Court Opinion

ID: 9885201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:47:02.561229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:42.940846
License: Public Domain

AVachenfeld, J.
(dissenting). The killing was vicious, cruel and bloody, and the gruesome details need not be recited further than to say that death was the result of an assault and robbery and under the statute was murder in the first degree.
But the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial are not impaired by the abundance of evidence against the accused, nor is the law to be altered or the trial errors condoned or excused because of evident guilt, if in fact they resulted in manifest wrong and injury.
I am in accord with the majority opinion except as to two points. I think there was error in the return of the verdict, which was a nullity for failure to comply with the statute by reciting the degree of murder of which the defendants were *132•convicted, and in the distribution of the so-called “blue book” with the legend set forth therein.
It is not disputed that three of the jurors in the Yaszorich •case, when polled, upon being asked to declare their verdict, merely responded: “Guilty, with no recommendation,” without specifying the- degree of murder as required by the statute. As to Brown, six jurors, when polled, replied: ■“Guilty, with a recommendation of life imprisonment.”
The statutory requirement as to the way and manner such verdict must be returned is found in N. J. S. 2A :113-2:
“A jury finding a person guilty of murder shall designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second ■degree.”
This court, in State v. Cooper, 2 N. J. 540 (1949), said it was “imperative in its command,” it was “a solemn obligation * * * in a matter of the utmost gravity,” “the Legislature deemed it essential that in resolving an issue involving the death penalty or life imprisonment the finding he specific and not left to conjecture.”
In State v. Cleveland, 6 N. J. 316 (1951), the unanimous court repeated:
“The question involves more than a technical violation of a statute or rule of procedure. * * * The finding must be specific and in exact accord with the statutory mandate.”
The same forceful language was used four months ago in State v. Greedy, 11 N. J. 485 (1953):
“It is the duty of the jury to find a verdict in compliance with the statutory mandate and the degree of murder of which the defendant is guilty is a specific prerequisite.”
The majority opinion concedes that under the statute “it is imperative that the jury ‘shall * * * designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree.’ ” It admits that on the poll the jurors failed to specify the degree of murder, but with seeming *133inconsistency then sustains the verdict because the failure of the jurors to specify the degree of murder was due to-“momentary inadvertence” and their conduct did not evince-a lack of “fixed intent” and concludes that “the inference necessarily suggested by the recommendation * * * may sufficiently show individual concurrence in a correct verdict
In other words, inferences can be drawn as to what the jurors meant or intended and their failure to comply with» the statute is to be excused because of “momentary inadvertence.”
In State v. Cleveland, supra, however, we said just the; opposite:
“Such a determination cannot be left to inference. The finding must be specific and in exact accord with the statutory mandate.”
And then to dispel any doubt as to this rule’s application im a poll of the jury, we said:
“We think the law clearly demands that when a jury in a murder case is polled, each juror, if he finds the defendant guilty, shall designate by his verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree.
This was not done in the case under consideration, and we think it. constituted prejudicial and therefore reversible error.”
It was not new law, for in State v. Cooper, supra, we said it is “essential that in resolving an issue involving the death, penalty'or life imprisonment the finding be specific and not left to conjecture.”
Then, to make “assurance doubly sure,” in State v. Greely, supra, we said compliance with the statutory mandate as to-the degree of murder was a “specific prerequisite.”
To me the factual situation here is identical. The Constitution is the same; the statute still remains in full force and< effect on our books. The only difference is that Cleveland,. Cooper and the others have been disposed of and Yaszorich- and Brown are answering at the bar of justice. The rule as-to them is different; it has been changed and Yaszorich’s *134death is decreed with little thought to the standards applied by us to others under the same circumstances.
No tribunal, high or low, has the right to take life without strict compliance with the legislative and constitutional mandates permitting it, nor is the judicial reasoning of such substance, quality or stability as to be an adequate substitute for the enacted provisions.
The comforting faith in the equality of the criminal law and its impartial administration may well totter under the impact of the attempted distinction here made. My bewilderment lies in my inability to reconcile the inconsistent treatment and results arrived at under the same law.
Also, there was distributed to the entire panel of prospective jurors a so-called “blue book” of 28 pages, entitled “Primary Instructions to Jurors,” containing this statement : “Facts and Principles with Which Every Juror Should Make Himself Familiar.” It had printed on its face in large letters, “Compliments of the Sheriff.” This advertisement admittedly had many errors not disputed by the majority opinion, including an improper definition of reasonable doubt quite contrary to what was ultimately charged by the trial judge. The booklet was given to the jurors without authority of any court, and they had it in their possession for four or five days. The concluding page of this catalogue of misleading “facts and principles” was devoted exclusively to this admonition, prominently and impressively displayed:
“On the head of the criminal lies the crime; but in a miscarriage of justice the jurors delinquent become participants of guilt.” Lyeurgus
History tells us that the author’s Spartan leadership existed in the Ninth Century b. c. His qualifications for instructing our jurors in this jurisdiction and in this age are absent from the record.
On oral argument the prosecutor honestly and freely admitted this quotation was not good law and he did not even undertake to defend it. That was left to us as another judicial chore if we would sustain the judgment below.
*135Realistically, this coined phrase trampled upon the constitutional privileges of the defendants and annihilated their rights by denying to them the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It replaced these two fundamental principles, constituting the very foundation of our criminal law, with a threat that unless there was a verdict of guilty, the jurors who asserted their independence, did their own thinking, and followed the law would themselves be guilty of a crime.
A greater trespass upon the primary rights of the prisoners is difficult to conceive. We have humbly said: “ ‘A thing in writing carries, particularly with the layman, a weight of its own,’ ” and such an incident “shears the balance of the oral testimony in the case of the weight it would otherwise have and is erroneous.” State v. Cleveland, supra.
The gravity of the situation was recognized by the trial court when, referring to the booklets, it said they “might be misleading when in the hands of laymen who know nothing about the law” and therefore ordered that the books be taken from the jurors. However, this action and what was said by the court were obviously ineffective as a cure for an error so prejudicial and glaringly defiant of our concept of essential and fundamental justice.
The harm occasioned by the written erroneous instructions as the guide by Which the jurors were to determine the fate of the defendants, absorbed by and impressed upon them by having physical possession of the erring document for days, could not be overcome that easily. “A thing in writing carries a weight of its own,” and a nullification of its imprint under the admitted circumstances is difficult of accomplishment.
The solemnity of the method of taking a verdict in a first degree murder case as required by the statute has been in existence for 35 years, State v. Turco, 98 N. J. L. 61 (Sup. Ct. 1922), and has been confirmed by this court on three different occasions within the last few years in strong and *136unequivocal language; yet the majority sees a difference in the case sub judice which I am unable to discern.
In effect, it changes the law, and if a change is to be made, we should at least recognize the right of the Legislature to make it instead of usurping its prerogative. Here in substance we now refuse to enforce a legislative directive which we have already upheld and termed a “solemn obligation,” “imperative in its command,” of the “utmost gravity,” and which the courts have supported since its enactment in 1917.
Apparently we do not mean what we said a few months ago, no matter how emphatically or plainly we expressed it. In fact, we have just changed our mind and that, it seems, should be sufficient, but Vaszorich is going to have difficulty understanding it.
His treatment is contrary to the standards heretofore unanimously agreed upon and accorded to others. I doubt if my difficulty is due to my lack of experience in criminal matters. Nevertheless, my analysis of the issues involved, with the pronounced authorities, compels me to conclude that the death warrant here, when issued, must be classified as “expedient” rather than “legal.”
I would reverse as to both defendants.
Mr. Justice Heher and Mr. Justice Burling concur in this dissent.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Oliphant, Jacobs and Brennan—4.
For reversal—Justices Heher, Wachenebld and Burling —3.