Court Opinion

ID: 9469281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:36:20.136247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:18.612854
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority for the following reasons. The District Court’s injunctive orders enforcing the neutrality clause are unconstitutional prior restraints because they prohibit protected speech. The question whether the injunctions are valid under the Boys Market exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act is therefore irrelevant to the proper disposition of this case. I write separately, setting forth my reading of the record and my analysis of the First Amendment question. I state the facts separately for two reasons. First, I interpret the record differently than does the majority. Second, the majority omits several important elements of the record from its discussion, including the express terms of the neutrality agreement and the language of the District Court’s orders.
Dana and the UAW share a long history of collective bargaining. In 1979, they executed a Master Agreement which is currently in force. The Agreement provides that all disputes about its meaning and application shall be resolved through binding arbitration. It specifically lists the Dana facilities it encompasses, namely Dana’s twenty-four manufacturing plants. In a subsequent letter supplementing the Master Agreement, Dana stated its intention to remain neutral if the UAW attempted to organize facilities not covered by the Agreement. The letter indicated that Dana would communicate with employees “not in an anti-union manner, but in a positive, pro-Dana manner.” Dana also reserved the right to “speak out” in the event of “undue provocation” in any UAW campaign, a fact the majority fails to discuss.
This controversy arises from the UAW’s attempt in December, 1979, to organize em*648ployees of the Wix Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Dana, located in Gastonia, North Carolina. Wix’s president, Bernie Hoyle, openly opposed the UAW’s campaign. In anticipation of an NLRB election scheduled for June 12,1980, Hoyle mailed a letter to his employees on April 28, listing ten “facts” about the UAW. Hoyle was also alleged to be responsible for posting anti-union material on Wix’s bulletin boards. The UAW invoked the neutrality clause of the Master Agreement and initiated a grievance in response to Hoyle’s actions. Although the parties scheduled several arbitration hearings, they could not agree on a convenient date. As a result, they never met.
Hoyle wrote a second letter to Wix employees on June 2. One week later, the UAW petitioned the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, to enforce the neutrality agreement and to compel Dana to submit to emergency arbitration. The court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Dana “from making anti-union or anti-UAW oral or written statements or other communications” to Wix’s employees. The court also ordered Dana to remove all anti-union material from the bulletin boards and walls of the Gastonia facility. Finally, the court ordered Dana to submit to emergency arbitration.
Dana’s general counsel read the terms of the court’s order to Hoyle in a telephone conversation and told him that Dana expected his compliance. Nevertheless, on June 10, Hoyle made anti-union speeches to Wix employees during each factory shift. He also failed to remove anti-union material from the plant’s bulletin boards and walls.
On June 11, the UAW decided to postpone the election, withdrew its application from the NLRB, and filed a motion to show cause why Dana should not be held in civil contempt. After a hearing the next day on the UAW’s motion, the court held Dana in contempt of the temporary restraining order. It ordered Dana either to pay $250 per day, or to purge itself of civil contempt by: (1) sending a repudiating letter to all Wix employees; (2) giving UAW representatives access to the audiences Hoyle addressed to enable the union to address them in Hoyle’s mandatory presence; and (3) removing all anti-union material from Wix’s environs. The order also required Dana to reserve at least half of each Wix bulletin board for pro-union materials, and to give the UAW daily access to the boards.
In a memorandum opinion, the District Court justified the temporary restraining order and the contempt order by speculating that the union election might be unfair: “In this case, with the election only three days away, to permit the defendant to continue to violate its agreement to remain neutral pending even the speediest arbitration could result in an unfair election. The result of arbitration would come too late to avail the plaintiff.” (emphasis added). On June 27, the court issued a preliminary injunction against Dana, based on the facts and legal conclusions supporting its previous orders. The court also concluded that the UAW had shown the “traditional prerequisites” for injunctive relief:
It further appears that plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if defendant is not restrained from making anti-union, anti-UAW communications to its employees at Gastonia pending a disposition of this lawsuit, in that, without such relief, defendant’s Gastonia employees will continue to be subjected to anti-union, anti-UAW statements from the employer and an election may be held without plaintiff being able to remedy such violation thereby completely depriving plaintiff of any benefit from its neutrality agreement and rendering any arbitration to be held a hollow formality, (emphasis added).
The language of the injunction essentially mirrors that of the temporary restraining order.
On appeal, Dana raises numerous contentions, chief among them that the District Court’s injunction enforcing the neutrality clause is an unconstitutional prior restraint. In my view, Dana is right in this contention for the following reasons.
*649As an initial matter, I reject the majority’s conclusion that Dana has waived its arsenal of First Amendment rights by bargaining for and adopting the neutrality clause. The majority states that Dana knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently agreed to curtail communications with its employees. In support of this conclusion, it cites D. H. Overmeyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 92 S.Ct. 775, 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972). Although I agree in principle that, under appropriate circumstances, a company may validly waive its First Amendment rights and agree to remain neutral in the face of union organizing efforts, as a matter of corporate policy, the record before this court will not support a broad waiver of the right to address employees. In my view, the majority mistakenly finds a waiver of the right to speak in an addendum to a collective bargaining agreement in which Dana promises, in vague terms, to remain “neutral” with respect to union organizing efforts. The agreement itself gives no content to the word “neutral,” because Dana unequivocally retained the rights to make “pro-Dana” pronouncements and to “speak out” in certain circumstances.
The majority’s conclusions ignore the well-settled rule that waivers of First Amendment rights may be inferred only in “clear and compelling” circumstances. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C.Cir.1979). Recently this court held in National Polymer Products v. Borg-Warner Co., 641 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1981), that court enforcement of a voluntary pre-trial agreement by an injunction prohibiting outside disclosure of trial evidence was an unconstitutional prior restraint. On the issue of voluntary waiver, we said that a waiver must be “clear and compelling,” and “narrowly construed” in the context of the First Amendment. Id. at 423. See also Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 452 U.S. 89, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981); Rodgers v. United States Steel Co., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976). In my view, the UAW’s neutrality clause is not a sufficiently explicit waiver to support a sweeping ban on speech. See Sambo’s v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981).
Two cases involving judicial enforcement of CIA employment contracts illustrate the proper waiver analysis. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the CIA’s standard secrecy agreement, which requires CIA employees to submit proposed manuscripts to the CIA for review and censorship before publication. In United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 553, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972), the Fourth Circuit held that judicial enforcement of an identical secrecy oath was not an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. Snepp, however, did not squarely answer the question whether one may validly contract to be subject to a prior restraint. Rather, the Court sanctioned the imposition of a constructive trust on profits earned by a former employee through breach of the CIA’s standard secrecy agreement. In Snepp, breach of a contract purporting to waive the First Amendment right to uncensored publication was punished retrospectively, not prospectively.
I discuss these cases for two reasons. First, they exemplify the rigor with which the “clear and compelling” standard must apply to First Amendment waivers. As a condition of employment, both Snepp and Marchetti signed contracts that expressly recited national security considerations. The contracts required the applicants to waive their right to uncensored publication, after first reading the Espionage Laws, Act of June 25, 1948, as amended. Moreover, the contracts required clear disavowal of any ownership interest in information and intelligence gathered during tenure with the CIA. In short, the CIA contract was a clear, unambiguous and compelling waiver of a valuable rights.
Furthermore, both Snepp and Marchetti, fairly read, turned on the presence of compelling state interests — national security and confidentiality. The Supreme Court characterized Snepp’s relationship to the CIA as that of a fiduciary, which carries “an extremely high degree of trust.” 444 *650U.S. 507, 509, 100 S.Ct. 763, 765, 62 L.Ed.2d 704, 709. The Fourth Circuit was careful to note in Marchetti that “the law would probably imply a secrecy agreement had there been no formally expressed agreement ...” 466 F.2d at 1316. No such compelling interests are present here to support inference of a valid waiver. The competing interest in this case is a pre-election atmosphere wholly favorable to the UAW. I am not persuaded that the UAW’s private self-interest shares equal footing with national security and confidentiality.
Second, Snepp and Marchetti point to the critical issue in this case, which the majority fails to address: whether court enforcement of a contractual waiver of First Amendment rights is unconstitutional state action. I reject the majority’s implicit conclusion that court enforcement of the neutrality clause is no more significant than enforcement of a private contract, without constitutional ramifications. It is clear to me that impermissible state action occurs when courts marshall their injunctive powers to enforce private agreements that operate as prior restraints on speech. As Judge Bazelon observed in Halkin :
Even where individuals have entered into express agreements not to disclose certain information, either by consent agreement, Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911, 83 S.Ct. 1300, 10 L.Ed.2d 412 (1963); or by an employment contract and secrecy oath, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 553, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972), the courts have held that judicial orders enforcing such agreements are prior restraints implicating First Amendment rights.
598 F.2d at 189-190 (emphasis added). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264, 84 S.Ct. 710, 717, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 697 (1964), the Supreme Court found sufficient state action in court enforcement of a common law rule to implicate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, noting: “[T]he test is not the form in which state power has been applied, but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.”
In order to justify court enforcement of the CIA contract’s covenant not to publish at issue in Marchetti, the Fourth Circuit first determined that the agreement itself did not violate the agent’s First Amendment rights. The agreement specifically covered only an agent’s use of classified information. The court was careful to emphasize the contract’s narrow scope:
As we have said, however, Marchetti by accepting employment with the CIA and by signing a secrecy agreement did not surrender his First Amendment right of free speech. The agreement is enforceable only because it is not a violation of those rights. We would decline enforcement of the secrecy oath signed when he left the employment of the CIA to the extent that it purports to prevent disclosure of unclassified information, for, to that extent, the oath would be in contravention of his First Amendment rights.
Thus Marchetti retains the right to speak and write about the CIA and its operations, and to criticize it as any other citizen may, but he may not disclose classified information obtained by him during the course of his employment which is not already in the public domain. 466 F.2d at 1317 (footnote omitted).
The court went on to say that “the risk of harm from disclosure is so great and maintenance of the confidentiality so necessary” as to warrant an administrative system of prior restraint. Id. at 1317.
It is clear from these cases that, although one may contract to waive one’s First Amendment rights and to submit to prior restraint in a clear and unambiguous contract, a court’s power to enforce such a bargain is narrowly circumscribed by the constitutional prohibition against judicial prior restraint. National Polymer Products, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., supra. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., supra; Rodgers v. United States Steel Co., supra. A court order enforcing a promise not to speak or publish transforms purely private action into state action, which is subject to strict *651constitutional scrutiny. Thus, such an injunctive order must not operate as a prior restraint, either by its own terms or by those of the underlying agreement it enforces. In my view, injunctive enforcement of an ambiguous neutrality agreement against a party disputing its scope and application, must be judged by First Amendment standards.
Because I conclude that Dana has not waived its First Amendment rights, I need not dwell at length on the majority’s statement that Dana lacks standing to raise the First Amendment rights of Wix employees to receive information in a robust campaign atmosphere. Nevertheless, I note that the First Amendment protects the free flow of information in the marketplace of ideas, as well as an individual’s right to speak. See, e.g., Linmark Assoc. Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977).
My view is compelled not only by the First Amendment, but by national labor policy as well. This court is committed to the policy that debate in union campaigns should be vigorous and open: “It is highly desirable that ... employees ... hear all sides of the [union] question in order that they may exercise the informed and reasoned choice that is their right,” NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 1971) (citing Colonial Corp. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1970). To the extent that it frustrates this objective of national labor policy, the UAW’s attempt to shield Wix employees from its adversary’s views is misguided and paternalistic. As the Supreme Court observed in Linmark:
“There is ... an alternative to this highly paternalistic approach. That alternative is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them .... But the choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia General Assembly’s. It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.”
431 U.S. at 97, 97 S.Ct. at 1620, 52 L.Ed.2d at 164 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1829, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976).
I turn now to consider the merits of Dana’s appeal. Dana characterizes the temporary restraining order, the contempt finding, and the injunction as prior restraints of expression. Dana argues that, as such, these actions, while not unconstitutional per se, nevertheless require careful scrutiny. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (the “Pentagon Papers” case) the Supreme Court reiterated its admonition that a prior restraint bears a “heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
Traditionally, prior restraint has been defined as a “pre-determined judicial prohibition restraining specified expression .... ” Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., supra at 467 [quoting Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S.Ct. 3201, 49 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1976) ]. The District Court’s injunction unquestionably creates a prior restraint. Its purpose and effect are not to punish speech after the fact, but rather to suppress it outright. By its terms, Dana is prevented from addressing its employees about union matters. It reaches future speech and conduct that presumptively fall within the purview of the First Amendment. See, e.g. WXYZ, Inc. and Michigan Assoc, of Broadcasters v. Michael J. Hand, 658 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978), aff’d per curiam, 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980).
*652Next, I must consider whether the prior restraint in this case withstands scrutiny. First, it must fit within one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the prohibition against prior restraints. For example, a court may validly restrain speech or information that is of such nature that it is not protected by the First Amendment. Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., supra, (citing New Jersey State Lottery Comm. v. United States, 491 F.2d 219, 222 (3rd Cir. 1974) (en banc) vacated on other grounds, 420 U.S. 371, 95 S.Ct. 941, 43 L.Ed.2d 260 (1975) (per curiam)). Second, the restraint must be necessary to prevent “direct, immediate and irreparable damage” to a competing protected interest. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., supra at 473. Finally, the restraint must be both narrowly drawn and the least restrictive means available. Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968); CBS, Inc. v. Young, supra. Judged by these standards, the injunction entered by the District Court cannot stand. For the following reasons, I reject the majority’s contrary conclusion.
First, the injunction does not fall within any exception to the prohibition against prior restraints. The injunction was entered in the context of a labor dispute. However, employer’s speech is unquestionably protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969); Florida Steel Co. v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1979). Protection for employer’s speech also springs from section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, which provides that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
This court has consistently recognized that an employer’s statements to his employees are within the guaranty of the First Amendment: “[Njeither the (Act) nor the Constitution tolerates an abridgement of the right of an employer to communicate with his employees so long as he does not attempt to infringe (their) rights ... as guaranteed by the Act.” NLRB v. Bangor Plastics, Inc., 392 F.2d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 1967). See also NLRB v. Ford, 170 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1948). Accord Nebraska Bulk Transport, Inc. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. South Shore Hospital, 571 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1978). In Auto, and Meas. Div., Bendix Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1968), we stated:
In this Circuit we have upheld the right of free speech in a Union organizational campaign and stated that its exercise should not be narrowly restricted. N. L. R. B. v. Uniform Rental Serv., 398 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1968); N. L. R. B. v. Hobart Bros. Co., 372 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1967); Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 341 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1965); Union Carbide Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1962).
[quoted in Colonial Corp. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 302, 306 (6th Cir. 1970).]
Furthermore, the question whether an employer’s anti-union expression constitutes protected speech or an unlawful threat or promise can only be determined by careful balancing, as the Supreme Court outlined in Gissel:
an employer’s free speech right to communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the Board. Thus, § 8(c) (29 U.S.C. § 158(c)) merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of “any views, argument, or opinion” shall not be “evidence of an unfair labor practice,” so long as such expression contains “no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit" in violation of § 8(a)(1)....
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the em*653ployees to associate freely, as those rights are embodied in § 7 and protected by § 8(a)(1) and the proviso to § 8(c). And any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.
395 U.S. 575 at 617, 89 S.Ct. at 1941.
With these principles in mind, I have examined the record. The District Court made no finding that Hoyle’s letters or speeches were threatening or coercive before it restrained all future anti-union speech. The court merely found them to be “anti-union” rather than “pro-Dana.” The fact that Hoyle’s statements may have violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the neutrality clause does not deprive them of First Amendment protection. Nor does it establish with virtual certainty that any future speeches, letters or postings would be impermissibly coercive. The District Court’s primary concern, however, was not for the rights of Wix employees. Rather, by its restraining order and injunction, the court attempted to give the UAW the benefit of its bargain. The court thus exalted a private interest over Dana’s right to speak freely.
The majority concludes, without support in the record, that the District Court made an implicit determination that Hoyle’s speeches and letters fell outside both First Amendment and section 8(e) protection. The UAW argues as well that the court below “may have found” that Hoyle’s expressions were unprotected before it issued any restraint. However, I decline to speculate about the District Court’s intentions and implicit findings when First Amendment interests are at stake. The record on appeal contains no express finding that Hoyle’s speech violated federal labor laws. Absent a clear and explicit determination that Hoyle’s speeches, letters, and notices are unprotected, the injunction cannot stand.1
Second, a prior restraint can only be supported by specific findings that the enjoined speech creates a “clear and present danger” or an imminent threat to a competing protected interest. E.g. Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697; 57 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931); CBS, Inc. v. Young, supra. See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). In the words of Justice Brandeis, “only an emergency can justify repression”, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (concurring opinion). The District Court made no such findings. To the extent the majority today makes such findings, it far exceeds the scope of appellate review. The District Court entered its order to prevent possible taint to the union election, and to preserve the benefit of the UAW’s bargain. The record does not convince me that an unfair election was imminent or that the UAW’s bargain was seriously threatened. Indeed, the UAW postponed the election, and thus destroyed any urgency its claim may once have had.
The District Court did not consider whether the UAW’s interests were substantial and compelling, approaching Dana’s First Amendment rights in dignity and importance. CBS, Inc. v. Young, supra. I search the record in vain for any evaluation of the implications of the temporary restraining order or the injunction, or for any finding that Hoyle’s speech would inevitably destroy the arbitration process and lead to an unfair election. Without findings to this effect, a prior restraint cannot be justified. See Alberti v. Cruise, 383 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1967).
Third, a prior restraint must not sweep too broadly. I agree with Dana that the District Court’s injunction is fatally over-broad. The court’s order enjoined future expression of all anti-union sentiments, and “other communications” with Wix employees. To the extent that it went beyond enjoining threats of reprisal or promises of *654benefits, the injunction is too broad to withstand scrutiny. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of Va., 442 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 228, 30 L.Ed.2d 184.
Finally, the District Court neither examined nor considered the alternatives available to the UAW under the federal labor laws that would have restricted Dana’s First Amendment rights less drastically than injunctive relief. The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n this sensitive field, the State may not employ means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, supra at 393 U.S. at 184-185, 89 S.Ct. at 253.
It is clear that a less restrictive alternative was, in fact, available. The federal labor laws establish a scheme of retrospective penalties for infringements of employees’ associational rights. These rights comprise the interest that the UAW ostensibly sought to protect. In no sense do the labor laws contemplate a system of prior restraint. The UAW could have filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB contesting the fairness of the election. The UAW could have then petitioned the Board to set the election aside and to order a new election, or to enter a bargaining order against Dana with respect to the Wix facility. See NLRB v. Kaiser Agri. Chem. Div. of Kaiser A & C Go., 473 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973). I reject the majority’s assumption that the express remedies of the federal labor laws are inadequate.
Furthermore, to protect its own rights, the UAW could have tried more diligently to meet Dana at the arbitration table. The record shows that the UAW itself cancelled arbitration dates. Also, the record shows Dana’s willingness to proceed to arbitration. Nevertheless, the UAW made no showing, and the court below no finding, that harm to the UAW could not have been averted by less drastic means than through prior restraint. The District Court’s orders thus fail in all respects to meet the heavy presumption against their validity.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand for entry of an order dismissing the orders granting the UAW’s motions for temporary and injunctive relief.
ORDER
A majority of the Judges of this Court in regular service have voted for rehearing of this case en banc. Sixth Circuit Rule 14 provides as follows:
The effect of the granting of a hearing en banc shall be to vacate the previous opinion and judgment of this Court, to stay the mandate and to restore the case on the docket as a pending appeal.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the previous decision and judgment of this Court is vacated, issuance of the mandate is stayed and this case is restored to the docket as a pending appeal.

. According to the UAW’s brief, the District Court noted in a memorandum dated July 9, 1980 that Hoyle threatened reprisals and also promised benefits. However, I do not consider this an adequate finding for two reasons: 1) that order was entered a full week after the injunction was granted; and 2) the order was not made part of the formal record on appeal to this court, therefore I do not consider it. In any event, the language of the injunction prohibited much more than “threatening” or “promising” speeches.