Court Opinion

ID: 9792799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:36:46.423533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:16.937942
License: Public Domain

Morgan, J.
(concurring) The State charged the defendant with two counts of second degree rape. Each count alleged an act of sexual intercourse committed by forcible *862compulsion. At the end of the evidence, the trial court instructed that the jury could convict on both counts only if it found separate acts. The jury so found, and the defense does not attack its finding for insufficient evidence.
With these facts in mind, I agree with the majority that the trial court had discretion, at sentencing, to treat the two counts as involving separate criminal conduct. Conversely, I also think the trial court had discretion to treat the two counts as involving the same criminal conduct. As we said in State v. Rodriguez:
If the facts, objectively viewed, can only support a finding that the defendant had the same criminal intent with respect to each count, then the counts constitute the same criminal conduct. If the facts, objectively viewed, can only support a finding that the defendant had different criminal intents with respect to each count, then the counts constitute different criminal conduct. ... If the facts are sufficient to support either finding, then the matter lies within the trial court’s discretion, and an appellate court will defer "to the trial court’s determination of what constitutes the same criminal conduct when assessing the appropriate offender score.” State v. Burns, 114 Wn.2d at 317 [314, 788 P.2d 531 (1990)].
State v. Rodriguez, 61 Wn. App. 812, 816, 812 P.2d 868 (1991).
The majority opinion holds that the facts of this case are sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s "objective intent” was different with respect to each of the two acts found by the jury. It concludes that we should not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion. Although the facts are also sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s "objective intent” was the same with respect to the two acts found by the jury, I concur that we should not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion.
Despite concurring in what I understand to be the core of the majority’s reasoning, I only partially concur in its discussion of State v. Walden. In Walden, Division One reversed the trial court’s determination that counts 1 and 2 were based on separate criminal conduct. It expressly *863recognized, however, that reversal was appropriate only for abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law. Walden, 69 Wn. App. at 188. It necessarily follows that Division One viewed the Walden record as sufficient to support only a finding of same criminal conduct. In contrast, the record in this case supports a finding of either (a) same criminal conduct or (b) separate criminal conduct. For that reason, Walden and this case are distinguishable.