Court Opinion

ID: 9831712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:18:52.073528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.286152
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In the original opinion filed in this cause, discussing the contention of plaintiff in error that- the act of Neilon in obscuring the memorandum on the back of the note was ratified by appellee when the suit on the note in its altered form was instituted, we said:
“If the memorandum had been a part of the note at the time of its alteration, there would be merit in this contention, but as it was no part of the instrument, its alteration was immaterial and the suit, instead of ratifying the unauthorized act of the agent, was a repudiation and rejection thereof.”
In plaintiff in error’s motion for rehearing, this proposition is criticized as follows:
“It is difficult to understand this proposition. Plaintiffs’ agent in effect canceled the credit indorsed on said note, and the plaintiffs instituí-, ed this suit on the note with the credit eliminated. If that was not a ratification of plaintiffs’ act in. obscuring the credit, then what was it? The authorities all hold that instituting, a suit on an altered note in its altered condition is a ratification and adoption of the alteration and defeats a recovery on the instrument either in its original or altered form.”
This criticism is justified because the language employed in the opinion does not accurately express our idea; Mr. Elliott, manager of the lumber company, was not apprised of the facts until they were developed on April 20, 1923, in the course of an Interview between him, Mr. McCurdy, Neilon, and Buxton, in Mr. McCurdy’s office. When thus apprised, he was for the first time called upon to either agree or disagree to the allowance of the credit. He refused to agree, and thus the memorandum never became a part 'of the note, and the idea we intended to express was that the institution of the suit on the note in its original form, instead of being, as contended by plaintiff in error, the ratification of the unauthorized act of an agent, was in fact evidence of an emphatic repudiation of the unauthorized attempt to impose nolens volens the Neilon account as a credit on the note. The opinion will be corrected to express this idea.
The suggestion is further made that the question of law involved, that is, whether the memorandum became a part of the note, is of sufficient importance' to the jurisprudence of the state to justify its certification to the Supreme Court for decision. To this we do. not agree. The question involved is not one of law, but of fact. We do not dissent from the propositions of law urged by plaintiff in error. We hold that under the facts the credit memorandum never became a part of the note because never agreed to by Elliott; hence its alteration was wholly immaterial and suit on the note ratified nothing, because there was nothing to ratify.
The oil company was indebted to the lumber company in the sum of $1,000.45 on open account, which was closed by the note prepared, executed, and delivered by McCur-dy to Neilon, on the back of which McCurdy indorsed the memorandum before delivery. McCurdy knew Neilon was not authorized to agree that his personal indebtedness to the oil company could be credited upon its indebtedness to the lumber company. He furthermore knew as a matter of law that Neilon could not act as agent for defendants in error In regard to this matter. By delivering the note to Neilon under the circumstances, Mc-Curdy made Neilon his agent to bring this matter to the attention of defendants in error, which in fact was never done. These .facts are undisputed; hence no question of law arises for- certification.
Having duly considered plaintiff in error’s motion for rehearing, we find no reason to disturb our' original holding, and the same is overruled.