Court Opinion

ID: 9490954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:00:00.062931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:25.814919
License: Public Domain

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority fundamentally misreads City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), and the resulting inquiry for determining the proper “congruence” and “proportionality” of Congress’s exercise of its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion successfully distinguishes, at best, the Flores Court’s alternate holding, and, at worst, its dicta. Because the issue we face is directly controlled by the core holding of Flores, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s diligent effort to resolve this difficult problem.
I.
A.
The majority relies primarily on congressional findings to distinguish the ADA from RFRA: “Congress’ inclusion of detailed findings in the ADA is an important distinguishing feature between this case and Flores.” Op. at 438. This “important distinguishing feature,” alone, however, cannot meet the “congruence and proportionality” standard outlined in Flores.
In Flores, the Court saw a myriad of problems with RFRA, just one of which was that there were inadequate findings to support the congressional judgment. The Court went to great lengths to note the independence of RFRA’s constitutional infirmities: “Regardless of the state of the legislative record,, RFRA cannot.be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning.” Flores, at —-, 117 S.Ct. at 2170 (emphasis added). Without more, therefore, the majority’s primary justification for distinguishing the ADA from RFRA logically fails.
B.
Unlike the majority, I regard the central issue not to be the presence or absence of congressional findings. That issue obscures the crux of the problem, which is whether, in the ADA, Congress, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, could increase the level of judicial scrutiny for states’ actions that incidentally burden disabled persons. In the wake of Flores, it could not.1
1.
In Flores, the Court rejected the notion that Congress can expand the substantive scope of constitutional rights using its section 5 powers:
*440Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the “provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].”
Flores, at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2164 (brackets in original). The Court decided that, in enacting RFRA, Congress had impermissibly attempted to expand the scope of substantive constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting generally applicable laws that had the effect of burdening religion to' a higher level of judicial scrutiny than what had been deemed appropriate in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887-88, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1604-05, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990): “Regardless of the state of the legislative record,” Congress could not create a substantive constitutional' right to “strict scrutiny” for these laws to which the Supreme Court had already determined that a lower standard of review should apply. See Flores, at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2170. The Court noted RFRA’s cardinal vice:
The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. If an objector can show a substantial burden on his free exercise, the State must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its interest____ Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise. We make these observations ... to illustrate the substantive alteration of [Smith ’.s] holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional invasion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.
Id. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2171.
2.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), the Court rejected this court’s attempt to make the mentally disabled a suspect, or quasi-suspect, class for Equal Protection purposes: “[W]e conclude for several reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally, accorded economic and social legislation.” Cleburne, at 442, 105 S.Ct. at 3255. The Court determined that state legislation having incidental burdens on the disabled would be subject to rational basis scrutiny, see id., under which state action affecting the disabled is constitutional if “rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.” Id. at 446, 105 S.Ct. at 3257. The holding of Cleburne, therefore, sets the outer bounds of congressional remedial powers under section 5:
Congress’ section five enforcement power, as it pertains to the Equal Protection Clause in cases not involving suspect or quasi-suspect classes or fundamental interests, is limited to the elimination of arbitrariness or the effects of arbitrary government action, and does not permit Congress to prohibit or otherwise target reasonable state decisions or practices.
Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir.1997).
3.
RFRA’s similarity to the ADA is striking, and compels the conclusion that Flores controls the instant case. Both RFRA and the ADA purport to establish greater rights for individuals against the states by increasing the measure of judicial scrutiny for conflicting state actions to a level higher than the Supreme Court has found appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As the majority opinion reflects, see Op. at 437-438, the ADA increases the judicial scrutiny level applicable for disabled persons by *441requiring a closer nexus between the governmental purpose and the governmental means than presently exists under rational basis scrutiny. The ADA mandates an affirmative justification for a state action that has the effect of incidentally burdening these non-suspect classes of persons; a state’s actions are no longer presumptively valid if rationally related to the interests that they serve. Instead, the state must make “reasonable accommodations” for the disabled — and only once the state can show that it cannot “reasonably accommodate” will the courts validate the state’s chosen policy. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
Such “searching judicial scrutiny” is incompatible with the more lenient rational basis test. Accordingly, the ADA, by its very terms, “remedies” more than “arbitrary” local governmental actions against the disabled. The Flores Court could well have spoken about the ADA by changing but a few words:
The stringent test [the ADA] demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. If an objector can show a substantial burden [of his rights under the ADA], the State must [show that it cannot reasonably accommodate him].... Laws valid under [Cleburne ] would fall under [the ADA] without regard to whether they [were rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose]. We make these observations ... to illustrate the substantive alteration of [Cleburne’s] holding attempted by [the ADA]. Even assuming [the ADA] would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional invasion into the States’, traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.
Flores, at --, 117 S.Ct. at 2171 (illustrative alterations added).
The majority attempts to meet these arguments, stating:
Aso, we are convinced that the threat posed by RFRA to our principles of-separation of powers is not similarly posed by the ADA. In the ADA, Congress included no language attempting to upset the balance of powers and usurp the Court’s function of establishing a standard of review different from the one previously established by the Supreme Court.
Op. at 438. For the majority, the proposition is self-evident; its “deference” to Congress is so great that it does not recognize what should be apparent: Congress’s definition of a' constitutional violation where there previously was none. Congress has done so by the “reasonable accommodation” language in the ADA, which increases the judicial scrutiny level for the disabled above that set forth in Cleburne.2
II.
Some may resist the resolution I suggest, because of a fear that it would eviscerate the basic protections the ADA gives disabled individuals against discriminatory state action. Those fears are unfounded, however.
Congress enacted the ADA under both the Commerce Clause and section 5. Of the two congressional powers, after Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), only the Fourteenth Amendment can provide a vehicle for abrogating a state’s protection, under the Elev*442enth Amendment, from suit in federal court. See Seminole Tribe, id. at 59, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. Under this reasoning, therefore, while an ADA suit against a state could not go forward in federal court, the plaintiff still could sue a state in state court3 to enforce the obligations the state owes the disabled under the ADA.4
Unlike the majority, therefore, I would repose my confidence in the state courts to enforce the ADA’s guarantees against the states. I would dismiss this claim, without prejudice, as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.5 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Unfortunately, not only does the majority fundamentally misread Flores, but it also fundamentally misconstrues the crux of this dissent. My argument does not rely (as the majority says) on the premise that “Congress does not have the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit constitutional conduct.” Op. at 438. Instead, my view, as was the Supreme Court’s in Flores, is that Congress does not have the power to tell us what' is, or is not, constitutional conduct in the first place. See Flores, at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2164.

. Although the majority decides to side with Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir.), petition for cert, filed., 66 U.S.L.W. 3308 (Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 974686), I choose instead to rely on the better-reasoned opinion in Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 987 F.Supp. 451, 458 (E.D.N.C.1997)): "Because the Supreme Court held in Cleburne that disabled people are not a class entitled to increased Fourteenth Amendment protection, this Court cannot now decide that Congress had the power to declare otherwise in the ADA. Thus, Congress is outside its Enforcement Clause authority in attempting to abrogate North Carolina’s sovereign immunity with the ADA.”

. Congress has abrogated the states' sovereign immunity from suit in state courts under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202.

. Although I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power cannot support the ADA’s enactment, most would agree that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, as it is now defined by the Supreme Court, supports the ADA’s imposition of anti-discrimination obligations on private actors engaging in such commerce. To the extent these obligations are "generally applicable” ones, the commerce power, therefore, also may support Congress’s power to subject the states to these burdens. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985).
I express no opinion whether the particular relief Coolbaugh seeks would fit within the Garcia framework. After Seminole Tribe, that inquiry most likely falls to the state courts to decide in the first instance.

. Throughout, I have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment issue is properly before our court. Still, I am uncomfortable with the posture in which that issue was raised and decided in this case. The parties had not initially raised or briefed this issue in this court or the district court. In response to this court's request for briefing on the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment, the state submitted a two-page letter rejecting federal jurisdiction based on its analysis of Seminole Tribe; the state did not indicate whether it had waived its immunity.
The Eleventh Amendment, in a very real sense, goes to our jurisdiction under Article III to decide this case. Raising this sua sponte is problematic, however, in light of Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2567 n. 19, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982), in which the Court stated: "[Bjecause of the importance of state law in analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and because the State may, under certain circumstances, waive this defense, we have never held that [the Eleventh Amendment] is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised by this Court on its own motion.”
The result of this footnote in Patsy has been disarray in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 582 n. 6 (4th Cir.1997) (following the footnote and refusing to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue because it was not raised by the parties); Flores v. Long, 110 F.3d 730, 732 (10th Cir.1997) (noting the Patsy language and refusing to decide whether the rule is discretionary or mandatory); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996) (exercising sua sponte review of the Eleventh Amendment issue and finding that Seminole Tribe abrogates the footnote), modified on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir.1997); Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955, 960 n. 4 (7th Cir.1996) (noting the Patsy language); Mascheroni v. Board of Regents, 28 F.3d 1554, 1558 (10th Cir.1994) (noting Patsy and debating — without deciding— whether the rule is mandatory or permissive); Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. I.C.C., 934 F.2d 327, 341 (D.C.Cir.1991) (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (noting Patsy).
One court has treated the Eleventh Amendment as an affirmative defense in light of Patsy. See ITSI TV Prods., Inc. v. Agricultural Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir.1993). Although this captures .the spirit of the Patsy footnote, it ignores the teachings of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1363, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), to the effect that the Eleventh Amendment can be raised by the state for the first time on appeal.
Not surprisingly, the academy has commented on the Patsy footnote. See Richard H. Fallon, et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1098 n. 2 (4th ed.1996). Most seem to conclude that the ban on sua sponte review is a prudential, discretionary rule, rather than a mandatory one. See, e.g., H. Stephen Harris & Michael P. Kenney, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After Atascadero: the Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 Emory L.J. 645, 720 n. 132 (1988); Thomas R. Johnson, Note, The Eleventh Amendment — the Fourth Circuit's Adaptation of Hess v. Trans-Hudson Port Authority Corp. in Gray v. Laws, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 347, 375 n. 143 (1996); Robert J. Martineau, Subject Matter Jurisdiction as a New Issue on Appeal: Reining in an Unruly Horse, 1988 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 35 n. 191.