Court Opinion

ID: 9955698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 00:00:37.047889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.971767
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50957          Document: 104-1           Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/28/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit
                                   No. 22-50957
                                 Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                 ____________                                March 28, 2024
                                                                              Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                          Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Fernando Angel Puga,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 3:19-CR-1359-1
                  ______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Defendant-Appellant Fernando Angel Puga was convicted by a jury of
(1) kidnapping, (2) carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, and (3)
transportation of a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce. He was sentenced
to a total of 372 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
Puga contends that the district court erred in imposing a standard supervised

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50957       Document: 104-1      Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/28/2024

                                 No. 22-50957

release condition that impermissibly delegates to the probation officer the
authority to require him to notify people of any risk he may pose to them.
However, Puga concedes that the issue is foreclosed by this court’s
precedent. See United States v. Mejia-Banegas, 32 F.4th 450, 452 (5th Cir.
2022). The Government moves for summary affirmance for that reason.
Because the Government’s position “is clearly right as a matter of law so that
there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case,” summary
affirmance is proper. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162
(5th Cir. 1969).
       Although the written judgment states that Puga was convicted by a
jury on counts one, two, and three—and identifies the offenses charged in
counts one and two—it does not identify the offense charged in count three.
We therefore remand the case for the limited purpose of correcting the
judgment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to reflect that Puga
was convicted of transportation of a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, as charged in count three of the indictment. See
United States v. Cooper, 979 F.3d 1084, 1089 (5th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Mackay, 757 F.3d 195, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2014).
       The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s
motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and its alternative motion
for an extension of time to file its brief is DENIED as moot. We REMAND
for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment under Rule 36 to reflect
that Puga was convicted of transportation of a stolen vehicle in interstate
commerce as charged in count three of the indictment.

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