Court Opinion

ID: 9849538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:17.698091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:17.466696
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Presiding Judge.
Andrew L. Collier was indicted by a DeKalb County grand jury for trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of marijuana. After the denial of his motion to suppress and the denial of his application for interlocutory review, Collier consented to a bench trial on the trafficking count with a negotiated recommendation of sentence, based on the testimony elicited in the hearing on the motion to suppress.1 He was found guilty, and his probation from an earlier conviction was revoked. He appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm.
We consider three principles when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress:
First, when a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support [them]. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment.
(Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646) (1994). Construed in this light, the evidence shows that a police officer responded to a domestic relations call on Quillian Avenue in DeKalb County. En route to the scene, he was informed that the situation had escalated; he therefore activated the patrol car’s blue lights “to prevent other vehicles from . . . coming in contact or conflicting with our investigation.” After the officer stopped and parked on the street, he saw a vehicle “backing up in the wrong lane of traffic.” He observed the vehicle approach him, stop, and then *606begin backing up. The officer was approximately 50 yards away from where the vehicle ultimately pulled into a driveway and stopped.
The officer approached the vehicle in his patrol car, got out and asked the driver, Collier, for his driver’s license and insurance card. He informed Collier that he had stopped him for improper backing. The officer then looked into the vehicle and saw in the center console a clear bag containing a white powdery substance that he suspected was powder cocaine. After Collier was arrested and placed in the back of a patrol car, a field test on the substance indicated that it was in fact cocaine. A further search of Collier’s vehicle revealed additional cocaine and a small amount of marijuana.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Collier’s motion to suppress, for two reasons: First, the officer did not stop Collier but merely approached him after he had pulled into a driveway and stopped his vehicle; and, second, the officer had a reasonable and objective basis to conclude that Collier had committed the traffic offense of improper backing.
At least three types of police-citizen encounters exist: verbal communications involving no coercion or detention; brief “stops” or “seizures” that require reasonable suspicion; and “arrests,” which can only be supported by probable cause. A first-tier encounter never intrudes upon any constitutionally protected interest, since the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact between police and citizens, but simply to prevent arbitrary and oppressive police interference with the privacy and personal security of individual citizens. On the other hand, a second-tier encounter may violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer briefly “stops” or “seizes” a citizen without an articulable suspicion. Articulable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that a citizen is involved in criminal activity.
(Citations omitted.) Brittian v. State, 257 Ga. App. 729, 731 (572 SE2d 76) (2002).
In this instance, the police officer did not “stop” Collier. It was only after Collier pulled into a driveway and stopped, as defense counsel conceded, that the officer “approached the vehicle” in his patrol car and “made contact with Andrew Collier as he was still seated in his vehicle.” On cross-examination, defense counsel characterized this encounter as “preventing him, for all intense [sic] purposes from turning around and going in the other direction,” but no evidence in the record indicates that Collier’s exit from the driveway was blocked or that he was otherwise prevented from *607leaving. The police officer did not protest defense counsel’s adroit re-characterization of the encounter, but that was not the officer’s testimony. What lawyers say is not evidence, including what they may suggest in cross-examination of a witness. See Parker v. State, 248 Ga. App. 748, 749-750 (2) (548 SE2d 634) (2001) (instruction to jury). It appears that Collier voluntarily stopped his vehicle in a driveway and that the police officer then approached his vehicle, with no indication that the officer prevented his departure other than by speaking to him.
“It is well established that an officer’s approach to a stopped vehicle and inquiry into the situation are not a stop or seizure but rather clearly fall within the realm of the first type of police-citizen encounter.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 834 (584 SE2d 2) (2003). While the officer, counsel, and the trial court referred to the encounter as a “stop,” in reviewing an order on a motion to suppress we conduct a de novo review of the application of the law to undisputed facts. “It is not that the magic words are spoken, but what is said and done irrespective of the magic words. We have long ago departed that realm of law where runes and sigils supplant reason and substance.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Saye v. State, 263 Ga. App. 225, 226 (1) (a) (587 SE2d 393) (2003). The facts here demonstrate that the officer did not “stop” Collier but approached him after he had already stopped.
Secondly, the police officer testified on direct examination that he observed Collier’s vehicle “backing up in the wrong lane of traffic.” The trial court specifically included this fact in its order denying the motion to suppress. Although the officer’s testimony was somewhat confusing and contradictory, the trial court is the finder of fact, and we construe the evidence to support its findings and judgment. Tate, supra. Moreover, depending on where Collier stopped and reversed course when he saw the officer, he may have backed as much as 50 yards before pulling into a driveway.
OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) provides: “A driver shall not back a vehicle unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic.” The facts here constitute some evidence of unsafe backing regardless of whether vehicles other than police cars were in the roadway. The fact that Collier managed to perform this maneuver without actually striking another vehicle does not demand a finding that “this maneuver was made with safety as OCGA § 40-6-240 (a) requires.” Roberson v. State, 230 Ga. App. 179, 180 (495 SE2d 643) (1998). Even if Collier’s behavior did not technically violate the traffic laws, the officer nevertheless had a “reasonable articulable suspicion to stop” Collier under the circumstances presented here, because his backing up on the wrong side of the road for a substantial distance could have endangered others and “[shopping *608his conduct was reasonable.” State v. Armstrong, 223 Ga. App. 350, 351 (2) (477 SE2d 635) (1996).
Further, an officer’s honest belief that a traffic violation has been committed in his presence, even if ultimately proven incorrect, may nevertheless demonstrate the existence of at least an articulable suspicion and reasonable grounds for the stop. In judging the officer’s honest belief, a court should determine whether the officer’s motives and actions at the time and under all the circumstances, including the nature of the officer’s mistake, if any, were reasonable and not arbitrary or harassing. And, while normal driving that incidentally evades a roadblock does not justify an investigative stop, abnormal or unusual actions taken to avoid a roadblock may give an officer a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity even when the evasive action is not illegal.
(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Jones v. State, 259 Ga. App. 506, 507 (1) (578 SE2d 165) (2003). In Richards v. State, 257 Ga. App. 358-360 (1) (571 SE2d 172) (2002), a driver backed up 50 feet and turned into a side street as soon as he crested a hill and saw a police roadblock. We concluded that, regardless of whether this conduct violated any traffic laws, it was sufficiently suspicious and furtive to provide an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 360. While the police officers in this case were not conducting a roadblock but simply answering a call, the presence of multiple police cars in the street with blue lights flashing obviously resembled a roadblock sufficiently to elicit an apparent evasive response from Collier. “No purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing the evidence found in this case, which was the product of a stop prompted by the officer’s legitimate concern for public safety.” Armstrong, supra, 223 Ga. App. at 353 (2).

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Bernes, J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., dissent.

 The remaining counts were nol prossed.