Court Opinion

ID: 9465386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:44:55.811847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:09.265600
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting as to defendant Walker only:
I regret that I must differ with my brethren concerning whether the trial judge abused the very wide discretion he is allowed in conducting voir dire. I recognize that some of my colleagues think voir dire is an appropriate adversary function, e. g., United States v. Ledee, 5 Cir. 1977, 549 F.2d 990, 993, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 297, 54 L.Ed.2d 188, and that my brethren on this panel are disposed to leave the question entirely to the discretion of the trial judge. Because, however, of my firm belief in court-conducted voir dire, my dissent on this issue may appear anomalous. For this reason, I expand my views.
As a trial judge, I personally conducted voir dire in every case tried before me for eleven years, and I continue to believe that when the trial judge is diligent in the scope of his inquiry and responsive to counsel’s suggestions, this method of examining potential jurors has many advantages over counsel-conducted questioning. In most cases, advocates seek by voir dire not to obtain impartial jurors but to enlist persons already predisposed in their favor. The trial judge is objective; his desire to achieve justice will be communicated to the jurors by his manner of conducting voir dire and by the phrasing of his questions. Therefore, his election to conduct a careful voir dire will usually better assure that the jury impanelled is fair and impartial and will, in addition, save time and invest the process with the appearance of integrity that it warrants.
If he assumes the task of conducting voir dire, the trial judge also takes on the responsibility of acting on behalf of both parties in determining whether any member of the venire harbors possible prejudice however covert. The court must not only allow counsel to suggest questions that might identify potential prejudice, but must also put at least the substance of those inquiries to prospective jurors. See Silverthorne v. United States, 9 Cir. 1968, 400 F.2d 627, 638; United States v. Lewin, 7 Cir. 1972, 467 F.2d 1132.
My brethren have fully stated the entire series of voir dire questions requested by Walker’s counsel. I agree with them that the trial judge did not err in failing to put parts (a) and (b). However, part (c) cannot be considered in isolation. Propounded alone and answered simply “yes” or “no,” the question might not seem particularly enlightening. But as the full text of defense counsel’s request shows, Walker admitted having procured the marijuana and being on board the “NAHOA”; his sole defenses were that the destination of the cargo was not the United States, but, if it was, he didn’t know it. Under these circumstances, it was critical for defense counsel to know whether Walker’s admitted complicity in a plot to ship marijuana (which he claimed was directed at Canada rather than the United States) would prejudice any potential juror against him. The substance of the proposed question was calculated to elicit from potential jurors a clue as to whether they harbored any predisposition to convict Walker merely because he was engaged in international marijuana dealing rather than because he was guilty of the precise crimes charged. If any juror answered “Yes”, he would assuredly have been challenged for cause. An equivocal answer or even the manner in which a negative answer was delivered might have *1275induced counsel to exercise a peremptory challenge. No experienced trial lawyer would have wished to try Walker’s case without this information.
In connection with requests for jury charges, we have repeatedly ruled that the trial judge may not refuse to charge a jury because the request is phrased inartfully. Dahlgren v. United States, 5 Cir. 1977, 553 F.2d 434, 440; Ullman v. Overnite Transportation Co., 5 Cir. 1975, 508 F.2d 676, 677 n.2; Messer v. L.B. Foster Co., 5 Cir. 1958, 254 F.2d 412, 414. See also Wilson v. Crouse-Hinds Co., 8 Cir. 1977, 556 F.2d 870, 874 n.8, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968, 98 S.Ct. 513, 54 L.Ed.2d 455; Posttape Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co., 3 Cir. 1976, 537 F.2d 751, 757; Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 10 Cir. 1975, 525 F.2d 827, 830; Honeycutt v. Aetna Insurance Co., 7 Cir. 1975, 510 F.2d 340, 349 n.11, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2416, 44 L.Ed.2d 679; Weekes v. Michigan Chrome & Chemical Co., 6 Cir. 1965, 352 F.2d 603, 611; Montgomery v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., 1951, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 191 F.2d 770, 772. See generally 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2552 at 631 & n.25 (1971). If the substance of the request is clear, it is his obligation to give a correct charge.
A similar principle has been recognized in connection with voir dire. The trial court has, of course, very broad discretion in conducting voir dire, e. g., United States v. Rojas, 5 Cir. 1976, 537 F.2d 216, 219, cert. denied, 1977, 429 U.S. 1061, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777; United States v. Wertis, 5 Cir. 1974, 505 F.2d 683, 684, cert. denied, 1975, 422 U.S. 1045, 95 S.Ct. 2662, 45 L.Ed.2d 697; United States v. Gassaway, 5 Cir. 1972, 456 F.2d 624, 626, but “subject to the essential demands of fairness.” Aldridge v. United States, 1931, 283 U.S. 308, 310, 51 S.Ct. 470, 471, 75 L.Ed. 1054, 1056. The procedure used for testing prospective juror impartiality must create “a reasonable assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present.” United States v. Dellinger, 7 Cir. 1972, 472 F.2d 340, 367, cert. denied, 1973, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706. Thus, refusal to inquire into a particular subject which affects the basic fairness of the trial is not acceptable. United States v. Eastwood, 5 Cir. 1973, 489 F.2d 818, 820.
The trial judge need not ask every question requested by counsel, or put the inquiry in any particular form. Ham v. South Carolina, 1973, 409 U.S. 524, 527, 93 S.Ct. 848, 850-51, 35 L.Ed.2d 46, 50. “It is enough if the court covers the substance of the necessary areas of its own questions.” United States v. Nell, 5 Cir. 1976, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 n.9. ■ Broad, general inquiries into potential bias do not satisfy the court’s duty in this regard. Once counsel had made the judge aware of the need to ascertain whether prospective jurors might be biased against Walker on the basis of his admitted involvement in marijuana smuggling, the judge had the obligation to put the substance of that question fairly.
After deliberating, the jury convicted Walker of conspiracy, but acquitted him of attempt. Because the only issue Walker contested at trial was his knowledge of the destination of the shipment, the verdicts appear to be inconsistent; the verdict of guilty on a single count may have been the result of a “bargain” to resolve a deadlock.
I would conclude that Walker was prejudiced by the failure to inquire into possible prejudgment of his guilt based merely on moral turpitude, and would grant him a new trial.