Court Opinion

ID: 9738194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:44:46.396835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.316479
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 88. (concurring!dissenting). I concur in that part of the majority opinion that concludes that Patrick Carter is due 302 days of sentence credit for the period between the date on which he finished his Illinois Driving Under the Influence (DUI) sentence, December 21, 2003, and the commencement of his Illinois armed robbery sentence, October 19, 2004.1 However, because no legal process caused Carter's custody in Illinois to be "in connection with" the Wisconsin crime2 until: (1) Illinois issued a fugitive warrant for Carter's arrest, based on the Illinois fugitive complaint, and (2) Carter had completed his Illinois DUI sentence, I dissent from the majority opinion's grant of sentence credit prior to December 21, 2003.
*42I. BACKGROUND
¶ 89. On August 30, 2005, Carter was convicted of recklessly endangering safety, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). He seeks a redetermination of the sentence credit he is due in connection with that conviction based on time he alleges to have been in custody in Illinois in connection with that crime. The majority opinion grants him 305 days of sentence credit.31 would grant him 302 days of credit. The difference may seem small, but the reason for the difference is important.
¶ 90. Carter was arrested in Illinois on December 13, 2003. That arrest was based on an Illinois probation violation warrant for a DUI conviction, dated September 3, 2002. It appears that the Illinois authorities were also aware of the Wisconsin felony warrant,4 dated July 23, 2003. First, Carter was brought before an Illinois judicial officer on the Wisconsin felony warrant on December 15, 2003.5 Carter refused to waive extradition to Wisconsin on that date.6
*43¶ 91. On December 16, 2003, pursuant to Illinois' enactment of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,7 Illinois issued a fugitive complaint and a fugitive arrest warrant against Carter.8 My dispute with the majority opinion is that it gives Carter sentence credit for December 13, 2003 through December 15, 2003, when he was not subject to legal process that caused his Illinois custody to be in connection with the alleged commission of a Wisconsin crime for which he received a sentence concurrent with the sentence for the Illinois conviction.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 92. In order to determine the appropriate amount of sentence credit to which Carter is entitled, I interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) and portions of Wis. Stat. § 976.03, the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.9 Statutory interpretation and application present questions of law. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 107, ¶ 27, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505. We independently interpret and apply statutes, while benefit-ting from the discussions in preceding judicial opinions. Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶ 8, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641.
*44B. Necessary Legal Process
¶ 93. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) establishes when sentence credit for presentencing incarceration is due. It provides: "A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."
¶ 94. The application of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) requires that I determine whether Carter was "in custody" and also whether all the days of custody were "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." See Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶ 31 (citing State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 391, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing approvingly of Gavigan's holding that § 973.155(1)(a) requires two determinations: whether the defendant was "in custody" and whether the custody was "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed").
¶ 95. Carter was arrested and taken "in custody" in Illinois on December 13, 2003. Accordingly, the first determination of whether Carter was "in custody" under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) has been met.
¶ 96. Our next task is to determine whether all the days Carter spent in custody were "in connection with" the subsequent Wisconsin conviction for reckless endangering, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). We must make this decision based on Carter's proof of legal process that held him in Illinois in connection with the Wisconsin charge of reckless endangerment. See State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 25-26, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984). As the dissent of Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler correctly points out, Carter has the burden of *45proof in this regard.10 See State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that "[t]he law places the burden for demonstrating both custody and its 'connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed, § 973.155(1)(a), Stats., on the defendant. . . .").
¶ 97. Carter's December 13, 2003 arrest was based on an Illinois probation violation warrant that resulted from a DUI conviction. That Illinois warrant was issued September 3, 2002. It appears that the Illinois authorities were aware of a Wisconsin felony warrant because they took Carter before a magistrate on December 15, 2003, on which date he refused to waive formal extradition proceedings.11
¶ 98. On December 15, 2003, Carter also was committed to the Cook County Department of Corrections to begin his sentence on the Illinois DUI conviction.12 Carter's service of his DUI sentence precluded sentence credit from December 15, 2003 through December 21, 2003, when that sentence concluded. See State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (affirming that "an offender was not entitled to sentence credit for the time spent in custody awaiting sentence on a robbery charge when he was simultaneously in custody serving a misdemeanor sentence for fleeing the scene of a crime").
¶ 99. On December 16, 2003, in preparation for formal extradition to Wisconsin, it appears that Illinois *46issued a fugitive complaint and an Illinois fugitive warrant,13 based on the outstanding Wisconsin charges. See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13.14 The function of the fugitive warrant was to arrest Carter in Illinois in order to hold him lawfully in custody in Illinois for extradition to Wisconsin. See State ex rel. Wells v. Hanley, 250 Wis. 374, 375, 27 N.W.2d 373 (1947) ("The function of the fugitive warrant under which the relator is detained is to provide for his arrest and detention pending the institution and conduct of an extradition proceeding."); see also Illinois v. Martin, 567 N.E.2d 1097, 1098-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
¶ 100. In State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975), we examined the procedure for issuing a fugitive complaint and a fugitive warrant under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and the effect of instituting that legal process. I relate such procedures here because they are illustrative of when a defendant’s custody becomes custody in connection with the Wisconsin crime for which a concurrent sentence was imposed.
¶ 101. In Hughes, the Beloit Police Department received a teletype message from Batesville, Mississippi, informing them of Mississippi warrants for the arrest of Hughes for assaulting a police officer. Id. at 664. Pursuant to that teletype, Hughes was arrested by the Beloit police. Id.
¶ 102. The Mississippi warrants and affidavits in support of those warrants arrived in Beloit shortly thereafter, whereupon they were sent to the district *47attorney's office for the preparation of a fugitive complaint. Id. at 665. An arrest of a person wanted in another state may be made with or without a warrant, Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13), (14). Id. at 668-69. In either case, a fugitive complaint is required to be issued. Id. at 669. Thereafter, a judge must satisfy himself that the person upon whom the fugitive complaint is served is the person charged with the commission of a crime in the demanding state and that the person has fled the demanding state. Id. If the judge is so satisfied, he then issues a "prerequisition" or "fugitive" warrant, for the arrest and confinement of the defendant, pending the issuance of the governor's requisition warrant. Id.; Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15).
¶ 103. It is only after the fugitive complaint and the prerequisition or fugitive warrant have been issued and served upon the defendant that the defendant is held in custody by the asylum state for the charges pending in the demanding state. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669.
¶ 104. The issuance of the fugitive complaint and fugitive warrant by Illinois held Carter for extradition to Wisconsin for 30 days.15 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15. Illinois notified Wisconsin of the legal process it had in place and requested that Governor Doyle sign and present an extradition warrant to Illinois.16 When the Wisconsin extradition warrant did not arrive in 30 days, Illinois extended the period of detention for 60 additional days and it notified Wisconsin that the Illinois *48detention would end March 14, 2004, if Illinois had not received the governor's extradition warrant before that date.17
¶ 105. Governor Doyle signed the extradition warrant on February 6, 2004, and it was served on Carter on March 11, 2004.
¶ 106. Carter was convicted of the Illinois armed robbery charge and he was sentenced for it on October 19, 2004. The Wisconsin governor's warrant was vacated on October 20, 2004. At the commencement of Carter's Illinois sentence for armed robbery, he was no longer being held in Illinois in connection with Wisconsin charges on which he was later convicted and for which he received a concurrent sentence. See Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 380. Carter was later returned to Wisconsin pursuant to a detainer agreement with Illinois.18 No sentence credit accrues for the time spent on detainer. State v. Nyborg, 122 Wis. 2d 765, 768, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985) (citingDemars, 119 Wis. 2d at 26). After Carter's Wisconsin conviction, he was returned to Illinois to complete his Illinois sentence for armed robbery.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 107. I concur in that part of the majority opinion that concludes that Carter is due 302 days of sentence credit for the period between the date on which he finished his Illinois DUI sentence, December 21, 2003, and the commencement of his Illinois armed robbery sentence, October 19, 2004. However, because *49no legal process caused Carter's custody in Illinois to be "in connection with" the Wisconsin crime until: (1) Illinois issued a fugitive warrant for Carter's arrest, based on the Illinois fugitive complaint, and (2) Carter had completed his Illinois DUI sentence, I dissent from the majority opinion's grant of sentence credit prior to December 21, 2003.

 See majority op., ¶ 17.

 See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).

 Majority op., ¶ 9.

 Throughout this opinion I use the terms "felony warrant" and "fugitive warrant." As used herein, a "felony warrant" is a warrant issued by a jurisdiction that seeks the arrest of an individual for the alleged commission of a felony in that jurisdiction. A "fugitive warrant" is a warrant issued by an asylum state pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. See State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 669, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975).
Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state is the state that is seeking the return of a defendant from another state. Id. at 670. The asylum state is the state where the defendant is physically present. Id.

 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.

 Id.

 Illinois has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act as 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/1 et seq.

 July 5, 2006, Order of the Honorable Mel Flanagan; see also Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.

 Wisconsin adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, effective July 1, 1970.

 Justice Ziegler's dissent, ¶ 244 (citing State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995)).

 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.

 See Cook County, Illinois Clerk of Circuit Court Order of Sentence and Commitment, Dec. 15, 2003.

 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.

 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13 is part of Illinois' Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13 of the Illinois Code parallels Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13).

 This initial period could be extended for an additional 60 days. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17; Wis. Stat. § 976.03(17).

 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 12/15/03.

 See Dallas Tyler, Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit, teletype of 03/05/04.

 See Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, Division of Corrections, Prosecutor's Report on Disposition of Charges, Sept. 8, 2005.