Court Opinion

ID: 9634205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:05:19.899043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:58.284917
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
GRACI, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in concluding that the Commonwealth had failed to make out a prima facie case against the Appellees and join the opinion to the extent that it reverses the order granting the motion to quash the informations filed against them. I am unable, however, to join the majority’s discussion of the first issue raised by the Commonwealth as Appellant since I believe that the Commonwealth waived that issue by failing to include it in its statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). Contrary to the argument of the Commonwealth, this claim is not jurisdictional. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas clearly had the jurisdiction or competency to enter the order appealed from in this case although it may have lacked the power or authority to do so. As this is a question of power, rather than subject matter jurisdiction, this claim had to be raised in the Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement. Since it was not, it is waived. Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (1998).
¶ 2 There is no doubt that questions of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties at any time or sua sponte by the appellate court. Riedel v. Human Relations Commission of City of Reading, 559 Pa. 34, 739 A.2d 121, 124 (1999). As the Court observed in Riedel, however:
Jurisdiction and power are not interchangeable although judges and lawyers often confuse them. Jurisdiction relates solely to the competency of the particular court or administrative body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs. Power, on the other hand, means the ability of a decision-making body to order or effect a certain result.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 565 Pa. 1, 771 A.2d 721, 737 (2001) (same; citing Riedel).
¶ 3 We have previously had occasion to describe the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to review the decisions of the Philadelphia Municipal Court in the following manner:
[T]he common pleas court has jurisdiction to review an order of the municipal court, under both 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 932 and § 1123(a)(2). Section 932 addresses appeals from final orders to the courts of common pleas from minor judiciary determinations, in general.
§ 932. Appeals from minor judiciary
Except as otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters), each court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the minor judiciary established within the judicial district.
1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2, effective June 27,1978.
Section 1123 defines the jurisdiction and venue of the Philadelphia Municipal *163Court, specifically, and sets out in subsection (a)(2) the particular type of appellate review available to defendants following final determinations in municipal court.
§ 1123. Jurisdiction and venue
(a) General rule. — Except as otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of matters), the Philadelphia Municipal Court shall have jurisdiction of the following matters:
(2) ... In cases under this paragraph the defendant shall have no right of trial by jury in the municipal court, but shall have the right of appeal for trial de novo, including the right of trial by jury, to the court of common pleas.
See Commonwealth v. White, 228 Pa.Super. 23, 324 A.2d 469 (1974).
In Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 248 Pa.Super. 564, 375 A.2d 384 (1977), this court further recognized in a footnote that appeal may also be sought from municipal court to common pleas by the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari.
Section 26 of the Schedule to Article 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: ‘Unless and until changed by rule of the Supreme Court, in addition to the right of appeal under section nine of this article, the judges of the courts of common pleas ... shall have power to issue writs of certiorari to the municipal court in the City of Philadelphia....’ Although the Supreme Court, by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 159(e), has suspended the Act of Dec. 2, 1968, P.L. 1137, No. 355, § 6, 42 P.S. § 3006, the act which previously authorized courts of common pleas to issue writs of cer-tiorari to minor judiciary courts, the Supreme Court has not specifically abolished certiorari. We must therefore assume that the courts of common pleas retain the power to issue writs of certiorari to the Philadelphia Municipal Court in non-summary criminal cases.
Id. at 567, 375 A2d at 386.
In sum, the nature and scope of the review by the court of common pleas of orders entered by the municipal court is carefully delineated by statute.
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 419 Pa.Super. 481, 615 A.2d 740, 742 (1992).
¶4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently addressed the subject of subject matter jurisdiction and has reiterated:
Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the competency of a court to hear and decide the type of controversy presented. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. Appellee was charged with violations pursuant to the Crimes Code. Controversies arising out of violations of the Crimes Code are entrusted to the original jurisdiction of the courts of common pleas for resolution. Every jurist within that tier of the unified judicial system is competent to hear and decide a matter arising out of the Crimes Code.
Commonwealth v. Bethea, — Pa. -, 828 A.2d 1066, 1074 (2003) (citations omitted).
¶ 5 Thus it clearly appears that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas was competent to determine the issues before it in these criminal cases. The general class to which these cases belong is that arising under the Crimes Code as in Bethea. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas *164clearly is competent to determine such controversies. Bethea,2
¶ 6 It may be that the Commonwealth is correct that the common pleas court lacked the authority or power to entertain a motion to quash the informations on the basis that there was no prima facie case on an appeal for de novo trial. That is a question separate and apart from the court’s competency or jurisdiction to decide issues raised in criminal cases as the cases cited above make clear. The issue of the court’s power or authority had to be properly raised and preserved in the Rule 1925(b) statement for it to be considered on appeal. See Riedel v. Human Relations Commission of City of Reading, 739 A.2d at 124 (since issue was not jurisdie-tional, appellate court improperly raised it sua sponte and since claim was not raised in trial court it was waived under Pa. R.A.P. 302). Since the Commonwealth failed to state this issue in its Rule 1925(b) statement it is waived under Lord and we may not consider it. Accordingly, I would leave for another day the question of whether a defendant who is convicted in the Philadelphia Municipal Court may, on the basis of the Commonwealth’s failure to establish a prima facie case, file a motion to quash3 the informations filed in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas when the defendant seeks a trial de novo.
¶ 7 Though I am unable to join the majority in this portion of its Opinion, I hasten to join its proper resolution of the *165remainder of the case and, therefore, concur in the majority’s result.

. The division of labor in the City of Philadelphia between the Court of Common Pleas and the Municipal Court is of no consequence to the question of the jurisdiction or competency of the common pleas court. Despite that division, the General Assembly has provided that the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the matters specified in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1123(a)(2) (relating to jurisdiction and venue) and the assignment of cases between the two courts shall be determined by rule prescribed by the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
Section 10 of Act 1976, July 9, P.L. 586, No. 142, as affected by Act 1982, Dec. 20, P.L. 1409, No. 326, § 316, 42 P.S. § 20076. The Commonwealth places substantial reliance on the grant of jurisdiction in section 1123(a)(2) without recognizing the grant of concurrent jurisdiction made by the above-quoted enactment. While the order here at issue may have been entered in violation of a rule prescribed by the President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (an issue we need not decide), it was certainly not issued by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.

. Though denominated a "motion to quash,” the courts of the Commonwealth have regularly recognized that the true nature of a motion challenging the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence in failing to establish a prima facie case is a request for habeas corpus relief. Commonwealth v. Hess, 489 Pa. 580, 414 A.2d 1043 (1980); Commonwealth v. Burkett, 352 Pa.Super. 350, 507 A.2d 1266, n. 1 (1986) (same, citing Hess); Commonwealth v. Stein, 363 Pa.Super. 410, 526 A.2d 411, 413 (1987) (same, citing Hess). While I do not think that this issue is properly before us for the reasons set forth in text, I must take issue with the majority’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Nelson, 230 Pa.Super. 89, 326 A.2d 598 (1974), for the conclusion "that a trial court, following an appeal for a trial de novo from a municipal court determination, has jurisdiction to hear and rule upon a motion to quash.” Opinion, at 159. To be sure, the common pleas court in Nelson ruled upon (and granted) a motion to quash after an appeal for a trial de novo. At issue, however, was not whether the Commonwealth had established a prima facie case. Instead, the court had to determine if the Commonwealth could indict on an additional charge after the case had been appealed from the municipal court. We concluded that the common pleas court had that authority. Whatever the worth of the Nelson opinion, I do not believe that it provides any guidance on the question before the Court in this appeal (which I believe is waived).