Court Opinion

ID: 9572004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:37:16.143838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:19.177674
License: Public Domain

NEIGHBORS, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the court’s conclusion that there was no crime of criminal contempt at common law. However, I disagree that the prosecution for the alleged contempt committed in this case was properly initiated by an information, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The issue squarely presented in this case is whether criminal contempt proceedings may be initiated by the filing of an information. I recognize that earlier decisions of this court permitted such actions to be initiated by the filing of an information. People ex rel. Attorney General v. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 P. 912 (1906), writ of error dismissed sub nom. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556, 51 L.Ed.2d 879 (1907); Bloom v. People, 23 Colo. 416, 48 P. 519 (1897). However, these cases are no longer controlling.
We now have comprehensive statutes and rules of procedure which govern the use of “informations” and the conduct of *1375civil and criminal proceedings. Utilizing an information to prosecute an alleged con-temnor for criminal contempt is not authorized by any statute or rule of procedure. Indeed, the reverse is true. Section 16 — 5— 101(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), governs the commencement of a criminal prosecution. The statute provides in pertinent part:
“(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a criminal action for violation of any statute may be commenced in one of the following ways:
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“(b) By the filing of an information in the district court; ...”
Section 16-5-202(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8), sets forth the requisites of an information. The statute provides:
“(1) The information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom:
“(a) That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense;
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“(c) That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, or is triable therein;
“(d) That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction.”
From these statutory provisions we learn that an information may be filed to commence a criminal action for an offense which consists of the violation of any criminal statute. Section 18-1-104(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), defines offense as follows:
“The terms ‘offense’ and ‘crime’ are synonymous and mean a violation of, or conduct defined by, any state statute for which a fine or imprisonment may be imposed.”
See also Crim.P. 7(b) which contains similar provisions relating to the information. Under the present statutory scheme and Rules of Criminal Procedure, an information may be used only to initiate the prosecution of a crime. The majority has correctly concluded that criminal contempt is not a crime.
The majority does not address the issue of how a document which may only be used to initiate the prosecution of criminal cases can be used to begin proceedings against a person for conduct not amounting to a crime. The court merely concludes that it is the content of the document rather than the form which is controlling. If the argument in this case was limited to a claim by the alleged contemnor that the information was defective because it violated his due process rights, I would agree. However, both the legislature, by enacting the Code of Criminal Procedure and this court, in adopting Rules of Criminal Procedure, have attached very specific definitions and requirements to the word “information.” Crim.P. 57(b) provides as follows:
“If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall look to the Rules of Civil Procedure and to the applicable law if no Rule of Criminal Procedure exists.”
Since there is no rule governing contempt in the criminal rules, C.R.C.P. 107 sets forth the only procedure authorized to be used in criminal contempt proceedings. We impliedly recognized the exclusivity of C.R.C.P. 107 in People v. Lucero, 196 Colo. 276, 280, 584 P.2d 1208, 1211 (1978), when we stated:
“The court’s authority to punish for contempt of court a witness who disobeys an order to testify issued under section 13-90-118, C.R.S.1973, cannot be seriously questioned. The civil contempt provisions of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Rule 107(a), expressly provide that ‘disobedience ... of any person to ... any lawful ... command of said court ... shall constitute contempt.’ ”
Rather than ending the hopeless confusion over whether criminal contempt proceedings are governed by C.R.C.P. 107, the court perpetuates the uncertainty by its decision today permitting the use of both an information and a C.R.C.P. 107 citation in such cases. We will next be faced with *1376determining, in a series of cases, whether an alleged contemnor is entitled to the full panoply of rights enumerated in the constitution, statutes, and rules of procedure which are available to criminally accused persons who are charged with criminal contempt by an information. No useful purpose will be served by such an exercise. Moreover, the existence of alternative procedures which may be employed to prosecute criminal contempt raises serious equal protection issues. Where one alleged con-temnor is prosecuted by an information and is or may be entitled to greater procedural and substantive rights than a person against whom contempt proceedings are initiated under C.R.C.P. 107, litigation involving equal protection arguments is sure to follow. In Lucero, 196 Colo. 276, 584 P.2d 1208, we held that the procedure authorized by C.R.C.P. 107, which had been utilized in that case, complied fully with the requirements of constitutional due process. I would put an end to the uncertainty and hold that C.R.C.P. 107 provides the exclusive means of punishing criminal contempt under the presently existing statutes and rules which quite clearly dictate such a result. The trial court correctly ruled it lacked jurisdiction to proceed and I would affirm the order of dismissal.