Court Opinion

ID: 9773789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:58:33.856498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:57.373758
License: Public Domain

CRAHAN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I concur fully in Judge Smith’s analysis of Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. App. 1997) and Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. App. 1997), in which the Southern District followed Zemelman without extended critical analysis. I do not agree that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Sommers, 954 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App. E.D. 1997) forecloses us from rejecting the reasoning of Zemelman and Jackson. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and transfer the cause to the Missouri Supreme Court.
As Judge Smith points out in his opinion, the alleged ambiguity identified in Zemel-man requires a conclusion that the policy issued to Zemelman provided insurance for the vehicle which collided with him.1 I agree with Judge Smith that underinsured motorist coverage cannot reasonably be described as insurance for the tortfeasor’s vehicle. Even if it could, however, the policy language would present no ambiguity on the facts presented either in Zemelman or in this ease. The Other Insurance clause expressly states that it applies to “any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own.” Assuming arguendo that underinsured motorist coverage may be deemed for certain purposes to be insurance on the tortfeasor’s vehicle, it must still be an underinsured vehicle for the Other Insurance clause to apply. Here, as in Zemelman, the tortfeasor’s vehicle was unquestionably not an underinsured vehicle. Thus the policy did not provide any insurance for it and the Other Insurance clause is inapplicable. If the Other Insurance clause is inapplicable by its own terms, it cannot conceivably create an ambiguity.
In Sommers, we expressly held that the language of the excess insurance clauses in Krenski v. Aubuchon, 841 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. App. 1992), Zemelman and Jackson. Therefore, although the court then gratuitously observed that the “other insurance” clauses at issue in those cases could reasonably be interpreted as providing excess coverage, the issue of whether Krenski, Zemelman and Jackson were correctly decided was not before us in Sommers and the statement may properly be characterized as dicta. Accordingly, I disagree that Sommers forecloses us from rejecting the reasoning of Zemelman and Jackson.
I would reverse the judgment for the reasons expressed in Judge Smith’s opinion and in this opinion and transfer the cause to the Missouri Supreme court to resolve the resulting conflict.

. The Zemelman court put it this way, 935 S.W.2d at 677:
... the Zemelman policy expressly states “insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own is excess_” Since underinsured coverage can be reasonably interpreted as "coverage for a vehicle you do not own,” the policies contain similar ambiguities...."