Court Opinion

ID: 9531323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:09:47.632844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:24.894795
License: Public Domain

*548Hunter, J.
(concurring) — I concur. The facts of this case are disclosed in the appellant’s brief and are not disputed by the defendant.
On Wednesday evening, October 3, 1973, the Bellevue Police Department received a report of a burglary at the Quorum Apartments. Officer Lorack, being in the immediate vicinity, was dispatched to the scene of the crime. Upon arriving, the officer observed the defendant in a Volkswagen traveling in the opposite direction without any headlights on. Seeing the police car, the defendant pulled into a dead-end drive leading to the Bellevue Community College. Being suspicious, the officer followed the defendant, pulled the car over, and inquired as to why the defendant’s headlights were not on. The defendant explained that he was having difficulty with his electrical system, had already made a makeshift repair, and had forgotten to turn the lights back on. The officer actuated the light switch and found the headlights to be functioning properly. The officer then inquired as to the defendant’s presence in the driveway to the college, to which the defendant responded that he was returning home from an insurance client’s home in Issaquah and that he was lost. Since the defendant resembled the description of the burglary suspect, and because the officer was not satisfied with the defendant’s answers, he advised the defendant of his rights to remain silent.
Officer Lorack again requested the defendant to explain his presence in the area. This time, according to the appellant, the defendant stated that he had been at Totem Lake in Kirkland on business, and was en route home to Seattle. While this discussion was going on, the officer received word that a witness to the burglary was en route to his location to determine if the defendant was the same individual who committed the burglary. Upon arriving, the witness positively identified the defendant as the person he had observed, in addition to identifying the defendant’s sweater and vehicle. The defendant was arrested for investigation of burglary.
*549On November 12, 1973, the police laboratory determined that latent fingerprints found on the door to the apartment which had been burglarized, were not those of the defendant. On the next day the prosecutor’s office dismissed the burglary charges.
On November 14, 1973, a misdemeanor warrant was issued, charging the defendant with violating the Bellevue “wandering and prowling” ordinance.
The purpose of the “wandering and prowling” ordinance is to protect persons and property from criminal activity by preventing crime at its inception. This was accomplished under the facts of the instant case under the investigative authority of the police officer without any utilization of the Bellevue “wandering and prowling” ordinance. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1967); State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974); State v. Davis, 12 Wn. App. 32, 527 P.2d 1131 (1974). In the case at bar, the defendant’s apprehension and subsequent arrest were premised on a finding by the officer that probable cause existed to reasonably believe that a burglary had been committed by the defendant. The defendant’s release resulted from a determination that there was insufficient evidence to bring him to trial for the commission of this crime. The ensuing arrest of the defendant under the “wandering and prowling” ordinance amounted to nothing more than harassment, since it is inconceivable that the ordinance was being employed to protect the public from the commission of a crime by this defendant.
It is argued that by striking down this ordinance the investigative authority of the police will be curtailed and that the police will have to wait for an overt act to occur which is itself a crime, or demonstrates an intent to commit a crime before it can intercede. This contention is wholly without merit. Its fallacy is demonstrated by the facts of this case, since this officer was able to stop the defendant, question him, and lawfully place him under arrest without any reliance on the “wandering and prowling” ordinance.
*550In conclusion, this ordinance is totally unnecessary for the accomplishment of its intended purpose: the prevention of crime at its inception. The police are in no way limited in the protection of the public from criminal activity by our striking down this ordinance.