Court Opinion

ID: 9663060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:56.292874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:45.310736
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. My disagreement is with the analysis in Part III of the principal opinion.
This is the second appeal involving the vicious rape and murder of a fifteen-year-old child. Occasionally, the heinousness of a crime, the seeming certainty of the same result if the case is remanded, and the delay occasioned by a second remand tempt one to wink at procedural defects. Nevertheless, the cornerstone of any civilized system of justice is that the rules are applied evenly to everyone, no matter how despicable the crime.
When this case was last before this Court, there were allegations that the original trial judge was impaired by alcohol at the first sentencing. The appeal was disposed of by an order and no opinion was issued as provided in Rule 30.25. The wisdom of issuing an order but no opinion need not be revisited here. But the words used in that order are very significant.
The order consisted of two sentences. They read, “Judgment vacated. Cause remanded for new penalty hearing, imposition of sentence, and entry of a new judgment.” (emphasis added). The italicized words make clear what was vacated and what must be done anew. The judgment was vacated and a new judgment was required. A judgment in a criminal case is “the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence.” Rule 29.07(c) (emphasis added). Words used in our orders should have the same meaning we have given them in our rules. In this case, that would mean the judgment, not in part but in whole, was vacated. That necessarily vacated the plea. Unless the order of remand says otherwise, vacation of a plea of guilty requires a new plea followed by appropriate proceedings consistent with the new plea. In addition, our order required entry of a new judgment. That certainly includes a new plea.
After the first remand, Judge O’Malley apparently did not understand that the plea of guilty was vacated. He did not solicit a new plea in order to enter the “new judgment” required by the order. As he put it at the Rule 29.07 hearing, “I do read [the Supreme Court’s] order to say however that the plea was reviewed in its entirety and in fact they do uphold the plea, and we are here to proceed with the sentencing phase.” There is nothing in the order that indicates this Court reviewed the plea or that the plea was upheld. To the contrary, our order vacated every element of the judgment, including the plea of guilty. The order required entry of a new judgment. No part of the old judgment was approved or preserved by our order. Until a plea is entered, the judgment is incomplete. The appeal should be dismissed pending entry of a new plea and proper proceedings pursuant to that plea which result in a final judgment.
Moreover, I am persuaded that this case is controlled by State v. Davis, 564 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1978). There both the state and defendant had rested their cases. The trial judge became ill and was hospitalized. Another judge took the bench, ruled on a motion to suppress identification, ruled on a motion for acquittal at the close of the evidence, determined which instructions should be read to the jury, supervised final argument, received the verdict, and sentenced the *928defendant under the then effective second offender act. § 556.280, RSMo 1969. The substitute judge stated that his review of the testimony placed him in a position to rule on pending motions and to conduct the sentenc- ' ing. Nevertheless, this Court held it reversible error to substitute a judge at that point in the trial without the consent of the defendant. 564 S.W.2d at 878-79. From Davis, it appears that not one, but two factors must be established before a judge may be substituted between the hearing of evidence and the sentencing: (1) the sentencing judge must be familiar with the trial record, and (2) the defendant must consent to the substitution.
The principal opinion would distinguish Davis by arguing that it involved hearing evidence at trial by one judge, followed by receipt of verdict and sentencing by a second judge.1 By contrast, this case involves a plea of guilty taken by one judge followed by a sentencing by another judge. However, accepting a plea of guilty is not unlike a trial. The judge taking the plea of guilty must assess whether the plea was intelligent and voluntary and whether the facts admitted or proven and would justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Morris v. State, 482 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Mo.1972); Rule 24..02(e). Those determinations depend in no small part on the credibility of what is said and done at the plea of guilty, even though the “witness” may be the accused.
Applying Davis, I would hold that even assuming Judge O’Malley was familiar with the transcript of the plea of guilty proceeding, defendant gave no consent to Judge O’Malley imposing the sentence. The filing of the Rule 29.07(d) motion, as well as the request that Judge O’Malley recuse, refute any notion of consent.
Further, I believe Judge Kennedy was right in King v. State, 615 S.W.2d 69 (Mo.App.1980), when he said,
In the decision to enter a plea of guilty to a criminal charge where no definite sentence is agreed upon, every lawyer knows that the disposition of the sentencing judge is a subject of consideration. The likelihood of a harsh or lenient sentence is assessed, the personal philosophy of the judge, as evidenced by punishment meted out in other similar cases, or as gathered from the his casual remarks and other sources is assayed, is he (in the case of a youthful offender) sympathetic toward youth? Does he invite the recommendations of the prosecuting attorney with respect to punishment? If so, does he routinely follow the prosecutor’s recommendation? Is the offense a type of which he takes a serious view, or is it of a kind which he treats with less gravity? To what aggravating and mitigating factors does he accord large importance or small? These are questions which any defendant, and any attorney representing a defendant, will closely weigh before he enters, or advises a guilty plea.
615 S.W.2d at 77 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). All the questions posited by Judge Kennedy and many more apply when the potential sentence is death. The sentencing decision in capital cases is not the product of a mathematical formula. Though guided by the existence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the often anguishing decision to impose the death penalty is ultimately a discretionary act falling on the shoulders of the trial judge. Every competent lawyer will learn all that he or she can about the propensities and background of a judge before advising a client to plead guilty. When the client’s life hangs in the balance, knowledge about the judge will be carefully weighed before advising an accused to proceed with a plea of guilty. Confidence that a plea of guilty is intelligent and voluntary is undermined when a new judge is substituted at sentencing. Because the identity of the judge sentencing the defendant plays such *929an important role, particularly in a death penalty case, the motion to "withdraw the plea of guilty pursuant to Rule 29.07 should have been sustained.
I would hold that when this Court vacated the judgment, that necessarily vacated the plea of guilty. There is now no plea and thus no judgment. Because there is no judgment, this Court has no jurisdiction of the appeal. The appeal should be dismissed until the defendant is permitted to enter a plea of either guilty or not guilty and a completely new judgment is entered.
Assuming there is a judgment, I would hold that a defendant must be sentenced by the same judge who heard the plea of guilty absent the existence of the two factors required in Davis. Moreover, I believe it is manifestly unjust for a defendant to be forced to persist in a waiver of substantial constitutional right to trial by jury when a plea of guilty is made before one judge, and another judge is substituted at the sentencing without the defendant’s consent. I would reverse the judgment.

. To distinguish Davis from State v. Tettamble, 450 S.W.2d 191 (Mo.1970), based on the substitution of the judge prior to verdict in Davis and after verdict in Tettamble is a distinction without a difference.