Court Opinion

ID: 9552919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:19:16.245863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:22.414937
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I find myself unable to concur in the opinion of the majority in what is said in paragraph 3 of the syllabus and corresponding portion of the opinion. I discern no bearing the provisions of G. S. 1949, 44-535, have on this question.
I am in complete accord in what is said to the effect that this *124court is committed to a liberal interpretation of the act. (See Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P. 2d 119.) My idea of the meaning of this is that where one construction will result in denying compensation and another will result in awarding it, we should adopt the construction in favor of the workman or his dependents, if we can reasonably do so.
The prevailing opinion states the question to be: Where a workman dies of his injury more than three years after the accident in which the injury occurred, are his dependents entitled to benefits under the workmen’s compensation act? In view of the above question I ask: Where in the act is there any provision that death must occur within three years of the happening of the accident in order for the dependents to recover? There is no such provision in the act. We have said many times that the act was complete in itself. (See Norman v. Consolidated Cement Co., 127 Kan. 643, 274 Pac. 233.) If such be the proper construction then whence cometh the statement that the 1927 amendment, section 44-520a was obviously for the purpose of setting a specific time, beyond which an employer would not be liable for death resulting from an accident arising out of and in the course of employment? That is not what the section says. It is a section devoted solely to the time within which a claim for compensation must be made, that is, one hundred and twenty days after the accident where the claim is for compensation for an injury not resulting in death or within eight months after the death of the injured employee if death results from the injury within three years after the date of the accident.
There is no limitation as to time for filing the claim where death occurs more than three years after the accident. That may seem strange, but that is the way the statute is written. The English language permits no other interpretation.
Now let us examine the sections fixing liability. G. S. 1949, 44-501, provides as follows:
“If in any employment to which this act applies, personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation to the workman in accordance with the provisions of this act. Save as herein provided no such employer shall be liable for any injury for which compensation is recoverable under this act . . .”
G. S. 1949, 44-510 (2) provides for the amount of compensation to be allowed on a claim where death results from the injury. Now *125if it were the obvious intent of the legislature that death must occur within three years of the accident in order to entitle the dependents to recover, in this section would have been the logical place to insert the provision. We do not find it, however, there nor anywhere else in the act.
It is true G. S. 1949, 44-535, provides:
“The right to compensation shall he deemed in every case, including cases where death results from the injury, to have accrued to the injured workman or his dependents or legal representatives at the time of the accident, and the time limit in which to commence proceedings for compensation therefor shall run as against him, his legal representatives and dependents, from the date of the accident.”
Where in that section do we find any provision fixing a time limit in which to commence proceedings for compensation? There is no such provision in that section nor do we find one anywhere until we read G. S. 1949, 44-520a. There we find no provision fixing the time within which death must take place after the accident to enable the defendants to recover compensation.
My point is, the construction put on the act by the majority opinion is a strained construction. To say the legislature obviously intended to set a specific time beyond which an employer would not be liable for death resulting from an accident is to give the legislature an intention which it failed to put into words.
The statute is ambiguous. I will not resolve that ambiguity in favor of the employer when to do so will deprive an orphan child of the injured workman the right to compensation a reasonable construction of the statute gives him.