Court Opinion

ID: 9369685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 16:09:39.791979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.517608
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCutchen, 2023-Ohio-368.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                          No. 111406
                v.                               :

DEONTE MCCUTCHEN, SR.,                           :

                Defendant-Appellant.             :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-19-640680-A

                                           Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Gregory Paul, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                Patituce & Associates, L.L.C., Megan M. Patituce, and
                Joseph C. Patituce, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J.:

                  Defendant-appellant Deonte McCutchen, Sr. (“McCutchen”) appeals

his convictions on multiple criminal counts. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I.   Background and Facts

               On March 18, 2022, McCutchen was convicted of the following

charges arising from a 12-count indictment returned on August 7, 2019, involving

two victims, Doe 1 (d.o.b. 2008) and older sibling Doe 2 (d.0.b. 2006):1

      Count 1: Rape,     a    first-degree          felony,      pursuant      to
               R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b);

      Count 2: Rape,     a    first-degree          felony,      pursuant      to
               R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b);

      Count 3: Gross sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, pursuant to
               R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);

      Count 5: Gross sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, pursuant to
               R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);

      Count 6: Kidnapping, a first-degree              felony,    pursuant      to
               R.C. 2905.01(A)(4);

      Count 7: Endangering children, a second-degree felony, pursuant to
               R.C. 2919.22(B)(1);

      Count 8: Gross sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, pursuant to
               R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);

      Count 9: Gross sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, pursuant to
               R.C. 2907.05(A)(4);

      Count 10: Kidnapping, a first-degree             felony,    pursuant      to
                R.C. 2905.01(A)(4); and

      Count 11: Endangering children, a second-degree felony, in violation
                of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).

      1 The original Count 3 rape, a first-degree felony under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), was
dismissed by the state during trial and the counts were renumbered. McCutchen was
found not guilty of Count 4: gross sexual imposition, a third-degree felony, pursuant to
R.C. 2907.05(A)(4).
                Counts 1 through 7 involved victim Doe 1 listed as under the age of 13

for Counts 1 through 6 and under the age of 18 for Count 7. The remaining counts

involved victim Doe 2 listed as under the age of 13 for Counts 8, 9, and 10 and under

the age of 18 for renumbered Count 11. Sexually violent predator specifications

under    R.C.    2941.148(A)      and   sexual   motivation    specifications   under

R.C. 2941.147(A) attached to the rape and gross sexual imposition (“GSI”) counts.

At McCutchen’s request, the sexually violent predator specifications were bifurcated

to be heard by the trial court.

                Trial began on March 15, 2022. Prior to empaneling the jury for trial,

the state moved to limit the testimony of Doe 1 regarding a prior accusation by Doe

1 against an eleven-year-old male cousin that was allegedly like that made against

McCutchen. The Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services

(“CCDCFS”) found the allegations were unsubstantiated. The trial court granted the

motion on the ground that the testimony was barred by the rape-shield law codified

at R.C. 2907.02(D).

                There was no medical evidence in the case. Testimonial evidence at

the April 2021 trial was provided by the victims, the victims’ mother (“Mother”), the

Cleveland Police Department (“CPD”) detective that interviewed Mother and the

girls in December 2018, several months after the incident, and two trauma

therapists from the Rape Crisis Center. McCutchen testified in his defense.

                Mother testified that she and McCutchen had known each other since

middle school. They began dating in 2016 and McCutchen moved in shortly
thereafter with Mother and her three daughters, Doe 1, Doe 2, and a younger

daughter. Mother worked 60 hours per week and McCutchen was at home with the

children during Mother’s absence.        Mother and the daughters had a good

relationship with McCutchen.

              The charges arose from allegations that McCutchen engaged in sexual

activity with Doe 1 and Doe 2 during the period of November 1, 2017, to July 13,

2018. In July 2018, McCutchen was seriously injured in a motorcycle incident that

resulted in hospitalization and was eventually released to his mother’s home for

rehabilitation. On September 25, 2018, Doe 1 and subsequently Doe 2 told Mother

about the sexual assaults. Mother confronted McCutchen at his mother’s home

where McCutchen denied the claims, but also apologized.

               Doe 2 testified that she was 15 years of age at the time of trial. Doe 2

had a good relationship with McCutchen who she thought was “funny” and “cool.”

(Tr. 314.) After school, Doe 2 and her sisters would watch television with McCutchen

in Mother’s room while Mother was at work. Mother’s room had the largest

television and a PlayStation game console attached. The bed took up most of the

room.

              McCutchen and the girls were watching a movie, Doe 2 and her sisters

were sitting on the floor, and McCutchen was laying on the bed. Doe 2 asked

whether she could play with McCutchen’s phone. McCutchen responded that she

could if she sat on the bed and Doe 2 agreed. McCutchen told the younger girls to
leave and locked the door. McCutchen was wearing boxer shorts, but Doe 2 could

not remember whether he was wearing a shirt.

               Doe 2 was clothed in shorts and a shirt. McCutchen “spooned” her by

laying behind her and pressing his lower area against her and began touching her

buttocks.2 (Tr. 320, 322.) Doe 2 stated she was shocked but did not tell Mother

because Mother “looked happy and I did not want to ruin anything because at the

time he was buying us Christmas gifts and birthday gifts and a lot.” (Tr. 321.)

               The sisters were not in the room when the next incident occurred.

Doe 2 was dressed in shorts and a shirt. McCutchen spooned Doe 2 and touched her

private part through her clothing. Doe 2 did not recall what happened that lead to

the touching. Doe 2 confessed the encounters to Mother in the presence of her two

sisters after Doe 1 informed Mother of her encounters with McCutchen. Doe 2 also

told the CPD detective and the therapist.

               Doe 1 was 13 years of age at the time of trial. Doe 1 testified that during

the relevant time period, the three siblings slept in the living room. (Tr. 294.) Doe 1

was excited when McCutchen moved in. “I liked how he was loving to us, he used to

take care of us, cook dinner for all of us, and just caring and kind.” (Tr. 285.)

               Doe 1 testified that McCutchen used to “spoon with me, touch on me,

and physically put his mouth” on her private part. (Tr. 286.) Doe also testified that

on another occasion, she entered Mother’s room where McCutchen was playing on

      2 A spooning position means “to nestle close together while lying down with one
person      facing    the     back      of      another.”      https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/spoon (accessed Feb. 2, 2023).
the PlayStation and asked to play with McCutchen’s phone. McCutchen began to

spoon with her while she was laying on the bed playing with the phone, and digitally

penetrated her. Doe 1 said similar incidents occurred “five times.” (Tr. 293.)

              Doe 1 also said she was in the living room playing with a phone late

one night while everyone was sleeping when McCutchen removed her underwear

and performed oral sex. Doe 1 did not say anything out of fear that Mother would

wake up and take McCutchen’s side in the matter because that is what Doe 1 had

seen on television. Doe 1 did not state where her sisters were at the time. Doe 1

recited an additional incident when only Mother, McCutchen, and Doe 1 were in

Mother’s room watching a movie. Mother was sitting in a chair in front of the bed.

McCutchen was laying on his stomach while holding Mother’s hand with his right

hand and “reached his arm over” and “started touching me [with his left hand].” (Tr.

303-304.)

              Doe 1 explained that one evening after McCutchen moved out, she

was watching a movie with Mother and her siblings when a commercial came on

that triggered a comment by Doe 2 about female personal grooming. Doe 1 decided

to text Mother that McCutchen had been touching her. Doe 1 and Mother talked in

the living room and Mother headed to McCutchen’s mother’s house to confront him.

              Doe 1 was cross-examined about the accuracy of her statement to

police that McCutchen performed oral sex on her every day. (Tr. 304.)

      Counsel: So what does that mean when you say he kept doing it every
               day?
      Witness: Like he would do it like — say, if it’s one day he would start
               touching on me, then probably two days later he would start
               touching on me again.

      Counsel: And as far — you said — the part that you said was every day.
               He licked your private part every day?

      Witness: Yes. No. No. * * * No, he did not. He probably — I think he
               did it once or twice.

      Counsel: So the whole time you knew him, you said he did it once or
                twice, but you told the detective he did it every day?

      Witness: Because I guess in my nine-year-old mind — he probably did
               or did not.

(Tr. 304-305.)

              Clinical manager and trauma therapist Sheri Stevens (“Stevens”) of

the Cleveland Rape Crisis Center testified that she first met with Doe 2 in 2018 due

to Doe 2 having experienced a sexual assault. Services were completed in December

2021. Stevens diagnosed Doe 2 with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

Stevens also testified that Doe 2 could not describe her experiences in detail, which

Stevens said was not uncommon in these types of cases.

              Trauma Therapist Amanda Petric (“Petric”), also with the Cleveland

Rape Crisis Center, testified that she believed she first connected with Doe 1 in

November 2018 and several times subsequently to assist Doe 1 with achieving a

greater sense of safety due to high stress symptoms. Doe 1 “was able to disclose

information related to what happened to her.” (Tr. 350.)

              Doe 1 did not identify the alleged perpetrator by name but “stated it

was a boyfriend that mom met at a coffee shop.” (Tr. 354.) Doe 1 disclosed “that
she was touched on her butt by the perpetrator when she asked to see their phone.

She disclosed that the perpetrator had placed his mouth on her genitals.” (Tr. 351.)

“She also disclosed that she overheard [Doe 2] experiencing something behind a

closed door.” Id. Doe 1 was assigned to another therapist after several sessions and

Petric did not reengage until late 2021. Doe 1 was also diagnosed with PTSD.

              CPD Detective Richard Durst (“Det. Durst”) of the sex crimes and

child abuse unit was assigned to the case on September 28 or 29, 2018. Det. Durst

talked with Mother approximately twice who informed him that the victims were

working with the Cleveland Rape Crisis Center but Det. Durst and the abuse

advocate encountered scheduling issues.

              Det. Durst first interviewed Mother and the victims separately on

December 4, 2018, and secured a warrant for McCutchen’s arrest. Det. Durst was

aware of McCutchen’s hospitalization and injuries but did not interview McCutchen

prior to issuing the warrant. Det. Durst subsequently submitted the case to the

county prosecutor’s office and testified before the grand jury because McCutchen

had not been picked up on the warrant. Indictments were filed July 16, 2019.

              McCutchen testified that he, Mother, and the daughters routinely

stayed at each other’s homes. In September 2018, still recovering from his accident,

he slipped and fell while visiting Mother’s home and decided to return to his

mother’s house. That evening, Mother arrived and told him of the allegations by

Doe 1. McCutchen denied the claims and opined that the victims resented that he

made them perform household chores. “I cannot figure it out. Honestly. But I did
not do it.” (Tr. 399.) He stated that Mother would allow Doe 2 to use Mother’s cell

phone though Doe 2 refused to perform chores. McCutchen would allow Doe 1 to

use his phone because Doe 1 willingly performed the chores and that did not sit well

with Doe 2.

               McCutchen confirmed that he, Mother, and the girls sometimes

watched television together in Mother’s room and that the living room was used as

a bedroom for the three girls. McCutchen was upset that he was not contacted by

Det. Durst or anyone from the CPD prior to his indictment. He learned of the

warrant for his arrest in 2019 when his mother contacted him in Alabama after

viewing the story on the news.

               During cross-examination, McCutchen admitted over objections to a

prior conviction for misuse of a credit card and extended probation due to marijuana

use during restrictions. He also admitted that he went to Alabama after he knew

about the allegations and that was when Mother confronted him. Mother “just asked

me did anything happen and I said no.” (Tr. 420.)

               McCutchen’s original and renewed Crim.R. 29 motions for judgment

of acquittal were denied. The jury found McCutchen not guilty of the Count 4 GSI

but guilty of all other charges. The trial court determined that McCutchen was not a

sexually violent predator. McCutchen was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 54

years to life in prison.

               McCutchen appeals.
II. Assigned Errors

                   McCutchen assigns three errors:

          I.    The trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing pursuant to
                State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992), prior to
                excluding evidence of a prior unsubstantiated allegation of sexual
                abuse.

          II.   Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing
                to request a limiting instruction as to McCutchen’s prior
                conviction.

          III. The cumulative effect of the errors in this case deprived
               McCutchen of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial.

III. Discussion

          A. Evidentiary Hearing

                   This court’s review of the trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters

such as a motion in limine is for an abuse of discretion. Sokolovic v. Hamilton, 195

Ohio App.3d 406, 2011-Ohio-4638, 960 N.E.2d 510, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). An “abuse of

discretion” occurs where “a court exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way,

in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v.

Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. No court has

discretionary authority to apply the law incorrectly, which is why courts apply a de

novo standard when reviewing issues of law. Id. at ¶ 38, citing Hudson v.

Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54, 2010-Ohio-4505, 936 N.E.2d 481, ¶ 30,

State v. Boles, 187 Ohio App.3d 345, 2010-Ohio-278, 932 N.E.2d 345, ¶ 26 (2d

Dist.).
               McCutchen argues that the trial court should have conducted an in

camera hearing before granting the state’s motion to limit testimony that Doe 1

previously made a similar allegation of sexual abuse against an 11-year-old male

cousin that CCDCFS found to be unsubstantiated. McCutchen cites State v. Boggs,

63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992) and R.C. 2907.02(E) in support of his

position.

               The rape-shield law, R.C. 2907.02(D), provides in applicable part,

that

       [e]vidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion
       evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
       victim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless
       it involves evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease, or the
       victim’s past sexual activity with the offender, and only to the extent
       that the court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in the
       case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh
       its probative value.

               The purpose of the rape-shield law is

       “[f]irst, by guarding the complainant’s sexual privacy and protecting
       her from undue harassment, the law discourages the tendency in rape
       cases to try the victim rather than the defendant. In line with this, the
       law may encourage the reporting of rape, thus aiding crime prevention.
       Finally, by excluding evidence that is unduly inflammatory and
       prejudicial, while being only marginally probative, the statute is
       intended to aid in the truth-finding process.”

Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992), quoting State v. Gardner,

59 Ohio St.2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979).

               R.C. 2907.02(E) provides:

       Prior to taking testimony or receiving evidence of any sexual activity of
       the victim or the defendant in a proceeding under this section, the court
       shall resolve the admissibility of the proposed evidence in a hearing in
      chambers, which shall be held at or before preliminary hearing and not
      less than three days before trial, or for good cause shown during the
      trial.

               The “threshold determination * * * is whether an alleged victim in a

sexual assault case can be cross-examined as to prior false accusations of rape” or

whether the examination is prohibited by the rape shield law. Boggs at 421. If it is

determined that cross-examination may be permitted, the inquiry becomes to what

extent. Id.

               “[P]rior false accusations of rape do not constitute ‘sexual activity’ of

the victim” under R.C. 2907.02. Id. at 423. Thus, “the rape shield law does not

exclude such evidence.” Id. However, “before cross-examination of a rape victim as

to prior false rape accusations may proceed, the trial court shall hold an in camera

hearing” to determine whether the evidence is barred by R.C. 2907.02(D). Id. at

424. If it is not barred by the rape shield statute, the trial court must consider

whether the testimony “is totally unfounded and admissible for impeachment of the

victim.” Id.

               In January 2020, McCutchen issued a trial subpoena duces tecum to

CCDCFS to provide records and testimony regarding the victims. The agency moved

to quash the subpoena on the grounds of statutory confidentiality. The records are

confidential under R.C. 5153.17, 2151.421 and other statutes, however, exceptions

exist. “Where the records are necessary and relevant to a proceeding and good cause

is shown for disclosure, ‘access to the records may be warranted.’” In re C.A., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102675, 2015-Ohio-4768, ¶ 78, quoting State v. Sahady, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83247, 2004-Ohio-3481, ¶ 32. See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (due process rights of a criminal

defendant, balanced against the confidentiality of a children’s services record,

entitled a defendant to an in camera records review to determine materiality).

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987).

               Ohio law requires an in camera examination of the agency records to

determine whether: (1) the records are relevant and necessary to the pending action

(2) whether the individual seeking disclosure has demonstrated good cause; and

(3) whether admission of the records outweighs the statutory confidentiality

considerations. In re C.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102675, 2015-Ohio-4768, ¶ 80;

Sahady, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83247, 2004-Ohio-3481, at ¶ 29; Child Care

Provider Certification Dept. v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82966, 2003-Ohio-

6500, ¶ 11-13; Johnson v. Johnson, 134 Ohio App.3d 579, 585, 731 N.E.2d 1144.

               To determine good cause, the trial court considers “whether the due

process rights of the accused are implicated” and “whether it is in the ‘best interests’

of the child.” Id., citing Johnson at 583, 1991 Ohio Atty.Gen.Ops. No. 91-003, 1991

Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 16. The trial court must also consider whether the records are

material to the defense or fair trial considerations are at stake. (Citations omitted.)

Id.

               The defendant may not participate in the in camera review. In re CA

at ¶ 82, citing State v. Stiles, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-08-12, 2009-Ohio-89, ¶ 32. The

defense “may have access to the information only if the trial court concludes that it
‘probably would have changed the outcome of the trial.’” Id., quoting Ritchie, 480

U.S. 39, 58, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987).

               On January 30, 2020, the trial court ordered the agency to produce

the records for an in camera inspection that were filed under seal February 7, 2020.

Multiple trial continuances were granted due to Covid. The parties stated during

oral arguments that an in camera review of the records occurred at some point. A

January 20, 2021 judgment entry documents that the parties were in possession of

the agency records.

               After jury selection but prior to opening arguments, the state posed

the oral motion in limine. The state argued that Doe 1’s statement was barred by the

rape-shield law and emphasized that allowing the defense to elicit testimony from

Doe 1’s therapist is the type of abuse the law was designed to protect. The defense

countered that the information is not shielded and is admissible to show credibility.

On appeal, the state argues that McCutchen was not entitled to a hearing because he

failed to demonstrate that the accusations were totally false and unfounded

pursuant to Boggs.

               The following discussion ensued:

      State:     Your Honor, we had — both counsel and I have reviewed
                 [CCD]CFS records in this case separately, Your Honor. I had
                 provided [defense counsel with] therapy notes for Jane Doe
                 1. Contained in both the [CCD]CFS records and the therapy
                 records for Jane Doe 1 was information she had shared with
                 her therapist related to another innocent [sic] involving
                 inappropriate touching by an 11-year-old cousin * * *.
                   Your Honor, we don’t intend to introduce the records to the
                   jury. We do intend to elicit testimony from the therapist.
                   Your Honor, it’s our position that through either Jane Doe 1,
                   when she testifies, or the therapist, that information that she
                   relayed to her therapist is protected by rape shield and
                   should not be questioned on by either party, Your Honor.
                   Thank you. * * *

     Defense: Your Honor, obviously if that was allowed, it would go to her
              credibility. [Jane Doe 1] made allegations similar to the
              allegations made herein. The allegations were
              unsubstantiated by [CCD]CFS is my understanding. No
              further action was pursued in these allegations against this
              cousin. So we would oppose the motion in limine.

     Court:        As to the unsubstantiated issue, do you want to say anything
                   from the State?

     State:        Yes, Your Honor. I believe it’s — even though it’s
                   unsubstantiated, unsubstantiated per the [CCD]CFS has no
                   bearing on the issue. It could be many reasons why it’s
                   unsubstantiated. Her divulging information in a private
                   setting to her therapist about another potential encounter is
                   the very reason that we have rape shield in the first place. It
                   makes victims feel that they can open up about things that
                   they would be less likely to do if it was presented to them on
                   the stand or their therapist at trial. Thank you, Your Honor.
                   ***

     Defense: Rape shield mostly deals with the sexual activity of the
              alleged victim. That’s not what this was about. This was
              about the allegation. The allegation of a cousin, very similar
              in nature to the allegation against Mr. McCutchen. It was
              unsubstantiated. There were no charges that were filed. But
              it’s about her allegations and it goes to her credibility, Your
              Honor.

(Tr. 209-211.)

                 The trial court granted the motion in limine.

     “Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity, opinion
     evidence of the victim’s sexual activity, and reputation evidence of the
     victim’s sexual activity shall not be admitted under this section unless
      it involves the evidence of the origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease,
      the defendant’s past sexual activity with the offender. And only to the
      extent the Court finds that the evidence is material to a fact at issue in
      the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not
      outweigh its probative value.”

(Tr. 211, quoting R.C. 2907.02(D).)

               Ohio law provides that a rape victim may be cross-examined

regarding prior false allegations at the trial court’s discretion “if the defendant shows

the allegations were clearly false and no sexual activity took place.” State v. Walker,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 79586 and 79695, 2002-Ohio-3265, ¶ 66, citing Boggs, 63

Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813. “If sexual activity, consensual or not, took place,

the rape shield law would prohibit cross-examination on that issue.” Id. “The

defense is not entitled to question the victim about other sexual allegations unless

they are proven untrue.” Id. at ¶ 67.

               “It is within the sound discretion of the trial court, pursuant to

Evid.R. 608(B), whether to allow such cross-examination.”               Boggs at 424.

Evid.R. 608(B) provides, in part, that “[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a

witness, for the purpose of attacking or support his credibility, * * * may not be

proved by extrinsic evidence.” Boggs at 421. “[I]f clearly probative of truthfulness

or untruthfulness” in the discretion of the trial court, the instances may “be inquired

into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for

truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Id., quoting Evid.R. 608(B).

               According to the record, the trial court conducted an in camera review

of the CCDCFS records and the parties were allowed, after that review, access to the
records. The trial court inquired about the issue of substantiation of the allegations

during the motion in limine discussion. The defense stated the allegations were

unsubstantiated by the agency and no actions were taken regarding the cousin. The

state countered that the term unsubstantiated did not necessarily mean it was false.

There was no other evidence introduced regarding the truth or falsity of the alleged

statement.

               Based on the foregoing in camera exchange, “the trial court was

therefore vested with discretion in determining whether to permit defense counsel

to proceed with cross-examination.” State v. Ferrell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90277,

2008-Ohio-4241, ¶ 37. Like the trial court in Ferrell, this court finds no abuse of

that discretion. Id., citing State v. Graber, 2003-Ohio- 137, 95 N.E.3d 361 (5th Dist.)

(trial court did not err in refusing to permit cross-examination where DHS

investigation indicated that allegations were unsubstantiated but did not indicate

that they were absolutely false); State v. Black, 85 Ohio App. 3d 771, 778, 621 N.E.2d

484 (1st Dist. 1993), citing Boggs, supra.

               Notably, Boggs emphasized that the defense bears the burden to

demonstrate that the accusations were totally false and unfounded where the

defense seeks to cross-examine on prior false accusations of rape. The defense must

show that the accusations were made by the victim and that the accusations were

“actually false or fabricated.” Id. at 423. “Only if it is determined that the prior

accusations were false because no sexual activity took place would the rape shield

law not bar further cross-examination.” Id. It is wholly within the trial court’s sound
discretion under Evid.R. 608(B) whether to allow the cross-examination. Id. The

trial court must “weigh the probative value of any relevant evidence against the

danger of unfair prejudice.” Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 423, 588 N.E.2d 813,

Evid.R. 403(A).

              Based on this court’s review of the record, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion in this case. The first assigned error lacks merit and is

overruled.

      B. Ineffective Assistance

              To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

McCutchen must show that counsel’s performance was so deficient that he was

prejudiced and denied a fair trial. State v. Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297, 2009-Ohio-

2961, 911 N.E.2d 242, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). McCutchen must also show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been

different. State v. Dues, 2014-Ohio-5276, 24 N.E.3d 751, ¶ 55 (8th Dist.), citing id.

              “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential.” Strickland at 671. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” as well as

“to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

              In Ohio, there is a presumption that a properly licensed attorney is

competent. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999). McCutchen
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged

action “‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland at 689, quoting

Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955). We also

consider whether the actions by counsel were “outside the wide range” of behaviors

demonstrating “professionally competent assistance.” Strickland at 690.

                McCutchen argues that trial counsel was ineffective due to failure to

request a limiting instruction regarding McCutchen’s prior conviction testimony.

McCutchen asserts the jury should have been instructed that the prior conviction

evidence should only be considered in regard to assessing credibility and not as

character evidence. Evid.R. 404 “prohibits the use of evidence of an accused’s

character to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” State v. Williams, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94261, 2011-Ohio-591, ¶ 23. “[I]t is an essential duty of defense

counsel to request limiting instructions regarding evidence admitted for purposes of

impeachment.” Id., citing State v. Todd, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 42056, 1980 Ohio

App. LEXIS 11779 (Nov. 20, 1980).

                The following exchange occurred over defense objections during

cross-examination:

      State:       In 2010, you pled in Lake County to the misuse of a credit
                   card; is that correct?

      Defense:     Objection, Your Honor.

      Court:       Sidebar.

       Court:      Overruled.

       Witness: Yes, sir.
(Tr. 404.) The state also elicited, over an objection subsequently sustained, that

McCutchen’s probation period was extended several times for smoking marijuana.

               Counsel’s decision whether to request such an instruction is tactical.

State v. Croce, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100244, 2014-Ohio-1627, ¶ 28, citing State v.

Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 61, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992), fn. 9.              Furthermore,

McCutchen has failed to demonstrate that, but for this error, the outcome of the trial

would have been different.

               In addition, the trial court issued a general instruction regarding

judging the credibility of witnesses. This court determined in State v. Croce, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100244, 2014-Ohio-1627, “that counsel’s failure to request a

limiting instruction, when the court gave a general instruction on credibility, does

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at ¶ 29. For that reason, we find

that no prejudice resulted.

               The second assigned error is overruled.

      C. Cumulative error

               McCutchen argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case

deprived McCutchen of his constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. Under

the doctrine of cumulative error,

      a conviction will be reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a
      trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though each of the
      numerous instances of trial-court error does not individually constitute
      cause for reversal. State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 196-197, 509
      N.E.2d 1256. See also State v Hunter, 131 Ohio St. 3d 67, 2011-Ohio-
      6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, 132. Moreover, “errors cannot become
      prejudicial by sheer weight of numbers.” State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d at
      212, 1996-Ohio-222, 661 N.E.2d 1068.
State v. Singleton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98301, 2013-Ohio-1440, ¶ 64. The

argument fails in the face of our finding that no errors were committed. Id. at ¶ 66.

              Moreover, McCutchen has not demonstrated that “there was a

substantial violation of any of defense counsel’s essential duties” and “that he was

materially prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.” State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d

210, 2006-Ohio-6404, 858 N.E.2d 1144, ¶ 139, citing State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio

St.3d 239, 244, 527 N.E.2d 831 (1988).

              The third assigned error also lacks merit.

IV. Conclusion

              The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR