Court Opinion

ID: 9630955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:25:22.634027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:46.713075
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

After the defendant Watson was arrested, he specifically requested a lawyer, and retained a private attorney. The record shows that Watson thereafter relied on the advice of *85his attorney. Thus, after charges had been filed and on the date of his second preliminary hearing, Watson, acting under the instructions of his attorney, agreed to take a polygraph examination. Watson’s attorney secured from the police an agreement that they would conduct no interrogation of Watson except for the questioning involved in the polygraph examination, and Watson knew of this agreement. However, despite the agreement, the police interrogated Watson after the polygraph examination had been completed. Watson gave a statement apparently intended to be exculpatory, but which in fact incriminated him by placing him at the scene of the crime. Watson was subsequently convicted, the trial court relying substantially on this statement.
Neither the majority nor the State dispute that an interrogation of Watson without his retained counsel took place at a critical stage of the proceedings, and consequently it is not disputed that Watson was entitled to the assistance of his counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). As previously stated by this Court in Elliott v. Warden, 243 Md. 627, 631, 222 A. 2d 55 (1966):
“Under the Massiah test, absent an effective waiver of Sixth Amendment rights, no inculpatory statement which is made by an indicted declarant will be allowed into evidence against him if such statement is elicited from the accused when he does not have counsel present.”
Thus, the only issue before the Court is whether Watson waived his right to the assistance of counsel.1
*86The majority emphasizes that this right can be waived. This is, of course, true. Significantly, however, the majority makes no mention whatsoever of the rigorous standards which must be satisfied before a court may find that the constitutional right to counsel has been waived.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated these rigorous standards in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977):
“The District Court and the Court of Appeals were also correct in their understanding of the proper standard to be applied in determining the question of waiver as a matter of federal constitutional law — that it was incumbent upon the State to prove ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S.,at 464. That standard has been reiterated in many cases. We have said that the right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506, 513; cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 471, and that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, supra, at 4; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 70.”
It is abundantly clear that, in order to establish the waiver of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, an “appropriately heavy burden” lies with the State. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 236, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
*87Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized in Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U. S. at 404, that:
“This strict standard applies equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical stage of pretrial proceedings. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 238-240; United States v. Wade, 388 U. S., at 237.”
It is clear, therefore, that the determination of the validity of Watson’s alleged waiver must be judged with the same scrutiny it would receive had he attempted this waiver at trial. The Supreme Court has been explicit in this regard — an examination into the knowing and understanding nature of the waiver must be conducted. As the Court stated in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 723-724, 68 S. Ct. 316, 92 L. Ed. 309 (1948):
“To discharge this duty [of assuring the intelligent nature of the waiver] properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understanding^ and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.”
The majority makes no serious attempt to view the facts of this case in light of these long established standards. It *?rests content with the statements, “he took matters in his own hands [and appears to be] a normal individual mentally.” This is insufficient.
An examination of the record in the instant case persuades me that the State has fallen short of satisfying its heavy burden.
The facts in the instant case present a defendant in the aftermath of a polygraph examination, circumstances highly unsettling, which were further charged by the polygraph operator’s having accused Watson of lying. It was under the pressure of these circumstances, and faced with this accusation, that Watson (according to the police testimony) requested to see his interrogator and made his incriminating statement.
If psychological pressure such as this were purposefully applied by the State to elicit a confession, it would be labeled coercive and condemned. Cf. Johnson v. State, 31 Md. App. 303, 355 A. 2d 504 (1976). However, even if Watson’s statement may have been “voluntary” for purposes of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment, I do not believe, given the circumstances in which it occurred, that it implies a waiver which can be deemed voluntary “with ‘regard ... [to] the higher standard with respect to waiver of the right to counsel that applies when the Sixth Amendment has attached.’ ” United States v. Satterfield, 558 F. 2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1977), quoting Judge Friendly, dissenting in United States v. Massimo, 432 F. 2d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 1022, 91 S. Ct. 586, 27 L.Ed.2d 633 (1971). This Court should be reluctant to find voluntary waivers of the right to counsel in circumstances so laden with psychological stress, whether or not this stress is intentionally induced by the State.
Furthermore, Watson’s interrogator testified that, on meeting with Watson, he stated to him, “I understand you have something to tell me, but first of all I’m going to read you your rights.” The very form of this statement under the circumstances, i.e., “first of all,” suggests that it was an invitation to ignore the substance of what followed. However, in any event, what followed was a mere recitation of the standard Miranda litany, telling Watson, inter alia, that the *89State would furnish him with a lawyer if he could not afford to hire one. This litany, of course, was not pertinent inasmuch as Watson already had an attorney and had just taken the lie detector test upon his lawyer’s instructions. The interrogator did not ask Watson if he wished to waive the services of the attorney he had already retained. See United States v. Springer, 460 F. 2d 1344, 1355 n. 3 (7th Cir. 1972) (Judge John Paul Stevens dissenting). He did not contact defendant’s counsel. See United States v. Thomas, 474 F. 2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U. S. 932, 93 S. Ct. 2758, 37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973). He did not explain or suggest to Watson the possible consequences of proceeding without the advice of counsel. Von Moltke v. Gillies, supra, 332 U. S. 708.
Finally, the interrogator flatly breached his agreement with Watson’s attorney by questioning Watson in the attorney’s absence. The interrogator did not mention that agreement. Watson knew of the agreement but made no reference to it which might suggest that he was disavowing it. As the Supreme Court said about the similar agreement in Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U. S. at 405, in concluding that there had been no waiver of counsel:
“Williams knew of that agreement and, particularly in view of his consistent reliance on counsel, there is no basis for concluding that he disavowed it.”
What the police did in the present case was to take advantage of the stress of the moment and deprive Watson of the right to assistance of counsel, a right which he had expressly and effectively “asserted... by having secured [an attorney who] acting as his agent... had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur ....” Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U. S. at 405.
In light of these facts, and faced with the admonition that a court must “indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver,” I cannot agree with the majority’s finding that Watson made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to assistance of counsel.
Finally, it must additionally be noted that the majority’s opinion does much to undermine the efficient and orderly *90administration of justice. The ability of a defense attorney to cooperate with the State in criminal proceedings, while at the same time protecting his client’s interests, is very much dependent on his ability to rely on the promises and commitments of the State. Cf. State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 357 A. 2d 376 (1976). If, however, the State may breach its commitments at its pleasure, the basis for such cooperation is vitiated. Precisely the same considerations apply in the instant case as those stated by Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring in Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U. S. at 415:
“Underlying the surface issues in this case is the question whether a fugitive from justice can rely on his lawyer’s advice given in connection with a decision to surrender voluntarily. The defendant placed his trust in an experienced Iowa trial lawyer who in turn trusted the Iowa law enforcement authorities to honor a commitment made during negotiations which led to the apprehension of a potentially dangerous person. Under any analysis, this was a critical stage of the proceeding in which the participation of an independent professional was of vital importance to the accused and to society. At this stage — as' in countless others in which the law profoundly affects the life of the individual — the lawyer is the essential medium through which the demands and commitments of the sovereign are communicated to the citizen. If, in the long run, we are seriously concerned about the individual’s effective representation by counsel, the State cannot be permitted to dishonor its promise to this lawyer.”
In addition, it is obvious that individuals wrongly charged with crimes might be expeditiously cleared by the administration of polygraph examinations. However, given the psychological stress inherent in a polygraph examination, I cannot imagine a competent defense attorney allowing his client to take such an examination, if the State may blithely *91ignore an agreement not to question the defendant out of counsel’s presence. The majority might as well have commanded defense counsel to keep his cooperation with the State at an absolute minimum level. The majority has managed to fashion an opinion which serves the interests of no one. The opinion makes bad policy as well as bad law. I would reverse.
Judges Digges and Levine have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. The majority states, in attempting to distinguish this case from Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), that “there was no surreptitious activity in this case as in Massiah" and that “[i]n Brewer ... it was conceded that the ‘Christian burial speech’ was an interrogation tactic.” It is important to note that these distinctions are of little moment to the disposition of the instant case. Massiah, exclusively, and Brewer, in part, were concerned with whether the Sixth Amendment right to and need for assistance of counsel had attached at all. It is in consideration *86of this question that “surreptitious activity” and the “Christian burial speech” were significant. For example, in Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U. S. at 401, it was because the Christian burial speech was “tantamount to interrogation” that the Court stated:
“It thus requires no wooden or technical application of the Massiah doctrine to conclude that [the defendant] ... was entitled to the assistance of counsel....”
In the instant case, however, the interrogation was express, and hence it is manifest that Watson was entitled to assistance of counsel. Whether or not this right was waived is here, as in Brewer, a separate inquiry.