Court Opinion

ID: 9947121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 18:13:09.159531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.117570
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00243-CV

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

                          EX PARTE P.A.E., AN ADULT

                    On appeal from the 92nd District Court
                         of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                  Before Justices Longoria, Silva, and Peña
                   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

      Appellant University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV) appeals the trial court’s

order granting expunction for appellee P.A.E. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02.

UTRGV argues that the trial court (1) abused its discretion when it granted the expunction

weeks prior to the hearing date originally set in the case; (2) abused its discretion in

granting the expunction when P.A.E. entered the same records he sought to expunge into

two sperate pending legal proceedings; and (3) erred by exempting from its order only
certain investigative records created before the arrest rather than all investigative records.

We reverse and remand.

                                    I.     BACKGROUND

       On January 14, 2022, P.A.E. filed a verified petition for expunction of records

related to his arrest for harassment. On February 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order

setting a hearing on the verified petition for March 31, 2022. UTRGV, as a public entity

named in the petition, received notice of the March 31, 2022 hearing date. On March 9,

2022, P.A.E. filed an agreed statement of facts between himself and the Hidalgo County

District Attorney’s Office (DA’s office), along with a proposed order for expunction. The

trial court granted the expunction on March 9, 2022, weeks before the scheduled hearing.

       UTRGV subsequently filed several motions to vacate and motions for new trial.

UTRGV was unable to secure a hearing, and its motions were overruled by operation of

law. This appealed followed.

                   II.    NOTICE & HEARING FOR EXPUNCTION PETITIONS

       By its first issue, UTRGV argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting

P.A.E.’s expunction order prior to the scheduled hearing date.

       A      Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       An expunction order requires governmental agencies to return, remove, delete, or

destroy all records of a person’s arrest and generally permits the person to deny the

occurrence of the arrest and the existence of the expunction order. See id. arts. 55.02–

.03. “A trial court’s expunction order is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the meaning

of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Ex parte R.P.G.P., 623 S.W.3d 313,

317 (Tex. 2021) (citing State v. T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d 617, 620 (Tex. 2018)). A trial court

                                              2
abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and principles or if its

actions were arbitrary and unreasonable. See Interest of A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282

(Tex. 2019); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.

1985).

         Article 55.02 states that the trial court “shall set a hearing on” the petition for

expunction “no sooner than thirty days from the filing of the petition and shall give to each

official or agency or other governmental entity named in the petition reasonable notice of

the hearing[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02, § 2(c). However, an evidentiary

hearing is not required if the petition seeking expunction can be decided on the paper

record alone. Matter of J.J.R., 599 S.W.3d 605, 613 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.);

see also Gulf Coast Inv. Corp. v. Nasa 1 Bus. Ctr., 754 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. 1988)

(noting that a “hearing” does not necessarily require either a personal appearance before

the court or an oral presentation to the court). A trial court may rule on an expunction

petition without conducting a formal hearing and without the consideration of live

testimony if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve the issues raised

by the petition. Ex parte Current, 877 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.—Waco 1994, no writ).

         The procedures listed in the expunction statute are mandatory and must be

complied with in the proceeding. Bargas v. State, 164 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, no pet.). If the record does not indicate that an agency

was notified in accordance with the statute, the proceeding is in violation of the statute,

and the expunction order must be set aside. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Soto, 285 S.W.3d

542, 544 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2009, no pet.) (setting aside expunction

                                              3
order because DPS, although a named agency in the petition, did not receive notice of

the expunction hearing).

        B.      Analysis

        UTRGV was notified of the original March 31, 2022 hearing date in accordance

with the statute, as it was a governmental entity named in the petition. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.02, § 2(c). However, the record is devoid of any subsequent

notices to UTRGV that the trial court intended to rule on P.A.E.’s proposed agreed order

with the DA’s office in lieu of holding the scheduled hearing. Further, UTRGV was not

served with a copy of the agreed statement of facts and proposed order prior to the trial

court granting the petition.

        Article 55.02’s notice requirement does not permit the trial court to reset the

expunction hearing without notice or to rule on a petition without affording the interested

agencies the allotted time to contest the petition. 1 See id. Because UTRGV was not

notified that the trial court was going to rule prior to the March 31, 2022 hearing date,

UTRGV was effectively denied notice of the resetting, and the expunction order must be

set aside. See Soto, 285 S.W.3d at 544; Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Deck, 954 S.W.2d

108, 112–13 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (setting aside expunction order

where DPS received notice of the first expunction hearing date but was not notified of the

reset date and DPS had not waived the notice requirement); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety v. Lozano, No. 13-08-00636-CV, 2009 WL 1975392, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg July 9, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (setting aside expunction order

       1 P.A.E. argues that UTRGV cannot now complain on appeal that it was deprived of proper notice

because “UTRGV had 21 days between being provided with notice of the hearing and the signing of the
Order of Expunction to file an answer or contest the suit.” However, because of the trial court’s actions,
UTRGV was deprived of over three weeks in which to answer or otherwise contest the suit.

                                                    4
because “nothing in the record show[ed]” that DPS received notice of the reset expunction

hearing). We further note that the DA’s office purported agreement with P.A.E. is not

binding on UTRGV because each law enforcement agency is entitled to represent itself

at an expunction hearing. Deck, 954 S.W.2d at 111–13.

       For all the above reasons, we sustain UTRGV’s first issue. As this issue is

dispositive, we need not address UTRGV’s remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

       We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

                                                             L. ARON PEÑA JR.
                                                             Justice

Delivered and filed on the
29th day of February, 2024.

                                           5