Court Opinion

ID: 9652785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:31:58.499238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:54.078388
License: Public Domain

*747ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority has constructed a somewhat persuasive argument; however, in the process, it has divorced itself from a basic tenet of contract construction.
The sole issue presented in this case is simple: Is the phrase “subject to legal documentation” an ambiguous term? Under settled rules of contract construction, ambiguity is a question of law for the court to decide by examining the contract as a whole in the context of the circumstances present when the contract was drafted. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1983); R & P Enterprises v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980). And if a contract is written so that a provision can be given a definite legal meaning, then it is not ambiguous and the court will therefore construe the contract as a matter of law. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 518, 243 S.W.2d 154,157 (1951). This is the exact situation presented in this case.
During trial, neither party contended that the term “subject to legal documentation” was ambiguous. Absent any dispute as to ambiguity, it thus became the trial court’s duty to construe the contract as a matter of law.
It is well settled that terms such as “subject to” create a condition precedent. Hohenberg Brothers Co. v. George E. Gibbons & Co., 537 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.1976). And, in this case, the term established a condition precedent to the formation of the contract. Inasmuch as the required “legal documentation” never took place, no contract was established between Foreca and GRD.
I would therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
WALLACE, MAUZY and CULVER, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.