Court Opinion

ID: 9443684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:27:28.47867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:34.277209
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This seems to me a typical jury case. The jury could have found that deceased went north on the east side of the intersection on a green light, which he could think had its ordinary meaning; that defendant, going south on the west lane, turned sharply left on the wrong side of the center of the intersection; and that he was driving his truck with such speed and power that his brakes dragged for ten feet after their application and he then struck deceased with sufficient force to throw the body another ten feet. The jury might also discredit the testimony of the eyewitness on the ground that she remembered too much too precisely and from a poor vantage point. All that is found wanting is lack of evidence of due care in observation on the part of the deceased, But, taking the facts as I suggest the jury could have found them, it seems to me clear that the jury might well conclude the defendant’s operation was such that decedent, starting from the curb when he was entitled to, was nevertheless likely to be hit in any event. Even if decedent had looked to his left for traffic coming east toward him, he might not have seen defendant’s truck approaching improperly from the intersection, or at any rate not in time to prevent the accident. The timing of events in a motor vehicle accident is so interwoven that I think we should greatly hesitate to conclude that one event must as a matter of law have happened so far before another *358that legal negligence is inevitably established. Here wé are holding that deceased had time after seeing the truck out of position and coming too fast to draw back and avoid the danger. How can we say that?
The matter is all the more serious, since deceased was killed in this accident and cannot himself testify. We do not want to put a premium oh killing the victim. A similar case arose in Connecticut, Kotler v. Lalley, 112 Conn. 86, 151 A. 433, leading to a notable dissent by Wheeler, C. J., and a change by statute, as discussed by us in Balchunas v. Palmer, 2 Cir., 151 F.2d 842. But we do not want to promote reform that way. I should think at the very least there should only be a direction for a new trial; and since I finally conclude that the charge was probably justified under Vermont precedents, I should affirm.