Court Opinion

ID: 9586955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:50.709194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:57.419393
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
specially concurring:
Crim.P. 24(e) provides that alternate jurors “shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires,” become unable or disqualified to act as jurors. 7B C.R.S. (1987). Otherwise, an alternate juror “shall be discharged at the time the jury retires to consider its verdict.” The procedure described in Crim.P. 24 does not provide for a rebuttable presumption, and I write separately because I do not agree that this court should go beyond the plain language of the rule to create such a presumption.
The majority notes that “[tjhere is no authority in Colorado ... for a trial court to substitute a previously discharged alternate for a regular juror after deliberations have begun.” Majority, slip op. at 9. Wisconsin adopted a per se rule when it “decline[d] to infer from a silent statute that the legislature approves substitution during jury deliberations.” Wisconsin v. Lehman, 108 Wis.2d 291, 299-300, 321 N.W.2d 212, 219-20 (1982). Although Lehman was addressing the statute,1 I would adopt the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
[I]n view of the significant division of opinion in the legal community as to the wisdom and constitutionality of allowing substitution of an alternate juror after the jury has begun deliberations, we decline to infer legislative approval of such substitution from a silent statute. We hold that in the absence of express authorization by statute or rule for substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror after jury deliberations have begun or in the absence of consent by the defendant to such substitution, hereafter it is reversible error for a circuit court to substitute an alternate juror for a regular juror after deliberations have begun. The decision whether an alternate juror should be permitted to replace a juror who dies, becomes disabled or is otherwise disqualified during the jury’s deliberations is a policy decision which should not be made by each circuit court on a case-by-case basis without any established guidelines. Until there is express authorization permitting a circuit court to substitute an alternate juror during jury deliberations, the circuit *592court has only three options available to it if a regular juror is discharged after jury deliberations have begun: first, to obtain a stipulation by the parties to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors; second, to obtain a stipulation by the parties to substitute a juror; and third, to declare a mistrial.
108 Wis.2d at 302-303, 321 N.W.2d at 222-23 (emphasis added).
The per se rule was also adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir.1975) (“[Rjeversal is required because of the failure of the District Court to comply with the plain requirements of Fed.R. Crim.P. 24(c).”).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has also held that
[although the rule does not specifically address the question of post-deliberation substitution, it unquestionably implies that the court would violate the rule if it replaced a juror with an alternate after the jury retired. “[Wjhen the language of a statute is clear and admits of no more than one meaning, we are not empowered to look beyond the literal words of the statute,” unless the clarity of the language, upon careful scrutiny, is “superficial,” or literal application would provide “absurd results,” create an “obvious injustice,” or frustrate the “legislative purpose.” The same interpretive policy applies to court rules.
Bulls v. United States, 490 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C.App.1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Based on the mandatory and unambiguous language of Crim.P. 24(e), I would conclude that the mid-deliberation juror substitution ordered by the court in this case was reversible error. Berry v. Florida, 298 So.2d 491, 492 (Fla.App.1974) (“The language of this rule is mandatory, not permissive. The trial judge must discharge an alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror, at the time the jury retires to deliberate.”). If appropriate, the rule could be amended to provide a procedure for mid-deliberation juror substitutions, or to provide for the use of eleven jurors under certain circumstances. At this time, the rule contains no such provisions. Because I do not agree with the creation and adoption of a rebuttable presumption under Crim.P. 24(e), I concur in the result only.

. The Wisconsin statute is analogous to F.R.C.P. 24(c) in "not expressly provid[ing] for replacement of regular jurors after the jury retires to consider its verdict.” Id. at 301, 321 N.W.2d at 221.