Court Opinion

ID: 9831055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:45:29.548185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:30.082126
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon the question of jurisdiction, o-ur opinion seems to be misunderstood. To correct the impression counsel for appellant seems to have, we will say that we entertain no doubt that, in a cause brought in a court which has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter and an appeal is taken from a judgment rendered disposing of the matter involved, the proper practice is for the appellate tribunal to reverse such judgment and dismiss the case. To illustrate, should a case be brought in the county court in behalf of the state to recover a penalty or forfeiture and such court should proceed to try and render judgment on it, undoubtedly the proper course on appeal would be to reverse the judgment and dismiss the case. The jurisdiction of an appellate court involves the duty of inquiring into the jurisdiction of the court from which an appeal is taken, and if, upon ascertaining it had none, it can make no inquiry into any other question involved, but must simply pronounce its judgment on the jurisdictional question from which a dismissal of the case follows as the legal consequence.
But this was not a suit in behalf of the state to recover either a penalty or a forfeiture. While its purpose was to forfeit a liquor dealer’s license, nothing of a pecuniary value was sought to he recovered on the forfeiture. It is as readily distinguished from a suit to recover on a forfeiture, as one brought by the state for a violation of a criminal statute punishable by a pecuniary fine is„from a suit brought in behalf of the state to recover a penalty. It is obvious to us that a proceeding to forfeit a liquor dealer’s license, brought under the statute quoted in the original opinion, cannot be classed among “suits in behalf of the state to recover forfeitures,” within the Constitution. But, as is held in the original opinion, a proceeding, administrative rather than judicial, to revoke a liquor dealer’s license, which is a mere permit to pursue an occupation, which, without such permit, would be a crime and. punishable under the law, in which the several county judges of the state — as judges, not as courts — have been vested by the Legislature with such administrative authority to be exercised in accordance with the statute which delegated and vested them with such administrative power, and imposed upon them the duty of exercising it.
If we are correct in this, it logically follows that we are without jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the county judge in forfeiting appellant’s liquor license, and are without jurisdiction in this proceeding to inquire into the constitutionality of the law under which the proceedings were had.
But inasmuch as it is contended in this motion that, in this state, at least, a liquor dealer’s license is stamped by law as property, in that it may be mortgaged, sold, or assigned, is property, and differentiates this case from those cited in the original opinion which held that such a license is a mere permit to do what would be otherwise unlawful, and has none of the elements of property. Suppose it should be conceded that in Texas such a license is property, still it acquires such character by virtue of the law which creates it and is held under and in subordination to the law of its being. It is held as property cum onere, subject to the privileges conferred and the conditions and burdens imposed. One of these conditions or burdens is that, if the license violates certain provisions of the law, it shall be revoked and canceled in a certain manner indicated by the law. It carries upon its face its own death warrant, though its knell may be rung by its owner. When he rings it, he is not in an attitude to say it was not deprived of life, and all the rights incident to its being, according to law.
We say “according to law,” because the sale of such things capable of being so used asoto be injurious to health or morals may, under the police power of the state, be regulated by statute. Intoxicating liquors are especially considered as subject, under such power, to regulation as a business attended with injury to the community, and statutes may prohibit the manufacture and sale of liquor, although buildings were erected and equipped and used for such purpose prior to the enactment of the regulating statute and at a time when the business was lawful. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205. It is within this power of the state, after granting licenses for the sale of liquors and receiving fees therefor, to revoke the license by a general law forbidding their sale entirely. This is founded upon the principle “that the state cannot barter away, or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of these essential powers which are inherent in all government, and the existence of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized society.” Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (7th Ed.) 400, and authorities cited in notes.
*173If, then, a forfeiture of a liquor license, carrying with it the destruction of its holder’s property, can be forfeited by general law, we fail to perceive why it cannot be done by a statute under which it is issued, which declares its forfeiture upon the failure of the license to obey the mandates of the law under which it was issued, although such license bore the elements of property, ^specially under a law like ours, which in its administration prescribes the manner of .ascertaining the facts which under the statute constitute the forfeiture. ■
Under our law the licensee himself, by doing or failing to do certain acts, makes the forfeiture; and the county judge, under the ■administrative power vested in him by the act, simply ascertains the facts constituting -such forfeiture and in consequence revokes .and cancels the license.
The motion is overruled.