Court Opinion

ID: 9550738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:41:27.623672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:16.529495
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice:
(Concurring and Dissenting).
I concur with the majority opinion except for that portion dealing with a pro se litigant’s entitlement to attorney fees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Utah Payment of Wages Act (“UPWA”). The majority holds that Smith, as a pro se attorney, cannot recover attorney fees because a lay pro se litigant would not be entitled to recover fees in a similar action. The majority reasons that “granting fees to pro se lawyers discriminates between lay and attorney litigants.” I believe that the policy underlying the allowance of attorney fees for successful litigants under the FLSA and UPWA requires a different result on this issue.
As a general rule, the amounts recoverable under the FLSA and the UPWA are so small that attorney fees will exceed any potential recovery. Hence, unless an award of attorney fees is available, workers would be unable to enforce their rights under these statutes. To further the policy of the statutes, a pro se attorney litigant should be compensated for economic loss resulting from pursuit of his or her rights under these acts. Otherwise, the time and trouble involved in pursuing such a case would far outweigh the ultimate benefit and thus discourage enforcement of the FLSA and UPWA.
I submit that this policy is equally applicable to non-attorney litigants. I agree with the majority that allowing a pro se attorney litigant to recover while denying that same right to other pro se litigants would unfairly discriminate between lay and attorney pro se litigants. However, rather than deny the right to recover attorney fees to all pro se litigants, I would allow all pro se litigants to recover fees where they can show an economic loss resulting from diversion of time from income-producing activities to the litigation of their claims. In my view, that position better promotes the policy underlying the statutory grant of attorney fees.1
Although not widely accepted, some courts have recognized the position I would adopt by acknowledging that non-attorney pro se litigants may be entitled to an award of attorney fees in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Crooker v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.1980) (implicitly holding that a pro se litigant who shows that prosecution of lawsuit under Freedom of Information Act caused diversion of time from income-producing activity may be entitled to attorney fees); *475Cox v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir.1979) (court may award attorney fees to non-attorney pro se litigant in Freedom of Information Act lawsuit).
In sum, given the policy for awarding attorney fees to a prevailing litigant in an FLSA and UPWA case, I see no reason why both pro se attorney and lay litigants should not be compensated for economic loss sustained from the diversion of time from income-producing activities.

. This position is also more consistent with our constitutional provision which gives a litigant the right to act pro se in any civil action in which he or she is a party. Utah Const, art. I, § 11.