Court Opinion

ID: 9745467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:00:17.144805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:24.674555
License: Public Domain

*453KESSLER, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the holding of section 111(A) of the majority opinion, namely, that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act may not be imported into section 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The statute does not compel such a reading, and all three-judge panels which have addressed the issue have concluded that section 2 requirements are not part of section 5. See Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 94-1529, Slip.Op. at 2, 1995 WL 456838 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 1995); Arizona v. Reno, 887 F.Supp. 318, 321-22 (D.D.C.1995); Georgia v. Reno, 881 F.Supp. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C.1995); New York v. United States, 874 F.Supp. 394, 400 (D.D.C.1994). Sections 2 and 5 are undoubtedly “designed to complement and reinforce each other,” Arizona, 887 F.Supp. at 321, but because they “differ in structure, purpose and application,” Holder v. Hall, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 2587, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.), the inquiries into each section are independent. Our colleagues in Arizona, recently considered the identical issue, and our holding today with respect to sections 2 and 5 is consistent with that opinion: The School Board may receive clearance under section 5 without demonstrating that its redistricting decision complies with section 2, and the Department may not withhold preclearance merely by establishing a section 2 violation. See Arizona, 887 F.Supp. at 323-24.
As to section III(B) of the majority opinion, however, I cannot in good conscience agree with the result reached by my two colleagues. The extensive record demonstrates that the Bossier Parish School Board did not act with “legitimate, nondiscriminatory motives.” New York, 874 F.Supp. at 400. Rather, in light of the impact the School Board’s decision will have on the black community, the long history of discrimination and segregation in the Bossier Parish school system, the perpetuation of the exclusion of blacks from full participation in the electoral process, the significant timing of events that led up to the School Board’s decision, and the noticeable departures from normal procedure, I am convinced that the School Board acted with “the purpose ... [of] abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Accordingly, I. would deny preclearance, and I respectfully dissent.
I.
Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the burden of proving that the adopted plan does not have a discriminatory purpose rests squarely with the Bossier Parish School Board. Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1565 n. 18, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973). As stated succinctly by the majority, if the evidence is equally convincing on either side, the School Board— bearing the risk of nonpersuasion — must lose. Maj. Op. 446; see McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 257, 104 S.Ct. 1037, 1050, 79 L.Ed.2d 271 (1984) (in the preclearance process, “the burden of proof (the risk of non-persuasion) is placed upon the covered jurisdiction”).1 In this case, the evidence is far from being equally convincing on either side. Not only does the evidence fail to prove absence of discriminatory purpose, it shows that racial purpose fueled the School Board’s decision.
II.
The Supreme Court has told us that “[d]etermining whether invidious purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Such evidence, the Court stated, includes the impact the state’s action has on protected mi*454nority groups; the historical background of the challenged decision; the specific sequence of events leading up to that decision; any substantive departure from the normal process; and the legislative or administrative history of the decision. Id. 429 U.S. at 266-268, 97 S.Ct. at 564-565. See also Busbee v. Smith, 549 F.Supp. 494, 516-517 (1982), aff'd 459 U.S. 1166, 103 S.Ct. 809, 74 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1983). Applying this legal standard to the record before us, I find that the evidence demonstrates conclusively that the Bossier School Board acted with discriminatory purpose.2
A.
In Arlington Heights, the Court said that when analyzing the government’s purpose, “an important starting point ... [is the] impact of an official action—whether it ‘bears more heavily on one race than another.’” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 563 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). The Board’s adoption of a redistricting plan with no majority-black districts undoubtedly “bears more heavily” on the black community in Bossier Parish than on the white community, because it effectively prevents black voters from electing candidates of their choice to the School Board.
In Bossier Parish, voting is racially polarized, Stips ¶¶ 181-196. No black person has ever been elected to the Bossier Parish School Board, Stip ¶ 153, despite the fact that 20.1% of the population of Bossier Parish is black, Stip ¶ 5, and almost 30% of its public schools are black. Stips ¶¶ 5, 134. Given this context, black voters may well require a majority-black district in order to have a fair chance of electing candidates of their choice. Further, “[b]ecause it is sensible to expect that at least some blacks would have been elected [to the Board], the fact that none have ever been elected is important evidence of purposeful exclusion.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623-24, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3279, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982). As one federal court of appeals noted, “nothing is as emphatic as zero.” United States v. Hinds County School Board, 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.1969). The fact is, the Board’s plan presents the black minority of Bossier Parish with no realistic opportunity to elect any candidates of its choice to any of the board seats.
Moreover, as Defendanb-Intervenors demonstrated, it was clearly possible to draw a redistrieting plan for the Bossier Parish Schools with one or two majority-black districts, and still respect traditional districting principles.3 The School Board admits that it is “obvious that a reasonably compact black-majority district could be drawn in Bossier City.” Stip ¶ 36. But rather than consider either of the alternative proposals brought before it or direct their own cartographer to draft one, the School Board adopted a plan “which guaranteed that blacks would remain underrepresented on the [School Board] by comparison to their numerical strength in the enlarged community.” City of Port Arthur v. United States, 517 F.Supp. 987, 1022 (D.D.C.1981), aff'd, 459 U.S. 159, 103 S.Ct. 530, 74 L.Ed.2d 334 (1982). This conscious decision to adopt a plan that effectively excludes minority voters from the political process is probative of discriminatory intent.
B.
The Supreme Court has held specifically that “the historical background of the challenged decision” is properly part of the purpose inquiry under the Voting Rights Act. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267, 97 S.Ct. at 564. Here, the history of discrimination and racism in and out of the school system demonstrates that the School Board’s vote was yet another chapter in its long-standing refusal to address the concerns of the black *455community of Bossier Parish. Evidence of historical discrimination “is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases such as this one where the evidence shows that discriminatory practices were commonly utilized ... and that they were replaced by laws and practices which, though neutral on their face, serve to maintain the status quo.” Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625, 102 S.Ct. at 3279.4
It is undisputed that Louisiana and the Bossier school system have a history of segregation and racial discrimination predating the Civil War. Following the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Louisiana began what the Supreme Court has called “unremitting and ingenious” defiance of the Constitution, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), by passing laws designed to disenfranchise black voters. Stip ¶ 216. One law prohibited elected officials from helping illiterates. Another statute required all voters to use complex application forms, prohibited explanation of application questions, and facilitated wholesale purges by party officials of voters who managed to register successfully. Id. The new laws reduced black registration by 90 percent in the state, leaving only 10 percent of adult black males eligible to vote. Stip ¶216. Two years later, in 1889, Louisiana’s Constitutional Convention imposed a “grandfather” clause and educational and property qualifications for voter registration. Both provisions were designed to limit black political participation, Stip ¶ 217, and both succeeded: black males constituted just 4 percent of the state’s population. See United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F.Supp. 353, 373 (E.D.La.1963).
In 1921, pursuant to state law, the state Democratic party established an all-white primary. Stip ¶¶ 220, 222. That same year, the Legislature replaced the grandfather clause with a requirement that an applicant “give a reasonable interpretation” of any section of the federal or state constitution in order to vote. Stip ¶221. After the all-white primary was struck down by a federal court, the Democratic party adopted an anti-single-shot law, and a majority vote requirement for party officers. Major v. Treen, 574 F.Supp. 325, 341 (E.D.La.1983). The “reasonable interpretation” requirement was finally held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 1965. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 85 S.Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965).
In the Bossier school system it was much of the same. Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), de jure segregation was the rule in Louisiana public schools, and federal courts were forced to order school districts to comply with federal law. Stip ¶ 235. Since 1965, the Bossier Parish School Board has been the defendant in Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, Civ.Act. No. 10,687 (W.D.La., filed Dec. 2, 1964) in which it was found liable for intentionally segregating the public schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.Supp. 709 (W.D.La.1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied 388 U.S. 911, 87 S.Ct. 2116, 18 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1967).
Throughout the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the school board sought to limit or evade its desegregation obligations. At one *456point, the School Board sought to assign black children of Barksdale Air Force Base personnel to black schools without a right to transfer to white schools, claiming that they were “federal children” and not within the “jurisdiction” of the school district. Stip ¶ 237. Circuit Judge Wisdom rejected the School Board’s “new and bizarre excuse” for rationalizing its denial of the constitutional right of black school children to equal educational opportunities. Bossier Parish School Board, v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 849 (5th Cir.1967).
In 1969, the Fifth Circuit rejected the school board’s “freedom of choice” plan in Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.1969), and in 1970, after “protracted litigation,” rejected another inadequate remedial plan proposed by the district in Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.1969).
In 1971, the court held unconstitutional the School Board’s plan to assign students to.one of two schools in Plain Dealing based on their test scores. Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.1971). In 1979, the School Board filed a motion seeking a declaration of unitary status and a release from further court supervision. The motion was denied, and the school district has yet to be declared a unitary system. Stip ¶239. Since 1980, despite the School Board’s continuing duty to desegregate, the number of elementary schools with predominately black enrollments has increased from one to four. To this day, the School Board remains under direct federal court order to remedy any remaining vestiges of segregation in its schools.
The Board has also failed to honor the Lemon court’s order to maintain a Biraeial Committee to “recommend to the School Board ways to attain and maintain a unitary system and to improve education in the parish.” Stip ¶ 111. The committee met only 2 or 3 times, and only the black members attended. For decades following the court’s order, the Board ignored this requirement altogether. Stip ¶ 112. In 1993, the Board finally established a similar committee, but disbanded it after three months because, according to School Board Member Barry Mus-grove, “the tone of the committee made up of the minority members of the committee quickly turned toward becoming involved in policy.” Stip ¶ 116. What exactly the Committee was supposed to become involved in, if not policy, is unclear. What is clear is that the Board’s unilateral dismantling of the Committee was in direct violation of a federal court order to address the concerns of the black community.
The School Board’s adoption of the Police Jury plan must be evaluated in the framework of this long history of official discrimination. It may seem unduly harsh to consider racism and discrimination dating back to the Civil War, but this history reveals an insidious pattern which cannot be ignored, and must inform our decision today. Like the school boards and legislatures before it, the Bossier Parish School Board’s actions effectively eliminate the black community from the political process. So long as black voters have no electoral power, they have no voice, and the School Board can safely ignore their concerns.
C.
The Supreme Court has told us that “the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purpose.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267, 97 S.Ct. at 564. Here, the sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the Police Jury plan supplies further proof of discriminatory purpose.
The redistricting process began in May, 1991, when the Board decided to develop its own plan rather than adopt the one accepted by the Police Jury. Given the fact that the next School Board election was not scheduled until October, 1994, there was no need for hasty Board action. The Board hired Gary Joiner, a cartographer, who had drawn the Police Jury plan. He was hired to perform 200-250 hours of work, far more time than would be needed simply to recreate the Police Jury plan. Stip ¶ 86. On July 29, 1991, the Police Jury plan was precleared by the Justice Department. On September 5, 1991, however, the School Board decided not to adopt the Police Jury plan, largely because it would pit incumbents against each other. Over the course of the next year, School *457Board members considered a number of redistricting options. Mr. Joiner met privately with School Board members and demonstrated different possibilities to them on his computer. Stip ¶ 96. These meetings were not open to the public nor were there any recorded minutes or published notice of the meetings.
While the School Board was meeting and planning in private, the black community was trying, unsuccessfully, to participate in public. In March of 1992, George Price, on behalf of a coalition of black community groups, wrote the School Board asking to participate in its redistrieting process. Stip ¶ 93. Neither the Board nor the Superintendent responded to this request. Id. In August of 1992, Mr. Price sent another letter asking specifically to be involved in every aspect of the redistrieting process. Again, no response. Stip ¶ 94.
Frustrated by the School Board’s unresponsiveness, Price contacted the NAACP Redistrieting Project in Baltimore. The Project developed a partial plan for Price to present to the School Board that consisted of two majority-black districts. Stip ¶ 98. The plan did not show the other ten districts that made up the Parish. When Price showed this plan to a school district official, he was told that the plan was unacceptable because it only showed two districts. Price went back to the NAACP and a new plan was drawn up.
Then, on September 3, 1992, when Price appeared on behalf of the black community at a public hearing and presented a new plan showing all twelve districts, including two majority-black districts, the Board dismissed it summarily, claiming — incorrectly—that they could not consider any plan that split precinct lines.5 Stip ¶ 102.
At its next meeting, on September 17, 1992, without any further consultation with its cartographer or attempt to address the concerns of the black community, the School Board passed a motion of intent to adopt the Police Jury plan, which had no majority-black districts. At that meeting, Mr. Price again presented the NAACP proposal. Stip ¶ 106. Instead of discussing the plan with Mr. Joiner, or asking him to further analyze the possibility of drawing black-majority districts without splitting precincts (the School Board’s purported reason for rejecting the plan), the Board simply passed the motion of intent to adopt the Policy Jury plan at the next School Board meeting. Id.
One week later, on September 24, 1992, an overflow crowd attended a public hearing on the redistrieting plan. Fifteen people spoke against the School Board’s proposed plan, most of whom objected because it would dilute minority voting strength. Not a single person spoke in favor of the plan. Stip ¶ 108. At this hearing, Mr. Price presented the Board with a petition signed by more than 500 Bossier Parish citizens, asking the Board to consider an alternative redistrieting plan. Id.
Despite the one-sided input from Bossier citizens, and despite the fact that the Board was under no time pressure to decide the issue, the Board voted one week later to adopt the Police Jury plan. As with the meetings of September 3 and September 17, the Board’s minutes of the October 1, 1995 meeting reflect little substantive consideration of the Police Jury plan, other than to approve the Police Jury plan as quickly as possible.6 Board Member Myrick testified that the Board adopted the plan that evening because it was “expedient.”
The Police Jury plan only became “expedient” when the School Board was publicly confronted with alternative plans demonstrating that majority-black districts could be drawn, and demonstrating that political pressure from the black community was mounting to achieve such a result. The commonsense understanding of these events leads to one conclusion: The Board adopted the Police Jury plan — two years before the next election — in direct response to the presentation of a plan that created majority-black districts. Faced with growing frustration of the black community at being excluded from *458the electoral process, the only way for the School Board to ensure that no majority-black districts would be created was to quickly adopt the Police Jury plan and put the issue to rest. This sequence of events of “public silence and private decisions,”7 culminating in the Board’s hasty decision, is evidence of the Board’s discriminatory purpose.
D.
The fact that the Board adopted a plan which departs substantively from its earlier districting plans and which ignores factors it has usually considered of paramount concern, is probative of discriminatory purpose, “particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decision-maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267, 97 S.Ct. at 564. The most glaring example is that the adopted plan forced incumbents to run against each other. Incumbency protection has always, understandably, been a high priority for both the Police Jury and School Board. That was the reason there were different redistricting plans in effect for each entity during the 1980s. That was also the reason the Police Jury refused to conduct a joint redistricting effort with the school board after 1990.
Moreover, the plan adopted by the Board contravenes other traditional districting principles. For example, it creates one district containing almost half of the geographic area in the Parish. Stip ¶ 140. Several of its districts are not compact, according to the Board’s own consultant. Stip ¶ 189. In addition, the plan creates election districts without any schools in them and ignores school attendance boundaries. Stip ¶ 141. Finally, the plan does not respect communities of interest in Bossier Parish. Stip ¶¶ 135-137.
Perhaps if the Board had ignored one or two of these standard redistricting criteria, it would not be noteworthy, but when the Board’s plan plainly violates a whole number of redistricting principles, we have further evidence from which to infer that the Board’s decision was fueled by discriminatory purpose.
E.
In setting forth the evidentiary categories to be evaluated in determining whether invidious purpose was a motivating factor, the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights noted that its listing of such categories was not exhaustive. 429 U.S. at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 565. Thereafter, in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982), the Court considered additional political and sociological factors that underscored the state’s discriminatory purpose. In Rogers, the Court struck down Burke County, Georgia’s at-large election system, holding that it violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the state had acted with discriminatory purpose. The Court considered important the fact that “lingering effects of past discrimination,” caused socioeconomic disparity between whites and blacks. Id. 458 U.S. at 626, 102 S.Ct. at 3280 (citations omitted). The Court also said that it was important to consider the educational disparity between whites and blacks. Id. 458 U.S. at 624, 102 S.Ct. at 3279. Here, it is undisputed that black citizens in Bossier Parish suffer a markedly lower socioeconomic status than their white counterparts, and that the difference is traceable to the legacy of racial discrimination in the Parish. Stip ¶ 200.
According to the 1990 Census8, the poverty rate for blacks (44.7%) is nearly five times the rate for whites (9.1%). The per capita income of blacks ($5,260) is only 40% of that enjoyed by whites ($12,966). The unemployment rate for blacks age 16 and over (22.4%) is nearly four times that for whites. The percentage of blacks over 25 without a high school degree (40.6%) is over twice the rate of whites (16.7%). Only 4.8% of whites age 25 and older have less than a ninth grade education, while 22.8% of blacks in the same age category have less than a ninth grade education. Almost 84% of whites 25 years or older were at least high school graduates, compared to only 58.7% of blacks. Also, 17% *459of whites 25 years or older had at least four years of college, compared to only 8.1% of blacks. In 1990, only 2.9% of the white labor force were unemployed, while 9.1% of the black labor force was unemployed. Finally, whites are five times as likely to own a car as blacks, a significant fact in a rural parish where voting places may be distant from people’s homes.
It is also undisputed that the depressed socioeconomic and educational levels of blacks within Bossier Parish make it hard for them to obtain necessary electoral information, organize, raise funds, campaign, register, and turn out to vote, and this in turn causes a depressed level of political participation for blacks within Bossier Parish. Stip. ¶ 213. Like the state representative in Burke County in Rogers, the School Board members in Bossier Parish “have retained a system which has minimized the ability of [Bossier Parish] Blacks to participate in the political system.” 458 U.S. at 626, 102 S.Ct. at 3280 (citations omitted).
Thus, the additional factors identified by the Supreme Court in Rogers, are met foursquare in this case. As the Court explained in Rogers, “[n]ecessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” 458 U.S. at 618, 102 S.Ct. at 3276 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2049).
F.
We also have before us statements made by three School Board members about minority representation on the Board. School Board member Henry Burns said that while he “personally favors having black representation on the board, other school board members oppose the idea.” U.S.Exh. 106 ¶ 17. School Board member Barry Musgrove said that “while he sympathized with the concerns of the black community, there was nothing more he could do ... on this issue because the Board was ‘hostile’ toward the idea of a black majority district.” Id. And School Board member Thomas Myriek told George Price of the NAACP that “he had worked too hard to get [his] seat and that he would not stand by and ‘let us take his seat away from him.’ ” U.S.Exh. 106 ¶ 29, D-I Exh. E ¶ 19.
These statements standing alone would certainly be insufficient to show discriminatory purpose. However, considered in the context of the School Board’s discriminatory past, the efforts to preserve segregation and exclude black representation from the Board, the sequence of events leading up to the Board’s decision, and the anomalous nature of the plan itself, the statements add further proof of improper motive. While the majority is correct that the statements are subject to different interpretations, Maj. Op. at 447-448, given all the evidence previously set forth showing discriminatory purpose, and the efforts of the past fifty years to desegregate the schools, it seems fair to conclude that at least some School Board Members were openly “hostile” to black representation on the school board.9
For all the foregoing reasons, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that the Bossier School Board acted *460with discriminatory purpose. The adopted plan has a substantial negative impact on the black citizens of Bossier Parish. The sequence of events leading up to the decision show conclusively how the School Board excluded the black community from the redistricting process and rushed to adopt the Police Jury plan only when faced with an alternative plan that provided for black representation. The plan itself ignores and overrides a number of the School Board’s normally paramount interests. And the statements of some School Board members certainly lend strength to the other evidence. “Justice is blind; but courts nevertheless do see what there is clearly to be seen.”10 We cannot blind ourselves to the reality of the situation and the record before us. The Bossier School Board acted with discriminatory purpose in adopting the Police Jury Plan.11
III.
In the face of this considerable evidence, the School Board has offered several reasons for its adoption of the Police Jury plan. Even the majority admits that a number of these reasons “clearly were not the real reasons,” Maj.Op. at 446 n. 14, i.e., the School Board lied.
For example, at one point, the School Board argued that it adopted the Police Jury plan (on October 1, 1992) to comply with Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (decided June 28, 1993), which was decided nine months after the Board adopted its plan. Although the Board does not lie as fragrantly in its remaining rationales, they are equally unconvincing.
The School Board claims that it could not adopt any p .an with majority-black districts because such a plan would require precinct-splitting, which violates state law and would be prohibitively expensive. The evidence shows conclusively, however, that throughout the redistrieting process, the School Board was willing to split precincts to do just that, i.e., to split precincts so long as it was for the protection of incumbents. It was only after the black community presented its alternative plan that the School Board proffered the “no precinct-splitting” rationale.
The majority agrees that when “the School Board began the redistrieting process, it likely anticipated the necessity of splitting some precincts.” Maj.Op. at 447. The School Board hired Mr. Joiner at the beginning of the process to develop the plan, fully intending that he would split precincts (that is why he needed between 200-250 hours to complete the job). At the September 5, 1991 School Board meeting, the first School Board meeting after the Police Jury plan had been precleared by the Department, Mr. Joiner presented proposed maps that showed split precincts. Further, it is now undisputed by the School Board that splitting precincts does not violate state law. While the School Board itself may not split precincts, police juries have the authority to establish and modify precinct lines, Stip ¶¶ 13-23, and many do so when requested by a school board. The Bossier Parish Police Jury itself created 13 new precincts in 1991, Stip ¶ 60, and the School Board has stipulated that the Police Jury was currently considering consolidating some of its precincts for other reasons. Stip ¶ 61.
Once again, it was only after being presented with the black community’s plan, and the possibility of a majority-black district in the ensuing election, that the Board totally reversed itself and “arrived quickly,” Maj.Op. at 447, at the conclusion that it was against splitting districts. Nor did the School Board voice its concern about too many precinct splits causing higher election costs in its initial submission to the Department. *461U.S.Exh. 102 at 9 (testimony of Blunt). Moreover, the Board never estimated the cost of splitting precincts before it voted to adopt the Police Jury plan. Id. Obviously, “cost” did not actually motivate the School Board’s decision at the time it was made. The focus of our inquiry is what motivated the Board at the time of its decision, not whether post-decision rationales would have been legitimate reasons. The Board’s excuses on the significant subject of precinct-splitting are clearly not justified.
The final reason offered by the School Board is that the Police Jury plan guaranteed preclearance, that is, the Department would approve the School Board’s plan because it was identical to the Police Jury plan which was precleared on July 29, 1991. It is clear, however, that “guaranteed preclearance” was not the School Board’s motive as it began the redistrieting process, because if so, it would not have waited until October 1, 1992 — almost 14 months later — to adopt the Police Jury plan. If guaranteed preclearance was what the Board wanted, it would have acted soon after the Police Jury plan was precleared by the Justice Department on July 29, 1991. As with the precinct-splitting issue, this rationale also surfaced only after the School Board was faced with alternative plans that could conceivably lead to majority-black districts and an elected black member.12 The evidence shows that School Board members adopted the Police Jury plan not because it “guaranteed preclearanee,” but because given growing dissatisfaction in the black community, it was the only way to ensure that there would be no black majority districts.
The Board’s rationales simply do not withstand a common-sense reading of the record. Some of the rationales are untrue on their face, and others do not bear even minimum scrutiny. Most of the alleged justifications are absent from the public record, so the School Board asks us to accept their post-hoc rationalizations rather than focus on their motive at the time of the decision. “[Ijnvidious purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048.
The evidence is clear that racial purpose was “a motivating factor in the [Board’s] decision” to adopt the Police Jury plan. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-266, 97 S.Ct. at 563 (emphasis added). The burden of proof is on the School Board to show absence of discriminatory purpose, Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 188 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1565 n. 18, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980), and it has woefully failed to satisfy that burden. Its rationales are so flagrantly pre-textual as to further corroborate the conclusion that the School Board acted with discriminatory purpose.
IV.
The School Board claims that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller v. Johnson, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995), precludes it from adopting any majority-black districts because such districts would constitute “racial gerrymandering” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The School Board’s reading of Miller is erroneous for a number of reasons.
First, this is simply not a Miller case. We do not have any plan with majority-black districts to evaluate, no less a plan where, as in Miller, “race was the overriding and predominant force in the districting determination.” Id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2485. Since the School Board chose to adopt the Police Jury plan, it would be sheer speculation on the basis of this record to determine whether “race was the predominant factor motivating,” id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2485, some other hypothetical redistricting plan. Defendant and D efendant-Intervenors are not even arguing that any particular plan *462should have been adopted by the School Board. How, in the absence of any concrete plan, can a court decide whether a plaintiff has proven that the government “subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, [and] respect for political subdivisions or communities”? Id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2488. The court would be speculating, and the prohibition against advisory opinions prohibits us from answering such hypothetical legal questions. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1950-51, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968) (such suits lack the “clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests”)
The Court was extraordinarily sensitive in Miller “to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s redistrieting calculus.” Miller, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2488. It recognized that legislatures engaged in this difficult process “will, for example, almost always be aware of racial demo-graphies; but it does not follow that race predominates in the redistrieting process.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court also understood the delicate line-drawing that fact-finders would have to engage in:
“The distinction between being aware of racial considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to make. This evidentiary difficulty, together with the sensitive nature of redistrieting and the presumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative enactments, requires courts to exercise extraordinary caution in adjudicating claims that a state has drawn district lines on the basis of race. The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision ...”

Id.

It would be impossible, without an actual plan, without “circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics,” without a showing that “the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations,” for a court to make the informed and sophisticated judgment called for by the Supreme Court in Miller. If and when the School Board does adopt a plan with one or more majority-black districts, the court may then determine whether that plan violates Miller.
Second, the Court made clear in Miller by its repeated citations to and discussion of Arlington Heights, that it was not altering the legal standard by which we assess violations of Section 5. See, e.g., Miller, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2487 (quoting Arlington Heights for proposition that in purpose inquiry, courts must look at impact and “other .evidence of race-based decisionmaking”). See also id. — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2483. Plaintiffs must still prove the absence of discriminatory purpose, applying the standards set forth in Arlington Heights and related cases in the voting rights area, such as Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 102 S.Ct. 3272. As the evidence shows, the School Board has made no such showing. The School Board would, through its reading of Miller, essentially undercut the vitality of Arlington Heights in a Section 5 case. That was not the intent of the Supreme Court.
Third, assuming arguendo, the existence of some hypothetical plan which contains one or more majority-black districts (we do not know which since we do not have a plan before us), the record makes clear that it is possible to draw at least one such district in Bossier Parish, consistent with Miller and Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). By affirming the race-conscious California redistrieting plan in DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.Supp. 1409 (E.D.Cal.1994) (decided the same day as Miller), aff'd — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2637, 132 L.Ed.2d 876 (1995), the Supreme Court made clear that considering race in redistrieting, by itself, does not automatically trigger strict scrutiny. In DeWitt, the district court found that the California plan “evidences a judicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistrieting, one of which was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights Act’s objective of assuring *463that minority voters are not denied the chance to effectively influence the political process.” 856 F.Supp. at 1413-14.
As noted earlier, Miller recognizes that “traditional race-neutral districting principles [such as] compactness, contiguity, and ‘respect for political subdivisions’ ... can defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.” Miller, — U.S. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 2488 (citations omitted). As discussed in detail above, see Section 11(D), supra, the alternative plans presented to the School Board and this court do rely upon “traditional districting principles.” The districts in the illustrative plans are contiguous, reasonably compact, and respect communities with actual shared interests. See Testimony of Price; Testimony of Hawkins; Stip ¶¶ 181-95. Moreover, at least one of the alternative plans would unite a predominantly black residential area, which is split under the Board’s plan. “[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes.” Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2826 (1993). Thus, assuming these districts existed — and they do not — the School Board could not meet its burden under Miller to show that race rather than traditional districting principles was the predominant force.
For all of these reasons, the School Board’s reliance on Miller v. Johnson is unpersuasive.
y.
The evidence in this case demonstrates overwhelmingly that the School Board’s decision to adopt the Police Jury redistricting plan was motivated by discriminatory purpose. The adoption of the Police Jury plan bears heavily on the black community because it denies its members a reasonable opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice. The history of discrimination by the Bossier School System and the Parish itself demonstrates the Board’s continued refusal to address the concerns of the black community in Bossier Parish. The sequence of events leading up to the adoption of the plan illustrate the Board’s discriminatory purpose. The School Board’s substantive departures from traditional districting principles is similarly probative of discriminatory motive. Three School Board members have acknowledged that the Board is hostile to black representation. Moreover, some of the purported rationales for the School Board’s decision are flat-out untrue, and others are so glaringly inconsistent with the facts of the case that they are obviously pretexts.
Sometimes we need to step back and look at first principles. Congress passed the Voting Rights Act to combat the “unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution” by several states, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, Louisiana among them. The Bossier School Board continues to resist the Constitution, through its ingenious, if subtle, discrimination against the black citizens of Bossier parish. We are long past the point where discrimination can be easily proven by use of racial epithets, racial categories or openly exclusionary voting requirements. “The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.” Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565, 89 S.Ct. 817, 831, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968). In this case, the School Board’s decision to adopt the Police Jury plan was a thinly-veiled effort to deny black voters a meaningful opportunity for representation on the School Board.
The burden is on the School Board to show lack of discriminatory purpose. Because the School Board’s proffered reasons are pretex-tual, it has not met its burden under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, and its request for pre-clearance must be denied.
Nov. 2, 1995
Date

. While it may be true that this burden-shifting scheme is “anomalous under our law,” Maj.Op. at 445-446, that should have no influence on our decision. Congress decides how to write the country's statutes, and Congress clearly believed that the states’ open defiance of the Equal Protection Clause — what the Supreme Court called an "insidious and pervasive evil,”—South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), was serious enough to warrant the “federalism costs,” Maj. Op. at 444 n. 9, of the Voting Rights Act.

. It is telling that the majority never once refers to Arlington Heights when they evaluate the evidence submitted by the Department and Interve-nors. See Maj.Op. at 447-449. Indeed, the majority articulates no standard by which it decides whether "the School Board's evidence is more persuasive than the evidence proffered against it.” Maj.Op. at 446.

. In addition to the plan presented to the School Board on September 3, 1992, Defendant-Interve-nors have presented two other plans that show it is possible to draw majority-black districts in Bossier Parish which are fully consistent with traditional districting principles.

. The majority excludes evidence of historical discrimination in the Bossier Public Schools and Bossier Parish because it believes that such “evidence [is] relevant only to the section 2 inquiry.” Maj.Op. at 440, n. 5. In my view, the majority wrongly believes that once we decide that sections 2 and 5 are analytically distinct, we may not use evidence of historical discrimination (which is central to a section 2 inquiry) to decide the "purpose" prong of section 5. But as the panel recently explained in Arizona v. Reno, 887 F.Supp. at 323, nothing in the statute or case law leads to that conclusion. "Although the inquiry required under the purpose prong of section 5 extends into areas that would also be relevant in a section 2 proceeding,” that does not mean that 'considering evidence of historical discrimination is "tantamount to launching a section 2 proceeding ... under the guise of section 5.” Id. at 323.
More importantly, excluding evidence of historical discrimination contravenes the Supreme Court's explicit direction in Arlington Heights, where the Court stated that among the factors to consider in the "purpose” inquiry is the "historical background of the decision ... particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” 429 U.S. at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 564. In short, the majority ignores the standard the Supreme Court established to govern precisely the type of inquiry we must make in this case.

. See discussion at pages 443-444, infra.

. For example, the Board seems to have abandoned its concerns about the Police Jury plan pitting incumbents against each other.

. Def.-Int. Bf. at 20.

. Stip ¶¶ 204, 208, 211.

. The majority argues that the appointment of Jerome Blunt to fill a vacant seat on the Board "proved [the Members'] lack of hostility to this sort of black- representation.” Maj.Op. at 447. However, Mr. Blunt was appointed to represent a district that was only 11 % black, and his short tenure on the job was a stark reminder of the highly polarized voting in Bossier Parish, see section 11(A), supra. Mr. Blunt's chances of reelection were slight, and his short-lived appointment was a far-cry from the full tenure of an elected black school committee member.
The majority notes, however, that the “timing and context” of Blunt's appointment indicate that the Board acted for legitimate reasons. Maj. Op. at 447-, The facts suggest the opposite. Blunt was appointed on September 17, 1992— squarely in the middle of the controversy surrounding the redistricting plan — at the very meeting where the Board adopted a motion of intent to adopt the Police Jury plan and after George Price had made his demands for a majority-black district. Certainly, Board members knew that adopting the Police Jury plan would ignite controversy in the black community. And on the very night of that decision, the School Board appointed a black to fill a seat that they knew he would be unable to hold, hoping to quell the political furor over adoption of the Police Jury plan.

. Laker Airways Limited v. Pan American World Airways, 568 F.Supp. 811, 816 (D.D.C.1983). While Judge Harold Greene made this observation in a very different context (an anti-trust case), its pithiness and wisdom apply beyond that context.

. Because of the paucity of public discussion about the Board’s decision (except for those who opposed it), and because the Board left virtually no legislative history, we cannot assess the "minutes of its meetings, or reports.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 565. Given the considerable evidence showing discriminatory purpose, however, the Board’s failure to document its decisionmaking process is certainly suspect.

. It is hard to accept the majority's unduly charitable characterization of this decision as nothing more than “an understandable, if not necessarily laudable, retreat from a highly charged public debate,” Maj. Op. at 449, when the evidence shows overwhelmingly that the black community was excluded from that public debate. School Board members did more than simply retreat from a political debate; in the guise of "expediency,” Dep. of Myrick, they excluded black citizens from the only process that would allow that community to elect a candidate of its choice.