Court Opinion

ID: 9452092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:30:05.911045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:03.483437
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur fully in all of the very excellent opinion prepared for the Court by Judge Kilkenny except as to some portions in the section entitled “Assignment V” as to which I have some reservations and that part entitled “Claim Against Cyanamid” which I believe to be erroneous. As to the latter I dissent. My difference would not change the result as between BEREAN and RELIANCE, between RELIANCE’S Cargo and RELIANCE, between the injured/decedents and RELIANCE and her owners, or the denial of relief as to injured/decedents against BEREAN. It would afford RELIANCE and the injured/deceased victims the right to show that damages and injuries were caused or aggravated by Cyanamid’s neglect of its duties. To this extent and for this purpose, I believe the case should be reversed and remanded.
As to “Assignment V,” I accept the proposition that a shipowner is entitled to rely on the classification of the material and the stowage requirements prescribed by the regulatory agency, here the Coast Guard. There may, however, come a time when a carrier acquires so much knowledge about the peculiar characteristics of a particular cargo, which are not generally known, that it can no longer rely solely on the insulation afforded by reading and applying Coast Guard regulations which it knows in fact are either wrong or incomplete. The aim of the regulations, the aim of the law, is to promote safety, especially to the innocent third parties — crew members, longshoremen, persons on other vessels, members of the public, and others — who are likely to be exposed to the hazards of the product in its normal course of distribution, transportation, and handling. That aim is hardly achieved by an absolute which declares that a shipowner may ignore hazards not disclosed by the Regulations, but of which it knows and knows how to minimize by prudence. This is a long way from making every shipowner his own chemist, physicist, physical chemist, or the like in this day of scientific marvels and new esoteric products.
But Cyanamid is in no such favored position. It is the manufacturer and supplier of a chemical that it knows can and does kill. Cyanamid’s awesome obligations in this day of products liability when Acrylonitrile goes to sea is no less than on land. It cannot rely on — and the proof does not even begin remotely to suggest that it ever did, or would, rely on — the Coast Guard. Cyanamid knows that if it — a huge industrial enterprise which proudly claims a pre-eminence in this chemical field — relied on the Coast Guard with its limited laboratory facilities for its research and development, it would go bankrupt. The Coast Guard might come to it, but it would never, simply never, go to the Coast Guard to *796ascertain what the characteristics and hazards of its own product are.
So while the law affords to BEREAN the right to accept a faulty Coast Guard classification, Cyanamid can claim no such privilege. Its own published pamphlet entitled “Handling-Storage-Analysis of Acrylonitrile,” introduced as an exhibit and to which the Court’s opinion refers, makes it clear that it was, as Dr. Brieger testified, no less toxic than a Class B poison since it was more toxic than the test standard 5% dilution of hydrocyanic acid. Dr. Brieger had preeminent qualifications which Cyanamid never challenged — indeed could not challenge.31 If, as the Court suggests, his testimony was guarded, occasionally hesitant, it was, as the quoted reference to autopsies (see note 23) reveals, just another clear proof of his scientific competence. Time and time again, he made plain, based upon a lifetime study and industrial experience with this very compound, that for seamen to be afloat in water having a film of Acrylonitrile on the surface 32 would mean almost certain death.33 And that is what Cyanamid’s own pamphlet reflected in vivid terms.34
*797The question is not whether BEREAN was at fault in loading Acrylonitrile in skin tanks unprotected by cofferdams. The question is whether Cyanamid knowing what it does, could knowingly load BEREAN at Cyanamid’s terminal knowing also that the cargo was going into skin tanks. In this respect Cyanamid had duties that transcended those it owed to Andersen or BEREAN and which, the Court supposes, it perhaps satisfied by showing the Master the blue pamphlet. It owed a duty literally to the world — at least that world within the reach and protection of American jurisprudence, land-based, salt water and amphibious. It had to have in mind port workers at the place of loading, crew members on the carrying vessel, crew members on accessorial tugs, owners and crew members of vessels with which the carrying vessel might come in contact by collision or otherwise, port officials, customs inspectors, immigration officers, maritime service personnel, and members of the public. The duties owed to this limitless group of protectees require as a minimum that it not knowingly participate in a method of handling or transport which would imprudently imperil the lives of these people. I do not suggest here that Cyanamid, the manufaeturer-suppliershipper, has the liability of an insurer, but it certainly has the far-reaching awesome liabilities now associated with products liability. Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 5 Cir., 1964, 338 F.2d 911, Restatement, Torts § 388. When the material is fraught with so much danger, the liabilities may be. almost absolute either because the so-called ordinary care of the prudent person itself calls for care which is extraordinary or because of principles of strict liability. Indeed, this teaching of Texas City was not lost to the industrial or 'judicial world because the Government as the manufacturer of FG AN escaped liability from the peculiar governmental “discretionary function” exemption, Dalehite v. United States, 1953, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427, or the stringent limitation of the scope of the FTCA to exclude “novel and unprecedented” cases, a reading which was shortly to be repudiated. Rayonier v. United States, 1957, 352 U.S. 315, 319, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354.
But the trial Judge never really faced up to this issue. Nor does this Court. Rather, each equates Cyanamid’s obligations with those the carrying vessel BEREAN owed to others. As to the BEREAN, the Coast Guard regulations so long as BEREAN did not know they were faulty, were an adequate insulation. But in relation to members of the public and others, Cyanamid could not fall back on the Coast Guard. The problem was really not whether the Coast Guard classification was in error, as Dr. Brieger tried to demonstrate. Rather, it was what Cyanamid actually knew and ought to have known about its own product and knowing that, what in prudence considering these extremely high hazards could and ought to be done to minimize,35 if not eliminate, the devastating consequences of a foreseeable casualty.
This was a basic error in approach by the District Judge. And our efforts to *798overcome the deficiency by questioning the standing of China Union to assert the claim and to hold as a matter of law that there could be no proof of causation as to the claims of the injured/deceased will not suffice. We must recall that this case, as are all extensive maritime catastrophies, was being tried in two stages —liability and damages. This is the first time, to my knowledge, for example, in which death, certificates, issued generally in Texas by people whose only competence is the lowest office in the judicial hierarchy — prove the cause of death. I agree the issue has not been proved. No more so was the damages sustained by BEREAN or its cargo. That is to come later. As to China Union’s standing, at the liability phase only, who is to say that had the fumes from this lethal cargo not have been freed by rupture of the hull forming the tank sides, the action on RELIANCE might not have been different?
On this record, the Judge should have held that as against Cyanamid a prima facie case had been made out. Cyanamid should have been put to its proof to refute, if it could, the hazardous characteristics, and on what prudence would require of the manufacturer-supplier-shipper of a product of such deadly potential.36 The Judge would then have decided whether Cyanamid had the usual land-based products liability of a chemical manufacturer. If he declared in the affirmative, proof of damages, if any— and I do not minimize the if any — would be opened for a second stage on damages.
The admiralty has led, not followed. But here salt water dilutes the responsibility now so plainly resting on the manufacturer-supplier-shipper of a commercially useful, indeed valuable, chemical compound which carries death with its utility.
I would therefore reverse for further hearing as appropriate on the claims of RELIANCE and her owners, and the injured/decedents against Cyanamid.

. Dr. Brieger had made tests and reports on Acrylonitrile which were submitted to Cyanamid.

. In the collision, No. 1 port wing tank was ruptured. All of the 226 tons of Acrylonitrile spilled out into the channel.

. Ironically the record reveals that about a year after this collision, the Master of BEREAN was killed by Acrylonitrile fumes resulting from a very small leak in the pump room. No one, certainly not Cyanamid, suggests that this post-collision event was an untoward surprise to those knowledgeable about Acrylonitrile.

. As to handling the chemical, Cyanamid explains:
“The precautions set forth in this bulletin are the results of the experience gained in handling and storing Acrylonitrile during this period. It should be emphasized at the outset, that because of the toxic and flammable nature of Acrylonitrile, handling operations should be performed in areas which are properly ventilated and free from sources of ignition.”
As to cleaning tanks in which Acrylonitrile has been stored, Cyanamid warns:
“Protective equipment should be made available to those entering [storage] tanks. This equipment should include cover-alls, eye goggles, and gas masks. * * * The person working in the tank should be provided with a body harness with life line attached. Station a man on the outside end of the life line to do nothing but watch the worker within.”
And the type of gas mask required differs with the concentration of the chemical’s vapors:
“Use this type of canister (organic vapor) only in locations where the Acrylonitrile vapor content is less than 2% and the oxygen concentration is above 16%. Otherwise a mask with self contained oxygen or air supply must be employed.” [Emphasis in original]
Cyanamid is the last to minimize the effects of the chemical on the human body:
“Acrylonitrile is toxic by inhalation, by absorption through the skin, and by oral ingestion.
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“Poisoning by Acrylonitrile produces symptoms which are similar to those produced by hydrogen cyanide. Excessive vapor inhalation causes weakness, headache, sneezing, abdominal pain, and vomiting. Absorption of large amounts of the liquid through the skin produces similar symptoms. * *
And in describing the proper methods of waste disposal, the manufacturer warns of the danger to fish:
“Acrylonitrile stream effluents should be treated to such an extent that they pose no danger to downstream public water supplies or to aquatic life. * * Although it has been demonstrated that fresh-water fish can tolerate an Acrylonitrile level of 10 p.p.m., the actual tolerable limit will depend on local conditions and use of streams.”
And if that “aquatic life” happens to be seamen afloat, who will both absorb and breathe vapors, “the currently accepted threshold limit for * * * an eight-hour exposure is 20 parts of vapor per million parts of air,” which makes it more toxic than carbon tetra chloride (25 p.p.m.) but only slightly less toxic than hydrogen cyanide (10 p.p.m.) Nevertheless, the chemical is toxic enough so that “the regimen of treatment [by a physi*797cian] recommended for Acrylonitrile poisoning is that for cyanide poisoning.”
In several places and ways the pamphlet equates Acrylonitrile with Hydrogen Cyanide (Hydrocyanic Acid). This is a Class A poison, § 146.25-5, defined as “poisonous gases or liquids of such nature that a very small amount of gas, or liquid, mixed with air is dangerous to life.” As such it is listed with only 13 other poisons, three of which are military poisonous gases. And footnote 1 to Hydrocyanic Acid permits dilute solutions not exceeding 5% strength to be classed as Class B poisons. Class B covers “Poisonous liquids or solids * * other than Class A, C ot D poisons, which are known to be so toxic to man as to afford a hazard to health during transportation.” § 146.25-10. Rat and rabbit ingestion, absorption and inhalation test standards are thereafter prescribed. There is no evidence to refute Dr. Brieger’s testimony that Acrylonitrile would fail these tests.

. BEREAN had main tanks 1 through 8 divided by longitudinal bulkheads affording a series of 16 inboard tanks fully separated from the ship’s hull by wing tanks on each, port and starboard, side.

. Indeed at this point the Coast Guard regulations might turn on Cyanamid to prescribe an absolute standard. Cf. Marshall v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 5 Cir., 1964 344 F.2d 131. If, as Dr. Brieger so stoutly maintained, the rat tests prescribed by § 146.25-10(1) (2) (see note 34, supra) would bring Acrylonitrile within Class B poisons, then it is undisputed that for a combustible liquid having lethal characteristics and defined as a Class B or Class C poison, such cargo must be carried in tanks which are independent of the ship’s hull, separated by cofferdams, etc. 46 C.F.R. § 39.01-1, .05-1. The significance of such tests would not be to establish that classifying Acrylonitrile as inflammable by the Coast Guard was erroneous as such. Rather, since a manufacturer knows what accepted tests would reveal, the significance would be to forbid the manufacturer as shipper to tender it for shipment without disclosing all these characteristics and to knowingly participate in a loading or shipment which, with such knowledge, it knows to be dangerous. Cf. 46 U.S.C.A. § 170(10).