Court Opinion

ID: 9917367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 06:04:59.662065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:35.483623
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362478
                                                                     St. Clair Circuit Court
DUSTIN DAVID TUCKER,                                                 LC No. 21-001372-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(a),1 second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1), and unlawful imprisonment, MCL
750.349b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of life imprisonment
without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, 11 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the second-
degree arson conviction, and 8 to 15 years’ imprisonment for the unlawful imprisonment
conviction. We affirm.

                                     I. OVERVIEW OF FACTS

        Defendant’s convictions arise from the May 28, 2021 strangulation death of Danielle
Smith, whose body was subsequently set on fire. The prosecution presented evidence that
defendant was in a relationship with his then live-in girlfriend, Shelby Cesefske, but also was
secretly involved in a relationship with Smith. Smith created certain Facebook posts about
defendant, including that she was pregnant with his child, and she shared with other people that
she and defendant were engaged. In response to Cesefske’s complaints about Smith, defendant
made comments to Cesefske about Smith being crazy and his intentions to kill Smith, who had a

1
  Defendant was charged with first-degree murder under alternative theories of first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b). The jury found
defendant guilty of first-degree murder under both theories. The trial court sentenced defendant
for first-degree premeditated murder.

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medical condition that limited her ability to walk without assistance and to use the stairs. The
prosecution’s theory at trial was that defendant planned to kill Smith because she was causing
recurring problems in his relationship with Cesefske, and that he subsequently went to Smith’s
house, carried or dragged her into the basement, strangled her, and then set her body on fire to
cover up evidence of the crime. Smith’s heavily charred body was discovered the next morning.

        Surveillance video from Cesefske’s residence and another nearby residence, as well as
cellular record maps, captured many of defendant’s movements around the time of Smith’s death.
Facebook messages and defendant’s recorded police interview were also admitted at trial. During
his interview, defendant admitted that he argued with Smith, carried or dragged her to the
basement, squeezed her neck, pushed her down, causing her head to hit the cement floor, and then
set her on fire. Defendant had scratches on his body and his DNA was found under one of Smith’s
fingernails.

       The principal defense theory at trial was that defendant did not act with premeditation. The
defense also asserted that Cesefske was not a reliable witness, and she made statements against
defendant to avoid being charged. The defense argued that, on the basis of the reliable evidence
presented during trial, the jury should convict defendant of only manslaughter and second-degree
arson. The jury found defendant guilty as charged of first-degree murder, second-degree arson,
and unlawful imprisonment.

                             II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his
convictions of both first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful imprisonment, which also
served as the predicate felony for his felony-murder conviction. We review de novo a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Speed, 331 Mich App 328, 331; 952 NW2d 550
(2020). When ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support a
conviction, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Miller, 326 Mich App 719, 735; 929 NW2d 821 (2019).
“[A] reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in
support of the jury’s verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).

                                      A. PREMEDITATION

        Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the
requisite element of premeditation to support his conviction of first-degree premeditated murder.
We disagree.

        First-degree premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the
victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App
297, 301; 642 NW2d 417 (2001). Premeditation and deliberation require “sufficient time to allow
the defendant to take a second look.” People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 537; 531 NW2d
780 (1995). “That is, some time span between the initial homicidal intent and ultimate action is
necessary to establish premeditation and deliberation, but it is within the province of the fact-finder
to determine whether there was sufficient time for a reasonable person to subject his or her action

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to a second look.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 242; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “While the minimum time necessary to exercise this process is incapable of
exact determination, it is often said that premeditation and deliberation require only a brief moment
of thought or a matter of seconds.” Id. at 242-243 (quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted). “The requisite state of mind may be inferred from defendant’s conduct judged in light
of the circumstances.” Id. at 243 (citation omitted.) The following factors may be considered to
establish premeditation: “(1) the prior relationship of the parties, (2) the defendant’s actions before
the killing, (3) the circumstances of the killing itself, and (4) the defendant’s conduct after the
homicide.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 229; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “[M]inimal
circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish the defendant’s state of mind.” People v Kanaan,
278 Mich App 594, 622; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).

         The evidence (1) that defendant, who was romantically involved with Smith, was upset
about Smith’s Facebook posts and her causing recurring problems in his relationship with his live-
in girlfriend, Cesefske, (2) that defendant indicated to Cesefske that he could help Smith die and
it would occur on May 28 or 29, 2021 (3) that on May 28, 2021, defendant went to Smith’s home
and strangled her for several minutes to cause her death, (4) that he set Smith’s body on fire, and
(5) that he then returned home and told Cesefske that they did not have to worry about Smith
because her neck was broken, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient
to enable a jury to find premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt.

        A jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that defendant formed a plan to
kill Smith, particularly on the basis of his comments to Cesefske before going to Smith’s house,
his acts of dragging Smith into the basement and returning to her house with a large can of a gas
mixture that he made, and his comments to Cesefske after returning home. The evidence also
supports an inference that defendant had an adequate opportunity to take a “second look” at his
actions during the “several minutes” that, according to the medical examiner, it would have taken
for defendant to apply significant force to Smith’s neck to cause her death by manual strangulation.
Although the brutal nature of a killing or manual strangulation alone is insufficient to show
premeditation, “evidence of manual strangulation can be used as evidence that a defendant had an
opportunity to take a ‘second look.’ ” People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 733; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
The evidence that defendant announced in front of witnesses that he was having a “guy’s night
out” before going to Smith’s house and that he needed the gas can to make a bonfire, neither of
which occurred, also supports an inference that he attempted to manufacture an alibi because he
deliberated killing Smith.

        In addition, evidence that, after killing Smith, defendant dumped a gas mixture on her body
and set her on fire “to cover evidence,” which defendant admitted during his police interview,
further supports a finding of premeditation. A defendant’s attempt to conceal a killing also can be
used as evidence of premeditation. People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 641; 664 NW2d 159 (2003).
Consequently, considering the nature and circumstances surrounding the killing, a jury could have
rationally inferred that defendant acted on a decided course of action rather than an unplanned
impulse. The evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of first-degree
premeditated murder.

       Defendant essentially argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction
because the prosecution failed to present evidence to show that the killing did not occur in the heat

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of passion, and because, although there was evidence that defendant referenced assisting Smith in
committing suicide and killing Smith by drowning her, that testimony does not support a finding
of premeditation because that is not how Smith was killed. However, defendant’s challenges,
including what inferences could be drawn from the evidence, are related to the weight and
credibility of the evidence, which were issues for the jury to resolve. See Kanaan, 278 Mich App
at 619 (“This Court will not interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the
evidence or the credibility of witnesses.”).

        The jury observed video evidence that captured defendant’s movements going to and from
Smith’s residence and retrieving a large gas can, his police interview and Facebook messages, and
heard testimony about defendant’s statements and actions both before and after the killing and
Smith’s cause of death—manual strangulation. The jury was free to accept or reject the theory of
either party in light of the evidence presented at trial, and this Court will not interfere with the
jury’s role of determining issues of weight and credibility. People v Baskerville, 333 Mich App
276, 283; 963 NW2d 620 (2020). Further, this Court is required to resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the prosecution. Id. This deferential standard of review is the same whether
the evidence is direct or circumstantial, Nowack, 462 Mich at 400, and it is well established that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime,” id. (citation omitted). Applying these standards,
there was sufficient evidence to enable the jury to find the requisite element of premeditation
beyond a reasonable doubt, and this Court will not disturb the jury’s verdict.

                               B. UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT

       Defendant also argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support
his conviction of first-degree murder under the alternative theory of felony murder because there
was no evidence to support the underlying felony of unlawful imprisonment. Again, we disagree.

        First-degree felony murder requires proof that the defendant (1) killed the victim, (2) with
the intent to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily
harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result (i.e., malice), (3)
while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of a felony specifically
enumerated in MCL 750.316(1)(b). People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 318-319; 733 NW2d 351
(2007) The underlying felony in this case, which defendant now challenges, was unlawful
imprisonment. The elements of unlawful imprisonment are delineated in MCL 750.349b(1) as
follows:

             (1) A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment if he or she
       knowingly restrains another person under any of the following circumstances:

               (a) The person is restrained by means of a weapon or dangerous instrument.

               (b) The restrained person was secretly confined.

               (c) The person was restrained to facilitate the commission of another felony
       or to facilitate flight after commission of another felony. [Emphasis added.]

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The statute defines “restrain” as “to forcibly restrict a person’s movements or to forcibly confine
the person so as to interfere with that person’s liberty without that person’s consent or without
lawful authority. The restraint does not have to exist for any particular length of time and may be
related or incidental to the commission of other criminal acts.” MCL 750.349b(3)(a).

        Preliminarily, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
support the offense of unlawful imprisonment because “[n]o weapon was placed in evidence.” In
this case, however, the charge of unlawful imprisonment was not based on MCL 750.349b(1)(a)—
“[t]he person is restrained by means of a weapon or dangerous instrument.” Instead, the record
discloses that the offense, as charged, was based on secret confinement or facilitating Smith’s
murder or second-degree arson under MCL 750.349b(1)(b) or (c). Indeed, in his opening
statement, the prosecutor stated:

                Then we move to that Unlawful Imprisonment charge, these are what you’re
       really looking at, and this ties right into Felony Murder as well . . . . And then
       we’ve got those or’s in that next element. And once again, it’s the A, B or C that
       [the trial court] was doing. Defendant did so using a weapon. I’ll tell you folks
       right now, I don’t think that’s going to be argued. However, those other two prongs
       are both going to be satisfied. [Emphasis added.]

In his argument on appeal, defendant ignores that the offense of unlawful imprisonment expressly
provides alternative theories under which a defendant may be convicted.

        Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to show
that defendant restrained Smith to facilitate her murder. MCL 750.349b(1)(c). There was evidence
that because of Smith’s medical condition, she had a limited ability to walk and was unable to
walk up or down stairs. Defendant admitted that he assaulted Smith during his first visit to her
house by pushing her down while upstairs, after which he carried or dragged her down the stairs
to the basement. Drag marks on the basement floor supported an inference that Smith’s body was
dragged from the stairs to where her heavily charred body was ultimately found. According to
defendant, Smith was alive, but unconscious, when he left her house, went to his house to retrieve
a gas can, stopped by a gas station, and returned to Smith’s house. The jury could infer from this
evidence that defendant forcibly restricted Smith’s movement by carrying or dragging her to the
basement, knowing that she did not have the ability to walk up the stairs to exit the basement.
According to defendant, after he returned to the basement, Smith woke up and he then killed her
by pushing her down, causing her to hit her head on the concrete floor. In addition, according to
the medical examiner, Smith’s cause of death was manual strangulation, and the expert explained
that defendant would have had to apply force to Smith’s neck for “several minutes,” thereby
restraining her, to facilitate her murder. The crime of unlawful imprisonment can occur when the
victim is “held for even a moment.” People v Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 70; 850 NW2d 612
(2014).

         In sum, the direct and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of
fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant restrained Smith to facilitate the commission
of her murder. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to prove the elements of unlawful imprisonment
beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby satisfying the predicate-felony element of first-degree felony
murder. Nowack, 462 Mich at 400.

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Affirmed.

                  /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                  /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                  /s/ Noah P. Hood

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