Court Opinion

ID: 9950729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 17:03:50.664948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:16.287361
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 P. v. Roberts CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   A168270

 v.                                                                   (Mendocino County
 WILLIAM CECIL ROBERTS, JR.,                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                                   23CR00144)
             Defendant and Appellant.

                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         A jury convicted defendant William Cecil Roberts, Jr., of transporting
fentanyl for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)).2 Defendant waived
a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors and admitted three of the six
factors alleged in the information: his offense involved a large quantity of
contraband (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(10)); he served a prior state

        This appeal is appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion in
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accordance with the California Standards of Judicial Administration,
section 8.1.
         We note the verdict form contains a clerical error and incorrectly
         2

refers to Penal Code section 11352 rather than Health and Safety Code
section 11352. The court shall correct this reference on remand. (See People
v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187 [on its own motion, appellate court
may order clerical errors corrected]; People v. Trotter (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th
363, 369–370 [trial court properly modified verdict form to correctly reflect
elements of relevant sentence enhancement].)

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prison term (id., rule 4.421(b)(3)); and he was on probation at the time of the
offense (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)). The People moved to strike the remaining
aggravating factors—defendant had engaged in violent conduct that indicates
a serious danger to society; his prior convictions as an adult or sustained
petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness; and his prior performance on probation/supervision/parole was
unsatisfactory—and the trial court granted the motion.
      Prior to the sentencing hearing, the probation department filed a
presentence investigation report recommending the trial court deny
probation and sentence defendant to the aggravated term of five years.3 The
department relied on six factors in aggravation and one in mitigation4 and
noted defendant “is facing sentencing on his seventh felony conviction and
now has 12 criminal convictions overall. Moreover, the defendant has been
granted summary and/or formal probation on multiple occasions (at least
three total); and performed poorly. He has violated his probation at least
twice, some resulting in new criminal convictions; and was on parole . . .
during the instant offense. He has also failed to appear in court on multiple
occasions. [Defendant] has served five prior state prison sentences
(Missouri); and has violated his parole multiple times, as well.”5

      3 A violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352 is punishable by
imprisonment for three, four, or five years. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352,
subd. (a).)
      4 The report listed the mitigating factor, “defendant was suffering from
a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for the
crime. [¶] Comment: The defendant has a long history of poly-substance
abuse issues; and was under the influence at the time of the offense.”
(Boldface omitted.)
      5 The probation report further noted defendant had been on parole for
two cases in Missouri during the commission of the current offense, and his

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      Defendant, in turn, filed a sentencing memorandum requesting the
court split some portion of his sentence and requesting the mitigated term of
three years because factors in mitigation, including his “childhood abuse,”
outweighed those in aggravation.
      At the sentencing hearing, the court stated it had reviewed the
presentence report, defendant’s sentencing memorandum, a certified copy of
defendant’s “rap sheet.” Counsel for defendant reiterated the points made in
his memorandum arguing for the low term and a split-term mandatory
supervision sentence. Further, counsel argued defendant’s childhood neglect
led to trauma and his polysubstance addiction, and these were contributing
factors to the underlying offense. Finally, counsel objected to the
consideration of any factor listed in the presentence report “that was not
stipulated to prior to today’s judgment and sentencing date.” The People
argued for the upper term as the aggravating factors outweighed those in
mitigation.6
      The trial court imposed a five-year aggravated prison term, relying on
the aggravating factors “stipulated by the defendant,” and additionally two
factors to which defendant had not stipulated—that his prior performance on
probation has been unsatisfactory and that he had six prior felonies and five
misdemeanors.7

supervision had been temporarily “transferred via Interstate Commission” to
the Mendocino County Probation Department.
      The probation officer also testified reaffirming the aggravated term
      6

recommendation.
      7 The trial court specifically stated it was not relying on the sixth
unstipulated factor—defendant had engaged in violent conduct that indicates
a serious danger to society.

                                       3
      On appeal, defendant contends the trial court (1) improperly relied on
aggravating factors that had been dismissed; (2) failed to properly consider a
mitigating circumstance; and (3) abused its discretion in declining to impose
a split sentence.
      The Attorney General concedes the trial court erred by prejudicially
relying on aggravating factors, which had been stricken and that remand is
necessary. The concession is well taken.
      Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “When a judgment
of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible
terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence
not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph
(2).” Paragraph (2), in turn, provides in part, “The court may impose a
sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (Id., § 1170, subd. (b)(2), italics added.)
      Here, the trial court erred in relying on two aggravating factors that
had been stricken and that were thus neither stipulated to nor found to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Attorney General notes, the courts
are divided on the applicable standard for assessing prejudice. But all agree
such error is harmless if the sentencing court indicated it would
“nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the upper term if it had
recognized that it could permissibly rely on only a few of the aggravating
factors, rather than all of the factors on which it previously relied.” (People v.
Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1355–1356, review granted Mar. 15, 2023,

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S278266; People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, 933–937 [discussing
various approaches], review granted Sept. 13, 2023, S281242.) Here, the trial
court gave no such indication. The court, in listing the aggravating factors it
considered, gave no indication of the weight accorded to any of them or that
in the absence of the two unstipulated factors, it would nevertheless select
the upper term sentence. Absent any such indication, we cannot say the
error was harmless.
                                DISPOSITION
      Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is returned to the trial
court for a full resentencing. (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893
[when part of sentence is stricken on review, remand for full resentencing is
appropriate for trial court to exercise its discretion in light of changed
circumstances].) We express no opinion as to how the trial court should
exercise its discretion on remand.8 Additionally, the court should correct the
verdict form for count 1 to refer to the Health and Safety Code. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

      8 In light of our disposition, we need not and do not reach defendant’s
remaining contentions on appeal—that the trial court failed to properly
consider a mitigating circumstance and abused its discretion in declining to
impose a split sentence—as defendant is free to raise those arguments on
remand.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

**Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A168270, People v. Roberts

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