Court Opinion

ID: 9479254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:12:38.855016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:54.558276
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Had the arbitrator changed a punishment which was initially and consistently imposed by Toshiba, I would have no quarrel with the majority opinion.1 Because the majority effectively holds that the arbitrator has no authority to hold Toshiba to the punishment Toshiba itself chose, I dissent.
The district court, and the majority, are entirely correct when they state that, once the union stipulated that an illegal strike occurred, article 4 of the agreement prohibits the arbitrator from modifying the penalty imposed. In the view of the majority, the “penalty imposed” was discharge. However, this conclusion ignores the fact that article 4 section (2)(a) differentiates between discharge and discipline:
Section 2. In the event of any violation or violations of the provisions of Section 1 of this Article by the Union, its members or representatives:
(a) Any such employee shall be subject to immediate discharge or discipline....
(Emphasis supplied). Moreover, article 10 section (1) reinforces the discipline/discharge dichotomy:
Article X

Discipline and Discharge

Section 1. The right to dismiss and maintain discipline among employees shall be the exclusive function of the Company, including the right to discipline, suspend or discharge employees, provided that an employee who has completed his probationary period shall be suspended, disciplined, or discharged only for just cause.
* * * * * *
(Emphasis supplied).
The majority treats the finding by the arbitrator that Toshiba agreed, during negotiations to end the strike, to impose discipline in the form of a five day suspension rather perfunctorily. However, it is precisely this fact which distinguishes the case before us from the one which the majority decides. In fact, Toshiba assessed a punishment — discipline—and it was the decision by Toshiba to change the assessed punishment of discipline to discharge which the arbitrator voided. Although Toshiba has the unilateral right to punish by discharge or discipline, I find absolutely no language in the agreement which permits Toshiba to change the punishment once assessed. Indeed, the most striking irony of this case is that it was Toshiba which “amended” the agreement, not the arbitrator. The arbitrator merely held Toshiba to the scope of Article 4, which allows Toshiba to assess discharge or discipline.
Moreover, it is simply not reasonable to conclude that even Toshiba believed that it had the power to change the punishment —a power which the majority gives it today. An example [differing from this case only in degree, and not in kind] will demonstrate the point. Suppose that Toshiba had sent notices to all of the strikers which read “Pursuant to Toshiba’s rights under the agreement, all those involved in the illegal strike will be suspended for five days, beginning on Monday.” On the subsequent Thursday, however, after the strikers had begun to serve their suspensions, suppose that Toshiba telephoned each of the strikers and told them that their pun*212ishment had been changed to discharge. According to the reasoning of the majority, an arbitrator would have no power to hold Toshiba to the penalty it initially imposed. It is inconceivable to me that either party negotiated article 4 with the notion that article 4 granted Toshiba the authority to change its mind at will as to the punishment for a violation of the no-strike clause, and the majority identifies no language, in article 4 or elsewhere, which would suggest otherwise.
In my view, the arbitrator acted with far more fidelity than Toshiba in upholding the integrity of the agreement. Far from merely “even arguably construing or applying the contract,” United Paperworkers’ International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 371, his conclusions were firmly grounded in the agreement’s language. Because the majority opinion, in ignoring the distinction between discipline and discharge, is not so firmly rooted, I dissent.

. I note, however, that the arbitrator’s conclusions went beyond a finding that "the side oral agreement overrode the express provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Supra at 209. The arbitrator also specifically held, as discussed, infra, that:
Even granting that Mr. Tyree may not have issued an ironclad guarantee not to fire the five Grievants, he, by his own admission, stated that discipline, not discharge, would be discussed for all employees after they were gotten back in (back to work). Discharge is differentiated from discipline in Article IV by being separately denoted, and any ambiguity, if one may be said to exist, should be construed against the user. Also, Company witness testimony, did not indicate that discharge, the Grievants’ names, or the Stewards as such were ever mentioned in the discussions between Mr. Tyree and Mr. Reynolds.