Court Opinion

ID: 9899570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 22:00:21.492872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:39.612963
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1220

                     JOEL NJOROGE MANGURIU,

                           Petitioner,

                               v.

              MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                           Respondent.

               PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
                THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

                             Before

                   Gelpí, Lynch, and Thompson,
                         Circuit Judges.

    Bernal Peter Ojeda on brief for petitioner.

     Brian Boynton, Assistant Attorney General, Shelley R. Goad,
Assistant Director, and Tim Ramnitz, Senior Litigation Counsel,
Office of Immigration Litigation, on brief for respondent.

                        November 16, 2023
            THOMPSON,        Circuit    Judge.      Petitioner          Joel    Njoroge

Manguriu,    a   Kenyan      national,    asks    this   court     to     review    the

decisions of an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration

Appeals     regarding     whether      U.S.     Citizenship       and    Immigration

Services properly served him with the notice of its intent to

revoke his visa petition (underpinning his request for adjustment

of   status)     and   the    official    revocation       that    followed.         In

Manguriu's telling, the notice of intent to revoke his visa

petition was legally insufficient because notice was not served

directly upon him, rather it went out only to an individual he

says is a "former" attorney.            The government submits, inter alia,

that service upon the attorney of record in the visa petition

proceedings was proper based on the applicable regulations and

relevant policies.

            For reasons we'll soon explain, we must dismiss the

petition for review.

                                    Background

            Manguriu's path through our country's immigration system

has been long and winding.          When Manguriu's file first came before

this   court,    "[t]he      relevant    facts    [were]    easily       assembled."

Manguriu v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 119, 120 (1st Cir. 2015) (hereinafter

"Manguriu I").     Given the passage of time, the various proceedings

that played out in the interim, and the issue raised now on appeal,

we have more background to lay out this time around.                           While we

                                        - 2 -
need not detail the totality of Manguriu's dense history before

various immigration agencies and entities in order to inform and

explain today's outcome, it is necessary to provide a somewhat

comprehensive setup to appreciate the full picture of Manguriu's

situation.   (A heads-up to the reader -- make a flow chart.)    We

do so next, drawing the relevant facts from the administrative

record.   See Dor v. Garland, 46 F.4th 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2022).

                       Pre-Remand Proceedings

          Manguriu entered the U.S. back in 1999 on a student visa,

which he overstayed.    He married a U.S. citizen in 2005 and she

later filed an I-130 visa petition (seeking to classify Manguriu

as a spouse of a U.S. citizen) in July of 2006.      Based on that

petition, Manguriu applied for adjustment of status.1     But U.S.

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)2 denied the I-130

     1 "Adjustment of status is a process by which '[non-citizens]
physically present in the United States may obtain [lawful]
permanent resident status without leaving' the country to apply
for a visa via consular processing." Thomas v. Garland, 25 F.4th
50, 51 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting De Acosta v. Holder, 556 F.3d 16,
18 (1st Cir. 2009)) (second alteration in original).           "An
individual can seek adjustment of status in a removal proceeding
as a form of relief from removal." Id.
     2 USCIS stands apart from the immigration court system --
their work is sometimes interrelated, but each operates under
different umbrellas and in different silos. See 8 C.F.R. Ch. I
(Department of Homeland Security), V (Executive Office for
Immigration Review, Department of Justice). Indeed, whereas our
immigration court system is housed within the Department of
Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review, which exercises
its function of adjudicating immigration cases and conducting
immigration court proceedings and appellate reviews under

                               - 3 -
petition based on marriage fraud, and that threw a wrench into

Manguriu's pursuit of adjustment of status.             When the Department

of Homeland Security (DHS) got removal proceedings underway in

2009, Manguriu sought relief from removal under the Violence

Against Women Act (VAWA), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), claiming

he was the spouse of an abusive U.S. citizen and filing, through

his attorney, Richard Cabelus, an I-360 visa petition with USCIS

to that effect in January 2010.

            USCIS approved Manguriu's I-360 petition in December

2010, and Manguriu then used that approved petition to ask an

immigration judge (IJ) to adjust his status.              Making an adverse

credibility finding and citing other reasons not relevant here,

the IJ denied Manguriu's adjustment-of-status petition and ordered

him removed in March 2012.         Manguriu appealed, but the Board of

Immigration   Appeals    (BIA)   agreed    with   the    IJ's   decision   and

dismissed   Manguriu's    appeal    in    February      2014.    Undeterred,

Manguriu filed the Manguriu I petition for review, arguing that

delegated power from the Attorney General, see THE U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last visited
Nov. 16, 2023); THE U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION
REVIEW: AN AGENCY GUIDE (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/fi
le/eoir_an_agency_guide/download, USCIS is "a component of the
Department of Homeland Security" responsible for administration of
immigration benefits and "oversee[ing] lawful immigration to the
United    States,"    see   U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/mission-and-core-values/what-we-
do (last visited Nov. 16, 2023); HOMELAND SEC., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.
PUB. ORG. CHART,       https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-
02/23_0221_dhs_public-organization-chart.pdf.

                                   - 4 -
the agency committed legal error in denying his adjustment-of-

status claim.    794 F.3d at 121.

             That brings us to the part of Manguriu's procedural

history that is at the root of his arguments before us now.                   In

the wake of his petition to this court in which he challenged the

BIA's   affirmance   of   the   IJ's    decision      denying   his   requested

adjustment of status -- but before the Manguriu I panel rendered

any decision on it -- USCIS sent out an April 24, 2014 notice of

its intent to revoke its December 2010 approval of Manguriu's I-360

petition on the basis of his questionable credibility (laying out

its own reasoning on this issue and also citing the IJ's opinion),

which included an invitation to submit evidence that would rebut

the cited grounds for revocation.            The April 24 USCIS notice was

sent by mail solely to the address for Cabelus, the attorney who

filed Manguriu's I-360 back in January 2010.            Specifically, it was

addressed to "Joel Njoroge Manguriu, C/O Richard Cabelus Esq, 340

Main Street Suite 712, Worcester MA 01608." USCIS got no response.

On June 20, 2014, USCIS revoked its approval of the visa petition.

             Since then, Manguriu has maintained he didn't receive

any notice whatsoever of USCIS's intent to revoke -- Cabelus was

not his attorney at the time the notice went out, he says, and no

notice was sent to him personally.           He argued as much in the reply

brief   he   filed   in   Manguriu     I,    urging   (in   response    to   the

government's argument that there was no valid visa petition upon

                                     - 5 -
which Manguriu could adjust status) that he lacked proper notice

of USCIS's intent to revoke.         Id. at 121, 122.       In view of that

argument, the Manguriu I court, taking judicial notice of USCIS's

revocation   decision,    id.   at   121,    and   the   "tenebrous"   record

surrounding the issue, opted for a remand, id. at 122 ("The

petitioner's claim that the revocation is ineffective for want of

proper notice is sufficient (though barely) to raise a factual

question requiring remand.").         It did so with instructions that

the agency "make due inquiry and determine, among other things,

whether the revocation of the VAWA [(I-360)] petition was lawfully

accomplished and, if so, whether the BIA decision that is the

subject of this petition for judicial review is now moot."              Id.3

                         Post-Remand Proceedings

          Faced with this court's mandate, the BIA remanded to an

IJ for further fact-finding on the notice question.            At a January

2016 hearing, the IJ administratively closed (sua sponte) the

proceedings to allow then-pro se Manguriu time to get a lawyer who

could then help him undertake further action on his I-360 self-

     3 In a motion to reconsider, the government argued the BIA
lacked jurisdiction to review whether Manguriu had proper notice,
but the court denied the motion, explaining "a remand is necessary
so that the BIA, either directly or through a further remand to
the [IJ], may gather any available evidence relevant to the
mootness inquiry" and that "[s]uch a task is well within the BIA's
jurisdiction." Manguriu I, 794 F.3d at 123.

                                     - 6 -
petition before USCIS -- and the IJ instructed Manguriu to move to

re-calendar the proceedings once he got a response from USCIS.4

          Time   --    and   various   continuances    and   other

wranglings -- marched on.5   In March 2018, a counseled Manguriu

appeared before the IJ. At that hearing, noting the case's "rather

unusual posture" and mindful of this court's mandate and the BIA's

remand to her, the IJ, at the government's request, queried whether

she had jurisdiction to delve into whether Manguriu had received

proper notice, the point being that she had no authority over USCIS

and, if she found insufficient notice, she would be powerless to

order USCIS to reopen the I-360 proceedings.        Purportedly to

sidestep this dilemma and pursuant to this court's order, the

parties agreed that the IJ should engage in fact-finding to

consider the notice-sufficiency question, and they asked her to

hold a hearing for that purpose.

          Manguriu and his counsel appeared before the IJ in August

2018 for that evidentiary and merits hearing.    The IJ got things

     4 The administrative closure prompted the Manguriu I panel to
dismiss as moot the petition for review over which it had retained
appellate jurisdiction. See 794 F.3d at 122.
     5 For example, in February 2017, DHS moved that proceedings
should resume because Manguriu had taken no action before USCIS
regarding his I-360. A counseled Manguriu appeared at the April
hearing that ensued and agreed he'd taken no steps to pursue his
I-360.   Manguriu's counsel requested copies of the notice and
revocation decision (DHS protested that Manguriu should have
obtained those documents from USCIS since the last hearing) and a
continuance to review them.     The IJ continued proceedings to
December 2017.

                              - 7 -
started by setting the stage:      USCIS served the 2014 notice and

revocation decision on Cabelus, but did Cabelus still represent

Manguriu in his I-360 proceedings at the time of service, or had

he obtained new counsel?     The government represented that Cabelus

never     withdrew   from   representing   Manguriu   in   his   I-360

proceedings, and no other counsel had ever entered an appearance

in these proceedings -- certainly Manguriu had other counsel, such

as attorney Jamie Jasso in Manguriu I, but when it came to

representation before USCIS, Cabelus was the only attorney of

record.

            For his part, Manguriu testified he hired the Cambridge

Lawyers Group to help him with his I-360 before USCIS and his

adjustment of status, working with Cabelus and another attorney in

that office, Oneyma Kamalu.        After the BIA's 2014 decision,

Manguriu testified, he had no contact with Cabelus or Kamalu; Jasso

represented him in his Manguriu I petition for review, and Jasso

never received notice of USCIS's notice of intent to revoke and

revocation decision. Manguriu stated that, had he received notice,

he would have responded.     When the government asked when Cabelus

and Kamalu stopped representing him, Manguriu answered that they

stopped representing him after the BIA's February 2014 decision.

When the government pressed Manguriu as to whether he'd asked

Cabelus and Kamalu to withdraw, he said no; when the government

queried whether (to his knowledge) either of those attorneys had

                                 - 8 -
filed a request to withdraw, Manguriu said he didn't "have any

. . . knowledge of that."

           The IJ wrestled with what she'd heard:     "[n]otice to

counsel is notice to [Manguriu]"; "that [counsel] didn't notify

[Manguriu] isn't the [g]overnment's fault"; "[b]ut [Manguriu]

didn't have an opportunity to participate because his lawyers

didn't tell him about the proceedings . . . I don't know what

happened there"; "I mean there is a claim perhaps for ineffective

assistance," "[b]ut . . . is that the practical solution?"; and

"[a]s a legal matter, . . . notice went to [Manguriu] through

counsel.   It was proper. . . .   [T]here's nothing I can do."   The

IJ asked, "[W]here does that leave us?"

           The government staked out the position that the record

and Manguriu's testimony supported the conclusion that Cabelus was

Manguriu's counsel of record before USCIS at the time of the notice

of intent to revoke and the revocation decision and, therefore,

USCIS properly served these documents on Cabelus.    The government

noted that failure by counsel to inform Manguriu of USCIS's notice

and decision might amount to an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, but it had no bearing on the issue of proper notice by

USCIS.   Manguriu's lawyer indicated that she "[understood] legally

[Manguriu] would have received notice because his attorney had

received the notice of intent to revoke and also the revocation,"

but "[t]he fact is that Mr. Manguriu did not receive the notice."

                               - 9 -
And Manguriu's lawyer also pointed out "Manguriu never would have

received     the   notice"       directly    from   USCIS   because,   with   VAWA

applications, only the attorney of record receives notice, not a

respondent.6       When the IJ asked whether Manguriu had taken any

steps to reopen his I-360 proceedings, his lawyer said he had not.

The hearing concluded when the IJ signaled she'd issue a written

decision.7

             The IJ's written decision explained that USCIS served

the notice and revocation decision on Manguriu's counsel of record

for his I-360 self-petition (Cabelus), and service on counsel of

record    here     constituted      proper    notice   pursuant   to   8   U.S.C.

§ 1229(a)(2)(A) ("In removal proceedings under section 1229a . . .

a written notice shall be given in person to the [non-citizen]

(or, if personal service is not practicable, through service by

mail to the [non-citizen] or to the [non-citizen]'s counsel of

record,    if    any)."),    8    C.F.R.    § 103.2(b)(19)(ii)(A)      ("When   an

     6 Manguriu's attorney was referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2)
and the USCIS policy requiring USCIS to use a "safe address"
system: To ensure an abuser does not receive correspondence from
USCIS regarding a VAWA self-petition, USCIS is required to send
all correspondence concerning a VAWA self-petition to counsel of
record, not the self-petitioner. More on this to follow.
     7 After the hearing, Manguriu filed a motion to terminate the
proceedings -- he said the IJ lacked jurisdiction because his
notice to appear (a charging document in immigration proceedings)
was defective in that it omitted the place and time for his initial
hearing. He appealed the IJ's denial of that motion to the BIA.
But before us on appeal, he explicitly disclaims any pursuit of
his challenge to the decisions on that matter.

                                       - 10 -
applicant or petitioner is represented, USCIS will send original

notices   both   to   the   applicant    or   petitioner   and   his   or   her

authorized attorney or accredited representative."),8 and USCIS

policy as promulgated by DHS.           The IJ thus reasoned that, since

USCIS "lawfully accomplished" notice, Manguriu's adjustment of

status claim was moot for lack of an underlying visa.

           Manguriu appealed to the BIA.         He argued that notice had

been improper in light of the fact that Manguriu had "provided

notice of change of attorney to USCIS in subsequent submissions."

Alternatively, he urged, § 103.2 did not support a conclusion that

service on counsel of record constitutes proper notice.                     The

government opposed, saying the record was clear that Cabelus --

and only Cabelus -- represented Manguriu with respect to his I-360

petition with USCIS.        And to the extent Manguriu was trying to

make a policy-driven argument that USCIS should send its notices

and decisions to a petitioner (not just counsel), the government

stated such an approach would fly in the face of USCIS's policy of

avoiding such service because it could clue in abusive spouses.

     8 The IJ cited the version of the regulation that was in
effect as of January 27, 2015. As the government rightly notes,
when USCIS served the notice and revocation decision in 2014, 8
C.F.R.   §  103.2(b)(19)   likewise   provided   for  service   on
"applicants, petitioners, and their representatives" -- it just
didn't contain the subsections ((i) and (ii)) that separate pro se
applicants from counseled ones. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 103.2 (2013)
with 8 C.F.R. § 103.2 (2015).

                                  - 11 -
            In March 2022, the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision that

USCIS properly served Manguriu.            The BIA was not persuaded by

Manguriu's     unsupported      argument       that    a   different      attorney

represented him -- rather, the BIA wrote, while another attorney

(Kamalu) did represent Manguriu as to his adjustment of status

application, that attorney did not submit a form designating his

appearance in proceedings for the underlying visa petition, "which

is a separate and distinct matter."             The BIA reasoned that there

was nothing in the record to suggest anyone other than Cabelus had

served as counsel of record in Manguriu's I-360 proceedings.                   And

since   notice   on   counsel    of    record    constitutes      proper   notice

(§ 1229(a)(2)(A)),      and     Manguriu       had    conceded    USCIS    policy

otherwise    avoids   service     on    self-petitioners         represented    by

counsel because of the possibility the abusive spouse will become

aware of the petition, the BIA, like the IJ before it, reasoned

that USCIS "lawfully accomplished" notice of both the notice of

intent to revoke and the revocation decision, and Manguriu's

adjustment of status claim was moot for lack of an underlying visa

as a result.

            This timely petition for review followed.

                                 Discussion

            Against this layered backdrop, Manguriu's argument on

appeal reprises the general thesis he's advanced since 2015, i.e.,

USCIS didn't properly serve him with its intent to revoke his visa

                                      - 12 -
and the agency9 erred in concluding otherwise.                 Should we see

things    his   way,   he   says,    the   dominoes   would    fall   like   so:

insufficient service means USCIS's revocation should be undone as

a matter of law for want of notice; that would thereby resuscitate

his visa petition; and that, in turn, would revive the foundation

for his adjustment of status claim.10

            The   government        responds   that   notice    was   properly

accomplished based on the applicable regulations and USCIS policy.

     9 We'll use "the agency" to refer to the IJ and the BIA
collectively. See, e.g., Loja-Tene v. Barr, 975 F.3d 58, 60 n.1
(1st Cir. 2020).
     10  In the final pages of his opening brief, Manguriu also
floats an argument that the agency lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the notice issue because USCIS has
exclusive jurisdiction over VAWA petitions.      If this argument
sounds familiar, it's for a reason:     It echoes the concern the
government raised in its motion for reconsideration following
Manguriu I. See supra n.3. As our colleagues clearly explained
the last time this came up, "[the] contention that the [agency]
lacks jurisdiction to review the validity of a decision revoking
a visa petition may be true, but that contention misconstrues this
court's mandate." 794 F.3d at 123. Indeed,
     [b]ecause the government has raised a colorable claim of
     mootness and the facts relevant to that claim are not
     presently in the administrative record, a remand is
     necessary so that the BIA, either directly or through a
     further remand to the [IJ], may gather any available
     evidence relevant to the mootness inquiry (for example,
     whether the petitioner received actual notice of the
     revocation, the nature of the relationship between the
     petitioner's successive attorneys, and what, if any,
     steps the petitioner has taken since he learned of the
     revocation). See Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 90-91
     (1st Cir. 2002); City of Waco v. EPA, 620 F.2d 84, 86-
     87 (5th Cir. 1980). Such a task is well within the BIA's
     jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Neto, 25 I. & N. Dec.
     169, 173 (B.I.A. 2010) (noting that despite lack of

                                      - 13 -
Along the way, the government parries Manguriu's arguments to the

contrary, flagging various exhaustion-related stumbling blocks and

urging overall that Manguriu failed to present any exhausted

challenge because the arguments he plugs here on appeal were not

presented the same way below.

            Manguriu's proposition here is straightforward -- the

notice wasn't sent directly to him, and, on this record, the

attorney who did receive the notice, for whatever reason (like the

IJ, we "don't know what happened there"), did not loop Manguriu

in. And thus, according to Manguriu, improper notification amounts

to ineffective revocation of his visa petition.                    But his legal

arguments run headlong into a series of barriers.

            To explain, we lay out some guiding principles, starting

with our parameters of review.             "We review the BIA's conclusions

of   law   de    novo   and   provide    'some    deference   to   the   agency's

expertise       in   interpreting   both    the   statutes    that   govern   its

operations and its own implementing regulations.'"                    Sanchez v.

Garland, 74 F.4th 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting Cabrera v. Lynch,

805 F.3d 391, 393 (1st Cir. 2015)).                "Where, as here, the BIA

      jurisdiction to adjudicate visa petitions, immigration
      judges "may examine the underlying basis for a visa
      petition when such a determination bears on the [non-
      citizen]'s admissibility").

Id. The remand for assessment of notice was cabined precisely to
that question. We proceed to our review of the appeal from that
sufficient-notice determination.

                                        - 14 -
adopted the IJ's findings of fact, we review the IJ's findings for

support by substantial evidence and 'accept the [IJ's] factual

findings . . . unless the record is such as to compel a reasonable

factfinder to reach a contrary conclusion."                Id. (emphasis and

omission in original) (quoting Dorce v. Garland, 50 F.4th 207, 212

(1st Cir. 2022)).

             Now, the pertinent regulations and law that guide our

analysis.     Section 1229(a)(2)(A), relied upon by the agency here

as generally prescribing how to effect notice in the context of

removal proceedings,11 provides that written notice (of changes or

postponements in removal proceedings, specifically) "shall be

given in person to the [non-citizen] (or, if personal service is

not practicable, through service by mail to the [non-citizen] or

to the [non-citizen]'s counsel of record, if any)."                    And then

there's 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(19)(ii)(A), which provides in relevant

part:     "When an applicant or petitioner is represented, USCIS will

send original notices both to the applicant or petitioner and his

or her authorized attorney or accredited representative."                    And

last but certainly not least, there's § 1367(a)(2), which instructs

that, subject to exceptions not relevant here, "in no case may the

Attorney     General,   or   any   other   official   or    employee    of   the

     11 See Matter of Estime, 19 I. & N. Dec. 450, 451 (B.I.A.
1987) (noting "portions of the regulations relating to evidentiary
requirements in visa petition proceedings apply, of course, to the
revocation of approved visa petitions" (citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.2)).

                                    - 15 -
Department of Justice, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the

Secretary of State, or any other official or employee of [DHS] or

Department of State (including any bureau or agency of either of

such Departments)" "permit use by or disclosure to anyone . . . of

any information which relates to          [a non-citizen] who is the

beneficiary of an application for relief" under certain sections,

including VAWA.      Drawing from this statutory imperative, the

USCIS's Policy Manual relative to VAWA petitions charges that USCIS

"[o]fficers   must   keep   in   mind   the   [§] 1367    confidentiality

provisions . . . , as well as the prohibition on the unauthorized

disclosure of information related to a protected person, including

acknowledgment that a self-petition exists."             See USCIS Policy

Manual, vol. 3, pt. D, ch. 6(A)(2) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1367),

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-3-part-d-chapter-

6#footnote-6 (last visited Nov. 16, 2023).

          With this guidance in mind, and similarly mindful that

Manguriu is not challenging the agency's fact-finding here, we

examine his case.

          Recall that a panel of this court remanded to the agency

because, to determine whether revocation of the visa petition was

lawfully accomplished, "potentially material facts" as to the

notice issue needed to be found.          Manguriu I, 794 F.3d at 122.

The IJ did just that:

                                 - 16 -
      •   Cabelus entered an appearance in the I-360 proceedings and
          never withdrew from representing Manguriu in his I-360
          proceedings;
      •   No other counsel entered an appearance in the I-360
          proceedings;
      •   Manguriu's counsel acknowledged that the attorney who
          handled the Manguriu I petition did not represent Manguriu
          before USCIS;
      •   Cabelus was the attorney of record for the I-360
          proceedings; and
      •   USCIS served Cabelus with the notice of intent to revoke
          and the revocation decision.
On   these   unchallenged   facts,   coupled   with   the   above-recapped

regulatory and policy guidance providing for service of VAWA-based

I-360 self-petitions -- and alert to our deference to the agency's

knowhow when it comes to its own operations and regulations, see

Sanchez, 74 F.4th at 5 -- we, like the agency, conclude notice was

lawfully accomplished.

             This conclusion is borne of how the relevant regulations

and law flow together.       Indeed, it's clear from the statute and

regulations that notice generally can go to counsel of record

and/or an applicant, and USCIS policy says the same -- except in

the case of I-360 self-petitions under VAWA, where USCIS serves

only the attorney of record because sending notice to the self-

petitioner would run the risk that the petitioner's abuser would

get notice too.

             Section 103.2(b)(19)(ii)(A) instructs that notice should

be sent "both to the applicant or petitioner and his or her

authorized     attorney     or   accredited    representative,"     while

                                  - 17 -
§ 1229(a)(2)(A) is clear that removal-proceedings notice "shall be

given in person to the [non-citizen] (or, if personal service is

not practicable, through service by mail to the [non-citizen] or

to the [non-citizen]'s counsel of record, if any)."             (Emphasis

added.)   See also Vaz dos Reis v. Holder, 606 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

2010) (assessing notice, in the context of reopening of removal

proceedings based on lack of notice, and reasoning that "[t]he

plain language of the statute indicates that notice to [a non-

citizen's] counsel of record constitutes notice to the [non-

citizen]").

           And central to all of this is the fact that Manguriu's

I-360 tapped into the power of VAWA -- that means notice here

simply cannot be viewed in a regulation vacuum; the USCIS policy

(based on § 1367(a)(2)) on such petitions is a notice-game-changer

here.   It's why notice went just to Cabelus.       And, notwithstanding

Manguriu's belief that Cabelus no longer represented him, because

Cabelus was the attorney of record in those proceedings, it's why

service on Cabelus was proper service as a matter of law.

           Resisting this conclusion, Manguriu says the agency's

reliance on the above-mentioned law was erroneous.               But his

protestations   are   both   unfounded    and   unpersuasive.    Manguriu

generally characterizes the agency as having committed legal error

when it "relied exclusively on inapplicable rules of service."

But he does so without citation to caselaw supporting their

                                 - 18 -
inapplicability to this case (and our research has turned up none),

and he does so without mention of or attempt to somehow explain

away §§ 1229(a)(2)(A) and 1367(a)(2) and their fundamental role in

this analysis.      And his effort to say why § 103.2 is inapplicable

is flawed in that he posits that it applies only to represented

petitioners and he was unrepresented in his I-360 proceedings in

2014, relying on previously unmentioned regulations (which we'll

discuss momentarily) to advance this cause.           But that angle is an

unexhausted one.

           Indeed, among Manguriu's appellate contentions is his

position   that    he   was    unrepresented   at   the   time    of   the   2014

revocation        happenings      because      Cabelus's         representation

automatically terminated pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(a)12 back in

2010, when USCIS initially approved his visa petition, and it was

error to consider Cabelus counsel of record "for a different new

matter" come the 2014 revocation events.            Additionally, he urges

that USCIS should've served him directly pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

§ 205.213 -- USCIS had his address and everything, he says.                  And

     12  Section 292.4(a) provides in pertinent part:           "An
appearance must be filed . . . by the attorney or accredited
representative appearing in each case. . . . The appearance will
be recognized by the specific immigration component of DHS in which
it was filed until the conclusion of the matter for which it was
entered."
     13Section 205.2 explains: "Revocation of the approval of a
petition of self-petition . . . will be made only on notice to the
petitioner or self-petitioner. The petitioner or self-petitioner
must be given the opportunity to offer evidence in support of the

                                    - 19 -
he abstractedly faults the agency for failing to "consider these

binding regulations."

          We understand his core thesis to be unchanged, but these

supporting arguments and the regulations cited to anchor them are

new to Manguriu's attack on the notice issue; crucially (and, from

Manguriu's perspective, perhaps regrettably) they were not raised

before the agency and therefore they are not exhausted. See, e.g.,

Odei v. Garland, 71 F.4th 75, 78 n.1 (1st Cir. 2023);14 Gomez-

Abrego v. Garland, 26 F.4th 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2022) (explaining

that "arguments not made before the BIA may not make their debut

in a petition for judicial review of the BIA's final order"

(quoting Ahmed v. Holder, 611 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2010))); Daoud

v. Barr, 948 F.3d 76, 82-83 (1st Cir. 2020) (refusing to review

petition or self-petition and in opposition to the grounds alleged
for revocation of the approval."
     14 In Odei, a panel of this court examined a petitioner's
argument that he had "recharacterize[d]" on appeal such that it
was distinct from what he'd argued to the agency. 71 F.4th at 78
n.1.   Concluding the petitioner had never made this particular
argument to the agency, the panel confronted the resulting
exhaustion problem in conjunction with the Supreme Court's recent
exhaustion-related guidance.      Id. (citing Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1108-16 (2023) (holding
the administrative exhaustion requirement prescribed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional but is instead a claims-
processing rule subject to forfeiture and waiver)). Specifically,
given that the government had raised the exhaustion requirement
(as has happened in our case, too) and because the petitioner never
made the same argument to the agency that he was making on appeal
(same here), the panel deemed the argument unexhausted and
therefore declined to consider it.         Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(d)(1)).

                              - 20 -
the unexhausted argument that resulted from a petitioner's attempt

"to repackage his argument on appeal" as to an agency misapplying

its regulations when "he did not contend before the BIA that the

BIA could not rely on the regulations identified by the IJ and the

corollary BIA regulation").   We thus do not consider them.15

                          Final Thoughts

          In the law, notice can mean a great many things.      See,

e.g., Notice Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (collecting

and defining different notice-related concepts, from "advance

notice" to "short notice").   There are different types of notice

and ways in which notice can be accomplished on the facts of any

given case.   To Manguriu's thinking, notice needed to be made as

he argues -- upon him, the petitioner, not an attorney Manguriu

     15 It's true, of course, that the agency must follow its own
regulations.   Manguriu I, 794 F.3d at 122.     Even so, litigants
still need to raise regulations-based arguments when urging that
the agency misapplied regulations. See, e.g., Daoud, 948 F.3d at
82-83. That didn't happen here.
     In all events, we note that, as to § 292.4, Manguriu's
appellate argument overlooks the salient concession made before
the agency that "legally" Manguriu received proper notice "because
his attorney had received the notice of intent to revoke and also
the revocation," and also his counsel's acknowledgment that USCIS
policy prevents service on self-petitioners.
     And as to § 205.2, it simply states the fact that a notice
requirement     exists    in    revocation    proceedings;     it's
§ 1229(a)(2)(A), § 103.2(b), and USCIS policy here that help
provide the contours of how to effect notice. Manguriu I noted
§ 205.2's fundamental requirement of notice of proceedings to
revoke a visa petition, 794 F.3d at 122, but the court did not say
§ 205.2 somehow controlled the outcome on remand or was "the proper
regulation" over § 103.2(b) as Manguriu argues before us (and, to
repeat, not below).

                              - 21 -
didn't think represented him anymore.   Given the discouraging way

things shook out for him, we can appreciate why he wishes this to

be so.    But "notice" and "personal knowledge" are not the same

thing, see Vaz dos Reis, 606 F.3d at 5, and on this record, notice

was undertaken and achieved in line with what the applicable

statute, regulations, and policy required.

           For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition for

review.

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