Court Opinion

ID: 9902548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:19:51.89535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.483162
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                __________________________________

                        Case No. 5D22-2695
                  LT Case No. 2022-DR-000524-A
                __________________________________

BLAKE VERNON GARRISON,

    Appellant,

    v.

TAMMY ELAINE WILLIAMSON,

    Appellee.
                 _______________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter County.
Michelle T. Morley, Judge.

Christopher P. Fordham, of Schenking & Fordham, P.A.,
Brandon, for Appellant.

No Appearance for Appellee.

                         October 20, 2023

JAY, J.

      Blake Garrison challenges the trial court’s issuance of a
dating violence injunction against him. Because we agree that
Garrison received insufficient notice of the evidentiary hearing on
the injunction petition, we reverse.

      On September 23, 2022, Tammy Williamson petitioned for a
dating violence injunction against Garrison, her former fiancé. The
trial court found that based on the allegations in the petition,
Williamson did not appear to be in any imminent danger.
Accordingly, the court did not issue an ex parte injunction. The
court set an evidentiary hearing on Williamson’s petition for the
morning of October 7, 2022, at the Sumter County Courthouse. The
court’s scheduling order stated that “[t]o appear at a hearing,
lawyers must file a Notice of Appearance at least 2 days in
advance.” Garrison, who resides in Pinellas County, was not
served with notice until the day before the hearing. He
immediately sought a continuance, but the court did not grant one.

       The hearing occurred as scheduled on October 7. Both
parties appeared pro se, and the court granted Williamson’s
petition. That same day, Garrison moved to modify the injunction.
The pro se motion—which reads like a motion for rehearing—
complained that Garrison had inadequate time to prepare for the
hearing. The court denied Garrison’s motion.

      The parties in a domestic injunction proceeding have full due
process rights. Berrien v. State, 189 So. 3d 285, 287 n.2 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2016). Due process demands “fair notice” and “a real
opportunity to be heard and defend” before a court imposes
judgment. State ex rel. Gore v. Chillingworth, 171 So. 649, 657 (Fla.
1936). Whether a party received procedural due process is a
question that we review de novo. Jenkins v. M.F., 280 So. 3d 507,
510 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

     To be fair, notice “must be of such nature as reasonably to
convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearance.” Ferris v.
Winn, 242 So. 3d 509, 510 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (quoting In re C.K.,
88 So. 3d 975, 977 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). “While there are no hard
and fast rules about how many days constitute a ‘reasonable time,’
the party served with notice must have actual notice and time to
prepare.” Id. (quoting Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla.
2d DCA 1996)). “The time requirements will vary based on the type
of proceeding and the circumstances surrounding it.” Spencer v.
Kelner, 357 So. 3d 166, 169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). However,
“Florida’s courts have routinely held that if service of notice is
made to a party only a few days or less before an adversarial

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hearing on the merits, then the notice is not fair and reasonable.”
Id.

     For example, in a case with facts analogous to this one, the
Second District held that twenty-five hours’ notice of a domestic
violence injunction hearing was insufficient:

    On April 8, 2010, A.M.C. (the Mother) filed a petition for
    injunction for protection against domestic violence
    against L.C., the child’s paternal grandfather. After
    reviewing the Mother’s petition, the court found that the
    facts as stated in the petition standing alone did not
    justify the entry of a temporary injunction. The court set
    a hearing for April 15, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. The
    Grandfather was not served with notice of the hearing
    until April 14, 2010, at 9:45 a.m. The Grandfather
    immediately attempted to obtain counsel, but was unable
    to do so in time for the hearing. After the hearing, he did
    retain an attorney who promptly filed a motion for
    rehearing detailing the Grandfather’s efforts to obtain
    counsel between the time he received the notice and the
    time of the hearing.

    On appeal, the Grandfather argues that the service of
    notice only twenty-five hours before the hearing was
    insufficient. . . . Under the[se] facts . . . we agree the notice
    was insufficient. The record contains no indication that
    J.C. was in any danger because of L.C., and certainly not
    imminent danger. L.C. acted diligently to obtain counsel
    after he was served with the notice, and he promptly
    sought rehearing after the injunction was entered in a
    motion that detailed his efforts. Accordingly, we reverse
    and remand for further proceedings.

L.C. v. A.M.C., 67 So. 3d 1181, 1182–83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)
(footnotes omitted); see also Spencer, 357 So. 3d at 169 (“[N]o
emergency existed . . . to justify providing Appellant with only
twenty-four hours’ notice of the hearing [on a petition for a
protective injunction].”); Ferris, 242 So. 3d at 512 (“Less than one
day’s notice to retain counsel and prepare for an evidentiary

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hearing on the mother’s verified motion [to prohibit contact with
the couple’s minor children] is not reasonable.”).

       Here, like L.C., Spencer, and Ferris, the amount of notice
was unfair because it did not afford Appellant a reasonable
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Appellant, who lives in
Pinellas County, did not receive notice of a dispositive, evidentiary
hearing in Sumter County until the day before the hearing. He
then promptly requested a continuance, but the court did not grant
one. In addition, the court’s scheduling order required all lawyers
to file their notices of appearance at least two days before the
hearing. Thus, by the time Garrison received notice of the
evidentiary hearing, it was impossible for any counsel he could
have retained to comply with the court’s scheduling order.

      Because Garrison did not receive fair notice of the hearing
on Williamson’s petition for a dating violence injunction, we
reverse the final judgment awarding an injunction.*

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    * The injunction expired on April 7, 2023. However, because of

the collateral consequences at stake, a pending appeal of a dating
violence injunction does not become moot when the injunction
expires. Bell v. Battaglia, 332 So. 3d 1094, 1097–1103 (Fla. 2d DCA
2022) (collecting cases and expounding on the rationale for this
rule); see also Malone v. Malone, 368 So. 3d 1057, 1059–61 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2023) (Tanenbaum, J., concurring).

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