Court Opinion

ID: 9907302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 01:00:35.214258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:43.262879
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20145        Document: 00516990984             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/05/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               December 5, 2023
                                      No. 23-20145                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                                  Clerk
                                    ____________

   Pamela Cyrilien,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:21-CV-2523
                     ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Appellant Pamela Cyrilien was diagnosed with breast cancer on
   December 14, 2018, and alleges that her former employer, the Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), failed to accommodate her
   disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
   (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). For the

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20145     Document: 00516990984              Page: 2     Date Filed: 12/05/2023

                                   No. 23-20145

   reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary
   judgment in favor of TDCJ.
                                        I.
         Cyrilien was employed as an administrative assistant at a TDCJ prison
   in Navasota, Texas. The essential functions of her job included performing
   technical assistance work; managing supplies, parts, and equipment for unit
   maintenance; coordinating the preparation, editing, and distribution of
   correspondence,    reports,   studies,       and   other     forms;   coordinating
   maintenance; training and supervising offenders in administrative support
   procedures; and assisting in maintaining the security of assigned offenders.
   She was diagnosed with breast cancer on December 14, 2018, and began
   chemotherapy treatment on March 29, 2019. Her last in-person workday at
   TDCJ was May 30, 2019.
         To continue receiving treatment, Cyrilien applied for and was granted
   Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave in June 2019. She also requested
   and received 400 additional hours of leave from TDCJ’s sick leave policy.
   Also in June 2019, Cyrilien applied for long-term disability benefits, and
   began receiving long-term disability payments from the Texas Income
   Protection Program and the Social Security Administration. After exhausting
   all her accrued and FMLA leave time, TDCJ placed her on “Leave Without
   Pay” status in December 2019. Under TDCJ’s policies, an employee may
   only be on Leave Without Pay status for 180 days within a rolling twelve-
   month period. In March 2020, TDCJ informed Cyrilien that her Leave
   Without Pay time had expired and her employment was terminated on March
   20, 2020.
         Cyrilien sued TDCJ in August 2021 alleging violations of the ADA
   and the Rehabilitation Act. Cyrilien’s ADA claim was dismissed in
   December 2021. After discovery, TDCJ moved for summary judgment on

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                                    No. 23-20145

   the remaining Rehabilitation Act claim. The district court granted TDCJ’s
   motion without a written opinion, thereby entering summary judgment in
   favor of TDCJ on Cyrilien’s Rehabilitation Act claim. Cyrilien appeals only
   the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim.
                                        II.
            This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
   novo and applies the same legal standards as the district court. Fahim v.
   Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008). Summary
   judgment shall issue “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
   to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “In determining whether a genuine issue as
   to any material fact exists, [the court] must view the evidence in the light
   most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fahim, 551 F.3d at 348–49.
                                        III.
            The Rehabilitation Act was enacted “to ensure that handicapped
   individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of prejudiced
   attitudes or ignorance of others.” Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1259
   (5th Cir. 1988). Because the ADA was also enacted to prevent discrimination
   against individual with disabilities, and because the language in the statutes
   contain parallel language, “[j]urisprudence interpreting either section is
   applicable to both.” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000).
   Thus, to prevail in a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation
   Act, Cyrilien must prove that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a
   disability;” (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were “known”
   by TDCJ; and (3) TDCJ failed to make “reasonable accommodations” for
   Cyrilien’s known limitations. Feist v. Louisiana, 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir.
   2013).

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                                     No. 23-20145

          Cyrilien argues that the district court erred in entering summary
   judgment on her failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act
   because she argues that she is a “qualified individual with a disability” within
   the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act.
          Cyrilien has not created a genuine dispute of material fact that she is
   a “qualified individual with a disability.” A “qualified individual” is a person
   (1) that can “perform the essential functions of the job in spite of [her]
   disability,” or (2) that “a reasonable accommodation of [her] disability would
   have enabled [her] to perform the essential functions of [her] job.” EEOC v.
   LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014).
          Cyrilien invokes the second pathway by arguing that TDCJ should
   have provided her with reasonable accommodations in the form of a “desk-
   job accommodation” and its failure to do so was a violation of their legal
   obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff bears the burden of
   requesting reasonable accommodations, and if no reasonable accommodation
   can be made to plaintiff’s prior job, the plaintiff also bears the burden of
   proving that another “available position exists that [she] was qualified for and
   could, with reasonable accommodations, perform.” Jenkins v. Cleco Power,
   LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). “For the accommodation of a
   reassignment to be reasonable, it is clear that a position must first exist and
   be vacant. Under the ADA, an employer is not required to give what it does
   not have.” Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997).
   Cyrilien proffers no evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact that
   such a position existed and was vacant. She points to deposition testimony of
   TDCJ’s accommodations coordinator, Terry Bailey, who stated that desk
   jobs existed at TDCJ. Specifically, when asked if she had “seen any of those
   light-duty work options . . . at TDCJ,” Bailey replied that she had. Cyrilien,
   however, offers no evidence that she was qualified for these positions, or that

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   any such position existed or was vacant at the time her employment was
   terminated.
           Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record to create a genuine
   dispute of material fact that Cyrilien could have performed any job, even with
   reasonable accommodations. Cyrilien’s own doctor submitted a statement in
   support of her claim for long-term disability benefits stating that Cyrilien was
   totally impaired from working and estimating her return-to-work date as
   February 2021. A plaintiff who has submitted a “sworn assertion in an
   application for disability benefits that she is… ‘unable to work’ will appear to
   negate an essential element of her ADA case”—namely, that she can
   perform the essential functions of her employment position— and as such,
   “must proffer a sufficient explanation” to account for the “apparent
   contradiction.” Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 483 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (citing Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806–07 (1999)).
   The district court found this precept to be important, stating that Cyrilien
   did not offer a sufficient explanation to account for the apparent
   contradiction, and that Cyrilien “represented under oath she is disabled,
   unable to work, and at the same time claiming entitlement to the job she can’t
   perform.” We agree with the district court and find that Cyrilien offers no
   explanation for the apparent contradiction.
           As such, we find that the district court did not err in finding that
   Cyrilien is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” foreclosing her
   failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act. 1 We AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           1
             Because we hold that Cyrilien is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” an
   essential element of her prima facie case under the Rehabilitation Act, we do not address
   whether she was subject to an adverse action solely because of disability.

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