Court Opinion

ID: 9563883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:49:09.060797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.940851
License: Public Domain

BERRY, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion. ’
At p. 57, § 70, 30 Am.Jur. Interest, it is stated that “as a general rule, where the contract is silent as to interest so that if it can be recovered at all, it is an incident *239of the debt sued for, and only as damages to make good to the creditor the loss it has sustained by reason of breach or default. An action to recover it cannot be maintained after the payment of the principal, * * *. The rule has also been applied where partial payments upon the principal have been accepted without reservation as to any right of interest. * * * ”
At p. 56, § 68, 30 Am.Jur. Interest, the converse of the rule is stated thusly: “The general rule is well settled that where interest is payable by the terms of the contract, it becomes an integral part of the principal debt, and the payment of the principal sum does not prevent a subsequent recovery of interest.” (Emphasis supplied)
Beginning at p. 96, 100 A.L.R., will be found annotations on the subject “Acceptance of principal seen as affecting right to interest.” At the beginning of said annotations the annotator says that “The right to recover interest after the payment of the principal sum due depends upon whether interest is due by the terms of the contract, or whether it is merely implied and allowed by way of damages in an action for the principal. If interest is due by the terms of the contract, the payment of the principal is no bar to its subsequent recovery, but if it is not due by the terms of the contract, the payment of the principal sum is a bar to recovery.”
By force of statute (23 O.S.1961 § 22, and 15 O.S.1961 § 266) interest at the rate of 6% was owing on the account in controversy. It is provided, however, in 23 O.S. 1961 § 8, that “accepting payment of the whole principal, as such, waives all claim to interest.” Therefore, by accepting the principal amount owing, plaintiff waived interest that was owing by virtue of the statutes first cited.
In its petition plaintiff alleged that “There is in the industry in which plaintiff and defendant are engaged a custom, or usage, generally understood and prevailing that amounts which become due and payable by virtue of contracts such as those entered into between plaintiff and defendant herein will bear interest at the legal rate of interest, or 6% per annum, until the same are fully paid and satisfied, and that the defendant and plaintiff were well aware of such custom or usage when the original agreement between them was entered into, and that said practice was understood and intended to be, and was, an implied and further term of said contract between the parties.”
Should greater force or different effect be given to the custom and usage to pay interest at the rate of 6% than to the applicable statutes which so provide? In brief, did custom and usage serve to create a promise to pay principal and also to pay interest? If the answer to the posed question is “yes”, plaintiff, by accepting the principal, did not waive the interest, but if the answer is “no”, plaintiff waived the interest. I am convinced that the latter answer is the correct answer. At p. 10, § 6, 30 Am.Jur. Interest, this is. said:
“Contracts for the payment of interest need not necessarily be express, but may be implied from circumstances surrounding the making of the contract. Such a contract may be implied from the course of dealing or usage és-tablished in a certain place where such custom or usage is well known, although a party not aware of the custom cannot be charged with interest. Moreover, it has been frequently held that where a definite contract exists for the payment of money at a fixed date, and the contract is breached, an implied promise exists to pay interest on the sum due, and the duty to pay interest may also arise by implication from a contractual obligation to make payments at stipulated times required by statute. In this connection, however, it should be noted that interest upon a breach of contract to pay money is usually allowed as damages, and not as interest by any implied contract." (emphasis supplied)
To my way of thinking, plaintiff is not in a position to assert that as to interest there *240'was an account stated. No mention was made of interest in the first invoices or billings that plaintiff forwarded to defendant. After receiving such invoices defendant made payments of $15,000.00, $5,000.00 and $4,000.00 on the principal. It was after these payments had been made that plaintiff billed defendant for interest that had accrued on prior payments as of date of payment and interest which had accrued on unpaid principal. Thereafter defendant tendered and plaintiff accepted the balance owing on. the principal indebtedness.
At p. 706, § 28, 1 C.J.S. Account Stated, it is stated that “an account stated must receive the assent of both parties; the minds of the parties must meet, for an account becomes stated only by reason of acquiescence in its correctness.” See also cases cited following ^5, Account Stated, Vol. 2, West’s Okl.Dig.
■ I do not believe that defendant can be said to háve acquiesced in the last statement since he treated the prior statements as being correct. .At p. 717, § 37b(2)(b), 1 C.J.S. Account Stated, this is said:
“Failure to object to the statement of an account may be explained by a showing that there had been an acquiescence in a previous, different statement involving the same transactions, * * (emphasis supplied)
Assuming that the last statement constituted an account stated, this would have no bearing upon the basic issue of whether defendant agreed at the inception of the transaction to pay interest and also to pay principal. On a number of occasions this Court has held that an account stated becomes a new obligation in place of the original obligation. See Mayes County Milk Producers Association, Inc., v. Hunter et ah, Old., 317 P.2d 736 and cited cases.
The record shows that for a long period (March, 1957 to May, 1958), plaintiff made no demand for interest and apparently made such demand in May, 1958, only because of defendant’s delay in paying in full the principal obligation, therefore, felt that defendant should pay interest because it had wrongfully deprived plaintiff of use of money that it was entitled to.
For reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.