Court Opinion

ID: 9896639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:11:40.500748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:10.402844
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Little, 2023-Ohio-4098.]

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     CASE NOS. 2023-P-0011
                                                             2023-P-0012
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                   Criminal Appeals from the
         - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

ANGEL LITTLE,
                                                   Trial Court Nos. 2021 CR 00659
                  Defendant-Appellant.                              2022 CR 00323 C

                                             OPINION

                                      Decided: November 13, 2023
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Eric R. Fink, 11 River Street, Kent, OH 44240 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

         {¶1}     In this consolidated appeal, defendant-appellant, Angel Little (“Mr. Little”),

appeals from his judgment of conviction in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas

following a jury trial in which he was found guilty of three counts of aggravating trafficking

in drugs and one count of aggravated possession of drugs.

         {¶2}     Mr. Little raises three assignments of error, contending (1) the trial court

erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress; (2) his convictions were not supported

by sufficient evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing joinder and failing to sever

his two indictments for trial.
       {¶3}   After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find as follows:

       {¶4}   (1) The trial court did not err in denying Mr. Little’s motion to suppress. The

traffic stop of Mr. Little’s vehicle was constitutional because the police had a reasonable

and articulable suspicion that he had engaged in drug activity, as well as probable cause

that he had committed traffic violations. Mr. Little’s detention for a canine sniff was also

constitutional. The testimony from the suppression hearing does not indicate Mr. Little’s

detention was artificially prolonged.      Even if it was, the delay was supported by

reasonable, articulable suspicion of Mr. Little’s drug activity.

       {¶5}   (2) The state presented sufficient evidence, if believed, to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Mr. Little committed three counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs

and one count of aggravated possession of drugs.              The testimony of the police’s

confidential informant, if believed, was sufficient to establish Mr. Little either sold, offered

to sell, or was complicit in selling methamphetamine during three controlled drug buys.

In addition, when the circumstantial evidence presented at trial is viewed in a light most

favorable to the state, it was sufficient to establish Mr. Little constructively possessed the

large amount of methamphetamine found under the hood of the vehicle he was driving.

       {¶6}   (3) Mr. Little has not established plain error with respect to the trial court’s

failure to sever his indictments for trial. The record supports the conclusion that based

on application of the “joinder test,” the evidence presented for each charge was simple

and direct.

       {¶7}   Thus, Mr. Little’s assignments of error are without merit, and we affirm the

judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.

                                               2

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
                          Substantive and Procedural History

       {¶8}   This matter involves Mr. Little’s convictions on two felony indictments that

were joined for trial: case no. 2022 CR 00323 C (“the 2022 case”) and case no. 2021 CR

00659 (“the 2021 case”). We summarize the underlying facts chronologically.

                                      The 2022 Case

       {¶9}   The 2022 case involves three controlled drug buys in which a confidential

informant (“C.I.”) for the Portage County Drug Task Force (“the Drug Task Force”)

purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Little. For each buy, the police equipped the C.I.

with a video/audio recording device and cash, transported the C.I. to the arranged

destination, and searched the C.I. before and after the transaction.

       {¶10} The first buy occurred on February 26, 2021, at a mobile home park in

Ravenna, Ohio. The C.I. contacted Mr. Little, and he agreed to sell an “eight ball,” i.e., “a

couple grams of meth,” for $100. Upon arrival, a woman answered the door and led the

C.I. to a bedroom where Mr. Little was present. The C.I. engaged in a short conversation

with Mr. Little, exchanged money for drugs, and left. Sgt. Graham of the Streetsboro

Police Department watched the video recording and identified Mr. Little from a screen

capture that he compared to a photo from Mr. Little’s social media account. Subsequent

testing revealed the substance weighed 3.7 grams and contained methamphetamine.

       {¶11} The second buy occurred on March 5, 2021, at an apartment complex in

Kent, Ohio. The C.I. contacted Mr. Little, and he agreed to sell another “eight ball” for

either $60 or $80. The C.I. had difficulty locating Mr. Little and called him on the phone.

Mr. Little told the C.I. to go to a back window. Upon arrival, an unidentified “skinny young

kid” completed the transaction through the window. The C.I. reported seeing Mr. Little

                                             3

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
inside the apartment standing next to the unknown person. Subsequent testing revealed

the substance weighed 1.68 grams and contained methamphetamine.

       {¶12} The third buy occurred on March 23, 2021, near an elementary school in

Ravenna, Ohio. The C.I. contacted Mr. Little, and he agreed to sell methamphetamine.

They were unable to agree on a location, so the C.I. suggested the school. While walking

to the building, the C.I. was met by Hailey Haney (“Ms. Haney”). The C.I. asked Ms.

Haney if she was Mr. Little’s “people.” Ms. Haney responded in the affirmative and said

she was Mr. Little’s cousin. According to Ms. Haney, she was at a house with Mr. Little

and overheard his conversation with the C.I. She volunteered to complete the transaction

because she wanted to “get high.” While walking to the meeting place, Ms. Haney ate

some of the drugs. The C.I. and Ms. Haney completed the transaction. Subsequent

testing revealed the substance weighed 3.46 grams and contained methamphetamine.

       {¶13} In March 2022, the Portage County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Little on three

counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03:       aggravated

trafficking in methamphetamine in an amount exceeding (but not exceeding five times)

the bulk amount in the vicinity of a school or juvenile, a second-degree felony (count 1);

aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine in an amount less than the bulk amount, a

fourth-degree felony (count 2); and aggravated trafficking in methamphetamine in an

amount exceeding (but not exceeding five times) the bulk amount, a third-degree felony

(count 3). Ms. Haney was charged as a co-defendant in count 1. Mr. Little pleaded not

guilty to the charges.

                                            4

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
                                       The 2021 Case

       {¶14} The 2021 case involves a traffic stop that occurred on June 23, 2021, in

which the police discovered a large amount of methamphetamine under the hood of the

vehicle Mr. Little was driving.

       {¶15} The Drug Task Force was conducting an interdiction operation focused on

hotels in Brimfield, Ohio. Sgt. Graham was sitting in an unmarked vehicle in a hotel

parking lot. At approximately 7:15 p.m., he observed Mr. Little, whom he recognized from

the prior controlled buys, drive an SUV into the parking lot along with a passenger. Sgt.

Graham later learned the passenger was Jason Little (“Jason”), who is Mr. Little’s father

or stepfather and a known drug trafficker who had spent time in prison.

       {¶16} Mr. Little drove towards the back of the hotel and parked. Two women came

out, walked to the driver’s side of the vehicle, and appeared to engage in a transaction.

After a brief period of time, the women walked away, and Mr. Little pulled out of the

parking lot.

       {¶17} Sgt. Graham radioed the other officers in the area, informed them about

what he had observed, and requested the initiation of a traffic stop. He also informed the

officers that based on information he had received from another member of the Drug Task

Force, Mr. Little was known to keep methamphetamine under the hood of his vehicle.

       {¶18} Det. Centa from the Portage County Sheriff’s Office observed Mr. Little’s

vehicle enter I-76 and begin traveling westbound at approximately 50 to 55 miles per

hour. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Little abruptly crossed over the fog line with all four tires,

exited the highway, and began traveling southbound on State Route 532. Det. Centa

informed the other officers of the traffic violations.

                                               5

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
       {¶19} Officer Kennedy of the Brimfield Police Department eventually initiated a

traffic stop of Mr. Little’s vehicle. He radioed for backup because there was more than

one person in the vehicle, and Officer Rapp arrived. Both officers approached the vehicle,

and Officer Kennedy informed Mr. Little he was stopped for impeding traffic.

       {¶20} Officer Kennedy asked Mr. Little for his information. Mr. Little produced

copies of a temporary permit and his identification card, and Jason produced his driver’s

license. Officer Kennedy walked back to his patrol car, radioed the parties’ information

to dispatch, and called for a canine unit.

       {¶21} Officer Kennedy walked back to the vehicle and asked Mr. Little where he

was going. Mr. Little said he was driving to the gas station on Gilcrest Road because he

was running out of gas. According to Officer Kennedy, however, Mr. Little was driving in

the opposite direction, which raised his suspicion.

       {¶22} Sgt. Knarr of the Brimfield Police Department intended to respond with his

canine partner but was delayed. Instead, Trooper English of the Ohio State Highway

Patrol arrived with his canine partner, Hunter. The officers had Mr. Little and Jason exit

the vehicle, patted them down for weapons, and placed them in separate patrol cars.

Hunter circled the outside of the vehicle and performed a free air sniff. He notified Trooper

English of a positive indication, and Officers Kennedy and Rapp began searching the

vehicle.

       {¶23} Sgt. Knarr arrived and assisted with the search. According to both Officer

Kennedy and Sgt. Knarr, a member of the Drug Task Force drove by and told them to

make sure they checked under the vehicle’s hood. The officers opened the hood and

discovered a black sunglasses case on the upper portion of the passenger side. Upon

                                             6

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
opening the case, they discovered baggies of what appeared to be methamphetamine.

The officers read Miranda warnings to Mr. Little and Jason and placed them under arrest.

Mr. Little was not cited for any traffic violations.     Subsequent testing indicated the

substance found under the hood weighed 55.22 grams and contained methamphetamine.

       {¶24} Mr. Little did not own the vehicle.        Sgt. Graham later contacted the

registered owner, Christina Brode (“Ms. Brode”). Ms. Brode indicated she was Mr. Little’s

friend and lent him the vehicle so he could practice driving with Jason in preparation for

his upcoming driver’s license test.       She emphasized that the methamphetamine

discovered under the hood did not belong to her.

       {¶25} In July 2021, the Portage County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Little on two felony

counts: aggravated trafficking in drugs in an amount exceeding five times (but not

exceeding 50 times) the bulk amount, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C.

2925.03 (count 1), and aggravated possession of drugs in an amount exceeding five

times (but not exceeding 50 times) the bulk amount, a second-degree felony, in violation

of R.C. 2925.11 (count 2). Mr. Little pleaded not guilty to the charges.

       {¶26} Mr. Little filed a motion to suppress, contending the traffic stop and his

detention were unconstitutional. The trial court held a suppression hearing, during which

the state presented testimony from Sgt. Graham, Det. Centa, Officer Kennedy, Trooper

English, and Sgt. Knarr. The trial court filed a judgment entry overruling Mr. Little’s motion

to suppress.

                                 Trial Court Proceedings

       {¶27} In May 2022, the state filed a motion for joinder of the two indictments

pursuant to Crim.R. 13, which Mr. Little opposed. The trial court filed a judgment entry

                                              7

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
granting the state’s motion for joinder. Mr. Little filed a motion to reconsider. The trial

court held a hearing and filed a judgment entry denying Mr. Little’s motion to reconsider.

       {¶28} The matter was tried to a jury from January 10 through 12, 2023. The week

before trial, on January 5, 2023, Mr. Little filed a motion for severance and relief from

prejudicial joinder pursuant to Crim.R. 14. The trial court addressed this motion on the

first day of trial, stating, “I had already granted the State’s motion months ago to join the

cases. I didn’t know if you were aware of that, [defense counsel], because I think [prior

defense counsel] was on it then.” Defense counsel responded, “After I filed the motion, I

became aware that we’d already talked about this and then I’d already requested that you

reconsider as well. * * * So we understand that nothing has changed.” The trial court

stated it intended to deny the motion for severance “because it was already granted that

they be joined for various reasons.”

       {¶29} The trial court also addressed the state’s request to amend the indictments.

For the 2021 case, the state indicated it was only proceeding on count 2, i.e., aggravated

possession of drugs. For the 2022 case, the state indicated it was dismissing the school

zone specification in count 1, which reduced the charge to a third-degree felony.

       {¶30} The state presented testimony from Sgt. Graham, the C.I., Det. Centa, Ms.

Haney, Officer Kennedy, Trooper English, Sgt. Knarr, and two forensic scientists from

Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“Ohio BCI”).          The state submitted exhibits

consisting of the methamphetamine, the video recordings of the controlled buys, the

screenshot of Mr. Little, body camera footage from the traffic stop, and reports from Ohio

BCI.

                                             8

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
       {¶31} Following the state’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for acquittal

pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court denied.           The defense rested without

presenting testimony or exhibits. The defense renewed its motion for acquittal, which the

trial court again denied.

       {¶32} The jury returned its verdict finding Mr. Little guilty of all four of the offenses

presented to it. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and set the matter for

sentencing.

       {¶33} On January 27, 2023, Mr. Little filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds

of prejudicial joinder.

       {¶34} On February 27, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial

court addressed Mr. Little’s motion for a new trial. Defense counsel stated, “Now that

we’ve had the trial, it’s even more apparent that Mr. Little was prejudiced by the trying of

both unrelated cases together.” The trial court overruled Mr. Little’s motion for a new trial,

stating it did not believe it was an appropriate remedy. The trial court sentenced Mr. Little

to an aggregate prison term of five to six-and-a-half years and a mandatory fine of $7,500.

In March 2023, the trial court filed a judgment entry memorializing Mr. Little’s convictions.

       {¶35} Mr. Little filed two notices of appeal, which we consolidated sua sponte. He

raises the following three assignments of error:

       {¶36} “[1.]    The trial court erred in denying Mr. Little’s Motion to Suppress

Evidence from the June 23, 2021 traffic stop in violation of his constitutional rights.

       {¶37} “[2.] Mr. Little’s convictions for Aggravated Possession and Aggravated

Trafficking are not supported by sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.

                                               9

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
       {¶38} “[3.] The trial court erred in allowing joinder and failing to sever Mr. Little’s

two cases for purposes of trial.”

                                    Motion to Suppress

       {¶39} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Little contends the trial court erred in

denying his motion to suppress.

       {¶40} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact

and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the

credibility of witnesses.” Id. On appeal, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id. “Accepting

these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without

deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal

standard.” Id.

                                        Traffic Stop

       {¶41} Mr. Little first contends the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was

pretextual. “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d

1204, ¶ 7. Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a “seizure”

within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Delaware v. Prouse, 440

U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979).

                                             10

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
       {¶42} The police may constitutionally stop a motorist if the seizure is premised

upon either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause. State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-

958, 29 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.). Specifically, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has

stated that a traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and

articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is about to commit

a crime.” Mays at ¶ 7. “[I]f an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation,

including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion

considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” Id. at ¶ 8. In

addition, “[w]here a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic

violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had some ulterior motive

for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator was engaging in more nefarious

criminal activity.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996), syllabus.

       {¶43} Here, the stop of Mr. Little’s vehicle was constitutional under either of the

foregoing bases. First, the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Mr.

Little had engaged in drug activity. Sgt. Graham testified during the suppression hearing

that he directly observed a possible hand-to-hand drug transaction in the hotel parking lot

between Mr. Little and the two women. Second, the police had probable cause that Mr.

Little had committed traffic violations. Det. Centa testified that he directly observed Mr.

Little impede traffic with his slow rate of speed and cross over the fog line with all four

tires while exiting the highway. While it appears the officers were more interested in

investigating Mr. Little for potential drug activity rather than traffic offenses, this does not

render the stop unconstitutional.

                                              11

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
                                         Detention

       {¶44} Mr. Little next contends his detention was unconstitutional because it was

impermissibly prolonged. “‘When detaining a motorist for a traffic violation, an officer may

delay the motorist for a time period sufficient to issue a ticket or a warning. * * * This

measure includes the period of time sufficient to run a computer check on the driver’s

license, registration, and vehicle plates. * * * “In determining if an officer completed these

tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop

in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently

conducted the investigation.”’” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204,

865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Howard, 12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2006-02-002

and CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d

585, 598-599, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995).

       {¶45} In addition, “an exterior sniff by a trained narcotics dog to detect the

presence of contraband does not constitute a search under circumstances in which a

vehicle has been lawfully detained.” State v. Melone, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2009-L-047,

2009-Ohio-6710, ¶ 58; see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160

L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). Thus, “[a] traffic stop is not unconstitutionally prolonged when

permissible background checks have been diligently undertaken and not yet completed

at the time a drug dog alerts on the vehicle.” Batchili at ¶ 14.

       {¶46} Even if a detention is “actually prolonged by the request for a dog search,

‘the detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond [the normal] time frame when

additional facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of

criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.’” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Howard

                                             12

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
at ¶ 16. “Once it is determined that a delay occurred for the sole purpose of conducting

a K-9 ‘sniff,’ the question is not whether the delay was undue, but whether the delay was

supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity.” Eggleston at ¶ 28.

       {¶47} The testimony from the suppression hearing does not indicate Mr. Little’s

detention was “artificially prolonged,” as Mr. Little contends. At the suppression hearing,

Officer Kennedy testified that the canine unit arrived within ten minutes or less. Mr. Little’s

argument relies on body camera footage that was admitted during trial; however, it was

not before the trial court when it considered Mr. Little’s motion to suppress. “An appellate

court may consider only evidence that was presented during the suppression hearing and

may not consider evidence presented at trial.” State v. Monford, 190 Ohio App.3d 35,

2010-Ohio-4732, 940 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.). Even if Mr. Little’s detention was

delayed to permit the canine unit’s arrival, any such delay was supported by reasonable,

articulable suspicion of drug activity, i.e., Sgt. Graham’s prior observation of a possible

hand-to-hand drug transaction in the hotel parking lot.

       {¶48} In sum, the traffic stop and the detention were both constitutionally

permitted under existing precedent. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling

Mr. Little’s motion to suppress.

       {¶49} Mr. Little’s first assignment of error is without merit.

                               Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶50} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Little contends his convictions were

not supported by sufficient evidence.

       {¶51} “‘“Sufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied

to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally

                                              13

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th

Ed.1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Id. “An appellate court’s

function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “This naturally entails a

review of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the state’s evidence.” State

v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13.

       {¶52} “[W]hen conducting a sufficiency of the evidence analysis, this court is to

look at the actual evidence admitted at trial, both admissible and inadmissible.” State v.

Rose, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2014-L-086, 2015-Ohio-2607, ¶ 34. In addition, “the claim of

insufficient evidence invokes a question of due process, the resolution of which does not

allow for a weighing of the evidence.” Id. at ¶ 33.

                                  Aggravated Trafficking

       {¶53} Mr. Little contends the state presented insufficient evidence to convict him

of three counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03, which

provides, in relevant part, “No person shall knowingly * * * [s]ell or offer to sell a controlled

substance or a controlled substance analog * * *.” R.C. 2925.03(A)(1).

                                               14

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
       {¶54} For all three controlled buys, Mr. Little contends the state presented “no

evidence” of the alleged conversations between himself and the C.I. regarding possible

drug transactions. For the first buy, Mr. Little also contends Sgt. Graham did not witness

the transaction, and Mr. Little was not the only person present in the mobile home.

       {¶55} The C.I.’s testimony implicated Mr. Little’s direct involvement, and the C.I.’s

testimony constituted “evidence.”       Mr. Little cites no authority indicating the C.I.’s

testimony was required to be corroborated, and we have not located any such authority.

See State v. Some, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28106, 2019-Ohio-3399, ¶ 14. Whether the

C.I.’s testimony was believable involves the C.I.’s credibility and the weight of the

evidence, not sufficiency. “On review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether

the state’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a

defendant would support a conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Thompkins, supra, at 390

(Cook, J., concurring). In addition, Sgt. Graham testified he was able to identify Mr. Little

from a screen capture of the video recording for the first controlled buy.

       {¶56} For the second buy, Mr. Little contends that even though the C.I. testified

regarding his presence, an unidentified person exchanged the drugs for money through

the apartment window. For the third buy, Mr. Little contends there was “absolutely no

evidence” of his involvement. Rather, Ms. Haney overheard Mr. Little’s conversation and

sold the drugs of her own volitation.

       {¶57} The C.I.’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish Mr. Little’s

convictions under two independent theories. First, the offense of aggravated trafficking

in drugs encompasses both selling and offering to sell a controlled substance. See R.C.

                                             15

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
2925.03(A)(1). Thus, the C.I.’s testimony, if believed, was sufficient to establish, at the

very least, Mr. Little offered to sell methamphetamine during the second and third buys.

        {¶58} Second, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of complicity. Ohio’s

complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, provides, in relevant part, “No person, acting with the

kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall * * * (1) [s]olicit or

procure another to commit the offense; [or] (2) [a]id or abet another in committing the

offense * * *.” R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) and (2).1 “To support a conviction for complicity by

aiding and abetting pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the

defendant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the

principal in the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent

of the principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the

crime.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus.

        {¶59} The C.I. testified that Mr. Little arranged the second and third buys. For the

second buy, Mr. Little told the C.I. exactly where to go at the apartment complex. For the

third buy, Ms. Haney confirmed she was Mr. Little’s “people.” Further, Ms. Haney testified

that she overheard Mr. Little making arrangements, and she volunteered to participate in

order to “get high.” This evidence, if believed, was sufficient to support an inference that

Mr. Little solicited, procured, aided, or abetted the unidentified person in the window and

Ms. Haney in selling methamphetamine during the second and third buys.

1. Although the indictment did not reference complicity, “[a] charge of complicity may be stated in terms of
[R.C. 2903.03], or in terms of the principal offense.” R.C. 2903.03(F).
                                                    16

Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
                                Aggravated Possession

       {¶60} Mr. Little next contends the state presented insufficient evidence to convict

him of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11, which provides, in

relevant part, “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance

or a controlled analog.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2925.11(A).

       {¶61} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware

that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a

certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that

such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact

is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively

believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts

with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B).

       {¶62} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance,

but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through

ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”

R.C. 2925.01(K).

       {¶63} Possession can be either actual or constructive. State v. Fogle, 11th Dist.

Portage No. 2008-P-0009, 2009-Ohio-1005, ¶ 28. “‘Constructive possession exists when

an individual is able to exercise dominion or control over an item, even if the individual

does not have the item within his immediate physical possession.’” State v. Hudson,

2018-Ohio-133, 104 N.E.3d 25, ¶ 47 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Kingsland, 177 Ohio

App.3d 655, 2008-Ohio-4148, 895 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). To prove constructive

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
possession, “[i]t must also be shown that the person was conscious of the presence of

the object.” State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 91, 434 N.E.2d 1362 (1982).

       {¶64} Constructive possession may be supported solely by circumstantial

evidence. Fogle at ¶ 30. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence

from which a factfinder may reasonably infer the existence of other facts. State v. Pistillo,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-183, 2004-Ohio-6333, ¶ 20. “Circumstantial evidence and

direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value,” and “[i]n some instances

certain facts can only be established by circumstantial evidence.” Jenks, supra, at 502.

For instance, “[a]bsent an admission by a defendant or direct testimony by another with

knowledge, the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of illegal drugs where the crime

charged is possession of drugs often must be proven via circumstantial evidence * * *.”

Hudson at ¶ 48.

       {¶65} Mr. Little contends the state presented “absolutely no evidence” that he

possessed the large amount methamphetamine discovered under the hood of the vehicle

he was driving. We disagree.

       {¶66} The testimony indicates that the Drug Task Force was conducting an

interdiction operation focused on hotels, and Mr. Little arrived. Sgt. Graham witnessed

Mr. Little appear to engage in a transaction with two women from the hotel. A member of

the task force indicated Mr. Little was known to keep methamphetamine under the hood

of his vehicle. When the police subsequently searched the vehicle Mr. Little was driving,

they discovered methamphetamine under the hood. Although Mr. Little did not own the

vehicle, Ms. Brode had given him permission to drive it. As the driver, Mr. Little would

have had sole access to the vehicle’s hood release. When this circumstantial evidence

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
is viewed in a light most favorable to the state, it was sufficient to establish Mr. Little

constructively possessed the methamphetamine.

       {¶67} In sum, the state presented sufficient evidence, if believed, to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that Mr. Little committed three counts of aggravated trafficking in

drugs and one count of aggravated possession of drugs.

       {¶68} Mr. Little’s second assignment of error is without merit.

                                  Joinder and Severance

       {¶69} In his third and final assignment of error, Mr. Little contends the trial court

erred in allowing joinder and failing to sever his two indictments for trial.

                                    Crim.R. 8(A) and 13

       {¶70} “‘The law favors joining multiple criminal offenses in a single trial.’” State v.

Gordon, 152 Ohio St.3d 528, 2018-Ohio-259, 98 N.E.3d 251, ¶ 18, quoting State v.

Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991). “This is because joint trials

‘conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and

avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial.’” Id., quoting Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123, 134, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Pursuant to Crim.R.

13, “[t]he court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried

together, if the offenses * * * could have been joined in a single indictment or information.”

Crim.R. 8(A) provides the standards for determining whether separate offenses can be

charged in the same indictment:

       {¶71} “Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment * * * if the

offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar

character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or

are part of a course of criminal conduct.”

       {¶72} Even if indictments are initially correctly joined under Crim.R. 8(A) and 13,

a trial court should order separate trials pursuant to Crim.R. 14 if it appears the defendant

is prejudiced by the joinder. Gordon at ¶ 20. Crim.R. 14 provides in relevant part:

       {¶73} “If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of

offenses * * * in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder for trial

together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an election or

separate trial of counts * * * or provide such other relief as justice requires.”

       {¶74} Mr. Little has not set forth an argument based on Crim.R. 8(A) and 13

asserting that the trial court improperly joined his indictments. Therefore, we consider his

third assignment of error solely in relation to severance under Crim.R. 14.

                                         Crim.R. 14

       {¶75} This court generally reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to sever under

an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-092,

2019-Ohio-421, ¶ 50. However, when a defendant fails to renew a motion to sever at the

conclusion of the presentation of all of the evidence at trial, it is waived, and the matter is

reviewed for plain error. State v. Jackson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-140, 2018-Ohio-

3241, ¶ 22.

       {¶76} Here, Mr. Little filed a motion for severance and relief from prejudicial

joinder pursuant to Crim.R. 14 a few days before trial. However, it appears defense

counsel abandoned that motion on the first day of trial. Specifically, the trial court stated

its belief that it had already considered the issue months ago by granting the state’s

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
motion for joinder, and defense counsel agreed. Defense counsel also did not renew its

motion for severance at the conclusion of the presentation of all of the evidence. Rather,

defense counsel reasserted the issue of prejudice over two weeks later in a motion for a

new trial. Thus, Mr. Little has waived all but plain error.

       {¶77} To establish plain error, a defendant must show an error that constitutes an

obvious defect in the trial proceedings and demonstrate that the error affected the

outcome of the trial. State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d

860, ¶ 22. “Notice of plain error * * * is to be taken with the utmost caution, under

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State

v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶78} “When a defendant claims that joinder is improper, he must affirmatively

show that his rights have been prejudiced.” State v. Quinones, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-

L-015, 2005-Ohio-6576, ¶ 38. “The accused must provide the trial court with sufficient

information demonstrating that he would be deprived of the right to a fair trial if joinder is

permitted.”    Id.   “The state may negate the defendant’s claim of prejudice by

demonstrating either of the following: (1) that the evidence to be introduced relative to

one offense would be admissible in the trial on the other, severed offense, pursuant to

Evid.R. 404(B); or (2) that, regardless of the admissibility of such evidence, the evidence

relating to each charge is simple and direct.” Id. at ¶ 39. “The former is generally referred

to as the ‘other acts test,’ while the latter is known as the ‘joinder test.’” Id., quoting State

v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990).

       {¶79} Mr. Little contends that the “other acts test” is not met. However, since Mr.

Little did not properly assert his motion to sever, the trial court did not engage in any

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012
“other acts” analysis under Evid.R. 404(B). We decline to do so for the first time on appeal

because the record indicates the less stringent “joinder test” is met.          Evidence is

considered simple and direct when “the jury is believed capable of segregating the proof

on each charge.” State v. Roberts, 62 Ohio St.2d 170, 175, 405 N.E.2d 247 (1980). Here,

each of Mr. Little’s charges involved different dates, locations, and actions. In addition,

Mr. Little’s alleged conduct in committing the aggravated trafficking offenses, i.e., selling

methamphetamine to the C.I. on three occasions, was separate and distinct from his

alleged conduct in committing the aggravated possession offense, i.e., concealing

methamphetamine under the hood of the vehicle he was driving. Accordingly, Mr. Little

has not established plain error with respect to the trial court’s failure to sever his

indictments for trial.

       {¶80} Mr. Little’s third assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶81} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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Case Nos. 2023-P-0011 and 2023-P-0012