Court Opinion

ID: 9713881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:58.9386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.185567
License: Public Domain

MEMORANDUM ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Per Curiam.
On February 6, 1968, this court vacated the entry denying rehearing filed January 30, 1968, and vacated as well the per curiam opinion heretofore filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court on November 29,1967.
The relators pointed out that the answer filed by James Craig, et al., in effect was only an answer as Members of and Constituting the Madison County Committee for the Reorganization of School Corporations and did not include any of the other defendants who in effect had not answered. Thus, alleged the relators, the filing of their motion for a change of venue was timely since the alleged issues had not been closed by the answer of all defendants.
The reasoning, therefore, of the per curiam opinion of November 29, 1967, would then be based on an error of fact since it was stated therein. “That an answer had been filed on September 1, 1966, by defendant James Craig, et al.” This was in fact an error since the transcript revealed that there was an answer filed by James Craig, et al. as Members of and Constituting the Madison County Committee for the Re*210organization of School Corporations, and there were other defendants including Bryce Bottom, Jean Pilot, William E. Wilson, John J. Dillon, Herbert Holmes, Chester Biddle, William Chambers, J. Preston Moody and L. R. Miller, as Members of and Constituting the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana, State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana, J. B. Kohlmeyer, Director of the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana, and Hon. Carl T. Smith, as Judge of the Madison Circuit Court.
The per curiam opinion supra was correct, however, as to its conclusion on the supplemental complaint filed by plaintiffs-relators, not superseding the pleading which it sought to supplement.
On May 25, 1965, a change of venue had been granted on the motion of the plaintiff for a change of venue from Madison County to Henry Circuit Court of Henry County.
It is to be noted, however, on December 14, 1966, a motion was filed by the named additional party-defendants for a change of venue from Henry County and granted to the Fayette Circuit Court, Fayette County.
On January 5, 1967, the order was duly granted changing to Fayette County, Indiana, and the defendants were given ten days thereafter to perfect the said change. On May 17, 1967, the plaintiff moved for a change of venue from the Judge, and the motion was denied.
The issues, therefore, were not fully closed when the cause reached Fayette County. Indiana Supreme Court Rule 1-12B, paragraph 6 is, therefore, applicable to the case at bar. This reads as follows:
“Provided further, in event a change is granted from the judge or county within the prescribed period, as stated above, a request for a change of judge or county may be made by a party still entitled thereto within ten (10) days after the special judge has qualified or the moving party has *211knowledge the cause has reached the receiving county or there has been a failure to perfect the change.”
The interpretation of this Rule 1-12B(6) has recently been made by this court in the recent case of State of Indiana v. Porter Superior Court (1968), 250 Ind. 416, 234 N. E. 2d 848, where it was held that in the event a change is had from the judge or county within the prescribed period, an additional request for change of judge may be made by a party still entitled thereto, within ten (10) days after the special judge has qualified or the moving party has knowledge the cause has reached the receiving county or there has been a failure to perfect the change.
The attorney for the relators in his memorandum improperly cites the case of State of Indiana v. Laxton (1962), 242 Ind. 331, 178 N. E. 2d 901 as authority as a case holding that the ten-day period begins to run after the issues have been closed.
In State of Indiana v. Laxton, supra, the court stated:
“It was never intended that a special judge could make ineffective the provision of Rule 1-12B by making himself unavailable to receive a motion for a change of venue from the county within ten days after he had qualified. Where, as here, the special judge resides in another circuit and does not make himself available to receive motions for change of judge or a change of venue from the county within ten days after he has qualified, the only alternative is for the party entitled to the change to file his motion, within the time required by the rule, with the clerk to be presented by him to the special judge when he again resumes jurisdiction in the case.”
The issue in the Laxton case was not on the closing of the issues, but on the qualification of the special judge.
The purpose of Rule 1-12B Change of Venue is to reduce the unnecessary delays occasioned by the late filing of change of venue petitions which have as their real object the postponement or avoidance of a trial. Its purpose is to expedite trials and not to cause further delay or aid *212in dilatory practice. The language of Supreme Court Rule 1-12B clearly states that in the event a change is had from the judge or county within the prescribed period, an additional request for change of judge may be made by a party still entitled thereto, within ten days after the special judge has qualified or the moving party has knowledge the cause has reached the receiving county or there has been a failure to perfect the change.
In the case at bar the time began to run when the matter had reached the Fayette Circuit Court in Fayette County, .December 14, 1966. The motion for a change of venue was not within the ten days as hereinabove set forth.
The writ was, therefore, improvidently issued and the same is now vacated.
Hunter, J. dissents without opinion.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 225. Rehearing denied 235 N. E. 2d 706.