Court Opinion

ID: 9369576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 14:01:37.957975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.953985
License: Public Domain

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                                              PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1615

        MICHAEL ANTWI ADJEI,

                    Petitioner – Appellant,

              v.

        ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, in his official capacity as Secretary of Homeland
        Security; TRACY RENAUD, in her official capacity as Acting Director, United States
        Citizenship and Immigration Services; KIMBERLY ZANOTTI, in her official capacity as
        Field Office Director, USCIS Washington Field Office,

                    Respondents – Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cv-01098-LO-JFA)

        Argued: October 27, 2022                                    Decided: February 7, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Senior Judge Motz wrote
        the majority opinion, in which Judge Heytens joined. Judge Wilkinson wrote a dissenting
        opinion.

        ARGUED: Annigje Johanna Buwalda, JUST LAW INTERNATIONAL P.C., Fairfax,
        Virginia, for Appellant. Catherine M. Yang, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
        JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jason West, JUST LAW
        INTERNATIONAL P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Raj Parekh, Acting United
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        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia,
        for Appellees.

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        DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge:

               We consider here whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a

        divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled

        in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Michael Antwi Adjei’s

        marriage to Barbara Boateng after Boateng and Kingsley Kwame Gyasi — both Ghanaian

        citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce,

        Boateng and Gyasi were lawful permanent residents of the United States and neither was

        present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to Boateng, Adjei became a lawful

        permanent resident of the United States. But when Adjei applied to become a naturalized

        citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he

        and Boateng were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia

        law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither

        spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Adjei sought review of the decision in

        the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Adjei then brought this

        appeal. We conclude that, as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise

        valid divorce, granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’

        domicile at the time. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to grant Adjei’s

        naturalization application.

                                                    I.

               Adjei, a native and citizen of Ghana, entered the United States in 1996. He met

        Janet (now Barbara) Boateng, also a native and citizen of Ghana, on December 31, 1999,

        and the couple married in Virginia in April of 2001.

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              Boateng had been married before. In 1996, she and Kingsley Kwame Gyasi were

        married in Accra, Ghana, under Ghanaian customary law. A few years later, Gyasi

        received a diversity visa, which permitted Gyasi and Boateng to immigrate to the United

        States as lawful permanent residents. See Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d 906, 907–08 (11th

        Cir. 2003) (explaining the diversity visa program). They were admitted to the United States

        and settled in Northern Virginia in June of 1999. Sometime later, their relationship broke

        down. Gyasi moved to Minnesota in search of better employment opportunities and the

        couple agreed to divorce.

               In accordance with Ghanaian customary law, Boateng and Gyasi contacted their

        respective families in Ghana, and the heads of each household performed a ceremonial

        divorce on January 6, 2000. Although both Boateng and Gyasi were citizens of Ghana,

        neither was present or domiciled in Ghana at the time of the divorce. A year later (on

        April 5, 2001) the head of Boateng’s family and the head of Gyasi’s family filed a

        declaration attesting to this divorce. The Circuit Court of Tema, Ghana, subsequently

        affirmed the validity of Boateng’s divorce under Ghanaian law.

               Three weeks after the declaration was filed and more than a year after Boateng’s

        divorce, Boateng and Adjei married in Virginia. Boateng then filed an I-130 petition

        requesting USCIS issue an immigrant visa to Adjei, her new husband. USCIS granted

        Boateng’s petition in March 2005. Adjei then applied for an adjustment to permanent

        resident status. USCIS granted his request in January 2010.

               In 2014, Adjei applied to become a naturalized citizen of the United States. USCIS

        denied his application, determining Adjei had not, in fact, lawfully obtained permanent

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        resident status. USCIS ultimately offered a single basis for its decision: Virginia, it

        believed, would not recognize Boateng’s divorce from Gyasi because neither spouse was

        domiciled in Ghana at the time of the divorce.

               Adjei sought reversal of the denial of his naturalization application in the Eastern

        District of Virginia. Both Adjei, on the one hand, and the Secretary of the Department of

        Homeland Security, the Director of USCIS, and the Director of USCIS’ Washington Field

        Office (collectively, USCIS), on the other, moved for summary judgment. The parties

        agreed there were no disputed issues of material fact and that the case turned entirely on

        whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize Boateng’s divorce from Gyasi.

        The district court granted summary judgment to USCIS, reasoning that Virginia would not

        recognize a divorce granted by a jurisdiction where neither spouse was domiciled at the

        time of divorce. Adjei timely filed this appeal.

                                                    II.

               “Courts review a decision denying a naturalization application de novo.” Dung

        Phan v. Holder, 667 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 8 U.S.C § 1421(c)). We review

        cross-motions for summary judgment under the same standard, considering “each motion

        separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment

        as a matter of law.” White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co., 35 F.4th

        179, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 637–38

        (4th Cir. 2007)).

               To be eligible for naturalization, an applicant must demonstrate he was “lawfully

        admitted for permanent residence.” Injeti v. USCIS, 737 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2013)

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        (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)). 1      Deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals’

        interpretation of the term “lawfully,” we have held that an applicant for naturalization must

        do more than simply show he was granted lawful permanent resident status. Id. at 316.

        Rather, he must “demonstrate that the grant of that status was ‘in substantive compliance

        with the immigration laws.’” Id. (quoting Kyong Ho Shin v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1213, 1217

        (9th Cir. 2010)).

               Adjei obtained an immigrant visa and became eligible to apply for lawful permanent

        resident status through his marriage to Boateng. A spousal petition for an immigrant visa

        must “provide evidence of the claimed relationship,” including “proof of the legal

        termination of all previous marriages” of both the petitioning spouse and the spouse for

        whom the visa is sought. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2). When the legality of the claimed marriage

        turns on an earlier divorce, USCIS “look[s] to the law of the state where the subsequent

        marriage was celebrated” to determine the validity of the divorce. Jahed v. Acri, 468 F.3d

        230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (quoting Matter of Hosseinian, 19 I. & N.

        Dec. 453, 455 (BIA 1987)). In this case that is Virginia — where Boateng’s subsequent

        marriage to Adjei was celebrated.

               To determine whether Virginia would recognize Boateng’s divorce from Gyasi, we

        “look first and foremost to the law of the state’s highest court, giving appropriate effect to

        all its implications.” Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d 96, 100 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting

               1
                Boateng herself became a United States citizen in 2005. Accordingly, when Adjei
        applied for naturalization, he indicated he was subject to the shorter continuous residency
        period set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a). But that provision, like § 1427(a), requires the
        applicant to have been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”
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        Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A. v. Neil, 160 F.3d 997, 1002 (4th Cir. 1998)). That court

        need not have decided the precise question at issue. Rather, it suffices if its decisions,

        fairly read, direct “a particular conclusion.” Assicurazioni, 160 F.3d at 1002.

                                                    III.

               An out-of-state divorce may be recognized in Virginia either under the Full Faith

        and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution or as a matter of comity.

               The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV § 1, commands “each state to

        recognize and give effect to valid judgments rendered by the courts of its sister States.”

        V.L. v. E.L., 577 U.S. 404, 406–07 (2016). Thus, when a state with jurisdiction to do so

        grants a divorce “in accord with the requirements of procedural due process,” the

        Constitution compels that all other states recognize it. Williams v. State of N.C. (Williams

        I), 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942). This is true even if the divorce offends the public policy of

        the recognizing state. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).

               Comity, on the other hand, “is not a matter of obligation.”           McFarland v.

        McFarland, 19 S.E.2d 77, 83 (Va. 1942). Instead, “[i]t is a matter of favor or courtesy,

        based on justice and good will.” Id. It is the recognition one sovereign extends to the acts

        of another, “having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights

        of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Hilton v.

        Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).

               Of course, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to the judgments of

        foreign nations. Jaffe v. Accredited Sur. & Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 584, 591 (4th Cir. 2002).

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        Thus, as Adjei recognizes, Boateng’s Ghanaian divorce is valid in Virginia only if Virginia

        would recognize it as a matter of comity.

                                                    IV.

               The Supreme Court of Virginia has emphasized the importance of comity for

        fostering good relations between sovereigns and promoting judicial economy. 2 Am.

        Online, Inc. v. Nam Tai Elecs., Inc., 571 S.E.2d 128, 132 (Va. 2002). Nevertheless, the

        court has announced four principles that “must be considered” before extending comity to

        the act of another sovereign. Id. at 133. The Commonwealth will only grant comity to an

        act of another sovereign if (1) the other sovereign had jurisdiction “to enforce its order

        within its own judicatory domain,” (2) the relevant law of the other sovereign is

        “reasonably comparable to that of Virginia,” (3) the decree was not obtained through fraud,

        and (4) enforcement of the other sovereign’s decree would not be “contrary to the public

        policy of Virginia.” Id.

               The first and third requirements are not at issue here. As to the first, USCIS

        acknowledges that Boateng and Gyasi’s divorce is valid in Ghana. Reply Mem. Supp.

        Resp.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 2 n.2. In fact, a Ghanaian court has expressly confirmed the

        validity of the divorce under Ghanaian law.       There is thus no question Ghana had

        jurisdiction to enforce the divorce “within its own judicatory domain.” Am. Online, 571

               2
                 Boateng’s divorce from her first husband was accomplished via Ghanaian
        customary law, rather than by court order, but neither party argues a declaration sufficient
        to dissolve a divorce under Ghanaian law should be treated differently from a divorce
        granted by a Ghanaian court for the purposes of comity. See Restatement (Third) of
        Foreign Relations Law § 484 n.6 (1987) (explaining that “the same rules of recognition”
        generally apply to nonjudicial divorces as to judicial divorces).
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        S.E.2d at 133. As to the third requirement, no party suggests that the divorce was obtained

        through, or tainted by, fraud. Accordingly, recognition of the divorce in Virginia turns

        entirely on the second and fourth America Online requirements. We consider each of them

        in turn.

                                                      A.

               With respect to the second America Online requirement, we must determine whether

        the law of Ghana, which grants divorces to its citizens even when those citizens are

        domiciled outside of Ghana, is “reasonably comparable to the law of Virginia.” Am.

        Online, 571 S.E.2d at 133.

               Virginia, like most of her sister states, will only grant a divorce if at least one spouse

        is domiciled in Virginia at the time of the divorce. Va. Code Ann. § 20-97; Blackson v.

        Blackson, 579 S.E.2d 704, 709 (Va. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover, Virginia will not recognize

        a divorce granted by a sister state unless one spouse was domiciled in that state at the time

        of the divorce. Howe v. Howe, 18 S.E.2d 294, 298 (Va. 1942). Relying on Howe, USCIS

        argues that Virginia also would not recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation unless

        one spouse was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. Resp. Br. at 14–

        15.

               But when the Howe court rejected Arkansas’ authority to grant a divorce to a man

        domiciled in North Carolina, it reasoned that “[f]or the purposes of citizenship,” the man

        had no more relation to Arkansas than any temporary visitor would have. 18 S.E.2d at 296.

        Rather, he “stood exactly as he would have stood had he gone to hunt bear in the canebrakes

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        of that State.” Id. In doing so, Howe emphasized the power of both domicile and

        citizenship to provide a sovereign authority over its own people. See id. at 296–97.

               Moreover, no Virginia appellate court has ever refused to recognize a divorce

        obtained in a foreign country by citizens of that country because neither spouse was

        domiciled there at the time of the divorce. This is unsurprising, given that the concerns

        that have animated the Supreme Court of Virginia’s treatment of divorces granted by a

        sister state when neither spouse was domiciled in that state simply are not present when a

        foreign nation grants a divorce to its own citizens. Virginia considers divorces granted by

        a sister state to two non-domiciliaries problematic because a state in which neither party is

        domiciled usually lacks a connection to the parties that would justify its exercise of control

        over the spouses’ marital status. See Evans v. Asphalt Rds. & Materials Co., 72 S.E.2d

        321, 326–27 (Va. 1952). In Howe, for example, the court explained that the North Carolina

        man who sought a divorce in Arkansas without intending to remain in Arkansas was no

        more than a “sojourner” in that state. 18 S.E.2d at 297.

               This concern does not exist when a foreign nation, like Ghana, grants a divorce,

        valid under its own laws, to its own citizens. As several courts have explained, “a

        country . . . may have a legitimate interest in the marital status of the parties, even though

        it does not accept the common law jurisdictional concept of domicile.” Scott v. Scott, 331

        P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1958) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d

        107, 110–11 (3d Cir. 1969) (“[D]omicile is not intrinsically an indispensable prerequisite

        to jurisdiction[.]”). Indeed, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law suggests a foreign

        nation has an interest in the marital status of its citizens, even if they are not currently

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        domiciled in that nation. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 484 n.1 (1987)

        (noting that “other substantial connections between the rendering state and a party, for

        example nationality, may suffice to justify recognition of a divorce”). Several international

        agreements similarly recognize that citizenship in the country where the divorce is sought,

        like domicile and habitual residence, provides a legitimate and independent basis upon

        which a country may grant a divorce. See Hague Convention on the Recognition of

        Divorces and Legal Separations art. 2(3), June 1, 1970, 978 U.N.T.S. 393; Council

        Regulation 2019/1111, art. 3(b), 2019 O.J. (L 178) 19.

               The dissent disputes the relevance of these authorities while ignoring that the

        Supreme Court of Virginia itself recognized the connection between citizenship and a

        sovereign’s authority to grant a divorce more than eighty years ago. Rather than accept the

        significance of the Howe court’s reasoning, the dissent relies on cases that emphasize the

        importance of domicile to each state’s jurisdiction to grant a divorce. But this gets it

        backwards. The domicile requirement rests on each state’s “right to regulate the domestic

        affairs of [its] citizens.” Rhonda Wasserman, Divorce and Domicile: Time to Sever the

        Knot, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 17 (1997); see also Michael M. O’Hear, Note, “Some of

        the Most Embarrassing Questions”: Extraterritorial Divorces and the Problem of

        Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 104 Yale L.J. 1507, 1525 (1995). In fact, in the influential

        early case Ditson v. Ditson, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island expressly grounded each

        state’s right to control the marital status of its domiciliaries on the more general principle

        that each “country or nation” has a “right . . . to determine the status of one of its own

        citizens.” 4 R.I. 87, 87 (1856). It follows that when citizenship does not depend on

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        domicile, neither does “the right of a . . . nation to determine the status of one of its own

        citizens.” Id.; see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 402(2), 421(2)(d).

               Citizenship in a nation, like domicile in a state, “implies a nexus between person

        and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations.” Williams v.

        State of N.C. (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); see also Evans, 72 S.E.2d at 324.

        Thus, the citizenship of both parties in a nation provides that nation with a jurisdictional

        basis for granting the parties a divorce that seems “reasonably comparable” to the

        relationship between a state and its domiciliaries. For these reasons, we believe that, if

        faced with the question, the Supreme Court of Virginia would consider Boateng and

        Gyasi’s citizenship in Ghana, the nation in which the divorce was granted, to be an

        acceptable alternative to domicile. 3

               3
                  In Jahed v. Acri, we predicted that Virginia would not recognize a Pakistani
        divorce granted to Afghan citizens who were domiciled in the United States at the time of
        the divorce. 468 F.3d at 236 n.5. This is entirely consistent with our holding today.
        Because Jahed’s parents were not citizens of Pakistan, citizenship did not offer an
        alternative basis for jurisdiction. The same is true for American citizens who obtain
        divorces abroad — domicile remains critical to the validity of a divorce granted by one
        nation not to its own citizens, but to citizens of another nation. See Harrison v. Harrison,
        214 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1954).
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                                                     B.

               We turn to the fourth America Online requirement: whether recognition of a

        divorce obtained in the absence of domicile would be contrary to the public policy of the

        Commonwealth.

               USCIS maintains that Virginia Code § 20-97 compels the conclusion that any

        divorce issued in the absence of domicile violates the public policy of Virginia. See Resp.

        Br. at 17. The relevant portion of § 20-97 provides only that:

               No suit for annulling a marriage or for divorce shall be maintainable, unless
               one of the parties was at the time of the filing of the suit and had been for at
               least six months preceding the filing of the suit an actual bona fide resident
               and domiciliary of the Commonwealth.

        Va. Code Ann. § 20-97. This statute simply establishes that domicile is required for

        Virginia’s own courts to grant a divorce. It does not prohibit the recognition of out-of-state

        divorce decrees granted in the absence of domicile.

               Nor does it follow that Virginia would refuse to recognize, as a matter of comity, a

        divorce issued by a foreign nation simply because Virginia itself would not grant a divorce

        under similar circumstances. Cf. McFarland, 19 S.E.2d at 84 (“[L]ack of reciprocity is not

        generally regarded as a basis for the denial of comity.”). This is especially true where, as

        here, the basis for the foreign nation’s jurisdiction to grant the divorce is the divorcing

        parties’ citizenship in that nation, a basis that has no independent analogue in the domestic

        context. Of course, Virginia could, as some states do, expressly forbid the recognition of

        all out-of-state divorces where both spouses are domiciled in the state where recognition is

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        sought. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-341; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 459:1. But Virginia

        law does not so provide. 4

               Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Virginia has repeatedly recognized that the

        public policy of Virginia favors recognizing divorces whenever possible, so that one’s

        marital status does not change with one’s location. See Newport v. Newport, 245 S.E.2d

        134, 139 (Va. 1978); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 123 S.E. 554, 561 (Va. 1924). And where,

        as here, the divorce is followed by a subsequent marriage, the Commonwealth’s interest in

        uniformity in marital status is reinforced by an even more foundational aspect of its public

        policy: “uphold[ing] the validity of the marriage status as for the best interest of society.”

        Levick v. MacDougall, 805 S.E.2d 775, 778 (Va. 2017) (quoting Needam v. Needam, 33

        S.E.2d 288, 290 (Va. 1945)).

               The importance of recognizing out-of-state divorces has only increased with

        advances in transportation. More than 50 years ago, in an often-cited opinion, New York’s

        highest court explained that in “a highly mobile era . . . it is needful on pragmatic grounds

        to regard the marriage itself as moving from place to place.” Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209

        N.E.2d 709, 712 (N.Y. 1965). The world has become even smaller and more mobile since

        then. See Ann Laquer Estin, Marriage and Divorce Conflicts in International Perspective,

               4
                Indeed, § 20-97 itself indicates that domicile, at least in the traditional sense, is not
        an invariable requirement for recognition of a divorce in Virginia. Traditionally, “[t]o
        change domiciles, a person must intend to make the new place her home.” Jahed, 468 F.3d
        at 236; Howe, 18 S.E.2d at 297. But to accommodate members of the Armed Services
        serving a tour in Virginia, even those who do not intend to make Virginia their home, the
        Commonwealth presumes, for purposes of jurisdiction to grant a divorce, that those
        stationed in the Commonwealth for six months are domiciled in Virginia. Va. Code Ann.
        § 20-97.
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        27 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 485, 516 (2017) (explaining that “[g]lobalization has

        heightened the importance of a durable and portable family status”).

               Given these precedents, we believe when, absent any fraud, a couple has married

        relying on a consensual divorce granted by a foreign nation to its citizens and in accordance

        with its laws, Virginia public policy would favor recognition of the divorce upon which

        the second marriage’s legitimacy depends.

                                                     V.

               In sum, Boateng and Gyasi’s divorce satisfies each of the preconditions Virginia

        has imposed on the doctrine of comity. A divorce obtained in a foreign nation by its own

        citizens is not invalid in Virginia simply because these citizens were not domiciled in their

        home country at the time of the divorce. Their citizenship in that country provides an

        adequate relationship between person and place to justify the foreign nation’s exercise of

        control over their marital status. Thus, as a matter of comity — which requires “due regard

        both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights . . . of other persons who are

        under the protection of its laws,” Hilton, 159 U.S. at 164 — we believe Virginia would

        recognize Boateng’s divorce from her first husband. 5

               5
                 In Annan v. Lynch, 202 F. Supp. 3d 596, 597, 604–06 (E.D. Va. 2016), the district
        court recognized a Ghanaian customary divorce under similar circumstances because it
        satisfied the test set out in Matter of Ma, 15 I. & N. Dec. 70 (BIA 1974). While we agree
        with the holding in Annan, we do not agree with its rationale. Matter of Ma applies only
        when there has been no subsequent marriage, and neither Matter of Ma nor the cases it
        relied on apply Virginia law. The Annan court should have looked to the requirements for
        recognition set out in America Online.
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               In so holding, we emphasize a critical difference between Virginia’s obligations

        under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its discretion when extending comity. A state

        may not disregard a judgment rendered by a sister state simply because it disagrees with

        the “policies reflected in the judgment.” Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S.

        222, 233 (1998) (quoting Estin, 334 U.S. at 546). In that context, focusing on the domicile

        of the spouses — and thus on the divorcing state’s jurisdiction over their marital status —

        is the only effective means for a state to ensure that its social policies are not undermined

        by proceedings in a sister state with no legitimate interest in the marriage. Williams II, 325

        U.S. at 230. By contrast, the Commonwealth may refuse to recognize a foreign divorce as

        a matter of comity if the divorce or the manner in which it was obtained offends Virginia

        law or public policy. We reject only USCIS’s argument that, pursuant to present Virginia

        law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by foreign nation to

        its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of

        the divorce.

               Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with

        instructions to grant Adjei’s application for naturalization.

                                           REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce

        granted by a foreign country, Ghana, to two Ghanaian citizens who were neither domiciled

        nor present there at the time of the divorce. Michael Adjei seeks to establish the validity of

        his wife’s prior Ghanaian divorce in order to demonstrate that he properly became a lawful

        permanent resident based on his marriage to her and is therefore eligible for naturalization.

               The majority does not dispute that Virginia has long refused to recognize divorces

        granted by other states unless at least one spouse was domiciled in the divorcing

        jurisdiction. Nor does it dispute that Virginia itself will not grant a divorce unless at least

        one spouse is a domiciliary of the Commonwealth. Instead, the majority hypothesizes that

        Virginia would extend comity to a foreign country’s divorce decree as long as the spouses

        were citizens of that country. Maj. Op. at 12. The majority surmises based on a hodgepodge

        of non-Virginia sources that the Virginia Supreme Court would hold that citizenship, even

        without domicile, creates a sufficient relationship with the divorcing country to justify that

        country’s exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 9–12.

               Not so. The majority has concocted a pre-Erie federal-common-law amalgam that

        ventures far afield from present Virginia law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

        (1938). Nothing in Virginia’s current law or precedent suggests that it would abandon the

        age-old proposition that the “judicial power to grant a divorce . . . is founded on

        domicil[e].” Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945); see Evans

        v. Asphalt Roads & Materials Co., 72 S.E.2d 321, 324–26 (Va. 1952). There is no

        indication that Virginia would recognize non-domiciliary divorces—i.e., divorces granted

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        by jurisdictions in which neither spouse is domiciled. I would not get ahead of the Virginia

        Supreme Court and purport to transform Virginia’s law in this way.

               Because this case concerns an alien seeking American citizenship, all “doubts

        should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.” Berenyi v. Dist.

        Dir., INS, 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967) (quotation marks omitted). It is at the very least

        doubtful that Virginia would extend comity to a divorce granted by a foreign country to

        non-domiciliaries. I would therefore hold that the petitioner has not carried his burden to

        show that Virginia would recognize the Ghanaian divorce at issue.

                                                     I.

                                                     A.

               The Supreme Court has explained that “[u]nder our system of law, judicial power

        to grant a divorce—jurisdiction, strictly speaking—is founded on domicil[e].” Williams II,

        325 U.S. at 229. The word “domicile” comes from the Latin domus, meaning home.

        “Domicil[e] implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control

        the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance.” Id. That is

        why a spouse’s domicile in a state gives the state power “to dissolve a marriage

        wheresoever contracted.” Id. at 229–30; see also Williams v. North Carolina (Williams I),

        317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942) (explaining that domicile is “essential in order to give the court

        jurisdiction which will entitle the divorce decree to extraterritorial effect”). “The framers

        of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 1789

        neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world has questioned it.”

        Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229.

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               The Supreme Court of Virginia has proven no exception. Virginia, taking its cue

        from the United States Supreme Court, has recognized that it is the “[d]omicile of one party

        to the divorce proceeding” that “creates an adequate relationship with the state to justify

        its exercise of power over the marital relation.” Evans, 72 S.E.2d at 324, 326 (citing, inter

        alia, Williams I, 317 U.S. at 298). “It is well settled that each state has exclusive control

        over the marital status of those domiciled within its borders.” Id. at 324 (emphasis added).

        Because domicile ensures the existence of a connection between the spouses and the state

        strong enough to justify that state’s jurisdiction over the marriage, the “fact of domicile” is

        the “controlling question.” Id. (citing Humphreys v. Humphreys, 123 S.E. 554, 559–60

        (Va. 1924), and McFarland v. McFarland, 19 S.E.2d 77, 81–82 (Va. 1942)).

                                                      B.

               Virginia’s view that domicile creates an adequate relationship with the state to

        support the state’s jurisdiction over the marriage is exemplified by its caselaw and its own

        requirements for granting a divorce.

               First, the Virginia caselaw. The majority cannot muster a single example of a

        Virginia court recognizing a non-domiciliary divorce granted by another state or country.

        To the contrary, the Virginia Supreme Court has refused to recognize a foreign divorce

        explicitly because domicile was lacking. See Howe v. Howe, 18 S.E.2d 294, 300 (Va. 1942)

        (refusing to extend comity to a divorce granted by Arkansas because “Dr. Howe was never

        domiciled in Arkansas” and therefore its “courts were without jurisdiction”).

               Second, Virginia’s own divorce statute. Virginia has long required that at least one

        spouse be domiciled in the Commonwealth before granting a divorce. See Towson v.

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        Towson, 102 S.E. 48, 52 (Va. 1920) (“Section 2259 of the Code (1904) declares that no

        suit for divorce shall be maintainable in the courts of this commonwealth unless one of the

        parties has been domiciled in the state for at least one year preceding the commencement

        of the suit.”). Today, no suit for divorce may be maintained in Virginia unless at least one

        spouse has been “for at least six months preceding the filing of the suit an actual bona fide

        resident and domiciliary of the Commonwealth.” Va. Code § 20-97. This requirement is

        further evidence that Virginia views domicile as a prerequisite to jurisdiction to grant a

        divorce. 1

               The majority muses that because Virginia’s underlying concern is with the existence

        of an adequate connection between the spouses and the state to justify jurisdiction over the

        marriage, the Virginia Supreme Court would recognize citizenship as an “acceptable

        alternative to domicile.” Maj. Op. at 9–12. The majority asserts that citizenship in a foreign

        state “implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the

        creation of legal relations.” Id. at 12 (quoting Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229). But that

        sentence from Williams II expressly uses the term “domicil[e],” not citizenship. Tellingly,

               1
                 The majority emphasizes that because § 20-97 presumes that members of the
        armed forces stationed in Virginia for at least six months are domiciled in the
        Commonwealth, that statute indicates that domicile in the traditional sense is not an
        invariable requirement for jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Maj. Op. at 14 n.4. But this
        narrow dispensation for military servicemembers proves the rule that domicile is generally
        required for jurisdiction. In fact, § 20-97 emphasizes domicile’s importance by granting
        servicemembers a presumption of domicile when it just as easily could have exempted
        them from the domicile requirement altogether. Moreover, this presumption is evidence of
        the general importance of domicile to jurisdiction everywhere: If servicemembers stationed
        in Virginia for at least six months could not obtain divorces in the Commonwealth, they
        would have difficulty obtaining divorces anywhere given the likely difficulty of proving
        domicile in any other state while they were stationed in Virginia.
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        the majority cites no Virginia case for the proposition that citizenship without domicile is

        an adequate basis for jurisdiction. The majority instead grasps at straws like a California

        Supreme Court concurrence, a Third Circuit case, a Restatement of Foreign Relations Law,

        and a Hague Convention on divorces. See id. at 10–11. All good sources to be sure, but

        what relevance does this disparate assemblage bear to Virginia law?

               Surprisingly, the majority cites Howe for the proposition that the Virginia Supreme

        Court has recognized a connection between citizenship and a sovereign’s authority to grant

        a divorce. Maj. Op. at 9–11. It builds its case on just a single use of the word “citizenship”

        in that opinion, in the following context: “One would have to be incredibly credulous to

        believe that Dr. Howe went to Arkansas intending to establish a domicile there. For the

        purposes of citizenship he stood exactly as he would have stood had he gone to hunt bear

        in the canebrakes of that State.” Howe, 18 S.E.2d at 296. This passage does not begin to

        support the proposition that citizenship without domicile in the international context is

        sufficient to create jurisdiction to grant a divorce. In contrast to this stray reference to

        citizenship, the Howe opinion mentions “domicile” twenty-six times, stating that “[e]ach

        state has exclusive control of the matrimonial status of those domiciled within its borders,”

        Dr. Howe “must have at least acquired an Arkansas domicile,” “statutory requirements for

        domiciliary residence are jurisdictional,” and “[s]ince Dr. Howe was never domiciled in

        Arkansas, its courts were without jurisdiction.” Id. at 297, 300 (emphasis added). I am

        surprised that the majority relies on a decision that so disproves its point.

               There are additional reasons to be skeptical. Virginia’s caselaw emphasizes that

        domicile creates a relationship sufficient to support jurisdiction and, crucially, we have

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        recognized that domicile goes beyond mere citizenship: “As a general matter, a domicile is

        understood to be ‘a person’s true, fixed, principal and permanent home.’” Jahed v. Acri,

        468 F.3d 230, 236 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 523 (8th ed. 2004)).

        Someone may have multiple citizenships by operation of law, but as a factual matter a

        “person can have only one domicile.” 23 Va. Admin Code § 10-110-30(B). It is hardly

        implausible therefore that domicile constitutes a connection that is strong enough to

        support jurisdiction but citizenship does not: Domicile, not citizenship, refers to a person’s

        one “fixed, principal and permanent home,” so only domicile “implies a nexus between

        person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations.” Williams

        II, 325 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added).

               The instant case is Exhibit A. While the relevant parties, Barbara Boateng and

        Kingsley Gyasi, were citizens of Ghana at the time of the decree, neither the petitioner nor

        the majority contends that they were domiciliaries of Ghana. They had moved to and

        became lawful permanent residents of the United States. As such, Virginia would view

        their state of residence—not Ghana—as having “exclusive control over the[ir] marital

        status” because they are “domiciled within its borders.” Evans, 72 S.E.2d at 324. It is

        therefore highly doubtful that Virginia would view Ghana as having jurisdiction to grant a

        divorce to these United States domiciliaries.

                                                     II.

               Why would Virginia extend comity to a Ghanaian divorce decree that it views as

        beyond Ghana’s power to grant? Comity is the recognition that a sovereign gives to

        another’s acts “having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the

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        rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”

        Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). Because comity is “a matter of favor or

        courtesy” and the “control and recognition of marriage is left to each State in its sovereign

        capacity,” “no State is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to the divorce laws of

        another State repugnant to its own laws and public policy.” McFarland, 19 S.E.2d at 82–

        83.

               The majority recognizes these principles and cites Virginia’s general test for

        whether to extend comity. Maj. Op. at 6–7. Under that test, (1) “the foreign court must have

        personal and subject matter jurisdiction to enforce its order within its own judicatory

        domain”; (2) “the procedural and substantive law applied by the foreign court must be

        reasonably comparable to that of Virginia”; (3) “the foreign court’s order must not have

        been falsely or fraudulently obtained”; and (4) “enforcement of the foreign court’s order

        must not be contrary to the public policy of Virginia, or prejudice the rights of Virginia or

        her citizens.” Am. Online, Inc. v. Nam Tai Elecs., Inc., 571 S.E.2d 128, 133 (Va. 2002).

        The majority’s application of this test is questionable at best.

               Begin with the requirement that Ghana’s “procedural and substantive law” of

        divorce must be “reasonably comparable to that of Virginia.” Id. The majority mentions

        but skims over the key procedural difference between Ghanaian and Virginia divorce law:

        Virginia requires at least one spouse to be domiciled in the state for at least six months,

        Va. Code § 20-97, but Ghana has no such requirement. Indeed, Ghanaian law apparently

        does not require either spouse to be present in the country at the time of divorce—or even

        to have set foot in the country for years. Given the tight link that Virginia caselaw has

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        drawn between domicile and jurisdiction to grant a divorce, this is no small difference.

        Moreover, Ghanaian law allows parties to divorce based on a tribal ceremony in which the

        spouses do not even participate, as long as the spouses’ family members are involved. See

        In re Kodwo, 24 I&N Dec. 479, 481–82 (BIA 2008). Virginia has no similar procedure.

        These differences are significant and cast doubt on whether the Virginia Supreme Court

        would find Ghana’s divorce law reasonably comparable to Virginia’s.

               It is also likely that the Virginia Supreme Court would find that extending comity

        to the Ghanaian divorce decree would contravene Virginia’s public policy. As explained

        in Part I, Virginia’s precedents and divorce statute reflect the view that domicile is essential

        to a jurisdiction’s power to grant a divorce. It is not citizenship but domicile—where the

        spouses make their principal and permanent home—that signals the existence of a

        sufficient nexus with the jurisdiction to justify its exercise of power over the marriage. See

        Evans, 72 S.E.2d at 326. In other words, Virginia’s public policy holds that the power to

        grant a divorce is based on territorial control over the land upon which the spouses live:

        “each state has exclusive control over the marital status of those domiciled within its

        borders.” Id. at 324 (emphasis added).

               Because the power to grant a divorce belongs exclusively to the state in which the

        spouses currently reside, it would contravene Virginia public policy to recognize a

        Ghanaian divorce granted to non-domiciliaries—a divorce decree that, in Virginia’s view,

        Ghana was powerless to grant. Respect for the sovereignty of the state in which the spouses

        are domiciled requires this conclusion. See McFarland, 19 S.E.2d at 82–83. Moreover,

        enabling another jurisdiction to exercise power to end the marriage threatens to introduce

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        additional unpredictability and jurisdictional conflict into the sphere of family relations—

        a result Virginia has taken pains to avoid.

                                                      III.

               Ultimately, because this case concerns an applicant for American citizenship, all

        “doubts should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.” Berenyi,

        385 U.S. at 637 (quotation marks omitted) (explaining that “it has been universally

        accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in

        every respect”). Given Virginia’s view on the relationship between domicile and the power

        to grant a divorce and how this public policy would affect the comity analysis, it is doubtful

        that the Virginia Supreme Court would extend comity to the Ghanaian divorce at issue

        here. Petitioner has thus failed to carry his burden.

               Family relations lie at the heart of state sovereignty and state-court competency.

        States have a sovereign interest in the “control and recognition of marriage,” McFarland,

        19 S.E.2d at 82, and state tribunals have developed a “special proficiency . . . over the past

        century and a half” in handling divorces, Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704

        (1992). It is certainly within the prerogative of the Commonwealth of Virginia to steer

        Virginia law down the path that the majority favors, away from the state’s paramount

        emphasis on domicile. Because I would wait for the Virginia Supreme Court to effect any

        such fundamental shift in Virginia law, I respectfully dissent.

               As federal judges, we must give effect to Virginia law and policy as they currently

        stand, not move state law in our preferred direction. Federal common law once gave federal

        courts this open range freedom, see Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), and I am

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        sorry to see the majority revert. Its decision is a throwback to a discredited era, to a day

        when wisdom reigned supreme on the bench, not in the given law and structure of our

        federal system. Declaring that Virginia would recognize non-domiciliary divorces in

        foreign jurisdictions is a step that lies far beyond our legal authority to take. I would affirm

        the judgment of the district court.

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