Court Opinion

ID: 9407838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 16:07:21.463765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.420308
License: Public Domain

J-S14010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    EMILY SCHUTZ                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1169 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 15, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0000898-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: July 10, 2023

        Emily Schutz appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Butler County Court of Common Pleas on June 15, 2022, following her

conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”) - controlled substance. On

appeal, Schutz challenges the admission of scientific testimony, the denial of

her post-sentence motion, and both the sufficiency and the weight of the

evidence underlying her conviction for DUI. After careful review, we affirm.

        The trial court accurately summarized the factual history from the trial

testimony as follows:

             At the trial, Corporal Michael Schmidt, a Pennsylvania State
        Trooper, testified about his encounter with [Schutz] in the early
        hours of May 17, 2020[,] starting around 12:30 in the morning.
        He was responding to an accident in Middlesex Township along
        Route 8 where both North and Southbound lanes were closed.
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     Vehicles were unable to travel in either direction of the four lane
     major thoroughfare. Both lanes of traffic were blocked with
     varying police and fire department vehicles with their respective
     emergency lights engaged. He, along with another law
     enforcement officer, were blocking the roadway one way with their
     vehicles and flares across the roadway in an effort to prevent
     traffic from entering the accident scene. When he encountered an
     oncoming vehicle, he would have them turn around and find an
     alternate route. At the time the Corporal came into contact with
     [Schutz], a medical helicopter was landing at the scene.

           Corporal Schmidt made a stop of [Schutz]s vehicle when he
     believed [Schutz] was attempting to go around the accident
     scene. [Schutz] was observed to be driving across the roadway
     cutting diagonal at a 45-degree angle aimed toward a parking lot
     where the Corporal believed would ultimately interfere with the
     helicopter landing. Corporal Schmidt stopped [Schutz]'s vehicle
     before it could enter the lot.

           Once stopped, he engaged [Schutz] and ultimately asked
     for her identification. During the initial encounter, he testified, "At
     that point I had asked her for her identification, which she
     provided me her driver's license. And during that initial encounter
     with her is when I determined that I could smell an odor of
     marijuana coming out of the vehicle."

            Corporal Schmidt also observed [Schutz] to have bloodshot
     eyes, heavy eyelids, and smaller than average pupils. Based on
     the Corporal's extensive training and experience with [DUIs], he
     instructed [Schutz] to exit her vehicle and submit to a litany of
     field sobriety tests.

            Corporal Schmidt, at the time of the trial, testified to making
     over 250 arrests related to [DUIs] in addition to being recognized
     by the Pennsylvania DUI Association as a Top Gun DUI Award
     winner for the past three years. The award is given to troopers
     with 50 or more DUI arrests. He has also taken many courses and
     trainings related to DUI detection during his career as a state
     trooper.

          Once [Schutz] was out of the vehicle, Corporal Schmidt
     guided her across the road to his vehicle to administer
     standardized field sobriety testing. In addition to his personal
     observations, he administered multiple tests that included the

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     Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test (HGN), Lack of Convergence test,
     the Walk and Turn test, One Leg Stand test, and the Modified
     Romberg Balance test.

            [Schutz] was not capable of properly executing the
     directions for the Walk and Turn test. There, [Schutz] did not take
     the proper amount of steps in both directions. In addition to that,
     [Schutz] was unable to perform the heel to toe steps on all of the
     steps taken. During the One Leg Stand test, [Schutz] was unable
     to stand on one leg without her foot stepping back onto the
     pavement and or using her arms to prevent her from swaying.

            Corporal Schmidt also testified to not solely relying on the
     HGN test alone to make his determination. Specifically, he stated,
     "That [HGN test] is an element of the totality of what I observed
     leading me down to make an arrest, yes. Not solely based on just
     that."

            At the conclusion of all the field sobriety testing, Corporal
     Schmidt made a determination, based on the totality of the
     circumstances. He stated, "My determination, based on the
     totality, from the time I first observed the vehicle until I'm at this
     point [post field sobriety testing], is that this individual is more
     than likely incapable of safe driving and impaired on a controlled
     substance."

            [Schutz] briefly testified at trial about having scoliosis.
     When asked how it affected her, she stated, "Back pain. It's
     crooked. So it makes me walk crooked. Do you want to see it?"
     The Court finds credible the Trooper's processes and procedures
     when performing field sobriety testing. Additionally, the Court
     does not find credible [Schutz]'s reasoning for failing to perform
     the field sobriety testing to a satisfactory level.

            Since Corporal Schmidt was at an active accident scene, he
     contacted additional troopers who were close in proximity to the
     scene to help assist with [Schutz] after the completion of the field
     sobriety tests. One of the troopers that arrived at the scene to
     assist was Trooper Francis Walters. In terms of how long it took
     the assistance to arrive on scene, Trooper Walters testified
     arriving, "Within minutes. We were in the area." Once he arrived
     on scene, he placed [Schutz] in his vehicle and transported her to
     Butler Memorial Hospital.

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              Trooper Walters also testified to his personal observations
        of [Schutz]. He testified, "While transporting her, I was able to
        smell the odor of marijuana and an alcoholic beverage."
        Additionally, when asked if [Schutz] was wearing a protective
        facemask, he answered, "I don't believe so." Once at the hospital,
        Officer Walters read the DL-26B to [Schutz] in which she declined
        to sign it along with refusing to submit to chemical testing.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/2022, at 1-4 (citations omitted). Schutz was

charged with two counts of DUI - general impairment and controlled

substance, along with three summary offenses for driving on the wrong side

of the road, careless driving, and for having an expired registration.

        On May 11, 2022, after a bench trial, the trial court found Schutz guilty

of one count of DUI - controlled substance and the summary offense of

operating a vehicle without a certificate of inspection. On June 15, 2022, the

trial   court   sentenced   Schutz    to    seventy-two   hours   to   six    months’

imprisonment, plus fines and court costs. The trial court denied Schutz’s post

sentence motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial, following a hearing.

This timely appeal followed.

        In her first issue on appeal, Schutz challenges the admission of Corporal

Schmidt’s testimony regarding the HGN and modified Romberg balance tests.

        Our standard of review for the admission of evidence is well-settled:

           The admission of evidence is solely within the discretion of
           the trial court, and a trial court's evidentiary rulings will be
           reversed on appeal only upon an abuse of that discretion.
           An abuse of discretion will not be found based on a mere
           error of judgment, but rather occurs where the court has
           reached a conclusion that overrides or misapplies the law,
           or where the judgment exercised is manifestly

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         unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or
         ill-will.

      To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
      be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining
      party. [A]n evidentiary error of the trial court will be deemed
      harmless on appeal where the appellate court is convinced,
      beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error could not have
      contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 479-480 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      At trial, Schutz objected to the testimony relating to her performance

on the field sobriety tests, including the HGN test, and modified Romberg

balance tests. See N.T., Non-Jury Trial, 5/11/22, at 16, 18, and 24. The trial

court overruled Schutz’s objections but limited Corporal Schmidt’s testimony

to his observations during his administration of the tests, preventing Corporal

Schmidt from drawing any conclusions from the tests.

      Schutz relies on our decision in Commonwealth v. Stringer, 678 A.2d

1200 (Pa. Super. 1996), to support her claim that without scientific

foundation, the Commonwealth cannot present any evidence on a defendant's

performance on the HGN test. See Appellant's Brief, at 18-20. In Stringer,

we stated, “Pennsylvania law requires that an adequate foundation be set

forth establishing that HGN testing is generally accepted in the scientific

community, including the medical science field of ophthalmology.” Stringer,

678 A.2d at 1203. As a result, the Stringer panel found the Commonwealth’s

presentation of testimony about the defendant’s performance on the HGN test

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was not harmless error where additional evidence of guilt beyond the HGN

test was lacking. See id.

      However, we note that the Stringer panel reached this conclusion by

distinguishing the facts before it from prior precedent. See id. at 1203.

Specifically, the Stringer panel distinguished Commonwealth v. Miller, 532

A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. 1987). In Miller, the Commonwealth did not rely solely

on the defendant’s performance of the HGN test to establish the defendant’s

intoxication. See id. at 1190. Therefore, even though the admission of the

HGN test results constituted error, the Miller panel found it to be harmless in

the face of the other, independent evidence of the defendant’s intoxication.

See id. (“We find that the arresting officers’ observations of appellant, as well

as appellant's performance on the other field sobriety tests, established a

sufficiently independent basis for the jury's verdict that appellant was guilty

of driving under the influence of alcohol.”).

      Here, Corporal Schmidt testified that he stopped Schutz’s vehicle when

he believed Schutz was attempting to go around an accident scene. During

the initial encounter, Corporal Schmidt testified that he determined that he

could smell an odor of marijuana coming out of the vehicle. Further, Corporal

Schmidt observed Schutz had bloodshot eyes, heavy eyelids, and smaller than

average pupils.

      Based on Corporal Schmidt’s extensive training and experience with

DUI's, he instructed Schutz to exit her vehicle and submit to a litany of field

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sobriety tests. In addition to his personal observations, Corporal Schmidt

administered not just the HGN test, but also the Lack of Convergence test,

the Walk and Turn test, One Leg Stand test, and the Modified Romberg

Balance test. Schutz was not capable of properly executing any of the tests.

      Corporal Schmidt testified that he made his ultimate determination

based on the totality of the circumstances and did not solely rely on the HGN

or Romberg test results. See N.T., Non-Jury Trial, 5/11/22, at 17, and 26-27.

Further, the trial court stated in its opinion, that it did not even consider the

HGN or modified Romberg balance test in reaching the verdict. See Trial Court

Opinion, 12/29/22, at 5.

      Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the full range of

testimonial evidence, any testimony regarding the HGN test was harmless

error. We find the observations by Corporal Schmidt of Schutz, and of Schutz’s

performance on the other field sobriety tests, established a sufficient

independent basis for the verdict.

      Additionally, based on the above information, we find Schutz’s argument

with regard to the modified Romberg balance test equally without merit.

Schutz cites to Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa. Super.

2017) for the proposition that a police officer's lay opinion testimony that the

defendant was under the influence of marijuana due to "eyelid tremors" was

inadmissible and that said admission of testimony was not harmless error.

However, once again, the Gause panel’s conclusion that admission of the

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evidence was not harmless was based on the lack of any other independent

evidence of the defendant’s intoxication. See id. at 540.

      Conversely, and as explained above, there was sufficient other evidence

presented here to support Schutz’s conviction for DUI, including other

testimonial evidence, and Corporal Schmidt’s observations of Schutz’s

performance on other non-scientific field sobriety tests. Schutz even admits

as much, when she acknowledges there are circumstances that distinguish

this case from Gause. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22-23. Specifically, unlike in

Gause, Corporal Schmidt did not conclude Schutz was impaired by marijuana

solely on the basis of the modified Romberg balance test. Rather, Corporal

Schmidt based his conclusions on the totality of the circumstances from the

start of his interaction with Schutz until the end of the interaction, including

his observed odor of marijuana coming from the car, and Schutz’s poor

performance on all of the tests.

      Accordingly, as we find any error based on testimony regarding these

tests is harmless, Schutz’s first issue is without merit.

      In her second issue on appeal, Schutz argues the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied her post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal

or a new trial. Notably, Schutz provides no individual argument for this issue.

Rather, Schutz directs us to the arguments provided for her first and third

issues, claiming this issue is addressed fully therein. Due to our disposition on

Schutz’s other issues, and Schutz’s failure to develop this issue, we do not

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reach this issue. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1175

(Pa. 1999) (noting that relief is unavailable based upon undeveloped claims

for which insufficient arguments are presented on appeal).

       In her third issue, Schutz challenges both the sufficiency and weight of

the evidence supporting her conviction for DUI. We are constrained to

conclude both challenges are waived.

       It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)

statement will be deemed waived for appellate review. See Commonwealth

v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). Further, an appellant’s concise

statement must identify the errors with sufficient specificity for the trial court

to identify and address the issues the appellant wishes to raise on appeal. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely

identify each error that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to

identify the issue to be raised for the judge”). A Rule 1925(b) concise

statement that is too vague can result in waiver of issues on appeal. See

Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“a

[c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the

issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no [c]oncise [s]tatement

at all”).

       If [an appellant] wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was
       insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the
       element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient.
       This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal.
       [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly

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       unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on
       appeal].

Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). Further, waiver applies even where the trial court addresses the

issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and where the Commonwealth does not

object to the defective Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“The Commonwealth's

failure and the presence of a trial court opinion are of no moment to our

analysis because we apply Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) in a predictable, uniform fashion,

not in a selective manner dependent on an appellee's argument or a trial

court's choice to address an unpreserved claim.”) (citations omitted).

       Here, Schutz’s Rule 1925(b) statement simply includes a blanket

statement challenging whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty

verdict for DUI - controlled substance. See Appellant's 1925(b) Statement,

10/20/2022. The statement fails to “specify the element or elements upon

which the evidence was insufficient” to support Schutz’s conviction. As a

result, we must conclude Schutz’s sufficiency of the evidence claim is waived

on appeal. See Williams, 959 A.2d at 1257-1258.1

____________________________________________

1 Even if Schutz had properly preserved this issue, we would find it would
merit no relief. Schutz challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish that she was impaired. See Appellant’s Brief at 26-27. We conclude
that Trooper Schmidt’s testimony, set forth above, was sufficient to establish
that Schutz was impaired.

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      Further, a review of the record reveals Schutz did not properly preserve

a weight challenge before the trial court.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A) requires a challenge to

the weight of the evidence to be raised with the trial court in a motion for a

new trial that is presented “(1) orally, on the record, at any time before

sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a

post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “Failure to properly preserve the

claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its

opinion.” Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

      In her post-sentence motion, Schutz conflated not only the distinct

issues of sufficiency and weight of the evidence, but also conflated the distinct

requests for judgment of acquittal versus a new trial.

      While Schutz requested either of the above avenues of relief in her post-

sentence motion, she did so under a section simply titled “Motion for Judgment

of Acquittal”, a remedy applicable to a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence only. Compare Pa.R.Crim.P. 607, (specifying that the remedy for a

challenge to the weight of the evidence is a new trial) with Pa.R.Crim.P. 606,

(specifying that the remedy for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

is a judgment of acquittal). Despite Schutz’s inclusion of general language

referencing the weight of the evidence, Schutz proceeded to present an

argument regarding only the sufficiency of the evidence in the motion, as well

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as in a memorandum of law requested by the trial court. Substantively,

Schutz’s argument in post-sentence proceedings was against the sufficiency

of the evidence, and the trial court treated it as such. See Memorandum

Opinion, 9/13/22. As a result, we have no ruling on the weight of the evidence

to review. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (Pa. 2008)

(“an appellate court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion

based upon a review of the record; its role is not to consider the underlying

question in the first instance.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the weight of

the evidence was not properly preserved. Therefore, we conclude the weight

of the evidence claim is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); Lofton, 57 A.3d at

1273.

        As we find Schutz’s claims are either waived or without merit, we affirm

the judgment of sentence.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2023

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