Court Opinion

ID: 9459139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:11:36.697405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:02.254289
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge,
concurring:
Appellant’s court-appointed attorney appeared at a suppression hearing on the day of trial totally ignorant of the circumstances surrounding the subject of that hearing:1 an identification lineup conducted after the preliminary *102hearing.2 The motion to suppress was denied, and trial began immediately. The identification at the lineup, and an in-court identification, were admitted, and appellant was convicted.
In order to decide the Sixth Amendment issue in this case, we must determine why trial counsel lacked this information. If the lineup had been held in the absence of any attorney, United States v. Wade 3 would require that we reverse.4 But, when Smallwood’s attorney failed to appear for the lineup, appellant was provided a substitute, albeit in a rather haphazard fashion.5
Wade suggested,6 and we have expressly held,7 that substitute counsel satisfies the constitutional requirement, but only if it “eliminate [s] the hazards which render the lineup a critical stage for the presence of the suspect’s own counsel.”8 The Court specified two such hazards in Wade: the occurrence of prejudice at the lineup, and the absence of a meaningful confrontation at trial if counsel is ignorant of such occurrences.9
If the Government, after providing substitute counsel, fails to make reasonably available to trial counsel either the substitute counsel or the observations he made at the hearing, the second of those hazards continues unabated. Thus the rule of per se exclusion established in Wade would still apply.10
*103But, there is no indication in this record that the Government failed that duty either. Indeed, inferences to the contrary may be drawn from trial counsel’s silence. Trial counsel had been appointed prior to the preliminary hearing; he was present at that hearing when both the lineup and his personal presence at the lineup were ordered by the court; he later moved for discovery of the events surrounding the lineup; he made no objection to the Government’s discovery in response to that motion; and he moved for, and received, a suppression hearing on the lineup identification. At no time did he complain that he lacked reasonable access to the substitute.
The Sixth Amendment inquiry does not end with Wade, however. If trial counsel’s ignorance is not traceable to the Government, we must still inquire whether his performance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This record shows that he inexcusably lapsed.11 He had no information at the hearing concerning the events surrounding the lineup,12 and he made no request for a continuance of the trial. Moreover, the record suggests that his acquiescence at the hearing stemmed from an improper desire to avoid censure for his lack of preparation.13
I agree with the court that this record does not show a substantial defect in the identification procedures themselves. Although the trial judge was clearly troubled by the lineup, his inquiry ended with the question of the presence of substitute counsel.14 We do not, thus, have a clear showing of “prejudice” in the very harsh sense applied in the early collateral attack cases involving ineffective assistance.15
I believe that there is a strong case to be made for reversal here without such a showing. Conceivably, a fully informed attorney could, as a “tactic,” decide not to challenge an identification. But an attorney who learns nothing of substitute counsel’s observations and knowledge of the lineup deprives his client of his only chance to be sure of a “meaningful confrontation at trial,” 16 *as *104required by the Supreme Court in Wade.17 On the other hand, this record is vitally deficient as to many factors that would be of importance in such a ruling, and would provide little aid in our attempts to resolve the complex questions that would be important to our subsequent disposition.
I would find it necessary to send this case back for supplementation of the record if affirmance would relegate Smallwood to post-conviction remedies. It is settled, however, that he may raise and more fully support his claims of a Sixth Amendment violation on a motion for a new trial without excusing that action with a showing of earlier “due diligence.”18

. In response to the prosecutor’s inquiry as to whether counsel was present at the lineup, the following colloquy took place:
Mr. Lynch [defense counsel]: I was under Court order to be present at the lineup but, I believe it was the order of Judge Burka. However, I was ill that evening and I wasn’t able to be present at the lineup. I viewed a photograph of the lineup and I viewed the lineup list, but I was unable to appear and actually be counsel to Phillip Small-wood at that lineup. However, I am sure that following their usual practice they substitute counsel, most probably the Public Defender, but I was unable to appear at the lineup. The list does not reflect who was counsel at the lineup.
Mr. Toomey [prosecutor] : Well, my indication is Joseph Lynch.
Mr. Lynch: I was supposed to be there, Your Honor, but I was ill that evening. I was not.
Mr. Toomey: Did you inform anyone, Mr. Lynch?
Mr. Lynch: Well, I spoke to a girl and I said I wasn’t there and who actually was and she said, “I don’t know” and I said “Is there any way I could find out?” and she said, “I don’t know.”
Tr. 19-20.

. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (U.S. June 7, 1972) limits the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to events occurring nfter the “initiation of judicial criminal proceedings.” Id. at 689, 92 S.Ct. at 1882. But Kirly’s citation of Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970), makes it clear that the right does attach by the time of the preliminary hearing.

. 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

. True, Wade would permit the Government to resurrect the in-court identification if it could show an independent source. But Gilbert v. California, 38S U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), would render the testimony relating to the lineup identification automatically inadmissible. And no suggestion has been made that admission of either identification was harmless. See Marshall v. United States, 141 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 436 F.2d 155 (1970).

. The record discloses only that ten individuals, each with his own attorney, were listed for the lineup; that a number of the attorneys’ names were crossed off the list; and that the names of attorneys already present on behalf of one subject were entered in place of those deleted. It thus appears that some of the attorneys present were representing, perhaps without prior knowledge, as many as four participants in the lineup.

. 388 U.S. at 237, 87 S.Ct. at 1933.

. See, e. g., United States v. Kirby, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 340, 427 F.2d 610 (1970).

. 388 U.S. at 237 n. 27, 87 S.Ct. at 1938 n. 27.

. Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was “ns much entitled to such aid [of counsel] . . . as at the trial itself.”
Id. at 236-237, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (footnote omitted).

. While there is no express holding on this point in this Circuit, our opinions have made our concern with the problem clear:
Where the Government elects to use “substitute” counsel to satisfy an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights, it may well be incumbent upon the prosecution to ensure that the observations and opinions of the substitute counsel are transmitted to the accused’s subsequently appointed trial counsel. Under this view, the “diligence” of the trial counsel in learning of the events at the lineup is not particularly relevant. Unless the Government takes affirmative action to provide trial counsel with the report of substitute counsel’s observations, the defendant may be denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Marshall v. United States, 141 U.S.App. D.C. 1, 6 n. 18, 436 F.2d 155, 160 n. 18 (1970) ; see United States v. Johnson & Estes, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 452 F.2d 1363 (1971).

. Moreover, other difficulties with this attorney have come to the attention of this Court. Trial counsel was subsequently indicted for crimes that took place near in time to the trial in the instant case and was found not guilty by reason of insanity. In another case involving the same counsel, doubts as to trial performance, when coupled with the existence of a reasonable doubt as to counsel’s sanity at the time of the trial, were enough to show ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Edgerton, No. 24,927 (D.C.Cir. June 1, 1972).

. Counsel did state that he had seen a photograph of the lineup and the “lineup list,” note 1 supra. The lineup list indicated that he had been appellant’s counsel, thus suggesting it was prepared before the lineup took place. And, in any case, the “prejudice” that spawned the Wade decision is precisely the “prejudice” that counsel could not detect after the fact.

. Mr. Lynch: We know that Mr. Small-wood was represented and as far as possible, I believe, Your Honor, we have spread before the Court the circumstances of the lineup, so I would be willing to stipulate that Mr. Smallwood did have counsel at the lineup without in any way prejudicing the motion.
The Oourt: Well, if you are stipulating that as a matter of fact, this defendant did have counsel then of course, the Sixth Amendment proposition has been taken care of.
Mr. Lynch: Yes, Your Honor. And if Your Honor will note, from my motion I raise no Sixth Amendment point.
The Oom-t: Yes, but you have evidence.
Mr. Lynch: Yes, Your Honor, yes, Your Honor — I have evidence and I think it shows it was in large part due to my dilatoriness in not quickly informing the United States Attorney of the fact that I wasn’t there and for that I can only apologize to the Court and take the Court’s censure.
Tr. 24-25.

. He accepted counsel’s “stipulation” that Smallwood’s Sixth Amendment rights had been accorded him. Transcript 25.

. See, e. g., Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 379 F.2d 113 (1967).

. A decision by trial counsel to learn nothing of substitute counsel’s observations is, in effect, a waiver of the right *104to counsel at the lineup. Assuming that it could ever be done knowingly, it cannot be done by counsel alone. Yet, that is precisely what he purported to do here. See note 13 supra.

. 388 U.S. at 239, 87 S.Ct. at 1933; see note 9 supra.

. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 33; Marshall v. United States, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 6 n. 11, 436 F.2d 155, 161 n. 11 (1970).