Court Opinion

ID: 9734554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:37:49.180981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.185115
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). I have signed the opinion of the Court because I agree, for the reasons therein set forth, that an order of the Public Service Commission granting "partial and immediate relief’ pursuant to § 6a1 of the public service commission act2 is not "a final decision or order” within the meaning of § 101 of the Administrative Procedures Act of 1969.3
*185The opinion goes on to state that an order for partial and immediate relief is not a final decision within the meaning of Const 1963, art 6, § 28, requiring that a final decision of an administrative agency be "supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record”.* **4 That statement, while possibly helpful on remand, is not necessary to decision.
Courts generally seek to avoid decisions on constitutional questions.
While this Court decides that the order for partial and immediate relief is not appealable pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, it holds that it is appealable pursuant to §26 of a 1909 utility regulation act for a determination whether the partial and immediate rate order is "unlawful or unreasonable”.5
I am reluctant to conclude that an order for partial and immediate relief need not be supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Section 6a provides that an order for partial and immediate relief can be issued only when a utility has placed in evidence the facts relied on to support its petition and has *186afforded interested parties a reasonable opportunity for a full and complete hearing and not before the commission’s technical staff has made an investigation and report.
The question whether an order for partial and immediate relief is a final decision within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures Act depends, as set forth in the opinion of the Court, on legislative intent. This Court might conclude, as a matter of construction of §§ 6a and 26, that the Legislature intended that an order for partial and immediate rate relief be supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. If this Court as a matter of statutory construction were so to conclude, there would be no need — the statutory standard being as high as the constitutional standard — to consider whether the constitution requires a higher standard than the public utilities statutes require.
The question whether the public utility statutes, in requiring evidentiary support, require that the whole record made before the entry of an interim rate relief order support any such order by competent, material and substantial evidence, is not presented by this appeal. This Court should avoid expressing an opinion on whether the constitutional standard applies to an interim rate relief order until it first determines that the statutes require a lesser standard. No such determination has been made and the constitutional question should not be discussed at this time.
While the term "final decision” appears both in the Administrative Procedures Act and in the constitution it does not follow that those words were used in the same sense in both documents. The intent of the Legislature and of the framers of the constitution and the people in using the same *187words may not be the same. Just as different persons use words differently, especially in different contexts, so too the Legislature and the framers and people may have used these words differently and have intended different meanings.
The structure, context and purpose of legislation is relatively narrow and focused and substantially different from the structure, focus and, indeed, the function of a constitution.
The opinion of the Court adverts to Judge Frank’s observation that "final” "does not have a meaning constant in all contexts”, and that there is still "too little finality about 'finality’ ”, United States v 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F2d 678, 680 (CA 2, 1942), but fails to follow that admonition.
The bulk of the reasoning of the opinion of the Court is devoted to the statutory issue of legislative intent and very little is said regarding the intent of the framers and people. This issue of constitutional law is treated almost in passing with the less than obvious observation that "[i]t is obvious that if the interim order is to be entered before the whole record is made, it cannot be reviewable upon a standard of 'competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record’ ”.6 But the whole record for an interim rate relief order could be the record made before it is entered and need not be regarded as encompassing the record not yet made with regard to the permanent order.
One cannot visualize all the contexts in which may arise the question of whether the constitutional standard governs where a partial, interim or temporary order granting some immediate relief has been entered. The question should not be addressed until it is presented in a case in which *188the record, made before the order was entered, does not support the order with competent, material and substantial evidence and the statute does not require such evidentiary support. Then only need the constitutional question be reached and decided.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 "When any finding or order is sought by any gas, telephone or electric utility to increase its rates and charges or to alter, change or amend any rate or rate schedules, the effect of which will be to increase the cost of services to its customers, notice shall be given within the service area to be affected. When such utility shall have placed in evidence facts relied upon to support its petition or application to so increase its rates and charges, or to so alter, change or amend any rate or rate schedules, the commission, pending the submission of all proofs by any interested parties, may in its discretion and upon written motion by such utility make a finding and enter an order granting partial and immediate relief, after first having given notice to the interested parties within the service area to be affected in the manner ordered by the commission, and after having afforded to such interested parties reasonable opportunity for a full and complete hearing: Provided, That no such finding or order shall be authorized or approved ex parte, nor until the commission’s technical staff has made an investigation and report: And provided further, That any alteration or amendment in rates or rate schedules applied for by any public utility which will result in no increase in the cost of service to its customers may be authorized and approved without any notice or hearing.” (Emphasis supplied.) MCL 460.6a; MSA 22.13(6a).

 1939 PA 3. MCL 460.1; MSA 22.13(1).

 "When a person has exhausted all administrative remedies *185available within an agency, and is aggrieved by a final decision or order in a contested case, whether such decision or order is affirmative or negative in form, the decision or order is subject to direct review, by the courts as provided by law. Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not require the filing of a motion or application for rehearing or reconsideration unless the agency rules require the filing before judicial review is sought. A preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling is not immediately reviewable, except that the court may grant leave for review of such action if review of the agency’s final decision or order would not provide an adequate remedy.” (Emphasis supplied.) MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201).

 "This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record.” Const 1963, art 6, § 28.

 MCL 462.26; MSA 22.45.

 Ante, p 182.