Court Opinion

ID: 9742906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:22:23.756354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.611025
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: Defendant was sentenced upon conviction of delivery of one gram of cocaine. The record does not show any application for probation and no oral request at the time of sentence by either counsel or the defendant in allocution. There is no testimony in mitigation or upon the question of probation. Defendant did offer into evidence a report of a drug treatment center which suggested probation. Such report also disclosed that defendant had been selling marijuana during the preceding two years and had, on at least one occasion, sold amphetamines. This transaction was a progression from a lesser to a greater offense. One does not deliver a gram of cocaine on the spur of the moment and without some conscious preparation. Section 206(b) (4) of the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1206(b)(4)) places cocaine upon Schedule II of controlled substances. Section 401(b) of that Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1401(b)) provides that the delivery of any amount of cocaine less than 30 grams shall be a Class 2 felony with a possible fine of *25,000. Section 411 of the Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 56½, par. 1411) provides that in determining the appropriate sentence for any conviction under the Act, the sentencing court may consider the unlawful delivery “of the most highly toxic controlled substances, as reflected by their inclusion in Schedule I or II of this Act” as indicative of the type of offenses which the legislature deems most damaging to the peace and welfare of the citizens of Illinois, and which warrants the most severe penalty. This case is obviously distinguishable from People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 378, 362 N.E.2d 90, where the several defendants were simply present without expectation of participation in the transaction, and actually served as a conduit in handing over the substance to the purchaser upon the request of another. Here, the trial court’s colloquy at sentence was directed to the seriousness of the offense. We cannot find in the record that the trial court imposed “an additional standard or requirement for probation” as in People v. Bellson (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 303 N.E.2d 30. The record does not affirmatively show that “the trial judge superimposed his personal belief in the severity of the crime charged and was predisposed to disregard arguments for probation” as in People v. Bolyard (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 583, 586, 338 N.E.2d 168, 169. In People v. Wilson (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 220, 222, 361 N.E.2d 1155, the opinion noted that the trial court’s colloquy: “* * # discloses a view or policy which would make it virtually certain that no offender would be granted probation for the violation of the statute at issue, and would to a substantial extent, thwart the legislative purpose of providing a wide range of sentence possibilities. Within the rule of Bolyard, it may be said that the denial of probation was an arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion in this case.” This record does not disclose any matter of such quality to support a conclusion that a failure to grant probation was an arbitrary abuse of discretion. In People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 368 N.E.2d 882, the court reiterated that in the absence of an abuse of discretion the reviewing court may not alter the sentence. As to defendant’s argument there, that an abuse of discretion need not be found in the record, the court said: “to whatever extent the appellate [court] opinion implicitly holds that an abuse of sentencing discretion need not be shown in order for a reviewing court to alter a sentence, that opinion is erroneous.” 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154. Examination of this record discloses no matter reflecting an abuse of discretion. The judgment should be affirmed.