Court Opinion

ID: 9739891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:22:57.361365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.421952
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 53. (dissenting). The majority opinion attempts to fit this case within the public policy considerations for denying liability for negligent conduct, which are the grounds used to explain the firefighter rule in Wisconsin.1 The public policy applied in the firefighter *160case was that imposing liability would place "too great a burden on homeowners, and other occupiers of real estate. . .[and] would permit the law of negligence to enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point" (citation omitted). Hass v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 48 Wis. 2d 321, 327, 179 N.W.2d 885 (1970).
¶ 54. The majority opinion simply concludes, without explanation or justification, that permitting the EMT in this case to recover damages places an unreasonable burden on drivers who negligently cause collisions; that the EMT's injury is simply too remote from the initial acts of negligence that caused the collision; and that permitting the action to proceed would enter a field with no sensible or just stopping point. Majority op. at ¶ 47. I am not persuaded. Negligence law imposes liability on negligent drivers for greater burdens and more remote injuries than would be imposed for injury to the EMT. The usual rules applicable to negligence actions suffice to address the majority's concerns.
¶ 55. The majority opinion applies the public policy doctrine underlying the firefighter rule to firefighters and EMTs because "[mjembers of both professions have special training and experience that prepare them to provide assistance under dangerous emergency conditions." Majority op. at ¶ 43. The rule the majority opinion adopts seems to apply to a host of paid employees and volunteers, both in public and private service. Are doctors or nurses who work in emergency rooms or in ambulances barred from recov*161ery for injuries caused by the negligence of a tortfeasor? Are teachers who assist children under dangerous emergency conditions barred from recovery for injuries caused by a negligent pupil? Are private-sector safety supervisors trained in emergency responses to toxic spills or petroleum fire-fighting barred from recovery for injuries caused by a negligent tortfeasor?2
¶ 56. The number of factual scenarios to which the majority's reasoning can be applied is troubling. The holding in this case is contrary to the general rule that cases in which a causally negligent tortfeasor is relieved of liability are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations.3 I do not think that the law of negligence or that public policy considerations favor holding that a tortfeasor has complete immunity from liability based on the plaintiffs occupation.
¶ 57. For the reasons stated, I dissent.
¶ 58. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent.

 The firefighter rule in other states developed from the doctrine of assumption of risk and the law of premises liability. *160Some states have relied on different public policy considerations than those relied on in Wisconsin cases. See Joseph B. Conder, Annotation, Application of "Fireman Rule" to Bar Recovery by Emergency Medical Personnel Injured in Responding to, or at Scene of, Emergency, 89 A.L.R.4th 1079, § 2(a) (1991).

 See Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 882 P.2d 347, 350 (Cal. 1994) (distinguishing firefighters and police officers and holding that the firefighter rule did not apply to private safety employees).

 See Schlomer v. Perina, 169 Wis. 2d 247, 253, 485 N.W.2d 399 (1992); Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978).