Court Opinion

ID: 9483814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:32:15.382854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:51.095863
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion is based upon a misguided analysis of United States v. Walton, 908 F.2d 1289 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990, 111 S.Ct. 532, 112 L.Ed.2d 542 (1990), I must dissent.
The majority states that, although the ex-parte contact in Walton was between a juror and a judge, it is not sufficiently distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Walton, the juror’s only contact with the judge was a conversation in which the juror stated he believed signalling was going on during the testimony of certain witnesses. The conversation took place outside the presence of the other jurors, and the juror informed the judge that he had not relayed his concerns to the other jurors.
In contrast, in this case Mrs. White addressed the entire jury and told them that she would pray for them. Whether this comment was intended to be threatening or not is irrelevant. The important fact is that the foreman indicated that some of the members of the jury were made “nervous” by the comment. It is impossible for any court at this stage to assess the impact this statement had on the jury. Therefore, it is fundamental to a fair trial that trial courts conduct a hearing to determine whether the jury was biased or prejudiced in situations where this type of juror communication takes place. I agree with District Court Judge Edward H. Johnstone’s well reasoned remarks:
While the Supreme Court has recognized that certain ex parte comments between a judge and juror may be harmless, Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983), this court is unable to conclude that the failure to hold a hearing in this instance was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Moreover, even though an unauthorized communication does not raise a presumption of prejudice and the defendant bears the burden to prove actual bias, the failure to conduct a hearing to allow the defendant the opportunity to prove bias warrants the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. See generally, United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.1978) (“in instances where the jury misconduct involves influences from outside sources, the failure of the trial judge to hold a hearing constitutes an abuse of discretion and is therefore reversible error”).
A different analysis must apply to a juror’s ex parte communication with a judge, as opposed to the mother of a defendant’s communication with the entire jury. The potential for bias is much greater in the case with contact between a defendant’s *168relative and the entire jury, than it is between the judge and one juror. The trial court should have conducted a hearing to determine whether this statement was prejudicial to the defendant. However, because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing, any determination of bias or prejudice is pure speculation. Because the hearing was denied, the defendant is entitled to the habeas relief he was granted by the district court. Accordingly, I would therefore affirm the district court’s ruling.