Court Opinion

ID: 9380761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 14:00:33.585836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.382642
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12283    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 03/21/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12283
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       MARKUS D. BELL,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Southern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00003-TFM-C-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12283

       Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              After appellant Markus D. Bell admitted that he violated the
       conditions of his supervised release, the district court revoked his
       supervised release and imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprison-
       ment, which was above the applicable range under the Sentencing
       Guidelines. On appeal, Bell argues that his sentence was procedur-
       ally unreasonable because that the district court failed to explain
       why it imposed an upward variance. Because we agree with Bell
       that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to
       impose an upward variance, we vacate and remand.
                                        I.
              In 2018, Bell finished serving a 51-month sentence for a fire-
       arms offense. Upon his release, Bell began to serve a three-year
       term of supervised release. On three separate occasions, the district
       court found that Bell had violated the terms of his supervised re-
       lease and revoked his supervised release. Each time, the district
       court sentenced Bell to a term of incarceration (each term was be-
       tween six and eight months) followed by a term of supervised re-
       lease.
              In April 2022, Bell was released from custody and began to
       serve his most recent term of supervised release. One condition of
       the supervised release was that Bell complete it at a residential
       reentry center. On the day of his release, Bell was supposed to
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       22-12283                   Opinion of the Court                        3

       report to a residential reentry center in Mississippi. But Bell never
       showed up at the center and failed to respond to his probation of-
       ficer’s multiple attempts to make contact. After Bell had been miss-
       ing for approximately two weeks, the probation officer filed a peti-
       tion to revoke Bell’s supervised release. Bell was subsequently ar-
       rested and admitted that he had violated the terms of his supervised
       release.
               In revocation proceedings, the probation officer made a con-
       fidential recommendation to the court about an appropriate sen-
       tence. The probation officer calculated Bell’s Sentencing Guide-
       lines range as 8–14 months’ imprisonment. The probation officer
       recommended that the district court impose a sentence of 24
       months with no period of supervised release to follow. He believed
       that this sentence was warranted because Bell showed “little re-
       spect . . . for rules and authority.” Doc. 72 at 7. 1 Based on his “lim-
       ited interaction[s] with Bell,” the probation officer determined that
       Bell had “no intention of following the instructions and orders” of
       the court. Id.
              At the revocation hearing, the district court found that Bell
       had violated the terms of his supervision and revoked his super-
       vised release. At the hearing, the court heard from the parties about
       an appropriate sentence. Bell asked the court to impose a sentence
       of time served followed by six months of supervised release in
       which he would wear an ankle monitor. The government

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-12283

       requested that the court impose a sentence of 24 months. At no
       point during the revocation hearing did the parties or the court
       mention the applicable guidelines range.
             After hearing from the parties, the court sentenced Bell to
       24 months’ imprisonment with no term of supervised release to
       follow. When the district court pronounced the sentence, the court
       did not mention any of the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 2
       or expressly acknowledge that it was imposing a sentence outside
       the applicable guidelines range.
              This is Bell’s appeal.
                                             II.
             If a defendant fails to clearly and specifically object at the
       time of sentencing to the procedural reasonableness of a sentence
       imposed by the district court, we ordinarily review for plain error.
       United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014).
       But we review de novo whether a district court complied with
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) by stating with sufficient specificity its reason

       2 The sentencing factors set forth at § 3553(a) include the need to: deter crim-
       inal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct;
       and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational training,
       medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Other
       factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
       characteristics of the defendant, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent
       policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwar-
       ranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
       Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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       22-12283               Opinion of the Court                         5

       for imposing a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range,
       even when the defendant did not raise an objection based on
       § 3553(c)(2) below. United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 996–97
       (11th Cir. 2016); see United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262,
       1265 (11th Cir. 2023) (same).
                                        III.
              Upon finding that a defendant violated a condition of super-
       vised release, a district court may revoke his supervised release and
       impose a term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). When
       imposing a term of imprisonment, the district court must consider
       the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
               A district court commits a significant procedural error if it
       fails to calculate the defendant’s guidelines range; fails to consider
       the § 3553(a) factors; bases the sentence on clearly erroneous facts;
       or fails to adequately explain the sentence, including an explanation
       for any deviation from the guidelines range. United States v. Hill,
       643 F.3d 807, 879 (11th Cir. 2011). If the district court imposes a
       sentence outside the applicable guidelines range, it must “state in
       open court . . . the specific reason” for the variance. 18 U.S.C. §
       3553(c)(2). This statement “must be sufficiently specific so that an
       appellate court can engage” in meaningful review of the district
       court’s decision to impose a variance. Parks, 823 F.3d at 997 (inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted). If the district court fails to make an
       adequate statement, “the case must be remanded for resentenc-
       ing.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                   22-12283

              Bell argues that the district court committed a procedural
       error in this case because at the revocation hearing the “district
       court did not state a specific reason for the upward variance.” Ap-
       pellant’s Br. at 9. We agree.
               Because the 24-month sentence in this case was above the
       applicable guidelines range, the district court was required to state
       in court the specific reason for the variance. See 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(c)(2); Parks, 823 F.3d at 997. The district court failed to do
       so. At the revocation hearing, the court gave no indication why it
       was imposing a sentence outside the guidelines range. In fact, it did
       not explain at the hearing why it selected a 24-month sentence and
       never mentioned any of the § 3553(a) factors. In addition, the dis-
       trict court failed to calculate the applicable guidelines range and did
       not expressly acknowledge that it was imposing an upward vari-
       ance. Because the district court’s statements at the revocation hear-
       ing are insufficient for us to engage in meaningful appellate review
       of the court’s decision to impose an upward variance, we remand
       for resentencing.3 See Parks, 823 F.3d at 997.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.

       3 Having decided that we must remand for resentencing, we need not and do
       not reach Bell’s argument that the 24-month sentence was substantively un-
       reasonable.