Court Opinion

ID: 9956039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-30 18:15:07.289313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.790840
License: Public Domain

NUMBERS 13-23-00136-CR, 13-23-00137-CR

                               COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                       CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ADRIAN MEDRANO,                                                         Appellant,

                                                    v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                      Appellee.

             ON APPEAL FROM THE 105TH DISTRICT COURT
                    OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Silva
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      In appellate cause numbers 13-23-00136-CR and 13-23-00137-CR, appellant

Adrian Medrano pleaded guilty to two separate offenses of possession of cocaine in an

amount of less than one gram, which are both third-degree felonies.1 See TEX. HEALTH &

      1 Appellant’s offenses were enhanced by two prior convictions.
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(b). Appellant received concurrent sentences of ten years’

confinement. By two issues, appellant contends that (1) “[t]he [Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility Program (SATF)] Major Rule [a]ppellant plead[ed] true to is facially

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,” and as-applied to appellant, and (2) his “plea of

true does not prevent him from contesting the constitutionality of SATF’s Major Rules.”

We affirm.

                                  I.     BACKGROUND

      On June 18, 2018, appellant pleaded guilty to two offenses of possession of

cocaine occurring on different dates and true to two enhancement paragraphs. The trial

court accepted appellant’s guilty pleas, imposed ten-year sentences, suspended the

sentences, and placed appellant on community supervision for a period of four years in

both causes.

      On October 12, 2021, the State filed motions to revoke community supervision for

violating various conditions of community supervision. Appellant pleaded “true” to the

State’s allegations. Rather than revoking appellant’s community supervision, the trial

court imposed sanctions.

      Appellant’s conditions of community supervision were subsequently modified on

August 18, 2022, and in relevant part, the trial court ordered appellant “[in] lieu of

incarceration . . . [to] participate in a CSCD-based Community Corrections Facility

program, to wit: [SATF] in Corpus Christi, Nueces County, Texas.” Appellant signed the

motion requesting this modification of his community supervision, which stated that he

must follow the rules of the SATF. A stipulation in the probation’s motion to modify the

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conditions of community supervision signed by appellant, stated that appellant must

“comply with all the rules and regulations, treatment programs and contracts of [SATF],

and remain therein until released by the Court in writing.”

        On November 17, 2022, the State filed motions to revoke community supervision

claiming that appellant violated the terms by, among other things, “using profanity when

speaking to another Resident” of SATF, which is a violation of SATF “Major rule 2.8”

prohibiting residents from expressing anger inappropriately or using “offensive language,

profanity[,] or vulgarity towards themselves or another.”2 At the revocation hearing on

April 11, 2023, based on an agreement with the State, appellant pleaded “true” to violating

rule 2.8; the State abandoned its other allegations and recommended that the trial court

impose “a 60-day jail sanction with credit” and then continue appellant on community

supervision. 3 The trial court found the allegation to be “true,” rejected the State’s

recommendation, revoked appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced appellant

to ten-year terms of confinement in both causes to run concurrently.

        Appellant filed a motion for new trial arguing that rule 2.8 is impermissibly vague.

At a hearing on that motion, appellant argued that the prohibition violation on him using

offensive language, profanity, or vulgarity violates his right to freedom of speech.

Appellant stated that Major rule 2.8 is “very vague” because “[p]rofanity could be

determined and interpreted differently by multiple different people.” The State argued that

      2 We note that the trial court ordered that as a condition of his community supervision, appellant

“REFRAIN from the use of vulgar or obscene language and remain courteous and respectful to the Court,
CSCD Staff, and Court personnel.”
        3 Specifically, the State abandoned, among other allegations, that appellant admitted that he had

a weapon at the facility—the weapon was a combination lock in a sock that appellant threatened to use.

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appellant’s motion for reconsideration should be denied because appellant pleaded “true”

at the revocation hearing, and the evidence presented at the reconsideration hearing had

not been contested. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

                                           II.     DISCUSSION

        By his first issue, appellant contends that rule 2.8 is facially unconstitutional,

overbroad, and vague.4 Appellant also argues that rule 2.8 is unconstitutional as applied

to him.

        “[A] challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a forfeitable right and must be

preserved in the trial court during or after trial.” Cooper v. State, 673 S.W.3d 724, 749

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.). Both facial and as-applied challenges must be

raised in the trial court to preserve error. Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d 377, 383 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014); Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

        An award of community supervision is not a right, but a contractual privilege,
        and conditions thereof are terms of the contract entered into between the
        trial court and the defendant. Therefore, conditions not objected to are
        affirmatively accepted as terms of the contract. Thus, by entering into the
        contractual relationship without objection, a defendant affirmatively waives
        any rights encroached upon by the terms of the contract. A defendant who
        benefits from the contractual privilege of probation, the granting of which
        does not involve a systemic right or prohibition, must complain at trial to
        conditions he finds objectionable. A trial objection allows the trial court the
        opportunity to either risk abusing his discretion by imposing the condition
        over objection or reconsider the desirability of the contract without the
        objectionable condition.

Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534–35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

         4 By his second issue, appellant contends that he did not waive his constitutional challenge to rule

2.8 by pleading true to violating it as the State argued. We are addressing appellant’s first issue that rule
2.8 is unconstitutional. Therefore, for purposes of this memorandum opinion, we will assume, without
deciding, that appellant did not waive his constitutional challenges on the basis that he pleaded true to
violating rule 2.8. We sustain his second issue.
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        Here, when appellant pleaded guilty, he entered into a contract with the trial court.

See id. at 534. The trial court modified the conditions of community supervision, thus,

modifying a preexisting contract. However, appellant did not object by motion or otherwise

to that modification of the contract.5 Instead of objecting, appellant acquiesced to the trial

court’s requiring him to attend the SATF by going to the facility and then breaking the

facility’s rules. See id.; see also Dansby v. State, 468 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2015, no pet.) (setting out that the doctrine of estoppel by contract applies when the

appellant challenges the legality of the community supervision conditions). Therefore,

because appellant benefited from the contractual privilege of community supervision, he

was required to object to rule 2.8 at the time the condition was imposed or at the very

least when he entered the facility.6 See id.; see also Ex parte Pena, 739 S.W.2d 50, 51

(Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“Where a trial judge imposes an invalid condition of probation,

the proper remedy is to reform the judgment of conviction by deleting the condition.”).

        Nonetheless, even assuming it was unnecessary for appellant to object when the

trial court ordered him to follow the Major Rules because there was no hearing, appellant

did not object to rule 2.8 on any basis at the November 17, 2022 revocation hearing. In

fact, he pleaded true to violating rule 2.8 in exchange for a recommendation from the

State of a sixty-day jail sentence and continuation on community supervision.

        5 It appears that no hearing was held.

        6 Appellant signed the motion to modify conditions of community supervision which states: “While

at the SATF, comply with all the rules, regulations, treatment programs and contracts of such facility, and
remain therein until released by the Court in writing.” Once appellant became aware of the Major Rules, he
could have filed a motion with the trial court objecting on the basis that the rules were unconstitutional.
However, he did not do so, and instead, pleaded “true” to violating rule 2.8 and asking the trial court to
impose a sixty-day jail sentence for that violation.

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       However, because at the motion for reconsideration hearing appellant stated that

rule 2.8 is “very vague” because “[p]rofanity could be determined and interpreted

differently by multiple different people,” we will assume without deciding, that he

preserved this challenge to rule 2.8. However, appellant only stated that rule 2.8 was

vague. Appellant did not argue that rule 2.8 is unconstitutional as applied to him, facially

invalid, or overbroad. Therefore, he has not preserved these arguments. See Karenev,

281 S.W.3d at 434; Reynolds, 423 S.W.3d at 383.

       As acknowledged by appellant, “the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a

penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people

can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage

arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982)

(emphasis added). The focus is on “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal

guidelines to govern law enforcement.” Id. at 357–58 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v.

Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572–73 (1974) (“Moreover, it requires legislatures to set

reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to

prevent ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’”)). However, appellant has not

provided a legal analysis with citation to pertinent authority supporting a conclusion that

the vagueness doctrine or any other constitutional challenge applies to rule 2.8 even

though it is neither a penal statute nor enacted by the legislature. See Sessions v.

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (“[T]he doctrine is a corollary of the separation of

powers—requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch, define what

conduct is sanctionable and what is not.”); Speth, 6 S.W.3d at 532–34 (explaining that

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the trial court imposes community supervision “in lieu of the sentence, not as part of the

sentence” and that the granting of community supervision “does not involve a systemic

right or prohibition”). We find no authority that the void-for-vagueness doctrine or any

other constitutional challenge applies to an inpatient facility’s rules. Therefore, we are

unable to conclude that the rule 2.8 is unconstitutionally vague or unconstitutional on any

other basis. See id. Accordingly, we overrule his first issue.7

                                            III.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                                                       JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                                       Justice

Concurring Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides.

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
28th day of March, 2024.

        7 The same is true to a facial challenge. See Ex parte McDonald, 606 S.W.3d 856, 858 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2020, pet. ref’d) (“A facial challenge is essentially a claim that the statute, by its terms, always
operates unconstitutionally.”) (cleaned up); Ghanem v. State,          S.W.3d,    ,    , No. 13-22-00447-CR,
2024 WL 116932, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 11, 2024, no pet. h.) (providing that a
facial constitutional challenge requires a showing that the “statute ‘operates unconstitutionally in all potential
applications’” (quoting Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018))).
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