Court Opinion

ID: 9542223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:08.014473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:09.513290
License: Public Domain

*277MOSK, J.
I concur in the result.
The majority are right in their affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeal: The underlying judgment of the superior court against defendant Debra Jane Bray, which is predicated on her criminal liability for the first degree murder of Gaylord Van Camp as an aider and abettor of her codefendant Richard D. Prettyman, must itself be affirmed because there was no reversible error in the instructions on that issue or otherwise.
Other than in the result, however, I do not concur.
The majority are wrong in their discussion of a trial court’s duty to instruct on the criminal liability of the aider and abettor, both generally and in this case itself.
I
We granted review in this cause to resolve a conflict between People v. Mouton (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1313 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 423] (hereafter sometimes Mouton), decided by Division Three of the First Appellate District of the Court of Appeal, and People v. Solis (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 264 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 184] (hereafter sometimes Solis), decided by Division One of the Fourth Appellate District of the Court of Appeal.
Under California law, the criminal liability of an aider and abettor is derivative of that of the actual perpetrator. The aider and abettor may be found guilty of the crime committed by the actual perpetrator that he in fact aids and abets—the “target” crime. But, under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule, the aider and abettor may also be found guilty of any other crime committed by the actual perpetrator—an “ultimate” crime—if any such “ultimate” crime is a natural and probable consequence of the “target” crime.
The Mouton court held that, even without a request, a trial court must instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements—to quote, it must “specify” and “define” any such offense—whenever the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. (People v. Mouton, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1318-1319.) It stated that, “[i]n a criminal case, even absent a request, the trial court has the obligation to instruct the jury on all general legal principles raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case." (Ibid.) It implied that such “general legal principles” include the law relating to any target crime and its elements. (Id. at pp. 1318-1321.)
*278Declining to follow Mouton, the Solis court held that a trial court generally need not instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements when the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. (People v. Solis, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274-275.) It expressed the view that to instruct on a target crime and its elements might burden the jury: It might make even more difficult its already “difficult task of comprehending that the” aider and abettor “may be found guilty of a crime he did not personally commit.” (Id. at p. 275.) It also expressed the view that to instruct on a target crime and its elements would not benefit the jury: Far from being included among the “general legal principles raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case” (People v. Mouton, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1319), the law relating to the target crime and its elements is “irrelevant to the determination of whether the ultimate crime was a natural and probable consequence .... Whether there is a nexus of foreseeability between” the target crime and the ultimate crime “depends not on crime definitions but on the specific facts of each offense.” (People v. Solis, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 273-274, italics in original.)
Whether we should in fact have granted review in this cause to resolve the conflict between Mouton and Solis is open to question. That is because the issue whether the trial court, even without a request, must instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements whenever the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule simply does not present itself here. The record on appeal is clear on its face: The prosecution did not seek so to prove Bray’s guilt as an aider and abettor. To be sure, the superior court did indeed instruct on the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. But, from all that appears, it did so ex mero motu and solely by inadvertence, without support in the facts and without need under the law.
Be that as it may, having granted review, we must at least resolve the conflict correctly. That means that we must follow Solis and reject Mouton— with the result that a trial court generally need not instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements when the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. My reasons are as follows.
At the very outset, we should avoid loading yet another sua sponte instructional duty on trial courts, which are already laden down under similar obligations (People v. Ibarra (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 413, 422-423, fn. 5 [184 Cal.Rptr. 639]; People v. Myers (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 735, 744 [178 Cal.Rptr. 259], disapproved on another point, People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 101 [192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520]).
*279Moreover, as Solis recognizes and Mouton ignores, to instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements might burden the jury: It would make a difficult task more difficult still.
In addition, as Solis also recognizes and Mouton also ignores, to instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements would not benefit the jury: it would rather misdirect its focus away from relevant facts toward inapplicable law. The teaching of decisions such as People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171 [74 Cal.Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198] and People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392] cannot be denied: The determination whether an ultimate crime is a natural and reasonable consequence of a target crime is not the resolution of a pure question of law that depends on a comparison of the offenses and their individual requirements in the abstract. It is rather the resolution of a pure question of fact that turns on an assessment of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes in the concrete.1
Lastly, to instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements might threaten the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome, to the detriment of the aider and abettor himself. In People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423], we concluded that, at the penalty phase of a capital trial, the court generally need not instruct on a crime and its elements under the aggravating factor for other criminal activity involving force or violence. (Id. at p. 73, fn. 25 (plur. opn. by Reynoso, J.).) We reasoned that “a defendant for tactical considerations may not want the penalty phase instructions overloaded with a series of lengthy instructions on the elements of . . . other crimes, perhaps because he fears that such instructions could result in the jury placing undue significance on such other crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die.” (Ibid.) Mutatis mutandis, that reasoning applies here. An aider and abettor might not desire instructions on uncharged target crimes and their elements, because he might be afraid that they might lead the jury to overemphasize the target crimes and to scant the ultimate crime—including the crucial issue of his guilt or innocence.
*280Although a trial court generally need not instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements when the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule, it must indeed do so in a single situation. That is when there is evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt whether the conduct underlying the target crime is in fact sufficient therefor. For, if it is not adequate, the aider and abettor cannot be found guilty of the ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. By definition, the ultimate crime must be the natural and probable consequence of a target crime.
When we turn to the case at bar, we are compelled to conclude that the superior court did not err by failing to instruct on any uncharged target crime or its elements. As stated, the prosecution simply did not seek to prove Bray’s guilt of any charged ultimate crime as an aider and abettor under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule.
In one respect, however, the superior court did indeed err. It instructed on the natural-and-probable-consequence rule itself. In so doing, it instructed “abstractly”—that is, in correct legal terms but without factual applicability (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 282 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897]). It should not have done so. (See ibid.)
The superior court’s error in giving an “abstract” instruction on the natural-and-probable-consequence rule violated California law, but did not implicate the United States Constitution. (See People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 282 & fn. 21 at pp. 282-283.) In most cases an error of this sort is harmless. (Id. at p. 282.) So was it here. The instruction on the rule must have been understood, and dismissed, by the jury as mere surplusage. (See ibid.) It cannot be held to have resulted in a “miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) It was too insignificant to have affected the outcome within a “reasonable probability],” as required by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [299 P.2d 243].
II
In resolving the conflict between Mouton and Solis, the majority do so incorrectly. That is to say, they choose to follow the former and reject the latter—with the result that, even without a request, a trial court must instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements—in their somewhat ambiguous words, it must “identify” and “describe” any such offense (see, e.g., *281maj. opn., ante, at p. 254)2—whenever the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule.
To the extent that the majority rely on reason, they are not persuasive. Let us consider each of their points in turn.
First, the majority assert that an instruction on any uncharged target crime and its elements will make it easier for the jury to determine whether the charged ultimate crime was a natural and probable consequence. But, as stated, such a determination is not the resolution of a pure question of law that depends on a comparison of the offenses and their individual requirements in the abstract. It is rather the resolution of a pure question of fact that turns on an assessment of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes in the concrete.3
Second, the majority assert that an instruction on any uncharged target crime and its elements will make it harder for the jury to speculate as to what conduct is in fact sufficient therefor. But, in the general case, the likelihood of such speculation is itself purely conjectural. So long as it is properly instructed on the natural-and-probable-consequence rule, the jury will direct its labors to the facts, and will not be tempted to muse about the law.
To the extent that the majority rely on authority, they are even less persuasive. After close consideration, their invocation of People v. Failla (1966) 64 Cal.2d 560 [51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39] (hereafter sometimes Failla), proves to help them not at all.
Failla was charged with five counts of burglary, which arose out of the breaking and entry into the apartments of five different women at night. At *282trial, “the evidence showed [he] entered each apartment, awoke the victim, and threatened her into silence. On Count I there was evidence tending to show that [he] intended to commit an act of oral copulation . . . ; but when the victim resisted and told him she was menstruating, [he] masturbated and left. On Count II [he] told the victim he wanted to show her his penis; he did so, and announced his intention to masturbate. ... On Count III [he] told the victim, T want you to play with me’; he took her hand and forced her to masturbate him, then left. On Count IV [he] told the victim he did not want to have intercourse with her but just wanted to kiss her; he put his hand on her private parts, and left when she began screaming. On Count V [he] appeared on the victim’s windowsill clad only in underwear, and said, T want you’; she screamed and he left.” (People v. Failla, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 563.) The court instructed the jury that “one who enters an apartment with intent to commit theft ‘or any felony’ is guilty of burglary,” and that “a necessary element of burglary is a specific intent to commit theft ‘or any felony.’ ” (Id. at pp. 563-564.) The jury found Failla guilty of each of the five burglaries charged. The court rendered judgment accordingly.
Having granted a hearing, we held: “The court committed . . . error in failing to give a[n] . . . instruction on its own motion defining ‘felony’ and advising the jury which acts [Failla], upon entry, may have intended to commit would amount to felonies. . . . [W]here the evidence permits an inference that the defendant at the time of entry intended to commit one or more felonies and also an inference that his intent was merely to commit one or more misdemeanors or acts not punishable as crimes, the court must define ‘felony’ and must instruct the jury which acts, among those which the jury could infer the defendant intended to commit, amount to felonies. . . . [50 . . . [0]n each burglary count the jury was required to find [Failla’s] intent upon entry circumstantially from his conduct and statements after entry. But on the evidence presented such conduct and statements remained ambiguous: they were subject to an inference not only that [he] intended to commit one or more felonies (e.g., oral copulation . . .), but also intended to commit one or more misdemeanors (e.g., indecent exposure or battery) or acts which are not crimes (e.g., masturbation).” (People v. Failla, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 564-565.)
The majority claim that Failla holds that, even without a request, a trial court must instruct on any predicate felony and its elements whenever the prosecution seeks to prove a burglar’s guilt.
Failla does no such thing.
As its very words establish, Failla holds only that, even without a request, a trial court must instruct on any predicate felony and its elements when the *283prosecution seeks to prove a burglar’s guilt in a situation in which there is evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt whether the conduct underlying the predicate felony is in fact sufficient therefor.
Hence, Failla does not support the majority’s conclusion that, even without a request, a trial court must instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements whenever the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule. It is rather altogether consistent with my position that a trial court generally need not instruct on an uncharged target crime and its elements when the prosecution seeks to prove an aider and abettor’s guilt of a charged ultimate crime under the natural-and-probable-consequence rule, except in a situation in which there is evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt whether the conduct underlying the target crime is in fact sufficient therefor.
Next, in turning their attention to what transpired in the superior court below, the majority do little better. Only brief comment is called for.
The majority conclude that the superior court erred, under California law and not the United States Constitution, but do so rather curiously. They reason that, once it undertook to instruct on the natural-and-probable-consequence rule, in spite of the fact that the rule was inapplicable, it was then bound to instruct on any uncharged target crime and its elements, even though such an instruction would have been required only if the rule had in fact been applicable. Their only support is ipse dixit. It is not enough.
III
Because the judgment of the Court of Appeal is sound, I join the majority in affirmance. But, for the reasons stated above, I join them no further.

See, e.g., People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323] (“The determination whether [an ultimate crime] was a natural and probable consequence of [a target crime] . . . requires application of an objective rather than subjective test. [Citations.] This does not mean that the issue is to be considered in the abstract as a question of law. [Citation.] Rather, the issue is a factual question to be resolved by the jury in light of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. (People v. Croy [(1985)] 41 Cal.3d [1,] 12, fn. 5 [221 Cal.Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]; People v. Durham [(1969)] 70 Cal.2d [171,] 181 [74 Cal.Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198].) Consequently, the issue . . . depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have or should have known that the [ultimate crime] was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the” target crime.).

As noted, the Moutoti court used the more precise words “specify” and “define.” (People v. Mouton, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.)

An example that the majority present to prove their point does the opposite. “If,” they say, “the jury had concluded that. . . Bray had encouraged . . . Prettyman to commit an assault on Van Camp but that Bray had no reason to believe that Prettyman would use a deadly weapon such as a steel pipe to commit the assault, then the jury could not properly find that the murder of Van Camp was a natural and probable consequence of the assault encouraged by Bray. [Citation.] If, on the other hand, the jury had concluded that Bray encouraged Prettyman to assault Van Camp with the steel pipe, or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, then it could appropriately find that Prettyman’s murder of Van Camp was a natural and probable consequence of that assault. Therefore, instructions identifying and describing the crime of assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury [citation] as the appropriate target crime would have assisted the jury in determining whether Bray was guilty of Van Camp’s murder under the ‘natural and probable consequences’ doctrine.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 267.) Not so. The law, as to either simple or aggravated assault, is of little importance. What matters, as the majority themselves imply, are the facts—including what, if anything, Bray actually “had . . . reason to believe” and what, if anything, she actually “encouraged.”