Court Opinion

ID: 9528044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:33.957418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:24.998398
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: As the majority points out, the trial court entered its order for judgment on the pleadings on May 2, 1985, and by docket entry made the finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. On May 24, 1985, the third-party plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate, titling the motion a motion to vacate the summary judgment but, as pointed out by the majority and as agreed by all of the parties to this proceeding, the motion was considered to be a motion to vacate the judgment on the pleadings, which was entered on May 2, 1985. Once again, on June 28, 1985, the court’s entry treated the May 24, 1985, motion as a motion to reconsider and denied that motion. Notice of appeal was filed on July 24, 1985, attacking the orders which were entered on June 28,1985, and May 2,1985. In determining the disposition of the motion to dismiss, we must consider section 2 — 1203 of the Civil Practice Law and Supreme Court Rules 303(a) and 304(a). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1203; 87 Ill. 2d Rules 303(a), 304(a). Section 2 — 1203 provides that motions after judgment in all cases tried without a jury may be made within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. The motion may be for the purpose of rehearing or retrial, modification of the judgment, to vacate the judgment, or for other relief. Rule 304(a) provides for the appeal of judgment as to fewer than all of the parties or claims if the court makes the express finding. Rule 304(a) does not provide for any time within which the appeal must be perfected. Because of that we cannot ignore the provisions of Rule 303(a), which are applicable to the instant case. As pointed out in Wool: “Clearly, Rule 303(a) controls the time for filing an appeal, even if the appeal is taken pursuant to entry of Rule 304(a) finding.” (89 Ill. App. 3d 560, 568, 411 N.E.2d 1135, 1142.) Logically, then, the stay provision of Rule 303(a), provided by filing of a timely post-trial motion pursuant to section 2 — 1203, should also be available for an appeal filed under Rule 304(a). The Wool court also pointed out the necessity of filing any post-trial motion pursuant to the predecessor of section 2 — 1203 within 30 days. This was done in the instant case: the motion to reconsider filed on May 24,1985, attacked the court’s entry of a judgment on May 2,1985. I do not read Supreme Court Rule 304(a) as a foreclosure for post-judgment motions. To do so forecloses the use of section 2 — 1203 and certainly the provisions of Rule 303(a). I would deny the motion to dismiss and consider the case on its merits.