Court Opinion

ID: 9754497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:39.810075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.158866
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, and in support thereof adopt the Commonwealth Court memorandum opinion filed in this case and authored by the Honorable James Gardner Colins.
The following is Judge Colins opinion:
No. 2659 C.D. 1984
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
May 13, 1985
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY COLINS, Judge.
The firm of Curran, Winning and Fioravanti, P.C., has applied for counsel fees, costs and expenses in connection with the representation of Carol Jones (petitioner) and the class of all owners, operators, and passengers of motor vehicles maintained and operated in Pennsylvania, and all pedestrians within Pennsylvania who brought suit against *549the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Insurance Department et al., (respondents) for their failure to establish a system for the funding of the Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund (CAT Fund).1
The “CAT Fund” was to become effective on October 1, 1984; however, as of September 7, 1984, the date petitioner filed a complaint and petition for special injunction, respondents had not established a system for the funding of the “CAT Fund”.
On September 7, 1984, our Court issued a special injunction ordering The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) to collect all fees necessary to implement the “CAT Fund” as a part of PennDOT’s Motor Vehicle Registration and Renewal Fee Collection Program. At this time, the question of payment of costs and counsel fees was deferred pending final outcome of the case.
On December 7, 1984, the class action was settled pursuant to an agreement entered into by petitioner and respondents. The Settlement Agreement provided for the identification of the entities to collect the “CAT Fund” charge, the method of collection, and the relationship of the “CAT Fund” collection system to the PennDOT registration system. As a result of the efforts of petitioner’s counsel, a system for the collection of the “CAT Fund” charge was created. Counsel for petitioner have spent 145.25 hours in connection with this action and are requesting a fee of One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour, plus costs and expenses. Respondents’ counsel are opposing the application for fees and costs contending that a rate of One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour is too high and *550that the efforts of counsel did not create a fund but that the fund was created by the Legislature.
As a result of respondents’ motion to compel discovery, this Court issued an order dated April 4, 1985, requiring petitioner’s counsel to produce redacted copies of any bills. Petitioner’s counsel produced a number of bills; however, on April 23, 1985, respondents filed a motion for sanctions due to the fact that petitioner’s counsel did not produce all bills in which a rate of One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour was charged.
On April 29, 1985, our Court held a hearing on this matter and heard arguments from both sides on whether petitioner’s counsel is entitled to fees of One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour plus costs to be extracted from the “CAT Fund”.2
The following factors as set forth in Pa.R.C.P. No. 1716 are to be considered by a reviewing court in determining the amount of counsel fees to be awarded:
(1) the time and effort reasonably expended by the attorney in the litigation;
(2) the quality of the services rendered;
(3) the results achieved and benefits conferred upon the class or upon the public;
(4) the magnitude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation; and
(5) whether the receipt of a fee was contingent on success.
In addition, existing case law must be considered to determine if counsel fees and costs should be awarded in the instant matter. Where the efforts of an attorney create a fund for the benefit of others, the attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee to be extracted from that fund. See Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 59 S.Ct. *551777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939); Estate of Tose, 482 Pa. 212, 393 A.2d 629 (1978).
It is clear from the pleadings in this matter that petitioner’s counsel created a fund that was not in existence prior to instituting the action. The suit was filed on September 7, 1984, and a fund was created within three months. Since the creation of the “CAT Fund” has a great salutary effect on the public, counsel is entitled to reasonable fees from the fund as a whole.
The rationale underlying the awarding of counsel fees from a fund created by an attorney for the benefit of others is to spread the costs of legal representation proportionately among those benefited by the suit. Otherwise, the persons who obtained the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its costs would be unjustly enriched at the successful litigant’s expense.
In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. of Philadelphia v. America Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir.1973), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the awarding of counsel fees from a fund created for the benefit of others under the equitable fund doctrine and stated:
There is, however, authority for the award of fees under the general equitable powers of the court (citations omitted). These equitable powers may, under the equitable fund doctrine, be used to compensate individuals whose actions in commencing, pursuing or settling litigation, even if taken solely in their own name and for their own interest, benefit a class of persons not participating in the litigation (citations omitted). Id. at 165.
It is axiomatic that the method of determining a fee for legal services provided on an hourly basis is to multiply the total number of hours expended by the reasonable hourly rate. The resulting figure is known as the “lodestar” fee, and a court can increase or decrease the lodestar fee in light of the contingencies involved and the quality of the work performed. See In Re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 499 (M.D.Pa.1979).
*552After carefully reviewing all of the pleadings and listening to arguments from both sides, we find that the 145.25 hours expended by petitioner’s counsel on this matter were reasonable and necessary to the conduct of this litigation. In addition, as the findings above indicate, petitioner’s counsel were able to negotiate a settlement efficiently and effectively due to the quality of work performed.3 Petitioner’s counsel substantially limited the time expended in an action of this complexity by being well-prepared, well-organized, and willing to settle the matter in a quick fashion for the best interests of the public.
With respect to the hourly rate charged by each attorney, this Court is of the view that the rate of One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour charged by Robert E.J. Curran, Esq., is in accordance with prevailing rates charged by attorneys with similar backgrounds, education, and experience practicing in the locality of the attorneys working for the petitioning firm; however, the rate charged by Joseph M. Fioravanti, Esq., shall be reduced from One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00) per hour to One Hundred Twenty-five Dollars ($125.00) per hour.
In determining whether the lodestar fee shall be increased by a requested multiplier of two, we must consider the following factors: (1) the magnitude, complexity, and novelty of the legal and factual issues involved; (2) absence of any prior governmental or similar action; (3) financial risk to petitioner’s counsel; (4) the result obtained by petitioner’s counsel for the class; (5) expertise of petitioner’s counsel in the subject matter of the suit; (6) achievement of a substantial benefit for the class with a minimum investment of time; (7) the quality of work submitted to this Court; and (8) the professional methods of counsel which substantially expedited the case. Municipal Authority of the Town of Bloomsburg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 527 F.Supp. 982 (M.D.Pa.1981).
*553The multiplier of two requested by petitioner’s counsel will be applied to the lodestar fee based on the contingent nature of the case, and the quality of the work performed and results obtained.
Petitioner’s counsel have also requested reimbursement for costs and expenses. Those expenses were reasonably necessary for the conduct of this litigation and are reasonable in amount. Thus, they will be awarded.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 1985, the firm of Curran, Winning and Fioravanti, P.C., is awarded the sum of Thirty-seven Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-seven Dollars, Fifty Cents ($37,887.50), as fees and Four Hundred Eighty-one Dollars, Seventy-five Cents ($481.75) as costs and expenses, for a total award of Thirty-eight Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-nine Dollars, Twenty-five Cents ($38,-369.25), to be paid from the Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund.
Costs for the April 29, 1985 hearing are to be assessed upon respondent.
/s/ James Gardner Colins JAMES GARDNER COLINS, JUDGE

. The “CAT Fund” was established pursuant to Sections 1761-1769 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, Act 11 of 1984, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1761-1769 and provides for funding for the payment of catastrophic loss benefits to seriously injured accident victims who incur medical expenses in excess of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00). Funding shall occur by levying an initial charge of Five Dollars ($5.00) upon all motor vehicles required to be registered. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department shall designate an insurance company or other party to collect the Five Dollar ($5.00) charge.

. On April 29, 1985, our Court also issued an order denying respondents’ Motion for Sanctions.

. Settlement occurred within three (3) months after suit was instituted.