Court Opinion

ID: 9530487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:17.917068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.781404
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction on count III. It is troublesome that we would find that one of defendant’s convictions was not supported by any evidence but remand with the observation that defendant’s total 15-year sentence could be increased to a total of 22 years. The State generally does not have the right to appeal or cross-appeal in a criminal case. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). A reviewing court does not have the power to increase the punishment imposed by the trial court. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b). Where a conviction has been set aside on direct appeal the court shall not impose a new sentence that is more severe than the prior sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—4 (West 2000). Section 5 — 5—4 sets out requirements of due process. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 669, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1969); People v. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d 439, 447, 657 N.E.2d 1005, 1008 (1995) (improper chilling effect on appeal). I can understand how a sentence of 3 years for a Class 1 felony, which carries a sentence of not less than 4 years and not more than 15 years, would be void. In this case, however, a total sentence of 15 years is not void. Even if a consecutive sentence had been imposed on all three offenses here, the trial court could have sentenced defendant to 10 years (4 plus 3 plus 3). The 15-year sentence was well within the power of the trial court. See People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 708 N.E.2d 1114, 1121 (1999) (“we find no justification for disturbing any statutorily sound sentence imposed against any defendant under the void truth-in-sentencing law”). The supreme court has stated that sentences imposed in violation of the mandatory consecutive sentences requirement are void, and there is no valid sentence to increase on remand. People v. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d 55, 73-74, 688 N.E.2d 57, 65-66 (1997). Garcia, however, did not involve a case where sentences had actually been increased after remand and did not overrule or even address Kilpatrick. Garcia recognized that due process may be violated where a defendant can show actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge. Garcia, 179 Ill. 2d at 74, 688 N.E.2d at 66. It may be understandable for a trial court to increase the total sentence if that is simply the result of imposing consecutive minimum sentences. But why would a trial court increase the total sentence if it did not have to? The argument that a void sentence may be corrected at any time seems to work only one way. We often reject a defendant’s claim that he has not received the mandatory day-for-day sentence credit, or the mandatory $5-a-day sentence credit, on the basis that he has not filed the proper appeal. See, e.g., People v. Turner, No. 4—02—0336 (May 5, 2004) (unpublished summary order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (conceded sentence credit may not be allowed on postconviction petition). If a void sentence can be corrected at any time, we should consider those issues. Since section 5 — 8—4 was amended to require mandatory consecutive sentences, there have been problems. Where a defendant is convicted of three counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12— 13(a)(3) (West 2000)), and the trial court feels a sentence of 12 years is appropriate, the trial court must be careful. If the trial court sentences defendant to four years on each count, mistakenly believing that the sentences are consecutive, the trial court may discover that it is limited to a sentence of four years. See People v. Todd, 263 Ill. App. 3d 435, 636 N.E.2d 114 (1994), abrogated by Kilpatrick, 167 Ill. 2d at 445, 657 N.E.2d at 1007-08. In a case where consecutive sentences are appropriate but one of the counts is reversed on appeal, the trial court may be limited to a sentence of 8 years, even though it believed each count warranted a sentence of 12 years. In the converse situation, where the trial court believes the sentences are concurrent and imposes a 12-year sentence on each count, a subsequent finding that the sentences must be consecutive may impose pressure on the court to impose a 36-year sentence it never intended. The requirement for detailed calculation provides uncertainty and may result in a sentence not originally intended by the trial court. The problem is made worse by the fact that a prosecutor can charge a single criminal sexual assault as several offenses with mandatory consecutive sentences, by charging each touching as a separate act. See People v. Anderson, 325 Ill. App. 3d 624, 638, 759 N.E.2d 83, 95 (2001) (Cook, J., dissenting).