Court Opinion

ID: 9616938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:50:49.078757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:03.828359
License: Public Domain

BROTHERTON, Justice,
dissenting.
A syllabus point not included in the majority’s opinion, but inherent in the logic of their decision might read as follows:
Where the trial court applies an incorrect sanction for a crime, this Court upon review will change the crime to fit the sanction. Facts tending to show which crime was actually committed are irrelevant and will not be explored on review.
Demonstrating this approach, the majority in this case set out the “purpose test” for distinguishing between criminal and civil contempt which we previously enunciated in State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W.Va. 660, 276 S.E.2d 812 (1981):
*138Whether a contempt is classified as civil or criminal does not depend upon the act constituting such contempt because such act may provide the basis for either a civil or criminal contempt action. Instead, whether a contempt is civil or criminal depends upon the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for the contempt and such purpose also determines the type of sanction which is appropriate.
The majority went on to paraphrase Robinson by noting that where the sanction “is to compel compliance with a court order by the contemnor so as to benefit the party bringing the contempt action” the proceeding is civil contempt. However, if the purpose is to punish the contemnor for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve or restore order in the court, the contempt is criminal. After setting out this test, the Court then completely ignored it. Instead, the majority looked to the sanction applied to decide the nature of the crime. In this case, the sanction was a prospective fine made payable to the State. This type of sanction is generally one for criminal contempt. The Court, therefore, pronounced the crime one of criminal contempt.
No attempt was made by the Court to look to the facts to see what crime might actually have been committed. Had the majority explored the facts, they would have found the case to be clearly one of civil contempt. The contempt action was unquestionably designed to benefit Massey. The action was brought by Massey and prosecuted by its attorneys to control picketers at Massey’s coal mines. The contempt was civil contempt.1
I feel strongly that where an incorrect sanction is applied for a transgression, this Court should alter the sanction and not the transgression.2 Because my brethren feel otherwise, I respectfully note my dissent.3
I am authorized to state that Justice Neely joins me in this dissent.

. The fact that this case had elements of criminal contempt as well as civil contempt does not change the nature of the contempt to criminal. Every contempt case, by definition, is an attempt to compel compliance with a court order. Therefore, even in the clearest of civil contempt cases, there will be some affront to the dignity of the court because its order was disobeyed. If this were to change the nature of the contempt to criminal, then there would be no civil contempt.

. We are not the first court to make this mistake in reviewing a contempt order. See generally, Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U.Cin.L.Rev. 677, 683-684 (1981).

.In the majority’s defense, their opinion is no more illogical than the law it interprets. There is no logical reason for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt. The distinction ■ serves no rational purpose and is the source of great confusion. Instead, we should review contempt procedures to see if the procedural safeguards were appropriate for the sanction imposed. See generally, Comment, Contempt of Court: Some Considerations for Reform, 1975 Wis.L.Rev. 1117.