Court Opinion

ID: 9729658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:45:53.997291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.534299
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I believe that a witness may be cross-examined as to matters tending to show interest or bias, in cases where the witness subject to cross-examination is also the victim, that victim should be treated differently from the ordinary witness. I, therefore, disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in precluding appellant from challenging the self-interest of the victim.
The liberalization of cross-examining witnesses creates a chilling effect on any victim of crime coming forth to testify. Mr. Demps was the victim in this case, and yet the defense was permitted to question him on unrelated matters to present the jury with a theory that he “might” try to obtain leniency in another case. While witnesses may come forth with the idea of gaining from their testimony, victims already have a vested interest in testifying, namely obtaining justice against their attackers. Victims do not look to be attacked in an effort to gain favor with prosecutors in their own cases. This decision reinforces the notion that victims should hesitate about coming forth.
This court, in determining that a defendant has the right to cross-examine a witness about pending charges, continues the progeny of case law established in Commonwealth v. Cobb, 409 Pa.Super. 168, 597 A.2d 714 (1991). I believe that while Cobb is factually analogous to the instant case, the rule of law it sets forth is incorrect. A proper examination of the law necessitates close examination of the court’s rationale.
In Cobb, Kenneth Cobb was charged with assault of Bonnie Rogers. Cobb had agreed to pay Rogers one hundred dollars *598if she drove him to Philadelphia to purchase drugs. When Rogers demanded her money, Cobb stuck her. This court determined that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow the defendant to question the victim/witness about outstanding charges against her. The court in Cobb relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Evans, 511 Pa. 214, 512 A.2d 626 (1986), which held:
[W]henever a prosecution witness may be biased in favor of the prosecution because of outstanding criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no promises, either on the present case or on any other pending criminal matters, the witness may hope for favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to the prosecution.
Id. at 224-25, 512 A.2d at 631-32 (emphasis added).
In Evans, the defendant wanted to cross-examine a co-defendant turning state’s evidence to determine whether the co-defendant was testifying to gain leniency in charges still pending against him. The court in Evans acknowledged the general rule barring admission of a witness’s unconvicted bad acts to determine whether a witness might be biased in his current testimony because of the possibility of lenient treatment on the other crimes. “No Pennsylvania case has allowed cross-examination concerning a witness’s ‘unconvicted bad acts’ to establish that a witness might hope for leniency.” Id. at 221, 512 A.2d at 630. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeded to base its decision in Evans on what I perceive to be an incorrect departure by the Superior Court in its decision in Commonwealth v. Joines, 264 Pa.Super. 281, 399 A.2d 776 (1979).
In Joines, Joines wanted to cross-examine Furlong, a prosecution witness, about Furlong’s guilty plea to a charge of insurance fraud. Joines hoped to show that Furlong was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and enter an ARD program in exchange for his testimony. The trial court refused *599to allow cross-examination on that topic, with the understanding that, according to Commonwealth v. Ross, 434 Pa. 167, 252 A.2d 661 (1969) and Commonwealth v. Coades, 454 Pa. 448, 311 A.2d 896 (1973), only a witness under indictment for the same crime involved in the case in which he is testifying is permitted to be cross-examined about that incident. This court, in determining that the trial court had erred, deviated from the exceptions set forth in Ross and Coades, and determined that such exceptions were premised on only two requirements: “the existence of an indictment against the witness; and evidence that the prosecutor was able to promise the witness leniency on the charges against him.” Joines, 264 Pa.Super. at 284, 399 A.2d at 778. A closer look at Commonwealth v. Warren, 250 Pa.Super. 522, 378 A.2d 1271 (1977), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explains its rationale for the exceptions set forth in Ross and Coades, illustrates the rather abrupt departure of the Joines court.
The rule seems to stand on two legs: necessity of an indictment; and necessity of same crime. The first leg is to ensure that there is some substance to the charge as to which leniency has allegedly been promised ... The second leg of the rule is to ensure that the prosecutor was able to promise leniency.
Warren, 250 Pa.Super. at 529, 378 A.2d at 1274 (emphasis added).
The court in Joines recharacterized Warren’s requirements; specifically, the court in Joines did not necessitate the witness be charged with the same crime. In my view, Joines erroneously extended the rule to allow the cross-examination of a prosecution witness who had been indicted on an unrelated charge. In Evans, the Supreme Court followed the Joines opinion, accepting the broadened applicability of bias cross-examination, namely, that a defendant could cross-examine any prosecution witness on any outstanding charge. Because I am of the opinion that this extension was improper, I feel that Cobb, too, (based on Evans) reached an incorrect result. The progeny of the aforesaid cases carrying out this broadened application of cross-examination bias, in my view, cannot *600be justified; this includes the case at hand. It should also be noted that neither the majority nor the concurrence has made an examination of whether or not the outstanding charge here is within the same jurisdiction, or if the prosecution has the power to promise leniency.
Should the law set forth in these cases continue to be followed by our courts, it will establish a society where a victim is discouraged from asserting a complaint; while a defendant’s past is protected, the victim will be forced to endure the disclosure of his own previous indiscretions, thereby increasing the chance that the victim will be denied justice. Additionally, when a defense attorney is permitted to attack the credibility of a victim/witness based on pending charges in another case, the prejudice of this revealed information far outweighs its probative value.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence. Accordingly, I dissent.