Court Opinion

ID: 9389111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 18:00:31.807933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.213189
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60111     Document: 00516722853          Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/24/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                       FILED
                                                                   April 24, 2023
                                   No. 22-60111
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                       Clerk

   Leaphiny Reese; Thou Samphear,

                                                                        Petitioners,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                       Respondent.

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                            Agency No. A089 360 354
                            Agency No. A089 581 178

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          A federal jury convicted Leaphiny Reese and Thou Samphear
   (“Petitioners”) of visa fraud, and the government charged them with
   removability based on that conviction. Petitioners contend that the Board of
   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) erred in holding that the visa fraud waiver
   could not overcome the grounds for their removal. Petitioners also raise a due
   process claim and issues the BIA did not address. We find that the visa fraud
   waiver does not reach Petitioners’ grounds for removal, we lack jurisdiction
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                                         No. 22-60111

   over the claims the BIA did not reach, and we determine that Petitioners
   failed to show a violation of their due process rights.
           The petition for review is DISMISSED in part for lack of
   jurisdiction and DENIED in part.
                                               I.
           Reese and Samphear are Cambodian citizens who traveled to the
   United States on visitor visas,1 entered into fraudulent marriages with U.S.
   citizens, and resided together as common law spouses in the United States.
   A federal jury convicted them of several crimes arising from the fraudulent
   marriages, including fraud and misuse of a visa, permits, and other
   documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).2 The pair received notices to
   appear and conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) for
   termination      of   conditional      permanent       residence      and     8   U.S.C.
   § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii) for violation of § 1546. Petitioners filed applications
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) for hardship waivers to overcome removability
   for termination of their conditional permanent residence. They also filed
   applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H) to waive removability for their
   visa fraud convictions.
           The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) addressed only the fraud waiver, rea-
   soning that ineligibility for that waiver obviated the need to consider the hard-
   ship waiver because Petitioners would remain deportable for fraud regard-
   less. The IJ first reasoned that a § 1227(a)(1)(H) fraud waiver requires, in

           1
             Petitioners most recently entered the United States as conditional residents,
   status granted based on their marriages to U.S. citizens.
           2
              Petitioners were also convicted of conspiracy to commit marriage fraud and
   benefit fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325(c), 1546(a), as well as aiding and
   abetting marriage fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c).

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                                           No. 22-60111

   part, that the applicant be “otherwise admissible to the United States.” 3 Be-
   cause Petitioners were convicted of marriage fraud, a crime involving moral
   turpitude, the IJ found that they would not be otherwise admissible.4 The IJ
   further reasoned that even if Petitioners did qualify for the fraud waiver, it
   could not waive their charge under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii), which rests on a
   criminal conviction. The IJ then granted the government’s motion to preter-
   mit Petitioners’ applications.
          The BIA determined that an application under § 1227(a)(1)(H) cannot
   waive Petitioners’ removability under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii), as the subpara-
   graph waives only grounds for deportability listed in § 1227(a)(1). The Board
   found “no good purpose” to adjudicate Petitioners’ hardship waivers given
   their deportability based on fraud convictions and dismissed the appeal.
          Reese and Samphear now petition this court for review, arguing (1)
   that an application under § 1227(a)(1)(H) can waive removability under
   § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii); (2) that they are eligible for hardship waivers under
   § 1186a(c)(4); (3) that the IJ erred in finding that Petitioners would be ineli-
   gible for a fraud waiver under § 1227(a)(1)(H); (4) that the IJ erred in finding
   that Petitioners could not “stack” waivers; and (5) due process violations.
   This court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
                                                 II.
          Petitioners first argue that the IJ erred in concluding that
   § 1227(a)(1)(H)         cannot       waive           a   removability       charge   under
   § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii). This court reviews the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo,5

          3
              8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(II).
          4
              See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
          5
              Rodriguez-Avalos v. Holder, 788 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 2015).

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   but the Board’s interpretations of statutes it administers receive Chevron def-
   erence when published as binding precedent.6 In addition, “any portion of a
   non-precedential decision that relies on prior precedential BIA decisions will
   be afforded Chevron deference as appropriate.”7 The BIA’s non-precedential
   opinion in this case relied on a precedential opinion, 8 so this court analyzes
   the agency’s legal conclusions under Chevron’s two-step framework.9 We de-
   termine that the BIA’s statutory interpretation reflects Congress’s unambig-
   uous intent and find no need to proceed past Chevron step one.10
           Section 1227 describes several categories of deportable aliens, split
   into six separate paragraphs. Those paragraphs separate those who (1) are
   inadmissible at time of entry or adjustment of status or who violate their sta-
   tus; (2) commit certain criminal offenses; (3) fail to register or falsify docu-
   ments; (4) are removable on security-related grounds; (5) “become a public
   charge”; and (6) vote unlawfully. The first of these categories includes aliens
   who commit marriage fraud, but the relevant provision does not require con-
   viction.11 This category also incorporates classes of inadmissible aliens found
   in 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which bars some people who commit fraud.12 The third

           6
            Dhuka v. Holder, 716 F.3d 149, 156 (5th Cir. 2013); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)
   (governing publication of BIA opinions).
           7
               Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 2014).
           8
                See Matter of Tima, 26 I. & N. Dec. 839, 843–45 (BIA 2016).
           9
                Garcia-Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2012).
           10
              Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
   (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
   the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
           11
                8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G).
           12
                See, e.g., id. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (misrepresentation).

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   category includes aliens who are convicted of visa fraud under 18 U.S.C.
   § 1546, like Petitioners in this case.13
          Petitioners seize upon a subparagraph within the first category provid-
   ing that when an individual meets certain criteria,
          The provisions of this paragraph relating to the removal of al-
          iens within the United States on the ground that they were in-
          admissible at the time of admission as aliens described in sec-
          tion 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) of this title [use of fraud or misrepresen-
          tation to procure a visa or other documentation], whether will-
          ful or innocent, may, in the discretion of the Attorney General,
          be waived . . . .14
   After explaining some additional requirements for the waiver, the subpara-
   graph states:
          A waiver of removal for fraud or misrepresentation granted un-
          der this subparagraph shall also operate to waive removal based
          on the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such
          fraud or misrepresentation.15
          As the Ninth Circuit summarized, the waiver effectively “trans-
   form[s] an individual who enters the United States with an invalid immigrant
   visa to the status of one who entered as a nonpreference immigrant, despite
   the fact that a valid immigrant visa would never have been available to the
   individual at the time of entry.” 16 The Supreme Court has commented that

          13
               Id. § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii).
          14
               Id. § 1227(a)(1)(H).
          15
               Id.
          16
               Vasquez v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

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   Congress enacted previous versions of the fraud waiver as a humanitarian
   measure, finding it “more important to unite families and preserve family ties
   than . . . to enforce strictly the quota limitations or even the many restrictive
   sections that are designed to keep undesirable or harmful aliens out of the
   country.”17 Petitioners argue that this waiver subparagraph can reach outside
   the first category of grounds for removability and waive their charge within
   the third category. Although Petitioners’ construction may align with Con-
   gress’s humanitarian intent, the statute’s plain text and five other circuits’
   well-reasoned holdings weigh against their position.18
           First, the waiver applies, by its plain text, only to aliens inadmissible
   due to use of fraud or misrepresentation to procure a visa or other documen-
   tation under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). That provision does not refer to convictions.
   The waiver also applies to “[t]he provisions of this paragraph,” limiting it
   explicitly to the first paragraph of § 1227.19 “Congress ordinarily adheres to
   a hierarchical scheme” in its construction of statutes, and the relevant

           17
                I.N.S. v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
           18
             See Tima v. Att’y Gen., 903 F.3d 272, 275–78 (3d Cir. 2018); Fayzullina v. Holder,
   777 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 2015); Gourche v. Holder, 663 F.3d 882, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2011);
   Herrera Gonzalez v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 638, 640–41 (8th Cir. 2021); Taggar v. Holder, 736 F.3d
   886, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2013).
           19
                See Gourche, 663 F.3d at 886–87.

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   provisions here are no exception.20 Where Congress includes waivers within
   other paragraphs, they generally apply to those subsections or paragraphs
   alone.21 The text here contains no indication that it applies to the entire sec-
   tion or to any other paragraph within the section. As such, the waiver provi-
   sion applies to specific instances of fraud within the first category only, not
   fraud at large.
           In addition, even if the waiver reached outside of its paragraph, it
   would not apply to Petitioners’ charge under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii). Petitioners
   argue that because the grounds for their removal relate to fraud, their charge
   could be waived. Yet the statute “operates [only] to waive removal based on
   the grounds of inadmissibility directly resulting from such fraud or misrepre-
   sentation.”22 Petitioners’ grounds for removability result from their convic-
   tions, not from their fraud, and the statute anticipates this distinction by
   providing separate charges for fraud and fraud convictions.

           20
              Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004). Congress
   generally follows this structure:
           § Section
                      (a) Subsection
                              (1) Paragraph
                                       (A) Subparagraph
                                                (i) Clause
                                                        (I) Subclause
           21
             See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (providing for hardship waivers for “for an alien
   who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (1)”); Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (providing
   for hardship waivers for aliens unlawfully present); Id. § 1182(a)(3)(D)(iv) (providing
   waivers for certain relatives of members of totalitarian parties).
           22
                Id. § 1227(a)(1)(H).

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           Petitioners also argue that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Judulang
   v. Holder supports their argument that the BIA’s policy is arbitrary and ca-
   pricious because the agency “hing[es] a deportable alien’s eligibility for dis-
   cretionary relief on the chance correspondence between statutory catego-
   ries . . . .”23 Judulang concerned the BIA’s interpretation of statutes to
   square the availability of waivers between aliens seeking to enter the United
   States and those already in the country. 24 The Supreme Court criticized the
   government’s comparable-grounds approach as disconnected from individu-
   als’ “fitness to reside in this country” because it afforded aliens within the
   country access to relief only if those outside the country had similar access
   under federal law.25 The BIA’s treatment of Petitioners in this case is dissim-
   ilar and far from arbitrary—the government charged them with removability
   for fraud convictions under a provision intended to make aliens removable
   for committing specifically that crime. The government simply applied the
   law as Congress wrote it.
           We hold that § 1227(a)(1)(H) does not function to waive a charge un-
   der § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii).
                                              III.
           Petitioners also challenge the process afforded to them in their immi-
   gration proceedings, alleging that the IJ and BIA violated their due process
   rights by finding them ineligible for waivers and pretermitting relief. Aliens
   are entitled to due process of law in removal proceedings. 26 Petitioners must

           23
                565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011).
           24
                Id. at 45–52.
           25
                Id. at 53.
           26
             Animashaun v. I.N.S., 990 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Reno v. Flores,
   507 U.S. 292, 305 (1993)).

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   show substantial prejudice resulting from any error, meaning that they must
   make a prima facie showing that they would be entitled to relief in the absence
   of any error.27 Due process claims that relate to matters other than purely
   procedural errors do not require exhaustion before the agency.28
           Petitioners’ due process claim largely restates grounds for relief raised
   in other portions of their petition and takes issue with the agency’s legal con-
   clusion, not the process by which the agency arrived at its decision. The IJ
   held, as a matter of law, that Petitioners would inevitably be removed follow-
   ing their concession of removability under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii). As a result,
   the IJ and the BIA found no need to consider Petitioners’ other arguments.
   Petitioners submitted significant evidence to the agency and were afforded
   multiple oral hearings to present their case, where the IJ reviewed their evi-
   dence. Petitioners were also afforded the opportunity to argue their theory of
   the law.
           Finally, Petitioners argue that it is unfair to find them ineligible for the
   fraud waiver merely because the government charged them with removability
   under § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii) rather than § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Even assuming this
   is a cognizable due process argument,29 the government does not act unfairly
   by charging Petitioners with removal under a provision designed for
   convicted individuals rather than a provision relating to unprosecuted fraud.
   Petitioners do not otherwise allege a procedural error and make no

           27
                Miranda-Lores v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1994).
           28
                See Anwar v. I.N.S., 116 F.3d 140, 144 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997).
           29
               This court has noted in the context of criminal prosecution that “when an act
   violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so
   long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.” United States v. Batchelder,
   442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).

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   substantive due process argument, so Petitioners have not shown a violation
   of their due process rights.
                                                  IV.
           Petitioners make three additional arguments: (1) they are eligible for
   hardship waivers under § 1186a(c)(4); (2) the IJ erred in finding that Peti-
   tioners would be ineligible for a § 1227(a)(1)(H) waiver; and (3) the IJ erred
   in finding that Petitioners could not “stack” waivers.
           This court has jurisdiction to review only final orders of removal,30
   and the BIA’s opinion represents the final order.31 This court has “authority
   to review only the decision of the BIA, not the IJ, unless the IJ’s decision
   influenced the BIA’s decision.”32 Petitioners concede that the BIA did not
   reach any of these additional issues but ask this court to remand to the agency
   so that the BIA may address them. Because the BIA’s opinion did not con-
   sider these remaining issues, this court lacks jurisdiction to review them. And
   this court will not remand if doing so would be “futile” 33 and there is “no
   realistic possibility” that the BIA would have reached a different conclu-
   sion.34 Because Petitioners are removable based on their charges under
   § 1227(a)(3)(B)(iii), there is no realistic possibility the BIA would reach a dif-
   ferent conclusion on their removability, and there is no reason to remand.

           30
                See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d).
           31
                See Castillo-Rodriguez v. I.N.S., 929 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1991).
           32
             Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Efe v. Ashcroft, 293
   F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           33
                Lopez-Perez v. Garland, 35 F.4th 953, 956 (5th Cir. 2022).
           34
                Luna-Garcia v. Barr, 932 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 2019).

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                                      ****
         The petition for review is DISMISSED in part for lack of
   jurisdiction and DENIED in part.

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