Court Opinion

ID: 9583152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:35:18.424271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:53.887165
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Justice,
specially concurring:
Because we have affirmed defendant’s conviction, we must conduct a proportionality review to determine “whether the sentence[ ] of death [is] excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51, cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101 (1977); see also State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 815 P.2d 869 (1991); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 814 P.2d 333, cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 343, 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991). In Arizona the death penalty is reserved for cases exhibiting “the most aggravating of circumstances, [those that] are so shocking or repugnant that the murder stands out from the normal first degree murder,” or cases in which “the background of the defendant sets him apart from the usual murderer.” State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981).
First, we have reviewed cases from throughout the country involving murders of pregnant women by individuals who knew of their victims’ conditions. These cases reveal that crimes similar to that committed by defendant are regularly punished by death. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 177-78, 800 P.2d 1260, 1285-86 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2044, 114 L.Ed.2d 129 (1991) (“De*509fensive wounds on pregnant victim’s hands indicate that she struggled to save her life,” and “blood was splattered through several rooms indicating that defendant pursued the victim as she unsuccessfully fought for her life.” No mitigating factors were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, so the death penalty was affirmed.); Heath v. State, 536 So.2d 142 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (death penalty affirmed for appellant who paid third party $2,000 to shoot his nine-months pregnant wife); People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730 (1989) (after extensive plotting and numerous failed attempts, defendant twice shot and killed his pregnant wife, the mother of his four children; death penalty affirmed); People v. Manier, 184 Colo. 44, 518 P.2d 811 (1974) (defendant sentenced to death for shooting his bigamist wife when she was nearly ready to deliver baby of her second husband, whom she wed while defendant was in jail); Jackson v. State, 366 So.2d 752 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979) (death sentence upheld for robber who killed woman, eight-months pregnant, by shooting her, tying electrical cord around her neck and then hiding her (and fetus) in isolated area); Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 368, 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981) (death penalty imposed on defendant who, with aid of companion, abducted, raped, robbed and pistol-whipped seven-months pregnant victim); Justus v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 667, 283 S.E.2d 905, 913 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 1491, 71 L.Ed.2d 693 (1982) (defendant sentenced to death for the “capital murder during the commission of, or subsequent to, rape ...” of victim who was carrying a near-term fetus). But see People v. Ruchan, 219 Ill.App.3d 739, 162 Ill.Dec. 240, 579 N.E.2d 1054 (1991) (trial judge sentenced defendant to imprisonment for his natural life at bench trial after finding defendant’s murder of his seven to eight-months pregnant wife and the female fetus she carried was “so vile and repulsive as to almost defy description”); Soto v. State, 252 Ga. 164, 312 S.E.2d 306 (1984) (judge sentenced defendant to life imprisonment for his non-trigger-person role in the murder of his pregnant wife after a jury deadlocked on whether the death penalty was appropriate); People v. Barber, 116 Ill.App.3d 767, 72 Ill.Dec. 472, 452 N.E.2d 725 (1983) (defendant received life sentence for murder of his ex-wife, who was pregnant by another man, after jury refused to impose the death penalty).
Other defendants’ death sentences for murdering pregnant women they knew to be pregnant were reversed due to procedural errors. See, e.g., State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979) (death sentence set aside despite “abominable and depraved” murder of near-term pregnant victim, because Idaho death penalty statute in effect at time of sentencing deemed unconstitutional); State v. Smith, 310 Or. 1, 791 P.2d 836 (1990) (Defendant’s pregnant wife died of exposure after he tied her hands and feet behind her back and left her in a remote area. His death sentence was reversed, however, and the case remanded for resentencing due to incomplete jury instructions under the Oregon sentencing statute.); State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 585 A.2d 864, 869-70 (1991) (defendant struck wife in head with hammer more than twenty times, killing her, her fetus and her eighteen-month-old son: murder conviction and death sentence reversed because defendant was erroneously required to prove he suffered from a diminished capacity that prevented him from acting purposely, knowingly or recklessly).
We have also reviewed Arizona cases in which the court affirmed death sentences when only one statutory aggravating factor existed, as in this case. See, e.g., State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 773 P.2d 983 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 1513, 108 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990) (death penalty affirmed, given that the killing was especially heinous or depraved and the only mitigating factor was the defendant’s remorse); State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 815 P.2d 869 (1991) (despite mitigating factors regarding defendant’s lack of criminal record, his dependent personality, his inability to form and maintain close relationships, his lack of a record of past violent *510behavior and his sorrow, death penalty appropriate, considering statutory aggravating factor that murder was committed for pecuniary gain); State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1458, 55 L.Ed.2d 500 (1978) (death penalty appropriate because there were no mitigating factors to weigh against aggravating factor of an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner of killing); State v. Ceja, 126 Ariz. 35, 612 P.2d 491 (1980) (reduction of sentence from death to life imprisonment not warranted because murder was committed in such an especially heinous, cruel or depraved way and there were “no mitigating circumstances which would indicate the inappropriateness of” the death penalty); State v. Hensley, 142 Ariz. 598, 691 P.2d 689 (1984) (mitigating factor that defendant obtained his G.E.D. while in prison not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency when weighed against the statutory aggravating factor that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain); State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 690 P.2d 54 (1984) (mitigating factors of defendant's young age at the time of the offense and his minimal remorse not sufficient to call for leniency in sentence for murder committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner); State v. Bishop, 127 Ariz. 531, 622 P.2d 478 (1981) (mitigating factors of no prior criminal record and low intelligence not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency in sentencing for murder committed in especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner); State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 800 P.2d 1260 (1990) (murder was so especially heinous, cruel and depraved that mitigating factors of no prior felony, limited intelligence and limited formal education, character evidence indicating no previous history of violence, age and subsequent remorse did not outweigh it).
Likewise, we have studied Arizona cases with findings of one or two statutory aggravating factors in which the sentence was decreased to life imprisonment. See e.g., State v. Brookover, 124 Ariz. 38, 601 P.2d 1322 (1979) (defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct was significantly impaired and this mitigating factor outweighed the aggravating factor of a previous conviction for which, under Arizona law, a sentence of life imprisonment or death was possible); State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 628 P.2d 943 (1981) (mitigating factors of defendant’s age at the time of the offense (21), evidence showing that the victim shot first, codefendant’s receipt of a life sentence, defendant’s behavior as a model prisoner and his attempt to further his education while in prison called for leniency in his sentence, despite aggravating factors, based on the same event, of a prior conviction for which a life sentence or death was possible and prior commission of a felony involving the use or threat of force); State v. Valencia, 132 Ariz. 248, 645 P.2d 239 (1982) (mitigating factor of age at time of offense (16) outweighed aggravating factors of prior convictions that involved the use or threat of violence and for which life sentences were imposable); State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 786 P.2d 395 (1989) (court found codefend-ants’ dramatically disparate sentence of four years imprisonment to be a significant and substantial mitigating circumstance calling for leniency, despite aggravating factors of committing murder for pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner); State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079 (1989) (Significant mitigating factors were: the defendant’s young age at time of offense (21), his background and character (defendant was a victim in a tragic motorcycle accident, not his fault, that caused loss of a leg, serious head injuries and, later, alcoholism which, in combination, led to his need to appear macho and his violent and unpredictable behavior), his “destructive abnormally symbiotic relationship” with his brother Lewis, and his probation officer’s recommendation against the death penalty because the case against defendant was based primarily on confessions made to family members (the defendant was known to brag at times about crimes he did not commit). These mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating factor that murder was committed for pecuniary gain.); State v. Stevens, 158 Ariz. 595, 764 P.2d 724 (1988) (aggravating factor that murder *511was committed for pecuniary gain outweighed by mitigating factor of defendant’s diminished capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct due to heavy alcohol and drug consumption the day of the killing).
Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 773 P.2d 983, also involves an emotional crime committed against a live-in-lover and her children without an apparent motive. The defendant in Wallace bludgeoned to death his live-in-girlfriend and her two children one at a time as they arrived home. 160 Ariz. at 425, 773 P.2d 983. We conclude, in our independent review of Wallace, that the murder victims were killed by surprise and relatively quickly. Further, the state in that case offered no evidence they suffered any pain. Id.; State v. Wallace (I), 151 Ariz. 362, 367, 728 P.2d 232 (1986). Defendant’s girlfriend, on the other hand, clearly suffered intense physical and emotional pain and trauma during her forty-five minute fight for her life. See infra pp. 501-502, 826 P.2d pp. 798-799. The murder in this case was at least as shocking and repugnant as the murders in Wallace, in which we affirmed the death sentence. Thus, our comparison of this case to Wallace does not convince us that defendant’s sentence is excessive or disproportionate.
We have reviewed cases involving facts and defendants similar to those of the present case and we find defendant’s death sentence to be neither excessive nor disproportionate.
FELDMAN, C.J., and FRANK X. GORDON, Jr., J., Retired, concur in Justice CORCORAN’s opinion and Justice CAMERON’S special concurrence.