Court Opinion

ID: 9607537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:30.0393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:18.655770
License: Public Domain

MOISE, Justice (dissenting). After considerable research and thought I have concluded that the opinion of the court does not accord with what would seem to me to be the proper disposition of this case. My disagreement is not founded on the tenuous distinction suggested by appellant to the effect that emancipation prior to suit should negate the child’s immunity to suit by the parent but is based on my belief that logic and reason do not support such an immunity, whether the child is emancipated or unemancipated. Also, since we have no precedent in New Mexico, we have no problem of stare decisis such as was present in the governmental immunity cases (see State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Town of Grants, 69 N.M. 145, 364 P.2d 853, and Clark v. Ruidoso-Hondo Valley Hospital, 72 N.M. 9, 380 P.2d 168). We should not blindly adhere to precedents from other jurisdictions, but should follow reason and logic in arriving at our own conclusion. If we do so we will be spared having to consider reversing our position at a later date when legal rights have accrued in reliance on our decision. In such circumstance, not making a change in established law- without legislative direction is justified. ■ However, we are' not now so situated.; ' ; . It is evident that there, are two conflicting positions with regard, to parent-child immunity. The great-weight of the case law supports the application of the barrier to suit as held in the court’s opinion, asserting as rationale therefor (1) the analogy between the barrier to suit between husband and wife; (2) the possibility of ultimate inheritance of the amount recovered in damages and depletion of other children’s -inheritance; (3) the possibility of fraud; > (4) -disturbance- of domestic tranquility; -'(5) the position of the family as a- quasi-governing unit; and (6) interference with . parental discipline and control. McCurdy, ' Torts Between Parent and Child; 5 Villa-nova L.Rev. 521, 526. The contrary position that there is no sound foundation for the parent-child immunity rule except • in cases where the alleged negligent act involves exercise of parental authority or exercise of parental discretion with respect to provision of necessities is supported by the great majority of the writers but until recently was virtually unsupported by any United States case law. Prosser on Torts, 3rd Ed., p. 885; 1 Harper and James,1 LaW of Torts, § 8.11, jp. 647;McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, supra; Comment, 23 Ohio St.L.Jrnl. 339; Note, 10 Wayne L.Rev. 602; Note 28 Tenn.L.Rev. 419; Comment, 48 Iowa L.Rev. 748; Note, 12 Cleveland Marshall L.Rev. 339. Of late, at least three jurisdictions -have come ;over to the view expressed by- the various writers on the subject. Wisconsin in Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, and the later case of Ertl v. Ertl (April 12, 1966) 30 Wis.2d 372, 141 N.W.2d 208; Minnesota in Balts v. Balts (April 1, 1966) 142 N.W.2d 66; and New Hampshire, in Gaudreau v. Gaudreau (December 30, 1965) 215 A.2d 695, following the policy set forth in Dean v. Smith (June 30, 1965) 106 N.H. 314, 211 A.2d 410, have all taken the position that there is no privilege or immunity to a suit in tort between parent and child. This is in keeping with the similar positions by various commonwealth nations. See Young v. Rankin (1934) Sess.Cas. 499 (Scottish, the digest of which is found at 28 English and Empire Digest 525, #203) and Deziel v. Deziel (1953) 1 Dominion Law Report 651 (Ontario High Court). As already noted, we have no previous precedent in our law with regard to the question. Accordingly, either position could be taken. Without setting forth the rationale supporting the immunity, I am impressed that the treatment of the problem in Balts v. Balts, supra, amply explains and accords with my own feeling. In addition to what is there said, I would add that the rule, as it stands, is already riddled with exceptions, many of which, with citations, are set out in 23 Ohio St.Law Jrnl. 339, 342-346. These exceptions include father and son in master-servant relationship, child riding in father’s school bus, infant riding with parent who is a common carrier, parent as a member of a partnership, parent’s wilful misconduct (see also, Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218), peace of the home already disturbed beyond repair, recovery from father’s employer though the father (employer’s servant) was immune, recovery after emancipation, recovery after majority, recovery against one who stands in place of a parent, recovery by brother against sister, child’s administrator recovering from parent, and (not mentioned in the note) the reverse—child recovering from representative of the deceased parent, Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo.1960), and parent’s dealings with infant’s property (wills, partnerships, real estate, etc.). These varied exceptions would seem to indicate an attempt by courts to avoid the consequences of the rule by eroding it gradually rather than by meeting it squarely and rejecting it. As to the comment of the majority concerning Goller v. White, supra, I do not understand that the Wisconsin court held that the fact that the individual had liability insurance was the reason for the decision. What they did hold was that the fact that today the general public could be assumed to have liability insurance (see §§ 64—24-42 to 64—24-104, N.M.S.A.1953) was a basis for overriding the policy upholding the application of the immunity doctrine since tranquility of the home was no longer threatened in the majority of the cases. This would seem to bé a valid' consideration of the overall effects of insurance in reaching a general public policy. Whether insurance is or is not present in any given case should not be considered in determining if liability is present. The case should be reversed and remanded for trial. I respectfully dissent from the contrary conclusion .reached by the majority.