Court Opinion

ID: 9703282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:49:55.742623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:47.080945
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, P.J.
(dissenting). In Kent v United States, 383 US 541; 86 S Ct 1045; 16 L Ed 2d 84 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that juveniles have a Sixth Amendment right to representation of counsel at adjudicatory proceedings. See also, In re Gault, 387 US 1; 87 S Ct 1428; 18 L Ed 2d 527 (1967). There is no question but that *581defendant would have the right to counsel at a transfer hearing today if he were a juvenile. MCL 712A.4; MSA 27.3178(598.4).
The majority correctly cites Trombley v Anderson, 439 F Supp 1250 (ED Mich, 1977), aff'd 584 F2d 807 (CA 6, 1978), as authority for the proposition that Kent does not apply retroactively to permit a collateral attack on a juvenile proceeding in which counsel was denied. However, I believe that the rtiajority extends Trombley beyond the limits of its holding when it uses it to affirm defendant’s habitual offender conviction.
In United States v Tucker, 404 US 443; 92 S Ct 589; 30 L Ed 2d 592 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld a post-conviction challenge to a defendant’s sentence premised on the ground that the sentencing judge erred when imposing sentence by considering a prior conviction of the defendant that was invalid under Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799; 93 ALR2d 733 (1963). The simple rule stated in Tucker was that where the record indicated that the sentencing judge considered a conviction invalid under Gideon an appellate court must remand for resentencing. Subsequently, the Michigan Supreme Court had opportunity to adopt Tucker and did so without equivocation. People v Moore, 391 Mich 426; 216 NW2d 770 (1974).
If it is forbidden for a sentencing judge to consider a defendant’s prior conviction that was invalid because the defendant was denied the right to counsel, does it make sense to let similar constitutionally infirm convictions in the juvenile context be the basis for sentencing enhancement pursuant to an habitual offender information? Tucker has been applied retroactively and now bars the use of constitutionally infirm convictions without *582regard to whether they occurred prior to or subsequent to its decisional date. I see no reason why Kent should not similarly be applied in the context of this case, which is not a collateral attack on defendant’s 1965 conviction. That conviction is not affected by our decision here. Defendant’s argument is simply that he was denied counsel at a critical stage in the 1965 proceeding and, as a consequence, his conviction in that proceeding should not be used today to enhance his sentence on the present charge. I agree with defendant.
I would reverse the habitual offender conviction.