Court Opinion

ID: 9753083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:56:33.011752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:29.437713
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
As the majority concedes, “[f]ee agreements, governing the amount and manner of a testamentary trustee’s compensation, have long been recognized as a valid means of governing terms of a testamentary trustee’s compensation----” Maj. op. at 416. The contract entered into by the testatrix and trustee Girard Bank in the instant matter is precisely such an agreement, governing both the amount and the manner of compensation. That agreement explicitly provided that all trustee’s fees would be charged against the principal of the trust unless the testatrix otherwise directed at the time the agreement was made. The testatrix signed the contract and did not elect to designate a source of trustee’s compensation other than principal. The estate should thus be bound by the explicit terms of the agreement. See Estate of Cohen, 483 Pa. 157, 394 A.2d 958 (1978); In re Duncan Trust, 480 Pa. 608, 391 A.2d 1051 (1978); In re Estate of Breyer, 475 Pa. 108, 379 A.2d 1305 (1977).
The majority reasons that it would be an “anomaly” to allow the agreement to nullify a provision in the testatrix’s will because that agreement was “not designed to express testamentary intent.” Maj. op. at 416. That conclusion is a non sequitur. The manner of payment of the trustees fees is not a question of testamentary intent but rather the interpretation of a material contractual term agreed to by the testatrix. Pursuant to the agreement, the trustee provides its services in return for compensation taken from the trust corpus. Although the will may authorize the trustee to deduct its fees and other proper expenses from the trust income, the alternative manner of payment established un*420der the contract is legally binding. The will should not be construed as abrogating a valid agreement between the testatrix and her trustee.