Court Opinion

ID: 9570610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:24:38.082518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:02.984425
License: Public Domain

GREENE, Judge,
dissenting in part.
As I believe the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, establishes substantial evidence to support his quantum meruit claim, I dissent. I otherwise fully concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.

Standard of Review

On appeal from a directed verdict, this Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of a plaintiffs claim. Cobb v. Reitter, 105 N.C. App. 218, 220, 412 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1992). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). In deciding a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, including evidence elicited from the defendant favorable to the plaintiff,” Environmental Landscape Design Specialist v. Shields, 75 N.C. App. 304, 305, 330 S.E.2d 627, 628 (1985), and resolve “all inconsis-tences, contradictions and conflicts for [the plaintiff], giving [the plaintiff] the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence,” McFetters v. McFetters, 98 N.C. App. 187, 191, 390 S.E.2d 348, 350, disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 140, 394 S.E.2d 177 (1990).

Elements

In order to prevent unjust enrichment, “[q\uantum meruit operates as an equitable remedy based upon a quasi contract or a contract implied in law, such that a party may recover for the reasonable value of materials and services rendered.” Data Gen. Corp. v. County of Durham, 143 N.C. App. 97, 103, 545 S.E.2d 243, 248 (2001). To recover in quantum meruit, a plaintiff must show: “(1) services were rendered to [the] defendants; (2) the services were knowingly and voluntarily accepted; and (3) the services were not given gratuitously.” Shields, 75 N.C. App. at 306, 330 S.E.2d at 628. In addition, there can be no recovery for quantum meruit if there is an express contract governing the same subject matter. Barrett Kays & Assoc., P.A. v. Colonial Bldg. Co., Inc. of Raleigh, 129 N.C. App. 525, 529, 500 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1998). When applying quantum meruit to real estate trans*315actions, a plaintiff is entitled to recover a commission if he procures a party who actually contracts to purchase the property. See Sessler v. Marsh, 144 N.C. App. 623, 629-30, 551 S.E.2d 160, 164, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 365, 556 S.E.2d 577 (2001).

Express Contract

Defendants allege plaintiffs quantum meruit claim is barred by the existence of an express contract.
I agree with the majority that if an express contract exists, quantum meruit is not appropriate. This proposition, however, is conditioned on the existence of an express contract. See Barrett Kays, 129 N.C. App. at 529, 500 S.E.2d at 111. Even assuming an express contract exists, it “may be abandoned or relinquished: (1) by agreement between the parties; (2) by conduct clearly indicating such purpose; [or] (3) by the substitution of a new contract inconsistent with the existing contract.” Bixler v. Britton, 192 N.C. 199, 201, 134 S.E. 488, 489 (1926).
In this case, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff on his quantum meruit claim, there is substantial evidence an express contract covering the Dixie/Squires transaction did not exist. While there is a conflict in the evidence as to the existence of an express contract, this conflict must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Even if there were no substantial evidence that an express contract existed, there is substantial evidence that any contract that did exist either was abandoned or relinquished. The parties’ conduct, including Rose and Patterson having already decided prior to the closing of the Dixie/Squires transaction that plaintiff would not be paid a 25% listing commission, leads to an inference that the contract was abandoned or relinquished by the parties’ conduct. See id.

Procuring Cause

Because I believe there is substantial evidence no express contract exists covering the Dixie/Squires transaction, I address whether there was substantial evidence plaintiff was the “procuring cause” of the transaction.
“The general rule is that a broker is entitled to a commission ‘whenever he procures a party who actually contracts for the purchase of the property at a price acceptable to the owner.’ ” Sessler, 144 N.C. App. at 629-30, 551 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting Realty Agency, Inc. v. Duckworth & Shelton, Inc., 274 N.C. 243, 250-51, 162 S.E.2d *316486, 491 (1968)). A “broker is the procuring cause if the sale is the direct and proximate result of his efforts or services,” Duckworth, 274 N.C. at 251, 162 S.E.2d at 491, and he sets “ ‘in motion a series of events which, without break in their continuity’ lead to the procurement of a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to purchase the property,” Sessler, 144 N.C. App. at 633, 551 S.E.2d at 166 (citation omitted). Thus, it is the broker’s “procurement of ‘a party who actually contracts for the purchase of the property,’ which determines entitlement to a realtor’s commission.” Collins v. Ogburn Realty Co., Inc., 49 N.C. App. 316, 320, 271 S.E.2d 512, 515 (1980) (citation omitted).
In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is substantial evidence plaintiff was the procuring cause of the Dixie/Squires transaction. Initially, plaintiff evaluated the property to determine if SRE’s listing of the Dixie property would be a profitable transaction. In addition, plaintiff was primarily responsible for marketing the property and cooperating with potential buyers. In June 1995, plaintiff provided a marketing packet, which included various information about the property, to Patterson for him to forward to Squires. Plaintiff worked with Patterson to promote the property, showed the property to Squires, and even drove Squires’ representatives and Patterson on his boat to view the Dixie property. Prior to plaintiff’s resignation, he received a proposed contract on the Dixie property from Squires and Patterson. Even after plaintiff resigned from SRE, from September 1995-December 1995, he continued to communicate with Dixie and worked with the lawyers of both Squires and Dixie to obtain a formal contract on the Dixie property, assisting in negotiation of those details. The evidence shows the Dixie/Squires transaction was a direct result of plaintiff’s efforts and services; specifically, through plaintiff’s marketing and advertisement of the Dixie property, he set in motion a series of events which led to the procurement of Squires, a ready, willing, and able purchaser.

Conclusion

Accordingly, as there is substantial evidence of each essential element of quantum meruit, specifically that there was no express contract and that plaintiff was the procuring cause of the Dixie/Squires transaction, plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim should have been submitted to the jury.