Court Opinion

ID: 9709719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:29.394088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:51.046818
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: It is unfortunate that the majority opinion in this case adds but another layer to the diverse views with reference to compliance with the statutory mandates for division of marital property. It is even more unfortunate that the majority opinion is internally inconsistent and self-contradictory. At one point the opinion notes that if “the trial court arrives at a substantially equal division, we believe that the rationale of the statute has been satisfied. 6 ° 0 [I]f further examination of the entire record reveals that the trial court arrived at an ultimate disposition in harmony with the rationale of the statute, no abuse of discretion has occurred.” (Emphasis added.) It is further to be regretted that the majority opinion adheres to the view set forth in McMahon and then says that the trial court was required to consider all relevant factors enumerate^ in the statute. I am unable to understand the observation that those 10 statutory criteria are not necessarily exclusive. Indeed, I think I am permitted to ask whether that observation means that the list is endless, limited only by further judicial legislation. The law with reference to the distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage has been drastically changed and we may as well accept the change and comply with the statutory mandate. That statutory scheme is the sole basis for the exercise of judicial power with reference to distribution of property. Neither this court nor the trial court has any inherent power to deal with other people’s property. We have to follow the statute, and from this record it is not ascertainable that there was consideration of the statutory criteria for division of property. Thus, for the reasons set forth in my dissent in McMahon, I dissent here.