Court Opinion

ID: 2964083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:08.938313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.308467
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-1804

                        DANIEL J. ROCHE ET UX. VALERIE ROCHE,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                     JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Boudin and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                              _________________________

               Robert E. Kelley, with whom Robert W. Kelley was on brief,
               ________________            ________________
          for appellants.
               Neil Jacobs, with whom Michael J. Moody and Hale and Dorr
               ___________            ________________     _____________
          were on brief, for appellee.

                              _________________________

                                    April 16, 1996

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  This appeal requires us to
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          consider whether a private party should be held liable under 42

          U.S.C.   1983 for an arrest and unsuccessful prosecution that

          followed on the heels of its detailed report of suspected

          wrongdoing to the authorities.  The district court found no

          competent evidence that the defendant violated   1983, discerned

          no merit in the plaintiffs' other claims, and granted brevis
                                                                ______

          disposition.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  Descrying no error, we
                        ___

          affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    We limn the facts in the light most hospitable to the

          summary judgment loser, consistent with record support.  See,
                                                                   ___

          e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.
          ____  _______    _______________

          1990).  In so doing, we ignore "conclusory allegations,

          improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."  Medina-
                                                                _______

          Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.
          _____    _________________________

          1990).

                    On March 18, 1991, as part of a sizeable reduction in

          force, defendant-appellee John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance

          Company (Hancock) laid off approximately 450 workers including

          plaintiff-appellant Daniel J. Roche.  The next day the principal

          architect of Hancock's downsizing (a senior executive vice-

          president who, for the sake of anonymity, we shall call "Green")

          received three electronically recorded telephone messages on his

          office voice mail system.  The speaker threatened Green's life

                                          2

          and forecast the imminent kidnapping and mutilation of his

          children.  Later that day Green's secretary received and recorded

          an equally ominous call.

                    Richard Louis, a Hancock employee responsible for

          internal investigations, prepared recordings of the menacing

          messages.  It was readily apparent that these anonymous calls

          were made by a man endeavoring to disguise his voice.  Louis

          tentatively concluded that the mystery man was a casualty of the

          recent reduction in force, reported the matter to the Boston

          police, and took steps to ensure the safety of Green and his

          family.  When the police investigation fizzled, Hancock retained

          a firm of private detectives (McCain & Fitzpatrick).  Robert

          Fitzpatrick spearheaded the probe.  After a preliminary review,

          Fitzpatrick agreed that a disgruntled ex-employee most likely had

          made the calls and predicted that the miscreant would strike

          again around the anniversary of the March 18 layoffs.

                    All was quiet until the day before Christmas when Green

          received another anonymous call.  This call was sarcastic but not

          threatening.  He received a second such call eight days later. 

          Louis played recordings of these two calls for his supervisor,

          David Cullington, who thought that the voice belonged to Jack

          Budrow (an employee who had lost his job in the March layoffs). 

          Fitzpatrick's attempts to correlate these calls with the four

          original calls proved inconclusive, and Hancock discounted Budrow

          as a suspect vis-a-vis the threats.

                    In February of 1992, Hancock rehired Roche.  On March

                                          3

          13, Green received another anonymous voice mail message.  This

          time the caller promised to kill him on the layoff anniversary

          date.  Louis recorded the communique and notified the

          authorities.  Cullington, understandably alarmed, played the

          recording for Neil Smith (a manager acquainted with many of the

          employees who had been cashiered in March 1991).  Smith had known

          Roche for twenty-two years and thought that he recognized Roche's

          voice.  Cullington next played the four March 1991 messages for

          Smith's listening pleasure, but Smith could not positively

          identify the caller.

                    Without mentioning Smith's views, Cullington aired the

          same five messages for Paul Heaslip, Hancock's director of labor

          relations, who had worked with Roche for four years.  Heaslip

          said that he recognized Roche's voice on the anniversary message,

          but that he could not identify the disguised voice featured in

          the four earlier recordings.  Without mentioning Roche's name,

          Cullington consulted Barry Rubenstein, Hancock's in-house

          counsel.  Rubenstein had worked with Roche off and on from 1985

          to 1989.  When he heard the same quintet of messages he

          volunteered that the voice on the latest recording belonged to

          Roche.

                    At that juncture, Rubenstein assumed an active role in

          the proceedings.  He researched the law, informed Cullington that

          the threatening calls probably violated federal and state

          criminal prohibitions, and stated that it would be appropriate to

          report Hancock's suspicions to the authorities.  Rubenstein also

                                          4

          counselled Cullington that, under the terms of the applicable

          collective bargaining agreement, Roche's employment could be

          terminated.  Out of an abundance of caution, Rubenstein suggested

          that the company obtain yet another opinion.  Following this

          advice, Cullington auditioned the recordings for Brooks Tingle  

          an employee who was in regular contact with Roche but not privy

          to the investigation.  Tingle stated without prompting that both

          the March 1991 and March 1992 recordings contained Roche's voice.

                    In the same time frame Fitzpatrick, acting for Hancock,

          recruited Sensimetric, a voice analysis firm, to compare the

          March 1991 and March 1992 messages in order to determine whether

          the calls had been made by the same person.  Fitzpatrick reported

          to Hancock that  Sensimetric's analysis "strongly indicate[d]

          that the same individual may have made both recordings." 

          Fitzpatrick also asked Sensimetric to compare the non-threatening

          messages attributed to Budrow with the threat made in March of

          1992.  Sensimetric's analysis failed to establish a likely tie. 

          On March 23, 1992, Hancock lawfully but surreptitiously obtained

          a recorded specimen of Roche's normal speaking voice. 

          Fitzpatrick subsequently reported to Hancock that, based on

          Sensimetric's examination of the sample, Roche's voiceprint

          matched that of the minacious caller.

                    Armed with this information, Louis recontacted the

          authorities.  A law enforcement official requested that he secure

          sworn affidavits from the individuals who claimed to be able to

          identify Roche's voice.  Louis followed instructions and, on

                                          5

          March 25, he met with representatives of the Boston Police

          Department and the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office. 

          Louis played the five threatening messages and presented sworn

          affidavits from Smith, Heaslip, Rubenstein, and Tingle confirming

          that each had identified Roche as the perpetrator.  Relying on

          Fitzpatrick's reports, Louis also told the authorities that

          Sensimetric had analyzed the recordings and had concluded that

          the caller's speech matched Roche's normal speaking voice.

                    The police decided to pursue the case.  Without the

          participation of any Hancock representative, the officers applied

          for a criminal complaint and procured an arrest warrant.  The

          next morning four police officers arrived by prearrangement at

          the company's Braintree office.  Louis joined them and summoned

          Roche.  After Louis handed Roche a termination letter, the

          gendarmes arrested him and, in short order, the district attorney

          charged him with threatening to murder Green, threatening harm to

          Green's family, and making harassing telephone calls.

                    Hancock kept close track of the criminal case:  it

          acceded to various prosecution requests for information, paid

          Sensimetric's expert witness fees, and in addition, several of

          its employees (including Louis, Heaslip, and Tingle) testified at

          the trial.  Notwithstanding Hancock's cheerleading, the jury

          voted to acquit.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                  Travel of the Case
                                  Travel of the Case
                                  __________________

                                          6

                    Roche sued Hancock in a Massachusetts state court.1 

          He asserted claims for abridgement of his civil rights pursuant

          to 42 U.S.C.   1983 and counterpart state statutes.  He also

          pleaded claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of

          process, malicious prosecution, and wrongful discharge.  Hancock

          removed the suit to the federal district court citing federal

          question jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C.    1331, 1441.
                                  ___

                    After the close of discovery, Hancock sought summary

          judgment.  The district court, ruling ore tenus, found that
                                                ___ _____

          Hancock, as a matter of law, had probable cause to believe that

          the appellant had committed or would commit a crime, and thus had

          legal justification to report the information in its possession

          to the police.  On this basis, the court rejected the appellant's

          civil rights, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution claims. 

          Finding his other claims to be equally lacking in merit, albeit

          for different reasons, the court granted judgment in Hancock's

          favor across the board.  This appeal followed.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                       Analysis
                                       Analysis
                                       ________

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                            The Summary Judgment Standard
                            The Summary Judgment Standard
                            _____________________________

                    We afford plenary review to the entry of summary
                              
          ____________________

               1Roche's wife, Valerie, joined him as a party plaintiff and
          appears as an appellant in this venue.  Since her claims (for
          infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium) are
          entirely derivative of his, we discuss the case as if Daniel
          Roche were the sole plaintiff and appellant.  Of course, our
          reasoning and result are fully applicable to Valerie Roche's
          claims.

                                          7

          judgment on the civil rights claim.  See Smith v. F.W. Morse &
                                               ___ _____    ____________

          Co., 76 F.3d 413, 428 (1st Cir. 1996).  The criteria are
          ___

          familiar:  a court may grant summary judgment if the nisi prius

          roll discloses no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing

          the entire record in the light most flattering to the nonmovant,

          the proponent demonstrates its entitlement to judgment as a

          matter of law.  See McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d
                          ___ ________    ________________________

          313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (collecting cases); see also Fed. R.
                                                       ___ ____

          Civ. P. 56(c).

                    In applying these criteria, we recognize that

          "genuineness and materiality are not infinitely elastic

          euphemisms that may be stretched to fit whatever pererrations

          catch a litigant's fancy."  Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721
                                      _______    _____

          (1st Cir. 1996).  An issue is "genuine" only when the relevant

          evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder, drawing favorable

          inferences, to decide it in the manner described by the nonmoving

          party; a fact is "material" only when it possesses the capacity,

          if determined as the nonmovant wishes, to alter the outcome of

          the lawsuit under the applicable legal tenets.  See id.  In this
                                                          ___ ___

          connection, it is important to remember that genuine disputes

          over material facts can only sprout out of competent and

          reasonably definite evidence actually contained in the summary

          judgment record.  See Garside, 895 F.2d at 50.  Put bluntly,
                            ___ _______

          "motions for summary judgment must be decided on the record as it

          stands, not on a litigant's visions of what the facts might some

          day reveal."  Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576,
                        _______________    __________________

                                          8

          581 (1st Cir. 1994).  Thus, speculation and surmise, even when

          coupled with effervescent optimism that something definite will

          materialize further down the line, are impuissant in the face of

          a properly documented summary judgment motion.  See Dow v. United
                                                          ___ ___    ______

          Bhd. of Carpenters, 1 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1993).
          __________________

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                                   The   1983 Claim
                                   The   1983 Claim
                                   ________________

                    The court below entered judgment on the   1983 claim

          based on its determination that Hancock had legal justification

          to report the appellant to the police and procure his arrest. 

          Since   1983 is aimed at state action and state actors, see 42
                                                                  ___

          U.S.C.   1983 (providing private right of action for deprivations

          of constitutional rights "under color of any statute, ordinance,

          regulation, custom, or usage" of any state), persons victimized

          by the tortious conduct of private parties must ordinarily

          explore other avenues of redress.  See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
                                             ___ ______    ______

          24, 27-28 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152
                            _______    ________________

          (1970).  To be sure, the rule is not absolute:  private actors

          may align themselves so closely with either state action or state

          actors that the undertow pulls them inexorably into the grasp of

            1983.  See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152; Burton v.
                   ___  ____  _______                   ______

          Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).  But the case
          ________________________

          at hand exemplifies the general rule, not the exception to it.

                    Here, the undisputed evidence discloses that the

          police, of their own volition, decided to seek an arrest warrant. 

          An independent magistrate then examined the collected evidence

                                          9

          and found it sufficient to justify issuance of the warrant. 

          There is not the smallest hint that the magistrate was a Hancock

          pawn, or, for that matter, that Hancock solicited the magistrate

          to act.  From that point forward, the police dictated the time,

          place, and manner of the arrest; the district attorney's office

          framed the charges; and that office directed the ensuing

          prosecution.  Because (1) the officers who requested the warrant

          independently exercised reasonable professional judgment in

          applying for it, cf. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 & n.9
                           ___ ______    ______

          (1986), (2) the magistrate acted autonomously and within the

          range of her judicial competence in issuing the warrant, and (3)

          the district attorney acted autonomously in prosecuting the case,

          there is no principled basis for attributing state action to

          Hancock.

                    Of course, liability under   1983 requires not only

          state action but also an unconstitutional deprivation of rights. 

          The appellant fares no better on this aspect of the inquiry.  At

          a bare minimum, if probable cause to arrest and prosecute the

          appellant existed, no unconstitutional deprivation occurred.2 
                              
          ____________________

               2We do not in any way imply that a citizen must have
          probable cause (or anything remotely approaching probable cause)
          before informing the police of a suspected crime.  Indeed, to the
          extent that the appellant's thesis implies that a private citizen
          who articulates his suspicions to the police may, without more,
          be held liable as a state actor under   1983 for an ensuing
          arrest and prosecution if probable cause is lacking, we
          unequivocally reject it.  There is a strong public interest in
          encouraging people to bring possible wrongdoing to the
          authorities' attention.  Consequently, when a private party,
          acting in good faith, reports suspected criminal activity to the
          police, the cutlass of the federal civil rights statute remains
          in its scabbard.  See, e.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196,
                            ___  ____  _________    _____

                                          10

          See Franco de Jerez v. Burgos, 876 F.2d 1038, 1040 (1st Cir.
          ___ _______________    ______

          1989) (holding that the filing of a criminal complaint does not

          violate the Constitution if the prosecutor had probable cause to

          believe the defendant had committed the crime); Mann v. Cannon,
                                                          ____    ______

          731 F.2d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 1984) (explaining that to prove a

          Fourth Amendment violation pursuant to   1983, a "plaintiff must

          show at a minimum that the arresting officers acted without

          probable cause").

                    Probable cause to arrest exists if, at the moment of

          the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the relevant

          actors' knowledge and of which they had reasonably reliable

          information were adequate to warrant a prudent person in

          believing that the object of his suspicions had perpetrated or

          was poised to perpetrate an offense.  See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
                                                ___ ____    ____

          89, 91 (1964); United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023
                         _____________    ________

          (1st Cir. 1987).  By definition, the determination does not

          require scientific certainty.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
                                         ___ ________    _____

          213, 235 (1983).

                    The inquiry into the existence vel non of probable
                                                   ___ ___

                              
          ____________________

          210 (1st Cir. 1987) (endorsing the "premise that merely
          initiating a good-faith request for police protection would not
          attach liability for the subsequent unconstitutional conduct of
          arresting officers"); Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823
                                _____    __________________________
          F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987) (similar; airline employee
          contacted police to remove striker from terminal); see also
                                                             ___ ____
          Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341,
          ______    _____________________________________
          351-52 (1st Cir. 1995) (granting summary judgment for restaurant
          manager in analogous circumstances); United States v. Garlock, 19
                                               _____________    _______
          F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a private employer
          who investigated employee misconduct and reported the results did
          not automatically become a state actor).

                                          11

          cause is not to be undertaken from the perspective of hindsight

          but from the perspective of a hypothetical "reasonable man"

          standing in the reporting person's shoes at the time when that

          person acted.  See Figueroa, 818 F.2d at 1023; United States v.
                         ___ ________                    _____________

          McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865, 870 (1st Cir. 1977).  The preferred
          ___________

          approach is pragmatic; it focuses on the "factual and practical

          considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

          men, not legal technicians, act."  Gates, 462 U.S. at 231.  Thus,
                                             _____

          the quantity and quality of proof necessary to ground a showing

          of probable cause is not the same as the quantity and quality of

          proof necessary to convict.  See United States v. Hoffman, 832
                                       ___ _____________    _______

          F.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Miller, 589
                                              _____________    ______

          F.2d 1117, 1128 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958
                                           _____ ______

          (1979).  It follows that one who asserts the existence of

          probable cause is not a guarantor either of the accuracy of the

          information upon which he has reasonably relied or of the

          ultimate conclusion that he reasonably drew therefrom.  See
                                                                  ___

          Figueroa, 818 F.2d at 1024-25.
          ________

                    Even assuming that it was Hancock (and not the police)

          who asserted the existence of probable cause, Hancock measures up

          against this benchmark.  Its own staff conducted an extensive

          investigation of the threatening messages.  That probe ultimately

          unearthed a quartet of employees who identified the appellant's

          voice.  These individuals were all familiar with his speech, and

          each vouchsafed the accuracy of the identification.  There is no

          suggestion in the record that any of these persons had the

                                          12

          slightest reason to dissemble.  Standing alone, the

          identification evidence is sufficient to support a finding of

          probable cause.

                    What is more, the finding of probable cause does not

          rest entirely on the identification evidence.  Voice analysis

          strongly suggested that the same individual originated the calls

          placed in March of 1991 and March of 1992, and that the appellant

            whose voiceprint matched the voiceprint of the man who placed

          the March 1992 call   was that individual.  To buttress this

          conclusion, Hancock received a series of reports from

          Fitzpatrick, a twenty-year veteran of the FBI, indicating that

          the appellant had placed the calls.  On the basis of the

          substantial evidence produced by Hancock's investigation, a

          reasonable factfinder would have no option but to conclude that

          Hancock had probable cause to report its findings to the

          police.3

                    The appellant attempts to undermine this conclusion by

          means of several expedients.  We find these expedients uniformly

          unavailing.

                    First, the fact that a state court jury acquitted the

          appellant of the criminal charges does not speak to the existence

          of probable cause.  The probable cause determination is made at a

          different point in time by a different, less demanding

                              
          ____________________

               3It should be noted that the incentive to contact the
          authorities was great; the caller threatened murder, and Hancock
          had every reason to believe that Green's life was in dire
          jeopardy.

                                          13

          methodology, and requires less proof than a conviction.  See
                                                                   ___

          Figueroa, 818 F.2d at 1023; Miller, 589 F.2d at 1128.
          ________                    ______

                    Second, the appellant's claim that the recordings were

          of such poor quality that no one could glean anything useful from

          them, even if true in retrospect, begs the question.  Roche

          points to nothing that furnishes any rational basis for believing

          that Hancock, at the time it contacted the police, knew of any
                        ___________________________________

          such shortcoming.  This is of decretory significance because, for

          the purpose of determining probable cause, courts must ask

          whether a reasonable person would rely on a particular piece of

          information, not whether that information was unquestionably

          accurate.4  See Gates, 462 U.S. at 231.
                      ___ _____

                    Third, the appellant's claim that the voice

          identifications were "shaky" because they were performed under

          highly suggestive conditions is argumentative.  He offers not a

          shred of probative evidence to support this asseveration, and it

          is flatly contradicted by affidavits and depositions contained in

          the record.

                    Fourth, the appellant asserts that the voice-imprint

          analysis performed by Sensimetric failed conclusively to identify

          him as the perpetrator.  We agree   but that fact is largely

          beside the relevant point.  The record is pellucid that Hancock

          based its assessment of the expert's findings on Fitzpatrick's

          account, and faithfully reported that account (which tended to
                              
          ____________________

               4In any event, the magistrate independently examined the
          recordings and apparently found them to be of adequate quality to
          support the issuance of an arrest warrant.

                                          14

          inculpate Roche) to the authorities.  If Sensimetric bungled   

          and there is little in the record to suggest that it did   that

          fact was not known to Hancock.

                    Fifth, the appellant maintains that Louis withheld

          certain of Sensimetric's findings that tended to exculpate him

          and did not mention the calls attributed to Budrow.  This claim  

          which amounts to an assertion that Hancock impermissibly edited

          what it told the police   is bootless.  Although Roche was able

          to demonstrate some equivocation on Sensimetric's part at the
                                                                 ______

          criminal trial, there is nothing in the record to show that
          ______________

          Hancock, which dealt with Sensimetric indirectly (through

          Fitzpatrick), knew more than it disclosed at the relevant time. 
                                                    __ ___ ________ ____

          Similarly, the second part of the claim conveniently overlooks

          the fact that Hancock's investigation implicated Roche, and that

          Hancock lacked any cause to make a good-faith report to the

          authorities concerning Budrow.

                    We could continue dissecting the appellant's

          asseverations, but it would be pointless to do so.  All of them

          share the infirmities of the ones we have addressed.  The short

          of the matter is that, when Hancock went to the police, the

          evidence it had in hand provided probable cause to believe that

          the appellant had threatened to commit a crime and had made

          harassing telephone calls, both of which constitute violations of

          Massachusetts law.

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                                Malicious Prosecution
                                Malicious Prosecution
                                _____________________

                                          15

                    The appellant's allegations of malicious prosecution

          cannot salvage his   1983 claim.  The law is settled that a

          garden-variety claim of malicious prosecution garbed in the

          regalia of   1983 must fail.  There is no substantive due process

          right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from malicious

          prosecution, see Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 810-19
                           ________    ______

          (1994) (plurality op.); Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68
                                  ____________    _________________

          F.3d 1, 3 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995), and the availability of a plainly

          adequate remedy under Massachusetts law, see Beecy v.
                                                   ___ _____

          Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Mass. 1982), defeats the
          ___________

          possibility of a procedural due process claim here, see Perez-
                                                              ___ ______

          Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1994). 
          ____    ______________

          Consequently, the appellant cannot rewardingly predicate his  

          1983 claim on malicious prosecution simpliciter.5

                                          D.
                                          D.
                                          __

                               The Supplemental Claims
                               The Supplemental Claims
                               _______________________

                    After appropriately granting summary judgment on the  

          1983 claim, the district court proceeded to administer the same

          medicine to the appellant on the pendent state-law claims.  The

          argument is made for the first time on appeal that, because the  

          1983 claim furnished the sole underpinning for federal

          jurisdiction, the district court at that point should have

                              
          ____________________

               5Although the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a
          malicious prosecution claim might lie under   1983 on the basis
          of the Fourth Amendment, see Albright, 114 S. Ct. at 813-14, we
                                   ___ ________
          need not explore this virgin territory.  Even assuming the
          vitality of such an approach, the existence of probable cause
          vitiates any arguable Fourth Amendment claim.

                                          16

          remanded the state-law claims to the state court or dismissed

          them without prejudice.  The argument lacks force.

                    A federal court exercising jurisdiction over an

          asserted federal-question claim must also exercise supplemental

          jurisdiction over asserted state-law claims that arise from the

          same nucleus of operative facts.  See 28 U.S.C.   1367(a)
                                            ___

          (providing that "in any civil action of which the district courts

          have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have

          supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

          related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction

          that they form part of the same case or controversy").  Thus, the

          court below had jurisdiction over the appellant's pendent state-

          law claims once Hancock seasonably removed the action from the

          state court.

                    Still, the appellant argues that the situation changed

          after the district court threw out his   1983 claim.  That

          development, he says, stripped the court of power to exercise

          jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.  We disagree. 

          In a federal-question case, the termination of the foundational

          federal claim does not divest the district court of power to

          exercise supplemental jurisdiction but, rather, sets the stage

          for an exercise of the court's informed discretion.  See 28
                                                               ___

          U.S.C.   1367(c)(3) (authorizing a district court to decline

          adjudication of lingering state-law claims after it has dismissed

          "all claims over which it has original jurisdiction").  In

          deciding whether or not to retain jurisdiction on such an

                                          17

          occasion, the trial court must take into account concerns of

          comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like. 

          See Rodriquez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st
          ___ _________    ____________________

          Cir. 1995); Vera-Lozano v. International Broadcasting, 50 F.3d
                      ___________    __________________________

          67, 70 (1st Cir. 1995); Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963-64
                                  ______    ______

          (1st Cir. 1991).  While dismissal may sometimes be appropriate if

          the federal-question claim is eliminated early in the

          proceedings, see, e.g., Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st
                       ___  ____  ________    _____

          Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995), each case must be
                 _____ ______

          gauged on its own facts.  The preferred approach is pragmatic and

          case-specific.  Thus, in "an appropriate situation, a federal

          court may retain jurisdiction over state-law claims

          notwithstanding the early demise of all foundational federal

          claims."  Rodriguez, 57 F.3d at 1177.
                    _________

                    Here, the district court's resolve to go forward with

          the state-law claims fell squarely within the realm of its

          discretion.  The litigation had matured well beyond its nascent

          stages, discovery had closed, the summary judgment record was

          complete, the federal and state claims were interconnected, and

          powerful interests in both judicial economy and fairness tugged

          in favor of retaining jurisdiction.  We are bound to conclude on

          this record that the district court appropriately exercised its

          discretion in retaining jurisdiction over, and disposing of, the

          entire compendium of claims in the case.

                                          18

                    That ends the matter.6  Since the appellant has not

          made a particularized argument that the district court decided

          the state-law claims erroneously, we need go no further.  See
                                                                    ___

          Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 1990)
          ____    ______________

          (explaining "that issues adverted to on appeal in a perfunctory

          manner, unaccompanied by some developed argumentation, are deemed

          to have been abandoned").

                                         IV.
                                         IV.
                                         ___

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                    We need go no further.  For the reasons enumerated

          above, we hold that the district court acted lawfully in granting

          Hancock's motion for brevis disposition on all claims.
                               ______

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                              
          ____________________

               6We add in passing that the appellant's argument is
          procedurally defaulted as well as substantively infirm.  When the
          time was right, he never asked the district court to withhold
          decision on the state-law claims and to remand them to the state
          court.  It is settled in this circuit that a litigant who could
          have asked the district court for relief fairly thought to be
          available, but who chose not to do so, cannot seek that relief
          for the first time on appeal.  See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960
                                         ___ _________    ____________
          F.2d 239, 243 (1st Cir. 1992); Feinstein v. RTC, 942 F.2d 34, 43-
                                         _________    ___
          44 (1st Cir. 1991).

                                          19