Court Opinion

ID: 9723822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:34:21.265041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:52.367385
License: Public Domain

O’Connor, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the court’s affirmance of the judgments from which Trinity has appealed, but I do not agree that the judgment against Hancock should be affirmed. I do not agree that the evidence warrants an award of compensation for structural damage to the church in *57addition to compensation for the cost of repairing its interior and exterior surfaces. More specifically, I do not accept the plaintiff’s “takedown” theory of damages as appropriate in this case.
Damages are not appropriate simply to respond to an unsolicited alteration of real property, but are appropriate only as compensation for actual loss. In appropriate circumstances, diminution in the market value of real property constitutes compensable loss. Also, in appropriate circumstances, the loss of use of special purpose property, being rationally susceptible of measurement in terms of money, is compensable. Common-wealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 352 Mass. 143, 149-151 (1967). Loss of use fairly encompasses a reduction in the “life expectancy” of a building, and, therefore, such a reduction, if it results from a defendant’s tortious conduct, ought to be compensable. But, the record contains no evidence of a diminution in the church’s market value, or of a present loss of use or enjoyment of the church, or of even a minute shortening of its usable life. There is no evidence that the church will ever be less usable or less enjoyable than it is now, or that it ever will have to be taken down and reconstructed. Neither the court nor any party suggests otherwise. Therefore, Trinity has not sustained its burden of proving a loss based on structural damage, and an award of compensation for structural damage is improper.
Unfortunately, the court assumes without discussion that the distortion of the church’s foundation and the resulting wall cracks have resulted in a loss to the plaintiff. Based on that erroneous assumption, the court concludes that “Trinity is entitled to be compensated for the reasonable costs of restoring the church to the condition it was in prior to the Hancock excavation.” Ante at 50. Of course, the award does not purport to put the plaintiff in position to restore the church to its condition prior to the excavation, but rather it is designed to require Hancock to pay now what is deemed to be Hancock’s equitable share of the cost of restoration sometime in the future should restoration ever become reasonably necessary. The award misses the mark, however, because costs of restoration, *58in whole or in part, are not a proper method of measuring damages unless restoration either is, or is likely to become, reasonably necessary, and there is no such evidence in this case. The court’s recognition of this principle, which it then does not follow, is demonstrated by its statement that “[n]ot only must the cost of replacement or reconstruction be reasonable, the replacement or reconstruction itself must be reasonably necessary in light of the damage inflicted by a particular defendant.” Ante at 50. See Commonwealth v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., supra at 149. The court’s affirmance of the judgment against Hancock, therefore, is erroneous.
In support of its holding, the court states, ante at 50-51: “It is useful to consider Trinity’s method with a view toward the impact of future damage. If at some time in the future another construction project damaged the church causing it to reach its ‘total loss’ or takedown point, the church would clearly be entitled to recover the depreciated reconstruction cost. Depreciation at that point, however, would include all the damage sustained up to that time, including that related to the Hancock tower construction. For this reason, unless Trinity is compensated for the Hancock related damages now, these damages will forever pass into the realm of nonrecoverable depreciation.” The court’s reasoning is circuitous. It begs the primary question, which is whether the evidence demonstrates that Trinity has sustained a loss. If, as I argue, Trinity has not sustained a loss as a result of the Hancock excavation, its building has not depreciated, for loss is depreciation and depreciation is loss. If the event speculated by the court should occur, the wrongdoer will not be entitled to deduct from the reconstruction cost any depreciation attributable to Hancock because there will not be any. It is not unusual for a court to conclude in a tort case that the defendant must take the plaintiff as he finds him.
Hancock more than adequately preserved its right to appellate review of this matter. The court’s holding causes a windfall to Trinity and an injustice to Hancock. Neither logic nor the law supports the structural damage award. I would reverse the judgment in favor of Trinity against Hancock, and I would *59remand the case to the Superior Court for the entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion. I would affirm the other judgments.