Court Opinion

ID: 9478775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:57:45.151276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:36.728172
License: Public Domain

MESKILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur, but I am not as convinced as the majority that the language of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S. C.A. 3668 (West 1985 & Supp.1988), and the legislative history suggest an affirmative answer to the difficult question Berrios poses.
While I agree with the majority’s position that in this case restitution in an amount higher than that charged in the information was properly ordered, I am concerned with the future implications of our holding. In my view, ordering restitution in an amount higher than the amount charged in the information is only proper where the higher amount is attributable to collateral consequences arising out of the specific offense to which the defendant has pled guilty. Where there are no such consequences, ordering restitution in the higher amount is an improper expansion of the court’s sentencing power. On the facts in this case, however, I would affirm without reaching the question whether restitution may be ordered in an amount greater than the amount charged in the information to which Berrios pled guilty.
In challenging his sentence, Berrios does not seek to withdraw his plea. Neither does he request resentencing even though, having had the benefit of a lenient sentence based on his concession of a moral obligation to make full restitution, resentenc-ing is what he should have to face, should the restitution order be ruled excessive. We need not even consider these options, however, because Berrios has no cause whatever to complain. At the time of his bargained-for plea, he knew that there was a likelihood that the order of restitution would be for $2,905, an amount higher than the $1,349 charged in the information. While it is true that Berrios’ counsel challenged the court’s authority to order restitution beyond the $1,349 charged, counsel acknowledged that $2,905 was the total loss Berrios caused the bank. Counsel stated further that Berrios would “certainly abide by whatever order [the District] Court imposes.” Counsel also indicated that her client felt a moral obligation to pay back the higher amount. Sentencing Tr. 8-9. This gave rise to the court’s compassionate statement: “You seem to have genuine remorse which is one of the major factors and you have tried to cooperate and the restitution will be important.” Id. at 4. The court thereafter sentenced Berrios. The facts in this case show a rather “fully bargained” plea agreement. Having chosen to go along with the plea agreement, I believe Berrios has waived his right to challenge the restitution order. He should not now be heard to complain; he has not been harmed. He has been ordered to do only what he admits he is morally obligated to do and what he agreed to do in order to escape incarceration.
I would affirm on this limited basis and leave the more difficult question for another day.