Court Opinion

ID: 9381713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:07:14.107352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.996377
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Loftus v. Three Palms Crocker Park, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-927.]

                                   COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

GERARD LOFTUS, ET AL.,                                   :

                Plaintiffs-Appellees,                    :
                                                                       No. 111639
                v.                                       :

THREE PALMS CROCKER PARK, LLC,                           :
ET AL.,
                                                         :
                Defendants-Appellees.
                                                         :
[Appeal by Robert Sotka,
                                                         :
                Defendant-Appellant.]

                                   JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023

                Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Case No. CV-20-932382

                                                Appearances:

                Gallagher Sharp LLP, Joseph W. Pappalardo, and Richard
                C. O. Rezie, for appellant.

                Bailey Cavalieri LLC, Elan Kandel, Sabrina Haurin, and
                Elizabeth E. Cary, for appellee State Automobile Mutual
                Insurance Company.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

                Defendant-appellant Robert Sotka appeals the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of his employer, Three Palms Crocker Park, LLC

(“Three Palms”) and its insurer, State Auto Mutual Insurance Company (“State

Auto”). Sotka, a defendant in this motor vehicle accident case, claimed his employer

Three Palms had respondeat superior liability and that its insurer, State Auto, was

required to provide coverage. Because the trial court properly granted summary

judgment, we affirm.1

I. Procedural History and Factual Overview

                On March 1, 2019, plaintiff Gerard Loftus was severely injured as a

passenger in a single-car accident in which Sotka was the driver.     The accident

occurred in Ottawa County, Ohio as Sotka was driving to Westlake, Ohio.

                Sotka was the manager at the Three Palms pizzeria restaurant at

Crocker Park in Westlake, Ohio. Sotka was a social acquaintance and friend of

Loftus, and Loftus was a frequent patron of the restaurant. In fact, both men had an

apartment near the restaurant in Crocker Park and socialized together multiple

times a week.

                Sotka had discussions with Loftus about potentially purchasing a

restaurant with him. One restaurant that was briefly discussed was the Canoe Club

1This case is a companion case to Loftus v. Three Palms Crocker Park, LLC, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 111635, in which Loftus appeals the same judgment entry granting
summary judgment.
in Catawba Island Township, near one of Loftus’s homes. Another restaurant was

Flip Side Restaurant in Rocky River, Ohio. A letter of intent had been drafted and

was scheduled to be signed by Loftus and Sotka on March 4, 2019, regarding the

purchase of Flip Side.

               On Friday, March 1, 2019, Sotka left the restaurant at 5:15 p.m. and

traveled over 60 miles to the Canoe Club to meet Loftus and a group of Loftus’s

friends. While Loftus testified that he was not interested in investing in the Canoe

Club because of the seasonal nature of the business, Sotka wanted to introduce

Loftus to the owner of the Canoe Club that night. When he arrived at the Canoe Club

at 6:20 p.m., Sotka had a tour of the Canoe Club from the owner and joined Loftus

and his friends for a drink. After socializing with everyone at the Canoe Club, Sotka

went to another bar in the area with Loftus and his friends, and later went to back

to one of the friends’ homes.

              At around 10:00 p.m., Sotka decided to return to Westlake, Ohio. He

stated that he intended to return to the restaurant before 11:00pm to supervise

closing. Although the restaurant closed at 10:00 p.m., Sotka testified that on

occasion he kept the restaurant open for customers after the posted closing time.

Loftus, who was scheduled to spend the night at his friend’s house that night,

changed his mind and agreed to ride with Sotka back to Westlake, Ohio. While Sotka

made statements after the accident that he was taking Loftus home that night, he

later supplied an affidavit that he was taking Loftus to the restaurant. He also

testified in deposition that he would have either dropped Loftus off at home or taken
him to the restaurant, depending on what Loftus wanted. That decision was never

made because of the accident, and Loftus had no memory of the events of the

evening.

               At around 10:15 p.m., Sotka was driving on State Route 52 in Ottawa

County, exceeding a speed of 120 m.p.h. The car left the road and hit a guardrail,

causing extensive damage.      Sotka’s passenger, Loftus, suffered extensive and

permanent injuries. As a result of his driving, Sotka was later convicted of the crimes

of Operating Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs — OVI, a

misdemeanor of the first degree, and Vehicular Assault, a felony of the fourth degree

in the Ottawa County Court of Common Pleas.

               On May 6, 2020, Loftus filed a complaint against Sotka and Three

Palms. He alleged that Sotka was liable for his injuries and that Three Palms, as

Sotka’s employer, was vicariously liable because at the time of the accident, Sotka

was acting within the course and scope of his employment or acting as an agent of

Three Palms. State Auto, who had issued Three Palms a business insurance policy,

intervened in the lawsuit and sought a declaratory judgment action that it need not

provide a defense or coverage because the accident that resulted in Loftus’s injuries

was not covered by the insurance policy.

               State Auto and Three Palms filed motions for summary judgment.

Three Palms argued that it was not vicariously liable because Sotka was not

conducting or furthering its business when he crashed his car injuring Loftus.
Similarly, State Auto argued that Three Palms’ policy excluded the incident because

Sotka was not using his car in Three Palms’ business.

                  Sotka filed a summary judgment motion alleging that Three Palms

was liable for the accident as well as asserting the accident was covered by the State

Auto insurance policy. Loftus filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the

same and seeking a determination of liability against Sotka.

                  The trial court granted summary judgment to both Three Palms and

State Auto, granted Loftus summary judgment in part, and denied Sotka’s motion

for summary judgment.2 In granting Three Palms’ and State Auto’s motions for

summary judgment, the trial court found that there were “no genuine issues of

material fact that Defendant Sotka was not within the course and scope of his

employment with defendant Three Palms Crocker Park, LLC at the time of the

subject accident [and] there is no coverage for the subject accident under State

Auto’s insurance policy.”

II. Law and Argument

           A. Assignment of Error

                  Sotka appeals, asserting the following assignments of error:

         The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to plaintiff-
         appellee State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company on its
         intervening complaint for declaratory relief, erred in denying Mr.
         Sotka’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and erred in declaring
         that there is no insurance coverage for the subject accident under the

2   Loftus’s claims against Sotka remain pending in the trial court.
       business owners’ insurance policy issued to defendant-appellee Three
       Palms Crocker Park, LLC.

                Sotka argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

because he was acting in furtherance of Three Palms’ business where he was

remotely managing the restaurant while away, he was returning to supervise the

restaurant at the time of the accident, and he was bringing a customer to the

restaurant. He further asserts that he was not a fixed situs employee and, thus, the

reasoning behind the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was errant.

       B. Standards of Review and Applicable Law

                1. Summary Judgment

                Under Civ. R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate if the record

demonstrates

       (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the
       moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that
       reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that
       conclusion is averse to the party against whom the motion for
       summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence
       construed most strongly in his or her favor.

Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978);

Civ.R. 56(C).

                Civ.R. 56(C) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if

“the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions,

affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed

in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A trial court’s grant of
summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d

102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). If the movant satisfies the initial burden, then the

nonmoving party has the burden to set forth specific facts that there remain genuine

issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Id.

               2. Interpretation of the Insurance Policy

               An insurance policy is a contract between an insurer and its insured.

E.g., AKC, Inc. v. United Specialty Ins. Co., 166 Ohio St.3d 460, 2021-Ohio-3540,

187 N.E.3d 501, ¶ 8. Thus, determining coverage under an insurance policy is a

matter of contract interpretation. Crum & Forster Indemn. Co. v. Ameritemps, Inc.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99610, 2013-Ohio-5419, ¶ 10.              The interpretation of

insurance policies is a matter of law. Id. “In insurance policies, as in other contracts,

words and phrases are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless there is

something in the contract that would indicate a contrary intention.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing

Olmstead v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St.2d 212, 216, 259 N.E.2d 123

(1970); Ohio N. Univ. v Charles Constr. Servs., Inc., 155 Ohio St.3d 197, 2018-Ohio-

4057, 120 N.Ed.3d 762, ¶ 11. “[W]here the provisions of an insurance policy are clear

and unambiguous, courts may not indulge themselves in enlarging the contract by

implication in order to embrace an object distinct from that contemplated by the

parties.” Crum & Forster Indemn. Co. at ¶ 11, citing Gomolka v. State Auto Mut.

Ins. Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 166, 168, 436 N.E.2d 1347 (1982).
               3. Employer Liability for Employee’s Actions While Driving

               An employer may be subject to respondeat superior liability for an

employee’s accident when that employee is acting within the scope of employment.

Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 330, 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992); see Morrison v.

Horseshoe Casino, 2020-Ohio-4131, 157 N.E.3d 406, ¶ 94 (8th Dist.) (“For an

employer * * * to be vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the

tort committed by the employee must be committed within the scope of

employment.”).

               “Conduct is within the scope of a servant’s employment if it is of the

kind which he is employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized

limits of time and space, and is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the

master.” Rockwell v. Ullom, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73961, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS

4101, 10 (Sept. 3, 1998), citing Martin v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d

83, 92, 590 N.E.2d 411 (1990). The Ohio Supreme noted that “the act of an agent is

the act of the principal within the course of the employment when the act can fairly

and reasonably be deemed to be an ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the

service to be rendered, or a natural, direct, and logical result of it.” Posin v. A.B.C.

Motor Court Hotel, Inc., 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 278, 344 N.E.2d 334 (1976); Amato v.

Heinika Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84479, 2005-Ohio-189, ¶ 10.

               Accordingly, the issue of Three Palms’ liability rests on whether

Sotka, at the time of the accident, was as a matter of law acting within the scope of

his employment.
      C. Summary Judgment in Favor of State Auto and Three Palms
      Was Appropriately Granted in This Case

              1. State Auto Policy Coverage of Accidents Caused By a
              Three Palms’ Employee While Driving

              State Auto’s insurance policy provides liability coverage to Three

Palms pursuant to the Commercial General Liability Coverage (“CGL policy”). The

CGL policy provides coverage for “those sums that the insured becomes legally

obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which

this insurance applies.” The parties agree the CGL policy specifically excludes

damages from motor vehicle accidents pursuant to exclusion 2.g but dispute

whether coverage is provided by the “Hired Auto and Non-Owned Auto Liability”

Endorsement (“Auto Endorsement”) to the CGL policy. The Auto Endorsement

provides CGL coverage for damages “arising out of the use of any ‘non-owned auto’

in your business by any person.” A “non-owned auto” is specifically defined in the

Auto Endorsement as

      any “auto” you[3] do not own, lease, hire, rent or borrow which is used
      in connection with your business. This includes “autos” owned by your
      “employees”, your partners or your “executive officers”, or members
      of their households, but only while used in your business or your
      personal affairs.

3 The CGL policy defines "you" and "your" as "the Named Insured shown in the
Declarations and any other person or organization qualifying as a Named Insured"
under the policy. The parties do not dispute that Three Palms is the Named Insured
in the State Auto policy.
The Auto Endorsement further designates the following as “insureds” for purposes

of the Auto Endorsement coverage:

      a. [The Named Insured]

      b. Any other person using a “hired auto” with [the Named Insured’s]
      permission;

      c. For a “non-owned auto”:

             (1) Any partner or “executive officer” of [the Named Insured];
             or

             (2) Any “employee” of [the Named Insured] but only while such
             “non-owned auto” is being used in [the Named Insured’s]
             business.

               In interpreting the language of an insurance policy, the Ohio Supreme

Court has noted that “the general intent of a motor vehicle insurance policy issued

to a corporation is to insure the corporation as a legal entity against liability arising

from the use of motor vehicles.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216,

2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶ 20, citing King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio

St.3d at 211, 519 N.E.2d 1380. In Powell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2d Dist. Darke

No. 1619, 2004-Ohio-1169, ¶ 26, 38, the court found that exclusionary language in a

business insurance policy that restricted coverage to accidents “while used in your

business or personal affairs” could serve to exclude claims where the employee was

not acting within the scope of their employment.

               In this case, there is no dispute that Sotka was driving a non-owned

auto as defined by the Auto Endorsement. However, the Auto Endorsement only

provides coverage while the non-owned auto is being used in Three Palms’ business.
Thus, the issue to be determined for the purposes of summary judgment was

whether Sotka used the vehicle in Three Palms’ business when the accident

occurred?

              2. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact That
              At the Time of the Accident Sotka Was Not Acting in
              the Course and Scope of His Employment or in
              Furtherance of Three Palms’ Business

               The issue of liability on the part of Sotka’s employer, Three Palms, is

dependent upon on whether, at the time of the accident, Sotka was acting within the

scope of his employment. Osborne, supra. Similarly, coverage under the insurance

policy would be found if Sotka was using the car in Three Palms’ business. The trial

court determined that neither condition was present upon the record and

specifically found that “reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that there

are no genuine issues of material fact that defendant Sotka was not within the course

and scope of his employment with defendant Three Palms Crocker Park, LLC at the

time of the subject accident.” May 19, 2022 journal entry. We agree.

               Both Loftus and Sotka raise similar arguments regarding Three

Palms’ liability and State Auto’s duty to provide coverage in their respective appeals.

They argue that Sotka was acting within the scope of his employment because he

managed the restaurant remotely while in Catawba and was driving Loftus, a

customer, to the restaurant so that Sotka could supervise the closing of the

restaurant.
              In considering the circumstances to determine if Sotka was acting

within the scope of his employment on the date of the accident, we note that Sotka

left the restaurant at 5:15 p.m., traveled a distance of over 60 miles, and admits the

purpose of his trip was to meet with his friend and soon to be new business partner,

Loftus. He had drinks and met with another friend and owner of the Canoe Club.

There is no evidence Sotka went to Catawba for any business purpose to benefit

Three Palms. He did not tell any of the Three Palms investors of his trip to Catawba.

This conduct is personal and would not normally be considered to be within the

scope of Sotka’s employment. Traveling 60 miles and socializing to pursue personal

business unrelated to his employer cannot be deemed to be in service of Three Palms

or a “natural incident or attribute of the service” Sotka rendered to Three Palms.

Posin, 45 Ohio St.2d 271, at 278.     However, Loftus and Sotka argue that Sotka

performed some acts that could be considered to be within the scope of his

employment or in furtherance of Three Palms’ business during his trip and at the

time of the accident.

              Both Three Palms and State Auto moved for summary judgment and

we construe the facts in the record in favor of Sotka. Harless, supra. In reviewing

affidavits or statements however, we may disregard conclusory statements or legal

conclusions     that    are    not    supported     by     sufficient   facts.   See,

Crawford v. Millar Elevator Serv. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77277, 2000 Ohio

App. LEXIS 2039, at 10 (May 11, 2000) (court not required to consider affidavit that

contained only conclusory statements and legal conclusions without sufficient
operating facts), Davis v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 98 Ohio App.3d 18, 21, 647

N.E.2d 827 (8th Dist.1994) (Trial court could ignore affidavit where it contained

conclusory statements and legal conclusions without stating sufficient supporting

facts.).

               As to bringing Sotka’s actions within the scope of his employment the

evening of the accident, both Loftus and Sotka ask us to consider that Sotka testified

in deposition that he “would have been managing the 3 Palms while off site” by

communicating with employees by text and telephone and that Sotka intended to

return to the restaurant to supervise the closing of the restaurant. Further, they note

that Sotka discussed pizza ovens with the owner of the Canoe Club. While the

testimony was not clear whether he actually talked to Three Palms employees that

night, when considering Sotka’s conduct in total, assuming he contacted employees

and spoke with others about the general aspects of the operation of a restaurant,

those actions are merely incidental to the purpose of his evening: socializing with

Loftus and furthering a personal business venture. Moreover, the restaurant

employees present on the evening of the accident closed the restaurant without

Sotka’s direction or input.

               In short, our review of the record reflects that Sotka’s purpose in

going to Catawba that evening was to socialize and further his own personal business

opportunities. Although some of Sotka’s conduct was similar to his duties as a

restaurant manager, those actions were merely incidental to the personal nature of

his trip to Catawba. Accordingly, the record, when taken in the light most favorable
to Sotka, does not provide an issue of material fact as to whether Sotka was acting

within the course and scope of his employment.4

              In arguing that the accident occurred while Sotka was acting within

the scope of his employment or in furtherance of Three Palms’ business, Loftus and

Sotka both argue that Sotka was bringing Loftus, a customer, back to the restaurant.

Sotka testified that his duties as restaurant manager included supervising all aspects

of the operations of the restaurant which included “bringing in” customers.

Although Sotka testified in his deposition that he would have taken Loftus either to

the restaurant or home depending upon Loftus’s wishes, upon summary judgment,

we assume Sotka was driving Loftus to the restaurant.           And even with that

assumption, in the context of Sotka’s employment with Three Palms, we do not

understand Sotka’s general duty to “bring in customers” to be so literal that Sotka

was expected to bring a single customer to the restaurant from a distance of over 60

miles while driving intoxicated. There was no evidence Sotka had ever personally

taxied customers to the restaurant in a privately owned automobile. Such action,

especially without precedent, would be unusual and beyond the generally

4 Three Palms and State Auto raise the issue that Sotka was a fixed situs employee
and his excursion from the restaurant was not within the scope of his employment.
Sotka and Loftus both argued that Sotka was authorized to leave the restaurant to
conduct business in the past in order to pick up necessary supplies or conduct other
business. As we find that the record reflects that Sotka was not acting within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident and was not driving the auto in
Three Palms’ business, whether Sotka was or was not a fixed situs employee is not
determinative in resolving the assignments of error.
understood meaning of “bringing customers” into a business. More so, Sotka

committed the offenses of operating a vehicle under impairment, and vehicular

assault, a felony. This conduct cannot “fairly and reasonably be deemed to be an

ordinary and natural incident or attribute of the service to be rendered, or a natural,

direct, and logical result of it.” Posin, 45 Ohio St.2d at 278.

               The undisputed circumstances surrounding Sotka’s conduct on the

night of the accident militate against a finding that Sotka’s trip was within the scope

of his employment. Sotka was on a personal trip, a large distance from the

restaurant, and was not engaged in conduct that was usual or in conformity with

other trips attendant to his duties such as picking up supplies for the restaurant.

The incidental nature of some of his actions that may have related to his employment

during his personal evening out do not serve to transform his trip into one in which

he was acting at the time of the accident within the scope of his employment or that

can be said were in furtherance of Three Palms’ business. The sole assignment of

error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               Because the record does not reveal genuine issues of material fact

that, at the time of the accident, Sotka was acting in the course and scope of his

employment or in furtherance of Three Palms’ business, summary judgment was

appropriately granted in favor of Three Palms and State Auto.

               Judgment affirmed, and cause remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings.
      It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR