Court Opinion

ID: 9407240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 14:00:36.577231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.510414
License: Public Domain

22-626-cr
Peng v. United States

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                    SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 6th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:
                   DENNY CHIN,
                   STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                        Circuit Judges,
                   PAUL A. ENGELMAYER,
                        District Judge.∗
___________________________________

You Zhong Peng,
                        Petitioner-Appellant,
                   v.                                                    22-626
United States of America,
                 Respondent-Appellee.
_____________________________________

∗Judge Paul A. Engelmayer of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, sitting by designation.
For Petitioner-Appellant:                    You Zhong Peng, pro se, Pine Knot,
                                             KY.

For Respondent-Appellee:                     Irisa Chen, Jo Ann M. Navickas,
                                             Assistant United States Attorneys, for
                                             Breon Peace, United States Attorney
                                             for the Eastern District of New York,
                                             Brooklyn, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Korman, J.).

      UPON       DUE        CONSIDERATION,      IT    IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

      You Zhong Peng, pro se and incarcerated, appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Alongside
several codefendants, Peng was convicted for his role in the “Plum Blossom
Gang,” receiving a statutory mandatory life sentence for hostage-taking plus 25
years for two firearms charges. We affirmed the conviction on direct appeal from
the denial of a motion for a new trial. See United States v. Chen, No. 97-1227, 1997
WL 768376 (2d Cir. Dec. 15, 1997).

      In 2020, Peng moved pro se for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), based primarily on his medical conditions. He initially withdrew
his motion but sought to reinstate it in January 2022, arguing that his health
conditions, his rehabilitation, and intervening changes in the law constituted
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting release. The district court
denied the motion with the following order:

      Defendant’s motion for compassionate release is denied. His criminal
      conduct was horrific in nature and has stayed in my mind until this
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      day, almost twenty-five years after his trial. Along with his
      accomplices, he “held ... three victims for more than one week in a
      basement apartment” and “made numerous calls to the victims’
      families in China demanding ransom money for the victims’ safe
      release.” While holding the victims captive, the defendant and the
      others “repeatedly beat the victims” and “repeatedly raped the two
      female victims.” They also “chopped off a victim’s finger in order to
      demonstrate the seriousness of their threats.” Then, “frustrated in
      their attempts to obtain the ransom money, the kidnappers shot the
      male victim in the head and left him for dead and strangled to death
      one of the female victims.” For these actions, Defendant received a
      statutorily mandated lifetime sentence.
      In light of his sickening conduct and the associated mandatory
      sentence, I find that … “the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors”
      do not support reducing Defendant’s sentence. Nor do I find that
      “[D]efendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons that
      might … justify a sentence reduction.”
Text Order, No. 98-CV-7697 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2022) (citations omitted). Peng
appealed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history, and the issues on appeal.

      We review the denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021). “A district court has abused its
discretion if it has (1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that
cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021)). The district court’s discretion in
this context is “broad.” United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020).

      Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a district court “may” reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment “after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a)” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a

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reduction” and “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A);
Brooker, 976 F.3d at 237. A district court may deny a motion based solely on the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73. Those sentencing
factors include, among others, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the need for the sentence
imposed … to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
law, … to provide just punishment for the offense,” to deter criminal conduct, and
“to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-
(2). Furthermore, “the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly
committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our review, as
long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable.” United States v.
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Even if Peng had demonstrated that his rehabilitation and unusually long
sentence constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying a sentence reduction based on the § 3553(a)
factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense. To the extent that
Peng argues that the district court did not adequately consider his rehabilitation
when weighing the § 3553(a) factors, we presume that the district court considered
all relevant § 3553(a) factors “unless the record suggests otherwise.” United States
v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 570 (2d Cir. 2022). The record here does not indicate that
the district court failed to consider any relevant factor. Moreover, a defendant’s
“[m]ere disagreement with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors …
is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 569 (internal
quotation marks omitted).1

1 We note that another panel of this court recently affirmed the denial of a motion for
compassionate release sought by one of Peng’s codefendants. In that case, the district

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      We have considered Peng’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are
without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

court similarly emphasized the nature and circumstances of the offense. See United States
v. Chen, No. 22-765, 2023 WL 2229367, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 27, 2023) (“The district court …
did not abuse its discretion by denying Chen’s motion for compassionate release based
on the serious underlying offense conduct.”).

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