Court Opinion

ID: 9893332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 17:03:14.505455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:14.857462
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 26 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.   22-30202

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                1:04-cr-00087-SPW-1
  v.

MARTIN GARCIA,                                  MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Montana
                   Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted October 19, 2023 **
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: GILMAN,*** KOH, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

       Martin Garcia was indicted as part of a large drug conspiracy in 2004 and

was later convicted and sentenced. In late 2019, Garcia moved the district court to

       *     This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
       ***  The Honorable Ronald Lee Gilman, United States Circuit Judge for
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and in 2020 he moved to reduce

his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). The district court granted both motions

and reduced Garcia’s total sentence from 720 months to 382 months of

imprisonment (comprised of 262 months for the drug charges and 120 months for

the firearm charges). Garcia now appeals these decisions, arguing that his sentence

should have been reduced even further, to a time-served sentence of 221 months.

      We review sentence-reduction decisions based on both 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1) and (c)(2) under the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States

v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion

if “it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous

finding of material fact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155

(9th Cir. 2013)).

      1. Garcia argues for a reduction of his sentence for the drug charges based

on Amendments 782 and 788 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which

lowered the Guidelines range for these drug charges after Garcia was originally

sentenced. A district court can reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for

a defendant who was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that [was] subsequently . . . lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” In

considering a motion under § 3582(c)(2), the court must adhere to any applicable

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission and consider whether a

                                           2
reduction is warranted after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a). One such policy statement makes clear that, for motions under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), the district court cannot reduce the defendant’s term of

imprisonment “to a term that is less than the minimum of the amended guideline

range[.]” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n

2021) (“U.S.S.G.”).

      Here, the district court granted Garcia’s motion for a sentence reduction

under § 3582(c)(2) and reduced his sentence on the drug charges to the low end of

his amended Guidelines range (262 months)—the lowest possible reduction

allowed under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). The court clearly did not abuse its

discretion in so doing. See United States v. Davis, 739 F.3d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir.

2014); United States v. Hernandez-Martinez, 933 F.3d 1126, 1131–36 (9th Cir.

2019).

      2. Even though the district court could not have reduced Garcia’s sentence

for the drug charges any more than it did under § 3582(c)(2), a further reduction to

Garcia’s total sentence was possible under § 3582(c)(1) (commonly known as the

compassionate-release provision). A district court can reduce a sentence under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) if it determines that “extraordinary and compelling reasons

warrant a sentence reduction” and if, after “weigh[ing] the factors set forth in 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a),” the “requested sentence reduction is warranted under the

                                          3
particular circumstances of the case.” United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945

(9th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Although the district court agreed with Garcia that

extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted a reduction, Garcia contends that

the court abused its discretion in failing to address several arguments that he raised

relating to the § 3553(a) factors that, in his opinion, should have reduced his

sentence even further.

      We agree with Garcia. On the one hand, a district court “need not tick off

each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them.” United States

v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). But “when a party raises a

specific, nonfrivolous argument tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) factor in support

of a requested sentence, then the judge should normally explain why he accepts or

rejects the party’s position.” Id. at 992–93. In United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d

1003 (9th Cir. 2013), we held that when a defendant “argu[ed] in part that

favorable treatment was justified by various factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),

including his family ties, his lack of other criminal history, his post-sentencing

rehabilitation, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities[,]” the

district court erred in concentrating on “[the defendant]’s role in the offense and

the amount of drugs involved” without “discuss[ing] the § 3553(a) factors urged by

[the defendant].” Id. at 1005.

      Garcia argued to the district court that several of the § 3553(a) factors

                                          4
weighed in favor of a significant sentence reduction: (1) his age and likelihood of

deportation meant that the risk to the community was low, (2) the significant

sentence that he had already served was sufficient deterrence, and (3) he was

ineligible for drug-abuse treatment and unlikely to receive vocational training

while incarcerated because of his immigration status. He also submitted a

character letter to the district court discussing his post-sentencing rehabilitation,

explaining his mixed disciplinary record, and stating that he had received positive

work-performance reports from supervisors and developed skills in mechanics,

electronics, and accountancy while in prison.

      The district court, however, “did not address any of [these arguments], even

to dismiss them in shorthand[,]” when determining Garcia’s sentence. See Trujillo,

713 F.3d at 1010. Rather, the court focused on Garcia’s role in the offense and the

sentencing disparity between Garcia and his codefendants. There is no mention of

Garcia’s alleged post-sentencing rehabilitation or the application of the other

§ 3553(a) factors given his likely removal to Mexico.

      District courts need not consider a defendant’s possible deportation in

sentencing, United States v. Crippen, 961 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1992), but courts

cannot disregard arguments tethered to the § 3553(a) factors simply because those

contentions implicate a defendant’s immigration status. See, e.g., United States

v. Bragg, 582 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The very broad discretion of district

                                           5
judges in sentencing post-Booker does not extend to ignoring sentencing factors

mandated by statute.”); see also Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1010 (“[T]he Supreme Court

made clear that post-sentencing or post-offense rehabilitation—particularly in light

of its tendency to reveal a defendant’s likelihood of future criminal conduct—was

a critical factor to consider in the imposition of a sentence.”).

      In this case, Garcia expressly argued that “very few of the other § 3553(a)

factors are being served under the terms of his current sentence[,]” in part because

of his immigration status. “Regardless of the ultimate force of [these] arguments,”

we cannot say that they are frivolous. See Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1011. Garcia, like

the defendant in Trujillo, therefore “presented nonfrivolous arguments, and the

district court did not at all explain the reasons for rejecting them; this was legal

error.” Id.

      For all of the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s order and remand

to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

      VACATED and REMANDED.

                                           6