Court Opinion

ID: 9406922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 12:03:55.747829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.147063
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
     Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
     opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
     prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
     official text of the opinion.

      In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                Decided: July 5, 2023

                        S23A0637. WOOD v. THE STATE

      COLVIN, Justice.

      Appellant Bobby Wood, Jr., was convicted of felony murder in

connection with the March 2020 shooting death of Aaron Skinner. 1

On appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the trial court abused its

discretion in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine the

      1 Skinner died on March 30, 2020. On November 6, 2020, a Baldwin
County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), and aggravated assault
(Count 3). On April 16, 2021, Appellant moved for immunity from prosecution
based on self-defense under OCGA § 16-3-24.2. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the immunity motion. At a jury trial held May 10 to 12, 2021, the jury
found Appellant not guilty of malice murder but guilty of felony murder and
aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison with
the possibility of parole for the felony murder count and merged the underlying
aggravated assault count into the felony murder conviction for sentencing
purposes. Appellant’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial on May
14, 2021, which was subsequently amended through new counsel on September
14, 2022. After a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion on
September 29, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was
docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term, and oral argument was held on May
18, 2023.
State’s expert witness about Skinner’s alleged arrest for criminal

trespass on the day before the shooting; (2) the trial court violated

his right to due process by denying him access to certain physical

evidence post-trial; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to the State’s redirect examination of the State’s expert

witness as outside the scope of redirect examination; and (4) the

cumulative effect of the alleged errors committed by the trial court

and trial counsel deprived Appellant of a fair trial. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm.

      1. The evidence at trial showed the following. 2 Around 9:00

p.m. on March 30, 2020, officers with the Baldwin County Sheriff’s

Office were dispatched to Fox Hill Road after a 911 caller reported

      2  Because this case involves questions of harmless error and prejudice
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984), the trial evidence is described in some detail rather than only in the
light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 772
(1) n.2 (865 SE2d 150) (2021) (noting that when assessing whether a trial-court
error was harmless, “we review the evidence de novo and weigh it as a
reasonable juror would, rather than reviewing it in a light most favorable to
upholding the jury’s verdicts of guilty” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See
also Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 382-383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021) (“To
determine whether [a defendant] has shown Strickland prejudice, we review
the record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
jurors to have done.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
                                       2
seeing “a suspicious person.” As an officer was en route to the area,

officers received a second 911 call from Appellant reporting that “a

man was shot” on Fox Hill Road. In response to the 911 operator’s

questions, Appellant revealed that he “shot [the man] . . . with a

rifle.” Appellant further stated that the man, who he identified as

his sister’s ex-boyfriend, was “coming at [him]” and “pointing a gun

at [him] or something and talking real crazy.”

     Upon arriving on the scene, officers found the man “lying on

the ground . . . [i]n the middle of the road” with a “[g]unshot wound

to the lower stomach area.” There were no weapons on or near his

body. Officers were able to identify the man as Skinner based on his

photo in the jail database system. Appellant was still at the scene

and, when asked, immediately identified himself as the shooter,

explaining that Skinner “came at [him], pointing something.” Upon

request, Appellant led the officers to his car, where he had placed

the firearm used to shoot Skinner, which was an AK 7.62 x 39

firearm with “two magazines that were taped together.”

                                 3
     Appellant waived his Miranda rights 3 and consented to be

interviewed by Detective Michael Burrell on the scene. Appellant

informed Detective Burrell that his sister, Sheila Wood (“Sheila”),

had dated Skinner over a year ago and that he “met [Skinner] a few

times and didn’t like him.”         According to Appellant, Sheila and

Skinner had not had any contact in the past year, until Skinner

showed up at Sheila’s house around midnight on the night before

the shooting. Appellant had been visiting Sheila at the time, but did

not speak with Skinner. Appellant further stated that, right before

the shooting, he was inside his house when he received a Facebook

message from his neighbor, Jessica Driggers, informing him that

Skinner was “geeked out” and Skinner was on his way to Appellant’s

house. Appellant went to his car, which was parked next to his

house, to grab his firearm and other belongings because, according

to Appellant, Skinner was a “thief,” and had stolen pistols from him

and Sheila in the past. Appellant then heard his roommate, Keith

Blizard, who was driving away from Appellant’s house but still

     3   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).
                                       4
within earshot, tell someone “to leave,” and Appellant saw Skinner

walking on the road toward his house. Appellant told Skinner to

“stop” and fired three warning shots from inside his fenced-in yard.

Appellant explained that he fired these warning shots at a ditch

near where Skinner was standing, which was between his three-

foot, barbed-wire fence and the roadway, and that Skinner

continued to “come at [him]” while “talking out of his head.”

Appellant stated that he fired one more shot in Skinner’s direction,

saw “sparks like [the bullet] hit the road,” and heard Skinner

“holler.” Appellant explained that he thought Skinner left the area

after the fourth shot, so he went inside his house to retrieve his

phone and a flashlight and then got into his car because he was

“fixing to see where [Skinner] went.” Appellant then saw Skinner

lying in the road and called 911. Throughout the interview, which

was recorded on the body camera of one of the responding officers,

Appellant maintained that he “thought [he] was in danger of

[Skinner] hurting him” but that he was unsure whether Skinner was

actually pointing a gun because “it was dark.”      Appellant also

                                 5
showed Detective Burrell where he was standing in relation to the

ditch and Skinner, and Detective Burrell confirmed with Appellant

that Skinner never entered his driveway or yard.

     On the morning after the shooting, officers went back to

investigate the scene, which was left unsecured overnight. Officers

observed three bullet strikes in the ditch area.         Officers also

observed four additional bullet strikes outside of the ditch and in the

road and general area. Further, the officers found in the general

area a total of seven shell casings and were able to recover two

bullets. Although the State’s ballistic expert testified that the shell

casings visually “matched the bullets that were in the magazines”

seized from Appellant, no further ballistic testing was performed.

     A search of Appellant’s cell phone confirmed his statement that

he had received a Facebook message from Driggers right before the

shooting. Appellant’s cell phone further revealed that he had the

following conversation with Sheila on Facebook Messenger at 9:12

p.m. on the night of the shooting:

     APPELLANT: I shot Aaron so go on to sleep

                                     6
     SHEILA: Seriously? I saw him walking up 49 today and
     [J]essica just said that he keeps coming by there.[4]

     APPELLANT: Seriously

     SHEILA: Is he dead? [J]essica told me his dumb a** was
     headed to you. He must have been tweaking bad

     SHEILA: She said he going on about me. I haven’t talked
     to him in over a year till he popped up. I heard cops
     hauled him off from his mama’s yesterday [so] he must’ve
     come this way?

     APPELLANT: Well [K]eith told [him] he better leave and
     he was talking crazy I told him he better get up road and
     he started at me pointing something I shot he hit ground
     started hollering he loved me I didn’t know if it was a gun
     or what so I shot

Appellant’s cell phone records further revealed that he had called

911 at 9:22 p.m., approximately ten minutes after he first messaged

Sheila.

     Detective Burrell interviewed Appellant two additional times,

both of which were video-recorded. Throughout the interviews,

Appellant maintained that he “didn’t know if [Skinner] had a gun or

not so [he] shot him,” and he stated that he had heard from Sheila

     4   Sheila then sent Appellant a “thumbs up” icon.
                                       7
that Skinner was recently in jail. When Detective Burrell revealed

to Appellant that officers found a total of seven shell casings,

Appellant responded that he thought he had only fired four shots.

Detective Burrell also asked Appellant why it had taken him ten

minutes to call 911 after messaging Sheila. Appellant responded

that he was trying to find a flashlight. During the final interview,

Detective Burrell asked Appellant if he had fired a few shots before

he saw Skinner raise his hand and point in Appellant’s direction,

and Appellant responded, “Yeah.”

     At trial, the jury viewed video recordings of Appellant’s three

interviews and body camera footage of the officers who first arrived

on the scene.    Detective Burrell testified that his investigation

revealed that Skinner had never entered Appellant’s property; that

Appellant began shooting toward Skinner from behind his fence

before he saw Skinner raise his hand and point something at

Appellant; that, when asked if Appellant knew what Skinner was

pointing, Appellant stated that he “d[id]n’t have a clue, it was dark”;

and that Appellant never stated during his interviews that Skinner

                                  8
verbally threatened him.

     The State’s ballistic expert, Major Joseph Bradley King,

testified that, based on the “cluster of shell casings” found, the

shooter fired a total of seven shots from a stationary position. He

further opined that the fatal bullet ricocheted off the roadway before

hitting Skinner and that it was unlikely that Skinner “would have

traveled far [after being hit with the bullet] because he was injured

pretty bad,” indicating that Skinner had been moving away from the

ditch and back toward the road when he was shot.           On cross-

examination, Major King was asked about his decision to leave the

crime scene unsecured on the night of the shooting and whether it

was possible that someone tampered with the evidence. Major King

maintained that it was “unlikely” and that he “[stood] by [his]

decision” to leave the scene unsecured.

     The State called Blizard, Sheila, and Driggers as witnesses.

Blizard testified that, shortly before the shooting, he saw Skinner

walking down the road toward Appellant’s house.         According to

Blizard, Skinner looked like “something was wrong with him,” and

                                  9
Blizard could “tell he was messed up on something.”         Blizard

testified that he told Skinner to go back the other way because he

“kn[e]w through [Appellant]” that Skinner was “a thief.”

     Sheila testified that Skinner came to her house around

midnight on March 29, that he appeared to be intoxicated, and that

he left after she asked him to leave. Sheila also testified that she

saw Skinner again at 4:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting. Skinner

was walking down the highway and again appeared to be

intoxicated. Sheila further testified that Skinner was “sweet” and

“[v]ery attentive” when he was sober. But she said that, when he

was intoxicated, “[h]e was very abusive verbally, sometimes

physically abusive,” and that, “if he had been up for a few days, he

tended to be more violent.” Sheila also stated that, while she and

Skinner were dating, she believed Skinner may have stolen

Appellant’s gun out of his truck.

     Driggers testified that Skinner knocked on her door shortly

before 9:00 on the night of the shooting and was “just babbling

incoherently.” Driggers further testified that she had seen him “a

                                    10
little high before,” but that “this time [she] felt like he was really out

there on something.” Driggers also stated that Skinner had not

threatened her but made her feel “uneasy” and that Skinner did not

appear to have any weapons but “did have a lot of things in his

hands.”

     Additionally, the State called as witnesses two people who were

driving down Fox Hill Road immediately after the shooting. They

testified that Appellant had appeared calm and did not seem to be

too “tor[n] up” about what had happened.

     A medical examiner testified that the bullet retrieved from

Skinner during his autopsy entered at an upward angle and that the

gunshot wound was “rapidly fatal.”         The medical examiner also

testified that Skinner had methamphetamine, amphetamines, and

marijuana in his system when he died.

     The defense introduced as its sole witness a toxicology expert.

She testified that, prior to Skinner’s death, he had “very recently”

used methamphetamine. However, she opined that Skinner “wasn’t

in a binging situation” and had likely used methamphetamine at

                                   11
“one setting . . . and then did not use any more.”

     2. Appellant first contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine Major

King about Skinner’s prior arrest for criminal trespass. Appellant’s

claim fails.

     Before trial, the State moved in limine “to prevent the

defendant from blatantly attacking the victim’s character.”

Specifically, the State sought to exclude evidence that, on the day

before the shooting, Skinner and his mother had an altercation and

Skinner was arrested for criminal trespass. The trial court ruled

that, because Appellant did not know about Skinner’s arrest when

the shooting occurred, the arrest was irrelevant and inadmissible.

     During trial, Appellant twice moved the trial court to reverse

its previous ruling excluding Skinner’s arrest.      First, Appellant

asked the court to revisit its earlier ruling after the jury viewed

video footage from the body cameras of Officers Kevin Veal and

Ashley Brown. The body camera footage showed the officers identify

Skinner based on his photo in the jail database system and discuss

                                  12
that Skinner was “in the jail recently” and had been “locked up for

criminal trespass,” and Appellant argued that the State had “opened

the door” to the arrest.    The State objected, noting that the

prosecutor had stopped playing Officer Brown’s body camera footage

before Skinner’s arrest was mentioned but that defense counsel had

requested that the entire footage be played for the jury. The trial

court denied Appellant’s request. Appellant again asked the court

to reconsider its prior ruling after the following exchange occurred

during the State’s redirect examination of Major King:

     STATE: This jury this week has heard what an awful
     person Aaron Skinner is or was. During the course of your
     investigation, your team’s investigation, did you look at
     Aaron Skinner’s criminal history?

     MAJOR KING: Yes, sir.

     STATE: How many burglary convictions did Aaron
     Skinner have?

     MAJOR KING: None.

     STATE: How many theft by taking convictions did Aaron
     Skinner have?

     MAJOR KING: None.

                                13
     STATE: How many felony convictions did Aaron Skinner
     have?

     MAJOR KING: None.

     STATE: How many battery convictions did Aaron Skinner
     have?

     MAJOR KING: None.

     STATE: How many simple assault convictions did Aaron
     Skinner have?

     MAJOR KING: None.

The trial court again denied the motion, explaining that the

prosecutor’s questioning of Major King was in rebuttal to defense

counsel referring to Skinner as a “thief,” which he had done ten

times during opening statements,5 and that Appellant was entitled

to show Skinner’s character only by reputation or opinion evidence.

     Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

preventing him from cross-examining Major King about Skinner’s

     5  Defense counsel also referred to Skinner as “violent” nine times. For
example, defense counsel stated that the jury would hear evidence that
Skinner, “[who was a] thief[,] who was high, who was violent, who had been
told to leave twice, and who had just heard three warning shots into a ditch
kept coming at [Appellant].”
                                     14
arrest pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-405 (c) (“Rule 405 (c)”). Rule 405

(c) provides an exception to the rule that character evidence

generally must be introduced through reputation or opinion

testimony, see OCGA § 24-4-405 (a), allowing a party to inquire “into

relevant specific instances of conduct” on cross-examination of a

character witness in order to discredit the witness. See Leanos v.

State, 303 Ga. 666, 672 (2) (c) (iii) (814 SE2d 332) (2018) (explaining

that Rule 405 (c) allows a party to cross-examine a character witness

about specific instances of conduct “in an attempt to undermine the

witness’s credibility”). See also United States v. Seymour, 468 F3d

378, 387 (II) (C) (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that, under Federal Rule

of Evidence 405, “inquiry into relevant specific instances of conduct

on cross-examination is allowed only where it goes to the accuracy

of the character witness’s testimony”) (citation and punctuation

omitted).6 According to Appellant, Major King’s testimony showed

      6 “Many provisions of the new Evidence Code were borrowed from the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and when we consider the meaning of these
provisions, we look to decisions of the federal appellate courts construing and
applying the Federal Rules, especially the decisions of the United States

                                      15
that Skinner was a “law-abiding citizen” and, thus, Appellant had

the right on cross-examination to inquire into specific instances of

Skinner’s conduct, such as his arrest, so that the jury heard

“balanced” rather than “exclusively positive” evidence of Skinner’s

criminal history.

     However, even assuming that the trial court abused its

discretion in preventing Appellant from cross-examining Major King

about Skinner’s arrest, any error was harmless.            “The test for

determining whether a non-constitutional evidentiary error was

harmless is whether it is highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.” Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 160-161 (2)

(875 SE2d 789) (2022). When reviewing an evidentiary error for

harmlessness, “we review the record de novo and weigh the evidence

as we would expect reasonable jurors to have done.” Id. at 160-161

(2) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, even assuming the jury heard “exclusively positive”

Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit.” Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2)
(786 SE2d 633) (2016).
                                   16
evidence about Skinner’s criminal record, it is highly probable that

any error in preventing Appellant from cross-examining Major King

about Skinner’s arrest did not contribute to the verdict because the

evidence against Appellant’s self-defense claim was strong. The jury

heard testimony from the State’s ballistics expert that Skinner was

on the opposite side of Appellant’s three-foot, barbed-wire fence

when he was shot and that Skinner had never entered Appellant’s

property. Moreover, the jury heard Appellant’s own assertions that

he began firing at Skinner before Skinner appeared to raise his hand

and point something at Appellant and that he was unsure whether

Skinner had a gun that night. Further, the jury heard testimony

from Driggers, who had encountered Skinner right before the

shooting, that Skinner was clearly under the influence but not

otherwise threatening. See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c)

(829 SE2d 142) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary error was

harmless “in light of the array of other strong evidence

demonstrating Appellant’s guilt”).

     3. Appellant next claims that the trial court violated his right

                                 17
to due process by denying his motion to permit a ballistics expert

retained after trial to access certain physical evidence for purposes

of developing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his

motion for new trial. Appellant argues that the trial court’s denial

of access hindered his right to appeal and deprived him of his right

to due process of law. We are unpersuaded.

     After trial, Appellant retained a ballistics expert in an effort to

determine whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

such an expert at trial. Appellant then moved the court to permit

the ballistics expert to access the AK 7.62 x 39 firearm seized from

Appellant at the time of his arrest, the magazines and cartridge

cases obtained at the scene, and the bullets recovered at the scene

and from Skinner’s body.

     The trial court held a status hearing on the motion, after which

Appellant provided an affidavit from his expert, as well as a letter

in which he claimed that an inspection and examination of the

requested evidence could determine whether Skinner was retreating

from or approaching Appellant’s property when he was shot.

                                  18
According to Appellant, if an examination revealed that the bullet

that hit Skinner had ricocheted off the ditch, rather than the road,

it would discredit the State’s argument that Appellant was not

justified in shooting Skinner in self-defense because Skinner was

retreating from Appellant’s property. The trial court summarily

denied Appellant’s motion to access the evidentiary materials and

proceeded with the hearing on the motion for new trial. At the

hearing, Appellant renewed his earlier motion, which the trial court

again denied.

     To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a

defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for his

lawyer’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Mattox v. State, 308 Ga. 302, 304 (2) (840 SE2d

373) (2020). Accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion

in denying a motion to allow an expert retained post-trial to examine

and test the physical evidence admitted at trial for purposes of

developing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim absent a

showing that “favorable testing results” would reveal “that the

                                 19
outcome of trial would have been different had trial counsel pursued

such testing.” Battles v. State, 290 Ga. 226, 230-231 (3) (719 SE2d

423) (2011) (concluding that “the trial court properly denied

appellant’s request to re-test the scientific evidence” because

appellant failed to demonstrate “how any favorable testing results

may have affected the result at trial”).

     Here, Appellant has failed to make the required showing.

Appellant’s hypothesis that an expert may be able to investigate the

evidence and determine that the fatal shot ricocheted off the ditch,

rather than the road, would be contrary to Appellant’s own

statements that, after he fired toward Skinner, he “saw sparks come

off [the] pavement,” “like [the bullet] hit the road,” and heard

Skinner “holler.” See Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 222 (3) (c)

(ii) (744 SE2d 706) (2013) (trial counsel’s failure to introduce an

expert witness who would testify that the defendant had no

knowledge of firing the gun did not prejudice the defendant where

“there [was] no reasonable probability that the jury would have

found persuasive his testimony,” given the defendant’s own

                                  20
statements to law enforcement officers acknowledging that he fired

the gun). Moreover, the evidence presented, which included a video

of Skinner lying in the road and a presentation of the bullet defects

found in the road, was consistent with the testimony of the State’s

ballistics expert that the shot that killed Skinner “absolutely”

ricocheted first off the road. See Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 77

(2) (586 SE2d 313) (2003) (concluding that the defendant could not

show a reasonable likelihood that, but for his trial counsel’s failure

to retain an expert, the outcome of his trial would have been

different, given that the evidence presented at trial was consistent

with the testimony of the State’s medical examiner).         Further,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that, even if he presented

evidence that the fatal shot had ricocheted off the ditch rather than

the road, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his

trial would have been different. The jury was authorized to reject

Appellant’s claim that he shot Skinner in self-defense, given that

Appellant was shooting at Skinner from the opposite side of his

fenced-in yard, that Skinner never entered his property, and that he

                                 21
was unsure whether Skinner had a gun that night. See Davis v.

State, 312 Ga. 870, 873 (1) (855 SE2d 390) (2021) (jury authorized to

reject self-defense claim in part because the defendant “admitted

that he did not see [the victim] pull a gun during the incident”).

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim fails. 7

      4. Appellant also argues that he received constitutionally

ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to

object to the State’s questioning of Major King on redirect

examination about Skinner’s lack of criminal convictions. According

to Appellant, the redirect examination was improper because Major

King had not testified on cross-examination about Skinner’s record.

      To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show both “that his counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result.”

      7 Appellant also cites Sheard v. State, 300 Ga. 117 (793 SE2d 386) (2016),
for the proposition that the denial of access to physical trial evidence violated
his due process rights. Appellant’s reliance on that case is misplaced. In
Sheard, we held that a defendant is entitled to have a trial transcript that
allows for “adequate appellate review of the trial below” id. at 120 (2), not that
a defendant is entitled to have trial exhibits made available for inspection post-
trial.
                                       22
Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022)

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80

LE2d 674) (1984)). To prevail on the deficiency prong, the defendant

“must demonstrate that the lawyer performed his duties in an

objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances in

light of the prevailing professional norms.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga.

180, 182-183 (2) (787 SE2d 221) (2016). “To prove prejudice, [the

defendant] must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have

been different.” Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3). “Failure to satisfy

either prong of the Strickland test is sufficient to defeat a claim of

ineffective assistance, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to

examine the other prong.” Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 733 (2) (770

SE2d 610) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, even assuming deficient performance, Appellant has not

shown that Major King’s testimony about Skinner’s lack of criminal

convictions prejudiced his defense. As we explained in Division 2,

the evidence against Appellant’s self-defense claim was strong,

                                 23
irrespective of whether the jury heard “exclusively positive”

evidence about Skinner’s criminal history. The jury heard evidence

that Skinner was on the opposite side of Appellant’s barbed-wire

fence when he was shot and never entered his property and heard

Appellant’s interview statements that he was unsure whether

Skinner had a gun that night and that Appellant fired toward

Skinner before Skinner raised his hand and pointed in Appellant’s

direction. Given that the evidence against Appellant was strong,

Appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s alleged deficiency, the result of the trial would have been

different. See Bell v. State, 294 Ga. 443, 446 (2) (754 SE2d 327)

(2014) (concluding that any deficiency in trial counsel’s failure to

object to the prosecutor’s questioning of a witness did not result in

prejudice “[g]iven the substantial evidence of [the defendant’s]

guilt”). Accordingly, this claim fails.

     5. Appellant lastly contends that the cumulative effect of the

trial court’s assumed error in preventing Appellant from cross-

examining Major King about Skinner’s arrest and trial counsel’s

                                   24
assumed deficiency in failing to object to the State’s redirect

examination of Major King about Skinner’s lack of criminal

convictions denied him a fair trial. 8 We disagree.

      To establish cumulative error, a defendant must demonstrate

that “at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial”

and “considered together along with the entire record, the multiple

errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the

petitioner a fundamentally fair trial.” State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 21

(4) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). When

considering the “cumulative effect of presumed errors by trial

counsel and the trial court,” this Court “consider[s] collectively the

prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along with the

prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel.” Patterson

v. State, 314 Ga. 167, 181 (5) (875 SE2d 771) (2022) (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      8Appellant does not argue that the trial court’s alleged error in denying
his expert access to certain physical evidence contributed to cumulative
prejudice. However, this makes no difference in the cumulative-error analysis
because we concluded that no error occurred. See Division 3, supra.

                                      25
     Appellant’s claim fails. As noted above, even assuming the jury

heard “exclusively positive” evidence of Skinner’s criminal history,

the trial evidence rebutting Appellant’s self-defense claim was

strong, particularly in light of Appellant’s own statements that he

fired at Skinner before Skinner raised his hand, that he did not

know if Skinner had a gun that night, and that Skinner never

entered his property. Accordingly, Appellant has not demonstrated

that the prejudicial effect of the assumed trial-court error and

assumed deficient performance denied him a fundamentally fair

trial. See Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 568 (6) (883 SE2d 773) (2023)

(“Appellant’s [cumulative-error] claim fails because Appellant has

not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of the assumed trial-

court errors and ineffective assistance denied him a fundamentally

fair trial, given the strong evidence against him.”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  26