Court Opinion

ID: 9948175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 17:01:48.925607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:17.474315
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3141     Document: 010111010692      Date Filed: 03/06/2024   Page: 1

                                                              FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals
                                                          Tenth Circuit
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                          _______________________________________          March 6, 2024

                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
  ANTHONY MARTIN GREEN,                                                     Clerk of Court
         Petitioner - Appellant,
                                                           No. 23-3141
  v.                                              (D.C. No. 5:23-CV-03115-JWL)
                                                             (D. Kan.)
  D. HUDSON, Warden,

         Respondent - Appellee,

                          _______________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

       This case addresses the use of credits earned by federal prisoners.

 These credits can sometimes be used to expedite the prisoner’s transition

 to prerelease custody or supervised release. But the right to use these

 credits depends on the prisoner’s classification, and we must decide

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-3141   Document: 010111010692   Date Filed: 03/06/2024    Page: 2

 whether the classification of a prisoner violated federal law. We answer

 no.

 1.    This case involves habeas claims challenging a prisoner’s
       classification.

       Mr. Anthony Martin Green is a federal prisoner. While in prison, he

 has participated in programs, earning 365 days of credits. But to apply

 these credits toward prerelease custody or supervised release, Mr. Green

 needed to show eligibility, which requires classification of his risk of

 recidivism as minimum or low. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i)–(ii). The

 Bureau of Prisons classified Mr. Green’s risk as medium, and this

 classification prevented use of the credits to expedite the transition to

 prerelease custody or supervised release.

       Mr. Green disagreed with this classification and sought a writ of

 habeas corpus in district court. The district court declined to issue the writ

 and Mr. Green appeals, arguing that the Bureau erred in how it had

 classified the risk of recidivism.

 2.    Congress directed creation of a system to assess risk.

       Congress directed the Attorney General to create a system to assess

 the risk of recidivism for prisoners. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a); Nathan

 James, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45558, The First Step Act of 2018: An

 Overview 1 (2019). The Attorney General delegated this responsibility to

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 the Bureau of Prisons, which created a system called the Prisoner

 Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs.

       This system scores a prisoner’s risk based on fourteen criteria. See R.

 at 59 (scoring document used by the Bureau); see also Male PATTERN Risk

 Scoring, Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

 https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/male_pattern_form.pdf?v=1.3 (last

 visited Feb. 22, 2024) (same, as located on Bureau website). The score

 triggers a risk classification of minimum, low, medium, or high. See 18

 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(1); Cut Points Used for PATTERN v. 1.3, Fed. Bureau of

 Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/fsa_cut_points.pdf?v=1.3

 (last visited Feb. 22, 2024).

 3.    The Bureau didn’t err in considering Mr. Green’s underlying
       conviction.

       Mr. Green was convicted of possessing a firearm after a felony

 conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Bureau regards this crime as

 violent. The crime’s classification as violent didn’t prevent Mr. Green from

 earning credits. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). But the Bureau categorizes

 the crime as violent when assessing an inmate’s risk of recidivism. See

 Violent Offense Codes for PATTERN Risk Assessment, Fed. Bureau of

 Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/fsa_pattern_violent_

 offense_codes.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2024). Mr. Green argues that

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Appellate Case: 23-3141   Document: 010111010692   Date Filed: 03/06/2024   Page: 4

 federal law prevents the Bureau from regarding this crime as violent when

 assessing risk. We disagree.

       The Bureau determines eligibility to use credits in two ways: (1)

 categorically excluding inmates convicted of certain crimes and (2)

 assessing risk through the fourteen criteria.

       The list of excludable crimes doesn’t include Mr. Green’s crime

 (possessing a firearm after a felony conviction). See 18 U.S.C.

 § 3632(d)(4)(D). Because many of the excludable crimes are violent,

 Mr. Green contends that the Bureau shouldn’t have regarded his non-

 excludable crime as violent when applying the criteria on risk.

       But the Bureau had discretion to consider the crime as violent.

 Federal law contains various provisions involving classification of crimes

 as violent. For example, such a classification can affect consideration of

 pretrial detention, applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence, and

 determination of the applicable guideline range for sentencing. E.g.,

 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A) (pretrial detention); 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)

 (mandatory minimum of a prison term); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (enhancement

 of the guideline range for sentencing). Unlawful possession of a firearm

 may be considered violent for some purposes and nonviolent for other

 purposes. See, e.g., Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 119 (3d Cir. 1998)

 (discussing the lack of uniformity on what is a crime of violence). The

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 Bureau had discretion to consider unlawful possession of a firearm as

 violent when assessing the risk of recidivism.

       Granted, unlawful possession of a firearm didn’t prevent offenders

 like Mr. Green from earning credits. See p. 3, above. But Congress

 determined that offenders could use these credits to transition to prerelease

 custody or supervised release only when the risk was low enough. See

 Parts 1–2, above. The Bureau viewed unlawful possession of a firearm as a

 factor bearing on the risk of recidivism. So Mr. Green’s eligibility to earn

 credits didn’t prevent the Bureau from upgrading his risk based on the

 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.

 4.    Mr. Green didn’t preserve his challenge based on the
       Administrative Procedure Act.

       Agencies like the Bureau of Prisons can issue legislative regulations,

 but only at the direction of Congress. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,

 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). To issue legislative regulations, agencies like

 the Bureau of Prisons must ordinarily comply with the Administrative

 Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. Mr. Green invokes this requirement,

 claiming that the Bureau violated the Administrative Procedure Act when

 adopting the system of risk assessment. But he did not make this argument

 in district court.

       We ordinarily don’t consider new arguments on appeal. See Havens

 v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 897 F.3d 1250, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2018) (“We

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 ordinarily deem arguments that litigants fail to present before the district

 court but then subsequently urge on appeal to be forfeited.”). We do have

 discretion to review new arguments under the plain-error standard. Id. But

 we generally don’t consider new arguments unless the appellant asks us to

 apply the plain-error standard. Id. at 1260; see Richison v. Ernest Grp.,

 634 F.3d 1123, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain

 error and its application on appeal—surely marks the end of the road for an

 argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”). 1

       Mr. Green points to the district court’s statement that the Bureau

 didn’t violate “the governing statutes” by deciding “to treat [his] particular

 offense in a particular way.” Dist. Ct. Order at 4. 2 But the district court

 made this statement when addressing other statutory arguments; the court

 never mentioned any issues involving the Administrative Procedure Act.

       Because Mr. Green did not raise this issue earlier, we decline to

 consider it.

 1     Mr. Green is proceeding pro se, so we liberally construe appellate
 briefs. See McKinney v. Okla., Dep’t of Human Servs., Shawnee, 925 F.2d
 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991). But procedural requirements apply equally to
 pro se litigants. E.g., Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d
 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005).
 2
       This order was omitted from the appellate record, but was attached to
 the government’s appellate brief.

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 5.    The Bureau could include some factors that wouldn’t change.

       Though the Bureau ultimately had the discretion to create a system

 assessing risk, this discretion was limited. For example, Congress required

 the Bureau to include factors that could change during imprisonment.

 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(4). So the Bureau included ten criteria that could

 change:

       1.     Incident reports during the current incarceration,

       2.     serious or violent incident reports during the current
              incarceration,

       3.     recency of any incident reports,

       4.     number of programs completed,

       5.     participation in work programs,

       6.     drug treatment while incarcerated,

       7.     noncompliance with financial responsibility programming,

       8.     recency of violence,

       9.     history of escape, and

       10.    education. 3

 3
        The parties and the district court referred to eleven changeable
 criteria, not ten, for a total of fifteen criteria. But the Bureau’s system lists
 only fourteen criteria. See R. at 59. The government’s brief cites a
 Department of Justice report, which lists fifteen criteria. See U.S. Dep’t of
 Just., The First Step Act of 2018: Risk and Needs Assessment System -
 UPDATE 37–39 (2020), https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/the-first-
 step-act-of-2018-risk-and-needs-assessment-system-updated.pdf . That
 report includes a criterion involving the recency of serious violent incident
 reports. See id. at 37. But this criterion doesn’t appear in the Bureau’s
 actual list.
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 R. at 59. But the Bureau also included four criteria that couldn’t change:

       1.     age at the time of the assessment,

       2.     criminal history,

       3.     sexual offender status, and

       4.     conviction of a “violent offense.”

 Id.

       Mr. Green argues that the governing statutes limited the Bureau to

 dynamic factors. For this argument, Mr. Green relies on the statutory

 requirement for the Bureau to assess risk “based on factors including

 indicators or progress, and of regression, that are dynamic and that can

 reasonably be expected to change while in prison.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(4)

 (emphasis added).

       Mr. Green invokes the negative implication canon. Under this canon,

 the mention of particular items can suggest exclusion of others. Navajo

 Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1213 (10th Cir. 2018). But the

 applicability of this canon depends on context. United States v. Porter, 745

 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2014). The context here involves a

 nonexhaustive term, “including.” See Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v.

 Bismark Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941) (“[T]he term ‘including’ is

 not one of all-encompassing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative

 application of the general principle.” (citation omitted)); Porter, 745 F.3d

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 at 1046–47 (discussing the non-exclusive purpose served by the use of the

 word including). The term implies here that

             some of the criteria must be within the prisoner’s ability to
              change and

             the Bureau is free to use other risk criteria that are not subject
              to change.

 See 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23, at

 316 (6th ed. 2000); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

 Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 132–33 (2012) (stating that “the

 word include does not ordinarily introduce an exhaustive list”).

       For example, suppose that a prisoner has a criminal history involving

 prior convictions for murder. The Bureau wouldn’t need to ignore those

 convictions. The same is true of the conviction underlying Mr. Green’s

 sentence. Though the Bureau had to consider at least some factors within

 the prisoner’s power to change, Congress didn’t force the Bureau to blind

 itself to the obvious risks from convictions for violent offenses.

       Mr. Green also argues that the inclusion of static factors denies

 prisoners “a meaningful opportunity to reduce their classification during

 the period of incarceration.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a)(5)(A). But the Bureau

 combined the four static factors with the ten dynamic factors, and the

 combination gave inmates an opportunity to lower their scores. This

 opportunity has proven meaningful for many federal prisoners:

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        99 percent of offenders have the ability to become eligible for
        early release through the accumulation of earned time credits
        even though they may not be eligible upon admission to
        prison. . . . [N]early all have the ability to reduce their risk score
        to the low risk category.

  U.S. Dep’t of Just., The First Step Act of 2018: Risk and Needs Assessment

  System 57–58 (2019), https://www.ojp.gov/First-Step-Act-of-2018-Risk-

  and-Needs-Assessment-System.

        Mr. Green’s experience reflects the meaningful opportunity for

  prisoners to lower their scores. Based on the ten dynamic criteria,

  Mr. Green has lowered his general score by thirteen points and his violent

  score by six points. See R. at 24 (Mr. Green’s risk assessment). These

  reductions have put Mr. Green within three points (in his score for

  violence) of eligibility to apply his credits. See Cut Points Used for

  PATTERN v. 1.3, Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

  https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/docs/fsa_cut_points.pdf?v=1.3 (last

  visited Feb. 22, 2024).

        We thus conclude that the Bureau didn’t violate federal law by using

  four static criteria along with the ten criteria that were dynamic.

                                        * * *

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        We affirm the denial of Mr. Green’s request for habeas corpus relief. 4

                                         Entered for the Court

                                         Robert E. Bacharach
                                         Circuit Judge

  4
       We grant Mr. Green’s application for leave to proceed in forma
  pauperis.

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