Court Opinion

ID: 9699126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:11:17.991021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.724929
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority decision because of the result. However, I agree with the concurrence of Judge Nierengarten that no inference should be drawn from the majority that Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 3(a) (Supp.1983) gives rise to a private civil cause of action. Violating section 169.09, subd. 3(a) is a misdemeanor, pursuant to section 169.09, subd. 14(d) (Supp.1983). I do not see any other legal sanctions.
Appellant attempted to convince the court to instruct the jury in conjunction with section 169.09, subd. 3(a); Minn.Stat. § 169.96 (1982);1 and 4 Minnesota Practice, CIV. JIG 302 (1986).2 I do not find that those three instructions are applicable, either by statute or by case law, to post-collision matters.
First of all, section 169.09, subds. 3(a) and (b) are directory, as Judge Nierengar-ten points out. They are intended primarily for informational purposes, and do not bear any relationship to the manner in which the accident happened. Minn.Stat. § 169.96 is intended to allow plaintiffs to use, as prima facie evidence, violations of section 169.96’s provisions relating to driving conduct. Minn.Stat. § 169.96 ends with, “shall be prima facie evidence of negligence only.” If section 169.96 literally applies to all provisions of ch. 169, then, since section 169.09, subd. 3, does not differentiate between the driver rendering reasonable assistance and the driver’s responsibility to give his name, address, date of birth, etc., it follows that in a negligence action the plaintiff is entitled to section 169.96 and to CIV. JIG 302 if the defendant failed to give his address or date of birth.
Yet, we know this is not the case. Failure to give that information is relevant only if a misdemeanor charge is filed against the driver, it is not relevant in a civil lawsuit for injuries. As to the question of negligence for causing the accident, such information is irrelevant.
I would find that a plain reading of Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 3, leads to the conclusion that this subdivision does not relate to negligence. Thus I would find that Minn. Stat. § 169.96 and CIV. JIG 302 are also inapplicable to post-collision causes of action.
Further, I believe the Good Samaritan Law, Minn.Stat. § 604.05, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983), overrides the defendant’s civil expo*558sure, if any, should Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 3, be found to give rise to a private cause of action. Although Minn.Stat. § 604.05 neither refers to “drivers” specifically nor to section 169.09, subd. 3, it uses the words, in both subdivisions 1 and 2, “any person.” The words “any person” by definition, have to include drivers of vehicles unless drivers are expressly excluded. Here they are not. Without clarification from the legislature, I see no reason to judicially exclude drivers from the protection of section 604.05.
Assuming arguendo, the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident absolutely “froze” at the scene, and sat and did nothing until other people or the authorities arrived, that driver might not come under the “shelter” of section 604.05, subd. 2. However, I still would not find a private cause of action by combining section 169.-09, subd. 3; section 169.96; and CIV. JIG 302. Following an accident, a driver is likely to be in some state of shock, fear, or dazed condition, or be injured himself. The problem would be almost insurmountable to relate his decision to stay in his car to the questions of negligence and proximate cause for the plaintiffs injuries allegedly received in the post-collision circumstances, as appellant did in this case. I will only enumerate, but not go into detail, the possible problems if such a private cause of action were to exist. First of all, serious issues of vehicle liability coverage would arise. Post-collision conduct really has nothing to do with driving the car. Second, the issue of what is “reasonable assistance” 3 is not susceptible of an instruction on prima facie negligence, as speeding or running a stop sign are. What we understand to be driving conduct violations in Minn.Stat. ch. 169 are objective standards. Speeding, running stop signs, driving while intoxicated, and all other acts prohibited by Minn.Stat. ch. 169 are readily definable by the trier of fact. On the other hand, what is “reasonable assistance” for a youthful driver, an elderly driver, a slightly injured driver, a seriously injured driver, a disabled or handicapped driver, a driver completely unschooled in post-collision safety techniques, a driver partially or fully schooled in post-collision safety techniques, etc.?
The present common law tort of leaving an injured person in a worse condition than you found him, or attempting to give aid with reckless or gross indifference, is sufficient to cover post-collision claims. I would not enhance the simple directional statement in section 169.09, subd. 3(a) by the application of section 169.96 and CIV. JIG 302.

. Minn.Stat. § 169.96 (1982) states, in pertinent part:
In all civil actions, a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, by either or any of the parties to such action or actions shall not be negligence per se but shall be prima facie evidence of negligence only.

. 4 Minnesota Practice, CIV. JIG' 302 (1986) states, in pertinent part:
2. (Read Minn.Stat. 169.96, prima facie negligence: In all civil actions a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter, by either or any of the parties to such action or actions shall not be negligence per se but shall be prima facie evidence of negligence only.)

. Minn.Stat. § 169.09, subd. 3(a) states, in pertinent part:
[The driver] shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in such accident.