Court Opinion

ID: 9539515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:05:23.372484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:54.951171
License: Public Domain

BIVINS, Judge (dissenting). While I agree with the majority that the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) could properly find that the union office is work for which Worker is fitted, and that the odd-lot doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of the present case, I cannot agree with the majority opinion which adopts “reduction in the spectrum of job opportunities” as an additional test for disability, and remands for reconsideration based on that standard. I therefore respectfully dissent. My concerns include: (1) lack of preservation of that issue; (2) failure to raise the issue on appeal, or, to the extent the reply brief may be said to suggest the issue, raising the issue too late; (3) “reaching out” to find basis for reversal; (4) adopting a test for disability that is not supported by case law on which opinion relies, and one that is contrary to the plain wording of the statutes, and (5) lack of direction to the WCJ as to what is expected on remand. I will expand on some of these concerns. 1. Lack of Preservation The pre-trial order sets forth the only issues remaining to be decided. The first issue is “whether Respondent’s total disability benefits should be reduced because of his employment in an elected capacity ... for Local Union No. 412, and if so, to what percentage and when.” As I read Worker’s requested findings, particularly numbers 16-27, he is asking the WCJ to find that he is wholly unable to perform: (1) the task of the job he was doing at the time of the injury; and (2) any other work for which he is fitted by reason of the criteria set forth in the statute. I do not read the requested findings as asking the WCJ to consider, in determining disability, the reduction in the spectrum of job opportunities. In sum, in order for this court to consider the issue, Worker must have invoked a ruling below. See SCRA 1986, 12-216(A); SCRA 1986, 12-213(A)(3); see also Gutierrez v. Albertsons, Inc., 113 N.M. 256, 259-60, 824 P.2d 1058, 1061-62 (Ct.App.1991) (burden on appellant to show issue ruled on below), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 44, 822 P.2d 1127 (1992). 2. Failure to Properly Raise the Issue on Appeal Moreover, I do not see anything in Worker’s brief-in-chief raising the reduction in the spectrum of job opportunities as an issue. Worker argues that his election to a union office was not “any work” for which he is fitted. His argument is based on the odd-lot doctrine which the majority rejects. I recognize in his reply brief, Worker does mention reduction in job opportunities; however, even if it can be said he intended to raise the issue that the majority now uses as its rationale, I think the issue came too late. See SCRA 1986, 12-213(A); see also Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 96 N.M. 433, 436, 631 P.2d 728, 731 (Ct.App.1981); Santistevan v. Centinel Bank, 96 N.M. 734, 737, 634 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Ct.App.1980); rev’d in part on other grounds, 96 N.M. 730, 634 P.2d 1282 (1981). Moreover, I interpret that brief remark regarding reduction in job opportunities as being in the context of the preceding sentences dealing with Worker being limited to only three possible union offices, not a reduction of job opportunities in the general market. 3. Reaching Out for a Basis for Reversal I believe that the majority strains to find a reason to remand, and unnecessarily suggests the result desired to be reached. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep’t v. Staples (In re Doe), 98 N.M. 540, 541, 650 P.2d 824, 825 (1982) (error for Court of Appeals to ignore arguments presented in briefs and issue opinion on ground not raised). It is not clear to me whether remand is based on the failure to consider the reduction in spectrum of job opportunities, or the fact that the WCJ may have weighed in his calculation the fact that Worker actually won his election. I think the analysis by the WCJ dispels that contention. Reference to the election was included, as I read the analysis, to answer Worker’s argument that “the elected union official position does not constitute work,” the position that Worker has taken on appeal under his first issue. The WCJ, referring to 1A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 56-35 (1989), considered elected positions for union officials just as compensable for workers’ compensation purposes as elected positions for public officials such as judges. I see no undue amount of weight given to that factor which would in any way justify remand. 4. “Reduction in Spectrum” Test As I understand the majority opinion, an additional test is being adopted to determine disability: “reduction in the spectrum of job opportunities.” While the majority opinion suggests that the test is supported by both statutes and case law, I would disagree. The test is not supported by ease law on which the opinion relies, and is contrary to the plain wording of the statutes. a. New Mexico Statutes Partial disability is defined as: [A] condition whereby a workman, by reason of injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, is unable to some percentage-extent to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of the injury and is unable to some percentage-extent to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-25. The statute does not support consideration of the “reduction in spectrum” of job opportunities, but rather concentrates on the ability to perform work a worker had been performing and “any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience.” Id. Having upheld the WCJ’s findings that the union position was a real job and that Worker is unable, by reason of the criteria set forth above under Section 52-1-25, to perform the usual tasks in the work, this court should affirm. Curiously, Worker does not challenge that percentage, only whether the work constituted a real job as opposed to odd-lot work.1  b. New Mexico Cases The majority also suggests that the New Mexico cases cited in the opinion are “representative” and “illustrate that the percentage of partial disability is based on the reduction in the spectrum of work for which the injured worker is fitted.” I do not find support for the “reduction in spectrum” test in these cases. One of the cases relied on by the majority is Anaya v. New Mexico Steel Erectors, 94 N.M. 370, 610 P.2d 1199 (1980). I note initially that the validity of this case has been questioned in later decisions of this court because Anaya apparently inadvertently relied on our earlier wage-earning statute, rather than the relevant capacity to do work statute. See Smith v. Trailways Bus Sys., 96 N.M. 79, 81-82, 628 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Ct.App.1981). Even if Anaya were relevant, it does not support the majority’s conclusion. In Ana-ya, the supreme court explained that while the worker was fitted to perform his present job involving light construction because of his experience and skills, his present disability (injury to right elbow resulting in partial loss of use of right arm and hand and permanent pain in area) “prevents him from performing all of the work for which he is fitted by his experience and skills: heavy construction and iron work.” Id. at 372, 610 P.2d at 1201. Later the opinion explains that “a workman is disabled if he cannot perform some or all the work for which he is fitted by reason of the various factors listed in the statute.” Id. In the instant action, because Worker is unable, due to his injury, to perform some of the work for which he is fitted — pipe fitting and presently climbing in and out of ditches — an award of partial disability would be proper. Anaya does not appear to hold that “partial disability is based on the reduction in the spectrum of work for which the injured worker is fitted” but rather track the language of the statute in holding that partial disability is based on the reduction in ability to perform that work for which the employee is fitted under the statute. In Jaramillo v. Kaufman Plumbing & Heating Co., 103 N.M. 400, 708 P.2d 312 (1985), the worker, a carpenter, fell and hit his head when jumping from a scaffold. As a result of his injuries, the worker complained of neck pain, headaches, dizziness, and pain and numbness in his right shoulder and arm. The worker was employed as a police officer for a period of time after his injury. In Jaramillo, the worker conceded that he was no longer totally disabled. Id. at 404, 708 P.2d at 316. While the court did not expressly state its reasons for affirming a finding of 15% partial disability, the court discussed eases such as Anaya, which held that inability to perform some of the work for which an individual was fitted was sufficient to uphold a finding of partial disability. Again, I see no suggestion in this case that the reduction of the spectrum of work for which the employee was fitted was a factor. In Schober v. Mountain Bell Telephone, 96 N.M. 376, 630 P.2d 1231 (Ct.App.1980), the worker could no longer perform some of the work for which he was fitted (electronics) because of his injury (smoke allergy). The worker learned how to install sprinklers and started his own business. The worker was found 30% disabled. Reasoning that because the worker’s current employment did not utilize his training and background experience, the court affirmed an award for disability benefits. Id. at 381, 630 P.2d at 1236. While the meaning of this statement is less than clear, I do not read it to mean the court considered reduction in job opportunities. Finally, in Gonzales v. Stanke-Brown & Associates, Inc., 98 N.M. 379, 648 P.2d 1192 (Ct.App.1982), the worker testified as to a decreased ability to perform certain tasks of his job and an increase in the time taken for those tasks which he was able to continue performing. The court decided the issue of disability summarily, finding that the worker’s testimony supported a finding of increased disability. Id. at 381, 648 P.2d at 1194. None of the New Mexico cases cited in the majority opinion support application of the “reduction in spectrum” test as suggested by the majority opinion. c. Other Authority The majority “find[s] additional support for [its] conclusion in jurisdictions that measure disability in terms of wage-earning capacity.” These cases are distinguishable because the statutes involved use earning capacity as the basis for disability, not capacity to perform work. Quintana v. Trotz Construction Co., 79 N.M. 109, 111, 440 P.2d 301, 303 (1968), overruled on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030 (1977), sets forth the test in New Mexico applicable to this case. It is easy to see why reduction in the spectrum of job opportunities could affect loss in wage-earning capacity. As noted in Taylor v. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co., 243 Mont. 464, 795 P.2d 433 (1990), for example, one of the cases cited by the majority, the worker, although returning to employment in a less strenuous job, had less advancement opportunities. Id. at 435. Applying the test for loss of earning capacity or whether the industrial accident caused a loss of ability to earn in the open market, the court affirmed the lower court’s award. Those considerations are not relevant to capacity to perform work, the test in New Mexico. The majority’s out of state cases do not support the conclusion reached. The majority has, by grafting on the reduction in spectrum of job opportunities standard to reduction of capacity to perform work, created a hybrid test. Not only is the new test beyond the plain meaning of the statute, I find it difficult to understand any justification for the change now. The capacity to perform work standard has been the law for almost thirty years. Moreover, if the majority’s position regarding the “reduction in spectrum” of job opportunities is not new, then I do not understand the rationale for remand. I believe that the WCJ’s findings of fact are sufficiently broad to have covered the statutory language, and if the concept of “reduction in spectrum” of job opportunities is implicit within that language, then his findings include that concept. Moreover, there was testimony brought out by Worker’s attorney through Mr. Patrick Ortiz regarding other employment, i.e., administrative assistant to contractors; therefore, how can we say that the WCJ did not consider this in his findings? The majority’s statement that there was no evidence in the record that Worker is fitted for any other work is incorrect. 5. Lack of Direction My final concern is the lack of direction provided to the WCJ as to what is expected on remand, i.e., who has burden of proving reduction of spectrum of job opportunities and, since this is a new concept, whether additional evidence may be received. If I understand the “reduction of spectrum” concept, it means that there must be proof not only of inability, either in whole or in part, to perform “any work for which [worker] is fitted,” but also there must be proof of the reduction of job opportunities in the general market. Who has the burden of proof of this second test? In Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 82 N.M. 424, 427, 483 P.2d 305, 308 (Ct.App.1970), this court states that once the worker puts on evidence as to his limitations and restrictions, then it is up to the employer to prove jobs for which the worker is fitted. Does this test require that the employer not only prove fitness but also the general spectrum of job opportunities and the extent to which the worker cannot find employment? Additionally, how does the “reduction in spectrum” of job opportunities factor into the equation? For example, where an injured worker is re-employed in a new job for which he is fitted, although with some disability, as in the case before us, how does the WCJ factor in the reduction of the spectrum of job opportunities? Here, the WCJ awarded 55% permanent partial disability apparently because Worker was unable to climb in and out of ditches, a desirable but apparently non-essential aspect of his job as business agent for the union. I would assume, based on the majority opinion, the WCJ must now factor in additionally any reduction in spectrum of job opportunities. What weight is to be given to this new standard? How is it to be considered — i.e. in addition to, or along with, reduction in capacity? Because I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to remand based on the “reduction of spectrum” test, I dissent.  . Indeed, Worker could hardly claim 55% partial disability inadequate when he is able to perform all the tasks of the two union positions except for climbing, a task that is apparently non-essential to his responsibilities.