Court Opinion

ID: 9733830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:18:16.718806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:29.998238
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). This case presents two issues. The first issue is whether the initial contact between the police and the citizen in this case constituted a "seizure” within the ambit of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, against such activity.1 The second issue is whether the officers’ conduct was reasonable, assuming the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), when judged by the totality of circumstances at the time of the incident, United States v Cortez, 449 US 411; 101 S Ct 690; 66 L Ed 2d 621 (1981).
I
The first issue has not yet been authoritatively *68resolved by any decision of this Court or of the United States Supreme Court. It was foreshadowed almost twenty years ago by Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Terry, supra. Writing separately, "to fill in a few gaps, as I see them, in [the majority] opinion” at 31-32, Justice Harlan stated:
In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own protection he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence.
Despite Justice Harlan’s prescient observation, the opinions in Terry and the companion cases focused2 attention on the pat down of Mr. Terry, and the pocket searches of the defendants in the companion cases. As Professor LaFave has noted:
The failure of the majority to heed [Justice Harlan’s] advice, it would seem, was unwise, for the Court thereby detoured around the threshold issue about stop and frisk, one on which courts, lawyers and police deserve guidance. [LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.3, p 64.]
Research has disclosed only two United States Supreme Court cases3 providing guidance for resolution of whether the conduct here constituted a stop._______
*69In United States v Mendenhall, 446 US 544; 100 S Ct 1870; 64 L Ed 2d 497 (1980), the Court considered whether a "seizure” had taken place when agents approached the defendant in an airport concourse and asked questions of her. In concluding that it had not, two justices noted that the Court in Terry had apparently and correctly assumed that a seizure had not taken place before the officer physically restrained Terry for purposes of searching his person for weapons. Mendenhall, supra at 552-553. The justices stated:
We adhere to the view that a person is "seized” only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safeguards. [Id. at 553.]
Analyzing the facts, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist observed that the events took place in a public concourse, the agents wore no uniforms and displayed no weapons, they did not summon the respondent to their presence, but instead approached her and identified themselves as federal agents. "Such conduct, without more, did not amount to an intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest.”4 Id. at 555.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v Delgado, 466 US 210; 104 S Ct 1758; 80 L Ed 2d 247 (1984), an action for injunctive and declaratory relief was brought by employees and their union, seeking to prevent the Immigration and Naturali*70zation Service from conducting "factory surveys” of the work force at a garment factory. Applying Mendenhall, supra, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the stationing of agents at the doors to the buildings during the one to three hours that other agents approached workers and asked questions about employee citizenship constituted a seizure of the entire work force because "a reasonable worker 'would have believed that he was not free to leave,' ” Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v Sureck, 681 F2d 624, 634 (CA 9, 1982). Consequently the Court of Appeals held that individual questioning of the employees violated the Fourth Amendment because there had been no reasonable suspicion or probable cause as to any of them.
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the majority held that interrogation relating to one’s identity or a request for identification does not by itself constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, despite the claim that the manner in which the surveys were conducted created a psychological environment which made the employees reasonably afraid they were not free to leave.
Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring in part and dissenting in part, believed that the employees were seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when they were "accosted by the ins agents and questioned” by them in circumstances which "demonstrated a 'show of authority’ . . . [that would] overbear the will of any reasonable person.”5
While neither Mendenhall nor Delgado dispose of the issue presented here, they do illustrate that *71the Court has applied the test of a reasonable apprehension of a citizen not to be free to go, only to determine whether an actual confrontation between a citizen and the police for interrogation purposes has become a seizure requiring further justification. See also Brown v Texas, 443 US 47; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979).
I would conclude that on this record there was not an intrusion on protected interests sufficient to constitute a stop. While the reasonable belief of an individual actually stopped by the police is relevant to whether a seizure has occurred, the threshold issue, whether there has been a "stop,” is one of law. I would find on this record that one individual running after another is, as a matter of law, not a detention for investigation. The defendant’s flight prevented any request for an explanation of his behavior. On these facts, not even a "forcible stop,” Terry, supra (Harlan, J., concurring), triggering Fourth Amendment protection had occurred before the defendant discarded the bag.
II
Even if running after the defendant was a "stop,” it is clear that the seizure was justified by a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the defendant was involved in criminal activity.
Since Terry v Ohio, supra, the Court has determined the propriety of Terry-type activity by balancing the extent of the intrusion on the individual’s rights against the right of the public to be free from criminal activity. Terry v Ohio, supra; Adams v Williams, 407 US 143; 92 S Ct 1921; 32 L Ed 2d 612 (1972); United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873; 95 S Ct 2574; 45 L Ed 2d 607 (1975).
In his Mendenhall concurrence, Justice Powell, *72joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-mun, determined that the initial stop of the defendant was a stop protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that the stop was reasonable. Mendenhall, supra at 560-566. Justice Powell wrote that "[t]he jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment demands consideration of the public’s interest in effective law enforcement as well as each person’s constitutionally secured right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id., p 565. After balancing the public interest against the extent of the intrusion, in light of all the circumstances of the case, Justice Powell concluded that the stop was reasonable.
There can be no debate that unlawful use of handguns constitutes a serious threat to public safety. According to figures compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, firearms were responsible for sixty percent of the 18,692 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters committed nationwide in 1984. The fbi also reports that firearms were used in thirty-six percent of the 485,008 robberies committed in 1984. According to the Detroit Police Department, in the first six months of 1985, firearms were responsible for 157 homicides in Detroit alone.
Balanced against the public’s right to be free from the employment of firearms for criminal use, is the limited nature of the intrusion on the defendant in this case.6 A pursuit in the attempt to stop to ascertain whether or not a weapon is being concealed is a minuscule intrusion when weighed against the havoc caused by weapons.
Applying the balancing test first articulated in *73Terry, the United States Supreme Court has approved a forcible stop to investigate an informant’s tip that the suspect was armed and carrying narcotics, Adams v Williams, supra, a brief stop of a moving vehicle to investigate a reasonable suspicion that its occupants were involved in criminal activity, United States v Brignoni-Ponce, supra, and a temporary detention of the occupant of a house while a search warrant for the house was being executed, Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692; 101 S Ct 2587; 69 L Ed 2d 340 (1981). Most recently the court has approved an investigative stop based on a reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity, United States v Hensley, 469 US 221; 105 S Ct 675; 83 L Ed 2d 604 (1985).
Moreover, since Terry, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the "reasonable suspicion” required for a valid investigative stop must be judged by the totality of the circumstances at the time of the incident. As the majority observes, this totality has been specifically held to include the experience and heightened perceptions of the police officers involved, United States v Cortez, supra.
It is true that Sight alone cannot give rise to probable cause, since, were it otherwise, anyone who does not desire to talk to the police and who either walks or runs away from them would always be subject to legal arrest. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 3.6, p 669.
It is also true that concealment itself may be insufficient to justify a stop. Id. The majority has not, however, set forth authority justifying the conclusion that, in combination, the observation by experienced police officers of concealment and flight may not provide a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is occurring. Indeed, the case cited by the majority, United States v Green, 216 *74US App DC 329; 670 F2d 1148 (1981), not only does not support the conclusion of the majority that the officers had only a generalized suspicion, it is actually a holding that the officers’ observation of activity typical of a narcotics transaction, the concealment of a brown paper bag and the flight and evasion by defendant when approached by an unmarked police car, constituted probable cause for arrest. Id. at 332.
The majority has discredited the inference which reasonable police officers might draw and has bifurcated the circumstances to conclude that the sum of the circumstances is not "greater than the sum of their parts.” Ante, p 60.
The purported justification for their conclusion is that each circumstance may have been innocent. This analysis obscures the significance of the officers’ experience and renders the totality of circumstances test meaningless. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in United States v Holland, 510 F2d 453, 455 (CA 9, 1975):
Clearly, the officers were not required to rule out all possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop .... The test is founded suspicion .... Even if it was equally probable that the vehicle or its occupants were innocent of any wrongdoing, police officers must be permitted to act before their reasonable belief is verified by escape or fruition of the harm it was their duty to prevent.
See also United States v Viegas, 639 F2d 42 (CA 1, 1981), and United States v Black, 675 F2d 129 (CA 7, 1982).
The defendant in this case was seen by two *75experienced police officers7 in a high-crime area, late at night, leaving a building in which one of the officers had previously made over fifteen arrests for concealed-weapons and narcotics offenses. Upon leaving the building, the defendant was seen "stuffing a paper bag like under his vest” or "in his pants.” After seeing the two officers stop their vehicle, the defendant began running down the street. At this point, the officers began pursuit.8
*76We would conclude that any "seizure” of defendant here was based on reasonable suspicion and that the seizure of the bag was therefore justified. The bag was observed by the officer in plain view in a place where he had a lawful right to be, Harris v United States, 390 US 234; 88 S Ct 992; 19 L Ed 2d 1067 (1968).
I would reverse and remand to the trial court.
Williams, C.J., concurred with Boyle,

 The prosecuting attorney in this case has conceded that the police officers’ conduct involved Fourth Amendment activity and, as such, is governed by the standards for investigative detention set forth in Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). However, we are not bound by the prosecutor’s interpretation of the case and may consider and analyze the facts and issues independent of such a concession. The United States Supreme Court in one of the companion cases to Terry, Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 58-59; 88 S Ct 1889; 20 L Ed 2d 917 (1968), disregarded the state’s representation of error and decided the case on its merits, noting:
“ '[0]ur judgments are precedents, and the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of the parties.’ . . . For us to accept his view blindly . . . would be a disservice to the State of New York and an abdication of our obligation to lower courts to decide cases upon proper constitutional grounds in a manner which permits them to conform their future behavior to the demands of the Constitution.”

 Sibron v New York, supra.

 At least two other state jurisdictions have considered, and come to different conclusions about, whether there was a seizure in cases with facts similar to those in the instant case. Compare State v Saia, 302 So 2d 869 (La, 1974) (seizure), with State v Sheffield, 62 NJ 441; 303 A2d 68 (1973) (no seizure).

 Concurring Justices Powell and Blackmun and the Chief Justice did not reach the issue as to whether the initial stop was a seizure.
"For me, the question whether the respondent in this case reasonably could have thought she was free to 'walk away’ when asked by two Government agents for her driver’s license and ticket is extremely close.” Id. at 560.

 See also United States v Barnes, 496 A2d 1040 (DC App, 1985) (no seizure where police officers approached defendant on the street, asked two questions, and requested that defendant remove his hands from his pockets).

 The limited intrusion in this case is especially apparent when considering what is not involved here. The officers did not search the defendant’s home or car, nor did they even conduct a search of the defendant. Nor was there any interrogation.

 Although courts have sometimes been concerned in cases such as this that police may unconstitutionally stop a citizen and then later seek to justify their actions with fabricated or unsubstantiated facts (see Landynski, The Supreme Court’s search for Fourth Amendment standards: The problem of stop and frisk, 45 Conn B J 146 [1971]), in this case it is important to note that there is no indication that the events did not happen exactly as the officer related them. In fact, the trial court specifically found the testimony of Officer Surma to be highly credible.

 A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, United States v Sharpe, 470 US 675; 105 S Ct 1568; 84 L Ed 2d 605 (1985), not only supports the observation by the majority "that flight may be a factor” (ante, p 62) in the determination of reasonable suspicion, but also offers instruction on the proper disposition of the instant case.
In Sharpe, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (dea) noticed a pickup truck with an attached camper traveling on the highway in tandem with another vehicle. After observing that the truck was riding low in the rear, that the camper did not sway or bounce when the truck drove over bumps or around curves, and that quilted material covered the rear and side windows of the camper, the dea agent followed the vehicles for approximately twenty miles as they proceeded into South Carolina. At this time, the agent decided to make an investigative stop and contacted the state police for assistance. After the police officers signaled the lead car to stop, the pickup truck cut between the car and the patrol vehicle and continued down the highway. The state police pursued the truck and finally stopped it about one-half mile down the road. When the dea agent arrived, he investigated further and, finding that the truck did not sink when he stepped on the back and that there was a strange smell emanating from the camper windows, he opened the rear door and found bales of marijuana. The Sharpe Court upheld the detention and search, holding that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The majority concluded that the Court of Appeals assumption that the police had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that defendants were engaged in marijuana trafficking, given the setting and all the circumstances when the police attempted to stop the vehicles, was abundantly supported by the record. The factors were noted as follows: the agents observed the vehicles in an area known to be *76frequented by drug traffickers; the pickup truck was a type used to transport marijuana; the truck appeared to be heavily loaded and its windows were covered with bed sheet material, the vehicles took evasive actions and started speeding when the officer began to follow them in his marked car. The Court noted: "Perhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken together as appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they provided clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited investigation.” Id., p 683.
Justice Marshall’s concurrence and Justice Brennan’s dissent also shed light on the correct resolution of this case. Justice Marshall concurred because "the evasive actions of the defendants here turned what otherwise would have been a permissibly brief Terry stop into the prolonged encounter now at issue.” Id., pp 688-689.
Justice Brennan, dissenting because the Court was making a de facto factual determination of evasiveness, also engaged in discussion instructive for our present purposes:
"I had thought it rather well established that where police officers reasonably suspect that an individual may be engaged in criminal activity, and the individual deliberately takes flight when the officers attempt to stop and question him, the officers generally no longer have mere reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to arrest. See, e.g., Peters v New York, decided together with Sibron v New York, 392 US 40, 66-67, companion case to Terry ('deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an arrest’).”
While this case does not involve a question whether knowledge of the officer was sufficiently specific to constitute probable cause when combined with flight, as the most recent discussion of the Court, Sharpe is notable as suggesting that there is no basis in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court for the decision reached today.