Court Opinion

ID: 9892183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 20:01:06.412014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:21:52.750054
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11059     Document: 64-1     Date Filed: 10/20/2023   Page: 1 of 61

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                   Nos. 22-11059, 22-10877, 22-11060, 22-10889
                           ____________________

        POSITANO PLACE AT NAPLES I CONDOMINIUM
        ASSOCIATION, INC.,
        a Florida not-for-proﬁt Corporation,
        POSITANO PLACE AT NAPLES II CONDOMINIUM
        ASSOCIATION, INC.,
        a Florida not-for-proﬁt Corporation,
        POSITANO PLACE AT NAPLES III CONDOMINIUM
        ASSOCIATION, INC.,
        a Florida not-for-proﬁt Corporation,
        POSITANO PLACE AT NAPLES IV CONDOMINIUM
        ASSOCIATION, INC.,
        a Florida not-for-proﬁt Corporation,
                                                      Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11059

        EMPIRE INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                          Defendant-Appellant.

                              ____________________

                   Appeals from the United States District Court
                         for the Middle District of Florida
            D.C. Docket Nos. 2:21-cv-00178-SPC-MRM, 2:21-cv-00181-SPC-
              MRM, 2:21-cv-00183-SPC-MRM, 2:21-cv-00186-SPC-MRM
                             ____________________

        Before LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               On our own motion, we vacate our prior opinion, and sub-
        stitute it with the following opinion. Empire’s motion for panel
        rehearing is denied as moot.
               These appeals 1 are about a pending insurance contract dis-
        pute between Positano Place at Naples I Condominium Associa-
        tion, Inc., and Empire Indemnity Insurance Company, which is-
        sued an insurance policy (the “Policy”) to Positano for coverage of
        five buildings that Positano owns in Naples, Florida. Following
        Hurricane Irma, Positano filed a first-party claim for property in-
        surance benefits under the Policy, claiming that Hurricane Irma

        1 We previously consolidated case numbers 22-11059, 22-10877, 22-11060, and

        22-10889 for purposes of hearing oral argument in those cases. We now sua
        sponte consolidate those cases for purposes of resolving these appeals.
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        22-11059               Opinion of the Court                        3

        damaged its property and that the damage was covered by the Pol-
        icy. After Empire investigated Positano’s claim, Empire deter-
        mined that there was coverage as to only three of the five buildings
        covered by the Policy but disagreed as to the amount of the loss.
        In response, Positano sought to invoke appraisal based on the Pol-
        icy’s appraisal provision. When Empire did not respond to Posi-
        tano’s appraisal demand, Positano sued Empire in Florida state
        court, and Empire removed the case to federal court based on di-
        versity jurisdiction.
               Following removal, Positano moved to compel appraisal
        and to stay the case pending the resolution of the appraisal proceed-
        ings, which Empire opposed. The magistrate judge issued a report
        recommending that the district court grant Positano’s motion, and,
        over Empire’s objection, the district court ordered the parties to
        appraisal and stayed the proceedings pending appraisal. Empire
        timely appealed the district court’s order.
               We issued a jurisdictional question to the parties asking
        them to address whether this Court had appellate jurisdiction over
        an order that compelled appraisal, stayed the case pending ap-
        praisal, and directed the parties to file status reports on the ap-
        praisal process. We also asked the parties to address whether or-
        ders compelling appraisal are treated the same as orders compelling
        arbitration for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.
               After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we conclude that the district court’s order compelling appraisal and
        staying the proceedings pending appraisal is an interlocutory order
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11059

        that is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
        We also conclude that the order compelling appraisal and staying
        the action pending appraisal is not immediately appealable under
        the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Accordingly, for the reasons
        stated below, we dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdic-
        tion.
                        I.      RELEVANT BACKGROUND 2
               Empire issued the Policy to Positano for five buildings
        owned by Positano in Naples, Florida (the “Insured Property”).
        The Policy has a total coverage value in the millions of dollars, and
        each of the buildings is separately scheduled and subject to a 3 per-
        cent hurricane deductible. The Policy contains the following ap-
        praisal provision:
               Mediation Or Appraisal
               If we and you:
               ....
               B. Disagree on the value of the property or the
               amount of loss, either may request an appraisal of the
               loss, in writing. In this event, each party will select a
               competent and impartial appraiser. The two apprais-
               ers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either
               may request that selection be made by a judge of a

        2 In these consolidated appeals, the facts, procedural histories, and arguments

        made below and on appeal are largely the same. For purposes of this opinion,
        our discussion of the facts and procedural history focuses on those in Positano
        Place at Naples I Condominium Association, Inc., v. Empire Indemnity Insurance
        Company, No. 22-11059.
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                           5

               court having jurisdiction. The appraisers will state
               separately the value of the property and amount of
               loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differ-
               ences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two
               will be binding. Each party will:
               1. Pay its chosen appraiser; and
               2. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire
               equally.
               If there is an appraisal, we will still retain our right to
               deny the claim.
               However, you are not required to submit to, or par-
               ticipate in, any appraisal of the loss as a precondition
               to action against us for failure to pay the loss, if we:
               1. Requested mediation and either party rejected the
               mediation result; or
               2. Failed to notify you of your right to participate in
               the mediation program.
               On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma struck Naples.
        Nearly seven months later, Positano notified Empire of storm dam-
        age to the Insured Property. Empire investigated the claim and in-
        spected the Insured Property. Empire and Positano exchanged a
        series of letters relating to Positano’s claim over a period of approx-
        imately three years. The details of those letters are not relevant to
        the issue before us. Suffice it to say that the parties disagreed about
        the amount of covered losses incurred by Positano as a result of
        Hurricane Irma.
              At some point during this process, Positano sent a written
        request for appraisal to Empire. After Positano’s appraisal request
        went unanswered, it filed a complaint against Empire in Florida
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11059

        state court. Empire subsequently removed the action to the United
        States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on the basis
        of diversity jurisdiction. After its initial complaint was dismissed in
        part, Positano filed its amended complaint. In its amended com-
        plaint, Positano asserted three claims: (1) specific performance; (2)
        breach of contract; and (3) declaratory judgment. As to specific
        performance, Positano alleged that the Policy’s appraisal provision
        demonstrated the parties’ intention to have disputes related to cau-
        sation, scope, and loss be resolved through the appraisal process
        upon either party’s demand. It alleged that the parties’ dispute was
        not a coverage dispute but a dispute over the amount of loss. As
        to the breach of contract claim, Positano alleged that Empire
        acknowledged loss and coverage but had failed to comply with its
        contractual obligations to engage in the appraisal process and had
        not paid in full for the covered losses suffered by Positano. And, as
        to the declaratory judgment claim, Positano asked the district court
        to declare, among other things, that it had “properly invoked the
        Policy’s appraisal provision.”
               Empire’s answer asserted nineteen affirmative defenses
        against Positano’s claims. Many of these affirmative defenses are
        coverage defenses, and, at the time this appeal was filed, the district
        court had not issued any dispositive rulings as to those coverage
        defenses.
               Positano then moved to compel appraisal and to stay the
        proceedings pending completion of appraisal. The district court
        referred the motion to compel to a magistrate judge. The
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        22-11059               Opinion of the Court                        7

        magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district
        court grant Positano’s motion, finding that Empire did not dispute
        Positano’s assertion that a “dispute has arisen over the scope and
        amount of [its] damages” and that requiring the parties to engage
        in appraisal was therefore appropriate.
                As relevant to this appeal, the magistrate judge rejected Em-
        pire’s contention that “compelling appraisal is an injunctive rem-
        edy in the form of specific performance,” which cannot be required
        because Positano failed to show entitlement to specific perfor-
        mance, and concluded that Positano was not required to plead and
        prove the elements of specific performance to compel appraisal be-
        cause Florida case law suggested that methods of alternative dis-
        pute resolution, e.g., appraisal, should be employed when possible.
        The magistrate judge also rejected Empire’s argument that ap-
        praisal could not be compelled absent a final determination about
        whether it breached the Policy’s appraisal provision. The magis-
        trate judge explained that, unlike summary judgment, an appraisal
        does not determine whether there is a genuine disputed material
        fact or there is entitlement to judgment and can be sought through
        breach of contract and declaratory judgment actions as a form of
        alternative dispute resolution.
                The district court accepted and adopted the report and rec-
        ommendation in full, and also provided additional analysis in its
        order. As relevant to this appeal, the district court addressed Em-
        pire’s argument that Positano must first obtain judgment in its fa-
        vor for specific performance before an appraisal could take place.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court               22-11059

        The district court explained that “[t]he problem for Empire—and
        for Positano in its attempt to plead a count for specific performance
        (as an alternative to its breach of contract and declaratory relief
        counts)—is that the appraisal process is not remedial.” The district
        court noted that participation in the appraisal process would not
        remedy the damages caused by Hurricane Irma; it would simply be
        “one step in this process, supplying an extra-judicial mechanism to
        calculate the amount of loss.” The district court stated that ap-
        praisal is a form of alternative dispute resolution and that its
        “source of authority to order the parties to participate in an alter-
        native dispute process comes from its subject-matter jurisdiction
        over a contract dispute where the contract contains a provision
        where the parties contracted for the right to have amount-of-loss
        disputes decided informally by experienced appraisers.” And the
        district court stated that appraisal would not dispose of any of the
        claims or defenses.
               This appeal ensued. During this appeal, we issued a jurisdic-
        tional question to the parties asking them to address the basis of
        our jurisdiction to review the order compelling appraisal in this
        case as well as whether an order compelling appraisal is treated the
        same as an order compelling arbitration for purposes of appellate
        jurisdiction. Following the parties’ briefing, we carried the juris-
        dictional issue with the case and now resolve it in this opinion.
                         II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
             We review de novo an order granting a party’s motion to
        compel appraisal. See Jacobs v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 236 F.3d
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                          9

        1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001). We also review de novo our appellate
        jurisdiction. Thomas v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1195,
        1200 (11th Cir. 2020).
                                  III.   ANALYSIS
                “We have a duty to assure ourselves of our jurisdiction at all
        times in the appellate process.” Id. (quoting Overlook Gardens
        Props., LLC v. ORIX USA, L.P., 927 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019)).
        Therefore, before we can review the order compelling appraisal in
        this case, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to do
        so. See World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir.
        2009). For an order to be appealable, it “must either be final or fall
        into a specific class of interlocutory orders that are made appealable
        by statute or jurisprudential exception.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of
        Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000); see 28 U.S.C.
        §§ 1291–92. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides us with appellate juris-
        diction of final decisions of the district courts, while § 1292 provides
        for review of certain classes of interlocutory orders. Additionally,
        for an order disposing of a request to compel arbitration, the FAA
        governs the appealability of such an order. Am. Express Fin. Advi-
        sors, Inc. v. Makarewicz, 122 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1997).
               We begin our analysis by addressing whether we have ap-
        pellate jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or 28 U.S.C.
        § 1292. We then explain why we do not have appellate jurisdiction
        under the FAA.
            A. Whether the Order Compelling Appraisal Is Appealable
                         Under 28 US.C. §§ 1291 or 1292(a)
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11059

               Under § 1291, the federal courts of appeals “shall have juris-
        diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
        United States.” “A final decision is ‘one which ends the litigation
        on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
        the judgment.’” CSX Transp., 235 F.3d at 1327 (quoting Pitney
        Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 1983)). When
        “a district court anticipates that further proceedings on substantive
        matters may be required, any order it makes to facilitate those fur-
        ther proceedings is necessarily not final.” Broussard v. Lippman, 643
        F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981). 3
                Here, we conclude that the order compelling appraisal in
        this case is not a final order appealable under § 1291. In its order,
        the district court explicitly contemplated further proceedings, ex-
        plaining that the appraisal would not dispose of any of the claims
        in the case nor Empire’s coverage defenses. Further, in Florida,
        “[a]ppraisal exists for a limited purpose—the determination of ‘the
        amount of the loss.’” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Mango Hill #6
        Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 117 So. 3d 1226, 1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
        “[A]n agreement for appraisal extends merely to the resolution of
        the specific issues of actual cash value and ‘amount of loss,’” and
        “all issues other than those contractually assigned to the appraisal
        panel are reserved for determination in a plenary action.” Id. at
        1229. And notably, Florida courts do not consider an order

        3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),

        this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
        cuit handed down before the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                        11

        compelling appraisal to be a final order. See, e.g., People’s Tr. Ins.
        Co. v. Garcia, 263 So. 3d 231, 233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); see also
        Fla. R. App. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) (“Appeals to the district courts of ap-
        peal of nonfinal orders are limited to those that . . . determine . . .
        the entitlement of a party to . . . an appraisal under an insurance
        policy.”). Thus, we do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the
        order compelling appraisal under § 1291, as it is not a final order.
                 Because the order compelling appraisal is not a final order
        appealable under § 1291, we now turn to the question of whether
        it falls within one of the classes of appealable, interlocutory orders
        under § 1292. In doing so, we are mindful that “interlocutory ap-
        peals are inherently “disruptive, time-consuming, and expensive,”
        and thus “are generally disfavored.” Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v.
        Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Waste Mgmt.
        Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 294 (1st Cir. 2000)).
               Section 1292(a) creates a narrow exception from the “long-
        established policy against piecemeal appeals.” Gardner v. Westing-
        house Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978). Under that statute, the
        courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction over certain classes of
        interlocutory orders, including interlocutory orders “granting, con-
        tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing
        to dissolve or modify injunctions.” § 1292(a)(1). Thus, as a thresh-
        old matter, we must determine whether the district court’s order
        that only compelled appraisal, and stayed the proceedings pending
        the appraisal process, was an explicit grant of an injunction.
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11059

                While Empire argues that the district court’s order here ex-
        plicitly granted an injunction, we disagree. As an initial matter,
        while the district court did not characterize its order as the grant of
        an injunction, we are not governed by that characterization. Bir-
        mingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v. Jefferson County¸280 F.3d 1289,
        1292 (11th Cir. 2002). “Instead, we make our own determination,
        and in doing so we take a ‘functional approach, looking not to the
        form of the district court’s order but to its actual effect.’” Id. at 1293
        (quoting Sierra Club v. Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990)).
        Taking this approach, we conclude that the appraisal order is not
        the explicit grant of an injunction for the following reasons. First,
        Positano did not move for an injunction, nor did it pursue any
        claim for injunctive relief in its operative complaint. Rather, Posi-
        tano simply moved to compel appraisal based on the appraisal pro-
        vision in the Policy that was agreed to by the parties. Second, in
        granting the motion, the district court did not make the findings of
        fact and conclusions of law that normally support an order granting
        injunctive relief. See Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092,
        1097 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A district court may grant injunctive relief
        only if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likeli-
        hood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered
        unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant
        outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause
        the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
        adverse to the public interest.” (quoting Siegal v. Lepore, 234 F.3d
        1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc))). Nor did the district court
        comply with the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
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        22-11059                    Opinion of the Court                                13

        Procedure 65(d). 4 Cf. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d
        1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012) (Pryor, J., concurring) (“‘[T]he absence
        of any semblance of effort by the [d]istrict [c]ourt to comply with
        Rule 65(d)’ is evidence that the district court did not intend to enter
        ‘an order granting an injunction.’” (quoting Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to
        End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 n.4 (1970))).
               Instead, in compelling the parties to appraisal, the district
        court emphasized that “the appraisal process is not remedial.” (Em-
        phasis added). The court reasoned that “[j]ust as an order requiring
        the parties to attend a mediation is not remedial, participation in
        the appraisal process will not remedy the damages caused by Hur-
        ricane Irma.” The court explained that appraisal was simply “one
        step in this process, supplying an extra-judicial mechanism to cal-
        culate the amount of loss.” See also State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Crispin,

        4 Our dissenting colleague notes that, in Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2321

        (2018), the Supreme Court stated that it had “never suggested that a failure to
        meet the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) would ‘deprive the Court of
        jurisdiction.’” Dis. Op. at 15–16. However, our consideration of the district
        court not complying with the requirements of Rule 65(d) relates only to
        whether the appraisal order is an injunction, not the ultimate jurisdictional is-
        sue presented by this case. As we later explain, we also have appellate juris-
        diction over “orders that have the practical effect of granting or denying in-
        junctions and have ‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.’” Gulfstream
        Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 277–78 (1988) (quoting Carson
        v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)). The Court in Abbott explained that
        the failure to comply with Rule 65(d) is not relevant to the practical effect anal-
        ysis, see 138 S. Ct. at 2321, and we likewise do not rely on Rule 65(d) in deter-
        mining whether the appraisal order had the practical effect of granting an in-
        junction.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11059

        290 So. 3d 150, 151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (describing appraisal
        as “an insurance contract’s alternative dispute resolution process”).
        And the court noted that appraisal would not dispose of any claims
        or defenses. Indeed, the appraisal process—a contractual mecha-
        nism agreed to by the parties in the Policy—does not entitle Positano
        to judgment on its claims against Empire; the appraisal process
        here will only resolve the question of the amount of loss. Thus,
        “[s]o far as we can discern from [the] record, the district court did
        not intend to issue an injunction” when it entered the order com-
        pelling appraisal. Supreme Fuels, 689 F.3d at 1247 (Pryor, J., concur-
        ring).
               Our dissenting colleague, however, concludes that the ap-
        praisal order is the explicit grant of an injunction because it ordered
        Empire to perform an act and is enforceable via the district court’s
        inherent civil contempt power. Dis. Op. at 6–7. It is true that, in
        Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir.
        2005), we stated that, to be appealable under § 1292(a)(1), “the in-
        terlocutory order appealed must have the first two elements of an
        injunction,” i.e., “it must be: (1) a clearly defined and understanda-
        ble directive by the court to act or to refrain from a particular ac-
        tion; and (2) enforceable through contempt, if disobeyed.” Id. at
        1128. But, we explained, “merely establishing that the order under
        consideration is a court order commanding or preventing an ac-
        tion, and enforceable by contempt, does not make it ‘an injunction’
        under § 1292(a)(1).” Id. The order must also give “some or all of
        the substantive relief sought in the complaint” and that “[t]he
        § 1292(a)(1) exception [to the final judgment rule] does not
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                          15

        embrace orders that have no direct or irreparable impact on the
        merits of the controversy.” Id. at 1128–29 (alterations in original)
        (quoting Gardner, 437 U.S. at 482).
                  For example, an order compelling discovery contains a di-
        rective by the court to act and is enforceable by contempt. See Serra
        Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 446 F.3d 1137, 1147 (11th Cir.
        2006) (explaining that one of the sanctions a district court may im-
        pose under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) is an “order treat-
        ing as a contempt of court the failure to obey” a discovery order);
        see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
        821, 833 (1994) (noting a court’s contempt power for a party’s fail-
        ure to comply with document discovery). But an order compelling
        discovery is not an injunction, as while “all orders of court are man-
        datory in the sense that they must be obeyed , , , [,] not all orders
        of [the] court are injunctions.” See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d
        384, 386 (5th Cir. 1970). As our predecessor court once explained,
        “the requirements of a healthy legal system simply do not permit
        halting the orderly process of a case in midstream to review inci-
        dentally matters which cross the current of the litigation,” and
        “[c]onstruing discovery orders as injunctive” would contravene
        that principle. See id. (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323
        (1940)). Rather, as this Court has repeatedly held, orders compel-
        ling discovery are interlocutory orders that are generally not ap-
        pealable. Robinson v. Tanner, 798 F.2d 1378, 1380 (11th Cir. 1986);
        see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981)
        (“[W]e have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders.
        . . . [I]n the rare case when appeal after final judgment will not cure
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11059

        an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the order, permit a
        contempt citation to be entered against him, and challenge the or-
        der on direct appeal of the contempt ruling.” (citations omitted));
        Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 112–13 (2009) (“Rou-
        tine appeal from disputed discovery orders would disrupt the or-
        derly progress of the litigation, swamp the courts of appeals, and
        substantially reduce the district court's ability to control the discov-
        ery process.” (quoting C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
        Practice and Procedure § 3914.23, at 123 (2d ed.1992))).
                This reasoning similarly holds true here. Again turning to
        the district court’s order compelling appraisal, the order, as we
        have explained, did not dispose of any of the claims or defenses in
        this case. Rather, it simply enforced the parties’ contractually-
        agreed-to, extra-judicial mechanism to calculate the amount of loss
        as to claims made under the Policy. Again, the appraisal process is
        not remedial, and the result of the appraisal process does not entitle
        Positano to relief or judgment on its claims against Empire related
        to Positano’s claims for property insurance benefits under the Pol-
        icy. We therefore respectfully disagree with the dissent’s determi-
        nation that the appraisal order is an explicit grant of an injunction. 5

        5 Our dissenting colleague also asserts that the district court intended to invoke

        the All Writs Act as a means of issuing the appraisal order, which, in his view,
        is an injunction. Dis. Op. at 18–20. For a party to obtain an “All Writs Act
        injunction,” which “is predicated upon some [matter other than some cause
        of action] upon which a district court has jurisdiction,” the party “must simply
        point to some ongoing proceeding, or some past order or judgment, the in-
        tegrity of which is being threatened by someone else's action or behavior.” See
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        22-11059                    Opinion of the Court                                17

               Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s characteriza-
        tion of its order and hold that the order did not explicitly grant an
        injunction. 6
                Although we have concluded that the district court’s order
        compelling appraisal is not an explicit grant of an injunction, our
        analysis of whether the order is appealable under § 1292(a)(1) does
        not end here. In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485
        U.S. 271 (1988), the Supreme Court explained that § 1292(a)(1) also
        provides appellate jurisdiction over “orders that have the practical
        effect of granting or denying injunctions and have ‘serious, perhaps
        irreparable, consequence.’” Id. at 287–88 (quoting Carson v. Am.
        Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)); accord Carson, 450 U.S. at 84
        (“Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory order . . . might
        have a ‘serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,’ and . . . can be
        ‘effectually challenged’ only by immediate appeal, the general

        Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). But, as we have concluded,
        the appraisal order is not an injunction. And, in any event, Positano did not
        seek an injunction under the All Writs Act, nor did the district court invoke
        that act in issuing the appraisal order. Cf. U.S. Army Corps, 424 F.3d at 1132
        (rejecting an argument that an injunction was issued under the All Writs Act
        in part because the district court never invoked the All Writs Act in its order).
        6 Our dissenting colleague, after concluding that the appraisal order is explic-

        itly an injunction, suggests that our analysis here indicates that the district
        court abused its discretion or otherwise demonstrates that Empire’s argu-
        ments as to why the appraisal order should be vacated have merit. See Dis.
        Op. at 9–11. We respectfully disagree. Our analysis here simply goes to show
        why the district court’s appraisal order is not an explicit grant of an injunction.
        We do not opine on any of Empire’s arguments on the merits, i.e., on whether
        the district court erred in entering the appraisal order.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11059

        congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude inter-
        locutory appeal.”); Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Royal Am. Managers,
        Inc., 854 F.2d 1272, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 1988). In United States v. City
        of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 1998), we summarized the re-
        quirements laid out in Carson and Gulfstream for appellate jurisdic-
        tion of an interlocutory order under § 1292(a)(1) as follows: (1) “if
        the relief sought is not actually an injunction, then it must have the
        practical effect of an injunction”; and (2) “the appellant must show
        that the interlocutory order of the district court ‘might have a seri-
        ous, perhaps irreparable, consequence, and that the order can be
        effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.’” Id. at 973 (quot-
        ing Carson, 450 U.S. at 84); accord Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653
        F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981); United States v. Bowman,
        341 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, “[i]f relief may be obtained
        upon review after trial, the parties are not considered to have suf-
        fered irreparable consequences.” Admin. Mgmt. Servs., 854 F.2d at
        1279.
               We have not decided the issue of whether an order compel-
        ling appraisal, and staying the proceedings pending appraisal, satis-
        fies the requirements set forth by Carson—and summarized by us
        in City of Hialeah. See City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 973; Carson, 450
        U.S. at 84. And applying those requirements, we conclude that nei-
        ther component of City of Hialeah’s second requirement is satisfied
        by the order compelling appraisal in this case. Indeed, the appraisal
        order does not have some “serious, perhaps irreparable conse-
        quence.” See id. The district court’s order does not entitle Positano
        to judgment on its claims against Empire. And while the appraisal
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        22-11059                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        process is binding on the parties as to the amount of the loss, Empire
        can still pursue its defenses of coverage denials as a whole and to
        specific buildings owned by Positano in the district court once the
        appraisal process concludes. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Licea,
        685 So. 2d 1285, 1287–88 (Fla. 1996). And if Empire is unsuccessful
        in the district court following the conclusion of the appraisal pro-
        ceedings, it can still obtain relief upon review after trial by appeal-
        ing any final judgment against it—meaning that the order is not
        effectively challengeable only by immediate appeal. 7 See Admin.

        7 We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague that the City of Hialeah

        requirements are limited only to interlocutory orders that have the practical
        effect of denying an injunction. See Dis. Op. at 27–29. First, our precedent in
        City of Hialeah did not make such a distinction in setting forth the require-
        ments. See City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d at 973. Additionally, the Supreme Court,
        in concluding that an “analogous” provision to § 1292(a)(1)—28 U.S.C.
        § 1253—encompassed orders with the “practical effect” of granting or denying
        an injunction, rejected the appellees’ argument that “an order denying an in-
        junction (the situation in Carson) and an order granting an injunction (the sit-
        uation here) should be treated differently.” Abbot, 138 S. Ct. at 2320–21. The
        Supreme Court noted that, not only did the appellees “offer no convincing
        reason for” drawing such a distinction, “[n]o authority supports their argu-
        ment.” Id. at 2321. The Court explained that “[t]he language of §§ 1253 and
        1292(a)(1) makes no such distinction” and that “the ‘practical effect’ analysis
        applies to the ‘granting or denying’ of injunctions.” Id. (citing Gulfstream, 485
        U.S. at 287–88). The Court also reasoned that “appellees’ suggested distinction
        would put appellate courts in an awkward position . . . [and] needlessly com-
        plicate appellate review.” Id. The Court’s reasoning in Abbott thus supports
        our conclusion that the City of Hialeah requirements are not limited to inter-
        locutory orders that have the practical effect of denying an injunction.
        Moreover, we are bound to follow our prior binding precedent unless and un-
        til it is overruled by this Court en banc or the Supreme Court. United States v.
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11059

        Mgmt. Servs., 854 F.2d at 1279 (“If relief may be obtained upon re-
        view after trial, the parties are not considered to have suffered ir-
        reparable consequences.”); see also Bowman, 431 F.3d at 1237
        (“What makes an issue effectively unreviewable on appeal is the in-
        sufficiency of the remedy after final judgment.” (quoting United
        States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. With Bldgs., Appurtenances & Im-
        provements, 767 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985))).
                While Empire raises out-of-circuit authority to argue that
        the order compelling appraisal is rooted in an action for specific
        performance of a contract that is treated as an injunction, see, e.g.,
        Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, 552 F.3d 1215, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2009);
        Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1333 (7th Cir. 1983), we do
        not find those cases persuasive here. In Westar Energy, the Tenth
        Circuit found that the district court’s order, in which the court or-
        dered the appellant to pay the appellee’s legal expenses and ex-
        pressly invoked its equitable powers, was a preliminary injunction.
        552 F.3d at 1222. The Tenth Circuit stated that “[a]n action seeking
        to enforce the right to advancement [of legal fees] is an action for
        specific performance of a contract,” that specific performance “is
        an equitable remedy,” and that “an interim grant of specific relief
        is a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 1222–23. And the Tenth Circuit
        declined to apply Carson’s “serious, perhaps irreparable,

        Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008). We therefore are bound to
        apply the City of Hialeah requirements in determining whether we can review
        the order granting the motion to compel appraisal in this case.
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        22-11059                   Opinion of the Court                                21

        consequence” requirement because it construed that requirement
        as applying only “in situations where orders have the practical ef-
        fect of denying an injunction.” Id. at 1223 (“[O]rders which them-
        selves grant or deny injunctive relief are appealable as injunctions
        under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) without the Carson showing.” (citing
        Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 566, 569 (10th Cir. 1997))).
               But unlike Westar Energy, the district court in this case did
        not order appraisal based on its “equitable powers.” Moreover, the
        “relief” granted by the district court was not enforcement of a right
        to advancement of fees but an order sending the parties to a con-
        tractually-anticipated alternative dispute resolution process that
        would not dispose of the underlying claims or defenses in the case.
        Further, even if the Tenth Circuit correctly determined that the or-
        der in Westar Energy was substantively a preliminary injunction
        such that Carson’s “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence” re-
        quirement did not apply, see id., for the reasons explained above,
        we conclude that the district court’s order compelling appraisal did
        not explicitly grant an injunction. Therefore, we are bound to ap-
        ply the City of Hialeah requirements of the interlocutory order hav-
        ing the practical effect of an injunction and having “serious, per-
        haps irreparable, consequence.” See 140 F.3d at 973. Thus, we do
        not find Westar Energy dispositive here. 8

        8 Because we conclude that the order compelling appraisal in this case did not

        explicitly grant an injunction, we also decline to follow the Tenth Circuit’s
        unpublished decision of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. v. Steele Street Ltd. II, No.
        19-1096, 2022 WL 39392 (10th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022), in which the Tenth Circuit
        applied Westar Energy to conclude that the Carson requirements were
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        22                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11059

                Additionally, in Hayes, the Seventh Circuit provided no anal-
        ysis of why it had appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) to review
        the order; the court simply concluded that it did. 722 F.2d at 1333.
        Given the lack of jurisdictional analysis by the Seventh Circuit, we
        decline to follow Hayes. And notably, Judge Posner dissented in
        Hayes on the basis that there was no jurisdiction to hear an inter-
        locutory appeal of an order compelling appraisal. See id. at 1336
        (Posner, J., dissenting). In doing so, Judge Posner specifically noted
        that there was no possibility of irreparable harm from the district
        court’s order because any delay to the plaintiffs’ lawsuit while ap-
        praisal was ongoing “would be trivial, and certainly could not harm
        them irreparably.” Id. at 1336–37 (citing Carson, 450 U.S. at 84).
        And, if the plaintiffs disagreed with the results of the appraisal,
        “they could—just as soon as the district court entered its final judg-
        ment on the basis of the appraisal—file the same appeal they have
        filed from the stay; and if we then reversed the district court’s judg-
        ment the appraisal would have caused the plaintiffs no harm at all.”
        Id. We agree with Judge Posner’s characterization of the lack of
        irreparable harm to a party that is ordered to appraisal. And, under
        City of Hialeah, some serious or irreparable consequence is required
        for an interlocutory order to be appealable under the injunction
        analogy theory. 140 F.3d at 973. Simply put, the district court’s
        interlocutory order compelling appraisal—which, again, did not ex-
        plicitly grant an injunction—does not implicate such serious or

        inapplicable and that it had jurisdiction over an order enforcing an insurance
        policy’s appraisal provision under § 1292(a)(1). Id. at *4.
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                          23

        irreparable consequence to a party as to satisfy City of Hialeah’s re-
        quirements.
                As a final note, we recognize that Florida courts do not re-
        quire a party seeking to enforce an appraisal provision in an insur-
        ance policy to file a motion for injunctive relief. See People’s Tr. Ins.
        Co. v. Nowroozpour, 277 So. 3d 135, 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)
        (“After a homeowner has filed suit, it may be more traditional for
        an insurer to move to compel an appraisal to seek enforcement of
        the policy provisions . . . .”); see, e.g., People’s Tr. Ins. Co. v. Mar-
        zouka, 320 So. 3d 945 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021); First Protective Ins.
        Co. v. Colucciello, 276 So. 3d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); People’s
        Tr. Ins. Co. v. Tracey, 251 So.3d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). Flor-
        ida courts grant motions to compel appraisal when “the parties
        have agreed to [appraisal] and the court entertains no doubts that
        such an agreement was made.” Marzouka, 320 So. 3d at 947–48
        (emphasis removed) (quoting Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 643
        So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
                Accordingly, because the district court’s interlocutory order
        compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings did not explicitly
        grant an injunction and does not satisfy all the requirements set
        forth by our decisions in Administrative Management Services and
        City of Hialeah, it is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1). We therefore
        lack appellate jurisdiction to review the order.
            B. Whether an Order Compelling Appraisal Is Appealable
                                 Under the FAA
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                22-11059

               We now turn to the issue of whether the order compelling
        appraisal in this case—which was ordered based on an appraisal
        provision in an insurance policy—is appealable under the FAA.
        The FAA provides that “[a] written provision in any . . . contract
        evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitra-
        tion a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or trans-
        action, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
        such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
        contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA governs the appealability of an
        order ruling on a motion to compel arbitration. Under 9 U.S.C.
        § 16(a)(3), an appeal may be taken from “a final decision with re-
        spect to an arbitration.” Conversely, under § 16(b)(1) and (3), an
        appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order that grants a
        stay of any action under 9 U.S.C. § 3—providing for stays of pro-
        ceedings where an issue in the suit is referable to arbitration—or
        that compels arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 206.
                Federal policy behind the FAA favors arbitration agree-
        ments, Wasyl, Inc. v. First Bos. Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir.
        1987), and the FAA creates a “body of federal substantive law of
        arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the
        coverage of the Act,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
        Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). But Congress did not define the term
        “arbitration” in the FAA. Salt Lake Trib. Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Plan.,
        Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 688 (10th Cir. 2004).
               Here, we are presented with an order granting a party’s mo-
        tion to compel appraisal based on an appraisal provision in an
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        22-11059                Opinion of the Court                          25

        insurance policy. We have not decided the question of whether an
        appellate court looks to state or federal law in determining whether
        an appraisal process falls within the definition of “arbitration” for
        purposes of the FAA, nor has the Supreme Court directly addressed
        the question. But see Advanced Bodycare Sols., LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc.,
        524 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2008) (articulating “a test for re-
        solving whether a particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA
        ‘arbitration’”).
                But we need not decide this issue because even assuming for
        the sake of argument that the order compelling appraisal here fell
        within the definition of arbitration for purposes of the FAA, we still
        lack appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order. Section
        16(a)(3) allows for an appeal from “a final decision with respect to
        an arbitration that is subject to this title” and is interpreted “accord-
        ing to the ‘well-developed and longstanding meaning’ of a ‘final de-
        cision.’” Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc.,
        939 F.3d 1145, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-
        Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000)). And “[a] final decision
        ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the
        court to do but execute the judgment.’” Id. (quoting Green Tree,
        531 U.S. at 86). For the reasons explained above, the district court’s
        order compelling appraisal and staying the case pending appraisal
        is not a final decision. And because § 16(b)(3) specifically states that
        “an appeal may not be taken from an interlocutory order . . . com-
        pelling arbitration”—and § 16(b)(1) likewise makes “an interlocu-
        tory order . . . granting a stay” pending referral of arbitrable issues
        to arbitration not immediately appealable—we lack appellate
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        26                    Opinion of the Court                22-11059

        jurisdiction over the order compelling appraisal even if appraisal
        were to be considered arbitration for purposes of the FAA.
                             IV.    CONCLUSION
               For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the district
        court’s order compelling appraisal and staying the proceedings
        pending appraisal is an interlocutory order that is not immediately
        appealable under either 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) or the Federal Arbi-
        tration Act. We therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate
        jurisdiction.
              APPEAL DISMISSED.
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        22-11059                   TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                               1

        TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
               I dissent from the Majority’s dismissal of these consolidated
        appeals for lack of jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). The Majority
        holds that we lack jurisdiction because the injunction that the Dis-
        trict Court entered (the “Appraisal Order”) is not an injunction as
        that word is used in § 1292(a)(1) and thus is not reviewable. Alt-
        hough the language of the Appraisal Order plainly reveals an in-
        junction, the Majority holds, in eﬀect, that this does not matter.
        Instead—according to the Majority—what matters is that the ap-
        pellant, Empire Indemnity (“Empire”), has not shown that the ap-
        pellee, Positano Place (“Insured”), 1 was entitled to the injunction.
        In other words, because Insured failed to make out a case for in-
        junctive relief, the Appraisal Order is not an injunction.
               I dissent for two main reasons. First, the Appraisal Order is
        an “interlocutory order” and an “injunction” as those words appear
        in § 1292(a)(1) because it both commands Empire to do something
        and is enforceable by contempt. 2 It is therefore reviewable. Sec-
        ond, the District Court had the inherent power to issue the

        1 I refer to the appellees in these consolidated appeals collectively as “Insured.”

        2 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) states:

                Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the
                courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
                [i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, con-
                tinuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refus-
                ing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct re-
                view may be had in the Supreme Court.
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        2                          TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                     22-11059

        injunction under the All Writs Act. 3 The Majority’s opinion gives
        no indication that the Majority even considered whether the Dis-
        trict Court’s inherent power provided the authority to issue the or-
        der. The Majority was nearsighted. As its opinion indicates, it
        looked only to Insured’s complaint for the source of the District
        Court’s authority. Speciﬁcally, it looked for a cause of action seek-
        ing relief in the form of the Appraisal Order and found nothing.
        Since there was nothing to support the issuance of the Appraisal
        Order, it could not be an injunction as the term is used in
        § 1292(a)(1), and we could not entertain these appeals.
                I organize my dissent as follows. Part I presents the injunc-
        tion, shows that the injunction is reviewable under § 1292(a)(1), and
        sets the stage for the Majority’s focus on Insured’s complaint as the
        source of authority for the District Court’s issuance of the

        3 As explained below in Section II.C., the District Court issued the Appraisal

        Order pursuant to its inherent power to manage a case to ﬁnal judgment. That
        power is acknowledged in § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
                And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned courts
                of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire
                facias, habaeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided
                for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
                respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and us-
                ages of law.

        ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81. Section 14 was codiﬁed in the All Writs Act, 28
        U.S.C. § 1651(a). The Appraisal Order is a permanent injunction in the sense
        that the District Court did not reserve its decision on the applicability of the
        insurance policy’s appraisal provision. The order compelling an appraisal was
        the court’s ﬁnal word on the application of the appraisal provision.
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        22-11059              TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                      3

        Appraisal Order. Part II centers on what appears to be the Major-
        ity’s reasons for determining that the Appraisal Order is not an in-
        junction. First, the Insured’s complaint lacked a cause of action for
        the Appraisal Order. Second, the District Court failed to comply
        with the procedural rules governing a traditional interlocutory in-
        junction. Notably, what the Insured sought was not based on its
        complaint but on the need for an appraisal so that the case could
        proceed to trial. I explain that the District Court had the inherent
        power, now codiﬁed in the All Writs Act, to issue this order. Part
        III demonstrates the impracticality of the Majority’s decision to
        deny Empire § 1292(a)(1) review of the Appraisal Order because it
        can instead obtain § 1291 review of the Appraisal Order by appeal-
        ing the ﬁnal judgment after the trial of the case. Part IV explains
        why the Majority’s additional theory for dismissing these appeals is
        irrelevant, in part because the theory applies in appeals from the
        denial of an interlocutory injunction, not in the grant of an inter-
        locutory injunction as in the instant cases. Part V posits that the
        Majority’s analysis of the jurisdictional issue presented is unwise
        from the standpoint of judicial administration and this Court’s re-
        lationship with district courts. Part VI brieﬂy concludes.
                                         I.
                                         A.
              I begin my discussion by reciting the operative provisions of
        the District Court’s order.
                   3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Appraisal and
                      Stay Proceedings is GRANTED. The parties
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        4                           TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting               22-11059

                        are ORDERED to expeditiously conduct an
                        appraisal as prescribed by the appraisal provi-
                        sions of the Policy. The appraisal award will
                        delineate between the specific coverages of-
                        fered under the Policy for each unique build-
                        ing.
                    4. The case is STAYED pending appraisal, and
                       the Clerk must add a stay flag to the file.
                    5. The parties are DIRECTED to file a joint
                       report on the status of appraisal on or before
                       June 8, 2022, and every ninety days thereaf-
                       ter until appraisal has ended.
                    6. Within seven days of appraisal ending, the par-
                       ties are DIRECTED to jointly notify the
                       Court of (a) what issues, if any, remain for
                       the Court to resolve; (b) whether the stay
                       needs to be lifted; and (c) how this action
                       should proceed, if at all.
                    7. If the parties cannot agree on the selection
                       of appraisers and an umpire, they must notify
                       Judge McCoy by March 24, 2022. Any dispute
                       over the selection of appraisers and an umpire
                       is REFERRED to Judge McCoy to conduct a
                       conference and issue any appropriate order.
                       All parties must ATTEND the conference
                       as directed by Judge McCoy. 4

        4 Record, vol. I, no. 60, at 10 (citations omitted).
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        22-11059               TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                         5

                The order the District Court issued is an injunction because
        (1) it commands Empire to do something (engage in an appraisal)
        and (2) it is enforceable under the District Court’s inherent civil
        contempt power. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428,
        129 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2009) (“[An injunction] is a means by which
        a court tells someone what to do or not to do. When a court em-
        ploys ‘the extraordinary remedy of injunction,’ . . . it directs the
        conduct of a party, and does so with the backing of its full coercive
        powers.” (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312,
        102 S. Ct. 1798, 1803 (1982))); Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
        424 F.3d 1117, 1128 (11th Cir. 2005) (defining an injunction as “(1) a
        clearly defined and understandable directive by the court to act or
        refrain from a particular action; and (2) enforceable through con-
        tempt, if disobeyed”); Injunction, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
        2019) (defining “injunction” as “[a] court order commanding or
        preventing an action”); 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Ju-
        risprudence § 861, at 57 (9th ed. 1866) (“A Writ of Injunction may be
        described to be a judicial process, whereby a party is required to do
        a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, ac-
        cording to the exigency of the writ.”); 1 Howard C. Joyce, A Treatise
        on the Law Relating to Injunctions § 1, at 2 (1909) (“In a general sense,
        every order of a court which commands or forbids is an injunction;
        but in its accepted legal sense, an injunction is a judicial process or
        mandate operating in personam by which, upon certain established
        principles of equity, a party is required to do or refrain from doing
        a particular thing.”).
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        6                          TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                      22-11059

                To determine whether an order is an injunction, “courts
        look not to terminology, but to ‘the substantial effect of the order
        made.’” McCoy v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 345 F.2d 720, 721 (5th Cir.
        1965) (per curiam) (quoting Ettelson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
        317 U.S. 188, 192, 63 S. Ct. 163, 165 (1942). 5 We take a “functional
        approach, looking not to the form of the district court’s order but
        to its actual effect.” Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117 v. Jefferson
        Cnty., 280 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sierra Club v.
        Marsh, 907 F.2d 210, 213 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also Gautreaux v. Chi.
        Hous. Auth., 178 F.3d 951, 956–57 (7th Cir. 1999) (“This court has
        repeatedly held that it will look beyond labels such as ‘clarification’
        or ‘modification’ to consider the actual effect of the order.”).
               The effect of the Appraisal Order will be to compel Empire
        to submit to an appraisal that will be introduced at the trial to prove
        the loss Insured sustained because of the catastrophe it insured
        against. This satisfies the first element of an injunction: an order
        commanding a party to perform an act.
               As to the second element, the order is enforceable via the
        District Court’s inherent civil contempt power. 6 How could it not

        5 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the

        Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
        Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
        6 The Judiciary Act of 1789 recognized the courts’ contempt power in § 17:

        “And it be further enacted, That all the said courts of the United States shall have
        power . . . to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts,
        all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” ch. 20,
        § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
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        22-11059                   TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                                 7

        be? If Empire refuses to participate in an appraisal, Insured will
        move the District Court for an order requiring Empire to show
        cause for its refusal. 7 Insured’s motion will simply cite the Ap-
        praisal Order and allege that Empire refuses to engage in an ap-
        praisal as ordered. Accepting the allegation as true, the District
        Court will enter an order requiring Empire to show cause for its
        refusal. At the show cause hearing, Empire will be obliged to pre-
        sent a legal excuse for its refusal or face a civil contempt adjudica-
        tion and a sanction for its refusal (probably a daily fine until Empire
        purged its contempt and submitted to an appraisal). If the District
        Court reduces an adjudication and sanction to a judgment, Empire
        could appeal that judgment to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 8
               In sum, taking the “functional approach” former Chief Judge
        Ed Carnes took in Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass’n 117, we must treat
        the Appraisal Order as an injunction because it commands Empire
        to perform an act, and it is enforceable pursuant to the District
        Court’s contempt power.
                                                 B.
              In holding that the Appraisal Order is not an injunction, the
        Majority relies in part on the parties’ responses to our request for

        7 In Part III, I describe what will take place in the District Court after we dismiss

        this appeal for lack of jurisdiction if Empire refuses to engage in the ordered
        appraisal.
        8 28 U.S.C. § 1291 states in pertinent part: “The courts of appeals . . . shall have

        jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
        United States . . . .”
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        8                         TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                     22-11059

        submissions on our jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) and the parties’
        briefs. 9 Ante at 3, 12–14. Empire insisted that the Appraisal Order
        was a reviewable interlocutory order under the statute. Insured
        disagreed and argued that the Appraisal Order did not involve a
        claim for injunctive relief. Neither side, however, considered
        whether the District Court may have derived its authority to issue
        the Appraisal Order from a source other than Insured’s complaint,
        to wit: the District Court’s inherent power. So, the Majority joined
        the parties in focusing on the Insured’s complaint for the source of
        the District Court’s authority to issue the Appraisal Order and thus
        in determining whether we had § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction. The alle-
        gations of Insured’s complaint (and Empire’s response) therefore
        prescribed the parameters of the District Court’s power to act.
               As indicated in Part II below, the Majority found nothing in
        the complaint that would support an order requiring Empire to
        submit to an appraisal. Moreover, the Majority strongly implies
        that the District Court, in entering the Appraisal Order, abused its
        discretion in disregarding altogether the standards traditionally
        governing the issuance of injunctions. For these appeals to

        9 In deciding whether we had § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction on the theory that the

        Appraisal Order was an injunction, we were obligated to consider the record
        sua sponte, “notwithstanding the contentions of the parties. That is so because
        subject-matter jurisdiction underlies a court’s power to hear a case.” DeRoy v.
        Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also
        Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“When a re-
        quirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider
        sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented.”).
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        22-11059                   TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                               9

        proceed, Empire—bearing the burden of establishing our jurisdic-
        tion—had to establish that the District Court did not abuse its dis-
        cretion. 10 Empire has failed to do that; hence, the dismissal of these
        appeals.
                                                II.
                                                A.
              According to the Majority, the District Court’s issuance of
        the Appraisal Order was an abuse of discretion for the following
        reasons:
                First, [Insured] did not move for an injunction, nor did it
                pursue any claim for injunctive relief in its operative com-
                plaint. Rather, [Insured] simply moved to compel an ap-
                praisal based on the appraisal provision in the Policy that
                was agreed to by the parties. Second, in granting the mo-
                tion, the district court did not make the findings of fact and
                conclusions of law that normally support an order granting
                injunctive relief. Nor did the district court comply with the
                requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
                65(d). Cf. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d
                1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012) (Pryor, J., concurring) (“‘[T]he
                absence of any semblance of effort by the [d]istrict [c]ourt to
                comply with Rule 65(d)’ is evidence that the district court did
                not intend to enter ‘an order granting an injunction.’”

        10 If Empire established that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, thus

        giving us § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction, how would Empire prevail on the merits,
        having established that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
        ing injunctive relief?
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        10                         TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                     22-11059

                (quoting Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399
                U.S. 383, 389 n.4 (1970))).

        Ante at 12–13 (emphasis added) 11 (footnote omitted) (other cita-
        tions omitted).
               With these recitals, the Majority demonstrates that Empire’s
        appeal has merit—the Appraisal Order should be vacated on the
        ground that the District Court abused its discretion in entering it.
        The District Court abused its discretion because its decision to is-
        sue the Appraisal Order was based on errors of law: it granted relief
        that Insured’s complaint did not seek, and it compounded that er-
        ror by failing to support the Appraisal Order with findings of fact
        and conclusions of law and by failing to comply with Rule 65(d).
        But instead of exercising § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction and vacating the
        Appraisal Order, we use the District Court’s errors as the basis for
        dismissing these appeals for want of jurisdiction. And we do so
        notwithstanding that the Appraisal Order is an injunction.
             I am aware of no precedent for this disposition. 12 What is
        the warrant for it? A desire to avoid opening the appellate

        11 I emphasize “evidence” because that is all the noncompliance is, a piece of

        circumstantial evidence that, when considered in isolation, proves nothing—
        especially in the face of the coercive (injunctive) provisions the District Court
        placed in the Appraisal Order. To determine whether the Appraisal Order is
        an injunction, we look to what the issuing court did and to the “substantial
        effect” of its order, McCoy, 345 F.2d at 721, which was to require Empire to
        engage in an appraisal.
        12 As I explain in Part IV, none of the cases the Majority cites support this dis-

        position.
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        22-11059                 TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                           11

        “floodgate” to the review of “orders that have no direct or irrepa-
        rable impact on the merits of the controversy”? 13 More about all of
        that later. For now, I will follow the Majority’s lead and decide
        whether we lack jurisdiction because the District Court lacked a
        lawful basis for issuing the injunction. That is, for purposes of dis-
        cussion, I will assume that our jurisdiction depends on whether
        Empire can show that the District Court’s issuance of the injunc-
        tion was not an abuse of discretion. In carrying out this exercise, I
        will dissect the portions of the Majority’s opinion quoted above for
        the purpose of interlineating and explaining what I believe the Ma-
        jority is actually saying.
                                             B.
                  Under the Majority’s logic, Empire cannot appeal the Ap-
        praisal Order because Insured’s complaint did not allege a cause of
        action (for an appraisal order), i.e., a “traditional” injunction. See
        Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 2004)
        (“[T]raditional injunctions are predicated on [a] cause of action
        . . . .”). Although its complaint did not state a cause of action for
        an order compelling Empire to engage in an appraisal, Insured
        nonetheless “moved [the District Court] to compel an appraisal
        based on the appraisal provision in the Policy that was agreed to by
        the parties,” ante at 12, and the District Court granted this motion.
        But the District Court failed to obey the law: it “did not make the
        findings of fact and conclusions of law that normally support an

        13 Gardner v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480, 98 S. Ct. 2451, 2453

        (1978).
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        12                          TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                  22-11059

        order granting injunctive relief.” Ante at 12 (citing Klay, 376 F.3d at
        1097). “Nor did the district court . . . comply with the requirements
        set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d).” Ante at 12–13
        (citing Sargeant, 689 F.3d at 1244 (Pryor, J. concurring)).
                Regarding the District Court’s failure to make the findings
        of fact and conclusions of law that normally support an order grant-
        ing an injunction, the Majority is referring to two things: (1) Fed-
        eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 14 and (2) the standards articu-
        lated in Klay that are necessary for compliance with Rule 52(a)(2):
                A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the
                moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial like-
                lihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury
                will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the

        14 Rule 52(a) states in relevant part:

                (a) FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

                     (1) In General. In an action tried on the facts without a
                jury or with an advisory jury, the court must ﬁnd the facts spe-
                cially and state its conclusions of law separately. The ﬁndings
                and conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of
                the evidence or may appear in an opinion or a memorandum
                of decision ﬁled by the court. Judgment must be entered un-
                der Rule 58.

                    (2) For an Interlocutory Injunction. In granting or refus-
                ing an interlocutory injunction, the court must similarly state
                the ﬁndings and conclusions that support its action.
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        22-11059                  TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                             13

               threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
               damage the proposed injunction may cause the op-
               posing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would
               not be adverse to the public interest.

        Ante at 12 (quoting Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097).
               In quoting this language, the Majority focuses on the show-
        ing the District Court should have required Insured to make to ob-
        tain a preliminary injunction 15—not the traditional injunction the
        Majority believes Insured should have pleaded in its complaint. Ac-
        cording to the Supreme Court, “[t]he purpose of a preliminary in-
        junction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties
        until a trial on the merits can be held.” Univ of Texas v. Camenisch,
        451 U.S 390, 395, 101 S. Ct. 1830, 1834 (1981). 16

        15 The “factors [quoted in the above text] are the elements for receiving a pre-

        liminary injunction.” Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097.
        16 The Supreme Court elaborated on this point:

               Given this limited purpose, and given the haste that is often
               necessary if those positions are to be preserved, a preliminary
               injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures
               that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in
               a trial on the merits. A party thus is not required to prove his
               case in full at a preliminary-injunction hearing[,] and the find-
               ings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a
               preliminary injunction are not binding at trial on the merits.
               In light of these considerations, it is generally inappropriate for
               a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a fi-
               nal judgment on the merits.
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        14                        TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                     22-11059

                To obtain a preliminary injunction in this case, Insured
        would have to show that it would likely succeed on the merits of a
        cause of action asserted in its complaint, i.e., a cause of action pray-
        ing for an appraisal order. Insured did not plead a cause of action
        for an appraisal, though. It did not because it wasn’t seeking a pre-
        liminary injunction so that the status quo ante could be maintained
        until a trial on the merits could be held. Thus, the District Court’s
        failure to make the findings and conclusions the Majority quotes
        from Klay is entirely irrelevant. 17
                I also disagree with the Majority regarding the District
        Court’s compliance with Rule 65(d). A failure to meet the specific-
        ity requirements of Rule 65(d) would not deprive our Court of ju-
        risdiction over the Appraisal Order. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct.
        2305, 2321, 201 L. Ed 2d 714 (2018). The Supreme Court has “never
        suggested that a failure to meet the specificity requirements of Rule
        65(d) would ‘deprive the Court of jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Gunn
        v. Univ. Comm. to End War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 n. 4, 90 S.

        Camensich, 451 U.S. at 395, 101 S. Ct. at 1834 (citations omitted).
        17 As an aside, it should go without saying that trial judges issue interlocutory

        injunctions on many occasions during the litigation of a case for purposes un-
        related to providing a remedy for a cause of action alleged in the complaint.
        And they do so without issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law or a
        written order containing Rule 65(d)’s requirements. If the injunction is ap-
        pealed, the appellate court may affirm because the record of the proceeding
        implies the necessary findings and conclusions. If the record does not enable
        meaningful appellate review, then the appellate court may vacate the injunc-
        tion.
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        22-11059                      TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                        15

        Ct. 2013 (1970)). 18 Rather, “it would be odd to hold that there can
        be no appeal in such a circumstance” because “[w]here a vague in-
        junction does not comply with Rule 65(d), the aggrieved party has
        a particularly strong need for appellate review.” Id. at 2321. That
        is, when a district court neglects to provide the necessary clarifica-
        tion mandated by Rule 65(d), thereby leaving the party uncertain
        about the court’s commands, that party should have the option to
        seek our review.
               But even if we entertain the Majority’s notion that Rule
        65(d) has relevance to our jurisdiction, the Appraisal Order has fully

        18 The Majority’s reliance on Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant,
        689 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2012) (Pryor, J. concurring) (quoting Gunn v.
        Univ. Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 n.4, 90 S. Ct. 2013
        (1970)), is misplaced because Gunn was distinguished by Abbott v. Perez,
        138 S. Ct. 2305, 201 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2018).
                [A]s explained in Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet
                Nam, 399 U.S. 383, 389, n. 4, 90 S. Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684
                (1970), we have never suggested that a failure to meet the spec-
                ificity requirements of Rule 65(d) would “deprive the Court of
                jurisdiction under § 1253.”

                    A contrary holding would be perverse. Rule 65(d) protects
                the party against which an injunction is issued by requiring
                clear notice as to what that party must do or refrain from do-
                ing. Where a vague injunction does not comply with Rule
                65(d), the aggrieved party has a particularly strong need for ap-
                pellate review. It would be odd to hold that there can be no
                appeal in such a circumstance.

        Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2321.
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        16                     TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting              22-11059

        satisfied its requirements. Rule 65(d) states that all orders granting
        injunctions must: “(A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its
        terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not
        by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts
        restrained or required.” The record and Appraisal Order itself re-
        veal precisely why the order issued, the order states its terms spe-
        cifically, and it informs Empire of the action the District Court ex-
        pected it to take. Rule 65(d)’s purpose is to “protect[] the party
        against which an injunction is issued by requiring clear notice as to
        what that party must do or refrain from doing.” Abbott, 138 S. Ct.
        at 2321. There is not a shadow of a doubt about what Empire is to
        do. It is crystal clear. And if Empire finds it is unable to compre-
        hend the Appraisal Order’s requirements, it can ask the District
        Court for clarification, a customary practice within trial courts.
               To summarize, the District Court did not abuse its discretion
        in issuing the Appraisal Order. The Majority’s analysis of the Dis-
        trict Court’s action focuses on whether the Court based its decision
        on Insured’s complaint. Insured did not move for the Appraisal Or-
        der based on a cause of action in its complaint. The Majority says
        Insured failed to establish the requirements for a preliminary in-
        junction, but Insured didn’t seek a preliminary injunction. A pre-
        liminary injunction would have restored the parties to the status
        quo ante, which would not have beneﬁtted Insured. Insured
        wanted an order granting its contract right to an appraisal.
              The Majority’s focus on Rule 52(a)(2) is irrelevant because
        the facts are in granite: the insurance policy gives Insured an
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        22-11059              TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                    17

        unequivocal right to an appraisal, and Empire resists being ordered
        to submit to one. As for Rule 65(d), we are bound by Supreme
        Court precedent affirming its irrelevance to our jurisdiction, and
        regardless, the Appraisal Order contains all that Rule 65(d) re-
        quires.
                                        C.
               The Majority is correct in stating that Insured’s complaint
        did not seek an appraisal order based on a cause of action asserted.
        But the Majority fails to consider whether the District Court issued
        the Appraisal Order in the exercise of a district court’s inherent
        power. Insured was seeking appraisal relief based solely on its in-
        surance policy with Empire. Empire refused to provide it, so In-
        sured—assuming that the District Court had the power to grant
        the relief as a matter of course to enable the case to proceed to
        trial—moved the District Court to step in.
               Insured’s motion was unsophisticated. It simply asked the
        District Court to require Empire to engage in an appraisal as In-
        sured’s policy provided. The case could not proceed to trial with-
        out an appraisal. And given Empire’s resistance to an appraisal, an
        order requiring Empire to submit to one had to issue if the case
        was to go forward.
               The District Court had the power to grant this relief in the
        exercise of its inherent power. And Insured didn’t need to cite to
        that power for the District Court. The Supreme Court “has long
        recognized that a district court possesses inherent powers that are
        ‘governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
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        18                     TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting               22-11059

        vested in courts to manage their own aﬀairs so as to achieve the
        orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Dietz v. Bouldin,
        579 U.S. 40, 45 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2016) (quoting Link v. Wabash
        R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1839 (1962)). District
        courts frequently exercise their inherent power in this way as a
        matter of course without reciting their inherent power as the
        source of their authority to act. As the former Fifth Circuit ob-
        served, “[t]he inherent powers doctrine . . . is rooted in the notion
        that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common
        law equity tools of a Chancery Court (subject, of course, to con-
        gressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and equitable
        conclusion.” ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th
        Cir. 1978). One of the tools is the injunction. It comes front and
        center when the remedy at law is inadequate.
               In Klay, we observed that the All Writs Act “is a codiﬁcation
        of the federal courts’ traditional, inherent power.” 376 F.3d at 1099.
        The Act’s role is to facilitate the “[district] court’s eﬀort to manage
        the case to judgment.” Barton, 569 F.2d at 1359.
               Whereas traditional injunctions are predicated upon
               [a] cause of action, an All Writs Act injunction is pred-
               icated upon some other matter upon which a district
               court has jurisdiction. Thus, while a party must “state
               a claim” to obtain a “traditional” injunction, there is
               no such requirement to obtain an All Writs Act in-
               junction . . . . The requirements for a traditional in-
               junction do not apply to injunctions under the All
               Writs Act because a court’s traditional power to
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        22-11059               TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                       19

               protect its jurisdiction, codiﬁed by the Act, is
               grounded in entirely separate concerns.

        Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100. Here, the concern is processing Insured’s
        case to trial. That is why the District Court entered the Appraisal
        Order. The parties’ insurance policy gave Insured (and Empire) the
        right to an appraisal. Insured sought one. Empire opposed its re-
        quest and is doing so now.
                The granting of Insured’s motion was a classic application
        of the District Court’s inherent power. The District Court entered
        the injunction in aid of its responsibility to guide this case to a just
        conclusion. Without the injunction ordering the appraisal, this
        case could not proceed to trial. As Barton makes clear, the injunc-
        tion’s service is to facilitate the “court’s eﬀort to manage the case
        to judgment.” 569 F.2d at 1359. In the face of Empire’s resistance,
        the law did not provide a mechanism that would ensure that an
        appraisal would be done so that a trial of the case could be held.
               Entering an injunctive order to facilitate its management of
        the case was the district court’s objective in SEC v. Torchia,
        922 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). However, the district court commit-
        ted a legal error in issuing the injunction and therefore abused its
        discretion. But that didn’t turn the injunction into a non-injunction
        and foreclose our § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction. Rather, we entertained
        the interlocutory appeal, corrected the error, and remanded the
        case for further proceedings. I refer to that decision now because
        it demonstrates the value of § 1292(a)(1) review of an injunction
        issued pursuant to a district court’s inherent power.
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        20                        TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                    22-11059

                                              D.
                Torchia involved a Ponzi scheme operated by James Torchia.
        Id. at 1311. Katherine and Richard Sutherland were victims. Id. at
        1312. They paid CN Capital, a Torchia entity, for a life insurance
        policy on the life of Jimmy Martin in which they were the desig-
        nated beneﬁciaries. Id. The SEC sued Torchia, bringing an end to
        the scheme, and the district court appointed a receiver for CN Cap-
        ital to marshal its assets and distribute the proceeds thereof to its
        “Direct Investors,” including the Sutherlands. Id. The district court
        ordered the Direct Investors either to assign their insurance policies
        to the receiver or remit to the receiver the value of the beneﬁt they
        received from CN Capital including any “ﬁctitious proﬁt.” Id. 19
                The receiver, acting under the district court’s order, “de-
        mand[ed] that [the Sutherlands] either assign the Martin policy to
        him or remit $25,820.34 in purported ﬁctitious proﬁts.” Id. When
        the Sutherlands refused to comply, the district court ordered them
        to assign the Martin policy or remit the $25,820.34 to the receiver.
        Id. at 1312–13.
               The Sutherlands appealed the district court’s order on the
        ground that “they were denied due process because the district
        court’s summary proceedings did not provide them with a mean-
        ingful opportunity to present their claims and defenses [to the

        19 “‘Fictitious proﬁts’ included ‘the amount of premiums paid by CN Capital

        to keep the Direct Investors’ policies in force, and the fair market value of
        other services provided to the Direct Investors by CN Capital.’” SEC v. Torchia,
        922 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019).
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        22-11059                TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                       21

        receiver’s claim] or to challenge the receiver’s determinations or
        calculations related to the claimed ﬁctitious proﬁts.” Id. at 1314.
        We entertained the appeal as an interlocutory appeal under
        § 1292(a)(1) and upheld the Sutherlands’ due process argument
        with this statement:
                    Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction
                to review certain interlocutory orders, such as those
                “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolv-
                ing injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify in-
                junctions.” “In determining what is an appealable or-
                der under § 1292(a)(1), courts look not to the termi-
                nology, but to the ‘substantial eﬀect of the order
                made.’”

                   The district court’s . . . order requiring the Suther-
                lands to either remit the purported ﬁctitious proﬁts
                or assign the Martin policy to the receiver, consistent
                with its prior order stating that all Direct Investors
                must remit ﬁctitious proﬁts or assign their policies, is
                an order “granting [or] continuing . . . [an] injunc-
                tion” under § 1292(a)(1). It “command[s] . . . an ac-
                tion” concerning the merits of the relief requested by
                the receiver.

        Torchia, 922 F.3d at 1314 (alterations in original) (second and third
        omissions in original) (citations omitted). 20

        20 Yeargin Constr. Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore Ala. Mech. & Servs. Corp.,
        609 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1980), and Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. Hosp.,
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        22                         TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                      22-11059

                In deciding to exercise its § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction, the Tor-
        chia panel gave no legal signiﬁcance to the fact that the district
        court’s initial orders 21 were not based on a cause of action asserted
        in a complaint, on ﬁndings of fact and conclusions of law made
        pursuant to Rule 52(a)(2), 22 or in compliance with Rule 65(d). See
        id. at 1315. The district court issued the orders to enable the re-
        ceiver to marshal CN Capital’s assets. How else would the receiver
        marshal the assets? Bring an action at law against the Direct Inves-
        tors and obtain money judgments and then writs of attachment or
        garnishment to satisfy the judgments? What about coercing the
        assignment of the life insurance policies to the receiver? No legal
        remedy I am aware of could do that.
              To sum up, in issuing these injunctive orders, the district
        court simply drew on its inherent power to enable the court-ap-
        pointed receiver to get its job done.
                                               III.
               Assuming the Appraisal Order is an injunction, the Majority
        holds that it is not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because
        Empire can obtain appellate review of the order under 28 U.S.C.

        564 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1977), quoted in Torchia, constitute Eleventh Circuit
        precedent. See Bonner, 661 F.2d at 1207.
        21 The orders required “all Direct Investors [to] remit fictitious profits or assign

        their policies” to the receiver. Torchia, 922 F.3d at 1315.
        22 As for Rule 52(a) findings and conclusions, it is an everyday occurrence that

        we affirm district courts’ decisions on the ground that they are based on find-
        ings and conclusions implied from evidence in the record.
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        22-11059                TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                   23

        § 1291 “after trial by appealing any final judgment against it—
        meaning that the order is not effectively challengeable only by im-
        mediate appeal.” Ante at 19. The Majority reinforces this holding
        with two parenthetical quotations: “(‘If relief may be obtained
        upon review after trial, the parties are not considered to have suf-
        fered irreparable consequences.’); (‘What makes an issue effectively
        unreviewable on appeal is the insufficiency of the remedy after final
        judgment.’).” Ante at 20 (first quoting Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v.
        Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 1988); and
        then quoting Bowman, 341 F.3d at 1237).
               So, as the Majority sees it: Empire has an adequate remedy
        at law. It can challenge the Appraisal Order in appealing the final
        judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A requirement for the issu-
        ance of an injunction—an inadequate remedy at law—is missing.
        A review of the Appraisal Order pretrial under § 1292(a)(1) is there-
        fore inappropriate.
               I disagree with the Majority’s position that Empire will be
        able to obtain appellate review of its challenge to the Appraisal Or-
        der in appealing an adverse final judgment under § 1291. 23 I do so
        for the reasons set out in Sections A, B, and C below.
                                          A.
                The ﬁrst reason for my disagreement with the Majority is
        that it ignores the probability that Empire’s compliance with the
        Appraisal Order will moot its controversy with the District Court

        23 See ante at 19.
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        24                        TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting            22-11059

        over the propriety of the Appraisal Order’s issuance. The contro-
        versy will be moot even if Empire’s compliance does not occur un-
        til after it has been held in contempt for refusing to comply with
        the order. Our precedent on this point is clear. “Once a contemnor
        has purged his contempt, he sacriﬁces his ability to challenge the
        merits of the underlying contempt order.” In re Grand Jury Sub-
        poena Duces Tecum, 955 F.2d 670, 672–73 (11th Cir. 1992). “[O]nce a
        civil contempt order is purged, no live case or controversy remains
        for adjudication.” In re Campbell, 628 F.2d 1260, 1261 (9th Cir.
        1980) (per curiam) (collecting cases stating the same).
                  It is true that compliance with an injunction does not render
        the issue moot where it is possible to undo the eﬀects of compli-
        ance. “Under settled law, we may dismiss the case [as moot] only
        if ‘it is impossible for a court to grant any eﬀectual relief whatever
        . . . .’” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC., 139 S. Ct.
        1652, 1660, 203 L. Ed. 2d 876 (2019) (quoting Chaﬁn v. Chaﬁn, 568
        U.S. 165, 172, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1019 (2013)). There is nothing this
        Court could do to “undo the eﬀects of compliance” in the situation
        here other than compensate Empire for the expense it incurred in
        complying with the Appraisal Order or recreate the status quo
        ante, and both are indeed problematic. 24
                                            B.
               My second reason for disagreeing is that Empire can obtain
        appellate review after the cases return to the District Court. If

        24 See infra Part V.
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        22-11059                  TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                            25

        Empire refuses to comply with the Appraisal Order and is held in
        civil contempt, and the District Court imposes a sanction and en-
        ters a judgment for that sanction, Empire may appeal that judg-
        ment under § 1291. A sanction entered as the result of a ﬁnding of
        contempt “render[s] the contempt judgment ﬁnal and ma[kes]
        both the ﬁndings of contempt and the later sanction order appeal-
        able under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” PlayNation Play Sys., Inc. v. Velex Corp.,
        939 F.3d 1205, 1212 (11th Cir. 2019) (alterations in original) (quot-
        ing Sizzler Fam. Steak Houses v. W. Sizzlin Steak House, Inc., 793 F.2d
        1529, 1533 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986)). In prosecuting the § 1291 appeal,
        Empire could challenge the underlying Appraisal Order. The re-
        view Empire would obtain under § 1291 in that situation would be
        the same as the review it would obtain under § 1292(a)(1) now.
                                              C.
               My third reason for disagreeing with the Majority is this:
        Empire will likely comply with the Appraisal Order and litigate In-
        sured’s loss at trial via an appraisal; then, in appealing the ﬁnal judg-
        ment under § 1291, Empire will seek a new trial based on the Dis-
        trict Court’s error in issuing the Appraisal Order. 25 That will be
        giving Empire two bites at the apple. 26 Empire’s lawyers will read

        25 And Empire will likely prevail given the Majority’s conclusion (in dismissing

        these appeals) that the issuance of the Appraisal Order constituted an abuse of
        discretion.
        26 With two bites at the apple, Empire will not seek appellate review of the

        Appraisal Order as described in Section III.B above.
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        26                     TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                22-11059

        our mandate that way and they will plan Empire’s litigation strat-
        egy accordingly.
                Empire will submit to an appraisal, and at trial, the appraisal
        will establish Insured’s loss. If the appraisal is at least as favorable
        (to Empire) as the loss a jury would ﬁx based on the evidence of
        loss presented at trial, Empire will accept the judgment based on
        the appraisal and close the case. But if Empire believes that a trial
        in which Insured has the burden of introducing evidence to prove
        its loss would yield a more favorable loss amount, it will appeal the
        ﬁnal judgment under § 1291 and challenge the Appraisal Order.
               During that appeal, Empire’s lawyers will be armed with our
        opinion, which essentially determines that the District Court
        abused its discretion in issuing the Appraisal Order. Insured’s law-
        yers will tell Insured that: (1) a reversal of the judgment is likely,
        (2) a new trial will be ordered, (3) preparing for a new trial in which
        Insured will have to prove its loss with live evidence will be very
        expensive, and (4) the loss the jury ﬁxes based on the evidence In-
        sured (and Empire) introduce at the new trial may be less than what
        the appraisal ﬁxed. A cost-beneﬁt analysis will inform Insured on
        whether to accept Empire’s oﬀer to settle for far less than it recov-
        ered at trial.
               Faced with this dilemma, Insured will wonder why its law-
        yers moved the District Court for the Appraisal Order in the ﬁrst
        place. They could have recommended that Insured not pursue an
        appraisal and suﬀer only one trial.
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        22-11059                   TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                               27

                                                IV.
               In reaching its decision to dismiss these appeals for lack of
        jurisdiction, the Majority asserts a reason other than the insuﬃ-
        ciency of Insured’s complaint for declining to exercise jurisdiction
        under § 1292(a)(1). It states that the Appraisal Order, itself, fails to
        demonstrate that Insured would suﬀer a “serious, perhaps irrepa-
        rable consequence” if it is denied the relief the order provides. Ante
        at 17–19. To support this, the Majority draws upon ﬁve cases where
        the appeals each related to the denial of an injunction. 27 In my
        view, cases reviewing interlocutory orders denying an injunction
        are of a far different breed and should not be relied upon here.
        Nonetheless, Empire’s compliance with the Appraisal Order will
        render this issue moot and thereby preclude our review of the

        27 See Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 101 S. Ct. 993 (1981); United States

        v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 1998); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
        Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988); Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd.
        v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1988); Roberts v. St. Regis
        Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 10, 1981) (refusing to dissolve an
        injunction). Aside from the denial-of-an-injunction cases, the Majority relies
        on only one other case, United States v. Bowman, 341 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003),
        to support the argument that Empire must satisfy a “serious, perhaps irrepa-
        rable consequence” requirement to establish § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction. How-
        ever, it is important to note that Bowman is also not relevant to our current
        situation. In Bowman, the appellants were not challenging an injunction; in-
        stead, they were contesting an order that upheld an “ex parte seizure.” Id. at
        1229. Furthermore, this order was associated with an in rem forfeiture action.
        Id.; see also supra Part I (describing an injunction traditionally as an in personam
        order). Therefore, the Bowman case does not provide any guidance or rele-
        vance to our present case, which pertains to an appeal following the grant of
        an injunction.
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        28                     TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                22-11059

        Appraisal Order on final judgment. So, this situation does indeed
        demonstrate the presence of serious, perhaps irreparable conse-
        quences.
               In Abbott, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that, for
        jurisdictional purposes, there is a distinction between orders deny-
        ing and granting injunctions. See 138 S. Ct. at 2321. Still, I empha-
        size the practical and legal distinctions in our review of injunction
        denials and grants, which could explain the “serious, perhaps irrep-
        arable consequence” language cited by the Majority.
                When appealing an interlocutory order denying an injunc-
        tion, the denial order itself will often lack the necessary detail to
        determine what exactly the district court has denied. Thus, to pro-
        vide the appellate panel with a clear understanding of the injunc-
        tive relief it was seeking, the movant must include the record of its
        application for the injunction. This record will not only allow the
        panel to determine whether the movant sought an injunction en-
        forceable via the district court’s contempt power but also deter-
        mine whether the district court’s order addressed the movant’s ap-
        plication in full.
                Additionally, the legal consequences of declining to review
        an interlocutory denial of an injunction are distinct. First, the denial
        of an interlocutory injunction is tentative and provisional, subject
        to reconsideration by the district court. Second, if the injunction
        was sought in the plaintiff’s complaint and its denial is reduced to
        a final judgment, the movant can obtain review of the denial under
        § 1291. Finally, unlike Empire’s situation here, a movant cannot
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        22-11059                  TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                              29

        obtain review of the denial of its application for injunctive relief by
        resisting the order and facing contempt charges. That is because
        the denial of an injunction is not enforceable by the district court’s
        contempt power—that much is obvious.
               Assuming the Appraisal Order remains in place on remand,
        this Court, in entertaining Empire’s appeal of the adverse final
        judgment under § 1291, will have to decide the legal effect of the
        Appraisal Order’s silence regarding the “serious, perhaps irrepara-
        ble consequence” the denial of the order would have visited on In-
        sured had the order been denied.
                                               V.
               Our decision to dismiss these appeals for want of jurisdic-
        tion under § 1292(a)(1) is troubling. I posit that the decision will
        have a deleterious eﬀect on our Court’s reputation, its relationship
        with the district courts in our circuit, and, in turn, the respect of
        the district courts amongst the litigants in these cases and the liti-
        gants awaiting their turn in the district courts’ queues. I begin with
        the consequences for our Court.
                                               A.
               The Majority says we lack jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) be-
        cause the Appraisal Order is not an injunction. It is not an injunc-
        tion because the District Court abused its discretion in issuing it. 28

        28 One could say that our determination that the District Court abused its dis-

        cretion in entering the Appraisal Order is the raison d’être of our jurisdictional
        decision, and therefore a holding.
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        30                       TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                   22-11059

        In other words, if we accepted jurisdiction (because the Appraisal
        Order is an injunction) and entertained these appeals on the merits,
        Empire would prevail given the District Court’s error. But Empire
        must now wait until the conclusion of the litigation to challenge
        the merits.
               In this second appeal following the entry of ﬁnal judgment,
        another panel of this Court, acting as a “recognizing” court, will
        have to decide whether to defer to our determination, as the “ren-
        dering” court, that the District Court abused its discretion in issu-
        ing the Appraisal Order. If the panel defers, Empire will receive a
        new trial, where Insured’s loss will not be ﬁxed by an appraisal. 29
               In asking the recognizing court to defer to our abuse-of-dis-
        cretion determination, Empire will rely on the doctrine of collat-
        eral estoppel, arguing that our determination was made after the
        parties fully litigated the issue. Insured will oppose this, arguing
        that Empire’s compliance with the Appraisal Order rendered moot
        the controversy over the order’s validity. Empire will have com-
        plied with the order because we eﬀectively invited it to, promising
        a second bite of the apple at the conclusion of the litigation. After
        Insured’s case is tried and a ﬁnal judgment is entered, Empire can
        obtain appellate review of the Appraisal Order in appealing that
        judgment. If the recognizing court agrees with Insured—that
        there is no longer an Article III case or controversy concerning the

        29 For a description of “rendering” and “recognizing” courts in the issue pre-

        clusion context, see Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169, 1215–
        23 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
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        22-11059                  TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                              31

        Appraisal Order’s validity—our promise of a second bite will van-
        ish, along with Empire’s respect for the integrity of our decision-
        making. We will have made a false promise in holding that Empire
        could have a second bite. Empire had the opportunity to seek ap-
        pellate review of the Appraisal Order pretrial under § 1291 by suf-
        fering a contempt adjudication, receiving a sanction, and appealing
        the corresponding judgment. However, relying on our promise,
        Empire forfeited this option.
                As for eﬃciency, our decision to determine § 1292(a)(1) ju-
        risdiction by looking to the merits of the enjoined party’s challenge
        to the injunction is a form of make-work. 30 When we deny juris-
        diction over interlocutory appeals of injunctions based on the mer-
        its, promising the enjoined party subsequent review upon ﬁnal
        judgment, this Court ends up reviewing the same issue twice. The
        ﬁrst panel ﬁnds no jurisdiction because the district court erred, 31
        and then the second panel reviews those same merits, deciding
        again whether the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion.
        The ﬁrst panel could avoid the second panel’s work altogether if it
        instead entertained the interlocutory appeal, corrected the error,

        30 This part of the discussion assumes that the enjoined party suffered sufficient

        prejudice to claim that it should be granted a new trial. I posit that the entry
        of few interlocutory orders would result in a reversible error for lack of preju-
        dice. Not so in the cases before us.
        31 One could say that our determination that the District Court’s issuance of

        the injunction was an abuse of discretion (for jurisdictional purposes) would
        be an advisory opinion, like an answer to a hypothetical question, foreclosed
        by Article III.
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        32                         TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                    22-11059

        and remanded the case for further proceedings, as we did in Torchia.
        We could also avoid the issue altogether by not assuring the en-
        joined party that this Court will review the injunction on appeal of
        an adverse ﬁnal judgment—notwithstanding the enjoined party
        possibly mooting the issue through its compliance with the injunc-
        tion.
                I sense that the Majority fears that if we accept jurisdiction
        in this case, it will open § 1292(a)(1)’s ﬂoodgates and we will be in-
        undated with appeals of interlocutory coercive orders, i.e., injunc-
        tions. This fear is unfounded. Most interlocutory injunctions are
        provisional, 32 subject to the district court’s modiﬁcation as the case
        moves toward trial. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449
        U.S. 368, 377, 101 S. Ct. 669, 675 (1981) (“[W]e have generally de-
        nied review of pretrial discovery orders . . . .”). And review of pro-
        visional rulings, like pretrial discovery orders, are generally denied
        because our decision would be advisory, and therefore unconstitu-
        tional. Banca Pueyo SA v. Lone Star Fund IX, L.P., 978 F.3d 968, 973
        (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the issue in reviewing a provisional
        ruling is that “our decision would . . . be advisory”). 33 When

        32 I omit preliminary injunctions issued to maintain the status quo while the

        trial court reaches the merits of the plaintiff’s causes of action.
        33 In Risjord, the Supreme Court expounded on its declination to review dis-

        covery orders with this statement: “Our rationale has been that in the rare case
        when appeal after ﬁnal judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order,
        a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be entered against
        him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling.” 449
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        22-11059                  TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                              33

        parties seek an advisory opinion, they fail to present a justiciable
        controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 1950
        (1968)). As a result, these provisional injunctive orders are either
        not appealed or the order is summarily aﬃrmed.
                Occasionally, however, an interlocutory injunction is not
        provisional. That is the situation here. Insured’s contract right is
        lost altogether unless enforced with an injunction like the Appraisal
        Order. The same is true when a district court orders a party to
        divulge privileged information. Absent the right to an interlocu-
        tory appeal, the enjoined party’s only recourse would be to defy
        the injunctive order, face a contempt adjudication and sanction,
        and then appeal the resulting judgment under § 1291.
                                                   B.
               How our method for determining whether we have
        § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction aﬀects the district courts will be of critical
        importance. Here, the District Court will learn that its issuance of
        the Appraisal Order constituted an abuse of discretion and, if the
        Appraisal Order remains in force, Empire may be entitled to a sec-
        ond trial. 34 No trial court relishes trying a case twice, but that may

        U.S. at 377, 101 S. Ct. at 675 (citing Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323,
        327, 60 S. Ct. 540, 542 (1940)).
        34 What will the parties and the District Court perceive as the law of this case?

        That the Appraisal Order remains intact? By stating that this Court will enter-
        tain Empire’s challenge to the Appraisal Order upon final judgment, we imply
        that the Appraisal Order has not been disturbed. This is one potential inter-
        pretation, as our dismissal for lack of jurisdiction hinges on the availability of
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        34                       TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                   22-11059

        occur here. To avoid a second trial, considering our conclusion that
        the issuance of the Appraisal Order was an abuse of discretion,
        should the District Court accede to Empire’s position and vacate
        the order? What’s at stake here? On one side, we have Insured’s
        contract right to an appraisal and a trial where the insurance loss is
        established by an appraisal. Insured asked for the Appraisal Order
        because it believes that engaging in an appraisal will be less expen-
        sive than proving its loss with live testimony at trial. On the other
        side, we have the District Court’s docket and other litigants waiting
        to be heard. A second trial would delay the consideration of their
        cases.
               The district courts will look with disfavor on the two-bites-
        at-the-apple dismissal of § 1292(a)(1) appeals on the ground that
        the appellant failed to show that the challenged injunction was not
        an abuse of discretion. To avoid the prospect of two trials, district
        courts will likely recognize that parties enjoined under the court’s
        inherent power will only have the option of reviewing pretrial or-
        ders under § 1291. That is, through appealing a judgment that ﬁnds
        them in contempt and imposes sanctions. Hearings on motions to
        show cause why the enjoined party should not be held in contempt

        § 1291 review. However, when we do entertain Empire’s challenge upon final
        judgment, will we grant Empire a new trial? We have already said, in effect,
        that Empire will be entitled to one. Alternatively, a future panel could treat
        our basis for dismissing these appeals—the District Court’s abuse of discre-
        tion—as pure dicta. In any case, in reviewing Empire’s appeal under § 1291,
        we will have to address Insured’s argument that Empire’s appeal of this issue
        is moot—and that determination remains uncertain.
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        22-11059               TJOFLAT, J., Dissenting                       35

        and sanctioned can be unpleasant, but the absence of § 1292(a)(1)
        review will likely lead to their increase.
                                          VI.
                The Appraisal Order is an injunction on its face. We have
        § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction to review it. The District Court entered
        the Appraisal Order pursuant to its inherent power, as codiﬁed in
        the All Writs Act, which is “necessarily vested in courts to manage
        their own aﬀairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious dispo-
        sition of cases.” Dietz, 579 U.S. at 45, 136 S. Ct. at 1891. The in-
        junction is one of the common law equity tools district courts use
        to achieve the just disposition of a case. District courts use this tool
        routinely, and they do so without announcing that they are issuing
        the injunctive order in the exercise of their “inherent power.” The
        District Court used this tool here so the case could go forward to
        trial and ﬁnal judgment.
                The Appraisal Order is due to be aﬃrmed. I respectfully dis-
        sent.