Court Opinion

ID: 9681689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:54:51.529353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.455804
License: Public Domain

ODOM, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent to the affirmance of this case, and if I could determine what rule of law is being applied by the majority, I would probably dissent to that hidden reasoning as well.
The first half of the majority opinion sets out the facts. Then, after observing that the disclosure of the identity of the informer constituted compliance with James v. State, 493 S.W.2d 201 (Tex.Cr.App.), the majority opinion briefly reviews statements from several cases out of several United States Courts of Appeals, which, of course, are not controlling authority in this jurisdiction. It is then proclaimed: “These decisions are of benefit in the present situation.” How they are “of benefit” is not explained. Guidelines might well benefit us and the rest of the bench and bar of Texas, but I see no guidelines established in the majority opinion.
Instead of guidelines, the majority opinion simply recites evidence that months after the disappearance of the witness the State made considerable effort to relocate him, and that the initial State action was inconsequential because seventy-five dollars “was not sufficient to travel any great distance nor keep him [the missing witness] in food for long.”
It is true that the State made diligent effort to find the witness, and that good faith effort is to be commended. But the ineffectiveness of that effort only serves to demonstrate all the more dramatically how successful the disappearance was in the first place. It is useless to close the barn door after the horses are gone.
The majority express concern over the safety of Levine, but should not the constitutional rights of the accused also receive our concern? As was stated in White v. State, 517 S.W.2d 543 at 548 (Tex.Cr.App.) (majority opinion on original submission), “Other means are available for the protection of a material witness than sending him out of town and rendering him totally unavailable to either party.” The majority state, “Levine’s appearance as a witness at future trials would seem to be more assured and likely if he sought safety out of town at the time than if he remained in town at the mercy of alleged narcotics pushers who might be released on bond.” It need only be observed that if it was the State’s purpose to guarantee Levine’s safety for appearance at appellant’s trial, the State’s plan utterly failed here, regardless of the likelihood asserted by the majority. Furthermore, the State has not asserted any such plan for Levine, nor explained its failure. Also, if Levine had remained in town, the State would not have been required to leave him at anyone’s “mercy”, but surely could have given him protection if needed. In sum, the two alternatives posed by the majority are not the only two that were available, and the one given the nod of approval by the majority was not even carried out by the State in this case.
The majority’s apparent reliance, in reaching its decision, on the amount of the money given the missing witness by the State surprises me. Instead of asking whether the State’s action was improper, the majority asks how much money was paid. Is the Court today holding that State action that successfully contributes to the disappearance of a material defense witness presents reversible error only if the State paid the entire bill? How much money paid to the witness would have changed the disposition of this case?
The case should not turn on how much money was paid but, instead, on whether the action was successful and, if so, whether the State participated at all. The appropriate analysis for disposition of the issue is *742that set out in White v. State, supra, in the majority opinion on original submission. When a defendant asserts denial of compulsory process on the basis of State action rendering the witness unavailable, the relevant inquiries are (1) materiality of the witness, (2) timely pursuit by the defense, (3) knowledge of the materiality of the witness at the time of the State’s action, and (4) improper action attributable to the State contributing to the witness’ unavailability. I am convinced in this case as I was in White v. State, supra, that reversible error has been shown.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.