Court Opinion

ID: 9429944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:28:23.584762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:22.248973
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins,
dissenting.
Last Term this Court divided sharply in a case involving an ex parte contact between a judge and juror during a criminal trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U. S. 114, (1983) (per curiam). Five separate opinions issued. Two Justices urged the Court to decide the “important constitutional questions” raised by such ex parte juror contacts, see id., at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id., at 123 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), but diverged significantly in their analyses and conclusions. Compare id., at 140 (Marshall, J., dissenting) {exparte contacts implicate three constitutional rights: “the right to counsel, . . . the ‘right to be present,’ . . . [and] the right to an impartial jury”) with id., at 125 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right”). Justice Blackmun and I dissented, arguing that the case should be either given plenary consideration, id., at 122 (Brennan, J., dissenting), or not reviewed at all, id., at 150-153 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In the face of this controversy, the bare per curiam majority explicitly declined to consider “[w]hether the error [of ex parte contact] was of constitutional dimension,” id., at 117-118, n. 2, and held only that any error demonstrated on the particular facts at issue was harmless. Id., at 121.
Today, without so much as a nod to this recent reservation of the question, the Court decides that the odd facts of this case do not constitute “the sort of event which every defendant ha[s] a right personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment,” citing the lone Member of the Court who would have *531so decided last Term. Ante, at 526-527. No guiding standard for future application is provided; the Court simply invokes its power to decide this case. Such ad hoc resolutions invariably engender more problems than solutions for lower courts.
Moreover, the parties directly affected by today’s decision have not even been permitted an opportunity to brief and argue the merits. Given the highly fact-specific nature of the case, my preference would be to deny the petition for certiorari. But if the merits are to be addressed, I would do so only upon full consideration after briefing and oral argument. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.