Court Opinion

ID: 9494269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:33:22.961477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:18.867905
License: Public Domain

PAEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all but Discussion § C of the majority’s decision. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in *1032admitting the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403. I would reverse the district court’s Rule 403 ruling and remand for reconsideration in light of our decision in Doe by Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir.2000) (hereinafter Glanzer).
Generally, a “district court need not recite the Rule 403 test when balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice” so long as “the record, as a whole, indicates that the court properly balanced the evidence.” United States v. Daly, 974 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Morris, 827 F.2d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir.1987)). However, we recognized in Glanzer that “[ble-cause of the inherent strength of the evidence that is covered by Fed.R.Evid. [414], when putting this type of evidence through the Fed.R.Evid. 403 microscope, a court should pay ‘careful attention to both the significant probative value and the strong prejudicial qualities’ of that evidence.” 232 F.3d at 1268 (quoting United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir.1998)).
In Glanzer, we identified five factors that district courts should consider in their Rule 403 analysis: (1) “the similarity of the prior acts charged;” (2) the “closeness in time of the prior acts to the acts charged;” (3) “the frequency of the prior acts,” (4) the “presence or lack of intervening circumstances;” and (5) “the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimonies already offered at trial.” 232 F.3d at 1268.1 We went on to hold that “the district court [must] fully evaluate the factors enumerated above, and others that might arise on a case-by-case basis, and make a clear record concerning its decision whether or not to admit such evidence.” Id. at 1268-69.
Generally, evidence of prior criminal activity offered “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith” is not admissible. Fed. R.Evid. 404(b). Such evidence is only admissible if it helps prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....” Id. Rules 413, 414, and 415 reverse this traditional rule and create a “presumption in favor admission” for highly prejudicial evidence. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1431 (10th Cir.1998). These rules were explicitly designed to allow the introduction of evidence of prior sexual crimes in order to prove propensity. See 140 Cong. Rec. H5437-03, *H5438 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyi) (“In sex-related crimes, it can be particularly useful to demonstrate a propensity of the accused to commit similar prior offenses.”).
Rules 413, 414, and 415 were extraordinarily controversial at the time of their passage. The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure both voted overwhelmingly to oppose the rules because they “would permit the introduction of unreliable but highly prejudicial evidence .... ” Fed.R.Evid. 413 hist, notes. The report submitted by the Judicial Conference to Congress expressed “significant *1033concern” about the “danger of convicting a criminal defendant for past, as opposed to charged, behavior or for being a bad person.” Id.
Nevertheless, there are benefits to these rules. As members of Congress repeatedly recognized, “[i]n most rape or molestation cases, it is the word of the defendant against the word of the victim. If the defendant has committed similar acts in the past, the claims of the victim are more likely to be considered truthful if there is substantiation of other assaults.” 140 Cong. Rec. H5437-03, *H6489 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyi). This case, with two child victims and no other witnesses, is precisely the type of case for which Fed.R.Evid. 414 was designed.
As courts, we are left to balance the public’s interest in convicting those charged with sexual abuse crimes, as expressed in these evidentiary rules, with the right of the accused to be convicted only for the crime charged, and not his previous acts. LeMay served his sentence for his previous criminal acts, and he may not be punished again, unless the government can prove that he committed new crimes as well. The best way for district courts to balance these competing interests is to conduct the Rule 403 analysis on the record, carefully considering each of the factors, and others as necessary, identified by this court in Glanzer.
In Glanzer, in contrast to this case, the district court did conduct the Rule 403 analysis on the record. “The district court reiterated the factors used under the Fed. R.Evid. 403 balancing test,” but also considered “the remoteness in time” of the earlier act, the lack of similarity between the two incidents, the lack of a pattern of behavior, and the victim’s reliability. 232 F.3d at 1269. We observed that “it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a district court could do more than the district court did in this case.” Id.
In this case, the district court made no record of its Rule 403 analysis at all. Unlike Glanzer, there was much more the district court could — and should — have done. In fact, the district court did not even identify the probative value of the evidence, only describing it as “relevant.” There is a marked difference between describing evidence as relevant and describing it as having probative value significant enough to outweigh any unfair prejudicial effect. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (“[W]hat counts as the Rule 403 ‘probative value’ of an item of evidence, as distinct from its Rule 401 ‘relevance,’ may be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternatives.”). We explained in Glanzer that there is a presumption that prior sex crimes evidence is relevant. 232 F.3d at 1268 (“[I]t is generally accepted that a defendant with a propensity to commit acts similar to those charged is more likely to have committed the charged act than another and therefore such evidence is relevant. ...”). The probative value of evidence is determined by considering the strength of and the need for that relevant evidence.
In this case, the district court found that evidence of LeMay’s prior conviction was “relevant” to bolstering the child witnesses’ credibility and to rebutting the suggestion that there was no proof that a crime actually occurred. But the district court later made an explicit factual finding that the two victims were “extremely credible,” that their testimony was clear, and that they testified with certitude and impressive demeanor. This, combined with the prosecution’s own assertion that the children’s testimony alone was sufficient for a conviction, suggests that the prior acts evidence had minimal probative value. *1034That minimal probative value should have been weighed against the risk of unfair prejudice to LeMay.
Because the district court did not conduct the 403 balancing on the record and consider the Glanzer factors, I would find that it abused its discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (“A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). But because the district court did not have the benefit of our later decision in Glanzer, I would reverse the Rule 403 ruling and remand to the district court for reconsideration.
Although the majority undertakes a thoughtful Rule 403 analysis, I believe that decision is better suited to the district court. Appellate courts have long recognized that we should give great deference to the evidentiary decisions of district courts. “[T]he trial court in the exercise of its discretion is more competent to judge the exigencies of a particular case.” Brigham Young Univ. v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836, 841 (10th Cir.1941). In this case, the district court is in a far better position than we to assess the intangibles that are not conveyed well by a cold transcript: the persuasiveness of the young victims’ testimony; the success of defense counsel’s efforts to undermine their credibility; and the probative value the presentation of prior conviction would have had in the absence of the mother’s testimony.
I do not quarrel with the district court’s decision to defer its decision on the Rule 414 evidence until after the victims’ testimony. At the point at which the prosecution sought to admit the prior acts evidence, however, the district court’s analysis should have been considered on the record. Furthermore, the district court should have considered each piece of proposed evidence individually and cumulatively. The testimony of the law enforcement officer, and the documentary evidence establishing the fact of LeMay’s prior conviction, were certainly less prejudicial than the earlier victims’ mother’s emotional and graphic testimony, which was likely to generate a greater emotional reaction in the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 adv. comm, note (“ ‘Unfair prejudice’ ... means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.”). There was no disagreement between the parties about whether the acts for which LeMay was earlier convicted were similar to the charged crimes. Proving similarity seems to be the primary purpose of the earlier victims’ mother’s testimony. Because there was no need to prove similarity, I do not see why the victims’ mother needed to testily at all. The law enforcement officer and the documents should have been sufficient. The prosecution also conceded at the pretrial hearing on this evidence that it did not need the victims’ mother to testify to prove the earlier acts.
If the district court were to find on remand that no evidence of a prior conviction should have been admitted under Glanzer, or at a minimum that the mother’s testimony should have been excluded, LeMay would be entitled to a new trial. Cf. United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9th Cir.1993) (reversing a district court’s evidentiary rulings and ordering that if, on remand, “the district court decides that disclosure of the informants’ identities or admission of the expert testimony was necessary at trial, [the defendants] must be granted a new trial”). But if after balancing the factors, the district court were to determine that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, then the conviction should stand. Now with the benefit of our decision in Glanzer, the district court, in my judgment, is better suited to consider *1035the issue in the first instance. Accordingly, I dissent.

. In Glanzer, we also explained that this list of factors is not exhaustive. The additional factors identified by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir.1998) are also helpful in conducting Rule 403 analysis of Rule 414 evidence:
1) how clearly the prior act has been proved; 2) how probative the evidence is of the material fact it is admitted to prove; 3) how seriously disputed the material fact is; [4)] whether the government can avail itself of any less prejudicial evidence[;] ... [5)] how likely it is such evidence will contribute to an improperly-based jury verdict; [6)] the extent to which such evidence will distract the jury from the central issues of the trial; and [7)] how time consuming it will be to prove the prior conduct.