Court Opinion

ID: 9400734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 05:08:04.325584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.568561
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

ROBERT J. DOERR,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     June 8, 2023
               Petitioner-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 358228
                                                                     Tax Tribunal
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,                                              LC No. 20-004152-TT

               Respondent-Appellee.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.

MURRAY, J., (concurring).

        The limited review this Court employs in its review of a final opinion and judgment of the
Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT), Campbell v Dep’t of Treasury, 509 Mich 230, 237; 984 NW2d 13
(2022), requires the conclusion that the MTT decision be affirmed. As explained in the majority
opinion, the MTT relied upon the address contained on petitioner’s voter registration, vehicle
registration and driver’s license, all of which contained the prior home’s address. Reliance on
these documents was completely permissible, see Estate of Schubert v Dep’t of Treasury, 322 Mich
App 439, 448; 912 NW2d 569 (2017), and the MTT was authorized to find those documents more
persuasive than the evidence submitted by petitioner. This standard of review compels my vote to
affirm. Nevertheless, I write separately to point out the absurdity of the MTT’s decision, and how
it appears to have resulted from a robotic acceptance of some evidence, and with blinders on as to
the evidence establishing the reality of petitioner’s situation. As I see it, there was persuasive
evidence that petitioner occupied the Lakeshore property for tax years 2018 and 2019.

        The law provides that “[a] principal residence is exempt from the tax levied by a local
school district for school operating purposes to the extent provided under . . . the revised school
code . . . if an owner of that principal residence claims an exemption as provided in this section.”
MCL 211.7cc(1). “In order to receive the exemption, a taxpayer must file an affidavit claiming
the exemption.” Estate of Schubert, 322 Mich App at 448. A person claiming a PRE “must
establish that he or she owned and occupied the property as a principal residence for each year that
the exemption is claimed.” Id. at 451 (emphasis added). While neither MCL 211.7cc nor MCL
211.7dd defines the term “occupy,” this Court explained in Estate of Schubert, 322 Mich App at

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450, that “a person must dwell either permanently or continuously at a property to ‘occupy’ the
property.”

        As the majority notes, there is no dispute that petitioner owned the Lakeside property; the
only question is whether he proved that he occupied the Lakeshore house during the relevant tax
years. But from the evidence petitioner submitted that the MTT found unpersuasive, it is clear that
petitioner and his late wife (who passed away while the appeal was pending) purchased the ranch-
style house to down-size from the two-story home in which they had previously lived, principally
for medical reasons. And, the Lakeshore home was just .4 miles from the prior property.

        “[D]ocumentary evidence relevant to whether a person occupies the property as his or her
principal residence can include utility bills, driver’s licenses, tax documents, other documents
showing the petitioner’s address, and voter registration cards,” but “[n]o single document is
conclusive.” Id. at 454-455. The evidence submitted by petitioner, at least as far as can be gleaned
from any existing record, were utility bills, tax bills, ambulance bills, a statement from a neighbor
indicating that petitioner lived year-round at the Lakeshore property, and a position statement from
petitioner’s son, who has a power of attorney, outlining the circumstances of petitioner’s move. 1
This evidence was sufficient to show that petitioner occupied the Lakeshore property in 2018 and
2019.2 In fact, much more than the evidence relied upon by the MTT, the evidence petitioner
submitted shows what petitioner was actually doing during 2018 and 2019—living at the
Lakeshore property. Utility bills show that the Lakeshore property was receiving services so that
petitioner and his wife could reside there, while ambulance bills showed that petitioner occupied
the property when he needed medical assistance. Similarly, the Christmas cards sent to petitioner
and his wife show that petitioner (and/or his wife) told people that their new mailing address was
at the Lakeshore property. Also relevant was that petitioner immediately changed his PRE when
he purchased the Lakeshore property, averring to the government that it was his principal
residence. Most importantly, petitioner’s son’s letter outlined exactly why petitioner moved to the
new location, and why petitioner did not change government documents like his voter registration
and license.

        In concluding otherwise, the MTT focused exclusively on the fact that “Petitioner did not
identify the subject property as his residence on his driver’s license, vehicle registration, or voter’s
registration for the tax years at issue.” In focusing only on the voter ID and driver’s license and
car registration, the MTT placed form over substance, and reflected blind allegiance to certain
forms of evidence-“utility bills, driver’s licenses, tax documents, other documents showing the
petitioner’s address, and voter registration cards,”—but failed to recognize that “[n]o single
document is conclusive.” Estate of Schubert, 322 Mich App at 454. Certainly, it was true that
petitioner had not changed his driver’s license or voter registration information, but as petitioner’s

1
  The letter references photos taken of the old home and the Lakeshore property which purportedly
showed the former as vacant, and the latter as full with furniture, etc. However, nothing shows
that these photos were actually submitted to the tribunal, or for that matter, at the informal
conference. They were not submitted on appeal.
2
    It appears undisputed that petitioner submitted no evidence as to 2017.

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son explained, petitioner was stuck in his ways and was reluctant to make these and other changes
when he only moved less than a half mile away. In other words, although the address contained
on these government documents may be relevant in many cases, here their relevance was greatly
diminished in establishing where petitioner actually resided during the relevant periods. The
MTT’s error was in its complete failure to consider the context of petitioner’s situation, and which
property he physically occupied, which after all is the controlling statutory question. In my view,
petitioner met his burden to prove that he occupied the Lakeshore property in 2018 and 2019.
However, because there was evidence supporting the MTT’s decision, and we are not permitted to
substitute our judgment for that of the tribunal, I reluctantly concur.3

                                                             /s/ Christopher M. Murray

3
   The dissent suggests a remand to determine whether certain evidence was submitted to the
tribunal, but respondent already submitted the pictures that were referenced by the tribunal, and
they were not of the houses. And, petitioner has submitted nothing to suggest that the photos or
videos of the houses were actually submitted to the tribunal. Hence, I’m afraid a remand would
add nothing to the record.

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