Court Opinion

ID: 9750096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:18:34.647858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.633638
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
The Court today concludes that the appellant, Walter Goldsmith, must be granted a new trial because the Commonwealth cannot provide him with either a transcript or an equivalent picture of his 1958 trial. For reasons set forth at length in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Jones (joined by this writer), in Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 447 Pa. 380, 290 A. 2d 93 (1972), I disagree with the retroactive application of the transcript requirements first enunciated by this Court in Commonwealth v. Anderson, 441 Pa. 483, 272 A. 2d 877 (1971), and therefore am obliged to dissent.
My disagreement with the majority, however, does not end on this point. As correctly noted in the Court’s opinion, appellant has not been deprived of a transcript through any fault of the Commonwealth. Rather, the untimely illness of the court reporter immediately following trial, his subsequent death, and the inability of any other reporter to read his shorthand notes com*33bined to limit the transcription to only 309 pages of testimony from the five-day trial. The Supreme Court of the United States, faced with a similar situation arising in an Illinois trial, i.e. unavailability of the trial transcript due to the death of the court reporter, held that Due Process and Equal Protection did not require the state to afford the defendant a new trial. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 10 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1963). That case, in my view, is controlling here. Said the Supreme Court: “When through no fault of the State, transcripts of criminal trials are no longer available because of the death of the court reporter some practical accommodation must be made. . . . ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations— illogical, it may be, and unscientific. . . . What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned.’ The ‘rough accommodations’ made by government do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the lines drawn are ‘hostile or invidious.’ ” Id. at 424; 10 L. Ed. 2d at 459.
The rough accommodation permitted in Norvell to relieve the state of its transcript obligation was a presumption that the defendant who had a lawyer at tidal and presumably for puiposes of appeal, and yet failed to pursue an appeal for some fifteen years, had his rights adequately protected. Admittedly, the same presumption does not attach here. The Post Conviction Hearing court held that appellant had been denied his appellate rights because of fear of the imposition of the death penalty after retrial. See Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A. 2d 811 (1969). To conclude now that his appellate rights were adequately protected by counsel1 would be both *34inconsistent and unjust. Cf. Commonwealth v. Norman, 447 Pa. 515, 291 A. 2d 112 (1972); Commonwealth v. Banks, 428 Pa. 571, 237 A. 2d 339 (1968) (dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Boberts).2 The unavailability of one form of rough accommodation, however, should not foreclose resort to others. In the present case, appellant can support his need for a transcript with only the baldest assertion that he recollects numerous trial errors, particularly in the court’s charge, none of which he specifies. It is not unwarranted to assume that such errors are alleged only because a transcript of that portion of the trial cannot be reproduced. In an analagous situation, the Supreme Court of the United States held that where a defendant’s grounds for error make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the state to show that something less will suffice. Mayer v. Chicago, supra at 195, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 378-9. To require in the instant case, where part of the transcript is unavailable through no fault of the state, the showing of a colorable need for the missing portion seems to me to be the type of “rough accommodation” sanctioned by Norvell. While avoiding the automatic release of those with spurious challenges, it affords those with meritorious claims the opportunity to vindicate their rights.
*35Appellant has available 309 pages of testimony from hig own trial, the complete transcripts of the trials of Ms three co-defendants, and the testimony from his 1965 habeas corpus hearing. In addition, it is customary for trial counsel to take at least rough notes of the proceedings, particularly of questionable passages in the charge of the trial court. Admittedly, these sources may not qualify as an equivalent picture for complete appellate review. Commonwealth v. Anderson, supra. I do not suggest, however, that appellant substantiate Ms claims of error by means of these sources, only that he demonstrate a colorable right to relief. His naked assertions fall short of this standard.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.

 The present appellant, Walter Goldsmith, has enjoyed the services of the same privately retained attorney for the past fifteen *34years—at trial, in the 1965 habeas corpus proceedings, and on this appeal. Significantly, the transcript cases, both federal and state, have all sought to insure that “[djestitute defendants . . . be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.” (Emphasis added). Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). See also, Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 30 L. Ed. 2d 372 (1971) ; Norvell, supra; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963) ; Pate v. Holman, 341 F. 2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Commonwealth v. DeSimone, supra; Commonwealth v. Anderson, supra. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963). Quaere whether denying a transcript to the nonindigent appellant in this case involves any of the “hostile and invidious” discriminations proscribed in Norvell?

 Cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895, 21 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1968).