Court Opinion

ID: 9529179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:48:31.660019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:42.181088
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Staton, P.J.
I dissent from the majority opinion, since its reasoning is specious. First, the majority opinion assumes that there are only two potential remedies: (1) “To permit the defendant to compel the court to discharge its responsibility without further delay.”; and (2) “To require that the defendant be discharged since a new trial would serve no useful purpose.”
The first remedy, compelling the court to discharge its sentencing responsibility, has been accomplished. To compel the court to resentence Taylor would accomplish nothing. Furthermore, a resentencing would further aggravate the first delay in sentencing which extended Taylor’s sentence by seventy-two days. The majority opinion assumes that remedy (1) would be proper “in those cases where sentencing latitude exists.” Taylor was sentenced to a determinate term of five (5) years. No latitude exists.
The second remedy, discharge, is not necessary. Under Article 7, § 6 of the Indiana Constitution, the Court of Appeals is given the authority to review and revise sentences. Taylor’s sentence has been extended by seventy-two days, since the *486trial court failed to comply with Criminal Rule 11 without good cause.
A third remedy would be to reduce Taylor’s sentence by seventy-two days. This remedy, which is available under the Indiana Constitution would avoid any question of due process of law and the disproportionate relief of total discharge.1
I further dissent from the rationale of the majority opinion which gives the trial court a license to extend the thirty day limitation under CR. 11. The majority’s rationale concludes that discharge is available only when the trial court deliberately withholds sentence, or where the trial court withholds sentencing without good cause “for such a period of time as to offend basic notions of fundamental fairness. . . .” CR. 11 does not give the trial court any license to delay sentencing beyond thirty days from the verdict without good cause. Alford v. State (1973), 155 Ind. App. 592, 294 N.E.2d 168.2 Whether there is an indefinite delay in sentencing or a seventy-two day delay of sentencing without good cause makes little difference in the trial court’s position under CR. 11. None of the cases cited by the majority opinion can be considered stepping stones for an interpretation of CR. 11 which was adopted in 1970. (The oldest case cited is Smith v. Hess (1884), 91 Ind. 424, and the latest case cited in the *487majority’s rationale is Smeltzer v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 437, 185 N.E.2d 428.).
My rationale is that CR. 11 is mandatory. It is mandatory by its own terms. It provides that the “. . . trial court shall sentence a defendant . . . within thirty [30] days of the finding or verdict of guilty.” In the absence of good cause or a waiver on the part of the criminal defendant, the trial court must comply with the rule. CR. 11 is a standard of justice which may only be changed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Where there is any deviation from this rule by the trial court as in the present case, extending Taylor’s punishment seventy-two days beyond the statutory penalty, the sentencing must be corrected to conform with the rule. Fortunately, the Indiana Constitution, Article 7, § 6, authorizes this Court to review and revise sentences to conform with justice and due process of law. Therefore, I would reduce Taylor’s sentence by seventy-two days. This reduction of sentence would have the effect of reverting the time of sentencing from October 11 to July 31, which is exactly what the trial court attempted to do by its “nunc pro tune entry”.
Note. — Reported at 358 N.E.2d 167.

. I do not agree with footnote one (1) of the majority’s opinion. Any exercise of Constitutional revisionary power in Article 7, § 6 by the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Indiana. If the Indiana Supreme Court concludes that the exercise of constitutional revisionary power has gone too far or beyond good policy considerations, it can revise the sentence again to conform with its policies. The present policy of the Indiana Supreme Court under Criminal Rule 11 is that the defendant shall be sentenced within thirty days from the verdict. The Court of Appeals should take the necessary action to comply with the rule where the trial court has violated the rule. The standard of justice should remain inviolate.

. Since the case has not yet been indexed in SHEPHERD’S INDIANA CITATIONS, I would note that Alford v. State (1973), 155 Ind. App. 592, 294 N.E.2d 168 was overruled to the extent that the holding therein conflicts with the Indiana Supreme Court decision of Holland v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 216, 352 N.E.2d 752. The Holland decision focused on in futuro sentencing grounds, and the facts differed substantively from Alford, so the Holland holding does not negate Alford as authority herein.