Court Opinion

ID: 9567457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:54:06.004765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:37.162608
License: Public Domain

KELSEY, J.,
dissenting.
Properly framed, the question presented by this case asks only whether the officers had probable cause to believe the CDs were subject to confiscation under Code § 59.1-41.5. Without contradiction, the evidence established that the observable characteristics of these CDs made them clearly recognizable as pirated “DJ mixes”—the kind most frequently *255traded in the black market. The trial court, therefore, properly denied McLaughlin’s suppression motion.
I.
Under settled principles, we address the legal issues arising from a suppression motion “only after the relevant historical facts have been established.” Logan v. Commonwealth, 47 Va.App. 168, 171, 622 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2005) (en banc). “On appeal from a denial of a suppression motion, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 473, 477, 612 S.E.2d 213, 215 (2005) (en banc) (citation omitted).
After making a traffic stop, Officer Clarence Goins approached the driver’s side to question McLaughlin, the only person in the vehicle. As Goins approached, McLaughlin made a “movement toward the right passenger side seat.” Arriving at the driver’s side window, Goins observed a .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun next to McLaughlin. Goins also saw in the vehicle what he immediately suspected to be “pirated” music CDs. Wanting to confirm his suspicions, Goins called for back-up officers who had received “specialized training in the detection of such bogus CDs.” These officers arrived two to three minutes later.
Without entering the vehicle, one of the officers saw similar CDs “all laid spread out all over the car.” Some could easily be seen both on “the seat and the floorboard.” The officers also noticed that the CDs were packaged in “slimline” plastic cases with “real blurry” paper insert covers both “highly unusual” characteristics for legitimate CDs. Relying on their specialized training, the two officers concurred with the patrol officer’s conclusion that the CDs were “pirated” and should be confiscated.
After making this determination, the officers entered the vehicle to confiscate the CDs, forty in all. One of the officers reached under the right passenger seat to remove CDs that “were sticking out from under the edge of the seat.” While *256doing so, he saw two other suspicious items and alerted Officer Goins to retrieve them. One was a bag of marijuana, the other a bag containing a “large quantity of money.” At that point, the officers arrested McLaughlin for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
McLaughlin moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers had no probable cause to believe he was committing any crime associated with the CDs and thus had no legal justification to search the vehicle. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the officers had probable cause to believe the CDs were “pirated” recordings subject to confiscation. Supporting this assertion, the Commonwealth presented expert testimony from a retired police officer trained in the “detection of bogus recordings, including CDs” and the specific attributes of “pirated” CDs.
The expert confirmed the police officers’ understanding of the “slimline” cases and blurred insert covers as characteristics of “pirated” CDs. He testified that no major label in the recording industry packages music CDs in “slimline” cases. “Nobody uses them,” the expert explained. He also pointed out that the insert covers reveal the recordings to be “DJ mixes” of “major artists” from “major labels.” The blurring occurred when the insert covers were “scanned into a computer and then printed out.” This process caused a noticeable “degradation of the graphics” on the finished product.
These unique circumstances, the expert testified, made these pirated CDs “very easily identified.” “Sometimes they are sophisticated,” he said, “these were not.” He was “absolutely” certain these CDs could be identified as pirated “DJ mixes” from a visual observation. In the black market, “probably more than anything else that we see in illegal music are DJ mixes.” This particular form of piracy, he explained, violates state anti-piracy statutes requiring CDs to disclose “the true name and address of the actual manufacturer.” None of the “DJ mixes” found in McLaughlin’s vehicle complied with this requirement, the expert concluded.
*257After examining the CDs described by the officers, the trial court agreed with the Commonwealth. Holding that the CDs were lawfully confiscated and the inadvertent discovery of the bags of marijuana and money occurred during the confiscation process, the trial court denied McLaughlin’s motion to suppress. The trial judge later found McLaughlin guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1.
II.
Contraband Seizure Doctrine & Pirated CDs
On appeal, McLaughlin argues that the officers did not have probable cause to believe he violated any federal or state intellectual property laws and that these laws, in any event, “do not outlaw simple possession of illegal CDs.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (emphasis added). Lacking probable cause to believe he committed any crime, McLaughlin concludes, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they searched his vehicle. The trial court rejected this reasoning, as do I.
An officer may confiscate contraband without any probable cause implicating the criminality of the possessor. “The critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1301, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999) (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1976-77, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978)). “The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.” Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 557, 98 S.Ct. at 1977 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59, 45 S.Ct. 280, 287, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). It simply misses the point, therefore, to assert “that property may not be searched unless its *258occupant is reasonably suspected of crime and is subject to arrest.” Id. at 559, 98 S.Ct. at 1978.
The question before us, then, is not whether the officers had probable cause to suspect McLaughlin illegally possessed pirated CDs, but whether they had probable cause to believe the CDs in McLaughlin’s vehicle were of the type that could be lawfully confiscated.2 The evidence at the suppression hearing establishes that they did.
Code § 59.1-41.5 mandates that “it shall be the duty of all law-enforcement officers, upon discovery, to confiscate all recorded devices that do not conform to the provisions of § 59.1-41.4.” Under Code § 59.1-41.4, “every recorded device sold, rented or transferred or possessed for the purpose of sale, rental or transfer by any manufacturer, distributor, or wholesale or retail merchant shall contain on its packaging the true name and address of the manufacturer.” This is one of several statutes dealing with “pirated or mislabeled recordings” distributed in Virginia. See Roger Douglas Groot, Criminal Offenses & Defenses in Virginia 967 (2006).
Patterned after similar state anti-piracy laws,3 Code § 59.1-41.4 seeks to deter intellectual property theft by requiring all *259manufacturers of recordings (including unauthorized copiers) to make a specific and “true” self-disclosure. See generally State v. Moghrabi, 341 N.J.Super. 354, 775 A.2d 519, 524 (App.Div.2001) (holding that a “manufacturer” under New Jersey’s anti-piracy statute “obviously refers to the maker” of the unauthorized copy); Milteer v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 732, 738-39, 595 S.E.2d 275, 278-79 (2004) (employing, without further comment, the maker interpretation of “manufacturer”).
Under the confiscation statute, a prior transfer makes the music recording every bit as illegitimate (and thus subject to confiscation) as an intended future transfer, regardless of who possesses it at the time of confiscation. See generally Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682-87, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 2091-94, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (noting that the property is “treated as the offender” under statutory forfeiture laws). The text of Code § 59.1-41.5 confirms this by clarifying that the authority to confiscate exists “regardless” of the lack of criminal mens rea under the corresponding criminal offense statute, Code § 59.1-41.3. See Code § 59.1-41.5 (stating that the confiscation duty applies to “any nonconforming recorded device, regardless of the requirement in § 59.1-41.3 of knowledge or intent of a retail seller”).
In this case, the officers had probable cause to believe the CDs in McLaughlin’s vehicle failed to “conform to the provisions of § 59.1-41.4.” See Code § 59.1—41.5. Testimony from the Commonwealth’s expert, a former police officer experienced in such things, established that a trained officer would easily recognize these CDs to be pirated “DJ mixes” subject to statutory confiscation.4 Packaged in their characteristic “slim*260line” cases, illegal “DJ mixes” do not identify the manufacturer by “true name and address” as Code § 59.1-41.4 requires. Making exactly the same assumption underlying the statute itself, the officers could reasonably conclude that intellectual property thieves do not provide such detailed self-disclosures.
The officers also had ample reason to believe that whoever manufactured these “DJ mixes” likely did so (at least likely enough to satisfy probable cause) for the very purpose of distribution. Custom graphic designs appear on the insert covers, like the trade dress one would expect of an item in commerce. The insert covers also feature specific DJ trade-names, no doubt to provide product recognition and thus commercial value in the pirated CD market. The blurred insert covers, moreover, appear to have been “scanned into a computer and then printed out.”
The probable cause standard requires no more. It does not “deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.” Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 101, 106, 582 S.E.2d 448, 450 (2008) (citation omitted). Nor does it “demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” Id. at 106, 582 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983)). “Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable-cause decision.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (citation and internal brackets omitted). Police officers, therefore, need not be “possessed of near certainty as to the seizable nature of the items.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 741, 103 S.Ct. at 1543.
Thus, the mere possibility of a wholly innocent explanation does not end the probable cause analysis. It must be an *261explanation leaving no persuasive room for any other, reasonably arguable, incriminating explanation. Under the facts of this case, the only plausible innocent explanation assumes someone took the time and energy to
• lawfully download several dozen music compilations of major artists from major labels,
• produce forty or so CDs of these compilations, using custom graphics and designs for each insert cover,
• scan each one of these graphic designs into a computer and then print out a single copy of the scan—instead of just printing out directly the graphic design, an easier process producing a sharper, cleaner image,
• think up fictitious names of D Js to help him identify his own compilations,
all for his own listening pleasure. In other words, we would have to conclude that someone succeeded in producing and packaging legal music compilations for his own personal use that, by pure happenstance, look exactly like the kind most often found in the “illegal music” trade. That supposition strikes me as highly unlikely—so much so that the incriminating inferences preponderate far higher than the probable cause standard even requires.
I respectfully dissent.

. For just this reason, the majority’s reliance on cases like Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 620 S.E.2d 760 (2005), is off the mark. Brown dealt with probable cause for purposes of justifying an arrest— not probable cause for suspecting an item to be within the scope of a civil confiscation statute.

. See Ala.Code § 13A-8-83 (2005); Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3705 (2005); Cal. Pen Code § 65w (2006); Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-4-604 (2005); Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53-142c (2004); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 922 (2005); D.C.Code § 22-3214.01 (2006); Fla. Stat. § 540.11 (2005); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7603 (2005); Ind.Code § 24-4-10-4 (2005); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3750 (2005); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:223.6 (2005); Mich. Comp. Laws § 752.1053 (2005); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 570.240 (2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-21 (2005); NY Penal Law § 275.35 (Consol.2005); N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-435 (2005); N.D. Cent.Code § 47-21.1-03 (2005); Or. Rev.Stat. § 164.868 (2003); Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-14-139 (2005); Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 35.94 (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 13-10-8 (2006); Wash. Rev.Code § 19.25.040 (2005); W. Va.Code § 61-3-50 (2005); Wis. Stat. § 943.209 (2005); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 2168 (2004).

. See generally Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1544, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (relying on expert witness who "corroborated” what the "trained eye” of the seizing officer suggested was contraband). The governing objective test does not draw distinctions between probable cause determinations of a “knowledgeable, veteran officer" and those "made by a rookie" officer faced with precisely the same circumstances. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154, 125 S.Ct. 588, 594, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004). It asks only what the objective facts would *260mean "to police officers trained in analyzing the observed conduct for purposes of crime control.” Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1976); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820-21, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981) (judging probable cause from the perspective of a "trained police officer”).