Court Opinion

ID: 9893291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:11:41.204485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:12.865921
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-3879.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                           No. 112455
                 v.                               :

KENNETH SMITH,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 26, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-666158-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Rachel E. Cohen, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 P. Andrew Baker, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Kenneth Smith (“Smith”), appeals from his

conviction following a guilty plea. He raises the following assignments of error for

review:
      1. The plea must be vacated because it was not made knowingly,
      intelligently, and voluntarily under the circumstances of the case.

      2. The no contact order must be vacated.

             After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm

Smith’s conviction and sentence.

                       I. Procedural and Factual History

             On December 15, 2021, Smith was named in a two-count indictment,

charging him with rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (Count 1); and gross

sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). The charges stemmed from

allegations that Smith sexually assaulted his daughter, E.S., when she was under the

age of 13 years old.

             On January 25, 2023, Smith expressed his desire to accept the terms of

a negotiated plea agreement with the state. Pursuant to the terms of the plea

agreement, Smith agreed to plead guilty to an amended count of rape in exchange

for the dismissal of Count 2 and the state’s agreement to amend Count 1 from a

charge of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to a charge of rape in violation

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). By deleting the reference to the victim’s age, Smith was no

longer subject to substantial penalties afforded under R.C. 2907.02(B) and

2971.03(B), and faced a term of incarceration of 3 to 11 years. The state specified,

however, that a condition of the plea agreement was that Smith “have no contact

with the victim in this case as well.” (Tr. 23.) Finally, the trial court confirmed that

if Smith entered a plea of guilty, the court “would sentence [him] to a concurrent
period of incarceration, not to exceed” his expected release date in Cuyahoga C.P.

No. CR-17-613973-A. (Tr. 24.)

               Following a Crim.R. 11 colloquy, Smith pleaded guilty to rape in

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree, as amended in Count 1

of the indictment.

               On February 1, 2023, the trial court sentenced Smith to a ten-year term

of imprisonment and designated him as a Tier III sex offender. The sentence was

ordered to run concurrently with the sentence previously imposed in Case No. CR-

17-613973-A. The court further ordered Smith to “have no contact with the victim

or the victim’s family.”

               Smith now brings this timely appeal.

                                    A. Crim.R. 11

               In the first assignment of error, Smith argues the trial court failed to

ensure that his guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Smith

contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s inaccurate explanation

concerning the state’s ability to amend his indictment to include a sexually violent

predator specification and the state’s ability to introduce evidence of his prior

convictions.

               The underlying purpose of Crim.R. 11 is to convey certain information

to a defendant so that they can make a voluntary and intelligent decision regarding

whether to plead guilty. State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480, 423 N.E.2d

115 (1981). “The standard for reviewing whether the trial court accepted a plea in
compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is a de novo standard of review.” State v. Cardwell,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92796, 2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26, citing State v. Stewart, 51

Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977).

                In order to ensure that a defendant enters a plea knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily, a trial court must engage in an oral dialogue with the

defendant in accordance with Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527,

660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). Crim.R. 11(C) outlines the trial court’s duties in accepting

guilty pleas:

      (2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
      plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
      without first addressing the defendant personally and doing all of the
      following:

      (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with
      understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
      penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for
      probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at the
      sentencing hearing.

      (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
      understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
      court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
      sentence.

      (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
      understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
      trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
      process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require
      the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
      trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against
      himself or herself.

                “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the
trial court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” State v. Dangler,

162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 13. “The test for prejudice is

‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v.

Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). A defendant must establish

prejudice “‘on the face of the record’” and not solely by virtue of challenging a plea

on appeal. Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa Health Sys., 139 Ohio St.3d 238,

2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26.

              The traditional rule, however, is subject to two limited exceptions. Id.

at ¶ 14-16. Under these two exceptions, no showing of prejudice is required when

(1) a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c) that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, or (2) a trial

court has completely failed to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C). Id. at ¶ 14-15,

citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31;

State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. “Aside

from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a defendant is not

entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a

failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16,

citing Nero at 108.

              Thus, when reviewing a trial court’s compliance with Crim.R. 11, the

inquiry no longer focuses on strict, substantial, or partial compliance with the rule.

State v. Kauffman, 2021-Ohio-1584, 170 N.E.3d 952, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). As the

Supreme Court of Ohio recognized, prior caselaw had “muddled [the] analysis by
suggesting different tiers of compliance with the rule” and “those formulations have

served only to unduly complicate what should be a fairly straightforward inquiry.”

Dangler at ¶ 17. Accordingly, the questions to be answered are as follows:

      (1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule?

      (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported
      failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
      demonstrating prejudice? and

      (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that
      burden?

Id.

              In this case, Smith does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with

a specific provision of Crim.R. 11. Rather, Smith suggests that “the trial court

provided [him] with too much information, specifically, inaccurate information.”

He explains his position as follows:

      First, at the plea hearing, defendant-Smith was advised by the
      prosecutor that he would be reindicted on the charges he was facing
      with the addition of a sexually violent predator specification that would
      potentially increase his sentence if convicted, and that the trial court’s
      response indicated that this would happen. (Tr. 27-28.) Later at the
      plea hearing, the trial court advised defendant-Smith that if he was
      reindicted with the sexually violent predator specification the jury
      would hear information about his prior criminal record.

(Appellate brief, pg. 5-6.)

              Smith maintains that the trial court’s advisements were inaccurate

because “it is unlikely the state could have indicted him with a sustainable charge

involving a sexually violent predator specification” because more than 270 speedy-

trial days had expired since the time of the original indictment. Smith further states
that it is unlikely that a jury would have heard about his prior convictions because

the sexually violent predator specification would have been tried to the bench and

Evid.R. 404(B) prohibits evidence of prior bad acts.

              It is well settled that “[i]f a trial judge chooses to offer an expanded

explanation of the law in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the information conveyed must

be accurate.” State v. Clarke, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462,

¶ 16. Thus, “when a defendant’s guilty plea is induced by erroneous representations

as to the applicable law, * * * the plea has not been entered knowingly and

intelligently.” State v. Loyd, 6th Dist. Erie Nos. E-10-055 and E-10-056, 2011-Ohio-

2964, ¶ 18; State v. Davner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104745, 2017-Ohio-8862, ¶ 57

(“when an erroneous understanding of the applicable law induces a defendant’s

guilty plea, the plea generally is not entered knowingly and intelligently”). “In order

to establish the necessary inducement to vacate a guilty plea, the defendant must

make a two-part showing. First, the defendant must show that he or she was

misinformed as to the applicable law.” Id. at ¶ 19. “Second, the defendant must

demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced by the misinformation.” Id. at ¶ 20; State

v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104078 and 104849, 2017-Ohio-2650, ¶ 15.

              “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been

made.’” Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, at ¶ 16,

quoting Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). Prejudice must be

established “‘on the face of the record.’” Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Hayward v. Summa

Health Sys., 139 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-1913, 11 N.E.3d 243, ¶ 26.
              In this case, we are unable to conclude that but for the allegedly

erroneous advisement, Smith would not have accepted the terms of the negotiated

plea agreement and pleaded guilty to the amended count of rape. As stated, Smith

was originally charged with rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) based on

allegations that Smith engaged in sexual conduct with his daughter, who was less

than 13 years of age at the time of the offense.

              Pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B), a trial court is authorized to sentence a

defendant for violating R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to either life without parole or one of

three indefinite sentences pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B). The Ohio Supreme Court

recently clarified this sentencing scheme, stating that “[w]hen a trial court does not

sentence a defendant convicted under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to life without parole

under R.C. 2907.02(B), R.C. 2971.03(B) provides three possible indefinite sentences

that may be imposed instead: 10 years to life, 15 years to life, or 25 years to life.”

State v. Bowers, 163 Ohio St.3d 28, 2020-Ohio-5167, 167 N.E.3d 947, ¶ 5. The three

possible indefinite sentences are set out in R.C. 2971.03(B)(1) which provides:

      [I]f the court does not impose a sentence of life without parole [under
      R.C. 2907.02(B)], the court shall impose upon the person an indefinite
      prison term consisting of one of the following:

      (a) Except as otherwise required in division (B)(1)(b) or (c) of this
      section, a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of life
      imprisonment.

      (b) If the victim was less than ten years of age, a minimum term of
      fifteen years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

      (c) If the offender purposely compels the victim to submit by force or
      threat of force, or if the offender previously has been convicted of or
      pleaded guilty to violating division (A)(1)(b) of section 2907.02 of the
      Revised Code or to violating an existing or former law of this state,
      another state, or the United States that is substantially similar to
      division (A)(1)(b) of that section, or if the offender during or
      immediately after the commission of the offense caused serious
      physical harm to the victim, a minimum term of twenty-five years and
      a maximum of life imprisonment.

               Under this statutory framework, the default mandatory sentence is

ten years to life pursuant to R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a), unless the provisions of R.C.

2971.03(B)(1)(b) or (c) are applicable. State v. Mejia, 2020-Ohio-6870, 164 N.E.3d

1177, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.).

              Given the severity of the charge and the length of the potential

sentence, the record reflects that Smith’s decision to accept the terms of the state’s

plea offer was premised on the agreement to amend Count 1 to a charge of rape in

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), and the court’s promise to impose a prison sentence

concurrently with Smith’s prior case, and not the alleged threat of a reindictment.

In fact, defense counsel indicated that Smith’s only reservation in accepting the plea

deal was whether the trial court would impose a concurrent prison term at the time

of sentencing. (Tr. 22.) The trial court later addressed these concerns by advising

the 72-year-old Smith on the record that it “would sentence [him] to a concurrent

period of incarceration, not to exceed [his] out date” in his prior case. (Tr. 24.)

Although Smith briefly expressed that he wished to proceed with a trial based on his

desire to preserve his relationship with his daughter, his ultimate decision to move

forward with the negotiated plea agreement was not premised on the threat of

reindictment. Rather, it was premised on the trial court’s statement that Smith
would no longer be entitled to the promise of a concurrent sentence if Smith went

forward with trial. (Tr. 33-34.) This statement reflected the court’s discretionary

powers and was consistent with the mandatory language of R.C. 2907.02(B).

(“Except as otherwise provided in this division, notwithstanding sections 2929.11 to

2929.14 of the Revised Code, an offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section

shall be sentenced to a prison term or term of life imprisonment pursuant to section

2971.03 of the Revised Code.”) (Emphasis added.)

              Based on the forgoing, we find that irrespective of the court’s

advisement concerning the state’s ability to amend the indictment, Smith cannot

demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the alleged misinformation. Smith received

the benefit of the negotiated agreement with the state and was sentenced to a

concurrent term of imprisonment in exchange for his guilty plea. Accordingly, we

conclude that when Smith decided to plead guilty following extensive discussions

with his counsel and the court, he did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

                              B. No-Contact Order

              In this second assignment of error, Smith argues the trial court

committed plain error by imposing a no-contact order with the victim or her family

because he was sentenced to a prison term. Smith contends that the trial court was

not permitted to issue a no-contact order unless it was imposed as a condition of

community control.
              We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59

N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22-23. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence or vacate a sentence and remand for

resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) the record does not

support certain of the sentencing court’s findings or (2) the sentence is “otherwise

contrary to law.” “‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof

* * * which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as

to the facts sought to be established.’” State v. Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

107482, 2019-Ohio-3760, ¶ 29, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

               In State v. Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, 35 N.E.3d

512, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue presently before this court. In

Anderson, the trial court imposed both prison terms and a no-contact order. The

Supreme Court explained that a trial court may only impose a sentence provided for

by statute, that “Ohio courts have recognized that a no-contact order is a

community-control sanction,” and the felony-sentencing statutes “reflect that the

General Assembly intended prison terms and community-control sanctions to be

alternative sanctions” for a felony offense. Id. at ¶ 12, 17, 28; State v. Conant, 4th

Dist. Adams No. 20CA1108, 2020-Ohio-4319, ¶ 43. Thus, Anderson held that “as a

general rule, when a prison term and community control are possible sentences for

a particular felony offense, absent an express exception, the court must impose
either a prison term or a community-control sanction or sanctions.” Id. at ¶ 31.

Therefore, “[a] trial court cannot impose a prison term and a no-contact order for

the same felony offense.” Id. at ¶ 1.

              After careful consideration, we find the circumstances presented in

this case are distinguishable from those presented in Anderson. Significantly, Smith

agreed to the no-contact order as part of his plea bargain with the state in this case.

Because the no-contact order was a product of a negotiated agreement, the trial

court did not commit reversible error by imposing the bargained term. At most, the

trial court’s inclusion of a no-contact order constituted invited error. See State v.

Clark, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29295, 2022-Ohio-2801, ¶ 13; State v. Marcum,

4th Dist. Hocking Nos. 12CA22 and 12CA26, 2013-Ohio-2189, ¶ 11.

              “The doctrine of invited error specifies that a [party] may not ‘take

advantage of an error which he himself invited or induced.’” State v. Garrett, Slip

Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 203, quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury Inc. v.

Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 590 (1986), paragraph one of the

syllabus. This doctrine applies to errors arising from a negotiated plea agreement.

See State v. Patterson, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2008-0054, 2009-Ohio-273,

¶ 12; State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90411, 2008-Ohio-3972, ¶ 7; State

v. Rohrbaugh, 126 Ohio St.3d 421, 2010-Ohio-3286, 934 N.E.2d 920, ¶ 10 (holding

a defendant cannot take advantage of an error that he invited through the plea

negotiations). Because Smith entered the plea with the understanding that the no-
contact order was a condition of the plea agreement, he cannot challenge the trial

court’s imposition of the no-contact order as being contrary to law.

              The second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR