Court Opinion

ID: 9793179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:04.960827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:37.221743
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. Summary judgment was granted defendant. In construing the language of § 30-31-34(D), N.M.S.A.1978, the trial court found that the defendant's pick-up truck was not used to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of marijuana. Section 30-31-34(D) subjects to forfeiture: [A]ll . . . vehicles which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale of property [which includes marijuana] To arrive at a conclusion in this case, we must first explain the meaning of the words and phrases in the statute. (a) The word “for” means “with a view to; in order to effect.” Ramsay Signs, Inc. v. Dyck, 215 Or. 653, 337 P.2d 309 (1959). (b) All vehicles “intended for use,” means vehicles “with a view to being used,” or “in order to effect the use” such as “looking forward to be used,” “expected to be used,” or “proposed to be used.” (c) “To facilitate the transportation,” means “to make [transportation] easy or less difficult . . . as to facilitate the execution of a task.” Mosley v. State ex rel. Broward Cty., 363 So.2d 172 (Fla.App.1978); United States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219 (3d Cir. 1956); Piatt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1947). (d) “For the purpose of sale of property” means “with a view to making a sale of property” or “in order to effect a sale of property.” (e)“Transport” means to carry or convey from one place to another. State v. One 1970 2-Door Sedan Rambler, 191 Neb. 462, 215 N.W.2d 849 (1974). The statute does not say “transport property for sale.” “Transportation” as used does not say “transportation of property for sale.” “Transportation for the purpose of sale of property” means “a vehicle used by a person to effect a sale of property.” Section 30-31-34(D) is not limited to “vehicles actually used by persons as transportation to effect a sale.” It also includes “vehicles which a person looks forward to using as transportation to effect a sale.” Forfeiture is not limited to actual transportation by a person. In other words, the legislature intended that forfeiture of vehicles may be undertaken when the facts show that a person actually used the vehicle as a means of transportation to effect a sale, or when a person owns a vehicle which he looks forward to using whenever he wants to effect a sale. The thrust of the statute is to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility. Of course, an automobile is subject to forfeiture when it is used to transport a drug to a parking lot where defendant met an unknown undercover agent to whom the sale was made. State v. Datsun, 139 N.J. Super. 186, 353 A.2d 129 (1976). In the instant case, defendant drove an undercover agent from a meeting place to defendant’s home, made the sale, and then drove the agent back to the point of the meeting place. The vehicle was used “to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of making a sale of property.” Mosely, supra; One 1950 Buick Sedan, supra; Platt, supra. A question of fact exists whether defendant’s vehicle is subject to forfeiture on two grounds: (1) whether the vehicle was used to facilitate a narcotics transaction and (2) whether the vehicle was intended for use for this purpose. This conclusion results from the fact that the prime target of vehicle forfeitures is the “narcotic peddler” and “drug trafficker.” The purpose of forfeiture is to deny these people mobility and to financially weaken the narcotics enterprise. State v. One 1972 Pontiac Grand Prix, Etc., 242 N.W.2d 660 (S.D.1976). Section 505(a)(4) of the 1979 Uniform Controlled Substances Act subjects to forfeiture: all . . . vehicles . . which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation for the purpose of sale or receipt of property [which includes controlled substances] . . . . [Emphasis added.] “Or receipt” was deleted from the above New Mexico statute. The Commissioners’ note says: . Effective law enforcement demands that there be a means of confiscating the vehicles and instrumentalities used by drug traffickers in committing violations under this Act. The reasoning is to prevent their use in the commission of subsequent offenses involving transportation or concealment of controlled substances and to deprive the drug trafficker of needed mobility. [Emphasis added.] Forfeiture statutes are intended to apply to those individuals who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. In re 1972 Porsche 2 Dr., Etc., 307 So.2d 451 (Fla.App.1975); Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297 (Fla.1978). This proceeding is now controlled by the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure inasmuch as summary judgment was entered. Reeder v. State, 294 Ala. 260, 314 So.2d 853 (1975). A preponderance of the evidence is required to establish the right of forfeiture. State v. One Certain Conveyance, Etc., 211 N.W.2d 297 (Iowa 1973). This appeal should be reversed.