Court Opinion

ID: 9553292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:27:14.364882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:39.023720
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice
(dissenting) :
I am in accord with the conclusion of the Chief Justice, and his reasons therefor, that the statute under consideration is constitutionally invalid. However, a few observations seem appropriate.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain, being contrary to the inherent rights of property ownership by individuals cannot be implied or inferred from vague or doubtful language in a statute, but must be given in express terms or by necessary implication. When the right to exercise the power can only be made out of argument and inference, it does not exist.1
First, with respect to the “limitation of territory,” the majority opinion seems to concede that “the Great Salt Lake and its environs” is indefinite, but takes refuge in the title of the- act which makes reference to “the meander line established by the United States surveyor general.”2 The title is not a part of the act.3 In rare instances it may be used to clarify the meaning of the énacted statute. However; it cannot be used to supply a jurisdictional defect or omission1 which would render the act constitutionally invalid.
Second,' as to the issue of “delegation of legislative authority,” a careful scrutiny of both the act and the main opinion fails to reveal the “objectives and purposes” of the legislation. The act itself makes several references to “the accomplishment of (its) objectives and purposes,” but nowhere is there a definitive expression of the same.
The majority opinion attempts to fill this void by quoting, incompletely, Sec. 6S-8-6 (S) and then observing that the members of the authority “are to carry out the purposes and objectives above referred to.” The “above referred to” could only refer to the incomplete quotation. The section, in its entirety, reads:
The authority shall coordinate multiple use of property for such purposes as grazing, fish and game, mining and mineral removal, development and utilization of water and other natural resources, industrial, and other uses in addition to recreational development, and adopt such reasonable rules and regulations as the authority may deem advisable to insure *55the accomplishment of the objectives and purposes of this act,4
Again, we might inquire, what are the limitations of the authority in exercising a power of eminent domain in “accomplishing” its undefined “objectives and purposes ?”
Third, observation is to be made as to the “authority to use eminent domain.” Sec. 65-8-6(10), quoted in the majority opinion, refers specifically to Antelope Island. It empowers the authority to acquire it, or any part thereof by means of voluntary conveyance — nothing more. However, the majority opinion would like to give the authority the power of condemnation by referring back to Sec. 65-8-6(1). If this latter section had force and meaning as to Antelope Island, then 65-8-6(10) is a redundancy. Accepted statutory construction prohibits this conclusion. Meaning must be given to subsection 6(10) which meaning is that the legislature intended a different mode of acquisition of Antelope Island (which negated the use of eminent domain).
Finally, without passing upon the merits or demerits of the “objectives and purposes” of the legislative enactment, whatever they might be, I cannot in good judicial conscience put my stamp of approval upon a statute, involving the possible deprivation of a person’s property, that is as vague, uncertain and incomprehensible as the one before us.5

. State ex rel. Cranfill v. Smith, 330 Mo. 252, 48 S.W.2d 891, 81 A.L.R. 1066 (1932).

. As pointed out in the opinion of the Chief Justice, this is a rather indefinite description of the authority’s territorial limitation.

.Majority opinion.

. The emphasized words are those not included in the section as set forth in the majority opinion. However, that opinion does quote this portion later on as being a “safeguard” to the exercise of the authority’s power of eminent domain.

. “Vague laws in any area suffer constitutional infirmity,” Ashton v. Kentucky, 86 S.Ct. 1407, decided May 1966.