Court Opinion

ID: 9819550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:27:28.06931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.213090
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring: I concur with the decision reached by Justice Knecht but write separately to state that I do so only because our supreme court has commanded this result by its decision in Mitchell, 158 Ill. 2d 143, 632 N.E.2d 1010. While I feel bound to adhere to that decision, I would, if free to do so, concur with Justice Myerscough’s dissent in this case. The procedural facts of this case are not unique. Through human error by those in the court system, the parties were deprived of their appellate rights. These kinds of errors occur in every one of the 30 counties in this district. In this instance, the error was committed by the trial court. In most other instances, the errors are committed by the employees of the circuit clerk’s office. In both instances, the aggrieved party has no recourse because of the immunities bestowed upon each official. Our supreme court’s admonition to counsel for vigilance in frequent checking with the trial court or the clerk as to the status of an awaited order is, I believe, misplaced. An attorney is rightfully wary of making a pest of himself or herself with the trial court for fear of creating prejudice in the mind of the trial court. It is also unrealistic for counsel to rely on clerk personnel with regard to the status of an order, as those personnel are the same persons who were supposed to have mailed an order in the first place. If they cannot be trusted to mail the order, they probably cannot be trusted to correctly advise as to case status. A better rule would be to provide a safety valve for the preservation of a party’s appellate rights, such as to allow the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal to run from the actual notice of the entry of an order, where that time is later than its entry and is supported by an affidavit from the trial court or clerk to the effect that an error of omission prevented an appealing party from knowing of the order being appealed within the 30-day period.