Court Opinion

ID: 9965441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 15:16:49.862305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:03.973295
License: Public Domain

THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                         2024 WY 48

                                                            APRIL TERM, A.D. 2024

                                                                       May 2, 2024

 SOLOMON PRESTON BOLEN,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.
                                                   S-23-0031, S-23-0154
 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Converse County
                         The Honorable F. Scott Peasley, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A.
      Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Jeremy Meerkreebs, Assistant Appellate
      Counsel. Argument by Mr. Meerkreebs.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen
      R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Jones.

FOX, C.J., delivers the opinion of the Court; FENN, J., files a specially concurring
opinion.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ*, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

* Justice Kautz retired from judicial office effective March 26, 2024, and, pursuant to Article 5,
§ 5 of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (2023), he was reassigned to
act on this matter on March 27, 2024.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Solomon Bolen was convicted of numerous offenses including attempted second-
degree murder and aggravated assault and battery. On appeal, he claims the district court
violated his due process rights when it did not instruct the jury on his not guilty by reason
of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI) plea, and his attorneys were ineffective when they
did not seek those instructions. He further contends his convictions for attempted second-
degree murder and aggravated assault and battery violated his right against double
jeopardy. We affirm.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2]   Mr. Bolen raises three issues, which we rephrase as follows:

              1. Did the district court violate Mr. Bolen’s right to due
                 process when it did not instruct the jury on his NGMI
                 defense?

              2. Did Mr. Bolen receive ineffective assistance of counsel
                 when his attorneys did not renew their request for NGMI
                 instructions or a special verdict form?

              3. Do Mr. Bolen’s convictions for attempted second-degree
                 murder and aggravated assault and battery violate his right
                 against double jeopardy?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] On October 5, 2021, Mr. Bolen set out from Sterling, Colorado with his girlfriend
and their young son. They were headed to the home of Meredith and Lewis Stock in
Douglas, Wyoming. Mr. Bolen had lived with the Stocks in 2016 and used to be in a
relationship with Lewis Stock’s daughter, Laura Stock.

[¶4] The three stopped in Glendo, Wyoming to rest and arrived at the Stock home on the
morning of October 6. Throughout the trip, Mr. Bolen had used methamphetamine, and
when they arrived, he was upset and behaving in a hyperactive and erratic manner. He told
Meredith Stock that Laura Stock was harassing him, and, although Ms. Stock could tell
Mr. Bolen was upset, she did not understand why because his conversation was “all over
the place.”

                                             1
[¶5] After his conversation with Ms. Stock, Mr. Bolen called 911, and Deputies Mark
Dexter and Russell Smith of the Converse County Sheriff’s Department responded. Deputy
Smith, who was the first to arrive, found Mr. Bolen upset because he thought his girlfriend
and son were missing, though he then told Deputy Smith that he had found them. Mr. Bolen
also wanted to report sex trafficking and prostitution he believed to be occurring in the
Sterling area. Deputy Smith found Mr. Bolen’s story disjointed and erratic, but he told Mr.
Bolen he would report his concerns to Colorado authorities.

[¶6] Deputy Dexter also spoke with Mr. Bolen, and Mr. Bolen repeated his report of
prostitution in Colorado. He also told Deputy Dexter that people were breaking into his
hotel room in Colorado and taking things, and he showed him a cell phone photo of a
broken door jamb that Deputy Dexter felt was consistent with his claim. Deputy Dexter
found Mr. Bolen to be agitated and speaking fast with his conversation all over the place.
He also thought Mr. Bolen seemed paranoid and was likely under the influence of a
controlled substance.

[¶7] When the deputies again informed Mr. Bolen that all they could do was forward his
report to the appropriate Colorado authorities, he became agitated and asked them to leave.
After the deputies left, Mr. Bolen took an older brown truck belonging to Mr. Stock and
drove to the Stocks’ rental property. He entered the residence and removed firearms and a
pair of binoculars belonging to the Stocks’ renter, Tracy Sanborn. From there, he drove to
an adjacent property owned by Frank and Diane Prado.

[¶8] The Prados allow friends to hunt on their ranch, and on that morning there were
three hunters from California on the property. Brothers Richard and John Cleary and their
friend George Heger had stayed in a trailer on the property and were packing up their camp
in preparation for their return home when Mr. Bolen approached the men on foot.

[¶9] After introducing himself and engaging in some casual conversation, Mr. Bolen
asked the hunters who was inside the trailer, if someone was under the trailer, and if he
could look inside the trailer. The men found these questions strange, and they told Mr.
Bolen he was trespassing and needed to leave. Mr. Bolen stormed off and stated: “I don’t
give a f*ck,” and “It’s going to be getting federal here in about 10 minutes.”

[¶10] The men heard a vehicle start up and saw Mr. Bolen in a brown truck speeding down
the Prados’ driveway toward the main residence. They decided to follow him to make sure
he was not doing anything wrong. John Cleary was driving, George Heger was in the front
passenger seat, and Richard Cleary was in the back seat.

                                            2
[¶11] When the hunters arrived at the Prados’ residence, they saw the brown truck parked
in front of the house and the front door open about a foot. They parked adjacent to the front
door, and almost immediately, Mr. Bolen came out the door, aiming one of Frank Prado’s
rifles at them. They attempted to leave, but as they drove around the circular driveway, Mr.
Bolen fired at them. The bullet entered the front passenger door of the truck and passed
through George Heger’s lower left leg, shattering his tibia and fibula and causing extensive
soft tissue, arterial, and nerve damage. The bullet then passed through both of John Cleary’s
lower legs before becoming embedded in the driver’s side door. Like Mr. Heger, John
Cleary sustained serious injuries to his lower legs, including a shattered tibia and broken
fibula on his right leg.

[¶12] John Cleary was able to drive a little further down the driveway, and the men took
cover behind some hay bales. Mr. Bolen then left the Prado residence, drove across the
Prado hay field, and returned to the Stock residence. When he arrived at the Stock
residence, Mr. Bolen told his girlfriend: “I just shot someone. I don’t care if they bleed
out.” He also told Meredith Stock he shot someone. He stayed at the Stock residence for
about ten minutes before leaving in a different green truck that belonged to Mr. Stock.

[¶13] George Heger managed to call 911 and reported two people had been shot by a
“crazy black male” who had fled and was heading east. Responding deputies encountered
Mr. Bolen as he was driving the green truck away from the Stocks’ property. After briefly
attempting to elude the deputies, Mr. Bolen was arrested. While searching Mr. Bolen
incident to his arrest, deputies found a yellow straw in his pants pocket that contained the
residue of a substance later confirmed to be methamphetamine.

[¶14] Mr. Bolen was charged with 16 counts: three counts of attempted second-degree
murder; three counts of aggravated assault and battery; 1 two counts of aggravated burglary
(of the Sanborn and Prado residences); one count of aggravated robbery (of the Prado
residence); one count of property destruction (damage to personal property of Sanborn);
two counts of property destruction and defacement (damage to Stock vehicle and Prado
hay field); one count of fleeing or attempting to elude police officers; one misdemeanor

1
  One of these counts (Count VI) was subsequently amended to “attempted aggravated assault and battery”
to reflect that the victim in that count, Richard Cleary, was not actually injured. As explained more fully in
our discussion of the double jeopardy issue, the crime of aggravated assault can be committed either by
causing or attempting to cause serious bodily injury to another. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i). Because
the statute has a built-in attempt provision, the general attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301, does not
apply, and the crime of attempted aggravated assault and battery technically does not exist. Rather, an
attempt to cause serious bodily injury constitutes aggravated assault and battery. Mr. Bolen did not argue
this crime was improperly captioned or that it is incorrect for his Judgment and Sentence to reflect a
conviction for “attempted aggravated assault and battery.”

                                                      3
count for possession of methamphetamine; one count of unauthorized use of a vehicle; and
one count of driving while under the influence of a controlled substance. 2

[¶15] Shortly after Mr. Bolen’s arraignment, defense counsel filed a motion for a
competency evaluation pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (2023). Dr. Renee
Wilkinson from the Wyoming State Hospital examined Mr. Bolen and recommended he
be found competent to proceed. The district court held a hearing on the evaluation and
found Mr. Bolen mentally fit to proceed.

[¶16] During that same hearing, Mr. Bolen indicated, based on findings in the competency
evaluation, that he would like to change his plea from not guilty to concurrent pleas of not
guilty and NGMI. The district court entered the pleas and ordered an NGMI evaluation
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304 (2023).

[¶17] After completing an NGMI evaluation, Dr. Wilkinson opined Mr. Bolen did not
meet the statutory criteria for an NGMI defense. Dr. Wilkinson noted there was “significant
evidence” Mr. Bolen was under the influence of methamphetamine and alcohol at the time
of the crimes, and although he had an “altered state of mind” and was psychotic at that
time, his condition was caused by self-induced intoxication, which is specifically excluded
from the statutory definition of mental illness or deficiency.

[¶18] The district court held another hearing after receiving the NGMI evaluation, which
Mr. Bolen refused to attend. Mr. Bolen’s attorneys indicated they did not intend to request
a second evaluation, and the court directed them to talk to Mr. Bolen about whether he
wanted to change his plea in light of the report.

[¶19] Approximately two months before trial, the parties submitted stipulated jury
instructions, which included instructions relating to an NGMI defense. At the pretrial
conference about a month before trial, the district court asked if there was still an NGMI
defense in the case. Defense counsel indicated there was, and that the defense intended to
call Dr. Wilkinson to testify.

[¶20] Mr. Bolen put on a defense case and called Dr. Wilkinson as a witness. She testified
to symptoms Mr. Bolen was experiencing on October 6, 2021, including delusions and
paranoia, but she opined his behaviors were consistent with methamphetamine use, and he
did not meet the statutory requirements to be found NGMI.

2
    This count was dismissed before trial.

                                             4
[¶21] During the reported jury instruction conference, the parties did not discuss the
NGMI instructions, no NGMI instructions were given, and the verdict form did not offer
the jury the option of considering Mr. Bolen’s NGMI defense. The jury was given an
instruction regarding the defense of self-induced intoxication.

[¶22] At the end of a four-day jury trial, the jury convicted Mr. Bolen of 13 of the 15
counts. 3 He was sentenced to a total of 30 to 40 years in prison and timely appealed. While
his appeal was pending, Mr. Bolen filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to W.R.A.P. 21.
He asserted his trial attorneys were ineffective for not pursuing NGMI instructions and a
special verdict form when his NGMI plea had not been withdrawn and he had not consented
to its withdrawal or abandonment. He asserted he had been prejudiced by this conduct
because he had put on evidence to support an NGMI defense, but the jury was not permitted
to consider it and decide whether his conduct was the result of a mental illness or self-
induced intoxication.

[¶23] Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Mr. Bolen’s W.R.A.P.
21 motion. It found trial counsel made a strategic decision not to pursue the NGMI defense
and to focus instead on the self-induced intoxication defense, and this decision did not
constitute ineffective assistance. Mr. Bolen appealed the denial of his motion for a new
trial, and we consolidated his appeals.

                                              DISCUSSION

I.        The district court did not violate Mr. Bolen’s right to due process when it did not
          instruct the jury on his NGMI defense.

[¶24] “A defendant has a due process right to a theory of defense instruction,” and our
review of a court’s rejection of or failure to give such an instruction is de novo. Kessel v.
State, 2023 WY 120, ¶ 13, 539 P.3d 406, 409 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Harnetty v. State, 2019
WY 21, ¶ 27, 435 P.3d 368, 374 (Wyo. 2019)). “[A]n erroneous refusal of a theory of
defense instruction is ‘reversible error per se.’” Kessel, 2023 WY 120, ¶ 13, 539 P.3d at
409 (quoting Black v. State, 2020 WY 65, ¶ 22, 464 P.3d 574, 579 (Wyo. 2020)). However,
a defense instruction not supported by the evidence may properly be refused. Garza v.
State, 2020 WY 32, ¶ 22, 458 P.3d 1239, 1244-45 (Wyo. 2020) (citing James v. State, 2015
WY 83, ¶ 18, 357 P.3d 101, 106 (Wyo. 2015)).

                  The quantum of evidence required to submit a theory of
                  defense to a jury has been described as “any evidence,” “some
                  evidence,” “slight evidence,” and “more than a scintilla.”
                  These phrases are not useful because the ultimate test is

3
    Mr. Bolen was found not guilty of two property destruction charges.

                                                      5
                whether the evidence (regardless of amount) creates a fact
                issue requiring submission to the jury.

Howitt v. State, 2022 WY 152, ¶ 27, 521 P.3d 314, 322 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Black, 2020
WY 65, ¶ 24, 464 P.3d at 580).

[¶25] Mr. Bolen contends he presented sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on
his NGMI defense and that the issue of whether his “distorted perception of reality” was
primarily attributable to self-induced intoxication or mental illness was a question of fact
the jury should have resolved. We disagree.

[¶26] “An NGMI defense is governed by statute, and the law presumes every defendant
to be ‘mentally responsible.’” Rodriguez v. State, 2022 WY 109, ¶ 38, 516 P.3d 850, 857
(Wyo. 2022) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b)). A defendant asserting the defense
bears the burden of disproving the presumption that he was mentally responsible.
Rodriguez, 2022 WY 109, ¶ 38, 516 P.3d at 857 (citing Gabbert v. State, 2018 WY 69,
¶ 13, 420 P.3d 172, 175 (Wyo. 2018)); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b) (2023)).

        The NGMI defense is statutorily defined as follows:

                A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
                of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental illness or
                deficiency, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate
                the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
                the requirements of law. As used in this section, the terms
                mental illness or deficiency mean only those severely
                abnormal mental conditions that grossly and demonstrably
                impair a person’s perception or understanding of reality and
                that are not attributable primarily to self-induced intoxication
                as defined by W.S. 6-1-202(b).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(a).

[¶27] Thus, to establish an NGMI defense, Mr. Bolen had to prove that at the time of his
crimes, he was 1) suffering from a “severely abnormal mental condition,” and 2) he was
unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. Importantly, only court-designated examiners who examined the
defendant “are competent witnesses to testify as to the defendant’s mental responsibility.” 4
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(c).

4
 A designated examiner is “a licensed psychiatrist, or other physician with forensic training or a licensed
psychologist with forensic training[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-301(a)(i).

                                                    6
[¶28] Dr. Renee Wilkinson was the only court-designated examiner of Mr. Bolen. She
testified that Mr. Bolen suffered from paranoia and delusions at the time of his crimes. She
did not, however, testify that Mr. Bolen suffered from a severely abnormal mental
condition or that he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. In fact, she testified to the
contrary that Mr. Bolen did not suffer a severely abnormal mental condition at the time of
his crime and was not statutorily eligible for an NGMI defense because his behaviors,
delusions, and paranoia were due to methamphetamine intoxication.

[¶29] Despite Dr. Wilkinson’s testimony, Mr. Bolen contends there was evidence from
which the jury could have found that at the time of his crimes he was suffering from a
severely abnormal mental condition and was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law. He points to evidence that one
of the victims described him as erratic, confused, and delusional and as “a crazy black dude
talking out of his mind.” He also cites a law enforcement’s description of him as paranoid
and delusional, and his own testimony that he could not remember the events of October
6, 2021.

[¶30] This evidence falls short because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305 is clear that “[o]nly
the designated examiners who examined the defendant . . . are competent witnesses to
testify as to the defendant’s mental responsibility.” By the plain terms of the statute, the
observations or testimony of a lay witness is not competent evidence of a defendant’s
mental responsibility. See Alvarado v. State, 2024 WY 9, ¶ 4, 541 P.3d 1097, 1099 (Wyo.
2024) (“When interpreting statutes, we seek the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain
and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute[.]”). 5

[¶31] When a defendant fails to present evidence to establish the statutorily required
mental illness or deficiency, “a district court should not . . . submit the issue of mental
illness or deficiency to the jury simply on the basis of a plea of not guilty by reason of
mental illness or deficiency.” Kind v. State, 595 P.2d 960, 962 (Wyo. 1979); see also 23A
C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 1786 (March 2024 Update)
(“[W]hether defendant has presented some evidence, so as to reach the jury on the insanity
defense, is for the court, which is permitted to withhold the defense from consideration of
the jury when there is no evidence presented or where there is insufficient evidence to
present a jury question on the defense . . . .”). Because Mr. Bolen did not present competent

5
  Mr. Bolen contends that the circumstantial evidence of his paranoia, delusions, and erratic behavior was
competent evidence of his mental responsibility and that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(c) precludes only
experts not designated by the court from testifying to a defendant’s mental responsibility. We can think of
no reason the legislature would deem an outside expert incompetent to testify to a defendant’s mental
responsibility but allow lay observations or testimony to establish the critical components of an NGMI
defense. We therefore reject this interpretation of the statute. See Hopeful v. Etchepare, LLC, 2023 WY
33A, ¶ 43, 528 P.3d 414, 427 (Wyo. 2023) (“We will not interpret a statute in a way that renders any portion
meaningless or in a manner producing absurd results.”).

                                                     7
evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of an NGMI defense, he was not entitled to
an instruction on the defense.

II.    Mr. Bolen was not deprived of the effective assistance of his counsel when his
       attorneys did not renew their request for NGMI instructions or a special verdict
       form.

[¶32] “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims ‘involve mixed questions of law and fact.’”
Jendresen v. State, 2021 WY 82, ¶ 36, 491 P.3d 273, 284 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Sides v.
State, 2021 WY 42, ¶ 34, 483 P.3d 128, 137 (Wyo. 2021)). “We review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” Id.

[¶33] A criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel. Buckingham v.
State, 2022 WY 99, ¶ 25, 515 P.3d 615, 619 (Wyo. 2022) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI;
Wyo. Const., art. 1, § 10; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2063, 80 L. Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant “must
show both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and he was prejudiced as a result.”
Buckingham, 2022 WY 99, ¶ 25, 515 P.3d at 619 (quoting Steplock v. State, 2022 WY 12,
¶ 20, 502 P.3d 930, 936 (Wyo. 2022)). Counsel acts deficiently when he “fails to render
such assistance as would have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney.” Steplock,
2022 WY 12, ¶ 20, 502 P.3d at 936-37 (quoting Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 53,
482 P.3d 337, 351-52 (Wyo. 2021)). “Prejudice occurs when there is ‘a reasonable
probability that, absent counsel’s deficient assistance, the outcome of appellant’s trial
would have been different.’” Steplock, 2022 WY 12, ¶ 20, 502 P.3d at 937 (quoting
Neidlinger, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 53, 482 P.3d at 351-52). We may, and often do, dispose of an
ineffective assistance claim solely on the prejudice prong. See Steplock, 2022 WY 12, ¶ 22,
502 P.3d at 937 (disposing of ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of prejudice is
often the preferred course.) (quoting Leners v. State, 2021 WY 67, ¶ 21, 486 P.3d 1013,
1018 (Wyo. 2021), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 410, 211 L. Ed.2d 220 (2021));
see also Tarpey v. State, 2023 WY 14, ¶ 55, 523 P.3d 916, 932 (Wyo. 2023); Buckingham,
2022 WY 99, ¶ 27, 515 P.3d at 619.

[¶34] Mr. Bolen claims that because the evidence warranted instructions on his NGMI
defense and he had not consented to abandonment of the defense, his attorneys were
ineffective in failing to renew their request for the instructions. We reject this claim under
the prejudice prong.

                                              8
[¶35] As discussed above, Mr. Bolen did not present evidence necessary to support an
NGMI defense, and he therefore was not entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense.
Kind, 595 P.2d at 962 (“In the absence of evidence submitted by a defendant in a criminal
proceeding tending to establish mental illness or deficiency, a district court should not,
despite the language of the statute, submit the issue of mental illness or deficiency to the
jury simply on the basis of a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.”).
Because the instructions would not have been proper even had Mr. Bolen’s attorneys
renewed their request for them, Mr. Bolen has not shown there is a reasonable probability
the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to him had his counsel renewed
their request. In the absence of prejudice, his claim fails.

III.    Mr. Bolen’s convictions for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated
       assault and battery do not violate double jeopardy.

[¶36] Mr. Bolen claims his convictions for the trio of attempted second-degree murder
charges and aggravated assault and battery charges “constitute double punishment” in
violation of double jeopardy protections because all six counts stemmed from the same
physical act: “one single shot from one single rifle.” Because he was convicted of attempted
second-degree murder for each victim, he contends the corresponding aggravated assault
and battery convictions cannot be sustained, and those sentences should be vacated.

[¶37] Mr. Bolen raises his claim under the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. We have said:

              The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
              applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
              prohibits multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same
              offense. U.S. Const. amend V (“nor shall any person be subject
              for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
              limb.”); Cercy v. State, 2019 WY 131, ¶ 11, 455 P.3d 678, 682
              (Wyo. 2019) (citations omitted). Article 1, Section 11 of the
              Wyoming Constitution also prohibits multiple prosecutions
              and punishments for the same offense. Wyo. Const. art 1, § 11
              (“nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
              offense.”). We give the two constitutional provisions the same
              meaning, consider them “coextensive in application,” and can
              look to federal court decisions regarding the Fifth
              Amendment’s double jeopardy protections for persuasive
              authority. Tucker v. State, 2010 WY 162, ¶ 41, 245 P.3d 301,
              311–12 (Wyo. 2010); Vigil v. State, 563 P.2d 1344, 1350
              (Wyo. 1977). The double jeopardy clauses protect against: (1)
              second prosecutions for the same offense after an acquittal; (2)

                                              9
              second prosecutions for the same offense after a conviction;
              and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Tucker,
              2010 WY 162, ¶ 41, 245 P.3d at 311-12; Amrein v. State, 836
              P.2d 862, 864 (Wyo. 1992).

Veatch v. State, 2023 WY 79, ¶ 9, 533 P.3d 505, 508 (Wyo. 2023).

[¶38] To determine if two offenses constitute the “same offense,” we have adopted the
same-elements test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S 299, 304, 52 S. Ct.
180, 182, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), which asks “whether each offense charged contains an
element not contained in the other.” Veatch, 2023 WY 79, ¶ 12, 533 P.3d at 508-09. “If the
elements are the same, they are the same offense, and the double jeopardy clause therefore
protects against successive prosecution and multiple punishments arising from those
offenses.” Id., 533 P.3d at 509 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182; United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696-98, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1993)).
In applying this test,

              we look only to the language used by the legislature to describe
              the elements which must be proven to bring a particular
              defendant’s specific conduct within the reach of the statute. We
              do not concern ourselves with how those elements are proven
              in that defendant’s case—that is, we look to what the
              legislature says must be proven, not the facts or evidence used
              in a particular case to establish that ultimate fact.

Winters v. State, 2019 WY 76, ¶ 101, 446 P.3d 191, 221 (Wyo. 2019) (quoting Jones v.
State, 2016 WY 110, ¶ 12, 384 P.3d 260, 264 (Wyo. 2016)). “[D]ouble jeopardy protections
relate to ‘offenses’ as defined by the language used to set out the elements of a statutory
crime, not as defined by a defendant’s particular actions.” Jones, 2016 WY 110, ¶ 13, 384
P.3d at 264 (citing Sweets v. State, 2013 WY 98, ¶ 47, 307 P.3d 860, 875 (Wyo. 2013)).

[¶39] “The key inquiry is whether the legislative branch intended the defendant’s conduct
to result in separate offenses and separate punishments—and if the legislature did so intend,
then there is no double jeopardy violation.” Winters, 2019 WY 76, ¶ 101, 446 P.3d at 221
(quoting Sweets, 2013 WY 98, ¶ 21, 307 P.3d at 867). “Whether the separate provisions
describe the ‘same offense’ is a question of legislative intent which this Court reviews de
novo.” Jones, 2016 WY 110, ¶ 10, 384 P.3d at 263 (citing Sweets, 2013 WY 98, ¶¶ 19, 21,
307 P.3d at 867) (italics removed).

[¶40] Second-degree murder is defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104(a) (2023), which
states in relevant part:

                                             10
              [W]hoever purposely and maliciously, but without
              premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the
              second degree . . . .

[¶41] Because Mr. Bolen was charged with attempted second-degree murder, we must
also look to the attempt statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301(a)(i) (2023), which provides in
pertinent part:

              A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:

                 With the intent to commit the crime, he does any act which
                 is a substantial step towards commission of the crime. A
                 “substantial step” is conduct which is strongly
                 corroborative of the firmness of the person’s intention to
                 complete the commission of the crime[.]

[¶42] Interpreting these two statutes together, we have held that the crime of attempted
second-degree murder “requires proof that a defendant intentionally did the act that
constitutes a substantial step towards committing murder, and that he also harbored the
intent that defines the underlying crime—that he acted purposely and maliciously.” Jones,
2016 WY 110, ¶ 26, 384 P.3d at 266 (citing Bloomfield v. State, 2010 WY 97, ¶ 13, 234
P.3d 366, 372 (Wyo. 2010)). Maliciously as used in the second-degree murder statute
“means that the act constituting the offense was done recklessly under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]” Wilkerson v. State, 2014
WY 136, ¶ 27, 336 P.3d 1188, 1200 (Wyo. 2014).

[¶43] The portion of the aggravated assault and battery statute under which Mr. Bolen was
charged, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i) (2023), states:

              A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he
              engages in any of the following:

                 Causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another
                 intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
                 manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
                 life[.]

[¶44] We have held that when a defendant is charged with aggravated assault and battery
involving an attempted injury, the State must prove the defendant acted with the specific
intent to cause serious bodily injury. Schuerman v State, 2022 WY 160, ¶ 11, 522 P.3d 145,
149 (Wyo. 2022).

                                            11
[¶45] The various elements of the crimes Mr. Bolen was convicted of are summarized in
the chart below:

 Counts I, II, and III   Counts IV and V                       Count VI
 Attempted Second-Degree Aggravated Assault and                  Aggravated Assault and
          Murder                 Battery                          Battery (Attempted
                                                                         Injury)
 1. Mr. Bolen “intentionally 1. Mr. Bolen “cause[d]            1. Mr. Bolen acted with
 performed an act            serious bodily injury to          the specific intent to
 constituting a substantial  another”; and                     cause serious bodily
 step toward” killing a                                        injury.
 human being; and

 2. he acted “purposely,”  2. he acted “intentionally,
 which means intentionally knowingly[,] or recklessly
 or deliberately; and      under circumstances
                           manifesting an extreme
                           indifference to the value of
                           human life.”

 3. he acted maliciously,
 which means he acted
 recklessly under
 circumstances manifesting
 an extreme indifference to
 the value of human life.

[¶46] A careful consideration of the statutory elements of each offense shows Mr. Bolen’s
convictions for his act against the three victims does not violate double jeopardy. First, the
charges involving John Cleary and George Heger each required proof of an element the
other did not. The attempted second-degree murder charges required the State to prove Mr.
Bolen intentionally or deliberately and maliciously took a substantial step toward killing a
human being. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301 and 6-2-104(a). Although the definition of
maliciously is the same as that of recklessly found in the aggravated assault and battery
statute, the aggravated assault and battery charge (with injury) did not require the State to
prove the defendant acted intentionally or deliberately. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).
The intent elements of attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery
with an attempted injury are thus distinguishable.

[¶47] Additionally, the aggravated assault charges involving the injured victims required
the State to prove Mr. Bolen caused serious bodily injury. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).
The attempted second-degree murder charges did not require proof of serious bodily injury.

                                             12
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104(a). The attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault
and battery charges thus contained elements the other did not. Veatch, 2023 WY 79, ¶ 12,
533 P.3d at 509-10 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. 182; Dixon, 509 U.S. at
696-98, 113 S. Ct. at 2856-57). Given the different elements, it is apparent the legislature
intended for attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery (with
injury) to constitute separate offenses. Mr. Bolen’s convictions for all four charges related
to John Cleary and George Heger therefore did not violate Mr. Bolen’s right against double
jeopardy.

[¶48] The charges involving Richard Cleary similarly have different elements under the
Blockburger test. Again, the attempted second-degree murder charge required the State to
prove Mr. Bolen intentionally or deliberately and maliciously took a substantial step
toward killing a human being. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-301, 6-2-104(a). Aggravated assault
and battery with an attempted injury does not contain a “recklessly” element similar to the
“maliciously” requirement of second-degree murder. Instead, the State had to prove Mr.
Bolen acted with the specific intent to cause serious bodily injury. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
502(a)(i); Schuerman, 2022 WY 160, ¶ 11, 522 P.3d at 149. In turn, the specific intent to
cause serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted second-degree murder. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104(a). Both attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and
battery with an attempted injury contain an element the other does not. Veatch, 2023 WY
79, ¶ 12, 533 P.3d at 508-09 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. 182; Dixon,
509 U.S. at 696-98, 113 S. Ct. at 2856-57). The legislature thus intended for attempted
second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery with an attempted injury to
constitute separate offenses. Accordingly, Mr. Bolen’s convictions for both charges
relating to Richard Cleary did not violate his right against double jeopardy.

                                      CONCLUSION

[¶49] Mr. Bolen did not present competent evidence showing he met the statutory criteria
for an NGMI defense, and the district court thus did not violate his due process rights when
it did not give NGMI instructions. Mr. Bolen’s ineffective assistance claim fails because
he did not establish that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s performance. Last, because
the crimes of attempted second-degree murder and aggravated assault and battery contain
separate elements, Mr. Bolen’s convictions did not violate double jeopardy.

[¶50] Affirmed.

                                             13
FENN, J., specially concurring.

[¶51] I agree with the results reached by the majority in this case. I write separately to
address some nuances with the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. As the majority
notes, our precedent states we may resolve these claims on the prejudice prong when
appropriate. Steplock, 2022 WY 12, ¶ 22, 502 P.3d at 937. However, doing so in this case
inadequately reflects the unique nature of an NGMI defense and what occurred at the trial
court level. The district court resolved the ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the
deficient performance prong, and I believe the deficient performance prong merits some
discussion in this case.

[¶52] As the majority points out, the NGMI defense is a statutory creation. Rodriguez,
2022 WY 109, ¶ 38, 516 P.3d at 857 (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b)). Once a
defendant enters an NGMI plea, the defendant’s mental responsibility becomes an
affirmative defense. Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1985). A defendant bears
the burden of disproving the presumption that he was mentally responsible. Rodriguez,
¶ 38, 519 P.3d at 857 (citing Gabbert, 2018 WY 69, ¶ 13, 420 P.3d at 175). A defendant
must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that “(1) as a result of mental illness or
deficiency, (2) he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.” Gabbert, ¶ 16, 420 P.3d at
177; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b). Pursuant to Wyoming Statute § 7-11-305(c), only
designated examiners who examined the defendant “are competent witnesses to testify as
to the defendant’s mental responsibility.”

[¶53] In this case, defense counsel thoroughly vetted the NGMI defense. A “designated
examiner,” Dr. Wilkerson, examined Mr. Bolen and concluded he was mentally
responsible for his crimes because voluntary intoxication is specifically excluded from the
definition of mental illness or deficiency under Wyoming’s NGMI statutes. After the
NGMI evaluation was completed, defense counsel learned there was no evidence to present
in support of Mr. Bolen’s NGMI defense. Accordingly, defense counsel made a strategic
decision to leave the NGMI plea in place while calling Dr. Wilkinson solely to elicit
testimony about Mr. Bolen’s delusions and paranoia to establish he was unable to form
specific intent to commit attempted second-degree murder due to his self-induced
intoxication. At the W.R.A.P. 21 hearing, defense counsel testified:

              [APPELLATE COUNSEL:] In your opinion, do you feel like
              you missed the issue of these jury instructions or was this a
              strategic choice?

              A. I would say it’s a strategic choice to go solely after specific
              intent because we had no evidence to support an NGMI plea.
              And, quite the contrary, we had evidence directly contradicting
              an NGMI plea.

                                             14
             Q. But separate from the strategic question of whether or not
             you would go for specific intent, which you’ve already testified
             that was your strategy, did you feel like strategically you could
             ignore the issue of NGMI because of the way the evidence
             shook out?

                    It’s a little bit of a philosophical question.

             A. So I would agree with the assertion simply because there
             was absolutely no evidence to support it. So, therefore, without
             any evidence to support it, it’s kind of a frivolous issue.

Defense counsel further testified about this issue during cross-examination:

             [STATE’S ATTORNEY:] Do you feel like you and co-
             counsel ignored the issue of NGMI when preparing for Mr.
             Bolen’s trial?

             A. No. It was thoroughly vetted.

             Q. Did you continue to consider the implications of an NGMI
             plea as it related to Mr. Bolen’s case?

             A. We considered it until we got the report from Dr. Wilkinson
             that said he did not meet the criteria.

             Q. And I think you’ve already testified to it, but I’ll ask again:
             Why was that that you felt like that was kind of a dispositive
             result?

             A. Under the statute of 7-11-304, it specifically states that only
             the doctors that examine the defendant can testify to an NGMI
             finding. It specifically says you can’t use lay people to do that.

                    We did the evaluation. We had one doctor. The doctor
             says he does not meet the criteria. That’s the only person that
             could testify to whether or not Mr. Bolen qualifies for an
             NGMI plea, and her finding was that he does not.

             Q. Do you recall Dr. Wilkinson testifying at Mr. Bolen’s trial?

             A. Yes, I do.

                                             15
             Q. Was her testimony consistent with her report?

             A. Yes, it was.

             Q. Again, I may possibly be belaboring the issue, but [appellate
             counsel] asked you about renewing the request for these jury
             instructions or objecting to their omission. If you know, do
             you know why there was not a request for a renewal of these -
             - Strike that.

                     Do you know why you did not ask for these instructions
             to be included or object to their omission?

             A. We had no evidence to support the NGMI, so there is no
             need for the instruction.

             Q. In your opinion, would you have been entitled to those
             instructions had you asked for them at that time once the
             evidence had closed?

             A. I don’t believe so at all.

Defense counsel also testified he had a specific conversation with Mr. Bolen about trial
strategy after the NGMI evaluation was completed:

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL] Shortly after we got the 304 report,
             the NGMI report, I went to the jail and met with him. And we
             discussed it at length because what was revealed in that report
             was not what he and I had talked about prior, which specifically
             was the use of methamphetamines. So we had a long
             conversation regarding that and that that was no longer an
             option that we could pursue.

             Q. However, you did persist with the NGMI plea; correct?

             A. I’ll say we let it die. I mean, we didn’t pursue it. We didn’t
             withdraw it.

             Q. So why not withdraw it?

             A. Well, so I’m not real certain on the proper procedure; but I
             knew if the NGMI was still on the table, there could be no

                                             16
              objection to Dr. Wilkinson testifying at trial. And I needed her
              -- I wanted her to testify to the findings in her report that related
              to the specific intent and that Mr. Bolen was suffering from
              paranoia and delusions. And I don’t know for certain, but my
              theory was if the NGMI comes off the table, the county
              attorney’s office could object to Wilkinson testifying because
              her point was to generate a report for NGMI.

Due to the lack of any evidence to support the NGMI defense, defense counsel made a
strategic decision to leave the NGMI plea in place to preserve Dr. Wilkinson’s testimony
so it could be used to establish another defense that had a possibility of succeeding.

[¶54] Mr. Bolen failed to establish defense counsel ignored or inadequately investigated
his NGMI defense. Mr. Bolen failed to show there was any evidence to support his NGMI
defense that defense counsel overlooked. Mr. Bolen failed to demonstrate he was entitled
to NGMI instructions that defense counsel neglected to request. Rather, there was simply
no evidence that would have allowed Mr. Bolen to meet his burden of proving the statutory
elements of the NGMI defense, and defense counsel strategically avoided withdrawal of
the NGMI plea to obtain Dr. Wilkinson’s testimony regarding Mr. Bolen’s ability to form
specific intent. In light of all the circumstances, defense counsel’s actions fell within the
“the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Steplock, 2022 WY 12, ¶ 20, 502
P.3d at 937 (quoting Neidlinger, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 53, 482 P.3d at 352).

[¶55] Although I agree with the majority that Mr. Bolen failed to establish he was
prejudiced by defense counsel’s performance, I would also conclude the district court
correctly denied Mr. Bolen’s W.R.A.P. 21 motion because Mr. Bolen failed to prove
defense counsel’s performance was deficient.

                                               17