Court Opinion

ID: 9768434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:02:34.611183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:40.807051
License: Public Domain

SEERDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that appellee, Ritenour, was not a consumer within the definition of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE ANN., Sec. 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp.1986).
The Money Market Certificate was purchased by the Ritenours on December 12, 1980. That transaction was complete at that time. A deposit of money is not a transfer of goods. Riverside National Bank v. Lewis, 603 S.W.2d 169, 176 (Tex.1980); First State Bank, Morton v. Chesshir, 613 S.W.2d 61 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.1981), on remand, 634 S.W.2d 742 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (on conversion claim). In Fortner v. Fannin Bank in Windom, 634 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, no writ), Fortner was held to be a consumer because the bank provided the service of filing title papers for his car in connection with his loan. Id. at 76. However, in this case, appellee did not plead or prove that he sought or obtained any financial counseling, planning or any collateral service at the time he bought the certificate.
Appellee did not attempt to alter the effect of the certificate until August 3, 1981, when he requested the “hold.” The transaction of August 3, 1981, does not fall under the D.T.P.A. because the “service” sought was not by “purchase or lease.” Hall v. Bean, 582 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1979, no writ); Exxon Corp. v. Dunn, 581 S.W.2d 500 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, no writ); Russell v. Hartford Insurance Company, 548 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
This case is similar to Thompson v. First Austin Co., 572 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.), in which the appellant borrowed money from appel-lee and executed a note and deed of trust. Subsequently, the lender wrote appellant stating it would not foreclose under the deed of trust if certain conditions were met. Thereafter, the lender posted the property for foreclosure and suit was filed under the D.T.P.A. In holding that the borrowers were not consumers under the Act, the court stated that the borrowers had not purchased services from the lender but had purchased the use of money with their note and deed of trust. Id. at 81-82.
Since I do not believe Ritenour is a consumer, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment against ap-pellee.