Court Opinion

ID: 9925914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 15:04:00.396776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:50.929237
License: Public Domain

FOURTH DIVISION
                                  DILLARD, P. J.,
                              RICKMAN and PIPKIN, JJ.

                      NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                      physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                      days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                 https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                      January 23, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1765. WILSON v. THE STATE.

      DILLARD, Presiding Judge.

      Following trial, a jury convicted Kalone Wilson on one count each of aggravated

assault, family violence battery, and criminal trespass. Wilson now appeals his

convictions and the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing the trial court erred in

admitting expert testimony the State did not timely produce during discovery and

qualifying that same expert under an incorrect legal standard. For the following

reasons, we affirm.
      Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,1 the record shows that

Carrie Walden and Wilson began a romantic relationship in 2014, and they moved in

together not long after that relationship started. But at some point, Wilson became

abusive towards Walden, including physically; and in 2019, she ended their

relationship and the couple stopped living together. Despite their breakup, Wilson

continued contacting Walden and frequently threatened her during those

communications.

      In the late afternoon on October 31, 2019, Walden—who drove a mini-van taxi

for employment—was taking her two-year-old daughter home to get ready for trick-or-

treating, when she stopped at a local gas station to refuel her vehicle. Immediately

after parking next to one of the gasoline pumps, Walden saw Wilson get out of his car,

approach her mini-van, and enter through the passenger-side door. Surprised and

fearful, Walden nervously smiled at Wilson, prompting him to ask if she thought

“something was funny.” But before she could answer, Wilson grabbed Walden’s cell

      1
        See, e.g., Libri v. State, 346 Ga. App. 420, 421 (816 SE2d 417) (2018) (noting
when a conviction is appealed, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, and the appellant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence).
                                          2
phone and threw it out the window. Wilson then placed his hands around Walden’s

neck and began strangling her.

      Struggling to get away, Walden climbed over the seat into the back of the mini-

van, but Wilson climbed over as well, began strangling her again, and bit her on the

face. At that point, Walden momentarily blacked out; but when she regained

consciousness, she managed to open the mini-van’s rear door and exit the vehicle.

And as she ran toward the gas station convenience store, Walden briefly paused and

asked a woman in another vehicle to help her. But with Wilson in pursuit, Walden

continued her flight into the store, pleading for help as she did so. Wilson followed

and initially threatened others in the store not to intervene; but when one of the

store’s employees ordered him to leave, he complied. Meanwhile, another store

employee—and the woman Walden sought help from in the parking lot—called the

police, who arrived a few minutes later.

      Thereafter, the State charged Wilson, via indictment, with aggravated assault,

family violence battery, and criminal trespass. The case then proceeded to trial, during

which the State presented the foregoing evidence. The State also called a forensic

sexual assault nurse examiner to testify as an expert on the subjects of domestic

                                           3
violence, trauma, and the physical effects of strangulation. And after the nurse

examiner testified as to her background and experience, the trial court ruled that she

could testify as an expert. The jury then found Wilson guilty on all counts at the

conclusion of the trial. Subsequently, Wilson filed a motion for new trial, which the

trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal follows.

      1. Wilson first contends the trial court erred in admitting the nurse examiner’s

expert opinions regarding the effects of strangulation into evidence, which were based

on studies and other information the State did not disclose during discovery (as

required by statute). We disagree.

      OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4), in part, provides:

      The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as
      otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to
      by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect and copy or photograph
      a report of any physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or
      experiments, including a summary of the basis for the expert opinion
      rendered in the report, or copies thereof, if the state intends to introduce
      in evidence in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or
      mental examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral
      or partially oral, the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant and
      material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve opposing
      counsel with such portions no later than ten days prior to trial.

                                            4
To ensure compliance with this statute, OCGA § 17-16-6 directs that

      [i]f at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
      attention of the court that the state has failed to comply with the
      requirements of this article, the court may order the state to permit the
      discovery or inspection, interview of the witness, grant a continuance, or,
      upon a showing of prejudice and bad faith, prohibit the state from
      introducing the evidence not disclosed or presenting the witness not
      disclosed, or may enter such other order as it deems just under the
      circumstances.

And importantly, this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling in this regard for an “abuse

of discretion.”2

      In this case, nearly two weeks before trial, the State’s prosecutor filed a witness

list, which included the nurse examiner. During trial, after she was qualified as an

expert and asked a few general questions about examining individuals who had

suffered trauma, the State asked the nurse examiner if trauma could affect a victim’s

recall. But before she responded, Wilson’s counsel objected and requested a bench

conference outside the jury’s presence. Once the jury left the courtroom, Wilson’s

      2
        Morris v. State, 341 Ga. App. 568, 575 (3) (802 SE2d 13) (2017); see Williams
v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 478 (II) (807 SE2d 350) (2015) (explaining appellate courts
review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings based on alleged criminal discovery violations
under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review).
                                            5
counsel complained that, although a few days before trial the State disclosed that the

nurse examiner would be referring to an anatomical diagram of the neck in her

testimony about strangulation, she was now, unfairly, going to offer opinions on

hypothetical questions that should have been disclosed much earlier in the

proceedings.

      The State’s prosecutor responded that the nurse examiner had not done any

experiments or produced any reports, oral or written, that would fall under OCGA §

17-16-4 (a) (4). In reply, Wilson’s counsel claimed the defense was unprepared for the

nurse examiner to offer medical opinions about how strangulation occurs, seemingly

implying that she was not qualified to provide such opinions. But the trial court noted

that it had reviewed OCGA § 17-16-4 and overruled Wilson’s objection. Even so, the

court ruled that following the nurse examiner’s direct testimony, it would give Wilson

additional time to prepare for his cross examination of the witness.

      The State’s prosecutor then continued her direct examination, which included

the nurse examiner referring to a 1943 study of the effects of G-forces on fighter pilots

that measured, among other things, the time it took to lose consciousness if air and

blood flow through the neck were cut off. And when the State’s prosecutor posed a

                                           6
hypothetical question as to whether a person could lose and regain consciousness

while being strangled, Wilson’s counsel objected and, again, was overruled. Then,

toward the end of the direct examination, Wilson’s counsel objected when the State’s

prosecutor started to pose a hypothetical based on the nurse examiner’s review of the

police reports and photographs of Walden, arguing the defense was “entitled to the

science” behind her opinion. But the trial court again overruled the objection, citing

its previously stated reasons for doing so.

      Upon the conclusion of the State’s direct examination, the trial court sent the

jury out for a break and held another bench conference, in which it reiterated its ruling

to overrule Wilson’s objections to the nurse examiner’s testimony. Nevertheless,

acknowledging defense counsel’s complaint that he did not have adequate time to

prepare for the specific opinions provided by the State’s expert, the trial court asked

counsel what he thought would be an adequate remedy. But rather than requesting a

continuance, Wilson’s counsel stated he would stand on his objection, arguing, inter

alia, that a delay would possibly annoy the jurors. Consequently, the trial court

repeated that it did not think OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) applied to the nurse examiner’s

testimony.

                                              7
      On appeal, Wilson argues the nurse examiner’s expert opinions—relying on the

anatomical diagram of the neck and the 1943 G-forces study—should have been

excluded as they prejudiced his right to a fair trial. This argument is a nonstarter.

      The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) requires

pretrial disclosure of an expert’s written report and that if an expert makes even an

oral report of his opinions regarding evidence before trial, the prosecutor is required

to prepare a written report of the opinion, provide the basis or bases of that opinion,

and serve the report on defense counsel no later than ten days before trial.3 But here,

there is no evidence the nurse examiner created a written or oral report; and the State

was under no duty to reduce to writing a non-existent oral report.”4 Furthermore, as

to the anatomical chart, Wilson acknowledged he was told about it prior to trial and

did not object when it was admitted as an exhibit. Additionally, the 1943 study was

“not introduced into evidence, nor was it a report on the results of an examination,

      3
        See Heywood v. State, 292 Ga. 771, 776-77 (4) (b) (743 SE2d 12) (2013) (holding
that current version of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) requires prosecutor to disclose written
report made by an expert witness regarding her opinions or prepare a written version
of an expert’s oral report, if such is made, and serve defense counsel with same at least
ten days before trial); Love v. State, 349 Ga. App. 741, 750 (4) (b) (824 SE2d 745)
(2019) (same).
      4
          Williams, 302 Ga. at 479 (II).
                                           8
test or experiment within the meaning of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4).”5 Given these

circumstances, Wilson cannot establish a violation of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4).6

      Moreover, even if we were to assume the State did not comply with OCGA §

17-16-4 (a) (4), we would not agree the trial court erred by admitting the nurse

examiner’s testimony. Indeed, exclusion of evidence is “a particularly harsh sanction

and should be imposed only where there is a showing of prejudice to the defense and

bad faith by the State.”7 And setting aside the question of whether the State acted in

bad faith, during the hearing on his motion for new trial, Wilson claimed he would

possibly have interviewed the nurse examiner before trial if he had known her

testimony about strangulation would be in such depth. But beyond that, he failed to

      5
          Turner v. State, 270 Ga. App. 245, 247 (4) (606 SE2d 296) (2004).
      6
         See Williams, 302 Ga. at 479 (II); see Heywood, 292 Ga. at 777 (4) (b)
(explaining defendant pointed to nothing in the record to prove that State’s expert
ever made an oral report before he testified, and in the absence of such a showing,
defendant could not establish a violation even of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4)); see also
Turner, 270 Ga. App. at 247 (4) (holding that medical study to which nurse who
testified for the prosecution referred was not admitted into evidence but was simply
acknowledged by the nurse as one of the studies she was familiar with which was part
of the medical literature on which her expertise was based, and therefore, was not
subject to requirements of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4)).
      7
       Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 446 (4) (782 SE2d 642) (2016) (punctuation
omitted); accord Chance v. State, 291 Ga. 241, 245 (5) (728 SE2d 635) (2012).
                                          9
articulate what prejudice he suffered that would have been cured by timely disclosure.8

Needless to say, it is usually a sufficient remedy for the defense to “be afforded an

opportunity to interview the witness.”9 Indeed here, the trial court offered Wilson a

continuance or, at the least, more time to interview the nurse examiner prior to cross

examining the witness, but Wilson declined it. So, even if the State failed to comply

with its discovery obligations, the trial court offered a sufficient remedy and did not

      8
         See Murphy v. State, 299 Ga. 238, 244 (3) (787 SE2d 721) (2016) (explaining
trial court did not err in admitting expert opinion despite State’s failure to comply
with OCGA § 17–16–4 (a) (4) given that defendant made no showing of what
additional evidence she would have presented or how the defense strategy would have
materially changed had she been given timely notice of this undisclosed opinion);
Leger v. State, 291 Ga. 584, 587 (2) (a) (732 SE2d 53) (2012) (holding trial court did
not abuse its discretion by admitting DNA evidence not disclosed in compliance with
the requirements of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) when defendant failed to articulate what
prejudice he suffered that would have been cured by timely disclosure); Aleman v.
State, 224 Ga. App. 391, 393 (2) (480 SE2d 393) (1997) (holding trial court did not err
in refusing to exclude scientific report because defendant made no showing at trial that
she was prejudiced as a result of the State’s failure to make the scientific report in
question available to her before trial).
      9
       Norris v. State, 289 Ga. 154, 156 (2) (709 SE2d 792) (2011) (punctuation
omitted).
                                          10
abuse its discretion in refusing to impose the harsh sanction of excluding the nurse

examiner’s testimony.10

       2. Wilson also maintains the trial court erred in initially qualifying the nurse

examiner as an expert, arguing that it did so under an incorrect legal standard. Again,

we disagree.

       Upon calling the nurse examiner as a witness, the State’s prosecutor questioned

her extensively regarding her educational background and experience in her

field—specifically her experience with the subjects of domestic violence, trauma, and

the physical effects of strangulation. And in her testimony, the nurse examiner

explained that she had testified as an expert on these subjects on three prior occasions.

The State’s prosecutor then tendered the nurse examiner as an expert witness. At this

point, the trial court asked Wilson if he had an objection or wanted to question the

       10
         See Tarpley, 298 Ga. at 446-47 (4) (holding defendant was not prejudiced by
State’s failure to include medical examiner’s name on witness list in murder trial and
to provide defendant with a copy of the autopsy report given that trial court continued
trial to allow defendant to test evidence discussed by medical examiner and was
permitted to interview individual who performed medical examiner’s test); see also
Valentine v. State, 293 Ga. 533, 536 (2) (748 SE2d 437) (2013) (holding that by failing
to ask for more time to prepare for the testimony of the expert witness, defendant
waived any claim of error with respect to the failure of the trial court to give his lawyer
more time).
                                            11
witness as to her credentials, but in response, Wilson’s counsel replied only that “we

object to counsel identifying anyone and we caution the Court about doing the same.”

       On appeal, Wilson argues the trial court erred by qualifying the nurse examiner

as an expert under a repealed statute, OCGA § 24-9-67.1,11 and the now abrogated

evidentiary standard delineated in Harper v. State.12 But as Wilson acknowledges, his

response to the trial court’s query following the State’s voir dire can hardly be

characterized as a specific objection to the nurse examiner being qualified as an expert

witness.13 As a result, the ruling related to this evidence is only “subject to review on

appeal for plain error affecting substantial rights.”14 In this regard, the Supreme Court

       11
        Former OCGA § 24-9-67.1 was repealed, effective January 1, 2013. See Ga.
L. 2011, pp. 99, 124-125, § 2 (Act 52).
       12
          249 Ga. 519 (292 SE2d 389) (1982), superseded by statute as stated in Nundra
v. State, 316 Ga. 1 (885 SE2d 790) (2023).
       13
         See Nundra v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 13-14 (5) (a) (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (holding
because defendant’s objection to expert testimony on appeal was not the same as the
issue raised at trial, his claim could only be reviewed for plain error); Anthony v. State,
302 Ga. 546, 549 (II) (807 SE2d 891) (2017) (holding that “[i]n order to preserve an
objection for ordinary appellate review, the specific ground of the objection must be
made at the time the challenged evidence is offered.” (punctuation and footnote
omitted)).
       14
         Gates v. State, 298 Ga. 324, 326 (3) (781 SE2d 772) (2016) (punctuation
omitted); see OCGA § 24-1-103 (d) (“Nothing in this Code section shall preclude a
court from taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although such
                                            12
of Georgia has adopted the federal plain-error standard of review, as articulated by the

Supreme Court of the United States in Puckett v. United States.15 Under this four-

pronged test,

      there [first] must be an error or defect—some sort of deviation from a
      legal rule—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,
      i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must
      be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the
      error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the
      ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it affected the outcome
      of the trial court proceedings. Fourth and finally, if the above three
      prongs are satisfied, the appellate court has the discretion to remedy the
      error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously
      affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
      proceedings.16

errors were not brought to the attention of the court.”).
      15
        556 U.S. 129 (129 SCt 1423, 173 LE2d 266) (2009); see Gates, 298 Ga. at 326
(3) (noting that the Supreme Court of Georgia has adopted the four-pronged
plain-error standard as set forth in Puckett).
      16
         Gates, 298 Ga. at 327 (3) (punctuation omitted), quoting State v. Kelly, 290 Ga.
29, 33 (2) (a) (718 SE2d 232) (2011); see Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (II).
                                           13
And importantly, satisfying all four prongs of this standard is “difficult, as it should

be.”17 Under this standard, Wilson cannot show the trial court plainly erred in

qualifying the nurse examiner as an expert witness—even though the court did refer

to OCGA § 24-9-67 and Harper in its ruling.

      To address Wilson’s specific claim, some historical context is useful. When the

current evidence code became effective in 2013,18 OCGA § 24-9-67.1 was replaced

with the nearly identical OCGA § 24-7-707,19 which provided: “In criminal

proceedings, the opinions of experts on any question of science, skill, trade, or like

questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may be given on the facts as

proved by other witnesses.” But effective July 1, 2022, the General Assembly repealed

      17
       Rijal v. State, 367 Ga. App. 703, 705 (1) (888 SE2d 272) (2023) (punctuation
omitted); accord Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 495 (2) (883 SE2d 733) (2023).
      18
         See Ga. L. 2011, pp. 99, 214, § 101 (providing that Georgia’s then-new
Evidence Code applies “to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced on or
after” January 1, 2013).
      19
          See Robinson v. State, 309 Ga. 729, 735 (3) n.2 (848 SE2d 441) (2020) (noting
“the evidentiary requirements relating to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
in a criminal case under the new Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-7-707) are nearly
identical to those that applied under the former Evidence Code (OCGA § 24-9-67”));
see also Ronald L. Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence 441 (5th ed.
2016) (explaining “this statute in essence recreates a former Georgia code provision
[OCGA § 24-9-67] that does not appear in federal law”).
                                          14
OCGA § 24-7-707 and amended OCGA § 24-7-702 such that the latter statute now

governs the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal as well as a civil cases.20 That

amended version of OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) provides:

      A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
      training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
      if: (1) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
      will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
      fact in issue; (2) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data; (3)
      The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (4)
      The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts
      of the case.

With this amendment, the General Assembly extended “to criminal cases the federal

standard of admissibility of expert testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[21] and its progeny.”22 And under this standard,

      20
          See 2022 Ga. L., p. 201, § 1 (amending OCGA § 24-7-702 to apply “in all
proceedings” rather than only “in all civil proceedings” and repealing OCGA § 24-7-
707); see also OCGA § 24-7-702 (a) (“Except as provided in Code Section 22-1-14 and
in subsection (g) of this Code section, the provisions of this Code section shall apply
in all proceedings. The opinion of a witness qualified as an expert under this Code
section may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.” (emphasis supplied)).
      21
           509 U.S. 579 (113 SCt 2786, 125 LE2d 469) (1993).
      22
        Smith v. State, 315 Ga. 287, 300 (2) (b) n.6 (882 SE2d 300) (2022)
(punctuation omitted); accord Rijal, 367 Ga. App. at 713 (3) (b) (ii) n.58.
                                            15
      a trial court must evaluate the reliability of the expert’s proffered
      testimony; proper considerations include whether a theory or technique
      can be tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and
      publication, the known or potential rate of error for the theory or
      technique, the general degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific or
      professional community, and the expert’s range of experience and
      training.23

Importantly, the trial court has broad discretion when “accepting or rejecting the

qualifications of an expert witness, and we review a trial court’s ruling on both the

qualification of an expert and the admissibility of that expert’s testimony for an abuse

of discretion.”24

      In this matter, the trial began on July 12, 2022, and therefore, the current

version of OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) outlined the applicable standard for determining the

nurse examiner’s qualifications to provide expert opinions.25 And as previously noted,

the trial court did, in fact, refer to OCGA § 24-9-67 and Harper when it explained its

      23
        Smith, 315 Ga. at 300 (2) (b) n.6 (punctuation omitted); accord Rijal, 367 Ga.
App. at 713 (3) (b) (ii) n.58.
      24
        Garland v. State, 361 Ga. App. 724, 732 (2) (865 SE2d 724) (2021)
(punctuation omitted).
      25
           See supra note 20 & accompanying text.
                                          16
reasons for finding her qualified to testify as an expert. But just before doing so, the

trial court also cited to OCGA § 24-7-702 (b) and recited some of the language in that

statute, explaining that the expert’s testimony “must be relevant and helpful to the

trier of fact in order to be admissible.” Furthermore, the nurse examiner began her

testimony by recounting her educational background in nursing, her additional

education and training for nearly two years in the specialty of forensic nursing, and

noting that she held several advanced certificates in forensic nursing. Thereafter, she

testified to her specific training with regard to identifying signs of strangulation, her

experience training other nurses in this subject, and her time spent keeping current

with the most recent articles and studies pertaining to this specialty. In light of these

circumstances, the nurse examiner’s testimony during the State’s voir dire provided

the trial court with sufficient information to “consider whether the expert [could]

testify competently on the areas [she] intend[ed] to discuss, whether the expert’s

methodology [was] sufficiently reliable, and whether the expert’s testimony, through

the application of [her] scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, [would] assist the

trier of fact to understand the evidence.”26 As a result, we are not persuaded the trial

       26
       United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F3d 1085, 1106 (IV) (C) (11th Cir. 2011).
Although our current Evidence Code has been in effect for ten years, we nevertheless
                                             17
court abused its discretion—much less plainly erred—in qualifying the nurse

examiner as an expert.27

      Moreover, even if Wilson could show any “clear or obvious error in the trial

court’s admission of [the nurse examiner’s] testimony, he cannot affirmatively show

note that because it is modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence, when the appellate
courts of this State consider the meaning of those provisions, “we look to decisions
of the federal appellate courts construing and applying the Federal Rules, especially
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit.” Olds v.
State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016).
      27
          See United States v. Perry, 14 F4th 1253, 1263-65 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2021)
(holding admission of expert testimony under Rule 702 from law enforcement agent
about meaning of coded drug language used in intercepted phone conversations
between defendant and coconspirators was not plain error given that expert testimony
about coded language was within agent’s expertise and was helpful to jury); United
States v. Clotaire, 963 F3d 1288, 1298 (III) (C) (11th Cir. 2020) (holding trial court did
not commit plain error in prosecution for access device fraud and identity theft by
permitting special agent to testify as expert, under Rule 702, about difference between
needle distortion and barrel distortion caused by camera lens because agent had
specialized training and experience working with closed circuit television cameras, and
he connected his opinions about camera distortions to knowledge from this experience
working with security camera footage); Jayyousi, 657 F3d at 1106-07 (IV) (C)
(explaining because defendants made no specific objection to expert’s testimony on
particular issue of use of code words by violent Islamists in conversations, appellate
court would address defendant’s challenge under plain error doctrine and, thus,
holding trial court did not plainly err when it permitted expert, pursuant to Rule 702,
to give such testimony given his specialized knowledge and fact that his testimony
helped jury understand the issue).
                                           18
that the alleged error probably did affect the outcome below.”28 Indeed, Walden

testified that Wilson attacked her in her vehicle, specifically strangling her to the

extent she briefly lost consciousness and biting her on the face before she could flee

into the gas station’s convenience store. Additionally, the responding officer testified

that he observed a bite mark on Walden’s face and marks on her neck consistent with

strangulation, and the State supported this testimony with photos of Walden taken

immediately after the incident. Finally, the convenience-store employee recounted

Walden fleeing into the store, noted that she appeared upset, and confirmed that

Wilson followed her inside the store before being ordered to leave. So, given the

overwhelming evidence of Wilson’s guilt, it “cannot be said that any error in the

      28
        Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 40, 43 (2) (785 SE2d 886) (2016) (punctuation
omitted).
                                           19
admission of [the nurse examiner’s testimony] likely affected the outcome below.”29

Consequently, the admission of that testimony did not constitute reversible error.

      For all these reasons, we affirm Wilson’s convictions and the denial of his

motion for new trial.

      Judgment affirmed. Rickman and Pipkin, JJ., concur.

      29
         Jones, 299 Ga. at 43 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Watson v. State, 303 Ga.
758, 761 (2) (c) (814 SE2d 396) (2018) (holding trial court did not plainly err by
allowing detective to provide expert opinion about trigger pull pressure and the
possibility of a .380-caliber gun firing .40 caliber bullets because overwhelming
evidence of defendant’s guilt showed that the detective’s testimony did not likely
affect the outcome of the trial); Jones, 299 Ga. at 42-43 (2) (finding the trial court did
not plainly err in admitting into evidence the testimony of State’s expert witness on
geo-cell phone analytics to show defendant’s proximate location the day before
murder given other overwhelming evidence that placed defendant at exact scene of the
crime).
                                           20