Court Opinion

ID: 9742083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:18.185168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.224649
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring: I concur with the majority’s result but write separately to address the issue of preemption. Despite asking the parties to discuss preemption at oral argument, and despite the fact that the majority of the discussion at oral argument concerned preemption, the majority does not address that issue. Preemption can, as discussed below, have subject-matter jurisdiction implications. Although United Way did not raise preemption before the trial court or on appeal, this court has a duty to sua sponte consider whether jurisdiction exists. See In re Marriage of Mardjetko, 369 Ill. App. 3d 934, 935, 861 N.E.2d 354, 355 (2007). Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (29 U.S.C. §185 (2000)), preempts state-law claims when the claims require the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. See Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410, 423, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1885 (1988). Moreover, section 301 reaches beyond collective-bargaining agreements and applies to “agreement[s] between employers and labor organizations significant to the maintenance of labor peace between them.” Retail Clerks International Ass’n, Local Unions Nos. 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 28, 7 L. Ed. 2d 503, 510, 82 S. Ct. 541, 548 (1962). The Memorandum between United Way and the AFL-CIO meets that definition here. Whether a preemption defense can be forfeited depends on the nature of the alleged preemption. The majority of federal courts addressing the issue have concluded that if preemption only alters the ápplicable substantive law, a party can forfeit the preemption defense by failing to raise it. Wolf v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 71 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1995); Dueringer v. General American Life Insurance Co., 842 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Armored Transport of California, Inc., 813 F.2d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1987); Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986). If, however, preemption alters the forum applying the law, the defense cannot be forfeited because it is essentially an issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. See International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 393 n.11, 90 L. Ed. 2d 389, 402 n.11, 106 S. Ct. 1904, 1913 n.11 (1986) (holding that preemption can be raised at any time where Congress has vested jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts because the state court had no power to act). Therefore, the issue here is whether section 301 preemption affects the choice of forum or the choice of law; that is, whether section 301 gives federal courts the exclusive jurisdiction over suits for violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations representing their employees or merely provides that federal law will apply regardless of the location of the suit. The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506-07, 7 L. Ed. 2d 483, 486-87, 82 S. Ct. 519, 522 (1962). Both state and federal courts, however, must apply federal law in deciding the claims. See Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102, 7 L. Ed. 2d 593, 598, 82 S. Ct. 571, 576 (1962). Because section 301 provides for the application of federal law and not exclusive federal jurisdiction, the defense of preemption under section 301 can be forfeited. See National Metalcrafters, a Division of Keystone Consolidated Industries v. McNeil, 784 F.2d 817, 825-26 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a defendant may raise a section 301 preemption argument for the first time on appeal only in special circumstances); Sweeney v. Westvaco Co., 926 F.2d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 1991) (section 301 preemption can be forfeited); but see Flanagan v. Comau Pico, 274 Mich. App. 418, 426-27, 733 N.W.2d 430, 435 (2007) (holding that federal law preempts state law in a dispute governed by section 301 and a party may not forfeit its application). As a result, United Way forfeited that argument here. However, in Gelb, a case cited by the majority, the First District stated that “[sjection 301 grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal district courts over suits for violations of contracts between employers and labor organizations representing their employees.” Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 826 N.E.2d at 398. At oral argument, both parties asserted that this statement, to the extent it held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over violations of collective-bargaining agreements, was wrong. Although Gelb contains the statement that the jurisdiction is “exclusive,” the Gelb court did not actually find that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, as the court proceeded to address the section 301 issue under federal law. Had the Gelb court meant that jurisdiction was exclusive in the federal court, the court would have dismissed the cause of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, I write to specially concur.