Court Opinion

ID: 9578497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:45:48.62405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.281376
License: Public Domain

JOHN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority as to its disposition of the cases against defendant Michael Lynn Taylor and therefore concur in the reversal of cases 99 CRS 001926 and 001928. However, I am unable to join in the reversal of the trial court’s denial of defendant Gregory Lee Nowell’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in cases 99 CRS 001922-25.
Citing no authority in support thereof, the majority herein announces a new “de minimis” exception to the exigent circumstances exception to the general constitutional requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to execution of a search by law enforcement officers. However, the majority concedes that courts nationwide have recognized “the probable destruction or disappearance of a controlled substance” as an exigent circum*647stance excusing the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. See U.S. v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[t]his court has recognized along with many others that exigent circumstances will be present when there is an urgent need to prevent evidence from being lost or destroyed”). Indeed, “the possibility of destruction of evidence” constitutes one of “ ‘the most common and compelling bases that establishes] exigency.” U.S. v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128, 130 L. Ed. 2d 883 (1995); see also State v. Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 293, 607 N.W. 2d 621, 628 (“[m]arijuana and other drugs are highly destructible”), cert. denied, -U.S. —, 148 L. Ed. 2d 90 (2000).
In the case sub judice, the majority recites uncontroverted testimony that “Taylor and Nowell asked for rolling papers so that they could ‘smoke a joint.’ ” Law enforcement officers thereupon entered Nowell’s residence and the latter was observed “standing behind a brick of marijuana” and “trying to peel it open.” Although “concrete proof’ that evidence was “on the verge of [being] destroyed],” U.S. v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 945, 114 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1991), is not required, the destruction of evidence under the instant circumstances was indisputably imminent, see Sangineto-Miranda, 859 R2d at 1512 (warrantless entry to prevent loss or destruction of evidence justified if prosecution demonstrates: “1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that [] the destruction of evidence is [imminent]”).
Nonetheless, the majority imposes upon law enforcement officers and our already over-burdened trial courts the new requirement of factoring the probability of destruction of all, some, or only a small portion of the evidence, into the decision as to whether exigent circumstances may reasonably be considered to be present. See id. (“inquiry focuses on what an objective officer could reasonably believe”). Under the majority’s novel test, North Carolina courts and police, in attempting to make exigent circumstances determinations, must now climb the slippery slope of hair-splitting assessments of both the quantity and indeed the quality of evidence subject to probable destruction or disappearance.
In U.S. v. Rivera, 248 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2001), a case involving approximately fourteen hundred pounds of marijuana, the Seventh Circuit rejected a similar approach as follows:
*648Essentially, [defendant] asks us to adopt a rule that exigent circumstances do not exist until a substantial portion of the evidence is in danger of being removed or destroyed. We decline that invitation. First, it is a completely unworkable standard. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, we analyze the situation from the perspective of the officers at the scene [], and it is virtually impossible for officers to make the type of proportionality analysis recommended by [defendant]. Officers should not have to engage in a guessing game as to how much evidence has been removed or how much remains, before they can bring depletion to a halt. Moreover, even the destruction or removal of a relatively small amount of evidence can have significant consequences at sentencing, where the drug quantity impacts the sentence.
If we were to define exigent circumstances as requiring that a certain quantum of evidence is in danger of destruction or removal — a magic number that must be reached before they can end the depletion — we would be imposing an unworkable standard on law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions at the site.
Id. at 681 (citation omitted).
I agree with the majority’s statement in footnote 1 that the “evidence regarding the entry of law enforcement officers into Nowell’s residence is uncontroverted,” and its determination that remand for findings of fact is unnecessary. See State v. Lovin, 339 N.C. 695, 705-06, 454 S.E.2d 229, 235 (1995). Rather, based upon the uncontroverted evidence regarding the warrantless entry into Nowell’s residence and for the reasons stated above, I vote no error in cases 99CRS 1922-25.