Court Opinion

ID: 9757235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:26:53.838348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.818541
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the trial court’s charge to the jury during the sentencing phase on the issue of whether the offense was committed by means of torture was proper. *248Because the majority’s definition of “torture” as “the infliction of a considerable amount of pain and suffering on a victim which is unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity” goes beyond the narrow aggravating circumstances intended by the Legislature, I must dissent. [Majority at 196]
The trial judge charged the jury as follows:
... Now, we usually like to define certain terms that may not have common meaning. Unfortunately under the laws of cases of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, we do not have the definition of torture. There is no legal precedent for me to follow and state, “This is what our Courts” — or—“this is what our laws say torture is.” So, what happens in a case like this is that we must look elsewhere for some sort of a definition of the word “torture.” So, I’ve looked at several, and these are the two definitions I’ve come up with. One of them is the Model Penal Code in which they say that the offense or murder committed by means of torture is designed for the defendant who causes a considerable amount of pain and that the language used for this particularly aggravating circumstance is the murder was especially “heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity.” Also, another place that I felt may be appropriate in trying to define for you “torture” was in the American Law Reports. They stated — these reports stated that since murder is an intentional act, that many Courts have determined, regarding murder by torture, a specific intention that the torture/murder has in committing the homicide. It has been held that this is an intention to inflict pain, suffering, or both pain and suffering.
[N.T. January 26, 1982, p. 146]. Defense counsel had objected to the definitions of torture prior to the charge. [N.T. January 26, 1982, p. 128].
The trial judge’s resolution of the difficulty of charging the jury on the definition of torture without the assistance or guidance of appellate decisions was admirable. It is imperative, however, that the definition of torture be circumscribed more than that of the trial court’s and that *249adopted by the majority today. The infliction of pain which is unnecessarily heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity may be interpreted to include acts resulting in the death of a victim which are not committed by means of torture. The former category is more inclusive than the latter. For example, the infliction of pain on an innocent and defenseless child resulting in death may well be understood by a jury, and this author, to satisfy the majority’s definition of torture. It would not be sufficient in itself, however, to establish an act committed by torture. The problem that I perceive with the majority’s definition is that it would impermissibly suggest to a jury that it may focus on the character of the defendant, rather than on the means by which the murder was committed. While it may be an unintended result, it is an inevitable one.
The Legislature clearly intended to differentiate between murders which are especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and murders by means of torture. Proposed amendments were suggested which would delete the language which is codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8) and substitute as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous. The Legislature considered and rejected the proposed amendments. 1978 Legislative Journal — Senate at 103.
While the trial court offered two definitions of torture to the jury, the impact on the jury of the definition discussed herein is demonstrated in the record itself. Prior to the deliberation, a juror requested the court to define exceptional depravity. [N.T. January 26, 1982, p. 149]. The trial judge correctly refused, directing the jury to use its common understanding of the term. After two hours of deliberating, the jury requested the court to redefine torture. The trial judge stated,
As I stated to you before, we have no precedent to follow in Pennsylvania, so I have used more or less two terms or two definitions; one from the American Law Reports and the other from the Model Penal Code. Now, as far as the American Law Reports is concerned, since murder is an intentional act in many Courts, other Courts outside *250of Pennsylvania have determined, regarding murder by torture, the specific intention that the torture/murder has in committing the homicide. It has been held that this is an intention to inflict pain, suffering, or both pain and suffering. With respect to the Model Penal Code, they state that the language used for this particularly aggravating circumstance is the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional” — you know what the word “exceptional” means — “depravity.” You’ve often heard the words “a depraved mind.” Well, that’s what “depravity” means, a type of mind that’s depraved. I hope that answers your question. I will send you out again, and you can still continue your deliberations.
[N.T. January 26, 1982, pp. 150-151]. The exchanges between the court and the jury emphasize the difficulties which I have outlined in defining torture to include heinous and depraved act.
For the purpose of charging the jury on the aggravating circumstance of torture, I would define “torture” as the continued or prolonged infliction of physical or mental abuse with the intent to cause pain and suffering. Because the majority’s definition encompasses the concept of heinous, atrocious, or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity, I dissent.