Court Opinion

ID: 9755670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:46:07.273747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:10.102593
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
Concurring.
I join the lead opinion except in the following respects, all of which concern the admissibility of the inculpatory statement appellant made in the patrol car.
This case does not pose the more common “custody” and “interrogation” questions seen in cases involving Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The case does not involve the classic formal arrest, transport to police headquarters, and extended incommunicado interrogation which gave rise to the Supreme Court’s adoption of a requirement of prophylactic warnings. Ultimately, I believe that we need not determine how the case would fit within the classic Miranda paradigm because, for the reasons well-expressed by the lead opinion, the question of the admissibility of appellant’s statement is controlled by the public safety exception to Miranda which was established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984). *237Along the way to its conclusion that Quarles controls, however, the lead opinion makes some findings and statements concerning the status of the law under Miranda with which I am in sufficient disagreement as to occasion this concurrence.
First, I disagree with the lead opinion’s analysis of the contours of the federal constitutional test for determining “custody” for purposes of Miranda. The lead opinion states that “appellant was clearly deprived of his freedom of action,” and therefore, was in “custody” for purposes of Miranda. Op. at 228-29, 855 A.2d at 790. This is not the proper federal test. As I noted in my Dissenting Opinion in In Re R.H., 568 Pa. 1, 791 A.2d 331 (2002):
An individual is not in custody for Miranda purposes simply because his freedom of action has been restricted in a significant way or he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement has been restricted by the questioning. The U.S. Supreme Court—which is the ultimate authority on the interpretation of Miranda questions—has held that, in determining whether an individual was in custody, the ultimate inquiry is ... whether there [was] a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (citations omitted). [T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at 1529. Thus, not every mere deprivation of an individual’s freedom of action triggers Miranda’s constitutional protections, and the subjective sentiments of the person being interrogated are wholly irrelevant to the objective custody inquiry.
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), for example, the Supreme Court held that Miranda warnings were not required prior to the roadside questioning of a motorist detained in a traffic stop. Although the Supreme Court recognized that a traffic stop significantly curtails the ‘freedom of action’ of *238the driver, and that, under the law of most states, it is in fact a crime to drive away without permission, it emphasized that this was not the end of the Miranda custody inquiry. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced ... only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3148-49. The Supreme Court found that the fact that traffic stops are typically temporary and brief, are conducted in public, and usually involve only one or at most two policemen mitigate[d] the danger that a .person questioned will be induced ‘to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.’ Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624).
Id. at 338 (Castille, J. dissenting); accord Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. at 2631 (“the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest”) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam))). Because I believe that the lead opinion misconstrues the controlling test, I also believe that the lead opinion is mistaken in its extended criticism of the plurality decision in Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143 (1999), and I necessarily disagree with the broad and contrary custody holding the lead opinion would announce to supplant the non-precedential decision in Gwynn. See Op. at 229-30 n. 12, 855 A.2d at 790-91 n. 12.1
In my view, the question of custody for Miranda purposes under the proper test in these unusual circumstances is a close one, but ultimately, it is a question this Court need not resolve. This is so because even if it is assumed that appellant was in custody when police temporarily placed him in the *239patrol car so that they could “freeze the situation” while they investigated this late-night report of an incident of domestic violence-a report corroborated by the on-scene cooperation of the reporting witness and the presence of blood on the doors of the two neighboring homes, as well as on a jacket found between the homes—the Quarles public safety exception obviated the necessity for police to recite Miranda warnings before asking appellant the single question they posed, a question which was designed to locate and thereby secure the safety of the woman police had reason to believe was a victim of domestic violence.
I also write to highlight the importance of undertaking the appropriate constitutional analysis when determining whether or not “interrogation” has occurred in a given case. As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980):
[T]he term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.... But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Id. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90 (bold emphasis added). Thus, the absence of Miranda warnings does not require suppression of a suspect’s custodial statement if, for example, the suspect spontaneously “blurts out” the statement, Commonwealth v. Baez, 554 Pa. 66, 720 A.2d 711, 720-21 (1998); or makes an incriminating statement in the course of “small talk” with authorities, Commonwealth v. Ahdul-Salaam, 544 Pa. 514, 678 A.2d 342, 351 (1996); or is merely responding to biographical questioning, Commonwealth v. Daniels, 537 Pa. *240464, 644 A.2d 1175, 1181 (1994); or makes an incriminating statement after voluntarily initiating communication with the authorities, Commonwealth v. Yards, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513, 523-24 (1988); or makes an incriminating statement in response to a declaration, rather than an inquiry, on the part of the authorities, Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 406 A.2d 1011, 1015-16 (1979). In addition, even a statement elicited in direct violation of Miranda may be admissible for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). Moreover, a concern for thorough examination of the question of interrogation is particularly appropriate in a close case, such as that sub judice, where, as the lead opinion aptly notes: “[T]he troopers were not attempting to elicit an incriminating response from Appellant when they placed him in the patrol car and asked him about the woman’s location.” Op. at 230-31, 855 A.2d at 791.
Finally, I do not join in the lead opinion’s preliminary finding that appellant’s failure to demonstrate “undue prejudice” from the admission into evidence of the statement in question would defeat his claim if it otherwise had merit. Presumably, if the statement were obtained in violation of Miranda, the burden would be on the Commonwealth to prove that its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). However, because the statement was properly admitted, and more importantly, because the Commonwealth has not argued harmless error, there is no reason to address the question of the effect of a non-existent error. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 443—445, 104 S.Ct. at 3152-54 (citing Chapman and refusing to apply harmless error standard, or even decide whether harmless error standard could apply to Miranda violation, where state did not argue harmless error).
With the exception of the foregoing concerns, I join the lead opinion.

. In any event, discussion of Gwynn is unnecessary to the decision of this case because (1) as the lead opinion notes, Gwynn is a plurality opinion with no precedential value; and (2) it is not apparent that, in the portion of the plurality opinion to which the lead opinion takes exception, the Gwynn Court was speaking of “custody” rather than ‘ 'interrogation.”