Court Opinion

ID: 9791891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:11.668998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.261793
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that, after the FED, defendants only had a right to the property in its removed state and, therefore, the court’s instruction limiting defendants’ damages in that fashion was correct. The majority’s analysis permits plaintiff to profit unfairly from her wrongful act and I, therefore, dissent.
Generally, the measure of damages in an action for conversion is the fair market value of the property at the time and place of conversion. Hall v. Work, 223 Or 347, 357, 354 P2d 837 (1960). There has been much debate and uncertainty in conversion cases about whether the measure of damages is the fair market value of the property “in place” or “in a removed state.” The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that in determining the proper measure of damages in conversion cases, it may be necessary, in order to prohibit a wrongdoer from profiting from the wrongful act, to consider what might be right for the injured party to receive, as well as what is just for the other party to pay. See Atlas Hotel Supply v. Baney, 273 Or 731, 741-42, 543 P2d 289 (1975). This is such a case.
In restricting defendants’ damages to the value of the equipment as if had been removed, the majority focuses only *114on the nature of defendants’ right in the equipment. Had plaintiff actually severed the equipment from the building, the majority’s analysis might be correct. However, that is not what happened. Instead, plaintiff converted the property by retaining it in place and subsequently leasing it in place to another tenant. After plaintiffs conversion of the equipment, the nature of defendants’ right in the equipment was simply one fact for the jury to consider in determining fair market value.
There is evidence that the equipment plaintiff converted had a much greater value in place than if removed.1 Plaintiff was part of the market of potential purchasers of the equipment in place at the time when she converted the equipment. Restricting the measure of damages to the value of the equipment as if removed allows plaintiff the potential to profit from her wrongful act. On the other hand, a jury instruction in accordance with the general rule of fair market value at the time and place of conversion would have permitted the jury to determine whether the fair market value was the in place value that defendant contended plaintiff had taken advantage of, or the value as if removed as plaintiff contended.
I would hold that the instruction given by the trial court limiting defendants’ damages to the value of the equipment as if removed was erroneous and that defendants are entitled to a new trial on their damages for plaintiffs conversion of the equipment.
Joseph, C. J., and Richardson and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.

 Plaintiffs expert, who valued the equipment “in a removed state” at $5,100, also testified that the cost of purchasing and installing new equipment was $125,000. In June, 1988, First Western had offered, in connection with the proposed lease assignment, to pay defendants $72,500 for the equipment.