Court Opinion

ID: 9629617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:46:10.822369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:21.636757
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
dissenting.
¶ 1 When police stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth for investigative purposes, the vehicle and its occupants are considered “seized” and this seizure is subject to constitutional constraints. Commonwealth v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 169, 611 A.2d 1177, 1178 (1992); Commonwealth v. Knotts, 444 Pa.Super. 60, 663 A.2d 216, 218 (1995). An officer may make an investigative stop where he observes unusual conduct that leads him reasonably to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot. Knotts, 663 A.2d at 219 (quoting Commonwealth v. Valenzuela, 408 Pa.Super. 399, 597 A.2d 93, 98 (1991)). Such an investigative stop of an automobile must be based on objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the motorist is presently involved in criminal activity. Id.
¶2 In this case, we must determine whether, at the time he activated the overhead lights on his marked police vehicle, Officer Steven Wassell possessed sufficient information to support a reasonable suspicion that the defendant, William Korenk-iewicz, was “presently involved in criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 550, 668 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1995) (determination of reasonable suspicion may be made only on the basis of information actually possessed by police officer). In my view, Officer Wassell’s testimony at the suppression hearing falls far short of supporting any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 3 In Commonwealth v. Lohr, 715 A.2d 459 (Pa.Super.1998), a panel of this court summarized the law of Pennsylvania on the subject of investigative stops of motor vehicles as follows:
It is well established that when the police stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth for [investigative] purposes, the vehicle, and its occupants are considered ‘seized’ and this seizure is subject to constitutional restraints. An [investigative] stop of an automobile is justified only when it is based upon objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion the vehicle’s occupants are presently involved in criminal activity. To meet this standard, the officer must point to specific articulable facts which, together with the rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant the intrusion.
To have reasonable suspicion, police officers need not personally observe the suspicious or illegal conduct, but may rely on the information of third parties, including “tips” from citizens. Naturally, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.
When the underlying source of the officer’s information is an anonymous call, the tip should be treated with particular suspicion. However a tip from a known informer known to the police may carry enough indicia of reliability for the police to conduct an investigative stop, even though the same tip from an anonymous informant would likely not have done so.
Id. at 461 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
¶ 4 Of course, the investigating officer need not have personal knowledge of the facts that support probable cause for an investigative stop. Commonwealth v. Cullen, 340 Pa.Super. 233, 489 A.2d 929, 937 (1985). He may reasonably rely upon radio transmissions so long as the officer issuing the information has received reasonably trustworthy information sufficient *967to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. Id. However, an investigative stop cannot be based upon an unparticularized hunch of an officer or of a private citizen. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 548 Pa. 484, 490, 698 A.2d 571, 574 (1997); Commonwealth v. Collazo, 692 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Pa.Super.1997).
¶ 5 To determine whether Officer Was-sell could reasonably suspect that Korenk-iewicz had violated the Vehicle Code when he responded to the call from the convenience store, we may consider only the facts as known to the officer at that time. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 550, 668 A.2d at 1116. In his Opinion, Judge Gavin set forth those facts as follows:
Police Officer Steven Wassell (“Was-sell”) was on patrol that evening and testified that he was dispatched to the Amoco station for a suspicious vehicle and person complaint. While en route, Wassell received additional information that the operator may be intoxicated and was preparing to leave (N.T. [2-11-98] 14). Wassell testified that when he arrived at the Amoco he observed “a vehicle matching the description given to the Chester County Police Radio as a dark colored convertible.” Wassell testified that the vehicle had its highlights on and was preparing to pull out of the service station onto Airport Road (N.T. 14). Wassell pulled up behind the defendant and activated his overhead lights. (N.T. 15).
Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/98, (filed 6/17/98) at 2-3. Judge Gavin’s Opinion includes additional facts drawn from Officer Was-sell’s testimony, none of which are material to a proper determination of whether Officer Wassell had reasonable grounds for suspicion at the time he activated his overhead lights and seized Korenkiewicz’s vehicle. Judge Gavin correctly states that the sole issue which he was called upon to address was whether Wassell had a legal basis to stop Korenkiewicz’s vehicle and investigate his condition. Id. at 3. The trial court’s analysis then proceeds as follows:
Here, Wassell testified that he was initially dispatched to the Amoco station to investigate a suspicious vehicle and person. Wassell then received further information that the suspicious vehicle was preparing to exit the service station and that the vehicle’s driver may be intoxicated. Wassell, thus, stopped defendant because he had articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect, or probable cause to believe, that a provision of the Vehicle Code was being violated, specifically, driving under the influence.
Id. at 4. These facts, standing alone, cannot establish articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code. Consequently, they do not justify the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
¶ 6 An examination of Officer Wassell’s entire testimony fails to provide any additional support for a conclusion that grounds existed for a legal stop. When asked, on direct examination, why he responded to the Amoco station on the evening in question, Officer Wassell testified:
A. We received a call for a suspicious vehicle and person complaint, and we had received additional information while en route to the station that the operator may be intoxicated and was preparing to leave.
Q. Okay. When you observed this vehicle, what did you do, or where did you go?
A. I pulled in through the front entrance to come around to the side, and pulled up behind the vehicle, and I initiated my overhead lights. And I got out and approached the vehicle to talk with the operator.
N.T., 2/11/98, at 14-15. On cross-examination, Officer Wassell repeated his understanding of the information transmitted to him over the police radio:
*968Q. Officer, back to prior to the stop, okay, you are on patrol in a marked vehicle; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you received a radio call from the police radio room; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And what did the radio call say to you?
A. Well, I can’t quote them verbatim, but it was a call for a suspicious vehicle and person in the parking lot of the Amoco Station.
Hi H* H* H*
Q. Did you receive any additional information from the radio room on your way to the scene?
A. Yes.
Q. What was it?
A. That the operator could be intoxicated and that it appeared he was going to be exiting the parking lot.
Id. at 20-21. Officer Wassell reiterated that he initiated his overhead lights when he pulled up behind Korenkiewicz’s vehicle. Id. at 21. He testified that Korenk-iewicz was not free to leave, once he, Officer Wassell, initiated his overhead fights. Id. When asked for the reason he had stopped Korenkiewicz, Officer Wassell testified:
A. I was investigating a suspicious vehicle complaint, and that vehicle matched the description given by the radio room.
Q. Did you see any traffic violations?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you see the defendant behave in any way suspiciously prior to the stop?
A. No.
Q. Any evidence whatsoever that the defendant was committing a crime when you pulled up?
A. Not at that moment.
Id. at 21-22.
¶ 7 My distinguished colleagues review the testimony of Kenneth Pingerton, the night manager at the Amoco station where the arrest occurred, along with all of the facts contained in Judge Gavin’s Opinion, as part of the totality of the circumstances. However, Pingerton’s testimony at the suppression hearing is wholly irrelevant to a determination of what conduct Officer Wassell had personally observed or what information he had received over the police radio prior to actuating the overhead fights on the police vehicle. Defense counsel properly objected to Pingerton’s testimony but the objections were overruled by Judge Gavin. Id. at 5-6, 8-9. Officer Wassell’s personal observations and communications are the only relevant subject of inquiry on this appeal, because a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause may be made only on that basis. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 550, 668 A.2d at 1116. Pingerton’s observations of Korenk-iewicz’s conduct are irrelevant to this issue, unless those observations were both reported to the police via 911 and subsequently communicated to Officer Wassell via police radio prior to the actuation of the overhead fights. The record does not support such a conclusion. Similarly, all of Officer Wassell’s testimony concerning his observations, of Korenkiewicz’s behavior after he seized Korenkiewicz’s vehicle is inadmissible to determine the legality of the stop. Commonwealth v. Murray, 460 Pa. 53, 58-59, 331 A.2d 414, 416-17 (1975) (holding officer must articulate specific facts possessed by him or her at time of vehicular stop providing probable cause to believe Vehicle Code was being violated).
¶ 8 We can accept Pingerton’s testimony for the limited purpose of establishing which facts the dispatcher could have received and then subsequently transmitted to Officer Wassell. Pingerton testified that he told the dispatcher “I had a person in the parking lot that was either ill or intoxicated, and I was afraid they were *969going to pull back out on the road.” N.T., 2/11/98, at 10. Pingerton went on to testify that, when he placed a second call to police dispatch, “I told them that the person had looked inside and I felt threatened, I was there by myself, that I wanted somebody there as quick as possible.” Id. at 11. While Pingerton testified to everything he had observed prior to the arrival of Officer Wassell’s police vehicle, our focus must be on the facts known to Officer Wassell when he initiated the investigative stop by actuating his overhead lights. Much of what Pingerton observed, as set forth in the recitation of facts in the Majority Opinion at 1-2, had not been reported at the time Officer Wassell initiated the stop. Instead, the certified record reflects only that Pingerton telephoned 911 and reported first that Korenkiewicz “was either drunk or ill,” N.T. 10, and on the second call, that Korenkiewicz had looked inside the store and Pingerton felt threatened. N.T. 11.
¶ 9 My distinguished colleagues find Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 673 A.2d 915 (1996), inapposite to the case now before us. However, I conclude that Hamilton is applicable to the facts presented here. In Hamilton, a police officer observed the defendant’s vehicle in a restaurant parking lot. Two women were standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle speaking to someone inside. One of these women, Cressley, who was known to the officer, walked over to the police car and told the officer that “everything is O.K., I have his keys.” The officer then drove his vehicle out of the parking lot and parked in another lot across the street. Shortly thereafter, the two women, whom the officer had seen previously, entered the defendant’s car and the defendant drove away. The officer followed the defendant and arrested him for driving under the influence.
¶ 10 The Supreme Court held that Cressley’s statement did not constitute a sufficient basis for an investigative stop. Although the court’s recitation of the facts suggests that the officer may have proceeded directly to an arrest rather than make an investigative stop, the court analyzed the case under the “reasonable suspicion” standard, not that of probable cause for an arrest. Id. at 617-18, 673 A.2d at 918-19. Furthermore, throughout the opinion, the court repeatedly characterized the encounter between the defendant and the officer as a “stop.” Id. The court stated that, while the officer had received information that implied that the defendant was intoxicated, he did nothing to verify that conclusion nor did he observe anything on his own to substantiate the claim. Id. at 618-19, 673 A.2d at 919. The court cited with approval, but distinguished, Commonwealth v. Hamme, 400 Pa.Super. 537, 583 A.2d 1245 (1990), in which a citizen’s report that the defendant had been driving erratically was held to constitute articulable and reasonable suspicion which justified a stop. Id.
¶ 11 Hamilton holds that (i) a citizen’s subjective conclusion and subsequent report that a driver is intoxicated, standing alone, will not support an investigative stop, but (ii) a report that sets forth specific objective observations to draw that conclusion will do so. This interpretation of Hamilton is consistent with our Supreme Court’s requirement that there must exist specific facts that justify the intrusion before the government may single out one vehicle to stop. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 112, 307 A.2d 875, 878 (1973).
¶ 12 The record indicates that Pinger-ton’s call to the police did not set forth the underlying facts upon which he based his conclusion that appellant was “drunk or ill.” Under Hamilton, I would be compelled to reverse. Pingerton’s second call, in which he stated that Korenkiewicz had looked in the store window and that Ping-erton was concerned for his safety, does not affect this result. In Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 314 A.2d 317 (1974), the Supreme Court held that an officer’s testimony that a defendant gave the police an “unusual look” was inadequate to justify *970an investigative stop. Pingerton’s second call consisted only of a vague assertion that was the substantial equivalent of an “unusual look.”
¶ 13 Pingerton may have made sufficient observations to justify his statement to the police that he believed that appellant may have been drunk or ill. However, he did not inform the police of these reasons. The police officer who took the call did not press Pingerton for more details. Therefore, Officer Wassell was left with nothing more than speculation that the suspect may have been either drunk or ill. When coupled with Officer WasselFs admission that he personally observed no untoward behavior prior to initiating the investigative stop, we are left with a shortage of articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the Vehicle Code was being violated.
¶ 14 A police officer may stop a motor vehicle if he or she has probable cause or articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 550, 668 A.2d at 1116. However, an investigative stop will be held illegal where the officer relies upon a police report that provides no objective facts creating a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is “presently involved in criminal activity at the time of the [investigative] stop.” Commonwealth v. Nagle, 451 Pa.Super. 16, 678 A.2d 376, 378 (1996).
¶ 15 Here, Officer Wassell testified that he initiated his overhead lights because he was investigating a suspicious vehicle complaint and because Korenkiewicz’s vehicle matched the description given by the radio room. Prior to the stop, Officer Wassell observed neither suspicious behavior, nor any traffic violation, nor any criminal activity. I am unable to join my colleagues in asserting that a citizen’s complaint of a “suspicious vehicle” where the operator may be “drunk” is sufficient to create either probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, or was being, committed. To lower the threshold of reasonable suspicion to this level would be equal to obviating the requirement that police officers possess knowledge of specific articulable facts before they may make an investigative stop. Where the arresting officer concedes that he observed nothing to corroborate the report of a suspicious vehicle, I can only conclude that the motion for suppression of the evidence arising from the investigative stop should have been granted. I would reverse the judgment of sentence, as well as the order denying the suppression motion, and remand for further proceedings in which all evidence secured after the stop was initiated would be suppressed. Hence, this dissent.