Court Opinion

ID: 9750147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:23:33.979562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:03.191436
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Eagen :
In good conscience I must dissent.
The trial court rejected a specific request by defense counsel to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense, In my view such an instruction was required *101under the proof in the case, and the refusal of the court to so charge is such error as to require a new trial.
To substantiate my conclusion, it is necessary to refer to Gray’s own trial testimony. His testimony may be summarized as follows:
On the date involved, Gray and John Stephens traveled from their home town of Chester to the Sharon Hill section of Darby Township, Delaware County, to visit a cousin of Stephens. The cousin was not at home, so they proceeded in the direction of the residence of a girl friend. As they walked south on Ash Street, they were accosted by twelve to fifteen members of the “alley gang” led by Brown, who started to pursue them and threw pieces of brick at them. Stephens and Gray walked, sometimes backwards, to a nearby police station, but found it locked since it was Sunday. Some of the pursuers then started to “move in” on Stephens and others on Gray. At this time, Stephens and Gray were standing several feet apart from each other. Gray grabbed two pieces of brick thrown at them, but one of the members of the gang pointed a gun at him and told him to drop them. Gray urged Stephens to run, because “there was too many of them.” Gray then started to run, but was called back by Stephens. A brick then hit Gray in the area of the left ear and knocked him down. After a short interval of darkness, he looked up and saw some of the gang “trying to get Stephens” and Brown with “a hold” on Stephens. Gray was in fear of his life, as well as that of Stephens, and “went back ... to fight . . . for both of our lives” and “to help free Stephens ... so he could run.” He hit Brown with both hands and backed away. He then yelled to Stephens “to come on” but Stephens said “he will give it a go or try”, and he hit Brown and knocked him down. Gray again yelled to Stephens to “come on”, and the “guy” with the gun waved it in *102his face. One in the gang near him had a razor in his hand and still another a stick or rod. The “guy” with the gun grabbed the stick and hit Gray with it and knocked him down. When he got up, Brown “stumbled past” and lay on the nearby grass.1 Gray said he did not have a knife or stab Brown.
While Gray denied stabbing Brown, this was only a portion of his testimony, and the credibility of the testimony in its entirety was for the jury. And, as we have said in a multitude of decisions and as recently as April 22, 1970, in Commonwealth v. Ewing, 439 Pa. 88, 264 A. 2d 661 (1970), a jury may reject one part óf a defendant’s testimony and still believe another portion thereof. Given the fact that the jury disbelieved Gray’s denial that he stabbed Brown, as the verdict indicates, it could still believe the remaining portion of his testimony, and if this testimony was sufficient to establish the possibility that the stabbing was committed in a legitimate act of self-defense, as I conclude it--was, then the issue was for the jury under proper instructions from the court. In other words, if there was any téstimony which might lead the jury to conclude that the stabbing occurred in a legitimate act of self-defense, the court was obliged to submit the issue to the jury. Cf. Commonwealth v. Beach, 438 Pa. 37, 264 A. 2d 712 (1970). The trial court by ruling out the issue of self-defense thereby limited the jury to passing on the credibility of Gray’s testimony that he did not stab Brown and denied the jury its right to resolve the truthfulness of the remaining portion of his *103testimony. This is violative of onr decision in Ewing, supra, and many prior cases.
In Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A. 2d 376 (1970), we recently reiterated the conditions which must be satisfied to successfully invoke the defense of self-defense where the slayer kills in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm.
“As a general proposition, a person is justified or excused in killing in defense of another person when, and only when, the circumstances are such that,the latter person would be justified or excused if he had committed the homicide in his own defense. A. person interfering in a difficulty in behalf of another simply steps in the latter’s shoes; he may lawfully dp in am other’s defense what such other might do in his own defense but no more; he stands on the same plane, is entitled to the same rights, and is subject to the same conditions, limitations, and responsibilities as the. person defended; and his act must receive the same construction as the act of the person defended would , receive if the homicide had been committed by him. This rule may be subject to qualification based on accused’s lack of knowledge of the facts and circumstances; but in general it is necessary and sufficient to justify or excuse a homicide in defense of another that neither the person defended nor the defender shall be at fault in bringing on the difficulty, or that, if he has provoked the attack, he shall in good faith withdraw from the combat before the killing; that the danger, real-or apparent, to the person defended shall be of death, great bodily harm, or a felony; that it shall be present, imminent, and impending, and not a past danger; that either the person defended shall be in real danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony at the time, or it shall be reasonably apparent to the slayer, or he sbfi.11 honestly and reasonably believe, that the person *104defended is in such danger, and that it is necessary to kill to save him therefrom; that the person defended shall retreat if he can do so without increasing his peril; that neither the person defended nor accused could have averted the apparent danger by any reasonably safe means other than the killing of deceased; and that the defender shall not use more force than is necessary or reasonably appears to him to be necessary to save the person defended from death or great bodily harm.” 40 C.J.S. Homicide §108, at 968-969 (1944). See Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106 A. 180 (1919).2
In applying these two doctrines in conjunction with one another, the accused in going to the defense of another under all the conditions set forth above does not automatically forfeit the right to assert the defense of self-defense because he failed to retreat or did thrust himself into the difficulty. It is his right to go to the defense of another in the proper circumstances, and he, therefore, has no duty initially to retreat nor does he necessarily provoke the difficulty thereby.3 Cf. Commonwealth v. Johnston, supra.
In this case, if Gray had a reasonably founded belief that Stephens was in imminent peril of death or great bodily harm, and it was necessary to kill Brown to save Stephens therefrom, he had the right to take Brown’s life on Stephen’s behalf, and in determining the existence or nonexistence of such a reasonable be*105lief, the attending circumstances must be viewed as seen through Gray’s eyes. In this case, although the struggle with Brown, as described, taken in isolation, would not have warranted, as a matter of law, a reasonable belief that Stephen’s life was in imminent danger or justified the taking of Brown’s life, taking the totality of the circumstances and realizing that Brown was but one of a hostile and armed gang of twelve or fifteen, the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to warrant a jury in finding not only that one in Gray’s situation could reasonably believe it necessary to take Brown’s life to preserve that of Stephens, but they could also find that, since Brown was the most immediate obstacle to the flight of Stephens and therefore Gray, Gray may have reasonably believed it essential to take Brown’s life to enable himself (Gray) to flee and thus preserve his own life as well.
By this opinion I indicate no view on the credibility of Gray’s testimony or the merit of the issue that he stabbed Brown in an act of self-defense, but merely say that these questions were for the jury to resolve under proper and adequate instructions.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this dissent.

 Since tibe police arrived apparently immediately after the stabbing of Brown, it is not clear what action the remaining members of the gang might have taken against Gray and Stephens or how serious a threat they were' to the lives of Gray and Stephens. This would have to be evaluated by the jury. After the police arrived, Gray was taken to the hospital where several sutures were necessary to close a wound in his scalp.

 In certain situations, when all these conditions are not satisfied so as to entitle an accused to acquittal, the crime may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 69 A. 891 (1908).

 For example, if A goes to the defense of B from an attack by C under the circumstances set forth above, and in so doing endangers his own life from another assailant, D, a cohort of C, A may assert his right of self-defense in killing D if he satisfies the other requirements of Commonwealth v. Johnston, supra.