Court Opinion

ID: 9378450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 16:00:26.575918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.293159
License: Public Domain

20-2426
     Chhetri v. Garland
                                                                                BIA
                                                                           Ruehle, IJ
                                                                        A209 161 082
                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 10th day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            REENA RAGGI,
 9            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   MEGH BAHADUR CHHETRI,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                        v.                                  20-2426
18                                                            NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                      Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New
25                                        York, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                        Attorney General; Anthony P.
 1                                    Nicastro, Assistant Director;
 2                                    Patricia E. Bruckner, Trial
 3                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration
 4                                    Litigation, United States
 5                                    Department of Justice, Washington,
 6                                    DC.

 7       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 8   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

9    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

10   is DENIED.

11       Petitioner Megh Bahadur Chhetri, a native and citizen of

12   Nepal, seeks review of a July 1, 2020, decision of the BIA

13   affirming a June 4, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge

14   (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

15   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16   (“CAT”).    In re Megh Bahadur Chhetri, No. A 209 161 082 (BIA

17   July 1, 2020), aff’g No. A 209 161 082 (Immigr. Ct. Buffalo

18   June 4, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

19   underlying facts and procedural history.

20       We     review   the   IJ’s    decision   as   the   final   agency

21   determination.      See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146

22   (2d Cir. 2008). We review adverse credibility determinations

23   for substantial evidence, see Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891

24   F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings

                                         2
 1   of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

 2   would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

 3   § 1252(b)(4)(B).           “Considering         the         totality        of    the

 4   circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

 5   base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or

 6   responsiveness     of    the     applicant     .       .   .   ,    the    inherent

 7   plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consistency

 8   between      the   applicant’s         .   .       .       written        and    oral

 9   statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such

10   statement, the consistency of such statements with other

11   evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods

12   in    such    statements,        without       regard          to    whether       an

13   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

14   the   applicant’s       claim,    or   any     other        relevant       factor.”

15   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).             “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

16   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

17   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder

18   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”                      Xiu Xia Lin

19   v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008).

20         Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

21   determination.      Chhetri alleged past persecution and a fear

                                            3
 1   of future persecution from members of the Maoist Party on

 2   account of his support for the Nepali Congress Party (“NCP”).

 3   The IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies regarding whether

 4   he was threatened by Maoists between 2009 and 2016 and whether

 5   he received training before joining the NCP. See 8 U.S.C.

 6   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.                         The IJ

 7   reasonably rejected his explanation that the period between

 8   2009 and 2016 was a time of peace because it did not resolve

 9   the inconsistency and contradicted his statement that he had

10   been threatened during that period.                   See Majidi v. Gonzales,

11   430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more

12   than    offer     a   plausible      explanation        for    his     inconsistent

13   statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

14   reasonable      fact-finder       would       be    compelled     to    credit    his

15   testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

16          The   IJ       also    reasonably           concluded     that     Chhetri’s

17   credibility was undermined by the vagueness of his testimony

18   about the injuries his wife allegedly sustained when Maoists

19   assaulted her after Chhetri left Nepal.                      See Jin Shui Qiu v.

20   Ashcroft,       329    F.3d   140,    152     (2d     Cir.     2003)    (“Where    an

21   applicant gives very spare testimony . . . the IJ . . . may

                                               4
 1   fairly   wonder    whether   the       testimony   is   fabricated.”),

 2   overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of

 3   Just., 494 F.3d 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007).            Chhetri testified

 4   that his wife was assaulted by a group of Maoists in January

 5   2017 and was treated at a hospital for her injuries.         However,

 6   he could not describe her injuries despite testifying that he

 7   spoke with his wife frequently, and the medical records he

 8   submitted did not confirm an assault or injuries typical to

 9   an assault.   It was therefore reasonable for the IJ to take

10   issue with the vagueness of Chhetri’s testimony, especially

11   because Chhetri relied on the incident to show that the

12   Maoists were still looking for him.          See Siewe v. Gonzales,

13   480 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The speculation that

14   inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made

15   available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single

16   fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary

17   experience.”).

18       Additionally, the IJ reasonably concluded that Chhetri’s

19   failure to produce corroborating evidence further undermined

20   his credibility.     See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268,

21   273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate

                                        5
 1   his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the

 2   absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable

 3   to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

 4   question.”).      Chhetri alleged that he and his wife reported

 5   the Maoist violence to the police, but he did not provide any

 6   police reports or supporting letters from relatives, NCP

 7   members, villagers, or others who had been beaten by Maoists,

 8   nor   did   he   indicate     that    he       had    tried   to    obtain       these

 9   documents.        Moreover,       while       country    conditions        evidence

10   reflected    some    political       violence,          it    reported      reduced

11   violence and did not reflect incidents similar to those

12   Chhetri alleged.       Cf. Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 288 (2d

13   Cir. 2000) (indicating that individualized corroboration of

14   credible     testimony      may    not        be     required      where    country

15   conditions       evidence    reflects          that     applicant’s        personal

16   “experiences closely parallel[] the patterns of persecution”

17   in the country of removal).

18         The inconsistencies, vague testimony, and absence of

19   corroboration      provide    substantial            evidence      for     the   IJ’s

20   decision.     See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.                      The adverse

21   credibility       determination           is       dispositive       of     asylum,

                                               6
1   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three

2   claims are based on the same factual predicate.   See Paul v.

3   Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

4       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

5   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

6   stays VACATED.

7                               FOR THE COURT:
8                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
9                               Clerk of Court

                                  7