Court Opinion

ID: 9779899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:58:00.158099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:45.528858
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HALL dissenting: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). I disagree, however, with the majority’s finding that the error does not warrant reversal under the second prong of the plain-error analysis. I believe that word deletions in the 2007 amendment to Rule 431(b) alter our analysis from that of People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 917 N.E.2d 401 (2009). In Glasper, the rule at issue was the 1997 version of Rule 431(b), which required trial courts to question prospective jurors about the Zehr principles only if requested to do so by defense counsel. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 187. The 1997 version of Rule 431(b) actually represented a compromise. See People v. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d 563, 580, 919 N.E.2d 1016 (2009) (McDade, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Supreme Court Rules Committee initially recommended that trial courts be required to question prospective jurors on each of the four Zehr principles. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 580 (McDade, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 187. The supreme court rejected the recommendation and instead added subsection (b), requiring trial courts to undertake such questioning only if requested by defendant. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 580 (McDade, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d at 200 (“As previously stated, when crafting the version of Rule 431(b) applicable here, this court had the opportunity to mandate Zehr questioning in every case, but chose not to. Instead, this court made the right to Zehr questioning permissive”). In 2007, the supreme court amended Rule 431(b), this time adopting the procedure it had rejected 10 years earlier. Alexander, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 580 (McDade, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The 2007 amendment deleted the words: “If requested by the defendant.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007). The deletion had the effect of imposing an affirmative sua sponte duty on trial courts to question prospective jurors about the Zehr principles, even absent a request by defendant. See People v. Graham, 393 Ill. App. 3d 268, 273, 913 N.E.2d 99 (2009). Rules of statutory construction apply equally to the interpretation of supreme court rules. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005). Every amendment to a rule is presumed to have a purpose, and a court must consider the language of the amendment in light of the need for the amendment and the purpose it serves. People v. Allen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 842, 846, 730 N.E.2d 1216 (2000). In amending Rule 431(b), by deleting the words: “If requested by the defendant,” our supreme court evidently determined that the Zehr principles are so integral to the selection of an impartial jury, and thus a fair trial, that trial courts should be required to raise them sua sponte even if not requested to do so by defense counsel. The majority’s interpretation of the 2007 version of Rule 431(b) renders meaningless the deletion of the words: “If requested by the defendant.” In light of the mandatory language of the 2007 amended version of Rule 431(b), I believe that the trial court’s failure to fully comply with the rule denied defendant a fair trial and was so fundamental an error that reversal is required under the second prong of the plain-error analysis.