difference between a

psychological conclusion and a court’s finding of intellectual disability.” Thus, the

record reflects that the trial court utilized the testimony of both experts and does not

reveal any sort of unwarranted reliance on Dr. Smith’s conclusions.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶23} Moreover, Dr. Smith’s qualifications as a psychologist are not contested

by the state, and his most recent opinion can be attributed to years of additional

interactions with Mr. Deloney as well as the promulgation of the Ford standard in the

interim between the two Atkins hearings. As explained in great detail above, the trial

court made the proper and thorough findings under the applicable law based on a

variety of sources, and its choice to credit Dr. Smith’s testimony fell well within its

discretion. See Pallone v. Pallone, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-409, 2017-Ohio-9324,

¶ 26, quoting Jackson v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 03-CA-17, 2004-Ohio-816,

¶ 21, and citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967) (“ ‘[The]

court is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony or opinions of any

witness, whether accepted as an expert or not and determine the weight and credibility

to be given thereto.’ ”).

       {¶24} Based on our review of the record, the trial court applied the correct law

and its findings appear to be both within the exercise of its discretion and supported

by the evidentiary record. We certainly have no basis for concluding otherwise in light

of the state’s failure to point out any deficiencies in the trial court’s findings to us.

       {¶25} During oral argument, the state requested that we create a new legal

standard requiring courts to find that any defendant who refuses to cooperate in

connection with Atkins hearing proceedings is not intellectually disabled. But it never

developed this argument in its brief, nor did it provide any case law to support it. The

bright-line rule it advocates strikes us as incompatible with both Ford and earlier

Supreme Court authority. See State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762,

890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 163-180 (considering, on the merits, the Atkins claim of an

“uncooperative” defendant who alleged that he suffered from an intellectual

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

disability). The Ford test requires the trial court to make findings, and in many cases,

if a defendant refuses to cooperate, that might doom his effort to avail himself of Ford.

Given the state’s failure to develop this argument in its brief and its failure to identify

any authority supporting it, we reject the invitation to create a novel rule of law from

whole cloth.

                                     *      *       *

       {¶26} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule the state’s sole assignment

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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