Court Opinion

ID: 9664774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:29:33.346502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.077065
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 27. (dissenting). In my view, the Majority expands the exceptions to the rule of governmental immunity in tort actions so that the exceptions have smothered the rule. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 28. The trial court found that Raymond McMillon "negligently jumped on the stalls, causing their collapse and subsequently plaintiff Pries's injury." The Majority holds that this simple act of negligence violated a "ministerial duty" because "[t]he removal of the chains had created a 'dangerous situation.'" Majority, ¶ 25. This expands the "known danger" exception beyond all recognition and will make governmental entities and persons liable for any negligent act because negligence is only actionable at all if the actor does something that "create[s] an unreasonable risk of dan*723ger." Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 723, 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (1981). On the other hand, "[t]he known danger exception as applied in the case law has been reserved for situations that are more than unsafe, where the danger is so severe and so immediate that a specific and immediate response is demanded." Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶ 70, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 488, 756 N.W.2d 601, 623. I respectfully submit that the facts of this case — a run-of-the-mill negligence action — fall far short of that standard.