Court Opinion

ID: 9734017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:22:59.849217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:09.909300
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein because I deem it was error for the trial court not to have submitted in the special verdict the questions requested by plaintiffs’ counsel with respect to whether the defendant Bryle Burnette was causally negligent as to management and control, and failure to stop for the arterial stop sign.
In evaluating evidence to determine whether it is proper to refuse to submit a requested question in a special verdict, the same test ought to be applied as in the case of passing on a motion for directed verdict. It is error to direct a verdict if there is “room in the evidence for the jury to have reasonably found either way.” Lambrecht v. Holsaple (1916), 164 Wis. 465, 467, 160 N. W. 168. Applying such test to the instant case, it was error to have refused to submit the questions of control and management, and failure to stop for the arterial stop sign, if there was room in the evidence for the jury to have answered such question either way.
Failure of an operator of a motor vehicle to reduce speed when a dangerous situation is sighted is properly a matter of control and management and not speed. Albrecht v. Tradewell (1955), ante, p. 303, 73 N. W. (2d) 408; Jennings v. Mueller Transportation Co. (1955), 268 Wis. 622, 631, 68 N. W. (2d) 565; and Thoms v. Gunnelson (1953), 263 Wis. 424, 429, 57 N. W. (2d) 678.
The majority opinion omits to state the facts from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that Bryle Burnette did see the light pole at the far or west side of County *365Trunk G in time to have stopped the car and avoided hitting the guy wire of such pole. The following, in question and answer form, is a portion of his testimony bearing on this point:
“Q. Now, how far away were'you from this telephone pole or this electric-light pole when you first saw it, Bryle? A. When I first saw it ?
“Q. Yes. A. Oh, I imagine about 300 or 400 feet.
“Q. 300 or 400 feet? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And then you knew you were coming to the end of the road? A. Yes.”
The skid marks measured back easterly from where the car came to a stop near such pole, as testified to by the traffic officer, were 96 feet in length. In other words, while Bryle had first sighted the pole and realized its significance when he was from 300 to 400 feet distant, he did not apply his brakes hard enough to make skid marks until but 96 feet away. From this the jury could reasonably infer, even after making due allowance for reaction time, that he did not properly apply his brakes as soon as he should have.
Furthermore, the testimony as to the speed at which Bryle was driving at the time he first sighted the pole is in sharp conflict. While at the trial he testified that he had the car “wide open” and might have been going 100 miles per hour, he told the investigating police-officers on the night of the accident that he was going 50 miles per hour and gave them a statement to that effect the following day. In the criminal case brought against him in the municipal court of Brown county he also testified that he was driving at the rate of 50 miles per hour at the time the accident occurred. One of the girl passengers testified that the speed was from 50 to 60 miles per hour.
Because of these conflicts in Bryle’s statements and testimony as to speed, his veracity was impeached and the jury did not have to accept as true any particular testimony which he *366gave at the trial. For example, the jury did not have to accept as true Bryle’s testimony that he applied his brakes the instant he saw the pole.
The facts brought out in evidence herein recounted constituted credible evidence which would have supported a jury’s finding that Bryle was guilty of negligence with respect to control and management and that the same was causal. This being the case, it was error not to submit questions on such issue in the verdict.
The reason advanced by the learned trial court for not submitting the requested question as to failure to stop for the arterial stop sign, as stated in his memorandum opinion, was that the objective of the statute requiring such a stop to be made was to afford protection only against the danger of collision with vehicles on the arterial highway, and not with objects beyond the limits of the far side of such arterial highway, like the pole and guy wire in the instant case. Such a restrictive purpose is not stated in sec. 85.69, Stats., and I doubt the wisdom of so restricting the application of the statute by inferring such a limited purpose on the part of the legislature. Bryle was guilty of negligence per se in failing to comply with the requirements of the statute by stopping his vehicle within 30 feet of the near limits of County Trunk G.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the ground that it was prejudicial error not to have submitted in the special verdict the questions requested by plaintiffs’ counsel as to management and control, and failure to stop at the arterial stop sign.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Broadfoot joins in this dissent.