Court Opinion

ID: 9421316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:57:49.261204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:29.674355
License: Public Domain

*413Me. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the Court and in so much of Mr. Justice Reed's opinion as supports the conclusion that cellophane did not by itself constitute a closed market but was a part of the relevant market for flexible packaging materials.
Mr. Justice Reed has pithily defined the conflicting claims in this case. “The charge was monopolization of cellophane. The defense, that cellophane was merely a part of the relevant market for flexible packaging materials.” Since this defense is sustained, the judgment below must be affirmed and it becomes unnecessary to consider whether du Pont’s power over trade in cellophane would, had the defense failed, come within the prohibition of “monopolizing” under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Needless disquisition on the difficult subject of single-firm monopoly should be avoided since the case may be disposed of without consideration of this problem.
The boundary between the course of events by which a business may reach a powerful position in an industry without offending the outlawry of “monopolizing” under i 2 of the Sherman Act and the course of events which brings the attainment of that result within the condemnation of that section, cannot be established by general phrases. It must be determined with reference to specific facts upon considerations analogous to those by which § 1 of the Sherman Act is applied. These were illuminatingly stated by Mr. Justice Brandéis for the Court:
“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which *414the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. . . Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238.
Sections 1 and 2 of course implicate different considerations. But the so-called issues of fact and law that call for adjudication in this legal territory are united, and intrinsically so, with factors that entail social and economic judgment. Any consideration of “monopoly” under the Sherman law can hardly escape judgment, even if only implied, on social and economic issues. It had best be withheld until a case inescapably calls for it.