Court Opinion

ID: 9418007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:46:33.561118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:54.079660
License: Public Domain

*339.Mr. Justice White,
.dissenting;.
The reasons for my dissent are stated, not only because of what seems to me is the encouragement afforded to frauds on the homestead law by the ruling now made, but also because of the possible injurious- consequences; to arise from the application hereafter of the assumed legal principles upon which the ruling is based.
These are the facts: Harness entered the homestead. Before he had performed the conditions required by the law of the United States to entitle him to a patent, he made a contract with the Norwood and Butterfield Company, to' convey to them, when he received a patent, the pine timber on the land and a right of way through and across the land for roads, trams or railroads one hundred feet wide. Harness ultimately filed the proofs required by the acts of Congress; in other words, made an affidavit, as required by law,- to the effect that he had the sole interest in the land, and that" there was an absence of interest in anybody else. Obtaining- the -patent, he made the' stipulated conveyance to the Norwood and Butterfield Company, which afterwards conveyed to the Butterfield Lumber Company, defendant in error. Before this deed, however, was recorded, as-required by the laws of Mississippi, Harness mortgaged the land to Hartman, plaintiff in error, and the mortgage was at once recorded. Thereafter the deed was recorded. Soon afterward the Butterfield Company filed its bill in a court of chancery in Mississippi to establish its alleged prior rights under the deed from Harness, and it was averred that Hartman accepted the mortgage to him with notice of the prior transfer, arid therefore took subject to the deed.
That a Federal question was present is conceded, in view of .the fact that the Mississippi court applied the laws of the United States in determining the validity of the contract and the deed. Having decided that they were valid, and that Hartman had notice of the transaction before the execution of the mortgage, the state court further held that the rights *340of Hartman were subordinate to those conferred by the contract and deed. I do not stop to demonstrate that a contract made by a homesteader to convey , to another, when a patent is obtained, a right to strip the land of all the timber and to vest in such party a right of way for a tramway to make the removal of the timber effectual, is void under the homestead laws of the United States. This I do not feel called upon to do, because the court in deciding this case expressly assumes that the contract to convey the timber was void, and bases its ruling upon that assumption, citing Anderson v. Carkins, 135 U. S. 483. But at the same time it is declared-that although the contract was void, by virtue of the policy of the United States as disclosed in its statutes, such contract was not inherently vicious or immoral. The deduction seems to me to be unwarranted. Considering a contract of this nature, in Anderson v. Carkins, it was said:
“There can be no question that this contract contemplated perjury on the part of Anderson, and was designed to thwart the policy of the Government in the homestead laws, to secure for the benefit of the homesteader the exclusive benefit of his homestead right. Such a contract is against public policy, and will not be enforced in a court of equity.”
And the doctrine of Anderson v. Carkins, which is conceded applies to this case, was reiterated in Adams v. Church, 193 U. S. 510, 515.
It having been impossible for the homesteader, without fraud and perjury, to execute the contract to strip the land of its timber and give a right of way for a tramway to make the stripping effectual, it seems to me that it cannot be said that it was not immoral and vicious. And when the necessary effect of the contract is thus fixed, it is submitted that it becomes at once patent that decisions holding that executed contracts are not affected by the statute of frauds have no application to this case, for, as said by Mr. Justice Jackson, in the case relied upon to demonstrate the doctrine, Bibb v. Allen, 149 U. S. 481, 497, “contracts not in conformity *341with the statute (of frauds) are only voidable and not illegal.”
It is said, however, that Harness made a deed in accordance with the contract, and this suit involves not the contract but the deed. But unless this proceeds upon the assumption that the contract was merely voidable and not illegal, as being contrary to public policy, it seems to me to be a pláin misconception. This is said, since it cannot be that.a court of equity will not enforce the specific performance of a contract which is void as against public policy, but yet will lend its aid to one of the parties by enforcing a deed which permits the fruits of the void contract to be realized.
As said in Deweese v. Reinhard, 165 U. S. 386, a case con-. cerning the homestead laws:
“A court, of equity acts only when and as conscience commands, and if the conduct of the plaintiff be offensive to the dictates of natural justice, then, whatever may be- the rights he possesses and whatever use he may make of them in a court of law, he will be held remediless in a court of equity.”
And especially must this be true where, as here, one of the parties to an illegal and void transaction invokes the aid of equity to give efficacy to perjury and a violation of public policy.
But it is asserted that whatever may be the right of the United States to assail the conveyance in question, neither the grantor nor his assignee has such right. Here, again, it seems to me clear that the distinction has been lost sight of which exists between contracts which are merely voidable and those which are void because contrary to public policy. That in a case of the latter character either party to the unlawful transaction or those in privity with them may be heard to contest the right of one of the wrongdoers to the active aid of a court of equity in making the illegal act effective, has long since been decided by this court. Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black, 316, 325.
I therefore dissent.