Court Opinion

ID: 9531131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:07:51.228381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:21.150952
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, also dissenting: A cat once made the mistake of sitting on a hot stove. It never sat on a hot stove again. It never sat on a cold stove again either. After its initial unpleasant experience, the cat jumped to a couple of erroneous conclusions. First, that it was the stove and not the heat which singed its derriere. Second, that there is no difference between a hot stove and a cold one. So it is with the majority opinion in the instant case. The majority reverses the conviction in this case merely because testimony was introduced concerning the use of a lie detector or polygraph. This, notwithstanding the majority’s concession that the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of the polygraph evidence, that the defendant himself caused, in part, the admission of polygraph evidence, and that the defendant received a fair trial. Purporting to ground its decision on precedent, the majority cites to People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 225. In Baynes, the prosecutor and defendant had entered into a stipulation that the defendant would take a lie detector test. Further, that if the defendant passed the test, the charges would be dropped. However, if the defendant failed the test, the test results could be introduced in evidence against him. Subsequently, the defendant took and failed the test. He went to trial and, pursuant to stipulation, the results of the test were introduced in evidence without objection. The defendant was convicted. In reversing the conviction, that opinion (itself unfortunate) pontificated that polygraph evidence is unreliable, and that its introduction in evidence is plain error which impinges upon the integrity of the judicial system. (Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244.) In the instant case, the majority opinion draws on that language to support its decision to reverse. Even if we were to assume that Baynes was correctly decided (a large concession), it does not follow that Baynes controls the case at hand. In Baynes, the polygraph results were introduced to prove that the defendant was lying. Nothing of the sort happened in the case at hand. What came out in the instant trial was simply that two of the witnesses took lie detector tests as part of the investigation process. I most strenuously disagree with the majority’s finding that reversal of this conviction is necessary merely because reference to a polygraph was before the jury. Here, the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the defendant suffered no prejudice from the admission of this evidence, and the trial was admittedly fair. The majority believes that reversal is necessary to preserve the integrity of our judicial system, and that to do otherwise would tarnish the reputation of the judicial process itself. To the contrary, I believe that the opposite is true. Affirmance is necessary to preserve not merely the integrity of the judicial system but its credibility as well. Justice William A. Lewis participated in the appellate court opinion which affirmed the trial court. (236 Ill. App. 3d 1001.) In supporting the affirmance, he opined: "If we reverse this case based upon the fact that the magic words 'polygraph or lie detector test’ were mentioned, then we would be creating the nightmare that exists in tort cases with the mention of the magic word 'insurance.’ The polygraph test may be unreliable, but it is an important investigatory tool for the police, especially in the elimination of innocent persons from the investigation or suspicion. We should not create potential reversible error in every case that the polygraph is used, unless its use clearly prejudices the defendant and interferes with the integrity of the judicial process. In this case the evidence was overwhelming against the defendant, so a reversal merely causes a retrial for no other purpose than to see if the prosecutor can coach or 'woodshed’ his witnesses sufficiently not to violate the rules of the game by mentioning those horrible words 'polygraph or lie detector.’ Meanwhile, defense counsel’s only hope is a mistrial and it becomes very tempting for counsel to lure the State’s witnesses into the trap. The question of guilt or innocence becomes lost in this game of technicalities. Finally, I feel that we sometimes fail to give jurors credit for having some intelligence and knowledge.” 236 Ill. App. 3d at 1018-19 (Lewis, J., specially concurring). Well, the nightmare which Justice Lewis envisioned has arrived. The majority opinion has created a per se rule which, though simple to apply, is inherently both thoughtless and unreasonable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court.