Court Opinion

ID: 9735060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:59:34.5548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:54.924046
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION RYAN, P. J. I cannot concur with the opinion of the majority of this court which holds that a new trial is required by the application of the rules relating to newly discovered evidence. The determination of a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence is largely discretionary with the trial court. 28 ILP, New Trials, § 98. The exercise of the court’s discretion will not be disturbed on review except in case of manifest abuse. Stocker v. Scherer, 1 Ill2d 405, 115 NE2d 614; Leonard v. Jacobs, 42 Ill App2d 261, 192 NE2d 304; Henderson v. Shives, 10 Ill App2d 475,135 NE2d 186. To justify a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, it must be of such conclusive character that it will probably change the results if a new trial is granted. Leonard v. Jacobs, supra; Henderson v. Shives, supra. As noted in the memorandum filed by the trial court, one of the principal questions presented by the evidence in this case was the question of which of the two automobiles, the Fleming Buick or the Drehle Ford was traveling northward in the southbound lanes of the interstate highway. The trial court reviewed the conflicting evidence which related not to the question of who was driving the Fleming Buick, but whether it was the Fleming Buick or the Drehle Ford which was traveling in the wrong direction on the one-way highway. The trial court correctly concluded that it was within the province of the jury to weigh this conflicting testimony. Citing Henderson v. Shives, supra, the trial court held that the burden is on the applicant for a new trial to rebut the presumption that the verdict of the jury is correct. The memorandum of the trial court in concluding stated: “Frank F. Pepole was not an occurrence witness. It does not appear to the Court from the statement of Mr. Pepole, which the plaintiff attached as an exhibit to the amendment to her post-trial motion, that the testimony which Mr. Pepole might give would be of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result if the new trial was granted.” I cannot conclude that this determination by the trial court was an abuse of its discretion. The newly discovered evidence was that of a person who was not an occurrence witness. It related to the question of who was driving the Fleming automobile two hours before the accident and many miles away from the scene thereof. Whether Fleming or someone else was driving his automobile was not material. The question was whether the Fleming automobile was going north or south in the southbound lane of the highway. I agree with the conclusion of the trial court that it does not appear that the testimony of Mr. Pepole would be of such conclusive character that it would probably change the result if a new trial were granted. Applying the well-established rules of law stated above, I am of the opinion that the applicant for a new trial did not rebut the presumption that the verdict of the jury was correct; that it does not appear that the newly discovered evidence is of such conclusive character that a changed result is probable if a new trial is granted and that the court in exercising its discretion in passing upon the motion for a new trial did not therefore manifestly abuse its discretion in denying the same. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.