Court Opinion

ID: 9407008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 16:08:30.274389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.716889
License: Public Domain

J-A09041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                v.                        :
                                          :
                                          :
 DAVID TALBOT TAYLOR                      :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 890 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 7, 2022,
               in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001130-2019.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                            FILED: JULY 5, 2023

      David Talbot Taylor appeals the judgment of sentence imposed after he

pled guilty to multiple offenses arising from the sale of drugs. Upon review,

we affirm.

      Taylor, along with David Seecharran, sold drugs throughout York

County.      Eventually, Taylor’s sale of drugs resulted in the death of two

individuals. Taylor was arrested and charged.

      In exchange for his cooperation in a companion case and his plea in the

instant case, the Commonwealth offered Taylor 10-20 years’ incarceration for

all counts, to run concurrently. Taylor, however, rejected this offer and chose

to enter an open plea.

      On February 14, 2022, Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit

corrupt organizations, two counts of drug delivery resulting in death
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(“DDRID”), two counts of drug delivery, and conspiracy to commit drug

delivery resulting in death.

      On April 7, 2022, the trial court sentenced Taylor as follows: conspiracy

to commit corrupt organizations, 1½ to 3 years’ incarceration (standard

range); DDRID, 5 to 10 years’ incarceration (mitigated range) each, to run

consecutively; and conspiracy drug delivery resulting in death, 5 to 10 years

to run concurrent to the DDRID sentence; and delivery of a controlled

substance, no separate sentence as those charges merged with the sentences

for DDRID. Notably, the trial court imposed the sentence for conspiracy to

commit corrupt organizations to run consecutively to the two sentences for

DDRID. In total, Taylor was sentenced to 11½ to 23 years’ incarceration, a

longer sentence than the Commonwealth offered Taylor. Taylor filed a post-

sentence motion which the trial court denied.

      Taylor filed this timely appeal. Taylor and the trial court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      Taylor raises one issue for our review:

      1. Did the sentencing court arrive at a manifestly unreasonable
      decision when it structured [Taylor’s] sentences for the charges of
      [DDRID] to run consecutively to the sentence for [criminal
      conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations], as opposed to
      concurrent, thus committing a manifest abuse of discretion?

Taylor’s Brief at 3.

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       Taylor challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.1 “It is well

settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, there is

no automatic right to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-

08 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). This Court has explained that, to

reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we must conduct a four-

part analysis of the following factors:

       (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether [a]ppellant
       preserved his issue; (3) whether [a]ppellant's brief includes a
       concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
       appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence [in
       accordance with 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise statement
       raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate
       under the sentencing code. . . . [I]f the appeal satisfies each of
       these four requirements, we will then proceed to decide the
       substantive merits of the case.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1042–43 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quoting Austin, 66 A.3d at 808).

       Here, Taylor satisfied the first three requirements under Colon.

Accordingly, we must determine whether Taylor raised a substantial question.

       In his 2119(f) statement, Taylor argues that the trial court abused its

discretion when it imposed the sentence for conspiracy to commit corrupt

organizations consecutive to the two sentences for DDRID. Specifically, Taylor

argues that imposing these sentences consecutively, rather than concurrently,

was unreasonable because the underlying conduct involved in each offense
____________________________________________

1 We note that, although Taylor’s argument uses a merger like analysis which
implicates the legality of sentence, he only challenges the discretionary
aspects of his sentence.

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was the distribution of opioids in York County; the conspiracy offense

encompassed the same foreseeable conduct as anticipated in the DDRID

offense. As such, Taylor maintains that the offenses were not so separate and

distinct to warrant consecutive sentences, and the trial court should have

imposed the sentences concurrently. Taylor’s Brief at 11-12.

      Regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences and whether a

substantial question has been raised, this Court has held:

      A court's exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence
      concurrently or consecutively does not ordinarily raise a
      substantial question. Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d
      581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010)[.] Rather, the imposition of
      consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will present a
      substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such
      as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the
      nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.
      Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 372 (Pa. Super.
      2012)[(en banc)].

      [An appellant] may raise a substantial question where he receives
      consecutive sentences within the guideline ranges if the case
      involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines
      would be clearly unreasonable, resulting in an excessive sentence;
      however, a bald claim of excessiveness due to the consecutive
      nature of a sentence will not raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338-39 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(quotations omitted).

      Given the circumstances here, we conclude that Taylor’s claim does not

raise a substantial question. Even if Taylor raised a substantial question, we

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would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed

consecutive sentences for DDRID and conspiracy.2

        As the trial court explained, the two crimes are clearly separate and

distinct, and Taylor’s argument is meritless.

        Contrary to [Taylor’s] contention, [conspiracy to commit corrupt
        organizations] is a separate and distinct crime from the crime of
        [DDRID]. For the [c]onspiracy charge, [Taylor] had to agree with
        one or more individuals (David Seecharran) to violate the
        [c]orrupt [o]rganizations statute by committing two or more
        crimes of racketeering, specifically trafficking in illegal drugs. The
        death of an individual is not required. On the contrary, for the
        crime of [DDRID], no conspiracy is required, and it is not
        necessary to commit two or more crimes of racketeering. Instead,
        all that is required is that [Taylor] intentionally delivered, gave or
        sold a controlled substance to the victim, and the victim died as a
        result of using that controlled substance. Because each of these
        crimes requires one or more elements that the other does not,
        they are separate and distinct from each other.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 3-4.            Thus, the decision to impose the

conspiracy sentence consecutively or concurrently was within the trial court’s
____________________________________________

2   Our standard of review of a sentencing claim is as follows:

        Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
        sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
        absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
        of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
        the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
        sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
        judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
        arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

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discretion. See Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. Super.

1995). We do not consider the court’s imposition of a standard range sentence

of 1½ to 3-years’ incarceration consecutively as manifestly unreasonable.

This Court has stated many times that defendants convicted of multiple

offenses are not entitled to a “volume discount.” See Commonwealth v.

Calhoun, 53 A.3d 281, 287 (Pa. Super. 2012) (where sentences do not

merge, defendant is not entitled to “volume discount” in being sentenced).

      In sum, Taylor did not raise a substantial question, but if he had, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced him.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/5/2023

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