Court Opinion

ID: 9943484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:06:11.317384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:06.801027
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                   STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                    COURT OF APPEAL

                                      FIRST CIRCUIT

VV

                                   NUMBER 2023 KA 0782

                                   STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                           VERSUS

                                    DIONTE BRACKEN

                                                     Judgment Rendered:    FEB 2 3 2024

                                      Appealed from the
                              Eighteenth Judicial District Court
                               In and for the Parish of Iberville
                                      State of Louisiana
                                   Docket Number 783- 20
                      The Honorable Alvin Batiste, Jr., Judge Presiding

     Antonio M. " Tony" Clayton                    Counsel for Appellee
     District Attorney                             State of Louisiana
     Terri Russo Lacy
     Assistant District Attorney
     Port Allen, Louisiana

     Jane L. Beebe                                 Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
     Addis, Louisiana                              Dionte Bracken

     Dionte Bracken                                In Proper Person
     Angola, Louisiana

                 BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
GUIDRY, C.J.

      The defendant, Dionte Bracken, was charged by grand jury indictment with

one count of second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 30. 1, and one count

of attempted second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14: 27 &       14: 30. 1. He

pled not guilty and, following a trial by jury, was found guilty as charged on both

counts. The defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence for second degree murder, and to a concurrent

sentence of fifty years without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence for attempted second degree murder. The defendant now appeals,

designating three assignments of error in a pro se brief and one assignment of error

in a counseled brief. For      the following reasons,   we reverse the defendant' s

convictions and sentences and remand for a new trial.

                                       FACTS

      On the night of August 19, 2020, Deandre Brown and his girlfriend, Jaion

Knight,   were   sitting   in Brown' s parked vehicle in Knight' s grandmother' s

driveway at 56630 Corporal Herman Brown in Bayou Goula, Louisiana. While

Brown and Knight were talking, someone approached the vehicle, opened the

driver' s side door, and fired one bullet into the car. The gunman then fired three or

four more shots before fleeing the area on foot. None of the bullets struck Brown,

however Knight suffered gunshot wounds to her leg and arm, and a fatal gunshot

wound to the head. Brown identified the gunman as the defendant, Dionte Bracken,

whom he had known for several years and from whom he had recently received

threatening messages. The defendant was later charged with the second degree

murder of Jaion Knight and the attempted second degree murder of Deandre

Brown.

                                          E
                          SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        In his third pro se assignment of error, the defendant contends that there was

insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the

offenses charged.'

       A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due

Process. See U. S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; La. Const. art. I, § 2.                  The standard of

review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether, viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found that the State proved the essential elements of the crime and the

defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See

La. C. Cr.P. art. 821( B); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 27813,

2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ( 1979); State v. Currie, 20- 0467 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 2/ 22/ 21),

321 So. 3d 978, 982.

       When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the

reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is

thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably

inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential

element of the crime. Currie, 321 So. 3d at 982. When a case involves circumstantial

evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the

defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another

hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Dyson, 16- 1571 ( La. App.                 1st

 When issues are raised on appeal contesting the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging one or
more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State
v. Hearold, 603 So. 2d 731, 734 ( La. 1992); State v. Duhon, 18- 0593 ( La. App. 1st Cir.
12/ 28/ 18), 270 So. 3d 597, 609, writ denied, 19- 0124 ( La. 5/ 28/ 19), 273 So. 3d 315.

                                                  3
Cir. 6/2/ 17), 222 So. 3d 220, 228, writ denied, 17- 1399 ( La. 6/ 15/ 18), 257 So. 3d

         Second degree murder is the killing of a human being when the offender has a

specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La. R.S.               14: 30. 1( A)( 1).   To

sustain a conviction for attempted second degree murder, the State must prove that

the defendant: ( 1)    intended to kill the victim; and ( 2) committed an overt act tending

toward the accomplishment of the victim' s death. La. R.S. 14: 27; 14: 30. 1. Although

the statute for the completed crime of second degree murder allows for a conviction

based on specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm, attempted second

degree murder requires specific intent to kill. Specific intent may be inferred from the

circumstances surrounding the offense and the conduct of the defendant. La. R.S.

14: 10( 1);   State v. Bishop, 01- 2548 ( La. 1/ 14/ 03), 835 So. 2d 434, 437.

        The State bears the burden of proving the elements of the offense, along with

the burden of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. When, as in this

case, the key issue is the perpetrator' s identity, rather than whether the crime was

committed,       the   State   is   required   to       negate   any   reasonable   probability      of

misidentification.     A positive identification by only one witness is sufficient to

support a conviction. State v. Coleman, 17- 1045 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 4/ 13/ 18), 249 So.

3d 872, 877- 78, writ denied, 18- 0830 ( La. 2/ 18/ 19), 263 So. 3d 1155.

        At trial, the State provided overwhelming evidence of the defendant' s identity

as the perpetrator of the instant offenses, including Brown' s positive identification of

the defendant as the person who shot at him and who killed Knight. Brown testified

at trial that a few days prior to the shooting, the defendant contacted Knight via

Snapchat. Brown, who was in a romantic relationship with Knight, responded to the

defendant in an escalating exchange that ended with the defendant asking Brown

where he was and Brown responding that he would be returning from Houston

shortly. Two days later, on the evening of August 19, 2020, Brown and Knight were

                                                    4
sitting in Brown' s vehicle, a distinctive lime green Dodge Charger, that was parked

in Knight' s grandmother' s driveway in Bayou Goula. Brown testified that the

driver' s side door was suddenly flung open by the defendant, who was dressed in all

black and stated " you thought this sh* * was dead,"    before firing his gun into the

vehicle.

       Brown then checked on Knight, who was unharmed at this point, before

exiting the vehicle and running after the defendant. Brown testified that he slipped

and fell down in front of his vehicle, at which point the defendant fired three or four

more shots in Brown' s direction before fleeing. At that point, Brown realized that

Knight was laying on the ground near the vehicle' s passenger side door and had been

shot. Brown further testified that he and the defendant had known each other since

the eighth grade, and prior to this incident, he believed that they were friends. Brown

stated that the defendant was not wearing a mask, that he looked him in the eyes and

recognized him immediately, and that he was one hundred percent certain that the

defendant was the shooter.

       Dr. Michael Defatta, the chief forensic pathologist with the St. Tammany

Parish Coroner' s Office, testified regarding Knight' s autopsy. The autopsy showed

that Knight suffered three gunshot wounds, one to her left cheek, one to her left calf,

and one to the back of her left arm. Dr. Defatta testified that her cause of death was a

cranial cerebral gunshot wound and the manner of death was homicide.

       Amaya Meads, the defendant' s girlfriend at the time of the shooting, testified

that she and the defendant were in Bayou Goula on the night of August 19, 2020.

Meads testified that she and the defendant drove to Bayou Goula to get his laptop

from his grandmother' s house on Corporal Herman Brown. After the defendant

retrieved his computer,    he returned to the vehicle and started to drive away.

However, when he reached the end of the street the defendant said that he was going

to " catch   somebody slipping"   before turning the vehicle around and parking in an

                                            5
abandoned lot. The defendant, who was wearing pink running shorts and a black t -

shirt with colorful lettering, then turned his t -shirt inside out and changed into a pair

of black shorts before putting his gun in his pocket and exiting the vehicle. Meads

testified that when the defendant returned to the vehicle he was short of breath, as if

he had been running. He then got into the passenger seat, and Meads drove away.

       Meads testified that the defendant told her to take the long way back to

Thibodaux, through Plaquemine, and that when she was passing the Geismar exit on

I- 10, the defendant got into the back of the vehicle and threw a gun out the window.

Meads continued to ask the defendant what happened,              to which he eventually

responded that he thought he shot " his b****."    Upon returning to Thibodaux, Meads

put her clothing, as well as the defendant' s pink shorts and black t -shirt, into a plastic

bag, which she then gave to a friend to throw away. Meads was later indicted for

accessory after the fact.

       Fre' nesha Owens, Meads' s friend, testified that Meads called her on the night

of August 19, 2020, and told her that the defendant had just left their vehicle and was

about to go do something to somebody. Owens told Meads that she needed to leave,

at which point Meads got into the driver' s seat to drive away. However, the

defendant returned to the vehicle shortly thereafter. Owens further testified that after

Meads returned from Bayou Goula, Meads went to Owens' s house. Owens and her

friend Tijalea Brooks then left Owens' s house and threw into a dumpster the plastic

bag containing Meads' s and the defendant' s clothing. Both Owens and Brooks were

indicted for accessory after the fact.

       Officers with the Iberville Parish Sheriffs Office responded to the scene on

56630 Corporal Herman Brown after one of Knight' s relatives called 911. Once

there, several pieces of evidence linking the defendant to the crime were collected.

Officers retrieved three 9 mm spent shell casings, one live 9 mm projectile, and one 9

mm bullet lodged in Brown' s vehicle. Officers also canvassed the neighborhood and

                                             n
located a surveillance camera on a nearby home, which, from a distance, captured the

shooting. The video is too dark and the incident too far away to show exactly what

happened. However, it is evident in the video that a car door is opened, after which

an individual ran toward the street and then fell down. Moreover, several flashes can

be seen in the video which are consistent with gunshots.

       A black 9 mm handgun was found in the median between the east and

westbound lanes of I- 10, near Prairieville, the area identified by Meads as where the

defendant threw the gun out of the vehicle. Ballistics testing indicated that the casings

recovered from the scene were fired from the recovered 9 mm handgun. Ballistics

testing also found that the two bullets recovered from the scene had the same class

characteristics and could have been fired from the firearm, although they were too

damaged to make an identification to that particular firearm. Additionally, testing

concluded that the live round from the scene was cycled through the same handgun.

Moreover, a DNA profile obtained from the handgun was consistent with the sample

DNA profile submitted by the defendant, and the defendant could not be excluded as

a contributor.

       Detective Jeremy Sanchez testified that he obtained search warrants for the

defendant' s cellphone records and Instagram account. A photo obtained from the

defendant' s Instagram account posted a few days prior to the shooting showed the

defendant in pink running shorts and a black t -shirt, the same outfit worn prior to the

shooting.'   The photo also showed the defendant with a black handgun resting on his

leg that closely resembled the handgun recovered in this case. Finally,                        the

defendant' s cellphone records indicated that on August 19, 2020, he traveled from

Thibodaux to the Plaquemine area and was in the vicinity of 56630 Corporal Herman

Brown when the shooting occurred. The cellphone records then show the defendant

2 The caption of the photo includes the phrase " If I Can' t Catchu Slippen ( sic) ... Take Someone
You Close To + Ian (sic) Sparing Hoes Cuz (sic) Y' al l B******   Do The Most Too".

                                                 7
traveling through Ascension Parish along I- 10 in the same area where the 9 mm gun

was later recovered.

       On appeal, the defendant argues that his conviction was based on the

unreliable testimony of Meads, Owens, and Brooks, each of whom was indicted as an

accessory after the fact in this case. However, the verdicts rendered in this case

indicate that the jury found these witnesses credible and rejected the defendant' s

hypothesis of innocence. We cannot say that they were unreasonable in doing so.

       In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with the

physical   evidence,    one witness' s testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is

sufficient to support a factual conclusion. Further,                 where there is conflicting

testimony    about     factual    matters,   the       resolution   of   which      depends   upon   a

determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the

evidence, not its sufficiency. State v. Alexander, 14- 1619 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 18/ 15),

182 So. 3d     126,     131,     writ denied,   15- 1912 ( La.       1/ 25/ 16),   185   So. 3d   748.

Accordingly, on appeal, this court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or

reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder' s determination of guilt. State v. Law,

13- 1025 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 3/ 11/ 14), 142 So. 3d 1000, 1006, writ denied, 14- 0644

La. 10/ 31/ 14), 152 So. 3d 150.

       The State presented overwhelming evidence of the crimes committed herein,

as well as the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator. Deandre Brown, the victim of

the attempted second degree murder, knew the defendant for years and was able to

immediately identify him as the gunman, including the clothing he had on. Brown

testified that the defendant fired one shot into the vehicle in which he and Knight

were sitting. Specific intent to kill may be inferred from a defendant' s act of pointing

a gun and firing at a person. State v. Henderson, 99- 1945 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 6/23/ 00),

762 So. 2d 7479 751,           writ denied, 00- 2223 ( La. 6/ 15/ 01),             793 So. 2d 1235.

                                                   8
Accordingly, Brown' s testimony alone would have been sufficient to establish the

elements of attempted second degree murder.

       Meads corroborated Brown' s testimony regarding the defendant' s clothing, as

well as his location in Bayou Goula on the night of August 19, 2020, the fact that he

was carrying a gun, his behavior before and after the shooting occurred, and that he

later threw the gun out of the vehicle window onto the highway median where it was

recovered. Meads, while having been indicted on accessory after the fact, testified

that she was not promised leniency by the State for her testimony. Moreover, her

testimony did not stand alone but rather was corroborated by the defendant' s phone

records and Instagram posts, as well as DNA and ballistics evidence.

       The defendant' s cellphone records showed him in the area where the shooting

took place at the time the shooting occurred. His phone records then showed the

defendant traveling back to Thibodaux along the interstate, including the area in

which his gun was recovered. The defendant' s Instagram photo showed him holding

a gun and wearing the same clothing later recovered in this case. Furthermore, the

caption to the Instagram post could reasonably have been interpreted by the jury as a

threat made towards Knight, Brown' s            girlfriend.   Finally, the State submitted

uncontroverted evidence that the defendant' s DNA was found on the recovered gun,

and also ballistics evidence that the casings recovered from the scene were from the

same gun.

       An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and

credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on

the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally

rejected by, the jury. See State v. Calloway, 07- 2306 ( La. 1/ 21/ 09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418

per curiam).   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we

find that a rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved beyond a

reasonable doubt all of the elements of second degree murder and attempted second

                                            E
degree murder, and the defendant' s identity as the perpetrator of those offenses. This

assignment of error is without merit.

                        RIGHT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY

           In his first and second pro se assignments of error, the defendant contends

that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury when a juror

informed the trial court that she could not continue deliberating and refused to be

sequestered, after which the trial court gave the jury an improper Allen3 charge.

           While   we   note     that   the   defendant     in    this   case     failed   to   make    a

contemporaneous objection to the jury charge, if an alleged error is so significant

that it violates a fundamental right, then to preserve the requirements of due

process,      the error is reviewable on appeal                even absent a contemporaneous

objection.     State v. Thompkins, 18- 1032 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2/ 27/ 19), 273 So. 3d

346, 350 n.4, writ denied,              19- 00666 ( La. 9/ 17/ 19),      278 So. 3d 973. As the

Louisiana Supreme Court has noted, La. C. Cr.P. art. 808 contemplates additional

instructions once jury deliberations have begun with only two major limitations.

These are that the judge may not comment on the facts nor may the judge attempt

to coerce the jurors into agreeing on the verdict. State v. Schamburge, 344 So. 2d

997, 1001 ( La. 1977).         Louisiana courts have previously made exceptions to the

contemporaneous objection rule with respect to a jury charge.                              See State v.

Williamson, 389 So. 2d 1328, 1331 ( La. 1980) ( erroneous instructions with respect

to   the    elements    of the    offense,    which     were     not   objected    to,   were   of   such

importance and significance as to violate fundamental requirements of due

process);     State v. Green, 493 So. 2d 588, 590 ( La. 1986) ( failure of trial court to

give a limiting instruction in a recidivist statute prosecution, while not objected to,

reached the level of due process considerations); cf State v. Caston, 561 So. 2d

941, 943 ( La.      App. 2d Cir. 1990) ( Allen charge was not coercive in its total

3 Allen v. U. S., 164 U. S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 ( 1896).

                                                   10
context,   so failure to lodge a contemporaneous objection precluded appellate

consideration).     Finding that the error alleged herein speaks directly to the

requirements of due process and the alleged violation of a fundamental right, we

find these errors reviewable absent a contemporaneous objection. See State v.

Williams, 17- 0585 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 11/ 16/ 17), 236 So. 3d 604, 607.

         In the instant case, after the State and defense delivered closing arguments

and the trial court instructed the jury, the court then released the sole alternate

juror,   and at 7: 22 p. m. the jury retired to deliberate. At 8: 08 p.m., the jury

submitted its first question, which in part asked for clarification regarding hung

juries. The trial court answered by stating: " A hung jury, in Louisiana, it requires a

unanimous verdict. So all 12 of you would have to vote either guilty or not guilty.

If there' s a hung jury, that means that we have to come back to try this case again

before another jury."

         The following exchange then took place between the jury foreperson and the

trial court:

FOREPERSON:                    I think that we had some very technical questions
                               regarding definitions of things, like when we asked:
                               What is a hung jury? Does that mean we have decided
                               not to agree? How many people have to disagree? How

                               long does it have to take for us to disagree? That was one
                               component of. What is a hung jury.

                               The second component of that question was: Then what
                               were the implications regarding, I guess, the defendant
                               and his custody? Where — what happens to him? What
                               does he get to do if that is a decision made by the jury?'

COURT:                         Okay. And, again, in order to reach a verdict in this case,
                               all 12 of you have to agree. So it has to be all 12 of you
                               would have to agree either to the original charge, to one
                               of the responsive verdicts to the original charge, or not

                               guilty. It takes all 12 votes.

                               And if you don' t or cannot agree to a unanimous verdict,
                               then we' ll have to try this case again, and we' ll have to

4 In response to this question, the trial court instructed the jury that their decision would not have
any impact or effect on the defendant' s status, so their decision needed to be made independent
of that consideration.
                               bring in a whole other jury in order to do that. You all
                               would be discharged from further jury service on this
                               particular case.

                               How long does it take you to make that decision? I know
                               you hadn' t been back there that long yet. I don' t want to
                               put you all in a position where you feel like you have to
                               stay there all night in order to do that because you don' t.
                               I don' t know if it would help if maybe you all got to go
                               home this evening and then come back in the morning to
                               try and do your deliberations. But I would say, you know,
                               to a point where you' ve discussed the case among
                               yourselves and then, after discussing the case, each juror
                               being able to express their opinion and reasons why they
                               have that opinion, if after that, the majority can' t change
                               the minorities' opinion or decision, then I would say you
                               al l have a hung jury and you can just report that back to
                               the court.

FOREPERSON:                    Your honor, would it be without reason for us to have a
                               conversation,    if we wish, to go home and cool off or
                               continue to discuss privately as opposed to in front —

       The trial court then asked counsel to approach, where it was discussed that

once deliberations began, the jury would have to be sequestered until they reached

a decision.' The following exchange then took place:

COURT:                         I' m being told now we' ll do some research to find out —I
                               guess because you' re at this point now, if you all wanted
                                 if you can' t reach a verdict tonight, it may be necessary
                               for us to house you until tomorrow in order for you to
                               make a decision, but we' re checking on that right now to
                               make certain that is correct.

JUROR NO. 57:                  Excuse me. I can' t be housed. I have a special needs
                               child. And I do know —we' ve been here nearly 12 hours
                               now, and —     I' m sorry. I' ve got my husband keeping her.
                               She' s severely autistic.

                               And I' m — I' m sure a lot of you already know — and I
                               can' t be put in a hotel tonight. I' ve got to get home to my
                               child. I mean, I' m sorry. But that is — you know, my

                               husband' s keeping her right now but, you know, I can' t —
                               she' s on medication twice a day. She' s severely autistic.
                               She has plenty behavioral issues, and I' m pushing it
                               staying this late.

5 In 2022, at the time of the defendant' s trial, La. C. Cr.P. art. 791( C) stated that in noncapital
cases, the jury shall be sequestered after the court' s charge and may be sequestered at any time
upon order of the court. This article was subsequently amended in 2023 to allow a trial court to
suspend deliberations and separate the jury without sequestration. See La. C. Cr.P. art. 791( C)( 3)
as amended by Acts 2023, No. 75, § 1).
                                                  12
                          When we took it over, y' all had said " till 5: 00." And I' m
                          okay with 5: 00, even okay with going home right now,
                          but I can' t stay much longer. I' m sorry. My brain really
                          can' t take anymore of this. I really can' t. I' m sorry.
                          That' s just —that' s how I feel.

      Thereafter, at 8: 27 p.m., the jury resumed deliberations. A few hours later,

the jury sent another question asking whether a juror could be released once the

jury had her vote. While the parties discussed the appropriate response, the State

offered the following:

STATE:                    Judge, we agree to ask — that she be instructed that the
                          people deserve a verdict —we' ll talk to all of them, bring
                          them in — and that you' re to not do any damage to your
                          conscience but to deliberate this case, and that' s it. And
                          then, after that, if they don' t want to do that, then we' ll
                          hold up and see what we' re going to do, but I just want to
                          Allen charge them one time.

COURT:                    Okay. Well, I' ll recharge them with the same verdicts as
                          before.

STATE:                    Thank you.

COURT:                    Because I looked at the case law. The Allen charge is
                          banned.

STATE:                    Not good.

COURT:                    It' s banned.

The court then instructed the jury as follows:

COURT:                    Ladies and gentlemen, I basically wanted to reiterate to
                          you what your duty is as jurors in this case. And I do
                          believe that at the time ...   even though I advised that the
                          normal hours of court would be 9: 00 to 5: 00, I also stated
                          that once the case was given to the jury, that we would
                          remain here until a verdict was rendered. So I know that
                          it' s late. I know that y' all have been here for some time,
                          but I think you need to recognize the importance of this
                          matter, not only to the State as well as the defendant, but
                          also to this community and the parish of Iberville to do
                          your job.

                          And, again, you' re not advocates for either side. Your

                          duty is to listen to the evidence and, as best you can[,] to
                          try and reach a verdict after discussing the case among
                          yourselves with each other, and if you' re convinced that

                                          13
                            your decision may not be correct after listening to your
                            other jurors, don' t hesitate to change your opinion; but if
                            you' re convinced that you' re right, then maintain that

                            opinion. And if you can' t reach a verdict, it' s perfectly
                            fine if you come back and tell me, " We can' t reach a
                            verdict,"   but we need to stay here until we know one way
                            or another, either that you have a verdict or you don' t
                            have a verdict. So I can' t let anyone leave. This has to be
                            done by all 12 jurors. Until you all can reach a decision
                            or you decide you can' t reach a decision, you have to
                            continue to hopefully try and reach some type of decision
                            in this case. So we' ll excuse you all again and just let us
                            know when you' re ready.

         At 10: 47 p.m. the jury again went back to continue deliberations. At 11: 25

p. m.,   the jury returned with a unanimous verdict of guilty as charged on both

counts. On appeal, the defendant contends that he was deprived of the right to a

fair and impartial jury when Juror No. 57 refused to be sequestered after the jury

was deadlocked, and the trial court gave the jury an improper Allen charge in order

to force a verdict.

         An Allen charge is an instruction acknowledged to be calculated to dynamite

jury deadlocks and achieve jury unanimity. State v. Mitchell, 17- 0431 ( La. App.

1st Cir. 9/ 21/ 17), 232 So. 3d 60, 67, writ denied, 17- 1928 ( La. 6/ 15/ 18), 257 So. 3d

686. Such a charge, and any coercive modification thereof, is banned in the courts

of Louisiana. An Allen charge emphasizes that the jury has a duty to decide the

matter at hand, which implies that the trial judge will not accept a mistrial in that

case. Additionally, when the duty to reach a verdict is coupled with the trial court' s

admonition that those in the minority shall reconsider their position, there exists an

almost overwhelming pressure to conform to the majority' s view. Id. Therefore, if

a trial judge gives an Allen charge, or any " coercive modification" of same, the

trial court will have committed reversible error. See State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d

639, 641 ( La. 1975);   State v. Lavigne, 22- 282 ( La. App. 5th Cir. 5/ 24/ 23), 365 So.

3d 919, 951.

                                             14
        Duty to Reach a Verdict

        In Nicholson, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the trial court' s use of

a modified Allen charge mandated reversal of the defendant' s conviction and

sentence. There, the court focused on the fact that the trial court' s Allen charge

 unmistakably indicat[ ed] to the lay jury that if the case were to end in a mistrial it

would definitely have to be tried again." The court found that these instructions

were misleading, in that they conveyed to the deadlocked jury the impression that

their inability to reach a verdict would absolutely ensure the expenditure of time

and money necessitated by a complete retrial. Accordingly, the court found that the

implications of the misleading charge presented a substantial risk that a juror or

jurors possessed of a genuine conviction that reasonable doubt existed would be

coerced into agreement with a majority voting to render a guilty verdict.

Nicholson, 315 So. 2d at 641- 42.

        We    find the     same    concerns     noted    in Nicholson       present, and       indeed

amplified, in the Allen charge used in the case herein. Where Nicholson noted the

potentially misleading instruction that a mistrial could require the case to be tried

again, the instruction given in the instant case stated unequivocally that a hung jury

would require a second trial.'       As the court explained in Nicholson, this instruction

ignores plausible alternative outcomes including that the defendant could be

offered a plea deal, or that the State could conclude that it does not have evidence

sufficient to justify another trial, and decide to dismiss the charges altogether. Id. at

642.   This misleading instruction is particularly troubling in light of the jury' s

question regarding the defendant' s status should the jury remain deadlocked. The

6 The trial court stated, at various points: " If there' s a hung jury, that means that we have to come
back to try this case again before another jury"; and "[ I] f you don' t or cannot agree to a
unanimous verdict, then we' ll have to try this case again, and we' ll have to bring in a whole
other jury in order to do that."

                                                  15
jury was clearly concerned with what would happen next, and the trial court' s

instruction failed to account for any possibility other than a full re -trial.

        Furthermore, while the trial court did state that it could accept a mistrial, the

trial court also repeatedly advised the jury of the importance of unanimity, even at

one point implying that a unanimous agreement was required to reach a hung jury.'

Moreover, the jury did inform the trial court at various points over the course of

four hours that it did not have a unanimous vote, and the trial court nevertheless

instructed the jury to continue deliberations. Accordingly, while the instruction

given stated a mistrial was an acceptable result, the reality is that the trial court did

not accept that the jury could not reach a unanimous decision.

        Finally, before the jury was ordered to continue deliberations for the final

time,   the trial court instructed the jury that they needed to " recognize                  the

importance of this matter, not only to the State as well as the defendant, but also to

this community and to the parish of Iberville to do your job." Implicit in this

instruction is that remaining deadlocked, and thus failing to deliver a unanimous

verdict, was a dereliction of the jury' s sworn duty. A charge which emphasizes the

jury' s duty to reach a verdict, thus implying that the trial judge would not accept a

mistrial, is the very type of charge that the Louisiana Supreme Court has banned.

See Nicholson, 315 So. 2d at 642 ("[         T] he general principles which govern jury

deliberations are undermined and weakened when an ` Allen charge' is given in

response to notice that the jury has failed to reach a verdict and considers itself

deadlocked. Each time a general principle applicable to deliberations is stated, it is

modified by a remark apparently calculated to render the desirability of reaching a

verdict foremost in the jurors' minds.").

  A hung jury, in Louisiana, it requires a unanimous verdict. So all 12 of you would have to vote
either guilty or not guilty."

                                               16
       Coercion to Conform to Majority Viewpoint

       The court in Nicholson also noted the trial court, in the course of giving its

instruction, admonished the jurors that if a majority favor conviction, the minority

should consider whether their doubts are reasonable, and if a majority or a lesser

number favor acquittal, the other jurors should ask themselves whether they do not

have a reason to doubt the correctness of a judgment not concurred in by their

fellow jurors. Id. The court found that such an effort to secure a verdict could

coerce a single juror into surrendering his conscientiously held views, thus

invading the province of the jury. Id.

        Herein, the trial court instructed the jury that if "the majority can' t change

the   minorities'   opinion or decision,"   then you all have a hung jury. This is

precisely what was warned of in Nicholson, in that the trial court instructed the

jurors in the majority to attempt to change the vote held by the minority, and

unduly pressured the juror or jurors in the minority to conform to the majority

viewpoint.

        The coercive effect of the trial court' s instructions was further compounded

by one juror' s obvious distress over the trial court' s announcement that the jury

would be sequestered if it could not reach a verdict. Juror No. 57           was clearly

distraught, explaining to the court that she had a special needs child who was

severely autistic, and that she had to go home and could not be sequestered. Juror

No. 57 went on to state: " I can' t stay much longer. I' m sorry. My brain can' t really

take any more of this. I really can' t. I' m sorry." The jury subsequently submitted a

question as to whether one juror, presumably Juror No. 57, could be excused once

they had her vote. This question further evidenced both the jury' s inability to reach

a verdict and at least one juror' s duress during the ongoing deliberation process. In

response to the jury' s final question, the trial court stated that " we need to stay here

until we know one way or another, either you have a verdict or you don' t have a

                                            17
verdict. So I can' t let anyone leave. This has to be done by all 12 jurors." The clear

implication of this    instruction was that deliberation would continue        until   a

unanimous decision was made.

       Setting the issue of the jury charge itself aside for a moment, we note that

the given charge did not occur in isolation and should be considered within the

entire context of the record. The record in this case shows that the totality of events

that occurred during the jury' s deliberation created an unnecessarily coercive

deliberative process. Initially, we note that only one alternate juror was selected

during voir dire. After twelve jurors and one alternate were selected, the State

asked the trial court whether it would like to voir dire another panel to select an

additional alternate juror, to which the trial court replied, " No. We' ve had these

people here long enough." Thereafter, once the jury was instructed but before it

was retired to deliberate, the trial court excused the sole alternate juror.

      The trial court could just as easily have kept the alternate juror sequestered

during the course of deliberations in the event that a juror became unfit to serve

before a decision was rendered. Incidentally, this is precisely what did happen with

respect to Juror No. 57, who was openly distraught by both the suggestion that

deliberations would have to continue, and that the failure to reach a unanimous

decision would result in overnight sequestration. The jury' s subsequent question as

to whether a juror could leave once his or her vote was cast suggests that the

urgency to reach a unanimous verdict and the distress communicated to the trial

court carried into the jury room and thus tainted the deliberative process.

      Given that jury deliberations in this case did not begin until after 7: 00 p.m.,

the trial court could have recessed the case after closing arguments and began the

jury instruction and deliberation process the following morning. The trial court

went forward with deliberation. This circumstance           manufactured a sense of

                                           18
urgency upon a jury that repeatedly expressed its desire to go home and was

repeatedly told that no one could leave until they reached a verdict.

        Given the totality of the circumstances, including the jury' s repeated

requests for clarification on the definition of a hung jury, Juror No. 57' s refusal to

be sequestered and clear distress over the continued deliberations, the foreperson' s

request to be excused for the night to " cool off," the trial court' s instruction that a

hung jury would necessarily require a second trial, its perplexing instruction that

all twelve jurors must agree to a hung jury, its recommendation that the majority

attempt to change the opinions of the minority, its instruction that the jury had the

duty to reach a verdict, and the trial court' s decision to select only one alternate

juror and to release that juror prior to deliberations, we find that the Allen charge

used in this case was improper.

        While the trial court indicated that a mistrial was possible if the jury could

not reach a verdict, the jury expressed its inability to reach a unanimous verdict

multiple times and was repeatedly instructed to continue deliberating. The clear

implication of this course of action was that the jury would be forced to continue

deliberating until a unanimous verdict was achieved.           Given Juror No.      57' s

objections both to continuing to deliberate and to being sequestered, as well as the

Foreperson' s request for time for the jurors to " cool off," we cannot say that the

juror or jurors in the minority were not pressured to conform to the majority' s

view.   Thus, although the language of the supplemental instructions was not

expressly coercive, the language clearly had a coercive effect and was therefore

reversible error. See Nicholson, 315 So. 2d at 642.

                            MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

        In this counseled assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial

court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after a witness offered prejudicial

                                           19
hearsay testimony. Finding error in the trial court' s Allen instruction,   further

discussion of this assignment of error is pretermitted.

      CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES REVERSED; REMANDED FOR
NEW TRIAL.

                                         20
STATE OF LOUISIANA                                           FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                             COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS
                                                             STATE OF LOUISIANA

DIONTE BRACKEN                                               NO. 2023 KA 4782

CHUTZ, J., dissenting.

       Although I agree with the majority' s conclusion that the evidence was

sufficient to support the defendant' s convictions,             I disagree with the majority' s

conclusion that the trial court committed reversible error in giving a prohibited Allen'

charge.
           While the trial court' s jury charges may have been imperfect, I do not

believe the charges rose to the level of a prohibited Allen charge.                In my opinion, the

trial court did not indicate to the jury either by its words or actions that it would not

accept a hung jury. In answering the jury' s question about the definition of a hung

jury, the court advised the jury it did not want the jurors to feel they had to stay there

all night, so if, after discussing the case and expressing their opinions, they could not

reach a verdict, they could " just report that back to the court."                 Subsequently, the

court again advised the jury it was " perfectly fine, if you come back and tell me, ` We

can' t reach   a verdict."'     This remark followed immediately after the trial court

instructed the jury that they should discuss the case among themselves and if after

listening to the others, they were convinced their opinion was incorrect, they should

not hesitate to change it, but if convinced they were correct, they should maintain

their opinion.   Considering the jury charges in their totality, I do not believe the effect

of   the   charges   was    coercive    to jurors     holding    a      minority   viewpoint   or   so

fundamentally unfair as to deprive the defendant of due process.                      Accordingly, I

respectfully dissent from the reversal of the defendant' s convictions and sentences.

 Allen Y. U.S., 164 U. S. 492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed.2d 528 ( 1896).