Court Opinion

ID: 9718308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:20:48.827432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:58.322476
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with Justice Cooper’s opinion that this Court need not apply common law rules of statutory construction to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent because the Legislature, in KRS 446.080(3), has instructed this Court not to construe a statute retroactively unless the General Assembly expressly declares that we should do so. I dissent separately, however, to express my view that a retrospective application of the 1998 amendment of KRS 304.36-080 increasing from $100,000.00 to $300,000.00 the maximum potential liability of the Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association (KIGA) would affect vested rights. Therefore, I disagree with the majority opinion’s attempt to characterize the 1998 amendment to KRS 304.36-080 as remedial under this Court’s holding in Peabody Coal v. Gossett.1 I further believe that this Court should overrule Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association v. Conco2 to the extent that it holds otherwise.
In Nutt v. Champion International Corporation,3 the Supreme Court of Tennessee . addressed whether legislative amendments to Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation statutes which permitted offsets against workers’ compensation benefits for payments made to the employee under an employer-funded disability plan should be applied retrospectively in the face of a presumption that statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature clearly indicates otherwise. The Court concluded that the amendment was not retroactive and explained the types of statutory changes which may be referred to as procedural or remedial:
Generally, the statute in effect at the date of the worker’s injury governs the rights of the parties under worker’s compensation law absent an indication of the legislature’s contrary intent. An exception to the prospective-only application exists for statutes which are remedial or procedural in nature. Statutes deemed remedial or procedural apply retrospectively to causes of action arising before such acts become law and to suits pending when the legislation took effect.
A procedural or remedial statute is one that does not affect the vested rights or liabilities of the parties. A procedural statute is one that addresses the mode or proceeding by which a legal right is enforced. Remedial statutes are defined as “[legislation providing means or method whereby causes of action may be effectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained.... ” “Statutes that create a new right of recovery or change the amount of damages recoverable are, however, deemed to have altered the parties vested right and thus are not considered remedial.” 4
Although merely persuasive authority, the depth of analysis in Nutt stands in sharp contrast to that in the three cases in which Kentucky courts have deemed remedial a legislative act or amendment which altered the amount of money to be received by a party, Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Conco,5 Napier v. Scotia Coal Co.,6 and Thomsbury v. Aero Energy.7 In none of these cases did the courts’ opinions indicate they gave any serious consideration to the vested rights of the parties. *618Today’s majority repeats that error in the one paragraph it devotes to the question of whether the KIGA Act creates a vested right:
The KIGA Act does not create a vested right. It merely provides a remedy when there is a judgment. KIGA accords the necessary means to satisfy judgments in the event of insurance insolvency. Consequently, any amendments which provide an increase in the coverage for those judgments are remedial and applicable to pending cases.8
After defining the purpose behind KIGA’s enactment as “provid[ing] a remedy when there is a judgment,” the majority appears to have ended its examination of the KIGA Act and reached the preordained conclusion that the Act was remedial. I believe a closer analysis of the KIGA Act demonstrates that a retrospective application of the $300,000 upper limit on recoveries impairs vested rights.
Vested rights are understood to be:
[R]ights which have been so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject to be defeated or canceled by the act of any other private person.... Immediate or fixed right to present or future enjoyment and one that does not depend on an event that is uncertain. A right complete and consummated, and of such character that it cannot be divested without the consent of the person to whom it belongs, and fixed or established, and no longer open to controversy.9
I believe the majority opinion has overlooked the implications of KIGA’s duty to pay covered claims defined by KRS 304.36-808(l)(a):
(1) The association shall:
(a) Be obligated to the extent of the covered claims existing prior to the order of liquidation and arising within thirty (30) days of liquidation, or before the policy expiration date if less than thirty (30) days after the order of liquidation, or before the insured replaces the policy or on request effects cancellation, if he does so within thirty (30) days of the order of liquidation. The obligation shall be satisfied by paying to the claimant an amount as follows:
1. The full amount of a covered claim for benefits arising from a workers’ compensation insurance policy purchased to satisfy the requirements of KRS 342.340;
2. An amount not exceeding then thousand dollars ($10,000) per policy for a covered claim for the return of unearned premium; or
3. An amount not exceeding three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000) [previous to this amendment, one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) ] per claimant for all other covered claims.10
Thus, once PIE Mutual Insurance Company (PIE) was declared insolvent, KIGA was deemed to be the insurer to the extent of obligations on the covered claims, and possessed all rights, duties and obligations of PIE as if PIE had not become insolvent.11 Under the terms of a typical insurance contract, an insured has vested contractual rights to payment under the policy. On the other hand, the policy limit of the insurance contract confers a vested right upon the insurer by establishing the maximum amount it will have to pay by virtue of the policy limits. Similarly, KIGA’s right to claim limitations on its liability established by the KIGA statute is an immediate or fixed right to future enjoyment which does not depend on an “uncertain” event, and vests at the time a *619covered claim12 arises. A.S such, even under the authority relied upon by the majority opinion, Peabody Coal v. Gossett,13 retrospective application is improper.
For the reasons outlined above, I would reverse the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
COOPER, J., joins this dissent.

. Ky., 819 S.W.2d33 (1991).

. Ky.App., 882 S.W.2d 129 (1994).

. 980 S.W.2d 365 (Term. 1998).

. Id at 368 (internal citations deleted and emphasis added).

. Supra note 2.

. Ky., 874 S.W.2d 377 (1994).

. Ky., 908 S.W.2d 109 (1995).

. Majority Opinion at 611.

. Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition (West Publishing Co. 1990).

. KRS 304.36-808(l)(a) (emphasis added).

. KRS 304.36-080(l)(c).

. KRS 304.36-050(6)(a).

. Supra note 1.