Court Opinion

ID: 9916779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 17:08:34.97424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:58.650396
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward A. DiIenno,                             :
                              Petitioner       :
                                               :
                       v.                      :   No. 161 C.D. 2022
                                               :   Submitted: December 4, 2023
Unemployment Compensation,                     :
Board of Review,                               :
                    Respondent                 :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                 HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                 HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                     FILED: January 10, 2024

       Edward DiIenno (Claimant) petitions for review of a Decision and Order of
the Unemployment Compensation (UC) Board of Review (Board) reversing a
decision of a Referee that determined Claimant was not ineligible for UC benefits
under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 after he
voluntarily left his employment at the County of Franklin (County) as a judicial law
clerk. The Board determined that Claimant did not take reasonable steps to preserve
his employment within the County. We affirm.

       1
            Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S.
§ 802(b).
I.    BACKGROUND
      Claimant was hired as a judicial law clerk for a one-year clerkship and began
his employment on August 22, 2019. (Board’s Decision, Finding of Fact (FOF) ¶¶
1-2.) Claimant’s last day of working for the County was August 28, 2020. (Id. ¶ 1.)
Claimant subsequently filed a claim for UC benefits. Claimant explained that his
position as a judicial law clerk was temporary, he applied to approximately 50
employers before his clerkship ended, and if he did not resign, it was his
“understanding” that he would be discharged. (Certified Record (C.R.) at 12, 15.)
The County responded that Claimant voluntarily quit and attached Claimant’s
resignation letter, and that Claimant could have extended his clerkship or applied to
different positions in the County. (Id. at 17-18, 29.) A UC Service Center issued a
Notice of Determination finding Claimant was ineligible for benefits under Section
402(b) because Claimant “has not shown that he had a necessitous and compelling
reason for leaving the job.” (Id. at 31.) Claimant appealed the decision, and a
telephone hearing was scheduled before the Referee. (Id. at 41, 49.)
      Prior to the hearing, Claimant filed numerous requests, including a request for
subpoenas of Court Administrator, who was Claimant’s supervisor, and Court
Administrator’s email asking Claimant for his letter of resignation, which the
Referee denied without prejudice for Claimant to raise the issue again at the hearing.
(C.R. at 55, 62-63, 65-83.)
      At the hearing, Claimant testified that his clerkship was a one-year position,
and his judge did not offer to extend his clerkship for another year. (Id. at 113.)
Claimant also testified that he did not speak to anyone at the County about securing
alternate employment. (Id. at 117.) Claimant sought to present the testimony of a
former law clerk who, according to Claimant, would “substantiate what [Claimant]

                                          2
said in terms of the procedure [Human Resources Generalist] requir[ed, which was]
that law clerks tender letters of resignation.” (Id. at 118.) The Referee denied this
request and stated that if Claimant already established this in his testimony, it was
unnecessary for Claimant to call a witness to substantiate. (Id.) Human Resources
Generalist testified for the County that Claimant was informed about open assistant
district attorney positions within the County at Claimant’s exit interview. (Id. at
119.) Human Resources Generalist testified that there was no guarantee of a position
for Claimant. (Id.) Human Resources Generalist also testified that “[a]ny employee
[who] leaves the County . . . provides a resignation letter if they[ are] not
terminated.” (Id. at 122.)
      Based upon the evidence presented, the Referee reversed the determination of
the UC Service Center and found Claimant was not ineligible for benefits because
“continuing work was no longer available to [] Claimant, and . . . Claimant did not
voluntarily leave his job[.]” (Id. at 146.) In so holding, the Referee credited
Claimant’s testimony that the position was for one year, which was not extended,
and Claimant’s supervisor asked for a letter of resignation. (Id.) The County
appealed the decision of the Referee to the Board. (Id. at 159.) The Board reversed
the Referee’s decision, finding, in pertinent part, as follows:

      2. [C]laimant was hired for a one-year clerkship with a County judge.

      3. [C]laimant did not ask for an extension of his clerkship nor did he
      ask if there were other positions available with the County. Clerkships
      can be extended for a second year.

      4. [C]laimant advised his supervisor, . . . [Court A]dministrator, when
      his last day of work was going to be and the supervisor requested a
      resignation letter.

      5. On July 21, 2020, [C]laimant submitted a letter of resignation.

                                           3
      6. During an exit interview, the employer’s [H]uman [R]esources
      [G]eneralist advised [C]laimant that there were several open assistant
      district attorney positions for which he could apply if interested, and
      the [H]uman [R]esources [G]eneralist would reach out to the district
      attorney on his behalf about them. He also informed [C]laimant that
      there was a position in the public defender’s office.

      7. [C]laimant informed the [H]uman [R]esources [G]eneralist that [the]
      County was not conducive for him to meet someone and he planned on
      moving back to the Philadelphia area.

      8. [C]laimant voluntarily left his employment because he did not want
      to stay in the [] County area.

(Board’s Decision, FOF ¶¶ 2-8.) The Board explained that the burden is on Claimant
to establish that Claimant left employment for a necessitous and compelling reason.
(Id. at 2.) Further, the Board explained that if Claimant did not take all reasonable
and necessary steps to preserve his employment, it will result in a voluntary
termination of employment. (Id.) The Board found that because Claimant did not
seek an extension of his clerkship, which Human Resources Generalist testified was
possible, and because Human Resources Generalist told Claimant about the assistant
district attorney positions and the public defender position, for which Claimant chose
not to apply, Claimant did not take all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve his
employment and voluntarily quit his employment. (Id.) In addition, the Board cited
Evans, Portnoy & Quinn v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 665
A.2d 548 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), for the proposition that because Claimant entered a
temporary employment arrangement with the County, did not request an extension
of his clerkship, and did not apply for other open employment within the County,
“[Claimant] does not fall within the class of employees the legislature intended to
protect[,]” and, therefore, “[C]laimant did not make a reasonable effort to preserve

                                          4
the employment relationship.” (Id. at 2-3.) Accordingly, the Board denied benefits
under Section 402(b) of the Law. (Id. at 3.)
       Thereafter, Claimant timely filed a Petition for Review with this Court.

II.    PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
       On appeal, Claimant raises three arguments. First, Claimant asserts he was
deprived of due process because the Board evaluated his claim under Section 402(a)2
of the Law, instead of Section 402(b), but it did not have the authority to consider
whether Claimant found “suitable work” under Section 402(a) because the Referee
expressly said that issue was not under consideration. (Claimant’s Brief (Br.) at 16-
17, 20.) Second, Claimant argues he was denied the opportunity to present material
evidence.     Specifically, Claimant states that an email from Court Administrator
prompting Claimant to tender his resignation and Court Administrator’s testimony
would have been relevant to whether Claimant voluntarily left his employment as it
would show that the resignation letter was part of an employer policy. (Id. at 26.)
Claimant further wished to present the testimony of a fellow law clerk to show “[a]
law clerk in [Claimant’s] circumstances would very likely have tendered [their] . . .
resignation[.]” (Id. at 25, 27 n.19.) Last, Claimant argues the Board relied on cases
that were not applicable or controlling to Claimant’s case. (Id. at 27-28.)
       Claimant seeks a reversal of the Board’s Decision and Order, or, in the
alternative, that this Court answer “the pure question of law of whether a judicial
law clerk, who literally tenders his resignation at the request of his or her employer,

       2
          Section 402(a) provides, in relevant part, “[a]n employe shall be ineligible for
compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to failure, without good cause,
either to apply for suitable work . . . or to accept suitable work when offered to him by the
employment office or by any employer[.]” 43 P.S. § 802(a).

                                                5
and who successfully completes a clerkship . . . is eligible [for UC benefits] under
. . . [the] Law[.]” (Id. at 30.) In another alternative, Claimant asks this Court to
vacate the Board’s Order and remand to the Referee and either order a new hearing
where the County must provide relevant documents and where Claimant may present
witnesses or allow Claimant to supplement the existing record. (Id. at 31.)
      The Board responds that Claimant failed to show he had a necessitous and
compelling reason to voluntarily quit his employment when he did not preserve his
employment within the County. (Board’s Br. at 8.) The Board explains that
Claimant voluntarily quit by not seeking to extend his clerkship for a second year or
applying for open positions within the County and cites Nolan v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review, 797 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), for support.
(Id. at 11-12.) The Board further contends Claimant’s argument that the Board
improperly considered “suitable work” is a misunderstanding of the Board’s
Decision and Order because the Board did not consider “suitable work” as set forth
in Section 402(a). (Id. at 17.) The Board contends that it only considered whether
Claimant voluntarily quit and took reasonable steps to preserve his employment
under Section 402(b). (Id. at 18.) Last, the Board argues the Referee did not err in
denying Claimant’s request for certain documents and witnesses because the
testimony would have been duplicative, the Board made findings consistent with
Claimant’s testimony, and the testimony did not address Claimant’s failure to
preserve his employment. (Id. at 20.) The Board explains that the testimony
Claimant sought to elicit would not have affected or changed the disposition of the
case. (Id. at 24-25.)

                                         6
III.   DISCUSSION
       “This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the findings of fact
were supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights were violated,
or whether errors of law were committed.” Showers v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 64 A.3d 1143, 1146 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). On appeal, “[t]he Board’s
findings of fact are conclusive” as “long as the record taken as a whole contains
substantial evidence to support them.” Henderson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 77 A.3d 699, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). In addition, “[w]here the Referee or
Board refuses to seek enforcement of a subpoena, our scope of review is limited to
determining whether there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law.” Beamer
v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 552 A.2d 774, 776 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).
       Section 402(b) of the Law provides, in relevant part, “[a]n employe shall be
ineligible for compensation for any week . . . [i]n which his unemployment is due to
voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . .”
43 P.S. § 802(b).

       In order to show necessitous and compelling cause, the claimant must
       establish that[: (1)] circumstances existed which produced real and
       substantial pressure to terminate the claimant’s employment; [(2)] like
       circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in the same
       manner; [(3)] the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and
       [(4)] the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve his or her
       employment.

Brown v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 780 A.2d 885, 888 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)
(emphasis added). The fourth prong is at issue here. “Where an employee has failed
to take all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the employment relationship,
he or she has failed to meet the burden of demonstrating necessitous and compelling
cause.” Fleming v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 513 C.D.

                                          7
2021, filed Feb. 9, 2023), slip op. at 7 n.6 (citing Westwood v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 532 A.2d 1281, 1282 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)).3
       Claimant first argues the Board was not permitted to address the issue of
“suitable work” under Section 402(a) of the Law because the Referee below did not
address it. A review of the Board’s Decision shows that it reversed the Referee’s
determination because “[C]laimant has not met his burden under Section 402(b) of
the Law.” (Board’s Decision at 3 (emphasis added).) The Board recited the above
rules related to Section 402(b) and analyzed whether Claimant took all reasonable
and necessary steps to preserve the employment relationship within the County,
including extending his clerkship for another year or applying to other open positions
in the County. (Id. at 2.) The Board did not discuss or analyze Section 402(a) of the
Law, relating to suitable work. (See Board’s Decision at 2-3.) Rather, the Board
strictly analyzed whether Claimant showed he “made a reasonable effort to preserve
his . . . employment” under the fourth prong of a necessitous and compelling cause
analysis. Brown, 780 A.2d at 888. Therefore, the Board did not discuss or analyze
the issue of suitable work under Section 402(a) of the Law and did not err in
analyzing whether Claimant attempted to preserve an employment relationship
within the County, which is an element of a voluntary quit analysis pursuant to
Section 402(b). Id.
       Claimant next argues that he was precluded from presenting material evidence
before the Referee. If evidence is not relevant, the referee may exclude it, and the
referee has discretion in the admission of evidence. Creason v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 554 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989).                  If evidence is

       3
         Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b), Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), and
Section 414(a) of this Court's Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a), an
unreported opinion of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for its persuasive value.

                                            8
duplicative, it is not necessary. See Beamer, 552 A.2d at 776 (holding the referee’s
denial of additional testimony was not in error because “[n]ot only would the
testimony of the missing witnesses and documents be duplicative of evidence
already of record, but the allegations which [the claimant] states they would
corroborate are not even in dispute”). “A referee may not refuse to issue a subpoena,
then rule against the party that requested the subpoena because it did not offer into
evidence the very information that the party could only have obtained through the
subpoena that the referee declined to issue.” Juniata Cnty. Childcare & Dev. Servs.,
Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 6 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Claimant asserted that the testimony of the former law clerk would have
“substantiate[d] most if not all of [Claimant]’s claims” relating to having a
successful clerkship, being required to tender his resignation, the circumstances
leading to his resignation, and the “County law clerk transition policy.” (Claimant’s
Br. at 27 n.19.) The Referee determined that the testimony of Claimant’s former
fellow law clerk at the County would be duplicative of Claimant’s testimony. As
such, the Referee did not err in refusing to allow Claimant’s fellow law clerk to
testify. Beamer, 552 A.2d at 776.
      Further, the refusal to subpoena Court Administrator and the email from Court
Administrator relating to a request for Claimant to submit a letter of resignation
under the County’s law clerk transition policy was not in error because neither the
Referee nor the Board used this lack of evidence to rule against Claimant. Juniata
Cnty., 6 A.3d at 1046. Rather, the Referee found in Claimant’s favor, and the Board
reversed on the grounds that Claimant did not extend his clerkship or apply for open
positions within the County. Claimant argues the Board did not find as a fact that
Court Administrator requested Claimant to tender a letter of resignation.

                                         9
(Claimant’s Br. at 10-11.)     However, the Board did find as fact that Court
Administrator requested a letter of resignation from Claimant. (Board’s Decision,
FOF ¶ 4.) The testimony and email sought to be elicited from Court Administrator,
which was related to the procedures and policy for resigning and requesting a
resignation letter, would not have been relevant to the issue of whether Claimant
took reasonable steps to preserve his employment within the County. Further,
Claimant was not prejudiced to the extent there was any error in excluding this
evidence because the Referee did not use this lack of evidence to rule against
Claimant, and the Board specifically found that Court Administrator requested that
Claimant tender his resignation. Therefore, Claimant was not precluded from
introducing material evidence as the evidence he sought to introduce was not
relevant, and Claimant was not prejudiced to the extent there was any error.
      Claimant lastly argues that the Board relied on case law that is distinguishable
from his case. Specifically, Claimant challenges the Board’s use of Evasovich v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 471 A.2d 921 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984),
Westwood, and Evans, Portnoy & Quinn. Contrary to Claimant’s assertions, the
Board did not liken the facts of Evasovich and Westwood to Claimant’s facts.
Rather, the Board used Evasovich and Westwood to establish the rule relating to
preservation of employment. (Board’s Decision at 2.) The Board then cited Evans,
Portnoy & Quinn for the rule that a law student who enters into a temporary
employment arrangement with a law firm and fails to request an extension or to seek
full-time employment is not protected under the Law because the Law is meant to
protect those who lose employment through no fault of their own. (Id. at 2-3.) The
Board did liken the facts of Evans, Portnoy & Quinn to Claimant’s facts to find that
Claimant is not part of the class of people the Law is meant to protect. (Id. at 2.)

                                         10
The Board did not err in likening Evans, Portnoy & Quinn to Claimant’s case
because the facts are indeed similar. In that case, a law student entered into an
employment arrangement with a law firm, whereby the student would work part-
time at the firm while she was attending law school and had a set termination date.
The student quit before the termination date to study for exams. This Court found
the student ineligible for UC benefits because the student “knowingly enter[ed] into
a temporary part-time employment arrangement with a law firm, voluntarily le[ft]
that employment prior to the end of the specified period to study for exams, and
fail[ed] to request [an] extension of the letter agreement or to seek regular full-time
employment with the law firm upon graduation.” Evans, Portnoy & Quinn, 665
A.2d at 552. Although Claimant did not leave the County before his termination
date, he did have a temporary employment arrangement with the County and did not
seek to extend that employment like the law student in Evans, Portnoy & Quinn.
(Board’s Decision, FOF ¶¶ 2-3.) Therefore, Evans, Portnoy & Quinn is applicable
and analogous to Claimant’s case. The Board did not err in citing Evasovich,
Westwood, and Evans, Portnoy & Quinn in its Decision and Order.

                                          11
IV.   CONCLUSION
      The Board did not address the issue of suitable employment, but rather
addressed the issue of whether Claimant attempted to preserve an employment
relationship within the County under Section 402(b) of the Law. The Referee did
not abuse her discretion or err in denying Claimant’s subpoena requests and denying
Claimant’s fellow law clerk from testifying at the hearing. Last, the Board did not
err in citing Evasovich, Westwood, and Evans, Portnoy & Quinn in its Decision and
Order denying Claimant UC benefits. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                        12
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Edward A. DiIenno,                     :
                       Petitioner      :
                                       :
                 v.                    :   No. 161 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Unemployment Compensation,             :
Board of Review,                       :
                    Respondent         :

                                    ORDER

     NOW, January 10, 2024, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, in the above-captioned matter, is AFFIRMED.

                                     __________________________________________
                                     RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge