Court Opinion

ID: 9494154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:42.811635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:14.971305
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result and in most of the opinion of the Court. I write separately to explain why, reluctantly, I believe that under our most recent precedents we should hold that it was plain error not to apply the “clear and convincing” standard of proof to the sentence enhancements in this case. I do so without regard to United States v. Valensia, 222 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir.2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated, and remanded by — U.S. —, 121 S.Ct. 1222, 149 L.Ed.2d 133 (2001), which no longer has precedential effect, notwithstanding some interesting analysis in that now-vacated case relied upon in the Court’s opinion.
The sentence enhancements in this case totaled nine levels and increased the applicable sentencing range by more than double. Under our precedents of the last two years, this degree of enhancement is sufficient to constitute an “extremely disproportionate effect” on the sentence and to require the “clear and convincing” standard of proof. United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc). These recent precedents begin with United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824 (9th Cir.1999), wherein we held that a seven-level enhancement which more than doubled the applicable sentencing range required the higher standard of proof. Id. at 833. Since Hopper, we appear to have consistently held that when the enhancement is greater than four levels and more than doubles the applicable sentencing range, then the enhancements must be proved under the “clear and convincing” standard of proof. Compare United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir.2000) (requiring “clear and convincing” standard of proof for a nine-level enhancement which more than doubled the applicable range) and United States v. Mezas de *935Jesus, 217 F.3d 688, 643 (9th Cir.2000) (same) with United States v. Johansson, 249 F.3d 848, 2001 WL 468413, at *6-*7 (9th Cir. May 4, 2001) (affirming “preponderance” standard for a four-level enhancement which did not more than double the applicable range) and United States v. Herrera-Rojas, 243 F.3d 1139, 1143-44 (9th Cir.2001) (affirming “preponderance” standard for a three-level enhancement which did not more than double the applicable range).
It is important to note, however, the curious evolution that brings us to this state of our law on standard of proof. In cases prior to Hopper, we held that the “preponderance” standard of proof was perfectly appropriate even though the enhancement was much greater than four levels and the applicable sentencing range was increased by well more than double. United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383, 1384, 1385-87 (9th Cir.1992) (affirming “preponderance” standard where enhancement was 14 levels and range increased from 10-16 months to 63-78 months); United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520, 1522, 1523-24 (9th Cir.1992) (remanding for “preponderance” standard where enhancement was 18 levels and range increased from 41-51 months to 292-365 months). Hopper, decided in 1999, did not attempt to distinguish these 1992-ffled cases, and, indeed, did not even bother to cite them. It was for this reason that, soon after Hopper was decided, we noted that Hopper created “uncertainty in this circuit as to when the higher burden of proof applies.” United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir.2000).
Nonetheless, as noted above, it appears as though any uncertainty created by Hopper has been moderated because four of our subsequent cases over the last two years have consistently adhered to its standard of proof formula. Although the change brought about by Hopper was accomplished, most remarkably, without benefit of en banc rehearing or decision by the Court en banc, indeed accomplished sub silentio, the change has been sufficiently persistent to make any deviation therefrom not only error, but plain error. While I do not approve of the path we have taken to get to this state of the law, I reluctantly concur in the judgment of the Court.