Court Opinion

ID: 9691557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:39:15.767213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:22.590138
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(concurring in ' part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 41.] I concur on all issues expect I respectfully dissent on Issues Number Three and Four. I would hold the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the claim against Dwight to proceed as Dwight did not have reasonable notice of the claim against him by the hospital as is required by SDCL 25-7-27 *420and the due process clauses of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions.
[¶ 42.] At common law, an adult child was not required to support his parents. Thus, the only basis for this claim is by statute, in this case SDCL 25-7-27. Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 571 (S.D.1994). SDCL 25-7-27 states:
Every adult child, having the financial ability to do shall provide necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance for a parent who is unable to provide for himself; provided that no claim shall be made against such adult child until notice has been given such adult child that his parent IS unable to provide for himself, and such adult child shall have refused to provide for his parent (emphasis added).
[¶ 43.] Harold was initially hospitalized from November 21 to December 19, 1993. The hospital knew at that time Harold had no hospitalization insurance. A second hospitalization occurred in the fall of 1994. Again, the hospital knew Harold had no hospitalization insurance and it further knew it had not been paid anything from Harold’s first hospitalization. According to the hospital, it only “learned of the transfer11 for the first time during the summer of 1995.” However, the hospital did not seek to raise a claim until September 3, 1996 when it finally notified Dwight of its intention to do so.
[¶ 44.] The explicit language of SDCL 25-7-27 states that no claim shall be made against such adult child except when his parent “is” unable to provide for himself or herself. The use of the word “is” is in the present tense and indicates an inability to pay concurrent with the treatment or shortly thereafter. Allowing notice years after the fact amounts to a de facto amendment of the statute to “was” unable to pay at the time of treatment or for a reasonable period thereafter. This is not mere quibbling over semantics as the time of the notice affects the child’s ability to respond.
[¶ 45.] Fundamental fairness requires reasonable notice which provides one an opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time and in a meaningful manner. S.B. Partnership n Gogue, 1997 SD 41, 562 N.W.2d 754. In dealing with the notice issue as it applies to county indigent relief, we have required prompt notice in strict accordance with the applicable statute. SDCL 28-13-34.1 (notice must be given within fifteen days in the case of an emergency admission or within seven days of a nonemergency admission). We held in Appeal of Presentation Sisters Inc., 471 N.W.2d 169,174 (S.D.1991):
The purpose of this notice of emergency hospitalization is to put the county on notice that one of its indigent residents is in the hospital, that the hospital intends to . seek payment from the county for its services, and that the county has the option of obtaining alternate arrangements for hospitalization pursuant to SDCL 28-13-35.
If this be the purpose of these types of notices, what good is it to give Dwight notice three years after the initial (and most expensive) hospitalization and two years after the second hospitalization. At that point, his options are long gone and his defenses few.12 What is his meaningful opportunity to be able to timely present his objections? First Nat. Bank of Eden v. Meyer, 476 N.W.2d 267, 269-270 (S.D.1991) (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).
[¶ 46.] Americana, upon which the majority relies, provides no factual support for its conclusion. In Americana, the son had direct control over all of the mother’s finances and either had, or would have, ownership of all her assets that were not spent for the parent’s care. In addition, son had legal guardianship over the mother and made all his mother’s decisions as mother had Alzheimer’s disease. Finally, and most importantly, son had an ongoing dispute (and thus *421notice of it) with the nursing home as to the fact his mother was in the home (he knew this because he put her there), that her bill was not being timely paid and that in some form the home was looking to him for payment as her son, guardian, or trustee as he had control over all his mother’s assets. He had options and chose not to pay the bill and leave her in that home as a resident until her death.
[¶47.] Meaningful notice depends on the facts of the individual case. However, it must mean an opportunity, if reasonable, to be appraised that your parent is hospitalized and the hospital may be looking to you as the child for past, present and future bills for treatment. It must mean more than receiv-' ing notice years after the fact. If counties are entitled to reasonable notice that being fifteen days after admission, how can notice to an adult child be reasonable three years after the fact?

. These transfers were done by deeds filed with the Clark and Day County Registers of Deeds on September 21, 1994. SDCL 43-28-15 states that the recording of an instrument such as a deed is constructive notice of the execution of that instrument to all purchasers or encumbrances subsequent to the recording.

. In addition Dwight points out this tardy notice greatly increased his costs of discovery as he now had to gather information on the hospitalization via discovery in a legal action rather than being given notice contemporaneous to the hospitalization when he could conduct a first hand investigation.