Court Opinion

ID: 9736340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:53:06.853742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:06.052032
License: Public Domain

Judge, RILEY,
concurring in part and dissenting in part with separate opinion.
Because we reverse the trial court on the issue of duty and remand for further proceedings, I would address Scott Lem-mons’ contention that he cannot be held personally liable for the acts of Lemmons Masonry. The trial court found that no duty was owed to Briesacher and made no findings on the individual liability of Scott Lemmons. The Briesachers appealed the trial court’s order and addressed in their Appellants’ Brief the rationale relied upon by the trial court to award summary judgment to both Lemmons Masonry and Scott Lemmons personally. Thereafter, Lem-mons Masonry and Scott Lemmons argued in their Appellees’ Brief, among other things, that Scott Lemmons could not be held individually liable. The Briesachers argued in their Reply Brief that Scott Lemmons could be held individually liable, an argument that they had preserved before the trial court. Since Indiana law strongly prefers disposition of cases on their merits, and not to erect procedural obstacles to their presentation, I would consider the Briesachers’ arguments on their merits. See Lindsey v. De Groot Dairy, LLC, 867 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied.
The Briesachers contend that Scott Lemmons is personally liable to the extent that he received assets from Specialized Construction upon the corporation’s liquidation. Indiana Code section 23-1-45-7(d), provides:
A claim may be enforced under this section:
(1) against the dissolved corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets; or
(2) if the assets have been distributed in liquidation, against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation to the extent of the shareholder’s pro rata share of the claim or the corporate assets distributed to the shareholder in liquidation, which ever is less, but a shareholder’s total liability for all claims under this section may not exceed the total amount of assets distributed to the shareholder.
Briesachers presented evidence to the trial court that Lemmons Masonry was voluntarily dissolved on or about November 14, 2005. I would conclude from the plain language of I.C. § 23-l-45-7(d) that *197Briesacher can pursue his claim for negligence against both Lemmons Masonry and Scott Lemmons to the extent allowed by this statute. Therefore, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment to Scott Lemmons individually because he may be held personally liable, even if to a limited extent.

ORDER

On March 4, 2008, the Court handed down its opinion in this appeal marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication. The Appellants, by counsel, have filed a Motion to Publish Memorandum Decision. The Appellants state that this decision clarifies a rule of law and involves a legal and factual issue of unique interest and substantial public importance.
Having considered the matter, the Court FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1.The Appellant’s Motion to Publish Memorandum Decision is GRANTED and this Court’s opinion heretofore handed down in this cause on March 4, 2008, marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication is now ORDERED PUBLISHED.
Sharpnack and Friedlander, JJ., concur.
Riley, J., would deny the motion to publish.