Court Opinion

ID: 9489651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:20:32.489985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:38.364371
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
This appeal comes before the en banc court following the withdrawal of a two-to-one decision, issued on February 6, 1996, in which a panel of this court vacated a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.1 The en banc court similarly withdrew a decision handed down by a different panel that construed the same federal statute, namely, section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, in a materially different way. See Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603. We granted rehearing en banc in both cases so as to afford us an opportunity to formulate a consistent rule in this circuit concerning the underlying question of statutory construction.
This case illustrates the problem. The defendant, Traylor Bros., Inc. (Traylor), contracted with the State of Rhode Island to construct a new bridge spanning Narragansett Bay from North Kingstown to Jamestown. Once work began, Traylor chartered tugboats and nonmotorized barges to assist it in building coffer dams for the new bridge. It hired pile-driving crews, carpenters, mechanics, and crane operators to man the barges.
In mid-1988, Traylor towed the barge BETTY F, whose main deck was fitted with a crane and a vibratory pile-driving hammer, to the coffer dam construction site. Thereafter, Traylor moved the BETTY F to various other aquatic locations where it functioned as a stationary platform for the pile-driving crew. During most pile-driving operations, a supply barge, used to carry materials and to house the powerpack for the pile driver, was moored alongside the BETTY F. Traylor routinely assigned two employees as “tag men” to stand on the supply barge’s main deck, grasp opposing guide ropes attached to the vibratory hammer, and steady the implement as it moved into position over the metal piles that were to be driven.
Beginning in September of 1988, worn fittings on the powerpack began to leak hydraulic fluid which spilled onto the deck of the supply barge. Crewmen complained unsuccessfully to their superiors and to the union steward about the hazard. They also tried to alleviate the problem from time to time, but to no avail.
On September 30, 1988, plaintiff Roeco DiGiovanni, Jr., who had been assigned by Traylor to work as a tag man on the supply barge, slipped on spilled hydraulic fluid as he started across the oil-covered deck to steady the BETTY F’s pile-driving hammer with his guide rope. DiGiovanni was seriously injured and received workers’ compensation benefits from Traylor under LHWCA § 904, 33 U.S.C. § 904.
Not satisfied with the avails of workers’ compensation, DiGiovanni sued in the federal district court. His complaint noted that Traylor was not only his employer but also the owner pro hac vice of both the BETTY F and the supply barge. Accordingly, he asseverated that Traylor was liable in negligence pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) in its capacity as vessel owner.
The district court entered judgment for Traylor as a matter of law following a three-day bench trial. See DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 855 F.Supp. 37 (D.R.I.1994). As mentioned earlier, a panel of this court vacated the decision. The panel held that the lower court had applied too restrictive a test to DiGiovanni’s “dual capacity” claim. It was against that backdrop that we granted en banc review.
The en banc court has now issued its opinion resolving the companion ease.2 See *626Morehead v. Atkinsov-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc). This opinion clarifies the proper interpretation of LHWCA § 905(b) in “dual capacity” cases. In the view of the majority of the judges of the en banc court, Morehead is controlling here. Moreover, Morehead explicates our reasoning in sufficient detail that added comment on our part would be supererogatory.
It suffices to say that we are not persuaded by the distinctions that our dissenting brother raises. As we see things, Morehead, as applied to the facts of the instant case, plainly requires that we depart from the position taken by the panel and reinstate the district court’s entry of judgment in Traylor’s favor. We need go no further.

Affirmed.

. The district court’s opinion is published. See DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 855 F.Supp. 37 (D.R.I.1994).

. The appeals in this case and in Morehead could not be treated in a single en banc opinion because a senior judge who had sat on the More-head panel was eligible to participate in the en *626banc decision in that case, but not in this case. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c); 1st Cir. Loc. R. 35.3.