Court Opinion

ID: 9742725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:19:06.623127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:35.597105
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The Eydes commenced actions in the circuit court and the Tax Tribunal alleging that the township excessively assessed their property, that the drainage boards failed to follow certain organizational and operational procedures, and that the notice provisions of the Drain Code were violative of the Due Process Clause.
The opinion of the Court affirms decisions of the Court of Appeals1 holding that the circuit court action against the township alleging an excessive assessment can be maintained only in the Tax Tribunal and that the challenge to the operation of the boards can be pursued only in the circuit court. This Court finds no violation of the constitution.
Because the Drain Code is not a property tax law and thus special drainage assessments are not levied under a "property tax law,”2 we would hold that the Eydes may maintain an action against the township in the circuit court challenging the *296assessment against their property. We also conclude that the notice provided did not satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
I
The Eydes contend that as property owners subject to assessment by the township they were entitled to personal notice of the hearings at which the drainage boards approved the proposed drain improvement and apportioned the costs among the affected municipal corporations.3 We agree and would reject Fair Drain Taxation, Inc v St Clair Shores, 219 F Supp 646 (ED Mich, 1963), which held that such notice is not required.
The assessment arises out of a drain improvement.4 The location of the proposed drain improvement was known, and the boards could readily have determined which property owners would or might be specially assessed to pay for the improvement. While it is true that the township had the legal authority to finance the improvement by means other than a special assessment,5 it is also true, that, as a practical matter, it would not do so. Few townships possess the financial means to finance such a project with ordinary revenues.
While it was not certain at the early stages of the proceedings that property owners such as the Eydes would be specially assessed, it clearly was probable that they would be. The Eydes might not *297be able to avoid assessment unless they protested the approval of the project. Because the boards failed to provide the Eydes with reasonable notice of the hearings, the Eydes were not given a meaningful opportunity to object, and they were thereby denied due process of law.
II
The Court, on the authority of Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), declares that "challenges to special assessments of this type are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.” Wikman,6 however, concerned a special assessment for road improvements levied under the authority of the Home Rule Act,7 and not a special drain assessment levied pursuant to the Drain Code.8
The Drain Code, in contrast with the Home Rule Act, contains special notice and assessment provisions pertaining both to apportionment of costs by boards9 and to special assessments by municipal corporations.10 These procedures were designed to expedite litigation that might delay the sale of bonds to finance construction.11 In adopting the Tax Tribunal Act, the Legislature did not intend to substitute for the specially designed, relatively *298expeditious procedures of the Drain Code the more time-consuming procedures of the Tax Tribunal.
Because the Tax Tribunal provides "de novo” review of the apportionment of benefits as well as of a claim that there is no benefit at all,12 it seems likely that opportunities for delay will increase and appeals will multiply. This is contrary to the legislative goal of reducing such obstacles to the construction of a drain.
Ill
The opinion of the Court holds that the Tax Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to hear the Eydes’ claim against the boards because the boards assessed the apportioned costs to the affected municipal corporations (including the township) and not against the real property alleged to have been benefited by the improvement. This ruling avoids making the Tax Tribunal the forum for review of apportionment in the instant case, but only because the assessment is in respect to an inter-county drain and the boards chose to apportion costs under chapter 21 of the Drain Code and not under chapter 25.
The Drain Code vests the exclusive power to apportion and assess the costs of an intracounty drain in drainage boards.13 Boards may and generally do assess the costs after apportionment directly to specific parcels of land.14 Such assessments would, in the majority view, be property taxes levied under property tax laws reviewable in *299the Tax Tribunal. The determination of the proper forum to protest a board’s apportionment thus will henceforth depend on whether the drain is intra- or intercounty. There is no reason to suppose that the Legislature intended for disputes involving apportionment to be resolved in separate forums with different procedures depending on whether the drain is intra- or intercounty.
Under the alternative apportionment method set forth in chapter 25, which may be employed for both intra- and intercounty drains, a board apportions costs on the basis of "the relative valuations, as equalized,” of each municipal corporation.15 Apportionment based on the equalized valuation of property seems, under the majority’s reading of Wikman, to be a property tax levied under a property tax law and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal. Yet nothing in the Drain Code suggests that the Legislature intended that a chapter 25 apportionment of the costs of an intercounty drain be treated differently than a chapter 21 apportionment of the costs of an intercounty drain. Chapter 25 is rather required to "be construed to be integrated with chapters 20 and 21.”16 Tax Tribunal review of chapter 25 apportionments requires a board apportioning the cost of an intercounty drain to choose between a possibly more expeditious method of apportionment (chapter 21, reviewable in the circuit court) and a method of apportionment that might appear to the board to be more appropriate in the circumstances (chapter 25, reviewáble in the Tax Tribunal).
Tax Tribunal review of board decisions will hamper the construction of drains. Instead of the *300ten-day period provided in the Drain Code,17 protesters will now have thirty days to seek review.18 Because Tax Tribunal procedure provides for de novo review,19 and, unlike the Drain Code,20 does not provide for the assessment of costs,21 review may be employed as a delaying tactic.
IV
The Legislature provided special procedures for drain assessments because drains "are necessary for the public health”22 and are a matter of "primary public concern.”23 The regulation of the public health is a matter within the police power of the state,24 and accordingly drain assessments may be within the "police power” exception noted in Wikman.25
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Cavanagh, J., took no part in the decision of this case._

 In Eyde v Lansing Twp, 105 Mich App 370; 306 NW2d 797 (1981), the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of certain claims brought against the township in the circuit court. In Eyde v Lansing Twp, 109 Mich App 641; 311 NW2d 438 (1981), the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of certain claims brought against the boards in the Tax Tribunal. Actions on the remaining claims are still pending in both the circuit court and the Tax Tribunal. See Eyde v Lansing Twp, 109 Mich App 641, 648, fn 3.

MCL 205.732; MSA 7.650(32).

 The majority finds it unnecessary to address this question. Ante, p 295. The question was briefed, and the Court of Appeals addressed the question. Eyde v Lansing Twp* 109 Mich App 641, 649-651; 311 NW2d 438 (1981). Because there remains some ambiguity concerning the proper forum in which to protest a board’s apportionment of costs (ante, p 295), and because the question may yet be litigated in these proceedings (see fn 1), we have addressed the question.

 Eyde v Lansing Twp, 105 Mich App 370, 371; 306 NW2d 797 (1981).

 MCL 280.526; MSA 11.1526.

 We recognize that Wikman is now the law in this state, but, for the reasons expressed in dissent in Wikman, the case was wrongly decided. Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq.

 MCL 280.1 et seq.; MSA 11.1001 et seq.

 See, e.g., MCL 280.521; MSA 11.1521 (notice and hearing procedures); MCL 280.161; MSA 11.1161 (accelerated protest time limits); Wikman, supra, p 719 (Levin, J., dissenting, discussing review).

 See, e.g., MCL 280.538a; MSA 11.1538(1) (special assessment prerequisites); MCL 280.539; MSA 11.1539 (special assessment limitations).

 See Wikman, supra, p 720 (Levin, J., dissenting).

 Wikman, supra, p 719 (Levin, J., dissenting).

 MCL 280.468; MSA 11.1468. See also Attorney General v Zantman Intracounty Drainage Board, 17 Mich App 110; 169 NW2d 132 (1969).

 MCL 280.151; MSA 11.1151.

 MCL 280.626; MSA 11,1626.

MCL 280.630; MSA 11.1630.

 MCL 280.161; MSA 11.1161.

 MCL 205.735; MSA 7.650(35).

 See Wikman, supra, p 719 (Levin, J., dissenting).

 MCL 280.161; MSA 11.1161.

 See Wikman, supra, p 718 (Levin, J., dissenting).

 MCL 280.512; MSA 11.1512.

 Const 1963, art 4, § 51.

 See Connor v Herrick, 349 Mich 201, 216-219; 84 NW2d 427 (1957), and sources cited therein.

 Wikman, supra, p 635. The majority decision may impair the constitutional rights of persons whose property is assessed by requiring such persons to commence two actions to protest a single assessment. The additional expenditure and effort required to protest might be unnecessary and unconstitutional. See Ortwein v Schwab, 410 US 656; 93 S Ct 1172; 35 L Ed 2d 572, 578 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).