Court Opinion

ID: 9436746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 03:01:29.283417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:25.268498
License: Public Domain

DENNIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in one part of the majority opinion — section IV.D — which holds that the security fee provision of Southeastern Louisiana University’s (SLU) policy on speech and assembly is facially unconstitutional, but I respectfully dissent from the rest of the majority opinion, which upholds the other challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy as facially constitutional. In my view, those other provisions of the SLU speech policy were unconstitutionally applied to the plaintiff, an itinerant Christian gospel teacher, when SLU police and administrative officers ordered him to stop his attempts to engage university students in religious conversations on a campus thoroughfare.
Several basic errors permeate the decisions of the district court and the majority. First, the district court and the majority erroneously reach and decide the plaintiffs facial challenge to the SLU speech policy without first deciding whether the plaintiffs as-applied challenges have merit. Second, the majority adopts as binding precedent a misconception of what makes a law facially invalid under the First Amendment. The majority erroneously sees the facial invalidity inquiry as a simple all-purpose “no set of circumstances” test, under which a plaintiff can prevail in a facial challenge only if the court is unable to imagine even a single set of circumstances under which the law or regulation at issue could survive an as-applied challenge. Although the Supreme Court has adverted to that test in dicta, it has never relied on it in deciding a facial challenge. In fact, the “no set of circumstances” test is contradicted by the holdings and reasoning of a substantial and growing number of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases. Moreover, the use of a single test that supposedly applies to all facial challenges appears to be incompatible with the Supreme Court’s recent explanation in Citizens United v. FEC, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, — L.Ed.2d - (2010), that “the distinction between facial and as-ap*450plied challenges” has no “automatic effect” on the “pleadings and disposition” of a case. Id. at 893.
Finally, the majority fails to properly apply the constitutional test required by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and applied by this circuit in Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.2006). As the Court in Ward stated:
Our cases make clear ... that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”
491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)). Although it appears undisputed that the SLU speech policy is a set of content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech in a public forum, SLU has not shown by the record in this case that its restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Thus, the challenged restrictions — which require even small groups and individuals to seek the government’s permission seven days in advance of speaking in public, to entrust significant personal information to SLU, and to speak for no more than two hours per seven days — are unconstitutional, at least as applied to the plaintiffs speech in this case.

I. The Plaintiffs As-Applied Challenge

The majority errs by treating this appeal as involving a purely facial challenge. This case began when Southeastern Louisiana University (SLU) applied certain provisions of its official policy on speech and assembly to Jeremy Sonnier, the plaintiff-appellant. Sonnier is a Christian preacher who stood in a pedestrian mall on SLU’s campus along with a handful of friends, holding a sign, and tried to start conversations about religion with individuals who passed by. Sonnier’s sworn account of these events is undisputed in the record, and there is no evidence that he tried to give a public speech to an audience, nor that he disrupted classes, blocked foot traffic, or in any way incited unrest or disorder. Sonnier was accosted by a campus police officer who told him that he could not speak because “people here” disagreed with him. He was threatened with arrest, prevented from conversing with passersby, and told that he could not speak in this manner without first getting permission from a university official.
Officer Carmichael told Sonnier that he would be arrested unless he discontinued all expressive activity. He told Sonnier that there had been “complaints” and that he was considered “disruptive ... because there are people here who are not agreeing with you.” He further explained that “when your speech becomes offensive to other people, then it becomes a problem.” When asked to explain how holding a sign or trying to engage in conversation on an open mall could be disruptive to education, the officer could not do so.
Sonnier was then taken to the office of Jim McHodgkins, Vice-President of Student Affairs, who supported Officer Carmichael’s comments and actions and refused to give Sonnier permission to speak on campus that day. Sonnier and his friends then left the campus for fear of arrest. In denying Sonnier permission to speak, McHodgkins relied on SLU’s “University *451Policy on Public Speech, Assembly and Demonstrations” (referred to as “the SLTJ speech policy” or “the SLU policy” throughout this dissent).
Those are the events out of which this lawsuit arose. Sonnier is challenging SLU’s restrictions on speech, not merely because he has an abstract disagreement with them, but because he contends that the SLU speech policy was applied to him in a way that unconstitutionally burdened, and continues to burden, his First Amendment rights. By bringing this case, he seeks to establish that he can, without seeking permission seven days in advance and complying with other SLU’s restrictions, walk or stand around the campus, carry a sign, and have conversations with individual students — the actions for which he was threatened with arrest by a campus police officer with the support of a senior university official.
This constitutional challenge, therefore, is not “purely facial” in any meaningful sense. It has been an as-applied case from the very beginning. Along with his complaint, Sonnier filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and provided summary judgment-type evidence in support of that motion, consisting of an affidavit setting out the facts as stated above; a copy of the SLU speech policy; and a map of the SLU campus. His memorandum in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction included several pages of arguments that specifically explained how SLU’s restrictions on speech “adversely impact Sonnier and his expression.”
About four months after Sonnier filed his motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court heard oral argument on that motion. During that four-month period, the government did not provide any evidence whatsoever; thus, Sonnier’s account of how the SLU policy had been applied to him was uncontested. During oral argument, Sonnier’s counsel continued to explain that the SLU policy’s application to Sonnier was unconstitutional. For example, at one point the judge asked whether the policy applied to one-on-one conversations as well as to speeches delivered to an audience. Sonnier’s counsel replied, “I think that’s confirmed by actual application to Mr. Sonnier. He was there and attempted to engage in one-on-one conversation ____ [H]e attempted to engage in a one-on-one dialogue with one student about theological points and the officer said that he couldffi’t]1 do that until he obtained permission from the university.”
The record on appeal thus contradicts the majority’s assertion that “Sonnier gave no indication to the court that his focus at the preliminary injunction hearing was on anything other than the facial challenge.”2 Maj. Op. 443. But the district court, de*452spite Sonnier’s written and oral explanations of why the SLU speech policy was unconstitutional as applied to him, decided to focus solely on the facial aspects of Sonnier’s arguments. The court made what it described as “a preliminary finding that it does not appear to violate First Amendment issues insofar as the policy itself on its face” and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
This was erroneous for two reasons. First, it should be self-evident that a party bringing a motion for a preliminary injunction has the right to make any relevant legal argument in support of that motion.3 Among the prerequisites for a preliminary injunction is that the moving party must establish “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” E.g., Palmer ex rel. Palmer v. Waxahachie Indep. Sch. Dist., 579 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir.2009). In order to show such a likelihood of success, a plaintiff who seeks a preliminary injunction because he believes a governmental restriction on speech is unconstitutional as applied to him has to make the argument that the restriction is unconstitutional as applied. If a court simply ignores all as-applied arguments, then the plaintiff is prevented from using those arguments to demonstrate his likelihood of success on the merits. The plaintiff is therefore denied injunctive relief to which he may be entitled, without having been afforded any real opportunity to explain why he is entitled to it.4
The fact that the district court intended to hear as-applied arguments at a later stage of this case does not excuse the failure to consider them at the preliminary *453injunction stage. Even if the district court will eventually be willing to listen to those arguments, it has already ignored them at a critical stage of this case, even though they were plainly relevant to whether Sonnier was entitled to a preliminary injunction. The denial of a preliminary injunction is, in itself, a substantial and unnecessary denial of Sonnier’s constitutional rights. “It is well settled that the loss of First Amendment freedoms for even minimal periods of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a preliminary injunction.” Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir.1981).
The second reason why the district court erred by choosing to consider only facial and not as-applied arguments is that such an approach to deciding cases is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements that as-applied challenges are to be favored over facial ones. “[F]acial challenges are best when infrequent. Although passing on the validity of a law wholesale may be efficient in the abstract, any gain is often offset by losing the lessons taught by the particular, to which common law method normally looks. Facial adjudication carries too much promise of ‘premature interpretatio[n] of statutes’ on the basis of factually barebones records.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608-09, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960)) (second alteration in Sabri) (citations omitted). See also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450-51, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008) (giving “several reasons” why “[fjacial challenges are disfavored”).
If facial challenges are disfavored, then when a plaintiff argues that a law is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied, courts ought to start by addressing the as-applied arguments. That approach allows us to focus on “the lessons taught by the particular, to which the common law method normally looks.” Sabri, 541 U.S. at 609, 124 S.Ct. 1941. The district court here did just the opposite. Sonnier provided an affidavit detailing the facts of the incident in which the SLU speech policy was applied to him; the government offered no countervailing evidence. Yet, rather than focusing on the particular facts of the event that gave rise to this lawsuit, the district court considered only the policy on its face.
Because the district court erred in this way, our court should either address Sonnier’s as-applied arguments or else vacate the district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction and remand the case for the district court to consider those arguments in the first instance. We can reach Sonnier’s as-applied arguments on appeal because they are not waived: Sonnier made them before the district court, even though they were ignored, and his appellate briefs are also replete with as-applied arguments. There is no good reason for this court to follow the district court’s error in treating this case as if it involved a purely facial challenge.

II. Facial Challenges and Intermediate Scrutiny

The majority opinion is predicated not only on the mistaken premise that this appeal involves an exclusively facial challenge, but also on the erroneous belief that there is one single test that must be used to resolve essentially5 all facial challenges *454regardless of subject matter. According to the majority, that test is the “no set of circumstances” test, under which a plaintiff can prevail only if the court cannot imagine even a single set of circumstances under which the law or regulation at issue could survive an as-applied challenge. The majority’s reliance on that test is erroneous for three principal reasons.
First, the idea that there is a single test for all facial challenges is contradicted by the Supreme Court’s explanation in Citizens United v. FEC that the facial/as-applied distinction does not have “some automatic effect” or “control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge.” — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893, — L.Ed.2d - (2010). Second, the “no set of circumstances” test is incompatible with the test that actually does determine the constitutionality of the content-neutral time-place-manner speech restrictions that are challenged in this case — namely, intermediate scrutiny, as defined in eases like Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.2006). Third, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have repeatedly disregarded or rejected the “no set of circumstances” test in a variety of circumstances, due to its incompatibility with numerous substantive constitutional doctrines and tests such as the Lemon test, the vagueness doctrine, and intermediate scrutiny.
For these reasons, even if it were true that this appeal involves a purely facial challenge, the “no set of circumstances” test on which the majority relies would still be the wrong test to apply. The way to determine whether the challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy are constitutional is to apply intermediate scrutiny — that is, to decide whether they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.

A. The majority’s reasoning relies on the “no set of circumstances” test, and not on intermediate scrutiny.

Although the majority seems to acknowledge that intermediate scrutiny is the applicable test in this case, Maj. Op. 468-69, its reasoning ultimately relies instead on the “no set of circumstances” test. The majority holds that the challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy are facially constitutional (except for the security fee provision) because the majority is able to imagine situations in which those provisions would survive as-applied challenges. According to the majority, “there are instances in which the seven-day notice requirement may be necessary” and therefore that requirement is facially constitutional. Maj. Op. 445. The majority likewise concludes that the limitation of speech to two hours per seven days is facially constitutional because “Sonnier has not demonstrated that the SLU regulation is invalid in all circumstances” and “[tjhere are situations in which limiting the number of times an individual speaks on campus and the length of time an individual speaks on campus are valid means for SLU to protect its legitimate interests.” Maj. Op. 446. And the majority holds that the personal information disclosure requirement is facially constitutional because “[wjhile there may be circumstances in which all of the information requested by SLU is not narrowly tailored, Sonnier has not demonstrated that in every instance this regulation is invalid.” Maj. Op. 447.
Thus, the test that determines the outcome the majority reaches is the “no set of circumstances” test. The majority’s line of *455reasoning is that because it is possible to imagine some set of circumstances in which each of these restrictions on speech would survive an as-applied challenge (for example, “[i]f Sonnier or another speaker wished to speak at a time when multiple members of the SLU administration were scheduled to be out of the office,” Maj. Op. 446), all of the restrictions are therefore facially constitutional. In other words, under the majority opinion’s reasoning, if one situation can be imagined in which a particular restriction on speech would be justified, that is enough to uphold a restriction which applies to all situations.
Although it sometimes mentions intermediate scrutiny and narrow tailoring, the majority opinion does not apply intermediate scrutiny to the challenged speech restrictions. That is, it makes no attempt to determine whether each of the restrictions is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, either as written or as applied to Sonnier. The majority does not determine whether each restriction “targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” Knowles, 462 F.3d at 434 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Nor does it consider whether “ ‘a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance’ the [restriction’s] stated goals.” Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746). Nor does it ask whether each restriction “burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Instead, the majority merely imagines hypothetical situations and decides that such imaginings are sufficient to facially justify SLU’s restrictions on speech.
The majority’s “no set of circumstances” test thus hardly amounts to scrutiny at all. It puts a practically insurmountable barrier in the path of Sonnier’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of these governmental limitations on speech.6 But my objection to the majority’s use of the “no set of circumstances” test is not only that it has the practical effect of making facial challenges futile. Rather, the most important problem with the “no set of circumstances” test is that it is an incorrect statement of the law: as I explain below, it is contradicted by numerous Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases concerning facial challenges and intermediate scrutiny, and it is ultimately based on nothing more than a controversial dictum in one case.

B. The Supreme Court in Citizens United has explained that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges has no automatic effect; this contradicts the mistaken idea that virtually all facial challenges are governed by the “no set of circumstances” test.

The majority’s stated reason for applying the “no set of circumstances” test is *456solely that this case involves (in the majority’s view) a purely facial challenge. Maj. Op. 443-44. Thus, the majority relies on a test that supposedly applies to all facial challenges, regardless of what type of law is being challenged. However, the Supreme Court has recently clarified that it is erroneous to make this kind of sharp, categorical distinction between the methods for adjudicating facial and as-applied challenges: “[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge.” Citizens United v. FEC, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893, — L.Ed.2d - (2010).7
The real significance of the facial/as-applied distinction, the Court explained, is that “it goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court.” Id. lit other words, the facial invalidation of a statute is a broader remedy than as-applied invalidation. A facial challenge is an argument asking the court to hold that a particular law can never be validly enforced, whereas an as-applied challenge is an argument asking the court to hold that a law cannot be enforced in some particular set of circumstances.8 In this case, the plaintiff has made both types of arguments before this court and the district court.
In Citizens United as well as other cases, the Supreme Court has relied on what is perhaps the clearest explanation of the relation between facial and as-applied challenges: Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1336-39 *457(2000).9 It is worth quoting that article at length here in order to correct some common misconceptions:
[T]he terms of discourse frequently suggest that there is a sharp, categorical distinction between facial and as-applied adjudication and that courts are often called upon to apply general principles governing facial challenges. Both suggestions are misleading.
Facial challenges are not sharply categorically distinct from as-applied challenges to the validity of statutes. Under Article III, a federal court must always begin with a case, framed by concrete facts including an allegation of harm to a specific plaintiff caused by an identified defendant. The focus of concern must be whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief. To adjudicate a case, however, a court will invoke legal doctrine, typically as reflected in general rules, principles, or tests. Moreover, the application of doctrine — including the processes of reasoning necessary to resolve the dispute — will sometimes unmistakably, even necessarily, yield the conclusion that a statute is invalid, not merely as applied to the facts, but more generally or even in whole. In such cases, facial invalidation occurs as an outgrowth of as-applied adjudication.
Marbury v. Madison, [5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803),] often regarded as the foundation for the traditional model of as-applied adjudication, is exemplary. In Marbury, the Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act permissibly vested the Court with original jurisdiction over William Marbury’s suit against James Madison. In ruling that Article III forbade the exercise of jurisdiction, the Court in one sense engaged in as-applied adjudication. It decided the constitutional issue only as an incident of determining its jurisdiction in a particular case. At the same time, Marbury’s reasoning was general. The Court made clear that the challenged provision of the Judiciary Act was invalid not merely as applied to Marbury’s suit against Madison, but in all cases insofar as it purported to confer original Supreme Court jurisdiction not contemplated by Article III.
As it was in Marbury v. Madison, so it is in myriad other circumstances: in ruling on an as-applied challenge, a court incidentally reaches a conclusion that a statute is more broadly invalid. In the modern day, the variety of tests employed in constitutional litigation is seemingly endless. Nonetheless, familiar and recurring kinds of tests illustrate how as-applied adjudication can inevitably result in facial invalidations. “Purpose” tests identify statutes as invalid if enacted for constitutionally forbidden motives.... “Suspect-content” tests, under which statutes that regulate on certain bases must be justified as narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, have similar effects. A *458statute that fails a suspect-content test is invalid in whole.
Just as some assessments of “as-applied” challenges necessarily yield the conclusion that a statute is wholly invalid, other judicial analyses — conducted pursuant to other doctrinal tests — establish that statutes are invalid in part. In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, [513 U.S. 454, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995),] for example, the plaintiffs challenged a federal statute forbidding certain governmental employees to receive honoraria for speaking or writing. To assess the claim, the Court articulated a balancing test. Under that test, it found the statute invalid as applied to the relatively low-level employees who had brought suit, but it noted that its reasoning would not necessarily apply to cases involving higher-level employees. The Court thus reserved the question of the statute’s validity as to categories of employees not before the Court. [See id. at 477-78, 115 S.Ct. 1003.]
Examples could be multiplied, all to the same effect: when a court upholds a constitutional challenge, the nature of the test that it applies will determine whether the statute is found unconstitutional solely as applied, in part, or in whole. Even facial invalidations are the outgrowth of litigation that is, in an important sense, as-applied. But once a case is brought, no general categorical line bars a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly “as-applied” cases. Nor is there a distinctive class of “facial challenge” cases in which the court is required to do so.
Fallon, supra, at 1336-39 (footnotes omitted). The key point is that facial and as-applied challenges are not categorically different types of cases to which different rules of decision apply. On the contrary, in order to adjudicate constitutional challenges, courts apply whatever constitutional doctrines and tests are relevant to the substance of each particular case, and the results of that analysis determine whether a challenged law is unconstitutional, either on its face or as applied to a particular situation.10
*459As the Supreme Court said in Citizens United, “the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect.” 130 S.Ct. at 893. There is “no general categorical line” between facial and as-applied challenges. Id. (quoting Fallon, supra, at 1339). The facial/as-applied distinction merely “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed,” id., because a facial challenge is an argument for the facial invalidation of a law, whereas an as-applied challenge is an argument for the narrower remedy of as-applied invalidation.11 Therefore, the underlying question in this case — that is, whether the SLU speech policy is consistent with the First Amendment — must be determined, not by applying a special test for all facial challenges (the majority’s “no set of circumstances” test), but by applying the substantive constitutional test that determines the constitutionality of the type of regulation that is challenged here. That test is intermediate scrutiny as defined in cases like Ward and Knowles, which requires that a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.
C. The “no set of circumstances” test is inconsistent with the requirements of intermediate scrutiny, and is therefore inapplicable to this case.
The majority’s “no set of circumstances” test is vastly different from, and logically incompatible with, the intermediate scrutiny test. These two tests allocate the burden of persuasion differently; they provide *460different criteria to determine a law’s constitutional validity; and they are likely to produce opposite results in a great many cases, including this one. Thus, the majority’s reliance on the “no set of circumstances” test in this case contravenes the numerous precedents which establish that intermediate scrutiny is the proper way to determine the constitutionality of a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech. The only way to remain consistent with the precedents on intermediate scrutiny is to reject the erroneous “no set of circumstances” test.
The well-known requirements of intermediate scrutiny are as follows:
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”
Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.2006) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984))).12 “A regulation ‘is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the “evil” it seeks to remedy.’” Id. at 434 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)). In other words, “[a] regulation is ‘narrowly tailored’ when it does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’ ” Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746). “At a minimum, a regulation cannot be narrowly tailored unless the cost to speech is ‘carefully calculated’ and the fit between the burden and the state interest is ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)).
“The government bears the burden of establishing that the regulations are reasonable.” Id. That is, the government must identify the significant state interests to which a challenged regulation is narrowly tailored, and “show affirmatively that the[] restriction is narrowly tailored to protect the identified interests.” Id. at 119. In summary, a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and the government bears the burden of identifying such interests and showing how the restriction is narrowly tailored to them.
As explained above, although the majority opinion initially seems to acknowledge that intermediate scrutiny is the governing test, the majority ends up relying on the “no set of circumstances” test instead. The two tests are inconsistent with one another for multiple reasons. First of all, they allocate the burden of persuasion in opposite directions. Intermediate scrutiny requires the government to justify the restrictions that it imposes on public speech. Hays County Guardian, 969 F.2d at 118. But the “no set of circumstances” test, as explained by the majority opinion, requires that “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” Maj. Op. 443 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987)). The majority opinion, in applying the “no set of circum*461stances” test, reiterates that it puts the burden on the plaintiff: “the plaintiff must establish the regulation would be invalid in all circumstances.” Maj. Op. 445 (emphasis added). “Sonnier has not demonstrated that the SLU regulation is invalid in all circumstances.” Maj. Op. 446 (emphasis added). “Sonnier has not demonstrated that in every instance this regulation is invalid.” Maj. Op. 447 (emphasis added). And this difference in the allocation of the burden of persuasion is not a mere technicality. By putting the burden on Sonnier, the majority demands that he prove a negative. This is improper not only because it is practically impossible to meet such a demand, but also because “[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). See also Hays County Guardian, 969 F.2d at 119. Intermediate scrutiny appropriately puts the burden of persuasion on the government; the “no set of circumstances” test fails to do so. The two tests are therefore inconsistent with one another.
Second, intermediate scrutiny and the “no set of circumstances” test require courts to base their decisions on entirely different criteria. Intermediate scrutiny requires courts to begin by identifying the legitimate government interests, if any, that are served by a restriction on speech. Courts must then decide whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to those identified interests — in other words, whether the restriction “does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’ ” Hays County Guardian, 969 F.2d at 118 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746). Thus, intermediate scrutiny requires a court to look at the overall burden on speech that is imposed by a challenged restriction, and decide whether that burden is substantially greater than necessary. By contrast, the “no set of circumstances” test does not require this sort of consideration of the “fit between the burden and the state interest,” id.— instead, it only requires the court to exercise its imagination in order to come up with some possible scenario in which the restriction at issue would survive an as-applied challenge. That is the process the majority has followed in applying the “no set of circumstances” test here.13 Because intermediate scrutiny and the “no set of circumstances” test require courts to use completely different decisionmaking processes, the two tests are incompatible.
Third, considering the vast differences between them, it follows that these two tests are likely to produce opposite results in a wide variety of cases. This case exemplifies the difference in results. The majority, applying the “no set of circumstances” test, holds that the challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy are facially constitutional. I, on the other hand, would apply intermediate scrutiny under Ward and Knowles and therefore conclude that the imposition of a permit requirement on individuals and small groups, the seven-day advance notice requirement, the limitation of speech to two hours per seven days, and the broad personal information collection requirement are unconstitutional. The reasons why these provisions do not survive intermedi*462ate scrutiny are explained below in Part III.
For all these reasons, the majority’s application of the “no set of circumstances” test contravenes the long list of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedents which establish that intermediate scrutiny is the proper way to determine whether a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech is constitutional.14 It is not possible to apply both the “no set of circumstances” test and the intermediate scrutiny test and reach consistent results. We should therefore apply intermediate scrutiny, a test that has been firmly established by a long line of governing precedents.

D. The Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have repeatedly disregarded or rejected the “no set of circumstances” test in cases where it was incompatible with the relevant constitutional doctrines.

Controversy among Supreme Court Justices15 and doubt among the lower courts16 *463regarding the “no set of circumstances” language has persisted since that phrase first appeared in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). In some recent cases, the Court has openly recognized, but not resolved, the dispute as to whether the “no set of circumstances” language is the governing test for all,17 or any, facial challenges. See United States v. Stevens, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1587, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010)18; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (2008); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007). The Court has sometimes quoted the “no set of circumstances” language in a positive light (without actually using it as the basis for a decision),19 but the phrase appears more frequently in Supreme Court dissents which have accurately pointed out that the majorities in those cases were not following the “no set of circumstances” test.20 Importantly, after diligent research I have been unable to find a single Supreme Court case — including Salerno itself — in which the holding actually relied on the “no set of circumstances” test.21 That language therefore *464remains nothing more than a controversial dictum.
Although lower courts should ordinarily take a deferential position toward Supreme Court dicta,22 this particular dictum is contradicted by the reasoning and the results of several subsequent Supreme Court cases. In addition, our own court has already issued at least four post-Saierno decisions which have directly contradicted the “no set of circumstances” test.
The list of Supreme Court cases contradicting the “no set of circumstances” test includes (but is not limited to) Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988); and Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). The Fifth Circuit cases include Service Employees International Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588 (5th Cir.2010); Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430 (5th Cir.2006); Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.1999); and Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District, 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.1996). In each of these cases (which will be discussed more specifically below), the courts adjudicated facial challenges by relying on substantive constitutional doctrines that were incompatible with the “no set of circumstances” test. Some of these eases involved intermediate scrutiny, while others involved other constitutional tests — but they were all facial challenges, and in all of them the courts disregarded or rejected the “no set of circumstances” test. These cases, all of which are binding on us, strongly support the conclusion that the “no set of circumstances” test simply is not an accurate statement of the law that governs this case.
The “no set of circumstances” test arose from this sentence in Salerno: “A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. This language constitutes dicta, not a holding, because it was not part of the basis for the Supreme *465Court’s decision in Salerno. The respondents in Salerno brought a facial challenge to the Bail Reform Act, but they did not claim that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to them. Id. at 745 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Therefore, if Salerno had really held that identifying a single valid application of a law is enough to defeat a facial challenge, the Court could have rejected the facial challenge simply because the Act was not unconstitutional as it had been applied to the respondents in that case. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the sentence was dicta for this reason).23 But instead, the Supreme Court decided in Salerno that the Bail Reform Act was facially constitutional, not because it satisfied the “no set of circumstances” test, but because the Act as written was consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment.24
Furthermore, Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” language has never played a decisive role in any subsequent Supreme Court ease either, as far as my research has shown. See Morales, 527 U.S. at 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (plurality opinion) (asserting that “the Salerno formulation ... has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself’); id. at 80 n. 3, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (responding to Justice Stevens’s claim, but not citing any Supreme Court case in which the “no set of circumstances” language has been decisive). Thus, although some Justices have debated whether the “no set of circumstances” test should be the law, the Supreme Court has never actually held that that language governs all (or any) facial *466challenges. See also United States v. Stevens, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1587, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (acknowledging that this issue “is a matter of dispute that we ... do not address”).
In sharp contrast to the absence of any Supreme Court cases in which the “no set of circumstances” test has actually been adopted as the law, there have been a significant number of post-Salerno cases in which the Court has adjudicated facial challenges in a manner that was inconsistent with that supposedly governing test. Our court, too, has done likewise on several occasions.
For instance, the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly disregarded the “no set of circumstances” test in deciding facial challenges in Establishment Clause cases, because it is inconsistent with the substantive constitutional tests that apply in that area of constitutional law. Only a year after Salerno was decided, the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988), applied the Lemon test25 to decide a facial challenge to a statute, and ignored the government’s argument that the Court should instead apply Salerno to resolve the facial challenge. The four dissenting Justices expressly agreed with this aspect of the majority’s reasoning because the “no set of circumstances” test “is wholly incongruous with the analysis of an Establishment Clause challenge under Lemon.” Id. at 627 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2562 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Following Bowen’s lead, the Fifth Circuit in Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District, 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.1996), sustained a facial challenge to a school prayer law under the Establishment Clause, holding that the law failed the Lemon test, the “coercion test,” and the “endorsement test.” Id. at 278-80. Some circuit judges accurately pointed out that the Ingebretsen panel’s reasoning and holding were contrary to the “no set of circumstances” test: “It would be ludicrous to assert, and the panel did not attempt to do so, that there is ‘no set of circumstances’ under which the Mississippi prayer statute can be upheld.” Id. at 286 (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095). The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 519 U.S. 965, 117 S.Ct. 388, 136 L.Ed.2d 304 (mem.).
Three years later, the Fifth Circuit again disregarded the “no set of circumstances” test and sustained a facial challenge to a school district’s policy regarding prayer in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School District, 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.1999). This time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed our court’s holding that the school policy at issue was facially unconstitutional. 530 U.S. 290, 316, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). (The policy “impose[d] on the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer” before football games. Id.) The dissents in both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit criticized the majorities for not following the “no set of circumstances” test. 530 U.S. at 318, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 168 F.3d at 832 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent showed that it was possible to imagine circumstances in which the school policy could survive an as-applied challenge. For instance, “it is possible that the students might vote not to have a pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a constitutional violation.” 530 U.S. at 321, *467120 S.Ct. 2266. Nonetheless, the six-Justiee Supreme Court majority declined to apply the “no set of circumstances” test and held that the policy was facially unconstitutional. Id. at 316, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (majority opinion).
The reason that both the Supreme Court and this court rejected the “no set of circumstances” test in Santa Fe, Bowen, and Ingebretsen is readily apparent: the use of that test would have been incongruous with the constitutional tests that courts normally use to decide whether a law violates the Establishment Clause, including the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test, see Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 279. Those cases presented essentially the same situation as the instant case: the “no set of circumstances” test is incompatible with the test that actually applies here — intermediate scrutiny — so the correct way to decide this case is to apply intermediate scrutiny.
Those Establishment Clause cases are not the only ones in which the Supreme Court has reached decisions that were incompatible with the “no set of circumstances” dictum. Another such case was Morales, in which the Court sustained a facial challenge to a Chicago anti-loitering ordinance because it was unconstitutionally vague and gave too much discretion to the police. See 527 U.S. at 51, 60-64,119 S.Ct. 1849 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia, in dissent, explained that the majority’s reasoning and result were inconsistent with the “no set of circumstances” test because it was possible to imagine a situation in which the ordinance would have survived an as-applied challenge. See id. at 81-82, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (depicting a scenario out of West Side Story which, under the “no set of circumstances” test, would be enough to “settle the matter of respondents’ facial challenge to the ordinance’s vagueness”). In Morales, just as in the aforementioned Establishment Clause cases, the application of the “no set of circumstances” test would have been inconsistent with the relevant substantive constitutional doctrine on which the majority relied — namely, “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,” id. at 60, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (majority opinion) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Scalia’s “no set of circumstances” reasoning simply did not answer the dispositive question: whether the ordinance was so vague that it failed to give minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement personnel. The majority therefore properly decided the case on the basis of vagueness and did not apply the “no set of circumstances” dictum, which would have been incompatible with that approach.
Another example of a case in which the Supreme Court’s reasoning and result were contrary to the “no set of circumstances” dictum is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), in which the Court held that a spousal notification requirement in a state law regulating abortion was “an undue burden, and therefore invalid.” Id. at 895, 112 S.Ct. 2791. In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist accurately observed that the lead opinion “appears to ignore” Salerno. Id. at 973 n. 2, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He explained that under the “no set of circumstances” test, the spousal notification provision could not possibly be facially unconstitutional because “the vast majority of wives seeking abortions notify and consult with their husbands, and thus suffer no burden as a result of the provision.” Id. There were any number of circumstances in which the notification provision would have been *468valid as applied, but the Supreme Court nevertheless held that it was facially unconstitutional. Many federal courts have recognized that the “undue burden” test under Casey contradicts the “no set of circumstances” test. See Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 368-69 (6th Cir.2006) (reviewing cases from nine other circuits). In short, the Supreme Court in Casey did the same thing it did in Morales, Santa Fe, and Bowen: it did not follow Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” dictum, and instead applied the relevant substantive constitutional test — which, the plurality in Casey decided, was the “undue burden” test.
The Supreme Court and our court have also disregarded the “no set of circumstances” test when adjudicating facial challenges raising the very same constitutional question that arises in this case: whether a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, or manner of speech is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The year after Salerno was decided, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny and not the “no set of circumstances” test in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). The majority held that the law at issue (an ordinance forbidding picketing in front of residences) was narrowly tailored and was therefore facially constitutional. Id. at 488, 108 S.Ct. 2495. The Court supported its holding not by imagining a single constitutionally valid application of the ordinance (which would be sufficient to defeat a facial challenge under the “no set of circumstances” test), but by considering the entire scope of the ordinance’s restriction on speech and determining that it was narrowly tailored. See id. at 485-88, 108 S.Ct. 2495.
Likewise, in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to a content-neutral restriction on the time, place, and manner of speech (a state law restricting protests near health care facilities). See id. at 708, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (noting that this was a facial challenge). The majority and the dissenters disagreed over whether the restriction was narrowly tailored, but none of the Justices even raised the “no set of circumstances” test. The majority held that the law- was facially constitutional because it was narrowly tailored, and did not employ the “no set of circumstances” test. See id. at 725-30, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (majority opinion). Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the law was not narrowly tailored, and hence was facially unconstitutional, because “with respect to those who are seeking to enter or exit [health care] facilities, the statute does not protect them only from speech that is so intimidating or threatening as to impede access. Rather, it covers all unconsented-to approaches for the purpose of oral protest, education, or counseling....” Id. at 755, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Scalia believed that the law could have legitimately been applied to speech that was “so intimidating or threatening as to impede access” to health care facilities. Under the “no set of circumstances” test, this single imagined circumstance under which the law would have been valid as applied would have been enough to uphold the facial constitutionality of the challenged law. Yet Justice Scalia argued that it was facially unconstitutional. Thus, in Hill, all nine Justices completely ignored the “no set of circumstances” test, even though that test would have easily compelled the conclusion that the challenged law was facially constitutional.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has twice sustained facial challenges to content-neutral time-place-manner restrictions, even though those restrictions would plainly *469have been facially constitutional under the “no set of circumstances” test. In Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430 (5th Cir.2006), this court held that two municipal ordinances were facially unconstitutional because they were not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. The ordinances forbade all “parades” and “street activity” at particular times of day, and imposed a permit requirement at all times. 462 F.3d at 431— 32. The ordinances would have been facially constitutional under the “no set of circumstances” test because it would have been trivially easy for the court to imagine particular kinds of “parades” and “street activities” on which the ordinances’ time restrictions and permit requirement could validly be imposed. For example, a sizable parade with floats and marching bands could have been subjected to a permit requirement, and could have been prohibited from passing through a school zone around the end of the school day. But this court properly disregarded the “no set of circumstances” test and instead applied intermediate scrutiny, holding that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored and were therefore facially unconstitutional. Id. at 431, 433 (facial challenge); id. at 437 (holding both ordinances unconstitutional).
Just recently, in Service Employees International Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588 (5th Cir.2010), this court again sustained a facial challenge to a content-neutral time-place-manner restriction even though the “no set of circumstances” test would have required the opposite result. The court held that an ordinance “eonfin[ing] downtown weekday parades to two one-hour windows: 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.,” id. at 603, was facially unconstitutional. Id. at 604; see also id. at 595 (noting that the plaintiffs had brought a facial challenge). If the court had applied the “no set of circumstances” test, it would
have had to hold that the ordinance was facially constitutional because it is possible to imagine a single day on which it might have been valid for the city to confine downtown parades to those two one-hour windows — for instance, a weekday when some kind of festival was scheduled to take place downtown between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. But the SEIU v. Houston court did not follow this kind of reasoning; rather, it explained that the restriction was not narrowly tailored: “there is scant connection between the restrictive parade hours and the putative consequences that are the justifications for the Ordinance.” Id. at 604. Thus, SEIU v. Houston and Knowles show that this circuit, like the Supreme Court, has quite properly disregarded the supposed “no set of circumstances” test when adjudicating facial challenges under intermediate scrutiny.
The collection of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases discussed here — Bowen, Ingebretsen, Santa Fe, Morales, Casey, Frisby, Hill, Knowles, and SEIU v. Houston — demonstrates whatever authority the Salerno “no set of circumstances” dictum may have once had has not endured. The majority opinion’s reliance on that dictum to decide this case is out of step with a large and growing body of authoritative caselaw to the contrary.
To summarize the foregoing analysis, there are at least three different lines of authority supporting the conclusion that the Salerno “no set of circumstances” dictum does not provide an appropriate standard for adjudicating this facial challenge. First, the “no set of circumstances” test supposedly governs all facial challenges, but the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC has contradicted the erroneous idea that there is one single test for all *470facial challenges; on the contrary, the facial/as-applied distinction does not have any “automatic effect” on the disposition of a case. — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, 893, — L.Ed.2d - (2010). Second, the “no set of circumstances” test is incompatible with intermediate scrutiny because the two tests allocate the burden in opposite ways, require the courts to focus on very different criteria, and ultimately produce incompatible results; thus, by applying the “no set of circumstances” test, the majority contravenes the numerous precedents (such as Ward and Knowles) holding that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate constitutional test for the content-neutral time-place-manner restriction that is at issue here. Third, the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly decided cases using reasoning and reaching results contrary to those required by the “no set of circumstances” test, e.g., Santa Fe, Morales, Casey, and Knowles. Therefore, considering all of the above, I believe the majority in this case has erred by using the “no set of circumstances” test as the decisive element in its reasoning.

III. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny

In this case, the plaintiff has brought a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of SLU’s policy on speech and assembly. These provisions are content-neutral26 and regulate the time, place, and manner of speech. Therefore, the test that determines their constitutional validity is the intermediate scrutiny standard as defined in numerous cases such as Ward and Knowles. To pass this test, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The remainder of this dissent examines whether the challenged speech restrictions — which require individuals and small groups to apply seven days in advance for permission to speak in public; require the disclosure of significant personal information from everyone who plays any role in a speech event; and limit the speech of any individual or group to two hours per seven days — are narrowly tailored to the significant interests that the government has identified.

A. Our Time-Place-Manner Precedents

Our cases uniformly hold that the government must justify content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech in a public forum27 by showing that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. This is commonly referred to as intermediate scrutiny. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir.2010); Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.2006); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, Miss., 664 F.2d 502, 516 (5th Cir.1981). “A regulation ‘is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the “evil” it seeks to remedy.’ ” Knowles, 462 F.3d at 434 (quoting Frisby *471v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988)). In other words, “[a] regulation is ‘narrowly tailored’ when it does not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989)). “At a minimum, a regulation cannot be narrowly tailored unless the cost to speech is ‘carefully calculated’ and the fit between the burden and the state interest is ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)).
“The government bears the burden of establishing that the regulations are reasonable.” Id. That is, the government must identify the significant state interests to which a challenged regulation is narrowly tailored, and “show affirmatively that the[] restriction is narrowly tailored to protect the identified interests.” Id. at 119.
This court’s method of analysis in Knowles exemplifies the usual and proper way of applying intermediate scrutiny to a restriction on speech. Knowles is on all fours with the instant case in every relevant respect: it involved a challenge to content-neutral restrictions on speech and assembly in a public forum. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Knowles brought purely facial challenges, and the court did not reach the issue of overbreadth. 462 F.3d at 433. Thus, even assuming that the majority is correct in addressing only Sonnier’s facial challenge, Knowles is indistinguishable from the present case.
In Knowles, the plaintiffs were antiabortion protesters who sought to “pray, display anti-abortion signs, distribute literature, and counsel clinic clients on the public sidewalk outside an abortion clinic”; they brought suit “challenging the facial constitutionality of two city ordinances that threaten[ed] their ability” to do so. Id. at 431. This court began its analysis by identifying the significant state interests that had been asserted by the government: “Waco’s asserted interests in protecting school children and citizens on public roads are generically significant.” Id. at 434. The court then decided whether the two challenged ordinances were narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted purposes. The court concluded that “the School Zone ordinance is not narrowly tailored because the ordinance ‘sweeps far more broadly than is necessary to further the city’s legitimate concern’ of enhancing the safety and welfare of schoolchildren and others using Waco’s public rights of way.” Id. at 435 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 801, 109 S.Ct. 2746). It further concluded that the other ordinance, the “Parade Ordinance,” was unconstitutional because “ordinances requiring a permit for demonstrations by a handful of people are not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” Id. at 436. Knoivles thus followed five other circuits28 in holding that laws requiring people to obtain permits for public speech and assembly must contain exceptions for small groups and individu*472ais. The court held that the government had failed to carry its burden to show that its restrictions on speech were narrowly tailored.29

B. Application of Precedents

In determining the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy,30 we must apply intermediate scrutiny, as exemplified by Knowles. Thus, the government must (1) identify the significant and legitimate government interests that it asserts as justifying its restrictions on speech, and (2) demonstrate that the SLU policy’s speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to further those government interests.

1. Identification of Government Interests

In cases like this one, in which speech restrictions at a state university are at issue, the government’s legitimate interests undoubtedly include protecting and furthering the university’s mission of educating its students. Still, the government must justify its restrictions on speech by showing that they are narrowly tailored to serve specific, legitimate government interests.
“First Amendment rights must be analyzed ‘in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,’ ” as the Supreme Court stated in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Disk, 393 U.S. 503, *473506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969)).31 “A university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of [the Supreme] Court have never denied a university’s authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.” Id. Nonetheless, “[w]ith respect to persons entitled to be there, [the Supreme Court’s] cases leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and association extend to the campuses of state universities.” Id. at 268-69, 102 S.Ct. 269.32 Therefore, as we have held in another case involving a state university, “[t]he government bears the burden of establishing that the regulations are reasonable.” Hays County Chiardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir.1992).
In this case, the defendant government officials have done little to carry their burden to “show affirmatively that [the restrictions are] narrowly tailored to protect [the government’s] identified interests.” Id. at 119. Indeed, at one point in their appellate brief, the defendants appear to be declining to even attempt to do so: “In this case the specific significant State interests of SLU were not in fact yet identified and remain to be determined in the case in chief.” Appellees’ Br. 12. That is of course an incorrect statement of the law, since the central issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of SLU’s speech restrictions, which cannot be determined without first identifying the legitimate interests that are asserted by the government.
Nonetheless, the defendants’ brief does mention some government interests. It states, “as a general principle, the government does have a significant interest in preserving the campuses of public colleges and universities for the use of students.” Appellees’ Br. 12 (quoting Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 770 (5th Cir.2005)). In other words, “the University has an interest in reserving [its] resources for University community members.” Appellees’ Br. 15 (quoting Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 982 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting ACLU Student Chapter—Univ. of Md., College Park v. Mote, 321 F.Supp.2d 670, 681 (D.Md.2004))). The defendants also assert the need “to plan for exigencies such as crowd control and insurance requirements.” Appellees’ Br. 15. They argue that “the university as a government entity ha[s] a significant interest in protecting the educational experience of the students in furtherance of its educational mission insuring student safety in fostering diversity.” Appellees’ Br. 16. And they reiterate that “SLU has a legitimate interest in maintaining sufficient order on its campus so that it may conduct its primary mission of providing an education to its students and preventing unnecessary disruption of the academic learning environment.” Appellees’ Br. 21.
These asserted state interests may be fairly summarized as (1) maintaining pub-*474lie safety, (2) preventing the disruption of education, (3) conserving the university’s resources, and (4) fostering diversity. But the defendants have offered little specific explanation of how any of the challenged provisions of the SLU speech policy are narrowly tailored to serve any of these specific interests. For the reasons that follow, the defendants’ arguments fall short of demonstrating that the challenged restrictions on speech are narrowly tailored to serve the identified interests.

2. Narrow Tailoring

a. Permit Requirement for Individuals and Small Groups

According to Sonnier’s uncontradicted affidavit, he and a handful of friends simply stood in a pedestrian mall, with Sonnier holding up a sign, and tried to engage in conversation with passersby. They were peaceable and did not cause any disruption. Under the precedents of the Fifth Circuit and five other circuits,33 the First Amendment forbids the government from requiring individuals and small groups, like Sonnier and his friends, to obtain advance permission for public speech and assembly. Such permit requirements are not narrowly tailored to serve any legitimate government interest.
In Knowles, this court recognized that “[o]ther circuits have held, and we concur, that ordinances requiring a permit for demonstrations by a handful of people are not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.” 462 F.3d at 436.34 The permit requirement at issue in Knowles was held to be unconstitutional because it made no exception for small groups. Five other circuits have held likewise. The SLU regulation that is at issue in this case does exactly what those precedents forbid- — it requires a handful of people to obtain a permit before they can speak in a public place. It is therefore unconstitutional.
There is a good reason why six circuits have agreed that such permit requirements are unconstitutional: the great majority of individuals and small groups exercising First Amendment rights do not block traffic or disrupt classes,35 whereas the few who actually intend to be disruptive or to interfere with the rights of others are very unlikely to seek advance permission before doing so. Thus, a permit requirement that applies to small groups and individuals can reasonably be expected to accomplish nothing except burdening the speech of law-abiding, non-disruptive people. Such a requirement therefore “burdenfs] substantially more speech than *475is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests,” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, and is not narrowly tailored. By contrast, advance permit requirements that apply only to larger groups or to speakers who draw large crowds are far more justifiable, because such groups inherently create logistical problems like traffic and noise that may need to be planned for in advance. Cf. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 981 (8th Cir.2006). But because these justifications do not pertain to small groups, permit requirements that apply to small groups are not narrowly tailored.
The majority opinion suggests that the requirement of an exception for small groups, which is well established for municipal ordinances, should not apply to public universities because “a university is less able than a city or other entity with police powers to deal with a significant disruption on short notice.” Maj. Op. 444 (quoting Bowman, 444 F.3d at 982). But this distinction is factually inapposite here because SLU — like many public universities — has a police force. Indeed, this case arose from an interaction between the plaintiff and a campus police officer.
Moreover, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have specifically rejected arguments that in small municipalities with limited resources and small police forces, public safety justifies requiring individuals and small groups to obtain advance permission to exercise First Amendment rights. Cox v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2005); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (8th Cir.1996). There are strong similarities between campuses and municipalities, as this court recognized in Hays County Guardian: “The campus’s function as the site of a community of full-time residents makes it ‘a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment,’ and suggests an intended role more akin to a public street or park....” 969 F.2d at 117 (quoting Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)). SLU is a sizable university with around 15,000 students; Douglas involved a municipality with a slightly smaller total population, and Cox involved a municipality about one-third as large as SLU.36 The reasoning of Cox and Douglas therefore applies to SLU with at least equal force.
The court in Cox explained that advance permit requirements are not justified by the speculative possibility that a small group engaging in free speech might do something disruptive: “the City fails to explain how a small demonstration that may become inflammatory would tax its police force any differently than, for example, a street fight between two individuals, so as to justify requiring advance warning of all small demonstrations.” 416 F.3d at 285. The court also emphasized that small municipalities can do many other things to meet their public safety goals. They “can enforce ordinances prohibiting and punish*476ing conduct that disturbs the peace, blocks the sidewalks, or impedes the flow of traffic.” Id. at 286. They “can also pass ordinances that ‘regulate only the volume, location, or duration of [protected] expression,’ rather than subjecting all speech to a permit requirement.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1990)). And they can enact permit requirements that “do[] not burden small gatherings posing no threat to the safety, order, and accessibility of streets and sidewalks.” Id. at 287. SLU, like the small municipalities in Cox and Douglas, is free to take steps such as these to further its legitimate interests in maintaining public safety and preventing the disruption of education. Thus, the reasoning of Cox and Douglas refutes the idea that the size of SLU’s police force might justify imposing a permit requirement on individuals and small groups.
The majority opinion cites two cases in support of the view that public universities can impose advance permit requirements on small groups. Maj. Op. 445. However, neither case is actually relevant to that issue. In Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967 (8th Cir.2006), the plaintiff was a speaker who drew crowds as large as 200 students. Id. at 981. The Eighth Circuit specifically explained that any argument for a small-group exception would be inapposite because the speaker regularly drew such large crowds.37 Thus, the Bowman court had no occasion to even consider whether such a permit requirement would be constitutional if imposed on an individual or a handful of people. If anything, the opinion’s emphasis on the size of crowds suggests that the court would have decided the case differently in the absence of Bowman’s “demonstrated ... capacity to attract a crowd.” Id. at 981. There is no evidence in the instant case to suggest that Sonnier draws sizable crowds when he speaks; rather, his uncontradicted evidence is that he merely carries signs and attempts to engage individual passersby in conversation.
The majority opinion also relies on Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1968). In that case, a college took disciplinary action against students who took part in a 16-person demonstration at an ROTC ceremony, in which the demonstrators deliberately interfered with the audience’s view of the ceremony. Id. at 77-78. The Second Circuit’s opinion explained that “the suspensions in this case were not bottomed on a failure to furnish notice to the administration” as required by the college’s 48-hour advance notice requirement. Id. at 84. Rather, the demonstrators were sus*477pended for engaging in disruptive civil disobedience. Thus, the Poiue ease did not actually involve a challenge to a policy requiring permission in advance for speech or assembly; a fortiori, the case did not come close to raising the issue of whether such a policy was required to contain an exception for individuals or small groups.
The bottom line is simply that when the government requires every individual or handful of people to seek advance permission before exercising their First Amendment rights in public, it suppresses a far greater amount of speech than is necessary to serve any legitimate governmental purpose. Occasionally a particular protester may act in a way that interferes with a university’s educational functions, but — as the Fourth Circuit said in Cox— that is not really different from the occasional outbreak of a fight, an out-of-control party, or another small disturbance. If the police can handle other small incidents of unruly behavior that happen without advance warning, then they are equally capable of handling an occasional disruptive protester or handful of demonstrators without advance warning. As this circuit and five others have recognized, requiring individuals and small groups to seek advance government permission before speaking in a public place is “too high a cost” because it unnecessarily burdens a substantial amount of peaceful, harmless, constitutionally protected speech. Cox, 416 F.3d at 285 (quoting Turner, 893 F.2d at 1392). Under these precedents, SLU’s advance permit requirement is unconstitutional.

b. Other Challenged Restrictions

The government has also failed to carry its burden to justify the other challenged elements of the SLU speech policy: the requirement that significant personal information be collected from every single participant in an event; the provision limiting speech to no more than two hours per seven days; and the provision requiring seven days’ advance notice to obtain a permit.
The SLU speech policy imposes a rather sweeping requirement that personal information, including social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses and phone numbers, be collected from every single individual who has any role at all in a speech event — including people who merely set up equipment, hold signs, or pass out pamphlets. Such a broad requirement is not necessary to further any legitimate interest that the government has identified. It is likely that a much narrower version of this policy could be justified under some circumstances: for instance, as the majority opinion states, it would be reasonable for planning purposes (at least for events of any substantial size) for the university to want to know “the identity of speakers on campus, where they intend to speak, and their purpose.” Maj. Op. 447. Furthermore, the university has good reason to obtain identifying information from at least one responsible person in order “to assure financial accountability for damage caused by the event.” Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). But neither of these considerations, nor any others that have been identified, provide any justification for SLU’s much broader and more burdensome requirement that everyone involved with an event must entrust their social security numbers and other personally identifying information to SLU officials. The majority opinion does not specifically explain why this requirement should be considered narrowly tailored. If there is no way to justify it as being narrowly tailored, then our court ought to acknowledge that it is simply unconstitutional.
*478As for the regulation limiting speech to two hours per seven days, it plainly restricts speech far more severely than is necessary to serve the university’s legitimate interest in “fostering a diversity of viewpoints and preventing one speaker from monopolizing space.” Maj. Op. 446. The same goals could be accomplished just as successfully by a policy that would merely give priority to speakers who had not already spoken for two hours in a given week. Such a policy might have the effect of limiting everyone to two hours if there was a week of extraordinarily high demand for speaking time — but, unlike the policy that is at issue here, it would not purposelessly restrict speakers to two hours even during weeks when there were no competing demands for space or time. The Eighth Circuit made the very same point concerning a similar restriction in Bowman:
The University’s interest in fostering a diversity of viewpoints and avoiding the monopolization of space serves a significant interest. However, the five-day cap is not sufficiently narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. The Policy as written does not by itself foster more viewpoints; it merely limits Bowman’s speech. If no one else wants to use the space after Bowman has used his five permits, the space will go unused even if Bowman still wants to use the space. A more narrowly tailored policy might grant Bowman more than just five days per semester to speak if the space is not being used, but give preference to other speakers who have not already obtained five permits.
444 F.3d at 981-82. The SLU policy restricts a speaker’s speech to one two-hour block per week (32 hours per semester), rather than the five eight-hour blocks (40 hours) per semester in Bowman, id. at 981, but the Bowman court’s logic applies equally well. The SLU policy, like the policy in Bowman, “does not by itself foster more viewpoints; it merely limits [Sonnier’s] speech.” Id. Because this restriction is no more effective at serving legitimate government interests than a much less restrictive alternative policy would be, it is not narrowly tailored.
Finally, the SLU speech policy requires all speakers to apply for permits seven days in advance. The majority opinion defends this advance notice requirement as being necessary to allow the university to prepare for events involving large numbers of people, or to allow SLU administrative staff to arrange their own schedules so that they can attend events. But there is no reason why a few people holding signs on a street corner, or a street preacher trying to converse with passersby about the Bible, would require SLU to engage in anything close to seven days of logistical preparation. Nor is it realistic to suppose that the University would expend its resources by having an administrator reai'range his or her schedule to spend hours watching a small group or an individual street preacher, when campus police officers can see that the peace is kept as part of their regular jobs. If the small group of anti-abortion speakers in Knowles could not be subjected to an advance permit requirement for security or logistical reasons, then there is likewise nothing justifying the imposition of a permit requirement on the speakers in this case.
The seven-day notice requirement that is challenged in this case might perhaps be narrowly tailored if it applied only to large groups, but there appears to be no case that even comes close to saying so; a seven-day notice period is more than twice as long as the three-day notice period that was upheld in Bowman for a speaker who drew as many as 200 people. Therefore, I would avoid deciding whether a seven-day notice period would be too long to be *479justifiable if it applied only to large groups. Instead, I would simply conclude that it is unconstitutional as applied to individuals and small groups.
In summary, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision not to hold unconstitutional, as applied to the plaintiffs speech, the governmental restrictions on speech that are at issue in this case (except for the security fee provision, which I agree is unconstitutional). I do so for three reasons: first, this appeal properly involves an as-applied challenge as well as a facial one; second, regardless of whether this suit involves a facial or as-applied challenge or both, the constitutional test that must be applied to these speech restrictions is intermediate scrutiny, not the “no set of circumstances” test; and finally, the government has failed to show that the challenged speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve any legitimate governmental interest.

. The majority opinion notes that Sonnier did not conduct any discovery, but it does not explain why Sonnier should have conducted discovery. He already knew from personal experience how the SLU policy had been applied to him.
Likewise, there is no apparent reason why Sonnier should have called witnesses at the preliminary injunction hearing. He had already given his account of the events giving rise to the lawsuit in his uncontradicted affidavit which had been filed four months earlier.
The-majority implies that Sonnier did something wrong when he "resisted providing initial Rule 26 discovery requested by the defendants.” Maj. Op. 443. However, assuming for the sake of argument that this is true (although the district court did not rule on any discovery disputes), the majority does not explain how ignoring all of Sonnier’s as-applied arguments could be an appropriate sanction for any such misbehavior.

. It is helpful to clarify that, as the Supreme Court has recently explained, facial and as-applied challenges are not really separate claims, but are merely different arguments in support of the claim that the plaintiff's constitutional rights have been violated. In Citizens United v. FEC, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 876, - L.Ed.2d - (2010), the Court explained that Citizens United’s facial challenge — in which it asked the Court to overrule Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) — was “not a new claim,” but was only “a new argument” in support of Citizens United's already-existing "claim that the FEC ha[d] violated its First Amendment right to free speech.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 893, 130 S.Ct. 876.
Likewise, in the instant case, Sonnier's facial and as-applied challenges are not separate claims, but are merely different arguments in support of Sonnier's claim that SLU has violated his First Amendment right to free speech. Thus, it is proper to refer to Sonnier’s "as-applied arguments” as I do here.
See section II.B below for a more extended discussion of the significance of Citizens United.

. The majority cites Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) and Dillon v. Bay City Construction Co., 512 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.1975), for the proposition that the district court acted within its discretion. Maj. Op. 442. However, these authorities are irrelevant; neither of them comes anywhere close to permitting a district court to ignore as-applied arguments and entertain only facial arguments for a preliminary injunction. Rule 65(a) states that "the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the [preliminary injunction] hearing,” but the district court did not do anything like that in this case; rather, it held a preliminary injunction hearing but refused to consider as-applied arguments.
In Dillon, this court held that a district court had abused its discretion by consolidating a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits in a way that "inhibited altogether the extensive discovery and investigation necessitated by this kind of class action and to which the plaintiffs had a right under [Rule] 26.” 512 F.2d at 804. If anything, Dillon favors the plaintiff in this case: it stands for the principle that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to structure its proceedings in a way that prevents a party from fully presenting its case. At any rate, the district court in this case did not consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits, so Dillon and Rule 65(a) are irrelevant.

. In the majority's view, there is one narrow exception to this rule: challenges involving the overbreadth doctrine in the context of the First Amendment. Maj. Op. 443 n. 6. That *454exception is not relevant here, since Sonnier's arguments do not rely on that doctrine.

. Interestingly, the majority does not apply the "no set of circumstances” test to SLU's security fee provision, which it holds is facially unconstitutional. Maj. Op. 447. Instead, it recognizes (and I agree) that this provision is indistinguishable from the ordinance that the Supreme Court struck down in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). However, if the majority were to apply the "no set of circumstances” test to the security fee provision, it would have to conclude that the provision is facially constitutional because it is possible to imagine a circumstance in which SLU might set a security fee that would be justifiable — for instance, a nominal fee for security for a large concert. The majority holds that this speech restriction is facially unconstitutional without regard to the "no set of circumstances” test, but it nonetheless holds that all the other challenged restrictions are facially constitutional because the plaintiff cannot meet that test.

. All nine Justices (five in the majority and four dissenters) agreed with this statement. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 935 n. 9, 130 S.Ct. 876 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressly agreeing that "the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges does not have 'some automatic effect’ that mechanically controls the judicial task"). See also id. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (further discussing the unimportance of the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges). See infra note 10 (quoting and discussing Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence).
It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court decided the facial challenge in Citizens United in a way that was consistent with this dissent’s analysis of the facial/as-applied distinction, and did not employ the "no set of circumstances” test. The Court announced that it was deciding the facial constitutionality of the statute at issue, id. at 892-96; explained that it was applying strict scrutiny, id. at 898; and held that the statute was facially unconstitutional, id. at 913. Several more examples of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases in which the courts have resolved facial challenges while disregarding the "no set of circumstances” test are collected in section II.D below.

. Further underscoring that facial and as-applied challenges are simply arguments for particular remedies, the Citizens United Court explained that Citizens United's facial challenge (which asked the Court to overrule Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990)) was "not a new claim” but was only "a new argument” in support of Citizens United's "claim that the FEC ha[d] violated its First Amendment right to free speech.” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 893, 130 S.Ct. 876. Thus, the underlying claim was that the plaintiff's constitutional right had been violated; the facial and as-applied challenges were the plaintiff's arguments in support of that claim; and the difference between the facial and as-applied arguments was that they led to different remedies.
Likewise, in the instant case, Sonnier’s facial and as-applied challenges are not separate claims, but are distinct arguments supporting Sonnier’s claim that SLU has violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The difference between Sonnier's facial and as-applied arguments is that the as-applied arguments, if accepted, would lead to a narrower holding that the challenged policy is invalid under certain circumstances, whereas the facial arguments would lead to a broader holding that the challenged policy is invalid in all circumstances.

. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct at 893, 130 S.Ct. 876 (''[O]nce a case is brought, no general categorical line bars a court from making broader pronouncements of invalidity in properly 'as-applied' cases.” (quoting Fallon, supra, at 1339) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) ("[A]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication.” (quoting Fallon, supra, at 1328) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Sabri, 541 U.S. at 610, 124 S.Ct. 1941 (citing Fallon, supra, at 1351).
Federal appellate courts, too, have often made use of this article. E.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 172—73 (4th Cir.2009) (en banc) (quoting at length from Fallon, supra, at 1331, 1337, 1368).

. This understanding is further reinforced by Chief Justice Roberts's concurrence in Citizens United:
[T]he debate over whether to consider this claim on an as-applied or facial basis strikes me as largely beside the point. Citizens United ... has a constitutional claim— the Act violates the First Amendment, because it prohibits political speech. The Government has a defense' — the Act may be enforced, consistent with the First Amendment, against corporations. Whether the claim or the defense prevails is the question before us.
Given the nature of that claim and defense, it makes no difference of any substance whether this case is resolved by invalidating the statute on its face or only as applied to Citizens United. Even if considered in as-applied terms, a holding in this case that the Act may not be applied to Citizens United — because corporations as well as individuals enjoy the pertinent First Amendment rights — would mean that any other corporation raising the same challenge would also win. Likewise, a conclusion that the Act may be applied to Citizens United — because it is constitutional to prohibit corporate political speech — would similarly govern future cases. Regardless whether we label Citizens United’s claim a "facial” or "as-applied” challenge, the consequences of the Court’s decision are the same.
130 S.Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). As the Chief Justice recognized, the labels of "facial” and "as-applied” were "beside the point”; the real question was whether the challenged law was consistent with the First Amendment, and the Court's answer to that substantive constitutional question would determine whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face, unconstitutional as applied, or constitutional.
Likewise, in every case in which a law is subjected to a constitutional challenge — in*459cluding the instant case — the proper method is to apply the relevant substantive constitutional doctrines and tests, and the result of that process determines whether the challenged law should be held unconstitutional either on its face or as applied.

. It is worth briefly noting that this understanding of the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not necessarily inconsistent with the opinion that has been read as creating the "no set of circumstances” test, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987).
The Federal Circuit, in Rothe Development Corp. v. Department of Defense, 413 F.3d 1327 (Fed.Cir.2005), adjudicated a facial challenge to a statute under strict scrutiny and not the "no set of circumstances” test. Id. at 1329, 1337-38. The court explained, “Salerno is of limited relevance here, at most describing a conclusion that could result from the application of the strict scrutiny test.” Id. at 1337-38. Thus, the Rothe court read Salerno as being consistent with the principle that the facial/as-applied distinction “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court,” Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 893, 130 S.Ct. 876. Under this reading, Salerno simply means that a successful facial challenge has the outcome of "establish[ing] that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. See also Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797-98, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) ("In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner.”).
Under the Federal Circuit’s reading, the Salerno "no set of circumstances” language does not create a universal test for all facial challenges; instead, it only describes the outcome of a successful facial challenge. This reading is consistent with all the authorities cited in this dissent that are in conflict with the "no set of circumstances” test. A few other courts and at least one eminent law professor have adopted this reading of Salerno. Daskalea v. Wash. Humane Society, 480 F.Supp.2d 16, 36 n. 22 (D.D.C.2007); MDK, Inc. v. Vill. of Grafton, 345 F.Supp.2d 952, 960 (E.D.Wis.2004); In re Termination of Parental Rights to Diana P., 279 Wis.2d 169, 694 N.W.2d 344, 361 (2005) (Roggensack, J., concurring); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1342-43 (2000). The article that makes the most thorough case for this reading is Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U.L.Rev. 359 (1998), on which the Rothe court relied.

. Even the defendants’ brief on appeal agrees that this is the applicable standard.

. E.g., Maj. Op. 445-46 ("If Sonnier expected to attract a large number of students with his message ... If Sonnier desired to speak on SLU’s campus at the same time as a number of other individuals and organizations ... If Sonnier or another speaker wished to speak at a time when multiple members of the SLU administration were scheduled to be out of the office....").

. E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481-82, 485, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir.2010); Knowles v. City of Waco, 462 F.3d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir.2006); Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir.1992); Beckerman v. City of Tupelo, 664 F.2d 502, 516 (5th Cir.1981).

. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999) (plurality opinion) ("To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is not the Salerno formulation, which has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself ....”); id. at 78-81, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending the "no set of circumstances” test); Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175-76, 116 S.Ct. 1582, 134 L.Ed.2d 679 (1996) (mem.) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (characterizing the "no set of circumstances” test as a dictum, "unsupported by citation or precedent,” inconsistent with an array of legal principles, and "draconian” in its effects); id. at 1178-81, 116 S.Ct. 1582 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (characterizing the "no set of circumstances” test as "a long established principle of our jurisprudence” but citing no Supreme Court case decided prior to Salerno to support it).

. For example, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.2000), noted that the "no set of circumstances” test "has been subject to a heated debate in the Supreme Court, where it has not been consistently followed.” Id. at 1235 n. 3. The court decided not to apply the "no set of circumstances” test to the facial challenge in that case because “[w]hatever the precise scope of the general rule may be, the Supreme Court and this Court consistently have permitted facial challenges to prior restraints on speech without requiring the plaintiff to show that there are no conceivable set of facts where the application of the particular government regulation might or would be constitutional.” Id. at 1236.
The Sixth Circuit, in Staley v. Jones, 239 F.3d 769 (6th Cir.2001), considered Morales to have overruled Salerno at least as to facial challenges under the vagueness doctrine, and held that prior to Morales there was no clearly established federal law on that issue. Id. at 789-90. And the en banc Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.2009) (en banc), after considering Salerno and other cases, concluded that "[w]e need not ... attempt to resolve the uncertainty regarding the appropriate criteria for entertaining facial challenges” because the facial challenge in that case failed even if "no set of circumstances” was not the proper test. Id. at 174.

. The "no set of circumstances” passage in Salerno excludes the narrow category of facial challenges under the overbreadth doctrine in the context of the First Amendment. 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. That exception is not at issue here. The majority in this case considers the "no set of circumstances” test to apply to all other facial challenges. Maj. Op. 443 & n. 6.

. The Court in Stevens wrote:
To succeed in a typical facial attack, Stevens would have to establish "that no set of circumstances exists under which [§ 48] would be valid,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 ... (1987), or that the statute lacks any "plainly legitimate sweep,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 ... (1997) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgments) (internal quotation marks omitted). Which standard applies in a typical case is a matter of dispute that we need not and do not address, and neither Salerno nor Glucksberg is a speech case.
130 S.Ct. at 1587. The Court's mention of speech cases is noteworthy here, since it suggests that some Justices may consider the "no set of circumstances” test to be inapplicable to speech cases even if it does apply to facial challenges in some other area of law. However, as will be discussed below, there are also Supreme Court decisions in several other areas of constitutional law that conflict with the “no set of circumstances” test.

. See Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143, 155 n. 6, 115 S.Ct. 1291, 131 L.Ed.2d 178 (1995); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301, 113 S.Ct 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514, 110 S.Ct. 2972, 111 L.Ed.2d 405 (1990).

. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 375 n. 4, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1019, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Morales, 527 U.S. at 78-81, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 973, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 82-83, 112 S.Ct. 2365, 120 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 627 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

. In Morales, the plurality opinion stated that “the Salerno formulation ... has never been the decisive factor in any decision of this Court, including Salerno itself.” 527 U.S. 41, 55 n. 22, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia’s dissent argued in favor of the "no set of circum*464stances” test, but tacitly conceded the inability to cite any case in which it had been "the decisive factor.” See id. at 80 n. 3, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While Morales was decided in 1999, my research has not revealed any Supreme Court case before or since then in which the "no set of circumstances” test has been decisive. See supra notes 19-20 (collecting cases in which that test has been mentioned).

. "Of course, we treat the considered dicta of the Supreme Court with greater weight and deference 'as prophecy of what that Court might hold.' ” Valladolid v. Pac. Operations Offshore, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n. 17 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc)). "We do not blindly, however, follow an unconsidered statement simply because it was uttered by the Supreme Court.” Id.
"While the dicta of the Supreme Court merits our deference, we also heed Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition that:
general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision....”
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Oct. 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 19 U.S. 264, 399, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821)).

. See also Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175, 116 S.Ct. 1582, 134 L.Ed.2d 679 (1996) (opinion of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (observing that the controversial statement was "unnecessary to the holding in [Salerno], for the Court effectively held that the statute at issue would be constitutional as applied in a large fraction of cases”).

. The specific reasoning by which the Supreme Court resolved the facial challenge in Salerno was as follows. As to the Due Process Clause, the Court acknowledged that there is a " 'general rule' of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial,” 481 U.S. at 749, 107 S.Ct. 2095, but nonetheless held that "this right may ... be subordinated to the greater needs of society” and that "Congress' careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted satisfies this standard,” id. at 750-51, 107 S.Ct. 2095. The Court thus balanced the rights of arrestees against the interests of society and decided that the Bail Reform Act, on its face, was constitutional because it did not go too far in "subordinating]” the rights of arrestees.
As to the Eighth Amendment, the Court held that "when Congress has mandated [pretrial] detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight [such as public safety], as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” Id. at 754-55, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Thus, the Court’s reasoning centered on what the Eighth Amendment does and does not require the government to do. It held that the Bail Reform Act was facially constitutional because the Eighth Amendment does not forbid Congress from mandating pretrial detention for arrestees who are thought to pose a danger to the community.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision in Salerno was not at all based on the “no set of circumstances” dictum. "In each step of its analysis, the Court measured the Bail Reform Act against the substantive requirements of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment as articulated in the relevant doctrinal tests. The Salerno defendants lost their facial challenge, not because the Court was able to identify some constitutional applications, but because the Court held that the Act on its face satisfied all of the applicable due process and Eighth Amendment doctrinal tests.” Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Over-breadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U.L.Rev. 359, 399 (1998).

. The Lemon test, which takes its name from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), is a three-part test for deciding whether a law violates the Establishment Clause. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602, 108 S.Ct. 2562.

. The plaintiffs appellate brief argues that the security fee provision is not content-neutral. I do not address that issue here, because I agree with the majority’s holding that the security fee provision is unconstitutional. The plaintiff acknowledges that the other provisions he challenges are content-neutral.

. As the majority opinion says, Maj. Op. 441, and as the defendants acknowledge, the public, outdoor areas of the SLU campus are either a traditional public forum or a designated public forum. There is no need to decide which of these two types of public forum is at issue because "[t]he state’s power 'to restrict speakers' access to [a designated] public forum is subject to the same first amendment constraints that apply to traditional public forums.’ ” Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345 (5th Cir.2001) (quoting Estiveme v. La. State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 376 (5th Cir.1989)).

. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1039 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); Cox v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir.2005); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir.2005); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1524 (8th Cir.1996); Grossman v. City of Portland., 33 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir.1994); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1990).

. The same method of analysis under intermediate scrutiny — examining whether the government has shown a sufficiently close connection between its means and its ends— has been followed in many other cases. See, e.g., SEIU v. Houston, 595 F.3d at 604 ("Houston has barred downtown parades for all but two one-hour periods a day on weekdays. Its asserted justification of preventing traffic congestion is arguably confined to the morning and evening rush hours.... [Tjhere is scant connection between the restrictive parade hours and the putative consequences that are the justifications for the Ordinance.”); Hays County Guardian, 969 F.2d at 123 ("We find the University’s educational goals sufficiently weighty.... We also find that the University’s financial support for the student-run newspaper is a narrowly tailored means of advancing these interests.”); Beckerman, 664 F.2d at 516 ("This ordinance reaches more broadly than is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate state interests.”); see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484-86, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (first identifying the "significant government interest” served by the challenged ordinance, and then explaining that the ordinance "is narrowly tailored” to that interest); Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 810, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (upholding an ordinance that "curtails no more speech than is necessary to accomplish its purpose”); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182-83, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (considering a challenged law’s apparent purpose as well as an additional justification proffered by the government, and holding that the law did not “substantially” or "sufficiently” serve either purpose); Berger, 569 F.3d at 1041 (explaining that this standard requires a reasonable fit between the government's means and ends); Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Brentwood, Tenn., 398 F.3d 814, 821 (6th Cir.2005) (upholding an ordinance because "[t]he fit between the City's means and ends is a reasonable one”); Chesapeake B&M, Inc. v. Harford County, Md., 58 F.3d 1005, 1013 (4th Cir.1995) ("The 'intermediate scrutiny’ analysis applicable to content-neutral restrictions on speech ... is concerned with the ends government can pursue, the means with which it can pursue those ends, and the relationship between them.”).

. The challenged provisions are quoted in full in the majority opinion. Maj Op. 439-40 nn. 1-4. The restrictions that will be addressed here are (1) the requirement that even individuals and small groups must obtain advance permission to speak in public; (2) the requirement that every person who has any role at all in a speech event must entrust various personal information to SLU; (3) the limitation of speech to a maximum of two hours per seven days; and (4) the requirement that would-be speakers must apply for permits seven days in advance.

. See also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) ("[I]n determining whether a statute is narrowly tailored, we have noted that '[w]e must, of course, take account of the place to which the regulations apply in determining whether these restrictions burden more speech than necessary.’ ... For example, we have recognized the special governmental interests surrounding schools, courthouses, polling places, and private homes.”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994)).

. The defendants have not argued that Sonnier was not "entitled to be there”; their argument is only that the SLU speech policy, on its face and as applied to Sonnier, is consistent with the First Amendment.

. SEIU v. Houston, 595 F.3d at 603; Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1039-40 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); Knowles, 462 F.3d at 436; Cox v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 286 (4th Cir.2005); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 608 (6th Cir.2005); Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1524 (8th Cir.1996); Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir.1994); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1990).

. The court cited Douglas v. Brownell, 88 F.3d 1511, 1524 (8th Cir.1996); Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1202-06 (9th Cir.1994); and Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1990). Cases from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits also support the same proposition. See supra note 30.

. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 119, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (“[I]t would be highly unusual if the classic expressive gesture of the solitary picket disrupts anything related to the school, at least on a public sidewalk open to pedestrians.”); cf. SEIU v. Houston, 595 F.3d at 603 (recognizing that a “careful distinction” between small parades and larger ones “is in accord with principles of narrow tailoring” because small parades have "lesser effects on safety and congestion concerns”).

. Despite the name of the case, the City of Charleston was not a party to the appeal in Cox v. City of Charleston. The appellee was a small municipality called Travelers Rest, South Carolina, which had a population of 4100 in the year 2000. That is less than one-third of the number of students enrolled at SLU. See http://travelersrestsc.com/ community/ (Travelers Rest population); Appellees’ Br. 14 (SLU enrollment).
Douglas concerned the City of Clive, Iowa, whose current population is around 14,000. See http://www.cityofclive.com/about-clive/. The court rejected the city’s argument that its “limited resources and small police force” justified a five-day advance notice requirement for a permit, two days shorter than the advance notice period that is at issue in this case. 88 F.3d at 1523-24.

. The Bowman court explained:
Bowman argues that the Thomas [v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002)] and Grossman [v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir.1994)] analyses are not applicable to him because he is a single speaker. This argument fails because regardless of whether Bowman is speaking alone or with others, carrying a sign, or handing out literature, he has demonstrated the capacity to attract a crowd and disrupt the unique educational environment. See [ACLU Student Chapter—Univ. of Md., College Park v.] Mote, 321 F.Supp.2d [670,] 679 [(D.Md.2004)]. In fact, the majority of Bowman's space reservation requests listed an estimated attendance of between fifty and one hundred people, analogous to the situation in Thomas. The actual attendance at his events has run as high as two hundred people. Under these circumstances, the permit requirement is justified to "coordinate multiple uses of limited space,” "assure preservation of the [campus],” "prevent uses that are dangerous” to students or other people, and "to assure financial accountability for damage” caused by Bowman's event. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322, 122 S.Ct. 775....
Bowman, 444 F.3d at 981.