Court Opinion

ID: 9371078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 15:02:11.323992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.225666
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 67
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION IV
                                       No. CV-21-537

                                                Opinion Delivered February   15, 2023
 CITY OF SHERWOOD
                                APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
                                          COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
 V.                                       FIFTH DIVISION
                                          [NO. 60CV-18-453]
 CLINT BEARDEN
                                  APPELLEE HONORABLE WENDELL
                                           GRIFFEN, JUDGE

                                                REVERSED

                            N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

       The City of Sherwood has filed this interlocutory appeal from an order of the Pulaski

County Circuit Court denying the City’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of

statutory immunity. We reverse.

       Becky and Dwight McPherson filed a complaint for inverse condemnation against the

City on January 23, 2018.1 The complaint alleged that the McPhersons owned residential

real property at 6956 Waterview Place in Sherwood, and the City had placed rainwater

drainage pipes under the street near their property. The plaintiffs alleged that the pipes were

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         Both Becky and Dwight McPherson died during the pendency of the case. The
circuit court entered an order substituting Clint Bearden as plaintiff and ordered that the
case style should be amended to reflect the substitution.
not sufficient in size to handle the rainwater in the area, and the City’s failure to place

properly sized pipes near their property had resulted in repeated flooding of their home

despite the City’s assurances that the problem had been corrected. The plaintiffs claimed

that the City’s action had resulted in a “taking” due to the “continuous and systematic

trespass of water” onto their property.

       The City timely answered the complaint, denying any wrongdoing and asserting

various affirmative defenses, including statutory immunity. Following discovery, the City

filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there was no evidence that it was involved

in the installation of the pipes, that any inverse-condemnation claim was barred by the statute

of limitations, and that the City was immune from liability pursuant to the tort-immunity

statute because, although labeled as an inverse-condemnation claim, the claim actually

sounded in tort. The City attached exhibits, including excerpts from the plaintiffs’ responses

to interrogatories and depositions. In those exhibits, the plaintiffs stated that the initial

flooding occurred in July 2005. The plaintiffs admitted that they did not know if the City

had actually installed the pipes, but they claimed that the City had either approved the

installation or accepted it after the fact, thereby adopting the flooding problem. The City

also attached an affidavit from its mayor stating that the City “does not now, nor has ever

maintained any type of insurance coverage which could be utilized to compensate the

Plaintiffs in this matter for any damage they allege to have occurred based upon their cause

of action.”

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       In response to the City’s motion, the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment was

not appropriate because they had timely and sufficiently alleged a claim for inverse

condemnation with evidence that the City had created the flooding problem through

approval of the drainage system and had failed to fix the problem despite its duty to maintain

the drainage system. They attached excerpts of depositions from Richard Penn, the City’s

current city engineer; Ellen Norvell, the City’s former city engineer; Brian Galloway, the

City’s director of public works; and Virginia Young, the City’s mayor. In a supplemental

filing, the plaintiffs submitted a letter from a valuation service valuing their dwelling with

unrepaired damages at $0.

       In their depositions, Penn and Norvell testified that when a developer is creating a

subdivision and doing drainage work, the developer and a registered professional engineer

submit plans for the city engineer to approve. The city engineer checks that a developer’s

calculations and drawings have been created correctly and ensures compliance with the City’s

rules and regulations. Penn testified that the property at issue, in its undeveloped state, was

located in the path of water flow. Penn testified that he would have approved construction

of a house on that lot only after an engineer had provided him with a design sufficiently

dealing with the stormwater. Norvell testified that her office investigated the plaintiffs’

flooding problem and found that the original subdivision plans did not show a certain pipe,

and the office could not find subsequent documentation regarding when or why the pipe

was installed. While construction plans were supposed to go through the engineer’s office,

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Norvell noted that construction would sometimes occur on private property without the

City’s knowledge.

       Galloway testified in his deposition that he had been called out to the plaintiffs’

property on at least two occasions. Once was after a very large rain event when the

homeowner asked him to look at the situation, and Galloway checked the drainage boxes

for any obstructions. Galloway testified that the City maintains the existing drainage

structures that belong to the City and has done some maintenance on the plaintiffs’ street,

Waterview Place. Galloway said that he did not know of a solution to the plaintiffs’ flooding

problem. Young agreed in her deposition that it was the City’s duty to maintain the

rainwater and storm-drainage systems.

       Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the City’s motion for summary

judgment. The court found that the complaint was not barred by statutory immunity

because the plaintiffs had met proof with proof on the issue of inverse condemnation. The

court also denied the motion on the basis of the statute of limitations upon finding that

there was an issue of material fact on the issue of tolling.

       The City has now filed this interlocutory appeal wherein the City argues that it is

immune from suit and that the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations. We have

jurisdiction to hear the statutory-immunity issue pursuant to Rule 2(a)(10) of the Arkansas

Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil, which provides that “[a]n order denying a motion to

dismiss or for summary judgment based on the defense of sovereign immunity or the

immunity of a government official” is an appealable order. However, we lack jurisdiction at

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this time to hear on appeal any issue other than whether the circuit court erred in denying

summary judgment on the issue of immunity. City of Malvern v. Jenkins, 2013 Ark. 24, 425

S.W.3d 711. Accordingly, we do not address the City’s statute-of-limitations argument.

       Our law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a circuit court only

when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Malvern, supra. Once the moving party has

established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet

proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On appellate

review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the

evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material

fact unanswered. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against

whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id.

Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents

filed by the parties. Id.

       The City contends that, rather than stating a claim for inverse condemnation, the

plaintiffs have alleged a tort claim from which the City is immune.             Arkansas Code

Annotated section 21-9-301(a) (Supp. 2021) provides that

       [i]t is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all counties,
       municipal corporations, school districts, public charter schools, special improvement
       districts, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their boards,
       commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be immune from
       liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by
       liability insurance.

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The issue of whether a party is immune from suit is purely a question of law and is reviewed

de novo. City of Malvern, supra.

       Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to

recover the value of property that has been taken in fact by a governmental entity although

not through eminent-domain procedures. Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 301 Ark. 226, 783

S.W.2d 53 (1990). “Fault” has nothing to do with eminent domain, and it is not bare

trespass or negligence that results in inverse condemnation but something that amounts to

a de facto or common-law “taking.” Id. When a municipality acts in a manner that

substantially diminishes the value of a landowner’s land, and its actions are shown to be

intentional, it cannot escape its constitutional obligation to compensate for a taking of

property on the basis of its immunity from tort action. Id.

       The City argues that there was no evidence that it did anything to invade or trespass

on the plaintiffs’ property because there was no evidence that the City installed the pipes

that led to the flooding. The City acknowledges that it likely approved the drainage plans

for the subdivision, but it argues—based on Norvell’s deposition testimony—that those plans

did not match the drainage ways that ultimately were installed and allegedly caused the

flooding. We agree that the plaintiffs failed to offer any proof for the allegation in the

complaint that the City “placed” the pipes. Although the deposition testimony did establish

that the City would have approved the private developer’s subdivision drainage system, we

hold that the mere approval of the developer’s plans is not sufficient evidence of government

action that could constitute a taking. In Robinson, supra, the plaintiffs presented evidence

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that their home had, over a nine-year period, been flooded intermittently with effluent from

the sewer system constructed and negligently operated by the appellee, City of Ashdown.

Here, rather than alleging negligent operation by the City, the plaintiffs alleged a design

defect in that the pipes installed by the developer were too small to handle the stormwater.

As other jurisdictions have found, the City’s approval of a private development pursuant to

the City’s regulations should not give rise to liability against the City for the negligence of a

developer. See Phillips v. King Cnty., 968 P.2d 871, 879 (Wash. 1998). Further, even though

the City had undertaken maintenance of the drainage system, there is no allegation that a

lack of proper maintenance caused the plaintiffs’ damages. See id. Plaintiffs alleged only that

the insufficient size of the pipes led to the taking.

       We also agree with the City that the plaintiffs failed to put forth proof of any

intentional conduct necessary to establish a taking. In Robinson, supra, the supreme court held

that when one knows that an invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land

is substantially certain to result from one’s conduct, the invasion is intentional. Here, there

is no evidence that the City knew the plans it approved were substantially certain to lead to

flooding on the property. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex. 2005)

(holding that there was no evidence the City knew flooding was substantially certain to occur

when the City relied on engineers’ certifications that the plans met the City’s codes and

regulations and would not increase downstream flooding). Although the City does not

dispute that it was informed of the flooding after the fact, the plaintiffs have not alleged any

action constituting a taking beyond the initial approval and installation of the pipes. See id.

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Accordingly, there is insufficient proof of any affirmative government activity that caused

the plaintiffs’ damages and could constitute an intentional taking.

       We hold that the plaintiffs have failed to put forth sufficient proof to support an

inverse-condemnation claim, and the claim, at most, amounts to negligence. Because the

claim sounds in negligence, the tort-immunity statute is applicable. See City of McCrory v.

Wilson, 2022 Ark. App. 200, 644 S.W.3d 823. There is no genuine issue of material fact in

dispute as to whether the City is entitled to immunity on a tort claim. Arkansas Code

Annotated section 21-9-301(a) (Repl. 2022) grants immunity “except to the extent that [the

City] may be covered by liability insurance.” The mayor’s affidavit submitted by the City is

sufficient to establish that the City does not have insurance to provide coverage for the

plaintiffs’ claim. City of McCrory, supra. Because the circuit court erred in denying the City’s

motion for summary judgment as to statutory immunity, we reverse.

       Reversed.

       HARRISON, C.J., and GLADWIN, J., agree.

       Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., by: Tory H. Lewis, Andrew M. Taylor, and Tasha C.

Taylor, for appellant.

       The Brad Hendricks Law Firm, by: Lloyd W. Kitchens, for appellees.

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