Court Opinion

ID: 9722709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:46:25.641269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.003155
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE O’MARA FROSSARD, dissenting: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court has the power to sua sponte raise a reverse-Bafeon. challenge when it is necessary to prevent discrimination. Batson and its progeny recognize that potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal protection right to jury selection procedures free from discrimination. It is within the discretion of the trial courts to manage and control the administration of justice, including intervening to protect this equal protection right of potential jurors, as well as litigants, by sua sponte raising a Batson challenge. See People v. Beard, 263 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081 (1993) (where trial court raised Batson question sua sponte, defendant was not obligated to have raised the issue); People v. Williams, 252 Ill. App. 3d 704, 712-13 (1993) (trial court may sua sponte call Batson hearing), rev’d on other grounds, 165 Ill. 2d 51 (1995) (affirming trial court); People v. Harvey, 209 Ill. App. 3d 733, 743 (1991) (noting that the trial court raised the Batson issue sua sponte)-, People v. Whaley, 184 Ill. App. 3d 459, 470 (1989) (Rizzi, J., specially concurring), quoting People v. Andrews, 172 Ill. App. 3d 394, 402 (1988) (trial court “ ‘cannot sit idly by’ ” and become accomplice to discrimination in jury selection). The exclusion of even one minority person from the jury venire based on race is unconstitutional. People v. Andrews, 155 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (1993). Moreover, Batson does not require a complete exclusion of a racial group to prove discrimination. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. App. 3d 991, 996 (1987). When, however, as in the instant case, the trial court sua sponte raises a revers e-Batson challenge, the court should adhere to the three-step process articulated in Batson. That process was not followed here. In Batson, the United States Supreme Court set forth a three-step analysis for establishing whether the State exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. That three-step analysis is equally applicable to a reverse-Bafeora challenge raised sua sponte by a trial court. First, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection must be demonstrated; second, if a prima facie case is demonstrated, the burden shifts to the party challenging the juror to articulate a race-neutral reason for challenging the juror; and third, the trial court considers those reasons and decides whether purposeful discrimination has been demonstrated. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24. Contrary to the three-step analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in Batson, the trial court, in the instant case, collapsed what ought to be a three-step procedure into an undifferentiated review of the jury selection process. See People v. Crockett, 314 Ill. App. 3d 389, 397 (2000). Regarding the prima facie case, which is the first stage of the three-step procedure under Batson, our supreme court has recognized several relevant circumstances to be examined in determining whether a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection has been established, including the following: (1) racial identity between defendant and the excused venire persons; (2) a pattern of strikes against African-American persons; (3) a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American persons; (4) the level of African-Americans represented in the venire as compared to the jury; (5) counsel’s questions and statements during voir dire and while exercising peremptory challenges; (6) whether the excluded African-American venire persons were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; and (7) the race of the defendant, victim, and witnesses. People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 71 (1996). In the instant case, the record fails to reflect that the trial court examined these relevant circumstances. The trial court did not articulate any evidence that defense counsel had engaged in purposeful discrimination, other than the fact that Mrs. Gomez would have been the second African-American female excused by the defense. Defense counsel had accepted one African-American female, Elma Starks, had excused another woman, Rosalee Huizanga, and had excused a white male, Thomas Hickey. The critical element of a prima facie case has been recognized to be whether the fact of removal and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. See People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 220 (1991). The trial court completely eliminated step one and failed to make a record demonstrating a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection. In People v. Davis, 345 Ill. App. 3d 901, 911 (2004), the same trial judge improperly collapsed step one and step three of the Batson analysis. The State relies on Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991), in support of the argument that the question of whether a prime facie case under Batson was established is moot because the defense counsel in the instant case submitted an explanation for his exercise of peremptory challenges. Based on that argument, the State contends that it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination has been demonstrated. Hernandez is distinguishable. Unlike Hernandez, in the instant case, the trial judge sua sponte raised a revers e-Batson challenge. As noted in Hernandez, the prima facie case analysis is rendered moot when a neutral reason is offered “without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405, 111 S. Ct. at 1866. In the instant case, explanations were offered by defense counsel in response to the trial court’s direct inquiry. After the trial court sua sponte raised the revers e-Batson challenge, the trial court questioned defense counsel’s decision to excuse Mrs. Gomez by asking, “Counsel, would you kindly articulate a basis of why you are excusing Mrs. Gomez?” Defense counsel’s explanations were offered in direct response to the trial court’s question. The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 427-28 (1993), extended the ruling in Hernandez and held that the prima facie issue is rendered moot once the trial court rules on the legitimacy of counsel’s explanations regardless of whether the State had or had not been prompted by the trial court to proffer its reasons. The majority relies on Hudson for the proposition that where race-neutral reasons are given for the peremptory challenge, even if prompted by the trial court, the prima facie issue is rendered moot. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 427-28. The majority asserts that only one published case decided after Hudson has held that where the trial court prompts the giving of race-neutral reasons, the issue of a prima facie showing is not rendered moot. See People v. Washington, 272 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916 n.l (1995). However, Hudson is not determinative in the factual context of this case, where a trial judge sua sponte raised a reverse-Batson violation and bypassed any determination of a prima facie case by requesting race-neutral explanations from defense counsel for his peremptory challenge. Neither Hudson nor any of the cases following Hudson have addressed the issue of whether trial court prompting or inquiry resulting in counsel giving explanations for the use of peremptory challenges renders the existence of a prima facie case moot in the context of a revers e-Batson challenge made sua sponte by the trial judge. The majority relies on People v. Rivera, 307 Ill. App. 3d 821, 830 (1999), as an example of a recent revers e-Batson case applying the Hudson ruling that the existence of aprima facie case becomes moot once explanations are given regardless of whether defendant volunteers explanations or is prompted by trial court inquiry. However, Rivera did not address the prima facie issue in the context of a revers e-Batson challenge made sua sponte by the trial judge. In Rivera, the State, not the trial court, raised the reverse-Batson challenge. The trial court, by sua sponte raising the revers e-Batson challenge and then requesting explanations from defense counsel for his peremptory challenge, bypassed the prima facie issue and deprived defense counsel of an opportunity to offer input regarding the prima facie case. That process precluded defense counsel from challenging the existence of a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. In the context of the instant case, a factual record demonstrating the existence of a prima facie case of discrimination is of particular importance to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the court’s decision to sua sponte raise and declare a revers e-Batson violation was justified. Revers e-Batson violations are rare, and even more unusual is the fact that the alleged reverse-Bafeora violation was raised not by a party, but by the trial judge, sua sponte. My research has revealed no Illinois case where a trial court raised sua sponte a reverseBatson challenge. The trial judge’s failure to make a record of the prima facie case regarding this uncommon sua sponte revers e-Batson challenge makes proper review of the Batson ruling impossible. The majority fails to address defendant’s argument that Batson is not applicable to combined race-gender discrimination. When the trial judge sua sponte raised the revers e-Batson challenge, the judge expressed concern about the fact that Mrs. Gomez was “the second African-American female that the defense has sought to exclude.” Relying on Hudson’s conclusion that establishing a prima facie case becomes moot once the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of discrimination, the majority dismisses the defendant’s argument that Batson is not applicable to combined race-gender discrimination. However, Hudson never addressed whether Batson is applicable to combined race-gender discrimination. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the focus of Batson is on the exclusion of members of a single identifiable group, not of different groups considered together. People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 344 (1994). However, the Illinois Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of whether Batson is applicable to combined race-gender discrimination. In People v. Washington, 257 Ill. App. 3d 26, 34 (1993), the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant, who had asserted that certain jurors were stricken by the State because they were “black males,” had failed to make the requisite prima facie showing, and stated it did not believe Batson applied to alleged combined race-gender discrimination. In Rivera, a case relied upon by the majority, the court, in addressing the issue of combined “race-gender” discrimination, claims that “this court has previously found such challenges impermissible under Batson.” Rivera, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 829. In the instant case, the trial court’s failure to articulate the circumstances that demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination leaves unanswered the question of whether the court’s finding a Batson violation was based on combined race-gender discrimination. The trial judge, by collapsing the Batson stages and failing to make findings of fact to clarify the record regarding the relevant circumstances demonstrating a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, has made proper review of this race-gender issue impossible. For the trial court to sua sponte raise and resolve a revers e-Batson claim requires adherence to the three-step process articulated in Bat-son together with the following: (1) balancing the trial court’s discretion to manage and control proceedings before it and to supervise voir dire\ (2) demonstrating impartiality by not assuming an adversarial role; (3) recognizing the role of the peremptory challenge in the jury selection process; and (4) guarding the equal protection right of potential jurors, as well as litigants, to jury selection free from discrimination. While the trial court properly raised the revers e-Batson challenge, the trial court failed to follow the three-step process articulated in Batson in resolving that challenge. Step one of the Batson process, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection, was not addressed by the trial judge. The trial judge, by raising the reverseBatson challenge sua sponte without making a record of the prima facie case of discrimination, eliminated examination of the circumstances demonstrating aprima facie case of purposeful discrimination. The sua sponte revers e-Batson challenge followed by the trial judge requesting defense counsel to provide explanations for using his peremptory challenge precluded defense counsel from challenging the existence of a prima facie case. Defense counsel had no opportunity to challenge the existence of a prima facie case because the trial judge had bypassed that issue when he asked defense counsel for race-neutral explanations. Eliminating step one collapsed what ought to be a three-step process into an undifferentiated review of the jury selection process. In the context of the revers e-Batson challenge raised sua sponte by the trial judge, mindful, not mindless, adherence to the three-step Batson analysis is necessary to allow defense counsel the opportunity to challenge the existence of a prima facie case. A mindful, not mindless, adherence to the three-step Batson analysis is necessary to provide the reviewing court a fully developed record to determine whether the circumstances articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams demonstrate the existence of a prima facie case. A mindful, not mindless, adherence to the three-step Batson analysis is necessary to determine whether the court’s finding of a Batson violation was based on combined race-gender discrimination, and if so, to determine whether Batson applies to alleged combined race-gender discrimination. We should retain jurisdiction (People v. Garrett, 139 Ill. 2d 189, 194 (1990)) while remanding for a three-step Batson hearing on the present record and any additional record the trial court or parties decide to make for the purpose of determining the Batson issue. Regarding the first step of the three-part process, the trial court should examine the relevant circumstances as previously discussed in this dissent and articulated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams to determine whether defendant has engaged in a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection. If a Batson violation is found, the trial court should further clarify whether the Batson violation is based on combined-race gender discrimination.