Court Opinion

ID: 9949454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 18:02:36.035471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.366449
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/11/24 P. v. Widener CA3
                                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                       THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                          (Yuba)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098039

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. CRF210831,
                                                                                         CRF2100898)
           v.

 AMANDA MAE WIDENER,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Amanda Mae Widener pleaded guilty to multiple offenses in two
separate cases after having previously been convicted of two prior felonies, which made
her presumptively ineligible for probation absent an unusual case finding. The trial court
initially found the case to be unusual, suspended imposition of sentence, and placed
defendant on probation, which she twice violated. After admitting the first probation
violation, a second judge reinstated her on probation. After admitting the second
probation violation, the same second judge declined to make an unusual case finding or
reinstate her on probation. The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of three
years eight months in state prison.

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       Defendant appeals, arguing the second judge abused her discretion in refusing to
reinstate probation again because the judge failed to consider the basis for the original
sentencing judge’s unusual case finding, and whether the same factors that supported the
original finding still applied, namely, that defendant had mental health issues and was a
victim and perpetrator of domestic violence.
       Finding the issue to be forfeited, we affirm.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In May 2021, defendant and her boyfriend got into an argument, and she hit him in
the face, causing an abrasion on his nose.1 Defendant claimed her boyfriend had yelled at
her and got in her face; she also said he had kicked her, but she could not specify where.
A records check revealed that defendant had an active arrest warrant and nine prior
domestic violence related contacts between defendant and her boyfriend.
       Defendant was charged in Yuba County case No. CRF2100831 (case 831) with
corporal injury of a spouse or cohabitant, A. Doe, with whom she was in a dating
relationship. (Pen. Code,2 § 273.5, subd. (a); count I.) She was released on her own
recognizance.
       Approximately a week later, defendant vandalized a hotel room, causing over
$1,000 in damages and several injuries to herself. While awaiting treatment at the
hospital, defendant caused a disturbance and security escorted her out of the building.
Defendant struck, kicked, and spit on the two security guards who tried to remove her, and
when a deputy sheriff who observed the struggle attempted to intervene, defendant
repeatedly kicked the deputy. The deputy eventually tased defendant to subdue and
restrain her. A Breathalyzer test showed defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0.19.

1 The brief factual summaries are based on the prerelease reports, which the parties
stipulated to as the factual basis for defendant’s pleas.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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       Defendant was charged in Yuba County case No. CRF2100898 (case 898) with
obstructing or resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties (§ 69; count
I), battery (§ 242; count II), assault (§ 240; count III), and disorderly conduct while
intoxicated in a public place (§ 647, subd. (f); count IV). For count I, it was alleged that at
the time of the offense, defendant was released from custody on bail or on her own
recognizance in case 831 (§ 12022.1).
       In September 2021, defendant resolved both cases by plea. Under the terms of the
conditional agreement, she pleaded no contest to the corporal injury offense (count I) in
case 831 and the resisting an executive officer offense (count I) in case 898 in exchange
for dismissal of the remaining counts and allegations and no immediate prison
commitment. Defendant further agreed that count IV in case 898 (disorderly conduct
while intoxicated in a public place) would be dismissed with a Harvey3 waiver as would a
pending vandalism matter (case No. CFR2100899). She also admitted a violation of
probation in case No. CRF2000967 and probation was terminated as unsuccessful. The
parties stipulated to a factual basis for the pleas based on the pretrial release and police
reports in each case.
       Judge Wirtschafter, who took defendant’s conditional plea, cautioned defendant
that given her two prior felony convictions, an unusual case finding was required to grant
probation. Counsel requested that the court make the finding, and the court indicated it
would be amenable to granting probation based on representations regarding defendant’s
mental health unless the presentence probation report included “something dramatic.”
       At the sentencing hearing in October 2021, the parties asked the trial court to
follow probation’s recommendation to make an unusual case finding in part due to
untreated mental health conditions and because defendant was under the influence of
alcohol during the offenses. Judge Wirtschafter followed probation’s recommendation,

3 People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.

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finding the case to be unusual “based upon mental health issues plus [his] concerns that
you may, in fact, be a victim of domestic violence.” The court warned defendant,
however, to stay away from the victim and cautioned her that “if you don’t stay away from
him, to protect everybody involved, it’s going to be a violation of probation. You’re going
to state prison. Clear?” Defendant responded, “Clear.”
       The court suspended imposition of sentence and granted probation, finding an
unusual case “for the reasons set forth by the Probation Department” including that “her
mental health status, while not amounting to a defense, is a mitigating circumstance such
that if [d]efendant were to receive treatment, she could comply with probation.” The court
placed defendant on probation for three years for the corporal injury offense in case 831
and for two years for the obstruction offense in case 898 with various terms and
conditions, including that she participate in substance abuse treatment and comply with
any mental health directives.
       In May 2022, probation filed petitions to revoke probation in both case 831 and
case 898 for failing to obey all laws, failing to abstain from using controlled substances,
and failing to participate in and successfully complete treatment and educational programs
for mental health. The petitions specifically alleged that: (1) in March 2022 defendant
violated Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) by possessing a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), which resulted in charges in Yuba County case
No. CRM2200556; (2) in April 2022 defendant’s urine sample tested positive for
amphetamines; and (3) in March 2022 defendant was discharged from previously ordered
mental health services due to excessive absences.
       At a hearing before Judge Scrogin on May 27, 2022, defendant pleaded no contest
to possession of methamphetamine in Yuba County case No. CRM2200556, and
acknowledged that by doing so, the court would find her in violation of her probation in
her prior matters. During the hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to warn defendant
that “this is the end of her local time. If she violates again, it would be a prison sentence.”

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The court agreed, stating, “And as the People pointed out, there is really no room for
reinstatement for you if you violate again.” Defendant responded that she understood.
       Judge Scrogin took judicial notice of her no contest plea in case No. CRM2200556
to find the first alleged probation violation proven, and defendant admitted the remaining
two alleged violations—that she tested positive for amphetamines and that she failed to
complete ordered mental health services. The court reinstated defendant on probation in
both cases without making any additional unusual case findings.
       In October 2022, probation filed a second petition to revoke probation in each case.
The identical petitions alleged that on September 6, 2022, defendant submitted a urine
sample that was positive for amphetamines and that on that same date she was ordered to
enroll in and successfully complete a substance abuse and treatment program, but she
failed to attend her scheduled intake assessment on September 12, 2022.
       At a hearing before Judge Wirtschafter (the original sentencing judge) on
January 11, 2023, defendant admitted probation violation allegation number two—that she
failed to enroll in and complete a substance abuse treatment program. The matter was
referred to probation for a supplemental report and set for sentencing the following month.
       In February 2023, probation submitted a supplemental report outlining defendant’s
multiple failures to report as directed, listing several presumptive positive drug tests, and
describing defendant’s numerous failures to attend scheduled substance abuse intake
assessments. The supplemental report detailed her extensive criminal history from 2006
to 2023 and found that her risk to reoffend was high.
       Although defendant requested reinstatement on probation, the supplemental report
noted that the trial court would have to make an unusual case finding given her two prior
felony convictions. Probation did not recommend reinstatement, however, as defendant
appeared willing to comply with probationary conditions only when she saw fit. She had
been given multiple opportunities to enroll and participate in substance abuse treatment
programs but failed to do so. She had also exceeded the maximum local custody time.

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Because probation concluded that the factors in aggravation outweighed any factors in
mitigation, probation recommended the court impose the midterm of three years for the
corporal injury offense in case 831 and a consecutive eight months for the obstruction
offense in case 898.
       Judge Scrogin, who had reinstated defendant on probation following her first
violation, conducted the sentencing hearing on the second violation of probation on
February 6, 2023. At the hearing, defense counsel requested reinstatement on probation
despite the probation department’s recommendation to the contrary. Counsel argued that
although defendant did not complete the program probation had recommended, she had
obtained employment and was now working on an online video program through that
employer addressing life skills, drug treatment, and coping with stress triggers. Counsel
believed that given another chance, defendant would comply with whatever program
probation recommended for her.
       The prosecutor argued that the court could not make an unusual case finding under
the circumstances. He argued that defendant’s history showed she had a “major drug
problem,” which probation had repeatedly tried to help defendant address but that she had
not been cooperative. Defendant’s purported unemployment appeared unreliable, and she
had been testing positive throughout the probationary period.
       Defense counsel responded that while defendant’s employment sounded “dubious,”
she obtained it through a church, and once she started attending church, she had tested
negative on a few occasions. At no time during the hearing, however, did defendant argue
that Judge Scrogin had to consider Judge Wirtschafter’s prior unusual case finding or the
basis for such a finding, before Judge Scrogin could decline to reinstate defendant on
probation.
       Before ruling, Judge Scrogin recounted defendant’s lengthy criminal history, her
previous violations of probation, and her failure to comply with the law; the court
observed that she did not abstain from using controlled substances and she did not

                                             6
participate in or complete treatment as ordered. While Judge Scrogin had hoped that
defendant would follow through and successfully complete probation after the judge had
reinstated defendant on probation following her first violation, the court concluded
defendant was not likely to do so. Judge Scrogin “[could not] make an unusual case
finding to reinstate her on a grant of probation,” reasoning that defendant “won’t show up,
she doesn’t cooperate, and [the court did not] think she’s taking her problem so seriously.”
       The trial court denied reinstatement in both matters and sentenced defendant to
three years on the corporal injury offense and a consecutive eight months (one-third the
midterm) for the obstruction offense. The court imposed various fees and fines and
awarded credits. Defendant timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court erred in declining to reinstate her on probation
without considering the basis for the unusual case finding made when defendant was
initially placed on probation by a different judge. She primarily relies on People v.
Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, where our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s
multiple convictions and death sentence for numerous heinous offenses, including murder,
attempted murder, rape, and arson, because of errors in granting the defendant’s request to
represent himself. (Id. at pp. 290-291.) The Supreme Court, noting that there are limits
on the authority of one superior court judge to set aside the order of another judge of the
same court (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4), found that the judge abused its discretion by
granting the defendant’s second Faretta4 motion to represent himself while his
competence to stand trial was still in question. The judge did so without considering a
different judge’s denial of the defendant’s first Faretta motion or the extensive psychiatric
evidence on which the first judge based its conclusion that defendant could not represent
himself because he had a mental disorder that prevented him from competently waiving

4 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.

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counsel. (Waldon, at pp. 294-303, 306-307 [“When a trial court exercises its authority to
reconsider another judge’s ruling, the trial court must, at minimum, consider the basis for
the prior ruling”].)
       We are skeptical of whether Waldon applies here given the obvious differences in
the issues presented in that capital case. Waldon dealt with the fundamental right to
adequate representation during trial while the defendant’s competency was yet to be
decided while this case involves a trial court’s discretionary sentencing choice following a
probation violation for a defendant represented by counsel during the proceedings. (See
People v. Casper (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38, 43 [it is axiomatic that a case is not authority for
propositions not considered].)
       In any event, we need not decide whether Waldon controls here because, as the
People argue and we agree, defendant failed to preserve the issue for review.5 That is,
defendant never objected below that Judge Scrogin had to consider Judge Wirtschafter’s
prior unusual case finding for purposes of determining whether to reinstate probation, and
she cannot belatedly do so for the first time on appeal.
       “Sentencing choices such as the one at issue here, whether to reinstate probation or
sentence a defendant to prison, are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Downey
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909.) “A denial of a grant of probation generally rests within
the broad discretion of the trial court and should not and will not be disturbed on appeal
except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.” (People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d 796, 807.) The same abuse of discretion
standard applies when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether a case is an
unusual one permitting probation. (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th
822, 831.)

5 Defendant does not address the People’s forfeiture argument in her reply brief.

                                              8
       Ordinarily, “complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercised its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356.) In such circumstances,
applying the forfeiture or waiver doctrine on appeal is appropriate because “[r]outine
defects in the court’s statement of reasons [for a sentencing choice] are easily prevented
and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Id. at p. 353.)
       Here, defendant never argued below that Judge Scrogin could not decline to
reinstate probation or otherwise find that the case was no longer unusual unless and until
she considered the basis for Judge Wirtschafter’s original unusual case finding based on
defendant’s mental health issues and the possibility that she was also a victim and
perpetrator of domestic violence. Had defendant raised this issue, Judge Scrogin could
have easily addressed the matter. By failing to do so, we conclude defendant forfeited the
issue on appeal.
                                        DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                    /s/
                                                   Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Hull, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Mesiwala, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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