Court Opinion

ID: 9537234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:41.332088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:12.640616
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority disposes of the only issue in the case with one sentence in the last paragraph of the opinion. That sentence reads:
Some might disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion, but we find that there was support for the decision; therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering appellant’s case transferred to adult court.
The majority does not tell us what support it finds for the juvenile court’s conclusion. Three court of appeals judges found none; I agree with them.
As the court of appeals noted, the juvenile in question “neither encouraged nor actively participated in any of Brown’s criminal activities.” In re Coconino County Juvenile Action No. J. 9896, 150 Ariz. 435, 440, 724 P.2d 54, 59 (App.1986). In fact, the trial court itself found that the juvenile’s fundamental culpability was in failing to “take evasive action through the appropriate agencies” when she learned of her friend’s plans. Id. In this light, I believe that the court of appeals correctly outlined the three factors that demonstrate the absence of any support for the conclusion that the juvenile should be treated as an adult. These are:
1. “Although accomplice and co-conspirator liability is for many [legal] purposes essentially equivalent to commission of the underlying offense, it makes no sense to equate the two in determining whether the juvenile presents a threat to the public safety____” Id.
2. The record shows there was no prior wrongdoing by the juvenile. Id. at 440-41, 724 P.2d at 59-60.
3. The witnesses “unanimously testified” that the juvenile presented no danger to society. The majority of the court argues that the juvenile judge is not required to accept expert testimony. While this is true, he is required to have some reason for even a discretionary finding. Nothing in this record, nothing in the juvenile’s pri- or record, and nothing in the evidence before the trial judge provide any support for finding that this juvenile presented any danger to society. Id. at 441, 724 P.2d at 60.
It is one thing to defer to the discretion of the trial judge. It is another to affirm conclusions that are unsupported by and directly contrary to every fact or opinion contained in that record. To allow this is to impose the subjective standards of each judge in place of objective, articulated standards to which all judges can be held.
I dissent.