Court Opinion

ID: 9690601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:26:09.840904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:00.121205
License: Public Domain

Andree Layton Roaf, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse this case. The sole item of evidence tying Phillips to the offenses of breaking and entering and theft of property is a single fingerprint on the inside of the window of the car in question. The owner found the car door ajar in a parking lot after it had been parked there overnight, and there was at least one unidentified fingerprint out of the three prints removed from the window. Although neither this court nor the supreme court has held that a single fingerprint is insufficient to support a conviction in circumstances analogous to this case, the published authorities all go to the length of setting out additional corroborating evidence. See Lamb v. State, 74 Ark. App. 245, 45 S.W.3d 869 (2001) (affirming conviction where appellant’s palm print found inside passenger window of stolen truck, vehicle was found within a block of appellant’s home, and appellant fled to another state when he learned the police were looking for him); Tucker v. State, 50 Ark. App. 203, 901 S.W.2d 865 (1995) (affirming conviction where, in addition to fingerprint evidence, stolen vehicle was found near appellant’s apartment and appellant had relatives living near the car lot from which the vehicle was stolen). There is none in this case. The law in fingerprint cases is clear. If there is corroborating evidence in addition to the fingerprint, then this court has determined that the fingerprint evidence sufficiently supports the conviction. This is clearly shown in Lamb, supra and Tucker, supra. In this case there is no additional corroborating testimony. There was no testimony from an eyewitness who saw Phillips leave the fingerprint on Schuetzle’s window as in Howard v. State, 286 Ark. 479, 695 S.W.2d 375 (1985), where an eyewitness testified that she observed the defendant touch the glass rim of the office wall. There was no corroborating testimony indicating that Phillips lived nearby, or was seen near or in the vehicle, and none of the victim’s property was recovered from Phillips at the time of his arrest. Further, although the victim, a police officer, dusted for fingerprints inside the car, other than the single print on the window of the door standing ajar, Phillips’ prints did not turn up, even though the perpetrator removed the contents of the glove box and center console and scattered them throughout the car. Because the State’s case is entirely circumstantial, there is not a strong enough link between the inferences that would prove Phillips’ guilt to a moral certainty. The trial court was left to speculate as to whether Phillips actually entered the vehicle or took Schuetzle’s property. According, I would reverse and dismiss. Hart, J., joins.