Court Opinion

ID: 9378393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 10:08:47.038079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.128298
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                         TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 10-21-00212-CR

TIFFANY WEATHERS,
                                                           Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                           Appellee

                           From the 77th District Court
                             Freestone County, Texas
                            Trial Court No. 20-100-CR

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

       In two issues, Appellant Tiffany Weathers challenges her conviction for assault

against a peace officer, a violation of Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.01. We will affirm.

       Weathers’ conviction arose out of a physical altercation with a Teague, Texas

police officer. A jury found Weathers guilty of assault against a peace officer, and the

trial court assessed her punishment at ten years’ incarceration in the Texas Department

of Criminal Justice.
       Weathers asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her

conviction and that her due process rights were violated. Both issues are predicated on

Weathers’ argument that the State did not prove that the officer suffered a bodily injury

as the result of being struck by Weathers’ hands as required by the language of the

indictment.

       The indictment against Weathers specifically charged that she did “intentionally,

knowingly, and recklessly cause bodily injury to [the police officer] . . . by striking her

with her hand, and the defendant knew that the complainant was a police officer and

the complainant was lawfully discharging an official duty, namely attempting to arrest

Tiffany Weathers. . . .”

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a

sufficiency issue as follows:

               When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
       consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
       favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
       essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
       Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v.
       State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires
       the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly
       to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
       reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S.
       at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our
       judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
       (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must
       not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the
       cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although
       juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are
       permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each
       inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507
       S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.
       Ct. 2781); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App.

Weathers v. State                                                                        Page 2
       2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
       from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.
       Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is
       because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of
       the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State,
       323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and
       circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial
       evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the
       cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to
       support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.
       App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

              We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
       to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
       defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
       State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
       correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized
       by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of
       proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and
       adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was
       tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
       2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory
       elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment.
       Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

       The elements of the offense of assault on a peace officer are: (1) the defendant

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to a peace officer; (2) the

defendant knew the other person was a peace officer; and (3) the peace officer was

lawfully discharging official duties at the time of the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.01(a)(1), (b-2). “Section 22.01 broadly defines bodily-injury assault as any injury

caused in any way with a requisite culpable mental state.” Ortiz v. State, 623 S.W.3d

804, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing § 22.01(a)(1)). “Bodily injury” is also broadly

defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. (citing

Weathers v. State                                                                       Page 3
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8)). “Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to

establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

“The jury may infer that a victim felt or suffered physical pain because people of

common intelligence understand pain and some of the natural causes of it.” McCall v.

State, 635 S.W.3d 261, 272 (Tex. App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d); see also Fonseca v. State,

2005 WL 3440730, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 15, 2005, no pet.) (slap that “hurts”

victim provides evidence of bodily injury).

       The police officer who was the victim in this case testified as follows:

             Q.     ([PROSECUTOR]) Stopping the video at 5 minutes and 5
       seconds.
                     Right there, as you go to her, what are you trying to do?
              A. Handcuff her.
              Q. Okay. And what does she do?
              A. Hit me in my face.
              Q. Okay. And -- you said that she hit you in your face?
              A. Yes.
              Q. There, we see kind of both of her hands throw out at you.
                     Do you remember which hand she hit you with?
              A. I don't. She -- I know she pushed me with one and hit me with
       the other one.
              Q. Okay. And do you remember where on your face that it hit
       you?
              A. This area (indicating).
              Q. Okay. So you're -- you're pointing to the right side of your face.
              A. Like cheekbone area.
              Q. Cheekbone area.

       ...

               Q. ([PROSECUTOR]) Okay. And did it hurt you?
               A. Yes.

       The physical pain suffered by the police officer was sufficient to meet the

definition of bodily injury.     There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to support

Weathers v. State                                                                     Page 4
Weathers’ conviction. Additionally, there was no variance between the indictment and

the State’s evidence such that Weathers’ conviction violated due process.

       We overrule both of Weathers’ issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                         MATT JOHNSON
                                         Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,*
        Justice Johnson, and
        Justice Smith
Affirmed
*(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Judgment of the Court. A separate opinion will not
issue.)
Opinion delivered and filed March 8, 2023
Do not publish
[CR25]

Weathers v. State                                                                  Page 5