Court Opinion

ID: 9758629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:38:29.297751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:53.567589
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
Coy Coley purported to be an eyewitness to the incident which included the fatal stabbing of John Alicea. Coley *333testified at the preliminary hearing and identified Whalen Laws as the person who stabbed the victim. Called at trial by the prosecution, Coley stated that he “didn’t really see what happened” and that he did not know whether the stabber, a “light skinned person”, was in the courtroom. The trial judge asked six questions of the witness in an attempt to clarify what Coley meant by the response “I don’t know.” The judge overruled a defense motion for a mistrial, observing that the witness had not been responsive and that his answers indicated he was either frightened or reluctant to get involved. In answer to another question from the court, the witness said flatly “I do not see the man.” At this the Assistant District Attorney pleaded surprise and requested permission to cross-examine Coley with the testimony he had given at the preliminary hearing. This was allowed,1 but after the court, out of the presence of the jury, had warned Coley concerning the crime of perjury and the attendant penalties for its commission.2 When the trial was resumed before the jury and the Commonwealth cross-examined Coley on the basis of his testimony at the prelimi*334nary hearing, the witness then identified Whalen Laws as the person who had stabbed Alicea.
The Court holds that “the trial court’s questioning of Coley and the use of perjury warnings unduly pressured Coley to retráct the testimony he initially gave at trial, and to adopt his testimony from the preliminary hearing.” Opinion of the Court, ante at 816. This conclusion involves some clairvoyance as to the witness’ state of mind that I do not share; I am unable to see how the Court can reach such a finding with any confidence from this record, and therefore dissent.
The question, manifestly, concerns the permissible degree of involvement by the trial judge in the conduct of a case. I agree that the guidelines are well articulated by Mr. Justice, (later Chief Justice) Kephart, speaking for the Court in Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 507-08, 123 A. 486, 487 (1924):
“A judge in a jury trial has a right to interrogate witnesses. It sometimes becomes his duty to do so . . . But a judge may so conduct an examination as to make it an abuse of discretion, requiring a new trial.
“Witnesses should be interrogated by the judge only when he conceives the interest of justice so requires. It is better to permit counsel to bring out the evidence and clear up disputed points on cross-examination unaided by the court; but where an important fact is indefinite or a disputed point needs to be clarified, the court may see that it is done by taking part in the examination. The practice of a judge entering into the trial of a case as an advocate is emphatically disapproved. The judge occupies an exalted and dignified position; he is the one person to whom the jury, with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute impartiality. An expression indicative of favor or condemnation is quickly reflected in the jury box and at counsel table. To depart from the clear line of duty through questions, expressions or conduct, contravenes the orderly administration of jus*335tice. It has a tendency to take from the parties the right to a fair and impartial trial, as guaranteed under our system of jurisprudence. Judges should refrain from extended examination of witnesses; they should not, during trial, indicate an opinion on the merits, a doubt as to the witnesses’ credibility, or do anything to indicate a leaning to one side or the other, without explaining to the jury that all of these matters are for them.”
Following these principles, we have held that “[i]t is always the right and sometimes the duty of a trial judge to interrogate witnesses, although, of course, questioning from the bench should not show bias or feeling nor be unduly protracted.” Commonwealth v. Watts, 358 Pa. 92, 96, 56 A.2d 81, 83 (1948). Accord, Commonwealth v. Miller, 442 Pa. 95, 97, 275 A.2d 328, 329 (1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 438 Pa. 52, 63, 265 A.2d 101, 107 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whyatt, 235 Pa.Super. 211, 219-21, 340 A.2d 871, 876-77 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lanza, 228 Pa.Super. 300, 302-03, 323 A.2d 178, 179 (1974). The extent to which a trial judge chooses to question a witness is within the trial judge’s discretion, and this Court will not find error in the exercise of such discretion except in cases of clear abuse. Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 455, 192 A.2d 693, 702 (1963). When the questions asked by the trial judge are not too numerous and are designed “to clarify the witness’s testimony to assist the jury in a more intelligent understanding of its import,” Commonwealth v. Miller, supra, 442 Pa. at 97, 275 A.2d at 329, there is no error.
Viewed against the teaching of these cases, I am satisfied that the Court’s finding of excessive and prejudicial questioning of Coy Coley by the trial judge is without adequate basis. As indicated above, Coley gave contradictory and ambiguous responses when asked by the Assistant District Attorney whether he saw the perpetrator of the crime in the courtroom. The total amount of questioning by the judge in front of the jury, comprising barely four pages of testimony, was not unduly protracted, nor did any of the questions *336asked reflect feeling or bias on the part of the judge. This case is not one in which the trial judge took on the role of an advocate. Commonwealth v. McCoy, 401 Pa. 100, 162 A.2d 636 (1960); Commonwealth v. Hales, 384 Pa. 153, 119 A.2d 520 (1956). What the trial court was attempting to do was merely to clarify for the jury and himself what Coley meant when he responded “I don’t know.” Nothing in the nature of the questions or the manner in which they were asked conveyed to the jury the judge’s views on whether Coley was telling the truth. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 468 Pa. 453, 364 A.2d 281 (1976); Commonwealth v. Butler, 448 Pa. 128, 291 A.2d 89 (1972). Thus I cannot agree that the trial judge abused his discretion in questioning Coy Coley as he did.
With respect to the perjury warning, appellant argues that by it the trial judge in effect was telling the witness that unless he identified appellant he would be charged with perjury. So interpreted, the warning allegedly coerced Coley into changing his prior testimony that he did not see in the courtroom the perpetrator of the killing. The majority accepts this argument. For the reasons which follow, I do not.
In Mooney v. United States, 320 F.Supp. 316 (E.D.Mo. 1970), the trial judge instructed the defendant’s brother, outside the presence of the jury, on the possible consequences of perjury. The district court there held that “[sjince the court’s advice was given after [defendant’s] brother had completely contradicted the testimony of the police officer, it is apparent that such instruction was necessary and well within the discretion of the trial judge.” Mooney, supra at 318. See also Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa.Super. 293, 323-24, 22 A.2d 204, 219 (1941). In the present case, the trial judge decided to advise Coley concerning perjury only after Coley had flatly contradicted the sworn testimony he himself had given at the preliminary hearing. In so deciding, I cannot believe that the trial judge abused his discretion.
*337Appellant characterizes the trial judge’s remarks with regard to perjury as being, in effect, a threat of prosecution. The record is to the contrary. The judge never told Coley that he did not believe him and that if he did not change his testimony and identify appellant he would be prosecuted for perjury, nor did he imply as much. All the judge did was to state in general, neutral and declarative terms that to lie (i. e., tell an untruth knowingly) under oath is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Such a statement, in the context of this case, is properly to be construed as protective of the witness rather than as an attempt to induce a change in his testimony favorable to the prosecution.3
Finally, I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that the advice given by the trial judge to Coley “pressured” him into changing his testimony. Following his comments regarding perjury the trial judge questioned the witness, still out of the jury’s presence, as to whether his preliminary hearing testimony or the testimony given before the jury was true, and whether or not he wished to change the latter in any way. Coley replied that he did not want to change his previous trial testimony. It was not until after his preliminary hearing testimony had been read to him for a second time and he had been cross-examined by the Assistant District Attorney in open court before the jury that Coley altered his trial testimony to coincide with what he had sworn to at the preliminary hearing. Under these circumstances, I am satisfied that no action of the trial judge intimidated Coley into identifying appellant as the assailant of the decedent. In short, the learned trial judge did not, in my view, overstep the bounds of propriety either in his questioning of the witness or his warning to him concerning perjury.
*338My review of the record and briefs persuades me that the other issues raised by appellant are also without merit. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
O’BRIEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant does not here challenge the propriety of allowing the Commonwealth to plead surprise and cross-examine its own witness.

. There were two warnings. The first was as follows:
“BY THE COURT:
Q. Do you know what perjury is?
A. No.
Q. Perjury, generally speaking, means lying under oath. It’s a crime in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania punishable by both or either prison or fine or both. Do you understand that?
A. Right.” N.T. Vol. II at 39.
The second mention of perjury was apparently not addressed directly to Coley:
“THE COURT: . . . And I want him [the witness] to understand — that’s the only reason I sent the jury out — a person who lies under oath is subjecting himself to perjury prosecution, which carries a substantially severe penalty, including prison—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object.
THE COURT: —and/or fines, if a person does lie under oath. Now, he knows all this and he said what he said here today is what is the truth. ...” N.T. Vol. II at 46.
There is no indication in the record as to whether Coley heard this second statement by the judge concerning perjury.

. It is to be noted that Coley, upon inquiry by the judge, responded that he did not know what perjury was. In light of this, it is quite possible that Coley was operating under the mistaken belief that he was free to alter his testimony without running any risk of prosecution. Merely to inform a witness of the possible consequences of a particular course of action where, as here, the witness is ignorant of the consequences is not error.