Court Opinion

ID: 9306449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:17:25.067223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:55.865700
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
(November 11, 1892.)
, Both parties being dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, I have permitted them to make further arguments. Tn' behalf of the city, it is asserted that, by its charter, the city is given specific power to locate sewers in its streets, and that the action of the city government in the exercise of this specific power is not subject to the power of the courts to pass judgment upon the reasonableness or unreasonableness thereof. The last proposition is well supported by authorities cited, including 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 328, 393; and it is .true that the city charter does contain a provision declaring, in specific terms, that the city government has power to locate sewers in the streets of the city. But this charter was framed and adopted by the people of the city themselves, after the rights of the complainant had become vested. The constitution and a general statute of the state gave the people of Spokane power to frame a charter for their 'city, and conferred upon the city, in general terms, the powers of a municipal corporation, and also granted certain powers and imposed limitations in specific terms. I do not find included in the enumeration of powers granted any specific provision relating to the location of sewers. That the charter of a city, framed by the people thereof under the constitutional and statutory provisions of this state, cannot be regarded as a grant of power from the state, is, in my opinion, established by the decision of the supreme court of this state in the case of City of Tacoma v. State, (Wash. St.) 29 Pac. Rep. 847. I hold, therefore, that the power of the city to locate sewers, and provide for the construction thereof, exists only by virtue of the general grant from the state of power to control its streets, and provide for the health and general welfare of its inhabitants; and, in the exercise of such powers, it cannot unreasonably infringe individual rights without liability to be called to account in the courts. Counsel for the city also calls my attention to the case of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450, and relies upon it as an authority denying the right of an individual to maintain a suit in defense of the rights of a corporation. That case appears to have been instituted for the protection of the shareholders of a corporation by one of their number. This case is different. The complainant is a mort*519gagee of the property of the Ross Park Railway Company. His rights and title are not merged in the rights and title of the corporation. Though he has but a lien, that lien is his property, and a suit to protect it from injury by trespass involves a direct controversy between him and the trespasser.
On the complainant’s side, the argument consists mainly of suggestions of difficulties and obstacles which may prevent a recovery of compensation for the destruction of his security in an action at law. The difficulties and obstacles, however, are not shown by averments in the hill to which the demurrer has reference. An amended hill having been presented to me, and the application for an injunction pendente lite being renewed pursuant to leave granted, I am of the opinion that it now appears that irreparable injury to the complainant is threatened. The amended bill shows that the railway company is insolvent; that it will be unable to repair the damage which will be done by constructing the sewer as proposed, or to again put its railway in operation; that the mortgaged property will not be of sufficient value, in the condition in which it will he left after the posts, wires, and tracks shall have been displaced, as proposed in the prosecution of the work of constructing said sewer, to produce, upon a sale thereof, more than a small fraction of the plaintiff’s debt; that the threatened injury to his security will render his bonds unmarketable, and worthless as negotiable paper; that the city of Spokane is now in debt to an amount exceeding $1,700,000, and, by reason of constitutional and statutory limitations upon its powers to levy taxes, collect revenue, and incur debts, a judgment against it for the amount of the damages which the complainant will sustain by reason of the acts threatened will not be collectible. These new averments show tha t the complainant has no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. In my opinion, the amended bill must be answered, and the present application for an injunction must be granted.