Court Opinion

ID: 9945354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:01:16.168382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.311499
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           _______________

                                No. 21-1880
                              _______________

         HERO TIERA TRAMAINE SMITH, f/k/a Tiera Tramaine Smith,
                                        Appellant

                                      v.

  WARDEN BAYLOR WOMENS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; ATTORNEY
                   GENERAL DELAWARE
                      _______________

                On Appeal from the United States District Court
                           For the District of Delaware
                            (D.C. No. 1-18-cv-0123)
                 District Judge: Honorable Maryellen Noreika
                                _______________

                                  Argued
                              November 1, 2023

            Before: JORDAN, ROTH, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

                          (Filed: February 27, 2024)
                              _______________

Thomas A. Dreyer [ARGUED]
30 Running Brook Road
Glen Mills, PA 19342
     Counsel for Appellant
Kathryn J. Garrison [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Delaware
Delaware Department of Justice
102 W. Water Street
3rd Floor
Dover, DE 19904
       Counsel for Appellees
                                  _______________

                                        OPINION *
                                     _______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

       Hero Tiera Tramaine Smith (“Smith”) challenges the District Court’s dismissal of

her petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After assuming, without

deciding, that Smith was entitled to equitable tolling, the District Court denied her

petition on the merits. Both Smith and the State of Delaware agree that the District Court

misapplied the applicable law for determining whether the assistance Smith’s counsel

rendered was ineffective, as the Court did not consider the Supreme Court’s decision in

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). But, regardless of the merits, the District

Court erred in reaching the merits without first addressing whether Smith was entitled to

equitable tolling, so we will remand.

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

                                              2
 I.   BACKGROUND 1

       A.     The Underlying Crime

       In July 2007, CJ Smith (“CJ”), no relation to the defendant-appellant here but an

acquaintance and sometimes a drug source for her, drove with some friends to an

apartment complex in Seaford, Delaware. As he was arriving, Smith, who was then 19

years old, was driving out. When they saw each other, they stopped their cars side-by-

side, with the cars facing opposite directions, and argued about an altercation they had

had the previous day. Within a minute, Smith pulled a gun out from under her seat, got

out of her car, walked to CJ’s car, and shot him three times at close range, killing him.

She then immediately got back into her car and sped off, almost running over a

construction worker in the process. The shooting was recorded by the apartment

complex’s surveillance equipment and was witnessed by CJ’s girlfriend, who was in CJ’s

car in the passenger seat, his two friends in the backseat, and multiple construction

workers. Smith boarded a bus and fled the state. She was later arrested in Georgia.

       B.     Guilty Plea and Sentencing

       A Delaware grand jury indicted Smith on one count each of first-degree murder,

first-degree assault, and possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, as well as

two counts of first-degree reckless endangering, and four counts of possession of a

       1
        These facts come from the Superior Court of Delaware’s memorandum opinion
denying Smith postconviction relief and the District Court’s memorandum opinion
denying Smith habeas relief. State v. Smith, 2017 WL 902149 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 6,
2017); Smith v. Caple, No. CV 18-123 (MN), 2021 WL 1226495 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2021)

                                             3
firearm during the commission of a felony. Smith was represented by an attorney (“trial

counsel”) with the Office of the Public Defender and, in consultation with that attorney,

pled guilty to second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of possession of

a firearm during the commission of a felony. The State of Delaware dismissed the

remaining charges.

       Prior to sentencing, the Delaware Superior Court ordered a presentence

investigation report. That report described Smith’s exposure to violence in her childhood

and adolescence, her repeated molestation as a child, her victimization in two armed

robberies, and her mother’s severe mental health challenges and drug history. At

sentencing in December 2008, the judge explained the sentence he was about to impose:

       Ms. Smith, you certainly have not made much of your life. You quit school
       after completing the eighth grade. Your work history is extraordinarily brief.
       You spent your days drinking alcohol, using drugs, selling drugs, and
       generally wasting your time in the life that you were given. And to protect
       your drug trade, you carried a loaded gun in your car. And not surprisedly,
       [sic] that created a huge problem and resulted in the senseless death of Mr.
       Smith.

       I have absolutely no reason to believe that you would ever be a productive
       citizen if given freedom. Indeed, I have every reason to believe it’s quite the
       opposite, quite frankly, that you will return to your ways and will be a danger
       to some other person who might encounter you.

(App. at 44, 80-81.) The judge then sentenced Smith to the statutory maximum term of

life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus 75 years’ imprisonment.

       C.     Procedural History – Postconviction Relief

       On January 5, 2009, Smith timely appealed pro se to the Supreme Court of

Delaware. She says that she had not had any communication from trial counsel between

                                             4
her sentencing hearing on December 5, 2008, and her pro se appeal. In addition to filing

her appeal, she also sent trial counsel a letter asking him to help her file a motion to

modify her sentence before the 90-day deadline for such a motion passed, and she asked

him to let her know any other steps she could take to get her sentence overturned or

reduced. On January 6, 2009, the Delaware Supreme Court, through its clerk’s office,

instructed trial counsel to file a written statement by January 16, 2009, “indicating that

[he] recognize[d] [his] continu[ed] obligation under Supreme Court Rule 26(a) to

represent Ms. Smith in the … appeal.” (App. at 55.) A copy of the letter was sent to

Smith, who then sent trial counsel a letter dated January 7, 2009, in which she referred to

the Court’s letter and told him that she needed his assistance and hoped that he would

prepare himself to help her. Smith contends trial counsel never responded to the

Supreme Court letter, and there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise.

       Still, on January 27, 2009, trial counsel did meet with Smith via video conference.

In his affidavit, he testified that, during their discussion, “it was determined that [Smith]

was, in fact, seeking a reduction in sentence and was not seeking review of any errors of

law or procedure. Accordingly, on advice of counsel, [Smith] decided to withdraw the

appeal and pursue the Motion for a Modification in [an] effort to reduce her sentence.”

(App. at 72.) Smith executed an Affidavit Requesting Dismissal of Appeal. According

to Smith, trial counsel “gave her only 20 minutes” to decide whether to sign it. (Opening

Br. at 25.) Whether that affidavit had been prepared in advance or was drafted on the

spot or right after is not clear. What is clear is that just two days later, on January 29,

                                               5
2009, trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, along with the supporting

affidavit, and, consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court granted the motion and closed

the case.

       About a month later, trial counsel filed a motion for a reduction of sentence in the

Superior Court before the same judge who had originally sentenced Smith. Smith claims

that counsel did not send her a copy of it. The trial court acted quickly, denying the

motion the following month. Smith alleges that, once again, trial counsel was

uncommunicative, failing to send her the order or otherwise to tell her about it. Nor did

he consult with her about appealing the denial. Having not heard from trial counsel since

their January 27 video conference, Smith says that in June she found a copy of the order

denying her a sentence reduction, but, by then, it was too late for an appeal.

       Years passed. Then, in April 2014, Smith filed a pro se motion for state

postconviction relief. New counsel was appointed to represent her, and in June 2015 that

counsel filed an amended motion. The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, and

denied Smith’s motion and amended motion for postconviction relief. 2 State v. Smith,

2017 WL 902149, at *1, 25 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017). On January 2, 2018, the

       2
        Smith’s motion for state postconviction relief was untimely under Delaware law,
Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1), and, therefore, procedurally barred unless it fell under
an exception in Delaware’s rules. Smith, 2017 WL 902149, at *1. The postconviction
court held that it fell under the exception for a “colorable claim that there was a
miscarriage of justice” and so could be heard on the merits. Id. at *2.

                                             6
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Smith v. State, 177 A.3d 613 (Del. 2018)

(Table).

       Within two weeks, Smith filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The District Court

denied the petition without a hearing, and Smith appealed that denial. We treated her

notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of appealability and ordered the State “to

show cause within thirty (30) days why a certificate of appealability should not be

granted with respect to Smith’s claim that counsel was ineffective for advising her to

withdraw her direct appeal.” (App. at 110-11.) The State then filed a response, and we

granted the certificate of appealability.

II.   DISCUSSION 3

       A.     Federal Habeas Statute of Limitations

       Before assessing the merits of Smith’s petition, we must consider whether Smith’s

petition is time-barred under the limitations period prescribed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), or whether that period is subject to tolling.

       3
          The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “Because the District Court
ruled on [Smith’s] habeas petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing, our review
of its legal conclusions is plenary.” Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 2009).
“Accordingly, we will review the state courts’ determinations under the same standard
that the District Court was required to apply.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the alleged procedural default related to Smith’s timeliness in filing her
§ 2254 petition is also plenary. Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 97 (3d Cir. 1999).

                                              7
       An application for a writ of habeas corpus like Smith’s must be filed within one

year of the finality of the state court action at issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 4

However, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction

or other collateral review … is pending” is not counted toward that one-year period. Id.

§ 2244(d)(2). Further, “the limitations provision of the AEDPA is not jurisdictional in

nature.” Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002). Therefore, “[a]

petitioner can seek tolling in two ways: (i) statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2), or (ii)

equitable tolling.” Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).

       “[B]ecause the AEDPA limitations period is subject to equitable modifications

such as tolling, it is also subject to other non-jurisdictional, equitable considerations, such

as waiver.” Robinson, 313 F.3d at 134. Thus, a state can waive its AEDPA limitations

defense. See id. In this case, however, the State did not waive the defense; it

affirmatively raised it in its initial response in the District Court.

       Unless tolled, the one-year period obviously expired long ago. Smith’s

opportunity for appeal lapsed in 2010, but she did not file her pro se habeas petition until

January 2018. Therefore, her § 2254 petition is time-barred and the District Court should

       4
           The relevant provision states,
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
       habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
       court. The limitation period shall run from … the date on which the
       judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
       of the time for seeking such review[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Accordingly, the one-year limitations period began when
Smith’s conviction became final.

                                                8
have dismissed it if there is no basis for statutory or equitable tolling. Jones v. Morton,

195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999).

              1.     Smith’s petition cannot be statutorily tolled.

       Smith argues that her petition should be statutorily tolled under § 2244(d)(2)

because the state court determined that her motion for state post-conviction relief (“PCR

motion”) was “properly filed[.]” But even assuming that her PCR motion was “properly

filed” in state court, it cannot toll the limitations period under § 2244(d)(2) because it was

not filed – and so did not begin to be pending – until long after the limitations period had

already expired. Put another way, the PCR motion could not toll the limitations period

because, by the time it was filed, there was no longer any limitations period left to toll.

       It may be that, in one sense, Smith’s state post-conviction relief petition was

“properly filed” because, despite being untimely under the pertinent limitations period for

postconviction relief, the court that entertained her petition permitted it under an

exception to the state’s usual timeliness rule. See Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 163

(3d Cir. 2003) (“When determining if a state petition is ‘properly filed,’ we must focus on

the ‘state law governing when a petition for collateral relief is properly filed.’” (quoting

Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2001))). Smith argues “a post-conviction relief

petition is pending until it has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-

conviction procedures; i.e., until the completion of that process.” (Reply Br. at 5 (citing

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002)).) According to her, “[t]he time during

which the PCR Motion was pending; i.e., until January 2, 2018, is statutorily tolled and is

                                              9
not counted toward the one-year period of limitation outlined in Section 2244(d)(1).”

(Reply Br. at 5.) But her focus on the expiration of what she considers as the statutory

tolling period is misplaced. Statutory tolling for habeas purposes remains unavailable to

Smith because she filed her state PCR petition after the federal one-year limitations

period had expired.

       Critically, Smith fails to address the start of the alleged pending period for

statutory tolling purposes – the date on which the PCR motion was filed. By ignoring

that, she seems to imply that the PCR motion was somehow “pending” since before it

was ever filed. She has, of course, failed to cite anything in support of that position,

because there is none. When asked about that logical lacuna during oral argument, her

attorney still could not provide any explanation for it. Following oral argument, Smith

sent us a Rule 28(j) letter in which she reiterates her argument that her PCR petition was

“properly filed”, but she still fails to present any logical or legal support for her

implication that her PCR petition could have been pending even before it was filed.

       The bottom line is simple: that the PCR petition was permitted under the state’s

exceptions to the state’s limitations period does not change the rules governing the

federal limitations period. While it may be relevant to equitable tolling, there is nothing

to suggest that it has any bearing on statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2). See Holland v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649-50 (2010) (holding that “§ 2244(d) is subject to equitable

tolling” and “[e]quitable tolling … asks whether federal courts may excuse a petitioner’s

                                              10
failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state

court’s interpretation of state law.”).

              2.      We cannot determine whether Smith is entitled to equitable
                      tolling.

       Because statutory tolling cannot save Smith’s petition, her petition is untimely

unless she qualifies for equitable tolling. See id., at 649. “[A] petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling only if [she] shows (1) that [she] has been pursuing [her] rights

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented

timely filing.” Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). “This conjunctive standard

requires showing both elements before we will permit tolling.” Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674

F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012).

       The District Court stated that it was “inclined to concur” with the State’s assertion

that Smith failed to demonstrate how her trial counsel’s actions prevented her from

timely filing her habeas petition. (App. at 20.) But it refrained from making findings

concerning either of the prongs required for equitable tolling, and instead addressed

Smith’s claims on the merits. Because the State raised a limitations defense, the District

Court should have first addressed both the diligence and extraordinary circumstances

prongs of the equitable tolling test to assess whether Smith is entitled to equitable tolling,

cf. Sistrunk, 674 F.3d at 190 (requiring a showing of both elements before equitable

tolling can be permitted), as she may well be, and which is of importance here since the

merits of her claim are not frivolous.

                                              11
       The District Court correctly identified that there are cases in which “an attorney’s

egregious error or neglect may constitute an extraordinary circumstance for equitable

tolling purposes.” Smith v. Caple, No. CV 18-123 (MN), 2021 WL 1226495, at *7 (D.

Del. Mar. 31, 2021) (citing Holland, 560 U.S. at 635-54). It explained,

       An “egregious error” generally includes instances where an attorney fails to
       file an appeal after an explicit request from the petitioner, see Velazquez v.
       Grace, 277 F. App’x 258 (3d Cir. 2008), “affirmatively deceives the
       petitioner about filing a direct appeal,” or “persistently neglects the
       petitioner’s case.” Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 76-77 (3d Cir. 2004).

Caple, 2021 WL 1226495, at *7.

       Smith’s trial counsel’s advice to withdraw her appeal could qualify as a similarly

extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes. It appears from the pleadings

that Smith’s trial counsel essentially abandoned her following her sentencing hearing, a

proceeding at which she received a life sentence, the statutory maximum penalty. He

eventually met with her virtually, but only after Smith filed her pro se appeal and the

Delaware Supreme Court reminded him of his continuing obligations to his client. At

that point he affirmatively advised Smith to withdraw her appeal and, instead, to seek a

sentence reduction – this despite the fact that the motion would be presented to the same

judge who had originally sentenced her. There does not appear to be any reasonable

explanation for the course of action he advised. Smith was not faced with a binary

decision to seek a sentence reduction or continue with the appeal. See Del. Super. Ct.

Crim. R. 35(b) (“The [sentencing] court may decide the motion [for a sentence reduction]

or defer decision while an appeal is pending.”). The avenues were not mutually

                                            12
exclusive, so not only was it entirely permissible to seek both forms of relief, it was the

reasonable and obviously advisable thing to do. And considering that Smith had already

been sentenced to the maximum possible penalty and was destined to spend the rest of

her natural life in prison, it is also obvious that her attorney should have advised her to

maintain her appeal rather than withdraw it and seek a sentence modification from the

judge who had imposed her sentence in the first place.

       Further, the record suggests there were nonfrivolous grounds to support such a

direct appeal. Under Delaware law, when a sentence does not exceed the statutory

maximum, as was the case for Smith, appellate review is limited to whether the

sentencing court abused its discretion by basing the sentence on judicial bias or

vindictiveness, a closed mind, or facts that are false, impermissible, or unreliable.

Weston v. State, 832 A.2d 742, 746 (Del. 2003). A judge sentences with a closed mind if

he does not consider the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant. Id.

       Smith’s postconviction counsel argued that the sentencing judge acted with a

closed mind and that it was not until the postconviction decision, which, again, was

rendered by the same judge who sentenced her, that her arguments about the judge’s

closed mind were finally addressed. State v. Smith, 2017 WL 902149, at *20-22 (Del.

Super. Ct. Mar. 6, 2017). None of the reasoning given for the denial of postconviction

relief had been given at Smith’s sentencing nor included in the sentencing order. Smith’s

trial counsel could have raised the very same “judicial bias” or “closed mind” arguments

on direct appeal. He didn’t, and instead advised Smith to withdraw her appeal and pursue

                                              13
the motion for a sentence reduction. And in that motion he made the very same

arguments that had failed to persuade the very same judge shortly before, and which

resulted in the statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment plus 75 years.

Considering that even an enormous reduction of 75 years would still have left Smith with

life imprisonment, it is, on this record, difficult to fathom how the advice to withdraw

Smith’s appeal and instead pursue only a motion for a reduced sentence can be called

reasonable.

       Trial counsel’s advice to withdraw the appeal certainly appears to be the type of

indefensible lawyering that could constitute an extraordinary circumstance for the

purposes of equitable tolling. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 651-52. But whether Smith was

reasonably diligent in pursuing her rights – the other prong of equitable tolling – is

unclear based on the record before us and requires fact finding that should be undertaken

by the District Court. We can only speculate about the delay, and we decline to do that,

so we will remand.

       Should the District Court find that Smith is entitled to equitable tolling, then it will

need to decide the merits of her ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim. We

therefore also address the appropriate analysis under the circumstances of Smith’s claim.

       B.     The Correct Application of the Strickland Standard

       To succeed on an IAC claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different.

                                              14
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). There is a “strong

presumption” that counsel’s conduct was reasonable, and we evaluate conduct “from

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

       When the basis for a petitioner’s IAC claim is a failure to appeal, however, “a

more specific version of the Strickland standard” established by the Supreme Court in

Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), applies. Harrington v. Gillis, 456 F.3d 118,

125 (3d Cir. 2006). In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court held that, when considering

whether counsel performed deficiently by not filing a notice of appeal, the court must

first ask “whether counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal.” 528

U.S. at 478. If he did so, then he performed in a professionally unreasonable manner if

he failed to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to the appeal. Id. If

he did not consult with the defendant, we must examine whether that failure to consult

constitutes deficient performance. Id. We believe the same reasoning and rule applies to

abandonment of an appeal. “[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult

with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational

defendant would want to appeal … or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably

demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id. at 480.

       To show prejudice in such cases, “a defendant must demonstrate that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to consult with him about

an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” Id. at 484. “[E]vidence that there were

nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant … expressed a desire to appeal” is

                                             15
often “highly relevant” to showing that counsel performed deficiently, and that the

defendant was prejudiced; however, a defendant is not required to show that his appeal

would have had merit. Id. at 485–86; see also id. at 486 (“It is unfair to require an

indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his hypothetical appeal might

have had merit”).

       Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is an “unreasonable

application” of federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Here, no

Court discussed or acknowledged Flores-Ortega in analyzing whether Smith’s trial

counsel was ineffective for advising her to withdraw her appeal. 5 The Delaware Superior

Court focused on the merits of Smith’s appeal, rather than her right to appeal, in

determining whether trial counsel was ineffective, Smith, 2017 WL 902149, at *20, and

the Delaware Supreme Court “affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by

the Superior Court in its … opinion[.]” Smith v. State, 177 A.3d 613, 2018 WL 266838,

at *1 (Del. Jan. 2, 2018) (Table). The District Court adopted the same framing. Caple,

2021 WL 1226495, at *12. The State concedes that, in doing so, those courts “missed an

important principle underlying the reasoning of Flores-Ortega – that the accused has the

       5
         The State admitted during oral arguments that Flores-Ortega was not raised in
the parties’ briefing with the state courts or District Court and that it had been unaware of
the different standard before this appeal.

                                             16
ultimate authority to make the fundamental decision whether to take an appeal.”

(Answering Br. at 34.) Under the circumstances, the Delaware courts’ framing of

Smith’s counsel’s actions was an unreasonable application of Strickland, because it

ignored the clearly established Supreme Court precedent in Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at

480, and, therefore, receives no deference. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at

413.

       The issue thus becomes 1) whether trial counsel’s advice to withdraw the appeal

was unreasonable and 2) whether Smith was prejudiced. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-

88, 694; Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478, 484. As to Strickland’s second prong, not only

would Smith have appealed but for counsel’s advice, she did appeal – without his help –

before he suggested withdrawing the appeal. Therefore, the prejudice prong of Strickland

is clearly established in these circumstances, 528 U.S. at 484, and the remaining merits

question is whether Smith’s trial counsel’s performance, in advising her to withdraw her

appeal, was unreasonable. Id. at 478, 485-46. The same actions and reasoning that may

form the requisite extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling may also

inform whether her attorney’s counsel was objectively unreasonable under the first

Strickland prong.

       However, we need not decide that in the first instance because, as discussed above,

the District Court must first address the threshold question of whether Smith was

reasonably diligent in pursuing her rights, such that she is entitled to equitable tolling for

her untimely § 2254 petition.

                                              17
III.   CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal of Smith’s

§ 2254 petition and remand for the Court to consider whether Smith is entitled to

equitable tolling and, if so, to address the merits of her claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel.

                                              18