Court Opinion

ID: 9848095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:12:39.891326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:00.897460
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion with reference to the inap*1365plicability of the rule against perpetuities, but I would rest the finding upon the proposition that the option creates a vested interest in the property, thus precluding the use of the rule against perpetuities, which assumes a future vesting. See eases cited in majority opinion with reference thereto.
I cannot agree that this court can make a factual finding of laches in this case, and I would remand the case for findings by the trial court with reference to the defenses other than that based on the rules against perpetuities.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the trial court found that appellant did not learn of the transfers from Whitlock to Mutual Construction Company and from Mutual Construction Company to Jones until 1970.1 The trial court also found that when appellant learned of these transactions, he “demanded a one-half share of Whitlock’s former interest.” Following is the testimony of appellant with reference to the discussion between appellant and ap-pellee Jones at the time appellant learned of the transactions in 1970:
“Well, I told him that, when he told me he had bought these lots, I said, Jim, that isn’t right, and he said, What do you mean? I said, well, we have a contract whereby either you or Oscar or myself have to offer to the others and have equal chance to purchase them. He said, Well, Oscar, or Mr. Whitlock owed him some money for sales commission on land he had previously sold for him, houses he had previously sold, and he said he paid $9,600. for these lots. And I said, well, I feel that I should have an opportunity to buy half of the interest that you bought from him, and he said, well, if I wanted to then, he said, I was going to have to pay all the interest during the time that he had had these lots, and he compiled the interest on this over a period of four year’s time, come up with a total figure and divided by two and said I would have to pay that. I said, Well, Jim, that isn’t fair that I should have to pay interest on that. I said, you should have come to me and told me, I should have been able to buy it at the time that you did, and I said, I want to buy into them, entitled to a half interest, and he said, all right, then I would have to pay this, but we saw each other many times after that for the following two years, Jim would come to the house, but I could never get him to bring me a deed. I kept pressing him, telling him I would like to get that settled.” (Emphasis added.)
In early 1976, a sale to a man named Ferguson failed because appellant would not agree to it unless he received a share which would reflect half ownership in the interest previously owned by Whitlock less half the amount paid by appellee Jones for such share. Later that year, negotiations were had between appellant and appellee Jones for the purchase of each other’s interest in an effort to settle the issue. They finally sold the property to Pulte Homes with $40,000 of the consideration being placed in escrow subject to a determination of the validity of appellant’s claim.
The testimony reflects that appellant and appellee Jones were not only business associates but were close friends. Under the circumstances of this ease, I do not believe laches can be attributed to appellant as a matter of law. Appellant asserted his position immediately upon learning of the prior transfers. The position was a factor in connection with subsequent potential sales of the property and in the final sale of it. Although appellant did not institute a legal action premised on his position, he was not completely “sleeping on his rights” but was actively contending for them in other fashions. At least there exists a factual question concerning the matter.
“ ‘ * * * The length of time during which the party neglects the assertion of his rights which must pass in order to show laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each case, and is not, like the matter of limitations, subject to an arbitrary rule. It is an equitable defense, controlled by equitable considerations, *1366and the lapse of time must be so great, and the relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it would be inequitable to permit the plaintiff to now assert them.’ ” Anderson v. Wyoming Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 346 (1944).
The majority opinion correctly notes that prejudice or disadvantage to those adversely interested is an element of the doctrine of laches. The determination of prejudice in this instance is one of fact.
The majority opinion refers to a denial by the trial court of appellee Jones’ counterclaim against appellant for $1,792, said to be appellant’s share of the cost of a sewer line on 21st Street in 1964. The counterclaim was denied because the statute of limitations operated to bar it. The majority opinion somehow attributes prejudice to appellees because appellant did not bring his action in time for appellees to assert their counterclaim before the bar. Appel-lees could have pressed their claim without waiting for appellant to act first. Which party, if any, was prejudiced by failure of the other party to first institute an action is a question of fact.
The majority opinion points to a specific conflict in testimony of appellant and ap-pellee Jones with reference to whether or not appellant had made this $1,792 contribution. The conflict should be resolved by the trial court. It is not the function of an appellate court to evaluate evidence, Ford Motor Company v. Arguello, Wyo., 382 P.2d 886 (1963), or to consider and weigh conflicts in it, LeBar v. Haynie, Wyo., 552 P.2d 1107 (1976).
I do not believe the facts of this case relative to laches are conclusively established, sufficiently clear, or of a nature from which different inferences can not reasonably be drawn. See e. g. Annotation: Constructive Eviction, 91 A.L.R.2d 638, 645, § 5[b]; Annotation: Liability Insurance— Notice — Papers, 18 A.L.R.2d 443, 504, § 40. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for consideration 2 and determination by the trial court of the affirmative defenses other than that grounded on the rule against perpetuities.

. The majority opinion noted that such precluded a bar to the action by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations was one of the affirmative defenses to the action.

. The trial court refused to enlarge and generalize the language of the judgment to include grounds for it in addition to a violation of the rule against perpetuities as requested by appel-lees.