Court Opinion

ID: 9795333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:26:26.15732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:07.792092
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
Like Justice Moreno, who dissents from affirmance of the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding (cone. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post), I am concerned at the potential breadth of that special circumstance. In light of our holdings that the special circumstance (set out in Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) does not require physical concealment but only “concealment of purpose, coupled with a surprise attack from a position of advantage” (People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 556 [257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]), and that the period of watchful waiting involved need be only so long “ ‘as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation’ ” (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 433-434 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992]), the concept of lying in wait threatens to become so expansive as to eliminate any meaningful distinction between defendants rendered eligible for the death penalty by the special circumstance and those who have “merely” committed first degree premeditated murder.
I do not believe, however, the special circumstance must or should be construed so broadly as to pose a constitutional problem. In order to find the *214evidence of lying in wait sufficient in this case, particularly, we need not understand concealment of purpose to mean simply that defendant did not announce his intent before killing the victim. This case, like Morales, involves active deceit as to purpose—a misrepresentation or ruse that lulls the victim into a false sense of security. In Morales, one of the murderers lured the victim into his car on the pretext of a shopping trip. (People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 554; see also People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 433 [sufficient evidence to support lying-in-wait special circumstance where murderers lured pizza delivery man to motel room by pretext of ordering pizza].) In the case at bench, defendant similarly employed a ruse—gesturing and smiling as he pulled alongside the victim, Raymond August—to induce August to slow his vehicle so that defendant could shoot him. (Or so the jury could infer from the testimony of eyewitness Rodney Stokes.) Defendant’s conduct was distinct from ordinary premeditated murder not merely because he did not warn the victim of his murderous intent, but because he actively concealed it by his deceitful behavior.
In my view, this is a meaningful distinction, one on which the voters could have reasonably relied in approving the special circumstance law. Those who conceal from the victim their intent to kill by deceit or ruse could reasonably be regarded as more culpable than those who do not do so; deceitful behavior is traditionally and rationally condemned. Perhaps more to the point, an aspiring murderer who lures his victim into a vulnerable position and then launches a surprise attack is particularly likely to succeed, and hence is particularly dangerous. As the penal law is meant to deter, the special circumstance is not irrational in selecting especially dangerous behavior for special punishment.
Considering defendant’s employment of a ruse, moreover, sufficient evidence supports the finding that he watched and waited for his opportunity to kill August for a substantial period. Though he took only a few seconds to prepare to shoot August, defendant used that time, as the majority explains, “to implement his plan of luring a victim of opportunity into a vulnerable position by creating ... a false sense of security.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 203.) Brief though it was, the period of watching and waiting here was substantial in that it allowed defendant to implement a critical step in his plan of attack.
Wary as I am of affirming a finding on an overbroad lying-in-wait special circumstance, therefore, I conclude that here, without adopting an unconstitutional construction, the majority properly holds the finding supported by substantial evidence.