Court Opinion

ID: 9958934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 14:08:51.723571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.966134
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3893-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SAHIL KULGOD,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued March 13, 2024 – Decided April 10, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 15-04-
                   0231.

                   John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti,
                   Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel
                   and on the briefs).

                   Bridgett Nichole Dudding, Assistant Prosecutor,
                   argued the cause for respondent (John P. McDonald,
                   Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Bridgett
                   Nichole Dudding, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      In 2019, defendant Sahil Kulgod was convicted at trial by a jury of

reckless vehicular homicide—a second-degree crime subject to enhanced

punishment under the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d)(3).

This case returns to us for a third time to address sentencing issues. At the latest

resentencing hearing, the judge imposed a five-year prison term—the lowest

sentence authorized for a second-degree crime.1 Defendant asks us to exercise

original jurisdiction and impose a downgraded sentence within the third -degree

range —four years—pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). We have no basis upon

which to reduce the five-year prison term. This time, there was no abuse of

sentencing discretion. Nor does the five-year term in any way shock the judicial

conscience. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                         I.

      This case has a long history.       On the morning of January 4, 2015,

defendant—a twenty-one-year-old college student home on winter break—

drove southbound on a road in Hillsborough Township where the posted speed

1
  The range of ordinary sentences for a second-degree conviction is five to ten
years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2). The range of ordinary sentences for a third-
degree conviction is three to five years. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(3). The minimum
ordinary term in the second-degree range is the same as the maximum ordinary
term in the third-degree range.
                                                                              A-3893-22
                                         2
limit was forty-five miles per hour. Defendant approached a sharp S-curve at a

speed of approximately eighty-six miles per hour, passing a warning sign

recommending a speed of thirty-five miles per hour through the curve. The road

surface was wet from earlier rainfall. Defendant lost control of his vehicle,

crossed the double yellow line, and struck an oncoming car nearly head on. The

crash caused the near-immediate death of the other driver, Nancy Louie.

      In September 2019, defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of

second-degree vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5. On November 8, 2019,

the trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of five years' imprisonment subject

to NERA. The judge denied the State's motion to consider defendant's Twitter

posts in which he boasted about how fast his car could go, including around

curves.2

2
  The trial court had previously excluded the Twitter posts at the jury trial. The
relevant posts read:

            The number of times I've seen triple digit speeds is
            probably wayyy more than what my engineers had in
            mind .... #shhh (posted on December 23, 2014).

            I still have speedstreaks from . . . all those times I was
            going over 110 mph teehee ;) #vroom (posted on
            December 27, 2014).

                                                                            A-3893-22
                                        3
      The trial judge found only one aggravating factor, aggravating factor nine,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ("[t]he need for deterring the defendant and others from

violating the law"). The judge found two mitigating factors, mitigating factor

seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7) ("[t]he defendant has no history of prior

delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial

period of time before the commission of the present offense"), and mitigating

factor nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9) ("[t]he character and attitude of the

defendant indicate that the defendant is unlikely to commit another offense").

      The judge rejected defendant's request to apply mitigating factors two,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) ("[t]he defendant did not contemplate that the

defendant's conduct would cause or threaten serious harm"); four, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(4) ("[t]here were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the

defendant's conduct, though failing to establish a defense"); and eight, N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(b)(2)(8) ("[t]he defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances

            Crossed 30,000 miles today!!! Had the honor of
            crossing the milestone right in front of Princeton
            Junction!! squeeee !!! (posted on December 27, 2014).

            And how Epic!!! in 2nd gear at 4000 rpm in a 4-wheel-
            drift going around the curve opposite Princeton
            Junction station with [music] on. (posted on December
            27, 2014).

                                                                           A-3893-22
                                       4
unlikely to recur").       The judge concluded the mitigating factors "slightly

outweighed" the sole aggravating factor.

      In September 2021, we affirmed defendant's conviction but remanded for

resentencing. State v. Kulgod (Kulgod I), No. A-1672-19 (App. Div. Sept. 10,

2021) (slip op. at 1). We held the trial judge's "outright rejection of mitigating

factor eight . . . [was] inconsistent with his findings regarding mitigating factor

nine." Id. at 8. We further noted the judge "improperly added an element to

that statutory mitigating factor, the necessity that he have 'certainty that this type

of driving behavior is [not] going to or is unlikely to recur.' Nothing in the

statute requires 'certainty.'" Ibid. We explained mitigating factor eight "requires

a judge to decide only whether it is likely that a defendant will 'act similarly' if

in the future he finds himself 'in a situation like the one underlying the present

case.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Jabbour, 118 N.J. 1, 9 (1990)).

      Because the trial judge's findings were inconsistent, we remanded for a

new sentencing hearing. Id. at 9. We also instructed the court on remand to

apply the newly enacted youth mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14) ("the

defendant was under [twenty-six] years of age at the time of the commission of

the offense"). Id. at 9.

                                                                                A-3893-22
                                          5
      The resentencing hearing was conducted by the same judge on March 18,

2022. The trial judge considered "voluminous exhibits" submitted by defendant,

including documents showing that he had no driving infractions during a five -

year period before his trial.

      The defense further established that in 2016, defendant graduated from

college with a degree in mechanical engineering. He received a "model scholar"

award and completed several automotive-related programs, including an

internship with a major automaker's research and development department.

After graduating, defendant worked for another major automaker as a "Product

Development Systems Engineer," which involved "developing advanced driving

systems, such as safety features, lane centering, pedestrian spotting, and blind

spot monitoring."

      The defense also presented evidence that after the fatal crash, defendant

received psychotherapy from two clinical psychologists. He was diagnosed with

and treated for adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to the accident.

      Thirty-one individuals submitted letters on defendant's behalf.          His

friends, family, and colleagues attested to his personal characteristics, including

                                                                             A-3893-22
                                        6
his "maturity," "most caring and giving" nature, "highly cautious, aware, and

defensive" driving, and "deep[] remorse."

      During his allocution, defendant stated:

            I am sorry. It is an insufficient word and it feels
            pathetic and useless as it leaves my mouth . . . No
            amount of elaborate decorating of the word is going to
            help it carry the weight I'm trying to give it.
            Understandably there is frustration—likely the
            frustration that the idea that after such a tragedy I would
            be granted any kind of relief, but in reality, even if I
            was somehow released from prison instantly . . . I
            would still be in a kind of . . . prison. That prison is
            knowing and living with the awareness that the Louie
            family has lost Mrs. Louie that . . . I know I could have
            [acted] differently, but I did not. [I] went too fast into
            that curve. I crashed into Mrs. Louie. And now Mrs.
            Louie is gone. I am sorry.

The trial judge found defendant was sincere in his apology. The judge again

denied the State's motion to consider defendant's Twitter posts.

      As before, the trial judge found aggravating factor nine. But this time, the

judge applied mitigating factors seven, eight, nine, and fourteen. He determined

the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the sole aggravating factor. The

trial judge also found "it would be in the interest of justice" to downgrade

defendant's sentence. The judge thereupon imposed a downgraded term of four

years imprisonment subject to NERA.

                                                                            A-3893-22
                                        7
      The State appealed the application of the sentence downgrade provision,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). On April 4, 2023, 3 we vacated defendant's sentence and

remanded the case for a second resentencing hearing before a different judge.

State v. Kulgod (Kulgod II), No. A-2151-21 (App. Div. Apr. 4. 2023) (slip op.

at 1), cert. denied, 254 N.J. 74 (2023). We concluded the trial judge "provided

no explanation for finding the interest of justice prong [of N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -

1(f)(2)] was satisfied." Id. at 6. Further, we stressed the trial court did not

consider "whether there were 'compelling reasons in addition to, and separate

from,' the mitigating factors, which require the downgrade in the interest of

justice." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We also held the trial judge

abused his discretion in refusing to consider defendant's Twitter posts. Id. at 5.

We instructed that on remand, the new resentencing judge was to consider the

relevant posts. Ibid.

3
   Defendant was released from prison on April 1, 2023—three days before we
issued Kulgod II—at which time he began serving his three-year period of parole
required by NERA. We note the three-year parole term is prescribed for second-
degree convictions, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(c). That parole term cannot be reduced
even if defendant were to be sentenced pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2) to a
term of imprisonment "appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that of
the crime for which the defendant was convicted." Cf. State v. Nance, 228 N.J.
378, 398-99 (2017) (the presumption of imprisonment survives a reduction in
the degree of sentencing).
                                                                            A-3893-22
                                        8
      Defendant filed a petition for certification to the Supreme Court and

sought a stay of our decision. We denied defendant's request for a stay, as did

the Supreme Court. On May 16, 2023, the Supreme Court denied defendant's

petition for certification. 254 N.J. 74 (2023).

      On August 10, 2023, Judge Peter J. Tober conducted the third sentencing

hearing in this case. To avoid needless repetition, we focus on new information

presented to Judge Tober at the third sentencing hearing, although he considered

all evidence and arguments presented by both defendant and the prosecutor.

Once again, defense counsel submitted numerous letters of support.          For

example, the owner of a consulting firm wrote that defendant began working at

his company in August 2022 through a work release program.           Defendant

became a full-time employee when he was released from the Department of

Corrections' custody.      The owner described defendant as "grounded,"

"thoughtful," and "an asset to his business."

      Defense counsel argued defendant's parents were facing "significant

health and financial issues." Defendant's father was placed on disability in

August 2022 and lost his job in January 2023. Defendant's mother explained

how defendant took on additional responsibilities to help his parents when he

was released from prison. Defendant's family relied on his income "to pay their

                                                                          A-3893-22
                                         9
mortgage, their significant medical debts, and the $250,000 owed to" defendant's

trial counsel.

      Citing these circumstances, defense counsel asked the judge to find

mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11) ("[t]he imprisonment of the

defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant's

dependents").

      During his allocution, defendant again expressed his remorse and

acknowledged his responsibility for the Louie family's pain. He stated, "I will

always think of the Louie family, and I will always seek out examples and

reminders of the grief and pain the Louie family feels such that I never forget

that pain and never forget my role in that pain."

      Judge Tober found aggravating factor nine and mitigating factors seven,

nine, and fourteen. He found defendant's Tweets rendered "mitigating factor

[eight] inapplicable," explaining,

             [i]f you look back at the conduct that happened in
             January of 2015 and you fold in the Tweets indicating
             that's he's engaged in some fast driving before, I don't
             think that conduct in 2015 was the result of
             circumstances unlikely to recur. It's probably happened
             many times before and it ended with this tragic
             accident.

                                                                          A-3893-22
                                       10
      Judge Tober also distinguished mitigating factors eight and nine, noting

factor nine is about "the character and attitude of the defendant." The judge

found mitigating factor nine applied, explaining:

            I think his character and attitude indicate he would be
            unlikely to commit another offense like this in the
            future. And we're in the unusual situation really of
            being eight years after the offense. . . . So we do have a
            little bit longer period of time for the defendant to
            exhibit character and attitude indicating unlikelihood of
            committing another offense.

      Although he sympathized with defendant's family, Judge Tober rejected

mitigating factor eleven, noting, "[w]hile certainly taking many significant

financial steps back, [the family is] still in the house, there may not be the same

type of insurance in place that there was when [defendant's father] had a job and

was able to treat and maybe his medical condition has suffered." He concluded

defendant's incarceration was not an excessive hardship.

      Ultimately, Judge Tober did not "find that the mitigating factors

substantially outweigh[ed] [the] aggravating factors sufficient to downgrade this

from a second[-degree offense] to a third[-degree offense]." He thereupon

resentenced defendant to the lowest prison term in the second-degree range—

five years, subject to NERA.

                                                                             A-3893-22
                                       11
      This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contentions for our

consideration:

            POINT I
            THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND AMPLY
            SUPPORTED MITIGATING FACTORS.

            A. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Consider All
            The Evidence In The Record In Support Of Mitigating
            Factor Eight And Instead Entirely Reject[ed] This
            Factor Based Solely On Four Old Twitter Posts.

            B. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Ascribe Any
            Weight To Mitigating Factor Eleven Despite The
            Unique Hardships Faced By [Defendant's] Family.

            POINT II
            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASCRIBING
            SIGNIFICANT WEIGHT TO AGGRAVATING
            FACTOR    NINE    BY   DOUBLE-COUNTING
            ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND WITHOUT A
            NEED FOR SPECIFIC DETERRENCE.

            POINT III

            THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ORIGINAL
            JURISDICTION AND IMPOSE A DOWNGRADED
            SENTENCE OF FOUR YEARS SUBJECT TO NERA.

Defendant raises the following contentions in his reply brief:

            POINT I

            THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FIND AMPLY
            SUPPORTED MITIGATING FACTORS.

                                                                       A-3893-22
                                      12
                 A. When Rejecting Mitigating Factor Eight, The
                    Trial Court Did Not Consider [Defendant's]
                    (1) Documented Mental Health Treatment
                    Following The Accident, (2) Deep Remorse
                    For His Actions, (3) Commitment To Pursuing
                    A Career In Automotive Safety, (4)
                    Unblemished Driving Record, And (5)
                    Maturation From A Twenty-One-Year-Old To
                    A Twenty-Nine-Year-Old.

                 B. The Trial Court Erred In Failing To Ascribe
                    Any Weight To Mitigating Factor Eleven
                    Despite The Unique Hardships Faced By
                    [Defendant's] Family.

           POINT II
           THE   TRIAL  COURT   DOUBLE-COUNTED
           ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN ASCRIBING
           HEAVY WEIGHT TO AGGRAVATING FACTOR
           NINE.

           POINT III
           [DEFENDANT'S]      UNIQUE,     PERSONAL
           CHARACTERISTIC[S], AS THEY RELATE TO THE
           OFFENSE,    SUPPORT    A    DOWNGRADED
           SENTEN[]CE.

                                    II.

     We begin our analysis by acknowledging "[our] review of sentencing

decisions is relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse of discretion

standard." State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246, 272 (2021); State v. Blackmon, 202

N.J. 283, 297 (2010).     A reviewing court is "deferential to sentencing

                                                                      A-3893-22
                                    13
determinations and 'must not substitute [its] judgment for that of the sentencing

court.'" State v. Rivera, 249 N.J. 285, 297 (2021) (quoting State v. Fuentes, 217

N.J. 57, 70 (2014)). We must affirm a sentence "unless (1) the sentencing

guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found were

not 'based upon competent credible evidence in the record;' or (3) 'the

application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly

unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience.'" Id. at 297-98 (alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

      If, however, the sentencing court "fails to identify relevant aggravating

and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates them, or forgoes a qualitative

analysis, or provides little 'insight into the sentencing decision,' then the

deferential standard will not apply." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 48, 65 (2014)

(quoting State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363 (1987)). "Proper sentencing thus

requires an explicit and full statement of aggravating and mitigating factors and

how they are weighed and balanced." State v. McFarlane, 224 N.J. 458, 466

(2016) (quoting State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 348 (2012)).            "[W]here

mitigating factors are amply based in the record before the sentencing judge,

they must be found." State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 504 (2005); see Rivera, 249

                                                                             A-3893-22
                                       14
N.J. at 298 ("Mitigating factors that are suggested in the record or brought to the

court's attention should not be ignored.").

                                        A.

      We first address defendant's contention Judge Tober abused his discretion

"in failing to ascribe any weight to mitigating factor eight," that defendant's

conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur. Defendant contends

the resentencing judge "myopically focused on four old Twitter posts from a

twenty-one-year-old's parody account of a car." Further, defendant argues, the

resentencing judge did not discuss "the extensive amount of other recent

evidence" supporting the conclusion defendant's conduct was the result of

circumstances unlikely to recur. Specifically, defendant relies on:

            (1) documented treatment for PTSD following the
            accident; (2) deep remorse for his actions; (3)
            commitment to pursuing a career in automotive safety;
            (4) maturation from a twenty-one-year-old to a twenty-
            nine-year-old by the time of the resentencing; and (5)
            an unblemished driving record in the five years before
            his trial. . . .

      We conclude Judge Tober properly addressed mitigating factor eight. The

judge acknowledged defendant's education, employment, lack of criminal

record, experiences in the halfway house and prison, character, and attitude. The

                                                                             A-3893-22
                                       15
judge further acknowledged the "longer period of time" between the fatal crash

and resentencing.

      Judge Tober also carefully analyzed defendant's Twitter posts—as per our

remand instructions. Kulgod II, at 12. He specifically addressed defendant's

argument that the "State cherry picked the [four] best [T]weets," and that the

Twitter account is "not replete with references to speeding, it's not replete with

references to cars." 4 Judge Tober disagreed, reasoning:

                  Now, I think what those [T]weets do is make
            mitigating factor [eight] inapplicable to this case. If
            you look back at the conduct that happened in January
            of 2015 and you fold in the [T]weets indicating that he's
            engaged in some fast driving before, I don't think that
            conduct in 2015 was the result of circumstances
            unlikely to recur. It's probably happened many times
            before and it ended with this tragic accident. So I reject
            factor [eight] and I give it no weight.

                  Now, [mitigating] factor number [nine] I think is
            a different story. That is not illuminated by the
            [T]weets, the character and attitude of the defendant
            indicate that he is unlikely to commit another offense.
            And [defense counsel] spelled this out very well in her
            brief. She talked about . . . what he's done at the
            halfway house, what he's done while he was in prison,
            the education he pursued while this case was

4
  As Judge Tober aptly noted, defendant "does have a Twitter account for his
own car and we can talk about that, . . . —some might find that amusing and
humorous, others might find it indicative of a fascination with vehicles and their
speed."

                                                                            A-3893-22
                                       16
               proceeding through the criminal justice system. He was
               out in Detroit at a very prestigious employment and
               training-type process.

                      I do believe factor [nine] applies. I think his
               character and attitude indicate he would be unlikely to
               commit another offense like this in the future. And
               we're in the unusual situation really of being eight years
               after the offense because of the trips up and down the
               appellate process and the length it took to get this
               matter to trial. So we do have a little bit longer period
               of time for the defendant to exhibit character and
               attitude indicating unlikelihood of committing another
               offense. But nonetheless, I find factor [nine] to apply
               and give it weight.

       In sum, Judge Tober carefully considered the evidence and arguments of

the parties and thoroughly explained his reasons for rejecting mitigating factor

eight. See Case, 220 N.J. at 65. We see no abuse of discretion. See Torres, 246

N.J. at 272.

      We add that despite defendant's claim, Judge Tober did consider

defendant's neurological maturation. The judge stated, "[s]tatistically, [twenty -

nine]-year-old drivers like [defendant] are more likely to drive safer than

[twenty-one]-year old drivers." Relatedly, the judge found the youth mitigating

factor "unquestionably applie[d] and [he gave] that significant weight because

[defendant] was under [twenty-six] years of age at the time of the commission

of the offense."

                                                                            A-3893-22
                                          17
                                       B.

      Defendant contends the resentencing court "erred in failing to ascribe any

weight to mitigating factor eleven despite the unique hardship faced by

[defendant]'s family." Defendant argues:

            It is extremely rare for an incarcerated defendant to
            earn his way into a halfway house with perfect behavior
            in prison, obtain a job under a work release program,
            have that employer hire him as a full-time employee
            upon release, and then lose that job as a result [of] his
            sentence being increased and being reincarcerated to a
            prison.

      As noted, mitigating factor eleven applies where "imprisonment of the

defendant would entail excessive hardship to the defendant or the defendant's

dependents." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).

      Defendant argues his parents should be considered dependents for

purposes of the family hardship mitigating factor because "the typical parent -

child relationship has flipped." Defendant cites to Black's Law Dictionary's

definition of dependent as "[s]omeone who relies on another for support; one

not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else."

      We read Judge Tober's decision as rejecting defendant's argument the

hardship on his family would be excessive, not that parents cannot be deemed

                                                                           A-3893-22
                                      18
to be "dependents" for purposes of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11).            Judge Tober

explained:

             [I]t's clear that imprisonment would . . . result in some
             difficulties for this family but this [c]ourt is faced with
             that argument all the time . . . Yes, [defendant] is
             certainly going to be affected. But the idea that it's
             excessive hardship, I decline to apply it. While
             certainly taking many significant financial steps back,
             [defendant's family is] still in the house, there may not
             be the same type of insurance in place that there was
             when [defendant's father] had a job . . . But all told, it
             is a son, a dependent, and I understand [defense
             counsel's] efforts to portray it the other way around,
             that the son has become the person providing and not
             the dependent. Still, you have a young [twenty-nine]-
             year-old with parents who both at one point worked.
             They're still in the home. I don't think imprisonment is
             an excessive hardship and I decline to apply factor
             [eleven].

      The record thus shows Judge Tober analyzed the pertinent facts and

provided insight into his decision. See Case, 220 N.J. at 65; see also State v.

Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 404 (2022) (Sentencing courts must "explain and make a

thorough record of their findings to ensure fairness and facilitate review."). We

decline to second-guess his conclusion. See Case, 220 N.J. at 65.

                                         C.

      We turn next to defendant's contention that the resentencing court "erred

in ascribing significant weight to aggravating factor nine," the need for deterring

                                                                             A-3893-22
                                        19
the defendant and others from violating the law, "by double-counting elements

of the offense and without a need for specific deterrence."            Specifically,

defendant argues Judge Tober's "reliance on the fact that this case involved

reckless driving that resulted in a fatality constitutes impermissible

double[-]counting."

      Our Supreme Court has "recognized that facts that established elements

of a crime for which a defendant is being sentenced should not be considered as

aggravating circumstances in determining that sentence." State v. Kromphold,

162 N.J. 345, 353 (2000) (citing State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 633 (1985)).

Otherwise, "every offense arguably would implicate aggravating factors merely

by its commission, thereby eroding the basis for the gradation of offenses and

the distinction between elements and aggravating circumstances." Ibid.; see

Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 75.

      Here, defendant was convicted of second-degree reckless vehicular

homicide: "[c]riminal homicide constitutes reckless vehicular homicide when it

is caused by driving a vehicle . . . recklessly." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5(a). In finding

aggravating factor nine, Judge Tober stated:

                  I think there's especially a need to deter . . . here.
            We've all been on the roads and you hear a car, a loud
            rumbling sound and it flies by you at God knows what
            speed and you think to yourself oh my goodness, he's

                                                                              A-3893-22
                                        20
            going to kill somebody and it's exactly what happened
            here.
                   [A]ggravating factor [nine] is extremely present
            in this case and I give it some significant weight. There
            is a need to deter him and others who would operate a
            vehicle like him from violating the law and driving in a
            manner that could kill somebody and did kill somebody
            in this case. So I give aggravating factor [nine]
            application, I give it strong weight.

      We are satisfied Judge Tober focused on the need to deter defendant and

others from driving at excessive speeds. We stress this is not a situation where

the sentencing court improperly viewed the victim's death as an aggravating

factor. See State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 425 (2001) (deaths caused by vehicular

homicide may not be viewed as an aggravating factor in a homicide case).

Furthermore, defendant's conduct far exceeded the level of recklessness needed

to prove the vehicular homicide offense. Cf. State v. Varona, 242 N.J. Super.

474, 492 (App. Div. 1990) (sentencing court may consider that the defendant

did more than was minimally required to satisfy an element of the crime).

                                      III.

      We turn next to defendant's contention he is entitled to a sentence

downgrade pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2). Specifically, defendant argues

the interests of justice demand a sentence downgrade because: (1) the

circumstances of his offense make it similar to third-degree reckless vehicular

                                                                            A-3893-22
                                      21
homicide, and (2) defendant's unique, personal characteristics "reflect[] a

transient lapse in judgment and presents a diminished need to deter." Those

characteristics, defendant argues, include his age, remorse, driving record, and

"commitment to using his engineering degree to contribute to a safer

community."      Furthermore, because there is an "extensive and largely

undisputed factual record," defendant asks us to exercise original jurisdiction

"to determine whether the interests of justice demand a downgrade rather than

remand this matter for a fourth sentencing hearing."

      We acknowledge our jurisdiction to review sentences includes the power

to make new findings of fact, to reach independent determinations of the facts,

and to supplement the record on appeal. State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 412

(1989); R. 2:10-3. However, "the exercise of appellate original jurisdiction over

sentencing should not occur regularly or routinely; . . . a remand to the trial court

for resentencing is strongly to be preferred." State v. Bell, 250 N.J. 519, 544-

45 (2022) (quoting Jarbath, 114 N.J. at 411). When "a remand will work an

injustice by continuing" the defendant's incarceration, then it is appropriate for

an appellate court to exercise original jurisdiction and resentence the defendant.

State v. L.V., 410 N.J. Super. 90, 113 (App. Div. 2009).

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        But of course, any such remand presupposes an injustice. Here, we see

none.    In reaching that conclusion, we stress "the standard governing the

downgrading of a defendant's sentence . . . is high." State v. Megargel, 143 N.J.

484, 500 (1996).

        N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(1) provides:

              (1) Except for the crime of murder, unless the
              preponderance of aggravating or mitigating factors, as
              set forth in subsections a. and b. of this section, weighs
              in favor of a higher or lower term within the limits
              provided in N.J.S.[A.]2C:43-6, when a court
              determines that a sentence of imprisonment is
              warranted, it shall impose sentence as follows:

              (a) To a term of [twenty] years for aggravated
                  manslaughter or kidnapping pursuant to paragraph
                  (1) of subsection c. of N.J.S.[A.]2C:13-1 when the
                  offense constitutes a crime of the first degree;

              (b) Except as provided in subparagraph (a) of this
                  paragraph to a term of [fifteen] years for a crime of
                  the first degree;

              (c) To a term of seven years for a crime of the second
                  degree;

              (d) To a term of four years for a crime of the third
              degree; and

              (e) To a term of nine months for a crime of the fourth
              degree.

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      In Megargel, our Supreme Court established a two-part test to justify a

sentence downgrade: (1) "[t]he court must be 'clearly convinced that the

mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating ones'"; and (2) "the

interest of justice demand[s] a downgraded sentence." 143 N.J. at 496 (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)). In applying this test, "the severity of the crime" is "the

most . . . important factor." Id. at 500. Furthermore, "[t]he reasons justifying a

downgrade must be 'compelling,' and something in addition to and separate

from, the mitigating factors that substantially outweigh the aggravating factors ."

State v. Rice, 425 N.J. Super. 375, 384 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Megargel,

143 N.J. at 505) (emphasis added).

      Contrary to defendant's contention, the facts of the crime he committed do

not make it similar to third-degree reckless vehicular homicide. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

5(b)(5) provides:

            Reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the third
            degree if the defendant proves by a preponderance of
            the evidence that the defendant did not commit any
            conduct constituting driving a vehicle . . . recklessly
            other than failing to maintain a lane in violation of
            [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-88.

      This was not a case of merely failing to maintain a lane. Defendant drove

his car at high-speed entering an S-curve on a wet road, reaching eighty-six

miles per hour five seconds before striking the victim's car head-on in a forty-

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                                       24
five-mile-per-hour zone. He drove past a warning sign recommending a speed

of thirty-five miles per hour. Further, the record shows defendant was driving

in a residential area with signs alerting drivers about a school bus stop, a hidden

driveway, horseback riders, and a T-intersection after the curve.            Without

question, his conduct constituted second-degree vehicular homicide, not third-

degree vehicular homicide.

      Furthermore, in State v. Locane, we held, "[t]he interest of justice analysis

does not include consideration of defendant's overall character or contributions

to the community." 454 N.J. Super. 98, 122 (App. Div. 2018). We explained

that a sentencing court may "consider the 'characteristics or behavior of the

offender[,]' but only to the extent 'they relate to the offense itself and give fuller

context to the offense circumstances.'" Id. at 121 (quoting State v. Lake, 408

N.J. Super. 313, 328 (App. Div. 2009)) (alteration in original); see L.V., 410

N.J. Super. at 112-13 (downgrading the defendant's sentence considering her

mental illness, young age, limited intelligence, cognitive inabilities, language

and social barriers, and history of sexual abuse).

      We acknowledge defendant has not incurred new charges. He has instead

pursued an education and career related to automobile safety.             Numerous

character letters were submitted on his behalf. Those circumstances, while

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commendable, do not satisfy the interests of justice test, especially when, as in

this case, defendant is subject to enhanced punishment. See Locane, 454 N.J.

Super. at 122, 130. As we noted in Kulgod II:

            where the Legislature has provided an enhanced
            penalty for an offense, "the downgrade of that offense
            requires more compelling reasons than the downgrade
            of an offense for which the Legislature has not attached
            an enhanced penalty." Rice, 425 N.J. Super. at 385
            (quoting Megargel, 143 N.J. at 502). A sentencing
            court should not use its discretion to circumvent the
            legislative design. State v. Lopez, 395 N.J. Super. 98,
            108-09 (App. Div. 2007). The Legislature subjected
            second-degree vehicular homicide to the parole
            ineligibility and mandatory parole supervision under
            NERA.

            [Kulgod II at 6.]

      Applying these principles to the present facts, we are not persuaded

defendant has established the high standard required for downgrading his

sentence. See Megargel, 143 N.J. at 500. Even accepting that the mitigating

factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factor, we see no compelling

reasons for the downgrade "in addition to, and separate from" those mitigating

factors. Id. at 502. We therefore decline to exercise original jurisdiction to

resentence defendant as if he had been convicted of a less serious crime than the

one he actually committed.

      Affirmed.

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