Court Opinion

ID: 9793139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:43:28.408649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:40.610967
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
In the instant case the minuscule, almost nonexistent, “record” demonstrates only that a fourteen year old girl shoplifted some soft drinks and a package of doughnuts. Alleging that the child was within the purview of the Youth Rehabilitation *701Act, a petition was filed in the magistrate division of the district court. The mother of the child sought the appointment of an attorney at public expense to represent her in those proceedings. Although not demonstrated in the record, presumably a different attorney was appointed to represent the minor child. We know not what proceedings thereafter took place nor any disposition that the magistrate might have taken. The attorney appointed to represent the mother submitted a claim for his services (presumably to the county) which was denied by the then administrative district judge for that judicial district.
We are not told whether any hearing on that claim was held nor whether the district judge denied the claim on the basis that it was excessive, that the claimed services had not been rendered, or that the judge thought that since the attorney was a member of a legal aid service, such service should be rendered without compensation. Of these matters, the record is completely lacking.
Thereafter, as reflected by the record, the attorney filed a purported notice of appeal giving notice to the administrative judge and to the Board of County Commissioners of Gem County that he was taking an appeal from an order of the magistrate’s division to the Supreme Court. I am unable to discern how such an appeal could be taken directly from the magistrate’s division to this Court and am further confused as to how an attorney (or any other class of person who rendered a service or furnished material to a county) can prosecute a creditor’s claim under the guise of appealing a matter to which he is a non-party.
The attorney here may or may not have a cause of action against the county upon the denial of his creditor’s claim. If he brings such an action, he may recover or, depending upon the facts and circumstances revealed, his claim may be determined by a court to be unfounded in part or in whole.
In my judgment, the majority opinion becomes needlessly involved in the technical niceties of whether or not the judge who denied the claim for legal fees was acting in a “judicial proceeding” or whether legal aid attorneys, because they are salaried employees of a public body, are or are not entitled to fees. With all deference, in my judgment, those issues should be resolved in a proper proceeding brought by the person claiming to be the creditor against the person or body who it is claimed is the debtor.
Again, with all deference, I cannot agree that the authorities cited in the majority opinion are in point or material to the case at bar. Both Townsend and Hairston are cases wherein parties took an appeal from denial of attorney’s fees and the discussion of those cases relates to the allowance of such attorney’s fees. Rodriguez was the decision of a federal trial court allowing attorney’s fees to community legal services. As indicated above, it is my opinion that the question of whether public service attorneys are entitled to be awarded fees should be reserved following a proper action to collect those fees. My point is perhaps best exemplified by the Avan case cited by the majority opinion, wherein a direct action by way of writ of mandate was brought by the attorney against the court which denied the attorney’s fees.
It is enough to state at this point that an attorney has no authority to institute or maintain an appeal separate and apart from his client. Annot. 91 A.L.R.2d 618 (1963). There are exceptions to that rule, as indicated by those cases cited by the majority, under special circumstances wherein an attorney has, through his efforts, secured a sum of money and seeks a lien thereon or under special statutory provisions such as workmen’s compensation awards, as was the case in Rose v. Alaskan Village, supra. The only case squarely in point is State v. Lehirondelle, 15 Wash.App. 502, 550 P.2d 33 (1976), in which the propriety of a lawyer taking an appeal was neither raised nor discussed.
I would dismiss the attempted appeal and leave the attorney to pursue his creditor’s claim through the regular channels of litigation, wherein an adequate record may be developed.
SCOGGIN, J. Pro Tem., concurs.