Court Opinion

ID: 9779602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:25:38.475682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:36.685459
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: The issue in this case is a relatively simple one. May a circuit court entertain a petition of juvenile delinquency when the subject of the petition is 21 years of age? The answer is simple: the court may not. For that reason, the circuit court correctly dismissed the delinquency petition filed in this case, and the appellate court’s judgment should be affirmed. Instead of recognizing that the circuit court is powerless to grant the relief requested in the petition, i.e., the adjudication of the respondent as a delinquent and a ward of the court, the court instead insists on sending the case back to the circuit court “for further proceedings consistent with this decision.” 239 Ill. 2d at 307. What further proceedings can occur, given the facts, is anybody’s guess. I, therefore, write separately to set forth my views on why the State can no longer obtain relief from the circuit court on its petition for delinquency. Article V of the Juvenile Court Act, which addresses delinquent minors, creates a special procedural and substantive enclave for minors accused of criminal acts. Not only is the purpose of this article to “ ‘dealt 1 with the problem of juvenile delinquency’ ” (In re Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d 526, 534 (2006), quoting 705 ILCS 405/5— 101(1) (West 1998)), but its “overriding purpose” is to “deal with delinquency in those ‘under the age of 21.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Jaime P., 223 Ill. 2d at 534, quoting 705 ILCS 405/5 — 101(10) (West 1998). According to article V, a delinquent minor “means any minor who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or State law, county or municipal ordinance.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — 105(3) (West 2008). A minor is defined as a “person under the age of 21 years.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — 105(10) (West 2008). In furtherance of its purpose, under article Y, a minor is to be accorded preferential and protective treatment not available to adults accused of committing crimes. For example, special obligations not applicable in adult criminal proceedings are imposed on the arresting officer (705 ILCS 405/5— 405 (West 2008)), pretrial judge (705 ILCS 405/5 — 501 (West 2008)), the State’s Attorney (705 ILCS 405/5— 415(2) (West 2008)), and trial judge (705 ILCS 405/5— 601 (West 2008)). The ultimate result of these special procedures differs, in substantial ways, from that of an adult criminal proceeding. Indeed, a successful prosecution under article V results not in a conviction of a crime, but rather in an adjudication of delinquency. Although a juvenile adjudged delinquent may be placed in detention, the detention cannot go beyond the attainment of the age of 21. 705 ILCS 405/5 — 750(3) (West 2008). Finally, by statute, all proceedings under the Act “automatically terminate upon [respondent’s] attaining the age of 21 years.” 705 ILCS 405/5 — 755(1) (West 2008). Accordingly, by definition, persons over the age of 21 are not entitled to the protections of the Act. There is no dispute in this case that defendant here was over 21 when the proceedings were instituted. The Act by its own language does not apply to him. More importantly, the circuit court could no longer enter a judgment of delinquency against him. By virtue of the State’s delay, defendant has outgrown his status as a juvenile and the purposes and benefits of the Act. The circuit court does not have the authority to adjudicate the matter of respondent’s delinquency. As such, the circuit court correctly dismissed the State’s petition. Rather than apply the statutory provisions, the court gets distracted by arguments regarding subject matter and personal jurisdiction, concepts that have nothing to do with the real issue: whether the circuit court has the authority under article V of the Juvenile Court Act to adjudicate a petition of delinquency filed against a 21-year-old. There is no question that the legislature made the adjudication of a minor’s delinquency a “justiciable matter” as that term is used in section 9 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution. In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 415-17 (2001); In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 444 (2009) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas and Burke, JJ.). The problem though remains that, because the respondent is 21 years old, the Act no longer applies to him, which renders the circuit court unable to grant relief under the Act. See In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d at 416; see also People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 564 (2003) (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, C.J.), citing In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 75 (1993) (Miller, C.J., concurring, joined by Bilandic, J.). A court cannot enter a judgment unauthorized by law. People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552 (2002); People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995). There was no action the circuit court could have taken in this case but to dismiss, again not for lack of jurisdiction, but more appropriately due to an inability to exercise jurisdiction given the parameters of the statute in question. See H. Fins, Re-Examination of “Jurisdiction” in Light of New Illinois Judicial Article, 53 Ill. B.J. 8 (1964). Because this court can affirm for any reason apparent in the record, the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed. JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.