Court Opinion

ID: 9919355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 01:00:40.69532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:58.642201
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60681     Document: 00517035939         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/17/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                           FILED
                                                                January 17, 2024
                                  No. 21-60681                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                           Clerk

   Kelmi Yarel Velasquez-Castillo,

                                                                         Petitioner,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                       Respondent.
                  ______________________________

                 Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A213 287 757
                  ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Graves, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
          Kelmi Velasquez-Castillo, a native and citizen of Honduras, filed a
   petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying
   a motion to reopen his removal proceedings. The Petitioner and Respondent
   agree that this Court should vacate and remand. We conclude that this case
   is not moot, that the BIA erred in denying the motion to reopen without
   resolving the issue of the statutory provisions relating to an unaccompanied
   minor, and that the BIA failed to consider whether there was new and
   previously unavailable evidence in support of asylum eligibility. Accordingly,
   we VACATE the BIA’s decision and REMAND.
Case: 21-60681         Document: 00517035939                Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/17/2024

                                           No. 21-60681

                                          Background
           Kelmi Yarel Velasquez-Castillo, born in October 2002, left Honduras
   with his mother and arrived at the Texas border around July 16, 2019. The
   mother and son were subsequently placed into removal proceedings under
   the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On January 28, 2020, after
   Velasquez-Castillo and his mother admitted removability, an Immigration
   Judge (“IJ”) (1) ordered them removed, (2) denied their application for
   asylum, and (3) denied their application to withhold removal under the
   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Neither Velasquez-Castillo nor his
   mother sought further review of the IJ’s decision, which became final on
   February 27, 2020.
           On March 7, 2020, Velasquez-Castillo, then-seventeen years old, re-
   turned to the United States-Mexico border alone. As a result, immigration
   officials categorized him as an unaccompanied minor (“UC”) 1 and trans-
   ferred him to the Office of Refugee Resettlement.
           On April 24, 2020, Velasquez-Castillo, with the assistance of pro bono
   counsel, submitted an asylum application to the United States Citizenship
   and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). He additionally filed a motion to reo-
   pen, arguing that his impending removal would violate the Trafficking Vic-
   tims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”) and that newly available
   evidence regarding his sexual orientation was relevant to his eligibility for
   asylum, withholding, and CAT relief.2 However, three days later, on April

           _____________________
           1
              The Immigration and Nationality Act defines a “UC” as a child who is not a
   citizen, is under eighteen years old, does not have legal status, and does not have a parent
   or guardian to take care of them in the United States. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g).
           2
              Velasquez-Castillo’s written declaration supporting his motion to reopen
   outlined his experiences with bullying and harassment in school, his awareness of his sexual
   orientation at the age of eleven, his attempts to suppress his instincts, his fear of disclosing

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   27, 2020, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) executed the IJ’s
   Order from January 28, 2020, and removed Velasquez-Castillo to Honduras.
            On August 25, 2020, the IJ denied Velasquez-Castillo’s motion to re-
   open. The IJ determined that Velasquez-Castillo “failed to demonstrate that
   the new evidence, his sexual orientation, was not available and could not have
   been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Accordingly, the IJ held
   that he did not meet the heavy burden required to reopen his removal pro-
   ceedings.
            On September 3, 2020, Velasquez-Castillo filed a timely notice of ap-
   peal with the BIA arguing that (1) DHS’s failure to place him in TVPRA re-
   moval proceedings was a due process violation that foreclosed his right to
   seek asylum, and (2) his disclosure of his sexual orientation upon the second
   entry was new material evidence that warranted reopening. On July 29, 2021,
   the BIA adopted and upheld the decision made by the IJ. Consequently, Ve-
   lasquez-Castillo submitted a petition for review of the BIA’s order in this
   Court.
            While the petition was under review in this Court, Velasquez-Castillo
   submitted a motion to reconsider to the BIA, arguing that the BIA failed to
   address his argument regarding the requirement to reopen his MPP removal
   proceedings under TVPRA. On June 15, 2022, the BIA denied the motion for
   the following reasons: (1) neither the BIA nor an IJ had “the authority to or-
   der DHS to place an individual in removal or reinstatement proceedings”;
   (2) these proceedings took place following Velasquez-Castillo’s March 2020
   reentry, when he had an outstanding final order of removal; (3) Velasquez-
   Castillo’s arguments “relate[d] to the initiation of new removal hearings or

            _____________________
   this personal information to his mother, and his ongoing struggles with self-acceptance as
   a gay person during the January 2020 merits hearing.

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   expedited removal proceedings,” and thus implicated prosecutorial discre-
   tion. DHS had failed to submit charging documents concerning the March
   2020 entry; (4) Velasquez-Castillo was no longer considered an UC as de-
   fined in the TVPRA, as he was over the age of eighteen at the time of the July
   2021 decision. For these reasons, the BIA determined that the remedy Ve-
   lasquez-Castillo sought was no longer viable.
          Velasquez-Castillo subsequently filed another timely petition for re-
   view in this Court, which we consolidated with the existing petition. After
   Velasquez submitted his opening brief, the parties filed a joint motion to re-
   mand on January 31, 2022. On March 29, 2022, this Court denied the parties’
   joint motion to remand and ordered that briefing resume.
                                Standard of Review
          When evaluating a denial of a motion to reopen or motion for recon-
   sideration, this Court reviews the BIA’s order and evaluates the IJ’s under-
   lying decision if it influenced the BIA’s opinion. Nunez v. Sessions, 882 F.3d
   499, 505 (5th Cir. 2018); Chen v. Holder, Jr., 598 Fed. App’x. 275, 276 (5th
   Cir.2015). The BIA’s denial of a motion for reconsideration or a motion to
   reopen will be upheld unless it is “capricious, racially invidious, utterly with-
   out foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary
   rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” Lowe v. Sessions,
   872 F.3d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 2017)(citation omitted). This Court reviews the
   BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and the legal conclusions un-
   derlying the decision de novo. Fuentes-Pena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 827, 829 (5th
   Cir. 2019).
                                      Analysis
          On appeal, Velasquez-Castillo contends that his status as an UC
   required the DHS and IJ to place him in TVPRA proceedings. The
   government does not rebut this argument. Instead, it agrees that remand is

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   appropriate because the BIA has not yet substantively considered and
   resolved Velasquez-Castillo’s TVPRA arguments. Velasquez-Castillo argues
   that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen and motion for
   reconsideration. After considering mootness, we address each of these
   arguments in turn.
                                     A. Mootness
          This court’s jurisdiction requires a live case or controversy at all
   stages of litigation. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Inherent in the
   case-or-controversy requirement is the doctrine of mootness; federal courts
   lack jurisdiction “when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
   whatever to the prevailing party.” United States v. Vega, 960 F.3d 669, 672
   (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S.
   298, 307 (2012)). “We review the question of mootness de novo, raising the
   issue sua sponte if necessary.” Id. (citation omitted).
          Here, Velasquez-Castillo asserts an actual injury that can be
   sufficiently redressed by the relief he seeks from this Court. Velasquez-
   Castillo met the requirements of the TVPRA when he filed his subsequent
   asylum claim, which is still pending. Application of the TVPRA to this case
   would invalidate the existing removal order and provide an alternative
   pathway for Velasquez-Castillo to pursue his asylum claim. See 8 U.S.C.
   § 1232(a)(5)(D). Accordingly, the case is not moot.
                                      B. TVPRA
          Next, the parties agree that the case should be remanded for further
   consideration because the BIA’s decision does not directly address
   Velasquez-Castillo’s argument for reopening under the TVPRA. The BIA
   determined that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Velasquez-Castillo’s
   TVPRA arguments because (1) DHS did not initiate new removal
   proceedings, (2) the IJ and the BIA lacked jurisdiction to place an individual

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   in removal proceedings, and (3) he was no longer eligible to be considered an
   UC. We disagree and remand.
           It is well-settled that the BIA determines whether reopening was
   justified in light of relevant statutory and regulatory provisions governing
   motions to reopen, such as the TVPRA. See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d
   484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006). And this Court must apply the principles of Chevron
   deference when reviewing BIA orders that interpret immigration laws.
   Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41, 56-57 (2014) (citing Chevron
   U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)). In
   the case at bar, the BIA neglected to consider the merits of Velasquez-
   Castillo’s argument for reopening.
           The TVPRA provides that “[a]ny unaccompanied [noncitizen] child
   sought to be removed by the Department of Homeland Security . . . shall be
   placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the Immigration and
   Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1229a).” 3 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D). Indeed, this
   Court has referred to TVPRA proceedings as “mandatory.” Sanchez v.
   R.G.L., 761 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Because the children were
   declared by DHS to be ‘unaccompanied alien children’, they entered
   mandatory removal proceedings.”).
           While this Court generally defers to an agency’s decision, this
   presumption does not apply when the agency’s decision is not based on its
   interpretation of a statute. Singh, 436 F.3d at 487. Accordingly, because the

           _____________________
           3
              “[T]he word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.” Maine Cmty. Health
   Options v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 1308, 1320 (2020). That connotation is particularly apt
   here, as it follows the phrase “any, unaccompanied [noncitizen] children,” which would
   suggest that the condition applies without exception. 8 U.S.C § 1232(a)(5)(D). “Any” is
   defined as “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Any, Merriam–Webster,
   http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited January 9, 2024).

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   BIA’s opinion does not address the possible application of the TVPRA, we
   send the case back to the BIA for an initial determination. See Lugo-Resendez
   v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We thus conclude that the BIA
   abused its discretion by ignoring Lugo-Resendez’s equitable tolling
   argument.”). On remand, the BIA should consider whether the TVPRA can
   be a remedy for Velasquez-Castillo.
                                C. Denial of Motions
          Lastly, Velasquez-Castillo seeks review of the BIA’s decision to deny
   his motion to reopen his removal proceedings and motion to reconsider in
   light of newly available evidence regarding his sexual orientation. While this
   Court reviews both motions under a “highly deferential abuse-of-discretion
   standard,” Zhao, 404 F.3d at 303, it reviews constitutional challenges de
   novo. Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 831 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Chen v.
   Holder, Jr., 598 F. App’x. 275, 276 (5th Cir.2015) (stating that the court
   applies the same standard for both motions).
          A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a
   hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits
   or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). The BIA cannot
   grant motions to reopen unless “the evidence sought to be offered is material
   and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the
   former hearing.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Similarly, a motion for
   reconsideration of a prior BIA decision may be made to obtain a re-evaluation
   of record evidence in light of “a change in the law, a misapplication of the
   law, or an aspect of the case that the BIA overlooked.” Zhao, 404 F.3d at 301;
   8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).
          It is unclear whether the BIA sufficiently considered the evidence
   regarding Velasquez-Castillo’s sexual orientation and his experiences with
   threats of violence in Honduras. Specifically, while his motion to reopen was

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   pending, Velasquez-Castillo filed a motion requesting an “urgent ruling” and
   attached additional evidence about sexual-orientation-based threats and
   country violence. The IJ and the Board failed to address whether this new
   evidence was previously unavailable and material to eligibility for relief.
          Upon remand, the BIA will address whether the TVPRA applies in
   this case. In doing so, it should consider whether the evidence submitted by
   Velasquez-Castillo—in his motion to reopen, his motion for reconsideration,
   and his motion for an urgent ruling—meets the requirements of 8 C.F.R. §
   1003.2.
                                     Conclusion
          In conclusion, because the BIA failed to address and interpret relevant
   provisions of the TVPRA, we VACATE the BIA’s decision and REMAND
   for the BIA to do so in the first instance.

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