Court Opinion

ID: 9532882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:49.459935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.848626
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
In my view, we should revisit the admissibility of polygraph evidence. That has not been done with any degree of careful assessment of the state of the art of polygraphy or, more importantly, of its potential for helping to eliminate undetectable error in the subjective assessment of a defendant’s credibility on the basis of the defendant’s demeanor. There is no scientific basis whatsoever, that I am aware of, for concluding that judges or juries are able to make unerringly valid judgments as to credibility on the basis of demeanor, notwithstanding the long-held assumption, and even presumption, that they can do so. Indeed, what evidence there is strongly suggests frequent error. Surely, there is no paucity of evidence in legal litera*347ture to the effect that horrendous mistakes have been made from time to time because of faulty credibility assessments.
Although polygraph test evidence is not foolproof, it is a mistake to assume that all scientific evidence is. See, e.g., Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1987). Moreover, polygraph evidence is more like an expert’s opinion based on a generally accepted technique or test than a scientific test based on principles of physics, chemistry, or another hard science. In truth, courts admit much expert opinion based on statistical correlations, standardized psychological tests, and even an expert’s own practical or clinical experience.
I think a defendant, and perhaps the prosecution, should have the right under certain circumstances to use the result of such a test, rather than having credibility decided solely on the basis of a nonreviewable, highly subjective judgment as to one’s demeanor. It is noteworthy that State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), indicated that the issue has not been disposed of for all time.