Court Opinion

ID: 9367406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 18:00:36.938736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:00.042166
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ____________

                                       No. 22-1245
                                       ___________

             PERIRX, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation formerly known as
              PERIRX, LLC, a Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company,
                                                  Appellant

                                             v.

      THE REGENTS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, a California corporation;
       EZ LIFE BIO INC., a California corporation; ARURAS HOLDINGS, LLC,
      a Nevada Limited Liability Company; DAVID T. WONG, D.M.D., D.M.Sc.,
             an individual; RNAMETRIX, INC., a Delaware corporation
                                   ____________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                                (D.C. No. 2-20-cv-02212)
                         District Judge: Hon. Joshua D. Wolson
                                     ____________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                  (January 26, 2023)

             Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.

                                 (Filed: January 31, 2023)

                                      ____________

                                        OPINION *
                                      ____________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

       PeriRx appeals the District Court’s order dismissing its tort claims against the

Regents of the University of California, David Wong, and RNAmeTrix, Inc. (RNA).

PeriRx also appeals the summary judgment for the Regents and RNA on its breach of

contract claims. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

                                             I

       Dr. David Wong, a professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, founded

RNA as an intellectual property holding company to commercialize his medical

inventions. In December 2010, the Regents licensed to RNA patent rights for certain

diagnostic technologies invented by Wong. The licensing contract between the Regents

and RNA (the UCLA Agreement) allowed RNA to sublicense the patent rights to third

parties. Three days after the UCLA Agreement took effect, RNA exclusively sublicensed

certain patent rights to PeriRx (the PeriRx Sublicense).

       In March 2019, the Regents terminated the UCLA Agreement, which effectively

terminated PeriRx’s sublicense rights. Section 3.5 of the UCLA Agreement addressed the

status of sublicensees upon the Agreement’s termination:

       If this Agreement is terminated for any reason, then upon the request of
       each Sublicensee, The Regents agree to enter into a license agreement with
       such Sublicensee(s) (each, a “New License Agreement”), the terms of
       which license agreement shall be substantially similar to the terms of the
       Sublicense granted by [RNA] to such Sublicensee . . . . The Regents further
       agrees that each Sublicense granted by [RNA] hereunder shall survive
       through the effective date of the New License Agreement.

App. 221. The Regents offered PeriRx a direct license before the termination of the

UCLA Agreement, but the parties did not reach an agreement.

                                             2
       PeriRx sued the Regents, RNA, Wong, and two unrelated companies. PeriRx

brought a third-party beneficiary claim against the Regents for breach of the UCLA

Agreement and sued Wong and RNA for breach of the PeriRx Sublicense. PeriRx also

sued the Regents for tortious interference with contractual relations and sued Wong and

RNA for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage.

       The Defendants moved to dismiss all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court granted in part and denied in part the

motion, dismissing all tort claims and all claims against Wong but allowing PeriRx to

pursue its contract claims against the Regents and RNA. In dismissing the tort claims, the

District Court considered several actions alleged by PeriRx: (1) the Regents and RNA

failing to enforce patent rights; (2) Wong advising potential investors or partners that

PeriRx did not have patent rights; (3) the Regents licensing certain patent rights to Aruras

Holdings, LLC while the PeriRx Sublicense was still in effect; and (4) the Regents, RNA,

and Wong conducting a patient study and seeking a competing patent. The District Court

held each allegation failed to state a claim: the first because it was an act of omission, not

commission; the second because it lacked sufficient specificity; and the final two because

they were time-barred. The Court later granted PeriRx leave to amend.

       PeriRx filed an Amended Complaint, asserting only contract claims. The District

Court eventually granted summary judgment to the Regents and to RNA on those claims.

It reasoned that even if PeriRx were a third-party beneficiary under the UCLA

Agreement, it could not recover under Section 3.5 because the Regents offered PeriRx a

new license prior to terminating the UCLA Agreement. And the Court rejected PeriRx’s

                                              3
arguments as to RNA’s alleged breach of the PeriRx Sublicense because PeriRx based its

arguments on either factual allegations not included in the Amended Complaint or

conduct unrelated to RNA. PeriRx timely appealed. 1

                                             II

       We first address whether the District Court erred in dismissing PeriRx’s tortious

interference with contractual relations claim against the Regents or its intentional

interference with prospective economic advantage claim against RNA and Wong. 2

PeriRx’s arguments on appeal as to both tort claims suffer from the same flaw: they are

not based on the Complaint or other materials before the District Court at the time it

dismissed the relevant claims. Instead, PeriRx relies on the summary judgment record to

argue that it stated plausible tort claims. But the summary judgment record was

developed in connection with the contract claims after the tort claims were dismissed. 3

Because these materials were not before the District Court when it dismissed the tort

1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
  Appellees argue that because PeriRx failed to replead the tort claims in its Amended
Complaint, it waived its challenge to the District Court’s dismissal order. We disagree
because dismissal was based in part on a legal barrier—the statute of limitations—and
because “doubt should be resolved against the party asserting waiver” in this context.
Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 803 (3d Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original)
(citation and alteration omitted).
3
  PeriRx stresses that “[d]iscovery in this matter shed much light on” its tort claims.
PeriRx Br. 40. But if that’s true, PeriRx should have sought leave to amend its Amended
Complaint to replead the tort claims rather than wait to highlight the new information on
appeal. See SEPTA v. Orrstown Fin. Servs. Inc., 12 F.4th 337, 345, 349 n.9 (3d Cir.
2021) (allowing amendment to include dismissed claims after discovery revealed new
facts).

                                             4
claims, we cannot consider them. See Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 797

(3d Cir. 2019).

       Beyond contending that the summary judgment record includes evidence that

suggests it could have stated a claim, PeriRx makes no argument that the Complaint

actually did state a tort claim against any defendant. So we will affirm the District

Court’s order dismissing those claims. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley

Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017) (“To be preserved, all arguments must be

supported specifically by ‘the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts

of the record on which the appellant relies.’” (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A)).

Because we affirm the dismissal of PeriRx’s tort claims, we need not consider its

arguments for vicarious tort liability.

                                             III

       PeriRx also challenges the summary judgment for the Regents on PeriRx’s third-

party beneficiary claim. PeriRx contends on appeal that the Regents breached Section 3.5

of the UCLA Agreement (1) by unilaterally terminating PeriRx’s rights under the PeriRx

Sublicense, and (2) by failing to negotiate in good faith a new license with PeriRx.

       As to the first theory, PeriRx argues that the Regents breached Section 3.5 by

unilaterally terminating the UCLA Agreement, and with it PeriRx’s rights under the

PeriRx Sublicense, without first entering into a license with PeriRx. PeriRx insists time

and again that the termination breached Section 3.5’s requirement that sublicenses issued

by RNA “shall survive through the effective date of the New License Agreement.” App.

221; PeriRx Br. 15, 18, 20, 24, 29; Reply Br. 1, 8–12. But PeriRx’s theory differed before

                                             5
the District Court, where it argued that the Regents breached Section 3.5 by “not

providing a substantially similar [license] agreement” to PeriRx. Supp. App. 260, 569.

That argument relied on a different provision within Section 3.5, which states, “[t]he

Regents agree to enter into a license agreement with . . . Sublicensee(s) . . . , the terms of

which license agreement shall be substantially similar to the terms of the [initial

sublicense agreement].” App. 221, Supp. App. 255–56. Indeed, PeriRx did not mention

the “shall survive” language at any point in its District Court briefing. It therefore

forfeited this argument. See United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013)

(“[T]he argument presented in the Court of Appeals must depend on both the same legal

rule and the same facts as the argument presented in the District Court.”).

       PeriRx’s second theory fares no better. It contends that if we consider Section 3.5

an agreement to negotiate, then the Regents breached it by failing to negotiate in good

faith. But PeriRx expressly disavowed this theory in the District Court, arguing “an

agreement to negotiate . . . does not exist here.” Supp. App. 569. The intentional

relinquishment of this argument was waiver. See Barna, 877 F.3d at 146 & n.7.

       Because PeriRx failed to preserve the breach-of-contract arguments it raises on

appeal, we will affirm the summary judgment for the Regents. 4

                                       *       *      *

4
  PeriRx does not challenge the summary judgment for RNA on the contract claims in its
Statement of Issues and makes only passing reference to RNA’s alleged breach of the
PeriRx Sublicense in the rest of its brief. So it forfeited any challenge to that ruling as
well. See United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 555 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017); Kopec v. Tate,
361 F.3d 772, 775 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004). Therefore, we need not address PeriRx’s argument
that the Regents is liable for RNA’s alleged breach under an alter-ego theory.
                                               6
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.

                                      7