Court Opinion

ID: 9940372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 07:11:44.270047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:48.435125
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion Filed February 7, 2024.

                                    S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00713-CV

                   ROBERT CARROLL BEVERS, Appellant
                                V.
                     PEYTON LYNN MABRY, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 417th Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 417-52953-2022

             CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
              Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Miskel
           Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
      I concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s opinion. I concur with

Part II of the majority’s opinion because I agree it is unnecessary to re-evaluate the

holdings of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals or the prior holdings of this Court

with respect to the constitutionality of the stalking statute. Because I would affirm

the judgment, however, I respectfully dissent to the remainder of the majority

opinion.

      By reversing the protective order at issue here, my colleagues fail to give the

trial court’s findings the required deference and improperly minimize and discredit
testimony supporting the injunction. Section 42.072 of the Texas Penal Code

requires proof the defendant “knowingly engages in conduct that:

            (1) constitutes an offense under Section 42.07, or that the
            actor knows or reasonably should know the other
            person will regard as threatening:

                  (A) bodily injury or death for the other
                  person;

                  (B) bodily injury or death for a member of
                  the other person’s family or household or
                  for an individual with whom the other
                  person has a dating relationship; or

                  (C) that an offense will be committed
                  against the other person’s property;

            (2) causes the other person, a member of the other person’s
            family or household, or an individual with whom the other
            person has a dating relationship to be placed in fear of
            bodily injury or death or in fear that an offense will be
            committed against the other person’s property, or to feel
            harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented,
            embarrassed, or offended; and

            (3) would cause a reasonable person to:

                  (A) fear bodily injury or death for himself or
                  herself;

                  (B) fear bodily injury or death for a member
                  of the person’s family or household or for an
                  individual with whom the person has a dating
                  relationship;

                  (C) fear that an offense will be committed
                  against the person’s property; or

                  (D) feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused,
                  tormented, embarrassed, or offended.

TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072(a) (emphasis added).
                                       –2–
        On appeal, Bevers argues the evidence is legally insufficient to prove he acted

with the requisite mens rea of “knowingly.” The majority agrees with Bevers and

sustains his sufficiency challenge by concluding “there is a complete absence of

evidence to prove Bevers acted with the requisite intent of knowingly threatening to

inflict bodily injury or death on Mabry or her family or to commit an offense against

Mabry’s property under § 42.072(a)(1).” More specifically, the majority concludes:

        There is nothing in the record showing that Bevers’s conduct threatened
        bodily injury or death to Mabry or her family or threatened an offense
        against Mabry’s property. To be sure, threats of harm need not be
        directly expressed and may be contained in veiled statements. But, in
        this case, the evidence does not show that Bevers ever alluded to bodily
        injury or another felony. Nor, for example, does it show that Bevers
        entered the Mabrys’ house and refused to leave until a demand was
        satisfied. Without more, there is nothing in the record that reasonably
        suggests the birthday and other cards signed “Romeo,” flowers, and
        perfume sets with the words “sweet” and “beautiful” were threatening
        death or bodily injury to Mabry or her family, or harm to Mabry’s
        property

(citations omitted).

        The majority appears to interpret section 42.072(a)(1) as requiring proof a

defendant made an actual threat. To commit the offense of stalking, however, the

complainant is not required to prove the defendant actually threatened bodily injury

or death.1 Rather, the statute requires proof the defendant “knowingly engaged in

    1
     See Griswold v. State, 673 S.W.3d 423, 432–33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (evidence sufficient
where “Griswold repeatedly sent emails, letters, cds, and text messages” over a decade-long period); see
also Hutton v. State, 313 S.W.3d 902, 908–09 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet. ref’d) (legally sufficient
evidence supported finding that reasonable person would have been placed in fear of bodily injury or death
from defendant’s actions, for purpose of supporting stalking conviction, where defendant exhibited pattern
of behavior, including leaving numerous phone messages for victim, appearing several times at her

                                                  –3–
conduct that the actor knows or reasonably should know the other person “will

regard as threatening” bodily injury or death for the complainant or her family or

“will regard as threatening. . . that an offense will be committed against the other

person’s property.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.072(a)(1) (emphasis added). To act

knowingly under the stalking statute, Bevers did not have to threaten bodily injury

or death or threaten an offense against Mabry’s property. Instead, Bevers had to

know or reasonably should have known Mabry would regard his conduct as

threatening bodily injury or death or threatening an offense against Mabry’s

property.

        Here, the evidence shows Mabry had been fearful for her own safety and for

the safety of her parents since the April incident. Further, Mabry testified she found

Bevers’s actions disturbing and took them as a threat. Although Mabry did not use

the magic words “bodily injury” or “death” to describe what threat Bevers’s conduct

indicated he planned to carry out, the record shows she considered Bevers’s conduct

to be a threat to harm her or her family. Rather than focus on the specific words used

by Mabry, I would address whether Bevers knew or should have known Mabry

would regard his conduct as threatening bodily injury or death against Mabry or her

family or threatening an offense against Mabry’s property.

apartment and other places where he knew she would be, and engaging in conduct that he knew would
frighten her); Battles v. State, 45 S.W.3d 694, 701 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.) (evidence legally
sufficient to support court’s finding that victim feared defendant might hurt or kill her or her son where
victim testified she was scared, witness observed victim to be “shaken” on one occasion when defendant
followed victim to daycare, and victim once called 911 when defendant was following her).
                                                  –4–
      Under this record, I would conclude the evidence is sufficient to establish

Bevers had the required mens rea. Mabry’s failure to use magic words to pinpoint

what offenses she thinks would be committed by Bevers does not support the

majority’s conclusion Mabry did not or could not reasonably believe Bevers was

threatening to commit bodily injury or death against her or her family. On the

contrary, a reasonable woman could easily consider Bevers’s conduct physically

threatening. Bevers, a stranger to Mabry, left her unsolicited gifts, signed the

accompanying cards as “Romeo,” repeatedly drove past her parents’ residence, and

changed his looks and vehicle to match Mabry’s father and brother. Bevers’s

conduct is not only “creepy,” but it is also the type of conduct a reasonable woman

would find physically threatening. The trial court heard the testimony, viewed the

witnesses’ body language, tone of voice, and demeanor, and found in Mabry’s favor.

I would affirm that decision.

      This Court is unable to weigh the evidence in person and consider the

witnesses’ credibility the way a trial judge can. The applicable standard of review

requires our Court to afford more deference to the trial judge’s findings than the

majority opinion gives.

      The appellate jurist must always remember and heed the truism that we
      have before us cold written records. We must afford the trial court
      discretion because the trial court judge is in a superior position to
      appraise the impact of the probative force of the evidence. The trial
      court judge sees and observes the witnesses, the defendants, the jurors
      (if any), and the lawyers; the trial court alone is in a position to witness
      all the participants’ mannerisms and reactions. The trial court alone can

                                         –5–
        weigh the intonation of the voices and the demeanors and acts and
        mannerisms of the witnesses.

Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 805 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 1991, writ denied). The grounds on which the majority reverses the

injunction do not follow these tenets of review. I, therefore, respectfully dissent to

Part III of the majority opinion.2

                                         CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, I concur in Part II of the majority opinion and

respectfully dissent from the remainder.

                                                     /Robbie Partida-Kipness/
                                                     ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
                                                     JUSTICE
220713DF.P05

    2
      Applying the applicable standards of review, I would overrule each of Bevers’s appellate issues and
affirm the judgment. Because the majority does not address Bevers’s remaining appellate issues, however,
I decline to address the merits of those issues here.
                                                  –6–