Court Opinion

ID: 9665525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:50:35.014845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.388660
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
concurring.
I wholly concur in the court’s decision and opinion, but write separately to emphasize *60that there are several modern-day rules which require-this outcome. And it is Armstrong or his attorney — not the State of Texas as claimed — who prevented Armstrong from appearing in court.
A pretrial conference was held in this case pursuant to Rule 166 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. At that conference his attorney did not seek Armstrong’s presence at the trial.
His request for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum filed on the day of trial was untimely and could have been denied on that basis. Furthermore, his request was tantamount to a motion for continuance. In addition to being untimely, it was unsworn and stated no basis why Armstrong’s presence was needed. Rules 251 and 252 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, governing motions for continuance based on the absence of a witness, require support in' the form of an affidavit showing what the testimony would be and its materiality. Armstrong made no such showing. Additionally, Armstrong has not preserved any complaint on appeal because he has not shown what his testimony would have been had he been called as a witness. Tex.R.App.P. 52(a).
If we were to hold that the trial court erred under the present circumstances, we would be saying that neither civil litigants who happen to be incarcerated nor their attorneys (no matter how well qualified) are required to follow the procedural rules of Texas.