Court Opinion

ID: 9376716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:40.013586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.496981
License: Public Domain

J-A04044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    RIGHTS TO I.B., A MINOR                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: J.J., FATHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1407 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Dated September 16, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Orphans' Court at
                               No(s): 2022-6798

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                           FILED: MARCH 3, 2023

       J.J. (Father) appeals from the decree entered in the Lycoming County

Orphans’ Court on September 16, 2022, involuntarily terminating Father’s

parental rights to his son, I.B. (Child), born in July 2014, and changing Child’s

permanency goal to adoption.1             On appeal, Appellant argues there was

insufficient evidence to support termination, and that the court relied solely

on his “extremely limited income.” In addition, counsel for Father (Counsel),

has filed an application to withdraw and an accompanying brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v.

____________________________________________

1 A.B. (Mother), the mother of Child, signed a Consent to Adoption on August
25, 2022. Father and Mother were not married at the time of Child’s birth and
did not appear to be together at the time of the termination hearing. Mother
is not a party to this appeal.
J-A04044-23

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After review, we affirm the termination

decree, and grant the application to withdraw.

       Child was placed in the emergency custody of Lycoming County Children

and Youth Services (Agency) on January 13, 2021, after Father was not

present to pick up Child from the school bus. N.T. 9/15/22, at 43. Child’s

school, Agency caseworkers, and “crisis workers” attempted to contact Father

several times.     Id.    When he did not respond, the Agency asked Child’s

neighbors if they could provide short term care for Child but were

unsuccessful. Id. The Agency then took emergency custody of Child. Id.

Father did not contact the Agency until approximately 11 hours later, at “about

2:00 a.m.[,]” on January 14th, but only to inquire as to why he had “so many

missed calls from [the Agency],” and did not ask about Child or “seem to

process the fact that [Child] wasn’t home with him.” Id. at 44. A Shelter

Care hearing was held on January 15th,

       at which time the [c]ourt found that allowing . . . Child to remain
       in [Appellant’s] home would be contrary to [Child’s] welfare.
       Legal and physical custody of . . . Child was to remain with the
       Agency and . . . Child was to remain in foster care.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. 9/19/22, at 2.2

____________________________________________

2 The court filed an opinion related to this appeal on October 4, 2022, in which
it adopted its September 19th opinion supporting the termination decree.
Orphan’s Ct. Op. 10/4/22, at 2 (unpaginated). We rely on the court’s
September 19th opinion in our analysis.

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       The orphans’ court held a dependency hearing and several permanency

hearings between January 2021 and June 2022. The court summarized the

hearings as follows:

             A Dependency Hearing was held on January 22, 2021, at
       which time the [c]ourt found that . . . Child was without proper
       care or control, education as required by law, or other care or
       control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or
       morals. The [c]ourt ordered that legal and physical custody
       remain with the Agency and that . . . Child remain in foster care.
       The [c]ourt noted that . . . Child had been absent from school on
       [36] days, with [21] of those days being unexcused, and that
       Father had previously been referred for Outreach Services by
       Bradford County [Children and Youth Services], but those were
       discontinued due to Father’s noncompliance.

             A permanency review hearing was held on May 14, 2021.
       Father did not attend. The [c]ourt noted that Father had only
       minimal compliance with the permanency plan, in that he
       attended [12] out of [26] visits during the review period. He
       attended an intake at Crossroads but did not attend any sessions
       and was discharged on April 6, 2021, due to non-attendance.
       Father was not compliant with Outreach services and they were
       subsequently closed[, and] Father relocated to Bradford County.
       Father was found to have made no progress towards alleviating
       the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
       Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed dependency and . . .
       Child remained in the legal and physical custody of the Agency
       with continued placement in his foster care home.

             A permanency review hearing was held on August 16, 2021.
       Father did not attend. The [c]ourt found that Father had no
       compliance with the permanency plan, in that he attended only
       [8] out of [19] visits during the review period. The Agency
       received a report on June 7, 2021,[3] that Father had overdosed
       and was receiving in patient services at Family Recovery
____________________________________________

3The termination petition states the Agency received this report on July 7,
2021. Petition for Involuntary Termination, 4/13/22, at 7. This discrepancy
does not impact our review.

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     Solutions, but Father did not provide any documentation to
     support this. Father did not participate in any other drug or
     alcohol treatment during this review period, nor did he participate
     in any parenting programs. The [c]ourt further found that Father
     had made no progress towards alleviating the circumstances
     which necessitated the original placement and noted that Father
     needed to take steps to seek help for himself before he could be
     considered a resource for the Child. Following the hearing, the
     Court reaffirmed dependency and the Child remained in the legal
     and physical custody of the Agency with continued placement in
     his foster care home.

            A permanency review hearing was held on November 29,
     2021. Father attended by telephone. The [c]ourt found that
     Father had no[t] compli[ed] with the permanency plan, in that he
     attended no visits during the review period, participated in no drug
     or alcohol programs during the review period, and had not
     participated in any programs for parenting during the review
     period.    Father’s communication with the Agency was very
     sporadic. For these reasons, the Court also found that Father had
     made no progress towards alleviating the circumstances which
     necessitated the original placement. The Agency requested that
     Father’s visits be reduced to the statutory minimum of one time
     every other week for one hour. The [c]ourt granted this request,
     with the caveat that if Father attended regularly his visits may be
     increased.     Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed
     dependency and . . . Child remained in the legal and physical
     custody of the Agency with continued placement in his foster care
     home.

           A permanency review hearing was held on March 9, 2022.
     Father attended in person. During this review period[,] Child’s
     placement was modified to the [home of Carol Swartz, a resource
     parent], where he has remained since that time. . . . The [c]ourt
     found that Father had minimal compliance with the permanency
     plan. He attended [four] out of [eight] visits and had [four] no[-
     ]shows. He was receiving no drug or alcohol services, and had
     not participated in any services for parenting. Father was not
     involved with Outreach services. For these reasons, the [c]ourt
     found that Father had made no progress towards alleviating the
     circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
     Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed dependency
     and . . . Child remained in the legal and physical custody of the
     Agency with continued placement in his foster care home. The
     [c]ourt directed the Agency to make a referral to Outreach

                                    -4-
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     services to Father, and to offer to provide those services at the
     Agency on the same day as Father’s scheduled visits with the
     Child.

            A permanency review hearing was held on June 24, 2022.
     Father attended in person. The [c]ourt found that Father had
     minimal compliance with the permanency plan, in that he
     attended [six] out of [seven] visits. However, he was still not
     receiving any drug or alcohol counseling and he only attended two
     Outreach appointments. He did not participate in any of . . .
     Child’s medication checks, which occurred virtually.        Father
     requested that his visits be increased to one time per week, which
     the [c]ourt granted as he had demonstrated good attendance
     during this review period and the visits were going well. The
     [c]ourt found that Father had made minimal progress towards
     alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
     placement, as he reported having a trailer to live in but that he
     had quit his job and his sole source of income was [Social Security
     Disability].   Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed
     dependency and . . . Child remained in the legal and physical
     custody of the Agency with continued placement in his foster care
     home.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 2-5.

     Meanwhile, on April 13, 2022, the Agency filed a petition for involuntary

termination of parental rights as to both Father and Mother pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). As mentioned above, on August 25,

2022, Mother signed a Consent to Adoption.         A hearing regarding the

termination petition was held on September 15, 2022. Despite being properly

served notice of the hearing, Father failed to appear but was represented by

Jessica Feese, Esquire. Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 1. Mother participated by phone

and was represented by Trisha Hoover Jasper, Esquire.        John Pietrovito,

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Esquire, counsel for the Agency, and Angela Lovecchio, Esquire, Child’s

guardian ad litem (GAL/Legal Counsel),4 were also present at the hearing. Id.

       The court first addressed Mother, who stipulated to the Agency’s exhibits

and all the allegations in the termination petition.    N.T. at 5-9.   She also

admitted that if the Agency had presented its full case against her, it would

have established by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination.

Id. at 10.

       The Agency then presented the testimony of Lycoming County Children

and Youth Outreach Program (Outreach) caseworker David Ryder, who stated

that during his time working with Father, Father was “difficult . . . or

impossible almost” to coordinate meetings with, “constantly” had issues with

phone contact, and was never able to work on identified goals. N.T. at 12-13.

When Caseworker Ryder inquired about Father’s visits with Child, Father told

____________________________________________

4 During involuntary termination proceedings where one or both parents are
contesting termination, the orphans’ court must appoint legal counsel to the
subject child to represent their legal interests. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). When
a court appoints one attorney as both GAL and legal counsel for the child, this
Court conducts a “sua sponte review to evaluate . . . whether the orphans’
court determined that the child’s best interests and legal interests did not
conflict.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(this Court must conduct independent review of whether orphans’ court
appointed counsel to represent the child’s legal interests, and when that same
counsel is also appointed as GAL, whether the orphans’ court determined that
the child’s best interests and legal interests do not conflict). Appellate review
“does not involve second-guessing whether GAL/Counsel in fact had a conflict
. . . but solely whether the orphans’ court made the determination in the first
instance.” Id. On June 16, 2022, the orphans’ court issued an order finding
no conflict of interest with Attorney Lovecchio acting as both GAL and Child’s
Legal Counsel. Order, 6/16/22.

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him they were “going good” but “it was costing . . . a lot of money for

transportation” because Appellant recently wrecked his car and did not have

the money for repairs. Id. at 14. Caseworker Ryder testified that Father

relocated to Bradford County to live with an aunt. Id. at 14. The caseworker

still offered to “work with [Father] on parenting” during his visitation with

Child, but Father declined. Id. at 14-15. Caseworker Ryder also provided

Father information to “pursue parenting” in Bradford County and stopped his

services with Father on April 13, 2021. Id. at 15.

      Barbie Barnes, another Outreach Caseworker, then testified that Father

was referred back to Outreach services on March 31, 2022. N.T. at 17. She

stated that her experience working with Father was “identical in nature” to

that of Caseworker Ryder, explaining that Father met with her only “three

times successfully face-to-face[,]” “willfully avoided” her, and made “no

progress” while working with her. Id. at 18-19. On August 10, 2022, Father

sent Caseworker Barnes a “lengthy text message . . . stating he wanted to

close [Outreach] services[.]” Id. at 19. Caseworker Barnes recommended

that Father continue working with Outreach and sent him a letter stating if he

did not contact Outreach by August 25th, the program would close services.

Id. at 20-21. The letter was not returned to Outreach as undelivered and

Father did not respond. Id. at 21.

      Heather Wood, a specialized services supervisor for the Agency, testified

that when Father attended the supervised visits, he was “engaged” and played

with Child, would “usually bring[ ] something for [Child] to do[,]” and brought

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“dinner or a snack[.]”    N.T. at 33.    Child “enjoy[ed]” the visits at first,

however, more recently, Child would express that he did not want to attend,

and on more than one occasion communicated that he “want[ed] to go home”

— referring to his foster home. Id. at 29, 33.

      Carol Swartz, Child’s resource parent, testified that at the time of the

hearing, Child had resided with her for six months. N.T. at 34. She stated

she cares for Child by ensuring his medical and mental health needs are taken

care of, doing activities with him on weekends, and making sure he is bathed,

clothed, and fed. N.T. at 34-38. Since residing with Swartz, Child’s behavior,

attendance, and performance in school have improved. Id. at 38-39. Swartz

stated that Father had the ability to call Child at her home and would do so

for “about [f]ifteen minutes” once a week, but Child “never wanted to talk.”

Id. at 39-40. Lastly, she said that if the court terminated Father and Mother’s

parental rights, she was ready, willing, and able to adopt Child. Id. at 40.

      Lastly, Ryan Snyder, a supervisor at the Agency, testified that his office

became involved with Child before January 2021, after: (1) receiving “multiple

reports of [Child] being outside unsupervised[;]” (2) learning Father was not

administering proper medical care; (3) learning of Father’s issues with

substance abuse; and (4) concerns arose regarding Child’s attendance at

school. N.T. at 42. He also stated that Appellant has a criminal conviction

from January 29, 2018, for endangering the welfare of a child and a “report”

from May 2017 for “creating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury.” Id. at

51. In both instances, Child was the victim. Id. He testified that the Agency

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recommended to terminate Father’s parental rights and that this course of

action “would best serve the needs and welfare” of Child. Id. at 54.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the Agency “clearly

established the grounds to terminate [Father’s] parental rights” and that it

was “in the best interest of [Child] to do so.” N.T. at 56. The next day, the

court entered a decree terminating Father’s rights and stating Child may be

subject to adoption proceedings without further notice to Father.      Decree,

9/16/22.      Counsel for Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a

contemporaneous concise statement of matters complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2) and (b). In the Rule 1925(b) statement,

Counsel also notified the court she intended to file an Anders brief. Counsel

filed her application to withdraw and an accompanying brief on November 17,

2022.5

       We begin by reviewing Counsel's application to withdraw and Anders

brief. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When counsel files

an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits without first addressing

counsel’s request to withdraw.”) (citation); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d

1267 (Pa. Super. 1992) (extending the Anders procedure to appeals from

____________________________________________

5In its brief, the Agency adopted the orphans’ court September 19, 2022,
opinion as part of its argument. Appellee’s Brief at 4. GAL/Legal Counsel for
Child sent a letter to this Court on December 12, 2022, stating that she was
not going to file a brief and was relying on the orphans’ court’s September
19th opinion. GAL/Legal Counsel Letter, 12/12/22.

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involuntary termination decrees). To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel

must:

        1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
        making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
        determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
        of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the
        [appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel
        or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy
        of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citation omitted). With respect to the third Anders requirement, this

Court has held counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of

the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”

Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

        Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directed that Anders

briefs must:

        (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
        citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
        counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
        counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
        counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
        Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
        case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
        that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

        “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct [our] own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (citation omitted). Here, Counsel has

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filed an Anders brief and application to withdraw stating she has conducted

a review of the record and determined that Father’s appeal is frivolous. See

Application to Withdraw as Counsel, 11/17/22, at 1 (unpaginated). Attached

to her brief is a copy of a letter Counsel sent to Father, which properly

addressed and explained his rights pursuant to Millisock.

      Likewise, Counsel has filed an Anders brief that substantially complies

with the requirements in Santiago. While Counsel provided a summary of

the procedural and factual history, made citations to the record where

appropriate, and concluded the present appeal is frivolous, the Anders brief

is sparse in its presentation of controlling law and the application of that law.

Nevertheless, Anders and Santiago require substantial, not perfect

compliance. Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super.

2007).    As we find the applicable law regarding termination to be

straightforward and referenced in part by Counsel’s discussion, we conclude

that her brief substantially complies with Anders and Santiago.             See

Wrecks, 934 A.2d at 1290 (stating that “[w]hile the brief fails to cite the law

relevant to the question of timeliness, we find the applicable time limits to be

straightforward[,]” thus substantially complying with Anders). We therefore

proceed with our independent review of the record and the issues presented

on Father’s behalf. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4.

      Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues:

      I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the [parental
      rights of [Father] when the evidence was insufficient to justify
      termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

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       II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in terminating the parental
       rights of [Father] when the termination of his parental rights
       improperly rested on his extremely limited income.

Anders Brief at 7.6

       The Anders Brief presents similar arguments in each of Father’s

potential claims.     As such, we address them together.       Father avers the

Agency did not present clear and convincing evidence that termination “was

in the best interest of Child” or that he “willfully refused his parental duties.”

Anders Brief at 13, 15. He insists, instead, that the court terminated his

rights “on the basis that he has extremely limited income.” Id. at 16. Father

notes that he advised Outreach employees that his financial limitations made

it difficult for him to attend visitation. Id. at 15. Father explained that he

often did not attend because he “wrecked” his car and “it was costing him a

lot of money for” transportation services to the visitation center. Id. at 16.

Further, Father maintains that the Agency’s evidence failed to show that the

bond between Father and Child was broken, contending that Child “want[ing]

to go [to his foster] home” during visitation sessions did “not clear[ly]” support

that their bond was severed. Id. at 15.

       Counsel also points out in the Anders brief that Father: (1) “was

homeless and his employment was inconsistent[;]” (2) had an “overdose”

prior to the termination hearing; and (3) “had not made any progress towards

____________________________________________

6 In the statement of questions involved, Counsel also included an inquiry as
to whether her petition to withdraw should be granted. Anders Brief at 7.
We address this issue separately.

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alleviating the circumstances” that lead to Child’s placement. Anders Brief at

16.

      Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires

us to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court

if they are supported by the record. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.

2013) (citation omitted). The court “is free to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations

and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citations omitted). We defer to the court because it often has

“first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.”        In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citations and quotation marks omitted). If the record

supports the court’s findings, we must determine whether the court committed

an error of law or abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion does not

occur “merely because the record could support a different result.”         In re

Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 587 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted). An

abuse of discretion will only be found upon “demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”        Id. (citation

omitted).

      Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Pennsylvania’s

Adoption Act.   See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.         Termination under the Act

requires the court to conduct a bifurcated analysis in which the court focuses

on parental conduct pursuant to Section 2511(a) and the needs and welfare

of the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.

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Super. 2007). If the court finds that the movant has established grounds to

terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a), the court must then analyze

the evidence under Section 2511(b). Id. “One major aspect of the needs and

welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond

between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.” Id. The movant is burdened to

show “clear and convincing” grounds for termination under both Sections

2511(a) and (b). In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). As we need only agree

with the court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section

2511(b), we will analyze the termination decree pursuant to Sections

2511(a)(1) and (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(en banc). Those sections provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
         six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
         either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
         parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
         parental duties.

                                 *     *      *

      (b) Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

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     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to [S]ubsection (a)(1), . . . the court shall not consider any efforts
     by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
     are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of
     the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

     With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), this Court previously explained:

     To satisfy the requirements of [S]ection 2511(a)(1), the moving
     party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct,
     sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the
     termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
     parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental
     duties. In addition,

        Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate
        both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
        child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties.
        Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated
        pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either
        demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing
        parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental
        duties.

        Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
        duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights,
        the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the
        parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
        abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
        consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights
        on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations omitted

& emphasis added). This Court has also instructed: “[I]t is the six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition that is most critical to our

analysis. However, the . . . court must consider the whole history of a given

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but

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instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.” In re D.J.S.,

737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This requires the

court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider all

explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his or her parental

rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of the

circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B., N.M.,

856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

      Further, we have stated:

      [T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
      be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
      psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious
      intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child
      relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity
      to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish
      his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this
      question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has emphasized

the following:

         There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties.
         Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of
         a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and
         support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be
         met by a merely passive interest in the development of the
         child.   Thus, this [C]ourt has held that the parental
         obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
         performance.

         This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
         obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
         genuine effort to maintain communication and association
         with the child.

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        Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
        requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
        place of importance in the child's life.

     Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
     faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
     to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
     ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
     available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
     must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in
     the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
     rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
     convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
     others provide the child with his or her physical and emotional
     needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations & some punctuation

omitted).

     Here, in concluding the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence

of Subsection § 2511(a)(1), the orphans’ court opined:

     [Agency Specialized Services Supervisor Wood] testified that
     Father has been on call-in status since March 3, 2021, meaning
     he must call . . . Agency between 8:00-8:30 a.m. on the day of
     his scheduled visit to indicate that he will be attending, and if he
     does not, . . . Child will not be transported to the visit. On March
     24, 2021, Father was placed on check-in status, meaning that in
     addition to calling [o]n the morning of the visit, Father must arrive
     one hour before the scheduled visit or . . . Child would not be
     transported[.] These extra conditions were put into place
     due to Father’s excessive no-shows, which would disappoint .
     . . Child and cause unnecessary disruptions to his schedule. At
     one point, . . . Agency requested that Father’s visits be reduced
     to the statutory minimum due to his poor attendance. With the
     exception of one review period, Father never attended
     more than 44% of his [scheduled] visits [with Child].

     Given the fact that Father had a very inconsistent visitation
     attendance, and he failed to maintain frequent and regular
     contact with the Agency, and failed to take advantage of all
     the resources offered to him to help him maintain a bond with

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      . . . Child, [the c]ourt is satisfied that he has demonstrated a
      settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to . . . Child.

              Additionally, grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.
      2511(a)(1) may also be proven where a parent fails to perform
      parental duties for a period in excess of six months prior to the
      filing of the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights.

Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 7-8 (paragraph break & emphases added).

      Regarding Father’s performance of parental duties, the orphans’ court

further stated that Child was placed in foster care “due to concerns about

parenting, truancy[,] and inadequate supervision.”       Orphans’ Ct. Op. at 9.

Child’s “greatest needs” included “food, shelter, clothing, education, medical

care, and comfort.” Id. Since Father failed to attend visitation regularly, he

failed to perform these duties consistently, leaving Child to rely on his foster

family “for all of his physical and emotional needs.” Id. Lastly, the court

recognized that despite Father being engaged in visits that he did attend,

Father only spent a total of 36.3 hours with Child during the period between

his January 13, 2021, emergency placement to the September 15, 2022,

hearing. Id. Consequently, the court found that the Agency presented clear

and convincing evidence that Father demonstrated “a settled purpose to

relinquish parental claim to . . . Child and failed to perform his parental duties

for at least six months prior to the filing of the termination.” Id. We agree

with the court and conclude it did not abuse its discretion in termination

Father’s rights.

      The record supports the court’s findings: in addition to not attending

regular visits with Child or performing parental duties, Father consistently

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failed to make reasonable advancements in his identified goals — parenting

classes, budgeting, organization, “follow through[,]” and housing — and

“willfully avoid[ed]” caseworkers when they attempted to help him make

progress. See N.T. at 12-18 (showing Father: (1) was difficult to reach; (2)

never made progress towards identified goals; (3) did not pursue parenting

classes; and (4) did not respond to Caseworker Ryder, leading to Outreach

closing services), 17-21 (demonstrating Father: (1) continued to be difficult

to reach; (2) did not respond to Caseworker Barnes when she tried to confirm

meetings, and in one instance “hung up the phone” when she asked to meet

him; (3) made no progress towards his identified goals; and (4) requested to

discontinue services with Outreach).

      Father avers that termination was based solely on his limited financial

situation, and then referenced the expense of transportation to the visitation

sessions. However, it is apparent from the termination hearing testimony that

even without his financial hardships, Father was uninterested in making

progress on his identified parental goals, or even communicating with

caseworkers in some instances. See id. Moreover, we reiterate that Father

also did not attend the termination hearing, even though he received proper

notice.

      Thus, because the evidence establishes Father failed to perform parental

duties and demonstrated a settled purpose to relinquish his claim to Child

since placement, we conclude the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion

in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). See 23

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Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1); B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (explaining that a parent

“must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting the obstacles” which limit his

ability to maintain a parent/child relationship). As we discern no abuse of

discretion, we do not disturb the court's findings. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267.

      We next review whether termination was proper under Section 2511(b).

As to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

      [I]f the grounds for termination under [S]ubsection (a) are met,
      a court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.
      § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
      been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,
      comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
      (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M. a/k/a
      L.C., Jr.], [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
      the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
      consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
      child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
      effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond. In
      re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, . . . [an] evaluation of a child’s
      bonds is not always an easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-

63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

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well.    Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted).

        Moreover,

        [w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
        aspect of the [S]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
        nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
        court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

           [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
           equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
           also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
           security, and stability the child might have with the foster
           parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court
           should consider the importance of continuity of relationships
           and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed
           without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

        The orphans’ court concluded the Agency presented clear and

convincing evidence satisfying Subsection 2511(b). Specifically, it stated that

despite Father being “very invested” when he did visit with Child, “a parent’s

own feelings of love and affection do not prevent termination[.]” Orphans’ Ct.

Op. at 15. Further, it opined that: (1) it “feels strongly” that any bond Father

has with Child “deteriorated” due to Father’s inconsistency; (2) Father only

minimally used the numerous services offered to him by the Agency, designed

to help with parenting skills and substance abuse issues; (3) testimony at the

hearing demonstrated that Child has lived with Swartz for six months and over

that time has bonded with her; and (4) under the care of Swartz, Child is

loved, cared for, participating in counseling, attends school every day, and

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has his medical needs taken care of. Id. The court also noted that Swartz is

ready, willing, and able, to adopt Child and his permanency should not be

delayed “until Father decides to take tangible steps towards establishing a

bond and being a resource for” him. Id. at 16. Lastly, it determined that

termination would not destroy an existing bond or cause trauma, and adoption

was in the best interests of Child. Id. We agree with the court’s conclusions.

      Father has failed to demonstrate that the orphans’ court abused its

discretion in its determinations. Child is cared for physically, mentally, and

emotionally with Swartz, who expressed that she was ready to adopt him.

Father has not offered any evidence suggesting that returning Child to him

would be in Child’s best interests. He just baldly asserts that the evidence

failed to show that his bond with Child was broken. See Anders Brief at 15.

To the contrary, in addition to the evidence the court noted — Father’s

inconsistency in visitation — the Agency also presented the following: (1) Child

expressed he did not want to go to visitations with Father; (2) Child asked to

go home during visitations with Father; and (3) during phones calls with

Father, Child “never wanted to talk” and said he was “done” speaking with

him. See N.T. at 29, 39. Moreover, we note that the Agency scheduled a

bonding evaluation after a scheduled visit with Child, and Father failed to

attend the visit. Id. at 30. Thus, Father’s own actions resulted in him missing

an opportunity to demonstrate any semblance of a bond he may have had

with Child. Id. The record supports the court’s conclusions and Father has

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shown no abuse of discretion on the part of the court.       See 23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(b); In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-63; In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

      Accordingly, based on our review of the record, Counsel did not overlook

any non-frivolous issues.    We conclude that the orphans’ court properly

terminated Father’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1) and (b), and

Father is not entitled to any relief. Therefore, we affirm the decree terminating

Father’s parental rights and grant Counsel’s application to withdraw.

      Decree affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/03/2023

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