Court Opinion

ID: 9464611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:38:19.789838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:43.885949
License: Public Domain

WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree that the government’s evidence was insufficient to uphold the conviction.
The government clearly established the existence of a conspiracy involving at least Tadique and Rivera. Once the conspiracy was proven to exist, only slight evidence was needed to connect Cloughessy with it. United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428, 43 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975); United States v. Jit Sun Loo, 478 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1973). This quantum of evidence will suffice regardless of whether the trial is heard by a judge or jury. United States v. Costey, 554 F.2d 909, 910 (9th Cir. 1977). The slight evidence can be circumstantial— proof of a formal agreement is not neces*192sary. See United States v. Westover, 511 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1009, 95 S.Ct. 2633, 45 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975). Further, in considering sufficiency, items of circumstantial evidence must be viewed in aggregate form, not in isolation. United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976).
Thus, the central question in this case is whether the record discloses the required slight evidence of Cloughessy’s participation in the conspiracy. The evidence presented at trial establishes that Cloughessy drove» Tadique and Rivera to the Royal Inn where the two of them met with undercover government agents to arrange a heroin transaction. When the agents went to a Daisy’s Restaurant after the meeting, Cloughessy sat in the restaurant lounge until the agents departed. Cloughessy subsequently returned to the Inn with his code-fendants and remained in the car while they went in to again meet with the agents. While waiting, Cloughessy observed one of the agents exit the Inn and drive off in an automobile. Cloughessy tailed the car and watched, from behind some trees, as the agent entered a building. He then followed the agent back to the Inn and informed his codefendants where the agent had gone.
Cloughessy did take the stand in an attempt to provide an exculpatory explanation for his involvement in the scheme. The trial court, however, expressly found Cloughessy’s testimony unbelievable and “an affront to the court.” If there is other evidence of his guilt, disbelief of Cloughessy’s testimony can be considered as evidence to sustain the finding of guilt. United States v. Hood, 493 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dixon, 460 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1972); see United States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 305 (9th Cir. 1971). That other evidence is clearly adequate when considered, as it must be, in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), drawing all reasonable inferences supportive of the government’s position, United States v. Brown, 454 F.2d 397, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 959, 92 S.Ct. 2067, 32 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
Although circumstantial in nature, the other evidence implies that Cloughessy was involved in the conspiracy. His actions in the restaurant and surveillance of the agent who left the Inn cannot be reasonably accounted for except as in furtherance of the planned crime. The trial court so found.
The events surrounding the conspired crime, when viewed collectively, together with the finding of disbelief of Cloughessy, raise a reasonable inference that Cloughes-sy was an active participant in the misdeed. They are certainly more than adequate to constitute the slight evidence needed to sustain Cloughessy’s conviction. The judgment should, therefore, be affirmed.