Court Opinion

ID: 9797532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:23:10.693826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:06.712748
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TRIEWEILER
concurs.
¶20 I specially concur with the majority’s conclusion that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Lewis and Clark County. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that judgment in favor of the County was justified because of the plaintiffs’ failure to prove causation. Instead, I conclude that the County simply had no duty to re-design or rebuild York Road. York Road at the time and place of the accident in question was a state-owned federal-aid highway for which the State Department of Transportation was the custodian. See § 60-1-102(2), MCA. For that reason the State transportation commission had the exclusive authority to designate the road for reconstruction. See § 60-2-110, MCA.
¶21 I dissent from that part of the majority opinion which concludes that the District Court correctly dismissed the State of Montana Department of Transportation by summary judgment.
¶22 “The State has the duty to provide and maintain safe highways for the citizens of the State of Montana.” Brohman v. State (1988), 230 Mont. 198, 201, 749 P.2d 67, 70 (citing State v. District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District (1977), 175 Mont. 63, 67, 572 P.2d 201, 203.) In this case there was evidence that the State breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe highway and that that breach was the cause of Kelly Vivier’s serious injuries.
¶23 While the majority opinion refers to the deposition of the *460plaintiffs expert, Don Fenton, it overlooks the affidavit submitted by Fenton in opposition to the State’s motion for summary judgment. In that affidavit, the following relevant statements are made:
1.1 am an expert witness in the above entitled action.
2. At the time of my deposition I had not had the opportunity to review the deposition of Lisa Loferski, the State’s accident reconstruction report and photographs of the vehicle which I have reviewed for the purposes of this affidavit. Based upon this information it is my opinion that this accident would not have occurred if FAS 280 was improved to safety standards for the reasons set forth below.
3. At the time of the accident Federal engineering safety standards would have required substantial improvement to FAS 280 because of traffic volumes that exceed the design capabilities of the road. The state had notice of traffic volumes and the fact that the road had exceeded its design life, two factors that made the road unreasonably hazardous.
4. Improvements that should have been made would include 6 foot paved shoulders on both sides of the road as explained more fully in my first affidavit.
5. It is my professional opinion that the hazardous condition of FAS 280 resulting from traffic volumes far in excess of design capabilities and the failure of the state and county to take reasonable steps to improve the road in accordance to federal requirements was a substantial cause resulting in the accident at issue because of the width of the road, the absence of shoulders and other design deficiencies as more fully stated in my opinion letter dated December 10, 1998.
6. Based upon the deposition of Lisa Loferski, the Reconstruction Report by Accident Graphics, and simple mathematics it is my opinion, simply put, that the accident would have been avoided all together had the road been wider.
7(a) Specifically, Lisa Loferski stated that as soon as she noticed the little girl she moved as far as she could into the left lane and there was no way that she could have gone further without going into the ditch.
(b) Lisa Loferski also stated that the little girl was riding her bicycle on the edge of the right side of the road prior to turning left.
(c) The State’s accident reconstructionist determined that it took the little girl approximately 2.3 seconds to travel from the edge of the road to the point of impact, a distance of approximately 15 feet.
(d) Had the little girl begun her turn from the edge of a safe road with 6 foot shoulders traveling at the same rate of speed she would have been six feet away from the point of impact at that *461time.
(e) If it took the little girl 2.3 seconds to travel 15 feet, as per the accident reconstruction report, by that calculation it would have taken her .93 seconds to reach the point of impact with an additional 6 feet shoulder.
(f) At a speed of 40 to 45 m.p.h. as stated by the reconstructionist or at a speed of 55 as stated by the driver Lisa Loferski the driver would have been, respectively 53.9 feet, 60.72 feet, and 81 feet beyond the point of impact before the little girl reached the point of impact.
(g) The 1980 Buick LeSabre was approximately 18 feet long which would have put it approximately 3 car lengths away at 40 mph, or as much as 4 Vz car lengths away going 55 m.p.h. beyond the point of impact at the time the little girl could have reached the point of impact. ...
¶24 Fenton is a qualified highway safety engineer who spent part of his career overseeing safety programs for the Federal Highway Administration and, before that, designed and built roads. His job for the Federal Highway Administration required evaluation of primary and secondary highways. He was fully qualified to express the opinions set forth in his affidavit. In fact, there are no objections from either party to Fenton’s qualifications.
¶25 Fenton’s affidavit raises issues of fact regarding the State’s breach of duty and the issue of causation. Liability cannot be resolved by summary judgment when factual issues concerning negligence and causation are presented. Dechesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369, 492 P.2d 926. While the investigating officer testified that the cause of Vivier’s accident was her own sudden and unexpected movement, the conflict in opinions simply gave rise to an issue of fact. Furthermore, an accident can result from more than one cause and contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery. See § 27-1-102, MCA.
¶26 For these reasons, I conclude that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to the State of Montana. The weight to be given to the testimony provided by the plaintiffs’ expert when that testimony is considered in light of the surrounding circumstances is the responsibility of the finder of fact and not, in this case, the district court.
¶27 For these reasons, I specially concur with and partially dissent from the majority opinion.