Court Opinion

ID: 9790780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:26.181278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.528824
License: Public Domain

Judge RULAND
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the result reached in part II of the majority opinion. However, I disagree with the majority that the validity of the attorney-client agreement has been preserved for appellate review, and thus, I respectfully dissent as to that determination.
The trial court denied the client’s motion for summary judgment on the- basis that: “The court is not satisfied that this contract on its face is void as against public policy, and the court believes that a factual presentation is necessary.” As to that ruling, I view the rule announced in Manuel v. Fort Collins Newspapers, Inc., 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo.1981) as controlling. Hence, I would not review the trial court’s decision on the motion for summary judgment.
In nine published opinions issued by this court since Manuel was announced, we have consistently declined to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Among others, these cases include Grogan v. Taylor, 877 P.2d 1374 (Colo.App.1994); Askew v. Ge-race, 851 P.2d 199 (Colo.App.1992); Garcia v. Estate of Wilkinson, 800 P.2d 1380 (Colo. App.1990); Vogel v. Carolina International, Inc., 711 P.2d 708 (Colo.App.1985); Pierce v. Erzen, 672 P.2d 1023 (Colo.App.1983).
These cases have not addressed the specific issue whether an appeal may be taken from the denial of a summary judgment motion which addresses only a point of law. However, in my view, there are sound reasons for consistent application of the rule in Manuel.
First and foremost, the rule is clear, longstanding, and the litigants should know how to proceed. Specifically, to preserve the issue, it is simply necessary for the party denied summary judgment to move for a directed verdict at trial. See Technical Computer Services, Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo.App.1992).
Second, application of the rule in this manner coincides with the interpretation of the federal rules as well. Thus, in Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1992) (fn. 4), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1417, 122 L.Ed.2d 787 (1993), the court recently declined to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment and observed:
We have found no [federal] case in which an appellate court overturned a jury verdict based on erroneous denial of summary judgment.
In my view, the adverse consequence of the exception created by the majority here will be that the party who does not prevail in either the motion for summary judgment or at trial will seek to cast the summary judgment ruling as a “point of law” on appeal. Indeed, in this context, each issue addressed on any appeal may be characterized as a question of law because this court may not adopt its own findings of fact. See Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). Thus, a body of case law will then have to be developed distinguishing between rulings that may be appealed as points of law and those that may not.
Such a result will undermine the very concept which prompted the Manuel rule in the *37first place, namely, the injustice of “de-priv[ing] a party of a jury verdict after the evidence was fully presented, on the basis ... of whether the pleadings and affidavits at the time of the summary judgment motion demonstrated the need for a trial.” Locric-chio v. Legal Services Corp., 833 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir.1987).
Hence, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.