Court Opinion

ID: 9948227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 18:04:19.425384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:20.444321
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/6/24 Sarah B. v. Evans CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 SARAH B.,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079447

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. CVPS2202003)

 STEVEN EVANS,                                                           OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Ronald L. Johnson,

Judge. Reversed with directions.

         Daniel J. Tripathi for Defendant and Appellant.

         Sarah B., in pro. per, and for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Steven Evans appeals from the trial court’s order granting a three-year civil

harassment restraining order against him. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; unlabeled statutory

references are to this code.) We conclude that the trial court prejudicially erred by not

allowing Evans to introduce certain evidence. We accordingly reverse the order and

remand with directions.

                                      BACKGROUND

       On May 25, 2022, Sarah B. applied for a civil harassment restraining order against

Evans. In support of the application, Sarah attested to being harassed by Evans in various

ways over the preceding two years, including that he had twice “attempt[ed] arson,”

threatened her and her husband, and harassed her in public. She also stated that Evans

“recently came at me as I was leaving my home[.] [C]aught me by surprise—Assaulted

my truck tried to enter my vehicle tried to stop me, . . . .”

       The court issued a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the

application in June 2022. Five days before the hearing, Evans filed a motion to deem

Sarah a vexatious litigant. Evans argued that Sarah qualified as a vexatious litigant

because she allegedly had unsuccessfully prosecuted seven cases in the preceding seven

years as a self-represented litigant. The motion was not accompanied by a declaration or

any exhibits, and it was not verified.

       Both Sarah and Evans testified at the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing,

Sarah stated: “You’re probably aware that I’m not a vexatious litigant. I did not get

served that paper.” The court stated that it was not entertaining the vexatious litigant

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motion, explaining that it had “no jurisdiction for that.” The clerk then stated that the

motion was on the calendar for that day, but the judge responded, “It’s denied,” adding,

“It can’t be heard here.” Evans did not object.

       The court questioned both parties. Evans testified that he had been on Sarah’s

property only in order to effectuate service of legal documents, most recently in May

2022. Evans explained that Sarah’s house is gated and walled, so he believed that he

could contact her only by approaching her when she was backing out of the driveway or

was already on the street. Sarah denied that Evans had been on her property only to

effectuate service.

       Asked what conduct by Evans she wanted restrained, Sarah testified that Evans

had “harassed [her], threatened to beat [her] up, attempted to burn [her] house down . . .

[¶] . . . threatened to kill [her] husband,” “chased me down with his truck,” and “killed

[her] dear dog.” The incident concerning the truck happened on May 25, 2022, or “after

that.” She said that she and Evans had some sort of physical confrontation in June 2022

when Evans trespassed onto her property to personally serve her with legal documents.

Sarah also described an incident that occurred at a courthouse in which a security guard

had to ask Evans to leave and escorted Sarah out of the courthouse because Evans was

screaming and yelling at her.

       Sarah told the court: “I want him to stop coming at my truck, yanking at the door

like he’s trying to get in, which I have pictures of.” Sarah said that Evans had hit her

windshield with his hand and grabbed at her truck door, trying to get inside of the truck.

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Evans admitted that his “hand did hit her windshield when she was trying to run me

down.” He explained, “That was when I was serving them. I have the direct incident on

my phone on video, if you want to take a look at it. I can show you exactly what

happened. She was backing out of her driveway. I entered the street. Okay. As she was

finishing backing up, she knew that I was in the road, and she chose to use her vehicle as

a weapon to avoid, almost—almost ran me down.” The court did not respond to Evans’s

offer to show the video. Sarah agreed that Evans had been attempting to serve her with

“just civil stuff,” and she stated: “He comes and hits the truck with his hand, and he

grabs, I have pictures. He’s grabbing my door trying to get into my truck.” Sarah also

said that she had witnesses whom she could present, but the court did not respond to

those statements either.

       After hearing from both parties, the court granted a three-year restraining order

against Evans. Evans objected, stating that he had just “served her small claims

paperwork, maybe not in the right way, but it was the only way that I knew of to be able

to serve her.” The court responded: “Well, no, sir, that’s not correct. It [led] to a

conflict that shouldn’t have been there. It became aggressive. The Court is not going to

allow it to occur any more.” The court ordered Evans to stay at least 10 yards from Sarah

and her residence, vehicle, and workplace for three years, until June 15, 2025.

                                              4
                                        DISCUSSION

       Evans argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to

introduce the video recording of the incident involving the truck. We agree.

       Section 527.6 provides that a trial court must issue a restraining order if the court

finds by clear and convincing evidence that the requesting party has suffered harassment

as defined by the statute. (Id., subds. (a), (i).) “‘Harassment’” is defined as (1) “unlawful

violence,” (2) “a credible threat of violence,” or (3) “a knowing and willful course of

conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person,

and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) We review for substantial

evidence the trial court’s express and implied factual findings in granting a civil

harassment restraining order. (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)

       “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.”

(Evid. Code, § 351.) “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant

to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to

prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends

‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’ to establish material facts . . . .”

(People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 177, overruled on another ground by People v.

Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118.) We review for abuse of discretion “any ruling

by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th

690, 717.)

                                               5
       The erroneous exclusion of evidence warrants reversal only if the effect of “the

error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Evid. Code, § 354.)

“A miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the reviewing court is convinced

after an examination of the entire case, including the evidence, that it is reasonably

probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached absent the

error.” (Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 853 (Brokopp).)

       Sarah repeatedly attested that she was concerned about the recent incident in

which Evans approached her truck, attempted to open her door, and hit her windshield.

The incident accordingly was of central relevance to the court’s determination of whether

Evans unlawfully harassed Sarah. Evans and Sarah agreed about certain aspects of the

incident, such as that it occurred because Evans was attempting to effect personal service

on Sarah and that Evans’s hand made contact with Sarah’s windshield during the

incident. But they otherwise disputed what happened, and they provided conflicting

versions of the incident. Evans claimed that Sarah had attempted to run him over, while

Sarah said that Evans approached the truck and attempted to “yank[]” open the door. A

video recording of the incident likely would shed light on what actually happened.

Moreover, the recording was additionally relevant to assessing the credibility of both

parties. (Evid. Code, § 210.) The parties’ credibility was particularly important given

that the bulk of the evidence in the case was their testimony. In light of the importance of

what transpired during the truck incident to the court’s determination of the ultimate

                                              6
issue, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the video

recording of that incident.

       We also conclude that the erroneous exclusion of that evidence was prejudicial. It

is reasonably probable that the recording portrayed the incident favorably to Evans, given

that he offered to introduce it. It therefore is also reasonably probable that the recording

would have impacted the trial court’s perception of Sarah’s overall credibility and thus

could have undermined Sarah’s entire case.1 We accordingly conclude that absent the

erroneous exclusion of the video recording, it is reasonably probable that the trial court

would have reached a result more favorable to Evans. (Evid. Code, § 354; Brokopp,

supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 853.) Because we conclude that the evidentiary error was

prejudicial, we need not and do not address Evans’s remaining arguments.2

1      Evans also argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by not allowing him to
admit evidence supporting the motion to deem Sarah a vexatious litigant, which he claims
was “integral” to his opposition to Sarah’s “civil harassment claim.” Evans did not
attempt to introduce such evidence at the restraining order hearing, so the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to admit evidence that no party sought to introduce.
(People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1304; see also Evid. Code, § 354, subd.
(a).) We nevertheless note that evidence showing that Sarah has engaged in conduct that
would justify deeming her a vexatious litigant (§ 391, subd. (b)) could be relevant to
evaluating Sarah’s credibility.

2      We also deny the parties’ various requests that we augment the record, receive
additional evidence, and take judicial notice of various documents on appeal—mainly
records from other court proceedings that were not introduced in this proceeding—
because the documents are not relevant to our analysis of the issues in this appeal.
(People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [“any
matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue”].)

                                              7
                                      DISPOSITION

       We reverse the June 15, 2022, order granting the civil harassment restraining order

against Evans. We remand the matter to the trial court to hold a new evidentiary hearing

on Sarah’s May 25, 2022, application for a civil harassment restraining order. Evans

shall recover his costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                MENETREZ
                                                                                        J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
                          J.

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