Court Opinion

ID: 9915069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 16:12:24.60654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:00.559286
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    JANUARY 4, 2024
                                                              In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                             WA State Court of Appeals Division III

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                              DIVISION THREE

METHOW VALLEY CITIZENS                      )
COUNCIL AND FUTUREWISE,                     )         No. 39059-4-III
                                            )
                    Respondents,            )
                                            )
      v.                                    )
                                            )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OKANOGAN COUNTY,                            )
                                            )
                    Petitioner.             )
      COONEY, J. — Methow Valley Citizens Council and Futurewise (MVCC) filed a

petition challenging Okanogan County’s (County) adoption of its comprehensive plan.

MVCC’s petition was filed 62 days after adoption of the comprehensive plan. The

County moved to dismiss MVCC’s petition on the basis that it was untimely and MVCC

lacked standing.

      The County plans under the Planning Enabling Act of the State of Washington

(PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, which does not contain a statute of limitations for appealing

the adoption of a comprehensive plan. Consequently, a disagreement between the parties

ensued over the applicable statute of limitations period. The County argued for

application of Okanogan County Code (OCC) 17A.350.030’s 20-day limit on challenging

legislative actions while MVCC advocated for the application of the Growth
No. 39059-4-III
Methow Valley Citizens Council & Futurewise v. Okanogan County

Management Act’s (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, 60-day statute of limitations. MVCC

claimed the triggering event for commencement of the 60-day statute of limitations was a

local newspaper article about the County’s adoption of the comprehensive plan.

       The superior court determined the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations period

applied. It further found the newspaper article was the event that triggered

commencement of the statute of limitations period. The superior court concluded that

MVCC’s petition was timely and that MVCC had standing to bring its claim under the

Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW. We granted the

County’s motion for discretionary review. We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND

       On December 29, 2021, following an extensive public process, the Okanogan

County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) adopted its comprehensive plan

pursuant to the PEA.1 On January 5, 2022, a local newspaper published an article about

the BOCC’s adoption of the comprehensive plan. On March 1, 2022, 62 days after the

comprehensive plan was adopted, MVCC filed a petition in the Okanogan County

Superior Court challenging the comprehensive plan under the UDJA. MVCC’s petition

also included State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), chapter 43.21C RCW, claims and

other causes of action.

       1
         The record before us lacks any evidence that the County provided advanced
notice of the comprehensive plan’s potential adoption.

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       The County promptly filed a motion under Civil Rule (CR) 12(b)(6), claiming

MVCC had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The County asserted

MVCC’s claims were untimely and MVCC lacked standing because their purported

injuries were speculative in nature and, therefore, insufficient to demonstrate injury in

fact. In response, MVCC filed declarations from property owners who conceivably

would be affected by the comprehensive plan. The declarations predated the adoption of

the comprehensive plan. The County’s motion to dismiss was brought before a superior

court commissioner. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court commissioner denied the

County’s motion.

       The County then filed a motion to revise the commissioner’s order. The trial court

determined that the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations applied to MVCC’s petition.

The court reasoned that adopting a comprehensive plan is different from other land use

decisions such as “vacating a road or planning a road or some of the other statutory

legislative powers that are granted to boards of county commissioners,” which are more

like what “one would think of when thinking of a board of county commissioners.” Rep.

of Proc. (RP) at 43. The court found that the “best evidence” of notice of adoption of the

comprehensive plan was the newspaper article. RP at 44. The trial court concluded that

MVCC’s petition was timely as it was filed within 60 days of the local newspaper

publishing the article. The court also ruled that MVCC had standing to bring its claims

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because MVCC’s member’s allegations of threatened harm sufficiently showed injury in

fact.

         The County sought discretionary review, arguing that the trial court committed

obvious error in applying the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations. Even if the GMA’s

statute of limitations was applicable, the County posited that the court erred by using the

newspaper article as the triggering event that commenced the statute of limitations

period. Comm’r’s Ruling (Dec. 14, 2022) at 3-7. The County also maintained that

MVCC lacked standing to bring its claims. Id. at 7-11. A commissioner of this court

granted discretionary review under RAP 2.3(b)(1) on the statute of limitations issue and

allowed the County to address its standing argument as a matter of judicial economy. Id.

at 11.

                                         ANALYSIS

         The County asserts the superior court committed obvious error by incorrectly

applying, by analogy, the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations, by using a local

newspaper article as the triggering event for commencement of the statute of limitations

period, and in concluding that MVCC had standing to bring its claims.

         When reviewing a motion to revise a superior court commissioner’s order

pursuant to RCW 2.24.050, this court reviews the superior court’s legal conclusions de

novo. Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d 308, 313-14, 386 P.3d 711 (2016). Any orders

and findings of a commissioner not revised by the superior court “become the orders and

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findings of the superior court.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391

P.3d 546 (2017).

       We apply de novo review to orders entered on CR 12(b)(6) motions. Dussault v.

American Int’l Group, Inc., 123 Wn. App. 863, 866-67, 99 P.3d 1256 (2004). The court

should only grant a CR 12(b)(6) motion when it appears beyond a doubt that no set of

facts, consistent with the complaint, would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Bravo v. The

Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d 147 (1995).

       On review, we consider only whether the complaint has adequately stated a claim

for relief and does not include reaching the merits of the plaintiff’s arguments. Byrd v.

Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 2d 249, 256-57, 269-70, 425 P.3d 948 (2018). All facts

alleged in the complaint are presumed true and courts may consider hypothetical facts

supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Id. at 257. If a claim remains legally insufficient under

the proffered hypothetical facts, dismissal under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate. Alim v. City

of Seattle, 14 Wn. App. 2d 838, 851, 474 P.3d 589 (2020). However, a motion to dismiss

will only be granted when a “‘plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the

complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief.’” Byrd, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 257

(quoting Kinney v. Cook, 159 Wn.2d 837, 842, 154 P.3d 206 (2007)).

       I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

       The PEA, which the County plans under, lacks a provision for challenging a

comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to the act. See generally RCW 36.70.320-.440.

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Accordingly, the PEA is void of a statute of limitations for filing a challenge to a

comprehensive plan. Similarly, absent from the UDJA is a statute of limitations.

Therefore, UDJA actions must “be brought within a ‘reasonable time.’” Auto. United

Trades Org. v. State, 175 Wn.2d 537, 541-42, 286 P.3d 377 (2012) (quoting Brutsche v.

City of Kent, 78 Wn. App. 370, 377, 389 P.2d 319 (1995)). The trial court must

determine what constitutes “a reasonable time” for filing a declaratory relief action “by

analogy to the time allowed for appeal of a similar decision as prescribed by statute, rule

of court, or other provision.” Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at 376. When there are two

analogous appeal periods, the general rule is that the longer of the two should apply. Id.

at 377.

          The County advocates for the application of the 20-day statute of limitations for

appealing county legislative decisions. OCC 17A.350.030; RCW 36.32.330. MVCC

promotes the more liberal 60-day limitation period for appealing a notice of adoption of a

comprehensive plan under the GMA. RCW 36.70A.290(2).

          OCC 17A.350.030 states, “Appeals of the final decision of any legislative actions

from the board of Okanogan County commissioners shall be submitted to superior court

in accordance with RCW 36.32.330.” (Emphasis added.) RCW 36.32.330 provides:

          Any person may appeal to the superior court from any decision or order of
          the board of county commissioners. Such appeal shall be taken within
          twenty days after the decision or order, and the appellant shall within that
          time serve notice of appeal on the county commissioners. The notice shall
          be in writing and shall be delivered to at least one of the county

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       commissioners personally, or left with the county auditor. The appellant
       shall, within ten days after service of the notice of appeal give a bond to the
       county with one or more sureties, to be approved by the county auditor,
       conditioned for the payment of all costs which shall be adjudged against
       him or her on such appeal in the superior court. The practice regulating
       appeals from and writs of certiorari to justice’s courts shall, insofar as
       applicable, govern in matters of appeal from a decision or order of the
       board of county commissioners.

(Emphasis added.) More expansively, RCW 36.70A.290(2), the GMA’s statute of

limitations, provides:

              (2) All petitions relating to whether or not an adopted
       comprehensive plan, development regulation, or permanent amendment
       thereto, is in compliance with the goals and requirements of this chapter or
       chapter 90.58 or 43.21C RCW must be filed within sixty days after
       publication as provided in (a) through (c) of this subsection.
              (a) Except as provided in (c) of this subsection, the date of
       publication for a city shall be the date the city publishes the ordinance, or
       summary of the ordinance, adopting the comprehensive plan or
       development regulations, or amendment thereto, as is required to be
       published.
              (b) Promptly after adoption, a county shall publish a notice that it
       has adopted the comprehensive plan or development regulations, or
       amendment thereto.
              Except as provided in (c) of this subsection, for purposes of this
       section the date of publication for a county shall be the date the county
       publishes the notice that it has adopted the comprehensive plan or
       development regulations, or amendment thereto.

(Emphasis added.)

              A. WHETHER OCC 17A.350.030 AND RCW 36.32.330 ARE
                 ANALOGOUS

       The County argues that because BOCC’s adoption of the comprehensive plan was

a legislative action, the 20-day appeal period under OCC 17A.350.030 and RCW

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36.32.330 are analogous. OCC 17A.350.030 governs appeals “from any decision or

order of the board of county commissioners.” See RCW 36.32.330. Neither party

disputes that the County’s adoption of the comprehensive plan is a legislative action. In

applying the “time allowed for appeal of a similar decision as prescribed by statute,” the

appeal period prescribed in OCC 17A.350.030 is analogous. Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at

376.

       However, MVCC also challenges the applicability of RCW 36.32.330 to land use

decisions. MVCC relies on State ex rel. Lyon v. Board of County Commissioners of

Pierce County2 in which the Supreme Court reasoned:

       [R]elating to city, town, county, and regional planning, imposes duties upon
       the county commissioners distinct from their ordinary and usual duties and
       is a special statute for a special purpose; and the conclusion is inescapable
       that the general statute with reference to appeals from decisions of the
       board of county commissioners is inapplicable to the present case.

31 Wn.2d at 370-71. Further, we have previously held that “RCW 36.32.330 applies in

situations where the Board is acting on its ordinary and usual duties. However, when it is

acting distinct from those duties, under special statute, it does not apply.” Sterling v.

Spokane County, 31 Wn. App. 467, 469, 642 P.2d 1255 (1982).

       Here, the County was acting pursuant to the PEA, which is outside of its ordinary

and usual duties. Regardless, we are not tasked with determining what specific statute

       2
           31 Wn.2d 366, 196 P.2d 997 (1948).

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directly applies to MVCC’s appeal of the comprehensive plan. Rather, we must

determine “a reasonable time” for filing a declaratory relief action “by analogy to the

time allowed for appeal of a similar decision as prescribed by statute, rule of court, or

other provision.” Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at 376.

       MVCC argues that, as applied here, OCC 17A.350.030 is unconstitutional as it

conflicts with state law. Article XI, section 11 of the Washington Constitution states that

“[a]ny county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such

local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” In

order to determine if a local ordinance is in conflict with state law, the test is whether the

ordinance permits that which state law forbids or vice versa. City of Bellingham v.

Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 111, 356 P.2d 292 (1960). “In establishing the constitutional

invalidity of an ordinance, a heavy burden rests upon the party challenging its

constitutionality.” HJS Dev., Inc. v. Dep’t of Plan. & Land Servs., 148 Wn.2d 451, 477,

61 P.3d 1141 (2003).

       MVCC argues that because OCC 17A.350.030 requires appeals of county land use

decisions be filed in 20 days pursuant to RCW 36.32.330, it conflicts with state law

because state law does not prohibit the filing of appeals of land use decisions after 20

days since RCW 36.32.330 does not apply to land use decisions. Cathcart-Maltby-

Clearview Cmty. Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wn.2d 201, 205, 634 P.2d 853

(1981).

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       The question before us is not whether any specific statute directly applies.

Instead, the question before us is which appeal period is analogous for purposes of the

UDJA. Accordingly, we need not determine the constitutionality of OCC 17A.350.030

or RCW 36.32.330 as neither the county code provision nor the statute is being directly

applied. Additionally, we adhere to “the fundamental principle that if a case can be

decided on nonconstitutional grounds, an appellate court should refrain from deciding

constitutional issues.” Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 146 Wn.2d 740,

752, 49 P.3d 867 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194

Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019).

       The 20-day appeal period provided in OCC 17A.350.030 and RCW 36.32.330 is

analogous as this is an appeal of a legislative action; albeit, one taken pursuant to the

PEA. However, our inquiry does not end here. When there are two analogous appeal

periods, the general rule is that the longer of the two should apply. Brutsche, 78 Wn.

App. at 377. Thus, we must determine whether the GMA’s 60-day appeal period is also

analogous.

              B. WHETHER RCW 36.70A.290(2) IS ANALOGOUS

       MVCC urges us to apply, by analogy, the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations

prescribed in RCW 36.70A.290(2). The County responds that the GMA’s publication

requirement cannot be severed from its statute of limitations. According to the County,

because the PEA does not require the County to publish notice of adoption of a

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comprehensive plan, the GMA’s statute of limitations is not analogous. The County

further argues that the GMA’s statute of limitations is not analogous because the County

does not plan under the GMA and the legislature would have codified a 60-day appeal

period had it intended one to apply to the PEA.

       Although the County does not plan under the GMA, there is no dispute that this is

an appeal of a comprehensive plan and that the GMA has a specific statute on point,

RCW 36.70A.290(2). It follows that the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations would be

the analogous appeals period because it is the “time allowed for appeal of a similar

decision as prescribed by statute.” Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at 376. Again, this appeal is

not about whether the GMA’s statute of limitations directly applies, it is about whether it

is an analogous appeal period.

       The County also argues that the GMA’s requirement that the adoption of a

comprehensive plan be published renders it inapposite because the PEA has no such

requirement. It is undisputed that, under the PEA, the County was not required to publish

notice of the adoption of the comprehensive plan. This does not, however, render the

GMA’s statute of limitations inapplicable by analogy. Instead, we must decide what

event, if any, triggered the commencement of the statute of limitations.

       Like OCC 17A.350.030 and RCW 36.70A.290(2), the GMA’s 60-day statute of

limitations for appealing a comprehensive plan is also analogous. Because it is the longer

of the analogous appeal periods, it applies here. Brutsche, 78 Wn. App. at 377.

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               C. WHETHER THE COURT PROPERLY USED THE PUBLICATION OF A
                  LOCAL NEWSPAPER ARTICLE AS THE TRIGGERING EVENT UNDER
                  RCW 36.70A.290(2)

       The County argues that even if the GMA’s 60-day statute of limitation is the

analogous period for challenges to the PEA, the trial court erred when it used the

publication date of a local newspaper article as the event that triggered the

commencement of the statute of limitations. MVCC responds that the trial court did not

err when it used the newspaper article publication date as it was the only notice that

MVCC had received that the BOCC adopted the comprehensive plan.

       Unlike, the GMA and SEPA, both of which require that certain actions or adoption

of comprehensive plans or development regulations be published within a prescribed time

period,3 in enacting the PEA, the legislature failed to include any notice requirements.

Chapter 36.70 RCW. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, we presume

the legislature’s omission was deliberate.

       The County argues that, in the absence of a notice requirement, limitation periods

are strictly applied without exception and begin to run when the cause of action arises,

regardless of the plaintiff’s knowledge of the right to sue. The cases relied on by the

County to support its contentions are distinguishable from the facts before us. Huff v.

       3
           See RCW 36.70A.290(2)(b); RCW 43.21C.080.

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Roach4 and Bennett v. Dalton5 dealt with legal malpractice and negligence, respectively,

not issues related to comprehensive planning. Although Montlake Community Club v.

Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board, 110 Wn. App. 731, 43 P.3d

57 (2002), concerned comprehensive planning, there, the Growth Management Hearings

Board upheld a planning ordinance that did not amend or revise the comprehensive plan.

We agreed, concluding that the enactment of the planning ordinance triggered the GMA’s

60-day statute of limitation period because the ordinance did not modify the earlier

comprehensive plan. Id. at 740.

       Other cases cited by the County hold that in challenging a land use decision, the

statute of limitations period generally begins to run upon adoption of a final decision.

See Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County, 183 Wn.2d 455, 470, 352 P.3d 177

(2015); Concerned Organized Women & People Opposed to Offensive Proposals, Inc. v.

City of Arlington, 69 Wn. App. 209, 218, 847 P.2d 963 (1993). Both Save Our Scenic

Area and Concerned Organized Women are distinguishable from the record presented

here. In Save Our Scenic Area, the Supreme Court relied on WAC 242-03-220(5) in

concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to act claim was timely under the GMA. The

Supreme Court further held that the “unique facts presented in this case all point to the

       4
           125 Wn. App. 724, 732, 106 P.3d 268 (2005).
       5
           120 Wn. App. 74, 85, 84 P.3d 265 (2004).

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conclusion that the ‘unmapped’ areas were not a final appealable regulation until 2012.”

183 Wn.2d at 468. In reaching its decision, the High Court reasoned that the unmapped

areas served as placeholders, rather than a permanent designation (i.e. a final decision).

Id. at 469.

       In Concerned Organized Women, the plaintiff argued the effective date of the

ordinance should trigger the 30-day appeal period. 69 Wn. App. at 218. We disagreed,

holding that the adoption of the rezone ordinance, rather than the effective date of the

ordinance, triggered the appeal period. Id. Unlike the facts presented here, in Concerned

Organized Women, the city council “heard testimony from various sources, including

members of Concerned Women” before it adopted the ordinance. Id. at 212. As the

court appropriately noted, the commencement date for the appeal period is the city

council’s adoption of the ordinance since “[t]he council’s decision is public and the

interested parties are usually present at the meeting at which the decision is made.” Id. at

219.

       Here, the record lacks any evidence of the BOCC providing advanced notice of its

intent to adopt the comprehensive plan, nor that the BOCC had subsequently published

notice that it had adopted the comprehensive plan. The County points to various dates

contained in environmental impact statements, but that does little to provide notice to the

public. In its supplemental briefing, the County directs us to a website containing the

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“Commissioners’ Meeting Agenda.”6 Per RAP 9.11, we decline to consider the

supplemental evidence.7

       The only notice contained in this record that the BOCC adopted the

comprehensive plan was in a local newspaper article published on January 5, 2022.

Consequently, the County has failed to show that, on the face of MVCC’s petition, there

exists an insuperable bar to relief. For purposes of the County’s CR 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss, the local newspaper article triggered the 60-day statute of limitations period.8

       The trial court did not err when it used the publication of a local newspaper article

as the triggering event for commencement of the statute of limitations. MVCC filed its

petition within 60 days from January 5, 2022. Accordingly, MVCC’s petition was

timely.

       II. STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

       The County contends the trial court erred in finding that MVCC had standing to

bring its petition. Washington applies a two-part test for determining whether an entity

       6
          https://media.avcaptureall.cloud/meeting/0b1d66f5-9782-48bd-a855-
ab3d9a69817c.
        7
          See King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d
543, 549 n.6, 14 P.3d 133 (2000).
        8
          We are not holding that the County must provide actual notice of adoption of a
comprehensive plan to every person who might wish to appeal its adoption. Rather,
governments must operate in the open. It would be sufficient if the County established it
held regular public meetings and publicly posted its agenda in some consistent fashion
prior to its meetings. In this manner, interested persons would know where and when to
look for the posted agenda.

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has standing to challenge a SEPA determination: “(1) The interest that the party is

seeking to protect must be ‘arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or

regulated’ by SEPA; and (2) the party must allege an ‘injury in fact,’ i.e., that he or she

will be ‘specifically and perceptibly harmed’ by the proposed action.” Anderson v.

Pierce County, 86 Wn. App. 290, 299, 936 P.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Trepainer v. City of

Everett, 64 Wn App. 380, 382, 824 P.2d 524 (1992)).

       The first item, not at issue here, “is easily met in environmental suits because of

the abundance of laws affecting use of our natural resources.” Save a Valuable Env’t v.

City of Bothel, 89 Wn.2d 862, 866, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).

       The second item, injury in fact, is more challenging for an environmental group to

show. Id. “The pleadings and proof are insufficient if they merely reveal imagined

circumstances in which the plaintiff could be affected.” Snohomish County Prop. Rts.

All. v. Snohomish County, 76 Wn. App. 44, 53, 882 P.2d 807 (1994). “[W]hen a person

alleges threatened injury, as opposed to existing injury, he or she must show immediate,

concrete, and specific injury to him or herself; if the injury is merely conjectural or

hypothetical, there can be no standing.” Id.; see also Anderson, 86 Wn. App. at 299.

One who threatens alleged injury in fact must allege facts sufficient to show it will be

adversely affected by the County’s supposed failure to comply with SEPA. Id. at 52.

However, “‘[a] party need not show a particular level of injury in order to establish

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standing.’” Chelan County v. Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d 904, 935, 52 P.3d 1 (2002) (quoting

Suquamish Indian Tribe v. Kitsap County, 92 Wn. App. 816, 832, 965 P.2d 636 (1998)).

       A comprehensive plan is “the generalized coordinated land use policy statement

adopted by a jurisdiction which will be used to guide its land use decisions well into the

future.” Town of Woodway v. Snohomish County, 172 Wn. App. 643, 653 n.13, 291 P.3d

278 (2013); see RCW 36.70.320-.360. A comprehensive plan has been described as a

“blueprint” or “guide” for future development. Id.

       The County argues that MVCC’s claimed injuries due to the adoption of the

comprehensive plan are too speculative and premature to satisfy the injury in fact

requirement for standing. The County points to the declarations alleging harm predating

the adoption of the comprehensive plan and the fact that the comprehensive plan does not

actually approve any development or project.

       In response, MVCC cites Anderson and Five Corners Family Farmers v. Dep’t of

Ecology9 to support its position that it has standing based on its allegations of future

environmental harm. In both cases, the court held that the appealing organizations had

standing. However, both cases involved challenges to specific projects. Anderson

involved a challenge to Pierce County’s issuance of a mitigated determination of

nonsignificance and conditional use permit. 86 Wn. App. at 295-98. Five Corners

       9
           173 Wn.2d 296, 268 P.3d 892 (2011).

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involved a challenge to a stock-watering exemption and sought to enjoin the operator of a

cattle feedlot from using groundwater without a permit. 173 Wn. App. at 301-02.

       Here, MVCC sufficiently alleged adoption of the comprehensive plan, which

authorizes future development, will threaten further injury. Although the declarations

that MVCC relies on predate the adoption of the comprehensive plan, we may consider

hypothetical facts that support MVCC’s claims. See Alim, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 851. The

facts alleged by MVCC, which we presume to be true, sufficiently establish a threatened

injury. The record shows that members of MVCC currently suffer interrupted water

supplies and will be even more adversely affected by the BOCC’s adoption of the

comprehensive plan. Specifically, the declarations and reports described instances of

interrupted and depleted water supplies in the Methow watershed and the Okanogan

watershed caused by existing development and environmental factors. The Department

of Ecology reports, “Demands of new water use reduce[s] water legally available for

existing, senior water rights including instream flows.” CP at 357. Certainly, the

prospect of continued development, coupled with the alleged water shortage, sufficiently

establishes an immediate, concrete, and specific harm.

       MVCC has alleged a threatened injury sufficient to constitute an immediate,

concrete, and specific injury for purposes of establishing standing to challenge the

County’s adoption of the comprehensive plan.

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                                    CONCLUSION

       The GMA’s 60-day statute of limitations applies by analogy to challenges to the

PEA. Based on the record before us, public notice of the BOCC’s adoption of the

comprehensive plan was provided through a local newspaper article published on

January 5, 2022. Lastly, MVCC presented a sufficient facts basis to support an injury in

fact for purposes of having standing to challenge the County’s adoption of the

comprehensive plan.

       We affirm.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                             Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Fearing, C.J.

Lawrence-Berrey, J.

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