Court Opinion

ID: 9739725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:20:09.418104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.658084
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I am in agreement with the dissent of Justice Wahl. I write separately because I believe that Minn.Stat. § 593.32 (1992) provides adequate grounds for resolution of this case, allowing us to avoid reaching the constitutional issues presented.
Under Minn.Stat. § 593.32, subd. 1, a citizen may not be excluded from jury service in Minnesota “on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or a physical or sensory disability.” Thus, if Minn.Stat. § 593.32 applies to the impaneling of juries, the prosecutor’s conduct here is a clear violation. It is argued that the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 593.32, subd. 1, apply only to the selection of the jury pool and not to the impaneling of any given jury. However, subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 593.32 suggests otherwise. Subdivision 2 states: “Nothing in subdivision 1 restricts the right to strike an individual from being impaneled on a jury for cause based on a showing that a physical or sensory disability will impair the juror’s ability to try a particular case.” (Emphasis added.) By implication, I read the language of subdivision 2 to say that subdivision 1 applies to the impaneling of juries as well as to creating jury pools. In addition, it would seem to make no sense for the legislature to provide for a system allowing an attorney to peremptorily challenge a juror because of that juror’s religion while, at the same time, requiring the attorney to have cause in order to challenge a person with a physical or sensory disability. Therefore, I would hold that the prosecutor’s challenge of the prospective juror in this case on the basis of that juror’s religion violated Minn.Stat. § 593.32, and I would remand this case to the district court for a new trial.