Court Opinion

ID: 9881094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:09:41.022906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:02.535151
License: Public Domain

J-S29003-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  DANIEL W. DURAND AND CAREY C.                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  DURAND                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                       Appellants              :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 239 MDA 2023
  JR BEARD, LLC                                :

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 11, 2023
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                      Civil Division at No. 2022-SU-000040

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                      FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2023

       Daniel W. and Carey C. Durand (Appellants), appeal from the entry of

summary judgment in favor of JR Beard, LLC (JR Beard), in this breach of

implied contract action. We affirm.

       The trial court detailed the case history:

             On March 15, 2021, [Appellants] hired JR Beard [] to
       complete concrete patio work at their home around their in-
       ground pool. [Appellants] had requested a quote from [JR Beard]
       for the work to be completed, and received a bid for $8,500[],
       accepting it that same day. The installation was done on or
       around April 2021, but [Appellants] were dissatisfied with the
       work. [JR Beard] returned to do additional work, and no other
       payments were rendered or received.

            On May 24, 2021, JR Beard [] filed a civil complaint against
       Carey Durand (“C. Durand”) with the Magisterial District Court
       [MDJ Action], seeking $5,200 together with costs. Def.’s Mot. for
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S29003-23

       Summ. J. ¶ 6. In his complaint, Beard alleged that C. Durand
       confirmed a bid for $8,500 with him for the concrete patio but only
       paid him $4,000 of the agreed upon amount. Id. at 3-5. The
       complaint also stated that an additional $700 worth of concrete
       [work was performed, …] and after the job was completed, [JR]
       Beard returned to C. Durand’s property three times to address
       concerns, but that each time his requests for payment for these
       visits were denied because C. Durand “had more concerns.” Id.
       ¶ 4. Def.’s Br. in Support at 2. In the MDJ action, then-defendant
       C. Durand did not file a cross-complaint, and thereafter[,] on June
       30, 2021, judgment was entered in favor of C. Durand, with no
       monetary award given. Id. at 8. It is also undisputed that no
       appeal was taken from that award by either party. Def.’s Reply
       Br. at 2.

             A little over five months later, on January 7, 2022,
       [Appellants] filed a [c]omplaint in the York County Court of
       Common Pleas alleging [JR] Beard failed to correct issues with
       [the] concrete patio work as well as other work performed,
       allegedly resulting in worse damage to the patio. Def.’s Mot. for
       Summ. J. 11-15. [Appellants] claim [JR] Beard demanded full
       payment, including an additional amount for extra concrete before
       he would make any further efforts to correct the issue(s). Id. at
       16. They also received estimates to repair the issues that
       allegedly remained with the concrete pool deck, and [] those
       estimates totaled $39,769.61[.] Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 1-3 (footnotes and italics omitted, citations

and some capitalization modified).

       On October 20, 2022, JR Beard filed a motion for summary judgment.

Appellants filed a response. On January 10, 2023, the trial court heard oral

argument.     By order entered January 11, 2023, the trial court granted JR

Beard’s motion for summary judgment. Appellants timely appealed.1

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1 Appellants have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and on March 9, 2023, the

trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting its January 11, 2023,
opinion.

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      Appellants raise the following issues:

      A. Whether the trial court erred by granting [JR Beard’s m]otion
         for [s]ummary [j]udgment on the basis that the doctrine of res
         judicata applied in this matter[?]

      B. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that the Appellants
         had to preserve their claim and failed to do so by not filing an
         appeal of the [MDJ Action, which was] in [their] favor with no
         monetary award, not filing a counterclaim at the [MDJ Action]
         by reducing [the] damages to fall within the jurisdictional
         requirements of [MDJ Actions,] or filing a counterclaim [in the
         MDJ Action] that exceeded the [MDJ Action’s jurisdictional
         limitations] and challenging jurisdiction[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 4.

       Our standard of review from the grant of summary judgment is well-

settled:

      [We] may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is
      established that the court committed an error of law or abused its
      discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.

            In evaluating the trial court’s decision to enter summary
      judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the
      summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that
      where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
      party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment
      may be entered. … Lastly, we will view the record in the light
      most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the
      existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved
      against the moving party.

Thompson v. Ginkel, 95 A.3d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      Because Appellants’ issues are related, we address them together.

Appellants contend the trial court erroneously concluded their complaint was

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barred by res judicata. Appellants’ Brief at 8-15.2 Appellants also maintain

the trial court erred in concluding they had recourse available to them in the

MDJ Action. Id. at 14.       Appellants assert the MDJ did not have the authority

to hear their claims because the amount in controversy exceeded jurisdictional

limits. Id. at 16. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments.

       The following principles inform our review. The doctrine of res judicata

is intended “to foreclose repetitious litigation by barring parties from re-

litigating a matter that was previously litigated or could have been litigated.”

Wilmington Trust Nat’l Assoc. v. Unknown Heirs, 219 A.3d 1173, 1179

(Pa. Super. 2019). Four common elements must exist before the doctrine

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2 While the MDJ Action was filed against Carey Durand only, under the doctrine

of res judicata, “a final valid judgment upon the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction bars any future suit between the parties or their privies, on the
same cause of action.” A.C. Elfman & Sons, Inc. v. Clime, 513 A.2d 488
(Pa. Super. 1986) (citations omitted). Appellants do not deny they are in
privity. See Appellants’ Brief at 8-18. Rather, they appear to argue that res
judicata does not apply because there is not identity of parties. Appellants’
Brief at 11 (referencing “switching of the parties”). Appellants emphasize they
were defendants in the MDJ Action, and plaintiffs in the instant case. Id.
Appellants have waived this claim, as they failed to raise it in their response
to summary judgment and Rule 1925(b) statement. See Appellants’ Brief in
Opposition to Summary Judgment, 11/21/22, at 2-9 (unnumbered); Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 3/8/23, at 1-2 (unnumbered).
Issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Satiro v. Maninno,
237 A.3d 1145, 1150-51 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) is not satisfied
by simply filing any statement. Rather, the statement must … permit the trial
court to understand the specific issues being raised on appeal.); Harber
Philadelphia Ctr. City Office Ltd. v. LPCI Ltd. P’ship, 764 A.2d 1100, 1105
(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted) (A non-moving party’s “failure to raise
grounds for relief in the trial court as a basis upon which to deny summary
judgment waives those grounds on appeal.”); Pa.R.A.P. 302.

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applies. There must be (1) identity of issues; (2) identity of causes of action;

(3) identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality

or capacity of the parties suing or sued. Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix

Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 378 n.9 (Pa. 2006). The trial court

“may consider whether the factual allegations of both actions are the same,

whether the same evidence is necessary to prove each action and whether

both actions seek compensation for the same damages.”              Dempsey v.

Cessna Aircraft Co., 653 A.2d 679, 681 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (citation

omitted). In addition, the prior action must have resulted in a final judgment

on the merits. Id. at 680-81.

      Here, Appellants do not dispute the identity of issues and causes of

actions. Appellants’ Brief at 8-18. The crux of their argument is that the prior

MDJ Action did not result in final judgment on the merits because “Appellants

did not have the ability to file a [counterclaim] in the total amount of their

loss and damages, to preclude them from filing [the instant] suit.” Id. at 12.

Appellants assert they were not required “to lower their requested relief to

avail themselves of the jurisdiction of the [MDJ] or to appeal a judgment

rendered in their favor, just to obtain the right to file their claims before” the

Court of Common Pleas. Id. at 15. Appellants maintain that because their

damages exceeded $12,000.00, they were “statutorily precluded from

previously raising any of their claims” in the MDJ Action. Id. at 16.

      The trial court disagreed, explaining:

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     [Appellants] correctly state that MDJs have the jurisdiction and
     authority to hear civil claims where the amount in controversy
     does not exceed $12,000 pursuant to [] 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
     1515(3)(i)-(iii). However, in order to properly address the civil
     complaint that stems from the same action but does exceed
     $12,000, the issue must be preserved, or the final judgment
     appealed.4 As [] JR Beard states in his brief, a counterclaim or
     complaint by [Appellants] in excess of $12,000 would have
     allowed the MDJ the option to transfer the case to the Court of
     Common Pleas anyway, and [the trial court] agree[s].
     Procedurally and under § 1515, asserting a cross-complaint was
     the necessary action to preserve [their] claim.

           4 The fact that the MDJ found in favor of [Appellants]

           does not necessarily preclude [them] from filing an
           appeal, since no monetary award was made on behalf
           of either party.    And, as the pleadings show,
           [Appellants] knew about the additional costs during
           the MDJ Action.

            Specifically [regarding] Magisterial District Court actions,
     Pa.R.Civ.P.M.D.J. 315 states that “the defendant, by filling a
     complaint... may assert in the case any claim against the plaintiff
     that is within the jurisdiction of a magisterial district judge.”
     Section B then states that “the rules governing the form,
     processing, and service of a plaintiff’s complaint shall apply also
     to the defendant’s complaint.” (emphasis added). Thus, a
     defendant who files a cross-complaint stands in the shoes of a
     plaintiff [regarding] a cross-complaint. And, by filing a cross-
     complaint against then[-]plaintiff [JR] Beard during the MDJ
     proceeding, [Appellants] would have become the plaintiff in that
     new claim. This switch of party positions through a cross-
     complaint would have afforded [Appellants] the ability to then
     apply § 1515(3)(iii), which states: “A plaintiff may waive a portion
     of her claim of more than $12,000 so as to bring the matter within
     the monetary jurisdiction of a magisterial district judge. Such
     waiver shall be revoked automatically if the defendant appeals the
     final order of the magisterial district judge or when the judgment
     is set aside upon certiorari.” Or, as noted earlier, the MDJ could

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       have transferred the case to the Court of Common Pleas.[3] Thus,
       [Appellants] did not properly preserve their claim at the MDJ
       proceeding, precluding them now under the doctrine of res
       judicata from bringing the claim based on the same issues already
       litigated by a court of competent jurisdiction.

             Alternatively, [Appellants] could have preserved their claims
       against [JR] Beard by appealing the MDJ’s decision to the Court of
       Common Pleas. However, they did not[,] which allowed the
       judgment of the MDJ to become final.           This finality again
       implicates the doctrine of res judicata and bars [Appellants’]
       instant action.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/23, at 4-6 (footnote 4 and bold emphasis in original,

one footnote added, some capitalization and punctuation altered).

       The record and law support the trial court’s analysis. In A.C. Elfman,

this Court held, “where the doctrine of res judicata is otherwise applicable, its

invocation will not be precluded or impaired because the prior judgment was

entered in [an MDJ Action].”           A.C. Elfman, 513 A.2d at 490 (citations

omitted). “The essential inquiry is whether the ultimate and controlling issues

have been decided in a prior proceeding in which the parties had an

opportunity to appear and assert their rights.” In re Jones and Laughlin

Steel Corp., 477 A.2d 527, 531 (Pa. Super. 1984). A plaintiff cannot split

causes of action that formed the basis of their defense in the MDJ Action and

now assert them in the instant action. Kessler v. Old Guard Mut. Ins. Co.,

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that there was an approximately 45-day period    between
the time JR Beard filed the MDJ Action and the date it was heard. There was
nothing preventing Appellants from filing their action in the Court of Common
Pleas during this period.

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570 A.2d 569, 573 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“The law does not permit the owner of

a single or entire cause of action to divide or split that cause so as to make it

the subject of several actions.”).

       While this Court has not directly addressed Appellants’ argument that

they were precluded from bringing their claims before the MDJ because of

monetary limits, trial courts in Pennsylvania at both the state and federal level

have rejected this argument. 4 In Crosley v. Agway, Inc., 656 F.Supp. 662

(W.D. Pa. 1987), the federal district court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that

they did not have a full and fair opportunity to have their counterclaim heard

before the MDJ because the disputed damages exceeded the jurisdictional

limit. Crosley, 656 F.Supp. at 663-64. The federal district court found the

MDJ “necessarily” had to have rejected this defense “in order to find in favor

[of the defendant] for the full amount.”         Id. at 664.   It further concluded

plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims where they

“appear[ed] and their defense was heard by the [MDJ] and necessarily

rejected.” Id.

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4 “Decisions of the Court[s] of Common Pleas are not binding precedent,” but

“may be considered for their persuasive authority.” Darrow v. PPL Electric
Utilities Corp., 266 A.3d 1105, 1112 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
omitted). “While we recognize that federal court decisions are not binding on
this Court, we are able to adopt their analysis as it appeals to our reason.”
Kleban v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 771 A.2d 39, 43 (Pa.
Super. 2001) (citation omitted).

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       In Conyers v. Easley, 2019 WL 9094724 (C.P. Lehigh Cnty. Sep. 6,

2019), the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas rejected a claim that the

plaintiff “could not have brought her personal injury claim before the [MDJ]

because the damages she allegedly sustained exceeded the $12,000.00

damages cap.” Conyers, 2019 WL 9094724, at *3. The court concluded,

“While plaintiff has pled damages in excess of $12,000.00 in the within matter,

she was not precluded from seeking damages for personal injuries in the

action she pursued before the [MDJ].” Id. (emphasis in original). We find

the reasoning in Crosley and Conyers persuasive.

       Here, Appellants presented their defense that JR Beard did substandard

work in the MDJ Action, which the MDJ “necessarily” accepted by entering

judgment in Appellants’ favor. As the trial court explained, Appellants could

have claimed damages in the MDJ Action.5 Their’ actions indicate they were

dissatisfied with or unaware of their options.      Accordingly, we agree that

Appellants claims either were or could have been asserted in the MDJ Action.

See Rothwell v. Groff, 72 A.2d 72 (Pa. 1950) (where landlord obtained

eviction of tenant from a justice of the peace, and tenant failed to either seek

certiorari to the court of common pleas or appeal the eviction, tenant’s

____________________________________________

5 Appellants imply they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate in

the MDJ Action because they were pro se. Appellants’ Brief at 6. We have
long held that “a layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding
to a reasonable extent assumes the risk that his lack of legal training will place
him at a disadvantage.” Commonwealth v. Ray, 134 A.3d 1109, 1114-15
(Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted).

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subsequent action for damages against the landlord was barred).      For the

above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor

of JR Beard.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/29/2023

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