Court Opinion

ID: 9602534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:56:34.749644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:04.433171
License: Public Domain

*556Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — As the majority states, "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider the material evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmoving party, Joe Novenson. If reasonable persons 'might reach different conclusions the motion should be denied.' Balise v. Underwood, 62 Wn.2d 195, 199, 381 P.2d 966 (1963)."
On the two-pronged test to determine whether an employment relationship exists, the majority apparently concedes the defendant had the right to control plaintiff's conduct in the performance of his duties but argues there is a factual question whether reasonable persons might reach different conclusions as to whether plaintiff consented to this relationship.
From this material evidence at hand, were there any reasonable inferences to be drawn other than that plaintiff consented to the employer-employee relationship? The response of the majority is: (1) A homily on the iniquity of defendant for hiring through a labor broker, which seems at worst an argument ad hominem and at best an argument properly settled by the legislature; and (2) the allegation that certain material factual questions exist regarding plaintiff's consent. On this latter point, the majority says,
The contractual agreement entered by Kelly and Spokane Culvert mentions no contract between Novenson and Spokane Culvert. As a Kelly day-to-day laborer, Novenson engaged in a conversation with a permanent employee of Spokane Culvert regarding the possibility of employment with the company. The trier of fact at trial is the one to draw any inferences as to Novenson's understanding and consent vis-a-vis an employment relationship with Spokane Culvert.
If this were all the trial court had to review in determining consent or inferences as to consent, the majority might have a case.
The facts, however, are somewhat more complete than simply the agreement between Kelly and defendant and the conversation cited by the majority. The undisputed facts *557established by the deposition of plaintiff and properly considered by the trial court on the summary judgment motion under CR 56(c) are: (1) Plaintiff had previously worked through a labor broker in another city and was familiar with the labor broker method of assigning workers to customer's facilities; (2) he understood his superior at Spokane Culvert was an employee of that business and not of Kelly; (3) on the mornings of both his second and his third days of work, plaintiff specifically requested Kelly to assign- him to Spokane Culvert for work; (4) while at defendant's facilities, no Kelly employee in a supervisory capacity at any level looked after or determined anything regarding plaintiff's work; (5) the only supervision or direction given plaintiff came from two employees of Spokane Culvert, the foreman and a machine operator; and (6) Spokane Culvert's supervision directed plaintiff not only as to the machine on which he was to work, but also to the function which he was to perform.
When Novenson accepted the assignment from Kelly, he was aware he would be working at Spokane Culvert's facilities under its direction. His prior familiarity with the arrangements made by labor brokers put him on notice as to his relationship to Kelly and to Spokane Culvert. Even if it might be argued plaintiff did not fully appreciáte this relationship when he first appeared at Kelly, his request on the second and third days to be reassigned to Spokane Culvert removes any inference that he did not consent to work there under the defendant's supervision. From the facts before the court and the inferences drawn from the facts, it can be concluded only that the element of consent was fulfilled. Plaintiff's argument to the trial court that he worked for Spokane Culvert only "in a spirit of cooperation with the dictates of his employer, Kelly Labor, who had ordered him to report to defendant to perform services" is both disingenuous and completely at odds both with the facts before us and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
The reality in this case is that the triangular relationship involving plaintiff, defendant and Kelly is an instance of a *558single employee with two employers. "When such an employee is injured in the course of extrahazardous employment, he is a workman in contemplation of the workmen's compensation act, upon the theory that he is an employee of either one or both of the employers." Lunday v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 620, 624, 94 P.2d 744 (1939).
One final observation: The majority cites no authority upholding its position on a set of facts such as this involving a labor broker, an employer and an employee. This is not remarkable in that neither the parties to this lawsuit nor independent research has revealed such authority. In contrast, there are numerous cases where summary judgment was granted in similar circumstances: Chickachop v. Manpower, Inc., 84 N.J. Super. 129, 201 A.2d 90 (1964); Daniels v. MacGregor Co., 2 Ohio St. 2d 89, 206 N.E.2d 554 (1965); Hamilton v. Shell Oil Co., 233 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Renfroe v. Higgins Rack Coating & Mfg. Co., 17 Mich. App. 259, 169 N.W.2d 326 (1969); St. Claire v. Minnesota Harbor Serv., Inc., 211 F. Supp. 521 (D. Minn. 1962); and Wright v. Habco, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1967).
While this court need not follow the guide of other states (see Eagan v. Spellman, 90 Wn.2d 248, 581 P.2d 1038 (1978)), we ought at least to discuss the arguments raised. The majority has not even attempted to do so.
Plaintiff does not have the facts to support his case. His own depositions and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom show plaintiff consented to the employment relationship with defendant. The trial court performed its duty under our rules and told him so. We should do the same. I would affirm the trial court.
Stafford, Utter, and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied March 14, 1979.