Court Opinion

ID: 9891165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 18:00:35.882943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:26.702330
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-3219
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                 v.

ELVIS C. MEDRANO,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
         Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
          No. 2:20-cr-00017 — James Patrick Hanlon, Judge.

                     ____________________

  ARGUED SEPTEMBER 7, 2023 — DECIDED OCTOBER 16, 2023

                     ____________________

   Before BRENNAN, ST. EVE, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. After the government presented
substantial evidence against Elvis Medrano, a jury found him
guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute con-
trolled substances. He challenges that conviction and asks for
2                                                   No. 22-3219

a new trial. He argues that a trial exhibit—screenshots of a text
message conversation between him and another individual—
should not have been admitted because the conversation was
hearsay. Given the considerable evidence introduced against
Medrano, any error in admitting that exhibit was harmless.
So, we aﬃrm the judgment of the district court.
                                I
                              A
    From March 2020 until his arrest in August 2020, Medrano
engaged in a conspiracy to distribute mixtures and substances
containing detectable amounts of methamphetamine, co-
caine, and 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)
in the Southern District of Indiana. A drug supplier shipped
drugs from California to Indiana, where Medrano and others
used the United States Post Oﬃce and a post oﬃce employee
to distribute the drugs in Indiana. Several other individuals
were involved.
    During this time, Medrano was a fugitive. Oﬃcers tracked
and attempted to arrest him on several occasions. On June 1,
2020, oﬃcers found Medrano at a motel in Indiana. When of-
ﬁcers attempted to arrest him, he ﬂed and led oﬃcers on a
high-speed chase. Medrano evaded arrest, but oﬃcers found
his truck, and took a co-conspirator, Nikki Foster, into cus-
tody. They later obtained a warrant to search Medrano’s mo-
tel room. There oﬃcers found his burner phone, as well as
drug paraphernalia including scales, baggies, and substances
used to dilute methamphetamine. They also recovered the
key to a post oﬃce box, which oﬃcers later determined
Medrano had received from Christina Johnson, a post oﬃce
employee.
No. 22-3219                                                             3

    Around July 2020, oﬃcers tracked Medrano to another
motel in Indiana. Once again, Medrano led oﬃcers on a high-
speed chase and avoided arrest. Oﬃcers executed a search
warrant for Medrano’s motel room and found drug parapher-
nalia, including substances used to dilute methamphetamine,
a vacuum sealer, rubber bands, baggies, a pipe, a scale with
calibrating weights, a gas stove for cooking methampheta-
mine, and a drug ledger. They also located another phone be-
longing to Medrano.
    Oﬃcers ﬁnally arrested Medrano at a residence in Indiana.
There they discovered methamphetamine, as well as drug
paraphernalia, including baggies, scales, and substances used
to dilute methamphetamine. They also found a third phone
belonging to Medrano. This phone contained text messages
between Medrano and a contact identiﬁed as “Rob Mar-
shalltown.” The text messages were later introduced at trial
as Exhibit 218(B).
                                B
    A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging
Medrano with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
and to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. 1 The district court held a four-day
trial.
   At trial, the government introduced overwhelming
evidence against Medrano. This included the testimony of

    1 Medrano was also indicted for and convicted of being a felon in pos-

session of ammunition. At oral argument he conﬁrmed he does not chal-
lenge that conviction, which would stand regardless of our decision on the
admission of Exhibit 218(B). Oral Argument at 2:00–2:35.
4                                                  No. 22-3219

several law enforcement oﬃcers, post oﬃce employees and
inspectors, and expert witnesses and lab technicians. The gov-
ernment introduced several exhibits, including text messages
between members of the conspiracy, drugs, drug parapherna-
lia, photos of drugs and drug paraphernalia, postal service
tracking reports and receipts, and photos of drugs in the
postal boxes. Motel surveillance videos were shown to the
jury. Two cooperating witnesses testiﬁed. Christina Johnson,
a postal employee who Medrano recruited to the conspiracy,
testiﬁed that she gave him access to post oﬃce boxes for oth-
ers to ship him drugs and that he asked her to track drug
packages. And Brandy Gregory, another co-conspirator, testi-
ﬁed that she witnessed Medrano and others selling and pur-
chasing drugs on multiple occasions.
    Medrano objected to the admission of several trial exhib-
its, but here only a text message conversation with Mar-
shalltown, Exhibit 218(B), is at issue. At trial, Medrano argued
the text message conversation was hearsay. The district court
overruled his objection, concluding that the exhibit was ad-
missible.
   After trial, the jury found Medrano guilty. The district
court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, and he
timely appeals.
                              II
    Medrano objects to the district court’s admission of the
text messages between him and Marshalltown as non-hearsay
statements of a co-conspirator under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E). He argues that the statements are hearsay and
represent only a buyer-seller relationship, not a co-conspira-
tor relationship.
No. 22-3219                                                      5

    Because “decisions regarding the admission and exclusion
of evidence are peculiarly within the competence of the dis-
trict court,” Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, 970
F.3d 823, 829 (7th Cir. 2020), they are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. We will reverse a district court’s factual determi-
nation only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Powers, 75
F.3d 335, 340–41 (7th Cir. 1996). “We will not reverse if the
error is harmless in light of the trial record as a whole.” Vi-
ramontes v. City of Chicago, 840 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2016).
     Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not hearsay
if it was “offered against an opposing party” and “made by
the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.” The government must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that “(1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the de-
fendant and declarant were members of the conspiracy; and
(3) the statement was made during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Singleton, 125 F.3d
1097, 1107 (7th Cir. 1997).
    As an initial matter, neither party addressed whether in-
dependent evidence supported the district court’s determina-
tion that Marshalltown was a member of the conspiracy. In
Bourjaily v. United States, the Supreme Court, looking to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, held that preliminary questions
concerning admissibility of evidence “shall be determined by
the [district] court” and that the district court may consider
any evidence it wishes, unhindered by considerations of
admissibility in making those determinations. 483 U.S. 171,
175–76 (1987). The Court held, however, that it “need not de-
cide … whether the courts below could have relied solely
upon … hearsay statements to determine that a conspiracy
had been established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
6                                                    No. 22-3219

at 181. Since then, this court has made clear that the statement
alone is not suﬃcient to establish a conspiracy exists and that
some independent evidence must be oﬀered. See, e.g., United
States v. Quiroz, 874 F.3d 562, 570 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing United
States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1239 (7th Cir. 1996)).
    While abundant evidence supported the ﬁnding that
Medrano participated in a larger conspiracy, notably, the gov-
ernment did not provide independent evidence that Medrano
conspired with Marshalltown or that Marshalltown otherwise
participated in the larger conspiracy. The district court stated
it “studied” Exhibit 218(B) and “in the context of th[at] spe-
ciﬁc exhibit, and with all of the other facts and circumstances
of the evidence that has been admitted,” it found that “the fac-
tors articulated for co-conspirator statements are satisﬁed.”
This raises the question whether a district court can rely solely
on hearsay statements and evidence of the larger conspiracy
involving the defendant, but not the declarant, to ﬁnd that a
conspiracy between the defendant and declarant existed.
    We need not resolve the independent evidence question
because any error in admitting Exhibit 218(B) was nonconsti-
tutional harmless error. Though Medrano argued at trial and
argues on appeal that the admission of the exhibit violated the
Confrontation Clause—and thus, the admission was a consti-
tutional error—the text messages in that exhibit are nontesti-
monial, and thus do not implicate the Constitution. See
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (recognizing
“testimony” as “[a] solemn declaration or aﬃrmation made
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact” in con-
trast to “a casual remark to an acquaintance”).
    A nonconstitutional error committed at trial that is un-
likely to have altered the outcome of the trial is harmless.
No. 22-3219                                                    7

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946). As with
much of American law, harmless error began with English
common law. The English harmless error rule provided that
the “erroneous admission or rejection of a piece of evidence
was not a suﬃcient ground for setting aside the verdict and
ordering a new trial unless upon all the evidence it appeared
to the judges that the truth had thereby not been reached.”
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 21, at 1 (4th ed. 2023). In contrast to
harmless error, an error that would have altered the outcome
of the trial or otherwise deprived the defendant of a fair trial
is prejudicial. See United States v. Harden, 893 F.3d 434, 451–52
(7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Lauderdale, 571 F.3d 657, 661
(7th Cir. 2009).
    Courts use two approaches to distinguish between harm-
less error and prejudicial error. The ﬁrst looks to whether the
jury reached the correct result, despite the trial court’s error.
See, e.g., WIGMORE § 21, at 9 & n.17 (collecting cases). The sec-
ond looks to whether the trial court’s error aﬀected the jury’s
deliberation or contributed to the judgment. See id. at 10. Our
court has adopted the second approach. See, e.g., United States
v. Diggs, 81 F.4th 755, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v.
Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 863 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
    Because Medrano challenges a nonconstitutional trial er-
ror, we apply the second approach. That approach is memori-
alized in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), which pro-
vides, “[a]ny error … that does not aﬀect substantial rights
must be disregarded.” Thus, “[t]he test for harmless error is
whether, in the mind of the average juror, the prosecution’s
case would have been signiﬁcantly less persuasive had the
improper evidence been excluded.” United States v. Curtis, 781
8                                                  No. 22-3219

F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2015). “We will aﬃrm if ‘the error had
no substantial inﬂuence on the verdict’ because ‘other un-
tainted incriminating evidence is overwhelming.’” United
States v. Chaparro, 956 F.3d 462, 482 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Zuniga, 767 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2014)). So
“[e]ssentially, an evidentiary error is harmless if it did not
have a substantial inﬂuence on the verdict.” United States v.
Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2020), as amended (Sept. 8,
2020). The government bears the burden of proving that an
error was harmless. United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th
915, 929 (7th Cir. 2022).
   While the line between harmless and prejudicial error can
be diﬃcult to draw, these facts fall well on the harmless side.
The evidence of Medrano’s guilt was overwhelming. See
WILLIAM J. BAUER PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT §§ 5.09–5.10 (2020 ed.) (listing the ele-
ments of conspiracy). A conspiracy existed. The government
presented multiple sets of text messages between members of
the conspiracy and Medrano discussing drug traﬃcking.
Postal employees and inspectors testiﬁed to the existence of
the conspiracy and how Medrano and others used the post
oﬃce to further their conspiracy. And a co-conspirator,
Brandy Gregory, testiﬁed that she witnessed Medrano and
others on multiple occasions selling and purchasing drugs.
   Medrano was a member of the conspiracy. Postal employ-
ees and inspectors also testiﬁed to how Medrano recruited a
post oﬃce employee and utilized the post oﬃce to further his
conspiracy. Christina Johnson, the postal employee who
Medrano recruited for the conspiracy, testiﬁed that she gave
Medrano access to post oﬃce boxes for others to ship him
drugs and that Medrano asked her to track drug packages.
No. 22-3219                                                   9

Several law enforcement oﬃcers testiﬁed that they chased
Medrano as he evaded arrest and searched Medrano’s diﬀer-
ent motel rooms. The government presented evidence of
drugs, drug paraphernalia, and photos of drugs and drug
paraphernalia taken from Medrano’s motel rooms.
   In addition to Medrano’s acts and declarations, the acts
and declarations of co-conspirators inculpated him where
they were done in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy,
were done during the existence of the conspiracy, and were
reasonably foreseeable. United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d
1128, 1143 (7th Cir. 1978) For example, postal employees and
inspectors testiﬁed about how co-conspirators used the post
oﬃce to further their conspiracy. To corroborate that testi-
mony, the government presented postal service tracking re-
ports and receipts, as well as photos of drugs in postal boxes.
Such acts, although not done by Medrano, implicate him and
were used as evidence against him at trial.
                         *      *      *
    The disputed exhibit was one small piece of the substantial
physical, electronic, and testimonial evidence supporting a
conviction against Medrano on the drug count. Even assum-
ing the district court erred in admitting the exhibit, any error
was harmless. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.