Court Opinion

ID: 9777284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:06:06.31667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.654575
License: Public Domain

Darrell Hickman, Justice, dissenting. The majority has found constitutional an act creating a new court, a “County Municipal Court.” This is not only contrary to our constitution but a breach of faith with those precedents that have interpreted our constitution differently. There is no such thing as a “County Municipal Court.” Only by a tortuous route can a case be made for such a creature. My examination of the problem does not start and end with Section 1, Article 7, of the Judicial Article, but encompasses all fifty-two sections of that article and other sections of the constitution that are pertinent. The majority’s simplistic approach, which is that anything the constitution does not forbid is proper, is essentially one that avoids interpreting the constitution. That is not the only test we should apply. It is the duty of this court to construe constitutional sections so that the instrument as a whole is harmonious, if at all possible. Ex Parte King, 141 Ark. 213, 217 S.W. 465 (1919). The constitution must be considered as a whole and to interpret any part of it we must read that part in the light of other provisions relating to the subject. Chesshir v. Copeland, 182 Ark. 425, 32 S.W. 2d 301 (1930). The constitution must be construed according to the sense of the terms used and the intentions of its authors. State v. Scott, 9 Ark. 270 (1849). These are the rules that we must follow when we read the constitution. Beginning with Section 1 of Article 7 we find that eight courts are mentioned: A supreme court, circuit courts, county and probate courts, justices of the peace, municipal corporation courts, courts of common pleas, and chancery courts. No other courts can be created by the General Assembly. We have held that beyond these enumerated courts the General Assembly does not have the power to create courts. Ward School Bus Mfg. Co. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W. 2d 394 (1977). In Jansen v. Blissenbach, 214 Ark. 755, 217 S.W. 2d 849 (1949) we held that a referee for probate court could not become, in effect, a second or deputy probate judge. In Nixon v. Allen, 150 Ark. 244, 234 S.W. 45 (1921) we held unconstitutional a legislative act providing for different persons to be county and probate judge. The power of the General Assembly to alter the judicial system is very limited. Section 1, Article 7, cannot be read by itself. The remaining sections of the Judicial Article spell out in every instance the eight approved courts, describing their duties and their jurisdiction. The article, with all its sections, provides for a complete and comprehensive judicial system. Nowhere in it is there any mention of a “County Municipal Court.” The jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court are set forth in Section 4; Circuit Courts in Sections 11-14; Chancery Courts in Section 15; County Courts in Section 28; Court of Common Pleas in Section 32; Probate Courts in Section 34; Justices of the Peace in Section 40, and Corporation Courts for cities and towns in Section 43. The jurisdiction of these courts is defined to avoid conflict: The jurisdiction of courts in cities and towns is spelled out to prevent conflict with justices of the peace; jurisdiction of justices of the peace courts is defined to avoid conflict with the circuit courts, Section 40. Courts of common pleas are limited to matters of contract and other civil matters not involving title to real estate. The jurisdiction of the supreme court is limited to appellate jurisdiction, a provision we have had to enforce. The General Assembly cannot add to or take away from that jurisdiction. Harding v. State, 94 Ark. 65, 126 S.W. 90 (1910). It is with these sections of the constitution and precedents in mind that we should examine the problem and not in the limited way the majority uses. The majority essentially rests its decisión on two words and a case. The words are “Municipal Corporations” and the case is City of Hot Springs v. Gray, 215 Ark. 243, 219 S.W. 2d 930 (1949). “Municipal Corporations” is interpreted to mean “county” in this instance, without regard to any comprehension of the Judicial Article. The constitution, in defining municipal corporation courts as authorized in Section 1, Article 7, provides in Section 43: Corporation Courts for Cities and Towns. The constitution does not say “corporation courts for cities, towns and counties.” In fact, I am firmly of the view that the great mischief behind this case was our decision in State v. Woodruff 120 Ark. 406, 179 S.W. 813 (1915). We held, contrary to all principles of government, that a Little Rock Municipal Court had jurisdiction county-wide. This is the only government entity to my knowledge that has powers beyond its borders. That decision, however wrong in my judgment, has been the law so long it probably cannot be overturned. But this should not lead to the conclusion that if a city court can have jurisdiction county-wide, a county municipal court is justified. The majority also relies on the fact that sometimes a county is a municipal corporation. But a county is not always a municipal corporation, sometimes it is a county. We should examine the constitution further to see what the framers meant in Section 1, Article 7, when they authorized Municipal Corporation Courts: Article 12 of the Arkansas Constitution deals with the subject of municipal and private corporations. Section 4 starts out, “No municipal corporations shall be authorized ...” Then it mentions, “The fiscal affairs of counties, cities and incorporated towns shall ...” [Emphasis added.] There is no doubt that in this section a county is included in the definition. Section 5 reads: “No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall ...” [Emphasis added.] Section 12 says: “Except as herein otherwise provided, the State shall never assume or pay the debt or liability of any county, town, city or other corporation.” [Emphasis added.] In every instance where there would be any doubt, the county is mentioned in the section concerning municipal corporations. Therefore, we can conclude the framers included counties specifically in a class with cities and towns when they intended to. Looking back to the Judicial Article we find no place where it says “County Municipal Court.” Section 43 mentions municipal corporation courts in cities and towns only. Why did the framers not provide for county municipal courts? The framers did not provide for such courts because they never dreamed of a county-wide court like the “Municipal” Court that was created in this case. Indeed, I would suggest they never dreamed of the one we approved in Woodruff. Article 7 creates a comprehensive court system, with jurisdiction of minor matters, out in a county, to be dealt with by the justices of the peace or the courts of common pleas. In cities and towns the court is a municipal court. That is the extent of the subject. It was never thought of by anyone, to my knowledge, that an appellate court of appeals could be created except by constitutional amendment. In fact, the Court of Appeals was created by constitutional amendment, Amendment 58. Section 1, Article 7, does not say that the General Assembly cannot create such a court. It simply says there will be one supreme court. Applying the logic of the majority a court of appeals could have been created by a legislative act because our Court of Appeals is not a Supreme Court; the constitution does not prohibit it so it can be done. Such a view of the constitution leads to distortions or, as in this case, a mutation — a “county municipal court.” I would, of course, reverse the trial judge on this issue and find the legislative act unconstitutional. I would not reach the second issue which gives a majority of this court some difficulty. Having approved a court not authorized by the constitution, i.e., the County Municipal Court, some members of the court find that they must also approve a new way to select judges — appointment by the county judge. Others find that method illegal for reasons not argued. No matter how this “County Municipal Court” is dressed up, it still remains a court created by the General Assembly with the acquiescence of a majority of this court; it is not a court authorized by our constitution. The unrestricted mischief that this creature will create cannot be ignored. Every county can now create its own traffic court. The temptation of such a proven source of revenue will be too great to resist. No doubt competition will abound between “city” municipal courts and “county” municipal courts since the constitution provides no guidelines regarding the authority or jurisdiction between such courts. The reason, of course, is that the constitution never contemplated that there would be such courts. All of this could be avoided if we would simply abide by the constitution. I am authorized to state George Rose Smith, J., joins this dissent.