Court Opinion

ID: 9633126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:34:51.592883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:06.296477
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.
I dissent.
The central question which we face in these three cases is whether the policy of automobile liability insurance issued by State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) covers the claim for personal injuries made by the named insured who purchased the policy (i.e., Stapler), or, as the case may be, the claim for wrongful death made by the heirs of the named insured (i.e., Jacober and Thompson).1 The majority conclude in all three cases that such claims are covered. In essence, they achieve this end by restructuring the policy provisions, examining them “from the permissive user’s point of view” (majority opn., ante, at p. 196); as a result one would think the driver had purchased the policy. The majority complete this technique by then simultaneously casting the named insured in the role of the “other person”; as a result they would have us think he had been freed from the binding effect of the very contract he had entered into. Having thus triggered the insuring clause of the policy, the majority then determine that it cannot be deactivated by any words of exclusion because they are not “conspicuous, plain and clear” (majority opn., ante, at p. 197); yet at the same time, despite their probing for more than one meaning, they carefully eschew selecting which of their unearthed meanings is the “correct” one. I must admit that this felicitous interpretation *209will have instant appeal to countless policyholders who I dare say had no idea they were obtaining with their automobile insurance benefits akin to those of an accident policy. But with all due respect for the views of my colleagues, I cannot join them in what I am strongly convinced is a construction of the policies completely at odds with accepted canons of interpretation and applicable rules of law.
The controlling provisions of these identical policies are contained in two clauses: the insuring clause, including applicable definitions of its terms, and an exclusionary clause. I set them forth as follows: First, the policy states that State Farm agrees “[t]o pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of (A) bodily injury [including death][2] sustained by other persons . . . caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use ... of the owned automobile . . . .” (Italics added.) Defining an insured, the policy provides that under coverage for bodily injury, referred to as “Coverage A,” the “unqualified word ‘insured’ includes (1) the named insured, and . . . (4) any other person while using the owned automobile, provided the operation and the actual use of such automobile are with the permission of the named insured . . . and are within the scope of such permission.” Second, the policy provides that “This insurance does not apply under: . . . (i) coverage A, to bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured.”3 (Original italics.)
Since no extrinsic evidence was offered or received as an aid in interpreting the above provisions of the policy, we must make an independent determination of their meaning, “a judicial function to be exercised according to the generally accepted canons of interpretation so that the purposes of the instrument may be given effect. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1635-1661; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1856-1866.)” (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865-866 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839].)
I first turn to the insuring clause since it is obvious that if the claims for personal injuries or wrongful death made by the named insured or his heirs, as the case may be, are not covered by State Farm’s basic agreement to pay, any reference to the exclusionary clause is unnecessary. *210I shall point out that such claims are clearly not covered. I also propose to show that my conclusion in this respect is confirmed by an examination of the exclusionary clause.
Since State Farm has promised to pay on behalf of the insured, claims for bodily injuries sustained by other persons, the terms “insured” and “other persons” must be read with reference to each other. In view of the fact that the word “insured” as used in the insuring clause is not qualified by any additional language, we must apply the above definition of the word “insured” according to the direction of the policy. Thus it is beyond any question that in the clause under examination the word “insured” includes the named insured and the permissive user. Indeed, the majority implicitly concede that this is correct since they state that the permissive user—one of the categories of the above definition—is a person insured under the policy. Thus under the facts before us, in the Jacober case, Warren Jacober, the named insured and Roger Dill, the driver, were both insured; in the Stapler case, Paul Smith, the named insured and James Stapler, the driver, were both insured; and in the Thompson case, Gail Thompson, the named insured and Ed Rhoades, the driver, were both insured.
What coverage did State Farm engage to afford these six insured persons? The policy provides an answer in plain unmistakable language: “To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of (A) bodily injuries sustained by other persons.” (Italics added.) Not for bodily injuries sustained by the named insured or the permissive user; not for bodily injuries sustained by one or more of the six persons enumerated above; but for bodily injuries sustained by persons other than the named insured and the driver, other than the six persons enumerated above. The term “other persons” therefore stands in contrast to the term “insured”; and “other persons” means those not having the status of an insured. The terms are mutually exclusive. It is crystal clear that under the insuring clause, State Farm is bound to insure the named insured and the driver only with respect to bodily injuries sustained by persons other than the named insured or the driver. It is an ineluctable conclusion from the foregoing that the policy does not insure against claims for personal injuries or death made by the named insured or his heirs.
This is sufficient to answer the principal question before us for if the insuring clause does not operate to cover the claims made here for personal injuries and death, it is of course unnecessary to consider the effect of the exclusionary clause. Nevertheless, I find it convenient to examine the exclusionary clause since it corroborates the above interpretation of the *211insuring clause by stating plainly, “This policy does not' apply under [original italics] .... (1) coverage A, to bodily injury to the insured [italics added] or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured . . . .”
In the cases at bench, since the word “insured” includes the three named insureds, Jacober, Smith and Thompson, and their respective permissive-user drivers, Dell, Stapler, and Rhoades, it follows that none of the six drivers nor any members of their families residing in the same household can claim damages for bodily injuries caused by an accident arising out of the operation of the automobile involved. But we need not consider the exclusionary clause that broadly. This much is clear beyond any dispute: that the policy does not apply to a claim for bodily injuries or death made by the named insured or his heirs as the case may be. We need not go any further. This determination is not only fully consistent with, but it also wholly supports, my conclusion that the insuring clause does not cover the instant claims.
Faced with the clear meaning of the language in the policies, the majority attempt to subvert it in two ways. First they say that in order to construe the word “insured” in the insuring clause, the cases must be examined from the point of view of the person facing liability, that is, the permissive user who is driving the vehicle. From his point of view, they conclude, a named insured who suffers bodily injuries while an occupant in the vehicle is among the group of “other persons” referred to in the insuring clause of the policies. The effect of the majority’s conclusion is to remove the term “named insured” from the definition of an “insured” stated in the policies. Thus the majority, in construing the language of the insuring clause, ignore their duty “simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; see Jensen v. Traders & General Ins. Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 786, 790 [345 P.2d 1 Estate of Townsend (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 25, 27 [34 Cal.Rptr. 275]; S & M Lamp Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 446, 453 [18 Cal.Rptr. 633].)
Neither is the result of the majority opinion supported by any of the cited cases. The cases relied upon construe language in automobile liability policies which differs significantly from the policy provisions in the cases at bench. Unlike the policies here, none contains the term “other persons” which, as I have explained, must be construed with reference to the word “insured.” By contrast, the cases relied on by the majority construe the meaning of the terms “any person” or “any person or persons.” (Italics added.) Reading these words together with the preceding word “insured” *212they generally concluded that the policies there involved covered claims for injuries made by a named insured, who fell within the term “any” person, there being no effective exclusionary clause to negate this result.
In Atlantic Nat. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong (1966) 65 Cal.2d 100, 107 [52 Cal.Rptr. 569, 416 P.2d 801], we merely held invalid an exclusion of liability to the driver of the rented vehicle for injuries sustained by an occupant in the vehicle because the attempted exclusion conflicted with statutory law. However, Atlantic (p. 109) specifically left open the question whether a policy may exclude coverage for injuries suffered by an insured; thus it could not have decided what language is needed to accomplish such an exclusion.
The remaining cases cited by the majority are distinguishable in that they concerned the construction of the term “any person” in an insuring clause as compared to the term “other persons” found in the policies here. For example, the insuring language in Bachman v. Independence Indem. Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 529, 530 [6 P.2d 943], contained the term “any person or persons.” Characterizing this language as “very broad, and perhaps somewhat unusual,” the court held that the policy provided coverage to a permissive user for liability to heirs of the named insured in a wrongful death action. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc. (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 150, 151 [34 Cal.Rptr. 406], it was held that the insurer was required to defend an action brought by its named insured against an additional insured for damages because of bodily injury arising from the allegedly negligent loading of the former’s vehicle. There the court distinguished the language of the policy (“any person”) from provisions construed in other cases (“liability to pay damages to others”) and explained that the latter provision “was understandably held to limit coverage to claims by others than the named or additional insured.” (Id. at p. 153.) In P. E. O’Hair & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 195 [72 Cal.Rptr. 690], on facts parallel to Norwich, supra, the court held that the insurer was required to indemnify an additional insured for liability to the named insured. Finally, the majority appear to rely on Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Frederick (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 776 [53 Cal.Rptr. 457], holding that the policy covered liability for injury to the named insured, but it too involved the application of the term “any person” in the insuring clause. (Id. at pp. 778, 782.)
Cases cited by the majority for the proposition that clauses excluding liability for injuries to employees of the insured will be construed to withhold coverage only as to injuries sustained by an employee of the “particular insured . . . seeking protection under the policy” are not in point. (Original italics.) (Pleasant Valley Assn. v. Cal-Farm Ins. Co. (1956) *213142 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [298 P.2d 109]; see also Paul Masson Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 265, 270 [92 Cal.Rptr. 463]; Campidonica v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App 2d 403, 407 [31 Cal.Rptr. 735].) Limiting the scope of an exclusion for injuries to an employee of a particular insured seeking the protection of the policy may be viewed as depending on an employment relationship which, in situations where a person is not the employee of the party facing liability, is irrelevant. By contrast, in the cases before us, application of the exclusion to an insured depends on status under the definitions given in the policy. The status of a named insured, however, unlike an employment relationship, does not become irrelevant merely because the named insured brings an action against his permissive user. The policy defines a named insured as that person designated by name on the face of the policy and it does not limit that status to particular situations. Thus, the named insured retains that status whether he is the driver of the vehicle or is merely an occupant.
The majority attempt to distinguish these cases at bench from Travelers Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co. (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 227 [51 Cal.Rptr. 724]. There the policy obligated the insurer to indemnify the insured for liability attributable to bodily injury or death “suffered by any person or persons, other than the insured or his employees . . . .’’(Id. at p. 234; original italics.) The named insured was injured when an additional insured, while loading steel beams on the named insured’s vehicle, negligently caused a steel beam to strike the named insured. The court held that the insuring clause “excluded from coverage claims [for bodily injury] by its named insured.” (Id. at p. 235.) The insuring clause in the instant cases is no less unambiguous than the insuring agreement in Travelers. A juxtaposition of contrasting terms is present in the insuring clauses of both cases: The term “other persons” or “other than the insured” is stated with reference to its antecedent term, “insured” or “any person or persons.”
The insuring clause, therefore, in the policy before us unmistakably affords no coverage for claims made by the named insured for his own bodily injuries or to the heirs of such insured in a wrongful death action (see Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Brown (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 120, 122-123 [60 Cal.Rptr. 1].) While the permissive user may therefore have no coverage for his negligence in causing injury to the owner, the realistic fact remains that such a result is commanded by the policy provisions themselves and is consistent with cases construing the language of such provisions.
Secondly, the majority argue that the exclusionary clause, which declares that the policy does not provide coverage for “bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same *214household,” is not a “conspicuous, plain and clear” exclusion of coverage for bodily injury to a named insured because of some uncertainty in the term “insured.” Although the policy itself defines an insured, the majority conclude that the word is ambiguous because it is susceptible of different meanings. They attach considerable significance to their belief that State Farm has advanced two possible interpretations of an “insured”: that it refers to any person coming within the definition of an insured or that it means only the named insured. However, the majority have mistaken the position of State Farm. An examination of State Farm’s briefs discloses that its position is simply this: that the term “insured” refers to any insured defined by the policy but, at the very least clearly includes the “named insured.” With all respect to the majority, I am inclined to think they are rather hard put to it when they must attempt to wring from the briefs words to support an ambiguity.
The majority, having posited two interpretations for the exclusionary clause, attempt to explain that there are difficulties with both. (See fn. 7 of majority opn.) “Insured” cannot refer only to the named insured, they say, because in other provisions of the policy where the insurer so intended, it applied the designation “named” to the word “insured.” They contend on the other hand, that if the full meaning of the term “insured” were applied, a partial redundancy occurs because the policy defines an insured as including, among other persons, any spouse or relative residing in the same household as the named insured; yet, the argument goes, the exclusionary clause not only uses the defined term “insured” but adds to it the very language (“any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household”) included in the definition.
Although the latter phrase appears to be redundant, I am unable to conclude, as the majority do, that the exclusionary clause is ambiguous.This “partial redundancy” does not alter the meaning of the word “insured” defined in the policy. Nor does it justify application of the rule allowing, where “semantically permissible,” a “construction as will fairly achieve [the] object of securing indemnity to the insured . . . .” (Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 423, 437 [296 P.2d 801, 57 A.L.R.2d 914].) In fact, the majority, despite their reference to this rule of construction, fail to apply it. They merely refer to their third assumed construction of the word “insured”—namely the permissive user seeking the protection of the policy—for which I have shown there is no constructional or legal basis whatsoever.
But, as I explained at the start, it is the insuring clause which is the crucial point in our inquiry and if this clause does not cover the instant *215claims, any reference to the exclusionary clause is actually beside the point. As made clear, supra, the insuring clause plainly, clearly and unmistakably does not. The majority attempt to escape this result by changing the terms of the contract. This they may not do.
I would reverse the judgments of the trial courts.

For convenience, I refer to each of the three actions for declaratory relief before us by the first-named defendants therein. The relevant terms of the three policies involved are identical in each instance and are set forth infra. I point out that the question before us concerns only the claim made by the named insured or his heirs. For example, in Thompson, State Farm raises no issue as to coverage of the claim for personal injuries made by Todd Thompson, son of the deceased named insured.

Under its “definitions” the policy provides that “Bodily Injury—means bodily injury, sickness or disease including death at any time resulting therefrom.”

The first clause set forth above is found at the beginning of the policy under the bold type heading “Insuring Agreement I—The Owned Automobile.” The definition of an insured is found under the bold type heading “Definitions—Insuring Agreements I and II.” The second clause is found under the bold type heading “Exclusions—Insuring Agreements I and II.”