Court Opinion

ID: 9517315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:13:18.86646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:34.620260
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, P. J., and LORENZ, J., concur. SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE MEJDA delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant in the petition for rehearing and by a separate motion moved to stay the entry of our final ruling in this case pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson (E.D. Mo. 1976), 425 F. Supp, 600, revd (8th Cir. 1977), 567 F.2d 757, cert, granted (1978), 436 U.S. 943, 56 L. Ed. 2d 784, 98 S. Ct. 2843. We find no authority, nor has defendant cited any, that would justify a delay in entry of judgment. Although Supreme Court Rule 368 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 368) does provide for a stay of judgment in certain circumstances, those circumstances invariably involve further review of the case in which the stay is sought. Mindful of the general principle that we must decide cases according to the law as it exists at the time our decision is rendered (see, generally, Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 488, 348 N.E.2d 825; Merlo v. Johnston City and Big Muddy Coal and Mining Co. (1913), 258 Ill. 328, 101 N.E. 525; 3 Ill. L. & Prac. Appeal and Error §895 (1953)), we will not attempt to expand our power to stay judgments in order to allow speculation as to the development of the law in related cases. Nonetheless, some comment on Quick Point is appropriate. Quick Point involved a contract providing for payment of a royalty to an inventor by a manufacturer who was given an exclusive license to manufacture the inventor’s keyholder. A patent application was pending when the agreement was made, and the royalty was to be reduced if a patent did not issue. The invention was never patented, and the manufacturer sought to avoid payment of royalties. The trial court held the contract to still be in force. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that patent law protection was originally sought by the inventor and thus patent law principles were applicable. Those principles required that, although the contract was not expressly conditioned on the issuance of a patent, the protection afforded the unpatented invention could not exceed that which was available to a patented invention. Unlike Quick Point, no patent or patent application is involved here. In Quick Point the court pointed out: “Not only did Aronson [the inventor] not rely on trade secret protection, it is doubtful that her keyholder would have been entitled to any such protection.” (567 F.2d 757,761.) Plaintiff in the instant case relied solely on Illinois trade secret protection.  Our decision in this case is consistent with the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. (1974), 416 U.S. 470, 40 L. Ed. 2d 315, 94 S. Ct. 1879. In holding that Federal patent law does not preempt State trade secret law, the court recognized that Federal patent and State trade secret law have coexisted for over 100 years and stated: “Congress, by its silence over these many years, has seen the wisdom of allowing the States to enforce trade secret protection. Until Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free to grant protection to trade secrets.” 416 U.S. 470, 493, 40 L. Ed. 2d 315, 332, 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1892.  We find no conflict between our decision in the instant case and the principles of patent and trade secret law expressed to date by the Supreme Court. Our application of these principles to the instant case will not be changed by a decision in Quick Point which involves the inventor’s reliance on Federal patent law from the outset of the contractual relationship. Accordingly, we find no cause to postpone final ruling and we adhere to our modified opinion delivered on denial of appellant’s petition for rehearing. The motion to stay final ruling is therefore denied. Motion denied. SULLIVAN; P. J„ and LORENZ, J., concur.