Court Opinion

ID: 9695555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:22:27.969957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:39.863295
License: Public Domain

*152NIGRO, Justice, dissenting.
Since I believe that Appellant should only be sentenced for one homicide conviction, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority contends that convictions of homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle/DUI do not merge for sentencing purposes because each contains an element not contained in the other. In making this contention, the majority applies the “same offense” test that was first articulated in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Under the Blockburger test, if each offense contains an element not contained in the other, the offenses are not considered to be “the same” and therefore, there is no double jeopardy bar to imposing separate punishments for the two offenses. See id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. 180. While there can be no dispute that homicide by vehicle does not contain the same elements as homicide by vehicle/DUI, strict application of the Blockburger test in the instant case results in a conclusion that is both unfair and illogical, i.e., two separate homicide convictions for one death. Moreover, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the Blockburger test is simply a rule of statutory construction. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). Although generally applicable, the Block-burger test, in my view, should simply not apply in cases where the outcome would result in two punishments for the same death,1 particularly where the General Assembly has not expressly indicated such intent.
*153Significantly, this construction is supported by the legislative history of the pertinent statutes. When it was originally created in 1976, the offense of homicide by vehicle was a misdemeanor of the first degree, regardless of whether the underlying offense was speeding, reckless driving or driving under the influence. In 1982, the legislature passed an act in an effort to deal with problems caused by drinking and driving. See Act of June 17, 1976, Pa. Laws 162, § 1, as amended, Dec. 15, 1982, Pa. Laws 1268, § 9, effective in 30 days (codified as amended at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731 (1982)). Although, mechanically, the General Assembly reposited the homicide by vehicle/DUI provisions in a separate section of the Vehicle Code, the essential import of this act was to *154increase the grading of homicide by vehicle/DUI from a misdemeanor of the first degree to a felony of the third degree2 and provide a mandatory minimum sentence of three years imprisonment. Further, the act amended Section 3732 (homicide by vehicle) by adding the words “except Section 3731(DUI).” Thus, the Legislature clearly indicated that while the commission of any traffic violation that resulted in the loss of human life was a serious offense, driving under the influence implicated a greater social evil and therefore warranted a concomitantly greater and more certain penalty. I do not believe, however, that its decision to organize the more serious form of the offense under a separate section heading evidences an intention to multiply the available offenses resulting from a single death.
Further, the “single offense” construction of the homicide by vehicle statutes is supported by the rule of lenity, under which penal statutes must be strictly construed, with ambiguities being resolved in favor of the accused. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Wooten, 519 Pa. 45, 545 A.2d 876, 879 (1988); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 511 Pa. 481, 515 A.2d 558, 561 (1986). In the context at issue here, the rule merely means that if the legislature does not fix the punishment for an offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). In the absence of a clear indication that the legislature intended multiple punishments for a single act, this Court should apply the rule of lenity and presume that the legislature did not intend for multiple punishments to be imposed.
Here, the majority concludes that the legislature intended double punishment because it crafted the statutory elements of homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle/DUI as “mutually exclusive” of each other. It makes more sense, however, to find that the legislature crafted homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle/DUI as mutually exclusive because they *155intended the two offenses to be alternative means of committing a homicide by vehicle. As noted by the majority, even the Commonwealth concedes that Appellant should be granted relief and states in its brief to this Court that the “[t]he fair import of the [homicide by vehicle] and [homicide by vehicle/DUI] statutes reveals a design to proscribe the same harm, i.e., taking of a life as a result of the criminal operation of a motor vehicle. Each statute simply provides alternative bases upon which to proceed if a life is taken as a result of the commission of a traffic offense. Where the underlying offense is DUI, however, the penalty is greater.” Appellee’s Brief at 10. Nonetheless, given these differing interpretations of the homicide by vehicle and homicide by vehicle/DUI statutes, it cannot be said with certainty whether the legislature intended multiple punishments. Under the rule of lenity, this ambiguity must be construed in favor of Appellant and, consequently, he should only be sentenced for one homicide conviction. I would therefore vacate the judgment of sentence as to homicide by vehicle and affirm the judgment of sentence for homicide by vehicle/DUI.
Justice SAYLOR joins in the dissenting opinion.

. Despite any difference in elements under the Blockburger test, a decisive majority of jurisdictions addressing the issue in a similar context have declined to impose multiple convictions and sentences for variations of murder when only one person was killed. See Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970)(premeditated murder and felony murder); People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983)(murder after deliberation and felony murder); State v. Chicano, 216 Conn. 699, 584 A.2d 425, (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1254, 111 S.Ct. 2898, 115 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1991)(felony murder and first degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of intentional murder); Gaskin v. State, 591 So.2d 917 (Fla.1991), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1244, 113 S.Ct. 22, 120 L.Ed.2d 948 (1992) (premeditated murder and felony murder); Pressley v. State, 235 Ga. 341, 219 S.E.2d 418 (1975)(malice *153murder and felony murder); Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731 (Ind.1989)(murder and felony murder); People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill.2d 353, 154 Ill.Dec. 562, 568 N.E.2d 783 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871, 112 S.Ct. 204, 116 L.Ed.2d 163 (1991)(knowing murder and felony murder); State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972)(premeditat-ed murder and murder in perpetration of robbery); State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 578 P.2d 1108 (1978)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Dechaine, 572 A.2d 130 (Me.1990)(intentional or knowing murder and depraved indifference murder); Wooten-Bey v. State, 308 Md. 534, 520 A.2d 1090 (1987), cert., denied, 481 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 2199, 95 L.Ed.2d 853 (1987)(premeditated murder and felony murder); People v. Densmore, 87 Mich.App. 434, 274 N.W.2d 811 (1978)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277 (Minn.1984)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. White, 254 Neb. 566, 577 N.W.2d 741 (1998)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Watson, 261 N.J.Super. 169, 618 A.2d 367, 373 (1992), cert. denied 133 N.J. 441, 627 A.2d 1145 (1993)(purposeful and knowing murder and felony murder); State v. Landgraf, 121 N.M. 445, 913 P.2d 252 (1996)(vehicular homicide [due 1o intoxication] and evading/eluding a police officer resulting in death); State v. Wilson, 345 N.C. 119, 478 S.E.2d 507 (1996)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Huertas, 51 Ohio St.3d 22, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (1990)(aggravated murder with prior calculation and design and aggravated murder in the course of aggravated burglary); State v. White, 549 N.W.2d 676 (S.D.1996)(premeditated murder and felony murder); State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 933, 115 S.Ct. 328, 130 L.Ed.2d 287 (1994)(same); Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263, 273 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1122, 117 S.Ct. 972, 136 L.Ed.2d 856 (1997)(4 deaths, 5 convictions: 4 capital murder convictions based upon murder in the course of robbery, one capital murder conviction for murder of multiple persons; "multiple murder” capital murder conviction vacated); Byrd v. United States, 510 A.2d 1035 (D.C.App.1986, en banc)(premeditated murder and felony murder).

. A subsequent amendment in 1996 increased the grading of homicide by vehicle/DUI from a third degree felony to a second degree felony.