Court Opinion

ID: 9941074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 20:03:10.63807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:12.354437
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/15/24 P. v. Jones CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B326463

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. A362278)
           v.

 CHARLES FRANKLIN
 JONES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Charles Franklin Jones appeals from an order denying his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His
appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental
brief. We review the contentions appellant raises in his
supplemental brief and affirm the order.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On November 7, 1980, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed an information charging appellant with the
murder of Terry Shackelford (§ 187). The information also
alleged that appellant personally used a firearm during the
commission of the crime (§ 12022.5) and suffered a prior
conviction for first degree robbery with use of a firearm (§§ 211,
667.5, subd. (a), 12022.5).
       On June 5, 1981, the trial court instructed appellant’s jury
with the following CALJIC instructions: 8.10 (Murder), 8.11
(Malice Aforethought), 8.20 (Deliberate and Premeditated
Murder), 8.30 (Unpremeditated Murder of the Second Degree),
8.42 (Sudden Quarrel or Heat of Passion and Provocation
Explained), 8.44 (No Specific Emotion Alone Constitutes Heat of
Passion), 8.50 (Murder and Manslaughter Distinguished), 8.52
(Murder or Manslaughter—Cooling Off Period), 8.70 (Duty of
Jury as to Degree of Murder), 8.71 (Doubt Whether First or
Second Degree Murder), 8.72 (Doubt Whether Murder or
Manslaughter), and 8.74 (Unanimous Agreement as to Offense).
The jury found appellant guilty of first degree murder. (People v.
Jones (Jan. 29, 1982, No. 40543) [nonpub. opn.].) A different
panel of this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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(Ibid.) We grant appellant’s request that we take judicial notice
of the appellate opinion, which was omitted from the appellate
record, but we rely on its procedural history only.2 (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3); see People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
292-293.)
       On March 21, 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.3
The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed
the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief
because his jury was not instructed on natural and probable
consequences, felony murder, or “aiding and abetting in any
form.” The People also argued that the jury necessarily found
appellant acted with malice, because it convicted him of first
degree murder despite being instructed on lesser included crimes
including manslaughter. The People attached the jury
instructions and verdict form to the opposition.
       Appellant filed a reply brief. He urged the court to
“examine the jury instructions and jury questions alongside the
court’s answers to determine whether there was an avenue for
either felony-murder liability or [natural and probable
consequences] NPC-liability.” Appellant argued that the matter
should proceed to an evidentiary hearing because appellant
“averred it was possible” for the jury to have convicted him on a

2      The prosecution attached a copy of the appellate opinion to
its brief opposing appellant’s petition for resentencing. Appellant
also attached a copy of the opinion to his supplemental appellate
brief.
3      Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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now-improper theory. He did not address any specific jury
instructions.
       The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that
appellant failed to make a prima facie case of eligibility for relief.
The court stated that it reviewed and considered appellant’s
petition, the People’s opposition brief, appellant’s reply brief, the
available court minutes, the jury instructions given at appellant’s
trial, and the oral arguments counsel made during the hearing.
It “considered no other sources of information in reaching its
decision,” including the appellate opinion. Based on the
information it considered, the court concluded that appellant’s
murder conviction “necessarily means he actually killed the
victim” because the jury was “not instructed on accomplice
liability, aider and abettor liability, felony-murder, natural or
probable consequences, on [sic] liability under the theory
defendant counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested,
or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder, or any
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime. Thus,
Petitioner’s murder conviction necessarily means the jury
determined he actually killed the victim.”
       Appellant timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no
issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of
his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the
arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232
[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or

                                  4
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion”].)
       Appellant first argues that he made a prima facie case for
relief because the facts of his case “fit a theory morso [sic] of that
of involuntary manslaughter than that of first degree murder.”
He points to an attached declaration, in which he asserts that he
feared for his life when the victim, who was substantially larger
than he was, “suddenly tried to grab the pistol out of my back
pocket.” Appellant asserts that he and the victim were “in a life
or death struggle,” and the gun discharged accidentally. He
contends that this new evidence, which was not presented during
his trial “to appellant’s demise,” shows the absence of malice.
       This argument misapprehends the scope of the court’s
limited prima facie review. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 971.) At the prima facie stage, the court considers the
allegations made in the section 1172.6 petition and makes a
preliminary assessment of whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if the allegations were proved. (Ibid.) The court
“‘should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing.’ [Citation.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s
own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in
the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Ibid.) “In reviewing
any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a
trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’’ (Id. at p. 972.)
Appellant’s declaration goes beyond the allegations of the petition
and invites the sort of factfinding and evidentiary weighing that

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is not permitted at the prima facie stage. Here, the court
properly considered the allegations in appellant’s petition and the
jury instructions given at appellant’s trial and concluded from
them that he could not have been convicted under a theory of
imputed malice.
       Appellant also argues that he is entitled to release because
he has served a term in excess of that permitted by regulation.
He cites a document titled “ISL Release Date Calculation”
attached to his supplemental brief, which he asserts
demonstrates that he should have been released from custody
more than 13 years ago. This argument is beyond the scope of
section 1172.6, which concerns only revisions to sections 188 and
189. Moreover, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate
term, which does not have a set release date; the document he
attached appears to concern his eligibility for a parole hearing.
The proper way to seek review of a decision of unsuitability or
ineligibility for parole is to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. (In re Roberts (2005) 36 Cal.4th 575, 584.)
                            DISPOSITION
       The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

MORI, J.

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