Court Opinion

ID: 9532548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:22:20.603766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:46.891077
License: Public Domain

PEEK, J., Dissenting.
I cannot agree with the interpretation which the majority places upon the words “fraudulently” and “corruptly” as used in section 25042 of the Government Code. It would appear to me that such construction, rather than following the well-established rule that “words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning unless otherwise intended or indicated” (Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal.2d 292, 294 [288 P.2d 857]), adopts a narrow construction which is neither “intended” nor “indicated.” Furthermore our courts have held that “the word ‘fraudulently’ is very broad in its meaning.” (People v. Simmons, 12 Cal.App.2d 329, 332 [55 P.2d 297].) Again in People v. Wisecarver, 67 Cal.App.2d 203, 207 [153 P.2d 778], it was held that “fraud may be committed by declaring to be true that which the declarant does not believe to be true; by suppressing a fact which he is bound to disclose; . . . (Civ. Code, § 1710; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal.App. 137, 140 [256 P. 484].) Moreover, any act fitted to deceive is actual fraud. (Civ. Code, § 1572.) ” Thus it would appear to follow that since under the statute a supervisor is liable for “fraudulently or corruptly” performing any duty imposed upon him, and since absent any intention or indication to the contrary, “words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning”; and since the word “ ‘fraudulently’ is very broad in its meaning,” and since, as is conceded by the majority, under such construction plaintiff’s complaint could be amended to state a cause of action, then defendants’ demurrer should not have been sustained without leave to amend.
It is true as the majority notes, public officials generally are entitled to official immunity from malicious prosecution. But *385when the Legislature chooses to make an exception thereto by the enactment of a statute such as the one here in question, it is not the province of this court to attempt to rationalize a “perceivable reason” for the adoption of such a policy, but rather it is our duty to interpret the same as we would any other statute in accordance with the well-established rules of construction. The Legislature having so expressed itself, it appears to me that to apply such a narrow interpretation to the critical words “fraudulently” and “corruptly” as does the majority, is to write into section 25042 something which was never intended. I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 19, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.