Court Opinion

ID: 9738776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:32.667344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.367974
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in reversal). We face again, this time without positive Michigan precedent pointing either way, forked trails of divergent legal travel. Once a court of last resort, standing thus before ways to left and right, conducts as it must an election between the 2, that court is committed to continue the way of choice regardless of unseen turns, grades and washouts that may lie ahead. It is committed because, appellate judges being both human and prideful, not one likes ever to admit he has erred. Further, once committed, the judge usually — as he may — dons the protective and altogether comfortable robe of stare decisis.
Today’s choice, then, should be made with deliberate care. Reliance upon available and dependable precedent is in order; not casual reference to the this-or-that conclusions of textwriters. As and for such precedent I tender the following rule, taken from New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Novich Transfer Co. (CCA 4), 274 F2d 916, 919, noting that in each cited instance the court was speaking of safety regulations adopted in pursuance of express statutory authority:
“These regulations have been in effect since June 1, 1952, and must be complied with by all motor carriers (49 CFR 193.1). Having been made in pursuance of constitutional statutory authority, they have the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Scarlett (1937), 300 US 471, 474 (57 S Ct 541, 81 L ed 748) Interstate Motor Lines, Inc., v. Great Western R. Co. (1947) (CCA 10), 161 F2d 968.”
*332For application, of this rule to a regulation of the secretary of tbe department of health, education and welfare, designating a certain drug as “habit forming,” see Archambault v. United States (CCA 10), 224 F2d 925, 928. And, for an earlier statement of the rule, see Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States, 251 US 342, 349 (40 S Ct 155, 64 L ed 297):
“It is settled by many recent decisions of this court that a regulation by a department of government, addressed to and reasonably adapted to the enforcement of an act of congress, the administration of which is confided to such department, has the force and effect of law if it be not in conflict with express statutory provision. United States v. Grimaud, 220 US 506 (31 S Ct 480, 55 L ed 563); United States v. Birdsall, 233 US 223, 231 (34 S Ct 512, 58 L ed 930) ; United States v. Smull, 236 US 405, 409, 411 (35 S Ct 349, 59 L ed 641); United States v. Morehead, 243 US 607 (37 S Ct 458, 61 L ed 926). The law is not different with respect to the rules and regulations of a department of a State government.”
The commissioner’s rules and regulations quoted in Justice Otis M. Smith’s opinion were designed, upon legislative authority, to protect from the dangers of fire persons gathered or having duty in places of public assembly. Violation either of the statute itself or the “rules and regulations of the commissioner lawfully issued thereunder” is made penal by express wording (CL 1948, § 29.22 [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 4.559(22) ]). Such rules and regulations are of State-wide, distinguished from local, effect. Their preventive purpose is public safety. Strict enforcement thereof by the courts as well as by the commissioner and his appointees (see section 2; CL 1948, §29.2 [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 4.559(2)]) will surely tend to reduce fire hazards in places “where an assemblage of more than 50 people may congregate.”' *333We should in these circumstances extend to Rule Nos 9 and 10 the force and effect of law and, having done so, attend their treatment as law in all of our courts.
Violation by Edgewater of Rule No 10 having been concededly established, plaintiff was entitled to grant of her request to charge No 15, either in the language of that request or in equivalent phrasing. Edge-water on account of such conceded violation was guilty of negligence per se, leaving only for jury consideration the liability issues of causal connection (between violation and death) and contributory negligence.
For the reason given above, that of the refusal by the trial judge to grant the wording or the likeness of plaintiff’s request No 15, I concur in reversal.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Black, J.
Souris, J., did not sit.
O’Hara, J., took no part in the decision of this case.