Court Opinion

ID: 9530036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:32.056198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:58.963363
License: Public Domain

Justice SILAK,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from Part V of the Court’s opinion because I believe the district court abused its discretion in awarding discretionary costs to respondent DeBest.
This Court has held that Rule 54(d)(1)(D) requires that the party seeking to recover discretionary costs must make an affirmative showing that those costs are exceptional, necessary, and reasonably incurred. See Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (1993); Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991); Fuller v. Walters, 119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991). The trial court should then make “express findings as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). I believe that both DeBest and the district court failed to meet the burdens imposed upon them by Rule 54(d)(1)(D).
In the present case, DeBest’s attorney submitted an affidavit in support of the memorandum of costs which generally alleged that the costs were exceptional and necessary. The affidavit failed to detail specific facts in support of those general allegations. At the hearing on the motion to award costs, DeBest’s attorney stated, “[W]e believe that we have shown that each of the costs were necessary, exceptionally and reasonably incurred.” The only item of costs for which any explanation was offered was the consult*188ing service provided by fire expert Jay Freeman. In support of Mr. Freeman’s services, DeBest’s attorney said, “That was an individual that we needed in order to better understand the fire damage, the firewall issue, and that certainly is an exceptional cost based on the unique facts of this case.”
I believe that DeBest failed to adequately show that the costs, other than those related to the fire expert, were exceptional and necessary. If a party does not attempt to explain why the costs are necessary and exceptional, that party is not entitled to discretionary costs. The party must also show that the costs should be assessed against the adverse party “in the interest of justice.” Automobile Club Ins. Co., 124 Idaho at 881, 865 P.2d at 972. The conclusory statements made by DeBest’s attorney at the hearing and in the affidavit in support of costs do not meet the standards required by law. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). This Court upheld an award of discretionary costs in Luna v. Shockey Sheet Melal & Welding Co., 113 Idaho 193, 743 P.2d 61 (1987), a case which provides an example of a showing that satisfies Rule 54(d)(1)(D). In addition to a statement that the expenses were “reasonably and necessarily” incurred, the supplemental memorandum of costs in Luna detailed “what photocopies and photographs were used for, as well as each item’s cost.” Luna, 113 Idaho at 197-98, 743 P.2d at 65-66. The conclusory “showing” set forth by DeBest in the instant case falls far short of that upheld in Luna.
Additionally, the trial court’s findings were equally conclusory and do not expressly explain why the court found that the costs were exceptional and necessary. I am especially troubled by the district court’s award of airfare to DeBest. An attorney might be required to travel to attend a deposition in almost any case. Considering the lengthy nature of civil litigation and the mobility of post-modern society, attorneys are often required to purchase plane tickets to attend out-of-state depositions. If a party is entitled to travel expenses of such an ordinary and mundane nature, it is difficult to say what could not be awarded as an “exceptional” discretionary cost.
The district court might have been aware of additional facts that seemed to justify the award of discretionary costs in this case. Such facts might have provided good reason for the court to exercise its discretion in favor of awarding costs. Unfortunately, the court’s findings are so conclusory that it is difficult to discern the reasoning by which the court arrived at its conclusion.
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the award of costs.
Chief Justice TROUT, concurs.