Court Opinion

ID: 9928417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 19:00:38.56584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:49.441176
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40415    Document: 00517051161        Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/31/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                              FILED
                                                                  January 31, 2024
                                No. 22-40415                        Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                              Clerk

   Raul Gerardo Favela, Jr.,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Bryan Collier, Individually; William Stephens, Individually;
   Brad Livingston, Individually; Richard Alford, Individually;
   Tommy Haynes, Individually,

                                          Defendants—Appellees.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 9:19-CV-93
                 ______________________________

   Before Graves, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
         Texas inmate Raul Gerardo Favela, Jr. alleges that prison officials
   failed to prevent his assault by another inmate. He sued several Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) employees, alleging that they
   ignored warnings that Favela was a target for violence. The district court
   granted summary judgment for the employees on the grounds that Favela
Case: 22-40415          Document: 00517051161              Page: 2         Date Filed: 01/31/2024

                                           No. 22-40415

   failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Concluding that summary
   judgment was inappropriate, we REVERSE and REMAND. 1
                                    I. BACKGROUND
           Favela alleges that, between October 2015 and January 2016, his
   attorney wrote four letters to prison officials expressing concern that Favela
   had been labeled a “snitch” and that his safety was in danger. Each letter
   requested that Favela be moved to another facility. Instead, in March 2017,
   an inmate attacked Favela with a small motor wrapped inside a sock. Favela
   sustained injuries to his nose and eye socket, requiring surgery and causing
   him significant pain.
               Favela sued five TDCJ employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
   that their failure to protect him violated his constitutional rights. On January
   16, 2022, defendants Richard Alford, Bryan Collier, and Brad Livingston
   moved for summary judgment. They argued, among other things, that Favela
   failed to exhaust the prison’s grievance process before suing as required by
   the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The defendants attached Favela’s
   grievance records, authenticated by TDCJ’s custodian of records for its
   Offender Grievance Department, which did not contain any grievance
   pertaining to the allegations in Favela’s complaint. Defendant Tommy
   Haynes later joined the defendants’ motion. 2
           In his response, Favela argued that he had in fact filed a grievance
   pertaining to his claims. To substantiate that argument, Favela submitted
   only his own declaration. Therein, Favela declared that he timely submitted
   Step 1 and Step 2 grievances relating to his claims but never received a
           _____________________
           1
               Judge Ho would affirm the judgment of the district court.
           2
               The fifth defendant, TDCJ employee William Stephens, has not appeared in this
   case.

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   response, and that he believed TDCJ was trying to frustrate any attempt he
   might make to file a lawsuit.
          On April 21, 2022, the magistrate judge issued a Report and
   Recommendation on the defendants’ motion, concluding that Favela failed
   to create a genuine issue of fact as to exhaustion. Specifically, the magistrate
   judge concluded that Favela’s declaration was insufficient to carry his
   summary     judgment      burden    because it      was     “unsupported” and
   “conclusory.”
          On May 11, 2022, the district court adopted the Report and
   Recommendation and entered judgment against Favela the same day. Favela
   appealed to this court.
                        II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          The standard of review on summary judgment is de novo. Davidson v.
   Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir. 2018). When a party
   moves for summary judgment on an issue where that party bears the ultimate
   burden of proof, it must establish a prima facie case with admissible evidence.
   Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Because exhaustion of
   remedies is an affirmative defense, defendants bear both the ultimate burden
   of proof and the initial burden here. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216
   (2007).The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence
   of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
                               III. DISCUSSION
          Under the PLRA, prisoners must exhaust their administrative
   remedies before filing suit under § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A Texas
   prisoner must complete that state’s two-step grievance process. Johnson v.
   Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2004). First, he must file a Step 1
   grievance within fifteen days of the relevant incident. Id. at 515. The
   grievance must provide enough detail to give officials a fair opportunity to

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   resolve the problem. Id. at 517. Officials then have 40 days to resolve the Step
   1 grievance. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., Offender Orientation
   Handbook 74 (2017), https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/documents/Offender_
   Orientation_Handbook_English.pdf. If the prisoner is not satisfied with
   their response, he has fifteen days to appeal by filing a Step 2 grievance. Id.
   Only after the Step 2 grievance is resolved has the exhaustion requirement
   been satisfied. Johnson, 385 F.3d at 515. Indeed, to properly exhaust, an
   inmate must satisfy both steps of the grievance process in accordance with
   the state’s procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006).
          Here, the defendants satisfied their initial summary judgment burden
   by pointing to Favela’s grievance records, which contain numerous
   grievances filed by Favela but no Step 1 or Step 2 forms pertaining to his
   claims in this case. The burden then shifted to Favela to establish a genuine
   issue of material fact. Favela produced his declaration, in which he stated the
   following:
          I filed a grievance after I was attacked within about 5 days or so
          requesting I be moved, for medical treatment for the injuries
          and pain, and damages for my pain and suffering and [stating]
          that the injuries were [the] fault of TDCJ officials who were
          notified of the danger I was in. I also filed an appeal of the
          grievance rerequesting the same things in the Step 1 grievance
          in a timely manner, however, I did not receive a response from
          TDCJ. I believe this was done to prevent a successful lawsuit.
          It is possible for a party to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue
   of material fact through reliance on a single declaration. Little v. Liquid Air
   Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). Nevertheless, the
   defendants contend that Favela’s declaration fails because it is “conclusory,
   unsubstantiated, [and] self-serving.” We have explained that “conclusory
   allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence”

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   cannot on their own create a genuine issue of material fact. Freeman v. TDCJ,
   369 F.3d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 2004). The issue, then, is whether Favela’s
   declaration satisfies that standard.
          An assertion is conclusory if it relies on inferences without also setting
   forth the facts that support those inferences. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
   Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 898–99 (1990) (concluding that assertions that an
   organization’s mission had been “significantly impaired,” its interests “had
   been injured,” and it “would be irreparably harmed” were too conclusory to
   establish Article III standing on summary judgment); see also Conclusory,
   Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“Expressing a factual
   inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is
   based”).
          Favela’s declaration is conclusory in some respects. Favela stated only
   that he filed his Step 2 grievance “in a timely manner”—a statement that is
   conclusory at least as to timing because it lacks any specific fact to support
   the inference of timeliness. Favela could have stated whether or when he
   received a response to his Step 1 grievance, or how many days passed
   between such a disposition and his filing of the Step 2 grievance.
          But the declaration is not devoid of specific facts. Indeed, Favela
   provided the general substance of his Step 1 grievance, stated approximately
   when that Step 1 grievance was filed, and noted that TDCJ failed to respond
   to his Step 2 grievance. In responding to the defendants’ motion, Favela’s
   burden was to “designate specific facts” showing that a genuine factual
   question exists, not to prove exhaustion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Because his
   declaration contains specific facts to support exhaustion, we conclude that it
   is not itself conclusory.
          Next, we have found declarations to be “unsubstantiated” when they
   were not sufficiently “explicit and clear,” see Little, 37 F.3d at 1075

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   (discussing Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994)), and particularly
   when they were inconsistent with other, more specific evidence in the record,
   Martin v. Spring Break ’83 Prods., L.L.C., 688 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2012).
   Applying that type of reasoning, the Second Circuit, in a somewhat similar
   case to this one, recently concluded that a prisoner’s declaration failed to
   create a genuine issue of material fact because it “rel[ied] on . . .
   unsubstantiated speculation.” Saeli v. Chautauqua County, 36 F.4th 445, 455
   (2nd Cir. 2022) (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 428
   (2d Cir. 2001)). There, the prisoner actually provided two pieces of evidence:
   (1) a copy of his grievance form, which had been in the possession of the
   defendant county, and (2) his own sworn statement. Id. at 454. The court first
   discounted the grievance form because it indicated on its face that it was not
   filed on time, and the prisoner’s sworn statements were too internally
   contradictory to add any clarity that helped him. Id. at 454-55. Then, the
   court explained that the sworn statement standing alone was also insufficient
   to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to exhaustion because it
   only stated that the prisoner filed a grievance on “some unspecified date.”
   Id. at 455.
          The Saeli court explained that because the statement “[did] not
   purport to provide the timing of the submission,” “the assertion that Saeli
   submitted the form in a timely manner rests entirely on speculation based on
   the face of the document, which, as discussed, is inherently inaccurate.” Id.
   Something more was needed to substantiate that assertion—“even in the
   form of [Saeli’s] own testimony from personal knowledge.” Id.
          In contrast, Favela’s declaration does not rely on unsubstantiated or
   speculative assertions. First, Favela did more than declare that his grievance
   was submitted on “some unspecified date”—he stated that his Step 1
   grievance was filed about five days after the incident and that his Step 2
   grievance was “timely.” Moreover, his declaration is not inconsistent with

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   his other representations, nor is it less specific than, nor even inconsistent
   with, the defendants’ evidence. After all, it sets forth a plausible reason for
   the absence of the Step 1 and Step 2 forms from the record—his belief in
   TDCJ’s desire to undermine his lawsuit.
           For the same reasons as above, we also conclude that Favela’s
   declaration contained more than a scintilla of evidence, 3 and that it was not
   “self-serving,” at least not in the sense that it lacked genuine substance, see
   Luna v. Davis, 59 F.4th 713, 716 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that a declaration
   is fatally self-serving when its “contents [are] either conclusory, vague, or
   not based on personal knowledge” (quoting Guzman v. Allstate Assurance
   Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2021)). 4
           Presented with a declaration that was not defective in any of those
   respects, the district court was required to believe the facts and make all
   justifiable inferences in Favela’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
   U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Therefore, because Favela’s declaration states that he
   filed a Step 1 grievance within about five days of his attack, the inference that
   he satisfied the Step 1 deadline is justifiable. And because Favela’s
   declaration states that he filed a Step 2 grievance, the inference that he either
   did not receive a response to his Step 1 grievance, or received an unfavorable
   one, is also justifiable. And, finally, because the declaration states that
           _____________________
           3
             A scintilla is something less than the amount of evidence necessary to support a
   reasonable finding of fact. Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (“A rational trier of fact might conclude that Davis’[s] allegations present a scintilla of
   evidence, but a mere scintilla is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”);
   see also Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–28 (Tex. 2003) (“Anything more
   than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding . . . .”).
   Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[a] spark or trace.” Scintilla, Black’s Law
   Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
           4
            Indeed, “[s]imply being ‘self-serving[]’ . . . does not prevent a party’s assertions
   from creating a dispute of fact.” Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2019).

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   Favela’s Step 2 grievance was filed “in a timely manner,” the only reasonable
   inference is that he filed it within the deadline. Any assessment of that
   statement’s credibility is a matter for trial, not summary judgment. See id.
          The defendants argue that if a litigant “can simply issue a sworn
   declaration that he did exhaust administrative remedies,” he could “self-
   generate an issue of material fact,” rendering both the summary judgment
   standard and the exhaustion requirement essentially meaningless. But even
   accepting that argument, Favela did not simply declare that he exhausted his
   remedies; he provided specific facts to counter the defendants’ prima facie
   showing. Moreover, he swore to the truth of those representations under
   penalty of perjury—one fact among others that distinguishes this case from
   those where we found a litigant’s written statements to be insufficient. See,
   e.g., Kidd v. Livingston, 463 F. App’x 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2012).
          While the facts here lack a satisfying analogue in our published
   opinions, we are not alone in concluding that a showing like Favela’s is
   satisfactory. In Paladino v. Newsome, the Third Circuit considered whether a
   New Jersey prisoner carried his summary judgment burden on exhaustion
   with regard to an excessive force claim. 885 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2018). Like
   here, the defendants produced the record of the prisoner’s past grievances
   and contended that, because there were no forms relating to the excessive
   force claim, the prisoner failed to exhaust. Id. at 206. The prisoner countered
   that he had filed “numerous [ ] grievances” that “have gone missing.” Id.
   To supplement that assertion, he submitted sworn deposition testimony
   which included his statement “that he ‘submitted no less than six . . . forms
   about [excessive force].’” Id. at 209. The Third Circuit explained that
   because that statement “set forth specific facts,” it showed that a genuine
   issue of material fact existed as to exhaustion. Id. Moreover, New Jersey, like
   Texas, requires prisoners to submit their grievances according to a specific
   timeline, id. at 205—but the court did not require the prisoner to point to

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   specific evidence of the precise timing of his submissions to create a genuine
   issue of material fact.
          Here, Favela similarly satisfied his burden of demonstrating the
   existence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing to specific facts in his
   own sworn statement.
                                 CONCLUSION
          The order granting summary judgment is REVERSED and this case
   is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with our opinion.

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