Court Opinion

ID: 9723844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:35:30.043369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:52.614771
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Chief Justice —
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. As set out in the majority opinion, appellant was arrested on August 6, 1982. The case was originally set for trial for June 16, 1983; however, the trial did not occur at that time. On June 20, 1983, the prosecuting attorney filed his written “Request for Trial Setting and Showing Court’s Congestion.” All of this occurred well before the one year period expired from the date of arrest. The action of the prosecuting attorney complied with Ind.R.Cr.P. 4(C).
In filing for a request for a trial setting and showing the court’s congestion, there is no requirement that the court take action on the prosecuting attorney’s motion within the time specified. It is true the trial court did not act until September 29, 1983; however, at that time, the court made a nunc ■pro tunc entry for June 20, 1983. Thus the court’s order book now shows that the State’s request for trial setting and showing the court’s congestion was filed and granted.
The court also took judicial knowledge of the fact the calendar was congested at that time and named the three cases which required attention during the period involved. Under the circumstances of this case, I see no justification for the ordering of appellant’s discharge.
I would hold that Ind.R.Cr.P. 4(C) was not violated and that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion for discharge.
GIVAN, C.J., dissenting opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.