Court Opinion

ID: 9675817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:06:38.69683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:39.875498
License: Public Domain

Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice. The petitioner, Tony Lee, has been charged with the criminal offense of fourth offense driving while intoxicated (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-65-103 and 111 (1987)). Lee is set to stand trial for this offense in Faulkner County Circuit Court. Lee has filed a petition for a writ of prohibition from this court to the Faulkner County Circuit Court requesting that this court prohibit his upcoming trial; Lee contends in his petition that the circuit court would not have jurisdiction over his criminal case because the judge who will preside over his case is the respondent chancellor, Andre McNeil, who would be sitting as circuit judge pursuant to an exchange agreement and docket division agreement within the twentieth judicial district. Judge McNeil is the duly elected, authorized, and acting judge of the chancery and probate courts of the twentieth district. The respondent, David Reynolds, is the duly elected, authorized, and acting judge of the circuit court of the twentieth district, and the respondent, Watson Villines, is the duly elected, qualified, and acting judge of the circuit-chancery courts of the twentieth district. After being sworn in on January 1, 1991, as judges of their respective courts, the three judges entered into an exchange agreement on February 5, 1991, by which the courts of the twentieth district were divided into three divisions. Lee asserts 1) that the judges of twentieth judicial district had no legislative authority to divide the district into divisions, and 2) that Judge McNeil and Judge Reynolds are usurping power of other courts within their district. We agree. Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-13-201 (1987) addressed the jurisdiction of circuit courts and provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings for the enforcement of civil rights or redress of civil wrongs, except when exclusive jurisdiction is given to other courts. Where those actions and proceedings are not expressly provided for by statute, the actions and proceedings may be had and conducted by the circuit courts and judges, in accordance with the course, rules, and jurisdiction of the common law. * * * * Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-13-304 (Supp. 1989) addresses the jurisdiction of chancery courts and provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Chancery courts shall have original jurisdiction in all matters in equity as fully as that exercised by the circuit courts of this state in counties where no separate chancery courts have been established prior to April 27, 1903. (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1989, or any other enactment which might be interpreted otherwise, the chancery court or any division of chancery court shall have jurisdiction for all cases and matters relating to paternity. Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-13-2803 (Supp. 1989) addresses the judges and chancellors of the twentieth district and provides as follows: (a) The qualified electors of the Twentieth District shall elect: (1) One (1) circuit judge; (2) One (1) chancellor; and (3) One (1) circuit-chancery judge. (b) (1) Each judge of the judgeship created by subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be the judge of the juvenile division of chancery court. The judge shall serve as judge of the juvenile division in lieu of the judge who would otherwise be designated as judge of the juvenile division of chancery court in the chancery district. (2) The judge of the additional circuit-chancery judgeship created in subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall devote such time as may be required to perform the duties of judge of the juvenile division, which duties shall be the primary obligation of the judge, and shall sit as judge of the circuit, chancery or probate court as time permits.  In this case, the judges entered of record an exchange agreement, which ordered in part that there be set up within the twentieth judicial circuit three divisions of each of the following courts: 1) chancery court, 2) circuit court; and 3) juvenile court. Although the State argues that this agreement is authorized under Ark. Const. art. 7, §22 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-14-403 (1987), we find otherwise. Article 7, § 22 provides that “[t]he judges of the circuit courts may temporarily exchange circuits or hold court for each other under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.” Section 16-14-403 incorporates this constitutional provision and addresses the exchange of districts among judges and provides as follows: (a) (1) Circuit judges and chancellors of their respective districts of this state may by agreement temporarily exchange districts and may hold courts for each other for such length of time as may seem practicable and for the best interest of their respective districts and courts. (2) The agreements shall be signed by the judges so agreeing and entered on the record of the court or courts so to be held. (b) It is the intent and purpose of this section: (1) To permit circuit judges to exchange districts with each other, (2) To permit chancellors to exchange districts with each other, (3) To permit circuit judges to exchange districts with chancellors', and (4) To permit chancellors to exchange districts with circuit judges. (Emphasis added.) The State’s argument fails to recognize that the statutory authorization for the exchange of districts among judges does not provide for the creation and exchange of divisions among circuit and chancery judges within a district. The exchange contemplated and authorized in section 16-14-403 is inter-district in nature, as compared to the intra-district exchange attempted by the judges in this case.  The judges of the twentieth district are, therefore, without legislative authority to alter, as among themselves, the duties and responsibilities they assumed upon their election to their respective positions. Cf. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-13-1503(b)(2) and 16-13-2603(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1991) (“The circuit judges, chancery judges, and circuit-chancery judges of the districts subject to this subsection [seventh and eighteenth respectively] may, by agreement, hold either of the circuit or chancery courts in their respective districts and may hear and try matters pending in any of those courts or may hear or try matters in the same court at the same time. The judges subject to this subsection may adopt such rules as they deem appropriate for the assignment of cases in the circuit and chancery courts of their district.”) Arkansas Const, art. 7, § 4 addresses the jurisdiction and powers of the Arkansas Supreme Court and provides “[t]he Supreme Court. . . shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts of law and equity; and, in aid of its appellate and supervisory jurisdiction, it shall have power to issue writs of . . . mandamus . . . .”  In Hobson v. Cummings, 259 Ark. 717, 536 S.W.2d 132 (1976), this court noted that the writ of prohibition lies to a court, not a judge. Consequently, Lee’s petition for a writ of prohibition is inappropriate. However, in that case, the petitioner’s pleading was treated as a petition for mandamus in directing the judge in that case to refrain from a particular action. Mandamus is a remedy to be used on all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy and justice and good government require it; it is a writ that is used to enforce an established right. State v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989).  The right that Lee seeks to enforce is contained in section 16-13-2803, which created a right in the people to select by the election process separate persons to serve as circuit, chancery, and circuit-chancery judges for the twentieth district. The only practical method of enforcing this right is the remedy of mandamus. Quo warranto is not appropriate because it is the State that initiates that proceeding under these circumstances, not an individual such as in this case. State v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm’rs, supra (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 25-16-704 (1987)); Cummings v. Washington County Election Comm’n, 291 Ark. 354, 724 S.W.2d 486 (1987); and McKenzie v. Burris, 255 Ark. 330, 500 S.W.2d 357 (1973)). Consequently, we treat Lee’s petition for writ of prohibition as one of mandamus and direct the respondent judges to refrain from judicially enlarging their respective jurisdictions. Accordingly, the petition for writ of prohibition is denied, and the writ of mandamus is granted. Newbern, J., concurs. Hays and Corbin, JJ., dissent.