Court Opinion

ID: 9371200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 18:03:07.265357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.059484
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/23 P. v. Brackett CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yuba)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096309

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. Nos. CRF2200263,
                                                                                 CRF2200544, CRF2200560)
           v.

 DEMOND CHARLES BRACKETT,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Demond Charles Brackett appeals from an order committing him to the
Department of State Hospitals (DSH) following a finding that he was incompetent to
stand trial in three criminal matters. His appointed counsel has filed a brief asking this
court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any
arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) While we are not
required to independently review the record in these circumstances (People v. Blanchard
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1024-1025 (Blanchard)), our discretionary review of the
record reveals no meritorious issues. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.

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                      FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       In February 2022, defendant was charged with assault upon a custodial officer
(CRF22-263). The following month, he was charged in two separate cases with battery
against a custodial officer (CRF22-544) and threatening a public officer (CRF22-560). In
the latter two cases, defendant was alleged to have a prior strike conviction within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law.
       On March 21, 2022, a day before the third of these cases was filed, defendant’s
trial counsel declared a doubt regarding defendant’s competence to stand trial in the first
two matters. The question of defendant’s mental competence was submitted on
psychiatric evaluations that were conducted in connection with two prior cases that are
not at issue in this appeal. Defendant’s attorney informed the trial court that defendant
had already been committed to DSH in those matters and was awaiting transport. Based
on these prior evaluations, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial in the
new matters and suspended criminal proceedings.
       On April 7, 2022, the same doubt was declared with respect to defendant’s
competence to stand trial in the third case at issue in this appeal. Criminal proceedings
were suspended in this matter as well. However, rather than find defendant to be
incompetent based on the prior evaluations, the trial court “reappoint[ed] Dr. Daisy
Switzer to give an updated opinion of [d]efendant’s competency” for purposes of all three
cases and ordered a hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 1369. Statutory section
citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
       At the hearing, held on April 28, 2022, the parties submitted the matter on the
report filed by Dr. Switzer, as well as two previous reports filed in the prior cases noted
above. Dr. Switzer concluded that while defendant was presently able to understand the
nature of the proceedings, he did not presently have sufficient mental capacity to consult
with an attorney and assist rationally in the formation of a defense. As the doctor

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explained, defendant “harbors deep resentment and persecutory delusions and refuses to
engage with his attorney.” In support of this conclusion, Dr. Switzer noted, among other
things, that defendant refused to attend the current evaluation and summarized a prior
evaluation in which defendant expressed paranoia about his case, believed his attorney
was conspiring against him, and admitted he was not communicating with counsel
“ ‘because of lies.’ ”
       Based on these reports, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial in
each of the three cases and committed him to DSH. We also note that in addition to
refusing to talk to his attorney and meet with Dr. Switzer for the current evaluation,
defendant also refused to attend the competency hearing. The commitment order
challenged in this appeal was filed on May 5, 2022.

                                        DISCUSSION
       A criminal defendant is not entitled to Wende review in an appeal from a
commitment order following a finding of incompetence to stand trial because such an
appeal is not the defendant’s first appeal as of right, and principles of due process do not
otherwise compel independent review in these circumstances. (Blanchard, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1024-1025.)
       In reaching this conclusion, the Blanchard court discussed In re Sade C. (1996)
13 Cal.4th 952, in which our Supreme Court held Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738 and People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, did not apply to an indigent parent’s
appeal of an order affecting child custody or parental status because such proceedings are
civil in nature and, therefore, the appeal is not a criminal defendant’s first appeal as of
right. (Sade C., at pp. 981-982.) However, the court nevertheless went on to consider the
following three factors in order to determine whether principles of due process required
Anders/Wende review to be extended to these circumstances: “(1) the private interests at
stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the procedures

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in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of the appeal.” (Id. at p. 987.) Balancing
these factors, the court concluded Anders/Wende review was not required. (Id. at pp.
987-991.)
       The Blanchard court then discussed Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th
529, in which our Supreme Court similarly held Anders and Wende did not apply to an
appeal from the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS)
Act. (Id. at pp. 536-537.) After further concluding that the foregoing factors did not
require extension of Anders/Wende review to such an appeal (id. at pp. 537-543), the
court provided the following guidance: “If appointed counsel in a conservatorship appeal
finds no arguable issues, counsel need not and should not file a motion to withdraw.
Instead, counsel should (1) inform the court he or she has found no arguable issues to be
pursued on appeal; and (2) file a brief setting out the applicable facts and the law. Such a
brief will provide an adequate basis for the court to dismiss the appeal on its own
motion.” (Id. at p. 544, fns. omitted.)
       Applying Sade C. and Ben C., the Blanchard court explained that the process for
committing a criminal defendant found to be incompetent to stand trial occurs while
criminal proceedings are suspended and “is a special proceeding of a civil nature
[citation], not a criminal defendant’s first appeal of right . . . .” (Blanchard, supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1025.) Nor do the factors set forth above require extension of
Anders/Wende review to an appeal from a commitment order: “The public and private
interests at stake in competency proceedings are strikingly similar to LPS commitments.
Concern for prompt evaluation and treatment of mentally incompetent defendants, their
individualized treatment and supervision, protection of the public, and a comprehensive
system of judicial review to protect the rights of such defendants are all attributes of the
statutory scheme.” (Ibid.) And while “the liberty interest at stake for a defendant found
incompetent to proceed is significant[,] . . . just as in the case of LPS commitments, the
scheme for mentally incompetent defendants has ‘several layers of important safeguards.’

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[Citation.]” (Ibid.) On balance, the court concluded “Anders/Wende review is not
required.” (Ibid.) Instead, the court concluded the brief filed by the defendant’s counsel
pursuant to Wende satisfied the procedure articulated in Ben C. and provided “an
adequate basis for [the] court to dismiss the appeal on [its] own motion.” (Id. at pp.
1025-1026.)
       Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo) contains additional guidance on how appellate courts should handle
requests for Anders/Wende review when the matter being appealed is not a criminal
defendant’s first appeal of right. There, after concluding the procedures set out in Wende
do not apply in the context of an appeal from an order denying postconviction relief
under section 1172.6, the court exercised its inherent supervisory powers to establish
appellate procedures and requirements for providing notice to a defendant before a Court
of Appeal dismisses an appeal in these circumstances: “the Court of Appeal should
provide notice to the defendant that counsel was unable to find any arguable issues; the
defendant may file a supplemental brief or letter raising any argument the defendant
wishes the court to consider; and if no such supplemental brief or letter is timely filed, the
court may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.” (Delgadillo, at p. 222.) There, the notice
provided to the defendant was “suboptimal” because “it did not inform [him] that the
appeal would be dismissed as abandoned if no supplemental brief or letter was filed.”
(Ibid.) The court then conducted its own independent review of the record and concluded
the defendant was not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6. (Ibid.) The court
further noted that “the decision to conduct independent review is solely up to the
discretion of the Courts of Appeal and is not required.” (Id. at p. 233, fn. 6.)
       While the appellate procedures set out in Delgadillo apply to appeals from an
order denying postconviction relief under section 1172.6, not appeals from a commitment
order following a finding of mental incompetence, and while the Delgadillo court cited
both Sade C. and Ben C. with approval in the opinion (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at

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pp. 222, 229-233), we nevertheless exercise our inherent discretion to independently
review the record because the notice given to defendant in this case similarly failed to
notify him that dismissal of the appeal was on the table.
       Our review of the record reveals no arguable issues. The finding that defendant
was incompetent to stand trial is supported by substantial evidence. (See People v.
Wycoff (2021) 12 Cal.5th 58, 84 [psychologist’s report constituted substantial evidence
supporting a finding of incompetence to stand trial based solely on the defendant’s
incapability of cooperating with counsel].) The commitment ordered by the trial court is
authorized by law. Defendant was at all times represented by competent counsel, who
was not precluded “from waiving a jury, forgoing the right to present live witnesses, and
submitting the competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court.”
(People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 904.)

                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment (commitment order) is affirmed.

                                                 HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RENNER, J.

MCADAM, J. Pro Tem.*

* Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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