Court Opinion

ID: 9775167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:46:48.868354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:22.126326
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for rape. Trial was before the court upon a plea of not guilty. Punishment was assessed at thirty-five years.
Appellant contends that his arrest without a warrant and the search conducted incident thereto were violative of his State and Federal constitutional rights.
Houston Police learned from the National Crime Information Center computer that appellant was wanted for parole violation in New Mexico. A telephone conversation to New Mexico authorities, as related by an officer who overheard the call, confirmed that appellant was wanted in New Mexico for violating his parole. Officers Witch-er and Davis were advised that appellant was wanted on a numbered fugitive warrant from New Mexico and were dispatched to a Houston address to arrest appellant. Appellant was arrested in the living room of his apartment. After appellant was handcuffed and admonished concerning his rights, Officers Witcher and Davis testified that they noticed that the apartment *171was unusually warm. It was noted that the burners on an electric stove in the kitchen were on. Negatives were observed on a bar four or five feet high which divided the kitchen and the living room. In the process of turning off burners and checking the thermostat in the hall, negatives were observed lying on the kitchen stove. Numerous negatives1 were seized by the officers and prints were made therefrom. Prints were carried to school authorities and the eleven year old girl depicted in some of the pictures having intercourse with appellant was located. It is undisputed that the State had no knowledge of the instant offense prior to the seizure of the negatives.
We find it unnecessary to determine the legality of the arrest in view of our disposition of appellant’s contention concerning the seizure of the negatives.
Assuming, arguendo, that the arrest of appellant without a warrant was legal, appellant urges that the search exceeded the limits of a search incident to a lawful arrest. In support of this argument, appellant cites Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), which held the scope of such a search is limited to “a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate control’ construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”
The State urges that the negatives were in plain view at the time the officers arrested appellant.
Officer Witcher testified that he went into the kitchen, turned off the stove and then picked up one of the negatives, held it up to the light and observed what he thought was an “illegal act,” the appellant “having intercourse with a minor child.” Witcher further testified that he looked at dozens of negatives in the kitchen and living room. Some of the negatives showed appellant and an adult woman. While Witcher was looking around for more negatives, he turned down the apartment heat at the thermostat on the hall wall. Witch-er stated that he could not tell what was in the negatives without holding them up to the light.
The testimony of Officers Witcher and Davis is in some degree of conflict in that Davis testified that he turned off the burner on the kitchen stove, adjusted the thermostat in the hall and went back to the kitchen and bar area to observe the negatives. Further, Davis testified that he could tell what one negative depicted that was lying on the light colored enamel stove in the kitchen without holding the negative to the light; however, he did not state what the negative purported to show.
Throughout the observation of the negatives by the officers, appellant was handcuffed. There is no indication that appellant was within reach of any of the negatives, made any effort to reach them, or even acknowledged their presence. The only information possessed by the officers at the time of appellant’s arrest was that he was wanted in New Mexico on a fugitive warrant.
Despite the conflict in the testimony of the officers, it would appear that both officers went out of their way to examine the negatives.
Even though the negatives were beyond the area of appellant’s “immediate control” as defined in Chimel, the State urges that the warrantless seizure of the negatives was proper under the “plain view doctrine.”
The United States Supreme Court discussed the relationship between the Chimel holding and the “plain view” doctrine in Collidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, at n. 24 (1971) :
“The ‘plain view’ exception to the warrant requirement is not in conflict with *172the law of search incident to a valid arrest expressed in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. The Court there held that ‘there is ample justification .... for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control”— construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.’ Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. The ‘plain view’ doctrine would normally justify as well the seizure of other evidence that came to light during such an appropriately limited search . . . . Where, however, the arresting officer inadvertently comes within plain view of a piece of evidence, not concealed although outside of the area under the immediate control of the arrestee, the officer may seize it, so long as the plain view was obtained in the course of an appropriately limited search of the arres-tee.” (emphasis added)
In the instant case, one officer said he could not determine the contents of the negatives until he held them up to the light. The other officer said he went back to the negatives to see what was in them. Both officers made conscious, deliberate efforts to examine the negatives, and only then did the officers become aware that the films might be evidence of a crime. What they discovered and seized was quite unlike what was in “plain view.”
In its discussion of the “plain view” doctrine in Collidge v. New Hampshire, supra, the Supreme Court said it must be “immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” (emphasis added)
In the instant case, the officers had, prior to examining the negatives, neither knowledge nor mere suspicion of an offense related to the film. What was in “plain view” in the apartment was not evidence of any crime or criminal behavior. It was not contraband2 or fruits or instrumentalities3 of any offense about which they knew or suspected upon entering the apartment. The officers did not inadvertently come across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The negatives were not incriminating until after the officers had examined them. Thus, it was not “immediately apparent” to the officers that they had evidence before them. Collidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
The officers’ original entry into appellant’s apartment was to arrest him for being a fugitive from New Mexico. The examination and seizure of the negatives exceeded the limits of a search incident to such arrest. The seizure was not justified under the “plain view” doctrine.
The State urges that it is presumed that any inadmissible evidence improperly admitted in trial before the court was disregarded and urges that there is ample evidence excluding the complained of photographs (printed from negatives seized in appellant’s apartment) to support appellant’s conviction. In this connection, the State points to the testimony of the prose-cutrix relative to penetration by appellant.
The negatives seized by the officers were the product of an unlawful search and seizure and were inadmissible. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Absent the seizure of the negatives, there is no showing that the testimony of prosecutrix would have been obtained in the normal course of investigation. The offense for which appellant was prosecuted was alleged to have occurred on September 15, 1970. Prior to the seizure of the negatives on February 27, 1971, the State had no knowledge of the offense. It is undisputed that the loca-
*173tion of prosecutrix resulted from the search and seizure of the negatives. Under these circumstances, the testimony of the prosecutrix would not have been obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable from the underlying illegality to be purged
of the primary taint. Noble v. State, Tex Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 83; Santiago v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 444 S.W.2d 758. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Opinion approved by the Court.

. The testimony concerning the number of negatives seized varied from two dozen to one hundred eighty.

. See Simpson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 807; Legall v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 463 S.W.2d 731.

. See Buntion v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 476 S.W.2d 317; Elliott v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 450 S.W.2d 863.