Court Opinion

ID: 9391115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-30 07:11:37.950139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.567677
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in Part; Reversed and Remanded in Part and Memorandum Opinion
filed April 27, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-22-00719-CV

                  IN THE INTEREST OF L.A.N., A CHILD

                   On Appeal from the 308th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 2013-42223

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      After a hearing on appellant Amity Leigh Nelson’s motion for enforcement of
child support, the trial court granted the motion in part finding appellee Wilfrid
Randall Nelson (Randy) in arrears on his child support obligation. The trial court
found Randy in criminal contempt on 31 counts of failure to pay child support and
ordered Randy confined for 30 days for each separate violation. The trial court
suspended Randy’s commitment and placed him on community supervision for 48
months. The trial court awarded judgment to Amity of $882.00 in unreimbursed
health-care expenses. In seven issues on appeal Amity challenges the trial court’s
order on the grounds that the trial court erred in failing to (1) award attorney’s fees;
(2) find an additional $7,903.72 in unreimbursed health-care expenses; (3) admit
evidence of health-care expenses; (4) award prejudgment interest on the
unreimbursed health-care expenses; (5) allow Amity to include additional health-
care expenses incurred after the motion was filed; (6) grant relief enforcing a
provision for Amity to verify the existence of a life insurance policy; and (7) enforce
by contempt Randy’s failure to update changes in his contact or employment
information. Concluding the trial court erred in failing to award attorney’s fees and
prejudgment interest, we reverse those portions of the judgment and remand for
further proceedings. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s judgment.

                                    BACKGROUND

      Amity and Randy Nelson were divorced in 2014 and Randy was ordered to
pay monthly child support. Randy was further ordered to notify Amity and the court
of any change of address and/or termination of employment. At the time of the
divorce Amity had enrolled the children in health insurance through the Affordable
Care Act. Randy was ordered, as additional child support, to pay to Amity the cost
of the children’s health insurance and all “reasonable and necessary health-care
expenses of the children that are not reimbursed by health insurance[.]” To obtain
reimbursement Amity was ordered to submit “all forms, receipts, bills, statements,
and explanations of benefits reflecting the uninsured portion of the health-care
expenses within thirty days” after she received them.

      In 2021 Amity filed a motion for enforcement of the child support order in
which she alleged Randy failed to comply with the order in that he:

          • Failed to make 62 monthly child support payments;
          • Failed to reimburse uninsured health-care expenses;
          • Failed to obtain life insurance and furnish written proof of
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               insurance; and
            • Failed to give notice of a change of address.

The trial court held a hearing on Amity’s motion at which Amity testified. At the
time Amity filed the motion for enforcement, Randy was $26,096.85 in arrears in
child support payments. At the time of the hearing Randy had made the child-support
payments and was no longer in arrears.

      The trial court granted Amity’s motion in part, including 31 counts of criminal
contempt for failing to pay child support, and a money judgment for health-care
expense reimbursement.

      The trial court subsequently signed findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which reflected that Randy was ordered to make periodic payments of child support,
with which he failed to timely comply 31 times. The trial court further found that
Randy failed to comply with Amity’s requests for unreimbursed health-care
expenses of $334.00 for an ophthalmology appointment and $548.00 for oral
surgery. The trial court specifically denied relief on other violations alleging
unreimbursed health-care expenses due to a lack of credible evidence. This appeal
followed.

                                      ANALYSIS

I.    The trial court erred in denying Amity’s request for attorneys’ fees.

      In Amity’s first issue she challenges the trial court’s denial of her request for
attorneys’ fees. Amity included a pleading for attorneys’ fees in her motion for
enforcement.

      Amity’s counsel, Alexandria Gwyn Foster, testified that she and co-counsel,
Stacy Sawyer, were retained to file Amity’s motion for enforcement. Their
attorneys’ fees were $200 per hour; paralegals’ fees were $100 to $150 per hour.

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Total hours spent on the motion for enforcement were 63, including several court
appearances and preparing for the hearing on the motion. Foster spent 19.75 hours
on the case at a billable rate of $200 per hour. A law clerk spent 3.75 hours at a
billable rate of $75 per hour.

      Sawyer testified that her rate was also $200 per hour and introduced evidence
of the firm’s billing in the case. The trial court admitted billing records from Amity’s
attorneys showing work performed on the motion for enforcement, hours worked,
and billable hourly rates.

      Randy moved for judgment requesting no attorney’s fees be awarded on the
grounds that the fees had not been properly proved, and that Amity’s counsel failed
to segregate the fees incurred between recoverable and non-recoverable claims.
Sawyer responded that until trial Amity was seeking contempt on all claims, which
made it impossible to segregate the fees. The trial court denied Amity’s request for
attorneys’ fees for failure to segregate the fees. On appeal Amity asserts the trial
court abused its discretion in denying her request for attorneys’ fees. We agree.

      Section 157.167 of the Family Code provides that “if the court finds that the
respondent has failed to make child support payments, the court shall order the
respondent to pay the movant’s reasonable attorney’s fees and all court costs in
addition to the arrearages.” Tex. Fam. Code § 157.167(a). The court may only waive
the requirement that the respondent pay attorney’s fees and costs for good cause if
the trial court states the reasons supporting the finding of good cause. Tex. Fam.
Code § 157.167(c). Medical support is an additional child-support obligation that
may be enforced by any means available for the enforcement of child support. See
Tex. Fam. Code § 154.183(a); In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Therefore, absent good cause stated on the record,
the trial court was required to award Amity her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

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in recovering the child-support arrearages of the unreimbursed health-care expenses.
See Russell v. Russell, 478 S.W.3d 36, 46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
no pet.) (section 157.167 mandates an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees if the trial
court finds that a party has failed to make child support payments).

      Pursuant to section 157.167(c) attorney’s fees were mandatory unless the trial
court found good cause to deny such fees. See id.at 45–46 (“section 157.167
mandates an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if the trial court finds that
a party has failed to make child support payments, except that the court may waive
the requirement for good cause shown and the court states the reasons supporting
the good-cause finding.”). The record in this case does not contain a finding of good
cause. Therefore, attorney’s fees were mandatory. See id. at 46.

      Randy asserts that Amity failed to present sufficient evidence upon which the
trial court could award fees pursuant to Rohrmoos Ventures v. UTSW DVA Health
Care LLP, 578 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. 2019). Generally, we review a trial court’s decision
to award attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d
19, 21 (Tex. 1998). Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error; instead, they are
considered in assessing whether an abuse of discretion has occurred. In re K.A.M.S.,
583 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

      When fee-shifting is authorized, as here, the fact finder must determine the
reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Rohrmoos, 578
S.W.3d at 498. We presume this base lodestar calculation is the reasonable and
necessary amount of attorney’s fees to be shifted to the opposing party, so long as
the amount is supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 499. Sufficient evidence
includes evidence of: “(1) particular services performed, (2) who performed those
services, (3) approximately when the services were performed, (4) the reasonable

                                          5
amount of time required to perform the services, and (5) the reasonable hourly rate
for each person performing such services.” Id. at 498. The reasonableness of
attorney’s fees is ordinarily left to the fact finder, and a reviewing court may not
substitute its judgment for the fact finder’s. Smith v. Patrick W.Y. Tam Trust, 296
S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009).

       The testimony and documents admitted at trial detail dates, hours spent,
hourly rate, and a brief narrative description of legal service performed and the
person who performed the service. For example, on November 4, 2021, Foster spent
2.75 hours drafting the motion for enforcement and corresponding with the client.
We conclude the record, consisting of both testimony and documentary evidence,
reflects sufficient evidence of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.

       Because attorney’s fees are recoverable only when provided for by statute or
the parties’ contract, a fee claimant must segregate attorney’s fees that are
recoverable from those that are not. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d
299, 310, 313–14 (Tex. 2006). When “discrete legal services” that advance both a
recoverable and unrecoverable claim are intertwined, they need not be segregated.
Id. at 313–14. When segregation is required, attorneys do not have to keep separate
time records for each claim. Id. at 314. Rather, an attorney’s opinion that a certain
percentage of the total time was spent on the claim for which fees are recoverable
will suffice. Id.

       Segregation is not required when attorneys’ fees are recoverable for all causes
of action. Land v. Land, 561 S.W.3d 624, 640 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, pet. denied). In this case, the trial court ordered contempt on unpaid child
support and a money judgment for child-support arrearages in the form of
unreimbursed health-care expenses. Attorneys’ fees are mandatory for both claims.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 154.183(a); In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 67. The need to

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segregate attorney’s fees is a question of law, and the extent to which certain claims
can or cannot be segregated is a mixed question of law and fact. See Chapa, 212
S.W.3d at 312–13; CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). In this case, section 157.167 prescribes mandatory
fees “if the court finds that the respondent has failed to make child support
payments.” Tex. Fam. Code § 157.167(a). The trial court found that Randy failed to
make child support payments and failed to reimburse health-care expenses, which
are considered additional child support. See In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 67. The trial
court did not find good cause not to award attorneys’ fees, but found Amity’s
attorneys failed to properly segregate their fees.

       Amity was required to segregate her attorneys’ fees proof to exclude
attorneys’ fees for her unsuccessful enforcement claims. See Land, 561 S.W.3d at
640. Failure to segregate attorneys’ fees does not preclude an attorneys’-fees
recovery. Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 428 (Tex. 2017). When a fee claimant
fails to properly segregate attorneys’ fees, we may remand the issue to the trial court
for reconsideration. Id. Because reasonableness of a fee award is a question of fact
and Amity presented some evidence of her fees, remand for a new trial on the
attorneys’ fees issue is appropriate to determine the segregated fee amount due. See
Russell, 478 S.W.3d at 52. We sustain Amity’s first issue.1

1
 Amity asserts she is also entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to subsection (d) of section
157.167, which states:
(d) If the court finds that the respondent is in contempt of court for failure or refusal to pay child
support and that the respondent owes $20,000 or more in child support arrearages, the court may
not waive the requirement that the respondent pay attorney’s fees and costs unless the court also
finds that the respondent:
(1) is involuntarily unemployed or is disabled; and
(2) lacks the financial resources to pay the attorney’s fees and costs.
Tex. Fam. Code § 157.167(d).

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II.    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying some of Amity’s
       claims for unreimbursed health-care expenses.
       In Amity’s second issue she asserts the trial court abused its discretion “by
forgiving $7,903.72 in uninsured medical and dental support arrearages without
counterclaim, offset, or contradictory evidence from Randy.” In Amity’s third issue
she asserts the trial court abused its discretion by excluding her reimbursement
requests as hearsay. We first address Amity’s third issue challenging the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings.

       A.      Background Facts

       The parties’ divorce decree ordered, as additional child support, that Randy
was to pay the cost of health insurance for the children.2 As to health-care expenses
not covered by insurance, the decree provided as follows:

       Pursuant to section 154.183(c) of the Texas Family Code, the
       reasonable and necessary health-care expenses of the children that are
       not reimbursed by health insurance are allocated as follows: WILFRID
       RANDALL NELSON is ORDERED to pay 100 percent of the
       unreimbursed health-care expenses.
       The party who incurs a health-care expense on behalf of a child is
       ORDERED to submit to the other party all forms, receipts, bills,
       statements, and explanations of benefits reflecting the uninsured
       portion of the health-care expenses within thirty days after he or she
       receives them. The nonincurring party is ORDERED to pay his or her
Amity is correct that the respondent was found in contempt of court for failure to pay child support
and there was no finding that he was involuntarily unemployed or lacked the financial resources
to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Subsection (d), however, requires that the respondent owe $20,000
or more in child support arrearages. The record reflects that, although Randy was held in contempt
for failure to timely pay more than $20,000 in child support, by the time of trial Randy had paid
the arrearages and did not “owe” more than $20,000 in support. Amity cites no authority
supporting her claim under subsection (d), nor have we found such authority. Having concluded
Amity is entitled to attorney’s fees under subsection (c), we need not address Amity’s argument
under subsection (d).
       2
        At the time the motion for enforcement was filed the parties’ older child had turned 18
and Amity was only seeking unreimbursed health-care expenses incurred by L.A.N.

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      percentage of the uninsured portion of the healthcare expenses either
      by paying the health-care provider directly or by reimbursing the
      incurring party for any advance payment exceeding the incurring
      party’s percentage of the uninsured portion of the health-care expenses
      within thirty days after the nonincurring party receives the forms,
      receipts, bills, statements, and explanations of benefits.

      In Amity’s motion for enforcement, she asserted five violations related to
unreimbursed health-care expenses. Amity testified that the child was insured
through Medicaid in Florida and that Randy was ordered to pay 100 percent of
unreimbursed health-care expenses. The child incurred expenses related to
orthodontia, nutrition therapy, oral surgery, and ophthalmology. Amity testified that
since the divorce decree was signed the child incurred exceptional health-care
expenses after being hospitalized for anorexia nervosa. To support her request for
reimbursement for nutrition therapy, Amity offered several exhibits to which Randy
objected.

      Amity first offered M-4, which was an invoice dated October 4, 2021, and
purported to cover dates between January 1, 2019 and October 4, 2021. Randy
objected to M-4 as hearsay and asserted that M-4 did not meet the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(6). M-4 was not accompanied
by testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness, or by a business records
affidavit. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(10). Amity responded that she was not offering M-
4 as a business record, but as a personal record in that Amity was the “custodian of
records for her own child’s medical invoices, receipts, and records.” The trial court
sustained Randy’s objection to M-4.

      Amity next offered M-5, an email she sent to Randy requesting
reimbursement for several health-care expenses, totaling $8,489.22. The trial court
admitted M-5 over Randy’s relevance objection. The email originally contained an
attachment with copies of invoices for the health-care expenses but the attachment
                                         9
was not admitted at trial.

      Amity next offered M-6, which was a letter sent certified mail return receipt
requested to Randy’s last known mailing address. The letter repeated the list of
health-care expenses found in M-5 and included the invoice from the excluded M-
4. Randy objected to M-6 as hearsay. The trial court sustained Randy’s objection
finding that Amity had not met the business records exception to the hearsay rule.

      Amity next offered M-10, which was a bill from the child’s eye doctor.
Randy’s hearsay objection was sustained. M-11 was an email sent to Randy
requesting that he reimburse Amity for the costs of the child’s eye exam and glasses,
which totaled $334.00. The trial court admitted M-11 over Randy’s hearsay
objection.

      Next, Amity offered M-13, which was a letter sent to Randy requesting
reimbursement for orthodontia, therapy, and oral surgery. Randy objected that M-13
was hearsay and Amity sought to introduce M-13 not for the truth of the matter
asserted—the amount of health-care expenses—but as evidence that Amity sought
reimbursement from Randy within the required time frame.

      The trial court also admitted evidence of invoices from the child’s therapist,
which were sent to Randy via certified mail. The admission was solely for the
purpose of demonstrating that the invoices were sent to Randy; the subject matter of
the invoices was excluded as hearsay. The trial court admitted evidence of an email
request sent October 26, 2020, requesting reimbursement for medical expenses for
braces, therapy, nutrition therapy, and oral surgery. The court only admitted this
evidence with the amounts of the expenses redacted. This evidence was also
admitted for the purpose of showing that Amity sent the requests to Randy; the trial
court specifically excluded the amounts of expenses from evidence. Amity testified
that Randy owed $1,172.50 in unreimbursed therapy expenses as of October 2020.
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      After Amity rested Randy moved for directed verdict on violations 63 through
68—unreimbursed health-care expenses—asserting that Amity failed to comply
with the decree because she failed to give notice to Randy within 30 days after she
received the medical forms, receipts and bills, statements, or explanation of benefits.
Randy’s motion relied on the lack of any non-hearsay evidence of health-care bills,
invoices, or explanations of benefits. Amity responded to Randy’s motion asserting
that she did not receive explanations of benefits or formal bills from the child’s
health-care providers and that she sent Randy what she had. The trial court ruled on
Randy’s motions for directed verdict as follows:

 Violation    Amount           Health-care service            Trial court’s ruling
                               provided
 63           $1,172.50        Nutrition therapy              Granted

 64           $334.00          Ophthalmological               Denied
                               appointment
 65           $3,027.50        Therapy                        Granted

 66           $548.00          Oral surgery                   Denied

 67           $3,703.72        Braces                         Granted

      B.     Exclusion of Evidence

      We first address Amity’s third issue in which she challenges the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, which excluded certain exhibits as hearsay. As stated above,
Randy objected to admission of the medical invoices Amity sought to introduce as
hearsay. Amity responded that the medical invoices met the business records
exception to the hearsay rule as personal records she kept in the maintenance of her
child’s health care. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(6).

      In reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit evidence, we use an abuse of

                                          11
discretion standard. See Nat’l Liability and Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525,
527–28 (Tex. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules without regard
for any guiding rules or principles. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972
S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). We must uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there
is any legitimate basis for the ruling. Id. “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). The proponent of hearsay
has the burden of showing that the testimony fits within an exception to the general
rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v.
Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 908 n. 5 (Tex. 2004).

      Rule 803(6) of the Texas Rules of Evidence—the business records
exception—provides that evidence meeting the following criteria should not be
excluded under the hearsay rule:

      A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:
         (A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information
         transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
         (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
         business activity;
         (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
         (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian
         or another qualified witness, or by an affidavit or unsworn
         declaration that complies with Rule 902(10); and
         (E) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source of information
         or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
         trustworthiness. “Business” as used in this paragraph includes every
         kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or
         not.
      Tex. R. Evid. 803(6).

      Thus, the foundation for the business records exception has four requirements:

                                         12
(1) the records were made and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, (2) it was the regular practice of the business activity to make the records,
(3) the records were made at or near the time of the event that they record, and (4)
the records were made by a person with knowledge who was acting in the regular
course of business. In re E.A.K., 192 S.W.3d 133, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). These prerequisites to admissibility may be shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or by an affidavit that complies
with Rule 902(10). Tex. R. Evid. 803(6)(D), 902(10).

      It is undisputed that Amity provided neither testimony of the custodian of
records or other qualified witness to testify as to the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. It is equally undisputed that Amity did not provide a business
records affidavit that complied with Rule of Evidence 902(10). The trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the exhibits because Amity did not provide
evidence of the prerequisites to admissibility under an exception to the hearsay rule.
See In re E.A.K., 192 S.W.3d at 144 (business record exception generally cannot be
established on the face of the document itself but requires live testimony or an
affidavit from a witness shown to be qualified).

      Amity’s testimony that she was the custodian of her child’s medical bills did
not satisfy the exception. See Sholdra v. Bluebonnet Sav. Bank, FSB, 858 S.W.2d
533, 535 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (party failed to show that the
information in the report came from someone with knowledge of that information,
failing to establish the necessary predicate for the introduction of a business record
in accordance with rule 803(6) of the Texas Rules of Evidence). We overrule
Amity’s third issue.

      C.     Unreimbursed health-care expenses

      In Amity’s second issue she asserts the trial court abused its discretion “by
                                          13
forgiving $7,903.72 in uninsured medical and dental support arrearages without
counterclaim, offset, or contradictory evidence from Randy.” Specifically, Amity
contends the trial court erred in not granting her requests for $1,172.50 for nutrition
therapy (violation 63); $3,027.50 for therapy (violation 65); and $3,703.72 for braces
(violation 67).

      Medical support is a child-support obligation. Tex. Fam. Code § 154.183. We
review a trial court’s confirmation of child-support arrearages for an abuse of
discretion. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990); In re A.L.S., 338
S.W.3d at 65. There is no abuse of discretion as long as some evidence of a
substantive and probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. In re
T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d 257, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

      In an enforcement action the movant must not only establish that an arrearage
exists, but the trial court must “confirm the amount of arrearages” under section
157.263 of the Family Code. Ochsner v. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d 717, 725 (Tex. 2016).
The burden is on the movant seeking enforcement to prove the amount of arrearage
due. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 66.

      The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law stating that the
court denied alleged violations 63, 65, and 67 because Amity “failed to timely
provide an explanation of benefits as required by the terms of the order she sought
to enforce.” The trial court further found that Amity’s oral testimony to the contrary
was not credible.

      The record supports the trial court’s finding that Amity failed to meet her
burden to show the amount of arrearages through admissible evidence. As stated
above, Amity failed to introduce non-hearsay evidence to support her claims for
unreimbursed medical expenses.

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       In asserting the trial court erred by forgiving child support without a
counterclaim, Amity cites the statutory provision that a trial court “may not reduce
or modify the amount of child support, medical support, or dental support
arrearages” except when the specifically enumerated offsets apply, and contends an
impermissible reduction or modification occurred here. See Tex. Fam. Code §
157.263. The plain language of this provision means that a trial court in an
enforcement action cannot alter the amount deemed payable in the original child-
support order. Ochsner, 517 S.W.3d at 723. But the trial court in an enforcement
action must hold the movant to her burden in confirming the amount of arrearages.
Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying some of
Amity’s requests for unreimbursed medical expenses as those expenses were not
supported by admissible evidence. We overrule Amity’s second issue.

III.   The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant prejudgment
       interest on unreimbursed medical expenses.
       In Amity’s fourth issue she contends the trial court erred in failing to award
prejudgment interest on violations 64 and 66, on which the court granted a money
judgment.

       The trial court awarded Amity a cumulative money judgment for violations
64 and 66, unreimbursed health-care expenses for an ophthalmological appointment
and oral surgery. The trial court awarded post-judgment interest on the judgment,
but did not award prejudgment interest.

       The Family Code provides that, if a motion for enforcement of child support
requests a money judgment for arrearages, the court “shall confirm the amount of
arrearages and render cumulative money judgments” that includes interest on the
arrearages. Tex. Fam. Code § 157.263(a), (b)(3). Awarding interest on child support
arrearages is mandatory, and the trial court has no discretion to not award the full

                                          15
amount of interest due. Chenault v. Banks, 296 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).

         Although Randy contends Amity is not entitled to prejudgment interest
because she presented no evidence to support her request, this circumstance does not
deprive Amity of her right to interest. In re A.L.S., 338 S.W.3d at 69 (rejecting
identical claim when no prejudgment interest was awarded on child-support
arrearages).

         The trial court concluded that Randy was in arrears on unreimbursed health-
care expenses in the amount of $882.00. The trial court was therefore required to
determine the date of the unpaid obligation and to calculate the prejudgment interest
accordingly. See Chenault, 296 S.W.3d at 192–93. The trial court erred in failing to
award prejudgment interest on the child-support arrearage. We sustain Amity’s
fourth issue.

IV.      Amity did not preserve error on the issue of additional unreimbursed
         health-care expenses incurred after her motion was filed.

         In Amity’s fifth issue she asserts the trial court abused its discretion by failing
to allow her to update the payment record to reflect additional unreimbursed health-
care expenses incurred after her motion for enforcement was filed.

         Amity attempted to introduce evidence of unreimbursed health-care expenses
that were incurred after her motion for enforcement was filed. Randy objected to
introduction of such evidence because Amity had not included those expenses in her
pleadings. Amity’s attorney then withdrew her request to introduce evidence of
unreimbursed health-care expenses incurred after the motion for enforcement was
filed.

         By withdrawing her request to introduce evidence of additional unreimbursed
health-care expenses Amity failed to preserve error in the trial court. See Tex. R.
                                             16
App. P. 33.1(a) (requiring a timely request, objection, or motion to preserve error
for appeal). We overrule Amity’s fifth issue.

V.    This court lacks jurisdiction over appellant’s issues challenging the
      contempt judgment.
      In issues six and seven Amity contends the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to grant relief enforcing the provisions that Randy provide proof of life
insurance and that Randy provide proof of a change of address. Amity requested
contempt as enforcement of those provisions.

      A contempt judgment is reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas
corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no
confinement is involved). In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999). Decisions
in contempt proceedings cannot be reviewed on direct appeal because contempt
orders are not appealable, even when appealed along with a judgment that is
appealable, as here. In re P.R.A., No. 14-18-01113-CV, 2019 WL 6317704, at *1
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex.
Animal Health Comm’n v. Nunley, 647 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1983)). Because
Amity brought her contempt-based complaints to this court on direct appeal, and
failed to make a specific request to invoke the court’s original jurisdiction, we
dismiss issues six and seven for lack of jurisdiction. See In re J.D.G., No. 01-19-
00476-CV, 2020 WL 3393538, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 18,
2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting that under certain circumstances an appellate
court may treat a direct appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, but without a
specific request for mandamus relief, the court will not treat an appeal as an original
proceeding). We dismiss Amity’s sixth and seventh issues.

                                    CONCLUSION

      We sustain Amity’s first and fourth issues and overrule her second, third, and

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fifth issues. We dismiss Amity’s sixth and seventh issues for lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment denying Amity’s attorney’s
fees and prejudgment interest on the $882.00 arrearage. We remand the issue of
Amity’s attorneys’ fees, and further remand for the trial court to determine the
amount of prejudgment interest applicable to the court’s grant of child-support
arrearage of $882.00 to Amity. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other
respects.

                                      /s/    Jerry Zimmerer
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Zimmerer, and Wilson.

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