Court Opinion

ID: 9421856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:00:14.664247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:32.883791
License: Public Domain

*509Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring specially.
What has been written on both sides of this case makes appropriate a further word from one who concurs in the judgment of the Court; but cannot join its opinion.
Unlike my brother Clark who finds this case “both clear and simple,” I consider the constitutional issue ■•’it presents most difficult and far-reaching. In my view the Court quite properly declines to decide it in the present posture of the case. My unwillingness to subscribe to the ..Court’s opinion is due to the fact that it unnecessarily deals with the very issue it disclaims deciding. For present purposes no more need be said than that we should not be drawn into deciding the .. constitutionality of the' security-clearance revocation procedures employed in' this case until the use' of such procedures in matters of this kind has been deliberately considered and expressly authorized by the Congress or the President who alone are in a position to evaluate' in the first instance the totality of factors bearing upon the necessity for their use. That much the courts are entitled to before they are asked to express a constitutional judgment upon an issue fraught with such important • consequences both to the Government and the citizen.
" Ample justification for abstaining from a constitutional decision at this stage of the case is afforded by the Court’s traditional and wise rule of not reaching constitutional issues unnecessarily or prematurely. That rule indeed has been consistently followed by this Court when faced with “confrontation” issues in .other security or loyalty cases. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331; Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535; cf. Service v. Dulles, 354 U. S. 363; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116. Adherence to that rule is, , as I understand it, the underlying basis of today’s decision, and it is on that basis that I join the judgment of the Court.
*510It is regrettable that my brother Clark should have so far yielded to the temptations of colorful characterization as to depict the issue in this case as being whether a citizen has “a constitutional right to have access to the Government’s military secrets,” and to suggest that the Court’s action today requires “the President’s Cabinet members to revoke their refusal to give” the petitioner “access to military , secrets,” despite any views they may have as to his reliability. Of course this decision involves no such issue or consequences. The basic constitutional issue is not whether petitioner is entitled to access to classified material, but rather whether, the particular procedures here employed to deny clearance on security grounds were constitutionally permissible; With good reason we do not reach that issue as matters now stand. And certainly there is nothing in the Court’s opinion which suggests that petitioner must be given access to classified material.