Court Opinion

ID: 9584814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:56.036172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:11.311375
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 1 of the majority opinion, because I conclude that plaintiff Marcus Luke “opened the door” to cross-examination regarding evidence of insurance coverage by testifying that he did not believe he could afford certain hospital care. The crucial part of Mr. Luke’s testimony was: “I told them, I said, T don’t think I can afford to keep the baby in the hospital for a month.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) This not only suggests but clearly states, as the majority phrases it, that plaintiffs “were unable to afford needed medical care,” either because of lack of wealth or lack of insurance. Patterson v. Lauderback, 211 Ga. App. 891, 892-893 (2) (440 SE2d 673) (1994).
I cannot conclude, as the majority suggests, that the jury may have attributed Mr. Luke’s testimony to concern about whether the baby would be covered by existing insurance. The conversation took place with hospital personnel, rather than with anyone who could have informed Mr. Luke about insurance coverage. Insurance itself was not mentioned; instead, Mr. Luke stated that he did not think he could afford the hospital charges. This is an even more explicit comment on inability to pay than the testimony in Patterson that the plaintiff “was not a wealthy woman.” 211 Ga. App. at 892. This con*89elusion is reinforced by counsel’s follow-up question, “Did you also receive a bill for the baby in the hospital?” which suggests that the testimony regarding inability to afford hospital bills was not an inadvertent, nonresponsive comment by Mr. Luke, but deliberately elicited for the benefit of the jury. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in allowing limited evidence of insurance to respond to the “clear import” of Mr. Luke’s testimony. Therefore, I must dissent to the majority’s ruling in Division 1.
Decided February 27, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 30, 1995
Hallman & Stewart, Ronald W. Hallman, Sutton & Associates, Berrien L. Sutton, for appellants.
Newton, Smith, Durden, Kaufold & Rice, Wilson R. Smith, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Beasley, Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Andrews join in this dissent.