Court Opinion

ID: 9380807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 14:07:32.849835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.715553
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                               OPINION

                                        No. 04-21-00372-CV

                                 EAGLE ROCK TIMBER, INC.,
                                         Appellant

                                                 v.

                  ROCK HARD RENTAL, LLC and Solid Rock Crushing, LLC,
                                    Appellees

                     From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas
                                      Trial Court No. 18992B
                           Honorable M. Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:      Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:         Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                 Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                 Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 15, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. (“ERT”) owns certain machinery used in crushing

rocks. Appellee Rock Hard Rentals, LLC (“RHR”) rented ERT’s equipment and sublet ERT’s

equipment to appellee Solid Rock Crushing, LLC (“SRC”), who used it in a Kerr County mining

operation under a contract with Wheatcraft, Inc. (“Wheatcraft”). This appeal comes before this

court after a bench trial in which the trial court found ERT liable to (1) RHR for over $350,000

and (2) SRC for approximately $600,000. We affirm.
                                                                                    04-21-00372-CV

                                         BACKGROUND

         RHR has one member, Sonny Heittola, who has over forty years’ experience in the rock

crushing business. Heittola has a longstanding relationship with ERT and one of its owners, Rick

Gokey.

ERT Becomes Indebted to RHR

         When Heittola met Gokey in 2013, Heittola was working for Hanson Custom Crushing,

Inc. (“HCC”) in North Dakota on a project with ERT. Although the amount was disputed, ERT

owed HCC money:

         As part of a buyout from HCC in early 2017, Heittola assumed HCC’s potential liability

for an allegedly out-of-specification material on the North Dakota project. HCC also assigned

Heittola its account receivable for ERT. While negotiating the buyout, Heittola and Gokey

discussed the account receivable and the potential liability for the allegedly out-of-specification

material. In one discussion, Gokey agreed to pay Heittola $90,000 to resolve ERT’s account

receivable and forgive any potential liability for the allegedly out-of-specification material.

However, ERT never paid any of the $90,000. Gokey claims the $90,000 debt was to be credited

to leasing ERT’s equipment to RHR for a project in Kerr County, Texas. Heittola denies that was

part of any deal.

         Another part of Heittola’s buyout from HCC involved the assignment of equipment to

Heittola which HCC owned and rented to ERT. Since 2017, HCC’s equipment had been in ERT’s

possession. When Heittola later went to retrieve the equipment in 2021, he found that it had been

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damaged. Heittola assigned to RHR his interest in the account receivable, the liability on the out-

of-specification material, and the title to the equipment from the HCC buyout:

ERT Agrees to Rent Equipment for Wheatcraft Project

       Heittola also held a one-half ownership interest in SRC. On September 27, 2017,

Wheatcraft retained SRC as a contractor on the Wheatcraft project in Kerr County, Texas:

Heittola met with Gokey in early October 2017 to discuss renting some of ERT’s equipment to use

on the Wheatcraft Project. Heittola knew ERT was having cash flow problems and was having

trouble making payments on its financed equipment, so he thought he could get a good rental rate

for the equipment.

       ERT orally agreed to rent the equipment to RHR, and although draft agreements were

exchanged, no written agreement was ever executed. On October 16, 2017, ERT’s principal signed

a draft agreement reflecting certain terms, including the payment of approximately $14,000 per

month for RHR’s rental of ERT’s equipment. The trial court found that ERT agreed to lease its

equipment to RHR for ERT’s payments on the financing in place on the equipment. Gokey testified

that the rental rate for RHR was a “pass-through” of ERT’s monthly payments on the equipment

(because the rate was the exact monthly payment ERT was making to its lenders):

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RHR Begins Wheatcraft Project

       Pursuant to their oral agreement, ERT allowed RHR to move equipment from North

Dakota to Texas. Over the next six weeks, Gokey sought to have RHR sign draft lease agreements.

One draft contained a rental rate of $23,850 per month, and one had a rental rate of $31,850 per

month. RHR refused to sign and instead modified one of the draft lease agreements (and returned

it to ERT) reflecting a lower amount. Heittola testified he would not sign a written lease agreement

unless it contained the rental rates agreed to in early October 2017. By December 8, 2017, Gokey

knew ERT would never have an acceptable equipment lease agreement in writing with RHR.

Nevertheless, ERT did not seek the return of the equipment and allowed it to remain in Texas for

months.

       On December 15, 2017, SRC began working on the Wheatcraft project using ERT’s

equipment rented from RHR. According to testimony adduced at trial, it is standard industry

practice to not begin rental charges on rented heavy equipment until the equipment is set up and

producing. After December 15, 2017, SRC and RHR were unable to reach Gokey by phone or text

message.

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ERT Repossesses Equipment and Files Lien

           On February 14, 2018, ERT appeared at the Wheatcraft project and presented invoices for

use of equipment from November 2017 to February 2018. The invoices were allegedly sent to

RHR two days earlier. The invoices listed no past-due amounts and all had sequential invoice

identification numbers. They were all created concurrently in February 2018 and were prepared

for Gokey to provide to Wheatcraft.

           After arriving in Texas, Gokey met with Wheatcraft and then with RHR and SRC, from

whom he demanded to be immediately paid $127,000, reflecting a rental cost of $31,750 per

month. Gokey testified that amount represented “the entire amount of November, December, and

January, then whatever days we went into February.” RHR and SRC offered ERT payment of

$42,000 (representing three months of rent at $14,000 per month). Gokey rejected the offer.

           On February 26, 2018, ERT notified Wheatcraft of ERT’s intent to file a lien on

Wheatcraft’s property. In response, Wheatcraft “trapped” funds payable to SRC based on ERT’s

threat that Wheatcraft’s owner would face personal liability if he violated the fund trapping

requirement under the lien. Two days later, ERT shut down Wheatcraft project operations and

repossessed the equipment. RHR and SRC helped ERT dismantle the crushing equipment so that

it could be hauled off site by seven trucks ERT brought to the site. ERT’s repossession occurred

less than thirty days after the invoices were allegedly sent to RHR and SRC. SRC asserted that

approximately $190,000 in work (with a profit of $65,000 to SRC) remained incomplete on the

Wheatcraft project.

           On April 5, 2018, ERT filed a lien on the Wheatcraft property for $242,395.44 to secure

payment for the equipment ERT furnished on the project: 1

1
    On August 23, 2018, ERT executed an amended affidavit claiming lien.

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       On April 13, 2018, SRC and RHR sent a letter advising ERT to remove its lien on the basis

it was invalid and fraudulent; ERT refused. Also on April 13, 2018, Century Asphalt signed a deal

with SRC on a new project that the two had previously orally agreed on. SRC claims it was

damaged because it was ultimately unable to undertake this project because of ERT’s fraudulent

lien. SRC projected the profits from the Century Asphalt to be around $440,000. According to

SRC, it lacked sufficient funds to procure the necessary equipment to commence the Century

Asphalt project because of ERT’s inflated lien. Thus, SRC could not make it to the Century Asphalt

project in time, and the job was lost:

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Litigation History

        On November 15, 2018, ERT filed its original petition against SRC, RHR, and Wheatcraft

for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and lien-related claims. Among other causes of action,

SRC and RHR counterclaimed for breach of contract and for a fraudulent lien under the Fraudulent

Lien Statute (Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code). In full settlement of claims

against it, Wheatcraft paid ERT $100,000 that it had trapped, and Wheatcraft was nonsuited. After

a bench trial, the trial court awarded SRC and RHR damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. ERT took

nothing. The trial court subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal,

appellant asserts thirteen issues.

                         STANDING UNDER FRAUDULENT LIEN STATUTE

        In its first issue, ERT asserts SRC does not have standing to pursue a claim under the

fraudulent lien statute because SRC is not an “obligor or debtor.” Although ERT did not raise this

argument below, ERT asserts this issue is jurisdictional and, therefore, not waived.

        The Fraudulent Lien Statute is found in Chapter 12 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies

Code. Section 12.003 (“Cause of Action”) provides: “The following persons may bring an action

to . . . recover damages under this chapter . . . in the case of a fraudulent lien or claim against real

or personal property or an interest in real or personal property, the obligor or debtor, or a person

who owns an interest in the real or personal property.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 12.003(a)(8) (emphasis added).

        In Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, the Supreme Court of Texas determined, “[W]hether a

party can prove the merits of its claim or satisfy the requirements of a particular statute does not

affect the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” 610 S.W.3d 763, 777 (Tex. 2020). “[T]he question

whether a plaintiff has established his right to go forward with [his] suit or satisfied the requisites

of a particular statute pertains in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the

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[subject-matter] jurisdiction of the court to afford it. Thus, a plaintiff does not lack standing in its

proper, jurisdictional sense simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks

standing [when] his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress.” Id. at 774 (internal

quotations omitted) (alterations in original); see also Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Tex.

Med. Ass’n, 616 S.W.3d 558, 566–67 (Tex. 2021) (“The Board characterizes § 2001.038(a) as a

‘statutory standing’ provision. Constitutional standing is a prerequisite for subject matter

jurisdiction. . . . But last Term in Pike v. EMC Management, LLC, we discouraged the use of the

term standing to describe extra-constitutional restrictions on the right of a particular plaintiff to

bring a particular lawsuit.”). The statutory question of whether SRC is an “obligor or debtor” under

Section 12.003(a)(8) is an extra-constitutional question and, therefore, not properly characterized

as jurisdictional under Pike.

        To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial court a timely

request, objection, or motion that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if not apparent

from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). If a party fails to present the issue to the trial court,

the error is not preserved and cannot be reviewed on appeal. See Bushell v. Dean, 803 S.W.2d 711,

712 (Tex. 1991). Here, ERT did not raise the issue of whether SRC is an obligor or debtor in the

trial court, and the issue is not jurisdictional. Therefore, it is not preserved for our review. See id.

We overrule ERT’s first issue.

                         LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

        In its second, third, fourth, fifth, and tenth issues, ERT challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence. We take each in turn.

Standard of Review

        We review sufficiency challenges to a trial court’s findings of fact under the same standards

that are used to review a jury’s findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).

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Where a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding for which

that party did not have the burden of proof, that party must show there is no evidence to support

the adverse findings. See Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). We view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, disregarding all contrary evidence that a

reasonable fact-finder could have disbelieved. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592

(Tex. 2008). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding, it must be upheld.

See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). The trier of fact is the sole judge

of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony. Rego Co. v. Brannon, 682

S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

       In a factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all the evidence. Cain v. Bain, 709

S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). If a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting

an adverse finding on an issue on which it did not have the burden of proof, that party must show

the finding is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

manifestly unjust. Id.

Fraudulent Lien Claim

       In its second issue, ERT asserts there is legally insufficient evidence that (1) ERT’s lien

was fraudulent; (2) ERT had knowledge that the lien was fraudulent; and (3) ERT intended the

lien would cause financial injury to SRC or RHR.

       ERT’s lien stated an agreed rental rate of $31,850 per month, but there was sufficient

evidence by which the trial court could find—and did find—the orally-agreed rental rate in October

2017 was $14,000 per month and ERT knew that the parties had not agreed to the higher rate at

the time it filed the lien. ERT’s lien also included over $94,000 in items not authorized by the lien

statutes, including (1) food and lodging for ERT’s employees when they came to Texas to

repossess ERT’s equipment; (2) fuel used in transporting repossessed equipment to North Dakota;

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(3) labor costs for breaking down the repossessed equipment for transport back to North Dakota;

(4) the cost to repair damage to a truck after it was repossessed; and (5) undefined miscellaneous

items. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 53.023, 56.002.

       The trial court found:

               Had ERT limited the lien to secure payment for authorized items
               (i.e., lease payments for equipment used during rock-crushing
               activities) then despite the parties’ disagreement over the monthly
               payment amounts, ERT’s lien would have been in an amount
               between $35,000 ($14,000 per month for 2.5 months at [sic]) and
               $79,625 ($31,850 per month at 2.5 months). Even using ERT’s
               alleged monthly payment amount, the $79,625 is less than the
               amount which [SRC and RHR] agreed to pay ERT during the 2-14-
               18 Starbucks meeting (whereat they offered to pay $80,000). But
               ERT intentionally filed a lien in the amount of $242,395.44 knowing
               this amount was something that [SRC and RHR] never could or
               would pay—and would create maximum pressure on [SRC and
               RHR] to forgive ERT’s prior debts and would intimidate
               Wheatcraft/[SRC and RHR] to submit to its outrageous payment
               demands. By knowing of the invalidity and fraudulent nature of the
               lien amount at the time of filing the lien, ERT acted with intent to
               defraud.

       The evidence and trial court’s credibility assessments support a determination that ERT’s

lien was created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude—in other

words, fraudulent. See Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Barefoot, No. 14-19-00750-CV, 2021 WL

5001660, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (citing Fraudulent Act,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (fraudulent act “involve[es] bad faith, dishonesty, a

lack of integrity, or moral turpitude”)). The trial court could have also ascertained ERT’s

knowledge and intent to cause injury from ERT’s actions in its February 2018 visit to the

Wheatcraft quarry; ERT’s threats against Wheatcraft; the use of sequentially-numbered invoices

apparently created to justify the existence of a lien; and ERT’s inflation of the amounts included

in the lien as potential leverage over pre-existing debt negotiations.

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        After reviewing the evidence and testimony at trial, we cannot say the trial court erred in

determining that ERT’s lien was fraudulent, that ERT had knowledge that the lien was fraudulent,

or that ERT intended the lien would cause financial injury. We overrule ERT’s second issue.

Lost Profits—Causation

        In its third and fourth issues, ERT asserts there is legally insufficient evidence to support

the trial court’s award of lost profits because there is insufficient evidence the filing of the lien

proximately caused financial injury to SRC. ERT complains over lost profits awarded both for the

Century Asphalt project and the Wheatcraft project.

                                           Applicable Law

        Lost profits damages can be recovered only when both the fact and amount of damages is

proved with reasonable certainty. Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., Inc., 520

S.W.3d 848, 859–60 (Tex. 2017). What constitutes reasonably certain evidence of lost profits is a

fact intensive determination. Id. A party’s bare assertion that a contract was lost does not establish

lost profits with reasonable certainty. Id. Rather, the general rule is that recovery of lost profits as

damages is allowed “where it is shown that a loss of profits is the natural and probable consequence

of the act or omission complained of, and their amount is shown with sufficient certainty.” Id.

(quoting Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Teletron Energy Mgmt., Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. 1994)).

                                Causation—Century Asphalt Project

        On appeal, ERT must show that no evidence supports the trial court’s finding that, due to

ERT’s fraudulent lien filing, SRC was unable to work on the Century Asphalt project. The trial

court found that Matt Hansen (an owner of SRC) credibly testified that ERT’s premature

repossession was a “challenge” to SRC but that ERT’s fraudulent lien filing was the primary reason

SRC could not timely mobilize to the Century Asphalt project. Heittola’s testimony tracked

Hansen’s, and no evidence was presented to the contrary. Both Heittola and Hansen also testified

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that, had ERT not inflated the amount of the lien, they could have had a much stronger possibility

of figuring out a way to complete the Century Asphalt project. However, according to their

testimony, ERT’s inflated claim to nearly $250,000 proved too large of an obstacle to overcome.

Heittola and Hansen’s testimony supports the trial court’s determination that SRC did not have the

funds to mobilize to the Century Asphalt project because they were trapped by Wheatcraft. Further,

the trial court could have concluded the lien resulted in Wheatcraft terminating its contract with

SRC, which resulted in SRC losing profits that could have been used to mobilize to its next project.

           After reviewing the evidence and testimony at trial, we cannot say the trial court erred in

awarding lost profits from the Century Asphalt project on the basis that that ERT’s lien

proximately caused financial injury to SRC. We overrule ERT’s third issue.

                                          Causation—Wheatcraft Project

           The trial court found, “[a]s a result of ERT’s lien filing and financial threats to Wheatcraft,

Wheatcraft refused to pay SRC for the crushing work it had already performed.” It further found

that Hansen “testified credibly that while ERT’s premature repossession of the equipment was a

challenge, ERT’s fraudulent lien was the primary reason it could not continue working because it

prevented SRC from receiving the remaining Wheatcraft profits. . . .”

           ERT’s pre-lien notices resulted in Wheatcraft being legally obliged to trap the funds it

owed SRC upon service of the notice of ERT’s claim. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 53.001 et seq.,

56.001 et seq. SRC was not paid what it was owed because of Wheatcraft’s obligation to trap the

funds. 2 Although Wheatcraft did not unequivocally testify that the lien was the sole reason SRC

was terminated from the Wheatcraft project, the trial court could have concluded from the

2
    Notably, Wheatcraft ultimately paid the funds to ERT in settlement of all claims against it.

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testimony presented at trial that Wheatcraft halted all work that SRC was performing for

Wheatcraft because of ERT’s threats and the lien.

        After reviewing the evidence and testimony at trial, we cannot say the trial court erred in

awarding lost profits from the Wheatcraft project on the basis that ERT’s lien proximately caused

financial injury to SRC. We overrule ERT’s fourth issue.

Amount of Damages

        In its fifth issue, ERT asserts there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support

the trial court’s award of lost profits.

                                           Applicable Law

        Lost profits damages can be recovered only when both the fact and amount of damages is

proved with reasonable certainty. Horizon Health Corp., 520 S.W.3d at 859–60. Recovery for lost

profits does not require that the loss be susceptible of exact calculation. Id. (quoting ERI

Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Tex. 2010)). However, the injured party

must do more than show that it suffered some lost profits. Id. The amount of the loss must be

shown by competent evidence with reasonable certainty. Id. What constitutes reasonably certain

evidence of lost profits is a fact intensive determination. Id. As a minimum, opinions or estimates

of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost

profits can be ascertained. Id. Although supporting documentation may affect the weight of the

evidence, it is not necessary to produce in court the documents supporting the opinions or

estimates. Id.

                           Amount of Damages—Century Asphalt Project

        Challenging the amount of lost profits pertaining to the Century Asphalt project, ERT

asserts “SRC’s only evidence is speculative and legally insufficient, because it is based entirely on

Hansen’s unsupported opinion testimony that he expected to earn 40% profit on the job. [Hansen]

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did not testify as to how this estimation was calculated, as to what data it was based upon, or

whether SRC had ever performed a job like the Century Asphalt project in the past.”

       Hansen testified that the Century Asphalt project was a $1.16 million project. In March

2018, Century Asphalt orally committed SRC to the project. Although SRC later signed a contract

for the project, SRC was unable to commence the job for the reasons we have discussed. Hansen

testified at trial that he expected profits of about 40% (about $440,000) from the $1.16 million job.

He testified as to SRC’s plan for the job and the equipment required to perform the job. Hansen’s

estimate was based on (1) having bid the job, (2) his familiarity with the requirements of the job,

and (3) his knowledge as to SRC’s finances and operations. Hansen offered Century Asphalt

multiple options for performing the project and explained the costs, including: the project’s

payroll, permitting costs, capital costs, fuel, and other expenses. We cannot say that Hansen’s

calculation, based on this information, was speculative—rather, we believe Hansen’s calculation

was proved with reasonable certainty. We reject ERT’s arguments to the contrary.

                             Amount of Damages—Wheatcraft Project

       Challenging the amount of lost profit damages pertaining to the Wheatcraft project, ERT

asserts, “There was no evidence to support $65,000 in lost profits on the Wheatcraft Quarry

Project. Hansen did not testify as to how any lost profit was calculated or as to what data it would

be based upon. . . . Further, there was insufficient evidence of the terms of any agreement between

Wheatcraft and SRC upon which lost profits might be based.” However, the $65,175 awarded by

the trial court in lost profits from the Wheatcraft project was based on the amount of profits actually

withheld by Wheatcraft and was, therefore, demonstrated by competent evidence calculated with

reasonable certainty. We overrule ERT’s fifth issue.

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Sufficiency of RHR’s Damages

       In its tenth issue, ERT asserts the trial court erred “in awarding $250,000 in actual damages

to RHR because there is insufficient evidence to support these damages and the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence shows a portion of those damages were settled for $90,000.” The

$250,000 ERT complains over includes (1) $165,000 relating to pre-existing debt; and (2) $85,000

relating to damage to RHR’s equipment.

                                            HCC Debt

       ERT first asserts the evidence at trial conclusively proved the parties agreed to settle the

$160,000 debt for $90,000, and, therefore, the judgment should be reformed such that the

obligation owed RHR for the HCC debt is the $90,000 settlement. We disagree.

       Heittola’s buyout agreement with HCC was introduced into evidence. Schedule 2 of the

agreement reflects HCC transferred to Heittola ERT’s accounts receivable in the amount of

$235,207.50. Schedule 3 reflects HCC transferred to Heittola ERT’s accounts payable in the

amount of $70,204.98. Crediting ERT’s payables against the receivables, the agreement evidences

$165,002.52 in debt owed by ERT to Heittola. ERT’s debt was subsequently transferred by

Heittola to RHR by another agreement. Therefore, there was some evidence before the trial court

that ERT owed RHR $165,000.

       Heittola testified that during negotiations with HCC, he reached out to Gokey (ERT’s

principal) to determine whether ERT was willing to settle the $165,000, and that during those

discussions, ERT did not dispute owing the $165,000. During these settlement discussions, ERT

offered to pay $90,000 in full satisfaction of the debt, and RHR agreed to accept it. However, by

the time of trial—four years later—ERT had not paid any of the $90,000. Gokey testified that ERT

did not pay because the $90,000 was agreed to as an offset against RHR’s rental costs for the

equipment. On the other hand, Heittola adamantly denied that there was any agreement to credit

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the $90,000 as an offset to equipment rental, and the lien does not reflect any credit of $90,000.

Faced with conflicting testimony on this point, the trial court was entitled to resolve the fact issue

based on its assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. See Wise v. Conklin, No. 01-13-00840-CV,

2015 WL 1778612, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (“In a bench

trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, and it may choose to believe one

witness over another; a reviewing court may not impose its own opinion to the contrary.”).

        Weighing the credibility of Heittola and Gokey’s testimony on this point, the trial court

determined that ERT cannot enforce the oral settlement for $90,000 on the $165,000 debt

because—in failing to pay anything within four years of the agreement—ERT failed to perform

within a reasonable timeframe. We cannot say the trial court’s finding is so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. We overrule

ERT’s complaints to the contrary.

                                         Equipment Damage

        ERT next asserts the trial court erred in awarding $85,000 in damages to RHR’s equipment.

According to ERT, there is no evidence that ERT damaged RHR’s equipment and no evidence of

the equipment’s value. However, Heittola testified (1) the equipment was in Gokey’s possession

when he retrieved it in 2021; (2) ERT was not paying for the equipment; (3) the equipment had

been broken for at least two years; (4) the equipment was broken from operator error; (5) although

Gokey blamed the damage on “faulty welding or whatever on the conveyer,” Heittola determined

the main axles were twisted from the wheels being stuck in sand; (6) the value of the stacker was

$75,000; and (7) the value of additional damages was approximately $10,000. Given these facts,

the trial court could have believed ERT damaged the equipment when it was in its possession

between 2017 and 2021. We cannot say the trial court’s finding is so contrary to the overwhelming

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weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. We overrule ERT’s tenth

issue.

                                       RHR’S DAMAGE CALCULATION

         In its eighth issue, ERT asserts the trial court erred in awarding $270,003 to RHR because

the amount in the findings of fact do not add up to this amount. ERT’s complaint appears to be

based on a clerical error in the findings of fact and conclusions of law. 3 The trial court’s findings

of fact and conclusions of law provide:

                  RHR has suffered the following damages . . .
                  Principal:                                                                     $165,000
                  Pre-Judgement Interest:                                                         $20,003
                  Replacement costs for a Kolberg stacker damaged by ERT:                         $75,000
                  Damage to other items of equipment recovered from ERT:                          $10,000
                  Total RHR Damages:                                                          $260,003.00

Although the “Total RHR Damages” line states a total of $260,003, the mathematically-correct

total is $270,003. Thus, the final judgment correctly states the total damages itemized in the

findings of fact and conclusions of law notwithstanding the clerical error contained in the findings

of fact and conclusions of law. Because the final judgment correctly reflected RHR’s damages,

there is nothing for this court to reform. We overrule ERT’s eighth issue.

                                           PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

         In its ninth issue, ERT asserts the trial court erred in awarding RHR prejudgment interest.

The entirety of ERT’s briefing on this issue states: “The judgment included an award for $20,003

which was designated as prejudgment interest in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law. The

trial court did not award prejudgment interest in its judgment (to either RHR or SHR) and judgment

for $20,003 should be reversed and judgment rendered that RHR take nothing for prejudgment

3
 Whether an alleged error constitutes a clerical error is a question of law we review de novo. See First Am. Title Ins.
Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627,631 (Tex. 2008). A mathematical error in the damages constitutes a clerical error.
Travelers Cos. v. Wolfe, 838 S.W.2d 708, 710 n.2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, no writ).

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                                                                                       04-21-00372-CV

interest. If the judgment amount is for interest on the [HCC] Debt, there is insufficient evidence to

show how the interest was calculated or when it began to accrue.”

       ERT cites no applicable authority in its brief, does not apply any authority to the facts of

this case, and does not otherwise “present sufficient argument [or] provide basis to support a

conclusion that the trial court erred.” Barrera v. Bexar Cnty. Hosp. Dist., No. 04-19-00893-CV,

2020 WL 6928394, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (quoting Lowry v.

Tarbox, 537 S.W.3d 599, 619–20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied)). As a result, we

overrule ERT’s ninth issue as inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived.

                                        QUANTUM MERUIT

       In its twelfth issue, ERT asserts the trial court erred in failing to award ERT damages in

quantum meruit. Quantum meruit is an equitable theory of recovery based on an implied contract.

Bashara v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985).

       On appeal, ERT argues it was entitled to recovery under a quantum meruit theory because

(1) it had an implied construction contract enabling it to be paid for partial performance and (2) the

Wheatcraft settlement payment does not preclude a finding that ERT still suffered unpaid rental

damages. However, the trial court denied quantum meruit relief on additional grounds.

       “When a separate and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on

appeal, [we] must affirm.” Harris v. Gen. Motors Corp., 924 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1996, writ denied); Fitzsimmons v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 03-19-00535-CV, 2020

WL 4726697, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“If an appellant

does not challenge every ground that could have independently supported the trial court’s ruling,

‘we must accept the validity of the unchallenged ground and affirm the adverse ruling.’”).

       On appeal, ERT failed to address three independent grounds supporting the trial court’s

denial of quantum meruit relief. First, the trial court found ERT’s unclean hands barred equitable

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                                                                                      04-21-00372-CV

relief. See Cantu v. Guerra & Moore, LLP, 448 S.W.3d 485, 496 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,

pet. denied) (“Unclean hands is an affirmative defense that may bar a party with unclean hands

from obtaining equitable relief.”). Second, the trial court found that ERT cannot recover because

it failed to mitigate its damages. Third, the trial court found ERT cannot recover because ERT

prevented appellees from performing in what it describes as an impossibility defense. Because

ERT failed to address these grounds on appeal, we must affirm the judgment on those grounds.

See Harris, 924 S.W.2d at 188; Bechtel Corp. v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-04-00910-CV, 2006

WL 228689, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).

                                               COSTS

       In its sixth and eleventh issues, ERT asserts the trial court erred in awarding costs to RHR

and SRC. The entirety of ERT’s briefing on these issues states: “The trial court erred by awarding

SRC costs because the judgment states that costs are to be borne by the party incurring same. ‘IT

IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that all taxable court costs are

assessed against the party incurring same.’ (Judgment, page 3 of 3).” Notably, in another portion,

the judgment also specifically awards costs to RHR and SRC.

       ERT cites no applicable authority in its brief, does not apply any authority to the facts of

this case, and does not otherwise “present sufficient argument [or] provide basis to support a

conclusion that the trial court erred.” Barrera, 2020 WL 6928394, at *4. As a result, we overrule

ERT’s sixth and eleventh issues as inadequately briefed and, therefore, waived.

                                        ATTORNEY’S FEES

       In its seventh issue, ERT asserts the trial court erred by awarding attorney’s fees to SRC

based upon the fraudulent lien statute because there is no or insufficient evidence that SRC is

entitled to recover under that statute, and therefore SRC does not have a statutory basis for recovery

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                                                                                     04-21-00372-CV

of the fees. Having determined SRC had a valid statutory basis for seeking attorney’s fees, we

overrule ERT’s seventh issue.

       In its thirteenth issue, ERT asserts it is entitled to recover attorney’s fees on its quantum

meruit claim should this court determine it was entitled to recover under a quantum meruit theory.

Because we have determined ERT is not entitled to recover under a quantum meruit theory, we

overrule ERT’s thirteenth issue.

                                          CONCLUSION

       Having overruled each of ERT’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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