Court Opinion

ID: 9953757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:02:52.780976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.400120
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Quijada CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B318184

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. KA013919)
         v.

RICHARD ROBERT
QUIJADA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge.
Affirmed.
      Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      I.     INTRODUCTION

      Defendant Richard Quijada appeals from an order denying
his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section
1172.6.1 We affirm.

                       II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Prior Proceedings

      1.    First Preliminary Hearing

      In January 1992, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office (the District Attorney) filed an information in
case number KA010081, charging, as relevant for purposes of this
appeal, defendant, Benito Gonzalez (Benito), Everett Gonzalez
(Everett), and Arturo Ruedas (Ruedas), with the murder of Juan
Lopez (§ 187, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon of Luiz
Figueroa (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), second degree robbery (§ 211), and
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211). The information
also alleged as a special circumstance that the murder was
committed while the defendants were engaged in a robbery.
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)
      Following the presentation of evidence at a preliminary
hearing, defendants moved to set aside the information pursuant

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated. The Legislature renumbered section
1170.95 as section 1172.6 effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we will refer to the statute by its
current section number only.

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to section 995.2 The prosecutor did not oppose the motion with
respect to the robbery special circumstance allegations against
defendant, Ruedas, and Benito. The prosecutor explained: “As to
[defendant], the only reason I’m not proceeding on him is that
there is a problem of proof at this time, and it seems to me to be
futile to go ahead and try and threaten him with the maximum
punishment when in fact I know that the evidence I have is
insufficient to support that, even though I do believe he is the
actual shooter.” The trial court struck the robbery special
circumstance allegation as to defendant, Ruedas, and Benito.
       The District Attorney subsequently dismissed the charges
against defendant and Ruedas from the information in case
number KA010081 and, in August 1992, filed an information in
case number KA013919, charging them with murder (§ 187, subd.
(a)), attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211), and second
degree robbery (§ 211). The information included a robbery
special circumstance allegation against defendant for the murder,
and alleged that defendant personally used a firearm during the
course of all three felonies.

      2.    Second Preliminary Hearing

      Following a second preliminary hearing, defendant moved
to dismiss the personal use of a firearm allegations and the
special circumstance robbery allegation against him. The

2      Section 995 provides that a trial court shall set aside an
information if, among other things, “the defendant had been
committed without reasonable or probable cause.” (§ 995, subd.
(a)(2)(B).)

                                 3
prosecutor agreed there was insufficient evidence to support the
allegations, and the trial court struck them.

      3.    Amended Information

      In November 1992, the District Attorney filed an amended
information against defendant and Ruedas for: murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1); attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211;
count 2); and second degree robbery (§ 211; count 3). The District
Attorney also alleged that a principal was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and that the crimes were committed in
furtherance of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1) & (2)).

      4.    Trial

            a.      Avalos

       Martin Avalos testified that on September 13, 1991, at
approximately 11:45 p.m., Avalos and a friend walked out of a
convenience store in El Monte and waved to their friends, Lopez
and Figueroa (the eventual murder and robbery victims). When
Avalos saw his two friends detained and attacked by defendant
and three other men, he ran toward them in order to render aid
to his friends.
       Avalos saw Sylvia Garcia sitting in a car parked near the
site of the attack. One of the attackers struck Lopez and another
hit Figueroa in the ribs and searched his pockets. After Figueroa
ran away from the attackers, one of the men yelled “Shoot him,
shoot him.” Avalos then heard Lopez say, “You shoot me if you’re
a man,” after which, a man walked up to Lopez and shot him in

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the chest. The four attackers then got into the car in which
Garcia had been sitting and drove away.
      Avalos knew three of the attackers, including defendant,
and knew they were members of a street gang.

            b.    Figueroa

      Figueroa testified that he was with Lopez when they were
attacked by four men demanding money. While Ruedas and
another man searched Figueroa, Lopez tried to defend himself
against the remaining two. When one of the men said, “give me
the gun,” another threw one to him. Lopez said, “shoot me,” and
the now armed man did so.

            c.    Garcia

      Sylvia Garcia testified that earlier on the day of the
shooting, Fernando Salazar (Salazar) showed her a gun. Later,
she, defendant, Ruedas, Salazar, Benito, Everett, and another
woman were driving in a car when they realized they did not
have enough money to purchase alcohol. Salazar suggested they
commit a robbery, and everyone in the car agreed. After Salazar
selected Figueroa and Lopez as the targets of the robbery, Benito
parked his car, and everyone got out. The men approached
Figueroa and Lopez while the women stayed near the car. Garcia
subsequently walked to where the robbery was occurring and
pulled on defendant in order to get him to come back to the car.
But defendant did not want to leave. At some point, Garcia saw
Salazar return to the car holding a gun. Salazar fired once in the

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air, and then shot Lopez. Everyone returned to the car and drove
away.
       Garcia admitted that defendant, Ruedas, Benito, and
Everett were members of a gang and she was an affiliate of the
same gang. Salazar, who was deceased by the time of trial, was
not a member of the gang. Garcia denied defendant was her
boyfriend.

            d.    Detective Burks

       Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Detective Gerald
Burks testified that Garcia told him she had grown up with
Ruedas, Everett, and defendant and had known them for years.
She also reported being defendant’s girlfriend; the two had
started dating a week prior to the shooting.
       Burks interviewed defendant, who admitted that everyone
in the car agreed to rob Figueroa and Lopez. When Burks told
defendant that the police believed he was the shooter, defendant
claimed this was a case of misidentification and that Salazar was
the shooter. The detective responded with skepticism because
defendant did not look “anything like” Salazar. When the deputy
asked defendant how someone could have mistakenly identified
defendant as having had the gun, defendant said his fingerprints
may be on the gun because he had touched a gun that Salazar
showed him earlier in the day. Further, defendant admitted to
saying “‘Give me the gun,’” but claimed that he did so as a
question, and was only repeating what Salazar had said. The
police never recovered the gun. Defendant admitted that after
the shooting, as he and the others fled in the car, he said words to
the effect of: “Fuck him, he deserved it.”

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            e.    Defendant

      Defendant testified at trial and denied engaging in a
robbery. Defendant claimed that Lopez was jumping around and
talking in a loud voice when Salazar shot him.

            f.    Ruedas

       Ruedas testified that he saw Salazar holding a gun prior to
the shooting. Ruedas denied knowing why the group got out of
the car. He also denied seeing a robbery or a fight. He heard a
gunshot, but did not know who fired the gun.
       Ruedas admitted that he previously told a detective that he
was the lookout for a planned robbery but now claimed that was
a lie. Ruedas also admitted that he told three different law
enforcement officers that defendant was the shooter, but refused
to do so in a tape-recorded interview.3 Ruedas explained that he
only identified defendant as the shooter to “get away from the
situation.” Ruedas believed he would be killed if he testified
against a fellow gang member.

      5.    Jury Instructions and Argument

       During the jury instruction conference, defendant
requested that the court deliver all the CALJIC instructions on
murder, rather than only the instructions that applied to a theory
of felony murder. The prosecutor objected, “Your Honor, it’s my
position that if there is not a robbery, these defendants are not

3     In the tape-recorded interview, Ruedas identified Salazar
as the shooter.

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guilty of anything.” He added that the delivery of jury
instructions on murder theories other than felony murder would
confuse the jury.
      The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection and
instructed the jury on aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01),
murder (CALJIC No. 8.10), and first degree felony murder
(CALJIC No. 8.21).
      The prosecutor argued to the jury that although Ruedas
had named defendant as the shooter, “it doesn’t really matter
whether you decide he was the actual shooter or he was there
assisting, aiding and helping what took place . . . .”

      6.    Verdict and Sentencing

      The jury convicted defendant and Ruedas of first degree
murder, second degree robbery, and attempted second degree
robbery, and found true the allegation that a principal was armed
with a firearm. The jury found the gang allegations to be not
true.
      The trial court sentenced defendant to 29 years to life in
state prison and we affirmed defendant’s conviction in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. Quijada (July 21, 1994,
B072776) [nonpub. opn.].)

B.    Section 1172.6 Petition

      In 2019, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition, asserting
that he was convicted under a felony murder theory or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and based on
amendments to sections 188 and 189, he could not now be

                                 8
convicted of murder. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent defendant, issued an order to show cause, and held an
evidentiary hearing at which the parties declined to call any
witnesses.
       The trial court explained that it would consider this court’s
prior appellate opinion affirming defendant’s conviction, the
reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts from defendant’s appeal, the
jury instructions and verdict forms from defendant’s trial, and
the appellate opinion from Everett’s appeal (People v. Gonzalez
(Sept. 29, 1994, B075164) [nonpub. opn.].)
       The trial court stated that it was acting as an independent
fact finder to determine whether the prosecution had proven,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of murder
on a currently valid theory of murder. The court then recited the
evidence presented at trial that demonstrated “one of two
individuals [was] the shooter: One being [Salazar], ‘Wizard,’ or
[defendant].” The court found the testimony of defendant,
Ruedas, and Garcia, identifying Salazar as the shooter, to be not
credible. In the court’s view, these witnesses falsely identified
Salazar as the shooter because Salazar was not a fellow gang
member, was a juvenile and would likely to be punished less
harshly, and was deceased at the time of trial. Further, the court
found that Garcia was not credible because her trial testimony,
that she had known defendant only a few months and was not his
girlfriend, was contradicted by Detective Burks.
       The trial court found that defendant was the actual killer,
observing that it did not “make any sense” that defendant would
ask, “give me the gun,” after Salazar supposedly said, “‘[g]ive me
the gun,’” if Salazar was the shooter. The court found that

                                 9
defendant therefore was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
Defendant timely appealed.

                        III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Any Error by the Trial Court was Harmless

         In his opening brief, defendant raised numerous challenges
to the trial court’s finding that he was the actual killer. We then
requested that the parties provide additional briefing on whether
the trial court’s ruling could be affirmed on any legal theory, and
whether substantial evidence supported a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant was a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Having
considered the parties’ arguments, we conclude that even
assuming the court erred in finding that defendant was the
actual killer, any such error was harmless. (See People v. Vance
(2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 706, 717 (Vance) [harmless error analysis
under state law standard applies to § 1172.6 proceedings]; People
v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 204 [we may affirm a court
ruling that is correct on any ground].)
         Section 1172.6 relief “is unavailable if the defendant was
either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of . . . Section 190.2.’ ( . . . § 189, subd. (e)(3) . . . .)” (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710.) On this record, it is not
reasonably probable that defendant would have enjoyed a more
favorable outcome in the absence of any assumed error because

                                   10
there was strong evidence that defendant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

      1.    Major Participant

       In determining whether the defendant was a major
participant in the underlying felony, “the ultimate question [is]
whether the defendant’s participation ‘in criminal activities
known to carry a grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently
significant to be considered ‘major’ [citations].” (People v. Banks
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803 (Banks).) Among the relevant factors
are the following: “What role did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role
did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons?
What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Ibid., fn. omitted;
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 611 (Clark).)
       Here, Garcia testified—and defendant admitted to
Detective Burks—that prior to the shooting, everyone in the car,
including defendant, agreed to commit a robbery. Although
defendant did not supply the gun used in the shooting, defendant
admitted to seeing and touching fellow robber Salazar’s gun on
the day of the robbery. Moreover, it was undisputed that
defendant was at the scene of the robbery and admitted during
his testimony that he observed the shooting. Finally, defendant

                                11
fled the scene of the robbery and shooting, and as he did so, said
that the murder victim “deserved it.” These factors demonstrate
that defendant was a major participant in the robbery and
attempted robbery.

      2.    Reckless Indifference to Human Life

         “‘[T]he culpable mental state of “reckless indifference to
life” is one in which the defendant “knowingly engag[es] in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death” [citation]
. . . .’ (People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 577.) ‘The
defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent
manner in which the particular offense is committed,
demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of
death his or her actions create.’ (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 801.) ‘[I]t encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant
does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his
actions.’ (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.)” (In re Loza (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 38, 51–52.)
         Among the relevant factors to consider in determining
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life are: (1) knowledge of weapons, and use and number of
weapons; (2) physical presence at the crime and opportunities to
restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) duration of the
felony; (4) the defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s likelihood of
killing; and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risks of the
violence during the felony. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–
623.) No one of the factors for determining reckless indifference

                                 12
“‘is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.’
[Citation.]” (Id. at p. 618.)
       As we note above, defendant admitted to seeing and
touching Salazar’s gun earlier in the day. Further, he traveled
with Salazar to the scene of the robbery. Thus, it is reasonable to
infer that he was aware that Salazar was armed with the gun
when defendant agreed to commit a robbery. Further, defendant
was present during the robbery and shooting but did nothing to
restrain the crimes from occurring. The duration of the crimes
also supports a finding of reckless indifference. This was not a
case of a robbery that immediately turned into a shooting.
Instead, during the course of the altercation, Figueroa was able
to flee from two of the attackers, Lopez fought with the other two
attackers and ultimately challenged one of the robbers to shoot
him, and the shooter asked for and was provided a gun by a
confederate. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620 [“Where a
victim is held at gunpoint, kidnapped, or otherwise restrained in
the presence of perpetrators for prolonged periods, ‘there is a
greater window of opportunity for violence’”].) Finally, defendant
did not minimize the violence. Not only did he refuse to leave
when Garcia tried to get him to do so, but he admitted that he
asked for a gun.
       On this record, defendant has failed to demonstrate that it
is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more favorable
result absent any error. (Vance, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 717.)

B.    Burden of Proof

      Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly
shifted the burden of proof from the prosecutor to him. Section

                                13
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) requires that “the burden of proof shall
be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the [defendant] is guilty of murder . . . under California law as
amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189. . . .” Whether the
trial court applied a statute properly is a question of law we
review de novo. (See People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
483, 495.)
       According to defendant, the trial court impliedly required
him to prove that there were more than two shooters and that
Salazar did not have the gun on him at the time of the shooting.
We reject defendant’s assertion. “It is a basic presumption
indulged in by reviewing courts that the trial court is presumed
to have known and applied the correct statutory and case law in
the exercise of its official duties.” (People v. Mack (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032; see Evid. Code, § 664.) Here, in reaching
its decision, the court expressly stated that the prosecutor was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was
guilty of murder. Absent an affirmative showing to the contrary,
we do not find that the court shifted the burden of proof.

C.    Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Defendant next argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by: failing to introduce certain evidence
that is the subject of defendant’s request for judicial notice (which
we have granted); failing to make the arguments that defendant
raises on appeal; and failing to make arguments that would
demonstrate defendant was not the shooter. We reject this claim.
       First, defendant’s contention that his Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated is

                                 14
meritless because “‘there is no constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel’ in state postconviction proceedings.”
(People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226.)
       Second, we disregard defendant’s assertion that he
nonetheless had a due process right to the effective assistance of
counsel, which was violated by counsel’s performance. By raising
this argument for the first time in his reply brief, he has waived
it. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.)
       Finally, even if defendant had a constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel during these postconviction
proceedings, he could not demonstrate prejudice. (See Strickland
v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [defendant must show
deficient performance by counsel prejudiced defense]; People v.
Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009–1010 [same].) We have taken
judicial notice of the records that defendant complains his
counsel failed to introduce in the trial court and those records do
not demonstrate prejudice. Further, we have affirmed the trial
court’s ruling based on defendant’s failure to demonstrate he was
prejudiced by the trial court’s actual killer finding. Thus,
defendant’s arguments concerning counsel’s purported failure to
challenge the trial court’s actual killer finding are not material to
the issue of prejudice. In any event, trial counsel is not
ineffective merely for failing to raise every possible argument.
(See People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211 [“A reviewing
court will indulge in a presumption that counsel’s performance
fell within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy”].)

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                        IV.   DISPOSITION

      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          KIM, J.

We concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             LEE, J.

     Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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