Court Opinion

ID: 9757199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:24:20.461606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.916193
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Associate Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority that the Board erred in this case in effectively disregarding petitioner’s sworn testimony before the Illinois hearing referee without having the benefit of any findings or any type of a credibility evaluation from that referee. Nonetheless, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s direction to the Board “to pay petitioner full benefits.”
When a claim is made for unemployment benefits, an initial determination as to a claimant’s apparent entitlement is made by the Board under D.C.Code 1972 Supp., § 46-311 (b). Such a determination is essentially a mathematical computation, based upon a claimant’s wage and employment record for a base period.1
In addition to providing that an initial determination shall be made as to a claimant’s benefits, among other provisions the amended § 46-311(b) states:
If, subsequent to such initial determination, benefits with respect to any week for which a claim has been filed are denied for reasons other than matters included in the initial determination, the claimant shall be promptly notified of the denial and the reasons therefor, and may appeal therefrom .... (Emphasis added.)
In this case, the Board’s decision apparently denied benefits to the petitioner for the period March 7 through June 6, 1970. As described in the preceding opinion, the basis for such a denial was the Board’s conclusion that petitioner was not sufficiently active in seeking employment during that period, and hence was ineligible to be paid the benefits to which she otherwise would have been entitled. D.C.Code 1967, § 46-309(d)2
The inclination to agree with bringing the entire proceeding to a conclusion is strong. Considering the costs to the government of petitioner’s three appeals to this court and the intervening agency proceedings, it is apparent that the denial of a portion of petitioner’s benefits has been many times more burdensome economically than the payment thereof would have been.3 Nonetheless, it is the Board, rather than this court, which is empowered to determine eligibility under § 46-309. In my view, our role ends when we determine whether or not the Board committed reversible error. Having concluded that it did, I believe that we should not go beyond remanding the case for further application of the Board’s expertise. E. g., Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 60 S.Ct. 437, 84 L.Ed. 656 (1940); McBride v. Smith, 405 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1968). Such a belief is reinforced in this case by the fact that the record makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine definitively the precise period for *231which petitioner was denied benefits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s direction that the Board pay benefits to the petitioner for the period in question.4

. This assumes the accuracy of the information given to the Board by the claimant. If the information is inaccurate, a claimant’s former employer is entitled to be heard. Id.

. Subsequent to that particular period, in the Board’s view, petitioner’s employment-seeking activities were sufficient to sustain her eligibility. She received a total of 11 weekly checks in the amount of $55 each. Those payments terminated when she became employed on August 25, 1970.

.It should be stressed, however, that the Board has an obligation to scrutinize claims carefully, and to limit the payment of benefits to those to which a claimant legitimately is entitled. As expressed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277, 281 (1953):
The basic policy of the law is advanced as well when benefits are denied in improper cases as when they are allowed in proper eases.

. It is recognized that benefits were ordered by this court to be paid in Simmons v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, 292 A.2d 797 (1972). However, that case is factually distinguishable from this one. In Simmons, the claimant liad been discharged from his employment, and the Board relied upon evidence of misconduct to disqualify him for benefits for six weeks under D.C.Code 1907, § 40-310 (b). This court concluded that the burden of proving misconduct was on the employer. The court's holding that the burden had not been met removed the misconduct disqualification, thereby making payment of the benefits appropriate.