Court Opinion

ID: 9917331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 00:07:55.275573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.602262
License: Public Domain

01/11/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                 Assigned on Briefs December 19, 2023 at Knoxville

              TAVARIS D. BLEDSOE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                      No. 15-03265       Chris Craft, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00361-CCA-R3-PC
                       ___________________________________

Petitioner, Tavaris D. Bledsoe, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance
of counsel. Upon our review, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prepare a sufficient
brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b). Accordingly, his issues are waived, and the appeal
is dismissed.

               Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER
and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Gerald S. Green, Memphis, Tennessee (on appeal), and James Jones, Memphis, Tennessee
(post-conviction hearing), for the appellant, Tavaris D. Bledsoe.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Sam Winnig, Assistant District
Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                         Factual and Procedural Background

        The Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Petitioner charging
him with second degree murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He subsequently pled
guilty to second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
        The facts of this case, as set forth by the State at the guilty plea submission hearing,
are as follows:

       [O]n September 16th, 2014[,] at approximately 3:40 a.m., the victim, Aaron
       Banks, was at the suspect, [Petitioner’s] house, residence located at 2609
       Lowell. Banks and [Petitioner] became involved in an altercation when
       [Petitioner] retrieved a handgun off the table and shot Banks. Banks was
       pronounced dead on arrival.

       The Shelby County Medical Examiner ruled Banks a criminal homicide as a
       result of a gunshot. [Petitioner] was arrested and gave a typed statement as
       to shooting Banks, because they were arguing. A criminal history was
       performed as far as [Petitioner], and [Petitioner] showed to be a convicted
       felon for aggravated robbery out of McNairy County, Tennessee. This did
       occur here in Shelby County, ask that counsel stipulate these would’ve been
       the facts had this matter gone to trial.

At the guilty plea submission hearing, trial counsel reminded the trial court about
Petitioner’s mental health status. The trial court inquired about Petitioner’s medication,
and Petitioner named the prescriptions he was taking. Petitioner told the trial court that he
was “clear-headed.” The trial court asked about the extent of Petitioner’s education, and
Petitioner said that he attended college for six months.

       The trial court reviewed the plea agreement with Petitioner, explained his rights,
and reviewed Petitioner’s potential sentence if found guilty. The court also discussed the
agreed-upon sentence from the plea agreement. Both trial counsel and the trial court
questioned Petitioner about the case, his potential defense, his understanding of his rights
and the plea agreement, and his potential sentencing exposure after a trial. Petitioner
indicated that he understood his rights and the plea agreement, and he requested to serve
his sentence in a special needs facility. The trial court acknowledged that it could not
guarantee service in a special needs facility but would make a recommendation to the
Department of Correction. After being advised of his rights, Petitioner repeatedly indicated
that he wanted to enter into the plea agreement. The trial court specifically found that
Petitioner “freely and voluntarily[,] knowingly and intelligently made” the agreement. The
court also acknowledged trial counsel’s efforts in representing Petitioner.

       Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his
guilty plea was not “knowingly, willingly, or voluntarily entered” and that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, he argued that trial counsel failed to
disclose Petitioner’s mental health issues to the trial court and erroneously advised
Petitioner that he would be sentenced to a special needs facility due to his mental health

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status “instead of the penitentiary.” Counsel was appointed, and no amended petition was
filed.

Post-Conviction Hearing

        At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he was appointed to
represent Petitioner, and due to mental health concerns, he had Petitioner evaluated by Dr.
Fred Steinberg, who was deceased at the time of the hearing. Trial counsel noted that
Petitioner had a “significant mental health history,” and he thought that Petitioner had been
institutionalized twenty-eight times. He was concerned about Petitioner’s ability to
understand the evidence and his defense at trial. Trial counsel noted that the subject matter
of Petitioner’s facial tattoos1 and his low IQ score test also caused him to question
Petitioner’s competency.

       Trial counsel testified that he filed a motion to suppress Petitioner’s statement,
which “was very short, but it was incriminating.” There were no other witnesses to the
offense. The victim was Petitioner’s cousin, and Petitioner’s defense was one of self-
defense. Trial counsel recalled that Dr. Steinberg testified at the suppression hearing as to
his report concerning Petitioner’s mental health evaluation, and the State cross-examined
him. Trial counsel testified that after the trial court denied the suppression motion,
Petitioner “really began to push to make the guilty plea.” He said that Petitioner’s
statement was the strongest evidence against him.

        Concerning Petitioner’s claim of self-defense, trial counsel testified:

        The problem with self-defense was that you have to be able to prove that
        [Petitioner], himself, was also not engaged in unlawful activity and whether
        the gray area of gambling or drug use or whatever had that perhaps ended,
        [Petitioner] was a felon.

        So, at some point, he possessed a weapon in order to shoot his cousin. And
        from studying how this Court had ruled in many jury trials, it was generally
        my understanding that this Court would find he was engaged in unlawful
        conduct and not entitled to the self-defense instruction for possessing a gun.

Trial counsel believed that he communicated this to Petitioner, but he did not think that
Petitioner would be able to fully understand and appreciate the information because “he
had a very limited intellectual quotient[,]” which “Dr. Steinberg had articulated to [trial
counsel].”

        1
          Although trial counsel could not remember for certain, he testified that Petitioner’s tattoos “said
something like, I’m insane or I’m crazy.” Petitioner also had a “tattoo of a crack in his forehead and bolts
on his neck as if he was a monster like Frankenstein.”

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        Trial counsel testified that Dr. Steinberg’s report indicated that Petitioner was
experiencing “psychosis” during his mental evaluation. Trial counsel admitted that he
never felt as though Petitioner was not “in his right state of mind.” He said, “More than
[Petitioner], maybe by limited intellectual capacity didn’t understand something and I
would try to explain it on numerous occasions. But I did not ever have a moment where
he was experiencing psychosis.” Trial counsel testified that Petitioner was always pleasant
during their interactions and a “very nice young man to me.” He was also cooperative.

     As to Dr. Steinberg’s “impression” that Petitioner did not appear to demonstrate
competency to understand or waive Miranda warnings, trial counsel testified;

       The problem in [Petitioner’s] statement that the doctor so accurately cites in
       his report and testimony is in that having to give a statement of waiving his
       Miranda rights, he stated the exact opposite of understanding his Miranda
       rights, which is, you know, he can remain silent and that can’t be used against
       him.

       And he said, “I have to give a statement or ya’ll will lock me up.” And that’s
       the exact opposite of what your Miranda rights are. It may have been true,
       but it’s not an explanation that he understood his rights.

(emphasis added). Trial counsel agreed that the concerns about Petitioner’s understanding
of his rights were brought to trial counsel’s attention prior to the guilty plea, and it was
“brought to the Court’s attention in trying to have the statement found unconstitutional
because he did not give a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights.”

        Trial counsel testified that the trial court was aware, prior to the guilty plea, of Dr.
Steinberg’s “impression” that Petitioner did not “demonstrate competency to enter a guilty
plea or to enter a plea and stand trial” and that Petitioner remained “actively psychotic.”
Trial counsel again noted that Petitioner had been “institutionalized in a mental health
hospital like [twenty-eight] times[,]” and he often heard voices. He had reviewed much of
Petitioner’s “extensive medical records[.]” Trial counsel agreed that the other findings in
Dr. Steinberg’s report concerning Petitioner’s mental health were brought to the trial
court’s attention prior to the guilty plea submission hearing. He further acknowledged that
the State’s mental health expert felt that Petitioner was “malingering” and was competent.
Trial counsel testified that he raised concerns about Petitioner’s competency again with the
trial court during the guilty plea process.

       Trial counsel testified concerning the plea negotiations and said that the State’s offer
went from forty years down to twenty-five years. He said:

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       So, the choice was face long odds at trial to get a mandatory [seventy]-year
       sentence, [sixty] years for second degree murder and ten years for
       employment of a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony. Or come
       down from his range to the [twenty-five] years with ten years concurrent on
       the felon in possession of a firearm.

Trial counsel discussed Petitioner’s options with him and discussed the offer with trial
counsel’s peers. “[T]he consensus of those peers that I consulted was the [Petitioner] was
likely to be found competent to stand trial and make this decision.” Trial counsel also had
many phone conversations with Petitioner’s mother. He never felt “comfortable” with
Petitioner’s guilty plea. Trial counsel testified:

       I had concerns then as I do now and before his plea. And I dragged it out as
       long as possible after the [un]successful suppression motion to the point that
       the State was going to demand a trial setting, which I thought would cause
       [Petitioner] to face an additional four and a half decades in prison at 100
       percent.

       And because he was still consistently expressing his desire to plead guilty, I
       took it all the way to the point that the State was demanding a trial setting
       before I acquiesced with advice from my peers and many conversations with
       [Petitioner] and his mother.

On cross-examination, trial counsel agreed that in denying Petitioner’s motion to suppress,
the trial court concluded:

       This Court finds Dr. Steinberg’s opinion and testimony [were] a product of
       assumption and possibility, not definitive at all and was somewhat
       ambivalent.

       Dr. Zager’s [the State’s expert] opinion, on the other hand, was the more
       reasonable and the most supported by facts, records and evidence formed
       from decades of experience in giving forensic psychological examinations.
       This Court finds that [Petitioner] made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary
       waiver of his Miranda rights and his statement was taken constitutionally.

Trial counsel further agreed that Petitioner was a career offender at the time of the offenses
in this case. He did not believe that his representation of Petitioner was deficient, but he
disagreed with the outcome “to a certain extent.”

       Petitioner testified that he had experienced mental health issues “since I was
[nineteen] all the way up [until] I was [twenty] - - up to [thirty] years old. I was going
every other week.” He was also receiving mental health assistance from the Department

                                            -5-
of Correction at the time of the post-conviction hearing which included medication.
Petitioner agreed that he and trial counsel discussed his mental health issues, and trial
counsel “had paperwork.” Petitioner testified that he had five prior felony convictions for
which he was sent to Western State Mental Health Institute in Bolivar, Tennessee, where
he remained for a year and then served “three years in the county.” He said that he was
released with time served and had no violations.

       Petitioner testified that he pled guilty in this case because he had been incarcerated
and “just got out [of] the suicide tank. I was anxious and didn’t know what I was doing
and just did something.” He said that he had been in the “suicide tank” for approximately
one week because he was talking about committing suicide.

        Petitioner testified that he did not recall if he and trial counsel discussed going to
trial after the suppression motion was denied or if they discussed a competency hearing.
Petitioner also claimed that he did not know how much time he faced if his case went to
trial, but he knew that it was more than twenty years. He did not remember the trial court
explaining his rights or sentencing exposure to him at the guilty plea submission hearing.
Petitioner testified that he told the trial court he understood everything because he was “so
anxious and [he] wanted to get out of 201 Poplar.” He agreed that he told the trial court he
was on the proper medication and that he was “clear headed” and knew what was going on
at the time of the guilty plea. Petitioner remembered telling the trial court that he heard
voices and requested that the court place him in a special needs facility. He said that he
constantly heard voices and was hearing them at the time of the post-conviction hearing.
Petitioner testified that he “just signed the paper” and was “trying to get to the penitentiary”
to get help rather than being in the suicide tank every day.

        Petitioner agreed that he gave a signed statement at the time of his arrest and testified
concerning his recollection of the circumstances of the shooting. He and trial counsel
reviewed all of the discovery from his case, and he talked with several doctors concerning
his mental health issues. He answered all of their questions and complied with their
requests. When asked if he decided to plead guilty after talking with trial counsel,
Petitioner said: “We debated. I told him I didn’t know. But I told him I was [going to]
plead guilty because I wanted to get out of 201 Poplar.” Petitioner admitted to writing a
letter to the District Attorney General about the circumstances of the shooting and a plea
offer and a letter to an assistant district attorney general about his desire to enter a guilty
plea. Petitioner claimed he did not ask for the twenty-five-year offer that trial counsel
procured for him, he “just got offered” it. He did not know anything additional trial counsel
could have done for him.

       After the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court entered an order
denying the post-conviction petition. The court made extensive findings and concluded
that Petitioner failed to show deficient performance by trial counsel and that there was “no

                                              -6-
showing [Petitioner] was not competent to enter his plea or did not have a sufficient
understanding of the consequences of his plea.”

                                         ANALYSIS

       Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by “failing to view the
cumulative effect of Petitioner’s claims as a constructive denial of the right to counsel and,
consequently, a structural constitutional error requiring the grant of the relief prayed for in
the Petition for Post-Conviction relief[.]” He further argues cumulative error. The State
responds that Petitioner has waived his arguments due to inadequate briefing. We agree
with the State.

       Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) requires that the appellant set forth
an argument for each issue, along with “the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the
contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate
references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on[.]” Tenn. R. App. P.
27(a)(7). Similarly, Rule 10(b) of the Rules of this Court states plainly that “[i]ssues which
are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to the
record will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b).

        Where there is a failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate record and
failure to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the issue is waived. State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 236 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988)
(waived issue where defendant had failed to adequately brief issues by making appropriate
references to the record, cite authority in support of issues, and/or make appropriate
arguments); see also State v. Molthan, No. M2021-01108-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL
17245128, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 28, 2022) (waived issues where Defendant had
failed to provide an adequate appellate record and had not prepared a sufficient brief) no
perm app. filed; see also State v. Lott, No. M2008-02127-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 565664,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb 18, 2010) (“Appellant also makes a cursory statement that her
sentences should have been run concurrently rather than consecutively. Appellant includes
no argument or citations to authority to support the statement. . . . Because Appellant has
failed to cite any authority for this claim, it is waived.”); see also Seaton v. State, No.
E1999-01312-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1177462, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug 21, 2000)
(waived issue where appellate brief contained no citations to appropriate authorities in
support of argument).

       In the “Statement of the Facts” section of Petitioner’s brief, he states only the
following: “The facts of the case are adequately recited in the Order denying Post
Conviction relief. (R. pages 18-31).” While Petitioner cites law in his brief related to legal
principles such as the right to legal counsel, structural and non-structural errors, plain error
and cumulative error, he makes not a single reference to the record in the argument section,
nor does he make any arguments as to how the applicable law applies to the facts in his

                                             -7-
case. Because of the inadequacy of Petitioner’s brief, we must conclude that he has waived
appellate consideration of this issue. “We caution counsel, [], that appellate review is
frustrated by the failure to include facts relevant to the issues on appeal and the failure to
identify the basis in the record for the argument presented and that compliance with the
Rules of Appellate Procedure is expected.” State v. Lynch, No. E2019-00195-CCA-R3-
CD, 2020 WL 1899611, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2020); see also State v. Moss,
No. M2021-00043-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 1117795, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 31,
2023), no perm. app. filed. Having concluded that Petitioner has failed to comply with the
applicable rules, he has waived the issues and we do not reach the merits of his claims.

                                        Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Petitioner’s appeal.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

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