Court Opinion

ID: 9838638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 08:10:54.416471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:32.984921
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                      EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                           EL PASO, TEXAS

    CESAR R. POSADA,                                        §                  No. 08-22-00101-CV

                                     Appellant,             §                     Appeal from the

    v.                                                      §         County Court at Law Number Three

    OSVANIS LOZADA and TELS, INC.,                          §                of El Paso County, Texas

                                     Appellees.             §                 (TC# 2018-DCV-4419)

                                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

         This appeal pertains to a personal injury suit following a highway collision. Appellant

Cesar R. Posada filed suit against Appellees Osvanis Lozada and TELS, Inc., bringing claims of

negligence and negligence per se based on theories of direct and indirect liability.1 The trial court

granted no-evidence motions for summary judgment favorable to Appellees, and entered related

evidentiary orders as to each. On appeal, Posada challenges all orders rendered against him except

he does not challenge the adverse rulings on punitive damages, nor the court’s ruling on TEL’s

liability for independent acts of negligence. Because Posada produced evidence raising a genuine

1
  Originally, Posada named the following parties as defendants in his suit: A&L Cargo Solutions, LLC, Lilia O.
Orozco, and Rio Financial Services, Inc. The trial court granted Rio Financial Services, Inc.’s special appearance and
dismissed it from the suit. Posada did not appeal. Thereafter, Posada filed a notice of nonsuit as to A&L Cargo
Solutions, LLC and Lilia O. Orozco.
issue of material fact on the challenged elements of breach of duty and proximate cause as to

Posada’s negligence claims against Lozada, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent of its

grant of summary judgment on those claims; moreover, we reverse the order to the extent of its

grant of summary judgment in favor of TELS as to Posada’s negligence claim based on vicarious

liability only. We remand these claims for further proceedings.

                                             BACKGROUND 2

        A. Underlying suit

        Appellant Posada and Appellee Lozada are both commercial truck drivers. On December

17, 2016, Posada was driving an 18-wheeler tractor-trailer while Lozada drove a like vehicle

owned by Appellee TELS, Inc. On a cold and fog-filled night, at about 1:40 a.m., the two drivers

were independently traveling westbound on Insterstate-10, in Fayette County, Texas. Lozada

drove slightly ahead of Posada along with other vehicle traffic. While driving his trailer-truck at a

speed of 72 miles per hour, Lozada felt the vehicle pull to the right as a front tire increasingly lost

air pressure. Soon, Lozada’s vehicle jackknifed and, ultimately, came to a full stop crossway on

the highway, blocking both lanes of traffic. Before he could move his 18-wheeler tractor-trailer

out of the way, Posada’s 18-wheeler tractor-trailer and another suv-type vehicle collided into

Lozada’s vehicle.

        Following the collision, Posada filed a personal injury suit. His live pleading alleged claims

of negligence and negligence per se against Lozada, and claims of vicarious liability, direct

negligence, and joint enterprise against TELS. Claiming he sustained serious bodily injuries as a

proximate result of the collision, Posada sought actual and punitive damages.

2
  Our summary of the facts is taken from the parties’ pleadings and summary judgment evidence, not otherwise
excluded by the trial court. As we must, we resolve any conflicts in the light most favorable to Posada.

                                                     2
       B. Lozada’s motion

       Pursuant to TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i), Lozada filed a no-evidence motion for summary

judgment stating the facts of the case as follows:

       This is a personal injury case arising out of a motor vehicle accident. Defendant
       had an unexpected loss of tire pressure that caused his tractor-trailer to jack-knife
       on a wet road. He regained control and didn’t hit anybody or anything. He ended
       up straddling the lanes of traffic. Other cars and trucks stopped. As he was trying
       to reverse to straighten out and get out of the road, [Posada] failed to keep a proper
       lookout and smashed into him. [Lozada] did absolutely nothing wrong to cause his
       tire to lose pressure. These things happen without negligence. He did nothing wrong
       to cause this accident.

Lozada claimed there was no evidence of three essential elements of Posada’s claims. First, he

claimed there was no evidence of his negligence, negligence per se, or breach of any applicable

standard of care. Second, he urged there was no evidence that any act or omission by him had

proximately caused the occurrence in question. Third, he contended there was no evidence he

committed any act or omission that would support an award of punitive or exemplary damages.

       Posada responded in opposition to Lozada’s motion, claiming that genuine issues of

material fact existed regarding the challenged elements. His response attached the following

exhibits as evidence: (1) excerpts of Lozada’s deposition (exhibit A); (2) the Texas Peace Officer’s

Crash Report (exhibit B); (3) Lozada’s responses to Posada’s first request for production (exhibit

C); (4) Lozada’s certificate of medical examination (exhibit D); (5) Lozada’s Driver’s Daily Logs

(exhibit E); and (6) accident scene photographs (exhibit F). Posada argued the evidence established

that prior to the collision: “[Lozada] lost control of the subject tractor-trailer while driving at 72

miles per hour at 1:41 a.m. on Interstate 10.” He urged that Lozada drove at that speed despite the

cold, rainy, and foggy weather existing at the time. He claimed that Lozada breached his duty to

maintain a safe speed and sufficient control of the vehicle under the conditions existing at the time.

He further asserted that Lozada breached the applicable standard of care by blocking all westbound

                                                  3
traffic lanes with his tractor-trailer after he lost control of his vehicle. He urged that more than a

scintilla of evidence existed, and that such evidence demonstrated that Lozada’s reckless driving

was a substantial factor in causing Posada’s injuries. Lastly, he argued the collision would not have

occurred had Lozada operated his tractor-trailer safely, and that the general character of his injuries

was foreseeable.

       In replying, Lozada objected to Posada’s exhibits B through E. Lozada also argued Posada

had failed to produce substantive evidence to defeat his no-evidence motion for summary

judgment.

       The trial court sustained Lozada’s objections to Posada’s summary judgment evidence.

That same day, the court granted Lozada’s no-evidence motion, finding there was no genuine issue

of material fact as to the challenged elements. The trial court ordered Posada take nothing by way

of his claims subject to Lozada’s motion.

       C. TELS motion

       Following the trial court’s grant of Lozada’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment,

TELS filed its own similar motion. TELS asserted there was no evidence it breached any standard

of care, nor evidence of any act or omission that proximately caused the occurrence, nor evidence

to support a claim for punitive or exemplary damages.

       Posada responded asserting that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary

judgment. To his response, Posada attached the deposition of Lozada, the crash report, Lozada’s

certificate of medical examination, Lozada’s driver’s daily logs, and photographs of the accident

scene. Posada also attached TELS’s supplemental responses to requests for production, the

deposition of Andreja Nikolic—the president of TELS, the expert report of V. Paul Herbert, photos

of the front right tire on Lozada’s tractor-trailer, the Texas Commercial Motor Vehicle Drivers

                                                  4
Handbook, Lozada’s motor vehicle record abstract, and TELS’s supplemental responses to

interrogatories.

       TELS replied by objecting to all of Posada’s summary judgment evidence except the

deposition of Lozada, the photographs, the deposition of Nikolic, the attached handbook, Lozada’s

motor vehicle record, and the interrogatory responses.

       In ruling on the motion, the trial court again sustained objections lodged against Posada’s

evidence and granted TELS’s no evidence summary judgment motion.

       Finally, Posada filed motions for new trial on the trial court’s grant of both motions for

summary judgment, which were denied. This appeal followed.

                                            DISCUSSION

       Posada brings two issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Lozada as to the negligence claims brought against him. Second,

he argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of TELS as to his negligence

claims based on its vicarious liability for Lozada’s negligence.

       A. Standard of review

       After an adequate time for discovery has passed, a party may move for a no-evidence

summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a

claim on which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant presents more than a scintilla of

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on each element specified in the motion. Id.; Mack

Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). A genuine issue of material fact exists if

the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their

conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). In contrast,

                                                 5
evidence that is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” does not create

a genuine issue of material fact. Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. 2014).

        We apply the same legal sufficiency standard of review to a no-evidence summary

judgment as a pretrial directed verdict. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–

51 (Tex. 2003). In our review, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging

every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 751.

        We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion. See Mann

Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). If the trial

court’s order does not specify the grounds upon which judgment was rendered, an appellate court

must affirm the summary judgment if any of the grounds in the motion are meritorious. FM Props.

Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000).

        B. Lozada’s no-evidence motion

        In his first issue, Posada challenges the trial court’s grant of Lozada’s no-evidence motion

for summary judgment. On appeal, Posada challenges the first two grounds of the motion, but not

the third ground challenging the evidence in support of his claim for punitive damages. 3 The first

ground asserted there was no evidence to support Posada’s claim that Lozada breached any

applicable standard of care. The second ground asserted there was no evidence that any act or

omission of Lozada proximately caused the occurrence in question.

        We address each ground in turn.

3
  Lozada’s motion included a third ground asserting there was no evidence he committed any act or omission with
malice or gross negligence or any other requisite mental state to justify the imposition of punitive or exemplary
damages. In briefing on appeal, Posada confirms he does not challenge the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment as to Lozada’s third ground addressing an absence of evidence to support punitive or exemplary damages.

                                                       6
           (1) Breach of the applicable standard of care

       On the first challenged element, Posada asserts the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment because he raised genuine issues of material fact that Lozada breached the applicable

standard of care.

       Texas common law imposes a duty on motorists to act with ordinary care. “A driver has a

general duty to exercise the ordinary care a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the

same circumstances to avoid a foreseeable risk of harm to others.” Ciguero v. Lara, 455 S.W.3d

744, 748 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (citing Williamson Co. v. Voss, 284 S.W.3d 897, 902

(Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.)). The meaning of this standard has been described as one that

“is elastic enough to meet all emergencies[,]” and requires a person to act as a person of ordinary

prudence would under similar circumstances. Wendell v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 677 S.W.2d

610, 620 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Because of the elasticity

of the meaning of ordinary care, courts have found that “[t]he resolution of a defendant's possible

breach of duty is a question of fact.” Caldwell v. Curioni, 125 S.W.3d 784, 793 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

       Posada contends the evidence raised more than a scintilla of evidence that Lozada breached

his duty of ordinary care by going an excessive rate of speed under the circumstances, by failing

to adequately maintain control of his vehicle (even assuming a tire suddenly lost pressure), and by

over-correcting and causing his tractor-trailer to jackknife on a wet road and block oncoming lanes

of traffic. He argues the key issue with respect to excessive speed in a negligence action is the

reasonableness of the speed under the circumstances, not whether the speed violated a statutory

maximum limit. He points to two provisions of the Texas Transportation Code to support this

standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. First, § 545.351(a) provides that: “[a]n

operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances

                                                7
then existing.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.351(a). Second, § 545.351(c)(5) provides that “[a]n

operator shall . . . drive at an appropriate reduced speed if: . . . (5) a special hazard exists with

regard to traffic, including pedestrians, or weather or highway conditions.” Id. § 545.351 (c)(5).

Adding to these provisions, Posada also cites to a third provision addressing where a motorist may

park or stop on a two-way roadway. Section 545.303(a) provides that “[a]n operator who stops or

parks on a two-way roadway shall do so with the right-hand wheels of the vehicle parallel to and

within 18 inches of the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway. Id. § 545.303(a). Posada contends

that given the weather conditions and darkness of the over-night hour, a jury could conclude from

the evidence that Lozada was operating his commercial motor vehicle at an excessive rate of speed

under the circumstances, and as well, that he overcorrected and lost control of his vehicle after a

sudden loss of tire pressure.

         In support of his claims of negligence and negligence per se, Posada’s summary judgment

evidence consisted of excerpts of Lozada’s deposition testimony and photographs of the crash

scene showing the aftermath of the collision. 4 Lozada’s testimony described the existing

conditions as he drove on the highway: “It was very cold. It was plenty cold, and there was like

fog.” He was driving his tractor-trailer going approximately 72 miles per hour at the time. While

he drove on the left side of the highway, he felt the air-pressure of a tire going down on his trailer-

truck. As the tire lost air, it started pulling him to the right. He decreased his speed to control the

truck and trailer, staying in the left lane of traffic. But, as his truck started pulling to the right

4
  In briefing, Posada asserts the evidentiary objections sustained by the trial court have no effect on the arguments he
brings on appeal. Thus, he does not initially cite to or refer to any of the excluded evidence in his briefing. But, as an
alternative argument, he describes that if this Court concludes otherwise that the summary judgment evidence is
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements, then he contends the trial court abused
its discretion in sustaining TELS’s objection to the police officer’s crash report when he responded to TELS’s motion.
Notably, however, Posada does not so challenge the ruling that sustained Lozada’s objection to the same report. Nor
does he challenge the court’s rulings regarding the other excluded evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that only
Lozada’s deposition testimony and the crash scene photos are relevant to our initial review of Lozada’s motion.

                                                            8
shoulder, he tried correcting it. He testified: “And that’s when I started to try to correct it. But

that’s when I started – that’s when I ended up in the middle, crossway on the highway.” When

asked: “So that’s where you lost control?” Lozada answered, “Yes. I was losing it there, yes.”

       Lozada then described that he tried to straighten out the truck so it would not cause an

accident. Other vehicles traveling on the roadway stopped to help him. At the moment he tried to

straighten his own trailer-truck, however, a black truck (Posada’s truck) crashed into Lozada’s

truck’s engine. He also confirmed that another vehicle impacted his truck and he similarly saw a

white pickup truck damaged at the scene. But he did not know how that other vehicle ended as it

did. Lozada also testified that the police officer who arrived on scene cited him with a ticket that

included two charges. One charge of failing to drive in a single lane; and a second for obstructing

the highway passageway. The officer explained he could appeal the charges in court. Responding

to questions about the officer’s crash report, Lozada testified, “[i]t wasn’t my fault really. It was

because of what happened with the tire.” Relying on Lozada’s testimony and the photographs,

Posada asserts the evidence amounts to more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of

material fact. Taken all together, he asserts the evidence would allow a jury to conclude that

Lozada breached his duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.

       Lozada counters by arguing the evidence showed an absence of a factual dispute. He points

out that Posada only presented Lozada’s testimony—not his own testimony or affidavit—nor that

from any other witness in the case. Though he plainly acknowledges that his tractor-trailer truck

blocked both lanes of traffic after it came to a full stop, he argues no evidence established he

breached his duty of ordinary care when reacting to the sudden loss of tire pressure in the right

front tire of his truck. Essentially, he argues that not every incident of a jackknifed tractor-trailer

truck will establish there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an overcorrection of

driving has occurred.

                                                  9
        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Posada, indulging every reasonable

inference and resolving any doubts in his favor, as we must, we conclude the evidence raised more

than a scintilla of proof from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Lozada breached his

general duty to exercise ordinary care in the operation of his commercial motor vehicle under the

circumstances. See King Ranch, 118 S.W.3d at 750–51 (providing that we must review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, “disregarding all contrary evidence and

inferences.”); see also Voss, 284 S.W.3d at 902 (whether certain acts established a breach of the

duty of ordinary care is a question for the factfinder). Here, Posada pointed to evidence establishing

that Lozada’s driving of his trailer-truck resulted in his vehicle fully blocking both lanes of traffic.

Indeed, Lozado himself testified that he tried to control his vehicle, but nevertheless it ended up

blocking the lanes of the highway. After evaluating the credibility of witnesses, a jury could

conclude as the trier of the facts that Lozada failed to use ordinary care in his driving of his tractor-

trailer truck under the circumstances. See Voss, 284 S.W.3d at 902. Thus, we conclude the trial

court erred in granting the no evidence motion for summary judgment on the challenged element

of breach of the applicable standard of care. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see also Merriman v. XTO

Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424

(Tex. 2009) (noting that a no-evidence summary judgment is improper when the non-movant

presents more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact).

            (2) Proximate cause

        We next determine whether Posada presented more than a scintilla of evidence creating a

fact issue on the element of proximate cause. “Proximate cause consists of two substantive

elements—cause in fact and foreseeability.” Ciguero v. Lara, 455 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2015, no pet.). “Cause in fact is not shown if the defendant’s negligence did no more than

furnish a condition which made the injury possible.” Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc.,

                                                   10
907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995). “The evidence must go further, and show that such negligence

was the proximate, and not the remote, cause of resulting injuries and justify the conclusion that

such injury was the natural and probable result thereof.” Id. (alterations in original omitted).

Foreseeability “requires that a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger

created by a negligent act or omission.” Id at 478. “Generally, lay testimony establishing a

sequence of events which provides a strong, logically traceable connection between the event and

the condition is sufficient proof of causation.” Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729,

733 (Tex. 1984). “Texas courts routinely hold that proximate causation is a fact question within

the jury’s province.” Berry Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Bliskey, 850 S.W.2d 644, 656 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 1993, writ dism’d).

          Focusing on the closeness in space and time, Posada asserts the evidence showed that

Lozada’s vehicle ended up straddling both lanes of I-10 traffic, fully blocking the roadway, and

such blockage resulted in his own semi-trailer truck and another vehicle colliding into Lozada’s

vehicle. He contends the evidence established a “strong, logically traceable connection,” between

Lozada’s negligence and Posada’s injuries and damages. In support of his position, he relies on

two cases, Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991), and Homeland Exp., L.L.C. v.

Seale, 420 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). Posada relies on Lear Siegler to

generally illustrate when a factual issues is raised as to causation or otherwise negated as a matter

of law; and he cites to Homeland Express. to show when causation was not established as a matter

of law.

          First, in Lear Siegler, the Supreme Court of Texas considered whether a fact issue was

raised as to causation in a personal injury case involving the death of a Texas Highway Department

worker. 819 S.W.2d at 471. There, the worker’s surviving heirs and a representative of his estate,

sued a manufacturer of a flashing arrow sign the worker had been pulling behind a truck to warn

                                                 11
traffic of ongoing highway maintenance. Id. When functioning properly, the sign warned traffic of

the presence of maintenance workers and equipment. Id. The deceased worker had stopped his

vehicle on the traveled portion of the road, when a van struck the sign, which in turn struck the

deceased. Id. The driver of the van had fallen asleep at the wheel. Id. The plaintiffs sued the

manufacturer of the sign for negligence and product liability. Id. The manufacturer moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that the sign did not cause the accident as a matter of law. Id.

Agreeing with that assessment, the Texas Supreme Court held that a proper operation of the

flashing arrow sign would have had no effect on the driver who had fallen asleep. Id. at 472. The

Court rejected plaintiffs’ allegation that the deceased worker would not have been at the place

where the collision occurred at the time it occurred had the sign functioned properly, concluding

it was too remotely connected to the manufacturer’s conduct to constitute legal cause. Id.

Contrasting this case with Lear Siegler, Posada argues he presented more than a scintilla of proof

from which a jury could conclude that Lozada’s negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries

and damages.

       Lozada counters by asserting there is undisputed evidence that the loss of tire pressure

occurred without any negligence on his part. He urges the tire failure “simply created a condition

that allowed Posada to crash into [him].” Lozada contends Lear Siegler in fact supports his

argument that he was not the proximate cause of the subject collision as a matter of law. He argues

the decedent in Lear Siegler checked on a malfunctioning sign, placing him in a similar position

as happened here, where both of them remained similarly in harm’s way at the mercy of oncoming

drivers. Citing Lear Siegler, Lozada contends he was doing the only reasonable thing he could do

in attempting to straighten his jackknifed trailer and, as a matter of law, he was not a proximate

cause of the collision.

                                                12
       Contrary to Lozada’s claim, Lear Siegler reiterates there may be more than one proximate

cause of an event. Id. at 471. There, the Supreme Court noted “there may be cases in which a

product defect or a defendant’s negligence exposes another to an increased risk of harm by placing

him in a particular place at a given time.” Id. at 472. Yet, even so, the higher court further outlined

the limits of proximate cause by stating “there are certain situations in which the happenstance of

place and time is too attenuated from the defendant’s conduct for liability to be imposed.” Id.

Because the evidence at hand showed the defendant driver was asleep, Lear Siegler found a proper

operation of the flashing arrow sign would have had no effect on his conduct. Id. Under those facts,

the Court found those circumstances were too remotely connected with defendant’s conduct to

constitute legal cause. Id. Here, we are not persuaded that Lear Siegler supports Lozada’s

contention that there was no evidence of proximate cause.

       Second, Posada also cites to a case rendered by this Court. See Homeland Exp., L.L.C. v.

Seale, 420 S.W.3d 145, 147 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.). There, a truck driver parked his

18-wheeler tractor-trailer on the shoulder of the highway to investigate why his “check engine”

light came on and the engine began to overheat. Id. The driver failed to park completely within the

shoulder and a portion of the trailer interfered with the nearest lane of the highway. Id.

Additionally, the driver had failed to place reflective warning devices behind his rig. Id. As a

grandfather driving a van with a 14-year-old passenger, a white pick-up truck passed the van,

changed lanes, and cut in front of the van. Id. The van swerved to the right onto the shoulder and,

while attempting to steer back into the lane, the driver clipped the left rear of the parked 18-

wheeler-trailer truck. Id. The van slid along the trailer’s side and collided with the tires located on

the rear axle of the tractor. Id. The mother of the 14-year-old sued alleging the accident would not

have occurred if the 18-wheeler-trailer truck had not parked where it had on the roadway. Id. at

148. The jury returned a verdict favorable to plaintiffs. Id. The issue before this Court was whether

                                                  13
there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of proximate cause. This Court ultimately held

there was legally sufficient evidence of proximate cause. Id. at 150-51. We concluded the actions

of the driver of the 18-wheeler-tractor truck, in failing to comply with regulations specifically

enacted to protect motorists, amounted to a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. Id.

The negligence of a third-party did not disrupt the nexus between the driver of the 18-wheeler’s

negligence and the 14-year old’s injuries. Id. Posada contends this precedent is supportive of his

claim.

         Responding, Lozada attempts to distinguish Homeland Express from the record at hand. 5

He asserts that, unlike in Homeland Express, there was no evidence he violated any state or federal

safety regulation, failed to do anything he should have done, or intentionally created a dangerous

condition. Lozada contends it was foreseeable that a parked rig would cause an accident in

Homeland Express. In contrast, he urges it was not foreseeable that his tire would fail when it did.

He argues his own actions merely created a condition that made the accident possible. We disagree.

Here, we cannot say the connection between Lozada’s actions and Posada’s injuries are too

attenuated as a matter of law. Cf. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995)

(holding a pump fire did no more than create a condition which made plaintiff’s injuries possible

in that she fell because a pipe rack was wet and slippery as a result of extinguishing the fire); Bell

v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1968) (holding a car accident was not the proximate cause of

three individuals injuries from removing debris from the accident because the initial accident was

5
  We note that although both parties cite Homeland Express, that case involved a jury trial. Unlike a review of
sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, which requires us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, indulging every reasonable inference to support the verdict, see Homeland Exp. L.L.C. v. Seale, 420 S.W.3d
145, 148 (Tex. App.—El Paso2012, no pet.), our review here is of the sufficiency of the evidence to raise a genuine
issue of material fact such as to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment. Here, we must take as true all
evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the
nonmovant’s favor. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).

                                                           14
not the active and efficient cause of plaintiffs’ injuries); see also Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 471

(holding the sleeping driver’s conduct negated the proximate cause of a purportedly

malfunctioning sign).

         Moreover, the contested issue of this summary judgment case is not whether the loss in

Lozada’s tire pressure was foreseeable. Rather, the issue is whether the evidence established a

genuine issue of fact regarding the sequence of events such that a strong, logically traceable

connection could be established linking Lozada’s driving with the cause of the collision involving

Posada’s truck. Here, although Lozada agreed that his truck should not have been “across all the

lanes of the highway,” he still maintained it was not his fault. 6 Notwithstanding Lozada’s denial

of fault, we conclude the record presented more than a scintilla of evidence from which a jury

could conclude, as a trier of fact, that the collision would not have occurred but for Lozada’s truck

blocking both lanes of traffic, and such evidence established a logically traceable connection

between Lozada’s negligence and Posada’s injuries and damages. Thus, Posada raised a genuine

issue of material fact as to the challenged element of proximate cause. 7 See Mack Trucks, 206

S.W.3d at 581-82 (noting that we review the evidence presented by a summary-judgment motion

and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was

6
  Lozano’s statement that the collision was not his fault was conclusory and self-serving and could be rejected by a
reasonable fact-finder. Moreover, his self-serving statement was contradicted by his other testimony that he was
driving at 72 m.p.h. in foggy weather, stayed in the left-hand lane even after the tire began losing pressure, attempted
to “correct” after the truck started pulling to the right, and lost control, ending up with his truck and trailer blocking
both lanes of the interstate. Based on our standard of review, we must credit this sequence-of-events evidence
favorable to Posada if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827
(Tex. 2005).
7
  We conclude the cases cited by the dissent were not raised by Appellees and are, in any event, distinguishable. All
of them deal with the issue of proximate cause in the context of a driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout, which is
not alleged here. Further, the dissent fails to explain how Lozano’s own admission that he lost control of his tractor-
trailer, and it ended up blocking the lanes of the highway, when viewed in favor of the nonmovant, would not raise a
fact issue on the element of proximate cause. See Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 810. A respondent to a no-evidence motion
for summary judgment is “not required . . . to marshal its proof but is only required to point out evidence that raises a
fact issue on the challenged elements[.]” Saenz v. S. Union Gas Co., 999 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999,
pet. denied).

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rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding

contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting

Lozada’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the challenged elements of breach of duty

and proximate cause. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); see also Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; Smith,

288 S.W.3d at 424.

       Posada’s first issue is sustained.

       C. TELS’s no-evidence motion

       In Posada’s second issue, he asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in

favor of TELS as to Posada’s vicarious liability theory.

       As a preliminary matter, Posada initially asserts the trial court erred in excluding the Texas

Peace Officer’s Crash Report attached to his response to TELS’s motion. He argues the report was

certified and therefore properly authenticated pursuant to the Texas Rules of Evidence.

Additionally, he contends the report is properly proved up as a public record exception to the

hearsay rule. Finally, he also argues that because TELS’s authorized representative testified he had

relied on information contained in the report to answer interrogatory questions, this testimony

manifested his adoption or belief in its truth making its contents non-hearsay under the party-

opponent rule.

       Responding, Lozada points out the crash report was only offered to support Posada’s

failure to train theory. Lozada further notes that Posada has since abandoned said theory as he

based his appeal only on his claim that TELS should be held vicariously liable for Lozada’s alleged

negligence. To this extent, Lozada asserts that Posada has failed to preserve this evidentiary

complaint for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. We agree.

       Posada’s appellate brief makes it clear that he only challenges the trial court’s ruling in

favor of TELS under a vicarious liability theory. Moreover, Posada did not respond to Lozada’s

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lack of preservation argument in his reply brief. For this reason, we conclude that Posada did not

preserve his complaint against the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on the crash report. See TEX. R.

EVID. 103(a), 105(b)(2); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

       On the merits of TEL’s summary judgment motion, Appellees concede that if we conclude

the trial court erred in granting Lozada’s motion, then the trial court’s judgment as to TELS would

also be subject to being reversed inasmuch as the lack of TELS’s vicarious liability was predicated

on Lozado’s liability.

       Accordingly, we sustain Posada’s second issue.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We reverse the trial court’s summary judgment granted against Posada’s negligence claim

as to Lozada. We also reverse the trial court’s summary judgment granted in favor of TELS as to

the vicarious liability theory only. As to these claims, we remand to the trial court for further

proceedings.

                                              GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

September 1, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
Soto, J., dissenting

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