Court Opinion

ID: 9493398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:06:49.378707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:00.229738
License: Public Domain

Straub, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, Carlos Pacheco’s three suspended sentences of one-year’s imprisonment for misdemeanor convictions cannot constitute “aggravated felonies” within the meaning of Section 101 (a)(43)(F) & (G) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) & (G), unless we adopt an “Alice-in-Wonderland-like definition of the term ‘aggravated felony’” that does violence to the plain and settled meanings of both “aggravated” and “felony.” Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of the Proposed Reforms, 113 Harv. L. Rev.1936, 1939 (2000). The majority apparently agrees, but finds this *156conclusion acceptable because it “consider[s] Congress ‘to be master — that’s all.’ ” Ante at 149 (quoting Lewis CaRROLL, Through the Looking Glass). In reaching this conclusion, however, the majority asks and answers the wrong question, for the critical issue presented by this case is not “whether Congress can make the word ‘misdemeanor’ mean ‘felony,’ ” ante at 149 (emphasis added), but rather whether it actually did. Because the plain meaning of “aggravated felony” conflicts with the manner in which that term is apparently defined in the statute, and because there is no indication that Congress intended to depart from the term’s plain meaning, I believe that the definition of “aggravated felony” in INA § 101(a)(43) is ambiguous on its face. Thus, the rule of lenity requires that we interpret the definition to exclude misdemeanor offenses.
I. Plain Meaning
In determining whether INA § 101(a)(43) includes misdemeanor convictions within the “crime of violence” and “theft offense” subsections of the “aggravated felony” definition, we must start by examining the plain meaning of the statute. See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir.2000). In doing so, we must attempt to give effect to the plain meaning of each word in the statute. See id. (when interpreting statute’s plain meaning, we “consider the ordinary, common-sense meaning of the words”); Harris v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.1992) (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-16, 25 L.Ed. 782 (1879) (“[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The plain and ordinary meanings of the words “aggravated” and “felony” clearly conflict with an interpretation of the term “aggravated felony” that includes misdemeanor offenses. First, there can be little argument that the word “felony” is commonly understood — and statutorily defined — to include crimes punishable by prison terms of greater than one year.1 *157See 18 U.S.C. § 8559(a); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir.1999); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1; see also BlacK’s Law Dictionary 633 (7th ed. 1999); WebsteR’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 836 (1993). And it is a well-settled maxim of statutory construction that “[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.” NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329, 101 S.Ct. 2789, 69 L.Ed.2d 672 (1981); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42-43, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979) (interpreting statutory use of common law term “bribery” in light of term’s “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” at time of statute’s enactment); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (“Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our traditional legal concepts.... ”); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911) (“[WJhere words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.”).
Second, it is quite clear that “aggravated felony” defines a subset of the broader category “felony.” Common sense and standard English grammar dictate that when an adjective — such as “aggravated” — modifies a noun — such as “felony”— the combination of the terms delineates a subset of the noun. One would never suggest, for example, that by adding the adjective “blue” to the noun “car,” one could be attempting to define items that are not, in the first instance, cars. In other words, based on the plain meaning of the terms “aggravated” and “felony,” we should presume that the specifics that follow in the definition of “aggravated felony” under INA § 101(a)(43) serve to elucidate what makes these particular felonies “aggravated”; we certainly should not presume that those specifies would include offenses that are not felonies at all.2 Thus, under the majority’s view, Congress has defined a subset of a category to include items that are not in the broader category itself.
The illogic of this conclusion is all the more apparent when one considers the meaning of the word “aggravated.” “Aggravated” denotes a state of affairs that is worse, enhanced, or more severe in some *158manner. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 65 (7th ed. 1999) (when used to describe a crime, “aggravated” means “made worse or more serious by circumstances such as violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit another crime”); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 41 (1993) (to “aggravate” means “to make worse, more serious, or more severe”); cf. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (noting that if 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) were a separate offense rather than a sentencing enhancement section, it would require proof that a prior offense was “ ‘aggravated’ or serious ” (emphasis added)). If a felony is a crime punishable by more than one year, how, then, can an “aggravated” felony include crimes punishable by just one year? To include misdemeanors within the definition of “aggravated felony” turns the plain meaning of the word “aggravated” entirely on its head, since in addition to not being felonies in the first place, misdemeanors are conventionally understood as being less severe than felonies, as well. See Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship Process and Policy 738 (4th ed.1998) (suggesting that INA § 101(a)(43) is ambiguous given the manner in which it uses the terms “aggravated” and “felony”).
Despite these significant difficulties, the majority asserts that we must adhere to the “clear dictates” of the statute and the “explicit,” “clear meaning” of the aggravated felony definition. Ante at 154. It is only by ignoring the clear meaning of certain terms within that statutory provision, however, that it becomes possible to render the definition “explicit on its face,” as the majority describes it. Ante at 154. The Third Circuit (and, by endorsing that court’s opinion, ante at 152, the majority) also asserts that Congress defined a “term of art” in “aggravated felony” — a term of art that includes misdemeanors. Graham, 169 F.3d at 792. While Congress certainly “has a right to define one thing to mean something different from what it normally means,” Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 173 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 72, 145 L.Ed.2d 61 (1999), the counter-intuitive use of language in INA § 101(a)(43)(F) & (G) should raise red flags signaling the need for closer scrutiny. It is not at all self-evident that the text of INA § 101(a)(43) includes misdemeanor convictions within the aggravated felony definition, at least not without a clearer indication that Congress intended that result. Cf. Benjamin, 172 F.3d at 173 n. 5 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“[Wjhen Congress, in a definitional section, seems to say that bananas are apples, we should ask whether that is really what Congress meant....”). Definitional provisions such as INA § 101(a)(43), like any other statutory provisions, “must be given their ordinary meanings, when such meanings make sense, but must be read in their context ... when the seemingly ordinary meanings lead to statements that are — to put it mildly — linguistically unnatural.” Benjamin, 172 F.3d at 192 (Calabresi, J., concurring). Cf. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (“The meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Thus, in my view, the “linguistically unnatural” statement that “aggravated felony” includes misdemeanors renders the term ambiguous and necessitates further inquiry.
II. Legislative History and Statutory Structure
Since it cannot seriously be contended that the plain, textual meaning of the “aggravated felony” definition is unambiguous, we must turn to other sources of interpretation for guidance. Unfortunately, the legislative history of INA § 101(a)(43) reveals very little regarding the intended scope of that definition. While Congress clearly intended to broaden the aggravated felony category to in-*159elude more criminal offenses, there is no evidence to suggest that in doing so, Congress intended to “break[] the time-honored line between felonies and misdemeanors” by including offenses punishable by one year’s imprisonment within that definition. Graham, 169 F.3d at 792.
Indeed, if anything, the legislative history of the amendments to INA § 101(a)(43) suggests that Congress wished to lower the imprisonment threshold from five years to one year, but in doing so inadvertently included offenses punishable by exactly one year. Prior to the statute’s 1996 amendments, INA § 101 defined “aggravated felony” as, inter alia, a crime of violence or a theft offense “for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of imprisonment) is at least 6 years.” INA § 101(a)(43)(F) & (G), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F) & (G) (1994). In the amending legislation, Congress directed that “is at least 5 years” be struck and replaced by “at least one year.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627 (Sept. 30, 1996). The Senate Report on the amendment stated only that IIRI-RA “[ljowers fine and imprisonment thresholds in the definition (from 6 years to 1 year ... ).” S. Rep. No. 249, 104th Cong., 1996 WL 180026. As the Graham court noted, the one year threshold was likely chosen because it “has been used to distinguish misdemeanors from felonies for a very long time.” 169 F.3d at 792. Congress, however, most likely failed to realize that by retaining the words “at least,” it-was potentially disregarding that historic distinction.
Furthermore, the overall structure of the statute by no means dictates that misdemeanors for which one-year sentences are imposed be included within the definition of “aggravated felony.” Assuming that INA § 101(a)(48)(F) & (G) mean to refer to sentences actually imposed and not to potential sentences, as both the majority and the Third Circuit sensibly conclude, see ante at 152; Graham, 169 F.3d at 792, no logical problem results from interpreting “crime of violence” and “theft offense” only to include crimes that already are felonies. As the Graham court itself concedes, “[s]ome one-year sentences would still be aggravated felonies — those imposed for felonies, that is, for crimes with maximum terms of more than one year.”3 169 F.3d at 792.
Moreover, if “aggravated felony” is read to include misdemeanor crimes of violence, the incongruous result would follow that the commission of three or more misdemeanors involving “crimes against the person” is punishable by a prison term up to 10 years, while the commission of just one misdemeanor involving a “crime of violence” is punishable by a prison term up to 20 years.4 Compare INA § 274(b)(1), 8 *160U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) -with INA- § 274(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The majority avoids this anomaly by stating that “it is neither our task to rewrite the definition of the underlying offense to eliminate the incongruity nor to ignore the clear dictates of the amended INA.” Ante at 154. However, it most certainly is our task to interpret an ambiguous INA provision in such a way as to avoid this incongruity when an alternative interpretation is readily available. See United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992); see also Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) (“[interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (same). Such attentiveness is particularly warranted when, as in this instance, we are “construing a recent amendment to a complex statute that produces an unexpected result and when there is strong reason to doubt that Congress intended that result.” Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir.1992).
III. The Rule of Lenity
In light of the inherent ambiguity in INA § 101(a)(43)(F) & (G), I believe we must apply the rule of lenity to interpret the statute in Pacheco’s favor.
The rule of lenity provides that “ambiguous laws which impose penal sanctions are to be strictly construed against the Government.” United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 120 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983); see also Dauray, 215 F.3d at 264 (suggesting that rule of lenity has constitutional underpinnings rooted in due process notions of “fair warning”). “[Bjefore a man can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’ within the provisions of some statute.” United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1245, 114 S.Ct. 2764, 129 L.Ed.2d 878 (1994). The rule is equally applicable in eases involving criminal sentencing, and in civil cases in which the governing standard is found in a criminal statute or the same statutory provision has both criminal and civil applications. See, e.g., United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 305, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992) (“[Tjhe rule [of lenity] has been applied not only to resolve issues about the substantive scope of criminal statutes, but to answer questions about the severity of sentencing....”); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 518 & n. 10, 112 S.Ct. 2102, 119 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992) (in civil action, rule of lenity applies when construing ambiguous statute that “has criminal applications”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) (in a civil action, when the “governing standard is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of lenity”).
We must reserve lenity “for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.” Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, *16165 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980)); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994) (applying rule of lenity “where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the Government’s position is unambiguously correct”).
Here, in my view, “a reasonable doubt persists” as to the “statute’s intended scope.” Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108, 111 S.Ct. 461. As in Dauray, “[w]e have read the plain language of’ INA § 101(a)(43)(F) & (G), “considered the traditional canons of statutory construction, looked for legislative history, and canvassed potentially relevant case law. And we are left with no more than a guess as to the proper meaning of the ambiguous language here.” 215 F.3d at 264. Accordingly, we should construe the statute to exclude misdemeanor offenses.
IV. Conclusion
The definition of “aggravated felony” in INA § 101(a)(43) has far-reaching implications that go well beyond the illegal reentry sentencing context. Aliens who have been convicted of an aggravated felony are ineligible for most forms of discretionary relief from deportation. See INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)® (asylum); INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (cancellation of removal); INA § 240B(a)(l) & (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(l) & (b)(1)(C) (voluntary departure). Moreover, such aliens are conclusively presumed to be deportable, and are subject to mandatory INS detention and expedited administrative removal proceedings. See INA §§ 236(c), 238(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c), 1228(a)-(c). Finally, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are not entitled to judicial review of their detention or of removal orders that are based upon those convictions, see INA §§ 236(e), 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e), 1252(a)(2)(C), and- may not reenter the United States without the Attorney General’s consent to apply for readmission, see INA § 212(a)(9)(A)®, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)®. See generally 6 ChaRles Gordon et al„ Immigration Law and Prooedure § 71.05[2][c] (rev. ed. 1998) (discussing numerous provisions and restrictions relating to aggravated felons); Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al„ Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy 739 (4th ed. 1998) (same).
With so much at stake, I am uncomfortable with this Court “simply guessing about congressional intent,” Dauray, 215 F.3d at 265, and respectfully dissent.

. While the Third Circuit acknowledged the "solidified” one-year line between felonies and misdemeanors, United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir.1999), the court there — and the majority here — decided to "give effect to the definition of the underlying offense and ignore the label.” Ante at 154 (quoting Graham, 169 F.3d at 793). In support of this decision, Graham cites cases that resolve the question of whether a crime is a "felony” or "misdemeanor” with reference to the actual term of imprisonment imposed, rather than with reference to the label given the offenses in question by Congress. See Graham, 169 F.3d at 793 & n. 4 ("When ... inconsistencies [became manifest in how particular crimes were labeled], courts generally held that the overarching felony/misdemeanor definition controlled, so that a particular statute's label would be overridden if it was inconsistent with the 'real' definition of a felony or misdemeanor.” (citation omitted)).
However, correct application of this principle actually yields the opposite result. In each of the cases cited by Graham, the court "ignore[d] the label” in order to ensure consistent application of the longstanding, "real” definition of "felony”; in each case, a criminal statute mislabeled a crime as a "felony” or "misdemeanor” by ignoring the historical one-year/more-than-one-year line between the two. See, e.g., Loos v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 442 (5th Cir.1955) (criminal offense providing for up to five years’ imprisonment was labeled a "misdemeanor,” which led the defendant to argue that he could not permissibly be imprisoned for more than one year). With respect to the "aggravated felony” definition in the INA, however, Graham (and the majority) invoke the same principle to advance the opposite end: namely, to undermine the longstanding consistency in the use of the term "felony.” This conclusion is reinforced by the significantly different setting in which this case arises: unlike the statutory provisions discussed in the cases discussed by Graham, all of which actually set' forth substantive criminal offenses, the "aggravated felony” provision in INA § 101(a)(43) does not itself define any crime. Rather, INA § I01(a)(43) merely identifies a certain set of preexisting felonies to which Congress has decided to *157attach immigration consequences. Simply "ignoring the label,” therefore, does not make sense in this context — for it is that label which helps to delimit the category of crimes that are to be included.
Consistent application of the underlying principle invoked by Graham, therefore, requires that whether a particular criminal offense constitutes an “aggravated felony” under INA § 101(a)(43) be determined, in the first instance, with reference to whether it properly may be characterized as a "felony.” And in accordance with that principle, whether such an offense actually is a “felony” under criminal law should be determined with reference to the traditional one-year/more-than-one-year line — not the label given to a particular criminal offense under federal immigration law.

. An analysis of the other subsections of INA § 101(a)(43) reveals that the overwhelming number of offenses included within the definition of “aggravated felony” are, without question, felonies. Only one — INA § 101(a)(43)(N), which incorporates violations of INA § 274(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), concerning the bringing and harboring of certain aliens — even appears to contemplate the inclusion of a misdemeanor. Even with this subsection, however, it is not entirely clear that misdemeanors are meant to be included, since only a limited class of offenses within INA § 274(a)(2) actually constitute misdemeanors and INA § 101(a)(43)(N) itself modifies the underlying offense in INA § 274(a)(2) by excluding first offenses in which the alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting only his or her spouse, child, or parent.

. This incongruity draws attention to another problem with the “aggravated felony” definition in INA § 101(a)(43). See generally Iris Bennett, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of “Aggravated Felony" Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1720-29 (1999). To the extent that provisions such as the illegal reentry offense defined in INA § 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), place nonuniform consequences upon conduct encompassed within the “aggravated felony” category, based on differences in state criminal law, such nonuniform operation of federal immigration law violates the one textual limitation on the federal immigration power explicitly set forth in the Con*160stitution — namely, the requirement under Article I that immigration law be uniform throughout the United States. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization” (emphasis added)). Under the INA definition of "aggravated felony,” an individual convicted, for example, of misdemeanor assault and battery in Texas would be subject to removal as an "aggravated felon,” while an individual convicted of the exact same offense in Arizona would not be subject to removal on that basis, since the maximum sentence for misdemeanor assault in Texas is one year, while in Arizona it is only six months. See Bennett, supra, at 1724-25.