Court Opinion

ID: 9633545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:51:30.694355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:36.919290
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing MOISE, Justice. Appellant, by motion for rehearing, asks that we determine that the notice of appeal was timely filed on August 24, 1962, the date on which the motion for “leave to appeal” and order granting “leave to appeal,” together with copy of the notice, were mailed to opposing counsel. We are asked to do this because of an office practice of never transmitting or delivering “to any opposing counsel any paper, notice or pleading required to be sent, delivered or mailed to opposing counsel, until the same has been duly filed with the Clerk of the Court,” asserted by counsel for appellant in an affidavit attached to his motion. The notice filed in court is dated August 24, 1962, but bears a filing stamp of August 29, 1962. The affidavit of appellant’s counsel, agreed to by appellee’s counsel, supports the fact that the notice was mailed to counsel for appellee together with the motion and order mentioned above on August 24, 1962. Appellee has furnished an affidavit from the clerk of the district court who was in office on the dates in question. She states that she does not recall any instance of an instrument being left in her office that was not immediately entered on the docket, and although in a few instances the filing stamp had not been affixed, she recalls no instance of failure to affix the filing stamp with coinciding failure to enter on the docket. In the instant case the docket shows the notice entered on August 29, 1962, and the instrument bear the same filing date.  Under the circumstances, we do not see how we have any discretion in the matter. Timely taking of an appeal is jurisdictional. Chavez v. Village of Cimarron, 65 N.M. 141, 333 P.2d 882. This is true whether appeals are taken by entry of an order allowing an appeal in cases filed prior to March 15, 1961, or by notice of appeal as provided by the rule effective on that date. In Adams v. Tatsch, 68 N.M. 446, 362 P.2d 984, we noted an exception where the order allowing appeal had been signed by the judge and mailed to the clerk in ample time to have been received before expiration of the appeal period. We there indulged a presumption of receipt in due course of mail, absent proof to the effect it had not been so received. We do not see how this holding is of any aid to appellant here. The notice was not mailed to the clerk but was personally delivered. To indulge a presumption based upon an affidavit of usual office practice would be extending the rule followed in Adams v. Tatsch, supra, beyond reason and beyond recognition. While having every confidence in the honesty and sincerity of counsel for appellant, to adopt a rule such as is here sought, we are confident would open a Pandora’s box of excuses for late appeals too hideous to contemplate. We regret that the issues in the case so carefully and fully briefed will not be decided, but feel bound not to proceed in the absence of jurisdiction to do so under our rules. For the reasons stated we adhere to our previous decision dismissing the appeal. It is so ordered. CHAVEZ and NOBLE, JJ., concur.