Court Opinion

ID: 9389976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 16:07:52.146204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.834526
License: Public Domain

J-S07006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SALVADOR ROBERTS                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1284 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-45-CR-0000036-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 26, 2023

        Appellant, Salvador Roberts, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence

entered on December 20, 2021, after he pleaded guilty to Third-Degree

Murder and Robbery.1 Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Finding Appellant’s issues waived, we affirm.

        We derive the following factual and procedural history from the trial

court opinion and certified record. On December 11, 2017, police arrested

Appellant for his role as the getaway driver in the robbery and murder of a

pizza delivery person. The Commonwealth charged him with, inter alia,

Criminal Homicide and Robbery. On August 27, 2019, while Appellant was

incarcerated pending disposition of these charges, the trial court sentenced

him to 1 to 5 years’ incarceration for a prior, unrelated burglary conviction.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 3701(a)(1)(i).
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        On October 7, 2021, Appellant entered an open guilty plea in the instant

case to Third Degree Murder and Robbery. On December 20, 2021, the court

held a sentencing hearing where it imposed an aggregate 25-to-60-year

incarceration sentence, comprised of consecutive sentences of 20 to 40 years

for Third-Degree Murder and 5 to 20 years for Robbery. The court granted

Appellant a 625-day credit against his December 20, 2021 sentence, for the

period from December 11, 2017, when police arrested him on the instant

charges, to August 27, 2019, when the court sentenced him for the unrelated

burglary. The court ordered Appellant to serve the December 20, 2021

sentence concurrently with the August 27, 2019 sentence.

        On December 29, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence Motion for

Reconsideration of Sentence, in which he “request[ed that his time] credit be

reviewed to ensure he receives the full credit to which he was entitled.” Motion

for Reconsideration of Sentence, 12/29/21, at ¶ 5. He also “request[ed that

the court] consider amending his sentence” because he “believes, and

therefore avers, that a combined sentence of [20] rather than [25] years is

appropriate for his involvement in this case.” Id. ¶ 7-8.

        On April 11, 2022, the trial court denied the motion. Appellant timely

filed a Notice of Appeal and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        [1.] Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its discretion
        by giving [Appellant] an excessive total sentence of [25 to 60]
        years.

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       [2.] Whether the sentencing court erred and abused its discretion
       by only giving [Appellant] a time credit for a total of [625] days
       rather than a credit from the date of his arrest on the underlying
       charges[, an additional 845 days].

Appellant’s Br. at 5 (reordered for ease of analysis)

                                               A.

       In his first issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s exercise of

sentencing discretion. Although he acknowledges that the sentencing court

“did not exceed standard range sentences for either offense,” Appellant

construes his aggregate sentence as an “aggravated” one because it

“exceed[s] the mandatory maximum for a charge [of Third-Degree Murder]

standing alone.” Id. at 11-12. He argues that the sentencing court abused its

discretion because it did not give an adequate explanation on the record to

justify its imposition of an allegedly aggravated-range sentence. Id.2

       Challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence do not entitle an

appellant to review as of right. Rather, a challenge in this regard is properly

viewed as a petition for allowance of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b);

Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 522 A.2d 17, 18-19 (Pa. 1987). To invoke

our review, the defendant must have (1) filed a timely notice of appeal; (2)

preserved the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (3) included

in his or her brief a Rule 2119(f) statement; and (4) raise in the Rule 2119(f)

____________________________________________

2 Unfortunately, Appellant does not cite even once to the notes of testimony
in his brief, in violation of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),
(c). Our review of the record reveals that the sentencing court, aided by a
presentence investigation report, provided an extensive on-the-record
explanation for the sentence imposed. N.T. Sentencing, 12/20/21, at 54-65.

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statement a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the

Sentencing Code or sentencing norms. Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz,

64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa. Super. 2013). Where an appellant has failed to raise

the discretionary sentencing claim at the sentencing hearing or in a post-

sentence motion, we will find the issue waived. Commonwealth v. Griffin,

65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013). See also Commonwealth v. Mann,

820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003) (finding waiver where “Appellant failed

to raise the specific claim” in the trial court).

      In the present case, Appellant failed to preserve his discretionary

sentencing claim in the trial court. He did not argue in his post-sentence

motion that his sentence is excessive or that the court failed to place adequate

reasons for the sentence on the record. He likewise failed to raise any such

claim at sentencing. Consequently, this issue is waived.

                                         B.

      In his second issue, Appellant purports to argue that the court erred by

failing to award him an additional 845 days of time credit. Id. at 11. Appellant

does not, however, argue that he was entitled to any additional time credit.

Instead, he asserts that the court abused its sentencing discretion by failing

to order that his December 20, 2021 sentence begin retroactively as of August

27, 2019. Id. at 11-12. He alleges that the court had the power to do so

                                       -4-
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pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 705(b).3 Id. He concludes that “the imposition of a

concurrent sentence that does not run from [August 27, 2019] is hardly

concurrent at all.” Id. at 12.

       Unfortunately, Appellant did not raise this issue at sentencing or in a

post-sentence motion. He likewise failed to include it in his Rule 1925(b)

Statement or Statement of Questions Involved. As a result, the issue is

waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 1925(b)(4)(vii), 2116(a).4

                                               C.

       In summation, we conclude that Appellant failed to preserve his

discretionary sentencing claims for this Court’s review. Consequently, we

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 Rule 705(b) states that if a court orders a sentence to run concurrently with
another sentence, “the sentence shall commence from the date of imposition
unless otherwise ordered by the judge.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 705(b). Appellant cites
no legal authority to support his argument that Rule 705 would have permitted
the court to order the retroactive commencement of his sentence.

4 Moreover, even if he had properly preserved this issue, we would conclude
that it is meritless. Appellant seeks to receive an additional 845 days of time
credit for the period from April 27, 2019, to December 20, 2021, while he was
serving an incarceration sentence for the unrelated burglary conviction. It is
axiomatic, however, that a defendant is not entitled to credit against a
sentence for time served on another sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 367 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“A defendant shall be given
credit for any days spent in custody prior to the imposition of sentence, but
only if such commitment is on the offense for which sentence is imposed.”
(citation omitted)). See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/26/2023

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