Court Opinion

ID: 9707612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:42.873869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.775798
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In doing so, I agree with the principle that an attorney representing an accused of crime may not admit his client’s guilt to the jury without obtaining the client’s consent. Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091, 102 S.Ct. 656, 70 L.Ed.2d 630 (1981).1 In this case, had defendant’s counsel done that, to-wit, admitted his client’s guilt without his client’s permission, I would vote for reversal. The majority opinion acknowledges that defense counsel did not expressly admit that the defendant was guilty. However, the majority concludes that in his cross-examination of the victim and her grandmother the attorney impliedly left the jury with the impression that the defendant was guilty, a ruling with which I disagree.2 While I *862concede this is a close case, I arrive at a different conclusion after considering the totality of the facts that came to light from the time of the assault on the victim until the trial events described in the opinion.
The 10-year-old victim immediately reported the incident to her grandmother. She gave the grandmother a description of the man and described the car, which was a good description of the car being driven by the defendant on the day in question. Her grandmother immediately called the police. A motel clerk identified a registration form at the motel signed by the defendant on February 23, 1982, and gave a physical description that fit the defendant. Another clerk at the same motel gave a description of Wiplinger as a man who had paid the bill for the motel room which he had rented on the day the girl was assaulted and, further, made an in-court identification of the defendant as being the man who paid that bill. Within 2 weeks after the incident, the victim identified the defendant as the perpetrator at a 7-person line-up after less than 5 seconds of deliberation. The experienced trial judge observed in the omnibus hearing order — and the record and exhibits clearly corroborate him — that “it would be difficult to imagine a line-up, either photographic or in person, which was more fair to the defendant.” These facts, considered together with the record evidence, in my opinion, clearly support the trial judge’s observation that “a great deal of corroborating evidence exists which bolsters the victim’s identification.” Not only at the line-up but at the trial, the victim unhesitatingly and unequivocally identified the defendant as being her assailant.
With that state of the record, which the defense counsel knew existed, I cannot agree that his cross-examination amounted to an implicit confession that his client was guilty, or that it deprived the defendant of effective assistance of counsel.3
After the victim made these various identifications, which had been corroborated by other investigation, defense counsel on cross-examination merely used the defendant’s name in propounding several questions. I cannot conclude under those circumstances that the defendant was prejudi-cially deprived of any constitutional right, denied effective assistance of counsel or that the result would have been any different had counsel, in questioning the victim used the identity of “the man” instead of Wiplinger’s name. Under the circumstances, it may have been preferrable had he done so, but I would hold that the error, if there were error, did not amount to prejudicial deprivation of effective assistance of counsel. If there were any error, it seems to me that it was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even when conduct of law enforcement officials results in the admission of evidence that is constitutionally impermissible, courts have found harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt if untainted evidence provides overwhelming support for conviction, See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Brown v. U.S., 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). We have applied the harmless error rule in various contexts. State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26 (Minn.1983) (error in jury instruction on duress defense burden of proof); Watts v. State, 305 N.W.2d 860 (Minn.1981) (admission of a gun); State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359 (Minn.1980) (admission of defendant’s statements harmless error even if Miranda rights violated); State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 372 (Minn.1980) (prosecutor’s good-faith use of inaccurate impeachment evidence); State v. Hull, 269 N.W.2d 905 (Minn.1978) (admission of defendant’s statement improperly elicited); State ex rel. Kopetka v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 52, 160 *863N.W.2d 399 (1968) (introduction of illegally-obtained evidence at trial).4
In my view, in this case the evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of the state on the issue of identification. This was evidence untainted by any constitutional infirmity. This is a case where we should find error, if any there were, to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On this record, this young victim should not have to face the emotional trauma of another trial, nor should the state be put to the expense of a retrial. I would affirm.

. The defendant’s lawyer specifically admitted his client’s guilt in making the closing argument. He asserted that the client was “guilty as charged”; that the prosecutor had proved "beyond a reasonable doubt that [he is] guilty”; and that the question of guilt is “absolutely clear.” Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 645 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1091, 102 S.Ct. 656, 70 L.Ed.2d 630 (1981).

. If, in fact, the attorney’s cross-examination of the victim and her grandmother constituted an admission of his client’s guilt, I concur in the *862majority opinion’s conclusion that the defendant did not give his consent or permission for the attorney to do so.

. The trial judge observed after the defendant objected to the cross-examination of the victim "to date the court could not have conducted the trial any better if he had been defense counsel, which I was for some 10 years as assistant public defender for the Ninth Judicial District, and I conducted many defenses.”

. For a general discussion of the constitutional harmless error rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and other cases see Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error — A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 15 (1977); Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 519 (1969); Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 Va.L.Rev. 988 (1973). For a strong attack on the constitutional harmless error rule, see Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. of Crim.L. and Criminology 421 (1980).