Court Opinion

ID: 9353827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:34.036134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:53.949278
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STILLWATER MINING COMPANY, §
                           §
     Plaintiff Below,      §                No. 24, 2022
     Appellant,            §
                           §                Court Below: Superior Court
     v.                    §                of the State of Delaware
                           §
NATIONAL UNION FIRE        §                C.A. No. N20C-04-190
INSURANCE COMPANY OF       §
PITTSBURGH, PA,            §
ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE     §
COMPANY, and QBE INSURANCE §
CORPORATION,               §
                           §
     Defendants Below,     §
     Appellees.            §

                         Submitted: October 26, 2022
                         Decided:   January 12, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN and TRAYNOR, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

David J. Baldwin, Esquire, Peter C. McGivney, Esquire, BERGER HARRIS LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, Martha Sheehy, Esquire (argued), SHEEY LAW FIRM,
Billings, Montana, and Kyle A. Gray, Esquire, HOLLAND & HART LLP, Billings,
Montana, for Plaintiff Below, Appellant Stillwater Mining Company.

Kurt M. Heyman, Esquire (argued), Aaron M. Nelson, Esquire, HEYMAN ENERIO
GATTUSO & HIRZEL, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Scott B. Schreiber, Esquire,
William C. Perdue, Esquire, Andrew T. Tutt, Esquire, and Samuel I. Ferenc, Esquire,
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Defendant
Below, Appellee National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburg, Pa.

John C. Phillips Jr., Esquire, David A. Bilson, Esquire, PHILLIPS, MCLAUGHLIN
& HALL, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Geoffrey W. Heineman, Esquire, Jung H.
Park, Esquire, and John J. Iacobucci Jr., Esquire, ROPERS MAJESKI, PC, New
York, New York, for Defendant Below, Appellee QBE Insurance Corporation.

John L. Reed, Esquire (argued), DLA PIPER LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Gregory
F. Fischer, Esquire, COZEN O’CONNOR, Wilmington, Delaware, Angelo G.
Savino, Esquire, COZEN O’CONNOR, New York, New York, for Defendant
Below, Appellee ACE American Insurance Company.

                                     2
SEITZ, Chief Justice:

      Stillwater Mining Company filed suit against its directors’ and officers’

liability insurers to recover the expenses it incurred defending a Delaware

stockholder appraisal action. The Superior Court granted the insurers’ motions

to dismiss after it found that Delaware law applied to the dispute and our Court’s

decision in In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals (“Solera II”) precluded coverage

for losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action under a similar D&O policy.

      The main issue on appeal is whether Delaware or Montana law applies to

the claims in Stillwater’s amended complaint. Stillwater argues that the Superior

Court should have applied Montana law because Montana has the most

significant relationship to the dispute and the parties. If Montana law applies,

according to Stillwater, it can recover its defense costs – not because the policies

cover the loss – but because Montana recognizes coverage by estoppel, meaning

the insurers are estopped to deny coverage when they failed to defend Stillwater

in the appraisal action.

      We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. Before this Court issued its

Solera II decision, the Superior Court in Solera I held that D&O insureds could

recover losses incurred in a stockholder appraisal action. Taking advantage of

the trial court’s favorable ruling, Stillwater argued that Delaware law applied to

the interpretation of the policies.     As it argued in its original complaint,

                                         3
“Delaware law applies to the principles of contract interpretation at issue in this

proceeding” and “Delaware has a strong interest in the application of its principles

of corporate law and governance in construing the directors’ and officers’ liability

insurance policies at issue in this matter.”1

         After Solera II, however, Stillwater reversed position and claimed that

Montana law applies to the policies. Its amended complaint dropped all indemnity

claims for covered losses in favor of three contractual claims for the duty to advance

defense costs and a statutory claim under Montana law. In our view, Stillwater’s

amended claims raise the same Delaware interests that Stillwater identified in its

original complaint – applying one consistent body of law to insurance policies that

cover comprehensively the insured’s directors’, officers’, and corporate liability

across many jurisdictions. Stillwater also challenges the Superior Court’s denials

of its motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice and its motion to stay

pending resolution of the action Stillwater filed in Montana. The Superior Court

did not exceed its discretion when it denied both motions.

1
    App. to Answering Br. at B275.

                                           4
                                            I.

                                            A.

       Stillwater Mining Company is a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business in Stillwater County, Montana.2 Stillwater has directors’, officers’, and

corporate liability insurance policies (the “D&O policies”) from National Union Fire

Insurance Company (“NUFI”), as primary policy issuer, and ACE American

Insurance Company and QBE Insurance Corporation, as excess insurers.3 We refer

to the three defendants together as the “Insurers.”

       The D&O policies provide that the Insurers “shall pay the Loss . . . arising

from any Securities Claim made against [Stillwater] for any Wrongful Act.”4 The

policies define “Loss” to include defense costs.5 The policies define a “Securities

Claim” as “a Claim . . . alleging a violation of any law, rule or regulation, whether

statutory or common law.”6 Under the policies, “Wrongful Act” means “any actual

or alleged breach of duty, neglect, error, misstatement, misleading statement,

omission or act by [Stillwater], but solely in regard to a Securities Claim.”7 The

2
  Unless otherwise specified, the facts are drawn from the Superior Court’s opinion, Stillwater
Mining Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2021 WL 6068046 (Del. Super. Dec.
22, 2021) [hereinafter Stillwater].
3
  The contract terms are from the primary policy. The excess policies are follow-form policies
that incorporate the primary policy’s terms and conditions. Opening Br. at 7 n.2; NUFI and QBE’s
Answering Br. at 8 [hereinafter Answering Br.].
4
  App. to Opening Br. at A0205.
5
  Id. at A0222, A0225.
6
  Id. at A0247.
7
  Id. at A0230.

                                                 5
D&O policies do not require the Insurers to provide a defense in litigation but the

Insurers “shall advance . . . covered Defense Costs” once they “received written

notice of a Claim.”8

       The D&O policies do not have a choice-of-law provision, but Stillwater

emphasizes that they contain Montana amendatory endorsements, one of which

provides for conformity with Montana law.9                 Another Montana amendatory

endorsement governing alternative dispute resolution states that “[t]he mediator or

arbitrators shall give due consideration to the general principles of the law of the

state where [Stillwater] is incorporated in the construction or interpretation of the

provisions of this policy.”10 The policies afford coverage “anywhere in the world.”11

       The D&O policies formed a tower of insurance that provided directors’,

officers’, and corporate liability coverage for claims made during the policy period

from May 1, 2016, to August 1, 2017.

                                               B.

       Stillwater was publicly traded until 2017 when Sibanye Gold Limited, a South

African mining company, acquired Stillwater in a merger and took it private.

Following the merger, some Stillwater stockholders filed an appraisal action in the

8
  Id. at A0213.
9
  Opening Br. at 7, 23–24; App. to Opening Br. at A0236.
10
   App. to Opening Br. at A0237.
11
   Id. at A0206.

                                              6
Court of Chancery under 8 Del. C. § 262, seeking the fair value of their stock.12 In

the appraisal proceeding, the petitioners claimed that Stillwater’s board and CEO

conducted a flawed and biased sale process and breached their fiduciary duty to

obtain fair value for Stillwater stock.

       In April 2017, Stillwater notified the Insurers of the appraisal demands and

requested approval to incur defense costs.13 NUFI advised Stillwater in June 2017

that it would be issuing a disclaimer letter in response to the notice of appraisal

demands, but it did not do so.14 Neither ACE nor QBE accepted coverage for the

demands.15

       On July 31, 2019, the Superior Court held in Solera I that a D&O policy

covered a Delaware stockholder appraisal action because it alleged a violation of

law and thus was a covered “securities claim” under the policy’s definition. 16 Both

Stillwater and the Insurers agree that the D&O policies in the current case are

substantially similar to the relevant portion of the policy in Solera I.17 Stillwater

contends that Solera I was the first time any court in the country addressed insurance

coverage of a Delaware appraisal action under a D&O policy. Thus, according to

12
   Id. at A0173. The petitioners filed multiple appraisal actions which were consolidated into In
re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co., C.A. No. 2017-0385-JTL. Id.
13
   Id. at A0184.
14
   Id. at A0185.
15
   Id.
16
    Solera Holdings, Inc. v. XL Specialty Ins. Co., 213 A.3d 1249, 1256 (Del. Super. 2019)
[hereinafter Solera I].
17
   App. to Opening Br. at A0185; Answering Br. at 10.

                                               7
Stillwater, both before and after Solera I, the appraisal action “at least potentially

implicated the D&O policies’ coverage for Securities Claims” and triggered the

Insurers’ duty to defend.18

       In August 2019, the Court of Chancery found after trial that the fair value of

Stillwater stock on the valuation date was the transaction price of $18 per share.19

The court also found that the petitioners failed to show a flawed and biased sale

process. As required by statute, the court awarded interest to the petitioners. The

petitioners appealed, and this Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s judgment.20

       Stillwater notified the Insurers of the Court of Chancery’s decision and

demanded reimbursement of defense costs and statutory interest payments.21 Shortly

after, Stillwater received NUFI’s notice denying coverage for the appraisal action.

NUFI explained that “[t]he Appraisal Action is not a Claim alleging a violation of

any law, rule or regulation and as such does not assert a Securities Claim . . . .

Moreover, the Appraisal Action did not allege a Wrongful Act.”22

       After unsuccessful mediation efforts, on April 13, 2020, NUFI filed a

declaratory judgment action against Stillwater in the Superior Court and sought a

declaration that the D&O policy did not cover losses from the appraisal action. In

18
   Opening Br. at 9.
19
   In re Appraisal of Stillwater Min. Co., 2019 WL 3943851, at *61 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019).
20
   Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund, Ltd. v. Stillwater Min. Co., 240 A.3d 3 (Del. 2020).
21
   App. to Opening Br. at A0186.
22
   Id.

                                                8
response, Stillwater filed its own action in the Superior Court against NUFI, ACE,

QBE, and other excess insurers seeking coverage for defense costs and statutory

interest payments from the appraisal action.23

                                                C.

       Against the backdrop of Solera I, Stillwater alleged in its original complaint

that “Delaware law applies to the principles of contract interpretation at issue in this

proceeding” and “Delaware has a strong interest in the application of its principles

of corporate law and governance in construing the directors’ and officers’ liability

insurance policies at issue in this matter.”24 The complaint was limited to indemnity

claims. In other words, Stillwater sought to recover its defense costs and statutory

interest payments as covered losses under the policies’ indemnity provisions, not

under a contractual duty to advance defense costs.25 Stillwater also filed a motion

for judgment on the pleadings in NUFI’s declaratory judgment action, relying

primarily on Solera I. The Superior Court stayed briefing on the motion pending the

appeal of Solera I. The court then consolidated NUFI’s declaratory judgment action

with Stillwater’s coverage action.

23
   Stillwater dropped the other excess insurers in its amended complaint and left only NUFI, ACE,
and QBE as defendants.
24
   App. to Answering Br. at B275.
25
   Id. at B269–99.

                                               9
       On October 23, 2020, this Court reversed Solera I.26 We held in Solera II that

an appraisal action under 8 Del. C. § 262 is not a claim “for a violation of law” and

therefore not a “securities claim” under the D&O policy.27 We explained that:

       this conclusion is compelled by the plain meaning of the word
       “violation,” which involves some element of wrongdoing, even if done
       with an innocent state of mind. It is also compelled by section 262’s
       historical background, its text, and by a long, unbroken line of cases
       that hold that an appraisal under section 262 is a remedy that does not
       involve a determination of wrongdoing. Rather, it is a remedy limited
       to the determination of the fair value of the dissenters’ shares as of the
       effective date of the merger or consolidation.28

       In reaction to Solera II, Stillwater filed a complaint against the Insurers in

Montana state court.29 And, on the same day, Stillwater filed in the Superior Court

a motion to dismiss its Delaware action without prejudice or, in the alternative, for

leave to file an amended complaint. The court denied the motion for voluntary

dismissal but allowed the motion to amend.

       Stillwater amended its complaint and no longer sought to recover the statutory

interest payments – only defense costs – and dropped all indemnity claims. The

amended complaint had four counts: (1) breach of contract against NUFI for its

failure to advance defense costs for the appraisal action; (2) breach of contract for

failure to advance defense costs against ACE and QBE; (3) declaratory judgment

26
   In re Solera Ins. Coverage Appeals, 240 A.3d 1121 (Del. 2020) [hereinafter Solera II].
27
   Id. at 1121.
28
   Id. at 1132.
29
   Opening Br. at 14. On November 24, 2021, the Montana court granted the Insurers’ motion to
stay the Montana action pending resolution of this case. Answering Br. at 13.

                                             10
against all Insurers for breach of the duty to advance defense costs; and (4) violation

of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“MUTPA”) against all Insurers for

improper claims handling. After the amended complaint, Stillwater reversed course

and argued that Montana law, not Delaware law, applied to the dispute.

       The Insurers moved to dismiss Stillwater’s amended complaint for failure to

state a claim. After the parties briefed and argued the motions to dismiss, Stillwater

filed a motion to stay pending resolution of the Montana action. The Superior Court

denied the motion to stay and found that it was filed too late and essentially sought

to reargue its voluntary dismissal motion.30

       The Superior Court eventually granted the Insurers’ motions to dismiss for

failure to state a claim.31 The court first assumed an actual conflict existed between

Delaware and Montana law after it found that Stillwater advanced a plausible

argument that Montana law imposed on an insurer a higher burden and more

significant consequences than Delaware law for refusing to defend. The court then

relied on our Court’s decision in RSUI Indem. Co. v. Murdock32 and held that

Delaware, as the state of Stillwater’s incorporation, had the most significant

relationship to the D&O policies and the dispute and therefore Delaware law applied.

Finding that Solera II barred coverage for the appraisal action, the court held that

30
   App. to Opening Br. at A0602.
31
   Stillwater, 2021 WL 6068046, at *12.
32
   248 A.3d 887 (Del. 2021).

                                          11
Stillwater failed to demonstrate that its insurance policies afforded coverage for the

alleged loss. Also, the court was not persuaded that Montana law should apply to

the newly pled claims-handling counts. The Superior Court reasoned that “[t]he

application of different states’ laws to different aspects of a contractual relationship

reduces both certainty and efficiency” and ran counter to our Murdock decision

where we emphasized the importance of a single body of law to govern

comprehensive insurance programs with broad geographical coverage.33 The court

dismissed all of Stillwater’s claims with prejudice.

                                            II.

       On appeal, Stillwater argues that the Superior Court erred when it applied

Delaware law. According to Stillwater, Montana law should apply to the amended

complaint because Montana has the most significant relationship to the dispute.

Although it took the position that Delaware law should apply to the interpretation of

the D&O policies and the indemnity claims in its original complaint, Stillwater

argues that its amended claims are limited to claims handling and the duty to defend,

not coverage and indemnity.34

33
   Id. at *11 (citing Murdock, 248 A.3d at 899).
34
  In Counts I–III of its amended complaint, Stillwater based its arguments on the contractual “duty
to defend” and uses the term interchangeably with the obligation to “advance defense costs.” See,
e.g., Opening Br. at 13, 18, 32. For purposes of this case, the distinction between the duty to
defend and the duty to advance defense costs is immaterial to our ruling. We use the two terms
interchangeably here but understand that some jurisdictions draw a distinction between the two.
See, e.g., Jeff Tracy, Inc. v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
see also In re Viking Pump, Inc., 148 A.3d 633, 670 n. 163 (Del. 2016) (recognizing courts in other

                                                  12
       According to Stillwater, Montana has a strong interest in adjudicating the

newly pled claims because it strictly regulates insurance claims-handling, no parties

have their principal places of business or offices in Delaware, and the policies were

negotiated and performed in Montana. Finally, Stillwater contends that the Superior

Court exceeded its discretion when it denied Stillwater’s voluntary motion to dismiss

and motion to stay, and erred when it misapplied the relevant factors considered

when evaluating the motions.

       We review de novo the Superior Court’s choice of law35 and the grant of a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.36

The court should grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim “only if the

plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances

susceptible of proof.”37 When considering the motion, the court must “accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”38 We review the Superior Court’s denials of a

motion for voluntary dismissal and motion to stay for abuse of discretion.39 “An

abuse of discretion occurs when a court has exceeded the bounds of reason in view

jurisdictions embraced the notion that “the duty to defend and the duty to pay defense costs are
two distinct obligations”).
35
   Murdock, 248 A.3d at 896.
36
   City of Fort Myers General Employees’ Pension Fund v. Haley, 235 A.3d 702, 716 (Del. 2020).
37
   Id. (internal quotations omitted).
38
   Id. (internal quotations omitted).
39
   Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Tr., 625 A.2d 859, 868 (Del. 1993); GXP Capital, LLC
v. Argonaut Mfg. Servs., Inc., 253 A.3d 93, 103 (Del. 2021).

                                              13
of the circumstances or so ignored recognized rules of law or practice to produce

injustice.”40

                                               A.

       As an initial matter, it is important to keep in mind how Stillwater’s claims

and positions have shifted over time. In Stillwater’s original complaint, Stillwater

sought to recover its litigation expenses and statutory interest payments under the

indemnity and coverage provisions of the policies. It did not allege a separate breach

of the duty to defend Stillwater in the appraisal proceeding. Stillwater also argued

that “Delaware law applies to the principles of contract interpretation at issue in this

proceeding” and “Delaware has a strong interest in the application of its principles

of corporate law and governance in construing the directors’ and officers’ liability

insurance policies at issue in this matter.”41 Stillwater’s original complaint also

quoted the policies’ amendatory endorsement on alternative dispute resolution,

which directed mediators and arbitrators to give due consideration to Delaware law

when interpreting the policies.42 Thus, when it came to interpreting the insurance

policies and their indemnity provisions, Stillwater was more than content to apply

Delaware law. After all, Solera I improved its chances of success.

40
   Harper v. State, 970 A.2d 199, 201 (Del. 2009).
41
   App. to Answering Br. at B275.
42
   Id. at B290.

                                              14
       After our Court decided Solera II, which doomed Stillwater’s original

complaint, it filed an amended complaint. The new complaint dropped its indemnity

claims and brought new claims for breach of the duty to defend and Montana

statutory claims. Stillwater disavowed Delaware law and argued that Montana law

should apply to these claims.

       The Superior Court expressed its discomfort with Stillwater’s change of

position.43 We have the same concern. Although Stillwater changed the nature of

its claims, Counts I–III of the amended complaint still allege “breach of contract”

claims.44 As we explain below, the same Delaware policy interests identified earlier

by Stillwater in its original complaint still apply to the amended breach of contract

claims.

                                               B.

       In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London v. Chemtura Corporation, we set

forth a three part test to determine the choice of law in a dispute before the Delaware

courts: “i) determin[e] if the parties made an effective choice of law through their

contract; ii) if not, determin[e] if there is an actual conflict between the laws of the

43
    Stillwater, 2021 WL 6068046, at *1 (“Arguably, the plaintiff is bound by its previous
representations to this Court.”).
44
   Count III sought a declaratory judgment that Stillwater was obligated to advance defense costs
in the appraisal action. We treat the breach of contract counts and the declaratory judgment count
as essentially the same – asserting as a declaratory judgment the contractual right to advanced
defense costs under the insurance policies.

                                               15
different states each party urges should apply; and iii) if so, analyz[e] which state

has the most significant relationship” to the claims.45

       The parties did not specify a choice of law in the insurance policies. And, as

the Superior Court found, Stillwater made a plausible argument that Delaware and

Montana law conflicted when it came to duty-to-defend claims. Our Court has not

recognized coverage by estoppel.46 Montana has recognized coverage by estoppel,

which means that when an insurer “refuses to defend a claim and does so

unjustifiably, . . . [it] is estopped from denying coverage and becomes liable for

defense costs and judgments.”47             The Montana Supreme Court in Tidyman’s

Management Service. Inc. v. Davis found the insurer liable for breach of the duty to

defend without deciding whether the claims were covered under the policy.48

45
   160 A.3d 457, 464 (Del. 2017) (footnotes and citations omitted).
46
   The Superior Court appears to have declined to apply coverage by estoppel. See Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WL 697943, *4 (Del. Super. Mar. 16, 2005), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 956 A.2d 1246 (Del. 2008) (holding
the insurer’s breach of the duty to defend did not constitute a waiver of coverage defenses);
McLewin v. Hill, 1998 WL 109840, at *8 (Del. Super. Feb. 18, 1998) (“As a general rule, . . .
estoppel . . . cannot operate to bring within a policy’s coverage property, risks or losses which the
policy’s terms expressly or otherwise exclude.”). The Insurers argue that “Solera II conclusively
establishes that there is no coverage as a matter of law” and therefore “there is no duty to defend”
under Montana law. Answering Br. at 33. But the Insurers cite no Montana cases where a legal
decision on a coverage issue precluded a breach of the duty to defend claim. Indeed, the argument
is inconsistent with the Montana cases, cited above, which suggest estoppel and coverage are
separate issues. Further, the argument does not fully explain whether the Insurers’ refusal to
defend before Solera II was a breach of the duty to defend under Montana law.
47
   Tidyman’s Mgmt. Servs. Inc. v. Davis, 330 P.3d 1139, 1149 (Mont. 2014) (internal citation
omitted).
48
   330 P.3d at 1149 (finding the duty to defend was breached when the insurer defended the
insured’s federal case, thus acknowledging the claims were potentially covered by the policy, but
later declined to defend a state case against the insured raising similar claims).

                                                16
Recently in National Indemnity Company v. State, the Montana Supreme Court

again found that “[e]stoppel is applied without regard to coverage defenses or

considerations.”49 Thus, with a conflict of laws, “the next step is to assess which

state has the most significant relationship to the contract and the parties to the

contract” using the considerations in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.50

                                           C.

       Section 193 of the Second Restatement “provides a presumption for insurance

contracts[] that, as a general matter, the law of the state ‘which the parties understood

was to be the principal location of the insured risk’ should be applied because that

state will have the most significant relationship.”51 If “some other state has a more

significant relationship to the transaction and the parties, . . . the local law of the

other state will be applied.”52

       But when, like here, the insurance policies are part of a comprehensive

program insuring risks that are not confined to a single jurisdiction, the presumption

is only “directionally helpful but arguably not conclusive.”53 In this instance, the

trial court’s attention should turn to the “broader subject-matter-specific factors” in

Section 188, which set forth the relevant contacts to consider when examining the

49
   499 P.3d 516, 536 (Mont. 2021).
50
   Chemtura, 160 A.3d at 464.
51
   Id. at 465.
52
   Second Restatement § 193.
53
   Chemtura, 160 A.3d at 467.

                                           17
different states’ relationships to the insurance policies.54     In other words, the

“presumption does not apply” to the policies in this appeal “which provide broad-

based coverage across many jurisdictions for a company’s enterprise-wide risks.”55

                                            D.

       Section 188 of the Second Restatement has “five factors to use to decide which

state has the most significant relationship:”56

       (a) the place of contracting,
       (b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
       (c) the place of performance,
       (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
       (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
       of business of the parties.57

When weighing the five factors, the court reviews them in the context of the

overarching choice-of-law considerations in Section 6 of the Second Restatement:58

       (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
       (b) the relevant policies of the forum,
       (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
       interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
       (d) the protection of justified expectations,
       (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
       (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
       (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.59

54
   Id. at 465, 467.
55
   Id. at 465.
56
   Id.
57
   Id. (citing Second Restatement § 188).
58
   Id. at 468.
59
   Second Restatement § 6.

                                            18
       In Murdock, we applied the Second Restatement and found that Delaware has

strong interests at stake for D&O policies issued to Delaware corporations.60 We

held “the state of incorporation is the center of gravity of the typical D&O policy”

and the California contacts, where the insured was headquartered, were insufficient

to tip the balance away from Delaware.61 Specifically, we found that 8 Del. C. § 145

intended to permit “Delaware corporations to provide broad indemnification and

advancement rights to their directors and officers and to purchase D&O policies to

protect them even where indemnification is unavailable,” and that applying

“‘Delaware law to the D&O policies that actually cover those costs advances the

relevant policies of the forum.’”62

       In Chemtura, we reversed the trial court’s decision when it applied, on a

claim-by-claim basis, different states’ law depending on where environmental

claims arose.63     We found a claim-by-claim review frustrated the intent of

“comprehensive insurance programs to have a single interpretive approach utilizing

a single body of law.”64 We reiterated in Murdock that when the policies were “part

of a comprehensive insurance program addressing risks across corporate operations

in multiple jurisdictions, the selection of a single interpretive approach, i.e., one

60
   248 A.3d at 900–01.
61
   Id. at 901.
62
   Id. at 900 (quoting Calamos Asset Management, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of
America, 2020 WL 3470473, at *3 (D. Del. June 25, 2020)).
63
   160 A.3d at 459.
64
   Id. at 460.

                                            19
state, as opposed to many, whose law would apply with regard to where a claim

arose, would best serve the parties’ expectations.”65

                                                   E.

                                                   1.

        As it did in the Superior Court, Stillwater once again tries to distinguish

Murdock by stressing the company’s connections to Montana, but those connections

are essentially the same as those that came up short in Murdock. The insurer in

Murdock advocated for California law by pointing to California connections almost

identical to those here – the location of its headquarters and the place where

negotiation and procurement of policy coverage took place.66 Our Court found that

the “emphasis on physical location underrates the significance of [the company’s]

status as a Delaware corporation—an entity formed and existing by virtue of the

Delaware Constitution and the Delaware General Corporation Law. As such, [the

company] is every bit a ‘citizen’ of Delaware as it is of California.”67 We held that

the alleged California contacts, when balanced “against Delaware’s interest in

protecting the ability of its considerable corporate citizenry to secure D&O insurance

65
   Murdock, 248 A.3d at 899.
66
   Id. at 897-98.
67
   Id. at 901. Stillwater argues that the current case is about corporate liability rather than directors’
or officers’ liability. This does not distinguish the case from Murdock because “we must examine
the insurance contract as a whole to determine its subject matter.” Id. at 900. The subject matter
of the policies here is directors’, officers, and corporate liability, and we have found “Delaware
has specific policies that affect this subject matter as expressed in 8 Del. C. § 145.” Id.

                                                   20
and thereby attract talented directors and officers,” were not “sufficient to tip the

balance toward California.”68

                                               2.

        Stillwater also argues that the policies have Montana amendatory

endorsements, and one endorsement states that the policy “conform[s] to the

minimum requirements of Montana law.”69 We agree with the Superior Court that

the Montana amendatory endorsements do not alter the balance of factors in this

case.   As the Superior Court held, “those provisions are neither unusual nor

sufficiently strong enough to tip the scale in favor of applying Montana law.”70 And,

as the Superior Court explained, “Delaware courts have declined to give those

provisions dispositive weight in a conflict of laws analysis.”71 It is also important to

note that a Montana amendatory endorsement covering alternative dispute resolution

points in the other direction – “[t]he mediator or arbitrators shall give due

consideration to the general principles of the law of the state where [Stillwater] is

incorporated in the construction or interpretation of the provisions of this policy.”72

68
   Id.
69
   Opening Br. at 23–24.
70
   Stillwater, 2021 WL 6068046, at *10.
71
   Id. (first citing Sycamore Partners Mgmt., L.P., 2021 WL 4130631 (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 2021);
then citing Murdock, 248 A.3d at 898; finally citing Pfizer Inc. v. Arch Insurance Co., 2019 WL
3306043, at *7 (Del. Super. July 23, 2019)).
72
   App. to Opening Br. at A0237.

                                               21
                                              3.

       In what might be considered its main argument on appeal, Stillwater claims

that Delaware does not have the strong interest present in Murdock because, unlike

in Murdock, the current iteration of the complaint is about claims handling, not

policy coverage. Stillwater points to what it claims is Montana’s heightened

vigilance over duty-to-defend claims and its application of coverage by estoppel.

       This argument fails for two reasons. First, we disagree that this dispute should

be characterized as a claim-handling dispute. Instead, it is mainly a contract dispute

involving the interpretation of the parties’ obligations and rights under the D&O

policies.73 As noted earlier, Stillwater has already taken the position that, for

purposes of its earlier indemnity claims, Delaware law should apply to interpretive

questions. By focusing narrowly on the claim-handling aspect when deciding which

law to apply, a trial court would be required to apply different laws to the same

contract depending on whether the claim is for indemnity or for breach of contract

for failure to advance defense costs. In Chemtura and Murdock, we emphasized the

importance of applying a single body of law to comprehensive insurance policies

like those here.

73
  See Chemtura, 160 A.3d at 459–60 (characterizing the dispute as a contract dispute involving
the interpretation of the insurance policies rather than about the underlying insurance claims).

                                              22
       Second, Stillwater has not shown that Montana has a relatively greater interest

than Delaware for the current dispute, which involves D&O policies purchased by a

Delaware corporation and an appraisal action brought in Delaware. Stillwater has

recognized that, in an insurance dispute, the Montana legislature intended Montana

law to apply if the “performance of the contract occurred in Montana.” 74 It argues

that Montana is the place of performance here. But the Montana Supreme Court’s

decision in Tidyman’s, cited extensively by Stillwater, undermines this argument.

There, the Court noted that the D&O policy provided that the place of performance

was anywhere in the world and thus Montana was only one of the anticipated places

of performance.75 Because the insured’s underlying action was brought and settled

in Montana, the Court in Tidyman’s found Montana to be the place of performance.76

Here, the D&O policies can be performed “anywhere in the world,” including

Delaware, and the underlying appraisal action was brought by shareholders of a

Delaware corporation in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Montana does not have

a stronger relative interest in this case than Delaware.

74
   Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1147 (citing Mitchell v. State Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703, 708–09 (Mont.
2003)). See also Mont. Code Ann. §28-3-102 (West); Opening Br. at 16–17.
75
   Tidyman’s, 330 P.3d at 1149.
76
   Id. Stillwater argues that because the D&O policies here only require the Insurer to “advance
the defenses” – not to defend Stillwater in court – the place of performance is Montana where
Stillwater would receive the advancement. Opening Br. at 22–23. But Tidyman’s was also about
the obligation to advance the defense costs. 330 P.3d at 1165.

                                               23
                                                4.

       Stillwater has conceded that, if Delaware law applies to its contract claims, it

cannot recover its costs. With the dismissal of Stillwater’s duty-to-defend claims in

Counts I–III, its MUTPA claim also fails. The MUTPA claim is based on the same

theory that the Insurers mishandled the insurance claims. Stillwater does not argue

that the choice-of-law analysis on this claim should be any different from the duty-

to-defend claims. Thus, Delaware law applies and Stillwater has no private right of

action under Delaware’s comparable statute.77 Nor would a different choice of law

provide Stillwater a meaningful victory because even if we apply Montana law to

Count IV, Stillwater still cannot recover under the MUTPA when there is no breach

of the duty to advance defense costs.78 Stillwater spent one paragraph arguing

without support that its MUTPA claim could “go forward even if the insurer did not

77
   See, e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Brown Robin Capital, LLC, 2020 WL 3096744 (Del. Ch. June 11,
2020) (where Delaware law governs the contract and the plaintiff’s claims were for fraud and
securities violations, the court dismissed claims asserted under other states’ statutes); Hilb Rogal
& Hobbs Co. v. Rick Strategy Partners, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:05CV355, 2006 WL 5908727, at *11
(E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2006) (where Georgia law applies to the claims, the court dismissed Virginia
statutory claims). See also 18 Del. C. § 2301, et seq.; GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Green, 276 A.3d
462, 462 n.79 (Del. 2022) (TABLE) (“[T]he Delaware Unfair Trade Practices Act does not create
a private right of action.”); Peterson v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., 2015 WL 4154070, at *3
(Del. Super. July 9, 2015) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held that 18 Del. C. § 2301, et seq. . . .
does not provide for a private cause of action.”).
78
   Truck Ins. Exch. v. O’Mailia, 343 P.3d 1183, 1188 (Mont. 2015) (holding district court properly
dismissed insured’s counterclaims under MUTPA after granting insurer summary judgment that it
had no duty to defend or indemnify); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Matthew Grieshop, 2021 WL
1209564, at *14 (D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2021) (dismissing claims under MUTPA after finding the
insurance policy afforded no coverage and there was no breach of duty to defend); Dunluck v.
Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. – UK Branch, 2022 WL 684377 (D. Mont. Mar. 8, 2022) (same).

                                                24
breach the insurance contract.”79 The case it relies on, Graf v. Continental Western

Insurance Company, involves neither the duty to defend nor a breach of an insurance

contract and is inapposite.80

                                              III.

       Finally, Stillwater claims that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in

denying Stillwater’s motion for voluntary dismissal and its motion to stay. For the

voluntary dismissal motion, the question before the Superior Court was whether

there would be any “plain legal prejudice” to the defendants by voluntary

dismissal.81    The court considers: (1) the defendants’ effort and expense in

preparation for trial; (2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the

plaintiff in prosecuting the action; (3) insufficient explanation for the need to take a

dismissal; and (4) whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the

defendant.82

       The Superior Court denied Stillwater’s motions after it found that Stillwater

had not offered a sufficient explanation for the need to dismiss the Delaware action

and pursue the claims in Montana.83 Specifically, the court noted that Stillwater

79
   Opening Br. at 35–36.
80
   89 P.3d 22 (Mont. 2004).
81
   Draper, 625 A.2d at 863.
82
   Id. at 864.
83
   App. to Opening Br. at A0153. Stillwater argues that the court’s finding incorrectly put the
burden on Stillwater to show a sufficient explanation instead of requesting the Insurers to show
insufficient explanation. Opening Br. at 39. This argument draws a non-existent distinction
between a finding of no sufficient explanation and a finding of insufficient explanation.

                                              25
previously asserted that Delaware law should apply, and even if Montana law ended

up applying, the court was capable of applying foreign law.84 The court also found

that granting dismissal after the adverse ruling of Solera II would promote forum

shopping and would result in piecemeal litigation because NUFI’s declaratory

judgment claims would still remain.85

       The Superior Court did not exceed its discretion. It is well within the trial

court’s discretion to deny a motion for voluntary dismissal based on forum shopping

concerns.86 The motion – filed simultaneously with the Montana action after Solera

II – was a tactical decision to avoid adverse Delaware precedent. Stillwater argues

that it was NUFI that forum shopped because it first filed the declaratory judgment

in Delaware. But Stillwater ignores the fact that it, too, filed a complaint in Delaware

and then affirmatively argued for the application of Delaware law.

       With the motion to stay, Stillwater concedes that “the issue of the stay depends

upon resolution of the conflict-of-laws issue.”87 Having resolved the conflicts-of-

laws issue against Stillwater, we affirm the denial of the motion to stay.

84
   App. to Opening Br. at A0152–55.
85
   Id.
86
   See AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2155695, at *5 (Del. Super.
Aug. 18, 2005) (denying motion for voluntary dismissal and finding “plain legal prejudice from
what is perceived as mere forum shopping to obtain a litigation advantage”); In re Walt Disney
Co. Derivative Litig., 1997 WL 118402, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 1997) (“[D]efendants will suffer
prejudice if plaintiffs may dash in and out of a forum based on tactical considerations and an
assessment that their case looks weak in light of the governing law in a particular jurisdiction.”).
87
   Reply Br. at 26.

                                                26
                                IV.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

                                 27