Court Opinion

ID: 9931224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:17:00.194089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:15.961568
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    FEBRUARY 8, 2024
                                                                In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                               WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

DANIELLE WADE,                                )
                                              )         No. 39172-8-III
                     Petitioner,              )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
MARK RYPIEN,                                  )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
                     Respondent.              )

       STAAB, J. — Danielle Wade filed a complaint against her former partner, Mark

Rypien, alleging that Rypien engaged in acts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress for incidents dating back to 2008. She sought

damages under a unified continuing tort of domestic violence. Rypien did not file an

answer to the allegations. Instead, the parties jointly moved the superior court to enter an

order certifying a question of law under RAP 2.3(b)(4) as to whether this court should

recognize a new unified continuing tort of domestic violence that would allow Wade to

seek damages for actions occurring beyond the relevant statute of limitations for each

individual act. Without deciding any issues of law or fact pertaining to this case, the

superior court granted the stipulated motion and the parties sought discretionary review in

this court.
No. 39172-8-III
Wade v. Rypien

       Division Three’s court commissioner granted discretionary review, agreeing that

the certified issue satisfied the requirements of RAP 2.3(b)(4), noting that question

presented a controlling issue of law, there is no Washington precedent on the issue, and

immediate review would materially advance the termination of the litigation. The

commissioner’s decision did not remark on the lack of decision by the superior court.

       After further review of RAP 2.3(b)(4), we conclude that discretionary review was

improvidently granted because the superior court has not decided the issue presented.

RAP 2.3(a) provides a method of seeking discretionary review of a superior court

decision that is not final. Specifically, the rule provides: “Decision of Superior Court.

Unless otherwise prohibited by statute or court rule, a party may seek discretionary

review of any act of the superior court not appealable as a matter of right.” RAP 2.3(a).

Under RAP 2.3(b)(4), a superior court may certify, or the parties may stipulate, “that the

order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for a

difference of opinion and that immediate review of the order may materially advance the

ultimate termination of the litigation.” (Emphasis added.)

       While we agree that this case presents a controlling question of law, RAP 2.3

requires the superior court to first decide the issue before certifying the question for

discretionary review. Notably, the language in RAP 2.3(b)(4) is different from the

language in RAP 16.16(a), which allows the Supreme Court to “entertain a petition to

determine a question of law” from a federal court.

                                              2
No. 39172-8-III
Wade v. Rypien

       We dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted without prejudice to the parties,

and remand the case to superior court. After the superior court has decided the legal

issue, the parties are free to request discretionary review once again with this court or the

supreme court.

       Dismissed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              _________________________________
                                                      Staab, J.

I CONCUR:

_________________________________
      Cooney, J.

                                              3
                                      No. 39172-8-III

       LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.C.J. (concurring) — I agree with the majority’s

interpretation of RAP 2.3(b)(4). The rule requires the trial court to first enter an order

before we can review the issues the parties seek us to address. I concur to clarify an

additional point, which I deem important.

       In this appeal, the parties asked us to address several issues, including what the

elements of the domestic violence tort might be, what the statute of limitations might be,

and whether the tort is a continuing tort for the purpose of recovering damages beyond

the limitations period. It often is said that the Court of Appeals is an error correcting

court. Here, we have no error to correct.

       If the parties desire us to address the three issues outlined above, the trial court

must first address them. My point is this: the scope of our review is dependent upon the

scope of the trial court’s order.1

                                                   ________________________________
                                                   Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

       1
         The parties, understandably, will be disappointed by our decision and may view
our approach as pedantic. But unless the correct procedure is followed, review beyond
this court might be denied.