Court Opinion

ID: 9752983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:48:46.096163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:27.013178
License: Public Domain

*52DEL SOLE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join that portion of the Majority Opinion that affirms the Trial Court’s grant of Summary Judgment against Appellant on her claims of employment discrimination for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-962.2. However I must dissent from its conclusion that the plaintiff can proceeded with her common law tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault.
I conclude that these claims are barred by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1, et seq., as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Majority reaches its result by relying on this court’s decision in Mike v. Borough of Aliquippa, 279 Pa.Super. 382, 421 A.2d 251 (1980). Unfortunately, this case does not apply to the facts before us. There, the employee was permitted to recover from his employer in a tort action because his injuries were inflicted by third parties, not fellow employees. This case does not apply to situations like those present where the intentional injury is inflicted by a fellow employee.
In Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp. 521 Pa. 29, 555 A.2d 766 (1989) the Supreme Court stated:
In this Court’s decision in Poyser, supra, [Poyser v. Newman & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 32, 522 A.2d. 548 (1987) ] we expressly held under ... provisions of the WCA that there was no intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provisions of the WCA. That decision ... [held that the WCA] ... preserved no common law cause of action for intentionally inflicted harm.
521 Pa. at 37, 555 A.2d at 770.
The Court went on to state that it has never recognized such an exception to the WCA. See also Barber v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 365 Pa.Super. 247, 529 A.2d 491 (1987) (Del Sole, J. Dissenting). It is my belief that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has effectively disallowed the type of action that the plaintiff seeks to pursue by its *53interpretations of the WCA and for this reason, I dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court.