Court Opinion

ID: 9736001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:39:28.533147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.269276
License: Public Domain

*50Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
Minn. St. 605.115, subd. 6, provides that in cases not specified in its subds. 2 through 5 (which are conceded not to be applicable here) the giving of the bond specified in § 605.10, subd. 6, shall stay proceedings in the court below. The bond provided for in § 605.10 is a $250 cost bond conditioned that appellant pay any costs and charges awarded against him on the appeal.
It is well settled that such a bond (which was filed here) does not vacate or annul the judgment from which the appeal is taken. The latter remains in full force and is res judicata unless modified by this court on the appeal. Pending the appeal the jurisdiction of the trial court is suspended as to matters involved in the appeal, but not as to matters independent of or supplemental to the appeal, or collateral to the proceedings in which the order or judgment appealed from was rendered. State v. Barnes, 249 Minn. 301, 81 N. W. (2d) 864; State ex rel. Spratt v. Spratt, 150 Minn. 5, 184 N. W. 31; West v. Manemann (8 Cir.) 144 F. (2d) 905.
Under the foregoing rule, which seems clear enough, it is my judgment that the cost bond filed here should not serve to stay or restrain the proceedings presently inaugurated by the state labor conciliator. As noted in the majority opinion the labor conciliator’s notice dated July 5, 1966, scheduled a hearing on July 21 and 22, 1966, “for the purpose of gathering pertinent evidence and testimony concerning the establishment of an appropriate representation unit.” It is to be noted that there is nothing in such notice which indicates that the hearing is called for the purpose of determining a representation election date, or that any such procedure is contemplated prior to the decision of this court on appeal.
I fail to see how a hearing for the purpose set forth in the notice would in any way affect the judgment from which this appeal is taken, or in fact how such a hearing in any way relates to “proceedings in the court below” to authorize a stay as specified in § 605.115, subd. 6. Clearly, proceedings contemplated by the labor conciliator are entirely independent of the lower court proceedings and are not directly involved therein. Nor can I see where the proposed action of the con*51ciliator would in any way jeopardize the position of appellant in this appeal or that a substantial or irreparable injury is threatened them if the conciliator proceeds with the contemplated hearing.
The same conclusion was reached by this court in J. F. Quest Foundry Co. v. International M. & F. W. Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N. W. (2d) 32, where it denied an application for temporary injunction enjoining the labor conciliator from proceeding with an election pending appeal. There the court stated (216 Minn. 441, 13 N. W. [2d] 35):
“* * * The purpose of injunctive process is not to allay a litigant’s fears or apprehensions. 3 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 4470; Eastman v. United States (D. C.) 31 F. Supp. 754; Redlands Foothill Groves v. Jacobs (D. C.) 30 F. Supp. 995; Burlington Mills Corp. v. Textile Workers Union (D. C.) 44 F. Supp. 699. The direction of an election is not a final order. It is but an intermediate step in a pending and undetermined investigation. N. L. R. Board v. Falk Corp. 308 U. S. 453, 60 S. Ct. 307, 84 L. ed. 396. The calling of an election does not command plaintiff to do or refrain from doing anything. It does not affect in any way the status of the contract, nor determine any right or obligation thereunder. It merely sets in motion the machinery prescribed by law for the ascertainment of a fact. In passing upon this question in Associated Press v. Herrick (D. C.) 13 F. Supp. 897, 900, the court said:
“ ‘Certification by the board of the names of representatives selected by the complainant’s employees will constitute no more than a mere finding of fact without mandatory effect. * * * A finding of fact in itself is no basis for injunctive relief. United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413, 71 L. Ed. 651.’
“* * * In the instant case, the conciliator, at the request of plaintiff, conducted an investigation and proceeded only so far, when restrained, as to give notice of the election. It cannot be said with certainty at this time what the results of such an election would be. It is possible that it might be determined that the C. I. O. Union continue as the exclusive bargaining agent of plaintiff’s employes, since a major*52ity of them are still members of that union. In any event, it is purely speculative now to determine that the results would be such as to constitute irremediable damage to plaintiff. Injunctive relief cannot be given for what is a mere assumption of a possible result. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Textile Workers Union (D. C.) 44 F. Supp. 699, supra. Some irremediable damage must be shown to establish a case for equitable relief. 3 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 4471; Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 66 App. D. C. 306, 86 F. (2d) 862, and cases there cited.”
See, also, Hotel & Restaurant Employees’ Union v. Tzakis, 227 Minn. 32, 33 N. W. (2d) 859; Local 597 State Capitol Employees v. Quigley, 269 Minn. 261, 130 N. W. (2d) 489; Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N. W. (2d) 18.
Our prior decisions have uniformly held that an administrative action which does not threaten irreparable injury to an appellant cannot be enjoined pending appeal, and this is true, even though the decision from which the appeal is taken is attacked on constitutional grounds.
On the basis of such decisions and on the facts here, I feel that a stay or restraining order is not warranted at this time.