Court Opinion

ID: 9530862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:04:37.38606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:16.420916
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT AND. DISSENTING IN PART '
Staton, P.J.
While I would have affirmed the decision of the trial court, I cannot concur with the majority holding of this Court. The majority, rather than meeting the issue concerning the propriety of a trial judge weighing the evidence at the close of a plaintiff’s case, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B), has merely regurgitated previous Indiana Appellate Court holdings. The problem with this tactic is that those earlier decisions which the majority cites are void of rationale. 1
*548It is pure flummery to suggest on one hand that the trial court must not weigh any evidence, and at the same instance maintain that where the court did weigh the evidence here (as the majority admits happened) such weighing is harmless. That result is impossible. Had the trial judge considered only the evidence favorable to Fielitz, he would have been able to utilize the following facts in ruling on the TR. 41(B) motion:
(1) Allred had reached a speed of between 55 and 65 miles per hour.
(2) She had failed to observe a road sign.
(3) She had consumed alcoholic beverages illegally (she was a minor at the time).
These facts would certainly constitute some evidence that the conduct might be classified as wanton or wilful misconduct under the Guest Statute.
Moreover, contrary to what the majority opinion purports to be saying, it actually does hold that weighing is permissible in all eases where the TR. 41(B) motion comes after the plaintiff has rested. This is the only time that a TR. 41(B) motion is properly made! To attempt to rationalize the necessary interpretation of TR. 41(B), that weighing is proper,2 under the guise that it is harmless error is a contradiction. The majority opinion only serves to confuse. Since the Indiana Supreme Court has not provided guidance concerning the interpretation of TR. 41(B), such a judicial opinion should be cautiously scrutinized.
If one accepts the holding of the majority that weighing of the evidence is impermissible in ruling on a TR. 41 (B) motion, then it is axiomotic that the weighing is harmful where, *549as here, the plaintiff has presented some evidence to support his complaint.3
Note. — Reported at 364 N.E.2d 786.

. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Verzele, et al. (1971), 148 Ind. App. 429, 267 N.E.2d 193, holds that weighing is impermissible. The rationale of the decision in that respect is particularly weak when one realizes that that Court equated TR. 41(B) with TR. 50. The two rules fulfill the same function but are not equal in operation. See Miller v. Griesel (1973), Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 463. Building Systems, Inc. v. Rochester Metal Prod., Inc. (1976), 168 Ind. App. 12, 340 N.E.2d 791, which the majority heavily relies upon, misquotes the Indiana rule by substituting the word “only” for the word “all” before “the evidence” which the trial court is to consider. Thus, the distinction which it attempts to draw between the Indiana and the Federal rules fades.

. See Harvey, INDIANA PRACTICE, Volume 3, pp. 217-218; MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, Volume 5, pp. 1156-1158.

. Powell v. Powell (1974), 160 Ind. App. 132, 310 N.E.2d 898, assumes that if both parties testify during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, this somehow magically removes the requirement that the judge not weigh the evidence. This assumption is not supported by the rule itself, nor by any logical reasoning process. Either the judge is allowed to weigh the evidence, or, as the majority holds, he is not. The rule provides for no exceptions. Upon what basis can the majority single' out the testimony of the parties as a special circumstance? There is no basis if the holding generally is that weighing is impermissible.