Court Opinion

ID: 9383832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:56.049668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.358342
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0770-MR

ASHLEY W. SIMMS                                                       APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM MASON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE DANIEL J. ZALLA, SPECIAL JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CI-00203

DEBORAH L. MASON AND JAMES
R. MASON                                                               APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: This case arises from a property dispute over restrictive

covenants. Appellant, Ashley W. Simms, appeals the judgment of the Mason

Circuit Court entered following a bench trial conducted on February 24, 2022.

Simms contends that the trial court erred by concluding that a structure erected on

his property violated restrictive covenants binding upon his three-acre lot in

Maysville. Finding no error, we affirm.
             Appellee, Deborah L. Mason, and her late husband, Mike Mason,

were the developers of Pleasant Ridge Subdivision, a community of fourteen

building lots. Simms purchased his property in the development directly from the

Masons; he was aware of the existence of the restrictive covenants. The parties

agree that the Pleasant Ridge Subdivision Revised Conditions and Restrictions (the

restrictive covenants) run with the land and are binding upon the Simms property.

The restrictive covenants provide, in relevant part, as follows:

             Garages may be attached or unattached to the residence.
             Unattached garages and storage buildings must be
             located within the setback lines and must be constructed
             of the same material and exterior finish as the residence.

             ....

                    No outbuilding, shed, tent, trailer, mobile home,
             modular home or double wide mobile home shall be
             erected or maintained on the subject property. . . . No
             travel trailers, campers or habitable motor vehicles, boats
             or accessory equipment of any nature shall be kept or
             stored on any part of the property, except in an enclosed
             garage. No trucks larger than a 1 ton pickup truck shall
             be parked within the subdivision. . . .

             ....

                    No sign of any kind shall be displayed to the
             public view on any lot, except one sign of not more than
             five square feet advertising the property for sale.

             ....

                   There shall be no nuisance permitted to take place
             on any lot, nor shall any owner allow an accumulation of

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             debris, junk, vehicles or other unsightly materials
             thereon.

James (“Russ”) Mason, the second appellee, also owns property in the

development.

             On August 20, 2019, Deborah Mason and Russ Mason filed a

complaint against Simms in Mason Circuit Court. They alleged that Simms was

violating express terms of the restrictive covenants by keeping on view at his

property an excessive number of personal vehicles, multiple tactical trucks

produced for military use (Humvees), a farm tractor, and a utility trailer. In

October 2019, they filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and injunction

related to the accumulation of items on the property. In response, Simms began

building a large structure on the property to store the vehicles and other personal

property.

             The circuit court conducted a bench trial on February 24, 2022. It

heard testimony from Simms, who indicated that he began to construct the metal

and vinyl-sided structure behind his brick home in late 2019. He received a permit

from the county and, as a courtesy, submitted the building plans to the Masons. He

admitted that the Masons expressly rejected his plan. However, he testified that

construction of the building was substantially complete by the time that the

Masons obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent its construction. He

testified that there were accessory buildings behind other homes in the

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development that did not appear to match the construction material or finish of the

residences associated with them. He identified some of these as “sheds,” which are

expressly excluded by the terms of the restrictive covenants.

             Deborah Mason testified that the restrictive covenants do not require

approval before construction begins in the development. She admitted that the

term “garage” is not defined by the restrictive covenants.

             Russ Mason testified that most lots in the development have a

residence, an attached garage, and a small storage building in the rear of the

property for items like lawn mowers and other yard tools. He indicated that the

Simms property includes a brick residence, an attached three-car garage, and a

commercial-sized outbuilding constructed of vinyl siding with a metal roof.

             The trial court rendered its findings and judgment in favor of the

Masons on May 5, 2022. The court found that Simms violated the terms of its

injunction entered in January 2020 by keeping on his property an excessive

number of personal motor vehicles, three Humvees, two farm tractors, and a utility

trailer. It found that the disputed structure built by Simms to store these items

(measuring 40 feet by 56 feet and erected some distance from the residence) was

not constructed of the same building material as the home. The court noted that

another outbuilding of a similar size in the development had been the subject of

litigation commenced by the Masons in 2018. In that litigation, the circuit court

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determined that the disputed structure was a “grandfathered” building -- an

exception to the restrictive covenants not applicable to these proceedings.

             The trial court concluded that the presence of the vehicles (including

the utility trailer) and a “do not enter” sign erected on the property plainly violated

the restrictive covenants. Interpreting the terms of the restrictive covenants to

reflect the intention of the parties, the court concluded that the disputed structure

built by Simms was not an unattached garage but a prohibited “outbuilding”

instead. It held that provisions of the restrictive covenants had not been waived

and that the Masons were entitled to enforce them. The court ordered that the

outbuilding be dismantled. It also ordered the Humvees, excess personal vehicles,

farm tractors, utility trailer, other accessory equipment, and the prohibited signage

be removed from the property.

             Its judgment was entered on May 11, 2022. Simms’s motion to alter,

amend, or vacate was denied. This appeal followed.

             Because this case was tried before the court without a jury, we will

not disturb the court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Kentucky

Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01. A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous

if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is “evidence of substance and

relevant consequence having the fitness to induce conviction in the minds of

reasonable men.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409,

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414 (Ky. 1998). In our review, we must recognize that the trial court is in the best

position “to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the

evidence.” Uninsured Employers’ Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.

1991) (citation omitted). The trial court’s conclusions of law, including the

interpretation or construction of restrictive covenants, are reviewed de

novo. Colliver v. Stonewall Equestrian Estates Ass’n, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 521 (Ky.

App. 2003).

              Simms argues that the trial court erred by failing to characterize the

disputed structure as an “unattached garage” expressly permitted by the restrictive

covenants. He reasons that any structure used to store vehicles and other personal

items is reasonably regarded as a “garage.” Furthermore, Simms argues that the

language of the restrictive covenants must be interpreted to permit his over-sized

garage because the restrictions expressly permit storage of “travel trailers, campers

or habitable motor vehicles, boats or accessory equipment” in an “enclosed

garage.” He contends that a garage of sufficient dimensions to accommodate these

items is necessarily over-sized. He explains that “[a]nyone who knows anything

about travel trailers or habitable motor vehicles would not expect them to be

housed in a normal size garage with small doors.” Simms specifically rejects the

trial court’s reliance on the atypical size, doorway dimensions, location,

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construction material, and exterior finish of the building to determine that the

structure is not permitted under the provisions of the restrictive covenants.

             “‘[Restrictive covenants] are regarded more as a protection to the

property owner and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property,

and the old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies.’” Hensley v.

Gadd, 560 S.W.3d 516, 521 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Triple Crown Subdivision

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138, 140 (Ky. 2008)

(quoting Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky. 1958)). “[T]he construction

[of restrictive covenants] may not be used to defeat the obvious intention of the

parties though that intention be not precisely expressed.” Ashland-Boyd County

City-County Health Dep’t v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky. 1952)

(citing Connor v. Clemons, 308 Ky. 9, 213 S.W.2d 438 (1948)). The scheme or

plan of development and surrounding circumstances must also be

considered. Brandon, 314 S.W.2d 521.

             The Masons planned and developed a distinctive neighborhood. The

restrictive covenants that they implemented were meant to protect the cohesive

appearance they envisioned for the community. We reject Simms’s assertion that

his oversized structure must be a garage because a typical garage cannot

accommodate “travel trailers, campers habitable motor vehicles, boats or accessory

equipment” -- various items expressly authorized for storage by the provisions of

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the restrictive covenants. The reasoning underlying his premise is unsound and

merely conclusory as Simms has presented no evidence to show that the various

items referenced in the restrictions could not be fitted in garages properly

integrated into the neighborhood. Furthermore, Simms did not indicate that he

stored any of these items in the challenged structure. The trial court did not err in

its interpretation of the restrictive covenants on this basis.

             Next, Simms argues that garage design standards outlined by the

provisions of the restrictive covenants have been waived. In the alternative, he

contends that the appearance of his outbuilding substantially complies with those

requirements. To the extent that these issues are relevant, we disagree in light of

our review of the trial court’s analysis.

             Referring to other outbuildings in the neighborhood, Simms argues

that there was “no strict adherence to matching the exterior of accessory buildings

to the main residence.” The restrictive covenants require that “unattached garages

. . . must be constructed of the same material and exterior finish as the residence.”

(Emphasis added.) As we noted in Colliver, 139 S.W.3d at 525:

                   The rule of law in regard to waiver of restrictions
             was succinctly stated in Bagby v. Stewart’s Ex’r, Ky.,
             265 S.W.2d 75, 77 (1954):

                    “A change in the character of the neighborhood
                    which was intended to be created by restrictions
                    has generally been held to prevent their
                    enforcement in equity, where it is no longer

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                    possible to accomplish the purpose intended by
                    such covenant....”

             (quoting 14 Am.Jur. Covenants § 302, page 646).

                   Arbitrary enforcement of covenants does not
             necessarily render covenants unenforceable. Instead,
             when arbitrary enforcement has resulted in a fundamental
             change in the character of a neighborhood, the purpose of
             the covenants may be defeated and accordingly become
             unenforceable.

                    “Where the restrictive covenant has not been
                    rigidly enforced, and where certain structures and
                    uses have been tacitly permitted which are
                    violative of the strict terms, but where, in spite of
                    such relaxation, there still remains something of
                    substantial value to those entitled to benefit by its
                    provisions, they are still entitled to enforce it
                    insofar as they were not affected by the principles
                    of estoppel and waiver. Applying this principle, it
                    seems clear that under the testimony there is no
                    estoppel, and there has been no waiver of the right
                    to object to the building and operation of structures
                    which partake in no degree whatever of the
                    character of residences within this subdivision[.]”

                   Hardesty v. Silver, Ky., 302 S.W.2d 578, 582
             (1956) (quoting Polk Manor Co. v. Manton, 274 Mich.
             539, 265 N.W. 457, 458 (1936)).

             Again, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the evidence.

While the entirety of Pleasant Ridge’s restrictive covenants may not have been

rigidly enforced, the evidence appears to support the trial court’s finding that the

Masons acted promptly to address issues that arose. Consequently, the character of

the neighborhood to be protected by the restrictive covenants did not change

                                          -9-
materially over time. The trial court did not err by concluding that the covenant

regarding the construction and appearance of unattached garages has not been

waived by a lack of enforcement. It did not err by concluding that even if Simms’s

structure could be characterized as an “unattached garage,” it nevertheless violated

the provisions of the restrictive covenants.

             Finally, Simms argues that even if the design restrictions have not

been waived, his structure “is in substantial compliance with the underlying

purpose of the Restrictive Covenants -- to have garages and storage buildings that

generally match the main residence.” (Emphasis added.) He acknowledges that

the building materials of the residence and the outbuilding “do not match at the

moment.” However, Simms explains that he intends to replace the roof of the

residence with a metal roof when it requires replacement. He points out that the

vinyl-siding of the outbuilding matches the color of the vinyl portions of his

residence.

             Restrictive covenants governing the use of real property are

enforceable according to their terms. Hensley, supra. The fact that the design

scheme of the outbuilding almost matches the required design scheme for

unattached garages in the neighborhood does not support Simms’s argument. The

court did not err by concluding that Simms’s structure was not a garage and that

                                         -10-
the construction materials and exterior appearance of the outbuilding violated the

terms of the restrictive covenants.

             We affirm the judgment of the Mason Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Scott A. Best                             A. Claire Estill
Florence, Kentucky                        Maysville, Kentucky

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