Court Opinion

ID: 9957489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:06:31.935864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:21.419159
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
       Individual Members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana,
                     in their official capacities, et al.,
                                        Appellants-Defendants
                                                                          FILED
                                                     v.               Apr 04 2024, 9:54 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                Anonymous Plaintiff 1, et al.,           Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

                                           Appellees-Plaintiffs

                                              April 4, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           22A-PL-2938
                             Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                            The Honorable Heather A. Welch, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                        49D01-2209-PL-31056

                                 Opinion by Judge Weissmann

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024    Page 1 of 76
                                       Judge May concurs and
                             Judge Bailey concurs with a separate opinion.

      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   The Indiana General Assembly passed a law criminalizing most abortions in

      the summer of 2022. Before the law took effect, five anonymous Indiana

      women and Hoosier Jews for Choice (collectively, Plaintiffs) challenged the law

      in a complaint they filed against the Individual Members of the Medical

      Licensing Board of Indiana and the prosecutors in Marion, Lake, Monroe, St.

      Joseph, and Tippecanoe counties (collectively, the State).1 Plaintiffs alleged that

      the law, now codified as Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1 (Abortion Law), violated

      their rights under the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). See

      Indiana Code § 34-13-9-1 et seq.

[2]   The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, halting

      enforcement of the Abortion Law against Plaintiffs until their underlying

      RFRA claim could be resolved. The State appeals that ruling as well as the trial

      court’s later certification of this case as a class action. The State claims the trial

      court lacked jurisdiction to enter the preliminary injunction because Hoosier

      Jews for Choice lacks standing and Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe for

      1
        Since Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, one of them—Anonymous Plaintiff 3—has been voluntarily dismissed
      from the case.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                             Page 2 of 76
      adjudication. The State also claims that Plaintiffs failed to prove the

      requirements for a class action or for a preliminary injunction, and, in any case,

      the injunction is too broad.

[3]   We conclude that Hoosier Jews for Choice has associational standing, that

      Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, and that the class action certification was not an

      abuse of discretion. Although we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion

      in granting injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overly broad because

      it enjoins enforcement of the Abortion Law in ways that do not violate RFRA.

      We therefore affirm but remand for entry of a narrower injunction.2

      Facts
[4]   The United States Supreme Court set the stage for this appeal two years ago

      when it ruled that the federal constitution “does not confer a right to abortion.”

      Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 292 (2022) (overruling in

      part Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,

      505 U.S. 833 (1993)). In so ruling, the Dobbs Court placed the ability to regulate

      abortions not protected by federal law squarely in the states’ laps.

[5]   The landmark decision unleashed a torrent of state legislative and judicial

      activity. Legislatures rushed to enact statutes that incorporated their views on

      this divisive issue. Just as quickly, individuals and organizations turned to the

      2
        We conducted oral argument in this matter and thank counsel for their excellent presentations. We also
      thank the amici curiae which submitted briefs. The quality of the submissions—both oral and written—
      greatly assisted the Court in deciding this appeal.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                               Page 3 of 76
      courts to challenge legislation that did not subscribe to their views of abortion.

      The citizens in some states even went to the ballot box to amend their

      constitutions to protect reproductive freedoms.

[6]   Indiana was among the states to act quickly after Dobbs. Through the Abortion

      Law, the General Assembly prohibited abortions except under specified

      circumstances when: (1) abortion is “necessary to prevent any serious health

      risk to the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s life”; (2) the

      pregnancy resulted from rape or incest; or (3) the fetus has a lethal anomaly.

      Ind. Code § 16-34-2-1.3

[7]   Before the Abortion Law took effect, Plaintiffs filed their “Class Action

      Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” seeking to halt the Abortion

      3
        Throughout the course of this case, the parties sometimes have used the term “fetus” to describe all
      developmental stages of a pregnancy. However, this language deviates from the scientifically accepted
      language. A zygote is created when the sperm fertilizes the egg. https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/
      articles/7247-fetal-development-stages-of-growth.com, Fetal Development: Week-by-Week Stages of
      Pregnancy (clevelandclinic.org) [https://perma.cc/G8NX-WRCJ]; see also https://www.cdc.gov/art/
      reports/2020/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/3UTU-AG67] (defining: (1) “fertilization” as “[t]he
      penetration of the egg by the sperm and the resulting combining of genetic material that develops into an
      embryo”; and (2) “zygote” as “[a] fertilized egg before it divides”).
      Once created, the zygote then divides and becomes an embryo about three weeks later. https://my.cleveland
      clinic.org/health/articles/7247-fetal-development-stages-of-growth.com, Fetal Development: Week-by-Week
      Stages of Pregnancy (clevelandclinic.org) [https://perma.cc/XY87-GW4]; see also https://www.cdc.gov/art/
      reports/2020/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/L57M-SREG] (defining “embryo” as “[a]n egg that has been
      fertilized by a sperm and has then undergone one or more cell divisions.”).
      Around eight weeks post-fertilization, a fetus is formed, and the fetal stage of development continues until
      birth of the human child. https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/articles/7247-fetal-development-stages-of-
      growth.com, Fetal Development: Week-by-Week Stages of Pregnancy (clevelandclinic.org) [https://perma.
      cc/4BW9-7R7W]; https://www.cdc.gov/art/reports/2020/glossary.html [https://perma.cc/GTH5-A4D3]
      (defining “fetus” as “[t]he unborn offspring from the eighth week after conception to the moment of birth”).
      We use the term “fetus” when quoting the parties, court decisions, and applicable statutes even if this term
      seemingly refers to an earlier stage of development. In all other respects, we employ the scientific terms.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 4 of 76
      Law’s application to them. Their Complaint alleged that the Abortion Law

      violated their state RFRA rights.

[8]   Under Indiana’s RFRA, “[a] governmental entity may substantially burden a

      person’s exercise of religion only if the governmental entity demonstrates that

      application of the burden to the person: (1) is in furtherance of a compelling

      governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that

      compelling governmental interest.” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8(b). Plaintiffs allege

      that their sincere religious beliefs (or, in the case of Hoosier Jews for Choice, its

      members’ sincere religious beliefs) direct them to seek pregnancy terminations

      criminalized by the Abortion Law. Plaintiffs further allege that the State has no

      compelling interest in preventing these religiously motivated health care

      decisions and, even if a compelling interest exists, the Abortion Law is not the

      least restrictive means of furthering that interest.

[9]   The Anonymous Plaintiffs, as described in their Complaint, are:

              • Anonymous Plaintiff 1, who is 39, Jewish, married with one
                child, and living in Monroe County. She follows a kosher-
                style diet and is active in her synagogue.

                   In accordance with her religion, she believes life begins when
                   a child takes their first breath after birth and that the life of a
                   pregnant woman—including her physical and mental health
                   and wellbeing—“must take precedence over the potential for
                   life embodied in a fetus.” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol.
                   II, p. 70. She further believes, in accordance with her Jewish
                   faith, that “if her health or wellbeing—physical, mental, or
                   emotional—were endangered by a pregnancy, pregnancy-

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                  Page 5 of 76
             related condition, or fetal abnormality, she must terminate the
             pregnancy.” Id. at 70-71.

             She previously terminated a pregnancy when genetic testing
             revealed the fetus had a severe chromosomal defect that likely
             would cause miscarriage, stillbirth, or death within the first
             year after a live birth. Although Anonymous Plaintiff 1 wishes
             to have another child, her pregnancy would be considered
             high risk due to her age, and she would face the risk of the
             same fetal defect. Due to the Abortion Law, she therefore has
             refrained from seeking to become pregnant.

        • Anonymous Plaintiff 2, who is a 30-year-old Allen County
          resident not affiliated with any religious organization and
          who does not believe in a single, theistic god. Married with
          two children, she instead believes in a “supernatural force or
          power in the universe that connects all humans” and that “we
          are endowed with bodily autonomy” that should not be
          infringed upon. Id. at 75.

             Her religious and spiritual beliefs guide her life and dictate
             that “[i]f a pregnancy or the birth of a child would not allow
             her to fully realize her humanity and inherent dignity, she
             would have to terminate her pregnancy . . . even under
             circumstances which would not be permitted under [the
             Abortion Law].” Id. at 76. She has terminated a pregnancy for
             that reason and does not believe that life begins at conception.
             Her “significant anxiety about the possibility of an unintended
             pregnancy and her inability to terminate such a pregnancy
             under” the Abortion Law has resulted in a “harmful”
             reduction in physical intimacy between her husband and her.
             Id.

        • Anonymous Plaintiffs 4 and 5, who are a Jewish, same-sex
          married couple without children, living in Monroe County.
          Active in their synagogue, they believe in accordance with
          their faith that “life begins when a child takes [their] first
          breath after being born” and that “the life of a pregnant

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 6 of 76
                    person, including their physical and mental health and
                    wellbeing, takes precedence over the potential for life
                    embodied in a fetus.” Id. at 81.

                    Prior to the Abortion Law’s enactment, the couple had
                    planned for one of them to become pregnant through
                    “assisted reproductive technologies.” Id. at 81. They now are
                    refraining from doing so due to the unavailability of a
                    pregnancy termination when their religious beliefs dictate it.

                •   Certain members of Hoosier Jews for Choice, which is a
                    membership organization aimed at advancing reproductive
                    justice, supporting abortion access, and promoting bodily
                    autonomy for Hoosiers. Its members are Jewish persons who
                    believe that “under Jewish law and religious doctrine, life
                    does not begin at conception, and that a fetus is considered a
                    physical part of the woman’s body, not having a life of its
                    own or independent rights.” Id. at 83.

                    Hoosier Jews for Choice’s members, some of whom are
                    capable of becoming pregnant, further believe that “under
                    Jewish law an abortion is directed to occur if it is necessary to
                    prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant person,
                    even if there is not a physical health risk that is likely to cause
                    substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major
                    bodily function.” Id.

[10]   In conjunction with their Complaint, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction

       to prevent enforcement of the Abortion Law. The State objected, arguing that

       Hoosier Jews for Choice lacked standing to bring this action and that Plaintiffs’

       claims were unripe because none of them were pregnant or seeking an abortion.

       The State also argued that Plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary

       injunction because they were not likely to succeed on the merits of their RFRA

       claim.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024              Page 7 of 76
[11]   The trial court granted the preliminary injunction in a 42-page order containing

       thorough findings of facts and conclusions of law. Id. at 17. The trial court’s key

       rulings were:

           • Anonymous Plaintiffs have standing to seek a preliminary injunction.

           • Hoosier Jews for Choice, which is asserting the rights of its members and
             not its own rights as an organization, has associational standing.

           • The issues are ripe for adjudication because Plaintiffs are suffering injury
             and altering their sexual and/or reproductive behavior due to the
             restrictions in the Abortion Law.

           • Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction barring the State’s
             enforcement of the Abortion Law against them until the court rules on
             the merits of their claims. In so ruling, the court found: (1) that Plaintiffs
             had shown that their remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing
             irreparable harm pending resolution until final judgment; (2) a
             reasonable likelihood of success at trial exists; (3) the threatened injury to
             Plaintiffs outweighs the potential harm to the State from a preliminary
             injunction; and (4) the public interest would be disserved if the
             preliminary injunction were not issued.

[12]   The State appealed the entry of the preliminary injunction and, under Indiana

       Appellate Rule 56, petitioned to transfer the case from this Court to the Indiana

       Supreme Court. Plaintiffs objected to the State’s petition, which our Supreme

       Court summarily denied by unanimous vote.

[13]   While this appeal was pending, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to

       certify the case as a class action. The court adopted Plaintiffs’ proposed class

       definition, which provided:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 8 of 76
               All persons in Indiana whose religious beliefs direct them to
               obtain abortions in situations prohibited by [the Abortion Law]
               who need, or will need, to obtain an abortion and who are not, or
               will not be, able to obtain an abortion because of the [Law].

       Appellants’ Class Action App. Vol. II, p. 58.

[14]   In response, the State moved for an interlocutory appeal under Indiana

       Appellate Rule 14(C), which applies to class action certifications. This Court

       accepted jurisdiction and consolidated the preliminary injunction and class

       action certification appeals.

[15]   While the present consolidated appeal was pending, our Supreme Court

       reversed a preliminary injunction issued in a Monroe County lawsuit filed by

       several Indiana abortion providers presenting a facial challenge to the Abortion

       Law. Members of the Med. Licensing Bd. v. Planned Parenthood Nw., Haw., Alaska,

       Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. 2023). The abortion providers contended

       that a woman’s right to “liberty” under Article 1, Section 1 of the Indiana

       Constitution encompasses a fundamental right to abortion and that the

       Abortion Law materially burdens a woman’s exercise of this right.

[16]   Our Supreme Court rejected this facial challenge. It determined that “Article 1,

       Section 1 protects a woman’s right to an abortion that is necessary to protect

       her life or to protect her from a serious health risk, but the General Assembly

       otherwise retains broad legislative discretion for determining whether and the

       extent to which to prohibit abortions.” Id. at 962. The Planned Parenthood Court

       concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024        Page 9 of 76
       that they could prove, in their facial challenge, that “there are no circumstances

       in which any part of [the Abortion Law] could ever be enforced consistent with

       Article 1, Section 1.” Id. The Court thus vacated the preliminary injunction in

       that case. Id.

[17]   The Planned Parenthood Court’s ruling expressly left open the possibility of

       future constitutional attacks on the Abortion Law. Id. at 984-85. And although

       the Court defined a minimum right to abortion under Article 1, Section 1—that

       is, when the abortion is “necessary to protect [the pregnant woman’s] life or to

       protect her from a serious health risk”—it did not expound on the potential

       breadth of that right. Id. at 976. Furthermore, Planned Parenthood neither

       involved nor addressed the Abortion Law in the context of a RFRA challenge.

       Discussion and Decision
[18]   The State raises five primary issues, which we resolve as follows:

               I.    The issues are justiciable. Hoosier Jews for Choice has
                     associational standing to raise its members’ RFRA challenges
                     to the Abortion Law. Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, although the
                     Plaintiffs are not now pregnant or seeking an abortion.

               II. The trial court properly certified the case as a class action.

               III. A preliminary injunction was merited.

               IV. The scope of the injunction was overbroad so we remand to
                   the trial court for adjustment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024            Page 10 of 76
       I. Justiciability of Plaintiffs’ Claims
[19]   The State’s standing and ripeness claims fall within the general doctrine of

       justiciability. Garau Germano, P.C. v. Robertson, 133 N.E.3d 161, 167 n.9 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2019). “Justiciability . . . is ‘[t]he quality or state of being appropriate

       or suitable for adjudication by a court.’” Berry v. Crawford, 990 N.E.2d 410, 418

       (Ind. 2013) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 943 (9th ed. 2009)). “[J]usticiability

       is not a question of jurisdiction, but whether it is prudent for the Court to

       exercise its jurisdiction.” Citizens Action Coal. of Ind. v. Koch, 51 N.E.3d 236, 241

       (Ind. 2016).

       A. Standing of Hoosier Jews for Choice
[20]   We first turn to the State’s claim that Hoosier Jews for Choice lacks standing.

       We review such issues de novo. Ehrlich v. Moss Creek Solar, LLC, 219 N.E.3d

       760, 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “Standing is a key component in maintaining

       our state constitutional scheme of separation of powers.” Pence v. State, 652

       N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). The standing requirement imposes a limit on the

       court’s jurisdiction by requiring that a litigant be “entitled to have a court

       decide the substantive issues of a dispute.” Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec.

       Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022).

[21]   Although a party’s standing may be conferred by statute or common law,

       plaintiffs must always meet the “irreducible minimum” standing requirements

       originating from the Indiana Constitution’s separation of powers clause. Id.;

       Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner’s Ass’n v. Indpls. Hist. Pres. Comm’n, 194

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 11 of 76
       N.E.3d 1175, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). These requirements mandate that a

       plaintiff “demonstrate a sufficient injury” that is “personal, direct, and one the

       plaintiff has suffered or is in imminent danger of suffering.” Holcomb v. Bray,

       187 N.E.3d 1268, 1286 (Ind. 2022). Thus, the invalidity of “a particular statute .

       . . is almost never a sufficient rationale for judicial intervention; the party

       challenging the law must show adequate injury or the immediate danger of

       sustaining some injury.” Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488. This determination is made

       “by looking at a lawsuit’s allegations—not its outcome.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d

       at 1286.

       i. Associational Standing Is Widely Recognized
[22]   RFRA confers standing on an organization under certain circumstances. It

       provides that “[a] person whose exercise of religion has been substantially

       burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by a [RFRA] violation” may

       assert a RFRA claim. Ind. Code § 34-13-9-9. A “person” in this context

       includes “[a]n organization,” “a religious society,” and “a group organized and

       operated primarily for religious purposes.” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-7(2).

[23]   Though Hoosier Jews for Choice is a “person” under RFRA, the organization

       does not allege any violation of its own RFRA rights. Without more, Hoosier

       Jews for Choice cannot meet the “irreducible minimum” standing

       requirements. See Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 216. Hoosier Jews for Choice instead

       asserts a cognizable injury to its members in the form of RFRA violations.

       Hoosier Jews for Choice therefore claims associational standing, a concept

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 12 of 76
       rarely applied in Indiana state courts but long ago accepted by federal courts

       and many state courts.

[24]   Associational standing, a 20th century offshoot of third-party standing, “is

       largely a creature of federal law, and permits an association to sue on behalf of

       one or more of its members” under certain circumstances. Bd. of Comm’rs of

       Union Cnty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 169 (Ind. 2017). Sometimes

       described as “representational” or “organizational” standing, this concept was

       at the forefront of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision last summer in

       Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

       181, 230 (2023) (ruling in favor of an organization with associational standing

       that race-based affirmative action programs in college admissions processes

       violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).

[25]   In recognizing the associational standing of the plaintiff, a non-profit

       organization alleging injury to its student members and not to itself, the Court

       relied on the test enunciated in Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432

       U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Under the Hunt test, which is used extensively in the

       federal court system, an organization has standing to raise the claims of its

       members when: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their

       own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s

       purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the

       participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 13 of 76
[26]   A large number of state courts, like their federal brethren, have found value in

       the associational standing doctrine. As of 2008, nearly half had adopted

       associational standing.4 These states typically have relied on the Hunt test or

       some modified version of it in determining whether plaintiffs qualified for

       associational standing. See, e.g., City of Pikeville v. Ky. Concealed Carry Coal., Inc.,

       671 S.W.3d 258, 264 (Ky. 2023) (requiring proof of only the first Hunt

       requirement for associational standing); Ill. Road & Transp. Builders Assoc. v.

       Cnty. of Cook, 204 N.E.3d 189, 195-97 (Ill. 2022) (applying unmodified Hunt test

       in determining associational standing).

[27]   Indiana courts have been slower to embrace the associational standing doctrine.

       But two panels of this Court have recognized associational standing, and both

       applied the Hunt test. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs in Cnty. of Allen v. Ne. Ind. Bldg.

       Trades Council, 954 N.E.2d 937, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“We find

       associational standing to be the most helpful lens for analysis, and thus address

       whether the Appellees have associational standing to sue on behalf of their

       members”), trans. denied; Save the Valley, Inc. v. Ind.-Ky. Elec. Co., 820 N.E.2d

       677, 680-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that plaintiff organizations had

       associational standing after noting two dozen states that have accepted the

       doctrine of associational standing).

       4
         See, e.g., Interactive Gaming Council v. Brown, 425 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014) (stating “most of our
       sister states have adopted associational standing”); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 148 v. Ill. Dep’t. of Emp.
       Sec., 828 N.E.2d 1104, 1112 (Ill. 2005) (identifying 24 states that have adopted associational standing with
       some version of the Hunt test).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                       Page 14 of 76
[28]   Our Supreme Court has neither explicitly recognized nor denounced

       associational standing. Cf. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union Cnty, 80 N.E.3d at 170

       (assuming, without deciding, that associational standing was available). 5 We

       therefore follow the lead of the two panels of this Court, many other state

       courts, and the federal courts and recognize the doctrine of associational

       standing. We also find that the Hunt test, relied upon by these courts in pure or

       altered form, is the proper test for determining whether associational standing

       exists.

       ii. Associational Standing Is Beneficial to the Pursuit of
           Justice
[29]   Assuming the requirements of the Hunt test are met, recognizing associational

       standing has broad benefits. See Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owner’s Ass’n,

       194 N.E.3d at 1183; Save the Valley, 820 N.E.2d at 680-81. “[A]llowing an

       association to represent its members’ interests promotes judicial economy and

       efficiency.” Save the Valley, 820 N.E.2d at 680. Clothed in associational

       standing, “a single plaintiff, in a single lawsuit, [may] adequately represent the

       interests of many members, avoiding repetitive and costly independent

       actions.” Id. The association’s members who have individual standing, in turn,

       may “pool their financial resources and legal expertise to help ensure complete

       and vigorous litigation of the issues.” Id. at 680-81. A third recognized benefit is

       5
        In its recent decision in Planned Parenthood, 211 N.E.3d at 966, our Supreme Court stated that third parties
       must “have their own direct injury” to have standing in cases in which they raise the claims of others. But
       Planned Parenthood did not involve associational standing, so we therefore do not read it as rejecting the
       doctrine.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 15 of 76
       that “associations are generally less susceptible than individuals to retaliations

       by officials responsible for executing the challenged policies.” Id. at 681.

[30]   The value of associational standing is evident in the RFRA context. Plaintiffs

       who believe their RFRA rights have been violated may be unable to pursue

       litigation due to the cost. They also may be unwilling to step forward

       individually and share intimate details of their religious beliefs or private

       conduct in the way that a RFRA challenge to statutory limitations may require.

       iii. Trial Court Correctly Determined that Hoosier Jews for
            Choice Has Associational Standing
[31]   We reject the State’s claim that Hoosier Jews for Choice does not meet the

       requirements for associational standing. The first two Hunt requirements are

       easily met here. And though the third requirement is more difficult to assess, we

       ultimately find that Hoosier Jews for Choice has met it.

       a. First Two Hunt Requirements Met
[32]   No disagreement exists as to the first Hunt requirement: that the organization’s

       members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right. The State

       attacks only the standing of Hoosier Jews for Choice, not of its membership. As

       the parties do not dispute that individual members of Hoosier Jews for Choice

       have standing to sue in their own right, we find the first Hunt requirement is

       met.

[33]   The record is equally clear as to the second Hunt requirement: that the interests

       the organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose. Hoosier Jews for

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 16 of 76
       Choice’s stated purpose is “to take action within the Jewish community and

       beyond to advance reproductive justice, support abortion access, and promote

       bodily autonomy for all people across the state of Indiana.” Appellants’ Prelim.

       Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 149. In this litigation, Hoosier Jews for Choice is asserting

       its members’ rights under RFRA by seeking to halt the Abortion Law’s

       restrictions on reproductive choices that conflict with its members’ exercise of

       their sincerely held religious beliefs. This conduct falls within the organization’s

       stated goals.

       b. Third Hunt Requirement Met
[34]   Hunt’s third requirement—that neither the claim asserted nor the relief

       requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit—is a

       closer question. In asserting its members’ RFRA claims, Hoosier Jews for

       Choice alleges that its members’ sincerely held religious beliefs dictate that

       reproductive health care decisions be left to the individual members. Hoosier

       Jews for Choice claims each member must decide whether prioritizing her

       physical, mental, or emotional health over that of the potential life—as directed

       by the member’s religious beliefs—requires the termination of a pregnancy.

[35]   The parties debate whether the personal nature of this claim requires the

       individual members’ participation in this lawsuit. In arguing that the individual

       members must participate, the State relies heavily on Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.

       297 (1980).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 17 of 76
[36]   In Harris, a church organization, relying on the First Amendment’s religion

       clauses, joined other plaintiffs in seeking to enjoin enforcement of legislation

       known as the Hyde Amendment. Id. at 302-06. The Amendment limited

       funding for abortions under the Medicaid program. Id. at 302. The

       organization’s membership purported to include “pregnant, Medicaid eligible

       women who, as a matter of religious practice and in accordance with their

       conscientious beliefs, would choose but are precluded or discouraged from

       obtaining abortions reimbursed by Medicaid because of the Hyde

       Amendment.” Id. at 321.

[37]   The Harris Court ruled that the organization lacked associational standing

       under the Hunt test because the organization’s claim required the participation

       of its individual members. Id. The Court reasoned:

               [The organization] concedes that “the permissibility, advisability
               and/or necessity of abortion according to circumstance is a
               matter about which there is diversity of view within . . . our
               membership, and is a determination which must be ultimately
               and absolutely entrusted to the conscience of the individual
               before God.” It is thus clear that the participation of individual
               members of the [organization] is essential to a proper
               understanding and resolution of their free exercise claims.

       Id.

[38]   The State contends that a similar diversity of views exists among the members

       of Hoosier Jews for Choice. But the State’s argument largely depends on an

       exaggeration of the deposition testimony of a founding member of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024        Page 18 of 76
       organization. The State contends, for instance, that the founding member

       “conceded” that Hoosier Jews for Choice would accept members who

       “disagree” about when abortions should be permitted. However, the founding

       member’s testimony was far more conjectural.

[39]   He testified that prospective members must sign a document similar to a

       statement of belief attesting to their agreement with certain Jewish tenets.

       Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. V, p. 35. He described these Jewish tenets as

       including beliefs that: 1) no separate life exists during pregnancy; 2) no being

       with rights independent of the pregnant woman exists during pregnancy; and 3)

       an abortion is “directed to occur if it is necessary to prevent physical or

       emotional harm to a pregnant person.” Id. at 32-36. When asked whether

       membership restrictions would attach to a person who believes women should

       have the choice of abortion but does not follow these Jewish tenets, the

       founding member testified that he “believe[d] so” and that he “definitely

       [would] want to hear them out” so he could be “more informed and understand

       them.” Id. at 35-36. But he conditioned those statements, noting that “I’m not

       the end-all-be-all of Hoosier Jews for Choice” because “[i]t’s a group

       organization.” Id. at 36.

[40]   The State also suggests the founding member “conceded” that any decision

       about the necessity of an abortion is for the pregnant person to make

       individually. In fact, the founding member’s testimony was far less conclusive.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 19 of 76
[41]   The founding member testified that the pregnant woman would be violating

       Jewish law and tradition if she did not have an abortion when Jewish law and

       tradition directed it. Id. at 61. The decision whether to follow the tenets of

       Jewish faith or violate Jewish law is an individual decision, as is the

       determination of whether the pregnancy would harm the pregnant person’s

       physical or emotional well-being, according to the founding member’s

       testimony. Id. at 33, 61.

[42]   Contrary to the State’s claim, no part of the founding member’s testimony

       establishes that Hoosier Jews for Choice’s members have disparate religious

       beliefs as to abortion. His testimony revealed no members of Hoosier Jews for

       Choice who do not subscribe to the Jewish tenets that he discussed. His

       testimony, in fact, corroborates the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint that

       Hoosier Jews for Choice “is made up of persons who believe that under Jewish

       law and religious doctrine, life does not begin at conception, and that a fetus is

       considered a physical part of the woman’s body, not having a life of its own or

       independent right.” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 36. His testimony

       also is consistent with Plaintiffs’ allegations that Hoosier Jews for Choice and

       its members “believe that under Jewish law an abortion is directed to occur if it

       is necessary to prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant person, even if

       there is not a physical health risk that is likely to cause substantial and

       irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function.” Id.

[43]   This basic commonality of views among Hoosier Jews for Choice’s

       membership was missing in Harris. Unlike Hoosier Jews for Choice, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024             Page 20 of 76
       plaintiff organization in Harris conceded a “diversity of view” within its

       membership as to “the permissibility, advisability and/or necessity of abortion

       according to circumstance.” Harris, 448 U.S. at 321. Noting that a free exercise

       case requires a plaintiff “to show the coercive effect of the [challenged]

       enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion,” the Harris

       court determined, based on the organization’s concession, that “the

       participation of individual members of the [plaintiff organization] is essential to

       a proper understanding and resolution of their free exercise claims.” Id.

[44]   Unlike Hoosier Jews for Choice, the plaintiff organization in Harris did not

       allege its members were “directed” by their religion to obtain an abortion under

       specific circumstances in which the challenged law would restrict abortion

       access. Whereas the members in Harris did not agree as to “the permissibility,

       advisability and/or necessity of abortion,” Hoosier Jews for Choice has alleged

       its members “believe that under Jewish law an abortion is directed to occur if it

       is necessary to prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant person.” Id.;

       Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 36. As the Abortion Law restricts

       abortions necessary to prevent physical or emotional harm to a pregnant

       person, an understanding of the coercive effect of the Abortion Law as it

       operates against the individual members of Hoosier Jews for Choice in their

       exercise of religion is not dependent on their individual participation in this

       lawsuit.

[45]   Our ruling is consistent with federal decisions finding that even some disparity

       of views or interests among the organization’s members does not render

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024        Page 21 of 76
       associational standing unavailable. See, e.g., Catholic Benefits Ass’n LCA v.

       Sebellius, 24 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1100-02 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (rejecting the notion

       that “Harris dictates that all RFRA claims require individual participation” and

       finding organization representing employers had associational standing based

       on its members’ shared submission to “Catholic conviction that contraceptives

       violate their conscience,” despite other disparities); Nat’l Mar. Union of Am.,

       AFL-CIO v. Commander, Mil. Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir.

       1987) (ruling that “the mere fact of conflicting interests among members of an

       association does not of itself defeat the association’s standing”).

[46]   Moreover, Hunt’s third requirement is based on prudential rather than

       constitutional constraints. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown

       Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1996).6 Rules of prudential standing—

       considered more flexible than their constitutional counterparts—are “best seen

       as focusing on . . . matters of administrative convenience and efficiency.” Id.;

       United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 757 (2013). In this regard, Hunt’s third

       requirement has three central purposes: (1) to “promote adversarial intensity”;

       (2) to “guard against the hazard of litigating a case to the damages stage only to

       find the plaintiff lacking detailed records or the evidence necessary to show the

       harm with sufficient specificity”; and (3) to hedge against any risk that the

       6
         Hunt’s first two requirements are spawned by the federal constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement
       applicable to federal courts whereas the third Hunt requirement, as a “prudential” rule of standing, essentially
       is self-imposed judicial restraint. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 555-57; see also Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041,
       1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (adopting certain federal prudential standing limitations as “equally applicable to
       questions of standing under the Indiana [C]onstitution”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                 Page 22 of 76
       damages recovered by the association will fail to find their way into the pockets

       of the members on whose behalf injury is claimed. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. at 556-

       57. These purposes already are served in this case.

[47]   For instance, adversarial intensity exists in this case even without the

       participation of Hoosier Jews for Choice’s members. The record on appeal, the

       quality of the parties’ lengthy written submissions and their oral presentations,

       and the number of amici curiae vividly illustrate this point. Moreover, Hoosier

       Jews for Choice already has provided substantial evidence from non-member

       sources like Jewish scholars and rabbis showing that its members’ religious

       beliefs conflict with the Abortion Law.

[48]   Finally, the relief sought in this case is injunctive relief, not damages. Where

       only injunctive relief is sought, associational standing is more easily established,

       partly because the relief is uniform. Id. at 546 (noting that damages claims

       necessarily involve individualized proof and therefore the individual

       participation of association members).

[49]   For all these reasons, we conclude that Hoosier Jews for Choice has met Hunt’s

       third requirement and has associational standing.7

       7
         We note that an Idaho state court and an Indiana federal district court have rejected an organization’s claim
       of associational standing in a RFRA challenge to post-Dobbs statutory restrictions on abortions. See Satanic
       Temple v. Labrador, 2024 WL 357045 (D. Idaho Jan. 31, 2024) (finding that plaintiff organization lacked
       associational standing because it failed to specify the identity of any of its members who had been or would
       be injured by the abortion law); Satanic Temple, Inc. v. Rokita, 2023 WL 7016211 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 25, 2023)
       (rejecting associational standing when organization failed to identify any of its members and relied only on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 23 of 76
       B. Ripeness
[50]   We next consider the State’s claim that the Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe. The

       ripeness doctrine is linked to the principles underlying standing. Horner v. Curry,

       125 N.E.3d 584, 589 (Ind. 2019) (describing ripeness as a “corollary doctrine[]”

       to standing).

[51]   Whereas standing first asks “whether a litigant is entitled to have a court

       decide” its substantive claims, “ripeness asks whether the claim is sufficiently

       developed to merit judicial review.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1285. In other

       words, ripeness “involves the timing of judicial review and the principle that

       judicial ‘machinery should be conserved for problems that are real and present

       or imminent, not squandered on problems that are abstract or hypothetical or

       remote.’” Ind. Fam. Inst., Inc. v. City of Carmel, 155 N.E.3d 1209, 1218 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020) (quoting In re Paternity of M.G.S., 756 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2001)).

[52]   For a claim to be ripe, “there must exist not merely a theoretical question or

       controversy but a real or actual controversy, or at least the ripening seeds of

       such a controversy.” Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Zoercher v. Agler, 202

       Ind. 214, 172 N.E. 186, 189 (1930)). Put simply, “the issues in a case must be

       statistical probabilities). These decisions do not support a different result here. The State does not claim that
       Hoosier Jews for Choice has not identified its membership or those who allegedly have suffered or will suffer
       harm from the Abortion Law. In fact, the State deposed members of Hoosier Jews for Choice and referred to
       them by name during the depositions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                  Page 24 of 76
       based on actual facts rather than abstract possibilities.” Id. A claim that “rests

       upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed

       may not occur at all’” is not ripe for adjudication and therefore not subject to

       appellate review. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1988) (quoting

       Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)); see also

       Garau Germano, 133 N.E.3d at 168.

[53]   The essence of Plaintiffs’ claim is that the Abortion Law “severely burdens

       [their] sincere religious beliefs” under RFRA by banning abortions under

       circumstances when their “sincere religious beliefs . . . direct them to obtain an

       abortion.” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 61. We agree with the trial

       court that this claim is ripe.

       i. Standard of Review
[54]   Indiana courts have taken divergent approaches when analyzing ripeness. Some

       panels of this Court have borrowed the federal courts’ two-part test for ripeness.

       See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461

       U.S. 190, 201 (1983) (considering during the ripeness determination the fitness

       of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties caused by

       withholding court consideration); see also Garau Germano, 133 N.E.3d at 168

       (citing the test for ripeness used in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.); Brogan v. State, 925

       N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (same).

[55]   Other Indiana appellate cases have relied simply on our Supreme Court’s

       language, found in Holcomb and other decisions, focusing on the requirements

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 25 of 76
       of “a real or actual controversy, or at least the ripening seeds of such a

       controversy,” that is “based on actual facts and not abstract possibilities.”

       Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1287 (citing Zoercher, 172 N.E. at 189).

[56]   Our Supreme Court has never cited the federal test for ripeness except in a case

       considering whether federal law preempted state law. See Hardy v. Hardy, 963

       N.E.2d 470, 474 n.3 (Ind. 2012) (approving Court of Appeals’ analysis of

       ripeness that incorporated federal ripeness test, although ripeness issue was

       raised on transfer). Accordingly, in addressing the State’s argument that the

       Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims are unripe, we follow the lead of Holcomb and

       determine whether the Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims reveal “a real or actual

       controversy, or the ripening seeds of a real controversy,” based on actual facts,

       not abstract possibilities. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1287 (quoting Zoercher, 172

       N.E. at 189).

       ii. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Ripe
[57]   The State asserts that the Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims are too undeveloped to

       determine whether the Abortion Law substantially burdens their sincere

       religious exercise or whether any such burden furthers the State’s compelling

       interest.8 The State focuses on two specific characteristics of the Anonymous

       8
         The State also argues that the trial court erroneously found Plaintiffs’ claim was ripe because they “are
       doing as did the Governor in Holcomb v. Bray and [are] merely challenging the validity of a statute.”
       Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 40 (citing 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 2022)). This comparison is
       erroneous. Holcomb centered on the Governor’s argument that the challenged statute was unconstitutional on
       its face—a claim that does not require consideration of the facts. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1287 n.9. Plaintiffs

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 26 of 76
       Plaintiffs: 1) their sincere religious beliefs ultimately leave to them as

       individuals the final decision on whether an abortion is mandated by those

       beliefs; and 2) they are not now pregnant.

[58]   The State notes that after a plaintiff establishes a RFRA violation, RFRA

       requires that the State prove a compelling government interest that is satisfied

       through application of the challenged law to the particular claimant whose

       sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. See, e.g., Gonzales v.

       O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006). The

       State claims this is a claimant-by-claimant, fact-sensitive inquiry that is

       impossible to conduct before Plaintiffs are pregnant. The State therefore insists

       pregnancy is an essential condition to Plaintiffs’ relief. 9

[59]   The State further contends that the lack of any pregnant Plaintiffs renders this

       case merely an abstract dispute because Plaintiffs have not yet been burdened

       by the Abortion Law. According to the State, whether any Plaintiff will even

       become pregnant—and whether those who do would be directed by their

       religious beliefs to terminate the pregnancy under circumstances prohibited by

       here are not challenging the constitutionality of the Abortion Law. Instead, they are challenging the Abortion
       Law as applied to them, contending this application violates their rights under RFRA. Although the facial
       challenge in Holcomb lacked the fact sensitivity of this appeal, Holcomb’s general statements about ripeness
       remain equally applicable here.
       9
         In response, Plaintiffs claim the State’s argument is tantamount to a rule that only pregnant persons may
       challenge an abortion ban. And thus, due to the temporary nature of pregnancy, such a law will be
       impossible to challenge. This claim confuses ripeness and mootness. See Garau Germano, 133 N.E.3d at 167
       (noting that the justiciability doctrine has four major categories: standing (who may sue), ripeness (when is
       the suit appropriate), mootness (whether the suit involves an active dispute), and political question (whether
       the dispute should be left to the political branches)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                 Page 27 of 76
       the Abortion Law—is inherently speculative and based on “abstract

       possibilities.’” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. Br., p. 34.

[60]   We agree that pregnancy, by its very nature, defies simple prediction. Some

       women become pregnant despite their use of contraceptives. Other women fail

       to become pregnant even when actively seeking that result. But Plaintiffs have

       alleged and presented evidence to support a substantial burdening of the

       exercise of their sincere religious beliefs in the form of altered sexual and

       reproductive patterns.

[61]   Due to their inability to obtain an abortion as their religious beliefs dictate,

       Anonymous Plaintiffs 1, 4, and 5 have alleged they are not attempting to

       become pregnant when they otherwise would. Anonymous Plaintiffs 1 and 2

       report that they have severely decreased their sexual intimacy with their

       husbands due to concerns about becoming pregnant while the Abortion Law’s

       restrictions are in effect. Some members of Hoosier Jews for Choice also have

       altered their sexual and reproductive practices in response to the Abortion Law.

       We agree with Plaintiffs and the trial court that these changes show a

       substantial burdening of the religious exercise of Plaintiffs and that these

       allegations of existing harm from the Abortion Law render Plaintiffs’ lack of

       pregnancy irrelevant to ripeness.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 28 of 76
[62]   Although no Indiana appellate court has addressed the ripeness of a RFRA

       claim,10 ripeness decisions in non-RFRA contexts have informed our analysis

       and support our finding. Indiana appellate courts repeatedly have found claims

       ripe in the face of arguments, like the State’s here, that the plaintiffs had yet to

       suffer actual injury.

[63]   Most recently, in Morales v. Rust, 228 N.E.3d 1025, 1034 (Ind. 2024), our

       Supreme Court ruled that a candidate who preemptively sued to prevent his

       removal from the ballot alleged a ripe claim. Noting that “[a]ny lingering

       doubts about . . . ripeness have been quelled because [the candidate] alleges [the

       challenged election law] infringes on his constitutional rights,” the Court

       ultimately determined that the candidate’s claim was ripe because he was “in

       imminent danger of suffering” a real—not a theoretical—injury to his rights.”

       Id.

[64]   Morales is consistent with other Indiana appellate decisions that have found a

       claimant’s action ripe without proof of an existing injury. For instance, in

       Nichols v. State, 947 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), the Court

       found a probationer’s claim that his mandatory sex offender registration should

       be for 10 years, rather than for life, was ripe. This was so despite the

       10
         Only one Indiana appellate court has been faced with an argument that a RFRA claim is unripe. Ind. Fam.
       Inst. Inc. v. City of Carmel, 155 N.E.3d 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). But the Family Institute panel ultimately
       decided the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise their RFRA claims and did not reach the ripeness issue. Id. at
       1218-21.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 29 of 76
       defendant’s lack of actual injury until the 10-year period expired without his

       removal from the list. Id.

[65]   Similarly, in In re Peeples, 37 N.E.3d 502, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), the Court

       found a trustee’s challenge to the trial court’s imposition of expense and hiring

       limitations to be ripe, despite the lack of evidence that the trustee would ever

       have needs beyond those restrictions. The Court ruled:

               [The appellant’s] decision-making as trustee will be affected by
               the limit, even if it does not go to the trial court seeking more
               money. Also, as things stand, before considering engaging the
               services of a third party, [the appellant] must weigh whether it is
               worth the additional trouble and expense of petitioning the trial
               court for permission to do so. We consider these restrictions to be
               more than abstract possibilities when viewed from [the
               appellant’s] perspective.

       Id. at 512.

[66]   Finally, in Ind. Educ. Emp. Relations Bd. v. Benton Cmty. Sch. Corp., 266 Ind. 491,

       496, 365 N.E.2d 752, 754-55 (1977), the Court rejected a ripeness challenge to a

       declaratory action challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring a

       hearing to determine organized labor representation from which the school

       corporation would have no right to judicial review. In an opinion that

       intertwined standing and ripeness analyses, the Court, finding the lawsuit was

       not premature, reasoned:

               We know of no principle requiring a party who deems himself
               assaulted by a statute, believed to be unconstitutional, to defer
               such challenge until he has been battered and to decry the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 30 of 76
               validity of his adversary’s constitutional authority only with his
               dying breath.

       Benton Comty. Sch. Corp., 266 Ind. at 499, 365 N.E.2d at 755.

[67]   Thus, the courts in Morales, Nichols and Peeples found ripeness despite the lack of

       existing injury to the litigant. Peeples also involved uncertainty as to whether the

       challenged action would ever cause the ultimate harm alleged. The anticipated

       harm in Benton was more definite but, as in Morales, Nichols and Peeples, had not

       yet occurred. All four courts found either immediate or imminent injury caused

       by the challenged action rendered the claims ripe.

[68]   Plaintiffs here have made a greater showing of harm than the litigants whose

       claims were found ripe in Morales, Nichols, Peeples, and Benton. Through

       evidence of their sexual and reproductive changes compelled by the Abortion

       Law, they have established an “actual controversy” that is ripe. See Holcomb,

       187 N.E.3d at 1287. As the trial court found, “The undisputed evidence shows

       why the Plaintiffs have taken these [restricted intimacy or restricted family

       growth] measures because their only alternative is the unacceptable risk of

       needing a termination of a pregnancy that would be required by their religious

       beliefs but prohibited by [the Abortion Law].” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App.

       Vol. II, p. 41.

[69]   But even if Plaintiffs did not establish existing harm from the Abortion Law

       that constitutes an “actual controversy,” their RFRA claims are ripe because

       they have established “the ripening seeds of such a controversy.” See Holcomb,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024            Page 31 of 76
       187 N.E.3d at 1287. Indiana RFRA specifies that “[a] person whose exercise or

       religion has been substantially burdened, or is likely to be substantially burdened, by

       a violation of this chapter may assert the violation or impending violation as a claim

       . . . .” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-9 (emphasis added). In light of this statutory

       language and our Supreme Court’s ripeness holding in Morales, supra, which

       found a claim ripe based on imminent future injury, a litigant who establishes

       an impending RFRA violation logically would have a ripe claim.

[70]   In addition to alleging an existing RFRA violation relating to changes to their

       sexual and reproductive activity compelled by the Abortion Law, Plaintiffs also

       have alleged an impending RFRA violation. They assert that if they were to

       become pregnant, they would be substantially burdened by the Abortion Law

       by being unable to obtain an abortion that their religious beliefs direct. They are

       sexually active women capable of bearing children so the prospect of pregnancy

       without the availability of a religiously directed abortion is evident. Given these

       assertions of an impending violation, the lack of pregnancy alone does not

       render Plaintiffs’ claims unripe, just as in Morales, supra, the candidate’s lack of

       removal from the ballot did not render his claim unripe while an imminent

       constitutional violation loomed. Instead, Plaintiffs’ non-pregnant status,

       standing alone, would translate into an unripe claim under Indiana Code § 34-

       13-9-9 only if Plaintiffs’ exercise of religion “has not been substantially

       burdened” or is not “likely to be substantially burdened,” by the Abortion Law.

       Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 32 of 76
[71]   Through their allegations that the Abortion Law bars them from obtaining

       abortions that their religious beliefs direct, Plaintiffs have shown that their

       religious exercise is likely to be substantially burdened by the Abortion Law.

       See, e.g., Doster v. Kendall, 54 F.4th 398, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2022) (finding service

       members’ federal RFRA claims were ripe because they had established an

       imminent injury from the challenged vaccine mandate, although they had not

       taken the required vaccine and the military had not yet enforced the mandate),

       cert. granted, judgment vacated on other grounds, 144 S. Ct. 481 (2023); Chelsey

       Nelson Photography, LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 624 F.Supp.3d

       761, 781-82 (W.D. Ky. 2022) (ruling that wedding photographer’s pre-

       enforcement challenge under RFRA to an ordinance guaranteeing access to

       goods and services regardless of sexual orientation was ripe).

[72]   We conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe because they present at least the

       “ripening seeds of a . . . controversy,” if not an already existing “real or actual

       controversy,” that is based on facts, not “abstract possibilities.” See Holcomb,

       187 N.E.3d at 1287; Planned Parenthood Ctr. of Tucson, Inc. v. Marks, 17 Ariz.

       App. 308, 312-13, 497 P.2d 534, 539 (1972) (finding in this pre-Roe v. Wade

       decision that a challenge to the constitutionality of statutes criminalizing

       abortion was justiciable, despite the lack of a pregnant petitioner, and rejecting

       the argument that the plaintiffs would have to wait to be prosecuted under the

       statute before the issues would be ripe).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 33 of 76
       II. Class Action Certification
[73]   The State next contends the trial court abused its discretion in certifying this

       case as a class action. We review a trial court’s class action certification ruling

       for an abuse of discretion. LHO Indpls. One Lessee, LLC v. Bowman, 40 N.E.3d

       1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[74]   Class action certification does not involve consideration of the merits of the

       claims. Id. at 1268. Instead, the trial court assumes the merits of an action and

       determines whether the named plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for class

       action certification under Indiana Trial Rule 23. Id. A party requesting class

       action certification carries the burden of proving that the proposed class meets

       all the requirements of Trial Rule 23(A) and at least one of the requirements of

       Trial Rule 23(B). Id. at 1269.

[75]   Trial Rule 23(A) provides that a plaintiff may sue as a representative on behalf

       of a class if these four requirements are met:

           1. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable
              (“numerosity”).

           2. There are questions of law or fact common to the class (“commonality”).

           3. The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
              claims or defenses of the class (“typicality”).

           4. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
              of the class (“adequacy”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 34 of 76
[76]   As for Trial Rule 23(B), the trial court found that Plaintiffs met subsection 2,

       which requires that:

               the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
               grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
               appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
               relief with respect to the class as a whole.

       Ind. Trial Rule 23(B)(2).

[77]   Along with the express requirements of Trial Rule 23, Indiana courts have

       imposed an implicit “definiteness” requirement for class action certification.

       LHO, 40 N.E.3d at 1269. “A properly defined class is necessary at the onset

       because a judgment in a class action has a res judicata effect on absent class

       members.” Id.

[78]   The State contends that Plaintiffs failed to prove all the class action certification

       requirements. We reject the State’s claim and find no abuse of discretion in the

       trial court’s class action certification.

       A. The Class is Sufficiently Definite
[79]   The trial court approved the following class definition:

               All persons in Indiana whose religious beliefs direct them to
               obtain abortions in situations prohibited by [the Abortion Law]
               who need, or will need, to obtain an abortion and who are not, or
               will not be, able to obtain an abortion because of the [Law].

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 35 of 76
       Appellants’ Class Action App. Vol. II, p. 58. The State argues that the proposed

       class is not definite because it is based on religious beliefs, motivations, and

       needs that are inherently subjective and externally unobservable.

[80]   “The class definition must be specific enough for the court to determine

       whether or not an individual is a class member.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Bailey,

       808 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “If the definition includes persons

       without interests or standing in the lawsuit, it is not adequate.” Indep. Hill

       Conservancy Dist. v. Sterley, 666 N.E.2d 978, 981-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

[81]   The State focuses on Plaintiffs’ assertions that their religious beliefs leave to the

       individual Plaintiff the ultimate decision on when those beliefs mandate an

       abortion. The State claims this subjective determination renders the class

       indefinite because class certification cannot depend on a state of mind. But the

       State’s argument is too broad because the core belief of the members remains

       uniform.

[82]   Plaintiffs share the view that their sincere religious beliefs require abortions that

       are prohibited by the Abortion Law. Although their religious beliefs may differ

       as to when abortions are mandated, varying religious beliefs among the class

       have not barred certification in numerous federal RFRA cases. See, e.g., Doster,

       54 F.4th at 441 (affirming class certification in RFRA litigation brought by Air

       Force servicemembers of various faiths challenging COVID-19 vaccine

       mandate); DeOtte v. Azar, 332 F.R.D. 188, 197 (N.D. Tex. 2019)

       (acknowledging that “a person’s religious beliefs are deeply personal and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 36 of 76
       subjective” but that “the contours of those beliefs are purely objective” and

       therefore certifying a class in RFRA litigation challenging the Patient

       Protection and Affordable Care Act’s mandatory contraceptive coverage). The

       State has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in defining the

       class.11

[83]   We also reject the State’s claim that a “fail-safe class” was created here. A “fail-

       safe class” is “one that is defined so that whether a person qualifies as a

       member depends on whether the person has a valid claim.” Messner v. Northshore

       Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012). “Such a class definition is

       improper because a class member either wins, or by virtue of losing, is defined

       out of the class and is therefore not bound by the judgment.” Id. But because

       the trial court’s class definition does not incorporate all the requirements that a

       class member must have to succeed under RFRA, it is not a “fail-safe class.”

       See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 34-13-9-9 (requiring that Plaintiffs be “substantially

       11
          In arguing that the class definition is not definite, the State relies primarily on two federal district court
       rulings denying class action certification in cases involving religious claims. The first is Lindh v. Dir. Fed.
       Bureau of Prisons, No. 2:14-cv-151, 2015 WL 179793 (S.D. Jan. 14, 2015), in which a prisoner challenged
       clothing rules that prevented him from wearing his pants above his ankles as allegedly prescribed by his faith.
       The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found indefinite the following proposed
       class: “all male Muslim prisoners confined within the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. at *1-3. The second case relied
       upon by the State is West v. Carr, 337 F.R.D. 181 (W.D. Wis. 2020), in which the United States District Court
       for the Western District of Wisconsin found indefinite a class defined as: prisoners “who have experienced or
       are likely to experience a cancellation of [an Umbrella Religious Group] congregate religious service or study
       group, where such service or study group is a religious exercise.” Id. at 186.
       But the denial of class action certification in Lindh was based on undisputed evidence that not all Muslims
       believed that their faith required males to wear their pants above the ankle. Lindh, 2015 WL 179793, at *7.
       And West involved no common religious beliefs. 337 F.R.D. at 190-91. Lindh and West therefore are
       distinguishable from this case, in which the class definition is specifically linked to the class members’
       religious beliefs that direct them to obtain abortions in situations prohibited by the Abortion Law.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                  Page 37 of 76
       burdened” by the challenged law).12 The trial court did not abuse its discretion

       in finding the definiteness requirement satisfied.

       B. The Class Satisfies Trial Rule 23(A) Requirements
[84]   The State also claims the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the

       litigation as a class action because the Plaintiffs did not meet any of the Trial

       Rule 23(A) requirements. We find no such deficiency.

       i. The Class Satisfies the Commonality Requirement
[85]   The commonality requirement in Trial Rule 23(A)(2) focuses on the

       characteristics of the class. LHO, 40 N.E.3d at 1271. Commonality is satisfied if

       the claims of the individual plaintiffs stem from a common nucleus of operative

       fact—that is, a “common course of conduct.” Id. (quoting Connerwood

       Healthcare, Inc. v. Estate of Herron, 683 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).

[86]   Arguing that the commonality requirement mandates that each member of the

       proposed class suffers the same harm, the State contends the class members do

       not meet that requirement. But a panel of this Court rejected this very argument

       in LHO, a tainted food case in which some class members suffered symptoms of

       food poisoning and others just tested positive for salmonella without

       experiencing symptoms. The LHO Court ruled that “[t]he fact that members

       12
          The State suggests various ways in which the class definition could be improved that do not rise to an
       abuse of discretion. If the class definition proves inadequate during the litigation, the trial court has discretion
       to adjust it before a final decision on the requested permanent injunction. See T.R. 23(C)(1) (specifying that
       class certification orders are “conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                    Page 38 of 76
       have a different degree of symptoms or damages does not negate the

       commonality component.” Id. at 1272. Observing that “individual questions do

       not prevent a class action on common questions,” the court concluded the

       plaintiffs had established “a common course of conduct” because the

       contaminated meals were served during a luncheon and evening event on the

       same date at the same hotel. Id.

[87]   Here, Plaintiffs’ shared claims—that their religious beliefs direct them to obtain

       abortions that the Abortion Law prohibits—are sufficient to establish a

       common course of conduct. At issue are the same laws (RFRA and the

       Abortion Law) and the same general injury (the unavailability of abortions that

       Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs direct). See DeOtte, 332 F.R.D. at 197-99 (finding the

       commonality requirement met in a federal RFRA case in which plaintiff

       employers had differing religious beliefs but all challenged the Affordable Care

       Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate and alleged the same broad injury—

       being forced to purchase insurance coverage for their employees that violated

       the employers’ religious beliefs).

[88]   Finding commonality here seems entirely consistent with other class action

       certifications in RFRA challenges to military COVID-19 inoculation mandates.

       See, e.g., Doster, 54 F.4th at 419 (approving class certification, despite varying

       religious beliefs among the plaintiffs); U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Austin, 594

       F.Supp.3d 767, 779 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (finding that proposed class met the

       commonality requirement because all of its members suffered the same core

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 39 of 76
       injury—RFRA and First Amendment violations—although their damages

       might be diverse due to varying religious beliefs).

[89]   In any case, the State’s focus on varying harms allegedly suffered by Plaintiffs

       appears to be an improper invitation to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims.

       See LHO, 40 N.E.3d at 1268 (stating that a court “may not conduct a

       preliminary inquiry into the merits of the suit” when determining whether to

       certify a case as a class action); Bolka, 693 N.E.2d 613, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)

       (stating individual questions relating to potential defenses are irrelevant to class

       certification and therefore do not impact whether a common course of conduct

       exists).

[90]   For similar reasons, we reject the State’s parallel claim that a single remedy

       cannot cure the harm of each class member.13 The trial court did not err in

       finding the commonality requirement met.

       13
         The State misstates the trial court’s class action certification order when it suggests the court “express[ly]
       concede[d] that a single injunction cannot provide a remedy benefiting the entire class.” Appellants’ Class
       Cert. Br., p. 44. The court ruled:
                To the extent that any future injunctive relief would need to be more narrowly
                fashioned to satisfy T.R. 65(D) and ensure that the remedy is only applicable to
                the claims as demanded by the putative class members, the Court has the capability
                to fashion such a remedy as needed. The contours of such a remedy do not need to
                be addressed at the class certification stage and may be addressed following further
                litigation on the merits of this case.

       Appellants’ Class Cert. App. Vol. II, p. 37. Thus, the trial court viewed a single injunction as capable of
       addressing all class members’ claims, although the court recognized the injunction might need to be narrowly
       tailored to comply with Trial Rule 65(D).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                   Page 40 of 76
       ii. The Class Satisfies the Adequacy of Representation and
           Typicality Requirements
[91]   The adequacy requirement in Trial Rule 23(A)(4) has three components: “(1)

       the chosen class representative cannot have antagonistic or conflicting claims

       with other members of the class; (2) the named representative must have a

       sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous adequacy; and (3) counsel

       for the named plaintiff must be competent, experienced, qualified, and generally

       able to conduct the proposed litigation vigorously.” LHO, 40 N.E.3d at 1273.

       The State challenges only the first two components.

[92]   Unlike the adequacy requirement, the typicality requirement is satisfied by one

       showing: that the representative plaintiffs’ claims are neither in conflict with nor

       antagonistic to the class as a whole. Id. at 1272. Thus, the adequacy

       requirement essentially encompasses the typicality requirement. Id. at 1273.

[93]   The State contends that the named Plaintiffs are neither members of the

       certified class nor representative of the class because they may never become

       pregnant or need an abortion. For the same reasons, the State argues that the

       named Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the class.

[94]   But these arguments just repeat the State’s assertion that the Plaintiffs have not

       suffered any injury from the Abortion Law—that is, that their exercise of

       religion has not been substantially burdened by the Abortion Law due to their

       lack of pregnancy. As the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims are presumed for purposes

       of class action certification, the availability of potential individualized defenses

       that would defeat a named Plaintiff’s claim “is not a bar to class certification.”
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 41 of 76
       Id. at 1274. And even if Plaintiffs’ claims later prove unmeritorious, “Trial Rule

       23(D)(2) contemplates that a representative might have to be replaced, since it

       provides for the appointment by the trial court of new representatives should

       such appointment become necessary.” Id.

[95]   Plaintiffs have shown an adequate interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous

       advocacy. The named Plaintiffs all are claiming that the Abortion Law

       substantially burdens their exercise of their sincerely held religious beliefs and,

       as a result, they have restricted their efforts to become pregnant or otherwise

       expand their families. As the named Plaintiffs’ claims are not antagonistic or

       conflicting with other members of the class and Plaintiffs have a sufficient

       interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous adequacy, the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion in finding the adequacy of representation and typicality

       requirements were met.

       iii. The Class Satisfies the Numerosity Requirement
[96]   As to the numerosity requirement in Trial Rule 23(A)(1), the State argues that

       the evidence fails to reveal the number of people in the class. But “the

       numerosity prerequisite is not simply a test of numbers.” LHO, 40 N.E.3d at

       1270. Instead, the determination focuses on whether joinder would be

       impracticable, with consideration also of judicial economy and the ability of the

       class members to institute individual lawsuits. Bolka, 693 N.E.2d at 616. Joinder

       impracticability focuses on the characteristics of the class and not just the class

       representatives. Matter of Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 54-55 (Ind. 1991).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 42 of 76
[97]   “A finding of numerosity may be supported by common sense assumptions.”

       Bolka, 693 N.E.2d at 616. Here, Plaintiffs assert that common sense requires a

       finding that hundreds, if not thousands, of potential class members exist. The

       named Plaintiffs in the class alone comprise 49 people: the four Anonymous

       Plaintiffs and the 45 members of Hoosier Jews for Choice who allegedly are

       able to bear children, of whom at least 13% have already changed their sexual

       and reproductive behaviors solely to avoid becoming pregnant when an

       abortion required by their religious beliefs is unavailable. Appellees’ Class Cert.

       Br., pp. 42-43. Further, Plaintiffs assert, and the State does not contest, that

       more than 26,000 Jewish persons, of which presumably a significant part are

       women, live in Indiana. Thus, the trial court acted within its discretion in

       finding the numerosity requirement met.

       C. The Class Satisfies Trial Rule 23(B)(2) Requirements
[98]   Trial Rule 23(B)(2) requires that Plaintiffs prove “the party opposing the class

       has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby

       making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief

       with respect to the class as a whole.” T.R. 23(B)(2). The State claims this single

       injunction rule remains unmet because Plaintiffs have sought relief broader than

       RFRA allows.

[99]   In their Complaint, Plaintiffs request an injunction “enjoining defendants from

       taking any action that would prevent or otherwise interfere with the ability of

       the individual plaintiffs, the class members, and Hoosier Jews for Choice’s

       members from obtaining abortions as directed by their sincere religious beliefs.”
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 43 of 76
        Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 85. The trial court appeared to

        acknowledge that the relief sought in the Complaint may be greater than that

        authorized by RFRA. See generally Indiana Code § 34-13-9-10(b)(1) (allowing

        “[d]eclaratory relief or an injunction or mandate that prevents, restrains,

        corrects, or abates the violation of this chapter”). But that is no obstacle because

        lesser relief—that is, a narrower permanent injunction—could be issued on the

        same Complaint if Plaintiffs ultimately prevail.

[100]   The State otherwise contends that no class-wide injunction is possible due to

        the diversity of religious views within the class, as well as the varying

        circumstances under which each faith mandates an abortion. But the State

        largely just repeats its claim that the class is too indefinite due to its members’

        varying faiths and beliefs—an argument we already have rejected.

[101]   The injunction sought by Plaintiffs, as they assert in their brief, is essentially a

        religious exemption to the Abortion Law. Thus, a single injunction seemingly

        could provide final, appropriate relief for the entire class consistent with RFRA

        upon proof that the Abortion Law violates Plaintiffs’ rights under RFRA. This

        is no different from the injunctions approved in the servicemember’s RFRA

        challenges to vaccine mandates. See, e.g., Doster, 54 F.4th at 439-441 (rejecting

        claim that a single injunction would not afford relief to the class of

        servicemembers challenging vaccine mandates). Accordingly, we conclude that

        the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Trial Rule 23(B)(2)

        requirements met.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 44 of 76
        III. Preliminary Injunction
[102]   Having determined the issues are justiciable and that class action certification

        was not an abuse of discretion, we turn to the central issue in this appeal: the

        propriety of the preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the

        movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the movant has

        a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the remedies at law are

        inadequate and irreparable harm will occur while the case is pending; (3) the

        threatened injury to the movant from a denial of the injunction outweighs the

        potential harm to the nonmovant from granting the injunction; and (4) the

        public interest would not be disserved by granting the injunction. Thind v.

        Delaware Cnty., 207 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023); Vikery v. Ardagh

        Glass, Inc., 85 N.E.3d 852, 859-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[103]   On appeal, the State contends Plaintiffs proved none of the preliminary

        injunction requirements and that the imposed injunction is overly broad.

        Appellate review of a preliminary injunction is “limited and deferential.” State

        v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ind. 2011). A trial court has

        discretion to enter a preliminary injunction and will be reversed only upon an

        abuse of that discretion. Id. at 799-800.

        A. Plaintiffs Have Shown a Reasonable Likelihood of Success
[104]   In determining whether the trial court properly determined that Plaintiffs’

        RFRA claims have a reasonable likelihood of success, we must look to the

        elements of a RFRA claim and the evidence submitted. A party establishes a

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024        Page 45 of 76
        prima facie case under Indiana’s RFRA by showing the disputed governmental

        action substantially burdens the party’s sincerely held religious belief. Blattert v.

        State, 190 N.E.3d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).14 Upon that showing, the

        burden shifts to the government to establish that a compelling governmental

        interest is “satisfied through application of the challenged law” to the claimant

        whose sincere exercise of religion is allegedly substantially burdened. Id. at 421

        (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 420). “Further, the government must establish

        that the substantial burden is the least restrictive means of furthering that

        interest.” Id.; see also Ind. Code § 34-13-9-8.

[105]   If the government does not meet its burden, “the court . . . shall allow a defense

        against any party and shall grant appropriate relief against the governmental

        entity.” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-10(a). RFRA allows for injunctive and declaratory

        relief as well as an award of all or part of the costs of litigation, including

        reasonable attorney fees, for violations. Ind. Code § 34-13-9-10(b)-(c).

[106]   The State offers two reasons why Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims are unlikely to

        succeed. First, the State asserts that Plaintiffs cannot prove that abortion is a

        “religious exercise” within the meaning of RFRA. Second, the State argues that

        the Abortion Law is the least restrictive means to achieve what the State views

        as its compelling interest in protecting the potential for life beginning at

        14
          Federal RFRA claims require the same analysis. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 705
        (2014).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                               Page 46 of 76
        fertilization. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

        finding the Plaintiffs’ RFRA claims are likely to succeed.

        i. Plaintiffs Have Shown Pregnancy Termination Qualifies as
           a Religious Exercise

[107]   The parties do not quarrel over the definition of religious exercise—only

        whether abortion falls within that definition. “Exercise of religion,” for

        purposes of the Indiana RFRA statute, “includes any exercise of religion,

        whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” Ind.

        Code § 34-13-9-5. In the federal RFRA context, the U.S. Supreme Court has

        concluded that “the ‘exercise of religion’ involves ‘not only belief and

        profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’ that are

        ‘engaged in for religious reasons.’” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.

        682, 710 (2014) (quoting Emp. Div. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,

        877 (1990)).15

[108]   The State claims that abortion does not fall within that definition because

        pregnancy termination is just one of several ways Plaintiffs can prioritize their

        15
           Although Indiana courts have not yet spoken on this issue, the federal courts treat federal RFRA as
        typically more plaintiff-friendly than the First Amendment’s free exercise of religion clause. As then U.S.
        Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Judge Sonia Sotomayor once explained: “[T]he Free Exercise Clause
        does not normally inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid laws of general application that incidentally burden
        religious conduct . . . RFRA, in contrast, requires strict scrutiny of such laws where the incidental burden on
        religion is substantial.” Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 112 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (Sotomayor, J.,
        dissenting); see also Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that RFRA-type
        legislation provides protections beyond that guaranteed by the First Amendment); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytech
        Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[RFRA] created a right of religious exercise that
        was more generous than that right protected by the Constitution . . . .”).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                  Page 47 of 76
        own well-being over that of any potential life. The State thus analogizes

        abortion to seeing a therapist or nutritionist during pregnancy. The State

        concludes that abortion, as described by Plaintiffs, should be viewed simply as

        an enhancement to Plaintiffs’ physical, emotional, or mental well-being, rather

        than a religious exercise.16

[109]   The State also emphasizes that abortion should not qualify as a religious

        exercise because Plaintiffs, by their own admissions, will not necessarily seek to

        terminate every pregnancy. According to the State, abortion is not the type of

        mandatory ritual, such as eating only kosher food or Sabbath requirements for

        some, that has been found to be a religious exercise. See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart,

        486 F.3d 112, 124 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing kosher prison diets and Jewish

        Sabbath and holy day services as religious exercise); Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d

        559, 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (recognizing Sabbath and holy day gatherings as

        cognizable religious exercises).

[110]   The procurement of health insurance is not a mandatory religious ritual, either,

        but it was at the core of a RFRA violation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. The Burwell

        Court ruled that federal regulations requiring employers to provide insurance

        16
           To the extent the State is arguing that Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs as to pregnancy termination are not
        sincere, the State has waived this argument through its acknowledged failure to raise the issue in the trial
        court. See Blackwell v. Superior Safe Rooms LLC, 174 N.E.3d 1082, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“[I]t is generally
        true that a party waives an issue on appeal [by failing] to raise the argument in the trial court.”). We find
        unpersuasive the State’s claims that Plaintiffs’ descriptions of their religious beliefs at the trial level were too
        sparse to allow such a challenge and that any evaluation of the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs cannot
        be made until they are pregnant.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                      Page 48 of 76
        coverage for contraceptives—including some that prevented development of an

        already fertilized egg—substantially burdened the religious exercise of three

        closely held corporate employers who objected to abortions based on their

        sincere religious beliefs. 573 U.S. at 690-91, 736.

[111]   Similarly, hair growth is not a religious ritual. Yet, courts have granted relief

        under RFRA to members of the Sikh faith, whose religion banned the cutting of

        a male’s hair on his head and face, when they challenged military grooming

        policies mandating haircuts and facial shaving. Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 110

        (D.C. Cir. 2022) (granting preliminary injunction); Singh v. McHugh, 185

        F.Supp.3d 201, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (granting summary judgment to the RFRA

        plaintiff).

[112]   Finally, avoiding vaccinations is not a religious ritual, but courts nevertheless

        have enjoined the military from enforcing vaccination mandates against

        servicemembers who challenged them under RFRA as a substantial burdening

        of their religious exercise. See, e.g., Doster, 54 F.4th at 421 (finding plaintiff

        servicemembers “met their duty [under RFRA] to prove that the vaccine

        mandate imposed a substantial burden on their sincerely held religious beliefs”);

        U.S. Navy SEALs, 27 F.4th at 353 (denying partial stay pending appeal of

        preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the vaccine mandate); Air Force

        Officer v. Austin, 588 F.Supp.3d 1338, 1357 (M.D. Ga. 2022) (enjoining military

        vaccine mandate in RFRA action).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024            Page 49 of 76
[113]   Although Burwell and these military cases were decided under federal RFRA,

        both the federal version of RFRA and Indiana RFRA specify that “exercise of

        religion” does not require that the exercise be “compelled by, or central to, a

        system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A); Ind. Code

        § 34-13-9-5. This plain language, together with its interpretation in Burwell and

        the military cases, leads us to conclude that Plaintiffs’ exercise of religion need

        not be ritualistic to be protected by RFRA.

[114]   Support for this broad view of the free exercise of religion is prevalent. For

        instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has described “[t]he free exercise of religion”

        as “first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religion

        doctrine one desires.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. Indiana’s religious liberty

        protections are similarly broad. See Ind. Const. art. 1, § 2 (“All people shall be

        secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the

        dictates of their consciences.”) (emphasis in original); id. art. 1, § 3 (“No law

        shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious

        opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.”); id. art. 1, § 4 (“No

        preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of

        worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any

        place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.”).

[115]   In particular, “[t]he inclusion of the phrase ‘in any case whatever’ [in Article 1,

        Section 3] demonstrates the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent to provide unrestrained

        protection for the articulated values.” City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of

        South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 445, 448 (Ind. 2001) (rejecting claim that the

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 50 of 76
        exercise of religion as defined by the Indiana Constitution’s religious liberties

        provisions is limited to the “personal devotional aspect” of worship).

[116]   The State has provided little authority—and none that we find persuasive—to

        support the more restrictive view that religious exercise does not encompass the

        pregnancy terminations at issue here. Plaintiffs’ claims, in fact, seem to be the

        other side of the Burwell coin. If a corporation can engage in a religious exercise

        by refusing to provide abortifacients—contraceptives that essentially abort a

        pregnancy after fertilization—it stands to reason that a pregnant person can

        engage in a religious exercise by pursuing an abortion. In both situations, the

        claimant is required to take or abstain from action that the claimant’s sincere

        religious beliefs direct. And in both situations, the claimant’s objection to the

        challenged law or regulation is rooted in the claimant’s sincere religious beliefs.

[117]   Again, “the ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and profession

        but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts[.]” Smith, 494 U.S. at

        877. Here, Plaintiffs have shown that the performance of a physical act—an

        abortion—is their religious exercise. Hoosiers have a long history of respecting

        religious diversity. See generally City Chapel, 744 N.E.2d at 448-49 (during a

        review of the history of religious liberties in Indiana, noting that “[t]he influx of

        settlers into Indiana reflected the whole range of religious belief and practice,

        and there was no religious unity from the beginning and denominations had no

        restraints” (internal quotations omitted)).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 51 of 76
[118]   Though people of varying faiths may view reproductive choices differently, the

        right to free exercise of religion acknowledges that “religious beliefs need not be

        acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others” to bear protection.

        Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)

        (quoting Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). We

        therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Plaintiffs’

        abortion when directed by their sincere religious beliefs is their exercise of

        religion.17

        ii. The State Has Not Established a Compelling Interest or
            that the Abortion Law is the Least Restrictive Means of
            Furthering that Compelling Interest
[119]   In its next attack on the trial court’s judgment, the State asserts that the

        Abortion Law is the least restrictive means of achieving the State’s alleged

        compelling interest in protecting the potential for life. The trial court found that

        the State had not established a compelling interest in enforcing the Abortion

        Law against Plaintiffs. Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. App. Vol. II, p. 52. The court

        also found that, even if a compelling interest existed, the State had not

        established that the Abortion Law was the least restrictive means of furthering

        the State’s compelling interest. Id. We agree with both conclusions.

        17
          The State does not appear to dispute that if pregnancy termination is an exercise of religion by Plaintiffs,
        the Abortion Law substantially burdens that exercise.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                  Page 52 of 76
        a. The State Has Not Shown a Compelling Interest
[120]   The State asserts a recognized compelling interest in protecting a potential

        human life beginning at fertilization. Its argument is based almost entirely on

        the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Cheaney v. State, 285 N.E.2d 265, 270

        (Ind. 1972).

[121]   In Cheaney, the Court recognized that the State had a “valid and compelling”

        interest in “a living being and potential human life” from “the moment of

        conception.” 285 N.E.2d at 270. But Cheaney involved a federal constitutional

        challenge to an Indiana criminal statute outlawing abortion, rather than a claim

        brought under state law. The Cheaney decision also predates Roe v. Wade, 410

        U.S. at 163-64, which recognized that the State has no compelling interest in

        potential life during the first trimester of pregnancy. Decrying the analysis in

        Roe—including its ruling that the State had no compelling interest until a viable

        fetus exists—the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Dobbs that the federal

        constitution “does not confer a right to abortion.” 597 U.S. at 292. The Dobbs

        Court left to the states the regulation or prohibition of abortion, which

        presumably entails determinations of the State’s interest in potential life. Id. at

        302.

[122]   The Indiana Supreme Court’s recent decision in Planned Parenthood did not fully

        explain its post-Dobbs view of the State’s interest under the Indiana

        Constitution. The plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood conceded that the State had a

        “legitimate” interest in “protecting prenatal life.” 211 N.E.3d at 979. But

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 53 of 76
        neither the Planned Parenthood plaintiffs nor the Court pinpointed exactly when

        that interest begins or the full extent of the State’s interest in zygotes, embryos,

        and fetuses.

[123]   By ruling that the Indiana Constitution “protects a woman’s right to an

        abortion that is necessary to protect her life or to protect her from a serious

        health risk,” the Planned Parenthood Court essentially established one general

        circumstance in which a woman’s interest in an abortion outweighs any interest

        by the State in protecting the potential of life. Id. at 962. But the Court did not

        specify when the State’s interest outweighs a woman’s competing interest in

        terminating a pregnancy. According to the Court, “Hoosiers have generally

        delegated this responsibility to the General Assembly.” Id. at 980.

[124]   The General Assembly has not fully drawn these interests. But its preliminary

        sketches indicate the State lacks a compelling interest in potential life from the

        moment an egg is fertilized. For instance, the General Assembly has declined to

        explicitly define human beings to include zygotes, embryos, or all fetuses. See

        Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-160 (defining “human being” as “an individual who has

        been born and is alive”); Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (differentiating between the

        killing of a fetus and the killing of a “human being”); Ind. Code § 34-23-2-1(b)

        (defining “child” for purposes of an action for wrongful death or injury to

        include “a fetus that has attained viability”). The Abortion Law also does not

        designate the exact point during pregnancy when the State’s interest in a

        zygote, embryo, or fetus becomes compelling.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 54 of 76
[125]   But we need look no further than the language of the Abortion Law to

        determine that the General Assembly does not view the State’s compelling

        interest as beginning at fertilization. The Abortion Law exempts in vitro

        fertilization procedures from its scope, although there is the potential for life

        that might be destroyed in the process of this procedure. Ind. Code § 16-34-1-

        0.5. That broad exemption suggests any compelling interest by the State is

        absent at fertilization.

[126]   Beyond that, the Abortion Law expressly permits abortions at all stages of

        gestation provided certain express requirements are met. Specifically, assuming

        all other statutory requirements are met:

            • Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1(a)(1) permits abortion “before the
              earlier of viability of the fetus or twenty (20) weeks of
              postfertilization age of the fetus if”:

                     o “reasonable medical judgment dictates that performing the
                       abortion is necessary to prevent any serious health risk to
                       the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s life”
                       or

                     o “the fetus is diagnosed with a lethal fetal anomaly.”

                     o But not by means of an abortion-inducing drug “after eight
                       (8) weeks of postfertilization age.”

            • Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1(a)(2) permits abortion “during the first
              ten (10) weeks of postfertilization age of the fetus, if . . . the
              pregnancy is a result of rape or incest.”

            • And Indiana Code § 16-34-2-1(a)(3) permits abortion “at the
              earlier of viability of the fetus or twenty (20) weeks of

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 55 of 76
                postfertilization age and any time after, for reasons based upon
                the professional, medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s
                physician if . . . performing the abortion is necessary to prevent
                any serious health risk to the pregnant woman or to save the
                pregnant woman’s life.”

[127]   We conclude for several reasons that the State has not demonstrated that a

        compelling state interest—particularly one that begins at fertilization—is

        “satisfied through application of the challenged law” to Plaintiffs. Blattert, 190

        N.E.3d at 421 (quoting Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 420). First, the State relies solely

        on Cheaney to its detriment. Decided a half century ago, Cheaney’s compelling

        interest statement was made in response to a claim that an Indiana statute

        criminalizing abortion violated the Ninth Amendment to the United States

        Constitution. 285 N.E.2d at 266-70. The appellant had argued that the Ninth

        Amendment “provides a fundamental right to privacy which includes the

        woman’s right to decide whether to bear an unquickened fetus.” Id. at 266. A

        similar privacy argument ultimately prevailed on the federal level the next year

        in Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. But the concept of a federal privacy-based right to an

        abortion under the United States Constitution was soundly rejected by Dobbs,

        597 U.S. at 273, 292. Therefore, Cheaney’s compelling interest holding was

        made in the context of a privacy claim that is no longer cognizable.

[128]   Moreover, in the 52 years since Cheaney was decided, significant medical

        advances have occurred, and state and federal courts have developed extensive

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024            Page 56 of 76
        precedent in a litany of various abortion-related disputes.18 Although Cheaney

        has never been overruled by the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court also has

        never directly applied Cheaney’s statement that the State has a compelling

        interest in potential life from fertilization. See Humphreys v. Clinic for Women,

        Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247, 255 (Ind. 2003) (noting State’s claim under Cheaney of a

        compelling interest from “conception” but only recognizing, without reference

        to Cheaney, the State’s “interest in protecting fetal life.”). In any case, Dobbs

        made clear that it was “return[ing] the issue of abortion to” state legislatures

        and that “courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the

        judgment of legislative bodies.” 597 U.S. at 289 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372

        U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963)).

[129]   Our Supreme Court’s treatment of Cheaney in Planned Parenthood does not

        change our conclusion that Cheaney is distinguishable from the present case. As

        Planned Parenthood involved a facial challenge to the Abortion Law that did not

        require compelling interest analysis, the Court never mentioned Cheaney’s

        finding “that a State interest in what is, at the very least, from the moment of

        conception a living being and potential human life, is both valid and

        compelling.” Cheaney, 285 N.E.2d at 270.

        18
          Since Cheaney was handed down, the word “abortion” has appeared in more than 180 Indiana appellate
        decisions, none of which have directly applied Cheaney’s statement that the State has a compelling interest in
        potential life that begins at “conception.” Cheaney, 285 N.E.2d at 270.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                Page 57 of 76
[130]   Given Cheaney’s questionable applicability here and the Abortion Law’s plain

        language permitting abortions at various stages of pregnancy, we conclude that

        the State has not shown a compelling interest in the protection of potential life

        beginning at fertilization.

        b. Even if the State Established a Compelling Interest, It
           Failed to Show that the Abortion Law Was the Least
           Restrictive Means of Furthering that Interest

[131]   The State also challenges the trial court’s finding that the Abortion Law is not

        the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s alleged compelling interest.

        “In other words, if a less restrictive alternative would serve the governmental

        purpose, a legislature must use that alternative.” State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431,

        458-59 (Ind. 2022).

[132]   Least restrictive means analysis requires a comparison of the State’s preferred

        means of protecting potential life—the Abortion Law—to other possible

        options. See Blattert, 190 N.E.3d at 423. The State has the burden of addressing

        each alternative of which it becomes aware during the litigation. Id. “[T]he

        State’s ‘burden is two-fold: it must support its choice of regulation, and it must

        refute the alternative schemes offered by the challenger.’” Id. (quoting United

        States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1289 (10th Cir. 2011)).

[133]   Plaintiffs did not expressly provide any alternative schemes for furthering the

        State’s alleged compelling interest of protecting the zygote, embryo, or fetus.

        Instead, Plaintiffs contend that the Abortion Law is “underinclusive” because it

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 58 of 76
        exempts some abortions from criminal prosecution on secular grounds but

        includes no religious exceptions. Appellees’ Prelim. Inj. Br., pp. 52-54.

[134]   The means used by the legislature to further its compelling interest must be

        neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at

        459. A law is underinclusive when it provides exceptions for secular conduct

        that contravene the State’s asserted compelling interest to a similar or greater

        degree than religious conduct not subject to an exception. Church of the Lukumi

        Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993). Underinclusiveness

        may “reveal that a law does not actually advance a compelling interest.”

        Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 449 (2015); see also Church of the Lukumi

        Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 547 (ruling that a law cannot be viewed as

        protecting an interest “of the highest order” if it allows “appreciable damage to

        that supposedly vital interest unprohibited”) (citations omitted). If a less

        restrictive method that would serve the government’s interest exists, the

        legislature must use that alternative. Katz, 179 N.E.3d at 458-59.

[135]   The Abortion Law allows a conditional right to abortions “to prevent any

        serious health risk to the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s

        life.” Ind. Code §§ 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(A)(i), (3)(A). This amounts to an exception

        to the Abortion Law’s prohibitions based on a prioritization of the pregnant

        woman’s health over the survival of the zygote, embryo, or fetus. But that is the

        same sort of prioritization reflected in the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs, albeit on a

        different scale.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 59 of 76
[136]   Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs direct them to terminate their pregnancy “if their

        health or wellbeing—physical, mental, or emotional—were endangered by a

        pregnancy, pregnancy-related condition, or fetal abnormality.” Appellees’

        Prelim. Inj. Br., p. 18. In other words, in accordance with Plaintiffs’ religious

        beliefs, the pregnant woman’s health must have precedence, with an abortion

        available even if, contrary to the Abortion Law: (1) the pregnancy is not life-

        threatening; (2) the pregnancy does not present a serious health risk as that term

        is used in the Abortion Law; or (3) the fetal abnormality is not lethal within the

        meaning of the Abortion Law.

[137]   Thus, the broader religious exemption that Plaintiffs effectively seek has the

        same foundation as the narrower exceptions already existing in the Abortion

        Law: all are based on the interests of the mother outweighing the interests of the

        zygote, embryo, or fetus. The religious exemption that Plaintiffs seek, based on

        their sincere religious beliefs, merely expands the circumstances in which the

        pregnant woman’s health dictates an abortion.

[138]   RFRA requires the Government to show that the claimed compelling interest is

        satisfied through application of the challenged law to the particular claimants

        whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. See Gonzales,

        546 U.S. at 430-31. That alone is a high bar. U.S. Navy SEALs, 27 F.4th at 350.

        But this already challenging standard is heightened further when, as here, the

        contested law already provides an exception for a particular group. Id.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024         Page 60 of 76
[139]   In determining whether the State has met this heavy burden, we must “look[ ]

        beyond broadly formulated interests” and “scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of

        granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” Gonzales, 546

        U.S. at 431. The State alleges that granting a religious exemption to Plaintiffs

        will cause loss of potential life. But the existing exceptions in the Abortion Law

        also result in the loss of that potential for life. Thus, the Abortion Law is

        underinclusive.

[140]   If a policy is underinclusive, the State must adequately explain its differential

        treatment to avoid the conclusion that the law does not actually serve a

        compelling interest. Ware v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d 263, 269 (5th Cir. 2017).

        As the State cannot rely on broadly formulated interests, it must show distinct

        harm from granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. Hobby

        Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726-27; Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 431 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,

        406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)).

[141]   The State’s explanation does not meet this standard. The State has not shown

        that its claimed compelling interest in protecting the potential for life is satisfied

        by denying Plaintiffs’ religious-based exception that prioritizes a mother’s

        health over potential life, given that other exceptions are allowed based on the

        same prioritization—that is, the exceptions applicable when the pregnancy

        poses a “serious health risk” or termination would “save the pregnant woman’s

        life.” Ind. Code §§ 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(3)(A); see, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 574

        U.S. 352, 368-70 (2015) (finding underinclusiveness when prison’s grooming

        policy did not allow prisoners to grow half-inch beard for religious reasons but

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 61 of 76
        authorized prisoners with a dermatological condition to grow quarter-inch

        beards); U.S. Navy SEALs, 27 F.4th at 352 (finding COVID-19 vaccination

        mandates to be underinclusive when exemptions were given to 17 other military

        members but denied to plaintiffs seeking religious accommodations).

[142]   This weakness in the State’s argument is even more apparent when the

        Abortion Law’s other exceptions are considered. First, the Abortion Law does

        not apply to in vitro fertilization. See Ind. Code § 16-34-1-0.5. That suggests the

        Abortion Law does not criminalize zygote destruction, although the State is

        claiming a compelling interest that begins the moment an egg is fertilized.

[143]   The Abortion Law also allows abortions when the pregnancy resulted from

        rape or incest or when the fetus has been diagnosed with a lethal fetal anomaly

        so long as other statutory conditions are met. Ind. Code §§ 16-34-2-

        1(a)(1)(A)(ii), (2)(A), (3)(A). The State does not explain why a victim of rape or

        incest is entitled to an abortion, but women whose sincere religious beliefs

        direct an abortion are not. The State also does not explain how allowing an

        abortion of a “fetus diagnosed with a lethal fetal anomaly”—as is conditionally

        permitted by the Abortion Law—advances the State’s alleged compelling

        interest in protecting potential life. Ind. Code § 34-16-2-1(a)(1)(A)(ii).

[144]   The rape/incest exception in the Abortion Law—while seemingly favoring the

        pregnant woman’s interest over that of the zygote, embryo, or fetus—is based

        on a tragic circumstance rather than risks to the mother’s physical health. For

        instance, the Abortion Law does not require a victim of rape or incest to obtain

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024            Page 62 of 76
        a doctor’s certification that “performing the abortion is necessary to prevent any

        serious health risk to the pregnant woman or to save the pregnant woman’s

        life,” as is required under other abortion exceptions within the Abortion Law.

        See Ind. Code §§ 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A). Given the Abortion Law’s

        underinclusiveness and the State’s lack of accompanying justification, we

        conclude that the trial court correctly found the State did not satisfy the least

        restrictive means test.

        B. Plaintiffs Must Prove Irreparable Harm, But They Met
           That Burden
[145]   The State also claims that Plaintiffs are not entitled to a preliminary injunction

        because they did not show they would be irreparably harmed absent the

        injunction. Although the trial court found that Plaintiffs satisfied all elements

        for a preliminary injunction, it alternatively determined that proof of the

        elements of irreparable harm and a balancing of harm in Plaintiffs’ favor were

        unnecessary. This alternative ruling was based on precedent establishing that

        when the acts sought to be enjoined are unlawful, the petitioner need not show

        irreparable harm or a balancing of harm in their favor. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Boone

        Cnty. Prosecutor, 85 N.E.3d 902, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

[146]   In finding proof of irreparable harm unnecessary, the trial court relied on Short

        on Cash.Net of New Castle, Inc. v. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 811 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ind. Ct.

        App. 2004), in which this Court ruled:

                [W]here the action to be enjoined is unlawful, the unlawful act
                constitutes per se “irreparable harm” for purposes of the
        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 63 of 76
                 preliminary injunction analysis. When the per se rule is invoked,
                 the trial court has determined the defendant’s actions have
                 violated a statute and, thus, that the public interest is so great that
                 the injunction should issue regardless of whether the plaintiff has
                 actually incurred irreparable harm or whether the plaintiff will
                 suffer greater injury than the defendant. Accordingly, invocation
                 of the per se rule is only proper when it is clear that a statute has
                 been violated.

        (internal citations omitted).

[147]   The State asks this Court to reject this per se standard, noting that our Supreme

        Court has limited it to cases, unlike the present litigation, in which the violation

        of a statute is clear and uncontested. See, e.g., Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin. v.

        Walgreen Co., 769 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 2002) (finding per se standard

        inapplicable because illegality of challenged action was not clear). Walgreen

        predated Short on Cash by two years. Short on Cash cited Walgreen twice on other

        points of law but never mentioned the case’s limitations on the per se standard.

        Short on Cash, 811 N.E.2d at 822-23.

[148]   Some panels of this Court subsequently cited Short on Cash with approval

        without mentioning Walgreen or its limitations on the per se standard. See, e.g.,

        Planned Parenthood of Ind. v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853, 863-64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006);

        Clay Twp. of Hamilton Cnty. ex rel. Hagan v. Clay Reg’l Waste Dist., 838 N.E.2d

        1054, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Our Supreme Court then reentered the debate

        in Leone v. Comm’r, Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d 1244, 148 n.6 (Ind.

        2010).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024             Page 64 of 76
[149]   The Leone Court observed that the rule in Short on Cash “may or may not reflect

        sound injunction law.” Id. But it proceeded to find, consistent with Walgreen,

        that the relaxed standard did not apply because the violation of law in Leone

        was not clear and uncontested. Id.; see also State v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959

        N.E.2d 794, 804 (Ind. 2011) (applying the per se standard where parties agreed

        that statute at issue was violated).

[150]   Given our Supreme Court’s decision in Leone, the per se standard does not apply

        here because the alleged violation of law—that is, contravention of RFRA

        through application of the Abortion Law to Plaintiffs—is vigorously contested.

        Accordingly, we agree with the State that the trial court erred in finding proof

        of irreparable harm was not required.

[151]   But the trial court’s alternative ruling—that Plaintiffs adequately showed

        irreparable harm—was justified by the evidence. The trial court found that

        absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed by the

        loss of their religious freedoms guaranteed by RFRA. A loss of First

        Amendment freedoms, which include the right to free exercise of religion, “for

        even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”

        Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).

[152]   In addition, the lack of access to an abortion before Dobbs was found to

        constitute irreparable harm justifying a preliminary injunction. J.D. v. Azar, 925

        F.3d 1291, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (concluding that irreparable harm arose from

        the lack of access by certain minors to pre-viability abortions). Even a

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 65 of 76
        requirement that abortion providers advise patients of certain statutory abortion

        restrictions was found, pre-Dobbs, to constitute irreparable harm for purposes of

        a preliminary injunction. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r, 194

        F.Supp.3d 818, 834-35 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (issuing preliminary injunction in

        action challenging, among other things, the constitutionality of an Indiana

        abortion statute under the First Amendment’s prohibition against compelled

        speech).

[153]   Since Dobbs, some courts have continued to enter preliminary injunctions after

        finding irreparable harm arising from statutes that had the effect of limiting

        abortion access. Fund Texas Choice v. Paxton, 658 F.Supp.3d 377, 414 (W.D.

        Tex. 2023) (“Because Texas’s abortion laws restrict the ability to speak openly

        about abortion support and threaten to force the organizations to close

        entirely,” the plaintiffs that facilitated out-of-state abortions “are suffering an

        ongoing and irreparable harm” and were entitled to a preliminary injunction);

        Matsumoto v. Labrador, No. 1:23-cv-00323-DKG, 2023 WL 7388852 (D. Idaho

        November 8, 2023) (granting preliminary injunction barring enforcement of

        Idaho statute criminalizing the facilitation of abortions to minors without their

        parents’ consent against plaintiffs, who desired to continue assisting pregnant

        people, including minors, with accessing legal abortion care); Okla. Call for

        Reprod. Justice v. Drummond, 543 P.3d 110 (Okla. 2023) (reversing denial of

        temporary injunction barring enforcement of statutes that limited a woman’s

        state constitutional right to an abortion to preserve her own life).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 66 of 76
[154]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Plaintiffs would suffer

        irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction.

        C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding the Balancing of
           Harms and Public Interest Weighed in Plaintiffs’ Favor

[155]   The State claims the balance of harms and public interest favors denial of the

        preliminary injunction, given that abortion is an irreversible procedure.

        According to the State, Plaintiffs’ harms from “changes to their contraceptive

        and sexual practices do not outweigh the grave consequences of killing an

        unborn child.” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj. Br., p. 60. The State also notes that if

        Plaintiffs’ future pregnancies during this litigation threaten their lives or pose a

        serious health risk, they could terminate their pregnancies legally under the

        Abortion Law. See Ind. Code §§ 16-34-2-1(a)(1), (3).

[156]   Relying on a federal appellate decision, the trial court found that because

        Plaintiffs showed they are likely to succeed on the merits, entry of a preliminary

        injunction would not create any substantial harm to others. See Déjà Vu of

        Nashville, Inc., v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 274 F.3d 377, 400 (6th

        Cir. 2001) (ruling that proof of likelihood of success on a First Amendment

        claim often determines a preliminary injunction challenge, given that even a

        minimal infringement of First Amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable

        injury, no substantial harm to others occurs in the enjoinment of such a

        violation, and preventing such violations is always in the public interest), cert.

        denied, 535 U.S.1073 (2002).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 67 of 76
[157]   Without a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs will suffer the loss of their right to

        exercise their sincere religious beliefs by obtaining an abortion when directed by

        their religion and prohibited by the Abortion Law. They also have shown their

        sexual and reproductive lives will continue to be restricted absent the injunction

        and as a result of the Abortion Law. The opposing harm with an injunction is

        the loss of the potential for life represented by a zygote, embryo or fetus that

        will no longer exist if a Plaintiff terminates the pregnancy outside the

        parameters of the Abortion Law. Thus, Plaintiffs have shown existing harm in

        the form of reproductive and sexual restrictions whereas the harm to the public

        is conditional (that is, based on the prospect of pregnancy that may eventually

        result in a live birth). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the

        harms in favor of Plaintiffs.

[158]   We also find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the public

        interest favored entry of the preliminary injunction. As the trial court

        determined, statutory violations are against public interest and may support

        issuance of an injunction. See Short on Cash, 811 N.E.2d at 823. And in any

        case, injunctions protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public

        interest. U.S. Navy SEALs, 27 F.4th at 353 (citing Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex.

        Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 2013)).

        IV. Breadth of Injunction
[159]   Given our finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

        Plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction, the only issue remaining is

        the State’s claim that the injunction exceeds the trial court’s remedial authority.
        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 68 of 76
        The trial court enjoined “the Defendants and their officers from enforcing the

        provisions of [the Abortion Law] against Plaintiffs.” Appellants’ Prelim. Inj.

        App. Vol. II, p. 59. The State argues that the injunction lacks the specificity

        required by Indiana Trial Rule 65(D), which requires that the order specify and

        “describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other

        document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.” T.R. 65(D).

[160]   The State asserts the injunction is so broad that it enjoins future government

        action that may not violate RFRA. RFRA authorizes relief that “prevents,

        restrains, corrects, or abates the [RFRA] violation.” Ind. Code § 34-13-9-

        10(b)(1). For instance, the injunction would bar the State from preventing

        Plaintiffs from obtaining abortions that are outlawed by the Abortion Law but

        that are not directed by Plaintiffs’ sincere religious beliefs.

[161]   Plaintiffs’ response is that the preliminary injunction should be interpreted more

        narrowly because Plaintiffs never sought such broad relief. But Plaintiffs do

        little else to dispute that the language is as broad as the State suggests. Plaintiffs

        instead suggest that the trial court simply can modify the language in the

        preliminary injunction if the need arises.

[162]   We view the more reasoned approach to be remand for entry of a more

        narrowly tailored preliminary injunction. See, e.g., AGS Cap. Corp. v. Prod. Action

        Int’l, LLC, 884 N.E.2d 294, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that “[a]

        preliminary injunction is to be narrowly tailored” and reversing in part and

        remanding where parts of preliminary injunction were overly broad).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024           Page 69 of 76
[163]   We therefore affirm the trial court’s finding that Plaintiffs are entitled to a

        preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

        opinion.

        May, J., concurs.
        Bailey, J., concurs with a separate opinion.

        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
        Theodore E. Rokita
        Attorney General of Indiana
        James A. Barta
        Solicitor General
        Katelyn E. Doering
        Deputy Attorney General
        Indianapolis, Indiana
        ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
        THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
        Paul J. Carroll
        Wooton Hoy, LLC
        Greenfield, Indiana
        Lori H. Windham
        Adèle A. Keim
        Rebekah P. Ricketts
        Washington, D.C.

        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
        Kenneth J. Falk
        Stevie J. Pactor
        Gavin M. Rose
        ACLU of Indiana
        Indianapolis, Indiana

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 70 of 76
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
THE JEWISH COALITION FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Zechariah D. Yoder
Adler Attorneys
Noblesville, Indiana
Joshua M. Blackman
Josh Blackman LLC
Houston, Texas
Howard Slugh
The Jewish Coalition for Religious Liberty
Washington, D.C.
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH
WOMEN INDIANAPOLIS SECTION; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL
ASSOCIATION; ZIONESS; T’RUAH; KESHET; THE RABBINICAL ASSEMBLY;
MOVING TRADITIONS; AVODAH; MUSLIMS FOR PROGRESSIVE VALUES;
RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE; SADHANA: COALITION
OF PROGRESSIVE HINDUS; HINDUS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; AND CATHOLICS FOR
CHOICE
Jeffrey A. Macey
Macey Swanson LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
HISTORIANS OF RELIGION, REPRODUCTION, AND THE LAW
William R. Groth
Bowman & Vlink, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
Mark W. Sniderman
Sniderman Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
CERTAIN SCHOLARS OF JEWISH STUDIES AND RELIGION
Richard E. Shevitz
Arend J. Abel
Natalie A. Lyons
Cohen & Malad, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024   Page 71 of 76
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; ADL (ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE); BEND THE ARC: A JEWISH PARTNERSHIP FOR
JUSTICE; CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS; GLOBAL JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCHES; HINDU AMERICAN
FOUNDATION; INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUNDATION; MEN OF REFORM
JUDAISM: METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL ACTION;
RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL ASSOCIATION; RELIGIOUS COALITION FOR
REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE; THE SIKH COALITION; UNION FOR REFORM
JUDAISM; UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION; AND WOMEN OF REFORM
JUDAISM
Richard B. Katskee
Alex J. Luchenitser
Kalli A. Joslin
Americans United for Separation of Church and State
Washington, D.C.
Katherine Lacy Crosby
Tachau Meek PLC
Louisville, Kentucky

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024   Page 72 of 76
        Bailey, Judge, concurring.

[164]   “All people shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD,

        according to the dictates of their own consciences.” IN Const. Art. 1, § 2

        (emphasis in original.) “No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free

        exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of

        conscience.” IN Const. Art. 1, § 3. Accordingly, our Indiana Supreme Court

        has stated:

                   From the literal text of Sections 2 and 3, the discussions at the
                   Constitutional Convention, and the surrounding circumstances,
                   we conclude that the framers and ratifiers of the Indiana
                   Constitution’s religious liberty clauses did not intend to afford
                   only narrow protection for a person’s internal thoughts and
                   private practices of religion and conscience.

        City Chapel Evangelical Free, Inc. v. City of South Bend ex rel. Dep’t of Redevelopment,

        744 N.E.2d 443, 450 (Ind. 2001). In accordance with abundant religious liberty

        and the recognition of a pluralistic society, our Constitution further provides:

        “No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode

        of worship[.]” IN Const. Art. 1, § 4.

[165]   Yet in this post-Dobbs19 world, our Legislature has done just that – preferred one

        creed over another. Based upon the premise that the State has a compelling

        interest in the outcome of a woman’s pregnancy arising at the very moment of

        19
             Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215 (2022).

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024             Page 73 of 76
        conception,20 there is a codification of when life begins, something intensely

        debated among adherents to various religions.21 Moreover, if I glean anything

        from the broad range of views on this concept of ensoulment contained in the

        amicus briefs, it is that there is truly no consensus about when ensoulment

        occurs. Rather, it is to be determined as an article of faith unique to each

        particular religious society. And despite the diversity of viewpoints on the

        concept of ensoulment, there is no claim among the amici that the termination

        of a pregnancy extinguishes the soul.

[166]   Given the breadth of religious diversity and sects among Hoosiers, I am not

        surprised that the language employed by the framers of our Indiana

        Constitution suggests that an individual facing circumstances attendant to

        pregnancy, experienced uniquely by that individual,22 should resort to her own

        conscience and her own creed without undue state interference. Indeed, where

        theologians cannot agree, legislators are ill-equipped to define when life begins.

        20
          As noted by the majority, the Abortion Law does not criminalize destruction of zygotes produced in
        anticipation of in vitro implantation.
        21
           I acknowledge that, in asserting its interest, the State no longer need be bound by the trimester formulation
        of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Nor is there any compulsion to follow the “undue burden” test of
        Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992) (which found the trimester
        “formulation ... misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman’s interest” and “it undervalues the State’s
        interest in potential life” and held that women had a federal constitutional right to abortion without undue
        interference from states before viability, but states could prohibit abortions after viability (so long as there was
        an exception for pregnancies which endangered a woman’s health or life)).
        22
          Because of biological realities independent of theological concepts, the physical and emotional burden of
        pregnancy falls squarely upon the female. And although the hope is that the psychological, financial,
        familial, and legal consequences will be shared, too many times these consequences fall disproportionately
        upon the pregnant woman or girl.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                    Page 74 of 76
        As the majority notes, our legislature has not – to date – enacted wholly

        consistent statutory schemes conferring the rights of a human being upon

        zygotes, embryos, and fetuses.

[167]   In a more perfect world, each pregnant woman in evaluating her options would

        have no burden beyond examining her individual conscience, counseling with

        her spiritual advisor, and consulting with her medical provider. 23 But a perfect

        world this is not and resulting pregnancy is not always a simple free will

        contract or agreement. Despite untiring and commendable legislative efforts,

        we do not live in a society in which we can confidently say that women and

        girls of childbearing age live free from physical and psychological domestic

        abuse, rape, human trafficking,24 incest, and economic disparity. And a woman

        who has become pregnant of her own free will may subsequently be confronted

        23
          I must acknowledge that the Abortion Law as it currently exists in Indiana has a chilling effect upon the
        scope of medical advice that may lawfully be conveyed. Indeed, the plaintiffs in this matter, who have been
        successful in their pursuit of an injunction, have secured no corollary means by which a medical practitioner
        could escape legal liability for a procedure performed in contravention of the Abortion Law.
        24
           Our criminal code defines human trafficking to include multiple acts, such as sex trafficking, forced
        marriage, and labor trafficking. See Ind. Code § 35-42-3.5-1 (providing that forcible, fraudulent, or coercive
        recruitment, harboring, or transport of a person to provide labor or services is the promotion of human labor
        trafficking, a Level 4 felony); I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.1 (defining promotion of human sexual trafficking, a Level 4
        felony, to include recruitment and other forceful, fraudulent, or coercive acts to cause a person to marry,
        engage in prostitution, or participate in sexual conduct); I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.2(a), (providing that a person who
        knowingly or intentionally recruits, entices, harbors, or transports a child less than eighteen years of age with
        the intent of causing the child to engage in prostitution, juvenile prostitution, or a performance or incident
        that includes sexual conduct in violation of I.C. 35-42-4-4(b) or I.C. 35-42-4-4(c) (child exploitation) commits
        promotion of child sexual trafficking, a Level 3 felony); I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.3 (defining child sexual trafficking,
        a Level 2 felony, as the knowing or intentional sale or transfer of custody of a child for the purpose of
        prostitution, juvenile prostitution, or participation in sexual conduct); and I.C. § 35-42-3.5-1.4(a) (providing
        that “A person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) pays, or offers or agrees to pay, money or other property;
        or (2) offers a benefit; to or for a human trafficking victim with the specific intent to induce or obtain the
        product or act for which the human trafficking victim was trafficked commits human trafficking, a Level 4
        felony.”)

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024                                   Page 75 of 76
        with adverse physical and mental conditions. In the face of monetary scarcity

        or physical limitations, she may be forced to allocate limited monetary or

        caregiving resources among the unborn and children already in existence,

        perhaps including those with special needs. She may lose her support system or

        employment. She may find that she needs medical treatment or pharmaceutical

        intervention incompatible with fetal life. She may discover that her pregnancy

        will not result in a live birth. Legislators, an overwhelming majority of whom

        have not experienced childbirth, nevertheless dictate that virtually all

        pregnancies in this State must proceed to birth notwithstanding the onerous

        burden upon women and girls. They have done so not based upon science or

        viability but upon a blanket assertion that they are the protectors of “life” from

        the moment of conception. In my view, this is an adoption of a religious

        viewpoint held by some, but certainly not all, Hoosiers. The least that can be

        expected is that the remaining Hoosiers of child bearing ability will be given the

        opportunity to act in accordance with their own consciences and religious

        creeds.

[168]   For these reasons, I concur with the majority opinion.

        Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2938 | April 4, 2024          Page 76 of 76