Court Opinion

ID: 9698952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:04:39.28734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:19.605666
License: Public Domain

*346O’Hara, J.
{dissenting). Regretfully I am compelled to dissent from the conclusions reached by my able colleagues.
As I conceive the issue, the Memorandum of Understanding was final and binding as to its basic intention which was to terminate the litigation.
The trial judge so found in explicit terms:
“This court having found that the cases captioned above were settled by the parties and that ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ is the settlement agreement of the parties; and
“McGregor Manufacturing Corporation’s attorney having telephoned this court and advised this court that the subject cases had been settled August 21, 1968, pursuant to said ‘Memorandum of Understanding’; and
“The court having found that no fraud, mistake or duress was claimed, by either party regarding the execution of said ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, and the court being fully informed in the premises (emphasis added),
“It is ordered, that ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ dated August 21, 1968, a copy of which is attached hereto, be, and the same hereby is, entered as the judgment of this court, and
“It is further ordered, that Charles C. Hill v. Mc-Gregor Manufacturing Corporation, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 67-40710, and the counterclaim therein, be, and the same hereby is, dismissed, with prejudice, and without costs, and
“It is further ordered, that McGregor Manufacturing Corporation v. Merritt D. Hill, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 68-44150, be, and the same hereby is, dismissed, with prejudice, and without costs, and
“It is further ordered, that any and all garnishments in Charles C. Hill v. McGregor Manufacturing Corporation, Oakland County Circuit Court Case No. 67-40710, be, and the same hereby are, released, without costs to either party.”
*347I have searched the record in vain in an effort to find that measure of proof or inference from proof that would justify an appellate court setting aside the above findings.
I readily concede that the judgment as entered on the memorandum contains no replacement for the percentage figure deleted by the parties in paragraph 9, for which an “x” was substituted.
I further concede that the phrase “a certain level” in that paragraph is just as meaningless as “x” percentage.
Absent an agreement by the parties on these two items, the paragraph of the judgment as entered is unenforceable by either party.
But the memorandum adjudicates with finality many other issues between the parties which had been bitterly contested over years of theretofore fruitless negotiations. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Cardozo, it does not accord with my particular sense of justice to compel the litigation of two actions and one counter-action with multiple issues because the terms of one paragraph of the total settlement agreement were left to subsequent anticipated agreement.
I would leave the parties where they left themselves as to paragraph 9. It should be noted that the whole paragraph is contingent in nature:
“If Meg does not receive manufacturing rights at a certain level then [and in that event only] their share of the royalties shall be increased by a figure not to exceed x % of the amount they would otherwise get.” (Bracketed material and emphasis supplied.)
If the initial contingency does not eventuate, no question under paragraph 9 can arise. If it is asserted that the contingency has in fact arisen, the *348forum below is open for appropriate action to establish that fact, and for further proceedings.
I would affirm.