Court Opinion

ID: 9377553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 07:09:10.07454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:14.882109
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 28, 2023

                                   S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-21-00778-CV

    HARRY HINES MILLENNIUM MARKET PLACE, LLC, Appellant
                             V.
        PAWN TX, INC. F/K/A FIRST CASH, LTD., Appellee

                On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-02585

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
              Before Justices Molberg, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle
                       Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      The case involves a commercial lease dispute. Appellant Harry Hines

Millenium Market Place, LLC (Harry Hines) contends appellee Pawn TX, Inc. f/k/a

First Cash, Ltd. (Pawn TX) failed to vacate the premises at the end of the lease and

became a holdover tenant for two months. Harry Hines appeals the summary

judgment dismissing its breach of contract action and the judgment in favor of Pawn

TX on its Chapter 93 counterclaim for bad faith retention of Pawn TX’s security

deposit. We affirm.
                                BACKGROUND

      This case involves a lease of commercial property located at 11250 Harry

Hines Boulevard, Dallas, Texas 75229 (the Property). The original parties to the

Lease were Harry Hines as landlord and National Jewelry Exchange, Inc. (National

Jewelry) as tenant. In 2009, National Jewelry assigned the Lease to First Cash Ltd.

n/k/a Pawn TX, Inc. Following the assignment, Pawn TX operated a pawn shop

business at the Property. The Lease term ended on May 31, 2013. The Lease,

however, included two separate five-year option periods through which the parties

had the option to extend the lease term. On January 23, 2013, Harry Hines and Pawn

TX triggered the first option period, amended the Lease, and extended the lease term

from June 1, 2013, to May 31, 2018. As the Lease neared the end of its term, Pawn

TX attempted to negotiate a lower monthly rent payment. Negotiations were

unsuccessful, and Pawn TX decided to relocate its business to a different location

(the New Property). Pawn TX made its last monthly lease payment to Harry Hines

on May 1, 2018, in the amount of $10,639.18. According to Mike McCollum, Pawn

TX’s district manager, Pawn TX “vacated and surrendered” the Property to Harry

Hines on May 31, 2018.

      Pawn TX transmitted a “Notice of Forwarding Address and Demand for

Security Deposit” (the Notice and Demand) to Harry Hines on July 12, 2018. In the

Notice and Demand, Pawn TX requested that Harry Hines return Pawn TX’s security

deposit of $9,252.00 and provided its forwarding address to which the deposit could

                                        –2–
be mailed. Harry Hines did not return the security deposit. Pawn TX sent additional

demands for the return of its security deposit on July 22, 2019, August 14, 2019, and

April 24, 2020. Harry Hines has not returned the security deposit.

      On February 14, 2020, Harry Hines filed the underlying lawsuit for breach of

contract against Pawn TX. Harry Hines alleged in its petition that Pawn TX “failed

to vacate the premises and remained in possession of the Demised Premises for an

additional two (2) months” and owed Harry Hines $31,919.40 in holdover rent

pursuant to Section 18.1 of the Lease, which provides:

      In the event Tenant remain [sic] in possessions [sic] of the Demised
      Premises after the expiration of this lease and without the execution of
      a new lease it shall be deemed to be occupying said premises as a tenant
      from months to months [sic] at rental (including any percentage rental)
      herein provided plus fifty percent of such amount otherwise subject to
      all the conditions, provisions and obligations of this lease insofar as the
      same are applicable to months-to month tenancy.

Pawn TX filed a general denial and, on July 21, 2020, filed counterclaims for breach

of contract and bad faith failure to return the security deposit in violation of Chapter

93 of the property code. Pawn TX sought actual damages in the amount of its

security deposit and statutory damages of $27,856.00.

      On May 7, 2021, Pawn TX moved for summary judgment on its counterclaims

and on Harry Hines’s breach of contract claim. Pawn TX’s motion as to Harry

Hines’s breach of contract claim was a hybrid motion alleging both no evidence and

traditional grounds. Pawn TX argued (1) there was no evidence Pawn TX breached

the lease, and (2) Pawn TX owed no holdover rent as a matter of law because the

                                          –3–
evidence conclusively established Pawn TX vacated the premises before the lease

expiration date. Pawn TX’s motion on its Chapter 93 counterclaim was a traditional

motion for summary judgment in which Pawn TX argued Harry Hines acted in bad

faith by failing to return the security deposit. Pawn TX included the following

evidence in support of its motions: the Lease, the 2009 assignment, the Notice and

Demand, the three additional letters and emails to Harry Hines demanding return of

the security deposit, Harry Hines’s responses to interrogatories and requests for

production, the Declaration of Mike McCollum, Pawn TX’s District Manager, the

Declaration of Robert Epley, Pawn TX’s Construction Coordinator, a general ledger

report, documentation concerning the New Property, and an attorney’s fees affidavit.

      In response to an interrogatory asking Harry Hines to identify the date on

which it contends Pawn TX surrendered the Property, Harry Hines stated that Pawn

TX surrendered the Property “on or about August or September 2018.” In response

to an interrogatory asking Harry Hines to identify all facts to support its contention

that Pawn TX failed to vacate the premises at the end of the Lease and became a

holdover tenant for two months, Harry Hines stated “Pursuant to the terms of the

Lease, Pawn TX, Inc. was to surrender possession to the Premises by June 1, 2018.

Pawn TX, Inc. did not surrender the Premises until August or September 2018.” In

its responses to requests for production, Harry Hines stated it found no responsive

documents of (1) demands Harry Hines made on Pawn TX for holdover rent, (2)

correspondence between Harry Hines and Pawn TX regarding Pawn TX’s surrender

                                         –4–
of the Property, and (3) documents Harry Hines contends establish the date Pawn

TX vacated the Property.

      Harry Hines responded to the motions for summary judgment. The only

evidence filed in support of its response was the two-page affidavit of Shazeb

Daredia, the sole manager and director of Harry Hines. In the affidavit, Daredia

made the following statements concerning the alleged holdover of Pawn TX after

the Lease expired:

           “On expiration of the lease term, Pawn TX., Inc. failed to vacate
            the premises and remained in possession of the Property for an
            additional two (2) months.”

           “At the time of holdover by Defendant, the monthly rent was
            $10,639.80 per month.”

           “In accordance with the terms of the Lease, Pawn TX., Inc. owed
            Harry Hines Millennium Market Place, LLC rent in the amount
            of $15,959.70 per holdover month.”

           “The total past due balance owed by Pawn TX., Inc. to Harry
            Hines Millennium Market Place, LLC pursuant to the Lease, as
            amended, is $31,919.40.”

           “Harry Hines Millennium Market Place, LLC made demand on
            Pawn TX., Inc. for payment of holdover rent prior to the filing of
            this suit without success.”

      On June 10, 2021, the trial court granted summary judgment for Pawn TX,

dismissed Harry Hines’s breach of contract claim with prejudice, and rendered

judgment for Pawn TX on its Chapter 93 counterclaim for bad faith retention of

Pawn TX’s security deposit. The trial court awarded Pawn TX actual damages of

$9,252.00, Chapter 93 statutory damages of $27,856.00, attorney’s fees of

                                       –5–
$6,840.00, and conditional appellate fees. Harry Hines filed a “Motion for New Trial

and, Alternatively Motion for Reconsideration of Final Summary Judgment.” The

trial court denied the motion for new trial, granted the motion for consideration in

part, and amended its June 10, 2021 summary judgment order to reduce the award

of actual damages to $100.00. Harry Hines appealed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

      Orders granting summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Lujan v. Navistar,

Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). If no grounds are specified for the ruling, we

must affirm on any meritorious grounds on which judgment was requested.

Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). A defendant is

entitled to summary judgment if it conclusively negates an essential element of the

plaintiff’s case or conclusively establishes all necessary elements of an affirmative

defense. Thomas v. Omar Inv., Inc., 129 S.W.3d 290, 292–93 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2004, no pet.); Pollard v. Hanschen, 315 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010,

no pet.). A plaintiff or counter-plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a cause

of action if it conclusively proves all essential elements of the claim. Meyerhoff v.

Pac. Union Fin., LLC, No. 02-18-00393-CV, 2019 WL 5089760, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Oct. 10, 2019, no pet.) (first citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a), (c), and then

citing MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986)); Fieldtech Avionics &

Instruments, Inc. v. Component Control.Com, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (same).

                                         –6–
      The legal sufficiency standard that governs directed verdicts also governs no-

evidence summary judgment motions. RTLC AG Prods., Inc. v. Treatment Equip.

Co., 195 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). To defeat a no-

evidence motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must produce evidence

regarding each challenged element of each challenged claim that “would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford Motor Co. v

Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004); see also King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman,

118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). “A no evidence point will be sustained when (a)

there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules

of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a

vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.”

King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (internal quotation omitted). In reviewing a no-

evidence summary judgment, we consider evidence in the light most favorable to

the non-movant, crediting evidence a reasonable jury could credit and disregarding

contrary evidence and inferences unless a reasonable jury could not. De La Cruz,

526 S.W.3d at 592.

      With respect to a traditional motion for summary judgment, we require the

movant to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and its

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Provident Life

& Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215–16 (Tex. 2003). If the movant

                                          –7–
satisfies this burden, to avoid summary judgment the nonmovant then bears the

burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84.

We credit all evidence favoring the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable

inference and resolving all doubts in its favor. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C.,

73 S.W.3d 193, 208 (Tex. 2002).

      When, as in this case, a party files a hybrid summary judgment motion on both

no-evidence and traditional grounds, we generally first review the trial court’s

judgment under the no-evidence standard of review. Should we determine summary

judgment was appropriate under the no-evidence standard, we need not address

issues related to the traditional summary judgment motion. However, if the court is

required to affirm the trial court’s ruling on traditional grounds, then we only address

the traditional grounds. Regency Dev. & Constr. Services, LLC v. Carrington, No.

05-18-00564-CV, 2019 WL 4051831, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 28, 2019,

no pet.) (internal citations omitted).

                                     ANALYSIS

      Harry Hines brings two issues on appeal. First, Harry Hines contends the trial

court erred by granting judgment in favor of Pawn TX on Harry Hines’s breach of

contract claim because Harry Hines established that Pawn TX did not vacate the

Property at the end of the Lease term. Second, Harry Hines argues the trial court

erred by granting summary judgment for Pawn TX on its counterclaim because

                                          –8–
 Harry Hines was entitled to retain the security deposit and apply it to the holdover

 rent owed by Pawn TX.

       We conclude the judgment should be affirmed. Pawn TX presented conclusive

 evidence that it surrendered possession of the premises at the end of the lease term

 and Harry Hines did not return the security deposit or provide an accounting of the

 deposit. Harry Hines presented no evidence to rebut Pawn TX’s evidence, and Harry

 Hines presented no evidence that its refusal to return Pawn TX’s security deposit

 was reasonable. We will address each appellate issue in turn.

I.     Dismissal of Harry Hines’s breach of contract claim

       The overarching question here is whether Pawn TX surrendered the premises

 at the end of the lease term or remained in possession of the premises and became a

 holdover tenant. Pawn TX presented conclusive evidence that it surrendered the

 premises on May 31, 2018, which was the end of the lease term. That evidence

 consisted of a statement in Mike McCollum’s declaration that “Pawn TX

 successfully met the key dates for the relocation and vacated and surrendered the

 Former Premises to Harry Hines on May 31, 2018.”

       Harry Hines presented no competent summary judgment evidence to rebut

 McCollum’s statement. Harry Hines relied solely on the Daredia affidavit in

 opposition to the motions for summary judgment. Daredia did not, however, present

 any evidence concerning when Pawn TX vacated and surrendered the premises. He

 merely made the following conclusory statement: “On expiration of the lease term,

                                         –9–
Pawn TX, Inc. failed to vacate the premises and remained in possession of the

Property for an additional two (2) months.” That statement is conclusory and

constitutes no evidence. See Eberstein v. Hunter, 260 S.W.3d 626, 630 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2008, no pet.) (conclusory statements in affidavits are not competent evidence

to support a summary judgment because they are not credible or susceptible to being

readily controverted.); see also Saronikos, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 285 S.W.3d 512,

516 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (a conclusory statement is one that does not

provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion).

      Further, McCollum provided additional testimony supporting his statement

that Pawn TX surrendered possession of the premises at the end of the lease term.

He explained in the declaration that during May 2018, Pawn TX gutted the

showroom of the Property, moved inventory and all pawns to the New Property,

pulled down fixtures and back racks at the premises, and surrendered the premises

before May 31, 2018. He further stated Pawn TX’s last pawn was made at the

premises on May 30, 2018. Harry Hines presented no evidence to rebut this

testimony.

      On appeal, Harry Hines argues that Pawn TX was required to take affirmative

steps to notify Harry Hines that Pawn TX had surrendered the premises. Harry Hines

further contends Pawn TX was required to return the keys to Harry Hines and

provide notice of the surrender of the premises. We disagree. The Lease Agreement

defines the lease term as:

                                       –10–
      Lease term: Commencing on the commencement Date and ending 60
      months after the Commencement Date, plus any partial calendar month
      following the Commencement date. Plus 2 (Two) Consecutive options
      of Five years each.

The Lease does not contain an automatic renewal clause and, therefore created a

tenancy for a definite term (i.e., a tenancy with a specified beginning and ending

date). See Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990). “The general

rule is that a tenancy for a definite term does not require a tenant to give notice in

order to terminate the tenancy, because a tenancy for a definite term simply expires

at the end of the contract period.” Id.; Carrasco v. Stewart, 224 S.W.3d 363, 368

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, no pet.) (“A tenancy for a definite term does not require

a tenant to give notice in order to terminate the tenancy because such a tenancy

simply expires at the end of the contract period.”); Four Bros. Boat Works, Inc. v. S

& SF, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 12, 16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)

(“A tenancy for a definite term expires at the end of the contract period.”); Brand v.

Degrate-Greer, No. 02-15-00397-CV, 2017 WL 1756542, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 4, 2017, no pet.) (same). The Lease, therefore, terminated no later than

the date specified in 2013 amendment to the Lease, which was May 31, 2018. See

Bockelmann, 788 S.W.2d at 571.

      Similarly, the Lease did not contain a provision for automatic renewal if the

tenant did not provide notice of termination. The tenancy created under the Lease

thus terminated regardless of notice. See Bockelmann, 788 S.W.2d at 571. The

                                        –11–
Lease, therefore, ended no later than the date specified in 2013 amendment to the

Lease, which was May 31, 2018. See id.

        The fact that the Lease contained two options to extend the lease term by five

years does not change this analysis. Generally, options to renew the lease for an

additional term must be exercised strictly according to the option provisions. Hush

Puppy of Longview, Inc. v. Cargill Interests, Ltd., 843 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 1992, no writ). It is undisputed Pawn TX did not exercise the option to

renew the lease a second time. Thus, the tenancy expired on May 31, 2018. See

Carrasco, 224 S.W.3d at 368 (tenancy expired at end of stated term where it was

undisputed the tenant did not exercise the option to renew the lease).

        McCollum testified that Pawn TX vacated the Property before the term

expiration date, and Harry Hines provided no competent summary judgment

evidence to contradict McCollum.1 Under this record, we conclude the Lease

terminated on May 31, 2018, and Pawn TX had no obligation to provide Harry Hines

notice of termination or notice that Pawn TX had vacated the Property. See Brand,

    1
      On appeal, Harry Hines cites to an appendix to its opening brief that contains seventeen photographs
of the Property that do not appear in the appellate or summary judgment record. We do not consider these
documents because they are not part of the summary judgment record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); K-Six
Television, Inc. v. Santiago, 75 S.W.3d 91, 96–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (appellate courts
cannot consider documents attached to briefs that do not appear in the appellate record); Hack v. Crocker,
No. 05-97-01418-CV, 2001 WL 337828, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9, 2001, no pet.) (holding the court
must disregard any materials in appendices to the brief that are not part of the official record); Till v.
Thomas, 10 S.W.3d 730, 733–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (“This Court must hear
and determine a case on the record as filed, and may not consider documents attached as exhibits to briefs.”).
                                                   –12–
  2017 WL 1756542, at *4 (tenant’s testimony that tenant vacated premises before the

  end of the lease term was sufficient to establish the tenant did not holdover).

        Harry Hines also asserts it was entitled to thirty days’ notice of termination

  under section 91.001 of the property code. That provision of the property code,

  however, applies to monthly tenancies or a tenancy from month to month. TEX.

  PROP. CODE § 91.001. The Lease at issue here was a tenancy for a definite term. See

  Bockelmann, 788 S.W.2d at 571. Section 91.001 is, therefore, inapplicable here.

        Pawn TX conclusively established it vacated the premises before the lease

  expiration date and, therefore, Pawn TX owed no holdover rent as a matter of law.

  Harry Hines failed to meet its burden of presenting evidence to raise a fact question

  concerning when Pawn TX surrendered the Property. We overrule the first issue.

II.     Judgment on Pawn TX’s Chapter 93 claim for bad faith withholding of
        the security deposit

        To obtain summary judgment on its counterclaim, Pawn TX had the burden

  to show there was no genuine issue of material fact and it was entitled to judgment

  as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); M.D. Anderson Hosp. & Tumor Inst.

  v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). Section 93.005(a) of the Texas Property

  Code places an obligation on commercial landlords to refund a tenant’s security

  deposit:

        (a) The landlord shall refund the security deposit to the tenant not later
        than the 60th day after the date the tenant surrenders the premises and

                                          –13–
        provides notice to the landlord or the landlord’s agent of the tenant’s
        forwarding address under Section 93.0092.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.005(a). It is undisputed that Pawn TX surrendered the

premises on May 31, 2018, and transmitted its forwarding address for the purpose

of refunding the deposit to Harry Hines on July 12, 2018. Harry Hines was obligated

to refund the deposit by September 11, 2018, but failed to do so. See TEX. PROP.

CODE § 93.005(a). The failure to return the deposit subjected Harry Hines to liability

under Chapter 93, as set out in section 93.011:

        (a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of
        this chapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times
        the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant’s
        reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in a suit to recover the deposit after
        the period prescribed for returning the deposit expires.

        (b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written description
        and itemized list of damages and charges in violation of this chapter:

                (1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security
                deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to
                the premises; and

                (2) is liable for the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a
                suit to recover the deposit.

        (c) In a suit brought by a tenant under this chapter, the landlord has the
        burden of proving that the retention of any portion of the security
        deposit was reasonable.

    2
      (a) The landlord is not obligated to return a tenant’s security deposit or give the tenant a written
description of damages and charges until the tenant gives the landlord a written statement of the tenant’s
forwarding address for the purpose of refunding the security deposit.
    (b) The tenant does not forfeit the right to a refund of the security deposit or the right to receive a
description of damages and charges for failing to give a forwarding address to the landlord.
    TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.009
                                                  –14–
      (d) A landlord who fails to return a security deposit or to provide a
      written description and itemized list of deductions on or before the 60th
      day after the date the tenant surrenders possession is presumed to have
      acted in bad faith.

TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011.

      Chapter 93, thus, establishes two distinct causes of action for a commercial

tenant seeking the return of its security deposit. TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011; see EDG

Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ratnani, 279 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no

pet.). The first cause of action involves the landlord’s bad faith retention of the

security deposit. TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011(a). The second cause of action involves

the landlord’s bad faith failure to account for the security deposit. TEX. PROP. CODE

§ 93.011(b). If the tenant shows the landlord failed to timely provide a refund of the

security deposit or an accounting, then it is presumed the landlord acted in bad faith.

Tunad Enters. Inc. v. Palma, No. 05-19-00497-CV, 2020 WL 3410633, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 22, 2020, no pet.) (citing TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011(d); FP

Stores, Inc. v. Tramontina US, Inc., 513 S.W.3d 684, 693 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2016, pet. denied)). The landlord then has the burden to prove the retention of

any portion of the security deposit was reasonable. TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011(c).

      Here, it is undisputed Harry Hines did not return the security deposit and did

not provide an accounting for the security deposit. Further, as discussed above, the

evidence conclusively showed that Pawn TX surrendered possession of the premises

on May 31, 2018, and provided its forwarding address for purposes of recovering

the deposit on July 12, 2018. The duty to refund the deposit and account for it was
                                       –15–
triggered at that time. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.005(a). Harry Hines, however, did

not fulfill its duty to refund or its obligation to provide a written description and

itemized list of damages and charges. Under this record, we conclude Pawn TX

raised the presumption that Harry Hines acted in bad faith by retaining the security

deposit. See TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.011(d); see also Tunad Enters. Inc., 2020 WL

3410633, at *6. The burden then shifted to Harry Hines to raise a genuine issue of

material fact that its retention of the deposit was reasonable.

      Harry Hines argues it acted in good faith and reasonably withheld the deposit

because Pawn TX owed rent at the time the lease terminated and, therefore, Harry

Hines was not required to refund or account for the security deposit under the statute.

This argument is based on section 93.006 of the property code, which sets out when

a landlord may retain a security deposit and the landlord’s duty to provide a written

accounting upon retaining all or part of the deposit. TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.006.

Under that provision, “the landlord may deduct from the deposit damages and

charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or damages and charges

that result from a breach of the lease.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.006(a). If the landlord

retains all or part of a security deposit, however, the landlord is required to give the

tenant any balance of the deposition and “a written description and itemized list of

all deductions.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 93.006(c). A commercial landlord is not required

to provide the tenant with a written description and itemized list of all deductions if

“the tenant owes rent when the tenant surrenders possession of the premises.” TEX.

                                         –16–
PROP. CODE § 93.006(c)(1). That exception does not apply here, however, because

the evidence conclusively established that Pawn TX’s rent was paid in full at the end

of the lease, and additional holdover fees were not incurred.

      Under this record, we conclude Harry Hines failed to meet its burden to raise

a genuine issue of material fact as to whether its retention of the security deposit was

reasonable. The trial court, therefore, did not err by granting summary judgment for

Pawn TX on its Chapter 93 counterclaim. We overrule the second issue.

                                     CONCLUSION

      Pawn TX conclusively established it relinquished possession of the Property

on May 31, 2018, and Harry Hines did not return Pawn TX’s security deposit or

provide an accounting for the deposit. Harry Hines failed to present evidence to raise

a genuine issue of material fact concerning when Pawn TX vacated the Property or

to establish its retention of the security deposit was reasonable. The trial court,

therefore, did not err by granting summary judgment for Pawn TX. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                            ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                            JUSTICE

210778F.P05

                                         –17–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

HARRY HINES MILLENNIUM                         On Appeal from the 44th Judicial
MARKET PLACE, LLC, Appellant                   District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-02585.
No. 05-21-00778-CV           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
                                               Kipness. Justices Molberg and
PAWN TX, INC. F/K/A FIRST                      Carlyle participating.
CASH, LTD., Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee PAWN TX, INC. F/K/A FIRST CASH, LTD.
recover its costs of this appeal from appellant HARRY HINES MILLENNIUM
MARKET PLACE, LLC.

Judgment entered this 28th day of February 2023.

                                        –18–