Court Opinion

ID: 9490488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:44:59.074019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:07.785624
License: Public Domain

BLOCK, District Judge,
with whom Judge CALABRESI joins, concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Calabresi’s opinion, which I join. I also write separately, howev*141er, to express my concern, triggered by Judge Meskill’s concurrence in the result, that our decision today may be perceived as qualifying the privilege in cases involving a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution based upon a case-by-case analysis of domestic law enforcement interests. According to Judge Mesldll, the determinant in such an ad hoc scenario should be the balance to be struck between the enforcement of our organic laws and the protection that the Fifth Amendment privilege affords to the affected individual.
This relativist approach echoes the holding of United States v. Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. 802 (D.Mass.1995), relied upon by the district court in this case. In Lileikis, the court attempted to stake out an intermediate position between the approach taken by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. (Under Seal) (Araneta), 794 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.1986), which did not permit invocation of the privilege, and that of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir.1995), in which the privilege was permitted to be invoked. The Lileikis court, attempting “to borrow constructively” from both opinions, 899 F.Supp. at 808, held that where a witness invokes the privilege based upon a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, the privilege should nonetheless give way “[i]f a governmental interest in enforcing the organic laws of the United States is involved, and the United States has a legitimate need for a witness’s testimony in furthering that interest....” Id. at 809. At the same time, however, the court also determined that it was inappropriate to “bend the Constitution solely to promote the foreign policy objectives of the executive branch, however laudable, by compelling the cooperation of a witness in a proceeding that does not have as its fundamental purpose the vindication of the domestic laws of the United States.” Id.
In my opinion, the privilege against self-incrimination is too principled a proposition to be dependent upon the quantification of governmental interests and the unpredictability of ad hoc adjudication. There is nothing in the lexicon of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence that supports the thesis that, barring waiver, factors other than a legitimate fear of prosecution should enter into its calculus. While the debate on this issue, which has been taunting the courts ever since Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) and Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) were decided in 1964, will continue until resolved by the Supreme Court, it seems to me that one must bite the conceptual bullet — either the privilege can be invoked by one facing a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, or it cannot— rather than grapple with balancing and qualifying the privilege’s application.
In opting for its unqualified application, I am satisfied that the concerns of Judge Mes-kill and others over compromising the efficacy of domestic law enforcement will invariably be subsumed by the factors that enter into the threshold determination of the legitimacy of the fear, and some very practical realities.
In determining whether the requisite real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution exists, this court has identified five factors for consideration:
whether there is an existing or potential foreign prosecution [against the witness]; what foreign charges could be filed against [the witness]; whether prosecution of them would be initiated or furthered by [the witness’s] testimony; whether any such charges would entitle the foreign jurisdiction to have [the witness] extradited from the United States; and whether there is a likelihood that [the witness’s] testimony given here would be disclosed to the foreign government.
United States v. Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.1982); see also United States v. Chevrier, 748 F.2d 100 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Gilboe, 699 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.1983). The fear “must be a real and reasonable one, based on objective facts as distinguished from [the witness’s] subjective speculation.” Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121; Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1553-66 (application by Eleventh Circuit of test similar to Flanagan). This rigorous test, requiring consideration, inter alia, of the likelihood that a witness’s testimony *142would be disclosed to the foreign government and whether the foreign prosecution would be initiated or furthered by the testimony, see Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121, will undoubtedly uncover those situations, such as Gecas and the present case, where the government is actively involved in facilitating a foreign prosecution and the risk of governmental overreaching is, therefore, sufficiently acute to warrant invocation of the privilege. But the test is also sufficiently rigorous to “eliminate[ ] the apprehension that a person could manufacture a potential for foreign prosecution or raise this specter solely to frustrate domestic law enforcement.” Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1564. I agree, therefore, with the panel’s rationale and conclusion in Gecas:
Just as the privilege is extended to prevent overzealous prosecution and to constrain the government, the privilege creates in the individual the freedom to remain silent where the testimony may be adverse to his penal interests. One purpose need not eclipse the other in its function. If the court reasonably finds that the fear of foreign prosecution is an actuality rather than a mere speculation, the individual should prevail and be permitted to invoke the privilege. If the prospect of foreign prosecution is pure conjecture, then the importance of domestic law enforcement prevails, and the witness must testify.... [Sjuch a balance both reasonably serves the purposes of the privilege and preserves the goals of domestic law enforcement.
Id. at 1564-65.
In any event, in a very real sense, I am not at all certain that the goals of domestic law enforcement would be significantly enhanced if the privilege could not be asserted. It simply cannot pragmatically be assumed that when faced with the “cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,” the choice would invariably be self-accusation. Balsys, for example, would obviously choose domestic contempt over foreign execution and it is unlikely, therefore, that the government would ever elicit from him the answers to its questions. The only practical domestic goal at stake would be the enforcement of our contempt laws, which are quite charitable. Had we held today that Balsys could not invoke the privilege, he initially would only be subject to civil contempt for his expected and rational silence. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1994); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.1983). However, a court’s authority to impose civil contempt sanctions “is limited by the concept that such sanctions are by their nature coercive rather than punitive.” United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.1987); see also United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir.1988). By statute, the duration of a witness’s civil confinement for a refusal to testify in court is not permitted to exceed the duration of the court proceeding, or 18 months, whichever is shorter. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). Further, as a matter of common law, if it becomes clear during the witness’s period of imprisonment that “there is no reasonable possibility that the sanction imposed for civil contempt will have the desired coercive effect, the sanction should be ended.” Giraldo, 822 F.2d at 210; see also Simkin, 715 F.2d at 36-37; Soobzokov v. CBS, Inc., 642 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1981). Similarly, although the court is empowered to assess a fine, the fine cannot continue after the court has determined that the fine is not having a coercive effect. See Soobzokov, 642 F.2d at 31. As for criminal contempt pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401, while it is available once it is determined that the civil contempt remedy is unavailing, see Simkin, 715 F.2d at 37, it is unlikely to result in a prolonged period of incarceration. See id. at 38 (“fear may warrant lenient sentence of criminal contempt”) (citing Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 166-67, 86 S.Ct. 352, 354-55, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965)).
In sum, for a witness facing a real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution, and foreign punishment, the choice of contempt may be preferable to the fate that awaits him abroad. Consequently, it is by no means assured that a different holding today would have a markedly different impact upon domestic law enforcement. To the extent that it does, the relinquishment of the enforcement of our contempt laws, such as they are, strikes me as a civilized trade-off for upholding a fundamental principle of individual dignity.
*143Judge CALABRESI authorizes me to say that he concurs in this opinion.