Court Opinion

ID: 9460874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:01:57.497486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:48.801492
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent.
Traditional principles of equity, comity, and federalism require that we reverse the district court and permit the pending state criminal prosecution of M & L Rest to proceed.
As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in his opinion for the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), even when there is only a threat of state prosecution, a federal court should not intervene absent a showing of “special circumstances,” such as bad. faith or harassment on the part of state or local officials. 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. 746. See also Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926). The reasons for this are two-fold. First, equitable relief traditionally has not been granted where there is an adequate remedy at law. Vindication of constitutional rights in a state criminal proceeding is deemed an adequate legal remedy. The fact that an individual may be compelled to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute or local ordinance in a state criminal proceeding does not constitute the sort of great and immediate irreparable harm that must be shown before a federal court should consider granting equitable relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 145-147, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968). Second, the overriding interest in federal-state comity and the avoidance of needless friction between the federal and state judicial systems require that due deference to the state judicial process be shown by the federal courts. The state courts are fully capable of fairly and properly adjudicating suits involving federal rights and should be permitted to do so. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, 319 U.S. at 163, 63 S.Ct. 877.
Here, plaintiffs have failed to show that they “have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to *24every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith.” Id. at 164, 63 S.Ct. at 881. No showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other “special circumstances” has been made. Under the circumstances, there is no reason why the federal courts should now intervene to enjoin an on-going prosecution.
It is, of course, true that the federal complaint requesting injunctive relief was filed one day prior to the commencement of the state criminal proceeding, which was only threatened at that time. On this basis, the majority argues that the need to demonstrate “special circumstances” justifying federal equitable intervention is unnecessary. The distinction urged between threatened and pending state prosecutions, while a useful rule of thumb, should hardly be applied as an absolute rule of law. A hard and fast rule based on this distinction would represent a significant departure, from traditional federal equity practice, e. g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, supra, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943), Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 55 S.Ct. 678, 79 L.Ed. 1322 (1935), Fenner v. Boykin, supra, 271 U.S. 240, 46 S.Ct. 492, 70 L.Ed. 927 (1926), Ex parte Young, supra, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Additionally, it would encourage unseemly races to the federal and state courthouses, with each party seeking to commence its action first. The preservation of the delicate balance between the federal and state courts, a consideration of the utmost significance in our judicial system, Younger v. Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, would be ill-served by such an .approach, which would leave little, if any, room for a careful analysis of the particular, often unique, factors present in each case.
The need for particularized analysis is amply demonstrated by the present case. Here the federal suit was initiated prior to the state prosecution, but by only one day. In their complaint filed in the district court on August 9, 1973, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order in addition to a preliminary injunction. While the return date for the motion for a preliminary injunction was set for August 22, thirteen days after the motion was made, the motion for a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the ordinance in the interim was denied on August 9, the same day it was made and the day before the criminal summons was served on M & L Rest. M & L Rest continued to provide topless entertainment in violation of the local ordinance, although it knew that the federal court, by denial of a temporary restraining order, had explicitly refused to insulate it from state prosecution at least until August 22. The local authorities, too, had reason to believe that at least until the return date for the motion for a preliminary injunction the federal court would not interfere with the enforcement of the ordinance and the prosecution of any violators. When the return date for the motion arrived and an injunction was issued, the state prosecution had already commenced. The criminal summons had been served and a hearing date had been scheduled. Under these circumstances, the interests of federal-state comity could hardly be served by now compelling the state to halt its prosecution of M & L Rest pending a federal court determination of the statute’s constitutionality.1
As for the two other federal plaintiffs, Tim-Rob Bar and Salem Inn, which are not presently subject to criminal prosecution, the suit against M & L Rest may very well be dispositive of their claim.2 At a minimum, the state *25courts should be afforded an opportunity to decide the ordinance’s constitutionality. This is particularly advisable because it seems likely that the statute in question can be given a narrow, constitutional construction by the state courts. For example, were the statute here interpreted as limited to places in which liquor is served, it could be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the local authorities’ police power. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972).
In this regard, the majority’s reliance on 414 Theater Corp. v. Murphy, No. 73-2327, 499 F.2d 1155 (2d Cir. 1974), is misplaced. 414 Theater Corp. in no way compels us to grant the injunctive relief sought here. Indeed, in that case the federal district court initially denied the request for a preliminary injunction “in order to permit the matter to be litigated in the state courts.” 360 F.Supp. 34, 35 (S.D.N.Y.1973). It was only after the state courts had “had ample opportunity to consider the question [of the ordinance’s constitutionality] in related cases and [had] declined to do so,” id. at 36, that hH Theater Corp. was permitted to renew its petition for injunctive relief in federal court. Moreover, the injunction was finally issued against a background of threatened harassment by local officials who apparently planned to initiate civil suits against 414 Theater Corp. and other peep show operators, despite an unappealed New York City Criminal Court ruling that the ordinance at issue was unconstitutional. At no time did the procedural setting approximate the situation here, where a state prosecution was going forward at the time of the hearing in the federal court, a prosecution which was based on violations occurring during the period in which the federal court had expressly declined to stay the enforcement of the law.
Of course, the plaintiffs here would be free at some later time to seek relief in federal court upon a showing, for example, that the prosecution in the state court was not proceeding with appropriate speed or that the plaintiffs were being harassed. But barring these or other “special circumstances” the proper course would be to raise the constitutional issues in the state criminal proceedings against M & L Rest.

. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505, (1974) is in no way dispositive here. In Steffel, the Supreme Court made clear that it was not addressing itself to the question of the appropriateness of injunctive relief against threatened and pending state prosecutions. Id. at 462-463, 94 S.Ct. 1209.

. The majority argues that an approach which would deny M & L Rest resort to the federal court for injunctive relief while al*25lowing it for Salem Inn and Tim-itob Bar, would work an inequitable result, waste judicial resources, and lead to possibly contradictory decisions on the ordinance’s constitutionality. The difficulties may all be avoided if the state courts are first permitted the opportunity to construe the ordinance and determine its constitutionality in the state criminal proceeding against M & L Rest.