Court Opinion

ID: 9462228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:35:29.851807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:58.552213
License: Public Domain

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
The convictions of both defendants should be reversed because there was no probable cause to search the Chevrolet. The majority says that information supplied by the informant furnished probable cause. The informant telephoned an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration and told him that a blue-green Pontiac, California license HGP 761, would enter the United States at Calexico “before too long” and would “contain marijuana.” If the informant gave the agent “any explanation, source or basis for this information, the government failed to introduce it.” (United States v. Hamilton (9th Cir. 1974), 490 F.2d 598, 600.)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the agent who received the informant’s phone call testified that the informant had supplied him with accurate information about contraband-laden vehicles on four to six occasions within the previous six years. This testimony was directed to the issue of the informant’s reliability. However, “there is a ‘two-pronged’ test. It is necessary to make some showing of the validity of the conclusions made by the reliable informant.” (United States v. Hamilton, supra, 490 F.2d at 600; see Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; United States v. Davis (3rd Cir. 1972), 461 F.2d 1026, 1033.) The second aspect of the test can be satisfied in any of three different ways: the informant can supply the government agent with the underlying basis of his conclusions; the agent can independently corroborate significant features of the informant’s story; or the information supplied by the informant can be so detailed that it is inherently reliable. (United States v. Hamilton, supra, 490 F.2d at 600 — 01.) The record fails to support any of these alternatives.
The Government contends that the informant’s tip was independently corrobo*1133rated. I cannot agree. Certainly there is nothing criminal about driving a vehicle across the border to a residence in Calexico. No criminal activity was apparent at the Eighth Street residence. In the farming community of Calexico, early rising, turning on lights, loading “a large box or large bag” onto a pickup truck are commonplace events. These routine activities are not signals of unlawful activity and they are “not endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informer’s tip.” (Spinelli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 418, 89 S.Ct. at 590; see United States v. Larkin (9th Cir. 1974), 510 F.2d 13 [observation of innocuous details not corroborative].) The Government cannot justify the search because an unverified tip turned out to be right. “It is hornbook law that ex post facto verification does not satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” (United States v. Hamilton, supra, 490 F.2d at 601.)
Moreno-Buelna’s conviction should be reversed on the additional ground that there is insufficient evidence connecting him with the underlying criminal activity. No agent saw him at the Eighth Street residence. No marijuana was found on his person. The sole evidence against him was the fact that he was a passenger in the Chevrolet when the Boarder Patrol stopped it and discovered the marijuana. The contraband was not visible to either the driver or the passenger. (See United States v. Thomas (9th Cir. 1971), 453 F.2d 141; see also United States v. Flom (9th Cir. 1972), 464 F.2d 554; United States v. Holland (1971), 144 U.S.App.D.C. 225, 445 F.2d 701; Murray v. United States (9th Cir. 1968), 403 F.2d 694.) The majority cites no evidence to support its statement that the jury could have concluded that Moreno-Buelna “was one of the male individuals who loaded the pickup.” I can find nothing in the record from which the jury could have inferred that Moreno-Buelna was present when the vehicle was loaded, or that he had anything to do with loading the pickup. The inference rests on nothing firmer than “utter speculation.” (United States v. Holland, supra, 445 F.2d at 703.)
Accordingly, I would reverse both convictions.