Court Opinion

ID: 9368659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-06 16:11:13.522634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:09.532692
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                        2023 WY 13

                                                           OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2022

                                                                    February 6, 2023

 RYAN LEWIS HILYARD,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.                                                         S-22-0144

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                    Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County
                      The Honorable Catherine E. Wilking, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Diane Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel;
      Elizabeth B. Lance, Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Lance.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General;
      Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; John J. Woykovsky, Senior
      Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Woykovsky.

Before FOX, C.J., KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Following a jury trial, Ryan Hilyard was convicted of committing aggravated child
abuse against his son KH and child abuse against his step-son LT. On appeal, Mr. Hilyard
argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting LT’s recorded interview with
investigators as a prior consistent statement under Wyoming Rule of Evidence (W.R.E.)
801(d)(1)(B). Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

                                          ISSUE

[¶2]   We restate the issue:

              Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting LT’s out
              of court statement as a prior consistent statement under W.R.E.
              801(d)(1)(B)?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Hilyard and his first wife had two sons—KH and KB—before divorcing. He
then met Sarah in 2017. She had one son—LT—from a prior relationship. Mr. Hilyard
and Sarah had a son together, married in 2018, and blended their two families, living in
Mills, Wyoming.

[¶4] On Sunday, August 2, 2020, Mr. Hilyard, Sarah, and the children went to a family
reunion at Mr. Hilyard’s brother’s home in Riverton, Wyoming. At the reunion, KH, who
was 12 years old at the time, upset Sarah and Mr. Hilyard by eating cake. Accounts vary
as to what happened when the family arrived home. By one account, KH fell on the stairs
and hit his head but seemed fine until his health deteriorated several days later. By another
account, both parents made KH run stairs as punishment and physically beat him in the
process, resulting in a head injury; they then delayed seeking medical treatment.

[¶5] On August 6, Sarah brought KH to the Wyoming Medical Center emergency room.
He was unresponsive and had numerous injuries, the most serious of which was a traumatic
brain injury (swelling of the brain and bleeding around the brain). He also had
approximately 40 bruises all over his body that were in different stages of healing. Medical
staff contacted police because they suspected child abuse. KH had to be transported to
Colorado for treatment due to the severity of his injuries. He suffered permanent brain
damage.

[¶6] In separate interviews, Sarah, Mr. Hilyard, LT, and KB all claimed KH fell down
the stairs. The children were taken into protective custody. LT and KB were placed in the
same foster home.

                                             1
[¶7] In late August, LT told his foster mother that an accident did not cause KH’s
injuries. Department of Family Services investigator Tazia Morgart and a detective
conducted a recorded interview with LT later that month.

[¶8] In the recorded interview, LT stated Mr. Hilyard told him and KB to lie to the cops
about what happened to KH because Mr. Hilyard did not want to go to jail. LT and KB
lied because they did not want Mr. Hilyard to hurt them. Mr. Hilyard told them people
were going to come over to ask questions and they were supposed to say KH just fell down
the stairs and so that is what they said. LT was afraid Mr. Hilyard would hurt him if he did
not lie because Mr. Hilyard picked the children up by their throats a lot and sometimes hit
them with a leather belt.

[¶9] According to LT, KH got in trouble for stealing cake at a family picnic. Sarah and
Mr. Hilyard yelled at KH on the drive home and then made KH exercise as punishment
when they got home.

[¶10] LT recounted that Mr. Hilyard made KH run up and down the stairs and then
punched him and dragged him up and down the stairs until KH fell down and hit his head.
At one point, it looked like KH “had no bones[.]” LT knew what happened because he
was standing there. When questioned about Sarah’s location when this occurred, LT
explained that she was helping Mr. Hilyard by pushing and dragging KH up and down the
stairs. LT stated “they told [LT]” that if KH stopped running LT needed to push KH down
the stairs. LT was afraid of what would happen if he did not push KH down the stairs, so
he pushed KH down the stairs one time. When KH fell down, Mr. Hilyard and Sarah
yelled, punched, and kicked KH. They told KH “stop faking it, get up.” Mr. Hilyard and
Sarah then took KH to his room and LT never saw KH after that.

[¶11] In November, the State charged Mr. Hilyard with aggravated child abuse under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-201 and 6-2-503(b)(i), (c), alleging, in part, he did “intentionally
or recklessly inflict physical injury . . . upon the victim, to wit: physically beat, kicked and
[dragged] [KH], or did aid and abet in the same offense[.]” It also charged him with child
abuse under §§ 6-1-201 and 6-2-503(b)(ii), alleging he did “intentionally or recklessly
inflict upon a child, under the age of eighteen (18) mental injury to wit: made [LT] beat his
brother [KH] or did aid and abet in the same offense[.]” 1 Mr. Hilyard pleaded not guilty
to the charges.

[¶12] At trial in November 2021, LT, who was 11 at the time, testified about the
circumstances surrounding KH’s abuse. He stated that LT and his family went to a family
reunion in Riverton and KH took food out of the trash and ate it. On the drive home, Mr.
Hilyard and Sarah yelled at KH for doing so. When they got home, LT and the other

1
  On the State’s motion, the district court dismissed a charge of attempted second degree murder prior to
trial.

                                                   2
children went outside to play while KH did pushups, sit-ups, and jumping jacks inside the
home as punishment. Later, LT went inside to get a drink and then a few minutes later KH
“was told to go run stairs.” LT watched from the living room as KH ran stairs. Sarah was
at the top of the stairs and Mr. Hilyard was at the bottom of the stairs. If KH stopped at
the top of the stairs, Sarah “would shove him down the stairs” and if KH stopped at the
bottom of the stairs, Mr. Hilyard “would, like, tell him to keep going or force him to keep
going.” LT saw his “mom pushing and dragging [KH] down the stairs” and “towards the
end, [Mr. Hilyard] and [Sarah] were kicking and punching him.”

[¶13] When asked what LT was doing when this occurred, the following colloquy ensued:

              Q. What were you doing while this was happening?

              A. I was at the top, mainly watching. But then, at one point,
              my mom went to go clean the kitchen or do something in the
              kitchen; I don’t exactly remember what. But she told me to
              stay at the top of the stairs and if [KH] had stopped at the top
              of the stairs, she wanted me to push him down. There was one
              point when he had stopped when I was up there. So I had
              mainly pushed him down. I’m pretty sure I only pushed him
              down two, but I didn’t really want to get in trouble myself.

              Q. And where was [Mr. Hilyard] when that happened?

              A. At the bottom of the stairs.

              Q. While you were at the top having to push?

              A. Uh-huh.

LT stated he pushed KH “[b]ecause I was scared that if I didn’t do it, then I was going to
get beat myself.”

[¶14] By LT’s account, the punishment ended when KH passed out at the bottom of the
stairs. When he passed out, Sarah and Mr. Hilyard both told him to “wake up and stop
faking it.” “[T]hey were kicking and punching him, and then, when they saw he wasn’t
faking it, then they stopped there.” “They dragged him towards his room and they splashed
him with water.” When KH did not wake up, they told the children to go to the living
room. KH remained in the basement after that. KH did not wake up until the next morning
and the children had not seen him since.

[¶15] The prior consistent statement at issue on appeal was admitted through the State’s
last witness, Ms. Morgart, who testified she was assigned to investigate the abuse

                                                3
allegations involving KH in August 2020. She further testified that she and a detective
conducted a recorded interview with LT in his foster home later that month. The State then
moved to admit the first 14 minutes of LT’s interview with Ms. Morgart and the detective.
Defense counsel objected.

[¶16] The jury found Mr. Hilyard guilty of aggravated child abuse of KH and child abuse
of LT. He was convicted of those offenses and sentenced to consecutive prison terms of
18 to 20 years for aggravated child abuse and 5 to 10 years for child abuse. This timely
appeal followed.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶17] Because Mr. Hilyard objected, we review the district court’s admission of LT’s prior
statement for an abuse of discretion. Blair v. State, 2022 WY 121, ¶ 17, 517 P.3d 597, 601
(Wyo. 2022) (citing Thompson v. State, 2021 WY 84, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d 1033, 1039 (Wyo.
2021)). “The district court abused its discretion if ‘it could not have reasonably concluded
as it did.’” Id. (citing Thompson, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d at 1039). If the district court abused its
discretion by admitting LT’s prior statement, we must determine whether this ruling
prejudiced Mr. Hilyard. Id. (citing Thompson, ¶ 15, 491 P.3d at 1039). Mr. Hilyard has
the burden to establish abuse of discretion and prejudice. Id. (citing Kincaid v. State, 2022
WY 4, ¶¶ 31, 32, 501 P.3d 1257, 1263 (Wyo. 2022)).

                                      DISCUSSION

[¶18] “Hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” W.R.E. 801(c). “Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because they
are made outside of court and, therefore, presumed to be unreliable.” Blair, ¶ 18, 517 P.3d
at 601 (quoting Bruce v. State, 2015 WY 46, ¶ 40, 346 P.3d 909, 923 (Wyo. 2015)); W.R.E.
802. LT’s prior recorded interview statement constituted inadmissible hearsay unless it
qualified as a prior consistent statement under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The rule provides:

              (d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay.—A statement is not
              hearsay if:

              (1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the
              trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
              the statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his
              testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
              against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or
              motive[.]

W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

                                             4
[¶19] We have enumerated four requirements for admission of a prior consistent statement
under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

              (1) the declarant must testify at trial; (2) the declarant must be
              subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement;
              (3) the prior statement must be consistent with the declarant’s
              trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement must be offered to
              rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
              recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.

Thompson, ¶ 18, 491 P.3d at 1039 (citation omitted). Mr. Hilyard concedes the first
requirement was satisfied because LT testified at trial. However, he argues the three
remaining requirements were not satisfied. We address each in turn and, for the reasons
set forth below, hold the district court reasonably concluded each requirement was met.

       The declarant must be subject to cross-examination concerning the prior
       statement.

[¶20] Mr. Hilyard acknowledges “L.T. was subject to cross-examination[,]” but asserts
LT “was not subject to cross-examination concerning the content of his prior out-of-court
statement” because “he had testified much earlier that day and exited the courtroom[,]” and
therefore “was not available” when the statement was admitted through Ms. Morgart.

[¶21] We have previously found the “subject to cross-examination” requirement was
satisfied where a prior consistent statement was admitted through a witness other than the
declarant. See, e.g., Griggs v. State, 2016 WY 16, ¶¶ 96, 99, 367 P.3d 1108, 1136 (Wyo.
2016) (prior consistent statements by the child victims were admitted through a forensic
interviewer); Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶¶ 5, 35, 38, 177 P.3d 807, 810, 818–19 (Wyo.
2008) (prior consistent statements by the child victims were admitted through their foster
mother and an investigator). But we have not squarely addressed the parameters of the
“subject to cross-examination” requirement under circumstances where, as here, the
declarant had testified previous to the witness through whom the prior statement was
admitted.

[¶22] “Where our rules are sufficiently similar to federal rules, we consider federal
decisions interpreting them persuasive.” Blair, ¶ 18, 517 P.3d at 601 (quoting Jontra
Holdings Pty Ltd v. Gas Sensing Tech. Corp., 2021 WY 17, ¶ 76, 479 P.3d 1222, 1244
(Wyo. 2021)). Though we have distinguished our prior consistent statement rule from the
federal rule in one important respect, see infra ¶ 34, it is sufficiently similar to its federal
counterpart for federal decisions to be persuasive on the “subject to cross-examination”
requirement. Compare W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

                                               5
[¶23] Federal courts applying Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) “typically condone”
admission of a prior consistent statement through a later-called witness “so long as there is
no bar to recalling the witness-declarant should the opposing party desire to do so.” Wright
& Miller, 30B Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 6733 (2022 ed.), Westlaw (Apr. 2022 Update)
(footnote omitted). See also United States v. Montague, 958 F.2d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (collecting cases). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held:

              [W]here the declarant has already testified and the prior
              consistent statement is proffered through the testimony of
              another witness, the Rule’s “subject to cross-examination”
              requirement is satisfied if the opposing party is not denied the
              opportunity to recall the declarant to the stand for cross-
              examination concerning the statement.

United States v. Caracappa, 614 F.3d 30, 39 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

[¶24] In overruling a case holding otherwise, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
explained:

              Cross-examination about the statement can be accomplished
              whether or not the statement is introduced by the declarant; if
              the statement is elicited from a third party, the declarant may
              be recalled for further examination. [United States v. West, 670
              F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1982)] thus goes beyond its justification and
              imposes a precondition for admissibility relating to the order
              and manner that evidence is presented, a precondition not
              contained in Rule 801(d)(1)(B). And although this limitation
              avoids having to recall the declarant and therefore may serve
              some benefit in terms of trial management, we think this
              consideration is better left to the discretion of the trial court.

United States v. Green, 258 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2001). Courts have thus found the
“subject to cross-examination” requirement satisfied where there was “no indication in the
record [] that the defendant made any effort to recall [the witness],” Montague, 958 F.2d
at 1099, or “was prevented from recalling [the witness] for cross-examination,” Green, 258
F.3d at 692.

[¶25] The same reasoning applies here. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) does not require a prior
consistent statement be introduced through the declarant. Rather, the plain language of the
rule simply requires the declarant be “subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement[.]” W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The record in this case indicates LT was available for
re-cross-examination about the recording because, unlike most of the State’s witnesses, he
was not released from his subpoena after testifying. Instead, the district court simply

                                              6
instructed LT he could “step off of the witness stand and exit the courtroom at this time.”
LT was therefore subject to recall but there is no indication in the record Mr. Hilyard made
any effort to recall him. Nor could we find any evidence the court prevented Mr. Hilyard
from doing so. The district court therefore reasonably concluded the second requirement
was satisfied.

       The prior statement must be consistent with the declarant’s trial testimony.

[¶26] A prior consistent statement may not be used to prove “new points” the declarant’s
testimony did not cover. Griggs, ¶ 100, 367 P.3d at 1136 (citation omitted). That is so
because “[m]aterial information presented for the first time to support a prior ‘consistent
statement’ has no antecedent with which to be consistent or inconsistent[.]” Id. ¶ 100, 367
P.3d at 1136–37 (citations omitted). However, the declarant’s prior statement and trial
testimony do not have to be identical. Id. ¶ 100, 367 P.3d at 1137 (citations omitted). They
need only be “generally consistent[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

[¶27] Mr. Hilyard argues LT’s “prior statement was not entirely consistent with [his] trial
testimony” because, at trial, LT testified his mother told him to push KH but, in his
recorded interview, LT stated they told him to push KH. He reasons that LT’s prior
statement “seems to implicate Mr. Hilyard[,]” while LT’s testimony “did not implicate Mr.
Hilyard in telling him to push K.H.”

[¶28] Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, 157 P.3d 923 (Wyo. 2007) is instructive. When Mr.
Martin tried to discredit the victim’s testimony that he previously choked and threatened
to kill her, the State responded by presenting testimony she previously reported to the
police that Mr. Martin had (1) choked and hit her in the face, and (2) threatened to slit her
throat. Martin, ¶¶ 27–28, 157 P.3d at 929–30. We affirmed admission of the first statement
but not the second, explaining that “[a]lthough . . . the prior statements need not be identical
word-for-word, W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) was not intended to allow testimony to move from
the vague to the specific.” Id. ¶ 29, 157 P.3d at 930. Further, “[t]he Rule does not allow
for the use of hearsay evidence to fill in the gaps in the testimony elicited from the initial
declarant.” Id.

[¶29] Here, unlike in Martin, LT’s prior statement that “they” told him to push KH was
not more specific than his testimony that his mother told him to push KH down the stairs.
Further, this is not a case like Martin, where a prior statement was used to fill gaps in
testimony. Mr. Hilyard seems to argue otherwise when he asserts he “was not implicated
during L.T.’s trial testimony of making him push K.H.” because “[i]t was clear that was
[done by] L.T.’s mom[.]” The flaw in this argument is that while LT’s mother may have
initiated his participation, Mr. Hilyard was standing at the bottom of the stairs when she
did so and it was Mr. Hilyard who ensured that LT would have to push KH by forcing KH
to continue running the stairs even after LT had taken his mother’s place.

                                               7
[¶30] Further, after having testified to seeing Mr. Hilyard force KH to run by beating him,
LT explained that he pushed KH because he “was scared that if I didn’t do it, then I was
going to get beat myself.” Given this testimony, it would be reasonable to interpret Mr.
Hilyard’s apparent silence when LT’s mother told him to take her place and push KH as
an implicit order to LT to do what his mother said. So understood, the statements are
consistent. See Sorensen v. State, 895 P.2d 454, 459 (Wyo. 1995) (“If there is a question
as to the consistency of the statements, the proper place to divine the witnesses’ meaning
is during cross-examination, not on appeal.”).

[¶31] Mr. Hilyard also faults the district court for not “mak[ing] an independent
determination as to whether the statement was consistent.” When the State moved to
introduce LT’s recorded statement, the district court noted it had not been asked to review
the recorded statement in advance, so it did not know what it contained. It therefore asked
the prosecutor to address whether the prior statement and LT’s testimony were consistent.
The prosecutor represented to the court that they were consistent. Defense counsel did not
disagree. The district court therefore relied on “[t]he uncontroverted . . . representations to
the [c]ourt . . . that the prior statement is consistent with [LT’s] trial testimony” in admitting
LT’s recorded statement. We cannot fault the district court for not independently
reviewing the recorded statement under such circumstances. It reasonably concluded the
third requirement was satisfied.

       The prior statement must be offered to rebut an express or implied charge
       against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.

[¶32] Under the fourth requirement, a prior consistent statement is permitted to
rehabilitate a witness’s credibility after defense counsel has impeached his credibility in
the manner described by the rule: “i.e., by an express or implied charge against the witness
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” Thompson, ¶ 19, 491 P.3d at 1039–
40 (citation omitted). The requirement is not satisfied merely because defense counsel
takes the position that what the victim claims happened did not occur. Id. ¶ 19, 491 P.3d
at 1040 (citation omitted). However, a fabrication or improper motive charge does not
have to occur through a “specific allegation during cross-examination[.]” Id. (citation
omitted). It may occur through “implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the thrust
of the defenses and testimony presented.” Id. (citation & quotations omitted).

[¶33] The district court could reasonably conclude the fourth requirement was satisfied.
On cross-examination, LT confirmed he “talked to people about this several times” and
“the story changed a little bit each time[.]” Defense counsel also suggested someone may
have pressured LT to say something about the abuse. This prompted the prosecutor to seek
clarification on redirect that LT felt pressure within himself to disclose the abuse. To his
recollection, no one else pressured him to say anything. On cross-examination of LT’s
foster mother, defense counsel confirmed LT disclosed the abuse to her the same day he
had been “acting out.” Defense counsel then asked whether it was “possible” LT told her

                                                8
about the abuse “to try and get back in your good graces[.]” Cf. Jones v. State, 2019 WY
45, ¶ 26, 439 P.3d 753, 762 (Wyo. 2019) (“Questions related to conversations they had
with others about what Mr. Jones had done, the photograph shown to A.B., and whether
anyone had helped them prepare to testify impliedly charged ‘recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive.’”).

[¶34] Mr. Hilyard seems to argue that if the prior statement was made after the motive to
fabricate arose, the court should have excluded the statement. He relies on Tome v. United
States, 513 U.S. 150, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995), which he cites for the
proposition that “prior consistent statements are not admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or
improper influence when made after the alleged improper motive arose.” That may be
true, but the federal rule does not apply here, and Tome is not the law in Wyoming. As we
have explained, “the decision in Tome was not based on a constitutional issue and is,
therefore, not binding upon this court, which is the final authority on this state’s court
rules.” Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 58 (Wyo. 2000). See also Jones, ¶ 16, 439 P.3d at 758
(“Although similarly worded, we have consistently held that W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) does not
require that prior consistent statements be made before the alleged improper motive arose.”
(citations omitted)). We set out the applicable rule in Hicks:

              In Wyoming, [a] prior consistent statement may be used as
              substantive evidence if the alleged improper influence arose
              after the statement was made. However, if the prior consistent
              statement was made after the improper influence arose, then
              the statement may only be used for rehabilitative purposes.
              When a prior consistent statement is admissible only for
              rehabilitative purposes, a limiting instruction must be given,
              but only if requested.

Hicks v. State, 2021 WY 2, ¶ 16, 478 P.3d 652, 658 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Griggs, ¶ 104,
367 P.3d at 1137).

[¶35] Notably, Mr. Hilyard did not request a limiting instruction. The district court
therefore did not abuse its discretion by not giving one. See Hicks, ¶ 16, 478 P.3d at 658
(“When no request is made to limit the purpose of a post-motive consistent statement, the
district court does not err by failing to give such an instruction.” (citations omitted));
Griggs, ¶ 107, 367 P.3d at 1138 (“Mr. Griggs did not request an instruction limiting the
purpose of the evidence to rehabilitation of the victims; thus, the district court did not err
by failing to give one.” (citation omitted)); Tombroek v. State, 2009 WY 126, ¶ 13, 217
P.3d 806, 811 (Wyo. 2009) (“We cannot find an abuse of discretion by the district court,
for failing to limit the prior consistent statements to rehabilitation of the victim, where the
appellant failed at trial either to identify when an alleged motive to fabricate arose, or to
request a limiting instruction.”). Because the statement was admitted without a limiting

                                              9
instruction, the jury could use it for any legitimate purpose, including as substantive
evidence. See Neidlinger v. State, 2021 WY 39, ¶ 31, 482 P.3d 337, 346 (Wyo. 2021) (“If
evidence comes in without . . . a request for a limiting instruction, the jury may use it for
any legitimate purpose.” (citation omitted)); Tombroek, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d at 811 (noting, with
respect to a prior consistent statement that, “[b]ecause there was no request for a limiting
instruction, we must assume that the jury used the evidence for whatever purpose it chose,
including substantive evidence of guilt.”). 2

                                            CONCLUSION

[¶36] The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting LT’s out of court
statement as a prior consistent statement under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Affirmed.

2
  Mr. Hilyard summarily asserts admission of LT’s prior consistent statement resulted in improper
bolstering. Improper bolstering occurs when “the State us[es] W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) as a tool for
impermissible trial tactics by having a victim repeat accusations to authority figures for the direct purpose
of using those statements later at trial as prior consistent statements.” Griggs, ¶ 111, 367 P.3d at 1139
(citation omitted). Mr. Hilyard has not shown the State used any such trial tactics in this case. His
bolstering argument therefore fails.

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