Court Opinion

ID: 9378369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 06:05:26.481525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.805713
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

TODD BRIGGS, Personal Representative of the                        UNPUBLISHED
Estate of OMARI BELL,                                              March 9, 2023

               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 358641
                                                                   Kalamazoo Circuit Court
JEFFREY KNAPP,                                                     LC No. 2020-000143-NI

               Defendant-Appellant,
and

GABRIEL CARMONA and ADRIAN ROJO,

               Defendants.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and LETICA, JJ.

K. F. KELLY, J. (dissenting).

        I respectfully dissent and would conclude the trial court erred when it denied defendant’s
motion for summary disposition. The evidence demonstrated that the decedent was dressed in
dark clothing and walking in the dark along a highway that did not permit pedestrian access when
the accident occurred. Although there was no evidence that defendant was distracted, the trial
court held—on the basis of conjecture and speculation—that questions of fact existed for the jury
regarding whether defendant properly exercised his standard of care. However, because defendant
was not required to disprove plaintiff’s hypothetical scenarios in which he may have been
distracted, and because plaintiff failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material
fact for trial, I respectfully dissent.

                                I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        On November 6, 2019, at approximately 9:30 p.m., the decedent, Omari Bell, was killed in
an accident after he was struck by two vehicles: the first driven by defendant, Jeffrey Knapp, and
the second vehicle driven by defendant, Gabriel Carmona. Knapp testified that he was driving
alone, heading home from a night class. He had not been drinking or using drugs on the day of

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the crash. He described the traffic conditions as “pretty light,” was using cruise control, and did
not recall any cars immediately in front of him at the time of the crash. It was dark outside, but
the weather was fine. Knapp had his standard headlights on and stated the lights were working.
Knapp had his phone in the car on the “docking station with maps up.” The docking station was
clipped to the heater vent, and Knapp stated he was not using his phone to text or make calls while
driving.

       Knapp stated that while driving, “all of a sudden there was an impact to the vehicle.” After
the impact, he pulled over to the shoulder of the road. He stated he had no warning that the crash
was going to occur and had no time to brake or swerve. Knapp testified he never saw Bell and did
not know in what direction Bell was walking. According to Knapp, he did not think that he could
have done anything to avoid the crash.

        Carmona testified that it was dark outside at the time of the accident. He also stated the
accident happened “very quickly.” Carmona stated that there was a car in front of him, which
seemed to be driving in a “normal” way, and it had its lights on. There was also a trailer in the left
lane. He was in the right lane when something seemed to fall in front of him. He had no time to
swerve or apply his brakes and hit Bell before he “knew it.” Carmona initially thought it was a
deer. Like Knapp, Carmona stated that he could not have done anything differently to avoid the
crash. The vehicle in front of Carmona did not seem to do “any quick maneuvering” before the
crash, and Carmona did not see any vehicle, including Knapp’s vehicle, strike Bell.

        Sergeant Brandon Davis also testified that it was dark outside, and there were no lights in
the area, not even ambient lighting from the city spilling onto the freeway. Sergeant Davis also
noted that Bell was dressed in “dark-colored black clothing,” including a black coat, black jeans,
and dark navy blue athletic shoes. Sergeant Davis saw nothing to indicate that either driver drove
outside the right lane of travel, and the roadway showed no tire marks on the roadway, which
“would be indicative that [the drivers] didn’t see the pedestrian before impact” or that at least there
was no roadway evidence that they saw him. According to Sergeant Davis, Knapp and Carmona
were not in violation of any provision of the Motor Vehicle Code. Ultimately, according to
Sergeant Davis, the circumstances of the crash were “straightforward” in terms of what happened.
That is, in Sergeant Davis’s view, the pedestrian seen walking westbound shortly before the
accident had crossed the highway and been hit on the eastbound side of the highway. The drivers
would not have expected to see a pedestrian, at night, all in dark clothing.

        In the trial court, in response to Knapp’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff argued
that Knapp was comparatively negligent because Knapp set his cruise control and surmised he was
not paying attention to the road because he did not see Bell before the accident even though two
other witnesses reported seeing him. For its part, the trial court denied Knapp’s motion because
“there was an argument being made with regard to [Knapp’s] GPS being on and some implication
that that might have distracted him,” and “there is the implication that at least at some point he
may have been visible, and that’s certainly something that a trier of fact could latch on[]to . . . .”
This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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        This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Sutariya Props, LLC v Allen & I-75, LLC, 331 Mich App 521, 528; 953 NW2d 434 (2020).
“Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A genuine
issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds
might differ.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must introduce evidence sufficient
to establish: “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal
duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s damages.” Powell-Murphy v Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental
Response Trust, 333 Mich App 234, 243; 964 NW2d 50 (2020) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “ ‘Duty’ is a legally recognized obligation to conform one’s conduct toward another to
what a reasonable man would do under similar circumstances.” Finazzo v Fire Equip Co, 323
Mich App 620, 625; 918 NW2d 200 (2018). Generally, the question of whether a duty exists is a
question of law for the court. Id. “Once the question of duty has been determined, the question
whether a defendant was negligent, i.e., whether the defendant breached its duty, is generally a
question of fact.” Boumelhem v Bic Corp, 211 Mich App 175, 181; 535 NW2d 574 (1995).
However, if reasonable minds could not differ, a court may determine whether a defendant’s
conduct fell below the applicable standard of care. See Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich
1, 7; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).

        Typically, under the doctrine of comparative negligence, a plaintiff’s damages are reduced
by the proportion by which a plaintiff’s own conduct contributed to his or her injuries. See MCL
600.2959; Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 496; 702 NW2d 199 (2005). However, a plaintiff
may not recover noneconomic damages when a plaintiff’s fault is greater than the aggregate fault
of the others involved. MCL 600.2959; see also MCL 500.3135(2)(b) (“Damages must be assessed
on the basis of comparative fault, except that damages must not be assessed in favor of a party who
is more than 50% at fault.”).

        In the case of an accident between a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, in the absence of more
specific statutory requirements, “it is the motorist’s duty in the use and operation of his automobile
to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution, that is, that degree of care and caution which
an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”
Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138, 141; 79 NW2d 605 (1956). “[T]he happening of the accident
alone is not evidence of negligence of the defendant sufficient to take that question to the jury.”
Gardiner v Studebaker Corp, 204 Mich 313, 316; 169 NW 828 (1918). And “[o]ne is not negligent
merely because he fails to make provision against an accident which he could not reasonably be
expected to foresee.” Hale v Cooper, 271 Mich 348, 354; 261 NW 54 (1935).

       It was not incumbent upon the defendants to guard against every conceivable result,
       to take extravagant precautions, to exercise undue care: but defendants were
       entitled to assume that others using the highway in question would under the

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       circumstances at the time use reasonable care themselves and take proper steps to
       avoid the risk of injury. [Id.]

        Moreover, a driver’s standard of care must take into account the “unique function” of a
particular roadway, such as a highway designed “to move great volumes of traffic at relatively
high speeds.” McGuire v Rabaut, 354 Mich 230, 238; 92 NW2d 299 (1958).

        Pedestrians generally enjoy “equal rights with automobiles in the use of public highways,”
but they are required to “exercise that care which, reasonably prudent persons would use for their
own protection and preservation.” Buchel v Williams, 273 Mich 132, 137; 262 NW 759 (1935).
However, pedestrians typically are not permitted on “a limited access highway.” MCL
257.679a(1). Moreover, a driver unaware of a pedestrian’s presence is not bound to anticipate that
a pedestrian “will come loping into his lane of traffic.” Gamet v Jenks, 38 Mich App 719, 724;
197 NW2d 160 (1972). Of course, that is not to say that a driver may be “permitted to lower his
head, close his eyes, and charge blindly . . . .” McGuire, 354 Mich at 235. At all times, a driver
remains obligated to “exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” Id. Nevertheless, until
a hazard is perceived, or until a hazard would have been apparent to “a reasonable man, considering
pertinent surrounding circumstances of traffic and terrain,” a driver has no duty to guard against
or anticipate an unknown hazard. See McGuire, 354 Mich at 230 (examining driver’s rights and
duty when approaching an intersection with the right-of-way and when confronted with a
subordinate driver, who fails to properly yield, at the intersection).

       An emergency involves a situation that is “unusual or unsuspected.” Vander Laan v
Miedema, 385 Mich 226, 232; 188 NW2d 564 (1971) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An
unusual event typically involves something that “varies from the everyday traffic routine,” such as
a phenomenon of nature like a blizzard. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court explained:

               ‘Unsuspected’ on the other hand connotes a potential peril within the
       everyday movement of traffic. To come within the narrow confines of the
       emergency doctrine as ‘unsuspected’ it is essential that the potential peril had not
       been in clear view for any significant length of time, and was totally unexpected.
       A good example of this can be seen in McKinney v Anderson, [373 Mich 414; 129
       NW2d 851 (1964),] supra, where defendant rear-ended a plaintiff’s car which had
       stopped while pushing a disabled vehicle on the highway. Coming over the crest of
       a hill, defendant first saw plaintiff’s taillights when he was 400 feet away.
       However, defendant did not clearly see the peril of plaintiff’s stopping until he was
       about 100-200 feet away, at which point it was too late to avoid a collision under
       the circumstances. Furthermore, the failure of the plaintiff to signal that he was
       stopping, coupled with the surrounding darkness, made the subsequent peril totally
       unexpected to the defendant. [Id.]

        Notably, the question of proximate cause must also be examined in light of the emergency
presented. DePriest v Kooiman, 379 Mich 44, 47; 149 NW2d 449 (1967); see also McGuire, 354
Mich at 240 (“Even had he looked, diligently, there was nothing he could have done, after
discovery of the danger, upon these facts, to avoid collision. The deficiency in plaintiff’s case lies
in the area of proximate cause.”).

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       It may well be that there has been negligence on the part of the arterial driver but
       that his permissible speed, and the traffic conditions, were then such that, even had
       he been alert, looked, discovered the danger, and responded instantaneously and
       properly, no action on his part could have averted collision once the subordinate
       driver came into his path. If this were the case his negligence in not properly
       observing or acting could not be a proximate cause of the accident. [DePriest, 379
       Mich at 47.]

        Turning to the facts of this case, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that Bell—a
pedestrian dressed entirely in dark clothing—was walking on a limited access highway at night in
an unlit area of the roadway. As a pedestrian, he had no right to be on a limited access highway.
See MCL 257.679a. In contrast, according to Knapp’s uncontradicted deposition testimony,
Knapp was traveling in a designated lane of travel, and he was not exceeding the speed limit. As
a motorist, Knapp was not required to guard against “every conceivable result” or to “take
extravagant precautions”; rather, he was entitled to assume that others would use reasonable care
themselves. See Hale, 271 Mich at 354. And as a motorist, Knapp could not be expected to
anticipate that a pedestrian would enter his lane of traffic, a rule that holds particularly true given
that Knapp was traveling on a limited access highway and that pedestrians do not have the right to
be on a limited access highway. See Gamet, 38 Mich App at 724. Coming upon a pedestrian—
clad entirely in dark clothing—in his lane of travel on a limited access highway, Knapp was, in
other words, confronted with a sudden emergency—an unexpected peril—not of his own making.
And the question of whether Knapp’s conduct constituted a proximate cause of the crash must be
judged in light of this emergency. See McGuire, 354 Mich at 230, 239-240; DePriest, 379 Mich
at 47. In this regard, the testimony from Knapp and Carmona demonstrated that Bell was not
visible on the roadway and that nothing could have been done to avoid the accident.

        Under the trial court’s reasoning, a fact-finder could conclude that Knapp was not being
truthful when he denied being distracted because Knapp’s testimony, while uncontradicted, was
subject to a credibility determination. But this is not the standard when deciding a motion for
summary disposition. When the nonmoving party produces evidence in support of the party’s
position, the “adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading,
but must, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” MCR 2.116(G)(4). Similarly, conjecture and speculation are
never sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Meisner Law Group PC v Weston Downs
Condo Assoc, 321 Mich App 702, 723; 909 NW2d 890 (2017). Yet mere conjecture and
speculation is all that the trial court relied on when denying defendant’s motion.

       And even assuming there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Knapp failed
to keep a proper lookout, plaintiff failed to present any evidence that Knapp could have done
anything to avoid the accident. See DePriest, 379 Mich at 4; McGuire, 354 Mich at 240; Gardiner,
204 Mich at 316. In other words, missing from plaintiff’s proofs is any evidence that Knapp should
have seen Bell in time to take evasive action, stop his vehicle, or otherwise avoid the accident.
Even viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence offered by the parties places a
pedestrian dressed entirely in dark clothing, in Knapp’s lane on an unlit, limited access highway
where he would not be expected and where Knapp was driving at a lawful speed in an otherwise
lawful manner on a highway with a speed limit of 70 miles per hour. On these facts, showing that
Knapp’s purported failure to keep a proper lookout was a proximate cause of the accident requires

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some evidence of when Bell should have been visible to Knapp and whether Knapp had time to
avoid the accident. See McGuire, 354 Mich at 239-240 (considering stopping distances and
whether the accident was avoidable).

        Plaintiff offered no such evidence. None. At most, plaintiff offered statements by two
witnesses who saw a pedestrian walking westbound on the highway to assert that Bell would have
been visible on the highway. Neither individual who called the police gave any indication that
they had to stop when they saw the pedestrian or that they would have had time to stop, or
otherwise avoid him, had he been in their lane of travel. Robbins’s affidavit—which also suggests
that Knapp could have seen Bell—similarly fails to provide any indication of when Knapp should
have seen Bell or whether Knapp should have seen him in time to avoid the accident. Plaintiff’s
failure to present such evidence leaves Knapp’s testimony uncontradicted that the accident could
not have been avoided. See Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996) (noting nonmoving party’s burden to respond to documentary evidence to establish that a
genuine issue of disputed fact exists).

       The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition. I would
reverse the order of the trial court and remand for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion.

                                                            /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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