Court Opinion

ID: 9846352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:45.333494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.261729
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I concur in Divisions 1 and 4 and in the judgment of the *135majority opinion, I cannot agree with Division 2 because, in my view, the evidence authorized the trial court’s determination that law enforcement officers did have probable cause to arrest appellant and his co-indictees after they exited the movie theater. As a result, I believe that it is unnecessary to reach the issues addressed in Divisions 3, 5 and 6.
The majority emphasizes the absence of an eyewitness who saw the trio at the scene of the crime, but gives little consideration to the fact that an eyewitness did see them “running like a racehorse” away from the scene. In several cases, Georgia courts have upheld a finding of probable cause to arrest a suspect in the vicinity of a recent crime having no eyewitnesses. Davis v. State, 203 Ga. App. 227, 228 (1) (416 SE2d 771) (1992); State v. Wilson, 179 Ga. App. 334 (346 SE2d 111) (1986); Davis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 312 (295 SE2d 131) (1982). See also Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 292 (1) (380 SE2d 259) (1989). If an eyewitness description is required in such instances, it will often be impossible to establish probable cause in cases where there were no eyewitnesses, such as many burglaries (e.g., Davis v. State, supra, 203 Ga. App.; State v. Wilson, supra), and in cases where the only eyewitness was the victim of murder, such as the instant case.
In reviewing a probable cause determination, we should consider “all the facts available to” the arresting officer (Hall v. State, 200 Ga. App. 585, 587 (1) (409 SE2d 221) (1991)), and not make the lack of an eyewitness description dispositive. Important facts and circumstances in this case include the following: the short time which had elapsed between the murder and the first sighting of appellant and his co-indictees; the close proximity of the location of that sighting to the crime scene; the limited number of pedestrians in the area due to the inclement weather; the direction of travel by the trio away from the crime scene; their running; and their continuing unusual and nervous behavior. See Davis v. State, supra, 203 Ga. App. at 228 (1); State v. Wilson, supra at 337; Davis v. State, supra, 164 Ga. App. at 315 (relying on United States v. Allen, 633 F2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1980)). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 44, 46 (90 SC 1975, 26 LE2d 419) (1970).
Had the officers released [appellant] ... to go and secure a warrant, they had no assurance that they would be able to find him or that any inculpatory evidence he had with him . . . would later be available.
State v. Wilson, supra at 337.
Because the trial court was authorized to find that appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. As the majority so astutely discusses in Division 4, *136there is no viable basis for a Fifth Amendment claim in this case. Therefore, the judgment of conviction should be affirmed without even reaching the harmless error analysis set forth in Division 6. There was no error.
Decided February 13, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 10, 1995.
Verna L. Smith, for appellant.
Lydia J. Sartain, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rachelle L. Strausner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this special concurrence.