Court Opinion

ID: 9383749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 00:00:29.53766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.685428
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10254      Document: 00516695312         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                           March 30, 2023
                                   No. 22-10254
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk
   Kevin Bernstein,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Maximus Federal Services, Incorporated,

                                                            Defendant—Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 3:21-CV-2131

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          After the EEOC closed its investigation into Kevin Bernstein’s charge
   of discrimination, the agency issued Bernstein a right-to-sue notice. This
   notice, however, only reached Bernstein’s attorney and not Bernstein
   himself. The EEOC then sent a subsequent notice acknowledging that the
   first had not reached Bernstein and advising him that his 90-day window in
   which to file suit began to run upon its—the second notice’s—receipt.
   Bernstein filed his complaint 141 days after his attorney is presumed to have
   received the first notice, and 89 days after Bernstein and his attorney received
   the second.
Case: 22-10254      Document: 00516695312          Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/30/2023

                                    No. 22-10254

          The district court dismissed Bernstein’s suit as untimely and held that
   equitable tolling was unavailable. In concluding that Bernstein’s case did not
   present the kind of exceptional circumstances that may warrant equitable
   tolling, the district court failed to consider controlling precedent from this
   court that tolling may be available when the EEOC affirmatively misleads a
   claimant about the time in which he must file his federal complaint. This was
   an abuse of discretion. Because the court did not proceed beyond this first
   prong of the tolling analysis, and because the record at this motion to dismiss
   stage does not disclose whether Bernstein diligently pursued his rights, we
   VACATE the court’s order dismissing Bernstein’s complaint and
   REMAND for further development of Bernstein’s claim to equitable tolling.
                                         I.
          Kevin Bernstein was employed by Maximus Federal Services until
   March 7, 2019, when he was fired after being accused of sexual harassment.
   Bernstein filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on October 17,
   2019, alleging that he had been sexually harassed by two female coworkers
   and was fired in retaliation for reporting this harassment to management. The
   EEOC closed its investigation into Bernstein’s charge and issued a right-to-
   sue notice on April 12, 2021. This notice was mailed to Bernstein, his
   attorney, and Maximus’s counsel. Bernstein’s attorney received the notice,
   but Bernstein himself did not because “the EEOC did not have [his] correct
   address.” Instead, the first notice was returned to the EEOC. On June 3,
   2021, the EEOC reissued this notice to Bernstein using a new address. The
   notice was accompanied by a cover letter which stated that the 90-day filing
   window began to run upon the second notice’s receipt. Bernstein received
   this letter and notice within a week of mailing and filed his complaint on
   September 7, 2021. He thus filed his complaint 148 days after the notice was
   first issued, but only 89 days after the second notice and letter were actually
   received by Bernstein himself.

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           In his complaint, Bernstein alleged one count of a hostile work
   environment and one count of retaliation for reporting harassment in the
   workplace, both in violation of Title VII.1 Maximus moved to dismiss the
   case, arguing that Bernstein’s claims were untimely. The district court
   agreed, finding that, under this court’s caselaw, receipt by counsel initiates
   Title VII’s 90-day filing period. Because Bernstein’s complaint was filed on
   September 7, 2021—148 days after the notice was mailed—his claims were
   untimely. The court also rejected Bernstein’s argument that equitable tolling
   should apply because the EEOC’s second letter confused him about the time
   in which he had to file. Specifically, the court held that “the doctrine of
   equitable tolling does not apply in this instance” and that Bernstein “failed
   to meet his high burden of showing exceptional circumstances apply.”
   Bernstein timely appealed.
                                              II.
           We review a district court’s denial of equitable tolling for abuse of
   discretion. Granger v. Aaron’s, Inc., 636 F.3d 708, 711–12 (5th Cir. 2011). This
   standard of review extends to both the district court’s factfinding, and its
   determination of the applicability of equitable tolling to those facts. Id.; cf.
   Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 2002). When
   equitable tolling is raised as a defense to a motion to dismiss, this court
   “assume[s] the pleaded facts as true, and…will remand if the plaintiff has

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             Bernstein’s complaint also referenced Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, which
   provides substantive protections against sex and racial discrimination in employment, and
   alleged that Maximus subjected him to a hostile work environment due to his national origin
   and religion. The district court dismissed these claims, finding that the Chapter 21 claims
   were time barred, and the national origin and religious discrimination claims were
   unexhausted. Bernstein did not oppose dismissal of these claims in the district court, and
   he does not challenge or discuss these rulings on appeal. “Claims not pressed on appeal are
   deemed abandoned.” Davis v. Maggio, 706 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir. 1983).

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   pleaded facts that justify equitable tolling.” Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d
   452, 456 (5th Cir. 2002).
                                         III.
          42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1) requires that a claimant initiate a Title VII
   civil action within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.
   There is no question that the 90-day period of limitation began to run upon
   receipt of the first notice by Bernstein’s attorney. In Ringgold v. National
   Maintenance Corporation, 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986), we held “that the
   90-day period of limitation established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) begins
   to run on the date that the EEOC right-to-sue letter is delivered to the offices
   of formally designated counsel or to the claimant.” We later explained that
   Ringgold’s “constructive notice rule” is premised on Congress’s “basic
   policy choice” that in our system of representative litigation “each party is
   deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have
   ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Irwin
   v. Veterans Admin., 874 F.2d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Link v.
   Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)), aff’d sub nom. Irwin v. Dep’t of
   Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 92–93 (1990) (adopting Fifth Circuit’s
   reasoning). Ringgold’s rule remains robust and vital today. See, e.g., Carrizal
   v. Brennan, 834 F. App’x 915, 917 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Fifth Circuit precedent
   is clear the [Title VII] period begins upon receipt by either counsel or
   claimant—whomever is first.”). The district court did not err in holding that
   Bernstein’s time to file began to run when his attorney received the first
   notice, even though Bernstein himself did not.
          Bernstein does not say exactly when his attorney received this first
   notice. However, his complaint alleges that the notice was mailed on April
   12, 2021. In the absence of any concrete allegations to the contrary, our
   caselaw presumes receipt within three to seven days of the date on which it

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   was mailed. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002).
   The exact number of days presumed “is . . . an open question in this Circuit,”
   but answering that question is unnecessary in this case where, even at the
   high end of the presumption, Bernstein’s suit was still filed 141 days after the
   limitations period began to run. Jenkins v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 784
   F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Morgan v. Potter, 489 F.3d 195, 196
   (5th Cir. 2007)). His suit was thus untimely.
          Instead, Bernstein argues, Title VII’s limitations period should be
   equitably tolled because the EEOC’s second right-to-sue notice purporting
   to trigger the 90-day filing window confused Bernstein as to how long he had
   to file. Title VII’s filing period is not jurisdictional and therefore may be
   equitably tolled. Harris v. Boyd Tunica, Inc., 628 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2010).
   One such situation in which equitable tolling may be warranted is when “the
   EEOC[] mislead[s] the plaintiff about the nature of [his] rights.” Granger,
   636 F.3d at 712. To mislead a plaintiff about the nature of his rights, “[i]t is
   not sufficient . . . to show that the EEOC failed to give him some relevant
   information; he must demonstrate that the EEOC gave him information that
   was affirmatively wrong.” Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 184. Our court has held
   before that a “two-letter situation” like Bernstein’s in which the EEOC
   advises a claimant in a later letter of an incorrect filing deadline is one where
   the EEOC has affirmatively misled the plaintiff about the nature of his rights.
          In Page v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 556 F.2d 346, 350–52 (5th Cir. 1977),
   the EEOC issued the plaintiff an initial notice stating that the agency’s
   conciliation efforts had failed and the claimant was now authorized to sue
   “[i]n accordance with [§ 2000e-5(f)(1)].” It later issued a second notice
   stating that the EEOC would not bring a civil action on the plaintiff’s behalf
   and that she had the right to file a complaint within 90 days of the second
   notice. Id. at 350. Our court held that, even if the first notice initiated the 90-
   day filing period, the plaintiff’s untimely filing should be equitably tolled.

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   “[W]e could not ignore the misleading effect of the [second] letter,” the
   court stated, in which “the EEOC explicitly informed [the plaintiff] that she
   had 90 days from the date of that letter to file suit.” Id. at 351. The plaintiff
   “was entitled to rely on this seemingly authoritative statement by the agency
   presumed to know the most about these matters.”
          The same is true in this case. Bernstein’s second letter incorrectly
   advised him that “[t]his document authorizes the recipient to commence
   formal legal proceedings in court at any time within 90 days after it is received
   by the Charging Party.” This is an affirmative and “seemingly authoritative
   statement by the agency” upon which Bernstein was entitled to rely. Page,
   556 F.2d at 351. Though the initial notice sent to Bernstein’s attorney was
   adequate to initiate the filing period, the subsequent correspondence misled
   Bernstein about a material aspect of the time he had to file, namely when the
   clock began to run. In such circumstances, equitable tolling may be available.
   See id.; see also Alvarado v. Mine Serv., Ltd., 626 F. App’x 66, 70–71 (5th Cir.
   2015) (collecting cases). Yet the district court concluded the opposite,
   holding that “the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply in this
   instance.” By failing to recognize that our precedent establishes such a
   situation as an exceptional circumstance, the district court abused its
   discretion.
          To establish equitable tolling, a plaintiff must not only show that the
   doctrine is applicable to his circumstances, but also that he “has vigorously
   pursued his action.” Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992). The
   district court did not make any factual findings or conclusions as to this step
   of the test, ruling only that equitable tolling did not apply. When a district
   court fails to make a required factual finding, the appropriate remedy is
   typically vacatur and remand for further factual development. See Mercado v.
   Ritz-Carlton San Juan Hotel, Spa & Casino, 410 F.3d 41, 48–50 (1st Cir.
   2005); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 391–92 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 3, 1981)

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   (Rubin, J.) (discussing proper procedure on remand for resolving 12(b)(6)
   timeliness defense). Moreover, when a time limitations defense is raised in a
   motion to dismiss, deciding the applicability of equitable tolling based solely
   on the pleadings may be premature “because facts tolling the running of the
   statute do not necessarily appear in the complaint.” Teemac, 298 F.3d at 456
   (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1308 (5th Cir. 1993)). Bernstein’s
   complaint is silent as to his diligence. Maximus’s assertions in its brief that
   Bernstein failed to immediately contact his attorney after receiving the
   second notice and that Bernstein’s attorney waited until the second notice
   arrived to discuss the prospect of litigation with his client appear nowhere in
   the record. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of
   Bernstein’s claim and remand for further factual development.
                                        IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s order
   dismissing Bernstein’s claims as untimely and REMAND for further
   proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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