Court Opinion

ID: 9467845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:57:53.547467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:33.361643
License: Public Domain

LIVELY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Judge Brown’s opinion recognizes that a state may place the burden of proving an affirmative defense upon a defendant so long as it does not require the defendant to prove an essential element of the crime. This is the holding of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.CL 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). However, the opinion of Judge Brown appears to treat O.R.C. § 2901.05(A),1 *in which the legislature reduced the burden on a criminal defendant relying upon the affirmative defense of self-defense, as the equivalent of making the absence of self-defense an element of the crime of felonious assault. Thus the opinion holds that the State of Ohio violated Isaac’s due process rights by permitting his conviction under instructions which placed upon him the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence matters as to which it had, by statute, assumed the burden of proof.
In State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 103, 351 N.E.2d 88 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court construed O.R.C. § 2901.05(A) and specifically declined to consider constitutional arguments based on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). The syllabus in Robinson, which contains the holding of the court under Ohio practice, states:
In a criminal case involving the affirmative defense of self-defense, the defendant has only the burden of going forward with evidence of a nature and quality sufficient to raise that defense, and does not have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence. (R.C. 2901.05[A] construed.)
I do not read O.R.C. § 2901.05(A) and the Robinson holding as placing on the state a burden which is the equivalent of its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a charged offense. The statute and decision merely reflect the state’s determination that a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense may be based on “evidence of a nature and quality sufficient to raise that defense.” Robinson, supra. They eliminate the former requirement that self-defense be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In reducing the quantum of proof required to permit an acquittal on grounds of self-defense, the *1139state did not make a determination that absence of the facts necessary to sustain a plea of self-defense “must be either proved or presumed.” Patterson, supra, 432 U.S. at 215, 97 S.Ct. at 2329.
I base this interpretation of Ohio’s action upon my understanding of the nature of the defense of self-defense. In Patterson, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a type of affirmative defense which does not seek to negative any facts which the state is required to prove in order to convict; that is, it does not put into issue any of the elements of the offense. Instead, such an affirmative defense constitutes “a separate issue.” 432 U.S. at 207, 97 S.Ct. at 2325. This is clearly true of self-defense under Ohio law.
In State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 294 N.E.2d 888 (1973), the Ohio court recognized that all affirmative defenses to criminal charges are not the same. Some, such as accident or alibi, deny the existence of one or more elements of an offense. Affirmative defenses such as these put in issue an element of the charge and have no effect on the burden of proof. The burden is on the state to prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt whether the issue is joined by a plea of not guilty or by reliance on an affirmative defense of the type which controverts the existence of a particular element. To require a defendant to prove an affirmative defense of this type would be a violation of due process.
In Poole the Supreme Court of Ohio also defined self-defense under Ohio law. It stated that the defense of self-defense admits the existence of the elements of an offense but claims an independent ground for escaping conviction. It is in the nature of a civil plea of confession and avoidance— it admits the facts claimed by the prosecution to establish an offense but relies on the existence of a separate set of facts or circumstances which the law recognizes as an excuse. When established, this excuse exempts the defendant from liability. As the Supreme Court in Patterson recognized, it does not violate due process to require the defendant to prove the existence of these facts or circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury does not reach a defense of self-defense until it finds that all elements of an offense have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus there is no impermissible shifting of the state’s burden.
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977), does not require us to reverse the district court. In Hankerson the state court construed the plea of self-defense as putting in issue an element of the offense of murder— the element of unlawfulness. For a trial court to require a defendant to prove self-defense, thus defined, by a preponderance of the evidence, was clearly a violation of the rule laid down in Mullaney v. Wilbur. Since the Ohio Supreme Court has defined self-defense is just the opposite way in Poole — as not controverting an element of the charge — Hankerson does not control this Ohio habeas case. The jury charge at Isaac’s trial did not shift the burden of proof as to any element of the offense, and thus did not violate the Winship-Mullaney rule. All that occurred was that a state court failed to follow a state procedural statute as it was subsequently construed by the state supreme court. No constitutional error occurred at Isaac’s trial, in my opinion.
Nor do I perceive a constitutional violation in the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision to limit the benefit of a retroactive application of its construction of the Ohio statute to those persons who objected to an erroneous instruction at trial. Though the Ohio court interpreted O.R.C. § 2901.05(A) in such a way as to make the instruction at Isaac’s trial on the burden of proving the affirmative defense erroneous, the Constitution of the United States did not require such a construction. I believe it was within the authority of the court which construed the statute to determine the extent of its retroactive application.2 The state did not vio*1140late Isaac’s due process rights by requiring him to abide by a longstanding state rule of practice in order to obtain appellate review. Shortly before the Ohio Supreme Court determined in State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977), to limit retroactive application of its Robinson decision to those defendants who had objected to an erroneous instruction, the Supreme Court appeared to invite such treatment by state courts in dealing with constitutional errors.3 If a state has this option in dealing with a constitutional requirement, surely it is not a violation of due process to so limit retroactive benefit of a decision which merely construes a state procedural statute.
The Supreme Court reminded us in Patterson of considerations which should guide federal courts in deciding habeas corpus cases involving the administration by states of their own criminal justice systems:
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government, Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 [74 S.Ct. 381, 384, 98 L.Ed. 561] (1954) (plurality opinion), and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is normally “within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion,” and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 [78 S.Ct. 1332, 1340, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460] (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 [72 S.Ct. 1002, 1007, 96 L.Ed. 1302] (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 [54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674] (1934).
432 U.S. at 201-02, 97 S.Ct. at 2322.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
ENGEL, Circuit Judge, joins in the dissent.

. Ohio Revised Code § 2901.05(A), effective January 1, 1974, provided:
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the accused.

. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the Supreme Court held that the decision whether to apply a new constitutional holding retroactively is largely *1140one of policy. If this is so with respect to constitutional holdings, it cannot be argued that a stricter standard applies where a state court issues a new statutory interpretation.

. Humphries was decided on July 20, 1977. The opinion in Hankerson v. North Carolina, issued June 17, 1977, contained the following footnote:
8. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the impact on the administration of justice in those States that utilize the sort of burden-shifting presumptions involved in this case will be as devastating as respondent asserts. If the validity of such burden-shifting presumptions were as well settled in the States that have them as respondent asserts, then it is unlikely that prior to Mullaney many defense lawyers made appropriate objections to jury instructions incorporating those presumptions. Petitioner made none here. The North Carolina Supreme Court passed on the validity of the instructions anyway. The States, if they wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error. See, e. g., Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 30.