Court Opinion

ID: 9425194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:14:02.550682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:53.981659
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
concurring in part.
Although I join Part I of the Court’s opinion and its judgment remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, I offer the following observations with respect to the question which the Court does not reach.
There can be no question that it would be sufficient for the Government to prove its case to show that Falstaff would have made a de novo entry but for the acquisition of Narragansett or that Falstaff was a potential competitor exercising present influence on the market. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States., 405 U. S. 562; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U. S. 568; United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U. S. 158; United States v. El Paso Natural Cas Co., 376 U. S. 651. But, I do not believe that it was a prerequisite to the Gov*539ernment’s case to prove that the acquisition had marked immediate, i. e., present, anticompetitive effects.
Section 7 evidences a definite concern for protecting competitive markets. It does not require “merely an appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in the future . . . .” United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 362. In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra, at 170-171, the Court said:
“The grand design of the original § 7, as to stock acquisitions, as well as the Celler-Kefauver Amendment, as to the acquisition of assets, was to arrest incipient threats to competition which the Sherman Act did not ordinarily reach. It follows that actual restraints need not be proved. The requirements of the amendment are satisfied when a ‘tendency’ toward monopoly or the ‘reasonable likelihood’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown.”
Moreover, we are concerned with probabilities, not certainties. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 323.
Falstaff acquired Narragansett in 1965. Prior to that time, Falstaff was the largest brewer in the country that did not sell in the New England market. It had stated publicly that it wanted to become a national brewer to allow it to compete more effectively with the existing national brewers. Falstaff has conceded in its brief that “given an acceptable level of profit it had the financial capability and the interest to enter the New England beer market.”
During the four years preceding 1965, beer sales in New England had increased approximately 9.5%. Nevertheless, the market had become more concentrated. In 1960, the eight largest sellers accounted for approximately *54074% of the beer sales; by 1964, they accounted for 81.2%. From 1957 to 1964, the number of breweries decreased from 11 to 6. In addition, there is evidence that two of the remaining breweries were interested in being acquired. And, by Falstaff’s own admission, “ [a] t the time of the acquisition, the substantial growth in the market shares of the national brewers was just beginning to occur.”
One of the principal purposes of § 7 was to stem the “ ‘rising tide’ of concentration in American business.” United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U. S. 546, 552. When an industry or a market evidences signs of decreasing competition, we cannot allow an acquisition which may “tend to accelerate concentration.” Ibid.; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra, at 346.
The implications of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act, 15 IT. S. C. § 18, are much, much broader than the customary restraints of competition and the power of monopoly. Louis D. Brandeis testified in favor of the bill that became the Clayton Act in 1914. “You cannot have true American citizenship, you cannot preserve political liberty, you cannot secure American standards of living unless some degree of industrial liberty accompanies it.”1 He went on to say2 in answer to George W. Perkins, who testified against the bill:
“Mr. Perkins’ argument in favor of the efficiency of monopoly proceeds upon the assumption, in the first place, and mainly upon the assumption, that with increase of size comes increase of efficiency. If any general proposition could be laid down on that subject, it would, in my opinion, be the opposite. It is, of course, true that a business unit may be too small to be efficient, but it is equally *541true that a unit may be too large to be efficient. And the circumstances attending business to-day are such that the temptation is toward the creation of too large units of efficiency rather than too small. The tendency to create large units is great, not because larger units tend to greater efficiency, but because the owner of a business may make a great deal more money if he increases the volume of his business tenfold, even if the unit profit is in the process reduced one-half. It may, therefore, be for the interest of an owner of a business who has capital, or who can obtain capital at a reasonable cost, to forfeit efficiency to a certain degree, because the result to him, in profits, may be greater by reason of the volume of the business. Now, not only may that be so, but in very many cases it is so.
“And the reason why . . . increasing the size of a business may tend to inefficiency is perfectly obvious when one stops to consider. Anyone who critically analyzes a business learns this: That success or failure of an enterprise depends usually upon one man ; upon the quality of one man’s judgment, and, above all things, his capacity to see what is needed and his capacity to direct others.”
That is why the Celler Committee reporting in 1971 on conglomerates and other types of mergers3 said that “Preservation of a competitive system was seen as essential to avoid the concentration of economic power that was thought to be a threat to the Nation’s political and social system.” 4 Control of American business is being transferred from local communities to distant cities *542where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or no relationship. As a result of mergers and other acquisitions, some States are losing major corporate headquarters and their local communities are becoming satellites of a distant corporate control.5 The antitrust laws favored a wide diffusion of corporate control; and that aim has been largely defeated with serious consequences. Thus, a recent Wisconsin study shows that “[t]he growth of aggregate Wisconsin employment of companies acquired by out-of-state corporations declined substantially more than that of those acquired by in-state corporations.” 6 In this connection, the Celler Report states: 7
“The Wisconsin study found, also, that 53 percent of acquired companies after the merger had a slower rate of payroll growth. Payroll growth, notably in large firms acquired by out-of-State corporations, was depressed by mergers. Inflation in recent years has markedly raised wages and salaries. It. would be reasonable to expect that payrolls in acquired companies, because of the inflation, would have advanced more than employment. In this connection, the report states: 'The fact that this frequently did not happen in companies acquired by out-of-state firms would lead one to believe that their acquirers have transferred a portion of the higher salaried employees to a location outside Wisconsin. Such transfers mean a loss of talent, retail expenditures, and personal income taxes in the economies of Wisconsin’s communities and the state.’ ”
*543The adverse influence on local affairs of out-of-state acquisitions has not gone unnoticed in our opinions. Thus “the desirability of retaining ‘local control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses” was our comment in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S., at 315-316, on one of the purposes of strengthening § 7 of the Clayton Act through passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act.
By reason of the antitrust laws, efficiency in terms of the accounting of dollar costs and profits is not the measure of the public interest nor is growth in size where no substantial competition is curtailed. The antitrust laws look with suspicion on the acquisition of local business units by out-of-state companies. For then local employment is apt to suffer, local payrolls are likely to drop off, and responsible entrepreneurs in counties and States are replaced by clerks.
A case in point is Goldendale in my State of Washington. It was a thriving community — an ideal place to raise a family — until the company that owned the sawmill was bought by an out-of-state giant. In a year or so, auditors in faraway New York City, who never knew the glories of Goldendale, decided to close the local mill and truck all the logs to Yakima. Goldendale became greatly crippled. It is Exhibit A to the Brandeis concern, which became part of the Clayton Act concern, with the effects that the impact of monopoly often has on a community, as contrasted with the beneficent effect of competition.
A nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream. So is the spawning of federal regulatory agencies to police the mounting economic power. For the path of those who want the concentration of power to develop unhindered leads predictably to socialism that is antagonistic to our system. See Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy — In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Col. L. Rev. 377 (1965).
*544It is against this background that we must assess the acquisition by Falstaff, the largest producer of beer in the United States that did not sell in the New England market, of the leading seller in that market.
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S., at 660, we indicated that “[t]he effect on competition in a particular market through acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or extent of that market and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company’s eagerness to enter that market, its resourcefulness, and so on.” Falstaff’s president testified below that Falstaff for some time had wanted to enter the New England market as part of its interest in becoming a national brewer. And Falstaff has conceded in its brief before this Court that “given an acceptable level of profit it had the financial capability and the interest to enter the New England beer market.” With both the interest and the capability to enter the market, Falstaff was “the most likely entrant.” FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U. S., at 581. Thus, although Falstaff might not have made a de nono entry if it had not been allowed to acquire Narragansett,8 we cannot say that it would be unwilling to make such an entry in the future when the New England market might be ripe for an infusion of new competition. At this point in time, it is the most likely new competitor. Moreover, there can be no question that replacing the leading seller in the market, a regional brewer, with a seller *545with national capabilities increased the trend toward concentration.
I conclude that there is “reasonable likelihood” that the acquisition in question “may be substantially to lessen competition.” Accordingly, I would be inclined to reverse and direct the District Judge to enter judgment for the Government and afford appropriate relief. Nevertheless, since the Court will not reach this question and I agree with the legal principles set forth in Part I of its opinion, I join the judgment remanding the case for further proceedings.

 Hearings on S. Res. 98 before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 62d Cong., Vol. 1, p. 1155.

 Id., at 1147.

 Investigation of Conglomerate Corporations, Report by the Staff of Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. Res. 161, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print).

 Id., at 18.

 Id., at 52-53.

 Id., at 53.

 Id., at 54.

 Falstaff contended below that a de novo entry would not be profitable. Management stated that an established distribution system was a prerequisite to entry. The District Judge concluded that “[t]he credible evidence establishes that [Falstaff] was not a potential entrant into said market by any means or way other than by said acquisition.” 332 F. Supp. 970, 972.