Court Opinion

ID: 9721142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:49:15.296479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:14.873796
License: Public Domain

*1682PERLEY, J.—
I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion the majority’s statement of facts places more emphasis than is justified on an equal responsibility for the confrontation which led to Dickson being shot. Certainly, the football players, their friends, relatives and supporters were at the dance to celebrate the victory of the Berkeley football team. On the other hand, the defendant, Greg Tolbert, Lament Butcher, Carlos Garcia, and Ferris Foreman were not students at the university or ardent supporters of the team and their actions indicate that they came as a group with the intent to cause trouble.
Thus, they brought at least two guns, a .32-caliber handgun and an Uzi. Further, they openly and deliberately sexually harassed a woman who was seven months pregnant, while she was peacefully dancing with a man who identified himself as her husband. When the married couple moved to the other side of the room, defendant’s group continued to behave in a confrontational manner toward the football players until the shooting occurred. One member of defendant’s group, Carlos Garcia, also harassed another woman at the victory party.
I further believe that the majority opinion fails to sufficiently emphasize that the bulk of the nine-day trial consisted of conflicting identification testimony regarding whether defendant was one of the persons who fired at Dickson.
As stated by the prosecutor in his opening statement: “As anyone might expect in a tragic shooting incident of the type of facts that I have outlined to you the testimony will establish, there are bound to be some people who are able and some people who are unable to identify positively the defendant as being the person that shot Mr. Dickson. There is also some evidence that in addition to the defendant, there was yet another man, a friend of the defendant’s who was at the scene who had a gun and who also shot at Mr. Dickson.” Thus, the prosecution conceded that Tolbert might also have fired at Dickson. The defense was that Tolbert alone fired.
A key prosecution witness testified that in a telephone conversation defendant told her that he and Tolbert shot a football player at a party.
In other prosecution evidence, four eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter, in court, in the following manner. Outside linebacker Albert D. Odom identified him without qualification. Defensive back John Hardy testified that two shots came “[fjrom the hand of the defendant.” The victim, defensive tackle Joel Dickson testified that he was shot by a man standing on a planter box and he was “[a] hundred percent sure” that defendant was on *1683the planter box at that point. Latina Johnson observed defendant extend his arm while he was holding a gun in his hand. She turned to run away and heard two shots.
At a live lineup prior to trial Odom, Hardy, and Johnson identified defendant without qualification as the shooter. Dickson was 70 percent to 80 percent sure. Each of these witnesses had earlier selected defendant’s picture when shown a group of polaroid photographs taken at the Bear’s Lair on the night of the shooting. Odom was 50 percent sure; Dickson “said he looks like the one who shot me.”
Johnson tracked down a photograph of defendant at his high school. However, the four witnesses were not always able to identify defendant in photographic lineups using different pictures of him.
The defense presented three eyewitnesses who contradicted the prosecution identifications. Defendant testified that he observed Tolbert fire two shots at Dickson. Defendant did not fire any shots although one of his group handed him an Uzi at the time of the incident.
Latitia Bradford saw a man on the bench with a shiny metal object that appeared to be a weapon and heard a clicking noise. When she started to walk away she heard shots. Bradford did not see defendant outside at that time. Bradford was shown the series of Polaroid photographs and she selected Tolbert as the man on the bench. Keith Hodges, a friend of the football players, appears to have seen two guns and two or three people around the planter boxes. Hodges observed two shots being fired and while he was running from the scene he heard one or two more.
Turning to the legal issues, the majority opinion may well be correct in holding that the potential evidence of Dana Dorham should have been disclosed at once. However, the “real issue” is whether defendant was prejudiced by the absence of the evidence. (People v. Frohner (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 94, 108 [135 Cal.Rptr. 153].) No reversal is called for unless defendant suffered prejudice; no prejudice occurs if the evidence was cumulative. (People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 34-35 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843].)
“To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear, ... 2. That the evidence be not cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different result probable on a retrial of the cause. . . .” (People v. Steele (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 67, 73 [257 Cal.Rptr. 687], citations arid quotation marks omitted.)
*1684“Numerous cases hold that a motion for a new trial should be granted when the newly discovered evidence contradicts the strongest evidence introduced against the defendant.” (People v. Martinez (1984) 36 Cal.3d 816, 823 [205 Cal.Rptr. 852, 685 P.2d 1203].) Evidence which supports the testimony of the defendant is not cumulative at least when it is the only evidence for the defense. (People v. Ah Lee Doon (1893) 97 Cal. 171, 178 [31 P. 933].) However, evidence which merely contradicts eyewitness testimony may be cumulative. (People v. Trujillo (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 547, 556 [136 Cal.Rptr. 672].)
In the present case the jury had to choose between conflicting identification testimony. Four eyewitnesses identified defendant. One witness testified to the effect that defendant and Tolbert fired. Two eyewitnesses identified Tolbert. One eyewitness testified to the effect that there were two shooters. Two of the three defense witnesses were completely impartial. Thus, any additional eyewitness testimony would be cumulative.
IXirning to Tolbert’s alleged statement. In order to be admissible the statement would have to be a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. The majority concludes that the test of whether the statement falls within the statute “is an objective one—would the statement subject its declarant to criminal liability such that a reasonable person would not have made the statement without believing it true” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1678). In support of this conclusion they cite 1 Jefferson, California Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) section 6.1, pages 259-260.
The full test enunciated in Jefferson is: would a reasonable person “in declarant’s position” have considered that the statement subjected him to the risk of criminal liability. (1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (June 1990 Supp.) pp. 98-99.) Several guiding principles have been developed by the cases to assist courts in applying this somewhat nebulous test.
“The focus of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration. [Citations.] In determining whether a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant’s relationship to the defendant. [Citations.]” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].)
A statement will not be admitted if under all the circumstances the declarant’s reasonable motivation was to exculpate himself even if the *1685resulting statement was inculpatory. (People v. Coble (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 187, 191 [135 Cal.Rptr. 199].) “The decision whether trustworthiness is present requires the court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad and deep acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct themselves in the circumstances material under the exception.” (People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1251 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].)
“The litmus test of determining the admissibility of the extrajudicial statement under section 1230 is whether the declarant should have realized or did realize that the statement when made was distinctly against his penal interest [citation].” (People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 749, 761 [114 Cal.Rptr. 545], italics in original.) A trial court’s ruling will be upheld “absent a clear error of law or manifest abuse of discretion.” (People v. Love (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 928, 941 [142 Cal.Rptr. 532].)
These rules have been applied to facts similar to the facts herein in the following cases.
In People v. Chapman (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 872 [123 Cal.Rptr. 862], the defendant was convicted of murder. He testified to the effect that Banks had killed the victim. (Id. at p. 876.) Statements by three witnesses that Banks had admitted the killing were excluded. Two witnesses heard the admission while they were in jail with Banks and the third was the defendant’s uncle. The prosecution had evidence that Banks had also stated that “ ‘he would take the beef because he is going to the YA and he couldn’t get hurt’ ” and that Banks had been pressured to testify by threats from the defendant. (Id. at pp. 877-878.)
The Court of Appeal affirmed because the “record here strongly suggests the existence of a plan by three fellow prisoners to have one person take the blame for another’s crime under circumstances where the one taking the blame could not suffer any real detriment to his own interests.” (People v. Chapman, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 880.)
In People v. Love, supra, two codefendants were convicted of robbery. One testified that Walton committed the robbery. (75 Cal.App.3d at p. 932.) Testimony of two witnesses that Walton admitted the robbery to them was excluded. (Id. at pp. 934-935.) The judgment was affirmed because one witness was a friend of defendant and Walton, the statement to the witness was incomplete, and it was not made until two months after the robbery. Walton owed money to the other witness and “a likelihood existed that any such confession, even if made, would have been fabricated by Walton to avoid his payment of his debt.” (Id. at pp. 940-941.)
*1686In People v. Blankenship (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 840, 847-848 [213 Cal.Rptr. 666], the defense offered a statement by the defendant that Gary Hahn confessed to the charged robbery and attempted murder while both were in the county jail. Hahn was awaiting trial for other offenses. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of the evidence as follows: “As the proposed testimony was to come from defendant himself it was highly suspect both because defendant had a motive to falsify and because accurate details concerning the crime could be explained by defendant’s own knowledge and guilt rather than Hahn’s.” (Id. at p. 849.)
Herein, the alleged statement from Tolbert was suspect on at least two grounds. First, since Tolbert was dead by the time of the trial, defendant and his friend Butcher could have easily made it up in order to protect defendant without jeopardizing any of the living members of their group.
Second, taking the statement at face value, a reasonable person in Tolbert’s position would not have necessarily considered that the statement subjected him to the risk of criminal liability. It was made to two members of the group that had forced a confrontation at a party and defendant was holding an Uzi at the time of the shooting. Thus, neither one of these persons was likely to report Tolbert to the authorities.
Finally, the motivation for the statement appears to be exculpatory. Approximately 30 minutes after Tolbert left a place where one of his group had shot another person, defendant accuses him of the crime. Tolbert denies the accusation. When pressed by defendant, Tolbert gives an evasive answer. Under all the circumstances a reasonable view of the colloquy is that defendant is attempting to divert suspicion from himself by blaming Tolbert while Tolbert is maintaining his innocence.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the evidence and there was no clear error of law. In support of their opinion the majority state: “Nor is it self-evident that such statements made very shortly after the crime to a group of friends all of whom had been at the scene are inherently unreliable.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1678.) Metaphysically speaking the majority may be correct, but this court’s burden is not to determine self-evident truth, but rather to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred.
The final conclusion by the majority opinion was that evidence of a threat by Tolbert was improperly excluded. Here again I disagree. Defendant’s girlfriend, Sheila Fields, testified that in October 1988, she was threatened over the telephone that if she testified against defendant she would be killed. Defendant was not the caller. In July 1989, her door was kicked in and two *1687windows were broken. Johnson received several phone calls where the person just stayed on the line without speaking, and her front room window was broken on February 14, 1989, the day before the preliminary hearing. Defendant testified that on the Friday night after the incident, Tolbert told defendant that if the police found out where Tolbert was staying, Tolbert would shoot defendant. Thus, the evidence was cumulative.
Further, it is undisputed that Tolbert was present at the scene of the crime and might have fired shots at Dickson. Thus, he would have sought to keep his name from the police whether or not he actually fired the shots which hit Dickson.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.