Court Opinion

ID: 9917122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:07:12.274671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:07.491463
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ratliff, 2024-Ohio-61.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :
                                                 :    Case No. 22CA22
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                     :
                                                 :
         v.                                      :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                                 :    ENTRY
CAITLIN RATLIFF,                                 :
                                                 :    RELEASED: 01/05/2024
         Defendant-Appellant.                    :

                                            APPEARANCES:

Tim Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Ohio Assistant Public Defender, R.
Jessica Manungo, Assistant Public Defender for appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells,
Ohio Assistant Ross County Prosecutor, Chillicothe, Ohio for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

         {¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas

judgment entry that convicted appellant, Caitlin Ratliff (“Ratliff”), of third-degree

felony burglary. On appeal Ratliff maintains that her conviction is not supported

by sufficient evidence and is also against the manifest weight of the evidence.

After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we

find her conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

of conviction.

                                            BACKGROUND

         {¶2} On March 10, 2022, a grand jury indicted Ratliff on a burglary charge

in violation of R.C. 2911.12 (A)(3), a third-degree felony. In a two-day trial
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                  2

beginning on May 11, 2022, Ratliff was tried on the charge of burglary before a

jury.

         {¶3} The state’s first witness was Ross County Sheriff’s Deputy, Ben

Roderick, who testified that on February 2, 2022, he was dispatched to 7149

County Road 550 to investigate a burglary in progress. He stated that it was

“overcast” and the ground was “wet” and “muddy.” Upon arrival, Roderick

noticed a “late model Ford F-150” (pickup truck) parked in the front yard of the

house. Roderick stated that a witness, Shane Morris, informed him two suspects

had taken his phone, shot at him with a gun, and then ran into the woods behind

the house. Roderick and deputy Mitchell attempted to pursue the suspects.

However, because the vegetation was so thick, the deputies set up a perimeter

to the east and south of the woods. They called for a K-9 unit so they could track

the suspects. A third deputy was patrolling nearby roadways looking for the

suspects.

         {¶4} While deputy Roderick was waiting for the K-9 unit, Mike Lemaster,

the homeowner showed up. Lemaster informed Roderick that there were a

“bunch of his items” that had been taken from his house that were in the pickup

truck.

         {¶5} After unsuccessfully investigating a nearby “ping” on Morris’s stolen

cell phone, Roderick returned to Lemaster’s property. At that time, Morris

informed Roderick that he had just seen an orange-colored vehicle stop about

1/8 of a mile up the road and that two persons who had emerged from the tree

line got into the back of the vehicle. Believing these persons might be the
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                3

suspects, Roderick got in his patrol vehicle and attempted to find that vehicle and

investigate. Roderick along with a state trooper executed a “felony stop” of the

vehicle, which contained five persons, including Ratliff who was seated in the

rear of the vehicle. Roderick described Ratliff as “disheveled” and “covered in

mud.”

        {¶6} The state’s next witness was Shane Morris who lived in the Frankfort,

Ohio area his entire life. He testified that on February 2, 2022, while taking a

load of scrap down County Road 550 to Pleasant Valley, he noticed a pickup

truck in the front yard of Lemaster’s house that did not belong to Lemaster, who

he had known for 30 years. Morris called Lemaster and told him about the

pickup truck, but Lemaster initially thought that someone’s truck had broken

down.

        {¶7} After leaving the scrapyard, Morris again passed Lemaster’s house

and noticed the pickup truck was still there, so he pulled into the property in front

of the truck to investigate. Morris saw two persons coming out of the house

“carrying stuff,” so Morris attempted to call 911 believing he was witnessing a

theft. He described one of the suspects as a male wearing a coat and the other

as a woman wearing a hoodie. Morris attempted to take pictures of the license

plate of the pickup truck. However, the suspects got into the pickup truck,

rammed Morris’s vehicle and then got stuck in the mud. The male suspect

emerged from the pickup truck with a gun and ordered Morris to give him his

phone, and Morris complied. The suspect then ordered Morris to push the

pickup truck out of the mud. Instead of pushing the pickup truck out of the mud,
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                   4

Morris put his vehicle in reverse and fled the property. The suspect shot at him

as he fled. Morris drove up the road to his friend’s home and called the

authorities on a landline. Neighbors told Morris that they saw the suspects

running through the woods, so he drove down the road to his parents’ house,

which was close by, to warn them of the situation.

       {¶8} Morris then returned to Lemaster’s house and spoke with the deputy

about the robbery. Morris identified one of the suspects who had been

apprehended from the orange Honda Element as the defendant herein, Caitlin

Ratliff, whom he had known for approximately 15 years.

       {¶9} The state’s next witness was Michael Lemaster, the property owner

whose home was burglarized. Lemaster stated that he received two calls from

Morris with the latter informing him that someone had broken into his house at

the 7149 County Road 550 address. When Lemaster arrived, deputies were

searching for the suspects. The suspects had apparently entered the garage

through an unlocked door and then broke a window between the garage and the

house to gain entry into the house. Lemaster identified personal property that

was missing from the house including guns, hunting knives, coins, and jewelry.

       {¶10} Lemaster testified that he had not lived in the house for more than a

year and does not stay overnight there, but he usually stops by the property “at

least once a day” to pick up mail. He also testified that he maintains the utilities

(water, electricity, etc.) at the house. And he makes repairs, e.g., keeping the

sump pump working.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                5

       {¶11} The state’s next witness was detective Brenton Davidson of the

Ross County Sheriff’s Office. He conducted an investigation of this burglary. His

investigation included examining the orange Honda Element in which Ratliff was

caught, the residence at the 7149 County Road 550 address, and the pickup that

was at the house at the time of the burglary. He discovered stolen items in the

orange Honda Element. He spoke to Lemaster, took photographs, as well as

marked and inventoried the stolen property from Lemaster’s house that was in

the truck and the orange Honda Element. Davidson also found Morris’s cell

phone in Lemaster’s back yard. A purse was recovered from the truck that

contained Ratliff’s Ohio identification card and her Visa debit card.

       {¶12} Detective Addy of the Ross County Sheriff’s Office was the state’s

last witness. He also investigated this burglary. He interviewed all five persons

who were in the orange Honda Element. He found a jewelry box and knives on

the floorboard of the Element that Lemaster identified as his property. He also

found a 9 millimeter pistol that did not belong to Lemaster. He testified that

Ratliff told him that she was with Mr. Stodgel on the day of the burglary but did

not participate in the burglary. She claimed that Stodgel told her that he stopped

at Lemaster’s house because he was looking for a house to rent, but claims that

once they were there, he committed the burglary on his own.

       {¶13} Detective Addy testified that Ratliff was wearing a jacket when she

was in the orange Honda Element and a pocket in that jacket contained a

woman’s watch that Lemaster identified as having belonged to his deceased wife

and had been in her bedroom.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                 6

       {¶14} Prior to retiring to deliberate, the judge instructed the jury on the

applicable law, including R.C. 2909.01(C)(1-4), which defines an “occupied

structure” for purposes of the burglary offense.

       {¶15} While deliberating, the jury asked “is there any clarification, apart

from what we have been provided, about temp – temporary dwelling? Is there

any definition?” After conferring with both counsel for the state and the

defendant, the court addressed the jurors and informed them that there was no

legal definition of “temporary dwelling.” “The entire definition of occupied

structure is specifically provided by the Ohio Revised Code Section 2909.01(C)

[sic.] and I gave [sic.] you that entire definition.” The court then proceeded to

reread R.C. 2909.01(C) to the jury.

       {¶16} The jury found Ratliff guilty as charged. On May 17, 2022, the court

issued a judgment of conviction and scheduled sentencing for May 26, 2022.

After that hearing, the court sentenced Ratliff to 30 months in prison and up to 2

years of post-release control. It is this judgment that Ratliff appeals.

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       I.     CAITLIN RATLIFF’S CONVICTION FOR BURGLARY IS NOT
              SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. FIFTH AND
              FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
              CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO
              CONSTITUTION R.C. 2911.12(A)(3); R.C. 2909.01(C).

       II.    CAITLIN RATLIFF’S CONVICTION OF BURGLARY IS AGAINST
              THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION OF
              THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND
              FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
              CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 16, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO
              CONSTITUTION. STATE V. THOMPKINS, 78 OHIO ST.3D 380,
              387, 678 N.E.2D 541 (1997).
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                    7

                             I. First Assignment of Error

       {¶17} In her first assignment of error, Ratliff claims that her conviction for

burglary is not supported by sufficient evidence. Ratliff maintains that a third-

degree felony burglary offense requires proof that the offender committed a

trespass in an “occupied structure” to commit a criminal offense. She asserts

four different arguments why Lemaster’s house was not an occupied structure

under R.C. 2909.01(C) to support her burglary conviction.

       {¶18} Ratliff first argues that Lemaster’s home was not maintained as a

“permanent or temporary dwelling” under 2909.01(C)(1) because as of the date

the burglary herein occurred, he had not lived in the house for two years. In

other words, Lemaster has not “maintained” his house as a “permanent or

temporary dwelling” so it was not an occupied structure under R.C.

2909.01(C)(1). Therefore, she argues, because there was no “occupied

structure,” which is a necessary element of burglary, there was insufficient

evidence to support her burglary conviction.

       {¶19} Ratliff claims that a recent Supreme Court decision, State v.

Whitaker, 169 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2840, 207 N.E.2d 677, supports her

argument. In Whitaker, the house in question had been unoccupied for years. It

had been gutted for a renovation so it remained unoccupied. Under these

circumstances, the Court determined that the house was “not maintained as a

permanent or temporary dwelling[,]” so it was not occupied under R.C.

2909.01(C)(1). Id. at ¶ 63
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                    8

       {¶20} Ratliff claims that Whitaker is persuasive in this case because the

evidence herein shows that Lemaster did not live in his house at the time of the

theft in this case and had not lived there for at least two years prior to that date.

Thus, consistent with Whitaker, Lemaster’s house also did not qualify as a

“permanent or temporary habitation” under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1) and therefore was

not occupied under that provision and as a result would not support a burglary

charge.

       {¶21} Ratliff also argues that Lemaster’s house was not “occupied as the

permanent or temporary habitation of any person” at the time of the offense so it

was not occupied under R.C. 2909.01(C)(2). Thus, there would be insufficient

evidence to support her burglary conviction.

       {¶22} Ratliff further argues that there is no evidence that Lemaster’s

house was specifically adapted for overnight accommodations under R.C.

2909.01(C)(3). Again, there would be insufficient evidence to support her

conviction.

       {¶23} Finally, she alleges that “no one was present at the time or likely to

be present at the house at the time of the trespass and theft” because the

incident occurred when Lemaster would likely be at work. Therefore, Lemaster’s

home did not qualify as an occupied structure under 2909.01(C)(4) and would not

support her burglary conviction.

       {¶24} In response, the state maintains that “the relevant inquiry in

determining whether a structure is occupied concerns the residential purpose of

the dwelling, rather than the presence or absence of an occupant.” State v.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                  9

Green, 18 Ohio App.3 69, 480 N.E.2d 1128 (3rd Dist. 1984). The state argues a

dwelling is “occupied” under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1) “where a dwelling is temporarily

not being occupied as a place of habitation and where persons are likely to be

present from time to time to look after the property to help maintain its character

as a dwelling.” State v. Steen, 2d Dist. Darke No. 19CA16, 2020-Ohio-4598, ¶

33.

       {¶25} In this case, the state claims that it has carried the burden of

showing that Lemaster’s house was regularly maintained as a dwelling. The

state asserts that Lemaster is at the house daily, he keeps the utilities on, and he

receives his mail at the house. “It is a residence where he could go and stay.”

       {¶26} The state claims that Whitaker is distinguishable from this case. In

Whitaker the house was being “gutted” during its renovation. In this case, unlike

Whitaker, the house was not gutted and Lemaster maintained furniture and

belongings at the house.

       {¶27} The state claims that this case is more like State v. Bell, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101489, 2015-Ohio-1294. In Bell, even though the owner of the

house died, the court did not find that the home was abandoned. The house still

had a residential purpose even though it was unoccupied because relatives were

maintaining the house when the burglary occurred. The house contained

furniture, appliances, and utilities. Therefore, the court found that it was an

occupied structure under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1).

       {¶28} Although Lemaster’s wife had died and he has opted to live in

another home, he has maintained the house at 7149 County Road 550 as a
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                 10

dwelling. Similar to Bell, Lemaster maintained the utilities at the house, made

repairs, and kept it furnished. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support

that Lemaster’s house was an occupied dwelling under R.C. 2909.01(C) at the

time of the burglary herein.

                                       A. Law

                               1. Standard of Review

       {¶29} “When reviewing a case to determine if the record contains

sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction, we must ‘ “examine the

evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would

convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’

” State v. Knowlton, 2012-Ohio-2350, 971 N.E.2d 395, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.), quoting

State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 06CA7, 2007-Ohio-502, ¶ 33, quoting

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus. Thus, “ ‘ “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ”

Id., quoting Smith, quoting Jenks.

                                     2. Burglary

       {¶30} Third-degree-felony burglary requires the state to prove that “by

force, stealth, or deception,” the defendant “trespasses in an occupied structure

with purpose to commit in the structure or separately secured or separately

occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense.” (Emphasis added.) R.C.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                11

2911.12(A)(3) and (D). For purposes of a burglary “ ‘occupied structure’ has the

same meaning as in section 2909.01 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2911.12(C).

                                3. R.C. 2909.01(C)

       {¶31} R.C. 2909.01(C) provides:

        (C) “Occupied structure” means any house, building, outbuilding,
        watercraft, aircraft, railroad car, truck, trailer, tent, or other
        structure, vehicle, or shelter, or any portion thereof, to which any
        of the following applies:
        (1) It is maintained as a permanent or temporary dwelling, even
        though it is temporarily unoccupied and whether or not any person
        is actually present.
        (2) At the time, it is occupied as the permanent or temporary
        habitation of any person, whether or not any person is actually
        present.
        (3) At the time, it is specially adapted for the overnight
        accommodation of any person, whether or not any person is
        actually present.
        (4) At the time, any person is present or likely to be present in it.

                                    B. Analysis

       {¶32} In the context of a burglary offense, “[a]t common law, the house

had to be ‘occupied’ as a dwelling, although a temporary absence with the

intention of returning would not render it unoccupied.” State v. Green, 18 Ohio

App.3d 69, 71, 480 N.E.2d 1128 (10th Dist.1984). “However, a house that was

permanently abandoned or its use changed to something other than residential,

would cease to be regarded as a dwelling. The offense was said to be one

against the security of habitation, and not an offense against property.” Id., citing

Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes, Sections 406-407 (1952).

       {¶33} However, Green went on to find that in promulgating R.C.

2909.01(A), now R.C. 2909.01(C),
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                               12

        [i]t is obvious that the General Assembly, in adopting the definition
        of “occupied structure” found in R.C. 2909.01, intended to broaden
        the concept of the offense of burglary from one of an offense
        against the security of habitation, to one concerned with the
        serious risk of harm created by the actual or likely presence of a
        person in a structure of any nature. In that context, it is noteworthy
        that the General Assembly utilized the word “maintained” * * * as
        opposed to “occupied[.]” * * * We believe that the distinction
        between “maintained” and “occupied” is significant, in the sense
        that the former alludes more to the character or type of use for
        which the dwelling is intended to be subjected, whereas the latter
        is more closely related to the actual use to which the structure is
        presently being subjected. (Emphasis added.)

Id. at 71-72.

       {¶34} We find that the state presented sufficient evidence that the property

was occupied under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1) and (4).

                               1. R.C. 2909.01(C)(1)

       {¶35} Consistent with Green’s recognition in this regard, the Eighth District

Court of Appeals interpreting R.C. 2909.01(C)(1) has held that “the relevant

inquiry in determining whether a structure is occupied concerns the residential

purpose of the dwelling, rather than the presence or absence of an occupant.”

State v. Calderwood, 194 Ohio App.3d 438, 956 N.E.2d 892, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.

2011), citing Green, 18 Ohio App.3d 69, 480 N.E.2d 1128 (10th Dist.1984) (home

left vacant after the owners moved to another residence was still an occupied

structure because it was being maintained as a dwelling); State v. Williams, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92668, 2009-Ohio-6826 (the fact that no one lived in the

house for four months is irrelevant in determining whether it was an occupied

structure); State v. Charley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82944, 2004-Ohio-3463
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                  13

(structure is still occupied despite the fact that the owner was in a nursing home

and the daughter was having the house restored); State v. Sharp, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 86827, 2006-Ohio-3158 (structure's status as an occupied

structure depends on the residential purpose of the dwelling rather than the

presence or absence of an occupant); State v. Tornstrom, Cuyahoga App. No.

72898, 1998 WL 811314 (Nov. 19, 1998) (a home uninhabitable while

undergoing major renovations was found to be an occupied structure); Compare

State v. Anderson, 2012-Ohio-3663, 975 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) (A house

condemned by a municipality as uninhabitable with no evidence of any future

repairs is not maintained as a dwelling for purposes of R.C. 2909.01(C)(1)).

       {¶36} We find the case of State v. Bell particularly instructive in the instant

case. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101489, 2015-Ohio-1294. In Bell, the defendant,

who was convicted of burglary, argued that the house was not occupied at the

time of the offense. The court of appeals found that even though the owner of

the house had died, “her house was not abandoned.” Id. at ¶ 23. Quoting

Calderwood, 194 Ohio App.3d 438 at ¶ 15, the court in Bell found that

        [t]he evidence proved that the house maintained its residential
        purpose even though it was vacant. “[The decedent’s daughter]
        and her husband maintained the property and when the incident
        occurred, the house was fully equipped with utilities, appliances,
        a furnace, and furniture. Therefore, the house was an ‘occupied
        structure’ within the meaning of R.C. 2909.01(C)(1).”
Id.

       {¶37} Similar to the house in Bell, Lemaster’s house at 7149 County Road

550 maintained its “residential purpose” because Lemaster’s mail was delivered

there, it contained furniture and Lemaster’s belongings, the utilities were on, and
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                  14

Lemaster made repairs to the house (e.g., he repaired the sump pump).

Therefore, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

we find that the jury could have concluded that Lemaster’s house was an

occupied structure under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1).

       {¶38} Contrary to Ratliff’s argument, we find that Whitaker is

distinguishable from the instant case. Instrumental in Whitaker’s holding that the

house therein was not maintained as a permanent residence under R.C.

2909.01(C)(1) was due, at least in part, to the fact that the house was “gutted”

during a renovation making it uninhabitable during that period of time. Whitaker,

169 Ohio St.3d 647, at ¶ 63. No similar activity was occurring at Lemaster’s

house that could have rendered the house uninhabitable during the burglary.

                               2. R.C. 2909.01(C)(4)

       {¶39} R.C. 2909.01(C) also defines an “occupied structure” as including a

“house” where “[a]t any time, any person is present or likely to be present in it.”

R.C. 2909.01(C)(4). “ ‘[A] person is likely to be present [in a house] when a

consideration of all the circumstances would seem to justify a logical expectation

that a person could be present.’ ” (Brackets and emphasis sic.) Bell, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101489, 2015-Ohio-1294, quoting State v. Cantin, 132 Ohio

App.3d 808, 813, 726 N.E.2d 565 (8th Dist.1999), citing State v. Green, 18 Ohio

App.3d 69, 480 N.E.2d 1128 (10th Dist.1984). Consequently, “if the evidence

demonstrates that the caretaker in possession of the former occupant's key has

the right of access to the home regularly, then there will be sufficient evidence

that a person is ‘likely to be present’ for purposes” of occupancy. Id., quoting
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                15

State v. Cochran, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 50057, 1986 WL 1302 (Jan. 30, 1986);

State v. Robinson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 49501 and 49518, 1985 WL 8499

(Oct. 24, 1985) (a person is likely to be present when the homeowner was away,

but had given keys to a neighbor who checked on the house periodically).

       {¶40} As the owner of the house at 7149 County Road 550, Lemaster

obviously could access his house at any time. He testified that he typically

stopped at least once a day. When asked if he had stopped by the day of the

burglary, he said he had not because he was at work. However, when asked

what his work hours were, Lemaster responded “usually whatever I want to

work.” Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find

that the jury could have determined that Lemaster’s house was “occupied” under

R.C. 2909.01(C)(4) for purposes of her burglary conviction because he was

“likely to be present” therein.

       {¶41} Because Lemaster maintained the residential purpose of his house,

and was “likely to be present” in his house, we find that there was sufficient

evidence for the jury to find that his house was an “occupied structure” under

R.C. 2909.01(C). Consequently, we find that there is sufficient evidence that

Lemaster’s house was “occupied” to support Ratliff’s burglary conviction.

Accordingly, we overrule Ratliff’s first assignment of error.

                            Second Assignment of Error

       {¶42} In her second assignment of error, Ratliff alleges that her conviction

for burglary is against the manifest weight of the evidence because the state did

not submit substantial evidence that she committed burglary. She claims that the
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                     16

testimony by the deputies and Morris established that Brandon Stodgel

committed the burglary of Lemaster’s home, not her. Ratliff maintains that

Morris’s testimony amounted to guilt by association because he “testified that

because [Ratliff] was with Mr. Stodgel, she must have been an outlaw.” Ratliff

claims that Stodgel was the driver of the pickup truck, while she was only a

passenger. Merely being at the scene is not enough to support Ratliff’s

conviction. Finally, she also maintains that the police and Lemaster testified that

they found only one trash bag of items in the pickup truck, which contradicts

Morris’s testimony that he saw the suspects carrying two trash bags of items.

        {¶43} Ratliff also claims that her conviction is against the manifest weight

of the evidence because Lemaster’s house was not an occupied structure. The

only evidence that he presented in support that the house was occupied was that

Lemaster picked up his mail, checked the sump pump, and maintained the

utilities.

        {¶44} In response, the state asserts that Ratliff’s conviction for burglary is

supported by the manifest weight of the evidence because of her conduct at the

scene and circumstantial evidence. The state maintains that Morris observed a

male and female carrying “stuff” outside Lemaster’s house, and he identified the

female as the defendant, Caitlin Ratliff. And there was no evidence that Morris

would be motivated to lie in identifying Ratliff as the female suspect. Conversely,

the jury did not believe Ratliff’s testimony that she was not involved in the

burglary, which it may do as the fact-finder. Finally, some of the items stolen

would be of interest to a female, e.g. jewelry and women’s jeans.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                17

         {¶45} The state also argues that the manifest weight of the evidence

supports that Lemaster’s house was occupied for purposes of the burglary

because he maintained his residence as a dwelling so he could stay there.

“[Lemaster] keeps the utilities on; he get (sic) his mail there, he goes there every

day to check on things, he maintains the sump pump to make sure it doesn’t

flood the basement.” The state also notes that all the witnesses referred to

Lemaster’s dwelling as his “house.”

         {¶46} Thus, the state maintains that Ratliff’s burglary conviction is

supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                         A. Law

         {¶47} “Even when sufficient evidence supports a verdict, we may conclude

that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, because the test

under the manifest weight standard is much broader than that for sufficiency of

the evidence.” State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-6143,

¶ 18, citing State v. Banks, 78 Ohio App.3d 206, 214, 604 N.E.2d 219 (10th Dist.

1992).

         {¶48} “In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, [and] consider the credibility of witnesses[.]” State

v. Evans, 4th Dist. Ross No. 22CA31, 2023-Ohio-1879, ¶ 26, citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). However, we

“generally must defer to the fact-finder's credibility determinations.” State v.

McNichols, 2020-Ohio-2705, 154 N.E.3d 125, ¶ 10 (4th Dist.), citing Eastley v.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                 18

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21. We must

then “determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

reversal of the conviction is necessary.” Evans at ¶ 26 “To satisfy this test, the

state must introduce substantial evidence on all the elements of an offense, so

that the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing State v.

Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304, syllabus (1988).

                                     B. Analysis

       {¶49} We find that the state presented substantial evidence that Ratliff

committed the burglary herein. Morris testified that he saw two suspects at

Lemaster’s house, one male and one female on the day of the burglary “carrying

stuff.” The pickup truck which was used by the suspects for transportation

contained property stolen from Lemaster’s house. After Morris confronted the

suspects and the suspects’ pickup truck got stuck in the mud, the suspects fled

into the woods behind Lemaster’s house.

       {¶50} The evidence further established that shortly after the burglary two

persons emerged from the woods about 1/8 of a mile from Lemaster’s house,

crossed a field, and entered an orange vehicle. Believing that those persons

might be the suspects, law enforcement officers stopped an orange Honda

Element. Ratliff was one of the passengers. She was arrested and described as

“disheveled” and “covered in mud,” which is consistent with someone who would

have had to navigate the woods and a field after fleeing from the rear of

Lemaster’s house on a day when the conditions were “wet” and “muddy.” She
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                    19

was also wearing a coat that had a watch in its pocket that Lemaster identified as

having come from his house and belonged to his deceased wife. Finally, Morris

identified Ratliff, whom he had known for 15 years, as the female suspect who he

saw at Lemaster’s house earlier that day, and there is no evidence in the record

that questions his credibility.

       {¶51} We also find that the state submitted substantial evidence that

Lemaster’s house was “occupied” for purposes of the burglary. The state

presented evidence that Lemaster’s house maintained its “residential purpose”

under R.C. 2909.01(C)(1) because he came to the house at least once a day,

received his mail at the house, the house contained furniture and his various

belongings, the utilities were on, and Lemaster undertook repairs to the house,

e.g., the sump pump. The state also presented evidence that Lemaster was

“likely to be present” in his house under R.C. 2909.01(C)(4) because, as its

owner, he had a key so he could access the house at any time, and typically

visited the house at least once a day.

       {¶52} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence,

considering all reasonable inferences and credibility of witnesses, we find that

the state presented substantial evidence that Ratliff committed burglary so the

jury did not lose its way in finding Ratliff guilty. Therefore, we overrule Ratliff’s

second assignment of error finding that Ratliff’s conviction is supported by the

manifest weight of the evidence.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                              20

                                    CONCLUSION

       {¶53} Having overruled both of Ratliff’s assignments of error, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment entry of Ratliff’s conviction.

                                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 22CA22                                                                  21

                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

       Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the
date of this entry.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                         For the Court,

                                    BY: ____________________________
                                        Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL
      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.