Court Opinion

ID: 9752485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:09:25.734557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:16.732328
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, J.,
dissenting only as to question 2.
The limitation of liability clause is ambiguous because it provides that the “limits” stated in the “declarations” are the “total limit of the company’s liability for all damages.” The policy at issue has a declarations page that provides:
“Uninsured Motorists:
$20,000 ea. person — $40,000 ea. occurrence [1] .50
$20,000 ea. person — $40,000 ea. occurrence [2] .50”
Thus on the face of the policy two premiums and two amounts appear in the declarations of coverage amounts section. If the company wished to clearly limit liability, it could have provided plain prefatory language to the effect that “Regardless of the number of vehicles to which this policy applies. . . .” See, e.g., Barnes v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 377, 236 *725S.E. 2d 9 (1977); Pettid v. Edwards, 195 Neb. 713, 240 N.W. 2d 344 (1976).
It is an anomaly that if the same two premiums were paid to two different companies, we would permit inter-policy stacking of “as many uninsured motorist policies as are applicable to him, up to his total damages”, Courtemanche v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 118 N.H. 168, 173, 385 A.2d 105, 108 (1978), but because the two different coverages were both purchased from the same insurer, we do not. “The mere form of a policy — a combination coverage— should not be the predicate for an exclusion of additional coverage.” Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1974).
Further, the result in this case defeats the reasonable expectation of the insured:
“Moreover, an insured owning two automobiles is clearly entitled to buy from an insurer a separate policy for each vehicle and thereby automatically have two coverages available for recovery, [citations omitted]. It is reasonable to expect the same coverage where comparable premium dollars are paid to insure the same two cars, for convenience, under a single policy. A combination coverage should not be the predicate for an exclusion of coverage [citations omitted]. Such a result would allow a simple change in form to defeat the insured’s reasonable expectation, as well as the substance of the law.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586 P.2d 313, 315 (Nev. 1978).
The following courts have come to the same conclusion. Traveler’s Ins. Co. v. Pac, 337 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. App. 1976):
“Stacking is derived from the presumption that when the named insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage on more than one automobile, he intends to buy extra protection for himself and his family, regardless of whether his injury occurs in any one of his insured vehicles or elsewhere.”
Curran v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 393 F. Supp. 712 (D. Alaska 1975); Lambert v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976); Yacobacci v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 Conn. Sup. 229, 372 A.2d 987 (1976); United Security Ins. Co. v. Mason, 59 Ill. App. 3d 982, 376 N.E. 2d 653 (1978); Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370 N.E. 2d 1044 (1977); Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969); Fletcher v. Aetna Casualty & *726Surety Co., 80 Mich. App. 439, 264 N.W. 2d 19 (1978); Citizens Mutual Ins. Co. v. Turner, 53 Mich. App. 616, 220 N.W. 2d 203 (1974).
As Professor Keeton has stated, the theory of reasonable expectations insures that “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though a painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.” R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE Law § 6.3(a) at 351 (1971).
“By permitting the insured to stack his coverages, this Court has simply honored the reasonable expectation of the ‘named insured’ that his payment of an additional premium will result in increased coverage for those falling within the definition of the ‘named insured’, and where an expectation of this nature is in conflict with a limiting clause in the policy, the resulting ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured due to the nature of insurance contracts. See generally Note, Insurance-Stacking-Multiple Recovery Permitted Under Single Policy Insuring More Than One Vehicle, 7 U. Rich. L. Rev. 385 (1972). As explained by Professor Keeton ‘[ijnsurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion under which the insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions offered to him. . . .’ R. Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance law § 6.3(a), at 350 (1971).”
Lambert, supra at 263.
Separate premiums were charged and, as this court held earlier this year, we “see no reason why the insured cannot stack coverage . . . in return for the premiums paid” to the same insurer. Shea v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 120 N.H. 106, 411 A.2d 1118 (1980) (medical payments stacking). See also Moomaw v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.W.Va. 1974); Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v. Jackson, 289 Ala. 673, 270 So. 2d 806 (1972); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 289 Ala. 657, 270 So. 2d 792 (1972); Breaux v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 373 So. 2d 1335 (La. App. 1979); Langston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 40 Md. App. 414, 392 A.2d 561 (1978); Ehlert v. Western National Mutual Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 195, 207 N.W. 2d 334 (1973).
“It is true that such holding results in permissible recovery exceeding what he would have received if the *727uninsured motorist had been insured for the minimum amount required under our Safety Responsibility Act. But if the question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather than that the insurer should escape liability for that for which it collected a premium.”
Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mutual Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W. 2d 348, 352 (1973). For a similar argument see A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage § 2.60 at 112 (1969):
“It is true, as some insurers have argued that if this approach to the indemnification is adopted, an insured who is covered by more than one uninsured motorist endorsement will be better off than he would have been had he been injured by a negligent motorist carrying the minimum coverage specified by the financial responsibility laws. However, the conclusion which insurance companies draw from this — that they should be allowed to reduce their liability — does not necessarily follow. A premium has been paid for each of the endorsements and coverage has been issued. It seems both equitable and desirable to permit recovery under more than one endorsement until the claimant is fully indemnified. This is not the same as stacking or pyramiding of coverages — that is, where a claimant recovers several times over for his injuries — which is appropriately criticized and which insurance companies should be entitled to curtail by limitations on the extent of various coverages.”
Finally, I would note that the majority opinion runs counter to the clear trend in the past five years in favor of intra-policy stacking. According to Davis, Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Insurance, N.H. Bar Ass’n CLE Handbook 33, 111-112 (1980), the following states first adopted intra-policy stacking or reaffirmed an earlier adoption since 1976: Nevada (1978), Hawaii (1978), Arkansas (1978), Maryland (1978), Michigan (1978), Connecticut (1978, 1976), Illinois (1978, 1977), Washington (1978, 1977), Mississippi (1978), Pennsylvania (1978), Missouri (1976), Montana (1979, 1976), Delaware (1977), Alabama (1976), Louisiana (1978), Florida (1977), Kentucky (1979). This brings to twenty-two the number of such states and clearly portends the future in this area. Id. at 145 n.40.