Court Opinion

ID: 9789464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:36:45.61529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:49.018315
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the result, except that I would reverse the ruling that father was in contempt of the district court’s order of July 21, 1988, and I would remand for further findings and conclusions with respect to the alleged contempt of the order of July 20. For the reasons stated below, I cannot join in much of the majority’s opinion. I. CONTEMPT OF THE STIPULATED ORDER A. Grounds Upon Which Stepmother Could be Awarded Visitation Rights My chief concern is the majority’s view that a district court may award visitation rights to any person so long as visitation is in the best interests of the child. That may be desirable policy, but it is not the policy adopted by the New Mexico Legislature. As explained below, the legislature has provided that the best interests of the child give way to the rights of fit natural and adoptive parents in matters of custody. That same subordination of the child’s interests also generally prevails with respect to visitation. Although the legislature has recognized that visitation may be awarded to certain categories of persons other than natural or adoptive parents — in particular, grandparents and, more pertinent to this case, those who stand in loco parentis — we should not suggest that the best interests of the child is the only consideration in matters of visitation. With respect to custodial rights, New Mexico has adopted a strict parental-preference doctrine. NMSA 1978, § 40-4-9.1(K) (Repl.Pamp.1989) states: “When any person other than a natural or adoptive parent seeks custody of a child, no such person shall be awarded custody absent a showing of unfitness of the natural or adoptive parent.” This 1981 legislation gives greater priority to parents than earlier judicial decisions, which adopted “a presumption that the welfare and best interests of the minor child will best be served in the custody of the natural parents and casts the burden of proving the contrary on the non-parent.” Shorty v. Scott, 87 N.M. 490, 493, 535 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1975). The statute expresses a policy that a fit parent’s custodial rights are paramount to the child’s best interests. Even if the parent were to concede that a child would be better off with another family, the parent who treasures the companionship of the child is still entitled to retain custody. Compare Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children) with Note, Alternatives to “Parental Rights” in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 Yale L.J. 151 (1963) (criticizing parental-rights doctrine as contrary to child’s interests). The majority finds Section 40-4-9.1(K) unpersuasive in the visitation context, pointing out that custody and visitation are not equivalent. Yet if parental rights are dispositive in custody matters, surely they do not become irrelevant when visitation is at stake. If the legislature has spoken on a matter of public policy, the judiciary should respect that policy in matters of statutory interpretation and common-law jurisprudence. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. 3, 18-22 (1966); M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law, 29-30 (1988). The right of custody is composed of a bundle of subsidiary rights, such as the power to make decisions regarding the child’s residence, education, and religion. See § 40-4-9.1(L)(2). The most precious of these parental rights is the right to the care and companionship of the child. New fit parents would trade the right to enjoy a child’s company for the power to determine the child’s education or medical care. If a court cannot deny a fit parent custody in favor of a non-parent, a court cannot deny a fit parent the most precious custodial right — the right to the care and companionship of the child — in favor of a non-parent. Although an award of visitation rights to a third person does not constitute a total denial of the custodial parent’s right to care and companionship, such an award substantially diminishes that right. Therefore, the law governing visitation rights must take into account the parental preference expressed by the legislature in Section 40-4-9.1(K). In the absence of a contrary expression of policy by the legislature, I would conclude that the parental rights of fit parents prevail over the best interests of the child in matters of non-parent visitation as well as non-parent custody. There are, however, contrary expressions of policy in two statutes. First, the legislature has adopted specific provisions relating to visitation by grandparents. See NMSA 1978, §§ 40-9-1 to -4 (Repl.Pamp. 1989). This statute explicitly provides for visitation by grandparents even without a showing that the parents are unfit. One might infer that the statute expresses a public policy in favor of awarding visitation rights to non-parents so long as it is in the best interests of the child. One could also infer, however, that the legislature enacted the grandparent-visitation statute because it assumed that in the absence of the statute grandparents could not be awarded visitation rights — in other words, the award of visitation rights to non-parents (when the parents are fit) is permissible only when specifically authorized by statute. Both inferences read too much into the enactment of the grandparent-visitation statute. An intermediate interpretation is more plausible: Although enactment of the grandparent-visitation statute suggests that the legislature regards an award of visitation rights to a third person as a substantially lesser infringement of parental rights than a denial of custody, the enactment also suggests that such an infringement requires some sort of legislative imprimatur (not necessarily explicit statutory authorization). The second statute more closely relates to this case. Section 40-4-9.1(L)(8) defines “visitation” as “a period of time available to a noncustodial parent, under a sole custody arrangement, during which a child resides with or is under the care and control of the noncustodial parent.” Cf, NMSA 1978, § 40-4-11.1(D)(2) (Repl.Pamp. 1989) (defining “basic visitation” for purposes of child support). “Parent” is defined as “a natural parent, adoptive parent or person who is acting as a parent who has or shares legal custody of a child or who claims a right to have or share legal custody[.]” § 40-4-9.1(L)(4). These definitions prompt two observations. First, visitation by non-parents is not recognized in the definition of “visitation.” Authority for such visitation must be found elsewhere, as in the grandparent-visitation statute. Second, even though natural and adoptive parents have an absolute preference with respect to custody, see § 40-4-9.1(K), other types of “parents” may be awarded visitation rights. To be sure, Section 40-4-9.1(L)(8) is only a definition and does not purport to establish substantive law (indeed, the purpose of the definition is unclear, because the word “visitation” does not appear elsewhere in Section 40-4-9.1). Nevertheless, the definition’s recognition of visitation by parents who are neither natural nor adoptive parents is a sufficient imprimatur to conclude that such visitation does not violate legislative policy. Despite the obscurity of the statutory definition of “parent,” I feel comfortable that it includes at least those persons who stand in loco parentis with a child. Thus, if stepmother held that status with respect to the children, an award of visitation rights was lawful. I agree with the majority that we cannot draw any contrary inference from the legislature’s failure to pass a bill introduced in 1987 that would have provided various persons, including stepparents, with rights to custody. There are too many other reasons why a bill does not become a law for us to infer that failure to enact a bill means legislative rejection of every substantive provision of the bill.1  B. Jurisdiction to Enter the Stipulated Order Father contests the jurisdiction of the district court to enter the stipulated order. Given the authority of the district court to award visitation rights to one who stands in loco parentis, father’s argument reduces to the claim that stepmother did not have an in loco parentis relationship with the children and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction to sward her visitation rights. Conceding that he stipulated to the order, father relies on the proposition that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. See Zarges v. Zarges, 79 N.M. 494, 445 P.2d 97 (1968); Elwess v. Elwess, 73 N.M. 400, 389 P.2d 7 (1964). The existence of an in loco parentis relationship was not, however, necessary to confer jurisdiction on the district court. Just because the proper issuance of an order requires the existence of a particular fact does not mean that the existence of the fact is necessary for the court to have jurisdiction. See Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp. v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 687, 789 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1990) (jurisdiction to hear a claim does not depend on validity of the claim). Although the meaning of “jurisdiction” may vary with the context, see id. at 690, 789 P.2d at 1257 (sometimes an error is labelled “jurisdictional” to mean that it may be raised for the first time on appeal); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 11 comment e (1982), it has a settled meaning in New Mexico when the district court’s jurisdiction to enter an order is challenged in a contempt proceeding. State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 69 P.2d 931 (1937) held in that context that “[t]he test of the jurisdiction of a court is whether or not it had power to enter upon the inquiry; not whether its conclusion in the course of it was right or wrong.” Id. at 399, 69 P.2d at 933 (emphasis in original). By that standard the district court undoubtedly had jurisdiction to enter the stipulated order. C. Ultimate Success of Father Father also contends that he cannot be held in civil contempt of the stipulated order because “this sanction [civil contempt to compensate for losses due to contemptuous conduct] is available only if petitioner wins his action in the original suit on the merits.” Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8 N.M.L.Rev. 55, 71 n. 62 (1977-78). Unfortunately, the article cites no case law in support of the proposition, so its scope is unclear. The proposition makes sense if it means merely that remedial relief is unavailable if the order violated is later found to have been invalid. See United states v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95, 67 S.Ct. 677, 696, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947) (right to remedial relief falls with an injunction which events prove was erroneously issued). I see no reason, however, to apply it to relieve a party of contempt sanctions solely because an order was later modified as a result of changed circumstances. Father’s stipulation to the order constituted a stipulation (at least for the purposes of that order) to all facts necessary to issuance of the order. He has no right to challenge at this late date the factual basis of the stipulated order. He should not be relieved from paying for damage caused by his violation of the stipulated order on the ground that the order was later modified prospectively because of subsequent events. D. Nature of Contempt Sanction and Violation of the Order I concur in the majority’s opinion that the contempt sanction was civil and that the district court could properly find that father was in contempt of the stipulated order. II. CONTEMPT OF THE JULY ORDERS I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the comtempt penalty for violation of the orders of July 20 and 21. The district court apparently found father in contempt of orders of whose existence he had no actual knowledge. Dial v. Dial, 103 N.M. 133,136, 703 P.2d 910, 913 (Ct.App.1985) included “knowledge of the court's order” among the elements necessary for a finding of civil contempt. Accord In re Hooker, 94 N.M. 798, 617 P.2d 1313 (1980). The knowledge need not be of the specific terms of the order, so long as the party has knowledge of the existence of the order. See General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem. & Oil Corp., 627 F.Supp. 678, 681-82 (E.D.N.Y.1986). The district court did not find that father knew of the July 21 order before the time for compliance or that father knew of the July 20 order for at least several days after its issuance. The facts are as follows: The district court held hearings on May 31 and July 14, 1988, on father’s alleged contempt of the stipulated order and on father’s motion to rescind the stipulated order. At the conclusion of the July 14 hearing the district court scheduled a continuation of the hearing for Monday, July 25, and suggested that Dr. Koenig should conduct a current-status interview with the children. Father’s counsel voiced no objection to the suggestion. According to the district court’s Finding No. 61, “It was resolved that [Dr. Koenig] should be requested to conduct this interview so he could report to the Court at the July 25, 1988 hearing.” On July 15 stepmother’s attorney submitted to the district court, with a copy to father’s attorney, a proposed order appointing Dr. Koenig as an expert to provide an evaluation to the court concerning visitation arrangements with the children, authorizing Dr. Koenig to conduct the evaluation in a manner he deemed appropriate, and ordering the parties “to cooperate with Dr. Koenig’s evaluation and carry out his directives incident thereto.” The only time constraint expressed in the proposed order was in paragraph E, which read: If possible, Dr. Koenig should provide his evaluation and recommendations in a written report and distribute it to counsel for both parties prior to the hearing on the merits herein. If there is insufficient time to provide a written report prior to the hearing, the report shall be provided at trial. In a letter accompanying the proposed order, stepmother’s attorney advised the district court that Dr. Koenig had agreed to see the children and requested that time be shortened for father’s attorney to object to the form of order or present his own, in view of the contemplated July 25 hearing date. On July 19 father’s attorney delivered to the court a letter objecting to the proposed order, to any further evaluation of the children, and to Dr. Koenig’s continued involvement in the case. The letter also requested a hearing on the matter. The district court conducted a hearing on July 20 and immediately entered an order based on the proposed order submitted by stepmother’s attorney. The order required the parties “to cooperate with Dr. Koenig’s interviews and carry out his directives,” but it eliminated paragraph E of the proposed order and made no mention of any time constraint. The afternoon of the following day, July 21, the district court entered a supplemental order requiring father to bring the children to an appointment with Dr. Koenig at 11:00 a.m. on Friday, July 22. Father was not present at the July 20 hearing. Father’s attorney advised the district court on July 22 that he had not been able to inform father of the court’s order for the July 22 interview. On July 18 Dr. Koenig’s office had made a tentative appointment with father and the children for July 20; father was to check with his attorney and call back, but did not do so. On July 21 father left with his children for Aspen, Colorado, where father had been previously scheduled to show some of his art work. The district court found that when father left for Aspen, he was aware that a continued hearing had been set on the Order to Show Cause and other motions for Monday, July 25, 1988; that Dr. Koenig was attempting to set up an interview with the children in connection with this hearing; that a proposed order for an evaluation of the children by Dr. Koenig had been submitted to the Court, and that the Court itself had on July 14, 1988, suggested such interviews. His attorney had left two messages on his answering machine for him to call. As I understand the district court’s ruling, it imposed the civil contempt sanction, at least in part, because of father’s failure to comply with the July orders prior to the scheduled July 25 hearing, even though father had no actual knowledge before July 25 that either order had been entered. The district court made no finding of such actual knowledge. Therefore, the contempt sanction for violation of the July orders cannot stand. A finding of contempt should not be based on a party’s knowledge that the court has expressed a favorable view toward entering an order at a future date. Too many things can cause the court to change its mind. With respect to the July 20 order, even assuming that father knew of the terms of the proposed order, his attorney had objected to the proposed order and requested a hearing to argue against it. We should not presume that father knew that the judge would enter the order after hearing the objections of father’s attorney. Indeed, the order actually entered on July 20 differs from the proposed order in that it contains no mention of a time deadline. It is questionable whether failure to comply by July 25 with the July 20 order would have constituted contempt of the order, particularly given father’s travel plans; that is probably why the July 21 order was entered. As for the July 21 order, there was no finding by the district court (and apparently no evidence) that father knew that an order had been or would be entered requiring him to bring the children for an interview on July 22. The majority suggests that the only knowledge required of one held in contempt is constructive knowledge of the order violated. Yet the only support the majority finds for its view are two New Mexico quiet-title cases that discuss constructive knowledge or notice of a mining claim and an unrecorded deed. The judicial power to hold a person in contempt is an extraordinary power. Sound policy counsels against exercising that power upon one who has only constructive knowledge of the existence of the order violated. Therefore, I would remand with instructions to the district court (a) to set aside any sanction imposed as a consequence of father’s violation of the July 21 order and (b) to limit any civil contempt sanction imposed for violation of the July 20 order to damages caused to stepmother by father’s violation of that order after father had knowledge of its existence. III. CROSS-APPEAL I agree with the majority that stepmother’s claim for custody was not properly before the district court. Although she had sought custody in earlier pleadings, she had not sought custody in any motion pending before the district court at the time of the hearings leading to the judgment on appeal. Because the district court can be affirmed on that ground, it is unnecessary to determine whether the natural mother of the children, who had visitation rights but not custody rights, was an indispensable party to a determination of the children’s custody. I also agree that we must affirm the district court’s denial of visitation rights to stepmother. Although the record suggests that this result rewards father for his misconduct — making enforced visitation by stepmother so traumatic to the children that it was no longer in their best interests — the appropriate remedy in such circumstances is contempt, even criminal contempt. Finally, I dissent from the denial of oral argument in this case.  . Also, the Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 40-10-1 to -24 (Repl.Pamp. 1989), is irrelevant to the question here, because it does not affect substantive rights and its definitions are designed to encompass statutory schemes in other states.