Court Opinion

ID: 9758852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:52:33.661318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:56.161182
License: Public Domain

WATT, J.
dissenting.
1 The majority opinion not only calls into question, but essentially destroys, over ninety-five years of precedent laid down by this Court.1 After publication of the majority's *1166pronouncement, the practice of utilizing "trial stipulations" as we have known it and its effectiveness in streamlining the trial process will be forever lost. The opinion's change of the rules regarding trial preparation: blind sides the appellee/defendant, Othel Gambel, Jr. (Gamble), without any opportunity for a response to an issue first considered sua sponte on appeal; robs Gamble of the trial court's discretionary award of a lodestar and bonus fee where no abuse of discretion in allowing either award exists;2 causes an unnecessary waste of judicial resources by creating a situation where the trial court must hear the testimony of witnesses in a situation where it was obvious previously that no such testimony was required;3 and surprises the appellant/plaintiff, Keota Mills & Elevator (Keota), with a late Christmas present, tied up in ribbon and bows ereated out of whole cloth by the majority through the changing of all the rules and by declaring it the winner on grounds neither party thought were relevant or even part of the rule book.
T2 The concurring opinion lends no cere-dence to the majority position. Rather, it is a blatant demonstration of the lengths to which the majority will go to reach a result in an individual cause without giving any fidelity or allegiance to the importance of stipulation law as it has developed in Oklahoma over the last century.
' 3 Most certainly, if the majority prevails, the only appropriate manner in which to handle this cause is to make it prospective to this cause and in all others which may be in the appellate pipeline.4 - Otherwise, this Court has, through judicial fiat, set a snare for unsuspecting litigants, lawyers, and trial courts who were well versed in stipulation law as it stood throughout this litigation and by which they understood themselves to be governed. Failure to apply the majority opinion prospectively deprives those who have relied on this Court's pronouncements of due process protections.5
T4 My allegiance to precedent carefully and thoughtfully crafted by this Court over almost a century and my oath of office prevent me from participating in a decision *1167which will have unwarranted legal ramifications and place this Court in the position of a "Supreme Trial Panel." Therefore, I dissent. The only way to keep from completely disrupting this cause and any other currently pending is to give absolute prospective application to the majority's surprising defection from well-settled stipulation law.6
STIPULATED FACTS
T5 The only applicable facts in the instant cause are those to which the parties stipulated in a hearing scheduled before the trial court on September 12, 2005. On the record, the parties agreed that whether the ecause should proceed would be governed by a single issue: whether the five-year or the six-year statute of limitations should apply.7 If as Gamble contended and the five-year statute of limitations governed the cause, the collection effort would be barred. Conversely, if Keota was successful in its attempt to apply the six-year statute of limitations, the cause would proceed for a determination of the balance due on the note along with associated issues.8
T6 When argued to the trial court on November 17, 2005, the parties presented the statute of limitations as the "crux" of the issue.9 In preparing its order, filed on January 12, 2006, the trial court recognized that the cause was to be governed by the parties' binding stipulations and that the first step in the adjudication would be to determine the applicable statute of limitations period.10 In *1168ruling that the cause was governed by the five-year limitations period, the trial court again recognized the stipulations and agreement of the parties.11
THE MAJORITY'S UNWARRANTED INTERVENTION
17 In Maule v. Independent School Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County, 1985 OK 110, ¶ 7, 714 P.2d 198, we held the union and the employer to stipulations entered defining the bargaining unit on grounds that parties to a contract are bound by the stipulated terms thereof. In White v. Amoco Prod. Co., 1985 OK 55, ¶ 8, 704 P.2d 470, Niemeyer v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 1990 OK 32, ¶ 12, 789 P.2d 1318, and Mehdipour v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 2004 OK 19, ¶ 5 n. 9, 90 P.3d 546, not only did this Court not sua sponte raise issues not presented to the trial court on appeal, but also we refused to allow the parties to engage in the activity. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Grand River Dam Auth., 1986 OK 20, ¶ 17 n. 11, 720 P.2d 718 and Tulsa County Budget Bd. v. Tulsa County Excise Bd., 2003 OK 103, ¶ 18 n. 31, 81 P.3d 662, we refused to issue advisory opinions. Furthermore, in Tulsa County, the Court acknowledged that it was bound by the record presented for review. Inexplicably, the author of each of the above cited cases is the same Justice authoring the majority opinion here.
18 Here, the majority ignores the teachings of all these causes. It throws out stipulations that the parties and the trial court agreed were determinative of the issue to be decided. The majority decides the cause on an issue which was never presented to the trial court and which it raises sua sponte. Finally, it issues an advisory opinion on an issue which can be found nowhere in the record presented either to the trial court or on appeal. The practical result of adopting the majority opinion is to overrule all the cases cited in 15 to the extent that they conflict with today's pronouncement.
THE MAJORITY SIMPLY "MISSES THE POINT" AND - MISREPRESENTS THE LAW BY QUOTING FROM AN ISOLATED CASE WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE CONTEXT.
19 The majority does not attack the opinions relied upon herein regarding the history of the sanctity of stipulations and their place in the resolution of issues before the trial court, because it cannot. Rather, the majority takes issue with the statement that "[the majority decides the cause on an issue which was never presented to the trial court and which it raises sua sponte." In so doing, it again "misses the point." The fact that the parties may have mentioned in closing arguments a statute which their stipulations make inapplicable will not justify the kind of judicial avarice represented by the majority's ignoring the specific stipulations made and presented to the trier of fact as governing the cause.
10 The majority's reference to the syllabus in First Nat'l Bank of Cordell v. City Guaranty Bank of Hobart, 1935 OK 1105, 174 Okla. 545, 51 P.2d 573 as standing for the proposition that parties may not affect the law applied to a cause by the Court through the utilization of stipulations is misplaced. In First Nat'l, the Court determined that the garnishee could not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court by stipulation. The holding in First Nat'l is consistent with case law which *1169refused to allow parties' stipulations to confer jurisdiction where none existed.12
T 11 In a more recent decision, State ex rel. State Ins. Fund v. JOA, Inc., 2003 OK 82, 78 P.3d 534, we held that the State Insurance Fund would be bound by its stipulation during litigation that a specific attorney fee statute would apply to the action. In so doing, we recognized that the Court was being presented with a stipulation of law. We also acknowledged that limitations existed on stipulations involving the power and structure of government.
112 The JOA Court relied heavily on a cause authored by Justice Opala, Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1993 OK 122, 872 P.2d 910. In that case, we noted that the Tax Commission had entered a stipulation on an issue of law and taken inconsistent positions on issues of law. In addressing the extent to which the Tax Commission was bound by its counsel's argument in the litigation, the Strelecki Court stated the following:
A party on appeal cannot take a position inconsistent with that maintained before a trial tribunal. While this court may decide a public-law case on dispositive issues, it will not relieve a party of a solemn commitment to a position argued both below and on appeal unless it is so contrary to the applicable law that it would amount to an wltra vires act.... The Commission will not be heard-at this late hour-to deny liability upon a changed interpretation of the state's remedial regime for refunds. The government stands before us on the footing of an ordinary appel-lee. It will not receive a more favorable treatment than that afforded other appellate litigants in a similar situation. [Footnotes omitted. "Bold" added for emphasis.]
The above quotation is supported by authority recognizing that: neither party on appeal will be allowed to change the theory of the case from that on which it was presented to the trial court;13 and, parties are bound in the appellate court by the theories on which a case was tried below.14 Nevertheless, the majority here strips private parties of the protections granted by this Court's jurisprudence on - stipulations where it would not do so to a State agency. There can be no justice in such a result.
THE CONCURRING OPINION LENDS NO CREDENCE TO THE MAJORITY POSITION.
{13 For the most part, the concurring opinion is interesting in what it does not do. First, in its exposition on what it perceives as being the dividing line between the duties of a trial court and those of appellate adjudicator, it finds little support in Oklahoma law. It does rely upon an opinion authored by Justice Opala, Broadway Clinic v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2006 OK 29, 139 P.3d 873, as one such cause which delineates the differences between a trial court's fact finding and this Court's appellate review. In that opinion, Justice Opala wrote the following:
©... It is not the function of this court to make first-instance determinations of fact or legal questions which have been neither raised nor assessed at nisi pri-us ...." [Bold added.]
As noted, the issue upon which the majority decides this cause was merely mentioned in arguments before the district court. It was not presented as a deciding factor for consideration by the trial tribunal.
' 14 The second thing which is interesting for its lack of discussion by the concurring opinion is any attempt to distinguish Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1993 OK 122, 872 P.2d 910. Justice Opala authored Strelecki in which he emphasized that this Court will not relieve parties of the "solemn commitment" taken before the finder of fact.
*1170DUE PROCESS CALLS FOR ADEQUATE NOTICE TO A PARTY WHOSE RIGHTS MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL ACTION.
15 Even if the result which the majority proposes would be appropriate under its analysis, it cannot bind these parties. To do so would be patently unfair. It "changes the rules of the game" which, heretofore, had been settled by precedent-setting jurisprudence at the time the cause was heard by the trial court. Due process requires adequate notice to parties whose rights may be adversely affected by judicial action. As Justice Opala stated for the majority in footnote No. 21 of McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, 979 P.2d 252:
"The standard of fairness exacted by the Due Process Clause mandates that notice meeting minimum constitutional standards precede judicial action.... Notice must be reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of every critical stage so as to afford them an opportunity to meet the issues at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ..." [Citations omitted.]
Here, all the parties, along with the trial court, will be amazed to discover that the rules they all thought were applicable are inapposite to this proceeding. Due process necessitates, just as it did in MceDanmeld, that the majority opinion be given completely prospective application.
CONCLUSION
116 Before today, stipulations were solemn admissions binding on the parties and the court.15 They were agreements between counsel concerning the business before the court and were a favored means to shorten, clarify or settle litigation.16 Stipulations have served as evidentiary substitutes dispensing with the need to take testimony.17 Through the use of stipulations, parties could expand or contract issues for determination. Having done so, they were bound by the same.18 That was the well-settled law in Oklahoma before today's majority opinion.
Today's pronouncement is a death knell to trial practice and procedures as we and the practicing bar have known it for over nine decades. Every case, now in the appellate pipeline along with those to be appealed in the future will be adversely affected. No longer may trial stipulations be agreed to and faithfully followed, as did the trial court below, with any confidence. Instead, the parties, the sitting trial judges, and the practicing bar must realize that such stipulations are now "fresh meat" for any appellate court to carve up as it sees fit. Those tribunals are now free to go outside the stipulated records and "make it up as they go along."
118 I cannot now nor shall I ever in the future turn this Court into a "Supreme Trial Court" with the unlimited ability to give "overs" where none have heretofore been allowed. To do so, would require that ninety-five years of precedent be trampled and result in my violating my oath of office. As I will do neither, I dissent.
§19 The only way to guarantee that the litigants here and those who may have made stipulations upon which trial tribunals have relied in their decisions to be guaranteed the constitutional protections of due process is to make the majority's pronouncement completely prospective. In so doing, the change in stipulation practice forecasted by the majority opinion would have no effect in the present cause or in those now pending in the appellate pipeline.19

. State ex rel. State Ins. Fund v. JOA, Inc., 2003 OK 82, ¶ 6, 78 P.3d 534 [Stipulations governing applicability of statute bound the parties.]; State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Baggett, 1999 OK 68, ¶ 21 n. 13, 990 P.2d 235 [Stipulations admitting or agreeing to certain facts for the purpose of trial are binding and conclusive on the parties during the progress of the trial and on appeal.] [Kauger, J. concurring]; Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., 1993 OK 131, ¶ 5 n. 15, 863 P.2d 1176 [Stipulations are solemn admissions and . are binding upon the parties and the court.]; Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1993 OK 122, ¶ 17, 872 P.2d 910 [Tax Commission held to stipulations and would not be relieved of legal position inconsistent with that maintained before the trial tribunal.]; State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, 1991 OK 97, 113 n. 14, 818 P.2d 889 [Stipulations filed in case are solemn admissions and binding and conclusive on the court.] [Opinion by Kauger, J.]; Maule v. Independent School Dist. No. 9, 1985 OK 110, ¶ 7, 714 P.2d 198 [Stipulation defining bargaining unit binding.] [Opinion by Kauger, J.]; Nanonka v. Hoskins, 1982 OK 53, ¶ 15, 645 P.2d 507 [Stipulation admitting or agreeing to certain facts for the purpose of trial is binding and conclusive on the parties during trial and appeal.]; Frank v. National Printing & Office Supply Co., 1959 OK 108, ¶ 16, 343 P.2d 1085 [Even irregularly entered stipulations are binding on the parties and on appeal.]; Elliott v. Hunt, 1946 OK 233, ¶ 0, 197 Okla. 464, 172 P.2d 804 [Agreed stipulation on description of property would bind party on ap*1166peal.]; Evans v. Raper, 1939 OK 271, ¶ 0, 185 Okla,. 426, 93 P.2d 754 [Litigants may stipulate concerning their respective rights and are bound thereby.]; Callaway v. Sparks, 1939 OK 180, ¶ 0, 184 Okla. 569, 89 P.2d 275 [Stipulation made in open court is binding and conclusive during trial and on appeal.]; Yamie v. Willmott, 1939 OK 130, ¶ 0, 184 Okla. 382, 88 P.2d 325 [Stipulations made in open court are binding and conclusive on parties during trial and on appeal.]; Bruner v. Burch, 1937 OK 63, ¶ 3, 179 Okla. 338, 65 P.2d 1215 [Stipulating that cause involved only one issue precluded consideration of issue of when limitations would run.]; Ray v. Ridpath, 1930 OK 413, ¶ 12, 145 Okla. 69, 291 P. 546 [Stipulation is a pleading which binds the party.]; First Nat'l Bank of Oklahoma City v. Foster, 1924 OK 1054, ¶ 3, 106 Okla. 240, 233 P. 762 [Bank held to stipulations on settlement of indebtedness.]; Skien v. Junction Oil & Gas Co., 1920 OK 365, ¶ 9, 80 Okla. 41, 193 P. 988 [Where a party admits or stipulates to certain facts, the court cannot indulge in inferences for the purpose of avoiding the binding effect of the admission or stipulation.]; Loman v. Paullin, 1915 OK 661, ¶ 0, 51 Okla. 294, 152 P. 73 [Stipulations are the equivalent of judicial admissions.]; Reeves Realty Co. v. Brown, 1915 OK 126, ¶ 4, 45 Okla. 737, 147 P. 318 [Parties by stipulations make the law for any legal proceedings to which they are parties, which not only bind them, but which the courts are bound to enforce.].

. A trial court's attorney fee award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. Spencer v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 2007 OK 76, ¶13, 171 P.3d 890.

. Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Application for Attorney Fee and Bonus Award, held on April 27, 2006, and providing in pertinent part at p. 35:
"... THE COURT: The case was set for nonju-ry trial and then the parties entered into lengthy written stipulations and then presented their oral argument, because after stipulating to the facts, there was no call for witnesses..."

. Gomes v. Hameed, M.D., 2008 OK 3, 184 P.3d 479, in which Justice Opala's dissent takes issue with the majority's having declared and given retrospective effect to a new rule of Oklahoma common law thus depriving the parties of due process. The exact action the Court takes in the instant cause.

. McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., 1999 OK 30, 979 P.2d 252, in which Justice Opala authored the opinion giving prospective application. to the cause in order to avoid an unpatently unfair result, as well as one which would be offensive to due process standards, by "changing the rules" after the cause was finally determined.

. McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., see note 5, supra.

. Transcript of Scheduling Hearing Regarding Briefing and Oral Argument of the Parties, September 12, 2005, providing in pertinent part at pp. 5-6:
"... MR. MERRITT: Your Honor, if I might. We have-I guess this case turns on as Dougal said, whether or not a five or six-year statute of limitations is applicable in this case. If the Court were to rule that a six-year statute is applicable, we would proceed.... However, if the Court were to rule that a five-year statute is applicable, we would just want that-the order to be a final order or a journal entry would be our request.
MR. SANDERS: ... What we are getting into, Judge, is that if you rule it's a five-year for the defendant, that ruling is going to mean that suit on the promissory note is time-barred ..."

. Transcript of Scheduling Hearing Regarding Briefing and Oral Argument of the Parties, September 12, 2005, providing in pertinent part at pp. 10-11:
"... THE COURT: So, for the purposes of today's argument, the both of you stipulate that a $20,000 payment was made on or about February ist, 1990 and that an approximate sum of $3972.60 was applied to the principal and $16,927.40 was applied to the interest and Mr. Sanders stipulated that if the six-year statute of limitations were to be the finding of the Court, that these figures will not be carved in stone as to the balance due at trial on the issue of the balance due.
MR. SANDERS: Exactly.
THE COURT: Is that the stipulation of both parties?
MR. MERRITT: Yes, Your Honor....
MR. SANDERS: Yes, that's it exactly...."

. Transcript of Oral Argument to the Court, November 17, 2005, providing in pertinent part:
at p. 5 "... MR. SANDERS: ... As stipulated, the promissory note at issue was executed on 1-6 of '89. At that point in time Title 12A, OS 3-118 did not address the statute of limitations and only spoke as to when it commenced to run. It did not provide a prescriptive period. The law in effect when this promissory note was executed on 1-6-89 is the law advanced by plaintiff [sic] at Title 12A-Title 12, Section 95 A. -1, that being a five-year statute of limitations period. The parties have stipulated thai this is the crux of the issue due to a time period that exists from March 5th of 1991 when, when a $20,000 payment was paid, no payments occurring again until 10-18 of 1996 when a $25,000 payment was made. Within that time period you are in excess of five years but less than six, and that's what brings us the Court
at pp. 19-20 "... MR. MERRITT: ... Your Honor, as plaintiff-I'm sorry. As defendant's counsel has previously said, the main issue that we are asking the Court to rule upon today is whether or not the six-year statute of limitations in Title 12A, Section 3-118A governs which provides for a six-year limitations period or alternatively whether 12 OS 95 governs which is the general contract statute and that statute, Your Honor, is the five-year statute of limitations. In this case in the present matter, more than five but less than six years passed between the March 5th, 1991 $20,000 payment that had been made and the October 18, 1996 $25,000 payment that they then made...."

. Order of the trial court filed on January 12, 2006, appearing at p. 110 of the record on appeal and providing in pertinent part:
"... 1. The Parties herein have agreed that the first step in this case is adjudication of the applicable statute of limitation period. ..."

. Journal entry of judgement filed on February 15, 2006, appearing at pp. 117-18 of the record on appeal and providing in pertinent part:
"... The parties stipulated and agreed on the record that the Court's adjudication of Tile 12 O.S. § 95(A)(1) as the applicable statute of limitations herein, would result in a time bar of Plaintiff's action and that final journal entry of judgement should thereupon be entered. The Parties stipulated and agreed on the record that the Court's adjudication of Title 12A O.S. § 3-118(a) as the applicable statute of limitations herein, would result in the case proceeding to Trial on the remaining issues....
The Court upon review of all the parties stipulations of record, the exhibits admitted into evidence by stipulation on the record, the Briefs of the parties and the parties oral arguments on the statute of limitations issue does now hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE as final judgement here that Title 12 O.S. § 95(A)(1) is the applicable statute of limitations on Plaintiff's promissory note action and that Plaintiff's action is time barred. ..."

. Jacobs v. Real Estate Mort. Trust Co., 1926 OK 620, 122 Okla. 1, 249 P. 930; Continental Baking Co. v. Campbell, 1936 OK 200, 176 Okla. 218, 55 P.2d 114; Pinkston Hardware Co. v. Hart, 1935 OK 674, 172 Okla. 566, 46 P.2d 501.

. Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Kouba, 1956 OK 70, 294 P.2d 583.

. Chrysler Corp. v. Walter E. Allen, Inc., 1962 OK 189, 375 P.2d 878; Griswold v. Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma, 1951 OK 342, 238 P.2d 322.

. Bonner v. Oklahoma Rock Corp., see note 1, supra; State ex rel. Trimble v. City of Moore, see note 1, supra.

. Nanonka v. Hoskins, see note 1, supra.

. State v. Torres, 2004 OK 12, ¶ 29, 87 P.3d 572.

. Brunerv. Burch, see note 1, supra.

. McDaneld v. Lynn Hickey Dodge, Inc., see note 5, supra.