Court Opinion

ID: 9528764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:43.902106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:18.491893
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority's analysis, including its adoption of the "overwhelming untainted evidence" test to determine if constitutional error is harmless. However, in adopting this test, I carefully distinguish those situations in which constitutional error may never be harmless. There are some constitutional vio*432lations which undermine the fundamental fairness of the judicial process to such an extent that they require automatic reversal. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44, 71 L. Ed. 2d 379, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such errors include the admission of an involuntary confession, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 (1978); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68, 2 L. Ed. 2d 975, 78 S. Ct. 844 (1958) and the knowing use by the prosecutor of perjured testimony, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 79 L. Ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 A.L.R. 406 (1935). Other constitutional errors potentially affect a trial in such a way that it is impossible for an appellate court to later evaluate the error to determine whether or not it was harmless. This type of error includes the failure to provide counsel for an indigent defendant, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193, 83 S. Ct. 1050 (1963); the failure to determine that a defendant is competent to stand trial, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 86 S. Ct. 836 (1966); discrimination in the selection of a jury, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599, 87 S. Ct. 643 (1967); and financial interest by a judge in the outcome of a trial, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437, 50 A.L.R. 1243 (1927). An appellate court can only speculate as to how the trial or the fact finder's perception of the trial would have differed had such constitutional errors not occurred. However, the admission of inadmissible evidence is not among the constitutional errors which the court must always find to be prejudicial. The court is ordinarily in a position to judge the possible effect of admitting a particular piece of evidence within the context of all the evidence presented at trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 128 n.7, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 104 S. Ct. 453 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Utter, Pearson, and Andersen, JJ., concur with Brach-TENBACH, J.