Court Opinion

ID: 9756341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:24:39.980777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:41.196792
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Manderino :
The majority of the court has held that under the Act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, §3, 19 P.S. §582, notes of testimony by a witness at an earlier trial involving solely the issue of defendant’s degree of guilt, were properly admitted into evidence at a trial involving the issue of defendant’s guilt or innocence. I respectfully dissent.
The Act of 1887, supra, states: “Whenever any person has been examined as a witness, either for the Commonwealth or for the defense, in any criminal proceeding conducted in or before a court of record, and the defendant has been present and has had an opportunity to examine, or cross-examine, if such witness after-wards dies, . . . notes of his examination shall be competent evidence upon a subsequent trial of the same criminal issue. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The above statute is in derogation of two well-established protections historically built into criminal trials to insure fairness. Hearsay evidence is prohibited in the trial of any cause except under circumstances guar*606anteeing the reliability of the hearsay testimony. The use of prior testimony should be permitted in a trial only if the circumstances guarantee the reliability of the hearsay.
The use of prior testimony, the hearsay rule aside, also violates a defendant’s right to confront witnesses and this right is guaranteed by both the Federal and Pennsylvania constitutions.
The Act of 1887 is in derogation of both the hearsay rule of evidence and the constitutional requirement of confrontation. We should, therefore, be most cautious and strictly interpret the Act of 1887 for the protection of the innocent and not for the convenience of the prosecution.
In the most ideal circumstances, the admissibility in a trial of prior reported testimony would not compromise the traditional rights, either evidential or constitutional, of the innocent if the prior reported testimony was properly admissible under identical circumstances in the earlier proceeding. The important and significant identical circumstances would include:
1. Identity of the action
2. Identity of the tribunal’s jurisdiction
3. Identity of the parties
4. Identity of counsel
5. Identity of the proponent and opponent of the testimony
6. Identity of all issues in the action
7. Identity of the issue on which the evidence is offered
8. Identity of the potential consequences of the action to the defendant
9. Identity of the opportunity to cross-examine
If any of the above identities are missing, close scrutiny is required to insure fairness to the innocent. For example, although the opportunity to cross-examine is the same in the present proceeding as in the earlier pro*607ceeding, the exercise by counsel of the opportunity to cross-examine may not be the same because the potential consequences of the actions to the defendant are vastly different. Motivation for human conduct is at all times determined by that which is at stake. The loss of a peppercorn is not the loss of liberty—and the loss of liberty is not the loss of life.
If we strictly apply the Act of 1887 for the protection of the innocent, the prior reported testimony in this case at a degree of guilt hearing should not have been permitted at the later trial involving the issue of guilt or innocence. In this case not only was there a lack of identity of issues, there was also a lack of identity of counsel and of the potential consequences of the action to the defendant. Three different attorneys represented the defendant at his original preliminary hearing, at the trial on the degree of guilt, and at the trial of guilt or innocence. At the preliminary hearing, the motive for cross-examination was completely different from the motive for cross-examination at the degree of guilt hearing, and a completely different motive entered the picture at the trial of guilt or innocence.
In 1970, this Court granted the defendant a new trial. Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 437 Pa. 262, 263 A. 2d 351 (1970). The effect of today’s decision is to take away from the defendant the new trial previously granted. A new trial limiting the rights of the defendant, presumed innocent before the new trial begins, is not really a new trial if prior reported testimony can be used and the prior reported testimony was not received under identical circumstances as those existing in the new trial.
The interpretation given by the majority to the Act of 1887 is not new, but perpetuates the error of prior decisions as in Commonwealth v. Crosby, 444 Pa. 17, 279 A. 2d 73 (1971) ; and Commonwealth v. Clarkson, 438 Pa. 523, 265 A. 2d 802 (1970). These cases should *608be overruled. The Clarkson decision particularly illustrates the dangers of loosely interpreting the Act of 1887. In Clarkson, prior reported testimony at a preliminary hearing was admitted at the later trial, even though hearsay, under the Act of 1887. Clarkson places a burden on defense counsel to conduct a complete cross-examination at a preliminary hearing as though the actual trial of guilt or innocence was in progress. This must be done even though the preliminary hearing is held before counsel has had an opportunity to fully consult with the defendant or prepare a defense or even conduct a preliminary investigation. Such results from a loose reading of the Act of 1887 transgresses well-established evidential and constitutional safeguards for the protection of the innocent.
It can be argued, of course, that the prosecution will be severely handicapped in some cases by the death of a witness or the unavailability of the witnesses for other reasons. Yet, this is always true even before any proceedings have begun. The well-established safeguards should not be dropped in later proceedings when they are so zealously defended in a first proceeding.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed and in any new trial the challenged hearsay evidence should not be allowed.