Court Opinion

ID: 9683512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:30:25.375156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:48.480118
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In Chavez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 384 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court held that use of testimony of the accused at a former trial of the same indictment at a retrial during which the accused chooses not to testify does not violate his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify to his own detriment. In a separate opinion in Nelson v. State, 765 S.W.2d 401, at 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), joined by Judge Miller, the late Judge Teague opined that “Chavez’ foundation resembles quick sand.” In brief, Judge Teague maintained that the authorities cited in Chavez do not address or decide a Fifth Amendment question at all. It was my understanding we granted this petition for discretionary view with a mind to reexamine the holding in Chavez. How ironic that the majority today still refuses to resolve the Fifth Amendment question!
The majority informs us that appellant did not waive his privilege against self-incrimination at his retrial by virtue of having testified at his first trial. At 643. This is certainly consistent with our holding in Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Accordingly, the majority frames the issue in this cause: “was appellant’s former testimony admissible in evidence against him at his second trial even though he invoked his privilege against self-incrimination?” At 643-644. Thus, as identified by the majority itself, the issue here is one of constitutional dimension.
The majority proceeds to answer its own question by asserting that appellant’s testimony from the first trial is admissible under Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 804(b)(1), because invocation of his privilege against self incrimination at the second trial rendered him “unavailable” by the terms of that provision. This would undoubtedly be the proper way to resolve a claim that appellant’s testimony at the first trial was objectionable at the second trial because it constitutes hearsay, ordinarily inadmissible under Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 802. However, it has no analytical bearing on the constitutional question the majority itself declares is the crux of this case.
If the majority does not wish to revisit the holding of Chavez after all, it should simply dismiss the cause as improvidently granted. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 202(k). While I do not favor that disposition, it is better than what the majority does today— to create a far more bizarre precedent than that which we granted discretionary review to examine. I therefore dissent.