Court Opinion

ID: 9372261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-20 17:02:27.098584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.005611
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

DEREK HOPKINS,                          §
                                        §     No. 102, 2022
       Defendant-Below,                 §
       Appellant,                       §     Court Below: Superior Court of
                                        §     the State of Delaware
       v.                               §
                                        §     Cr. ID No. K2001012867
STATE OF DELAWARE,                      §
                                        §
       Appellee.                        §

                        Submitted: November 16, 2022
                         Decided: February 20, 2023

Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

Zachary A. George, Esquire, Hudson Jones Jaywork & Fisher, Dover, Delaware, for
Appellant, Derek Hopkins.

Brian L. Arban, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellee.

VAUGHN, Justice:
       The Defendant-Below, Appellant, Derek Hopkins, appeals from his

convictions in Superior Court for Drug Dealing, Disregarding a Police Officer’s

Signal, Conspiracy in the Third Degree, Resisting Arrest, Illegal Possession of a

Controlled Substance (2 counts), Driving While Suspended or Revoked, Reckless

Driving, Failure to Transfer Title and Registration, Unreasonable Speed, and Failure

to Stop at a Stop Sign.          He was also found “responsible” for possession of

marijuana.1 He makes three claims. First, he claims that the Superior Court abused

its discretion by refusing to accept a plea agreement offered by the State and the

defense on the morning of trial. Second, he claims that the Superior Court erred as

a matter of law by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of

Drug Dealing. Finally, he claims that the cumulative effect of the errors was to

prejudice his substantial rights, requiring the convictions to be vacated. We find no

merit to the defendant’s claims and affirm.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On January 21, 2020, around 10 p.m., Delaware State Police Officers Brian

Holl and Lloyd McCann were patrolling the area of Frederica, Delaware in an

unmarked SUV. They observed the defendant driving a Ford Crown Victoria on

1
  “[S]imple possession of a personal use quantity of marijuana is a civil, not criminal, offense.”
State v. Murray, 158 A.3d 476, 479 (Del. Super. 2017); see 16 Del. C. § 4764(c)(1). It is our
understanding that, in cases involving marijuana possession as a civil violation, a court will find
an individual “responsible” or “not responsible.”
                                                2
Bowers Beach Road. They ran the tag number of the defendant’s vehicle and

discovered that the vehicle’s title and registration had not been properly transferred.

Trooper Holl, the driver of the police vehicle, activated his emergency lights and

attempted to stop the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant failed to comply and

attempted to flee at a high rate of speed. He continued to travel at a high rate of

speed, running through several stop signs. Finally, he lost control of his vehicle and

crashed into a cement porch at a residence. When the officers exited their unmarked

SUV and approached the defendant’s vehicle, he attempted to pull away in reverse.

Trooper Holl then broke the driver’s door window with his baton. Officer McCann

unlocked the driver’s side door, removed the defendant from the vehicle and, despite

the defendant’s resistance, secured him with handcuffs. A female passenger was

also taken into custody.

      Upon the defendant’s arrest, Officer McCann conducted a search of his

person. The officer found two bags containing a green leafy substance, suspected

and later confirmed to be marijuana, and a prescription pill bottle containing a white

rock substance, suspected and later confirmed to be crack cocaine. The cocaine

weighed in at 1.3 grams. Officer McCann also found $573 cash in the defendant’s

pocket. The defendant stated to Officer McCann that the substances belonged to

him, but signed a Notice of Forfeiture form indicating that the money was not his.

                                          3
       Heroin was also found in the vehicle. A bundle2 of heroin was discovered in

the “back passenger floorboard area.”3 Bags containing the heroin were labeled

“Armany AX.”4 When asked about this labeling, Officer McCann explained: “It’s

common for packaged heroin to have a -- it’s stamped, but it’s the brand . . . of the

heroin.”5 The following day, Trooper Holl discovered bags of heroin bearing the

label “Hell Cat”6 in the back seat of his vehicle where the defendant’s female

passenger had been the previous evening. She was charged with possession of the

“Hell Cat” heroin. No drug paraphernalia of the kind used to ingest drugs was found

in the vehicle or on the defendant’s person.

       The defendant’s indictment occurred during the public health and judicial

emergencies caused by COVID-19. During that time, emergency restrictions on

judicial branch activity were in effect and jury trials were not being held.              The

emergency declarations were rescinded on July 13, 2021, and the Superior Court

began to address the significant backlog of cases which were then pending. The

defendant’s trial was scheduled for Monday, October 18, 2021, and Thursday,

October 14, 2021, was established as a plea-by-appointment deadline. In other

2
  Officer McCann, who testified about the discovery of this heroin in the vehicle, described a
bundle of heroin as a collection of nine to thirteen bags of heroin which are wrapped together,
usually with a rubber band.
3
  App. to Opening Br. at A-280.
4
  Id.
5
  Id.
6
  Id. at A-285.
                                              4
words, any plea agreement between the State and the defendant was required to be

presented to the court by October 14, and a plea agreement tendered after that date

was subject to rejection by the court as untimely.

      In addition to this case, the defendant had two other outstanding cases, one

which included drug charges and one which included drug and weapons charges.

They were also scheduled for trial for October 18. The State offered a plea

agreement to the defendant a week before the plea-by-appointment deadline that

would have resolved all three of the defendant’s cases with a recommended sentence

of three years at Level V. This plea offer was not accepted by the defendant. At a

pretrial conference on Friday, October 15, the Superior Court assigned this case as

the one that would go forward for trial on October 18, with the other two cases being

given new trial dates. Negotiations between defendant’s counsel and the State

continued past the October 14 deadline and into the weekend. These continued

negotiations resulted in the State making a new plea offer that would resolve this

case and the other drug case with a recommendation for a sentence involving only

probation. The new offer did not include the drugs and weapons case and left it

unresolved, to be discussed at a later time.

      On the morning scheduled for trial, the State and defense counsel appeared

before the judge who was calling the criminal trial calendar and informed him of the

new plea offer made after the plea-by-appointment deadline. Defense counsel

                                          5
indicated that he believed the defendant would be receptive to the plea offer, but that

he had been unable to speak with him that morning before appearing in court. The

court expressed frustration with the parties for this and rejected the plea offer,

explaining:

                And, again, in the COVID scenario, I’ve had a hundred
                something jurors get thrown in today. And the parties
                need to come to grips with that and they need to
                understand that and they need to take that seriously when
                we’re handling these matters . . . . I’ve got to worry about
                the State’s concerns, the defendant’s concerns the jurors
                and the court system’s concerns as a whole, and we need
                to make sure that these deadlines are worked . . . . I’m
                hearing the parties got together, did more negotiating over
                this weekend, decided they were going to resolve matters
                that would take this case off the calendar. And that’s not
                acceptable.7

         Later that morning, defense counsel and the State met with the assigned trial

judge in chambers. During this office conference, the court informed the parties that

the earlier rejection of the plea offer would not be changed or reconsidered. The

trial judge explained:

                And let me just make this clear. The case is regarding the
                Court’s discretion to accept a late plea, and based on the
                principle that the Court has to manage its docket, and the
                Court cannot effectively manage its docket if counsel do
                not follow the directives of the Court. The Court has made
                it clear countless times to counsel that we have a plea-by-
                appointment deadline that has been in effect now for a
                number of months, and, particularly, in the context of the
                pandemic, and requiring jurors to expose themselves to

7
    App. to Opening Br. at A-182.
                                             6
               danger by coming out and serving, which they have been
               doing, that we must abide by that plea-by-appointment
               deadline. If the Court begins to allow that deadline just to
               be disregarded, and then plea negotiations to continue after
               the plea-by-appointment deadline, then the Court loses
               control over its docket.8

The court further reiterated that there existed no rule of law that mandated that plea

agreements must be accepted by the court, especially in cases when they are

presented outside the established deadlines.

       Trial by jury then proceeded. During the trial, Trooper Holl and Officer

McCann testified about the events surrounding the defendant’s arrest. Officer

McCann testified to a number of points relevant to the drug dealing charge:

               • Drug dealers do not usually have drug paraphernalia—
                 the “kind to ingest drugs”9—with them.
               • No such drug paraphernalia was found in the
                 defendant’s vehicle.
               • “[D]rug dealers usually have a larger amount of
                 currency in smaller denominations”10 and the
                 defendant’s money included “one $1 bill, one $2 bill,
                 12 $5 bills, 23 $10 bills and 14 $20 bills.”11
               • “[I]t’s common for drug dealers to separate themselves
                 from funds that are a profit of drug sales.”12
               • “[I]n my experience, drug dealers are those that are
                 selling drugs for any kind of profit. They usually have
                 a larger quantity of narcotics, usually multiple variants
                 of narcotics, as well as some sort of digital scale to be

8
  Id. at A-169.
9
  Id. at A-281.
10
   Id.
11
   Id.
12
   Id. at A-286.
                                            7
                   used with any kind of drug paraphernalia associated
                   with those that are actually selling the narcotics.”13
               •   Officer McCann “use[d] force to pull [the defendant]
                   out of the car”14 and after being laid on the ground with
                   his hands underneath of his body, the defendant’s
                   hands had to be physically pulled behind his back so
                   that he could be handcuffed, as the defendant “would
                   not comply with [Officer McCann’s] verbal commands
                   to put his hands behind his back.”15
               •   1.3 grams of cocaine is “more than a user amount”16
                   and, in Officer McCann’s experience, users of cocaine
                   usually do not possess quantities over one gram.
               •   Officer McCann did not know how much 1.3 grams of
                   cocaine would cost or how much cocaine a person
                   could get for $50.
               •   Officer McCann “think[s]”17 the amount of cocaine
                   typically bought by users “all depends on how much
                   money the person that wants to buy the drugs has.”18
               •   When crack cocaine is sold, the dealer will break a
                   piece off of the rock, and that piece “could be as small
                   as a piece of sand.”19
               •   Crack cocaine is usually consumed by smoking, and
                   some methods involve use of a cigarette or crack pipe.
               •   Officer McCann “assum[ed]”20 cocaine could be
                   ingested orally, but he “never had anyone say that they
                   ingest crack cocaine by eating it or swallowing it.”21

Officer McCann explained that he “can’t testify to [the defendant’s] intent[,]”22 and

13
   Id. at A-281.
14
   Id. at A-277.
15
   Id.
16
   Id. at A-289.
17
   Id.
18
   Id.
19
   Id. at A-290.
20
   Id. at A-286.
21
   Id.
22
   Id. at A-287.
                                             8
further explained, “No, I mean I’m not in his head.               But the totality of the

circumstances with drugs, money, and him fleeing from the police, you could

conclude that there was drug sales.”23

       At the conclusion of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for judgment of

acquittal as to the drug dealing charge. The drug dealing count charged the

defendant with knowingly delivering or possessing with intent to deliver cocaine.

Defense counsel argued that there was a “decidedly insufficient amount of evidence

to submit [the charge] to the jury on the issue of intent to deliver.” 24 The motion

was denied.

                              STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review a court’s rejection of a plea agreement for abuse of discretion.25

“Abuse of discretion occurs when, among other things, the trial judge has ‘ignored

recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice.’”26

       This Court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.27

Specifically, this Court examines whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the

evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most

23
   Id. Officer McCann elaborated: “Without him stating, yes, I’m a drug dealer, yes, I do not
know.” Id.
24
   Id. at A-297.
25
   Berryman v. State, 897 A.2d 767, 2006 WL 954242, at *2 (Del. Apr. 11, 2006) (ORDER).
26
   Longford-Myers v. State, 213 A.3d 556, 558 (Del. 2019) (quoting Edwards v. State, 925 A.2d
1281, 1284 (Del. 2007)) (citations omitted).
27
   Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106 (Del. 2018).
                                             9
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

all the elements of the crime.28 “For the purposes of this inquiry, this Court does not

distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence[,]”29 and in cases involving

purely circumstantial evidence, the State need not “disprove every possible innocent

explanation[.]”30

                                       DISCUSSION

       The defendant first claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by

rejecting the parties’ late plea agreement.31 He contends that the State’s making of

a revised offer after the plea-by-appointment deadline had passed, an offer not

available to the defendant on or before the plea-by-appointment date, constituted

good cause to accept the plea agreement on the morning of trial.32

       Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(e)(3) states: “Time of Plea Agreement

Procedure. Except for good cause shown, notification to the court of the existence

of a plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or at such other time, prior to

trial, as may be fixed by the court.”33 “A defendant has no constitutional right to

28
   Id. at 106-07; Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879 (Del. 2001).
29
   Ways, 199 A.3d at 107 (quoting Cline v. State, 720 A.2d 891, 892 (Del. 1998)).
30
   Monroe v. State, 652 A.2d 560, 567 (Del. 1995).
31
   Opening Br. at 15.
32
   Id.
33
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(e)(3) (emphasis in original).
                                              10
have the court accept a plea agreement.[34] Trial courts have significant control over

and discretion in the management of their dockets and the scheduling of cases.”35

       The morning of trial, after being informed of the updated plea offer, the

judicial officer calling the criminal trial calendar asked the State three times to

provide a reason as to why the plea offer was not discussed before the plea-by-

appointment deadline. The State explained that over the weekend defense counsel

had broached the possibility of negotiating a plea agreement for this case and the

other drug case, and leaving the third case, the drugs and weapons case, which

carried mandatory time, for another day. This was an approach that had not been

considered before. The State indicated that it was willing to consider this approach

and over the weekend made the above-described offer to resolve this case and the

other case involving drug charges.

       A similar discussion occurred in an office conference with the trial judge. The

trial judge asked for a demonstration as to whether some kind of “change in

circumstances . . . prevented the State from making this offer before the plea-by-

appointment deadline[.]”36 The trial judge reiterated: “can anyone offer me any

34
   Berryman v. State, 897 A.2d 767, 2006 WL 954242, at *2 (Del. Apr. 11, 2006) (ORDER)
(quoting Slade v. State, 746 A.2d 277, 2000 WL 140039, at *1 (Del. Jan. 24, 2000) (citation
omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35
   Berryman, 2006 WL 954242 at *2 (quoting Washington v. State, 844 A.2d 293, 295 (Del. 2004))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
36
   App. to Opening Br. at A-170.
                                             11
reason why this couldn’t have occurred before the plea-by-appointment deadline?”37

After hearing responses from both the State and the defendant’s counsel, which were

similar to those given to the judge calling the criminal calendar, the court stated that

the previous ruling on the matter would remain intact.

       It appears that the revised plea offer evolved from continued negotiations of

the parties after expiration of the plea-by-appointment deadline, and not from any

new or unexpected developments in this case. We understand the logic of the

defendant’s contention – that he was denied a probationary plea for two cases that

was not available to him until after the plea-by-appointment deadline had passed.38

Both of the Superior Court Judges involved, however, explored with counsel the

reasons why the revised plea offer was made after expiration of the plea-by-

appointment deadline, and both concluded that no good cause existed for the

untimely plea offer. After carefully considering the defendant’s argument, our

conclusion is that the Superior Court acted within its broad discretion in deciding

that good cause did not exist to justify accepting an untimely plea agreement. No

abuse of discretion occurred. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s first claim.

       The defendant’s second claim that the Superior Court’s denial of his motion

for judgment of acquittal was error.39 We disagree. The evidence, viewed in the

37
   Id.
38
   Opening Br. at 15-16.
39
   Id. at 22.
                                          12
light most favorable to the State, is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of drug dealing.40

       The defendant claims that he could not be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

on the drug dealing charge “because there is no evidence to support a finding that

[he] had the requisite state of mind – intent to deliver the cocaine found in his

possession.”41 He argues that Officer McCann’s testimony “contort[ed] the facts”

to support a bias against the defendant; that the cocaine did not weigh enough to be

on a tier schedule; that it was not packaged in multiple bags; that police did not

observe any drug sales; that he did not admit possessing the cocaine with the intent

to deliver it; and that his flight was not probative of an intent to sell the cocaine

because he was in possession of illegal substances.42

       In Laws v. State, this Court stated the following regarding proof of “intent to

distribute:”

               [T]his Court held that an “intent to distribute” may be
               established through evidence of an additional element
               beyond mere possession. This additional element may
               include: (i) an admission by the defendant that the drugs
               were not for personal use; (ii) expert testimony about the
               amount or type of packaging generally used by sellers vs.
               users; or, (iii) some other credible evidence.43

40
   See Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106-07 (Del. 2018); Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879
(Del. 2001).
41
   Opening Br. at 23 (emphasis in original).
42
   Id. at 26.
43
   Laws v. State, 840 A.2d 641, 2003 WL 22998850, at *1 (Del. Dec. 18, 2003) (ORDER) (citing
Cline v. State, 740 A.2d 891, 892-93 (Del. 1998)) (footnote omitted).
                                             13
Officer McCann provided testimony, without objection, as an expert. He testified

that the defendant carried $573 on his person in denominations of $20 and under and

drug dealers often have large sums of money in small denominations; the defendant

claimed the money was not his, and drug dealers often try to “separate themselves”

from drug profits;44 1.3 grams of cocaine was “more than a user amount[;]”45 the

defendant did not possess drug paraphernalia and drug dealers usually do not have

drug paraphernalia with them; the defendant possessed more than one kind of drug,

as drug dealers often do; and the defendant resisted arrest.46 This evidence, viewed

in the light most favorable to the State, was more than sufficient to justify a rational

trier of fact’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for drug dealing.47

       The defendant’s third claim is that cumulative error occurred in the court

below. In light of our decisions that no abuse of discretion occurred with respect to

the rejection of the late plea agreement and that no error occurred with respect to the

denial of the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, we find that no

cumulative error occurred.

44
   App. to Opening Br. at A-286.
45
   Id. at A-289.
46
   Trooper Holl also testified to the fact that the defendant resisted arrest.
47
   See Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101, 106-07 (Del. 2018); Gronenthal v. State, 779 A.2d 876, 879
(Del. 2001).
                                             14
                          CONCLUSION

    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is

AFFIRMED.

                                15
TRAYNOR, Justice concurring:

       Although I agree with my colleagues that Hopkins’ convictions should be

affirmed, I write separately to express my misgivings over the strength of the

prosecution’s evidence on the charge of drug dealing. In the context of this case,

that charge required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hopkins possessed

cocaine with the intent to deliver it. If not for the deferential standard applicable to

motions for judgment of acquittal, I would have grave reservations about the

adequacy of the proof of Hopkins’ intent. In my view, Officer McCann’s testimony,

admittedly unrebutted by Hopkins, that the quantity of cocaine Hopkins possessed—

1.3 grams—was “more than a user”48 amount, but one gram would not be, is suspect.

Moreover, the logic of the officer’s testimony that Hopkins’ claim that the money

found in Hopkins’ back pocket was not his and Hopkins’ lack of cooperation are

indicative of drug dealing instead of simple possession is puzzling. And finally, the

officer’s lack of familiarity with the street value of the cocaine seized from

Hopkins49 calls into question his expertise in this area.

       But we are left with the fact that Hopkins did not challenge Officer McCann’s

expertise or object to any of the opinions he offered. I therefore reluctantly conclude

48
   App. to Opening Br. at A289. The basis for the officer’s opinion that a crack-cocaine user
would not typically possess more than one gram was that he had “stopped a lot of users and they
usually don’t have more than a gram on them.” Id.
49
   When asked if he knew the “cost[]” of 1.3 grams of cocaine, the officer candidly
acknowledged that he had “no idea.” Id.
                                              16
that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of

fact could rely on Officer McCann’s expert opinion—based on his largely

unchallenged interpretation of the evidence seized incident to Hopkins’ arrest—and

find Hopkins guilty of drug dealing beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                          17