Court Opinion

ID: 9707887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:56.503628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.462228
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
(dissenting). The question to be determined in this appeal is whether a 254-day delay between appellants’ demand for a speedy trial (July 22,1968) and their arrest (April 2, 1969) constituted a violation of the constitutional mandates guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. This case raises a far worse situation than the typical case presenting the speedy trial issue. Here the delay was in simply arresting the appellants, not in scheduling their case for trial. Here, too, the delay was necessitated apparently only because the Milwaukee district attorney’s office took over eight months to process the forms and send an officer to arrest appellants who were incarcerated for the final *575three months in three neighboring county jails (Wauke-sha, Ozaukee, and Kenosha). Most of this time they were incarcerated in the Kenosha county jail, 40 miles from Milwaukee. On these facts I believe the delay unnecessary, unreasonable, and unconstitutional. I would reverse the convictions.
As the majority point out, a determination of whether a criminal defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is largely dependent on the facts of each case; there is no definite time after which a defendant is entitled to release.1 In State v. Fogle 2 this court indicated that a defendant who makes various pretrial motions cannot assert that he has been denied a speedy trial because of the delay necessitated by his own motions. Here, however, the defendants did absolutely nothing to delay the proceedings, nor was the delay occasioned by a judge’s illness as in Kopacka v. State3 or by the need to prepare the prosecution as in United States v. Ewell.4 Here the record discloses that the delay was occasioned by the district attorney’s eight-month delay in filing the proper papers. The record is silent as to why such a length of time was required to perform such a simple task.5 I conclude that the delay was not reasonable.
*576While a precise time cannot be set for determining when a defendant has been denied a speedy trial, the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice has set down general guidelines in its Standards Relating to Speedy Trial. In this case the conduct of the Milwaukee county district attorney’s office is directly contrary to section 3.1 of the Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft, 1968). That section provides:
“Prosecutor’s obligations; notice to and availability of prisoner.
“To protect the right to speedy trial of a person serving a term of imprisonment either within or without the jurisdiction, it should be provided by rule or statute and, where necessary, interstate compact, that:
“(a) If the prosecuting attorney knows that a person charged with a criminal offense is serving a term of imprisonment in a penal institution of that or another jurisdiction, he must promptly:
“(i) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial; or
“ (ii) cause a detainer to be filed with the official having custody of the prisoner and request him to so advise the prisoner and to advise the prisoner of his right to demand trial.
“(b) If an official having custody of such a prisoner receives a detainer, he must promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of the prisoner’s right to demand trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs such official that he does demand trial, the official shall cause a certificate to that effect to be sent promptly to the prosecuting attorney who caused the detainer to be filed.
“(c) Upon receipt of such certificate, the prosecuting attorney must promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
“(d) When the official having custody of the prisoner receives from the prosecuting attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of such prisoner for trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that prosecuting attorney (subject, in cases of inter jurisdictional transfer, to the traditional right of the executive *577to refuse transfer and the right of the prisoner to contest the legality of his delivery).”
Here the prosecutor took no action until long after the demand for a speedy trial was made.
The majority also assert that the eight-month delay was not prejudicial to appellants. The law requires, however, that when a violation of a constitutional right is involved the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation is not prejudicial.6 This requirement also applies to the denial of a speedy trial.7 In the present case the state submitted a brief which was so long that parts of it were struck by order of the court, but not one word is devoted to demonstrating that the delay here was not prejudicial. Common sense dictates that such a delay would naturally cause the witnesses to remember less clearly the events surrounding the crimes and such a lapse of time would certainly deny a defendant the ability to locate witnesses and evidence needed for trial. In the absence of a showing by the state, I believe this court is required to assume that the delay was prejudicial. As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, “[d] enial of the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial is a form of punishment never excused by a belated conviction.” 8
In Dickey v. Florida 9 the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously reversed the conviction of an armed robber and ordered him released from custody because he was not afforded a speedy trial. In so doing, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the court, pointed out:
*578“The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality in the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution’s case, as is the defendant’s right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial. This is brought sharply into focus when, as here, the accused presses for an early confrontation with his accusers and with the State. Crowded dockets, the lack of judges or lawyers, and other factors no doubt make some delays inevitable. Here, however, no valid reason for the delay existed; it was exclusively for the convenience of the State. On this record the delay with its consequent prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and impermissible as a matter of law. [Footnotes omitted.]”
The same principle applies in the present case. I would reverse the judgment with directions to dismiss the complaint.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Hallows and Mr. Justice Heffernan join in this opinion.

 Under see. 971.10 (2) (a) of the new criminal procedure code, a defendant charged with a felony is entitled to a trial within ninety days of his demand. The statute provides, however, that such demand can be made only after arrest. Because this new statute applies only to prosecutions commenced after July 1, 1970, I do not reach the issue of whether the statute applies to the present situation.

 (1964), 25 Wis. 2d 257, 130 N. W. 2d 871.

 (1964), 22 Wis. 2d 457, 126 N. W. 2d 78.

 (1966), 383 U. S. 116, 86 Sup. Ct. 773, 15 L. Ed. 2d 627.

 18 U. S. Code, sec. 4085, codifies the procedure to be followed by the state in securing the custody of a federal prisoner. In Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U. S. 374, 381, 89 Sup. Ct. 575, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607, the supreme court took note of the policy of the United States Bureau of Prisons to encourage the expeditious disposition of prosecutions in state courts against federal prisoners. The procedure to be followed is set out in footnote 13 in Hooey.

 Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U. S. 18, 87 Sup. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 70S; Whitty v. State (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 278, 149 N. W. 2d 657.

 See: Cameron and Osborn, When Harmless Error Isn’t Harmless, 1971 Law and the Social Order, 23, 34.

 Hinton v. United States (D. C. Cir. 1969), 424 Fed. 2d 876, 880.

 (1970), 398 U. S. 30, 37, 38, 90 Sup. Ct. 1564, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26.