Court Opinion

ID: 9706503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:07.594882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.315399
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I believe that State’s Attorney Glen Weber’s rebuttal argument was so fraught with improper comments that it not only rose to the level of reversible error, it shattered the ceiling of courtroom decorum and professional conduct. I recognize the general principle of affording prosecutors wide latitude in closing argument. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 127 (2000). However, this wide latitude is not without limits. See People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723, 727-32 (2001). A fundamental tenet of our criminal justice system is that prosecutors owe defendants a duty of fairness. People v. Amaya, 255 Ill. App. 3d 967, 973 (1994). This duty extends throughout the trial and includes closing arguments. Amaya, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 973. What this means is that State’s Attorney Weber has an ethical obligation to refrain from presenting improper and prejudicial argument. See People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441 (1993). We expect our state’s prosecutors to prosecute with earnestness and vigor. But as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “[WJhile [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he [or she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935). In the present case, the first foul blow emanating from State’s Attorney Weber came at the outset of his rebuttal, when he explained to the jury that defendant could have chosen to do what “80 to 90 percent of [d]efendants do in this country” and that is “they be honest [and] forthright,” and “[t]hey go into the courtroom and they plead guilty.” Upon defense counsel’s objection that the remark just attacked defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial (see U.S. Const., amend. VI), the trial court actually overruled the objection and allowed Weber to continue. Thereafter, Weber repeatedly accused defendant of lying, accused defense witnesses of lying, explained why defendant and defense witnesses would lie, and why defendant and defense witnesses would continue to maintain their lie. Weber explained to the jury that defendant “want[ed] to escape responsibility for his crime,” “get back out on the street, back out after the verdict and yuck it up with the officers.” Weber then concluded by asking the jury to “send [defendant] a message” and say “enough of these lies.” In my view, Weber’s rebuttal argument exceeded all bounds of reasonable and proper comment. The argument was especially harmful due to Weber’s strategic decision to wait until rebuttal to present it, so that defendant would have absolutely no method to substantively counteract the venom of Weber’s comments before the jury retired to deliberate. See People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d 874, 896 (2000). Time and again Glen Weber has crossed the line of permissible conduct. See People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723, 727-32 (2001); People v. Couch, No. 2 — 01—0585 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23); People v. Doll, No. 2 — 02—0564 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). In Slabaugh, Weber repeatedly argued that defense witnesses were “ ‘lying,’ ‘[sat] down together and [got their] stories straight,’ ‘concocted’ their defense, and ‘creat[ed] a defense.’ ” Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 729. We noted that, despite a trial court’s sustaining an objection and instructing the jury, when a prosecutor repeatedly attempts to make unfounded arguments, a defendant may still be prejudiced. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 731-32. In reversing the defendant’s conviction, we held that, in addition to his improper impeachment, Weber’s “numerous improper arguments” deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 732. In Doll, we noted in a special concurrence that Weber’s comment that the defendant was a “rat in a maze” “served no other purpose than to arouse the passions of the jury.” Doll, slip op. at 15 (Gilleran Johnson and McLaren, JJ., specially concurring). In the present case, Weber, while attempting to explain what a “prior inconsistent statement” was, argued: “you see, because we have [defendants here that are always trying to, you know, they’re like a rat in a maze, you know, okay, let’s see what it looks like in here — zoom, zoom, and try to get out of it.” (Emphasis added.) Just as in Doll, this type of rhetoric served no purpose other than to arouse the passions of the jury and to denigrate defendant and the defense witnesses and is, therefore, highly improper. See Doll, slip op. at 15 (Gilleran Johnson and McLaren, JJ., specially concurring). Apparently, our past admonitions to Glen Weber have gone callously and cavalierly disregarded as this case more than amply demonstrates. I am further troubled that the majority’s treatment of this issue does nothing to diminish the likelihood that such conduct will recur. Though I am unable to convince my colleagues, I feel compelled to make a public record of Glen Weber’s lack of professionalism and decorum. In cases such as this, where prosecutorial misconduct has not been deterred through admonition or condemnation, the United States Supreme Court has stated that it “may well so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to support reversal under the plain-error doctrine.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 33 n.16, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1, 24 n.16, 105 S. Ct. 1038,1055 n.16 (1985) (Brennan, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). Given the cumulative effect of Weber’s comments and the nature of the evidence in this case, I believe that defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. See Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 732. The evidence of guilt can hardly be characterized as overwhelming; consequently, this is not a matter of harmless error. A reversal and remand for a new trial free from the taint of Glen Weber is not only justified in this instance, it should be mandated. I urge judges to vigorously guard against such improper argument and unprofessional conduct. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.