Court Opinion

ID: 9896211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 19:09:23.027618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:29.286075
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hines v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4066.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

BRENDA J. HINES,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                  :
                                                                              No. 112638
                 v.                                    :

DIRECTOR OF THE OHIO DEPT.                             :
OF JOB & FAMILY SERVICES,

                 Defendant-Appellee.                   :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 9, 2023

     Administrative Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CV-23-974836

                                            Appearances:

                 Voudris Law LLC and Stephan I. Voudris, for appellant.

                 Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Brian P. Murphy,
                 Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:

                   Plaintiff-appellant, Brenda J. Hines, appeals the trial court’s decision

affirming the decisions of the appellee, the Ohio Department of Job and Family

Services (“ODJFS”) and the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission
(“the Commission”) denying Hines’s application for unemployment benefits. For

the reasons that follow, this court affirms.

I.   Procedural Background

               From March 2021 until September 2022, Hines was employed by

Oxford Government Consulting L.L.C. (“Oxford”). As an Oxford employee, Hines

performed clerical or administrative support work. Initially, she primarily worked

remotely or from home under a teleworking policy. However, in May 2022, she

returned to an in-office setting. It was at that time that she learned that she suffered

from a medical condition. On September 20, 2022, Hines saw her medical physician

for her condition. As a result, her physician issued a letter to her then-employer that

“due to her recent diagnosis [Hines] would need to work from home until her work

up is complete.” Hines claimed that she submitted the letter to Oxford along with

her request for an accommodation. (Record p. 31.) She worked from home the

following day, but on September 22, 2022, Oxford terminated Hines’s employment

“for being absent or tardy.”

               Hines subsequently filed for unemployment compensation benefits.

In her application, she indicated that she “restricted the type of work” that she was

seeking because she had a “doctor’s order [that she] must work from home due to

[a] medical condition.” On October 14, 2022, ODJFS determined that Oxford

discharged Hines without just cause, but found that “beginning 09/18/2022, the

claimant has restricted the work he/she will accept. In doing so, the claimant
reduced the opportunity to obtain employment in his/her customary occupation

and, as a result, failed to meet the availability requirement of [R.C.] 4141.29(A)(4).”

               Hines requested a redetermination of ODJFS’s denial of benefits. On

November 3, 2022, ODJFS affirmed its denial of benefits. Hines appealed this

decision, and ODJFS transferred the matter to the Commission.

               On November 18, 2022, the Commission conducted a telephonic

hearing at which Hines provided sworn testimony. At the hearing, Hines explained

that she suffered from a temporary medical condition that would require surgery.

She told the hearing officer:

      So this condition is, it’s just a temporary condition, but, um, I had the
      condition and I, you know, been working with the condition. Um, I
      made the mistake and checked the restriction box. You know, I’m not
      really restricted. I, ah, every job that I fill out for, um, it is for, for a
      remote position and I was working remote before I even found out that
      I had, ah, this condition. So, I’m very capable of working.

(November 18, 2022 hearing transcript; record p. 82.)

               The hearing officer clarified with Hines that her condition did not

prevent her from physically being able to work, but that she was “just not able to go

into a formal office setting at this time.” Id. Hines responded:

      Right. That’s just the only thing. I’m very capable of working. Like I
      said, I didn’t even know for a while. And we thought it was something
      totally different, something minor. And so it’s like I was working in the
      office and then I was blessed enough to get some positions where I
      could work from home. And I guess as time went on, um, my condition
      got worse.

Id. at p. 83. Hines further explained that she had not yet scheduled her surgery

because she would need to undergo three procedures beforehand.
                Regarding availability of work, Hines stated that nothing would

interfere with her ability to work full time because she was able to schedule certain

procedures on the weekends. She further denied that her condition or “flare-ups”

would render her physically incapacitated for the day — “when it happens, it’s just a

quick fix. Okay? It’s nothing that requires like, it keeps me down for a day. It’s just,

it’s just a quick fix.” Id. at record p. 85.

                Finally, Hines expressed that her condition is not a restriction and

that she made a mistake in marking “restricted” on her unemployment

compensation application.

       I am very capable of working. Um, my work for the last four or five
       years has been nothing but office work and it is work that can be done
       from home. As you see, I have been working from home. And, um, it
       was my mistake when I put “restricted.” * * * I’m just, you know,
       temporarily out of commission as far as being able to go into a physical
       facility with the proper bathroom facility for me. But, like I said, that
       is just something temporary. I’m working on it. Um, I have been
       working with this condition. And hoping to get gainfully employed, you
       know, soon, even though I still have this condition. They’ll be able to,
       you know, correct it and go back to being a person that can go into a,
       you know, a physical facility. But, um, I am able to work. I’m not
       restricted as far as that goes.

Id. at p. 86.

                On December 3, 2022, the Commission affirmed ODJFS’s decision.

It determined that Hines’s medical condition and restriction rendered her ineligible

for benefits for the period beginning September 18, 2022, because she was not

available for suitable work as required by R.C. 4141.29(A)(4).          Following this

determination, Hines retained counsel who requested a review of the Commission’s
decision pursuant to R.C. 4141.281(C)(3). On January 11, 2023, the Commission

disallowed counsel’s request for review. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

              R.C. 4141.282(H) sets forth the appropriate standard of review: “[i]f

the court finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful, unreasonable, or

against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the

decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm

the decision of the commission.” See also Geretz v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

Servs., 114 Ohio St.3d 89, 2007-Ohio-2941, 868 N.E.2d 669, ¶ 10, quoting Tzangas,

Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 697, 653 N.E.2d

1207 (1995). This standard of review applies to “‘all reviewing courts, from the first

level of review in the common pleas court, through the final appeal in’ the Supreme

Court of Ohio.” Boynton v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 21AP-481, 2022-Ohio-2597, ¶ 8, quoting Tzangas at 696.

              Our focus, therefore, is on the Commission’s determination rather

than the common pleas court’s decision. Boynton at ¶ 8, citing Houser v. Dir., Ohio

Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-116, 2011-Ohio-1593,

¶ 7, citing Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1260, 2008-Ohio-

1958, ¶ 12. Accordingly, this court may reverse the Commission’s decision only if it

is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Irvine v.

State, Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985), citing

Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach, 148 Ohio St. 511, 518, 76 N.E.2d 79 (1947).
               When reviewing a decision from the Commission, this court must

refrain from making factual findings or weighing the credibility of witnesses and

must instead determine whether the evidence in the certified record supports the

Commission’s decision. Tzangas at 696, citing Irvine at 18. If such evidence is

found, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Wilson

v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 14 Ohio App.3d 309, 310, 471 N.E.2d 168 (8th

Dist.1984). “The fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not

a basis for the reversal of the [Commission’s] decision.” Irvine at 18, citing Craig v.

Bur. of Unemp. Comp., 83 Ohio App. 247, 260, 83 N.E.2d 628 (1st Dist.1948).

III. The Appeal

               Hines contends in her sole assignment of error that the Commission’s

decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Under this assignment of error, she raises two issues. First, she contends that the

decision was unlawful or unreasonable because the Commission disallowed her

unemployment benefits without considering the “suitability” factors found in R.C.

4141.29(F), which include “the degree of risk to the claimant’s health and safety” and

the claimant’s “physical fitness for work.” Accordingly, she maintains that the

Commission improperly assumed that anyone seeking only work-from-home jobs is

not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Second, Hines contends that

the Commission’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence because

the entirety of the evidence demonstrated that work-from-home jobs were the only

suitable work for Hines. These issues will be addressed together.
IV. R.C. 4141.29(A)(4) — “available for suitable work”

                R.C. 4141.29 governs an individual’s eligibility and qualifications for

unemployment benefits due to involuntary employment. Relevant to the appeal, no

individual is entitled to benefits for any week unless the individual “[i]s able to work

and available for suitable work.” R.C. 4141.29(A)(4)(a)(i).

                “One can be able to work but unavailable.” Chesapeake v. Ellis, 4th

Dist. Lawrence No. 93 CA 3, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5684, 7 (Nov. 24, 1993). By

definition, the phrase “able to work” means “physical capability to work,” while

“available for work” means “readiness to work.” Hinkle v. Lennox Furnace Co., 84

Ohio App. 478, 486-487, 83 N.E.2d 903 (3d Dist.1948). “To be available for work

within the meaning of the statute, one must be ready, willing, and waiting to accept

suitable employment, and must be exposed to the labor market.” Ellis at 7, citing

Yobe v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 68 Ohio Law. Abs. 260, 122 N.E.2d 202 (C.P.1954).

“Availability” depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Rieth v. Ohio

Bur. of Emp. Serv., 43 Ohio App.3d 150, 152, 539 N.E.2d 1146 (8th Dist.1988);

Johnson v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 73591, 1998 Ohio App.

LEXIS 2177, 12 (May 14, 1998).

                In this case, the Commission made the following relevant findings of

fact:

        [Hines] has been diagnosed with rectal prolapse. As a result, she is
        unable to work in a traditional office setting[,] which led to her
        separation. Her medical provider has restricted her to work from home
        only until she has surgery to correct the issue. As of the November 18,
        2022 hearing, claimant is still under the restriction that she works only
        from home.
Based on those findings of fact, the Commission reasoned that Hines was “not

available for work as required by [R.C.] 4141.29(A)(4)” because

      [Hines’s] restriction that she only works from home due to her medical
      condition is too prohibitive and an undue barrier which prevents her
      from working in all forms of suitable employment. That barrier has not
      been lifted as [Hines] is still under the restriction that she works from
      home until she has surgery. Under the circumstances, this Hearing
      Officer finds [Hines] is not available for work and is ineligible for
      benefits [for] the period beginning September 18, 2022. [Hines]
      remains ineligible for benefits until she can show she is available for
      work without restriction and otherwise eligible for benefits.

              The issue before this court is whether there is competent, credible

evidence in the record that would support the Commission’s decision that Hines was

not “available for suitable work,” and thus, ineligible for unemployment benefits.

              Hines first contends that the Commission’s decision is unlawful and

unreasonable because it did not consider the factors listed in R.C. 4141.29(F) in

determining whether work-from-home positions were the only suitable work for her

based on her medical condition.          Consequently, Hines contends that the

Commission established a blanket rule that a claimant who only seeks remote work

is ineligible for unemployment benefits. We disagree.

              R.C. 4141.29(F) provides in pertinent part:

      [I]n determining whether any work is suitable for a claimant in the
      administration of this chapter, the director * * * shall consider the
      degree of risk to the claimant’s health, safety, and morals, the
      individual’s physical fitness for the work, the individual’s prior training
      and experience, the length of the individual’s unemployment, the
      distance of the available work from the individual’s residence, and the
      individual’s prospects for obtaining local work.
                Based on our reading of the statute, the section only requires the

Commission to consider these factors in deciding whether “work is suitable for the

claimant”; it does not require that the Commission affirmatively identify the factors

or make specific findings regarding these factors.

                We find that the record reveals that the Commission considered these

factors in making its determination. The hearing officer asked Hines about her

medical condition and what limitations it placed on her ability to work. She testified

that her condition did not prevent her from physically being able to work because

she was still able to move and type and perform her duties. (Record at p. 82.) She

also explained that nothing would interfere with her ability to work full time during

normal business hours, nor would her condition render her physically incapacitated

for any specific day or time. Id. at p. 82, 85. In fact, she stated that if her condition

“flared-up,” it was a “quick fix.” Id. at p. 85. Hines also stated that she is “not

restricted” in her capability, but “temporarily unable to go into a physical facility

with the proper bathroom facility” for her — “I am able to work. I’m not restricted

as far as that goes.” Id at p. 86. Accordingly, although the hearing officer did not

expressly discuss any specific factors identified in R.C. 4141.29(F) in its decision, the

record supports that those factors were considered.1

       1This case presents somewhat of an anomaly because the case law addressing
whether someone is available for suitable employment typically involves a claimant or
employee who refused to accept certain job duties or employment. In those cases, courts
applied the R.C. 4141.29(F) suitability factors. See, e.g., Blake v. Admr. of the Unemp. Rev.
Comm., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27958, 2017-Ohio-166 (Commission found work unsuitable
when claimant was physically unable to lift weight required for the position); Tary v. Bd.
               Hines contends that this court should find that remote or work-from-

home positions were suitable work based on her medical condition and restriction.

In support, she relies on Johnson v. Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 110 Ohio Misc.2d

18, 742 N.E.2d 1231 (C.P.2000), wherein the Medina County Common Pleas Court

determined that the Commission failed to consider all of the factors contained in

R.C. 4141.29(F) when it determined that the claimant’s work-hour restriction

rendered him “unavailable to for suitable work.”

               In Johnson, the claimant, who worked in the factory and trucking

business for his entire career, had been diagnosed with obstructive sleep apnea.

According to Johnson’s physician, Johnson needed to “avoid night and evening shift

work.” When his employer required Johnson to work second-shift and subsequently

could not accommodate Johnson based on his medical condition, Johnson was

terminated. The Commission determined that Johnson was wrongfully terminated,

but that Johnson’s medical condition rendered him “unavailable for work as

required by law.” Id. at 22. The common pleas court reversed the Commission’s

“unavailability” determination, finding that in addition to the Commission’s

misstatement of the law, the Commission selectively applied the suitability factors

in R.C. 4141.29(F). As a result, the court held that Johnson was “available for

of Rev., 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954) (Commission found refusal justified based
on “morals” factor when person refused employment that required him to work on the
Sabbath); Clement v. Clow Water Sys. Co., 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 91-CA-22, 1991 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6344 (Dec. 27, 1991) (unemployment benefits allowed when employee refused
work from employer because employee was physically restricted from working in high-
degree temperatures and the employer could not offer an accommodation.).
suitable work,” and thus, entitled to unemployment compensation benefits despite

his medical condition that limited his hours in which he was available for work. Id.

at 26.

                 Although the facts and circumstances of Hines’s case are similar to

those in Johnson, we do not find the reasoning in Johnson persuasive because in

that decision, we believe that the trial court did not apply the correct standard of

review.2 In Johnson, the trial court took issue with the Commission’s misstatement

of the law and found that the Commission selectively applied the R.C. 4141.29(F)

suitability factors. The trial court then considered all the suitability factors, applied

them to the evidence in the record, and made its own findings and conclusions. This

conduct by the court was contrary to a reviewing court’s standard of review set forth

in R.C. 4141.282(H). As a reviewing court, the trial court in Johnson was required

to determine whether the record contained competent, credible evidence supporting

the Commission’s determination. Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 18, 482 N.E.2d 587. Even

if the trial court could reach a different conclusion based on the evidence, that fact

could not serve as a basis to reverse the Commission. Id. Accordingly, we decline

to follow Johnson.

                 For the same reasons we find Johnson inapposite, we cannot grant

Hines’s request and apply the suitability factors under R.C. 4141.29(F) to the facts

and circumstances of Hines’s case to find that remote or work-from-home positions

         2 We note that Johnson has not been cited by any court.
was suitable work. To do so would require this court to make factual findings, which

is beyond our scope of review under the law. Tzangas, 73 Ohio St.3d at 696, 653

N.E.2d 1207, citing Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 18, 482 N.E.2d 587. For the reasons

previously discussed, the record supports our conclusion that the Commission

considered the factors found in R.C. 4141.29(F) in concluding that Hines’s

restriction rendered her unavailable for suitable work. Accordingly, we find that the

Commission’s decision is not unlawful or unreasonable.

               We also find that the Commission’s decision is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Hines testified that she had worked from home

doing clerical work for a prior employer in 1999 and then again when she was

employed by Oxford in March 2021. She testified that in May 2022, Oxford required

that she return to an in-office setting. At that time, she discovered that she suffered

from her current medical condition and sought medical treatment. Hines testified

that based on her diagnosis, her physician provided her with a letter stating that she

had to work from home. She subsequently submitted this letter to her then-

employer in conjunction with a request for a work accommodation.

               When asked about the restriction that she noted on her

unemployment application, Hines stated that she made a mistake when filling out

her application to indicate that she had a restriction. She testified, however, that she

had been limiting her search to only remote or work-from-home positions. Hines

supported her job search by relying on her doctor’s note generated for her former

employer. She explained that because she had a “telework policy” in place, and
based on her job duties, her physician told her that, “‘well, you know, it’s nothing

that I can’t do at home because it’s not like I have to, um, use a printer or mail or

scan or something like that.’ I just generate letters.” (Record at p. 82.)

               Hines nevertheless stated that her condition did not prevent her from

physically being able to work because she was still able to move and type and

perform her duties. (Record at p. 82.) She also explained that nothing would

interfere with her ability to work full-time during normal business hours, nor would

her condition render her physically incapacitated for any specific day or time. Id. at

p. 82, 85. In fact, she stated that if her condition “flared-up,” it was a “quick fix.” Id.

at p. 85. Hines stated that she is “not restricted” in her capability but “temporarily

unable to go into a physical facility with the proper bathroom facility” for her — “I

am able to work.” Id.

               Based on the foregoing, we find competent, credible evidence in the

record supporting the Commission’s conclusion that Hines restricted her job

availability to only remote positions that she could perform from home. For

purposes of unemployment compensation benefits, Hines was obligated to be

available for all jobs that might be suitable opportunities, including office jobs that

could accommodate her considering her medical condition.

               The Tenth District recently considered a similar case involving a

teacher who restricted her employment search to only smaller-sized classrooms to

limit her exposure to COVID-19. Yang v. Dir., Ohio Dept. Of Job & Family Servs.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-377, 2022-Ohio-4480. During the hearing before the
Commission, the Yang claimant explained that because her husband suffered from

a medical diagnosis that placed him at a high risk of illness and with the spike and

spread of COVID-19, she looked for a classroom or facility with a smaller group of

children. The claimant explained that at the time of her unemployment application

and job search, neither she nor her husband had received the COVID vaccine

because it was unavailable. The Commission disallowed unemployment benefits,

finding that the claimant restricted her employment search, and thus failed to meet

the availability requirements of R.C. 4141.29(A)(4). The trial court upheld the

Commission’s determination.       The claimant appealed to the Tenth District,

contending that although evidence existed supporting that she restricted her job

search, there was also evidence demonstrating that she did not. The court found

that the record contained competent and credible evidence supporting the

Commission’s finding that the claimant restricted her job search to only smaller

classroom settings, thus rendering her not available for suitable work during the

relevant weeks.

              Hines contends that Yang is distinguishable because there is no

indication that the claimant submitted any medical evidence from her doctor that

she needed to work in smaller classrooms to limit her exposure to COVID. Hines

notes that the Yang Court expressly stated that it did not consider any health or

safety issues regarding the suitability factors because those issues had not been

preserved for appeal. Id. at ¶ 16. According to Hines, she properly raised the health

and safety factors with the Commission when she submitted her doctor’s note to the
Commission that stated that she needed to work from home until her “workup” was

completed.

               We find that the Yang Court’s reasoning is persuasive and not

distinguishable as Hines suggests. Much like in Yang, where the claimant limited

her job search to smaller classrooms due to COVID-19, Hines limited her job search

based on a restriction that she “work from home” due to a temporary medical

condition. Much like the Yang Court concluded, a claimant cannot unilaterally

determine what work is suitable or not suitable, or self-impose limitations or

conditions on suitable work when a claimant conducts her job search.3

               Hines maintains, however, that unlike in Yang, she did not “self-

impose” the restriction that limited her job search, but rather, the restriction was

imposed by her medical condition and physician. She claims that she “followed her

doctor’s orders in applying only to remote jobs.” (Appellant’s brief, at p. 3.) The

evidence and the Commission’s findings do not support this assertion. Hines’s

physician stated in a single-sentence letter that “due to her recent diagnosis she will

      3 Case law in other states has also held that a person cannot self-impose conditions

or limitations on acceptable work and still be “available for suitable work” as the law
provides. See, e.g., Robinson v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd., 202 Md. 515, 97 A.2d 300
(1953) (employee restricted her job search to only part time); Corrado v. Dir. of Div. of
Emp. Sec., 325 Mass. 711, 92 N.E.2d 379 (1950) (employee refused work due to number
of coworkers) Unemp. Comp. Com. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524 (1951)
(employees restricted days to work); Ford Motor Co. v. Unemp. Comp. Comm., 316 Mich.
468, 25 N.W.2d 586 (1947) (employee restricted which shift she would work); Jacobs v.
Office of Unemp. Comp. & Placement, 27 Wash.2d 641, 179 P.2d 707 (1947) (claimant
would only accept day work and not night work); Goings v. Riley, 98 N.H. 93, 95 A.2d 137
(1953) (claimant would work first but not second or third shift); Mills v. South Carolina
Unemp. Comp. Comm., 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535 (1944) (another shift case).
need to work from home until her work up is complete.” (Record at p. 41.) This

letter was generated for Hines to submit in seeking an accommodation from her

then-employer. Also, the Commission found that “[Hines’s] medical provider has

restricted her to work from home only until she has surgery to correct the issue.”

These statements do not support Hines’s belief that she had to apply for only remote

jobs; rather they support that Hines would need an accommodation.

                Hines’s   temporary    medical    condition    that   requires   an

accommodation is separate from her availability for suitable work. Granted, it

seems futile to have a claimant search for all areas of suitable employment and then

seek an accommodation once employment is offered. However, it is possible that

some employers may not advertise the possibility of remote or hybrid employment.

See, e.g., State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2975, ¶ 39

(Brunner, J., dissenting) (“We can certainly take judicial notice that during the

pandemic some workplaces embraced teleworking and that some jobs remain

amenable to that type of work arrangements.” (Emphasis sic.)). Limiting a job

search to only work-from-home employment would exclude those precise

opportunities or employers who offer accommodations to those individuals who

require them.

                Finally, this court further finds that the Commission’s decision did

not create “a blanket rule” that anyone seeking only work-from-home jobs is not

eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Whether someone is available

and seeking suitable work depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Rieth, 43 Ohio App.3d at 152, 539 N.E.2d 1146. Accordingly, there can never be a

bright-line test for when a person is determined to be “available” and what work will

be deemed “suitable.” See, e.g., Caudill v. Bur. of Emp. Servs., 12th Dist. Warren

No. CA84-08-051, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 12155, 7-8 (Dec. 31, 1984) (“This is not to

say that every claimant who merely asserts his or her religious beliefs as a basis for

being unavailable for work will be granted unemployment benefits. The existence

of a spurious relationship between a claimant’s religion and refusal to work will not

justify the award of benefits.”). Accordingly, this court’s decision is limited to the

specific facts, circumstances, and procedural posture of this particular case. This

decision does not foreclosure the possibility that a claimant would be eligible for

unemployment benefits when the claimant seeks and requires only work-from-

home positions when the facts and situation warrant.

V.   Conclusion

              After reviewing the evidence in the record and applying the applicable

law, we find some evidence in the record to support the Commission’s decision that

Hines was not available for suitable work and thus, that the decision was not

unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Again, in

making this determination, we are mindful of our limited appellate review and defer

to the Commission’s determinations as to factfinding and witness credibility. “The

fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the

reversal of the [Commission’s] decision.” Irvine, 19 Ohio St.3d at 18, 482 N.E.2d

587, citing Craig, 83 Ohio App. at 260, 83 N.E.2d 628.
              Hines’s assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR