Court Opinion

ID: 9389945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 16:04:43.948447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.720667
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0254
                                Filed April 26, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF Z.J.,
Minor Child,

V.C., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,

District Associate Judge.

       A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.

AFFIRMED.

       Robert W. Davison, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Kimberly Opatz of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Considered by Badding, P.J., Buller, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

       *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                         2

DANILSON, Senior Judge.

      A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child,

challenging the grounds for termination and contending termination is not in the

child’s best interests. Upon our review, we affirm.

I.    Background Facts and Proceedings

      The mother and father began their relationship toward the end of 2019. The

mother gave birth to an older child, V.C., in September 2020. The department of

health and human services became involved with the family later that year due to

concerns that then two-month-old V.C. was being left home alone “for unknown

periods of time,” the family’s “apartment was in a deplorable condition,” and the

mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the child.           V.C. was

adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA), V.C. was removed from the

home, a safety plan was implemented, and services were provided to the mother

and father.1 Eventually, paternity testing determined the father was not V.C.’s

biological father. But the couple “remained in a relationship,” and “[c]oncerns

about [their] stability and safety continued throughout th[e] case,” including

physical violence, drug use, and inconsistent housing. The mother’s parental

rights to V.C. were terminated in March 2022.

      Meanwhile, in September 2021, the father moved to his home state of New

York. Several months later in Iowa, the mother gave birth to Z.J., who was

immediately removed from her care due to her lack of progress in V.C.’s case. In

1Although testing determined he was not V.C.’s biological father, “he and [the
mother] were a couple for a majority of [V.C.’s] case, and services were made
available to [the father] during that time.”
                                           3

March 2022, paternity testing confirmed the father to be Z.J.’s biological father.

Z.J. was adjudicated a CINA, and he has remained out of parental care since birth.

The father has never seen Z.J. in person.

         With the parents making little progress toward reunification, the State filed

a petition to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing over two days in

September 2022, the juvenile court entered an order terminating their parental

rights. The father appealed.2

II.      Standard of Review

         Appellate review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo.

In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021).             Our paramount concern in

termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d

521, 529 (Iowa 2019).

III.     Discussion

         The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2022).              Under Iowa Code section

232.116(1)(e), the State must establish three elements:

                 (1) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA].
                 (2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
         the child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
                 (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents
         have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child
         during the previous six consecutive months and have made no
         reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given
         the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph,
         “significant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to the
         affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by
         the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to
         financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a
         genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case

2   The parental rights of mother were also terminated, and she did not appeal.
                                         4

      permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with
      the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a
      place of importance in the child’s life.

Under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), the State must establish four elements:

             (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
             (2) The child has been adjudicated a [CINA].
             (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
      the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months
      ....
             (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
      cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the
      present time.

      On appeal, the father contends “[t]he grounds for termination as it relates to

the child and Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h) have not been established.”

The father does not specify what element or elements he is challenging. Instead,

he argues “Z.J. could easily be placed with his grandmother in New York in a safe

environment and give [the father] a chance to prove himself.” Specifically, the

father contends:

      An interstate compact home study was approved by the State of New
      York for [the father’s] mother. Z.J. could easily be placed there as
      either a long-term or shorter-term placement to allow Z.J. to remain
      with family and form a stronger bond with his father. . . . An extension
      of time would have allowed that to occur, but [the father] was not
      given the chance to do so.

      We interpret the father’s contention to be an argument that he should have

been granted additional time to work toward reunification. Bypassing the State’s

claim the father has waived a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the grounds for termination,3 we find a ground for termination of the

3 Cf. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (finding the mother “adequately
raised the issue on appeal without targeting reasonable efforts argument to each
specific subsection”).
                                          5

father’s parental rights to Z.J. has been established under section 232.116(1)(h).

At the time of the termination hearing, the father had never met Z.J. “face to face,”

had not provided financially for the child, and struggled to maintain his own

independence without assistance from his mother. A caseworker recalled having

safety concerns with the father’s parenting of V.C. and opined she would not place

a child in his care. Another caseworker testified the father lacked “basic parenting

skills,” had “called [V.C.] names” like “dummy or idiot,” and had exhibited

aggressive behavior toward the mother and providers. Indeed, the record includes

various reports of the father’s “anger issues,” including that he “punch[ed] the wall”

when talking to providers and “made threatening comments about providers and

other individuals.”

       Although the father’s physical distance from the child and limited financial

means should not alone be a cause to terminate his parental rights, the facts reflect

a lack of any evidence showing Z.J. could be safely placed in the father’s care at

the time of the termination hearing. Thus, termination under section 232.116(1)(h)

was proper, and we affirm. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012)

(noting we may affirm the termination order if the record supports termination on

one of the cited grounds).

       We further conclude additional time to work toward reunification was not

warranted in this case. Contrary to the father’s claim that he did not know the

mother was pregnant when he moved from Iowa and he only learned he was Z.J.’s

father in March 2022, a caseworker testified the father “was aware” of the mother’s
                                          6

pregnancy prior to his move to New York and “believed that he was the father.”4

Yet, despite repeated requests by providers, the father had only very recently

participated in substance-abuse and mental-health evaluations.          Although the

father’s substance-abuse evaluation recommended no treatment, a caseworker

expressed concern about his acknowledged regular use of marijuana to “maintain

his mental health.”5 Aside from the father’s drug use, the caseworker opined “the

most concerning thing is just the lack of bond with his child” and his “inability to be

truthful if [the child] were with him.” Indeed, the juvenile court noted the father’s

“entire testimony was questionable as to the credibility,” and the court observed

the father “seemed to give conflicting answers to questions throughout his

testimony.” We give weight to the court’s assessment of the father’s credibility.

See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014).

       In addressing the father’s request for additional time, we have also

considered the paternal grandmother’s testimony that she would assist and

support the father in caring for Z.J. if the child was placed in his care in New York.

But the father’s parental responsibilities cannot be assumed by the grandmother—

despite her “very good intentions”—particularly in this situation where the father is

essentially an unknown to the child and providers.6 We also hesitate to take that

4 Department reports also noted the mother “planned to get custody of [V.C.] back
and then move to New York to be with [the father].”
5 As the juvenile court observed, use of marijuana is legal in New York. Even so,

abuse of the substance may interfere with parenting, as with any other mind-
altering substances including alcohol, and there is some evidence here that the
father’s consumption of the substance may exceed casual use.
6 As one caseworker explained:

       He has never met [Z.J.] in person, never ever demonstrated his
       parenting abilities. There were many concerns in the last case that
       prevented [the mother and the father] from moving forward in
                                           7

leap of faith given the testimony of several caseworkers that the grandmother

“enables” the father and does not “recognize[] the concerns” with his parenting.7

       Lastly, the father asserts termination was not in the child’s best interests

“because of the importance of maintaining children with biological family and

strengthening that bond.” Under our statutory best-interests framework, we “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.”            Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

Consideration of these factors and the father’s lack of progress or participation in

this case provides clear and convincing evidence termination of his parental rights

is in the child’s best interests. We affirm.

       AFFIRMED.

       interactions, parenting concerns. It’s hard to assess parenting when
       he is not here to be a parent to his child.
7 That caseworker further opined, “I don’t believe guardianship is ever appropriate

for a child this young.”