Court Opinion

ID: 9961588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:02:41.455242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:02.139967
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 19, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0464
                                _________________________

                 Kim J. Washington and Katrina J. Williams

                                                  v.

                                   Elrick Earl Johnson

                       Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
                                 (CV-22-900835)

SHAW, Justice.

       The sibling plaintiffs below, Kim J. Washington and Katrina J.

Williams ("the plaintiffs"), appeal from the judgment as a matter of law
SC-2023-0464

entered by the Baldwin Circuit Court in favor of the defendant, their

brother Elrick Earl Johnson ("Johnson"), in their action seeking to

partition jointly owned real property. The real property at issue in this

case is indisputably "heirs property" subject to partition under the

mandatory application of the Alabama Uniform Partition of Heirs

Property Act ("the Heirs Act"), § 35-6A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. See §

35-6A-2(5), Ala. Code 1975 (defining "heirs property"), and § 35-6A-3(a)-

(b), Ala. Code 1975 (explaining the mandatory application of the Heirs

Act "to partition actions filed on or after January 1, 2015," that involve

"heirs property"). Applying the Heirs Act, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand.

                     Facts and Procedural History

     In August 2022, the plaintiffs filed in the trial court a "Complaint

for Partition of Real Property by Sale and Division of Proceeds" against

Johnson. The complaint identified the real property at issue as jointly

held "heirs' property" comprising 2.8 unimproved acres located in

Fairhope ("the property"), which the plaintiffs proposed to sell -- a plan

to which, they said, Johnson would not agree. The complaint further

alleged that the property was "incapable of being equally and equitably

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partitioned in kind." Thus, the plaintiffs requested that the trial court

order the property sold and divide the proceeds among the parties in

accordance with their respective ownership interests. In his subsequent

answer, Johnson essentially admitted the basic facts underlying the

parties' disagreement but disputed that the property was not subject to

partition in kind.

     Although the record is silent as to whether there was compliance

with the various pretrial procedural requirements of the Heirs Act, 1 on

March 22, 2023, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the matter.

During that proceeding, Washington was the sole witness for the

plaintiffs. She confirmed that the plaintiffs were "asking the Court to

order that the property be sold and the [sale] proceeds be divided equally"

among the parties. Washington indicated that she and Williams had

previously met and corresponded with Johnson in an effort to "work out

a fair split of the property" but that Johnson had declined to sell and

instead had expressed a desire to keep the property.               During

Washington's testimony, the plaintiffs admitted into evidence a survey of

the property as well as an accompanying appraisal valuing the property

     1See, e.g., §§ 35-6A-6 and 35-6A-7(e)-(f), Ala. Code 1975.

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at $258,000 and determining that its highest and best use was for

residential purposes.

     When asked to explain to the trial court why she desired to sell the

property, Washington indicated that she is approaching retirement and

that both she and Williams, who Washington described as disabled, could

use the money that the sale of the property would provide. She further

explained that the property had been vacant since her father's death in

2012, that the plaintiffs' children had no interest in returning to the

property, and that the parties were "paying taxes every year on it." More

specifically, according to Washington, she had been personally

responsible for ensuring that the annual taxes totaling approximately

$400 on the property were paid and had often paid both her one-third of

the tax bill as well as Johnson's one-third. Washington further testified

that Johnson had neither offered to purchase her interest in the property

nor proposed a way to equitably divide the property among the parties.

     Washington opined that it would be impossible to divide the

essentially L-shaped property to ensure that each sibling received "a fair

piece." She attributed this to the fact that only an 87-foot-wide portion

along the front of the property had road access and explained that "the

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back two lots" do not have an alternate means of road access. When

asked whether she had explored the possibility of first dividing the

property and then selling it in subdivided parcels, Washington testified

that she had done so and had learned the following in response to her

inquiries:

     "[B]ecause the land is locked on the back, it would be very
     difficult. I would have to go through the City, there was
     something about egresses and ingresses or getting the
     neighbors and having to put a driveway all the way back. It
     just seems that the back property would be too difficult to sell
     separately from the front piece."

Thus, Washington stated that, in her opinion, the property was worth

more as a whole than as three individual parcels. Finally, Washington

denied being aware of any purported sentimental attachment to the

property by any of its owners and also noted that Johnson neither lived

on the property nor used it for any business purpose.

     During cross-examination, Washington confirmed that there was

no residence on the property. She did note that Johnson lives directly

across the street from the property and voluntarily mowed and

maintained the property. Washington also explained that she and her

siblings had not, since receiving the property from their mother in 2013,

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entered into any type of written agreement regarding the property's

upkeep, the payment of the annual taxes on the property, or the future

disposition of the property.

     Washington further noted that she believed the $258,000 appraisal

value represented a fair price for the property.       When asked what

evidence she possessed suggesting that, were the property partitioned in

kind, her portion would be worth less than one-third of that appraised

value, Washington reiterated her belief "that the back lots would be less

because they're landlocked." Upon being presented with the possibility

of creating a 30-foot right-of-way on the property to provide access from

the road frontage to the rear of the property, Washington expressed her

lack of qualification to say whether that was a viable option for equitably

dividing the property into three lots. She did note that the property

possessed no natural impediments to the creation of such a right-of-way

and conceded that, while potentially "costly," that solution was "probably

possible."   Washington also conceded that, were that to occur, she

possessed no evidence to suggest that she would be unable to sell her

resulting one-third portion of the property and receive as much as she

would if the property was sold as a whole and she received one-third of

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the sales price. Finally, Washington agreed that the property had "been

in [their] family for a long period of time."    She also admitted that

Johnson had previously informed her that he did not want the property

sold because he wanted it to remain in the family. Washington also

agreed that the impetus behind the lawsuit was her desire for the money

she would receive from the requested sale and that, if the property was,

instead, partitioned in kind, she and Williams could, in fact, sell their

parcels.

     On redirect, Washington acknowledged that during trial was the

first time she had been presented with the possibility of creating a right-

of-way as a means of providing access to the rear of property if it were

partitioned in kind.    Washington expressed fear that she would be

financially responsible for that process. She also noted that she remained

unclear about which of the three owners would be entitled to the parcel

with road frontage and the existing driveway.        Washington further

explained that, despite the absence of a written agreement regarding the

upkeep and taxes, she had historically paid Johnson's portion, because,

she said, he felt that mowing the grass on the property throughout the

year was his contribution.

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     Upon the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, Johnson testified. He

confirmed that he lived directly across from the property, which, he said,

had been in his family for 40 or 50 years. He indicated that, as a result,

the property held sentimental value for him because "[he was] raised [on

the property] and … [had] been working on that property all [his] life."

Johnson indicated that he did not want the property sold because he

wanted it to remain within the family.

     Johnson also testified that the parties had no written agreement

regarding managing the property but stated that, when the taxes came

due annually, "each one of [them paid] it." He acknowledged that he did

not contribute to the property taxes every year but, instead, indicated

that he has "always" done "everything" necessary with regard to the

actual maintenance of the property. Despite the plaintiffs' appraisal,

Johnson testified that he felt the property was worth closer to $300,000.

He noted, however, that he had never obtained his own appraisal of the

property either as a whole or as three individual parcels. Johnson further

indicated that there had been no discussion among the parties about

"buy[ing] each other's interest out."

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     When asked whether, despite Washington's representations as to

the inability to equitably divide the property, he had a proposal to

accomplish a fair partition in kind, Johnson demonstrated on a map of

the property where separate lots could be located and where an easement

or right-of-way for road access could be placed. He further testified that

the property was "nice and level" with only a slight slope in the back and

that there was sufficient room to create the easement he proposed.

Johnson's testimony suggested that, were his plan implemented, he

desired to take the resulting lot fronting the roadway and said that

Washington and Williams could receive "the back two lots and

everybody'll have access to get to it." He noted that a survey would be

necessary to divide the property into three equal lots comprising

"[a]lmost an acre" each, but he indicated that he had no idea whether his

proposed division would affect the plaintiffs' ability to sell their lots.

When asked, on cross-examination, why he did not simply purchase the

plaintiffs' interests in the property, Johnson said that "if [he] had the

money he would," but he again denied that it was necessary that the

property be sold. Upon the conclusion of his testimony, Johnson rested

his case.

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     At that time, the plaintiffs "request[ed] that the [trial court] enter

an order that the property be listed for sale on the open market and that

the proceeds be distributed amongst [the parties]." Johnson responded

with his own oral motion for a judgment as a matter of law on the ground

that the plaintiffs had allegedly "failed to meet their burden of proof to

show [the property] cannot be equitably divided." In support, Johnson

emphasized his sentimental attachment to the property and its proximity

to his own home. He also pointed out the lack of evidence indicating that

a partition in kind would result in proceeds for the plaintiffs materially

less than if the property was sold in its entirety.

     Thereafter, the trial court granted Johnson's motion for a judgment

as a matter of law. In that judgment, the trial court found that the

property qualified as heirs property derived from the parties' mother and

that each party was a one-third owner. It further held, in pertinent part:

           "… The Plaintiffs never had a survey conducted on the
     property, nor produced an expert witness who could state the
     property could not be equally and equitably divided. …
     Washington only stated, based on personal opinion, the
     parcels would be less valuable if divided into one-third
     portions rather than as a whole. Other than her testimony,
     [the] Plaintiffs offered no expert opinion as to whether or not
     a partition would reduce the value.

                                     10
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         "….

          "… If a joint owner is unable to demonstrate that the
    real property cannot be equitably divided among the joint
    owners, the property must be partitioned and not sold. … The
    party seeking the sale for division has the burden of proving
    that the property cannot be equitably divided between the
    joint owners. … The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of
    proof.

          "… After considering the factors listed in Ala. Code § 35-
    6A-9(a), the Court is of the opinion the property is not due to
    be sold. The Plaintiffs produced no survey nor provided any
    expert witness who could state the property could not be
    practically divided or the parcels, if sold separately, would
    have less value than if it were sold as a whole. The Plaintiffs
    also testified they have no knowledge of the process of
    subdividing the property or setback regulations with the City
    of Fairhope.

          "… Further, the evidence presented proved the property
    was in the family for decades and held sentimental value to
    Johnson for that reason. Johnson presented evidence which
    also proved he solely contributed to all maintenance on the
    property. Johnson provided a proposed division of the
    property in Court which would allow each co-tenant access to
    the public road and a fair division of the property for each co-
    tenant. Johnson further testified the property in question
    was raw undeveloped land with no businesses or structures
    located thereon.

         "… Since it is the burden of the Plaintiffs to prove … the
    property could not be equally or equitably divided, and they
    were unable to do so, a partition by sale is not appropriate."

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The trial court thus entered a judgment "in favor of" Johnson. It did not

order that the property be partitioned in kind or otherwise equitably

divided.

     Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a postjudgment motion and an

accompanying brief challenging the trial court's judgment in several

respects.   In particular, in addition to identifying purported factual

inaccuracies in the trial court's findings, the plaintiffs contended that §

35-6A-8, Ala. Code 1975, of the Heirs Act provides that "a partition in

kind should be ordered if not partitioned by sale or purchased by the

other co-tenants." Thus, they argued that, having concluded that the

property was not subject to partition by sale, the trial court should amend

its judgment to partition the property in kind among the parties.

Following the denial of their postjudgment motion, the plaintiffs

appealed.

                           Standard of Review

           "Because the circuit court received evidence ore tenus,
     our review is governed by the following principles:

                  " ' " ' "[W]hen a trial court hears ore tenus
            testimony, its findings on disputed facts are
            presumed correct and its judgment based on those
            findings will not be reversed unless the judgment

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           is palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust." ' "
           Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Bd. v. Parks, 977
           So. 2d 440, 443 (Ala. 2007) (quoting Fadalla v.
           Fadalla, 929 So. 2d 429, 433 (Ala. 2005), quoting
           in turn Philpot v. State, 843 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala.
           2002)).     " 'The presumption of correctness,
           however, is rebuttable and may be overcome where
           there is insufficient evidence presented to the trial
           court to sustain its judgment.' " Waltman v.
           Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Ala. 2005) (quoting
           Dennis v. Dobbs, 474 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1985)).
           "Additionally, the ore tenus rule does not extend to
           cloak with a presumption of correctness a trial
           judge's conclusions of law or the incorrect
           application of law to the facts." Waltman v.
           Rowell, 913 So. 2d at 1086.'

     "Retail Developers of Alabama, LLC v. East Gadsden Golf
     Club, Inc., 985 So. 2d 924, 929 (Ala. 2007)."

Bond v. Estate of Pylant, 63 So. 3d 638, 643-44 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).

                               Discussion

     The Heirs Act seeks to protect the property rights of cotenant heirs

susceptible to losing family-owned property by means of a forced sale.

See generally Manson v. McNeil, 376 So. 3d 454 (Ala. 2022) (Mitchell, J.,

concurring specially). See also Stephens v. Claridy, 346 So. 3d 519, 520

(Ala. 2020) ("The Heirs Act presumes that a partition in kind can be

ordered unless such a partition would 'result in great prejudice to the

                                    13
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cotenants.' § 35-6A-8(a), Ala. Code 1975."), and § 35-6A-7(a), Ala. Code

1975 (providing that if a petitioner, in his or her initial pleading, fails to

state a preference for means of division, "the petitioner shall be deemed

to have not requested partition by sale"). Section 35-6A-7(a) of the Heirs

Act permits a cotenant heir to request the partition of jointly owned heirs

property by filing a petition "request[ing] partition by sale." 2 In that

event, the Heirs Act affords the remaining cotenants first an opportunity

to "buy all the interests of the cotenants that requested partition by sale"

and, if that does not occur, permits the "cotenant that requested partition

by sale … to buy all the interests of the other cotenants that requested

partition by sale." § 35-6A-7(e) and (f)(2). Neither option occurred here.

In such cases, the Heirs Act provides: "If no cotenant elects to buy all the

interests of the other cotenants that requested partition by sale, the court

shall send notice to all the parties of that fact and resolve the partition

action under Section 35-6A-8 to Section 35-6A-11 …." § 35-6A-7(f)(8).

     Section 35-6A-8, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

     2Remaining    provisions of § 35-6A-7 deem a pleading seeking
partition but not specifically stating a desire that the property be sold as
not requesting partition by sale. In this case, Johnson's answer indicated
that the property could be equitably divided and thus should not be sold.
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           "(a) If all the interests of all cotenants that requested
     partition by sale are not purchased by other cotenants
     pursuant to Section 35-6A-7, or, if after conclusion of the
     buyout under Section 35-6A-7, a cotenant remains that has
     requested partition in kind, the court shall order partition in
     kind unless the court, after consideration of the factors listed
     in Section 35-6A-9, finds that partition in kind will result in
     great prejudice to the cotenants. …

           "(b) If the court does not order partition in kind under
     subsection (a), the court shall order partition by sale pursuant
     to Section 35-6A-10 or, if no cotenant requested partition by
     sale, the court shall dismiss the action."

(Emphasis added.)
                                    I.

     The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in holding that the

property could be partitioned in kind -- as opposed to being sold --

because, they say, a partition in kind would greatly prejudice them. See

§ 35-6A-8(a). Specifically, the plaintiffs point to Washington's testimony

as to her belief that the property could not practicably be divided because

the two resulting parcels in the rear of the property would allegedly be

landlocked, because of the need for providing easements, and because of

the related costs of providing ingress/egress to those two parcels.

     Section 35-6A-8(a) provides that when the interests of cotenants

that requested partition by sale are not purchased, or when any

remaining cotenant requests that heirs property be partitioned in kind,
                                    15
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the trial court "shall order partition in kind unless the court, after

consideration of the factors listed in Section 35-6A-9, finds that partition

in kind will result in great prejudice to the cotenants." Section 35-6A-9,

Ala. Code 1975, includes the following factors for evaluating a request to

partition heirs property:

           "(a) In determining under subsection (a) of Section 35-
     6A-8 whether partition in kind would result in great prejudice
     to the cotenants, the court shall consider all of the following:

                "(1) Whether the heirs property practicably
           can be divided among the cotenants.

                 "(2) Whether partition in kind would
           apportion the property in such a way that the
           aggregate fair market value of the parcels
           resulting from the division would be materially
           less than the value of the property if it were sold
           as a whole, taking into account the condition under
           which a court-ordered sale likely would occur.

                "(3) Evidence of the collective duration of
           ownership or possession of the property by a
           cotenant and one or more predecessors in title or
           predecessors in possession to the cotenant who are
           or were relatives of the cotenant or each other.

                 "(4) A cotenant's sentimental attachment to
           the property, including any attachment arising
           because the property has ancestral or other unique
           or special value to the cotenant.

                "(5) The lawful use being made of the
           property by a cotenant and the degree to which the
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           cotenant would be harmed if the cotenant could
           not continue the same use of the property.

                 "(6) The degree to which the cotenants have
           contributed their pro rata share of the property
           taxes, insurance, and other expenses associated
           with maintaining ownership of the property or
           have contributed to the physical improvement,
           maintenance, or upkeep of the property.

                 "(7) Any other relevant factor.

            "(b) The court may not consider any one factor in
     subsection (a) to be dispositive without weighing the totality
     of all relevant factors and circumstances."

     The trial court's application of § 35-6A-9 in this case was fact-

intensive. The plaintiffs, in support of their claim that the above factors

weigh in favor of a sale of the property in this case, accurately recount

Washington's testimony below as resolving some of the foregoing factors

in the plaintiffs' favor. However, her testimony was countered by other

evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs

nonetheless failed to demonstrate that the statutory factors as a whole

weigh against a finding of prejudice to them in the event of partition in

kind. For example, Johnson presented a potential solution to provide

right-of-way access from the road to any resulting lots at the rear of the

property -- a proposal that Washington could not dispute was a viable

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option for equitable division. Further, Washington conceded both that

the property possessed no natural impediments to creation of such a

right-of-way and that while such a right-of-way might result in some

additional costs -- a point on which no party offered actual evidence -- it

did appear to present a possible solution. 3 Perhaps most importantly,

Washington also conceded that she possessed no evidence suggesting

that, in the event that road access was provided to the rear lots and the

property was partitioned in kind rather than sold, she would receive less

money for her resulting lot than for her one-third interest in the property

if it were sold in its entirety.

      The evidence further indicated that the parties' family had long

held the property and that Johnson had a sentimental attachment to it

as a result. Further, both Johnson and other family members apparently

reside nearby, including a nephew who resides in the residence formerly

      3Although Washington expressed general concerns about the "costs

and difficulties" of partitioning the property in kind and who would be
responsible for the costs, those concerns were unspecified. Further,
Johnson proposed that an easement for access be provided on the
property, not that an actual driveway, road, or other improvements be
constructed by the parties. It is not explained how the costs related to a
partition in kind in this case would differ from the costs associated with
a partition by sale.

                                    18
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occupied by the parties' mother on adjacent property. 4

     Thus, we are unable to agree with the plaintiffs' argument that they

successfully demonstrated that, under § 35-6A-9, partition in kind would

result in great prejudice to them in this case. In rejecting their claim, we

reiterate that the ore tenus standard is premised on the fact that the trial

court had the opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and credibility of the

witnesses. See Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d

791, 795 (Ala. 2000). After having fully reviewed the record, we are, like

the trial court, unable to conclude that the plaintiffs met their burden of

proving that the property could not be fairly and equitably divided among

the parties. See Cotton v. McMurtry, 440 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Ala. 1983)

("The burden of proving that a parcel cannot be fairly and equitably

divided is upon the party seeking a sale for division."). Cf. Stephens, 346

So. 3d at 523 (quoting Black v. Stimpson, 602 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. 1992))

     4Although it appears undisputed that Johnson had not paid his one-

third share of the annual taxes on the property every tax year and that
Washington has, in some years, been forced to pay the entirety of the
taxes, Johnson apparently did, according to his own testimony,
contribute in some years, and he testified that, in the years he had not
done so, he felt that he had matched his portion through physical labor
maintaining the property -- a task for which he has apparently been
solely responsible since the inception of the parties' joint ownership.
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(" 'A trial court's finding that land cannot be equitably partitioned is

entitled to a presumption of correctness and will be overturned only if

plainly or palpably erroneous.' "), and Steadman v. Uptown Motors, Inc.,

842 So. 2d 684, 685 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002) ("The trial court's determination

of whether the property may be divided equitably among the joint owners

is entitled to the ore tenus presumption of correctness."). Instead, the

evidence supporting the factors set forth in § 35-6A-9 was disputed, and

the trial court was tasked with resolving that dispute. See Bond, supra.

According the trial court's findings the deference they are due, we are

unable to conclude that the trial court's finding that the plaintiffs failed

to show that the property cannot be partitioned in kind is palpably

erroneous or manifestly unjust. Id.

                                    II.

     The plaintiffs also seek relief based on purported factual errors

contained in the trial court's judgment, which, they say, Johnson

proposed and the trial court adopted as its judgment.

     For example, the plaintiffs first point to the fact that the trial

court's judgment appears to suggest that they "never had a survey

conducted on the property" and also "produced no survey," which

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findings, they say, were clearly belied by their evidentiary submissions

at trial. As the plaintiffs correctly indicate, a survey of the property and

a related appraisal were introduced into evidence at trial. Although the

materiality of the trial court's finding to the judgment seems

questionable, it appears, based on the context, that the trial court was

inartfully pointing out that the plaintiffs had not offered a survey or

appraisal of the property to prove that it would be less valuable if

equitably divided and sold in individual lots.

     The plaintiffs also challenge the trial court's finding that Johnson

offered a proposed equitable means of partitioning the property in lieu of

a sale. The plaintiffs contend that the evidence established that the

property has a single means of ingress and that any rear lot would be

landlocked.    Contrary to this claim, as explained above, Johnson's

proposed division specifically included a right-of-way to provide access to

the two resulting parcels that would not have road frontage.

     The plaintiffs next challenge the trial court's conclusion that the

plaintiffs possessed "no knowledge" of regulations governing the

proposed right-of-way or of municipal regulations. Instead, they say,

Washington's testimony demonstrated that, as to any landlocked lot, the

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parties " 'would have to go through the City, there was something about

egresses or ingresses or getting the neighbors and having to put a

driveway all the way back.' "       Plaintiffs' brief at 28.   However, that

testimony appears to make the trial court's point that, other than mere

generalities, the plaintiffs offered no concrete evidence establishing that

Johnson's alternate proposed partition in kind was legally unworkable.

     In sum, any purported inaccuracies in its judgment aside, the trial

court's judgment makes clear that, in resolving this matter, the trial

court considered the disputed evidence in light of the relevant statutory

factors and found that the evidence supported a partition in kind. We

again see nothing, based on our own review of the record and the

testimony recounted above, to suggest that the trial court's judgment is

either palpably erroneous or manifestly unjust. See Bond, supra.

                                      III.

     Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred to the extent

that it failed, despite concluding that the property was heirs property, to

order the property either partitioned in kind or partitioned by sale as,

they say, the Heirs Act requires.

     It is well established that

                                      22
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            "[p]artition of land at the instance of any adult tenant in
     common is a matter of right. If the land is not capable of an
     equitable division in kind, a sale for division is a matter of
     right, without regard to the interest of other tenants in
     common. Raper v. Belk, 276 Ala. 370, 162 So. 2d 465 (1964).
     The circuit court of the county in which the land is located has
     subject matter jurisdiction to partition the land, or to sell the
     land for division of the proceeds if the complaint alleges and
     it is proven that a fair and equitable partition in kind cannot
     be made. Meador v. Meador, 255 Ala. 688, 53 So.2 d 546
     (1951)."

Sockwell v. Hyde, 503 So. 2d 817, 818 (Ala. 1986). 5

     Relying on language from § 35-6A-8, the plaintiffs correctly contend

that when heirs property cannot be equitably divided, the court may

order the sale of the property and the division of the resulting proceeds;

alternately, they say, when the property can be equitably divided among

its co-owners, § 35-6A-8(a) provides that the "the court shall order

partition in kind." (Emphasis added.) We agree.

     Here, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, concluded

that the partition of the property by division would not greatly prejudice

the cotenants -- a finding affirmed above.          Having reached that

     5Section  35-6A-3(c), Ala. Code 1975, explains that the Heirs Act
"supplements" existing provisions of Title 35, Chapter 6 (governing
general "partition" actions) and replaces only the portions of that chapter
"that are inconsistent with [the Heirs Act]."
                                    23
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conclusion, the trial court was required under the Heirs Act to so divide

the property in kind.     In Stephens, supra, we explained:       "If heirs

property cannot be partitioned in kind, then a partition by sale must be

ordered pursuant to § 35-6A-10, Ala. Code 1975." 346 So. 2d at 520.

Applying the mandatory provisions of § 35-6A-8(a), the converse is also

true. See Steadman, 842 So. 2d at 685 ("If a joint owner is unable to

demonstrate that the real property cannot be equitably divided among

the joint owners, the property must be partitioned and not sold."). More

specifically, a trial court, having concluded that a sale was not warranted

because a means of equitable partition in kind exists, may not simply

take no further action and, in effect, deprive a cotenant of the legal right

to seek partition. 6

      6To the extent that Johnson contends that the plaintiffs failed to

argue that a partition in kind was required at any time before the filing
of their postjudgment motion, we note that such an argument was not
ripe until after the trial court had concluded that partition by sale was
inappropriate. Moreover, the plaintiffs presented their claim to the trial
court in their timely filed postjudgment motion and thus provided that
court the opportunity to correct its error. Additionally, during closing
remarks to the trial court, Johnson's counsel acknowledged that that
court "has the authority to order this to be partitioned" and specifically
requested that the court "order as a matter of law that it be done in the
way … Johnson has proposed and not [be] sold."

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                                Conclusion

     Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court erred in

finding that the property can be partitioned in kind. That portion of the

trial court's judgment is therefore affirmed. Because the trial court found

that a partition in kind was possible, the trial court was required to order

that the property be partitioned in kind. We thus reverse the trial court's

judgment to the extent that it failed to do so, and we remand the matter

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

     AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

     Parker, C.J., and Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

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