Court Opinion

ID: 9488530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:48:08.164444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:56.714794
License: Public Domain

McKEE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion except insofar as the majority concludes that the prosecutor’s remarks do not constitute prejudicial plain error.
As my colleagues point out, the government concedes that the challenged portion of the prosecution’s rebuttal summation was “ill-advised.” Indeed, it was more. It was unethical, unnecessary, and I believe it raises doubts about the very verdict it sought to compel.
Failure to object to improprieties in a closing argument precludes appellate review in all cases except where “plain error” is established. United States v. Lawson, 337 F.2d 800, 807 (3d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 919, 85 S.Ct. 913, 13 L.Ed.2d 804 (1965). We must “correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights, if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Olano, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). See Fed.R.CRIM. P. 52(b). The error here affects all three.
During his rebuttal address to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, the prosecutor here, responded to an attack upon a government agent’s credibility by arguing as follows to the jury: “[f]or what, ladies and gentlemen? He’s gonna risk his career? He’s gonna risk his job? He’s gonna risk going to jail? For what? To lie to you on the stand, ladies and gentlemen? I submit not, ladies and gentlemen.” That argument was forceful, responsive, and absolutely proper. The Assistant U.S. Attorney was asking the jury to reach a common sense conclusion that the agent had too much to lose to commit perjury merely to convict this defendant. It was the kind of effective and logical response to an attack on an agent’s credibility that has been made in countless numbers of closing arguments, and will be made in countless more.
However, the Assistant U.S. Attorney was not content to let well enough alone. He insisted upon gilding the lily. Having made his point, he marched forward and assured the jury that government witnesses “don’t make up lies. And they didn’t lie here and they’re not lying to you ... when they tell you what they did. And they’re not lying to you when they tell you that defendant, Ru-dolfo [sic] Bethancourt, talked to them about that statement.” That argument contains two serious improprieties. First, the prosecutor is, in no uncertain terms, telling the jury as a matter of fact that the particular witness didn’t lie. Second, and I think even worse, he is telling the jury that government witnesses don’t lie as a matter of policy.
In his opening statement, the defense counsel attacked the credibility of government witnesses as follows:
You’re going to hear the evidence and you’re going to decide whether or not what they say happened happened....
*1083But I ask you, as the evidence comes in, listen very carefully and determine whether or not you accept what’s on these transcripts as being the evidence in this case because only you can make that determination. ...
Listen to the evidence. All right? Just listen to the evidence. Don’t jump to any conclusions here....
Supp.App. at 58-63. Obviously, if the defendant was going to put on a defense, the defense attorney had to attack the credibility of the agent who took the defendant’s statement. In his closing, defense counsel attempted to raise a reasonable doubt about the authenticity of the defendant’s statement:
Is it reasonable for you to believe that because his signature that was contained on that statement was not his real signature but it was a fake, it was a disguise, what do you think happened? I’m gonna, suggest to you what you know from your common sense happened here. They typed this stuff up, they put stuff in there that he was never gonna agree to and they wouldn’t leave him alone. He was there for six hours. It’s now midnight. How did he get out of that room with these agents and get to go to jail which was probably a better place than sitting with them in that room even though he got a chicken sandwich? You know what he did, yeah, okay. And he forged his signature. He faked it. What does that tell you? That tells you that in no way are they the statements, are they the words, are they the concepts, or is that the confession of Rudolfo [sic] Bethancourt. It’s theirs and they tried to make it his. This is not a strange concept in the world. This kind of attempts to put one thing on paper and get somebody else to agree with it by signing their name too it. This is an old story. That’s how he got out of that room. And that’s why Gus Lesnevich is so clear to you that if Bethancourt wrote that on there it’s an intentional disguise. You take it from there.
SuppApp. at 497-98 (emphasis added).
The defense counsel sought to have the jury draw certain conclusions from the testimony, and their own common sense. That was entirely proper. Yet, even if the defense attorney’s argument had been improper, it does not justify the kind of response that occurred here. The defense attack on the credibility of the government agent called for an appropriate and reasoned response. The Assistant U.S. Attorney’s rebuttal was neither. Over thirty years ago this court stated:
A United States attorney in a criminal case has an even greater responsibility than counsel for an individual client. For the purpose of the individual ease he represents the great authority of the United States and he must exercise that responsibility with the circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for. His case must rest on evidence, not epithet. If his ease is a sound one his evidence is enough; if it is not sound, he should not resort to epithet to give it a false appearance of strength.
United States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir.1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 941, 81 S.Ct. 459, 5 L.Ed.2d 372 (1961) (emphasis added).
When the Assistant U.S. Attorney assured the jury that government agents “don’t make up lies,” and that they were not lying when they testified in this case, there is no doubt that he was asserting his personal opinion to the jury and, even worse, guaranteeing that the United States does not allow its witnesses to he. My colleagues state:
We do not believe that the prosecution’s rebuttal constituted plain error. Defense counsel, who represented the defendant at trial and on appeal, impressed us as articulate and experienced. Yet, at the time of the prosecution’s remarks, he heard nothing in the Government’s response warranting any objection whatsoever. The prosecutor’s isolated and marginal comments in the course of a short rebuttal summation, which followed an untainted closing summation, did not ‘undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.’ At most they were harmless error.
Majority opinion at 1079-80 (footnote omitted).
*1084Over twenty years ago we addressed the problem of prosecutorial indiscretion in closing statements. We were obliged to “consider such errors because of their recurrence in criminal trials and the consequent importance of emphasizing the impropriety of such practices by prosecuting officers.” United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477, 478 (3d Cir.1973) (Seitz, J.). We explained that “[w]e recognize the line between permissible and impermissible comment is a thin one, and precision of expression can be difficult. Nevertheless, we strongly disapprove expressions of personal opinion by prosecutors on credibility and guilt.” Id. Although we did not find the comments at issue in LeFevre to be sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error, we were careful to “emphasize that the trial judge should be alert to each of these deviations from professional norms. Since such comments have the clear potential of adversely affecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the judge should take prompt action to correct them without relying upon defense counsel to object.” Id. at 480. Soon thereafter in United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864 (3d Cir.1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 2673, 53 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), we deemed it necessary to again comment upon the “rash and inappropriate” remarks of prosecutors during closing arguments. In Homer, the court issued the following scolding: “[i]n recent years we have had the occasion to admonish counsel for thoughtless and inappropriate remarks made in the course of heated and vigorously contested trials_ [T]he comments are so grossly improper as to prejudice a defendant and deny him a fair trial.” Id. at 867.
We have repeatedly had to address this problem. See United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1421-23 (3d Cir.1994); United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (3d Cir.1989); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 770 F.2d 343, 348-51 (3d Cir.1985); United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1296-97 (3d Cir.1984); United States v. Scarfo, 685 F.2d 842, 848-49 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1041-43 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864, 867-68 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 739-41 (3d Cir.1974); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470, 477-80 (3d Cir.1970). Even though we held in each of these cases except Schartner that the particular statement did not constitute reversible error, this history demonstrates that our oft repeated refrain as to the impropriety and danger of such argument is faffing upon deaf ears.
Moreover, we recently addressed a rebuttal that was nearly identical to the one before us here. In United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.1989), the prosecutor told a jury, “[w]e don’t take liars. We don’t put liars on the stand. We don’t do that.” Id. at 999 (emphasis in original). We analyzed the likely effect of such a statement upon the jury’s deliberations as follows:
The remarks are better understood as meaning that the government, as a matter of policy in the prosecution of its cases, does not use liars as witnesses. No explanation was given, however, of how the government ascertains the honesty or veracity of its witnesses. Indeed, we have found nothing in the record upon which the prosecutor could have grounded his statement. ... What the jury was lead to do instead was merely to infer that other information existed which the government used to verify the credibility of its witnesses prior to introducing their testimonies at trial....
The possibility that the jury engaged in such deductive reasoning, prompted by the government’s vouching of its witnesses, especially in light of the crucial nature of the witnesses’ credibility here, clearly jeopardized the defendants’ right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented at trial.
Id. at 999-1000. Although this court subsequently decided that the per se reversal rule of DiLoreto could not stand under United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044-45, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the analysis of the impact of the closing remains valid.1
*1085Furthermore, our sister courts of appeals have also met with difficulty in stopping such abuse. In United States v. Maccini, 721 F.2d 840, 846 (1st Cir.1983), the court stated:
That despite our consistent warnings to the Government we should still be called upon to admonish against such conduct is reprehensible per se because it constitutes a disregard to our directives. But additionally it is particularly pernicious because it results in an unnecessary waste of judicial resources, both at the trial and appellate level, by diversion and attention to review of what by now should be understood to be totally unacceptable conduct by those who lay claim to representing the Government of the United States.
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted: “[a] few injudicious words uttered in the heat of battle by an Assistant United States Attorney may undo months of preparation by police, prosecutorial, and judicial officers.” United States v. White, 486 F.2d 204, 204 (2d Cir.1978). See also United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-83 (2d Cir.1981) (“This Court, in particular, has repeatedly expressed frustration at the regular appearance on its docket of eases in which prosecutors have delivered improper summations.”); United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir.1973) (reversing conviction following the third appeal involving improper summations by the same prosecutor).
Here, given the effect that the rebuttal may well have had upon the jury’s deliberations, see DiLoreto, supra, and the serious and repeated nature of this type of transgression, I do not believe that the error was harmless, even despite the defense attorney’s failure to object, and the curative instruction given by the attentive trial judge. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a). (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”)
As noted above, I find our analysis of the nearly identical statements in DiLoreto compelling insofar as we there discussed the probable effect of such an argument upon the jury’s deliberations. When the Assistant U.S. Attorney here vouched for the government agents, (indeed all government witnesses) his comments were not only prejudicial to Bethancourt, they also undermined the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. I do not see how those remarks could have done anything other than corrupt the deliberations to the point that this defendant could not have received a fair trial. Moreover, since the prosecutor apparently felt that the strength of his case required poisoning the deliberative process, I can not say that the evidence against this defendant was so “overwhelming” that the remarks were irrelevant to the determination of guilt. Had the prosecutor felt that the evidence was so compelling I assume he would not have felt it necessary to resort to such an improper argument.
The reliability of the outcome of this trial, as well as the public perception of fairness dictate that we conclude that this error was not harmless and that it requires a new trial. The essence of the Government’s case was the testimony of the agents who took the statement from the defendant. Under those circumstances, the prosecutor’s rebuttal can not be dismissed as harmless error.
Although I continue to believe that Young clearly prohibits a per se rule of reversal in cases such as this and DiLoreto, this case would present a strong argument for just such a rule if we were free to establish one. Despite our best efforts, some prosecutors continue to engage in behavior that can only corrupt the judicial process and undermine the very investigative and prosecutorial resources they seek to serve. They apparently do so with little or no concern for the effect of their actions upon the quality of justice, their positions as officers of the court, or the real possibility of causing an erroneous conviction. Yet, we continue to oblige their nonchalant approach to justice by finding their transgressions to be harmless.
Because such transgressions poison the deliberative process, I must respectfully dissent from the reasoning of my colleagues.

. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1699, 131 L.Ed.2d 562 (1995).