Court Opinion

ID: 9930754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:05:47.802212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:57.209046
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-1776
                               Filed February 7, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF S.C.,
Minor Child,

L.H., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Cynthia S. Finley,

District Associate Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Michael M. Lindeman of Lindeman Law, Cedar Rapids, for appellant

mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Julie G. Trachta, Linn County Advocate, attorney and guardian ad litem for

minor child.

       Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

         The mother appeals termination of her parental rights to S.C., born

December 2022. This family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services (HHS) shortly after the mother gave birth to S.C.

because of the        mother’s mental-health issues (including mental-health

commitments during pregnancy).        HHS again received additional reports the

following February about the mother allegedly using marijuana while caring for

then-three-month-old S.C. and failing to adequately attend to the child’s medical

needs. Around this same time, the mother rode with S.C. on her lap unrestrained

in a moving car and left the infant unattended in an apartment.

         These reports led to HHS removing the child that same month. The mother

was arrested and briefly incarcerated for fighting with and injuring police during

that removal.      HHS tested S.C.’s hair, and the results were positive for

methamphetamine and tetrahydrocannabinol (better known as THC).

         The mother left Iowa for Illinois in March. During that trip, she had more

police interactions and was hospitalized in a mental-health facility for about two

weeks. The same month, the juvenile court adjudicated S.C. as a child in need of

assistance. The mother lived in both Iowa and Minnesota in the following weeks

before becoming homeless. She obtained housing two-and-a-half months before

trial.

         When obtaining a substance abuse evaluation in June, the mother denied

methamphetamine use—even though S.C. tested positive for methamphetamine

while in her care. The mother subsequently missed almost half of her drug-testing

appointments. On the tests she did complete, her results came back negative for
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all substances until August, when she tested positive for methamphetamine and

cocaine on a patch after S.C.’s father “came to town.” The mother claimed the

positive test results were from sex with a drug user and refused to test after the

positive result. HHS testified the patch measured ingestion, not sexual activity.

       The mother participated in some mental-health services. She self-reported

attending counseling and complying with a prescription-drug regimen. But HHS

could not corroborate the self-report, and the mother’s substance-abuse counselor

reported she hadn’t seen the mother “for some time” as of trial. The mother’s

attendance at visits with S.C. was inconsistent, and she made little progress with

parenting skills despite being offered services to improve them.

       From August to the termination trial, the mother did not attend any of S.C.’s

medical appointments, and she claimed she “didn’t even know [she] was able to

attend [S.C.’s] appointments.” She also refused to meet with HHS, and she did

not attend any visits with S.C. after August 16.       She told HHS on “several”

occasions she planned to consent to termination.

       At trial, the mother testified she was deliberately unemployed because she

wanted to take care of her daughter. But the HHS worker testified the mother had

been fired or quit “probably five or six jobs” during the life of the case. The mother

said she stopped attending visits with S.C. “because of the fact it was a lot of

pressure for me.” She mentioned she stopped meeting with HHS and participating

in services because it “stressed [her] out,” so she “just chose not to go.”

       Meanwhile, S.C. was placed with maternal great-grandparents who were

working to obtain their adoption license. The child was doing well in their care and

her medical needs were met.
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       The county attorney, HHS, the court appointed special advocate, and S.C.’s

guardian ad litem all recommended termination. The court terminated the mother’s

rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h) (2023).

       The mother appeals, and our review is de novo.              In re W.M., 957

N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). “We are not bound by the factual findings of the

juvenile court, though we give them respectful consideration, particularly with

respect to credibility determinations.”    Id.   The State must present clear and

convincing evidence to support the grounds for termination. Id.

       As to the statutory elements, the mother contends the State did not prove

the child could not safely be returned to her care. While the requirement a child

cannot safely return is an element of section 232.116(1)(h), it is not element of

paragraphs (b) concerning abandonment or (e) concerning failure to maintain

meaningful contact. Despite claiming to challenge these two grounds in a heading

in her petition, the mother does not make any substantive challenge on appeal

toward the statutory elements of (b) or (e), so we summarily affirm on those

grounds. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

       As to best interests, we note the mother’s argument conflates best interests

with the permissive bond exception at section 232.116(3)(c). See, e.g., In re A.L.,

No. 22-0422, 2022 WL 1658699, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022) (“As many

parents do, the mother conflates a best-interests argument with arguments about

permissive factors weighing against termination.”). Assuming without deciding a

substantive best-interests claim is presented, we reject it. In deciding a child’s best

interests under the statute, we give primary weight “to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
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physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2). We also consider the child’s integration into the foster family and

whether the foster family is willing to permanently integrate the child into the family.

Id. § 232.116(2)(b). The mother abandoned the child and has taken limited steps

to resume care or provide a safe home. She is unwilling or unable to engage with

HHS and has not had consistent visitation with the child. S.C., meanwhile, is well-

integrated into the great-grandparents’ foster home, which has potential for

adoption. Termination is in S.C.’s best interests.

       On the permissive bond exception, section 232.116(3)(c) allows the juvenile

court to decline termination if it “would be detrimental to the child at the time due

to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” A parent resisting termination

has the burden to prove this permissive exception by clear and convincing

evidence, and our case law recognizes that—without more—neither a parent’s

love nor the mere existence of a bond is enough to prevent termination. See In re

A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa 2021); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709

(Iowa 2010). Assuming without deciding there is a bond between the mother and

S.C., any potential detriment caused to S.C. by severing that bond is outweighed

by the stability and safety afforded S.C. by termination and adoption. See In re

M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting we consider the bond in the

context of a case’s unique circumstances and the child’s best interests).

       AFFIRMED.