Court Opinion

ID: 9834232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:25:24.426983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:13.084697
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Bule 62a was adopted by the Supreme Court on October SO, 1912, and became effective on November 15, 1912, and no opinion of any court of Texas has come to our notice which reverses a judgment for an error in the charge similar to one now before this court. 149 S. W. x. However, it is stated in the motion for rehearing that the judgment in the case of Brewer v. Doose, 146 S. W. 323, was reversed because of a similar charge, and that the decision was rendered after rule 62a was in effect That opinion was rendered on February 14, 1912, nine months before the rule became effective. A different order of things has happily been inaugurated in Texas, if the appellate courts are permitted by the authors of the rules to carry them into effective execution.
Rule 62a clothes the Courts of Civil Appeals with the authoi'ity to determine whether an error of law amounts “to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.” The charge in this case was not given “scant consideration,” as stated by appellant, but was thoroughly considered in the light of the circumstances in this case. The facts showed that appellee was an inexperienced boy and was working under the immediate supervision and control of Cain, appellant’s superintendent, who knew how the pipe should be loaded, and who should have warned appellee of the danger of getting in the wagon. These facts were un-contradicted and tended to show that appel-lee was not guilty of contributory negligence in getting in the wagon, even though not ordered to do so by Cain. There was no testimony that indicated that appellee knew of the danger of his position. Cain knew and had been told just before the accident that he was not loading the pipe in the proper manner. There was no evidence of contributory negligence, unless getting in the wagon was contributory negligence. That act was either commanded by the superintendent, or he permitted an inexperienced boy to do a thing -which he knew was dangerous. In either event appellee was not guilty of contributory negligence. ' The wagon was being loaded under the personal supervision of the superintendent and in the manner directed by him. How could any kind of erroneous charge on the amount of proof required have injured appellant?
The evidence showed that appellee was ignorant of the danger of the position occupied by him in the wagon, and that the superintendent did know it, and yet he did not warn him. That duty devolved upon appellant, and the failure to instruct the servant as to the danger removed the question of contributory negligence from the ease. Labatt, Master & Servant, § 235. The charge on contributory negligence, standing alone, could not have injured appellant, and, when read in connection with other parts of the court’s charge and the special charges asked by appellant, it is apparent that no harm was done by it.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.