Court Opinion

ID: 998845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:16:59.18519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:18.373688
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                     No. 97-4867
JAIME RAMIREZ-SALAZAR, a/k/a Jorge
Enrigne Ospina,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.
(CR-97-220-A)

Submitted: May 11, 1999

Decided: June 4, 1999

Before WIDENER and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Gregory Edward Stambaugh, LAW OFFICES OF GREGORY E.
STAMBAUGH, Manassas, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,
United States Attorney, Robert A. Spencer, Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jaime Ramirez-Salazar entered a conditional plea of guilty to a
charge of unlawful entry into the United States after being deported
subsequent to a felony conviction. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a), (b)(2)
(West 1999). He reserved his right to appeal the district court's
refusal to allow testimony concerning his reasons for reentering the
United States and the district court's refusal to allow evidence that he
was not properly advised on how to reenter the United States legally.
On appeal, he also contends that the district court erred in refusing to
depart downward from the guideline range based on Ramirez-
Salazar's reasons for reentering the United States and his willingness
to be deported, rather than incarcerated. Finding no error, we affirm
Ramirez-Salazar's conviction.

This court has held that reentry after deportation is a general intent
crime, a conviction for which only requires proof that the defendant
voluntarily reentered the United States. See United States v. Espinoza-
Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir. 1989). Therefore, evidence as to
Ramirez-Salazar's reasons for reentering the United States is not rele-
vant to whether he, in fact, reentered. See id. We also find that
Ramirez-Salazar's attempt to prove a justification defense under
United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989), fails.

Section 1326(a) "clearly provides notice that unapproved reentry at
any time following deportation is proscribed." United States v.
Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. McCalla, 38 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 1994)), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 66 U.S.L.W. 3296 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1997) (No. 96-9470).
Because the statute is clear and persons are presumed to know the
law, see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991), the lack
of a form detailing how to reenter the United States lawfully is not
relevant to the determination of whether Ramirez-Salazar violated
§ 1326(a).

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The district court determined that, even if it had the authority to
depart downward from the guideline range based on Ramirez-
Salazar's reasons for reentering the United States and his willingness
to be deported, it chose not to exercise that authority. Therefore, the
district court's decision not to depart is not appealable. See United
States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 876 (4th Cir. 1996) ("If a district court
is cognizant of its authority to depart, but does not do so, such a
refusal to depart downward from the guideline range is simply not
appealable.").

In conclusion, we dismiss that portion of the appeal challenging the
district court's decision not to depart from the guideline range and
affirm Ramirez-Salazar's conviction and sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART

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