Court Opinion

ID: 9615911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:41:46.318291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:12.694586
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
dissenting:
The district court’s action in the present case, which removed from the jury the question of the existence of certain terms of an employment contract, was contrary to established law and thus erroneous. The majority errs in affirming that action.
This Court has consistently held that question of the existence of a contract, or the terms thereof, is a question of fact for the trier of fact. The sole exception to this rule is where the evidence admits of only one reasonable inference or conclusion. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984). Furthermore, we have consistently held that the question of whether the contents of employer manuals or policies constitute enforceable terms of an employment contract is likewise a question of fact for the trier of fact. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., supra; Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 715 P.2d 1283, (1986). The majority’s attempt to circumvent this rule based upon its conclusion that no issue of fact exists regarding the terms of the alleged employment contract is unavailing. The majority’s action in upholding the district court’s decision has effectively denied appellant its right to a jury trial on a key issue in this case.
The majority correctly states that the law in Idaho is that, absent an express contract, employment is “at will” of either party to the contract. As such, the employment relationship may be terminated by either employer or employee without liability and “without cause.” An employee asserting a claim of “wrongful discharge” bears the burden of establishing that the employment is not “at will.” Plaintiff’s complaint is completely devoid of any allegations regarding the existence of an express employment contract. It was not until the case had proceeded to summary judgment stage that plaintiff first argued the existence of a contract limiting the right of the employer to terminate the employment relationship. It was at this stage of the proceeding that plaintiff for the first time asserted that the provisions of the employee handbook were incorporated into her employment contract. Yet, plaintiff’s trial brief agreed with defendant’s argument that “[wjhether a contract between an employer and employee contains terms limiting the employer’s right to discharge the employee depends upon whether there was a meeting of the minds of the parties with respect to such terms. Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640 (1984); Shields & Co. v. Green, 100 Idaho 879, 606 P.2d 983 (1980).”
It is by now axiomatic that questions regarding “meeting of minds” or the intent of parties to the contract are, in nearly all cases, questions of fact for the trier of fact. The majority fails entirely in its attempt to address the issue of meeting of minds. Instead, the majority sets up an issue of “mutuality of obligation” which it finds easily overcome based on the fact that the employment contract in this case involves a unilateral contract. The Court’s statement in this regard is a statement of the obvious; the very nature of a unilateral contract is such that mutuality of obligation would never exist, at least before the unilateral contract is performed. However, a finding of no “mutuality of obligation” does not equate with the finding of meeting of the minds or address the intent of the parties as to whether or not the provisions of the handbook were incorporated into Mrs. Watson’s employment contract and therefore binding upon the hospital.
Indeed, the only evidence in the record and before the trial court was short excerpts from the policy manual. However, Mrs. Watson in her testimony never asserted that the policy manual provisions were relied upon by her as terms of her contract with appellant hospital. In fact, the only testimony before the trial court was to the effect that the policy manual was a guide for management. There simply was no *51testimony that the policies were applied to non-management employees. The language utilized in the policy manual itself discloses that the policies in the manual are addressed to management personnel only. Testimony elicited by plaintiff’s counsel from the hospital’s personnel director was to the effect that sanctions for failure to follow the policy guidelines were imposed on supervisors and not on non-management employees. Indeed, the record discloses that the entire thrust of plaintiff’s counsel’s questioning of hospital personnel was along the lines of finding out why management did not follow policy regarding timekeeping. Counsel for plaintiff simply did not attempt to elicit any testimony regarding policies of the hospital concerning limitations on the right of the hospital to discharge employees. At no time did counsel seek to elicit testimony from hospital personnel as to the binding effect of hospital policy on non-management employees.
Plaintiff did attempt to have admitted into evidence the employee handbook as a whole on grounds that the terms contained therein were part of her employment contract. However, the district court sustained appellant hospital’s objection to the admission of that piece of evidence. That is, plaintiff argued that the employee handbook contained provisions which she felt were part of her employment contract and sought to have that evidence admitted on that basis for that very purpose. However, appellant hospital was successful in its objection to the evidence, and the handbook was not admitted into evidence. Therefore, there is simply no basis in the record before this Court or before the trial court for finding as a matter of law and instructing the jury that a contract existed based upon the terms of the employee handbook or policy manual. Again, as we stated in Harkness v. City of Burley, supra, “At a minimum, [the question of whether or not the terms of the policy manual constituted terms of the employment contract is] a question of fact for the jury to decide.” 110 Idaho at 359, 715 P.2d at 1289. In no event has plaintiff advanced her burden of proof so far as to warrant taking the issue from the jury by finding in her favor on the issue of the existence of a contract and the terms thereof as was done in this case. Yet, that is precisely what the trial court did by giving the following instruction:
“INSTRUCTION NO. 12
“In this case, a contract of employment did exist between the Plaintiff and the Hospital. The contract contained a provision which set forth certain actions which could result in an immediate discharge. The Hospital maintains that the Plaintiff was discharged because of an intentional falsification of a certain time record which record was required for payroll computation. The Court in a later instruction will instruct you as to the burden of proof; however, the Court will inform you at this time that the burden is not upon the Hospital to prove they had a legal and justifiable right to discharge the Plaintiff, but the burden is upon the Plaintiff to prove the discharge was wrongful.” (Emphasis added.)
Whether the provisions of the manual were contained in the employment contract was a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. Harkness v. City of Burley, supra. Because the trial court denied appellant its right to a jury trial on that fact issue, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court and remand for a new trial permitting the appellant the opportunity to present the issue of the existence of a contract to the jury for its decision.