Court Opinion

ID: 9833648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:55:12.972182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.675947
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants urgently insist that we discuss the authorities relied on by them in their briefs filed, and complain of our failure to do so in our opinion on original hearing. In the case of Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717, L. R. A. 1917F, 989, a lease, which in terms was similar to the one in controversy in this suit, was held to be a conveyance of an interest in the land, with a condition of defeasance subsequent- for the nonperformance of which the title might revert to the grantor. Many other decisions are cited by appellants which follow that decision in principle, such as Pierce-Fordyce Oil Association v. Woodrum, 188 S. W. 245. And appellants quoted the following from Simkins on Contracts, pp. 593, 594:
“A condition subsequent operates on an estate already created and vested, which, if not performed, the estate may be defeated by the re-entry of the grantor. * * * When the matters breached are shown by the contract to be vital to its existence, that is, goes to the root of the contract, so that ¡failure would destroy its purpose and object, then the breach would release the promises. * * • Again, it applies in all cases where time is of the essence of the contract, and there is a failure to act within the time as limited.”
Appellants insist, that the instrument in controversy was a conveyance of the minerals underlying the land, upon a condition subsequent expressed in paragraph 8, which condition, they allege, was never performed by the lessee within the time fixed in that paragraph, and that, since such time limit was of the essence of the contract, the title conveyed by the instrument terminated and reverted to the grantors.
In the case of Grubb v. McAfee, 212 S. W. 464, the lease in controversy was canceled on the ground that the facts showed an abandonment by the lessee. And several other decisions have been cited, such as Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co., 178 S. W. 905; Munsey v. Marnett Oil & Gas Co., 199 S. W. 686, which recognize the rule that an oil lease may be canceled for abandonment by the lessee.
In Weiss v. Claborn, 219 S. W. 884, this court held that'the'general rule that a court of equity will never lend its aid to enforce a' forfeiture did not. apply to that case, which was a suit to cancel an oil and gas lease by reason of the failure of the lessee to exercise the option given him to continue it in force by performance of the conditions therein stated.
As shown in our opinion on original hearing, we held that time was of the essence of the conditions to be performed by the lessee, in order to keep alive the lease, and recognized the soundness of the proposition that, unless those conditions were performed, within the limits of time so fixed, all rights of the lessee were lost. In view of that conclusion, to which we still adhere, we deemed it unnecessary to determine whether or not the instrument executed by John Black conveyed title to the minerals upon conditions subsequent, or was a mere optional lease of the mineral rights upon the same conditions, since in either contingency a failure to perform the conditions would give Black, the grantor, and his assignees the right to have the lease canceled.
As shown in our original opinion, drilling operations were begun before the expiration of the 7-year period mentioned in the lease, and after such beginning, they were prosecuted with due diligence until the well was finished. If we were correct in our conclusion that paragraph 8 did not stipulate for a forfeiture in those circumstances, then the issue of aban*864donment prior to the completion of that well had no proper place in the discussion of the case, and for that reason the authorities bearing on that issue, and cited by appellants, were not referred to.
The equity rule invoked in Weiss v. Claborn, 219 S. W. 884, was not invoked by ap-pellees in the present suit, and the conclusions we reached were not in conflict with that decision, but in strict accord with it. Hence we deemed it unnecessary to discuss that case. The lease in controversy here uses the expression. “Under penalty of forfeiture,” and “forfeiture may be saved however,” and we used the term “forfeiture” in the same sense, just as it was used by Chief Justice Phillips in Decker v. Kirlicks, 216 S. W. 385, cited in our original opinion, and as it is commonly used in suits for the cancellation of such leases. That term is given different interpretations in different circumstances, as shown by numerous authorities cited in Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 611, 612.
We fully recognize the right of cancellation, if the conditions of the lease were not complied with within the time limits fixed by its term's. That was all that appellants contended for and insisted on. But for the reasons given in our original opinion, which it is unnecessary to repeat, we did not believe that the lessee failed to comply with the conditions of the lease within the limits of time stipulated. The question of the proper interpretation of the instrument itself was the pivotal and controlling issue in the .case.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.