Court Opinion

ID: 9638523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:46:11.322233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:07.486413
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority unduly limits Long’s complaint when it says: “Long correctly argues that when a Cl is present at the time of an illegal transaction or participated in its commission, the Cl is a material witness to that transaction and must be identified.” Its decision about the ruling on Long’s motion to require disclosure of the informer’s identity is then based on these statements:
• “... the illegal act the Cl witnessed is not the same illegal act with which Long is charged.”
• “Thus, the Cl was not a material witness to the events upon which the State relied for a conviction, which were the events and evidence Tanner witnessed and seized when he executed the search warrant .... ”
• “He or she did not supply the information upon which the State relied for a conviction on manufacturing methamphetamine; [Detective] Tanner supplied that particular information.”
(Emphases added). But Long’s motion and his argument are not so limited. The written motion he filed prior to trial, after discussing Roviaro v. United States, says:
In addition to Roviaro, the Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 508(c)(2), provides that the identity of an informant must be revealed when “the informant may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt, innocence.” This has been held to be broader than Roviaro. Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313 (Cr.App.1991).
Long’s burden was to make a “plausible showing” that the informer “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of a material issue on ... guilt or innocence.” Tex.R. Evid. 508(c)(2); see Edmond v. State, 911 S.W.2d 487, 487 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1995, no pet.) (“It is only necessary for a defendant to make a plausible showing that the informer could give testimony necessary to a fair determination of guilt.”). Under the rule, the threshold is low: may be able to give testimony. As the majority concedes, once the threshold is crossed, the trial court is required to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether the informer can sup*738ply testimony to which the defendant is entitled in his defense. See Bodin v. State, 807 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (“the judge shall give the public entity a chance to show in camera whether the informer can, in fact, supply that testimony”) (italics in original).
In Roviaro v. United States, which Long cited, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the issue of when does the prosecution have an obligation to reveal the identity of an undercover informer who is not called to testify at trial. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-63, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628-29, 1 L.Edod 639 (1957). Justice Ginsberg has described Roviaro as holding that no privilege obtains “[w]here the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S.-,-, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 1276, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). Even though the informer in Roviaro did not testify, disclosure was required because he could have “amplified or contradicted” the testimony of government witnesses. Id.
As Long also noted, the Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that the circumstances under which disclosure is required are broader under Rule of Evidence 508(c)(2) than under the common law rule previously followed in Texas. Anderson v. State, 817 S.Wüd 69, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Bodin, 807 S.Wüd at 318.
Long met the Roviaro test of showing that the informer’s testimony could have amplified or contradicted the State’s witnesses. See Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 630. He also met the “plausible showing” test that the informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of a material issue on guilt or innocence. See Edmond, 911 S.Wüd at 487.
It is undisputed that the informer was not present when the search warrant was executed and Long was arrested. By limiting Long’s contention to the informer’s presence or participation in the offense, the majority opinion can say that the informer could not testify about “the illegal act with which Long is charged,” “events and evidence Tanner witnessed and seized when he executed the search warrant,” and “the information upon which the State relied for a conviction.” And in so limiting Long’s argument, the majority fails to address the claim that Long made under the Rule, both to the trial court and to this court.
I would hold that the trial court should have held an in camera hearing before ruling on Long’s motion. See Heard v. State, 995 S.Wud 317, 320 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref d). I would also find that Long was harmed. See id.; Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(b). An integral part of the in camera process is the preservation of the evidence reviewed by the trial court for review on appeal. See id. (very nature of the error prevents us from assessing harm; record does not contain adequate materials to determine whether defendant was harmed); Tex.R. Evm 508(c)(2). Long has been denied our review of any in camera evidence that the State would have submitted.
Because the majority does not find that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an in camera hearing under Rule 508(c)(2), I respectfully dissent.