Court Opinion

ID: 9915986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:07:47.360551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:48.190986
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0486-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

B.A.W.,1

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided January 9, 2024

                   Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 19-07-1865.

                   Alyssa A. Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Alyssa A. Aiello, of counsel
                   and on the brief).

                   Kevin Jay Hein, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Grace C. Mac Aulay, Camden County

1
 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the victim. See R.
1:38-3(c)(12).
            Prosecutor, attorney; Kevin Jay Hein, of counsel and on
            the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Following a trifurcated trial, the same jury convicted defendant of various

offenses for attempting to kill his estranged wife, F.R. (Faith), on the night of

November 4, 2018; stalking her in the weeks leading up to the shooting; and

possessing a weapon by a convicted felon. During the first trial, the State

presented evidence that Faith was shot multiple times as she and her friend, S.W.

(Steve), left his gated apartment complex in Cherry Hill. The State's theory was

that defendant followed Faith to Steve's residence, laid in wait, shot Faith in a

jealous rage, and fled to Florida.

      Married in 2011 when Faith was twenty-two years old and defendant

forty-six; they share two children. In 2017, Faith and the children moved into

her father's home in response to defendant's controlling and possessive behavior.

About six weeks before the incident, defendant's alarming conduct escalated: he

peered at Faith through windows; made unwanted calls and text messages; and

accused Faith of cheating on him. Faith caught defendant following her to and

from work, social gatherings, and errands. As one notable example, on October

18, 2018, defendant followed Faith to a wineshop in his Honda Civic, prompting

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                       2
Faith to call the police. Defendant called Faith while she was speaking with the

officer. Faith testified she "was living in fear all the time."

      The evening of the incident was the third time Faith socialized with Steve

outside the store, where she worked and he often shopped, and the first time she

was inside his apartment. Faith arrived at 8:30 p.m. and had a few drinks but

did not feel inebriated. Fearing defendant had followed her, Faith looked out

the window several times and told Steve about her concerns.

      Around 11:30 p.m., Steve walked Faith to her car. Before he could open

the door, a man with a gun jumped out from behind the car. Faith immediately

recognized defendant as the gunman. She watched as he loaded the cylinder of

the gun while pointing it in her direction. Steve tackled defendant to the ground;

they wrestled; defendant freed himself; and Faith and Steve ran in two different

directions. At some point, defendant caught up with Faith and shot her in the

face. Faith heard six shots; she was shot three times.

      Steve heard the shots and called 9-1-1. He saw Faith run to the front of

the apartment building and pulled her inside. Faith told Steve: "That was

[B.A.W.]. That was [B.A.W.]."

      Police arrived within minutes of the shooting and found Faith and Steve

in the apartment building's lobby bathroom. Writhing in pain, Faith immediately

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                         3
identified defendant as the shooter. At trial, the State played video footage from

body worn cameras (BWC) of two responding officers. Totaling more than

twenty minutes in length, the BWC footage graphically depicted Faith's injuries

and captured various statements made by Faith and echoed by police that

defendant was the shooter. The State elicited testimony concerning Faith's

identification of defendant from her, Steve, and the responding officers. Faith

maintained she was certain her husband shot her with a revolver and that he had

driven a "black jeep-like car" to the scene. There were no eyewitnesses to the

shooting but Steve's neighbors saw a jeep-type SUV leaving the scene.

      No weapon was recovered at the scene. Police found one shell casing

which, defendant's expert later testified, was "highly likely" to have been

discharged from a "semi-automatic firearm." The State did not introduce any

phone records or evidence that defendant owned or had access to a jeep vehicle.

A local detective testified defendant was arrested in Florida about one month

after the incident. Defendant did not testify but argued that this was a case of

misidentification.

      Following the first trial, defendant was convicted of counts one through

seven charged in a nine-count Camden County indictment:               first-degree

attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and :11-3(a)(1) (count one); third-degree

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                        4
aggravated assault with a revolver-style handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2) (count

two); third-degree aggravated assault on a domestic violence victim, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(b)(12) (count three); fourth-degree aggravated assault by pointing a

firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count four); fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-10(b) (count five);2 second-degree unlawful possession of a revolver-

style handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count six); and second-degree possession

of a revolver-style handgun for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count

seven). After the second trial, the jury found defendant not guilty of fourth -

degree criminal contempt by violating a TRO, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(b) (count

eight). At the conclusion of the third trial, the jury found defendant guilty of

second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1)

(count nine).

      After denying defendant's motion for a new trial, granting the State's

motion for a discretionary extended term as a persistent offender, N.J.S.A.

2
  The indictment charged defendant with third degree stalking in violation of a
temporary restraining order (TRO), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(c). Because the stalking
count referenced the TRO, in the first trial, the jury only was asked to consider
whether defendant was guilty of fourth-degree stalking. When asked to consider
whether defendant committed stalking in violation of a TRO, in the second trial,
the jury answered "no." The parties agreed to a trifurcated trial to insulate the
jury from hearing evidence of Faith's TRO, relevant to counts five and eight;
and defendant's prior aggravated assault conviction, relevant to count nine.
                                                                           A-0486-20
                                       5
2C:44-3(a), and ordering the appropriate mergers, the trial court sentenced

defendant to an aggregate thirty-eight-and-one-half-year prison term, with a

thirty-and-one-half-year period of parole ineligibility. Specifically, the court

imposed the following prison terms on the remaining counts: thirty years,

subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 on count one;

eighteen months on count five, consecutively to counts one, six, and nine; seven

years with a forty-two-month parole disqualifier on count six, consecutively to

counts one and five, and concurrently to count nine; and seven years with a five-

year mandatory parole ineligibility period pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1)

on count nine, consecutively to counts one and five and concurrently to count

six.3

        Defendant appeals raising the following points for our consideration:

                                     POINT I

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE
              VICTIM'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS NAMING
              DEFENDANT AS THE SHOOTER, WHICH WERE
              CONTAINED IN HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL [BWC]
              RECORDINGS. THE COURT FURTHER ERRED BY
              ALLOWING THE [BWC] FOOTAGE TO BE
              PLAYED BEFORE THE JURY, BECAUSE, AS
              [DEFENDANT] ARGUED BELOW, THE VISUAL

3
    Pursuant to the parties' negotiated plea agreement, defendant also was
sentenced to a concurrent prison term of eighteen months for fourth-degree
resisting arrest, charged in a separate indictment.
                                                                           A-0486-20
                                         6
            IMAGE OF THE BLEEDING VICTIM WRITHING IN
            PAIN HAD NO PURPOSE OTHER THAN TO
            INFLAME THE PASSIONS OF THE JURY.
            MOREOVER, THE [BWC] RECORDINGS, WHICH
            SPANNED          MORE      THAN [TWENTY-FIVE]
            TRANSCRIPT PAGES, CONTAINED NUMEROUS
            OTHER STATEMENTS THAT WERE IRRELEVANT
            AND PREJUDICIAL.
            [(Partially raised below)]

                                    POINT II

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CHARGING THE
            JURY ON FLIGHT BECAUSE [DEFENDANT]'S
            PRESENCE IN FLORIDA, MORE THAN A MONTH
            AFTER THE SHOOTING, DID NOT REASONABLY
            JUSTIFY AN INFERENCE THAT [DEFENDANT]
            LEFT NEW JERSEY WITH A CONSCIOUSNESS OF
            GUILT AND TO AVOID ARREST.

                                   POINT III

            IMPROPER COMMENTS MADE                       BY THE
            PROSECUTOR           IN  SUMMATION            REQUIRE
            REVERSAL.
            (Partially raised below)

                                   POINT IV

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING THREE
            CONSECUTIVE      SENTENCES     WITHOUT
            CONSIDERING THE OVERALL FAIRNESS OF THE
            SENTENCE.

      Having considered defendant's challenges to his convictions in view of

the totality of the evidence presented at trial, we are satisfied any trial errors

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                        7
were not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result."         See R. 2:10-2.

Although we are satisfied that the court's imposition of consecutive sentences

conformed with the factors enumerated by our Supreme Court in State v.

Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), we nonetheless remand for an overall statement

of fairness pursuant to State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021), decided the year

after defendant was sentenced. We therefore affirm defendant's convictions and

remand for resentencing.

                                        I.

      In his first point on appeal, defendant raises various overlapping

arguments concerning the trial court's admission of Faith's identification through

the testimony of the responding officers and, again, when their BWC footage

was played for the jury. He further contends the admission of the video portions

of the BWC footage was highly prejudicial because they depicted images of

Faith, bleeding in obvious pain. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues

the BWC audio contains other irrelevant and highly prejudicial statements.

      We address defendant's contentions in light of our discretionary standard

of review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. See State v. Garcia, 245 N.J.

412, 430 (2021). Accordingly, we do "not substitute our judgment unless the

evidentiary ruling is 'so wide of the mark' that it constitutes 'a clear error in

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                        8
judgment.'" Ibid. (quoting See State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412 (2020)).

"Every mistaken evidentiary ruling, however, will not lead to a reversal of a

conviction. Only those that have the clear capacity to cause an unjust result will

do so." Ibid. (first citing State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 581 (2018); and then

citing R. 2:10-2). We address those claims that were not raised before the trial

court through the prism of the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2 (providing, in

pertinent part, "the appellate court may, in the interests of justice, notice plain

error not brought to the attention of the trial . . . court" but shall disregard any

error unless it was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result").

      To give context to the court's admission of Faith's identification, we

briefly summarize the pertinent procedural history underpinning the State's

intention to admit the footage from the BWCs of Cherry Hill Police Officers

Sean Fay and Jordan Mayr.

      On the State's pretrial application, the court conducted a Driver4 hearing

regarding the admissibility of the BWC footage. At the outset of the hearing,

the State acknowledged its obligation to redact all references to Faith's

4
  State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255 (1962). Following a Driver hearing, the trial court
determines whether a sound recording is admissible, considering several factors
including whether any changes, additions, or deletions have been made to the
recording. Id. at 287.

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                         9
restraining order. While the videos were played in open court, the parties agreed

to certain other redactions, and the court sustained defendant's objection to

additional statements. For example, the court excluded Steve's remarks that

Faith had told him she feared defendant as "hearsay within hearsay" and "overly

prejudicial." Defendant did not, however, object to Faith's identification of

defendant or any other statements as hearsay.

      During her opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury: "You're gonna

see body worn camera footage which, I have to warn you, is somewhat graphic

and may be a little disconcerting."     Defendant posed no objection to the

prosecutor's remark.

      At trial, Fay testified when he first encountered Faith in the lobby

bathroom, "she was in a distraught state and seemed very . . . panicked." Fay

observed Faith bleeding in and around her mouth. "She was crying to a degree.

She was in agonizing pain it appeared." Fay described Faith's demeanor as

"frantic." Over defendant's objections, the following exchange ensued:

            PROSECUTOR: What did she say about how she
            sustained these injuries?

            FAY: She said she was shot.

            PROSECUTOR: Did she say who shot her?

            FAY: Yes.

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      10
            PROSECUTOR: And who was that?

           FAY: She said, "[B.A.W.]"
      Thereafter, the State moved into evidence Fay's BWC video footage. At

sidebar, apparently for the first time at trial, defendant objected to the video

portion, contending it "offer[ed] no probative value at all." The State countered

that the court had held "a preliminary hearing about this matter" and "ruled that

[the video] was admissible" as "highly probative because it shows the moment

after the shooting occurred when [Faith identified defendant]."5 The prosecutor

argued the video provided a basis for the jury "to assess th[e] credibility of

[Faith] making the identification"; all prejudicial portions of the video were

redacted; and the footage "corroborate[d] the witness's testimony." Contending

the prosecutor's argument "c[ould] be satisfied with the audio," defendant

explicitly limited his objection to the "video portion" of the BWC footag e and

stated he had "no objection to the audio." The parties then disputed whether the

injuries depicted in the video were relevant to the elements of the charges. The

court overruled the objection based on the "victim's identification."

5
  The court's decision on the admissibility of the videos is not contained in the
record provided on appeal. According to defendant's case information
statement, no inquiry was made of the trial court as to "whether the judge
w[ould] be filing a statement or opinion pursuant to R[ule] 2:5-1(b)."
                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      11
      Similarly, the State introduced Faith's identification of defendant through

Mayr's testimony and BWC footage. Mayr arrived at the scene after Fay,

observed Faith on the bathroom floor "bloody and . . . screaming and writhing

in pain."

      Within five to ten minutes of Mayr's arrival, EMS arrived and placed Faith

in the ambulance, where they attempted to stabilize her. Mayr accompanied

Faith in the ambulance. When asked to describe her condition, Mayr testified:

"She's screaming. She's telling EMTs and myself that he tried to kill me, he

tried to kill me. I can see blood from her mouth and her chest. She kept saying

over and over again." The responding EMT later testified "it looked like [Faith]

was in the beginning stages of shock."       Over defendant's objection, Mayr

testified he asked Faith who tried to kill her and Faith responded, "[B.A.W.],"

who "was her ex-husband." During his ensuing testimony the State played

Mayr's BWC footage, subject to the same objection previously raised by

defendant regarding the introduction of Fay's BWC footage.

      In summation, the State played both BWC videos. The prosecutor argued

the footage demonstrated Faith did not sound confused about who shot her.

Pertinent to this appeal, at the conclusion of the prosecutor's closing statement

defendant objected to the prosecutor's comments, "Does she look confused?";

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      12
and "Why would she lie?" as attempts to bolster Faith's credibility. The court

indicated it would instruct the jury "if anything that counsel said was in conflict

with [its] instruction to . . . ignore them or to . . . listen to [its] instructions

only."

                       A. Faith's Identification of Defendant

         We first address defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously

admitted Faith's statements identifying defendant as the shooter through the

testimony of Officers Fay and Mayr. The State maintains the statements were

properly admitted as excited utterances under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2), and prior

identification under N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3). The trial court did not provide a basis

for overruling defendant's objections.

         N.J.R.E. 801 defines hearsay as "a statement other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted." N.J.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay may not be admitted

into evidence unless it falls within one of the exceptions provided by the rules

of evidence or "other law." N.J.R.E. 802.

                               1. Excited Utterances

         The excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission

of a statement "relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                         13
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition and without

opportunity to deliberate or fabricate." N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2). The rationale for

the excited utterance exception is that "excitement suspends the declarant's

powers of reflection and fabrication, consequently minimizing the possibility

that the utterance will be influenced by self-interest and therefore rendered

unreliable." State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 328 (2005) (quoting State v. Long,

173 N.J. 138, 158 (2002)).

      In deciding "whether there was an opportunity to fabricate or deliberate,

a court should consider 'the element of time, the circumstances of the incident,

the mental and physical condition of the declarant, and the nature of the

utterance.'" Long, 173 N.J. at 159 (quoting State v. Williams, 106 N.J. Super.

170, 172 (App. Div. 1969)). Although each factor is important, "the crucial

element is the presence of a continuing state of excitement." Cotto, 182 N.J. at

328 (quoting State v. Lyle, 73 N.J. 403, 413 (1977)). "[A] statement constitutes

an excited utterance when 'the circumstances reasonably warrant the inference

that the statement was made as an uncontrolled response to the shock of the

event before reasoned reflection could have stimulated a self-serving response.'"

Ibid. (quoting Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 504 (1971)).

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      14
      Defendant renews his objection that Faith's statements to Fay and Mayr

did not fall within the excited utterance exception. In his merits brief, defendant

argues unlike her statement to Steve, which was "made spontaneously . . .

immediately after they reached the safety of the lobby bathroom," Faith's

statements to the officers were made after she "had time to reflect on the

shooting and her belief that [defendant] committed it." Citing the Supreme

Court's decision in Cotto, defendant argues Faith's statements to Fay and Mayr,

naming defendant as the shooter, were not "not sufficiently spontaneous to

assure reliability." Defendant's contentions are misplaced.

      In Cotto, the Court held the exception inapplicable where two sisters, who

had witnessed a residential robbery, gave statements to police at the crime-scene

apartment about fifteen to twenty minutes after the robbery and at the police

station about thirty to forty minutes after the robbery. 182 N.J. at 329-30. The

Court reasoned the statements were made at the apartment after the witnesses

"had an opportunity to deliberate." Id. at 330. Similarly, the statements given

at police headquarters were made after "a cooling-off period during which the

sisters achieved some physical and emotional distance from the robbery." Id. at

329. Thus, "the sisters would have had an opportunity to calm themselves and

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                       15
provide thoughtful answers to the questions the police posed during the formal

interview at the station." Ibid.

      The Court nonetheless deemed harmless the admission of the witnesses'

statements through the trial testimony of the police officers. Id. at 331. The

Court cited the witnesses' previous in-court identification of the defendant; the

prior romantic relationship between one witness and defendant; and defendant's

opportunity to cross-examine the sisters at trial.

      In the present matter, Faith was in the "the presence of a continuing state

of excitement" when she told Fay "[B.A.W.]" shot her. See id. at 328. Indeed,

in his merits brief, defendant acknowledges Faith, who had suffered multiple

gunshot wounds just moments before, was "clearly distraught from the obvious

pain she was in" when she made the statement to Fay and a significant amount

of time had not passed since the shooting. Notably, Faith made the statement to

Fay on the heels of her statement identifying the shooter to Steve, which

defendant acknowledges "had all the hallmarks of an exited utterance."

      Nor are we persuaded that the court erroneously admitted Mayr's

testimony concerning Faith's identification of defendant. Although Faith made

the statement approximately fifteen minutes after the shooting, she was still in

"the presence of a continuing state of excitement." Unlike the time frame in

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                       16
Cotto, where the thirty to forty-five-minute interlude provided the witnesses

with a "cooling-off period during which [they] achieved some physical and

emotional distance" from the crime, Faith was still in the throes of agony when

she told Mayr "[B.A.W.]" shot her. See id. at 329. Her body was in the

beginning stages of shock, and she reasonably believed she was dying. The

fifteen minutes between the shooting and her statements to Mayr thus did not

provide Faith with a period of "calm" and opportunity for "reasoned reflection"

indicative of a statement falling outside the purview of an excited utterance. See

id. at 328-29.

      We further reject defendant's contention that Faith's identification of

defendant fails to satisfy the excited utterance exception because it was made in

response to police questioning. As the Court observed in Cotto, "a response to

a question may constitute an excited utterance," but in that case, "the sisters

would have had an opportunity to calm themselves and provide thoughtful

answers to the questions the police posed during the formal interview at the

station." Id. at 329. No such cooling off period occurred here.

      Even if Faith's statements were erroneously admitted under the excited

utterance exception to the hearsay rule, we conclude any error was harmless.

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       17
Faith knew her assailant, having been married to defendant for about eight years;

testified at trial; and identified him in court at the time of trial. See id. at 331.

                               2. Prior Identification

      Because we conclude Faith's identification of defendant was properly

admitted as excited utterances, we need not reach the State's alternate argument.

We do so for the sake of completeness.

      A declarant-witness's statement that is a "prior identification of a person

made after perceiving that person if made in circumstances precluding

unfairness or unreliability" is admissible as a hearsay exception if the declarant

witness testifies and is subject to cross-examination. N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3). The

rationale for admitting a prior identification is that "it is likely to be correct since

it was made when the events and sensory impressions were fresh in the mind of

the one making the identification." Biunno, Weissbard & Zegas, Current N.J.

Rules of Evidence, cmt. 3 on N.J.R.E. 803 (2023-2024) (citing State v. Matlack,

49 N.J. 491, 498 (1967)) (explaining the similarity between Rule 63(1)(c) (1967)

and N.J.R.E. 803(a)(3)).

      Faith made the identifying statements no more than fifteen minutes after

she was shot. She testified about her opportunity to observe defendant in the

"lit" parking lot during the attack and that the alcohol did not affect her ability

                                                                                 A-0486-20
                                          18
to identify him as the shooter. Further, there is no indication in the record, nor

has defendant argued, that the procedure under which Faith made the

identifications was "inherently suggestive" or otherwise unsuitable for

submission to a jury. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). Accordingly,

Faith's statement to police that the shooter was "[B.A.W.]" was admissible as a

"prior identification."

                          B. Prejudicial BWC Footage

      We turn to defendant's argument that the trial court committed reversible

error in admitting the BWC recordings because the prejudicial effect of their

combined twenty-minute footage, including "disturbing images" of Faith,

substantially outweighed their probative value. Defendant renews his argument

that the BWC footage was cumulative because the officers and Steve testified at

trial that Faith had identified defendant as the shooter. He further contends the

prosecutor's remarks in summation concerning Faith's several statements

identifying defendant exacerbated the BWC recordings' prejudicial impact. In

addition,   defendant     belatedly   claims   the   BWC     footage    contained

overwhelmingly prejudicial remarks, including, "the dramatic sounds of [Faith]

crying that she wanted to die"; "[Steve] telling [Faith] he loves her"; "officers

and EMTs describing [Faith]'s injuries"; the officers' repeated statements

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       19
defendant was the suspect; and "[Faith] repeatedly saying the name of a 'federal

agent,' who 'knows everything.'"

      "'Evidence must be relevant for it to be admissible,' and 'all relevant

evidence is admissible' unless excluded by the Rules of Evidence or other law."

State v. Williams, 240 N.J. 225, 235 (2019) (first quoting State v. Scharf, 225

N.J. 547, 568 (2016); and then quoting N.J.R.E. 402). "Evidence is relevant if

it has 'a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the

determination of the action.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.R.E. 401). The evidence must

be probative of a fact that is "really in issue in the case," as determined by

reference to the applicable substantive law. State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261

(2013) (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 359 (App. Div. 1990)).

      Under N.J.R.E. 401, "[e]vidence need not be dispositive or even strongly

probative in order to clear the relevancy bar."     Buckley, 216 N.J. at 261.

Moreover, "[t]he proponent need not demonstrate that the evidence can, in and

of itself, establish or disprove a fact of consequence in order to meet the

benchmark of N.J.R.E. 401." State v. Cole, 229 N.J. 430, 448 (2017). "Once a

logical relevancy can be found to bridge the evidence offered and a

consequential issue in the case, the evidence is admissible, unless exclusion is

                                                                          A-0486-20
                                      20
warranted under a specific evidence rule." State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 127

(2008); see N.J.R.E. 402.

      N.J.R.E. 403 "mandates the exclusion of evidence that is otherwise

admissible 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a)

undue prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay,

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Cole, 229 N.J.

at 448 (quoting N.J.R.E. 403). "The party urging the exclusion of evidence

under N.J.R.E. 403 retains the burden 'to convince the court that the N.J.R.E.

403 considerations should control.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 406

(2019) (quoting Rosenblit v. Zimmerman, 166 N.J. 391, 410 (2001)).

      To determine undue prejudice, the inquiry is "whether the probative value

of the evidence 'is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory

potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a

reasonable and fair evaluation of the' issues." Cole, 229 N.J. at 448 (alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421 (1971)). "[T]he mere

possibility that evidence could be prejudicial does not justify its exclusion."

State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 429 (2007) (quoting State v. Koskovich, 168

N.J. 448, 486 (2001)). "It is not enough for the opposing party to show that the

evidence could be prejudicial; '[d]amaging evidence usually is very prejudicial

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      21
but the question here is whether the risk of undue prejudice was too high.'" Cole,

229 N.J. at 448 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383,

453-54 (1998)).

      Citing our decision in State v. Taylor, 350 N.J. Super. 20 (App. Div.

2002), defendant urges us to similarly conclude that the admission of the BWC

videos deprived him of a fair trial. In its responding brief and during argument

before us, the State argues the Taylor decision is anachronistic because "the

proliferation of video, and particularly BWC [footage], has impacted jurors'

degree of trust in the words of witnesses, and police officers especially."

      In Taylor, the trial court admitted a video depicting the last three and one-

half minutes of the victim's life as a dying declaration of his attacker's identity.

350 N.J. Super. at 35-36. The defendant's identity was captured during the final

ten seconds of the recording. Ibid. The preceding three minutes showed the

victim struggling for life, gasping, and stating, "ambulance, I'm dying," while

people walked in and out of the store stating, "he's gonna die, man." Id. at 36.

The video concluded with the arrival of the victim's mother, frantically urging

him to identify who stabbed him, and the victim's reply, "in a barely audible

whisper, . . . 'Johnny.'" Ibid. One or two jurors were moved to tears by the

video, which was played during the State's case-in-chief and again in

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        22
summation. Ibid. The prosecutor's closing remarks reminded the jury about

hearing the victim's "suffering." Ibid.

      We held the probative value of the video was minimal because three

eyewitnesses testified about the victim's dying declaration at trial and "the

potentially prejudicial effect of observing the victim struggling for life [wa]s

enormous." Id. at 36-37. The prejudice was compounded by the other three

minutes of the video, which "lacked any intrinsic relevance," serving only to

further inflame the jury. Id. at 38. We concluded "playing the video twice for

the jury deprived [the] defendant of a fair trial." Ibid.

      The circumstances in Taylor are distinguishable from those in the present

matter, where defendant's primary theory was misidentification. Defendant

argued several Henderson factors6 negatively impacted Faith's ability to identify

him at the time of the shooting, i.e., her intoxication, stress, and weapon focus,

and poor lighting at the time of the shooting negatively impacted her ability to

accurately perceive the shooter, leaving a "hole" in her memory . Defendant

urged the jury to reject Faith's testimony in view of her faulty memory.

6
   In Henderson, the Court adopted a framework to determine whether the
process utilized by police to obtain eyewitness identification of a perpetrator
was reliable or impermissibly suggestive, thereby requiring a hearing to
determine the identification's admissibility. 208 N.J. at 288-96.
                                                                            A-0486-20
                                        23
Conversely, the victim's ability to perceive his assailant was not part of the

defense in Taylor.

      The BWC footage provided context for the jury to assess the reliability

and credibility of Faith's identification of defendant, a hotly disputed issue in

the case. For example, the footage demonstrates Faith answered the officers'

questions directly and did not display any overt signs of intoxication that would

inhibit her ability to recognize her husband of several years. See State v.

Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 214 (2008) (recognizing "the signs of drunkenness are

matters of common knowledge and experience").

      Moreover, unlike the victim in Taylor, Faith survived the shooting,

testified at trial, and her identification was subject to cross-examination.

Further, the footage depicted the extent of the Faith's injuries, a necessary

element of the aggravated assault on a domestic violence victim charge, and a

factor for the jury's consideration of the attempted murder charge. And unlike

the jurors in Taylor, there is no indication in the record that the jury in the

present matter was moved to tears upon viewing the video.             We therefore

conclude those portions of the BWC footage pertaining to Faith's identification

of defendant and the extent of her injuries were clearly probative.

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                      24
      In distinguishing our decision in Taylor, however, we are not persuaded

by the State's argument that because today's jurors are hesitant to believe

witnesses in the absence of video evidence, such evidence was "less important

and more cumulative in nature" two decades ago when Taylor was decided. We

therefore next address defendant's contention that the footage nonetheless

should have been excluded because its prejudicial effect substantially

outweighed its probative value, especially in view of its cumulative nature,

graphic imagery, and irrelevant remarks.

      Although the evidence contained in the BWC footage was, in part,

undoubtedly damaging, "the danger of undue prejudice" did not "outweigh [its]

probative value so as to divert jurors 'from a reasonable and fair evaluation of

the basic issue of guilt or innocence.'" See State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 467

(1991) (quoting State v. Sanchez, 224 N.J. Super. 231, 249-50 (App. Div.

1988)). Here, the BWC footage permitted the jury to assess Faith's demeanor

within minutes of the shooting and consider defendant's contention that Faith

was intoxicated when she repeatedly stated defendant was the shooter. Nor are

we persuaded that the cumulative nature of the BWC videos warrants reversal.

See State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 114 (1982) ("Evidence that is merely cumulative

                                                                          A-0486-20
                                      25
does not create a reasonable possibility that the verdict would have been

affected.").

      We nonetheless agree with defendant that at least half of the combined

BWC footage was not probative of Faith's identification.             However, the

irrelevant footage does not render the entirety of the footage inadmissible. In

hindsight, that footage should have been considered for redaction during the

Driver hearing, when efforts were made by both parties to reduce the prejudicial

impact of the BWC videos by redacting certain statements, including Faith's

references to her TRO against defendant and her prior disclosure to Steve that

she feared defendant would attack her.

      In any event, any error was harmless in view of the evidence of defendant's

guilt at trial. Although, as defendant argues, there only was one identification,

no forensic evidence, and no corroborating witnesses to the actual shooting, the

victim in this case was married to defendant for several years before the

shooting. Moreover, the State presented evidence that defendant continuously

stalked Faith after she left the marital home with the couple's two children until

the time of the shooting. The quantity of proofs might have been minimal; th e

nature of the proofs was overwhelming. Finally, we note in its final instructions

to the jury, the court instructed: "As jurors, it is your duty to weigh the evidence

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        26
calmly and without passion, prejudice or sympathy."          Model Jury Charge

(Criminal), "Final Charge" (rev. Sept. 1, 2022). We presume the jury followed

the court's instructions. See State v. Vega-Larregui, 246 N.J. 94, 126 (2021).

We therefore conclude any error was harmless. See R. 2:10-2.

      We also reject defendant's belated assertion that certain irrelevant

statements should have been excluded. Because defendant sought to exclude

only the video portions of the video, any error in admitting those statements was

invited. See State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561-62 (2013) (holding "trial errors

that were induced, encouraged or acquiesced in or consented to by defense

counsel ordinarily are not a basis for reversal on appeal") (quoting State v.

Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)).

      Based on the totality of the circumstances presented here, we cannot

conclude the court's admission of the recordings was a "clear error in judgment."

Medina, 242 N.J. at 412 (2020).

                                        II.

      In his second point, defendant argues the trial court erroneously granted

the State's application to charge the jury on flight. Overruling his objection, the

court found the testimony that defendant "was apprehended in Florida within a

month of the event" permitted a reasonable inference that defendant fled shortly

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                       27
after the shooting. Defendant does not challenge the language of the specific

jury instruction on the flight charge, which substantially tracked the model jury

charge on flight, Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Flight" (rev. May 10, 2010).

Instead, he maintains there was an insufficient evidentiary basis for the

instruction.   For the first time on appeal, defendant contends the State

"exacerbated" the error by arguing in summation, "it took the police a month to

find him in Florida," without evidentiary support that the police were searching

for defendant during that timeframe.

      Whether there exists a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a flight

charge is within the trial judge's discretion. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 499

(1990). In determining whether to instruct a jury on flight, a judge "must

cautiously consider whether, given the peculiar facts in th[e] case, a flight charge

is appropriate." State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 595 (2017). An instruction on

flight "is appropriate when there are 'circumstances present and unexplained

which . . . reasonably justify an inference that it was done with a consciousness

of guilt and pursuant to an effort to avoid an accusation based on that guilt.'"

State v. Latney, 415 N.J. Super. 169, 175-76 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v.

Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 418-19 (1993)). "The jury must be able to find departure

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        28
and 'the motive which would turn the departure into flight.'" Id. at 176 (quoting

State v. Wilson, 57 N.J. 39, 49 (1970)).

      Although evidence presented to support a flight charge must be

"intrinsically indicative of a consciousness of guilt," it need not "unequivocally

support a reasonable inference of the defendant's guilt." Randolph, 228 N.J. at

595 (quoting State v. Randolph, 441 N.J. Super. 533, 562-63 (App. Div. 2015)).

For example, in Wilson, our Supreme Court held that even when evidence could

lend itself to multiple interpretations, a flight charge still is appropriate if the

evidence presented could allow a jury to "readily infer that [a defendant] fled to

avoid apprehension by the police and thereby exhibited consciousness of guilt."

57 N.J. at 49. Accordingly, the Court determined that although the jurors could

have attributed an innocent motive to the defendant's abrupt departure, the flight

instruction was proper because the evidence also could support a finding that

defendant sought to avoid apprehension for the particular crime. Ibid.

      At trial through Faith's testimony, the State presented evidence of

defendant's pervasive presence in New Jersey during the weeks prior to the

shooting. In addition, Cherry Hill Police Detective Michelle Chambers testified

that following the shooting, defendant's whereabouts were unknown and during

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        29
the first week of December 2018, he was arrested in Tampa, Florida by members

of the United States Marshall Service's Fugitive Task Force.

      We discern no error in the court's issuance of the flight charge. Witness

testimony established facts from which the jury could have concluded defendant

resided in New Jersey, was consistently present in the state, followed Faith

during the weeks leading to the shooting, fled the crime scene after the shooting,

and was apprehended one month later in Florida. Consistent with the Court's

decision in Wilson, the jury was permitted to accept that testimony and infer

defendant "fled to avoid apprehension by the police and thereby exhibit ed

consciousness of guilt." Ibid. Although we agree with defendant that there was

no direct evidence police were searching for defendant between the time of the

shooting and his arrest in Florida, the prosecutor's comment was a reasonable

inference based on the evidence in the record that defendant's whereabouts were

unknown.    See State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 96 (2006) (recognizing the

prosecutor's "duty is to prove the State's case based on the evidence").

      Even if the flight instruction were issued in error, however, any error was

harmless because the jury was well aware defendant contested identity. The

flight charge did not distract the jury from its primary task of determining

defendant's guilt. As is evident from a reading of the entire jury instructions

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       30
and from defendant's testimony, the jury was informed identity was the main

issue in this case. Accordingly, the flight instruction was not clearly capable of

producing an unjust result. See R. 2:10-2.

                                       III.

      In his third point, defendant challenges certain comments made during the

prosecutor's summation. Defendant argues the prosecutor expressed her opinion

regarding defendant's guilt, bolstered Faith's credibility, and denigrated the

defense. At the conclusion of the State's summation, defendant only objected to

one of those remarks. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's improper comments

were especially prejudicial because the State's case hinged on the credibility of

Faith's testimony and the cumulative effect of the comments deprived defendant

of a fair trial and require reversal. Having reviewed the prosecutor's summation

"within the context of the trial as a whole," State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 64

(1998), we reject defendant's contentions.

      In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we consider whether:

defense counsel raised "timely and proper objections"; "the offending remarks

'were withdrawn promptly'"; "the trial court struck the remarks and provided

appropriate instructions to the jury"; and "the offending remarks were prompted

by comments in the summation of defense counsel." State v. Smith, 212 N.J.

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       31
365, 403-04 (2012) (quoting State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)). "Generally,

if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be

deemed prejudicial." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 333 (2005). Conversely, an

objection made immediately after summation is considered timely because it

affords the trial judge the opportunity to take curative action. See e.g., State v.

Bauman, 298 N.J. Super. 176, 207 (App. Div. 1997); State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99,

106 (1972).     Proper curative instructions generally remove the potential

prejudice resulting from improper closing remarks. See Smith, 212 N.J. at 409.

      New Jersey courts have long recognized prosecutors "are afforded

considerable leeway in making opening statements and summations." State v.

Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 447 (1988). They may even do so "graphically and

forcefully." State v. Pratt, 226 N.J. Super. 307, 323 (App. Div. 1988).

      Nonetheless, "the primary duty of a prosecutor is not to obtain convictions

but to see that justice is done." Smith, 212 N.J. at 402-03. A prosecutor's "duty

is to prove the State's case based on the evidence and not to play on the passions

of the jury or trigger emotional flashpoints, deflecting attention from the hard

facts on which the State's case must rise or fall." Blakney, 189 N.J. at 96. "A

prosecutor must 'conscientiously and ethically undertak[e] the difficult task of

maintaining the precarious balance between promoting justice and achieving a

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                       32
conviction,' ensuring that at all times his or her 'remarks and actions [are]

consistent with his or her duty to ensure that justice is achieved.'" State v.

Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 408 (2012) (alterations in original) (quoting Williams,

113 N.J. at 447-48).

         Even if the prosecutor exceeds the bounds of proper conduct, that finding

does not end our inquiry "because, in order to justify reversal, the misconduct

must have been 'so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.'" State

v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181 (2001) (quoting Frost, 158 N.J. at 83). "To justify

reversal, the prosecutor's conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably

improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right

to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense." State v. Timmendequas,

161 N.J. 515, 575 (1999).

         Against these well-established principles, we consider the prosecutor's

comments at issue.

                       A. Personal Opinion Regarding Guilt

         Defendant first asserts the prosecutor improperly expressed her "personal

or official opinion or belief" in defendant's guilt, by twice informing the jury the

State had arrested "the right guy." Defendant did not object to the comments at

trial.    The State counters the comments responded to defendant's closing

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        33
argument that the State's investigation was deficient, and the comments were

based on the evidence adduced at trial.

      The defense theory of the case was misidentification. To drive that point

home, defense counsel stated "they got the wrong guy" eight times during his

summation. The defense also highlighted the State's failure to corroborate

Faith's identification of the shooter through DNA and fingerprint evidence.

Defendant further argued the State failed to produce telephone records or call

witnesses to corroborate Faith's allegation that defendant had stalked her prior

to the shooting.

      "Our Supreme Court has disapproved of any expression of personal or

official opinion or belief that a jury could understand as based on something

other than the evidence, including a belief in the defendant's guilt 'unless [the

prosecutor] makes it perfectly plain that his [or her] belief is based solely on the

evidence that has been introduced at the trial.'" State v. Rivera, 437 N.J. Super.

434, 445-46 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 398

(1962) (first alteration in original)). According to the Court "such statements

may add the weight of the prosecutor's official and personal influence and

knowledge to the probative force of the evidence adduced, thus creating the

possibility that the jurors consciously or unconsciously might adopt the

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        34
prosecutor's view without applying their own independent judgment to the

evidence. Thornton, 38 N.J. at 398.

      In the present matter, the prosecutor's remarks were made in direct

response to the defense counsel's closing argument. See State v. Munoz, 340

N.J. Super. 204, 216 (App. Div. 2001) ("A prosecutor is permitted to respond to

an argument raised by the defense so long as it does not constitute a foray beyond

the evidence adduced at trial."). Further, the disputed comments were tied to

the evidence adduced at trial. Thus, any suggestion that the prosecutor or law

enforcement team believed in defendant's guilt was not based on evidence

outside the record.

                      B. Bolstering the Victim's Credibility

      Defendant contends the prosecutor made other inappropriate comments

during summation which bolstered Faith's credibility and cumulatively deprived

him of a fair trial. Other than the prosecutor's rhetorical question, "why would

she lie," defendant did not object to the prosecutor's other comments, which

informed the jury that the lack of corroborative evidence or witnesses "doesn't

matter" because the "best evidence" was adduced through Faith's testimony.

      A prosecutor may argue that a witness is credible, "so long as the

prosecutor does not personally vouch for the witness or refer to matters outside

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       35
the record as support for the witness's credibility." State v. Walden, 370 N.J.

Super. 549, 560 (App. Div. 2004). "A prosecutor is not forced to idly sit as a

defense attorney attacks the credibility of the State's witnesses; a response is

permitted." State v. Hawk, 327 N.J. Super. 276, 284 (App. Div. 2000).

      Although defense counsel did not explicitly contend Faith was lying

during his summation, he framed his arguments as "misidentification" in view

of Faith's "stress" and "intoxication"; the presence of a weapon; and "bad

lighting" at the scene to contend Faith's honest belief that defendant shot her

was caused by her clouded perception. In essence, defense counsel's summation

challenged Faith's credibility – not by calling her a liar – but by pointing out the

various factors that might have affected her ability to identify defendant as the

shooter.

      Further, defense counsel argued the prosecutor failed to corroborate

Faith's stalking allegations by introducing into evidence Faith's phone records

or calling other witnesses. The prosecutor responded to this argument by asking

the jury, "Why would she lie? She had no reason to lie."

      Although the prosecutor did not personally vouch for Faith's credibility,

her rhetorical question and answer skirted the line between fair comment and

misconduct. However, when viewed in the context of defense counsel's closing

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        36
arguments, which opened the door for the prosecutor's comments; the entirety

of the prosecutor's summation; and "the trial as a whole," Feaster, 156 N.J. at

64, we find no showing that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Moreover,

in its final charge, the court issued the standard instruction that "[a]rguments,

statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not evidence and

must not be treated as evidence." Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Final Charge"

(rev. Sept. 1, 2022). Again, we presume the court's instructions were followed.

See Vega-Larregui, 246 N.J. at 126.

                     C. Casting Aspersions on the Defense

      Defendant claims the prosecutor twice denigrated the defense by

characterizing as "ridiculous" its theory that Faith misidentified the shooter

because: (1) the parking lot was dark; and (2) she had been drinking. We agree

that the State's characterization of the defense theory as "ridiculous" was out of

bounds. A prosecutor is "not permitted to cast unjustified aspersions on the

defense or defense counsel." Smith, 167 N.J. at 177.

      While improper, however, the prosecutor's remarks were not so egregious

that they "substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury

fairly evaluate the merits of his defense." Wakefield, 190 N.J. at 438 (quoting

State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 625 (2000)). Both comments were tethered

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       37
to the prosecutor's beseeching the jurors to use "everyday common sense" and

ask themselves whether "it ma[d]e sense that [a] woman who was married to a

man for eight years wouldn't know him from the front, from the back, in the

light in the dark?"

      Because defendant failed to object to the remarks at the time of trial, we

review the prosecutor's comments for plain error. R. 2:10-2. In view of the

court's final instruction on the jury's function in considering the arguments of

counsel, and the State's emphasis on the relationship between defendant and the

victim, we conclude the remarks were not "so egregious that [they] deprived the

defendant of a fair trial," State v. McGuire, 419 N.J. Super. 88, 139 (App. Div.

2011), nor "clearly capable of producing an unjust result," R. 2:10-2.

                                       IV.

      Alternatively, defendant argues his sentence is excessive. He asserts "the

court paid lip service to the Yarbough factors" and failed to explicitly assess the

overall fairness of the three consecutive sentences imposed, in contravention of

the Court's holding in Torres.      Defendant does not challenge the court's

assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a) and

(b). The State acknowledges the court failed to articulate the requisite overall

fairness assessment but defers to this court's discretion as to whether remand is

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                       38
necessary. For the reasons that follow, we agree that a limited remand is

necessary for the court to comply with Torres.

      Ordinarily, we defer to the sentencing court's determination, State v.

Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014), and do not "substitute [our] judgment" for that

of the sentencing court, State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). We will not

disturb a sentence that is not manifestly excessive or unduly punitive, does not

constitute an abuse of discretion, and does not shock the judicial conscience.

See State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215-16 (1989). However, our deference

"applies only if the trial judge follows the Code and the basic precepts that

channel sentencing discretion." Case, 220 N.J. at 65.

      "[T]rial judges have discretion to decide if sentences should run

concurrently or consecutively." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 128 (2011); see

also N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a). Judges are permitted to impose consecutive sentences

where multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed and after considering the

Yarbough factors. A "sentencing court must explain its decision to impose

concurrent or consecutive sentences in a given case." State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.

321, 348 (2019). "When a sentencing court properly evaluates the Yarbough

factors in light of the record, the court's decision will not normally be disturbed

on appeal." Miller, 205 N.J. at 129.

                                                                             A-0486-20
                                       39
      Similar to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, "[t]he

Yarbough factors are qualitative, not quantitative," and "applying them involves

more than merely counting the factors favoring each alternative outcome." Cuff,

239 N.J. at 348. Instead, the sentencing court must consider all the Yarbough

guidelines, with emphasis on the five subparts of the third guideline. State v.

Rogers, 124 N.J. 113, 121 (1991). In applying the factors, "[t]he focus should

be on the fairness of the overall sentence, and the sentencing court should set

forth in detail its reasons for concluding that a particular sentence is warranted."

State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122 (1987).

      In its assessment of the Yarbough factors that supported consecutive

sentences in this case, the court found "there can be no free crimes in a system

for which the punishment shall fit the crime," under the first factor. The court

also found "stalking is a completely separate offense from the attempted murder

charge[]"; "the crimes and their objectives were predominately independent of

each other" and defendant stalked Faith "on diverse dates and at separate

places." Those findings demonstrate the court fully considered the pertinent

criteria under the third factor:       "the crimes and their objectives were

predominantly independent of each other"; "the crimes involved separate acts of

violence or threats of violence"; and "the crimes were committed at different

                                                                              A-0486-20
                                        40
times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely in time and

place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior." The court's reasons

hardly constituted "lip service" to the requisite Yarbough factors.

      While this appeal was pending, however, the Court issued its decision in

Torres, exhaustively reviewing the Yarbough factors while reaffirming the

discretionary authority of sentencing courts to impose consecutive sentences by

using those guidelines. Torres, 246 N.J. at 264-66. The Court reiterated that

Yarbough requires the court place on the record "[a]n explicit statement" of

reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, which should address the overall

fairness of the sentence. Id. at 267-68 (citing Miller, 108 N.J. at 122).

      Although the court in the present matter properly assessed the applicable

Yarbough factors, the court did not, however, explicitly address the overall

fairness of the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant. Consistent with

the Court's advisement in Torres, we therefore remand for the court to provide

"[a]n explicit statement, explaining the overall fairness" of defendant's

aggregate sentence. 246 N.J. at 268. The scope of the remand, however, should

be limited to an analysis of the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence

imposed, rather than constituting a full resentencing. See State v. Randolph,

210 N.J. 330, 353 (2012) (explaining that a remand "for a statement of reasons

                                                                            A-0486-20
                                       41
on the record for the imposition of consecutive sentences" is limited in scope

and excludes reconsideration of sentencing factors). Defendant does not argue

otherwise.

      To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because

either our disposition makes it unnecessary, or the argument was without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed in part and remanded for the limited purpose of rendering a

fairness determination under Torres. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                           A-0486-20
                                      42