Court Opinion

ID: 9735249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:06:46.280556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:56.295448
License: Public Domain

MOLINARI, J.
I dissent for the reason that I do not believe it was the intent of the Legislature to make it a crime to sell an alcoholic beverage at less than the price stipulated in a fair trade contract. I am persuaded to this conclusion because the Legislature has made it eminently clear in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (Div. 9 of the Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 23000 to 25762, incl.) that when it intended therein to make a particular violation of the act a crime it has specifically and meticulously said so in unmistakable language. There are at least 37 instances in which a violation is specifically declared to be a misdemeanor.1 In three sections the *786offense is definitely designated as a felony.2 In three other sections it is stated that it is “unlawful” to do the things therein specified without any specific statement that it is a misdemeanor or felony to do so.3 And in another section it is provided that certain activity is “prohibited”4 without stating that it is a crime to do what is thus prohibited.5 It should also be noted that there are other sections which provide for seizure6 or forfeiture7 of alcoholic beverages, and one section which declares that it is a nuisance to do the things therein prohibited.8
Turning to section 24755, the statute particularly applicable to the violation of fair trade contracts, as it read at the times pertinent to the instant case9 we find that prior to September 15, 1961, the Legislature chose to use the following language: “All distilled spirits sold at retail shall be, and any other alcoholic beverage may be, sold pursuant to a contract executed pursuant to this chapter.... No licensee shall violate any of the provisions of any such contract.” (Italics added.) On September 15, 1961, the Legislature repealed section 2475510 and enacted an entirely new section bearing the same number and applicable to fair trade contracts. The said section, in pertinent part, now reads: “(a) No package of distilled spirits. .. shall he sold at retail in this State ... unless a minimum retail price for such package first shall have been filed with the department in accordance with the provisions of this section. ... (d) ... No retailer shall sell any package of distilled spirits as a loss leader. . . . (e) . . . No offsale licensee shall sell any package of distilled spirits at any price less than the effective filed price of such package unless written permission is granted by the department. ...” (Italics added.)11 It is significant that section *78724755 as it now reads, and as it read prior to its amendment in 1961, does not specifically declare or state that its violation is a misdemeanor or a felony, nor does it use the terminology “unlawful” in connection with its proscription. It is also noteworthy that with respect to the sale of wine12 below the minimum sales price the Legislature has specifically provided that the department may suspend or revoke a license for a violation of wine fair trade contracts subject to certain limitations.13 Again, in our probe of the legislative intent, we look at sections 25000 to 25004, inclusive, applicable to the selling of beer pursuant to a written schedule of selling prices, and we find that in such instance the Legislature has specifically provided that “any departure or variance therefrom• by a licensee is a misdemeanor,”14 (Italics added.)
It is readily apparent from a reading of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act that the Legislature has seen fit to declare certain violations to be a crime while others are merely subject to disciplinary action. The latter sanction is, of course, applicable where there has been a violation of a penal provision.15 The administrative disciplinary proceedings under the Act are covered by sections 24200 to 24301, inclusive.16 The power and authority to revoke and suspend licenses is likewise provided for in article XX, section 22, of the California Constitution.17 Such disciplinary proceedings are not *788criminal in nature, nor are they governed by the law applicable to criminal eases. (Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal.App.2d 178, 184 [273 P.2d 572].) As stated in Cornell, “The object of an administrative proceeding aimed at revoking a license is to protect the public, that is, to determine whether a licensee has exercised his privilege in derogation of the public interest, and to keep the regulated business clean and wholesome. Such proceedings are not conducted for the primary purpose of punishing an individual.” (P. 184.)
My colleagues, in reaching the conclusion that the selling of alcoholic beverages at less than the minimum retail sales price pursuant to fair trade contracts is a crime, have been persuaded by the peculiar language of section 25617, which provides that “Every person convicted for a violation of any of the provisions of this division for which another penalty or punishment is not specifically provided for in this division is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500) or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” (Italics added.) The language of the section is somewhat tautological, to say the least. It says in essence that a person convicted of violating the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, where no other penalty or punishment is specifically provided, is guilty of a misdemeanor. It is plain that before the penalty or punishment therein provided for can occur there must be a conviction. A “conviction” presupposes the existence of a criminal offense. A “conviction” is the “act of proving, finding, or adjudging a person guilty of an offense or crime. ...” (Webster’s Third New Internal Diet.) Conviction is the verdict in a criminal case; the ascertainment of guilt. (People v. Hurley, 155 Cal.App.2d 350, 352 [317 P.2d 1003] ; People v. Acosta, 115 Cal.App. 103, 107 [1 P.2d 43].) It is beyond peradventure that one cannot be convicted of a crime unless the offense has first been declared to be a crime. In the ease at bench the Legislature has not declared it to be a crime to violate the provisions of section 24755.
In my opinion, the terminology “is guilty of a misdemean- or” cannot make a crime of what has not been declared to be a crime. Section 25617, as I read it, has two objectives. Its main purpose is to provide for punishment for a misdemean- *789or where no other penalty or punishment has been specifically provided for. Of the 37 offenses specifically declared to be misdemeanors, only three provide for the punishment or penalty.18 Accordingly, section 25617 provides the penalty or punishment for the other 34 misdemeanors provided for in the act. The other objective of section 25617 is to make certain that all crimes for which a person shall have been convicted under the act for which another penalty or punishment is not specifically provided shall be deemed to be guilty of a misdemeanor, i.e., all crimes which have not by the act been declared to be felonies. It should be here noted that none of the particular statutes providing that the offenses therein described constitute a felony provide for a penalty or punishment. Such penalty or punishment is provided for in section 25618.
The effect of the majority opinion is to make every violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act at least a misdemeanor. This was not the intent of the Legislature. The apprehension of the majority that to hold that only those statutes which specifically declare the violation to be a misdemeanor are within the contemplation of section 25617 would leave other violations without punishment may, in my opinion, be allayed by what appears to be a clear legislative intent that the only sanction intended for the commission of a substantial number of violations of the act is that provided for by way of disciplinary proceedings looking to suspension or revocation of licenses. The majority expresses concern that the conclusion urged in this dissent would leave without penalty the three instances in the act wherein it is merely stated that “ [i]t is unlawful” to do a certain act.19 This assertion is likewise met, in my opinion, by what has been herein said with respect to the sanction imposed by disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, while an unlawful act is one expressly forbidden by law, it need not necessarily be punishable as a crime. “ ‘Unlawful is not synonymous with criminal. “. . . Every criminal act is illegal or unlawful, but illegal or unlawful acts may not be criminal.” ’ ” (People v. Ranney, 213 Cal. 70, 77 [1 P.2d 423]; see People v. Wilson, 78 Cal.App.2d 108, 114 [177 P.2d 567]; Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comrs., 169 Cal.App.2d 188, 200 [337 P.2d *790203]; and see Civ. Code, § 1667.20)
In order to comply with the constitutional requirement of due process of law, the crime itself which is prohibited and punishable as such must be clearly defined; it cannot be left to inference, implication, innuendo or surmise; and a statute setting forth certain acts as a criminal offense should be specific and not open to doubt. (MacLeod v. City of Los Altos, 182 Cal.App.2d 364, 368 [6 Cal.Rptr. 326]; California Gasoline Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Corp., 50 Cal.2d 844, 862 [330 P.2d 778]; Sharpensteen v. Hughes, 162 Cal.App.2d 381, 387 [328 P.2d 54].) Accordingly, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that the courts will not impose penalties for noneompliance with statutory provisions in addition to those that are provided expressly or by necessary implication. (City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 276 [339 P.2d 851, 73 A.L.R.2d 1420].) It is also axiomatic that when language is used in a penal law which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted. (People v. Ralph, 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401]; People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 143 [169 P.2d 1]; People v. Smith, 44 Cal.2d 77, 79 [279 P.2d 33]; People v. Stuart, 47 Cal.2d 167, 175 [302 P.2d 5, 55 A.L.R.2d 705]; Chessman v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 835, 843 [330 P.2d 225]; In re Tartar, 52 Cal.2d 250, 256 [339 P.2d 553].) It is not the judicial function, therefore, to make a crime of an offense which the Legislature has not specifically declared to be a crime. As stated in People v. Ralph, supra: “In other words, criminal statutes will not be built up ‘by judicial grafting upon legislation....’” (P. 581.) As I have pointed out above, section 24755 does not specifically define or set forth the acts therein mentioned as a criminal offense. As for section 25617 its language is doubtful, ambiguous and reasonably susceptible of two constructions so as to allow for a construction against its making a penal statute out of section 24755. In tracing the legislative history of section 25617, the majority opinion acknowledges that it is susceptible of two interpretations, but reasons that because each is reasonable, the construction reached by it is proper. It is submitted that this conclusion is not consonant with the policy applicable to *791the construction, of penal statutes in the light of the authorities above alluded to.
While not indifferent to the legislative history of section 25617, I am not in accord with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion that the Legislature intended to revert to a meaning similar to that expressed in the original enactment in 1933. That statute expressly and clearly made any violation of the act a misdemeanor. In its present form section 25617 is not so explicit or clear, but leaves in doubt whether it intends to make every violation of the act a misdemeanor. By its peculiar and ambiguous language it leaves the legislative intent subject to two reasonable constructions, and hence must be tempered to the rule hereinabove mentioned.
I am persuaded, moreover, that while the Legislature has delegated to wholesalers the authority to set prices by way of fair trade contracts, and while these prices are subject to be enforced by the sanction of license suspension or revocation, it was never the intent of the Legislature to make it a crime to violate such fair trade contracts. In Allied Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Cal.2d 141 [346 P.2d 757], the Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of fair trade contracts under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, held that the Legislature has power to provide for administrative sanctions with respect to a licensee who violates the fair trade provisions of the act. The Supreme Court, however, entertained reservations as to criminal sanctions. Said the court: “We need not determine whether the criminal sanctions are proper since such penalties were not imposed in this ease, and the provision authorizing them is severable.” (P. 150.) I am not unmindful that the majority rely upon dictum in Allied which is indicative of a recognition by the Supreme Court that section 25617 makes it a crime to violate fair trade provisions under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. The Supreme Court acknowledges that it was not called upon to make the determination now confronting us in this case, because no criminal proseetuion was involved there. The court was not attempting to construe section 25617, but was merely paraphrasing the actual wording of the section without placing it under the close scrutiny required in the instance of statutory construction. In any event, it is apparent from the language quoted above that while the Supreme Court did state that the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act “provides for administrative and criminal sanctions” (p. 150) with respect to fair trade contracts, it *792was not making any decision as to the propriety of criminal sanctions, but was leaving that question for future determination.
Accordingly, the peremptory writ should be denied.
The petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 30, 1963. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

§§ 23109, 23301, 23403, 23670, 25004, 25170, 25171, 25172, 25173, 25175, 25176, 25177, 25180, 25351, 25504, 25600, 25601, 25602, 25606, *78625607, 25608, 25609, 25610, 25614, 25615, 25616, 25619, 25630, 25631, 25632, 25633, 25656, 25657, 25658, 25661, 25662 and 25663.

§§ 23301, 25372 and 25603.

§§ 23404, 25235 and 25237.

§ 25664.

It should be particularly noted that this section is contained in an article (art. 3, §§ 25656-25665, inch), which contains 9 sections which relate to prohibited activity, 8 of which specifically state that the activity therein prohibited is a misdemeanor.

§§ 23666, 25174, 25236 and 25350.

§§ 23660 and 23668.

§ 25604.

Prom December 1959 to April 3, 1962.

See § 24755, legislative history.

The effect of the amendment was to incorporate rule 99 theretofore adopted by the department to supplement § 24755 pursuant to rule-*787making power granted by § 24757 with reference to fair trade contracts and price posting.

By amendment in 1961, the sale of wine was embraced within the provisions of § 24755. Prior thereto it was covered by separate provision. See § 24862.

§ 24880 as it now reads, and as it read at all times herein pertinent, provides as follows: “For a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or rules adopted pursuant to this chapter, the department may suspend or revoke a license as follows: (a) For a first offense, not exceeding 10 days’ suspension, (b) For a second offense, not exceeding 30 days’ suspension, (e) For a third offense, the department may suspend or revoke a license. ’ ’

§25004.

See § 24200, subd. (b), which provides in pertinent part, that “the violation or the causing or the permitting of a violation by a licensee of. .. any other penal provisions of law of this State prohibiting or regulating the sale ... of alcoholic beverages ’ ’ is a ground which constitutes a basis for the suspension or revocation of licenses.

The grounds for suspension and revocation are set out in detail in § 24200. These include the violation of any rules of the department as well as the violation of penal provisions. (See subd. (b).)

California Const., art. XX, §22, in relevant part provides: “The department shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny, suspend or *788revoke any specific alcoholic beverage license if it shall determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare or morals. ...”

§§ 25606 ($500 and or not more than 1 year) ; 25616 ($100-$1,000 and or 1 to 6 months) ; and 25656 ($100 and or 3 months).

§§ 23404, 25235 and 25237.

§ 1667 provides: "That is not lawful which is: 1. Contrary to an express provision of law; 2. Contrary to the policy of express law, though not expressly prohibited; or, 3. Otherwise contrary to good morals.”