Court Opinion

ID: 9720671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:38:45.897712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:20.481833
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanaugh, J.
We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.1
Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively.
The statute uses the phrase “The transaction of any business within the state.” (Emphasis added.) When we keep in mind that we are dealing not with general jurisdiction which is provided for in another part of the statute (MCLA § 600.701 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.701]) which would expose a nonresident to suit in Michigan for any cause wherever it arose, *199but rather with limited jurisdiction which exposes a nonresident to suit in Michigan only for a cause which arose out of the relationship serving as a basis for such jurisdiction we see no Federal Constitutional question.
The courts of those states having “long-arm” statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on “the transaction of any business within the state,” have generally construed their statutes as extending the state’s jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.
Colorado: Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court of Denver (1968), 167 Colo 456 (448 P2d 783); Illinois: Koplin v. Thomas (1966), 73 Ill App 2d 242 (219 NE2d 646); Ziegler v. Hodges (1967), 80 Ill App 2d 210 (224 NE2d 12); Tennessee: The Hamilton National Bank of Chattanooga v. Russell (ED Tenn, 1966), 261 F Supp 145.
The phrase “transaction of any business” is construed as broader than “doing business”. New York: Simonson v. International Bank (1964), 14 NY2d 281 (251 NYS2d 433, 200 NE2d 427); Illinois: Lurie v. Rupe (1964), 51 Ill App 2d 164 (201 NE2d 158), cert den 380 US 964 (85 S Ct 1108, 14 L Ed 2d 154); Haas v. Fancher Furniture Company (ND Ill, 1957), 156 F Supp 564.
It can scarcely be doubted that the negotiations in Michigan resulting in defendant’s retainer come within the concept of the transaction of “any”2 business.
Neither does any valid basis for distinction for *200this consideration appear from the fact that the retainer involved a professional relationship.
In my view the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the case and applied the sounder rule.
I vote to affirm.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, Adams, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, J.

 See Commentaries by Professor Carl S. Hawkins and authorities cited therein to chapter 7 BJA, MCLA p 329 and to MCLA § 600.705, p 343.

 The word “any” means just what it says. It ineludes “each” and “every”. See Harrington v. Inter-State Business Men’s Accident Ass’n (1920), 210 Mich 327; Gibson v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co. of America (1937), 282 Mich 282. It comprehends “the slightest”.