Court Opinion

ID: 9475204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:19:53.177638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:33.935143
License: Public Domain

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the court. Although pro se litigants are not generally entitled to be told the law, see Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.1986), for the judge is not an ombudsman, it is humane as well as prudent to help the pro se litigant learn the essential ingredients of a request for appointed counsel. Knowledge makes it easier for a person to vindicate his substantive rights and for the judge to pass on the litigant's claims. Simple notices of preliminary steps, especially how to apply for counsel, are wise judicial administration. The court makes it clear, however, that not all wise things create personal rights. I hope we shall not see complaints about the adequacy of the notice, as opposed to the substance of the judges’ decisions.
The court properly leaves open questions concerning the extent to which judges should appoint counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The statute does not require district judges to appoint counsel whenever an impecunious plaintiff has been unable to persuade a lawyer to bring a colorable case. A judge should find out why counsel declined to take the case. If no one would take the case because the plaintiff was obnoxious or because other cases were stronger on the merits, a judge ought not to appoint counsel. This would force the civil rights bar to displace strong cases with weak ones; lawyers should be able to handle the strongest cases first.
One reason why judges do not review prosecutors’ decisions to pick some cases rather than others is that they cannot see the full menu of choices and therefore cannot make intelligent decisions about which cases are the best available. United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 266 (7th Cir.1986). There is a similar problem deciding which cases need the assistance of counsel. Some litigants will handle their own cases better than others; the assistance of counsel should be used only when *505its marginal benefit is greatest, but this is hard to tell from a review of the case file. And lawyers must exercise judgment in choosing from the palette available. If a good lawyer skilled in Title VII law would decline to represent a paying client with a 20% chance of prevailing, a judge ought not compel that same lawyer to take the case of an indigent plaintiff with a 15% chance of prevailing. A colorable claim is not enough. Indigents are not entitled to preferential treatment. All who claim scarce resources must pay, stand in line, show a superior entitlement, or all three.
Congress did not doubt the value of voluntary transactions in allocating legal services. The statute authorizing the award of attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, depends on voluntary arrangements as the mainstay of civil rights enforcement. Attorneys’ time should go first where it is most valuable. People claiming to have been injured by defective products must persuade lawyers to take their cases, and as a rule people claiming to have been injured by violations of Title VII also should abide the judgment of the bar about whose case is strongest. Yet if a person has trouble getting a lawyer because the bar is hostile to civil rights claims, or because the anticipated attorneys’ fees under § 1988 are insufficient, then there is a stronger reason to appoint counsel. Unless fees under § 1988 are enhanced to take account of the risk of losing — whether through a multiplier or by the contingent fee device when the stakes are high — fees will be systematically too small. See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir.1986). So the appointment of counsel under § 2000e-5(f)(l) may be an important tool. But it is not one to be used reflexively. A large bar is engaged in Title VII practice. This bar brings many cases, some with excellent chances and some marginal. This court has not been flooded with colorable cases, prosecuted pro se, that leave us wondering why no member of the bar would assist. Experience should lead us to rely on the care of the legal profession and of the district courts to decide when cases should proceed with counsel. See Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir.1983), at 764-66 (majority opinion), 769-71 (dissenting opinion). I do not understand today’s decision to diminish the discretion of the district courts to make prudent judgments about whether to conscript members of the bar to take cases when they have good reasons to do other work instead. See Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 886 (7th Cir.1981).