Court Opinion

ID: 9863819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:54:40.12307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:21.033228
License: Public Domain

KNUDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
The portion of this opinion with which I do not agree is the conclusion that appellant was not entitled to a jury trial.
The record discloses that on April 1, 1963, the trial court fixed April 24, 1963 as the date upon which a pretrial conference would be held. At said conference appellant’s answer was amended by adding a second affirmative defense and appellant also at that time demanded a jury trial. Appellant states that the court at that time indicated that a jury trial would not be granted and appellant thereafter on May 1, 1963, filed a written demand for a jury trial.
The pretrial order was filed May 3, 1963, wherein it was stated that defendant’s answer had been amended by alleging a second affirmative defense, the allegations of which were set out in haec verba. The order 'also stated that the case had been set for trial to commence at 10:00 a; m. May 24, 1963, “before the court,” Appellant filed objection to the setting as stated in the pretrial order and at the same time again requested a jury trial. Trial was commenced May 24, 1963, before the court sitting without a jury.
The amendment constituting the second affirmative defense which was permitted and made at the pretrial conference alleged and set up the defense of estoppel which in fact created a new jury issue. This court has repeatedly held that' a defense of estoppel must be pleaded with certainty and particularity. Neitzel v. Lawrence, 40 Idaho 26, 231 P. 423; Jackson v. Lee, 47 Idaho 589, 277 P. 548. Since such defense had not been mentioned in the prior pleadings in this case, I contend that the amendment created a new issue and that the rule stated' and followed in Lehman v. Bair, 85 Idaho 59, 375 P.2d 714, should here be applied.
I consider it to be of equal importance that this court require compliance with, its pronouncement made in R. E. W. Construction Co. v. The District Court of the Third Judicial District, Idaho, 400 P.2d 390, wherein it is stated:
“It is essential, that upon a request for trial of issues by a jury, even after the time for demand for jury has elapsed, that the trial court liberáíly exercise 'its discretion in this regard to carry out the *42designed purpose of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.”
The foregoing is also quoted in the majority opinion, hut I am unable to reconcile its provisions with the decision arrived at.
The majority opinion attempts to justify the court’s refusal to grant the request upon the theory that the factual presentations in the original pleadings were the same as alleged in the amendment referred to and consequently the waiver of a trial by jury was not revoked by the amendment, as provided by I.R.C.P. 38(d). I disagree with such theory and I contend that even though it he conceded to he correct, it would not justify the refusal involved. The pronouncement above quoted in substance directs a trial court to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a request for a trial by jury even after the time within which an enforceable demwtd has elapsed.
' It is uncontradicted that request for a jury trial was made during the pretrial conference which was held before any date of trial had been fixed and it was in fact made one month prior to the date which was thereafter set for trial. The question of whether appellant was entitled to a jury trial has been recognized as one of the principal issues throughout this case and it must he assumed that the record before us discloses the pertinent facts relating thereto. In this record I am unable to find where any justifiable reason has been given or mentioned for denying the request for a jury trial. There is no showing of a claim on the part of anyone connected with the case that the granting of such request would in any respect prejudice or even inconvenience them, in fact I do not find any showing that respondent or anyone else even resisted the request. Under these circumstances I cannot escape the conclusion that the request was denied without substantial cause. Consequently to me, the effect of the foregoing decision is to delete the words “it is essential” from the pronouncement made by this court herein-before quoted and referred to, whereas it is my view that compliance therewith should be required. The request for a jury trial should have been granted.
Since writing the foregoing portion of this dissent the majority opinion has been amended to state that even had a jury been empaneled, the facts presented to the trial court in this cause were insufficient to have sustained any verdict a jury might have returned for appellant on his affirmative defense. This conclusion does not, in my opinion, justify the denial of a jury trial. Disregarding the affirmative defense alleged, the record clearly discloses that appellant’s answer to respondent’s complaint specifically denies that appellant is indebted to respondent in any amount. The record is replete with testimony on the part of appellant to the effect that the purchases which are the subject of this action were not made by appellant as an individual and respondent knew *43and understood that appellant was not to he individually liable for such purchases.
Notwithstanding the fact that appellant may not be entitled to recover under his affirmative defense, if a jury had believed appellant, which they would have been entitled to do, surely it cannot be said that a verdict in favor of appellant on his denial of liability would not have been sustained by competent evidence. The jury, as the trier of fact, would have determined the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. It would be pure speculation to assume that a jury would have found exactly as the trial court regarding the testimony submitted.
On Petition for Recall of Remittitur
McFADDEN, Justice.
Appellant heretofore petitioned for rehearing of this cause, which petition was denied; thereafter, appellant petitioned for recall of the remittitur, asserting that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the authority of the legislature and of this court to promulgate rules of procedure in the courts of this state. The issue presented was considered by this court not only in the instant cause, but also in R. E. W. Const. Co. v. District Court of Third Jud. Dist., 88 Idaho 426, 400 P.2d 390. Because of its importance to the members of the bench and bar and to litigants, this issue has again been examined.
The legislature enacted I.C. § 1-212 to 1-215 inch, in 1941 (S.L.1941, Ch; 90), which act recognizes the inherent power of the Supreme Court to make rules governing procedure in all courts of this state, and that:
“Such rules, when adopted by the said Supreme Court shall take effect six months after their promulgation and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.”
This Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and § 86 thereof provides:
“These rules shall take effect on November 1st, 1958, and thereafter all laws and rules of Civil Procedure in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. * * * ”
(Note, however, the exception provided by I.R.C.P. 81(a) as to special statutory-proceedings.)
In the case of State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court (1959), 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475, the Supreme Court of Indiana was faced with a similar problem of whether the legislature still had rule making power after it had enacted a statute similar to S.L.1941, Ch. 90. There that court in language most appropriate here stated:
“In order to remove any conflict-which would inevitably result from *44both the Legislature and the Supreme Court promulgating rules of procedure, and to fix responsibility therefor exclusively in the Supreme Court, the Legislature enacted § 1, ch. 91 of the Acts of 1937, being § 2-4718, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
‘The Supreme Court shall have the power to adopt, amend and rescind rules of court which shall govern and. control practice and procedure in all the courts of this state; such rules to be promulgated and to take effect under such rules as the Supreme Court shall adopt, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.’
“By the enactment of this statute the Legislature surrendered and abandoned any rights it might have had under Art. 7, § 4, of the Constitution of Indiana, to impose ‘regulations and restrictions’ upon the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with respect to ‘rules of court which shall govern and control practice and procedure in all the courts of this state.’ Such statute also conferred upon the Supreme Court the power to adopt, amend and rescind rules of court governing and controlling practice and procedure in all courts of the State, and provided that after promulgation of such rules by this court ‘all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.’ ”
It is our conclusion that the result reached by the Supreme Court of Indiana in State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, supra, is correct. By S.L.1941, Ch. 90, the legislature abdicated the rule making power, which is neither exclusively a legislative nor a judicial power.
Finally appellant in essence contends that Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 7, requires that the waiver of a jury trial in a civil action can be accomplished only by the consent of the parties in a manner as may be prescribed by law; that the phrase as “prescribed by law” means as prescribed by the legislature, and hence I.R.C.P. 38(d) is ineffective to abrogate the provisions of what was formerly I.C. § 10-301. This, however, is not the case. The method of waiving of a jury trial is recognized as a procedural matter. State ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich (1959), 7 Wis.2d 353, 96 N.W.2d 337; Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 158 N.E.2d 285; Englehardt v. Bell & Howell Co. (C.C.A.8 1962) 299 F.2d 480. The method of expressing consent to waiver of a jury trial being procedural, it follows that under the provisions of I.C. § 1-215, the Supreme Court in enacting I.R.C.P. 38(d) effectively superceded and abrogated the provisions of what was formerly I.C. § 10-*45301, and it was done in accordance with law by the legislature enacting S.L.1941, Ch. 90, now I.C. §§ 1-212 to 1-215 incl.
The petition to withdraw remittitur is denied.
McQUADE, C. J., and TAYLOR and SMITH, JJ., concur.
KNUDSON, J., adheres to opinions previously expressed.