Court Opinion

ID: 9646721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:09:04.572568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.073098
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that appellant is entitled to a new trial, but not to discharge. I dissent because in ordering a new trial, the majority suggests that the lower court should hold a hearing in order to determine whether the blood was the fruit of the illegal arrest. See the last paragraph of the majority’s opinion. The lower court should not hold such a hearing. The Commonwealth has—correctly—conceded that the blood was the fruit of the *70arrest. See Brief for Commonwealth at 4, 11. Its argument has been that the arrest was not illegal.
I also wish to make one further comment.
On February 7, 1978, appellant was given a sentence of three years probation. He took an appeal from the judgment of sentence, and on January 4,1980—almost two years later—a panel of this court issued an opinion vacating the judgment and ordering appellant discharged. On March 13, 1980, the Commonwealth’s application for reargument was granted, and on November 14, 1980, the case was re-argued before the court en banc. I recite this procedural history to emphasize that when appellant was initially discharged by this court, he had already served nearly two years of his three year sentence of probation. This fact does not, as appellant contends it does, entitle him to discharge rather than a new trial. However, if after a new trial, appellant should again be convicted, the lower court will not be able to impose a more severe sentence than the initial sentence of three years probation, “[ajbsent valid and sufficient intervening conduct by the defendant articulated in the record.” Commonwealth v. Brenizer, 477 Pa. 534, 538, 384 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Pearson, 450 Pa. 467, 303 A.2d 481 (1973). Furthermore, it is constitutionally required that “punishment already exacted must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-719, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2077-2078, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (footnote omitted).