Court Opinion

ID: 9560959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:11.809546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:23.406701
License: Public Domain

McNamee, J.
(concurring) :
I concur in the result, but the reasons for my conclusion follow.
The doctrine of assumption of risk although usually limited to controversies between master and servant may also apply to preclude recovery in negligence cases. This doctrine has been held applicable to the situation under the so-called darkness rule which provides that where a person goes forward into an unfamiliar dark place, he does so at his own risk. Wentink v. Traphagen, 138 Neb. 41, 291 N.W. 884; Bianchi v. South Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J. Law 325, 8 A.2d 567, 124 A.L.R. 808.
The darkness rule, however, is more often considered in connection with the doctrine of contributory negligence. See 65 C.J.S., sec. 121, p. 731. Whether a given state of facts constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law or whether it should go to the jury depends entirely on the existing circumstances in each particular case. Here the negligence of the respondents is conceded, and it is not necessary to consider further the doctrine of assumption of risk.
The authorities seem to recognize the following broad general rules:
1. To proceed in the dark in a strange or unfamiliar place is negligence as a matter of law;
2. To proceed in the dark in a familiar place is not negligence as a matter of law;
3. To proceed in the dark in a familiar place but *297which has been subjected to unknown changed conditions is not negligence as a matter of law;
4. To proceed in the dark in a familiar place which has been subjected to known changed conditions is negligence as a matter of law;
5. (As a necessary corollary resulting from 3 and 4:) To proceed in the dark in a familiar place which has been subjected to changed conditions and it is questionable under the evidence whether the changed conditions were known or should have been known or were not known is a factual question for the jury and is not negligence as a matter of law. See 65 C.J.S. Negligence, sec. 254, p. 1154 and cases in Notes 18 and 19.
From the evidence in the record on appeal reasonable men could differ whether the changed conditions were known or should have been known to appellant, and consequently it was error to take this issue from the jury.