Court Opinion

ID: 9714475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:38:29.66497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.349314
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WARD, dissenting: The biblical admonition is that the letter of the law killeth. This ancient wisdom is illustrated by the majority’s holding that the defendant was not entitled to the assistance of counsel before undergoing interrogation on the murder charge. With what I consider too narrow a perception of the right to assistance of counsel, the majority says that “the interrogation of the defendant which is at issue in the instant case was unrelated to the original charge of rape.” 102 Ill. 2d at 422. The majority does not deny that knowledge that the public defender had been appointed on September 2 and that an assistant public defender was representing the defendant was attributable to the State’s Attorney’s office. The majority seems simply to put the defendant’s right to the public defender’s assistance, and that attorney’s responsibility to the defendant as well, into an isolated box. I cannot agree that the right to assistance of counsel here, and the corollary, namely, the responsibility of the appointed attorney to provide counsel, were confined to the criminal charge which resulted in the attorney’s appointment. I have a broader perception. I consider that this defendant, who, one may add, was in custody and under police control, had a right to the advice of the attorney appointed to represent his interest and that the attorney had an obligation to provide counsel at a time when the client was being interrogated on another crime and another charge against him was being sought. Would the majority hold that had his attorney been advised that the defendant was seeking Ms counsel whether to respond to questiomng about the murder the attorney could properly have refused to see Ms client on the ground that his professional obligation was limited exclusively to the rape charge? The opinion illustrates the narrowness of the majority’s view of the right to the assistance of counsel in stating that “assistant public defender Koivun was not defendant’s attorney of record on the murder charge at the time of interrogation.” While the primary responsibility of the attorney was on the rape charge, to say that he had oMy the responsibility of counseling on that charge and that the benefit of counsel to wMch the client was entitled was also so limited seems dangerously close to making the attorney’s appointment here only a formalism. The majority does say that the People did have an obligation under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, to honor the rights of the defendant against self-incrimination, wMch included a right to counsel to protect Ms rights. After discussion, the majority concludes that the defendant waived these rights. I feel that the defendant’s comprehension of his rights under Miranda was doubtful. It is not unreasonable to conclude that had he understood that he was being told that he had a right to an attorney’s assistance he would have responded that he already had an attorney — assistant public defender Koivun. GOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., join in tMs dissent.