Court Opinion

ID: 9745451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:57:55.053594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.579988
License: Public Domain

*103Dissenting Opinion.
Bierly, J.
I am unable to concur in the majority-opinion of this court.
This cause came for consideration by this court on a Writ of Certiorari addressed to the Board of Zoning Appeals for the City of Indianapolis to review a decision as of the date of October 26, 1956 in the Zoning Board Case No. 450-56 and entitled “Sam S. Schahet.” Appellee, Sam S. Schahet, received from said Board a variance which nullified in that particular the classification of the U-3 Zone.
Issues were formed by Petition by Appellants “as supplemented for Writ of Certiorari to the Board of Zoning Appeals” of Indianapolis, and also by return to the aforesaid Writ, including the original petition of Sam S. Schahet, appellee, to the Board of Zoning Appeals as set forth at length seeking a variance of the U-3 Zone classification.
Allegations by appellants as set forth in this petition and embodied in their action for Writ of Certiorari to the Board of Zoning Appeals were to the effect that the decision of the Board in granting “the Petition for variance to the Appellee was illegal, and that the Board in granting the petition and permission acted in a capricious, arbitrary and illegal manner.”
The return to the Writ of Certiorari was filed in accordance with the conditions set forth and a hearing was held thereon.
The Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 5, supported the findings of the Board of Zoning Appeals and affirmed the decision of said Board October 26,1954.
Inasmuch as the classification of “U-3” of the Section of the Zoning Code is the pertinent portion in dispute, we quote Section 11-112 (b) (6) :
*104(b) “U3 Uses Subject to Specified Requirements. In a Class U3 or business district, a building or structure or part thereof may, however, be erected, altered or used, or premises used in whole or in part which is arranged, intended or designed for any of the following enumerated uses when on a lot determined by the Board of Zoning Appeals, after public notice and hearing, to be so located that such building, structure or use will, in the judgment of said Board, substantially serve the public convenience and welfare, and will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of the neighboring property, to-wit:
(6) Premises, building, or structures commonly known as “drive-in” or “curb-service” establishments, where food, beverages, ice cream or other refreshments are served to parked cars for consumption at the place of service.”
I am unable to agree with my learned colleagues approving the majority opinion, as I perceive the Ordinance (U-3) obligates the Board, prior to granting the petition for a variance in favor of appellee Schahet, to determine subsequent to the submission of evidence before it by the petitioner-appellee, and the respondent, that the proposed use sought by the variance will (1) “substantially serve the public convenience and welfare, and (2) that it will not substantially or permanently injure the appropriate use of neighboring property.”
In reference to the facts presented by appellees in evidence before the Board of Zoning Appeals, and as emphasized in Items 1 to 13, inclusive, in appellees’ brief under the heading “The Record Affirmatively shows:” I fail to make judgment that such facts support an affirmative determination in favor of appellee-petitioner, Sam S. Schahet, as alleged in his petition that the intended use of the contemplated *105variance “would substantially serve the public convenience and welfare.”
Respondents further allege that evidence failed to establish that the proposed use sought by the variance would not “be detrimental to the use of their neighboring property by them, and that instead of serving the convenience and welfare, such proposed use would actually comit a dis-service to the public convenience and welfare” through additional traffic hazards for pedestrians and vehicles and added problems of juvenile misbehavior.
Appellee is further charged by his failure to present facts warranting the submission of his cause before the Board inasmuch as he did not conform to the provisions of the ordinance entitling him for a consideration of his variance sought.
On page 2 the majority opinion blandly asserts:
“The relief sought by appellee, Schahet, was an exception pursuant to the terms of the Zoning Ordinance and not a variance, although sometimes the two terms have been used indiscriminately. 101 C. J. S. Zoning §271, p. 1034; §272, p. 1037; Am. Jur. Zoning §196, p. 1046 anno; 168 A. L. R. 13, p. 20.” (My emphasis.)
In the above quotation if the term “sometimes” relating to “exception” and “variance” being used indiscriminately means anything, it appears that such application should have been attempted. And without a copy of the Ordinance in question, the assumption of the authority of the paragraph certainly places a strain on the imagination. (Our emphasis.)
Further, the opinion expressed the statement:
“The conditions permitting an exception are those which are found in the ordinance itself. Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1947), 117 *106Ind. App. 314, 69 N. E. 2d 613, 101 C. J. S. Zoning §273, p. 1037."
Again the majority opinion failed to include the conditions permitting exceptions as indicated in the ordinance. These conditions, in my judgment, should have been specified.
It is well settled that administrative boards created by acts of our legislature possess such powers only that the General Assembly allocates, and no inference as to power or authority claimed by such boards are permissible. Administrative boards possess no power as courts of law.
Parties to this action take diametrically opposite views in reference as to whether the Zoning Board was required to prepare and set forth “findings” preparatory to rendering its decision in favor of the appellee. The judgment of the trial court follows:
“JUDGMENT”
“This cause having been submitted to the Court March 18, 1957 for hearing and determination, and the Court having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel and having taken the cause under advisement, and now being duly advised in the premises, finds against the petitioners herein.
“The Court further finds that the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Indianapolis, entered October 26, 1956, sought to be reviewed herein, is legal in all respects and that there were no illegalities in the proceedings before, or in the decision of, said Board of Zoning Appeals; and that said decision should be wholly affirmed.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Indianapolis sought to be reviewed herein is legal m all respects, and that there were no illegalities in the proceedings before, or in the decision of said Board of Zoning Appeals.
*107“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Indianapolis be, and it is hereby, wholly affirmed.”
No special findings of facts were indulged in by the trial court as to evidence nor any cognizance taken on Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Adding Supplemental Specification of Illegality by Appellant other than Granting such Motion.
Respondent strenuously argues that §53-777, Burns’ Replacement, [1961 Supp.], and reading in part as follows:
“The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, keep records of its examinations and other official actions and shall record the vote on all actions taken. All minutes and records shall be filed in the office of the board and shall be a public record. [Acts 1947, ch. 174, §76, p. 571; 1951, ch. 291, §4, p. 935.]”
and which Act amended §53-777, Burns’ Ind. Stat., 1951 Replacement, reading in part as follows:
“The board shall keep minutes of its proceedings, keep records of its examinations and other official actions, prepare findings and record the vote on all actions taken. All minutes and records shall be filed in the office of the board and shall be a public record. [Acts 1947, ch. 174, §76, p. 571.]”
A notation following §53-777, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, [1961 Supp.], supra, had an insertion by the compiler reading as follows:
“AMENDMENT. The 1951 amendment inserted in the first paragraph the words ‘and applica*108tions for variances and exceptions” (Our emphasis.)
No mention was made, however, by the compiler of the omission of the phrase “prepare findings” in the second paragraph thereof. Whether in redrafting the amendment of 1951 of §53-777, supra, the phrase “prepare findngs” was intentionally omitted or omitted through inadvertence is not of major importance.
We think it is of fundamental importance that the Board must find as a matter of fact that the use to be made as requested in the petition of variance will give service of public convenience and welfare. The granting of the same will neither substantially nor permanently reflect injury in the use of neighboring property by the owners thereof. It is essential that the Board, as previous decisions have indicated, must be furnished evidence for an approval of a variance that there be no diminution of value of surrounding properties; that a public benefit will be accomplished; that there be no injustice manifest; that the ordinance be not waived in any general particular. Evidence that fails to include all these elements is deleterious to the purposes of the statute.
We think that the evidence presented before the Board was insufficient to meet the requirement of the ordinance. Hence, as a corollary the decision of the court was irregular and illegal in regard thereto.
Petitioner is obligated to submit proof in compliance with requirements to be awarded a variance. Having failed therein, the variance should have been refused.
In the case at bar we are inclined to share the view of the appellants that it is a basic duty of any administrative agency possessing quasi-judicial capacity *109when issuing decisions affecting substantial rights of interested parties to specify specific facts underlying a determination by such administrative agency. We are unimpressed with the contention of the appellees that the omission of the words “prepare findings” in Burns’ §58-777,1951 Replacement, [1961 Supp.], supra, could vitiate and render nugatory a fundamental principle of such long practical procedure necessitating finding of facts obligatory prior to the issuance of decisions.
If §53-777, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, [1961 Supp.], supra, had intended to provide relief from a mandatory duty to prepare findings, it appears that such waiver to so do should have been clearly expressed. This was not done.
Hence, I am of the opinion that the Board of Zoning Appeals should have fortified itself with the approval of the Board of Works prior to a grant of variance sought by appellee and failing so to do, performed an illegal act; that the Board failed to affirmatively show by its decision that the proposed “buildings, structures and use will substantially serve the public convenience and welfare.” Having omitted such affirmative showing, I conclude such failure of the Board to be illegal.
The Superior Court of Marion County by supporting the Zoning Board likewise committed error in its avoidance to require findings by the Board by a process of reasoning to which I deem appellants were entitled. To so do, a fundamental tenet of due process appears to have been disregarded.
In light of the above it is my opinion that the decision of the trial court is contrary to law. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the majority opinion that the case be affirmed.
*110Note. — Reported in 182 N. E. 2d 790.
Transfer denied, Achor, Acting C. J.; Jackson, C. J., dissents.
Bobbitt, J., not participating.