Court Opinion

ID: 9796338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:55:49.606219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:04.616421
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, P. J.,
concurring.
I concur with the majority’s ruling that the trial court’s failure to make findings renders its ruling on the attorney fees and those issues associated with the request for attorney fees not subject to meaningful review and that remand on those issues is necessary. I concur also with the result reached by the majority on defendants’ other assignments of error but would reach that result as to defendant Falbo’s first assignment of error on a different basis.1
The majority exercises its discretion not to review Falbo’s first assignment of error by relying on reasoning first *45employed by this court in Mt. Fir Lumber Co. v. Temple Dist. Co., 70 Or App 192, 688 P2d 1378 (1984), with regard to the reviewability of the denial of motions for summary judgment.2 We reasoned in Mt. Fir Lumber Co. that it would be fundamentally unfair to deprive a party that prevailed after a full trial of its verdict on the ground that the court should have ruled for the other party on a less complete record. The majority applies that reasoning to ORS 31.150 to 31.155:
“After a jury has spoken, there is no systemic benefit in requiring a new action to try the same claim to a different finder of fact on the ground that, on a different record early in the course of the first action, a motion to strike should have been granted. The erection of such a legal maze would undermine the systemic values of judicial economy and efficiency, with the only personal benefit being to give the defendant another bite at the proverbial apple. Nothing in the statutory text or underlying legislative history suggests that the legislature countenanced such a result. In short, we conclude that, after a trial, appellate review of the denial of a special motion to strike is available only when the motion is limited to purely legal issues and the facts, disputed or undisputed, are immaterial.”
222 Or App at 32.
There are two potential sources of the majority’s authority to deny reviewability of Falbo’s first assignment of error. One source is the legislature; the other source is the court’s inherent authority under Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution. The legislature has chosen not to enact any express limitations on reviewability as part of ORS 31.150 to 31.155. The majority and I draw conflicting inferences from the legislature’s silence. As I understand the majority’s position, the legislature’s silence regarding reviewability creates a vacuum in which it is permissible for this court to exercise its inherent authority to deny review for purposes of judicial economy. If, in fact, the legislature intends that a denial of a motion under ORS 31.150 be reviewable, the majority would agree that the exercise of the inherent authority of this court to deny review would create a *46separation of powers problem under the constitution and that this court’s exercise of its inherent authority would not be constitutionally permissible. Thus framed, the determinative issue is whether or not the legislature intended that the denial of a motion made under ORS 31.150 be reviewable on appeal to this court.3
As noted above, ORS 31.150 to 31.155 is not encumbered by any express limitations as to review. Generally, it should be assumed that the legislature intends that rulings made by trial courts concerning statutory procedures are subject to appellate review unless the legislature provides otherwise. To adopt a contrary notion would require the legislature to specifically provide for appellate review as part of every statutory procedure that it enacts. A survey of Oregon statutes supports that assumption and demonstrates that the legislature knows how to limit appellate review when it wants to. See, e.g., ORS 138.050 (limiting appellate review regarding pleas of guilty or no contest). Had the legislature intended that the well-established rule regarding the review-ability of the denial of motions for summary judgment be extended to motions under ORS 31.150 to 31.155, it could have easily expressed that intention in the above statutes (particularly in light of the long-standing precedents of this court interpreting the provisions of ORCP 47).
Indeed, ORS 31.150(1) expressly provides that a special motion to strike shall be treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21A and not as a motion under ORCP 47: “The special motion to strike shall be treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A but shall not be subject to ORCP 21 F.” The denial of an ORCP 21 A motion to dismiss is reviewable after a defendant does not prevail at trial. See, e.g, Burden v. Copco Refrigeration, Inc., 339 Or 388, 121 P3d 1133 (2005) (upholding the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss). The legislature’s provision in ORS 31.150(1), that motions under the statute are to be treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A, also suggests that the reviewability of rulings under ORS 31.150 to 31.155 is contemplated to *47be no different than the reviewability of rulings under ORCP 21 A.
Moreover, in enacting ORS 31.150, the legislature expressly exempted ORS 31.150 to 31.155 from the effect of ORCP 21 F.4 In other words, in enacting ORS 31.150 to 31.155, it is apparent that the legislature intended to incorporate only particular provisions of ORCP 21. Presumably, the legislature was aware that rulings under ORCP 21A are subject to appellate review. Had the legislature intended that the denial of a motion under ORS 31.150 not be reviewable, it could have expressly said so, just as it excepted ORCP 21 F from the provisions of ORS 31.150. Instead, the majority’s reasoning impermissibly “inserts what has been omitted” into ORS 31.150. See ORS 174.010.5 To illustrate, the majority interprets ORS 31.150(1) to include the provision that “the denial of a motion to strike shall not be reviewable” when that language does not appear in the statute.
Also, the majority’s holding is at odds with the general authority granted to appellate courts by the legislature to review claims of error arising out of the adjudication of legal actions. There are any number of statutory provisions that provide for procedures or claims created by the legislature. These provisions, except when expressly limited by the legislature, are subject to the general provisions of ORS chapter 19 pertaining to appeals. For example, ORS 19.415(1) provides that “[u]pon an appeal from an action at law, the scope of review shall be as provided in section 3, Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution.” ORS 19.415(2) provides that “[n]o judgment shall be reversed or modified *48except for error substantially affecting the rights of a party.” A denial of a motion under ORS 31.150 is a ruling in “an action at law,” and ORS 31.150 to 31.155 afford defendants a substantial right to obtain a dismissal of certain kinds of claims.
Finally, using the rationale of Mt. Fir Lumber Co. as an indicator of legislative intent is problematic when the procedure in ORS 31.150 to 31.155 is compared with the procedure embodied in ORCP 47. The majority believes that Mt. Fir Lumber Co. is an example of this court’s exercise of its inherent authority to fill a vacuum left by the legislature’s failure to direct that review of the denial of motions for summary judgment occur. But a careful reading of Mt. Fir Lumber Co. demonstrates that the court did not undertake to analyze whether the review of the denial of summary judgment motions was consistent with the legislature’s intent. Rather, the court’s reasoning borrowed extensively from Bell v. Harmon, 284 SW2d 812 (KY 1955), and its reasoning based on federal appellate court decisions. 70 Or App at 197-98. At the core of these decisions is the understanding that no right of a party is substantially affected by the denial of a summary judgment motion because the unsuccessful movant will have the procedural opportunity to raise the same legal issues during trial. But an unsuccessful movant under ORS 31.150 to 31.155 does not have a similar opportunity, as explained more fully below.
ORS 31.150(3) provides that the defendant has the initial burden of “making a prima facie showing that the claim against which the motion is made arises out of a statement, document or conduct described in subsection (2)” of the statute. If the defendant satisfies that burden, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff “to establish that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by presenting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case.” If the plaintiff is able to carry the burden, the court is required to deny the motion; if the plaintiff is unable to carry that burden, then “[u]pon granting the special motion to strike, the court shall enter a judgment of dismissal without prejudice.” ORS 31.150(1). In comparison, the grant of a summary judgment under ORCP 47 is proper when there is no genuine *49issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Under the procedure in ORS 31.150 to 31.155, a plaintiff has the opportunity to refile in the event that the plaintiff acquires additional evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case. That procedure is unlike a summary judgment procedure where, if the motion is granted, a preclusive judgment results.
There are other differences between the procedures. The words “substantial evidence” are not defined in ORS 31.150. However, those words are defined in other Oregon statutes, such as ORS 183.482(8)(c). That statute provides that “[substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” Presumably, the legislature intended the words “substantial evidence” in ORS 31.150 to have the same meaning. The statute also contains the words “prima facie case,” a term of legal art that is commonly defined as “[a] party’s production of enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact in issue and rule in the party’s favor.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1228 (8th ed 2004). Presumably, the legislature intended the words “prima facie” in the statute to connote the legal elements of a claim that is governed by ORS 31.150(2) in connection with the evidentiary standard of “substantial evidence.”
What then distinguishes ORS 31.150 from other provisions in Oregon law that govern the pretrial disposition of civil claims is that the standards of “substantial evidence” and “prima facie case” in ORS 31.150 contemplate that the trial court engage in an evaluation of the weight of all the evidence in the record — that is, the court must evaluate the evidence against a proposed finding as well as the evidence supporting it to determine whether substantial evidence establishes a prima facie case. See Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 295, 787 P2d 884 (1990) (interpreting the words “substantial evidence” for purposes of ORS 183.482(8)(c)). Thus, under the procedure contemplated by ORS 31.150, a court is required to consider conflicting evidence in order to make the determination of whether a reasonable factfinder could find that the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case.
*50Those differences in the procedures under ORS 31.150 when compared to other procedures like ORCP 47 assist in understanding why the legislature would have contemplated that the denial of a motion under ORS 31.150 is reviewable. Essentially, the procedure under ORS 31.150 affords defendants a procedural right to an early dismissal based on judicial factfinding and the failure of the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case. An unsuccessful movant under ORS 31.150 has no subsequent opportunity to test the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence under the standards imposed by ORS 31.150, unlike an unsuccessful movant under ORCP 47 who has additional opportunities to reassert the same legal challenge to the plaintiffs evidence under ORCP 60 and ORCP 63.6 Providing an unsuccessful movant in a summary judgment proceeding with the right of review creates a procedural redundancy in opportunities to obtain a preclusive dismissal of an action at law, a result that the legislature likely would not have contemplated. On the other hand, because an unsuccessful movant in an ORS 31.150 proceeding has no subsequent opportunity to challenge the plaintiffs prima facie case in light of conflicting evidence, it is more likely than not that the legislature intended that a ruling on such motion be reviewable on appeal whether the motion is allowed or denied.
The majority disagrees. In part, it asserts that
“[t]he problem that the concurrence does not address is how, in the case of the denial of a special motion to strike, an appellate court can review the court’s ‘evaluation of the weight of all the evidence in the record’ -without reexamining facts that have already been tried by the jury. The *51related question, of course, is why the legislature would have intended a result that runs afoul of the Oregon Constitution.”
222 Or App at 35-36 (emphasis in original). With respect, the majority’s reasoning proves too much.
Article VII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution contains two substantive provisions: In actions of law, it provides that the right of trial by jury “shall be preserved,” and that “no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.” The legislature’s enactment of ORS 31.150 to 30.155 brings into play the presumption that every statute that it enacts is presumed to be constitutional, Adm. Vets. Affairs v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or 203, 211, 229 P2d 213 (1951), and the understanding that the overlap of judicial and legislative powers regarding civil procedures arises from the legislative police power to protect the public welfare by promoting the efficient and impartial administration of justice. Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or 279, 286, 550 P2d 1218 (1976). If the legislature had really been concerned that an appellate court’s exercise of review over the denial of an ORS 31.150 motion would be unconstitutional because the process under the motion contemplates an appellate court reexamining a fact tried by a jury, it surely would have been concerned about whether the right to trial by a jury in an action at law guaranteed by section 3 is short-circuited by the grant of an ORS 31.150 motion. It is more likely that the legislature perceived ORS 31.150 as an appropriate exercise of its police powers and that it did not engage in the constitutional analysis attributed to it by the majority.
For all of the above reasons, I would hold that, inasmuch as the legislature has undertaken the effort through a special statutory procedure in ORS 31.150 to afford a unique procedural right to defendants in addition to the other existing procedure rights, it also intended for defendants to have the opportunity for appellate review in the event that a trial court incorrectly denied a motion made under the statute. Consequently, the majority cannot limit reviewability of such rulings through the exercise of its inherent authority without encroaching on the authority of the legislature. It follows that *52I would not apply the rationale in Mt. Fir Lumber Co. to ORS 31.150 and that I would reach the merits of defendants’ first assignment of error.
With regard to defendants’ first assignment of error, the trial court ruled that defendants had not met their burden of proof under the statute. The court reasoned that
“[pllaintiff s sexuality and lawful activities are not of public interest. Plaintiff is a private individual; he is not a public figure in any sense.
“The fact that Club 71 offers nude dancing may be of public interest, and if Defendants had limited their statements to Club 71 in general, or the patrons of Club 71 in general, those statements would probably be of public interest. However, once Defendants made Plaintiff and Plaintiffs lawful activities the subject of their statements, those statements can no longer be characterized as such.
* * * *
“However, Plaintiff did not bring this action regarding the existence of Defendants’ website in general, or to protest Defendants’ views. If Defendants had limited themselves to expressing their displeasure over nude dancing at Club 71, even with an admission that they intended to put the club out of business, their expressive activity would likely have been protected. However, Defendants targeted Plaintiff specifically and by name. They posted their activity beyond the bounds of joint expressive activity.”
On appeal, defendants argue,
“Even assuming, arguendo, that such comments were directed at [plaintiff], they were not actionable under the facts of this case because they constituted rhetorical hyperbole made in the heated, ongoing exchange of public debate on issues of public interest.”
Plaintiff responds by adopting the trial court’s reasoning in that respect.
“Neither are Defendants’ statements hyperbole or exaggeration. To characterize Plaintiff specifically as sexually frustrated, drunk and prone to violence is not rhetorical hyperbole or exaggeration. If Defendants’ comments had been directed generally at patrons of Club 71, this argument might be persuasive. Coupled with a photo of Plaintiffs face, it is not.”
*53Defendants’ argument is apparently premised on the proposition that by choosing to patronize a business featuring nude dancing, plaintiff made himself a public figure in the public debate regarding nude dancing establishments. But defendants’ argument is inconsistent with the Oregon Supreme Court’s characterization of who is a public figure for purposes of constitutionally protected expression. In Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99, 593 P2d 777 (1979), the court discussed that issue for purposes of defamation and libel claims. The plaintiff was a well-known Appaloosa horse trainer. He brought an action against racehorse owners who had terminated him from their employment and then had published defamatory statements as to the performance of his work duties. At the time, among those interested in Appaloosa horse racing, a controversy existed regarding rules and training practices. The defendants urged that the plaintiff was a public figure and thus must accept the consequences of his involvement including the risk of closer public scrutiny than otherwise might be the case if he were a private figure. The court, however, rejected that argument, observing,
“There was, however, no evidence that plaintiff had attempted in any way to influence that controversy or that he had taken any public part in it whatsoever. Until the statements which are the subject of this case were made, the only publicity which plaintiff had received, so far as the record shows, was attributable solely to and concerned only his success as a trainer. There was no showing he had voluntarily engaged in any activities * * * nor had he been engaged in any public controversy. For purposes of this case, he is entitled, under the applicable federal law, to whatever protection the state has chosen to afford to the reputations of private persons.”
286 Or at 116-17.
The reasoning in Wheeler informs the correct result in this case. On the facts before the trial court at the time of the ORS 31.150 motion, plaintiff had not made himself into a public figure or inserted himself in a public controversy merely by patronizing Club 71.7 It follows that the trial court *54ruled correctly when it held that defendants’ statements placing plaintiff in a false light were not protected expression made during a debate on an issue of public concern.8
For the above reasons, I concur in the majority’s result.

 Defendants’ second assignment of error is in regard to the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment. I agree with the majority’s reasoning regarding reviewability as it pertains to that assignment.

 See also Payless Drug Stores v. Brown, 73 Or App 90, 698 P2d 45, rev’d and rem’d, 300 Or 243, 708 P2d 1143 (1985).

 There is no helpful legislative history regarding this issue. Essentially, both the majority and I are left to discern what the legislature would have intended, had it considered this issue.

 ORCP 21 F provides, in part:
“If a party makes a motion under this rule, except a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person or insufficiency of summons or process, but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to the party which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on the defense or objection so omitted, except a motion as provided in subsection G(3) of this rule on any of the grounds there stated.”

 ORS 174.010 provides:
“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”

 Under ORCP 47, 60, and 63, the court must draw all reasonable factual inferences in the favor of the nonmovant. In contrast, the court under ORS 31.150 must take into account conflicting evidence. A comparison with ORCP 54 B(2) illustrates the point. Unlike ORCP 47, 60, and 63, that rule authorizes trial courts, when acting as the trier of fact in an action tried to the court without a jury, to grant an involuntary nonsuit on the basis of the insufficiency of the evidence and to enter a judgment with or without prejudice. Under ORCP 54 B(2), the standard of review when the judgment dismissing the complaint is without prejudice is whether the plaintiff has by its evidence established a prima facie case. Gearhart v. Emploment Div., 99 Or App 601, 604, 783 P2d 526 (1989), rev den, 310 Or 70 (1990). ORCP 54 B(2) avoids constitutional implications regarding the right to a jury trial because it is limited to actions tried to a court without a jury. ORS 31.150 has no such restriction.

 See also Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or 434, 443, 693 P2d 35, cert den, 474 US 826 (1985) (explaining that, in Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n Inc., 443 US 157, 167, 99 S Ct 2701, 61 L Ed 2d 450 (1979), “the Court held that merely because events involving a private individual attract public and media attention does not transform that private individual into a public figure”).

 Plaintiff also argues that, had defendants’ motion under ORS 31.150 been granted, it would have deprived him of his right to a jury trial in violation of Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution under the holding in Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 987 P2d 643 (1999). Because I would resolve the assignment of error on subconstitutional grounds, I would not reach that issue.