Court Opinion

ID: 9540490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:16:36.136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:52.791814
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority's conclusion that the trial court in this case correctly entered an injunction preventing the IHSAA from enforcing its eligibility determination. In my view, the Majority decision suffers the same flaw as did the trial court's-it employs an overzealous review that does not accord the IHSAA decision sufficient deference.
I begin by reiterating that we review an IHSAA decision such as this only for arbitrariness or capriciousness. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222 (Ind.1997). Our Supreme Court has explained that this is "a narrow standard of review and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the IHSAA." Id. at 283. The ruling or decision under review will be deemed arbitrary and capricious " 'only where it is willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or cireumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion!" Id. (quoting Dep't of Natural Res. v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1007 (Ind.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078, 110 S.Ct. 1130, 107 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1990)).
With this in mind, I proceed to an examination of a part of our strictures on review that I believe the Majority, and the trial court before it, have failed to adhere to. Specifically, this pertains to the consideration of evidence. We have set out those principles and the restrictions on the powers of our court sitting in review of ITHSAA decisions as follows:
We conclude that when reviewing IHSAA eligibility decisions, a trial court is limited to reviewing the record of the proceedings conducted before the IHSAA with respect to the factual determinations made by the IHSAA. The trial court may receive mew evidence only if such evidence pertains to matters concerning the IHSAA proceedings, or if it pertains to factual determinations made by the IHSAA and the foil wre to present such evidence to the IHSAA was not attributable to choice or inexcusable neglect. The trial court's task upon review is the same as when reviewing an administrative agency's decision. The court may not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility, but simply analyzes the record as a whole, including both the proceedings before the IHSAA and the proceedings before the trial court, to determine whether the IHSAA's findings were supported by substantial evidence. The trial court is not to try the case de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the IHSAA.
When reviewing the trial court's judgment with respect to factual determinations made by the IHSAA, our scope of review is the same as that applied by the *759trial court. We examine the record of the proceedings before the IHSAA, together with any properly admitted, relevant new evidence presented to the trial court, to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the IHSAA's findings. Both trial and appellate courts must accord great deference to IHSAA eligibility determinations. With respect to trial court determinations regarding the propriety of the proceedings conducted before the IHSAA, our review again is the same as that of the trial court.
Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Reyes, 659 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), adopted in Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249 (Ind.1997) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). I highlight the language in the foregoing excerpt because it delineates the place where I begin my analysis, i.e., the legitimacy of the evidentiary hearing conducted by the trial court.
Before rendering its decision, the IHSAA Review Committee conducted a hearing at which it received evidence. That evidence focused on the reason for Jasmine's transfer from Elkhart Memorial High School to South Bend Washington High School. Depending on the Review Committee's findings, Jasmine might be declared athletically ineligible for her senior year pursuant to one of several IHSAA eligibility rules. As ably set forth in the majority opinion, the resolution of this case boiled down to the question of whether athleties was a primary factor in the transfer. The record reflects that the Review Committee heard testimony and considered documentary evidence offered by the parties. Each side was given the opportunity to marshal and present its evidence, to explain its position, and to identify and offer justification for its desired outcome. Following the hearing, the Review Committee issued findings of fact and the con-elusions based upon those findings. The Review Committee concluded that Jasmine's transfer was athletically motivated, based upon certain factual findings which I will detail below. It is at this point that the matter was appealed to the trial court for judicial review, in the form of a petition for preliminary injunction.
As set forth above, the trial court's review of IHSAA action is essentially the same as ours. I stress several key principles of that review. First, it is a deferential standard of review-arbitrary and capricious,. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222. Second, concerning the factual determinations made by the IHSAA, a trial court is limited to reviewing the record of the IHSAA proceedings. The trial court may receive new evidence about the facts of the case "only if ... the failure to present such evidence to the IHSAA was not attributable to choice or inexcusable neglect." Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Reyes, 659 N.E.2d at 164. Third, in reviewing the evidence, "'the trial court cannot weigh the evidence and must uphold the organization's finding if it is supported by any substantial evidence."" Id. at 168 (quoting Terrell v. Palomino Horse Breeders of Am., 414 N.E.2d 332, 335 n.2 (Ind.Ct.App.1980)). In my opinion, the trial court in this case exceeded the limits of its review in conducting a new evidentiary hearing.
I wish to stress here that I do not object to the trial court's decision to hold a hearing on the Watsons' motion for preliminary injunction. I do not believe, however, that the receipt of new evidence was appropriate. With respect to the evidentiary facts upon which an IHSAA determination is based, per Reyes, a trial court may receive new evidence only when the party who wishes to proffer it demonstrates that it *760was unable to present the evidence at the IHSAA proceeding. This is the only reasonable interpretation of the limitation "only if ... the failure to present such evidence to the IHSAA was not attribut, able to choice or inexcusable neglect" set out in our opinion, see Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Reyes, 659 N.E.2d at 164, and adopted by our Supreme Court. This interpretation is consistent with the other condition under which a trial court may receive new evidence, i.e., when the evidence pertains to the IHSAA hearing itself, in that both evince a clear purpose of ensuring that the appellant had a fair hearing before the IHSAA.
In the instant case, in her Verified Complaint For Injunctive Relief, For Temporary and For Permanent Injunction, Jasmine did not allege that the hearing she received before the Review Committee was unfair. To the contrary, she claimed that "[the evidence submitted ... at the hearing, was probative evidence, and conclusive evidence, that Jasmine's transfer ... was not athletically motivated or based on undue influence." Appellant's Appendix at 78. Moreover, Jasmine asked the trial court "to declare that upon the evidence submitted at the hearing of the Review Committee on October 9, 2008, Jasmine has full eligibility[.]" Id. at 85 (emphasis supplied). Therefore, in my view, the trial court erred in receiving any evidence at the hearing on Jasmine's motion to review the merits of the Review Committee's determination.
I turn now to an application of the first and third principles set out above, both of which require that courts review the Review Committee's findings only for arbitrary and capricious action and forbid reweighing the evidence or re-assessing witness credibility. In so doing, I reiterate that we may consider only the evidence that was presented in the Review Committee hearing. The Review Committee entered exhaustive findings of fact on the issues of the Watson family finances and the contact between Jasmine, her family, and various coaches and school personnel involved from both Elk-hart Memorial and South Bend Washington. Beginning with the latter, there was testimony that Jasmine's family was not pleased with her situation vis-a-vis the Elkhart Memorial girl's basketball team. Jasmine had stated to her teammates pri- or to leaving Elkhart that she was going to use her grandmother's South Bend address so she could play at South Bend Washington. Ultimately, Jasmine admitted to Fielstra, her Elkhart Memorial coach, that Mo Seott, South Bend Washington's coach and Jasmine's summer AAU coach, was "always asking her when she would be coming to South Bend Washington" and "was always trying to get her to go to South Bend Washington and even introduced Jasmine to the younger South Bend Washington players and telling them that Jasmine was coming to South Bend Washington." Id. at 698.5 *761Coach Fielstra testified that he was informed that Jasmine's mother stated sometime in the summer before her senior year that one of the conditions to her remaining at Elkhart Memorial was that Elkhart Memorial needed to "get the ball more" to Jasmine. Id. at 699. Previously, Jasmine's mother had threatened to move Jasmine from Elkhart Memorial to South Bend Washington because Elkhart Memorial would not help pay for an ad for Jasmine in the Indiana All-Star Magazine. South Bend Clay coach Steve Scott indicated he had spoken with Jasmine's grandmother at her request. She told him they were checking out the Clay basketball program and looking for a place for Jasmine to play basketball because Elkhart Memorial was not getting her the ball enough and because they were not treating her right. Elkhart Memorial assistant track coach Tami Gregory indicated that Jasmine's mother had told her that South Bend Washington was pressuring Jasmine to come to Washington to play basketball.
There was more evidence, indeed significantly more, both that Jasmine's family was dissatisfied with her situation on the basketball team at Elkhart Memorial and that South Bend Washington was recruiting Jasmine to come there to play basketball. But, the foregoing is sufficient for my purpose of illustrating that the Review Committee's decision had a solid evidentia-ry basis. Upon what basis did the trial court grant the injunction and, in effect, reverse the Review Committee's decision in the face of this considerable evidence? In my view, it did so by erroneously conducting its own independent inquiry into the matter, which included receiving new evidence, rejfudging witness credibility, independently weighing the evidence presented at both hearings, and drawing its own independent conclusions.6 This was not merely tantamount to a trial de novo, it was a trial de novo. As indicated previously, our Supreme Court has "emphatically" rejected such close scrutiny of IHSAA eligibility determinations. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlbery by Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 231.
The appropriate deferential review of the Review Committee's determination in this case would consider only the evidence presented at the hearing before the Review Committee. That evidence included everything set out in the preceding paragraphs with respect to South Bend Washington's recruitment of Jasmine to play there, and more. In my view, this evidence was more than sufficient to sustain the Review Committee's determination of ineligibility. Apparently, the Majority, like the trial court before it, hesitates to designate it as evidence at all, ie., "much of the 'evidence' relied upon by the IHSAA ...", before dismissing it as unsubstantiated hearsay and double hearsay. Op. at 752. Our court has indicated that the normal proscriptions against hearsay do not apply in an administrative proceeding. *762In fact, an ageney review board "can admit all hearsay evidence without fear of automatic reversal." Kriss v. Brown, 180 Ind.App. 594, 390 N.E.2d 193, 203 (1979). Granted, if a proper objection is interposed at the hearing and preserved on review and the evidence does not fall within a recognized exception to the Hearsay Rule, then a decision may not be based solely upon such hearsay. On the other hand, if not objected to, hearsay may form the basis for a decision. Kriss v. Brown, 180 Ind.App. 594, 390 N.E.2d 193 (applied when reviewing an eligibility determination made by the IHSAA). Jasmine did not object to any evidence on hearsay grounds.
In making these observations concerning the use of hearsay evidence in an IHSAA eligibility proceeding, I do not believe I am laboring under any misconceptions about what the trial court did, or about the gist of the Majority's views regarding what the trial court did. The Majority asserts that the trial court did not exclude the evidence on the ground that it was hearsay, it merely found said evidence to be incompetent and rejected it on that basis. The Majority concludes, "the trial court was well within its rights to find the type of hearsay and double hearsay evidence relied upon by the IHSAA to be incompetent evidence." Op. at 758 n. 2. My examination of the record of the IHSAA proceeding in this case reveals that the type of hearsay and double hearsay evidence relied upon in the IHSAA's ruling was run-of-the-mill hearsay. There was nothing inherently incredible or unbelievable about what the proponents of the hearsay claimed to have heard. Thus, I am left to conclude that it was deemed incompetent by the trial court merely because it was hearsay, and rejected on that basis. Indeed, the Majority acknowledges as much, and approves of the trial court's action. What emerges is a rule that says hearsay evidence is permitted in an administrative proceeding such as that before the IHSAA here, but may be rejected because, as a matter of law, as hearsay, it is incompetent. It is unclear to me how this holding squares with the Majority's statement, "We have not ruled on--and were not asked to rule on-whether the trial court appropriately exeluded evidence because it was hearsay." Id. What is the practical difference between excluding evidence on the basis that it is hearsay and deeming it incompetent on the basis that it is hearsay? None that I can detect. The result is the same either way and the IHSAA might just as well consider such evidence meaningless in all future proceedings because trial courts will be authorized by this decision to deem hearsay evidence incompetent merely because it is hearsay.
I reiterate that Jasmine did not object to the evidence and that, if not objected to, hearsay may form the basis for a decision. Thus, we are left with this: There was competent evidence at the hearing before the Review Committee that South Bend Washington had been actively recruiting Jasmine, that Jasmine and her family were dissatisfied with the way she was utilized on the Elkhart Memorial basketball team, and that she had threatened to move to another school where the basketball situation would be more to her and her family's liking. I understand that Jasmine, her mother, and South Bend Washington's basketball coach all denied doing or saying many of the things attributed to them by the evidence upon which the Review Committee ultimately reached its determination that Jasmine's transfer was motivated primarily by athletics. In granting the injunction and effectively reversing the IHSAA's eligibility determination, the trial court not only reweighed the evidence, but re-assessed the credibility of key witnesses such as Jasmine, her mother, and Coach *763Seott of South Bend Washington. There can be no other basis that I can perceive for rejecting the Review Committee's conclusion that Jasmine's transfer was primarily athletically motivated.
At this point, I feel compelled to address the matter of the Watson family financial cireumstances. They were relevant in this case because the Watsons offered them as the sole motivation for the family's move from Elkhart Memorial to South Bend Washington. It is clear to me that the trial court focused on those cireumstances in reaching the conclusion that the injunetion should be granted. The first three sentences of the Majority's opinion reflect that this captured the lion's share of the Majority's attention as well. Indeed, they are compelling, and I certainly am not unsympathetic to the family's struggles. I think, however, the compelling nature of those matters diverted the trial court's, and the Majority's, attention somewhat from the main issue before the Review Committee. The Majority invites the reader to step away from the trees and observe the forest. The forest in this case is described by the Majority in sympathetic, even compelling, terms-a single mother struggling to pay bills on a reduced salary, a mother unable to find a suitable home in Elkhart, but ultimately able to secure a residence within her means, in a safe location, "and close enough to her extended family that they could lend much needed support to the struggling family." Op. at 756. Leaving aside for the moment the fact that several of the cireumstances thus recited were not firmly established by the evidence (including most notably that the Watsons simply could not have found suitable housing in or near Elkhart), I would respectfully suggest that the Majority's gaze is fixed upon the wrong forest.
Writing rhetorically, the Majority asks, "what does the IHSAA believe [Jasmine's mother] should have done?" Id. at 756. The Majority then provides five alternatives from which it asks the IHSAA to choose, had it been in Valerie Watson's position. Four of those options were clearly bad, at least as constructed by the Majority, and one was impractical. The clear implication is that moving to South Bend was the only viable option open to the Watsons. I disagree that such accurately represents7 or describes the entire *764universe of choices available to Valerie Watson as she approached the summer before Jasmine's senior year. Regardless, I respectfully suggest that the IHSAA is not in this or any case in the business of making such life decisions on behalf of student-athletes' families, nor is it in the business of evaluating the wisdom of those choices after a family makes them. Rather, its task "is to encourage, regulate, and give direction to wholesome amateur inter-school athletie competition between its member schools." Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Martin, 765 N.E.2d 1238, 1239 (Ind.2002). Integral to regulating the competitive landscape among the more than 400 member schools of the organization is Rule 19-4 which, in order to "preserve the integrity of interschool ath-leties and to prevent or minimize reeruit-ing, proselytizing and school [jumping' for athletic reasons, regardless of the circumstances" limits eligibility of student athletes who transfer for primarily athletic reasons or as a result of undue influence. Appellant's Brief at 4 n. 4 (emphasis supplied). It is this purpose (ie., to encourage, regulate, etc.), the IHSAA member schools, and the integrity of the athletic competition among them, that represent the metaphorical forest upon which the IHSAA must focus its attention.
The Review Board's decision would perhaps have been easier to embrace had the family's financial circumstances been less emotionally compelling. But the question of motivation for the transfer of schools was not necessarily a function of whether Valerie established that her family was in dire financial straits in the months leading up to the commencement of Jasmine's senior year, at least not on the facts established by the evidence in this case. Rather, the evidence at the hearing established both that the family was experiencing serious financial difficulties and that Jasmine was being recruited by South Bend Washington and Jasmine's basketball endeavors were a significant factor in the transfer from Elkhart Memorial to South Bend Washington. Put another way, the Review Committee was not bound to find that athletics was not a significant factor in the transfer if it believed the family was experiencing financial hardship. This was not an either-or proposition.
In summary, there was considerable evidence that Jasmine was recruited by South Bend Washington and that Valerie's decision to transfer Jasmine from Elkhart Memorial to South Bend Washington was primarily motivated by athletics. Some of that evidence I have documented, much of it I have not. The Majority wrongly rejects much of this evidence as hearsay and condones the trial court's error in conducting an im-permissibly stringent level of review, which included receiving new evidence, reweighing evidence, and re-assessing witness credibility. Moreover, I believe the Majority goes astray in diverting its attention from the main issue, ie., the evidence of South Bend Washington's recruitment of Jasmine and the evidence that Jasmine's basketball endeavors were a prime consideration in Valerie's decision to move to South Bend and to have Jasmine transfer schools, and focusing instead on the family's financial plight. Absent the considerable evidence of improper recruitment and parental inclination to make Jasmine's athletics a prime factor in deciding what school she should attend her senior year, the evidence of the family's financial problems would *765very probably have led the IHSAA to conclude that Jasmine would have been eligible to play varsity sports wherever the family moved. In the face of that considerable evidence, however, I fear the matter of financial hardship, real though that hardship was, has become a red herring, at least with respect to reviewing the issue the Review Committee was called upon to decide. Under the IHSAA eligibility rules as I understand them, and as they have been consistently enforced by the IHSAA, compelling financial hardship, or any other personal difficulty for that matter, does not ex-euse the forbidden act of making athletics a primary consideration in an IHSAA student-athlete's transfer from one high school to another.
In the end, we must ask ourselves, was the Review Committee's decision that Jasmine's transfer to South Bend Washington was primarily motivated by athletics " «willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts or cireumstances in the case, or without some basis which would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion'"? Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlberg by Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 233 (quoting Dep't of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d at 1007). In my view, the answer is, emphatically, no. Thus, the Watsons failed to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits of their claim for relief. I would reverse and vacate the injunction in its entirety.

. I note here the Majority's conclusion that Coach Mo Scott's persistent attempts to persuade Jasmine to transfer, which Jasmine claimed happened "all the time ... [every time I'm over there", Appellant's Appendix at 293, did not constitute undue influence because ""[nlo illicit offers were made, no bribes extended[.]" Op. at 754. "Illicit" and '"'bribe" denote illegal activity. I cannot agree that a finding of undue influence must be premised upon illegal behavior. To the contrary, the sort of persistent pressure that Jasmine described to others casily suffices. I note also that the Majority dismisses Coach Scott's touting of the ready prospect of a state championship should Jasmine transfer as "some friendly boasting", id., and not an inducement within the meaning of the Undue Influence Rule. Such evinces a fundamental misunderstanding of the psyche of the typical high school athlete, for whom a state championship would almost certainly be of the ut*761most importance. Indeed, Jasmine told an Elkhart Memorial teammate prior to leaving that she was considering transferring to South Bend Washington because she wanted a state basketball championship ring before she graduated. Moreover, the Majority does not mention that a different Elkhart Memorial teammate overheard Coach Scott tell Jasmine on more than one occasion that if she transferred to South Bend Washington, she "would have a better chance of being recruited by the elite colleges." Id. at 444. Touting the greatly enhanced possibilities of a state basketball championship and an athletic scholarship to an elite university are not only inducements to a high school athlete, but powerful ones at that.

. The terms "independent" and "independently" here mean essentially without regard whatsoever for the Committee's findings and conclusions.

. I note, as just one example of the way in which some of these dire-sounding alternatives are perhaps mis-cast, a letter submitted for consideration in the hearing before the Review Committee by one A.J. Rodino. Rodi-no stated that he had a five-bedroom home that he would be willing to rent to the Wat-sons for lower rent and a lower deposit "so [they] could afford the house." Appellant's Appendix at 219. Coach Fielstra told Valerie about the home, but she did not contact Rodi-no and follow-up. When Coach Fielstra asked whether she had looked at the home, she told him it was not big enough. It was not until the hearing before the Review Com-raittee that Valerie claimed the reason she rejected Rodino's property was because it was located near a liquor store. This discrepancy in the reasons given for rejecting the possibility of moving into Rodino's rental, together with much other evidence on the subject of her housing search in Elkhart, permits a reasonable inference that not all housing possibilities in Elkhart Memorial were "too small, too expensive, or situated right next to a liquor store" and thus rejected on only those bases. Op. at 756.
I note also that the Majority upholds the validity of the injunction at least partially on grounds that Elkhart Memorial was guilty of what it labels as "blatant" reverse recruiting, the point being that to take action on South Bend Washington's improper actions while ignoring similar transgression on the part of Elkhart Memorial constituted arbitrary and capricious action on the Review Committee's part. Id. at 755-56. I cannot agree with the Majority's implicit assertion that the Review committee acted illogically or inconsistently ("had the IHSAA been acting consistently and logically, it would not have explicitly stated *764..", id. at n. 4) in failing to sanction Elichart Memorial's actions. That matter simply was not before the Review Committee at the time.