Court Opinion

ID: 9560791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:56:07.486669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:11.926920
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring).
I concur on the ground shown in the main opinion by Justice Worthen: that there was ample evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff, and although the evidence is such that the jury could reasonably have refused to so find, under our rule, as I understand it, it was within the discretion of the trial court to grant him a new trial. As to his power in that regard, I deem it meet to make some comments.
Attempting to give expression to the extent of the trial court’s discretion in granting new trials is fraught with difficulty. It is stated variously, ranging between two extremes: on the one hand, that the trial judge is an active participant in trying the facts and has the prerogative of setting aside a verdict which does not conform to his views; on the other, that the trial court should scrupulously keep hands off the fact-finding function which is the exclusive prerogative of the jury and should never interfere unless the evidence is such that he is required to do so as a matter of law.
The former point of view is reflected in Burke Greis Co. v. Ballard.1 “ * * * It is an unyielding and obligatory duty of the trial court to carefully weigh the entire judicial proceedings, * * * and, unless the verdict of the jury meets the responsive and affirmative approval and conscience of the court, * * * the same should be set aside and a new trial granted.” Under this point of view the trial judge entrusts little to the jury except the privilege of seeing if they can guess what he thinks is right. This is sometimes referred to as the “thirteenth juror” concept: In it the judge has the all important veto power whenever the verdict of the jury does not comport with his views. It is readily seen that if the trial judge follows such a pattern and will nullify the verdict, or a series of verdicts, until one is rendered which reflects his own judgment, in the hands of a strong-minded *440judge the vaunted right of trial by jury would be but a delusion and would afford no sanctuary from the will of officialdom for the aggrieved seeking justice, as trial by jury is purposed to do.
The other point of view, that the court should exercise extreme forbearance from interfering with jury verdicts is found in Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,2 “A court, vacating a verdict and granting a new trial by merely setting up his opinion or judgment against that of the jury, but usurps judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional [right of] trial by jury.” This seems to imply that the court should never disturb a verdict where it is sustainable as a matter of law. A modification of this restrictive view is that a new trial should not be granted where doing so goes against the weight of the evidence.3 With that idea I could agree if the weight of the evidence could be determined with the exactness with which we weigh beans or corn. But the testimony of witnesses is unfortunately not susceptible of any such precise measurement. The disparate views of the same evidence taken by jurors, trial and appellate judges are sometimes surprising, even bewildering. Witness the instant case: the jury found for the defendant; 'the trial judge disagreed, thinking strongly that the verdict was against the preponderance of the evidence; four judges of this court appear to agree with him; whereas, our learned colleague, Justice HENRIOD, agrees with the jury.
It seems likely that, as is often the case, the most practical and satisfactory policy to follow is to be found somewhere in the mean between the extremes. This is about what is reflected in the prior decisions of this court. They reflect the sound principle that the matter should rest pretty much within the sound discretion and good conscience of the trial judge.4 Supporting this view is the fact that Rule 59(a), giving the court power to grant new trials for insufficiency of the evidence, must import something more than the mere authority to do so when the proof is so lacking that there should have been a directed verdict. In the latter instance it is the court’s imperative duty not only to set aside the verdict, but to dismiss the action. Therefore, if any meaning is to be given to the provision that a new trial may be granted for insufficiency of the evidence, it must mean something other than the obvious duty just referred to, i. e., it must repose some discretion in the trial court to grant *441new trials for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, even where there is more than the amount necessary to make •out a prima facie case.
If the trial court is to fulfill his function of maintaining general supervision over litigation to see that justice is done, it is necessary that he have the power to set aside verdicts and grant new trials when that objective is not served. But such prerogative should be exercised with caution and forbearance consistent with his important and imperative duty to safeguard the right of trial by jury.5 The verdict, when supported by substantial evidence, should be regarded as presumptively correct and should not be interfered with merely because the judge might disagree with the result. The prerogative should only be exercised when, in the view of the trial court, it seems clear that the jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence so that the verdict is offensive to his sense ■of justice to the extent that he cannot in .good conscience permit it to stand.
It is appreciated that such a test has a high degree of subjective content for the trial judge and that this sometimes makes ■.it difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether he abused his discretion. Due to the considerations set forth above, and the advantaged position the trial court occupies with respect to the trial, the prior decisions of this court have been uniformly to the effect that the trial court has a broad discretion in ruling on motions for a new trial and that his action will not be disturbed in the absence of plain abuse thereof.
WADE, J., concurs in the views expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice CROCKETT.

. 200 Okl. 341, 193 P.2d 582, 585.

. 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1192.

. See Strode v. Strode, 194 Ky. 665, 240 S.W. 368, 27 A.L.R. 313.

. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068; King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 P.2d 692; Stack v. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594; see, also, Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826.

. See Stickle v. Union Pac. R. Co., 122 Utah 477, 251 P.2d 867.