Court Opinion

ID: 9756003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:02:19.760256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.413116
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In my opinion, under the more lenient “fair and just” standard, the trial court erred in denying Pierce’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. See Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301, 806 (D.C.1987). Pierce, who was about seventeen years old at the time of the plea, is “undisputed[ly] functionally illiterate,” and he was taking prescribed antidepressant medication at the time of the plea, according to the trial court’s findings.1 The trial court also found that Pierce was from a “chaotic and dysfunctional family background,” received a written death threat from someone at the jail in June 1989, and was placed in lock-down status at the jail. In seeking to withdraw the plea of guilty which he entered on February 12, 1990, Pierce contended that the plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered because of the effects of his medication and his mental condition and limitations, among other reasons.
In applying the “fair and just” standard using the factors outlined in Gooding, supra, to the facts of this case, in spite of its careful and thoughtful analysis, the trial court took into account an improper factor and did not accord fair consideration to other relevant factors. “An important factor in these fair and just withdrawal motions is whether the defendant has asserted his or her legal innocence.” Gooding, 529 A.2d at 306 (citation omitted). Where the accused asserts a defense, the trial court is not to decide its merits or determine guilt or innocence. Id. Pierce asserted the defense that another person, one Patrick, committed the offense, a claim which he made when first questioned by the police about the case. In weighing this factor against Pierce, the trial court took into consideration “his confession, the strength of the government’s proffer, and his sworn adoption of the facts contained in that proffer when he pled guilty.” Thus, the court apparently weighed the evidence, rather than determining from the facts underlying the asserted defense whether Pierce presented a cognizable defense, as Gooding contemplates.2 Id. at 306-07. The court also considered the delay in Pierce’s assertion of innocence in evaluating his assertion of legal innocence. While the delay between the entry of the guilty plea and the expression of the defendant’s desire to withdraw it is appropriately a separate factor for consideration, it has no bearing on whether the claim for relief is supported by a legally cognizable defense. See id.; see also Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1992).
The trial court considered the length of time between Pierce’s plea and his request to withdraw it and weighed the factor against him. In doing so, the court considered that although only eleven weeks intervened between the plea and Pierce’s request to withdraw it, another eleven months elapsed between the time his successor counsel filed a formal motion, and another two years elapsed before the motion was heard and decided. Therefore, the court concluded that the delay for that entire period weighed against granting the motion. As the majority opinion observes, “[ujnder Springs the time that passed after [Pierce] expressed his desire to withdraw the plea cannot be considered in examining the prejudice to the government.” See Springs, supra, 614 A.2d at 4 (citation omitted). Therefore, it was error to consider it. The merger of the delay and prejudice factors also appear to have prevented a fair consideration of each.3
*1096‘Whether the defendant has met the fair and just’ standard for withdrawing the guilty plea is left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, 191 (D.C.1995) (citing Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976)). For the foregoing reasons, it appears that the trial court took into account an improper factor and did not adequately consider other relevant factors, and therefore, abused its discretion in resolving Pierce’s motion. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C.1979). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. Pierce reported to the court at the time of the plea that he was taking antidepressant medication, which the trial court determined in the post-plea proceeding to be a 75 mg. dose of Sinequan.

. The court also appears to have considered the timing of Pierce’s claim of innocence in reviewing both the assertion of innocence factor and the length of delay between entry of the guilty plea and the motion.

.For example, in considering separately the length of time between Pierce’s plea and his request to withdraw it, it would have been fair to consider that he is functionally illiterate, has tested retarded, was in lock-down, and frequently on medication for a mental condition.