Court Opinion

ID: 9847224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:56:13.083685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:03.828141
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority’s opinion holds: (1) this Court cannot consider plaintiff’s first argument challenging denial of summary judgment because a final judgment on the merits has been made; (2) the trial court did not err by allowing equitable distribution to proceed; (3) plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the trial court’s allegedly improper reliance on a Douglas Forms book; and (4) the trial court did not err by classifying plaintiff’s separate property as marital property. I concur in that portion of the majority’s opinion *40holding this Court cannot review a denial of a motion for summary judgment once a final judgment on the merits has been entered.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court properly allowed equitable distribution to proceed in contravention to a valid prenuptial agreement and properly classified plaintiff’s separate property as marital property. I vote to reverse and respectfully dissent.
I. Analysis
Plaintiff argues the parties’ prenuptial agreement waived the parties’ rights to equitable distribution and the trial court erred when it allowed equitable distribution and classified property acquired by the parties individually during their marriage as marital property. I agree.
The parties’ prenuptial agreement expressly states that each party “releases . . . all marital rights in the real estate and personal property . . . .” of the other spouse. (Emphasis supplied). The trial court specifically and correctly concluded: (1) defendant was not unduly influenced, coerced, or under duress when she signed the prenuptial agreement and (2) the prenuptial agreement was valid. Defendant did not cross-appeal any error in either of these conclusions and does not argue the invalidity of either conclusion.
“[T]he very existence of the [prenuptial] agreement evinces an' intention by the parties to determine for themselves what their property division should be . . . rather than to leave th[is] decision[] to a court of law.” Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 293, 354 S.E.2d 228, 233 (1987). “The value of such agreement[] lies in the ability to have [it] enforced in the courts.” Id. at 295, 354 S.E.2d at 235.
“Premarital agreements, like all contracts, must be interpreted according to the intent of the parties.” Howell v. Landry, 96 N.C. App. 516, 532, 386 S.E.2d 610, 619 (1989), disc. rev. denied, 326 N.C. 482, 392 S.E.2d 90 (1990).
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the contract is a matter of law for the court.
It is a well-settled principle of legal construction that it must be presumed the parties intended what the language used clearly expresses, and the contract must be construed to mean what on its face it purports to mean.
*41Hagler, 319 N.C. at 294, 354 S.E.2d at 234 (internal citations and quotation omitted).
The unambiguous language of the parties’ prenuptial agreement clearly established the parties’ intention to fully resolve “all marital rights in the real estate and personal property . . . .”
Where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, the construction of the agreement is a matter of law; and the court may not ignore or delete any of its provisions, nor insert words into it, but must construe the contract as written, in the light of the undisputed evidence as to the custom, usage, and meaning of its terms. If the plain language of a contract is clear, the intention of the parties is inferred from the words of the contract.
Hemric v. Groce, 169 N.C. App. 69, 76, 609 S.E.2d 276, 282 (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 359 N.C. 631, 616 S.E.2d 234 (2005).
“[T]he object of all interpretation is to arrive at the intent and purpose expressed in the writing, looking at the instrument from its four corners, and to effectuate this intent and purpose unless at variance with some rule of law or contrary to public policy.” Bank v. Corl, 225 N.C. 96, 102, 33 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1945). “Courts are not at liberty to rewrite contracts for the parties. We are not their guardians, but the interpreters of their words. We must, therefore, determine what they meant by what they have said-what their contract is, and not what it should have been.” Penn v. Insurance Co., 160 N.C. 399, 402, 76 S.E. 262, 263 (1912).
The language the parties used in the prenuptial agreement is clear and unambiguous. The trial court erred when it concluded the prenuptial agreement did not waive “all marital rights....” of the parties and allowed an equitable distribution of property.
II. Conclusion
The parties’ intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the unambiguous and valid written agreement. Corl, 225 N.C. at 102, 33 S.E.2d at 616. The plain and unambiguous language of the prenuptial agreement entered into by the parties fully disposed of “all marital rights . . . .” and bars equitable distribution. This Court cannot under the guise of judicial construction divine a different intent than that shown by the express terms of the binding agreement. Id.
I vote to reverse the trial court’s 31 July 2001 judgment that found the parties did not waive “all marital rights . ...” to an equitable dis*42tribution of their property and to vacate the trial court’s equitable distribution order entered 3 December 2004.1 respectfully dissent.