Court Opinion

ID: 9702555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:16:43.134307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:38.752223
License: Public Domain

*181Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
The majority opinion relative to the appeals at Nos. 384 and 390, sub silentio, gives retroactive application to the decision of Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 26 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held that a right to jury trial must he provided where the defendant is charged with an offense for which the punishment prescribed may be imprisonment for a period in excess of six months. This result is reached by reading the Baldwin six months rule into the requirement of a right to jury trial for serious criminal contempts as previously announced in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 20 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1968).
The frequently quoted Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967) standards for determining retroactivity are: “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” The foremost of these considerations is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1969). As I view the Baldwin ruling, it is not an effort to overcome a flaw in the truth determining process, nor an effort to cure past prejudice, but is rather a practical standard by which to implement the basic constitutional right to a trial by jury in contempt of court situations. Just as the serious offense standards announced in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1968) and Bloom v. Illinois, supra, were given a purely prospective application by the United States Supreme Court, DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1308 (1968), I conclude the six months standard announced in Baldwin should likewise be accorded a purely prospective application. For this reason, I dissent in Nos. 384 and 390. See People *182v. Dargan, 27 N.Y. 2d 100, 313 N.Y.S. 712, 261 N.E. 2d 633 (1970); U. S. ex rel. Buonoraba v. Commissioner of Corrections, 316 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) ; but see U. S. ex rel. Butler v. Thomas, 319 F. Supp. 524 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
As to No. 391, wherein Robert Victor Boyer is the defendant, I concur in the opinion of the Court.