Court Opinion

ID: 9381882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 05:04:45.838466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.189983
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

LUCIOUS CONWAY,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 23, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 360250
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
PAUL BENSON, D.O., COLIN DOE, P.A., also                             LC No. 21-008572-NO
known as COLIN COLTER, P.A., and BE WELL
MEDICAL CENTER,

               Defendants-Appellees.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and SWARTZLE and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff visited the Be Well Medical Center for medical treatment, and Dr. Paul Benson
prescribed plaintiff certain medications that made plaintiff ill. Plaintiff sued for medical
malpractice without filing an affidavit of merit. Defendants moved for a protective order as well
as summary disposition, both of which were granted by the trial court. We affirm.

        Plaintiff required medical treatment for his complex medical history, and he told Colin
Colter, Dr. Benson’s assistant, that he had not been taking his prescribed medication to treat his
medical conditions for more than two years. Upon performing an examination, it was discovered
that plaintiff’s immune system was dangerously weak. Dr. Benson wrote prescriptions for plaintiff
to begin a rapid course of treatment. After ingesting the treatment, plaintiff started to
uncontrollably vomit and he required emergency care for sepsis as well as respiratory failure.

        Plaintiff filed the instant suit, claiming that defendants had committed medical malpractice
by prescribing him medications that allegedly brought about a medical emergency. Plaintiff did
not file an affidavit of merit with his complaint. In lieu of answering, defendants moved for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) to argue that plaintiff’s failure to submit an
affidavit of merit was fatal to his complaint. Plaintiff responded that his complaint sounded in
ordinary negligence.

      Defendants also moved for a protective order to stay discovery while the trial court decided
the motion for summary disposition. The trial court granted defendants the protective order,

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stating that plaintiff could not rely on discovery to create a sufficient basis for his complaint.
Further, the trial court granted defendants summary disposition because plaintiff’s claims sounded
in medical malpractice and he failed to file an affidavit of merit with his complaint.

        “We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition.” Sherman v City of St Joseph, 332 Mich App 626, 632; 957 NW2d 838 (2020)
(citations omitted). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “by
considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Patrick v Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 605; 913 NW2d
369 (2018). “Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman, 332 Mich
App at 632.

        When determining whether a claim sounds in ordinary negligence or medical malpractice,
a reviewing court must determine “(1) whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within
the course of a professional relationship; and (2) whether the claim raises questions of medical
judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Bryant v Oakpointe Villa
Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 422; 684 NW2d 864 (2004). “If both of these questions are
answered in the affirmative, the action is subject to the procedural and substantive requirements
that govern medical malpractice actions.” Id. “A professional relationship exists if a person or an
entity capable of committing medical malpractice was subject to a contractual duty to render
professional healthcare services to the plaintiff.” Kuznar v Raksha Corp, 481 Mich 169, 177; 750
NW2d 121 (2008). The claim raises questions of medical judgment when “the reasonableness of
the action can be evaluated by a jury only after having been presented the standards of care
pertaining to the medical issue before the jury [as] explained by experts.” Bryant, 471 Mich at 423.

        In this case, the treatment that plaintiff was prescribed required medical knowledge of his
complex medical history. Further, the reasonableness of prescribing plaintiff those medications
can only be evaluated when considering whether providers with the same expertise would have
prescribed the same treatment given plaintiff’s complex medical history.

        Plaintiff argues that his claim sounded in ordinary negligence because he was not informed
about the side-effects of the medications and defendants were deliberately indifferent to the
consequences of the side-effects. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of deliberate indifference in the
trial court, however, and this issue is not preserved for appellate review. “Although this Court has
inherent power to review an issue not raised in the trial court to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
generally a failure to timely raise an issue waives review of that issue on appeal.” Walters v Nadell,
481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008) (cleaned up). “By limiting appellate review to those
issues raised and argued in the trial court, and holding all other issues waived, appellate courts
require litigants to raise and frame their arguments at a time when their opponents may respond to
them factually.” Id. at 388. “Generally, a party may not remain silent in the trial court, only to
prevail on an issue that was not called to the trial court’s attention.” Id. Thus, because plaintiff
failed to raise this argument in the trial court, it is waived and we decline to consider it.

        Given the medical knowledge needed to understand the treatment plaintiff required,
plaintiff’s complaint sounds in medical malpractice. MCL 600.2912d(1) requires that “the
plaintiff in an action alleging medical malpractice ... shall file with the complaint an affidavit of

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merit signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably believes meets the
requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169].” To properly commence a medical
malpractice suit, a plaintiff is required to file both a complaint and an affidavit of merit. Zarzyski
v Nigrelli, 337 Mich App 735, 741; 976 NW2d 916 (2021). Plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of
merit, and the trial court did not err when it granted defendants summary disposition because MCL
600.2912d(1) required plaintiff to file that affidavit.

        Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants a protective order,
that stayed discovery until defendants’ motion for summary disposition had been decided, because
discovery would have provided plaintiff the ability to defend that his complaint sounded in
ordinary negligence.

        This Court reviews “a trial court’s decision to grant or deny discovery for abuse of
discretion,” Mercy Mt Clemens Corp v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 219 Mich App 46, 50; 555 NW2d 871
(1996), as well as a trial court’s decision to issue a protective order, In re Pott, 234 Mich App 369,
373; 593 NW2d 685 (1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Radeljak v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 475
Mich 598, 603; 719 NW2d 40 (2006).

       MCR 2.302(C) states, in pertinent part:

              On motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
       on reasonable notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
       pending may issue any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from
       annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one
       or more of the following orders:

       (1) that the discovery not be had;

       (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions . . .

         Thus, any limitations on discovery through a protective order must be shown to be
necessary to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense. Szpak v Inyang, 290 Mich App 711, 714-716; 803 NW2d 904 (2010). “In the
context of our court rules, [g]ood cause simply means a satisfactory, sound or valid reason,” and
“a trial court has broad discretion to determine what constitutes ‘good cause.’ ” Thomas M Cooley
Law Sch v Doe 1, 300 Mich App 245, 264; 833 NW2d 331 (2013) (cleaned up).

       Plaintiff argues that discovery was necessary to uncover whether defendants’ policies
required them to provide informed consent regarding the treatment that he was prescribed, and
whether or not defendants breached that duty to provide informed consent was paramount to
supporting his contention that his claim sounded in ordinary negligence. Underlying plaintiff’s
argument, however, is the contention that medical knowledge was required to understand the side-

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effects of the treatment that he was prescribed and that those treatments would require informed
consent. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the protective order.

       Affirmed. Defendants, as the prevailing parties, may tax costs under MCR 7.219.

                                                           /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                           /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                           /s/ Noah P. Hood

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