Court Opinion

ID: 9566394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:38:47.727214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:22.848549
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Vice Chief Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur in the opinion of the Court in this matter, feeling that it is not in the interest of justice to extend the attorney-client privilege to instances where the client’s position is an attack on the adequacy of the representation of the attorney.
While I concurred in the first opinion of this Court remanding the case for a determination as to whether the defendant knew that her privilege against self-incrimination was waived by her plea of guilty, I now have had some second thoughts as to the correctness of our action then.
It should be clearly understood that defendant Lawonn first pled not guilty to the charge of possession of a stolen check. At the hearing in which she changed her plea to guilty, the following occurred:
“THE COURT: * * * you are Leah Lawonn, is that correct ?
“DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes.
THE COURT: And you realize you have been charged by the State of Arizona with possession of a stolen check, do you not ?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes.
THE COURT: Is it your desire to enter a plea of guilty to that offense?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Have you thoroughly discussed your change of plea decision with your attorney ?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: Do you have any question at all concerning your change of plea—
DEFENDANT LAWONN: To—
THE COURT: —to guilty ?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: No, Your Honor.”
The court then inquired of her as to whether there had been any threats made in an effort to get her to change her plea, any promises of leniency, whether she knew that if she did not go to trial she would waive her right to trial by jury, her right to take the witness stand and testify in her own behalf, her right to subpoena witnesses and to cross-examine the witnesses. Then this occurred:
“THE COURT: Did, as a matter of fact, you have possession of a stolen check, a check that belonged to somebody else?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And when was that, ma’am ? About when ? What month ?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: October.
THE COURT: And were you trying to pass that, cash that check ?
DEFENDANT LAWONN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Let the record indicate there is a factual basis for the change of plea, the Court accepts the change of plea to guilty, finds it knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”
*116The defendant was never told specifically that she was waiving her constitutional right against self-incrimination. But it is apparent from the fact she knew she did not have to plead guilty, having previously pled not guilty, and from the fact that a plea of guilty can only be understood as an acknowledgment of wrongdoing that she knowingly and voluntarily gave up by such acknowledgment any right which she might have against self-incrimination as to the particular offense charged.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the Court said :
“Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth.” 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S. Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 279.
I do not understand that the United States Supreme Court is saying a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be made by a plea of guilty if the plea is with the full knowledge by the defendant of his other rights and is voluntary.
The plea of guilty by defendant in the instant case was an acknowledgment of her participation in the criminal offense charged. Such an acknowledgment of guilt is plainly a voluntary waiver of any right against self-incrimination which she might have had and which she exercised in her original plea of not guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States used the words “compulsory self-incrimination.” When the defendant stood up in open court, was fully advised of all the other legal rights she was waiving by her plea of guilty, then acknowledged her guilt, admitting the essential elements of the offense charged, she made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of her right against self-incrimination. All the technicalities of the law have been complied with, down to the dotting of the last “i” and the crossing of the last “t”.
I do not now believe there was a need to remand this case to the Superior Court for a determination of whether defendant, Leah L. Lawonn, knew that she waived a privilege against self-incrimination by changing her plea. I think as a matter of law it can be said that there was no compulsory self-incrimination.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of conviction.