Court Opinion

ID: 9663990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:58:28.063162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:00.683205
License: Public Domain

Patterson, J.,
dissenting in part — concurring in part.
I dissent from the opinion of the majority as it is my opinion that the relationship between Brent and the Gin was that of a gratuitous bailment with the attendant duty of the gratuitous bailor to warn the bailee of any known defects in the bailed chattel. I concur in the result as to Compress.
In regard to the former, I note that Brent was an independent electrical contractor; that he was hired by Compress to repair the defective hoist; that he was to be paid by Compress on a labor and material basis, as he had been paid in the past, for the performance of specific tasks. He was a business stranger to the owners of the Gin, had never been hired by them and expected no pay from them. From the entire record I can detect neither tangible nor conjectural hope of remuneration or reward to Brent from the Gin for either his services or the use of his hoist, the use of the hoist as between these two being for the benefit of the Gin only. Under these facts I am of the opinion that Brent was a gratuitous bailor to the Gin. See 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bailments see. 15 (1963) as follows: “The general rules for distinguishing a bailment for hire from a bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor are for the most part applicable in différentiating such a bailment from one for the sole benefit of the bailee ....
“A bailment for mutual benefit arises when both parties to the bailment receive a benefit from the trans*120action although, no actual money or other consideration passes, as where the bailment or loan of an article is motivated by the bailor’s desire to promote a sale of it by the bailee. But to create a bailment for mutual benefits in a business transaction, the reward of the bailor must be found to arise out of hope of tangible remuneration from the transaction then being consummated, or it must be shown that the bailor has held out to the public in general a firm offer that in consideration of the business to be transacted he would create a benefit for a bailee.” See Robirtson v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co., 171 Miss. 628, 158 So. 350 (1935), a suit by an employee of a creosoting company against the railroad who furnished the company a defective car, the defect causing his injury, wherein it stated: “The purpose for which the railroad car was being used at the time of appellant’s injury was one incident solely to the business of the creosoting company. ... It does not appear from the averments of the declaration that the particular use made of the car by the creosoting company, that is, its use in a strictly intraplant movement of his products for convenient storage for ultimate shipment was any way connected with, or in aid of, appellee’s business of transporting such products at such future time as the business of the creosoting company required. ... We think this charge, when taken in connection with all the averments of the declaration as to the business relations between the appellees and the creosoting company, is too indefinite and sets forth facts too remote to constitute a business interest on the part of the appellees in the mere intra-plant movement of the creosoting company’s products.” (Emphasis ours.) Appellee cites no authority to the effect that Brent is other than a gratuitous bailor nor does he argue to the contrary.
A gratuitous bailor owes only a duty to his bailee to warn of known defects in the instrument or thing fur*121nished to the bailee. Robirtson supra; Ruth v. Hutchinson Gas Co., 209 Minn. 248, 296 NW 136 (1941); Blom v. McNeal, 199 Minn. 506, 272 NW 599 (1937); and Prosser Torts sec. 84, at 513 (2d ed. 1955), wherein he states, “The cases which have dealt with gratuitous lenders and bailors have held that there is no greater obligation toward a third person than to the immediate bailee. The bailor is therefore under no duty to inspect the chattel before delivering it, and the bailee assumes the full responsibility for its condition. There is liability only for a failure to disclose defects of which the bailor has knowledge which may render it dangerous to others. ’ ’ And 8 C.J.S. Bailments sec. 25(b), at 386 (1962), “As a general rule, the only duty which a gratuitous bailor owed either to the bailee or to third persons is to warn them of known defects which render the bailed chattel dangerous for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used.” There being no evidence by the plaintiff that Brent knew of any defect in the hoist and no evidence from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that he knew thereof which would support a verdict for the Gin as against Brent, the motion for a directed verdict by Brent at the close of plaintiffs’ testimony should have been sustained. Clark v. Luther McGill, 240 Miss. 509, 127 So. 2d 858 (1961); and Williamson v. Inzer, 239 Miss. 707, 125 So. 2d 77 (1961). I am of the opinion the court erred in overruling Brent’s motion for a peremptory instruction.
The majority opinion states that Brent should not be held to a lesser degree of responsibility than Compress. Unfortunately, no authorities are cited to establish this same degree of responsibility with Compress, and those which hold differently, with deference, are not followed. Robirtson is cited by the majority as being-no obstacle in the path of the “same degree of responsibility” conclusion. I cite it as being squarely in point and authority for Brent’s legal position as a gratuitous *122bailor with a lesser degree of responsibility to the Gin than Compress. The controlling opinion asserts, however, that Brent’s relationship to the Gin was entirely different from that of the railroad company to the creosoting company in Robirtson. It is different and this difference strengthens Brent’s gratnitons position. In Robirtson the railroad, which supplied a defective car, had hope of ultimate future reward by way of increased business as the result of the use of the car. This Court held this hope of reward was too remote to hold the railroad to be other than a gratuitous bailor. Here Brent had no hope of reward whatsoever, either remote or otherwise, from the Gin and thus the case is actually authority for his position as a gratuitous bailor. It is my opinion that the principles announced in Robirtson should be followed, as I do not see how it can with logic be distinguished from the case at bar.
The opinion of the majority suggests “that Brent had a direct arid immediate financial interest in supplying the hoist to Gin. ...” Assuming this to be true, the financial interest of Brent was still to be paid by Compress and not by Gin as is positively reflected by the record, therefore, their relationship was not altered.
The majority suggests also that Brent as the owner and physical possessor of the hoist, and being an electrician, was the only one who had opportunity to use reasonable care to see that the hoist was reasonably safe for its intended use and the only one who had the right to repair the hoist or have it repaired. I disagree as I do not believe the facts warrant this assumption. The evidence reflects that Brent was an electrician, but it also reflects that he obtained the services of an electrician skilled in electric motors, Flannigan, to repair the hoist. Whether this was done due to his own inability, for convenience, or for whatever reason, the fact remains that Brent was not shown to be a person of superior knowledge as to electric motors; if anything, *123the inference would seemingly be to the contrary as he hired another to do this work for him. To assume, as the majority does, that Brent was the only one who had the opportunity or right to use reasonable care to see that the hoist was reasonably safe for its intended use is erroneous. The majority imposes a duty of reasonable inspection upon Compress and they must therefore confer therewith the right to perform that duty. Lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Here the majority states that Compress owes the duty of reasonable inspection and yet it withholds from it the right of inspection, thus creating a legal paradox in which I cannot concur, especially in view of the statement of the majority, “Compress assumed dominion and control over the Brent hoist. . . . ”
I concur in the result as to Compress, as I am of the opinion that the question of reasonable inspection and the related question of whether a reasonable inspection would have disclosed the defect, and whether the defect caused the injury, was one for the jury to pass upon under proper instructions.
The duty owed by a bailor to his bailee when the bailment is for their mutual benefit is expressed in 8 C.J.S. Bailments sec. 25, at 381 (1962), as follows: “A bailor has the duty to use ordinary, due or reasonable care to furnish chattels which are reasonably fit for the purposes of the bailment, or capable of the use, known or intended, for which they are bailed. ... To this end the bailor must use reasonable care to inspect or examine the chattel before delivering it to the bailee, particularly where it was made by a third person. Under other authorities, the bailor owes a duty to the bailee and to third persons to make the chattel safe for the use to which it is to be put, or to give warnings of the danger of which he knows, and to make any reasonable inspection of the chattel to ascertain any defect or dangerous conditions.” And in Minicozzi v. The Atlantic *124Refining Co., 143 Conn. 226, 120 A. 2d 924, 926 (1956) the court in discussing the duties of one who supplies personalty to another for use in which the supplier had a business interest made this statement: “It is a well-established principle of law that one who supplies tangible personal property to another for a use in which the supplier has a business interest owes a duty to the other to use reasonable care to see that the property supplied is safe for its intended use. Prosser, Torts (2d Ed.) pp. 491, 492; Restatement, Torts § 392. This duty to exercise reasonable care includes the duty of reasonable inspection of the property supplied. Restatement, 2 Torts § 392, comment b; see Cavanaugh v. Windsor Cut Stone Corporation, 80 Conn. 585, 590, 69 A. 345; Rincicotti v. John J. O’Brien Contracting Co., 77 Conn. 617, 620, 60 A. 115, 69 L.R.A. 936,” and McNeal v. Greenberg, 40 Cal. 2d 740, 255 P. 2d 810 (1953), and finally, the case of Mississippi Central Railroad v. Lott, 118 Miss. 816, 80 So. 277 (1918) in which this Court in considering a case similar to the one at hand reduced the same to this cogent point on page 829 thereof: “The jury has said by their verdict that the car was in fact defective. The important inquiry then, as we view the case, is whether the defective condition of the car could have been discovered by reasonable inspection. On this question there was a dispute in the testimony, and all doubts or conflicts in the evidence have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff, and on this point we see no reason to disturb the verdict of the jury.” There being evidence that the inspection relied upon by Compress was not reasonable, I am of the opinion the court below did not err in overruling the motion of Compress for a peremptory instruction.
The case should be reversed and rendered as to Brent and reversed and remanded for a new trial as to Compress.
Ethridge, J. joins in this dissent.