Court Opinion

ID: 9734291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:31:14.13918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:47.719923
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although we agree with the majority’s conclusion that the minor’s estate has no cause of action under Michigan’s Liquor .Control Act, as amended in 1986,1 we are unable to agree that the family of the minor has no cause of action.
The statute does not contain language that specifically suggests that the family members of an imbibing minor ought not be deemed individuals who suffer damage as a result of the minor’s having unlawfully obtained alcoholic liquor. The majority’s conclusion requires the assumption that the Legislature indirectly eliminated an historically recognized cause of action through the subsection authorizing claims, while omitting clear language in the exception clause that would have directly accomplished the same result. We cannot agree.
After review of the factors available to assist in construing the statute,2 we conclude that the *388amended wording of subsection 4 permits an individual, including a family member of an imbibing minor, to recover. Therefore, we concur with the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in LaGuire v Kain, 185 Mich App 239; 460 NW2d 598 (1990), insofar as it pertains to the cause of action of the minor’s estate. We dissent in the reversal of Waranica v Cheers Good Time Saloons, Inc, 186 Mich App 398; 464 NW2d 902 (1990), and LaGuire regarding the existence of a cause of action for the minor’s family.
i
As originally constructed, the language in the dramshop act, subsection 5, provided a cause of action to families of intoxicated persons through the enumeration of potential plaintiffs, "[a] wife, husband, child, parent, guardian . . . .” The original language provided a cause of action to third parties through the language "other person.” Gradually, "other person” expanded to include various third persons and siblings of the intoxicated person and the enumeration of "wife, husband, child” language was extended to encompass the heirs of an innocent third party.3 This broad*389ening of both aspects of the language eventually caused confusion, and arguably resulted in duplicitous litigation, interfering with dramshop defendants’ ability to settle cases because they could not be sure that some additional "other person” might not still bring a claim.
To avoid this, the Legislature reworded subsection 4, eliminating the listing of potential plaintiffs that included the phrase resulting in recognition of a claim for even an ex-wife of a decedent, the "other person.”4 In its place, the Legislature provided that "an individual” or the "spouse, child, parent or guardian of that individual” had a right of action.5 At the same time, the Legislature made *390several other minor wording changes in subsection 4.6 Nothing in the revised text supports the assertion that a family member of an intoxicated person or minor might not fall within the category of "individual[s]’’ who suffer damages or are injured because of the unlawful provision of alcoholic beverages that is the proximate cause of the damages.
Thus, the text of subsection 4 supports the view that family members are entitled to recover. Indeed, the majority concedes that "as under the wording of the former act, both persons who are directly injured by an intoxicated person, and persons whose injuries are more indirect and dependent upon another person’s injury, such as the loss of means of support, may recover.” (Ante, p 380.)
Consideration of the structure of the statute in conjunction with the text of subsection 10, also counsels against the majority’s interpretation of the statute. Subsection 4 authorizes recovery for *391particular persons and categories of persons. Subsection 10 creates an exception to the categories of persons entitled to sue under subsection 4. Thus, the class created in subsection 4 is necessarily larger and inclusive of the exception class created in subsection 10. Family members of the intoxicated person or minor fall within the category of persons who can recover as "individuals” who suffer damage or who are personally injured as a result of the unlawful provision of alcohol to the minor or intoxicated person. Then, subsection 10 excepts from recovery claims of the visibly intoxicated person and the family of that person.7
Additionally, a fair reading of the legislative history provides support for recovery for the minor’s family. The Senate substitute for House Bill 4550 added the word "minor” to what is now subsection 4, clarifying that a cause of action existed when the licensee provided alcoholic beverages either to a minor or a visibly intoxicated person.8 A similar change was made in substitute 5 *392for House Bill 4550.9 These changes in the House and Senate versions of the bill marked the beginning of the distinction made throughout the final statute between a minor and a visibly intoxicated person.10
Both the House and Senate versions included language providing a cause of action to an individual injured by a minor or intoxicated person or the family of the injured person. The versions differed regarding the right of the family of the non-innocent party to recover.11 The House version precluded suit by the visibly intoxicated person and the visibly intoxicated person’s family.12 The Senate version eliminated a cause of action for *393both the family of the minor and the family of the visibly intoxicated person.13
Eventually the two versions were submitted to a conference committee. A critical issue before the committee was whether to adopt language precluding suit by both the visibly intoxicated person’s, family and the minor’s family or to adopt language which precluded only the visibly intoxicated person’s family from bringing suit.14 The confer*394ence report included the language from the House version. It was adopted by both houses and signed by the Governor.
The conclusion that the minor’s family has a cause of action is also buttressed by the observation that the Legislature continued the special treatment afforded to minors and their families by virtue of MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004. In fact, while revising the act in 1986, the Legislature increased the penalties for serving persons who are underage, MCL 436.20; MSA 18.991, and made no changes to eliminate the cause of action recognized under § 33 in which minors may sue social hosts in Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675, 681-683; 377 NW2d 804 (1985).
Although the majority finds support for its conclusion that the minor’s family lacks a cause of action in a literal reading of subsection 6, the name and retain provision, we are unable to agree with a literal reading of that subsection to abolish an historically recognized cause of action when the language, prior judicial construction, and legislative history all support a different approach.
Subsection 6 was first enacted in 1972 as an amendment of the dramshop act.15 From its inception, the scope of the provision has occasioned difficulty. Both this Court and various Court of Appeals panels have fashioned judicial exceptions to the literal application of the language of subsection 6.16 To be sure, as the defendants note, this *395Court has strictly construed the name and retain provision where the parties have sought to circumvent its protections against collusion and fraud.17 However, even after opinions in which this Court "returned to the course of strict construction,”18 panels of the Court of Appeals continued to find that subsection 6 did not bar the claims of the families of the intoxicated person. In Newman v Hoholik, 138 Mich App 66; 359 NW2d 253 (1984), the Court of Appeals considered the holding of Putney, .noting that it affirmed the continuing vitality of Salas and its rationale, that it failed to reference Scholten, and that it employed narrow language. On the basis of these factors, the panel concluded that Putney did not impliedly abrogate the holdings of Scholten and its progeny.19
When the Legislature embarked on this comprehensive review of the dramshop act, opinions of this Court and the Court of Appeals existed that limited the scope of the name and retain provision in some circumstances. One must be cautious about imputing a meaning to legislative inaction,20 *396but the existence of Salas and Scholten and its progeny with no legislative change in subsection 6 supports the view that whatever the Legislature intended to accomplish with the name and retain provision, it did not intend to abolish the minor’s family’s cause of action.
This conclusion is strengthened by consideration of the Legislature’s explicit rejection of a proposal to abolish the cause of action of the minor’s family in subsection 10. If, as the defendants contend, the name and retain provision had eliminated claims by the family of the minor, it seems inexplicable that the question whether to exclude the minor’s family’s claims in subsection 10 would be the focus of debate. Yet, that issue was one of several that divided the House and Senate, resulting in the passage of two versions of the bill and the necessity for a conference committee to create a compromise. It is implausible that the Legislature engaged in this debate regarding the scope of subsection 10 if a previously existing subsection had already eliminated the claims of the minor’s family.
Ultimately, the language of subsection 10 barred the claims of the families of visibly intoxicated persons, while omitting language which would have barred the claims of the families of the minor. The majority concludes, despite this omission, that the Legislature implicitly eliminated the claims of the minor’s family through subsection 6. This Court has recognized that where the Legisla*397ture has affirmatively rejected language that would support an interpretation of a statute, that rejection evidences a legislative intent toward a contrary construction.21 In light of the existing case law suggesting a different interpretation to the name and retain provision, as well as the Legislature’s explicit rejection of language that would have accomplished this precise result, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the name and retain provision bar these claims.
The majority also finds support for its conclusion in the literal wording of subsection 8.22 We disagree. Statutory construction is an holistic endeavor. We reiterate that it seems unlikely that the Legislature sought to achieve indirectly in subsection 8 a result that it explicitly rejected in subsection 10.
To be sure, if read in isolation, the language of subsection 8, like that of subsection 6, is susceptible to an interpretation that would preclude suit by the minor’s family. A more natural reading of subsection 8 would be that it was intended to allow the licensee to assert available defenses when the plaintiff had a claim against the third party. The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions postulated that the most proba*398ble effect of this change will be to allow the licensee to assert the no-fault threshold defenses as well as eliminating the potential for the licensee to be liable to the plaintiff injured in a fight, although the intoxicated person would escape liability by raising the defense of self-defense.23
ii
This interpretation falls short of the most desirable result, which would reflect a consistent approach to the situation the Legislature addressed. The decision-making process we are engaged in is neither "linear” nor "purely deductive.” Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory interpretation as practical reasoning, 42 Stan L R 321, 348 (1990). It involves consideration of a broad range of evidence and factors to determine the meaning of a particular text within the context of a particular application.24 We reach this result, however, because the critical legislative debate indicates an alteration of *399what may have been the initial purpose of subsection 4. The addition of the word "minor” in subsection 4 and the insistence on not precluding the minor’s family’s cause of action in subsection 10 indicates a purpose we may not ignore in the interest of tidying up the ragged edges of the legislation. In this case, "different values will pull the interpreter in different directions,” Eskridge & Frickey, supra, p 324. When read in conjunction with the statute as a whole, its text, its background and structure, and the context within which it was passed, we think the pull of the literal language of subsection 8 (or subsection 6) is less than the force of the interpretive pull toward other factors.
Justice Mallett concurred with Justice Boyle.

 1986 PA 176, MCL 436.22 et seq.; MSA 18.993 et seq.

 Prior opinions of this Court have emphasized the goal to properly interpret and apply the statute in accord with the legislative intent and as articulated by the text. See, e.g., Karl v Bryant Air Conditioning Co, 416 Mich 558, 567; 331 NW2d 456 (1982). Careful review of opinions of this Court will reveal a shifting emphasis on intent, purpose, text, context, structure, canons of construction, and other factors depending on the particular case. See, e.g., Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 142-145; 468 NW2d 479 (1991); Girard v Wagenmaker, 437 Mich 231, 238-239; 470 NW2d 372 (1991); Auto Club Ins Ass’n v Hill, 431 Mich 449, 454-458; 430 NW2d 636 (1988); Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 612-613; 424 NW2d 278 (1988); BCBSM v Governor, 422 Mich 1, 13; 367 NW2d 1 (1985); Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1, 7-10; 317 NW2d 529 (1982); Arrowhead Development Co v Livingston Co Bd Comm, 413 Mich 505, 512-519; 322 NW2d 702 (1982). This shifting *388emphasis has occurred because neither text, purpose, nor intent is, or can be the sole touchstone of judicial reasoning. The Court has historically adhered to a "modest approach” to statutory construction that is grounded upon "practical reason.” See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory interpretation as practical reasoning, 42 Stan L R 321, 322-323 (1990).

 See Hylo v Mich Surety Co, 322 Mich 568; 34 NW2d 443 (1948) (the Court granted an adult child a cause of action as encompassed within the language providing a claim to "child” or "other person”); LaBlue v Specker, 358 Mich 558; 100 NW2d 445 (1960) (an illegitimate child was entitled to recover pursuant to language granting a claim to a "child” or "other person”; Eddy v Cartwright, 91 Mich 264; 51 NW 887 (1892) (a parent was entitled to recover for loss of support for the death of her adult child); O’Dowd v General Motors Corp, 419 Mich 597; 358 NW2d 553 (1984) (the heir of the deceased may bring a claim under the dramshop act in his individual capacity); West v *389Leiphart & Co, 169 Mich 354; 135 NW 246 (1912) (the Court refused to allow a mother to bring one suit seeking damages for herself and her minor children for the death of their brother, suggesting that separate actions were appropriate); Brannstrom v Tippman, 141 Mich App 664, 671; 367 NW2d 902 (1985) (the ex-wife and parents of the deceased victim were entitled to sue as "other person[s]” under the statute).

 One set of proposals for reform of the dramshop action suggested options for clarifying the statute. See Rod Brown suggestions, Materials from Dramshop Subcommittee, Senate Select Committee of Civil Justice Reform, State Archives of Michigan. (Rod Brown was president of the Michigan Licensed Beverage Dealers Association.) Notably, the suggestions dealt with two separate issues, those pertaining to "[t]he non-interested party” and those pertaining to "[relatives of the non-innocent party.” The options recommended for addressing the "non-interested party” included 1) defining a cause of action to include an injured innocent party or the estate of such party under the wrongful death act and the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of the injured innocent party; or 2) restricting eligibility to the injured innocent party or the estate of a deceased injured party under the wrongful death act. The language changes in subsection 4 were intended to implement the first option.

 This language closely followed the first option discussed in the suggestions described in n 4. The text of the amended statute is as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who suffers damage or is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death, or the spouse, *390child, parent, or guardian of that individual, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who by selling, giving, or furnishing the alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has caused or contributed to the damage, injury, or death. [MCL 436.22(4); MSA 18.993(4).]

 Specifically, the Legislature replaced "injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise” with "who suffers damage or is personally injured.” In addition, the Legislature replaced "by a visibly intoxicated person” with "by a minor or visibly intoxicated person.” The addition of the word "minor” in the language defining who had a cause of action was designed to eliminate the need to prove that the minor was visibly intoxicated in order to recover. The change apparently was made in response to concerns articulated to Representative Stopczynski, Cháir of the House of Representatives Liquor Control Committee, by Patricia J. Knox, then Chair of the Liquor Control Commission. The commission urged the Legislature that the act of selling alcoholic beverages to a minor be sufficient for a cause of action when the sale contributes to or results in death or injury, without also requiring that the minor be visibly intoxicated. State Archives, Bureau of History, Department of State, drafters’ folder for 1986 amendments to the dramshop act.

 The majority conceded that if the wording of subsection 4 "were ambiguous,” the interpretation of subsection 10 "would tip the balance.” (Ante, p 386.) Recognizing a "possible ambiguity” arising from subsection 10, the majority resolves it against granting a cause of action for family members of intoxicated minor’s despite the longstanding history of recovery for these persons. If the Legislature wants to abolish an historically recognized cause of action, we believe it should speak more clearly than it has done with these amendments.

 Except as otherwise provided in this section and sections 22H and 221, a person injured in person or property by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or the visibly intoxicated person, if the selling, giving, or furnishing is proven to be a proximate cause of the injury or death, or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of the injured person, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the retail licensee who by the selling, giving, or furnishing of the alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or has caused or contributed to the injury. Except as provided in section 22K, the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of the minor or the visibly intoxicated person shall not have a cause of action against a retail licensee under this section.

 Except as otherwise provided in this section, an individual who is personally injured by a minor or visibly intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing of alcoholic liquor to the minor or visibly intoxicated person, if the unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the injury or death, or the spouse, child, parent, or guardian of that individual, if the individual, spouse, child, parent, or guardian has not caused or contributed to, or substantially participated in the drinking activity resulting in, the intoxication of the person, shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who by the selling, giving, or furnishing the alcoholic liquor has caused or contributed to the intoxication of the person or who has caused or contributed to the injury or death.

 The language finally enacted by the Legislature mentions both a minor and a visibly intoxicated person in subsections 3, 4, 6, and 8. Subsections 7 and 10 mention only the visibly intoxicated person.

 The versions also differed regarding various other provisions including the liquor licensee’s right to indemnification and right to raise the defenses of the intoxicated person and the plaintiff’s obligation to provide notice to the licensee of a potential suit.

 The alleged visibly intoxicated person shall not have a cause of action pursuant to this section nor shall any person have a cause of action pursuant to this section for the loss of financial support, services, gifts, parental training, guidance, love, society, or companionship of the alleged visibly intoxicated person. [House Bill 4550-Substitute 6, reported from the House Committee on Liquor Control on October 1, 1985 and passed (with several amendments) by the House on December 10, 1985.]

 The text of the Senate version is set forth supra, p 391, n 8. In the proposed Senate Substitute, Senate Bill 478, the language dealt with both the class of persons entitled to sue and the limitation on that class created by the noninnocent party doctrine.

 There is abundant support in the legislative history for the notion that debate focused on the issue who was entitled to sue. The legislative history evidences lobbying by various groups and individuals regarding the proposed versions of the bill. The analysis notes that Mothers Against Drunk Driving opposed language to eliminate the cause of action of family members of the intoxicated person. House Republican Bill Analysis — Research and Program Development Section of HB 4550 (H-6), November 27, 1985. The State Bar of Michigan also took a position against the bill objecting to proposals to "put a limit on what could .be recovered from those responsible for a drunk’s condition, bar the drunk’s dependents from suing those who knowingly made him drunk, and otherwise significantly limit the ability of those who are seriously injured by drunks to fully recover their damages.” Press Release, State Bar of Michigan, Michael Frank, State Archives of Michigan, RG 91-286, Box 1, Folder 12. In addition, the Michigan Insurance Bureau prepared a survey of insurers regarding the availability of liquor liability insurance and gathered their comments regarding proposed dramshop reforms. Several major insurers within the state commented that removal of the right to sue from intoxicated persons and their families would help solve problems with insurance. Michigan Insurance Bureau, Liquor liability insurance: A survey of insurers in Michigan, 1985. The Michigan Licensed Beverage Dealers Association lobbied on behalf of the liquor industry. Some of their proposals are set forth, supra, p 389, n 4. Finally, the House Republican Committee Conference Report Update specifically mentioned differences between existing law, the House-passed version, and the Senate-passed version of the bill pertaining to who was entitled to sue. Conference Report Update — Dram Shop, House Republican Caucus, Ben Williams, June 9, 1986. That update noted that under .existing law the family of the intoxicated person could sue. It further observed that under the House-passed version, the family of the “minor/drunk can’t sue for injuries to minor or visibly intox[icated] individual.” Finally, it reported that the Senate-passed version precluded suit by the family of a minor/visibly intoxicated person except that a “minor child of drunk hurt as result of drunk” was entitled to damages to be held in trust under court control.

 1972 PA 196.

 See Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 110; 247 NW2d 889 (1976) (recognizing a judicial exception to the name and retain requirement where the plaintiffs did not know the name of the intoxicated person); Scholten v Rhoades, 67 Mich App 736; 242 NW2d 509 (1976) (recognizing a judicial exception to the name and retain provision where no cause of action exists by a parent against a child who is not a third party tortfeasor); Schutz v Murphy, 99 Mich App 386; 297 NW2d 676 (1980) (recognizing a judicial exception to the name and retain provi*395sion where a wife has no cause of action against her husband for damages arising out of his negligent infliction of injuries upon himself).

 See, e.g., Putney v Haskins, 414 Mich 181; 324 NW2d 729 (1982); Riley v Richards, 428 Mich 198; 404 NW2d 618 (1987). As these opinions make clear, this Court will not permit the parties to circumvent the name and retain provision by entering into covenants not to sue or limiting liability so that the dramshop defendant is left with liability when an available cause of action against the intoxicated person was either settled or limited in some manner by the plaintiff.

 See Spalo v A & G Enterprises (After Remand), 437 Mich 406, 411; 471 NW2d 546 (1991).

 See also Burke v Angies, Inc, 143 Mich App 683; 373 NW2d 187 (1985); Luberski v North, 148 Mich App 675; 384 NW2d 840 (1986); but see Moran v McNew, 134 Mich App 764; 351 NW2d 881 (1982) (a short opinion lacking analysis, but concluding that Putney mandated that the minor or visibly intoxicated person be named and retained barring suit by the parents of the injured minor).

 See, e.g., Zuber v Allen, 396 US 168, 185, n 21; 90 S Ct 314; 24 L Ed 2d 345 (1969) (the "verdict of quiescent years cannot be invoked to *396baptize a statutory gloss that is otherwise impermissible”); Johnson v Santa Clara Co Transportation Agency, 480 US 616, 672; 107 S Ct 1442; 94 L Ed 2d 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("vindication by congressional inaction is a canard”). Arguments against the use of legislative acquiescence have been based upon formalist concerns (such as focusing on the intent of the enacting legislature rather than later legislatures) as well as upon realist concerns (such as the indeterminacy of collective legislative intent). See, generally, Eskridge, Interpreting legislative inaction, 87 Mich L R 67 (1988).

 See, e.g., People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221, 243-244; 380 NW2d 11 (1985); Miller v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 538, 567; 302 NW2d 537 (1981); General Teamsters Union v Uptown Cleaners & Hatters, 356 Mich 204, 240; 97 NW2d 593 (1959); People v Adamowski, 340 Mich 422, 429; 65 NW2d 753 (1954); Miles ex rel Kamferbeek v Fortney, 223 Mich 552, 564; 194 NW 605 (1923).

 All defenses of the alleged visibly intoxicated person or the minor shall be available to the licensee. In an action alleging the unlawful sale of alcoholic liquor to a minor, proof that the defendant retail licensee or the defendant’s agent or employee demanded and was shown a Michigan driver’s license or official state personal identification card, appearing to be genuine and showing that the minor was at least 21 years of age, shall be a defense to the action. [MCL 436.22(8); MSA 18.993(8).]

 SJI2d, p 11-8b.

 We think Justice Frankfurter’s description of the process is apt:
The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enactment of situations not anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, reveal doubts and ambiguities in statutes that compel judicial construction. The process of construction, therefore, is not an exercise in logic or dialectic: The aids of formal reasoning are not irrelevant; they may simply be inadequate. The purpose of construction being the ascertainment of meaning, every consideration brought to bear for the solution of that problem must be devoted to that end alone. To speak of it as a practical problem is not to indulge a fashion in words. It must be that, not something else. Not, for instance, an opportunity for a judge to use words as "empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will” — his caprices, fixed notions, even statesmanlike beliefs in a particular policy. Nor, on the other hand, is the process a ritual to be observed by unimaginative adherence to well-worn professional phrases. [Frankfurter, Some reBections on the reading of statutes, 47 Col L R 527, 529 (1947).]