Court Opinion

ID: 9580121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:02:07.563448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:03.076981
License: Public Domain

Reilly, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In People v Tucker, 177 Mich App 174; 441 NW2d 59 (1989), another panel of this Court held that a conviction of operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, could not serve as the underlying felony for sentence enhancement pursuant to the habitual offender statute, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, because that provision was in conflict with the more specific sentence enhancement provisions of the Vehicle Code, MCL 257.625(5) and (6); MSA 9.2325(5) and (6). That decision was followed by another panel of this Court in People v Bewersdorf, 181 Mich App 430; 450 NW2d 271 (1989). Although leave to appeal was denied in the Tucker case, leave to appeal the Bewersdorf decision was granted by the Supreme Court in July 1990. The Court of Appeals ruling in Bewersdorf, rejecting the application of *299the habitual offender sentence enhancement statute, was reversed by the Supreme Court on August 22, 1991. People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55; 475 NW2d 231 (1991). The Supreme Court determined that the provisions were not in conflict and that the terms of the habitual offender sentence enhancement statute were clear and unambiguous.
When defendant was arrested and charged on June 26, 1991, the Tucker/Bewersdorf interpretation of the conflict between the statutes was controlling precedent for the trial court. Before November 1, 1990, that precedential ruling was controlling only until a contrary result was reached by another panel of this Court or the Supreme Court. Richardson v General Motors Corp, 139 Mich App 727; 363 NW2d 22 (1984). After November 1, 1990, however, any published decision issued by a panel of this Court became controlling until reversed or modified by the Supreme Court or a special panel of this Court comprised of the Chief Judge and twelve other members of this Court. Administrative Order No. 1990-6.
At the time the defendant was arrested in 1991, he could expect that should his case reach the Court of Appeals, the panel that would consider his case might disagree with the Tucker/Bewersdorf ruling, and he would be bound by any contrary ruling until it was reversed or modified by a thirteen-member panel of this Court or by the Supreme Court. Richardson, supra; Administrative Order No. 1990-6. Defendant was not entitled to rely on a ruling by the Court of Appeals that foreseeably could be determined to be erroneous. Bouie v Columbia, 378 US 347, 353-354; 84 S Ct 1697; 12 L Ed 2d 894 (1964). State v Elliott, 114 Wash 2d 6, 18-19; 785 P2d 440 (1990), cert den 498 US 838 (1990). Therefore, the defendant in this case, like the defendant in Bewersdorf, was not *300faced with an ex post facto application of a sentence he could not anticipate at the time of his arrest.
I would reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to quash the supplemental information and remand for further proceedings.