Court Opinion

ID: 9695722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:28:12.371595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:24.420282
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. On July 15, 1974, a criminal complaint was filed against the appellant, charging him with burglary1 and theft by unlawful taking.2 On March 26, 1975, the appellant was convicted of these charges by a jury. The appellant now claims that his right to a speedy trial was denied in that he had not been brought to trial within 180 days from the date the criminal complaint was filed against him, as required by Pa. *571R.Crim.P. 1100(a) (2).3 After careful examination of the record, I agree with this contention, and would therefore reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge the appellant.
On November 25, 1974, the Commonwealth applied to the court below for an extension of time for commencement of trial pursuant to Pa,R.Crim.P. 1100(c).4 On January 7, 1975, the court below granted the Commonwealth an extension of 120 days, or until May 7, 1975, for commencement of trial. On January 16, 1975, the appellant filed a petition to dismiss the charges against him for violation of his right to a speedy trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f).5
The Commonwealth predicated its petition for an extension of time upon a claim that trial could not be commenced by January 13, 1975, the 180th day, because the case had not been received by the court below until August 19, 1974, which was five days after the docket had closed for presentation to the September Grand Jury of Lancaster County. Implicit in the Commonwealth's petition is a recognition that it was highly improbable that the appellant’s trial could be commenced within the prescribed period because the next Grand Jury of Lancaster County was not scheduled to convene until January, *5721975. The record clearly shows that the appellant was not responsible for any of the delay in the case reaching the court below. The Commonwealth admits that the case was delayed in being brought to the lower court solely because the appellant’s preliminary hearing, scheduled for July 22, 1974,6 was continued until August 13, 1974, at the request of the local Justice of the Peace. (NT 12) Because Justices of the Peace constitute an integral part of the judiciary of this Commonwealth, we must classify the instant delays as judicial delay. The majority interprets the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976), and Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976), as authority for its holding that the type of judicial delay present in the instant case justified the allowance of an extension of time for commencement of trial to the prosecution. I emphatically disagree with the majority’s reading of these cases.
In Mayfield, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may be granted an extension of time predicated solely upon the judiciary’s inability to provide trial within the prescribed period. The court, however, recognized that the judiciary, as well as the prosecution, must exercise due diligence in implementing the objectives of Rule 1100 and therefore conditioned its holding by declaring that the Rule may not be “. . . circumvented by unwarranted grants of extensions.” Commonwealth v. Mayfield, supra, 469 Pa. at 221, 364 A.2d at 1349. For this reason, the court declared that the:
“[Tjrial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the ‘due diligence’ of the prosecution, and (2) certification that trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business; provided that if the delay is due to the court’s inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the caus*573es of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided.” Id. at 222, 364 A.2d at 1349-50.
There can be no doubt that the first requirement of the Mayfield test has been satisfied in the present case. The record clearly shows that the prosecution proceeded with due diligence to bring the appellant to trial. However, it is equally clear that the second requirement of the May-field test has not been met. The record reveals that the Justice of the Peace violated the mandate of Pa.R.Crim. P. 140(f)7 by failing to arrange a preliminary hearing within three to ten days after the preliminary arraignment. As the majority notes, this failure on the part of the Justice of the Peace resulted in a four month delay in trial. The majority, however, fails to recognize that under Mayfield the ultimate responsibility for the actions of the lower judiciary lies with the trial court.8 I believe we are therefore precluded from finding on the record either that trial was scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court’s business or that the trial court acted with due diligence in attempting to commence trial within the prescribed time. Further, although the record reveals that the Justice of the Peace’s inaction caused the delay in trial, the record, in violation of Mayfield, is silent as to why the delay could not have been avoided. Because the record does not evidence compliance with the requirements of Mayfield and because the appellant’s trial did not commence within the time period prescribed by Rule 1100(a)(2), I would reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge the appellant.
*574Surprisingly, the majority, in affirming the judgment of sentence, ignores the requirements of the Supreme Court as prescribed in Mayfield. Instead, the majority relies upon certain language from Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra, as authority for its holding. The Supreme Court there stated:
“ [A]lthough we rule ‘judicial delay’ may justify an extension, it does not follow that every period of time utilized by a court in considering a matter pending before it relating to the accused will justify an extension. To the contrary, Rule 1100 allows an adequate period Of time in which the Commonwealth may prepare its case and during which matters preliminary to trial may be disposed of. .
While the following situations are not to be considered exclusive, they represent the type of circumstances wherein an extension may be justifiably granted because of a causal relationship between the ‘judicial delay’ and the Commonwealth’s inability to commence trial despite due diligence. . . . (2) Situations where the Commonwealth is prepared to corhmencé trial prior to the expiration of the mandatory period but the court because of scheduling difficulties or the like is unavailable.” Id. 469 Pa. at 17-18, 364 A.2d at 698-99.
I believe the majority’s reliance upon this language to be improper for several reasons. First, the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court in Mayfield must be satisfied before an extension of time for commencement of trial can be justified. The examples given by the court in Shelton were clearly meant to serve only as general guidelines in determining a sufficient basis for an extension of time. The mandate of Mayfield is clear: Each individual fact situation, even a situation apparently envisioned by the court in Shelton, must comply with the Mayfield test. Here, as previously demonstrated, the record does not show compliance with those requirements. *575Secondly, this case certainly does not fit “squarely within the mandate of the Shelton case.” The example used by the court in Shelton, and relied upon by the majority here, depicts a situation in which the trial court is unable, despite due diligence, to hear a case, otherwise ready for trial, within the prescribed time period because of “scheduling difficulties or the like. . . .” Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra, 469 Pa. at 18, 364 A.2d at 699. Here, the delay was not caused because the court was unavailable due to an unavoidable court backlog “or the like;” rather, it was occasioned by an unexplained violation by the lower court of a specific rule of procedure.
Rule 1100 was adopted “[i]n order to reduce the backlog of criminal cases in the courts of common pleas and to provide an objective standard for the protection of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . ..” Commonwealth v. White, 469 Pa. 460, 366 A.2d 880 (1976). In Mayfield, the Supreme Court provided the courts of this Commonwealth with a means by which to determine whether a sufficient basis exists to justify an extension of time. The purpose of this test is to ensure that the underlying principle of Rule 1100 is upheld. I believe that the holding of the majority not only distorts the import of both Mayfield and Shelton but also ignores the express mandate of Mayfield and destroys the protective function of the Rule.
I would reverse the judgment of sentence.
SPAETH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502.

. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2) provides that: “[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”

. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) provides in pertinent part:
“At any time prior to the expiration of the period for commencement of trial, the attorney for the Commonwealth may apply to the court for an order extending the time for commencement of trial. . , . Such application shall be granted only if trial cannot be commenced within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth.”

. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f) provides in pertinent part:
“At any time before trial, the defendant or his attorney may apply to the court for an order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that this Rule has been violated.

. The appellant was arraigned on July 15,1974.

. Pa.R.Crim.P. 140(f)(1) provides:
“When a preliminary hearing is not waived, the issuing authority shall: (1) fix a day and hour for a preliminary hearing which shall not be less than three nor more than ten days after preliminary arraignment unless extended for cause shown, unless the issuing authority fixes an earlier date upon request of the defendant or his attorney with the consent of the complainant and the attorney for the Commonwealth.”

. Clearly, the appellant has no obligation to arrange for a preliminary hearing. E. g., Commonwealth v. Adams, 237 Pa.Super. 452, 352 A.2d 97 (1975).