Court Opinion

ID: 9856715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:56:01.854051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:26.518835
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and concurring specially.
I concur in all parts of the Court’s opinion, except part XII (Proportionality), in which I concur specially.
The legislature has directed us to determine “[wjhether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3). The legislature copied this provision from the death sentencing scheme enacted in Georgia following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Ga.Code Ann. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982).
In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875-76, 79 L.Ed.2d 29, 35-36 (1984), the Supreme Court differentiated between traditional proportionality and the proportionality to which I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) refers:
Traditionally, “proportionality” has been used with reference to an abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime. Looking to the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty, to sentences imposed for other crimes, and to sentencing practices in other jurisdictions, this Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when imposed for a particular crime or category of crime. The death penalty is not in all cases a disproportionate penalty in this sense.
The proportionality review sought by Harris, required by the Court of Appeals, and provided for in numerous state statutes is of a different sort. This sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the *815penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime.
(Citations and footnotes omitted).
In Pulley, the Supreme Court ruled that the statutory proportionality review mandated by statutes such as I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) is not required by the eighth amendment. Id. In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1775, 95 L.Ed.2d 262, 288 (1987), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that this statutory proportionality review is not constitutionally required “where the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer’s discretion.”
Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho noted that proportionality review is not constitutionally required but that Pulley and McCleskey “make clear that proportionality review may be considered and implemented by the states as an additional safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences.” Beam v. Paskett, 744 F.Supp. 958, 960 (D.Idaho 1990) (emphasis in original).
Therefore, I conclude that the review required by I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) is entirely governed by the statutory intent of the legislature and not by any constitutional considerations. This statutory intent is revealed by the other provisions of I.C. § 19-2827 and by decisions of this Court applying the statute.
I.C. § 19-2827(g) provides that the Court “shall collect and preserve the records of all cases in which the penalty of death was imposed from and including the year 1975.” In State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 375 n. 2, 670 P.2d 463, 476 n. 2 (1983), the Court read I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) and (g) together “as requiring a comparison of the capital cases from 1975 to the present.”
I.C. § 19-2827(a) provides that this Court must review a death penalty sentence “on the record.” In State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 387, 716 P.2d 1152, 1159 (1985), the Court construed I.C. § 19-2827(a) and (c)(3) together to require “an independent review of the sentence on the record.” In Scroggins, the Court concluded that the sentence of death imposed in that case was “excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” 110 Idaho at 387, 716 P.2d at 1159. The Court said:
We have painstakingly considered the record, and in so doing, have focused not only on the crime and the circumstances surrounding its commission but on the age, characteristics, criminal record and personal involvement of this defendant. We must conclude that the death sentence should not have been imposed in this case because in light of the following considerations, the death sentence as applied to this defendant was excessive.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Among the considerations discussed by the Court in Scroggins were that Scroggins did not have a history of violent criminal conduct, that his mental age was only 13.8 years, that he was under tremendous psychological pressure, and that he had failed to develop mature responses to stressful situations. 110 Idaho at 388, 716 P.2d at 1160.
In State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 420-22, 716 P.2d 1182, 1192-94 (1985), the Court said:
Whenever the death penalty is imposed this Court is required to conduct an independent review of the record to insure ... that when both the crime and the defendant are considered, a sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate. After careful consideration of both the crime and the defendant, we conclude that the sentence of death imposed in this case was excessive and disproportionate. We therefore set aside the death sentence and remand for resentencing.
The concept of individualized sentencing is firmly entrenched in modern American jurisprudence. The familiar maxim that punishment should fit the crime has been broadened to provide that punishment should also fit the criminal. With this in mind, we now turn our focus to the defendant as an individual, outlining those factors in Windsor’s background *816and character which convince us that the death penalty was excessive in this instance. We begin by noting that Windsor, unlike the majority of capital defendants, has no formal criminal record nor significant history of prior criminal activity. There is no history of violent criminal activity, nor is there an indication that Windsor possesses any propensity toward violence.
(Citation omitted).
The Court then reviewed other circumstances of Windsor personally, including her skills and abilities, her education, her experience and training, her troubled childhood and serious problems in her home environment. 110 Idaho at 422-23, 716 P.2d at 1194-95.
The trial court described the crime in this case in the findings of the court in considering the death penalty:
The Defendant Paul Ezra Rhoades ... was observed loitering around convenience stores in Blackfoot and Idaho Falls and watching the female employees. On February 28, 1987, the defendant entered [a convenience store] in Blackfoot, Idaho. He worked nearby as a drywaller and frequented the store, but on this evening, he stayed only a short time and then left.
Near midnight he returned and at gunpoint robbed the till and forced clerk, Stacy Dawn Baldwin, age 21, into his pickup and drove her to a secluded spot near the Snake River just off Rose Road in Bingham County. He attempted to attack her, she fought back, and finally as she was on hands and knees trying to get away, he shot at her with his pistol. The first shots missed her and made glancing marks in the snow. Finally his shots hit her. One ricocheting bullet lodged in her elbow and one bullet went through her back and through her lungs. The tread on the soles of his boots left their imprint as he walked toward Stacy, but then he left while she was still alive. She lived for about 1 to IV2 hours and then died alone in the cold.
The trial court described the defendant in this case in the findings of the court in considering the death penalty:
The defendant, male Caucasian, was born January 18,1957. He is unmarried. Until incarcerated he lived with his parents____ He has a close relationship with his parents, two brothers and two sisters.
He was born and raised in Idaho Falls, Idaho. He liked grade school, but he had other interests in junior and senior high school and he dropped out of school in the 9th grade. He attempted to enlist in the armed forces, but was rejected because of physical problems caused by polio during his early childhood. He went to work ... at 16 years of age, but was involved in an industrial accident and the tips of his fingers were cut off. When his fingers healed, the defendant went to work with his uncle and his father and later his brother in the drywall construction business. The defendant is considered an excellent craftsman.
The defendant describes his interests as fishing and boating and reading “fantasy” novels.
The defendant denies any serious relationships or romantic ties with women, although he has numerous female friends. His mother describes him as responsible and easy going and a nonviolent person that does not hold a grudge and who “never went out looking for trouble.” She points out that children liked him and that he was a “father image to children” in the neighborhood and those he babysat.
The defendant suffered with polio at about age 4 and spent considerable time in the [hospital]. The illness necessitated that he have many operations on his feet and suffered considerable pain and as a result, the defendant is not well coordinated.
His aunts and lady friends describe the defendant as being a very compassionate person who was responsible and trustworthy.
One friend ... describes him as “being her big brother” who can listen to her *817and in whose presence she feels comfortable.
He admits that he has abused alcohol and drugs.
The presentence investigation report indicates that Rhoades had a prior criminal record that included offenses of resisting and obstructing an officer, petit theft, inattentive driving, driving while suspended, infamous crime against nature, rape, kidnapping, first degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, second degree murder and robbery.
As directed by I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) and the decisions of this Court interpreting it, I have reviewed the sentence of death imposed on Rhoades in this case compared to the penalty imposed in similar cases in which the sentence was imposed in 1975 or later, considering both the crime and the defendant, to determine whether Rhoades’ sentence is excessive or disproportionate. For ease of reference, I append a summary of the cases I have compared.
The cases I find most similar to this one so far as the crime is concerned are:
1. State v. Pizzuto (death penalty imposed)
2. State v. Searcy (fixed life imposed)
3. State v. Lankford (death penalty imposed)
4. State v. Smith (fixed life imposed)
5. State v. McKinney (death penalty imposed)
6. State v. Fetterly (death penalty imposed)
7. State v. Bainbridge (fixed life imposed)
8. State v. Paradis (death penalty imposed)
9. State v. Sivak (death penalty imposed; vacated on procedural grounds; remanded for resentencing)
The death penalty was imposed by the trial court and upheld by this Court in the majority of these cases. On the basis of this comparison of these case in which the crime was similar to the murder in this case, I find the death sentence imposed on Rhoades in this case not to be excessive or disproportionate.
The cases I find most similar to this one so far as the defendant is concerned are:
1. State v. Pizutto (death penalty imposed)
2. State v. Searcy (fixed life imposed)
3. State v. Smith (fixed life imposed)
4. State v. Beam (death penalty imposed)
5. State v. Aragon (death penalty imposed)
The death penalty was imposed by the trial court and upheld by this Court in a majority of these cases. On the basis of this comparison of these cases in which the circumstances of the defendant were most similar to the circumstances of Rhoades, I find the death sentence imposed on Rhoades not to be excessive or disproportionate.
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