Court Opinion

ID: 9550521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:36:15.362065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:42.200453
License: Public Domain

HERNANDEZ, Judge (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The defendant stated in its motion for summary judgment that it was based upon the pleadings, the deposition of the plaintiff, affidavits, etc. In its answer the defendant alleged several affirmative defenses, the second of which is pertinent: “Plaintiff’s alleged disability is not compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act because it does not arise out of and in the course of his employment for defendant.” The trial court in its order granting defendant’s motion, gave its reason for granting it: “The court concludes as a matter of law, that plaintiff did not sustain an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act . . . .” I agree with the trial court’s conclusion, that plaintiff’s injury was not compensable. However, I disagree with the trial court’s reasoning. In my opinion, plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of his employment. Our Supreme Court in Gilbert v. E. B. Law & Sons, Inc., 60 N.M. 101, 107, 287 P.2d 992 (1955) stated: “Before an injury may be said to be compensable as ‘arising out of employment,’ the accident causing the injury must result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment; a risk common to the public generally and not increased in any way by the circumstances of the employment is not covered by our act; . . . ” [Emphasis added.] In Berry v. J. C. Penny Co., 74 N.M. 484, 394 P.2d 996 (1964) stated: “There must not only have been a causal connection between the employment and the accident, but the accident must result from a risk incident to the work itself. “When the employee, as in this case, solely because of a non-occupational, preexisting physical condition, suffered a muscle spasm of the lower back, the question arises whether the muscle injury is one arising out of the employment. “This court, along with the courts of most states, has interpreted ‘arising out of employment’ to require a showing that the injury was caused by a peculiar or increased risk to which claimant, as distinguished from the general public, was subjected by his employment. [Citations omitted.] “Under the facts in this ease, it is quite clear that claimant’s injury arose out of risks or conditions personal to her and not out of a risk peculiar to the employment. Such injuries do not ‘arise out of’ the employment unless the employment contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury. Those injuries within the category of risks personal to the claimant are universally held to be non-compensable.” See 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 700. The increased-risk doctrine might be summarized as follows: there must be a showing that the injury was caused by an increased risk to which the worker, as distinct from the general public, was subjected by his employment. The following Texas cases are good examples of the use of the doctrine. American General Ins. Co. v. Webster, 118 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex.Civ.App.1938): “It is, of course, the rule, as contended by appellant that to be compensable the heatstroke must originate in the business of the employer and at a time when the employee is engaged in the performance of duties that subject him to greater hazards from heatstroke than applied to the general public. The location of the place of work and the condition of the premises may constitute such extra hazard, in whole or in part. . The extra hazard may be supplied by the very nature of the work itself. It is a known fact, and was so testified by a medical witness in the instant case, that heavy exertions tend to generate a great deal of bodily heat. ... In the case before us the very work which the deceased was doing for his employer exposed him to greater hazard from heatstroke than the general public was exposed to for the simple reason that the general public were not pushing wheelbarrow loads of sand in the hot sun on that day.” Weicher v. Insurance Company of North America, 434 S.W.2d 104 (S.Ct.Tex.1968): The petitioner was a saleslady in a department store who was seeking compensation due to heat exhaustion. “It would appear, then, that Petitioner in order to recover would be required to show that the heat and humidity inside the building where Petitioner worked had been intensified by some circumstance of the condition of the premises. It takes evidence of this nature to prove that the heat and humidity inside the building is more hazardous than the natural heat and humidity outside to which the general public was subjected.” Any member of the public who entered those buildings would be exposed to the same air. The underlying reason for his disability was personal not work connected. It was purely coincidental that this sensitivity happened at work, it could have happened most any place. In my opinion, the trial court reached the right conclusion for the wrong reason.