Court Opinion

ID: 2964272
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:03.285631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:51.355113
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USCA1 Opinion

	

               [This opinion is For Pubication as of October 21, 1996.]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1093

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  RAYMOND J. BLAIS,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                       [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               John J. Barter, by Appointment of the Court, for appellant.
               ______________
               Margaret E. Curran, Assistant  United States Attorney,  with
               __________________
          whom Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and Stephanie S.
               __________________                              ____________
          Browne,  Assistant  United States  Attorney,  were  on brief  for
          ______
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   August 28, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.  Defendant-appellant Raymond J.
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          Blais  ("Blais")  appeals  his   conviction  under  18  U.S.C.   

          922(g)(1), as well as his  resulting sentence of 235 months in  a

          federal corrections facility plus five years' supervised release.

          We affirm the judgment of the district court in both regards.

                                    I. BACKGROUND
                                    I. BACKGROUND
                                       __________

                    On February 3, 1994,  Blais was arrested in Providence,

          Rhode Island, after Providence police discovered a firearm in his

          apartment.  On May 27, 1994, a federal grand jury returned a one-

          count indictment charging Blais with being a felon in  possession

          of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.   922(g)(1).  On June 29,

          1994,  Blais  filed a  motion to  suppress,  which was  denied on

          October 12, 1994.

                    Viewed  in the  light  most favorable  to the  verdict,

          United  States v. Bartelho, 71 F.3d 436, 438 (1st Cir. 1995), the
          ______________    ________

          following facts could have been found by a reasonable jury.  O  n

          February  3,  1994, Providence  Police  Reserve  Officers Timothy

          Dupuis  ("Officer Dupuis") and  David Paolino ("Officer Paolino")

          went to 160 Benedict Street, a Providence Housing Authority high-

          rise  apartment   building,  in  response   to  a  report   of  a

          disturbance.    The  complainant,  Geraldine  McGill  ("McGill"),

          alleged that  Blais had  threatened her verbally  and physically,

          and  that he possessed a  firearm.  In  response, Officer Dupuis,

          Officer  Paolino and  a security  guard, Alan  Rivera ("Rivera"),

          headed for Blais's  apartment.   Officer Dupuis  walked down  the

          hallway  first, and he spotted  a man, whom  he later learned was

                                         -2-

          Blais,  carrying  a  handgun.   After  seeing  the  man enter  an

          apartment, Officers  Dupuis and Paolino  knocked on the  door and

          announced that they were  police officers.  Failing to  receive a

          response, they  again  knocked and  announced  their  identities,

          after  which  the  apartment's  occupant  asked  who  was  there.

          Officer  Dupuis again stated that it  was the police.  Failing to

          obtain any  further response, the officers  knocked and announced

          themselves a third time.  In response to another inquiry, Officer

          Dupuis stated that it was the police and that the occupant should

          open the door.  At this point, Blais opened the  door and invited

          them in, saying, "Come on in, I'll talk to you in my apartment."

                    Officers  Dupuis and  Paolino,  and then  later Rivera,

          entered the apartment, which consisted of a single open room that

          functioned  as a  bedroom,  living room  and  dining room.    The

          officers proceeded  to question Blais, who  appeared intoxicated,

          about  the incident  with  McGill.   At  some point  during  this

          questioning, Blais sat down on the corner of the bed, and Officer

          Dupuis spotted a firearm lying on the bed behind Blais.

                    At trial,  the parties  stipulated as to  Blais's prior

          conviction of  a crime punishable by a term of more than one year

          in prison prior to February 3, 1994, and on November 8, 1994, the

          jury returned a verdict of guilty on the indictment's lone count.

          On January 11, 1995, Judge Lisi sentenced Blais to 235 months  in

          prison, as well as  a 5-year term of  supervised release and  the

          statutory assessments.

                                         -3-

                                    II. DISCUSSION
                                    II. DISCUSSION
                                        __________

                    Blais  makes four  types of  argument.   The first  set

          hinges  on  his contention  that, in  light  of United  States v.
                                                          ______________

          L pez,  ___  U.S.  ___, 115  S.  Ct.  1624,  1626-27 (1995),  his
          _____

          indictment,  his   jury  instructions  and   his  conviction  are

          unconstitutional, or, failing that, the government failed to meet

          its  burden  under L pez  with respect  to  showing an  effect on
                             _____

          interstate commerce.  Second, Blais contests the district court's

          denial  of  his motion  to suppress.    Third, he  challenges the

          district court's  denial of his motion  for exculpatory evidence.

          Fourth, and finally, he  argues that the district court  erred by

          refusing to limit or identify which of Blais's  prior convictions

          it would allow  the government  to introduce if  he were to  deny

          committing the present offense.

                   A.  The Constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1),
                   A.  The Constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1),
                       Interstate Commerce and Related Arguments
                       Interstate Commerce and Related Arguments

                    Blais  makes four  related arguments  regarding section

          922(g)(1)  and the issue of whether his conviction is pursuant to

          a proper exercise of the power of the federal government.  Citing

          L pez, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S. Ct. 1624, Blais argues that:  (1) the
          _____

          statute   under   which  he   was   charged   and  convicted   is

          unconstitutional; (2)  his indictment  was defective for  lack of

          any allegation of effect on interstate commerce; (3) the jury was

          improperly  instructed in  a manner that  omitted any  element of

          substantial effect  on interstate commerce; and  (4) the district

          court erred in  denying his  motion for a  judgment of  acquittal

                                         -4-

          based on the  Government's failure to meet its  burden to show an

          effect on interstate commerce.

                    In L pez,  the Supreme  Court struck down  the Gun-Free
                       _____

          School Zones Act, 18  U.S.C.   922(q), which prohibited  a person

          from possessing  a gun while in a "school zone."  L pez, ___ U.S.
                                                            _____

          at ___, 115  S. Ct. at 1631; see United  States v. McAllister, 77
                                       ___ ______________    __________

          F.3d 387,  389 (1st Cir. 1996).   The Court held  that in passing

          section 922(q),  Congress exceeded  its power under  the Commerce

          Clause because that statute was

                      not  an  essential   part  of  a   larger
                      regulation of economic activity, in which
                      the regulatory scheme  could be  undercut
                      unless   the  intrastate   activity  were
                      regulated.    It  cannot,  therefore,  be
                      sustained   under  our   cases  upholding
                      regulations of activities that  arise out
                      of  or are  connected  with a  commercial
                      transaction,   which    viewed   in   the
                      aggregate,      substantially     affects
                      interstate commerce.

          L pez, ___ U.S.  at ___, 115  S. Ct. at  1631.  Blais's  argument
          _____

          with respect to section  922(g)(1) is essentially that:   (1) the

          statute provides that it is unlawful for a felon

                      to  ship  or transport  in  interstate or
                      foreign  commerce,  or   possess  in   or
                                                        _______
                      affecting   commerce,   any  firearm   or
                      ____________________
                      ammunition; or to receive any firearms or
                      ammunition  which  has  been  shipped  or
                      transported in interstate commerce,

          18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)  (emphasis added); and (2)  this court should

          not assume  that Congress  must have meant  "affecting interstate
                                                                 __________

          commerce"  when  it said  "affecting  commerce"  with respect  to

          firearm possession by a felon.  As a result, claims Blais, he was

          charged pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.

                                         -5-

                    However,   Blais's   challenge    to   the    statute's

          constitutionality  is foreclosed  by previous  decisions of  this

          court.   Since L pez,  this court has  twice ruled  that a facial
                         _____

          challenge to the  constitutionality of the  statute at issue,  18

          U.S.C. 922(g)(1), is "hopeless on . . . the law."

          United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 1996), 75 F.3d
          _____________    _______

          40,  49 (1st cir. 1996) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 431
                                          ___________    _____________

          U.S.  563 (1977) (discussed in  United States v.  L pez, ___ U.S.
                                          _____________     _____

          ___, 115  S. Ct. 1624 (1995))) ;  United States v. Abernathy, ___
                                            _____________    _________

          F.3d ___, 1996  WL 199620,  *2 (1st Cir.  1996) (rejecting  post-

          L pez  Commerce Clause-based  challenge to  power of  Congress to
          _____

          enact    922(g)(1)  and 922(k) and  quoting Bennett's description
                                                      _______

          of "hopeless[ness]")); see  also United States v. Joost, ___ F.3d
                                 _________ _____________    _____

          ___, No.  95-2032, slip op. at  17 (1st Cir. Aug. 7,  1996).  The

          implication of  our holding  in Bennett  is  that Scarborough  is
                                          _______           ___________

          still good  law after L pez.  Bennett,  75 F.3d at 49.   We state
                                _____   _______

          that here more  fully.  In  so doing, we are  in accord with  the

          other circuit  courts  that have  confronted  similar  post-L pez
                                                                      _____

          challenges  to   section  922(g)(1).     See  United   States  v.
                                                   ___  _______________

          McAllister,  77 F.3d  387,  390 (11th  Cir.  1996) (stating  that
          __________

          "[n]othing in L pez suggests that the 'minimal nexus' test should
                        _____

          be changed"); United  States v. Sorrentino,  72 F.3d 294,  296-97
                        ______________    __________

          (2d Cir. 1995);  United States v. Bell, 70  F.3d 495, 497-98 (7th
                           _____________    ____

          Cir. 1995); United States  v. Hinton, 69 F.3d 534, 1995 WL 623876
                      _____________     ______

          (per curiam) (unpublished decision  4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
                                                              ____________

          116 S. Ct. 1026 (1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400
                                  _____________    ______

                                         -6-

          (10th Cir. 1995),  cert. denied,  116 S. Ct.  966 (1996);  United
                             ____________                            ______

          States  v. Shelton,  66 F.3d  991 (8th  Cir. 1995)  (per curiam),
          ______     _______

          cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1364 (1996); United  States v. Mosby, 60
          ____________                          ______________    _____

          F.3d  454, 456 (8th Cir.),  cert. denied, 116  S. Ct. 938 (1996);
                                      ____________

          United States v.  Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456, 1462 n.2  (9th Cir. 1995);
          _____________     _____

          see also  United States v.  Spires, 79  F.3d 464,  466 (5th  Cir.
          ________  _____________     ______

          1996)  (upholding the statute under plain error review).  We also

          note in  passing that, confronting a  L pez-based challenge, this
                                                _____

          court also has upheld charges for possession of a firearm with an

          obliterated   serial  number   under  18   U.S.C.      922(k)  as

          constitutional,  and that statute's  language, like  the language

          Blais  challenges, also makes it unlawful for a felon to "possess

          in or  affecting commerce,  any firearm  or ammunition."   United
                                                                     ______

          States v. D az-Mart nez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir. 1995).
          ______    _____________

                    Given the constitutionality of  the statute, we believe

          that  the  indictment and  the  jury  instructions are  similarly

          valid,  since  both  tracked  the  language  of  the  statute  in

          question.   Furthermore, the district court read to the jury both

          the statute  and the  indictment and specifically  instructed the

          jury that  as one of the  elements of the crime  in question, the

          prosecution  had to  prove  beyond a  reasonable  doubt that  the

          firearm had  been  in  or affecting  interstate  commerce.    The
                                               __________

          district court stated that "[t]he Government may  meet its burden

          with  respect to  this element  by proving  a connection  or link

          between interstate  commerce and the possession  of the firearm."

          The court  went on  to state  that  "[i]t is  sufficient for  the

                                         -7-

          Government  to satisfy  this element to  prove that  the firearm,

          allegedly  possessed  by  the  Defendant,  had[,]  at  some  time

          previously,  travelled  across a  state  line"  -- a  proposition

          supported by the Supreme Court's holding in Scarborough, 431 U.S.
                                                      ___________

          at  575 (holding, under  the predecessor statute  to   922(g)(1),

          that  proof that  the possessed  firearm previously  travelled in

          interstate  commerce was  sufficient  to  establish  an  adequate

          interstate nexus).

                    Blais also  argues that the district  court should have

          allowed his motion  for a  judgment of acquittal  on the  grounds

          that the government's sole evidence  on the element of "affecting

          interstate  commerce" was  the  out-of-state manufacture  of  the

          handgun.   Having  already rejected  his arguments  about L pez's
                                                                    _____

          alteration  of  the Scarborough  standard  of  minimal nexus,  we
                              ___________

          conclude  that  the  evidence  proffered by  the  government  was

          sufficient to meet  its required  showing of  minimal nexus  with

          interstate  commerce.  See  McAllister, 77 F.3d  at 390 (evidence
                                 ___  __________

          that a gun had previously travelled in interstate commerce before

          felon's possession  held sufficient to meet  required showing for

          minimal  nexus).   As a  result, we  uphold the  district court's

          denial of Blais's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

                              B.  The Motion to Suppress
                              B.  The Motion to Suppress

                    With  respect to the  motion to  suppress, we  review a

          district court's findings of fact only for clear error, Bartelho,
                                                                  ________

          71  F.3d at 441; United  States v. Mart nez-Molina,  64 F.3d 719,
                           ______________    _______________

          726 (1st  Cir. 1995), but questions of law are subject to de novo
                                                                    _______

                                         -8-

          review,  Ornelas  v.  United  States,  116  S.  Ct.  1657 (1996);
                   _______      ______________

          Bartelho,  71 F.3d at 441; United States  v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971,
          ________                   _____________     ______

          975 (1st Cir. 1994).

                    Prior to  trial, Blais  moved to suppress  the evidence

          obtained during the officers' February 3 visit  to his apartment.

          Based on  the facts  presented at  the  evidentiary hearing,  the

          district court  denied Blais's suppression motion.   The district

          court  rested its conclusion on the findings that the totality of

          the   circumstances  established   that  Blais   voluntarily  and

          knowingly  invited the  police officers  into his  apartment, and

          that the officers saw the gun lying on the bed in plain view.  

                    We agree  with the  district court's denial  of Blais's

          motion  to suppress.  Based  on the testimony  of Officer Dupuis,

          Officer  Paolino  and Rivera,  the  evidence  at the  suppression

          hearing reasonably  supported the  district court's  finding that

          Blais  gave his  consent  to entry,  and  that that  consent  was

          voluntary.  Blais argues  that the officers failed to  advise him

          of his right to deny entry.  However, while the failure to inform

          an individual that he has a right to withhold consent is a factor

          to be weighed in  determining the issue of voluntariness,  such a

          failure does  not   preclude a  finding of  valid  consent.   See
                                                                        ___

          Schneckloth  v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.  218, 245 (1973); Zapata, 18
          ___________     __________                             ______

          F.3d at 977.  The district court also properly rejected any claim

          of coercion.   While  Blais claims  that  the circumstances  were

          inherently coercive  because he was a  69-year-old man confronted

          by  two officers and a  security guard, the  evidence showed that

                                         -9-

          the three  men did not enter  until Blais invited them  in on his

          own initiative.  As a result, we conclude that the district court

          did  not commit error in finding that Blais admitted the officers

          and the security guard into his apartment voluntarily.

                    The  district   court  found  that   testimony  at  the

          suppression hearing  also showed that the  firearm discovered was

          lying on the bed in plain view of the officers as they questioned

          Blais.   Defendant's argument  that the district  court erred  in

          making this finding is based on a challenge to the credibility of

          the  officers  and  the  security guard.    However,  credibility

          determinations are for the district court, not  us, to make.  See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Patrone, 948  F.2d 813,  816 (1st  Cir. 1991),
          ______________     _______

          cert. denied, 504 U.S. 978 (1992).  And even if  the testimony in
          ____________

          question  is,  as  Blais  argues, subject  to  another  plausible

          reading, the  district court's  choice of  one  of two  competing

          interpretations  of the  evidence  cannot  be clearly  erroneous.

          United States v. Cruz-Jim nez, 894 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990).
          _____________    ____________

                    Because we conclude that the district  court's findings

          of invited entry and plain view were not erroneous, we affirm its

          denial of Blais's motion to suppress. 

                       C.  The Motion for Exculpatory Evidence
                       C.  The Motion for Exculpatory Evidence

                    Blais  contends  that  the   district  court  erred  in

          quashing certain  subpoenas issued  for the  suppression hearing.

          On appeal, Blais points  to quashed subpoenas for arrest  records

          and reports  of the  Providence Police Department,  including the

          report of the officers' interview with McGill.

                                         -10-

                    First,  Blais argues  that  the Jencks  Act, 18  U.S.C.

            3500,  entitles  him to  these  documents.   However,  the  Act

          "establishes procedures whereby a criminal defendant may exercise

          his  limited   right  to  obtain  previous   statements  made  by

          government  witnesses that are  in the  possession of  the United

          States  to be used for  impeachment purposes."   United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Neal,  36 F.3d  1190, 1197  (1st Cir.  1994).   McGill was  not a
          ____

          government  witness and did not  testify.  The  statements of all

          the witnesses  who did  testify at  the suppression  hearing were

          turned over.  

                    Second,   Blais   contends   that    the   sought-after

          information constituted  material he was entitled  to under Brady
                                                                      _____

          v.  Maryland,  373  U.S.  83 (1963),  for  impeachment  purposes.
              ________

          However,  Brady  error  occurs  when  the  government  suppresses
                    _____

          "material"  information that  is favorable  to the defense.   See
                                                                        ___

          Gilday  v.  Callahan, 59  F.3d 257,  267  (1st Cir.  1995), cert.
          ______      ________                                        _____

          denied,  116 S. Ct. 1269  (1996).  Information  is "material" "if
          ______

          there is  a reasonable  probability that,  had the  evidence been

          disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

          been  different."   United States  v. Bagley,  473 U.S.  667, 682
                              _____________     ______

          (1985).  Blais has failed to articulate any  theory demonstrating

          such a reasonable probability.

                    In  fact,  Blais has  failed to  show  that any  of the

          additional arrest  records or police  reports that he  seeks even

          exist.     Indeed,  McGill's   statement  could  not   have  been

          exculpatory.   While  her  complaint  was  the  impetus  for  the

                                         -11-

          officers'  and the  security guard's  visit, her  statement could

          have had no relevance  to the issues at the  suppression hearing:

          whether Blais admitted the  officers to his apartment voluntarily

          and  whether the  firearm was  in plain  view.   As a  result, we

          uphold  the district court's  decision to quash  the subpoenas at

          issue.

                            D.  Blais's Prior Convictions
                            D.  Blais's Prior Convictions

                    Blais also  contends that  the district court  erred by

          failing  to  explain more  fully its  ruling  with regard  to the

          admissibility of  his prior convictions.  The  ruling in question

          was rendered in response  to Blais's motion in limine  to exclude

          criminal convictions greater than ten years old.   The government

          objected,  filing  a  memorandum  in support,  arguing  that  the

          convictions  should   be  admissible  for  impeachment  of  Blais

          pursuant to  Federal Rule of  Evidence 609.   In the course  of a

          hearing on the motion,  the government withdrew its  objection to

          the  exclusion of all  previous convictions save  four which fell

          within the  ten-year limit because  Blais had been  released from

          his  prison  term  for  those  convictions  less  than  ten years

          previously.  By doing so, the government cleared the way  for the

          exclusion  of  a  number  of Blais's  previous  convictions  that

          involved the use or  possession of firearms.  The  district court

          ruled that  three convictions (for armed  robbery, kidnapping and

          driving away in an automobile) could come in.  The district court

          explained its ruling to defense counsel as follows:

                        So  we're  left, [counsel],  with three
                      previous convictions, none  of which  are

                                         -12-

                      greater than  ten years  old.   The armed
                      robbery,  kidnapping  and the  unlawfully
                      driving off  an  auto, which  I'm  ruling
                      will   be   admissible  to   impeach  the
                      credibility of Mr. Blais should he decide
                      to testify  under  609.   Depending  upon
                      what Mr.  Blais  says on  the stand,  the
                      Government  may  seek  permission of  the
                      Court  to  introduce  any  of  the  other
                      convictions under another rule.

          Defense counsel sought further elaboration  as to the last point,

          asking  whether testimony denying  the firearm  possession charge

          would be viewed  by the court  as opening the  door to the  other

          convictions.  The court  responded:  "read the Norton  case.  I'm
                                                         ______

          not going to do your homework for you."

                    Blais  argues that  the  court's  cryptic reference  to

          United  States v. Norton, 26  F.3d 240 (1st  Cir. 1994), provided
          ______________    ______

          little  guidance,  since Norton  recognizes that  "[t]he district
                                   ______

          court  is vested  with  broad  discretionary  power to  admit  or

          exclude evidence."  Id. at 243.  Reading Norton, we do not agree.
                              ___                  ______

          The defendant in  Norton, like  Blais, was charged  with being  a
                            ______        _____

          felon-in-possession,  had  a  prior firearm  conviction,  and had

          succeeded   in  persuading   the  trial   court  to   exclude  as

          inadmissible  all his  prior convictions  greater than  ten years

          old, including his  prior firearm  conviction.   However, in  the

          course  of his testimony, the defendant in Norton denied not only
                                                     ______

          possessing  the gun  identified in  the indictment,  but in  fact

          denied having ever possessed a  gun in his life.   The prosecutor

          sought and was granted permission  to introduce the prior firearm

          conviction  to  contradict  the defendant's  false  and  material

          testimony.  In  upholding the district court's ruling, this court

                                         -13-

          explained that "[o]nce Norton denied that he had ever possessed a

          gun, he  opened the door  to the  issue of his  prior or  present

          firearm possession."  Id. at 244.   As a result, Norton could not
                                ___

          complain  that he was unfairly  prejudiced by the introduction of

          the conviction to show that he lied.  Id. at 244-45.
                                                ___

                    We conclude that  the district court's  explanation was

          hardly  cryptic.  While it may have required that Blais's counsel

          do some reading, that is certainly not reversible error.

                                   III. CONCLUSION
                                   III. CONCLUSION
                                        __________

                    As  a  result of  the  foregoing, the  judgment  of the

          district court is affirmed.
                            affirmed
                            ________

                                         -14-