Court Opinion

ID: 9951749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 21:06:23.163666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:22.514727
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                              STATE OF MINNESOTA
                              IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                    A23-0760

                              August Ventures, LLC, et al.,
                                     Respondents,

                                           vs.

                                Gedney Foods Company,
                                      Appellant.

                                 Filed March 18, 2024
                                       Affirmed
                                    Schmidt, Judge

                              Carver County District Court
                                File No. 10-CV-19-999

Matthew P. Kostolnik, Aaron P. Minster, Moss & Barnett, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondents)

William G. Carpenter, Mark J. Briol, Briol & Benson, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

      Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and

Schmidt, Judge.

                          NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

      In this breach-of-lease action, appellant-tenant Gedney Foods Company challenges

the grant of summary judgment to respondent-landlord August Ventures, LLC, et al.

Gedney argues the district court erred in (1) determining that clause 8.1 of the lease—

covering what happens in the circumstance of a government taking—was not triggered;
(2) rejecting Gedney’s impossibility defense; and (3) rejecting its frustration-of-purpose

defense. We affirm.

                                          FACTS 1

      This dispute arises from the lease of a building located in Chaska, Minnesota

(Premises). In 1957, Gedney, a producer of pickles, purchased land and built the Premises.

In 1965, Gedney purchased another parcel of land located within the Minnesota River

floodplain to construct wastewater treatment ponds (Pond Parcel). The Premises and the

Pond Parcel are, and have always been, legally separate and distinct pieces of property.

      In 2007, Gedney sold the Premises to a predecessor of August Ventures. The

transaction included a sale leaseback, which allowed Gedney to continue operating at the

Premises. Gedney retained ownership of the Pond Parcel.

      The lease defines the Premises as “approximately 143,211 square feet in the

building located at 2100 Stoughton Avenue, Chaska, County of Carver, Minnesota.” The

lease provided that Gedney could use the Premises for “[f]ood production/processing,

office, distribution or warehouse.” The lease provided for the termination of the agreement

under certain circumstances. Relevant to this appeal, clause 8.1 provides that the lease

terminates upon a government taking of the Premises.

             8.1      SUBSTANTIAL TAKING. If all or a substantial part of
                      the Premises are taken for any public or quasi-public use
                      under any governmental law, ordinance or regulation,
                      or by right of eminent domain or by purchase in lieu
                      thereof, and the taking would prevent or materially
                      interfere with the use of the Premises for the purpose for

1
  We recite the facts in the light most favorable to Gedney, as the nonmoving party.
Trebelhorn v. Agrawal, 905 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Minn. App. 2017).

                                              2
                     which it is then being used, this Lease shall terminate
                     and the rent shall be abated during the unexpired portion
                     of this Lease effective on the date physical possession
                     is taken by the condemning authority. Tenant shall have
                     no claim to the condemnation award or proceeds in lieu
                     thereof, except that Tenant shall be entitled to a separate
                     award as provided by applicable law.

       In 2007, the parties added an addendum to the lease that recognized Gedney’s

ownership of, and responsibility for, the Pond Parcel:

              7. OFF-SITE PONDING AREA.

                 (a) The parties hereby acknowledge that Tenant [Gedney]
                     is the fee owner of that certain real property Tenant uses
                     in its operations for ponding purposes and that Tenant
                     operates and maintains various pipes running to and
                     from said property and the Premises (the property and
                     pipes being collectively referred to herein as the “Pond
                     Parcel”). The parties hereby agree that Tenant shall be
                     solely responsible for all costs related to the Pond
                     Parcel, including without limitation the costs of
                     maintenance, repair, taxes, insurance, and compliance
                     with the law and that Tenant shall indemnify, hold
                     harmless, and defend Landlord from and against any
                     claims, damages, penalties, liabilities, and costs
                     (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs)
                     related to the Pond Parcel.

       The parties amended the lease in 2010, which expanded the Premises by adding

approximately 39,120 square feet to the building and extended the lease into 2023. The

amendment did not otherwise modify the definition of the Premises.

       The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) has issued use permits to Gedney

for its Pond Parcel for over forty years. In 2018, the MPCA sent Gedney a Notice of

Violation identifying several permit violations, including wastewater from the Pond Parcel

reaching the Minnesota River. The Notice of Violation also required Gedney to take

                                              3
corrective actions.   During a meeting between Gedney employees and MPCA staff

regarding the violations, the MPCA expressed concerns about Gedney’s ability to comply

with the terms of its permit. Following the meeting, the MPCA wrote to Gedney and

“clarif[ied] that the meeting did not set forth any broad policy implications for wastewater

facilities permitted by the MPCA.” The MPCA noted the meeting was aimed at identifying

Gedney’s “short-term and long-term plan for the wastewater ponds,” including “actions

that ensure compliance with Minnesota statutes, rules and permit conditions.”

       In June 2019, Gedney told the MPCA that it planned on ceasing operations at the

Premises. Gedney stopped paying rent to August Ventures in September 2019 and vacated

the Premises entirely by October 2019. At the time Gedney vacated the Premises, it was

still producing pickles notwithstanding the fact the permit had expired and Gedney had not

corrected the violations.

       August Ventures sued Gedney, alleging that Gedney breached its lease by failing to

pay rent after Gedney abandoned the Premises. August Ventures moved for summary

judgment. Gedney opposed the motion, arguing that clause 8.1 of the lease was triggered

by MPCA’s action, and that the MPCA frustrated the purpose of the lease by making

performance impossible. The district court granted August Ventures’ motion for summary

judgment, determining that Gedney had breached its lease and had no defense for its

breach.   As a result of the breach, the district court awarded August Ventures

$1,459,952.30. The district court later awarded $271,456.30 in attorney fees.

       Gedney appeals.

                                             4
                                      DECISION

      On appeal from summary judgment, we review “the record to determine whether

there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the district court erred in its

application of the law.” Dahlin v. Kroening, 796 N.W.2d 503, 504 (Minn. 2011). “We

review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo.” Riverview Muir Doran,

LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). We view the evidence

“in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted.” Trebelhorn,

905 N.W.2d at 241.

I.    The district court properly determined that clause 8.1 of the lease was not
      triggered.

      Gedney argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the

MPCA’s actions related to the Pond Parcel resulted in a substantial taking, which

terminated the lease under clause 8.1. We disagree.

      As an initial matter, we have serious doubts as to whether a governmental taking

had occurred. At the time Gedney vacated the Premises and stopped paying rent, the

MPCA had not yet completely prohibited Gedney from using the Pond Parcel for

wastewater. The record also contains no evidence that the MPCA demanded that Gedney

immediately stop using the Pond Parcel for wastewater. The evidence shows that the

MPCA demanded Gedney to submit a short-term plan and a long-term plan for the Pond

Parcel that ensured compliance with the law and its permit conditions. The undisputed

facts demonstrate that the MPCA would likely—in the future—take actions that would

expressly prohibit Gedney’s continued use of the Pond Parcel for wastewater. But no such

                                           5
prohibition had yet occurred. The proffered facts present Gedney’s belief that a taking

would occur, not that an actual taking had occurred. We, nonetheless, consider whether

the MPCA’s alleged taking of the Pond Parcel terminated the lease under clause 8.1.

       Gedney asserts the district court “erroneously determined that the [l]ease defined

the word ‘Premises’ to exclude the Ponds.” The purpose of contract interpretation is to

determine and effectuate the intent of the parties. Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic

Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 323 (Minn. 2003). “Where the parties express their intent

in unambiguous words, those words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.

       Clause 8.1 provides that the lease “shall terminate” upon a government taking of

“all or a substantial part of the Premises[.]” The parties’ original lease defined “Premises”

as “approximately 143,211 square feet in the building located at 2100 Stoughton Avenue.”

Shortly after executing the lease, the parties incorporated an addendum in which Gedney

agreed to “be solely responsible for all costs related to the Pond Parcel, including without

limitation the costs of . . . compliance with the law[.]” Gedney also agreed to “indemnify,

hold harmless, and defend [August Ventures] from and against any claims, damages,

penalties, liabilities, and costs . . . related to the Pond Parcel.” The 2007 addendum did not

change the definition of the Premises. The 2010 amendment to the lease redefined the

Premises to account for an expansion of the building but did not otherwise modify the

definition. The 2010 amendment makes no mention of the Pond Parcel.

       The original lease, the 2007 addendum, and the 2010 amendment evince the parties’

intent to distinguish the Premises from the Pond Parcel. The district court did not,

therefore, err in determining that the definition of the Premises is unambiguous and

                                              6
excludes Gedney’s Pond Parcel. Because the lease’s definition of the Premises does not

include Gedney’s Pond Parcel, the district court properly determined that the MPCA’s

actions with regard to the Pond Parcel—even if it could be considered a “taking”—did not

trigger clause 8.1 of the lease. As such, the district court properly granted summary

judgment to August Ventures because Gedney breached the lease by failing to pay rent.

II.    The district court properly determined that Gedney’s impossibility and
       frustration-of-purpose affirmative defenses failed.

       Gedney argues the district court erred by rejecting Gedney’s affirmative defenses

of impossibility and frustration of purpose. We are not persuaded.

       A.     The district court did not err in rejecting Gedney’s impossibility defense.

       Gedney argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment, contending

the MPCA’s actions on the Pond Parcel made it objectively impossible for Gedney to

perform its contractual obligations under the lease. The doctrine of impossibility allows a

party to be excused from performing under the contract “due to the existence of a fact or

circumstance of which the promisor at the time of the making of the contract neither knew

nor had reason to know . . . .” Powers v. Siats, 70 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1955). But

difficulty of performance does not excuse a party from its contractual duties. Id. at 349.

       As reflected in Gedney’s history of making pickles at that location, the record shows

Gedney knew its use of the Pond Parcel for wastewater was subject to government

oversight when it entered the lease. And yet, Gedney assumed “all costs related to the

Pond Parcel, including without limitation the costs of . . . compliance with the law” and

indemnified August Ventures “against any claims, damages, penalties, liabilities, and costs

                                             7
(including reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs) related to the Pond Parcel.” Thus,

the district court properly determined that impossibility was not an available defense

because Gedney knew its Pond Parcel was subject to government regulation at the time of

contracting. Id. at 348-49 (noting impossibility applies only when an unforeseeable event

renders performance impossible or impracticable).

       B.     The district court did not err in rejecting Gedney’s frustration-of-
              purpose defense.

       Gedney argues the district court erred in determining that the frustration-of-purpose

doctrine does not apply. A party asserting a frustration-of-purpose defense must establish

(1) the contract’s principal purpose has been frustrated, (2) the frustration was not the

party’s fault, and (3) the event that frustrated the purpose of the contract was unforeseen at

the time the contract was made. Nat’l Recruiters, Inc. v. Toro Co., 343 N.W.2d 704, 707

(Minn. App. 1984). To prevail under the frustration-of-purpose doctrine, the frustration

must be substantial. City of Savage v. Formanek, 459 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn. App. 1990)

(“It is not enough that the transaction has become less profitable for the affected party.”

(quotation marks omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 1990).

       Gedney summarily states that the “purpose in entering the [l]ease was substantially

frustrated by the loss of use of its wastewater disposal system due to MPCA’s new [p]olicy

and its condition that Gedney provide a short-term and long-term plan to stop treating

wastewater within the floodplains of the Minnesota River.” Gedney fails to acknowledge

that the lease specifically provided for permitted uses of the Premises, including “[f]ood

production/processing, office, distribution or warehouse.” Although Gedney’s “[f]ood

                                              8
production/processing” would eventually need to be altered given the Pond Parcel permit

requirements, 2 the lease provided for other permitted uses of the Premises. Because the

parties contemplated multiple uses for the Premises at the time they entered into the lease,

and because Gedney failed to present an argument explaining why it could not use the

Premises for one of the other permitted uses, we are not convinced that the principal

purpose of the lease was frustrated. The district court did not err in concluding the purpose

of the contract was not frustrated.

       Gedney also claims that it was not at fault because the MPCA’s actions caused

Gedney to stop paying rent. The record, however, shows that the MPCA engaged Gedney

to identify plans for the wastewater ponds, including “corrective actions” to ensure

compliance with the “statutes, rules and permit conditions.” The record also shows that

Gedney’s issues with the MPCA related to the permit violations, which Gedney took

responsibility for in the lease. As the district court properly noted, a party cannot claim

frustration of purpose when they are at fault. Nat’l Recruiters, 343 N.W.2d at 707.

       Finally, Gedney claims the MPCA’s actions were unforeseen at the time the parties

entered into the lease. But there is no indication that, at the time of contracting, the parties

assumed the state’s regulatory requirements related to using the Pond Parcel for wastewater

would remain the same indefinitely such that the event was unforeseen. The undisputed

2
  At the time Gedney stopped paying rent, Gedney could have worked with the MPCA and
provided a short- and a long-term plan for its wastewater. It is entirely possible, and
perhaps even likely, that the MPCA would require Gedney to stop operating because it no
longer had a valid permit. But at the time Gedney stopped paying rent, the MPCA had not
yet told Gedney to cease all operations.

                                               9
facts show that Gedney knew its use of the Pond Parcel was contingent on maintaining a

wastewater permit and that the permit could be modified or revoked. Gedney previously

had to adjust its operations when the state agency required Gedney to stop dumping

wastewater into the river. At that time, the state agency issued a permit that allowed

Gedney to use the Pond Parcel for its wastewater. The change in the permit—which

required a change in operation—demonstrates Gedney knew full well that the MPCA could

amend, modify, or revoke its wastewater permit. As such, the district court did not err in

determining that the frustration-of-purpose doctrine did not excuse Gedney’s breach. 3

      Affirmed.

3
  We note that breaching the lease was not Gedney’s only option. Gedney could have
exercised its rights under clause 3(a) of the addendum, vacated the production portion of
the Premises, paid a $100,000 fine, and its rent would have been reduced accordingly.
Gedney also could have continued to use the Premises for any of the other permitted uses
under the lease, for example, “office, distribution or warehouse.”

                                           10