Court Opinion

ID: 9761186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:33:57.57897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.829974
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe that a new trial should be granted. For I agree with appellant’s argument that “[o]nce a lawyer for the defendant informs the police that the defendant desires to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege, any further statement obtained from the police as a result of further interrogation instituted by the police is constitutionally impermissible and inadmissible.” Brief for appellant at x.1
Immediately before surrendering to the police, appellant telephoned an attorney, Lewis S. Small, and requested his assistance. N.T. 118-19. Small went to the police station, and following his arrival, appellant conferred with him and his associate, Steven Margolin, for approximately 20 minutes. N.T. 98; 118-19. As Small and Margolin left the police station, Small told the detectives that appellant did not want to make a statement. N.T. 98-99; 122. Within moments of Small’s and Margolin’s departure, the detectives went to appellant, advised him of his Miranda rights, and asked him whether he wanted to remain silent. N.T. 100-02. Appellant said he was willing to talk, and confessed to having committed the robbery. At his trial his confession was introduced into evidence against him.
Small’s statement to the detectives that appellant did not want to make a statement was an effective assertion of appellant’s right to remain silent. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 405, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, reh’g denied, 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977). (Defendant “effectively asserted his right to [have] counsel [present during interrogation] by having secured attorneys *259... both of whom, acting as his agents, had made clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey.” (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Rigler, 448 Pa. 441, 412 A.2d 846 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 3004, 69 L.Ed.2d 387 (1981). (Because neither defendant nor his attorney asserted defendant’s right to remain silent, prohibition against subsequent interrogation inapplicable); Commonwealth v. Bullard, 465 Pa. 341, 347, 350 A.2d 797, 799 (1976) (Where judge advised police that they were not to talk to defendant until his family obtained a lawyer, “[t]he record show[ed] that, through th[is] intermediary], appellant expressed a clear desire not to be questioned until counsel was obtained for him____”) (emphasis added).
When a defendant asserts his right to remain silent, the police are forbidden from interrogating him further unless: (1) the defendant initiates further communication, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh’g denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1629, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh’g denied sub nom. California v. Stewart, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966); Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 269 Pa.Super. 291, 409 A.2d 894 (1979); Commonwealth v. Nahodil, 462 Pa. 301, 341 A.2d 91 (1975); or (2) a sufficient period of time has elapsed, Commonwealth v. Crosby, 464 Pa. 337, 346 A.2d 768 (1975) (Police may initiate interrogation more than two weeks after defendant asserts right to remain silent); Commonwealth v. Frison, 301 Pa.Super. 498, 448 A.2d 18 (1982) (Police may initiate interrogation three months after defendant asserts right to remain silent). Here, within moments of appellant’s assertion of his right to remain silent the police went to him, advised him of his Miranda rights, and asked him whether he wanted to remain silent. The only question, therefore, is whether this conduct of the police constituted interrogation. For if it did, appellant’s resulting confession was obtained in violation of Miranda and should not have been introduced into evidence at his trial. Miranda v. Arizona, supra.
*260It is clear to me that the conduct of the police did constitute interrogation. Miranda warnings are required only as a prelude to custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, supra, and the police could have had no other purpose in mind when they gave appellant the warnings except to elicit a statement. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held in Edwards v. Arizona, supra, that police conduct indistinguishable from the police conduct here constituted interrogation. In Edwards, the defendant asserted his right to remain silent. The next morning, police detectives went to see him at the jail. Over Edwards’s protest, the jail guard took him to the detectives. They told Edwards that they wanted to speak with him, and they advised him of his rights. Edwards then made an inculpatory statement. The Court held that this conduct constituted forbidden interrogation. Since the conduct of the police here is indistinguishable from the police conduct disapproved in Edwards, appellant’s confession was obtained in violation of Miranda and should not have been introduced into evidence at his trial.
A new trial should be granted.

. The majority fails to address appellant’s argument, instead observing that "the suppression court found that there was no agreement by the police not to interrogate appellant____" At 1332. Whether there was agreement, however, is irrelevant.