Court Opinion

ID: 9552815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:17:25.964425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:04.461393
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
I cannot concur in the views expressed in the majority opinion. My dissent is based upon fundamental principles of constitutional law which I believe are completely disregarded by affirmance of the judgment in this cause.
The statute in question, in substance, makes a criminal of any person (not a bonded butcher) who sells or offers for sale the carcass, or any portion thereof, of a beef or veal, without first exhibiting to the purchaser the hide of the animal and exposing the brand, if any. One who sells or offers to sell any such carcass, or portion thereof, must “preserve the hide of the same for a period of thirty days and exhibit the same for inspection upon the demand of any person.” If he fails to do any of these things he subjects himself to prosecution as a criminal. If this- statute is upheld against the constitutional objections hereinabove briefly mentioned, it must be held to be a proper exercise of the police power of the state.
Generally, the legislature in the exercise of the police power of the state may, within constitutional limitations, adopt statutes which are appropriate and reasonably needful in the promotion and protection of the public health, the public morals, and the public safety. However, any legislative exercise of the police power which violates any right guaranteed by the national or state constitutions is invalid. In Re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 Pac. 1071. If a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, morals or safety, has no real *469or substantial relation to these objects or is clearly an invasion of the constitutional freedoms and liberties of the people to use, enjoy or dispose of their property without unreasonable governmental control or regulation, the courts should declare it void. Platte & Denver C. & M. Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376, 30 Pac. 68. “Freedom is the general rule and restraint the exception.” Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522. In Chenoweth v. State Board, 57 Colo. 74, 141 Pac. 132, we said: “The legislature has no power, under the guise of police regulations, to arbitrarily invade the personal rights and personal liberty of the individual citizen. Its determination upon this question is not final or conclusive. If it pass an act, ostensibly in the exercise of the police power, but which in fact interferes unnecessarily with the personal liberty of the citizen, the courts have a right to examine the act and see whether it relates to the objects which the exercise of the police power is designed to secure, and whether it is appropriate for the promotion of such objects.”
An owner cannot be deprived of his property, or the use thereof without due process of law. The term “property,” as used in due process of law guarantee, embraces every kind of property, or right, of which a person may have exclusive control or dominion. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158.
The term “property” as used in the due process clause includes the right to make any legitimate use, or disposal, of the thing owned. Neither may an owner be deprived of any of the essential attributes of his property without due process of law, or without just compensation. Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Mayor et al., 14 F. (2d) 257; People ex rel. Schimpff v. Norvell, 368 Ill. 325, 13 N.E. (2d) 960. In the case last cited we find this language: “The privilege of a citizen to use his property according to his own will is not only a liberty but a property right, subject only to such restraints as the common welfare may require, and while new burdens *470may be placed on the property when the public welfare demands it, this power is limited to enactments having direct reference to the public health, comfort, safety, morals and welfare.” (Italics supplied.)
In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16, we find: “Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property.” (Italics supplied.) See also, United States v. Carotene Products Co., 7 Fed. Supp. 500.
Any legislative action which takes away any of the essential attributes of property, or imposes unreasonable restrictions thereon, violates the due process clause. People v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 306 Ill. 486, 138 N.E. 155; Bettey v. City of Sidney, 79 Mont. 314, 257 Pac. 1007. We quote the following from the Bettey case: “The constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law may be violated without the physical taking of property for public or private use. Property may be destroyed, or its value may be annihilated; it is owned and kept for some useful purpose and it has no value unless it can be used. Its capability for enjoyment and adaptability to some use are essential characteristics and attributes without which property cannot be conceived; and hence any law which destroys it or its value, or takes away any of its essential attributes, deprives the owner of his property. (Matter of Application of Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636.)
“Laws enacted in the exercise of the police power, whether by municipal corporations acting in pursuance of the laws of the state or by the state itself, must be reasonable, and are always subject to the provisions of both the federal and state constitutions, and they are always subject to judicial scrutiny. (McCray v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. 60, 126 N.E. 557; 6 R.C.L. 244.)” (Italics supplied.)
Under this statute the conduct of the citizen, which is *471made criminal, has no direct reference whatever to public health, morals or safety. I am at a loss to understand how the requirement of exhibiting a hide, or of keeping it for thirty days, would improve in any manner whatever the health of the people, the morals of the people, or the safety of the people. It is argued, and the majority opinion indicates, that this measure was adopted-on behalf of the livestock industry, “and is designed to assist in the • prevention of larceny of livestock.” It is not pointed out, however, how a quarter of beef, dressed and ready for consumption, can in any manner whatever be identified with the hide of any particular animal. As aptly put by Mr. Justice Holland in his dissenting opinion, hundreds of law abiding and honest citizens are restricted in the free use of property, which they own, in the hope that some person who may have committed larceny, but against whom no evidence of such crime is available, may be apprehended and punished for doing something which is not inherently wrong.
While it is true, as pointed out in the court’s opinion, that some states have upheld similar statutes against the objections here made to their constitutionality, prior to this time Colorado never has passed upon the question, and I cannot agree that the decisions cited from other jurisdictions should be followed in this state. I am persuaded that such decisions tend to weaken and destroy the force and effectiveness of constitutional guarantees.
Under the stress and strain of war and other so-called national emergencies, appellate courts in recent strenuous years have been inclined to emasculate constitutional provisions until basic guarantees of our constitutions, both national and state, have lost much of their original meaning. This result -has been brought about in many ways, and no doubt with the best of intentions. However, if constitutional government is to survive, the creeping paralysis that has set upon the once deep rooted concepts of constitutional law must be met by appellate courts with a reaffirmance of fundamentals, and a rededication *472by appellate judges to the task of restoring health and vigor to our constitutional body to the end that the constitutions of our state and nation shall in actual practice amount to a first line of defense against invasions upon the freedoms and liberties of the people. The alarming truth is that, notwithstanding the hue and cry concerning threatened loss of freedom from without, our constitutional guarantees have become more and more impotent and powerless in courts of justice to stand as a bulwark of strength against the invasion of those fundamental and inalienable rights and privileges which the constitutions obviously were intended to guarantee the individual.
In my opinion the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the defendant.
Mr. Justice Alter and Mr. Justice Holland authorize me to say that they concur in this dissent.