Court Opinion

ID: 9633213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:38:24.049695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:19.056395
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, C. J.,
dissenting.
If the trial judge’s statements made in explanation for the judgment are given a strictly literal reading there is, to be sure, an irreconcilable inconsistency in his conclusions.
However, the process of reasoning which the *162trial court used in reaching its conclusion is so evident that it seems unfair and highly technical to remand the ease for a new trial.
It seems clear that the court, as the trier of the facts, concluded either that the plaintiffs could not produce a working system or that, if this was not established -with certainty, the circumstances were such that defendant was not unreasonable in assuming that the plaintiffs could not perform and consequently acted reasonably in taking plaintiffs off the job and substituting another contractor to continue with the work. If defendant had given two days’ notice before acting, there would not have been any question of the defendant’s right to terminate the contract. But defendant was faced with a problem not covered by the contract; that is, where it was evident that plaintiffs could not perform and consequently the giving of two days’ notice would serve no purpose. Under such circumstances, though the notice given did not comply with the terms of the contract, defendant was nevertheless entitled to recover because its breach was merely technical and justifiable.① In my opinion this is what the trial judge purported to say. His statement, “I can’t actually say whether they [plaintiffs] could or couldn’t” have performed is not inconsistent with this since the crucial factor is not the plaintiffs’ actual capability to perform as determined at the time of trial, but rather their apparent capability at the time of termination.②
Having decided that defendant was to prevail, ' the court was then faced with determining the amount "of damages. The court found that defendant expended *163$11,501.19 to have the plant site dewatered. But it was clearly not entitled to that amount since it would have been required to pay $6,636.27 for the work if plaintiffs had completed their contract. Defendant was entitled only to the amount in excess of that which it was required to expend due to plaintiffs’ failure to perform. This amount was $4,864.92. To have awarded defendant more than this would have been to enrich defendant unjustly.
The problem in this case is presented by the trial judge’s explanation for the result he reached. Instead of explaining the result as having been reached by crediting plaintiffs with the $6,636.27 to prevent unjust enrichment, the court cast his reasoning in terms of an award made pursuant to the prayer of plaintiffs’ complaint. Although, technically, this was inconsistent with permitting defendant to recover on its counterclaim, it nevertheless seems evident that the court was simply computing the net damages which defendant suffered. For this reason, further proceedings seem unnecessary and I would affirm the result reached by the trial court.
Moreover, even if the court cannot accept this interpretation, I still see no need to remand for a new trial. It does not appear that additional evidence is necessary for a proper determination of this case. The trial judge’s error was one arising out of his explanation of the theory upon which he reached his conclusion. Additional evidence would not be helpful in resolving the dilemma presented by the literal reading of the language which he used in arriving at his conclusion. All we need is a clarification of his oral opinion — something we ourselves have been called upon to do from time to time.

 6 Corbin on Contracts, § 1259, pp. 32-33 (1962); Restatement, Contracts § 280 (1932).

 See Corbin supra § 1260.