Court Opinion

ID: 9705531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:10:41.909128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.098573
License: Public Domain

*513PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
DISSENT
I respectfully dissent. The issue before us is not whether the termination of respondent Deloris Coats’ parental rights was justified on the merits. Rather, the issue is whether the district court was justified in terminating her parental rights based on her failure to “appear” at a pretrial hearing. Put another way, was the process fair? I conclude that it was not. Moreover, in reinstating the district court’s decision, this court, like the district court below, has treated Deloris Coats’ parental rights in a wholly cavalier fashion.
As an initial matter, I am at a complete loss to explain how either the district court or this court can justify their conclusion that Deloris Coats failed to appear at the October 12, 1999, pretrial hearing. On the morning of October 12, 1999, the district court convened the pretrial hearing at 9 a.m. Deloris Coats did not attend, but her attorney was present. Because Deloris Coats was not present, DCFS moved to proceed by default on the merits of the petition. The district court granted DCFS’s motion and then proceeded to terminate Deloris Coats’ parental rights.
The notice requiring Deloris Coats to appear at the pretrial hearing stated:
The next hearing in this case is for PreTrial/Trial at 8:30/9:30 o’clock on Oct. 12/Nov. 23, 1999.
The Parent(s) and Child(ren) (12 years of age or over who are participating) are required to appear at Room 231, Juvenile Justice Center, 626 South 6th Street (corner of 6th and Park), Minneapolis, Minnesota, or a JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED.
Deloris Coats acknowledges that she received this notice. Applying the common meanings to the words used in the notice, the notice cannot be read to mandate Deloris Coats’ personal presence at the pretrial hearing. Clearly, the notice required Deloris Coats to “appear” at the October 12 pretrial hearing. The court asserts that the notice “plainly says ‘[t]he Parents) * * * are required to appear.’ ” This assertion, however, merely begs the question of what it means to “appear.” The court offers no explanation as to what it is about this language or any other language in the notice that would make a person reading it understand that he or she was required to appear personally and not through counsel. Noticeably absent from the notice is any explicit requirement that parents personally appear. Given this absence, the proper recourse is to determine the meaning of “appear.” This court has indicated that a party may appear either personally or through counsel.1 See Croes v. Handlos, 225 Minn. 247, 249, 30 N.W.2d 471, 472 (1948) (upholding a default judgment ordered against a defendant for failing to appear at a hearing and noting that a defendant must appear and answer either personally or by counsel). We are not alone. At least two courts addressing the specific issue raised in this case have held that a party to a termination of parental rights proceeding may appear either personally or through counsel. See In re M.M., 708 So.2d 990, 992 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (holding that a trial court’s decision, in a termination of parental rights proceeding, to enter a default judgment against parents for failing to “appear” at *514an adjudicatory hearing as required by the summons for the hearing was improper because they “ ‘appeared]’ through their counsel”); In re Brandon A, 769 A.2d 586, 589 (R.I.2001) (defining “an appearance as ‘[a] coming into court as party to a suit, either in person or by attorney’ ”) (quoting Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2d 1037, 1048 (R.I.1997)). In that we have indicated that a party may appear either personally or through counsel, how is a party to know, absent express language stating so, that they are required to appear in person? The answer is they cannot know.
In light of Croes and the fact that Deloris Coats appeared at the pretrial hearing through counsel, there was absolutely no basis for the district court to grant DCFS’s motion to proceed by default. Having no basis to proceed by default, the district court had no basis to enter the default judgment terminating Deloris Coats’ parental rights. For this reason alone, the court of appeals’ decision should be affirmed. Yet this court now reverses the court of appeals.
The district court’s entry of the default judgment also violated Deloris Coats’ right to due process because of inadequate notice. This due process violation required the district court to grant Deloris Coats’ motion to vacate the default judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f) (stating a court may grant relief for any other reason justifying relief). Notice is “universally recognized as essential to due process.” Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108, 119, 7 N.W.2d 501, 508 (1943). In affirming the district court’s decision denying Deloris Coats’ motion to vacate, this court applied the four-factor analysis from cases such as Nguyen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn.1997), to analyze Deloris Coats’ Rule 60.02 motion. Although that test ordinarily provides the framework for evaluating such a motion, its use in this case is inapplicable because the notice Deloris Coats received did not comply with due process. See Lyon Dev. Corp. v. Ricke’s, Inc., 296 Minn. 75, 84, 207 N.W.2d 273, 279 (1973) (holding that, for default judgment against a garnishee, failure to give notice of default hearing and obtain court order are “procedural defects of such consequence” that four-factor test for vacating default judgment not applicable).2
“It is settled that the nature of due process is flexibility. The amount of process due varies with the circumstances of the case.” In re Welfare of H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn.1981). Accordingly, “the determination of what process is due involves a balancing of the interests involved in the specific case under consideration.” Id. In this case, the “pivot point from which we start is that the substantial and fundamental rights of parents to the custody and companionship of their children should not be taken from them except for grave and weighty reasons.” Id. At the same time, it is also true that “[cjhil-dren are not property, * * * but unique and vulnerable small persons entrusted to the care and protection of parents,” id., and that “the law secures parents’ right to custody ‘only so long as they shall promptly recognize and discharge their corresponding obligations,’ ” In re Welfare of P.J.K., 369 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn.1985) (quoting H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d at 825).
*515The notice in this case is deficient with respect to its language concerning when a default judgment may be entered, as well as the scope of such a default. The notice merely warns that “JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED” for failure to appear. It does not clearly indicate, however, that this warning applies to the pretrial hearing and not just the trial. Even if it is assumed that the statement can be read to apply to the pretrial hearing, it is not clear that the default referred to would go beyond the matters that were the subject of the pretrial hearing, inasmuch as the logical assumption would be that the default would relate to pretrial issues and not the merits of the termination petition, particularly when the trial date had already been set. Finally, the notice did not notify Deloris Coats that she had to appear at the pretrial hearing in person.3 In sum, Deloris Coats’ failure to personally attend the October 12 pretrial hearing hardly constituted a “grave and weighty” reason justifying the entry of a default judgment on the merits of the termination petition. H.G.B., 306 N.W.2d at 825.
Nor do any of the surrounding circumstances suggest that the “extreme sanction” of a default judgment was warranted in this case. Hennepin County ex rel. Bartlow v. Brinkman, 378 N.W.2d 790, 793 (Minn.1985). Deloris Coats had no history of failing to make required court appearances. Nor does the record demonstrate misconduct on her part during the termination of parental rights proceedings, or suggest that she was unable or unwilling to participate in the proceedings. Rather, the record shows that she had a number of court appearances in both the child protection and termination of parental rights proceedings and attended all of them except the October 12 pretrial hearing. Although she may have failed to attend a number of appointments required under her case plan, those failures go to the merits of the termination petition and not to her compliance with the procedural requirements of the termination proceedings. Further, nothing in the record suggests that DCFS would have suffered any prejudice if the district court had vacated the default judgment against Deloris Coats. The motion to vacate the default judgment was made well before the scheduled November 23 trial date, so DCFS would not have been prejudiced by proceeding to trial at that time. In any event, DCFS needed to appear for the November 23 trial because it still had to proceed on its petition to terminate the parental rights of Cornell Robinson, the biological father of three of Deloris Coats’ four children. Given these circumstances, the balance of interests implicated was clearly in Deloris Coats’ favor, and more process was due. It is therefore clear that Deloris Coats established “any other reason justifying relief’ from the default judgment based on due process.4 Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(f). *516The district court erred both in granting the default judgment against Deloris Coats and in failing to vacate that judgment. Thus, the court of appeals’ decision should be affirmed.
Finally, I am compelled to comment on what is alleged to be a common practice in Hennepin County District Court — granting default judgments at pretrial hearings in termination of parental rights cases. It appears that in many cases the only reason for holding such pretrial hearings is to see whether the parents will appear in person as opposed to appearing through counsel and, if not, to enter a default judgment against them on the merits of the termination petition. It also appears to be the practice in Hennepin County District Court to allow attorneys appearing on behalf of parents who are not physically present to withdraw during default proceedings, leaving the parents’ rights completely unprotected.
What is more disturbing is the fact that victims of these practices, like Deloris Coats, are likely to be poor people and/or people with chemical dependency or mental health problems. When it comes to due process, these practices treat them as second-class citizens. But their parental rights are no less valuable and should be accorded no less respect than the rights of any other person. I simply cannot imagine that a default judgment on the merits for failure to personally appear at a pretrial hearing attended by their counsel would ever be entered against people who were not poor. This disparity in treatment is irreconcilable with a legal system that purports to dispense equal justice under the law. Nor can I imagine that counsel for parents with financial wherewithal would ever seek to withdraw from their representation in such a situation. These practices are “so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.” State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn.1995). Yet this court condones them and in the process gives truth to the proverb, “the court is most merciful when the accused is most rich.”
I am appalled and dismayed, but, more than anything, I am disappointed.

. Yel the court’s reading of the notice in this case implies that every notice instructing a party to "appear” actually requires a personal appearance by that party. I suspect members of the practicing bar will be surprised to learn that at each court hearing they attended over the years without their client physically present, the client was subject to default for failure to appear.

. The court attempts to distinguish Lyon as involving a complete absence of notice rather than, as Deloris Coats argues, inadequate notice. Noticeably absent, however, is any explanation as to why this so-called distinction alters any aspect of the due process analysis or changes the proper remedy upon a finding of insufficient notice. This is hardly surprising because the distinction put forth is without significance.

. The fact that the default judgment was entered against Deloris Coats at the pretrial hearing demonstrates even greater reason to vacate the default judgment than in cases such as Brandon and M.M. At least the default judgments in those cases were entered at a hearing on the merits rather than at a mere pretrial hearing. M.M., 708 So.2d at 991; Brandon, 769 A.2d at 588.

. I note with considerable dismay the court's myopic focus on Deloris Coats' alleged failure to argue before either the district court or the court of appeals that she was denied due process, that the notice was ambiguous, or that her attorney's presence at the October 12 pretrial hearing satisfied her obligation to "appear.” Significantly, however, in her motion to reconsider, Deloris Coats complained of not having an opportunity to present the court with evidence of her commitment to her children or to respond to the allegations against her. The opportunity to be heard is the fundamental due process requirement. In *516re Kirby, 354 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Minn.1984). Therefore, although inartful, Deloris Coats' assertions were sufficient to preserve a due process claim.
Moreover, while the court’s focus on Deloris Coats’ alleged failure to argue that the notice was ambiguous and that she appeared at the October 12 pretrial hearing may provide the court some legal comfort, the fact remains that the notice is ambiguous and she did appear. "[I]t is the responsibility of appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be 'diluted by counsel's oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities.’ ” State v. Hannulcsela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n. 7 (Minn.1990) (citation omitted). Further, this court may, in its discretion, address issues raised for the first time on appeal "when the interests of justice require their consideration and addressing them would not work an unfair surprise on a party.” State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn.1989). This is such a case. The default termination of Deloris Coats’ parental rights based on the notice resulted in a callous and unjustifiable violation of those rights. Nor should it be overlooked that this practice has an impact that goes far beyond the family involved in this case. "No oppression is so heavy or lasting as that which is inflicted by the perversion and exorbitance of legal authority.” Joseph Addison, available at http://www.cybernation.com/victory/quota tions/authors/quotes-addison.joseph.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2001).