Court Opinion

ID: 9917314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 22:02:10.392331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:21.242315
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/24 P. v. Woods CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166996
 v.
 VIRGIL WOODS,                                                          (San Francisco City & County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 21005009)
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Defendant Virgil Woods appeals from his conviction for gross vehicular
manslaughter, leaving the scene of an injury accident, misdemeanor hit-and-
run driving involving property damage, reckless driving, and making a false
report of a crime. After the jury returned their verdicts on the underlying
substantive offenses, the trial court found true allegations that defendant
had a prior serious felony conviction (Pen. Code,2 § 667, subd. (a)(1)) for
battery with infliction of serious bodily injury under section 243,
subdivision (d) (section 243(d)) which qualified as a strike under the “Three

         1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California

Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
         2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

indicated.
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (d) & (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) & (c)). At
sentencing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the prior
strike and serious felony findings in the interests of justice under
section 1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) 13 Cal.4th 497.
      On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding the
prior strike and serious felony allegations true because his prior conviction
for battery with serious bodily injury in violation of section 243(d) did not
qualify as a serious or violent felony under California law. The Attorney
General agrees, as do we.
      Battery is a serious felony and a strike when the defendant inflicts
great bodily injury. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b), 667.5, subd. (c)(8),
1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) Here, however, serious bodily injury, not great bodily
injury, was an element of defendant’s prior conviction. (§ 243(d) [“When a
battery is committed against any person and serious bodily injury is inflicted
on the person, the battery is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not
exceeding one year or imprisonment . . . for two, three, or four years.” (italics
added)].)
      As our Supreme Court recently explained: “[N]ot all jury findings of
serious bodily injury necessarily entail a finding of great bodily injury.” (In re
Cabrera (2023) 14 Cal.5th 476, 488 (Cabrera).) In Cabrera, the jury found
the defendant guilty of battery with serious bodily injury but deadlocked on
charged allegations of infliction of great bodily injury. (Id. at pp. 480, 482,
489.) Nonetheless, the trial court imposed a five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1) after concluding the defendant’s felonies were
serious because there was great bodily injury. (Cabrera, at pp. 482, 488.)
The California Supreme Court rejected the premise that serious bodily injury
and great bodily injury were equivalent as a matter of law. Rather, because

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“a jury could reasonably apply the statutory definitions and find a serious
bodily injury not to be a great bodily injury, the jury’s finding of serious
bodily injury . . . did not necessarily establish that [the defendant] inflicted
great bodily injury; such a determination was not ‘inherent in the jury’s
verdict.’ ” (Id. at p. 489.) Moreover, the trial court’s finding that the serious
bodily injury constituted great bodily injury violated the Sixth Amendment
under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490, which requires any
fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the statutory maximum be submitted to the jury. (Cabrera, at
pp. 483, 489.)
      Thus, following our Supreme Court’s holding in Cabrera, defendant’s
conviction for battery with infliction of serious bodily injury is not, as a
matter of law, a serious felony or prior strike conviction because it did not
require a finding that defendant inflicted great bodily injury. Furthermore,
the Attorney General concedes that the record before the court at sentencing
did not contain any substantial evidence that defendant committed great
bodily injury in connection with the prior offense.
      Remand for full resentencing is appropriate when a defendant can
demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of
the error. (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233; People v. Buycks (2018)
5 Cal.5th 857, 893 (Buycks) [“when part of a sentence is stricken on review,
on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances’ ”].) We agree with the parties that defendant has
made such a showing here.
      At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court announced its
tentative sentence, which included the dismissal of the prior strike and

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serious felony allegation pursuant to defendant’s Romero motion. Defense
counsel then requested the court impose a lower term sentence of two years
for count I, rather than the middle term of four years.
      The trial court responded that it “gave a lot of thought to what [defense
counsel] suggested just now, in terms of imposing the mitigated terms.” In
explaining why the court decided against imposing a lower term sentence for
count I, the court stated it had already taken defendant’s history and the
numerous mitigating factors into consideration and gave credit to those
mitigating factors in choosing to grant the Romero motion, which, the court
noted, was “an extraordinary thing to do.” Based on the trial court’s
comments, we agree with the parties that there is a reasonable probability
the trial court may have imposed a lower term sentence on count I had it
known defendant did not possess a prior strike and serious felony conviction.
Accordingly, a remand for resentencing is appropriate so that the court may
exercise its informed discretion on this issue. (See People v. Henderson (2022)
14 Cal.5th 34, 56 [full resentencing is appropriate where trial court
misunderstood scope of its sentencing discretion]; Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 893.) We express no opinion on how the trial court should exercise its
discretion on remand.
      Defendant also asserts, and the Attorney General concedes, that
certain errors on the abstract of judgment must be corrected. We need not
address defendant’s contention because the parties may address this issue
with the trial court during resentencing.
                               DISPOSITION
      The true findings on the prior strike and serious felony allegations are
reversed and defendant’s sentence is vacated. The matter is remanded to the
trial court for full resentencing. Following resentencing, the court shall issue

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a new abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

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                                         CASTRO, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A166996
People v. Woods

     
       Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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