Court Opinion

ID: 9795789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:38:59.743376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:45.079749
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, Judge,
dissenting:
{1 I dissent from today's Court opinion based upon its resolution of Long's claim regarding his right to present a closing argument, as well as the opinion's discussion of the legal defense of duress.
12 In Herring v. New York,1 the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a constitutional right to make a closing argument, even in a bench trial.2 The Court wrote, "There can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial." 3 The Court likewise recognized closing arguments as being critical to the "ultimate objective" of the criminal trial process:
The very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a factfinding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment.4
13 In light of Herring and its recognition of the critical importance of a defendant's right to present closing arguments, I dissent from today's holding that this constitutional *110right will be presumed waived if a defendant merely fails to object when a trial court begins to announce its judgment immediately after the close of evidence. While this right, like most constitutional rights, can certainly be waived, waiver should be found only where a defendant or his counsel actually announces a decision not to present closing argument. Waiver should be found only where the defendant affirmatively waives his right to present a closing argument, not merely from silence or inaction.5
{4 Furthermore, the Court's conclusory finding, at the conclusion of today's opinion, that "trial counsel's failure to preserve the right to closing argument was sound trial strategy" is not supported by the record in this case-from which it does not appear that the failure was even a "strategy," let alone a sound one. Nor is the finding supported by any argument or legal authority.
4 5 In addition, while I agree that counsel was not ineffective in this case for failing to raise the defense of duress, I strongly disagree with the majority's decision with respect to that defense. The Oklahoma legislature has set forth the defense of duress, exonerating defendants who commit crimes while involuntarily subject to the power of a superior.6 The Legislature has specifically provided that a person is entitled to assert duress as a defense if he commits a prohibited act because he has a reasonable belief that he, a spouse, or a child, is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from another.7 In Spunaugle v. State,8 a case of first impression, this Court examined the clear language of the statute, concluded that the Legislature meant what it said, and reaffirmed the principle that duress is a defense to malice murder. Today the majority ignores the letter and spirit of the statutes and overrules Spunaugle, because it finds any other result would be "repugnant to nearly universal standards of decency." This displays a contempt for our precedent and the legislative process with which I cannot agree.
T 6 Underlying the majority's decision is a belief that "duress is not a defense to taking the life of an innocent person." This belief is directly contradicted by the statutory language, which makes no exception for an "innocent" victim where the statutory requirements are met. In order to bolster this belief, the majority relies on dicta from Tully v. State.9 As we noted in Spunaugle, the discussion of duress in Tully focused solely on justification and did not take into account the explicit language of Oklahoma's statutes, which focus on the legal theory of excuse.10 Rather than acknowledge this, the majority treats Tully as binding precedent. This is simply not the case.
7 The majority's legal analysis appears to be driven not by principles of legal interpretation but by "moral" principles. In short, the majority simply believes that it is indecent for a murderer to claim he acted under duress. Whether or not that is true, it is not the question before us. Nothing has changed since Spunaugle that would suggest the Legislature intended a different interpretation of the duress statutes. This Court ought not amend or repeal a clear expression of Legislative intent because it does not agree with the outcome.

. 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 LEd.2d 593 (1975). The Herring holding was first raise on rehearing and is the reason this Court granted a rehearing in the case.

. Id. at 865, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (holding that denial of defendant's request to make closing argument, based upon New York statute making presentation of such arguments discretionary in bench trials, violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel). I do not understand the inclusion of Paragraph 7 in today's Court opinion, which is a holdover from the opinion originally issued in this case-before the significance of Herring was raised on rehearing. Whether the right to present closing argument in a bench trial exists under state law is a purely academic issue at this point, since Herring compels our recognition of this right under federal law.

. Id. at 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550.

. Id. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550.

. The majority opinion cites Moore v. State, 1987 OK CR 68, 736 P.2d 161, in support of its waiver holding. Moore is a capital case in which the defendant, at the conclusion of the State's second-stage closing argument, affirmatively stated that he wanted to waive closing argument. The trial court then warned the defendant that it still had discretion to allow the State a second closing argument. Nevertheless, the defendant again "stated that he wished to follow his counsel's advice and waive closing argument." Id. at 166 Hence the Moore case involved a defendant who twice explicitly waived his right to present a closing argument. It provides no support for the Court's current holding regarding implied waiver.

. 21 0.$.2001, §§155, 152(7).

. 21 0.9.2001,§156.

. 21 0.5.2001,§ 156.

. 1997 OK CR 47, 946 P.2d 246.

. Spunaugle, 946 P.2d at 250. The Oklahoma statutes focus on the actor and individual characteristics which may excuse his actions, rather than on the moral justification for the actions themselves.