Court Opinion

ID: 9738110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:53.153368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.760932
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s opinion that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff’s timely filed motion to vacate because it had made a finding pursuant to Rule 304(a). For 30 days subsequent to the entry of a judgment or final order, or until notice of appeal is filed, the circuit court retains jurisdiction over a case. (In re Estate of Tobin (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 965, appeal denied (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 541.) During the 30-day period, a circuit court may, through its inherent authority (Marshall Field & Co. v. Nyman (1918), 285 Ill. 306) or upon motion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 2 — 1202, 2 — 1203), vacate that order. A court loses jurisdiction when 30 days pass without a post-trial motion being filed (Fox v. Department of Revenue (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 358), or when a notice of appeal is timely filed (City of Chicago v. Myers (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 470). In the instant case, the circuit court entered a final order on February 23, 1987. Within 30 days, the plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the order. She never filed a notice of appeal. Thus, the circuit court retained jurisdiction to rule on her motion to vacate, and the ruling on the motion should stand. That the circuit court also made a Rule 304(a) finding at the time it entered the final order did not somehow divest the court of jurisdiction to modify its judgment within 30 days. Rule 304(a) was adopted simply to provide an easy method for determining when judgments or final orders as to fewer than all the parties or claims are appealable. It was not intended to immediately divest the circuit court of jurisdiction, or otherwise change the law regarding final orders and judgmerits. As the committee comments to Rule 304(a) provide: “Paragraph (a) of this rule was adopted as Rule 304, effective January 1, 1967, to supplant former paragraph (2) of section 50 of the Civil Practice Act without change of substance but with some amplification. The supplanted statutory provision, originally adopted in 1955 (Laws 1955, p. 2238, §1) to provide an easy method for determining when certain orders were appeal-able ***, proved to be anything but easy. *** In moving the provision to the rules, the Committee revised the language slightly *** to emphasize the fact that it is not the court’s finding that makes the judgment final, but it is the court’s finding that makes this kind of a final judgment appealable. This did not change the law.” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 304(a), Committee Comments, at 157 (Smith-Hurd 1985). See also Duncan v. Irwin (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 3 (citing the Committee Comments with approval). Further, the majority’s reliance on Elg v. Whittington (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 307, aff’d (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344, as support for its holding that a Rule 304(a) finding immediately divests the circuit court of jurisdiction, is misplaced. The rule established in Elg has no application to the instant case. In Elg, the court entered a final order concerning fewer than all the parties or claims and made a Rule 304(a) finding on May 2, 1985. On May 24, 1985, the third-party complainants moved to vacate the order. The motion was denied on June 28, 1985. On July 24, 1985, the third-party complainants filed a notice of appeal as to the May 2,1985, order. On appeal, the third-party defendants asked the court to dismiss the appeal for the third-party complainants’ failure to file notice of appeal within 30 days of the Rule 304(a) finding. The third-party complainants maintained the time for appeal was tolled by the filing of the post-trial motion. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the filing of a post-trial motion does not toll the time for appeal under Rule 304(a). In dicta, the court indicated that it is doubtful whether a circuit court retains jurisdiction overt a post-trial motion in the face of a Rule 304(a) finding. On appeal of the Elg decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, the higher court agreed with the appellate court’s initial rationale for dismissing the appeal, that a strict reading of Rule 304(a) does not allow the filing of a post-trial motion to toll the time for appeal, and affirmed. It was silent as to whether or not a finding under Rule 304(a) divests the circuit court of jurisdiction. The present case does not concern whether or not the plaintiff’s filing of a post-judgment motion tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal. The plaintiff never exercised her right to appeal pursuant to the Rule 301(a) finding. Rather, she chose to rely on her right to file a post-judgment motion (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1203), which was granted. It is clear that had the plaintiff’s post-judgment motion been denied, and had she then filed a notice of appeal, the appeal would have been untimely as established by Elg, but such is not the case. The majority's opinion succeeds in overturning the longstanding rule that a circuit court retains jurisdiction over a case for 30 days subsequent to the entry of a judgment or final order (In re Estate of Tobin (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 965, appeal denied (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 541, deprives the plaintiff of her right to file a post-judgment motion and alert the circuit court of possible errors (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1203; see also Elliott v. Willis (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 530), and denies circuit courts the opportunity to review possible errors of a judgment or final order once a Rule 304(a) finding is made. Accordingly, I dissent.