Court Opinion

ID: 9810067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:54.411633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:21.029117
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MARQUEZ,
dissenting.
{41 I respectfully dissent. The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act ("UMDDA") expressly provides that "the receipt of the request" by the court and prosecutor triggers the prosecution's obligation to timely dispose of a prisoner's untried charges. § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. (2014). Despite this plain language establishing "receipt of the request" as the speedy trial clock trigger, and despite this court's case law "liberally construling]" the UMDDA to allow a prisoner's substantial compliance with the Act to secure its protections so long as the prosecution has "actual notice" of the prisoner's request, see People v. Trancoso, 776 P.2d 374, 380 (Colo.1989), the majority today imports a new "actual knowledge" requirement into the Act that cannot be squared with the plain language of the statute. Maj. op. 1 21.
142 Specifically, the majority concludes that even where a prisoner's pro-se written UMDDA requests are unmistakably clear and even where the court and the proseentor's office actually receive those requests, the prisoner still cannot claim the protections of the UMDDA unless and until he can also prove the prosecutor has "actual knowledge" of the requests sitting in the prosecutor's own case file. Id. at 114, 40. Indeed, rather than charge the prosecution with actual notice of the contents of its own files-as the "receipt" trigger in section 16-14-104(1) essentially requires-the majority now requires the prisoner to establish precisely when, following receipt, the prosecutor obtained "actual knowledge" of the prisoner's request. Id. at T21 (emphasis added) (remanding for determination of when the prosecution gained actual knowledge of McKim-my's requests). As a practical matter, the majority's new requirement unfairly burdens prisoners and effectively rewards the prose-ecution where it neglects to review its files or otherwise misplaces a prisoner's UMDDA request.
43 There is no question that the single-page, written requests in this case, which were properly addressed to the court and prosecution, substantially complied with the requirements of the UMDDA. In my view, the prosecution's undisputed receipt of such requests constitutes "actual notice" for the purpose of triggering a prisoner's speedy trial rights under our UMDDA case law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I.
44 The UMDDA provides that a person in the custody of the department of corrections may request a final disposition of any untried charges pending against him in Colorado. §§ 16-14-101 to -104, C.R.S. (2014). The Act gives prisoners a mechanism to insist on the speedy disposition of such untried charges, which otherwise can disrupt or preclude a prisoner's access to prison rehabilitation programs. People v. Higginbotham, 712 P.2d 998, 997 (Colo.1986); People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101, 105 (Colo.1983). When properly invoked, the UMDDA requires the court to dismiss the untried charges with prejudice if they are not brought to trial within the UMDDA's speedy trial period. § 16-14-104(1).
T 45 When interpreting the UMDDA, this court has held that a prisoner who fails to strictly comply with the Act's procedural requirements nonetheless sufficiently invokes his speedy trial rights if he substantially complies with its provisions and the prosecution has "actual notice" of the prisoner's request. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d at 106; accord People v. Campbell, 742 P.2d 302, 810 (Colo.1987).
1 46 Because no one disputes that McKim-my's requests "substantially complied" with the Act's requirements, the dispositive issue here is what constitutes "actual notice" to the prosecution of MeceKimmy's requests. The majority concludes that, for the purpose of substantial compliance under the UMDDA, "actual notice" necessarily means "actual knowledge." Maj. op. T21. The majority asserts that this court has never defined *345"actual notice" in the context of the UMDDA. Id. at 120. It then reasons that equating "actual notice" with "actual knowledge" serves the UMDDA's purpose of protecting a prisoner's constitutional right to a speedy trial because "logic dictates" that the prosecution can effectuate the Act's goals only if it has "actual knowledge" of a prisoner's request. Id. at 180. Applying its new "actual knowledge" requirement here, the majority concludes that the prosecution did not have "actual notice" of McKimmy's requests-not because the prosecution never received McKimmy's letters, but rather, because his requests apparently were "stuck in between . some computer printouts" in the prosecution's file and thus got "lost in the shuffle." Id. at 1 12.
47 Although the majority limits its new "actual knowledge" requirement to invocations of the UMDDA "in the context of the doctrine of substantial compliance," id. at T29; see also id. at M1 30, 34, it can point to no language in the Act that justifies this limitation. Nor is the majority's rationale for its new requirement logically limited to a substantial compliance analysis. In other words, if "logic dictates" that the prosecution can effectuate the Act's goals "only ... if it gains actual knowledge" of a prisoner's request, see id. at 180, then such logic necessarily applies to every request under the UMDDA-including those that strictly comply with the Act's requirements. Assuming the prosecution actually receives a prisoner's UMDDA request, the majority's logic cannot explain why the prosecution's "actual knowledge" of that request is necessary under a substantial compliance analysis (because the prisoner sent the request directly to the prosecution), yet would be irrelevant under a strict compliance analysis (had the prisoner instead sent the identical request to the prison superintendent). Thus, I fail to discern in the majority's logic any principled basis to conclude that, after today, the prosecution's mere "receipt of the request" ever suffices to trigger a prisoner's UMDDA speedy trial rights.
1 48 By defining "actual notice" as "actual knowledge," the majority effectively invents a new UMDDA requirement that exists nowhere in the statute and, in so doing, misreads Mascarenas and our subsequent case law applying its "substantial compliance" rule. This result is troubling not only because it contravenes the express language of the statute, but, in doing so, it effectively places the trigger of the prisoner's UMDDA speedy trial clock squarely in the hands of the prosecution. |
IL.
A.
1 49 I begin by looking to the language of the UMDDA. Section 16-14-102(1) requires a prisoner who seeks to invoke his UMDDA speedy trial rights to submit a request "in writing," "addressed to the court" in which the indictment, information, or criminal complaint is pending, "and to the prosecuting official" responsible for prosecuting it. The written request must also "set forth the place of confinement." Id. Section 16-14-108(1)(b) requires the prisoner's request to be "delivered to the superintendent where the prisoner is confined," who must then forward a copy of the request to the court and the prosecuting attorney.
1 50 Importantly, section 16-14-104(1) expressly provides that "receipt of the request" by the court and the prosecuting official triggers the speedy trial period, and if the charges are not tried within that period, the court loses jurisdiction and must dismiss the charges with prejudice:
Within one hundred eighty-two days1 after the receipt of the request by the court and the prosecuting official, ... the indictment, information, or criminal complaint shall be brought to trial.... If after such a request, the indictment, information, or erim-inal complaint is not brought to trial within that period, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor shall *346the untried indictment, information, or criminal complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall dismiss it with prejudice.
§ 16-14-104(1) (emphasis added). This language plainly tethers the speedy trial clock trigger to "receipt of the request" and not to the point at which, following receipt, the prosecuting official actually reviews the prisoner's request. Also notably absent from this statutory language is any requirement that the prisoner verbally reiterate his request in open court in order to invoke the UMDDA.
T51 Moreover, so long as the court and prosecution actually receive the request, nothing in section 16-14-104(1) expressly requires the prisoner's request to be received directly from the superintendent. In other words, a prisoner who addresses and mails his request directly to the court and the prosecuting attorney has, for all practical purposes, fulfilled the superintendent's most important statutory duty under section 16-14-108(1)(b) by sending the request to the entities with the power and responsibility to enforce his speedy trial rights. I recognize that strict compliance with the UMDDA is preferable. That said, the plain language of the statute evinces the General Assembly's intent to make "receipt of the request" sufficient to bind the court and the prosecutor to the UMDDA trial timeline.
B.
{52 In addition to the plain language of the statute, this court's case law confirms that receipt, and not "actual knowledge," is the requisite legal standard under the UMD-DA. Trancoso, 776 P.2d at 377 ("Receipt of these materials by the court and prosecutor . initiates [the] period within which the prisoner must be brought to trial, failing which the charge must be dismissed." (emphasis added) (citing Higinbotham, 712 P.2d at 9986)); Campbell, 742 P.2d at 303 (concluding that, where a prisoner was not brought to trial within the speedy trial period after receipt of his UMDDA request, his UMDDA rights were violated); Mascarenas, 666 P.2d at 105 (noting that the "receipt of the request" triggers the time period for the prosecution to "bring the untried matters to trial" (emphasis added)).
I 53 In Mascarenas, the prisoner sought to invoke his UMDDA rights by mailing written requests directly to the district courts in both El Paso and Weld Counties 666 P.2d at 105. The El Paso County District Court forwarded Mascarenas's request to the prosecution in that district and issued an order directing the prosecution to bring the defendant to trial. Id. By contrast, the clerk for Weld County District Court did not forward the request to the prosecuting official in that district. Id. at 106. Today, the majority suggests that Masearenas's first request (to the El Paso County District Court) was operative because the prosecution "gained knowledge" of it; in contrast, the second (to the Weld County District Court) was inoperative because the prosecution "never knew it even existed." Maj. op. 1 29.
154 However, a closer reading of Mas-carenas reveals that we tethered our analysis in that case to "receipt" rather than "actual knowledge." Specifically, this court conelud-ed that the prosecution in the El Paso case had "actual notice" of Mascarenas's attempt to invoke the Act because "[his] request was subsequently delivered to the El Paso County district attorney." Mascarenas, 666 P.2d at 106 (emphasis added). Nothing in our discussion hinted that actual notice to the district attorney in that case required more than mere "delivery" of the prisoner's request. And the Weld County prosecuting official was unaware of the request because "[ulnlike the El Paso County case, the request was not forwarded to the prosecuting official." Id. (emphasis added).
155 In short, the prosecution in the El Paso County case had "actual notice" of the request because it actually received the request; the prosecution in Weld County did not have actual notice because it did not receive the request. This view of Mascare-nas harmonizes its result with the plain language "receipt" standard of the UMDDA.
56 Our decision in Campbell, issued four years after Mascarenas, likewise equated "notice" with "receipt." 742 P.2d at 308. In that case, we observed that on July 19, 1984, *347the prisoner wrote a letter to the chief judge of the district court requesting that the court dismiss his charges based on a violation of the UMDDA. Id. We noted that "[the court received the letter on July 28, and a copy was received by the district attorney on that same day," yet the prosecution took no action to bring the matter to trial. Id. (emphasis added). The district court in that case ultimate ly dismissed the charges because the prosecution did not bring the prisoner to trial within 90 days 2 of "the receipt of his July 19, 1984, letter by the court and the district attorney...." Id. at 804.
157 In reviewing on appeal whether the prisoner's July 19, 1984 letter sufficiently invoked his rights under the UMDDA, we referred to our requirement in Mascarenas that the prosecution have "actual notice" of the prisoner's request. Id. at 310 (citing Mascarenas, 666 P.2d at 106). Crucially, we observed that actual notice hinges on receipt:
Although the defendant did not mail a copy of his request to the district attorney's office, the court provided the prosecutor with actual notice of the defendant's letter by mailing a copy to his office. The district attorney received the July 19, 1984, letter on July 28. This fulfilled the statutory purpose of giving notice to the prosecuting official....
Id. at 310 (emphasis added) (citing Mascare-mas, 666 P.2d at 106). This passage in Campbell confirms that the prosecution has "actual notice" when it receives the defendant's request.
58 Most recently, in Trancoso, we reaffirmed our view in Campbell that delivery and receipt are the touchstones of notice under the Act-not "actual knowledge." 776 P.2d at 374. In that case, the prisoner delivered his UMDDA request to a superintendent who failed to forward the request to the court and prosecution, as required by the UMDDA. Id. at 377, 380 (citing § 16-14-103). Importantly, we observed that, had the superintendent complied with his duties under section 16-14-1083 to forward the requests, the court and prosecution "would have received copies of Trancoso's request," and that such compliance "would have fulfilled the statutory purpose of giving notice to the court and the prosecuting official under the Uniform Act." Trancoso, 776 P.2d at 380 (citing Campbell, 742 P.2d at 310).
T 59 In short, I disagree with the majority that "we have never defined 'actual notice'" in this context,. See maj. op. 120. Indeed, our case law makes clear that this court requires only actual "receipt" to trigger the UMDDA speedy trial clock.
C.
160 I fail to see how the majority can logically restrict its "actual knowledge" requirement to a "substantial compliance" analysis. See id. at 1129-30, 34. If indeed "logic dictates that the prosecution can only effectuate the Act's goal of ensuring speedy trials if it gains actual knowledge of a defendant's UMDDA request," id. at 180, then such logic holds with respect to every UMD-DA request-even where a prisoner "strict, ly" complies with the Act by sending a proper request to the superintendent.
T 61 Further, the majority's holding today has troubling implications for prisoners who must now prove prosecutors' "actual knowledge" of their UMDDA requests. As a practical matter, I fail to grasp how a prisoner might prove "actual knowledge" beyond reiterating his request in open court-a requirement that appears nowhere in the statute. Even where a prosecutor admittedly receives a request, a prisoner's UMDDA speedy trial clock trigger now depends upon when the prosecutor gains "actual knowledge" of that request. Today's holding not only creates problems of proof for the prisoner, but raises new issues: Is "knowledge" mere "awareness" of the request, or something more? And who must have this knowledge? Is it sufficient that a staff member know of the request? The prosecuting attorney alone? Although the majority suggests that "prosecutors cannot bury their heads in the sand and prevent prisoners from invoking their UMDDA rights through willful ignorance," it nevertheless absolves the prosecution of its *348"inattention" in this case. Id. at 186. Indeed, the majority places no responsibility on the prosecution to be aware of the contents of its own files. Rather, it places the burden entirely on the prisoner to "ensure that the prosecution was aware of his requests" by "rais[ing] [them] in open court"3 and blames McKimmy in this case "[blecause he chose not to take such actions." Id. Today's holding effectively rewards prosecutors who ignore the contents of their case files or misplace a prisoner's request-a result that I simply cannot square with the language of the statute and this court's case law.
IIL
T62 McKimmy's pro-se written requests in this case clearly indicated his desire to invoke the UMDDA's protections. He addressed his letters to the court and the prosecutor, with "Request for Speedy Disposition" in the reference line of each letter. He identified his place of incarceration and case numbers. His single-page letters "formally request[ed] protection under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (CRS-16-14-102) in the above-named case number[s]." And critically, it is undisputed that the prosecution actually received these requests.
T63 However, rather than place any burden on the prosecution to be aware of the contents of its own files, the majority instead accuses McKimmy of "deception" for choosing to "actively conceal" his prior written requests because he failed to refer specifically to the UMDDA when he repeatedly raised his speedy trial rights in colloquies with the court. Id. at 188. Yet the prosecution's failure to read those requests-due to negligence, oversight, or simply because it misplaced them-should not be blamed on the prisoner.
{ 64 In my view, the UMDDA plainly tethers the speedy trial clock to the "receipt of the request" and nothing more. Here, the prosecution's undisputed receipt of McKim-my's requests constitutes "actual notice" under our UMDDA case law for the purpose of triggering McKimmy's speedy trial rights. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. As the majority notes, when McKimmy sought to invoke his rights under the UMDDA, the version of the Act then in effect established a 180-day speedy trial period, rather than the current 182-day period. See maj. op. 138 n.8 (citing § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. (2011); § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. (2014)).

. At the time of this case, the UMDDA provided for a 90-day speedy trial period. Compare § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. (1986), with § 16-14-104(1), C.R.S. (2014).

. The majority repeatedly insists that McKimmy failed to inform his own counsel of his UMDDA requests, see, eg., id. at I 4, yet the record before us is at best unclear on this point.