Court Opinion

ID: 9732929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:44:58.352952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.518596
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The conduct of Gibbs at the time in question does not rise to the level of “recklessness” so as to justify a conviction of a Class C felony. In Nordstrom v. State (1994) Ind.App., 627 N.E.2d 1380, this court acknowledged that criminal recklessness must neces*1110sarily be more egregious than an act of common law negligence.
“A person acts recklessly if he or she engages in conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and such conduct involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” Id. at 1383 (citing McClaskey v. State (1989) Ind., 540 N.E.2d 41, 45).
With respect to this issue, the facts before us create a case of first impression, not heretofore decided either by the Indiana Supreme Court or by this court. Accordingly, it is appropriate to draw upon cases from other jurisdictions. Two such cases are People v. Friesen (1978) Ill.App., 58 Ill.App.3d 180, 15 Ill.Dec. 722, 374 N.E.2d 15, and King v. Commonwealth (1977) Va., 217 Va. 601, 231 S.E.2d 312. In Friesen, the defendant, as here, while driving his vehicle, began to experience difficulty with the amperage. He turned off the main headlights in order to conserve the battery but left the parking lights on. The residential area through which he was driving at approximately midnight, was unlighted, and there were no sidewalks. The vehicle struck and killed one of two pedestrians walking along the side of the road. The court reversed the reckless homicide conviction stating:
“In the instant case, the defendant was clearly negligent and it is possible that but for his negligence, Beth Douglas would still be alive.
Nonetheless, the gist of the offense in this case is not merely negligence.
While the defendant must have realized that turning off the Jeep headlights created a risk, under the circumstances, the probability that turning off the headlights would lead to the Jeep hitting a pedestrian was insufficient to render the defendant’s conduct ‘an utter disregard of the safety of others under circumstances likely to cause injury.’ ” Friesen, supra at 185, 15 Ill.Dec. at 727, 374 N.E.2d at 19 (quoting People v. Sikes (1927), 328 Ill. 64, 74, 159 N.E. 293, 297).
In King, the conviction was for involuntary manslaughter which under state law was defined as “the killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, in the prosecution of some unlawful, but not felonious, act...” 231 S.E.2d at 315. The defendant was driving her vehicle northbound at approximately 11:30 PM with only the parking lights on. She struck broadside a vehicle which had been waiting to turn left, allowing other northbound vehicles to clear the intersection of the four-lane divided highway. Not seeing defendant’s vehicle, the victim had turned in front of defendant. In reversing the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court held:
“In the operation of motor vehicles violation of a safety statute amounting to mere negligence proximately causing an accidental death is not sufficient to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
... Accordingly, we define involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor vehicle as the accidental killing which, although unintended, is the proximate result of negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of human life.” King, supra, 231 S.E.2d at 316.
The State relies here upon two other cases, State v. Stottlemyre (1988) Mo.App., 752 S.W.2d 840, and State v. Mears (1984) La.App., 445 So.2d 167. Those cases, however, are clearly distinguishable in that there were other culpable acts of the defendant in addition to driving without headlights. In Stott-lemyre, the defendant was operating his motorcycle at a high rate of speed on the wrong side of the road, lost control and struck a guardrail killing his passenger. In Mears, the defendant knew he had no headlights before he began to drive the vehicle and, in addition, was intoxicated. In my view, these cases do not lead to the conclusion that Gibbs’ conduct was criminally reckless, given the Indiana definition of recklessness.
An additional factor militates in favor of reversal. Violation of I.C. 9-21-7-2, Indiana’s statute requiring the display of headlights at certain times of the day and under certain conditions, is only a Class C infraction. Significantly, I.C. 9-21-8-52 *1111which sets forth various acts constituting reckless driving categorizes those acts of recklessness as more serious Class B misdemeanors. A logical analysis of the two statutes would lead one to conclude that our legislature did not contemplate that operating a vehicle with only parking lights displayed would constitute criminal recklessness.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the reckless homicide conviction and remand with instructions to discharge the defendant.2

. In light of my view of the law applicable to the facts before us, I would further conclude that a conviction for criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, a Class C felony, would likewise be erroneous.