Court Opinion

ID: 9720408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:29:34.572565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:17.632327
License: Public Domain

*807Shanahan, J.,
concurring.
While the majority properly dispels the mistaken notion that an expert, or other witness to whom the State has issued a certificate or license, must, prefatory to testifying, have presented to a trial court documentation reflecting the witness’ field of expertise or specialization, the majority superficially treats Obermier’s “best evidence” objection and gives short shrift, actually no shrift at all, to Obermier’s “foundation” objection under the Nebraska Evidence Rules.
The State’s complaint contained the alternative allegations that Obermier did “operate or have actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor,” or “when he had a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath.” Police officers, after testifying about their observations of Obermier, expressed opinions that Obermier ■was under the influence of alcohol while he was driving his truck. There was extensive testimony that the “Intoxilyzer” was properly functioning before and during the breath test administered to Obermier in accordance with state regulations governing the procedure for proper administration of an Intoxilyzer test. Sgt. Paul Vrbka of the York County Sheriff’s Department testified that he held certificates issued by the Nebraska Department of Health; one certificate authorized Vrbka’s maintenance of the Intoxilyzer used in the Obermier test, while the other certificate, a “Class B permit,” authorized Vrbka to operate the Intoxilyzer. Vrbka detailed his maintenance on the Intoxilyzer and the machine’s accuracy. Copies of the state regulations specifying the classes of permits, including a Class B permit, to operate breath-testing equipment and the methods for conducting a valid test were received in evidence.
In the direct examination of Sergeant Cobb, a member of the York Police Department and the operator of the Intoxilyzer described by Vrbka which was used for the breath test on Obermier, the following occurred:
Q----[A]re you certified to operate the intoxilyzer?
A. Yes, sir. I am.
Q. And when did you become certified?
*808A. I was . . .
[Obermier’s lawyer:] Objection. Not the best evidence.
. . . The witness is test — is testifying as to a writing, a public record. I don’t believe he can — he can testify as to the contents of that writing unless he complies with 27-1004.
THE COURT:... I believe he can testify as to the date. You may answer.
A. It was December 22nd of 1984.
When asked “what kind of certificate” he held, Cobb, over Obermier’s best evidence objection, testified that his certificate was a “Class B permit,” the same type of certificate held by Sergeant Vrbka.
Later in the State’s case in chief, without objection, Cobb testified that he observed “the reading” on the Intoxilyzer during Obermier’s test, and he was then asked:
Q. And what reading appeared on the intoxilyzer when Mr....
[Obermier’s lawyer:] Objection. Foundation.
Q. [State’s attorney:] . . . when Mr. Obermeier [sic] produced the breath sample?
THE COURT: The Court would overrule. You may answer.
A. It was a .151.
Q____151 what?
A. Of a gram of alcohol per two ten liters of breath.
In view of Obermier’s objections to the preceding excerpts from Sergeant Cobb’s testimony, Obermier claims that the trial court erred by admitting “the results of defendant’s breath test into evidence at trial, over objection, due to lack of foundation being established for such evidence.” Later in his brief Obermier argues that
the State failed to prove that the officer administering the breath test was qualified to do so and held a valid permit. Officer Cobb, the testing officer, was permitted to testify *809to holding a Class B permit on the date in question. The permit itself or a copy thereof was never offered or received in evidence. Defendant submits that the original or a certified copy of said certificate was required to evidence Officer Cobb’s qualifications and that other evidence as to the contents of such certificate (such as Officer Cobb’s oral testimony) was inadmissible under Section 27-1004, Nebraska R.R.S.
Brief for appellant at 13.
Neb. Evid. R. 1002 states:
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress or of the Legislature of the State of Nebraska or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Under Rule 1002, to prove material contents of a writing, the original writing must be produced unless that writing is unavailable for some reason other than the proponent’s fault — for instance, unavailability due to loss of the writing or the writing’s destruction. See Neb. Evid. R. 1004 (admissibility of other evidence concerning contents of a writing). See, also, Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1983); Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1980).
As we recently stated in Equitable Life v. Starr, 241 Neb. 609, 615-16, 489 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1992):
Thus, the original writing or “original document” rule, expressed in Rule 1002, does not set up a hierarchy for admissibility of evidence, but applies when a party seeks to prove material contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. See, United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Lang, 354 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1984); State v. Stramiello, 392 So. 2d 425 (La. 1980); Mitchell v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 325, 267 N.W.2d 349 (1978). The purpose of Rule 1002 is the prevention of fraud, inaccuracy, mistake, or mistransmission of critical facts contained in a writing, recording, or photograph when its contents are an issue in a proceeding. See, U.S. v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1989) (original document rule *810prevents inaccuracy and fraud in an attempt to prove the contents of a writing); Williams v. State, 386 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1980) (original document rule ensures accuracy in proof of a document’s critical contents); Proffitt v. Ricci, 463 A.2d 514 (R.I. 1983) (in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for nonproduction of an original document, the original document rule bars admission of secondary evidence to prove the contents of the document); Crosson v. State, 268 Ind. 511, 376 N.E.2d 1136 (1978) (original document rule excludes testimony concerning the contents of a document when the document itself is available for examination by the trier of fact). See, also, 2 McCormick on Evidence § 231 (John W. Strong 4th ed. 1992).
In Obermier’s case, Sergeant Cobb testified without objection that he held a Nebraska Department of Health certificate to operate the Intoxilyzer used in the test on Obermier. Thus, Obermier’s first best evidence objection was directed to information concerning the date on which Cobb’s certificate was issued and did not relate to the certificate’s contents as a material issue in the case, while Obermier’s second best evidence objection pertained to Cobb’s identifying a particular category or type of license issued to him by the Nebraska Department of Health. Neither of Cobb’s answers, received over Obermier’s best evidence objections, was testimony to prove the contents of the certificate or permit as a written expression of Cobb’s qualifications and the authorization extended by the State to operate an Intoxilyzer. Rather, Cobb’s qualifications and authority from the State to operate the Intoxilyzer existed outside and independent of the Class B permit as a document issued to Cobb. Proof of Cobb’s authorization to conduct an Intoxilyzer test and, consequently, his qualification to operate the machine was supplied by Cobb’s affirmation that he was “certified to operate the Intoxilyzer” in light of state regulations received in evidence. Consequently, the court correctly overruled Obermier’s best evidence objections to the questions asked Cobb and to his answers, since the State was not attempting to prove the contents of an original writing.
Next, Obermier claims that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence, over Obermier’s foundation objection, Cobb’s *811testimony that the digital reading on the administered Intoxilyzer test was “.151.”
An appellant claiming reversible error as the result of admission of evidence must have made a timely objection, stating the specific ground of objection, if a specific ground was not apparent from the context. See Neb. Evid. R. 103(1)(a). See, also, State v. Coleman, 239 Neb. 800, 478 N.W.2d 349 (1992). “One function of a proper objection is to direct the court’s attention to questioned admissibility of particular evidence so that the court may intelligently, quickly, and correctly rule on the reception or exclusion of evidence.” Id. at 812, 478 N.W.2d at 357. “[A]n objection on the ground of insufficient foundation is a general objection.” Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., 236 Neb. 900, 911, 464 N.W.2d 343, 350 (1991). See, Brown v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 855, 468 N.W.2d 105 (1991); Kennedy v. Woods, 131 Neb. 217, 267 N.W. 390,(1936). As we observed in Sherard v. Bethphage Mission, Inc., supra:
“The objection ‘lack of foundation’ is employed at trial in reference to many different situations.” M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 611.9 at 528 (2d ed. 1986). “If a general objection is overruled the objecting party may not complain on appeal unless: (1) The ground for exclusion was obvious without stating it, or (2) the evidence was not admissible for any purpose.” Gateway Bank v. Department of Banking, 192 Neb. 109, 112, 219 N.W.2d 211, 213 (1974).
236 Neb. at 911, 464 N.W.2d at 350.
Did Obermier’s foundation objection challenge Sergeant Cobb’s competency to testify about the digital reading on the Intoxilyzer — for instance, Cobb’s inability to observe the digital display on the Intoxilyzer? Was the foundation objection a challenge to the reliability or accuracy of the Intoxilyzer as a measuring device? Did the objection raise a question about validity of procedures for an Intoxilyzer test generally, or, specifically, the validity of the particular procedures employed in the Intoxilyzer test administered to Obermier? Or, did the objection pose the question whether the Intoxilyzer was properly functioning during the test on Obermier? Under the *812circumstances, the record does not present an obvious ground apparent from the context of Obermier’s foundation objection. Moreover, Cobb’s testimony concerning the reading on the Intoxilyzer was relevant to the charge that Obermier was operating a motor vehicle while he “had a concentration of ten-hundredths of one gram or more by weight of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of his breath.” Consequently, the trial court properly overruled Obermier’s foundation objection as a general objection.
Since the trial court was correct in overruling Obermier’s best evidence and foundation objections, there is no merit to Obermier’s assignment of error concerning admissibility of evidence under the Nebraska Evidence Rules. Also, quite apart from evidence derived through the Intoxilyzer test, there was ample relevant evidence on the question whether Obermier was drunk or intoxicated while he was driving his truck, that is, whether Obermier was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage when he operated a motor vehicle. For that reason, Obermier’s conviction must be affirmed.