Court Opinion

ID: 9782633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:00:46.536025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:06.748687
License: Public Domain

MAY, Judge,
dissenting with separate opinion.
I believe the evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, supports the trial court’s specific findings and those findings support its conclusions and judgment. I must therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority’s decision appears to rest solely on its rejection of the trial court’s conclusion that Kosarko’s damages “were not sufficiently ascertainable within a time frame that justifies granting [Kosarko’s] motion for prejudgment interest.” (App. at 12.) The only reason the majority pro*814vides for rejecting that conclusion is that “Padula had ample opportunity to evaluate the known dollar cost of the dispute and consider settlement” in the year that elapsed between March 2009, when Padula found out about Kosarko’s back surgery, and the trial in March 2010. Op. at 812-13. What the majority does not explain, however, is how Padula’s opportunity in 2009 and 2010 to evaluate the then-known dollar cost of the dispute is relevant to whether Kosarko’s damages were ascertainable during the thirty days in 2008 when Kosarko’s Qualified Settlement Offer (“QSO”) was valid.2
Because of the discrepancy between Ko-sarko’s alleged costs in March 2008 and March 2009,1 disagree with the majority’s assertion it did not need to address whether the prejudgment interest statute eliminated the common law rule that damages have to be complete and ascertainable in order for prejudgment interest to be available. Op. at 813, n. 1. This is the basis on which the trial court denied Kosarko’s claim, and the trial court’s order included a number of findings in support thereof. The court found that, in March of 2008 when Kosarko offered to settle for $100,000, the record suggested she was claiming only “soft tissue injuries with $23,216.49 in medical expenses;” (App. at 11, fn.l), and six months later, her medical expenses had increased to only $31,410.31. However, another six months later, following back surgery, Kosarko’s medical expenses had jumped to $72,733.58. On that record, the trial court was well within its discretion to find that, at the time the QSO was available, the value of Kosarko’s damages could not have been ascertained. Thus, the majority could reverse only by rejecting the trial court’s decision as a matter of law. And that is what the majority implicitly does — it holds that despite a more than three-fold increase in medical expenses between the expiration of the QSO and the trial date, a defendant can be punished for rejecting a settlement offer that requested damages five times the known medical expenses. I would not so hold. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Combs, 873 N.E.2d 692, 724-25 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (reversing award of prejudgment interest because the jury’s general verdict did not permit the court to say any of the damages were “ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and accepted standards of valuation”), trans. denied; see also id. at 725 n. 32 (explicitly rejecting assertion that prejudgment interest act permitted trial courts to award prejudgment interest when the amount of damage is disputed).
Neither can I agree with the majority’s assertion that the circumstances here demand “the defendant and not the plaintiff should bear the cost of the time value of money.” Op. at 813. The delay of trial from March 2009 to March 2010 was caused by Kosarko’s failure to notify Padu-la, from early January 2009 to late March 2009, about the back surgery that caused a $50,000 increase in her medical expenses. (See Tr. at 14) (Judge remembers “quite clearly, because at the last minute that information was kind of dropped on [Padu-la’s] counsel, and I said that was not appropriate. That’s why we continued the case.”). The Prejudgment Interest Act provides: “The court shall exclude from the period in which prejudgment interest accrues any period of delay that the court determines is caused by the party petitioning for prejudgment interest.” Ind.Code § 34 — 51—4—8(b) (emphasis added). The trial court therefore could not have held Padula responsible for the time value of *815money during those months the trial was delayed by Kosarko. Nor was it required as a matter of law to hold Padula responsible for any remaining months between the QSO and the Judgment. See, e.g., Whited v. Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Ind.2007) (noting trial court had discretion to deny completely wife’s request for prejudgment interest based on delay attributable to her).
Finally, even if I could concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest, I could not concur with its decision to impose the $79,627.40 in pre-judgment interest Kosarko requested. Not only does that total erroneously contain interest for twelve months during which the judgment was delayed by Kosarko, but its imposition usurps the trial court’s authority to exercise its discretion in determining an appropriate amount of pre-judgment interest. See, e.g., Deel v. Deel, 935 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (remanding for trial court to consider request for pre-judgment interest). Permitting the trial court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest seems particularly appropriate where, as here, the legislature explicitly placed within the court’s discretion the setting of multiple values necessary to compute the amount of prejudgment interest due. See Ind.Code 34-51-4-8 (“court shall determine the period during which prejudgment interest accrues.... ”); Ind. Code 34-51-4-9 (The court computes prejudgment interest based on the “simple rate of interest determined by the court,” but the rate must be between six and ten percent per year.).
I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Kosarko’s petition for prejudgment interest and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The QSO states: “this offer to settle remains valid for thirty (30) days after receipt.” (App. at 37.) The QSO was sent on March 18, 2008, and received on "3/19/08.” (Id. at 39.) Thus it expired on April 18, 2008.