Court Opinion

ID: 9738313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:45.3306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:40:17.603679
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Sullivan, J.
Notwithstanding this writer’s tacit concurrence in Bell v. Wabash Valley Trust Co. (1972), 154 Ind. App. 575, 290 N.E.2d 454, wherein an appeal was dismissed under similar circumstances, I do not concur here. In the interim, opportunity for reflection upon the purpose of AP. Rule 2(A) has compelled my change of procedural position.
As applied by the majority here, AP. Rule 2(A) is unduly harsh. In my view the Rule serves a legitimate purpose only insofar as it tends to expedite the appellate process. Its exclusive value is in its prevention of an appellant from procrastinating nearly to the end of the 90 day filing period provided by AP. 3(B) and then seeking an extension of time in order to request, at that late date, that a transcript be prepared. Application of the rule should be restricted to the implementation of that purpose.
In the matter before us, appellant’s transcript was filed within the 90 day period required by AP. 3(B) and appellant’s brief was timely filed pursuant to AP. 8.1(A). It should also be noted that the appellee filed his answer brief within 30 days thereafter as required.
Rule AP. 2(A) itself does not state that filing of the praecipe is truly jurisdictional. It merely says that failure to so file constitutes a forfeiture of the right of appeal. Unless, *99therefore forfeiture is claimed timely, this court need not in all cases and sua sponte impose the penalties of such “forfeiture” upon an appellant. See Langley v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538 at 542 and 545.
Appellant, I believe has good cause to argue that by filing his answer brief upon the merits, appellee has waived any such technical forfeiture on the part of appellant. See Board of Tax Commissioners v. Stanley (1952), 231 Ind. 338, 108 N.E.2d 624.
Be that as it may, and even if appellee has not waived the grounds for dismissal as asserted in his October 12, 1972 motion to dismiss, by the filing of his answer brief upon the merits, no delay has been occasioned by the very technical failure to reduce to writing appellant’s timely request for the transcript and by the technical failure to make such request a formal matter of record. When the purposes of the rule are not frustrated the court need not visit the wrath of dismissal upon an otherwise diligent appellant who expedites the appeal. For purposes of facilitating the appellate process who is the friend and who is the culprit? On the one hand is the appellant who technically fails to timely praecipe in writing for a transcript but who nevertheless timely (within 90 days of the ruling on the Motion to Correct Error) files such record and who thereafter without extension of time files his brief. On the other hand is the appellant who though timely and within 30 days praecipes for the record but nevertheless seeks repeated extensions of time for the filing of such transcript and repeated petitions for time to file his brief. The question I believe is rhetorical.
I would overrule the appellee’s alternative motion to dismiss or affirm, and would proceed to a determination of the appeal upon its merits.