Court Opinion

ID: 9491655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:19:43.82703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:51.965638
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and writing the majority opinion with respect to Cashaw’s enhancement, in which BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, joins.
We join in all but that portion of the court’s opinion affirming Cashaw’s four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a). We also write separately to highlight the district court’s discretion to grant a downward departure'when the government’s conduct directly results in prejudice to a defendant which is significant enough to take the case out of the heartland of the Sentencing Guidelines.
“At sentencing, the government bears the burden- of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts necessary to establish a defendant’s role in the offense.” United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). In determining whether to enhance a defendant’s sentence under § 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing court should consider such factors as “the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). While our court may broadly construe the definition of leadership or organization, “if the words ‘organizer’ and ‘leader’ are to have their ordinary meaning, a defendant must do more than sell [drugs] for resale.” United States v. Miller, 91 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Rowley, 975 F.2d 1357, 1364 n. 7 (8th Cir.1992) (“[W]e have always required evidence that the defendant directed or procured the aid of underlings.”)); see also United States v. Del Toro-Aguilera, 138 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir.1998) (status as supplier or distributor without more is insufficient to support a managerial enhancement under § 3B1.1).
The record in this ease does not support the conclusion that Cashaw exercised decision-making authority, recruited accomplices, *483claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, participated in the planning or organization of the conspiracy, or had control or authority over others. Nothing in the record indicates that Cashaw did anything other than provide drugs to Rashid. While Cashaw provided significant amounts of drugs to the conspiracy, his status as a supplier of distributor is already reflected in his base-offense level. See Del Toro-Aguilera, 138 F.3d at 343; United States v. Bryson, 110 F.3d 575, 585 (8th Cir.1997). In this regai-d, this case is factually indistinguishable from Miller. The record reveals that Cash-aw did not undertake an organizational role in Rashid’s drug operation, much less the Los Angeles or Houston cocaine shipments. Rather, Cashaw merely sold drugs for resale. At trial, for example, Rashid testified that “Mr. Cashaw was a supplier. He was not part of my operation.” (Tr. at 122.) Rashid also testified that he never invited Cashaw to California and that Cashaw did not “have any control over where [Rashid was] going with any contraband [Rashid] may have received in California.” (Tr. at 144.) With respect to the Houston shipment, the record similarly indicates that Cashaw was either reselling drugs he had himself purchased or embarking on a joint venture to purchase drugs. In sum,
[Cashaw] was not the “organizer” or “leader” of a conspiracy. Although [he] sold large enough quantities of [cocaine] that it is reasonable to infer that he knew the drugs were being resold, [he] did not have any involvement in the resales. There is no evidence that [Cashaw] controlled his buyers in their resale of the [cocaine].
Miller, 91 F.3d at 1164. Because Cashaw’s role in the offense does not satisfy any of the factors enumerated in the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines and because it was limited to selling drugs for resale, the district court committed clear error by imposing a four-level enhancement under § 3Bl.l(a).
Furthermore, we note that this case exemplifies an emerging trend in which the government secures a substantially reduced sentence for the principals of a drug conspiracy in exchange for their testimony against lesser members of the conspiracy. This trend generally results in the principals receiving substantially lower sentences than the lesser members and is yet another example of how the Sentencing Guidelines have transferred the discretion once held by judges to the government. While courts generally endorse this anomalous byproduct of the Sentencing Guidelines, to the extent that the government’s behavior directly results in prejudice to a defendant, which is significant enough to take the case out of the heartland of the Sentencing Guidelines, district courts have the discretion to grant an appropriate downward departure.
As the court’s opinion correctly notes, the government was less than forthright with the jury about its arrangements with Rashid and Whitley regarding the consequences of their testimony. The district court sentenced Jones and Palmer to 235 months each and Cashaw to 360 months imprisonment. Rash-id, far and away the kingpin of the conspiracy, originally faced a sentence of 360 months to life which was ultimately reduced to 60 months for his cooperation in testifying against the 'lesser members of the conspiracy. At Cashaw’s' sentencing, the district court responded to Cashaw’s request for a downward departure:
[T]his simply isn’t fair and doesn’t make a lot of sense and I agree with that but I unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, cannot be responsible for the actions of other judges in other cases. And the fact that there may be some apparent inconsistencies is something that a court of higher authority than mine is going to have to address.
(Sentencing Tr. at 3.) In addition, the district court stated that “I am personally offended by the differences that the law dictates in these sentences but there is nothing I can do about it.” (Sentencing Tr. at 76.)
In promulgating § 3B1.1, the Sentencing Commission included managerial adjustments “primarily because of concerns about relative responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (backg’d); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.1997) (“The adjustment for being an organizer or leader is intended to reflect relative responsibility compared to other participants in the crime.”).. ; While the Sentencing Guidelines *484apportion sentences based at least m part on the relative responsibility of each conspirator in a conspiracy, “dissatisfaction with the available sentencing range or a preference for a different sentence than that authorized by the guidelines is not an appropriate basis for a sentence outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, comment. Thus, a district court does not have the discretion to grant a downward departure if its only objection is the disparity of sentences between co-conspirators. However, where the government’s conduct directly results in prejudice to a defendant, which is significant enough to take the case out of the heartland of the guidelines, the district court has the discretion to impose a downward departure. See United States v. Lopez, 106 F.3d 309, 311 (9th Cir.1997) (Lay, J.) (citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2046, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)).
Because the district court committed clear error by imposing a four-level managerial enhancement under § 3Bl.l(a), Cashaw’s sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing. Also, if the district court on remand determines that any of the appellants were directly prejudiced by the government’s conduct significantly enough to take the case out of the heartland of the Sentencing Guidelines, it may exercise its discretion in determining whether to grant an appropriate downward departure.