Court Opinion

ID: 9746998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:51:35.304502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.207014
License: Public Domain

HAERLE, J.
I respectfully, but strongly, dissent. The fact that there are two different “incidents” of gun possession by a felon does not mean that a prosecutor must charge two separate offenses, or even that there are such. Further, there is absolutely no statutory or constitutional impediment to the result in the instant case, much less any prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel. I will deal with these points in the order just noted.
A.
Preliminarily, it should be stressed that, when Penal Code section 12001, subdivision (k), says that, notwithstanding the “any firearm” phraseology of section 12021, “each firearm . . . shall constitute a distinct and separate offense,” it does not mean that, in cases of multiple possessions of firearms, the district attorney must charge each possession as a separate offense. This is so because, among other things, of (1) the legislative history of that provision, (2) the doctrine of separation of powers, and (3) established precedent that multiple but similar offenses may sometimes be charged in one or several counts.
Subdivision (k) of Penal Code section 12001 was adapted in 1994 and was a well-advertised legislative overruling of People v. Kirk (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 58 [259 Cal.Rptr. 44], which had held that the use of the word “any” in a weapons possession statute such as Penal Code section 12021 *190necessarily means that possession of multiple weapons at the same time constitutes a single violation. (See Stats. 1994, First Ex. Sess. 1993-1994, ch. 32, § 5, quoted in Historical and Statutory Notes,,51C West’s Ann. Pen. Code, § 12001 (1999 pocket supp.) p. 56.) The fact that the Legislature desired to overturn that result does not, however, mean that a prosecutor must now charge possession of multiple weapons as separate and distinct offenses. This is so because of both common sense and the doctrine of separation of powers. As our Supreme Court explained quite recently, the latter mandates that the executive branch (i.e., the prosecutor) and not the judicial branch decides what offenses are to be charged. (See People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134-136 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].) As applied to this situation, it means that the prosecution could have but did not need to charge the possession of the two guns as two separate offenses.
Indeed, our appellate courts have often permitted the prosecution to charge theoretically multiple offenses either separately or jointly. For example, in a case where multiple entries into the same dwelling were charged as a single burglary, our Supreme Court stated; “[W]e need not concern ourselves with whether multiple burglaries properly could have been alleged . . . .” (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1046, fn. 10 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].) By way of contrast, in People v. Washington (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 568, 574-579 [57 Cal.Rptr.2d 774], and In re William S. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 313, 317 [256 Cal.Rptr. 64], exactly the same conduct was permitted to be charged as multiple burglaries. Thus, just because something may be charged as a separate offense doesn’t mean it must be; sometimes an offense may be charged either separately or jointly with a closely related offense. (See generally, the cases cited above; and 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Elements of Crime, §§ 117, 122, pp. 137, 141.)
B.
Second, the fact that there are two separate incidents of gun possession does not mean that there are two separate “offenses.” Indeed, by far the troubling feature of the majority’s opinion is its persistent confusion of the concepts of “offense” and “incident.” This confusion is made manifest by a comparison of the constantly shifting terminology utilized by it in the “Discussion” portion of its opinion. Thus, when it is discussing either cases it believes support its analysis or the appellant’s basic contention on appeal, the majority consistently uses phraseology such as “ ‘offense not shown by the evidence at the preliminary hearing.’ ” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 165; see also id. at pp. 166, 167, 171, 172-173, 175, 177.) But when it alludes to the relevant facts in the case at bench, it conspicuously reverts to the term *191“incident.” (See lead opn., ante, at pp. 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 176, 178.) Indeed, sometimes the two words are used interchangeably in the same sentence (lead opn., ante, at p. 178) or adjacent paragraphs (lead opn., ante, at p. 171), with no apparent differentiation between the two. The majority is, I believe, attempting to equate the two terms, i.e., to suggest that where, as here, there are two distinct “incidents” of possession of a gun there are automatically two distinct “offenses.”
In this case, the offense is the same — possession of a gun by a felon; all that is different is the gun and the witnesses to its possession! The majority completely fails to appreciate this critical point. The impact of this failure is most pronounced when it uses cases holding that an information cannot be amended to charge an offense not shown by the evidence at the preliminary examination to argue that an information cannot be amended so as to deal in combination with two very similar incidents both constituting the same offense1
The majority correctly notes that the prosecution first charged possession of a .38-caliber revolver (the gun testified to by the neighbors at the preliminary hearing), then figured out during trial that maybe appellant possessed two different guns on the same day in the same neighborhood, then amended to delete the words “.38 caliber” from the information, and concluded by arguing to the jury that appellant possessed two guns on the day in question.2 The majority suggests this process constitutes error because only one possession-by-a-felon offense was charged in the information.
*192However, the woods are literally full of cases in which the prosecution proves more offenses than it has charged — exactly what happened here. Most but not all of these cases have involved child abuse prosecutions. The author of the lead opinion here, Presiding Justice Kline, accurately noted that an “either/or rule” applied in such cases. (See People v. Moreno (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 776 [259 Cal.Rptr. 800] (Moreno).) There, he described that rule — approvingly, it would seem — as “the principle that ‘when the accusatory pleading charges a single criminal act and the evidence shows more than one such unlawful act, either the prosecution must select the specific act relied upon to prove the charge or the jury must be instructed in the words of CALJIC No. 17.01 or 4.71.5 or their equivalent that it must unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the same specific criminal act. (See People v. Dunnahoo [1984] 152 Cal.App.3d [561] at 568-570 [199 Cal.Rptr. 796], and cases cited therein including People v. Deidrich [1982] 31 Cal.3d [263] at pp. 280-281 [182 Cal.Rptr. 354, 643 P.2d 971].)’” (Moreno, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 786, quoting People v. Gordon (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 839, 853 [212 Cal.Rptr. 174], fns. omitted (Gordon).)
This “either/or rule” was approved not only in the cases cited by Justice Kline in Moreno but also, one year later, by our Supreme Court in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307 [270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643] (Jones), a decision which not only cited Moreno approvingly (id. at pp. 310-311) but bestowed similar blessings on the cases it cited regarding that rule, People v. Dunnahoo (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 796] and Gordon, as well as others to the same effect. (51 Cal.3d at p. 307; see also People v. Gear (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 86, 90 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 261], and People v. Salvato (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 872, 878-882 [285 Cal.Rptr. 837] (Salvato).)
The “either/or rule” was effectively followed here. One possession of a gun offense was charged but evidence was adduced as to two (again, both on the same day and in the same community). The jury was given CALJIC No. 17.01* *3 and returned with a guilty verdict. So why doesn’t the “rule” cited approvingly by Justice Kline nine years ago apply here? The majority does *193not tell us. Perhaps it does not because the cases applying it necessarily hold the opposite of its essential premise. It holds that, if the charged offense is the same and CALJIC No. 17.01 is given, the prosecution may prove multiple “incidents” to establish the same “offense.”
The most recent decision of this district to so state is Salvato, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d 872, a decision authored by then Presiding Justice Low of Division Five of this district. That case dealt not with child molestation, but with various and sundry threats of injury or death sent by the husband in an acrimonious dissolution action to his former wife. On appeal from his conviction on six counts of violations of Penal Code sections 136.1, 422, 522 and 523, he contended that, because he specifically requested such prior to trial, he was entitled to a prosecutorial “election” as between the “specific acts” it would rely upon as to three of the counts on which he was convicted. The court agreed with this contention as to one count and disagreed as to the others. As a result, it reversed on one count and affirmed on the remainder. In the process, however, Justice Low and his colleagues both approved the “either/or” rule (234 Cal.App.3d at p. 880) and also carefully analyzed the essential difference between “acts” (i.e., “incidents” in the majority opinion) and “offenses.” Thus, in discussing People v. Castro (1901) 133 Cal. 11 [65 P. 13] (Castro), the leading case on a defendant’s right to such an “election,” Justice Low wrote: “Castro establishes the following principles: (1) When the evidence tends to show a larger number of distinct criminal acts than have been charged, the prosecution must, upon defense request, select the specific act upon which it will rely for each allegation; (2) if there is no request for an election, the court must instruct the jury so as to ensure unanimity.” (Salvato, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 879.) The court then held that no case subsequent to Castro “mandates departure from the . . . rule entitling [a] defendant to an election on demand when the evidence tends to show more distinct criminal acts than charged.” (Id. at p. 880.) And, later in the opinion, it continued to differentiate between “distinct acts” and a charged offense. (See, e.g., id. at pp. 881-884.)
The point of these portions of Salvato (as well as the many similar cases cited above) is obvious: there is a fundamental difference between the “offense” which is charged in an information and the “acts” or “incidents” which may be used to prove it. Even where there is only one of the former, several of the latter may be used to prove it, subject, of course, to the multiple protections of (1) the “either/or” rule, (2) the requirement of a unanimity instruction, and (3) and election-on-demand (the subject of *194Salvato). The lead opinion utterly fails to grasp this basic point and its importance to this case.4
C.
The majority holds that the main error underlying the conviction is that the preliminary examination dealt only with the neighbors gun and appellant must have been convicted (for the reasons just noted) on the “distinct offense” (lead opn., ante, at p. 171) of the “Daniels gun.” This, they hold, violates the “rule” that the preliminary examination must provide notice to a defendant of the offense of which he is going to be charged. The majority attempts to elevate this “error” to constitutional magnitude by suggesting that appellant’s conviction thus violates the requirement of article I, section 14, of the California Constitution (lead opn., ante, at p. 170), or at least that provision as it was interpreted in Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660, 666 [94 Cal.Rptr. 289, 483 P.2d 1241], which held that one may not be prosecuted “in the absence of a prior determination of a magistrate . . . that such action is justified.”
Let us for the moment indulge the majority’s speculation and assume that, indeed, the jury did in fact convict only on the “Daniels, gun” evidence.5 The majority concludes that reversal is then mandated because no evidence pertaining to that incident was presented in the preliminary hearing. But, the majority to the contrary, the law is clear that what must be presented at the preliminary hearing is evidence of the offense charged (in this case, possession of a gun by a felon), and not details of the particular incident upon which the offense is based.
One reason for this is that, as our Supreme Court has recently pointed out, the latter is eminently discoverable by all sorts of other means.6 In Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pages 316-319, a decision inexplicably ignored by the majority, the court discussed how far due process does and doesn’t go in requiring prior notice to a criminal defendant regarding the charges against him. Jones was yet another child molestation case. In it, the court considered what detail of notice is mandated by due process. In the course of that *195consideration, it held that a “defendant has no right to notice of the specific time or place of an offense, so long as it occurred within the applicable limitation period.” (Id. at p. 317; see also People v. Gear, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 95.) The court further explained that the information and the preliminary examination were but two devices of several now available to a defendant to learn of the details of the prosecution’s case: additionally, “the defendant may learn further critical details of the People’s case through demurrer to the complaint or pretrial discovery procedures.” (Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 317.)
A second reason for this conclusion derives from a decision cited approvingly in Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 317. In People v. Luna (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 726 [250 Cal.Rptr. 878] (Luna), disapproved on other grounds in Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at page 322, the court stated: “So long as the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing supports the number of offenses charged against a defendant and covers the time frame or time frames charged in the information, a defendant has all the notice the Constitution requires. Should a defendant in such circumstances feel the lack of greater specificity hampers his ability to prepare a defense, he may demur; to the extent the success of the demurrer depends upon an offer of proof concerning his intended defense, making such offer in camera ensures the defendant would not be compelled to disclose prematurely his defense strategy to gain the constitutionally adequate notice of the charges against him to which he is entitled.” (Luna, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at p. 748.)
I submit that precisely this rule applies here. The information in this case, as amended, advised appellant that he was charged with being a felon in possession of a revolver. He also knew that the prosecution was addressing, and addressing only, such possession on January 8, 1996, in Bay Point, Contra Costa County. The only thing he didn’t know, from the combination of the preliminary hearing testimony and the information, was whether the charge encompassed both revolvers and both sets of witnesses or, if not, which one. I think the law, as defined in Jones and Luna, is absolutely clear that no principle, constitutional or statutory, mandates such that he have such notice.7
There is also the matter of the cold, hard realities of this case. As the majority concedes (lead opn., ante, at p. 171), appellant had plenty of notice *196that Daniels would testify as to the farmer’s possession of a revolver on the morning of January 8. Approximately six weeks before trial, the prosecution informed defense counsel that Daniels had seen appellant with a Ruger Security Six revolver on or about that date. Moreover, the defense was given a copy of a taped interview of Daniels by an investigator from the district attorney’s office, an interview which made clear than Daniels had witnessed appellant with a revolver on January 8. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant in fact had notice that the prosecution intended to rely on testimony regarding the “Daniels gun.” Thus, for two separate and independent reasons, one based on controlling precedent and the other on the hard realities of this record, the majority’s constitutional argument utterly fails.
D.
My final basis for profoundly disagreeing with the majority’s reversal of this conviction involves its ultimate basis of reversal, i.e., there was ineffective assistance of counsel. I disagree with its conclusion on this issue for two reasons. First of all, and for the several separate and distinct reasons set forth above, I disagree with the majority that there was any error manifested by the trial court to which trial counsel could have appropriately objected. (See, for a case coming to a similar conclusion in a similar situation, People v. Newlun (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1590, 1604-1605 [278 Cal.Rptr. 550].) Second, even if there was error which was incorrectly waived by trial counsel, I do not think there was any prejudice to appellant.
My conclusion that there was no prejudice rests, in turn, on three premises. First of all, it needs to be stressed that appellant’s defense depended not one whit on any confusion between the guns much less any “lack of notice” problem. He admitted being where all witnesses placed him in both the morning and evening incidents, but flatly denied having any revolver in his possession at any time on January 8 in Bay Point. He did so both by his own testimony and by attacking the credibility of all the witnesses to both incidents, to and including charging two homosexual advances by Daniels. And, in his closing, appellant’s counsel flatly argued that appellant possessed no gun at all on January 8. In sum, appellant’s position in the trial court was unmistakable and uniform; the prosecution’s witnesses were all liars and scoundrels, and he possessed neither gun on January 8.
Second, there was and is clearly substantial evidence that he possessed both guns on the day in question. Indeed, I do not understand the majority to even hint, much less contend, otherwise.
But there is yet a third reason why there is no prejudice here; the majority’s conclusion that appellant must have been convicted based on the *197“Daniels gun” incident because he was acquitted on the brandishing charge involving the “neighbors gun” does not withstand scrutiny. The majority states: “There is no apparent basis upon which a rational juror could have determined that Wallace and the Weighills were telling the truth as to appellant’s possession of the firearm but not as to his pointing it at Wallace and the Weighills.” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 182.) Among other things, this statement ignores (a) what constitutes “brandishing” under the Penal Code, (b) other more likely explanations for the “inconsistency,” and (c) why verdicts sometimes appear inconsistent and what should not be concluded from such appearances.
Here, count 2 charged the misdemeanor of brandishing, which requires something more than simply “showing” a gun: it requires the drawing or exhibiting of the same “in a rude, angry or threatening manner . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(2).) As contrasted with the majority’s thesis, I submit it is far more likely that the jury acquitted appellant on the misdemeanor brandishing count because it concluded one or more of the following: (a) the quoted element was not shown, possibly due to Wallace’s testimony that appellant didn’t point the gun “at” him, (b) as far as any “brandishing” at Weighill was concerned, the latter was equally at fault for also having — and possibly also brandishing — a gun during the evening argument (not to mention his nonappearance at trial), (c) the prosecutor was being petty in tacking a misdemeanor count onto an easily proved (with either gun) felony count, or (d) some leniency was warranted in view of their conviction of him on the felony count and/or the behavior of Weighill and Wallace. I suggest that some combination of these alternatives is equally — if not more — likely as that contended for by the majority.
The appellate courts of this state have long stressed that little or nothing should be made of an apparent inconsistency in verdicts on different counts of an information. Justice Chin, then with Division Three of this district, summarized the law in this area in People v. Pahl (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1651, 1656-1657 [277 Cal.Rptr. 656]: “The question of the validity of inconsistent verdicts usually arises when a jury renders two verdicts on two different counts which are contradictory. [Citation.] Understandably, in such cases defendants, like appellant here, take the position that the acquittal is the legally correct verdict while the conviction is not. This argument has been universally rejected because inconsistent verdicts are probably the result of compromise in the jury room or of an extension of leniency or mercy to the defendant. [Citation.] In other words, if the conviction is supported by substantial evidence, it is valid because the defendant ‘had the benefit of the jury’s compassion, rather than suffering a burden because of its passion . . . .’ [Citations.] [¶] Prior to 1927, appellate courts of this state *198did not follow this view, but held that inconsistent verdicts ‘would not support a judgment of conviction.’ [Citations.] In apparent response to these decisions, the Legislature amended section 954 in 1927, adding the last sentence of the section, which now provides: ‘An acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed an acquittal of any other count.’ [Citations.] This amendment made clear that each count must stand on its own, and a verdict on one has no bearing on any other. Therefore, the fact that a guilty verdict on one count is inconsistent with an acquittal verdict on another no longer compels reversal if there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. [Citation.] Simply put, ‘Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.’ [Citation.] [¶] Since 1927 our courts have followed the general rule and viewed an inconsistent acquittal as the product of confusion or an act of mercy on the part of the jury, of which an appellant is not permitted to take further advantage. [Citations.] Thus California has codified and established ‘ “the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons.” [Citations.]’ [Citation,]”
This same reasoning obtains when, e.g., a jury returns a verdict of guilty on multiple counts of assault with a deadly weapon but then, in dealing with the enhancement, finds he did not personally use a firearm in committing the offenses (see People v. Lopez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 565, 570-571 [182 Cal.Rptr. 563]) or when it renders inconsistent findings on “personal infliction of great bodily injury” enhancement allegations in companion counts of an information. (See People v. Brown (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 762, 768-769 [220 Cal.Rptr. 264].)
In conclusion, I submit the majority has totally ignored the principle enunciated by us (via a panel including Presiding Justice Kline) in People v. Pettaway (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1312, 1325 [254 Cal.Rptr. 436], that “ ‘inconsistent findings may be caused simply by the mercy or leniency of the jury’ [citation], to which we might add, or through confusion or ennui.” (See to the same effect, People v. York (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1510 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 66].)
E.
The combination of the majority’s confusion of “incident” and “offense” (see pt. B, ante) and its position as to what must be shown at a preliminary hearing (see pt. C, ante) necessarily means it is advancing the following proposition:
Premise No. 1: A single observed “incident” of possession of a gun by a felon is the equivalent of a single chargeable “offense”;
*199Premise No. 2: At a preliminary hearing, the defendant must be presented with evidence of each offense charged;
Therefore, at a preliminary hearing, the defendant in a felon-in-possession-of-a-gun prosecution must be presented with evidence of each observed “incident” of possession for such to be admitted at trial.
Well, then, let us imagine a felon simultaneously in possession of not one but two similar-appearing guns. Over a 12-hour period (about the length of time between the “incidents” involved here), he periodically displays one or the other of these weapons to different witnesses in the same neighborhood. Assuming a single felon-in-possession charge in the information, if the majority is correct, for a conviction to stand the prosecution must present at the preliminary hearing testimony as to any “incident” concerning which it intends to introduce evidence at trial. I respectfully submit that this is both wrong and a radical departure from existing precedent.
I would affirm the conviction and deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

This entirely uncomplicated point seems to elude the majority. Repeatedly, it stresses that “Daniels’s testimony described an offense entirely separate from and unrelated to the only offense described by the evidence at the preliminary hearing” (lead opn., ante, at p. 172), that the issue at hand is “a court’s authority to convict of an offense not shown by the evidence at the preliminary hearing” (lead opn., ante, at p. 174) or, alternatively, whether the defendant had “notice of the offense being prosecuted” (ibid.), and that there is “obvious illegality [in] prosecuting and convicting appellant of an offense not shown by the evidence at the preliminary hearing . . . .” (Lead opn., ante, at p. 182.) I repeat: the offense was and is always the same: possession of a gun by a felon. Only the underlying evidence of that offense was different as between the two incidents.

The two revolvers involved were indeed quite similar. As matters sorted themselves out at trial, the gun Daniels returned to appellant on the morning of January 8,1996, was apparently a Ruger Security Six or Speed Six gun, i.e., a .357 magnum revolver, having a four- to six-and-a-half-inch barrel, the thumb catch shaved off the hammer, and a rectangular handle. The gun the neighbors apparently saw during the nighttime incident on the same day in the same neighborhood was described as a .38-caliber Smith & Wesson “snub nose” with a two- or two-and-a-half-inch barrel, a thumb catch, and a teardrop-shaped handle. Both the police and the prosecutor (the latter at least up until various witnesses started testifying) apparently thought that appellant was in possession of the same revolver in both the morning and evening incidents. Indeed, the prosecutor argued that the gun Daniels described “looks like a .38 caliber”; there was even testimony that a .357-caliber gun can fire ammunition designed for a .38-caliber gun and that the Ruger revolver came in varying barrel lengths, i.e., six-inch, *192four-inch “or shorter.” In light of all this, the majority’s suggestion that the prosecution was playing a deliberate “hide the ball” game regarding which incident it was relying upon (lead opn., ante, at pp. 176-177) seems to me a trifle churlish: I suspect there aren’t very many prosecutors or police who could readily divine that the same felon would be exhibiting two separate and distinct revolvers in the same community on the same day.

As and when the prosecution proves more offenses than it alleges, a unanimity instruction is required. If given, a guilty verdict on that count may stand. (See Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 321-322; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1343 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].)

So does the concurring opinion. Contrary to its implication, I am not positing any sort of a “continuing violation” principle here. I am simply advocating continued adherence to the principle set forth in the cases cited in this section, to wit, that the prosecution may, subject to the three separate and distinct protections noted in the text, introduce evidence of multiple “incidents” in support of a single charged offense. I see nothing in either the lead or concurring opinion even purporting to explain why that principle is not fully applicable here.

But see part D, post.

And, as Division Five of this district noted in Salvato, “preliminary hearing testimony is frequently less specific than testimony at trial in showing particular events.” (Salvato, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 881.)

The concurring opinion professes not to object to the philosophy set forth in Jones and Luna (cone, opn., ante, at pp. 186-187), but it certainly does not follow it. The only reason it suggests for not doing so is that those cases were “factually problematic” child molestation cases. (Cone, opn., ante, at p. 186.) True, but nothing in them, or in any other authority of which I am aware, implies that a lower level of due process notice to the defendant is applicable in such cases versus, for example, gun possession cases.