Court Opinion

ID: 9951347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 20:01:08.558149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:39:34.798750
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10685    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 03/15/2024   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10685
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        TONIA BROADNAX,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SSF IMPORTED AUTO PARTS LLC,
        JOHN DOE,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00295-MLB
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        2                       Opinion of the Court              23-10685

                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
              Tonia Broadnax appeals the district court’s order granting
        SSF Imported Auto Parts LLC’s motion for summary judgment on
        her premises liability negligence claim against SSF. On appeal,
        Broadnax argues that the grant of summary judgment was im-
        proper because there are genuine issues of material fact as to
        whether SSF breached its duty to keep its premises safe for
        Broadnax. For the following reasons, we affirm.
            I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                Broadnax was an independent contract driver for Cannon
        Delivery Services, Inc., a third-party delivery company. As part of
        Broadnax’s job, she picked up automobile parts from SSF’s ware-
        house in Norcross, Georgia, for Cannon. On December 21, 2016,
        Broadnax arrived at around 7:00 a.m. to SSF’s warehouse to pick
        up a delivery. After picking up the delivery, Broadnax slipped and
        fell on a metal ramp as she was exiting the warehouse, causing her
        to suffer injuries.
              Broadnax subsequently filed a complaint against SSF in
        Georgia state court in December 2018, alleging a premises liability
        negligence claim. Broadnax eventually voluntarily dismissed this
        complaint without prejudice on June 25, 2020.
             Then, on December 18, 2020, Broadnax filed a renewed
        complaint and jury demand in Georgia state court. In her renewed
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        23-10685               Opinion of the Court                        3

        complaint, Broadnax alleged that the metal ramp she slipped on
        was “covered with black ice, just outside the building,” and consti-
        tuted a hazardous condition.
                SSF removed the renewed action to federal court on the ba-
        sis of diversity jurisdiction. Broadnax sought to remand the action
        to state court, but the district court denied her motion.
                Broadnax then filed an amended complaint and jury de-
        mand. Broadnax again asserted that she slipped on black ice on the
        metal ramp. She alleged that the ramp “was not treated with rock
        salt, or sand or any other substance to reduce, eliminate or prevent
        ice accumulation.” She claimed that SSF: was on notice that in-
        vitees would be utilizing the ramp that caused her fall; was aware
        of prior instances where ice accumulation made the ramp unsafe
        under certain weather conditions; was aware, via actual or con-
        structive notice, that the ramp was slippery; and knew the condi-
        tion of the ramp constituted a hazardous condition. Broadnax al-
        leged that SSF owed a legal duty under Georgia law of reasonable
        care to invitees to inspect and keep the premises in a safe condition
        and that SSF failed to inspect the premises for and remedy the black
        ice accumulation that caused her fall. She also alleged that SSF
        failed to warn her of the black ice accumulation and that SSF had
        superior knowledge and actual or constructive knowledge of the
        hazardous condition. And Broadnax alleged that SSF had employ-
        ees in the area where she was injured immediately before and after
        her fall.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10685

               The case proceeded to the discovery phase, and Broadnax
        was deposed. Broadnax testified to the following during her depo-
        sition. On the morning of the incident, Broadnax arrived at SSF’s
        warehouse at around 7:00 a.m. and parked between the ramp and
        a warehouse door. Broadnax stated that the weather was cold and
        that she noticed ice on her car’s windshield that morning.
        Broadnax walked up the stairs, entered the warehouse, and pro-
        ceeded to retrieve the items that she was scheduled to deliver later
        that day.
               Broadnax then began to depart the premises, carrying the
        items. As she was walking down the ramp, her feet slipped, but she
        could not say with specificity where her feet were located on the
        ramp when she fell. Broadnax then fell directly backwards onto the
        ramp. Broadnax did not see anything on the ramp while she was
        laying on the ground. When she put her hands on the ramp, she
        stated that she “felt cold” and “felt ice.” But Broadnax did not have
        any water on her hands nor on any part of her body following the
        fall. Nor was she sure if there was any ice on her clothing or body
        following the fall. While Broadnax “felt the ice,” she “did not see
        any ice” on the ramp. She stated that she felt “thin” “ice chips” on
        the ramp and that her whole hand was cold. But she then stated
        that she did not know how thick the ice was.
              Additionally, Broadnax was the first person to walk down
        the warehouse’s ramp that day. And she did not know the last time
        an SSF employee was in the area where she fell.
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        23-10685                Opinion of the Court                           5

                 After completing discovery, SSF moved for summary judg-
        ment. SSF argued that Broadnax could not show that SSF had ac-
        tual knowledge of the hazard that allegedly caused her accident be-
        cause no evidence demonstrated that SSF had actual knowledge of
        ice on the ramp. SSF also argued that Broadnax could not show
        that SSF had constructive knowledge of the hazard because: (1) she
        did not see ice on the ramp after her fall and there was no SSF em-
        ployee in the area that could have easily seen the ice; and (2) no
        evidence showed that the alleged ice was present for a length of
        time sufficient for knowledge of it to be imputed to SSF. SSF fur-
        ther argued that Broadnax could not identity what caused her to
        fall, as her testimony was speculation and conjecture. Finally, SSF
        argued that it did not breach a duty owed to Broadnax regarding
        naturally accumulating ice in winter weather and that she had
        equal knowledge of the hazard. 1
                SSF also attached a statement of undisputed material facts to
        its motion. Of relevance here, SSF stated that: (1) Broadnax did not
        know the last time an SSF employee was in the area where the fall
        occurred nor the last time the ramp was inspected; (2) she was the
        first person to walk down the ramp that day; (3) she could not say
        with specificity where her feet were located on the ramp when she
        fell; (4) she had no water on her hands or any part of her body

        1 SSF also argued that Broadnax was required to indemnify SSF because no

        evidence showed agreement between the parties in its motion. The district
        court, however, rejected this argument in granting summary judgment, and
        the issue is not relevant to this appeal.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10685

        following the fall; (5) she did not see ice on the ramp after the fall
        and “simply felt the cold ramp after [the] fall”; (6) she did not know
        how thin the ice was or how long it was on the ramp; and (7) she
        was aware that the weather was cold the morning of the accident
        and “aware of icy conditions and had noticed ice on her car.”
                Broadnax opposed SSF’s motion, arguing that SSF had supe-
        rior knowledge of the hazardous condition and that there was a
        genuine issue of material fact as to whether SSF breached its duty
        to her when it failed to adhere to its own policy and procedures,
        e.g., its internal policies and procedures for daily inspections of its
        premises and its Inclement Weather Policy that mandated ramps
        to be “winterized” by using de-icing solutions. Additionally, she
        argued for the first time that the ramp had an “inappropriate
        pitch/slope.” She also provided a response to SSF’s statement of
        facts and her own statement of undisputed material facts. In this
        response, Broadnax argued that she “did not have notice of any ‘icy
        conditions’ at the SSF facility,” as her testimony was that “she no-
        ticed ice on her windshield as she entered her car when she left
        home, nothing more.” However, she did not respond to any of the
        other allegations from SSF’s statement of material facts.
              On February 17, 2023, the district court granted summary
        judgment in favor of SSF. The district court began by noting that
        Broadnax had only responded to one of SSF’s allegations from its
        statement of undisputed material facts. As such, the court stated it
        would deem all the other allegations in SSF’s statement of material
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        23-10685               Opinion of the Court                         7

        facts admitted pursuant to Northern District of Georgia Civil Local
        Rule 56 if supported by the record.
                Turning to SSF’s arguments, the district court found that
        summary judgment was appropriate because Broadnax could not
        identify what caused her fall. The court explained that Broadnax
        had alleged that she slipped on black ice in her complaint but that
        “[b]y the time of summary judgment, it was just an ‘icy ramp.’”
        Further, Broadnax admitted she did not see any ice on the ramp
        after she fell, could not specify where her feet were on the ramp
        when she fell nor how thick the ice was, and had no water on her
        hands or body after she fell. Instead, the court stated that “[s]he
        merely felt the cold ramp.” But, the district court explained, Geor-
        gia law required more, as “no one, not even after the fact, wit-
        nessed ice on the ramp.” As such, the court found that SSF was
        entitled to summary judgment on this argument. Further, in a
        footnote, the court noted that it had “discovered” a portion of
        Broadnax’s deposition “in which she claimed to have ‘felt the ice,’
        like ‘thin chipped.’” But the court explained that Broadnax had
        failed to raise this testimony in her response brief and statement of
        facts and declined to consider it. The court also reasoned that even
        if it considered this evidence, it still found SSF entitled to summary
        judgment based on constructive knowledge.
              The district court next addressed Broadnax’s argument
        about the “inappropriate pitch/slope” of the ramp. The court
        found that, to the extent she was citing the slope as the cause of her
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                23-10685

        injury, she could not do so, as she did not allege the slope as the
        cause of her injury in her complaint.
               The court then addressed SSF’s duty and knowledge argu-
        ments. The court explained that, even in the case of naturally oc-
        curring hazards, it must assess whether SSF had notice of the al-
        leged hazard. The court noted that Broadnax had not alleged ac-
        tual knowledge of the hazard, so it only considered whether SSF
        had constructive knowledge. The court explained that Broadnax
        had only alleged constructive knowledge under an ”inspection pro-
        cedure theory” and that, because there was no evidence of prior
        incidences or of SSF’s employees being in the immediate area, it
        would only assess constructive knowledge under a reasonable in-
        spection theory. But, the court further explained, it “need not de-
        cide whether there was a reasonable inspection procedure because
        there is no evidence the ice could have been discovered during any
        such inspection.” The court again found that the undisputed evi-
        dence showed that Broadnax did not see any ice on the ramp after
        she fell and could not specify where her feet were located on the
        ramp when she fell nor how thick the ice was. As a result, the court
        could not conclude that a reasonable inspection procedure would
        have prevented the accident. Finally, the court found that because
        SSF lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard,
        Broadnax could not show that SSF had superior knowledge to her.
            Accordingly, the district court granted SSF’s motion for
        summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
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        23-10685                  Opinion of the Court                          9

                         II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judg-
        ment, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most
        favorable to the nonmoving party.” Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc.,
        764 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014). “Summary judgment is ap-
        propriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
        and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
        Id. “An issue of fact is ‘material’ if, under the applicable substantive
        law, it might affect the outcome of the case.” Hickson Corp. v. N.
        Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). And “[a]n issue
        of fact is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a ra-
        tional trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 1260.
                                    III.   ANALYSIS
                On appeal, Broadnax argues that the district court erred in
        granting summary judgment because there are genuine issues of
        material fact as to whether SSF breached its duty to keep its prem-
        ises safe for Broadnax. Broadnax asserts that genuine issues of fact
        remain as to: (1) the faulty and noncompliant set-up of the ramp;
        (2) SSF’s failure to follow internal protocols for maintaining written
        evidence for its daily safety inspections of its premises; (3) SSF’s fail-
        ure to follows its Inclement Weather Policy, which specifically ap-
        plied to conditions that created the alleged hazard that injured
        Broadnax; (4) SSF’s failure to utilize supplies and resources onsite
        to “de-ice” or “winterize” its entryways and ramps as required by
        its internal policies and procedures; and (5) SSF’s liability for lead-
        ing Broadnax through a bay door to use a ramp for egress when
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                   23-10685

        SSF knew or should have known it failed to follow internal proce-
        dures to ensure the directed route was safe to traverse.
                Under Georgia law, 2 “[t]he threshold point of inquiry in a
        slip and fall case is the existence of a hazardous condition on the
        premises.” El Ranchero Mexican Rest., No. 10, Inc. v. Hiner, 728 S.E.2d
        761, 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Flagstar Enters. v. Burch, 600
        S.E.2d 834, 856 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)). Thus, “proof of a fall, without
        more, does not give rise to liability on the part of a proprietor.”
        Emory Univ. v. Smith, 581 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (quot-
        ing Christensen v. Overseas Partners Cap., Inc., 549 S.E.2d 784, 785
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)). Rather, “[t]he true basis of a proprietor's lia-
        bility for personal injury to an invitee is the proprietor's superior
        knowledge of a condition that may expose the invitees to an unrea-
        sonable risk of harm,” and “[r]ecovery is allowed only when the pro-
        prietor had knowledge and the invitee did not.” Id. (quoting Chris-
        tensen, 549 S.E.2d at 785–86). Further, “[w]here the plaintiff does
        not know of a cause or cannot prove the cause, there can be no
        recovery because an essential element of negligence cannot be
        proven.” El Ranchero, 728 F.3d at 763 (quoting Flagstar, 600 S.E.2d
        at 856). And “[a] mere possibility of causation is not enough and
        when the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, it
        is appropriate for the court to grant summary judgment to the de-
        fendant.” Id. (quoting Flagstar, 600 S.E.2d at 856); see, e.g., Hudson
        v. J.H. Harvey Co., 536 S.E.2d 172, 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 200) (affirming

        2 We apply Georgia’s substantive law in this diversity action.   Newcomb v.
        Spring Creek Cooler Inc, 926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2019).
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        23-10685               Opinion of the Court                        11

        the grant of summary judgment for defendant because the plaintiff
        had not presented evidence of how she slipped and because “spec-
        ulation cannot establish causation”).
                For example, in Veazey v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 382 S.E.2d 411
        (Ga. Ct. App. 1989), a plaintiff slipped and fell in the defendant’s
        store and brought a premises liability action against the defendant.
        Id. at 411. The plaintiff had entered the store on a rainy day and
        walked across an entrance lobby to the top of a stairway. Id. The
        plaintiff then paused, placed her hand on the railing, and slipped.
        Id. The plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall but assumed
        it was because of an accumulation of rainwater on the floor. Id.
        But the plaintiff did not see any rainwater on the floor before or
        after she fell. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for
        defendant, and the Georgia appellate court affirmed. Id. The court
        reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to prove how or why she
        slipped. Id.
                Similarly, in Futch v. Super Disc. Mkts., Inc., 526 S.E.2d 401
        (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), the plaintiff slipped and fell while shopping in
        the defendant’s grocery store. Id. at 403. During the plaintiff’s dep-
        osition, she admitted that she was not sure what caused her fall but
        claimed to have seen two puddles of liquid on the floor in the area
        of the fall after the incident. Id. at 403–04. But other than those
        puddles, the plaintiff did not see anything else in the area. Id. The
        trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
        and the Georgia appellate court affirmed. Id. at 404–05. In doing
        so, the court explained that “the mere presence of two undisturbed
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10685

        puddles near the area of [plaintiff’s] fall” did not raise a genuine is-
        sue of fact as to whether she might have slipped in a different pud-
        dle of liquid, particularly when she testified that she saw no liquid
        on the floor where she fell nor noticed any liquid on her hands or
        clothes. Id. at 405.
                 And, in Taylor v. Thunderbird Lanes, LLC, 748 S.E.2d 308 (Ga.
        Ct. App. 2013), the plaintiff fell when she approached the foul line
        of a bowling alley lane to bowl her first ball and landed nearly four
        feet past the foul line. Id. at 310. After she fell, the plaintiff’s son
        came to her aid and noticed there was a significant amount of oil
        in the lane where she fell. Id. But when being deposed, the plaintiff
        testified that “she did not know why she fell” and “did not see any
        oil in the approach area before the foul line” but that “she believed
        that there must have been oil in the approach area, which caused
        her to slip.” Id. But neither the plaintiff’s son nor daughter-in-law
        noticed any oil on the “approach” side of the foul line, and the
        daughter-in-law had bowled without incident only moments be-
        fore the fall. Id. at 311. The trial court granted the defendant’s
        motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s premises liability
        claim, and the Georgia appellate court affirmed because the plain-
        tiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
        oil caused her to slip and fall. Id. at 311–12.
               Here, the district court found that the cause of Broadnax’s
        fall was pure “speculation or conjecture.” The court explained that
        the evidence showed Broadnax did not see any ice nor was she wet
        after the fall and that “[o]ther than the ramp being cold and the
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        23-10685               Opinion of the Court                         13

        weather, [she] present[ed] no evidence for her ice theory.” And,
        the court explained, “no one, not even after the fact, witnessed ice
        on the ramp.” And, in granting summary judgment, the court re-
        lied on Hudson, in which the Georgia appellate court affirmed the
        grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plain-
        tiff’s premises liability claim because, despite assuming she slipped
        on water in the defendant’s supermarket on a rainy day, she did not
        see or feel any water after she fell nor noticed any water on her
        clothes. 536 S.E.2d at 173.
                Reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that
        the cause of Broadnax’s fall was speculative. On the morning of
        the incident, the weather was cold. Broadnax testified that, after
        she fell, she “felt cold” on the ramp and asserted that it was ice. But
        she did not have any water on her hands or body after the fall, nor
        could she remember if there was any ice on her clothing or body.
        Broadnax also did not see any ice on the ramp nor was able to say
        how thick the alleged ice on the ramp was. And she could not iden-
        tify where her feet were located on the ramp when she fell.
                On appeal, Broadnax primarily focuses on whether SSF
        complied with its own inspection policies and procedures to argue
        that SSF had constructive notice of the alleged hazard, although
        she briefly claims that the cause of her fall was not speculative be-
        cause “she confirmed she felt ice immediately after her fall.” But
        Broadnax does not otherwise address the evidence relied on by the
        district court. “Evidence of a hazardous condition was required
        before [SSF] could be said to have actual or constructive knowledge
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                        23-10685

        of it.” See Hudson, 536 S.E. 2d at 173; see also Emory Univ., 581 S.E.2d
        at 406. But given the evidence that she saw no ice before or after
        the fall, 3 Broadnax’s assumption that there was ice on the ramp be-
        cause she felt cold metal on a cold morning is mere speculation and
        cannot establish causation for her premises liability claim under
        Georgia law. See id.; Veazey, 382 S.E.2d at 411; Futch, 526 S.E.2d at
        404–95; Taylor, 748 S.E.2d at 311–12.
               Broadnax alternatively argues that the ramp she slipped on
        had an inappropriate “pitch/slope,” of which SSF had constructive
        notice. But, as the district court noted, Broadnax did not allege that
        the ramp was too steep in her renewed complaint; she made this
        argument for the first time in her response to SSF’s motion for sum-
        mary judgment. A plaintiff, however, “may not amend her com-
        plaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”
        Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
        2004); accord White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188,

        3 At one point in Broadnax’s deposition, she testified that she felt “ice chips”

        on the ramp. But as the district court noted, Broadnax did not present this
        testimony in opposing SSF’s summary judgment motion or in her statement
        of material facts; rather, the district court discovered it “[b]y coincidence” and
        declined to consider it. Northern District of Georgia Civil Local Rule
        56.1(B)(2)(a) provides that the court will deem a movant’s facts as admitted
        unless the respondent “directly refutes the movant’s fact with concise re-
        sponses supported by specific citations to evidence.” Broadnax failed to re-
        spond to SSF’s statement of undisputed facts with this testimony, and we can-
        not say the district court abused its discretion in applying its local rules and
        not considering this portion of the testimony. Cf. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d
        1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008).
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        23-10685                   Opinion of the Court                                 15

        1200 (11th Cir. 2015). Rather, if Broadnax intended to rely on the
        ramp’s slope as an issue, the proper course was for her to amend
        her complaint in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
        15(a). 4 We therefore decline to consider Broadnax’s arguments
        about the ramp’s slope.
                Accordingly, because Broadnax failed to establish causation
        for her premises liability claim under Georgia law, we affirm the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of SSF.
                                   IV.     CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order grant-
        ing summary judgment in favor of SSF.
                AFFIRMED.

        4 We also reject Broadnax’s argument that her complaint’s allegation of “[t]he

        condition of the ramp, at the time of [her] fall, constituted a hazardous condi-
        tion” was sufficient to put SSF on notice that she was claiming the ramp’s slope
        was a hazard. As the Supreme Court explained in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
        (2009), the pleading standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “does not
        require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
        the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
        Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
        conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
        not do[,]’ [n]or does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid
        of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
        Simply put, Broadnax’s allegation that “[t]he condition of the ramp . . . consti-
        tuted a hazardous condition” did not put SSF on notice that Broadnax was
        claiming the ramp’s slope constituted a hazardous condition, especially when
        coupled with the complaint’s allegation that identified “black ice” on the ramp
        as the cause of her fall.