Court Opinion

ID: 9541842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:58.658637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:59.730661
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
WAKATSUKI, J.
I respectfully dissent
I disagree with the majority’s construction of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-700(9) as applied to HRS § 707-736(1 )(b). The majority’s interpretation of HRS § 707-700(9) concludes that defendant’s fondling of the breast of a girl who is under fourteen years of age does not violate that statute which prohibits the intentional touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person who is less than fourteen years old simply because her nightgown prevented contact with her skin. The majority arrives at this conclusion by relying heavily on the fact that the definition of “sexual conduct” in HRS § 712-1210(8) specifically refers to physical contact with a person’s “clothed or unclothed” intimate parts, whereas HRS § 707-700(9) does not.
*445I fail to comprehend how the comparison of two different sections under two different chapters of our penal code can logically lead to the conclusion adopted by the majority. Chapter 712 is entitled “Offenses Against Public Health and Morals” and § 712-1210(8) falls under Partll entitled “Offenses Related To Obscenity”, whereas Chapter 707 is entitled “Offenses Against The Person” and § 707-736( 1 )(b) falls under Part V entitled “Sexual Offenses.” The term “sexual conduct." as defined in § 712-1210(8), is used primarily in connection with prohibitions against certain visual displays, specifically, displaying indecent matter and promotion of pornography whereas the term “sexual contact," as defined in § 707-700(9), is used in connection with physical crimes against the person.
Moreover, the term “sexual conduct” is used primarily in sections of Chapter 712 where the issue of whether the intimate parts are clothed or unclothed is pivotal in determining guilt or innocence.1 Therefore, in enacting laws prohibiting indecent displays or promotion of pornography, our legislature obviously took into account that issue when it defined “sexual conduct” in HRS § 712-1210(8) to include physical contact with a person’s clothed as well as unclothed sexual parts.
Furthermore, the fact that similar sexual abuse statutes that served as models for Hawaii’s sexual abuse laws were ultimately clarified to explicitly include clothed touching does not necessarily mean that Hawaii’s unmodified definition is susceptible to a contrary interpretation. Cf. State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60 (Me. 1978) (A statute that was subsequently amended to expressly include contact through clothing was held to include such contact even prior to the amendment.).
I do not agree with the majority that the “sexual contact” definition can reasonably be construed to exclude clothed touchings. HRS § 707-700(9) defines “sexual contact” as including “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person.” (emphasis added). There is nothing in the statute which expressly requires that the touching of an intimate part be upon the skin. Cf. Miles v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 188, 247 S.W.2d *446898 (1952). A plain and natural reading of the statute strongly suggests that a person who rubs a female child’s breast through her nightgown is engaging in “any touching” of her breast. The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982) gives as its first definition of “touch”:
To cause or permit a part of the body, esp. the hand or fingers, to come in contact with so as to feel.
This definition indicates that the essence of the act of touching is contact that permits perception by the sense of feeling. Clearly the interposition of a nightgown will not prevent an actor from feeling whatever is directly beneath it. See Resnick v. State, 574 S.W.2d 558, 559-560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
The primary legislative purpose of a sexual abuse statute which prohibits sexual contact with children under fourteen years old is to protect children of tender ages and immaturity, and who may be incapable of protecting themselves, from conduct that may severely traumatize them as well as inflict serious emotional and psychological damages. State v. Samson, 388 A.2d 60 (Me. 1978). The psychological and emotional impact of a sexually motivated fondling of an intimate part does not disappear nor is it lessened simply because the intimate part is covered. It is clear and evident that our legislature has expressly indicated its desire to protect children from sexual molestation by enacting sexual abuse statutes. Therefore, it is inconceivable that our legislature intended to permit a person to derive sexual gratification by fondling an underaged girl’s breast simply because there is no direct contact with her skin

HRS § 712-1211 prohibits certain public displays which reveal
the person with less than a fully opaque covering over his or her genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, or depicting the person . . . engaged in an act of sexual conduct ....
HRS § 712-1210(7)(b) makes a similar reference to “sexual conduct” in defining pornography for minors.