Court Opinion

ID: 9940112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:12:31.241134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:05.689826
License: Public Domain

J-A28002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CORDELL ANTHONY LIVINGSTON                   :   No. 2540 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered August 31, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0001995-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2024

       The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on

August 31, 2022, which granted the suppression motion filed by the

defendant, Cordell Anthony Livingston (“the Defendant”).         We vacate and

remand.

       On May 13, 2020, the Defendant was arrested and charged with a

number of crimes, including possessing a controlled substance with the intent

to deliver (“PWID”) and criminal conspiracy.1         The Defendant then filed a

pre-trial motion, where he sought to suppress certain evidence against him.

See The Defendant’s Pre-Trial Motion, 7/8/21, at 1-3.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, respectively.
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     On July 22, 2022, the trial court held a suppression hearing. The trial

court ably summarized the evidence it heard during the hearing:

        On May 13, 2020 at approximately 8:30 a.m. Trooper James
        Nolan of the Pennsylvania State Police was in his fully marked
        patrol vehicle observing southbound traffic on Interstate 95
        in Tinicum Township, Pennsylvania. At the time and place in
        question, the trooper observed a black Infinity G35 with
        heavily tinted windows bearing a Virginia license plate and
        began to follow same. The trooper clocked the vehicle in
        question at 70 m.p.h. for [0.3] miles with his calibrated police
        vehicle which was also equipped with a motor vehicle
        recorder [(“MVR”)]. The speed limit in this area on Interstate
        95 is 55 [miles per hour.]

        The trooper testified that although through training and
        experience it was his belief that a lot of people from out of
        state come to Philadelphia to obtain large quantities of drugs
        and take them back to their respective cities he did not know
        whether this vehicle had actually stopped in Philadelphia or
        not. After the vehicle in question was stopped Trooper Nolan
        exited his patrol car and approached [the Defendant’s]
        vehicle from the passenger side during which time he
        observed “[a] lot of movement within the vehicle. It looked
        like people were moving around of [sic] the vehicle and the
        car was bouncing back and forth as if they switched seats.”
        The [trooper] testified that such movement was unusual in
        his experience.

        During the suppression hearing, the tape of the [MVR] in
        Trooper Nolan's vehicle was placed into evidence without
        objection. All counsel agreed that the court could review the
        MVR in its entirety at a later date in chambers. The court did,
        in fact, conduct such review in chambers.

        The review revealed that as the Trooper approached [the
        Defendant’s] vehicle after it [had] been pulled over there was
        some perceptible movement [in] the vehicle consistent with
        a person or persons moving around within the interior of said
        vehicle.

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       When asked about the movement inside the car, [the
       Defendant, who was then in the passenger’s seat,] told
       Trooper Nolan that [he and his co-defendant, Jonathan Moore
       (“Mr. Moore”)] had switched seats. Upon his initial approach
       the passenger window was cracked about [four] inches and
       the trooper immediately smelled a very large odor of
       marijuana and air fresheners such as cologne along with little
       trees hanging on the floorboard which Trooper Nolan felt was
       indicative of a criminal element within the vehicle.

       [The Defendant and Mr. Moore] produced their driver's
       licenses upon request.       [The Defendant’s] license was
       suspended, however, Mr. Moore’s license was valid. The
       vehicle's registration came back to Sharon Horton. Neither
       occupant provided any information about Ms. Horton and the
       vehicle had not been reported stolen. The trooper [did not]
       recall ever asking the occupants what their relationship may
       have been to the owner [of the vehicle]. When asked why
       that issue was not raised, the trooper stated that he made
       the decision to conduct a probable cause search of the vehicle
       as soon as he smelled the marijuana.

       Although Trooper Nolan told the court he smelled the odor of
       burnt marijuana he had earlier told defense counsel that he
       could not recall if the smell was from fresh marijuana or not.
       Trooper Nolan was told that the occupants had changed seats
       in the vehicle, although there is no indication in the record
       that the trooper interrogated the passengers as to the reason
       for the switch or that either occupant volunteered such
       information.

       Neither of the occupants of the vehicle consented to a search
       of the car and Trooper Nolan conceded that there was nothing
       precluding him or his fellow officer from obtaining a search
       warrant for the vehicle in question.

                                    ...

       When asked by the [trial court] why the ownership issue was
       not pursued, Trooper Nolan [testified]:

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              I think at that point, again, pre-Alexander,[2] I knew that
              I was going to search the vehicle anyway ... I kind of was
              just trying to get straight to the point.

         [As Trooper Nolan testified: “in the rear seat of the vehicle,
         I noticed the armrest was down, which then has a little lever
         door that you can gain entry to the trunk. I opened that
         [little lever] door, and there were two pounds of marijuana
         vacuum-sealed sitting right there.”]

Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/23, at 3-5 (citations omitted).

       On August 31, 2022, the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion and

suppressed all evidence against the Defendant.          See Trial Court Order,

8/31/22, at 1-6. Regarding the Commonwealth’s claim that the Defendant

failed to demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, the trial court

declared: “[i]n the instant matter the Commonwealth failed to establish [the

Defendant’s] lack of privacy interest. Accordingly, the burden never shifted

to the [Defendant] and the Commonwealth’s argument must fail.” Trial Court

Statement of Facts, 8/31/22, at 5.

       The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal and, within its notice,

the Commonwealth properly certified that the trial court’s order “will terminate

or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Commonwealth’s Notice of Appeal,

____________________________________________

2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Alexander

in December 2020. In Alexander, the Supreme Court overruled prior
precedent and held that, under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, “warrantless vehicle searches require both probable cause and
exigent    circumstances;   one     without  the    other   is  insufficient.”
Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177, 207 (Pa. 2020) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).

                                           -4-
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9/29/22, at 1; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 311(d). The Commonwealth raises one

claim to this Court:

        Did the lower court err in granting [the Defendant’s] motion
        to suppress where: (1) the evidence that [the Defendant]
        had been driving an out-of-state car registered to someone
        else was sufficient to meet the Commonwealth’s initial
        burden of production; and (2) [the Defendant] did not even
        attempt to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in
        the car?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.

      “Once a motion to suppress evidence has been filed, it is the

Commonwealth's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant's

rights.” Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–1048 (Pa. Super.

2012) (en banc); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). If the defendant prevails in

the underlying proceeding, “[w]e review a trial court's order suppressing

evidence for an abuse of discretion and our scope of review consists of only

the evidence from the defendant's witnesses [during the suppression hearing,]

along with the Commonwealth's evidence that remains uncontroverted.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 186 A.3d 448, 450 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Where the [trial] court's factual findings are

supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse

only if the [trial] court's legal conclusions are erroneous.” Commonwealth

v. Palmer, 145 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and

citations omitted).    Relatedly, “[i]t is within the suppression court's sole

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province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given their testimony.”    Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583,

585 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).          However,

“we maintain de novo review over the suppression court's legal conclusions.”

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 253 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

      “Generally, to have standing to pursue a suppression motion under

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, the defendant's own constitutional rights must have been

infringed.”   Commonwealth v. Enimpah, 106 A.3d 695, 698 (Pa. 2014).

“However, it is well settled that a defendant charged with a possessory offense

in this Commonwealth has ‘automatic standing’ because the charge itself

alleges an interest sufficient to support a claim under Article I, § 8.”      Id.

(brackets and some quotation marks and citations omitted). “This rule entitles

a defendant to a review of the merits of his suppression motion without a

preliminary showing of ownership or possession in the premises or items

seized.” Id.

      In order to prevail on a suppression motion, however, “a defendant must

show that he had a privacy interest in the place invaded or thing seized that

society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. at 699. “The expectation

of privacy is an inquiry into the validity of the search or seizure itself; if the

defendant has no protected privacy interest, neither the Fourth Amendment

nor Article I, § 8 is implicated.” Id.

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       Although “the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect to

his privacy interest,” the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of production

“to present evidence that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not

infringed.” Id. at 701. Thus, in cases where the Commonwealth contests the

defendant’s expectation of privacy, the Commonwealth bears the initial

burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence “show[ing that] the

defendant lacked such a privacy interest.” Id. If the Commonwealth satisfies

this initial burden, “it need do no more, absent proof to the contrary from the

accused himself.”      Id. at 703.      At this point, the burden is shifted to the

defendant, to “show[ that] such an expectation [of privacy] did exist.” Id. at

701. Where “the Commonwealth's evidence show[s] the defendant lacked

any protected privacy interest,” and the evidence favorable to the defendant

does not effectively rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence, the defendant’s

suppression motion must be denied, as “a defendant cannot prevail upon a

suppression motion unless he demonstrates that the challenged police conduct

violated his own, personal privacy interests.”3 Id. at 700 and 701 (quotation

marks omitted).

____________________________________________

3 In Enimpah, our Supreme Court clarified:

         Although the defendant will typically present his own
         evidence to satisfy this burden, he is not required to do so.
         Indeed, he may succeed without presenting any evidence at
         all. See 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.2(b), at
         50 (5th ed. 2012) (noting “even if the burden of proof is on
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       “An expectation of privacy is present when the individual, by his

conduct, exhibits an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and [] the

subjective expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as

reasonable.”     Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa.

1993). “In determining whether a person's expectation of privacy is legitimate

or reasonable, the totality of the circumstances must be considered and the

determination will ultimately rest upon a balancing of the societal interests

involved.” Commonwealth v. Viall, 890 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2005).

“The constitutional legitimacy of an expectation of privacy is not dependent

on the subjective intent of the individual asserting the right but on whether

the expectation is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.”

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

       On appeal, the Commonwealth claims the trial court erred when it

determined     the    Commonwealth        failed   to   carry   its   initial   burden   of

demonstrating that the Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the vehicle. The Commonwealth further argues that, since the trial court

found, as a fact, that the vehicle was registered to a third-party named Sharon

Horton, the burden shifted to the Defendant and required the Defendant to

prove he had a privacy interest in the vehicle.                       According to the

____________________________________________

         one party, it may happen that the burden is actually met in a
         particular case by evidence given by the other party”).

Enimpah, 106 A.3d at 702 n.6.

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Commonwealth, since there was no evidence presented at the suppression

hearing tending to show that the Defendant had an expectation of privacy in

the vehicle, the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant’s motion to

suppress.      See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11.          We agree with the

Commonwealth.

       Following the suppression hearing, the trial court found, as a fact, that:

the Defendant was driving the vehicle in Pennsylvania, without a license; the

vehicle had a Virginia license plate; the vehicle was registered to a third-party

named Sharon Horton; and, “[n]either [the Defendant nor Mr. Moore]

provided any information about Ms. Horton” during the traffic stop or the

suppression hearing. See Trial Court’s Statement of Facts, 8/31/22, at 1-4.

Under our precedent, the trial court’s factual findings prove that the

Commonwealth carried its initial burden of coming forward with sufficient

evidence “show[ing that] the [D]efendant lacked [] a privacy interest” in the

vehicle.    See Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120 (Pa. Super.

2005) (holding: the appellant did not possess a reasonable expectation of

privacy in a vehicle where: “he was the operator of a rental car but not the

named lessee, was not an authorized driver, the named lessee was not present

in the vehicle, [a]ppellant offered no explanation of his connection to the

named lessee, and the return date for the rental car had passed”);4

____________________________________________

4 Compare with Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (2018) (holding that

“someone in otherwise lawful possession and control of a rental car
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Commonwealth v. Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 436 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc)

(holding that the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in a vehicle,

where he did not own the vehicle and where he “offered no evidence to explain

his connection to the vehicle or his connection to the registered owner of the

vehicle”); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1251–1252 (Pa. Super.

2011) (holding that the defendant did not demonstrate he had an expectation

of privacy in the vehicle he was driving at the time of the stop because the

defendant “presented no evidence that he owned the vehicle, that it was

registered in his name, or that he was using it with the permission of the

registered owner”); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 14 A.3d 907 (Pa. Super.

2011) (holding:        where the Commonwealth presented evidence at the

suppression hearing establishing that the vehicle the defendant was driving

was owned by his girlfriend, the burden then shifted to the defendant to

establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle; however, since there was

“no evidence that [the defendant] had permission from [his girlfriend] to drive

the car,” the defendant “failed to establish an expectation of privacy in the

vehicle he was driving”); see also Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220,

1224 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“a driver who does not own a vehicle may still

establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle if he can prove he has

____________________________________________

has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it even if the rental agreement does
not list him or her as an authorized driver”) (emphasis added).

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permission or authority from the owner to drive the vehicle”)

(emphasis added).

      Since the Commonwealth came forward with evidence tending to show

that neither the Defendant nor Mr. Moore were the registered owners of the

vehicle, the burden shifted to the Defendant to prove that he had a privacy

interest in the vehicle.   However, neither the Defendant nor Mr. Moore

presented any evidence during the suppression hearing. Further, no evidence

was presented during the hearing that would support a conclusion that the

Defendant had an expectation of privacy in the vehicle, which “he did not own,

that was not registered to him, and for which he has not shown authority to

operate.”   Burton, 973 A.2d at 436.    Therefore, we must vacate the trial

court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress. See Enimpah,

106 A.3d 699 (“if the defendant has no protected privacy interest, neither the

Fourth Amendment nor Article I, § 8 is implicated”).

      Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/13/2024

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