Court Opinion

ID: 9851368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:11:27.734245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:54.601629
License: Public Domain

Justice Britt
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion concluding that there was no error in defendant’s conviction of the offense of kidnapping. In my opinion, there was a fatal variance between the pleading and the proof on the kidnapping count.
*89The second count in the bill of indictment reads as follows:
And the jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the 3rd day of July, 1980, in Cumberland County Ezekiel Hall unlawfully and wilfully did feloniously kidnap Thomas Lee Thompson, a person, who had attained the age of sixteen (16) years, by unlawfully removing him from one place in Cumberland County to another for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony, to wit: Armed Robbery. The person kidnapped was seriously injured during the kidnapping; in violation of North Carolina General Statutes Section 14-39; .... (Emphasis added.)
G.S. 14-39, our kidnapping statute, provides in pertinent part:
“Kidnapping. —(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person * * * shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of:
(1) Holding such other person for ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person.”
The evidence in the case at hand showed that defendant and his accomplice robbed Mr. Thompson at the Wright’s Texaco Station on Gillespie Street in Fayetteville; that thereafter, at gunpoint, they forced Mr. Thompson into the automobile they were driving; that they then transported their victim some 5 miles to a point on 1-95 near Rockfish Creek; that they then stopped the car and ordered the victim to get out; that after Mr. Thompson got out of the car, the accomplice shot him in his back; and that the two robbers then drove away.
With respect to the kidnapping charge, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
*90Now, in the second count, the defendant has been charged with the offense of kidnapping. Now I charge that for you to find the defendant guilty of kidnapping, the State must prove to you four things beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, the State must prove that the defendant unlawfully, that is, without legal justification or excuse, removed Thomas Lee Thompson from one place to another.
Secondly, the State must prove that Thomas Lee Thompson did not consent to this removal.
Now, members of the jury, the consent that is referred to here means free and voluntary consent. Consent which is obtained or induced by fear, violence, or threats of violence is not consent in law.
And, third, the State must prove that the defendant removed Thomas Lee Thompson for the purpose of facilitating his commission of a robbery with a firearm. (Emphasis ours.)
And, fourth, the State must prove that the removal was a separate complete act independent of and apart from the offense of robbery with a firearm.
* * *
So it is, that on the count wherein the defendant is charged with the offense of kidnapping, that I instruct you that if you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about July 3, 1980, the defendant, Ezekiel Hall, acting either by himself or together with Johnny Hyman, unlawfully removed, that is, carried Thomas Lee Thompson from Wright’s Texaco station on Gillespie Street in the city of Fayetteville, a distance of some four or five miles to a location on Interstate 95 near Rockfish Creek; and that Mr. Thompson did not consent to this removal; and that this was done for the purpose of facilitating the defendant’s commission of a robbery with a firearm of Thomas Lee Thompson; and that this removal was a separate complete act independent of and apart from the robbery with a firearm, I say, if you so find as to these things, it would then be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of kidnapping. (Emphasis ours.)
*91However, if you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to any one or more of these things, it would then be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty as to the charge of kidnapping.
I am unable to reconcile the holding of the majority in this case with our decision in State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 253 S.E. 2d 890, cert. denied, 44 U.S. 874, 62 L.Ed. 2d 102, 100 S.Ct. 156 (1979). In that case the indictment charged that the defendant kidnapped the victim by “removing her from one place to another for the purpose of facilitating flight following the commission of the felony of rape.” The evidence showed that the defendant, with a knife in his hand, entered the victim’s car, made her move from the driver’s seat to the passenger’s seat, drove the car several miles to a remote area, and forced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him.
In a unanimous decision we held in Faircloth that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof and that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the kidnapping charge. We noted that if the defendant had been tried on an indictment alleging that he restrained or removed the victim from one place to another for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the felony of rape, the conviction could be upheld. “But, the evidence does not support the charge as laid in the indictment.”
In State v. Law, 227 N.C. 103, 40 S.E. 2d 699 (1946), in an opinion by Chief Justice Stacy, we find:
The question of variance may be raised by demurrer to the evidence or by motion to nonsuit. “It is based on the assertion, not that there is no proof of a crime having been committed, but that there is none which tends to prove that the particular offense charged in the bill has been committed. In other words, the proof does not fit the allegation, and, therefore, leaves the latter without any evidence to sustain it. It challenges the right of the State to a verdict upon its own showing, and asks that the court, without submitting the case to the jury, decide, as matter of law, that the State has failed in its proof” — Walker, J., in S. v. Gibson, 169 N.C., 318, 85 S.E., 7. To like effect are the decisions in S. v. Weinstein, 224 N.C., 645, 31 S.E. (2d), 920; S. v. Jackson, 218 N.C., 373, 11 *92S.E. (2d), 149; S. v. Harris, 195 N.C., 306, 141 S.E., 883; S. v. Harbert, 185 N.C., 760, 118 S.E., 6; S. v. Nunley, 224 N.C., 96, 29 S.E. (2d), 17; S. v. Davis, 150 N.C., 851, 64 S.E., 498; S. v. Hill, 79 N.C., 656. 227 N.C. at 104, 105. (Emphasis ours.)
If defendant in the case at hand had been tried on an indictment alleging that he restrained or removed Mr. Thompson from one place to another for the purpose of facilitating flight following the commission of the felony of armed robbery, I would vote to uphold the conviction. Unfortunately, the evidence does not support the charge as laid in the indictment.
Chief Justice BRANCH and Justice Exum join in this dissent.