Court Opinion

ID: 9640791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:15:30.884629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.351079
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, concurring. Relying on longstanding precedent, the appellees correctly state the legal issue before us as follows: Whether the General Assembly could have had a rational basis for the classifications contained in Act 808 of 1977 as amended by Act 840 of 1987 (hereinafter Act 840). Even the appellees concede a couple of the classifications are constitutionally suspect, but it suggests those categories could be severed, thus not affecting the constitutionality of the remaining and basic portion of the Act.1 Unfortunately, even if the court severed the provisions the appellees concede are special legislation, the remaining basic scheme or classifications for electing directors and mayors in city management governments still want for logic and reason. Those remaining classifications by methods of selection are three-fold and appear as follows: Population Method of Selection 1. up to 15,000 Directors: all at-large Mayor: Appointed by Board 2. 15,000 to 29,999 Directors: Majority by district; balance at-large Mayor: Elected by people 3. above 30,000 (1) Directors: All at-large (2) Directors: Majority by district; balance at-large Mayor: Elected by people (3) Directors: All by district Mayor: Appointed by Board When viewing the above three separate groups of cities with manager forms of government, let us attempt to assign a reason for their respective classifications and different methods by which each group selects directors and mayors. Appellees suggest that cities that have a population of under 15,000 may be small enough that the peoples’ interests are similar in nature or kind so as to negate any significant value in having directors elected by single-member districts. Following such logic, one could further conclude that city governments, with a population of over 15,000 to 30,000 (the second group above), have grown to a point where the geographic needs and interests of the people warrant their directors to be elected by districts. That being so, the General Assembly’s enactment of Act 840 is reasonable since it requires single-member districts in the second group or class of cities. When, however, we review the third group — cities over 30,000 — we find single-member districts are not required. Instead, these larger class cities have an option to select their directors either at large or by district. Why more populous cities should have an option to elect directors at-large when the smaller, second group of cities has no such option is truly puzzling. In fact, based upon the logic that cities become less homogeneous as they become larger, the rationale for single-member districts in cities over 30,000 is necessarily the same for those size cities that fall within the 15,000 to 30,000 classification. No reason exists for the disparate treatment given these two classifications of larger Arkansas cities by Act 840. To make any sense, both larger groups of cities should be permitted either the option to elect directors at large or by district or they both should be required — with no options available — to elect their directors by districts. As Act 840 presently reads, these classification provisions are inseverable and therefore constitutionally unsalvageable. In sum, I agree with the result reached by the majority but do so because the classifications contained in Act 840 are inconsistent and provide no rational basis to the purpose of the law, viz., to assign a method by population of selecting directors by districts or at large for different sized cities with a city manager form of government.2 See Board of Trustees for Little Rock Police Pension Fund v. City of Little Rock, 295 Ark. 585, 750 S.W.2d 950 (1988); Lovell v. Democratic Central Comm., 230 Ark. 811, 327 S.W.2d 387 (1959); Knowlton v. Walton, 189 Ark. 901, 75 S.W.2d 811 (1934). Act 840 offends amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution as that amendment has been interpreted by longstanding precedent; for that reason alone, I feel Act 840 must fall under amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution. Justice Newbern’s dissent suggests the majority decision overrules Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206, 655 S.W.2d 459 (1983). He cites Sfreight for the proposition that it is the duty of the party challenging the constitutionality of legislation to demonstrate it could have no rational basis. Of course, that rule was adopted by this court many decades before Streight, and the majority opinion, without citing Streight, specifically acknowledges that rule. Unquestionably, the presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of any legislation passed by the General Assembly. That presumption cannot prevail, however, when there is no rational basis to support the arbitrary classification given Arkansas cities under Act 840. Newbern’s reference to affluent and less affluent districts and media expense for campaigning in no way addresses the disparate treatment given the three classifications of cities, as I have attempted to discuss above. Justice Hays’s dissent, on the other hand, attempts to sustain Act 840’s constitutionality by propping it up with the “one man-one vote” rule announced in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Act 840 may be consistent with that rule, and it may not. It could be argued even cities under 15,000 should have single-member districts. It also could be contended that cities over 30,000 must have single-member districts and an option to allow at-large directors is unconstitutional. Those issues and arguments simply are not before us. The only question in this appeal is a state issue, viz., whether Act 840 contravenes amendment 14 to the Arkansas Constitution, i.e., whether the act is special or local legislation. Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. While I share the majority’s concern that this legislation is difficult to reconcile with Amendment 14, nevertheless, I believe a rational basis can be found in the self-evident intent of the enactments to promote greater compliance with the “one man, one vote” rule. That objective is both rational and mandatory. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1967); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1961). The majority largely ignores the spirit of Act 840 and the higher principle to which it points, i.e. the general rule of law of “one man, one vote.” This general principle of law pervades Act 840, however, on closer examination, the exceptions carved out in this Act while appearing to make this legislation special or local, demonstrate an effort to provide these exceptions with the same opportunity to achieve the “one man, one vote” principle. The general overriding intent of Act 840 is to provide a system of electing a city’s officials which more closely promotes the “one man, one vote” rule. The exemptions that trouble the majority are aimed at providing for a more representative election by districts or wards. Act 840 applies only to the city management form of government. All other forms of local government provide for a seemingly “one man, one vote” principle. For example, the mayor-council form of government provides for the selection of alderman from districts. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-43-307 (1987). Additionally, the city administered governments provide for a selection of a majority of the directors by district and the direct election of the mayor. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-48-110 (1987). As to the commission form of government, because only three commissioners are elected there is little reason to distinguish by districts and at large. The classification by population simply ensures that the cities of Little Rock and Hot Springs, and potentially seven other cities should they elect a city management form of government, have the opportunity to afford their citizenry the option to enact an ordinance providing for more representative city government. I would affirm the trial court.   Although not fully discussed, the selection of mayoral positions also varies dependent upon the classification and size.