Court Opinion

ID: 9661495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:23.290766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.209665
License: Public Domain

FRANK C. PRICE,
Justice, dissenting from order.
I disagree with the majority’s rationale used to resolve the characterization issue. The majority is critical of the trial court judge for characterizing a plea of guilty as a plea without an agreed recommendation.
Appellant pleaded guilty to an indictment alleging first degree homicide. The plea papers filed with the court reflect “PSI with a cap of 30 years.” Any judge who has ever worked in the trial courts understands this language to mean there is no punishment agreement as to a set number of years. The PSI (pre-sentence investigation) will supply the trial court judge the necessary information to make an independent judgment. The 30-year cap is nothing more than the prosecution informing the trial court that 30 is the maximum number of years the case is worth and intends to argue for the maximum but recognizes the judge may think differently, thus the need for a PSI.
The trial judge understood this as well. During her admonishments, the judge in*143formed appellant she could assess his punishment anywhere from probation to 30 years confinement. At the conclusion of the plea, the judge found the evidence sufficient to establish guilt but deferred the finding until she read the PSI and conducted a punishment hearing. This preserved appellant’s hope for probation or a small number of years if the trial judge thought that was appropriate. After the hearing, the judge found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment as 30 years confinement. She then inquired if appellant wanted to appeal.
Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal which was approved by the trial court. The trial judge declared appellant indigent, appointed him an appellate attorney and provided his attorney with a cost-free appellate record. The certification form signed by the trial judge reflects that she did not consider this a plea bargain case.
The majority disagrees with this certification and takes the position that a sentencing cap is a complete and total plea bargain even though the trial court has the flexibility to assess punishment anywhere between the minimum and the cap. For support of its opinion, the majority relies on cases recited earlier.
These opinions, while not well reasoned, state that under Rule 25.2(a)(2)(B), a cap is a plea bargain that prohibits appeal without the trial court’s permission. Specifically, the rule states that “In a plea bargain case — that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty ... and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant — a defendant may appeal only ... (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.” Tex. R.App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
The rule requires that before there is a plea bargain the defendant must agree to “the punishment recommended by the prosecutor.” Id. The statute requires mandatory compliance. Appellant did not accept 30 years as an agreed-upon punishment. He merely agreed to let the prosecutor argue for 30 years which is the maximum the prosecutor thought the case was worth. Appellant asked for the PSI because he disagreed with the prosecutor as to the value of the case. Even the legislature, in setting a wide range of punishment, realized that because of divergent facts, all first degree felonies are not valued equally. The trial judge did not think the case was worth more than 30 years or she would have assessed more, or at least expressed her displeasure for not being allowed to if she felt committed to the cap.
This is no different than if the plea papers reflected “PSI-State to argue for 99 years.” According to the majority, anything the trial judge assessed between probation and 99 years would not be appeal-able.
There is nothing in the record here to suggest this case is worth more than 30 years or that the prosecutor, as a compromise or in exchange for the defendant’s plea of guilty, substantially limited the defendant’s punishment exposure by setting a 30-year cap. Obviously, appellant did not agree that 30 years was a proper or acceptable punishment or he would not have asked for a PSI and demanded a punishment hearing. Without an agreement, the mandates of Rule 25.2(a)(2)(B) are not met. Consequently, the trial court judge was correct in her characterization that this was a plea of guilty without an agreed recommendation.
For all the reasons listed above, I strongly disagree with how the majority disposes of this case.