Court Opinion

ID: 9768120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:43:12.914849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:36.744545
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DOUGLAS, Judge.
I concur in the affirmance of the conviction, but would hold that the indictment is sufficient under the forgery statute even if there had been an exception to or motion to set aside the indictment.
The indictment alleges, in part, that “John Jones * * * on or about the 5th day of February, A.D., 1974, with intent to defraud and harm, forge, by passing to Jerry Haile, a writing as follows: . . .” A copy of the check followed that allegation.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 32.21, Forgery, provides, in part, as follows:
“(a) For purposes of this section:
“(1) ‘Forge’ means:
“(A) to alter, make, complete, execute, or authenticate any writing so that it purports:
“(i) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act;

“(B) to issue, transfer, register the transfer of, pass, publish, or otherwise utter a writing that is forged within the meaning of Paragraph (A) of this subdivision; . ..”
The statute does not require knowledge that the instrument passed was forged. It does provide that the passing or transfer of a forged instrument comes within the definition of forgery. A person commits an offense under Section 32.21(b), supra, if he forges a writing with intent to defraud or harm another.
The Legislature was within its authority in defining the offense and repealing the forgery statutes in the former Code. It has provided that it is unlawful to pass an instrument that is forged with intent to defraud even though the person passing the instrument is unaware that it is forged provided that he intends to defraud with that instrument. This is the wrongful conduct that the Legislature has the authority to penalize. There is no need, cause or justification to add an element to the offense not provided for in the statute.
A culpable mental state of intentional passing is alleged in the indictment when it alleged the act with “intent to defraud and harm.” This complies with Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sections 6.02 and 6.03.
In Teniente v. State, 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), it was contended that a burglary indictment did not allege that the act was knowingly and intentionally done. The indictment alleged in part that “. Teniente did then and there with intent to commit theft, enter a habitation without the effective consent of Carlos Reyna, the owner.” This Court noted that the gist of the offense of burglary was entry of the habitation with the requisite intent and upheld the indictment. In the present case the gist of the offense is to pass a written instrument with intent to harm or defraud. There is no need for an allegation that he knowingly passed a forged instrument with intent to defraud. This would be like requiring an allegation that he intentionally intended, or that he knowingly intended, to pass the instrument.
It should be noted that an act done intentionally or with intent is one committed with the highest culpable mental state prescribed by the penal code. Knowledge or *781the lack thereof may become a legitimate factor in the proof of lack of intent to defraud.
This Court should not use or add prior laws as a part of the new statute. Article 996 of the 1925 Penal Code required knowledge that an instrument was forged before one could be convicted as passing a forged instrument. That statute was expressly repealed by the new penal code.
Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.03(a), provides:
“(a) Conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, order of a county commissioners court, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.”
The indictment alleges an offense under the forgery statute.