Court Opinion

ID: 9685873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:07:50.715324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:12.411063
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2023
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0135-MR

DAQUANTAE DELANE SMITH                                                APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE LUCY VANMETER, JUDGE
                      NO. 19-CR-00377 & 20-CR-00097

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      Daquantae Smith (Smith) was convicted in Fayette Circuit Court of two

counts of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun; two counts of

assault in the fourth degree; two counts of resisting arrest; one count of

criminal mischief in the third degree; and one count of disorderly conduct in

the second degree. Smith was further found to be persistent felony offender

(PFO) in the second degree. He now appeals his resulting twenty-year sentence

as a matter of right.1 Smith argues that the circuit court erred by granting the

Commonwealth’s motion to join two separate criminal indictments against him

for trial, and by allowing Smith’s charges of being a convicted felon in

      1 Ky. Const. § 110.
possession of a handgun to be tried alongside his charges for assault in the

fourth degree, domestic violence. After review, we hold that Smith was not

unduly prejudiced by the joinder of his separate indictments for trial, and that

his counsel invited any alleged error in trying his felon in possession of a

handgun charges concomitantly with his domestic violence assault charges.

We accordingly affirm.

                I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In January 2019, Paula Woolridge (Paula), had recently started a

relationship with Smith. Paula was pregnant with his child, and although they

were not living together, Smith was occasionally staying at Paula’s apartment.

On the night of January 5 into the morning hours of January 6, Smith was at

Paula’s apartment with his two young children. At around midnight that night,

Smith began going through Paula’s phone and accusing her of cheating on him

while questioning the unborn child’s paternity. He became angry and hit Paula

in the face with a closed fist multiple times, resulting in Paula having a busted

lip and a bruised and swollen eye. Smith also kicked Paula in the stomach and

told her he would kick the baby out of her and threw several items, including a

lit candle, at her. Smith’s outbursts and abuses continued intermittently from

midnight to sometime around 8 a.m. when Smith went to sleep. Paula

retrieved her phone and escaped from the ground floor apartment through a

window. Paula called a friend, who picked her up and convinced Paula to call

the police.

                                            2
      When officers arrived at the apartment complex, they spoke with Paula in

the parking lot. She explained what happened the night before and further told

the officers that Smith, a convicted felon, had guns in her apartment. When

the officers walked into Paula’s apartment, they saw Smith on a couch that was

partially blocking the front door. They attempted to speak with him about the

situation, but he refused to answer their questions. When the officers informed

him that he was under arrest and stood him up, the officers saw a handgun on

the couch where he had been sitting. Smith resisted the officers’ attempt to

arrest him, but they were ultimately able to subdue and handcuff him after a

brief struggle that began in the apartment and ended in the apartment

building’s breezeway. After Smith was removed from the scene, Paula escorted

the officers to a bedroom in the apartment and showed them three additional

guns—two handguns and a shotgun—under a mattress. Three of the guns

found in the apartment had previously been reported stolen.

      In March 2019, Smith was indicted in Fayette Circuit Court, Third

Division, for the events that occurred on January 6 in case number 19-CR-377.

Initially, the charges in that indictment were the following counts:

      Count 1: Convicted felon in possession of a handgun

      Count 2: Convicted felon in possession of a firearm

      Counts 3-5: Receiving stolen property, firearm

      Count 6: Assault in the fourth degree, domestic violence, third or
               greater offense within five years

      Count 7: Resisting arrest

      Count 8: Persistent felony offender in the second degree
                                           3
On April 19, a month after Smith was indicted, he was released on bond. In

the months that followed, Smith and Paula continued to see each other, and on

November 18, 2019, a second domestic violence incident occurred between

them. Paula decided she wanted to end her relationship with Smith and went

to his apartment with her three small children to retrieve her belongings.

When Smith realized that Paula intended to leave him, he became angry and

would not allow her to leave the apartment. As she was trying to leave, he

slammed the front door on her forearm and tried to physically prevent her from

leaving. She was eventually able to escape to a neighboring apartment and call

911. By the time police arrived on scene minutes later, Smith was gone, and

they were unable to arrest him that day. No firearms were found in Smith’s

apartment that day, but the officers recovered a gun clip that was lying in a

closet in plain view.

      On November 25, the police went back to Smith’s apartment to serve the

arrest warrant issued in relation to the November 18 incident. When the

officers knocked on his door, Smith came to the door in a t-shirt, nude from

the waist down. He told the officers he needed to put pants on, so the officers

followed him into the apartment. As Smith was walking towards the back of

the apartment, he went into a bedroom and tried to quickly shut the door.

Before he could shut the door, the officers saw a handgun on the bed in plain

sight. The officers prevented him from shutting the door and told him that he

was under arrest. After a struggle, the officers were able to get Smith into

handcuffs and put pants on him. Smith resisted the officers the entire time

                                           4
they walked him to a cruiser and at one point “went dead weight” on them,

requiring the officers to carry him. During the time the officers were moving

Smith from his apartment to the cruiser, he began screaming for his mother

and “causing a scene” by telling the officers they had no right to arrest him.

Several people from the apartment complex started to form a crowd outside the

complex in response to the commotion. As they were placing Smith into the

cruiser, he threw his head back into the face of Officer James Chips (Officer

Chips), which busted his lip.

      While sitting in the back of the cruiser, Smith was able to get his

handcuffed hands from behind his back to the front of his body. He then

began beating and kicking the cruiser’s window with such force the officers

were afraid he was going to break it. They therefore removed him from the

cruiser so they could place his ankles in shackles and re-cuff him behind his

back before transporting him. After they placed shackles on him, they removed

his handcuffs. Smith again resisted the officers and bit Officer Chips on the

left forearm during the struggle.

      Three months later, in February 2020, Smith was indicted in relation to

the November 18 and November 25 incidents in Fayette Circuit Court, Eighth

Division, in case number 20-CR-97. The charges in that indictment were as

follows:

      Count 1: Convicted felon in possession of a handgun

      Count 2: Assault in the third degree of a police officer

      Count 3: Criminal mischief in the second degree

                                           5
      Count 4: Resisting arrest

      Count 5: Disorderly conduct in the first degree

      Count 6: Assault in the fourth degree, domestic violence, third or
               greater offense within five years

      Count 7: Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree

      Count 8: Persistent felony offender in the second degree

      Two days after the 20-CR-97 indictment, the Commonwealth filed a

combined motion to transfer 20-CR-97 from the Eighth Division to the Third

Division of Fayette Circuit Court and to join 20-CR-97 with 19-CR-377 for trial.

Smith’s defense counsel filed a response objecting to the joinder. During a

hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion, it argued that the indictments could

be properly joined because the incidents that occurred on January 6, 2019,

and November 18, 2019, respectively, were domestic violence episodes

involving the same victim that occurred within a year of one another. And, that

the charges that stemmed from Smith’s conduct on November 25, 2019, had a

sufficient nexus to the November 18 incident because they occurred while the

police were attempting to serve an arrest warrant in connection with the

November 18 incident. Defense counsel argued that the January 6 incident

should be tried separately from the two November incidents, primarily arguing

that the two domestic violence episodes were distinguishable on their facts.

Counsel argued that they occurred at two different locations, that different

injuries were inflicted, and that they occurred eleven months apart from one

another.

                                           6
      Following the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion and supplemental

briefing from both parties, the circuit court granted the Commonwealth’s

motion to transfer and join. The court found that the offenses that occurred on

November 18 and November 25 were properly joined under 20-CR-97 because

there was a sufficient nexus and logical relationship between them.

Specifically, the November 25 offenses occurred while officers were serving an

arrest warrant for the November 18 offenses. In addition, Smith’s actions in

fleeing the scene on November 18 and resisting arrest on November 25 were

relevant to demonstrate his consciousness of guilt. The court further found

that 19-CR-377 and 20-CR-97 could be properly joined for trial because both

cases involved offenses of the same or similar character and were committed

against the same victim. The court found that Smith would not be unduly

prejudiced by joining the two indictments because evidence of the January 6

assault would be admissible during a trial for the November 18 assault

pursuant to KRE2 404(b). Although the court acknowledged that it could not

divine what Smith’s defense would be prior to trial, it agreed with the

Commonwealth’s contention that evidence of the January 6 assault would be

relevant to establish motive, opportunity, intent, plan, or absence of mistake or

accident regarding the November 18 assault.

      Subsequently, the Commonwealth moved to amend or sever several

charges from 19-CR-377 and 20-CR-97 as follows: (1) amend both fourth-

      2 Kentucky Rule of Evidence.

                                           7
degree assault counts to no longer include the enhancement of being a third

offense or greater within five years, making both of those counts a fourth-

degree assault under KRS 508.030 rather than KRS 508.032;3 (2) sever

Counts 3-5, receiving stolen property, from 19-CR-377; (3) sever Count 2,

third-degree assault (police officer), from 20-CR-97; (4) amend Count 3 from

20-CR-97, second-degree criminal mischief, to third-degree criminal mischief;

and (5) amend Count 5 from 20-CR-97, first-degree disorderly conduct, to

second-degree disorderly conduct. There being no objection from the defense,

the trial court accepted the modifications to the original indictments.

      Significantly, because of the foregoing changes the only felony offenses

remaining in either indictment were the three counts of being a felon in

possession of a handgun/firearm; all of the remaining charges were

misdemeanors. During a pre-trial discussion between the trial court and

parties regarding how the trial would be conducted, the following exchange

occurred:

      Court: But in the first phase when we’re having a trial on the
      assault fourth and resisting arrest, the convicted felon in
      possession of a firearm and a handgun, that’s a separate phase.

      CW: 4 Well, I’m proposing to try the misdemeanors with the felon in
      possession and I don’t think [defense counsel] has an objection to
      that. I told him that it’s his decision.

      Court: [Defense counsel]?

      Defense: We don’t disagree.

      3 The Commonwealth acknowledged that it made an error in making the

calculations required to enhance this offense under KRS 508.032(2).
      4 Counsel for the Commonwealth.

                                             8
      Court: Okay, so the jury’s going to know he’s a convicted felon,
      and everybody is okay with that?

      Defense: Well, I think a part of the guilt phase for being a
      convicted felon in possession of a handgun is the conviction.
      Because these assaults are misdemeanors, he’s already served well
      beyond the maximum he could ever get for a misdemeanor, so I
      don’t think there is any prejudice or harm in that regard for a jury
      to potentially max him out on a misdemeanor.

      Court: I see, so the only real punishment he could get in this case
      is on the convicted felon in possession of a handgun.

      Defense: Yes.

      Court: So it can’t harm him on the misdemeanors.

      Defense: I don’t believe so.

      With the foregoing changes made to the original indictments, Smith’s

trial proceeded on the following counts: Count 1: Convicted felon in possession

of a handgun (19-CR-377); Count 2: Convicted felon in possession of a firearm

(19-CR-377); Count 3: Convicted felon in possession of a firearm (20-CR-97);

Count 4: Fourth-degree assault (19-CR-377); Count 5: Fourth-degree assault

(20-CR-97); Count 6: Second-degree unlawful imprisonment (20-CR-97);

Count 7: Resisting arrest (19-CR-377); Count 8: Resisting arrest (20-CR-377);

Count 9: Third-degree criminal mischief (20-CR-97); Count 10: Second-degree

disorderly conduct (20-CR-97); and Count 11: Second-degree PFO. Because

Smith requested that the charges of being a felon in possession of a

handgun/firearm be tried during the guilt phase of his trial, the jury was

informed that he was a convicted felon but was not told what specific charges

he was previously convicted of.

                                          9
      Smith’s defense primarily focused on refuting the counts of being a felon

in possession of a handgun/firearm. He claimed that none of the guns found

in Paula’s apartment on January 6 were his. He further argued that Paula did

not escape through a window that day, but rather went out the front door after

planting the pistol found on the couch beneath Smith. The defense highlighted

that the guns were not tested for DNA, and no useable fingerprints were

recovered from them. Counsel did not provide an explanation as to how Paula

could have planted the gun found in Smith’s apartment on November 25, as

she was not present in the apartment that day.

      As for the two counts of assault in the fourth degree, the defense

conceded that the jury would find Smith guilty of the January 6 incident; the

Commonwealth played an arresting officer’s body camera footage of Smith

admitting to causing Paula’s injuries on that date. However, the defense

asserted that Paula lied about the November 18 assault, noting that the

paramedic that examined her noted no abnormalities to her arm.

      The jury ultimately found Smith guilty on all counts except for Count 2

(convicted felon in possession of a firearm under 19-CR-377) and Count 6

(unlawful imprisonment under 20-CR-97). The jury recommended the

minimum five-year sentence for both Count 1, felon in possession of a

handgun, and Count 3, felon in possession of a firearm. Following the guilt

phase, the jury found Smith guilty of being a second-degree PFO which

enhanced his sentences for Count 1 and Count 3 to ten years each. In

                                          10
accordance with KRS 533.060(3), the court ruled that those sentences had to

run consecutively for a total of twenty years.5

      Additional facts are discussed below as necessary.

                                   II.   ANALYSIS

      Smith raises two alleged errors before this Court. He first argues that

the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to join 19-CR-377

and 20-CR-97 for trial. Second, he asserts that the trial court erred by not sua

sponte severing his charges of being a convicted felon in possession of a

handgun and firearm from his other charges for the purposes of trial. Finding

no error, we affirm.

A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the
   Commonwealth’s motion to join 19-CR-377 and 20-CR-97 for trial.

      Smith first argues that the trial court erred by granting the

Commonwealth’s motion to join 19-CR-377 and 20-CR-97 for trial.6 Trial

courts have broad discretion when ruling on a motion to join separate

indictments for the purposes of trial, and this Court will not disturb such a

ruling absent an abuse of discretion.7 “The test for abuse of discretion is

      5 The jury’s recommendation for the remaining misdemeanor convictions were

as follows: Count 4: twelve months, Count 5: ninety days, Count 7: ninety days, Count
8: six months, Count 9: $250 fine, and Count 10: one day.
       6 This issue was preserved for our review by defense counsel’s written and

verbal objections to the Commonwealth’s motion. See Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure (RCr) 9.22.
      7 See, e.g., Garrett v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Ky. 2017).

                                             11
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.”8

      The statutes that govern this issue are RCr 9.12, RCr 6.18, and RCr

8.31. RCr 9.12 provides that a court may order two or more indictments to be

tried together “if the offenses . . . could have been joined in a single

indictment.” In turn, RCr 6.18 states that two or more offenses “may be

charged in the same indictment . . . if the offenses are of the same or similar

character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or

constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” Additionally, this Court has

stated that

      to justify joining separate offenses in a single trial, there must be a
      sufficient nexus between or among them. The required nexus
      must arise from a logical relationship between the crimes, some
      indication that they arose one from the other or otherwise in the
      course of a single act or transaction, or that they both arose as
      parts of a common scheme or plan.9

RCr 8.31 is the antithesis of RCr 9.12 and RCr 6.18 in that it mandates

severance of charges that are otherwise properly joined “[i]f it appears that a

defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a joinder of

offenses[.]” In this vein,

      [b]ecause a certain degree of prejudice is inherent in the joinder of
      offenses, as it is in any indictment, this Court has explained that
      the “prejudice” calling for severance or other relief under [RCr
      8.31]10 is “undue prejudice,” i.e., prejudice that goes beyond the

      8 Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999).

      9 Cherry v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Ky. 2015) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).
      10 RCr 8.31 was formerly codified as RCr 9.16.

                                            12
       inherent prejudice to that which is unnecessary and
       unreasonable.11

       Smith argues before this Court that the two indictments should not have

been tried together because the January 6 and November 18 assaults were not

of the same or similar character. In doing so, he attempts to distinguish the

two assaults on their facts. He argues that the motive for the January 6 attack

was a suspicion that Paula was cheating on him, while the November 18 attack

was motivated by Paula’s desire to leave the relationship; that the attacks took

place almost eleven months apart; and that the injuries inflicted to Paula were

different.

       We disagree and hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion

by finding that the offenses committed on January 6 and November 18 were

properly joined under RCr 6.18 and RCr 9.12. The January 6 and November

18 assaults were both domestic violence12 assaults committed against the

same victim, within a residence, and in the presence of small children.

Additionally, during both assaults Smith attempted to prevent Paula from

leaving, and following both assaults Paula fled to a different location before

calling for help.

       11 Whaley v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Ky. 2019) (quoting Peacher

v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Ky. 2013)).
       12 KRS 403.720(2)(a) defines domestic violence and abuse, in relevant part, as

“[p]hysical injury, serious physical injury or the infliction of fear of imminent physical
injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, strangulation, or assault between family
members or members of an unmarried couple[.]”

                                               13
      Notwithstanding our agreement with the trial court, even assuming

arguendo that the trial court abused its discretion by joining Smith’s separate

indictments for trial, he is not entitled to relief absent a showing that he was

unduly prejudiced by said joinder.13 “The primary test for determining if the

consolidation of different crimes for a single trial creates undue prejudice is

whether evidence necessary to prove each offense would have been admissible

in a separate trial of the other.”14 KRE 404(b) is the guiding statute for this

inquiry, though this Court has previously stated that a failure to sever in

violation of KRE 404(b) may still be considered harmless error if the evidence of

guilt is otherwise overwhelming.15

      KRE 404(b) directs that evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs,

or acts are inadmissible to prove a defendant’s character “in order to show

action in conformity therewith.” However, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or

acts may be admissible

      13 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 28, 35–36 (Ky. 2010) (“Even

assuming the trial court abused its discretion by joining those offenses, Montgomery is
not entitled to relief unless he was prejudiced by the improper joinder.”).
      14 Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 824 (Ky. 2016).

      15 Peacher, 391 S.W.3d at 839 (“[W]hile we have focused on mutual

admissibility as an important factor in the prejudice analysis, mutual admissibility is
not, by itself, determinative. United States v. Cardwell, 433 F.3d 378 (4th Cir.2005).
Where there is a lack of mutual admissibility, it could be that the trial court's having
admonished the jury to compartmentalize the evidence sufficed to neutralize the KRE
404(b) concerns, id., or, even absent such an admonition, it could be that the failure
to sever, in effect a KRE 404(b) error, was harmless under our harmless error
standards. See Wiley v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 570 (Ky.2010) (finding KRE
404(b) error harmless in light of overwhelming admissible evidence supporting the
conviction)[.]”).

                                              14
      (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive,
          opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
          absence of mistake or accident; or

      (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to
          the case that separation of the two (2) could not be
          accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering
          party.16

      With this standard in mind, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by finding that evidence of the January 6 assault would have been

admissible during a trial for the November 18 assault. This Court has stated

numerous times that “evidence of similar acts perpetrated against the same

victim are almost always admissible” under KRE 404(b).17 Moreover, at trial

Smith conceded he was guilty of the January 6 assault but argued that Paula

fabricated the November 18 assault. Evidence of the January 6 assault would

have therefore been admissible at a trial for the November 18 assault to refute

Smith’s defense that Paula lied about it.

      As for the weapons charges, Smith denied owning any of the guns found

in Paula’s apartment on January 6 and argued to the jury that she planted

them to frame him. Consequently, evidence that police recovered a gun from

his apartment on November 25 would have been admissible at a trial for the

January 6 weapons offenses: Paula was not present in Smith’s apartment on

November 25 and the gun was on his bed in plain sight. Evidence of the gun

found on November 25 was therefore relevant and probative to prove that Paula

      16 KRE 404(b)(1)-(2).

      17 See, e.g., Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Ky. 2008).

                                            15
did not frame Smith on January 6 and that the guns found on both dates did

in fact belong to him.

      Tellingly, Smith’s argument to this Court fails to articulate how the

joinder of his indictments resulted in undue prejudice to him. We also note

that the jury found him not guilty of one count of being a convicted felon in

possession of a firearm and one count of unlawful imprisonment. And, while

the jury found Smith guilty of the two remaining weapons offenses, it initially

recommended the minimum sentence of five years for each of those counts.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that no undue prejudice resulted from joining

19-CR-377 and 20-CR-97 and affirm.

B. Smith invited any error committed in trying his charges of felon in
   possession of a handgun and felon in possession of a firearm alongside
   his domestic violence assault charges.

      For his second assertion of error, Smith contends that the trial court

reversibly erred by allowing his three charges of being a convicted felon in

possession of a handgun/firearm to be tried in a single guilt phase alongside

his two charges for assault in the fourth degree, domestic violence. He argues

under Wallace v. Commonwealth18 and Hubbard v. Commonwealth,19 that the

trial court was required to try his weapons charges separately. He contends

that even though his trial counsel requested to try the weapons charges in the

same guilt phase as his assault charges, the trial court was required by RCr

8.31 to sua sponte reject defense counsel’s decision and try the weapons

      18 478 S.W.3d 291 (Ky. 2015).

      19 633 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. 1982).

                                          16
charges separately. While the respective holdings in Hubbard and Wallace

remain sound, we hold that under the particular facts of this case Smith’s

counsel waived his ability to raise this issue on appeal by inviting this alleged

error.

         In Hubbard, the defendant was charged with burglary in the third degree,

theft by unlawful taking, felon in possession of a handgun, and being a first-

degree PFO.20 Prior to trial, the defendant moved to have the charge of felon in

possession of a handgun severed from the other charges, but the trial court

denied the motion.21 During the trial’s guilt phase, the Commonwealth

presented evidence that the defendant had been previously convicted of third-

degree burglary twice.22 He was found guilty on all charges except for the

charge of being a felon in possession of a handgun.23 This Court reversed and

remanded for a new trial.24 It reasoned that

         [RCr 8.31] provides that if it appears that either the
         Commonwealth or the defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial
         of separate offenses they shall be tried separately. This case is a
         perfect example of when a severance should be granted. The two-
         stage proceeding in persistent felony-offender cases was designed
         for the specific purpose of obviating the prejudice that necessarily
         results from a jury's knowledge of previous convictions while it is
         weighing the guilt or innocence of a defendant on another charge.
         Cf. KRS 532.080(1), enacted in 1974. Such evidence is no longer
         relevant or competent during the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial
         unless, of course, it should become relevant for impeachment
         purposes. Here the jury acquitted Hubbard of possessing the gun,

         20 Id. at 67.

         21 Id. at 68

         22 Id.

         23 Id. at 67.

         24 Id. at 68.

                                             17
      but in considering his guilt or innocence of the burglary and theft
      the jurors had been made aware of his previous record.25

      Several decades after Hubbard, this Court rendered Wallace. In that

case, the defendant used a handgun during the commission of a series of

robberies and was charged with five counts of first-degree robbery and one

count of being a felon in possession of a handgun.26 The trial court entered a

pre-trial order severing the felon in possession of a handgun charge from the

other charges.27 But, instead of holding a separate trial for the handgun

offense, the trial court opted to “trifurcate” the trial.28 During the first phase,

the jury considered evidence solely concerning the robbery charges.29 In the

second phase it heard evidence establishing that the defendant was a convicted

felon in possession of a handgun, and the final step was a consolidated

sentencing phase.30

      On appeal, the defendant argued under Hubbard and RCr 8.31 that the

trial court abused its discretion by not ordering a separate trial for the felon in

possession of a handgun charge.31 As a matter of first impression, this Court

approved of the trifurcated proceedings.32 The Wallace Court acknowledged

      25 Id.

      26 Id. at 293-94.

      27 Id.

      28 Id.

      29 Id.

      30 Id.

      31 Id. at 302.

      32 Id.

                                            18
that a defendant would be prejudiced if, during the second phase of a

trifurcated trial, the jury heard evidence of a felon in possession of a handgun

charge that was not mutually admissible during a trial for the charges

adjudicated during the first phase.33 However, because Wallace had used a

handgun during the commission of the underlying offenses, that evidence was

inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the robberies and no prejudice

resulted.34 The Court accordingly held that

      trying the robbery charges and severed charge of possession of a
      handgun by a convicted felon in one trial with a bifurcated guilt
      phase followed by a consolidated penalty phase is not an inherently
      inappropriate means of complying with the purposes and
      requirements of Criminal Rule [8.31] and Hubbard[.] This
      procedure is only inappropriate if separate trials are necessarily
      required to avoid prejudice reciprocating between otherwise
      properly joined separate counts. Clearly, when the handgun is
      used in the underlying offense, there can be no such
      reciprocation.35

      To summarize, Hubbard held that RCr 8.31 required a charge of being a

felon in possession of a handgun/firearm to be severed from other criminal

charges. And Wallace held that a severed felon in possession of a

handgun/firearm charge could be tried using a trifurcated trial instead of a

separate trial if evidence of the handgun/firearm offense presented during the

second phase would have been admissible during a trial on the offenses

adjudicated in the first phase. Wallace is therefore inapplicable: Smith’s trial

      33 Id. at 304.

      34 Id.

      35 Id. at 306.

                                           19
was not trifurcated and the question before us is not whether the trial court

abused its discretion by holding a trifurcated trial.

      Instead, the issue is whether this alleged error is properly before us

based on the equally well-established rule that “one cannot commit to an act. .

. and later complain on appeal that the trial court erred to his detriment,” or,

stated differently, that “[a] defendant cannot complain on appeal of alleged

errors invited or induced by himself[.]”36 Hubbard is accordingly not dispositive

either because the defendant in that case requested that the court sever the

count of being a felon in possession of a handgun and argued that he would

suffer prejudice if his motion was denied.37

      In contrast, Smith’s trial counsel without question invited the alleged

error that Smith now argues entitles him to reversal and a new trial. During a

pre-trial discussion between the court and the parties regarding how the trial

would proceed, the trial court stated its intention to try the three charges of

being a felon in possession of a handgun/firearm using a bifurcated guilt

phase like the one approved of by Wallace. The Commonwealth replied that it

was proposing to try all the counts, except the PFO, in a single guilt phase but

conceded it would be defense counsel’s decision. Defense counsel not only

      36 Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 679 (Ky. 2006).   See also Tackett v.
Commonwealth, 445 S.W.3d 20 (Ky. 2014) (“[A] party cannot ask a trial court to do
something and, when the court does it, complain on appeal that the court erred.”);
Quisenberry v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19 (Ky. 2011) (“Generally, a party is
estopped from asserting an invited error on appeal.”).
      37 Hubbard, 633 S.W.2d at 68.

                                             20
stated he had no objection, but then stated twice that his client would not be

prejudiced by a single guilt phase trial:

      Court: Okay, so the jury’s going to know he’s a convicted felon,
      and everybody is okay with that?

      Defense: Well I think a part of the guilt phase for being a convicted
      felon in possession of a handgun is the conviction. Because these
      assaults are misdemeanors, he’s already served well beyond the
      maximum he could ever get for a misdemeanor, so I don’t think
      there is any prejudice or harm in that regard for a jury to
      potentially max him out on a misdemeanor.

      Court: I see, so the only real punishment he could get in this case
      is on the convicted felon in possession of a handgun.

      Defense: Yes.

      Court: So it can’t harm him on the misdemeanors.

      Defense: I don’t believe so.

“Invited errors that amount to a waiver, i.e., invitations that reflect the party's

knowing relinquishment of a right, are not subject to appellate review.”38

Smith’s counsel rejected the trial court’s suggestion to try the weapons charges

separately. In addition, the defense used the evidence that Smith was a

convicted felon to bolster its defense that Paula framed him. Smith argued that

Paula knew Smith was not allowed to have handguns or firearms and therefore

lied to the police and told them that the guns in her apartment were his so that

he would be arrested. Based on the foregoing, we hold that Smith invited the

alleged error that the trial court erred by trying his felon in possession of a

      38 Mullins v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.3d 434 (Ky. 2011).

                                            21
handgun/firearm charges alongside his two charges of fourth-degree assault.

The issue is therefore not properly before us, and we decline to review it.39

                                III.   CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

      Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell and Thompson, JJ., sitting. All

concur. VanMeter, C.J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Molly Mattingly
Kathleen Kallaher Schmidt
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Jay Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Todd Dryden Ferguson
Robert Lee Baldridge
Perry Thomas Ryan
Assistant Attorney General

      39 Because this error was invited, palpable error review under RCr 10.26 is not

appropriate. See id. at 439.

                                             22