Court Opinion

ID: 9550706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:40:49.173218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:12.947207
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
In my view, the majority opinion is an example of the maxim that hard cases sometimes make bad law. I cannot help but feel that the result in this case has been influenced by the fact that upon the search of defendant’s ear the officers found no more than one germinant seed of marijuana. Would the majority have reached the same result if, instead, the officers had found 10 pounds of uncut heroin or a stolen gun used in an unsolved murder, with identifiable fingerprints ?
Or what if, during the days of prohibition, an officer saw a man “reputed” to be the local bootlegger handing “what appeared to be a whiskey bottle” to another person, receiving in exchange “something that was green” and “looked like money”? Would it not have been a revelation to law enforcement officers to be informed that they had no “probable cause” for arrest or for search of the automobile even without a search warrant, much less for the issuance of a search warrant for the automobile?
Such a conclusion would have required the officer to be able to swear under oath that the contents of the bottle was an illegal alcoholic beverage and that what “looked like money” was actually money, thus imposing requirements for the issuance of a search warrant that would have been impossible, as a practical matter. While yesterday’s problems of illegal *255liquor traffic may have been succeeded by today’s problems of illlegal drug traffic, I cannot believe that the law relating to search warrants has changed to the extent suggested by the majority.
In considering cases involving motions to suppress evidence obtained by an allegedly invalid search warrant we must constantly remember that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States extends only to “unreasonable searches and seizures.” We must also bear in mind, as recognized by the majority, that in determining whether there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, warrant affidavits are to be interpreted in a commonsense rather than a hypertechnical manner. State v. McDonald, 253 Or 533, 539, 456 P2d 80 (1969), quoting with approval from United States v. Ventresca, 380 US 102, 108, 85 S Ct 741, 13 L ed 2d 684 (1965). Also, we have recognized that although evidence of probable cause must be more than would give rise to a “mere suspicion,” it can be “less than would justify an officer in making a search without a warrant.” State v. Ingram, 251 Or 324, 326, 445 P2d 503 (1968).
In my judgment, the majority, while paying lip service to these well-established rules, has declined to apply them in this case. This affidavit for a search warrant stated three basic facts:
(1) That the defendant was “known” to the officer “as a trafficker in narcotics and dangerous drugs”;
(2) That the officer observed defendant hand to Graven “what appeared to be a baggie of marijuana” and to be “the kind ordinarily used to contain marijuana”; and
(3) That the officer observed that defendant “receive [d] money-in return.”

*256
The “impressions” or opinions of the officer, based on firsthand observation, were not “controverted” by his subsequent admission that he could not be “certain” that they were correct.

With referencé to items (2) and (3), the majority holds that “assuming, without deciding, that this portion of the affidavit stating the officer’s observation is sufficient to establish probable cause,” these statements in the affidavit were “controverted” by the testimony of the officer on cross-examination at the time of trial. I do not agree.
First of all, no motion was filed by defendant for a hearing under OES 141.150 to “controvert the ground of issuing the affidavit.” Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was upon the ground that “the affidavit is not sufficient,” rather than that the statements in the affidavit had been “controverted” by testimony. Defendant’s assignment of error on appeal to the Court of Appeals was that the trial court erred in denying that motion.
It is true that defendant’s petition for review states that “review is warranted because the majority opinion [of the Court of Appeals] * * * relied upon the officer’s affidavit even though he controverted it at the motion to suppress.” The state’s attorney contended on oral argument, however, that ■ “there was never a motion to controvert * * * this was simply a motion to suppress. The grounds [sic] at no time urged that anything in the affidavit is factually false * * *. The whole basis is that the affidavit is not sufficient to authorize the search.” In addition, there was no separate “suppression hearing,” although it was stipulated that the issues raised by the motion to sup*257press be tried at tbe same time as the trial on the indictment.
On this record, it is my view that the sole question before this court is the sufficiency of the affidavit and that the question whether statements in the affidavit were “controverted” is not properly before this court in this case. Had that contention been made properly in the trial court the state might well have offered testimony to support and corroborate the statements in the affidavit.
Assuming, however, that this question is properly before this court, I do not agree that these statements in the affidavit were “controverted.” The officer testified that what he said in his affidavit “appeared to be a baggie of marijuana,” and to be “the kind ordinarily used to contain marijuana,” “could have” been an ordinary “plastic container,” and that he could not see its contents. He also testified that he could not be certain that what he saw “come back” was “money.”
Tn my view, that testimony, while perhaps impeaching somewhat the credibility of the officer, did not so completely “controvert” the statements of the affidavit so as to destroy them. These statements in the affidavit were, in essence, expressions of the officer’s “impression” or opinion that what he observed was the exchange of a marijuana “baggie” for money. As such, these statements would have had sufficient probative value so as to be admissible even on trial as the “shorthand rendering” of the “impression” or opinion of the officer based upon firsthand observation of the transaction. Such testimony is not shorn of all probative weight because the witness admits, on cross-examination, that he cannot be certain of the correct*258■ness, of ¡-his “impression” or opinion. On the contrary, the determination of the credibility of snch testimony in snch an event is still for the trier of the facts. See McCormick on Evidence (2d ed) 20-22, § 10.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that what we are primarily concerned with in this case is the sufficiency of the affidavit and the question whether or not it provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The effect of the opinion by the majority is to hold that an officer who is present during such a transaction must be able to testify under oath at a hearing to suppress such evidence or on trial of the case that he could positively identify, without equivocation, that a container alleged to contain unlawful' drugs did in fact contain unlawful drugs and that what he observed to be passed in exchange for such a container was in fact, “money.” Such a requirement would be completely unworkable and one which would impose an impossible burden on law enforcement officers.
• But even if the statements in the affidavit relating to the “baggie” and the “money” be considered ‘insufficient, standing alone, it is my opinion that the majority is incorrect for a more fundamental reason. This relates to the “reputation” statement in the affidavit (item (1)) and the holding by the majority that “the bare allegation in the affidavit that the defendant was known as a-trafficker in drugs gives no additional weight to what the officer observed” and “is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate’s decision.”
The reputation of the defendant as a “trafficker in drugs” was a relevant fact and as such, was en,-titled to consideration, along with other, facts and *259circumstances, in determining the existence of probable cause and could not be totally disregarded.
The basic error by the majority, in my judgment, is its assumption that this court is bound by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L ed 2d 637 (1969). In Spinelli it was held (at 418-419), by a divided court, that the statement in an affidavit for the search warrant that defendant was “known” to the FBI and others as a gambler was completely irrelevant and added no weight to the affidavit. Justice Black dissented on the ground that the majority opinion in Spmelli was an “indefensible departure from the principles of our former eases.” Justice Stewart and Justice Fortas also dissented and Justice Marshall took no part in the case.
More recently, in United States v. Harris, 403 US. 573, 91 S Ct 2075, 29 L ed 2d 723 (1971), Chief Justice Burger, in writing the opinion for the majority of the court, had this to say about Spinelli (at 582):
“* * * In Spinelli * * * the Court rejected as entitled to no weight the ‘bald and unilluminating’ assertion that the suspect was known to the affiant as a gambler. 393 US, at 414, 21 L Ed 2d at 643. For this proposition the Court relied on Nathanson v. United States, 290 US 41, 78 L Ed 159, 54 S Ct 11 (1933). But a careful examination of Nathanson shows that the Spinelli opinion did not fully reflect the critical points of what Nathanson held since it was limited to holding that reputation, standing alone, was insufficient; it surely did not hold irrelevant when supported by other information. * * *” (Emphasis added)
' Two members of the court expressly concurred in that part of the opinion by. Chief Justice Burger. *260Two otlier members of the court concurred in the opinion, but did not expressly either agree or disagree with the proposal that Spinelli be overruled. Thus, it was not necessary in Harris to decide whether or not to overrule Spinelli because of other and independent grounds for that decision.
In my view, however, Spinelli is not only bad law, but the opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Harris, as well as the present trend of the decisions by the United States Supreme Court, leads me to the belief that Spinelli will be overruled when that issue is squarely presented to the court.①
In recent years we have not hesitated to decide criminal cases involving questions of constitutional law upon what we believe to be the correct rules of law. See State v. Douglas, 260 Or 60, 488 P2d 1366 (1971), holding that a “Miranda warning” is not required before a so-called “consent search” — a rule later ap*261proved by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 231, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L ed 2d 854, 865 (1973). See also State v. Brewton, 247 Or 241, 422 P2d 581 (1967), stating a rule more restrictive than that subsequently adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 US 222, 91 S Ct 643, 28 L ed 2d 1 (1971). As a result, it is my view that this court should decide for itself what it believes to be the correct rule of law for application in this case, leaving it to the United States Supreme Court to reverse us if that court should disagree.
The rationale of the opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Harris, as stated in US v. Harris, supra at 583, is that:
“We cannot conclude that a policeman’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation — something that policemen frequently know and a factor that impressed such a ‘legal technician’ as Mr. Justice Frankfurter — is not a ‘practical consideration of everyday life’ upon which an officer (or a magistrate) may properly rely in assessing the reliability of an informant’s tip. To. the extent that Spinelli prohibits the use of such probative information, it has no support in our prior cases, , logic, or experience and we decline to apply it to. preclude a magistrate from relying on a law enforcement officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation.”
This view is consistent with that taken by Justice Black, dissenting, in Spinelli, as stated at 431:
“The petitioner was known by federal and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker and an associate of gamblers. 1 cannot agree with the Court that this knowledge was only a ‘bald and xmilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to.no weight in appraising the magistrate’s, decicision.’ Ante, at 414, 21 L ed 2d at 643. Although *262•the statement is hearsay that might not he admissible in a regular trial, everyone knows, unless he shuts his eyes to the realities of life, that this is a relevant fact which, together with other circumstances, might indicate a factual probability that gambling is talcing place.” (Emphasis added)
Indeed, evidence of reputation has long been considered to be admissible as a relevant fact not only for the purpose of impeachment of witnesses, but also as substantive evidence in the trial of many types of criminal cases on their merits, where the standard of proof is much higher than mere probable cause. Cf. United States v. Harris, supra at 584.
A few examples should suffice:
In rape cases evidence that the reputation of the prosecuting witness for chastity is bad is admissible for consideration by a jury on the issue of whether she was ravished by force or consented to intercourse. See State v. Ogden, 39 Or 195, 208, 65 P 449 (1901). Cf. 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed) 495, § 1620.
In cases involving the keeping of houses of prostitution, evidence of the reputation of defendant as the owner of such a house is admissible. State v. McGinnis, 56 Or 163, 167-168, 108 P 132 (1910). Cf. 5 Wigmore, supra, 496-497, § 1620.
In cases of homicide or assault and battery in which self-defense is claimed to be a defense, evidence of the known reputation of the alleged assailant as a violent and dangerous person- is admissible on the issue whether the defendant had reason to apprehend an attack (i.e., “probable cause” to strike the first blow). See 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed) 52, § 246. Cf. State v. Selby, 73 Or 378, 380, 144 P 657 (1914).
For numerous other examples, see 2 Wigmore, *263supra, 43-83, §4 244-259; 5 Wigmore, supra; 443-510, §§ 1580-1626; and McCormick on Evidence (2d ed) 595, 749-750, §§ 249, 324.
In my opinion, these authorities provide ample support for the proposition that “a policeman’s knowledge of a suspect’s reputation” cannot he properly ignored, as was done in Spmelli, hut is a “practical consideration of everyday life,” to use the words of Chief Justice Burger in Harris, and as such is entitled to consideration, on the issue of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. For the same reasons, as pointed out by Black, J., dissenting in Spmelli, the reputation of the defendant as a bookmaker and a gambler, as in that case, or as a trafficker in drugs, as in this ease, is a “* * * relevant fact which, together with other circumstances, * * *” might 'indicate the “factual probability” required for a showing of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, at least in narcotic cases, such as this.
Even assuming that there would be no probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant to search the automobile of an ordinary person observed to hand what appeared to be a “baggie of marijuana” and receive in return what appeared to be “money,” when the person who is observed to engage in such a transaction has the reputation of being a “trafficker in narcotics and dangerous drugs,” I would hold that a magistrate could properly find probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for the search of the automobile of such a person.
For all of these reasons I cannot agree with an opinion which embraces the rule of Spmelli as a correct statement of the law and as stating a rule that is binding on this court.
*264Finally, the majority says that the statement by the officer that the defendant was “known” to him to be snch a person was also “controverted” by Ms testimony at the time of trial.
The statement by the officer in his affidavit that defendant was “known to me as a trafficker in narcotics and dangerous drugs” was, in effect, a statement that he knew that to be defendant’s reputation and is so considered by the majority in its discussion of that statement in the light of Spinelli and Harris. The “reputation” of a person is “the opinion which others have formed and expressed of Ms character.” 5 Wig-more, supra, 477, § 1608. It may be that this statement by the officer in Ms affidavit would have been “controverted” if the officer had been asked whether he had ever discussed defendant’s reputation with anyone and had stated that he had never done so. See 5 Wigmore, supra, 486, § 1614.
No such question was asked, however, but only the question “What, if anything, did you know about Mm?” In response to that question, the officer testified that “* * * we have had information * * * that he uses and sells * * * marijuana * * That testimony in no way “controverts” Ms prior statement as a statement of defendant’s reputation. If anything, that testimony tends to corroborate rather than to “controvert” Ms prior statement and no attempt was made on cross-examination to inquire as to the nature or sources of such information.
In any event, as previously stated, the sole question raised by. defendant’s motion to suppress was the sufficiency of the affidavit. The question whether *265the affidavit was “controverted” by testimony on trial is not properly before this court in this case.②
For all of these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion by the majority and would affirm the decision by the Court of Appeals that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant in this case.
I would, however, reverse that decision to the extent that it would refuse to remand the case for resentencing. I believe that defendant is correct in his contention that the fine of $1,000, with a jail sentence of 90 days and probation for five years, as imposed by the trial court, was an excessive penalty for the possession of one marijuana seed, particularly in view of the action subsequently taken by the 1973 Legislature, under which the maximum penalty for that act would be a fine of not more than $100. (Oregon Laws 1973, ch 680, OES 167.207.)
Howell, J., joins in this dissent.

 In. addition, it is important to note that Spinelli was not a case in which the affidavit for the search warrant was based upon personal observation by the officer of the alleged criminal activity, combined with his knowledge of defendant’s reputation as in this case. Instead, both Spinelli and Harris were cases in which the primary basis for the affidavit was the tip of an informer, combined with the reputation of the defendant, thus presenting the problem of whether there was a sufficient showing of the reliability of the informer. Indeed, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in Harris (at 597) to the effect that evidence of defendant’s reputation was not sufficient to establish the credibility of the informant in that case, was careful to point out (at 587) that Harris was not a case in which “the officer observed that activity himself.” Similarly, the problem considered in Spinelli was whether an informer’s tip had been sufficiently corroborated and whether the reputation of the defendant had any probative value for that purpose. This basic distinction in the nature of the problem presented in this case, as compared with the problem presented in Spinelli, is a further reason why that decision is not controlling in this case, even .if good law as applied to. the. problem presented in that case, contrary to the subsequent opinion by Chief Justice Burger in Harris..

 As also previously pointed out, this case does not present the problem of whether the reliability of an informer’s tip has been sufficiently established by reference to other independent facts. (See footnote ®) The statement of an officer that a defendant has a reputation of being a drug pusher or bootlegger, arid the reliability of such a statement, presents a different problem because knowledge of the reputation of a person must be based upon the opinions formed and expressed by other persons, rather than upon personal knowledge of the defendant or of his conduct or upon information relating to specific acts of prior misconduct. See 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed) 477, 482, §§ 1608, 1612.