Court Opinion

ID: 9964564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:12:12.649359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.935859
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-21-00410-CR

                                        James Cornelious SCOTT,
                                               Appellant

                                                  v.

                                          The STATE of Texas,
                                                Appellee

                     From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2020CR7104
                            Honorable Michael E. Mery, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: April 24, 2024

VACATED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART

           Following a bench trial, appellant James Cornelious Scott was convicted of one count of

possession of a controlled substance in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams, and

one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount of 4 grams or

more but less than 200 grams. During the punishment phase, defense counsel stated Scott intended

to change his plea on the habitual offender enhancement from “not true” to “true.” The trial court

found the habitual offender enhancement true and assessed punishment at twenty-five years’

imprisonment for each count to run concurrently. In his sole issue on appeal, Scott argues there is
                                                                                     04-21-00410-CR

insufficient evidence to support the enhancement allegation because counsel only stated Scott

“intend[ed]” to change his plea to “true”; however, Scott argues he did not actually change his

enhancement plea.

       Although not briefed by Scott, the State points out that double jeopardy bars conviction of

both possession and possession with intent to deliver when the two charges arise from the same

transaction and involve the same controlled substances. We agree double jeopardy bars the

conviction for possession of a controlled substance under the facts of this case. Therefore, we

vacate the judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, and we affirm the

judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver.

                                          BACKGROUND

       San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) Officer Joseph Warren initiated a traffic stop

and pulled Scott over after he observed two traffic violations. When he approached Scott, Officer

Warren smelled marihuana and observed marihuana in Scott’s lap. Officer Warren searched

Scott’s vehicle and found several drugs in the vehicle, including what was ultimately determined

to be methamphetamine in little baggies. Officer Warren also found cash, a scale, and empty

baggies in the trunk of the vehicle. A grand jury indicted Scott for possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver and simple possession of a controlled substance. The indictment

further alleged Scott was a habitual offender.

       The case was tried to the bench and the trial court found Scott guilty of both counts. During

the punishment phase, defense counsel stated: “Mr. Scott intends to change his plea on the

enhancement paragraphs from not true to true, so we won’t need to present the witnesses to the

[c]ourt.” The State responded: “With the defendant pleading true to his priors, we have no

witnesses.” Subsequently, the following exchange took place:

                                                 -2-
                                                                                      04-21-00410-CR

       State:                 We would ask, Judge, that you find the defendant’s
                              enhancements true on the record.
       Trial Court:           Yes.
       Defense Counsel:       Yeah. I had told you he changed his plea, but I don’t think the
                              Court actually took that plea.
       Trial Court:           Right. Okay. The Court finds the enhancement allegations to
                              be true; therefore, he’s required to be punished under the
                              habitual enhancement, and the minimum—the statutory
                              minimum under these circumstances is 25 years in the
                              penitentiary.
                              Mr. Scott—well, I’ll ask first, [Defense Counsel], is there any
                              legal reason why the [c]ourt cannot proceed to assess
                              punishment today?
       Defense Counsel:       There is not, Your Honor.
       Trial Court:           Thank you. Mr. Scott, is there anything you want to say to this
                              [c]ourt before I assess punishment?
       Defendant:             Sir, the only thing I wanted to say was the only reason why I
                              went to trial is because I truly did not have any knowledge of
                              anything that was in that car illegal.

       The trial court then assessed punishment at twenty-five years’ imprisonment and a zero

dollar fine. Scott appeals.

                                                PLEA

       In his sole issue, Scott argues there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

true finding on the habitual offender enhancement. Specifically, Scott argues counsel’s assertion

that Scott “intends” to change his plea to “true,” without more, did not constitute a “true” plea.

       “A plea of ‘true’ will satisfy the State’s burden of proving an enhancement allegation, but

there must be affirmative evidence in the record showing that the defendant entered a plea of

‘true.’” Wood v. State, 486 S.W.3d 583, 587–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A plea of true to

enhancement allegations may be entered by counsel on defendant’s behalf. See Tindel v. State,

830 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Johnson v. State, No. 02-22-00195-CR, 2023 WL

2805903, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem op., not designated for

                                                 -3-
                                                                                       04-21-00410-CR

publication); Legget v. State, No. 05-16-00923-CR, 2017 WL 1149672, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Mar. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In Tindel, the Court of

Criminal Appeals held the record was “sufficient to show that appellant pled ‘true’ to the

enhancement allegations” because: (1) he was present in open court when the State read the

enhancement allegation and the trial court asked for the plea; (2) his counsel had authority to act

on his behalf and respond to the trial court’s inquires; and (3) there was no objection when the trial

court noted that appellant had pled “true” to the enhancement. Tindel, 830 S.W.2d at 137.

       Scott contends Tindel is distinguishable from the case at bar because he initially entered a

plea of “not true” at the beginning of the merits phase of the trial and his counsel changed his plea

to “true” at the beginning of the punishment phase. Scott argues his counsel’s representation that

Scott intends to change his plea to “true” does not supersede his initial plea of “not true.” We

disagree.

       Here, Scott was present when counsel represented that Scott desired to change his plea

from “not true” to “true” on the habitual offender enhancement. Defense counsel had authority to

act on Scott’s behalf and at the outset of the punishment trial defense counsel informed the trial

court and the State there would be no need for witnesses because Scott was changing his plea. The

State asked the trial court to find the enhancement true on the record, which the trial court did. At

no point did Scott object to the trial court’s finding. The trial court went on to inform Scott that,

based on the true finding, Scott was subject to a statutory twenty-five-year sentence. Further, the

trial court gave Scott an opportunity to address the court before it assessed punishment. While

Scott did maintain he was innocent of the possession charges, he did not object to, or even speak

of, the “true” plea on his prior convictions. Under the facts of this case, we conclude defense

counsel entered a “true” plea to the habitual offender enhancement on Scott’s behalf. Because

counsel may enter a true plea on behalf of his client, and a true plea is sufficient to support an

                                                 -4-
                                                                                       04-21-00410-CR

enhancement finding, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the

habitual offender enhancement was true. See Wood, 486 S.W.3d at 587–88; see also Tindel,

830 S.W.2d at 137.

       Accordingly, Scott’s sole issue is overruled.

                                        DOUBLE JEOPARDY

       In its brief, the State points out that the charge for simple possession was a lesser-included

offense of the possession with intent to deliver offense. Because conviction under both counts

results in multiple punishments for the same offense, the State requests we vacate the conviction

for the simple possession offense.

       “Because double jeopardy concerns affect fundamental, constitutional rights, they may be

raised for the first time on appeal, or even for the first time on collateral attack[,] when the

undisputed facts show the double jeopardy violation is clearly apparent on the face of the record

and when enforcement of usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interests.”

Sledge v. State, 666 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that when a defendant appeals his conviction, invoking

the appellate court’s jurisdiction, “the State was not required to file a notice of appeal before it

could point out appellant’s illegal sentence to the court of appeals.” Pfeiffer v. State, 363 S.W.3d

594, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003)). Thus, “a proper notice of appeal in a criminal case confers jurisdiction upon a court

of appeals, and that court then has the authority to address any issue or claim pertinent to the

judgment or order appealed from unless otherwise restricted by statute.” Pfeiffer, 363 S.W.3d at

599; see also Steels v. State, 170 S.W.3d 765, 767–69 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.)

(addressing, in the interest of justice, a double jeopardy claim that was not raised on appeal because

the error was clearly apparent on the face of the record and enforcement of the usual rules of

                                                 -5-
                                                                                     04-21-00410-CR

procedural default served no legitimate state interest). Because the undisputed facts show the

double jeopardy violation here is apparent from the face of the record, and the State concedes no

legitimate state interest is served by enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default, we will

review the double jeopardy issue. See Sledge, 666 S.W.3d at 599.

       “Under principles of double jeopardy, no person may be ‘subject for the same offence to

be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). The Fifth

Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause offers protection against: (1) a second prosecution for the

same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and

(3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Sledge, 666 S.W.3d at 599. “A claim of multiple

punishments may be valid if one offense is a lesser-included offense of the other and the same

conduct is punished twice or if the same criminal act is punished under two distinct statutes when

the legislature intended the conduct to be punished under either statute, but not both.” Weinn v.

State, 326 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An offense is a lesser-included offense if,

among other things, it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to

establish the commission of another offense charged. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1);

Berger v. State, 104 S.W.3d 199, 205 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.).

       Here, the State concedes the simple possession charge is a lesser-included offense of

possession with intent to deliver because both charges arise from Scott’s possession of one quantity

of methamphetamine. See Weinn, 326 S.W.3d at 194 (holding a single act of simultaneous

manufacture and resulting possession with intent to deliver with respect to a single quantity of a

controlled substance constitutes a single violation); Berger, 104 S.W.3d at 205. The State further

concedes punishment for both offenses arising from the same criminal transaction—possession of

the methamphetamines—is barred by double jeopardy. See Berger, 104 S.W.3d at 205. We agree.

                                                -6-
                                                                                     04-21-00410-CR

       “When a defendant is convicted in a single criminal trial of two offenses that are considered

the same for double jeopardy purposes, the remedy is to vacate one of the convictions.” Bien v.

State, 550 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). When deciding which conviction should be

vacated, the Court of Criminal Appeals has instructed that the most serious offense should be

retained. Id. “The most serious offense is the offense of conviction for which the greatest sentence

was assessed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the sentences are the same for both

convictions, the Court of Criminal Appeals has indicated the prosecutor should be given the

opportunity to elect which conviction is retained. Id. at 188–89.

       Here, the trial court assessed the same punishment for both convictions; therefore, the

prosecutor may elect which conviction should be retained. Id. The State has requested that the

conviction for Count I—possession, with intent to deliver, of a controlled substance in an amount

4 grams or more but less than 200 grams—be retained. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s

judgment on Count II—possession of a controlled substance in an amount 4 grams or more but

less than 200 grams.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We vacate the trial court’s judgment of conviction on Count II of the indictment for

possession of a controlled substance in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction on Count I of the indictment for possession with

intent to deliver a controlled substance in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams.

                                                  Irene Rios, Justice

Do not publish

                                                -7-