Court Opinion

ID: 9873005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 21:19:43.503932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:31.739858
License: Public Domain

LaSalle, J.,
concurs in part and dissents in part, and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt of the charges of manslaughter in the first degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. I also agree with my colleagues in the majority that the County Court properly denied the defendant’s request to charge manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree. However, I respectfully dissent, and vote to affirm the judgment, because I conclude that the court properly denied the defendant’s request for a justification charge. In my opinion, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no reasonable view of the evidence which would have permitted the jury to find that the defendant’s conduct was justified. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the judgment of conviction.
I. The People’s Case
In the evening of June 15, 2013, the defendant and four of his friends went to El Molino, a restaurant and bar in Poughkeepsie. The four friends were the codefendant Armando Martinez-Mendoza, Jonathon Ramirez, Milagros Huerta, and Tania Raya. Raya drove all of them in her car, and the men brought two backpacks with them.
While the defendant and his friends were in the bar, Jermaine Knox, who was working security, went into the bathroom and saw the defendant in an altercation with an individual called Casper. Upon exiting the bathroom, the defendant, who appeared to be upset and in pain, spoke to Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez, both of whom appeared angry.
*839When the defendant and his friends were leaving El Molino, another bouncer heard Martinez-Mendoza say “Fuck El Molino” and “we’re going to get you all.” Raya heard the defendant say to either Martinez-Mendoza or Ramirez, “I’ll show you who it is.” The defendant told Raya to go open the car, and Huerta went with her. Raya, Huerta, the bouncer, and Roman Berra, the owner of El Molino, all testified that while the defendant and his friends were exiting the bar, no one was threatening them.
While outside El Molino, Ramirez was observed waving a beer bottle at individuals. Meanwhile, Raya, Huerta, and the defendant arrived at the car. The defendant opened the back door, reached into the back seat for something, and then returned to the front of El Molino where Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez had remained. There were approximately five or six other individuals outside. Huerta overheard Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez ask the defendant “who did it.” The defendant then whispered something in Martinez-Mendoza’s ear and handed him a gun. Martinez-Mendoza began to fire the gun in the direction of the people who had gathered outside, and struck an individual who then ran inside the bar. Martinez-Mendoza then went inside the bar and continued firing the gun, striking two more individuals.
Raya drove her vehicle to the front of El Molino, and the defendant, Martinez-Mendoza, and Ramirez got inside. She testified that she did not hear anyone making threats while she was driving to the front of El Molino. Shortly after leaving El Molino, Raya’s vehicle was pulled over by a police officer. The police officer observed a silver-colored handgun between the center console and the front passenger seat, and also observed one of the backpacks, which contained a kitchen knife.
Martinez-Mendoza, who signed an agreement requiring him to testify truthfully at the defendant’s trial, was called as a People’s witness. He testified that while at the bar, he went into the bathroom to find the defendant getting up from the floor with a swollen face. Martinez-Mendoza later learned that the defendant had been in a dispute with someone over the price of drugs. Martinez-Mendoza was angry and asked the defendant who had hit him. As they returned to the bar, the defendant told Martinez-Mendoza that he would show him who had attacked him. The two of them, together with Ramirez, Raya, and Huerta, then proceeded to leave, and as they were leaving, Ramirez told the defendant to go get the gun. The defendant had previously bought the gun, but Martinez-Mendoza denied that the defendant ever gave it to him before the shoot*840ing. No one was yelling at or threatening them, throwing things at them, or rushing toward them as they were leaving.
Martinez-Mendoza testified that he started yelling and screaming to get people to come outside. When four or five people came outside, he asked them who hit the defendant, because he wanted to “go after the guy.” At the time, Ramirez was waving a broken beer bottle. The defendant came and stood behind him, handed him a gun, and then pointed to a man and said “that’s him.” Martinez-Mendoza testified that before the defendant handed him the gun, no one was threatening them or trying to come after them. Martinez-Mendoza fired in the direction the defendant had indicated, and hit a man who was not armed and was standing approximately four or five feet away from him. He then walked toward the bar and continued shooting, hitting two other people. Martinez-Mendoza testified that he fired the gun because he was drunk and angry that the defendant had been assaulted. When they got in the car, he gave the gun to the defendant. Shortly after that, the police pulled them over. Martinez-Mendoza admitted that he initially lied to police when he said that he shot the victims because he felt threatened and afraid.
II. The Defendant’s Case
The defendant testified that on March 31, 2013, less than three months prior to the incident that occurred at El Molino, he was the victim of a stabbing that occurred outside a club in Newburgh. As a result of that stabbing, the defendant purchased a gun from a man in Newburgh. Although the defendant later gave the gun to Martinez-Mendoza, the gun was kept in the defendant’s house because Martinez-Mendoza did not want his parents to find it.
On June 15, 2013, when the defendant and his friends were going to El Molino, Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez both brought backpacks, but he did not know which backpack the gun was in. While at the bar, the defendant went into the bathroom and saw Casper snorting cocaine. Casper asked the defendant if he wanted to buy drugs, and the defendant declined. Casper then punched him in the face, and other individuals began kicking him.
After the defendant was assaulted, he spoke to Ramirez and Martinez-Mendoza, who was drunk. The defendant was in pain and wanted to leave the bar to get medical attention. The defendant asked Raya to go open the car because he wanted to leave quickly. While they were leaving the bar, Martinez-Mendoza asked the defendant who had attacked him, and the defendant pointed to Casper. The defendant testified that he *841and his friends just wanted to leave, and they left on their own.
As they were leaving, approximately 15 people followed and threatened them. They told the defendant and his friends not to come back, and threatened to kill Ramirez and Martinez-Mendoza. Martinez-Mendoza told the defendant to get the gun from Ramirez’s backpack. The defendant saw Ramirez break a beer bottle in what he believed was an attempt to keep people away. The defendant testified that he, Huerta, and Raya walked toward the car, and Ramirez and Martinez-Mendoza stayed behind, trying to keep the people outside the bar, who were continuing to make threats, away from them. The defendant testified that he walked quickly to the car and retrieved the gun. He believed that his life and his friends’ lives were in danger. Although there was also a knife in the backpack, the defendant did not take it, because he believed it would not be sufficient to keep the people away. The defendant testified that he did not know whether the gun was loaded, and he did not believe that Martinez-Mendoza would shoot anyone; rather, he thought that he would only use the gun to scare people away.
The defendant testified that the people outside El Molino had lots of bottles and probably had knives. He further testified that he saw a “shiny thing,” but was unsure whether it was a knife. He also testified that he saw a man reach for something at his waist, although he admitted that he never told anyone that before the trial. The defendant testified that he believed that if he had not retrieved the gun, he and his friends would have been shot and killed.
When the defendant returned to his friends with the gun, Martinez-Mendoza began shooting in Casper’s direction, but struck another individual. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and Martinez-Mendoza ran to the car, but then Martinez-Mendoza went back and continued shooting.
III. Cross-Examination of the Defendant
On cross-examination, the defendant conceded various points. The defendant admitted that while he was in the bar, he pointed out to Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez the individual who had assaulted him, and that he did not call the police after he was assaulted. He also admitted that when he and his friends were leaving El Molino, no one prevented them from leaving.
He conceded, upon being shown a videotape recording of the parking area outside El Molino, that when he went to the car to get the gun, and after he retrieved it, he was not running. Rather, the defendant described it as “speed walking.” He also *842admitted that there were no individuals blocking the way to the vehicle. Notwithstanding this, he never told Martinez-Mendoza or Ramirez to get in the car so they could leave. While at the car, he didn’t call the police from his cell phone. He also did not tell the girls to call the police. He admitted that at this point he was safe and he could have left in the car.
The defendant reiterated during cross-examination that even though there was also a knife in the car, he took the gun because he did not believe the knife would be as effective at scaring the people away. However, he admitted that once he retrieved the gun, he never held the gun up or displayed it in any way, and he never yelled at the crowd to back off. Rather, he gave the gun to Martinez-Mendoza even though he knew he was drunk and angry; he also claimed, inconsistently, that Martinez-Mendoza grabbed the gun from him. He admitted that the gun would have been safer in his hands. He admitted that, even though there were other individuals standing outside threatening them, Martinez-Mendoza fired the gun in Casper’s direction, and hit another individual who was standing in front of Casper. The defendant also admitted that he did not tell the police, when they pulled over Raya’s car, that there was a gun in the car or that he saw an individual reach into his waistband while outside the bar.
IV. Justification
At trial, the defendant requested a justification charge. The County Court denied the defendant’s request, finding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence that supported a justification defense. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in denying his request for a justification charge. I disagree with my colleagues in the majority, and would hold that there was no reasonable view of the evidence which would have permitted the jury to find that the defendant’s conduct was justified.
Penal Law § 35.15 provides, in pertinent part: “A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person . . . unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating” (Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]). A person is justified in using deadly physical force against another if he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force by such other *843person (see People v Heron, 130 AD3d 754, 755 [2015]; People v Ojar, 38 AD3d 684 [2007]).
“[J]ustification is comprised of both subjective and objective elements. The subjective element is concerned with whether the defendant believed that the use of deadly force was necessary; while under the objective prong, the jury must consider whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have believed that deadly force was required” (People v Umali, 10 NY3d 417, 425 [2008]). When a defense of justification is raised, “the People must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not believe deadly force was necessary or that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have perceived that deadly force was necessary” (id. at 425).
A charge on the defense of justification is required when requested if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view of the evidence permitting the jury to find that the defendant’s conduct was justified (see People v Irving, 130 AD3d 844 [2015]; People v Heron, 130 AD3d at 755; People v Nunez, 120 AD3d 714 [2014]; People v Ramirez, 118 AD3d 1108, 1112 [2014]; People v Zayas, 88 AD3d 918, 920 [2011]; People v Fermin, 36 AD3d 934, 935 [2007]). To be entitled to a justification charge relating to the use of deadly physical force, the record must include evidence that the defendant reasonably believed the victim was using or was about to use deadly physical force and that he or she could not safely retreat (see People v Ramirez, 118 AD3d at 1112; People v Fermin, 36 AD3d at 935).
The NY Criminal Jury Instructions provide that the determination of whether a person reasonably believes deadly physical force to be necessary to defend himself/herself or someone else from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force by another individual, requires the application of a two-part test (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 35.15 [2]). “First, the defendant must have actually believed that [the individual] was using or was about to use deadly physical force against him/her [or someone else], and that the defendant’s own use of deadly physical force was necessary to defend himself/herself [or someone else] from it; and Second, a ‘reasonable person’ in the defendant’s position knowing what the defendant knew and being in the same circumstances, would have had those same beliefs” (id.).
“Thus, under our law of justification, it is not sufficient that the defendant honestly believed in his [or her] own mind that he [or she] was faced with defending himself/herself [or *844someone else] against the nse or imminent use of deadly physical force. An honest belief, no matter how genuine or sincere, may yet be unreasonable” (id.).
A “defendant would not be justified if he/she knew that he/ she could with complete safety to himself/herself and others avoid the necessity of using deadly physical force by retreating” (CJI2d[NY] Penal Law § 35.15 [2]).
V. Analysis
Notably, much of the defendant’s testimony that he believed that the people outside El Molino were armed and that he feared for his and his friends’ lives was contradicted by the testimony of all of the People’s witnesses. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, in my view, there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would have permitted the jury to find that the defendant’s conduct was justified.
The defendant testified that after he was attacked, he was in pain and just wanted to leave quickly and seek medical attention. He further testified that he and his friends were able to leave the bar and go outside without incident. However, he testified that as he and his friends were leaving, approximately 15 people followed them, told the defendant and his friends not to come back, and threatened to kill Ramirez and Martinez-Mendoza. However, it is undisputed that none of these individuals stopped or interfered with the defendant or any of his friends from leaving the bar.
The defendant testified that these people had bottles with them; however, there was no evidence that they broke the bottles or were attempting to use them as weapons. Indeed, the only individual who broke a bottle in an attempt to utilize it as a weapon was the defendant’s friend Ramirez. Although the defendant stated that the people “probably had knives,” and that he saw a “shiny thing,” he did not testify that he saw any of the individuals actually possess or display a knife or any other weapon. The testimony that he saw one of the individuals reach for something at his waist was revealed by the defendant for the first time at trial, and nonetheless was not evidence that the individual was reaching for a weapon.
The defendant conceded that none of these individuals attempted to stop him and his friends from leaving, and none of them was impeding their ability to get to the car. Indeed, Raya, Huerta, and the defendant were able, with complete safety, to get back to the car without anyone impeding or harming them in any way, and there was no evidence that Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez were prevented from getting to the car.
Once the car was unlocked, rather than leaving or attempt*845ing to get Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez into the car, the defendant retrieved the gun, and returned to the area where Martinez-Mendoza and Ramirez had remained, essentially leaving the safety of the vehicle and returning to the area where he believed deadly physical force was imminent.
In my view, the defendant’s testimony did not establish that, at the time he retrieved the gun, the defendant reasonably believed that any of the people outside El Molino was using or about to use deadly physical force on himself or his friends, and that he and his friends could not safely retreat.
The defendant conceded that once he and his friends were outside, he never told his friends that they should leave. None of the individuals was physically blocking their path to the car. Yet, when Martinez-Mendoza told him to get the gun, he did not tell his friends that they should leave or that he wanted to leave. The defendant could not have reasonably believed that any of the individuals was about to use deadly physical force, because he did not see any of them possessing any weapons, other than bottles. However, even assuming that the defendant could have reasonably believed that the use of deadly physical force was imminent, he could not have reasonably believed that there was no ability to safely retreat. This was demonstrated by the fact that the defendant, Huerta, and Raya were indeed able to get to the car without incident, and the defendant conceded that he was safe at that point and could have left.
The defendant conceded that the individuals outside El Molino did not stop them from going to the car, and there was no testimony by the defendant that these individuals did anything to prevent Martinez-Mendoza or Ramirez from going to the car. There was no testimony that the individuals, aside from making threats, did anything to prevent the defendant or any of his friends from leaving. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there was no reason to believe that the defendant and his friends could not have retreated in complete safety. Rather than attempt to get Martinez-Mendoza or Ramirez to leave, the defendant went to the car, retrieved the gun, and walked back to the very location where he claimed he and his friend were being threatened.
I agree with the general proposition stated by the majority that where a principal is entitled to a justification charge, a codefendant charged with acting-in-concert with the principal is also entitled to a justification charge (see People v Fermin, 36 AD3d 933 [2007]; People v Gant, 282 AD2d 298 [2001]). Here, however, Martinez-Mendoza admitted at trial that he *846lied initially when he told the police and his mother that he shot the gun because he felt threatened and afraid, and actually shot the victim and others because he was drunk and angry. Additionally, Martinez-Mendoza’s guilt of intentional murder was established by his plea of guilty.
In my view, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew and in the same circumstances, would not have believed that the use of deadly physical force was imminent or that he and his friends could not have retreated with complete safety. In my view, there is no reasonable view of the evidence which would have permitted the jury to find that this conduct by the defendant was justified (see People v Watts, 57 NY2d 299 [1982]; People v Heron, 130 AD3d 754 [2015]; People v Casseus, 120 AD3d 828 [2014]; People v Small, 80 AD3d 786 [2011]; People v Dickerson, 67 AD3d 700 [2009]; People v Simon, 56 AD3d 804 [2008]; People v Ojar, 38 AD3d 684 [2007]; People v Snell, 256 AD2d 480 [1998]).
Accordingly, because I conclude that the County Court properly denied the defendant’s request for a justification charge, I vote to affirm the judgment of conviction.