Court Opinion

ID: 9531018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:22.06799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.329393
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent on the ground that the record before us does not reflect that the information demanded was not privileged. The affidavit of defendant’s attorney that such information zvas privileged, based on facts stated therein, has not been denied. In my opinion such affidavit reflects a privileged situation under the very criteria upon which plaintiffs’ counsel rely to defeat the privilege. They cite United States v. U. S. Shoe as their authority. The undisputed affidavit of defendant’s counsel fits into every slot of that case’s enunciated criteria, to determine privilege, there being IS of them. One of them is that the information was secured for the purpose of “(i) . . . (ii) ... or (iii) assistance in some legal proceedings . . . . ” The plaintiffs say (1) that the affidavit says the information was not privileged because acquired “in anticipation of litigation” and (2) that the criteria governs whether “the privilege is claimed by an individual or a corporation,” but “because of the unique characteristics of the corporate client there is a special rale regarding this privilege." 1
At to these assumptions, it is noted that the test laid down in the rule is said to be “for the purpose of securing . . . assistance in some legal proceedings,” — and plaintiffs urge that this means proceedings presently extant. This, of course, would mean that if defense counsel requested and obtained information from his client one day before the suit against such client is filed, it is not privileged, but if received five minutes after the court clerk rings up the complainant’s filing fee, defendant may enjoy immunity from disclosure by seeking sanctuary in the Church of Split Seconds. If such conclusion be true, its absurdity calls for euthanasia of the rule. The plaintiffs’ interpretation of U. S. v. U. S. Shoe (which didn’t interpret the rule that way, but simply said “some legal proceedings,” which may, in my opinion, connote either past, present or future legal proceedings) is contrary to someone else’s version, — and I prefer a version that would strengthen the attorney-client privilege rather than to have strangers wandering around law offices with rulish skeleton keys, opening confidential cabinets of counselors at law. In support of its urgence for disclosure and *317the espousal of an exception to the rule in the case of a corporation, plaintiffs cite the significantly named case of Radiant Burners v. American Gas to say, “Certainly the privilege would never be available to allow a corporation to funnel its papers and documents into the hands of its lawyers . . . and thereby avoid disclosure.” This aside is an unwarranted innuendo attributing deception to the corporation here and/or a suborning thereof by its counsel, — clearly not reflected in the record before us and consequently irrelevant. Hence, I consider plaintffs’ position in (1) and (2) above as being unproductive of any sensible answer to defendant’s claim that the information sought was protected under the privilege traditionally reserved in the attorney-client relationship.
It' is submitted that the result of the main opinion is to favor the destruction of professional expertise and alertness, compensate indolence, and abort a rule whose tenor seemingly is intended to nourish the attorney-client relationship, exceptions to which devour it. The uncontradicted affidavit pf counsel for defendant is watered down by irrelevant suggestions that what was said therein was insincere and an attempt, without warrant, to evade the very rule to which the main opinion renders lip service but discards by reference to matters dehors the record, and by citing authorities irrelevant to the fact and procedural situation here. It cites the iridescent case of Radiant Burners v. American Gas, — as did the plaintiffs, — to support the thesis that the subject information was not privileged. The same inference indulged by the plaintiffs, of deception on the part of defendant, finds approbation by the court based on something undiscoverable in this record.
In arriving at its conclusion the main opinion draws on a rule not thought of by the plaintiffs, — Rule 26(2) — having to do with the fact that “IF the judge finds that sufficent evidence, aside from the communication, has been introduced to warrant a finding that the legal service wa¿ sought or obtained in order to enable or aid the client to commit a crime or a tort . . suggests that there was “sufficient evidence” here, aside from the communication, to evince some sort of criminality and/or tortious conduct on the part of defendant in asserting the claim of privilege. There is not only not “sufficient evidence” here to support such a conclusion or argument, but there is no evidence to support it. When the main opinion says the “defendant cannot foreclose the discovery process by the simple expedient of funneling the matter into its counsel’s custody,” (where there is no evidence to support such conclusion) it not only implies some sort of crime or tort, but invites another observation. One might paraphrase such gratuity by saying, “This court cannot invoke the rules having to do with the discovery process by *318the simple expedient of funneling an irrelevant and nonexistent factual situation into the court’s custody.”
I think the trial court’s order should be reversed.

. This appears to be a yes-it-is but no-it-isn’t explanation of a simple logical problem rendered illogical.