Court Opinion

ID: 9634909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:28:19.967552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:01.267189
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the affirmance of the felony conviction. However, I would hold that appellant waived his continuing objection by affirmatively stating “no objection” when the exhibits were offered into evidence and that any review is therefore limited to a review for plain error.
*724I.
Appellant was charged and convicted of the class C felony of “creation of a controlled substance”, specifically, methamphetamine. Immediately prior to trial, appellant renewed a motion to suppress the physical evidence in the matter, including chemicals, equipment and other items seized from appellant’s residence. Appellant alleged that the search of his residence was improper due to lack of probable cause resulting from “stale” information and hearsay information. Appellant also alleged improper execution of the search warrant in that the search was conducted at nighttime and the police did not “knock and announce” prior to entering. Also prior to trial, appellant’s counsel (“counsel”) indicated that he would seek a continuing objection during trial and the prosecutor indicated that he would agree to a continuing objection.
At trial, during the state’s opening statement to the jury, the prosecutor referenced the physical evidence covered by the motion to suppress. At that point, counsel objected to “any further comment from the prosecutor regarding any evidence which was obtained through the search warrant.” Counsel objected that “the Court should suppress any evidence based on ... lack of probable cause” and that “the execution was not done properly.” The objection was overruled. Counsel then requested that the objection be a continuing objection and the state and the court agreed.
Later in the case, counsel’s response to the state’s offer of exhibits recovered from the search of appellant’s residence into evidence was much different. When the state offered this evidence, some 110-177 pages later in the transcript, rather than simply remaining silent or stating something to the effect of “no further objection,” counsel affirmatively indicated no objection each time such evidence was of-
fered. Specifically, each time such evidence was offered, counsel stated:
MR. KOPP: Okay. Judge, at this time I’d like to offer State’s Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 5 into evidence.
MR. PETTY: Judge, we don’t have any objection to the introduction of these exhibits. (Tr. 286).
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MR. KOPP: I offer State’s Exhibit 41 into evidence at this time, your Honor. MR. PETTY: Judge, no objection. (Tr. 348).
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MR. KOPP: Judge, at this time, I’d offer into evidence ... State’s Exhibits ... 42, 43, 44, and 47.
MR. PETTY: Judge, we have no objection to these. (Tr. 348).
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MR. KOPP: At this time, Judge, I’m going to offer into evidence State’s Exhibits ... 6, 34, 10, 39, 30, 31, 36, 14, 28, 25, ... and 22.
MR. PETTY: Defense has no objection to the introduction of these. (Tr. 349).
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MR. KOPP: At this time, Judge, State would offer State’s Exhibit 4, 20, 21, 24, 27, 29, 33, 37, and 13.
MR. PETTY: The defense has no objection. (Tr. 349).
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MR. KOPP: One more time. State’s going to offer State’s Exhibits 7, 8, 9,11, 12,15,16,17, and 35.
MR. PETTY: No objection. (Tr. 350).
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MR. KOPP: Offer State’s Exhibit 45 into evidence, your Honor.
MR. PETTY: No objection. (Tr. 351).
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*725MR. KOPP: Offer State’s Exhibit 46 into evidence, your Honor.
MR. PETTY: No objection to State’s— (Tr. 353).
Appellant contends that the statements regarding admission of the evidence actually meant “no further objection.” However, that is not what was stated. In fact, counsel’s first response was that he did not have “any objection” to the introduction of that evidence.
The majority recognizes that this Court has long held that “stating ‘no objection’ when evidence is introduced precludes direct appellate review of the admission,” State v. Starr, 492 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Mo. banc 1973) and that counsel is obligated to make specific objections at trial. See Williams v. Barnes Hosp., 736 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. banc 1987). The majority also notes, “[ajppellant’s contradictory statements regarding the admission of the seized evidence would seem to lead to the precise uncertainties the rule was designed to prevent.” Nonetheless, the majority opinion circumvents the rule, citing court of appeals decisions asserting that to declare a waiver in this situation “would be a hypertechnical application” of the rule. It assumes that appellant’s counsel meant something different than what he said.
The record discloses very few objections at trial. A close review of those objections reveals no additional evidentiary issues regarding the physical evidence obtained under the search warrant other than those covered in appellant’s motion to suppress and continuing objection. Thus, counsel’s statement of “no objection” to admittance of this evidence could only pertain to those issues covered under his previous continuing objection. There is no indication in the record to support a conclusion that counsel was confused, mistaken, or misspoke. To apply waiver in this situation would not be a “hypertechnical application” of the rule.
Only three conclusions can be reached to answer the question of why, after fighting so diligently for the motion to suppress, counsel would state that he did not “have any objection” to this evidence: 1) Counsel simply changed his mind during the course of the trial; 2) counsel believed that he was actually stating “no further objection;” or 3) counsel sought to minimize the effect of his objection on the jury’s perception of this evidence — essentially pandering to the jury to gain favor.
It is unlikely that counsel simply changed his mind. Counsel fought painstakingly to suppress this evidence. It is unlikely that he would simply reverse course after having heard the evidence. This leaves two other explanations.
Admittedly, it is plausible that counsel simply misspoke and truly meant “no further objection.” However, counsel might also have engaged in the precise manipulation the majority admits it fears but then disregards — that counsel consciously stated “we don’t have any objection to the introduction of these exhibits” to minimize the jury’s perception that appellant might fear introduction of these exhibits, yet preserve the issue on appeal through the continuing objection.
The crux of appellant’s defense at trial was two-fold and somewhat inconsistent. If he could keep out the evidence gathered in the search, the state’s case would be unpersuasive, if not insufficient. Alternatively, appellant argued that certain police officers had some sort of vendetta against him and that the items seized under the warrant were simple household and business items put to ordinary and legal use. To show further opposition to these exhibits would have undermined appellant’s defense that the goods were for innocent use only. A statement of “no objection” indi*726cated to the jury that appellant did not fear these exhibits because they were not important to the state’s case against him. It appears most likely that counsel attempted to have it both ways.
It is counsel’s burden to produce a clear record of his objection. Neither the opposing attorney, nor the trial court, should be forced to speculate that a lawyer speaking in open court means something other than what he or she says. Nor should a jury be allowed to be fooled by such a strategy. This is the precise reason for the rule. In the context of a continuing objection, a lawyer may remain silent or should simply state “no further objection” or “no additional objection” if that is truly what the lawyer means. He or she should not be allowed to state the opposite, that “we don’t have any objection” or “no objection,” and still preserve the objection.
Application of the traditional rule does not leave appellant without a remedy, nor does it change the outcome of this appeal. Review still remains for plain error.
II.
I would abide by the rule declared' in State v. Starr and hold that counsel’s affirmative statement to the court that he had no objection to admission of the physical evidence waived his prior continuing objection, limiting analysis to plain error review.