Court Opinion

ID: 9635561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:54:13.351613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:29.766869
License: Public Domain

Stapleton, Circuit Judge,
dissenting
I agree with my colleagues that the District Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction and that, given the absence of an evidentiary hearing, it erred in failing to accept as true the facts alleged by the Metcalfes. In my view, however, even accepting those facts, the District Court’s conclusion that it lacked personal jurisdiction was correct.
A district court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state in determining whether personal jurisdiction is proper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). The reach of the long arm statute of the Virgin Islands was intended by its legislature to be coextensive with the maximum parameters of the Due Process Clause. Urgent v. Tech. Assistance Bureau, 255 F. Supp. 2d 532 (D.V.I. 2003). We therefore look to federal Due Process law to determine Renaissance’s susceptibility to personal jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands. Vetrotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prods. Co., 75 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1996). We summarized that law in Vetrotex, 75 F.3d at 150-51:
The due process limit to the exercise of personal jurisdiction is defined by a two-prong test. First, the defendant must have made constitutionally sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 *1239L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985) (the “constitutional touchstone” of personal jurisdiction is “whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum State”). The determination of whether minimum contacts exist requires an examination of “the relationship among the forum, the defendant and the litigation,” Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), in order to determine whether the defendant has “ ‘purposefully directed’ ” its activities toward residents of the forum. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S. Ct. at 2182 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 70 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984)). There must be “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). Second, if “minimum contacts” are shown, jurisdiction may be exercised where the court determines, in its discretion, that to do so would comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1945); Farino, 960 F.2d at 1222.
My analysis begins with an indisputable proposition. In applying these principles, it “is well established ... that a nonresident’s contracting with a forum resident, without more, is insufficient to establish the ‘minimum contacts’ required for an exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident.” Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assoc., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis supplied). See also Vetrotex, 75 F.3d at 151.
It is also important in the current context to stress at the outset that it is the defendant who must be shown to have engaged in some affirmative act by which he “purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thus invoking the benefit and protection of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958). As the Supreme Court explained in Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (emphasis supplied):
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State .... it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws.
*1240The facts usually found to constitute “the more” necessary to subject a nonresident who contracted with a forum resident to the jurisdiction of the forum court are notably absent here. Renaissance is not alleged to have ever had an office, employee or other representative in the Virgin Islands for any purpose. Nor is it alleged to have engaged in sales to distributors or other third parties who sell Renaissance vessels in the Virgin Islands. Further, it is not alleged to have advertised its vessels in the Virgin Islands media or to have in any other way solicited from the Metcalfes or anyone else in the Virgin Islands an offer to purchase a vessel. Finally, Renaissance is not alleged to have shipped any product into the Virgin Islands for sale or, indeed, for any other purpose. The most that is alleged is that it “shrink wrapped” a vessel in its home state of Florida and delivered it to the Metcalfes’ shipper at a port in Florida.
As a substitute for the customary allegations, the Metcalfes insist that they have made five allegations that must be accepted as true and that provide the required “more” than the existence of a contract with a forum resident. I am unpersuaded.
The Metcalfes’ first and primary argument is based on their allegation that, while Renaissance did not ship the vessel into the Virgin Islands, it “was fully aware that the ultimate destination of the Vessel was the Virgin Islands.” App. at 86. The only relevant issue, however, is what Renaissance did in the Virgin Islands. Accordingly, I would hold that its knowledge of what the vessel’s purchasers intended to do with it after the purchase is irrelevant.10 It is difficult to imagine a contract of sale between a forum nonresident and a forum resident where the nonresident seller does not have reason to believe that the ultimate destination of the goods will be the forum. Yet, we know that such a contract is not alone enough to subject the seller to the personal jurisdiction of the forum court.
Second, the Metcalfes rely upon their allegation that they first became familiar with the type of vessel they ultimately bought when they rented one in the Virgin Islands from See & Ski, a boat rental firm. They do not claim any relationship between Renaissance and See & Ski, however, other than that the latter from time to time purchases vessels from the former for use in the latter’s rental business. The leasing by a Virgin *1241Islands boat rental firm of a Renaissance built vessel owned by the rental firm can hardly be viewed as an act by Renaissance “invoking the benefits and protections of’ Virgin Islands law.
Next, the Metcalfes emphasize that they “negotiated the sale from St. John, primarily via the telephone, telefax and the internet.” App. at 86. Once again, however, they focus on the wrong party. The Metcalfes make no allegation that Renaissance dispatched anything to the Virgin Islands in whatever discourse led up to the one-time purchase contract. To be sure, it is reasonable to infer from the Metcalfes’ alleged use of interstate communication facilities and the alleged existence of a contract that Renaissance’s acceptance of the Metcalfes’ offer may have been communicated through such facilities to them in the Virgin Islands. But not every telephone call into the forum state constitutes the kind of “reaching out” to the forum state that subjects a nonresident to its jurisdiction. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479. In Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 2008), for example, we determined that the fact that the parties negotiated an agreement by telephone and mail with the plaintiff remaining in the forum state did not support a finding of minimum contacts with that state. We noted “an important distinction between the negotiations in Burger King and those in [Budget Blinds in] that the Burger King defendant actively sought contract negotiations with a company based in the forum state,” whereas in Budget Blinds, there was no indication that the non-forum resident had reached out to anyone in the forum. Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 261. Likewise, in the present case, the fact that reciprocal communications may have occurred between Renaissance and the Metcalfes is not sufficient to establish that Renaissance purposely “reached out” to the Virgin Islands where Renaissance is not alleged to have actively sought contract negotiations with the Metcalfes there.
Fourth, the Metcalfes point to the Renaissance website, attaching as Exhibit A a “copy of link entitled ‘Contact Other Owners.’ ” App. at 88 (emphasis supplied). As the title of the link suggests, however, Exhibit A cannot accurately be viewed as supporting the Metcalfes’ contention that “Renaissance advertises the rental of its vessels on St. Thomas on its website.” Id. Exhibit A consists of a list of the names of people who have previously purchased vessels from Renaissance along with their email addresses. On the first page, fifteen such vessel owners are listed along with a suggestion that anyone who currently owns a Renaissance vessel *1242and who wants to talk to “other owners” contact them through the addresses provided. Only one listed owner, See & Ski, appears to be from the Virgin Islands. App. at 89.
We articulated the controlling principle here in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir 2003), as follows:
As Zippo and the Courts of Appeals decisions indicate, the mere operation of a commercially interactive web site should not subj ect the operator to jurisdiction anywhere in the world. Rather, there must be evidence that the defendant “purposefully availed” itself of conducting activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.
Exhibit A is not targeted at the Virgin Islands. If it be regarded as targeted at all, it is targeted at anyone anywhere in the world who owns a Renaissance vessel and has an interest in communicating with “other” Renaissance vessel owners. If that targeting is sufficient, Renaissance’s website has subjected it to personal jurisdiction anywhere in the world that a Renaissance vessel owner resides, a result that seems inconsistent with Toys “R” Us.
Finally, the Metcalfes rely upon their allegation that during some past period of unspecified duration “Renaissance has sold approximately 7 vessels to Virgin Islands residents.” App. at 87. At least three are said to have been sold to See & Ski. This is, of course, not relevant to whether the District Court can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Renaissance given that the Metcalfes’ claim does not arise from those transactions. Conceivably, however, these seven sales might provide a foundation upon which to build a prima facie case of general personal jurisdiction (i.e., the presence of currently existing, “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum, Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 255 (3d Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless, in the absence of any indication as to when the seven sales were made and whether, unlike the sale to the Metcalfes, they involved some Renaissance activity in the forum, I *1243conclude that the Metcalfes have not come close to alleging a prima facie case of general personal jurisdiction.11
The only remaining issue is whether we should remand to provide the Metcalfes with an opportunity for jurisdictional discovery. Toys “R” Us provides the controlling test:
If a plaintiff presents factual allegations that suggest “with reasonable particularity” the possible existence of the requisite “contacts between [the party] and the forum state,” Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992), the plaintiff’s right to conduct jurisdictional discovery should be sustained.
Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 456. I read “with reasonable particularity” to mean that if a plaintiff suggests a realistic basis for believing that personal jurisdiction exists, he or she should be allowed to pursue discovery before having to prove that such jurisdiction does exist. In my judgment, the Metcalfes have not met this threshold. But it is not necessary to so hold. The Metcalfes have never requested jurisdictional discovery in the District Court, and it would clearly be unfair to Renaissance to allow them to successfully insist upon it in the course of this appeal.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 To the extent that Four Winds Plaza Corp. v. Caribbean Fire & Assoc., 48 V.I. 899 (D.V.I. 2007), and Buccaneer Hotel Corp. v. Reliance Int’l Sales Corp., 17 V.I. 249 (Terr. Ct. 1981), can be read to suggest the contrary, I would overrule those cases.

 While the Metcalfes do not so allege, my colleagues note that “Renaissance avers that ‘all purchase agreements entered into by and between Renaissance and its customers are subject to a Ten Year Limited Hull Warranty.’ ” Op. at 19. That warranty provides that (1) Renaissance will repair defects in workmanship and/or materials without cost to the purchaser, (2) “[a]ny expense for delivery of the boat to the manufacturer for repair will be paid for by the Purchaser,” (3) the “laws of the State of Florida shall govern the interpretation and enforcement of this Hull Warranty,” (4) “[a]ny action under this Hull Warranty shall be brought in the courts of the state of Florida,” and (5) the “remedies contained in the warranty constitute the sole recourse of Purchaser against Seller for breach of any of Seller’s obligations under [the] warranty agreement.” App. at 43. Thus, while it may be true that Renaissance has entered into warranty contracts with residents of the Virgin Islands, the warranty obligations are to be performed in Florida and hardly can be said to provide the “more” necessary to subject Renaissance to the personal jurisdiction of the District Court.