Court Opinion

ID: 2963417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:09:29.103688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:21.118029
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        June 14, 1995           [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                           

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2316 

                                 WILLIAM J. ROBINSON,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               DAVID P. TONIS, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert B. Collings, Magistrate Judge]
                                               ________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            William J. Robinson on brief pro se.
            ___________________
            Frank A. Smith, III  and Frank A. Smith III & Associates, P.C.  on
            ___________________      _____________________________________
        brief for appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per Curiam.  The court did not abuse its discretion
                      __________

            in first denying plaintiff a continuance and later dismissing

            plaintiff's  action with  prejudice  when plaintiff  did  not

            appear  for trial.   Plaintiff had  sufficient notice  of the

            trial date and adequate time to prepare.  Plaintiff's hope or

            expectation  that his  case  would not  be  tried until  mid-

            November  was   unjustified,  for   it  was   quite  possible

            throughout   that   the   intervening   case   would  settle.

            Consequently, plaintiff  should  have been  ready to  proceed

            when the case did settle.

                      Plaintiff argues that dismissal with  prejudice was

            too harsh because  he had  not exhibited a  pattern of  delay

            (instead, he had duly appeared at all prior conferences)  and

            because, plaintiff  believes, defendant  would not  have been

            prejudiced  had  plaintiff been  permitted  to  reinstate his

            case.   We disagree.  A continuance had been properly denied,

            the jury  had  been empaneled,  and  trial was  scheduled  to

            proceed when  plaintiff failed to appear.  The district court

            was well within its discretion in concluding that plaintiff's

            disregard  for the  court's  scheduling  order warranted  the

            harshest  sanction.    See  Goldman,  Antonetti,  Ferraiuoli,
                                   ___  _________________________________

            Axtmayer  & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 691-
            ___________________    __________________

            92 (1st Cir. 1993); Barreto v. Citibank, 907 F.2d 15, 16 (1st
                                _______    ________

            Cir.  1990)  (dismissal  warranted  to  deter  litigants from

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            misconduct impeding the court's ability to manage its limited

            resources).

                      We  reject   plaintiff's  attack  on   the  court's

            allowance of costs  to defendant.   Even if  -- as  plaintiff

            asserts --  defendant agreed not  to seek costs  if plaintiff

            discontinued his case,  plaintiff essentially repudiated that

            agreement by moving  to vacate the court's order of dismissal

            and to set his case for trial.

                      Affirmed.
                      ________

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