Court Opinion

ID: 2964845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:03.756649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.476885
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2002
                                   UNITED STATES,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                  ANTHONY J. RIZZO,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                             Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            James H. Budreau for appellant.
            John M. Griffin
                          , Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 
                                                                       Donald
       K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee.
                                ____________________
                                   August 11, 1997
                                ____________________

                      STAHL, 
                            Circuit Judge
                                         . Defendant-appellant Anthony J.
            Rizzo appeals the thirty-seven month sentence that the district
            court imposed upon him after he pleaded guilty to several
            counts involving possessing, negotiating, and uttering
            counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 371, 513.
            Finding no merit to Rizzo's arguments, we affirm. 
                                        Facts
                      We consider the facts as set forth in "the
            presentence report, the sentencing transcript[,] and various
            other materials before the district court."  United States v.
            Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 485 (1st Cir. 1996).
                      The counterfeit scheme in which Rizzo was involved
            was designed to operate as follows: Rizzo supplied counterfeit
            checks to Ronald A. Moore, who forwarded them to Joseph
            Savarese. The checks were made payable to Savarese's business,
            Thermal Shield of New England ("Thermal Shield"). Savarese was
            to deposit the counterfeit checks in his business' bank
            accounts and then withdraw the funds after the checks had
            cleared. Rizzo, Moore, and Savarese were to share in the
            illegal proceeds from the counterfeit checks. 
                      During the course of the scheme in 1992, Rizzo
            provided Savarese with five checks that were fraudulent
            reproductions of actual corporate checks. Moore operated as
            the middleman between Rizzo and Savarese for the first three
            checks; Rizzo dealt directly with Savarese for the final two
                                         -2-
                                          2

            checks. The companies whose checks had been counterfeited
            neither issued these checks nor authorized the disbursement of
            any funds to Thermal Shield.
                      In April 1992, Rizzo, Moore, and Savarese conducted
            their first illegal transaction. Moore gave Savarese a
            $160,00.00 counterfeit check that Rizzo had provided him
            listing Thermal Shield as payee and Hasbro, Inc. as payor.
            Savarese then deposited the counterfeit check into the Thermal
            Shield account at the Winthrop, Massachusetts branch of New
            World Bank and delivered the deposit slip to Moore. After the
            check cleared, Savarese withdrew the $160,000.00 proceeds from
            the check. There being little honor among the dishonest, it
            was not until Moore made threatening statements to Savarese on
            several occasions that he provided Moore with approximately
            $40,000.00 of the illicit proceeds to be shared with Rizzo as
            their portion of the illegal booty.
                      Prior to the Hasbro check transaction, for reasons
            not entirely clear in the record, Savarese had contacted agents
            of the Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI") concerning the
            counterfeit check scheme. The FBI agents instructed Savarese
            that under no circumstances was he to become involved with the
            Hasbro check. Savarese did not follow these instructions, and
            the FBI agents subsequently discovered Savarese's participation
            in negotiating the first counterfeit check. Following the
            Hasbro check transaction, Savarese began cooperating with the
                                         -3-

            FBI in connection with the Bureau's investigation of the
            counterfeit check scheme. During this time, the FBI, with the
            knowledge of Savarese and the assistance of security officials
            at the Bank of Boston, established a "shell" account in the
            name of Thermal Shield at the Bank of Boston.
                      Emboldened by their success with the Hasbro check,
            Rizzo, Moore, and Savarese agreed to negotiate additional
            counterfeit checks drawn on unsuspecting corporations. On June
            2, 1992, Moore gave Savarese two counterfeit checks from Rizzo;
            one in the amount of $47,750.00 naming New Wave Transport
            (U.S.A.) as payor and one in the amount of $47,785.00 naming
            The American Experience West Corp. as payor. Savarese
            deposited the checks in the Thermal Shield account at the Bank
            of Boston and delivered the deposit slip to Moore. On June 9,
            1992, upon Moore's urging, Savarese visited the Bank of Boston
            in an effort to withdraw the funds from the two counterfeit
            checks. By previous arrangement between the FBI and the Bank
            of Boston, the teller furnished Savarese with a letter stating
            that his account was closed.
                      On July 1, 1992, Savarese met directly with Rizzo.
            During one conversation, Rizzo told Savarese that they would
            "do two more." Several days later, Rizzo gave Savarese two new
            counterfeit checks, one in the amount of $9300.00 naming the
            Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. as payor and one
                                         -4-
                                          4

            in the amount of $9,275.00 naming Waldbaum, Inc. as payor. The
            conspirators never negotiated either of these two checks.
                                Procedural Background
                      On December 14, 1995, a federal grand jury returned
            a three-count superseding indictment alleging that Rizzo
            engaged in a counterfeit check scheme. The indictment stated
            that Rizzo illegally conspired with co-defendant Ronald A.
            Moore and others to obtain cash through the negotiation of
            counterfeit corporate securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S
            371. The indictment further alleged two counts of uttering and
            possessing counterfeited securities of a corporation, in
            contravention of 18 U.S.C. S 513.
                      On May 10, 1996, Rizzo entered a plea of guilty to
            all three counts. Following Rizzo's plea, the United States
            Probation Officer prepared a Presentence Report, which
            recommended an adjusted offense level of sixteen for Rizzo's
            participation in the counterfeit check scheme. The base
            offense level under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 was six and the Report
            suggested several enhancements. First, the Report recommended
            an eight-level increase because the intended loss from the
            scheme exceeded $200,000.00.  See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(I).
            The Presentence Report calculated the amount of loss under
                                
            1.  On December 14, 1993, Savarese was convicted and sentenced
            to sixty-three months imprisonment. Savarese's conviction and
            sentence reflected his involvement in the negotiation of the
            Hasbro check. 
                                         -5-
                                          5

            U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 by using the actual loss of $160,000.00 from
            the Hasbro check and adding the intended loss of $113,950.00,
            representing the total of the four other checks involved in the
            scheme. The next suggested enhancement entailed a two-level
            increase, which reflected the fact that the offense involved
            more than minimal planning.   See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).
            Finally, the Presentence Report recommended a three-level
            increase because Rizzo committed the offense while awaiting
            sentencing on a 1992 federal conviction. 
                                                    See U.S.S.G. S 2J1.7.
            The Presentence Report recommended reducing the resulting
            offense level of nineteen to sixteen because Rizzo demonstrated
            acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1(a),(b)(2).
                      The Presentence Report computed Rizzo's criminal
            history category as a IV. This computation included Rizzo's
            1992 federal conviction for negotiating counterfeit checks and
            using stolen credit cards and false identification, for which
            he had been sentenced to thirty-three months' imprisonment on
            September 17, 1992. Rizzo completed the sentence on February
            3, 1995, at which time he began a period of supervised release.
            Rizzo's criminal history computation also reflected a 1989
            conviction in Charlestown District Court for possession of a
            firearm without proper identification.
                                         -6-
                                          6

                      Rizzo filed numerous objections to the Presentence
            Report. Of importance for purposes of this appeal,     Rizzo
            argued for a downward departure, asserting that his case fell
            outside the heartland of the Guidelines because he was unable
            to request concurrent federal sentences due to the fact that
            the thirty-three month sentence imposed in September 1992 had
            been discharged by the time he was indicted in this case. In
            support of this assertion, Rizzo advanced two arguments:
            first, he contended that the government purposefully delayed
            the indictment in the instant case until after he completed his
            thirty-three month sentence for his 1992 conviction in order to
            circumvent U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c); second, he claimed that the
            government was aware of the instant counterfeit check offenses
            when he was sentenced in September 1992 for his prior crimes,
            but improperly failed to inform the district court of the new
            offenses at the 1992 sentencing so that the sentencing judge
            could consider them as relevant conduct. According to Rizzo,
            if the government properly had informed the court of the
            relevant conduct involving this case, the court then "would
            have combined the two cases." If the court had combined the
            two cases, this process would have "result[ed] in a level 20
                                
            2.  Rizzo lodged a total of nine objections to the Presentence
            Report. We discuss only those arguments which bear upon the
            subject matter of this appeal.
                                         -7-
                                          7

            for the combined cases." A level twenty carries a sentencing
            range of thirty-seven to forty-six months, which is at least
            twenty-four and potentially thirty-three months shorter than
            the total of seventy months Rizzo received on the two separate
            indictments.
                      Also of importance for purposes of this appeal, Rizzo
            insisted that he should not have been subject to an eight-level
            increase reflecting the intended loss. According to Rizzo, the
            $273,950.00 of counterfeit checks involved in the scheme were
            "generated through a government sting operation," and, thus,
            "no loss was capable of occurring as a matter of law."
                      On July 19, 1996, following an hour-long sentencing
            hearing at which Rizzo voiced his objections to the Presentence
            Report, the district court (Gorton, J.) accepted the
            recommendations contained in the Report and declined to depart
            downward from the suggested adjusted offense level of sixteen.
            The district court sentenced Rizzo to thirty-seven months'
            imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Thirty-
            three months of the imprisonment term were to run concurrently
                                
            3.  Given our disposition of this appeal, we need not recite
            the process Rizzo set forth to arrive at a total offense level
            of twenty.
            4.  An offense level of sixteen permits the sentencing judge to
            sentence the defendant to a period of incarceration ranging
            from thirty-three months to forty-one months. The sentence
            that Judge Gorton imposed in this case (thirty-seven months)
            thus falls precisely in the middle of the possible
            incarceration terms Rizzo faced at sentencing.
                                         -8-
                                          8

            on counts one, two, and three, and four months of the term were
            to run consecutively, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3147.     The
            district court also ordered Rizzo to pay $12,500 in
            restitution.
                                 Standard of Review
                      "[O]ur review of the legal conclusions and factual
            determinations underlying the district court's departure
            decision [is] . . . conducted under a unitary abuse-of-
            discretion standard." United States
                                                v. 
                                                   Cali, 87 F.3d 571, 580
            (1st Cir. 1996). "Abuse of discretion review necessarily
            'includes review to determine that the [district court's
            exercise of] discretion was not guided by erroneous legal
            conclusions.'" Id. (quoting 
                                        Koon v. 
                                                United States
                                                             , 116 S. Ct.
            2035, 2045 (1996)). When the issue is whether or not the
            district court believed it had authority to depart, we have
            held that "[w]hat the district court thought was the scope of
            its authority [to depart from the guidelines] is perhaps a
            question of fact, but it is one that we must answer ourselves,
            by reviewing the sentencing transcript. Whether the district
            court's belief was mistaken is plainly a legal question that we
                                
            5.  18 U.S.C. S 3147 concerns "person[s] convicted of an
            offense committed while released pursuant to this chapter," and
            provides that "[a] term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to
            this section shall be consecutive to any other sentence of
            imprisonment." As noted above, at the time Rizzo committed the
            crimes underlying this appeal, he was on release awaiting
            sentencing for his 1992 conviction. 
                                         -9-
                                          9

            review de novo."  United States v. Saldana, 109 F.3d 100, 103
            (1st Cir. 1997).
                      "Appellate review of a district court's application
            of the Guidelines is a two-part process. We first determine
            the applicability of the guideline to a particular case    de
            novo. After determining the guideline's scope and meaning, we
            review the district court's factual determinations for clear
            error, 'giv[ing] due deference to the district court's
            application of the guidelines to the facts.'" 
                                                         Cali, 87 F.3d at
            575 (internal citations omitted) (quoting   United 
                                                               States v.
            Joyce, 70 F.3d 679, 681 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
            Ct. 1556 (1996)).
                                     Discussion
                      On appeal, Rizzo advances two arguments that he
            raised both in his objections to the Presentence Report and
            during his sentencing hearing. First, he contends that the
            district court erred when it denied his request for a downward
            departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0
                                                  and U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c)
                                
            6.  U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 provides in pertinent part: "Under 18
            U.S.C. S 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence
            outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if
            the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
            circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken
            into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
            the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
            that described.'"
            7.  U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c) states: "(Policy Statement) In any
            other case, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposed
            to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively
            to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a
                                        -10-
                                         10

            because "the record in the instant case fails to reveal whether
            the court understood that the present case fell outside of the
            guideline's heartland and that it had the discretion to depart
            downward." Second, Rizzo insists that the district court
            arrived at an incorrect adjusted offense level because it
            misapplied U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1     in calculating the loss
            attributable to him. We address Rizzo's arguments in turn.
            A.  Downward Departure
                      As we previously have stated, "a criminal defendant
            cannot ground an appeal on the sentencing court's discretionary
            decision not to depart below the GSR. . . . [A]ppellate
            jurisdiction[, however,] may attach if it appears that the
            failure to depart stemmed from the sentencing court's mistaken
            impression that it lacked the legal authority to deviate from
                                
            reasonable punishment of the instant offense." Rizzo bases
            much of his argument on a snippet of commentary to this section
            stating "[d]eparture would be warranted when independent
            prosecutions produce anomalous results that circumvent or
            defeat the intent of the guidelines." This commentary,
            however, was deleted from the Guidelines in 1989. Because
            Rizzo was sentenced in 1996, the November 1995 Guidelines apply
            to this case. See 
                              United States
                                            v. 
                                              DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1254
            n.26 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.  denied, 117 S. Ct. 1109 (1997);
            United 
                   States v. Springer, 28 F.3d 236, 237 (1st Cir. 1994).
            Moreover, there is no 
                                 ex 
                                    post 
                                         facto problem because S 5G1.3(c)
            did not change after Rizzo committed the offenses underlying
            this appeal. See 
                             United States
                                           v. 
                                             Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 66 n.1
            (1st Cir. 1991).
            8.  U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1) concerns increases to the base
            offense level of six applicable to offenses involving fraud or
            deceit and necessitates increases to this base offense level
            depending on the amount of loss resulting from the fraud or
            deceit. 
                                        -11-
                                         11

            the guideline range."  United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462,
            473 (1st Cir. 1994). Rizzo asserts both that the district
            court believed that it lacked the legal authority to depart and
            that the court's belief was mistaken. The record reveals
            little to buttress his assertion that the district court
            believed it lacked authority to depart downward. To support
            his assertion that the district court was mistaken, Rizzo
            contends that a court may depart downward pursuant to U.S.S.G.
            S 5G1.3(c) and U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 when the government delays an
            indictment until after a defendant completes a previous federal
            sentence or when the government "had full knowledge of the
            facts and circumstances related to the instant case prior to
            the sentencing in that previous case" but failed to apprise the
            court of such facts and circumstances.
                                
            9.  Specifically, Rizzo points to the following question that
            the district court asked during the sentencing hearing as
            evidence that the court believed it lacked authority to depart:
            "Do you have any law, statutory or otherwise in this regard,
            that requires the government to call such relevant conduct to
            the attention of the sentencing court?" Rizzo's counsel then
            directed the court to a section of the commentary to U.S.S.G.
            S 5G1.3 that was deleted in 1989: "[A] departure would be
            warranted when independent prosecutions produce anomalous
            results that circumvent or defeat the intent of the
            guidelines."  See supra note 7. The court then responded by
            questioning Rizzo's counsel about this commentary: "It ought
            to be in the guideline manual, shouldn't it?" The court
            ultimately denied Rizzo's request for a downward departure,
            stating: "To the extent that this is in support of a motion
            for a downward departure, that motion is denied." From this
            interchange, Rizzo concludes that the district court did not
            think that it possessed the authority to depart downward. 
                                        -12-
                                         12

                      "We are obliged to review a trial court's actions as
            they are made manifest in the record."      United  
                                                               States v.
            Tavano, 12 F.3d 301, 304 (1st Cir. 1993); 
                                                     see 
                                                         United States
                                                                       v.
            Morrison, 46 F.3d 127, 130 (1st Cir. 1995) ("When determining
            whether the sentencing court merely refused to exercise its
            discretionary power to depart, we consider the totality of the
            record and the sentencing court's actions as reflected
            therein."). The record in this case does not support Rizzo's
            claim that the district court believed it lacked authority to
            depart downward.
                      Rizzo, both in his objections to the Presentence
            Report and during his sentencing hearing, clearly enunciated
            his position that his case fell outside the heartland of the
            guidelines and thus warranted a downward departure pursuant to
            U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 and U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3. During the sentencing
            hearing, for instance, Rizzo's counsel explained that "[a]ll of
            this is, even the reference to . . . 5G.3 is in reference to a
            downward departure. . . . And, again, I think, because of the
            facts, it does take it out of the heartland of the guidelines."
             During the course of the sentencing hearing, the district
            court questioned Rizzo's counsel concerning this argument. The
            court repeatedly manifested its understanding of Rizzo's
            argument, initially stating: "you argue that under Sections
            5G1.3 and 5G1.2, pertaining to the sentencing on multiple
            counts of conviction, that the present offense should run
                                        -13-
                                         13

            concurrently with Mr. Rizzo's prior offense. Is that basically
            it?" Later in the discussion, the court asked Rizzo's counsel,
            "Do you have any law, statutory or otherwise, that will guide
            the Court in this regard, that requires the government to call
            such relevant conduct to the attention of the sentencing
            court?" After Rizzo's counsel presented his argument and the
            district court subjected him to questioning, the government
            responded to Rizzo's argument at length during the sentencing
            hearing. After listening to both parties on the subject of a
            downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 and U.S.S.G. S
            5G1.3, the district court ruled: "To the extent that that is
            in support of a motion for a downward departure, that motion is
            denied."
                      "[I]f a district court desired to depart but thought
            this course forbidden by explicit guideline language, one would
            expect the court to cast its refusal in these terms."  United
            States v. DeCosta, 37 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1994);  see  United
            States v.  Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 565 (1st Cir. 1996)
            (indicating that if the record is ambiguous concerning the
            district court's awareness of its discretion to depart
            downward, "that ambiguity, without more, would not be enough to
            make the district court's refusal to depart appealable"). In
            this case, unlike in     DeCosta, the district court made
            absolutely no remark that could be construed to indicate that
                                        -14-
                                         14

            it thought it lacked the authority under the guidelines to
            depart downward.
                      [W]e have suggested that a sentencing
                      court state, where appropriate, "that it
                      has considered the mitigating factors
                      urged but does not find them sufficiently
                      unusual to warrant a departure in the case
                      at hand." If a sentencing court neglects
                      to use such language, however, the
                      sentencing decision is not necessarily
                      ripe for remand or review.     Sentencing
                      courts 
                             have 
                                  had 
                                       abundant 
                                                opportunity 
                                                             to
                      become 
                            experienced with the Guidelines and
                      familiar  
                               with  
                                     their  
                                            authority  
                                                       to  
                                                           make
                      discretionary decisions regarding whether
                      to depart.
            Morrison, 46 F.3d at 132 (internal citations and footnote
            omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting (
                                               DeCosta, 37 F.3d at 8). As
            in 
              Morrison, "viewed in harmony with its context, the [district
            court's decision not to] depart[] reflects no misapprehension
            on the part of the district court as to its departure power,
            but simply its decision not to exercise that power in the
            present case."  Id. at 132-33; see United 
                                                      States v.  DiIorio,
            948 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[W]e think it apparent from
            this record that the court understood its authority to depart
            downward[], and yet concluded . . . that the specific
            provisions of the Guideline that DiIorio wished to invoke
            simply did not permit departure under the circumstances of her
            case.").
                                
            10.  While we do not believe the record supports Rizzo's
            contention that the district court did not understand that it
            had authority to depart downward in this case, we note that the
            district court could have avoided much trouble in this case if
                                        -15-
                                         15

                      Because we find that the record contains no evidence
            that the district court believed it lacked authority to depart
            downward in this case, we pause only briefly to address Rizzo's
            arguments supporting his plea for such a departure. Initially,
            we note that with respect to his contention that U.S.S.G. S
            5G1.3 provided authority for the district court to depart
            downward, S 5G1.3 applies only to "undischarged terms of
            imprisonment." See 
                               United States
                                             v. 
                                               McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1040
            (4th Cir. 1996),  cert. denied, No. 96-8994, 1997 WL 275967
            (June 16, 1997); 
                            Prewitt v. 
                                       United States
                                                    , 83 F.3d 812, 817-18
            (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, Rizzo had discharged the
            thirty-three month term of imprisonment resulting from his 1992
            convictions prior to being sentenced for his 1995 federal
            indictment.
                      Similarly, Rizzo's argument that the government
            improperly delayed indicting Rizzo until he served his thirty-
            three month term of imprisonment for the 1992 convictions is
            unavailing in light of 
                                  United States
                                                v. 
                                                   Saldana, 109 F.3d 100,
            104 (1st Cir. 1997). In 
                                   Saldana, a federal grand jury indicted
            the appellant following his release after serving twenty months
            of a thirty-month state sentence. The federal grand jury
                                
            it had heeded the suggestions of  DeCosta and Morrison.   See
            DeCosta, 37 F.3d at 8 (suggesting that the "district court
            say--where this is the case--that it has considered the
            mitigating factors urged but does not find them sufficiently
            unusual to warrant a departure in the case at hand"); 
                                                                Morrison,
            46 F.3d at 132 (same). 
                                        -16-
                                         16

            indicted the appellant based on conduct that occurred
            approximately two years previously, prior to his conviction and
            sentencing in the state case. The district court sentenced the
            appellant to seventy months' imprisonment.  See id. at 102.
                      The appellant claimed, inter alia, that "if he had
            been charged with the federal offense while still serving his
            state sentence, the federal sentence would, under U.S.S.G. S
            5G1.3(c), have been set to run concurrently with the state
            sentence."  Id. In    Saldana, we reasoned that "deliberate
            tampering to increase a sentence would be a concern, but the
            ordinary accidents of acceleration or delay are part of the
            fabric of criminal proceedings."    Id. at 104. Affirming
            appellant's sentence, we held that "in the present case, the
            delay was neither extreme nor implicitly sinister."  Id. 
                      As in Saldana, nothing in the record indicates that
            the delay in this case was sinister. Rizzo indicated that he
            possessed no evidence concerning the government's motive in
            waiting to indict him until 1995. During the sentencing
            hearing, in fact, Rizzo's counsel conceded "I'm not pointing
            the finger at the government in terms of its conduct."
            Furthermore, in light of the precedent in this circuit, we do
            not believe that the delay in this case was "extreme."    See
            Saldana, 109 F.3d at 102-04 (involving two-year delay); 
                                                                   United
            States v. 
                     McCoy, 977 F.2d 706, 711 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding no
                                        -17-
                                         17

            due process violation in case of three and one-half year delay
            between conduct at issue and return of federal indictment).
                      Rizzo's contention that the government knew of the
            facts of the offenses underlying this appeal at the time of his
            1992 sentencing and improperly withheld this information from
            the sentencing court also is unpersuasive. We previously have
            explained:
                      Undercover operations comprise a valuable,
                      and generally lawful, weapon in the
                      government's ar[senal]. Thus, courts
                      should proceed with caution in staking out
                      rules that will hinder government agents
                      who seek lawfully to set such ruses in
                      motion. "Despite the fact that undercover
                      operations by their nature involve
                      elements of furtiveness, duplicity, and
                      manipulation, we have never held that such
                      initiatives are per  se unfair. To the
                      contrary, we think that the Executive
                      Branch is free,  within 
                                              broad 
                                                    limits, to
                      set such snares for unwary criminals."
            United  
                   States v.  Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994)
            (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting United
            States v. 
                     Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 470-71 (1st Cir. 1994)). Given
            the wide latitude we afford the government in conducting sting
            operations, "the burden of showing sentencing factor
            manipulation [necessarily] rests with the defendant. As with
            other fact-sensitive sentencing issues, the burden of proof
            must be carried by a preponderance of the evidence."
                                                                 Gibbens,
                                
            11.  Particularly in light of Rizzo's failure to provide an
            adequate explanation, we agree with the government that Rizzo's
            non-disclosure argument essentially constitutes an accusation
            of sentencing factor manipulation on the part of the
                                        -18-
                                         18

            25 F.3d at 31-32 (internal citations omitted);    see  United
            States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (indicating
            that the "standard is very high" and cautioning that "garden
            variety manipulation claims are largely a waste of time").
                      In this case, Rizzo offered no evidence whatsoever of
            any bad faith on the government's behalf. During Rizzo's
            sentencing hearing, his counsel explicitly stated that he did
            not have evidence concerning the government's motive in
            protecting the information pertaining to Rizzo's "relevant
            conduct" during the 1992 sentencing. At one point, Rizzo's
            counsel admitted: "I can't probe into the minds of the
            government at the time." Later in the hearing, Rizzo's counsel
            explained: "[W]e can't speculate about whatever the reasons
            were for the government not raising it at that time." 
                      Rizzo also failed to direct the district court (and
            now fails to point this court) to any authority requiring the
            government to "call such relevant conduct to the attention of
            the sentencing court." For its part, the government explained
            that it did not reveal Rizzo's "relevant conduct" to the 1992
                                
            government.  See United 
                                    States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
            Cir. 1995) (indicating that sentencing factor manipulation
            encompasses "vast range of circumstances"); United 
                                                               States v.
            Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 n.8 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Governmental
            misconduct that shapes the contours of the crime and thus
            delimits the available sentencing options . . . can, in a
            suitable case, furnish the basis for downward departure."); 
                                                                      see
            also United 
                        States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240 (7th Cir. 1995)
            ("Sentencing manipulation occurs when the government engages in
            improper conduct that has the effect of increasing a
            defendant's sentence.").
                                        -19-
                                         19

            sentencing court because it "had a specific investigative plan
            . . . to move from Mr. Rizzo to . . . find out who the
            participants were in this counterfeit check ring who were
            spreading [fraudulent] paper all throughout the city." This
            explanation is plausible given the record in this case and
            particularly Rizzo's numerous references to others in the
            scheme to whom he was responsible. See 
                                                   Gibbens, 25 F.3d at 31
            (crediting government's explanation that it "was hoping, based
            on appellant's allusions to a supposed business partner, to
            land a bigger fish"). We thus find that the district court did
            not commit an abuse of discretion in refusing to depart
            downward on the grounds that the government somehow manipulated
            Rizzo's 1992 sentence; Rizzo simply failed to carry his burden
            of proof with respect to his allegation of sentencing factor
            manipulation.  See id. at 32; Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4.
            B.  Loss Calculation
                      The district court sentenced Rizzo based on the total
            $273,950.00 value of the five counterfeit checks given to
            Savarese in 1992. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(B)(1)(I), the
            district court increased Rizzo's base offense level of six by
            eight levels because the loss involved in the scheme fell
            between $200,000.00 and $350,000.00.
                      Rizzo objected to the eight-level increase both in
            his objections to the Presentence Report and during his
            sentencing hearing. Rizzo argued that the $273,950.00 was
                                        -20-
                                         20

            generated through a government sting operation. Distorting the
            record, Rizzo asserted that "all the checks were deposited into
            the government's shell corporation . . . . Therefore, Mr.
            Rizzo's guidelines should not be increased by 2F1.1(b)(1) as no
            loss was capable of occurring as a matter of law." Perhaps
            recognizing the flaw in his earlier assertion, on appeal Rizzo
            alters his argument slightly, insisting that he "should only
            have been responsible for at most $160,000 under S 2F1.1 since
            the other amounts were incapable of being lost and/or had not
            been completed as a substantive offense." Because a loss
            calculation of $160,000.00 necessitates a seven-level increase
            pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), rather than an eight-
            level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(I), Rizzo
            maintained that his "total offense level should have been 15
            instead of 16."
                      Rizzo rests his argument that actual rather than
            intended loss represents the appropriate calculation for
            purposes of U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1) on two cases, 
                                                            United States
            v. 
              Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir.), 
                                                   cert. 
                                                         denied, 513 U.S.
            889 (1994), and United 
                                   States v. Watkins, 994 F.2d 1192 (6th
            Cir. 1992). In     Galbraith, the appellant contended that
            "because his offense was committed in response to an undercover
            sting operation structured so there was no possibility of loss
            to a victim, the intended or probable loss was zero."
            Galbraith, 20 F.3d at 1059. Reasoning that "[b]ecause this was
                                        -21-
                                         21

            an undercover sting operation which was structured to sell
            stock to a pension fund that did not exist, defendant could not
            have occasioned any loss even if the scheme had been
            completed," the Tenth Circuit ruled that the applicable loss
            calculation for purposes of U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1) was zero.
            Id. 
                      The Galbraith court's rationale is inapplicable to
            this case. Unlike the fictitious victim in    Galbraith, the
            intended victims of Rizzo's counterfeit check scheme were
            actual corporations. Moreover, the fact that the conspirators
            managed to deposit the first check and then to withdraw the
            entire $160,000.00 demonstrates that Rizzo could have
            "occasioned" a loss "if the scheme had been completed" with
            respect to the remaining four checks. If, for instance,
            Savarese again had determined to flout the FBI's instructions,
            it appears that the conspirators could have successfully
            negotiated the other checks totaling $113,950.00.
                      As with 
                             Galbraith, we find 
                                                Watkins' treatment of the
            appropriate loss calculation under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)
            unpersuasive in the context of Rizzo's appeal. In 
                                                             Watkins, the
            Sixth Circuit enunciated three factors that must be present for
            an amount of loss to be relevant under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1:
            "First, as application note 7 instructs, the defendant must
            have intended the loss. Second, it must have been possible for
            the defendant to cause the loss. Third, the defendant must
                                        -22-
                                         22

            have completed or been about to complete but for interruption,
            all of the acts necessary to bring about the loss."  Watkins,
            994 F.2d at 1196. Contrary to Rizzo, we believe that these
            three factors were satisfied in this case. First, as Rizzo
            admits, he intended the $273,950.00 loss. Second, the
            conspirators' success with the $160,000.00 check demonstrates
            that it was possible for the defendant to cause the loss.
            Third, Rizzo provided Savarese with five checks totalling
            $273,950.00 and urged him to deposit these checks and then to
            remove the funds from the Thermal Shield account, thus
            "complet[ing] . . . but for interruption, all of the acts
            necessary to bring about the loss." We therefore find that
            even if the Watkins factors were dispositive of this appeal,
            the circumstances of this case were such that $273,950.00, not
            $160,000.00, would represent the proper figure for purposes of
            calculating loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1).
                      Because Watkins does not guide our analysis of this
            issue, we add a few words about our interpretation of U.S.S.G.
            S 2F1.1(b)(1). Application Note 7 to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 states
            in pertinent part: "Consistent with the provisions of S 2X1.1
            (Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy), if an intended loss that
            the defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, this
            figure will be used if it is greater than the actual loss." In
            this case, Rizzo admits that he intended to inflict $273,950.00
            of loss. According to Application Note 7, therefore,
                                        -23-
                                         23

            $273,950.00 represents the appropriate amount for purposes of
            calculating loss under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 in this case.
                      In United 
                                States v.  Egemonye, 62 F.3d 425, 428-29
            (1st Cir. 1995), furthermore, we addressed the issue of
            intended loss in the context of U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. The 
                                                                 Egemonye
            appellant was charged with conspiracy and other offenses
            relating to the possession and use of stolen credit cards. 
                                                                      See
            id. at 426. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), the
            district court computed the loss at $242,950.00, "representing
            the aggregate credit limit of the 51 credit cards purchased .
            . . in the four transactions," despite the fact that the
            appellant never inflicted any actual loss with many of the
            stolen credit cards that he purchased.  Id. at 426-27. As in
            the instant case, the appellant was sentenced within the
            guidelines range to thirty-seven months' imprisonment. 
                                                                  See 
                                                                      id.
            at 427. Rejecting the appellant's argument that the district
            court's loss calculation based on the limits of all of the
            credit cards was "unrealistic," we concluded that on the
            "record the use of the aggregate card limits as a measure of
            intended and potential loss was [not] clearly erroneous." Id.
            at 429. We explained that "[w]here there is good evidence of
            actual intent and some prospect of success, we do not think
            that a court needs to engage in more refined forecasts of just
            how successful the scheme was likely to be."  Id.
                                        -24-
                                         24

                      Given the evidence of Rizzo's intent and the prospect
            of future success manifested by his initial success with the
            $160,000.00 check, we do not find that the district court's use
            of the $273,950.00 figure for purposes of calculating loss
            under U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1(b)(1) was clearly erroneous. 
                                                               See 
                                                                   United
            States v. Carrington, 96 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1996),     cert.
            denied, 117 S. Ct. 1328 (1997); Egemonye, 62 F.3d at 429.
                                     Conclusion
                      For the reasons stated above, we affirm the sentence
            that the district court imposed.
                                        -25-
                                         25