Court Opinion

ID: 9673924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:32.50878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.851888
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because I do not believe that the trial courts should set traps for litigants, or that appellate courts should spring the traps.
The decree of April 28, 1988 made it clear to the defendant-appellant that the trial court would hear him within six months “over the issues of the amount of child support and maintenance....” The defendant and his counsel had every reason to believe that there was no decree in the case which was then final and appealable, and some of the cases considered by the court would support this assumption. It is clear that, had the defendant filed a notice of appeal, the entire case would have been transferred from the trial court to the court of appeals, so that the trial court would have lacked the power to act within the reservation of jurisdiction.
Now we tell the defendant that his appeal has been barred. I have no quarrel with the holding that the reservation of jurisdiction was invalid, insofar as this establishes a rule for future guidance. But the effect of the holding is to deny this defendant the right to appeal. The trial court compounded the problem because it held the motion for reconsideration under advisement from August 17, 1988 until December 5, 1988, thereby depriving the defendant of the opportunity to seek leave to appeal by special order as authorized by Rule 81.07(a). The time for such an application expired late in November of 1988.
Because of the confusion of the law I would place the burden on the plaintiff to seek relief by writ against the invalid retention of jurisdiction, rather than surprising the defendant with the news that he has lost his right of appeal by assuming that the trial judge was aware of his powers. I would rule the merits of the appeal, or retransfer the case to the court of appeals for this purpose.