Court Opinion

ID: 9785730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:16:50.657564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:32.027517
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: Beginning with the suppression issue, I first acknowledge the majority’s thorough and thoughtful analysis of the more recent post-Miranda decisions. In my view, such a detailed synthesization of the cases is testament to the manner in which appellate courts have worked diligently and creatively to unnecessarily complicate, and thus emasculate, the straight-forward directive, pronounced in Miranda some 43 years ago and quoted by the majority, that “a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer . . . affirmatively secures [the] right to have one.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966). Nevertheless, even in the current environment, I would find that Appleby effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
First, I would not require a detainee to possess the knowledge of a constitutional scholar well-versed in Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, I would view the circumstances from the perspective of an objectively reasonable layperson interacting with an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer. In that context, even though only the officer knew that the arrest was pretextual, both could not have questioned that Appleby was actually in custody on the 6-year-old Connecticut charges, so as to trigger the protections applicable to custodial interrogations.
In that setting, Appleby asked Detective Jewiss about consulting with an attorney not once, but four times. The trial court found that Appleby had asserted his right to an attorney, albeit perhaps only for Sixth Amendment purposes. The majority questions, but does not decide, whether the wording of Appleby’s requests was *1071sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. Without belaboring the point, I would simply submit that one might expect a detainee, who has been confronted in his home by a multitude of armed officers, arrested, and taken to jail, to propound a request for an attorney in a most polite and nonconfrontational manner. Moreover, Appleby’s persistence in making a number of requests in a short period of time belies any equivocation as to his desire to have an attorney present or as to Detective Jewiss’ understanding of that desire.
Granted, the majority discards two of Appleby’s requests; one because it was made prior to his receiving the Miranda warnings and one because it was tied to the execution of the DNA search warrant. Even without those requests, however, Appleby still asked about consulting with an attorney twice after receiving the following Notice of Rights:
"1. You are not obligated to say anything, in regard to this offense you are charged with but may remain silent.
“2. Anything you may say or any statements you malee may be used against you.
“3. You are entitled to the services of an attorney.
“4. If you are unable to pay for the services of an attorney you will be referred to a Public Defender Office where you may request the appointment of an attorney to represent you.
“5. You may consult with an attorney before being questioned, you may have an attorney present during questioning and you can not be questioned without your consent. X [Initialed:] BA
“6. (Not applicable if you were arrested on a Superior Court Warrant which specified that bail should be denied or which ordered that you be brought before a clerk or assistant clerk of the Superior Court.)
You have a right to be promptly interviewed concerning the terms and conditions of your release pending further proceedings, and upon request, counsel may be present during this interview.”
A reasonably intelligent person could not read the plain language of paragraph 3 of that form and know, or even guess, that the “services of an attorney” to which he or she is facially unequivocally entitled are, as a matter of law, divided into two categories, i.e., Fifth Amendment services and Sixth Amendment services. Accordingly, a detainee would need to possess excellent clairvoyance — or astute constitutional acumen — to ascertain that, if there *1072is any way in which the detainee’s request for an attorney might be construed as being for Sixth Amendment purposes, then the right would not actually accrue or the request become effective until some undisclosed later time, after the detainee has been subjected to a custodial interrogation.
Likewise, the language of paragraph 5 would not, on its face, be confusing to a layperson. The detainee may consult with an attorney “before being questionedthen the detainee may have an attorney present “during questioning”; but ultimately, the detainee may withhold consent to be questioned at all. However, from a temporal standpoint, a detainee dare not take his or her stated rights literally at the risk of being legally sandbagged. Under the authority cited by the majority, the right to consult with an attorney may be validly asserted only when authorities are conducting a custodial interrogation or when such interrogation is imminent. See 2 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g), p. 869 n.200 (3d ed. 2007). In other words, contrary to the plain language in the Notice of Rights, an attempt to exercise of the right to “consult with an attorney before being questioned” will be deemed invalid as anticipatory, unless it is asserted during questioning.
Appleby faced one more explosive in the minefield that lay between the receipt of the Notice of Rights and the exercise of those rights. The form told Appleby that he could have an attorney present during questioning. Detective Jewiss propounded questions to Appleby during the book-in process, and Appleby twice asked about consulting an attorney while answering those questions. The majority flicks away that circumstance as not being an ""interrogation,” noting parenthetically that the courts have recognized a “ ‘routine booking question’ ” exception to Miranda for questions designed to obtain the “ " “biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.” ’ ” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990).
How was Appleby to know of this court-made exception? The Notice of Rights form did not suggest any exceptions. Detective Jewiss’ self-serving testimony that he advised Appleby that someone else would be talking to him about the case does not change the fact that Detective Jewiss was “questioning” Appleby, even if *1073it was not a legal interrogation for Miranda purposes. Moreover, the distinction between booking questions and case interrogation is less defined in this case, given that part of the biographical data, specifically Appleby’s use of an alias, was to be an integral part of the prosecution. Nevertheless, I reject the notion that Appleby’s invocation of his right to an attorney, made while he was in custody and being questioned by a law enforcement officer, was an anticipatory request that did not manifest an intent to have an attorney present during questioning, as he had been advised was his right.
Under the circumstances of this case, I would find that Appleby effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel with respect to the Connecticut charges and in conformance with the Notice of Rights he had been given in that case. As the majority notes, McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991), instructs us that Appleby could not thereafter be approached for further interrogation by the Kansas detectives. Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of tire suppression motion.
I concur with the majority’s result on the other issues. However, I feel compelled to voice my concerns, or perhaps merely display my lack of comprehension, on the stated law applicable to the double jeopardy and premeditation issues.
The majority notes that a constitutional claim of double jeopardy arises when a defendant is actually punished more than once for committing one offense. It then turns to the State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 133 P.3d 48 (2006), paradigm of applying the strict-elements test to a unitary conduct, multiple-description scenario to determine what constitutes one offense. The rationale for that approach is to “implement the legislative declaration in [K.S.A. 21-3107] that a defendant may be convicted of two crimes arising from the same conduct unless one is a lesser included offense of the other.” Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 498. In other words, if a person commits a single act, rather than two acts of discrete conduct, that person may be punished as many times as the legislature may dictate through its definition of the elements of various crimes.
In my view, that is tantamount to letting the tail wag the dog in the arena of constitutional jurisprudence. Under the separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary is to interpret the Constitution, i.e., *1074determine whether a person is being unconstitutionally subjected to multiple punishments, rather than abdicating that responsibility to the legislature. To the contrary, by developing a test that implements K.S.A. 21-3107, we have permitted the legislature to tell the judiciaiy that the prohibition against multiple punishments guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of our state and federal Constitutions simply does not apply in this state, unless perhaps a lesser included offense is involved. For instance, the legislature could effect a multiple punishment in nearly every speeding or other traffic infraction case by creating the crime of possessing a motor vehicle with the intent to use it to commit a traffic offense. See State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (offense of manufacturing methamphetamine does not have the same elements as offense of using drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine; multiple punishments for the same conduct is constitutional so long as the crimes have different elements). I simply cannot accept that constitutional rights are to be determined by the legislature.
Finally, tilting at one last windmill, I must express my frustration with the complete adulteration of the rather simple concept of premeditation. In my view, that concept was aptly described in a portion of the definition proffered in State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 9, 144 P.3d 647 (2006), which stated that “[pjremeditation is the process of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct.” Unfortunately, that case, and others, have gone further by opining that premeditation does not have to be present before the commencement of a fight, quarrel, or struggle and declaring that manual strangulation is strong evidence of premeditation. 282 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 9. Apparently, the suggestion is that, even though a killer may commence the homicidal conduct of manual strangulation without having thought over the matter beforehand, he or she may be deemed to have premeditated the killing if there is a possibility that the killer ruminated upon what he or she was doing during the murderous act, but before it actually caused the victim’s death. To the contrary, I would find that premeditation, as the very word contemplates, requires that the matter be thought over before commencement of the homicidal conduct, *1075whether the killing method be shooting, stabbing, strangulation, or some other means. Nevertheless, I concur with the majority in this case because of the evidence supporting two instances of strangulation, which would allow for a period of time to premeditate the killing before commencing the second, fatal strangulation.