Court Opinion

ID: 9684169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:48:57.610363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:53.586854
License: Public Domain

DIES, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
With respect, I dissent. The trial court had before him probative evidence that Berton entered into the deed of trust with Ryan only on the assurance by Ryan that it *365would and could finance the development of the some 1500 acres on Lake Conroe; that at that time it knew it could not and would not carry this out; to Berton’s damage. The representation was made in Montgomery County. Under these circumstances venue was properly laid in Montgomery County under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1995 § 7 (1964). See “Survey of Texas Law for the Year 1948”, 3 Sw.L.J. 386 (1949); McDonald v. Peebles, 267 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1954, no writ); Tex. Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Kelly, 261 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1953, no writ); Neon Signs & Service v. Hill, 251 S.W.2d 570 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1952, no writ). See also Custom Leasing Inc. v. Texas Bank & T. Co. of Dallas, 516 S.W.2d 138, 143-144 (Tex.1974).
With respect to the judgment of October 9,1974 (discussed and quoted in the majority opinion) the court had evidence before him from which he could infer that Berton and Ryan agreed to this for the purpose of finding a new investor for the development plan. The trial court also heard evidence from which he could infer that not only did Ryan fail to cooperate in this task but probably prevented it. Under these circumstances, the court was authorized to grant relief under the bill of review. See 34 Tex.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 188 et seq. at 19 (1962), and authorities cited. Such authority rests largely in the discretion of the trial court and is not disturbed in the absence of abuse. See 34 Tex.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 193 at 28 (1962), and authorities cited.
At any rate, if this dissent be incorrect as to the venue question, I see no reason to dissolve the temporary injunction, and much reason not to. The record reflects Berton has unsecured creditors. It also shows the land in question is far greater in value than Berton’s debt. Therefore, if Ryan prevails in a trial on the merits, preventing foreclosure until the outcome on the merits can do Ryan no harm. On the other hand, continuing in force the temporary injunction will protect the unsecured creditors until the case is concluded on its merits. See Great Am. Mtg. Inv. v. Republic of Texas Sav. Ass’n, 538 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (on Motion for Rehearing).