Court Opinion

ID: 9478219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:43:17.433437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:18.310624
License: Public Domain

BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result.
Appellants did not seek, and the district court did not deny, a preliminary injunction to switch the seasons. See Ridgeway v. Montana High School Ass’n, 633 F.Supp. 1564 (D.Mont.1986). On appeal neither party invoked the test for a preliminary injunction: “probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm” or the like. Arcamuzi v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.1987).
That leaves two alternatives. Either the district court administered an aspect of the parties’ settlement agreement, or the district court denied a permanent injunction. *590First: if the district court merely administered an aspect of the settlement agreement, we lack jurisdiction. The district court’s order would be neither a final decision affording jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor a decision on an injunction affording jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Second: if the district court denied a permanent injunction, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). This appeal would settle the issue of switching seasons.
The district court’s order did not merely administer an aspect of the settlement agreement; the parties consistently have treated switching seasons as a separate issue. Here appellants sought a permanent injunction to switch the seasons, and the district court denied the injunction.
The next question concerns the scope of the district court’s order. The order could be interpreted as denying a permanent injunction to apply only during the 1986-87 season:
1. The girls’ high school basketball program in Montana shall remain in the fall and the high school volleyball program shall remain in the winter for the 1986-87 school year.
Ridgeway, 633 F.Supp. at 1583. If the injunction was to apply only during the 1986-87 season, this appeal is moot, and we lack jurisdiction. After all, the 1986-87 season is over.
The logic of the district court’s opinion, however, is to deny a permanent injunction for the 1986-87 season and all subsequent seasons. The district court concluded that “merely requiring reversal of the seasons ... will do nothing to remedy the inequities the Court has found to exist.” Ridgeway, 633 F.Supp. at 1582-83. As this statement indicates, the present appeal is not moot— but only because the district court denied appellants’ request for a permanent injunction once and for all.
Today we affirm the district court. If tomorrow appellants again may request a permanent injunction, and the district court may grant one, our decision today is meaningless. At some point appellants may be able to obtain relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (relief from order m extraordinary circumstances). Otherwise, in affirming the district court’s denial of a permanent injunction, we necessarily foreclose further judicial oversight of the sequence of Montana high school girls’ basketball and volleyball seasons.