Court Opinion

ID: 9864990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:19:48.456155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:40.091397
License: Public Domain

*186Mr. Justice Butler,
concurring:
I concur in the reversal of the judgment for the reason that Mrs. West so commingled her own money with that belonging to the mortgagors that it was impossible for the trial court to- determine, from the evidence, what part of the money used by her to purchase the property at the- tax sale was her own money and what part, was theirs. There was no basis, therefore-, for that part of the decree providing for the- reimbursement to which Mrs. West would have been entitled had the amount of her own money so used been capable of definite ascertainment.
One part of paragraph 2 of the majority opinion is not clear to- me. If it is intended to hold — and it is not clear to- me that, it is not — that the fact that Mrs. West! was an agent or a tenant of her parents, or occupied a confidential relation toward them, is an independent reason, or an additional reason why she was not entitled to- reimbursement, I cannot assent to such holding. If she occupied any one of those relations, it is true that if she acquired a tax title to her parents’ property, she could not assert it as against them, but would hold it in trust for them, and, upon reimbursing her for her outlay, they would be- entitled to a conveyance-; or if she held only a tax sale certificate, as in the present case, they would be entitled to a cancellation thereof upon doing equity, that is to- say, upon reimbursing her. See application of this principle in International Trust Co. v. Stearns Investment Co., 87 Colo. 31, 285 Pac. 169, 171. Of course, if Mrs. West was under any obligation to pay the taxes with her own money, her parents or, in this case, the Gibson Company, would be entitled, without reimbursing her, to an assignment or a cancellation of the tax sale certificate; but she was under no such obligation. That by the statement in the cases cited in the majority opinion, to the- effect that an agent or a tenant cannot acquire a title adverse to his principal or his landlord, was meant that he cannot refuse to convey that title to the principal *187or the landlord u,pon being reimbursed for his outlay, is made clear by an examination of those cases. Not one of them supports the proposition that a principal or a landlord or a beneficiary is entitled to a conveyance of the land, or to the assignment or cancellation of a tax sale certificate, without reimbursing- the agent or the tenant or the trustee for his outlay. Nor does 15 R. C. L., p. 415, supoprt such a proposition.
In Barlow v. Hitzler, 40 Colo. 109, 118, 90 Pac. 90, 93, the court held that the defendant Barlow, having received from the rents, issues and profits an amount “in excess of the money expended by her in payment of taxes and for the care and preservation of the property, was not entitled to receive: further reimbursement for the money so expended.”
In Hurt v. Schneider, 61 Colo. 104, 156 Pac. 600, the tenant, Hurt, covenanted to pay the taxes for certain years. He acquired a tax sale certificate for a year prior to those mentioned in his covenant, and later received a tax deed based on the certificate. Thereafter he conveyed the land to Green. We held that the heirs of the landlord were entitled to redeem from Hurt and Green and have the tax deed cancelled.
So far as the cases cited have any bearing- upon the case at bar, they indicate that if the amount of Mrs. West’s own money used in the purchase at the tax' sale were ascertainable, Mrs. West' would be entitled to reimbursement as a condition to the cancellation of her tax sale certificate.
The reason why Mrs. West was not entitled to reimbursement in this case was not, either wholly or in part, because she was an agent or a tenant of her. parents, or occupied a confidential relation toward them, but wholly because it was impossible to determine what part of the money used to purchase the property at the tax sale was her own money.