Court Opinion

ID: 9648094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:02:09.294525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.184736
License: Public Domain

REID, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Despite some reservations regarding the majority’s response to the assignments of error charging discrimination based on race, the defendant is a black male and the victim was a white female, I concur with the majority’s decision affirming the conviction of first degree felony murder.
The language of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), is particularly applicable to the facts of this case: “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors ... might give rise to [the] inference of discrimination” required to establish a pri-ma facie case of purposeful discrimination in selecting the jury.
Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.
Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. The first five peremptory challenges exercised by the *928State were of black prospective jurors. The majority opinion appears to acknowledge that a prima facie case of discrimination was established as to the peremptory strike which is at issue in this appeal, thereby shifting the burden of proof to the State to present a neutral reason for the strike. The evidence supporting the State’s proposition that its strike was based on the juror’s hostility, evasiveness, and opposition to the death penalty is meager. In exercising its duty to determine if the State’s “neutral explanation” is adequate, a trial court should require clear and specific reasons for peremptory strikes to prevent the assurance of equal protection from becoming “vain and illusory.” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598, 55 S.Ct. 579, 583-84, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935)).
I agree that, because the issue of intentional discrimination turns in large part on the credibility of the prosecutor, great deference must be given to the decision of the trial court. Consequently, on this record, I am not prepared to say the defendant has presented a basis for reversing the conviction.

SENTENCING

I would reverse the sentence of death because the defendant is not death-eligible under Tennessee law, and, in the penalty phase of the trial, the trial court committed prejudicial errors which the majority fails to acknowledge. The sentence of death is precluded in this case by T.C.A. § 39-13-203, which prohibits the execution of persons who are mentally retarded. And further, not only did the trial court find the defendant to be death-eligible, it refused to allow evidence of the defendant’s retardation in mitigation. In this poorly tried case, the majority has denied all assignments of error or found that the errors assigned were harmless, and then concluded with the statement, “We are of the opinion that the senseless and brutal killing of this elderly woman warrants the imposition of the death penalty.” It was a brutal murder and a senseless murder, senseless in that it was committed by a person legally not accountable for his criminal acts, and brutal like all murders are brutal. Whatever may be the majority’s opinion, its conclusion is not supported by the law properly applied to the facts of this case. This, in my view, is the practice condemned in Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion to Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 972-73, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3436-37, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), of becoming “a rubber stamp for lower court death-penalty determinations.” See also, State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 194-95 (Tenn.1991) (Reid, C.J., concurring & dissenting).

MENTAL RETARDATION UNDER T.C.A. § 39-13-203

Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion that the trial court determine that the provisions of T.C.A. § 39-13-203 precluded the imposition of a sentence of death in this case. The statute provides that “no defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death.” T.C.A. § 39-13-203(b). This code section represents a statutory enactment, and perhaps a constitutional declaration, that “contemporary standards of decency” in Tennessee forbid the execution of persons who are mentally retarded. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 193 (Reid, C.J., concurring & dissenting).
The proof shows that the defendant is retarded, as defined by the statute.' Under the statute a person is mentally retarded if he or she exhibits:
(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below; [and]
(2) Deficits in adaptive behavior....
T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a). The statute also provides that “[t]he mental retardation must have been manifested during the developmental period [of the defendant], or [by the age of] eighteen (18).” T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a)(3). The defendant has the burden of proving mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. T.C.A. § 39-13-203(e).
The trial court’s finding with regal’d to the defendant’s motion is not clear. The court *929apparently found that the defendant’s intelligence level was not low enough to meet the first requirement of the statutory definition of mental retardation. However, the evidence shows that conclusion to be wrong. Even the State. does not dispute that the defendant’s mental functioning was below a functional intelligence quotient of 70, the statutory standard, and that the retardation was manifested during the defendant’s developmental period and prior to age 18. Thus it is conceded that the defendant met the first and third portions of the statutory definition of mental retardation.
The State’s sole reliance is that the defendant “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has suffered deficits in his ‘adaptive behavior’ as a result of his IQ.” In this respect, it should be noted that the statute requires only a finding of deficits in adaptive behavior; it does not matter what caused the deficits — whether low IQ, parental neglect, or an inadequate social environment. See In re Elmore, 13 Ohio App.3d 79, 468 N.E.2d 97, 104 (1983). The statute clearly provides that adaptive behavior and intellectual functioning are independent criteria, a point obviously not understood by the trial court.
The significant question presented, and an issue of first impression for this Court, concerns the proof necessary to establish “deficits in adaptive behavior.” As the majority opinion notes, the statute does not further define the phrase “deficits in adaptive behavior.” The majority then concludes that the Court must rely upon the “ordinary” meaning of the language and construes the phrase to mean “the inability of an individual to behave so as to adapt to surrounding circumstances.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority erroneously rejects the defendant’s assertion that the phrase “deficits in adaptive behavior” is a well-defined term of art, found in the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) manual, Classification in Mental Retardation (1983). The definition of mental retardation contained in § 39-13-203(a), closely tracks that adopted by the AAMR, which is “the current and generally accepted definition of ‘mental retardation.’ ” See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 7-9.1, Commentary n. 4 (2d ed. 1980). Variations thereof are found in a substantial number of state statutes, including T.C.A. § 39-13-203.1 See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 17-7-131(a)(3) (Supp.1994); Ky.Rev.Stat. § 532.130(2) (1990); Md.Code Ann. Art. 27, § 412(e)(3) (1992).
It is apparent that “adaptive behavior” is a term of art with a settled meaning. See J. Ellis & R. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 414, 422 (1985). Words of art or technical terms in a statute are to be taken in them technical sense unless it is clear from the context that another sense was intended. Cordis Corp. v. Taylor, 762 S.W.2d 138, 139-140 (Tenn.1988). See generally 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.29 (5th ed. 1992). In such circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that the language in a statute is intended to import a generally accepted definition of the tenn among the members of the discipline or profession in which it is used. Resort to material which is admissible under the Rules of Evidence was not necessary. The meaning of such terms may be gathered from definitions found in technical dictionaries and treatises. See Cordis Corp. v. Taylor, 762 S.W.2d at 140.
By codifying the phrase “adaptive behavior” without further defining its meaning, the General Assembly intended that those words be taken in their generally accepted technical sense. According to the AAMR’s Classification in Mental Retardation, “deficits in adaptive behavior,” as used in T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a), means
significant limitations in an individual’s effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are *930expected for his or her age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales.
Classification in Mental Retardation at 11 (1983).
Apparent from this definition is the need for clinical evaluation in determining deficits in a defendant’s adaptive behavior. See, e.g., State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988) (Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale used to evaluate defendant); cf. T.C.A. § 33-5-305(c) (requiring that at least one witness at a commitment hearing for a mentally retarded offender “be a licensed or qualified mental retardation professional”).
The hearing in the present case illustrates the perils of assessing the adaptive behavior of a defendant without recourse to clinical evaluation.
Most of the mentally handicapped who are arrested fit into the “mildly retarded” category; criminal suspects with IQs below fifty are relatively easy to identify and typically are diverted from the criminal justice system to state facilities for the mentally retarded. Mildly retarded defendants, however, face special difficulties in the criminal system. They may wear a “ ‘cloak of competence’ that allows them to ‘pass as normal.’ ” Consequently, lawyers and judges frequently are unable to identify them as retarded.
P. Fetzer, Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment without Justification, 40 S.C.L.Rev. 419, 424-125 (1989) (footnotes omitted). The trial court’s cursory findings, indeed the entire proceedings, reveal a lack of understanding of the criteria that must be considered in deciding whether the definition of mental retardation in T.C.A. § 39-13-203 has been met. This lack of understanding is indicated by the trial court’s statement, “[e]ven Dr. Hutson doesn’t say that he’s retarded,” while the entire import of Dr. Hut-son’s testimony was that the defendant was in fact retarded.
While the burden was on the defendant to establish that he is mentally retarded, the evidence in this case and the definition placed upon the statute by the trial court call into question the holding of the court on this issue. The proof reveals that the defendant’s IQ met the first requirement of the statutory definition. Likewise, the third requirement, manifestation of mental retardation, was met. As to the second statutory requirement, the evidence shows “significant limitations” in the defendant’s maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility in light of his age and cultural group. The record reveals that the defendant withdrew from school in the ninth grade. He had never had regular employment and had resided his entire life with his mother. At the age of fifteen, he had begun having difficulties with the juvenile authorities. The only time the defendant has exhibited any ability to function effectively was when he was in the very structured setting of imprisonment.
Evidence of the defendant’s inability to live independently, remain gainfully employed, or abide by community standards of acceptable behavior is sufficient to establish that he suffered from “deficits in adaptive behavior,” even under the majority’s unartful definition of mental retardation. This evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally retarded and not subject to the punishment of death under the legislative directive of T.C.A. § 39-13-203.

FAILURE TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The majority opinion finds that Dr. Hut-son’s opinion concerning the validity of the defendant’s score on the “Beta IQ test” was relevant to sentencing issues and therefore should have been admitted at the sentencing hearing. The majority, however, holds that the trial court’s error in this respect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because this information was indirectly presented to the jury as a mitigating factor when the defendant asked Dr. Hutson about other intelligence tests.
A court cannot, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United *931States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, withhold from the sentencer evidence relevant to the defendant’s background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (1992). The error in this case is of constitutional dimension, see Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); and harmlessness must be determined beyond a reasonable doubt. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
The primary mitigating circumstance presented by the defendant concerned his limited mental capacity. The jury was allowed to hear that the defendant had received a score of 88 on the “Beta IQ test” but not allowed to hear Dr. Hutson’s testimony that the “Beta IQ test” did not measure the critical statutory factor determining retardation. Denying the defendant the opportunity to present evidence that this so-called IQ test, containing a numerical indicator higher than the statutory level when measured by a valid test, was not valid, in all reason, affected the jury’s conclusion as to the defendant’s level of mental capability. The majority’s conclusion that the fact that the “Beta IQ test” was not an IQ test at all for the purpose of determining mental retardation was communicated to the jury by Dr. Hutson’s statement that “the two IQ tests most commonly used were the Wechsler and Stanford-Binet,” and that this statement by Dr. Hutson “implied that these two were valid IQ tests in comparison with the Beta IQ test”2 is sophistry, at best. The majority’s further conclusion, that this conceded violation of the defendant’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights3 regarding the most significant fact in the case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, is absolutely implausible. I would hold that this error entitles the defendant to a new sentencing hearing.

MIDDLEBROOKS ERROR

The majority concludes that the jury’s consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance, that the murder was committed during the course of a felony, see State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992), was harmless error. The majority dismisses the Middlebrooks issue with a recitation of the evidence supporting the two remaining aggravating circumstances, and the conclusion that the jury would have imposed the sentence of death had “the jury given no weight to the invalid felony murder aggravating factor.” 4
I can do nothing more than state again the settled law:
The issue on harmless error analysis is whether the Court can conclude that beyond a reasonable doubt the invalid aggravating circumstance did not influence the jury in its determination that the sentence would be death. The issue is not the extent to which the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were supported by the evidence or whether the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. A finding that the evidence in support of the valid aggravating circumstance was overwhelming and the evidence in mitigation was meager may, ... support the jury’s finding that beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances, but it does not necessarily follow that the jury was not influenced by the invalid aggravating circumstance.
State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 269 (Tenn.1993) (Reid, C.J. concurring). In Howell, I stated, in concurrence, that in a capital case where “a court can conclude beyond a rea*932sonable doubt that there was no evidence before a jury which could influence its decision,” it can find that admission of an invalid aggravator is harmless error. Id. at 270. But, “in all cases where the Court must make a subjective decision regarding the effect of the aggravating circumstance,” harmless error analysis is inappropriate. Id. at 268. In this case, although the two remaining aggravating circumstances were proven, and no additional evidence was admitted in support of the invalid aggravating circumstance, the evidence of mental retardation is a strong mitigating factor whose weight could well be more persuasive against two aggravating circumstances than three. Because the existence of substantial mitigating evidence forces the jury in this case to make a very subjective decision as to weight, the State, which has the burden of proof, cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the ultimate decision to execute the defendant was not influenced by the submission of the invalid aggravating circumstance; therefore, the submission of this circumstance was not harmless error, and resentencing is required. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 347.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

For the reasons I have set forth in previous cases, see, e.g., State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 744 (Tenn.1994) (Reid, C.J., dissenting); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 272 (Tenn.1994) (Reid, C.J., concurring & dissenting); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 84-85 (Tenn.1992) (Reid, C.J., dissenting); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 193-195 (Tenn.1991) (Reid, C.J., concurring & dissenting); I dissent from the majority’s summary holding that its comparative proportionality review “convinces” one that the sentence of death is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the nature of the crime and the defendant. As in State v. Cazes, the Court has before it another example of the deficiencies afflicting the meager safeguards of comparative proportionality review as practiced by this Court.
In this case, the report required under Rule 12 of the Supreme Court does not appear in the record and was not transmitted to the Clerk of the Supreme Court. Presently, the Rule 12 reports are the sole resource for a comparative proportionality review, yet the trial court has failed to file a Rule 12 report to be considered by the Court in its mandated proportionality review. Consequently, there is in the record no basis on which to make a comparative proportionality review.
Like State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn.1994), this is the kind of case in which a procedure for comparing cases is necessary to provide a meaningful review. Here, a comparative analysis would give a clear answer as to whether defendants with this level of IQ have been subjected to execution; and any meaningful comparative analysis must include a study of Rule 12 reports to resolve this question. Slightly over 200 of the Rule 12 reports filed with the Court at this time contain information regarding the defendant’s IQ. Of these defendants, only 20 are described as possessing a “low” IQ, i.e., an IQ below 70. Of these 20 only two are among the approximately 90 persons sentenced to death for whom Rule 12 reports are currently on file.5 This is a significant disparity; it suggests the capriciousness and arbitrariness prohibited by the constitution. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 350-51 (Tenn.1992) (Reid, C.J., concurring & dissenting). Nevertheless, the majority opinion is silent on this point, except to recite that it has conducted a “meaningful” proportionality review. The deficiency in the process requires that the defendant be granted a resentencing hearing or the sentence be reduced to life imprisonment.

*933
CONCLUSION

Because the evidence in this case establishes that the defendant is mentally retarded under the provisions of T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a) and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty, I dissent from the majority’s holding affirming the sentence in the present case. Furthermore, even if the proof did not show that the defendant was mentally retarded, I would hold that the several errors discussed so prejudiced the sentencing phase of the trial that a new sentencing hearing is constitutionally required.

. Similar definitions of mental retardation tracking the language of the AAMR definition are used in other sections of the Code. See T.C.A. §§ 33-1-101(15) and 33-5-303(1) (dealing with mental health).

. Majority opinion at 922.

. The majority does not mention Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.

.Majority opinion at 926.

. The Rule 12 report requires that the trial court disclose the "intelligence level" of the defendant where this information is known. See Section B(9), Supreme Court Rule 12 Report. Of those defendants on whom a sentence of death has been imposed, only Ricky Goldie Smith, see State v. Smith, 695 S.W.2d 954 (Tenn.1985), and Michael Angelo Coleman, see State v. Coleman, 619 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn.1981), were listed as having a "low" IQ, meaning an IQ below 70. The death sentences in both of these cases were affirmed prior to the adoption of T.C.A. § 39-13-203.