Court Opinion

ID: 9706892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:54:30.497111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.738457
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the evidence of appellant Hill’s assault on Ms. Duncan approximately four months before her death was admissible under the motive exception of Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 16, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (1964). I also agree with my colleagues’ concern that “the lengthy parade of witnesses to prove the earlier incident was far more than necessary to establish that Hill had a motive to kill his former girl friend; indeed, it took up almost half of the trial.” Ante at 63. I cannot agree, however, with the majority conclusion that we may review only for plain error because defense counsel’s objection to admission of this “other crimes” evidence was not sufficient to embrace “the redundancy and excessiveness of that evidence.” Ante at 63.
Defense counsel vigorously objected to admission of evidence concerning Hill’s previous assault on Duncan. Counsel argued, unsuccessfully, that motive, malice, and state of mind were not in dispute and that the evidence, therefore, was inadmissible. Counsel also argued, unsuccessfully, that this evidence was more prejudicial than probative, especially because the government would be using it to establish Hill’s propensity for violence.
I believe defense counsel’s objection to any evidence about the prior assault is equivalent to an objection to every bit of such evidence. I do not understand why a party who objects to any (and thus every) item of other crimes evidence must — to avoid plain error review on appeal — keep registering that concern as each detail, or each witness, is presented, as the majority opinion clearly suggests.1
I believe that an unqualified objection to each proffered category of other crimes evidence, before any testimony has begun, should be understood as a continuing objection that extends to every witness and detail.2 Thus, the trial court’s initial ruling *65that the proffered Drew evidence would be more probative than prejudicial should have remained under continuous trial court scrutiny, subject to a ruling that “enough is enough” once increasing prejudice had begun to exceed probative value. Obviously, a trial court, in ruling on an other crimes proffer, will often not be able to appreciate at the outset how prejudicial the evidence can become as the trial progresses; the relationship between probative value and prejudicial impact may change as the quantity of other crime evidence builds. In another context — a motion to sever as to defendants or offenses at a joint trial — we have recognized that the trial court has a continuing obligation to monitor for prejudice and to sever if prejudice appears at any point in the proceedings. See Sousa v. United States, 400 A.2d 1036, 1041 (D.C.) (citing Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 516, 80 S.Ct. 945, 948, 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1960)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979); see also Ready v. United States, 445 A.2d 982, 987-88 n. 10 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1025, 103 S.Ct. 1279, 75 L.Ed.2d 498 (1983). The same approach should apply to other crimes evidence, particularly when that evidence is exhaustive, increasingly inflammatory, or otherwise prejudicial.
Here, I believe the trial court erred in tolerating “prosecutorial overkill,” ante at 64, while presenting evidence of Hill’s prior assault on Duncan. I infer from the majority’s strong cautionary language that my colleagues would agree if they were applying harmless error review. Given defense counsel’s objection, I believe such review— not plain error review — is the applicable standard here. On this record, I conclude the “overkill” was not harmless. I therefore would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. When admitting the other crimes evidence, the trial court said:
I want to make clear that the ruling that I am making today [allowing the other crimes evidence in the government’s case-in-chief] only goes to the admissibility under Drew and that the Defense does retain any other evidentiary objections that it has about this evidence as the Government offers it piece by piece.
This Drew ruling would appear to foreclose any requirement that the defense continually object to the introduction of other crimes evidence on Drew grounds — in contrast with the court’s view that defense counsel retained the right to object to each piece of evidence on any other eviden-tiary basis, such as hearsay. See Clark v. United States, 412 A.2d 21, 30 (D.C.1980).

. As we have said in another context:
The government contends that we must review Wilkins’ claim of error under the plain error standard set forth in Watts v. United States, 362 A.2d 706, 709 (D.C.1976) (en banc), because defense counsel failed to object when the prosecutor actually read Pipkin’s grand jury testimony aloud in front of the jury. We do not agree. An objection to evidence, once made and overruled, need not be renewed to the same type of evidence subsequently received. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 52, at 132 (3d ed. 1984); 88 CJ.S. Trial § 122 (1955). It is clear from the record that defense counsel made three separate attempts to object to the prosecutor’s improper method of refreshing the witness’ recollection. Once the court implicitly overruled the objection by allowing the prosecutor to proceed, defense *65counsel did not need to object again to preserve his claim of error on appeal.
Wilkins v. United States, 582 A.2d 939, 942 n. 7 (D.C.1990).