Court Opinion

ID: 9943889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:10:11.875613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:49:34.696700
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community                         :
Development Coalition, Inc.                    :
                                               :     No. 299 C.D. 2022
                v.                             :
                                               :     Submitted: April 21, 2023
Bruce Fassett, trustee for                     :
Sierra Fassett,                                :
                    Appellant                  :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                          FILED: February 26, 2024
                This appeal involves the remediation of blighted property in the City of
Philadelphia (City) pursuant to the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship
Act,1 commonly known as Act 135 (Act 135). Appellant Bruce Fassett, trustee for
Sierra Fassett (Fassett), appeals from three orders entered by the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas (trial court) on March 25, 2022.2 Also before the Court is
Appellee Philadelphia Community Development Coalition, Inc.’s (PCDC) Motion to
Quash Appeal (Motion to Quash). After careful review, we grant PCDC’s Motion and
quash this appeal, but on grounds different than those asserted by PCDC.
                       I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                         A.        Act 135
                We have described proceedings brought under Act 135 as follows:

       1
           Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. §§ 1101-1111.

       2
         The trial court disposed of the three motions together in a single order filed on March 25,
2022. (Original Record (O.R.) Document (Doc.) No. 63.) The trial court then filed three additional
orders on March 25 and 28, 2022, that disposed of the same three motions. (O.R. at Doc. Nos. 64-
66.)
                Act 135 authorizes a court to appoint a conservator to
                rehabilitate a deteriorating building, thereby incurring debt
                that ultimately may be the owner’s responsibility. The
                conservator is responsible for bringing buildings into
                municipal code compliance when owners fail to do so.
                Section 2 of Act 135, 68 P.S. § 1102, authorizes the filing of
                a Petition for the Appointment of a Conservator with the
                court of common pleas by certain named interested parties
                who seek the appointment of a conservator to take possession
                of the property, undertake its rehabilitation[,] and, as
                appropriate, ultimately sell the property unless reclaimed by
                the owner(s).
In re Conservatorship Proceeding In Rem by Germantown Conservancy, 995 A.2d
451, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).3

      3
          Section 2 of Act 135 identifies its purpose and objectives:
                (1) Pennsylvania’s older communities are important to the
                Commonwealth’s economic health by providing a focal point for
                businesses and services and to this Commonwealth’s quality of life
                with its rich history and diverse communities. However, many older
                communities suffer from blighted properties that have been abandoned
                by their owners.
                (2) Many citizens of this Commonwealth are adversely affected by
                abandoned and blighted residential, commercial and industrial
                properties, including those citizens who live in proximity to such
                substandard buildings, as well as those who own property in the
                vicinity of such buildings.
                (3) Substandard, deteriorating and abandoned residential, commercial
                and industrial structures are a public safety threat and nuisance and
                their blighting effect diminishes property values in the communities in
                which these properties are located.
                (4) If these buildings are not rehabilitated, they are likely to remain
                abandoned and further deteriorate, resulting in increased costs to the
                Commonwealth, municipality and taxpayers to secure and ultimately
                demolish them.
                (5) Providing a mechanism to transform abandoned and blighted
                buildings into productive reuse is an opportunity for communities to
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   2
                                   B.      Proceedings Below
              On December 7, 2018, PCDC filed a Petition for the Appointment of a
Conservator (Conservator Petition) pursuant to Section 4(a) of Act 135, 68 P.S. §
1104(a) (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 0018a.) The Conservator Petition concerned
the real property located at 5105 Overbrook Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Property). At a hearing on May 15, 2019, Fassett (1) stipulated on the record that the
Property was “both abandoned and blighted under [Act 135] and that conditions exist
for the appointment of a conservator,” and (2) elected “conditional relief” under
Section 5(f) of Act 135, 68 P.S. § 1105(f).4 (Notes of Testimony (N.T.), May 15, 2019,

              modernize, revitalize and grow, and to improve the quality of life for
              neighbors who are already there.
              (6) If the owner of a residential, commercial or industrial building fails
              to maintain the property in accordance with applicable municipal codes
              or standards of public welfare or safety, it is in the best interest of the
              Commonwealth, the municipality and the community for the court,
              pursuant to the provisions of this act, to appoint a conservator to make
              the necessary improvements before the building deteriorates further
              and necessitates demolition, resulting in the removal of the building
              from the housing supply or prohibiting future productive economic use.
68 P.S. § 1102.

       4
        Section 5(f) of Act 135 permits the owner of a property to remedy conditions that otherwise
would necessitate the appointment of a conservator. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
              (f) Conditional relief.--
                  (1) If the [trial] court finds after a hearing that the conditions for
                  conservatorship . . . have been established, but the owner represents
                  that the conditions, violations or nuisance or emergency condition
                  will be abated in a reasonable period, the [trial] court may allow the
                  owner to proceed to remedy the conditions.
                  (2) If the conditions set forth in paragraph (1) have been satisfied,
                  the [trial] court shall enter an order providing that, in the event that
                  the violations or nuisance or emergency conditions are not abated
                  by the owner by a specific date or that other specified remedial
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   3
at 12; R.R. at 0597a.) Fassett further agreed that if he could not remediate certain
blighted conditions on the Property, including the roof, doors, windows, front porch,
and rubbish inside the house, he would consent to PCDC’s appointment as conservator.
Id. at 13; R.R. at 0598a.
               On August 6, 2019, on PCDC’s request, the trial court conducted a status
hearing, after which it entered an order finding that, “upon agreement of the parties, . .
. [Fassett] is incapable of proceeding under the prior [c]onditional [r]elief agreement”
and that “[PCDC] should be appointed as [c]onservator.” (R.R. at 0053a.) The trial
court accordingly appointed PCDC as conservator of the Property and granted it all
rights and duties under Act 135 together with full access to, and possession of, the
Property. Id. On October 1, 2019, PCDC filed a Motion for Approval of Final Plan
for Abatement (Final Plan), in which it detailed, and included photographs of, the
deplorable conditions of the Property, listed the work it had performed since being
appointed as conservator, proposed additional work to be completed prior to final
termination of the conservatorship, and itemized the estimated costs of the
conservatorship. (O.R. Doc. No. 18.)
               After a hearing on October 11, 2019, the trial court approved PCDC’s
Final Plan with certain modifications regarding the joists in the house. (O.R. Doc. No.
20.)5 On December 11, 2019, again after a hearing, the trial court ordered Fassett to

                     activities have not occurred by a specific date or dates, an order
                     granting the relief requested in the petition shall be entered.
68 P.S. § 1105(f).
       5
         Specifically, the trial court approved the work already completed by PCDC and the following
additional work:
               a) [d]emolition and stabilization of [the] existing front porch, at an
                  estimated cost of $9,250.00;
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                   4
complete the following work within three weeks: (1) remove from the Property all
remaining items of personal property, including any vehicles; and (2) bring duly
licensed and insured contractors to inspect the Property and provide PCDC with formal
written quotes for the work that PCDC was ordered to complete. (O.R. Doc. No. 22,
¶¶ 1-2.)
               In a January 7, 2020 Status Report on the Implementation of Its Final Plan,
PCDC advised the trial court that Fassett had not complied with the trial court’s
December 11, 2019 order and that, upon completion of the court-approved remediation
work, PCDC would file a motion to market the Property for sale. (O.R. Doc. No. 24.)
On February 26, 2020, PCDC filed a Motion to Amend Final Plan and List Property
for Sale (Motion to Amend), in which it noted additional structural issues that were
identified during interior demolition and debris removal. (O.R. Doc. No. 25.) PCDC
submitted a Supplemental Structural Evaluation Report from Bustamante Engineers
detailing proposed additional remediation work and itemizing the proposed additional
costs. Id. ¶ 28, Ex. “F.” PCDC also requested, pursuant to Section 9(b) of Act 135, 68
P.S. § 1109(b),6 to amend the Final Plan to include making the Property structurally

               b) [i]nterior demolition/debris removal, at an estimated cost of
                  $8,000.00;
               c) [r]eplacement of existing roof, at an estimated cost of $9,000.00;
               d) [s]elective replacement and/or securing of doors and windows, at
                  an estimated cost of $5,000.00;
               e) [s]elective masonry repairs, at an estimated cost of $1,200.00; and[]
               f) [g]eneral maintenance of exterior grounds, at an estimated cost of
                  $1,650.00.
(O.R. Doc. No. 18, ¶ 7.)
       6
         Section 9(b) of Act 135 authorizes the sale of property held in conservatorship under certain
specified conditions:
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  5
sound so that it could be sold to a third party for productive use. Id. ¶ 30. PCDC
indicated that it had been approached by several developers that were interested in
purchasing the Property “as is,” subject to certain structural work to the front wall of
the home. Id. ¶ 32.
              After a hearing on October 7, 2020, the trial court denied PCDC’s Motion
to Amend, vacated PCDC’s previously approved Final Plan, and directed PCDC to
submit an alternative final plan in accordance with Section 6(c) of Act 135, 68 P.S. §
1106(c).7 (O.R. Doc. No. 29.) Thereafter, on February 19, 2021, PCDC filed a Motion

              (b) Sale by conservator.--Upon application of the conservator, the
              [trial] court may order the sale of the property if the [trial] court finds
              that:
                     (1) Notice and an opportunity to provide comment to the court was
                     given to each record owner of the property and each lienholder.
                     (2) The conservator has been in control of the building for more
                     than three months and the owner has not successfully petitioned to
                     terminate the conservatorship . . . .
                     (3) The terms and conditions of the sale are acceptable to the [trial]
                     court, and the buyer has a reasonable likelihood of maintaining the
                     property.
68 P.S. § 1109(b).
       7
        Section 6 of Act 135 defines the powers and duties of a conservator. 68 P.S. § 1106. Section
6(c) governs the conservator’s final plan for abatement of the conditions on property held in
conservatorship:
              (c) Hearing on conservator’s final plan for abatement.--
                     (1) At the time the court appoints a conservator, the conservator
                     may present and the court may approve the final plan for abatement.
                     If no plan is presented at that hearing, a hearing date on the
                     conservator’s final plan for abatement shall be set within 120 days
                     of the appointment.
                     (2) Thirty days prior to the date of the hearing, the conservator shall
                     submit the plan to the court and to all parties to the action.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                     6
to Approve a New Final Plan, in which it summarized the work completed and the
municipal liens, taxes, and utility bills it had paid. Id. ¶¶ 49-52. PCDC further alleged
that “additional work should not be performed by PCDC—or any other party—without
undertaking significant structural repairs that can only be justifiable when made in
conjunction with a full renovation.” Id. ¶ 54. PCDC outlined three alternative final
plan options: (1) sell the Property in its current condition; (2) improve the Property
with additional structural and restoration work at a cost of approximately $103,000.00;
or (3) terminate the conservatorship conditioned on Fassett obtaining the means to
finish the renovations and pay the costs of the conservatorship. Id. ¶¶ 56-80.
              The trial court held a hearing on the Motion to Approve New Final Plan
on April 1, 2021, at which PCDC requested that the trial court approve the first
alternative plan to sell the Property in its current condition because it believed that it
was the only financially viable alternative of the three. (N.T., April 1, 2021, at 18-26,

                     (3) The plan shall include a cost estimate, a financing plan and
                     either a description of the work to be done for the rehabilitation of
                     the building or, if rehabilitation is not feasible, a proposal for the
                     closing, sealing or demolition of the building.
                     (4) The plan shall conform with all existing municipal codes, duly
                     adopted plans for the area and historic preservation requirements.
                     (5) At the time of the hearing, all parties shall be allowed to
                     comment on the plan, and the court shall take all comments into
                     consideration when assessing the feasibility of the plan and the
                     proposed financing. In making its assessment, the court shall give
                     reasonable regard to the conservator’s determination of the scope
                     and necessity of work to be done for the rehabilitation or demolition
                     of the building in approving the final plan and in approving the
                     costs of conservatorship and sale of the property.
                     (6) Within 15 days of the hearing, the court shall issue a decision
                     approving the plan or requiring that the plan be amended.
                     (7) If the court decision requires that the plan be amended, a hearing
                     date shall be set within 60 days from the date of the decision.
68 P.S. § 1106(c).

                                                     7
72-74; R.R. at 0640a-42a, 0653a-54a.)         On April 6, 2021, the trial court granted
PCDC’s Motion to Approve New Final Plan and directed that PCDC implement its
second alternative plan (New Final Plan) to complete additional remediation and
restoration work. (O.R. Doc. No. 35.) PCDC moved for reconsideration, which was
denied on April 26, 2021. (O.R. Doc. No. 37.)
             On December 3, 2021, PCDC filed a “Motion to Confirm Listing Contract
for the Sale of [the Property]” (Listing Motion). (R.R. at 0035a.) Therein, PCDC
alleged that it had substantially completed the court-ordered work outlined in the New
Final Plan, including removal of the exterior columns, installation of a new roof, and
completion of structural repairs to the masonry walls. (Listing Motion, ¶¶ 56-57; R.R.
at 0047a-48a.)      PCDC included its total costs of conservatorship, including
construction, liens, and fees, totaling $275,361.98. Id. ¶¶ 60-62; R.R. at 0048a-49a.
PCDC agreed to waive its statutorily-authorized conservator fee and to reduce legal
fees by approximately $23,000.00. Id. PCDC also alleged, via printout from the City’s
Department of Revenue, that the only outstanding municipal obligation for the Property
was payment of 2022 taxes in an amount of $1,836.54. Id. PCDC therefore requested
that the trial court approve an initial active listing of the Property for $199,900.00, even
though PCDC expected that it would receive multiple bids above asking price. Id. ¶¶
67; R.R. at 0049a-50a.
             On January 20, 2022, Fassett filed a “Motion [ ] to Terminate
Conservatorship of [PCDC] and to Sell Property” (Termination Motion), which the
trial court did not immediately decide. (R.R. at 0143a.) After a hearing, the trial court
granted the Listing Motion by order filed on January 26, 2022 (Listing Order). (O.R.
Doc. No. 55.) In the Listing Order, the trial court approved a listing contract with
Compass Pennsylvania, LLC and an initial listing price of $199,900.00. Id. It further

                                             8
directed PCDC to actively market the Property for at least 30 days, after which PCDC
could file a motion to approve a sale in accordance with Section 6 of Act 135. Id. On
February 3, 2022, Fassett filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Listing Order, in
which he alleged that granting the Listing Motion was inappropriate while his
Termination Motion was pending. He also argued that the Property was in worse
condition after PCDC completed its remediation work than it was at the beginning of
the conservatorship (Reconsideration Motion). (R.R. at 0181a-84a.)
             PCDC filed its Fee & Cost Report on March 1, 2022. (R.R. at 0196a.) On
March 4, 2022, pursuant to Section 9 of Act 135, PCDC filed a “Motion to Approve
Agreement of Sale and Authorize Conservator to Transfer [Property]” (Sale Motion).
(R.R. at 0213a.) Therein, PCDC indicated that it had listed the Property in accordance
with the Listing Order and had received multiple offers ranging from $152,000.00 to
$278,000.00. (Sale Motion, ¶¶ 3, 8; R.R. at 0214a.) PCDC further indicated that the
highest offer did not include a financing contingency and waived all inspections. Id. ¶
11; R.R. at 0216a.
             After hearing on March 25, 2022, the trial court entered an order (1)
granting PCDC’s Sale Motion (Sale Order); (2) denying Fassett’s Termination Motion
(Termination    Order);   and    (3)   denying   Fassett’s   Reconsideration   Motion
(Reconsideration Order). (O.R. Doc. No. 63.) The trial court further scheduled a status
hearing for May 17, 2022, and directed PCDC to file a final fee and cost petition in
advance of the hearing. Id. By separate order also entered on March 25, 2022, the trial
court further explained its Sale Order:
             [T]he [trial c]ourt finding that work approved by the [trial
             c]ourt[ ] . . . has been completed by [PCDC], and after the
             record owner of the [ ] Property and each lienholder has been
             provided with an opportunity to comment on the proposed
             sale, and with no party having presented a viable proposal to

                                           9
             terminate this conservatorship in accordance with Section 10
             of Act 135, [ ] 68 P.S. § 1110, or sought to stay the sale in
             accordance with [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
             (Pa.R.A.P.)] 1732, the Court hereby ORDERS and
             DECREES THAT:
                a) [PCDC] has been in control of the building for more
                than three months and the owner has not successfully
                petitioned to terminate the conservatorship under
                [S]ection 10 of Act 135, [ ] 68 P.S. [§] 1110[;]
                b) The terms and conditions of the Agreement of Sale
                dated February 1, 2022 and fully executed on March 3,
                2022, which is attached to [PCDC’s] [Sale Motion] as
                Exhibit “C,” are acceptable to the [trial c]ourt;
                c) The proposed [b]uyers have a reasonable likelihood of
                maintaining the [ ] Property;
                d) [PCDC], in accordance with Section 9(c) of Act 135, [
                ] 68 P.S. § 1109(c), is hereby authorized to sell the
                building free and clear of all liens, claims and
                encumbrances and shall execute all documents necessary
                to transfer the [ ] Property to the proposed [b]uyers . . . ;
                e) All proceeds from the sale, after payment of all taxes,
                closing costs and broker’s commissions shall be placed
                into the [Income on Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA)] of
                Orphanides & Toner, LLP, pending review and approval
                of a distribution schedule submitted by [PCDC] pursuant
                to Section 10 of Act 135, [ ] 68 P.S. [§] 1110.

(O.R. Doc. No. 64.)8
             Fassett filed a Notice of Appeal on March 29, 2022, in which he purported
to appeal from the trial court’s orders denying his Termination and Reconsideration
Motions and granting PCDC’s Sale Motion. (O.R. Doc. No. 67.) Fassett did not
purport to appeal directly from the trial court’s Listing Order and did not seek a stay of

      8
         The trial court also entered separate orders denying Fassett’s Termination and
Reconsideration Motions. (O.R. Doc. Nos. 65, 66.)

                                           10
the sale of the Property. The trial court ordered Fassett to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement), which he
did on April 18, 2022. (O.R. Doc. Nos. 68, 70.)
                 In the interim, on April 8, 2022, PCDC filed a Petition for Appeal Bond
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1737 (Bond Petition). (R.R. at 0221a.) In the Bond Petition,
PCDC noted that it had self-financed all costs of the conservatorship and that the trial
court had approved all work that it had completed to make the Property salable. (Bond
Petition, ¶¶ 2, 6; R.R. at 0221a-22a.) Although PCDC acknowledged that the posting
of financial security is not mandatory in appeals from non-monetary judgments where
a stay is not sought by the appellant, it nevertheless argued that, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1737(a)(1),9 the trial court had discretion to require security based upon “unique facts
and circumstances.” Id. ¶¶ 13-14; R.R. at 0223a. PCDC further advised that, although
Fassett had not sought a stay of the sale of the Property pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1731,
the title underwriters for the sale would not issue a title insurance policy during the
pendency of this appeal. Id. ¶ 29; R.R. at 0226a. PCDC requested the imposition of
an appeal bond in the amount of $415,153.99, which is an amount equal to 120% of
PCDC’s combined conservatorship costs, conservator’s fee, and anticipated legal fees
on appeal. (R.R. at 0227a.)

       9
           Pa.R.A.P. 1737 is titled “Modification of Terms of Supersedeas.” Rule 1737(a)(1) provides:
                 (a) The trial court or the appellate court, may at any time, upon
                     application of any party and after notice and opportunity for
                     hearing:
                 (1) require security of a party otherwise exempt from the requirement
                     of filing security upon cause shown[.]
Pa.R.A.P. 1737(a)(1).

                                                  11
              The trial court granted the Bond Petition on May 24, 2022, and required
Fassett to post bond in the amount of $415,153.99 within 10 days (Bond Order). (O.R.
Doc. No. 78.) It is undisputed that Fassett did not post the required security or appeal
the trial court’s Bond Order.
                                II.        ISSUES ON APPEAL
              There are three issues presented in this appeal: (1) whether Fassett’s
appeal should be quashed due to his failure to comply with the Bond Order; (2) whether
the trial court’s Listing Order and, relatedly, Reconsideration Order are reviewable on
appeal; and (3) whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in granting the Sale
Motion. Importantly, the following matters are not at issue in this appeal: (1) the
appointment of PCDC as conservator; (2) the fees and costs associated with PCDC’s
conservatorship; (3) the trial court’s Termination Order;10 or (4) the validity or scope
of PCDC’s New Final Plan.
                                      III.   DISCUSSION11
                                      A.     The Bond Order
              We first address PCDC’s argument that Fassett’s failure to comply with
the trial court’s Bond Order requires the quashing of this appeal. Fassett argues in
response that the trial court’s Bond Order was not authorized by the Rules of Appellate

       10
          Although Fassett purported to appeal from the trial court’s Termination Order and included
in his Concise Statement certain issues related to the Termination Motion, see O.R. Doc. No. 70, he
has not raised or briefed any issues in this court challenging the Termination Order. We therefore
consider that issue to be abandoned and waived. See Philadelphia Community Development
Coalition, Inc. v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 298 A.3d 172, 174 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).

       11
          Our review determines whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error
of law necessary to the outcome of the case. Germantown Conservancy, Inc., 995 A.2d at 459 n.6.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which our scope of review is plenary and
standard of review is de novo. Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 292 A.3d
866, 871 n.9 (Pa. 2023).

                                                12
Procedure and that quashing the appeal on this ground would be contrary to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in PPM Atlantic Renewable v. Fayette County
Zoning Hearing Board, 81 A.3d 896 (Pa. 2013).
              Preliminarily, we emphasize that Fassett did not attempt to appeal the
Bond Order and did not amend his Concise Statement to raise any issues related to it.
Any arguments Fassett makes regarding the Bond Order’s validity or amount therefore
are technically not before us. Nevertheless, because PCDC seeks to quash this appeal
on the ground that Fassett did not comply with the Bond Order, we address, to the
extent necessary, its validity and enforceability.
              We have recognized that, in certain limited circumstances, an appellant’s
failure to post an appeal bond may justify quashing the appeal. See, e.g., Takacs v.
Indian Lake Borough, Zoning Hearing Board, 18 A.3d 354, 360 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)
(quashing land use appeal due to appellant’s failure to post appeal bond ordered
pursuant to Section 1003-A(d) of the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)12). Here,
PCDC sought the imposition of an appeal bond pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1737(a)(1),
which provides as follows:
              (a) The trial court or the appellate court, may at any time,
              upon application of any party and after notice and
              opportunity for hearing:
              (1) require security of a party otherwise exempt from the
              requirement of filing security upon cause shown[.]

Pa.R.A.P. 1737(a)(1). PCDC argues that this rule generally permits a trial court to
impose an appeal bond and that an appellant’s failure to comply requires quashing the
appeal. We disagree.

       12
          Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Section 101 of the Act of December
21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 11003-A.

                                               13
             First, Rule 1737 is titled “Modification of Terms of Supersedeas”
(emphasis in original). It is included under the subheading “Stay or Injunction in Civil
Matters,” which falls under Chapter 17 (“Effect of Appeals; Supersedeas and Stays”).
Thus, by its very name and placement in the Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 1737
is intended to govern bonds imposed in association with stays or injunctions sought
and ordered in the trial court. It is not, on its face, a broadly applicable general rule
authorizing the imposition of bonds in all, or even a broad class of, appeals where no
stay or injunction has been entered.
             Second, Rule 1737(a) authorizes the imposition of security only against a
party who is “otherwise exempt from the requirement of filing security . . . .” Pa.R.A.P.
1737(a). Rule 1736, which governs “Exemption from Security,” provides that certain
persons and entities generally are exempt from posting security, including, inter alia,
the Commonwealth and its officers, political subdivisions and their officers, and a party
acting in a representative capacity. Pa.R.A.P. 1736(a)(1)-(5). Rule 1736(b) further
provides that, unless otherwise indicated elsewhere, the taking of an appeal by any
party listed in subsection (a) operates as an automatic supersedeas in favor of that party.
Pa.R.A.P. 1736(b).
             Thus, and contrary to PCDC’s argument, Rule 1737 did not authorize the
imposition of an appeal bond in this case. It is undisputed that Fassett did not seek a
stay of the trial court’s Sale Order and has not sought a stay in this Court. Thus, Chapter
17 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure generally does not apply to Fassett’s appeal and
do not authorize a bond requirement. Further, although Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) has been
recognized to provide a trial court with jurisdiction to issue a stay and require
associated posting of security after an appeal has been filed, our Supreme Court has

                                            14
cautioned that Rule 1701(a) does not itself authorize the imposition of a bond without
other statutory or rule-based authorization. In PPM, the Supreme Court opined:
               To the extent the dissent may be understood to suggest that
               Rule 1701(b)(1) itself supplies common pleas courts with
               broad powers to require the posting of appeal bonds,
               moreover, such a concept is highly suspect. Rule 1701
               primarily divests such tribunals of their ability to proceed
               further in a case, and subsection (b)(1) makes an exception
               for certain matters that have been described as
               “housekeeping” in nature . . . .
               Appeal bonds are materially different: they are in derogation
               of the right to appeal . . . . That right is constitutional in its
               dimension. . . . In this respect, imposition of a bond is in
               contrast to the more conventional scenario where security is
               posted in exchange for a stay or supersedeas. Under the latter
               procedure, made expressly available per our appellate rules,
               see Pa.R.A.P. 1731, 1733, a failure to post security has no
               effect on the right to appeal.
               ....
               [T]o the extent this case involves any question regarding the
               scope of powers purportedly subsisting under appellate rule
               1701(b)(1), we are not receptive to the position that that rule
               alone gives trial courts power or discretion to require the
               posting of bond as a precondition to an appeal where no
               other, external source of authorization for such a bond exists.
Id. at 901-02.
               We thus conclude that, because PCDC has not identified any statutory or
rule-based authority pursuant to which the trial court could impose an appeal bond, we
will not quash Fassett’s appeal on the ground that he did not comply with the Bond
Order.
          B.       Appealability of the Reconsideration and Listing Order
               Next, we consider whether Fassett’s appeal from the Reconsideration
Order is proper. The parties do not dispute, and Pennsylvania courts have long held,

                                              15
that orders denying reconsideration are not reviewable on appeal. In re: Merrick’s
Estate, 247 A.2d 786, 787 (Pa. 1968); Chaney v. Fairmount Park Real Estate Corp.,
155 A.3d 648, 652 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016); Thorn v. Newman, 538 A.2d 105, 108 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1988). Nevertheless, Fassett argues that the Listing Order may be reviewed
on appeal even if the Reconsideration Order may not. We disagree.
             First, Fassett did not file an appeal from the Listing Order within the 30-
day appeal period, see Pa.R.A.P. 903(a), and, because the trial court did not expressly
grant reconsideration during that period, the appeal period was not tolled or stayed.
See Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3); Monsour Medical Center v. Department of Public Welfare,
533 A.2d 1114, 1115-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Second, the parties do not dispute, and
we agree, that the Sale Order is not a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341. Thus, all
previously entered interlocutory orders have not been rendered reviewable by Fassett’s
appeal from the Sale Order. See In re: Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 8 A.3d 1270, 1278
(Pa. Super. 2010) (once an appeal is filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory
orders become reviewable) (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, because
Fassett did not appeal directly from the Listing Order and this appeal does not render
that order reviewable, we have no jurisdiction to consider it.
                                   C.    Sale Order
             Finally, we consider Fassett’s argument that the trial court erred and
abused its discretion in entering the Sale Order. Before we address Fassett’s last issue,
we first must once again determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider it.
Although the parties appear to agree that the Sale Order is an interlocutory order
appealable as of right pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(2), the appealability of an order
goes to the jurisdiction of the court and may be raised by the court sua sponte. Shearer

                                           16
v. Hafer, 177 A.3d 850, 855-56 (Pa. 2018); Fried v. Fried, 501 A.2d 211, 212 (Pa.
1985).
               Although this Court has held that conservatorship proceedings under Act
135 generally are included within the category of matters referenced in Rule 311(a)(2),
see Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 298 A.3d at 176 n.9, the rule authorizes a
direct appeal from an interlocutory order “confirming, modifying, dissolving, or
refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an attachment, custodianship, receivership, or
similar matter affecting the possession or control of property . . . .” Pa. R.A.P. 311(a).
The question thus is whether the Sale Order, which approved the sale of the Property,
was an order “confirming, modifying, dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or
dissolve”13 the conservatorship. We conclude that it was not. The circumstances in
which we have considered appeals from conservatorship proceedings under Act 135
have involved appeals from orders appointing or terminating, or refusing to appoint or
terminate, a conservatorship. See, e.g., Germantown Conservancy, 995 A.2d at 452
(appeal from order dismissing petition for appointment of conservator); City of
Bethlehem v. Kanofsky, 175 A.3d 467, 468 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (appeal from order
appointing conservator); Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 298 A.2d at 174, 177
(appeal from an order terminating petition for appointment of conservator, construed
as an order refusing to confirm a conservator). See also Auto Shower II, Inc. v.
Juszczak, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1165 C.D. 2022, filed November 17, 2023)
(considering appeal from order refusing to strike restrictive covenants placed on

       13
          The language “affecting the possession or control of property,” describes the nature of the
proceeding involved, and not the nature of the order entered by the trial court. Thus, not every order
entered in any proceeding that affects the possession and control of property is immediately
appealable under Rule 311(a)(2). Compare Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(6); In Re: Estate of Kraskinski, 218
A.3d 1246 (Pa. 2019) (Rule 342(a)(6) permits immediate appeals from Orphans’ Court orders
“determining an interest in real or personal property,” which includes orders approving sale of real
property out of an estate).

                                                 17
property in conservatorship where trial court certified order for immediate appeal
pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 702(b)); Walsh v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 1689 & 1781
C.D. 2019, filed June 23, 2021), slip op. at 1 (appeal from trial court orders denying
motions to terminate conservatorship);14 Walsh v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 336 C.D.
2021, filed October 1, 2021), slip op. at 1-2 (granting PCDC’s motion to quash appeal
because trial court orders approving listing contract and price and imposing appeal
bond “do not confirm, modify, dissolve, or refuse to confirm, modify, or dissolve the
conservatorship”); Philadelphia Community Development Coalition v. Isabella (Pa.
Cmwlth. Nos. 11, 12, & 268 C.D. 2019, filed August 28, 2020) (appeals from trial court
orders that included an order denying motion to terminate conservatorship).
              Here, although the Termination Order presumably would qualify as an
appealable order under Rule 311(a), Fassett has abandoned his appeal of that order.
Fassett also stipulated to the appointment of PCDC as conservator, which appointment
is not before the Court. In approving the sale of the Property, the trial court did not
modify the conservatorship. Rather, it approved the sale pursuant to Section 9 of Act
135 which, because Fassett stipulated that he is incapable of remediating the Property
himself, is a valid resolution under Act 135. See 68 P.S. §§ 1102(6), 1109(b). Although
Fassett presumably could appeal from the trial court’s final order and seek a stay
pending appeal, he has not done so here. We simply cannot conclude that Fassett’s

       14
          This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited for their persuasive value.
Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a).

                                             18
appeal of the Sale Order properly is before this Court pursuant to Rule 311(a)(2) or any
other rule.15 Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to consider it.16
                                     IV.     CONCLUSION
               Because we conclude that Fassett’s failure to post bond in the trial court
is not fatal to his appeal, we will not quash it on that ground. However, because we
nevertheless conclude that Fassett has not appealed from any other appealable orders
entered in the trial court, we are without jurisdiction to consider the issues he raises in
this Court. We accordingly grant PCDC’s Motion to Quash on these alternative
grounds.

                                                   ________________________________
                                                   PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

       15
           The parties do not argue, and we do not conclude, that the Sale Order is appealable as either
a final order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341 or a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313.

       16
          Although we are without jurisdiction to consider Fassett’s challenge to the Sale Order, we
note that Fassett’s single argument on appeal is that the trial court did not require complete
remediation of the Property prior to approving the sale pursuant to Section 6(c) of Act 135, 68 P.S. §
1106(c). (Fassett Br. at 25-31.) However, Section 6 of Act 135 governs the powers and duties of a
conservator, and Section 6(c) in particular provides the requirements for a conservator’s final plan of
abatement. 68 P.S. § 1106(c). Fassett did not attempt to appeal from any of the trial court’s orders
approving PCDC’s Final or New Final Plans, and Section 6 therefore is immaterial to the trial court’s
entry of the Sale Order. Further, Section 9(b) of Act 135 authorizes the sale of a property in
conservatorship in certain limited circumstances. See 68 P.S. § 1109(b). Fassett makes no arguments
on appeal that challenge in any meaningful, reviewable way any of the findings made by the trial
court pursuant to Section 9(b).

                                                  19
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community,              :
Development Coalition, Inc.          :
                                     :    No. 299 C.D. 2022
            v.                       :
                                     :
Bruce Fassett, trustee for           :
Sierra Fassett,                      :
                    Appellant        :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 26th day of February, 2024, it is ordered that the
Motion to Quash Appeal filed by Appellee Philadelphia Community Development
Coalition, Inc. hereby is GRANTED, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing
Opinion. The instant appeal accordingly is QUASHED.

                                         ________________________________
                                         PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge