Court Opinion

ID: 9400187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 16:09:36.757995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.807387
License: Public Domain

J-S11011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 CORY JACKSON                           :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1611 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 6, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0008863-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED JUNE 07, 2023

     Appellant, Cory Jackson, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on May 6, 2022, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s

post-sentence motion on May 20, 2022. We affirm.

     The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:

       At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of [D.W.
       (hereinafter “the Complainant”), E.P., and K.B.]. Viewed in
       the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict
       winner, the evidence established the following.

       During the summer of 2019, [Appellant] lived a block away
       from the house of [the Complainant]. Prior to August of that
       year, [the Complainant] barely knew [Appellant’s] first name
       and considered him to be a mere acquaintance from the
       neighborhood. However, [the Complainant] eventually came
       to have interactions with [Appellant] that left her feeling
       increasingly uncomfortable.

       During one evening in August [] 2019 at approximately 10:00
       p.m., [Appellant] came up onto the front porch of [the
       Complainant’s] house and rang the doorbell. After [the
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       Complainant] answered the door, [Appellant] told her he
       needed a place to sleep and asked if he could come in and
       sleep on her couch.          Shocked and confused, [the
       Complainant], who was home alone at the time, responded
       that [Appellant] could not come inside. She told him that he
       should go home and then shut the door. Later that month,
       [Appellant] came up onto [the Complainant’s] porch again
       and told her that he saw someone on her porch and had
       scared them away. [The Complainant] felt uncomfortable
       with [Appellant] on her porch, where he could look directly
       through windows into the home's living room. On other
       occasions while riding his bicycle, [Appellant] again relayed
       to [the Complainant] that he saw someone on her porch.
       During these encounters, [the Complainant] told [Appellant]
       at least twice that he was not allowed to be on her porch.

       By October of 2019, [the Complainant’s] roommate, [E.P],
       had returned to their home after having been away for the
       summer. On October 2, 2019, at about 10:00 or 10:30 p.m.,
       [E.P.] rode her bicycle home and noticed [Appellant] walking
       slowly down the block. As [E.P.] walked up to the home's
       front door, [Appellant] came up to the doorstep and started
       a conversation with [E.P.], which lasted for about 10 minutes.
       Eventually, [E.P.] stated that she was sweaty from the gym
       and needed to go inside. [Appellant] then began making
       comments about “air drying when you take a shower” and
       about being nude. [E.P.] told [Appellant] she was feeling a
       little uncomfortable and was going to go inside. After
       entering the home, [E.P.] sent a text message to [the
       Complainant] regarding her interaction with [Appellant].

       Later that same night, at approximately 2:00 a.m., [the
       Complainant] was in her second-floor bedroom with the light
       on when she heard what sounded like something being
       thrown at her window. Startled, she went downstairs and
       looked out her kitchen window into an outside area directly
       below her bedroom window. There, she saw [Appellant]
       throwing rocks at her window. Already upset from [E.P.’s]
       earlier text message about [Appellant’s] comments to [E.P.],
       [the Complainant] began yelling at [Appellant]. She yelled
       that [Appellant] should not be throwing rocks at their window
       or be on their porch, and that he needed to go away and
       leave them alone. [Appellant] backed away and began
       walking down the street.

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       [The Complainant] then checked to make sure all the house's
       doors and windows were locked. After realizing that she had
       left her cellphone in her car, she went upstairs to wake up
       [E.P.] so that she could use [E.P.’s] cellphone. When [the
       Complainant] went back downstairs, she noticed her cat
       looking out onto the porch through the front window. [The
       Complainant] looked through the same window and saw
       [Appellant] outside. She went to the front door, looked
       through its peephole, and saw [Appellant] walk up the steps
       to the door. [The Complainant] then observed the door
       handle jiggling for a few seconds as [Appellant] tried to open
       the front door. After his unsuccessful attempt to open the
       door, [Appellant] walked back down the steps and across the
       street into a well-lit area. [The Complainant] saw his head
       poking out from behind a car across the street, and then
       [Appellant] came out from behind the car while masturbating
       with his penis in his hand. He continued to masturbate as he
       walked back towards [the Complainant’s] home and then
       stood at the side of her house. He pulled his pants down to
       his ankles and masturbated for five more minutes while
       looking at the house. [The Complainant] called 911.

       Multiple police cars eventually arrived in response to [the
       Complainant’s] 911 call, but [Appellant] had already [run
       away] by that point. The police circled the block a few times
       before leaving. After the police left, [the Complainant] began
       hearing more rocks being thrown at her bedroom window.
       She then went back downstairs and saw [Appellant] throwing
       rocks again. She called the police a second time, but before
       another police car arrived, [Appellant] had left again. While
       police officers were still at the house, [Appellant] walked back
       up the street. One of the officers then pursued and arrested
       him.

       At trial, the Commonwealth also presented evidence of prior
       bad acts pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)
       through the testimony of [K.B.]. The evidence established
       the following.

       In June [] 2018, after being dropped off near her home at
       night, [K.B.] saw [Appellant] walking down the street.
       [Appellant] began yelling things at her.     When [K.B.]
       continued walking towards her home, [Appellant] turned and

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        began following her. [K.B.] then ran to her house, opened
        the door, and got inside. As soon as [K.B.] shut the door,
        [Appellant] was on the other side of the door, turning the
        door handle and trying to get inside. He then went over to
        the living room window and began banging on it and looking
        into the house. A few moments later, [K.B.’s] roommate and
        her roommate's boyfriend arrived at the home. [Appellant]
        moved away from the house as they approached. [K.B.] then
        opened the door to let them in. While [K.B.] was standing in
        the doorway, [Appellant] ran up, slapped [K.B.’s] buttocks,
        and then grabbed her buttocks before running away. On June
        25, 2019, [Appellant] pled guilty to charges of indecent
        assault and harassment for the incident involving [K.B.].[fn.1]

            [fn.1] At trial, the parties also stipulated that [Appellant]
            has a prior conviction for stalking from 2014, which was
            also introduced by the Commonwealth pursuant to
            Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/22, at 2-5 (citations omitted).

      Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of

attempted burglary and indecent exposure and, on May 6, 2022, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to serve 42 to 84 months in prison, followed by five years

of probation, for his attempted burglary conviction and to serve a concurrent

term of nine to 18 months in prison for his indecent exposure conviction. After

the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion, Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises two claims on this appeal:

        1. Does the trial record contain sufficient evidence for the
        conviction of attempted burglary?

        2. Was the sentence of 42-84 [months’] incarceration plus
        five years of probation an abuse of the sentencing court’s
        discretion?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

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     Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his

attempted burglary conviction.     We review Appellant’s sufficiency of the

evidence challenge under the following standard:

        The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
        evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
        in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
        sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
        element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
        the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
        our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we
        note that the facts and circumstances established by the
        Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
        innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
        resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
        and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact
        may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
        Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
        element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
        of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
        above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
        evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
        trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
        and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
        all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Callen, 198 A.3d 1149, 1167 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

     As is relevant to the case at bar, the offense of burglary is defined in

the following manner:

        (a) Offense defined.--A person commits the offense of
        burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the
        person:

           (1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or
           separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is
           adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the

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            time of the offense any person is present and the person
            commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury
            crime therein;

                                       ...

        (e) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words
        and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this
        subsection:

            “Bodily injury crime.” As follows:

                (1) An act, attempt or threat to commit an act which
                would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under the
                following:

                                       ...

                   Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses).

                                       ...

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502 (effective from January 3, 2017 to September 8, 2022).

“A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime,

he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission

of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support

his attempted burglary conviction because, “[f]rom the evidence in the

record[,] it cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]

intended to enter the home.”      Appellant’s Brief at 6.   Instead, Appellant

argues, the evidence merely established that Appellant was “trying to get the

attention of [the Complainant] to get her to come to the window or the door.”

Id. at 6-7. Appellant’s claim fails.

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         Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

the evidence was clearly sufficient to prove that Appellant intended to enter

the Complainant’s home.          Certainly, the evidence established that, at

approximately 2:00 a.m. on October 2, 2019, Appellant was throwing rocks

at the Complainant’s bedroom window.          The Complainant testified that, in

response, she angrily “yelled at [Appellant] and said this needs to stop, you

shouldn’t be throwing rocks at our window, you shouldn’t be on our porch.

You need to go away. Leave us alone, hop off.” N.T. Trial, 3/4/22, at 34.

The Complainant testified that Appellant then “backed away into the street.”

Id. at 35.       However, as the Complainant testified, after she woke her

roommate, she saw Appellant “walk up the steps [of their house and] . . .

tr[ied] to open the door.”        Id.   Specifically, the Complainant testified,

Appellant “walk[ed] up the steps onto [the Complainant’s porch and] jiggle[d

the] door handle [for] . . . two seconds” in an attempt “to open the door.” Id.

at 51.

         Within Appellant’s brief to this Court, Appellant claims that his actions

constituted a mere attempt “to get the attention of [the Complainant]” – and

not an attempt to enter the home.         Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.   Appellant's

argument is contingent upon this Court viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to him.      This we will not do.    Rather, as explained above, our

standard of review requires that we view the evidence “in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner, and [] draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v.

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Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1164 (Pa. 2012) (quotation marks and citations

omitted).

      Viewed in the proper light, the evidence does not support Appellant's

self-serving version of the events. Instead, and consistent with the express

testimony of the Complainant, the evidence establishes that, when Appellant

“jiggle[d the Complainant’s] door handle [for] . . . two seconds,” Appellant

was “try[ing] to open the door” to the Complainant’s home. Indeed, had the

Complainant’s door been unlocked, Appellant would have gained entry to the

Complainant’s house. Appellant’s first claim on appeal thus fails.

      Next, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion at

sentencing. “[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super.

2001). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

      As this Court explained:

        [t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we
        conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
        appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,
        903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
        sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
        Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal
        defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
        substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not

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        appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.]
        § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion

when it imposed his sentence for attempted burglary, as the term of 42 to 84

months in prison was “at the very top of the aggravated range [and] does not

take any mitigating facts into account.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant has

waived his discretionary aspects of sentencing claim because he failed to

include a Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) statement in his

brief and the Commonwealth objected to the omission. Commonwealth's Brief

at 11–12; Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1071–1072 (Pa. Super.

2007) (“[t]o be reviewed on the merits, a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of sentence must raise a substantial question that the sentence

imposed is not appropriate.     A substantial question is raised when the

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentence was either

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to

the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.          This Court

determines whether an appellant has raised a substantial question by

examination of the appellant's concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal, which must be included in the appellant's brief,

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f).          If a Rule

2119(f) statement is not included in the appellant's brief and the appellee

objects to the omission, then this Court is precluded from reviewing the merits

of the appellant's claim”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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        Further, even if Appellant had not waived his discretionary aspects of

sentencing claim, the claim would fail on the merits. Generally, to raise a

substantial question, an appellant must “advance a colorable argument that

the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the

Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie

the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel, 629 A.2d 1012, 1013

(Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748 A.2d 721, 726 (Pa.

Super. 2000) (en banc). Appellant contends that his sentence is excessive

because the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating factors at

sentencing, including: “Appellant was high on PCP when he committed this

crime;” Appellant took responsibility for his crimes; Appellant completed a

four-month drug program while he awaited trial in this case; while in prison

awaiting trial, Appellant “witnessed multiple stabbings and heard a man being

raped in his cell;” and, due to COVID, “Appellant had already served over two

years in state prison for previous convictions while he was waiting for the

present matter to be tried.” Appellant’s Brief at 8.

        This Court has held that “an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citations omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d

1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117

A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (same). Nevertheless, Appellant's

claim    fails   because,   during   the   sentencing   hearing,   the   trial   court

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demonstrated it was well aware of – and thoroughly considered – the

mitigating factors in Appellant’s case.   As the trial court explained during

sentencing:

        In determining what I believe to be an appropriate sentence,
        I've considered all of the evidence presented during the
        history of this case, including the evidence adduced during
        the trial of this case, over which I presided. I've considered
        the information in the presentence investigation report, the
        investigation of prior record score, and the mental health
        evaluation, all of which I've carefully reviewed. I've also
        considered the information presented today during the
        sentencing hearing, including the statements made by
        counsel, as well as [Appellant’s] allocution, and I've
        considered the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, which
        I've already calculated and put on the record there was an
        agreement on.

        I'll just note again, the guidelines for the attempted burglary
        are a recommendation of a minimum of 18 to 30 months,
        plus or minus 12 months, and indecent exposure, restorative
        sanctions 6 months, plus or minus 3 months.

        I've also considered the statutory factors that I'm required to
        consider by law. I've considered the need for protection of
        the public. And in looking at [Appellant’s] conduct in this
        case, as well as [Appellant’s] history, I do think that there is
        a substantial need to protect the public in this case, because
        [Appellant] has engaged not in just one criminal incident, but
        in a pattern of conduct over a period of years. Despite
        repeated arrests, convictions and sentences, he has
        continued to engage in this conduct. And I agree with the
        Commonwealth's view that [Appellant] has not demonstrated
        a full acceptance of responsibility for his conduct, rather,
        blaming, in this case, a feeling of being disinhibited by his
        use of PCP.

        While I don't doubt that his drug abuse has only exacerbated
        his decision-making and conduct in various instances in his
        life, the fact is that this is not an isolated type of behavior.
        This has happened again and again.

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       In this particular case over which I presided at trial, the facts
       demonstrated that [Appellant] went very late at night,
       around [2:00] a.m., to the victim's house, throwing rocks at
       the window. She yelled at him to leave, and even though she
       told [Appellant] multiple times in the past that he was not
       allowed on her porch, he came back onto her porch and tried
       to open the door. When unsuccessful, he eventually started
       masturbating under a light outside -- in public, outside of the
       victim's house and continued to do so for five minutes. He
       ran away when police arrived, and then came back and threw
       rocks at the bedroom window again, and then was finally
       arrested after the victim called the police again.

       It's concerning to me that this, again, appears to be a pattern
       of conduct. In fact, the testimony at trial from witness [K.B.]
       demonstrated that in June of 2018, [Appellant] tried to open
       the doorknob to her house and banged on her window and
       also grabbed her -- what she described as grabbed her butt
       and then ran away.

       I also find it concerning that on June [24,] 2019, [Appellant]
       pled guilty in five separate cases, all of which involved crimes
       of indecent assault. Sentencing was scheduled for December
       of that year, and while awaiting sentencing, he committed
       the offenses in this case on October [2,] 2019, and then was
       sentenced on December [30,] 2019.

       So, despite having been arrested and pleading guilty for all
       the different cases, he then committed the crime in this case,
       and that shows, in my mind, reflects a serious concern that
       [Appellant] presents a higher risk of recidivism than similarly-
       situated defendants, which is an aggravating factor. I think
       his prior record score understates the seriousness of his
       criminal history. I think he presents a danger to society, and
       I think he has not fully accepted responsibility in a manner
       that would indicate he is less likely to commit this kind of
       activity in the future.

       I think a sentence in the aggravated range is appropriate
       here, because of the gravity of the offense, attempted
       burglary, his conduct and his pattern of conduct over these
       years.

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         And for all these reasons, I am going to sentence [Appellant]
         to a sentence in the aggravate[d] range on attempted
         burglary.

N.T. Sentencing, 5/6/22, at 20-24.

      Therefore, since the trial court did, in fact, consider the mitigating

factors in Appellant’s case, Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing

claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/7/2023

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