Court Opinion

ID: 9851915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:21:30.721013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:19.396251
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. In this case the landlord leased certain realty to the tenant under a written contract. The premises were partially destroyed by fire and the landlord settled its claim against its fire insurer and subrogated such rights as it might have to said insurer. The insurer sued the tenant; the tenant filed a third-party complaint against the landlord, alleging that the landlord’s negligence caused the fire.
*174The landlord filed an answer thereto and a motion for summary-judgment, praying that judgment be entered in its favor as a matter of law, which motion was denied by the trial court.
§ 14 of the Civil Practice Act (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 627; Code Ann. §81A-114) provides in pertinent part: "At any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against him.” The above language would seem to leave it beyond peradventure that the tenant had the right to bring the landlord into the case as a third-party defendant. Further, the law vests a discretion in the trial court as to whether or not to allow a third-party defendant brought into the case, and that discretion must be exercised at the trial court level and not by this court. Dyke v. Sechrist (DC-Md), 21 FRD 240.
Further, as to motions for summary judgment: "The party opposing the motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue exists and the trial court must give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. . . The act cannot deprive a party of the opportunity to have a trial of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and it is indeed a great responsibility to say that 'in truth there is nothing to be fried.’” (Emphasis supplied). Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 5 (126 SE2d 442). The majority opinion states: "The only result would be confusion for the jury. This is directly contrary to the spirit and purpose of third-party practice.” In this respect, let me observe that in my opinion third-party practice is indeed confusing to the jury and to the court, but the entire Civil Practice Act, in my opinion, is fraught with increased confusion. It is too late in the day to complain of "confusion” when we have to live by the Civil Practice Act. Therefore, I would affirm the lower court and I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.