Court Opinion

ID: 9450346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:42:47.073389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:15.463030
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This case came before us on the appellant’s motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis. As presiding judge, I submitted to my brothers a proposed one-sentence order reading, “Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is hereby granted.” It was, and still is, my thinking that the allegation of a coerced plea of guilty depends on facts dehors the record, that the section 2255 motion should not have been denied without a hearing,1 and hence that leave to appeal in forma pauperis should be granted.
My brothers, however, raise, sua sponte, as a jurisdictional obstacle their view that the movant is not in federal custody because the record discloses that he is in a Florida state penitentiary serving sentences for offenses against that State. The movant, appearing pro se, made the further allegation that there is a “federal detainer.”
With deference, I submit that it is my brothers who are permitting themselves to “indulge in a conjecture or surmise” when they reach the conclusion, without any opportunity for the movant to be heard on the issue, that the record affirmatively discloses an absence of jurisdiction. The record does not show that movant’s federal sentence has expired, and clearly it has not or he would not be here complaining. If we granted leave to appeal in forma pauperis, and the facts on this new issue were developed on the hearing on the merits as would be proper,2 we might know officially that the movant was conditionally released on parole from the federal penitentiary with a part of his federal sentence unserved. If, as the majority holds, the movant must begin actually serving the remainder of his allegedly illegal federal sentence before he can test its legality, it may'well be that his sentence will have been served before its legality can be tested.
An absence of remedy which would require service of any part of an illegal sentence is a gross inadequacy. I submit that our modern federal procedure is not subject to that criticism.3 The simplest answer is that the prisoner remains “while on parole, in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General, until the expiration of the maximum term * * * for which he was sentenced.” 18 U.S.C. § 4203.4 Likewise, a state prisoner on parole remains “in custody” within the meaning of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.5
*758My brothers, however, raise the conceptual objection that: “Young is in the Florida penitentiary. There cannot be dual or joint custody. An order of release under Section 2255 would be a nullity. We think there was no custody as to sustain jurisdiction under Section 2255.”
With deference, I submit that such a barren conceptual objection is not sound, and should not operate to deprive the movant of any effective remedy. There was a “federal detainer,” thus continuing the “legal custody and * * * control of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4203. That statute contains no exception to its requirement that a prisoner “remain, while on parole, in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General, until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced.” With deference, I submit that my brothers have no authority to amend that statute so as to except the time which the prisoner may spend in a State prison.6
Abstract questions of “custody” of a prisoner as between State and federal authorities are matters of comity between sovereigns which present no obstacle to a trial by the other sovereign.7 Conversely, such questions should present no obstacle to the assertion of a prisoner’s rights.
Moreover, if there is not such custody as to permit the exercise of section 2255 jurisdiction, we should, as in the Shelton case, cited supra n. 5, “ ‘treat the record as adequately presenting a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis enabling the trial court to properly exercise its jurisdiction.’ ” 242 F.2d at 101, 111. This proposition was followed on en banc rehearing. See 246 F.2d 571 at 577, 578. The Supreme Court’s per curiam order of reversal, 356 U.S. 26, necessarily held by implication that the district court had jurisdiction.
Indeed my brothers concede as much, but express uncertainty “as to whether jurisdiction was exercised under Section 2255 or of a coram nobis proceeding.” To me that seems immaterial. By one-route or the other, jurisdiction existed.
I differ with my brothers’ further objections to the treatment of the motion-as an application for a writ of coramnobis, which, as I understand them, are: (a) that no relief can be granted; and (b) that the circumstances do not compel such action to achieve justice. With deference, I submit that the responses-to those objections are too obvious to require statement. In any event, those-objections are not jurisdictional, but are-matters requiring the exercise of discretion in a case which has not yet been-heard by this Court on its merits.
The district court did not doubt its-jurisdiction. That doubt has arisen on> this Court’s consideration of the motion-, for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.. The record does not disclose that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Leave to> appeal in forma pauperis should be granted. I respectfully dissent.

. See Waley v. Johnston, 1942, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302; Machibroda v. United States, 1962, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473.

. See Fallen v. United States, 1964, 378 U.S. 139, 143, 84 S.Ct. 1689, 12 L.Ed.2d 760.

. That is indicated by the direction that our Rules of Civil Procedure “shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action,” and by the similar purpose and, construction of our Rules of Criminal Procedure: “These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”

. See Anderson v. Corall, 1923, 263 U.S. 193, 196, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247. United States v. Brilliant, 2 Cir. 1960, 274 F.2d 618, 620; Hoptowit v. United States, 9 Cir. 1960, 274 F.2d 936.

. Jones v. Cunningham, 1963, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285. The word “custody” as used in section 2255 has the same meaning as in habeas corpus. Shelton v. United States, 5 Cir. 1957, 242 F.2d 101, 110; see subsequent en banc opinion, 246 F.2d 571 at 577, 578; and per curiam opinion of Supreme Court, 356 U.S. 26, 79 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579; United States v. Glass, 4 Cir. 1963, 317 F.2d 200, 203.

. It is interesting to note that section 4203 does not expressly grant to the Attorney General the discretion granted in the case of a prisoner who has served his term less good-time deductions: “This section shall not prevent delivery of a prisoner to the authorities of any State otherwise entitled to his custody.” 18 U.S.C. § 4164.

. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 1922, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607; Strand v. Schmittroth, 9 Cir. 1957, 251 F.2d 590, 599; 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 111. See also, Myers v. Hunter, 10 Cir. 1952, 199 F.2d 662; Welch v. Taylor, 1961, 292 F.2d 481, 483 which concludes: “Had the petitioner complied with the conditions of his release, he would have completed his-federal sentence even though he was imprisoned in the Texas State Penitentiary-during a portion of the time that he was. on conditional release.”