Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-03-08 22:00:57.259916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:33.924625
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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11381
                           ____________________

        LATHENIA JOY BAKER,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        UPSON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00283-TES
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                    22-11381

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge,
        and PROCTOR, ∗ District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
                                  I. INTRODUCTION
                Plaintiﬀ, Dr. LeThenia Joy Baker (“Dr. Baker”), appeals the
        district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former
        employer, Upson Regional Medical Center (“Upson”). Dr. Baker
        contends that Upson violated the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and Title
        VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) by providing her
        with a less favorable bonus compensation structure than her male
        colleague received. Although Upson conceded that Dr. Baker was
        paid less than her male colleague, it argued that the pay disparity
        was based on a factor other than sex: the male doctor’s greater ex-
        perience. The male doctor was a board-certiﬁed OB-GYN who had
        been practicing for ﬁfteen years. Dr. Baker was not board certiﬁed
        and had been practicing for less than three years. The district court
        found that Dr. Baker’s EPA claim failed because Upson established
        an aﬃrmative defense that its bonus structure, which paid Dr.
        Baker less than her comparator, was based on factors other than
        sex. As to Dr. Baker’s Title VII claim, the district court found that
        the claim was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
        After careful review and with the beneﬁt of oral argument, we af-
        ﬁrm.

        ∗ Honorable R. David Proctor, United States District Judge for the Northern

        District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        22-11381               Opinion of the Court                         3

                                II. BACKGROUND
                We begin by reviewing the Rule 56 record regarding the hir-
        ing and employment of both Dr. Baker and her comparator, Dr.
        Nicholas Psomiadis. Dr. Baker is a female OB-GYN who attended
        medical school at Morehouse School of Medicine and graduated in
        May 2009. After medical school, she completed her residency at
        Morehouse and Grady Health System in Atlanta. She then worked
        at St. Francis Hospital in Columbus, Georgia for two years, where
        she earned a base salary of $200,000.
               Dr. Baker began working for Upson in March 2015 under a
        locum tenens contract. A locum tenens is a physician or provider
        that comes to a hospital to help with calls or hospital coverage on
        a temporary basis. Dr. Baker was later hired as a full-time OB-GYN
        in June 2015. At the start of her full-time employment with Upson,
        Dr. Baker had two and a half years of experience as a practicing
        physician, but she did not have any certiﬁcations or fellowships.
               Dr. Baker’s initial employment contract was executed on
        June 15, 2015. She retained counsel, Arden Miller, to represent her
        during contract negotiations with Upson. Miller specializes in ne-
        gotiating physician contracts, which is her sole area of law practice.
        The negotiations took place between Dr. Baker, Miller, Ronald Bar-
        ﬁeld (Upson’s attorney), and David Castleberry (Upson’s CEO at
        the time).
              Under her initial contract, Dr. Baker received a base salary
        of $260,000 with an increase to $265,000 in the second year,
        $270,000 in the third year, $275,000 in the fourth year, and $280,000
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11381

        in the ﬁfth year. Her contract also provided $10,000 for moving ex-
        penses, $20,000 as a signing bonus, and $20,000 a year to pay stu-
        dent loans (up to a total of $100,000). During negotiations, Upson
        originally oﬀered Dr. Baker a base salary of $250,000, but she suc-
        cessfully negotiated this amount to $260,000.
                Additionally, Dr. Baker’s contract provided incentive com-
        pensation based on wRVU levels. A wRVU, or work relative value
        unit, is a point value assigned to a particular medical procedure or
        service. wRVU values are set by the Centers for Medicare and Med-
        icaid Services and dictate the amount a hospital can bill. The num-
        ber of wRVUs assigned to a certain procedure is set by a national
        standard and it is the same regardless of which physician performs
        the procedure.
              Dr. Baker’s initial contract included a bonus structure that
        compensated her for producing wRVUs above a certain threshold
        within a contract year the 12-month period beginning on the anni-
        versary date of when the employment contract was executed. Un-
        der this bonus structure, she would receive $5 for each wRVU
        above 6,548, $10 for each wRVU above 7,203, and $20 for each
        wRVU above 7,923.
               Although this compensation plan provided an incentive to
        produce more wRVUs, it also provided penalties for failing to reach
        a certain wRVU threshold. If Dr. Baker failed to produce at least
        6,548 wRVUs annually, her salary would be reduced.
             Dr. Nicolas Psomiadis is a male OB-GYN who was hired by
        Upson around the same time as Dr. Baker. At the time he began
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        22-11381               Opinion of the Court                        5

        working for Upson in August 2015, Dr. Psomiadis was a board-cer-
        tiﬁed OB-GYN and had been in practice for ﬁfteen years. During
        those ﬁfteen years, Dr. Psomiadis had never been sued and never
        had a fetal demise.
               Dr. Psomiadis’s employment contract provided for a base
        salary of $305,000 a yearUnlike Dr. Baker, he was not entitled to
        annual raises; that is, his base salary remained at $305,000 during
        the entire ﬁve-year term of his contract. Nor did Dr. Psomiadis re-
        ceive the $20,000 annual student loan reimbursement payment that
        Dr. Baker earned.
               Under his agreement, Dr. Psomiadis also received incentive
        compensation based on wRVU production, but his compensation
        was structured diﬀerently than Dr. Baker’s. Under the terms of Dr.
        Psomiadis’s employment contract, he was only entitled to receive
        a bonus if he achieved at least 3,990 wRVUs during the ﬁrst half of
        his contract year, and at least 7,980 wRVUs during the entire year.
        If he met those thresholds, he would receive $40 for each wRVU
        performed in excess of the 3,990 ﬂoor amount. This bonus struc-
        ture was in place during each half of the contract year. Like Dr.
        Baker, Dr. Psomiadis would face a reduction in salary if he failed to
        meet his 7,980 wRVU threshold.
               In 2017, after she learned about Dr. Psomiadis’s compensa-
        tion structure, Dr. Baker began renegotiating her contract. She re-
        tained the same attorney, Arden Miller, to represent her during the
        negotiations. Ultimately, Upson agreed to a contract amendment
        that made Dr. Baker’s wRVU compensation structure identical to
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11381

        Dr. Psomiadis’s. The amended employment contract was executed
        on August 23, 2018. Upson represented that the contract amend-
        ment would have been executed sooner, but Upson experienced
        turnover in the position responsible for physician contract negotia-
        tions, which caused delay
               Upson’s corporate representative, Jennifer Thompson, testi-
        ﬁed about the negotiation of Dr. Baker’s initial employment con-
        tract and the reasons for the diﬀerences in the two doctors’ respec-
        tive bonus structures. Thompson was the director of physician
        practices at Upson at the time, and she was responsible for facilitat-
        ing communication between Dr. Baker and Upson throughout
        their second set of negotiations. She also had conversations with
        David Castleberry about Dr. Baker’s contract and Dr. Psomiadis’s
        contract, including the reasons why the contracts diﬀered.
               Thompson testiﬁed that Upson relied on Medical Group
        Management Practices Association (“MGMA”) data to set Dr.
        Baker’s base salary. The MGMA maintains a national database that
        surveys hospitals and practices all over the country and compiles
        certain data, including physician compensation rates. MGMA data
        can be ﬁltered by specialty, geographic region, years of specialty,
        and years of experience, and it can show diﬀerent percentiles of
        base salary pay rates based on those categories. According to
        Thompson, Dr. Baker’s base salary reﬂected the 25th percentile for
        physicians of similar experience. Likewise, Dr. Psomiadis’s base sal-
        ary was around the 25th percentile for physicians with experience
        similar to his.
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        22-11381              Opinion of the Court                        7

             Although Upson relied on MGMA to set base salaries,
        MGMA does not contain information about average wRVU bonus
        compensation structures. So, it follows that Upson did not rely on
        MGMA or any other database when structuring Dr. Baker’s wRVU
        compensation rates.
               Thompson testiﬁed that the reason Upson oﬀered Dr. Pso-
        miadis a higher base salary and diﬀerent wRVU compensation
        structure than Dr. Baker was because Dr. Psomiadis was board cer-
        tiﬁed, had ﬁfteen years of experience, and in those years had never
        been sued or had a fetal demise. She also stated that Upson believed
        that Dr. Psomiadis would be a good mentor for Dr. Baker and that
        it would be “a good relationship in order for a young physician just
        out of school just starting out to be mentored by someone with so
        much experience.” Additionally, Thompson explained that Dr.
        Baker’s wRVU structure diﬀered from Dr. Psomiadis’s because she
        “was a newer physician[,] and her particular threshold would allow
        her to become eligible for a bonus at a lower threshold with lower
        rates while she grew and ramped up her practice.”
               In the district court, Dr. Baker acknowledged that having a
        higher wRVU threshold makes it more diﬃcult to become eligible
        for a bonus. She did not provide data about the actual number of
        wRVUs she performed during the relevant years, but she did recog-
        nize that there were situations in which she would have actually
        earned less if she were under Dr. Psomiadis’s bonus structure be-
        cause she produced fewer wRVUs. Indeed, during renegotiations
        of her contract, Dr. Baker stated in an email:
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11381

              I would prefer to leave my bonus structure tiered.
              Changing to exactly what [Dr. Psomiadis] has is not
              beneﬁcial for me because I don’t do the volume of ul-
              trasounds that he does in oﬃce. For instance, if we
              take by total RVUs from 2016: 8303, my bonus would
              have actually been LOWER using this method despite
              the fact that I am working, well, frankly, a lot more
              hours, but not necessarily on billable items. In addi-
              tion, my base salary is lower, so my incentive should
              start at lower threshold.
               Dr. Baker ﬁled suit against Upson on July 14, 2020, asserting
        claims for employment discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
        § 2000e, and the EPA, 29 U.S.C. § 206. Upson moved for summary
        judgment on all claims. The district court found that Dr. Baker
        abandoned her Title VII race and sex discrimination claims and any
        EPA claim based on anything other her bonus compensation struc-
        ture. And, the trial court dismissed her Title VII claim regarding
        her bonus compensation structure, ﬁnding that she failed to timely
        ﬁle her EEOC charge, and therefore that her Title VII claim was
        time-barred.
               As to Dr. Baker’s EPA claim related to her bonus compensa-
        tion structure, Upson conceded that she established a prima facie
        case under the Act, but it asserted an aﬃrmative defense: that the
        pay disparity was based on a factor other than sex. The district
        court found that the undisputed Rule 56 evidence established Up-
        son’s aﬃrmative defense and, therefore, entered summary judg-
        ment in its favor.
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        22-11381                Opinion of the Court                          9

                          III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
        all facts in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant
        and drawing all inferences in her favor. Frederick v. Sprint/United
        Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). However, the court
        will not make credibility determinations or weigh the parties’ evi-
        dence. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are
        no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled
        to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
                 “When the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that
        party must show aﬃrmatively the absence of a genuine issue of ma-
        terial fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence . . .
        that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at
        trial.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438
        (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Upon making this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving
        party, who must produce “signiﬁcant, probative evidence demon-
        strating the existence of a triable issue of fact” to avoid summary
        judgment. Id. That is, the moving party must demonstrate that, on
        all the essential elements on which it bears the burden of proof at
        trial, no reasonable jury could ﬁnd for the nonmoving party. Chanel,
        Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.
        1991). If the moving party makes such an aﬃrmative showing, it is
        entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in re-
        sponse, “come[s] forward with signiﬁcant, probative evidence
        demonstrating the existence of a triable issues of fact.” Four Parcels
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11381

        of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1438 (alteration in original) (quoting Cha-
        nel, Inc., 931 F.2d at 1477); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
                                 IV. DISCUSSION
               This appeal presents two issues: (1) whether the district
        court applied the correct legal standard in considering Upson’s
        summary judgment motion directed at Dr. Baker’s EPA claim, and
        (2) whether the district court correctly determined that Upson was
        entitled to summary judgment.
             A.   Our Circuit’s Standard for Analyzing Equal Pay Act Claims
                The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of sex
        and “forbids the speciﬁc practice of paying unequal wages for equal
        work to employees of the opposite sex.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Gro-
        cery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (11th Cir. 1992); 29 U.S.C.
        § 206(d)(1). The analysis of an EPA claim follows a two-step frame-
        work. First, to establish a prima facie case a plaintiﬀ must show
        “that an employer pays diﬀerent wages to employees of opposite
        sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
        equal skill, eﬀort, and responsibility, and which are performed un-
        der similar working conditions.’” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,
        417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)); Brock v. Ga.
        Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1032 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled on other
        grounds by McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). Sec-
        ond, if an EPA plaintiﬀ establishes a prima facie case, “the burden
        shifts to the employer to prove that the diﬀerence in pay is justiﬁed
        by one of the four exceptions in the Equal Pay Act:” (1) “a seniority
        system;” (2) “a merit system;” (3) “a system which measures
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        22-11381                Opinion of the Court                          11

        earnings by quantity or quality of production;” or (4) “a diﬀerential
        based on any factor other than sex.” Brock, 765 F.2d at 1036 (ﬁrst
        citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); and then citing Corning, 417 U.S. at 196).
        The application of an exception under the Act is an aﬃrmative de-
        fense on which the employer bears the burden of proof. Corning,
        417 U.S. at 196–97; Gosa v. Bryce Hosp., 780 F.2d 917, 918 (11th Cir.
        1986) (per curiam).
                Both Dr. Baker and the Equal Employment Opportunity
        Commission in its amicus brief argue that the district court erred
        in its analysis of Dr. Baker’s EPA claim by determining that, after
        Upson met its burden to establish an aﬃrmative defense, the bur-
        den shifted back to Dr. Baker to prove that Upson’s explanation for
        the pay disparity was pretextual. A review of the district court’s de-
        cision shows that it relied on Irby v. Bittick, which states that after a
        defendant meets its burden of establishing an aﬃrmative defense,
        “the plaintiﬀ must rebut the explanation by showing with aﬃrma-
        tive evidence that it is pretextual or oﬀered as a post-event justiﬁca-
        tion for a gender-based diﬀerential.” 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir.
        1995). The Irby panel cited a prior decision of this Court, Schwartz
        v. Fla. Board. of Regents, 954 F.2d 620, 623 (11th Cir. 1991) (per cu-
        riam). Baker and the EEOC contend that the district court should
        not have relied on this language from Irby because “Irby’s analytical
        approach to EPA claims is inconsistent with both the EPA itself and
        this Court’s earlier, controlling precedent.”
              We agree that Irby’s references to a third step in the analysis
        have created confusion within our Circuit about the correct
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        12                          Opinion of the Court                        22-11381

        standard for analyzing EPA claims. So, we take this opportunity to
        clarify that the correct standard is the one established in precedent
        that preceded Schwartz and Irby.
                The proper EPA analysis consists of two parts only; there is
        no third step. See Mitchell v. Jeﬀerson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 936 F.2d 539,
        547 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The Supreme Court has stated that the EPA
        consists of two parts, a deﬁnition of the violation followed by four
        aﬃrmative defenses.” (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452
        U.S. 161, 169 (1981)). Numerous binding decisions, including deci-
        sions by our Court, which all predated Schwartz and Irby, applied a
        two-step framework in assessing EPA claims. See Corning, 417 U.S.
        at 195–96; Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 722 (5th
        Cir. 1970); 1 Pearce v. Wichita Cnty. Hosp. Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 133–34
        (5th Cir. 1979); Brock, 765 F.2d at 1032–36; Gosa, 780 F.2d at 918;
        Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1568–70 (11th Cir. 1988);
        Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1988); Price v. Lockheed
        Space Operations Co., 856 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1988); EEOC v.
        White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1009–10 (11th Cir. 1989); Mitch-
        ell, 936 F.2d at 547.
               A third step, assessing pretext, makes no sense in an EPA
        analysis because that statute, unlike Title VII, does not require
        proof of intentional discrimination. Mitchell, 936 F.2d at 547 (“The
        plaintiﬀ is not required to prove intentional discrimination, just that

        1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this

        Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
        handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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        22-11381                 Opinion of the Court                           13

        the employer pays unequal wages for equal work, as deﬁned in the
        Act.”). Indeed, while EPA and Title VII pay claims are often
        brought in tandem, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between them
        as to both their respective elements and their burdens of proof.
        Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170; Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1526; Meeks v. Comput.
        Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994); see Brookhaven Gen.
        Hosp., 436 F.2d at 727 (“The purposes of the Equal Pay Act and Title
        VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are not well served by confound-
        ing the respective proofs required of plaintiﬀs.”).
                One source of the confusion between the two standards
        may be our imprecise use of the term “burden of proof,” which is
        notably “one of the ‘slipperiest members of the family of legal
        terms.’” Schaﬀer ex rel. Schaﬀer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (alter-
        ation omitted) (quoting 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 342, p.
        433 (5th ed. 1999)). “[H]istorically, the concept encompassed two
        distinct burdens: the ‘burden of persuasion,’ i.e., which party loses
        if the evidence is closely balanced, and the ‘burden of production,’
        i.e., which party bears the obligation to come forward with the ev-
        idence at diﬀerent points in the proceeding.” Id.
               Under Title VII, the burden of persuasion remains with the
        plaintiﬀ at all times. Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528. So, initially, a plaintiﬀ
        asserting a Title VII pay claim using the familiar McDonnell Douglas
        framework must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
        “demonstrating that she is female and that the job she occupied
        was similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males.” Id. at 1529.
        Then, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to “articulate
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11381

        some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” for the alleged discrim-
        ination. Id. at 1528 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
        U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The defendant’s burden to rebut a Title VII
        prima facie case is “exceedingly light.” Id. at 1529 (quoting Perryman
        v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983)). And, in
        this Title VII context, if a defendant cannot articulate a legitimate
        reason for its decision, the inference of discrimination created by
        the plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case is not dispersed, and that carries the
        day for the plaintiﬀ. Perryman, 698 F. 2d at 1142 (quoting Burdine,
        450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). If, on the other hand, the defendant’s prof-
        fered reasons “appear legitimate,” the burden then “returns to the
        plaintiﬀ to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
        proﬀered justiﬁcations are actually a pretext for gender-based dis-
        crimination.” Miranda, 975 F. 2d at 1529. But, to be clear, “[u]nder
        Title VII, the risk of nonpersuasion always remains with the plain-
        tiﬀ.” Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1019.
               In contrast, the EPA “prescribes a form of strict liability.” Mi-
        randa, 975 F.2d at 1533. To establish a prima facie case under the
        EPA, a plaintiﬀ “must meet the fairly strict standard of proving that
        she performed substantially similar work for less pay.” Id. at 1526.
        Once a plaintiﬀ establishes a prima facie case under the EPA, the
        “burden of both production and persuasion” shift to the employer
        “to show that the pay diﬀerential was justiﬁed under one of the
        Equal Pay Act’s four statutory exceptions.” Gosa, 780 F.2d at 918
        (emphasis added). The employer’s burden “is a heavy one—the ex-
        ceptions granted with the EPA constitute aﬃrmative defenses. If
        proven, [the] defendant is absolved of liability as a matter of law.”
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        22-11381                Opinion of the Court                         15

        Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590–91 (11th Cir. 1994) (ci-
        tation omitted). However, “[i]f the defendant fails, the plaintiﬀ
        wins. The plaintiﬀ is not required to prove discriminatory intent on
        the part of the defendant.” Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533; see Meeks, 15
        F.3d at 1018. Once a plaintiﬀ makes out a prima facie case under
        the EPA, unlike Title VII, “[t]he risk of nonpersuasion is borne by
        the employer.” Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1018.
                To the extent Schwartz and Irby contradict the framework
        outlined above, they are inconsistent with our prior precedent. See
        United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 1994) (describing
        the prior-panel precedent rule, which requires following the earli-
        est decision when “reconciling an intracircuit conﬂict of author-
        ity”). However, we recognize that some of the confusing language
        in these cases may be a product of the task courts face in assessing
        the parties’ respective (and shifting) burdens on a motion for sum-
        mary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. There-
        fore, an overview of a court’s approach in reviewing a summary
        judgment motion in an EPA case, where usually an employer
        moves for summary judgment on an aﬃrmative defense, is appro-
        priate.
               We “employ a two-part framework of shifting burdens to
        determine whether, as regards a given material fact, there exists a
        genuine issue precluding summary judgment.” Fitzpatrick v. City of
        Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). But, the parties’ respec-
        tive burdens vary depending on whether the relevant legal issues
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11381

        are ones on which the movant or non-movant would bear the bur-
        den of proof at trial. Id.
                 An employer bears the burden at trial of proving its aﬃrma-
        tive defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Mulhall, 19 F. 3d
        at 590. When an employer moves for summary judgment on an
        EPA claim based on an aﬃrmative defense, the employer “must
        show aﬃrmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it
        must support its motion with credible evidence . . . that would en-
        title it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Fitzpatrick,
        2 F.3d at 1115 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Four
        Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
        “In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the es-
        sential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof
        at trial, no reasonable jury could ﬁnd for the nonmoving party.”
        Four Parcels, 941 F2d at 1438. If an employer meets its Rule 56 bur-
        den, the plaintiﬀ must come forward with “signiﬁcant, probative
        evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.”
        Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115 (quoting Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1438). In
        the end, the employer will only be entitled to summary judgment
        if “the combined body of evidence presented by the two parties” is
        “such that no reasonable jury could ﬁnd for the non-movant[.]” Id.
        at 1116.
              So, in the EPA aﬃrmative-defense context, the question a
        court must answer is whether the defendant has shown that the
        evidence is undisputed and that no reasonable juror could ﬁnd sex
        was a factor in the pay decision. Of course, a plaintiﬀ need not
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        22-11381               Opinion of the Court                       17

        stand on the sideline during the court’s assessment of whether a
        defendant has shown it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
        on its defense. A plaintiﬀ opposing such a motion is free to point
        out that there are genuine issues of material fact presented by the
        Rule 56 evidence and therefore that the question of whether sex
        was considered is controverted. Thus, though a plaintiﬀ is not
        called upon under the EPA to prove pretext, once the employer
        meets its heavy burden of establishing its aﬃrmative defense, a
        plaintiﬀ may defeat summary judgment by pointing to a genuine
        dispute of material fact in the Rule 56 record. Id. at 1115.
               B.     The District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment
               In granting summary judgment to Upson, the district court
        determined that Upson presented “uncontroverted evidence” es-
        tablishing that sex played no factor in its decision to oﬀer Dr. Pso-
        miadis and Dr. Baker diﬀerent bonus structures. The court con-
        cluded that this uncontroverted evidence satisﬁed Upson’s burden
        to rebut Dr. Baker’s prima facie case, and that a reasonable jury
        could not ﬁnd otherwise. Dr. Baker contends this was error be-
        cause Upson presented “no evidence or justiﬁcation” for the diﬀer-
        ence in bonus structures. And, she dismisses Jennifer Thompson’s
        testimony as nothing more than “vague presumptions and half re-
        membrances” from “a person who did not take part in the decision
        at issue.” We disagree.
              First, Thompson testiﬁed that she had personal knowledge
        of what occurred during the original negotiations of Dr. Baker’s
        contract because (1) she was responsible for communicating
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11381

        between Dr. Baker and Upson, and (2) she discussed the negotia-
        tions with Upson’s decisionmakers—namely Ronald Barﬁeld and
        David Castleberry. Further, Thompson stated that the reason Up-
        son oﬀered Dr. Psomiadis a higher base salary and a diﬀerent
        wRVU compensation structure than Dr. Baker was because Dr.
        Psomiadis was board certiﬁed, had ﬁfteen years of experience, and
        had never had a fetal demise or been sued. Thompson also ex-
        plained that Dr. Baker’s wRVU structure diﬀered from Dr. Psomi-
        adis’s because Dr. Baker “was a newer physician[,] and her particu-
        lar threshold would allow her to become eligible for a bonus at a
        lower threshold with lower rates while she grew and ramped up
        her practice.”
               It is undisputed that Dr. Psomiadis had more than ﬁfteen
        years of experience as a physician, while Dr. Baker had less than
        three. It is also undisputed that in his ﬁfteen years of practice, Dr.
        Psomiadis had never been sued or had a fetal demise. And, Dr. Pso-
        miadis was board-certiﬁed when he was hired by Upson. Dr. Baker
        was not. Each of these undisputed facts supports Upson’s conten-
        tion that Dr. Psomiadis was paid more because of his greater expe-
        rience.
                It is also undisputed on this record, and Dr. Baker herself has
        acknowledged, that having a higher wRVU threshold makes it
        more diﬃcult to become eligible for a bonus. Indeed, according to
        Dr. Baker, if she received the same bonus structure as Dr. Psomi-
        adis, she may have actually received a lower bonus in certain years.
        This bolsters Upson’s position that her wRVU compensation
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        22-11381               Opinion of the Court                         19

        structure was designed to allow her to “ramp up” her practice, and
        not based on her sex.
                We acknowledge Dr. Baker’s assertion that the hospital bills
        the same amount per wRVU regardless of whether she or Dr. Pso-
        miadis performed the service. While true, that fact does not create
        a jury question in this case. Upson does not claim that it chose to
        pay Dr. Psomiadis more because it expected to earn greater reve-
        nue per wRVU for his services. Rather, as Upson explained, it val-
        ues experienced providers with stellar track records, and it is willing
        to pay more for them. The fact that Dr. Baker disagrees with this
        approach is irrelevant because “[u]nder the Equal Pay Act, the
        courts and administrative agencies are not permitted to substitute
        their judgment for the judgment of the employer[.]” Gunther, 452
        U.S. at 171 (cleaned up).
               The district court correctly found that “the record provides
        that [Upson] relied on multiple factors other than sex to set [Dr.
        Baker]’s bonus structure diﬀerently”—“[i]t looked at the two phy-
        sicians’ diﬀering levels of experience, their certiﬁcations (or in [Dr.
        Baker]’s case, lack thereof ), their prior production, and it deter-
        mined that this structure would allow [Dr. Baker] to ramp up her
        new practice.” Upson met its burden of proving that the diﬀerence
        in bonus compensation was based on factors other than sex, that
        there are no genuine disputes of material fact for a trier of fact to
        decide, and that no reasonable jury could ﬁnd in favor of Dr. Baker
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11381

        on the question of whether her sex was considered in the diﬀerent
        bonus structure she agreed to. 2C. Dr. Baker’s Other Claims
               Dr. Baker originally brought claims against Upson for race
        and sex discrimination in violation of the EPA and Title VII. At
        summary judgment, the district court determined that Dr. Baker
        abandoned her Title VII race discrimination claim and any EPA and
        Title VII sex discrimination claims other than those based on a dis-
        parate bonus compensation structure. The court also dismissed her
        remaining Title VII claim regarding her bonus compensation struc-
        ture, ﬁnding that she failed to timely ﬁle an EEOC charge, and
        therefore her Title VII claim was barred.
              Dr. Baker has not challenged any of these ﬁndings on appeal.
        Therefore, she has “abandoned any challenge of that ground, and

        2 The dissent suggests that this court should remand the case to the district

        court to apply the clariﬁed EPA framework in the ﬁrst instance. Respectfully,
        we disagree. The district court’s “error” (which again, was occasioned by con-
        fusion in some of our decisions) was to proceed to a third (pretext) step in its
        analysis. It should not have evaluated pretext after ﬁnding that Upson had es-
        tablished its aﬃrmative defense based on the undisputed Rule 56 evidence.
        But, remand is unnecessary because the district court found that “Dr. Baker
        has not provided any evidence to indicate that Defendant set her bonus com-
        pensation plan lower than Dr. Psomiadis’ because she is a woman. So, the dis-
        trict court held that “[Upson] has provided uncontroverted evidence in the rec-
        ord that establishes it oﬀered Dr. Psomiadis a diﬀerent bonus structure based
        on factors other than sex such as his greater experience. The Court ﬁnds that
        . . .a reasonable jury could not disagree.” On this record, that conclusion was
        not error and remand is unnecessary.
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        22-11381              Opinion of the Court                     21

        it follows that the judgment is due to be aﬃrmed.” Sapuppo v. All-
        state Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).
                               V. CONCLUSION
              For all these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant
        of summary judgment in favor of Upson Regional Medical Center.
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        22-11381           Jill Pryor, J., dissenting in part                1

        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
               I agree with much of the majority opinion. For starters, the
        majority opinion correctly determines that Baker has abandoned
        her challenge to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on
        her Title VII claims. And by applying our prior panel precedent rule
        to hold that our decisions in Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir.
        1995), and Schwartz v. Florida Board of Regents, 954 F.2d 620 (11th
        Cir. 1991), improperly added a third step to the two-step frame-
        work for evaluating claims under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C.
        § 206(d), the majority opinion correctly resolves the confusion
        these cases have wrought in our Circuit.
                But having clarified the standard for evaluating Equal Pay
        Act claims, the majority opinion misapplies it. In my view, Upson
        has failed to carry its “heavy” burden. Maj. Op. at 17. At summary
        judgment, Upson’s task was to show that a factor other than sex
        motivated its decision: that “no reasonable juror could find sex was
        a factor in [Upson’s] pay decision.” Id. I would vacate the grant of
        summary judgment in Upson’s favor on Baker’s Equal Pay Act
        claim because the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to
        Baker, does not meet this standard.
               I proceed in two parts. First, I describe the burden Upson
        shoulders at summary judgment. Second, I explain why gaps in Up-
        son’s evidence prevent it from carrying this burden.
               First, Upson’s burden. As the majority opinion observes, the
        Equal Pay Act imposes “a form of strict liability” on employers. Mi-
        randa v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir.
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        2                       Jill Pryor, J., dissenting              22-11381

        1992). The Act holds liable an employer who pays an employee
        “less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the op-
        posite sex . . . for equal work on jobs . . . which require[] equal skill,
        effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
        working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Once the Act’s condi-
        tions are met, an employer escapes liability only if it can establish
        one of four enumerated affirmative defenses. Meeks v. Comput. As-
        socs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1018 (11th Cir. 1994).
               When it comes to an Equal Pay Act affirmative defense, the
        employer bears “[t]he risk of nonpersuasion” at trial. Id. To prevail
        on such a defense at the summary judgment stage, an employer
        “must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material
        fact.” United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1438
        (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (emphasis in original). That showing re-
        quires putting forward evidence that, viewed in the light most fa-
        vorable to the employee allows “no reasonable jury” to side against
        the employer. Id.; see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
        251 (1986) (explaining that “the genuine issue summary judgment
        standard is very close to the reasonable jury directed verdict stand-
        ard” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
               The majority opinion holds that Upson (the movant) estab-
        lished the Equal Pay Act’s fourth affirmative defense: that the pay
        differential between Baker (the nonmovant) and Psomiadis was
        based on a “factor other than sex,” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)—namely,
        Psomiadis’s greater experience as an OB-GYN and track record of
        no fetal demises or lawsuits. To make out that defense, Upson
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        22-11381            Jill Pryor, J., dissenting in part                   3

        faced the “difficult” task of showing that “sex provided no basis for
        the wage differential.” Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., 882 F.3d
        1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original) (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted); accord Maj. Op. at 17. Put differently, Upson
        was required to put forward evidence from which a reasonable
        jury, drawing all inferences in Baker’s favor, would have to con-
        clude that “none of the decision-makers, whether in middle or up-
        per management, were influenced by sex bias.” Bowen, 882 F.3d at
        1362–63 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It
        further required Upson to put forward evidence showing that a le-
        gitimate factor, such as experience, accounted for the differential,
        not an illegitimate one, such as race. See, e.g., Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
        318 F.3d 1066, 1078 (11th Cir. 2003) (observing that a “general prac-
        tice” is not a legitimate factor other than sex (internal quotation
        marks omitted)).
               Turning back to this case, recall the specific compensation
        difference for which Upson’s affirmative defense must account.
        When Baker began working at Upson, it paid her male colleague
        Psomiadis an additional $40 for each wRVU he produced above
        7,980. Baker received $5 for each wRVU above 6,548, $10 for each
        wRVU above 7,203, and $20 per wRVU above 7,923. Upson had to
        show that this difference in no way reflected consideration of sex
        because it was founded on a permissible factor other than sex—and
        that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.
              Second, Upson’s evidence. In my view, the combined
        weight of the summary judgment standard and the difficulty of
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        4                     Jill Pryor, J., dissenting           22-11381

        establishing an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act proves
        too much for Upson’s evidence. Upson’s motion for summary
        judgment relied almost exclusively on the deposition testimony
        and affidavit of its corporate representative: Jennifer Thompson. As
        Upson’s physician practice administrator, Thompson acted as an
        intermediary between Baker and Upson’s decisionmaker, then-
        CEO David Castleberry, during the negotiation of Baker’s contract.
                According to Thompson’s affidavit and testimony, Upson
        paid Baker and Psomiadis differently because “Baker was a newer
        physician and her particular threshold would allow her to become
        eligible for a bonus at a lower threshold with lower rates while she
        . . . ramped up her practice.” Doc. 36-1 at 2. But in her deposition,
        when asked how Psomiadis’s wRVU compensation plan was deter-
        mined, Thompson admitted, “I don’t know exactly. . . . I don’t
        know how that number came about, but I know we talked about
        his years of experience and his track record being so good.” Doc.
        26 at 76. She further testified that Upson had no guidelines or writ-
        ten policies for setting bonus compensation based on wRVUs. And
        she could not explain how the dollar amounts per-wRVU (ranging
        from $5-$20 for Baker and $40 for Psomiadis) were set.
               Thompson’s testimony cannot carry the day for Upson. It
        does not affirmatively show—such that no reasonable jury could
        conclude otherwise—that “sex provided no basis for the wage dif-
        ferential,” as the defense requires. Bowen, 882 F.3d at 1362 (empha-
        sis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor does her
        testimony show that “none of the decision-makers, whether in
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        22-11381           Jill Pryor, J., dissenting in part               5

        middle or upper management, were influenced by sex bias.” Bowen,
        882 F.3d at 1362–63 (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). It could not, because she admitted that she did not know
        everything the decisionmakers considered when setting Baker’s
        and Psomiadis’s respective wRVU compensation plans. After all,
        Thompson was not the decision-maker; that was David Castle-
        berry, whom she never consulted when preparing for her deposi-
        tion. And Thompson was unaware of any general Upson policies
        to which Baker’s wRVU compensation could be attributed. At best
        for Upson, Thompson’s testimony shows that Upson considered,
        as one factor, Psomiadis’s experience and track record. Viewing the
        evidence in the light most favorable to Baker, Upson has not done
        enough.
               Because Upson has failed to carry its heavy burden under the
        standard the majority opinion correctly describes, I respectfully dis-
        sent from its affirmance of the grant of summary judgment to Up-
        son on Baker’s Equal Pay Act claim.