Court Opinion

ID: 9622669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:21:54.516909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:33.938957
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because it disregards a long line of precedent in this state that an insurance policy is a contract and, if there is any ambiguity to be found therein, the ambiguity must be construed against the insurer. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Staton, 286 Ga. 23 (685 SE2d 263) (2009); Richards v. Hanover Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 613 (1) (299 SE2d 561) (1983); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 308 (1) (a) (680 SE2d 168) (2009); Perry v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 297 Ga. App. 9 (1) (676 SE2d 376) (2008) (“if ... a provision is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we construe such provision against the insurer”). Adherence to this precedent eviscerates the need to adopt a hard and fast analytical approach from other jurisdictions, as requested by the district court, when certain terms in an insurance policy are undefined. “The burden is on the insurer to make its intent clear and unmistakable and to explicitly show any exceptions to coverage.” Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Page, 188 Ga. App. 876 (374 SE2d 768) (1988). “[T]he risk of any lack of clarity or ambiguity in an insurance contract must be borne by the insurer.” Claussen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 337 (380 SE2d 686) (1989).
Here, it is unnecessary to adopt any of the theories requested by *618the district court because the matter may be resolved by the rules of contract construction. Although Georgia law regarding contract construction is cited by the district court, it is not clear that any rules of contract construction have been applied to the policy at issue. For example, in its order, the district court states that the terms “accident,” “each accident,” “any one accident,” and “the auto accident” are undefined by the insurance policy and seems to imply that an ambiguity exists due to the policy’s failure to define these terms; however, the district court does not set forth any analysis. Under Georgia law, undefined terms in an insurance policy are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning. Claussen, supra, 259 Ga. at 334-335.3 Alea London Ltd. v. Lee, 286 Ga. App. 390 (649 SE2d 542) (2007). If, after giving the terms their plain, ordinary meaning, there is still some ambiguity in the policy, or the language at hand is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then the language is to be construed most strongly against the entity that drafted the policy and in favor of the insured. Claussen, supra, 259 Ga. at 334-336 (if a word in an insurance policy is capable of more than one meaning, then the meaning favoring the insured must be applied). Neither the district court’s order nor the majority’s opinion explain why the rules of contract construction are insufficient to resolve the case at hand.
Decided March 1, 2010.
Saveli & Williams, Jeffrey A. Van Duyne, William E. Turnipseed, for appellant.
Daughtery, Crawford, Fuller & Brown, Peter J. Daughtery, Dustin T. Brown, Cash, Krugler & Fredericks, Andrew B. Cash, Susanne W. Langlais, Berry, Shelnut, Day & Hoffman, Peter B. Hoffman, for appellees.
Accordingly, I believe more analysis is warranted on the part of the district court and I would thus respond to the certified question in the negative.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Presiding Justice Carley join in this dissent.

 Using definitions contained in dictionaries is an acceptable method by which to ascertain the everyday meaning of words contained in insurance policies. Claussen, supra, 259 Ga. at 335.