Court Opinion

ID: 9838717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 17:05:16.45953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:44.914386
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/7/23 P. v. Orona CA1/2
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                               A165978
 v.
 TOMAS ORONA,                                                  (Alameda County Super. Ct.
                                                                No. 171531)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        A jury found defendant Tomas Orona guilty of 10 felony offenses,
including attempted murder of a sheriff’s deputy, and found true numerous
firearm enhancement allegations. In a prior appeal, we affirmed the
convictions, but we remanded for resentencing, in part so the trial court could
consider whether to strike one or more of the firearm enhancements in the
interests of justice under its new discretion granted by Senate Bill No. 620
(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 620). (People v. Orona (Feb. 14, 2018, A143354)
2018 WL 851212, *1, *15 (Orona I).)
        The trial court resentenced defendant on remand, and defendant now
appeals from the new sentence. We remand to the trial court to clarify its
intentions as to certain aspects of the sentence and to correct three errors in
the abstract of judgment.

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             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Charges and Conviction
      Following a multiple-day crime spree, defendant was charged in a 10-
count information with assaulting Robert Duszynski with a firearm (Pen.
Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1); possessing a firearm as a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 2); assaulting James Gregory with a firearm (§ 245, subd.
(a)(2); count 3) with an allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); kidnapping Gregory (§ 207, subd. (a); count 4); driving
or taking a vehicle owned by Victoria Gray (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
count 5); evading a peace officer (id., § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 6); assaulting a
peace officer, sheriff’s deputy Duane Fisher, with a firearm (§ 245, subd.
(d)(1); count 7); attempting to murder peace officer Fisher (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664, subd. (e); count 8) with allegations that the attempt was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated (§ 664, subds. (e)-(f)) and that defendant
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)-(c)
& (g)); falsely imprisoning Fred Dudek by violence (§ 236; count 9); and,
again, possessing a firearm as a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 10).
(Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *1.)
      For counts 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, the information alleged defendant
personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.5, subd.
(a)). (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *1.) It was also alleged that
defendant had been convicted of two prior serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1))
and three prior strikes (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)) and that he had served a prior
prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). (Ibid.)
      After a jury trial, “defendant was found guilty of all charges except for
the kidnapping of James Gregory (count 4); the jury also found defendant

      1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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guilty of the lesser included offense to count 4 of false imprisonment of
Gregory by violence (§ 236) and found true the allegation that defendant
personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury found true all of the
related special allegations.” (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *4.) In a
subsequent court trial, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to
dismiss the third strike allegation and found true the remaining allegations
regarding prior convictions. (Ibid.)
       At sentencing in 2014, “the trial court struck one of the prior strike
allegations, and defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 30
years to life, plus a consecutive 45-year 4-month determinate term.” (Orona
I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *4.) The trial court designated count 8,
attempted murder of Officer Fisher, the principal term and, for this count,
imposed an indeterminate term of 30 years to life (15 years to life doubled
because of the prior strike) and consecutive determinate terms of 20 years for
the firearm discharge enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) and 5 years for the
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).
Defendant’s First Appeal
       “Before 2018, sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 prohibited a trial court
from striking a firearm enhancement required to be imposed under those
sections. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) to amend sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, effective January 2018,
to give a trial court discretion to strike those enhancements: Sections
12022.5, subdivision (c), and 12022.53, subdivision (h), now provide that a
‘court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time
of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed by this section.’ ” (People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–
16.)

                                        3
      In his first appeal, defendant argued, among other things, that the
matter should be remanded for resentencing under S.B. 620. (Orona I, supra,
2018 WL 851212, at *14.) We agreed and remanded to allow the trial court to
consider, in the first instance, whether to strike one or more of the firearm
enhancements under its newly granted discretion. (Id. at *15.)
Sentencing on Remand
      On remand in 2022, the trial court elected to reduce the firearm
enhancement for count 8 from 20 years to 10 years.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Corrections to the Abstract of Judgment
      Initially, we will order the trial court to correct three errors in the
abstract of judgment that the parties and this court have identified.
      1.    Firearm Enhancement Under Section 12022.53, Subdivision (b)
      At resentencing, the trial court stated it would “re-impose under Count
8 the 15 years-to-life which is double because of that strike prior, but I would
impose not a 20-year [enhancement for personal discharge of a firearm] . . .
but a 10-year [enhancement for personal firearm] use under the lesser
12022.53(b).” (Italics added.) There is no dispute that under S.B. 620, the
trial court had discretion to replace the 20-year enhancement for personal
discharge of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (c), with the lesser
included 10-year enhancement for personal use of a firearm under
subdivision (b) of the statute. (See People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688,
700–702 [“the Legislature has permitted courts to impose the penalties under
section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d) so long as the existence of facts required by the
relevant subdivision has been alleged and found true”].)
      The abstract of judgment filed June 20, 2022, however, reflects an
enhancement for count 8 under section “12022.53(c),” rather than section

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12022.53, subdivision (b). The parties agree the abstract of judgment should
be amended to correct this error. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185 [appellate courts may order correction of abstracts of judgment that
do not accurately reflect the oral pronouncements of sentencing courts].) We
therefore order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to delete
reference to section “12022.53(c)” and instead to reflect the court’s imposition
of a 10-year enhancement for count 8 pursuant to section 12022.53,
subdivision (b).
      2.    Custody Credits
      “[W]hen a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of
an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and
credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has
already served.” (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29.)
      Here, the abstract of judgment filed June 20, 2022, incorrectly provides
that defendant has 938 total credits with 816 actual days served. These are
the same numbers shown in the prior abstract of judgment filed September 3,
2014. The parties agree the abstract of judgment should be corrected to
reflect all of defendant’s custody credits. We remand the matter with
instructions that the trial court recalculate defendant’s custody credits and
amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.
      3.    Stay of Punishment for Count 7 Under Section 654
      In his first appeal, defendant argued the punishment for count 7,
assault with a firearm on Officer Fisher, had to be stayed under section 654
because the same conduct was already punished by count 8, attempted
murder of Officer Fisher. (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *11.) We
found the sentencing hearing transcript suggested that both the prosecutor
and the trial court understood section 654 applied to count 7, but the court

                                       5
“inexplicably did not stay the sentence.” (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at
*11.) However, we concluded the record was ambiguous on the issue; so we
remanded “to the trial court to consider and clarify whether and how section
654 applie[d] to . . . counts” 7 and 8 (the two offenses that involved shooting
at Officer Fisher). (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *12.)
      The transcript of the resentencing hearing in 2022 demonstrates the
prosecutor and the trial court understood that section 654 applied to counts 7
and 8 such that punishment for one of the two counts had to be stayed. The
prosecutor noted that section 654 had recently been amended, and the trial
court now had the discretion to stay the punishment for either count 8 or
count 7, where previously the court had been required to impose the longer
punishment and stay the shorter punishment.2 After hearing argument on
the issue, the trial court stated it “would continue” to “stay” the punishment
for count 7, which was stayed because “it relates to the principle [sic] offense”
of attempted murder. The court concluded, “the sentence . . . and the four-
year gun enhancement is stayed as it relates to Count 7.” Thus, the trial
court unambiguously stayed punishment for count 7 pursuant to section 654.
      But the abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates (as before) that the
12-year term for count 7 is concurrent rather than stayed. We therefore
order the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment to accurately reflect

      2 In 2014, when defendant was originally sentenced, “section 654

provided that when an act or omission was ‘punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law,’ the trial court was required to punish the
defendant ‘under the provision that provide[d] for the longest potential term
of imprisonment.’ (Former § 654, subd. (a), as amended by Stats.1997, ch.
410, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2022, . . . Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) . . . amended section 654, subdivision (a), ‘to afford sentencing
courts the discretion to punish the act or omission under either provision,’
without regard to the longest potential term of imprisonment.” (People v.
Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 688.)

                                        6
that the 12-year term for count 7 is stayed under section 654. (See People v.
Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
B.    Defendant’s Remaining Claims Regarding the Abstract of Judgment
      Defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be amended in two
additional ways. We disagree.
      1.    Background
      When defendant was originally sentenced in 2014, the trial court
imposed a 5-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) (§ 667(a)),
for a prior serious felony conviction in connection with count 8 and ordered
restitution of $10,000 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and another
$10,000 pursuant to section 1202.45, “suspended unless parole is revoked.”
      In defendant’s first appeal, we affirmed the judgment but remanded for
resentencing. The disposition in Orona I provided, “The matter is remanded
to the trial court for a sentencing hearing to consider the applicability of
section 654 consistent with this opinion, and to consider whether it should in
the interests of justice under section 1385 strike one or more of the firearms
enhancements. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.” (Orona I,
supra, 2018 WL 851212, at *15.)
      At the resentencing hearing on remand in 2022, the trial court did not
mention the 5-year enhancement under section 667(a), or restitution. The
abstract of judgment filed June 20, 2022, reflects the 5-year enhancement
under section 667(a) for count 8 and the two restitution fines continue to be
imposed.
      2.    Analysis
      Defendant argues the fact the trial court did not expressly state that it
was reimposing the section 667(a) enhancement for count 8 and the
restitution fines on remand means the court implicitly exercised its discretion

                                          7
not to impose the enhancement and restitution fines. He argues, therefore,
that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to delete the enhancement
and restitution fines. This argument might be persuasive if the 2022
sentencing hearing had been the original sentencing hearing and the trial
court failed to address these matters. (See People v. Tillman (2000) 22
Cal.4th 300, 302–303 [where the sentencing court fails to impose mandatory
restitution fines and fails to make the required finding for not doing so, claim
of sentencing error is forfeited on appeal unless the People raised the issue
with the lower court].)
      But, in this case, the trial court properly imposed the 5-year
enhancement under section 667(a) and the restitution fines at the original
sentencing hearing in 2014. In defendant’s first appeal, we found no
sentencing error, and our disposition remanding for resentencing did not
operate to vacate the original sentence. (See People v. Ramirez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 55, 63 [remand for resentencing “did not necessarily vacate the
original sentence and therefore an operative judgment remained”].) Because
we did not vacate the original sentence, the trial court was not required to
conduct an entirely new sentencing hearing from scratch on remand. We
instructed the trial court only “to consider the applicability of section 654 . . .
and to consider whether it should in the interests of justice under section
1385 strike one or more of the firearms enhancements,” while holding that
the judgment was otherwise affirmed. (Orona I, supra, 2018 WL 851212, at
*15.) At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel never argued the court
should reconsider its previous imposition of the section 667(a) enhancement
for count 8 or the restitution fines. Thus, it is understandable that the trial
court on remand addressed how section 654 applied to counts 7 and 8 and

                                         8
reconsidered the firearm enhancements but did not mention either the
section 667(a) enhancement or restitution.
      On this record, we reject defendant’s argument that we must interpret
the court’s silence as to the section 667(a) enhancement for count 8 and the
restitution fines—matters unrelated to the scope of our remand—to mean the
court implicitly exercised its discretion to reconsider, and then declined to
impose, the section 667(a) enhancement and restitution fines it previously
imposed and which remained in effect. That said, we recognize the
resentencing transcript is arguably ambiguous regarding the trial court’s
intention. In this circumstance, we will remand to permit the trial court to
clarify whether it intended to decline to impose the section 667(a)
enhancement and the restitution fines. (See People v. Garcia (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 834, 838–839 [remanding for clarification where the appellate
court could not tell what the trial court’s intended sentence was].)
C.    The Trial Court’s Stay of Firearm Enhancements
      Finally, we identify an issue not raised by the parties.
      At the original sentencing hearing in 2014, the trial court imposed
additional terms of imprisonment pursuant to section 12022.5, subdivision
(a), for defendant’s use of a firearm in the commission of counts 1, 3, 4, 7, and
9.3
      At resentencing on remand, the trial court reconsidered these firearm
enhancements and stated that it would “stay” each of them. Given that we
instructed the court “to consider whether it should in the interests of justice
under section 1385 strike one or more of the firearms enhancements,” it
appears that the trial court intended to apply section 1385 when it stayed the

      3 Count 4 here refers to defendant’s conviction of false imprisonment, a

lesser included offense of the charged offense of kidnapping.

                                        9
firearm enhancements. But section 1385 does not authorize the stay of
enhancements; rather, “[u]nder section 1385, a trial court may ‘strike or
dismiss an enhancement’ or ‘the additional punishment for that enhancement
in the furtherance of justice.’ (§ 1385, subd. (b)(1).)” (People v. Bay (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 126, 139 [“ ‘The trial court has no authority to stay an
enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for
doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice’ ”].)
      The trial court could not stay enhancements under section 1385. When
“a sentence choice is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, the
matter must be remanded for an informed determination.” (People v. Downey
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 912.) We believe this rule applies here.
Accordingly, we will remand for the trial court to clarify whether it intended
to strike or dismiss these enhancements or the additional punishments under
section 1385.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The matter is remanded for the trial court to clarify whether it
intended to decline to impose the section 667(a) enhancement for count 8 and
the restitution fines and whether it intended to strike or dismiss one or more
of the firearm enhancements associated with counts 1, 3, 4, 7 and 9, and to
recalculate defendant’s custody credits. In addition, the trial court is ordered
to correct the abstract of judgment by (1) deleting reference to “12022.53(c)”
and specifying that the 10-year firearm enhancement to count 8 is pursuant
to section 12022.53, subdivision (b); (2) deleting the incorrect amount of
custody credits and listing defendant’s recalculated custody credits; and (3)
reflecting that the 12-year term for count 7 is stayed pursuant to section 654.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J.*

A165978, People v. Orona

      * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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