Court Opinion

ID: 7811589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:13:27.51971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:29.231882
License: Public Domain

McCulloch, C. J., (dissenting). There is no doubt about the Legislature having power to require citizens to contribute their personal labor in maintaining roads •and to provide for a commutation on payment of money in lieu of performing labor. This power is of ancient origin and has always been exercised in this country. The fullest latitude is also allowed to the lawmakers in prescribing the class of persons subject to this exaction. They may determine what classes of persons shall be required to labor upon the public highways, and that classification should not be disturbed unless found to be obviously and demonstrably arbitrary and unreasonable. The instance now before us is not one of allowing commutation, for no alternative is given to the taxpayer. It is nothing more nor less than a capitation tax, imposed without regard to labor upon the public highway. It stands, therefore, on the same ground as any other capitation tax and should be uniform in its application — that is to say, without arbitrary or unreasonable effect. The fact that the tax is imposed for road purposes does not take it out of the general class of capitation taxation. Speaking of this class of taxation, Judge Cooley, in his work on Taxation (vol. 1, p. 28), says: “As they regard only the person, they must be shared equally by all, except under governments where privileged orders are recognized and where they might be graded according to the orders to which the several persons taxed belong.” The statute now under consideration imposes the tax on male citizens between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five. This is not a reasonable classification of persons, for a mere tax payable only in money, not being a commutation, physical ability to labor has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the classification. Of course, women and persons under majority may reasonably be excluded, but there is no reason for excluding persons merely because they are over the age of forty-five years. Such a classification is arbitrary. My conclusion is therefore that the chancellor was correct in declaring the statute to be void.