Court Opinion

ID: 9457106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:12:34.350934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:13.138637
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I concur in affirmance of the conviction of Williams. In the case of Simpson, however, a contention is made which I think requires reversal.
The evidence against Simpson consisted primarily of the testimony of one witness, a police officer who was some distance from the scene. Though appellants were arrested immediately after the incident, none of the jewelry which the testimony indicated had been stolen was found. There was a “third man”, however, who was not apprehended. In any event the jury acquitted Simpson of grand larceny,1 at the same time convicting him of second degree burglary, indicating that the conviction may have been the result of compromise due to doubts on the part of some jurors. In these circumstances, I think that the admission of the 1962 robbery conviction at this 1969 trial might well have affected the jury’s appraisal not simply of Simpson’s credibility, as to which alone it could be admitted, but of his guilt of the burglary charge, as to which it could not be considered. While the court correctly instructed the jury on the limited use it was entitled to make of the 1962 conviction, it is plain to me as it has been to many judges and commentators, see my opinion in United States v. Bailey, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 246-248, 426 F.2d 1236, 1240-1242 (1970), that evidence of such a prior conviction cannot be said to be limited in its impact upon a jury to the defendant’s credibility. Rather it inevitably influences the jury generally to the effect that he is again guilty as he had been before.
It is the extent of the prejudice that the prior conviction creates on the issue of present guilt, not that the conviction does not bear on credibility, as I assume it does, that for me has been the test of its admissibility. I would have no problem if the effect could be limited to credibility. But when evidence of the prior conviction has the additional prejudicial effect for which it is not admissible, I do have a problem which requires me to reach a judgment whether the prejudice arising from its non-admissible use outweighs its usefulness for the purpose for which it is admissible. The trial court carefully considered the several factors bearing upon the exercise of the discretion held in Luck to reside in the court to admit or exclude the evidence. I do not find error in the manner in which the court approached the Luck problem. Yet I cannot agree with the conclusion reached. I think it was a serious error to permit the robbery conviction of 1962 to be brought before the jury in this trial held in 1969. The robbery convic*739tion was both remote in time 2 and similar to the charge on trial, each of which factors weighs against its admissibility. Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 347, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968). Moreover, the ease obviously was one in which the defense was under great need to place the defendant on the stand, since it had no other witness to give to the jury the defendant’s version of what transpired. With all respect, I think that the prejudice resulting from the evidence of the 1962 robbery conviction outweighed its usefulness on the issue of the defendant’s credibility.3 Cf. United States v. Bailey, supra.
Under the terms of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub.L.No.91-358, § 133, 84 Stat. 550 (to be effective February 1, 1971), referred to by my brethren, it appears no discretion will be left to the trial judge to admit or not a prior conviction coming within the criteria of the Act, regardless of the court’s view of the effect on the fairness of the trial. Simpson is entitled, however, to have us review his trial under the rules of evidence applicable when he was tried. Were his present conviction reversed, as I think should be done, and were he retried after February 1, 1971 and testified again, the new statute would no doubt be invoked against him unless a certificate of rehabilitation referred to in the statute were available to him.4 I do not speculate, however, as to what course would be pursued at the trial, or upon our review of it if a conviction resulted and it were appealed.

. The jury reached this verdict notwithstanding testimony that the jewelry was of the value of $2,000.00.

. Appellant was incarcerated following his 1962 conviction until July 19, 1967, eight months prior to the offense on trial. Yet this fact does not mitigate against the remoteness of the previous conviction. In United States v. McCord, 137 U.S. App.D.C. 5, 7, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (1969), we said that such a determination is to be made from the time of conviction, not from the date when the accused is released from prison.

. As to the comment of my brethren that the admission of defendant’s record strengthens the credibility standing of a witness without a record, I do not understand that the evidentiary rule rests upon such a premise.

. The statute does not itself clarify the method by which such a certificate can be made available.