Court Opinion

ID: 9883083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:37:02.516485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:21.096856
License: Public Domain

Mr. .Justice Brown,
dissenting.
I am- unable to concur in the construction put' by the court upon th.e statute of June 3, 1878. Bearing in mind that the policy of the Government has been to preserve its rapidly diminishing areas of forest lands for the benefit of the whole people, any statute which permits timber to be cut by individuals should be narrowly construed.
In my view, the license given to citizens of the United States and residents of the States and Territories named, “to fell and remove, for building, agricultural, mining or other domestic purposes,” timber and trees growing upon the public lands should be confined to timber intended to be used for structural or household purposes, and not be extended so far as to authorize the consumption of timber in manufacturing or other business operations. The word “building” explains itself. “Agriculture” would include timber used for houses, barns, tools, furniture and fences. The word “mining” was doubtless intended to include not only the buildings necessary for mining operations, but such timber as is used in shoring up the walls of the mine, and perhaps also in operating .the hoisting engines, but not that used for consumption in the treatment of ores.
It is true the words “other domestic purposes” are susceptible of two constructions. The word “domestic,” when used in connection with the words commerce, manufactures or industries, is significant of locality, and is contradistin-guished from foreign, but when used in connection with the *217word “purposes” it is! most nearly analogous to “household.” The difficulty with the former construction is that it practically liberates the word from all restrictions. If it be construed as referring to locality, what is the locality to which it should be confined? Is it the immediate neighborhood, township, county or State, or may it be given the same, construction as given to it in connection with the words commerce or manufacturing, and be extended to the .whole United States? If either of these constructions were possible, it would result in-the destruction of all timber standing upon public mineral lands, as well as in an unfair discrimination against those less favorably situated, who are compelled to pay for the fuel consumed in the treatment of ores. I do not think the word “other ” can be used as an enlargement of the word “domestic,” and that it should be confined, as are the preceding words, to timber used for other analogous structural purposes and for household consumption — in short, to other purposes domestic in their character.
For these reasons I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the court.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Peckham concur in this dissent.