Court Opinion

ID: 9768631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:12:57.969067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:42.685229
License: Public Domain

LUKOWSKY, Justice
(dissenting).
Today, the majority eviscerated Sections 14 and 54 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky with the scalpel of judicial fiat. The importance of this necropsy makes it necessary that I publicly express my views.
KRS 304.39-060 provides, in part:
“(2)(a) Tort liability with respect to accidents occurring in this commonwealth and arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle is ‘abolished’ for damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease to the extent the basic reparation benefits provided in this subtitle are payable therefor, or that would be payable but for any deductible authorized by this subtitle, under any insurance policy or other method of security complying with the requirements of this subtitle, except to the extent noneco-nomic detriment qualifies under subsection (2)(b) hereof.
“(b) In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required in this subtitle, or against any person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in toft for pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of such motor vehicle only in the event that the benefits which are payable for such injury as ‘medical expense’ or which would be payable but for any exclusion or deductible authorized by this subtitle exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a compound, com-minuted, displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, permanent loss of bodily function or death. Any person who is entitled to receive free medical and surgical benefits shall be deemed in compliance with the requirements of this subsection upon a showing that the medical treatment received has an equivalent value of at least one thousand dollars ($1,000).
“(c) Tort liability is not so limited for injury to a person who is not an owner, operator, maintainer or user of a motor *781vehicle within subsection (1) of this section.
“(3) For purposes of this section and the provisions on reparation obligor’s rights of reimbursement, subrogation, and indemnity, a person does not intentionally cause harm merely because his act or failure to act is intentional or done with his realization that it creates a grave risk of harm.
Section 14 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky provides:
“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”
Section 54 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky provides:
“The General Assembly shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or property.”
In Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932) we said:
“It was the manifest purpose of the framers of that instrument (the constitution) to preserve and perpetuate the common law right of a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to sue to recover damages for his injury. The imperative mandate of section 14 is that every per-son, for an injury done him in his person, shall have remedy by due course of law.”
“It is insisted that this section of the Constitution (54) does not guarantee the continuation of the right of action theretofore existent, but merely applies to such causes of action as continue to exist, and prohibits the Legislature from limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to person or property so long as a right of action exists for such injuries, but does not prohibit it from abolishing the right of action.”
“When that section is read in connection with other sections of the same instrument, such as sections 14 and 241, the conclusion is inescapable that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to inhibit the Legislature from abolishing rights of action for damages for death or injuries caused by negligence.”
In Saylor v. Hall, Ky., 497 S.W.2d 218 (1973) we said:
“Our state Constitution, however, has been held to prohibit the legislative branch from abolishing common-law rights of action for injuries to the person caused by negligence or for death caused by negligence.”
On numerous occasions we have indicated the importance of a person’s right to recover damages for pain and suffering. See, e. g., Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 66 S.W.2d 57 (1933); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright, 246 Ky. 208, 54 S.W.2d 666 (1932). In Ashland-Coca Cola, supra, we felt compelled to state:
“The right to recover of a wrongdoer compensation or allowance looking toward recompense for pain and suffering caused by him has been everywhere recognized as a fundamental and cardinal principle of law, because it is naturally connected with all physical injuries and must be considered as a direct and proximate result.”
It is, therefore, as obvious as a “purple cow” that the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act abolishes the tort action for pain and suffering for most accident victims in minor accident cases and is, consequently, unconstitutional unless these victims may be construed to have consented to •the application of the Act and waived their constitutional rights.
The method by which this consent or waiver is obtained is the following language from KRS 304.39-060.
“(1) Any person who registers, operates, maintains or uses a motor vehicle on the public roadways of this commonwealth shall, as a condition of such registration, *782operation, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle and use of public roadways, be deemed to have accepted the provisions of this subtitle, and in particular those provisions which are contained in this section.”
A person who wishes to retain his right to sue may do so only by affirmatively complying with the further provisions of KRS 304.39-060.
“(4) Any person may refuse to consent to the limitations of his tort rights and liabilities as contained in this section. Such rejection must be in writing in a form to be prescribed by the department of insurance and must have been executed and filed with the department at a time prior to any motor vehicle accident for which such rejection is to apply. Such rejection form together with a reasonable explanation thereof shall be furnished by the reparation obligor with each policy, to each prospective insurance applicant. Such rejection form shall affirmatively state in bold print that acceptance of this form of insurance denies the applicant the right to sue a negligent motorist unless certain requirements contained in the policy of insurance are met. Rejection by a person who is under legal disability shall be made on behalf of such person by his legal guardian or his natural parent. The failure of such guardian or a natural parent of a person under legal disability to file a rejection, within six (6) months from the date that this subtitle would otherwise become applicable to such person, shall be deemed to be an affirmative acceptance of all provisions of this subtitle. Provided, however, any person who, at the time of an accident, who does not have basic reparation insurance but has not formally rejected such limitations of his tort rights and liabilities and has at such time in effect security equivalent to that required by KRS 304.39-110 shall be deemed to have fully rejected such limitations within meaning of this section for that accident only.
“(5) Any rejection must be filed with the department of insurance and shall be for a period of five (5) years from the date of its execution unless revoked in writing. A copy of such rejection or revocation must be filed with each insurance company providing an automobile policy under which the individual is a named insured as defined in the policy.”
The argument is that we have approved the use of such a system of implied consent, acceptance and waiver of constitutional rights by holding the implied consent doctrine constitutional in relation to KRS 186.-565, which provides that a person’s driver’s license may be revoked if he refuses to take a chemical test to determine- the alcoholic content of his blood, breath, urine or saliva after he has been arrested for allegedly driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages, Craig v. Commonwealth, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 11 (1971), and in relation to KRS 342.395, which provides that an employee, as a part of his contract of hiring, shall be deemed to have accepted all the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and be bound thereby unless he shall have filed written notice to the contrary with his employer, Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953).
Craig, supra, is inapposite since it does not. involve an implied consent to the waiver of basic constitutional rights specifically delineated in the constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).
Wells, supra, does not control the situation presented here. The provision in the Workmen’s Compensation Act withstood attack only because it was aimed at eliminating the workman’s difficulty of proof of acceptance of the provisions of the act. The statute affected only the peculiar relationship of employer and employee by providing that acceptance of the act was a condition of the contract of hiring unless written out of the contract. It is notorious that every contract of hiring involves on both the part of the employer and employee a discussion of wages, hours, fringe bene*783fits, terms and conditions of employment. In fact, these very matters are now, in the majority of cases, the subject of collective bargaining with labor unions and employers associations on a unit and even industry-wide basis. Dick v. International Harvester Company, Ky., 310 S.W.2d 514 (1958). While the rights involved are the same, the antecedent contractual nature of the relationship between tortfeasor and victim and the bargaining process restrict the applicability of Wells, supra, to the field of workmen’s compensation.
Persons who are under legal disability comprise a substantial part of the population of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.1 These persons are covered by the Act unless its provisions are rejected by his legal guardian or his natural parent and any failure of rejection for a period of six months is deemed to be an affirmative acceptance of the Act. This permits one person to waive specific constitutional rights of another person without the advice or consent of a court. Constitutional rights have always been cherished rights and neither the workmen’s compensation act nor the statute dealing with a chemical test for alcoholic content in the blood allows one person to waive the constitutional rights of another. In addition, the rights of persons under legal disability have always been carefully protected by our law. For example, the statute of limitations with respect to any cause of action does not begin to run against a person under a legal disability until the disability is removed. KRS 413.-170. Thus, if a child of age eight is injured by some negligent person the period of one year, KRS 413.140(a), in which he has to bring suit against the negligent person does not begin to run until the child reaches the age of legal majority. The child is protected until either he is old enough to make his own decision about whether to bring suit or, if suit is brought earlier in his behalf by a guardian or next friend, its prosecution and settlement is supervised by a court.
It is a fact of judicial history that from 1953 to date there has been an increasing concern for the protection of fundamental constitutional rights. The Supreme Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, illuminated and eliminated the evils of the implied acceptance, implied consent, implied waiver approach when it said:
“Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional rights. The Court has defined waiver as ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, 146 A.L.R. 357 (1938). Courts should ‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver,’ Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 812, 81 L.Ed. 1177,1180 (1937), and they should ‘not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.’ Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 731, 81 L.Ed. 1093, 1103 (1937). In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), we held:
‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandably rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ Id., at 516, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 8 L.Ed.2d at 77.
“The Court has ruled similarly with respect to waiver of other rights designed to protect the accused. See, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628-1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Boykin v. *784Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).”
To those who would attempt to construct an artificial distinction between criminal vis-a-vis civil constitutional rights it is enough to say that the constitutional rights of persons who have conducted themselves so as not to .be charged with a' crime are also worthy of protection.
To apply a different standard here would, by implication, authorize the legislature to write a statute which would abolish or limit recovery in actions for medical and legal malpractice via an implied waiver based upon the failure of the patient or client to notify the physician or lawyer and the hospital or courthouse and the Director of the Department of Health or the Chief Justice of his rejection of the provisions of the act and place our “nihil obstat” on the Good Samaritan Act, KRS 411.148.
To the argument that the doctrine of implied consent is supported by the constitutionality of the Non-Resident Motor Vehicle Operator’s Act, KRS 188.020, the Long Arm Statute, KRS 454.210, and similar legislation, suffice it to say that those Acts open rather than close the courthouse door.
The implied consent, implied acceptance, implied waiver doctrine does not meet constitutional standards. Consequently, the entire Act is unconstitutional and void. KRS 304.39-340(2).
I would reverse the judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court and remand the cause for the entry of judgment consistent herewith. The majority having reached a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
JONES and STERNBERG, JJ., join in this dissent.

. The 1970 Federal Census discloses that of Kentucky’s population of 3,219,311 there were 1,114,042 persons under the age of 18 years. Kentucky’s Department for Human Resources reports that during fiscal year 1974 8,179 persons were determined to be incompetent in judicial proceedings.