Court Opinion

ID: 9881925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:20:01.760253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.743161
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LEE LIFENG HSU                               )
& JANE YUCHEN HSU,                           )
                                             )
             Plaintiffs,                     )
                                             )            C.A. No. N23C-05-052 FJJ
      v.                                     )
                                             )
JACLYN B. WOOTERS                            )
& DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND                   )
SOCIAL SERVICES (DHSS),                      )
                                             )
                Defendants.
                              Submitted: September 27, 2023
                               Decided: October 3, 2023

               ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

        Upon consideration of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant, Delaware

  Department of Health and Social Services (“DHSS”), it appears to the Court that:

        1.      On March 21, 2023, Jane Hsu and her dog, “Kiki,” were attacked by

  another dog owned by the codefendant, Jaclyn Wooters, who left the scene of the

  incident shortly thereafter. As a result of the incident, Jane Hsu suffered injuries

  and her cell phone was broken. Jane Hsu called her husband, Lee Hsu, for help.

  Soon after, he arrived at the scene, and eventually called 911. Approximately 70

  minutes later, Sergeant Tammy Mosley from DHSS Office of Animal Welfare

  (“OAW”) arrived at the scene. At some point Mosely completed an incident report.

  Before and after Mr. Hsu received the report, he emailed Sergeant Mosely
regarding questions he had about the report and the application of Delaware dog

laws to the incident. After receiving the report, Mr. Hsu emailed Sergeant Mosely,

and called telephone numbers found on the back of the report, listed under the

“Victim Bill of Rights” paragraph, with questions. Mr. Hsu received different

answers to his questions.1

       2.     Mr. and Mrs. Hsu have sued DHSS and Wooters. Mr. and Mrs. Hsu

have not sued Mosley. The claims against DHSS are based on OAW’s failure to

enforce the applicable Dangerous and Potentially Dangerous Dogs law found at

16 Del.C. §3071F and DHSS’s violation of the “Victim’s Bill of Rights” found at

11 Del. C. §§9401-9420.

       3.     “When considering a motion under SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULE

12(b)(6), the Court’s task is to determine whether a plaintiff may recover under

any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof under the

complaint.”2 Under that Rule, the Court will:

                  (1) Accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true;
                  (2) Accept even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they give
                      the opposing party notice of the claim;
                  (3) Draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
                      party; and

1
  These allegations, which are taken from the complaint, must be accepted as true when
  considering a Motion to Dismiss.
2
  Vinton v. Grayson, 189 A.3d 695, 700 (Del. Super. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting SUPER. CT.
  CIV. R. 12(b)(6)).
                 (4) [Not dismiss the claims] unless the plaintiff would not be
                     entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of
                     circumstances.3

       “If any reasonable conception can be formulated to allow [p]laintiffs’

recovery, the motion must be denied.”4 If the claimant may recover under that

standard, then the Court must deny the motion to dismiss.5 This is because

“[d]ismissal is warranted [only] where the plaintiff has failed to plead facts

supporting an element of the claim, or that under no reasonable interpretation of

the facts alleged could the complaint state a claim for which relief might be

granted.”6

       4.     SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULE 9(b) requires those pleading negligence

to do so with particularity—a heightened pleading standard.7 The particularity

requirement is not satisfied with general statements or conclusions.8 Gross

negligence requires a showing of negligence that is a higher level of negligence

representing extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care.9 Wanton

conduct requires a showing of an “I don’t care” attitude.10 A recitation of

3
  Id. (quoting Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535
   (Del. 2011)).
4
   Id. (citing Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 535).
5
   Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978).
6
   Hedenberg v. Raber, 2004 WL 2191164, at *1 (Del. Super. Aug. 20, 2004) (citation
    omitted).
7
   SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 9(b).
8
   Jackson v. Delaware Office of Animal Welfare, 2017 WL 4082756 (Del. Super., 2017).
9
   Hughes v. Christiana School Dist., 2008 WL 73710 (Del. Super. 2008),
10
    Eustice v. Rupert, 406 A.2d 507, 509 (Del. 1983).
conclusory allegations is not sufficient to meet the particularity requirement when

the plaintiff has not provided any facts supporting a claim of willful or wanton

conduct.11

       5.      DHSS has moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ Complaint on a number

of grounds. The two relevant grounds here are: (1) DHSS’s position that the State

is immune from suit; and (2) the claim for gross negligence or wanton conduct has

not been pled with the required particularity.

       6.      The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity provides that the State may not

be sued without its consent.12 Such immunity may only be limited or waived by

“act of the General Assembly.”13 In order to overcome the State’s sovereign

immunity: (1) the State must waive immunity; and (2) the State Torts Claims Act14

must not otherwise bar the action.15 Plaintiffs are incorrect that a state agency may

be sued if the State Torts Claims Act is met. First, and as a condition precedent to

the recovery under the State’s Tort Claims Act, the state must waive immunity as

to a state agency.16

11
   Jackson v. Delaware Office of Animal Welfare, 2017 WL 4082756 (Del. Super. 2017).
12
    Doe v. Coates, 499 A.2d 1175 (Del. 1985); J.L. v. Barnes et. al., 33 A.3d 902, 913 (Del.
   Super. 2011).
13
    See Del. Const. Art. I, §9).
14
   10 Del.C. §4001.
15
    Doe, 488 A.2d at 1176-77; J.L., 33 A.3d at 913.
16
    McCafferty v. Delaware Department of Transportation, 2013 WL 6114832 (Del. Super.
   2013).
       There are two means by which the State, through the General Assembly,

may waive immunity: (1) by procuring insurance coverage under 18 Del.C. §6511

for claims cited in the complaint;17 or (2) by statute which expressly waives

immunity.18      Defendant has produced an affidavit of Debra Lawhead, the

Insurance Coverage Administrator for the State of Delaware. Lawhead’s affidavit

adequately demonstrates that the State has not procured insurance coverage for the

risks implicated by Plaintiffs’ claims. Lawhead avers that she reviewed Plaintiffs’

Complaint and that “the State of Delaware, and its agencies thereof, had not

purchased any insurance … that would be applicable in the circumstances and

events alleged in the Complaint.19 Moreover, Lawhead confirms that the “General

Assembly has not enacted any legislation pertaining to or allowing any possible

liability of the state resulting from the facts as alleged in said Complaint.”20

       Lawhead’s affidavit establishes that the State has not waived immunity with

respect to Plaintiffs’ claims against DHSS. She also confirms that no statute

waives immunity in this instance. Accordingly, the claims against DHSS must be

dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity.

17
    Id.
18
    Id.; see also Janawski v. Div. of State Police Dept. of Safety & Homeland Security, 2009
    WL 537051, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 27, 2009).
19
    See Exhibit 6 in support of Dependents’ Motion for Summary Judgment).
20
   Id.
       7.      In addition to the defense of immunity, Plaintiffs have not pled gross

negligence or wanton conduct with any particularity. The Court appreciates that

Plaintiffs have not yet sued Mosley and have indicated in their response to this

Motion that they have not sued Mosley. If the Plaintiffs decide to seek leave to

amend their Complaint to sue Mosley, the Court will consider that request.

However, Plaintiffs should be forewarned that any amended complaint will need

to be pled with more particularity than the present Complaint.21,22 An amended

complaint which merely substitutes Sergeant Mosley for DHSS will undoubtedly

be dismissed by this Court for failure to plead with the particularity required to

assert the claim of gross negligence and/or wanton conduct.

       8.      The Court has received and reviewed Plaintiffs’ response addressing

the relevant dog laws. The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ position, appreciates

the trauma suffered by Mr. and Mrs. Hsu, and understands the arguments and

requests being made. However, it must be noted, that in order for the Court to find

that a genuine issue exists in the current case, it is required that there be a case and

controversy.23 Further, for there to be a case and controversy, there must be a live

21
    THE STATE TORT CLAIMS ACT (10 Del.C. §4001) permits suit against a state employee if the
employee’s actions were: 1) ministerial; 2) done in bad faith; or 3) done with gross negligence
and/or wanton conduct.
22
   Wicks v. Delaware Veteran’s Home, 2023 WL 5497040 (Del.Super. 2023).
23
   In Re: Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services, 2023 WL 5527967 (Del. Super.
2023).
party on both sides of the argument.24 Here, due to issues of sovereign immunity,

as explained in paragraph 6, there fails to be a live party on both sides. The

Delaware Constitution, along with the legislature, severely limits cases in which

citizens can sue a state agency.

          9.      However, despite issues of immunity in this case, there is another

potential party against whom the Plaintiffs’ may assert their claims, Ms. Wooters.

Whether the ultimate fact finder will impose liability on Ms. Wooters, and to what

degree, is an issue for another day. However, the point to be made is that the

Sovereign Immunity Doctrine applicable in this case does not leave Plaintiffs

without any potential remedy.

          10.     For the foregoing reasons, DHSS’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

          IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                          /s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr.
                                                         Francis J. Jones, Judge

24
     Rollins Int’l Inc. v. Int’l. Hydronics, Inc., 303 A.2d 660, 662-663, (Del. 1973).