Court Opinion

ID: 4070589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 01:20:57.570986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:04:01.991825
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                           01-15-00090-cv
                                                               FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                       HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                    10/5/2015 12:59:02 PM
                                                                    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                   CLERK

                        No. 01-15-00090-CV

             In The Court of Appeals 1st COURT FILED IN
                                                   OF APPEALS
                                           HOUSTON, TEXAS
       For The First Court of Appeals District
                                        10/5/2015 12:59:02 PM

                 Houston, Texas         CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                 Clerk

                        VICKY MCKENNA,
                            Appellant,
                                   v.
             BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE,
                       Appellee.

            ON APPEAL FROM THE 11TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
                         HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
                         CAUSE NO. 2012-74884

                      BRIEF OF APPELLEE

                  NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
                          Shauna Johnson Clark
                shauna.clark@nortonrosefulbright.com
                         State Bar No. 00790977
                             Joy M. Soloway
                 joy.soloway@nortonrosefulbright.com
                         State Bar No. 18838700
                           Heather L. Sherrod
               heather.sherrod@nortonrosefulbright.com
                         State Bar No. 24083836
                      1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
                         Houston, Texas 77010
                      Telephone: (713) 651-5151
                      Telecopier: (713) 651-5246
         Counsel for Appellee Baylor College of Medicine

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
                                                                                                                       Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii
LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL.................................................................. viii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ix
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .............................................ix
ISSUES PRESENTED..............................................................................................x
RECORD REFERENCES .......................................................................................xi
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...............................2
           I.       In 2008, McKenna Becomes a Baylor Employee ................................2
           II.      In 2010, Baylor Implements New Patient Care Standards................... 2
           III.     McKenna Falls Short of Baylor’s Standards and Is Disciplined ......... 3
           IV.      Events Leading to McKenna’s October 2011 Termination for
                    Poor Performance .................................................................................5
           V.       Following the Termination Meeting, Baylor Re-Categorizes
                    McKenna’s Termination from Performance to Misconduct ................ 7
           VI.      The Garey Email and the Letter to McKenna ......................................8
           VII. McKenna Informs Certain Prospective Employers of the
                Circumstances of Her Termination ......................................................8
           VIII. McKenna’s EEOC Charge, the Lawsuit and Summary
                 Judgment ..............................................................................................9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................................................................12
STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................12
ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................13
           I.       The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on
                    McKenna’s Discrimination Claims ....................................................13
                    A.       The McDonnell Burden-Shifting Framework Applies
                             Here ..........................................................................................13

58615585                                                      i
                                              Table of Contents
                                                (continued)
                                                                                                                  Page

                  B.      Baylor Conclusively Established a Legitimate, Non-
                          Discriminatory Reason for Its Discharge Decision .................15
                  C.      McKenna Failed to Raise a Fact Issue on Her Pretext
                          Claim ........................................................................................17
                          1.       Disagreement with the employer’s decision is no
                                   evidence of pretext.........................................................17
                          2.       McKenna also failed to raise a fact issue on her
                                   claim that she was treated differently ............................18
           II.    The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on
                  McKenna’s Libel Claim .....................................................................23
                  A.      Summary Judgment Should Be Affirmed Because
                          McKenna Did Not Dispute the Truthfulness of the
                          Statements and She Failed to Raise a Fact Issue on Her
                          Self-Publication Theory ...........................................................24
                          1.       McKenna did not contest the truthfulness of the
                                   statements ......................................................................24
                          2.       McKenna failed to raise a fact issue on her self-
                                   publication theory (assuming arguendo the claim
                                   is cognizable) .................................................................25
                  B.      McKenna’s Libel Claim Was Time-Barred .............................26
                  C.      As a Matter of Law, Baylor Proved the Statements Were
                          Protected by a Qualified Privilege ...........................................30
                          1.       The statements here are protected by the privilege .......31
                          2.       McKenna waived her claim that the statements
                                   were made with malice ..................................................33
           III.   The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on
                  McKenna’s Breach of Contract Claim ...............................................34
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF .....................................................36
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COMPLIANCE.........................................................37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................37

58615585                                                  ii
                                      TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
                                                                                                              Page(s)

Cases
Anderson v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys.,
  458 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) ...............passim
Arredondo v. Rodriguez, 198 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
   2006, no pet.) ......................................................................................................36

Austin v. Inet Techs., Inc.,
  118 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) ..............................23, 26, 31
Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Williams,
  360 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) ..........passim
Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc.,
   413 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................17
Burbage v. Burbage,
  447 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2014) ........................................................................30, 33
Carlton v. Houston Cmty. Coll.,
  No. 01-11-00249-CV, 2012 WL 3628890 (Tex. App.—Houston
  [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...................................................21
Chandler v. CSC Applied Techs., LLC,
  376 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet.
  denied)..........................................................................................................passim

City of Keller v. Wilson,
   168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) ..............................................................................13

Domingo v. Mitchell,
  257 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied) .................................35

Easley v. Members Ins. Grp.,
  828 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) ...............24, 25

58615585                                                   iii
Fago v. City of Hartford,
  No. 3:02-cv-1189-AHN, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14911 (D. Conn.
  Mar. 31, 2006).....................................................................................................22

Flournoy v. Campbell Concrete & Materials, LLC,
   No. H-09-3894, 2011 WL 722614 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2011) ...........................18
FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin,
  22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000)...........................................................................13, 23

Frakes v. Crete Carrier Corp.,
   579 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................31, 33
Gallien v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
  No. 14-11-00938-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790
  (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2013, pet. denied)
  (mem. op.) .....................................................................................................35, 36

Green v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc.,
  199 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet.
  denied).................................................................................................................17
Heck v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
  No. 07-4915(MLC), 2009 WL 540685 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2009)...........................23

Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc.,
  177 S.W.3d 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet.
  denied).................................................................................................................31
Holloway v. Butler,
  662 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d
  n.r.e.) ...................................................................................................................27

Iacono v. Lyons,
   16 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ..........................35

Kirkpatrick v. Pfizer, Inc.,
   391 F. App’x 712 (10th Cir. 2010) .....................................................................23

Lee v. Kansas City & S. Ry. Co.,
   574 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2009) ............................................................18, 19, 20, 22

81266839                                                      iv
Lyle v. Waddle,
   144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770 (1945) .................................................................26

Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez,
  206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) ..............................................................................13

Majdzadeh-Koohbanani v. Jaster-Quintanilla Dallas, LLP,
  No. 3:09-CV-1951-G-BK, 2010 WL 5677911 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20,
  2010) ...................................................................................................................32

Martinez v. Hardy,
  864 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) ................... 27
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
  411 U.S. 792 (1973) ............................................................................................13

Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,
  372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) ..............................................................................14
Navy v. Coll. of the Mainland,
  407 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. 2013) ..................................................................18, 20, 22
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.,
   690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) ..............................................................................12

Patrick v. McGowan,
   104 S.W.3d 219 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.)....................................31

Preuss v. Kolmar Labs., Inc.,
   970 F. Supp. 2d 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ..........................................................21, 22

Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Davis,
  891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995) ............................................................24, 31, 33, 34

Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
  540 U.S. 44 (2003) ..............................................................................................16

Rincones v. WHM Custom Servs.,
   457 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. filed)..............25, 26, 32

Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc.,
  813 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. 1991) ..............................................................................35

81266839                                                     v
Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez,
   365 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2012) ..............................................................................16

Schirle v. Sokudo USA, L.L.C.,
   484 F. App’x 893 (5th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................29

Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland,
   20 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) ............................................27

Stokes v. Va. Dep’t of Corr.,
   No. 3:10cv370, 2012 WL 4461493 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2012)
   aff’d, 512 F. App’x 281 (4th Cir. 2013) .............................................................16
Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Mfg. Co.,
   744 F.3d 944 (5th Cir. 2014) ..............................................................................28

Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc.,
   219 S.W.3d 563 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) ...................................29
Tex. Gas Utils. Co. v. Barrett,
   460 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. 1970) ..............................................................................35
Turner v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.,
   675 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 2012) ..............................................................................18

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
   164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) ..............................................................................13

Villegas v. Harris Cnty.,
   No. 01-07-00031-CV, 2007 WL 4465369 (Tex. App.—Houston
   [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) ....................................................14
Waddill v. Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity Lambda Tau Ch. Tex. Tech
  Univ.,
  114 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) ..........................................29

Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys.,
  271 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001) ..............................................................................17

Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc.,
  978 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no pet.) ......................................31

81266839                                              vi
Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez,
   177 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) .........................................................19

Rules, Statutes & Codes
29 C.F.R. § 1910.141(g)(2) ........................................................................................6

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d)(2)(ix) ................................................................................6
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.002(a) .........................................................26, 27
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.068 ...................................................................28

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001 ..........................................................23
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.005 ...................................................................24
Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001(1) .....................................................................................14

Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B) ....................................................................................2
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ......................................................................................24, 36

Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) .............................................................................................33

Other Authorities
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 (1981) ......................................................35
Samuel Willston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 23 (Walter
  H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957) ..............................................................................35

81266839                                                 vii
                    LIST OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant:                     Appellant’s Trial & Appellate Counsel:
Vicky McKenna                  Glenn W. Patterson, Jr.
                               glenn@patterson-adr.com
                               Attorney at Law
                               11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2820
                               Houston, Texas 77046
                               Telephone: (713) 961-1200
                               Telecopier: (713) 961-0941

Appellee:                      Appellee’s Trial Counsel:
Baylor College of Medicine     Shauna Johnson Clark
                               shauna.clark@nortonrosefulbright.com
                               Heather L. Sherrod
                               heather.sherrod@nortonrosefulbright.com
                               NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
                               1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
                               Houston, TX 77010-3095
                               Telephone: (713) 651-5151
                               Telecopier: (713) 651-5246

                               Appellee’s Appellate Counsel:
                               Shauna Johnson Clark
                               shauna.clark@nortonrosefulbright.com
                               Joy M. Soloway
                               joy.soloway@nortonrosefulbright.com
                               Heather L. Sherrod
                               heather.sherrod@nortonrosefulbright.com
                               NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP
                               1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
                               Houston, TX 77010-3095
                               Telephone: (713) 651-5151
                               Telecopier: (713) 651-5246

58615585                        viii
                         STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:          Plaintiff Vicky McKenna brought this race (she is
                             white) and age (she is 48) discrimination case
                             following her October 31, 2011 termination from
                             Baylor College of Medicine (“Baylor”). CR4. In
                             addition to discrimination, McKenna asserted
                             claims for libel and two breach of contract claims.
                             CR58. Her breach of contract claims were for
                             back pay (pay for an allegedly unpaid shift) and
                             breach of an alleged promise to keep her on the
                             payroll for 30 days following her termination.
                             CR68.

Trial Court:                 11th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas
                             Honorable Michael Miller presiding.

Course of Proceedings:       Following adequate time for discovery, Baylor
                             filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for
                             summary judgment on all of McKenna’s claims.
                             CR71.
Disposition:                 The trial court granted Baylor’s motion except as
                             to McKenna’s claim for back pay. CR488. The
                             parties then entered into a Rule 11 agreement
                             providing that McKenna would dismiss her back
                             pay claim without prejudice allowing the summary
                             judgment to become final. CR489; 2SCR3, 5.

58615585                             ix
                  STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
           Baylor is asking for argument only because McKenna did and if this Court

grants argument, Baylor would like to participate. But Baylor does not believe

argument is warranted in this case as the parties’ arguments are adequately set

forth in their briefs, the record is manageable and the law is settled.

58615585                                   x
                                ISSUES PRESENTED
           1.   Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to

Baylor.

           2.   Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to Baylor

on McKenna’s discrimination claims because she failed to raise an issue of

material fact.

           3.   Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Baylor

on McKenna’s libel claim because she did not refute Baylor’s evidence that the

statements at issue were true, or because as a matter of law (1) McKenna’s claims

are time barred and (2) the statements at issue are protected by a qualified

privilege.

           4.   Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Baylor

on McKenna’s claim for breach of contract on the basis of no consideration.

58615585                                  xi
                               RECORD REFERENCES
           The original clerk’s record is cited as “CR.” The first supplemental clerk’s

record filed on June 25, 2015 is cited as “SCR” and the second supplemental

clerk’s record filed on August 28, 2015, is cited as “2SCR.”               McKenna’s

Appellant’s Brief will be cited as “AB.”

58615585                                    xii
                                   INTRODUCTION
           The facts of this case, as established by the summary judgment evidence, are

straightforward. McKenna was employed by Baylor between 2008 and 2011; her

employment ended because of poor performance. In the year leading up to her

termination, McKenna failed to timely complete her chart reviews, failed to treat

the required number of patients per hour, was late for work, and exhibited a

negative attitude. The events of October 7, 2011 were the tipping point. On that

day, McKenna failed to properly transfer a patient under her care to another

provider at the end of her shift, carried a water bottle in the patient care area in

violation of Baylor policy and federal regulations, and loudly used unprofessional

language in front of patients. Baylor decided to terminate McKenna for these

events after reviewing her prior disciplinary history.

           Because of McKenna’s disrespectful and aggressive conduct during and

after her termination meeting (including pointing her finger in her supervisor’s

face), Baylor’s Human Resources Department decided to re-categorize McKenna’s

termination from performance-based, which carried with it eligibility to be rehired

within Baylor, to “misconduct—ineligible for rehire.”

           McKenna’s claims for discrimination, libel and breach of contract had no

factual basis. This case was properly disposed of by summary judgment.

58615585                                     1
             STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
           McKenna’s statement of facts is incomplete, is missing required record cites,

and is misleading.         Baylor therefore provides its own.        Tex. R. App. P.

38.2(a)(1)(B).

I.         In 2008, McKenna Becomes a Baylor Employee
           Between 2006 and 2008, McKenna worked as a nurse practitioner (also

referred to as a midlevel provider) at the Ben Taub Emergency Center for the

Harris County Hospital District. CR117-19, 120. McKenna became a Baylor

employee in October 2008 when Baylor took over the Ben Taub Emergency

Center. CR118. McKenna was then 45 years old. CR136. McKenna continued in

her same position in the Emergency Center. CR118.

II.        In 2010, Baylor Implements New Patient Care Standards
           Beginning in July 2010, Baylor instituted emergency medicine standards to

ensure physicians and midlevel providers were providing efficient, quality patient

care. CR157. First, Baylor tracked the number of patients each midlevel provider

treated and instituted a goal for every midlevel provider to treat an average of two

patients per hour. CR156, 166. Midlevel providers who consistently failed to treat

an average of two patients an hour were counseled. CR176-77.

           Second, Baylor implemented chart reviews as a means of achieving quality

assurance and measuring performance. CR122-23. On a monthly basis, midlevel

providers were required to select ten patient charts to review with their supervising

58615585                                     2
physician. CR122-23. The midlevel provider and supervising physician were to

then discuss each chart, review the patient’s symptoms, diagnostic management,

and the diagnostic tests that should be utilized to determine the patient’s diagnosis

and care. CR123, 155. To track compliance with this requirement, the midlevel

provider’s supervising physician completed a chart review form, which the

midlevel provider submitted to the Ben Taub Emergency Department

Administrator with copies of the reviewed charts. CR122, 154.

III.       McKenna Falls Short of Baylor’s Standards and Is Disciplined
           McKenna was subject to these initiatives. However, McKenna fell short of

Baylor’s new performance standards. For example, McKenna failed to timely

complete her chart reviews and treated less than two patients per hour on average.

These issues were brought to her attention, and she did not react appropriately.

           First, in December 2010, McKenna, along with other midlevel providers,

received an email from her immediate supervisor, Trisha Harris, stating that her

chart reviews were more than 30 days delinquent. CR123.1

           On April 12, 2011, McKenna, along with other midlevel providers, received

another email notifying her that her chart reviews were more than 30 days late.

CR124, 171-72.

1
  McKenna’s presentation of the facts suggests that she was delinquent in completing her chart
reviews for only a few weeks in the summer of 2011. AB 4. She leaves out that she was first
counseled for delinquent chart reviews in December of 2010, and that she remained so. Id.

58615585                                      3
           McKenna ignored these reminders. CR172. Instead, in response to Harris’

April email, McKenna suggested to her new supervising physician that her failure

to timely complete her chart reviews be “disregard[ed].”                    CR124-25.       Her

suggestion was straight-out rejected. CR125. McKenna was also reminded that

she was six months delinquent in submitting chart reviews, and that it was her

responsibility to find a time to meet with her supervising physician to prevent such

delinquencies. Id. Even though she understood that the chart reviews provided an

educational opportunity, McKenna remained delinquent. Id.

           On June 13, 2011, McKenna received a written warning for delinquent chart

reviews. CR126.2 Along with the written warning, McKenna was asked to work

an extra shift to make up the administrative time she missed by failing to complete

the reviews and as a deterrent to discourage future delinquencies. CR173, 188.3

           On June 21, Harris and Dr. Angela Fisher, the Associate Chief of Operations

for Baylor’s Emergency Medicine Section, met with McKenna to discuss her

performance. CR127. McKenna was told that her productivity was substandard.

2
  Besides McKenna, the counseled employees included Trent Renfrow (age 45, Caucasian),
Charles Dangerfield (age 40, African-American), and Alicia Nash (age 39, African-American).
CR177, 194. McKenna’s claim that Dr. Fisher wanted to fire her (AB 3, 17) is misleading. The
testimony is that Dr. Fisher wanted to make sure that McKenna’s low productivity was properly
documented, which action is not probative of a discrimination claim. CR451-52.
3
  Midlevel providers are expected to work a set number of hours annually. CR171. Time spent
working clinical shifts treating patients, vacation time, holiday time, and time spent performing
administrative and academic duties are counted toward the annual, hourly expectation. CR188.
McKenna was a salaried employee. CR123. Her pay was never docked, and she received the
same amount of pay regardless of the number of hours she worked. CR123, 174.

58615585                                       4
CR127-28. McKenna was also told that other nursing staff had concerns about her

performance. CR128. After the meeting, McKenna received a written warning,

which summarized her supervisors’ concerns, including that she was inefficient

regarding patient care and throughput, exhibited a negative attitude at work, failed

to comply with non-clinical faculty requirements, and had persistent poor

productivity. See CR127-29, 175-76, 196.4 McKenna was placed on probation

pending improvement of her performance. CR128, 182, 196. And she was told

that failure to improve could result in further disciplinary action. CR196.

           On June 27, 2011, McKenna was more than two hours late for work and was

given a written warning. CR127, 174.

IV.        Events Leading to McKenna’s October 2011 Termination for Poor
           Performance
           The tipping point happened on October 7, 2011. At the end of her shift,

McKenna presented Dr. Fisher with disorganized sign-out reports for four patients

in her care. CR130-31, 149. When a patient is transferred to another department

or a midlevel provider completes his or her shift, it is standard practice for the

midlevel provider to “sign-out” or transfer his or her patients to another provider.

CR149. To ensure that care is seamlessly transferred from one provider to another,

4
 McKenna claims that she was the only person actually written up (as opposed to spoken to) for
“not seeing two or more patients per hour.” AB 4. That is factually incorrect. As noted in n.2
supra, McKenna’s former supervisor, Trisha Harris, testified that McKenna, Alicia Nash, Trent
Renfrow, and possibly Charles Dangerfield were written up for failing to meet the Emergency
Medicine Section’s productivity expectations. SCR103.

58615585                                      5
the departing provider verbally explains each patient’s chart, including any tests

run and other pertinent information. CR149-50.

           After McKenna completed her sign-out, Dr. Fisher learned that McKenna

had failed to sign-out a fifth patient. CR149, 152, 198-99. Left in the critical care

area by herself, the patient became angry and uncooperative. CR198-99. When

Dr. Fisher approached McKenna in the patient care area to discuss the patient,

McKenna became upset and loudly used profane language in front of patients.

CR132, 198-99. McKenna at this time was also carrying a water bottle in the

patient care area, breaking another rule; i.e., it is a violation of hospital policy and

the law, for hospital employees to have food or drinks in patient care areas.

CR132, 150, 199. (This may sound like a minor violation of an unimportant

policy, but it is not. The prohibition on food and beverages in patient care areas is

required by OSHA. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1030(d)(2)(ix), 1910.141(g)(2).)5

           After reviewing this last incident and McKenna’s prior disciplinary history,

Baylor decided to terminate McKenna. CR152, 201. There was no single reason

for the decision. It was instead the culmination of the performance-related events

recounted above. CR202.

5
  McKenna’s assertion that she did not violate policy by drinking liquids in patient areas (AB 6)
is refuted by her record cite to Dr. Fisher’s testimony. CR327 (testifying that OSHA regulations
mandate that “food and drink are not allowed in patient care areas”).

58615585                                       6
V.         Following the Termination Meeting, Baylor Re-Categorizes McKenna’s
           Termination from Performance to Misconduct
           On the morning of October 31, 2011, McKenna’s supervisors (Dr. Fisher

and Harris) and members of Baylor’s Employee Relations Department (Judy Garey

and Letha Smith) met with McKenna to inform her that she would be terminated

effective December 1, 2011 because of her persistent poor performance. CR130,

181. Baylor offered McKenna 30 days of paid administrative leave as a courtesy

to assist her in transitioning to a new position at Baylor (other than Baylor’s

Emergency Medicine Section) or elsewhere. CR152, 212, 214.

           McKenna became upset; things quickly escalated to the point where she

became disrespectful.       CR143, 153, 183, 202, 421.     She stormed out of the

meeting, slammed her office door, at some point resorted to pointing her finger in

Dr. Fisher’s face, and had to be escorted from the premises by security. CR152,

183, 202, 223-24, 421. The security officer was in “disbelief” at McKenna’s

behavior. CR183, 421.

           After the termination meeting, Garey met with Dane Friend, Baylor’s Vice

President of Human Resources, and told him what had happened. CR212. Based

on the conduct witnessed by Garey and Smith, Baylor’s Employee Relations

Department concluded that McKenna’s behavior at the meeting constituted

misconduct, decided to terminate McKenna effective immediately, and to re-

categorize her termination from “performance” to “misconduct.” CR181, 184,

58615585                                   7
212-13. As a result of the re-categorization, McKenna was not eligible to receive

30 days of paid administrative leave and was no longer eligible for rehire at

Baylor. CR182, 184.

VI.        The Garey Email and the Letter to McKenna
           On October 31, McKenna’s midlevel colleagues and supervisors were

informed by email that (1) McKenna would no longer work in the Emergency

Medicine Section, (2) everyone should “respect Ms. McKenna’s privacy and allow

her departure to remain confidential,” and (3) Human Resources agreed that

McKenna could be discharged for misconduct, making her ineligible for rehire.

CR231-32 (hereafter the “Garey Email”).

           By letter dated November 2, Baylor notified McKenna of her change in

status—i.e., that she was terminated for misconduct and would not receive post-

termination pay. CR234. (The letter mistakenly noted her date of discharge as

October 24 rather than October 31. Id.)

           In mid-November, Maria Rodriquez, McKenna’s former colleague who had

received the Garey Email, forwarded it to her. CR221-22.

VII. McKenna Informs Certain Prospective Employers of the Circumstances
     of Her Termination
           Baylor’s practice is to answer inquiries about former employees by

providing only dates of employment and last position held. CR202. However,

McKenna herself informed certain prospective employers that she was terminated

58615585                                  8
by Baylor for misconduct, which she claims frustrated her job search for a few

months, until she was able to secure employment with an agency. CR131, 486;

AB 7, 12, 31.

VIII. McKenna’s EEOC Charge, the Lawsuit and Summary Judgment
           EEOC proceeding.      On March 22, 2012, McKenna filed a charge of

discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) and for the first time complained she was the victim of discrimination

by Baylor. CR236; see also CR120, 137 (McKenna’s acknowledgment that she

never complained about discrimination while working at Baylor).                     Baylor’s

responsive filing stated that McKenna was terminated for persistent poor

performance, not because of race or age. CR215.6

           After the EEOC dismissed McKenna’s charge, McKenna filed this lawsuit

alleging race and age discrimination. CR4. Her amended pleading also asserted

claims for libel and breach of contract. CR71.

           Race and age discrimination claims. McKenna’s discrimination claims

were based on the discipline she received and her discharge. CR61-62. McKenna

6
  McKenna points out that Baylor was unable to explain why it informed the EEOC that she was
terminated for performance-related issues rather than misconduct (e.g., AB 10, 13), but the
accuracy of the information Baylor provided to the EEOC in that regard is not probative of any
element of any claim.

58615585                                      9
has since limited her discrimination claim to her termination. CR269, 276; AB 14-

24.7

           While acknowledging that no one ever made any negative comments about

her race, McKenna nonetheless claims her termination was discriminatory because

she was “singled out” by Harris and Dr. Fisher. CR136. With respect to her age

claims, McKenna claims that Dr. Fisher called her “old school” or “from . . . the

old Ben Taub.” Id.; see also AB 3. McKenna also points out that she was the

“oldest white female of medical providers” and Kaye-Ann Christie, a “25-year-old

black female,” was hired after she was terminated. CR63, 136, 137, 140; see also

AB 3, 21. (Christie was a top performer in Baylor’s fellowship program and did

not replace McKenna. CR185-86, 239-40.)

           Libel. McKenna’s libel claim (CR65-68) was based on (1) the Garey Email

(CR231); (2) the November 2, 2011 letter (CR234); and (3) statements Baylor sent

to the Texas Workforce Commission (“TWC”) in response to McKenna’s

unemployment claim (CR247-48).8 McKenna’s libel claim was first asserted in

her First Amended Petition filed May 19, 2014, well over a year from the date of

the alleged defamatory statements. CR19, 26.

7
 This makes sense as TCHRA reaches only “ultimate employment decisions.” Anderson v.
Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 458 S.W.3d 633, 644 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
8
  In that response, Baylor stated that McKenna had become “verbally combative” during her
termination meeting and was terminated for misconduct.

58615585                                    10
           Breach of contract claims. McKenna alleged two breach of contract claims.

First, McKenna alleged that Baylor was contractually bound to pay her the 30

days’ salary promised to her during the October 31, 2011 termination meeting.

CR68. Second, even though she was a salaried employee (CR123), McKenna

alleged Baylor owed her an additional 12 hours of pay because she was assigned

an extra shift in July 2011 in order to correct delinquent chart reviews. CR68, 173.

           Baylor moved for summary judgment on traditional and no-evidence

grounds. CR71. Baylor demonstrated that it was entitled to summary judgment as

a matter of law for the following reasons:

               Claim                       Basis for Summary Judgment
Discrimination                   McKenna’s discrimination claim failed as a matter of
                                 law because (a) McKenna was terminated for a
                                 lawful reason and (b) McKenna could not establish
                                 that Baylor’s reasons for its termination decision
                                 were pretextual. CR85-94.
Libel                            McKenna’s libel claim failed as a matter of law
                                 because the statements at issue were true, the claim
                                 was barred by limitations, the relation back doctrine
                                 was inapplicable, and every statement was subject to
                                 a qualified privilege. CR94-104.
Breach of Contract               McKenna’s claim that Baylor breached its promise to
                                 pay her an additional 30-days’ salary and benefits
                                 failed for lack of consideration and her claim for
                                 back pay (for a 12-hour shift) failed because she was
                                 a salaried employee. CR104-06.

58615585                                   11
           In her response, McKenna did not dispute Baylor’s claim that the statements

made by Baylor were true (CR283-87), as Baylor so noted (1SCR70).

           The trial court granted Baylor’s motion for summary judgment on all claims

asserted by McKenna except her claim for back pay.               CR488.     McKenna

subsequently nonsuited her back pay claim without prejudice (CR489; 2SCR6) and

then filed her notice of appeal. CR511.

                          SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
           McKenna’s appeal has no merit. She broke several rules, was a repeat

offender, and was discharged. The trial court properly granted summary judgment

on her baseless claims for discrimination, libel and breach of contract.          The

judgment below should be affirmed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW
           The standard of review for a traditional summary judgment is well

established: (1) the movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is therefore entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material

fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will

be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of

the nonmovant and any doubts resolved in the nonmovant’s favor. See, e.g., Nixon

v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).

58615585                                    12
           Because a no-evidence summary judgment motion is essentially a motion for

a pretrial directed verdict (Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581-82

(Tex. 2006)), the Court applies the same legal-sufficiency standard of review that

applies when reviewing a directed verdict. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (setting forth circumstances for when a no-evidence

challenge should be sustained).

           In either case, traditional or no evidence, review is de novo.   Valence

Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When the trial court

grants the judgment without specifying the grounds, the judgment will be affirmed

if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City

of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000).

                                     ARGUMENT

I.         The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on McKenna’s
           Discrimination Claims

           A.    The McDonnell Burden-Shifting Framework Applies Here
           McKenna claimed she was the victim of age and race discrimination in

violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). CR62-64.

           McKenna relied on circumstantial evidence to support her allegations. Id.

When, as here, a plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination through circumstantial

evidence, this Court applies the familiar burden-shifting framework established by

the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

58615585                                   13
See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012);

Anderson v. Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys., 458 S.W.3d 633, 643 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).9

           The discrimination plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.       Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 643.               If a plaintiff successfully

demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant-

employer to show a legitimate and non-discriminatory basis for the adverse

employment decision. Id. at 643-44. Notably, an employer’s burden of producing

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is not a difficult one. Chandler v. CSC

Applied Techs., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 802, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,

pet. denied); (“‘Management does not have to make proper decisions, only non-

discriminatory ones.’”) (citation omitted); Villegas v. Harris Cnty., No. 01-07-

00031-CV, 2007 WL 4465369, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20,

2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“This burden of production is not difficult to meet: even

an incorrect belief that an employee’s performance is inadequate constitutes a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action.”).

           If the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for its employment

action, then the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the articulated

9
  Because it is modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, Texas courts
look to analogous federal law to guide their analysis of discrimination claims brought pursuant to
the TCHRA. Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001(1); Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 372 S.W.3d at 633;
Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 643.

58615585                                       14
reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at

643-44; see also Chandler, 376 S.W.3d at 814-15.

           Although the burden of production shifts between the parties, the burden of

persuasion “‘remains continuously with the plaintiff.’” Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at

644 (citation omitted).

           Baylor assumed for purposes of its motion below that McKenna was able to

make a prima facie case for her race and age discrimination claims (CR85, at n.10)

and will do so again here.10 Baylor then went on to establish as a matter of law

that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its discharge decision and

McKenna failed to show those reasons were pretextual.

           B.    Baylor   Conclusively    Established a       Legitimate,                Non-
                 Discriminatory Reason for Its Discharge Decision
           Baylor’s summary judgment evidence conclusively established that

McKenna was terminated because of her performance deficiencies—over a lengthy

period of time, McKenna was simply not performing up to Baylor’s standards. For

example, McKenna failed to submit her chart reviews for months on end (after

numerous reminders), failed to meet the requirement for average number of

patients to be treated per hour, was late to work, violated hospital policy by failing

10
   For example, Baylor assumed that McKenna, although white, was a member of a protected
class for purposes of her race discrimination claim. Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 643 (to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, the employee must show she is a member of a protected
class).

58615585                                      15
to transfer a patient at the end of the shift (thus creating a dangerous situation for

that patient), used profane language, and violated hospital policy and federal law

by bringing a water bottle into a patient care area. E.g., CR124-27, 132, 150, 172,

174, 199.

           Separate and apart from her prolonged failure to meet Baylor’s performance

standards, McKenna’s behavior at her termination meeting also supplied a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination.                  CR181, 184, 212-13.

McKenna left that meeting, then proceeded to slam the door to her office, and had

to be escorted out by security. CR152, 183, 202, 223-24. Her misconduct is a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Baylor’s decision to reclassify her

termination from performance to misconduct.11 See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,

540 U.S. 44, 54-55 (2003) (holding that a “no-rehire policy is a quintessential

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was

terminated for violating workplace conduct rules”); Stokes v. Va. Dep’t of Corr.,

No. 3:10cv370, 2012 WL 4461493, at *8 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2012) aff’d, 512 F.

App’x 281 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding evidence of inappropriate behavior a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for refusing to rehire the plaintiff).

11
   The Texas Supreme Court has noted that the decision to categorize an employee as ineligible
for rehire is not qualitatively different than the termination itself. Safeshred, Inc. v. Martinez,
365 S.W.3d 655, 665 (Tex. 2012). Accordingly, a separate claim for re-categorizing her
termination fails.

58615585                                        16
           Because Baylor established that it had a legitimate reason (actually multiple

reasons) to terminate McKenna, the burden then shifted to McKenna to show that

each reason was pretextual.          Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 643-44; Wallace v.

Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001).               In other words,

McKenna was required to show that each reason is false and that the real

motivating reason for her discharge was age or race discrimination. Chandler, 376
S.W.3d at 814; Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc. v. Williams, 360 S.W.3d
15, 23-24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (observing in a race

discrimination case that even if the plaintiff establishes that the employer’s

termination reason is false, the plaintiff must still show that the employer

discriminated against him or her because of a protected status).

           C.    McKenna Failed to Raise a Fact Issue on Her Pretext Claim

                 1.    Disagreement with the employer’s decision is no evidence of
                       pretext
           As a threshold issue, that McKenna disagrees with Baylor’s decision to

terminate her does not establish pretext. Chandler, 376 S.W.3d at 814; Green v.

Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 199 S.W.3d 514, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, pet. denied) (noting that appellant’s subjective belief regarding reason for

discharge was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact); see also

Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2005)

(“Management does not have to make proper decisions, only non-discriminatory

58615585                                     17
ones.”); Flournoy v. Campbell Concrete & Materials, LLC, No. H-09-3894, 2011
WL 722614, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2011) (noting that Title VII is “not aimed at

redressing errors of perception and managerial judgment” and that “this court will

not second guess [employer’s] business decision”).

                 2.    McKenna also failed to raise a fact issue on her claim that
                       she was treated differently
           As McKenna acknowledges (AB 19), to show she was treated less favorably

than similarly situated persons outside of her protected class, she must show that

the conduct committed “that drew the adverse employment decision must have

been ‘nearly identical’ to that of the proffered comparator.” Turner v. Kan. City S.

Ry. Co., 675 F.3d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see

also Navy v. Coll. of the Mainland, 407 S.W.3d 893, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (someone is “similarly situated if their circumstances are

comparable in all material respects, including similar standards, supervisors, and

conduct”). Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit held in Lee v. Kansas City & Southern

Railway Co., 574 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2009):

           [W]e require that an employee who proffers a fellow employee as a
           comparator demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were
           taken under “nearly identical circumstances.” The employment
           actions being compared will be deemed to have been taken under
           nearly identical circumstances when the employees being compared
           held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or
           had their employment status determined by the same person, and
           have essentially comparable violation histories.

58615585                                   18
Id. at 259-60 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Ysleta Indep. Sch.

Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917-18 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Baker

Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 360 S.W.3d at 27.

           However, McKenna’s application of the law to her facts is incorrect.

           First, McKenna claims that her colleagues were not written up for delinquent

chart reviews, citing to her deposition and her affidavit. AB 4, 17 (citing CR315,

484). But her own testimony refutes this argument, as she admitted that she does

not know whether the other midlevel providers who, like her, received emails from

Harris that they were behind in their chart reviews, remained delinquent in their

chart reviews following Harris’ email.           CR315-16.     For that same reason,

McKenna’s claim that her colleagues were not required to work an additional shift

to bring their chart reviews current (AB 17) fails as she does not know whether

they, unlike her, heeded Harris’ emails and became current on their chart reviews.

           Next, McKenna claims that none of her colleagues were discharged for

failure to meet the two-patients-per-hour requirement. AB 18, 20. But that is not

why she was discharged. Instead, McKenna’s discharge was the culmination of

many events, including disciplinary issues and productivity deficiencies. CR179,

202, 453. Thus, whether other midlevel providers also did not meet the two-

patient-per-hour goal, McKenna’s mantra (AB 11, 18-20), is not probative of

whether McKenna was treated less favorably than others in nearly identical

58615585                                    19
circumstances. Lee, 574 F.3d at 260; Navy, 407 S.W.3d at 900; Baker Hughes

Oilfield Operations, Inc., 360 S.W.3d at 27.

           McKenna then lobs a series of “facts” that she claims should have defeated

summary judgment on her discrimination claims. For example, she argues that she

was the only employee “punished” by having to work a shift without pay. AB 20.

But as McKenna was a salaried employee (CR123), she was never paid for any

shift.12 Regardless, McKenna did not raise this “fact” below in the context of her

discrimination claim (in her summary judgment response), but only raised it in

support of her breach of contract claim (e.g., CR252, 287) and therefore cannot do

so now. Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 645.

           Similarly unavailing is McKenna’s claim that she was treated less favorably

because another employee was paid extra for working extra shifts. AB 20. First,

there is no record cite for this claim, but even if there were, the circumstances, as

McKenna herself has described them, are not comparable or “nearly identical.” As

pointed out to the trial court (again, in the context of McKenna’s breach claim),

Baylor may have paid midlevel providers who chose to work extra shifts additional

12
   As noted supra in n.3, the uncontroverted summary judgment evidence established that
midlevel providers are expected to work a set number of hours annually. CR171. Time spent
working clinical shifts in the Emergency Center treating patients, vacation time, holiday time,
and time spent performing administrative and academic duties are counted toward the annual,
hourly expectation. CR188. McKenna was a salaried employee. CR123. Her pay was never
docked, and she received the same amount of pay regardless of the number of shifts she worked.
CR123, 174.

58615585                                      20
compensation, but McKenna was required to work an additional shift because she

had not completed her chart reviews. CR74.

           McKenna then claims Baylor’s reasons were pretextual because she did not

conduct herself in an unprofessional manner and other employees agreed she acted

professionally. AB at 20-21; see also id. at 6. But all this proves is that Baylor

might have reached a wrong conclusion about whether McKenna should have been

terminated, which even when accepted as true for summary judgment purposes, is

not probative of a discrimination claim, as this Court has previously held.

Chandler, 376 S.W.3d at 819 (“‘The question is not whether an employer made an

erroneous decision; it is whether the decision was made with discriminatory

motive.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 820 (employee’s “‘own conclusory allegation

that he did not behave inappropriately is irrelevant”) (citation omitted); Carlton v.

Houston Cmty. Coll., No. 01-11-00249-CV, 2012 WL 3628890, at *14 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Plaintiffs’

subjective belief that HCC’s evidence is false and its reasons pretextual, sincere as

that belief may be, does not create a fact issue to defeat summary judgment.”).

           McKenna’s reference to Baylor’s decision to hire a 25-year old African

American—graduating fellow Ms. Christie—without interviewing another

candidate (AB 21-22) also does not demonstrate error by the trial court in granting

Baylor’s motion. Preuss v. Kolmar Labs., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 171, 188 n.17

58615585                                  21
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[R]eplacement by a younger worker, standing alone, is

insufficient to show pretext.”); see also Fago v. City of Hartford, No. 3:02-cv-

1189-AHN, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14911, at *20 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2006)

(granting summary judgment finding fact that plaintiff replaced by someone

outside of protected class not sufficient to maintain discrimination claim in light of

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for adverse action).          Moreover, it is

uncontroverted that Christie’s transition from part-time fellow to full-time

employee was separate and distinct from McKenna’s termination. CR185-86, 239-

40; see also CR465-66. And, unlike McKenna, Christie was one of the Emergency

Medicine Section’s top performers. CR186. Thus, McKenna’s frequent references

to Baylor’s hiring of Christie, a graduating Baylor fellow, is no evidence of pretext

and was thus incapable of defeating Baylor’s summary judgment motion.

           Finally, McKenna’s chart identifying the names of her former colleagues,

their hire dates, birth dates and race (AB 23) also does not evidence that she was

treated less favorably under nearly identical circumstances. Lee, 574 F.3d at 260;

Navy, 407 S.W.3d at 900; Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 360 S.W.3d at

27-31. Indeed, it is difficult to know the point McKenna is attempting to make.

Her chart certainly fails to show the necessary similarities between her

circumstances (i.e., cumulative conduct that led to her discharge) and those of the

58615585                                  22
employees whom she lists to make any meaningful comparison.13 Baker Hughes

Oilfield Operations, Inc., 360 S.W.3d at 27.

           In short, summary judgment was correctly granted on McKenna’s age and

race discrimination claims.

II.        The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on McKenna’s
           Libel Claim14
           Baylor moved for summary judgment on McKenna’s libel claim on the

bases that (1) the statements at issue were true, (2) the claim was time barred, and

(3) the statements were protected by the qualified privilege, and McKenna had no

evidence of malice, which is necessary to refute the privilege. CR94-104. The

summary judgment can be supported on any of these bases. FM Props. Operating

Co., 22 S.W.3d at 872.

13
   In her statement of facts (AB 3), McKenna notes that she was labeled “old school” but she
does not repeat this point in her argument. Regardless, such a remark is insufficient to raise a
fact issue on her discrimination claim. Anderson, 458 S.W.3d at 644-45 (“[s]tray remarks” are
no evidence of an intent to discriminate); see also Kirkpatrick v. Pfizer, Inc., 391 F. App’x 712,
720 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding “old school” comment to be a stray remark and too ambiguous to
be evidence of age discrimination); Heck v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. 07-4915(MLC), 2009
WL 540685, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 4, 2009) (finding comments including references to the plaintiff
as “old school” insufficient to establish pretext for discrimination). Moreover, there is no
evidence linking this alleged comment to an employment decision of any kind, which is fatal to
her claim. Chandler, 376 S.W.3d at 816, 821-22 (affirming summary judgment for employer
and noting that plaintiff presented no evidence that alleged comments were made close to the
time of the adverse employment issue or were made by persons who had authority to make
employment decisions or to influence employment decision).
14
  Libel is defamation expressed in written form. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001;
Austin v. Inet Techs., Inc., 118 S.W.3d 491, 496 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)

58615585                                       23
           A.   Summary Judgment Should Be Affirmed Because McKenna Did
                Not Dispute the Truthfulness of the Statements and She Failed to
                Raise a Fact Issue on Her Self-Publication Theory

                1.    McKenna did not contest the truthfulness of the statements
           Baylor moved for summary judgment on the bases that McKenna had no

evidence that any of the statements made by Baylor were false, and that as a matter

of law, the statements were true. CR71, 98-100.

           McKenna’s response to Baylor’s summary judgment on her libel claim

spanned five pages. CR283-87. While she acknowledged Baylor moved for

summary judgment on the basis that the statements at issue were true or

substantially true (CR283), she did not counter Baylor’s assertion that the

statements were in fact true or substantially true. Instead, McKenna’s arguments

were confined to attempting to refute Baylor’s claim of privilege and

demonstrating the applicability of the relation back doctrine. CR283-87.

           It follows that summary judgment on McKenna’s libel claim was required.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 73.005 (“The truth of the statement in the

publication on which an action for libel is based is a defense to the action.”);

Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Davis, 891 S.W.2d 640, 646 (Tex. 1995) (“Truth

is a complete defense to defamation.”); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Issues

not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other

response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”); Easley v.

58615585                                  24
Members Ins. Grp., 828 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no

writ) (“Because appellant chose not to file a response to appellee’s motion for

summary judgment, there were no fact issues to determine.”).15

                 2.    McKenna failed to raise a fact issue on her self-publication
                       theory (assuming arguendo the claim is cognizable)
           It is unclear whether McKenna is seeking to overturn the trial court’s

judgment on the basis that she self-published the alleged libelous statements in the

course of seeking employment, a claim asserted in her petition. CR66. Her self-

publication is not listed among the actionable statements identified in her appellate

brief (AB 25, listing alleged libelous statements), but there is mention of this

assertion in the context of her relation back argument (AB 31). To the extent

McKenna is asserting self-publication as a basis to overturn the judgment, her

argument fails.

           First, neither the Texas Supreme Court nor this Court have recognized a self-

publication defamation theory. See Rincones v. WHM Custom Servs., 457 S.W.3d
221, 246-47 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, pet. filed) (noting that the Texas

Supreme Court has never recognized the theory).                Nor should the theory be

15
   Because McKenna did not dispute Baylor’s truth defense, the Court need not consider her
appellate argument that the statements to other midlevel providers set forth in the Garey Email
that she was terminated for misconduct were not true either because Baylor told the EEOC that
she was terminated for performance reasons or because, according to McKenna, she did not
engage in any misconduct as defined in Baylor’s Policies and Procedures manual. AB 24-26. In
any event, these alleged facts do not controvert the truth of the statement that McKenna’s
termination was indeed changed from performance to misconduct based on her conduct at and
after the termination meeting.

58615585                                      25
recognized, as doing so would allow an employee who disagrees with her

employer’s reasoning for discharge, to create an actionable tort merely by making

a defamatory statement herself to a third party regarding the circumstances of her

termination. See Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 94, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)

(plaintiff cannot recover for defamation if the statement about which the plaintiff

complains was “authorized, invited or procured by the plaintiff”).

           Moreover, the majority of intermediate courts which have recognized the

self-publication theory do so only in very narrow circumstances—where the

plaintiff can prove she was unaware of the alleged defamatory nature of the

communication at the time she published it to third parties. Rincones, 457 S.W.3d

at 247 (collecting cases); see also Austin, 118 S.W.3d at 499 (finding that

employee’s argument that her reasons for termination were false negated her self-

defamation claim as a matter of law). As Baylor pointed out below (CR100),

McKenna’s self-publication theory failed because she believed the statements were

not true when she made them. Rincones, 457 S.W.3d at 246-47; Austin, 118
S.W.3d at 499. In any event, self-publication is not actionable under Texas law.

           B.    McKenna’s Libel Claim Was Time-Barred
           A plaintiff must file and serve her defamation lawsuit within one year of the

publication of the alleged defamatory statement. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

58615585                                     26
§ 16.002(a); Martinez v. Hardy, 864 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1993, no writ).

           The one-year limitations period begins to run on the “last day of the mass

distribution of copies of the printed matter.” Holloway v. Butler, 662 S.W.2d 688,

692 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (emphasis added).

“On that date, the publisher of the statement has made the libelous matter available

to his intended audience and the tort is complete.” Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at

Garland, 20 S.W.3d 880, 889 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.).

           McKenna amended her petition to include her libel claim on May 19, 2014.

CR19, 26-29. All of the alleged libelous statements are barred by limitations as all

statements predate May 19, 2013.

           McKenna does not contest that each of the alleged defamatory statements

were published more than one year before she asserted her libel claim. Instead, she

asserts that the relation back principal should have saved them from the limitations

bar. AB 27-32. The trial court correctly rejected this argument.

           The “relation back” doctrine enables a plaintiff to add a new claim after the

statutory limitations period has expired only if common operative facts unite the

original and the new claim and at the time the original claim was filed, the new

claim was not already time-barred:

           If a filed pleading relates to a cause of action, cross action,
           counterclaim, or defense that is not subject to a plea of limitation

58615585                                     27
           when the pleading is filed, a subsequent amendment or supplement to
           the pleading that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense is
           not subject to a plea of limitation unless the amendment or
           supplement is wholly based on a new, distinct, or different transaction
           or occurrence.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.068.

           Here, the following three alleged libelous statements were time-barred when

McKenna filed her Original Petition on December 20, 2012 (CR4), and thus cannot

be saved by the relation back doctrine:

           •     Judy Garey’s October 31, 2011 email to members of the Emergency
                 Medicine Section notifying them of McKenna’s termination for
                 misconduct (Garey Email). CR60, 231.

           •     Judy Garey’s November 2, 2011 termination letter to McKenna.
                 CR234.

           •     Baylor’s alleged statements to the TWC Unemployment Division in
                 November 2011 that McKenna was terminated for misconduct.
                 CR247.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.068; Taylor v. Bailey Tool & Mfg. Co., 744
F.3d 944, 946-47 (5th Cir. 2014).

           Moreover, all of the alleged libelous statements at issue are factually distinct

from her discrimination claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.068. The

facts asserted in McKenna’s Original Petition involve events and conduct that

occurred during her employment through her termination. CR6-7, ¶¶ 17-24. In

contrast, the facts asserted in her Amended Petition to support her libel claim arise

from events that occurred after her termination. See CR26, 65-66. In other words,

58615585                                      28
McKenna’s Amended Petition purported to add a completely new set of facts as

well as new grounds for liability that were based on an entirely new and different

occurrence. See Schirle v. Sokudo USA, L.L.C., 484 F. App’x 893, 896, 901 (5th

Cir. 2012) (Texas law) (holding defamation claims asserted in amended petition

did not relate back to the original petition asserting discrimination claims because

the claims were factually distinct); Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt.

Holdings, Inc., 219 S.W.3d 563, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied)

(declining to employ relation back doctrine because each defamation claim is

treated as a separate transaction with a separate injury); see also Waddill v. Phi

Gamma Delta Fraternity Lambda Tau Ch. Tex. Tech Univ., 114 S.W.3d 136, 144

(Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (holding plaintiff could not relate back his

amended defamation claim that involved conduct that occurred after the events

made the basis of his original claim). Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting

McKenna’s attempt to invoke the relation back doctrine.

           McKenna’s efforts to distinguish Texas Disposal Systems Landfill and

Waddill (AB 28, 30) fail. She argues that in Waste Management, the claim of

defamation did not occur after the original petition had been filed, and in Waddill,

the two claims arose over a year apart and were unconnected. But McKenna

ignores the reason that Baylor cited these cases, is that their holdings, consistent

with the statute, that claims will not be saved from limitations where the amended

58615585                                 29
petition purports to add a completely new set of facts as well as new grounds for

liability based entirely on new and different occurrences. CR97.

           In sum, because McKenna cannot show that her libel claim relates to events

that happened during her employment, which was the basis for her original

petition and instead arise from statement made after her termination, the savings

doctrine does not apply here. And it makes no sense that it would. McKenna’s

original petition was based on discrimination, which claim necessarily concerns

events that occurred during employment, while her libel claim arises from post-

termination events. CR4, 58. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any set of facts where a

former employer could discriminate against the former employee after the

employment relationship ended. The term “transaction or occurrence” simply

cannot be stretched to include the entirely separate events that are the grounds for

McKenna’s libel claims.

           C.    As a Matter of Law, Baylor Proved the Statements Were
                 Protected by a Qualified Privilege
           Yet another basis on which the trial court’s summary judgment can be

affirmed is the application of qualified privilege. See Burbage v. Burbage, 447
S.W.3d 249, 254 (Tex. 2014) (“We have recognized that defamation actions

necessarily inhibit free speech, and, thus, the qualified privilege offers an

additional safeguard, even in cases of private, non-political speech.”).         The

qualified “privilege remains intact as long as communications pass only to persons

58615585                                   30
having an interest or duty in the matter to which the communications relate.”

Randall’s, 891 S.W.2d at 646.

                 1.    The statements here are protected by the privilege
           Many cases have applied the privilege to communications between the

employer and the plaintiff’s former colleagues. As this Court itself has held

“communications between company principals and employees, including

communications concerning the termination of an employee, have been held to be

protected by this privilege.” Henriquez v. Cemex Mgmt., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 241,

253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (collecting cases).

           Indeed, Texas courts routinely conclude that the qualified privilege attaches

to statements about why an employee has been discharged.               Frakes v. Crete

Carrier Corp., 579 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that an employer’s

statement to “‘individuals who worked directly with [the plaintiff]’” was protected

by the privilege) (citation omitted); Austin, 118 S.W.3d at 497 (statements made to

supervisors and HR in the course of investigating insubordination incident were

privileged); Welch v. Doss Aviation, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 1998, no pet.) (concluding that circulation of memo to pilots explaining

why another pilot instructor had been fired was within the scope of the employer’s

qualified privilege); see also Patrick v. McGowan, 104 S.W.3d 219, 224 (Tex.

58615585                                     31
App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (concluding that statements made to other

employees are generally privileged unless they are made with malice).

           Second, communications between employers and the TWC regarding an

employee’s unemployment claims are also protected by the privilege. Rincones,
457 S.W.3d at 245-46 (statements to the TWC were “absolutely privileged [and]

cannot serve as a basis for liability”); Majdzadeh-Koohbanani v. Jaster-

Quintanilla Dallas, LLP, No. 3:09-CV-1951-G-BK, 2010 WL 5677911, at *9

(N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2010) (holding employer’s statements to the TWC were

protected by qualified privilege because the TWC had an interest in learning the

reasons for the plaintiff’s termination so it could determine whether to pay

unemployment benefits).

           The privilege indisputably applies here to all the statements at issue. Indeed,

it is hard to imagine a more perfect factual basis for applying the privilege. Each

statement concerned McKenna’s termination for misconduct communicated to

people with an interest in her termination, i.e., her midlevel colleagues, her

supervisors, HR personnel, and the TWC. CR102, 117, 119, 120, 124, 127, 130-

31, 178, 194.

58615585                                     32
           McKenna appears to argue that the privilege does not apply because the

statements at issue were not made “during an investigation.” AB 33.16 But that

argument erroneously seeks to constrain the scope of the privilege. See Randall’s,
891 S.W.2d at 646 (qualified privilege applies when statements were

communicated to those who had an interest in the matter to which the

communications relate); Frakes, 579 F.3d at 430.

                 2.    McKenna waived her claim that the statements were made
                       with malice
           The qualified privilege is lost if the declarant made the statements with

actual malice. Randall’s, 891 S.W.2d at 646. Actual malice, in the defamation

context, means “‘the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with

reckless disregard of whether it is true.’” Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 254 (citation

omitted).

           Below, Baylor sought summary judgment on the basis that McKenna was

unable to defeat its privilege claim with evidence of malice, an issue on which she

had the burden of proof. Id. (once a defendant establishes the privilege, “the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant made the statements with

actual malice”); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); see CR71, 102-04. McKenna failed to

offer any evidence of malice, instead erroneously presuming that the burden was

16
   Baylor says “appears” because this argument is under McKenna’s heading that “Baylor Failed
to Show The Libelous Statement Was Made [Without] Malice.” AB 32-33.

58615585                                     33
on Baylor to prove the absence of malice (CR284), an argument that reappears in

her appellate brief (AB 32). For this reason alone, her libel claim fails as a matter

of law and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment.

           But even if entertained, there was no malice here as the statements at issue

were true, a point which is uncontested. Again, Baylor made the decision to re-

categorize McKenna’s termination as “misconduct” based upon McKenna’s

conduct witnessed by members of Baylor’s Employee Relations Department at the

termination meeting.         Baylor’s Human Resources Department believed the

statements regarding McKenna’s behavior at her termination were true (see above

at 24) meaning they were not published with reckless disregard for the truth. See

Randall’s, 891 S.W.2d at 647 (“Randall’s established an absence of malice with

regard to these statements by conclusively proving that its employees had

reasonable grounds to believe that their statements were true.”).

           In sum, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on McKenna’s

libel claim.

III.       The Trial Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on McKenna’s
           Breach of Contract Claim
           McKenna’s breach of contract claim was premised on Baylor’s offer for

post-termination pay. CR68. Baylor moved for summary judgment on the basis

that a valid enforceable contract had not been formed because of the lack of

consideration. CR104-05.

58615585                                    34
           The requirement of consideration, the mutual exchange of promises, is

hornbook law. Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 23, at 51

(Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17

(1981). Countless Texas courts have applied this principle. Roark v. Stallworth

Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tex. 1991); Tex. Gas Utils. Co. v. Barrett,

460 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. 1970); Domingo v. Mitchell, 257 S.W.3d 34, 40 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied); see also Iacono v. Lyons, 16 S.W.3d 92, 94

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (“A contract must be based upon a

valid consideration, in other words, mutuality of obligation.”).

           McKenna claims she raised a fact issue on whether a supposed contract for

pay and benefits was supported by consideration. AB 34-37. McKenna cites to

her affidavit wherein she claims that she was told she would be paid her salary and

benefits for 30 days if she promised not to come onto the premises or speak to her

fellow midlevel providers for 30 days. AB 36 (citing to her affidavit at CR485,

¶ 11). First, McKenna’s response to Baylor’s motion included no citation to any

exhibit in support of the contention that she was told she would continue to receive

her salary provided she did not return to the premises or speak with her former

colleagues. CR289. For that reason alone, the summary judgment should be

affirmed. Gallien v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-11-00938-CV,

2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 2790, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19,

58615585                                   35
2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Arredondo v. Rodriguez, 198 S.W.3d 236, 238–39

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).

           Second, as Baylor pointed out below, McKenna’s affidavit is flatly refuted

by her deposition testimony (three separate depositions) where she discussed in

detail the events during that meeting and never mentioned the alleged promise of

continued pay provided she not return to the premises or speak with her colleagues.

SCR66.

           Simply put, McKenna’s breach of contract claim was properly disposed of

by summary judgment.

                    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

           For the reasons set forth above, Appellee, Baylor College of Medicine,

respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.

Appellee also prays for such further relief to which it may be entitled.

58615585                                   36
                                      Respectfully submitted,

                                      NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP

                                      By:          /s/ Joy M. Soloway
                                             Shauna Johnson Clark
                                             State Bar No. 00790977
                                             shauna.clark@nortonrosefulbright.com
                                             Joy M. Soloway
                                             State Bar No. 18838700
                                             joy.soloway@nortonrosefulbright.com
                                             Heather L. Sherrod
                                             State Bar No. 24083836
                                             heather.sherrod@nortonrosefulbright.com
                                      1301 McKinney, Suite 5100
                                      Houston, Texas 77010
                                      Telephone: (713) 651-5151
                                      Telecopier: (713) 651-5246

                                      Counsel for Appellee Baylor College of
                                      Medicine

                 CERTIFICATE OF WORD COMPLIANCE
       Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned
counsel – in reliance upon the word count of the computer program used to prepare
this document – certifies that this brief contains 8,562 words, excluding the words
that need not be counted under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

                                         /s/ Joy M. Soloway
                                      JOY M. SOLOWAY

58615585                                37
                           CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
      I hereby certify that on the 5th day of October 2015, Appellees served a
copy of this motion by electronic service (via FileTime) upon the following
counsel of record:

           Mr. Glenn W. Patterson, Jr.
           Attorney at Law
           11 Greenway Plaza, Suite 2820
           Houston, Texas 77046
           Via e-File (glenn@patterson-adr.com)
           Counsel for Appellant Vicky McKenna

                                                /s/ Joy M. Soloway
                                      JOY M. SOLOWAY

58615585                                38