Court Opinion

ID: 9495157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:55:56.860239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:51.104077
License: Public Domain

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This is a criminal case for reentry after deportation, not direct review of the deportation.1 Ahumada-Aguilar has won this case before on the theory that maybe he wasn’t an alien at all.2 The Supreme Court vacated.3 Now he wins again. And again, his victory isn’t based on any question about whether he reentered following deportation, but on the theory that his deportation proceeding was defective. Aid again,4 we err. The collateral issue on which Ahumada-Aguilar gains relief under today’s majority opinion is that his waiver of counsel was defective under our previous decisions. But today’s decision doesn’t follow our precedents; rather, it expands and extends them far beyond their already extended reach.
1. Procedural Defect
The issue here is whether Ahumada-Aguilar, in his deportation hearing, waived his right to counsel. Deportation isn’t criminal, so we are not talking about the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rather, the right to counsel at issue is the one codified in the applicable statute and INS regulations.5 Under the regulation, the Immigration Judge had to “require him to state then and there whether he desires representation.”6 The IJ did just that. He carefully explained the right to representation, saw to it that the four people before him knew that they had a right to free lawyers, and gave them a list of the names of such lawyers. Ahumada-Aguilar was given a form in Spanish and English explaining his right, and advised that he could be helped to obtain a free lawyer if he couldn’t afford to hire one.
*953Then the Immigration Judge, in the context of discussing the right to representation by a lawyer, said that anyone who didn’t want the continuance to obtain counsel that the judge had offered, and instead wanted to proceed immediately and waive counsel, should stand up and raise his hand. The IJ told them that “[tjhose of you who want to proceed right now and speak for yourselves [should] please stand up.” After being asked for clarification by one of the detainees, the IJ answered, “I have told you that if you want more time to get a lawyer I will give you more time .... But if you want to proceed right now and speak for yourselves, proceed with your case right now, I want you to stand up and raise your right hand.” Ahumada-Aguilar stood up and raised his hand. The record is perfectly clear on that. Had there been any ambiguity about whether Ahumada-Aguilar preferred to take advantage of the judge’s offer of a continuance to obtain counsel, or to waive counsel and proceed immediately, it would be fully cleared up by Ahumada-Aguilar’s statement when the judge conducted his individualized colloquy following the group procedure. When the judge explained that Ahumada-Aguilar could appeal his decision, Ahumada-Aguilar said, “I just want to get it over with.”
The deportation hearing was conducted in English and Spanish. Ahumada-Agui-lar had lived in the United States most of his life and was fluent in both languages. Most of the difficulty in reading the hearing transcript is not because it was inherently confusing to the participants, but because it is hard to read a transcript where the proceedings are translated, and initials are used to refer to the interpreter when the interpreter states in English what was just said in Spanish.
The majority says the IJ’s procedure was so defective as to constitute a denial of the constitutional right to due process, under United States v. Lopez-Vasquez,7 United States v. Ortiz-Rivera,8 and United States v. Zarate-Martinez.9 But those cases are distinguishable. In all three, the alien had to stand up to assert the right. In Lopez-Vasquez, we held that “mass waiver by silence made it impossible to determine whether [the alien] made a voluntary and intelligent decision,” because “individual detainees will feel coerced by the silence of their fellows” and directing that someone who wants to assert a right “must stand up ... tended to stigmatize.” 10 In Ortiz-Rivera, we held that making an alien stand up if he wanted to preserve his right to appeal was inadequate under Lopez-Vasquez.11 Likewise in Zarate-Martinez we held, following Lopez-Vasquez, that making an alien raise his hand to assert his right was “indistinguishable from the silent waiver we condemned in Lopez-Vasquez.”12
But in this case, Ahumada-Aguilar didn’t have to stand up or raise his hand to assert or retain a right. There wasn’t any “silent waiver” in the sense that we condemned it in those cases. In all three of those cases, if an alien, through social pressure, shyness, or inattention, sat and did nothing, his right disappeared. But in the case at bar, if Ahumada-Aguilar sat and did nothing, his right was retained. In order to waive his right, Ahumada-Aguilar had to do what we said was too *954much to ask in those three cases: he had to stand up and also raise his hand. Since it is much more conventional to do one or the other but not both, it is hard to imagine anyone standing up and simultaneously raising his hand unless he really meant to. You don’t stand up and raise your hand through shyness, inattention, or discomfort with an unfamiliar situation.
Moreover, it isn’t the silence, as such, that makes the waiver bad in Lopez-Vasquez: it’s the ambiguity. It’s hard to tell if someone sitting and doing nothing really means to do something, namely to waive a right. In this case, Ahumada-Aguilar’s act of standing and raising his hand made his active choice clear. In deliberative bodies, standing up is used as a means of avoiding possible ambiguity that may arise from oral expression. Robert’s Rules says that if any member of a deliberative body doubts a vote, a “division” is called for, and the chairman should first ask those in favor of the motion to rise, and then those opposed to rise, in order to be accurately counted.13 The physical movement is used as an especially plain and express statement.
2. Prejudice
The majority’s prejudice analysis is also mistaken. The majority says that a competent lawyer would have asserted that Ahumada-Aguilar was a citizen. I don’t think that contention at any time had merit, and I dissented when a majority of this panel previously said it did.14 The Supreme Court vacated that previous majority decision.15 As a matter of law, there cannot be cognizable prejudice arising out of failure to assert a legally erroneous position.16
The majority says that a competent lawyer would have pressed an appeal merely for purposes of delay, so that Ahumada-Aguilar could stretch his residency to five years. That is a troubling notion of competence. An ethical lawyer does not file papers in order to cause unnecessary delay.17
The majority’s last point on prejudice is that a lawyer would have warned Ahuma-da-Aguilar against waiving his right to fight deportation, because he wouldn’t be able to get back in. That assumes too much. First, because his previous convictions for possession of cocaine and residential burglary would have weighed heavily against a discretionary waiver of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1991), his likelihood of getting this relief wouldn’t be high enough to sacrifice any other concerns Ahumada-Aguilar might have had about remaining in custody. Second, although no lawyer could suggest it, he could get back in despite deportation by sneaking in, which is just what he did at least seven times. And third, most importantly, criminals waive their rights and accept *955immediate deportation all the time, because a bus ride out of the United States to immediate freedom is a lot better than sitting for weeks or months in detention pending deportation proceedings. A waiver is often intelligent and knowing for this reason. We can never know what Ahuma-da-Aguilar knew and what his attorney might have known about why it might be in his interest to get deported immediately rather than staying in jail in the United States. A competent and ethical lawyer might very well have advised Ahumada-Aguilar to do just what he did, and there isn’t any showing of prejudice.
Because the IJ in this case did not violate Ahumada-Aguilar’s right to due process and because, even if he had, there was no prejudice, I dissent.

. See Majority at 945.

. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.1999) ("Ahumada I ”).

. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 533 U.S. 913, 121 S.Ct. 2518, 150 L.Ed.2d 691 (2001) ("Ahumada II").

. See Ahumada I, 189 F.3d at 1127 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).

. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1991); see also 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a).

. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a).

. 1 F.3d 751 (9th Cir.1993).

. 1 F.3d 763 (9th Cir.1993).

. 133 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir.1998).

. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d at 754.

. Ortiz-Rivera, 1 F.3d at 768.

. Zarate-Martinez, 133 F.3d at 1198.

. Robert’s Rules of Order § 38 (1982).

. Ahumada I, 189 F.3d at 1127 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).

. Ahumada II, 533 U.S. at 913, 121 S.Ct. 2518.

. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 392, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (”[G]iven the overriding interest in fundamental fairness, the likelihood of an outcome attributable to an incorrect interpretation of the law should be regarded as a potential 'windfall' to the defendant rather than ... legitimate prejudice'.”).

.See, for example, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1) ("By presenting [papers] to the court.., an attorney ... is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, — (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to ... cause unnecessary delay.”); see also Wash. R.P.C. §§ 1.3, 3.2 (1985).