Court Opinion

ID: 9811400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:16.548467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:19.357492
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting to opinion on en banc reconsideration.
For the reasons set forth below, I agree with the dissenting opinion that E.L. preserved her appellate complaint that her affidavit of relinquishment was not executed voluntarily; I dissent from the plurality opinion’s holding to the contrary. But, because I believe that the mediated settlement agreement entered into by the parties is, in fact, legally enforceable, I concur with the plurality opinion’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying E.L.’s motion for new trial.
E.L. and her attorney, both of the foster parents and their attorney, and the attorney ad litem for D.E.H. all signed a mediated settlement agreement. The mediated settlement agreement complies with the requirements of family code section 153.0071(d), making it binding on the parties to the agreement. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009). When a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of section 153.0071(d), “a party is entitled to judg*838ment on the mediated settlement agreement notwithstanding Rules 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law.” Id. § 153.0071(e).
The body of the parties’ mediated settlement agreement simply contains boilerplate provisions concerning the enforceability of the agreement; it contains no specific agreed terms. Instead, the mediated settlement agreement states that the “[t]erms of the settlement are set out in Exhibit ‘A’ attached to this agreement.” At the end of the agreement, after the provision “EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT REVOCABLE,” is a handwritten notation that the “attached Rule 11 is agreement of parties.” A three-page document titled “Rule 11 Agreement” is attached to the mediated settlement agreement. The rule 11 agreement attached to and incorporated in the mediated settlement agreement is also signed by all the parties. That document outlines the agreed-upon terms of the post-termination and post-adoption visitation of D.E.H. by E.L.1
Following the execution of the mediated settlement agreement incorporating the rule 11 agreement, E.L. executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment, relinquishing her parental rights to D.E.H. The trial court subsequently signed an order terminating E.L.’s parental rights to D.E.H. based solely on her affidavit of voluntary relinquishment. See id. § 161.001(1)(K) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
E.L. filed a motion for new trial and testified at the motion for new trial hearing that she had signed the affidavit of voluntary relinquishment in reliance on the provisions of the rule 11 agreement, which was incorporated into the parties’ mediated settlement agreement and which provided her with post-termination and post-adoption visitation with D.E.H. E.L. now complains on appeal that because the parties’ agreement is purportedly legally unenforceable, she was fraudulently induced into executing her affidavit of relinquishment.
I cannot agree with the plurality opinion’s conclusion that E.L. did not raise her appellate complaint in the trial court. The family code expressly authorizes a parent to pursue a direct attack on a termination order that is based on the parent’s affidavit of voluntary relinquishment on the ground of fraud in the execution of the affidavit of relinquishment. See id. § 161.211(c) (Vernon 2008). The Texas Supreme Court and numerous courts of appeals have recognized that a false representation of a right to continued, post-termination visitation made to a biological parent to encourage that parent to sign an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment constitutes fraud. See, e.g., Rogers v. Searle, 544 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex.1976) (recognizing in bill of 1'eview proceeding that fraudulent misrepresentations inducing execution of affidavit of voluntary relinquishment constitute extrinsic fraud); Jones v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 85 S.W.3d 483, 492-93 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (same); Queen v. Goeddetz, 48 S.W.3d 928, 931—32 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2001, no pet.) (same); In re S.A.B., No. 04-01-00795-CV, 2002 WL 1573431, at *3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 17, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (same). Because E.L.’s appellate complaint that she did not voluntarily sign the affidavit of relinquishment is, exactly, an argument that she involuntarily signed the affidavit of relinquishment because of fraud, I re*839spectfully dissent from the plurality opinion’s holding that E.L. failed to preserve this complaint.2
I nonetheless concur with the plurality opinion’s disposition of this appeal because I believe that the parties’ mediated settlement agreement that incorporates the rule II agreement providing for post-termination and continued post-adoption visitation of D.E.H. by E.L. is legally enforceable, contrary to the position taken by the plurality opinion and by the dissenting opinion. The family code expressly provides that, when a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of section 153.0071(d), “a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law.” See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.0071(e) (emphasis added). Here, the mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of section 153.0071(d). Consequently, both E.L. and the foster parents, as parties to the mediated settlement agreement, are “entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law.” See id. (emphasis added). “Notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of law” means, by its plain language, notwithstanding another rule of law set forth in the family code, that is, notwithstanding sections 161.206(b) and 161.2062 (the provisions E.L. claims make the mediated settlement agreement legally unenforceable). See id. § 161.206(b) (Vernon 2008) (providing that termination order divests parent and child of all legal rights except child’s right of inheritance); § 161.2062 (Vernon 2008) (providing that termination order “may not require that a subsequent adoption order include terms regarding limited post-termination contact”); Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d 354, 358-59 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding section 153.0071’s “notwithstanding any other law” provision meant that the trial court could enforce a mediated settlement agreement providing for joint managing conservatorship with no designation of conservator who had right to determine child’s primary residence despite section 153.133(a)(l)’s requirement for such designation); see also In re L.M.M., 247 S.W.3d 809, 811-12 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (enforcing mediated settlement agreement in child custody dispute); see generally, e.g., In re Marriage of Joyner, 196 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) (recognizing absolute enforceability of mediated settlement agreements).
Moreover, holding that the parties’ mediated settlement agreement is enforceable is not inconsistent with the provisions of *840family code sections 161.206(b) and 161.2062. D.E.H. will retain the right to inherit from E.L. if the mediated settlement agreement and its post-termination, post-adoption visitation provisions are enforced. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.206(b). And while family code section 161.2062 prohibits a termination order from requiring that a subsequent adoption order include terms regarding limited post-termination contact between the child and parent, that section does not, on its face, prohibit a pre-termination agreement between prospective adoptive parents and the biological parent concerning post-termination visitation. Even the foster parents, who are the prospective adoptive parents here and who have filed a response to E.L.’s motion for en banc reconsideration, contend that the parties’ mediated settlement agreement may be legally enforceable.3
Finally, sections 161.206(b) and 161.2062 deal generally with orders terminating parental rights while section 153.0071(d) deals specifically with mediated settlement agreements. A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that a more specific statute controls over a more general one. Beyers, 199 S.W.3d at 359 (citing Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 901 (Tex.2000)). The government code provides that general and specific provisions should be construed, if possible, to give effect to both, but when they cannot be reconciled, the specific provision should prevail. Id.; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026 (Vernon 2005). Thus, to the extent, if any, that enforcement of the parties’ mediated settlement agreement conflicts with family code sections 161.206(b) and 161.2062, section 153.0071 — specifically dealing with mediated settlement agreements in suits affecting the parent-child relationship — controls. See Beyers, 199 S.W.3d at 359.
Because I would hold that the parties’ mediated settlement agreement, including provisions for post-termination visitation, is legally enforceable and because there has been no showing that the foster parents have violated this agreement, I concur with the plurality opinion’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying E.L.’s motion for new trial.
DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ., join.

. For example, the agreement sets forth visitation “after the child turns 3" and provides that if E.L. misses two consecutive visits with D.E.H., all contact for E.L. shall cease.

. The position taken by the plurality opinion — that "E.L.'s appellate argument that she did not voluntarily sign the affidavit because the Rule 11 agreement is unenforceable is not an argument that she involuntarily signed the affidavit of relinquishment because of fraud, duress, or coercion” — has been expressly rejected in a similar case. See Vela v. Marywood, 17 S.W.3d 750, 763 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000), pet. denied, 53 S.W.3d 684 (Tex.2001). In Vela, the appellate court explained,
Marywood [as the majority here] takes this testimony [testimony by the mother that she was not physically threatened or coerced or defrauded into signing the relinquishment affidavit] out of context. [Biological mother] was not threatened, coerced, or defrauded into physically signing the relinquishment affidavit. At the time she signed the affidavit, [biological mother] did not know that the post-adoption plan was unenforceable and thus had no reason to believe that she would not have access to her child. [Biological mother's] testimony cannot be considered evidence that the affidavit was signed knowingly and voluntarily because she was testifying about her state of mind before she knew that the post-adoption plan was unenforceable.

Id.

. The foster parents point out that while a termination decree (as opposed to an adoption decree) cannot require post-termination, post-adoption visitation because the adoptive parents cannot be forced to permit visitation, nothing would prohibit an adoption decree from including an agreement between the adoptive parents and the biological parent permitting post-adoption visitation. The foster parents also point out that although section 161.206(b) divests a biological parent of legal rights and duties "innately accompanying the parent-child relationship” it does not divest a biological parent of any contractual rights negotiated by the biological parent such as those set forth in the mediated settlement agreement here.