Court Opinion

ID: 9708979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:37:06.540619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.114581
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
dissenting.
That guarantee in the Sixth Amendment which is the heart of Lemuel Larson’s argument in this case is an assurance that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” The transcript of the preliminary hearing discloses that Larson and his counsel were “confronted” by Witness Goughnour through 38 pages of testimony — 17 of which were cross-examination. Confrontation is not the lacking item.
The State commendably disclosed to the court and to the defendant before trial that ordinary efforts to have Goughnour present at the trial would probably be futile. Through roughshod treatment of the witness, it is obvious that Goughnour could have been made to appear and testify at the trial. It could have been done entirely within the rules, albeit Goughnour may have suffered significant financial sacrifice or maybe a loss of his job. I believe that judges have an obligation to not let the judicial system do that to anyone.
The majority opinion overreaches in applying Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). In Barber, counsel did not cross-examine the witness during the preliminary hearing and the State made no effort to obtain the presence of the witness at trial. There would have *124been no sacrifice for that witness to have been required to appear; he was in a federal prison a comparatively short distance from where the trial was being held. It would be my guess that the United States Supreme Court would have based its opinion in Barber upon due process as contended by Justice Harlan, if anything, had there been cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. Here, Larson doesn’t argue due process.
There are some practical consequences— some good and some bad — that could flow from the holding by the majority. First, it might result in a more readily acceptable use of depositions in criminal cases as contemplated by Rule 15(e) and (g), NDRCrimP, and I think that would be good. Second, it might — as suggested by the state’s attorney — result in the prosecutors sitting on problems that they know exist and drop them like a bomb on the day of the trial. No one should want to encourage that, but some writers contend, for example, that the exclusionary rule accomplishes just that kind of result. See The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, by Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Judicature, The Journal of the American Judicature Society, Yol. 62, No. 5 (Nov. 1978).
The failure of the State to select the best option, as viewed by hindsight, to present Goughnour’s testimony in the fairest way under all the circumstances was, at best, a technical error that prevented Larson from having a perfect trial but did not prevent him from having a fair trial. See my dissent in State v. Pfister, 264 N.W.2d 694, 700 (N.D.1978).
The error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 52(a), NDRCrimP. I see no likelihood that a retrial will change the result.