Court Opinion

ID: 9623960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:47:22.391765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:15.824175
License: Public Domain

Donworth, J.
(dissenting in part)—I agree with the majority that the provision in the interlocutory decree that relator should pay fifty dollars per month to his former wife until a total sum of two thousand dollars had been so paid constituted an award of alimony and not a money judgment.
However, I cannot agree that the trial court had no jurisdiction to award alimony because there was no prayer for alimony in the complaint. In my opinion, divorce actions are not governed by the general rule applicable to other types of actions to the effect that the relief to be granted is limited to that prayed for in the complaint. The cases cited by the majority correctly state the rule as to ordinary legal actions.
The legislature in enacting Rem. Rev. Stat., § 988 (and amendments thereof), has declared the policy of the state of Washington concerning the powers and duty of the court in the conduct of divorce actions. That section contains a provision that the interlocutory order “shall also make all necessary provisions as to alimony, costs, care, custody, support and education of children. ...”
It has been held by numerous courts of last resort in the United States that an award of alimony is incidental to the granting of a decree of divorce and is not dependent upon either allegations in the complaint or request in the prayer relative thereto.
In Hopping v. Hopping, 233 Iowa 993, 10 N. W. (2d) 87, 152 A. L. R. 436, the cases on this subject are reviewed and the distinction between divorce proceedings and ordinary *875actions with regard to defaulting defendants stated as follows:
“In Ecker v. Ecker, 130 Minn. 472, 153 N.W. 864, under a statute similar to section 10481 of the Iowa Code, in a suit for a divorce, where personal service was made upon the defendant in the county of plaintiff’s residence, and the complaint contained no specific demand for alimony, and the defendant did not answer, the court sustained an alimony award to the plaintiff. In support thereof, see, Sprague v. Sprague, 73 Minn. 474, 76 N.W. 268, 42 L.R.A. 419, 72 Am. St. Rep. 636, and O’Neil v. O’Neil, 148 Minn. 381, 182 N.W. 438.
“In Haven v. Trammell, 79 Okla. 309, 311, 193 P. 631, 632, plaintiff filed petition for decree of absolute divorce, attorney’s fees, costs, and general relief. The defendant, served personally, defaulted. A judgment granting absolute divorce, $1,000 alimony, attorney’s fees and costs, was sustained on appeal, against a challenge that the judgment for alimony was void for the reason that the petition failed to specifically pray for alimony." Oklahoma has a statute similar to section 10481, Code, 1939. Referring to it the court said:
“ ‘It is thus clearly fixed by our law that alimony is a mere incident to divorce, and when a divorce is granted, alimony may be awarded without it being prayed for in the original pleadings.’
“The opinion cites, in support thereof, 19 C.J., Divorce, 283, section 650; Prescott v. Prescott, 59 Maine 146; 2 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation, 421, section 1067, which states:
“ ‘By the English and better American practice, the proceeding for alimony is strictly ancillary. Neither the complaining wife’s libel or petition nor the husband’s answer thereto makes any mention of her alimony or his faculties.’
“Later Oklahoma decisions supporting the holding in the Trammell case are Javine v. Javine, 134 Okla. 283, 273 P. 267, 268; Downing v. Downing, 121 Okla. 273, 249 P. 732; Bowen v. Bowen, 182 Okla. 114, 76 P. 2d 900, 902; Donahoe v. Alcorn, 188 Okla. 305, 307, 108 P. 2d 786, 788. In the last-cited case, the court, after referring to the statutory power of the court respecting alimony, said:
“ ‘The statutory duty thus imposed on the court . . . is not dependent upon any particular form of pleading other than such as would be appropriate to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, for the purpose of granting a divorce. . . . *876The defaulting defendant is presumed to be cognizant of the duty imposed by law upon the court in this respect.’
“In 1 R.C.L., Alimony, 883, 884, section 23, is this statement:
“ ‘In divorce or separation suits, however, owing to the fact that a demand for alimony is not an essential part of the cause of action but is merely incidental thereto, it may be awarded in the absence of a specific request therefor in the original bill . . . ’
“Other decisions supporting directly or by analogy that the matter of alimony is but an incident of divorce, or that it is not essential to the jurisdiction of the court awarding it that it be specifically referred to in the pleadings, are Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99, 88 P. 267, 11 Ann. Cas. 520; Hegwood v. Hegwood, 133 Ark. 160, 202 S.W. 35; Smith v. Haltom, 177 Ark. 790, 8 S.W. 2d 437, 439; Lynde v. Lynde, 54 N.J. Eq. 473, 35 A. 641, 642; Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N.Y. 405, 56 N.E. 979, 48 L.R.A. 679, 682, 76 Am. St. Rep. 332 [affirmed 181 U.S. 183, 21 S. Ct. 555, 45 L. Ed. 810]; Blackinton v. Blackinton (Justice Holmes), 141 Mass. 432, 5 N. E. 830, 831, 55 Am. Rep. 484.
“The appellant relies upon section 11573 of the Codes of 1931, 1935, and 1939, which provides that:
“ ‘The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that which he has demanded in his petition.’ “He also cites in support of his contention, among other cases, Richardson v. Short, 201 Iowa 561, 567, 207 N.W. 610; Rees, Gabriel & Co. v. Shepherdson, 95 Iowa 431, 64 N.W. 286; Davis v. Davis, 209 Iowa 1186, 1189, 229 N.W. 855; Rayburn v. Maher, 227 Iowa 274, 288 N.W. 136; Manassa v. Garland, 200 Iowa 1129, 1132, 206 N.W. 33. These decisions correctly interpret section 11573 and we fully agree with tfiem. It is our view that neither the section nor the cited cases have any application to the matter before us. Our decision is controlled by section 10481, applying to divorce suits, and by our decisions construing it. This contention of the appellant has been made in other jurisdictions. In Ecker v. Ecker, supra, 130 Minn. 472, 473, 153 N.W. 864, 865, it was urged that section 7896, of the Minnesota General Statutes, 1913, controlled. It provided that:
“ ‘As against a defendant who does not answer, the relief granted to plaintiff shall not exceed that demanded in the complaint.’
“In holding to the contrary, the court said:
“ ‘This provision is found in the general practice act and applies wherever no different provision is made by some *877specific statute. Divorce suits are controlled and governed by a specific statute devoted to that particular subject matter; and, in divorce suits, the provisions of this specific statute supersede those of the general practice act insofar as they are inconsistent therewith.’
“A similar answer was made to a like contention in Donahoe v. Alcorn, supra, 188 Okla. 305, 108 P. 2d 786.” (Italics mine.)
See, also, Nelson v. Nelson, 181 Ore. 494, 182 P. (2d) 416.
While there is no statute in this state limiting the relief which may be granted in ordinary actions to that prayed for in the complaint, the rule laid down in State ex rel. First Nat. Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23 (cited in the majority opinion), so holding, is as effective in this state as a statute would be. Consequently, the rule stated in Hopping v. Hopping, supra, should be applied in the case at bar, since it is immaterial whether the aforesaid limitation be based on a statute or a decision of this court.
So far as lack of due process is concerned, the relator is presumed to know the law relating to the powers and duty of the trial court in divorce proceedings, and, since he elected in this case (after service of process upon him) to default and decline to enter an appearance, he cannot be heard to complain that his former wife was awarded alimony by the interlocutory decree in spite of lack of specific allegation of the need therefor or prayer for such relief.
Our holding in Ermey v. Ermey, 18 Wn. (2d) 544, 139 P. (2d) 1016, does not give effect to our statute (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 988) and should be overruled. The statement of the law in Ackerman v. Ackerman, 32 Wn. (2d) 53, 200 P. (2d) 527 (which the majority hold to be dictum), applies to the case at bar and should be adopted as stating the correct rule.
I would deny the writ of prohibition sought by relator for the reason that the trial court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction in awarding alimony.
Robinson, J., concurs with Donworth, J.