Court Opinion

ID: 9369411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 19:02:07.083427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.832800
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/23 P. v. Karels CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       B319323

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. MA080988)
           v.

 WILLIAM ANTHONY KARELS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed.
      Kathy R. Moreno, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  _____________________________
       Johnny Powell was killed when a speeding car crossed the
road, struck him as he walked on the far shoulder, made a U-turn
and ran over him as he lay in the street. The murder car was
found, abandoned, badly damaged and with no license plates, the
following morning.
       William Anthony Karels was the predominant
(overwhelming) contributor of DNA present on the steering wheel
and gear shift of the car used in the murder. Only tiny amounts
of DNA from other, unknown individuals were detected at those
sites. Karels’s DNA was also found immediately adjacent to a
large hole cut in the driver’s side of the windshield where the
vehicle identification number (VIN) had been removed. In
addition, an eyewitness described the driver as a light-skinned
White or Hispanic male with facial hair, a description, albeit a
general one, consistent with Karels’s physical characteristics and
one that did not match the car’s owner.
       On appeal Karels argues his conviction for the
premeditated murder of Powell was not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Murder of Johnny Powell
      Powell was struck twice by an automobile on the evening of
August 24, 2020 near a bar on Trevor Avenue in Lancaster. He
died from his injuries several hours later. Surveillance video
from the bar showed Powell walking toward the northeast corner
of Trevor Avenue and West Ovington Street (away from the bar)
when a car, later determined to be a 2003 Chevrolet Monte Carlo,
driving southbound on Trevor Avenue struck Powell on the east
shoulder of the road, knocking him into the side of an adjacent

                                2
building.1 The car drove out of camera range and then returned,
now moving in a northbound direction, and ran over Powell as he
lay in the street.
       Victor Palomo was at the scene, outside the bar, when he
heard a loud “thump.” He turned and saw a motionless body
lying on the ground approximately a block away. Palomo also
saw a car, just beyond the body, make a U-turn. As Palomo
watched, the car drove over Powell’s body and left the scene.
Palomo immediately reported the incident, and Los Angeles
County deputy sheriffs arrived to investigate. Palomo described
the car to the deputies and stated the driver was a “light skin
White or Hispanic” male “with facial hair.”
      2. The Investigation and DNA Analysis
      The following day, a mile from the scene of the incident,
sheriff’s deputies found a car that, based on a review of the bar’s
surveillance footage, appeared to be the vehicle that ran over
Powell. In addition to collision damage, a large hole had been cut
in the lower left quadrant of the windshield (the driver’s side)
where the metal plate displaying the VIN should be located.2 The

1     An overhead or aerial photograph of the area near the bar
was admitted into evidence at trial. It was used to explain to the
jury Powell’s movement, the murder car’s path and the location of
witness Victor Palomo in relation to the car’s impact.
2     Federal law requires every vehicle have a VIN, which for
passenger cars must “be located inside the passenger
compartment” and “readable, without moving any part of the
vehicle, through the vehicle glazing under daylight lighting
conditions by an observer having 20/20 vision (Snellen) whose
eye-point is located outside the vehicle adjacent to the left
windshield pillar.” (Vehicle Identification Number (VIN)
Requirements, 49 C.F.R. § 565.13(f) (2023); see generally

                                 3
VIN had been removed, and the car’s license plates were missing.
There was blood on the undercarriage of the car, which the
sheriff’s department, through DNA analysis, determined
belonged to Powell. Deputies swabbed locations on the
windshield and the interior of the car, including the steering
wheel and the gear shift, for additional DNA evidence.
       Meanwhile, through its investigation the sheriff’s
department learned that Karels had received a citation while
driving the car in Lancaster on August 6, 2020. On that occasion
the deputy who issued the citation determined the car’s
registered owner was Bryan Haddock. The sheriff’s department
later retrieved records documenting Haddock’s sale of the car for
$200 on July 31, 2020 to Earl Cager. A color copy of Cager’s
driver’s license, introduced at trial, indicated Cager was a dark-
skinned Black male. Investigators were unable to locate Cager at
any of the addresses listed on the documents they obtained.
       Sheriff’s deputies interviewed Karels and took a sample of
his DNA. They also obtained a blood sample card from the
coroner following Powell’s autopsy. Laboratory analysis
established Karels was the predominant contributor to DNA
samples taken from the car’s steering wheel, where he

Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg (1999) 527 U.S. 555, 559, fn. 2
[“Herman Snellen was a Dutch ophthalmologist who, in 1862,
devised the familiar letter chart still used to measure visual
acuity. The first figure in the Snellen score refers to distance
between the viewer and the visual target, typically 20 feet. The
second corresponds to the distance at which a person with normal
acuity could distinguish letters of the size that the viewer can
distinguish at 20 feet”].)

                                4
contributed more than 99 percent of the DNA,3 with a tiny
amount from an unknown contributor, and gear shift, where
Karels contributed 94 percent of the DNA, with the remaining
amount from an unknown contributor. Testing samples from the
perimeter of the car’s windshield revealed in one instance Powell
was the single source contributor and in another Powell
contributed 96 percent and Karels contributed 4 percent of the
DNA present. The sample around the large cutout in the
windshield where the VIN plate had been removed, however,
revealed a 52 percent contribution from Karels, 46 percent from
Powell, and a remaining 2 percent from an unknown contributor.
     3. Karels’s Conviction for the Murder of Powell
       The People charged Karels with murder (Pen. Code, § 187,
subd. (a)). At the jury trial in March 2022 the People called
six witnesses: Palomo; Deputy Sheriff Felipe Alejandre, who
initially responded to Palomo’s report of the incident; Deputy
Sheriff Trevor Mangan, who issued Karels the citation on
August 6, 2020; Detective Cynthia Toone, the sheriff’s
department homicide detective assigned to investigate the case;
Christopher Lee, a senior criminologist in the sheriff’s
department, who collected the DNA samples from the car that
ran over Powell; and James Nieman, another senior criminologist
in the sheriff’s department, who analyzed the DNA samples
collected by Lee. The prosecutor introduced into evidence several
exhibits used during his examination of the People’s witnesses,

3     The criminologist who analyzed the DNA samples testified
there were two contributors to the steering wheel sample but
described Karels’s DNA profile as aligning “with the 100 percent
component of the steering wheel sample.”

                                5
including color photographs of the damaged Monte Carlo and
surveillance videos from the bar.
      Deputy Mangan testified that, during the traffic stop of the
Monte Carlo Karels was driving, he ran the license plate on the
vehicle and learned the vehicle’s registration was expired and
Karels was not the registered owner. The citation, admitted into
evidence as a defense exhibit, included the car’s license plate
number (confirming the plates were still on the vehicle at that
time), stated the traffic stop had been conducted at Meech Street
and Milling Avenue in Lancaster and described Karels as a six-
foot one-inch White male with brown hair and blue eyes. It did
not indicate there was a very large hole or similar defect in the
vehicle’s windshield.
      While describing the investigation of Powell’s death,
Detective Toone identified a photograph of the Monte Carlo’s
windshield, taken several days after the incident, which showed a
large hole over most of the lower left side of the windshield, “right
above where the VIN plate is normally located on a car.”
Detective Toone testified the VIN plate “had been removed.”
Detective Toone also explained the database search that revealed
the sale of the Monte Carlo on July 31, 2020 from Haddock to
Cager for $200; the acquisition of a copy of Cager’s driver’s
license with his photograph, which was admitted into evidence;
and her inability to locate Cager at any of the addresses listed for
him.
      Nieman described the results of his analysis of various
DNA samples taken from the car. In response to a question from
the prosecutor, Nieman testified, “DNA can be degraded over
time if it is subject to certain environmental insults,” and gave as
examples “extreme heat” and “exposure to ultraviolent radiation.”

                                 6
Neither term was further defined on either direct or cross-
examination. When questioned by defense counsel, Nieman
acknowledged that DNA testing cannot determine when a sample
was deposited on an item.
       Karels did not testify or call any witnesses in his defense.
In his closing argument Karels’s counsel argued, because there
was no way to determine when DNA was deposited, the People’s
evidence did not prove Karels was driving the car when it ran
over Powell, only that he had been driving the car at some
point—specifically on August 6 when he received the traffic
citation. Defense counsel discounted the significance of Palomo’s
description of the murder car’s driver, stating, “The Antelope
Valley is full of light-skinned, White or Hispanic males with
facial hair.” And he pointed out the People had not suggested
any motive for the murder or introduced any evidence Karels
knew or was associated with Powell in any way.4 Finally, defense
counsel emphasized CALCRIM No. 224, included in the court’s
instructions, and explained it meant to convict Karels the jury
had to believe “the only reasonable theory in this case is that
Mr. Karels was driving the car on August 24th. If you believe
other scenarios are reasonable, then you have to find my client
not guilty. . . . I don’t think, given the gaps and the problems
with the evidence, that anyone can logically argue or logically
believe that the prosecutor’s theory of the case is the only
reasonable thing, the only thing that could’ve happened.”

4     In his rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor reminded
the jury that motive was not an element of the crime and
explained, “It’s not that there’s no motive. It’s that we didn’t go
into a motive. There’s no evidence of a motive. It’s not that
there’s no motive.”

                                  7
      The jury convicted Karels of first degree murder. The trial
court sentenced him to an indeterminate state prison term of
25 years to life. Karels filed a timely notice of appeal.
                         DISCUSSION
      1. Standard of Review
       “To decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
jury verdict, ‘a reviewing court reviews the entire record in the
light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
such that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th
411, 453-454.)5 In applying this test, we “‘presume in support of
the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.’” (People v. Sandoval (2015)
62 Cal.4th 394, 423.) “‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’” the
jury’s verdict.’” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)
This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence
is involved. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254,
294; see People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339
[“[s]ubstantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence,” internal
quotation marks omitted].)

5     Because we must review the entire record to determine if
substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict, necessarily we
are not limited in that assessment by what evidence the
prosecutor elected to emphasize in closing argument or the
Attorney General discussed in his brief or at oral argument.

                                 8
       To constitute substantial evidence, an inference “‘“may not
be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation,
supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work.”’” (People v.
Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360; see Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b)
[“An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established in the action”]; People v. Hughes (2002)
27 Cal.4th 287, 365 [“a jury may not rely upon unreasonable
inferences,” and “‘[a]n inference is not reasonable if it is based
only on speculation’”]; see also People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 735 [“‘speculation is not evidence, less still substantial
evidence’”].)6
       “Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if
it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of
two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other
innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court, which must be

6      “Fundamentally, whether evidence ‘raises’ or ‘supports’ a
particular inference is a matter of probability. Relevant evidence
increases the apparent probability a particular fact is true. Some
evidence increases that apparent probability greatly, and other
evidence does so slightly. There is a point on this spectrum above
which the probabilistic connections between the evidence and
proposed inference are deemed ‘reasonable’ and below which
weaker probabilistic connections are deemed ‘speculation’ or
‘conjecture.’ [Citation.] In this way, the law distinguishes
between facts that can ‘logically and reasonably be drawn’ from
the evidence [citation] versus evidence which ‘merely raises a
possibility’ a particular fact is true. [Citation.] The former is
called a reasonable inference; the latter is called speculation and
is ‘not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact.’ [Citation.] At
the margins, it can be difficult to demarcate between the two.”
(People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153, 180.)

                                 9
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If
the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might
also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant a reversal of the judgment.” (People v. Harris (2013)
57 Cal.4th 804, 849-850 [cleaned up]; accord, People v.
Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 97.)
      2. The Limits on the Probative Value of Fingerprint (or
         DNA) Evidence
       Fingerprints and DNA share two fundamental
characteristics. When fully preserved and properly analyzed,
they provide unassailable evidence of the identity of the
individual from whom they came. And notwithstanding advances
in scientific techniques, it is generally not possible to determine
when they were left on an object. Emphasizing this latter
common feature and citing case law involving fingerprints,
Karels contends the DNA evidence indisputably linking him to
the murder car was insufficient to support his conviction for
killing Powell.
       Karels relies principally on People v. Trevino (1985)
39 Cal.3d 667 (Trevino), disapproved on another ground in People
v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1221, which we are obligated to
follow, and Mikes v. Borg (9th Cir. 1991) 947 F.2d 353 (Mikes),
which, at most, has persuasive value here. In Trevino the
Supreme Court reviewed the dismissal of murder charges against
Leonard Rivas, one of two defendants charged with the murder of
their friend Rollo Hinton. (Trevino, at p. 676.) Hinton had been
found dead in the bedroom of his ransacked apartment. The
cause of death was a blow to the back of the head. The possible
murder weapon, a steam iron, was found next to the body. (Id. at

                                10
p. 677.) A neighbor of the victim testified she saw Jeremiah
Trevino leave Hinton’s apartment on the afternoon of the murder.
At the same time she heard a groan coming from inside the
apartment and saw a tall, slender, clean-shaven man emerge
from the apartment. The neighbor identified Trevino, but not
Rivas, at a live line-up and admitted at trial she could not
positively identify Rivas as the man she saw that afternoon.
However, she stated, “This man carried himself in the same
manner as Rivas did in the courtroom.” (Ibid.)
       The only other evidence linking Rivas to the scene of the
crime was one fingerprint found on a dresser drawer in the
victim’s bedroom. (Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 678.) One of
Trevino’s prints was also on the dresser, and two of Hinton’s and
two of another individual’s were on a whiskey bottle in the living
room. (Ibid.) The fingerprint expert was unable to estimate the
age of the print, and another witness testified that Trevino and
Rivas visited Hinton at Hinton’s apartment on occasion. (Ibid.)
       According to the trial court’s ruling on a new trial motion,
Rivas at the time of the crime was neither slender nor clean-
shaven (he had a moustache). (Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at
p. 696.) The Supreme Court held the combination of the
neighbor’s “highly speculative and equivocal identification
testimony” and the “solitary fingerprint of some unknown
vintage” were insufficient as a matter of law to support a guilty
verdict. (Id. at p. 697; accord, People v. Redmond (1969)
71 Cal.2d 745, 756 [defendant’s fingerprint at the scene of a
burglary was insufficient to support his conviction because he
was previously at the scene lawfully].)
       In Mikes, supra, 947 F.2d 353 the murder victim was found
in his basement after a burglary. (Id. at pp. 355-356.) The

                                11
prosecution’s case rested solely on the presence of the defendant’s
fingerprints on the murder weapon, a portion of a disassembled
turnstile the victim had recently purchased at a hardware store’s
going-out-of-business sale. (Ibid.) The Ninth Circuit held this
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, reasoning,
“[I]n fingerprint-only cases in which the prosecution’s theory is
based on the premise that the defendant handled certain objects
while committing the crime in question, the record must contain
sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably
infer that the fingerprints were in fact impressed at that time
and not at some earlier date.” (Id. at pp. 356-357.) But the court
went beyond the reasonable inference requirement and added, to
meet this standard, “the prosecution must present evidence
sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that the objects on which
the fingerprints appear were inaccessible to the defendant prior
to the time of the commission of the crime.” (Id. at p. 357.) The
prosecution had introduced no evidence placing the defendant at
the scene of the crime, either on the day of the murder or on any
other occasion; and, because the turnstile presumably had been
in operation before being sold and was available to the public
when offered for sale by the hardware store, the evidence was
insufficient to preclude the reasonable possibility the defendant’s
fingerprints were on the item prior to the victim’s acquisition of
it. (Id. at pp. 358-359.)
       The Ninth Circuit’s strict requirement the prosecution
present proof the item bearing the defendant’s fingerprints was
inaccessible to the defendant prior to the time of the commission
of the crime was not followed by the Supreme Court in People v.
Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, a case not cited by Karels. The
Johnson Court considered the admissibility of evidence the

                                12
defendant had raped a woman as an aggravating circumstance
during the penalty phase of a capital murder case. (Id. at p. 515.)
As the Court explained, to be admissible the trial court had to
determine the evidence offered would allow a rational trier of fact
to decide beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant had
committed the criminal activity alleged (ibid.)—the same
standard we use to determine whether substantial evidence
supports a conviction. The sole evidence connecting the
defendant to the rape was his fingerprint on the magazine (gun
clip) of a firearm used in the rape and found at the site of that
crime.
       The defendant in Johnson, relying on Mikes, supra,
947 F.2d 353, argued the evidence he committed the rape was
insufficient because the magazine was a movable object, and
there was no evidence he could not have accessed it prior to its
use by whomever committed the rape. (People v. Johnson, supra,
8 Cal.5th at pp. 515-516.) The Supreme Court rejected the
contention such evidence was required, effectively adopting a
more lenient standard. Noting simply there was no reasonable
explanation for how the defendant’s fingerprint could have been
left on the magazine—the defendant did not know the man from
whom the gun had been stolen nor had the defendant been inside
the gun owner’s home before the theft—the Court held Mikes was
“easily distinguished” because, unlike the turnstile pole in that
case, “there was no evidence the magazine was accessible to the
general public before the crime against [the rape victim].” (Id. at
p. 516.) That is, the Johnson Court did not require the
prosecutor to prove the item was, in fact, totally inaccessible to
the defendant prior to the crime, but only that the evidence did
not preclude a rational trier of fact from finding beyond a

                                13
reasonable doubt the fingerprint was left on the magazine during
(or in preparation for) the offense.
      3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding That
         Karels Killed Powell
      Because it is undisputed Karels was driving the Monte
Carlo on August 6, 2020, the presence of his DNA on the steering
wheel and gear shift did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt he
was the individual who murdered Powell and, standing alone,
would not be sufficient evidence for us to affirm his conviction.
To a lay jury, of course, the minimal presence of DNA from other
individuals in those places inside the car certainly suggested
Karels was the most recent driver and hence the killer. But
under Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d 667, more is required. It is
possible, at least based on what the prosecution’s DNA expert
said and, more importantly, did not say, the individual driving
the car on August 24, 2020 was wearing gloves and, as a result,
neither left his own DNA nor wiped away the DNA previously left
by Karels. There could also be other explanations—certainly
speculative, but potentially plausible as a matter of DNA
science—for how Karels’s DNA retained its dominant presence on
the steering wheel and the gear shift although someone else was
driving the car when it ran over Powell. Expert testimony could
have addressed those evidentiary gaps. The People did not
present it.
      But the jury had significantly more evidence on which to
base its finding that Karels was guilty of murder than his DNA
inside the car. As discussed, the traffic citation Karels received
on August 6, 2020 indicated he was a White male with brown
hair and blue eyes, a description generally consistent with
Palomo’s testimony the driver was a “light skin White or

                                14
Hispanic” male “with facial hair.” In addition, the jury was
entitled to compare Palomo’s description to Karels’s physical
characteristics. (See, e.g., People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328,
335 [“a view of the defendant by the trier of fact in an appropriate
case may be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant is
an adult”]; People v. Castaneda (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 197, 203
[jury’s observation of defendant’s apparent age properly
considered in determining sufficiency of the evidence to establish
defendant was more than 10 years older than minor victim of
sexual abuse]; see also Simons, Cal. Evidence Manual (2022 ed.)
§ 1.2 [“Observations about a party or witness made by the trier of
fact may be evidence regardless of whether or not the person
testifies. If relevant, observations of a party’s appearance are
evidence. . . . The jury may compare the defendant’s appearance
to the witness’s description of the perpetrator”].) Because under
substantial evidence review we presume the existence of every
fact the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence it
heard and saw, we necessarily presume Karels met that
description.7 And as general as that description may have been,
it had far more probative value than the neighbor’s speculative
and unreliable identification of the second perpetrator at issue in
Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d 667. In addition, the evidence
established that Cager, the owner of the Monte Carlo, did not

7     Although statements by counsel are not evidence (see, e.g.,
People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1033; People v. Cook
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1359), Karels’s lawyer confirmed the
propriety of the presumption that Karels was a light-skinned
White or Hispanic man with facial hair by arguing in his closing
that many men in the area where the murder occurred match
that description, not that his client did not.

                                15
match Palomo’s description of the driver and thus could
reasonably be excluded as Powell’s killer.8
       Moreover, in addition to the DNA in the interior of the
Monte Carlo, Karels’s DNA was found, mixed with Powell’s, on
the edge of the large cutout in the windshield above where the
VIN plate had been removed. (Nieman testified there was a
52 percent contribution from Karels, 46 percent from Powell, and
a remaining 2 percent from an unknown contributor.) Powell’s
DNA was also found elsewhere on the periphery of the car’s
windshield as the single source contributor at one location and as
contributing 96 percent (with Karels contributing 4 percent) at
another.
       It was certainly reasonable for the jury to infer, as the
prosecutor argued in his closing, because Karels knew he had
been linked to the Monte Carlo as a result of the traffic stop and
citation 18 days earlier, he cut open the windshield after the
murder in order to remove the car’s VIN plate in an effort to
avoid detection as Powell’s killer, leaving his DNA next to the

8      As Justice Segal acknowledges in his dissent, no
demographic information concerning the number of individuals
who reside in Los Angeles County and who might match Palomo’s
description of the driver of the murder car was introduced at
trial. But if this type of statistical analysis were pertinent to
determining whether substantial evidence supported Karels’s
conviction, the appropriate inquiry would not be the probability
that someone matching that description was driving the Monte
Carlo in Los Angeles County on the day of the murder but the
probability that two different individuals matching that
description would be driving a car, not owned by either of them,
in the City of Lancaster within 18 days of each other. The
answers to those questions would likely be very different.

                                16
hole in the process. To be sure, there was no direct evidence of
when the hole was cut and the car’s VIN and license plates
removed.9 However, based on the People’s post-murder
photographs, the jury could logically and reasonably conclude it
must have been after Powell was hit and the car was being
abandoned because it was not feasible the car was driven for any
distance with a hole extending over nearly one quarter of the
windshield directly in front of the driver.
      As for Powell’s DNA on edges of the windshield, including
in the area near the cutout, from Palomo’s testimony and the
surveillance video, it would be reasonable to conclude it was left
there, as was the DNA extracted from blood on the car’s
undercarriage, as a result of Powell being struck by the car.
While our dissenting colleague correctly points out that nothing
in Palomo’s testimony or the surveillance video indicates Powell’s
body was thrown onto the windshield of the Monte Carlo, that
evidence indisputably established Powell was hit twice by the
front end of the vehicle. It seems a clear example of a reasonable
inference, not “simply guesswork,” for the prosecutor to argue,
and the jury to deduce, that Powell’s DNA on the windshield,
including near the large cutout, was the result of those two
assaults.10

9     Deputy Magnan’s testimony he ran the vehicle’s license
plate during the August 6, 2020 traffic stop, as well as the
notation of the plate number on the citation, established that the
license plates were still on the car on that date. And it is unlikely
the deputy would not have noted (at least) a very large hole in
the windshield.
10    Neither criminalist testified whether Powell’s or Karels’s
DNA on the windshield had been extracted from blood or other
biological deposits. In his closing argument the prosecutor

                                 17
       One could certainly conjure another explanation for why
Karels’s DNA was at the precise location of the cutout on the
windshield, just as could have been done with respect to the
fingerprint evidence on the gun magazine in People v. Johnson,
supra, 8 Cal.5th 475. But unlike in People v. Trevino, supra,
39 Cal.3d at pages 696 to 697, where the Supreme Court quoted
the trial court’s assessment that there was “‘no reason to
presume’” the defendant’s fingerprint “‘was made on the day of
the murder as opposed to some other occasion,’” here it was
logical and reasonable to conclude Karels’s DNA next to the
cutout had been deposited on the day Powell was killed.
       In sum, taken together, Karels’s DNA on the steering wheel
and gear shift, his DNA next to the cutout from the windshield
above the location of the car’s missing VIN plate, and his match
to the general description of the driver provided by Palomo
reasonably justified the jury finding Karels guilty of first degree
murder. Whether or not there was also an explanation of the
evidence suggesting Karels’s innocence, as defense counsel
argued to the jury when discussing CALCRIM No. 224, a reversal
of the judgment is not warranted. (See People v. Manibusan,
supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 97.)

indicated (without objection) Karels’s had come from blood on the
edge of the windshield cutout.

                                18
                  DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

                             PERLUSS, P. J.

I concur:

      FEUER, J.

                        19
      SEGAL, J., Dissenting.

       I respectfully dissent from the majority’s valiant effort,
largely unaided by the People, to find substantial evidence to
support Karels’s conviction. I agree with the majority that—as in
People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, where a fingerprint and
equivocal identification were insufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction—the presence of Karels’s DNA on the
steering wheel and gear shift was not, without more, substantial
evidence to support his conviction. But the majority attempts to
escape the holding of Trevino by saying there was “significantly
more evidence” of Karels’s guilt. I don’t think there was, and
that’s where we differ.
       The first additional piece of evidence the majority cites is
the description in the August 6, 2020 traffic citation of Karels as
a White male with brown hair and blue eyes, which the majority
asserts was “generally consistent with” Palomo’s description of
the perpetrator as a “light skin White or Hispanic” male “with
facial hair.” Significantly, in his respondent’s brief, the Attorney
General does not cite or rely on any evidence of Karels’s skin
color or physical appearance or any other evidence suggesting
Karels matched Palomo’s description. Nor did the Attorney
General accept our invitation to do so at oral argument. Which is
understandable, given the (as I see it) negligible probative value
of Karels matching the exceedingly broad description of a White
or Hispanic male.
       The majority justifiably resorts to the phrase “generally
consistent.” It is difficult to know which demographic figures to
use or how to use them, but as long as we are going to make
inferences without assistance from the parties, I would observe
that the most recent figures available from the United States
Census Bureau11 indicate that 75.4 percent of California’s
estimated population of 39,029,342 is either White or Hispanic
and that 50 percent is male. That’s 14,714,062 White or Hispanic
male Californians. Conservatively excepting from this number
the percentage that is under 18 years old and therefore may be
less likely to drive a car or grow significant facial hair (22.4
percent) leaves 11,418,112 Californians plausibly matching
Palomo’s description. That Karels was one of at least 11 million
people who could have been driving the car that hit Powell seems
hardly more probative than the “highly speculative and equivocal
identification testimony” in People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at
page 697.12

11    Available at
 [as of Feb. 6, 2023], archived at <
https://perma.cc/U379-XUAH>.

12    If we were going to use figures for Los Angeles County
(available at
 [as of Feb. 6, 2023], archived at <
https://perma.cc/JBM9-4H3H>.): 74.4 percent of the county’s
estimated population of 9,829,544 is either White or Hispanic and
49.6 percent is male, which leaves 3,627,338 White or Hispanic
males. Adjusting to exclude those under the age of 18 (21.1
percent) would narrow to 2,861,970 the number of Los Angeles
County residents plausibly matching Palomo’s description.

                                 2
       The majority asserts that, from the jury’s opportunity to
observe Karels at trial, “we necessarily presume Karels met
[Palomo’s] description” of the driver. It is not clear from this
assertion whether the majority is presuming Karels had light
skin and facial hair. If so, I have reservations about presuming
those facts. The majority cites a treatise stating that a jury’s
“observations of a party’s appearance are evidence” (Simons,
California Evidence Manual (2022 ed.) § 1.2) and the well-
established principle that we presume “‘the existence of every
fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.’”
(People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 423). Thus, in
considering the possibility the jury deduced from its observation
of Karels at trial that he matched Palomo’s description, the
question is: Was such a deduction reasonable? And the answer
depends on what Karels looked like. Besides the traffic citation’s
description of him as White and male, we have no evidence of
what Karels looked like. Therefore we cannot say the jury could
have “reasonably deduced” anything more probative from its
observation of Karels at trial than that he was White and male.
In sum, while we must presume the existence of facts the jury
could have reasonably inferred from the evidence, we must not
infer the existence of evidence to support deductions we presume
were reasonable.
       Neither of the cases the majority cites (and the parties did
not) on this issue, People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328
(Montalvo) and People v. Castaneda (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 197
(Castaneda), applies here. In what the court in Castaneda
identified as “dictum” (Castaneda, at p. 203), the Supreme Court
in Montalvo discussed the evidence required to prove a
defendant’s age for the offense of furnishing a narcotic to a minor

                                 3
by an adult, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11502.
The Supreme Court in Montalvo observed: “‘Experience teaches
us that corporal appearances are approximately an index of the
age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old
age and youth.’” (Montalvo, at p. 335, italics in original.) The
Supreme Court went on to state that “a view of the defendant by
the trier of fact in an appropriate case may be sufficient to
support a finding that the defendant is an adult. In any event,
the information or indictment must contain the necessary
language as to age and in jury trials, the jury must be properly
instructed as to all of the elements of the offense.” (Id., at
pp. 335-336.)
       The court in Castaneda, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 197 cited
this discussion in concluding a jury’s observation of the defendant
and the victim in that case, “corroborated by . . . testimony” the
defendant “was an adult man” when the victim was five years
old, was sufficient to prove the age element of sexual offenses
requiring that the defendant be 10 years older than the victim.
(Id. at pp. 202-204.) Montalvo and Castaneda thus suggest that,
in some cases, where the prosecution pleads and must prove the
age element of an offense and the court instructs on it, the
reviewing court may consider the jury’s observation of the
defendant in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence on that
element. Neither case stands for the proposition that, where a
witness describes a perpetrator’s appearance and the jury finds
the defendant guilty, we must presume the defendant matched
the witness’s description in all or even any respects.
       The only other additional evidence—i.e., in addition to the
presence of Karels’s DNA inside the car—cited by the majority is
the presence of Karels’s DNA, in more or less equal proportion to

                                 4
Powell’s (52 percent to 48 percent), next to the windshield cutout
near where the VIN plate was removed. From that evidence of
relative parity in the two men’s DNA next to the cutout, the
majority concludes the jury could have reasonably inferred Karels
“cut open the windshield after the murder in order to remove the
car’s VIN plate to avoid detection as Powell’s killer” because
Karels knew the traffic stop 18 days earlier might link him to the
car. (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 16.)
       I think that’s quite a leap, one not even the Attorney
General was willing to make. In fact, the Attorney General
attached no particular significance to the presence of Karels’s
DNA next to the hole in the windshield. And again, in my view,
for good reason: Rather than sticking to the “‘facts that can
“logically and reasonably be drawn” from the evidence,’” the
majority’s analysis rests on “‘evidence which ‘merely raises a
possibility’ a particular fact is true,’” that is, on impermissible
“speculation.” (People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153, 180; see
People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360 [a “‘“finding of fact
must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere
speculation as to probabilities without evidence”’”]; People v.
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 365 [“‘a jury may not rely upon
unreasonable inferences,’” and “‘[a]n inference is not reasonable if
it is based only on speculation’”].)
       The series of supposedly reasonable inferences the majority
constructs from the presence of Karels’s DNA next to the hole in
the windshield seems insufficiently supported by logic or
evidence. (See People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 172
[deductions that are “highly speculative” and require “a number
of inferential leaps” are not substantial evidence].) For example,
if Karels was so concerned law enforcement would link him to the

                                 5
car because of the traffic citation, why would he use the car as a
murder weapon in the first place? And are we to suppose (i.e.,
speculate) Karels knew just enough about vehicle identification
numbers to think of removing the VIN plate from the dash, but
not enough to know the VIN was readily retrievable from other
locations on the car?13 Similarly, the majority’s accounting for
the nearly equal amount of Powell’s DNA around the windshield
cutout is simply guesswork—nothing in Palomo’s testimony or
the surveillance video indicates Powell’s body was thrown onto
the windshield. (See Ware, at p. 167 [a reasonable inference
“may not be based on suspicion alone, or on imagination,
speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work”
(internal quotation marks omitted)].)
       In my view, while Karels may have committed this murder,
the People did not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, and
substantial evidence does not support his conviction. Therefore, I
would reverse the conviction.

                                                  SEGAL, J.

13     Sheriff’s Department investigators appear to have had no
difficulty locating the VIN on the car. (See United States v.
Wallace (2d Cir. 2019) 937 F.3d 130, 134 [“The VIN . . . is
required by law to be printed on each vehicle in multiple
locations. 49 CFR § 565.13. Among other locations, the VIN
must be printed . . . on the Federal Label, which is a sticker
affixed to the ‘hinge pillar, door-latch post, or the door edge that
meets the door-latch post, next to the driver’s seating position’
(the ‘doorjamb’). 49 C.F.R. § 567.4.”].)

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