Court Opinion

ID: 9889706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:07.341331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:19.992151
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: October 11, 2023

                        S23A0702. THE STATE v. COOK.
                      S23A0703. THE STATE v. ROACHE.
                     S23A0704. THE STATE v. DELA CRUZ.
                      S23A0705. THE STATE v. JACKSON.
                     S23A0706. THE STATE v. STROWDER.
                     S23A0707. THE STATE v. WHITAKER.

        BETHEL, Justice.

        Antonio May died from injuries he sustained inside the Fulton

County Jail while in the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff. The

defendants, Aaron Cook, Jason Roache, Guito Dela Cruz, Omar

Jackson, Kenesia Strowder, and William Whitaker, were employed

as jailers by the Fulton County Sheriff and were on duty at the

Fulton County Jail when May died. The State alleges through

indictments of the defendants for felony murder and other crimes

that the defendants beat, pepper sprayed, and repeatedly shocked

May with an electronic taser, thereby causing his death. Claiming
entitlement to the pre-indictment protections afforded to “peace

officers” under OCGA § 17-7-52, the defendants sought to quash

their indictments on the basis that they did not receive pre-

indictment notice and an opportunity to be heard.

     The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter and

thereafter entered an order quashing the indictments. The trial

court’s analysis turned on whether the defendants were “peace

officers,” as that term is used in OCGA § 17-7-52. After considering

definitions of “peace officer” found elsewhere in our Code, the trial

court determined that OCGA § 16-1-3 (11), which defines “peace

officer” as “any person who by virtue of his office or public

employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order

or to make arrests for offenses,” was “most applicable.” Applying

that definition, the trial court found that, while none of the

defendants   were   empowered     to   make    arrests,   they   were

nevertheless charged with maintaining the public peace. To that

end, the trial court reasoned that “within the community of over

3,000 inmates in the Fulton County Jail (which is accessible to the

                                 2
public in various controlled ways), detention officers are the

maintainers of public order” in the event that “there is a fight in the

mess hall over bad beans or a brawl in the common space over which

channel the TV should be on[.]” (Emphasis in original.) Following its

finding that the defendants were charged with the control and

supervision of inmates at the jail, the trial court determined that the

defendants were “vested with a duty to maintain public order, i.e.,

keep the peace,” and, as such, were peace officers entitled to the

protections of OCGA § 17-7-52. On that basis, the trial court

quashed the indictments. The State appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a)

(1) (allowing the State to appeal in criminal cases from, among other

things, “an order, decision, or judgment setting aside or dismissing

any indictment”).

     This appeal presents two issues for our consideration. We must

determine, first, whether the trial court properly defined “peace

officer” for purposes of OCGA § 17-7-52 and, second, whether the

trial court erred by finding that the defendants here fall within that

definition. As to the first issue, we reach the same general definition

                                  3
of “peace officer” as the trial court — that is, a “peace officer” is an

officer vested by law with a duty to maintain the public peace — but

for different reasons and without importing the statutory definition

found in OCGA § 16-1-3 (11). As to the second issue, we conclude

that the trial court erred by finding that the defendants’ duty to

control and supervise inmates within the jail constitutes a duty to

maintain the public peace. Accordingly, we reverse.

     1. We first address what is meant by “peace officer” in OCGA §

17-7-52. And because we must consider the statute’s proper

construction, our review is de novo. See Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga.

692, 693 (749 SE2d 726) (2013).

     To begin, we recall the well-settled principles that guide our

inquiry. As in all cases of statutory construction, we remain mindful

that “we must give the text its plain and ordinary meaning, view it

in the context in which it appears, and read it in its most natural

and reasonable way.” State v. Coleman, 306 Ga. 529, 530 (832 SE2d

389) (2019). Of course, while “[t]he common and customary usages

of the words are important, . . . so is their context.” (Citation and

                                   4
punctuation omitted.) Langley v. State, 313 Ga. 141, 143 (2) (868

SE2d 759) (2022). See also May v. State, 295 Ga. 388, 391 (761 SE2d

38) (2014) (“In our search for the meaning of a particular statutory

provision, we look not only to the words of that provision, but we

consider its legal context as well.”). “For context, we may look to

other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the

whole statute, and the other law — constitutional, statutory, and

common law alike — that forms the legal background of the

statutory provision in question.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Langley, 313 Ga. at 143 (2). “Thus, we construe statutes in

connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a

general and uniform system of jurisprudence.” (Citation and

punctuation omitted.) Id. Guided by these principles, we turn to the

statutory text at issue.

     OCGA § 17-7-52 (a) provides:

     Before a bill of indictment or special presentment against
     a present or former peace officer charging the officer with
     a crime which is alleged to have occurred while he or she
     was in the performance of his or her duties is presented
     to a grand jury, the officer shall be given a copy of the

                                  5
      proposed bill of indictment or special presentment and
      notified in writing of the contemplated action by the
      prosecuting attorney.

OCGA § 17-7-52 does not define “peace officer,” and it is not

otherwise defined within Title 17. The term is, however, defined

elsewhere in our Code. The parties’ arguments on appeal, as well as

the trial court’s ruling, focus on determining which of these

statutory definitions of “peace officer” may be applicable to OCGA §

17-7-52. Specifically, the State contends that we should apply the

definition of “peace officer” in OCGA § 35-8-2 (8),1 while the

defendants maintain that the trial court properly applied the

definition in OCGA § 16-1-3 (11).2 But the statutory text contradicts

the parties’ arguments and precludes the mechanical importation of

      1 OCGA § 35-8-2 (8), which is part of the Georgia Peace Officer Standards

and Trainings Act, identifies five categories of “peace officer” and sets out a
separate definition for each category by reference to the person’s employer,
duties, and powers. As the State notes, several definitions require a person to
have “the power of arrest” in order to be deemed a “peace officer” under that
statute. But the State does not identify which of the five definitions should be
applied in the context of OCGA § 17-7-52; instead, it simply asserts that the
defendants do not meet any of those definitions.
      2 OCGA § 16-1-3 (11) says, “[A]ny person who by virtue of his office or

public employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to
make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited
to specific offenses.”
                                       6
these independent definitions into OCGA § 17-7-52. Indeed, the

definitions in both OCGA §§ 16-1-3 and 35-8-2 are limited in

application by their express language,3 and OCGA § 17-7-52 does not

incorporate by reference any independent statutory definition of

“peace officer.”4 This is not to say that these statutory definitions are

without significance; they can — and do — provide important

context to our ordinary-meaning analysis. See Seals v. State, 311 Ga.

739, 740 (1) (860 SE2d 419) (2021) (“The primary determinant of a

text’s meaning is its context, which includes the structure and

history of the text and the broader context in which that text was

enacted, including statutory and decisional law that forms the

background of the written text.” (punctuation omitted)). They simply

do not play the outsized role the parties ascribe to them. Instead, in

      3 OCGA § 16-1-3 applies only within Title 16, while the application of

OCGA § 35-8-2 is limited to Chapter 8 of Title 35.
       4 In other sections of our Code, including elsewhere in Title 17, where

the statute at issue is found, the General Assembly has incorporated by
reference the statutory definitions proposed by the parties. See, e.g., OCGA §§
17-4-20 (b) (incorporating OCGA § 35-8-2 (8)); 42-8-60 (j) (9) (B) (i)
(incorporating OCGA § 35-8-2 (8)); 35-2-36 (c) (incorporating OCGA § 16-1-3
(11)); 16-10-34 (incorporating OCGA § 35-8-2 (8)); 49-4A-8 (i) (2) (incorporating
OCGA § 35-8-2 (8)).
                                       7
the absence of an applicable statutory definition of “peace officer,”

we must look first to the term’s “ordinary, natural, and most basic

meaning[.]” Nuckles v. State, 310 Ga. 624, 629 (2) (853 SE2d 81)

(2020). And, of course, “[t]he ordinary public meaning of statutory

text that matters is the meaning the statutory text had at the time

it was enacted.” Seals, 311 Ga. at 740 (1).

     The statutory provision at issue here was enacted in 1975.5 An

examination of the relevant sources of ordinary meaning reveals

some accord on the basic definition of a peace officer. See State v.

Sass Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893, 898-899 (2) (a) (885 SE2d 761) (2023)

(“[C]ontemporaneous dictionaries from around the time when the

text was adopted . . . offer a useful reference for [an ordinary-

meaning] analysis.”). As a general matter, those sources broadly

define a peace officer as an officer vested by law with the duty to

maintain the public peace. See The American Heritage Dictionary of

the English Language 963 (1973) (defining “peace officer” as “[a] law

     5 See Ga. L. 1975, p. 607, § 1. OCGA § 17-7-52 has been amended several

times since 1975, and each version has used the term “peace officer.” See Ga.
L. 1997, p. 879, § 1; Ga. L. 2001, p. 487, § 5; Ga. L. 2016, p. 186, § 6.
                                     8
officer, such as a sheriff, responsible for maintaining civil peace”);

Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English

Language 1317 (1968) (defining “peace officer” as “any officer of the

law charged with the preservation of the public peace, as a sheriff,

constable, or policeman”). And these definitions comport with the

definition of “peace officer” in Black’s Law Dictionary, which, around

the time of the statute’s enactment, defined the term as “generally

[including] sheriffs and their deputies, constables, marshals,

members of the police force of cities, and other officers whose duty is

to enforce and preserve the public peace.” Black’s Law Dictionary

1287 (4th ed. 1968).

      This understanding of “peace officer,” a term with deep roots in

Georgia law, finds support in a broader context. The term “peace

officer” has been used in Georgia statutory law since at least 17936

      6 See, e.g., Robert Watkins, et al., Digest of the Laws of Georgia, p. 532

(1799) (Act No. 499, Dec. 19, 1793) (“[I]t shall be the duty of the justices of this
State . . . on issuing a warrant, to apprehend any person or persons charged
with any criminal offence, to direct the peace officer executing the same, to
make diligent enquiry as to the property, of which any person charged as
aforesaid, may be possessed at the time he or she was apprehended . . . and if

                                         9
and has also appeared with some regularity in our decisional law,

beginning with the early opinions of this Court. But the term

predates even those sources and in fact derived from the common

law. As Blackstone explained,7 the common law “had a special care

and regard for the conservation of the peace,” which was considered

“the very end and foundation of civil society.” See 1 William

Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 349 (8th Ed.

1778). In this regard, officers known as “conservators of the peace”

were, at first, elected by the people and, after about 1351, appointed

by the king “for the maintenance of the public peace.” Id. at 349-351.

At common law, these conservators of the peace had powers “in

suppressing riots and affrays, in taking securities for the peace, and

in apprehending and committing felons and other inferior

criminals.” Id. at 354. Sheriffs, constables, and coroners, among

any justice or peace officer shall fail to perform the duties hereby required, he
shall himself be subject to the payment of the cost with which such criminal
may be chargeable. . . .”).
      7 “[W]e have long accepted [Blackstone] as the leading authority on the

common law[.]” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Henry County Bd. of Comm’rs,
315 Ga. 39, 48 (2) (a) (880 SE2d 168) (2022).
                                       10
others, were styled conservators of the peace — a term that became

interchangeable with peace officers8 — by virtue of their duty to

maintain the peace. Id. at 350. And to aid the execution of that duty,

peace officers were vested with the concomitant power to apprehend

or restrain those who violated the peace within their jurisdictions.

Id. at 350. See also 4 Blackstone 290-293 (discussing arrest powers

and defining an arrest as “the apprehending or restraining of one’s

person, in order to be forthcoming to answer to an alleged or

suspected crime”).

      This common-law understanding that peace-officer status

flowed from the duties and powers vested in an officer is also

reflected in Georgia statutory and decisional law. Our case law has

frequently spoken of peace officers in terms of their duty to maintain

the public peace. See, e.g., Parker v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 174 Ga. 525,

527 (163 SE 159) (1932) (“[A] policeman is a peace officer, whose

      8 See Vandiver v. Endicott, 215 Ga. 250, 251 (109 SE2d 775) (1959) (the

term “conservator of the peace” is “synonymous with the term ‘peace officer’”);
Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (identifying “conservator of the peace”
as an alternative term for “peace officer”).
                                      11
duties are connected with the public peace[.]”); Ramsey v. State, 92

Ga. 53, 62 (17 SE 613) (1893) (“[T]he defendant was engaged in a

violation of the public peace amounting to an offence against the

laws of the State[;] and it was the duty of the deceased, as a peace-

officer, to arrest him.”). These judicial decisions painted with broad

strokes and portrayed a peace officer’s duty to maintain the public

peace as generally pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws.9

See, e.g., Ramsey, 92 Ga. at 62; Elder v. Camp, 193 Ga. 320, 322-323

(18 SE2d 622) (5) (1942) (“In exercising [his] duties and powers and

      9 Both the Georgia Code and Georgia appellate decisions have employed

“peace officer” as a collective term to encompass what are now generally
considered to be law enforcement officers, such as sheriffs, police officers, and
marshals. See, e.g., Penal Code 1910, § 338 (“Any person who shall, without
authority, exercise or attempt to exercise the functions of, or hold himself out
to anyone as, a deputy-sheriff, marshal, policeman, constable, or other peace-
officer or detective shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Penal Code 1895, § 332
(“No sheriff, mayor, or other person authorized by law to appoint special
deputy-sheriffs, constables, marshals, policemen, or other peace-officers, or
detectives, to preserve the public peace or detect crime, shall appoint . . . any
person who is not a citizen of this State[.]”); McDuffie v. Perkerson, 178 Ga.
230, 236 (173 SE 151) (1933) (noting that “[m]any persons perform duties of a
public nature who are not officers,” including “persons assisting sheriffs and
other peace officers”); Porter v. State, 124 Ga. 297, 302 (52 SE 283) (1905)
(recognizing that Penal Code section “was applicable to municipal peace
officers, such as a policeman or town marshal”); Columbus v. Ogletree, 96 Ga.
177, 179-180 (22 SE 709) (1895) (“In the absence of any ordinance or statutory
provision specially defining the powers and duties of policemen, they are
presumptively, as at common law, mere peace officers.”).
                                       12
acting as a conservator of the peace within his county, a sheriff has

the right and duty to enforce the laws enacted for the protection of

the lives, persons, property, health, and morals of the people.”

(punctuation omitted)); Cook v. Mayor & Council of the City of

Macon, 54 Ga. 468, 469 (1875) (concluding that, for purposes of

municipal liability, a police officer appointed by a city was a “peace

officer” because his duties were “connected with the public peace in

which the state is interested, and in a very wide sense he is a state

officer; many of his duties are duties connected with the prevention

and punishment of crime”).

     And our case law recognized that peace officers are vested with

the powers necessary to fulfill that duty, most notably the power of

arrest. See Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 128, 138 (1883) (criticizing peace

officer’s failure to grant    request to issue peace warrant and

emphasizing that a peace officer “is invested with power to command

and restrain” and “should not desist from the performance of his

duty . . . when he is bound by every obligation and is fully armed

with power to secure peace”); McCrackin v. State, 150 Ga. 718, 722

                                  13
(105 SE 487) (1920) (“[S]ome latitude is allowed to peace officers in

making arrests of persons who have violated penal statutes, because

it is essential to protection of person and property. . . . [P]eace

officers . . . are charged by law with th[e] duty [to make arrests] and

are subjected to penalties for failure thereof.”); Porter v. State, 124

Ga. 297, 307-308 (52 SE 283) (1905) (Lumpkin, J., concurring

specially) (“A policeman performs the duty of arresting both for

offenses against the State and those against municipal ordinances.

He partakes both of the nature of a constable, and a watchman at

common law, with such added powers as may result from

legislation.”).10

      10 See also Graham v. State, 143 Ga. 440, 443 (85 SE 328) (1915) (“At

common law, certain officers, as conservators of the peace, were entrusted with
power to make arrests without a warrant in certain cases. . . . As to [arrests for
misdemeanors] . . . the officer could arrest without a warrant any person who
committed a breach of the peace in his presence or within his view.”); Williford
v. State, 121 Ga. 173, 177 (48 SE 962) (1904) (If an escaped convict is not
“legally at liberty,” “then any peace officer may arrest him without a warrant
and restore him to the imprisonment to which the court has sentenced him. It
is the duty of the officer to take prompt action in effecting the capture of the
escape[e], and to then turn him over to his lawful custodians within a
reasonable time.”); Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 304-305 (133 SE 42) (1926)
(“A peace officer has the right to make an arrest without a warrant, for the
purpose of preventing the commission of a felony . . . [and] may make an arrest

                                       14
     When OCGA § 17-7-52 was enacted in 1975, the common-law

connection between peace officers and the duty to maintain public

peace was reflected in codified definitions of “peace officer,” as well.

The first codified definition of the term defined “peace officer” in the

context of designating the class of public employees eligible to

participate in the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund, as

persons “required by the term of their employment . . . to give their

full time to the preservation of public order, or the protection of life

and property, or the detection of crime.” Ga. L. 1950, p. 50, § 8

(predecessor to current OCGA § 47-17-1 (5)). The predecessor to

current OCGA § 16-1-3 (11) defined a “peace officer” as “any person

who by virtue of his office or public employment is vested by law

with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses,

whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific

offenses.” Ga. L. 1968, p. 1249, § 1. And under the predecessor to

current OCGA § 35-8-2 (8) (A), a “peace officer” was “any officer or

without a warrant for the purpose of preventing an imminent breach of the
peace.” (punctuation omitted)).
                                   15
member of a law enforcement unit . . . who has the power of arrest,

and who is responsible for the enforcing of criminal laws of this State

or its political subdivisions.” Ga. L. 1970, p. 208, § 2. The common

thread between these statutory definitions and the decisional law

discussed above is the peace officer’s duty to maintain the public

peace, generally by enforcing criminal laws through the power of

arrest. Because these statutory definitions invariably incorporate

the duty to maintain the public peace, they also reflect, whether

explicitly or implicitly, the common law’s consistent recognition that

the arrest power is integral to the performance of that duty.

     Having reviewed the background upon which OCGA § 17-7-52

was enacted, what do we make of it all? There can be no question

that a peace officer is, at bottom, an officer vested by law with the

duty to maintain the public peace. The term’s ordinary meaning and

its related context readily support that understanding. But,

emphasizing OCGA § 16-1-3 (11)’s explicit reference to arrest powers

in its definition of the term, the State argues that a person is not a

peace officer unless he has both a duty to maintain the public peace

                                  16
and the power to effect arrests. As we have seen, the presence of

arrest powers is most often a distinguishing feature of a peace

officer. And we agree that the presence of arrest powers has

significant relevance to determining whether a person is a peace

officer.11 However, we need not resolve, at least at this juncture, the

extent to which the presence of arrest powers might control that

analysis because the trial court found that the defendants here do

not have arrest powers12 and because, as we will discuss, the

      11 For example, we have deemed the presence of statutory arrest powers

pertinent, but not dispositive in the context of determining whether a duty to
maintain the public peace is owed for purposes of eligibility in the Peace
Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund Act. See Vandiver v. Manning, 215 Ga. 874,
879-880 (114 SE2d 121) (1960) (discussing probation officer’s arrest powers);
Vandiver, 215 Ga. at 251-252 (rejecting fire department officer’s claim that he
was charged with maintaining public peace and was thus a peace officer,
despite fact that he was “invested with the powers of police officers and [was]
authorized to make arrests within the city” of Atlanta); Clay, 214 Ga. at 72
(noting that “nothing in the law” authorized motor-carrier inspectors for
Georgia Public Service commission to make any arrests).
      12 On appeal, the defendants briefly argue that their authority to control

and supervise inmates within the jail is akin to arrest powers. In support of
that claim, they point only to legal authority holding that a person is under
arrest for purposes of the Fourth Amendment whenever his liberty is
restrained, assert that they have authority to restrain the liberty of inmates
confined to the jail, and then summarily conclude that they have arrest powers.
But the defendants point to no controlling authority — and we are aware of
none — holding that the authority they maintain over jail inmates establishes
that they have arrest powers for purposes of OCGA § 17-7-52.
                                      17
defendants do not have a duty to maintain the public peace.

      2. Having determined the basic meaning of “peace officer” for

purposes of OCGA § 17-7-52, we turn next to consider whether the

trial court erred by finding that the defendants, who maintained

order within the jail, meet that definition.13 We begin and end our

inquiry with the duty to maintain public peace.14

      We have not previously identified what considerations may be

relevant to whether a person asserting peace-officer status under

OCGA § 17-7-52 is charged with maintaining the public peace. But

a few guideposts exist in this area. To start, we have explained that

“‘[p]ublic order’ means the tranquility and security which every

      13 As we noted at the outset, in defining “peace officer” as the term is

used in OCGA § 17-7-52, the trial court traversed the wrong analytical path
but nevertheless reached the right definitional destination. Thus, in resolving
the factual issue of whether the defendants are “peace officers,” the trial court
applied the correct legal standard, asking whether the defendants are officers
vested by law with a duty to preserve the public peace. Accordingly, remand is
unnecessary. Cf. Smith v. Northside Hospital, 302 Ga. 517, 531 (3) (807 SE2d
909) (2017).
      14 Because it is clear that the defendants here are not charged with a

duty to maintain the public peace, we need not — and, thus, do not — address
the remaining determinations underlying the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendants were peace officers, namely that they were officers and that their
duties were vested by law.
                                       18
person feels under the protection of the law” and that “[t]o preserve

the public peace means to secure that quiet and freedom from

disturbance which is guaranteed by law.” Bd. of Commrs. v. Clay,

214 Ga. 70, 72 (1) (102 SE2d 575) (1958). Accord Black’s Law

Dictionary 1287, 1393 (4th Ed. 1968) (defining “public peace” as

“[t]he peace or tranquility of the community in general”). We have

also associated a duty to maintain the public peace with a duty to

enforce criminal laws. See Ramsey, 92 Ga. at 62; Cook, 54 Ga. at 469.

     When determining, in the context of other statutes, whether an

individual was duty-bound to preserve the public order, we have

employed a fact-specific analysis, looking to the person’s primary

duties and assessing whether those duties included maintaining

public order, or whether the person’s performance of his private

duties   merely   facilitated,   or    tangentially   benefitted,   the

preservation of the peace. See Clay, 214 Ga. at 73-74; Fleming v.

Maddox, 225 Ga. 737, 740-741 (171 SE2d 276) (1969). For instance,

a person who, “incidental to the primary duties of [his] employment,

occasionally perform[ed] some of the services of a police officer” did

                                  19
not have a duty to maintain public order. Vandiver v. Endicott, 215

Ga. 250, 252 (109 SE2d 775) (1959). See also Clay, 214 Ga. at 74 (2)

(appellees did not enjoy peace-officer status where their duties

“relate[d] only to the enforcement of the laws and the rules of the

Public Service Commission” and they were not authorized “to act as

‘peace officers’ in the general sense, either in the preservation of

public order, or in the protection of life and property, or in the

detection of crime”). Finally, we have inquired into the scope of the

duties imposed upon a person seeking peace-officer status,

comparing those duties to the ones imposed upon a law enforcement

officer, the prototypical peace officer. See Vandiver v. Manning, 215

Ga. 874, 878-879 (114 SE2d 121) (1960) (comparing duties,

authorities, and jurisdiction of probation officer to those of police

officers). With these general considerations in mind, we return to

the case at hand.

     Here, the trial court rested its conclusion that the defendants

were charged with preserving the public peace on the sole fact that

the defendants were responsible for maintaining order among the

                                 20
inmates confined to the Fulton County Jail.15 While it is true that

the defendants’ work may have benefitted the public peace, a

tangential benefit to the public peace is not synonymous with a duty

to maintain the peace within the community as a whole.16 See

Fleming, 225 Ga. at 740-741; Clay, 214 Ga. at 73-74; Endicott, 215

Ga at 252. The trial court even acknowledged as much, indicating

that the defendants do not maintain “the public order traditionally

conceived of.” Indeed, any authority the defendants may exercise is

constrained to a limited population of inmates and, perhaps, to

certain members of the general public who voluntarily enter the

jail’s boundaries via its controlled access points. And unlike “[l]aw

enforcement officers [who] have a general duty to enforce the law

and maintain the peace [that] exists 24 hours a day,” Woodard v.

      15 The defendants do not argue that the trial court’s factual findings are

incomplete or that the trial court otherwise overlooked facts that might
establish their duty to maintain public order. Instead, the defendants argue
that, by maintaining order within the jail, they “provide[d] a benefit” to “the
surrounding community.”
      16 The defendants themselves acknowledge that inmates in the Fulton

County Jail are not members of the general community, “should not be out in
the community,” and have in fact been removed from the general community
by virtue of legal process.
                                      21
State, 296 Ga. 803, 807 (3) (771 SE2d 362) (2015), there is no

indication that the defendants’ duty extends beyond the timeframe

of their work shifts or the bounds of the Fulton County Jail.17 The

defendants’ duties instead are primarily related to maintaining

order at the Fulton County Jail and to supervising the inmates and,

therefore, were simply insufficient to establish that the defendants

owed a general duty to maintain the public peace within the

community at large.

     Thus, because the defendants’ primary duty of supervising and

controlling a defined population of inmates was markedly limited in

comparison to a traditional peace officer’s and because they had no

duty to maintain the public peace in a general sense, we conclude

that the trial court erred by deeming them peace officers under

OCGA § 17-7-52. We therefore reverse the trial court’s quashal of

the indictments.

     Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

     17 Of course, nothing   we say should be understood to undermine the
peace-officer-status of law enforcement officers with a narrow geographic
jurisdiction merely because their physical jurisdiction is relatively small.
                                    22