Court Opinion

ID: 9412648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 12:06:36.810003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:21.280483
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                  No. COA22-481

                               Filed 01 August 2023

Forsyth County, No. 21 CVS 1539

WILLIAM HINMAN and JOANNE W. HINMAN, Plaintiffs,

            v.

WADE R. CORNETT and TERESA B. CORNETT, Defendants.

      Appeal by Defendants from an order entered 22 November 2021 by Judge

Susan E. Bray in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2

November 2022.

      Craige Jenkins Liipfert & Walker PLLC, by Thomas J. Doughton, for Plaintiffs-
      appellees.

      The Dawson Law Firm PC, by Kenneth Clayton Dawson, for Defendants-
      appellants.

      WOOD, Judge.

      This is an appeal from a summary judgment order settling a property dispute

between disgruntled neighbors and involves questions of the parties’ property

interests in an old easement. The summary judgment order granted one neighbor’s

trespass claim and dismissed the other neighbor’s counterclaims for adverse

possession and nuisance. For reasons explained below, we hold that the adverse

possession counterclaim was improperly dismissed, reverse the trial court’s summary

judgment order, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
                                HINMAN V. CORNETT

                                     Opinion of the Court

                                I.      Background

      In 1983, the Cornetts, husband and wife, rented a home from Ms. Tilley before

purchasing the same property in 1995. The entire property comprises several tracts

of land which Ms. Tilley acquired at different times prior to conveying them to the

Cornetts. For instance, the home rests on what has now been labeled Tract 1. As the

diagram below shows, this square, half-acre tract abuts the main road to its north,

and a driveway extends from the road along the tract’s western side. Tract 2, similar

in size and shape to Tract 1, comprises the Cornetts’ backyard and rests behind Tract

1, to its south. The same driveway runs along this tract’s western border as well.

Behind and adjoining Tract 2 of the Cornetts’ property lies a larger property

originally owned by the Churches, a family who, by all accounts, maintained a cordial

relationship with the Cornetts for the duration of their ownership. In 2019, however,

the Churches sold this larger, southern property to the Hinmans, and relations

between the Cornetts and these newcomers quickly soured.

      Armed with a recent land survey, the Hinmans insisted the Cornetts were

encroaching on the Hinmans’ recently acquired property and requested that the

Cornetts remove such encroachments. The survey showed that the Hinmans owned

the land containing the driveway running along the western sides of Tracts 1 and 2

as well as a strip of land several feet wide running along the eastern side of the

driveway and into what a casual observer might mistake for the Cornetts’ land. The

Hinmans identified the corridor at issue, featuring the driveway and the adjacent

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                                 HINMAN V. CORNETT

                                  Opinion of the Court

strip of land, as an easement conveyed by their predecessor in title to Ms. Tilley. Ms.

Tilley subsequently conveyed the easement to the Cornetts when she conveyed the

two tracts of land to them. Allegedly oblivious to this easement and believing that

they owned the disputed corridor, the Cornetts had used the driveway to access both

Tracts 1 and 2 of their property, paved and maintained the driveway, and allowed

guests and others to park on the driveway. On a strip of land adjacent to the

driveway, the Cornetts maintained gardens, fences, a brick column, and several trees.

Also, two carports extended from the home on Tract 1 to the driveway, thus extending

into the adjacent strip of land in the corridor easement. These two carports and the

other structures existed on the land prior to 2000. The brick column predated the

Cornetts’ ownership of the property. The Cornetts began planting trees and a garden

in 1983. They added another carport and a fence in 1991 and 1992 respectively.

Another carport was added in 1996. Since 1999, the Cornetts further maintained

another garden, crepe myrtle trees, and a fence. The Cornetts refused to remove

these alleged encroachments. The Hinmans built a fence, with a gate, along the

boundary between the driveway and Tract 1 and subsequently filed suit against the

Cornetts.

      In their complaint, filed 23 March 2021, the Hinmans alleged trespass. The

Cornetts counterclaimed, alleging that they had obtained title of the disputed corridor

easement by adverse possession, that the twenty-year statute of limitations for the

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                                  Opinion of the Court

recovery of adversely possessed land barred the Hinmans’ trespass claim, and that

the Hinmans’ new fence constituted a nuisance.

      The Hinmans moved for summary judgment, filed 22 October 2021, upon their

claims of trespass and requested an injunction for the removal of the alleged

encroachments. The Hinmans alleged “that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact” that the Cornetts were trespassing upon their land. In support of their

summary judgment motion, the Hinmans filed affidavits, including their own, and

one from the land surveyor. The Cornetts responded with their own motion for

summary judgment, filed 3 November 2021, requesting the trial court grant them

title to the strip of land in the corridor easement between the driveway and the

Cornetts’ property.   They also requested the trial court hold that the Hinmans’

trespass claim was barred by the applicable twenty-year statute of limitations and

contested the Hinmans’ construction of a “nuisance fence.”

      After a 9 November 2021 hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the

Hinmans’ motion and dismissed the Cornetts’ counterclaims in a summary judgment

order filed 22 November 2021. The order states:

             [S]ummary judgment is granted in favor of plaintiffs
             against defendants on all claims asserted by the plaintiffs
             and that defendants counterclaims are dismissed with
             prejudice and that defendants are further ordered to
             remove all structures, within 15 days of the date of this
             order, that are encroaching on Plaintiffs’ property
             including the portion of Plaintiffs two carports that are
             located on Plaintiffs property, the split rail fence, the lion
             statue, chain link fence and post, a brick column and the

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                                 Opinion of the Court

            concrete base to the smaller carport. Attached hereto as
            Exhibit A is a survey that shows the encroachments and
            Exhibit B which shows tracts 1 and 2 of Defendants
            property. It is further ordered that the recorded easement
            as set out in Book 1890 Pages 1245-1247 of the Forsyth
            County Register of Deed [sic] is on land owned by the
            Plaintiffs and the easement only applies to tract 2 as set
            out in Book 1890 page 1247 and shown on Exhibit B. Thus,
            the Defendants may only use the 30-foot recorded
            easement to access tract 2. Defendants may not use the
            recorded easement to access tract 1 which includes but is
            not limited to accessing their current carports. In addition,
            Defendants cannot use the area in the recorded easement
            to park vehicles on or to allow third parties to park vehicles
            or delivery vehicles on. In addition, Defendants may not
            drive on or otherwise use the paved driveway to the West
            of their property which is outside the 30-foot recorded
            easement. Defendants may use the portion of the paved
            driveway that is contained within the 30-foot recorded
            easement but only to access tract 2 of their property.
            Finally, the fence as built by the Plaintiffs along the
            eastern boundary of the 30-foot easement is legal under
            North Carolina law and may remain and that the cost of
            this action be taxed against the Defendants.

      Attached to the order are two survey exhibits of the same properties, which are

convenient for our demonstrative purposes here:

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 Opinion of the Court

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 Opinion of the Court

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                                     Opinion of the Court

      The Cornetts appeal the order as a final judgment pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 7A-27(b).

                            II.    Standard of Review

      A motion for summary judgment should be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule

56(c) (2022). We review a trial court’s summary judgment order de novo. Forbis v.

Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 385 (2007). “ ‘Under a de novo review, the

court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of

the lower tribunal.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011)

(quoting State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008)). We

cannot affirm a trial court’s summary judgment order if a “genuine issue as to any

material fact” remains when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Forbis, 361 N.C. at 524, 649 S.E.2d at 385 (quoting N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

                                  III.   Discussion

      Challenging the trial court’s summary judgment order, the Cornetts argue the

trial court erred when it determined that the Cornetts may not utilize the easement

to access their Tract 1, failed to consider the presence of a prescriptive easement,

improperly ruled on the matter of adverse possession where material facts remained

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                                   Opinion of the Court

contested, ordered the Cornetts to remove items alleged to have trespassed upon the

Hinmans’ land, and allowed the Hinmans to establish a nuisance fence. We address

these issues in turn.

A. Easement to Access Tract 1

      We first address whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

as to whether the Cornetts may use the driveway to access Tract 1 of their property.

As explained above, the thirty-foot wide easement contains the driveway, or some

part of it, and a strip of land east of the driveway. This issue concerns only the

driveway and not the disputed strip of land which we discuss below.

      “An easement is an interest in land” and is generally treated as a contract

when deeded. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 257 N.C. 717, 719,

127 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1962). Easements may either be appurtenant or in gross.

Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454, 133 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1963). “An appurtenant

easement is one which is attached to and passes with the dominant tenement as an

appurtenance thereof; it is owned in connection with other real estate and as an

incident to such ownership.” Id. It “is incapable of existence apart from the particular

land to which it is annexed.” Id. Because an appurtenant easement runs with the

land, it “passes with the transfer of the title to the land.” Id. at 454, 133 S.E.2d at

186. An appurtenant easement exists between the dominant tenement (the tract that

benefits from the use of the easement) and the servient tenement (the tract that is

burdened by the use of the easement). Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 39, 43

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                                   Opinion of the Court

(1853). An appurtenant easement is only allowed to be used “in connection with an

estate to which it is appurtenant, and cannot be extended to any other property which

[the easement owner] may then own or afterwards acquire.” Hales v. Atl. Coast Line

R.R. Co., 172 N.C. 104, 107, 90 S.E. 11, 12 (1916). In contrast, an easement in gross

is more like a personal license, a permit, and “is not appurtenant to any estate in land

and does not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in other

land, but is a mere personal interest in or right to use the land of another.”

Shingleton, 260 N.C. at 454, 133 S.E.2d at 185. An easement in gross generally

terminates “with the death of the grantee” unless abandoned or otherwise

extinguished. Id.

      The easement here was conveyed by deed with a dominant tract of land and is

presumed to be appurtenant. Id. at 455, 133 S.E.2d at 186. Therefore, it ran with

the land when Ms. Tilley deeded the dominant tenement to the Cornetts. We now

look at what interests Ms. Tilley received.

      Ms. Tilley gained ownership of Tracts 1 and 2 through two separate deeds. The

deed to Tract 2, which does not contain road frontage, contained the easement at

issue. After describing the metes and bounds of Tract 2, it reads, “The Grantor also

conveys to the Grantee a road right-of-way or easement to and from the above

described parcel of land for purposes of ingress, egress and regress, said right-of-way

being 30.0 feet in width and described as follows . . . .” When Ms. Tilley was deeded

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                                     Opinion of the Court

Tract 1, no similar easement appears. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence

showing that Ms. Tilley acquired an access easement for Tract 1.

       Ms. Tilley subsequently deeded both Tracts 1 and 2 as well as the access

easement to the Cornetts via a single deed. That deed, after describing Tracts 1 and

2 by metes and bounds, reads, “Also conveyed herein is a thirty (30) foot right-of-way

or easement for the purpose of ingress, egress and regress from Griffin Road more

particularly described as follows . . . .”

       Just as “no one can transfer a better title than he himself possesses,” no one

can transfer a greater easement than he himself enjoys. Miller v. Tharel, 75 N.C.

148, 152 (1876). Thus, when Ms. Tilley conveyed Tract 1, Tract 2, and the access

easement to the Cornetts via a single deed, the easement only benefited and allowed

access to Tract 2 from the main road. Ms. Tilley could only transfer an interest in

property, in the form of an access easement here, that she herself had received. Even

if Ms. Tilley had desired to, she could not transfer an access easement to Tract 1

unless, perhaps, she had previously purchased the property that the Hinmans now

owned and absorbed the original easement by merger.            See Patrick v. Jefferson

Standard Life Ins. Co., 176 N.C. 660, 670, 97 S.E. 657, 661 (1918) (“A merger,

technical or ideal, takes place when the owner of one of the estates, dominant or

servient, acquires the other, because an owner of land cannot have an easement in

his own estate in fee.”). Yet, the record lacks any evidence for this possibility as well.

All evidence suggested that the easement allowed for access to Tract 2 and that the

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                                  Opinion of the Court

Hinmans’ use of the easement to access Tract 1 constituted a “misuse or

overburdening” of the easement. City of Charlotte v. BMJ of Charlotte, LLC, 196 N.C.

App. 1, 20, 675 S.E.2d 59, 71 (2009). We therefore affirm the trial court’s order as to

the access easement for Tract 2 but not for Tract 1, which has frontage and direct

access to Griffin Road.

B. Prescriptive Easement

      The Cornetts next argue that the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment against them by failing to consider whether the Cornetts had gained a

prescriptive easement over the disputed land. However, the Cornetts did not advance

this theory before the trial court. Instead, they advanced an adverse possession

counterclaim. Though the elements necessary to maintain adverse possession and

prescriptive easement claims are similar, they are nonetheless distinct actions

requiring distinct pleadings. We therefore cannot consider this argument on appeal.

See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1); Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E. 836, 838 (1934)

(“[T]he law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a

better mount” on appeal.).

C. Adverse Possession

      We next address the issue of adverse possession. The Cornetts clarified at the

summary judgment hearing and in their reply brief that they allege adverse

possession only of the strip of land consisting of their garden, brick pillar, several

trees, fencing, and portions of their carports. The Cornetts do not allege adverse

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                                   Opinion of the Court

possession of the shared driveway, which they used with the Churches’ permission

and acknowledge is contained within the easement. Like the driveway, though, this

disputed strip of land rests within the easement. Yet, because the Cornetts pleaded

that they maintained this strip of land for over twenty years and alleged all elements

necessary to support a claim of adverse possession, the Cornetts challenge the trial

court’s dismissal of this claim in its summary judgment order.

      Adverse possession “is not favored in the law.” Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663,

667, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1981). The possessor’s use of the land, therefore, “is

presumed to be permissive.” Id. at 666, 273 S.E.2d at 288.

      A successful claim of adverse possession requires that the possession be “open,

continuous, exclusive, actual and notorious” (“OCEAN”) for the prescribed period.

Jones v. Miles, 189 N.C. App. 289, 299, 658 S.E.2d 23, 30 (2008). Our Supreme Court

has more eloquently described these requirements as follows:

             It consists in actual possession, with an intent to hold
             solely for the possessor to the exclusion of others, and is
             denoted by the exercise of acts of dominion over the land,
             in making the ordinary use and taking the ordinary profits
             of which it is susceptible in its present state, such acts to
             be so repeated as to show that they are done in the
             character of owner, in opposition to right or claim of any
             other person, and not merely as an occasional trespasser.
             It must be decided and notorious as the nature of the land
             will permit, affording unequivocal indication to all persons
             that he is exercising thereon the dominion of owner.

Locklear v. Savage, 159 N.C. 236, 237, 74 S.E. 347, 348 (1912). The prescriptive

period for adverse possession, without color of title, is 20 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-

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                                  Opinion of the Court

40 (2022).

                    No action for the recovery or possession of real
             property, or the issues and profits thereof, shall be
             maintained when the person in possession thereof, or
             defendant in the action, or those under whom he claims,
             has possessed the property under known and visible lines
             and boundaries adversely to all other persons for 20 years;
             and such possession so held gives a title in fee to the
             possessor, in such property, against all persons not under
             disability.

Id. One may assert a claim of adverse possession upon a portion of a tract of land so

long as such portion is identifiable by “known and visible lines and boundaries.”

Dockery v. Hocutt, 357 N.C. 210, 218, 581 S.E.2d 431, 436 (2003). However, “his claim

is limited to the area(s) actually possessed, and the burden is upon the claimant to

establish his title to the land in that manner.” Id.

      We are met with an initial question: may the owner of a dominant tenement

adversely possess the same land described in the easement burdening the servient

tenement?

      Neither party cites and we did not locate North Carolina authority definitively

answering this question. One commentator who published many treatises on real

property writes,

             The adverse user may be, not only by the owner of the
             servient tenement, but also by another person, and such
             other person may be one who has also an easement in the
             same land. That is, if there is adverse possession sufficient
             to divest a fee simple title to land, it will also operate to
             extinguish an easement in such land, without reference to
             whether the adverse possessor previously had himself an

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             estate or an easement in the land.

Herbert Thorndike Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, Vol. 3, 397 (Basil Jones ed., 3d

ed. 1939).   While helpful, this commentary does not explicitly suppose that the

adversely possessed land is also the possessor’s easement.

      Looking beyond our borders, no other state has yet to address this question,

save for the state of Washington. There, its Court of Appeals concluded that the

owner of an easement in common property, held in title by a homeowners association,

could adversely possess that land without offending the requisite elements of

adversity. Timberlane Homeowners Ass’n v. Brame, 901 P.2d 1074, 1078 (1995),

superseded by statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.165 (2022). “Although the use was

originally permissive[,] . . . the construction of a fence and a concrete patio on the

property far exceeded a reasonable exercise of that easement right.” Id.

      Our precedent allows the owner of a servient tenement to successfully claim

adverse possession so as to extinguish an easement on his own property. Skvarla v.

Park, 62 N.C. App. 482, 488, 303 S.E.2d 354, 358 (1983). Here, though, the alleged

adverse possessor is the easement owner, the owner of the dominant tenement. A

successful action for adverse possession in this case would not only extinguish the

easement but would, in effect, divest the servient estate owner of title to his land.

      The principal concern with adversely possessing the land of one’s own

easement lies in the adverseness—or hostility—of the possession. This hostility

element requires “a use of such nature and exercised under such circumstances as to

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                                   Opinion of the Court

manifest and give notice that the use is being made under claim of right.” Dulin v.

Faires, 266 N.C. 257, 261, 145 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966). “[T]his does not mean that ill

will or animosity must exist between the respective claimants. It only means that

the one in possession of the land claims the exclusive right thereto.” Brewer v.

Brewer, 238 N.C. 607, 611, 78 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1953). Regardless of the “length of

time in the enjoyment of his easement,” an easement owner cannot divest the servient

owner of his land merely because he made some use of the land consistent with the

easement. Everett v. Dockery, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 390, 392 (1860). However, where the

dominant estate owner’s use of the easement is so inconsistent with its permissive

use as to inhibit the rights of the servient estate owner, it follows that the possession

is hostile. We therefore hold that, where the elements of adverse possession are

otherwise satisfied, the owner of a dominant tenement may adversely possess the

land underlying his own easement.

      We briefly address another dispositive question: may a party properly claim

adverse possession when he is unaware of the adverse nature of his possession? In

other words, may a party adversely possess land when he mistakenly believes that

he was the owner during the entirety of the prescriptive period? Our Supreme Court

has answered this question in the affirmative. A party may succeed in an adverse

possession claim “though the claim of title is founded on a mistake.”           Walls v.

Grohman, 315 N.C. 239, 249, 337 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1985). Since 1985, this state has

been among a majority of states which allow a claim for adverse possession though

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                                    Opinion of the Court

the adverse possessor be oblivious to the adverse nature of his possession.             Id.

Therefore, though the Cornetts allege in their depositions that they were unaware of

any encroachments upon their neighboring property and believed they owned the

strip of land at issue, this mistake is not fatal.

       Further, though the Cornetts admit their use of the driveway was permissive,

this, too, is not fatal to their claim of adverse possession over the disputed strip of

land. The disputed land here is not the driveway but the strip of land between the

driveway and the Cornetts’ recorded property line, said land containing a brick

column, small garden, trees, fencing, and two carports.           Nothing in the record

suggests the Cornetts received permission from the Churches or their successor in

title, the Hinmans, to possess and erect permanent structures on this disputed strip

of land.

       Next, we consider whether the Cornetts appropriately alleged an adverse

possession claim sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss. As our Supreme Court

has held, “[a] party seeking to prove adverse possession of a portion of a parcel has

the burden of pleading and proving all elements of the claim.” Minor v. Minor, 366

N.C. 526, 531, 742 S.E.2d 790, 793 (2013). Yet, “[i]n actions to recover land, wherein

the plaintiff alleges title and right to the possession, it is generally sufficient for the

defendant to make a simple denial and introduce evidence of his possession for twenty

years . . . in support of his denial.” Whitaker v. Jenkins, 138 N.C. 476, 478, 51 S.E.

104, 105 (1905).

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                                  Opinion of the Court

      Further, “[a] party against whom summary judgment is sought ‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must, by affidavit or

otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ”

Koenig v. Town of Kure Beach, 178 N.C. App. 500, 504, 631 S.E.2d 884, 888 (2006)

(quoting Enterprises v. Russell, 34 N.C. App. 275, 278, 237 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1977));

see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(e) (2022). Put another way, presuming without

deciding the Cornetts’ allegations relating to the adverse possession claim are true,

would they be entitled to a grant of title by adverse possession? We hold that they

would.

      Here, the Cornetts did not merely allege adverse possession without

supporting evidence. Though they did not provide the trial court with affidavits, they

submitted a highlighted survey exhibit outlining the “known and visible lines and

boundaries,” Dockery, 357 N.C. at 218, 581 S.E.2d at 436, of their purported adverse

possession. In their counterclaim, the Cornetts list the disputed encroachments upon

this portion of the easement and the dates in which the encroachments were

established or presented as evidence of their continuous possession for the

prescriptive period. In the Cornetts’ depositions, which were presented to the trial

court, the Cornetts state that they believed the contested strip of land was theirs and

had improved and maintained it since 1983. The Cornetts’ counsel at the summary

judgment hearing argued that the Cornetts treated the strip of land as their own and

did not hide their maintenance of the structures.        This evidence is sufficient to

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                                  Opinion of the Court

support every element of adverse possession, that the Cornetts actually possessed the

land in a manner that was open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious

(“OCEAN”) for the prescribed period and under known and visible lines and

boundaries.

      Presumably, the Hinmans’ predecessor in title, the Churches, had the

opportunity to discover and remedy the Cornetts’ encroachment for over twenty years

but did not do so. Indeed, this case serves as a stark reminder that “the law aids the

vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights.” Butler v. Bell, 181 N.C. 85, 90,

106 S.E. 217, 220 (1921). This is true even for the Churches’ successor in title, the

Hinmans, who brought the trespass action after the Cornetts had possessed the land

for over twenty years. Prior to buying the property from the Churches, the Hinmans

had the opportunity to discover the encroachments by obtaining a survey.

      Our statute and caselaw treats the twenty-year prescriptive period of adverse

possession as a “statute of limitations” for actions to recover property, and we have

never held that the prescriptive period must restart due to the sale of land adversely

possessed. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 3, 789 S.E.2d 445, 446

(2016).   So long as the adverse possessor continues to possess the land for the

prescriptive period, the time required to adversely possess the land is not tolled or

otherwise reset by the sale of the land adversely possessed. “At the expiration of the

requisite period of possession, the possessor acquires fee simple title to the land; a

new title is created and the title of the record owner is extinguished.” Fed. Paper Bd.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

Co. v. Hartsfield, 87 N.C. App. 667, 672, 362 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1987). If the Cornetts

did adversely possess the land of the Churches prior to the sale of the Churches’

interest to the Hinmans, then the Hinmans would not have received fee title in the

disputed land. See, e.g., Deans v. Mansfield, 210 N.C. App. 222, 229, 707 S.E.2d 658,

664 (2011) (holding that the prescriptive period acts to divest a record owner’s

interest in the land even though the adverse possessor files a claim for title after a

period of subsequent interruption).

      These circumstances are juxtaposed to those found in Dockery v. Hocutt.

There, our Supreme Court held that a party’s evidence, even “when considered in the

light most favorable to” the party, was not sufficient to bring the matter to a jury.

357 N.C. 210, 218, 581 S.E.2d 431, 437 (2003). The record was “devoid of evidence of

known and visible boundaries” where the court was left to merely speculate as to

where an ambiguous boundary was. Id. Further, the party did not evidence an

encroachment “for the requisite twenty-year period.” Id. at 219, 581 S.E.2d at 437.

The Cornetts, by contrast, identified the contested strip of land where known and

visible boundaries exist between it and the driveway. The Cornetts alleged that they

possessed this property for over twenty years and listed the dates for the

establishment of structures existing on the disputed strip of land.

      These circumstances are also juxtaposed to those found in Jones v. Miles. This

Court held that the hostility requirement of adverse possession may be extinguished

with a subsequent grant of permission, unless “the possessor either rejects the grant

                                         - 20 -
                                 HINMAN V. CORNETT

                                   Opinion of the Court

of permission or otherwise takes some affirmative step to put the true owner on notice

that the possessor’s use of the land remains hostile.” 189 N.C. App. 289, 294, 658

S.E.2d 23, 27 (2008). In the present case, the record demonstrates the Churches

allowed the Cornetts to use the driveway but contains no indication that the Cornetts

received permission to possess the disputed strip of land as their own. Although the

disputed strip of land is within an easement, the easement was for ingress and egress,

not for the building of permanent structures.

        The Cornetts presented evidence sufficient to overcome the Hinmans’ motion

to dismiss, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Hinmans

when genuine issues of material fact remained.

D. Trespass

        Because we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the Cornetts’ adverse

possession counterclaim, we hold that the trial court erred in granting the Hinmans’

motion for summary judgment on their trespass claim.          One party’s successful

adverse possession claim necessarily defeats another’s trespass claim upon the same

land.

        Further, adverse possession is a defense to trespass. In Williams v. South &

South Rentals, the plaintiff sought to require the removal of an apartment building

which encroached approximately one square foot onto the plaintiff’s property. This

Court in Williams said, “While the action sounds in trespass because there is no

dispute over title or location of the boundary line, plaintiff seeks a permanent remedy

                                          - 21 -
                                 HINMAN V. CORNETT

                                   Opinion of the Court

and is subject to the twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession.” 82

N.C. App. 378, 382, 346 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1986). In the case of Bishop v. Reinhold,

this Court held the plaintiff’s action to remove structures built by the defendants

which partially encroached onto the Bishops’ property “would not be barred until

defendants had been in continuous use thereof for a period of twenty years.” 66 N.C.

App. 379, 384, 311 S.E.2d 298, 301 (1984). Thus, if the Cornetts are successful in

showing adverse possession of the disputed strip of land for twenty years, it would

defeat the Hinmans’ claim of trespass and request to remove the encroachments.

E. Nuisance Fence

      The Cornetts allege that the Hinmans erected a nuisance fence between the

driveway and the Cornetts’ property. It is not clear, presuming the Cornetts’ succeed

in their adverse possession counterclaim, whether the fence would be on the Cornetts’

or the Hinmans’ property.

      If the fence is on the Hinmans’ property, its mere presence on the easement is

not an actionable issue so long as its presence does not interfere with the Cornetts’

permissive use of the easement. “The owners of the servient estate may make any

use of their property and road not inconsistent with the reasonable use and

enjoyment of the easement granted.” Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 457, 133

S.E.2d 183, 187 (1963); cf. Ingraham v. Hough, 46 N.C. (1 Jones) 39, 44 (1853)

(holding that an impassable gate across a right of way is an “interruption[] to the user

of the easement”). The Cornetts allege that the fence frustrates their use of the

                                          - 22 -
                                 HINMAN V. CORNETT

                                  Opinion of the Court

easement in that it does not allow them access to Tract 1 of their property or, rather,

makes it more difficult to access Tract 1. Because we hold that the easement does

not grant access to Tract 1 and because the Cornetts did not otherwise argue that the

fence impedes their access to Tract 2, the Cornetts and their land are uninjured.

Therefore, this argument is overruled. Yet, because the issue of whether the fence is

on the Cornetts’ property or the Hinmans’ property is unresolved, this issue must be

remanded to the trial court.

                                IV.   Conclusion

      The trial court did not err when it prohibited the Cornetts from using the

driveway to access Tract 1 of their property, as the Cornetts do not have an easement

to access Tract 1.   However, the trial court did err in dismissing the Cornetts’

counterclaim for adverse possession of the strip of land between the driveway and the

Cornetts’ deeded property. Because of this error, the trial court further erred in

granting the Hinmans’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of trespass.

Consequently, we reverse the dismissal order and the summary judgment order of

the trial court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

      AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

      Judge TYSON concurs in the result in part and dissents in part by separate

opinion.

      Judge MURPHY concurs in the result only without separate opinion.

                                         - 23 -
 No. COA22-481 – Hinman v. Cornett

      TYSON, Judge, concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.

      The plurality’s opinion properly affirms the trial court’s prohibition of the

Cornetts from using the driveway easement to access Tract 1 of their property. The

plurality’s opinion further holds the trial court erred in dismissing the Cornetts’

counterclaim for adverse possession of the strip of land between the driveway

easement and their deeded property. I vote to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the

Cornetts’ counterclaim and of Hinmans’ motion for summary judgment on their

trespass claims. I respectfully dissent.

                            I.   Standard of Review

       North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows a moving party to obtain

summary judgment upon demonstrating that “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits” show that they

are “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” and “that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2021).

      “The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing

that there is no triable issue of material fact.” DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355

N.C. 672, 681, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002) (citation omitted). “This burden may be

met by proving that an essential element of the opposing party’s claim is non-existent,

or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to

support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense

which would bar the claim.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
                                   HINMAN V. CORNETT

               TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

      A genuine issue is one supported by evidence that would “persuade a

reasonable mind to accept a conclusion.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356

N.C. 571, 579, 573 S.E.2d 118, 124 (2002) (citation omitted). “An issue is material if

the facts alleged would . . . affect the result of the action.” Koontz v. City of Winston-

Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 518, 186 S.E.2d 897, 901 (1972).

      When reviewing the evidence at summary judgment, “[a]ll inferences of fact

from the proofs offered at the hearing must be drawn against the movant and in favor

of the party opposing the motion.” Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 343, 368

S.E.2d 849, 858 (1988) (citation omitted). On appeal, “[t]he standard of review for

summary judgment is de novo.” Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382,

385 (2007) (citation omitted).

                  II.   Adverse Possession for Twenty Years

       “To acquire title to land by adverse possession, the claimant must show actual,

open, hostile [notorious], exclusive, and continuous [“OCEAN”] possession of the land

claimed for the prescriptive period [.]” Merrick v. Peterson, 143 N.C. App. 656, 663,

548 S.E.2d 171, 176, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 364, 556 S.E.2d 572 (2001). The

law does not favor adverse possession and the presumption before the court is that a

claimant’s use is permissive. See Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 667, 273 S.E.2d 285,

288 (1981) (citation omitted).        Adverse possession of privately-owned property

without color of title must be continuously maintained for twenty years before a

claimant may successfully assert a claim to acquire title to the land. N.C. Gen. Stat.

                                               2
                                     HINMAN V. CORNETT

                 TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

§ 1-40 (2021).

      A hostile use is “simply a use of such nature and exercised under such

circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the use is being made under a claim

of right.” Dulin v. Faires, 266 N.C. 257, 261, 145 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966). “[I]n order

for plaintiffs to succeed in their claim, they must have shown sufficient evidence of

the hostile character of their use to create an issue of fact for the jury.” Potts, 301

N.C. at 667, 273 S.E.2d at 288. Webster’s Real Estate Law describes hostile possession

as by claimant’s possession, which excludes “any recognition of the true owner’s

rights” to the property. James A. Webster, Jr., Webster’s Real Estate Law in North

Carolina § 14.06 (Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, J. eds., 6th ed. 2022)

(“Hostile possession is possession that excludes any recognition of the true owner’s

rights in the property.” citing Marlowe v. Clark, 112 N.C. App. 181, 435 S.E.2d 354

(1993); State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 166 S.E.2d 70 (1969)).

       “The hostility element may be satisfied by a showing that a landowner, acting

under a mistake as to the true boundary between his property and that of another,

takes possession of the land believing it to be his own and claims title thereto.” Jones

v. Miles, 189 N.C. App. 289, 292, 658 S.E.2d 23, 26 (2008) (citation and quotation

marks omitted). “However, the hostility requirement is not met if the possessor’s use

of the disputed land is permissive.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The common law of North Carolina presumes the user’s possession, claiming

title by adverse possession, is permissive:

                                                 3
                                   HINMAN V. CORNETT

               TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

             Plaintiffs have vigorously urged us to reject our present
             position that a user is presumed to be permissive and adopt
             the rule, obtaining in the majority of jurisdictions, that the
             user is presumed to be adverse. This we decline to do. An
             easement by prescription, like adverse possession, is not
             favored in the law and we deem it the better-reasoned view
             to place the burden of proving every essential element,
             including hostility, on the party who is claiming against
             the interests of the true owner. Additionally we note that
             the modern tendency is to restrict the right of one to
             acquire a prescriptive right-of-way whereby another,
             through a mere neighborly act, may be deprived of his
             property by its becoming vested in one whom he favored.
             Thus, in order for plaintiffs to succeed in their claim, they
             must have shown sufficient evidence of the hostile character
             of their use to create an issue of fact for the jury.

Potts, 301 N.C. at 666-67, 273 S.E.2d at 288 (internal citations, footnote, alterations,

and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).

      Nearly seventy-five years ago, our Supreme Court held:

             A statute prescribing the length of time during which an
             adverse possession of land must be maintained in order for
             it to ripen into title will not begin to run until these two
             things concur: (1) The claimant has actual possession of the
             land under color of title, or claim of right; and (2) the
             possession of the claimant gives rise to a cause of action in
             favor of the true owner. In other words, an adverse
             possession will never run against the owner of an interest in
             land unless he has legal power to stop it.

Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C. 579, 587, 61 S.E.2d 717, 723 (1950) (internal citation

omitted) (emphasis supplied).

      Here, the undisputed evidence tends to show and the trial court’s judgment

concludes the Cornetts paid the Churches, the Hinman’s predecessor-in-title, directly

                                               4
                                   HINMAN V. CORNETT

               TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

for the driveway easement to be paved in 1996 and shows the Cornetts also paid for

the installation of drainage pipes within the easement to the Churches.               The

structures including: the brick driveway; the front carport; the chain link fence about

the front carport; the gravel, later paved, road; the chain link fence; and, the garden

were in place before the Cornetts first rented the parcel.

      The burden on proving each element rests on the party claiming title by

adverse possession. This party also has the burden of rebutting a presumption that

its use is permissive and is not adverse.             The Cornetts cannot overcome the

presumption of permissive use. See Potts, 301 N.C. at 667, 273 S.E.2d at 288 (“Thus,

in order for plaintiffs to succeed in their claim, they must have shown sufficient

evidence of the hostile character of their use to create an issue of fact for the jury.”).

      The Cornetts installed the rear shelter during the Gulf War in 1991, the wood

rail fence was constructed in 1992, the front car port in 1996, the chain link fence in

1996, and the garden and crepe myrtle trees were planted and maintained since 1999.

This Court found possession not to be hostile, where the putative adverse possessor’s

actions acknowledge the continuing ownership rights of the landowner.                 New

Covenant Worship Center v. Wright, 166 N.C. App. 96, 104, 601 S.E.2d 245, 251-52

(2004).

      During his deposition, Mr. Cornett was asked “[S]o Bennie Church was fine

with you using the driveway. Correct?” He replied: “Oh, yes.” Mr. Cornett further

stated there was no problem with the placement of drainage pipes in the easement

                                               5
                                   HINMAN V. CORNETT

               TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

from the Churches nor when they planted crepe myrtles in the easement. The

Churches, who owned the servient estate, helped to pay for the paving of the driveway

that they shared use of with the dominant estate. The Hinmans insisted for the

Cornetts to move a disabled vehicle from the easement after a few weeks, and it is

now on the parcel the Cornetts’ son lives on.

      The running of the prescribed twenty-year statutory period to assert and

adversely possess real property was tolled by the Churches’ granting permissive use

of the easement and parcel at issue to the Cornetts. Id.; Eason, 232 N.C. at 587, 61

S.E.2d at 723. The record shows the Churches, the Hinmans’ predecessors-in-title,

had expressly granted permission to the Cornetts to use the now-disputed tract of

land. This permissive use tolled the running of the twenty-year statute of limitations

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-40. The Hinmans acquired the servient parcel in

2019. The Hinmans timely filed this action to quiet title and for trespass in 2021.

      The plurality’s opinion states: “A party may succeed in an adverse possession

claim ‘though the claim of title is founded on a mistake.’ ” citing Walls v. Grohman,

315 N.C. 239, 249, 337 S.E.2d 556, 562 (1985). This is an accurate quote from Walls,

and the Cornetts purportedly and may have mistakenly believed they owned the land

contained within the easement. Even if true, their belief does not address the tolling

of the statutory period by their admittedly permissive use and the Churches’

ownership of the servient parcel prior to the Hinmans’ acquisition. During Wade

Cornett’s deposition, he testified he believed he owned the land under which the

                                               6
                                    HINMAN V. CORNETT

                TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

easement ran.

      In Walls, the Supreme Court of North Carolina overruled its prior holdings in

Price v. Whisnant, 236 N.C. 381, 72 S.E.2d 851 (1952) and Gibson v. Dudley, 233 N.C.

255, 63 S.E.2d 630 (1951), which required an adverse possessor to have the mind of a

thief in order for his possession of the property to be adverse:

             [W]e now join the overwhelming majority of states, return
             to the law as it existed prior to Price and Gibson, and hold
             that when a landowner, acting under a mistake as to the
             true boundary between his property and that of another,
             takes possession of the land believing it to be his own and
             claims title thereto, his possession and claim of title is
             adverse.

Walls, 315 N.C. at 249, 337 S.E.2d at 562.

      However, the plurality opinion’s reliance on this application of Walls under

these facts is misplaced and erroneous. While the Cornetts’ purported mistaken

belief may not necessarily defeat their claim, the plurality’s opinion erroneously

labels it as a dispositive question, without making an analysis of the Churches’ prior

ownership and their express permissive allowance of the Cornetts use. The Supreme

Court’s analysis in Eason and this Court’s analysis in Jones is dispositive. See Eason,

232 N.C. at 587, 61 S.E.2d at 723 (“[C]laimant has actual possession of the land. . .

an adverse possession will never run against the owner of an interest of land unless

he has the legal power to stop it.”); Jones, 189 N.C. App. at 292, 658 S.E.2d at 26 (true

owner must be on “notice that the [adverse] use is being made under claim of right.”).

                                   III.    Conclusion

                                                7
                                   HINMAN V. CORNETT

               TYSON, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part

      The plurality’s opinion properly affirms the trial court’s prohibition of the

Cornetts from using the driveway to access the non-dominant Tract 1 of their

property.

      The Cornetts did not prove open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious

(“OCEAN”) possession of the Hinman’s property for the requisite statutory period.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Cornetts, no genuine issues of material fact

exist of whether they failed to hold possession of the disputed tract for the requisite

statutory twenty-year period. Resort Realty of the Outer Banks, Inc. v. Brandt, 163

N.C. App. 114, 116, 593 S.E.2d 404, 407-08, disc. review denied, 358 N.C. 236, 595

S.E.2d 154 (2004).     The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the

Hinmans should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.

                                               8