Court Opinion

ID: 9539841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:10:56.402172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:23.778907
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice,
with whom HARGRAVE, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I dissent from the lenient discipline imposed by today’s decision. Because in my view Border’s derelictions charged in Counts I and III rise to reckless indifference to his clients’ wellbeing, I would order him suspended for 30 days on each count, with the time to run consecutively.
The evidence is clear and convincing that Borders violated both DR 6-101(A)(3)1 and DR 9-102.2 As for the misconduct charged in Count I, Borders ignored the numerous calls from his client’s mother and from the public defender’s office concerning the status of his client’s appeal. He was aware a problem existed but took no action to ensure that his client’s interests were protected. As for Count III, Borders did not take proper care of his client’s property. Instead of parting with the abstract upon completing a title opinion in 1981, he retained the document and then would not respond to the many calls requesting its return. Even after reaching Borders, who then offered to locate the abstract, the client never heard back about the result of the promised search. Moreover, Borders refused to answer an inquiry about the missing abstract from his former client’s new lawyer. His failure to produce the abstract and his refusal to communicate about it no doubt had serious economic consequences to those whom he was bound to serve faithfully. The clients harmed by the conduct charged in Counts I and III were forced to secure other legal assistance to rectify Border’s dereliction of duty.
In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Braswell3 we dealt with a lawyer’s professional delinquency which was pressed upon us as “grossly negligent” in degree 4 — the *932law’s equivalent of intentional misconduct. We there held that suspension was unwarranted because no “active” negligence was shown.5 Public censure was held to be appropriate when the proof demonstrates neglect by inaction.6 The court in Braswell gave three examples of “affirmative” or “active” misconduct: (1) misrepresentation, (2) failure to return a client’s calls and (3) neglecting to check on the status of a matter that has been brought to the attorney’s attention.7 Borders had been derelict with respect to the latter two categories of misconduct. The record shows a pattern of professional dereliction in the category of active misconduct — i.e. refusal to return clients’ calls, failure to answer letters, refusal to communicate with clients concerning the status of their litigation or their property’s location and failure to monitor the status of a case after a serious problem had been brought to his attention.
Mere passive professional neglect,8 where active misconduct is absent, warrants no more than public censure. When negligence is coupled with active harm dealing,9 more severe discipline is clearly in order. A lawyer’s active professional neglect and mishandling of client’s property may cause serious economic damage. The public must be secure in its day-to-day reliance on legal practitioners for delivery of service with utmost care and dispatch. A constant flow of communication between attorney and client constitutes a vital part of a lawyer’s professional undertaking. When a client seeks information, prompt responsive action should be forthcoming. Prolonged and willful silence by failure to return calls or answer letters is the very kind of neglect that destroys the public s confidence in the integrity of the Bar. In sum, ignoring a client’s repeated pleas for service that is justifiably due is active professional wrongdoing. If, as here, the lawyer knows, or should know, that the dereliction of duty is fraught with serious harm-dealing consequences, withholding services amounts to reckless indifference,,10
Borders’ misconduct, which clearly constitutes reckless indifference to his clients’ interest, warrants a sanction far more severe than that imposable for mere passive neglect. I would suspend Borders from the practice of law for 30 days on each of the two counts — I and III — and would direct that the time run consecutively for the aggregate interval of 60 days.

. The terms of DR 6-101(A)(3), Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.1981, Ch. 1, App. 3, are:
"(A) A lawyer shall not: * * * (3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.”

. The pertinent provisions of DR 9-102(B), Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S.1981, Ch. 1, App. 3, are:
"(B) A lawyer shall:

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(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or othex properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive." [Emphasis supplied.]

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Braswell, Okl., 663 P.2d 1228, 1232 [1983].

. Oklahoma recognizes three degrees of negligence — slight, ordinary and gross. 25 O.S.1981 § 5.
The statutory definition of gross negligence is “want of slight care and diligence.” 25 O.S.1981 § 6. Slight care or diligence is "such as persons of ordinary prudence usually exercise about their own affairs of slight importance." 25 O.S. 1981 § 4.
The statutory definition of ordinary negligence is the "want of ordinary care and diligence.” 25 O.S.1981 § 6. Ordinary care or diligence is “such as [persons of ordinary prudence] ... usually exercise about their own affairs of ordinary importance." 25 O.S.1981 § 4.
The statutory definition of slight negligence is “want of great care and diligence.” 25 O.S.1981 § 6. Great care or diligence is "such as [persons of ordinary prudence] ... usually exercise about their own affairs of great importance.” 25 O.S.1981 § 4.

. See infra note 9.

. See infra note 8.

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Braswell, supra note 3 at 1232.

. Passive negligence is found in mere nonfea-sance or inaction when one’s duty to act immediately is not yet clearly perceivable. See Herman Christensen & Sons, Inc. v. Paris Plastering Co., 61 Cal.App.3d 237, 132 Cal.Rptr. 86, 94 [1976].

. Active negligence is the negligent conduct of active operations and involves some positive act or some breach of duty to act which is the equivalent of a positive act. See Sweeny v. Pease, 294 N.W.2d 819, 823 [Iowa 1980].

. Reckless indifference is gross negligence tantamount to intentional misconduct. See Fox v. Oklahoma Memorial Hospital, et al., Okl., 774 P.2d 459 [1989]; Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632, 651 [1983]; Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Okl., 688 P.2d 42, 45-46 [1984]; Wootan v. Shaw, 205 Okl. 283, 237 P.2d 442, 444 [1951].