Court Opinion

ID: 9591122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:02:21.539122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:05.566443
License: Public Domain

*35JOSEPH, C. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent.
There is so much that is wrong or doubtful about the majority’s opinion that I am hard put to know exactly where to begin. Therefore, I will begin with the part that is most certainly wrong. The majority says:
“Petitioner also suggests that, independently of its hearsay nature, the proof did not constitute substantial evidence to support the Commission’s specific findings against him. The Commission’s third, fourth and fifth conclusions of law, quoted above, set forth independent alternative bases for the Commission’s disposition. Therefore, if there was adequate evidentiary support for any one of them, petitioner’s substantial evidence contentions must fail.” 101 Or App at 34.
In Garcia v. Boise Cascade Corp., 309 Or 292, 787 P2d 884 (1990), the substantial evidence test was reviewed. The test requires the court to
“evaluate all the evidence to determine whether a reasonable person could have made the findings which the referee and the Board made on the evidentiary record. Instead, the court concluded that certain evidence supported findings different from those reached by the referee and that the referee (and the Board) thus erred. The Court of Appeals effectively has substituted its review of the evidence, contrary to ORS 183.482(8)(c). That was an incorrect application of the substantial evidence standard of review.” 309 Or at 295.
The other side of that statement is that we must not simply determine whether there is evidence to support a finding but whether “a finding is reasonable in light of countervailing as well as supporting evidence.” 309 Or at 295.1 do not think that the majority has adhered to that process.
Although I continue to be hopeful that the Supreme Court will someday reconsider the theoretical underpinnings for cases like Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19, 300 Or 507, 716 P2d 724 (1986), and Trebesch v. Employment Division, 300 Or 264, 710 P2d 136 (1985), in the light of how agencies actually do their business, it never having been clear to me how an individual adjudication can establish either a policy or an interpretation of a statutory term, I do not really want to get involved in that, now or ever. However, I cannot go along with the majority in being satisfied, as it is, by the *36Commission’s having determined petitioner’s “lack of good moral character by reference to the rule pertaining to gross unfitness and to gross neglect of duty.” 101 Or App at 31. (Emphasis supplied.) The majority approves the sort of thinking that says, “I cannot define good taste, but I recognize bad taste.” That might lead to good literary criticism, but I do not think it fair to make a person’s career hang on it.
Although ORS 183.450(1) makes admissible in an administrative proceeding any evidence “of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons in conduct [sic] of their serious affairs,” the issue cannot be dealt with easily in this context. Assuming that the burden of proof was with the Commission, which is not clear under the provisions of ORS 342.143,1 it does not seem that reasonably prudent (and well informed) persons would rely on hearsay if they knew that the actual speakers were available and were not presented so that their statements could be tested.
Even if the Commission did not statutorily have the burden of proof, it voluntarily undertook that burden. In any event, it ought not to be permitted to rely entirely on hearsay evidence, when it has it in its power to bring before it all of the actual participants. We need not adopt the “residuum rule” or create “a specific rule that makes hearsay insufficient to support an agency’s finding when there is no other evidence probative of the fact.” 101 Or App at 33. All we need say is that, if the party having the burden of proof can, but does not, produce direct evidence of the facts on which it relies, hearsay evidence, although admissible, is not substantial evidence.
I dissent.

 ORS 342.143 provides that the Commission may “require an applicant for a teaching certificate to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Commission of good moral character * * * and such other evidence as it may deem necessary to establish that applicant’s fitness to serve as a teacher.”