Court Opinion

ID: 9893503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 15:00:37.632663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:22.063124
License: Public Domain

21-6185
    Lopez-Lopez v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Spencer, IJ
                                                                       A209 235 604/605

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 27th day of October, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                      JON O. NEWMAN,
                      JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                      EUNICE C. LEE,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    LAURA MAGDALENA LOPEZ-LOPEZ,
    MARJORI ALEJANDRA HERNANDEZ-
    LOPEZ,
             Petitioners,

                      v.                                        21-6185
                                                                NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS:                    Nicholas J. Mundy, Esq., Brooklyn, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Assistant Attorney
                                    General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director;
                                    Timothy G. Hayes, Senior Litigation Counsel,
                                    Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                    States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                    DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioners Laura Magdalena Lopez-Lopez and her daughter, Marjori

Alejandra Hernandez-Lopez, natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of a

March 17, 2021 decision of the BIA, affirming a March 20, 2019 decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied Lopez-Lopez’s application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). 1 In re Lopez-Lopez, Nos. A 209 235 604/605 (B.I.A. Mar. 17, 2021), aff’g

Nos. A 209 235 604/605 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 20, 2019).         We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v.

1 We principally refer to Lopez-Lopez because her daughter was named as a derivative
beneficiary to her application.
                                         2
U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual

findings for substantial evidence, and we review questions of law and the

application of law to facts de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d

Cir. 2009).   “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      As a preliminary matter, there is no merit to Lopez-Lopez’s argument that

the agency lacked jurisdiction to order her and her daughter’s removal because

their notices to appear did not specify the date or time that they should appear for

a hearing. In Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the Supreme Court held

that a notice to appear lacking a hearing date and time did not cut off the accrual

of continuous presence for the purposes of cancellation of removal, and in Niz-

Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480–86 (2021), the Supreme Court held that, for

purposes of cutting off accrual of presence, the Government could not cure a defect

in the notice to appear by providing the missing information in a separate

document. However, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has held that

such defects necessarily divest the agency of jurisdiction. To the contrary, we

have held that the regulations vesting jurisdiction in the agency do not require a

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notice to appear to specify the date and time of a hearing “so long as a notice of

hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien.” Banegas Gomez v.

Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted);

see also Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980, 987 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Banegas Gomez remains

good law even after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Niz-Chavez.”). Here, the

agency had jurisdiction because, although the notices to appear omitted the initial

hearing date and time, a hearing notice supplied Lopez-Lopez and her daughter

with that information, and they appeared at their hearings. See Chery, 16 F.4th at

987; Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d at 110–112.

      To establish eligibility for asylum, Lopez-Lopez had to show that she

suffered past persecution or had a well-founded fear of persecution. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Lopez-Lopez

alleged that a gang member demanded money from her, but she ignored that

demand without consequence. She further alleged that she saw gang members

shoot her neighbor, and she later learned that the gang was looking for her because

she was suspected of reporting the shooting to the police, but she had no further

contact with the gang because she went into hiding and then left the country.

      The agency reasonably concluded that Lopez-Lopez did not allege harm

                                           4
rising to the level of persecution. 2 Persecution “is an extreme concept that does

not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” Mei Fun

Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

Unfulfilled threats generally do not rise to the level of persecution. See Gui Ci Pan

v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Here, it is unclear

whether the statements at issue were threats, and, in any event, they were

unfulfilled and insufficient to rise to the level of persecution. Lopez-Lopez did

not allege that the first gang member told her that anything would happen to her

if she did not pay the gang as they demanded, and she did not take the demand

seriously.   The information that the gang was looking for her following the

shooting was communicated only once, through at least two intermediaries, and

it also did not contain a concrete threat. Furthermore, although witnessing a

shooting is undoubtedly a frightening experience, an asylum applicant generally

“cannot claim past persecution based solely on harm that was inflicted on [another

person].” Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 2007).

      The agency also reasonably concluded that Lopez-Lopez did not

2 Although the IJ made an adverse credibility determination, the BIA did not rely on
this determination. Thus, we do not reach that issue here. See Xue Hong Yang, 426
F.3d at 522.
                                          5
demonstrate an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution.        Her fear is

premised on the warning that the gang was looking for her immediately after the

shooting. Lopez-Lopez did not present evidence about the events following the

shooting—such as whether the police investigated or whether anyone was

arrested or convicted—that would speak to the likelihood that the gang remained

interested in retaliating against a witness and that the government would be

unwilling or unable to protect her. There is no allegation that the gang continued

looking for Lopez-Lopez beyond the immediate aftermath of the shooting or that

it ever went to her former home, and Lopez-Lopez confirmed that the gang had

not approached her relatives in gang-controlled areas of El Salvador looking for

her. Cf. Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding fear of

future persecution weakened when similarly situated family members remained

unharmed in petitioner’s native country). Under these circumstances, Lopez-

Lopez’s feared harm is speculative. See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129

(2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In the absence of solid support in the record . . . [an

applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”).

      Because she failed to establish the likelihood of harm required for asylum,

Lopez-Lopez “necessarily” failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of

                                           6
removal or CAT relief. Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010). It is

therefore unnecessary for us to address the agency’s additional findings that

Lopez-Lopez failed to demonstrate nexus to a protected ground, as required for

asylum and withholding of removal, and that she waived her CAT claim. See INS

v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule courts and

agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                      Clerk of Court

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