Court Opinion

ID: 9775817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:09:55.392445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.157778
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
dissenting.
All members of the court seem to agree that a professional insurance agent has a responsibility to disclose certain information to assist a client in making an informed decision. The debate today is limited to whether there is any evidence of the negligence of the agent who dealt with this particular East Texas family. The Rusk County jury that heard the case found that the agent failed to use ordinary care in selling the Mays an insurance policy. Increasingly, however, when this majority disagrees with a jury verdict, it simply replaces the deliberations of twelve members of the local community with the preferences of a majority of the “high nine” in Austin.1 Today this disturbing trend continues.
In reviewing a “no evidence” point, this court “must consider only the evidence and inferences tending to support the jury’s finding, viewed most favorably in support of the finding, and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.” Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex.1992); State v. $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d 783 (Tex.1991) (per curiam); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). In concluding that there is no evidence of negligence “under the facts of this case,” the majority ignores this long-standing rule and instead reweighs the evidence to determine its factual sufficiency. Where more than a “scintilla” of evidence exists to support a finding, we remand to the court of appeals to perform a factual insufficiency review. Because no challenge was made to the sufficiency of the evidence in the court of appeals, the majority, under our ordinary procedure, has been denied the ability to order a remand. Nevertheless, rushing to the rescue, today’s opinion transforms something into nothing by categorizing what clearly is some evidence as no evidence.
Here the jury found that the insurance agent made no misrepresentations, but was nonetheless negligent in advising the Mays. I do not personally view the evidence underlying that finding to be overwhelmingly persuasive. In fact, I disagree with Justice Gammage that this agent may have breached his duties to the Mays for personal financial gain. Making a reasonable profit is hardly illegal; indeed, it is at the core of our economic system. There is no evidence that this agent, Rex Wiley, could not have earned just as much from selling the Mays a different policy. Even without such a comparison, in some instances a jury may be entitled to infer an improper financial motive, but that cannot be done on this record, nor here is this even a relevant consideration. Regardless of Wiley’s state of mind, his failure to make a reasonable disclosure to his clients was some evidence of negligence.
When Faith May sought an affordable “good policy” that would provide coverage for any future children, she entrusted to Wiley the job of assessing the available alternatives and advising her as to the most appropriate coverage. He not only failed to make such an evaluation, but neglected to inform the Mays that there were any alternatives to the policy he recommended. While emphasizing Wiley’s disclosure of the particular termination clause that eventually caused coverage to lapse, see 844 S.W.2d at 670 n. 10, the majority fails to note that the Mays had no way of knowing whether there were any available alternatives to better meet their needs or *675whether this was standard boilerplate found in every insurance policy. Whatever Wiley’s motives for failing to disclose the substance of the available options, or even their existence, that failure was some evidence of negligence.
An insurance agent, like other professionals, is not a guarantor of the client’s happiness and should not be subject to liability any time the client is dissatisfied. Nor should the fact that the agent earns a reasonable profit from providing a service, by itself, be evidence the service has been negligently performed. But as the agent should not bear responsibility for every bad result, neither should the consumer.
An insurance agent is required to “keep his clients fully informed so that they can remain safely insured.” Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Burnette, 560 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1977, no writ) (quoting Cateora v. British Atlantic Assurance, Ltd., 282 F.Supp. 167, 174 (S.D.Tex.1968)). In Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Beach, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 251, 261 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court upheld a jury finding that an insurance agent was negligent in failing to “thoroughly acquaint himself” with his client’s needs and in failing to procure the coverage most appropriate to fulfill them. See also Hitching v. Zamora, 695 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.1985). Recognizing that insurance agents must exercise reasonable care in advising consumers, the majority cites a number of opinions from other states, such as Sobotor v. Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 200 N.J.Super. 333, 491 A.2d 737, 741-. 42 (App.Div.1984) (per curiam). There the court affirmed a finding that an agent was negligent in failing to inform the client of the availability of uninsured motorist coverage after he had requested the “best available” insurance. Id. 491 A.2d at 738.2
Although the majority acknowledges that Wiley “could have done a better job” by informing the Mays more fully, it nonetheless concludes that there is no evidence to support a negligence claim. 844 S.W.2d at 672. Distinguishing Sobotor on the grounds that requesting “the best available” insurance is qualitatively different from requesting “good” coverage, 844 S.W.2d at 673, the majority approaches the case from the perspective of the factfinder. The jury here was entitled to find that, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable insurance agent in Wiley’s position should have informed the Mays of the availability of other policies. In Kabban v. Mackin, 104 Or.App. 422, 801 P.2d 883, 891 (1990), the court held that the question of whether the agent should have advised the client of a potential coverage problem was for the jury to determine. Because the trial court had essentially usurped the jury’s role through instructions defining the standard of care, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. Like the trial judge in Kabban, the majority today supplants the jury as fact-finder by holding that, even though Wiley’s conduct was less than exemplary, the record contains no evidence of his negligence. Because the majority continues its steady erosion of our right to trial by jury, I dissent.

. See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, — S.W.2d -, - (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Leleaux v. Hamshire-Fannett I.S.D., 835 S.W.2d 49, 55-56 (Tex.1992) (Doggett, J., dissenting); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 491 (Tex.1991) (Doggett, J., concurring and dissenting); Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting).

. Other states have imposed liability in similar situations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Urie, 405 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn.1987) (reversing summary judgment for insurer based on agent’s failure to offer or explain uninsured motorist coverage); Dimeo v. Burns, Brooks & McNeil, Inc., 6 Conn.App. 241, 504 A.2d 557, 559 (1986) (approving jury instructions imposing duty to advise); Bicknell, Inc. v. Havlin, 9 Mass.App. 497, 402 N.E.2d 116, 119 (1980) (agent negligent in failing to place sufficient coverage on plaintiffs buildings after undertaking to advise as to appropriate coverage); Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Or., Inc., 44 Or .App. 739, 607 P.2d 763, 765 (1980) (agent had duty to inform plaintiff of the "significant distinctions between the alternative insurance policies under consideration”); see also Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters, Inc., 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, 403 (1984) (noting that an insurance agent acts as an "advisor” with a "duty to speak without negligence”).