Court Opinion

ID: 9385558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 14:03:56.317818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.887966
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 21–1968

               Submitted January 19, 2023—Filed April 7, 2023

ROGER BLASDELL,

      Appellee,

vs.

LINNHAVEN, INC. and ACCIDENT FUND NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY/UNITED HEARTLAND,

      Appellants.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty,

Judge.

      An employer seeks further review from a court of appeals decision that

affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of the claimant in a workers’

compensation proceeding. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT

COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

      Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Waterman,

Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., joined. McDonald, J., filed a dissenting opinion,

in which Oxley, J., joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision

of the case.

      Laura Ostrander, Lansing, Michigan, for appellants.
                                  2

      Thomas M. Wertz and Mindi M. Vervaecke of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar

Rapids, for appellees.
                                       3

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice.

      We must decide when a married couple’s separation results in spousal

desertion within the meaning of Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) (2017). Almost two

and a half years into their marriage, the wife in this case left the marital home

in Delhi in search of employment elsewhere. She ultimately accepted a position

in Cedar Rapids and moved in with a family friend. Meanwhile, the husband and

the wife’s son from a previous relationship moved for financial reasons to

Manchester, where the husband worked. The husband and wife never lived

together again, but they remained in contact, supported each other financially,

and never sought a divorce.

      A year after her move, the wife was permanently and totally disabled as a

result of a work injury and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. She

passed away from an overdose of prescription medication approximately four

years later. When the husband filed a claim for burial expenses and death

benefits as the surviving spouse, his wife’s employer and her insurer claimed he

was not entitled to those benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) because

he had willfully deserted his wife without any fault by her. The workers’

compensation commissioner agreed.

      On judicial review, the district court reversed the workers’ compensation

commissioner’s decision, concluding it was not supported by substantial

evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court, and we granted the

employer’s application for further review. For the reasons explained below, we

affirm the district court decision that there was not substantial evidence to
                                        4

support a finding that the husband deserted his wife without fault by her under

Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a).

      I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      Roger and Heather Blasdell long held a nontraditional relationship that

dates back to at least 1998. In March 1999, Heather gave birth to their daughter,

whom Heather and Roger placed in a guardianship with a maternal relative who

they felt was better able to address their daughter’s needs, including special

health issues. They eventually married on August 23, 2008, and lived together

with Heather’s teenage son from a previous relationship until January 2011,

when they separated largely for financial reasons. Heather had just lost her job,

and Roger could not afford their rent alone in Delhi. Unable to find another job

in the area, Heather moved to Clinton for a few months with only her clothes and

vehicle. Shortly thereafter, she moved in with a family friend in Cedar Rapids

and started a position there with Linnhaven, Inc., as a direct care provider. Roger

stayed in the Delhi home with Heather’s son for three to four months after

Heather left, but he could not afford to continue paying the rent. Consequently,

Heather’s son moved with Roger to Manchester, where Roger worked.

      Roger began dating another woman, Angela, in Manchester, and Heather’s

son later moved in with Heather in Cedar Rapids but continued to commute with

an uncle to attend school in Manchester. In 2011 and 2012, Roger filed his taxes

as “married filing separately.” He did not list Heather as a spouse on his 2012

Iowa return and listed himself as single on a W-4 form in 2011 and 2015.
                                               5

      On November 5, 2012, Heather sustained an injury while working at

Linnhaven, Inc., and sought workers’ compensation benefits from Linnhaven,

Inc., and its insurer, Accident Fund National Insurance Company/United

Heartland (collectively Linnhaven). Heather’s marital status was not an issue in

the workers’ compensation proceedings, but she stated during a January 21,

2014 deposition that she was legally married to Roger. However, she explained

that the pair were separated and had not divorced because of “money.” A deputy

workers’ compensation commissioner ultimately determined Heather was

permanently disabled as a result of the work injury and awarded Heather

workers’ compensation benefits for as long as she remained permanently and

totally disabled. The workers’ compensation commissioner delegated a deputy

workers’ compensation commissioner with the authority to issue a final agency

decision, which subsequently affirmed the prior decision.

      On September 9, 2016, Heather died from an overdose of a mix of

prescription medications quetiapine (Seroquel) and zolpidem (Ambien).1 Roger

filed a claim for death benefits as Heather’s surviving spouse and sought

reimbursement for Heather’s burial expenses, which he had paid. Linnhaven

asserted that Roger was barred from receiving death benefits under Iowa Code

section 85.42(1)(a), which states: “When it is shown that at the time of the injury

the surviving spouse had willfully deserted the deceased without fault of the

      1Whether   Heather’s death was accidental or intentional is not an issue in this appeal.
                                        6

deceased, then the surviving spouse shall not be considered as dependent in any

degree.”

      In a deposition on April 3, 2018, Roger stated that Heather was listed as

his emergency contact at work, the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, and

as a driver on his car insurance for two vehicles at the time of her 2012 injury.

He described his relationship with Heather as “kind of on and off.” According to

Roger, Heather would stay with him occasionally, and they continued to see each

other “[a]lmost weekly” even though they did not have a sexual relationship.

      Roger’s former girlfriend, Angela, was deposed on the same day. Angela

reported that she had dated Roger from July 2011 until July 2017 and lived with

him in a home they rented together from around 2015 until they ended their

relationship. She knew Roger was still legally married to Heather and continued

to communicate with Heather throughout her relationship with Roger. When

asked how often Roger would communicate with Heather, Angela stated, “It

didn’t come up too much, so I -- I would say maybe like once a month.” Angela

was not aware of any financial support that Roger may have provided to Heather.

      Roger’s claim went to hearing on May 15, 2018. Roger’s testimony was

similar to his deposition testimony. He reiterated that he and Heather separated

in January 2011 primarily for financial reasons but remained in contact. When

asked whether he recalled providing Heather with financial assistance after her

injury, Roger testified that he “would give her money almost weekly, anywhere

from 50- to 100-dollars.” In contrast, he rarely received financial assistance from

Heather.
                                        7

      Heather’s son testified next. He lived with Heather at the time of her injury

and recalled Heather and Roger maintaining “frequent conversations throughout

the week” during that time period. He elaborated that he did not “necessarily

know what they talked about” but knew “that they were in contact with each

other.” He continued, “And throughout -- after her injury, I had been present a

few different times when they had met up with each other.” When they met up,

Heather’s son recalled, “Sometimes it was just a -- have a conversation and check

up and see how everybody was doing. Sometimes it was Roger loaning my mom

money to help out with bills.”

      The deputy workers’ compensation commissioner who presided over the

hearing became unavailable before issuing a decision, so the workers’

compensation commissioner authorized another deputy to issue a proposed

decision. This deputy relied on the record and posthearing briefs in concluding

that “Roger had willfully deserted Heather without fault by Heather as of 2011—

before her underlying work-related injury”—and was thus not entitled to death

benefits under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). Roger requested a rehearing based

on the change in deputy commissioners after his hearing, arguing witness

demeanor was a substantial factor in the case. A deputy commissioner acting

with authorization from the commissioner granted this request “in an effort to

maintain the integrity of the contested case process before the agency.”

      The deputy who issued the first proposed decision presided over Roger’s

new hearing in July 2020. No new exhibits were permitted, and only Roger

testified, repeating much of what he had already stated in his deposition and the
                                            8

first hearing. The deputy found Roger “to be a generally credible witness” but

again determined that Roger was not entitled to death benefits because he

willfully deserted Heather. On appeal, a deputy commissioner acting with the

commissioner’s authorization agreed. The deputy bolstered this final agency

decision with the following summary:

             The record indicates that Roger and Heather intended to
      terminate their marriage relationship in January 2011. The record
      indicates Heather moved out of the house she shared with Roger at
      that time. Shortly after that in early 2011, Roger began a
      relationship with [Angela]. This was a relationship that lasted at
      least five years and included several years of cohabitation. The
      record reflects that after January 2011, Roger and Heather never
      lived together or had any sexual relationship. Given this record, it is
      found that Heather and Roger ended their marital relationship in
      January 2011. It is also found that Roger willfully and intentionally
      separated from Heather at that time.

            As noted in the record, the separation between Heather and
      Roger occurred due to financial reasons. Given this fact, it is found
      that Roger’s willful separation from Heather was without the fault of
      Heather.

      Roger petitioned for judicial review before the district court. The district

court reversed the agency’s decision, noting the agency’s “finding that both

parties intended to end the marriage suggests that Heather is not without fault.”

The district court remarked that both parties and the deputy commissioner

“seem to treat the questions of whether [Roger] and Heather were married at the

time of injury and whether [Roger] abandoned Heather as one in the same[;]

[t]hey are not.” (Footnote omitted.)

      In concluding Roger lacked the requisite intent to desert Heather, the

district court cited the following facts:
                                          9

      Claimant remained in the marital home with Heather’s child.
      Additionally, according to unrefuted testimony, Claimant attempted
      to contact Heather several times. Heather’s son testified that
      Claimant was successful, while [Angela] stated Claimant was
      unsuccessful in contacting Heather. Finally, while true that
      Claimant listed himself as single on his 2011 W4 form, Claimant
      stated on his 2011 and 2012 taxes that his marital status was
      “married fil[ing] separately.”

(Citations omitted.)

      The district court remanded the case to the commissioner for a ruling on

whether Heather’s death met the willful-injury exception under Iowa Code

section 85.16 to bar Roger from recovering survivor’s benefits. See Iowa Code

§ 85.16. Linnhaven appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals,

which affirmed the district court’s ruling. We subsequently granted Linnhaven’s

application for further review.

      II. Standard of Review.

      Iowa   Code      chapter    17A   guides   our   judicial   review   of   agency

decision-making to determine whether we reach the same result as the district

court. Chavez v. MS Tech., LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). In this case,

we are asked to determine whether the commissioner erred in concluding that

Roger deserted Heather without fault on Heather’s part under Iowa Code section

85.42(1)(a). This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact: the operative

facts that gave rise to the desertion claim present a question of fact, while the

question of law is inherent in the commissioner’s decision on whether those facts

support a conclusion that Roger “had willfully deserted [Heather] without fault

of [Heather]” at the time of her injury. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a); see Meyer v. IBP,

Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006).
                                         10

      We “are bound by the commissioner’s resolution of the first question—

finding the operative facts from the evidence presented—if supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 218. In

contrast, “the application of the law to the facts . . . can be affected by other

grounds of error such as erroneous interpretation of law; irrational reasoning;

failure to consider relevant facts; or irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable

application of law to the facts.” Id. Accordingly, “[w]hen the agency exercises its

discretion based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, we are not bound by

those ‘legal conclusions but may correct misapplications of the law.’ ” Id. at 219

(quoting Stroup v. Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1995) (en banc)).

      III. Analysis.

      In addition to arguing the district court erred in finding Roger did not

desert Heather, Linnhaven maintains: (1) we should affirm the district court’s

conclusion that the commissioner’s designee could issue the final agency

decision, and (2) we should find the doctrine of estoppel does not bar Linnhaven

from raising the defense of spousal desertion. Neither of those requests is

properly before us. Roger did not cross-appeal the district court’s conclusion that

the commissioner’s designee could issue the final agency decision, so there is no

dispute over this matter for us to resolve. Likewise, Roger is not claiming

Linnhaven is estopped from raising the spousal desertion defense, and the

district court declined to address the issue. Accordingly, we only address

whether the district court erred by finding Roger did not desert Heather.
                                        11

      In relevant part, Iowa Code section 85.31(1)(a) states, “When death results

from the [workplace] injury, the employer shall pay the dependents who were

wholly dependent on the earnings of the employee for support at the time of the

injury.” Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) establishes that a surviving spouse “shall

be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent upon the deceased employee”

unless “it is shown that at the time of the injury the surviving spouse had

willfully deserted the deceased without fault of the deceased, then the surviving

spouse shall not be considered as dependent in any degree.” Here, neither party

disputes that Roger and Heather were still legally married at the time of Heather’s

injury. Additionally, Iowa does not recognize common law divorce. See In re Est.

of Weems’, 139 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1966) (“[W]e know of no such thing as a

common law divorce, or divorce resting on nothing more secure than bigamy.”).

See generally Iowa Code ch. 598 (governing the dissolution of marriage). So, the

only question here is whether Roger willfully deserted Heather without fault by

her. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a).

      We have seldom had the opportunity to examine the spousal desertion

exception. In fact, the pertinent Iowa precedent analyzing spousal desertion in

workers’ compensation proceedings is from over a hundred years ago in James

Black Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Indus. Com’r, 173 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1919). There,

the husband left the marital residence after years of marriage due to “serious

financial difficulty” and traveled to find work. Id. Yet the husband and wife met

periodically, and the husband mailed money to the wife. Id. at 25.
                                        12

      We borrowed from fault divorce cases in concluding that the following

elements must exist to show desertion: (1) “the cessation of the marriage

relations,” (2) “the intent to desert,” (3) “a continuance of the desertion during

the statutory period,” and (4) “the absence of consent or misconduct of the party

alleged to have been deserted.” Id. at 24. In considering these elements, we held

that the wife had not deserted her husband simply because the parties agreed

to live apart. Id. at 25. As we explained, “[S]eparation and desertion are not

synonymous.” Id. Rather,

      the act [of desertion] is willful when there is a design to forsake the
      other spouse willfully or without cause, and thereby break up the
      marital union, deliberate intent to cease living with the other as
      spouse, abnegation of all duties of the marriage relations, the actual
      ceasing of cohabitation, and the intent to desert.

Id. Perhaps most importantly, we approvingly cited Iowa caselaw for the principle

that “if plaintiff consented to defendant living apart from him, there was no

desertion.” Id.; see also Day v. Day, 50 N.W. 979, 980 (Iowa 1892) (“If the

separation was by mutual agreement, there could have been no willful desertion,

and hence no divorce on that ground.”).

      With that legal background in mind, the district court correctly determined

Roger did not intend to desert Heather—especially without fault on Heather’s

part—under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a). Just as the husband in James Black

Dry Goods Co. left the marital residence due to “serious financial difficulty” and

traveled to find work, Heather left the Delhi residence that she shared with Roger

and her son to find work. See James Black Dry Goods Co., 173 N.W. at 25. Like

the husband and wife in James Black Dry Goods Co., Heather and Roger, too,
                                       13

maintained contact and helped each other financially. See id. at 24–25. Although

Roger engaged in a romantic relationship with another woman during this time,

there is no exception under the statute precluding a surviving spouse from

receiving workers’ compensation benefits for adultery. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1).

Nor is it within our authority to create such an exception. See The Federalist

No. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,

Gideon ed. 2001) (“[Courts] may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but

merely judgment.”). Significantly, Roger started this relationship months after

Heather chose to leave the marital home and move to Clinton and then Cedar

Rapids.

      Linnhaven argues this case is distinguishable because the couple in James

Black Dry Goods Co. exchanged “a number of letters and postcards,” while Roger

“was only able to produce a single page of messages from [Heather].” It also

argues there is not substantial evidence that Roger gave Heather money. True,

Roger only produced a single page of electronic messages from Heather. But

unlike the husband and wife in the 1919 James Black Dry Goods Co. case, Roger

and Heather had various means to interact beyond paper mailing—be it by

phone, text message, social media updates, and the like. They also were able to

travel to see each other by vehicle frequently and with relative ease, which was

not the case in the early 1900s when the husband and wife in James Black Dry

Goods Co. lived apart in different regions of the country. Anyway, Linnhaven’s

criticism of Roger for not providing more documentation to support his claims

about his relationship with Heather is misplaced because Roger has the
                                        14

statutory benefit of being presumed wholly dependent upon Heather as her

surviving spouse. See Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a).

      Further, despite Linnhaven’s many attempts to cast doubt on the

credibility of Roger’s testimony in its appellate brief, the deputy commissioner’s

rehearing decision specifically addressed Roger’s credibility. As the decision

summarized,

             Ultimately, given Roger’s consistent testimony throughout the
      entirety of the case, I find Roger’s behavior and outward manner to
      be forthcoming and straightforward. At no point on rehearing was I
      given the impression that he was attempting to conceal information.
      I therefore find him to be a generally credible witness and I find his
      demeanor reflects positively on his case.

“It is the commissioner’s duty as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of

the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and decide the facts in issue.” Arndt v. City of

Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394–95 (Iowa 2007). The deputy commissioner was

certainly in a better position to judge Roger’s credibility by participating in the

hearing and observing Roger’s testimony live than we are in our review of the

transcript and record as a whole.

      Notably, Linnhaven did not argue in its appellate brief that we should

apply a standard other than that set forth in James Black Dry Goods Co. to

determine whether Roger deserted Heather under Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a).

Nor does it argue that the statutory spousal desertion exception allows for the

deprivation of death benefits in cases of mutual abandonment between spouses.

Instead, Linnhaven only sought to differentiate this case factually from James

Black Dry Goods Co.
                                         15

      Now, Linnhaven tries to take a different route in its application for further

review by arguing that “the Iowa Court of Appeals erred in finding the appellee

did not abandon his spouse because the legal principles of spousal abandonment

have changed since the James Black Dry Goods Co. case was issued during a

time where at fault divorce was the legal standard in Iowa.” However, Linnhaven

does not elaborate on this claim further. In any event, it is well established that

“[w]e generally will not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief in

an appeal, let alone in an application for further review.” State v. Warren,

955 N.W.2d 848, 867 (Iowa 2021) (quoting State v. Shackford, 952 N.W.2d 141,

147–48 (Iowa 2020)).

      Moreover, although our laws governing marriage have since changed, it

still generally remains the case in workers’ compensation cases that “[m]ere

separation of a husband and wife, by itself, has not affected the right of a

surviving spouse to workers’ compensation benefits.” 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers’

Compensation § 166, at 192–93 (2013). Many states continue to examine the

same elements set forth in James Black Dry Goods Co. to determine whether the

surviving spouse willfully deserted the decedent. See, e.g., Robinson Foundry,

Inc. v. Moon, 503 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (“If a wife is living apart

from her husband and if this separation is a result of the husband’s deserting

the wife, she may still be constructively living with him and entitled to benefits.”);

Morrison ex rel. Bryant v. Indus. Comm’n, No. 1 CA–IC 09–0021, 2009

WL 4547027, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2009) (“Voluntary abandonment is

based on the surviving wife’s state of mind and is a question of fact to be
                                       16

determined by the ALJ from the wife’s ‘testimony coupled with the surrounding

circumstances and past history of the parties.’ ” (quoting Clark v. Indus. Comm’n,

460 P.2d 22, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969))); Midway Landfill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n,

304 N.E.2d 607, 609 (Ill. 1973) (“Here, although the husband had knowledge of

his wife’s adultery, nonetheless he visited her, had marital relations with her,

referred to her as his wife, discussed reconciliation with her, corresponded with

her, and at no time sought to institute divorce proceedings to terminate the

marriage relationship. In addition, the [wife] had not secured a divorce, had not

remarried and was not living with [her paramour] at the time of her husband’s

death.”); In re Way v. J & J Log & Lumber Corp., 797 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App.

Div. 2005) (“[A]bandonment in th[e workers’ compensation] context requires

proof that the separation was voluntary, unjustified, nonconsensual and

intended to be permanent.”); Rogers v. Univ. Motor Inn, 405 S.E.2d 770, 773

(N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“By the time of his death, the deceased had not stopped

drinking. It would defy justice to require that the appellant endlessly subject

herself to her husband’s violent behavior and alcoholism in order to qualify as a

widow under the Workers’ Compensation Act.”); Tatum v. Tatum, 736 P.2d 506,

509 (Okla. 1982) (“Although [the wife] didn’t know why [her husband] left, she

made it clear that he was always welcome home. . . . In the meantime, she

maintained the home they previously occupied together and kept her job as a

means of providing herself with a livelihood. She had not initiated a divorce suit

nor, to her knowledge, had he brought one against her.”).
                                        17

      For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected claims that a wife lost

her statutory status as the surviving spouse and thus could not receive her

husband’s death benefits “because she failed either to pursue her husband with

a view to bringing him back home or failed to follow him in his travels” after he

left the marital home. Tatum, 736 P.2d at 508. Comparable to Heather’s moves

to establish employment in this case, the husband in Tatum “revealed a

predisposition to wandering, short-term employment, discontent with jobs and

instability.” Id. Relevantly, the court observed, “The law would indeed be both

[naïve] and unrealistic if it expected a wife to abandon her only precious

possessions in a fruitless quest after an errant husband who had given no

indication of his desire to return and stay.” Id. In holding the wife was entitled

to the deceased husband’s death benefits as his statutory surviving spouse, the

court cited facts similar to this case. Id. at 508–09.

      Like the contact between Heather and Roger, the husband in Tatum

“communicated with [his wife] several times. He even returned to see her on

several occasions, but never to stay.” Id. at 509. Likewise, neither of them ever

sought a divorce. Id. Nevertheless, the husband entered into a relationship with

another woman, Gloria, established a common household with Gloria and two of

her children from another marriage, had a child with Gloria, and held himself

out as Gloria’s husband despite no legal marriage. Id. at 507. Yet the court

rejected Gloria’s claim that the wife was not entitled to the deceased husband’s

death benefits as his surviving spouse and remarked that the wife’s “status as a
                                        18

deserted spouse was not lost either by inaction or non-pursuit.” Id. at 508–09.

That is also the case here.

      We acknowledge that much of the caselaw nationally analyzing the

deserted spouse exception is based on an outdated view of marital relationships.

By all appearances, Roger and Heather made a mutual decision to live apart and

had an unconventional marriage at the time of Heather’s 2012 injury. But the

statutory language of Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a) is clear that the spousal

desertion exception only applies if at the time of Heather’s injury, Roger had

willfully deserted Heather without fault by Heather. This is where the dissent is

misguided in accusing us of “go[ing] out of [our] way to defeat rather than uphold

the agency’s decision.”

      The agency’s determination that Roger deserted Heather is not purely a

factual finding in which we must only decide whether that decision was

supported by substantial evidence. Rather, we must decide whether the agency

correctly applied those facts to the law, which specifically asks whether Roger,

as the surviving spouse, “willfully deserted [Heather] without fault of [Heather]”

at the time of her injury. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a) (emphasis added). “When the

agency exercises its discretion based on an erroneous interpretation of the law,

we are not bound by those ‘legal conclusions but may correct misapplications of

the law.’ ” Meyer, 710 N.W.2d at 219 (quoting Stroup, 530 N.W.2d at 443). Here,

the commissioner erroneously interpreted the law by conflating separation with

desertion and ignoring Heather’s fault in that separation. It is our job to correct

that misapplication of the law.
                                         19

      The district court aptly summarized how the statute operates, explaining,

“If Heather deserted [Roger], [Roger] would still be eligible for survivor’s benefits.

Likewise, if neither party deserted one another, [Roger] is eligible for survivor’s

benefits. If both parties deserted the marriage, then it cannot be said Heather is

without fault, so [Roger] would still collect.”

      Based on the facts before us, we cannot say that Roger intended to desert

Heather or that Heather is without fault for their separation. This is especially

so considering Heather initiated the separation through her choice to leave Roger

and her son in their marital home in pursuit of work in a different part of the

state. “The law would indeed be both [naïve] and unrealistic if it expected [Roger]

to abandon” his employment and home to follow Heather through multiple cities

in her quest for work. Tatum, 736 P.2d at 508. Other facts supporting our

conclusion include Heather and Roger’s continued contact after Heather left,

Roger’s 2011 and 2012 tax filings that list his marital status as “married filing

separately,” and Roger’s continued financial support of Heather at the time of

her injury.

      Accordingly, we agree with the district court that there is not substantial

evidence to support the commissioner’s finding that Roger deserted Heather

without fault by her under section 85.42(1)(a). Because the final agency ruling

concluded that Roger was not entitled to benefits under Iowa Code section

85.31(1)(a), it did not address Linnhaven’s claim that the willful injury exception

under Iowa Code section 85.16 bars Roger’s recovery of the benefits. Thus, we
                                        20

also agree with the district court’s determination that remand is appropriate for

the commissioner to make the factual findings necessary to decide this issue.

      IV. Conclusion.

      We affirm the district court’s ruling and remand to the workers’

compensation commission to determine whether the willful injury exception

applies.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT

AFFIRMED.

      Waterman, Mansfield, and McDermott, JJ., join this opinion. McDonald,

J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Oxley, J., joins. May, J., takes no part.
                                          21

                                                 #21–1968, Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc.

McDONALD, Justice (dissenting).

      Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), this court “must

‘broadly and liberally’ apply the agency findings in order to uphold, rather than

defeat, the agency’s decision.” Stephenson v. Furnas Elec. Co., 522 N.W.2d 828,

831 (Iowa 1994) (quoting Ward v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 304 N.W.2d 236, 237

(Iowa 1981)). Contrary to the IAPA and our longstanding precedents interpreting

the same, the majority seeks to defeat rather than uphold the agency’s decision.

The majority applies the incorrect standard of review and then compounds the

error by incorrectly applying the incorrect standard of review. I respectfully

dissent. I would vacate the decisions of the court of appeals and the district court

and would affirm the agency’s decision.

                                           I.

      The majority’s first error is that it applies the wrong standard of review.

See generally Ripperger v. Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 967 N.W.2d 540, 555 (Iowa 2021)

(Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting on ground

that “[t]he majority has applied the wrong standard of review”). The majority

states that desertion is a mixed question of law and fact, but the majority cites

no authority for that proposition. There is a good reason for the majority’s

omission: the majority’s statement regarding the standard of review is directly

contrary to controlling and persuasive authority holding that desertion is solely

a question of fact left to the finder of fact.
                                        22

      In the controlling case of James Black Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Industrial

Com’r, which the majority discusses at length, this court stated desertion is a

“question[] of fact.” 173 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1919). James Black Dry Goods Co.

went on to explain that in reviewing an administrative proceeding, this court

does “not pass upon questions of fact,” and if “the commissioner could have

found, under the evidence, even though there was a conflict therein,” desertion

or no desertion, “then there is no question for this court to pass upon.” Id.

      The conclusion that desertion is a question of fact makes sense because

desertion is a question of intent. “Desertion consists in the actual ceasing of

cohabitation and the intent in the mind of the offending party to desert the

other.” Nelson v. Nelson, 68 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1955) (quoting Parker v.

Parker, 55 N.W.2d 183, 185 (Iowa 1952)). Desertion can be shown by “intent to

cease living with the other as spouse,” “abnegation of all duties of the marriage

relation,” and an intent “not to return.” Parker, 55 N.W.2d at 185 (quoting

Tipton v. Tipton, 151 N.W. 90, 92 (Iowa 1915)). As a question of intent, desertion

“is a question of fact.” Conlin v. Conlin, 144 N.W. 1005, 1008 (Iowa 1914).

      James Black Dry Goods Co., Nelson, Parker, and Conlin are not outliers.

Other courts also hold desertion is a question of fact left to the discretion of the

agency or the finder of fact. See, e.g., Blache v. Blache, 160 P.2d 136, 144 (Cal.

Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (stating desertion “is entirely a question of fact”); Casale v.

Casale, 86 A.2d 568, 570 (Conn. 1952) (stating desertion is intent to cease

cohabitation with no mind to renew and “the question of intent is always a

question of fact” (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 43 Conn. 313, 318 (1876))); Stark v.
                                            23

State Indus. Acc. Comm’n, 204 P. 151, 158 (Or. 1922) (stating question of

desertion for compensation benefits “was a question of fact”); Roanoke Belt,

Inc. v. Mroczkowski, 455 S.E.2d 267, 271 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Kelly v.

Pendleton Constr. Co., 28 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Va. 1944), for the proposition that

“determination of wife’s desertion of marriage abrogating dependency . . . was

question of fact”); Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 367, 376 (1871) (stating desertion

“was a question of fact”).

      Because desertion is a question of fact, the correct standard of review

under the IAPA is substantial evidence review. The legislature has “vested the

commissioner with the discretion to make factual determinations.” Mike Brooks,

Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014). Courts are bound by these

factual determinations “if they are supported by ‘substantial evidence in the

record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa

Code § 17A.19(10)(f) (2009)). Substantial evidence is “the quantity and quality of

evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable

person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the

establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.”

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (2017). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely

because different conclusions may be drawn from the evidence.” Cedar Rapids

Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011). So long as there is

some evidence to support the finding actually made, a reviewing court must

affirm the agency’s finding of fact “even though [the court] may have drawn a

different conclusion as fact finder.” Id.
                                        24

      The agency’s finding that Roger deserted Heather is supported by

substantial evidence and should be affirmed. The agency found that Heather

moved and Roger did not follow her. After Roger decided to not move with

Heather, Roger began a relationship with another woman “that lasted at least

five years and included several years of cohabitation.” Roger and Heather never

had a sexual relationship after they ceased living together, and there is no

evidence in the record of his intent to resume a marital relationship with

Heather. It is well established that a person who ceases cohabitation with his or

her spouse and cohabits with another has objectively demonstrated an intent to

desert the marital relationship. See, e.g., Redditt v. McDonald’s Rest., 990 P.2d

759, 762 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (“[C]ohabitation with another may be indicative of

a changed character in the spousal relationship.” (quoting Tatum v. Tatum, 736

P.2d 506, 509 (Okla. 1982))); Tatum, 736 P.2d at 509 (stating “cohabitation with

another” is “outward recognition that the marriage relationship had come to an

end”); In re Est. of Talerico, 137 A.3d 577, 582 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (recognizing

state supreme court had held wife’s cohabitation with another man constituted

“open disregard” of marital relationship and thus constituted desertion) (quoting

In re Crater’s Est., 93 A.2d 475, 477 (Pa. 1953)); Petachenko v. Petachenko, 350

S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1986) (discussing lack of cohabitation and desertion).

                                        II.

      The majority’s second error is that it incorrectly applies the incorrect

standard of review. Even if desertion constituted an application of law to facts,

as the majority contends, this court is still required to afford the agency great
                                           25

deference in reviewing its application of law to facts. But the majority affords the

agency no such deference here.

      “The legislature clearly vested the agency with the application of the law

to the facts.” Drake Univ. v. Davis, 769 N.W.2d 176, 183 (Iowa 2009) (citing Iowa

Code §§ 86.14–.24 (2003)). Our review of an agency’s application of law to facts

is thus incredibly deferential. “We are required to give the agency appropriate

deference.” Id. (citing Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c)). When a party “challenges the

agency’s application of law to facts, we will not disrupt the agency’s decision

unless it is ‘irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.’ ” Neal v. Annett Holdings,

Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 526 (Iowa 2012) (quoting Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763

N.W.2d 842, 857 (Iowa 2009)).

             A decision is “irrational” when it is “not governed by or
      according to reason.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
      1195. A decision is “illogical” when it is “contrary to or devoid of
      logic.” Id. at 1127. A decision is “unjustifiable” when it has no
      foundation in fact or reason. See id. at 2502 (defining “unjustifiable”
      as “lacking in . . . justice”); id. at 1228 (defining “justice” as “the
      quality or characteristic of being just, impartial or fair”); id. (defining
      “just” as “conforming to fact and reason”).

Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 432 (Iowa 2010).

The drafter and leading expert on the IAPA, Professor Bonfield, explained that

this standard of review is essentially an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of

review. Id.; cf. Iowa Farm Bureau v. Env’t Prot. Comm’n, 850 N.W.2d 403, 432

(Iowa 2014) (discussing Professor Bonfield’s work in this area and describing him

as the “leading authority on administrative procedure law”).

      The agency’s determination that Roger deserted Heather and was not

entitled to death benefits was not wholly arbitrary and capricious. The limits of
                                        26

reasoned judgment are determined by the purpose of the statute at issue. This

statute was intended to provide death benefits to “dependents who were wholly

dependent” upon the wage earner. Iowa Code § 85.31(1)(a) (2017). Included

among these wholly dependent persons is the nondeserting “surviving spouse”

of the wage earner. Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a). The agency’s determination that

Roger—a working man, who was in no way financially dependent on his spouse,

who was not cohabiting with his spouse, and who was instead living with another

woman—was not a wholly dependent spouse entitled to spousal death benefits

is rational and reasonable. Indeed, the agency’s determination that a financially

independent man who was living with another woman was not a wholly

dependent spouse is better reasoned and better supported by the controlling and

persuasive precedents than the majority’s contrary conclusion.

                                        III.

      “The administrative process presupposes judgment calls are to be left to

the agency. Nearly all disputes are won or lost there.” Sellers v. Emp. Appeal Bd.,

531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). This court is “not

free to interfere with any agency finding where there is a conflict in the evidence

or when reasonable minds might disagree about the inference to be drawn from

the evidence, whether it is disputed or not.” Stephenson, 522 N.W.2d at 831.

Instead, this court “must ‘broadly and liberally’ apply the agency findings in

order to uphold, rather than defeat, the agency’s decision.” Id. (quoting Ward,

304 N.W.2d at 237). The majority goes out of its way to defeat rather than uphold
                                       27

the agency’s decision. The majority’s approach is contrary to statute, controlling

precedents, and persuasive precedents. I respectfully dissent.

      Oxley, J., joins this dissent.