Court Opinion

ID: 9458095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:43:03.97471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:38.337586
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM E. MILLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I regret that I am unable to join in the majority’s disposition of this case. It is clear to me that the majority is in error in stating in substance that the new trial was granted by the district judge because he found in effect that *117there was no evidence in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury. At most, he expressed the view that he was “not satisfied that the evidence supports the verdict.”
Earlier in his remarks from the bench he merely made the statement that he had “some doubt as to whether there is any evidence in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury.”
It is my understanding of the law that a district judge has no power to set aside a jury verdict merely because he is not satisfied with it, nor because he has some doubt whether the evidence supports it. He must find that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, which the district judge in this case manifestly did not do, or he must find that a new trial is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. A federal trial judge is not a thirteenth juror, as a state trial judge is in Tennessee. It is generally not within his province to determine questions of credibility of the witnesses or to weigh the evidence.
This Court in a comparatively recent case, Duncan v. Duncan, 377 F.2d 49 (1967), reversed a district judge’s order setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial in a personal injury diversity action in Tennessee, even though the district judge made a specific finding that the jury verdict in favor of the defendant was contrary to the “weight of the evidence.” In reaching this result the appellate court itself reviewed the evidence, made a finding that the evidence in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant was not “strong” at the first trial, and then proceeded to vacate the order of the district judge granting a new trial and to remand the action with instructions for reinstatement of the original verdict rendered in favor of the defendant. This ruling spells out clearly that this Circuit is committed to a strict rule in reviewing the action of a trial judge in setting aside jury verdicts where questions of the sufficiency of the evidence are concerned. The rationale of this approach is to protect the litigant’s right to a trial by jury.
In the present case the majority holds that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in granting a new trial even though no mention whatever is made of the evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiff. Nor is the Duncan case even so much as referred to. In light of Duncan, I am totally unable to see how the Court could conclude that there was no abuse of discretion without considering the evidence itself to determine whether a jury question was presented. Doubtless the district judge was of the opinion that there was at least some evidence to go to the jury, otherwise it would have been his duty to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment n. o. v. rather than to grant a new trial..
Following the principle enunciated in Duncan and looking to the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff at the first trial, it is clear to me that there was substantial evidence which required the court to submit the case to the jury. It is true that the evidence was in sharp conflict, but since the plaintiff’s evidence was substantial, this factor is irrelevant.1 It is peculiarly within the jury’s province to resolve evidentiary conflicts and to decide upon the credibility of witnesses. I think the Court today in holding that there was no abuse of discretion without basing its decision upon a lack of evidence or upon some fatal weakness in the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff clearly departs from the teaching of Duncan and deprives the plaintiff of a verdict to which he was rightfully entitled. I would, therefore, vacate, the judgment for defendant and remand the action for *118reinstatement of the original verdict and judgment.
I do agree with the comments in the majority’s opinion concerning the impermissible practice of interrogating the members of the jury to ascertain their reasons for reaching their verdict. However, in this case since the Court in its formal ruling granting a new trial, made specific reference to this interrogation, pointing out that “it was evident that a number of the jurors were not convinced that the evidence supported plaintiff’s theory,” I think we must conclude that at least in part the conclusion of the district judge to set the jury’s verdict aside was based upon the responses which he improperly received from the jurors.

. One cannot read the testimony of the witnesses examined hy the plaintiff, Hal Newman, Paul H. Fortenberry, John D. Faulkner, Theodore L. Tillson, Theodore H. Fortenberry, Robert L. Bane and Mrs. Henry Fortenberry, without finding substantial and material evidence supporting the plaintiff’s case. The testimony of the five witnesses offered in behalf of the defendant merely developed conflicting factual issues, which should have been left to the jury to resolve.