Court Opinion

ID: 9681115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:44:10.267433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:32.310070
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority states: “The jury’s verdict ... has a special, significant sacredness and inviolability. The jury’s verdict cannot be violated under our Texas Constitution.” What cannot be violated is the citizen’s right to trial by jury. A court of appeals may reverse and remand for a new trial when it concludes that a jury’s “failure to find” is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, our review of this “failure to find” does not violate the right to trial by jury. Cropper v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex.1988). We, as an intermediate appellate court have the responsibility to review a jury’s verdict when presented to us in the proper procedural posture. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.1986), is not a prohibition against overturning a jury verdict, simply an admonition *943that the evidence should be detailed when doing so.
The jury never established a wage rate for appellant because that issue was predicated on determining (1) whether appellant had worked 210 days in the year preceding the injury or, if not, (2) whether a same or similar employee had worked the requisite 210 days. They failed to find either. I believe the negative finding as to a same or similar employee is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. The majority does not distinguish the question of wage rate, wages, hourly wages, daily wages or weekly wages, from the question of a same or similar 210-day employee. They are separate and apart, yet the majority characterizes the testimony as the “wage rate issues(s).”
Concerning the 210-day employee issue, appellant testified on direct examination:
Q I believe you testified you thought you had but you weren’t quite sure, and I think you testified you felt like you had. Do you know anybody else that worked at that job longer than you worked?
A Yes.
Q Who?
A Todd Robbins.
Q What position did Todd Robbins work in?
A Laborer for Owens-Corning.
Q How long had Todd Robbins worked at Owens-Corning when you came there in 1985, February?
A About a year and a half before I came. I had worked with him the previous year, too, and he worked there about a year and a half to two years before I came back the second time steady without a lay off.
Q I take it what you’re saying is before you came back in February of 1985 for the last time you worked there, he had been there for almost a year or more before that?
A He had been there almost two years before that.
Q But he worked there for three years, approximately, before you were injured?
A Yes.
Q Was he ever laid off during that time?
A No.
Q Are you absolutely sure about that?
A He told me he wasn’t.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to that last statement as hearsay.
THE COURT: Sustained.
On cross-examination:
Q Ms. Crawford, do you recall where Todd Robbins is today?
A Yes, ma’am, he’s employed by Union 76.
Q But he’s not here in the courtroom. He’s not here to testify?
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Q Now, you don’t have any personal knowledge that he worked exactly 210 days or more during the exact 365 days preceding 11-15-85, do you?
A Yes, ma’am, I know he worked.
Q You know that he worked but you don’t know how many days he worked.
A I know he worked non-stop for about two years.
Q He may have worked non-stop for two years but my question to you is: During the 365 days preceding 11-15-85 you don’t know whether he worked more than 210 days, sitting here today?
A Have I seen written documents, no.
Q You don’t have personal knowledge of that?
A I don’t know it’s personal knowledge.
Q You don’t have any personal knowledge of that, do you?
A Did I see him with my own eyes, you mean?
Q Ma’am, it’s a very simple question. Do you have personal knowledge that he worked more than 210 days during the exact 365 days preceding your injury?
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Your Hon- or, I’m going to object. She has already testified she knows the man worked for two to three years prior to the time she got hurt. She’s asking the same question over and over and over, so I object—
*944[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m entitled an answer. I’m entitled to cross examine the witness.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. WITNESS:
A I don’t know how to answer you without going into hearsay.
Q All right. Let me rephrase my question and try to ask it again. Sitting here today, first of all, you don’t have any records to show that Todd Robbins worked 210 days or more during the exact 365 days preceding your injury?
A No, I don’t.
Q You don’t have any other documentation to show the Jury that?
A No.
Q You don’t remember the exact dates that Todd Robbins worked?
A No.
Q You don’t have his personnel records here with you?
A No.
Q You don’t know for a fact that he worked more than 210 days during the 365 day period preceding your injury?
A I know it. I know for a fact he did but—
Q How—
A I don’t know how to do it without hearsay.
Q Ms. Crawford, you know that because your attorney has told you you need to prove that up in this case; isn’t that right?
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Your Hon- or, I’m going to object. That is not true at all. She knows that this Court—
THE COURT: Okay. I can simplify it. If you know that only by hearsay, then you don’t know it of your own personal knowledge.
WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Does that help you in answering the question?
WITNESS: Okay.
Q You don’t know that of your own personal knowledge, do you?
A No, I guess not.
On re-direct examination:
Q Let me ask you something that you do know of your own personal knowledge. Do you know for a fact that when you came to work on February 5, 1985 at — or February, 1985, that he had been there working for at least several months?
A Yes.
Q Was it obvious that he had been there working for several months?
A Yes.
The business manager of appellant’s union testified on direct examination:
Q Now, do you understand the type of work they were doing at Performance Contractors?
A Yes I did.
Q I take it in your job do you have good knowledge of the work conditions and the amount of work that was available during the time period for the year or more prior to her injury of November 15, 1985?
A Yes.
Q Did you have personal knowledge that other employees of the same class as my client worked at least 210 or more days of the year preceding November 15, 1985 in the same or similar employment and in the same or neighboring place?
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A Yes.
Q Do you feel confident about that information—
A Yes, I do.
Q —based upon your knowledge of the work conditions and how people were working at that time?
A And the jobs, uh-huh.
Q Do you know Todd Robbins?
A Yes, I do.
Q Do you know if Todd Robbins worked at Performance Contractor Owens-Corning at the Union 76 job in excess of 210 days prior to November 15, 1985? Let me ask it this way: Do you know he had worked there for two continuous years? A Yes, I do.
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*945Q But would it be fair to say based upon your expertise and your knowledge and having been Business Manager at the time, would it be fair to say that you know quite well that many people worked in the same or similar employment for at least 210 days prior to November 15, 1985?
A Yes.
Q And in the same or similar or neighboring places?
A Yes.
On cross-examination:
Q You didn’t bring any records with you today at all, correct?
A No.
Q You don’t have any documentations to show the Jury the daily wage or the hourly wage that you’re talking about?
A No.
Q Do you know from personal knowledge what Todd Robbins or any other employee made during the year preceding November 15, 1985 on a daily basis?
A Only the contract, which would give our hourly wage.
Q But you can’t say what they made on a daily basis?
A No, I .ouldn’t.
Q And you couldn’t say what they made on a weekly basis?
A Not unless I know what they made an hour.
A summary of this testimony is that appellant initially testified unequivocally that Todd Robbins was a 210-day similar employee. Admittedly, she wavered when confronted with the “personal knowledge” questioning. However, the union business manager testified unequivocally and was never cross-examined on the 210-day employee issue, but only on the hourly or daily wage issue. Appellee produced no evidence to dispute the testimony that Todd Robbins was a 210-day similar employee. I find no evidence that Robbins was not a 210-day employee, but if there is any, clearly the evidence that Robbins was a 210-day employee outweighs any such evidence. Consequently, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.