Court Opinion

ID: 9786739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:02:04.732722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:48.153400
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissents.
The question presented is whether a reasonable person in Smith's position would have believed before he confessed that he was free to terminate the questioning by Trooper Barnes and either leave or ask the police to leave.1 If the answer to this question is yes then Smith was not in custody and no Miranda warning was required, but if the answer is no a warning was required. I agree with the court of appeals that the answer is no.
Smith was being questioned about a crime that was not only serious, but notorious and frightening to the community. A fourteen-year-old girl had been dragged off a bike path and raped. In the close confines of a *1162patrol car, Trooper Barnes made it clear that he knew that Smith was the rapist. He described the strong evidence against Smith. The victim had identified Smith in a photo lineup, and bicycle tracks at the scene matched the unique set of tires on Smith's bicycle. After hearing this, given the serious and notorious nature of the crime, I do not believe that a reasonable person in Smith's position would believe that he would be allowed to remain at large. And, as this case illustrates, a reasonable person would be right in that belief, for Smith was under continuous and overt police surveillance from the end of the interview until he was formally arrested two hours later.
Trooper Barnes told Smith in sequence, "[It's kinda obvious that you were involved in this OK. And what I need to do is, is, have you tell me the truth And I'm not gonna arrest you." How would these statements be understood by a reasonable person in Smith's position? In the context of Barnes's expressed belief that Smith was "involved," the request that Smith tell the truth is obviously a request for a confession. What then to make of the statement that Smith would not be arrested? The state argues that Barnes was not telling Smith that if he confessed he would not be arrested. Instead, according to the state, Barnes was promising freedom from arrest no matter what Smith said.2
Accepting this interpretation simply illustrates that the promise not to arrest was not reasonably believable. The state would have us believe that Trooper Barnes meant-and a reasonable person would understand him to mean-that Smith would not be arrested even if he confessed that he was the rapist the police sought. In my opinion, no reasonable person could believe this.3
A truly knowledgeable person would realize that the purpose of the assurance of no arrest was to avoid the need to give a Miranda warning, and that it was untrue. Less knowledgeable but reasonable people might not know the purpose of the assurance, but they would realize that it was probably not true. A policeman who had just recited persuasive evidence showing that a suspect was guilty of a serious crime and who then told the suspect that he was obviously guilty would be unlikely to set the suspect free.
Trooper Barnes quietly, skillfully, and repeatedly insisted that Smith confess.4 He said nothing after he laid out the evidence and declared his belief in Smith's guilt that would cause a reasonable person to believe that Smith still had freedom of action. For these reasons I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

. See Long v. State, 837 P.2d 737, 740 (Alaska App.1992) ([U]nder the circumstances of the police interaction with the suspect, would a reasonable person have felt free to break off the interrogation and, depending on the location, either leave or ask the police to leave?").

. According to the state, "Barnes's remarks could reasonably be construed as providing unconditional reassurance that Smith would not be arresied."

. I believe the majority opinion agrees with this point. It states, "'Would a reasonable innocent person believe that, if he falsely confessed to a crime, the police would not arrest him and he would be free to leave?" Op. at 1158, note 38. A guilty person would have even less reason to believe that he could remain at large if he confessed.

. For example, chronologically: "And what I need to do is, is, have you tell me the truth." "Well I can't, can't stress to you Ruple how important it is that ah, you tell us the truth and you tell us the truth right away." "Right, right from the beginning on this Ruple." "So I need to have your side of the story Ruple and and, cause I, I'm sure that, that, some of the things you told me, aren't exactly what happened."