Court Opinion

ID: 9828412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:21:05.654674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:47.839184
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In her motion for rehearing, appellant earnestly insists, among other things, that we were in error in holding that Seydler was liable for the attorney’s fees provided for in the notes he assumed, for the reason that the deed to him did not disclose that such notes provided for attorney’s fees, and that consequently he had no notice thereof and could not be held liable therefor. In support of this contention numerous cases are cited, including Dalton v. Rainey, 75 Tex. 516, 13 S.W. 34; Hall v. Read, 28 Tex.Civ.App. 18, 66 S.W. 809 (writ ref.); Standard Paint & Wall Paper Co. v. Rowan (Tex.Civ.App.) 158 S.W. 251; Gray v. Fenimore (Tex.Com.App.) 215 S.W. 956; and Elgin v. Banks (Tex.Civ.App.) 38 S.W.(2d) 149.
Because of apparent conflict between these cases and those cited in our original opinion on this question, we have deemed it advisable to distinguish them. A careful consideration of the cases above cited will disclose that in all except Elgin v. Banks there was no assumption by the vendee of the note sued upon. Either the subsequent vendee had purchased the property subject to the outstanding debt and lien or was asserting a claim against the land adverse to that claimed by virtue of the note and lien involved. In such cases it is manifest that a subsequent vendee who has not assumed the payment of, nor made himself primarily liable for, the outstanding purchase-money note against such land, is entitled to rely upon the record title to the land as disclosing the extent of the obligations against it. Consequently, there cannot be asserted against such subsequent vendee any additional obligation or burden upon the land other than that disclosed by the record upon which such vendee has the right to rely.
A different situation is presented, however, where such subsequent vendee assumes the payment of the outstanding note. In such 'case it becomes his duty to ascertain the extent of the obligation which he assumes in writing to discharge. Having assumed it, and having made himself primarily liable for its discharge, he cannot then be heard to say, as stated by Judge Williams in the Tinsley Case, that he was ignorant of the extent of the liability which he voluntarily assumes. That being true, the rule announced in our original opinion here is applicable to the facts of the instant case.
While it is stated in Elgin v. Banks, a case wherein a subsequent vendee did assume payment of a prior executed note, that “it would seem” that the rule announced in Dalton v. Rainey, and the other cases above cited, would control as to attorney’s fees, not described in the deed but provided for in the note, that case was decided upon other grounds, and the comments of the court on this point were not essential to a disposition of the case. In that case the attorney’s fees were recovered by the plaintiff, and the judgment of the trial court awarding same was affirmed on other grounds. Under these circumstances, we think there is no conflict between Elgin v. Banks and the holding in Tinsley v. Houston Land & Trust Co., supra, and subsequent cases following the rule therein announced.
The other contentions made in the motion have been disposed of in the original opinion, and we deem it unnecessary to write upon them further.
Motion for rehearing will therefore be overruled.
Overruled.