Court Opinion

ID: 9828788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:44:15.34311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.115051
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
It is contended in appellant’s motion for rehearing that we were in error in that portion of our opinion reading:
“What, if any, efforts appellant made to have the case postponed or continued in order that he might be at the trial of the case at bar are not disclosed by the record.”
In this connection it is urged that a telegram from the federal clerk at Fort Worth to the district clerk at Austin, dated March 26, 1923, and reading, “In cause Sloan v. Penix and Costley motion to continue overruled and case goes to trial,” shows that Oostley made every effort to get the federal court case continued.
As pointed out in our original opinion, the burden was upon appellant to show both a valid excuse for not being at the trial, and that his absence resulted to hiS' prejudice. Even though a valid excuse' were shown, still, as held in our original opinion, no prejudice was shown, and for that reason, if for *546no other, the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.
[9] However, we are clear in the view that a sufficient excuse was not shown, and this fbr two reasons: First, because the efforts made by Costley, if any, to have the federal court case continued, were not shown; and, second, because his absence in the trial of another case under all the circumstances shown by the record was not sufficient ground as a matter of law ,to require continuance or postponement of the case.
The telegram quoted merely stated that a motion for continuance was overruled. It did not state who made the motion, nor the grounds upon which' it was predicated. If we assume that the motion was made by Costley, still it does not appear whether he urged the setting of the present case for trial; and the court was not advised either in the motion for continuance, or in the motion for new trial, of the grounds for the motion in the federal court.
Aside from this, we think it would seriously interfere with the administration of justice to hold as a matter of law that attendance upon trial in one court by a party litigant is ground for continuance or postponement of another cause. A case might be presented in which under its peculiar circumstances the trial court ought to grant a continuance or postponement on this ground and to deny it would be abuse of judicial discretion. See Hill v. Clark, 51 Ga. 122. Ordinarily, where due diligence is shown and parties are acting in good faith, matters of this sort are readily adjusted in the trial court; and it is for this reason, no doubt, that there are so few cases upon the subject which have reached the appellate courts. But no special circumstances were shown in the present case, and the trial court appears to have been disposed to grant appellant every concession within its power without seriously impairing the chances of a trial of the case at that term, or interfering with the trial of other eases. The case had already been continued once upon the application of appellant, and upon the ground that he had not had opportunity to acquaint his counsel with the facts of the case. When the case was set for trial, there was no objection made by appellant’s counsel, and appellant was notified of the setting the same day and no objection was made by him. It does not appear when the case at Fort Worth was set for trial. If before the setting of the present case, then it was certainly incumbent upon appellant to notify the court of that fact before or at the time the jury docket was set, so as to avoid a conflict. When the case was called for trial it was postponed from Monday until Thursday, in order to give appellant an opportunity to be present. The court, in qualifying the bill of exceptions to the overruling of the motion to postpone or continue, states that the postponement was made to Thursday, “there being other jury cases set on the docket of this court for the succeeding jury -weeks.” The clear inference from this qualification is that the court was of the opinion that further postponement would interfere with the other settings on the jury docket, and that all the latitude consistent with the disposition of the docket had been allowed by granting the postponement from Monday to Thursday. There is no showing in the record that this was not the case. Under the circumstances, we do not doubt that the trial court acted properly without any abuse of its discretion in declining to further postpone the trial.
The other contentions in the motion were disposed of in the original opinion, and, in our judgment, are entirely without merit.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.