Court Opinion

ID: 9890014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:45.369351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.875367
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 In re Ja.P. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re Ja.P. et al., Persons                                  B321468 (consolidated with
Coming Under the Juvenile                                    B321471)
Court Law.                                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No.
                                                             21CCJP02855A–B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

M.A.,

         Defendant and Appellant.
      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Peter R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore.
Dismissed.
      Darlene A. Kelly, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Veronica
Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

           _________________________________________

                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      M.A (mother) appeals from an exit order that granted J.P.
(father) unmonitored visitation with the children, Ja.P. (born in
2008) and Jac.P. (born in 2011), arguing that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in issuing the order. The right to appeal
from such an order, however, is generally limited to parties
aggrieved by it. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 902; In re Crystal J. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189–190; In re Carissa G. (1999) 76
Cal.App.4th 731, 734 [“To be aggrieved, a party must have a
legally cognizable immediate and substantial interest which is
injuriously affected by the court’s decision. A nominal interest or
remote consequence of the ruling does not satisfy this
requirement”].)1 We conclude that because mother is not

1     The children requested that the juvenile court grant father
unmonitored visitation and, therefore, they did not appeal from
the exit order granting such relief. And, although the
Department joined in mother’s request that father’s visitation be

                                 2
aggrieved by the order, she lacks standing to bring this appeal
and that, even if she was aggrieved, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering unmonitored visitation.

                     II.    BACKGROUND

      On August 10, 2021, the Department sustained an
amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition that
alleged father’s sexual abuse of the children’s two adult half-
sisters, when those siblings were minors, and mother’s failure to
protect the children placed the children at risk of serious physical
harm and sexual abuse. The court ordered the children removed
from father and granted father monitored visitation two times a
week for two hours each visit. The court granted father
reunification services and ordered him to participate in sex abuse
counseling and individual counseling.
      On January 31, 2022, the Department filed a status review
report. Jac.P. told the social worker that he wished to see father
more often. Ja.P. had initially declined to visit with father, but
then told the social worker that she missed father and wished to
participate in visits with him. She was subsequently “very
happy” to see father on visits. A social worker observed that the
monitored visits were going well. The children’s therapist
reported that she had no concerns about abuse or neglect of the
children, who appeared to love father and spoke of him in a

monitored, it did not file a respondent’s brief, and instead filed a
letter stating that “the proper respondent is father whose rights
are impacted by the outcome of this appeal” and therefore took no
position on whether the unmonitored visitation order was an
abuse of discretion.

                                 3
positive manner. Father had enrolled in individual counseling
and missed only one session. The therapist reported that father
“appear[ed] to be [a] protective and loving father.” Father had
also enrolled in sexual abuse counseling and had participated in
13 sessions, but missed three. Although father had “good
participation,” he continued to deny that he sexually abused the
older siblings.
       On February 8, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a status
review hearing at which it concluded that continued jurisdiction
was necessary and continued all prior orders.
       On May 3, 2022, the Department filed a status review
report explaining that father was in compliance with his case
plan. Further, an in-home outreach counselor expressed that she
did not have any safety concerns for the children and that the
children reported being close to father. Father’s therapist
reported that father participated in 30 sessions and had two
absences. Although father actively participated in the sessions,
he continued to deny engaging in sexual abuse. The therapist
observed that father lacked insight and she therefore
recommended further individual therapy. Father’s sexual abuse
counselor reported that father attended 24 sessions and missed
four, three of which were excused. Father had “good
participation, ask[ed] questions, [was] receptive to comments,
and provid[ed] his peers with his feedback.” He persisted,
however, in his denials of the sustained sexual abuse allegations
against him. The counselor stated he would provide further
updates on father’s progress. The children reported feeling
comfortable and safe with father. They enjoyed their visits and
looked forward to spending more time with him. And, they
wanted their visits to be unmonitored. The Department

                                4
recommended that jurisdiction be terminated with an order
granting joint legal custody to the parents, primary physical
custody to mother, and monitored visits for father.
       On May 18, 2022, the parties appeared for a review
hearing. Father requested that the visits with his children be
unmonitored. Mother did not object to jurisdiction being
terminated, but opposed father’s request for unmonitored
visitation. The children’s counsel did not oppose the termination
of jurisdiction and related that the children wished to have more
visits and for those visits to be unmonitored. The Department
objected to unmonitored visitation for father.
       The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, granted the
parents joint legal custody, and granted mother sole physical
custody. It also granted father two, three-hour visits with the
children, which were to be unmonitored, but in a public setting,
from noon to 3:00 p.m. on a Saturday or Sunday. Further, father
was ordered to confirm his visits 24 hours in advance. The court
noted the children’s ages, one being a teenager, and that they had
expressed a desire for visitation.
       Mother timely appealed.

                       III.   DISCUSSION

A.    Standing

      The parties fully briefed the abuse of discretion issue on the
merits. But, because the standing issue was not raised by the
parties, we requested supplemental letter briefs addressing it. In
her supplemental brief, mother contends that she is aggrieved by
the exit order’s grant of unmonitored visitation to father.

                                 5
According to mother, by authorizing unsupervised visits with
father, the order impairs her ability to protect the children from
him by requiring her to seek a family court order based on
changed circumstances before she can restrict his access to
them.2 Father counters that mother’s interest in the order is
insufficient to support standing and that she has an adequate
remedy in the family court to seek restrictions on visitation.
       Mother, whose custodial rights to the children have already
been reinstated, does not have “a legally cognizable immediate
and substantial interest” in the challenged exit order. (See In re
Carissa G., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 734, 736 [that a parent
takes a position on a matter at issue in a juvenile dependency
case that affects his or her child does not alone constitute a
sufficient reason to establish standing to challenge an adverse
ruling on it]; In re Devin M. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1541
[“[A] parent’s interest is in reunification. The interest of siblings
or other relatives in their relationship with the minor is separate
from that of the parent”].) Accordingly, she lacks standing to
appeal from it.

B.    Abuse of Discretion

      But even if we assumed that mother’s interest in protecting
the children was sufficient to support standing on appeal to
challenge the exit order, we would conclude that the juvenile

2     Mother additionally contends that prior to the initiation of
juvenile court proceedings, she had “sole legal and physical
custody of the children.” Mother’s contention is contrary to the
record, which indicates that prior to the instant proceedings, the
parents were not parties to a family law order.

                                  6
court did not abuse its discretion by granting father unmonitored
visitation.
       We review a juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of
discretion. (In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 902.) “‘“The
appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court.”’
[Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319.)
       On appeal, mother argues that father’s continued denial of
sexual abuse and his lack of progress in therapy and sexual
abuse counseling—as demonstrated by the therapist
recommending further therapy and the sexual abuse counselor
assuming the need for such further counseling—supported an
inference that he was a continuing danger to the children. In
making that argument, however, mother ignores other evidence
supporting an equally reasonable inference that the children
would not be not be at risk during the visits.
       Although father, throughout the course of the proceedings,
denied the alleged sexual abuse of the adult half-siblings, the
record also showed that he willingly and “actively” participated in
the court-ordered services, attending 30 individual therapy
sessions and 24 sexual abuse counseling sessions. The record
also showed that the children felt comfortable and safe around
father, enjoyed and looked forward to their visits with him, and
wanted those visits to be unmonitored. In addition, there were
no current allegations involving the children similar to the past
claims of serious abuse against father and, as the juvenile court
noted, the children were old enough to recognize and report any
such inappropriate conduct. Finally, the court did not grant

                                7
father unfettered access to the children, and instead limited his
contact to three hours during the weekend, between noon and
3:00 p.m., in a public setting.
      Having reviewed the evidence under the applicable
standard of deferential review, we would conclude that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an exit order
that granted father unmonitored visitation.

                      IV.    DISPOSITION

    Mother’s appeal from the exit order granting father
unmonitored visitation with the children is dismissed.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           KIM, J.

I concur:

            MOOR, J.

                                 8
In re Ja.P. et al.
B321468

BAKER, Acting P. J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

       I do not agree M.A. lacks standing such that the appeal
should be dismissed. I do agree the limited order for
unmonitored visitation the juvenile court made was not an abuse
of its discretion. I would accordingly affirm the order challenged
on appeal.

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.