Court Opinion

ID: 9697199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:08:32.708544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:29.926800
License: Public Domain

PORTER, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the opinion of Judge Cheever affirming the judgments as to defendants Lonnie Whiting, Royce Whiting, Vaughn Whiting and Dennis Runge. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion as to defendants Becky Kapsch and Becky Bollack.
BECKY KAPSCH
I
She was with the other defendants at Lake Mitchell at midnight. She was a passenger in a car with the other defendants when the car was stopped by a police officer as described in the majority opinion.
Assuming that two or four of the males in the car had burglarized the liquor store and that the beer in the back seat came from the burglary, the question presented is whether Kapsch’s conviction of burglary can be sustained solely upon proof of her association with the male defendants at Lake Mitchell and at the time she and the other defendants were found in the car.
There is no direct evidence that Kapsch was present at the scene of the burglary, nor that she in any way aided or abetted the four males. None of the circumstantial evidence, i. e., blood samples, glass particles, boots, footprints or clothing, pertains to her. The State made no claim that she was in unexplained possession of recently stolen property from which circumstance her guilt could be inferred, and it is clear from the instructions the case against her was not submitted to the jury on that basis. According to the arresting officer, he did not stop the car in which the defendants were riding. He had followed it and when it stopped, he approached it. Just before it stopped, the car was proceeding in the direction of the liquor store rather than fleeing the scene at a high speed.
Kapsch cannot be convicted as an aider or abetter unless there is evidence that she aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated, by act or advice, the commission of the burglary. As a matter of law her guilt of burglary may not be inferred solely from her presence in the car at some time after the burglary. State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 142 N.W.2d 240 (1966). At most the evidence does no more than cast a suspicion upon Becky Kapsch, and “mere suspicion or probabilities, however strong, are not sufficient basis for a conviction.” State v. Johnson, 67 S.D. 459, 463, 293 N.W. 822, 824 (1940). As the Iowa Supreme Court said in State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827 (1972): “Suspicion is no substitute for proof. The best way to prevent conviction of the innocent is to require the State to prove guilt by substantial evidence. In this case the State did not meet its burden.” For the same reason the motion for directed verdict made on behalf of defendant Kapsch should have been granted.
II
Defendant Kapsch timely moved for a separate trial. Under the circumstances here I would hold that her motion, made before trial, should have been granted at that time. However, the motion to sever was not renewed at the close of all the evidence. Thus, the failure to grant the motion pre-trial was waived by failure to renew the motion. See A.B.A. Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, § 2.1(b) (Approved Draft, 1968). On that basis I agree with the majority opinion that reversible error is not presented on appeal because of the denial of the severance motion.
*884BECKY BOLLACK
Except for the issue of ownership of the car, the case against Bollack is no different from that against Kapsch. The only evidence concerning ownership of the car is Exhibit 24. This exhibit is a vehicle registration document which indicates the vehicle involved was registered to “Becky Bol-lack or Donna Koehler.” The exhibit was offered in evidence, but I am unable to find from the record that the exhibit was admitted or received as evidence. Moreover, the index of exhibits at the close of the transcript fails to indicate the exhibit was received in evidence.*
Assuming that Bollack was in fact present in the car at a time after the burglary when the officer came to the car to investigate, I would hold that her motion for directed verdict should have been granted, for the reasons given concerning Kapsch, supra.

 SR 638-39, 759.