Court Opinion

ID: 9469944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:52:38.222738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:38.421387
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the decision to remand this case for further fact findings although I reach this conclusion for different reasons than those set out in the majority opinion. The majority would require a specific finding by the court that “but for” the discrimination of defendant, Harbison would have been promoted. I do not agree that this specific finding is required if the evidence is analyzed under the proper legal standards.
The trial judge found that the competitive promotion standards used by defendant had a disparate impact on blacks. He further found that the promotion system permitted the use of subjective criteria by which the qualifications of candidates for promotion could be and were manipulated to exclude blacks. The court also determined that Harbison himself was the victim of disparate treatment because of his race. Thus the case raises issues of both discriminatory impact and discriminatory treatment prohibited by Title VII. See, e.g., Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 448-50 (10th Cir.1981).
Unfortunately, the district court’s findings and conclusions are not couched in the *119analytical framework of either disparate impact, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colorado School District, 641 F.2d 835, 839-41 (10th Cir.1981), or disparate treatment. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Fumco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). It is my understanding that these standards incorporate the “but for” requirement of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). A finding of discrimination after the evidence is evaluated under the proper criteria constitutes a determination that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the illegal conduct of the defendant within the meaning of Title VII. See, e.g., Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070, 1074 (D.C.Cir.1981). Accordingly, a remand to allow the district court to properly frame its findings of fact” and conclusions of law will, in my opinion, necessarily resolve the “but for” determination that concerns the majority.