Court Opinion

ID: 9793184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:09.175655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:37.614856
License: Public Domain

*945Mowbray, C. J.,
dissenting:
This Court has previously held that a criminal defendant’s statutory right to post-conviction appellate review of any “intermediate order or proceeding,” see NRS 177.015(2) and 177.045, is an “all-embracive” right, State v. Teeter, 65 Nev. 584, 592, 200 P.2d 657, 661 (1948), and that such a substantial right may not be curtailed absent a specific limiting statute, O’Donnell v. District Court, 40 Nev. 428, 432-33, 165 P. 759, 759-60 (1917). My brethren today announce a novel legal proposition: appellate review of a meritorious claim of pre-trial error is foreclosed in this Court when a criminal defendant has refused to seek piecemeal review of his case. Because this defendant has refused to disrupt the orderly progress of his criminal case by petitioning, prior to trial, for an extraordinary writ of mandate, see Franklin v. District Ct., 85 Nev. 401, 455 P.2d 919 (1969), he is to be turned away without relief when it is conceded by all that he was entitled to a preliminary examination, that he requested one, and that he was denied one.1 With this result I cannot agree.
The majority’s reasoning is difficult to follow. First, the majority insists that appellant had a “clear right to a preliminary examination,” so clear, in fact, that the learned trial judge below did not perceive that right nor did appellant’s two attorneys, the effective quality of whose representation the majority goes to great lengths to establish. Then, the majority reasons that since the trial court has the discretion to remand the cause for a preliminary examination, NRS 171.208, and since this Court has the discretion, under NRS 34.160, to issue a writ of mandate to secure appellant’s right, this appellant waived his right to appellate review under NRS 177.015(2) and 177.045 simply by failing to petition this Court for a pre-trial extraordinary writ to compel the trial court to exercise its discretion. This, I respectfully submit, neither is, nor ought to be, the law.
In O’Donnell v. District Court, supra, this Court held that, because the right to an appeal is a substantial one, a statute will not be construed as taking away that right unless its language clearly reveals such an intent. 40 Nev. at 432-33, 165 P. at 760. Indeed, if a statute is capable of a construction maintaining the right of appeal, it will be so construed. Id. at 433, 165 P. at 760. Without doubt, NRS 34.160, permitting appellate review by way of the extraordinary writ of mandate, does not, by any stretch of the imagination, purport to foreclose the possibility *946of post-conviction appeal to this Court. The majority apparently overlooks the force of our decision in O’Donnell.
Moreover, this Court has expressly disapproved of the use of pre-trial extraordinary writs, absent special circumstances, in criminal cases. Franklin v. District Ct., supra. In Franklin, we held that the extraordinary writ of certiorari would not lie to challenge an intermediate order for discovery since a post-conviction appeal could be had to this Court; we noted:
[A]ppellate review should be postponed, except in narrowly defined circumstances, until after final judgment has been rendered by the trial court. Piecemeal review does not promote the orderly handling of a case, and is particularly disruptive in criminal cases where the defendant is entitled to a speedy resolution of the charges against him.
85 Nev. at 403-04, 455 P.2d at 921 (citation omitted). I can see no difference between the present case and the situation in Franklin.
Of course, our holding in Franklin left open the possibility of extraordinary relief in a “narrowly defined” class of criminal cases. The majority interprets our dictum in Franklin to mean that whenever this Court, after the fact, determines that the remedy of mandamus was available, a criminal defendant, by not pursuing that remedy, has waived appellate consideration of what is conceded by all to be patent error. I can find no opinion, prior to today’s, in this or any other jurisdiction which holds that absent a specific statute, rule or precedent clearly detailing the proper mode of appellate review, the failure to pursue the possible remedy of mandamus bars subsequent appellate review. Nor can I find any authority for the proposition that a criminal defendant must waive his right to a speedy trial, his right to present his defense while memories and evidence are still fresh, in order to preserve a point for appeal.
Significantly, the five “analogous” cases cited by the majority, ante at 943, deal with the pre-trial writ of habeas corpus, holding that the failure to pursue the explicit statutory remedy of appeal from the denial of a pre-trial application for a writ of habeas corpus waives any subsequent challenge to that denial.2 The pre-trial habeas situation, however, is manifestly different from the present situation. With respect to pre-trial habeas, the legislature has specifically provided for a comprehensive scheme whereby an accused can, before trial, attack a possibly erroneous determination of probable cause. See NRS 34.380. *947Thus, we have held that the pre-trial habeas statute, NRS 34.380, excludes, by its own terms, the possibility of post-conviction or collateral review of a probable cause determination. Ex parte Merton, 80 Nev. 435, 395 P.2d 766 (1964).
The rationale of the pre-trial habeas cases is simply inapplicable to the present situation. First, the legislature has not provided for a comprehensive scheme by which an aggrieved defendant can challenge, prior to trial, a district court’s decision to refuse him a preliminary examination. On the contrary, under the guidelines announced by this Court in State v. Teeter, supra, such an erroneous decision is appealable following conviction. 65 Nev. at 592-93, 200 P.2d at 662.
In addition, appellant, as all those charged with the commission of a felony, has both a right to a speedy trial and a right to a preliminary examination. In the present case, however, the district court’s erroneous decision placed appellant in the position of having to choose between these two rights: appellant could waive his right to a speedy trial and pursue the extraordinary remedy of mandamus; or, as he ultimately decided to do, appellant could forego his right to a preliminary examination and defend himself on the merits. I know of no decision of this Court or of any other jurisdiction that holds that such an election constitutes a voluntary and intelligent waiver of such a substantial right as that to a preliminary examination. Nor can I find any authority for the proposition that the possible availability of a writ of mandate precludes appellate consideration of the denial of this statutory right.
By contrast, this Court has often considered, on post-conviction appeal, the denial of so important a right — even though the appellant had not sought any extraordinary writ before trial. For example, in State v. Teeter, supra, we reversed a defendant’s conviction because the trial court had erroneously denied his motion for bail. There, we noted that the defendant had an absolute right to bail and that the trial court had no discretion to deny it. Clearly, under today’s majority holding, Teeter could have and should have sought a pre-trial writ of mandate to enforce that right. Though Teeter did not pursue such a remedy, this Court considered his post-conviction appellate claims and found them meritorious.
Similarly, in State v. Rollings, 58 Nev. 58, 68 P.2d 907 (1937), we considered, on post-conviction appeal, Rollings’ contention that his preliminary examination was held after the statutory limit for such an examination had expired. Though we denied Rollings’ requested relief, this Court did not hesitate to reach the merits of his claim even though a pre-trial writ of mandate was available to enforce the statutory right. The fact *948that the majority expressly overrules Rollings does not convince me that today’s decision is in accord with the prior decisions of this Court.
More recently, in Anderson v. State, 86 Nev. 829, 477 P.2d 595 (1970), we reviewed, on post-conviction appeal, a defendant’s contention that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. In Anderson, we noted that on the facts of that case, Anderson had a mandatory right to a speedy trial. Yet, even though Anderson had not pursued a pre-trial writ of mandate to enforce that mandatory right, we considered his claims on appeal following conviction.
Even were I to accept the rule announced by my brethren, I do not believe that it would necessarily be applicable in the instant case. While I agree that a defendant has a right to a preliminary examination, granted by NRS 171.196 and referred to in NRS 171.186, I note that NRS 171.208 provides that a district court may, before a plea is entered or indictment found, remand the defendant for a preliminary examination when one has not been had. This seems to imply that the district court has some discretion in the matter; and, of course, a writ of mandate will not issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act. See, e.g., Roventini v. District Court, 81 Nev. 603, 407 P.2d 725 (1965).
In addition, I question the propriety of applying the majority’s rule of waiver to the instant proceedings. It is well established that an appellate court’s procedural decisions, arrived at without benefit of case precedent or rule, may only have prospective application. Hill v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 234, 236, 452 P.2d 918, 919 (1969). A fortiori, where prior cases have given conflicting or ambiguous directions concerning the proper manner in which to seek appellate review — as our decision in Rollings clearly does — prospective application is mandated. See, e.g., State v. Post, 592 P.2d 775, 777 (Ariz. 1979); State v. Stanley, 592 P.2d 422, 426 (Haw. 1979); People v. Chi Ko Wong, 557 P.2d 976, 987 (Cal. 1976).
I should note further that the majority’s opinion may affect the efficient administration of our criminal justice system. Taken to its logical end, the majority holds that for a criminal defendant to preserve any pre-trial issue for appeal, he must first file a pre-trial petition for extraordinary relief in this Court.3 The result could be that the speedy and orderly resolution of criminal cases in the district courts will be disrupted, *949and that the speedy disposition of appellate matters in this Court will be impeded.
In sum, I believe that the majority opinion announced today does not make good law. Since I believe that appellant has not waived his right to appellate review in this Court, I feel constrained to reach the question of whether the denial of appellant’s right to a preliminary examination, under the circumstances of this case, mandates reversal of appellant’s conviction. For the reasons stated below, I believe that it does.
The right to a preliminary examination is a legislative grant of a substantial right to protect the accused from improvident and groundless charges. Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968). In addition, the preliminary examination is a critical stage of the proceedings against an accused: a lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the prosecution’s case; the examination works as a discovery device by which the accused and his attorney may prepare a proper defense; defense counsel may elicit testimony, under oath, with which the prosecution’s witnesses may be impeached at trial. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970). In the present case, appellant withdrew his pleas of guilty on two occasions because he wished to defend himself on the merits. Appellant believed not only that he was not guilty, but that he could successfully rebuff the prosecution’s attempts to prove otherwise. Taken in this light, the district court’s erroneous ruling did not merely deprive appellant of his right to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause; rather, the ruling deprived appellant of his right to prepare effectively for his defense. Under the facts of this case, then, I would reverse appellant’s conviction.
I add, as well, that I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellant was afforded effective assistance of counsel. We have held that counsel’s failure to pursue his client’s interests zealously, In re Kramer, 61 Nev. 174, 122 P.2d 862 (1942), and counsel’s failure to prepare and investigate his client’s case carefully, Jackson v. Warden, 91 Nev. 430, 537 P.2d 473 (1975), results in the deprivation of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The record before us indicates that defense counsel below demonstrated a marked indifference to appellant’s interests.4 Appellant himself orally moved the district court to remand his case for a preliminary examination, to disqualify the district judge on the grounds of prejudice, to discharge his present attorneys, and to appoint new, effective counsel. With respect to each of these oral *950motions, the district judge either ignored appellant’s claims or denied them summarily since no written papers were before him. Defense counsel did not argue any of appellant’s oral motions, with the exception of counsel’s own motion to withdraw, nor did counsel file any written motions or points and authorities in support of appellant’s motions. All in all, the record, in my opinion, indicates that defense counsel, while attémpting to withdraw from the case, failed to assert their client’s rights. While I agree with the majority that the record demonstrates that counsel did cross-examine the State’s witnesses at trial, I would hardly classify such cross-examination as vigorous. In addition, there is no way to gauge how much more effective that cross-examination would have been had counsel reaped the discovery benefits of a preliminary examination. And, after all, it was largely because of defense counsel’s indifference or mere neglect that appellant was denied his “clear” right to a preliminary examination. I believe, therefore, that, in the instant case, appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
For the reasons discussed above, I would reverse appellant’s conviction. Respectfully, I dissent.

 The request and subsequent ruling were made in another department of the Eighth Judicial District Court and not before or by the district judge who presided at appellant’s trial.

 It is noteworthy that the legislature has removed the provision for appeals of denials of pre-trial writs of habeas corpus. 1979 Nev. Stats., ch. 216, § 1.

 In all fairness to the majority, today’s rule of waiver applies only to cases where a criminal defendant determines that a trial court’s “abuse is so patent and deprivation purportedly so crucial.” Ante at 943. Such determinations, I submit, have been historically left to this Court to resolve and not to defendants or their counsel.

 Appellant has been represented by other counsel throughout the proceedings before this Court.