Court Opinion

ID: 9864638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:32:14.312264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:30.922415
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
Upon a petition for rehearing two points are insisted upon: First, that the opinion which reversed the judgment for plaintiff upon the ground that he was guilty of contributory negligence fails to state that his *753negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries which he sustained; second, that in spite of the contributory negligence of plaintiff the judgment should, nevertheless, be sustained on the doctrine of the “last clear chance.” The first point is without merit. After reviewing the evidence the opinion clearly states that the failure of the plaintiff to look in the direction from which he should have anticipated the approach of vehicles, before attempting to cross the ' street, constituted contributory negligence. It was then said it was, therefore necessary to reverse the judgment because “the undisputed evidence showing a lack of due caution on the part of plaintiff precludes his right of recovery.” This conclusion is ample upon which to assume the appellate court was invoking the doctrine of contributory negligence which is necessarily based upon the assumption that the negligent acts or omissions on the part of the plaintiff in fact contributed to the cause of his injuries. Upon a careful review of the evidence we are unable to reach any other conclusion.
It is true that the application of the doctrine of the last clear chance to avoid the accident, may properly be a question to be submitted to and determined by the jury. (19 Cal. Jur. 653, sec. 80; also, p. 733, sec. 139.) Although a construction of the evidence in the present case which would be most favorable to the plaintiff would admit of the application of this doctrine of the last clear chance (Darling v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 197 Cal. 702 [242 Pac. 703]; Haber v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 78 Cal. App. 617, 632 [248 Pac. 741]), unfortunately this court is precluded from considering its effect, since the issue was not presented to the jury by instructions or otherwise. There is nothing in the record indicating that the jury, in rendering its verdict, considered the doctrine of the last clear chance. No instruction upon this subject was offered. It therefore becomes necessary to deny the petition for rehearing.
It is so ordered.
A petition by respondent to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on January 9, 1930.
All the Justices concurred.