Court Opinion

ID: 9766788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:59:17.775979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:26.246805
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,
dissenting. The majority opinion correctly states that the resolution of this case depends upon the classification of the lift facilities as either real property or personal property, complicated by the fact that “the facilities are perhaps truly neither, or a little of both.”
The majority then sets forth three tests for resolving the classification of things as real and personal property: (1) the annexation, actual or constructive, of the article to the real estate; (2) its adaptation to the use of the realty to which it is annexed; and (3) whether or not the annexation has been made with the intention to make it a permanent accession to the freehold.
The majority holds that the first two criteria above set forth are amply evidenced by the fact that, the towers which support the lifts are designed according to the topography of the line of each particular lift, and each such tower is embedded in a cement base. In my view, such facts are not enough for a determination that the lifts and their accessories have been so annexed to the realty that they have become part of it.
As the majority opinion states, “the lifts, including towers, cables, chairs, railings and platforms are integrated devices for providing uphill transportation.” While, of necessity, the ski lifts must necessarily follow the contours of the mountainous land upon which they are placed, the purpose of such lifts is to move ski enthusiasts quickly *487and without physical effort on their part to elevations from which they can enjoy the excitement of the downhill run. The plaintiff corporation is in the business of selling the privilege of skiing upon the land leased by it to the general public. The erecting of'the lifts and its accessory parts and structures has been done by the plaintiff corporation to further the desire of the public to use its particular ski area, in preference, perhaps, to other such areas, and thus to advance the business of the plaintiff corporation.
This Court was confronted with the problem of whether buildings and machinery placed upon rented premises should be treated as part of the realty, or as trade fixtures and personal property, in Snow v. Smith et al, 86 Vt. 58, 83 Atl. 269.
Speaking for the Court, the late Chief Justice Powers set forth the following test for such determination:
“The general principle involved in a determination of such questions is the distinction between the business which is carried on in or upon the premises and the premises themselves. That the former is personal in its nature, and articles that are merely accessory to the business and have been put on the premises for this purpose, retain the personal character of the principal, to which they are subservient. But articles which have been annexed to the premises as accessory to the land, without regard to the business there carried on, become subservient to the realty, and acquire its character.
The opinion then states:
“. . . the size, quality and character of a building, and the manner in which it is attached to the realty are of little or no consequence, except as evidence bearing upon the purpose of its erec-. tion.” Snow v. Smith et al, supra, pp. 60-61.
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the installations here were for the purpose of advancing the business of the plaintiff corporation, and were not annexed to the leased premises without regard to such business. I must, therefore, regretfully dissent from the majority view that such installations were part of the realty. I would hold them to be trade fixtures and would affirm the judgment rendered below.