Court Opinion

ID: 9589932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:17.574297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:23.289831
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
In ruling that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction in this case, the majority demonstrates fundamental misunderstandings of our domestic relations long-arm statute9 and of the minimum contacts test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner.10 For the reasons that follow, I would hold that OCGA § 9-10-91 (5) and the minimum contacts test preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in this case.
1. The majority reasons that compliance with OCGA § 9-10-91 (5) is unnecessary in this case because it only applies to the exercise of personal jurisdiction and because Mr. Abernathy’s claims for divorce and division of the parties’ property only invoke principles of in rem jurisdiction. The majority, however, overlooks the simple pro*821position that the legislature in enacting § 9-10-91 (5) chose to require personal jurisdiction to litigate the claims asserted by Mr. Abernathy in this case.
Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion is any mention of the language of § 9-10-91 (5). OCGA § 9-10-91 provides, in relevant part, that
[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an agent, he:
(5) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action for divorce or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the statute plainly addresses actions for “division of property in connection with an action for divorce” and provides that a trial court “may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident” in such an action if the cause of action arises from the maintenance of “a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action” or from the residence of “the defendant ... in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not.”11 Further, given the broad, expansive language of “proceedings” for “division of property in connection with an action for divorce,” and given that property division in divorce cases typically involves property located in this state, the only reasonable construction of § 9-10-91 (5) is that the General Assembly intended it to govern divorce cases involving the division of property located within this state. Moreover, if the General Assembly had intended for this language only to apply to the division of property located outside of this state, it easily could have, and presumably would have, added language to that effect. Finally, by providing requirements for how a trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction in divorce and property division cases, the General Assembly clearly intended for personal jurisdiction to be a requisite for a Georgia court *822to exercise jurisdiction in those cases. Otherwise, the statute need not have contained language regarding divorce and property division cases, and the inclusion of those cases within the scope of § 9-10-91 (5) would be completely meaningless.
Further, it is beyond dispute that the General Assembly has the power to require personal jurisdiction in cases of divorce and division of property located in this state if it so desired and to set forth the type of contacts necessary to exercise that jurisdiction. Other courts have moved in this direction,12 and I believe our legislature did so in adopting § 9-10-91 (5).
Moreover, the phrase “personal jurisdiction” does not mean, as the majority concludes, that the General Assembly did not intend § 9-10-91 (5) to apply to what have been regarded as in rem cases. First, as I have explained, it is contrary to the statute’s clear intent. Second, before paragraph (5) of § 9-10-91 was adopted, a blurring of the Latin labels in personam and in rem was occurring, as was a blurring of the requirements for exercising in personam and in rem jurisdiction. For instance, in Shaffer, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification,”13 and concluded that in rem jurisdiction had to be justified based upon the minimum contacts test set forth for in personam jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (66 SC 154, 90 LE 95) (1945).14 Furthermore, since Shaffer, the Supreme Court has confirmed the melding of the labels of in personam and in rem jurisdictions. In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, Justice Scalia wrote the following regarding Shaffer:
Shaffer was saying . . . that quasi in rem jurisdiction, that fictional “ancient form,” and in personam jurisdiction, are really one and the same and must be treated alike — leading to the conclusion that quasi in rem jurisdiction, i.e., that form of in personam jurisdiction based upon a “property ownership” contact and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state service, must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of International Shoe. The logic of Shaffer’s holding . . . places all suits against absent nonresidents on the same constitutional footing, regardless of whether a separate Latin label is attached.15
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable for the General Assembly *823to have set forth the minimum contacts necessary for a court of this state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident in divorce and property division cases when the property to be divided was located in this state, and to have used the label of “personal jurisdiction.”
With its opinion today, the majority of this Court effectively strikes the language “or division of property in connection with an action for divorce” from § 9-10-91 (5) and, in doing so, tells the General Assembly that it acted uselessly and unnecessarily in adopting rules to govern jurisdiction in such actions. This obliteration of statutory language is unacceptable to me, and contrary to all rules of statutory construction.
Moreover, this Court has previously given § 9-10-91 (5) the construction that I advance in this dissent. In Heath v. Heath,16 involving, among other things, a claim for division of property located within this state, this Court held as follows:
If a foreign court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, it may adjudicate property rights such as alimony, child support, and title to real property. Whitaker v. Whitaker, 237 Ga. 895 (230 SE2d 486) (1976). Such a right is afforded by our domestic long-arm statute under OCGA § 9-10-91 (5) provided the defendant has had sufficient minimum contacts with the state. From the record it appears that because of husband’s contacts with the state and wife’s residency the Georgia court has in personam jurisdiction over both parties and may decide their property rights.17
Additionally, in Kemp v. Sharp,18 we have stated that “ ‘Georgia’s domestic-relations long arm statute’ (Braden v. Braden, 260 Ga. 269, 270 (392 SE2d 710) (1990)), . . . applies by its own terms only to actions involving alimony, child support, and division of property. The action brought by Kemp against Sharp involved none of those matters.” The clear implication of the foregoing is that if the action brought by Kemp had involved any one “of those matters,” i.e., alimony, child support, or division of property, the long-arm statute would have been applicable. Significantly, in commenting on the scope of § 9-10-91 (5) in Kemp, we did not state that it applies “only to actions involving . . . division of property [located outside this state].”
Instead of eviscerating § 9-10-91 (5), I would apply its terms to Mr. Abernathy’s action for divorce and division of property. Because Ms. Denny did not maintain a “matrimonial domicile” in Georgia at the time Mr. Abernathy filed his complaint and because she did not *824reside in Georgia before the action was filed, I would hold that the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction, and I would reverse the trial court’s denial of her motion to dismiss.19
2. Further, even assuming that § 9-10-91 (5) is inapplicable to this case, the trial court nevertheless erred in exercising jurisdiction in that doing so violates fundamental notions of fair play and substantial justice and does not meet the minimum contacts test established by the United States Supreme Court.
Although the majority correctly states that Shaffer v. Heitner does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction over actions in rem, the majority fails to give any meaningful analysis of whether minimum contacts were satisfied in this case. Instead, the majority focuses on the following quote from Shaffer:
This argument, of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest.20
Relying on this example, the majority in this case reduces the minimum contacts test for cases involving the division of property located in this state to one factor — whether the property is related to the litigation. This reductionist approach, however, is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaffer and other cases. In Shaffer, referring to the foregoing illustration, the Supreme Court stated that it did not include all of the factors that would satisfy the minimum contacts test and that the factors the Court mentioned were not “necessarily decisive.”21 Further, in a footnote, the court stated that “[i]n some circumstances the presence of property in the forum [s]tate will not support the inference suggested in text [i.e., that the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate when the property is located in a state and is related to the litigation]. Cf., e.g., Restatement [(Second) of Conflict of Laws] § 60, Comments c, d.”22 In this regard, Comment c of the *825Restatement § 60 provides that “[a] state will not usually exercise judicial jurisdiction to affect interest in a chattel brought into its territory without the consent of the owner unless and until the owner has had a reasonable opportunity to remove the chattel.” The Court in Shaffer also cautioned that the minimum contacts test is one of reasonableness and is not subject to mechanical application.23 Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, the Supreme Court did not hold that the fact that property is related to a cause of action dictates a holding that the minimum contacts test is satisfied. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized in Shaffer that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”24
Although the majority does not evaluate the exercise of jurisdiction in this case pursuant to those standards, I will do so. Under International Shoe25 and its progeny, a defendant must “ ‘have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ”26 Further,
the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established “minimum contacts” in the forum State. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 316, [66 SC at 158]. . . . “[Critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” [World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. [286, 297 (100 SC 559, 62 LE2d 490) (1980)]. In defining when it is that a potential defendant should “reasonably anticipate” out-of-state litigation, the Court frequently has drawn from the reasoning of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253 [(78 SC 1228, 1239-1240, 2 LE2d 1283)] (1958):
“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case *826that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”
This “purposeful availment” requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U. S. [770, 774 (104 SC 1473, 79 LE2d 790) (1984)]; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, [444 U. S.] at 299, [100 SC at 568] or of the “unilateral activity of another party or a third person,” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, [466 U. S. 408, 417 (104 SC 1868, 80 LE2d 404) (1984)].27
Similarly, this Court has held that
[d]ue process requires that individuals have “fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.” Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462 (105 SC 2174, 85 LE2d 528) (1985). In evaluating whether a defendant could reasonably expect to be haled into court in a particular forum, courts examine defendant’s contacts with the state, focusing on whether (1) defendant has done some act to avail himself of the law of the forum state; (2) the claim is related to those acts; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, that is, it does not violate notions of fair play and substantial justice. Straus v. Straus, 260 Ga. 327 (393 SE2d 248) (1990); Smith v. Smith, 254 Ga. 450 (330 SE2d 706) (1985).28
Clearly, then, a significant factor in considering whether the dictates of Shaffer v. Heitner are satisfied in this case is whether Ms. Denny has purposefully availed herself of the benefits and protections of the State of Georgia. The answer: She has not. She was not married here, has never lived here, has never brought property into this state, and has never bought property in this state. She simply has done no act to avail herself of the benefits and protections of this state. Rather, it is the unilateral action of Mr. Abernathy in moving to Georgia and purchasing property here that has created a connection with the State of Georgia. Under the foregoing authority, the unilateral actions of Mr. Abernathy are insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.
Further, basic considerations of fairness dictate that Georgia is *827not the proper forum for resolving Mr. Abernathy’s claim. Ms. Denny has never availed herself of Georgia and has at all times remained in Louisiana, the state of matrimonial domicile. Mr. Abernathy, on the other hand, left that State and moved to Georgia, purchasing real property here after the separation. Under these circumstances, it would be unfair to Ms. Denny to impose upon her the financial and personal difficulties of litigating in Georgia.29 Further, in Burger King, the Supreme Court stated that a factor to consider in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction “comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” is the “ ‘interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies.’ ”30 In cases such as the present one, where there is another state (Louisiana) that can resolve the parties’ entire controversy, the majority opinion will foster the inefficient resolution of divorce issues, with, in many cases, this state resolving property division issues regarding property located in this state, and the other state resolving alimony, child support, and property division issues regarding property located in that state. Moreover, considering the close connection between property division issues and alimony and child support issues,31 this is an ineffective method to resolve the bundle of issues that can arise from a divorce.
Instead of evaluating Ms. Denny’s contacts with Georgia under International Shoe and its progeny, the majority simply concludes that the location of the disputed property here is a sufficient minimum contact. For the reasons given above, this analysis is misguided. Moreover, the majority relies on two Missouri cases for this proposition.32 Chenoweth, however, followed the seminal Missouri case of In re Marriage of Breen, and Breen correctly recognized that the “perennial rules of due process for judgments in rem and quasi in rem have been reordered by the United States Supreme Court very recently in Shaffer v. Heitner,” and had been replaced by the minimum contacts analysis set forth in International Shoe.33 Significantly, in ruling that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction based upon a minimum contacts analysis, the court in Breen considered it critical that the parties, including the nonresident, had purchased real estate in Missouri.
The acquisition of the real estate within Missouri by the *828marriage was a purposeful avail by the spouses of the protection by this sovereignty of their interests in the property. It was a conscious assumption of risk that the State would exercise its power over their property interests, and certainly would adjust their disputes over ownership should the marriage dissolve. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 253, [supra].34
Decided March 3, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 4, 1997.
Hirsch, Partin, Grogan & Grogan, John P. Partin, for appellant.
Cohn & Cohn, Leslie L. Cohn, for appellee.
McCamy, Phillips, Tuggle & Fordham, Joseph T. Tuggle, Jr., Kutner & Bloom, Jean M. Kutner, amici curiae.
The present case stands in stark contrast to Breen. Here, as has been previously outlined in this dissent, Ms. Denny has not purposefully availed herself of Georgia sovereignty by purchasing property in this state or otherwise.
Significantly, the majority opinion conflicts with the holdings of other courts and the analysis of commentators. In this regard, these courts and commentators reason that where one spouse takes marital property to another state and files for divorce in that state, that state cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident spouse because the nonresident spouse has not purposefully availed herself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the state where the property is located.35
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold in this case that the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction is inconsistent with the constitutional limitations discussed above.
3. Because the majority misconstrues § 9-10-91 (5), as well as the minimum contacts test, and because a proper analysis of § 9-10-91 (5) and the minimum contacts test mandate the reversal of the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, I dissent to the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.

 OCGA § 9-10-91 (5).

 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (97 SC 2569, 53 LE2d 683) (1977).

 Id.

 Villarroel v. Villarroel, 562 A2d 1180 (2) (Del. 1989); Mock v. Mock, 400 SE2d 543, 544-545 (Va. App. 1991); Smith v. Smith, 459 NW2d 785, 787-789 (N.D. 1990).

 Shaffer, 433 U. S. at 212.

 Shaffer, at 207, 212.

 495 U. S. 604, 621 (110 SC 2105, 109 LE2d 631) (1990).

 257 Ga. 777, 778 (364 SE2d 272) (1988).

 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 778.

 261 Ga. 600 (409 SE2d 204) (1991).

 See Frasca v. Frasca, 254 Ga. 532, 535 (3) (330 SE2d 889) (1985); Lanier, Connecting Defendant’s Contact and Plaintiff’s Claim: The Doctrine of Specific Jurisdiction and the Matrimonial Domicile Provisions of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, 11 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 303 (1995).

 (Footnotes omitted.) Shaffer, 433 U. S. at 207.

 Shaffer, 433 U. S. at 208-209, n. 28.

 Id. at 208, n. 25.

 Shaffer, 433 U. S. at 203-204. In Kulko v. Superior Court of Calif., 436 U. S. 84, 92 (98 SC 1690, 56 LE2d 132) (1978), the court stated that “[l]ike any standard that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the ‘minimum contacts’ test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 246 [(78 SC 1228, 1235, 2 LE2d 1283)] (1958).”

 Shaffer, 433 U. S. at 212.

 326 U. S. 310.

 Kulko v. Superior Court of Calif., 436 U. S. at 92, quoting International Shoe, 326 U. S. at 316.

 Burger King Corp.v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 474-475 (105 SC 2174, 85 LE2d 528) (1985).

 Beasley v. Beasley, 260 Ga. 419, 421 (396 SE2d 222) (1990).

 See Kulko, 436 U. S. at 97-98 (the Supreme Court held that considerations of fairness would be violated if husband, who continued to live in the state of matrimonial domicile (New York), had to litigate child support in California, the state to which the wife had moved).

 Burger King, 471 U. S. at 476-477.

 Stokes v. Stokes, 246 Ga. 765, 772-773 (273 SE2d 169) (1980).

 Chenoweth v. Chenoweth, 575 SW2d 871 (Mo. App. 1978); In re Marriage of Breen, 560 SW2d 358 (Mo. App. 1977).

 Breen, 560 SW2d at 362.

 Breen at 363.

 Oldham, Conflict of Laws and Marital Property Rights, 39 Baylor L. Rev. 1255, 1264-1265 (1987); Carroll v. Carroll, 363 SE2d 872, 873-875 (N.C. App. 1988); Shamley v. Shamley, 455 SE2d 435, 437-439 (N.C. App. 1994); Smith v. Smith, 459 NW2d 785 (N.D. 1990).