Court Opinion

ID: 9847889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:16.460819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:42.946255
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissenting). While in jail for an armed robbery in Southfield, defendant became a suspect in the instant case which concerns an armed robbery in Detroit. The case was in a purely investigative stage. No judicial proceedings had begun.
On February 12, 1970, the witnesses to the *424Detroit robbery were shown 50 photographs. They did not identify any and it is not known whether or not defendant’s photo was among them. The next day, 17 more photographs were shown to the witnesses. Five identified the defendant. One eyewitness not present at the photo showing identified defendant independently at trial. Defendant also admitted guilt at his sentencing hearing, so there is no doubt of his guilt, only of the process.
The Court has remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. As authority, People v [Franklin] Anderson, 389 Mich 155; 205 NW2d 461 (1973) and People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974) are cited. In my dissent to the Jackson decision, I noted that the "United States Supreme Court has afforded strong and recent precedent which we ignore.” We have again done so.
The precedent to which I referred is Kirby v Illinois 406 US 682; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972) and United States v Ash, 413 US 300; 93 S Ct 2568; 37 L Ed 2d 619 (1973). In Kirby, the Court said the presence of counsel is not required at events prior to the beginning of adversary criminal proceedings. In Ash, the Court said the presence of counsel is not required when photographic displays are used for identification purposes.
As did Jackson, the instant case falls within the Kirby and Ash rules. It remains my belief that "adoption of those rules would promote efficient criminal investigation while preserving the rights of all citizens”. As in Jackson, I do not believe the Court’s decision as effectively serves those ends.
As a matter of policy, the majority opinion is untenable in its general application. The effect of the finding is to mandate that before the judicial process begins and while a crime is under investigation, the whereabouts of each possible suspect *425must be ascertained prior to a photo showing in which his or her picture is used. If any are incarcerated anywhere for any other offense, knowledge of such would appear to be conclusively presumed. An incarcerated suspect would have to be returned to the jurisdiction and site of the crime and an attorney made available for any photo showing in which his (or her) picture might appear.
As in many cases, such a showing may contain photos of several incarcerated suspects. The opinion would appear to require attorneys for all. The criteria for the necessity of an attorney are too unrealistic in my opinion. The police often — perhaps most frequently — focus upon a series or a group of suspects until adequate proofs are gathered to support an information. In order to be on firm ground, under the recent case law of this Court, they would have to make counsel available to each possible suspect in any jail for any other offense.
I do not see any constitutional rights abridged in this case. I do see a policy which, if possible to comply with at all in many cases, at best is impractical and which further impedes the investigative process by inserting new requirements at who knows what additional cost in time and money. All this for doubtful, if any, benefit to the not-yet-accused person.
As the will of the majority prevails, it is recommended that the Court’s opinion be prospective in its application.
J. W. Fitzgerald, J., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Levin, J., did not sit in this case.