Court Opinion

ID: 9865001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:20:06.444379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:45.135820
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Butlee
dissenting.
The decision in this case is (,such a radical departure from principles that seem to me to be well established, that it is impossible for me to concur in the decision, or in the opinion by which it is attempted to support it.
1. As to Parker’s negligence. In the opinion it is said that Parker’s “culpability appears conclusively from the evidence.” I do not so understand the record. True, Reasoner’s testimony is that Parker made a statement that may be construed as an admission that he was negligent. Parker testified that he might have said that he was either negligent or careless, but that he did not think he was careless; that he did not think he said what Reasoner testified he said. The majority opinion treats this as conclusive of Parker’s guilt. It declares that “if the case had gone to the jury, and if they had found him guiltless in the face of his half-hearted, but nevertheless convincing admissions, we should unhesitatingly direct that the verdict be set aside.” The record discloses, the following situation: Parker had the right of way. The car driven by Beckman (who, all parties agree, was negligent) approached the intersection from the left. There was evidence from disinterested eye witnesses, as well as from Parker, tending to show that the Parker car was traveling at a moderate rate of speed and was not exceeding the speed limit; that Parker was traveling at the rate *105of about 20 miles per hour as he approached the intersection; that the Beckman car was going at a speed of 30 to 40 miles per hour; that it entered the intersection without any diminution of speed and proceeded without the application of brakes; that there was no checking of its speed until the collision; that it proceeded either in a straight line, or, if it turned away from a straight line prior to the accident, it turned a little to' the left and then was turned again to the right, directly into the path of the Parker car; that the Parker car was under control, and that as soon as Parker observed that the Beckman car was coming into the intersection despite Parker’s right of way under the Colorado Springs ordinances, Parker immediately turned his car to the right, applied his brakes, and attempted to avoid the accident, but was unable to do so; that Parker applied his brakes within a few feet after entering upon the paving; that as a result of the accident the Parker car was swung around in a half circle, remaining on its wheels, and the Beckman car turned over twice, and stopped 105 to 150 feet south of the point of collision. On the other hand, there was evidence which, together with the evidence concerning Parker’s admission, tended to show that Parker was negligent. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence. Besides, different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the facts and circumstances that were not in dispute. It requires no citation of authorities to show that in the circumstances disclosed by the record, the question whether or not Parker was negligent was one for the jury to determine. It was a question of fact for the jury, not one of law for the court. Such question was submitted to the jury in the companion case of Parker v. Ullom, 84 Colo. 433, 271 Pac. 187. It should have been submitted to the jury in this case.
2. As to the damages. The majority opinion proceeds upon the theory that, as there was no conflict in the evidence to the effect that the deceased was the husband of the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was widowed and her chil*106dren made fatherless, that Plympton had been earning $90 per month, and that the mortality table gave deceased a life expectancy of 28.18 years, the amount of damages recoverable is a simple matter of calculation; and that such calculation should be made, not by the jury, but by the court. I am impressed with the idea that the matter is not so simple as the majority opinion assumes that it is. There are cases where the amount of damages may be determined by mathematical computation. In such cases the court may make the computation and instruct the jury as to the amount. Baldwin v. Central Sav. Bank, 17 Colo. App. 7, 67 Pac. 179. But in actions for death by wrongful act the problem is not so simple. In such cases the amount of damages suffered depends upon a variety of circumstances and future contingencies. It “cannot be determined with mathematical exactness.” Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Gunning, 33 Colo. 280, 80 Pac. 727. Much latitude must be given the jury in estimating the damages. The plaintiff is entitled to a sum equal to the net pecuniary benefit that she probably would have received from her husband if he had not been killed. The jury may consider the husband’s age, health, life expectancy, condition in life, habits of industry or otherwise, ability to earn money, actual earnings, disposition or lack of disposition to provide for the plaintiff, and his habits of sobriety or otherwise; and from these and other circumstances determine the amount of benefit that plaintiff probably would have received from her husband had he lived. Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 Pac. 348; Pierce v. Connors, 20 Colo. 178, 37 Pac. 721; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer, 27 Colo. 313, 61 Pac. 606; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Gunning, supra ; Mollie Gibson C. M. & M. Co. v. Sharp, 5 Colo. App. 321, 38 Pac. 850; 8 R. C. L., p. 827.
That there are still further uncertainties to be considered is shown by the following quotation from the opinion in Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer, supra: “In considering this question, account should be taken of his *107liability to illness, Ms incapability of further exertions by reason of age, and that he might, on account of his years, conclude to retire from active work; that in all probability his age would soon incapacitate him from discharging his duties as an employe in the bank, in which he was engaged; that if‘he did continue to earn money for a portion of his expectancy of life, he would at least expend a part so earned for personal use during the remaining years. All these are contingencies which must be considered. ’ ’
Jurors, drawn as they are from different occupations and with varied experience and wide opportunity for observation, are peculiarly fitted to determine such matters. In Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Gunning, supra, we said: “Necessarily, then, in determining the amount of damages in cases of this character, where future contingencies and a variety of circumstances must be taken into consideration, the award must be left to turn mainly upon the sound sense and deliberate judgment of the jury. Their own observation, experience and knowledge respecting these matters, conscientiously applied to the facts and circumstances of the case, would be important for them to consider in determining the amount of the award.”
As to the right of jurors to consider the facts in connection with the knowledge and experience possessed by them in common with men in general, see also Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442.
In the majority opinion it is assumed that in ascertaining life expectancy, one has merely to consult the mortality table. This is a mistake. That table is'receivable in evidence, “together with other evidence as to health, constitution, habits and occupation” of the person. C. L. § 6536. In determining the life expectancy of Plympton, this court is doing what a jury should be permitted to do. In Alabama Mineral R. R. Co. v. Jones, 114 Ala. 519, the court said (p. 533): “The court at the request of the plaintiff instructed the jury that if deceased was, at the *108time of Ms death, in good health and of sober habits, and was 48 years of age, his expectancy of life was as much as eighteen years. This charge was an invasion of the province of the jury. In assessing damages, in cases like this, it devolves upon the jury, upon consideration of all the circumstances bearing, upon the subject, as disclosed by the evidence, to ascertain what the duration of -the party’s natural life would have been. There is no method of .ascertaining it, as a positive fact. The period fixed, in any case, is necessarily an inference drawn from many conditions and circumstances. In the same case, different minds of equal intelligence, might reach different conclusions. The tables of mortality, computed upon the experience of life insurance companies, which, being of such universal recognition, courts will judicially notice', are not conclusive that the life expectancy of any particular person, though in good health and of sober habits, should be declared to be the period they estimate. It may be stated as a fact generally known that in the system of insurance many conditions enter, as factors, in the determination of the hazards and duration of a person’s life. Though good health and sober habits, at the time, prevail, there may be other physical infirmities creating extraordinary hazard; such, for instance, as heritable diseases in ancestors, undue relation of height to weight, and the like. Again, the occupation the party pursues-is of weighty consideration — whether or not involving-extraordinary risk and danger. These may all be matters of evidence before the jury, in a given case, and it is for that body to draw the proper inference as to the real duration of the party’s natural life. In the present case, not only the age, goqd health and sober habits of the deceased were shown in evidence, but he was pursuing an occupation attended with unusual dangers. The charge was bad, in that it withdrew that fact from the consideration of the jury, as well as, because it made the court to draw the inference which it was alone the province of the jury to draw.”
*109The question of the amount of damages to be awarded was a jury question. In adjudging that the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $5,000, the trial court invaded the province of the jury.
3. As to the effect of the motions for a directed verdict. The majority opinion sets out a part of the proceedings. For a better-understanding of the situation, the entire proceedings should be considered. After the evidence on both sides was in, Parker moved for a directed verdict in his favor. Whereupon Beckman moved for a directed verdict in his favor; and the plaintiff then moved for a directed verdict for $5,000 in her favor against both defendants. Thereupon the following proceedings were had:
“The Court: The effect of all parties joining in a motion for a directed verdict is a stipulation that there are no facts to be submitted to the jury, and the Court may direct a verdict, so there is nothing for the jury to do unless you wish the jury to remain in attendance during the judgment of the Court.
“Mr. Hutton [attorney for Parker] : If your Honor please, in response to your Honor’s suggestion, it is my understanding that the defendant Parker has a right at this stage of the case to make a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant Parker, and to ask that the same be ruled upon; that in the.event such a motion should be overruled, or not allowed, it would be the right of the defendant Parker then to have the case submitted to the jury on any disputed facts.
‘ ‘ The Court: That is not the law, Mr. Hutton. In four or five decisions of the Supreme Court, where all parties have joined in a request for a directed verdict, it has been held that that is in effect a stipulation that there are no facts to be submitted to the jury, and that the Court may either direct a verdict or enter judgment; and that will be the holding in this case, because that is the situation here.
*110“Mr. Hutton: So I understand, if your Honor please, and I wish to be understood, as far as making this motion on my part is concerned on behalf of the defendant Parker, that we make it with a reservation, in the event that the motion should be overruled, of our right to a submission of the issues of the case to the jury. So I understand, that whatever right the defendant has to present and have heard and ruled upon a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, that right can in no measure be affected by the action of other parties in the case. Now, if your Honor proposes, as your Honor has indicated, that in view of the motion for directed verdict as made by the defendant Parker, and the motion which has followed for a directed verdict on behalf of the plaintiff, and the motion for directed verdict by the defendant Beckman to treat these motions as having the legal effect of a waiver of a right to the submission of the issues in the case to the jury, and has the conclusive legal effect of presenting the case to the Court for a final decision so far as the trial Court is concerned, without any later submission, in any event, of the issues to the jury, we are frank to say to the Court that we are disposed to withdraw the motion and to submit the case to the jury; but do so only in view of the indicated proposal of your Honor in the light of the motions that have been made to treat the case as one in which the jury is wholly waived and the case is submitted to the Court for his decision.
“The Court: Do you now ask leave to withdraw your motion with the qualifications which you have indicated?
“Mr. Hutton: Yes. I would like also to say to your Honor, that we think it would be error to decline to consider the defendant Parker’s motion for a directed verdict at this stage of the case, except upon condition that it be regarded as a waiver of the right to any submission of the issues to the jury.
“The Court: It is my opinion, from the decisions of the Supreme Court, that you are not permitted to make *111a stipulation in open court, that being the effect of the motions, and then withdraw from the effect of the motions, and it will not be permitted.
“Mr. Hutton: Save our exception to the ruling of the Court.
“The Court: Now, I want to know whether you want me to keep the jury. I am going to determine the case. Is there any objection to my entering a judgment, or do you want the verdict directed? That question has never been passed on by the Supreme Court.
“Mr. Strachan [attorney for plaintiff] : I think we should not excuse the jury unless by stipulation of all parties.
“The Court: I will hear you on your motion. I might suggest now that if you desire to submit the motion without argument I will determine it, and there may be a motion for a new trial, or you may argue it now and I will dispense with the motion for a new trial.
“Mr. Hutton: I would like to present the matter now, if your Honor please.
“The Court: Very well.
(Argument of counsel to the Court)
“The Court: The Court denies the motion of the defendant Parker and the defendant Beckman for a directed verdict, and in doing so I am acting upon the law as I conceive it to be, that when all parties join in a request for a directed verdict it is a stipulation that there are no facts to be submitted to the jury, or if there are any facts that they may be determined by the Court.
“Mr. Hutton: May I ask at this time, on behalf of the defendant Parker, that the Court submit to the jury in this case the issue as to whether or not the defendant Parker was guilty of negligence proximately causing the death of the decedent, Hercules Plympton, and also that the Court submit to the jury for its determination the issue as to whether or not, either by virtue of independent negligence on the part of Plympton himself, as one of those riding in the Beckman car, or by virtue of the exist*112ence of a joint enterprise in which, they were all principles and agents of each other, the decedent Plympton was guilty of contributoiy negligence; and further, that the Court submit to the jury, if your Honor please, the issue as to whether or not the plaintiff in this case has been damaged under the evidence to the extent that is claimed by her.
‘ ‘ The Court: The request is denied.
“Mr. Hutton: Save my exception.
“The Court: The findings of the Court are, that the decedent Plympton was not guilty of negligence and that the defendants in this action were both guilty of negligence, the proximate cause of the death, and that there is no evidence of a joint enterprise or common venture in the case. Those findings may be modified, after a consideration of them, but that is the effect of the findings.
“Mr. Hutton: We except to the findings of your Honor, except to your Honor’s overruling of the defendant Parker’s motion for directed verdict, and we except to any action on the part of the Court directing the jury to bring in a verdict for the plaintiff in this case, and particularly in the light of the request of the defendant Parker that the issue of negligence on his part, and of contributory negligence, and the issue with reference to common enterprise, be submitted to the jury for its findings and determination.
“Thereupon, the Court directed the jury to return the following verdict (omitting the formal portions thereof): “We, the jury, duly empaneled and sworn in the above entitled cause, do, upon our oaths, find the issues herein joined in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, and assess her damages in the sum of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars;”
Counsel for Plympton contend that the request by both parties for a directed verdict was a waiver of the right to have the jury pass upon disputed facts, and in effect was a stipulation that the facts may be found by the court, the same as though the case, by stipulation, had *113been tried to the court without a jury. That contention is upheld in the majority opinion. It is said that we have repeatedly decided that the effect of motions by both parties for a directed verdict is a submission of the cause to the court on both the law and the facts. Prior to the decision in the present case this court never decided that such motions had that effect where either party made known his wish to have the jury pass upon the facts. Let us consider the cases.
In Saxton v. Perry, 47 Colo. 263, 107 Pac. 281, the rule is stated thus: “Where at the close of the testimony, each party moves for a directed verdict and neither party, after a ruling on such motions, requests the submission of any fact question to the jury, the decision of the court has the effect of a general verdict, and is a finding upon all fact questions, in favor of the successful party.”
In that case the court was not requested to submit any question of fact to the jury. It was not intimated, at any stage of the proceedings, that either party wished the jury to pass upon the facts; and because no such request was made, the court held as it did. In all other cases where such a situation was presented, this court has made the same ruling. In the Saxton case, after stating the law in the words quoted above, and quoting the language of Circuit Judge Adams in Michigan Home Colony Co. v. Tabor, 141 Fed. 332, 72 C. C. A. 480, the court said, “This principle is supported by a mass of cases, both from the federal and state courts, ’ ’ citing cases, in not one of which did either party request that the facts be submitted to the jury. Among those cases we find Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, 15 Sup. Ct. 566. That case was followed in Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison Ry. Co., 210 U. S. 1, in which the court said:
“It was settled in Beuttell v. Magone, supra, that where both parties request a peremptory instruction and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed and in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences proper to be drawn from them. *114But nothing in that ruling sustains the view that a party-may not request a peremptory instruction, and yet, upon the refusal of the court to give it, insist, by appropriate requests, upon the submission of the case to the jury, where the evidence is conflicting, or the inferences to be drawn from the testimony are divergent. To hold the contrary would unduly extend the doctrine of Beuttell v. Magone, by causing it to embrace a case not within the ruling in that case made. The distinction between a case like the one before us and that which was under consideration in Beuttell v. Magone has been pointed out in several recent decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeals. It was accurately noted in an opinion delivered by Circuit Judge Severens, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Minahan v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., (70 C. C. A. 463) 138 Fed. Rep. 37, 41, and was also lucidly stated in the concurring opinion of Shelby, Circuit Judge, in McCormack [McCormick] v. National City Bank of Waco, (73 C. C. A. 350) 142 Fed. Rep. 132, where, referring to Beuttell v. Magone, he said (p. 133):
“ ‘A. party may believe that a certain fact which is proved without conflict or dispute entitles him to a verdict. But there may be evidence of other, but controverted, facts, which, if proved to the satisfaction of the jury, entitles him to a verdict, regardless of the evidence on which he relies in the first place. It cannot be that the practice would not permit him to ask for peremptory instruction, and, if the court refuses, to then ask for instructions submitting the other question to the jury. And if he has the right to do this, no request for instructions that his opponent may ask can deprive him of the right. There is nothing in Beuttell v. Magone, supra, that conflicts with this view when the announcement of the court is applied to the facts of the case as stated in the opinion.’ ”
In the case of In re Iron Clad Mfg. Co., 116 C. C. A. 642, the court said: “We find nothing in the various motions made at the close of the case to preclude the *115bankrupt from asking that tbe issues be sent to the jury. The fact that each party asks for a peremptory instruction to find in his favor does not submit the issues of fact to the court, so as to deprive either party of the right to ask other instructions, and to except to the refusal to give them, or to deprive him of the right to have questions of fact submitted to the jury, where the evidence on the issues joined is conflicting, or divergent inferences can be drawn therefrom. Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154.” And see Sena v. American Turquoise Co., 220 U. S. 497, 31 Sup. Ct. 488; Hover v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. (C. C. A., 8th Circuit), 17 Fed. (2d) 881; Koehler v. Adler, 78 N. Y. 287; Kirtz v. Peck, 113 N. Y. 222, 21 N. E. 130; Shultes v. Sickles, 147 N. Y. 704, 41 N. E. 574; Sundling v. Willey, 19 S. Dak. 293, 103 N. W. 38; Manska v. San Benito Land Co., 191 Iowa, 1284, 184 N. W. 345.
In the Saxton case, supra, we adopted the rule announced in the Beuttell case, supra. We have rendered no decision that has overruled the decision in the Saxton case, or that in any manner has weakened or qualified it. On the same state of facts the same principle was .announced by this court, in substantially the same words, in O’Brien v. Galley-Stockton Shoe Co., 65 Colo. 70, 173 Pac. 544, and by the Court of Appeals in Butcher v. Butcher, 21 Colo. App. 416, 122 Pac. 397, and Nisbet v. Siegel-Campion L. S. Co., 21 Colo. App. 494, 516, 123 Pac. 110. In the O’Brien case the court based its ruling upon the Saxton case, no request having been made to submit the facts to the jury.
As a conclusive justification for the decision, the majority opinion (paragraph 3) quotes certain expressions occurring in several late Colorado cases. There is a failure to notice the well-recognized distinction that exists between a decision by the court and the language used in an opinion. Opinions always should be considered in connection with the facts before the court; divorce them, and confusion and error naturally result, as in the present case. In Wadsworth v. Union Pac. Ry. *116Co., 18 Colo. 600, 33 Pac. 515, Mr. Justice Elliott (p. 610) quoted the following from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 97: “It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all ofher cases is seldom completely investigated. ’ ’
It was said by Mr. Justice Campbell in Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hanna, 73 Colo. 162, 168, 214 Pac. 550, that a statement made in an opinion ‘ ‘ should be read in the light of the facts”; and by Mr. Justice Garrigues in Montgomery v. Colorado Springs & I. Ry. Co., 50 Colo. 210, 214, “An opinion is only authority on the point decided”; and by Mr. Justice Lamar in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220, 234, 33 Sup. Ct. 32, “What was said in the opinion must be limited, under well-known rules, to the facts and issues involved”; and by Mr. Justice Shiras in Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45, 51, 18 Sup. Ct. 521, “It is trite to say that general principles announced by courts, which are perfectly sound expressions of the law under the facts of a particular ease, may be wholly inapplicable in another and different case”; and by Mr. Justice White in United States v. Eaton, 169 U. S. 331, 348, 18 Sup. Ct. 374, “general language must be confined to the precise state of facts with reference to which it was used”; and by Chief Justice Marshall in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 333, “But that decision is not supposed to be a precedent for Ogden v. Saunders, because'the two cases differ from each other in a material fact; and it is a general rule, *117expressly recognized by the. court in Sturgis v. Crowninsbield, that the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with the facts on which it is made. ’ ’ And see Louisville & N. R. Co. v. County Court of Davidson, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 637, 695.
The language quoted from Saxton v. Perry, supra, applied strictly to the facts in that case. Every part of it was necessary to a decision of the case; it ivas the decision. Each and every part of the rule announced in that case is an inseparable part thereof. The rule can no more be split up, and one of its parts considered by itself, without destroying the rule, than can the sentence “The fool hath said in his heart ‘There is no God’ ” be treated in a similar way without destroying its meaning.
Consider the cases cited and relied upon to support the present decision.
The quotation from Watkins v. Security Benefit Association, 81 Colo. 66, 255 Pac. 452, illustrates what may happen when a court quotes general language, but fails to consider the facts. An examination of the abstract in that case shows that there was no disputed question of fact to be submitted to the jury. The trial court held that, “as a matter of law, * * * the plaintiff has not proven a case.” It appears, therefore, that the trial judge confined himself, as he should, to the purely judicial duty of deciding a question of law; he did not assume to perform the duties of a jury.
The language quoted from McGhee Investment Co. v. Kirsher, 71 Colo. 137, 204 Pac. 891, shows that there was no conflict in material evidence; hence there was no jury question, and, naturally, no request to submit the facts to the jury was made. The statement as to what would happen “if the situation were otherwise” is dictum.
In McLagan v. Granato, 80 Colo. 412, 252 Pac. 348, the facts were submitted to the jury after both parties moved for a directed verdict. If that case had been followed in the present case, the facts would have gone to the jury, as Parker requested.
*118In Cascade Auto Co. v. Petter, 72 Colo. 570, 212 Pac. 823, the court was not requested to submit the facts to the jury. That being the situation, the court properly held that the whole case was submitted to the judge. In support of its ruling, the court cited, inter alia, Beuttell v. Magone, supra, and Nisbet v. Siegel-Campion L. S. Co., supra.
In Boldt v. Motor Securities Co., 74 Colo. 55, 218 Pac. 743, neither party requested the submission of the facts to the jury.
The same situation existed in Commonwealth Casualty Ins. Co. v. Kuhrt, 75 Colo. 175, 225 Pac. 251, in which Saxton v. Perry, supra, was cited as authority for the ruling; and in Catlin v. Moynihan, 76 Colo. 164, 230 Pac. 1114, and in Butts v. Sauve, 79 Colo. 317, 245 Pac. 713, where the court cited Saxton v. Perry, supra, in support of the decision.
In each and every case cited in paragraph 3 of the majority opinion (except the McLagan case) the facts were the same as in the Saxton case; namely, motions for a directed verdict were made by both parties, and neither party requested the submission of any fact to the jury. The general language in the opinions, therefore, as we have seen, “must be confined to” that “precise state of facts.” So confined, the decision in each case, as in the Saxton case, was that, where .both parties move for a directed verdict, and neither party requests the submission of any fact to the jury, the decision of the court has the effect of a general verdict, and is a finding upon all fact questions in favor of the successful party.
4. The argument in paragraph 4 of the majority opinion, based upon the power of this court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, requires but slight notice. Rules are made in two ways; by formal adoption by the court sitting en bmic, and by decisions of cases submitted to the court. When the court decides a point of practice, it “prescribes” a rule of practice; but it requires a decision by the court to accomplish that result. It has al*119ready been shown that previous to the present one, there never has been a decision by this court adopting such a rule as the court has established and made retroactive in this case.
5. In regard to the reference, in paragraph 5, to the rule concerning the submission of special interrogatories, it requires no argument to show that the question of special interrogatories is not involved in this case.
6. The law encourages the disposition of law points before submitting the facts to the jury; a decision of the former may settle the case, thereby dispensing with a trial on the facts. Thus, upon demurrer to the complaint, the court may decide that, assuming the truth of all that the plaintiff alleges, he is not entitled to judgment. This dispenses with a trial on the facts. So, upon demurrer to an answer, the court may decide that the facts pleaded do not defeat the plaintiff’s right to a judgment. In such case, also, no trial on the facts is necessary. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence in a jury trial, the defendant may believe that, as a matter of law, the facts proven by the plaintiff do not entitle the plaintiff to a judgment. To have this law question determined, he moves for a nonsuit. If the court decides against the defendant, the trial on the facts — to the. jury, not to the judge — proceeds. When all the evidence is in, the plaintiff or the defendant may believe that, as a matter of law, and without a determination of the disputed facts, he is entitled to judgment. By a motion for a directed verdict, he presents to the court this question — purely a law question. If the court decides this question of law against him, the case goes to the jury, the sole trier of facts. Why should the procedure be different in case both parties submit to the court this question of law, and one of the parties makes it clear to the court at any time during the proceedings that he insists upon having the disputed facts submitted to the jury in the event of the court’s deciding against him on the law question? The decision in the present case abolishes a general practice of long standing, *120a practice that is convenient, useful, just — one that recognizes the separate functions of judge and jury, and confines the judge within the limits prescribed by law. Only when it appears that a party intended to waive a jury trial should he be held to have waived it. Section 191 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “In actions * * * for injuries, an issue of fact must be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered, as provided in this Code.” Did Parker waive his right to a jury trial on the issues of fact? He did not. Both before and after the court intimated what its ruling on the motions for a directed verdict would be, Parker’s attorney, as we have seen, not only requested the court to submit to the jury all questions of fact, but vigorously insisted upon his client’s right to have that course pursued. Repeatedly it was made clear to the trial court that Parker did not intend to waive that right, and would not and did not consent to the substitution of the judge for the jury as the trier of the facts. His motion for a directed verdict submitted to the court a question of law —that, and nothing more. Plympton’s counsel, who have shown no lack of diligence, have not called to our attention a single case where, upon a record such as this, or remotely resembling this, it has been held that a trial judge was entitled to perform the duties of a jury; nor is any such case cited in the majority opinion. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that there is no such case.
The right to a jury trial is a valuable right; so much so, that the Constitution (art. 2, § 23) provides that such right shall remain inviolate in criminal cases. Indeed, in some criminal cases the right probably cannot be waived. In cases where a waiver is permitted, a person should not be held to have waived a jury trial unless it appears that he intended to waive it. To say that in this case Parker intended to waive his right to have the jury pass upon the facts? would be an astounding state*121ment, one that is flatly contradicted by the record. In holding him to a waiver in the face of such a record as ’we have before us, this court, in my opinion, has done an injustice, and has taken a position in which it stands, and doubtless will continue to stand, alone.
The judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
When Mr. Justice Walker was a member of this court, he expressed concurrence in views now embodied, in substance, in this dissenting opinion. Before announcement day his term of office expired.
Mr. Chiee Justice Dsisnsorr concurs in this dissenting opinion.