Court Opinion

ID: 9395250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 16:04:04.836588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.623644
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                   ADRIAAN RODERICK MCDONALD,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-886

                              [May 17, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Daliah H. Weiss, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2019-CF-
007775-AXXX-MB.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elijah Giuliano, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CIKLIN, J.

    The defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for fifteen counts
of possessing, controlling, or intentionally viewing sexual performance by
a child while in possession of ten or more images of child pornography.
We write to address two of the numerous issues raised by the defendant,
which we find to be reversible error and to warrant a new trial. Because
of the trial court’s erroneous admission of previously undisclosed evidence
and the allowance of an improper statement in closing arguments, we
reverse and remand.

    The defendant came upon law enforcement’s investigatory radar after
Dropbox – an online digital storage cloud service – reported to the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) that an unknown user
using a specific Gmail account had uploaded 33 video or image files that
Dropbox believed depicted child pornography. The defendant submitted
to an interview by law enforcement, a recording of which was played at
trial, in which he admitted to having the specified Gmail account. The
defendant also provided law enforcement with his phone number.
                               Discovery Violation

   The defendant proceeded to trial on a theory that the Gmail account in
question was not his, and he testified on direct examination that he has
never had a Gmail account. Thereafter, as rebuttal evidence, the state
sought to enter a record—produced by Google in response to a subpoena—
linking the Gmail address in question to the defendant by name and phone
number. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the state had not
produced the record in discovery. The trial court conducted a Richardson 1
hearing, determined that the state’s discovery violation was not willful and
that the defendant was not procedurally prejudiced, and allowed the state
to admit the record.

   “When a trial court learns of a possible discovery violation, ‘the court
must conduct a Richardson hearing to inquire about the circumstances
surrounding’ the State’s discovery violation, and it must ascertain the
possible prejudice to the defendant.” Ferrari v. State, 260 So. 3d 295, 309
(Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (quoting Cuminotto v. State, 101 So. 3d 930, 936 (Fla.
4th DCA 2012)). “[T]he Richardson rule applies to evidence submitted
during rebuttal.” Barrett v. State, 649 So. 2d 219, 222 (Fla. 1994).

   If the trial court determines that a discovery violation occurred, it must
then determine: “(1) whether the discovery violation was inadvertent or
willful; (2) whether it was trivial or substantial; and (3) whether
noncompliance with the discovery requirements prejudiced the defense’s
ability to prepare for trial.” Cruz v. State, 222 So. 3d 572, 574 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2017). Only the third prong, whether the discovery violation
procedurally prejudiced the defendant, is at issue in this appeal.

    “[A] discovery violation is subject to a harmless error analysis,” and “the
State has the heavy burden to show the lack of procedural prejudice.”
Ferrari, 260 So. 3d at 311. “A Richardson violation is harmless error ‘only
if an appellate court can determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defense was not procedurally prejudiced[.]’” Id. (quoting Goldsmith v.
State, 182 So. 3d 824, 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).

            In determining whether a Richardson violation is harmless,
         the appellate court must consider whether there is a
         reasonable    possibility  that   the discovery        violation
         procedurally prejudiced the defense. As used in this context,
         the defense is procedurally prejudiced if there is a reasonable

1   Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

                                          2
      possibility that the defendant’s trial preparation or strategy
      would have been materially different had the violation not
      occurred. Trial preparation or strategy should be considered
      materially different if it reasonably could have benefited the
      defendant. In making this determination every conceivable
      course of action must be considered. If the reviewing court
      finds that there is a reasonable possibility that the discovery
      violation prejudiced the defense or if the record is insufficient
      to determine that the defense was not materially affected, the
      error must be considered harmful. In other words, only if the
      appellate court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the discovery
      violation can the error be considered harmless.

         ....

         We recognize that in the vast majority of cases it will be
      readily apparent that the record is insufficient to support a
      finding of harmless error.

State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1020-21 (Fla. 1995), holding clarified by
Scipio v. State, 928 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 2006).

    “[T]he test for prejudice does not concern the impact of the undisclosed
evidence on the fact-finder.” Scipio, 928 So. 2d at 1148 (emphasis in
original). “An analysis of procedural prejudice does not ask how the
undisclosed piece of evidence affected the case as it was actually presented
to the jury.” Id. at 1149. “Rather, it considers how the defense might have
responded had it known about the undisclosed piece of evidence and
contemplates the possibility that the defense could have acted to counter
the harmful effects of the discovery violation.” Id.

   Goldsmith is instructive to the case at hand. Goldsmith was charged
with robbery and related charges. 182 So. 3d at 826. The victim, who did
not testify at trial, identified the perpetrator as “Biggy” in the 911 call that
was admitted into evidence. Id. On cross-examination, Goldsmith denied
having the nickname Biggy. Id. at 827. The prosecutor then showed him
an undisclosed printout of his Facebook page, which said, “BIGGY.” Id.
The trial court concluded no discovery violation had occurred and failed to
address the three prongs of Richardson. Id. at 827-28.

   We reversed and remanded for a new trial, explaining that the Facebook
page’s public availability did not negate the state’s duty to disclose it, and
the violation was not trivial, as it “served to damage appellant’s credibility

                                       3
and to corroborate the male victim’s statements on the 911 call.” Id. at
828. We further explained:

         We are compelled to reverse because the State has failed to
      show that the defense was not procedurally prejudiced by the
      prosecutor’s surprise use of appellant’s Facebook page to
      impeach his testimony that he did not go by the nickname
      “Biggy.” Had the Facebook printout been timely disclosed to
      the defense before appellant took the stand, defense counsel
      could have discussed the issue with appellant before he
      testified. Thus, at a minimum, the prosecutor’s discovery
      violation could have affected appellant’s decision as to
      whether to testify.

Id.

    Similarly, in Dabbs v. State, 229 So. 3d 359, 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017),
Dabbs was charged with killing his co-worker and presented a defense
theory alleging in part that the co-worker owned the gun used to shoot
him, brought it to the murder scene, and Dabbs wrestled it away from him.
After the victim’s ownership of the gun was implied in opening statements,
the trial court permitted the state to introduce previously undisclosed
evidence to show that the victim did not own the gun. Id. We reversed
and remanded for a new trial, recognizing that “[a]t the time of opening
statements, none of the State’s proffered evidence would have conclusively
disproved [the defense] theory,” and “[h]ad Appellant known that the State
was planning on using this evidence and witness, there is a ‘reasonable
probability’ that Appellant’s strategy for opening statement would have
been different.” Id. at 361. We further noted “that new discovery which
requires a defendant to ‘back step’ statements already made is prejudicial.”
Id. (citing Brown v. State, 640 So. 2d 106, 107-08 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
(reversing and remanding for a new trial where defense counsel stated in
opening that car in which cocaine was found was not defendant’s and
prosecution later introduced an undisclosed statement that defendant told
officer that car was his)); see also McArthur v. State, 671 So. 2d 867, 868-
70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (in sexual battery case, reversing where state
disclosed pre-trial lab report mistakenly reflecting that victim’s shorts were
not torn, defendant presented consent theory in opening statements, and
state was permitted to introduce victim’s torn shorts into evidence).

   In the instant case, immediately after the defendant testified that he
had never intentionally possessed or viewed child pornography, he testified
that he did not have the specified Gmail account, and he denied ever
having a Gmail account. The trial court then permitted the state to

                                      4
surprise the defendant by introducing the previously undisclosed Gmail
records, which the prosecutor described as “the Google subscriber
information, that has the defendant’s name on the account with the email
at issue with this Dropbox account, recovery emails, the date that the
email account was created which was March 28, 2010, his phone number
listed here, as well as alternative emails.” The prosecutor also referred to
the Gmail records in closing argument.

   The defendant was procedurally prejudiced, and the state has not
demonstrated harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The undisclosed
Gmail records directly impeached the defendant’s testimony that he has
never had a Gmail account, and, accordingly, served to damage his
credibility. Had the discovery violation not occurred, in all likelihood, the
defense strategy would have been altered, and thus trial preparation would
have been different. Defense counsel would have discussed the evidence
with the defendant, and he may have chosen to pursue a different defense
theory and/or to not testify. Accordingly, because the trial court’s ruling
severely undermined the defendant’s testimony and theory of his case
causing procedural prejudice, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

               Improper Prosecutorial Closing Argument

    We address the next issue, an improper statement in closing argument,
to prevent its repetition on remand. “Where a defendant objects to
allegedly improper comments, and the objection is overruled, our standard
of review is abuse of discretion.” Panchoo v. State, 185 So. 3d 562, 564
(Fla. 5th DCA 2016).

    “[T]he courts of this state allow attorneys wide latitude to argue to the
jury during closing argument. Logical inferences may be drawn, and
counsel is allowed to advance all legitimate arguments.” Smith v. State, 7
So. 3d 473, 509 (Fla. 2009) (citation omitted). However, “a prosecutor’s
comments must be based on facts in evidence or fair inference from those
facts.” McKenzie v. State, 830 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
“Arguing facts that are not supported by the record is clearly improper. It
is well settled that a prosecutor must confine closing argument to evidence
in the record, and must refrain from comments that could not be
reasonably inferred from the evidence.” Id. (citations omitted).

    At trial, the state produced evidence that the defendant used internet
websites including Kik, Omegle, and Mega to obtain pornographic
materials. The prosecutor stated in closing arguments that “[t]he majority
of the time [these websites] are used for trading illegal child pornography.”
The trial court overruled an objection to this statement.

                                     5
    As the state concedes, any evidence that most people using these
websites did so to exchange child pornography was never developed during
trial and thus did not support the prosecutor’s inflammatory argument.
Improper closing argument has no rightful place in the repertoire of
criminal trials and with the barest of trial preparation is easy to avoid. The
statement was improper, and we caution against its re-use on remand.

   The defendant raises numerous other issues, but they are either
meritless, unpreserved, or are rendered moot by our determination that a
new trial is warranted due to the errors described above. However, we note
that, should the matter again proceed to sentencing and the state seeks
prosecution costs exceeding the statutory minimum, the state must
properly request and prove these costs. See Guadagno v. State, 291 So.
3d 962, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020).

   Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

MAY and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                            *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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