Court Opinion

ID: 9931354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:03:46.599934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:28.872642
License: Public Domain

IN THE

 Indiana Supreme Court
            Supreme Court Case No. 23S-PL-71

  Jason Morehouse and Sarah Morehouse,
                         Appellants,
                                                                       FILED
                             –v–                                  Feb 08 2024, 11:38 am

                                                                       CLERK
                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                      Court of Appeals
                   Dux North LLC,                                       and Tax Court

                          Appellee.

       Argued: May 4, 2023 | Decided: February 8, 2024

       Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court No. 6
                   No. 29D06-2010-PL-7042
             The Honorable Gail Bardach, Judge

  On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                       No. 22A-PL-664

                Opinion by Justice Slaughter
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Goff, and Molter concur.
Slaughter, Justice.

   Plaintiff, Dux North LLC, owns landlocked property in rural Hamilton
County, Indiana. To access its property, Dux seeks an implied easement
over adjacent property owned by Defendants, Jason and Sarah
Morehouse. An easement is an interest in land that entitles the owner to
use another’s property for a specific purpose. An implied easement arises
not from the parties’ expressed intent in a land transaction but from
circumstances inferred from their transaction. Here, Dux claims as
alternative relief either an implied easement by prior use or an implied
easement of necessity over the Morehouse property.

   We clarify our precedent to hold, first, that despite their similarities, the
implied easements at issue here are conceptually different. For an implied
easement by prior use, the claimed servitude must predate the severance
creating the separate parcels. For an implied easement of necessity, in
contrast, the claimed necessity need arise only at severance and not
before. Thus, Dux can seek relief under either implied easement, and the
failure of one such easement does not necessarily defeat the other. And we
hold, second, that an implied easement of necessity requires a showing
that access to property by another means is not just impractical but
impossible. We reverse and remand.

                                              I

                                              A

   Dux’s property consists of three contiguous parcels—parcels 3, 4, and 5
in the picture below—with no access to a public road. The Morehouse
property consists of parcels 1 and 2 and contains a private road that runs
across the property to parcel 3.

  The relevant chronology begins in 1991. In that year, Maurice and
Gwendolyn Marshall owned parcels 1, 2, and 3 as a unitary tract. In April
1991, the Marshalls conveyed parcel 3 to Shorewood Corporation. This
conveyance disconnected parcel 3 from the public road abutting parcel 1.
The conveyance also linked parcel 3 to Shorewood’s adjoining property,
which included parcels 4 and 5 and the so-called “southern tract”. The
southern tract is the area below parcel 5 and to the west of Little Cicero

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024         Page 2 of 18
Creek. A public road abuts the southern tract. Parcels 3, 4, and 5—now
owned by Dux (pronounced “ducks”)—were not landlocked until 1993,
when Shorewood conveyed the southern tract to North Star Construction
& Development, Inc.

   Before 2018, Dux accessed parcel 3 through a private road on parcels 1
and 2 with the Marshalls’ permission. After a series of conveyances,
parcels 1 and 2 are now owned by the Morehouses, who in 2020 denied
Dux permission to use the private road, citing increased usage and Dux’s
lack of legal right to cross the Morehouse property.

                                              B

 The denial of access over the private road prompted Dux to sue the
Morehouses. Dux sought a declaratory judgment that an implied

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024    Page 3 of 18
easement of necessity was established in 1991 when the Marshalls
conveyed parcel 3 to a new owner, thus severing the ownership of parcel 3
from parcels 1 and 2, which the Marshalls still owned. According to Dux,
this severance created an implied easement of necessity over the private
road on parcels 1 and 2 to benefit parcel 3.

   Dux moved for summary judgment, arguing that in 1991 the only
practical means of accessing parcel 3 was the private road on parcels 1 and
2, and thus an easement was reasonably necessary. The Morehouses
responded with their own motion for partial summary judgment. In
support, they designated evidence that parcel 3 was part of a contiguous
tract with access to a public road in 1991. Specifically, they claimed that
Dux does not have an easement of necessity because when parcel 3 was
severed from parcels 1 and 2, parcel 3 had access to a different public road
over a different route—through contiguous parcels 4, 5, and the southern
tract. Thus, the Morehouses claim, an easement over parcels 1 and 2 was
not strictly or absolutely necessary in 1991.

  Without challenging this evidence, Dux designated its own evidence
that accessing parcel 3 from the public road along the southern tract was
not practical. No road connected parcel 3 to the public road abutting the
southern tract. The border between parcels 3 and 4 is about twenty-eight-
feet wide and sits on a forested ravine with a nearly seven-foot elevation
difference from one end to the other. A route from parcel 4 to the southern
tract must pass through dense forest and two small creeks. The border
between parcel 5 and the southern tract is on a steep ravine, and crossing
the border requires traversing another creek. Parcels 4 and 5, which
border Little Cicero Creek, are designated wetlands by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service. Wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable
waters and their tributaries are regulated under the federal Clean Water
Act. Sackett v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 143 S. Ct. 1322, 1336, 1339, 1341, 1347
(2023). Dux did not designate evidence to show Little Cicero Creek is
navigable or a tributary to navigable water. If parcels 4 and 5 are
regulated wetlands, then Dux may need a permit to place any fill material
on the wetlands to build a road. See id. at 1331.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024      Page 4 of 18
   The trial court concluded that Dux had an implied easement by prior
use and did not address whether it also had an implied easement of
necessity. The court granted Dux’s summary-judgment motion and
denied the Morehouses’ motion. It found, among other things, that the
Morehouses admitted the prior use had been obvious and permanent
since the land was severed in April 1991. It also declared an easement in
favor of parcel 3 over parcels 1 and 2 and found the easement is at least
twenty feet wide. To enable an immediate appeal, the court’s written
order expressly determined there was no just reason for delay and
expressly directed the entry of judgment as to these claims and issues.

  The Morehouses then appealed. They challenged the grant of summary
judgment for Dux, the denial of their own motion for partial summary
judgment, and the declaratory judgment creating the implied easement.
The court of appeals reversed both summary-judgment rulings and
remanded for further proceedings. Morehouse v. Dux N. LLC, 196 N.E.3d
704, 705, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). It concluded that Dux did not have an
implied easement of necessity, and that more facts were needed on
whether it had an implied easement by prior use. Id. at 711.

   Dux then sought transfer, which we granted, 205 N.E.3d 203 (Ind. 2023),
thus vacating the appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

                                              II

   Under Indiana law, easements may arise by grant, prescription, or
implication. Unlike express easements, which are specifically granted in a
deed or written contract, Shandy v. Bell, 189 N.E. 627, 630 (Ind. 1934), and
prescriptive easements, which arise from an ongoing trespass of property
for at least twenty years, Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind.
2005), the proposed easements at issue here are implied easements.
Implied easements are those that courts engraft onto a land transaction in
certain circumstances to accomplish some overriding goal the parties
could have expressly provided for themselves but did not. See Shandy, 189
N.E. at 630–31. Under the statute of frauds, conveyances of real estate
must be in writing. Brown v. Branch, 758 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. 2001). Implied
easements are disfavored because they are in derogation of the rule that

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the written instruments express the parties’ intent. See Shandy, 189 N.E. at
631.

   Although implied easements are disfavored, courts have offered
varying justifications for implying such easements in law. One is that
courts are merely inferring what must have been the intention of the
parties to the transaction—that the parties surely would have included an
easement providing ingress and egress to landlocked property had they
considered it. See Ritchey v. Welsh, 48 N.E. 1031, 1032 (Ind. 1898). Another
justification is that landlocked property has little or no value because it is
inaccessible, and courts must imply an easement to ensure that land
remains productive even if the parties to the transaction did not provide
for such access. See, e.g., Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484, 491 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2001).

  The two implied easements at issue here are easements by prior use and
easements of necessity. Dux’s complaint specifically sought a declaration
that it has an implied easement of necessity over an existing access road
on the Morehouse property. And at the summary-judgment stage, Dux
argued that it also has an implied easement by prior use. As explained
below, the two implied easements are distinct. We find Dux has not
shown it has an easement by prior use. And the Morehouses have shown
Dux has no easement of necessity as a matter of law.

                                              A

   Early Indiana cases were often imprecise and unclear in outlining the
elements and contours of these two easements. Our cases sometimes
described these implied easements interchangeably, while at other times
treating them as distinct. For instance, in Shandy v. Bell, we cited both
easement-by-prior-use and easement-of-necessity cases while calling the
easement one of reasonable necessity. 189 N.E. at 630–31. But we applied
an easement-of-necessity standard in Logan v. Stogdale, 24 N.E. 135, 137
(Ind. 1890), and a prior-use standard in John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Patterson, 2 N.E. 188, 191 (Ind. 1885). The resulting confusion
demands that we resolve first the threshold question whether these two
claimed easements—of necessity and by prior use—are separate and
distinct or whether they are one and the same. We hold that these

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easements, though similar, are conceptually different. Thus, a claimant
may seek implied-by-law access to landlocked property in connection
with either or both claimed easements. The defeat of one such easement
does not mean the other necessarily fails.

  The key difference between these two implied easements turns on
whether the proposed easement was previously used to access the
property. In other words, an easement by prior use presupposes what its
name implies—that a preexisting use of property before severance of the
parcels must continue to ensure access to what becomes (upon severance)
a landlocked parcel. Id. at 192–93. In contrast, an easement of necessity
arises upon severing the parcels to ensure access to a landlocked parcel,
whether or not the proposed route had previously been used to access the
parcel. Logan, 24 N.E. at 137.

                                              B

   Having resolved the threshold question that the two easements are
distinct claims, we turn next to whether Dux has either an easement by
prior use or one of necessity. We hold that issues of fact remain on
whether Dux has an easement by prior use because the parties designated
conflicting evidence on whether the private road was in use at the time of
severance. And we hold that Dux does not have an easement of necessity
as a matter of law because parcel 3 was not legally landlocked when it was
severed from parcels 1 and 2.

                                              1

  Based on our cases, we discern two tests for these implied easements.
We begin with easements by prior use. For these easements, the owner of
the dominant estate must prove that (1) the land was once commonly
owned; (2) the common owner imposed a servitude (easement) on part of
the land to benefit another part; (3) the servitude was permanent and
obvious; (4) the land was eventually severed (meaning the common owner
transferred part of the land to another owner); (5) at severance the
servitude remained in use; and (6) at severance the servitude was needed
to enjoy the dominant estate (the parcel that the easement benefits; in
contrast to the servient estate, which is the parcel the easement burdens)

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in substantially the same condition. John Hancock, 2 N.E. at 191. If the
claimant fails to establish any of these elements, the proposed easement by
prior use fails.

   To justify implying an easement upon land where the deed is silent, the
owner of the dominant estate must show more than that the proposed
easement is convenient or beneficial to the future use and enjoyment of
the land. Id. at 191–92. It must appear both that the servitude is necessary
to such future use and enjoyment and that the common owner (before
severance) intended by his servitude to adopt a permanent and obvious
use. Ibid. This latter showing justifies implying an easement at all despite
no express easement in the deed. See generally 11 Ind. L. Encyc. Easements
§ 8 (2018).

   In its summary-judgment motion, Dux designated evidence that the
access road across parcels 1 and 2 was an obvious servitude dating to the
1980s that remained in place in April 1991 when the Marshalls sold parcel
3 to Dux—when, that is, parcel 3 was severed from parcels 4 and 5 and the
southern tract. The trial court found that the Morehouses answered the
Dux complaint by admitting the servitude existed at severance. But the
appellate court rejected this argument, explaining that the Morehouses’
answer admitted only that the “Marshalls had ‘freely allowed the owners’
of Parcel 3 to use the access road ‘in order to access the Dux North
Preserve . . . at all times from 1991 until Gwendolyn Marshall’s death in
2018[.]’” 196 N.E.3d at 710 (ellipsis and emphasis in original). “We
believe”, the appellate court held, that “Dux North’s interpretation of that
admission is too broad.” Id. at 711. The court continued, observing that the
term “from 1991” did not necessarily admit that the disputed road was “in
use” on the “critical date” in April 1991:

      The Morehouses’ admission that the access road had been in
      use “from 1991” could mean any date between January 1, 1991,
      and December 31, 1991. But the critical date is the date of
      severance in April 1991, and there is no designated evidence

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024      Page 8 of 18
      that shows that the access road was definitively “in use” at that
      time.

Ibid. We agree.

   And we note that the trial court’s finding that the servitude was in use
at severance is the Morehouses’ primary basis on appeal for objecting to
the judgment below as to the prior-use easement. Notably, the
Morehouses do not contest that the access-road servitude across their
property is necessary to Dux’s use and enjoyment of parcel 3 in
substantially the same condition as before severance. In addition to their
primary objection, the Morehouses also argue that Dux waived its claim
for a prior-use easement in the trial court. We reject the waiver argument
because Dux’s complaint pleaded all facts necessary to state a claim for
such an easement, and Dux raised the prior-use easement before the trial
court during summary-judgment proceedings. On remand, if the trial
court finds that such an easement exists, the court will need to revisit its
prior determination that the “right of way shall extend no less than ten
(10) feet in each direction from the center line of said unpaved access
road.” We find nothing in the record to support the court’s conclusion that
the purported easement is at least twenty feet wide.

                                              2

  Next, we consider implied easements of necessity. Unlike prior-use
easements, easements of necessity do not require that a way of necessity
exist before severance. Indeed, the propriety of such an easement—
whether the proposed route is necessary for joining the dominant estate
with a public road—is not assessed until severance.

   To establish an easement of necessity, the owner of the dominant estate
must prove that (1) the servient and dominant properties had a common
owner (unity of ownership); (2) the unity of ownership was severed when
the common owner conveyed one of the parcels (severance); (3) this
severance made an easement necessary for the owner of the dominant
estate to access a public road (necessity at severance); and (4) the
easement’s necessity remained after severance (continuing necessity). See

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Dudgeon v. Bronson, 64 N.E. 910, 910 (Ind. 1902); William C. Haak Tr. v.
Wilusz, 949 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

   The first two elements are not in dispute here—the Marshalls had unity
of ownership over parcels 1, 2, and 3, and this unity was severed in April
1991 when the Marshalls conveyed parcel 3 to Shorewood, which owned
parcels 4 and 5 and the southern tract. The only disagreement concerns
the third and fourth elements—whether necessity existed at severance and
continued thereafter to justify creating an easement over parcels 1 and 2 in
favor of parcel 3.

   The central issue here is the degree of necessity required to establish an
easement of necessity. This is an issue of law we review de novo. Town of
Ellettsville v. DeSpirito, 111 N.E.3d 987, 990 (Ind. 2018). The parties ask us
to choose between reasonable necessity, on one hand, and strict or
absolute necessity, on the other. We decline to adopt either and instead
focus on the term “necessity” itself. We hold that courts will imply an
easement of necessity only when the parcel is legally landlocked. In
applying this standard, we find that Dux has no easement of necessity
because parcel 3 had access to a public road at the time of severance.

                                              a

   Indiana courts have been all over the map describing just how much
necessity is, well, necessary. We have sometimes required “strict” (or
“absolute”) necessity, Dudgeon, 64 N.E. at 910, and at other times seemed
to require only “reasonable” necessity, Shandy, 189 N.E. at 631. Our early
cases, especially, were inconsistent both in announcing a clear standard
and in explaining whether the announced standard applied to in-use or
of-necessity easements, or both. Dux, for example, argues that Shandy
abrogated prior case law and imposed reasonableness as the governing
standard for implied easements of necessity. We are not so sure. Shandy’s
facts and the cases it cites have many earmarks of easements by prior use.

   Indiana has not been alone in generating such uncertainty. As courts
elsewhere have noted, these rival labels—“reasonable” versus “strict” (or
“absolute”) necessity—often mean less in practice than meets the eye. As
Pennsylvania’s supreme court recently observed, an Idaho appellate court

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024        Page 10 of 18
purported to adopt a “reasonable necessity” standard but acknowledged
that “the criteria for determining ‘reasonable’ necessity . . . could not
easily be distinguished from those we had postulated for ‘strict’
necessity.” Bartkowski v. Ramondo, 219 A.3d 1083, 1093 n.12 (Pa. 2019)
(ellipsis in original) (quoting MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 739 P.2d 414, 419 n.3
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987)). Pennsylvania’s highest court continued, explaining
there is little difference between the two standards in practice:

      This sentiment is expressed as well by leading treatise writers,
      who posit that the difference between the two standards is
      “greater in theory than in practice,” and that “[a]n examination
      of decisions in this area reveals that, in many cases, the court
      would reach the same result under either degree-of-necessity
      test.”

Ibid. (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land § 4:10 (March 2019 Update)).

  We find much practical wisdom in these observations. And so, to
provide greater clarity to landowners and lower courts that must abide
and apply our standard, we ditch adjectives like “reasonable”, “strict”,
and “absolute” from our tests of necessity. Instead, we focus on the term
“necessity” itself, which means essential or indispensable. Necessity,
Merriam-Webster-Online Dictionary, https://perma.cc/6M2Y-M7TD (citing
Necessary, Merriam-Webster-Online Dictionary, https://perma.cc/783P-
RUWD). In other words, an easement of necessity arises if the easement is
essential (or indispensable) for the owner of the dominant estate to access
a public road. An easy case is where the affected parcel is landlocked—
surrounded by other properties—so there is no means of ingress and
egress. Logan, 24 N.E. at 136. In such cases, courts will imply an easement
of necessity to enable access between the dominant estate and a public
road. Id. at 137.

   A harder case is what we face today. At the April 1991 severance, parcel
3 did not become legally landlocked. Parcels 3, 4, and 5, and the southern
tract were all contiguous parcels then, and the southern tract adjoins a
public road. Under these circumstances, the Morehouses argue, it was not

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024      Page 11 of 18
“necessary” at severance to imply an east-west easement over parcels 1
and 2 since a north-south route was available to access parcel 3 from a
different public road.

  Dux acknowledges that parcel 3 may not be landlocked legally, but it
says the parcel is landlocked functionally. There is no practical means of
access, Dux contends, given the rough terrain, the topography, and the
wetlands between parcel 3 and the southern tract. Because parcel 3 is
practically landlocked, according to Dux, we must imply an easement of
necessity over parcels 1 and 2. Thus, the issue before us is whether
necessity can ever be met when a public road abuts the property directly
or through contiguous parcels.

   Courts have used two approaches for dealing with practically
landlocked parcels—theoretically accessible to/from a public road, but not
practically so. And we note that each approach has its own merits and
demerits. Jon W. Bruce, James W. Ely, Jr., & Edward T. Brading, The Law of
Easements & Licenses in Land § 4:10 (2023-1 ed.). One approach is to draw a
clear line in the sand and hold that the law will imply an easement of
necessity only for truly (legally) landlocked parcels—those that are
circumscribed by others’ property—but for no other parcels. The other
approach is to imply an easement of necessity even for parcels abutting a
public road if it would be cost-prohibitive for the owner of the dominant
estate to build an alternate route to a portion of its parcel. Because the
former better realizes parties’ expressed intent by narrowing when we
imply easements, and the latter results in significant costs and discourages
the parties’ private, negotiated resolution, we adopt the former.

                                              i

   The approach we adopt today recognizes an implied easement of
necessity only when land is legally landlocked with no public road
abutting contiguous property. The result may seem harsh (especially to
the owner of the isolated parcel), but the upside is that the rule is easy to
apply, and it avoids having courts rewrite parties’ written agreements by
imposing a term (guaranteeing access) they could have included
themselves but did not.

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  When assessing the rights of a party to a contract for real property,
courts must enforce the parties’ intent as expressed in the written deeds.
Shandy, 189 N.E. at 631. An easement of necessity gives effect to the
“presumed intent of the parties”. Ritchey, 48 N.E. at 1032. The law
presumes parties intend that one convey land to the other in a manner
enabling both parties to use their land productively. Id. at 1032–33.
Necessity is evidence of that intent. Shandy, 189 N.E. at 630–31. But
because an easement of necessity counters the written language in a deed,
our precedents grappling with the meaning of necessity have consistently
held that the degree of necessity must be more than convenient or
beneficial. Id. at 631. If the owner can access the land another way, there is
no necessity. Ibid. The mere fact that an “alternate means of access would
be more difficult or expensive for the plaintiff” does not amount to
necessity. Cockrell v. Hawkins, 764 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Despite the often ambiguous and confusing language of our case law on
easements of necessity, on these points we have always been clear.

   We observe that two of our neighboring states—Michigan and Ohio—
require that property be legally landlocked before implying an easement
of necessity. Waubun Beach Ass’n v. Wilson, 265 N.W. 474, 478–79 (Mich.
1936); Trattar v. Rausch, 95 N.E.2d 685, 690 (Ohio 1950). Ohio’s supreme
court holds it will not find necessity even if the “other outlets are less
convenient and would necessitate the expenditure of a considerable sum
of money to render them serviceable.” Trattar, 95 N.E.2d at 690. And
Michigan’s supreme court holds that no easement exists when there is a
“right of access thereto from the street”, and “[t]here is no intervening
property.” Burling v. Leiter, 262 N.W. 388, 392 (Mich. 1935). We agree with
the Michigan court’s reasoning that under “any other rule”, “we open the
door to doubt and uncertainty, to the disturbance and questioning of
titles, and to controversies as to matters of fact outside the language of the
deed.” Id. at 391. Under Dux’s proposed rule, in other words, “the sanctity
and security of titles by deeds, exact and precise in their terms, would be
seriously shaken and impaired.” Ibid.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024       Page 13 of 18
                                              ii

   We thus reject Dux’s proposed rule, which would require courts to
imply an easement of necessity when an alternate route for accessing land
is merely impracticable. To be sure, this approach would enable the owner
of the dominant estate to access its parcel and may enhance the parcel’s
value. The downside to this approach, though, is that implying an
easement in these circumstances is not without cost. And the costs can be
considerable. One is that these corresponding benefits and burdens are
often a zero-sum game. For every owner of a dominant estate benefited
when the law implies such an easement, the owner of the servient estate is
burdened by it. And because the easement is implied, it arises without the
consent of the servient-estate owner.

    This approach imposes a further set of costs, and that is the cost of
litigating these easement disputes. Litigation is expensive and often
uncertain. How a court or jury will react to particular facts or legal
arguments can be anyone’s guess. And that is especially true when the
governing legal “standards” (such as they are) are murky at best. This
area of the law, especially, is rife with standardless “standards”, which
mean whatever a court’s majority says they mean.

   Consider how Pennsylvania’s supreme court approaches this issue. The
court rejected a proposed clear, bright-line rule that would have implied
an easement of necessity only for truly (legally) landlocked parcels.
Bartkowski, 219 A.3d at 1093. Instead, the court adopted a test asking
whether constructing alternate access would be “manifestly impracticable,
even though theoretically possible”. Id. at 1094. Just one of the factors
informing this inquiry is the expense of building alternate access. Quoting
Maryland’s highest court, the Pennsylvania court described the standard
as whether alternate access to a public road “would require unreasonable
expense out of proportion to the value of the land”. Ibid. (quoting Condry
v. Laurie, 41 A.2d 66, 68 (Md. 1945)). As the court explains, the inquiry is
“fact-intensive” and “defies a one-size-fits-all, bright-line standard.” Id. at
1096. Instead, the inquiry is multifaceted and informed by “multiple
factors”:

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024        Page 14 of 18
        Each case will require individualized consideration of multiple
        factors, including, but not limited to: the existence of zoning
        restrictions and the likelihood that the party can obtain the
        necessary variances or exceptions; the existence of state or
        federal regulations that prohibit certain uses of the land in
        question; the topography of the land and the practicability of
        constructing alternative access; the environmental
        consequences of construction; the costs involved; and, of
        course, whether and to what extent these impediments existed
        at the time of severance.

Ibid.

   As the Pennsylvania court explains, this list of “multiple factors” is
“non-exclusive”. Ibid. The reason: “future cases may well present
additional circumstances relevant to the establishment of necessity.” Ibid.
(emphasis added). The party claiming necessity will often have to rely on
expert testimony to prove that “any legal or physical barriers cannot or
are exceedingly unlikely to be overcome.” Ibid. And both the weight and
credibility to be afforded such testimony “are matters that we entrust to
the discretion of the fact-finder.” Ibid.

   This amalgam of factors informing the necessity analysis, the court
notes, is “intended only to guide courts in navigating the ‘gray area’
between sheer impossibility and mere convenience.” Ibid. As the court
observes, the take-away from all this—the only part of the discussion that
is not “gray” but crystal clear—is that “the presence of one or more, or
even all, of the above-listed circumstances” does not “automatically
establish[] . . . necessity.” Ibid. In other words, the particulars of a given
case may establish necessity. Or they may not.

   Such a highly fact-bound, multi-factor balancing test is not susceptible
to—but the opposite of—clear line-drawing. In practice, litigants subject to
such a test will never be sure what a given set of circumstances means in
each case until a court—likely an appellate court—has weighed in. We
eschew any such holistic test of necessity in favor of a straightforward,
bright-line rule: A court will imply an easement of necessity only if the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024       Page 15 of 18
parcel is truly landlocked, meaning it has no legal access to (or from) a
public road.

    The costs associated with the alternative multi-factor approach
discourage extralegal bargaining—where parties contract around existing
rules to achieve an outcome suitable to both sides. Parties are more likely
to negotiate when faced with bright-line rules than with ambiguous rules
that make it unclear when the law applies and whom it favors. Town of
Ellettsville, 111 N.E.3d at 996. “[C]ertainty in the law is the antidote to
litigation”. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts,
79 Antitrust L. J. 941, 950 (2014). With straightforward legal rules,
neighbors can more readily assess whether one has an easement of
necessity over another’s land. In those cases, the parties know their
respective legal rights and can negotiate beneficial contract terms for
property access accordingly. Low transaction costs for such two-party
negotiations facilitate productive bargaining and make private resolution
more likely. See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. &
Econ. 1 (1960).

  But if property rights are unclear, the incentive on both sides, as seen
here, is to resort to courts to assess competing values and define
reasonable costs en route to deciding whose property rights prevail in a
given case. As Judge Posner observes, “vague standards beget disputes
that require litigation . . . to resolve.” Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law 490 (8th ed. 2011). Not only do courts have limited institutional
competence with such tasks, but even our best efforts are unlikely to
consistently strike the right balance between competing claims for and
against access to disputed property. Here, there is presumably some price
at which the Morehouses will tolerate increased traffic across parcels 1
and 2 so Dux can access parcel 3. We think it better that the parties make
these choices through private negotiations than for courts to impose such
access (in the form of an implied easement) based on imprecise, hard-to-
apply rules.

                                              b

  Here, at severance in April 1991, parcel 3 had access to a public road by
two routes: (1) a private, east-west road over the Morehouse property; and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024        Page 16 of 18
(2) a north-south route over contiguous property to the southern tract
consisting of ravines, creeks, dense forest, and regulated wetlands. Dux
cannot meet its burden to show an easement of necessity was established
because at the time of severance, parcel 3 was contiguous to property
abutting a public road.

  Indeed, the Morehouses’ designated evidence shows that Dux does not
have an easement of necessity over their property as a matter of law. A
public road abuts the southern tract, and Shorewood owned contiguous
property including the southern tract at the time of parcel 3’s conveyance
in 1991. This evidence is enough to defeat Dux’s claim for an easement of
necessity. It matters not that building a road between parcel 3 and the
southern tract would be expensive, difficult, or inconvenient, as Dux
argues. Nor does it matter that Dux’s property is currently landlocked.
The necessity for the easement must exist at the time of severance. State v.
Innkeepers of New Castle, Inc., 392 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. 1979). The
Morehouses are thus entitled to judgment that Dux has no easement of
necessity over their property.

                                      *       *        *

   For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s judgment granting Dux’s
motion for summary judgment on the easement-by-prior-use claim and
denying the Morehouses’ motion for partial summary judgment on the
easement-of-necessity claim. We also reverse the declaratory judgment
establishing an implied easement by prior use over the Morehouse
property. And we remand to the trial court with instructions (1) to enter
judgment for the Morehouses on Dux’s claim for an implied easement of
necessity and (2) to decide whether Dux has an easement by prior use
over the Morehouse property.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024      Page 17 of 18
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS JASON MOREHOUSE AND SARAH
MOREHOUSE
Zechariah D. Yoder
Adler Attorneys
Noblesville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE DUX NORTH LLC
Thaddeus J. Schurter
Alexander C. Trueblood
Christopher S. Drewry
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
Carmel, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-71 | February 8, 2024   Page 18 of 18