Court Opinion

ID: 9734796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:46:22.695466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.371475
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
While I can readily agree with the majority’s statement that a total preparation time of twenty minutes for the defense in a case involving a charge of murder would “impair” the right of effective assistance of counsel, I cannot conclude from the record here that there was a valid and sufficient waiver of this right.
I believe it is necessary for a proper analysis of the issues presented here that we recognize that the right which appellant was called upon to relinquish in this proceeding amounted to nothing less than an outright waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. It has been explicitly and repeatedly recognized by both the United States and Indiana Supreme Courts that adequate pre-trial preparation time is implicit in the constitutional right to counsel.
In Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, the Federal Supreme Court held that:
*336“The prompt disposition of' criminal cases is to be commended and encourage, but in reaching that result a defendant, charged with a serious crime, must not be stripped of his right to have sufficient time to advise with counsel and prepare his defense.
“ ‘It is vain to give the accused a day in court with no opportunity to prepare for it or to guarantee him counsel without giving the latter any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts or the law of the case.’ ” 287 U.S. at 59.
Several years later that Court again recognized this important aspect of the right to counsel and more clearly delineated the functions counsel was to perform in this critical pre-trial period:
“Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved. . . .” Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948), 332 U.S. 708, 721, 68 S. Ct. 316, 92 L. Ed. 309.
This Court has been quite clear in its interpretation of adequate preparation time as it affects both the Article 1, § 13, right to counsel of the State Constitution as well as the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
“The right to counsel includes reasonable time for counsel to prepare for trial under the circumstances of each particular case if the right is to be given a fair opportunity to safeguard the rights of a defendant charged with a crime. The right to investigate and confer with witnesses as well as subpoena them is included in representation by counsel.” Hay v. State (1947), 225 Ind. 428, 436, 75 N. E. 2d 915.
In the later case of Lloyd v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 192, 170 N. E. 2d 904, we stated:
“We do however hold that where the charge was murder, which carries the penalty for life imprisonment or life itself, a period of two and one-half hours was utterly insignificant for consultation, investigation and preparation for trial resulting in a virtual denial of the appellant’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.” 241 Ind. at 199.
*337See also Sweet v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 160, 117 N. E. 2d 745; Taylor v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 131, 84 N. E. 2d 580; Rice v. State (1942), 220 Ind. 523, 44 N. E. 2d 829.
These cases demonstrate clearly that the appellant here relinquished not a mere incidental to his right to counsel but an aspect of that right which has been held to be essential to its' fulfillment. That being the case any alleged waiver he may have exercised must reach the level of a waiver of a Sixth Amendment right.
The right to counsel is a right the waiver of which cannot be presumed from a silent record. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694; Carnley v. Cochran (1962), 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884, 8 L. Ed. 2d 70.
In order for the waiver to meet constitutional standards it must be shown to have been made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461; Nacoff v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 97, 267 N. E. 2d 165; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37, 262 N. E. 2d 638.
“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevent circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. U.S. (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747.
With these standards in mind I do not believe that a waiver of a constitutionally recognized aspect of the Sixth Amendment which requires that a defendant and his attorney be given an adequate preparation time can be considered valid unless the defendant has been fully informed of the hazards of his decision. Since adequate preparation time has been held to be absolutely essential to, and implicit in, the right to counsel a court must inquire as to defendant’s comprehension and understanding of what he is waiving.
“A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all *338the circumstances under which such a plea is rendered.” 332 U.S. at 724.
The bare and conclusory waiver presented in the majority opinion here is clearly insufficient since it is without inquiry as to the appellant’s understanding and comprehension of the implications of his decision. A defendant can waive this aspect of the Sixth Amendment only if he has an intelligent understanding of what an attorney can do for him. It is not sufficient that he may have a vague notion that lawyers are sometimes of assistance in such matters. The Constitution requires that a defendant have knowledge of exactly what he is foregoing by his waiver. The appellant should have been made aware that his decision to proceed to trial with a lawyer who has spent twenty minutes in preparation of his defense would result in his attorney being unacquainted with appellant’s version of the facts; unacquainted with the State’s theory of the case and unprepared for a theory of defense; unacquainted with pre-trial events; unacquainted with any potential defense witnesses; unacquainted with the State’s witnesses and possible areas of cross examination; and without time to prepare special instructions which might be usefully submitted to the jury on the issues raised in the case.
Since I believe the alleged waiver set out above is totally insufficient to meet these high standards I must respectfully dissent.
Note. — Reported in 303 N. E. 2d 274.