Court Opinion

ID: 9719722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:01:37.261378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.541820
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring). The Chief Justice has written in this case consistently with that which appears over his signature in Boyd v. Maruski, 321 *356Mich 71; Morse v. Bishop, 329 Mich 488; Ortisi v. Oderfer, 341 Mich 254; Buehler v. Beadia, 343 Mich 692, and Barron v. City of Detroit, 348 Mich 213. The doctrine espoused by him in such previous cases has .prevailed or failed by the gossamer weight of manufactured fantasy; that of arbitrary assumption — as in this case — that the luckless plaintiff has entered or proceeded into and upon the intersection or crosswalk “literally with eyes closed to everything but the traffic light.”
This word-picture, of a motorist proceeding forward like a bridled horse with special over and under as well as side blinders affixed, seems a bit overstretched. The human eye (unlike most cameras) is not equipped with a rotary shutter, and the unsupported suggestion that Mr. Stillwell proceeded into this 4-and-4-lane intersection with vision thus peripherally limited offends our rule of favorable view. True, if Mr. Stillwell actually had testified — much though such testimony might tax our credulity — that he was guilty of any such vision-restrictive effort, I would agree that the question of contributory negligence in this case would have been one for the court rather than the jury. But there is no such testimony, and certainly no right on our part to infer that Mr. Stillwell’s conduct was so well-nigh impossible. It would require a consciously steady and difficult squint of the eyes to so restrict — if one could do it at all — the orbital focus of normal driving vision and, assuming that it was within the province of the triers of fact to draw such an inference from Stillwell’s testimony, the most that can be said of its evidentiary utility is that due appraisal thereof was made in the Gratiot county circuit court jury room.
I do not believe in lip service of our requirement of favorable view when the defendant in a negligence case moves for an instructed verdict on assigned ground of contributory negligence. See in such re*357gard the vigorous comment of the court of appeals of the 6th circuit in Patterson v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (CCA 6), 238 F2d 645 (a case arising under and determinable by the Michigan law of contributory negligence).* Neither do I regard it a proper function of this Court to presume or guess that the scope of vision of a licensed motor vehicle operator has been so confined. Bather, I suggest that it is our. obligation to assume — in the course of test of this' motion for directed verdict — that the plaintiff motor- ■ ist’s gaze ahead included, within the zone of fairly required watchfulness, not only the traffic signal but that which, in the judgment of fair appraisers of fact, is reasonably expectable and possibly avoidable in and near the peripherally viewable path of travel ahead.
This brings us to the real crux of our continuing disagreement; the controversial doctrine that the degree of ordinary care, exacted of a motorist to protect himself from injury in like circumstances, requires as a matter of law that he constantly swivel his head and eyeballs from one side to the other as he proceeds into an intersection by authority of “the green light.” Such — in the language of the Chief Justice — “is a view I do not share.” My reason, 'so far as precedent is concerned, goes back to intelligent and reasonable authority.
Back in 1951, no one of the undersigned being around to object at the time, this Court speaking through the present Chief Justice cavalierly cast aside (in Morse v. Bishop, supra) that which — surely *358to' the traffic-signal-familiar layman at least — is the common sense of Travis v. Eisenlord, 256 Mich 264. I refer to these passages (pp 265, 266 of Travis’ report).
“The. court was wrong in holding that the plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. If he were correct in so holding, it would mean that the driver of the plaintiffs’ car must at his peril assume that the defendant would disobey the law and rush the red light. The contrary is true. He had a right to assume that defendant understood the red signal and that he would not undertake to make the crossing until it had changed to green. If he had looked, as the court says he should have done, it is true that he would have seen the defendant approaching, but he would have had a right to rest on the assumption that defendant would stop before the red light and wait until it had changed.”
Travis’ doctrine, like old time religion, is good enough for me. It became the linchpin of that which, in Barron, brought confirmation of denial of a demand for directed verdict by another adjudged violator of the lawful command of a traffic signal. Thus, by force of the foregoing opinion of Mr. JusticeKavanagh, it definitely may now be said — in paraphrase of the Chief Justice — that it is the law of Michigan that one entering an intersection under beckon of a green light may and should escape being held guilty of contributory negligence (as a matter of law, of course) even though it be affirmatively shown that he did not — at any time — turn his head or his gaze to the left or the right to discover possible approach of another motorist engaged in violating what is now a universally known law of traffic control. The reason, given in Travis,, is that a motorist proceeding under such “go” signal has good reason to believe that he is protected from danger in the direction or directions faced by red lights while *359the signal light facing him is green. Whether, and at what stage, he is required to abandon reliance on such protection and go into emergency action is, at best and as against a motion for directed verdict, assigning contributory negligence, a question for the trier or triers of fact.*
I concur in Mr. Justice Kavanagh’s opinion.
Smith and Voelkeb, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Having quoted at length, from Justice Cooley’s opinion in Detroit & Milwaukee R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, the court of appeals went on to say (page 650 of Patterson’s report) :
“Some of us have noted a modern tendency — perhaps a growing one — to give mere lip service to these sound principles. Trial by jury is our established constitutional safeguard against assumption of unwarranted judicial authority and should be honored by steadfast observance rather than discarded by dictatorial breach.”

 If it were neeessary to exeuse, as against this motion for directed, verdict, Mr. Stillwell’s omission of gaze or glance to his left before starting forth into the intersection, such excuse would not be difficult in point of fact. Because M-21 (likewise US-27) was a 4-lane highway at the'point of intersection, 2 westbound cars drew up abreast (for the then red light) at the eastern boundary of the intersection. One was Mr. Stillwell’s car. It was in the northernmost lane of M-21. Both westbound cars started forward when the traffic signal changed to green. Thus it is easy to perceive why Mr. Stillwell did not see the approach of defendant’s northbound ear as soon as did the westbound driver at the left. Stillwell could not see it, until the situation had beeome one of unavoidable collision, because the other westbound car blocked his vision until the last and too-late moment. This, at least, is my notion of favorable view of the testimonial record.