Court Opinion

ID: 9383973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 15:04:42.656057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.233386
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220264-U

                                                                                 FIRST DISTRICT,
                                                                                 FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                 March 31, 2023

                                               No. 1-22-0264

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

      PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,           )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
            Plaintiff-Appellant,                )     Cook County
                                                )
      v.                                        )     No. 2016 CH 08564
                                                )
      BARBARA J. TURNER, ET AL.,                )     Honorable
                                                )     Joel Chupack,
            Defendant-Appellee,                 )     Judge Presiding.
     _________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Lavin and Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: We affirm the circuit court’s orders denying defendant’s motion to quash service
                  of process and approving the sale of the foreclosed-upon property where service
                  was proper, the summons was adequate, and the court had personal jurisdiction over
                  defendant.

¶2          For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3                                          BACKGROUND

¶4          On June 27, 2016, plaintiff PNC Bank, National Association (“PNC”) filed a residential

     mortgage foreclosure complaint against defendant Barbara J. Turner (“Turner”), in connection

     with a loan secured by real property located at 11265 South Laflin Street in Chicago, Illinois (“the

     property”). A special process server was appointed, and substitute service was effected on June
     No. 1-22-0264

     29, 2016. The affidavit of the special process server filed on July 8, 2016, reflects that Turner’s

     daughter, “Eyvette Dayton,” accepted service at the property.

¶5          PNC filed a Motion for Default based on Turner’s failure “to appear, answer, or otherwise

     plead” despite being “served via substitute service with the complaint and summons on June 29,

     2016.” The circuit court granted an Order of Default and Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale on

     May 15, 2017. On October 21, 2019, the property was sold at a judicial sale and PNC moved for

     an order approving the sale.

¶6          On November 13, 2019, Turner filed a Motion to Quash Service of Process pursuant to 735

     ILCS 5/2-301, alleging that service was defective. Turner claimed that no one named “Eyvette

     Dayton” resided at the property and could not have accepted substitute service. Turner also argued

     that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her because the caption did not designate her as a

     “Defendant,” in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 101(a). Affidavits from Turner, her

     daughter, April Drayton, and her son, Darryl Drayton, were attached to her motion, attesting that

     no one named “ ‘Eyvette Dayton’ resides or has resided at the property.”

¶7          PNC responded that Turner did not refute that her daughter had been served at the property,

     or “argue or provide facts establishing that an individual by the name of Eyvette Dayton is not a

     family member or does not exist.” (See Central Mortgage Co. v. Kamarauli, 2012 IL App (1st)

     112353, ¶ 21 (Section 2-203(a) of the Code does not require that the family member served is a

     resident of the property.)). PNC also argued that the omission of the word “Defendant” in the

     summons caption was a “technical error” that did not affect the court’s jurisdiction under 735 ILCS

     5/2-201.

¶8          The circuit court continued the motion for an evidentiary hearing. At the September 11,

     2020, hearing, April Drayton testified that she was Turner’s daughter and had lived at the property

     since 2006. April acknowledged that she had a sister named “Yvette Drayton” who lived at 65th

                                                    -2-
       No. 1-22-0264

       and Western in Chicago. She also admitted that Yvette had visited Turner at the property in the

       past, but denied she was present on June 29, 2016. Turner also testified that Yvette was not at the

       property on June 29th. The process server was not called to testify at the hearing.

¶9            In a written order entered on September 15, 2020, the circuit court denied Turner’s Motion

       to Quash service. The court found that the process server’s affidavit “strictly complied with the

       requirements for abode service under § 2-203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure,” and that Turner

       had not met her burden of presenting contradictory evidence. The court indicated that “Turner

       neither submitted an affidavit from Yvette Drayton nor called her as a witness,” and that none of

       the affidavits mentioned “Yvette Drayton,” or denied that Yvette was served. The court recognized

       that “it is not necessary under § 2-203(a) of the Code that the member of the family served reside

       at the abode address.” The court found that Turner and April’s testimony that Yvette was not

       visiting her mother “four years earlier” was “self-serving and basically uncorroborated.”

¶ 10          On October 27, 2021, PNC moved for an order approving the sale of the property. Turner

       argued, inter alia, that “justice has not otherwise been done where the service on [her] should have

       been quashed and the judgment against [her] should have been vacated.”

¶ 11          On January 26, 2022, the circuit court approved the sale of the property.

¶ 12                                             ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Turner claims that the circuit court erred in denying her Motion to Quash Service and

       approving the sale of the property. She further asserts that “justice was not otherwise done” by the

       entry of these orders.

¶ 14                                          Service of Process

¶ 15          In reviewing a decision on a motion to quash service of process, we must determine

       whether the circuit court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Brewer, 2012 IL App (1st) 111213, ¶ 17. If service is not

                                                      -3-
       No. 1-22-0264

       proper and the defendant did not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction, the court lacked

       personal jurisdiction over the defendant and any judgment entered against that party is void.

       BankUnited v. Velcich, 2015 IL App (1st) 132070, ¶ 27. We review de novo the issue of whether

       the trial court obtained personal jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 26 (citing BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP v.

       Mitchell, 2014 IL 116311, ¶ 17)).

¶ 16           “Every defendant in an action filed against him in this State is entitled to receive the best

       possible notice of the pending suit and it is only where personal service of summons cannot be

       had, that substituted or constructive service may be permitted.” Bell Federal Savings and Loan

       Ass’n v. Horton, 59 Ill. App. 3d 923, 927 (1978). Section 2-203(a) of the Code allows substitute

       service to be made upon a defendant by “leaving a copy at the defendant’s usual place of abode,

       with some person of the family or a person residing there, of the age of 13 years or upwards.” 735

       ILCS 5/2-203(a) (West 2015). The affidavit of service of the person making substitute service

       “must show strict compliance with every requirement of the statute.” State Bank of Lake Zurich v.

       Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 309 (1986). The presumption of validity that attaches to a return or affidavit

       reciting personal service does not apply to a return reciting substitute service. Id. Unless the return

       of the person making substituted service shows “strict compliance with every requirement of the

       statute,” the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 309.

¶ 17           The process server’s affidavit constitutes “prima facie evidence of service that cannot be

       set aside based upon an uncorroborated affidavit from the person served.” Central Mortgage Co.,

       2012 IL App (1st) 112353, ¶ 28 (citing Nibco, Inc. v. Johnson, 98 Ill. 2d 166, 172 (1983)). It can

       only be set aside by “clear and satisfactory evidence.” Id. However, this rule applies only to

       “matters that are within the knowledge of the process server, such as *** who accepted the

       service.” Id.

                                                        -4-
       No. 1-22-0264

¶ 18          In this case, the process server’s affidavit indicated that substitute service was made by

       leaving a summons and complaint with Turner’s daughter, “Eyvette Dayton,” at the property on

       June 29, 2016. The affidavit described “Eyvette Dayton,” as a 41 to 45 year old black female with

       black hair, approximately 5 foot 4 inches to 5 foot 7 inches tall and weighing approximately 131-

       150 pounds. Since these matters were within the knowledge of the process server, his affidavit of

       service could only be set aside by “clear and satisfactory evidence.” Id.

¶ 19          The affidavits of Turner, April Drayton, and Darryl Drayton, averred that “No person by

       the name ‘Eyvette Dayton’ resides or has resided at the property.” The affidavits did not expressly

       deny that Yvette Drayton was served. Moreover, Turner and April both testified that Turner’s

       daughter, “Yvette Drayton,” lived in Chicago and sometimes visits her mother, but was not at the

       property on June 29, 2016. Yvette was not called to testify at the hearing.

¶ 20          The circuit court held that the process server’s affidavit “strictly complied with the

       requirements" for abode service under section 2-203(a) of the Code, deeming the difference

       between “ ‘Eyvette Dayton’ and ‘Yvette Drayton,’ as the identity of the person served,

       inconsequential.” See Secura Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 217 (2009)

       (A “slight defect” such as “a typographical error, misspelling, or other inadvertent mistake” will

       not deprive the court of jurisdiction).

¶ 21          Turner argues the circuit court arbitrarily drew “a negative inference” from Yvette’s

       “absence and silence,” but not from the process server’s failure to testify. Turner failed to explain

       why Yvette did not submit an affidavit or testify at the hearing. In contrast, the special process

       server’s affidavit constituted prima facie evidence of service that cannot be set aside based on an

       uncorroborated affidavit from the person served. See Nibco, Inc., 98 Ill. 2d at 172. “[T]he weight

       to be given to the assertions in the affidavit and to the testimony of the process servicer,” are

       “peculiarly within the province of the trial court.” Abbington Trace Condominium Ass’n v.

                                                       -5-
       No. 1-22-0264

       McKeller, 2016 IL App (2d) 150913, ¶ 14. The circuit court’s determination that Turner and

       April’s uncorroborated testimony was not credible was not contrary to the manifest weight of the

       evidence.

¶ 22                                         Adequacy of Summons

¶ 23             Turner also argues that the mortgage foreclosure summons did not comply with the

       requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 101(a) by identifying “who the parties are” with the

       labels “Plaintiff” and “Defendant.” As this issue is purely legal in nature, our review is de novo.

       Studentowicz v. Queen’s Park Oval Asset Holding Trust, 2019 IL App (1st) 181182, ¶ 12.

¶ 24             “To determine whether the alleged technical defects in the summons were so severe as to

       preclude the court from obtaining personal jurisdiction over defendant, we must place substance

       over form and ask whether the summons adequately notified defendant that an action had been

       commenced against him.” BankUnited, National Ass’n v. Giusti, 2020 IL App (2d) 190522, ¶ 30.

       In deciding the sufficiency of the summons to accomplish that aim, we “construe a summons

       liberally.” Owen Loan Servicing, LLC v. DeGomez, 2020 IL App (2d) 190774, ¶ 20 (citing In re

       Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector, 307 Ill. App. 3d 350, 355

       (1999)).

¶ 25             Turner does not explain how the alleged defect frustrated her ability to understand that

       PNC had instituted foreclosure proceedings against her. Construed liberally, we find that the

       technical defect in the summons did not deprive the circuit court of personal jurisdiction over

       Turner.

¶ 26                                            Approval of Sale

¶ 27             Finally, Turner argues that the circuit court erred in approving sale of the property. “A

       circuit court’s decision to confirm the judicial sale of property is reviewed for an abuse of

       discretion.” US Bank, National Ass’n v. Avdic, 2014 IL App (1st) 121759, ¶ 18 (citing Household

                                                       -6-
       No. 1-22-0264

       Bank, FSB v. Lewis, 229 Ill. 2d 173, 178 (2008)). Unless it finds that a required notice was not

       given, the terms of the sale were unconscionable, the sale was conducted fraudulently, or “justice

       was otherwise not done,” a circuit court is required to confirm the sale. 735 ILCS 5/15-1508(b)

       (West 2020). It is the burden of the party opposing the sale to prove that any of the exceptions

       apply. T2 Expressway, LLC v. Tollway, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 192616, ¶ 26.

¶ 28          Turner argues that “justice could not have been done” as the court did not have personal

       jurisdiction over her when she “was divested of her rights to and interest in the property.” We

       disagree. We find that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Turner in this case and did

       not abuse its discretion by confirming the judicial sale of the property.

¶ 29                                         CONCLUSION

¶ 30          For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 31          Affirmed.

                                                       -7-