Court Opinion

ID: 9880647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 22:03:32.594043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:18.717723
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/27/23

                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,            A165093
                 v.                         (Contra Costa County Super. Ct.
 WILLIAM DAVENPORT,                         No. 5000716688)
       Defendant and Appellant.

       In 2007, appellant William Davenport pleaded no contest to second
degree murder with a firearm enhancement for the shooting death of Joe
West. He was sentenced to prison for 18 years to life. In 2020, Davenport
petitioned for resentencing relief pursuant to former section 1170.95 of the
Penal Code, now section 1172.6 as recently renumbered.1
       This appeal arises from the third denial of Davenport’s petition for
resentencing, following reversals by this court of two previous denials at the
prima facie stage of the proceeding. At an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Davenport was the actual killer of West and thus is ineligible for
resentencing.
       Davenport now contends that, at the evidentiary hearing, the trial
court erroneously admitted into evidence the transcript of preliminary

       1 Statutes 2022, chapter 58, section 10.
                                              All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise designated.

                                       1
hearing testimony from Malisa Hardiamon, a witness to the shooting.
Hardiamon’s testimony was hearsay, he argues, and there was no showing of
witness unavailability under Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a).
      We see no error and shall affirm.
                            I. BACKGROUND
                                      A.
      The transcript of Hardiamon’s testimony at the October 16, 2007
preliminary hearing in the underlying murder case against Davenport shows
as follows.
      Hardiamon dated Davenport and had a child with him in 2005. They
broke up six or seven months later, but then they got back together.
Davenport was a little jealous and “too in love.”
      On the morning of January 4, 2007, Hardiamon dropped the child off
with Davenport and spent the day with Joe West. West was Hardiamon’s
cousin by marriage. They were not romantically involved.
      West was with Hardiamon when she dropped the child off with
Davenport. Hardiamon told Davenport that she would be gone for a couple
of hours.
      Around 11:00 p.m., West drove Hardiamon home to her mother’s
house. They arrived sometime between midnight and 1:00 a.m. West
stopped the car in the parking lot in front of the house. They talked for a
couple of minutes before Hardiamon saw someone walking to her right.
      Hardiamon recognized the person approaching as Davenport, and said,
“ ‘Oh, shit, my baby daddy.’ ” Hardiamon hoped that Davenport did not
think “anything happened” between her and West.
      Davenport opened the car door and said something to Hardiamon.
Davenport pulled out a gun. While Davenport held the gun three to four

                                       2
inches in front of Hardiamon’s face and pointed it at West, the gun went off
more than once. There were no pauses between shots.
        After the shooting, Hardiamon got out of the car and called out to
Davenport asking him why he did it, but he was already gone. West backed
the car up and left.
        Hardiamon went inside and woke up her brother and his girlfriend.
Hardiamon said that Davenport had just shot someone. They thought she
was lying, but she said she saw it happen. Hardiamon went into her
mother’s room and repeated that Davenport had shot someone.
        Davenport called Hardiamon five minutes later. Hardiamon again
asked Davenport why he did it. Davenport said it was going to be okay.
Davenport told her not to worry and to come with him. Davenport said that
he saw West crash and West was dead.
        Detective Scott Cook testified that he responded to a report of a
suspicious death involved in a car accident a half-mile from Hardiamon’s
residence. Detective Cook found West slumped over dead in the driver’s seat
with blood around his chest and mouth. There was blood spatter in front of
the driver’s seat.
                                       B.
        An information dated October 17, 2007, charged Davenport with
murder. (§ 187.) It further alleged personal and intentional discharge of a
firearm causing great bodily injury and death as well as personal and
intentional discharge and personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subds. (b)–
(d)).
        On November 30, 2007, Davenport entered a plea to second degree
murder and admitted personal use of a firearm within the meaning of
section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The court sentenced him to a term of 15

                                        3
years to life for second degree murder consecutive to a term of three years
for the enhancement.
      In 2019, Davenport filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to former
section 1170.95. Davenport alleged that the information allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a felony-murder theory or under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine; that he pleaded no contest to second
degree murder in lieu of going to trial; and that he could not be convicted of
murder under current law.
      The superior court appointed counsel for Davenport, and then denied
the petition for failure to state a prima facie case for relief. On appeal, the
Attorney General conceded Davenport had stated a prima facie case for
relief. This court vacated the denial order and remanded the matter for
further proceedings. (People v. Davenport (June 24, 2020, A158211)
[nonpub. opn.].)
      On remand, the superior court again denied the petition at the prima
facie stage, finding that the record of conviction conclusively established
Davenport’s ineligibility for relief. In doing so, the court relied on
Davenport’s admission to the firearm enhancement and on the preliminary
hearing transcript.
      Davenport appealed a second time, and again prevailed. This court
held that the superior court erred in considering facts from the preliminary
hearing transcript because Davenport did not stipulate to the transcript as a
factual basis for his plea. (People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476,
481 (Davenport II).) As a result, we held, the court engaged in improper fact
finding at the prima facie stage of the proceeding. (Ibid.)
      We reversed and remanded for the issuance of an order to show cause
and for an evidentiary hearing. (Davenport II, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at

                                        4
p. 485.) We noted that, at what is now a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)
hearing, the prosecution could “rely on the preliminary hearing transcript to
sustain its burden of establishing that [Davenport] is not entitled to [section
1172.6] relief.” (Davenport II, at p. 485, fn. 3.)
        On remand, at the start of the evidentiary hearing and by written
motion in limine, Davenport moved to exclude the preliminary hearing
transcript and all exhibits admitted at the preliminary hearing. The only
two witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing were Hardiamon and
Detective Cook. Without their testimony—particularly Hardiamon’s, an
eyewitness to the shooting—there would have been no evidentiary basis to
hold Davenport over for trial.
        Davenport argued that the preliminary hearing testimony from
Hardiamon and Detective Cook should not be considered because such
testimony did not qualify for admission as former testimony under Evidence
Code section 1291. He also argued that, by the plain terms of section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), testimony from Detective Cook’s reporting by hearsay the
statement of another officer, Officer Goley, should be excluded because it had
been admitted at the preliminary hearing under section 872, subdivision
(b).2
        The prosecution conceded that section 872, subdivision (b), testimony
from Detective Cook was inadmissible but asserted that other testimony at
the preliminary hearing—specifically Hardiamon’s—was admissible, along
with stipulated facts and matters of which the court could take judicial
notice. The prosecution argued that section 1172.6 authorized the court “to

        2 Section 872, subdivision (b), allows a qualified law enforcement

officer to testify at a preliminary hearing as to hearsay statements,
“[n]otwithstanding section 1200 of the Evidence Code.”

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consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law.”
      The trial court largely denied the in limine motion, but granted it in
part. The court stated that it would not consider Detective Cook’s hearsay
testimony regarding Officer Goley’s statement but otherwise impliedly
denied the motion to exclude.
      The prosecution requested that the court take judicial notice of the
court file, review the preliminary hearing transcript, and consider
preliminary hearing exhibits 1 through 3; and directed the court to footnote
3 of this court’s opinion regarding the admissibility of preliminary hearing
testimony. (See Davenport II, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 485, fn. 3.)
      The prosecution argued it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
Davenport was the actual killer of West based on Davenport’s plea to second
degree murder and his admission of the firearm enhancement, taken
together with Hardiamon’s preliminary hearing testimony.
      Relying on Hardiamon’s testimony, the court found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Davenport was the sole shooter. Specifically, the
court determined that while Hardiamon was in the passenger seat of a
parked vehicle driven by West, Davenport opened her door, placed a firearm
near her face, and fatally shot West.
      The court concluded that, based on Davenport’s plea to second degree
murder and the facts established by a percipient witness’s testimony at the
preliminary hearing, Davenport was guilty of malice murder in the second
degree. And since the evidence established that Davenport was the actual
killer of West, it denied resentencing relief.

                                        6
      Davenport timely appealed.3
                             II. DISCUSSION
      Davenport contends the superior court erred by admitting
Hardiamon’s preliminary hearing testimony for its truth at the section
1172.6, section (d)(3) evidentiary hearing and then relying on it to deny him
relief. We disagree.
      Under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), “The admission of evidence in
the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that
is admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated
evidence, and matters judicially noticed. . . . However, hearsay evidence . . .
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872
shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”
      “When interpreting a statute, a court’s role ‘is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We
begin as always with the statute’s actual words, the “most reliable indicator”
of legislative intent, “assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings,
and construing them in context. If the words themselves are not ambiguous,
we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the statute’s plain
meaning governs.” ’ ” (People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 101 (Cody);
see People v. Lawrence (2000) 24 Cal.4th 219, 230–231.) “ ‘ “On the other
hand, if the language allows more than one reasonable construction, we may
look to such aids as the legislative history of the measure and maxims of

      3 We granted a request from Davenport asking that we take judicial

notice of the reporter’s transcript of the 2007 preliminary hearing in the
underlying case.

                                       7
statutory construction. In cases of uncertain meaning, we may also consider
the consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on
public policy.” ’ [Citation.]” (Cody, at p. 101.)
      Although section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) does not contain express
language stating that a preliminary hearing transcript is admissible at the
evidentiary hearing, a plain reading of the statute compels this conclusion.
First, the provision unambiguously provides that a trial court ruling on the
merits of a resentencing petition “may consider evidence previously admitted
at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) Second, because of the proviso
that the trial court may not consider hearsay testimony that was admitted
into evidence at a preliminary hearing under subdivision (b) of section 872,
unless some other hearsay exception applies, section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3) expressly contemplates that preliminary hearing testimony in
particular will be considered at an evidentiary hearing.
      In effect, what section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) does is create a new
hearsay exception applicable specifically to merits hearings in section 1172.6
resentencing proceedings. “Most hearsay exceptions are located in Evidence
Code §§ 1220 to 1390. They exist, however, in other codes as well.” (Simons,
Cal. Evidence Manual (Dec. 2022) § 2:20.) Section 872, subdivision (b), is an
example. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), contains another, broader
exception for former testimony given at a preliminary hearing, but carves
out an exception for section 872, subdivision (b), testimony. Thus, as we
read section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the rules of evidence apply to
hearings held under section 1172.6, subdivision (d); under those rules,
hearsay is inadmissible in the absence of an exception; and the pertinent
exception here is the clause in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), stating that

                                         8
“except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any
prior hearing . . . .”
      But what about the additional phrase in section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3) requiring previously admitted evidence to be “admissible under
current law,” Davenport asks. To the extent the phrase “is admissible under
current law” creates ambiguity, we think the most natural reading of those
words is that the basis for admission of testimony at the hearing or trial in
which it was previously admitted must remain a valid basis for admitting the
testimony “under current law.” The statute “contemplate[s] that there may
be some evidence that was admitted at a former trial that would not be
admissible [in such a proceeding] under current law.” (Cody, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 104 [citing “case-specific” hearsay under People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686, as an example].) Hardiamon testified
competently from her personal knowledge at the preliminary hearing in
2007, and no change in the law would bar her testimony if that hearing were
held today.
      Davenport would have us read “current law” to mean, simply, “the
Evidence Code.” This is the premise for his argument that, to be admissible
at a section 1172.6 merits hearing, there must be a showing of witness
unavailability under Evidence Code section 1291 as a prerequisite to
admission. Not only does this proffered interpretation overlook the fact that
some statutory hearsay exceptions may be found outside the Evidence Code,
but more fundamentally it violates the basic maxim that a “ ‘ “statute must
be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation.” ’ ” (People v.
Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 972.) If, as Davenport claims, section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) means that properly admitted former witness testimony
must once again be run through the rigorous filter of the rules of evidence—

                                       9
but at a different time, under different circumstances—the exception for
previously admitted testimony would be superfluous. So read, we could take
a pen and strike out everything in the clause starting with “except that the
court may consider” through “current law,” and the statute would mean the
same thing. Giving the words a reasonable reading, that cannot be right.
      To be sure, section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) now makes clear that not
all evidence that has traditionally been considered to be part of the “record of
conviction” (see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis), as
codified and clarified by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 551; Senate Bill 775)),4 is automatically admissible in section
1172.6 merits hearings. Detective Cook’s preliminary hearing testimony as
to the statement of Officer Goley is an example. Indeed, the exclusion of
Detective Cook’s testimony illustrates how the hearsay exception for former
testimony given at a preliminary hearing works against the backdrop of the
newly tightened rule that the record of conviction may generally be
considered at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing. Detective Cook’s
testimony is part of the record of conviction, but because it was admitted at
the preliminary hearing under Evidence Code section 872, subdivision (b),
the trial court correctly ruled it is inadmissible at a resentencing merits
hearing under “current law”: Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), by its
express terms, now bars this specific form of hearsay, while permitting

      4 We deferred ruling on a request from the Attorney General asking

that we take judicial notice of the legislative history of Senate Bill 775. We
now grant that request.

                                       10
admission of all other forms of previously admitted former witness
testimony.5
      Davenport insists that, if former testimony given at a preliminary
hearing is freely admissible at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing
without a showing of witness unavailability, subject only to the carveout for
law enforcement officer testimony under section 872, subdivision (b), former
testimony admitted on that basis would not be sufficiently reliable for
admission as to its truth. According to Davenport, he “did not have an
opportunity to cross-examine Hardiamon at his preliminary hearing with a
motive and interest similar to what he would have had if she had been
produced to testify at the [evidentiary] hearing.” In this view, the
substantive changes in the law of murder wrought by Senate Bill No. 1437
(2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) and follow-on legislation have
“substantially reshaped, if not turned on their head, what counsel’s tactical
objectives, motive and interest would have been when cross-examining
Hardiamon at the evidentiary hearing . . . .”

      5 Another example, and another qualification to the broad

admissibility in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearings of evidence
traditionally considered to be part of the “record of conviction,” concerns
prior appellate opinions bearing on a section 1172.6 petitioner’s conviction or
convictions. Prior appellate opinions that are part of a section 1172.6
petitioner’s “record of conviction,” which were once admissible for whatever
weight the court wished to give them at a merits hearing under former
section 1170.95—including for their recitations of fact (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972)—may now be considered only for their “procedural
history.” (Senate Bill 775, Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, codifying and clarifying
Lewis on this point; see People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292
[“trial judges should not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior
appellate decisions when a [former] section 1170.95 petition reaches the
stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing”].)

                                      11
      This argument about counsel’s “motive and interest” in cross-
examining Hardiamon at the preliminary hearing versus at the section
1172.6, subdivision (d) merits hearing does not aid Davenport’s cause. If
indeed his counsel’s approach to cross-examining Hardiamon in 2007
differed from the approach he would have liked to have taken at a section
1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing years later, the remedy was in his hands:
Nothing stopped him from subpoenaing Hardiamon to testify if the prior
transcript was incomplete or otherwise misleading. And if she was
unavailable to testify for some reason, the hearing transcript of her
testimony would have been admissible even under the theory he now
pursues.
      But Davenport has never made any argument—in the trial court, or
here—that he now has some basis to explore with Hardiamon whether
someone else shot West, or whether her testimony that he shot West was in
some respect inaccurate. That highlights the essential weakness of the line
of argument he pursues in this appeal. Granted, there have been some
seismic changes in the governing law since Hardiamon testified at the
preliminary hearing, but the only change material to what evidence could be
“considered” at his section 1172.6, subdivision (d) hearing was the enactment
of a narrow bar on law enforcement officer hearsay at a preliminary hearing
under section 872, subdivision (b).
      Both sides cite case law that they say supports their respective
readings of section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). The Attorney General cites
Davenport II, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at page 485, footnote 3, just as the
prosecutor did in the trial court, and here on appeal he adds People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989, footnote 11, and People v. Garrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747–748. Davenport, for his part, cites People v.

                                      12
Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575. Davenport II, Flores, and Garrison are
consistent with the Attorney General’s position, and Mitchell is consistent
with Davenport’s position, but none of these cases explicitly addresses the
issue presented here. The former testimony exception in section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) was squarely at issue in none of them. We do not find the
implicit holdings the parties draw from these cases to be particularly
illuminating. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 87—which was decided after all
briefs in this case were filed—is the only published case on point, and we
will follow it.
      Finally, Davenport places great emphasis on the legislative history of
Senate Bill 775, a 2022 amendment to the language of section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3) enacted to codify and clarify the holding in Lewis,
supra,11 Cal.5th 952. He claims that a Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 775 in
the Assembly Public Safety Committee outlines a possible construction of
the text of the bill in accordance with the interpretation he now proposes.
(Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 775 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), as amended July 6, 2021 (Assembly Committee on Public Safety Bill
Analysis, or Senate Bill 775 Analysis).)6 We think Davenport overreads the

      6 Davenport also relies on an article authored by Judge Richard

Couzens, a leading commentator on criminal sentencing matters. (See
Couzens, Accomplice Liability for Murder (SB 1437 and 775) (April 2022)
<https://www.fdap.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Accomplice-Liability-for-
Murder-SB-1437-and-SB-775.pdf> [as of Sept. 27, 2023].) Judge Couzens
states that “As originally enacted, section 1170.95 did not fully address the
hearing on the merits of the petition. [Former] [s]ection 1170.95, subdivision
(d)(3), provided: ‘The prosecutor and the petitioner may rely on the record of
conviction or offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.’ ” (Id. at p. 51.) This view appears to be based on a reading of the
Senate Bill 775 Assembly Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis. Citing
the Senate Bill 775 Analysis, Judge Couzens states “it appears the

                                      13
legislative history. Indeed, his reliance on the Senate Bill 775 Assembly
Committee on Public Safety Bill Analysis illustrates one of the hazards of
relying on legislative history as a guide to the meaning statutory language in
some circumstances: The Senate Bill 775 Analysis is itself ambiguous.
      That document, prepared by Counsel to the Assembly Committee on
Public Safety, states as follows: “It is not entirely clear whether” the
applicability of the rules of evidence at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
hearing “means a statement in the record of conviction that is offered to
prove the truth of the matter stated would have to fall within an exception to
the hearsay rule in order to be admissible at the hearing. This raises a
concern that parties would be required to recall witnesses from the trial to
testify again at the . . . section [1172.6] evidentiary hearing, even where
there is a prior transcript of the trial testimony as part of the record of
conviction; this may not be possible in older cases in which witnesses are no
longer available.” (Senate Bill 775 Analysis, supra, at p. 10.) “[A]ssuming
the prosecution must prove witness unavailability”—which presupposes the
answer to the hearsay question posed—the Senate Bill 775 Analysis goes on
to state that the proposed bill’s “author should consider clarifying this point.”
(Id. at p. 11, italics added.)
      We view the above comments as good counseling in the course of the
drafting process, offered for all legislators to consider with a view to possible
clarifying changes, not an expression of what the draft language meant as
then written. In any event, there is a straightforward answer to the hearsay
question the Senate Bill 775 Analysis raises. The text of Senate Bill 775 at

amendment to [former] section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3), limits evidence at
the hearing on the merits of the petition to what is admissible according to
the traditional rules of evidence.” (Couzens, Accomplice Liability for Murder
(SB 1437 and 775), supra, at p. 52.)

                                       14
the time the Bill Analysis was prepared, in July 2021, and when the
proposed bill was later enacted, sets forth an express hearsay exception for
former witness testimony that does not require a showing of witness
unavailability. What is key is that the uncertainty in the text discussed in
the Senate Bill 775 Analysis was never clarified. Thus, given the lack of
response to the recommended clarification in the Senate Bill 775 Analysis,
we cannot rely on it as an expression of Senate Bill 775’s meaning that
legislators could have and probably did rely upon in voting to enact. It
simply raises an unresolved drafting issue for the Legislature as a whole to
consider as the legislative process moved forward.
      Now the issue comes to us, and in our view consideration of “ ‘ “the
consequences of a particular interpretation, including its impact on public
policy” ’ ” (Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 101), provides a better aid to
statutory interpretation than we may glean from this narrow slice of the
legislative history. “Were we to adopt [Davenport’s] interpretation of section
1172.6, it would mean we would have to disregard the statute’s plain
language. Further, it would mean that all section 1172.6 evidentiary
hearings would effectively become new court trials. As another appellate
court recently stated, that is plainly not what the Legislature intended.”
(Cody, at p. 104, emphasis in original [citing People v. Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 297 for the proposition that “the Legislature did not
choose to grant qualifying offenders under section 1172.6 a new trial, but
rather the Legislature chose a procedure ‘requiring trial judges to decide the
critical factual questions based—at least in some cases—on a cold record’ ”].)
                            III. DISPOSITION
      Affirmed.
                                                     STREETER, J.

                                       15
WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J.*

      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                      16
Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa

Trial Judge: Hon. Theresa Canepa

Counsel:        Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
                   Defendant and Appellant.

                Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
                  Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
                  Assistant Attorney General, Amit Kurlekar and Claudia H.
                  Amaral, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
                  Respondent.

People v. Davenport – A165093