Court Opinion

ID: 9442570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:51:57.979945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:08.330552
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As. to two of the underlying questions which should control the disposition of this case, we are all in agreement. That is that the transactions were so much in interstate commerce as, to be subject to the exercise of Congressional power in the regulation thereof and, also, that the provisions of the Miller-Tydings Amendment, relaxing the regulations in protection of interstate commerce evidenced by the Sherman Act,1 are so clear as to render improper resort to the legislative history of that Amendment in applying its'terms.2 The sole point of difference between us therefore is the, effect which should be given this, amendment when read in the light of its unambiguous language.
It seems clear to me that the .majority opinion enlarges and extends the provisions of the statute to a scope not justified by the. legislative language. : I can not agree that the amendment, merely by excepting from the prohibition of the otherwise illegal , “contracts and, , agreements” forbidden by the Sherman Act, “contracts and agreements prescribing minimum prices * *. * when contracts or agreements (italics supplied) of ;that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions” under the State law, likewise embraces within its exemption the provi-, sions of any State statute, and this notwithstanding the only reference to such statute is that which might validate the “contracts and agreements.” It may be further observed at this point, that the Miller-Tydings Amendment in no way sought to remove the prohibition against a “combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of ■ trade or commerce among the several States.”
The nature and purpose of the statute amended, — the Sherman Act, — requires that any amendment thereto which, in anywise relaxes the statutory declaration of public policy should be strictly construed. As has been said, “the legislative purpose set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy, and only those subjects expressly exempted by the proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute.”3 Indeed, upon any basis, (except possibly from applying the - statute, not as enacted, but upon conjecture which might arise from some features of its legislative history), it is difficult to perceive any basis for enlarging the plain meaning of its language. But we are all agreed that there is no occasion here for consideration of the legislative history of the Amendment, and therefore whatever may have been the intention of its sponsors, we are controlled by the amendment as actually enacted. The amendment deals only with “contracts and agreements” and in the absence of any enlarging provision, furnishes no basis for incorporating as an exemption from the Sherman Act any provision of a State Statute which restrains interstate commerce by provisions applicable to those who have not made the “contracts and agreements.” My position is illustrated by the observation that the Miller-Tydings Amendment goes no further than to remove the taint of illegality attendant upon such contracts as to interstate transactions (Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502) as is removed by section *171 of the Louisiana Act now in questipn as to intrastate transactions. Section 1 of the Louisiana Act relates, as likewise does the Federal Act, only to establishing the legality of the contracts in question. That far, the two statutes are in pari materia. Section 2 of the Louisiana statute, upon which the present cause is predicated, is a substantive law of Louisiana, not a contract or agreement. I believe it may not be successfully contended that without section 2, the provisions of section 1 could be in any wise applied to retailers who had not seen fit to execute price maintenance contracts legalized by section 1. The terms of the Federal Amendment no more embrace section 2 of the Louisiana Act than does section 1 of that Act. Thus Congress has legalized the contract validated by the State law, but not every provision of the statute. If, over and beyond the establishment of the legality of the contractual obligation to maintain minimum prices, the State statute otherwise authorizes conduct or procedure which runs afoul of a Congressional protection of interstate commerce from unlawful restraint, such as the appellant defendant here asserts to be true as to him, such provision of the State statutes must yield to paramount Federal law.
It is not material whether the defense be declared predicated upon the lack of State power, or upon the ground that the enforcement of a State statute will result in a Federal Court of Equity basing the exercise of its injunctive power upon grounds which are illegal because of the Sherman Act. The result properly to be reached is the same, for the Federal Court must not require action which countenances conduct contrary to Federal law. In the present case, the Court could enforce section 1 of the Louisiana Act, but could not enforce that part of section 2 relating to non-contractors if, under the circumstances, such enforcement would be contrary to the Sherman Act. It is recognized that in this time when the weight of interstate commerce affects multitudinous transactions, the construction here given the ■ Miller-Tydings Amendment greatly circumscribes the relaxation of Federal control in the enforcement of State Fair Trade Acts. However, we should apply the statute as writ ten. This construction removes the legal difficulty to the enforcement of permissive contracts, themselves declared illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., supra, and likewise makes it clear that the provision of the Amendment that the making of such contracts shall not be an unfair method of competition, removes further infirmity theretofore found inherent in such contracts. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 42 S.Ct. 150, 66 L.Ed. 307, 19 A. L.R. 882. If the Congress determines it wise to further relax the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, it can very easily do so by merely excepting from its operation all provisions of State Fair Trade Acts, including their planned restrictive operations against sales by those in no wise obligated by any contractual relation restriction.
It is also clear that as to those who have not executed contracts or agreements validated by the Amendment, there may be combinations or conspiracies in illegal restraint of trade which have a basis over and beyond that afforded by the execution of contracts and agreements as such. If so, such contracts being legally permitted, of course would not themselves evidence any illegality of agreement, but neither would they raise a sanctuary for those who, though parties to legal contracts, might illegally combine or agree to restrain interstate commerce so far as non-contractors are concerned. This was recognized by the parties and the trial Court. That Court, being of the opinion that the Miller-Tydings Amendment, construed in the light of its legislative history, in effect adopted the State Fair Trade Statute (as do my colleagues, but without resort to legislative history), expressly found as a conclusion of law, “defendants have attempted to show that plaintiff’s actions in fixing retail prices constitute a restraint of trade between the states. No finding on this feature of the case is required, however, in view of the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.” For the reasons I have stated, I do not accept this view. The proper disposition of this case *18would require us to adjudge that the Court was in error in holding that the Amendment removed the protection of the Sherman Act from non-contractors. He should have considered and adjudged the defendants’ contention that, as to them, non-contractors, the plaintiffs’ conduct constituted an illegal restraint of commerce between the states, at the same time giving to the plaintiffs the benefit of the Amendment so far as applicable to parties entering into the permitted price maintenance contracts. We should not evaluate the facts, which must be done in order to apply the law, in the first instance. I would reverse the judgment of the trial Court with direction that the case be thus heard and concluded.

. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7, 15 note.

. Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442, L.R.A.1917F, 502, Ann.Cas.1917B, 1168; Gemsco, Inc., v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 65 S.Ct. 605, 89 L.Ed. 921; Ex parte Collett; 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 959, 93 L.Ed. 1207, 10 A.L. R.2d 921; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 4 L.Ed. 529.

. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. 1943, § 4933; U. S. v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141, 163, 40 U.S. 141, 163, 10 L. Ed. 689.