Court Opinion

ID: 9909522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:09:05.036833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:33.212903
License: Public Domain

J-S29018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  TANYA ANN SCRIVENER                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  RUSSELL REES, M.D., ROBERT                   :
  PACKER HOSPITAL AND GUTHRIE                  :
  MEDICAL GROUP, PC                            :
                                               :
                       Appellees               :       No. 266 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered January 20, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
                      Civil Division at No(s): 2017MM0001

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                        FILED: DECEMBER 13, 2023

       Appellant, Tanya Ann Scrivener, appeals from the order entered in the

Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment

in favor of Appellees, Russell Rees, M.D., Robert Packer Hospital and Guthrie

Medical Group, PC. We affirm.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

of this appeal as follows:

          [Appellant], through counsel, filed a complaint in medical
          negligence and respondeat superior against [Appellees] on
          March 30, 2017. The complaint alleges that Dr. Russell Rees
          negligently caused injuries to [Appellant’s] bladder, ureters
          and supporting structures during a hysterectomy performed
          by him that resulted in [Appellant] having to undergo
          multiple corrective surgeries and to suffer unresolved
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S29018-23

       injuries, pain, and loss of function. The complaint attached
       a Certificate of Merit signed by [Appellant’s] counsel
       certifying that an appropriate licensed professional has
       supplied a written statement … that there is a basis to
       conclude that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or
       exhibited by [Appellees] … fell outside acceptable
       professional standards, and that such conduct was a cause
       in bringing about the harm.

                                 *    *    *

       On May 6, 2019, approximately two (2) years after the
       complaint was filed, [Appellant] filed a praecipe for a pretrial
       conference. In response, [the court] scheduled a status
       conference for August 14, 2019, to discuss the status of the
       case and the scheduling of deadlines … to move the matter
       forward. At [Appellees’] request, the status conference was
       continued, without objection, to September 11, 2019.

       At the status conference, the parties agreed to the following
       deadlines: (i) Discovery: March 13, 2020; (ii) [Appellant’s]
       expert report: May 15, 2020, with [Appellees’] and
       [Appellant’s] supplemental report, if any, to follow on
       specified dates; (iii) Dispositive Motion: September 4, 2020.
       The parties agreed to promptly schedule and take the
       depositions of [Appellant] and Dr. Rees first, followed by
       approximately four to six depositions.

       After receiving a letter from counsel dated February 19,
       2020, advising that the parties were seeking a joint
       continuance of the case management deadlines, [the court]
       eventually issued an order acknowledging receipt of the
       letter, but because no motion, no proposed order, and no
       proposed new dates had yet been filed or received, [the
       court] directed [Appellant] to file, within sixty (60) days, a
       motion and proposed order with new dates and deadlines.
       [Appellant] did not file the motion as directed.

       Two (2) years later, on March 8, 2022, due to (i)
       [Appellant’s] failure to file a motion to extend the case
       management deadlines, (ii) [Appellant’s] alleged failure to
       produce her expert report by the May 15, 2020, deadline,
       (iii) [Appellant’s] alleged failure to identify her expert, and
       (iv) [Appellant’s] counsel’s alleged failure to respond to

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       communications from [Appellees’] counsel as to whether
       [Appellant] intended to proceed with the case, [Appellees]
       filed a Motion for Sanctions seeking to preclude [Appellant]
       from presenting any evidence or testifying at trial, including
       expert witness testimony.

       On April 21, 2022, [Appellant] filed a response to
       [Appellees’] Motion for Sanctions that admitted, among
       other things, the above-mentioned allegations. [Appellant]
       also filed an Attorney Affirmation that attached emails from
       April to June of 2021, supporting [Appellant’s] position that
       counsel had been communicating with each other in good
       faith and were in general agreement to move back the
       discovery deadline to September 30, 2021, and adjust the
       other deadlines accordingly.        The Attorney Affirmation
       further provided explanations and excuses for [Appellant’s]
       failure to conduct the deposition of Dr. Rees, [Appellant’s]
       failure to produce an expert report, [Appellant’s] failure to
       file a motion to extend the deadlines, and [Appellant’s]
       failure to comply with all of the case management deadlines.
       These explanations and excuses included (i) the onset of
       Covid, (ii) the change of [Appellees’] attorneys, (iii) the
       departure of [Appellant’s] attorney from his prior firm in
       order to start his own firm, (iv) the misunderstanding of
       [Appellant’s] counsel as to his obligation to formally file a
       motion to extend the case management deadlines, and (v)
       the disorganization and understaffing of [Appellant’s]
       counsel’s new law firm combined with a full caseload that
       resulted in a crushing workload. [Appellant’s] counsel also
       asserted that there was no prejudice to [Appellees] due to
       the delay, and that this case is not far off from being trial
       ready given that the only tasks left to complete are the
       deposition of Dr. Rees and the exchange of expert reports,
       … tasks [that] can comfortably be completed within 90 days.

       One week later, by Order dated April 28, 2022, [the court]
       denied [Appellees’] Motion for Sanctions, without prejudice
       to [Appellees’] right to renew said Motion if [Appellant] does
       not diligently move this litigation forward, and scheduled the
       matter for a status conference on May 26, 2022. The Order
       indicated that at the status conference [the court] wanted
       to be advised as to recent progress as to the exchange of
       expert reports and the deposition of Dr. Rees, both of which
       tasks [Appellant’s] counsel states can be completed within

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       90 days. [The court] also advised that [it] expected to
       implement a new scheduling order.

       On the same day that [the court] denied the Motion for
       Sanctions, [Appellant] filed a Motion to Extend Discovery
       Deadlines, suggesting the following new deadlines:

          a.    60 days to complete discovery (by 6/30/2022)
          b.    90 days to complete the exchange of
                [Appellant’s] expert reports (7/30/2022)
          c.    120 day[s] for the defense t[o] complete
                the [exchange] of their expert reports
                (8/30/2022)
          d.    Dispositive briefs and motions by 9/30/2022
          e.    A pre-trial conference will be scheduled after the
                resolution of all dispositive motions

       Neither [Appellant] nor her counsel appeared at the status
       conference on May 26, 2022. [Appellees’] counsel did
       participate. Notwithstanding [Appellant’s] absence, on the
       record before [the court], [it] granted [Appellant’s] Motion
       to Extend Discovery Deadlines and adopted the new case
       management dates proposed by [Appellant] in her motion.

       The next action of record in this case occurred more than
       four (4) months later when, on September 29, 2022, one
       day before the dispositive motion deadline, [Appellees] filed
       [a] Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law
       in Support thereof. By Order dated October 12, 2022, [the
       court] scheduled the motion for argument on December 2,
       2022. [Appellant] filed a Response, Attorney Affirmation,
       and Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines on November 2,
       2022. The Response again admitted [Appellant’s] failures
       and the Attorney Affirmation offered a new explanation for
       the recent failures, specifically an emergent heart issue of
       counsel’s father that required two (2) surgeries and
       hospitalization, that finally stabilized at the end of June. As
       in April, counsel again asserted this case is not far off from
       being trial ready, with the only tasks left to complete being
       the deposition of Dr. Rees and the exchange of expert
       reports.    Although the Attorney Affirmation mistakenly
       utilized the same April 18, 2022, date as the earlier Attorney
       Affirmation, and mistakenly requested in the prayer for
       relief that [Appellees’] Motion for Sanctions be denied,

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         [Appellant’s] filing was clearly offered in response to
         [Appellees’] Motion for Summary Judgment, as [the court]
         had already denied [Appellees’] Motion for Sanctions six (6)
         months earlier. By Order dated November 7, 2022, [the
         court] scheduled [Appellant’s] Motion to Extend Discovery
         Deadlines for argument on the same date and at the same
         time as argument on [Appellees’] Motion for Summary
         Judgment.

(Order and Opinion, filed 1/20/23, at 1-4) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

      By opinion and order entered January 20, 2023, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of Appellees and denied Appellant’s motion to

extend discovery deadlines as moot. In its opinion, the court emphasized that

Appellant’s failure to provide an expert report opining on Appellees’ deviation

from the standard of care amounted to “a substantive deficiency of proof in

[Appellant’s] cause of action,” which warranted the entry of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees. (Id. at 7) (citing Grandelli v. Methodist

Hosp., 777 A.2d 1138 (Pa.Super. 2001)). Appellant timely filed a notice of

appeal on February 17, 2023.      On February 22, 2023, the court ordered

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. Appellant subsequently complied.

      Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:

         That the trial court erred in not granting [Appellant’s]
         motion for an extension of discovery deadlines to allow
         additional time to complete discovery and complete expert
         disclosure. The failure to grant [Appellant’s] motion was
         unwarranted, unreasonable, improper, an abuse of
         discretion, and resulted in manifest injustice.

                                     -5-
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       That the trial court erred in granting [Appellees’] motion for
       summary judgment since discovery was not complete.
       Granting     [Appellees’]     motion     was    unwarranted,
       unreasonable, improper, an abuse of discretion, and
       resulted in manifest injustice.

       That the trial court failed to consider and/or give sufficient
       weight to the enumerated circumstances that prevented the
       completion of discovery within the timing of the scheduling
       order. Granting [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment
       without doing so, and denying [Appellant’s] motion for an
       extension of the discovery deadlines without doing so, was
       unwarranted, unreasonable, improper, an abuse of
       discretion, and resulted in manifest injustice.

       That the trial court failed to consider and/or give sufficient
       weight to defense counsel’s refusal to schedule [Appellee
       Rees’] deposition within the timing of the scheduling order,
       and the role this played in [Appellant’s] inability to comply
       with the expert disclosure schedule required by the
       scheduling order.        Granting [Appellees’] motion for
       summary judgment without doing so, and denying
       [Appellant’s] motion for an extension of the discovery
       deadlines    without      doing   so,    was    unwarranted,
       unreasonable, improper, an abuse of discretion, and
       resulted in manifest injustice.

       That the trial court failed to consider and/or impose any
       lesser outcome than granting the motion for summary
       judgment.     Granting [Appellees’] motion for summary
       judgment without doing so, and denying [Appellant’s]
       motion for an extension of the discovery deadlines without
       doing so, was unwarranted, unreasonable, improper, an
       abuse of discretion, and resulted in manifest injustice.

       That the trial court failed to consider the manifest injustice
       visited on [Appellant] as a result of its failure to consider
       and/or direct lesser option to dismissal.            Granting
       [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment without doing
       so, and denying [Appellant’s] motion for an extension of the
       discovery deadlines without doing so, was unwarranted,
       unreasonable, improper, and an abuse of discretion.

       That the trial court failed to consider that [Appellant’s]

                                   -6-
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          counsel did not receive notice of the May 26, 2022
          conference, as set forth in paragraph 19 of [Appellant’s]
          response to [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment.
          Granting [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment
          without doing so, and denying [Appellant’s] motion for an
          extension of the discovery deadlines without doing so, was
          unwarranted, unreasonable, improper, an abuse of
          discretion, and resulted in manifest injustice.

          That the trial court abused its discretion in granting
          [Appellees’] motion for summary judgment and denying
          [Appellant’s] motion for an extension of discovery
          deadlines, resulting in a failure to give [Appellant] her day
          in court and denying an opportunity to have her claim
          decided on the merits.

(Appellant’s Brief at 2-5).

       In her issues combined, Appellant contends that “courts may disregard

any error or defect of procedure which does not affect the substantial rights

of the parties,” and “[a]ny sanction imposed for a discovery [violation] must

be commensurate with the violation.”1 (Id. at 11-12). Appellant maintains

that the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Appellees

“was tantamount to a [discovery] sanction, which resulted in dismissal of the

case[.]” (Id. at 11). Because she believes that the court imposed a discovery

sanction, Appellant insists that the court should have considered: 1) the

nature and severity of the violation; 2) the defaulting party’s willfulness or

____________________________________________

1 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), the argument shall be divided into as many

parts as there are questions to be argued.        See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Nevertheless, the argument section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into
sections that correspond to each question presented. Rather, the argument
section addresses one overarching theme: the court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees amounted to an improper discovery sanction.

                                           -7-
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bad faith; 3) prejudice to the opposing party; 4) ability to cure prejudice; and

5) the importance of the precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply. 2

Appellant complains that the court erred by failing to consider these factors,

which weighed in favor of a lesser sanction than dismissal.            Appellant

emphasizes that the “only piece of discovery to complete was the deposition

of [Appellee] Rees,” which was delayed because of a medical emergency in

Appellant’s counsel’s family.          (Appellant’s Brief at 14).   Under these

circumstances, Appellant concludes that the court erred in granting Appellees’

summary judgment motion. We disagree.

       Appellate review of an order granting a summary judgment motion

implicates the following principles:

          On appellate review, an appellate court may reverse a grant
          of summary judgment if there has been an error of law or
          an abuse of discretion. But the issue as to whether there
          are no genuine issues as to any material fact presents a
          question of law, and therefore, on that question our
          standard of review is de novo. This means we need not
          defer to the determinations made by the lower tribunals. To
          the extent that this Court must resolve a question of law,
          we shall review the grant of summary judgment in the
          context of the entire record.

Valley National Bank v. Marchiano, 221 A.3d 1220, 1222 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 606 Pa. 294, 307, 997 A.2d 1152,

1159 (2010)). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa.

____________________________________________

2 See Croydon Plastics Co., Inc. v. Lower Bucks Cooling & Heating, 698

A.2d 625, 629 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal denied, 553 Pa. 689, 717 A.2d 1028
(1998).

                                           -8-
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407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct.

2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).

        [W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing
        all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists
        a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the
        light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts
        as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must
        be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is
        no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that
        the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
        law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the
        existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be
        resolved against the moving party.

        Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly
        implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of
        action.    Summary judgment is proper if, after the
        completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including
        the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will
        bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
        evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
        which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
        to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine
        issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the
        cause of action or defense, which could be established by
        additional discovery or expert report and the moving party
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary
        judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports
        summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are
        undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to
        make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.

        Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s
        conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     The trial court granted Appellees’ summary judgment motion pursuant

to Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2), which provides as follows:

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        Rule 1035.2. Motion

           After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such
        time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move
        for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law

                                 *     *      *

                 (2) if, after the completion of discovery
           relevant to the motion, including the production of
           expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the
           burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence
           of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
           which in a jury trial would require the issues to be
           submitted to a jury.

Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2). “Where the order at issue is entered not as a sanction,

but to address a substantive deficiency of proof in the cause of action, the

order is properly subject to review under Rule 1035.2 and cases interpreting

that rule.” Grandelli, supra at 1144 (emphasis added).

     “The purpose of [Rule 1035.2] is to eliminate cases prior to trial where

a party cannot make out a claim or a defense after relevant discovery has

been completed.”    Miller v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 753 A.2d 829, 833

(Pa.Super. 2000) (quoting Eaddy v. Hamaty, 694 A.2d 639, 643 (Pa.Super.

1997)). To establish a prima facie cause of action for medical negligence, a

plaintiff must demonstrate:

        (1) a duty owed by the physician to the patient; (2) a breach
        of that duty; (3) that the breach of duty was the proximate
        cause of the harm suffered by the patient; and (4) that the
        damages suffered were a direct result of that harm.

Mazzie v. Lehigh Valley Hospital—Muhlenberg, 257 A.3d 80, 87

(Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 265 A.3d 205 (2021) (quoting

                                     - 10 -
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Mitchell v. Shikora, 653 Pa. 103, 116, 209 A.3d 307, 314 (2019)).

          Our courts have held that because the complexities of the
          human body place questions as to the cause of pain or injury
          beyond the knowledge of the average layperson, a medical
          malpractice plaintiff generally must produce the opinion of
          a medical expert to demonstrate the elements of [a] cause
          of action. Thus if, at the conclusion of discovery, the plaintiff
          fails to produce expert medical opinion addressing the
          elements of his cause of action within a reasonable degree
          of medical certainty, [the plaintiff has] failed to establish a
          prima facie case and may not proceed to trial. At this
          juncture, a moving party is entitled to summary judgment
          under Rule 1035.2. In the absence of competent evidence
          of medical opinion, the plaintiff may avoid summary
          judgment only if the matter … is so simple, and the lack of
          skill or want of care so obvious, as to be within the range of
          ordinary experience and comprehension of even non
          professional persons.[3]

Miller, supra at 833 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See

also Mazzie, supra at 87 (reiterating that plaintiff in medical negligence case

must present expert witness who will testify, to reasonable degree of medical

certainty, regarding standard of care, that physician deviated from standard

of care, and such deviation was proximate cause of harm suffered).

       Instantly, the trial court expressly stated that its January 20, 2023 order

was not a discovery sanction:

          When I considered [Appellees’] Motion for Sanctions in April
          of 2022, I did so subject to a different set of standards than
____________________________________________

3 Appellant does not aver that the facts at issue are so simple as to be within

the range of ordinary experience and comprehension of non-professional
persons. Instead, as the trial court observed, the response to the summary
judgment motion indicated that Appellant’s “trial expert has been arranged,
and the only information necessary for him to complete his report [is] the
deposition of [Appellee] Rees[.]” (Attorney Affirmation, filed 11/2/22, at ¶5).

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          those utilized for summary judgment. At that point in the
          proceedings, despite the fact that more than seven (7) years
          had passed since the surgery at issue, and despite the fact
          that [Appellant] was, according to the case management
          order then in place, two (2) years beyond the date by which
          discovery was to be completed and her expert report was to
          be produced, I determined it was not appropriate to
          foreclose [Appellant] from presenting evidence, including
          expert testimony, at trial. Accordingly, I denied [Appellees’]
          Motion for Sanctions and granted [Appellant’s] Motion to
          Extend Discovery Deadlines, adopting the new deadlines
          that [Appellant] proposed. It is these deadlines upon which
          [Appellees] relied when preparing and filing their Motion for
          Summary Judgment. I no longer have a motion for
          sanctions before me.

          Rather, currently pending is [Appellees’] Motion for
          Summary Judgment and, filed more than a month past the
          deadline for dispositive motions, [Appellant’s] second
          Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines. With respect to the
          summary judgment motion, [Appellees] have simply
          identified what the Grandelli Court called “a substantive
          deficiency of proof in [Appellant’s] cause of action,” i.e., the
          absence of an expert report in which a qualified professional
          opines, within a reasonable degree of professional certainty,
          that Dr. Rees deviated from the standard of care and that
          such deviation proximately caused the harm suffered by
          [Appellant]. Here, without said report, which [Appellant]
          has yet to provide, [Appellant] cannot prevail at trial, and
          summary judgment in favor of [Appellees] and against
          [Appellant] is appropriate.

(Order and Opinion at 6-7) (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis

added).

     Because the trial court did not enter its order as a sanction, we review

the order under Rule 1035.2 and the cases interpreting that rule.            See

Grandelli, supra. Based upon our examination of the certified record, we

discern no error in the court’s decision to grant Appellees’ summary judgment

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motion pursuant to Rule 1035.2.     Appellant needed to produce a medical

expert’s opinion and, without one, Appellant could not establish a prima facie

case of medical negligence.   See Miller, supra.     On this basis, the court

properly granted Appellees’ summary judgment motion.             See Valley

National Bank, supra; Chenot, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/13/2023

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