Court Opinion

ID: 9587091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:58.172282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:01.468551
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority regarding what constitutes a valid lis pendens. The majority expressly requires as a prerequisite to a valid lis pendens that the court in which the notice is filed not only be the court that has jurisdiction over the real property for which a notice of lis pendens is sought, but “ ‘must [also] be the court before which the underlying litigation was filed.’ [Cit.]” Majority Opinion, p. 489. The majority’s holding, however, not only bars out-of-state litigants from filing a valid lis pendens in Georgia, it also adversely affects Georgia litigants whose causes of action involve real property located in more than one Georgia county. Hence, a spouse filing for divorce in Chatham County where the marital residence is located can no longer file a lis pendens on the couple’s vacation property in Hall County; parties to a lawsuit over the dissolution of a partnership created to develop realty in Cobb, Fulton and DeKalb Counties would have to file litigation in each of those counties and no consolidation of these actions could be accomplished without sacrificing the validity of the lis pendens.
The majority claims its holding will have no effect on these types of Georgia litigants, relying on Walker v. Houston, 176 Ga. 878 (169 SE 107) (1933), which held that “[c]ommon law doctrine permits lis pendens to give notice of a lawsuit brought in a county within the state other than the county in which the real property at issue is located.” Majority Opinion, p. 490, n. 6. What the majority plainly fails to recognize, however, is that OCGA § 44-14-610 was enacted for the very purpose of changing the “common law doctrine” on which Walker relied and that its superseded holding cannot support the majority’s claim.
*493Walker, supra, was rendered six years before the enactment of the Lis Pendens Act of 1939, Ga. L. 1939, p. 345, § 1, at a time when “purchasers of land were charged with notice of pending suits involving the title which might have been filed in the county where the land lay or in any other county of the state.” Hinkel, Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law, Vol. 1, § 1-20, p. 29, n. 22 (5th ed. 1998). As the facts in Walker reveal, Mary J. Crosby conveyed certain Bacon County property to Walker. The purchase for value was made after Walker had examined Bacon County public records and discovered nothing in them to put him on notice that, during the pertinent time period, Crosby had been named a party in a Pierce County suit filed by Houston regarding her claim of ownership to that same Bacon County property. As this Court phrased it:
The sole question to be determined is whether the suit to cancel the [Bacon County] deed, as filed and docketed in Pierce County, constituted constructive notice of [Houston’s] claim against the property as to those who purchased during the pendency of [the Pierce County] litigation, the same having terminated favorably to [Houston].
Id. at 879. We answered that question as follows:
At the time Mary J. Crosby of Pierce County proposed to convey the property now in question, there was filed and docketed against her in that county a valid suit in which her claim of title was being attacked. By ascertaining the fact that she resided in Pierce County and by inspecting the dockets and files of the superior court of that county, any person could have discovered the existence and character of [Houston’s] claim. Under the law this was a necessary precaution; and this is true notwithstanding the property was located in a different county. . . . Under the facts appearing in the present case, no essential element of a valid notice of lis pendens was lacking.
Id. at 880-881. Thus, as Walker clearly explains, the lis pendens in Bacon County was valid, even though there was absolutely nothing about the Pierce County litigation in its public records, because the common law doctrine deemed every potential purchaser of realty to have constructive knowledge regarding litigation involving that realty instituted anywhere in the State against the prospective seller of the realty.
Six years after this opinion was rendered, the lis pendens statute was enacted, see Ga. L. 1939, supra, thereby superseding Walker and *494its holding that a valid notice of lis pendens arose by the mere filing of a suit in one county involving realty in another county. The Lis Pendens Act of 1939 “marked a considerable advance in property law reform.” Hinkel, supra. Rejecting the Walker holding that purchasers of land were charged with notice of pending suits involving title filed anywhere in the State, the new law provided that, “in order for [the] constructive notice to be operative, a notice of lis pendens must be filed [cit.],” Vance v. Lomas Mtg. USA, 263 Ga. 33, 35 (1) (426 SE2d 873) (1993), with the further specification that the notice must be “entered on the lis pendens docket of the county where the land lies.” Hinkel, supra. See also OCGA § 44-14-610.
It thus appears that the entire premise behind Walker’s holding was superseded by OCGA § 44-14-610. In lieu of a constructive notice assumed from the mere filing of a lawsuit anywhere in the State, OCGA § 44-14-610 substitutes a constructive notice created solely from the proper filing of a lis pendens at a specific court on a specific docket in the specific county where the real property is located. It is contrary to the legislative history of the Lis Pendens Act to engraft, as the majority attempts, the common law concept behind Walker onto our modern lis pendens statute merely in order to avoid the consequences created by the engrafting of another, equally outdated common law concept onto the same statute, namely, the idea that a lis pendens is only valid in “ ‘the court before which the underlying litigation was filed.’ [Cit.]” Majority Opinion, p. 489.
I cannot agree with the majority’s efforts to warp Walker out of its historical and legal context to obtain the result the majority clearly desires, the barring of out-of-state litigants from accessing Georgia courts to file valid lis pendens. Nothing requires this Court to limit lis pendens in the manner set forth in the majority opinion. Clearly, the plain language of OCGA § 44-14-610 does not mandate that holding. That statute requires only that the action involve real property and contains absolutely no limitation language regarding the situs of the underlying litigation. The case law on which the majority relies, wrenched out of its historical and legal context, does not compel the majority’s result, yet the majority refuses to reject it under the peculiar idea that such action by this Court would constitute an “expansion” of the doctrine of lis pendens that can only be handled by the General Assembly. In support of this idea, the majority cites cases clearly distinguishable in that they involved situations where parties asked us to create an entirely new means to levy on property, Powers v. CDSaxton Properties, 285 Ga. 303 (676 SE2d 186) (2009), and raised legitimate policy concerns regarding the effect of this Court’s long-established interpretation of a procedural statute. Atmos Energy Corp. v. Ga. Public Svc. Comm., 285 Ga. 133 (674 SE2d 312) (2009). The case before us now does not *495implicate any of the concerns that have properly warranted our referral of matters to the General Assembly. Rather than an expansion of the statute, we would merely be construing it in a manner consistent with the Legislature’s original intent. Accordingly, I would recognize that, rather than being a matter for the Legislature, this case embodies the very purpose of the courts: to construe the language of statutes, reconcile conflicts between statutes and older case law and reevaluate the validity of our own precedent.
Therefore, because I cannot agree with the majority’s resurrection of moribund case law and the imposition of a limitation on OCGA § 44-14-610 contrary to its provisions and inconsistent with the long-standing practice of our bench and bar, I respectfully dissent.