Court Opinion

ID: 9876529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 00:00:25.945836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:46.089075
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20337          Document: 00516909260               Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/26/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                       ____________                                              FILED
                                                                                         September 26, 2023
                                        No. 22-20337                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                              Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                               versus

   Clint Carr,

                                                Defendant—Appellant.
                       ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:18-CR-339-2
                      ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District
   Judge. *
   Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
          A jury convicted Clint Carr of numerous federal drug offenses related
   to his ownership and operation of a Texas pharmacy that was, in reality, an
   illegal pill mill. On appeal, Carr’s arguments for overturning his convictions
   largely concern four audio recordings that, after being vetted by a
   government filter team, were turned over to the prosecution. Carr contends

          _____________________
          *
              District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
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                                     No. 22-20337

   that the recordings intruded into privileged conversations with his attorney
   and prejudiced his defense and that, as a result, his indictment should have
   been dismissed. Finding Carr’s arguments meritless, we affirm.
                               I. Background
          A. Facts and Proceedings
          Clint Carr and his business partner, Dustin Curry, were co-owners of
   CC Pharmacy. They opened the original CC Pharmacy in Houston and later
   added “satellite” locations in Austin and Round Rock, Texas. In 2018, a
   Houston grand jury indicted Carr, Curry, and others for operating CC
   Pharmacy as a “pill mill.” Specifically, the indictment charged them with
   conspiring to unlawfully distribute controlled substances, unlawfully
   distributing and dispensing controlled substances (four counts), conspiring
   to launder monetary instruments, and engaging in monetary transactions in
   property derived from specified unlawful activity (two counts). See 21 U.S.C.
   § 846; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C.
   § 1956(h); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Curry pled guilty of conspiring
   to unlawfully distribute controlled substances and cooperated with the
   government. Carr went to trial.
          In March 2022, Curry and CC Pharmacy employees testified in detail
   during a five-day trial about the pharmacy’s criminal operations and Carr’s
   involvement. The evidence showed the pharmacy was a voluminous and
   lucrative operation. From May 2016 to November 2017, it filled 18,327 fake
   prescriptions and dispensed 1,685,400 units of controlled substances
   including hydrocodone, oxycodone, Xanax, codeine cough syrup, and Soma.
   This generated at least $5.58 million in revenue.
          Carr’s basic defense at trial was that, while he “undoubtedly lied to
   drug suppliers, pharmacy inspectors, and employees,” nonetheless “it was
   not outside the realm of plausibility that [he] was in fact a naïve and foolish

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   participant but not a conspirator.” He concedes, however, “[t]hat CC
   Pharmacy was unlawfully distributing controlled substances,” and that the
   government “overwhelmingly” proved this.
          The jury found Carr guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 240
   months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release.
          B. The Recordings
          Most of Carr’s appellate arguments concern four audio recordings,
   which he contends violated his attorney-client privilege and prejudiced his
   defense. Although none were introduced at trial, we provide this detailed
   background on the recordings in order to fully address Carr’s arguments.
          Two years before trial, in March 2020, Carr agreed to allow a
   government filter team to review potentially privileged evidence seized from
   CC Pharmacy. While all this evidence was to be released to the defense, none
   was to be released to the prosecution until “cleared” by the filter team.
   During their review, the filter team found four audio recordings that included
   either conversations with CC Pharmacy’s attorney, Don Lewis (who died in
   2020), or discussions about advice received from Lewis.
          Recording 1 captures an August 15, 2017, conversation between Carr,
   Curry, and Lewis. Lewis advises Carr and Curry how to respond to the Drug
   Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) seizure of drugs illegally transported
   by pharmacy employee Jeremy Newberry. After this discussion, Carr emailed
   pharmacist Megan Hanson, instructing her to falsely tell the DEA that
   Newberry was authorized to transport the drugs but had left the requisite
   DEA Form 222 on the pharmacy printer.
          Recording 2 captures a conversation between Carr, Curry, and
   Newberry, also on August 15, 2017. Carr tells Newberry that he and Curry

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   had spoken with Lewis and, as a result, were going to plant the DEA Form
   222 on the pharmacy printer.
          Recording 3 captures an August 16, 2017, call between Curry and
   Newberry. Curry tells Newberry that he and Carr have talked to Lewis and
   have a “good gameplan on” to respond to the DEA seizure.
          Recording 4 is from July 18, 2017—i.e., a month before Recordings 1–
   3. It captures a call between Carr, Curry, and CC Pharmacy pharmacists
   Hassan Barnes and Jose Sanchez. Barnes discusses advice received from
   Lewis in response to concerns raised by Sanchez about the legality of
   transferring drugs between CC Pharmacy locations. Barnes and Carr discuss
   further plans to consult with Lewis.
          In June 2021, the filter team gave Carr’s attorney copies of the four
   recordings. On September 1, 2021, they asked Carr’s attorney whether he
   intended to assert any privilege with respect to the recordings. The team
   explained that, in their view, any privilege was vitiated because CC Pharmacy
   had forfeited its charters and the State of Texas had terminated its
   registrations. When Carr’s lawyer did not respond, the filter team followed
   up on September 9, 2021, stating they planned to file a motion with the
   district court to authorize release of the recordings to the prosecution. After
   some back and forth, Carr’s lawyer finally said on September 14, 2021, that
   he intended to assert a privilege.
          On November 1, 2021, the filter team filed a motion with the district
   court to allow release of the recordings. The motion noted Carr’s opposition
   in a footnote. Because, as it later explained, the court mistakenly believed the
   motion was unopposed, it granted the motion the next day, before Carr
   responded. But the filter team did not immediately release the recordings.
   Rather, as they explained in an email to the prosecution, they waited to see
   whether Carr would respond or move for reconsideration. After two weeks

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   transpired with no action from Carr, the team finally released the recordings
   to the prosecution on November 16, 2021.
          On January 10, 2022, the government filed its trial exhibit list with the
   district court. The list included Recording 4, but none of the other
   recordings. The local rules required Carr to object to the list by January 17,
   2022, but Carr did nothing. At this point, as the district court later explained,
   because Carr failed to timely object, the court could have deemed any
   objections to the recordings waived. At a pre-trial hearing on January 20,
   2022—almost three months after the filter team filed its motion and the court
   granted it—Carr finally told the court that he believed that the recordings
   were privileged and that he objected to their use at trial. The district court
   explained it had mistakenly thought the filter team’s release motion was
   unopposed, and so gave Carr a week to file an objection, even though such
   objections had been due three days prior.
          Instead of filing an objection, though, Carr moved to dismiss the
   indictment on January 26, 2022. The deadline for such motions had been
   December 1, 2021. Carr’s motion argued that the prosecution’s review of the
   recordings violated his attorney-client privilege, his Sixth Amendment right
   to counsel, and his Fifth Amendment right to due process. He also claimed
   the filter team misled the district court into believing the release motion was
   unopposed.
          The district court denied Carr’s motion as untimely. As the court
   explained, it had only allowed Carr to file an out-of-time objection to
   Recording 4, not an untimely motion to dismiss the indictment.
   Alternatively, the court found Carr’s motion meritless because the
   recordings contained no discussions of trial strategy nor had the government
   intentionally interfered with Carr’s right to counsel. Finally, the district
   court rejected Carr’s contention that it had been misled by the filter team.

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   To the contrary, the filter team’s “motion complied with the local and
   Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and there is no evidence that
   Government’s counsel, either the filter team or prosecutors, attempted to
   mislead the Court, disregarded any applicable rules, or engaged in any
   unprofessional conduct.”
          The case then proceeded to trial and, as noted, the jury found Carr
   guilty on all counts.
          Carr now appeals. He argues the district court erred by (A) denying
   his untimely motion to dismiss the indictment; (B) admitting evidence
   concerning Carr and Curry’s plan to plant the DEA form on the pharmacy
   printer; and (C) suggesting at the preliminary charge conference that, if Carr
   testified, a “deliberate ignorance” instruction would be appropriate. We
   consider each issue in turn.
                           II. Standard of Review
          We review the denial of Carr’s motion to dismiss the indictment as
   untimely for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dennis, 41 F.4th 732, 739
   (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2616 (2023). If the district court did
   not abuse its discretion, we review the underlying motion for plain error.
   United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2018). If it did abuse its
   discretion, we review the underlying motion de novo. United States v. Ollison,
   555 F.3d 152, 160 (5th Cir. 2009).
          We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Richard, 775 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2014). We
   review Carr’s complaint about the deliberate indifference instruction for
   plain error, however, because it was unpreserved. United States v. Ricardo,
   472 F.3d 277, 285 (5th Cir. 2006).

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                                III. Discussion
          A. Denial of Carr’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
                  1. Untimeliness of the motion
          First, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in
   denying Carr’s motion to dismiss the indictment as untimely. District courts
   obviously have a strong interest in enforcing their deadlines. See, e.g., United
   States v. Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d 70, 80 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v.
   Trobee, 551 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting importance of enforcing
   court-ordered deadlines); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1). Nonetheless,
   courts may consider untimely motions for “good cause.” Fed. R. Crim.
   P. 12(c)(3). “[A] showing of good cause requires a showing of cause and
   prejudice.” Dennis, 41 F.4th at 739–40. Here, Carr shows neither.
          As to cause, Carr first argues that the December 1, 2021, deadline for
   pretrial motions gave him “less than 20 days” to prepare a motion to dismiss
   the indictment, which he says was insufficient. We disagree. For starters,
   Carr counts from the wrong date. He reckons twenty days from when the
   pretrial motion deadline was set on November 10. But the district court
   ordered release of the recordings eight days earlier, on November 2. So, Carr
   was on notice of the principal ground for his motion to dismiss longer than
   twenty days before the deadline. Indeed, he had known for months that the
   filter team had the recordings and would seek to release them to the
   prosecution.
          In any event, Carr fails to explain why twenty days were insufficient
   to prepare his motion. Criminal litigants often must act on shorter time-fuses.
   See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) (requiring motions for judgment of
   acquittal to be filed within fourteen days after trial); Fed. R. Crim. P.
   33(b)(2) (requiring motions for new trial to be filed within fourteen days after
   trial). Indeed, Carr proved capable of working much more quickly in this case:

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   when the district court allowed him to file out-of-time objections in January
   2022, he filed a motion to dismiss in only six days.
          Carr next argues that, even if he had enough time, he could not have
   moved to dismiss the indictment until the government filed its exhibit list,
   which included Recording 4, on January 10. Only then, Carr contends, did he
   know the government would use the recording at trial. We again disagree. As
   the government points out, “Carr could have foreseen that the government
   would seek to use information that it had asked the district court to release.”
   As discussed, Carr had known for months that the filter team had the
   recordings and, furthermore, he had known since at least September that
   they planned to move for authorization to release them to the prosecution.
          Additionally, Carr fails to explain why he took no action to prevent the
   recordings’ release to the prosecution after the district court’s November 2
   release order. One would have expected Carr to promptly alert the district
   court it was mistaken about Carr’s opposing the motion. But even then, the
   filter team still waited until November 16 to release the recordings. In all that
   time, Carr did nothing. Instead, he waited more than two months to raise the
   issue with the district court, at which time the dispositive motion deadline
   had long expired. And even then, Carr did not ask for leave to file an out-of-
   time motion to dismiss the indictment but only asked for leave to object to
   the recordings’ release. Given that chronic inaction, we cannot say the
   district court abused its discretion in finding no cause for Carr’s untimely
   motion to dismiss.
          Finally, Carr fails to show any prejudice, because, as explained in the
   next section, his arguments for dismissing the indictment are meritless. See
   Dennis, 41 F.4th at 739. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in denying Carr’s motion to dismiss as untimely. Ibid.

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                  2. Merits of Carr’s motion to dismiss the indictment
          Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as
   untimely Carr’s motion to dismiss the indictment, we review the merits of
   that motion for plain error. Vasquez, 899 F.3d at 373. Accordingly, “we will
   reverse only if [Carr] shows error that is plain and affects his substantial
   rights, and even then, only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
   public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Grzywinski, 57
   F.4th 237, 238 (5th Cir. 2023), petition for cert. filed, (Apr. 7, 2023) (citations
   omitted) (cleaned up).
                         a. Sixth Amendment
          We begin with Carr’s Sixth Amendment argument. He claims the
   indictment must be dismissed because the prosecution violated his Sixth
   Amendment right to counsel by reviewing the four recordings. That
   argument fails. Even assuming any of the recordings were privileged, but see
   infra III(B), Carr’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached when
   the recordings were made. That right attached when Carr’s prosecution
   “commenced”—that is, when the grand jury indicted him in June 2018.
   United States v. Diaz, 941 F.3d 729, 738–39 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
   (quoting Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008)). But the
   conversations at issue were recorded nearly a year before that—in July and
   August 2017.
          Our decision in Diaz is squarely on point. There, as here, the
   government obtained and reviewed recordings of conversations appellant
   claimed contained information protected by attorney-client privilege. Id. at
   739. We found no Sixth Amendment violation because, “when the
   recordings took place . . . [the] prosecution had not yet commenced.” Ibid.
   (citing Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 198). So too here.

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          Carr’s attempts to distinguish Diaz fail. First, he points out that Diaz
   found the recorded conversation contained no privileged information. True,
   but immaterial. Diaz turned on the fact that the “prosecution had not yet
   commenced” when the conversation was recorded. Ibid. That the
   conversation’s subject matter was also non-privileged separately supported
   the court’s decision (as it does here, see infra III(B)). Ibid.
          Second, Carr argues that in Diaz the government reviewed the
   recording before the indictment, whereas here it did so afterwards. Again,
   that is immaterial. Diaz turned on the fact that “[a]t the point in the
   investigation when the recordings took place . . . prosecution had not yet
   commenced.” Ibid. (emphasis added). When the prosecutors reviewed the
   recordings was of no moment.
          Finally, Carr argues the recordings here, unlike in Diaz, were not
   made “at the behest and direction of the Government as part of their
   investigation,” so the recordings are not “governmental act[s].” It is unclear
   why that distinction would help Carr. If anything, it shows that any
   governmental intrusion was less significant here than in Diaz.
          In sum, we see no error, plain or otherwise, with respect to Carr’s
   Sixth Amendment claim.
                         b. Fifth Amendment
          We next consider Carr’s Fifth Amendment claim. He argues the
   prosecution’s access to the recordings denied him due process. We disagree.
          “Government misconduct does not mandate dismissal of an
   indictment unless it is so outrageous that it violates the principle of
   fundamental fairness under the due process clause of the Fifth
   Amendment.” United States v. Sandlin, 589 F.3d 749, 758–59 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (quoting United States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2009)). The

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   government’s actions must be “shocking to the universal sense of justice,”
   and “such a violation will only be found in the rarest circumstances.”
   Mauskar, 557 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted). “While rare, governmental
   intrusion into an attorney-client relationship has occasionally risen to the
   level of ‘outrageous government conduct’ violative of the Fifth
   Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” United States v. Scarfo, 41 F.4th 136,
   172 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Pelullo v. United States, 143 S. Ct.
   1044 (2023) (citation omitted); see Gaetano v. United States, 942 F.3d 727,
   732 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Vanishingly few decisions have found a due process
   violation for government intrusion into the attorney client relationship.”). A
   defendant asserting such a claim must also show “actual and substantial
   prejudice.” United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996); see
   United States v. Williams, 720 F.3d 674, 686 (8th Cir. 2013).
          Nothing in the government’s conduct here rises to the level of
   shocking or outrageous behavior that would justify dismissal under the Due
   Process Clause. As discussed, before releasing the recordings, the filter team
   contacted Carr’s lawyer to ask whether he intended to assert a privilege—
   while explaining they did not believe the recordings were privileged. When
   Carr’s lawyer did not respond for over a week, the filter team did not take
   this silence as license to go forward. Rather, they again asked whether Carr
   intended to assert a privilege. Because Carr’s lawyer said that he would do so
   only after this second set of correspondence, the team moved the district
   court to authorize release of the recordings. And even when the district court
   prematurely granted that authorization the next day, the team still did not
   release the recordings because they believed Carr would take corrective
   action. It was only after two weeks passed with no word from Carr that the
   filter team finally released the recordings.
          This hardly constitutes conduct that is “outrageous” or
   fundamentally unfair. Sandlin, 589 F.3d at 758–59. To the contrary, the

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   government afforded Carr every opportunity to oppose the release of the
   recordings, even assuming there was any basis to do so. But see infra III(B).
   Accordingly, we find no merit in Carr’s due process claim and certainly no
   plain error on the district court’s part.
           In short, Carr cannot demonstrate any error, much less “clear or
   obvious” error, in the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
   indictment. Vasquez, 899 F.3d at 373 (citation omitted).
           B. Evidentiary Claims
           Carr also contends the district court erred in admitting two pieces of
   evidence at trial: (1) Curry’s testimony explaining how he and Carr planted
   the DEA Form 222 on the printer at the Round Rock CC Pharmacy, and
   (2) the email Carr sent to pharmacist Megan Hanson instructing her how to
   justify Newberry’s transport of drugs to the DEA. Carr argues this evidence
   was “fruit[] of [the government’s] unlawful intrusion into Carr’s privileged
   communications” because it involved actions taken in response to advice
   they received from Lewis that was captured in Recording 1. We disagree. 1
           Carr cannot show any error because, as the government argues, the
   crime-fraud exception vitiates any privilege Carr could have claimed over
   Recording 1. “Under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
   privilege, the privilege can be overcome where communication or work

           _____________________
           1
              It is unclear whether Carr preserved this objection. Although he did object to
   admitting this evidence, his argument was that the evidence itself was privileged. That is
   somewhat different from the argument he now makes that the evidence was the “fruit” of
   an unlawful intrusion into his attorney-client relationship. United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d
   543, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “[t]o preserve error, an evidentiary objection
   must ‘state[] the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context,’” and that “a
   trial court judge must be fully apprised of the grounds of an objection” (quoting Fed. R.
   Evid. 103(a)(1)(B), and United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878, 883 (5th Cir. 1998))). In any
   event, we need not decide whether plain error review should apply because Carr cannot
   show any error to begin with as to admission of this evidence.

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   product is intended to further continuing or future criminal or fraudulent
   activity.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (citation omitted). “[W]here the government makes a prima facie showing
   that the attorney-client relationship was intended to further continuing or
   future criminal or fraudulent activity, the privilege does not exist.” United
   States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983).
          In the conversation captured in Recording 1, Carr solicited Lewis’s
   advice about what Hanson should tell the DEA to cover up CC Pharmacy’s
   wrongdoing. Lewis instructed Carr to have Hanson tell the DEA that she had
   authorized Newberry’s drug transfer, and that Newberry had simply
   forgotten the requisite form. Carr promptly put that advice into action by
   emailing Hanson the falsehood-laden script for her call with the DEA. This
   establishes a prima facie case that Carr’s communication with Lewis was
   “intended to further continuing or future criminal or fraudulent activity.” In
   re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 561 F.3d at 412 (citation omitted). Because
   Recording 1 was non-privileged, the prosecution’s use of Curry’s testimony
   and Carr’s email at trial could not have been the “fruit” of any unlawful
   intrusion into the attorney-client relationship. 2
          But even assuming Recording 1 was privileged, Carr fails to explain
   why the proper remedy would have been to exclude the evidence at issue.
   Both Curry’s testimony and Carr’s email plainly incriminated Carr. He does
   not argue that the prosecution had this evidence only because of its access to
   Recording 1. Cf. United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 235 (5th Cir. 2002)
   (under the “independent source” exception, “evidence obtained from an
   illegal search is admissible if the same evidence was also obtained from a
          _____________________
          2
             Because we conclude Recording 1 was not privileged, we need not consider the
   government’s alternate argument that Lewis represented CC Pharmacy, not Carr, and that
   any privilege CC Pharmacy could have asserted expired when the company ceased to exist.

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   lawful source independent of the illegality”). As the government notes,
   “Carr’s argument appears to be that, had the government not possessed
   Recording 1, it would not have sought to introduce Carr’s email directing
   Hanson to tell the DEA that she had authorized the transfer and that
   Newberry had forgotten the form or Curry’s testimony.” That argument
   fails. So, even if Recording 1 intruded into Carr’s privilege, the evidence here
   was not a “fruit” of that intrusion.
          In sum, the district court did not err in admitting Curry’s testimony
   or Carr’s email.
          C. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction
          Finally, Carr argues the district court erred by stating at the charge
   conference that it would give a “deliberate ignorance” instruction if Carr
   chose to testify. We disagree.
          “A deliberate ignorance instruction informs the jury that it may
   consider evidence of the defendant’s charade of ignorance as circumstantial
   proof of guilty knowledge.” Diaz, 941 F.3d at 741 (cleaned up) (quoting
   United States v. Ricard, 922 F.3d 639, 655 (5th Cir. 2019)). Because such an
   instruction risks convicting a defendant for mere “negligence or stupidity,”
   it “should only be given when a defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge
   and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.” Ricard,
   922 F.3d at 655–56 (quoting United States v. Wofford, 560 F.3d 341, 352 (5th
   Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Araiza-Jacobo, 917 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir.
   2019) (discussing deliberate ignorance instruction).
          Carr contends that the district court’s statement impermissibly
   chilled his right to testify. Because the prosecution’s case was so powerful,
   he argues his “only recourse to set the record straight would have been to
   testify during his case-in-chief.” But “that avenue was cut off to him” by the
   court’s stated intention to give a deliberate ignorance instruction if he

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   testified. As noted, Carr did not object, and so we review for plain error. See
   Grzywinski, 57 F.4th at 238.
           We see no error here, plain or otherwise. Carr concedes there was
   “overwhelming[]” proof that CC Pharmacy was an illegal drug operation
   and, moreover, he admits he “undoubtedly lied to drug suppliers, pharmacy
   inspectors, and employees.” His story, however, was that he just did not
   realize anything illegal was afoot. As he puts it in his brief, he would have
   testified that he was merely “a naïve and foolish participant but not a
   conspirator” and that his “lies could just as easily have been to avoid red tape
   or to appease a less morally scrupulous Dustin Curry’s sensibilities.” That is
   a textbook case for a deliberate ignorance instruction. 3 A district court does
   not err by informing a defendant about the legitimate consequences that will
   flow from a decision to testify. See United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 552–
   53 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, a deliberate ignorance instruction was plainly one
   of them.
           Furthermore, as the government argues, “Carr has not shown that,
   but for the court’s statement, he would have testified.” Many things might
   have led Carr to forgo testifying: the prospect of cross-examination, for
   instance, or the risk of a perjury sentencing enhancement. The record is silent
   on this point—no doubt because Carr failed to object to the district court’s
   statement. Accordingly, we cannot find that the district court’s statement
   (even assuming it was improper) affected Carr’s substantial rights.

           _____________________
           3
              See, e.g., Diaz, 941 F.3d at 741 (instruction appropriate when defendant’s
   “charade of ignorance” could be “circumstantial proof of guilty knowledge” (citation
   omitted)); Araiza-Jacobo, 917 F.3d at 367 (instruction appropriate when “the
   circumstances were so overwhelmingly suspicious that [the defendant’s] failure to conduct
   further inspection or inquiry suggests a conscious effort to avoid incriminating knowledge”
   (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Case: 22-20337     Document: 00516909260           Page: 16   Date Filed: 09/26/2023

                                    No. 22-20337

          Finally, Carr claims his argument is supported by our decision in
   Ricardo. We disagree. In that case, we cautioned that a perjury sentencing
   enhancement cannot be “based entirely on the jury’s verdict without any
   independent findings by the court.” Ricardo, 472 F.3d at 285–86. A court’s
   suggesting otherwise to a defendant could chill a defendant’s right to testify.
   Ibid. This case is different. As discussed, here the evidence plainly supported
   giving a deliberate ignorance instruction if Carr decided to testify. That
   would have been the legitimate price of his claiming “lack of guilty
   knowledge” in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Wofford,
   560 F.3d at 352.
                               IV. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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