Court Opinion

ID: 9857759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:59:03.849202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:28.869119
License: Public Domain

Murphy, Justice
(dissenting).
By his amended complaint, Frank L. Webster alleged that he and the defendant Paul Schwartz entered into a joint venture to develop certain real estate. The Penn Development Company was the corporate vehicle used in connection with their joint enterprise. It is alleged that certain property of the joint venture has been transferred from Penn Development Company to the additional defendant Anderson company. Webster asked for an accounting and for a determination of his interest in the real estate. By his answer Schwartz admitted indebtedness in a limited amount to the plaintiff. The additional defendant Anderson company admitted that it claimed record title to certain of the property described in the complaint. After the taking of depositions and interrogatories to the plaintiff, none of which were directed to the substance of his claim, the additional defendant Anderson Company filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion was noted for July 11, 1955, and at the same time the plaintiff filed a notice of motion for leave to interpose a proposed amended complaint and noticed it for hearing June 29, 1955. The purpose of the proposed amended complaint was to allege that plaintiff and Schwartz were in a joint venture; that the defendant *233Schwartz and the additional defendant Anderson company were in a separate joint venture; and that Schwartz and the Anderson company engaged in a plan to use in their own enterprise assets belonging to the joint venture of the plaintiff and the defendant Schwartz. The proposed amended complaint asked for an accounting between the plaintiff and all of the defendants; for a determination of the interest of the additional defendant in the property in question; for restoration of the alleged diverted assets; and that a trust be imposed on all property in which the plaintiff has an interest but the record title to which is in the additional defendants.
Construing the proposed amended complaint so as to do substantial justice, as courts are required to do by Rule 8.06, it appears that the relief sought not only includes an accounting between the plaintiff and the defendants but asks as well that a constructive trust be impressed upon the real estate in which the plaintiff claims an interest, and record title to which now appears to be in the name of the additional defendant Anderson company. It seems to me that the proposed amended complaint fulfills the “fact-giving” and “issue-forming” function of notice so as to state a cause of action under Rule 8.01. 1 Youngquist & Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice, p. 193. Real estate owned by joint adventurers is impressed with a trust in favor of all members of the joint venture and the trust follows the land until it passes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser. Irvine v. Campbell, 121 Minn. 192, 141 N. W. 108; Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 152 Minn. 442, 189 N. W. 583; 10 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 4949; Altman v. Altman, 234 Minn. 183, 47 N. W. (2d) 870.
A summary judgment should be granted only where there is no issue of fact upon which a party can possibly recover. The pleadings are to he liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion (Purity Cheese Co. v. Frank Ryser Co. [7 Cir.] 153 F. [2d] 88) and all doubt should be resolved as against the moving party. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp. 321 U. S. 620, 627, 64 S. Ct. 724, 728, 88 L. ed. 967, 972.
*234I think the plaintiff should have been given an opportunity to clarify his complaint and to have his day in court. While the allegations in the amended complaint and the proposed amended complaint as to the additional defendant Anderson company could have been more clearly stated, neverthless on the motion for summary judgment the objections could have been corrected, and the court should have permitted the proposed amendment in conformity with respected authority of Federal courts on this question. 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure (Rules ed.) §§ 444, 447; 3 Id. § 1236; Sidebotham v. Robinson (9 Cir.) 216 F. (2d) 816; Kane v. Chrysler Corp. (D. Del.) 80 F. Supp. 360. Cases should be determined on their merits and not on technicalities. 1 Moore, Federal Practice, § 8.01, states:
“* * * Litigation is not an art in writing nice pleadings. It can and should seldom be settled on its merits at the pleading stage * * *.”
Tipton v. Bearl Sprott Co. (9 Cir.) 175 F. (2d) 432; Topping v. Fry (7 Cir.) 147 F. (2d) 715; Copeland Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp. (5 Cir.) 199 F. (2d) 566. In McNaughton v. New York Cent. R. Co. (7 Cir.) 220 F. (2d) 835, the court pointed out that leave to amend must be freely given, commensurate with the requirements of justice, and no proposed amendment should be denied unless it appears to a certainty that the moving party would not be entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim.
It is clear from the record that by the granting of the motion to amend the position of the case on the calendar would not have been disturbed, nor would the objecting party have been prejudiced by delay.
It seems to me that Rule 15.01, which deals with amendments and which provides “and leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires” (italics supplied), has also been ignored. While it is apparent that amendments should not be granted without limit, and due regard should be had for the timeliness of the amendment, and for the question of whether or not the opposing party is preju*235diced by it, the use of the word “freely” can have no other meaning than to persuade a court to unhesitatingly permit amendments where justice requires so that a litigant may have an opportunity to fully present the merits of his cause.
The plaintiff should be entitled to prove, if he can, that he has some right or interest in the real estate involved in this suit or whatever equity he may have in the assets of the first joint venture which are now alleged to be in the name of and under the control of the additional defendant Anderson company. The fact that it may appear that plaintiff is unlikely to prevail upon trial is not sufficient reason for denying him his day in court, particularly on the record before us which does not indicate that the plaintiff’s claims are sham, frivolous, or so unsubstantial that it would obviously be futile to try them. Sprague v. Vogt (8 Cir.) 150 F. (2d) 795, 801; Johnson Farm Equipment Co. v. Cook (8 Cir.) 230 F. (2d) 119; Marion County Co-op. Assn. v. Carnation Co. (W. D. Ark.) 114 F. Supp. 58.
Without further laboring the points presented, it is sufficient only to refer to the well-considered case of Michel v. Meier (W. D. Pa.) 8 F. R. D. 464, where most of the objections raised by the defendants were considered and rejected.
I therefore respectfully dissent.