Court Opinion

ID: 9844927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:11:48.080555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:47.316952
License: Public Domain

HiggiNS, J.,
-dissenting: To dissent from an opinion awarding a new trial to an unfortunate human being under sentence of death is not easy. Added to the difficulty in this case is the fact the Attorney General confesses he is unable to distinguish between the charge here *287challenged and similar changes which have been heldi as error in .past decisions of this Court. Only the firm and settled conviction the former decisions .are erroneous in the particular here involved induces me to record my objection.
The amendment .in question was added to a section of the statute entitled: “MURDER IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE DEFINED; PUNISHMENT.” Before the amendment, the statute provided that murder in the first degree “shall be .punished with death.” The amendment added, “Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State’s prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury.”
The recommendation must be made at the time, and as a part of the verdict. By authorizing and empowering the jury to determine whether the punishment shall be death or life imprisonment, I think it was contemplated the determination would be made upon the basis of the evidence in the case and after its full consideration. In passing on the question of guilt and of the degree thereof, decision must be made upon the evidence and applicable law. The amendment makes no provision for the court or the jury to restrict or to enlarge the scope of the inquiry. Certainly the amendment fails to make provision for hearing of the evidence not otherwise competent on the general issue of guilt or innocence. This failure lends support to the view that the jury must base its recommendation -on the evidence, for surely it was intended that the recommendation should be based on something other than whim. The jury has discretion, of course, but the manner of its exercise surely should be governed by the evidence. Pertinent here is a quotation from Vol. 32, N. C. L. Review, p. 439: “The 1949 amendment, making capital punishment in first degree murder cases discretionary has been construed to give' the jury an ‘unbridled discretion.’ The jurors’ power of mitigation is absolute; it may apparently proceed from any assumption which the jurors wish to make; and any doubt .as to the procedural implications of this will be dispelled by a glance at State v. McMillan and State v. Simmons, two recent cases in which the Court reversed trial judges who suggested — by even the faintest inference — that the jurors should look to the ‘facts and circumstances’ of a ©ase in deciding the defendant’s punishment. Thus, the trial judge is totally confined, and the jury perforce is totally unconfined; it may roam at will in selecting reasons for or against death.”
A proviso in the same words .as here involved was made applicable to a conviction for rape. In the case of State v. Shackleford, 232 N.C. *288299, 59 S.E. 2d 825, the present Chief Justice I think correctly interpreted the meaning of the Statute: “However, it is clear from a reading of the amendment that the General Assembly did not attempt to malee any change in the elements constituting the crime of rape, or in the rules of evidence applicable in the trial on a charge of rape. Rather, it is patent that the sole purpose of the act is to give to the jury the right on the evidence in the case to render a verdict of guilty of rape, with recommendation of life imprisonment, even though the jury may find facts sufficient to constitute rape as defined by the statute.” (emphasis added)
In the ease of State v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E. 2d 212, the trial court h'ad charged that the jury had the right and the power, in its discretion, to accompany the verdict (murder in the first degree) with a recommendation of life imprisonment if the jury felt that the facts and circumstances warranted the recommendation. “That is a matter to be exercised by you gentlemen, in your own discretion.” This Court held the instruction erroneous and .said: “Therefore, any instruction, charge or suggestion as to the causes for which the jury could or ought to recommend is error sufficient to set aside a verdict where no recommendation is made.” In the Shackleford case the Court held the jury had the right on the evidence in the case to render a verdict of rape with recommendation of life imprisonment. In the McMillan case the Court held that any instruction, charge or suggestion as to causes for which the jury ought to recommend life imprisonment is error.
In the case of State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 664, counsel for -the private prosecution in the argument against a recommendation of life imprisonment, said: "... in cases where sentences are for life imprisonment, petitions are filed for commutation; that the commutations are allowed and persons thus sentenced to life imprisonment are finally paroled and allowed to go free.” The argument was held to be improper because based on matters dehors the record. This Court, however, correctly stated the applicable rule: “It is generally recognized that wide latitude should be given to counsel in making their arguments to the jury. State v. Bowen, 230 N.C. 710, 55 S.E. 2d 466; State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 45 S.E. 2d 542. Even so, counsel may not go outside the record and inj ect into their arguments facts not included in the evidence.” The inference is plain that argument on the question of recommendation is proper if based on the evidence.
In the case of State v. Oakes, 249 N.C. 282, 106 S.E. 2d 206, this Court for the first time has said, inferentially, that it is error for the *289State to argue in a capital case that the evidence does not warrant a recommendation of life imprisonment. In that case the .trial court charged: “The State says and contends that your verdict should be murder in the first degree; .that your verdict should stop there and that you should not recommend that his punishment be imprisonment for life.” If it is error for the judge to state the contention, it must be error for the solicitor to make it. If the State cannot .argue the question, the defense should not. The concurring opinion in this case agrees with this view. I have no complaint with the statement that the proviso gives the jury discretion. But the jury should hear the evidence and the argument on the evidence, and the court’s charge before exercising the discretion. Discretion is not license. The Court is now holding in effect that counsel must not contaminate the jury with .any argument as to the bearing the evidence should have on the recommendation. The Court is thus building around the right and duty of passing on the question of life imprisonment a barricade and has in effect .put up a sign, “Under quarantine. Discussion forbidden.”
My view differs from the Court in this respect. I think the jury should hear the evidence, proper argument based thereon, and the charge of the court fairly reviewing the contentions upon the evidence, and then exercise its discretion. It seems to be the majority view that the jury should hear the evidence but .should not hear argument or analysis of the evidence and the trial court must not state the contentions of counsel arising on the evidence. The trouble has arisen, I think, because of a picturesque and catchy, but inaccurate and unfortunate .statement that the jury has unbridled discretion. Discretion involves the exercise of judgment based on facts. Unbridled, conduct is based on whim or fancy.
From a comparison of the foregoing quotations from State v. Shackleford and State v. McMillan as to the meaning of the proviso, and from State v. Dockery and the present concurring opinion ¡as to the scope of the argument, it appears there is not much upon which to call for the application of stare decisis. The decisions in material aspects .aire conflicting. “Much was said on the argument in favor of adhering to this recent decision, but the doctrine of stare decisis is not to be observed with inflexible strictness, especially where no rule of property is involved, and it should never be employed to perpetuate an error.” Spitzer v. Commissioners, 188 N.C. 30, 123 S.E. 636.
In the case of State v. Oakes, supra, I agree that a new trial was required because of the admission over defendant’s objection of the affidavit made by the deceased in a prior case. I also agree a new trial was required in State v. Denny, 249 N.C. 113, 105 S.E. 2d 446, *290because of the announcement of the solicitor at the beginning of the trial iand the form of the verdict.
For the reasons herein stated, I think the decision in State v. McMillan, supra, was erroneous and that the error should not be perpetuated. In this case, I vote no error.
Parker, J., has authorized me to say that he j oins in this dissenting opinion.