Court Opinion

ID: 9396241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 21:03:02.810249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.457408
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 19, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0860
                                _________________________

      Ex parte Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert

                     PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                                  (In re: Yvonne Mason

                                                  v.

             Midsouth Paving, Inc., and Christopher Nivert)

                    (Tallapoosa Circuit Court, CV-20-900093)

STEWART, Justice.
SC-2022-0860

     Midsouth Paving, Inc. ("Midsouth"), and Christopher Nivert have

petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Tallapoosa

Circuit Court ("the trial court") to enter a summary judgment in their

favor in an action commenced against them by Yvonne Mason. For the

reasons explained below, Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert

are barred by § 25-5-11, § 25-5-52, and § 25-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, of the

Alabama Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"), § 25-5-1 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975. Accordingly, we grant the petition and direct the trial court

to enter a summary judgment in favor of Midsouth and Nivert.

                     Facts and Procedural History

     PeopleReady, Inc., is a temporary-employment agency that

recruits, hires, and supplies temporary employees for Midsouth, a road-

paving contractor, through a contractual agreement ("the labor-supply

agreement"). 1 In June 2020, Mason applied with PeopleReady to work as

a flagger. On July 2, 2020, Mason attended training provided by

Midsouth, and, shortly thereafter, she began accepting assignments as a

flagger at Midsouth job sites. During her employment with PeopleReady,

     1Thelabor-supply agreement was entered into between Midsouth's
parent company, CRH Americas, Inc., f/k/a Oldcastle, Inc., and
PeopleReady's parent company, TrueBlue, Inc.
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Mason worked as a flagger only at Midsouth job sites. Mason would

receive a daily text message from PeopleReady with a list of available

flagging jobs, and Mason had the option to accept or reject the jobs. If

Mason accepted a job, she would go to the PeopleReady office where she

would receive a "ticket" to take to the Midsouth job site. PeopleReady

initially provided Mason with a hard hat, sunblock, water, and a vest

with "Midsouth" printed on it, and Mason kept those items in her

automobile. At the job site, Midsouth employees directed and supervised

Mason's job duties. Mason's flagging duties generally included holding a

sign that said either "Stop" or "Slow" to help with redirecting traffic led

by a pilot vehicle during road-paving jobs. At the end of each shift, a

Midsouth supervisor would verify the hours Mason worked on her ticket,

and Mason would return the ticket to the PeopleReady office.

     On August 13, 2020, Mason was working at a Midsouth job site

when Nivert unintentionally drove his pilot vehicle into Mason while he

was making a three-point turn. Mason's leg was severely injured, and she

received multiple surgeries and remained in a hospital and then a

rehabilitation facility for over a month. PeopleReady began paying

workers' compensation benefits to Mason after the accident and also paid

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for her continued medical care. Pursuant to the labor-supply agreement,

Midsouth was an insured alternate employer under PeopleReady's

workers' compensation insurance policy.

     On November 2, 2020, Mason commenced an action against

Midsouth and Nivert in the trial court, asserting claims of negligence;

wantonness; negligent hiring, training, and supervision; and negligence

per se. Midsouth answered the complaint and raised numerous

affirmative defenses, including immunity under § 25-5-52 and § 25-5-53

of the Act ("the exclusive-remedy provisions"). Nivert filed a separate

answer and raised, among other defenses, the exclusive-remedy

provisions and asserted that Mason's claims did not meet the

requirements of § 25-5-11 of the Act, which, generally, requires willful

conduct to support a civil claim against a co-employee.

     Midsouth and Nivert jointly moved for a summary judgment,

asserting that Mason had been a "special employee" of Midsouth's, that

Mason had not alleged willful conduct on the part of Nivert, and that,

therefore, the exclusive-remedy provisions and § 25-5-11 barred her

claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Midsouth and Nivert supported

their motion with, among other evidence, deposition testimony from

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various employees of Midsouth and PeopleReady and other documents

relating to Mason's employment relationship with Midsouth and

PeopleReady, including a document that Mason had signed entitled

"Employment    Terms    and    Acknowledgements"      ("the   employment

agreement"), which contained the following relevant provision:

     "16. I understand that my employer provides temporary
     associates for its customers to work at the customer's job site.
     While working at the customer's job site, I agree and consent
     that the customer is my special employer ('Special Employer')
     and that the customer directs, controls and supervises my
     work. Workers' Compensation shall be my sole remedy for on
     the job injuries. If I am ever injured in the course of my work
     I agree that I will elect, and solely rely upon [PeopleReady's]
     Workers' Compensation coverage for any recovery for such
     injuries, and waive any recovery whether civil or through
     workers' compensation, from any Special Employer. …"

Midsouth also submitted evidence indicating that Mason's job duties

while on Midsouth assignments were directed, controlled, and supervised

exclusively by Midsouth employees. PeopleReady paid Mason for the

hours she worked at Midsouth assignments based on the hours verified

on the ticket filled out by a Midsouth supervisor. However, PeopleReady

submitted an invoice to Midsouth, and Midsouth paid PeopleReady

Mason's hourly rate of $14.35 plus a 51% additional charge. That

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additional charge was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other

expenses, workers' compensation insurance.

        Mason filed a response in opposition to the summary-judgment

motion in which she argued that genuine issues of material fact existed,

thus precluding the entry of a summary judgment. Mason specifically

asserted that she was an independent contractor, not a "special

employee," of Midsouth. Mason supported her response with, among

other evidence, the labor-supply agreement, which states, in relevant

part:

        "7. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

        "Supplier [i.e., PeopleReady] enters into this Agreement as an
        independent company. Supplier shall not in any way
        represent that it is an agent, employer, employee, partner, or
        legal representative of Customer [i.e., Midsouth] or any
        Customer Affiliate. As an independent contractor, Supplier is
        not authorized to make any contract, agreement, warranty, or
        representation on behalf of Customer or any of its Affiliates
        without Customer's express written prior approval. Supplier
        is solely responsible for the recruiting, screening,
        interviewing, selecting, testing, and hiring of all TAs
        [temporary associates]. TA [i.e., Mason] shall be considered
        solely an employee of Supplier and not employees or agents of
        Customer or any Customer Affiliate. Customer and its
        Affiliates will not treat TAs as Customer employees or
        Affiliate employees for purposes of worker's compensation
        insurance, federal or state income tax withholding, FICA
        withholding, or any other taxation purpose. ..."

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     Mason also submitted testimony indicating that she believed that

she had been an employee of PeopleReady, that she had not intended to

be a special employee of Midsouth, and that she believed that she had

worked as an independent contractor for Midsouth. Mason also presented

testimony indicating that she had intended to work for only PeopleReady

because she had preferred having the ability to accept only the

assignments she wanted and had not wanted to be constrained by

another employer.

     On August 10, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying

Midsouth and Nivert's summary-judgment motion. Midsouth and Nivert

petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.

                           Standard of Review

           " 'The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary
     writ, to be "issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
     the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon
     the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
     3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly
     invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte United Serv.
     Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see also Ex
     parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134 (Ala. 1995).' Ex parte Carter,
     … 807 So. 2d 534[,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)]."

Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala. 2001). The "denial of a

summary-judgment motion based on a claim of immunity under the

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exclusive-remedy provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act … is

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Tenax Corp.,

228 So. 3d 387, 391 (Ala. 2017)(citing Ex parte Salvation Army, 72 So. 3d

1224, 1228 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)). In conducting our de novo review of

whether a summary judgment is due to be granted on the basis of the

applicability of the immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy

provisions of the Act, this Court considers whether the defendant

established a prima facie showing as to each element of the defense

raising the exclusive-remedy provisions and, if so, whether the plaintiff

presented substantial evidence to overcome the defendant's prima face

showing. Gaut v. Medrano, 630 So. 2d 362, 364 (Ala. 1993).

                               Discussion

     Midsouth and Nivert argue that they are entitled to a summary

judgment because, they assert, Mason was a special employee of

Midsouth's and, as a result, was barred from asserting claims against

Midsouth and Nivert under the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act.

They further assert that Mason did not allege willful conduct sufficient

to bring a claim against Nivert under § 25-5-11 of the Act. Section 25-5-

52 provides, in part:

                                   8
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           "Except as provided in [the Act], no employee of any
     employer subject to [the Act] ... shall have a right to any other
     method, form, or amount of compensation or damages for an
     injury or death occasioned by an accident or occupational
     disease proximately resulting from and while engaged in the
     actual performance of the duties of his or her employment and
     from a cause originating in such employment or
     determination thereof."

Section 25-5-53 provides, in part:

            "The rights and remedies granted in [the Act] to an
     employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the
     employee, his or her personal representative, parent,
     dependent, or next of kin, at common law, by statute, or
     otherwise on account of injury, loss of services, or death.
     Except as provided in [the Act], no employer shall be held
     civilly liable for personal injury to or death of the employer's
     employee, for purposes of [the Act], whose injury or death is
     due to an accident or to an occupational disease while engaged
     in the service or business of the employer, the cause of which
     accident or occupational disease originates in the
     employment. In addition, immunity from civil liability for all
     causes of action except those based upon willful conduct shall
     also extend ... to an officer, director, agent, or employee of the
     same employer ...."

     In addition, § 25-5-11 allows an injured employee to bring a cause

of action against, among other third parties, a co-employee whose conduct

was willful and contributed to the employee's injury, but it does not affect

the immunity afforded the designated persons in § 25-5-53. See Padgett

v. Neptune Water Meter Co., 585 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1991)).

                                     9
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     The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act also provide immunity

to any employer characterized as a "special employer" of an injured

employee that satisfies the following three-pronged test adopted in Terry

v. Read Steel Products, 430 So. 2d 862 (Ala. 1983):

           " ' " When a general employer lends an employee to a
     special employer, the special employer becomes liable for
     workmen's compensation [and thus immune from liability for
     tort actions brought by the employee] only if

                 " ' " ( a) the employee has made a contract of
           hire, express or implied, with the special employer;

                 " ' " (b) the work being done is essentially that
           of the special employer; and

                " ' " (c) the special employer has the right to
           control the details of the work.

           " ' " When all three of the above conditions are satisfied
     in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for
     workmen's compensation." ' "

Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364 (quoting Terry, 430 So. 2d at 865, quoting in turn

1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 48 (1980)).

     There is no dispute regarding the second and third prongs

identified in Terry; Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and

Midsouth controlled the details of her work. The issue is whether Mason

expressly or impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth.

                                     10
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     Mason argues, as she did in her response to Midsouth and Nivert's

summary-judgment motion, that she did not expressly or impliedly

consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth. Midsouth argues that Mason

expressly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth by signing the

employment agreement with PeopleReady that specifically stated that

Mason would be a special employee of PeopleReady's customers. The

employment agreement between PeopleReady and Mason does not evince

an express contract of hire between Midsouth and Mason; however, as

discussed below, that agreement supports the contention that Mason

impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth.

     In determining whether a worker impliedly consented to a contract

of hire with a special employer, this Court has considered several factors,

including: 1) "whether the general employer is, in reality, acting as a

'labor broker' or a temporary employment agency for the special

employer," G.UB.MK Constructors v. Garner, 44 So. 3d 479, 488 (Ala.

2010); 2) "whether the special employer provided the workers'

compensation insurance," id., and 3) " ' "whether the employment with the

borrowing employer was of such duration that the employee could be

reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the risks of his

                                    11
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employment," ' " id. (quoting Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367, quoting in turn

Vanterpool v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 766 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1985)).

     Midsouth asserts that it presented evidence affirmatively

supporting the foregoing factors and, therefore, demonstrated that

Mason had impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth. In

particular,   Midsouth     presented     evidence    demonstrating      that

PeopleReady    is   a   temporary-employment        agency   that   provides

temporary employees to Midsouth; that Midsouth paid PeopleReady an

amount in excess of Mason's hourly rate to cover, among other expenses,

premiums for workers' compensation insurance; and that Mason worked

exclusively at Midsouth job sites, used Midsouth's equipment, and

submitted to Midsouth's control.

     PeopleReady is indisputably a temporary-employment agency, and

it supplies temporary employees to Midsouth. In cases in which a

temporary-employment agency places an employee with a special

employer, " ' "the employee applies to the general employer for the specific

purpose of temporary placement with special employers and thus

necessarily agrees to a contract of hire with the special employer." ' " Ex

parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488,

                                    12
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quoting in turn Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 366). See also Hicks v. Alabama Power

Co., 623 So. 2d 1050, 1054-55 (Ala. 1993)(discussing various cases

involving employment agencies2 and recognizing that the employees in

those cases did not contact the employment agencies "for the purpose of

entering into employment with those companies to do the work of those

companies; rather, the plaintiffs intended for the general employers to

'market' them to secure employment with another, special employer" and

that, "[o]nce those plaintiffs were presented by the employment services

to the special employers, those plaintiffs then entered into a contract of

hire with those special employers").

     Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady

served as a temporary-employment agency that supplied temporary

workers to various customers, including flaggers for Midsouth, and that

Mason applied for employment with PeopleReady for the purpose of

working as a flagger. Accordingly, Midsouth demonstrated that

PeopleReady acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth. See

     2Terry v. Read Steel Prods., 430 So. 2d 862, 865 (Ala. 1983), Marlow
v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988), Bechtel v. Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986), and Pettaway v. Mobile
Point Mfg. Co., 467 So. 2d 228 (Ala. 1985).
                                   13
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Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So. 3d at 392 (quoting Garner, 44 So. 3d at

488).

        The second consideration -- whether the special employer pays

workers' compensation benefits, also weighs in favor of finding an implied

contract of hire. Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that

PeopleReady physically paid Mason's wages but that, in return,

Midsouth paid PeopleReady Mason's hourly wages, plus a 51% additional

charge that was used by PeopleReady to pay for, among other expenses,

workers' compensation insurance. Moreover, the labor-supply agreement

required Midsouth to be an insured alternate employer under

PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. As we have

previously explained, whether a special employer participates in funding

workers'    compensation   coverage     is   a   "particularly   significant"

consideration, because permitting a civil action against an entity

providing benefits under the Act would contravene the very purpose of

the Act. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 489. See also Ex parte Tenax Corp., 228 So.

3d at 394 (placing import on evidence indicating that the alleged special

employer paid a portion of the employee's workers' compensation

insurance premiums). Therefore, Midsouth presented evidence showing

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that it funded, at least in part, workers' compensation insurance that was

used to cover Mason.

     In addressing the third consideration -- whether the employee's

employment with the alleged special employer " 'was of such duration

that the employee could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and

acquiesced in the risks of his employment,' " this Court has considered

the frequency and exclusivity of the employee's work with the alleged

special employer and the employee's understanding of the scope of the

special employer's authority. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (noting that the

employee had reported to the alleged special employer's workplace each

workday, that he was aware that it was his ordinary workplace, and that

he was aware that he was required to follow instructions of the special

employer's supervisors). This Court distinguished cases in which an

employee is briefly or randomly "lent to another employer," noting that,

in those cases, the employee would have "little or no reason to actually

consent to a contract of hire with the borrowing employer." Gaut, 630 So.

2d at 367. This Court in Gaut also discussed Pettaway v. Mobile Paint

Manufacturing Co., 467 So. 2d 228, 230 (Ala. 1985), and highlighted the

decision of the employee in that case to accept the employment agency's

                                   15
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offer of a work assignment as indicative of an implied contract of hire.

630 So. 2d at 366. Likewise, here, Midsouth presented evidence

indicating that Mason had applied to PeopleReady to work as a flagger,

that Mason had accepted only Midsouth job assignments during her

employment with      PeopleReady, and that Midsouth           supervisors

exclusively directed her job duties and verified her work hours. Moreover,

as mentioned above, Mason signed an employment agreement with

PeopleReady that specifically designated her as a "special employee" of

the customer, i.e., Midsouth, and required her to acknowledge her

understanding that Midsouth would direct, control, and supervise her

work. Accordingly, Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that

Mason's employment with Midsouth " 'was of such duration that [she]

could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced in the

risks of [her] employment.' " Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 367 (quoting Vanterpool,

766 F. 2d at 122).

     Midsouth presented evidence demonstrating that PeopleReady

acted as a temporary-employment agency for Midsouth, that Midsouth

paid at least a portion of the premiums for workers' compensation

insurance for PeopleReady's employees working for Midsouth, and that

                                   16
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Mason " 'could be reasonably presumed to have evaluated and acquiesced

in the risks of [her] employment' " from the duration of her employment

with Midsouth. Id. As a result, Midsouth demonstrated that Mason

impliedly consented to a contract of hire with Midsouth, and, as

mentioned above, there is no dispute regarding the other two factors

relevant to the determination of whether Midsouth was Mason's special

employer -- Mason was performing the work of Midsouth, and Midsouth

had the right to control the details of her work. See Terry, 430 So. 2d at

865. Accordingly, Midsouth made a prima facie showing of Mason's status

as a special employee of Midsouth and, thus, the applicability of the

immunity afforded by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act. As a

result, the burden shifted to Mason to present substantial evidence

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding

her employment status with Midsouth. Gaut, 630 So. 2d at 364.

     Mason asserts that a factual dispute exists as to whether there

existed a mutual contract of hire with Midsouth and, ultimately, whether

she was a special employee of Midsouth's. First, Mason asserts that

Midsouth was precluded from entering into a contract of hire with her

because of the provision in the labor-supply agreement that states that

                                   17
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temporary associates placed with Midsouth "shall be considered solely an

employee of [PeopleReady] and not employees or agents of [Midsouth]."

Mason argues that that "agreement constitutes strong and compelling

evidence" that Midsouth was not Mason's employer in any capacity and

that it foreclosed the possibility of Midsouth's offering a contract of hire

to Mason. Mason relies on Hicks v. Alabama Power Co., in which this

Court considered a similar provision in a contract between a general

employer and an alleged special employer prohibiting an employee of the

general employer from being considered an employee of the special

employer. 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (Ala. 1993). Hicks is distinguishable from

the present case because, in Hicks, the general employer was not an

employment agency; the employee was placed by a union for employment

with the general employer, who provided contracting services to another

company. Additionally, as mentioned above, the Court in Hicks noted the

distinction between the factual scenario in that case and previous cases

involving temporary-employment agencies. Moreover, this Court more

recently considered an argument regarding a similar provision in a

contract between a maintenance contractor (the general employer) and a

utility company (the special employer) in Garner. The employee in that

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case argued that he was not a special employee, and he relied on a

provision in a contract between the companies stating that the

maintenance contractor's employees that provided services to the utility

company would continue to be considered the maintenance contractor's

employees. Garner, 44 So. 3d at 490. This Court noted that the employee

"was not a party to the contract and there was no evidence indicating that

he ever saw it or was aware of th[at] provision." Id. This Court explained

that, although " ' "employers certainly may contract as between

themselves to define their business relationships and accomplish their

business objectives, an agreement between the employers may not be

determinative of the issue of special employment." ' " Garner, 44 So. 3d at

490 (quoting Hamberg v. Sandia Corp., 142 N.M. 72, 82, 162 P.3d 909,

919 (Ct. App. 2007), quoting in turn Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace

Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 553, 559-60, 585 N.E.2d 355, 358-59, 578 N.Y.S.2d 106,

109 (1991)). The situation in Garner is much more analogous to the

present case than is the situation in Hicks.

     Mason also argues that Midsouth did not provide workers'

compensation benefits, which, she asserts, presents a factual dispute as

to the existence of an implied contract of hire. Mason relies on the

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remainder of the provision in the labor-supply agreement considering

temporary associates to be solely employees of PeopleReady that states

that Midsouth would not treat the temporary associates as its own

"employees for purposes of worker's compensation insurance, federal or

state income tax withholding, FICA withholding, or any other taxation

purpose." Regardless of the terms of the labor-supply agreement, the

evidence presented indicated that Midsouth paid an amount in excess of

the temporary associates' hourly wages for the purpose of covering

additional expenses, including workers' compensation insurance, and

Midsouth was required to be an insured alternate employer under

PeopleReady's workers' compensation insurance policy. Accordingly, the

labor-supply agreement between PeopleReady and Midsouth is not

substantial evidence demonstrating that Mason did not impliedly

consent to a contract of hire with Midsouth.

     Mason also points to evidence that she presented indicating that,

despite signing the employment agreement with PeopleReady addressing

her status as a special employee with PeopleReady's customers, she was

not aware that she would be considered a special employee, she did not

know what a special employer was and no one explained that term to her,

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and she did not realize that she was waiving her right to assert civil

claims for injuries against PeopleReady's customers. However, this Court

has explained that "when a competent adult, having the ability to read

and understand an instrument, signs a contract, he will be held to be on

notice of all the provisions contained in that contract and will be bound

thereby." Power Equip. Co. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1296

(Ala. 1991) (citing Massey v. Ingram, 567 So. 2d 1272 (Ala. 1990), and

Norman v. Amoco Oil Co., 558 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1990)). Therefore, Mason's

ignorance of the terms of her employment agreement with PeopleReady

does not serve as substantial evidence that she did not have an implied

contract of hire with Midsouth or that she was not a special employee of

Midsouth's.

     Mason further points to her testimony that she intended to be an

employee of only PeopleReady and that she never intended to be

employed by Midsouth. Mason contends that she sought employment

with PeopleReady because she wanted the flexibility of accepting or

rejecting jobs based on her preferred schedule. It is undisputed, however,

that Mason applied to PeopleReady for the purpose of working as a

flagger. PeopleReady does not have employees who perform flagging

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duties for it; instead, PeopleReady supplies employees to perform

flagging duties for other companies, particularly Midsouth. See, e.g.,

Hicks, 623 So. 2d at 1054-55 (recognizing that the employees in Terry;

Marlow v. Mid-South Tool Co., 535 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1988); Bechtel v.

Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 495 So. 2d 1052 (Ala. 1986); and

Pettaway did not seek employment with the temporary-employment

agencies to perform the work of those agencies but, instead, for the

purpose of performing the special employers' work). Evidence of Mason's

intent with respect to her employment is an important consideration. See

Garner, 44 So. 3d at 488 (stating that "the focus is on what the employee

intended in providing services for the alleged special employer").

However, the evidence Mason presented regarding her intent is not

substantial evidence sufficient to overcome the evidence demonstrating

that she was a special employee of Midsouth's.

     Perhaps the most instructive case is Pettaway, the facts of which

are largely indistinguishable from Mason's factual scenario. In that case,

Pettaway was employed by Manpower, a temporary-employment agency.

After three months' employment with Manpower, during which he had

accepted temporary job assignments with various Manpower customers,

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Pettaway accepted an assignment with Mobile Paint Manufacturing

Company. Pettaway stopped by Manpower's office before and after his

shifts at Mobile Paint's job site to obtain and return a timesheet. While

working for Mobile Paint, Pettaway was supervised and directed by

Mobile Paint employees. Pettaway received paychecks from Manpower,

but Mobile Paint paid to Manpower Pettaway's wages and an additional

charge that covered, among other expenses, premiums for workers'

compensation    insurance.   After    working   for   Mobile   Paint   for

approximately three weeks, Pettaway was injured, and he commenced an

action against Mobile Paint. The trial court in that case entered a

summary judgment in favor of Mobile Paint, finding that it was

Pettaway's special employer and, thus, that his claims were barred by

the Act. Pettaway appealed, and this Court affirmed the summary

judgment, determining that, under the facts, Mobile Paint was

Pettaway's special employer. 467 So. 2d at 228-30. Likewise, here, Mason

accepted job assignments with Midsouth, retrieved a timesheet from

PeopleReady before each job, had it filled out by a Midsouth supervisor,

and returned it to PeopleReady at the end of each shift; Mason's pay and

workers' compensation insurance from PeopleReady was subsidized by

                                     23
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Midsouth; and Mason's specific job duties were assigned and controlled

by Midsouth.

     Applying this Court's precedent to the evidence presented,

Midsouth demonstrated that Mason was a special employee of

Midsouth's, and Mason failed to present substantial evidence to refute

that she was a special employee of Midsouth's. In addition, Mason did not

present any evidence or argument indicating that Nivert acted willfully

in causing her injuries so as to permit a claim against him under § 25-5-

11. Therefore, the immunity afforded in the exclusive-remedy provisions

of the Act bars Mason's claims against Midsouth and Nivert. Accordingly,

Midsouth and Nivert have demonstrated a clear legal right to a summary

judgment in their favor.

     PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Mendheim, Mitchell, and

Cook, JJ., concur.

     Sellers, J., concurs in the result.

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