Court Opinion

ID: 9860236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:15:38.488465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:32.199206
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BRESLIN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs right to file her state law claim was barred by a failure to timely file a petition under the Vaccine Act. The Vaccine Act does not explicitly provide that plaintiffs are prohibited from filing their actions in state court if they do not first timely file a petition under the Act. The Act states that once the Court of Federal Claims (court of claims) has entered a judgment, plaintiffs must either elect to accept the award and formally abandon their tort rights or reject the award and proceed by way of civil action. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa — ll(a)(2)(A)(i), 300aa — 21(a) (1994). The Act does not state, however, that if a petition is not filed within the applicable statutory period, a plaintiff is barred forever from seeking a state law remedy. See Cook v. Children’s Medical Group, 756 So. 2d 734 (Miss. 2000) (determining that if a petition under the Vaccine Act is dismissed as being time-barred in the court of claims, a plaintiff should be allowed to bring suit under state law). Although the majority correctly notes that the Vaccine Act does not preempt state law, it concludes that the Act mandates that plaintiffs first file their actions with the court of claims. While the Act creates an additional method for plaintiffs to recover for injuries due to the administration of the DTP vaccine, it does not explicitly restrict the rights of plaintiffs to pursue traditional state tort remedies. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa— 11(a)(2)(A), 300aa — 21(a) (1994). Though the filing of the plaintiff’s petition in this case was untimely, she should still be able to pursue a civil action in state court because she substantively complied with the requirements of the Act. The Act allows a plaintiff to bring civil actions where the court of claims “has issued a judgment *** on such petition.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa — 11(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1994). “Judgment” is defined as “[t]he final decision of the court resolving the dispute and determining the rights and obligations of the parties.” Black’s Law Dictionary 841-42 (6th ed. 1990). In my view, the court of claims’ dismissal of this Vaccine Act claim was a final judgment that triggered the plaintiffs right of election to file in state court. See Evans v. Lederle Laboratories, 167 F.3d 1106, 1109 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999) (determining that the Vaccine Act does not require a judgment on its merits). Furthermore, a consideration of public policy supports a finding that the Vaccine Act does not prohibit Krystal Dickey, as mother and next friend of minor, Gina Dickey, from filing an action in state court without first pursuing a claim under the Vaccine Act. As noted by the majority, minors are given special protection for their legal rights. See, for example, 735 ILCS 5/13 — 211 (West 2000) (allowing minors to file tort actions within two years after attaining the age of 21). Moreover, courts have been hesitant to deprive minors of their rights because of the mistakes of their guardians or lawyers. See Dachs v. Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital, 156 Ill. App. 3d 465, 509 N.E.2d 489 (1987) (stating that statutes of limitations consistently have been construed to preserve a minor’s right to a day in court). As such, the Vaccine Act should be interpreted to give the fullest protection possible to minors so that they may obtain fair compensation as a result of vaccine-related injuries. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion because the plain language of the Vaccine Act does not act to bar the plaintiffs right to file her action in state court and because a consideration of public policy supports a determination that minors are to be afforded the fullest possible rights to recover for their vaccine-related injuries.