Court Opinion

ID: 9448239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:26:51.017663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:20.282323
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting),
Judge SMITH’S compelling dissent points up a developing problem stemming. from discontent with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the concept of unseaworthiness on the part of those brethren who find themselves in greater sympathy with the views of the dissenters than those of the majority in the quite similar case of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 80 S.Ct. 926, 4 L.Ed.2d 941. I suggest that a reading of the opinions there, particularly the dissenting opinions, against the opinions herein, will support this conclusion. And the problem is bound to recur often in view of the large number of these cases corning before each panel of our court. The intellectual reaction is understandable, since the minority view was powerfully presented. But whatever we may feel as to the merits of the debate, our duty is surely to apply the presently prevailing law and leave the question of further change to the Court itself. Furthermore, the Court’s manifest intent to safeguard human lives at sea and to enforce the shipowner’s responsibility by strict liability is not one to combat. But the trend here illustrated toward divergent precedents will make decision increasingly embarrassing for us.
I realize that the in banc device represents at best a temporary palliative, rather than the permanent corrective which can be supplied only by the Court itself, But there are now too many eases to expect the Court to act in all these private *9claims in view of its pressing public obligations. And in our recent past we have employed the in banc device to correct decisions not accepted by a majority; indeed, among our inconsistent appearing decisions thereto, the one and only thread, quite obviously, has been its use as such a corrective. Failure to resort to it here to resolve a really troublesome division of view I do think ought to have one advantage, namely in freeing us from the bondage of supporting decisions in which we do not believe. I have always believed that judges must have and do have a moderate degree of freedom in this regard, see, e. g., Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois’ Sons Co., 2 Cir., 275 F.2d 304, 306, certiorari denied Henry Du Bois’ Sons Co. v. Dunbar, 364 U.S. 815, 81 S.Ct. 45, 5 L.Ed.2d 46, though this view seems to have engendered a certain amount of criticism. Chabot v. National Securities & Research Corp., 2 Cir., 290 F.2d 657, 659; Friendly, 109 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 1040, 1045 (1961). Surely we cannot be expected to go contrary to what we believe to be the clear mandate of the Supreme Court by reason of a panel precedent which we thus appear to be powerless to change or modify. But as the more immediate way out of our present self-created dilemma I would vote for deliberation by the entire court.
Judge SMITH concurs in this dissent.