Court Opinion

ID: 9588237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:31:41.950429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:57.164988
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
specially concurring. I do not agree with all of the reasoning in the majority opinion. As to its reference to "I’m my own grandpaw,” remember the popular ditty of the same era, "Pistol Packin’ Mama — Lay that Pistol Down”? Surely, those were the good old days, and many were the glasses that were hoisted while the mellifluous and melodious notes made *882the rafters ring. But what relevancy has either to this case?
Ben Fluellen owned an automobile and caused same to be insured with Southeastern Fidelity Insurance Company. Part Three of the policy provided indemnity for damages for collision or upset with a $100 deductible feature therein. The car was wrecked while being driven by the owner’s stepson, who was less than 25 years of age, and who did not reside in the owner’s household. The damage amounted to $1,750, and after various preliminaries the owner sued for $1,650 (allowing $100 deductible as a credit), plus interest, costs and attorney’s fees.
Defendant’s principal contention is that the driver was not insured under the policy, as he was a stepson of the owner, and an emancipated minor less than 25 years old; and that endorsement EC-2 of the policy, applicable to Part 1 and 3, provides that insurance is not afforded when the vehicle is driven by a male operator under 25 years of age, who is a relative of the named insured, unless named in Item 7 of the Declaration of the policy. EC-2 of the policy provides that as to an under age operator, unless named in Item 7 of the declaration, insurance is not afforded by the policy when a vehicle is being driven by a male operator under 25 years of age who is a member of the owner’s household, or is a relative of the owner regardless of residence. Item 7 of the policy begins thus: "Complete all questions fully for all known drivers, both residents and non-residents.” Ben Fluellen, owner, was the only driver described in Item 7.
The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment, and the above recitals of fact were shown to be true. It was also shown that the stepson had never driven the car before, that he was not a member of the owner’s household, and that he took the car while the owner was asleep, without the owner’s permission and wrecked it.
1. As to the requirement in Item 7 of the policy that *883all "known drivers” be listed, Ben Fluellen, owner, faithfully complied with this requirement by listing himself as the only "known driver.” There is not a line in the policy which states or faintly suggests that if some other driver, unknown as a driver by the owner at the time of issuance of the policy, drives and wrecks the car, insurance will not be afforded. The failure to list the stepson as a driver does not nullify the insurance coverage in this case.
. 2. The insurer maintains that under EC-2 no insurance coverage is provided because the car was being driven by a male operator under 25 years of age. But it is undisputed that the stepson was not a member of the owner’s household, and this exclusion is ineffective unless such person under 25 years of age be a member of the owner’s household.
3. The insurer maintains that under EC-2 no insurance coverage is provided because the driver was "a relative of the owner.” The stepson who was the driver of the car was related by affinity and not by consanguinity; by marriage and not by blood. What is meant by the word "relative”? Under Biblical history, all of mankind is related, being descendants of Adam and Eve. But under Georgia law, the term is narrowed somewhat, and special treatment is given as to the degree of relationship, and as to whether a relative by marriage stands on the same footing as a relative by blood. It is quite significant that under our statutes, each time in-laws are included in that term, the statute, with great specificity, uses words to make it plain that they are included. For instance, jurors who are related within a prohibited degree to the party, by "affinity or consanguinity” are disqualified. Code Ann. § 24-102 (Ga.L. 1935, p. 396; 1943, p. 322); Code Ann. § 59-716 (Ga. L. 1935, p. 396). (Emphasis supplied.) Persons related within certain degrees by "blood or marriage” may not marry each other. Code § 53-102 (2). And marriage by such persons is ground for divorce. Code Ann. § 30-102 *884(Ga.L. 1946, pp. 90, 91; 1951, pp. 744, 745; 1962, pp. 600, 601; 1963, pp. 288, 289; 1971, p. 361; 1972, pp. 633, 634). Grand jurors related by consanguinity or affinity to a party are disqualified to sit in that case. The rules of inheritance, other than as to wife or husband, specify "half-blood or whole-blood,” leaving out in-laws. Code § 113-903 (5). In National Life &c. Ins. Co. v. Parker, 67 Ga. App. 1, 22 (19 SE2d 409), it was held that a stepchild, as such, does not have an insurable interest in the life of the stepfather. It is clear from the foregoing that, in Georgia, when it is intended for the term "relative” to include both blood relatives and relatives by marriage, specific language must be used, such as "blood or marriage,” or "consanguinity or affinity.” The term "relative” without modification or description, is a general term. Black’s Law Dictionary describes "relative” as "a person connected with another by blood or affinity; strictly, one allied by blood. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, a strict construction of "relative” means a "blood-relative.”
How will the word "relative” be construed when used by an insurance company in one of its policies of insurance? The law is well-known that it must be construed "strictly” and if left without modification or in an ambiguous fashion such general or ambiguous language must be construed in favor of the insured person and against the insurance company. This is because the insurance company has its choice of words when its experts prepare its policies, whereas the insured person is allowed no part in the choice of words that are placed in the policy, nor is he usually an expert in such matters. As to "strict” construction against the insurance company, see Farmers Mutual &c. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 39 Ga. App. 528 (3) (147 SE 725); John Hancock &c. Ins. Co. v. Frazer, 194 Ga. 201 (20 SE2d 915); Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Jack Jordan, Inc., 213 Ga. 299, 302 (99 SE2d 95). Construing the language "relative” strictly against the insurer, the stepson was not a relative of Ben Fluellen, *885the owner, and this provision of the policy is not effective to nullify coverage in this case.
4. Finally, the act of driving the car by the stepson in this case was the first and only time he had ever driven it, so far as the record shows, and was thus an isolated instance. "Isolated instances” are not within the purview of an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy, in cases like the one sub judice. See Buffington v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 104 Ga. App. 139 (121 SE2d 270).
5. I would affirm the trial court in its findings in favor of the insured person for the foregoing reasons.