Court Opinion

ID: 9948851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 01:06:56.6658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:09.260846
License: Public Domain

ELED
                                                                                   MAR 07 202
                                       139 Nev., Advance Opinion 57
                                                                               ELI7     "TH A. BR
                                                                             CLER1 OF 'U lEME       URT
      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE                                            BY—
                                                                                   rtIEF DEPUTY CLERK
             STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE
      OF KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, PiturEcTED PERSON.
KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, APPELLANT, V. ROBYN FRIEDMAN;
   DONNA SIMMONS; AND ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD,
   GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR KATHLEEN JUNE JONES,
   RESPONDENTS.
                               No. 84655
December 21, 2023
  Appeal from district court order granting guardian ad l item fees.
Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County;
Linda Marquis, Judge.
  Affirmed.

  Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Scott Cardenas
and Elizabeth Mikesell, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

   Dawson & Lordahl, PLLC, and Elizabeth Bricklield, Las Vegas,
for Respondent Elizabeth Brickfield.

  Michaelson Law and John P. Michaelson, Amnwn E. Francom,
and Peter R. Pratt, Henderson, for Respondents Robyn Friedman
and Donna Simmons.

   Julia S. Gold, Chairperson, Dara    Goldsmith, Amicus Cur-
iae Chairperson, Michael if Keane, and Amanda Netuschil, Reno,
for Arnicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Probate and Trust Law
Sect ion.

  Before the Supreme Court, HERNDON, LEE, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

                             OPINION

  By the Court, H ER NI DON, J.:
  Roughly 18 months after respondents petitioned for guardianship
over their mother, triggering the contentious litigation that fol-
lowed,' the district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to aid

  'See Mauer qf Guardianship qf Jones, 138 Nev. 51, 507 P.3d 598 (Ct. App.
2022), for background inlbrination on the guardianship proceedings.
                    in re Guardianship ofiones

it in determining the protected person's best interests. The GAL, an
attorney, soon thereafter filed a notice of intent to seek the fees and
costs to be incurred at her standard hourly rate. After submitting a
report, the GAL sought fees at her stated rate. The court awarded
her those fees over the protected person's objection. At issue in this
appeal are three arguments against the fee award: (1) the GAL has
no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did
not specify the rate, as required by the Nevada Statewide Rules for
Guardianship (NSRG); (2) the court improperly appointed an attor-
ney as the GAL under N RS 159.0455 and NSRG Rule 8; and (3) the
rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of
a fiduciary, not an attorney.
    We conclude that the protected person waived any argument per-
taining to the form of the district court's order by failing to raise
the issue below. Even so, we note that, within days of the GAL's
appointment, the protected person was notified that the GAL would
seek fees at her requested rate of compensation, and the district
court's failure to specify the rate in the order thus did not prej-
udice the protected person. We further conclude that the district
court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court
to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer
program. However, this error was harmless because the district
court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due
to the cornplexity of this matter. Lastly, we conclude that the record
contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL's fee request. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the
full amount of her requested fees.

              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   Upon petition, respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Sim-
mons became temporary guardians over their mother, appellant
Kathleen June Jones (June); their temporary guardianship was fol-
lowed by their sister Kimberly's appointment as guardian. During
Kirnberly's term as guardian, there were over 400 documents filed
in the case, 25 hearings held, and at least 3 investigations conducted
into the circumstances underlying the guardianship proceedings.
   A major issue between the parties concerned Robyn's and Don-
na's ability to obtain Collinilin icat ion, visits, and vacation time with
June. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the
issue and appointed respondent Elizabeth Brickfield, an attorney, as
GAL for June. ln particular, the court directed Brickfield to address
the issue in the following manner:
     Schedule[ ] opportunities for Protected Person to elect to speak
     with and/or visit in person with her adult daughters and [address]
     whether the Guardian has an obligation to facilitate, prompt,
                   I n re Guardianship of Jones                      3

     encourage, plan, schedule, and/or create an environment that
     promotes an opportunity for continued communication between
     Protected Person and her adult daughters based upon the cur-
     rent level of care and needs of the Protected Person.

The court later asked Brickfield to assist with another issue—that
of relocating June to California. It noted that each of the issues for
which it sought the GA L's help were interrelated and complex. As
to compensation, the order stated, "[t]he guardian ad litern rnay
request fees from the guardianship estate or a third party" and any
request must comply with NRS 159.344.
   Five days after the order was filed, Brickfield filed a notice of
appearance and a notice of intent to seek attorney fees and costs
from the guardianship estate pursuant to N RS 159.344(3). Brick-
field's notice indicated that her hourly rate was $400 and listed
various support staff billing at rates ranging from $75 to $350 per
hour. In response, June filed a notice of objection, arguing that the
GAL was not entitled to her attorney rate of $400 per hour because
the issues did not require legal services or legal expertise. June pro-
posed that the GAL should charge within the national average range,
which June represented to be $22 to $48 per hour. Kimberly joined
June's opposition. Brickfield filed a declaration in response to the
notice of objection, describing her extensive experience and quali-
fications and asserting that the rate was comparable to that charged
by other attorneys with similar qualifications in Clark County for
services as counsel and as a GAL.
   About 6 weeks later, Brickfield filed her report to the court. The
report outlined Brickfield's work on the case:
     (i) reviewed the pleadings relevant to the issues of visita-
     tion and communication and the Physician's Certificate and
     accompanying report; (ii) rnet with Ms. Jones by telephone
     on 2/24/21 and in person on 3/25/21; Ms. Jones was accompa-
     nied by LACSN counsel; (iii) inet individually with Ms. Jones'
     five children by separate telephone or Zoom conferences; the
     children who are represented by counsel were accompanied
     by counsel. Each meeting with a child lasted approximately
     one hour; the two meetings with Ms. Jones totaled one hour;
     and (iv) separate telephone conversations with the respective
     children's counsel.

Brickfield also provided her conclusions and made recommenda-
tions in June's best interests.
   Brickfield thereafter filed a petition seeking approval of her GAL
fees and costs, requesting a total of $5713.50. Brickfield requested
$5400 in fees for herself for 13.5 hours of work, $310 in fees for 2
hours of work by a paralegal, and $3.50 in costs for filing fees. June
4                     In re Guardianship of Jones

objected, agreeing that Brickfield was entitled to compensation but
arguing that a GAL should be paid at a lower GAL rate rather than
an attorney rate. She added that 13rickfield misrepresented how she
benefited her and that, in fact, she gained no benefit from Brick-
field's appointrnent. She added that she should not have to pay for
a GAL to whom she objected. The district court entered a written
order awarding Brickfield her requested $5713.50 in fees and costs.
June appealed,' and the Probate and Trust Section of the Nevada
State Bar was permitted to file an am icus curiae brief.

                               DISCUSSION
Any error in ihe district court's order appointing the GAL is waived
   June argues the district court lacked authority to award the GAL
fees because it did not specify the GAL's rate in its appointment
order. NSRG 8(1) requires the district court to "state the hourly rate
to be charged by the guardian ad litern" in the appointment order.
June contends that Brickfield cannot receive payrnent because her
rate was not specified in the appointment order. She adds that the
district court also did not amend its appointment order to corn-
ply with NSRG 8(1) after receiving Brickfield's notice of intent to
seek fees. Respondents assert that June waived her argument that
the order appointing the GAL does not conform with NSRG 8(1)
because June failed to raise it below.' Respondents also argue that
any error in failing to state the GAL's exact rate was not prejudicial.
   Generally, la) point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes
to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and
will not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97
Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). This general rule applies even
to issues that are subject to review de novo. Schuck v. Signature

   2 Respondents assert that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the

order awarding guardian ad litem fees and costs was entered amidst ongo-
ing guardianship proceedings and thus does not constitute a special order
after final judgment appealable under N RA 3A(h)(8) and because it is not
appealable under any other provision of that rule. We conclude that the order is
independently appealable under N RS 159.375(5) (allowing appeals from orders
in guardianship proceedings "authorizing the payment ()fa debt, claim, devise,
guardian's fees or attorney's fees"). Moreover, despite respondents' request, we
decline to issue sanctions for June's counsel filing this appeal, as this appeal
ostensibly was filed to protect her interests and presents previously unanswered
questions of law pertaining to attorney GALs. NSRG 9.
   3 Respondents further suggest that the issue was waived when June failed to

appeal from the order appointing the CiAt            that order was not appeal-
able. See grown v. MHC Stagecoach, L LC, 129 Nev. 343, 345. 301 P.3d 850, 851
(2013) ("[Wie may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule.");
N RA P 3A(b) (providing appellate jurisdiction over final ju(lgments and other
specified orders).
                    In re Guardianship ofJones                         5

Flight Support of Nev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 436, 245 P.3d 542, 544
(2010).
   The record below supports that June waived any argument that
the district court order did not satisfy the forrnalities under NSRG
8(1). June did not raise any such issues with the district court's order
in her objection to Brickfield's notice for fees, nor did she raise any
such issues in her opposition to Brickfield's petition for fees. Finally,
June did not raise arty issues with the GA L's appointment order at
the hearing on the motion for fees. Thus, June waived any aresu-
ments to the form of the appoint ment order.
   Even if the issue had been properly raised. June fails to demon-
strate any prejudice warranting reversal. See NRCP 61 (providing
that reversal is not warranted where the error is harmless). The order
specifically required the GAL to comply with N RS 159.344, indi-
cating to the parties the GAL was allowed to seek fees, and further
expressly permitted the GAL to "request fees from the guardian-
ship estate or a third party." Shortly after the order was entered and
on the same day she filed her notice of appearance, Brickfield filed
her notice of intent to seek fees. See NSRG 8(1). June noticed her
objection, but the court did not alter the noticed cornpensation rate.
Thus, while June correctly notes that the district court should have
stated the GA L's permissible hourly rate in its order of appointment,
the error was harmless in this instance and did not divest the court
of authority to later award tees.

The district court erred in concluding that it must appoint an attor-
ney to serve as a GA L, but the error was harmless
   In addressing June's objections to Brickfield's motion for fees, the
district court concluded that it could appoint a nonattorney as GAL
only if a court-approved volunteer advocate program was estab-
lished under NRS 159.0455. June argues that the court erred in so
concluding. Respondents argue that, even if the court could have
appointed a nonattorney outside of a volunteer advocate program,
no other person who had the appropriate training and experience
to serve as the GAL was suggested to the court, noting that Brick-
field was uniquely qualified to address the issues present in such a
complex case.
   The district court's interpretation and construction of a stat-
ute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Zohar v.
Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). Likewise, the
district court's legal conclusions regarding court rules are reviewed
de novo. Casey v. Wells Fargo I3ank, N.A., 128 Nev. 713, 715, 290
P.3d 265, 267 (2012). When interpreting a statute that is clear on its
face, the language of a statute should be given its plain meaning.
Zohar, 130 Nev. at 737, 334 P.3d at 405.
6                  In re Guardianship of Jones

    A GAL may be appointed by the court to represent a protected
person if the court deterrnines that the protected person will benefit
from the appointment and the GA L's services will be beneficial in
determining the protected person's best interests. N RS 159.0455(1).
Under NRS 159.0455(3), lilt - a court-approved volunteer advocate
prograrn for guardians ad litern has been established in a judicial
district, a court may appoint a person who is not an attorney to
represent a protected person or proposed protected person as a
guardian ad litem." On the other hand, NSRG 8, which governs
GALs appointed pursuant to NRS 159.0455, specifies in subsec-
tion 11 that "[a] guardian ad litein may be a trained volunteer from
a court-approved advocate program, an attorney, or any other per-
son that the court finds has appropriate training and experience."
   June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8(H) contradict each
other on the topic of who a court may appoint as GAL. But there is
no conflict: NSRG 8(H) creates a complete list of people who could
be eligible to serve as a GAL ("a trained volunteer from a court-
approved advocate program, an auorney, or any other person that
the court finds has appropriate training and experience"). Mean-
while, the statute clarifies that the court may appoint a nonattorney
li]f a court-approved volunteer advocate program for guardians ad
litern has been established in a judicial district." N RS 159.0455(3).
But the statute does not create a necessary condition for the appoint-
ment of a nonattorney. So the district court erred in interpreting
N RS 159.0455(3) as requiring the appointment of an attorney where
there is no court-approved volunteer program.
   A third option under NSRG 8(H) exists and does not conflict with
N RS 159.0455(3). NSRG 8(H) provides three types of individuals
that the district court can appoint as a GA L: an attorney, a volun-
teer frorn a volunteer advocate program, and "any other person that
the court finds has appropriate training and experience." While the
district court analyzed the first two options, it did not address the
third option, which included any person trained and experienced as
a GAL. Thus, it erred to the extent it concluded that it had to appoint
an attorney because no trained volunteer was available.
   This error, however, was harmless, as the district court alterna-
tively stated that an attorney GAL was specifically appointed due to
the complex nature of the case, the visitation issues' impact on June,
and the parties' continuing inability to communicate effectively. See
NRCP 61: Cook v. SW1rise Hosp. & Med. Cir., LLC, 124 Nev. 997,
1007, 194 P.3d 1214, 1220 (2008) (explaining that to be reversible
error, the moving party rnust demonstrate that a substantial right
was prejudiced and "that, but for the error, a different result might
have been reached"). There is no evidence in the record that the
district court was aware of any nonattorney with the appropriate
                      In re Guardianship of Jones                            7

training and experience to be considered for the appointment. Nor
does the record reflect that any such persons were proposed to the
district court for consideration. So, while NSRG 8(1-1) provides three
options, the facts of the instant case indicate that the third option
was not available to the district court. The district court reviewed
Brickfield's extensive qualifications, including her experience, legal
abilities, and knowledge in the guardianship field. Because June
cannot demonstrate that the district court could have appointed a
nonattorney to deal with the complex legal issues relating to June's
guardianship and relocation, we conclude that the district court's
error could not have affected the outcome of the GAL proceedings.
lts error was thus harmless.

 The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAO
fres
   June contends that the district court should not have awarded
Brickfield fees at her attorney rate because a GAL performs fidu-
ciary services, as opposed to legal services!' June argues that NRS
 159.0455 and NSRG 8 make clear that a GAL, as "an officer of the
court," is a fiduciary and is restricted from "offer[ing] legal advice
to the protected person." NRS 159.0455; NSRG 8(C) (noting that "[all
guardian ad litem is an officer of the court"); NSRG 8(N) (distin-
euishing the role of an attorney from the role of the GAL); see also
NRS 159.344 (concerning the payment of attorney fees and costs
in a guardianship). June alleges that the district court's finding that
the customary fiduciary rate for a GAL in Clark County is $400 per
hour or more has no evidentiary basis and that, based on the market
rate, a reasonable fee ranges between $22 to $48 per hour.
   Respondents argue that the district court's fee order is supported
by substantial evidence and that Brickfield's fees as a GAL were
appropriately paid at an amount commensurate with her attorney
rate. Respondents contend that there is no market rate requirement
and that the district court satisfied the requirements codified in
NRS 159.344.
   But the statute requires a court to determine the nature of' the
services performed in awarding compensation: it distinguishes
between "services that require an attorney[r which may be com-
pensated at an attorney rate, and "fiduciary services," which may
be compensated at a fiduciary rate. NRS 159.344(5)(g). We now
deterrnine that, while GA Ls in Nevada act in the same manner as a
fiduciary and do not provide "attorney" work, the record nonetheless
  4 June does not provide any arguments specific to the S3.50 in costs or the
paralegal's $310 in lees. Thus, June appears to only dispute the $5400 in lees
awarded to Brickfield.
8                     ln re Guardianship ofJones

contains substantial evidence supporting the district court's award
of Brickfield's requested fees.

     GA Ls ore fichiciaries
    A fiduciary relationship is one "between two persons when one
of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the bene-
fit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation[ship]."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. a (Am. Law 'Inst. 2008);
see also Mutter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133
Nev. 50, 58, 390 P.3d 646, 653 (2017) (same).
    As noted, the district court may appoint a GAL to benefit the pro-
tected person and assist in determining the protected person's best
interests. N RS 159.0455(l)(a). A GAL "is an officer of the court and
is not a party to the case." NRS 159.0455(4); see also In re Christina
B., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a GAL
is a party's representative whose purpose is to protect the person,
creating a role that is "more than an attorney's but less than a par-
ty's"); Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App.
1990) (collecting cases and explaining that "[a] guardian ad litem
is a representative of the court"). The GA L's duties are limited to
those set forth in the district court's order. NRS 159.0455(2). GA Ls
are also prohibited from offering legal advice to the protected per-
son. NRS 159.0455(4).
    We conclude that the relationship between GA Ls and protected
persons is fiduciary in nature. The scope of duties GA Ls are ordered
to perform is directed by the court for the benefit of the protected
person. NSRG 8. While amicus contends that GA Ls are only "offi-
cers of the court" pursuant to N RS 159.0455(4), nothing prevents an
officer of the court from also being a fiduciary. GA Ls are required
to "zealously advocate for the best interest of the protected per-
son .. . in a manner that will enable the court to deterrnine the action
that will be the least restrictive and in the best interest of the pro-
tected person or proposed protected person." NSRG 8(13). This duty
fits squarely with the definition of a fiduciary. Likewise, GA Ls are
to "advocate for the best interest of the protected person . . . based
on admissible evidence available" and "conduct independent inves-
tigation and assessment of the facts to carry out the directives of the
appointing order and may submit recommendations to the court that
are based on admissible evidence." NSRG 8(G).
    Here, every aspect of the GA L's relationship with June is to act
for her benefit and with her best interests in mind under the direction
of the district court. Other states have recognized the same where
the GAL is court-appointed and acting as a branch of the judiciary.'

   'See. e.g., Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding
that the GAL is a type of fiduciary): Golin v. Allenby, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762,
                      In re Guardianship of Jones                               9

This, however, does not mean that the GAL cannot perform services
that require an attorney. For example, advocacy before a court is the
quintessential task of an attorney and a purpose of the GAL. See
NRS 159.0455(4)(a) & (b) (requiring a GAL to advocate for the pro-
tected person's best in(erests in a manner that enables the court to
act in those interests). We now take this opportunity to clarify how
the GA Us actions in a guardianship proceeding bear on the type of
fees they may seek.
   ln Hull v. United States, the Tenth Circuit considered whether
compensation for a GAL was taxable as costs or as attorney fees.
971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). That court held that the GA L's role
determines whether its expenses are taxed as costs or attorney fees.
Id. at 1510. It then remanded the case to district court to determine
what portions of the guardian ad litem's work should be taxed as
costs and what portions should be paid as attorney fees based on the
nature of the GA L's work; specifically, based on whether the GAL
performed tasks "as an officer of the court," or whether they per-
formed "legal services as an attorney." Id. On appeal after remand,
the court upheld the award of guardian ad litem fees as costs, find-
ing undisputed evidence that the GAL rendered services solely as
an officer of the court while a separately retained attorney rendered
attorney services. Hull ex rel. Hull v. United States, 53 F.3d 1125,
1128-29 (10th Cir. 1995). We now adopt this distinguishing factor
because it clarifies that the type of work performed by the GAL dic-
tates the propriety of the GA L's fees. GA Ls are not presumptively
entitled to "attorney fees" because they do not act as attorneys on
behalf of the protected person. However, if they perform the type
of services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate
experience as an attorney, GA Ls may be compensated at an attor-
ney rate for their work. This conclusion accords with NSRG 8(J),
which requires courts to analyze the work completed by the GAL
and their particular expertise and experience. We hold that courts,

787 (Ct. App. 2010) (observing that a GA L's powers are "subject to both the
fiduciary duties owed to the incompetent person and ... the requirement that
court approval he obtained kir certain acts"); People ex rel. KAI, 726 P.2d
 1108, 1119-20 (Colo. 1986) (noting the propriety olappointing a GAL as a fidu-
ciary representative fbr the protected person): Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabei,
806 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. 1991) (recognizing that GA Ls "occup[yl a position ofthe
highest trust suggest[ingl that he or she is a fiduciary"); Byrd v. Woodrifff, 891
S.W.2d 689. 706 (Tex. App. 1994) (holdini4 that "a guardian .1(.1 litein's court-
appointed role to act as the representative of a minor's interest is sullicient to
establish a fiduciary relationship"); see cdso 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1991 (2008)
(defining GAL as a fiduciary): f Honing v. Ashill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 753-54
(S.C. 1997) (holding that the relationship between a CiAL and the court is not
an employer-employee relationship. creating no agency relationship between
the court and the GAL).
10                   In re Guardianship of Jones

when determining fees for a GA L, should evaluate (1) the experi-
ence and qualifications of the GAL, (2) the nature and complexity of
the work asked of the GAL, (3) the work actually performed, (4) the
result of the GA L's work, and (5) any other factors the court finds
to be relevant in a particular case.6 We adopt these factors, which
are similar to the factors guiding inquiries into attorney fees in
guardianship proceedirws, because they bear on the propriety of
the GAL's rate, the success (or lack thereof) of the GAL, and the
nature of the GA L's work.

      The award of Brickfield's fees al a rate of S400 per hour is
      reasonable
   When a fee award depends on the interpretation of a statute or
court rule, the district court's decision is reviewed de novo. Logan v.
Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 R3d 1139, 1141 (2015). An award of costs
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1144.
   This court has not determined the standard of review for an
award of fees to a GAL as a fiduciary. We now determine that the
appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Robbins
V. Ginese, 638 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the
GAL its attorney rate). An abuse of discretion "occurs if the district
court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds
of law or reason." Jackson v. Stale, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 13.3d 998,
1000 (2001).
   The parties agree that the district court discussed each enumer-
ated factor in NRS 159.344(5) when evaluating Brickfield's fee
request. While we now clarify that N RS 159.344(5) is not appro-
priately applied to GAL fees but rather only to attorney fees, June's
only argument is that the fiduciary rate is not equivalent to the
attorney rate. However, based on the factors enumerated above, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in award-
ing Brickfield $400 per hour, as the court noted the importance
of the GA L's report and its determination regarding the visitation
petition. See Brunzell v. Golden Gale Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 350,
455 P.2d 31, 33-34 (1969) (stating that the trier of fact understands
the value of the services the best). June's analysis fails to consider
that Brickfield's experience as an attorney was important to this
case, though she was acting as a fiduciary. The district court was
not required to rely on June's suggested $22 to $48 per hour range,
   "We also clarify that while ti GAL seeking compensation must mect the
requirements of' NRS 159.344, as per NSRG 8(.1), the factors listed in N RS
159.344(5) apply only to attorney lees. not GAL lees. That is. GA Ls must meet
the written notice and petition requirements laid out in the statute. hut courts
evaluating their compensation should consider the factors enumerated above,
not the factors enumerated in NRS 159.344(5).
                   In re Guardianship of Jones                       11

as she merely surveyed three websites without any indication as
to delineating factors like each GA L's experience, qualifications,
or work performed. June also ignores the difficulty of the visita-
tion petition and the legal knowledge required to serve her best
interests. Meanwhile, the district court reviewed Brickfield's expe-
rience, her qualifications, the services she provided for June, the
invoices submitted, and the benefits June received. The district
court also repeatedly noted the complexity of the visitation petition
and the need for someone with extensive guardianship experience.
As it noted, Brickfield operated in the sensitive area of determin-
ing how June's family members could cornrnunicate with or visit
her, a determination that required legal experience and skill. Brick-
field also aided in the court's deterrnination to remove Kimberly as
June's guardian and its appointment of June's next guardian.
   Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
Brickfield's requested fees were appropriate compensation for her
work as a fiduciary in this case. While Brick field's fees are more
appropriately termed as a fiduciary lee rather than an attorney fee,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full
amount requested.

                           CONCLUSION
   Although the district court erred by failing to include Brick-
field's rate in the order of appointment. June waived this argument
by failing to raise it below. Likewise, the district court's error in
concluding an attorney must be appointed where a volunteer is not
available from a GAL program, without acknowledging the third
option under NSRG 8(I-1), was harmless. Finally, while Brickfield
is a fiduciary entitled to fiduciary fees, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding her fees in an amount cornmensu-
rate with her attorney rate because the award was supported by the
GAL's experience, specialized knowledge, and ability to understand
the intricacies of this particular case's complex legal issues. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding the GAL fees.

  LEE and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

SPO, CARSON CITY, NEVADA, 2023