Court Opinion

ID: 9469928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:52:14.945582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:38.074338
License: Public Domain

DECKER, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the remand ordered by the majority cannot be justified, either under the facts as found by the Merit Systems Protection Board or under the controlling law, I must respectfully dissent.
The foundation of Judge Posner’s opinion is built upon the premise that appellant, as a “slumlord”1 was guilty of such egregious *1135conduct in his off-duty association with the two apartment buildings during the period in question that the image of HUD was seriously tarnished. Judge Posner then reaches his conclusion that the close connection between appellant’s duties as an appraiser and the mission of HUD in itself provides the substantial evidence and nexus sufficient to justify his discharge. In reaching this conclusion, the majority makes no reference to the fact that in the record before the local MSPB official in this case, there was do evidence that Wild’s off-duty conduct had an adverse effect on any HUD employee’s performance of his job responsibilities. The record is also undisputed that Wild’s own performance evaluations for 1977 and 1978, during the midst of his real estate activities, rated him above satisfactory or outstanding in all categories. There was no evidence, moreover, that the performance of any other HUD employee was affected in any way by Wild’s off-duty conduct. The local official’s decision upholding Wild’s discharge was based solely on his conclusion that the housing court complaints against Wild’s wife, the Sun-Times article, and the actions by WPNC were harmful to the department’s public image.
The “presumption” relied on by HUD, and approved by this court, cannot substitute for the requirement of “substantial evidence.”
In order for a federal employee’s discharge to be based on publicity adverse to the agency, the government must establish not only that the publicity was in fact adverse, but also that the publicity was sufficiently adverse to impair the efficiency of the service. Sherman v. Alexander, 684 F.2d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 1982); Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071, 1076 (5th Cir. 1981). In this case, the government offered no evidence linking the publicity concerning Wild to an adverse effeet on the efficiency of the service. HUD offered no evidence to support a finding, for instance, that its dealings with the City of Chicago, the local business community, or the public at large were impaired by the news report of Wild’s actions. Similarly, HUD offered no evidence that Wild’s activities were known by the general public, except for a single newspaper account buried on page 26 of the Chicago Sun-Times. The local MSPB official’s conclusions reflect the lack of any evidence linking the publicity to agency efficiency:
“While the significant population of the metropolitan Chicago area tends to dilute the adverse impact, if any, of the media identification of the appellant as an agency employee and while there is no specific showing that the agency’s ability to carry out its mission was harmed in any way, the agency presented evidence sufficient to show that, because of the appellant, a situation existed wherein the public image of the agency could suffer, notwithstanding the continued acceptable performance by the appellant.”
R. 141 (emphasis supplied). Such a finding, that the employee’s actions contributed to a “situation” in which the agency’s image “could” suffer, hardly constitutes substantial evidence of a “vital link” between discharging the employee and promoting the efficiency of the service. Young v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1261 (7th Cir. 1977). Mere transitory institutional discomfiture over an embarrassing newspaper story is not a sufficient basis for firing a federal employee. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C.Cir.1969).
This court’s majority contends that “proof of [the] relation [between the misconduct and the agency’s mission] is the substantial evidence that the statute requires; to require more proof is both unnecessary and unrealistic.”2 I cannot accept *1136the adoption by the Merit Systems Protection Board or by this court of a presumption that off-duty misconduct related to the agency’s mission necessarily impairs the efficiency of the agency. Burdening the federal civil servant challenging a wrongful discharge with such a presumption violates his rights under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.
While, as the majority correctly observes, promoting business-like efficiency in government service was one purpose of the Civil Service Reform Act, it was by no means the exclusive one. Protecting the procedural and substantive rights of federal employees remained a core congressional concern. Thus, in the list of the objectives of his civil service reform proposals that President Carter sent to Congress, the first objective listed was: “To strengthen the protection of legitimate employee rights.” President’s Message to the Congress on Civil Service Reform, March 2, 1978, quoted in H.R.Rep. No. 1403, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). The Senate Report, too, reflects the Act’s multiple purposes: “One of the central tasks of the civil service reform bill is simple to express but difficult to achieve: Allow civil servants to be able to be hired and fired more easily, but for the right reasons.” S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 2726 (emphasis supplied).
Using a presumption such as that embraced by the majority to sustain adverse agency actions which are unsupported by evidence might be acceptable if the inquiry on appellate review was merely whether the action was arbitrary or lacked a rational basis. But, in enacting the 1978 Act, Congress decisively rejected application of such minimal levels of appellate scrutiny to adverse actions against employees for misconduct. In adopting, instead, the “substantial evidence” test, the Senate Committee stated:
“[T]he Committee felt that the agency should have to meet a heavier burden of proof when it sought to take an adverse action against an employee for misconduct than when the action was based on unacceptable performance. In the case of misconduct, the case is more susceptible to the normal kind of evidentiary proof, and the nature of the proceeding is more disciplinary in nature.. ..
“As under current law, the agency would continue to have the burden of ... convincing the decision maker in the end that its action was lawful. There must be substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency action. In these two respects, S.2640 as reported differs from the original [Carter] bill, which placed the burden on the employee, and only required that the agency action not be arbitrary or capricious.”
S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54r-55 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 2776-2777. Not only did the Senate enhance employee protections against unjust discharges by requiring substantial evidence, but the House added still more protection for civil servants like Wild by making it a “prohibited personnel practice” to “discriminate ... against any employee on the basis of [non-criminal] conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee ... or the performance of others.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). This is another indication that the burden of proof is to be on the agency to establish that an employee’s off-duty conduct has harmed the agency.
Two recent decisions by other Courts of Appeals illustrate how Congress intended to allocate the burden of proof between an agency and its employee charged with misconduct. In Hoska v. United States Department of the Army, 677 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir.1982), the court reversed an order of the Merit Systems Protection Board affirming the dismissal of a civilian employee of the Army based largely on evidence of incidents allegedly involving sexual misconduct or other indiscreet behavior while off-duty. *1137Relying in part on the prohibited personnel practice (§ 2302(b)(10), quoted above) added in 1978, the court, id. at 144 n. 22, held that where, as here, the employee’s on-the-job performance was not in question, failure to prove the “nexus” between allegedly immoral off-duty conduct and the efficiency of the service was fatal, because
“the rational nexus requirement is perhaps nowhere more important than where an adverse action is taken against an individual on the basis of lawful, consensual, social behavior that is considered by his superiors to be ‘immoral’ or ‘notoriously disgraceful.’ Without the limitations provided by the nexus requirement, such a standard would give the Army virtually free reign [sic] to purge itself of persons found to be distasteful under the sacrosanct guise of protecting the national security.”
Hoska, 677 F.2d at 145. The “egregiousness” standard applied by the Merit Systems Protection Board and sustained by the decision of the majority bears a strong resemblance to the “notoriously disgraceful” standard condemned by the Hoska court, with relation to the mission of the agency substituted for national security as the justification.
In Bonet v. United States Postal Service, 661 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981), the court reversed the Merit Systems Protection Board’s affirmance of the dismissal of a Postal Department employee, who was manager of a postal branch station, based on allegations of immoral and disgraceful off-duty sexual conduct3 that had been publicized in a local newspaper. In an effort to show the required nexus between the discharged employee’s conduct and the efficiency of the service, the Postal Service relied on its code of ethical conduct, which forbade “dishonest, notoriously disgraceful or immoral conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the Postal Service.” Id. at 1075. The court, relying on the protections for federal employees in the 1978 Act, firmly rejected use of any such “presumed or per se nexus”:
“The government maintains that a per se nexus is appropriate when the employee engages in conduct like that charged to Bonet....
“Despite our reflective revulsion for the type of off-duty misconduct in question, ... the 1978 Act does not permit this court nor an employing agency to characterize off-duty conduct as so obnoxious as to show, per se, a nexus between it and the efficiency of the service. [Citations to statute omitted.] ....
“These provisions clearlysignal a legislative intent that the agency must demonstrate by sufficient evidence that the off-duty misconduct, upon which the disciplinary action is founded, adversely' affects the performance of the duties of the employee or the agency. We further conclude, in light of the statutory requirements, that the reviewing authority may not place upon the employee, as the Board did, the burden of showing that his continued employment will not affect the efficiency of the service. The Board may not shift the burden of proof by presumption or application of the per se rule.”
Bonet, 661 F.2d at 1077-78. The burden on the employee rejected in Bonet is precisely the burden placed on Wild and sustained by the majority. The Merit Systems Protection Board, in affirming Wild’s dismissal, relied specifically on a finding that “[appellant has not revealed any evidence to rebut the presumption that his conduct and the attendant adverse publicity, including the public’s awareness of his affiliation with the agency, caused the agency to suffer a loss of public confidence in its ability to *1138accomplish its mission.” R. 170. Not only is saddling a discharged employee with such a burden inconsistent with the statutory mandate, but the burden is one impossible to meet. What evidence could Wild possibly produce to prove that HUD did not suffer a loss of public confidence? Even if he had the resources to commission a poll on the question, he would have no corresponding data from the period before the publicity with which to compare his results.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development did not meet its burden of proof in this case, and the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board approving the appellant’s discharge was in error and should be vacated.
The unusual disposition of this appeal is another reason for my dissent. The court purports to vacate the order of the Board upholding Wild’s discharge and remand the case to HUD, “limited to the sanctions question.” The Merit Systems Protection Board, in dismissing appellant’s appeal, expressly held that the Presiding Official of the MSPB’s Chicago Field Office was acting within his authority in upholding the sanction of dismissal after two of the three charges against appellant had been dismissed by the Presiding Official. It is most unlikely after this action by both the Presiding Official and the MSPB, and the strong views expressed by the majority approving the sanction of dismissal, that HUD would seriously consider a lesser action. Further, HUD can only reconsider the kind of sanction it wishes to impose on an individual who remains in HUD’s employ. But, as the majority correctly observes, Wild is no longer in the employ of HUD. Since the court does not order HUD to reinstate Wild so as to be able to initiate new proceedings against him, if HUD should so choose, Mr. Wild is left in some kind of limbo, in which he has a theoretical right to have the nature of his punishment reassessed but only in the extremely unlikely event that HUD chooses to rehire him. It seems to me unfair to both Wild and HUD to dispose of this case in a manner, such as the majority has, which leaves both parties speculating as to just where they go from here. Wild, in particular, is at least entitled to some final order on the merits of his discharge, without prolonging this litigation.
Having concluded that the record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the Board’s decision that Wild’s discharge promoted the efficiency of the service, I would remand the case to the Board to order appropriate relief, including reinstatement, back pay, and such other relief as may be warranted.

. In using the term “slumlord” throughout his opinion, Judge Posner has added some individual color to the otherwise drab facts of this case. Given the majority’s sensitivity to matters of public opinion, as manifested by its concern for HUD’s public image, it cannot be unaware of the pejorative impact of this characterization of Wild’s off-duty activities. The trier of the facts below made no reference to the appellant Wild as a slumlord. Indeed, the only appearance of the word “slumlord” in the findings below comes in an isolated quote from the discharging agency, which had itself placed the term in quotation marks. Moreover, the press, not known for restraint, made no use of the term “slumlord” in its one reference to the housing court proceedings. The trier of fact, eschewing pejorative labels, found no more than that Wild had, at worst, permitted his wife’s buildings to deteriorate while under his management without taking steps to cause the buildings to be repaired or sold. Judge Posner also makes no mention of the fact that six weeks before the hearing examiner rendered his decision, one of the two buildings had not only not been demolished, but had four of its *1135six units ninety to one hundred percent rehabilitated, with two of these four occupied, which is inconsistent with the scenario that appellant continued to act as a slumlord after being warned by his superiors.

. The majority insists that it is unnecessary to require HUD to produce evidence of what is logically “obvious” — that employing a slumlord impairs the efficiency of the agency. But where the governing statute demands “substantial evidence,” that means evidence, not *1136inferences, no matter how “obvious.” “While logic can be helpful to supplement evidence or to draw inferences from evidence, it cannot substitute for evidence.” Storer Broadcasting v. American Federation of Tel, 600 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir. 1979).

. The majority attempts to distinguish cases such as Bonet on the basis that they “involve off-duty sexual behavior of federal employees whose official duties do not involve sex,” whereas housing is both the business of Wild’s agency and the area of his alleged off-duty misconduct. While Wild’s case may present a greater “irony,” to use Judge Posner’s phrase, postal employee Bonet’s alleged misconduct (committing sexually indecent acts with a child) was just as sensitively related to the work of his department, which is, after all, one of the few federal agencies that sends its employees door-to-door among the homes in the community. Irony is no substitute for nexus.