Court Opinion

ID: 9389021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 07:08:56.263748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.640839
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-21-00051-CR
     ___________________________

 DAVID GENE CHRISTENSEN, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 271st District Court
           Wise County, Texas
        Trial Court No. CR21856

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. Introduction

      Appellant David Gene Christensen pleaded guilty to a six count indictment

charging him with aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(2)(B).        There was no plea bargain, and after a

punishment hearing, the trial court sentenced Christensen to forty years’ confinement.

      On appeal, Christensen complains that his forty-year sentence is grossly

disproportionate to his crime and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. He also claims that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel because his attorney failed to object to the sentence assessed by the trial

court. Because Christensen forfeited his Eighth Amendment claim and because he

cannot show that his attorney was ineffective, we affirm.

                                  II. Background

      M.W., thirty-four years old at the time of trial, was sexually abused as a child by

Christensen, her father.

      M.W. lived with Christensen from the time she was two years old until age

eighteen.   M.W. testified that Christensen first molested her when she was six.

Christensen was driving M.W. home and asked her to perform oral sex on him. He

ejaculated in her mouth.

      Another occasion took place in Christensen’s garage. While Christensen’s

then-wife was in the kitchen making dinner, Christensen asked M.W. to accompany

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him to the garage. Inside a small tool closet, Christensen had M.W. get on her knees

and perform oral sex. Again he ejaculated.

      According to M.W., these events—and events like them—took place almost

daily for a number of years.

      The last act of abuse that M.W. testified about occurred before she turned

fourteen. Christensen asked M.W. to pull down her pants and bend over the end of a

bed. He tried to put his penis into M.W.’s anus, but she cried out and he stopped.

M.W. went to her room. The next day, Christensen again called her into his room,

but this time he said that he was sorry and that he would not “do it anymore.” The

family moved to Colorado not long after this.

      In early 2019, M.W. decided that she did not want anything more to do with

Christensen. This was occasioned by what M.W. saw as Christensen’s “grooming” of

her own daughter—inappropriate and constant requests for kisses and hugs. M.W.

and her husband confronted Christensen, telling him that they wanted nothing more

to do with him.

      Several weeks later, M.W. went to the Wise County Sheriff’s Office and made a

report detailing Christensen’s actions. An investigator with the District Attorney’s

Office set up a recording device and, with M.W.’s permission, recorded a telephone

call between her and Christensen. During the call, Christensen admitted both to

having oral sex with M.W. several times and contacting his penis with her anus.

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Further, the investigator testified about texts between Christensen and M.W.’s mother

in which he admitted sexually abusing M.W. and other girls.

       Christensen’s sexual misconduct was not limited to M.W.; indeed, he has a

pattern of inappropriate behavior towards other children, including his stepdaughter,

M.R. When she was fifteen or sixteen, Christensen walked into her room and climbed

into bed with her. She told Christensen he was in the wrong room, but he just leaned

on top of her, put his face close to hers and said, “I know what room I’m in.” M.R.

was angry and shoved him off her. The next morning she told her mother; they both

left, and her mother divorced Christensen soon after.

       Another of Christensen’s victims was his half-sister who is ten years younger

than he is. She testified that Christensen abused her when she was between the ages

of three and seven.

       In addition to his acts of child abuse, Christensen demanded oral sex from

M.W.’s mother as a condition to her being allowed to visit M.W. and their other

children.

                                    III. Discussion

       Christensen raises two points on appeal. First, he claims that the trial court’s

decision to sentence him to forty years in prison violates the principles of

proportionality embodied in the Eighth Amendment. Second, he claims that his

attorney at trial rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to his sentence.

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A. Christensen’s Eighth Amendment Claim is Unpreserved

      Christensen made no objection or complaint to the trial court about the length

of his sentence.     And as he concedes, a defendant’s claim that he suffered a

disproportionate sentence must be raised in the trial court at the time the sentence

was imposed or, at best, in a motion for new trial. See Sample v. State, 405 S.W.3d 295,

304–05 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d); Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). Christensen argues that “nothing in the

rules precludes taking notice of fundamental errors affecting substantial rights,” but

he provides no support for the assertion that sentencing disproportionality is exempt

from the normal rules for preserving error. In any event, the law does not support

such a claim. See Poss v. State, No. 02-12-00010-CR, 2013 WL 2435536, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 6, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(stating that excessive punishment claim is not so fundamental as to relieve litigant of

necessity to object (citing Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d))).

      Christensen’s first point is overruled.

B. Christensen’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

      Christensen also complains that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to object to the disproportionality of his sentence.

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       1. Ineffective Assistance Standard

       The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance

of counsel. Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see U.S. Const.

amend. VI.        To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation was deficient and that

the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

The record must affirmatively demonstrate that the claim has merit. Thompson v. State,

9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

       Strickland’s prejudice prong requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so

serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial—that is, a trial with a reliable

result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In other words, an appellant

must show a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have turned out

differently without the deficient performance. Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Nava, 415

S.W.3d at 308. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068; Nava, 415

S.W.3d at 308. We must ultimately focus on examining the fundamental fairness of

the proceeding in which the result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104

S. Ct. at 2069.

       Christensen argues that “there is a reasonable probability that [his] sentence

would have been less severe but for counsel’s failure [to object to the severity of his

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punishment].” Accordingly, Christensen must show that the trial court would have

committed error in overruling his objection. See Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 566

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We must therefore analyze whether his sentence was truly

disproportionate to his crime.

      2. Disproportionality Under the Eighth Amendment

      Generally, a sentence within the statutory range of punishment for an offense

will not be held to be cruel or unusual. Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (citing Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1973)). Indeed, a trial court’s discretion to impose any sentence within the

prescribed statutory range is essentially unfettered. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320,

323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, a narrow exception to this general rule exists:

the Eighth Amendment prohibits noncapital punishment within the statutory limits if

the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,

59–60, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021–22 (2010); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997–1001,

111 S. Ct. 2680, 2702–05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in

judgment); State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). The gross-

disproportionality exception occurs “only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case.”

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23.

      Texas courts have followed the Fifth Circuit’s analysis for addressing Eighth

Amendment proportionality complaints. McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.

1992). This requires that we first conduct a threshold comparison of the gravity of

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the offense underlying the current conviction, as well as the offenses underlying any

prior convictions, against the severity of the sentence. Id. at 316. The test is whether

the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses upon which the

sentences are based. See Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 390 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2008, pet. ref’d). We consider the gravity of the offense in light of the harm caused or

threatened to the victim or society and the culpability of the offender. Solem v. Helm,

463 U.S. 277, 291–92, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3010–11 (1983).

      In the rare case in which this threshold analysis indicates gross

disproportionality, we proceed to then compare the defendant’s sentence with those

received by similar offenders in this jurisdiction and with those imposed for the same

crime in other jurisdictions. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323; see also Solem, 463 U.S. at 296–

300, 103 S. Ct. at 3012–15 (applying steps two and three).

      3. Analysis

      Christensen was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The statutory

range of punishment for this first degree felony is five to ninety-nine years or life and a

fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 22.021(e). The trial

court assessed Christensen a sentence of forty years—a duration not at the lower end of

the range, to be sure, but neither was it the maximum term. As for the seriousness of

the offense, “[b]y making the aggravated sexual assault of a child a first degree felony,

the legislature has identified the crime as among the most heinous acts addressed in the

penal code.” Bailey v. State, Nos. 14-01-00486-CR, 14-01-00487-CR, 2002 WL 122295,

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at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for

publication). Indeed, sexually assaulting a child is a serious offense that harms not only

the victim but also society, which has a vested interest in protecting its most vulnerable

members. See Wade v. State, 02-21-00206-CR, 2023 WL 1859797, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

      The evidence at trial demonstrates that Christensen’s victim suffered significant

harm. First, his actions constituted an ongoing sexual abuse. Christensen began

abusing M.W. at age six and continued until she was at least fourteen; this occurred

“on almost a daily basis.” The regularity of Christensen’s ongoing sexual abuse

undermines any notion that a sentence of forty years was “grossly disproportionate.”

See Dale, 170 S.W.3d at 800 (concluding that fifty-year sentence for aggravated sexual

assault not grossly disproportionate where the offenses occurred with “regularity”).

      Christensen is M.W.’s biological father. Christensen raised her and lived in the

home with her until she turned eighteen. She was, in fact, dependent on Christensen

because her mother was not present in the home. The fact that Christensen was in a

position of trust and authority lends a particularly grievous nature to his crimes. See

Baletka v. State, Nos. 09-04-00180-CR, 09-04-00181-CR, 2005 WL 387662, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Feb. 16, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Further, the victim suffered psychological trauma, including adverse relationships with

others and a “turbulent” relationship with her sister. See Mathews v. State, 918 S.W.2d

666, 669 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d) (emphasizing the potential for

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“mental, emotional, and physical scarring” of a young sexual abuse victim in finding

the defendant’s thirty-year sentence to be appropriate).

      Similarly, the fact that Christensen enforced silence from M.W. by threatening

that she would lose everything and be separated from her sister underlines the lengths

to which Christensen would go to continue committing his crimes. These threats,

coupled with the ongoing nature of Christensen’s crimes, indicate his culpability and

demonstrate that his actions were deliberate. See Erickson v. State, No. 02-19-00287-

CR, 2020 WL 4907364, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2020, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting defendant’s blameworthiness as

part of “methodical and repetitive” nature of criminal conduct).

      Finally, Christensen’s behavior with other members of his household also

demonstrates that a forty-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault was not grossly

disproportionate. Christensen forced his own half-sister to engage in oral sex with

him, and he threatened her if she ever told anyone in the family. The half-sister

described Christensen as “manipulative,” “coercive,” and a “great groomer.”

Christensen also climbed into bed with his teenaged stepdaughter. When she told

him he was in the wrong room, Christensen did not seem to care. M.W. was also

aware of the fact that Christensen had begun to groom her own daughter. This is

what led her to outcry about Christensen’s crimes.

      Christensen’s sexual misconduct was not limited to children. The ex-wife of

Christensen’s half-brother testified that, while she was dating the half-brother and was

                                          10
at Christensen’s house, Christensen grabbed her hand and held it on his penis. Also,

M.W.’s mother testified that, as a condition to allow her to visit her children after

their divorce, Christensen would routinely force her to perform oral sex on him.

         In light of the gravity of aggravated sexual assault, the harm caused to M.W.,

and Christensen’s culpability, we cannot say that a forty-year sentence is grossly

disproportionate. The mere fact that Christensen admitted to his offenses and has no

prior record does not render the trial court’s sentence grossly disproportional.

Because we have found no gross disproportionality, it is unnecessary to evaluate the

sentences under the two remaining factors of the Solem test. See Bolar v. State, 625

S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). Accordingly, the record

does not show that the result of the proceedings would have been different had trial

counsel presented a gross-disproportionality complaint. We overrule Christensen’s

second point.

                                    IV. Conclusion

         Having overruled Christensen’s two points, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                      /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                      Wade Birdwell
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 20, 2023

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