Court Opinion

ID: 9736755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:05:23.826178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:08.707738
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The majority opinion lends itself to at least two *72possible interpretations. One reading is that the crime of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter, sec. 940.05(2), Stats. (1985-86),1 does not include an actor whose actual, unreasonable belief in the need to use force stems entirely from mental disease or defect. See majority op. pp. 67-68 n.5, 69-70. A second reading is that the crime of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter encompasses an objective element. Because neither reading of the majority opinion is supported by the statutes or our case law, I dissent.
If the majority opinion holds that attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter may not be applied to individuals suffering from mental disease or defect, it offers no justification for this holding, and the holding creates significant legal problems.
The majority's distinction between those who are "normal" and have an unreasonable belief and those who suffer from mental disease or defect and have an unreasonable belief is not justified in the context of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter. According to the majority opinion, if a rational person unreasonably perceives an unlawful threat to his person, the circuit court will give an instruction for attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter. The majority explains this result by characterizing the "normal" person's error in judgment as the result of "human weakness, causing the defendant to make an error in judgment or perception." Majority op. p. 68. If, on the other hand, a person suffer*73ing from mental disease or defect unreasonably perceives an unlawful threat to his person, the circuit court will not give the instruction. The majority opinion offers no explanation why mental disease or defect should not be considered "a human weakness causing the defendant to make an error in judgment or perception." The majority merely concludes that "an utter incapability to reason or comprehend or judge the nature of [the] situation" does not constitute an unreasonable belief under sec. 940.05(2). Majority op. p. 68.1 do not think the crime of imperfect self-defense manslaughter and the defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect are mutually exclusive.
The single case cited by the majority opinion, Terrill v. State, 95 Wis. 276, 70 N.W. 356 (1897), provides no support for the proposition that mental disease or defect should not mitigate homicide. The case simply states that the law will have regard for human infirmity and excuse intentional acts stemming from "weakness of judgment, fear, or other cause" that result in homicide. Nothing in the case suggests that courts should not consider mental illness one of the human infirmities. The other cases the majority opinion cites establish that an "honest belief" or a conclusion formed "hastily and without due care" qualify for the instruction. These cases fail to support the majority opinion's contention that mental disease or defect may not mitigate homicide.
The majority's holding that the crime of attempted imperfect self-defense does not apply to an individual suffering from mental disease or defect creates significant legal problems. How is the circuit court to know in the first phase of the trial whether the defendant has a mental disease or defect? In a bifurcated trial, the defendant's mental state is determined in the second phase of the trial. In this appeal, both phases of the trial have *74been completed; this court reviews the first phase knowing the result of the second phase. Unlike an appellate court, the circuit court does not have the benefit of hindsight.
Moreover, if an actor does not enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, is the actor entitled to instructions on the lesser included offense of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter? Does the majority opinion thus force a defendant to elect between getting jury instructions on the lesser included offense and pleading not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect? Is forcing such an election lawful?
The second possible interpretation of the majority opinion is that it adopts an objective element, along with two subjective elements. The state's brief urges this interpretation of sec. 940.05(2), Stats. (1985-86).
The objective element, according to the state's brief, is that the actor must have a reasonable belief that some unlawful interference with his or her person is threatened. In other words the actor must have an objectively rational basis for resorting to self-defense. An objectively unreasonable belief may stem, I assume, from a number of causes, including but not limited to mental disease or defect.
The two subjective elements are: (1) The actor subjectively believes that force was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference, but the belief is unreasonable; or (2) the actor subjectively believes that the amount of force used was necessary to prevent or terminate the interference, but the belief is unreasonable.
I cannot find support for the objective element in the statutory language or the cases of this court.
While there has been some disagreement among commentators, after reviewing the statutory formulations, the case law, and the public policy underlying the *75crimes and the defenses, I conclude that the crime of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter under sec. 940.05(2), Stats. (1985-86), is based on the actor's subjectively held but unreasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense, even when the actor's actual, unreasonable belief stems entirely from the defendant's mental disease or defect.2 I reach this conclusion on the basis of the text of the statute and the legislative history of sec. 940.05(2), including its recent restatement in sec. 940.01 (2) (b), Stats. (1987-88).3
*76In the case at bar, the defendant presented psychiatric and personal history evidence in the first phase of a bifurcated trial on attempted first degree murder charges to prove that he had an actual, unreasonable belief in the need to use force. I believe that the circuit court erred in failing to give a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter.4
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 Section 940.05(2), Stats. (1985-86), provides:
Whoever causes the death of another human being under either of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class C felony:
(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony . . ..

 For discussions of the Wisconsin law generally supporting the position I espouse, see, e.g., 2 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, p. 272, n.6 (1986); 1950 Report of the Legislative Council, pp. 56-58; 1953 Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, pp. 60-62; State v. Gomaz, 141 Wis. 2d 302, 310, 414 N.W.2d 626 (1987), citing Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 166-68, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973); Roe v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 226, 243-44, 290 N.W.2d 291 (1980); Fullin, Revision of the Criminal Code, 62 Wisconsin Lawyer 10, 12-13 (June 1989); 1987 Senate Bill 191; Minutes of the Judicial Council Special Committee on Homicide and Lesser Included Offenses (Sept. 1982-May 1983) and Minutes of the Judicial Council (1982-1987), passim (available at the Judicial Council, 25 West Main Street, Madison, Wis.); State's Brief, p. 33, n.4; Amicus Brief, Court of Appeals.

 Section 940.01(2)(b), Stats. (1987-88), provides:
The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under s. 940.05:
(b) Unnecessary defensive force. Death was caused because the actor believed he or she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable.
The Judicial Council's Prefatory Note to 1987 Sen. Bill 191 which was enacted as part of the 1987 Acts ch. 399 states that "the revised code preserves the traditional elements of each *76offense but modernizes terminology." I therefore conclude that the new statute is the same as the old in setting forth the elements of attempted imperfect self-defense manslaughter.

 I do not understand the majority opinion's discussion about the reinstruction. In this case no instruction was given on the defendant's subjective belief about imminent danger of death. Thus the issue to which evidence of the defendant’s psychiatric and personal history was relevant was not before the jury.