Court Opinion

ID: 9955540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:03:00.30601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.633470
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Morales CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B330561

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA509579
         v.

FRANK MORALES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
      James R. Bostwick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and John Yang, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ____________________
       Frank Morales told store employees “I’m going to get a
pistol and come back.” In context, these words sufficed to support
his probation revocation because they put enough fear into one of
the employees to count as a criminal threat. We affirm.
Statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
       Morales pleaded no contest to assault by means likely to
produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) and was on
probation for two years with a suspended term of three years.
       After about a month on probation, Morales entered a CVS
store. He seemed to be drunk. The store had a restraining order
against him. When Morales tried to buy liquor, employee Sergio
Lozano told Morales the store was not allowed to sell him liquor.
       Morales told Lozano, “Mother fucker, just tell [the cashier]
to sell it to me.”
       Morales again asked to buy the liquor. The cashier did not
remember his exact phrasing “but it was not that nice.” Morales
used “bad words.”
       “And he started getting louder and just arguing more, so I
asked him to go[,] . . . to leave the store.” “As soon as we said,
‘no,’ [Morales] just became more and more aggressive and very
loud in the store.”
       Lozano told Morales, “You know, we can’t sell it to you.”
       Morales pointed at Lozano, and said, “You’re next. You’re
next. You’re next. You’re next, you mother fucker.”
       Morales did not look angry; “he just looked very serious.”
       The cashier took these words as a threat.
       A security guard asked Morales to go outside.
       Outside, Morales told the guard he was going to come back
with a pistol.

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      The guard told Lozano that Morales said he would return
with a gun.
      Lozano testified he was “concerned” that Morales said he
would return with a gun. The guard, however, was not afraid.
      The court found Morales violated probation and imposed
the suspended three-year sentence.
      A court may revoke and terminate a person’s supervision if
the court has reason to believe that person later committed other
offenses. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) The standard of proof is
preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51
Cal.3d 437, 447.) We review probation revocation decisions for
substantial evidence. (People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766,
773.)
      The relevant crime is section 422: “Any person who
willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death
or great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent
that the statement, made verbally, . . . is to be taken as a threat,
even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its
face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey
to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety . . . , shall be punished. . . .” (See People v. Holmes,
McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 809 [elements of
crime].)
      Our deferential review reveals support for the court’s
ruling.
      A person tried to buy alcohol and became loud, aggressive,
and abusive when rebuffed. He told an employee “You’re next,”

                                 3
and then said he would return with a gun. This statement was of
concern to a store employee on the scene. These facts justified
this probation revocation.
       Morales’s appellate counsel objects to this conclusion on
two concise grounds.
       First, Morales claims the statement that he was “going to
get a pistol and come back” did not constitute a “true threat.”
The reasonable interpretation of these words in context, however,
was that an aggressive and abusive man was promising to return
with a firearm and to use it. This is evidence of a true threat.
(See, e.g., In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 655 [“a
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that A.G.’s post was a
willful threat to kill or cause great bodily injury because it
suggested he was going to bring the gun to school and harm
people with it”].)
       An indirect threat can be a criminal threat. (E.g., In re
David L. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1658–1660.) The
reasonable inference is that one store employee will tell the
others about a threat of this kind.
       Second, Morales argues his words did not put any alleged
victim in sustained fear. Lozano, however, testified he was
“concerned” that Morales said he would return with a gun. In
reply, Morales argues being “concerned” is not enough, for “one
can be ‘concerned’ that it may rain and ruin one’s shirt on the
walk home from the grocery store.” In context, however, the
reasonable interpretation of Lozano’s “concern” was that Morales
would return with a gun and use it to damaging effect. (Cf.
People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349 [one minute of
fear can be enough where the threat is serious and involves a
gun].)

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.

                                      WILEY, J.

We concur:

             STRATTON, P. J.

             GRIMES, J.

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