Court Opinion

ID: 9407884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 18:00:51.355623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.847017
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50656         Document: 00516814700             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                         July 10, 2023
                                       No. 22-50656                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   Alfredo Alvarez, Parent of J.A., a minor child, and next friend,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Texas Education Agency,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 1:19-CV-921
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Douglas, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Alfredo Alvarez on behalf of his son, J.A., brought this suit against the
   Texas Education Agency (“TEA”). He argues that the TEA failed to create
   procedures for certain cognitively impaired students to obtain representation
   when they seek to enforce their rights under the Individuals with Disabilities
   Education Act (“IDEA”). These students include those who have turned 18,

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 22-50656

   who have not been deemed incompetent, but do not have the mental capacity
   to make their own decisions, provide informed consent, or complete a viable
   power of attorney. The IDEA includes a Special Rule which, if adopted,
   would lay the groundwork for the procedures necessary to appoint
   representation for this unprotected group. However, the district court held
   that only the Texas Legislature has the authority to enact the Special Rule
   and thus, Alvarez lacked standing. He appealed. Because the TEA does not
   have authority to adopt the Special Rule, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   judgment.
                I. Factual & Procedural Background
          A. IDEA
          The IDEA ensures that states provide necessary special education
   services to students with disabilities. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S.
   154, 157 (2017). It does so by exchanging federal funds for a promise that
   students with disabilities receive a “free and appropriate public education”
   (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael
   Z, 580 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2009). States generally fulfill this promise by
   tailoring students’ education to their “unique needs . . . by means of an
   [individualized education program].”Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)). An
   eligible child acquires a “substantive right” to such an education once a state
   accepts financial assistance under the IDEA. Fry, 580 U.S. at 158.
          Parents can dispute the enforcement of this right if they feel that the
   state is not fulfilling its promise. The authority to enforce the right, however,
   transfers to the student once he or she reaches the age of 18, unless that 18-
   year-old “has been determined to be incompetent under State law.” 20
   U.S.C. § 1415(m)(1)(B) (allowing states to transfer parental rights to a
   student who has reached majority and has not been found incompetent);
   Tex. Educ. Code § 29.017 (transferring rights). On the other hand, if an

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   18-year-old student has not been deemed incompetent but has “a lesser
   degree of diminished capacity” preventing him or her “from providing
   informed consent,” that student must look to the Special Rule. Reyes v.
   Manor Indep. Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 2017). It states:
           If, under State law, a child with a disability who has reached the
           age of majority under State law, who has not been determined
           to be incompetent, but who is determined not to have the
           ability to provide informed consent with respect to the
           educational program of the child, the State shall establish
           procedures for appointing the parent of the child, or if the
           parent is not available, another appropriate individual, to
           represent the educational interests of the child throughout the
           period of eligibility of the child under this subchapter.
   Id. § 1415(m)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.520(b). Presently, Texas has not adopted
   the Special Rule.1 Reyes, 850 F.3d at 255.
           B. Alvarez, on behalf of J.A.
           In 2019, J.A. was a student receiving special education services at the
   Corpus Christi Independent School District (the “District”) in Texas. When
   Alvarez believed that the District was not providing J.A. a FAPE, he filed a
   request for a special education due process hearing. At the time he filed this
   request, J.A. was 18 years old. Alvarez argued that the TEA had not
   developed a procedure to ensure that students like J.A. were fairly
   represented pursuant to the Special Rule. He also asked that the Special

           _____________________
           1
             See Matthew S. Smith & Michael Ashley Stein, Transfer of Parental Rights: The
   Impact of Section 615(m) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 13 Drexel L.
   Rev. 987, 995 n.22 (2021) (“While the IDEA clearly does not require states to transfer
   parental rights to students when they become adults, it is less clear whether the IDEA
   requires or merely allows states to adopt procedures for appointing educational
   representatives for adult students deemed unable to give the consent required by the IDEA.
   The IDEA’s legislative history suggests [the Special Rule] is permissive . . .”).

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   Education Hearing Officer (“SEHO”) appoint him as J.A.’s next friend
   pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44. Id. In response, the District
   argued that Alvarez did not have standing to bring the action because, as an
   18-year-old, only J.A. had that authority. The SEHO agreed with the District
   and dismissed the case for lack of standing.
           Instead of filing an administrative appeal, Alvarez brought the instant
   suit in federal court, on behalf of J.A. and other similarly situated students in
   Texas schools. He argued that the TEA denied these students a FAPE in
   violation of the IDEA and discriminated against them in violation of Title II
   of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
   (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701
   et seq. (“RA”). He also sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
   brought claims under the Texas Constitution. His prayer included injunctive
   and declaratory relief, nominal damages, and attorney’s fees.2 As part of his
   request, he sought an order requiring the TEA “to cease excluding J.A. and
   members of the [proposed class] from participation in, denying the benefits
   of, or subjecting to discrimination under any program or activity [that he or
   she] may otherwise be afforded under the IDEA.” He also sought an order
   requiring the TEA “to immediately permit a parent,” to continue
   representing his or her child after the child reaches “the age of majority,
   absent a guardianship proceeding that states otherwise.”
           When the TEA filed its initial motion to dismiss, it was denied. The
   magistrate judge determined that Alvarez had standing to bring this suit

           _____________________
           2
             Although Alvarez sought nominal damages in his complaint, he has not argued
   that such damages are redressable to satisfy standing. Because this issue would therefore
   be waived, we do not address it. See E.T. v. Paxton, 41 F.4th 709, 718 n.2 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (“[A]rguments in favor of standing, like all arguments in favor of jurisdiction, can be
   forfeited or waived.” (emphasis in original)).

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   against the TEA and recommended that he be allowed to proceed on all of
   his claims except the constitutional claims which were insufficiently pled.
   The district court adopted that recommendation in its entirety. Alvarez then
   filed a motion to certify the proposed class, and the district court denied the
   motion because he failed to meet the appropriate requirements under the
   class certification standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Later, Alvarez moved
   the district court to take judicial notice of the Texas Legislature’s Senate Bill
   2105, which sought to enact the Special Rule. In response, the district court
   stayed the case while the Texas Legislature considered the bill. When the bill
   “was left pending in committee and thus never voted on by either the Texas
   Senate or House of Representatives,” the stay was lifted, and the case
   proceeded.
          Thereafter, Alvarez sought judgment on the pleadings under Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The TEA opposed the motion and filed a
   second amended motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
   12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing inter alia that Alvarez lacked standing.
          Upon review, the magistrate judge issued a report recommending that
   the district court grant the TEA’s second amended motion to dismiss.
   According to the magistrate judge, the TEA “as a state agency, has no
   authority to enact the Special Rule; only the Texas Legislature has the power
   to amend § 29.017 of the Texas Education Code.” She further stated that
   although she “previously determined that [Alvarez] had standing to bring
   this case, the parties’ briefing of the instant motions and the introduction and
   failure of [S.B.] 2105 persuade[d]” her “that [Alvarez’s] pending requests
   for relief [were] not redressable.” She, therefore, recommended that
   Alvarez’s suit be dismissed for lack of standing and declined to “address the
   parties’ alternative arguments.” The district court adopted the magistrate
   judge’s report and recommendation and dismissed the suit without
   prejudice. Alvarez appealed.

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          Coincidently, during the pendency of this appeal, the very issue before
   us—adoption of the Special Rule—was introduced to the Texas Legislature
   again in House Bill 166. Alvarez moved this court to hold his appeal in
   abeyance “until after the legislative session is complete, so that the parties
   can determine, what if anything, still needs to be heard by this or any other
   panel.” The motion was carried with this case, but before the court issued
   this decision, Alvarez advised this court that, although H.B. 166 was passed
   in the House and referred to the Education Committee in the Senate, the
   session ended before its resolution. Accordingly, we deny as moot Alvarez’s
   motion to hold this appeal in abeyance and proceed to address his arguments
   on appeal.
                          II. Standard of Review
          “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent
   jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.”
   Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation
   omitted). It is well settled that “the issue of standing is one of subject matter
   jurisdiction.” Cobb v. Cent. States, 461 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2006). We
   “review[ ] a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”
   Gallegos-Hernandez v. United States, 688 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2012).
                                III. Discussion
          To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show inter alia that a
   favorable decision will redress their alleged injury. Lujan v. Defenders of
   Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “For a plaintiff’s claim to be
   redressable,” that showing “must be ‘likely, as opposed to merely
   speculative.’” Dep’t of Tex., Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S. v. Tex. Lottery
   Comm’n, 760 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting S. Christian Leadership
   Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 2001)). The

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   question before us is whether the TEA has the authority to redress Alvarez’s
   challenge to the State’s lack of procedures under the IDEA’s Special Rule.
          Under the IDEA, states are given the authority to set up the
   enforcement procedures for achieving the IDEA’s goals. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).
   Texas, through the TEA, administers the laws of the Texas Education Code
   and promulgates accompanying regulations. See State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341
   U.S. 22, 30 (1951) (“That a legislature may delegate to an administrative
   body the power to make rules and decide particular cases is one of the axioms
   of modern government.”). Section 29.001 of the Texas Education Code
   mandates that the TEA:
          develop, and modify as necessary, a statewide design,
          consistent with federal law, for the delivery of services to
          children with disabilities in this state that includes rules for the
          administration and funding of the special education program so
          that a [FAPE] is available to all of those children between the
          ages of three and 21.
   Tex. Educ. Code § 29.001. The statewide design must include “rules for
   the administration and funding of the special education program so that a
   [FAPE] is available to all of those children between the ages of three and 21.”
   Id.
          Additionally, as stated previously, Texas law provides that “[a]
   student with a disability who is 18 years of age or older . . . shall have the same
   right to make educational decisions as a student without a disability.” Tex.
   Educ. Code § 29.017(a). “All other rights accorded to parents under [the
   IDEA] transfer to the student.” Id. The same statute, however, states that
   “[t]he commissioner shall adopt rules implementing the provisions of 34
   C.F.R. § 300.520(b), [i.e., the Special Rule].” Id. at § 29.017(f).
          Throughout this case, Alvarez has made clear that adoption of the
   Special Rule is the primary relief that he seeks. For example, when nothing

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   came of S.B. 2105 before the Legislature, Alvarez notified the district court
   that “the Legislature once again failed to assure the civil rights of [students
   like J.A.]” and as a result, he was “look[ing] again to this court to cure the
   problem.” Similarly, in his motion to this court, he stated that H.B. 166
   would “substantially streamline if not negate the questions raised by this
   appeal.” It therefore appears that Alvarez is improperly looking to the courts
   to fulfill a task that the Texas Legislature has not completed.
          According to Alvarez, the Texas Legislature gave the TEA broad
   authority under § 29.001 and express authority under § 29.017(f) to
   implement procedures consistent with the Special Rule. As such, he argues
   that the district court erred in determining that his claims are not redressable.
   The TEA, on the other hand, contends that Alvarez lacks standing because
   he is “seeking wholesale adoption of the Special Rule,” and the “TEA
   cannot adopt it absent substantive changes to State law by the Texas
   Legislature.” The TEA emphasizes that under Texas law an individual who
   has reached the age of majority is either competent and capable of providing
   informed consent or incompetent. Because the State’s laws do not
   contemplate a middle ground, the TEA argues that it “cannot develop
   procedures under the Special Rule” until the Texas Legislature makes
   substantive changes in its law regarding the transfer of rights.
          We agree with the TEA that it lacks authority to implement
   procedural mechanisms under the Special Rule absent legislative action.
   Alvarez’s argument—that § 29.001 gives the TEA broad authority to
   develop these procedures—misses the mark. Alvarez cites Texas Advocates
   Supporting Kids With Disabilities v. Texas Education Agency, 112 S.W. 3d 234,
   236 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2003) to show an example of when the TEA has
   adopted rules consistent with the IDEA, even when it “had no specific
   statutory authority to do so.” However, the TEA does not dispute that it has
   broad authority to implement rules consistent with the purpose of the IDEA.

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   Rather, the TEA’s argument hinges on its lack of authority to develop
   procedures that are inconsistent with the rules that the Texas Legislature
   already has in place. Indeed, the TEA cannot divorce the general authority
   allotted under § 29.001 from the other provisions in the statute. See United
   States v. Atl. Rsch. Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 135 (2007).
          Alvarez’s argument—that the TEA has express authority—is
   likewise unfounded. Section 29.017(a) makes clear that an adult student with
   a disability “shall have the same right to make educational decisions as a
   student without a disability” and that all other rights “transfer to the
   student.” That is, under current Texas law, a student with a disability that
   reaches the age of majority and has not been deemed incompetent has equal
   rights as his or her counterparts that do not have a disability, and thus, must
   make decisions on his or her own behalf or seek guardianship.
   See §§ 29.017(a)-(c-3). He provides no support for the proposition that the
   TEA can bypass the legislature and institute procedural mechanisms to the
   contrary. See El Paso Cnty., Tex. v. Trump, 982 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (finding no redressability where county failed to demonstrate “a substantial
   likelihood that the requested relief [would] remedy the alleged injury in fact”
   (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
          Instead, Alvarez relies on the language in § 29.017(f) which states that
   “[t]he commissioner shall adopt rules implementing the provisions of [the
   Special Rule].” Tex. Educ. Code § 29.017(f). But he ignores that the
   Special Rule is contingent upon whether a state recognizes a situation where
   an adult student who has not been deemed incompetent, can nevertheless be
   determined to lack the ability to provide informed consent. See § 1415(m)(2)
   (“If, under State law, a child . . . is determined not to have the ability to
   provide informed consent . . . , the State shall establish procedures . . . ”).
   Currently, Texas does not recognize that contingency and is among a number
   of other states that have not adopted the Special Rule. See Smith, supra note

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   1, at 1025 (recognizing that only 18 states have established procedures
   pursuant to the Special Rule). Because Alvarez provides no argument which
   negates the Legislature’s sole authority to amend § 29.017 to achieve his
   requested relief, we see no basis for the TEA’s authority.3
           This determination is bolstered by the Legislature’s recent activity
   aiming to amend the language of § 29.017 to expressly adopt the Special Rule
   and a procedural mechanism through which students like J.A. can seek a
   determination that they do not “have the ability to provide informed consent
   with respect to the educational program.” § 1415(m)(2); see also Clapper v.
   Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“[S]tanding . . . serves to
   prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the
   political branches.”(citations omitted)). Accordingly, Alvarez has failed to

           _____________________
           3
              Alvarez’s alternative argument does not shift this analysis. He states that the TEA
   can redress his injuries because it can require SEHOs to appoint a next friend for students
   like J.A. under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44. But he provides no caselaw or support for
   this argument. Nor does he describe how Rule 44 applies to students like J.A., how it can
   be determined that these students are non compos mentis, and what control the TEA has
   over SEHOs and the procedural decisions they make in other cases not presently before
   this court for review.

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   allege injuries which can be redressed by a favorable decision, and, as a result,
   he lacks standing to bring this suit.4
                                     IV. Conclusion
           We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Alvarez’s suit.

           _____________________
           4
              Alvarez also takes issue with the district court’s failure to address his ADA and
   RA claims. However, the district court properly disposed of those claims after finding that
   the IDEA claims were not redressable. Alvarez’s own framing of his argument explicitly
   tied the TEA’s violation of the IDEA to his ADA and RA claims. “In his Amended
   Complaint J.A. argued that he, and other students similarly situated, had plausible claims of
   discrimination based upon disability pursuant to both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation act
   of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 (“Rehab Act”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
   12131 et seq. (“ADA”) because of the State’s failure to assure their rights were protected under
   the Individuals with Disabilities Act.” (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court
   properly dismissed all claims for lack of standing and did not proceed to the merits. See
   Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, LLC, 858 F.3d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 2017); Ctr. for
   Biological Diversity v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 937 F.3d 533, 545 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Because
   Petitioners lack standing, we do not reach the merits of their claims.”). Accordingly, in
   affirming the district court’s holding, we also do not reach the merits of Alvarez’s ADA
   and RA claims.

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