Court Opinion

ID: 9483506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:22:34.459048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:39.879574
License: Public Domain

SKINNER, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the court’s judgment, but write separately because I am unable to accept the court’s conclusion that there is in fact no conflict between the 1987 Note *26and the Guarantee. In my view this issue should not be resolved without an eviden-tiary hearing. The result adopted by the court can be reached by a different route, however.
Congress opted for certainty when it enacted the categorical recording scheme embodied in § 1823(e). Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 95, 108 S.Ct. 396, 399, 98 L.Ed.2d 340 (1987). The scope of a court’s inquiry into the enforceability of an agreement is limited, and the court’s conclusion depends entirely on the agreement’s compliance or noncompliance with the statute. See id. at 94-95, 108 S.Ct. at 399. The statute provides that any agreement that “tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the [FDIC] in any asset acquired” as receiver is invalid against the FDIC, unless the agreement:
(1) is in writing, (2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution, (3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said board or committee, and (4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official record of the depository institution.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e).
In this case, the district court concluded correctly that the 1985 Guaranty was an “asset” of the FDIC within the meaning of § 1823(e). FDIC v. Virginia Crossings Partnership, 909 F.2d 306, 312 (8th Cir.1990); FDIC v. P.L.M. Int'l, 834 F.2d 248, 253 (1st Cir.1987). Therefore, in order to defeat or impair the Guaranty, the appellants had the burden of demonstrating that the 1987 Agreement and purported release complied with each of the four requirements of § 1823(e). FDIC v. Rivera-Arroyo, 907 F.2d 1233, 1236 (1st Cir.1990); P.L.M., 834 F.2d at 253.
The statute, among other things, requires both that the board or loan committee approve the agreement and that such approval be reflected in the minutes of the board or committee meeting. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(3). Absent evidence of such approval, the agreement is unenforceable against the FDIC. P.L.M., 834 F.2d at 253; FDIC v. Eagle Prop., 664 F.Supp. 1027, 1051 (W.D.Tex.1985) (holding subordination certificate unenforceable in spite of general board authorization because minutes do not specifically approve the certificate); FDIC v. Gardner, 606 F.Supp. 1484, 1488 (S.D.Miss.1985) (side agreement not referenced or affirmatively and directly acknowledged is unenforceable).
The record is devoid of evidence supporting appellants’ contention that the board or loan committee approved a release or modification of the guarantors’ liability. At oral argument, appellants conceded that they could point to no document and no affidavit to demonstrate the requisite approval. But the record is not silent on this issue. Indeed, far from reflecting a purported release, both the Loan Committee Minutes and the Loan Approval Sheet indicate precisely the opposite understanding: they refer to the four appellants, by name, as “guarantors” of the new Note. Moreover, the record demonstrates that the continuing personal guaranties of the appellants were significant factors in approving the loan. A risk analysis report, attached to the loan approval sheet, twice mentions the “strength” of the appellants’ personal guaranties as mitigating risk factors. It is clear that no release of personal liability was authorized.
There is no genuine issue of material fact and the FDIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I therefore join in affirming the judgment of the district court.