Court Opinion

ID: 9583111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:54.583085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:15.058877
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. All evidence as to the actual commission of the crime is circumstantial. The state contends that the prior inconsistent statement (in writing) of Travis Sutton that appellant poured a liquid on the sofa ánd in his mother’s bedroom is evidence of appellant’s guilt. However, the state used the prior inconsistent statement to impeach Travis (a state witness), and it is well settled in Georgia that “ [a] prior contradictory statement is admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness shown to have made it, but is not in itself probative evidence which will tend to prove any fact therein contained.” Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 336, 357 (7) (51 SE2d 33) (1948); Mathis v. State, 210 Ga. 408 (1) (80 SE2d 159) (1954); Lewis v. American Road Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 507, 509 (1) (167 SE2d 729) (1969); Dickey v. State, 240 Ga. 634, 636 (242 SE2d 55) (1978).
Turning then to an evaluation of the evidence excluding the prior inconsistent statement, I note, as stated previously, that all evidence relating to commission of the crime was circumstantial. In my opinion such evidence falls far short of establishing appellant’s guilt of arson; at most, it shows that appellant was present in the trailer shortly before the fire started.
This court has held that “it is clear that in this state ‘to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’ Code § 38-109; [cit.].” Vaughn v. State, 136 Ga. App. 54, 56 (220 SE2d 66) (1975). “In making a determination of whether any other *740reasonable hypothesis exists, the defendant’s explanation must be taken into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted. [Cits.]” Elam v. State, 125 Ga. App. 427, 430 (187 SE2d 920) (1972). Accord, Jackson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 441, 443 (263 SE2d 181) (1979).
Our court has recognized that it is often not possible to prove arson by direct evidence or to directly connect the defendant with the commission of the crime; hence, “ ‘ “[t]o sustain a conviction, it is not required that the evidence exclude every possibility or every inference that my be drawn from proved facts. It is only necessary to exclude reasonable inferences and reasonable hypotheses which may be drawn from the evidence under all the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case.” [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. State, 85 Ga. App. 129, 133 (2) (68 SE2d 393) (1951). Accord, Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387 (94 SE2d 741) (1956); Smith v. State, 122 Ga. App. 882 (179 SE2d 261) (1970); Whitten v. State, 143 Ga. App. 768 (240 SE2d 107) (1977). But see Cook v. State, 146 Ga. App. 353 (246 SE2d 347) (1978).
Applying the principles set forth above to the instant case, the most that the evidence establishes is that appellant was present in the trailer either at the time, or shortly before, the fire started and that he sprayed some “Car-New” on the sofa and rug in the living room. There is no evidence that “Car-New” is flammable, and there is no evidence that appellant was ever in the bedroom where the fire marshall testified, unequivocally, that the fire started. Finally, there is no evidence as to what started the fire, and the fire marshal testified he could not come to an opinion as to what started the fire. In short, there is no evidence that the fire was set. Thus, “the evidence, though entirely circumstantial, was sufficient to raise a grave suspicion of the defendant’s guilt of the offense charged; yet it was, nevertheless, insufficient, when given its strongest intendment against him, to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of his guilt. . .” Redwine v. State, 207 Ga. 318, 324-325 (61 SE2d 481) (1950). In the instant case appellant presented a reasonable hypothesis other than that of his guilt, particularly when we are required, as here, to disregard the impeaching statement of the witness, Travis Sutton. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority. I would reverse and grant appellant’s motion for a directed verdict.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian and Judge Smith and Judge Birdsong concur in this dissent.