Court Opinion

ID: 9910031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 19:00:42.797899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:42.615689
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10090        Document: 00517001701             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/14/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                      No. 23-10090
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                             December 14, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                    ____________                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   James Earl Carroll,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:22-CR-274-10
                     ______________________________

   Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         James Earl Carroll pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
   distribute. He stipulated in a factual resume that he “knowingly possessed
   with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable
   amount of methamphetamine.” The methamphetamine was submitted to a
   laboratory, and the analysis “revealed 55.9 grams of methamphetamine

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10090       Document: 00517001701            Page: 2     Date Filed: 12/14/2023

                                       No. 23-10090

   hydrochloride with a purity of 95 percent, resulting in 53.1 grams of
   methamphetamine (actual).” The presentence report (PSR) used the
   conversion rate applicable to actual methamphetamine to calculate the base
   offense level. See § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c), & comment (n.8(B), (D)). Carroll
   objected and requested a downward variance, arguing the district court
   should use the calculation rate for methamphetamine mixtures instead. 1 In
   response, the Government argued that the use of the actual
   methamphetamine rate was appropriate. The district court overruled the
   objection and sentenced Carroll to 150 months of imprisonment and three
   years of supervised release.
          Carroll appeals his sentence, contending that because the factual
   resume and indictment referred to the methamphetamine in terms of
   “mixture and substance,” the Government breached the plea agreement by
   “cross[ing] the line in arguing for something other than the terms set forth
   in the plea agreement.” He requests specific performance and for his
   sentence to be vacated and remanded. Because this argument is raised for the
   first time on appeal, we review for plain error. United States v. Hebron, 684
   F.3d 554, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2012).
          When a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, “the
   Government must strictly adhere to the terms and conditions of its promises
   in the agreement.” United States v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (citation omitted). To interpret “terms of a plea agreement, courts are to
   apply general principles of contract law” and must consider “whether the
   government’s conduct is consistent with the defendant’s reasonable
   understanding of the agreement.” United States v. Cluff, 857 F.3d 292, 298
          _____________________
          1
            Higher sentences are imposed for actual methamphetamine than for a mixture or
   substance containing methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) &
   (b)(1)(B)(viii).

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Case: 23-10090      Document: 00517001701            Page: 3    Date Filed: 12/14/2023

                                      No. 23-10090

   (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A breach can
   occur “when the Government agrees to one thing at the plea but then actively
   advocates for something different at sentencing.” United States v. Loza-
   Gracia, 670 F.3d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 2012).
          In the plea agreement, the Government agreed to not bring additional
   charges and to dismiss the remaining charges. The agreement contained no
   terms explicitly restricting what the Government could argue at sentencing
   and no reference to the calculation of Carroll’s base offense level. However,
   it specified that the “document is a complete statement of the parties’
   agreement and may not be modified unless the modification is in writing and
   signed by all the parties,” the agreement “supersedes any and all other
   promises, representations, understanding, and agreements that are or were
   made between the parties before” entry of the guilty plea, and “[n]o
   promises or representations have been made by the United States except as
   set forth in writing in this plea agreement.” Accordingly, the plea agreement
   contains no indication that a “reasonable understanding” includes any
   agreement as to base offense level calculation. Cluff, 857 F.3d 292 at 298.
          Carroll seizes on language in the indictment and factual resume
   because they refer to the methamphetamine in terms of “mixture and
   substance.” But the factual resume states that “it is not intended to be a
   complete accounting of all the facts and events related to the offense charged
   in this case,” and that its “limited purpose . . . is to demonstrate that a factual
   basis exists to support the defendant’s guilty plea.” Mere reference in this
   context does not evidence that a “reasonable understanding” includes any
   agreement as to the calculation of the base offense level.
          Despite the language in the agreement and factual resume, Carroll
   relies on two cases to argue that we should nevertheless find a breach here.
   Both are distinguishable. First, in United States v. Lee, the defendant

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                                    No. 23-10090

   stipulated that she supplied “over three kilograms of methamphetamine
   hydrochloride (ice).” 725 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2013). “Ice” has a specific
   meaning under the Sentencing Guidelines, but the defendant argued that she
   understood “ice” to reference methamphetamine “generally” when she
   pleaded guilty. Id. The Ninth Circuit found a breach, in part because none of
   the seized methamphetamine tested qualified as “ice.” Id. at 1167. But here,
   there is no similar supporting evidence of Carroll’s purported understanding.
   Second, in United States v. Edgell, the Government specifically promised “to
   limit [the defendant’s] relevant drug conduct to less than five (5) grams of
   substances containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine.” 914 F.3d
   281, 287 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). After the plea
   agreement was signed, lab results showed the substances were actual
   methamphetamine. The Government then advocated at sentencing for a
   higher range. The Fourth Circuit found this to be a breach. Id. at 288–89. But
   here, the Government made no such promise, and thus was not similarly
   constrained at sentencing.
          Because there was no agreement as to the base offense level
   calculation and the cases Carroll relies on are distinguishable, we conclude
   that the Government did not breach a promise it made. Indeed, we have
   found there to be no breach in similar circumstances. See United States v.
   Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no breach where the
   plea agreement included no promise from the Government as to drug
   quantity or what the Government could argue). Carroll has not demonstrated
   the existence of error, plain or otherwise. See Hebron, 684 F.3d at 557-58.
          AFFIRMED.

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