Court Opinion

ID: 9705898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:25:52.512356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:19.159114
License: Public Domain

HOLLAND, Justice,
dissenting.
Of the thirty-seven states that sanction capital punishment, Delaware and Florida are two of only four states that provide for a jury override.30 The issue presented in Garden’s case relates to the death penalty *319statute that Delaware enacted in 1991, using the post-Furman31 Florida statute as a model.32 The operation of Florida’s jury override was discussed by the United States Supreme Court briefly in 1976 in Proffitt v. Florida,33 and at length in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida.34 When this Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1991 Delaware statute, we relied upon those holdings by the United States Supreme Court that had approved the Florida death penalty system.
In Proffitt, the United States Supreme Court discussed the Florida jury override and quoted from the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Tedder v. State. Pursuant to the holding in Tedder, the United States Supreme Court recognized that in order to sustain a judge’s sentence of death by overriding a jury recommendation of life, Florida required the facts suggesting a sentence of death to be “so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”35 The United States Supreme Court examined and upheld the facial constitutionality of the Tedder jury override standard in 1984 in Spaziano v. Florida.36
The Tedder holding is now well established as the cornerstone of the Florida jury override doctrine. The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that the Ted-der standard is rigorous, and that it has become more so in the years since Spazi-ano v. Florida was decided. This Court cited Tedder in 1992 in the Pennell opinion that resulted in the first Delaware execution following the enactment of the new statute.37

Florida Override Experience

Delaware adopted a death penalty statute in 1991 that was modeled on the Florida statute.38 Accordingly, the summary of the Florida jury override system in a 1991 law review article by Michael Mello is didactic.39 Table 1 that is attached to the Mello article shows that in the fifteen year span of Florida’s post-Furman statute, jury life recommendation overrides by trial judges were reversed in seventy-four percent of the cases by the Florida Supreme Court.
The same article then states that the figures in Table 1 become more significant when they are divided into three time periods. “From 1974 (when the first override case reached the Florida Supreme Court) until the end of 1983 (just before certiorari review was granted in Spaziano v. Florida), sixteen of sixty-two life overrides were affirmed. In 1984 and 1985 — during the pendency of Spaziano v. Florida in the United States Supreme Court and the year after Spaziano was decided — affirmances by the Florida court were significantly more frequent: twelve of eighteen (66.7%). *320But from 1986 through May 1990, only two of thirty-two (6.25%) were affirmed.”40
Therefore, in the four years that immediately preceded the enactment of the Delaware statute in 1991, death sentences imposed by jury overrides were reversed by the Florida Supreme Court in more than ninety-three percent of the relevant cases. Conversely, death sentences imposed by overrides of jury life recommendations survived appellate review in less than seven percent of the cases during that four-year period. According to a subsequent study, the Florida Supreme Court continues to affirm jury override death sentences in only a few cases.41
Garden is the first case, and may be the only case, in which this Court applies the Tedder standard to review a trial judge’s decision to impose a death sentence by overriding a jury recommendation of life.42 The Florida Supreme Court, however, has applied the Tedder standard in reviewing more than 140 jury override cases.43 Since very few death sentences imposed by jury overrides have been affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, it is logical for this Court to look at the facts in some of those Florida cases where the Tedder standard was applied and the judge’s decision to impose death by overriding the jury’s recommendation of life were affirmed.

Florida Mills Jury Override

The Mills case from Florida is significant for two reasons. First, the facts of the crime and the circumstances of the defendant are similar to the Garden case. Second, the trial judge’s jury override death sentence in Mills was not only affirmed on direct appeal in 1985, during the Florida Supreme Court’s statistical zenith in affirming jury overrides, but the jury override death sentence in Mills was also reaffirmed in 2001, diming the still extant nadir in the Florida Supreme Court’s override affirmance rate.
In 1979, Mills, then 22 years old, was convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery, and burglary. The facts set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in its 1985 opinion on direct appeal are as follows:
The evidence at the trial showed that Gregory Mills and his accomplice Vincent Ashley broke into the home of James and Margaret Wright in Sanford between two and three o’clock in the morning, intending to find something to steal. When James Wright woke up and left his bedroom to investigate, Mills shot him with a shotgun. Margaret Wright awakened in time to see one of the intruders run across her front yard to a bicycle lying under a tree. Mr. Wright died from loss of blood caused *321by multiple shotgun pellet wounds.44
After finding Mills guilty of first degree murder, burglary, and aggravated battery, and with the knowledge that the prosecution granted immunity to Mills’ co-defendant, Ashley, who testified against Mills, the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s jury override and specifically held that the jury override death sentence in Mills’ case met the requirements of Tedder v. State.45
We hold that the trial judge’s findings in support of the sentence of death even without the finding of especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, meet the Tedder standard. We find that the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. There are three valid statutory aggravating circumstances, and the trial judge has found there are no valid mitigating circumstances. The purported mitigating circumstances claimed by Mills, but not found by the trial judge, are not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances nor do they establish a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation. We conclude that the imposition of a sentence of death after a jury recommendation of life was proper in this case.46
In 2001, the Florida Supreme Court had the Mills jury override death sentence before it once again. According to Mills’ collateral attack on his jury override death sentence, Keen’s47 application of Tedder by the Florida Supreme Court constituted a new standard by which jury override eases are reviewed in Florida. In responding to Mills’ argument, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged:
In Keen, on the defendant’s direct appeal following his third trial, we applied the Tedder analysis. In applying Ted-der, we emphasized the fact that a trial court’s analysis in an override situation should focus on the record evidence supporting the jury’s recommendation and should not be the same weighing process that is used when the jury recommends death.48
The Florida Supreme Court then made three emphatic points in its 2001 Mills opinion. First, Keen is not a major constitutional change or jurisprudential upheaval of the law as it was espoused in Tedder.49 Second, Keen offers no new or different standard for considering jury overrides on appeal.50 Third, “we disagree with Mills’ contention that Keen offers a new standard of law and we reject the contention that Keen was anything more than an application of our long-standing Tedder analysis.” 51
The final three statements in the 2001 Mills opinion, however, are most significant in our review of Garden’s appeal. First, Tedder is the seminal case in Florida *322on jury overrides and remains so after Keen 52 Second, Tedder was properly applied to the Mills case.53 Third, Keen provides no basis for a reconsideration of the trial judge’s decision to sentence Mills to death by overriding the jury’s recommendation for life.54

Garden Jury Recommendation

Garden was convicted on three counts of Murder in the First Degree, Robbery in the First Degree, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and related charges.55 The jury’s unanimous finding, under a reasonable doubt standard, that Garden committed felony murder established the statutory aggravating circumstance rendering Garden eligible for the death sentence.56 The jury then recommended a finding that the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances by a ten to two vote on the intentional murder conviction and by a vote of nine to three on the merged felony murder conviction.57 The Superior Court was required to apply the Tedder standard by giving the jury’s advisory recommendation of a life sentence “great weight” and the Superior Court could override the jury’s majority recommendation only “if the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”58

Garden’s Aggravating Circumstances

The Superior Court determined that several aggravating circumstances were associated with the murder of Denise Rhu-dy by Garden:
1) Statutory Aggravator — Felony Murder- — The fact that Denise Rhudy was killed during the commission of an attempted robbery established the statutory aggravating circumstance of felony murder that rendered Garden eligible for the death sentence.59 This aggravating factor was established beyond a reasonable doubt by the verdict of the jury. The Superior Court judge described this felony murder as an aggravating factor of the highest magnitude because “Denise Rhudy was not accosted during the course of an unlawful transaction or for the purpose of taking contraband from her. She was an innocent, law-abiding citizen who was out for a night of amusement with friends when she was gunned down because she refused to give up her property to an armed robber. The judgment of the people of this State that a crime of this nature justifies imposition of the ultimate penalty cannot reasonably be disputed.”
2) Attempted Murder of Companion— After killing Denise Rhudy, Garden fired a shot at one of her companions, Stephanie Krueck. The bullet narrowly missed its target, passing instead through the sleeve of Krueck’s jacket. The Superior Court judge found that Garden probably did intend to kill Krueck. But most importantly to the Superior Court judge, “the shot fired at Krueck shows Garden’s willingness *323to take a second life.” Accordingly, the judge stated “this too is an aggravating factor of the highest order.”60
3) Lack of Remorse — The Superior Court judge found that Garden had shown no remorse for killing Denise Rhudy. The Court found this to be “evidence of a cold and pitiless character.” The judge determined that no reasonable person could consider Garden’s lack of remorse as other than an aggravating factor.
4) Criminal Record — Despite his relatively young age, Garden had amassed a significant criminal record. By age 24, Garden was eligible for a life sentence under Delaware’s habitual criminal statute.61 The judge noted that the Delaware habitual offender law reflects a strong public policy against releasing repeat offenders because of the threat they pose to society. The Superior Court judge concluded that “Garden’s status as an habitual offender is a non-statutory aggravating factor, which is firmly rooted in the public policy and law of this State. It is also a weighty aggravating circumstance.” The nature of Garden’s prior crimes was equally important to the Superior Court judge. All of Garden’s crimes involved some degree of premeditation, and all but two involved serious elements of violence and danger to the public. On two separate occasions, Garden was caught driving vehicles which he had stolen using burglary tools. In each instance, Garden led police on a high-speed chase through residential streets, exposing members of the public to injury. Each chase ended in a crash with Garden struggling against the police as they attempted to arrest him. Accordingly, the Superior Court judge determined that “Garden’s criminal record and habitual offender status are also aggravating factors of great magnitude.”
5) Character and Propensities — The Delaware statute requires the judge and jury to consider the character and propensities of the offender. The judge determined “the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from Garden’s criminal history amassed by the age of 24 is that Garden had a serious propensity for violent criminal conduct.” The judge found no reasonable basis for deeming Garden’s criminal record as other than a substantial aggravating factor.
An examination of the substance of the prior felony crimes committed by Garden revealed serious elements of violence and premeditated lawlessness. In fact, if he had only committed the armed robbery of Denise Rhudy, Garden was eligible for habitual criminal status. The Superior Court judge characterized Garden’s criminal history as an aggravating circumstance of “great magnitude.”
6) Incorrigibility — The Superior Court judge found that “consistent with Garden’s propensity for lawlessness, is his inability to conform to prison rules.” The judge determined that while most of Garden’s rule violations in prison were minor, three were for fighting and one for carrying an open razor. The Superior Court judge concluded that “these facts show Garden’s unmllingness to obey authority, which can only be taken as an aggravating factor.”
7) Victim Impact — The Superior Court judge determined that another aggravating factor was the impact of Denise Rhu-dy’s death on those around her, including her parents, with whom she was close; her best friend, who witnessed her murder; *324her ex-husband, who is now a single parent of four young children; and most compelling, her four children, who were aged 16 months to 14 years at the time of her murder. The Superior Court judge noted that Denise Rhudy was a wholly innocent victim selected at random. She was described as a good, decent and much-loved person who is missed by her family and friends. The judge saw “no reasonable basis for finding that the loss of such a person is not an aggravating factor.”

Garden’s Mitigating Circumstances

The Superior Court judge carefully considered the mitigating circumstances presented by Garden and determined that each of those claims of mitigation by Garden were entitled to little or no weight.
(1) Planning — Both of Garden’s original co-defendants, who testified against Garden, stated there was no prior plan to shoot or kill anyone. Garden contends that the absence of premeditated intent to kill anyone is a mitigating factor. The jury convicted Garden of both Intentional Murder in the First Degree and Felony Murder in the First Degree. The record is undisputed that Garden armed himself with a loaded weapon and planned to rob an innocent victim at gun point simply because he wanted money that night. When a plan to commit armed robbery at gun point results in death, it becomes felony murder. Rather than a mitigating circumstance, the General Assembly has classified felony murder as the statutory circumstance that made Garden eligible for the death sentence.
(2) Employment History — Garden asserts that his work history is a mitigating factor. The record provides facts on this subject only from June 1998 to the date of his arrest in December 1999. From June 1998 to July 1999, Garden was employed by a temporary agency and worked on assignment to various employees. Although the office manager described him as dependable, the agency’s records show that Garden worked intermittently for only about four months during the thirteen-month period. In August of 1999, Garden began working for a warehouse company, initially on assignment through a different temporary agency and then as a direct employee. A manager described him as a “good worker,” but-company records show that during his fourteen weeks of work, Garden was late 23 times and was reprimanded for insubordination. The Superior Court judge found no reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that Garden’s work history was anything other than a minor mitigating factor. Moreover, Garden’s ability to work aggravates his decision to support himself through a life of crime.
(3) Relationship with Girlfriend — Garden contended that his relationship with his girlfriend was a substantial mitigating factor. Garden became involved with Constance Webster in September 1997 and moved into her apartment in December. He moved out in April 1999 at her suggestion, but the relationship continued. Webster had four children when she began dating Garden and testified that he was a father figure to them and took care of them while she was working. She said he provided substantial financial support. The Superior Court judge determined that the record casts some doubt on Webster’s testimony. For example, Garden’s work history reflects that he could not have made any substantial financial contribution to the household. The record also demonstrates that Garden gave Webster items purchased with the credit cards stolen in the robbery the night before Denise Rhu-dy’s murder. Accordingly, the Superior Court judge concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the jury to consider *325this relationship a mitigating circumstance of substantial weight.
(4) Age — Garden was 24 years old when he murdered Denise Rhudy. Garden asserted that this age was a mitigating factor. The Superior Court judge concluded that, even if a juror found some mitigating value in Garden’s age, it is not reasonable for the jury to conclude that this factor could have been given substantial weight.
(5) Psychological Evidence — Garden’s psychological makeup is another factor that the Superior Court was asked to consider in mitigation. At the age of 23 months, Garden was afflicted with a serious and life-threatening illness, Histiocyto-sis-X. This illness required several months of hospitalization followed by a lengthy period of chemotherapy. It was resolved by the time Garden was age six or eight, but periodic follow-up examinations were necessary as a precaution against recurrence. This history was used as the basis for opinions offered by Dr. Charles Bean, a neurologist with special competence in children, and Dr. Alvin Turner, a licensed psychologist.
Dr. Bean saw Garden on two occasions, at a medical examination when Garden was eleven and in again August of 2000 while he was in prison awaiting trial. Dr. Bean testified that Garden was in good health and showed no after-effects of his childhood disease. He also testified that Garden had a performance IQ of 100, which is average, and a verbal IQ of 91, which is only slightly below average. Drawing on Garden’s medical and social history, Dr. Bean concluded: “Childhood experiences have shaped a gentleman with a personality of significant weakness and vulnerability, and he used significant denial to protect himself from self realization.”
Dr. Turner saw Garden on two occasions, once shortly after his arrest and once again shortly before trial. Dr. Turner, who conducted various psychological tests in addition to his clinical interviews, concluded that “Garden is best classified as a person with a personality disorder not otherwise specified.” He went on to say: “It is my belief that his childhood experiences are crucially involved in shaping a life-long pattern of behavior which are responsible for the characteristics which I have outlined above. These include utter helplessness, a pervasive sense of guilt, and a deep and pervasive sense of personal incompetence.”
Neither expert witness testified that Garden’s mental state impinged on his ability to recognize the wrongfulness of murder or to resist the urge to commit the crime. Certain testimony of Dr. Turner suggests that Garden acted with a cruel and brutal rationality. In fact, after killing Denise Rhudy, Garden later callously told his co-defendants that he had “shot the bitch because she wouldn’t give it up.”62 The Superior Court judge found that the psychological evidence did not provide a rational basis for concluding that Garden’s mental status was a mitigating factor, and a contrary conclusion by a juror would have been unreasonable.
(6)Disparate Treatment of Garden Accomplice — Garden argued that another mitigating circumstance is the fact that his co-defendant, Johnson, was allowed to plead guilty to non-capital murder. Jury recommendations against the death penalty, which may have been based on a desire to provide equality in sentencing, were considered by the Florida Supreme Court in Eutzy v. State.63 In that case, the *326Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that it has upheld the reasonableness of jury recommendations of life which could have been based, to some degree, on the treatment accorded one equally culpable of the murder.64 In summarizing its cases that had reversed the judge’s decision to override the jury recommendation, the Florida Supreme Court found: the accomplice was a principal in the first degree;65 the accomplice was the actual triggerman;66 the evidence was equivocal as to whether defendant or the accomplice committed the actual murder;67 or the accomplice was the controlling force instigating the murder.68 In each of those Florida cases, the jury had before it, in either the guilt or the sentencing phase, direct evidence of the accomplice’s equal culpability for the murder itself. The Superior Court judge concluded that the evidence in Garden’s case provided no basis upon which the jury could have recommended life imprisonment in order to prevent disparity in sentencing. The record reflects that it was Garden, rather than his accomplices, who inflicted the fatal shot. In Mills, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the jury override death sentence when the less culpable defendant was given immunity.

Garden Jury Override Death Sentence

The record in this case supports the Superior Court judge’s findings regarding the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The judge concluded that the aggravating factors were substantial and that the mitigating factors were ephemeral in comparison. The Superior Court judge in Garden’s case, like the judge in Mills,69 concluded that the purported mitigating circumstances claimed by Garden were not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and did not establish a reasonable basis for the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence. Accordingly, the Superior Court judge concluded the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. That conclusion by the Superior Court judge is supported by the record and is the product of a logical deductive process. The record reflects that Garden is a remorseless, incorrigible, violent habitual offender who committed an unprovoked cold-blooded murder of an innocent person who lacked the ability to defend herself, solely for pecuniary gain.

Other Analogous Florida Override Cases

The jury override death sentence imposed in Garden’s case is consistent with Mills and is consistent with jury override death sentences affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in other similar cases. In Echols v. State,70 the crime was felony murder. It occurred during the commission of a robbery and burglary in the home of the victim by a person previously convicted of violent felonies. Four aggrava-tors were found.71 In addition to the other *327factors, the trial judge found that, like Garden, the defendant failed to exhibit any remorse. In upholding the jury override, the Florida Supreme Court noted that lack of remorse could be used as evidence to negate mitigation.72 As with Garden, the defendant’s age was also addressed. The Florida Supreme Court noted that if age is to be afforded weight as a mitigating factor, it must be “listed with some other characteristics of the defendant or crime such as immaturity or senility.”73
In Burr v. State,74, the felony murder was committed during the course of a robbery of a convenience store and was cold, calculated and premeditated. As in Garden, the felony murder was committed “without any pretense of moral or legal justification.”75 The sentencing judge also found that the murder was committed to avoid a lawful arrest. Because of the presence of aggravators and the absence of any mitigation, the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial judge’s death sentence was the appropriate penalty, and the jury’s life recommendation was unreasonable.76
In Porter v. State,77 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed an override of a unanimous jury recommendation of life. The defendant, age 22, murdered an elderly man and his wife. As with Garden, the felony murder occurred during the commission of a robbery. The sentencing judge found three aggravating factors, including that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, and that the defendant killed to avoid arrest. While some mitigating circumstances were found, the sentencing judge determined that those circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating factors and sentenced the defendant to death. In affirming the override, the Florida Supreme Court stated, “ ‘mere disagreement with the force to be given [mitigating evidence] is an insufficient basis for challenging a sentence.’ ”78

Conclusion

When this Court upheld the validity of the 1991 amendments to the Delaware Death Penalty Statute, we recognized that “the new law changed the roles of the judge and the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.”79 Pursuant to the 1991 amendments, the jury “functions only in an advisory capacity.”80 The 1991 amendments provide “the judge, after taking the jury’s recommendation into consideration, has the ultimate responsibility for determining whether the defendant will be sentenced to life imprisonment or death.”81
The Tedder standard requires a jury’s recommendation of life to be accorded great weight and to be followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. In Garden’s case, the Superior Court judge’s findings in support of his decision to impose a sentence of death, by overriding the jury recommendation of life, met the Tedder standard. In Garden’s case, the facts sug*328gesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Accordingly, I would affirm the Superior Court judge’s decision to override the jury’s verdict and to impose the death sentence.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

.Ala.Code § 13A-5-47(c) (1997); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (2001); Fla. Stat. ch. 921.141 (2002); Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998 & Supp.2003).

. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).

. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del.1992).

. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).

. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984).

. Proffitt v. Florida, 428, U.S. at 249, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975)).

. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 453, 104 S.Ct. 3154.

. Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del.1992).

. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 342 (Del.2003).

. Michael Mello, The Jurisdiction to Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 924, 937 (1991).

. Id. At 937. See also Cochran v. State, 547 So.2d 928, 933 (Fla.1989).

. Ken Driggs, Regulating the Five Steps to Death: A Study of Death Penalty Direct Appeals in the Florida Supreme Court 1991— 2000, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 759, 770 (2002).

. In 2003, the Delaware death penalty statute was amended and the Tedder standard for appellate review of jury override death sentences was eliminated. Therefore, Garden's case may be the only opinion in which the Delaware Supreme Court applies the Tedder standard to review a jury override death sentence. The Tedder standard for jury overrides is still the law in Florida. A similar proposal to remove the Tedder standard by amending the Florida statute was vetoed several years ago. See LaTeur Rey Lafferty, Florida's Capital Sentencing Jury Override: Whom Should We Trust to Make the Ultimate Ethical Judgment, 23 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 463, 483-84 (1995).

.See Scott E. Erlich, Comment, The Jury Override: A Blend of Politics and Death, 45 Am. U.L. Rev. 1403, 1405 (1996).

. Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172, 174 (Fla.1985) (emphasis added).

. Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975) (“a jury’s recommendation of life should be given great weight and should be followed unless the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”).

. Mills v. State, 476 So.2d at 179.

. Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263 (Fla.2000).

. Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 539 (Fla.2001).

. Id. at 540

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Del.Super.2001).

. Id. at 1028 & n. 1 (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(l)(j), (e)(2)).

. Id. at 1028.

. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 343 (Del.2003).

. State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1028 & n. 1 (Del.Super.2001) (citing Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(l)(j), (e)(2)).

. See Del.Code Ann., tit. 11 § 4209(e)(l)(k), which specifies the killing of two or more persons as a statutory aggravating circumstance.

. Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(a).

. State v. Garden, 792 A.2d at 1033.

. Eutzy v. State, 458 So.2d 755 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1045, 105 S.Ct. 2062, 85 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985).

. See McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1982).

. Herzog v. State, 439 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1983); McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1982).

. Barfield v. State, 402 So.2d 377 (Fla.1981); Slater v. State, 316 So.2d 539 (Fla.1975).

. Smith v. State, 403 So.2d 933 (Fla.1981); Malloy v. State, 382 So.2d 1190 (Fla.1979); Halliwell v. State, 323 So.2d 557 (Fla.1975).

. Stokes v. State, 403 So.2d 377 (Fla.1981); Neary v. State, 384 So.2d 881 (Fla.1980).

. Mills v. State, 476 So.2d 172, 177 (Fla.1985).

. Echols v. State, 484 So.2d 568 (Fla.1985).

. Id. at 576.

. Id. at 575.

. Id.

. Burr v. State, 466 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1985).

. Id. at 1052.

. Id. at 1054.

. Porter v. State, 429 So.2d 293 (Fla.1983).

. Id. at 296 (quoting Quince v. State, 414 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla.1982)).

. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 849 (Del.1992).

. Id.

. Id. (emphasis added).