Court Opinion

ID: 9473475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:30:51.155162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:33.099785
License: Public Domain

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In dissent following a rehearing en banc, I have little to add to my dissent at the panel level appearing in Dracos v. Hellenic *354Lines Ltd., 705 F.2d 1392, 1397 (4th Cir. 1983). I should point out two things, however:
A. The statement that Greek law should apply made in the contract between Hellenic and the seaman is put forth by the majority as a factor somehow distinguishing the Supreme Court decision in Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 318, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 1738, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970), the case which creates in my judgment an offensive collateral estoppel. For one thing, however, Hellenic delayed far too long in seeking to raise the point. Second, and more importantly, such a choice of law provision also appeared in the contract involved in Rhoditis,3 yet was not given the effect the en banc majority attributes to it. Hence the provision calling for application of Greek law appearing in the Dracos contract hardly suffices as a basis for distinguishing Rhoditis.
B. There is solace in the reasoned assessment by United States District Judge Raymond J. Broderick in Papaioannoiu v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 569 F.Supp. 724, 728-29. (E.D.Pa.1983) of the issue which separates the majority and me:
Upon serious reflection of the problems presented in this litigation, this Court finds that Judge Murnaghan’s dissent enunciates the applicable rule which gives the Rhoditis decision a presumptive collateral estoppel effect regarding this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction of Jones Act claims against Hellenic____ The passage of time, without more, is not sufficient to overcome the presumption created by Rhoditis. As heretofore noted, the defendant has not shown sufficiently changed circumstances regarding Hellenic. This Court therefore has determined that it has jurisdiction in this action based on the eight factors enunciated in Lauritzen and Rhoditis as well as on the basis of the defendant’s failure to present sufficient evidence to overcome the effect of the collateral estoppel created by the findings of fact in Rhoditis.
I am authorized to state that PHILLIPS, J., joins in this opinion.

. Justice Harlan, dissenting, stated "In the case before us, there is no reason to disregard either the law of the flag or plaintiff’s contractual undertaking to accept Greek law as controlling ____” (Emphasis supplied). Yet the majority of the Supreme Court did determine that there was a reason to disregard the contractual undertaking to accept Greek law as controlling.