Court Opinion

ID: 9387280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 16:00:22.706743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.673271
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eighth Circuit
                       ___________________________

                               No. 22-1615
                       ___________________________

                            United States of America

                       lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                          v.

                              Andrew Scott Scanlan

                      lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                      ____________

                   Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
                                 ____________

                          Submitted: February 13, 2023
                             Filed: April 17, 2023
                                  [Published]
                                ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, STRAS and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                              ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Andrew Scott Scanlan, age 34, was sentenced to 840 months of incarceration
following a guilty plea to two counts of producing child pornography (360 months
each) and one count of committing an offense while a registered sex offender
(mandatory minimum of 120 months). Scanlan’s pornography production offense
involved the sexual abuse of his ten-year-old nephew and four-year-old niece. In
addition to the incarceration, the district court1 also imposed ten years of supervised
release. As a special condition of the supervised release, the district court required
that Scanlan not contact the victims or the victims’ family without permission from
his probation officer. Scanlan argues that the district court made three reversible
errors during sentencing. Specifically, he asserts that (1) his lengthy sentence is
substantively unreasonable; (2) the special condition of supervised release is not
narrowly tailored and is not reasonably related to the goals of sentencing; and (3) the
district court failed to make an individualized inquiry when crafting the special
condition of supervised release. We affirm.

                                    I. Background
      The district court orally justified its sentence as follows:

            Pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section
      3553, in determining the sentence that is appropriate, the Court needs to
      consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
      characteristics of the defendant. I have considered all of the factors
      under Section 3553(a), although it will not be necessary to address all
      of them in the process of explaining the sentence here today.

            Mr. Scanlan, I understand you’ve got a rough background, and I
      understand you’ve been through a lot yourself, but you are a sexual
      predator. You’re a dangerous guy, and you’re a dangerous guy to
      vulnerable people.

            The Court begins and almost ends with the seriousness of the
      offense. The offense involving the children that came from online
      sources is serious enough because it continues to do damage to those
      children, but what you did under the circumstances of this case so

      1
      The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of Iowa.

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      fundamentally violated the trust of these good people and this child,
      these children, that the seriousness of the offense is overwhelming.

            Anything I do today is going to apply to the deterrence of criminal
      conduct by others. I need to be concerned about protecting the public
      from further crimes that you might commit, and it’s obvious in this
      record that there is a huge danger that you will commit further crimes,
      very serious crimes.

             Accordingly, based upon the Court’s review of the criteria set
      forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553, and the unique
      circumstances of this case, it is the judgment of the Court that the
      defendant, Andrew Scott Scanlan, is hereby sentenced to the custody of
      the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 840 months, consisting of 360
      months on each of Counts 2 and 3 consecutive and 120 months
      consecutive on Count 6.

R. Doc. 66, at 15:3–16:8. The district court also imposed a ten-year term of
supervised release, projected to begin in 2080.

                                   II. Discussion
       Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in either the
length of the sentence or in imposing the challenged special condition of supervised
release, we affirm.

                     A. Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence
       Scanlan first argues his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We review a district court’s sentencing decision for substantive
reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Stoner, 795
F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2015). “An abuse of discretion is (1) failing to consider a
relevant factor that should have received significant weight; (2) giving significant
weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considering only the appropriate
factors but in weighing them, committing a clear error of judgment.” Id. Sentences

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within the applicable Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable upon appellate
review. United States v. Williams, 913 F.3d 1115, 1116 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
“It is the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,
above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.”
United States v. Wisecarver, 911 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The district court recounted the relevant factors and explained the
weight it placed on each. Scanlan’s case indeed involves a very high sentence; but
given the offense conduct, the harm to the victims, and the need to protect the public
outlined by the district court, it is not “the unusual case” warranting reversal. See id.
The district court considered all the applicable § 3553(a) factors and committed no
clear error of judgment in weighing them. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s within-
Guidelines-range sentence.

                    B. Special Condition of Supervised Release
       Scanlan next argues that the special condition of supervised release (1) is
insufficiently narrowly tailored; (2) is unrelated to the familiar goals of sentencing;
and (3) was imposed without an individualized inquiry. We review the imposition of
special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Jennings, 930 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2019). “District courts have wide discretion
in imposing conditions of supervised release, so long as the conditions meet the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” United States v. Wroblewski, 715 F.3d 701,
702 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)
(requiring that conditions “involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary”). “When crafting a special condition of supervised release, the
district court must make an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances
underlying a case and make sufficient findings on the record so as to ensure that the
special condition satisfies the statutory requirements.” United States v. Walters, 643
F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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       The special condition Scanlan challenges reads, “You must not contact the
victim(s), nor the victim’s family without prior permission from the U.S. Probation
Officer.” R. Doc. 53, at 5. Scanlan argues that, as written, the special condition is not
narrowly tailored because it could be read to prevent him from contacting members
of his own family who are only distantly related to the victims. Because Scanlan’s
victims are his niece and nephew, there is familial overlap. Scanlan asks that the
condition be amended to say “immediate” family. The government argues that
“immediate” family is the most natural reading of the condition and concedes that,
were the condition read and applied in a manner to include distant relatives of his
victims, it would be insufficiently narrowly tailored. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

       Scanlan’s proposed reading of the release condition is not reasonable. The
obvious intent of the condition is to prevent Scanlan from having unpermitted contact
with both his victims and those so intimately connected to them that Scanlan
indirectly victimized them. This includes the parents and siblings now shouldering
not only the weight of ameliorating the physical and psychological trauma inflicted
by Scanlan’s abhorrent crimes on his victims but also their own psychological trauma.
Given the facts of the case and those harmed by his conduct, the victims’ “close”
family—more than only immediate family, but less than distant shared relations—is
the only reasonable meaning. Should the probation officer’s implementation of that
reading prove problematic when Scanlan’s incarceration ends, the court supervising
the case can address it at that time. If Scanlan then faces a “greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary,” due to restrictions on family members he wishes
to visit, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), he may renew his objection to the appropriate court at
that time.

      Scanlan further argues that the condition is unrelated to the familiar goals of
sentencing. Not so. Preventing victims from experiencing repeated abuse or further
psychological harm is reasonably related to the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)(1) (requiring special conditions be reasonably related to certain sentencing

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factors, such as “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), and “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)); see also United States v. Forde, 664 F.3d
1219, 1223–24 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting the Supreme Court’s emphasis on a sentencing
court’s broad discretion in crafting special conditions of supervised release and the
appropriateness of using “judicial common sense” when doing so); United States v.
Hobbs, 710 F.3d 850, 853–54 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding a special condition of
supervised release requiring probation officer’s permission before the defendant
could contact his own children following conviction for possession of child
pornography, even though the defendant had no history of sexually abusing minors).
The condition protects Scanlan’s victims and those closest to them from being
revictimized upon his eventual release—a goal reasonably related to the appropriate
sentencing factors.

                               C. Individualized Inquiry
       Finally, Scanlan argues that the district court failed to make an individualized
inquiry into his case prior to imposing the special condition. To the contrary, as
quoted above, the district court highlighted the hideousness and destructiveness of
Scanlan’s crimes. The district court concluded that Scanlan “fundamentally violated
the trust of these good people and this child, these children.” R. Doc. 66, at 15:19–20.
The court’s statement reflects its individualized inquiry into Scanlan’s case and made
a sufficient record of the court’s thorough consideration of the circumstances.

                                  III. Conclusion
      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s imposition of the
special condition of supervised release as appropriately within its discretion and its
imposition of an 840-month sentence as substantively reasonable.
                       ______________________________

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