Court Opinion

ID: 9841380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 06:05:25.221306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:03.092799
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   September 21, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 361350
                                                                   Wayne Circuit Court
FRANK ROMERO, JR.,                                                 LC No. 19-001986-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and BOONSTRA and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, MCL
750.529, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. Imposing a downward departure from the minimum sentence guidelines range of 51 to
85 months’ (4 years and 3 months to 7 years and 1 month) imprisonment, the trial court sentenced
defendant to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of 3½ to 10 years for the armed robbery
convictions, consecutive to concurrent 2-year terms for the felony-firearm convictions. This Court
affirmed defendant’s convictions, but remanded for resentencing due to improper scoring of
Offense Variable (OV) 1 and to award the proper jail credit.1 On remand, the successor judge
imposed identical sentences. We affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

        On October 2, 2018, defendant and another man approached two elderly women, a mother
and daughter, as they exited their vehicle just outside a church in Detroit. Defendant demanded
the victims’ purses. The victims complied before running away and contacting law enforcement.
One of the victims identified defendant from a photographic show-up, while the second man was
never identified. The victims testified that defendant had a handgun, although neither indicated

1
 People v Romero, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 17,
2022 (Docket No. 350395).

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that he pointed the gun at or toward them. Defendant was 20 years old at the time of the crime.
He had no prior juvenile or adult record.

        Defendant was first sentenced on July 22, 2019. Defendant was assessed 15 points for
Offense Variable (OV) 1, which is scored when “[a] firearm was pointed at or toward a victim or
the victim had a reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery when threatened with a knife or
other cutting or stabbing weapon.” MCL 777.31(1)(c). The guidelines range for defendant’s
minimum sentence was calculated as 51 to 85 months. The court imposed a downward departure,
and sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of 3½ to 10 years for the
armed robbery convictions, consecutive to concurrent 2-year terms for the felony-firearm
convictions.

       Defendant appealed his convictions and his sentences. This Court affirmed his convictions
and assessments of costs, and denied his request for a Ginther2 hearing. People v Romero,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 17, 2022 (Docket No.
350395), pp 2-8. However, this Court held that OV 1 should have been assessed at 0 points
because there was no evidence “that defendant pointed the gun at or toward [the victims] or that
defendant possessed ‘a knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon.’ ” Id. at 6. This Court also
ordered that defendant’s jail credit be adjusted to reflect all of the days to which he was entitled
This change reduced defendant’s guidelines range to 42 to 70 months. Id. Accordingly, this Court
remanded the case for resentencing.

        At the April 26, 2022 resentencing before a successor judge, defense counsel requested a
downward departure. Defense counsel pointed out that this was defendant’s “first interaction with
the criminal justice system.” Defense counsel further characterized defendant as “extremely young
today,” and argued that his youthfulness influenced his decision making. Defense counsel asserted
that defendant had “done well” in prison so far, including performing “very well” in a general-
education diploma program in which he was enrolled. The prosecution, on the other hand,
requested the same sentences as the ones imposed by the predecessor judge. The prosecution
argued that defendant had received 11 misconducts in his three years’ incarceration, which
reflected that he was likely experiencing a difficult time adjusting to prison. Defense counsel
conceded that defendant had accumulated a “substantial number” of misconducts in prison, but
stated that they were all “low level” and had occurred “at the beginning of his sentence.”

       Ultimately, the successor judge sentenced defendant to the identical sentences as the
predecessor judge, explaining, “Well this Court’s going to adopt the sentence that [the predecessor
judge] gave. I mean, [the predecessor judge] had an opportunity to hear the testimony, as well as
the proofs.” Defendant now appeals.

2
  People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing
to develop a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

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                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Defendant argues that his sentences are not reasonable or proportionate in light of the facts
and circumstances of the case, and also that the resentencing judge abdicated its sentencing
discretion by simply deferring to the predecessor judge’s sentences. We disagree.

                                    A. PROPORTIONALITY

       Defendant concedes that his 3½ -year minimum sentences are within the guidelines range,3
but argues that his sentences were disproportionate in light of his youth and lack of a prior record.
We disagree.

        “This Court reviews the proportionality of a trial court’s sentence for an abuse of
discretion.” People v Lydic, 335 Mich App 486, 500; 967 NW2d 847 (2021). A trial court abuses
its discretion when it chooses an outcome that falls outside of the principled range of outcomes.
People v Babcock 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NAW2d 231 (2003).

        Although Michigan’s sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, they “remain a highly
relevant consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.” People v Lockridge,
498 Mich 358, 391; 870 NW2d 502 (2015); see also People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 474-
475; 902 NW2d 327 (2017). “Sentencing courts must . . . continue to consult the applicable
guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.” Lockridge, 498 Mich at 392;
see also Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 475. “[T]he key test is whether the sentence is proportionate to
the seriousness of the matter, not whether it departs from or adheres to the guidelines’
recommended range.” People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 661; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). A within-
guidelines sentence is presumptively proportionate. People v Posey, __ Mich __, __; __ NW2d
__ (2023) (Docket No. 162373); slip op at 36.

         Defendant argues that we should hold MCL 769.34(10), under which we must generally
affirm a within-guidelines sentence, unconstitutional. Since defendant filed his brief on appeal,
our Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of MCL 769.34(10) in Posey, and a majority of
the Court agreed that the first sentence of MCL 769.34(10) is unconstitutional. Id. at __ (BOLDEN,
J.); slip op at 29-30; Id. at __ (CAVANAGH, J., concurring); slip op at 1; Id. at __ (WELCH, J.,
concurring); slip op at 2-3. The Posey majority struck “the portion of MCL 769.34(10) that
requires appellate courts to affirm within-guidelines sentences . . . .” Id. at __ (BOLDEN, J.); slip
op at 33-34; Id. at __ (WELCH, J., concurring); slip op at 2-3. On appeal, there is a rebuttable
presumption that within-guidelines sentences are reasonable and proportionate, provided they are
not otherwise constitutionally defective, and “the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that
their within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate . . . .”. Id. at __ (BOLDEN, J.);
slip op at 36.

        Defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionate because it failed “to account for
his rehabilitative potential and other mitigating factors.” Defendant emphasizes that he was 20

3
 Defendant does not allege any error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or that his sentences
were based on inaccurate information.

                                                 -3-
years old at the time of the robbery as the primary factor weighing in favor of a lighter sentence.
We acknowledge that both federal and Michigan caselaw have stressed the importance of youth as
a mitigating factor. See People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 77; 528 NW2d 176 (1995); Roper v
Simmons, 543 US 551, 574; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 L Ed 2d 1 (2005); People v Parks, 510 Mich 225,
246; 987 NW2d 161 (2022). But this caselaw tends to address the most serious punishments, such
as a life sentence without the possibility of parole, as applied to defendants who are 18 years old
or younger. See Roper, 543 US at 574; Parks, 510 Mich at 265. Defendant was not a juvenile at
the time of the offense, nor was he sentenced for first-degree murder. Although defendant’s age
is a proper mitigating factor, neither Fields, nor any other authority defendant cites, indicates that
factor alone renders a 3½-year minimum for armed robbery an abuse of discretion. Defendant also
argues that he does not have a prior criminal or juvenile record. But this factor was properly
reflected in the scoring of the guidelines. See MCL 777.57(1)(b). Defendant further maintains
that his improved behavior and educational progress in prison are mitigating sentencing factors.
Although we applaud defendant’s progress in those regards, we disagree that it indicates that the
interests of justice would be better served by a shorter period of incarceration.

        We conclude that defendant’s 3½-year minimum sentences for robbing two elderly victims
while displaying a firearm were not a disproportionately harsh. The armed-robbery sentences
aligned with the low end of the corrected guidelines range. Considering that there were both
mitigating and aggravating factors involved in this crime, defendant’s sentence at the bottom of
the guidelines range was not disproportionately harsh and thus not an abuse of discretion.

                              B. ABDICATION OF DISCRETION

       Next, defendant argues that the resentencing court abdicated its discretion and merely
readopted the first sentence he had received. We disagree.

        There are no special steps that a defendant must take to preserve a challenge to whether a
sentence was proportional. People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 350; 901 NW2d 142 (2017).
However, to the extent that defendant’s challenge to the resentencing court’s reasons constitutes a
challenge to the accuracy of the information relied upon, defendant was required to raise it at
sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion for remand filed in this Court. People v
Clark, 315 Mich App 219; 888 NW2d 309 (2016). Defendant did not raise this issue at sentencing.
And, although he raised the issue in a motion to remand for resentencing, that motion did not
satisfy MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)’s requirement that it “show (i) that the issue is one that is of record
and that must be initially decided by the trial court; or (ii) that development of a factual record is
required for appellate consideration of the issue.” Instead, the motion merely stated in conclusory
fashion that it satisfied this requirement without explaining why further factual development was
actually required or why the trial court needed to be the first decider. Accordingly, this issue is
unpreserved.

        Unpreserved appellate claims are reviewed for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three
requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious,
3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. at 763. When plain error has occurred, “[t]he
reviewing court should reverse only when the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 774.

                                                 -4-
        In our view, defendant’s characterization of the resentencing court’s actions as an
abdication is overstatement. The court held a full resentencing hearing, where both the prosecution
and defense were given ample opportunity to present arguments. The court’s reference to the prior
sentencing court’s sentence was not improper. Although that reference was an indication that the
earlier sentence factored into the court’s consideration, the court never stated that it was the only
such factor.

        A “trial court is responsible for tailoring a sentence to an individual defendant and for
giving reasons for imposing each sentence in order to facilitate appellate review.” People v Boykin,
510 Mich 171, 192; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). But our caselaw does not require “trial courts to fulfill
these responsibilities by articulating specific factors on the record. Instead, our sentences must
follow the principle of proportionality[.]” Id.

       Here, the resentencing court explained that it was adopting the predecessor judge’s
sentence because the predecessor judge “had an opportunity to hear the testimony, as well as the
proofs.” The resentencing court then sentenced defendant at the very bottom of the guidelines
range. We conclude that the reasoning articulated by the resentencing court was sufficient for our
proportionality review.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                              /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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