Court Opinion

ID: 9794486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:06:56.130781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:52.992098
License: Public Domain

GEORGE L. REESE, Jr., District Judge (concurring specially). The majority opinion does not specifically overrule Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez, 51 N.M. 156, 180 P.2d 790, and cases based thereon, but I suggest that there is an apparent inconsistency in the interpretation which the court now gives to Rule 41(e) and that given it in Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez. The majority now hold that the rule requires the defendant to file his motion to dismiss before the plaintiff has taken the requisite action to bring the case . to its final determination, regardless of the date when the action was commenced. This holding is not contrary to the holding on the factual situation in that case or to that in many subsequent decisions which follow it. However, the present holding cannot be consistent with the prior announcements that Rule 41(e) is, in effect, a statute of limitation, requiring a plaintiff, absent legal inability or excuse, to bring his case to trial within a period of two years after the complaint is filed or suffer dismissal with prejudice. ' The majority opinion is based upon the provisions of the rule which are to the effect that it becomes operative only when the defendant elects to file a written motion requesting dismissal and that a defendant cannot slumber on his right to file such a motion, permit the plaintiff to take the requisite action to bring his case to its final determination, and thereafter successfully press his motion. With this interpretation of the rule, I agree, but I can foresee nothing but future 'controversies which must be resolved as to what “requisite ac-. tion” means. I would prefer to overrule Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez and' all subsequent decisions which are based upon it. The rule, by its terms, extends only to a situation where the plaintiff has “failed to take action.” One cannot “fail” to take action unless action is permissible within the rules of practice and procedure. Under existing rules, there is no method provided by which a plaintiff can have his case tried within any certain time. In the instant case there was a motion filed requesting the district court to set the case for trial on the merits. The case was not at issue. Motions filed by the defendants had not been disposed of. No answer has been filed by either defendant. The rules do not provide a method of having motions heard by the court. The rules do not provide a method of having cases set for trial on the merits. The district court of the second judicial district had not established regular motion days, as contemplated by Rule 78, nor had it provided a method of setting cases for trial as required by Rule 40. There is no rule providing for the filing of motions for trial settings, either of motions or of cases on their merits. In the light of a total absence of any rules of procedure from whence comes the authority of this court to say that a letter to the judge or an oral request is less effective as “action” to bring a case to its final determination, than a motion filed requesting a setting? In Pettine v. Rogers, 63 N.M. 457, 321 P.2d 638, and Schall v. Burks, 74 N.M. 583, 396 P.2d 192, this court said that the file itself must reflect the requisite action, but there is no provision to this effect in Rule 41(e). I would call attention to the fact that Rule 41(e) is a mere continuation by the Supreme Court, under its rule making power, of Chapter 121, Laws 1937, the title to which reads: “An Act to Provide for the Dismissal With Prejudice Of Civil Actions or Proceedings in the District Courts of This State Where No Action Has Been Taken Towards The Termination Thereof by The Plaintiff Therein, or by the Defendant Upon a Cross-Complaint, for at Least Two Years; and Providing That the Filing of a Motion By Any Party To Any Such Action or Proceeding for the Dismissal Of Such Action Shall Not Be Deemed a General Appearance In Said Action.” I would point out that the title does not give any hint that the Act itself includes any requirement that actions are to be dismissed unless brought to trial within two years from filing date. I would then demonstrate that the Act itself, Rule 41(e), does not by its terms lend itself to the erroneous construction so often repeated in the decisions of this court, that dismissal is required where a case has not been .broúght to trial within a period of two years from date of filing unless the time is tolled by written stipulation or for reasons enumerated in Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez, supra. The Act, Rule 41(e), provides for dismissal when it shall be made to appear by written motion filed by the defendant: “[Tjhat the plaintiff therein * * has failed to take any action to bring such action * * * to its final determination for a period of at least two years after the filing of said action * * *.” (Italics mine.) To bring the language of the rule within range of the construction heretofore given it by the court, the words underscored above must all be deleted and the word “within” must be added immediately preceding the words “a period.” Viewing the body of the Act in the light of the title, it seems clear to the writer that Rule 41 (e) is purely and simply a non-action statute and gives to a defendant an optional right to move for dismissal where the plaintiff has failed to take any action towards the termination of the case for at least two years immediately prior to the filing of the motion. Vigil v. Johnson, 60 N.M. 273, 291 P.2d 312; and see Gilman v. Bates, 72 N.M. 288, 383 P.2d 253. To delete words in a statute is in violation of the rule which makes it the duty of the court to give full effect to all the language embraced therein. Corondoni v. City of Albuquerque, 72 N.M. 422, 384 P.2d 691. To read language into a statute of plain meaning and import is likewise wrong. Griffith v. Humble, 46 N.M. 113, 122 P.2d 134. The title to the Act may certainly be considered in resolving any doubt concerning the meaning of the act. State ex rel. Sedillo v. Sargent, 24 N.M. 333, 171 P. 790; State v. Moore, 40 N.M. 344, 59 P.2d 902; Harriett v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738. The rule as formerly construed by the court could quite reasonably be argued as offending the New Mexico Constitution, Article IV, Sec. 16, because the title gives no hint that the Act provides for the mandatory dismissal of actions where not brought to trial within a period of two years after filing date unless the time is tolled by written stipulation or for reasons enumerated in Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez, supra. I would demonstrate the underlying fallacy in Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez, supra, as stemming from an erroneous statement that Rule 41 (e) is quite similar to the California Statute. The California Statute gives a discretionary power of dismissal on motion of the defendant, where plaintiff has failed for two' years after answer to bring the action to trial and provides for mandatory dismissal on motion of the defendant or by the court on its own motion unless the action is brought to trial within five years after answer filed. The California Statute as it existed when Ringle Development Corp. was decided is quoted in Romero v. Snyder, 167 Cal. 216, 138 P. 1002. The two fundamental differences in the two statutes are: (1) a positive requirement in the California Statute that the action be brought to trial within five years after issue joined, as opposed to the New Mexico Statute or rule which merely provides for dismissal where the plaintiff fails to take action towards final determination for a period of two years, and (2) the requirement in the California Statute that the court dismiss on its own motion, as opposed to the New Mexico Statute or rule which leaves the court powerless unless the defendant elects to file a written motion. In Vigil v. Johnson, supra, this court cited cases from Washington, West Virginia, Louisiana, Delaware and Florida in all of which the courts were dealing with statutes or rules more nearly like ours than is California’s, and I would recognize the error in following California cases rather than compound it by ignoring the obvious. I would not ignore the salutary rule embraced in the doctrine of stare' decisis. Baca v. Chavez, 32 N.M. 210, 252 P. 987. But, since Rule 41(e) is nothing but a procedural rule and does not affect the personal or property rights of anyone, I would give greater weight to the doctrine that the purpose of our legal system is to serve justly the needs of present day society and to accomplish this the court should correct judicial errors in decisions which embody erroneous statutory interpretations. Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apt’s., Inc., 15 N.J. 418, 105 A.2d 387, reh. den. 16 N.J. 47, 106 A.2d 271. This is particularly true when an erroneous interpretation may be in conflict with a provision of the Constitution. Carter-Jones Lbr. Co. v. Eblen, 167 Ohio St. 189, 147 N.E.2d 486, 68 A.L.R.2d 285. I would point out the fact that courts have the inherent power sua sponte or on motion to dismiss claims which have not been prosecuted with reasonable diligence. City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 701; Emmco Ins. Co. v. Walker, 57 N.M. 525, 260 P.2d 712; Pettine v. Rogers, supra. Such dismissals are, of course, ordinarily without prejudice. I would also point out the fact that the right of a defendant to move for dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute with diligence is provided by Rule 41(b), and that a dismissal under this rule may be either with or without prejudice depending on the circumstances. Ringle Development Corp. v. Chavez, supra. Thus, it is evident' that the correction at this time of the erroneous' construction and interpretation which' this court has given to Rule • 41 (e) will not impede either the courts or the litigants in their proper objective of procuring trials on the merits as expeditiously as possible but will rather serve the purpose of removing a pitfall into which litigants may fall and lose their right to be heard on the merits of their claims. In the light of the mounting, backlog of untried cases, it is imperative, in my opinion, that diligence, or lack of diligence, in the prosecution of a case, be deft to the determination of the trial courts in each particular -case and that the positive right of a defendant to procure a dismissal with prejudice after at least two years of non-action on the part of the plaintiff be tested by a determination as to just what action the plaintiff could have taken, within the applicable rules of procedure, to bring his case to trial. The dismissal of an action merely because it is not tried within two years, three years, or within any other fixed period after the filing of the complaint, amounts to an arbitrary denial of justice unless the plaintiff has failed to take some action, within the given period, which he could effectively take, and has thereby been guilty of a statutory abandonment of his claim. I therefore express my concurrence in the result reached by the' majority, but file this concurring opinion in' the hope that it may create a small crack in the armor of the opposition which with the passage of time will widen.