Court Opinion

ID: 9766807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:59:48.908047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:26.432399
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
This suit was begun under the provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.1 That eminent*555ly important fact, which means that we are dealing with statutory interpretation, is not reflected in the majority result. Bight of that fact also seems to have been lost in a growing number of similar cases as well.
There is no special statutory remedy applicable in this case, and in the absence of such a remedy2 I can see no reason why a declaratory judgment is not permissible and appropriate; there is manifest statutory *556authority for its use. It is difficult to conceive of clearer legislative language to embody the evident intent of the statute: to broaden the availability of declaratory judgments and to thereby provide an alternative, not an extraordinary, remedy.3 It is equally difficult to discover any line of decisions which renders an obvious and legitimate legislative intendment more nugatory than this Court’s recent decisions dealing with the availability of declaratory judgments. See generally Notes, Section 6 of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 793 (1963).
The majority holds that a declaratory judgment proceeding is not an optional substitute for established remedies and that it may not be utilized where “a more appropriate remedy” is available. My fundamental objection to this conception of the remedy is that it flies squarely in the face of the statute’s intent and language.4 Section 6 expressly provides: “the mere fact that an actual or threatened controvery is susceptible of relief through a general common law remedy, or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, whether such remedy is recognized or regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in *557any case where the other essentials to such relief are present. . . ,”5
A declaratory judgment proceeding is so useful a tool and the Legislature has so patently fostered its use, that I greatly regret the majority’s opinion proceeding as though the statute never existed. The time has long since passed when this legislatively created, helpful and sound method of adjudication should be fully utilized.6

 At the time the suit was begun, the pertinent statute was Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, as amended by Acts of April 25, 1935, P. L. 72, and May 26, 1943, P. L. 645, 12 P.S. §§831-46. Section 6 provided: “Relief by declaratory judgment or decree may be granted in all civil cases where an actual controversy exists *555between contending parties, or where the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation, or where in any such case the court is satisfied that a party asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege in which he has a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of such asserted relation, status, right, or jn-ivilege by an adversary party who also has or asserts a concrete interest therein, and the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment or decree will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Where, however, a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of case, that statutory remedy must be followed; but the mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is susceptible of relief through a general common law remedy, or an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy, ichether such remedy is recognised or regulated by statute or not, shall not debar a party from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in any case where the other essentials to such relief are present; but proceeding by declaratory judgment shall not be permitted in any case where a divorce or annulment of marriage is sought.” (Emphasis supplied.) (The section may be found in 12 P.S. §836 (1953)).
The stipulation of facts respecting the petition for declaratory judgment was filed on February 27, 1964, and the court filed its opinion and decree on July 6, 1964. Section 6 of the Act was again amended on July 25, 1963 by P. L. 305, §1, 32 P.S. 836 (Supp. 1964). The changes, which relate to tax controversies, are not pertinent to the subject matter in this case and in no way affect it.

 “Where ... a statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific type of ease, that statutory remedy must be followed. . . .” §6, supra note 1.

 See Philadelphia Mfrs. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rose, 364 Pa. 15, 22-23, 70 A. 2d 316, 319-20 (1950) ; Reader, Judicial Review of “Final” Administrative Decisions in Pennsylvania, 67 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 30 (1962). See also the excellent historical treatment of the remedy in Johnson Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 171 A. 2d 518 (1961).

 McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 179 A. 2d 222 (1962), from which the Court gleans these rules, seems squarely at odds with Johnson Estate, 403 Pa. 476, 171 A. 2d 518 (1961). See the opinion of Mr. Justice Jones concurring and dissenting in McWilliams v. McCabe, 406 Pa. 644, 658, 179 A. 2d 222, 229 (1962) ; Notes, 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 793, 801-02 (1963).
See also note 3, supra.

 Supra, note 1.

 “It is likely that with a policy of judicially broadened acceptance of declaratory suits, court time will be saved by the forestalling of many suits based on conduct founded on originally incorrect premises. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act procedure might be looked on as ‘preventive medicine’ in our repertory of legal remedies and should be ‘shaken well’ and applied in large doses.” (Footnote omitted.) Notes, Section 6 of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 24 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 793, 806 (1963).
“As said by Congressman Gilbert in 69 Cong. Rec. 2030 (1928), under declaratory judgment proceedings the court is not required to tell ‘the prospective victim that the only way to determine whether the suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool is to eat it.’ ” Daub, Penna. Keystone, Declaratory Judgments §1 (1964).