Court Opinion

ID: 9849340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:38:34.023151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:18.350074
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
The majority opinion appears to fit within the lengthy legal leviathan level or pattern of large opinions of our appellate courts, along with Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749 (312 SE2d 40) (1983) (81 pages); Housing Auth. of Atlanta v. Famble, 170 Ga. App. 509 (317 SE2d 853) (1984) (24 pages); and Shellenberger v. Tanner, 138 Ga. App. 399 (227 SE2d 266) (1976) (15 pages). When the latter opinion was written, one judge on the panel congratulated the author on having written an excellent opinion on the important subject, but indicated that the length of the draft qualified what was said as more appropriate for an article in a law review or law journal, and that, as it was too lengthy for an opinion of this court, he felt compelled to and did concur in the judgment only.
Concurrence in the judgment only in the instant case, however, is done not necessarily because of the length or latitude of the majority opinion (our court today for the first time is listing certain cases for non-publication in the official reports in order to reduce the size of the latter), but because of other reservations and concerns.
Perhaps the better rule would be, where the trial court (as here) reverses or modifies the order of the special master, to express in the *873order of modification the reasons for reversing. There is some question, however, as to whether stipulating the reasons in the order is always a requirement. The holding in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (95 SC 2362, 45 LE2d 280) (1975), limits this application to where an award of back pay is declined. No authority is cited in the majority opinion for extension or enlargement of this standard. Since there appears to be some competent evidence to sustain the order of the special master, and since the trial court did not find that order clearly erroneous, we must reverse the trial court.
Decided September 10, 1985.
Martha M. Pearson, for appellant.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Wayne P. Yancey, Jr., Carl C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
This case is one of many based on alleged job decisions and directions involving discrimination based purely on sex. Extraordinary equality efforts are sometimes extravagantly expounded and enunciated by extremists.1 A queen may be inferior in poker but reigns superior and supreme in the royal game of chess. There are, and must be, some differences and distinctions between the sexes but without discrimination; or, if any, of a de minimis nature. In the opinion of the writer, however, absolute and total equality between the sexes, as between men and men and women and women, is impossible in all respects.

 “Extremists ‘are protesting that in poker, for example, two kings should not beat two queens,’ says Time magazine at page 8 of its issue of August 21, 1972.” Emerson v. Fleming, 127 Ga. App. 296, 297 (193 SE2d 249) (1972).