Court Opinion

ID: 9657777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:37:38.275953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.288628
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). In 1971, on the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission,1 the divorce laws were amended to provide for the "substitution of one non-fault ground for divorce for the existing fault grounds.”2
The majority turns the clock back over twenty years in holding that fault remains "one of the relevant factors”3 for determining the division of property. Validating the introduction of evidence concerning marital fault reintroduces the evil sought to be remedied by the enactment of no-fault divorce. The construction placed by the majority on the 1971 statute4 is opposed by the overwhelming weight of authority.5_
*165I
The Law Revision Commission said that the introduction of fault as an issue in an action for divorce was a cause of delay in the courts, and that the recital of misconduct in a complaint for divorce "impedes the working out of suitable arrangements for custody of the children, visitation rights, alimony, child support and property settlement”6 and that in a fault regime "participants often are pressured to make unfair and unreasonable concessions as to child custody, alimony, child support or property division.”7
A
The goal of the Law Review Commission, eliminating fault as an issue, is expressed in the language recommended to and adopted by the Legislature: "In the complaint the plaintiff shall make no other explanation of the grounds for divorce than by the use of the statutory language.”8
The "statutory language” provides that a divorce shall be granted where "there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship to the extent that the objects of matrimony[9] have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.”10
The complaint frames the issues to be tried in a lawsuit. In barring the plaintiff from alleging any ground for divorce other than the statutory no-fault ground, the Legislature evidenced its intent *166to bar fault as an issue.11 The majority holds incongruously that fault, no longer an issue, may be considered in the division of property.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court observed:
Establishing blame for the failure of a marriage was a primary function under the prior divorce law. It was also the primary basis for criticism of that law and led to its repeal. The proponents of no-fault. divorce pointed out, and the legislature apparently agreed, that usually the conduct of both spouses contributes to the failure of a marriage, that establishing guilt and innocence is not really useful, and that the adversarial nature of fault-based divorce proceedings fosters bitterness and acrimony which are detrimental to both parties and any children involved.[12]
*167B
It makes little difference whether it is under one section of the divorce laws or another that a participant is, by introduction of fault as an issue, delayed in obtaining a divorce, or is impeded in working out suitable arrangements for property settlement, or is pressured to make unfair or unreasonable concessions concerning property division.
The legislative purpose — eliminating litigation concerning fault as a cause of delay, as an impediment to working out suitable arrangements, and as a cause of pressure to make unfair and unreasonable concessions concerning property division— is defeated by today’s decision allowing fault to be considered as a factor in determining property division.
c
If a trial judge must consider, in deciding property division, as a "factor,” that one or both of the participants, in violation of the marital vow, did not "forsake all others,” then, by the same rationale — now that fault is again a factor — the judge may also be called upon to consider, in dividing property, evidence that one party or both violated the promise to "live together in marriage,” or the promise to "love and comfort,” or the promises to *168"honor and keep” the other "for better or worse, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health.”
The majority argues that evidence of infidelity or domestic violence may be related to the statutory ground, "breakdown in the marriage relationship,” and that the statutory language "does not demonstrate any legislative intent to totally remove the consideration of the parties’ conduct during the marriage.”13 Any grievance tending to establish the statutory ground of "breakdown in the marriage relationship” would, again, under the majority’s analysis, be relevant without regard to whether there is any issue of child custody or property division. The divorce proceeding can again become a forum for finger-pointing and ventilating grievances, and the law returns full circle to where it was immediately before the Legislature enacted the no-fault statute.
The majority’s analysis makes even "cookie crumbs” relevant. Under the majority’s construction of the 1971 no-fault statute, the judge might consider, might even be obliged to consider, in deciding the division of property — to be sure only as a "factor” — whether a party did indeed eat cookies in bed.
D
It is noteworthy that the Law Revision Commission stated that the statute it was recommending was based on the Iowa statute. The Iowa Supreme Court held that evidence of fault respecting the breakdown of a marriage is inadmissible on the issues of property settlement, alimony, or support under a statute providing for dissolution of mar*169riage upon a finding that the marriage is no longer viable.14
In another case, the court said that not only must the "guilty party” concept be eliminated as a factor, but evidence of the conduct of the parties insofar as it tends to place fault for the breakdown of the marriage on either spouse must also be rejected as a factor in awarding a property settlement or an allowance of alimony or support money.15
II
Forty-three states currently provide for no-fault divorce.16 Of these, thirteen do not allow fault of any kind to be considered when dividing marital property where a no-fault divorce is entered.17 Two states permit the consideration only of "egregious” *171fault — behavior that shocks the conscience or indicates a blatant disregard of the marital relationship, such as attempting to murder a spouse, but not sexual infidelity.18 Ten states limit judicial consideration to "economic” fault — conduct, usually postseparation, that leads to depletion of marital financial resources.19 And one state limits con*173sideration to evidence of postseparation fault.20
While eight states do permit courts to consider fault other than egregious or economic fault when dividing marital property,21 none has a statutory *174scheme similar to Michigan’s. Most22 are distinguishable because, rather than eliminating traditional fault-based grounds, these states merely added a no-fault ground and thus have not removed fault from consideration.23
*175In sum, at least twenty-five no-fault states, and one traditional fault-based state, preclude consideration of fault that constitutes a cause of the breakdown of the marital relationship in deciding on the distribution of marital property. Of these, six presently have statutory schemes similar to Michigan’s — the legislatures adopted true no-fault divorce, eliminating traditional fault-based grounds, but did not amend property distribution statutes that are silent concerning the role of fault.24
Further, in • two other no-fault states where courts had previously held, like the majority does today, that, under statutory schemes similar to Michigan’s, fault other than egregious and economic fault could be considered, the legislatures subsequently amended the statutes expressly to provide that marital fault shall not be considered in dividing property.25
Of particular interest is the large number of states that have retained fault-based grounds for divorce but nevertheless preclude fault other than egregious and economic fault from consideration when dividing marital property.26 Clearly, it is the position of a large majority of states that marital fault should not be considered when distributing property.
*176Ill
The majority stresses the failure of the Legislature, when enacting the no-fault statute, to amend the statutory provisions concerning the division of property to expressly preclude consideration of fault.27 The property division provisions, however, say nothing about fault. It probably never occurred to any legislator, certainly not to the Law Revision Commission, that it was necessary to amend the property division provisions of the statute, as well as the provisions concerning the grounds for divorce, in order to accomplish the goal of eliminating fault as an issue in a divorce action.
If that had occurred to a legislator, it may very well have seemed beyond reasonable possibility that this Court would conclude that because fault was considered by the courts in <the division of property in a pre-no-fault divorce, that judicial pronouncements in a fault regime would be thought to have survived to play a role in the division of property in a no-fault divorce. The legislator may have assumed, apparently incorrectly, that a court obliged to implement legislative intent could not so manifestly misread and fail to implement the plain, well-advertised purpose of the no-fault statute to eliminate fault as a cause of delay, as an impediment to working out suitable arrangements, and as a cause of pressure to make unfair and unreasonable concessions concerning property division._
*177IV
The conduct of the parties in the marital setting is surely relevant in deciding any issue concerning the custody of children. A judge may also properly consider that one of the parties squandered family money when deciding upon the division of what is left of family property. It defeats, however, as most courts have concluded, the legislative purpose to allow fault, including sexual infidelity, to be generally considered as a factor in the division of property.

 Michigan Law Revision Commission, 5th Annual Report, p 7.

 Id., p 8.

 Ante, p 158.

 1971 PA 75, MCL 552.6; MSA 25.86.

 See part n.

 Commission Report, n 1 supra, p 8. (Emphasis added.)

 Id., p 7. (Emphasis added.)

 MCL 552.6(1); MSA 25.86(1).

9 The bill recommended by the commission spoke of the "legitimate objects of matrimony.” Commission Report, n 1 supra, p 11.

 MCL 552.6; MSA 25.86.

 The New Hampshire statute similarly provides:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, irrespective of the, fault of either party, on the ground of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. In any pleading or hearing of a libel for divorce under this section, allegations or evidence of speciñc acts of misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible, except where child custody is in issue . . . or . . . where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable differences. [NH Rev Stat Ann 458:7-a. Emphasis added.]
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has ruled that while fault can statutorily be considered in some limited circumstances, these are extreme, and fault should not routinely be considered in asset distribution. Murphy v Murphy, 116 NH 672; 366 A2d 479 (1976). In a later case, the court ruled that if a divorce is granted on no-fault grounds, fault may not be considered on questions of property division or alimony. Chabot v Chabot, 126 NH 793; 497 A2d 851 (1985). Subsequently, the court further ruled that in a no-fault divorce, marital misconduct may not be considered in property division. Boucher v Boucher, 131 NH 377; 553 A2d 313 (1988).

12 Dixon v Dixon, 107 Wis 2d 492, 502; 319 NW2d 846 (1982).
Homer H. Clark, Jr., in his treatise on domestic relations law, offered the following reasons for not considering fault in property distribution:
The arguments for this position are that divorces are now *167generally granted without regard to fault; that it is difficult to determine in most cases which spouse is at fault; that fault may merely be evidence of a marriage which is no longer viable; and that the whole concept of fault is one which is not relevant to the basis for the property division, i.e., that it recognizes the contribution which each spouse made to the marriage. [2 Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States (2d ed), § 16.3, p 195.]

 Ante, p 155.

 In re Marriage of Williams, 199 NW2d 339 (Iowa, 1972).

 In re Marriage of Tjaden, 199 NW2d 475 (Iowa, 1972).

 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Am Jur 2d Desk Book, Item No. 121, p 384 (1979), and Walker, Family law in the fifty states: An overview, 25 Family LQ 417, 439-440 (1992). See also ante, p 153, ns 18 and 19, and p 155, n 21.
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin replaced traditional fault-based grounds with no-fault as the sole ground for divorce. Id.
Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming added a no-fault ground to existing traditional fault-based grounds. Id.

 Alaska, California, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Pennsylvania expressly preclude courts from considering fault when distributing *170marital property. See Ky Rev Stat 403.190; 86 ALR3d 1116, 1127, § 4 (Supp, August, 1991), pp 57-58; NH Rev Stat Ann 458:7-a; 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 928, p 916; 23 Pa Stat Ann 3502.
Alaska: See Hartland v Hartland, 777 P2d 636 (Alas, 1989) (marital misconduct does not justify granting unequal percentages of the marital estate).
California: See, e.g., In re Marriage of Juick, 21 Cal App 3d 421; 98 Cal Rptr 324 (1971); In re Marriage of Silvers, 23 Cal App 3d 910; 100 Cal Rptr 731 (1972); In re Marriage of Rosan, 24 Cal App 3d 885; 101 Cal Rptr 295 (1972); In re Marriage of Cosgrove, 27 Cal App 3d 424; 103 Cal Rptr 733 (1972); In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal App 3d 372; 107 Cal Rptr 232 (1973).
Iowa: See part i(d).
Kentucky: See Ky Rev Stat 403.190, adopting the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act language that expressly excludes the consideration of marital misconduct in property distribution. This statute overruled Chapman v Chapman, 498 SW2d 134 (Ky, 1973), which held that fault could be considered in the distribution of assets because the legislature had failed to change the property distribution statute, when it adopted no-fault divorce, to expressly preclude fault from consideration.
Maine: See Boyd v Boyd, 421 A2d 1356 (Me, 1980) (marital fault is not to be considered at all in arriving at a property division).
Montana: See In re Marriage of Collett, 190 Mont 500; 621 P2d 1093 (1981) (the court is precluded from considering marital misconduct in disposing of marital assets).
Nebraska: See Campbell v Campbell, 202 Neb 575; 276 NW2d 220 (1979) (whether the unilateral act of one party had been responsible for the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage was not a proper factor for consideration by the trial court in making a division of property).
New Hampshire: See n 11 supra.
New Jersey: See Chalmers v Chalmers, 65 NJ 186; 320 A2d 478 (1974) (marital fault is not to be considered at all in arriving at a property division).
Oregon: See Minovsky v Minovsky, 10 Or App 540; 500 P2d 1234 (1972) (fault cannot be considered in determining a property division); In re Marriage of Koch, 58 Or App 252; 648 P2d 406 (1982) (the institution of no-fault divorce did away with the previous practice of assigning fault and awarding property or support on the basis of fault).
Pennsylvania: See 23 Pa Stat Ann 3502, stating that property rights must be determined "without regard to marital misconduct.”
South Dakota: See Baltzer v Baltzer, 422 NW2d 584, 587 (SD, 1988): "Factors to be considered in dividing marital property include: duration of the marriage; value of the property; ages of the parties; their health and competency to earn a living; the individual contributions of the parties to the accumulation of the property; and the income producing capacity of the parties’ individual assets. . . . Fault should not be considered.” (Emphasis added.) But see SD Cod Laws 25-4-45.1, allowing fault to be considered with regard to the awarding of property if it is relevant to "the acquisition of property during the *171marriage,” and allowing fault to be considered with regard to the awarding of child custody if it is relevant to "the fitness of either parent.”
Wisconsin: See Dixon v Dixon, n 12 supra, p 502 (marital misconduct should not be considered when deciding questions of property division and maintenance).

 Kansas and North Dakota. North Dakota also permits consideration of "economic waste by one spouse.” Martin v Martin, 450 NW2d 768, 770 (ND, 1990).
New York, which is not a no-fault state, also allows "egregious fault” to be considered.
Kansas: See In re Marriage of Sommers, 246 Kan 652; 792 P2d 1005 (1990) (fault may not be considered in a property division except in extreme situations, and a financial penalty may not be assessed because the legislature intended consideration of fault regarding grounds of dissolution only).
New York: See O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 589; 489 NE2d 712 (1985) (the statute authorizes courts to consider " 'any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper,’ ” but this may only be done in egregious cases that shock the conscience of the court, because only then would it be just and proper to take fault into account); Rosenberg v Rosenberg, 126 AD2d 537, 539; 510 NYS2d 659 (1987): "[gjenerally, 'the marital fault of a party is not a relevant consideration ... in distributing marital property . . . [unless the] marital misconduct is so egregious or uncivilized as to bespeak of a blatant disregard of the marital relationship [that is] misconduct that "shocks the conscience” of the court’ ” — "defendant’s adulterous relationship, . . . does not, without more,” constitute such egregious conduct.
North Dakota: See Martin v Martin, supra, p 770: "Without a determination of serious marital misconduct or economic waste by one spouse, we cannot direct substitution of an unbalanced division to the other spouse of property acquired during a long-term marriage.” (Emphasis added.)

 Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Arizona and Minnesota statutes expressly preclude courts from considering marital misconduct except for economic fault when distributing property. See Ariz Rev Stat 25-319; Minn Stat Ann 518.58(1).
South Dakota permits fault of any kind to be considered when *172determining child custody. North Dakota allows consideration of "serious marital misconduct” when dividing property. Martin v Martin, supra, p 770.
Arizona: See Oppenheimer v Oppenheimer, 22 Ariz App 238, 244; 526 P2d 762 (1974) (the statutory scheme expressly precludes a court from considering marital misconduct when distributing property unless such conduct leads to " '[e]xcessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and other property held in common’ ”). Ariz Rev Stat 25-319.
Florida: See Noah v Noah, 491 So 2d 1124 (Fla, 1986) (with respect to an alimony award, adultery is only relevant as it relates to depletion of financial resources); Mosbarger v Mosbarger, 547 So 2d 188 (Fla App, 1989) (the only type of marital misconduct that is relevant to distribution of assets is the type that translates into greater financial need due to depletion of Bnancial resources).
Illinois: See In re Marriage of Getautas, 189 Ill App 3d 148; 544 NE2d 1284 (1989) (the only misconduct that qualifies as economic fault is generally recognized in Illinois); In re Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill 2d 487; 563 NE2d 494 (1990) (economic fault is only that fault that leads to dissipation of assets and must occur while the marriage is undergoing irretrievable breakdown).
Indiana: See In re Marriage of REG v LMG, 571 NE2d 298 (Ind App, 1991) (the conduct of the parties during the marriage is irrelevant to the division of marital assets, except as it relates to the disposition or dissipation of property).
Maine: See Eaton v Eaton, 447 A2d 829 (Me, 1982) (marital fault, at least insofar as it relates to noneconomic issues, is an inappropriate consideration in property distribution). But see Boyd v Boyd, n 17 supra (marital fault is not to be considered at all in arriving at a property division).
Minnesota: See Minn Stat Ann 518.58(1), expressly excluding marital misconduct or fault from the consideration of the court, except insofar as waste of marital assets can be proven. This statute overruled Peterson v Peterson, 308 Minn 365; 242 NW2d 103 (1976), which held that fault could be considered in property disposition because the legislature, when it adopted no-fault divorce, had failed to enact proposed bills that would have removed fault from consideration.
North Dakota: See Martin v Martin, supra, p 770: "Without a determination of serious marital misconduct or economic waste by one spouse, we cannot direct substitution of an unbalanced division to the other spouse of property acquired during a long-term marriage.” (Emphasis added.)
South Dakota: See SD Cod Laws 25-4-45.1, providing that "[f]ault shall not be taken into account with regard to the awarding of property or the awarding of child custody, except as it may be relevant to the acquisition of property during the marriage or to the fitness of either parent in awarding the custody of children.” (Emphasis added.) This statute overruled Swenson v Swenson, 181 NW2d 864 (SD, 1970), which held that fault could be considered in property distribution.
*173Virginia: See Marion v Marion, 11 Va App 659; 401 SE2d 432 (1991) (fault that has an economic effect upon the marital property or its value may be considered); Aster v Gross, 7 Va App 1; 371 SE2d 833 (1988) (although the Virginia property division statute provides that the court may take into account the circumstances and factors in bringing about the end of the marriage, the only fault that counts in equitable distribution is economic fault).
West Virginia: See 14 W Va Code 48-2-32, excluding the consideration of fault or marital misconduct "except for a consideration of the economic consequences of conduct.”

 Georgia: See Anderson v Anderson, 237 Ga 886; 230 SE2d 272 (1976) (evidence of marital misconduct of either party in a divorce action based on the no-fault ground that the marriage is irretrievably broken is not admissible with regard either to alimony or the division of property between the parties).
See also McEachern v McEachern, 260 Ga 320; 394 SE2d 92 (1990) (evidence of postseparation adultery is relevant to the jury’s determination of alimony and property division in Georgia to the extent that it prevented reconciliation).

 Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.
Alabama: See Sides v Sides, 677 Ala 39; 221 So 2d 677 (1969) (allowing fault to be considered); Huggins v Huggins, 57 Ala App 691; 331 So 2d 704 (1976) (allowed fault to be considered in an alimony award, construed statutory silence as adding no-fault grounds to the existing fault grounds for divorce, and read the alimony statute as applicable regardless of the ground for the divorce itself); Miller v Miller, 361 So 2d 577 (Ala App, 1978) (the court considered the fault of a husband in committing adultery); Cooper v Cooper, 382 So 2d 569 (Ala App, 1980) (the court considered the fault of a spouse in committing adultery).
Connecticut: See Sweet v Sweet, 190 Conn 657; 462 A2d 1031 (1983) (considered evidence of a husband’s fault in connection with an award of alimony and division of marital property, though fault was not a consideration under the no-fault statute, statutes governing the division of property required the trial court to consider causes for dissolution of the marriage).
Missouri: See Givens v Givens, 599 SW2d 204, 205-206 (Mo App, 1980): “The trial court has discretion in the division of marital property and a just division does not have to be equal, particularly where one party has engaged in misconduct. . . . Among the factors to be considered by the court in distributing the marital property is the conduct of the parties during the marriage. . . . While marital misconduct may serve as a basis for the court in dividing the marital property, it 'should not serve as a basis for ordering excessive mainte*174nance against, or inadequate marital property to, the offending spouse.’ ” See also Hogan v Hogan, 651 SW2d 585, 586 (Mo App, 1983) (the conduct of the parties is among the factors to be considered in the division of marital property).
Nevada: See Heim v Heim, 104 Nev 605; 763 P2d 678 (1988) (the concept of fault is consistent with the statutory requirement that property division and alimony awards be just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties).
Rhode Island: See Conley v Conley, 508 A2d 676 (RI, 1986) (the court was justified in assigning the marital home to the wife upon the basis of findings regarding the wife’s conduct and contribution during the marriage and the husband’s abusive conduct and his limited participation in preserving it).
South Carolina: See Woodside v Woodside, 290 SC 366; 350 SE2d 407 (1986) (the conduct factor becomes important in equitable distribution when the conduct of one party to the marriage throws upon the other party burdens beyond the norms to be expected in a marital relationship, and when this happens, such misconduct would affect property distribution).
Texas: See Young v Young, 609 SW2d 758 (Tex, 1980) (fault can be considered in property disposition). But the divorce at issue was based on one of the retained traditional fault-based grounds. It is therefore unclear what the Texas Supreme Court’s position is regarding the consideration of fault in property distribution based on no-fault divorce. But see Clay v Clay, 550 SW2d 730 (Tex Civ App, 1977) (where in a divorce granted on a no-fault ground, the trial court, in dividing property, could consider the jury’s finding that the wife was guilty of cruelty); Hourigan v Hourigan, 635 SW2d 556 (Tex App, 1981) (where a divorce is based on both no-fault and fault grounds, the court could consider the fault of one spouse in breaking up a marriage in making the property division).
Wyoming: See Grosskopf v Grosskopf, 677 P2d 814, 818 (Wyo, 1984) (because the Wyoming no-fault statute states that divorce may be decreed upon " 'the complaint of the aggrieved party,’ ” [emphasis added] this term necessarily implies that one party is to blame, and therefore the trial court could consider fault of respective parties together with all other facts and circumstances surrounding dissolution of a marriage for purposes of determining the division of property, alimony, and an award of attorney fees); Igo v Igo, 759 P2d 1253 (Wyo, 1988) (the court has discretion, in the division of property, to consider the fault of the respective parties).

 Alabama, Connecticut, Missouri, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wyoming. See n 16 supra.

 The majority distinguishes Idaho, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylva*175nia, and Rhode Island from Michigan on the basis that these states "merely added nonfault grounds to the traditional fault grounds such as adultery and desertion.” Ante, p 153. That, however, cuts the other way. Many of the states that have merely added no-fault grounds to the traditional fault-based grounds still preclude their courts from considering fault when dividing marital property, at least if the divorce was granted on no-fault grounds. See ns 16-21.

 Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. See n 16 supra.

 Kentucky and Minnesota. See ns 17 and 19.

 Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. See ns 16-20.

 The majority’s reliance (ante, pp 156-157 and ns 24 and 25) on the dictum of Kretzschmar v Kretzschmar, 48 Mich App 279; 210 NW2d 352 (1973), is without reexamination by this Court of the legislative materials discussed in Kretzschmar. The legislative history there discussed says nothing, one way or the other, about the issue now before us.