Court Opinion

ID: 6659782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 21:00:51.245021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:00:07.225720
License: Public Domain

Barnes and Sedgwick, JJ.,
dissenting.
We are unable to concur in the majority opinion. While there can be no doubt of the soundness of the conclusion that a contract to do an illegal thing may be rescinded by either party before it is completed, yet it is equally clear that one who attempts to avail himself of that rule must show that the contract which he seeks to rescind provides for the doing of some illegal act. It seems to us that the defendant failed to make such a showing. There is nothing in the agreement of sale or in the transactions which took place between the plaintiff and defendant, as disclosed by the record, which requires either party to do an illegal thing. The contract did not require the use of slot machines in the business after the sale to the plaintiff. He was at liberty to insist on the discontinuance of their use if such use was illegal, and the presumption is that their use would have been discontinued. The machines in and of themselves were harmless and could be legally sold. The contract between the parties is a simple one, and, so far as the substance of it is concerned, it is perfectly fair and legitimate. It is true that the defendant stated in his testimony as a justification of Ms past conduct in using *444the machines that all others engaged in the cigar business did so, and that it had been a necessary part of the business, but it does not appear that when their use had been declared illegal the defendant designed to continue such use., The contract does not mention the slot machines. It simply appears in the evidence that there were such machines amongst the property and that they had been used in the business, and it seems that their use theretofore had not been considered unlawful by the defendant. After the completion of the sale plaintiff would have had equal authority with the defendant to control the manner of con-' ducting the business, and there is nothing in the agreement that directly or indirectly binds either of them to continue the business in the same manner in which it had been transacted. There being no agreement in the contract for the use of the slot machines in the business, the parties did not agree to do an illegal thing, and we doubt whether the law will presume that they contemplated such a course. Even if they did at that time intend to use the machines, there was no binding agreement that they should continue to do so. The plaintiff could at any time put a stop to it, and the presumption is that he would do so.
To our minds the record clearly shows that the plaintiff is trying dishonestly to avail himself of an afterthought to avoid a perfectly legal contract which was entered into by both parties in good faith, and that his real reason for seeking a rescission and recovery of the money paid to bind the bargain is that his father persuaded him to engage in a different business at another place. No presumption of the illegality of the contract should be indulged in to enable him to recover the earnest money paid, which, so far as the record discloses, was not more than sufficient to indemnify the defendant for the interruption of his business and the time spent in taking the inventory which was made at plaintiff's request to ascertain the amount he was to pay for a half interest in the defendant’s cigar and tobacco business.
*445To our minds the judgment of the district court was wrong and should be reversed.
Rose, J., concurs in this dissent.