Court Opinion

ID: 9398702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 21:00:59.581514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.581335
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                      File Name: 23a0113p.06

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                            ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                            │
                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                             >        No. 21-1521
                                                            │
        v.                                                  │
                                                            │
 CALVIN EARL MCREYNOLDS, JR.,                               │
                                Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                            ┘

 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.
                No. 1:16-cr-20677-15—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.

                                  Argued: February 9, 2023

                              Decided and Filed: May 31, 2023

                  Before: CLAY, GRIFFIN and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

                                     _________________

                                           COUNSEL

ARGUED: Anna Schuver, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, for Appellant. William J. Vailliencourt, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Schuver, Melissa M. Salinas,
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Timothy
M. Turkelson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellee.

         CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., joined. GRIFFIN,
J. (pp. 13–15), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
 No. 21-1521                      United States v. McReynolds                              Page 2

                                      _________________

                                           OPINION
                                      _________________

       CLAY, Circuit Judge.       For the second time, Defendant Calvin E. McReynolds Jr.,
appeals his sentence for his 2017 conviction for conspiring to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In his
first appeal, McReynolds argued that the district court erred in attributing to him a quantity of
drugs substantially higher than the quantity of drugs that the jury attributed to him. This Court
vacated McReynolds’ sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district
court attributed the same quantity of drugs to McReynolds as it had at the first sentencing.
McReynolds now appeals the district court’s resentencing. For the reasons that follow, we
VACATE McReynolds’ sentence and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this
opinion.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

       In April 2017, a grand jury indicted McReynolds with conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
846. McReynolds was indicted alongside seventeen co-defendants, all of whom pled guilty.
McReynolds pled not guilty and proceeded to trial.             At trial, the government, using
circumstantial evidence, argued that McReynolds was part of the charged conspiracy, and thus
should be held responsible for the drug quantities attributed to the conspiracy. McReynolds
denied his involvement in the charged conspiracy, arguing that he was a drug dealer who only
sold drugs for individual consumption. The jury found McReynolds guilty of the charged
offense and attributed “less than 100 grams” of heroin and “less than 500 grams” of cocaine to
him. (Jury Verdict, R. 478, Page ID #2534–35). The jury’s verdict did not include the drug
amount attributed to the entire scope of the conspiracy. After the trial, the Probation Office
prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) that included the drug amounts attributable
to the conspiracy in its calculation of the drug quantity attributable to McReynolds—in total, it
attributed 767.66 grams of heroin, 711.56 grams of cocaine, and 263.51 grams of cocaine base to
McReynolds.
 No. 21-1521                      United States v. McReynolds                             Page 3

       Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, the district court adopted the PSR’s drug quantity
calculation and resulting offense level calculation when calculating McReynolds’ sentence. The
PSR calculation increased the low end of McReynolds’ advisory guidelines range by
approximately five years, as his base offense level based on the jury’s determination is 24 (63 to
78 months) and his base offence level based on the PSR’s determination is 30 (121 to 151
months).    Combining his base offense level, criminal history, and a two-level firearm
enhancement, McReynolds’ guidelines range was calculated to be 151 to 181 months of
imprisonment.    The district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 151 months of
imprisonment and six years of supervised release.

       McReynolds timely appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed McReynolds’
conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded “with instructions that the district court should
adequately explain its reasoning if it attributes any drug amounts to McReynolds beyond the
jury’s verdict when calculating his base offense level.” United States v. McReynolds, 964 F.3d
555, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). We reasoned that the district court was “authorized to disregard the
jury’s conclusions regarding the drug amounts and to attribute higher drug amounts to
McReynolds at sentencing only insofar as those amounts were supported by a preponderance of
the evidence.” Id. at 565. Because “the district court did not explain why it found those higher
drug amounts supported by preponderant evidence in the present case,” the sentence was
remanded. Id.

       On remand, the district court did not change its guideline range determination of 151–181
months, but it imposed a below guideline sentence of 145 months to account for McReynolds’
post-sentencing positive conduct. Further, in accordance with this Court’s opinion, the district
court provided additional explanation of its sentencing decision. The district court concluded
that the PSR correctly calculated the drug quantity attributable to McReynolds because that
quantity was within the scope of his conspiratorial agreement and foreseeable to him. To explain
its deviation from the drug quantity that the jury attributed to McReynolds, the court opined that
the jury was “confused.” In support of its own drug quantity determination, the district court
pointed to three key witness testimonies. Those witnesses were: Mitchell King, a special agent
 No. 21-1521                             United States v. McReynolds                                         Page 4

who investigated this case; Brandon Pratt, charged as a co-conspirator in this case; and Araceli
Acosta, one of McReynolds’ former customers.

         We briefly review the witness testimony on which the district court relied, and turn first
to Mitchell King’s witness testimony. Based on intercepted communications obtained through
court-authorized wiretaps, King testified that McReynolds purchased a half ounce of cocaine
from the lead actor of the conspiracy “about every four days,” and asked to share weight scales at
least once.1 (Trial Tr., R. 570, Page ID # 3878–79, 3884). King also testified that Damarlin
Beavers, the conspiracy’s supplier, warned McReynolds of potential law enforcement in the area.
Further, King testified that a remote pole camera2 identified Defendant outside of one of the
houses commonly used by and associated with members of this conspiracy. However, King also
testified that no documentation or physical evidence linked McReynolds to the lead conspirators.
Moreover, King testified that even though eight warrants were executed during the investigation,
and McReynolds was identified on intercepted communications, no warrant was executed to
search McReynolds’ residence.

         We next turn to Brandon Pratt’s testimony. Based on the intercepted calls that the
government played for Pratt, Pratt testified that he believed McReynolds was involved in various
joint undertakings, including participating in conversations setting drug prices to divert business
from other dealers “probably a couple times,” (Trial Tr., R. 571, Page ID #4000–02), and once
sharing a scale with Beavers. The government also played for Pratt a conversation between
Beavers and McReynolds in which Pratt suggested that the two were talking about “cutting”
(diluting) the drugs. Pratt also confirmed, based on an intercepted call played for him at trial,
that Beavers had warned McReynolds of law enforcement in the area. Pratt further testified that
McReynolds frequently associated with other conspirators, including Kendrell Stephens.
According to Pratt, McReynolds and Stephens would share customers as well. With respect to
one of the identified stash houses, Pratt did not know whether McReynolds ever used the house

         1
          King testified that scales were used among the conspirators in this case to accurately calculate the quantity
of controlled substances before sale.
         2
         King testified that a pole camera is a video recording device, with no audio, that is placed on a pole and
used to monitor an area remotely, allowing law enforcement to identify individuals and record license plate
numbers.
 No. 21-1521                            United States v. McReynolds                                      Page 5

to store drugs but testified that he had seen him there “probably once or twice.” (Id. at Page ID
#4014, 4017). However, despite the alleged connections to the co-conspirators, Pratt testified
that “[McReynolds] like[d] to do his own thing,” and after 2013 Pratt did not engage in any drug
related conduct with McReynolds. (Id. at Page ID # 3994–95).

        Finally, we turn to Araceli Acosta’s testimony. Acosta testified that between 2014 and
August 2016, she bought heroin and crack cocaine from McReynolds “two or three times a day,”
totaling about 0.3 grams of each per day. (Trial Tr., R. 559, Page ID #3503–05). Acosta also
testified that she had seen McReynolds and Stephens together at an apartment known as “the
kitchen.”     As Acosta recalled, she came to “the kitchen” looking to buy heroin from
McReynolds. Based on Acosta’s testimony, it is unclear whether McReynolds was already in the
kitchen when Acosta arrived, but Acosta waited at the house and saw Stephens walk in carrying
“bricks” of purported cocaine and heroin in a duffel bag.                   Stephens then apparently said,
“Remember, she’s not supposed to be here.” (Id. at Page ID #3516). Acosta testified that she
left the house to wait outside, and McReynolds stepped out and sold her heroin. Acosta also
recalled another instance where she met McReynolds at the “kitchen.”                         She testified that
McReynolds was there with Stephens and that the two were packaging heroin for retail
distribution. (Id. at Page ID #3517–18). Acosta’s testimony does not establish that McReynolds
and Stephens shared any controlled substances or related materials, nor did she state that
McReynolds stored any of his supply in the “kitchen.”3 Acosta’s testimony was limited to
observing McReynolds interacting with Stephens in the “kitchen” while she waited for her
delivery of requested narcotics.

        McReynolds        timely     appealed     the    district   court’s    resentencing      determination.
McReynolds argues that the district court erred in attributing the conspiracy-wide drug quantities
to him, as the evidence used to justify the amount was circumstantial, and only establishes that
McReynolds “was a low-level dealer who purchased drugs in small quantities from Damarlin
Beavers, the conspiracy’s supplier, to sell to individual users for consumption.” (Pet’r’s Br.,

        3
          The court below found Acosta’s testimony that McReynolds was involved with dividing the bricks to be
credible but found the evidence as to the composition and weight of the bricks to be conjecture. Thus, the district
court did not attribute the “bricks” observed by Acosta to McReynolds’ sentencing calculation.
 No. 21-1521                       United States v. McReynolds                              Page 6

ECF No. 16, 5). McReynolds requests that “this Court [] remand with instruction that the drug
quantity calculation made at sentencing be limited to the jury’s affirmative finding on the
specific quantity attributable to McReynolds.” (Id. at 7). Further, McReynolds requests that the
district court adopt the jury’s findings of a “lower drug quantity” resulting in “a base offense
level of 24.” (Id. at, 36, n.3). He also requests that this Court reassign the case to a new district
judge on remand.

                                        II. DISCUSSION

                                     A. Standard of Review

       We review the district court’s factual determination of the quantity of drugs involved in
an offense for clear error. United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir. 2010). We also
review “a district court’s decision concerning a defendant’s role in an offense” for clear error.
United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 709 (6th Cir. 2006). “A court’s approximation of the
amount of drugs involved in a particular case is not clearly erroneous if supported by ‘competent
evidence in the record.’” United States v. Mahaffey, 53 F.3d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1993)). “The district court can make a
reasonable estimate [as to the drug quantity] based on physical evidence or testimony.” United
States v. Tisdale, 980 F.3d 1089, 1096 (6th Cir. 2020). Then “the drug quantity assigned to a
defendant [must be] supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Gardner,
32 F.4th 504, 525 (6th Cir. 2022).         “The government has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence the amount of drugs for which a defendant is accountable.” Id. at
131.

                                           B. Analysis

       1. Lack of Supporting Evidence

       On appeal, we are presented with the question of whether competent evidence in the
record supports the district court’s drug quantity determination. We hold that it does not. The
district court’s attribution of conspiracy-wide drug quantity to McReynolds was clearly
erroneous because the record only presents circumstantial evidence establishing that
 No. 21-1521                            United States v. McReynolds                                        Page 7

McReynolds had knowledge of the conspiracy—it does not establish he was a participant in the
conspiracy.4

         “[I]n order to hold a defendant accountable for the acts of others [under
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)], a district court must make two particularized findings: (1) that the acts were
within the scope of the defendant’s agreement; and (2) that they were foreseeable to the
defendant.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United
States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1995)); accord, e.g., United States v. Merriweather,
728 F. App’x 498, 520–22 (6th Cir. 2018). These contours “provide[] adequate protection
against the possibility that a less culpable, ‘small-time’ seller of drugs will be caught up in the
sweep of [21 U.S.C. § 841] due to the acts of coconspirators.” United States v. Pruitt, 156 F.3d
638, 645 (6th Cir. 1998). At issue is the scope of the conspirator’s agreement with McReynolds.
To determine the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity, we consider six factors: “(1) the
existence of a single scheme; (2) similarities in modus operandi; (3) coordination of activities
among schemers; (4) pooling of resources or profits; (5) knowledge of the scope of the scheme;
and (6) length and degree of the defendant’s participation in the scheme.” United States v.
Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886, 895–96 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Salem, 657 F.3d 560,
565 (7th Cir. 2011)).

         The district court found that:

         the evidence at trial [] indicated that Defendant collaborated with Kendrell
         Stephens, sold and packaged drugs in the “the kitchen,” visited the Grant Street
         stash house with other conspirators, and was otherwise informed of and
         participated in the full scope of the criminal enterprise. There was even testimony
         that other conspirators would warn Defendant when police were patrolling near
         where he dealt drugs.

(Sentencing Order., R. 776, Page ID # 6322).                    Those findings constitute an exaggerated
interpretation of the record.

         4
           McReynolds argues that the district court erred in relying on the PSR because the PSR used an incorrect
legal standard for relevant conduct at sentencing. However, the PSR purports to provide the factual background of
the case and information pertaining to the defendant’s personal characteristics and criminal history. The district
court is tasked with conducting the legal analysis based on the facts in the record. In this case, the district court
applied the correct legal standard for relevant conduct, pertaining to, (1) the scope of the conspiracy and
(2) foreseeability, but we find that the district court erred in its application of the legal standard to the facts.
 No. 21-1521                       United States v. McReynolds                              Page 8

       None of the six factors point to a conspiratorial agreement involving McReynolds. As to
the existence of a single scheme, the district court has failed to establish that McReynolds was an
actor in the single conspiratorial scheme in this case.       The record simply established that
McReynolds bought small quantities of drugs from Beavers and sold them to customers for
individual consumption.

       The government argues that “McReynolds and his co-conspirators coordinated with each
other to sell kilograms of cocaine and heroin throughout Saginaw.” (Resp’t’s Br., ECF No. 21,
18). This is not supported by the record. The purposes for which McReynolds communicated
with Beavers included: to obtain a supply of controlled substances, to alert one another of police
activity, and to share a scale once. These instances of communication do not establish a common
goal of criminal activity. The sharing of a scale once and warning of police activity in the
neighborhood is not sufficient to establish a single scheme. Cf. United States v. Love, 392 F.
App’x 410, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Love did not merely purchase cocaine from other members
of the conspiracy for distribution, but he also recruited others and provided logistical support; his
criminal responsibility therefore extended well beyond the quantities of cocaine that he himself
handled.”).

       Moreover, the government did not establish modus operendi, coordination of activities
among schemers, or a pooling of resources or profits. The only common thread established by
the government is that Beaver supplied controlled substances. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt.
n.4(C)(vi) (distinguishing for purposes of sentencing street-level drug dealers who share a
common source of supply but otherwise operate independently, from street-level dealers who
pool resources and profits). The record does not establish that McReynolds coordinated his drug
sales with the other conspiracy members or performed a specific service for the conspiracy. The
conjecture that McReynolds may have been present in one or two meetings regarding pricing
over the course of fourteen months, had been seen with co-conspirators, or appeared in the stash
house on two occasions, is not sufficient to establish that McReynolds was a co-conspirator.
Further, Pratt testified that he did not know whether Defendant ever used the house to store
drugs. (Trial Tr., R. 571, PageID #4014, 4017). And Acosta’s testimony did not establish that
any controlled substances or materials related to the controlled substances were shared between
 No. 21-1521                             United States v. McReynolds                                        Page 9

McReynolds and Stephens, nor did she state that McReynolds stored any of his supply in “the
kitchen.” At most, the record established that McReynolds had knowledge of the scope of the
conspiracy, but not that he had an agreement as to the scope of the overall operation.5 See
United States v. Cowley, 800 F. App’x 402, 404 (6th Cir. 2020) (attributing the conspiracy-wide
quantity where “evidence showed that higher-ups in the conspiracy would ask [for defendant’s]
help with critical tasks, such as picking up packages, alerting other co-conspirators when
packages had arrived, and ‘breaking down’ shipments of crystal meth into saleable portions.”).
As to the last factor, the length and degree of the defendant’s participation in the scheme,
McReynolds bought drugs from Beavers during the relevant time frame, but the scope of his
narrow agreement with Beavers did not vary during that time. The evidence only establishes that
McReynolds occasionally associated with the conspirators and used Beavers as a supplier for his
own drug sales. The district court failed to establish, with competent evidence from the record,
that the scope of McReynolds’ agreement went beyond an individual agreement with Beavers.

         Moreover, we note a significant absence of evidence linking McReynolds to the
conspiracy. Law enforcement’s fourteen-month investigation produced no physical evidence
connecting McReynolds to the conspiracy-wide drug quantity, and none of the eight search
warrants that law enforcement executed at the conspiracy’s stash houses and conspiracy leaders’
homes yielded any evidence against McReynolds. The searches did not uncover any drug
ledgers, fingerprints, personal items, documentation, or any other physical evidence linking
McReynolds to the conspiracy. Throughout the course of its investigation, law enforcement

         5
           The dissent concludes that “McReynolds was an active participant in cutting drugs used by the entire
conspiracy.” It bases its conclusion on an inaccurate reading of the record. The dissent states that Pratt linked
McReynolds to the “cutting” process based on Pratt’s interpretation of one phone call between Beavers and
McReynolds, where Beavers asked whether McReynolds had gone to a hardware store; Pratt testified that “cut” was
typically bought at hardware stores. (See Trial Tr., R. 571, Page ID # 4005–06). According to Pratt’s interpretation
of the call, McReynolds told Beavers that Stephens “got it.” (See id.). The dissent’s conclusion that this phone call
establishes enough to implicate McReynolds as an active participant in “cutting” drugs for the conspiracy is
misguided. The district court acknowledged that Stephens, not McReynolds, “was generally in charge of ‘cutting’
the group’s heroin for distribution.” (Sentencing Order, R. 776, Page ID # 6313). Pratt’s testimony merely
demonstrates that McReynolds had knowledge of Stephens’ role in diluting the conspiracy’s drugs, not that he
himself took part in the process. The dissent also points to Pratt’s interpretation of a phone call between Stephens
and Beavers regarding “[g]etting cut for the heroin,” and an individual on the call stated that “he got some cut from
Detroit.” (See Trial Tr., R. 571, Page ID # 4006). The dissent incorrectly characterizes the phrase “he got some cut
from Detroit” as vague. Pratt is interpreting a phone call between Stephens and Beavers, and Pratt’s use of “he” is in
reference to one of the individuals on the call. (See id.). The dissent errs in finding that the “he” could refer to
McReynolds. (See id.). Therefore, the dissent misrepresents the evidence in this case in reaching its conclusion.
 No. 21-1521                             United States v. McReynolds                                        Page 10

chose not to search McReynolds’ home or wiretap his phone. The evidence presented only
establishes that, as previously noted in the Court’s prior opinion, “McReynolds was a dealer,
who was ‘merely purchas[ing] cocaine from other members of the conspiracy for distribution,’
which he would then sell in half-ounce portions for personal consumption.” McReynolds, 964
F.3d at 565 (quoting United States v. Love, 392 F. App’x 410, 417 (6th Cir. 2010)). Because the
higher drug quantities were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, McReynolds’
sentence is substantively unreasonable.6, 7

         2. Jury Determination of the Drug Quantity Attributable to McReynolds

         Having determined that the district court clearly erred in attributing the conspiracy-wide
drug quantity to McReynolds because competent evidence did not support that determination, we
need not proceed further. However, we will address the district court’s reliance on the jury’s
alleged “confusion” to explain its deviation from the jury-found drug quantity attributable to
McReynolds.

         The district court based its opinion on the length and difficulty of the jury instructions.
Given this purported confusion, the court “believed there was good reason to reconsider the
jury’s determination, to independently evaluate the evidence, and to decide whether the
preponderance of the evidence supported the attribution provided in the PSR.” (Sentencing
Order, R. 776, Page ID #6326)

         6
          McReynolds argues that the government misstated McReynolds’ criminal history level as VI at his
resentencing hearing, which could have prejudiced the district court’s analysis. (Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 16, 35).
Moreover, the district court incorrectly stated that McReynolds “scored six criminal history points with two
convictions.” (See Sentencing Order, R. 776, Page ID #6316). However, McReynolds does not provide analysis as
to how these errors impacted his sentence. Given McReynolds contention that the PSR correctly applied a criminal
history level III to McReynolds, and the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation, the district court’s
misstatement in its sentencing opinion is harmless error.
         7
           The dissent ignores the preponderance of evidence standard in its analysis. It instead assesses whether the
district court’s interpretation of the record was reasonable; however, the district court is also tasked with
determining that its sentencing determination is supported by a preponderance of evidence. See Gardner, 32 F.4th
at 525. The dissent is correct in stating that district court may deviate away from jury-found facts in its sentencing,
including “acquitted conduct.” See United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 382 (6th Cir. 2008). However, as we have
stated in our prior opinion in this case, if a judge deviates from jury-found facts, the basis for the deviation must be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. United States v. McReynolds, 964 F.3d 555, 565–66 (6th Cir. 2020). In
our analysis, we simply apply the well-settled standard that when a district court applies judge-found facts to a
sentencing determination, the district court’s conclusions must be supported by a preponderance of evidence.
 No. 21-1521                            United States v. McReynolds                                       Page 11

         However, the district court provided the jury instructions to seek a drug quantity
determination based on the government’s recommendation acting on internal guidance from
Department of Justice, which the district court found to be “reasonable, especially given this
Court’s experience with advisory jury findings.” (Id., Page ID # 6325). “Accordingly, the jury
was tasked with finding the specific type and amount of controlled substances ‘that was either
attributable to the defendant as a result of his own conduct, or the conduct of other conspirators
reasonably foreseeable to him.’” (Id. (quoting Verdict Form, R. 478, Page ID # 2534)).

         The district court simply concludes that “whether the conduct of any conspirators was
‘reasonably foreseeable’ proved to be a problematic inquiry.” (Id., Page ID # 6325). However,
the district court’s description of the jury’s purported confusion in its sentencing opinion is
general, speculative and fails “to overcome the presumption that the jury was capable of
[resolving the dispute] or to outweigh society’s interest in a single, efficient trial.” United States
v. Allen, 16 F.3d 1221, at *1 (6th Cir. 1994) (table). Indeed, the jury posed questions during its
deliberation about drug attribution and pointed to a mistake in an exhibit provided by the
government, which was subsequently corrected. In response, the court received the jury’s
concerns and provided corrections and responses when necessary.

         If the district court was concerned with the jury’s understanding of the case, it could have
ameliorated the confusion through special instructions or cautionary warnings. The district court
did not take any action beyond responding to the jury’s questions, thus demonstrating its
confidence in the jury’s ability to understand the instructions set forth to them. Accordingly, the
record does not support the district court’s statement at sentencing that the jury was confused in
reaching its determination. Instead, it appears that the district court was simply dissatisfied with
the outcome.8

         8
          Because we hold that competent evidence does not support the district court’s deviation from the jury-
found drug quantity attributable to McReynolds and vacate and remand McReynolds’ sentence on that basis, we
need not decide whether a district court may make findings that contradict a jury’s affirmative findings. In United
States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008), this Court authorized a district court to sentence the defendant based
on conduct established by a preponderance of the evidence, even though the jury found that the defendant’s conduct
was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By contrast, in this case, an affirmative jury verdict found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the specific drug quantity attributable to McReynolds. Allowing a district judge to use facts and
conduct in its sentencing determination that contradict affirmative determinations made by the jury, risks the
creation of “a shadow criminal code under which, for certain suspected offenses, a defendant receives few of the
 No. 21-1521                           United States v. McReynolds                                    Page 12

        3. Reassignment

        Finally, we address McReynolds’ request that the Court assign the case to a new district
judge. McReynolds requests that this Court “remand this case to a new judge in light of the
unusual, years-long back-and-forth between this Court” and the district court. (Pet’r’s Br., ECF
No. 16, 35). As this Court has explained, “reassignments should be made infrequently and with
the greatest of reluctance.” Sagan v. United States, 342 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Armco, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 169, 280 F.3d 669, 683 (6th Cir.
2002)). In considering whether reassignment is necessary, the Court considers three factors:
“(1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected to have substantial difficulty in
putting out of his or her mind previously expressed views or findings; (2) whether reassignment
is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3) whether reassignment would entail
waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness.”
Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, none of the factors
favor reassignment. While the Court finds that the district court’s handling of McReynolds’
sentencing was not correct, it does not find that it was based on any improper conceptions
regarding the merits of McReynolds’ claims. Nor is there any indication of bias or prejudice on
behalf of the district judge. The Court therefore finds there is benefit in remanding this case to
the same district judge that has a thorough understanding of the facts present in this case.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

        For the reasons set forth above, we VACATE McReynolds’ sentence and REMAND for
resentencing, with instructions that the district court implement the jury’s verdict setting forth the
jury-found facts.

trial protections mandated by the Constitution.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 574 (3d Cir. 2007) (Ambro,
J., concurring). However, this Court need not make this determination to resolve this case.
 No. 21-1521                      United States v. McReynolds                           Page 13

                   ____________________________________________________

                    CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
                   ____________________________________________________

        GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

        I join that portion of the majority opinion that denies McReynolds’s request for
reassignment to a different judge, with the exception of the statement that “the district court’s
handling of McReynolds’s sentencing was not correct.” However, because the district court did
not clearly err when it calculated the drug weight attributable to Calvin McReynolds and
sentenced him accordingly, I would also affirm his sentence. I therefore concur in part and
dissent in part.

        In my view, our clear-error standard of review is dispositive regarding this sentencing
appeal. Under this rigorous and deferential review standard, we must affirm the district court’s
factual determinations regarding drug weight (and, correspondingly, the scope of McReynolds’s
conspiratorial agreement) absent a clearly erroneous ruling. United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d
886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018). A “finding of fact is not clearly erroneous simply because there is
evidence in the record that might support a different finding.” United States v. Vance, 956 F.3d
846, 853 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Rather, it is clearly erroneous only if we are “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Donadeo, 910 F.3d at
893 (citation omitted). This review is extremely deferential: we must affirm the district court
“even if we would have made the opposite finding, so long as both stories are plausible on the
record as a whole.” United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Furthermore, the district court was permitted to
draw reasonable inferences from the record when fashioning McReynolds’s sentence.            See
United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Gardner,
32 F.4th 504, 525 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[A] drug-quantity determination doesn’t require explicit
statements from a defendant. Instead, a district court need make only a reasonable estimate
based on the record.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the record and the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it fall comfortably within the deference we accord the
sentencing court.
 No. 21-1521                       United States v. McReynolds                          Page 14

       Recall first that Araceli Acosta testified that she saw McReynolds twice at “the kitchen,”
a location conspirators used to prepare their drugs.          On one of those occasions, Kendrell
Stephens brought large quantities of cocaine and heroin and told Acosta to leave before
McReynolds distributed a smaller amount of heroin to her outside. Before she left, though, she
saw McReynolds and Stephens processing and packaging drugs for sale. This testimony directly
supports the district court’s conclusion that McReynolds had a larger role in the conspiracy than
the street-level dealer he claims to be.

       Several reasonable inferences also support this conclusion. First, Damarlin Beavers, the
conspiracy’s supplier, asked McReynolds if he had a scale, from which the district court could
reasonably infer the two were pooling resources. Second, Beavers also called McReynolds to
warn him about police presence. It is reasonable to infer that Beavers was protecting a peer (that
is, a high-level participant) in the conspiracy. Third, Brandon Pratt testified that McReynolds
participated in price-setting conversations, bolstering the reasonable inference that McReynolds
helped manage the conspiracy. Finally, although Stephens was “generally” in charge of cutting
(diluting) the drugs, Pratt linked McReynolds to that process—testifying that Beavers asked
McReynolds if he had gone to a hardware store and bought cutting agents, to which McReynolds
replied “yeah, [Stephens]’s got it.” Although Pratt testified that “he got some cut from Detroit”
without clarifying whether “he” was McReynolds, Beavers, or Stephens, it was reasonable for
the district court to infer, based on this ambiguous testimony and other record evidence tying
McReynolds to the conspiracy’s distribution activities, that McReynolds was an active
participant in cutting drugs used by the entire conspiracy.

       Each of these reasonable inferences supports the district court’s factual finding that
McReynolds agreed to all the conspiracy’s dealings. But rather than accepting these reasonable
inferences, the majority makes different factual findings—all in McReynolds’s favor. It outright
rejects the testimony about sharing a scale and warning of police activity, characterizes the
testimony about McReynolds’s participation in price-fixing conversations as “conjecture,” and
assumes that none of the drugs in the “kitchen” were McReynolds’s. Yet the clear-error standard
turns not on the inferences we would draw after review of the cold record, but on the
reasonableness of the inferences made by the district court. Absent unreasonableness, it is not
 No. 21-1521                       United States v. McReynolds                                Page 15

our place to disturb the district court’s findings of fact. United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562,
570 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Estrada-Gonzalez, 32 F.4th at 614.

       Finally, I respectfully dissent from the extraordinary and unprecedented directive on
remand for “the district court [to] implement the jury’s verdict setting forth the jury-found facts.”
Our precedent allows district courts to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing. See United
States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997). Today’s remand order directly conflicts with that precedent. In
particular, were the district court’s drug-weight calculation to be clearly erroneous, the
appropriate remedy would be to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing following the
district court’s renewed fact-finding regarding the drug weight attributable to McReynolds. See,
e.g., United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 399, 401 (6th Cir. 2002). In my view, the
majority’s directive that the district court adopt the jury-found facts is contrary to law.

       The district court concluded that a single scheme existed: one that McReynolds knew of
and participated in by coordinating activities and pooling resources with his co-defendants. See
Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 895–96. It was then authorized to sentence McReynolds using the
conspiracy-wide drug amount, even if that amount was larger than the weight attributed to
McReynolds by the jury. See Watts, 519 U.S. at 154; White, 551 F.3d at 382. On this record,
I am not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Donadeo, 910 F.3d at 893 (citation omitted).

       For these reasons, I would affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.