Court Opinion

ID: 9905360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 14:02:50.472299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:12.750302
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2020-3741
                  _____________________________

GULF MANAGEMENT, INC., and
GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES,
INC.,

    Appellants,

    v.

TALMADGE WALL,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims.
Mark A. Massey, Judge.

Date of Accident: March 18, 2009.

                        November 29, 2023

TANENBAUM, J.

     Both Gulf Management, Inc. and its servicing agent,
Gallagher Basset Services, (collectively referred to herein as Gulf
Management) appeal an order of the judge of compensation claims
(“JCC”) awarding Talmadge Wall permanent total disability
benefits (“PTD”) under section 440.15(1), Florida Statutes. Gulf
Management asserts several grounds for setting aside the order,
but essentially, the grounds are variations of a “sufficiency-of-the-
evidence” argument. That is, Gulf Management, in several ways,
attacks how the JCC considered and weighed the live testimony
and other evidence given at the final merits hearing, and it also
contends that the JCC misapplied the so-called “Blake methods.”
See Blake v. Merck & Co., 43 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). We
affirm because the JCC’s findings of fact have support in
substantial evidence found in the record, and his conclusions
properly applied the governing statute to those facts. We hasten,
though, to highlight two important points in the analysis that
follows. One is our role in conducting judicial review of an
adjudicative order stemming from a quasi-judicial administrative
proceeding like the one had here. The other has to do with the role
that the Blake methods play in applying section 440.15(1) to the
evidence when determining a PTD claim.

                                   I

     First, our role. The JCC is an administrative hearing officer
vested by the Legislature with quasi-judicial authority and tasked
with adjudicating a dispute between an injured worker and the
employer over a claim for benefits under chapter 440. See
§§ 440.192, 440.25, 440.29, 440.33, 440.45, Fla. Stat.; cf. Art. V, § 1,
Fla. Const. (providing that “administrative officers [] may be
granted quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the
functions of their office”). As an adjudicator, the JCC conducts a
final hearing at which he or she receives and weighs the evidence
presented and makes findings of fact material to the dispute.
See §§ 440.25(4), 440.29, 440.33, Fla. Stat. “[T]he weighing of
evidence and judging of the credibility of witnesses . . . are solely
the prerogative of the [JCC] as finder of fact.” Strickland v. Fla. A
& M Univ., 799 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). “It is the
hearing officer’s function to consider all the evidence presented,
resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible
inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact
based on competent, substantial evidence.” Heifetz v. Dep’t of Bus.
Regul., Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 475 So. 2d 1277,
1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

     By law, we have the authority to review an order of a JCC. See
§ 440.271, Fla. Stat.; cf. Art. V, § 4(b)(2), Fla. Const. (“District
courts of appeal shall have the power of direct review of
administrative action, as prescribed by general law.”). This judicial
review is still appellate review, and it is limited with respect to the
JCC’s adjudication of disputed facts.

                                   2
    [W]henever any person . . . may be clothed with authority
    to hear testimony and charged by law with the duty of
    deciding questions of fact . . . [he] is at least acting in a
    quasi-judicial capacity and as such fact-finding arbiter
    his . . . findings are entitled to great weight and should
    not be reversed unless there is no competent, substantial
    evidence which supports such findings.

U.S. Cas. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d 741, 744–45 (Fla. 1951).
“This is so because [the JCC] is the only person charged with the
burden and responsibility of hearing the witnesses and making
findings of facts.” Id. at 744. “The fact-finding arbiter is usually in
a better position than the reviewing body to judge the ability,
experience and reputation of the various [] witnesses who appear
personally before him and to determine the weight which should
be given their testimony.” Id. at 745.

     Under our deferential appellate review, then, where the JCC
has made “administrative findings” based at least in part on live
testimony, we do not consider the evidence anew. Instead, we make
a legal assessment of whether someone reasonably could reach the
conclusion the JCC did about a certain fact when faced with the
evidence submitted. “The general rule is that administrative
findings, in order to be upheld by the courts, must be supported by
substantial evidence,” meaning “there must be evidence which
supports a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can
be reasonably inferred.” Laney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for
Orange Cnty., 15 So. 2d 748, 753 (Fla. 1943); see also De Groot v.
Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957) (explaining that, in the
context of an administrative proceeding, “evidence relied upon to
sustain the ultimate finding should be sufficiently relevant and
material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to
support the conclusion reached”); cf. Nelson v. State ex rel. Quigg,
23 So. 2d 136, 136 (Fla. 1945) (“We have held, and it seems to be
an almost universal rule, that the findings of fact made by an
administrative board, bureau, or commission, in compliance with
law, will not be disturbed on appeal if such findings are sustained
by substantial evidence.”); Adams v. Wagner, 129 So. 2d 129, 131
(Fla. 1961) (same). We look only at whether there was such
evidence before the JCC “in character, weight, or amount, as will
legally justify the judicial or official action demanded.” Tibbs v.

                                  3
State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981), aff’d sub nom. Tibbs v.
Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982).

     In other words, we do not re-weigh the evidence; that is a more
subjective task reserved entirely to the fact-finder. Id.; see Catron
Beverages, Inc. v. Maynard, 395 So. 2d 261, 262 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA
1981) (“Perhaps no principle of appellate review is more
universally followed than that which proscribes an appellate court
from substituting its judgment for that of the trier of fact on factual
issues supported by competent, substantial evidence.”). Rather, we
will affirm a JCC’s findings of fact when they “are supported by
competent, substantial evidence even though, had we been the
trier of fact, we might have reached an opposite conclusion.”
Heifetz, 475 So. 2d at 1281–82; cf. Swanigan v. Dobbs House, 442
So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (explaining that even when
there is evidence in the record that supports both parties’ positions
as to the facts, and the “case could have been decided either way,
depending on the testimony and evidence accepted and believed by
the” JCC, we “do not retry the claim at the appellate level and
substitute our judgment for that of the [JCC] on factual issues
supported by competent, substantial evidence, and appeals asking
us to do so are frivolous”); see also Howard v. Green's Tractor Co.,
290 So. 2d 46, 48 (Fla. 1973) (observing the contradictions in
evidence and that “the conflict could have been resolved by” the
JCC “in a manner opposite from that in which he resolved it” but
that the role of an appellate court is not “to re-weigh the evidence
to see if we agree with the particular manner in which such
conflicts were resolved”).

     Similarly, on appellate review, we do not consider “whether
the record contains evidence which could be interpreted to support
the arguments rejected by the JCC.” Frederick v. United Airlines,
688 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); see Swanigan, 442 So. 2d
at 1027 (“We do not review whether there was competent,
substantial evidence to support the claim disallowed by the [JCC];
we only review whether the record contains competent, substantial
evidence to support the [JCC’s] order.); Mercy Hosp. v. Holmes, 679
So. 2d 860, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Once again we remind
counsel of the basic premise that the standard of review in worker’s
compensation cases is whether competent substantial evidence
supports the decision below, not whether it is possible to recite

                                  4
contradictory record evidence which supported the arguments
rejected below.”).

                                  II

      Now we get to the role of Blake in a PTD analysis. Gulf
Management’s arguments in part treat Blake as setting out a rigid,
categorical methodology for establishing PTD—as if it sets out
three separate and independent ways for doing so, each with its
own elements that must be strictly adhered to. To be clear, though,
it is section 440.15(1)(b), not Blake, that governs how an employee
can establish entitlement to PTD benefits. Under that paragraph,
unless the employee has suffered one or more of the enumerated
injuries, he or she must establish “that he or she is not able to
engage in at least sedentary employment, within a 50-mile radius
of the employee’s residence, due to his or her physical limitation.”
§ 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). 1 This is a fact question that must
be resolved by the JCC based on the evidence presented, as we just
discussed above.

    The statute does not set out any formulaic test to govern the
PTD determination, other than what appears in the text itself.
Blake is not to the contrary. Instead, it catalogs the different forms
of proof that have been accepted as competent, substantial

    1 The Legislature enacted this provision in 2003. See ch. 2003-

412, § 18, 58–59, Laws of Fla. Between 1993 and the 2003
enactment, only catastrophic injuries qualified for PTD. See ch. 93-
415, § 20, at 118–19, Laws of Fla. Before that, going back to 1979,
a claimant could not receive PTD compensation if he or she “is
engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, gainful
employment.” Ch. 79-40, § 10, at 228, Laws of Fla. (amending
section 440.15(1)(b), Florida Statutes). The claimant had to prove
“that he or she is not able uninterruptedly to do even light work
due to physical limitation.” Id. In 1990, the Legislature added a
requirement that the work be available within one hundred miles
of the claimant’s residence. See ch. 90-201, § 20, at 934, Laws of
Fla. Of course, with the current law, that radius is fifty miles. At
all events, before 1979, unless the claimant suffered a specified
injury, PTD simply would be “determined in accordance with the
facts.” § 440.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1977).

                                  5
evidence supporting a JCC’s determination of PTD. These
categories of acceptable proof, though, are not mutually exclusive.
How could they be? The statutory text anticipates that the
claimant is going to have to prove the following: that he cannot
work at least in a sedentary job within fifty miles of his residence
and that his inability to work is tied to his limitation. The
assessment necessarily will be—and has been—a flexible one.

     All Blake did was bring forward this court’s previously
cataloguing of the flexible approach allowed to JCCs as to the
evidence on which they could rely to determine whether PTD had
been proven under the statute. See Blake, 43 So. 3d at 883 (looking
to Com. Carrier Corp. v. LaPointe, 723 So. 2d 912, 916–17 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1999), as “instructive” because of the similarities between the
pre-1994 version of the statute and the current version, and
quoting that decision’s “three ways to prove entitlement to PTD
benefits”). In applying the pre-1994 version of section 440.15, this
court observed the following:

    The cases recognize three ways to prove entitlement to
    permanent total disability benefits on account of
    industrial accidents occurring before January 1, 1994:(1)
    evidence of permanent medical incapacity to perform
    even light work uninterruptedly; (2) evidence of
    permanent work-related physical restrictions coupled
    with an exhaustive but unsuccessful job search; or (3)
    evidence of permanent work-related physical restrictions
    that, while not alone totally disabling, do preclude
    performing light work uninterruptedly, when combined
    with vocational factors.

LaPointe, 723 So. 2d at 916–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing
Herrera v. Hojo Inn Maingate, 680 So. 2d 439, 440–41 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1996), and Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Liggon, 668 So. 2d
259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)).

     Herrera before that had merely noted that PTD could “be
proven by medical evidence that a claimant is unable to do light
work uninterruptedly due to physical limitations,” but even if
there were not those full restrictions, “evidence of a lengthy yet
unsuccessful job search” could suffice. Id., 680 So. 2d at 440
(citations omitted). The court added that a claimant could prove

                                 6
entitlement to PTD compensation through “a combination of
medical proof of a substantial permanent impairment and
vocational evidence that a claimant is unemployable.” Id.
(citations omitted). This recitation, in turn, was just an overview
of the flexible evidentiary approach that already had developed
over time under the pre-1993 statute (again, the text of which is
similar to the current statute).

    In fact, this court early on rejected a rigid requirement that
there be medical restrictions against even light work to prove PTD:

    We do not read the terms of the statute to limit
    permanent total disability compensation to those
    claimants whose doctors impose medical restrictions
    against “light work.” Such a construction would collide
    with the basic long-standing statutory definition of
    disability: an incapacity to earn to which a compensable
    injury contributes. It would also collide with the terms of
    the 1979 amended provision for permanent total
    disability above quoted, which restricts such
    compensation when claimant is “physically capable of ...
    gainful employment.” (e.s.) The amended language does
    clearly emphasize the requirement that such disability
    shall be causally related not only to the compensable
    accident and injury but also to the resulting physical
    limitation.

H.S. Camp & Sons v. Flynn, 450 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1st DCA
1984). Some years later, the court recognized the flexibility set out
in Flynn by explaining that proof of the claimant’s engagement in
“a lengthy, exhaustive job search”—to no avail—could serve as an
evidentiary substitute for medical evidence that the claimant. U.S.
Foundry & Mfg. Co. v. Serpa, 564 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA
1990). “Where there is no medical evidence that the claimant is
unable to work, she is required to make a conscientious effort to
return to work before she can establish that she is in fact unable
to work.” Id.

     This flexible, holistic approach to PTD broadened further in
this court’s assessment in Carter v. City of Venice, 584 So. 2d 577
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991):

                                 7
    [T]he claimant consistently attempted to find suitable
    employment within his physical limitations, but met with
    no success. Moreover, the job search evidence was
    bolstered by the above described uncontradicted
    testimony of the vocational counselor and the
    rehabilitation nurse, coupled with the claimant's
    unsuccessful efforts to return to work for the City of
    Venice, the subject employer. Given these factors,
    combined with the obvious difficulties which confront a
    functionally illiterate 54–year–old man seeking to secure
    a light, sedentary position, it is clear that claimant’s job
    search satisfied the standard articulated in Serpa.

Id. at 578.

     Around the same time, this court rejected as too inflexible
even the requirement that there be proof of “a lengthy and
exhaustive work search” in the absence of evidence of total medical
restrictions. Pan Am. Bank v. Glinski, 584 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1991). This argument too “misconceive[d] the nature of the
proof required to establish the essential statutory elements of that
award.” Id. According to the court, where “the medical testimony
established that claimant was suffering from a substantial
permanent impairment due to the injury that severely restricted
her ability to engage in physical activities,” a vocational expert’s

    opinion as to the claimant’s employability in the job
    market while taking into account her physical
    limitations, including those imposed by [her physician],
    was competent substantial evidence sufficient to support
    a finding that claimant was totally disabled from earning
    the wages she was receiving at the time of her injury.

Id. The court noted that “[t]here simply is no legal requirement
that claimant is limited to either presenting medical testimony
that she cannot return to work or performing an exhaustive work
search before qualifying for permanent total disability benefits.”
Id. at 53–54 (first emphasis supplied). “The combination of the
medical proof presented here coupled with the other evidence
received by the judge was legally sufficient to support the award
in this case.” Id. at 54.

                                 8
     The Glinski panel indeed acknowledged that this approach
followed on the flexible analysis taken by a prior panel, in Bill’s
Equip. & Rentals v. Teel, 498 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
The former panel noted that “[w]hile there was no specific medical
evidence of claimant’s total inability to work, the physical
restrictions placed on his activities had the effect of eliminating all
types of employment within claimant’s capacity and for which he
would be qualified.” Id. The court explained its disposition as
follows:

    Claimant is hampered by his limited schooling and
    advanced age, and has no job skills which do not involve
    repetitive twisting, bending, and lifting more than ten
    pounds. The record reveals that claimant sought
    employment commensurate with his work experience and
    job skills, while the employer made no effort to obtain
    employment for claimant. Based on these facts, the
    deputy commissioner did not err in excusing claimant’s
    failure to more actively seek employment. Where an effort
    to find employment would be a futile and useless gesture,
    the deputy may excuse claimant from the requirement of
    a work search as a predicate for disability benefits.

Id. (emphasis supplied).

     As we close this part, we note the flexibility given to JCCs
under section 440.15(1), as summarized in Liggon, the other
decision cited by LaPointe: “In assessing entitlement to PTD
benefits, the court may consider factors such as a claimant’s actual
physical impairment, work history, education and training, ability
to do and obtain other work, and age.” Liggon, 668 So. 2d at 264
(quoting Shaw v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 609 So. 2d 683, 685
(Fla. 1st DCA 1992), which also took a holistic approach to the
evidence in assessing the sufficiency of proof in support of PTD).

     The enumeration of “three ways” (in Blake or LaPointe), then,
should be treated as guidelines for what a JCC may consider to be
sufficient proof to demonstrate PTD under section 440.15(1)(b).
When determining a PTD claim, the JCC must consider the overall
picture painted by the evidence presented. He may weigh the
evidence regarding the employee’s efforts at conducting a job
search, together with evidence of his injury and disability plus

                                  9
testimony from a vocational expert, and reach a conclusion of
whether the employee has established what section 440.15(1)(b)
requires.

     Our overall point here is that the categories of proof identified
in Blake for PTD claims should not be read as being restrictive.
They are not to operate as separate theories of “recovery,” so to
speak, with each designated theory carrying its own legal elements
that must be proven to prevail on a PTD claim. We reject the
appellant’s apparent effort to treat the categories restated in Blake
in this way—which would inappropriately transform these
guidelines into extra-statutory elements of proof that must be
correctly applied as if they were themselves the law.

                                 III

     With all of this in mind, we look at whether there was
competent, substantial evidence to support the JCC’s factual
findings and his determination that Wall established he qualified
for PTD benefits. We note initially that there were several live
witnesses, including Wall and both his and Gulf Management’s
vocational experts. The JCC, then, was in the best position to
observe the witnesses and assess the credibility of their testimony.
As we said at the top, we cannot touch these assessments on
appeal.

     The JCC’s findings were supported by the following evidence.
Wall, a former service consultant at Lexus of Tampa Bay, suffered
a compensable work-related injury on March 18, 2009, when he
sustained injuries to his head, right arm, and left ankle. Following
the accident, Wall received temporary total disability (“TTD”)
benefits while recovering from surgery on his right hand. He was
released to work with restrictions of lifting no more than twenty-
five pounds and no climbing in September 2010 and returned to
Gulf Management, which was doing business as Lexus of Tampa
Bay. At this time, he was placed at maximum medical
improvement (“MMI”) with a fifteen percent impairment rating.

     Wall continued with Lexus of Tampa Bay until July 2016,
when he was terminated for attempting to direct customers to
services off-site. After his termination, Wall worked a series of jobs
in the Tampa Bay area. He worked at Gordon Chevrolet from

                                 10
September 2016 until March 2017, Palm Harbor Chevrolet from
July 2018 to September 2018, and Goody’s Fleet Solutions from
September 2018 until November 2018, when he was terminated
following a probationary period. He also ran his own concierge
services business from August 2016 until July 2018. Wall has not
held employment since leaving Goody’s Fleet Solutions in 2018.
Due to worsening symptoms from the injury, Wall underwent
surgery on his right hand in January 2020. He was placed at MMI
on April 20, 2020, with permanent restrictions of lifting no more
than 4 pounds with his right arm. No restrictions were placed on
his left hand.

     Wall has held four different jobs, including self-employment,
since his termination from Lexus of Tampa Bay. During these
periods of employment, there were also substantial periods of
unemployment. Between May 2017 and August 2017, Wall applied
for five jobs. In 2019, he applied for one job, at Gator Ford in
Seffner. In 2020, Wall did not apply for any jobs. Over the course
of four years, Wall applied for a total of six jobs, the majority
shortly after his termination. While no records were kept of his job
searches, Wall stated he also searched Indeed.com and
Monster.com for employment within his field and claimed to have
made between 50 and 100 contacts. According to Wall’s testimony,
he searched for jobs within his previous field of employment,
relating to car maintenance and sales. His searches were made
without consideration for the types of job he could still perform
within his restrictions.

     The JCC conceded that Wall’s job searches were “on the low
side.” Yet, the JCC concluded that based on Wall’s subsequent
employment after termination from Lexus of Tampa Bay,
motivation to find work, and good faith attempt to continue
looking, he had satisfied the requirements of an exhaustive job
search. The JCC admitted that the number of applications was on
the “low side” and “out of the 52 months that have transpired since
his termination in July 2016, there have been approximately 38
months during which claimant was unemployed. This averages out
to 1.3 to 2.6 contacts per month.” Based on Wall’s search history
and scattered employment since termination, the JCC found the
number of contacts to be “reasonable and sufficient.”

                                11
     The JCC also accepted the testimony of Wall’s vocational
expert, Rebecca Balter (who testified in person) over that of Gulf
Management’s expert, John Roberts (who also testified in person).
The JCC found Balter’s opinion regarding his “employability is
both more realistic and more objective,” and relied on the “caution
and limitations” of Wall’s doctors “as to type, capacity and volume
especially as it pertains to writing and typing activities.” She had
considered Wall’s restrictions and limitations and conducted a
transferable skills analysis. This led her to conclude that due to
the accommodations that would have to be made and his limitation
in the use of his right hand for writing or computer operation for
any extended period, he is unable to compete successfully for work
in the open job market in his area.

     Notably, Balter considered Wall’s online job searches and the
fact that Wall previously had secured employment three different
times after his termination from Lexus of Tampa Bay, all in the
automotive field. According to Balter, though, the type of work that
Wall performed in these positions fell outside of his current
medical restrictions, because the positions required repetitive and
frequent movements and regular typing and writing. Balter
accepted the restrictions of Wall’s doctor to low-capacity, low-
volume work, including a prohibition of lifting more than four
pounds. These restrictions, Balter believed, resulted in his
inability to engage in even sedentary employment. When asked
about potential re-training options, Balter responded that she did
not see that option being successful because those positions would
require the same accommodations Wall was unlikely to receive in
his current field. In addition, Balter noted that in trying to secure
employment, Wall would face difficulties relating to his recent
absence from the workforce, expired work-related certifications,
and inability to have procured more than three jobs in his field.

     There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the JCC’s
determination. The JCC considered all of the evidence together
and specified in his compensation order how he weighed and
resolved conflicting evidence, where it existed. We are not here to
second-guess this. Of course, the JCC, as the trier of fact with live
witnesses before him, was entitled to accept Balter’s opinion
testimony over Roberts’s testimony. The JCC, in fact, explained
how he made that call. As the supreme court has explained:

                                 12
    The fact-finding arbiter is usually in a better position
    than the reviewing body to judge the ability, experience
    and reputation of the various so-called expert witnesses
    who appear personally before him and to determine the
    weight which should be given their testimony. One doctor
    may have a long list of degrees behind his name, while
    another has but few, However, the latter might, by his
    demeanor on the witness stand and by his freedom and
    clarity of expression, disclose a familiarity with the
    subject under discussion which far exceeds that of the
    ostensibly better educated theorist.

U.S. Cas. Co., 55 So. 2d at 745 (misspelling corrected).

     The JCC also was candid about the weakness of the job-search
evidence, characterizing the intensity of the search as “on the low
side.” It is equally clear to us that even though the JCC tried to
keep     the    job-search     and     the   vocational   analyses
compartmentalized, the JCC ultimately considered the weaker job-
search testimony from Wall with the explanation given by Balter
along with her assessment of Wall vocationally. See GCC
Beverages v. Simmons, 571 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
(explaining that nothing “establishes any absolute number of
minimum or average monthly contacts as a threshold requirement
for an adequate work search” and that this court has “cautioned
against such a mechanical approach, emphasizing instead that the
adequacy of a work search is a factual issue which is dependent
upon the totality of circumstances, including quality and context
as well as number of job contacts, in each case”).

     We may have reached a different conclusion, as the trier of
fact, about whether, under the circumstances, Wall’s job search
was exhaustive and unsuccessful. There, however, was enough
substantial evidence submitted to the JCC about the overall
picture and circumstances that Wall was facing—including
Balter’s testimony—to support the JCC’s conclusion, even if the
conclusion that Gulf Management urges also finds support in the
evidence.

    AFFIRMED.

                                13
M.K. THOMAS and NORDBY, JJ., concur. 2

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Tiffany Hawks, MKRS Law, Coral Gables, for Appellants.

Bradley G. Smith and Nicolette E. Tsambis, Smith, Feddeler &
Smith, Lakeland, for Appellee.

    2  Judges M.K. Thomas and Nordby substituted for Judges
Makar and Jay, who were recommissioned as judges of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal. Judges Thomas and Nordby have viewed
the digital recording of oral argument.

                              14