Court Opinion

ID: 9575787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:17:13.658686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:03.692795
License: Public Domain

Thomas Gallagher, Justice
(dissenting).
The evidence upon which the court found that plaintiff had agreed to complete the entire project in accordance with defendant’s requirements for $4,000 included an unsigned statement dated November 6, 1958, furnished to defendant by plaintiff as follows:
“Wykoff, Minnesota 11-6, 1958
“Earl Turner
$ $ * $ *
“Wykoff Lumber Company
sji # #
“45' x 75' 20x30 2 8 x 26
Pole Bldg. $4000.00
Holding Area
Parlor
Footing & Setting of Stalls
Partition Wall
Remove Tower
Sewer System
Water System
Fix over Stalls for overhead Feeding
Provide 10% floor area for Sidewall Lights.”
Testimony with respect to this statement including the following: By plaintiff:
“* * * my manager and I * * * figured out a rough estimate about what it would run to build the pole building and holding area, and put some cement footing in for this old schoolhouse, and the cement block, help to put the building onto it, and * * * there was also one partition through the center, through the twenty-eight foot, wood frame partition with stone board figured on both sides, * * *. % * ifc #
“* * * i went back * * * in the afternoon and talked to Mr. Turner and gave him the estimate of what I thought we could do this work for.
*177“* * * I gave him an approximation on the building and the holding area, and this parlor for concrete work, and this partition, around $4,000.00.
*****
«* * * it was an estimate, a rough estimate of what, if it was done, in the way we had planned it.
‡ * ❖ # *
“* * * there was no specifications or blueprints.
*****
“* * * no plans * * * or elevations and things like that * * (Italics supplied.)
“Q; Now, Mr. Delyea, you had conversations with Mr. Turner at the inception of this deal, at which time you estimated that this work would cost $4,000.00 * * *?
“A. Right.
“Q. Now, that was in the nature of an approximation, or an estimate?
“A. Correct.”
In response to questioning by the court, plaintiff testified that the work described in the written statement was to be furnished by him for $4,000 if it was done “our way.”
Upon cross-examination he was asked:
“Q- * * * were you ever asked to sign any estimate by the Turners?
¥ ¥ ¥ $
“The Witness: Mr. Turner asked me if I would sign the estimate, yes.
*****
“Q. And what did you tell him?
“A. I told him no, that I normally do not sign any estimate when we go into a remodeling job, as this is. It can vary quite a bit, and quite frequently does.”
*178■ This testimony was not denied by defendant. With respect to the written statement, the latter testified as follows:
“A. He [plaintiff] was to do this work, the bam, the parlor, and the holding area. If there was anything I saw that I wanted changed, I said I would pay extra for it. Then in the parlor, he agreed to do everything according to Grade-A specifications.
* s¡< s¡: * *
“Q. And had you advised him that you wanted Grade-A specifications?
“A. He told me that would be complete. I said there may be a lot of little incidentals. He said that is complete, that is his words.” (Italics supplied.)
There is no testimony whatever to establish just what “Grade-A” specifications were; or that plaintiff had made any statements either orally or in writing with respect thereto. No exhibits or other documentary evidence were submitted to enlighten the court thereon, and plaintiff testified that such specifications had never been discussed with defendant at any time before the work was done.
With reference to a substitution of soil pipe for clay tile, required by defendant, the latter testified as follows:
“Q. Do you know how that came about that they used it [soil pipe]?
“A. I believe a Surge dealer came in there and he had a Grade-A book with him, * * * and he said that they [clay tile] weren’t acceptable * * *. And so we didn’t use them.”
Other testimony by defendant with respect to the terms of the agreement takes the form of several conclusions recited in response to leading questions by his counsel, a few of which are quoted here as illustrative of this:
“Q. Mr. Turner, you understood that Mr. Delyea was to do what is on that slip for $4,000.00?
“A. That is right.
*179“Q. And was it your understanding that it was to comply with Grade-A requirements?
“A. That’s right.
* # * * *
“Q. Mr. Turner, what was the discussion on November 6th regarding the requirements of this agreement?
“A. It had to be set up according to Grade-A regulations.”
On cross-examination, he further testified:
“Q. * * * Is there anything in either of these exhibits [the state-
ment of November 6, 1958] * * * with reference to ventilation?
“A. In stating to complete a building and to have the Grade-A requirements; you have to have ventilation and painting.
“Q. I know. I asked you if there was anything in either one of these Exhibits with reference to ventilators, to a ventilation system?
“A. No.
:}: sfc % ♦
“The Court: * * * where do you get these Grade-A requirements?
“The Witness: They have a book of rules, I believe, that sets out Grade-A requirements. Any Grade-A inspector has them, and I think the creameries have them, * * *.
* * * * *
“Q. Now, you have testified, Mr. Turner, in reference to a water line, running the water pipe in this some hundred feet, was that it, did you request that?
“A. You mean what pipe?
“Q. Into the pole barn?
“A. That was to be in the deal. There was supposed to have been a calf pen in the comer of this pole barn, and the agreement was to pipe water from my present water system, so I could have water in the calf pen as well as in the milking parlor.
* * * %
“Q. Isn’t it a fact, Mr. Turner, that you were there watching that
*180job as it progressed every day, and * * * you were making suggestions practically daily as to what should be done?
“A. No, I wouldn’t say that.
‡ $
“A. I told the fellows it had to be done according to Grade-A, and I suppose I made that statement four dozen times.” (Italics supplied.)
The work commenced November 15, 1958. It is undisputed that during its progress numerous changes and requirements therein were made by defendant, none of which had any reference to the written statement described. Plaintiff submitted in evidence, without objection, sales slips, records, and other documents establishing that before the project was completed labor and material of the fair and reasonable market value of $8,715.13 had been furnished and supplied by him thereunder. This included numerous items for labor and material for changes which defendant had ordered while the work was under way. Plaintiff submitted testimony that after defendant’s payment in February monthly statements of the account were mailed to defendant showing items of labor or material furnished on the project during each month.
Mr. Charles R. Halweg, manager of a lumber company at Preston, testified on behalf of defendant. His company had unsuccessfully bid for defendant’s work. As a foundation for his testimony relative to the value of plaintiff’s work, he testified that he did not profess to be an expert on lumber and had no more than a general knowledge of cement and construction work. Asked if he was familiar with the buildings constructed by plaintiff on defendant’s farm, he replied that he had “looked at them once.” Based upon such foundation, the court permitted him to estimate the value of the project as somewhere between $5,000 and $5,500.
Following the trial and before the court’s decision therein, on February 20, 1960, the parties entered into a written stipulation as follows:
“That the reasonable value of labor, material and supplies of each Item in the list of modifications, additions and alterations submitted to the Court, are as follows:
*181“[An itemized list indicating the stipulated value of such amounts in the sum of $1,175.91.]
“This Stipulation is not to be construed as an admission by plaintiff that an oral contract existed between the parties, nor an admission by defendants that said items were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of making the original agreement.”
In its finding with respect to the latter, the court allowed a total of only $696.08 of the aforesaid items designated as extra material due in excess of the $4,000 set forth in the statement of November 6, 1958, and as indicated above disallowed plaintiffs claim of lien for the balance due him. In a memorandum attached to the findings the trial court stated:
“The complaint of the Plaintiff proceeded on the theory of quantum meruit. * * * The Plaintiff finally admitted, upon I believe the cross-examination, that there was an agreement whereby the Defendants were to pay the Plaintiff the sum of $4,000.00 for doing certain things with respect to building a new pole barn and remodeling an old school house into a milk parlor. * * * At any rate, the claim of the Plaintiff in his complaint and in his lien statement are so excessive that I have concluded that the Plaintiff, in making his complaint and his lien statement, claimed more than he knew or should have known was justly due.”
1. In my opinion, it is clear that the written statement submitted by plaintiff to defendant on November 6, 1958, was limited to plaintiffs performance of the work described therein for the sum of $4,000. It is very definite in this respect and certainly the parties here would be bound to the extent of such definite provisions. McCreight v. Davey Tree Expert Co. 191 Minn. 489, 254 N. W. 623; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Bryngelson, 160 Minn. 205, 199 N. W. 905; Shinners v. Ford, 151 Minn. 328, 186 N. W. 704. While parol evidence was admissible to show further agreements between the parties on matters not included in the written statement, 7 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 3392, such evidence was not admissible for the purpose of varying its plain terms as it related to various items which plaintiff was to furnish and provide *182thereunder for the sum of $4,000. Id. §§ 3368, 3407. Defendant’s testimony, however, in effect did vary many of the clear provisions of this statement and enlarged it to require of plaintiff that he remodel the old schoolhouse to a completed “milking parlor” upon defendant’s premises in compliance with so-called “Grade-A” specifications which were not clearly identified or submitted in evidence. Defendant’s testimony reveals his position that, notwithstanding the definite terms and limitations of the written statement, plaintiff was nevertheless obligated to furnish and provide many items not mentioned therein simply because defendant “understood” that such items were to be provided by plaintiff. As the work progressed, he gave orders for numerous changes and modifications concerning which plaintiff was not consulted. In plaintiffs absence, about “four dozen times” he directed plaintiff’s employees that the work must be performed in accordance with his idea of Grade-A specifications which at no time had been submitted to plaintiff. On these occasions he did not request estimates from plaintiff as to the extra costs of such changes, and at no time did he obtain plaintiffs consent thereto. The latter’s course of conduct in refusing to sign the November 6, 1958, statement; in keeping accurate books and records covering the extra material ordered; and in forwarding monthly statements of accounts to defendant is indicative of his firm conviction that the modifications and extras ordered by defendant were to be at the latter’s expense, and of the fact that defendant was well aware that separate charges therefor were being made by plaintiff.
2. Further, it seems clear that defendant’s testimony to the effect that he “understood” that certain items were required to be furnished by plaintiff under the agreement; or that they had been “agreed to” by the parties were simply conclusions on his part, inadequate to form a sound basis for an agreement with respect thereto, or to justify a variance in the terms of the written statement. Bergland Oil Co. Inc. v. Grommesh, 226 Minn. 19, 31 N. W. (2d) 644; Village of Hibbing v. Township of Stuntz, 225 Minn. 31, 29 N. W. (2d) 808; Bardwell v. Witt, 42 Minn. 468, 44 N. W. 983. Likewise, the court’s conclusions set forth in its memorandum that by his admission plaintiff had ac*183knowledged the existence of a contract under which he was required to perform all the work ordered by defendant for the sum of $4,000 appears entirely unjustified. All plaintiff admitted was that the work provided in the written statement would be performed by him for the sum of $4,000 if such work was done “our way.” It is obvious that thereby plaintiff meant that the work to be performed by him and the manner of its performance was indicated and limited by the statement of November 6, 1958. Certainly, this was not a concession by him that all the obligations that defendant “understood” rested upon plaintiff had actually been undertaken by him. That the work went far beyond the requirements of the written statement is quite obvious from testimony submitted.
3. Further, I have difficulty in ascertaining the basis of the court’s finding that plaintiff was entitled to only the sum of $4,581.08 for the labor and material furnished by him. Defendant stipulated that certain of the modifications ordered by him as the work progressed were of the value of $1,175.91 over the $4,000 figure. His expert witness estimated the total value of the construction at between $5,000 and $5,500. Plaintiff’s books and records established that the cost of the labor and material furnished by him therein equaled the sum of $8,715.13. The reasonableness of such charges was not disputed by defendant and his repeated requests for alterations, modifications, and additions as the work progressed accounted for much of the additional cost. At the end of each month statements covering items furnished during the month were forwarded to him by plaintiff’s bookkeeper, and he did not deny receiving them. Certainly such evidence would require a finding of an amount due in excess of that determined by the court.
4. By virtue of all the foregoing, I have serious doubt as to whether the evidence submitted herein is adequate to support the court’s findings and conclusions as to the terms of the agreement between the parties; as to the value of items of labor and material required to be furnished by plaintiff thereunder; and as to the basis of payment therefor. Under the circumstances presented, and in view of the rather free reception of evidence definitely too inconclusive to form a sound *184basis for establishing the terms of such an agreement, or to allow a variance in the terms of the written statement of November 6, 1958, I am of the opinion that in the interests of justice the case should be remanded for new trial. At that time, the parties should be limited to material and relevant evidence deemed requisite to establish the exact terms of their agreement, the work to be performed by plaintiff thereunder, and the basis of payment therefor — quantum meruit or a fixed price. In view of the fact that such issues appear to be dependent upon what the parties agreed to on November 6, 1958, or upon any subsequent modification of their agreement of that date, applicable rules of evidence governing their determination should be strictly applied.
5. Further, I am of the opinion that plaintiff should not be held to have lost his lien rights for any balance found due him. It is undisputed that the labor and material which he furnished included many items of labor and material which defendant had directed that plaintiff’s employees furnish, and concerning which plaintiff was not consulted. Accordingly, since there is nothing in the statement of November 6, 1958, making reference to such items, it would seem clear that plaintiff was justified in assuming that he would be paid the reasonable value thereof. His monthly statements forwarded to defendant established that he furnished labor and material on the project of the value of $8,715.13. Defendant made no attempt to controvert the reasonableness of these charges, or to show bad faith or fraudulent conduct on the part of plaintiff therein. In Aaby v. Better Builders, Inc. 228 Minn. 222, 226, 37 N. W. (2d) 234, 236, where we upheld plaintiff’s lien rights under § 514.74, we stated:
“In the cases cited [denying lien rights], the court found that the lienors had intentionally demanded more in their lien statements than was justly due them, with a motive amounting almost to bad faith. Here, plaintiff has been guilty of no bad faith nor fraudulent intent. * * * He has not knowingly, as used in § 514.74, demanded more than was justly due him.”
See, also, Temes v. Westberg, 246 Minn. 485, 75 N. W. (2d) 415.
Under these decisions, the basis for denying lien rights under § 514.74 *185was held to rest upon evidence establishing the bad faith or fraudulent conduct of the lien claimant. Here, where there is nothing to support a finding that plaintiff was guilty of any such misconduct in filing his lien, I believe that his hen for whatever amount is due him should be upheld as valid and enforceable.