Court Opinion

ID: 9542402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:33:47.757379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:50.516348
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
dissenting.
I must dissent because I believe, regardless of the dispute in the evidence as to whether Dickson, as the driver of Reidesel’s truck, was negligent, that as a matter of law Mrs. Blank was herself guilty of contributory negligence. Thus, it was error for the trial court to deny both the defendants’ motion for judgment of dismissal and their later motion for a directed verdict.
The “conflicting versions of what happened,” referred to in the opinion, have only to do with whether the Reidesel vehicle was stopped on the bridge or whether it was moving very slowly, for Dickson admitted he was in the middle of the bridge right-of-way at the time of the collision and the other facts are undisputed.
*345The important facts showing Mrs. Blank’s negligent conduct, however, have been omitted and disregarded by the majority opinion and I therefore feel constrained to recite them in some detail along with the pertinent ones already stated, as follows:
The rear-end collision between the two heavily loaded wheat trucks occurred at 2:15 p.m. about 6% miles north of Yona, Colorado. The accident took place on a clear day on a bridge that was 20 feet wide and 165 feet long. The hard-packed gravel road, leading to the bridge from the north was 22 feet wide. A profile drawing of the bridge and the road to the north shows a hill crest, a dip, and a small knob with a 6% grade below the rise to the bridge. The small knob is 525 feet north of the north end of the bridge and because of this topographic feature it is physically impossible to see any vehicle between that point and the south end of the bridge until one reaches the top of the knob.
It appears from the testimony of Beverly Kay Brown, a then twelve year old girl passenger in the Blank truck, that the plaintiff’s wife, who admittedly had driven over this road many times and was an experienced truck driver, had followed defendant Reidesel’s truck at varying distances for approximately eight miles. Because of the number of small hills in the one and a half miles before the bridge, plaintiff’s wife had lost sight of defendant’s truck. As the Blank truck came over the crest of the hill going south no vehicle could be seen in front of her on the road; however, when her truck came to the top of the small knob, Mrs. Blank saw Reidesel’s truck in the middle of the road on the north end of the bridge, either stopped or moving slowly •—• depending on whose version of the accident one believes. Plaintiff’s wife immediately applied her truck’s brakes but could not stop in time to prevent ramming the rear of the other truck on the bridge. The force of the collision mashed the Blank truck’s engine and cab into a compressed tangle of metal, killing the driver and injuring *346her passenger. Both vehicles were forced across the bridge and came to rest 320 feet from the point of impact according to a state patrolman who investigated the tragedy. Mrs. Blank’s truck laid down 269 feet of skid marks prior to striking the other vehicle. There was no precise testimony as to the speed of the Blank vehicle at the time of the impact but the passenger testified that Mrs. Blank had been driving at speeds of from 20 to 30 m.p.h. at the slowest and up to 40 m.p.h. at times. As she recalled, their speed was about 20 m.p.h. when they got to the top of the hill.
C.R.S. ’53, 13-4-33, which was applicable to the situation before us at the time, states in pertinent part:
“Speed limits.— (1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 'conditions then existing.
“(2) * * *
“(3) The fact that the speed of a vehicle is lower than the foregoing prima facie limits shall not relieve the driver from the duty to decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions, and speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care.”
The above statute provides that “* * * speed shall be decreased as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any * * * vehicle, * * (Emphasis supplied.) This is the law in 'Colorado and this court should not attempt to qualify it by allowing a jury to apply a reasonable man standard to it. Cf. Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey, 61 Utah 465, 214 Pac. 304 (1923). The legislature, in effect, *347has decided what a reasonable man will do and we are bound by that determination. 'And, independently of statute, it is negligence as a matter of law for a person to drive an automobile upon a traveled highway in such a manner and at such a rate of speed so that the vehicle cannot be stopped within the distance at which the driver is able to see objects upon the highway in front of him. Union Pacific v. Cogburn, 136 Colo. 184, 315 P.2d 209 (1957); Ridenour v. Diffee, 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956).
Here Mrs. Blank could not stop in time to avoid the accident even though she had over 500 feet in which to act and laid down 269 feet of skid marks in trying to stop. The entire circumstances of this case, where an experienced truck driver knew the road, knew there was another truck ahead of her, knew the narrow wooden bridge lay at the foot of the hill and should have known how long it would take to stop her truck if she had to, show a reckless and almost willful disregard of the rights of others. In my opinion, her conduct was at the very least a proximate cause of the accident. This is true regardless of whether the other vehicle was stopped or moving or was in the middle of the right-of-way on the bridge or whether its driver was also guilty of negligence. To me only one reasonable inference can be drawn from Mrs. Blank’s conduct, which inference made the question one of law for the court.