Court Opinion

ID: 9494409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:37:18.820765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:23.944981
License: Public Domain

PAEZ, Circuit Judge,
with whom Chief Judge SCHROEDER and Circuit Judges HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and RAWLINSON join, concurring:
I concur in the determination that the district court must suppress the incriminating statements Orso made after two U.S. Postal Inspectors arrested and took her into custody and then drove her in their government vehicle from the Redondo Beach Police Department to the Postal Inspection Service Office. The Postal Inspectors interrogated Orso without first informing her of her Constitutional rights, and these “unwarned” statements must therefore be suppressed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
With some reluctance, I also concur in the conclusion that, under Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the district court need not suppress the confession Orso made after she was read, and then waived, her Miranda rights. I write separately for two reasons. First, the court’s opinion does not accord due weight to the Inspectors’ admission that they deliberately failed to advise Orso of her Constitutional rights because they believed that, unwarned, she would unwittingly incriminate herself. Second, the court identifies the particular conduct that Orso contends was coercive, but does not consider all the factors in their totality, as the Supreme Court *1041requires and as the Inspectors’ subtle coercion demands.
I
The Fifth Amendment guarantees a person’s right to remain silent “unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (holding the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). The Supreme Court acknowledged in Miranda that “inherently compelling pressures” in the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crimes “work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602. As we have explained, the Court ordered that an accused be advised of his rights before custodial interrogations begin “to ensure [he] is both aware of his substantive Constitutional right to silence, as well as his continuous opportunity to exercise that right.” Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1239 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc) (“It is no accident that the first words out of a police officer’s mouth during a Miranda advisement must be: You have a ‘right to remain silent.’ ”).
“A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him....’” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).1 Society abhors the use of involuntary confessions because they are inherently untrustworthy and because we share “the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law[.]” Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (“The quality of a nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law.”) (quoting Walter Y. Schaefer, “Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,” 70 HaRV. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1956)).
The roots of our recognition and protection of the fundamental right not to be compelled to testify against oneself run deep. More than a century ago, the Supreme Court observed in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), that under English law dating back to 1655, courts knew that the very process of giving a statement to an official might “impel [a prisoner] involuntarily to speak” unless he was cautioned that the statement was optional. The cautionary advisement was so important, in fact, that the precise wording of the warning was codified by statute. 168 U.S. at 550, 18 S.Ct. 183 (“You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you upon your trial.”).
To be voluntary, a confession must be “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.” Blackburn v. State of Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). In addition to the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation, other factors can compromise the free will of an accused. Officials cannot extract a confession “by any sort of threats or violence, nor ... by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.” Bram, 168 U.S. at *1042542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, quoted in Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489. Courts do not require physical injury before finding an interrogation unconstitutional. “[M]ore sophisticated modes of ‘persuasion’ ” may suffice. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206, 80 S.Ct. 274. Neither physical intimidation nor psychological pressure is permissible. U.S. v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir.1981) (citation omitted) (subtle psychological coercion suffices at times more effectively “to overbear a rational intellect and a free will”) (quoting Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 208, 80 S.Ct. 274); see also Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206, 80 S.Ct. 274 (“A prolonged interrogation of an accused who is ignorant of his rights and who has been cut off from the moral support of friends and relatives is not infrequently an effective technique of terror.”) (emphasis added); Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1247 (“pressuring a suspect to talk can be impermissibly coercive, even if no physical brutality is used.”).
In assessing the voluntariness of a confession, we examine police conduct to determine whether it was coercive. Fortunately, we rarely encounter the types of police misconduct that gave rise to Miranda. Nonetheless, “as law enforcement officers become more responsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because of the more delicate judgments to be made.” Spano, 360 U.S. at 321, 79 S.Ct. 1202, quoted in Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1245.
We take a dim view of deliberate, in contrast to inadvertent or “technical,” failures to advise an accused of his Constitutional rights. See, e.g., Henry v. Keman, 197 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir.1999) (although a post-Miranda voluntary statement can be used for impeachment purposes, where the sheriffs officers “set out in a deliberate course of action to violate Miranda [,] ... the State should not be permitted to use [these] statements[.]”). The focus remains on coercion, and where the failure to comply with Miranda is coercive in intent and effect, this conduct cannot be ignored. “For victims caught in the[ ] snare” of “officials who deliberately choose to ignore the law and the Constitution in favor of their own methods ... the Constitution of the United States becomes a useless piece of paper.” Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1252.
The Supreme Court has recognized repeatedly that our inquiry does not become less rigorous merely because physical coercion has yielded to far more sophisticated methods. To the contrary, the Court has directed that our decisions reflect “a careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Thus, when considering whether the degree of coercion involved in a deliberate, calculated decision to violate Miranda deprives an individual of due process under the Fifth Amendment, we pay close attention to the subtleties of interrogation techniques.
One relevant factor we examine is whether and when the police administer the Miranda warnings. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (“lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights” is factor in determining voluntariness); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (“Before petitioner made any incriminating statements, he received partial warnings of his constitutional rights[,] ... a circumstance quite relevant to a finding of volun-tariness.”); Davis v. State of North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966) (whether defendant received warnings at outset of interrogation is “significant factor” and “gives add*1043ed weight” to circumstances which made confessions involuntary.); United States v. Wauneka, 770 F.2d 1434, 1440-41 (9th Cir.1985) (“whether Wauneka was advised that his prior admission could not be used against him; or whether ... Wauneka was told that his previous remarks could be used against him” are factors in determining voluntariness of confession).
The timing of the Miranda advisement can be critical. As Justice Brennan explained in his dissent in Elstad, “expert interrogators” aim for the all-important “first admission”: “such revelations frequently lead directly to a full confession. Standard interrogation manuals advise that ... ‘there is every reason to expect that the first admission will lead to others, and eventually to a full confession.’ ” 470 U.S. at 328, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (internal citation omitted). He added that “[i]nterro-gators describe the point of the first admission as the ‘breakthrough’ and the ‘beachhead,’ ... which once obtained will give them enormous ‘tactical advantages!.]’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted). As a result, withholding Miranda warnings until the end of an interrogation session is not a novel strategy. At that late point in the interrogation, Miranda warnings may have less impact:
There are numerous variations on this theme. Police may obtain a confession in violation of Miranda and then take a break for lunch or go home for the evening. When questioning is resumed, this time preceded by Miranda warnings, the suspect is asked to “clarify” the earlier illegal confession and to provide additional information ... Alternatively, the suspect might be questioned by arresting officers “in the field” and without Miranda warnings, as was young Elstad in the instant case. After making incriminating admissions or a confession, the suspect is then brought into the station house and either questioned by the same officers again or asked to repeat his earlier statements to another officer.
Id. at 330-31, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). “For all practical purposes, the prewarning and post-warning questioning are often but stages of one overall interrogation.” Id. at '331,105 S.Ct. 1285.
In this case, there was nothing accidental about the failure to advise Orso of her rights. Inspector Galetti testified that they had an arrest warrant for Orso and took her into custody. She was placed in handcuffs and seated in the government car — next to Inspector Tiller. Neither Galetti nor Tiller read Orso her rights upon taking her into custody, handcuffing her, or placing her in the vehicle. After some general conversation, Galetti initiated discussion of the robbery. Neither Galetti nor Tiller read Orso her rights at this point either. In fact, Galetti admitted that he meant to get her talking and that to do so, he said he was just “reviewing the facts of the robbery” with her. Why no Miranda warnings? “Well, we wanted to eventually speak with Miss Orso and thought that if we Mirandized her right away that she might not want to speak with us.” He stated that he told her not to talk, but his lack of good faith emerges from his candid admission that he intended to prompt her to converse with them.
True, the inspectors did not touch Orso, deprive her of food or water, or even utter a harsh word. But Inspector Galetti’s blatant manipulation of the duty to advise a suspect of her Constitutional rights makes a mockery of Miranda and the rights the case was intended to protect. The fact that Inspector Galetti adeptly maneuvered around the requirements of Miranda should not obscure the fact that in doing so, he deprived Orso of information that *1044was indispensable to her exercise of free will. “To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Pain-free coercion is coercive just the same.
II
Our jurisprudence regarding confessions “yield[s] no talismanic definition of ‘volun-tariness,’ ” so we must determine “the factual circumstances surrounding the confession, assess[ ] the psychological impact on the accused, and evaluate[ ] the legal significance of how the accused reacted.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. “[T]he voluntariness of the first [unwarned] confession is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Wauneka, 842 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). No single criterion controls. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041.
The Supreme Court in Schneckloth set out several of the factors that bear on our analysis. In the past, for example, the Court had considered “the youth of the accused, ... or his low intelligence, ... the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights, ... the length of detention, ... the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, ... and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.... ” 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Today’s opinion identifies the relevant factors in the analysis and rejects each factor as a basis in and of itself for finding Orso’s unwarned statements to be involuntary. The analysis is correct as far as it goes, but a final step remains: considering the factors in their totality. U.S. v. Wauneka, 842 F.2d at 1087. In my view, the Inspectors’ tactics are more coercive when the following facts are reviewed together. Notably, Orso was in the Inspectors’ custody from the moment they left the Police Department; she was handcuffed; she was placed in the back of a government vehicle; Inspector Tiller sat next to her; these procedures were followed, Inspector Galetti testified, because Orso was a “prisoner;” Inspectors Galetti and Tiller deliberately failed to advise Orso of her Constitutional rights at any point during the drive to the Postal Inspection Service Office because they believed she would exercise her right to remain silent if they did so; knowing that no witness saw her use a gun, Galetti nevertheless lied to Orso about this fact; and knowing that there was no evidence that she had used a gun, Galetti nevertheless told her that she potentially faced a 25-year sentence (for armed robbery).
Although other factors (relatively brief period of detention, adult suspect, suspect’s awareness prior to being taken into custody of investigation into the robbery) appear to have lessened the coercive impact on this defendant of the Inspectors’ “end run” around Miranda, neither the letter nor the spirit of Miranda fare well today. The official conduct here did not consist of “a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise [her] free will.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. I concur, however, because I cannot say that, under existing Supreme Court precedent, the Inspectors’ conduct was so coercive that Orso lacked sufficient free will to decide whether to waive her right to remain silent.

. Although Orso's incriminating unwarned statements were not a full confession, the analysis of their voluntariness remains the same.