Court Opinion

ID: 7399503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-29 01:42:33.989692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:21:53.191694
License: Public Domain

KONDUROS, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand Moore's case for a new trial. I conclude Officer McGraw's warrantless examination of the SIM card constituted a search that violated Moore's Fourth Amendment rights. As Officer McGraw explained in his testimony, the contents one can find on a SIM card include the stored phone number, call logs, a contact list, and "things of that nature." In this case, Officer McGraw testified he recovered the cell phone number, thirty-four contact entries, and three text messages. The minute Officer McGraw removed the SIM card, he had access to digital information in which our courts have recognized an expectation of privacy. See Riley v. California , --- U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (explaining society is willing to recognize an expectation of privacy in the digital contents of one's cell phone as reasonable). Therefore, I would conclude the warrantless search of Moore's cell phone violated his Fourth Amendment rights and no exception to the warrant **184requirement applies to the facts of this case.4 Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (indicating searches without a warrant are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless some exception applies).
The lead opinion cites to two cases-one from the Georgia Court of Appeals and one from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals-both of which are distinguishable from the facts in this case. In State v. Hill , the police used a locked cell phone to call 911 and obtain the owner's phone number, name, and date of birth. 338 Ga.App. 57, 789 S.E.2d 317, 318 (2016). Such limited identifying information is not all Officer McGraw had access to in Moore's SIM card. The 911 dispatcher in Georgia did not provide the police with the owner's contact list, text messages, or call logs. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Graham , 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), addressed an individual's expectation of privacy in historical cell-site location information. Again, this is distinguishable from the information available on a SIM card.
Additionally, I respectfully disagree with both of my learned colleagues that this warrantless search of Moore's cell phone can be cured through inevitable discovery. The holding in Riley "is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest." 134 S.Ct. at 2493 (emphasis added). As I noted in my dissent in State v. Brown , 414 S.C. 14, 32, 776 S.E.2d 917, 927 (Ct. App. 2015) (Konduros, J., dissenting), cert. granted (S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated August 8, 2017), I believe this language from Riley indicates an officer must obtain a warrant prior to searching a cell phone absent an applicable exception, even when one's expectation of privacy is diminished. Allowing officers to search the digital content of a cell phone prior to obtaining a warrant, yet cure such an invasion by arguing they could have inevitably obtained the information, circumvents the spirit of the warrant requirement. In keeping with my previous dissent and adhering to what I **185believe is the Court's holding in Riley , I would find the search of the digital contents of Moore's cell phone violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the case should be reversed and remanded.5

I agree with Chief Judge Lockemy that the facts of this case do not support a finding Moore abandoned his expectation of privacy in the contents of the cell phone.

Because my resolution of Moore's issue regarding the warrantless search of the cell phone would be dispositive, I decline to address his second issue on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not address remaining issue when disposition of prior issue is dispositive).