Court Opinion

ID: 9352089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 21:03:26.365426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:52.797029
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/4/23 San Jose Nihonmachi v. Japantown Development CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 SAN JOSE NIHONMACHI, LLC,                                                B323095

            Plaintiff and Appellant,                                      (Santa Clara County
                                                                          Super. Ct. No. 19CV353484)
           v.

 JAPANTOWN DEVELOPMENT, L.P.,
 et al.,

             Defendants and Respondents,

      Appeal from judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara
County, Christopher G. Rudy, Judge. Affirmed.
      Gates Eisenhart Dawson, James L. Dawson, Marc A.
Eisenhart, Steven D. McLellan and Claire A. Melehani for
Plaintiff and Appellant San Jose Nihonmachi, LLC.
      The Keegan Law Firm, William J. Keegan; Law Office
of Gerald Clausen and Gerald Clausen for Defendant and
Respondent Japantown Development, L.P.
      Brothers Smith and Mark V. Isola for Defendant and
Respondent Nihonmachi-Miraido Partners, L.P.
       Appellant San Jose Nihonmachi, LLC (SJN) appeals from
the May 25, 2021 judgment entered in favor of respondents
Nihonmachi-Miraido Partners, L.P. (NMP) and Japantown
Development, L.P. (Japantown Development) following issuance
of the court’s April 16, 2021 order granting respondents’ motions
for summary judgment and the court’s August 4, 2021 order
denying SJN’s motion for new trial. Specifically, SJN contends
that the trial court erred in concluding on summary judgment
that SJN was not entitled to an accounting from either
respondent. Because SJN cannot establish the requisite “balance
due” element of its accounting claims, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

   FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
      A.    Overview
      This appeal arises out of the last of three cases filed by
SJN against NMP and Japantown Development in connection
with the parties’ development of Miraido Village, a 109-unit
multifamily residential rental facility in the “Japantown” area
of San Jose, California (the project). The 35-year history of
business dealings and litigation between the parties is set forth
in detail in our opinion in San Jose Nihonmachi, LLC v. Miraido
Corporation et al. (Jan. 4, 2023, B323093) [nonpub. opn.]. We
therefore summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this related appeal.
      In 1987, a group of businesspeople, including Yoshihiro
Uchida (Uchida), formed an entity for developing a Japanese
cultural center and low-income housing project, with a
combination of investor funds and a $4.2 million loan from
Uchida. For that purpose, the entity acquired real property

                                   2
located at the corner of 6th Street and Jackson Street in San
Jose, California (the property). When the entity was unable to
stay current on the loan payments to Uchida, it conveyed the
property to Miraido, Uchida’s wholly owned corporation, in
exchange for forgiveness of the $4.2 million loan.
       In June 1993, Uchida and a few other individuals created a
new entity, Nihonmachi-Miraido Partners, L.P. (NMP) to make
a renewed effort at developing the property. Pursuant to the
June 7, 1993 limited partnership agreement governing NMP (the
NMP agreement), Miraido served as NMP’s general partner, and
SJN’s predecessor-in-interest, San Jose Nihonmachi Corporation,
served as its limited partner.1
       In June 1995, development of the project again stalled, and
NMP sold the property to the San Jose Redevelopment Agency
(RDA). Then, on May 1, 1997, NMP entered into a limited
partnership agreement with A.F. Evans, forming a new entity—
Japantown Development—to take over development of the
property (the Japantown agreement). The Japantown agreement
designated A.F. Evans as Japantown Development’s general
partner and NMP as its sole limited partner. Soon after its
formation, in 1997, Japantown Development obtained a ground
lease from the RDA, and construction of Miraido Village began.
       In the midst of construction, in August 1998, SJN filed
a lawsuit against Miraido, Uchida, A.F. Evans, and Japantown

      1 The parties agree that SJN acquired all the rights of
San Jose Nihonmachi Corporation in 2003, and the distinction
between the two entities is not pertinent to the issues on appeal.
In the interest of simplicity, we therefore refer only to SJN in the
remainder of the opinion.

                                    3
Development (the 1998 action) seeking, inter alia, invalidation of
the June 1995 sale of the property to the RDA and recalculation
of the NMP capital accounts for Miraido and SJN. SJN contends
that it “filed the 1998 lawsuit for a number of reasons, including
an attempt to reduce SJN’s economic interest in NMP, and a
refusal by NMP to provide any financial information to SJN.”
After nearly five years of litigation, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement in February 2003 (the 2003 settlement).
The parties executed amendments to the NMP agreement and
Japantown agreement, in accordance with the 2003 settlement’s
terms.
       As relevant to this appeal, the second amendment to
the NMP agreement included the memorialization of SJN’s
right to certain “special allocations,” including as set forth in
section 3.1(g) of the amendment: “(g) Special allocation of profits
on sale of substantially all property. After the allocation of
profits made in Section 3.1(b) and (h) (in the priority established
in the Treasury Regulations), 3.1(e)(ii), 3.1(a)(i), 3.1(c) and 3.1(d),
and prior to any other allocation of profits from the sale of
substantially all the partnership property or from the sale
of substantially all of the property held by Japantown
[Development], profits shall be allocated to the limited partner
to the extent of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000).”
(Capitalization omitted.) SJN maintains that, following the
settlement, “NMP and [Japantown Development] continued to
refuse to give [it] basic financial information such as ledgers,
subledgers[,] and source documents.”
       Construction had continued during the 1998 action and
the project was completed by the end of 1999. The property,
however, had significant, on-going environmental clean-up

                                      4
issues resulting from a prior owner’s industrial use of the land.
Although the problem did not prevent leasing the units
at Miraido Village, respondents contend that the problem
consumed funds generated from the lease payments.
Nonetheless, Japantown Development was able to make a
number of interim partnership distributions to NMP between
2015 and 2020. Each time Japantown Development made a
distribution to NMP, NMP would, in turn, make a distribution
to SJN, in accordance with the capital account interests set
forth in the 2003 settlement—namely, 23.2 percent to SJN
and 76.8 percent to Miraido. Respondents contend that SJN
never communicated to them any objection to the amount of
the distributions.
       In September 2017, Japantown Development sold the
project to a third-party buyer for approximately $34.5 million.
The net proceeds from the sale exceeded $21 million. NMP
received $13.2 million in October 2017 as the initial distribution
of the proceeds from the sale of the property. Of that
$13.2 million, NMP held $1 million in reserves for future
expenses and distributed $2,830,400 to SJN (i.e., 23.2 percent
of $12.2 million) and $9,369,600 to Miraido (76.8 percent of
$12.2 million). The parties agree that the 2017 sale of the
project triggered the dissolution of both NMP and Japantown
Development. The parties also agree that both partnerships
remain in the process of winding up.
       On the day the sale closed, SJN again filed suit against
Miraido, Uchida, A.F. Evans, and Japantown Development in
connection with the project (the 2017 action). SJN demanded an
accounting and also asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
declaratory relief, and conversion. Following nearly two years of

                                    5
litigation, in May 2019, SJN voluntarily dismissed all its claims
on the eve of trial.
       Three months later, on August 21, 2019, SJN filed suit
in connection with the project yet again (the 2019 action)—the
case giving rise to this appeal. The operative first amended
complaint (FAC) in the instant action names Uchida, AFE Urban,
NMP, and Japantown Development as defendants, and asserts
four claims: (1) long accounting (by NMP against Japantown
Development)2; (2) dissolution and winding up (by NMP against
Japantown Development); (3) long accounting (by SJN against
NMP); and (4) dissolution and winding up (by SJN against NMP).
In contrast to the complaint filed in the 2017 action, however,
the seven-page FAC before us does not allege any wrongdoing
or misconduct by defendants in support of its request for an
accounting.
       In July 2020, SJN dismissed the second and fourth claims
from the FAC without prejudice, leaving only the long accounting
claims remaining. Then, in October 2020, NMP and Japantown
Development each filed a motion for summary judgment on SJN’s
claims for long accounting, arguing that (1) an accounting claim
cannot be pursued independently of other causes of action, and
(2) because no balance was then due, it could not satisfy one of
the requisite elements of an accounting claim. NMP further

     2  SJN contends that a “long accounting” requires the court
to examine all debits and credits of the NMP and Japantown
Development partnerships dating back to the partnerships’
inception, and to determine any amount owing to SJN. Because
SJN is a limited partner in NMP—and NMP, in turn, is a limited
partner in Japantown Development—SJN brings its long
accounting claim against Japantown Development derivatively.

                                  6
argued that SJN could not satisfy the “balance due” requisite of
such a claim because SJN had not produced any evidence that
any amount due could only be ascertained by an accounting.3
       SJN opposed both motions and lodged related evidentiary
objections. NMP and Japantown Development each filed reply
briefs, and NMP lodged its own evidentiary objections. The
parties also filed related requests for judicial notice.

      B.    Trial Court’s Order Granting Summary
            Judgment
      After a hearing on the two summary judgment motions, on
April 16, 2021, the court issued a 17-page written order granting
the motions. The court granted NMP’s requests for judicial
notice, but did not rule on the other parties’ requests for judicial
notice or on any party’s evidentiary objections. On appeal,
neither party challenges the court’s evidentiary rulings.
The court rejected respondents’ argument that an accounting
claim may not be pursued independently of other causes of
action. The court, however, agreed with NMP that (1) it did not
then owe any amount to SJN, and (2) to the extent any amounts
become due, they will be readily ascertainable without an
accounting.

      3 NMP sought summary adjudication on an additional
statute of limitations-related issue that we need not address,
given our conclusion, ante, that SJN cannot establish the
requisite “balance due” for its accounting claims. In addition,
NMP’s motion sought summary judgment in favor of Uchida.
The trial court ruled that this portion of the motion was moot,
in light of SJN’s prior dismissal of Uchida (and AFE Urban)
from the action.

                                     7
      Similarly, with respect to Japantown Development,
the court concluded “that there is presently no basis for an
accounting.”
      The court entered judgment in favor of respondents on
May 25, 2021. The court denied SJN’s subsequent motion for
a new trial, and SJN timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION
     A.    Standard of Review
      “We review a trial court’s granting summary judgment
de novo, ‘considering all the evidence set forth in the moving
and opposition papers except that to which objections have been
made and sustained.’ [Citation.] We ‘liberally constru[e] the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment
and resolv[e] doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that
party.’ [Citation.]” (Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1030, 1034.)

     B.    The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
           Judgment in Favor of Respondents
           1.    Law Governing Accounting Claims
       “An accounting is an extraordinary remedy usually
available only when legal remedies are inadequate.” (Border
State Bank, N.A. v. AgCountry Farm Credit Services (8th Cir.
2008) 535 F.3d 779, 784.) A plaintiff therefore bears the burden
of establishing need for an accounting. (See, e.g., Baxter v.
Krieger (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 730, 732 [“Before an accounting is
in order, the right to an accounting must be established. It may
be dispensed with where under the evidence the need or right to
one is not shown.”].) Courts have recognized such a need in cases

                                   8
involving alleged fraud or misconduct by the party from whom
the accounting is sought (see, e.g., Roberts v. Eldred (1887) 73
Cal. 394, 395 (Roberts)), or where a party has a contractual right
to an accounting. (Wolf v. Superior Court (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th
25, 35.) Most recently, our Supreme Court has confirmed that
a plaintiff may establish the need for an accounting by pleading
and proving: “(1) ‘that a relationship exists between the plaintiff
and defendant that requires an accounting’ and (2) ‘that some
balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an
accounting.’ ” (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 869 (Sass),
quoting Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179
(Teselle).)4

            2.    SJN Cannot Establish Either that a Balance
                  Is Due or that an Accounting Is Necessary
                  To Determine the Amount Due
      The trial court properly granted summary judgment
in favor of respondents because the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that no balance was then due to SJN from NMP
or Japantown Development that can be ascertained only by an
accounting.
      SJN does not contend that any alleged misconduct by
respondents or any contractual right establishes the need for
an accounting in this case. Instead, SJN alleges in the FAC
that an accounting is required here because “[u]pon information

      4 The Sass court refers to these requirements as “two
elements.” (Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 869.) Broken down,
however, the requirements are actually three: (1) a relationship
that requires an accounting; (2) a balance due; and (3) the
balance due can only be ascertained by an accounting.

                                    9
and belief, a balance is due” to it. SJN identifies only two forms
of payment that might constitute such a “balance due”: (1) a
$200,000 special allocation of profits from the sale of the property
pursuant to section 3.1(g) of the second amendment to the NMP
agreement, and (2) a final partnership distribution, by virtue of
SJN’s status as a limited partner in NMP, which, in turn, is a
limited partner in Japantown Development.5
      As to SJN’s claimed entitlement to the $200,000 special
allocation, even if the allocation constitutes a balance owed to
SJN, no accounting is necessary to ascertain the amount due.
(See St. James Church of Christ Holiness v. Superior Court (1955)
135 Cal.App.2d 352, 359 [“The complaint does not state a case for
an accounting. It clearly appears that none is necessary . . . . All
the facts necessary for the calculation of the amount sought are
alleged . . . and the amount is certain.”].)
      As to SJN’s possible entitlement to a final partnership
distribution, it cannot satisfy the “balance due” requirement.
Corporations Code section 15905.046 provides expressly that a
limited partner “does not have a right to any distribution before
the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership unless

      5 Although SJN asserts that “[b]oth NMP and [Japantown
Development] admit that they are withholding monies which,
in some amount, are owed to SJN and NMP,” it fails to refute
respondents’ contention that a balance would only be due a
limited partner, like SJN, in the form of an interim or final
partnership distribution. On appeal, SJN does not pursue
certain arguments it originally made before the trial court
concerning other allegedly unpaid interim distributions.
      6All unspecified statutory references are to the
Corporations Code.

                                   10
the limited partnership decides to make an interim distribution.”
(§ 15905.04.) The Japantown agreement similarly provides
that no final distribution can be made to the partners until
the partnership first liquidates its assets and uses the proceeds
to satisfy any partnership debts to creditors—i.e., winds up.
And NMP cannot wind up and make its final partnership
distribution until it receives the final distribution from
Japantown Development. SJN does not dispute that the
partnerships still are in the process of winding up. Therefore,
no final partnership distribution to SJN is due at this time.
       Accordingly, the undisputed evidence establishes that,
at the time the court ruled on the summary judgment motions,
(1) the only balance allegedly due from NMP to SJN could be
ascertained without an accounting, and (2) no balance
whatsoever was due from Japantown Development. These
facts are fatal to SJN’s accounting claims.7
       To be clear, we do not hold that a plaintiff never can
seek an accounting prior to a partnership’s winding up. It is
conceivable, for example, that where a partner allegedly has
engaged in fraud or misconduct, an accounting prior to winding

      7 Given this conclusion, we necessarily reject SJN’s
argument that respondents shirked their evidentiary burden on
summary judgment by failing to “produce all evidence of debits
and credits [dating back to the partnerships’ inception], i.e., to
account.” The argument is circular, and the decision in Civic
Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1,
on which SJN relies, applies an outdated summary judgment
standard that required “[t]he proponent of summary
judgment . . . to negate all possible merit inherent in the cause
of action it seeks to terminate.” (Id. at p. 15.)

                                   11
up might be appropriate. Various cases SJN cites—inapposite to
the instant case, which does not involve any allegations of fraud
or misconduct—might support such a proposition. (See Roberts,
supra, 73 Cal. at p. 395; Davis v. California Motors (1946) 73
Cal.App.2d 241, 243; Swanton v. Jacks (1916) 30 Cal.App. 66,
68.) We need not resolve this issue, however, because here no
such allegations are contained in the operative complaint.
       SJN advances three additional arguments on this point,
none of which we agree with: (1) the trial court “disregard[ed]
SJN’s long accounting claims” as pleaded and “summarily
adjudicat[ed] an entirely different claim of merely seeking
post-dissolution distribution” (capitalization omitted); (2) SJN
does not have to establish that “ ‘some balance is due . . . that
can only be ascertained by an accounting’ ” (Sass, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 869), because NMP and Japantown Development’s
dissolution alone entitles SJN to an accounting; and (3) even
if SJN does need to establish that some balance is due, it need
not demonstrate that any balance “presently” is due or that
the balance is uncertain and can be ascertained only via an
accounting.
       As an initial matter, we disagree that the trial court
effectively “rewr[ote] SJN’s complaint” by purportedly ignoring
SJN’s request for a long accounting of all partnership activities,
including the alleged “decades of complex transactions in
developing and managing Miraido Village,” and focusing instead
on NMP’s and Japantown Development’s “post-dissolution
expenses and distributions.” Indeed, SJN itself concedes that
“the trial court repeatedly acknowledged in its order that SJN
sued for a long accounting.” The court correctly focused its
analysis on whether any final partnership distribution then

                                   12
was owed to SJN because, as discussed, ante, a final partnership
distribution is the only possible unascertained balance that may
be due to SJN.8
       We turn next to SJN’s contention that, notwithstanding
its allegations in the FAC that an accounting is required here
because “a balance is due,” SJN is excused from demonstrating
the existence of such a balance because NMP’s and Japantown
Development’s dissolution alone establishes the need for an
accounting. None of SJN’s authorities supports this proposition.
Ferem v. Olsen & Mahony (1917) 176 Cal. 652, relied on by SJN,
does not involve facts analogous to those here—namely, where
(1) the partnerships still are in the midst of winding up, and
(2) by statute or by contract, the only form of payment to which
the limited partner is entitled (here, a final distribution) will not
come due until the winding up process is complete. Avery v.
Peirson (1925) 74 Cal.App. 617 and Kritzer v. Lancaster (1950)
96 Cal.App.2d 1 (Kritzer), also relied on by SJN, affirmatively
support that an accounting plaintiff must establish that some
balance is due. (See Avery, supra, 74 Cal.App. at p. 620 [“[o]n
the dissolution of the partnership, each partner was entitled to

      8 For this same reason, we reject SJN’s argument on
reply that Japantown Development and NMP “misapprehend
the ‘balance due’ element” (boldface and capitalization omitted)
as “requir[ing] a right to a final or interim distribution.”
Respondents do not contend that a partner always must
demonstrate that a final or interim distribution is due to satisfy
the “balance due” requirement. Japantown Development and
NMP focus their arguments on interim and final partnership
distributions because SJN identifies no other specific payments
to which it may be entitled.

                                     13
an accounting, if there was any sum whatever to be accounted for,”
italics added]; Kritzer, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 7 [“it is rather
clear that [the complaint] states a cause of action for an
accounting as it appears that a relationship exists which requires
an accounting and that there is something due to appellant from
the respondents,” italics added].)
       The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) provisions
that SJN cites also confirm that a partnership’s dissolution
alone is insufficient to support an accounting claim, as they
tether the availability of an accounting to a partnership’s
winding up. (See § 15907.02, subd. (c) [“[a] transferee is entitled
to an account of the limited partnership’s transactions only
upon the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership,”
italics added]; § 15907.04 [incorporating section 15907.02 by
reference]; § 15910.01, subd. (c) [“[a] right to an accounting
upon a dissolution and winding up does not revive a claim
barred by law,” italics added].) Moreover, we find unconvincing
SJN’s argument that “the limitations period on ‘look back’
accountings . . . leave[s] no doubt” that a partnership’s
dissolution, standing alone, establishes the need for an
accounting. Although not entirely clear, SJN’s argument appears
to proceed as follows: (1) an action for a “long accounting” is
a “well understood” legal term of art that requires a court to
“examin[e] [the] debits and credits span[ning] the entire time
of the partnership’s ‘conduct’ ”; (2) the statute of limitations for
a long accounting claim begins to run only upon the dissolution
of the partnership; and (3) the combination of these two facts
confirms that a partnership’s dissolution alone—even in the
absence of any unascertained balance due—establishes the need
for an accounting. We note Japantown Development’s argument

                                   14
that the 2010 enactment of section 15910.019 “means that any
ancient claims SJN was hoping to uncover by examining all of the
partnership’s transactions going back to 1997 would be barred by
the statutes of limitations, or by laches, or by both.” Nonetheless,
we need not and do not resolve the issue.
       We therefore conclude that, standing alone, the dissolution
of the NMP and Japantown Development partnerships does not
entitle SJN to an accounting. We note that, in addition to
harmonizing SJN’s authorities with Sass, our conclusion
promotes the principle of judicial economy. As discussed during
oral argument, the law affords limited partners means other
than a judicially supervised accounting to obtain access to a
partnership’s books and records. (See, e.g., § 16403, subd. (b)
[“[a] partnership shall provide partners and their agents and
attorneys access to its books and records”].) It therefore makes
sense that a plaintiff must make a showing of need before
shifting the cost and burden of an accounting to the court or a
court-appointed referee. Because, as set forth, ante, SJN cannot
make such a showing, the trial court properly granted summary
judgment.
       SJN’s final arguments concerning the “balance due”
requirement are also unconvincing. Its insistence that it need
not demonstrate that a balance “presently” is due is belied by the
language of Sass and other controlling precedent that discusses
the “balance due” requirement in the present tense. (See Sass,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 869 [accounting claim requires “ ‘that

      9 Subdivision (c) of section 15910.01 provides, in relevant
part, “[a] right to an accounting upon a dissolution and winding
up does not revive a claim barred by law.”

                                   15
some balance is due the plaintiff , ’ ” italics added]; Teselle, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 179 [“[a] cause of action for an accounting
requires a showing that . . . some balance is due the plaintiff,”
italics added]; Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1136−1137 [an accounting “is
proper where there is an unliquidated and unascertained amount
owing that cannot be determined without an examination of
the debits and credits on the books to determine what is due
and owing,” italics added]; Kritzer, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 7
[“there is something due to appellant from the respondents,”
italics added].)
       Also unavailing is SJN’s reliance on Roberts and Walsh v.
McKeen (1888) 75 Cal. 519 (Walsh). SJN urges that these cases
reflect courts’ willingness to “consider payments or obligations
that occur after filing the lawsuit in finalizing the accounting,”
and that this, in turn, suggests that no balance need be due
“presently.” But it does not follow from a court’s willingness to
roll newly occurring obligations into an existing accounting action
that a plaintiff may initiate an accounting in the absence of at
least some balance due. And SJN confuses proof of its present
entitlement to any balance due with proof of the dollar amount
due in arguing that, because “the purpose of the accounting is,
in part, to discover what, if any, sums are owed” (Teselle, supra,
173 Cal.App.4th at p. 180), it need not establish that any balance
is due presently.
       Similarly unpersuasive is SJN’s parallel contention that
“in the context of an action for accounting precipitated by a
partnership dissolution, the cases establish that the ‘sum certain
or easily calculable’ rule simply does not apply.” Teselle and
Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872,

                                     16
cited by SJN, confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the balance due cannot be ascertained absent an accounting.
(Teselle, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 179 [“[a]n action for
accounting is not available where the plaintiff alleges the right
to recover a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by
calculation”]; Jolley, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 910 [“ ‘[a] cause
of action for an accounting requires a showing that . . . some
balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an
accounting’ ”].) And, read in context, the language SJN cites from
Wolf and Jones v. Wagner (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 466, buttresses
only the uncontroversial principle that a fiduciary relationship
may support, but is not required for, an accounting action.
       Accordingly, we conclude that SJN cannot establish the
claims for accounting.10 We therefore affirm the judgment in
favor of respondents.

      10 Our conclusion renders consideration of the parties’
remaining arguments unnecessary, including SJN’s argument
that the trial court violated its due process rights by granting
summary judgment to Japantown Development on a ground not
raised. Our affirmance relies solely on issues the parties fully
briefed before the trial court and on appeal.

                                    17
                       DISPOSITION
       The court’s May 25, 2021 judgment in favor of NMP and
Japantown Development is affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                       ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                BENDIX, J.

                WEINGART, J.

                                18