Court Opinion

ID: 9865410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:08:37.810614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:12.662421
License: Public Domain

J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: D.B., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: L.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 530 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0002134-2018

 IN THE INTEREST OF: D.Z.T.B., A       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: L.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 531 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000744-2021
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.B., A MINOR :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :            PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: L.B., MOTHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :       No. 532 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0000742-2020,
           CP-51-DP-0000742-2020, CP-51-DP-0000742-2020

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A.B., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: L.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 533 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000745-2021

                                  -2-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

 IN THE INTEREST OF: D.B., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 662 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0002134-2018

 IN THE INTEREST OF: D.Z.T.B., A       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 663 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000744-2021

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.B., A MINOR :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                   :            PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
 APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER           :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :       No. 664 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 9, 2023
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000742-2020

                                   -3-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

 IN THE INTEREST OF: E.A.B., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: T.B., FATHER                 :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 665 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered February 9, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000745-2021

BEFORE: STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

      In these matters, L.B. (Mother) and T.B. (Father) appeal the decrees

that terminated their parental rights to their sons, 4-year-old D.B., and 2-

year-old E.B. (the Children), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b).     Each parent also appeals the decision to

change the goal of the dependency proceedings from a concurrent

reunification and adoption goal, to just an adoption goal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

6351. Because each parent’s appeal raises the substantially the same issues

and involves the same facts and circumstances, we address the parents’

appeals together in one decision.    After review, we affirm the trial court’s

decrees, and we dismiss the challenges to the goal change orders as moot.

      The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved

with the family in January 2018 after receiving a report following the birth of

                                     -4-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

D.B.   The report alleged that both Mother and D.B. tested positive for

marijuana and phencyclidine (PCP).    The report alleged that there was no

record Mother received prenatal care.   DHS was also concerned there was

domestic violence in the home. Although Mother denied the same, hospital

records indicated that Mother had been seen in the emergency room after she

was abused by Father.

       Notwithstanding these allegations, the case did not become court-

active. Between January 2018 and September 2018, DHS worked with the

family to address the concerns relating to Mother’s drug use and domestic

violence. Mother enrolled in a drug treatment program, and DHS implemented

in-home services through Community Umbrella Agency (CUA). But by July

2018, Mother had only attended about half of her treatment sessions, and she

had again tested positive for marijuana and PCP. She also admitted that she

had cancelled one of D.B.’s occupational therapy appointments and did not

attend some of the child-specific programming.    Moreover, Mother did not

participate in some of the domestic violence programming.      In September

2018, DHS filed a dependency petition for D.B.

       On November 1, 2018, the juvenile court adjudicated D.B. dependent.

Still, D.B. was not removed from Mother’s care. Instead, the court directed

DHS to investigate inpatient treatment programs and/or whether Mother could

move to a shelter that accepts mothers with children. The court also directed

DHS to investigate kinship placement resources.

                                    -5-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

      In December 2018, Mother obtained a temporary Protection From Abuse

(PFA) order. Mother alleged that she and Father were arguing; that Mother

ran out of the house and into the street to get away from Father, when she

was hit by a car. Mother was taken by ambulance, but she was treated and

released.   The court ultimately dismissed Mother’s temporary PFA order

without prejudice, after Mother did not proceed with the final hearing.

      In February 2019, Mother again tested positive for marijuana and PCP.

Although Mother subsequently began outpatient drug treatment, Mother again

tested positive for PCP in April 2019. Thereafter, Mother and D.B. returned to

inpatient drug treatment. Mother was otherwise moderately compliant with

her single case plan objectives. The court did not remove D.B. from Mother’s

care. Instead, the court ordered that Mother be referred to domestic violence

counseling and that she remain at the inpatient drug facility until she was

clinically discharged. At the June 2019 permanency review hearing, the court

determined Mother was mostly compliant with her plan. By September 2019,

Mother was so compliant with her objectives that the court entered an order

terminating court supervision.      DHS continued to monitor the family

throughout the rest of 2019 and into 2020.

      In July 2020, E.B. was born.      Mother and E.B. tested positive for

marijuana and PCP at E.B.’s birth, just as Mother did at the birth of D.B.

Mother told DHS that she relapsed after witnessing the murder of her friend.

Mother said she had been attending an outpatient drug treatment program,

and that she would re-enroll in the inpatient program. DHS visited the family’s

                                     -6-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

home and discovered that the home was infested with roaches, including

inside the freezer and refrigerator, and that there were no beds for the

Children.   Meanwhile, the Children had been staying with a family friend.

Although the Children were safe, DHS ultimately concluded that the family

friend was not an appropriate caregiver. DHS obtained an order of protective

custody and sought kinship placements. The juvenile court placed D.B. and

E.B. in the homes of two different maternal cousins.

     The adjudicatory hearing was continued several times for, among other

reasons, Father’s lack of services. The Children were ultimately adjudicated

dependent in November 2020.      The court ordered an array of services to

address the parents’ drug use and domestic violence issues. The goal of the

dependency proceedings was reunification.      Mother’s objectives were: to

achieve and maintain sobriety; to comply with intensive outpatient treatment;

to improve parenting skills; and to ensure the Children’s basic needs were

met. Father had substantially the same objectives, with the added directive

that he make himself available for services and comply with recommendations

from CUA.

     In May 2021, the goal of the dependency proceedings changed from

reunification to a concurrent goal of reunification and adoption. Throughout

this time, the parent’s objectives largely remained the same. Mother had been

minimally compliant, but Father was not compliant at all. Around September

2021, the Children moved into the home of foster mother, J.R.

                                    -7-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

      On December 9, 2021, DHS filed separate termination petitions against

Mother and Father. Mother had made minimal progress during the preceding

months. Importantly, Mother was noncompliant with submitting to drug and

alcohol screens, nor did she comply with the services meant to address

domestic violence or her parenting skills. She was also not consistent with

her visitation goal.

      The termination proceedings were continued several times throughout

2022. The trial court finally conducted the first day of the hearing on January

23, 2023. Neither parent was present. The court continued the hearing for a

second day of testimony to February 2, 2023. Again, neither parent appeared,

but the court agreed to leave the record open and allow the parents an

opportunity to give testimony. On February 9, 2023, the parties rested their

cases.   The court subsequently granted the petitions and terminated the

parents’ rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). The

court further changed the goal from concurrent planning to adoption. Mother

and Father timely filed these appeals; they challenge both the termination

decrees, and the goal change orders, as to each Child.

      Mother presents the following issues:

            1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its
               discretion where it determined that the requirements
               of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) to terminate Mother’s rights
               were met?

            2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its
               discretion where it determined that 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
               2511(b) were met?

                                     -8-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

            3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse its
               discretion where it determined that the permanency
               goal for the Children should be changed to adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 3 (cleaned up).

      Father raises substantially the same issues:

            1. Whether the trial court committed error by
               involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights
               where such determination was not supported by clear
               and convincing evidence establishing grounds for
               termination under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
               2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?

            2. Whether the trial court committed error by
               involuntarily terminating Father’s rights where such
               ruling did not give primary consideration to the
               developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
               welfare of the Children as required by the Adoption
               Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

            3. Whether the trial court committed error by changing
               the Children’s permanency goal from reunification to
               adoption?

Father’s Brief at 9.

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

         The standard of review in termination of parental rights
         cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
         and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
         supported by the record. If the factual findings are
         supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
         court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
         decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
         upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
         partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
         decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
         the record would support a different result. We have
         previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
         often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
         multiple hearings.

                                     -9-
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has stated that in termination cases, deference to

the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580,

597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa.

2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive case

involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should review

the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports that

trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record for

contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

                                     - 10 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

      These appeals implicate Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b),

which provide:

         (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

         (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
         six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
         either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
         parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
         parental duties.

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

                                      […]

          (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
         for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
         to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
         the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
         a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
         reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
         the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         child within a reasonable period of time and termination of

                                     - 11 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

         the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
         of the child.

                                     […]

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8).

      We may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis exists for the

result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. Specifically, we need only agree with

the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, we review the trial court’s decision that

DHS proved termination was warranted under Section 2511(a)(2).

      To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2), DHS must prove

“(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cause the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re

C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The grounds

for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern parental

incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.

                                    - 12 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

Super. 2010).   Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id.

     We begin with Mother’s appeal. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial

court determined DHS met each element of the Section 2511(a)(2) analysis:

        At the hearing on February 2, 2023, this Court heard clear
        and convincing evidence from CUA Manager, James Allen,
        who testified that he had been the case manager […] since
        January of 2022. Mr. Allen testified that Mother had single
        case plans throughout the life of the case, that CUA regularly
        held single case plans meetings regarding these objectives,
        and that they have remained substantially the same since
        Mr. Allen was assigned the case in January of 2022. Mr.
        Allen testified that Mother was not compliant with her case
        plan objective to reengage and complete drug and alcohol
        treatment nor did she provide Mr. Allen with proof of
        treatment. Mr. Allen also testified that Mother refused to
        complete random drug screens[.]

        Mother did not attend random drug screens […], she did not
        provide CUA with her updated address, nor did she provide
        CUA with an opportunity to evaluate her current residence.
        Mr. Allen testified he had no knowledge of Mother being
        employed.

                                     […]

        Mr. Allen testified that he has concerns with the Children
        being reunified with Mother. Mother does not present
        herself in a stable manner and is unprepared for the
        responsibilities of being the Children’s mother. Mother
        struggles with simple things, such as buying clothes that are
        too small for the Children.

        Mr. Allen testified that since his assignment on the case,
        Mother has had weekly supervised visitations with D.B. and
        E.B. Mother attended approximately twenty to thirty visits
        with D.B. and E.B. totaling twenty to thirty hours of
        interaction with the Children. While these visits were mostly
        consistent, Mr. Allen testified that periodically Mother would
        not show up. Mr. Allen testified that on one visit he
        observed D.B. ignore[] Mother and was non-responsive to

                                    - 13 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

         her communication with him. During some visits, Mother
         would completely ignore the Children, would be on the
         phone, would show up with food and eat the food during the
         visit but would not bring any food for the Children, and
         would use profanity or yell at the Children when
         communicating with them. Mr. Allen testified that Mother
         does not communicate with the Children between visits. On
         one occasion, Mr. Allen testified that Mother reported that
         she moved to Johnstown and she was gone for a few weeks
         thereafter. Mother initially texted Mr. Allen letting him know
         she was thinking of moving to Johnstown, and two weeks
         later sent Mr. Allen another message that she was in
         Johnstown and unavailable for visits. Mother did not provide
         CUA with her Johnstown address. Approximately three
         weeks later, Mother indicated she was in Philadelphia, yet
         still did not provide an address to CUA.

                                      […]

         Mr. Allen testified that Mother had previously completed
         anger management, but she remained aggressive with him
         and other CUA staff. Mother was ordered to complete a
         parenting and anger management program and did not
         follow up on that order.

         The court found that Mr. Allen’s testimony was credible.
         Mother was notified of her single case plan objectives on
         February 23, 2021. Mother refused to comply with random
         drug screens, failed to provide an address of her home and
         thus afford CUA the opportunity to assess her home. Mother
         failed to provide CUA proof of employment and failed to
         provide proof of completion of drug and alcohol treatment,
         per her single case plan objectives.       Mother has not
         remedied the conditions which led to the removal of D.B.
         and E.B. The court found credible the testimony from Mr.
         Allen that Mother had drug screens and refused to attend
         them; that at Mother’s last screen on August 22, 2022, she
         tested positive for PCP and marijuana; that there was no
         proof of Mother attending drug and alcohol treatment
         programs; that Mother never provided an address for her
         home to be assessed by CUA.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/23, (T.C.O. 1) at 24 -26; 28 (style adjusted).

                                     - 14 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), DHS may prove – among other suitable

reasons for termination – parental incapacity. Mother argues there was no

evidence of incapacity. To make this argument, however, Mother confines the

definition of incapacity to only include mental incapacity. See Mother’s Brief

at 17-18.   Mother’s construction of Section 2511(a)(2) is too narrow.         In

C.M.K., for instance, we concluded that the local child protective services

agency proved parental incapacity when it established the parent’s inability to

make substantial progress toward their reunification goals – specifically the

parent’s sobriety goal. See C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262-63.         In other words,

C.M.K. supports the notion that a parent’s habitual drug use may be fairly

construed as contributing to parental incapacity.

      Like in C.M.K., Mother has been incapable of caring for the Children for

years. A principal cause for this inability, though not the exclusive cause, has

been Mother’s failure to achieve sobriety.        In this context, “incapacity”

recognizes that the parent’s drug addiction, by nature, overrides an

individual’s will – in this case, Mother’s will to properly care for her children.

But another view of drug addiction, albeit a harsher one, could be to construe

the parent’s addiction as a “refusal” to parent. Both “incapacity” and “refusal”

are bases for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) – to say nothing of

parental “neglect.” In any event, the trial court was within its discretion to

conclude that Mother’s prolonged addiction had caused the Children to be

without parental care, and that she cannot, or will not, remedy the same. We

                                     - 15 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

discern no error or abuse of discretion regarding the court’s decision to

terminate Mother’s rights under Section 2511(a)(2).

      For his part, Father argues that trial court erred under Section

2511(a)(2) because there was no evidence that Father was unwilling or

refused to care for the Children. See Father’s Brief at 31. He also cites his

repeated statement that he loves his Children and wants them placed in his

care. Id.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion regarding Father’s case, the trial court made

the following findings:

            At the hearing on January 10, 2023, this court heard clear
            and convincing evidence from CUA case manager, James
            Allen, who testified that he had been the case manager since
            January 3, 2022. Mr. Allen testified that at the time the
            Children were adjudicated dependent on November 20,
            2020, there were concerns regarding Father about drug and
            alcohol use, domestic violence, and neglect. Mr. Allen
            testified that Father had single case plan objectives and that
            they have remained substantially the same since Mr. Allen
            was assigned the case on January 3, 2022. CUA regularly
            held single case plan meetings regarding these objectives.
            Mr. Allen testified that Father’s single case plan objectives
            were communicated to Father verbally, and Father and Mr.
            Allen spoke after court multiple times in the presence of
            Father’s lawyer. […] Mr. Allen believed that based on those
            conversations, Father understood that his compliance with
            the single case plan objectives was necessary in order to be
            reunified with his Children. Mr. Allen testified that Father’s
            response to the communications regarding single case plan
            objectives was that “nobody was going to tell him [Father]
            what to do.”

            Mr. Allen testified that Father was not compliant with any of
            his case plan objectives. Father’s single case plan objectives
            included making himself available for services; comply with
            CUA services and recommendations; engage in domestic

                                        - 16 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

       violence; complete a CEU drug assessment, as well as three
       random[ drug screens]; comply with family school services;
       and avail his home for a walkthrough. Mr. Allen testified
       that Father failed random drug screens for testing positive
       for marijuana. Even though Father indicated to Mr. Allen
       that he had a marijuana card, the card was never provided.

       Mr. Allen went on to testify that the last time Father
       responded to any of Mr. Allen’s communication efforts to
       him was on March 17, 2022, and on that date Father’s
       response to Mr. Allen was “Yes, sir, Master.” Mr. Allen
       reached out to Father via text and phone calls, to no avail
       since last hearing from him in March of 2022. Mr. Allen
       stated that Father had not spoken to him outside of being
       in the courtroom when he appeared at court, which was in
       July of 2022. Mr. Allen stated that at the July 2022
       courtroom appearance by Father, Father provided his home
       address and indicated he lived there with [Mother]. Mr.
       Allen testified that Father held this address out to be a place
       where the Children could live once reunified, but did not
       provide any additional information, such as how many
       bedrooms or the living situation if the Children went to live
       there. Father was aware at the time that Mr. Allen would
       have to make an in-person visit to verify the home was
       appropriate for the Children before they could live there.
       The court order from the July 2022 hearing required Mr.
       Allen to do a home assessment within 20 days of that
       hearing, which Mr. Allen was unable to complete because
       Father was not responsive.

       Mr. Allen further testified that Father did not engage in any
       type of drug and alcohol treatment, did not provide any
       proof of completion of domestic violence counseling, and did
       not allow Mr. Allen to evaluate his home.           Mr. Allen
       attempted to go to Father’s home at least five times since
       being assigned to the case on January 3, 2022, and each
       time there was no answer at the door.

       Mr. Allen also testified Father has not visited the Children
       since Mr. Allen’s assignment to the case on January 3, 2022.
       Father also had no communications with the Children
       through the foster parent.

                                   - 17 -
J-S26016-23; J-S26017-23

Trial Court Opinion, 4/17/23 (T.C.O. 2.), at 24-27 (citations to the record

omitted) (style adjusted).

      After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its

discretion when it concluded that Father’s repeated and continued refusal to

parent has caused the Children to be without essential care. It is quite evident

that Father cannot or will not remedy the same. Father was required to make

diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of his duties. Z.P.,

994 A.2d at 1117. He made no efforts. Notwithstanding Father’s inaction on

his reunification plan, Father avers that he loves his Children and wants them

in his care. However, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child,

alone, do not prevent the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re

T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Having concluded that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion

under the first prong of the termination analysis under Section 2511(a) for

both parents, we next review the court’s conclusion that termination would

best serve the Children’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b).         That

subsection provides:

         (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which

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         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      This Court has explained:

         [S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
         parental rights would best serve the developmental,
         physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
         In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
         this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
         security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
         needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
         that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
         of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
         on     the     child  of    permanently     severing     that
         bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
         a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
         that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
         (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
         effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
         the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting

bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

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      “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.        Finally, we

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with [their] child is a major

aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one

of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the

best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citation omitted).

      Instantly, the trial court issued the following findings to support its

decision that DHS met its burden under Section 2511(b):

         In regard to Section 2511(b) and the best interest of D.B.
         and E.B., Mr. Allen testified that D.B. and E.B. have been
         placed with their current foster parent since December of
         2021. He testified that he has observed the Children with
         the foster parent once a month in the foster home, as well
         as weekly when the foster parent brings the Children to CUA
         for supervised visits. Mr. Allen testified that the relationship
         between the foster parent and D.B. looks like that of a
         mother and child. D.B. Looks to the foster parent for
         necessities like food. Mr. Allen testified that D.B. looks to
         the foster parent for love, protection, and support, and looks
         to his foster parent as his caretaker and provider. The most
         recent time that Mr. Allen saw D.B. was January 2, 2023,
         and he was safe and his needs were being met. Mr. Allen
         did not believe D.B. would suffer irreparable harm if
         Mother’s parental rights were terminated and that Mother
         does not provide him with a stable environment. Mr. Allen
         went on to testify that E.B.’s relationship with the foster
         parent is nearly identical to that of D.B.’s relationship with
         the foster parent, with more codependence on the foster
         parent since E.B. is younger. E.B. looks to the foster parent
         for help with things such as getting dressed. E.B. likewise
         looks to the foster parent for love, protection, and support.
         Mr. Allen did not believe E.B. would suffer irreparable harm

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          if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, based on his
          age and Mother’s lack of parental engagement.

          Mr. Allen testified that during the one visit with Mother in
          September of 2022, he personally observed Mother upset
          and disconnected from D.B. and E.B., focused only on her
          newborn baby and caused a scene at the agency regarding
          her newborn baby.[1] Mr. Allen stated this had no effect on
          D.B. and E.B. because they were not paying attention to
          Mother. D.B. and E.B. do not talk about nor ask about
          Mother. Mr. Allen testified that Mother does not inquire
          about D.B. or E.B. nor has she asked for additional visits
          with them.

                                           […]

          In regard to Section 2511(b) and the best interest of D.B.
          and E.B., the court found credible the testimony of Mr. Allen
          regarding the lack of a parent/child bond between Mother
          and D.B. was well as Mother and E.B. The court found
          credible the testimony regarding Mother’s use of profanity
          and yelling around the Children, and Mother’s failure to
          redirect the Children. The Children have been with their
          foster parent since December 2021. The court also found
          credible the [representation made by the Child Advocate,
          who said] that D.B. indicated he wanted [his] foster mom to
          be [his] mommy. Consequently, the court found that the
          termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best
          interest of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

T.C.O.1 at 26-29 (citations to the record omitted) (footnote added) (style

adjusted).

       Mother argues that because she consistently visited with the Children,

termination of her rights would not best serve the needs and welfare. See

generally Mother’s Brief at 23-24. Mother reasons that she did the best she

could, and notwithstanding her difficulties, she was still able to maintain a

____________________________________________

1 We note that Mother’s newborn baby is not the subject of these appeals.

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relationship with the Children. Id. at 24. While Mother’s consistency was

laudable, we must recognize that after the Children were removed in

November 2020, Mother never progressed in her single case plan to warrant

much more than weekly supervised visitation. As a result, the bond between

the Children and Mother grew attenuated. In her absence, the Children turned

to the foster mother for their needs and security. The trial court’s thorough

findings under this subsection are all supported by the record. We discern no

abuse of discretion.

      Father’s argument under Section 2511(b) is there was insufficient

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination would best

serve the Children’s needs and welfare. We disagree. In its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the trial court set forth the following findings:

         In regard to Section 2511(b) and the best interest of [the
         Children], Mr. Allen testified that D.B. and E.B. have been
         placed with their current foster parent since December of
         2021. He testified that he had observed the Children with
         the current caregiver, and the Children had a bond with the
         resource parent. Mr. Allen stated that the relationship
         looked to be that of “normal four- and two-year-old children,
         running around playing.” Mr. Allen testified that E.B. and
         D.B. look to the resource parent for necessities like food
         when they are hungry.          Mr. Allen testified that the
         relationship between the resource parent and the Children
         looks to be that of a typical parental relationship, and that
         D.B. and E.B. look to the foster parent for love, protection,
         and support. The most recent time that Mr. Allen saw D.B.
         and E.B. was on January 2, 2023, and they were safe and
         their needs were being met. Mr. Allen did not believe D.B.
         and E.B. would suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental
         rights were terminated, based on Father being absent from
         the Children’s lives for close to two years. E.B. has no
         relationship with Father being that he is only two years old,

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         and D.B. was unable to identify who his father was. The
         Children have never asked about Father nor asked to visit
         with Father since Mr. Allen has been on the case.

                                      […]

         In regard to Section 2511(b) and the best interest of D.B.
         and E.B., the court found credible the testimony of Mr. Allen
         regarding the lack of a parent/child bond between Father
         and D.B. as well as Father and E.B. The court found credible
         the testimony Father did not make any attempts in more
         than a year to see or communicate with his Children. The
         Children did not ask about Father nor ask to visit with
         Father. The Children have been with their foster parent
         since December 2021. Consequently, the court found that
         termination of Father’s parental rights would be in the best
         interest of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
         Additionally, termination of parental rights would not have
         a detrimental effect on the developmental, physical, and
         emotional needs of D.B. and E.B.

T.C.O.2 at 27-28 (citations to the record omitted) (style adjusted).

      After review, the record supports these findings, and thus we conclude

the court did not err or abuse its discretion when it determined that the

termination of Father’s rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

Children under Section 2511(b).

      Finally, we note that both parents challenge the trial court’s decision to

change the permanency goal of the dependency proceedings from a

concurrent goal to the goal of adoption. Instantly, our decision to affirm the

trial court’s termination decree necessarily renders moot any challenge to the

goal change orders. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa.

Super. 2021); Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020);

see also In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before

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a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that

has any legal force of effect.”). Accordingly, we dismiss the parents’ appeal

of the goal change issue as moot.

      In short, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or

commit an error of law in terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Decrees affirmed.     Appeals as to permanency goal change orders

dismissed as moot.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/25/2023

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