Court Opinion

ID: 9646024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 06:09:27.791674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:25.271424
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 15, 2023

                                    S   In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00577-CV

                      IN THE INTEREST OF I.P., A CHILD

                 On Appeal from the 301st Judicial District Court
                              Dallas County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-00991

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                 Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia, and Kennedy
                             Opinion by Justice Garcia

        This is a divorce case. Appellant Margarita Padilla challenges the property

division ordered by the trial judge after a bench trial. We affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

A.      Facts

        Appellant Margarita Padilla and appellee J. Isaias Padilla were married in

1994.

        Isaias sued for divorce in January 2019, and Margarita filed a counterpetition

for divorce. Both parties pleaded that the marriage had become insupportable.

Margarita also pleaded that Isaias had committed adultery.
      On October 14, 2021, the case was tried without a jury. The parties had one

minor child, I.P., but child-custody issues were not greatly disputed. Rather, the

trial’s focus was the property division.

      Evidence suggested that the community estate’s most significant assets were

the following:

      •      a business called Rock N Roll Stone Supply that Margarita
             operated;

      •      an interest in a pool-installation business called Rooster Tile that
             Isaias operated;

      •      a house that Margarita lived in;

      •      a house that Isaias lived in;

      •      other real property consisting of

             +      two rental properties in Irving;

             +      a house in Mexico;

             +      a lot on or near Stemmons Freeway; and

             +      an interest in two lots in Dallas where Rooster Tile had its
                    place of business;

      •      several vehicles, including some that Isaias used to carry on
             Rooster Tile’s business; and

      •      several bank accounts and a certificate of deposit.

Regarding Rooster Tile, Isaias testified that his brother Juan owned a 50% interest

in that company and the community estate owned the other 50%. Other evidence

indicated that Isaias and Juan jointly owned the two lots on which Rooster Tile’s

place of business was situated.

                                           –2–
      The valuation of the two family businesses was an important issue at trial.

Isaias called an expert witness who testified that “Mr. Padilla’s 50-percent interest”

in Rooster Tile was worth $236,000. Isaias’s inventory and appraisement was

admitted into evidence, and in that document Isaias stated that the community’s 50%

interest in Rooster Tile was worth $386,233 as of August 31, 2020 (over a year

before trial). The same inventory and appraisement listed the value of Rock N Roll

as $700,000 as of August 31, 2020, but Margarita testified that Rock N Roll’s value

was not $700,000. No other evidence of Rock N Roll’s market value was admitted

at trial, although federal tax returns were admitted showing that Rock N Roll had

“Ordinary business income” of $64,529 in 2019 and $17,959 in 2020.

      There were discrepancies in the evidence about the parties’ bank accounts.

The evidence consisted principally of some bank statements, a list of accounts and

values prepared by Margarita, and a similar list appearing in Isaias’s inventory and

appraisement. Notably, most of Isaias’s information about the accounts was over

two years old, while Margarita’s list of accounts was undated. We summarize the

evidence as follows:

        Account                   Margarita’s list           Isaias’s inventory
  Bank of America 6223               $84,400                     $76,849.33
                                                            (as of Oct. 13, 2021)
  Bank of America 2328               $3,430.02                   $66,138.98
                                                            (as of Dec. 17, 2018)
  Bank of America 1488               $4,763.64                   $27,855.08
                                                            (as of Mar. 15, 2019)
  Bank of America 2270               $23,021.13                  $23, 020.26
                                                            (as of Dec. 18, 2018)

                                         –3–
       Chase Bank 6249                not listed                  $377,536.71
                                                             (as of Dec. 31, 2018)
       Chase Bank 1729               $281,226.80                    not listed
       Chase Bank 2760                $5,058.46                     not listed
     Bank of America 6339            $14,015.01                     not listed

            Totals                   $416,995.06                 $571,400.36

        Finally, Isaias testified that he began an adulterous relationship during the

marriage and that he fathered three children in that relationship. The trial judge made

a fact finding that Isaias committed adultery.

B.      Posttrial Proceedings

        On October 26, 2021, the trial judge issued an unsigned memorandum ruling

rendering judgment that the divorce was granted and stating how the community

estate would be divided. For present purposes, the significant rulings were as

follows:

        •     Isaias received 100% of the community interest in Rooster Tile;

        •     Margarita received 100% of Rock N Roll and the Stemmons
              property;

        •     Isaias and Margarita each received 50% of a Chase account
              ending in 6249; and

        •     Margarita received 100% of a Chase savings account ending in
              1729.

        A month later, the trial judge issued an amended memorandum ruling that

made the following changes:

        •     the Stemmons property would be sold and the proceeds equally
              split between Isaias and Margarita unless Margarita bought
              Isaias out for $200,000 by January 30, 2022;

                                         –4–
      •      Isaias, rather than Margarita, received 100% of the Chase savings
             account ending in 1729.

      On March 9, 2022, the trial judge held a hearing about the form of the final

decree. During the hearing, the judge indicated that she had changed the original

allocation of the Chase 1729 account because she reviewed the evidence and saw

the discrepancy about the Chase accounts and amounts. She also indicated that she

did not make a finding about waste and was not trying to reimburse Isaias for

anything; rather, she was attempting to make a just and right division.

      On March 13, 2022, the trial judge signed the final decree of divorce. The

property division essentially tracked the amended memorandum ruling and made the

following awards:

      Property Awarded To Isaias                Property Awarded To Margarita
 •    100% of Rooster Tile and the real •        100% of Rock N Roll
      estate it occupied                •        The house she lived in and the
 •    The house he lived in, the house           other of the community’s two
      in Mexico, and one of the                  rental properties
      community’s two rental            •        100% of Chase account 2760
      properties                                 ($5,058.46)
 •    100% of Bank of America               •    50% of Bank of America
      account 6223 ($76,849.33)                  accounts 2328, 1488, and 2270
 •    100% of Chase account 1729                 (Margarita’s share totaling
      ($281,214.56)                              $46,960)
 •    50% of Bank of America
      accounts 2328, 1488, and 2270
      (Isaias’s share totaling $46,960)

The decree further ordered that Margarita would receive the Stemmons property if

she paid Isaias $200,000 by June 1, 2022; otherwise the property would be sold for
                                          –5–
at least $425,000 and the net proceeds would be divided equally between Margarita

and Isaias.

         Margarita timely filed a motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment.

The trial judge held a hearing, at which Margarita argued that the property division

actually gave her less than half of the value of the community estate. The judge

disagreed and said that she thought the division resulted in a difference of about

$83,000 in Margarita’s favor. The judge denied the motion to modify by written

order.

         On Margarita’s request, the judge later signed findings of fact and conclusions

of law. In the findings, the judge reiterated the property division ordered in the

divorce decree. She did not find the value of Rooster Tile, Rock N Roll, or any of

the community real estate. In finding 39, she stated the factors that she considered

in determining a just and right division of the community estate as follows:

         a.    the adultery on the part of [Isaias] during the marriage;

         b.    the granting of conservatorship of [I.P.] to [Margarita];

         c.    future needs of the child;

         d.    the community indebtedness and liabilities for which [Isaias and
               Margarita] will be responsible;

         e.    the tax consequences of the division of the property;

         f.    the future earning power, business opportunities, capacities, and
               abilities of the spouses[;]

         g.    the money in the possession of [Margarita] at the time of
               separation and the amount of money depleted from the bank

                                            –6–
             account under her control of [sic] the Chase Bank Account
             number ending 1729.

      Margarita timely filed a notice of appeal.

                              II. ISSUES ON APPEAL

      Margarita raises four issues on appeal, which we paraphrase as follows:

      1.     The record contains no evidence to support the valuation of the
             community’s interest in Rooster Tile because Isaias’s expert’s
             testimony on that subject was conclusory and speculative.

      2.     The record contains no evidence to support the valuation of the
             community’s interest in Rock N Roll.

      3.     Given the lack of evidence about the value of the businesses, the
             trial judge abused her discretion by dividing the community
             estate.

      4.     There is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support
             finding of fact 39(g), and that erroneous finding materially
             affected the property division.

                                  III. ANALYSIS

A.    Issues Two and Three: Did the trial judge err by dividing the community
      estate because there was no evidence to show the value of Rock N Roll?

      We choose to address Margarita’s second issue first. Her second issue

necessarily refers to her third issue, which is essentially a harmful-error argument in

support of both issue one and issue two.

      1.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review

      Upon granting a divorce, the trial judge must order a division of the parties’

estate in a just and right manner having due regard for the rights of the parties and

any children of the marriage. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001. The trial judge need

                                         –7–
not divide the community property equally. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–

99 (Tex. 1981). In dividing the estate, the judge may consider factors such as

      •      the parties’ capacities and abilities,

      •      the benefits that the party not at fault would have derived from
             the marriage’s continuation,

      •      the parties’ business opportunities and education,

      •      the parties’ health and ages,

      •      the parties’ relative financial conditions and obligations,

      •      the size of the separate estates, and

      •      the nature of the property.

See id. at 699. The court may also consider a spouse’s dissipation of the community

estate when making a just and right division. Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 862

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.).

      In a divorce proceeding, community property should generally be treated

according to its market value. See Ricks v. Ricks, 169 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, no pet.).

      The trial judge has wide discretion in dividing the community estate, and we

reverse only if the trial judge abused her discretion. See Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 698.

      2.     Error Preservation

      Margarita argues that the only evidence of Rock N Roll’s value admitted at

trial was conclusory and, thus, nonprobative. Therefore, she concludes, the trial

judge abused her discretion by dividing the community estate without any evidence

                                           –8–
of the value of a significant community asset. Isaias makes several responses, one of

which is that Margarita forfeited this argument by failing to present any probative

evidence of Rock N Roll’s value herself. We conclude that Isaias is correct.

      “[W]hen a party does not provide values for property to be divided, that party

may not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to

properly divide the property.” Deltuva v. Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d 882, 887 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); accord In re M.H.A., No. 05-20-00787-CV, 2022 WL

2527003, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 7, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Marriage

of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 385, 389, 391 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no

pet.); Talliti v. Sarris, No. 05-10-00096-CV, 2011 WL 2859996, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Dallas July 20, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). In this case, Margarita did not introduce

any evidence of Rock N Roll’s value, so she cannot complain on appeal that the trial

judge lacked sufficient information to divide the estate in a just and right manner.

See Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d at 887.

      Margarita cites authority for the premise that the parties’ failure to introduce

evidence of the value of significant community assets does not absolve the trial judge

of the duty to make a just and right division of the community estate. See Odom v.

Odom, No. 12-06-00218-CV, 2007 WL 677800, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Mar. 7,

2007, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Mathis v. Mathis, No. 01-17-00449-CV, 2018

WL 6613864, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Odom expressly states that the Deltuva waiver rule is appropriate only if (1) the

                                         –9–
record contains some evidence of the value of the contested item or estate or (2) the

unvalued items would obviously have little effect on the overall property division.

2007 WL 677800, at *2; see also Mathis, 2018 WL 6613864, at *3 (stating rules

similar to those stated in Odom). But Deltuva and its progeny do not recognize these

exceptions to the waiver rule, and we are bound to follow our own precedents. See

Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022). Accordingly, we must

reject Odom and Mathis to the extent they are contrary to Deltuva.

      Margarita also cites Finn v. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735, 746–47 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (en banc), for the premise that a trial judge cannot

properly exercise its discretion in dividing the estate without a proper valuation of

the community’s assets. But in Finn, the appealing spouse actually introduced some

evidence regarding the value of the community asset in question—her husband’s

partnership interest in a law firm—and the question before us was whether the trial

judge had committed harmful error by denying the wife’s requests for discovery

regarding the value of the partnership interest. Id. at 742–47. Thus, Finn is

distinguishable from cases like Deltuva in which the appealing spouse failed to

introduce any valuation evidence regarding a community asset.

      Finally, we recognize that a different rule governs when a divorce and

property division are rendered by default. In that circumstance, we will reverse the

property division if it is not supported by evidence of the value of the community

estate. See, e.g., Heap-Welch v. Welch, No. 05-19-01260-CV, 2020 WL 6304992, at

                                       –10–
*2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 28, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Gonzalez v. Gonzalez,

331 S.W.3d 864, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); In re E.M.V., 312

S.W.3d 288, 291 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); accord Sandone v. Miller-

Sandone, 116 S.W.3d 204, 205 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, no pet.); O’Neal v.

O’Neal, 69 S.W.3d 347, 348 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.). But because these

cases involve default judgments, they are distinguishable from Deltuva and similar

cases in which the appealing spouse appeared at trial but nevertheless introduced no

valuation evidence regarding a community asset.

      Because Margarita introduced no evidence of the value of Rock N Roll, she

cannot now complain that the trial judge lacked sufficient information to make a just

and right division of the community property.

      3.     Conclusion

      We overrule issue two and the related part of issue three.

B.    Issues One and Three: Did the trial judge err by dividing the community
      estate because the evidence of Rooster Tile’s value was conclusory and
      speculative?

      In issues one and three, Margarita argues that the trial judge erred by dividing

the community estate because no probative evidence of Rooster Tile’s value was

admitted at trial. Specifically, she argues that the expert testimony adduced by Isaias

regarding Rooster Tile’s value constituted no evidence because the testimony was

conclusory and speculative.

                                        –11–
      Our analysis of issue two above also applies to issue one. Margarita argues

that the trial judge could not properly divide the community estate because no

probative evidence of Rooster Tile’s value was admitted at trial. But Margarita

herself offered no evidence of Rooster Tile’s value at trial. Accordingly, even if

Margarita is correct and no probative evidence of Rooster Tile’s value was admitted

at trial, Margarita cannot argue on appeal that this lack of evidence rendered the

property division an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Deltuva, 113 S.W.3d at 887.

      We overrule issue one and the related part of issue three.

C.    Issue Four: Is finding of fact 39(g) supported by legally or factually
      insufficient evidence, thereby making the property division an abuse of
      discretion?

      In finding of fact 39, the trial judge listed the factors that she considered in

determining a just and right division of the community estate. In her fourth issue,

Margarita argues that there was legally or factually insufficient evidence to support

one factor listed in finding 39(g) and that this erroneous finding affected the property

division. See In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d at 383 (insufficiency

of the evidence is a relevant factor in determining whether the trial judge abused her

discretion). Isaias responds that the evidence was sufficient to support finding 39(g).

We conclude that Margarita has not shown that the property division was an abuse

of discretion.

      As noted above, the trial judge’s finding of fact 39 stated the factors that she

considered in determining a just and right division of the community estate:

                                         –12–
      a.     the adultery on the part of [Isaias] during the marriage;

      b.     the granting of conservatorship of [I.P.] to [Margarita];

      c.     future needs of the child;

      d.     the community indebtedness and liabilities for which [Isaias and
             Margarita] will be responsible;

      e.     the tax consequences of the division of the property;

      f.     the future earning power, business opportunities, capacities, and
             abilities of the spouses[;]

      g.     the money in the possession of [Margarita] at the time of
             separation and the amount of money depleted from the bank
             account under her control of [sic] the Chase Bank Account
             number ending 1729.

      Margarita attacks only the second half of finding 39(g), arguing that there is

no evidence that she depleted the Chase account ending in 1729. (Although that part

of the finding does not expressly state that Margarita caused the depletion, the

reference to the bank account’s being under Margarita’s control implies that she did.)

But even assuming that Margarita is correct about the insufficiency of the evidence,

we conclude that she has not shown reversible error.

      To obtain reversal, Margarita must show not only that the trial judge erred by

making finding 39(g) but also that the error was harmful, i.e., caused the property

division to be an abuse of discretion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Wheeling v.

Wheeling, 546 S.W.3d 216, 224 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). But the trial

judge did not find the amount of the money that was taken from the 1729 account so

as to constitute “depletion.” Without such a finding, Margarita cannot show that the

                                          –13–
error, if any, had more than a de minimis effect on the trial judge’s just and right

division of the community estate. See Rice v. Rice, No. 02-21-00413-CV, 2023 WL

109817, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[E]rrors

that have a de minimis effect on the division, such as in the range of two to three

percent, do not require reversal and remand.”).

      The Wheeling case is closely on point. In that divorce case, the trial court

found that both spouses committed waste and that each spouse’s wasteful conduct

offset the other spouse’s waste. 546 S.W.3d at 222. On appeal, the wife argued that

there was insufficient evidence that she committed waste. Id. at 224–25. The court

of appeals disagreed, but it went on to hold that in any event the wife had failed to

show harm because there was no finding of the value of the waste the parties

committed. Id. at 227. Because the trial court did not find the value of the waste,

there was no way to compare the waste to the entire community-property estate, and

thus the wife could not “show that this error [i.e., the finding that she committed

waste], if any, had more than a de minimis effect on the just and right division of the

community estate.” Id. “In other words, even if we determined that Wife was correct

in her assertion that the trial court erred in finding that she committed waste she

nonetheless failed to establish that such an error probably caused the rendition of an

improper judgment.” Id. The same reasoning applies to this case: because the trial

judge did not find the amount by which Margarita depleted the 1729 bank account,

we cannot tell whether the depletion finding, even if erroneous, had more than a de

                                        –14–
minimis effect on the property division. Accordingly, Margarita has not shown that

the depletion finding was harmful even if it was erroneous. See TEX. R. APP. P.

44.1(a)(1).

      We overrule Margarita’s fourth issue.

                               IV. DISPOSITION

      We affirm the final decree of divorce.

                                          /Dennise Garcia/
                                          DENNISE GARCIA
                                          JUSTICE

220577F.P05

                                       –15–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF I.P., A                     On Appeal from the 301st Judicial
CHILD                                          District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DF-19-00991.
No. 05-22-00577-CV                             Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
                                               Justices Pedersen, III and Kennedy
                                               participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee J. Isaias Padilla recover his costs of this
appeal from appellant Margarita Padilla.

Judgment entered this 15th day of August 2023.

                                        –16–