Court Opinion

ID: 9537671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:21:13.596638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:53.332000
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
concurring.
I am not persuaded that the special verdicts are inconsistent. Given the jury’s return of special verdicts awarding $0 damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement, $0 damages for loss of enjoyment of life, and $31,777.88 in damages for past and future medical care, the two zero damage special verdicts should be viewed as inadequate rather than inconsistent.1 Further, I think it manifestly unfair to invoke the doctrine of waiver in the circumstance where Ruggles’ counsel apparently did not realize the special verdicts in question could be characterized as inconsistent rather than inadequate. If the jury had chosen to return special verdicts of $1 in damages for pain and suffering and disfigurement, and $1 in damages for loss of enjoyment of life, it could not reasonably be argued that the special verdicts were inconsistent.
Thus, I conclude that the issue before us is whether the superior court abused its discretion in denying Ruggles’ motion for a new trial, limited solely to damage claims for pain, suffering, disfigurement, and loss of enjoyment of life, based on the inadequacy of the special verdicts. In view of the credibility issues involved, and the problematic attempt to limit the scope of the new trial, I conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rug-gles’ motion for a new trial.

. See Spalding v. Shinkle, 774 S.W.2d 465, 466-67 (Ky.App.1989); McCain v. Redman Homes, Inc., 387 So.2d 809, 812-13 (Ala.1980).