Court Opinion

ID: 9665211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:47.783961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.005960
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the circuit court erred in not enforcing the decision of the employee grievance board which plaintiff contractually agreed to accept as the final and binding resolution of her grievance with the defendant. I am persuaded that the majority’s reliance upon Fulghum v United Parcel Service, 424 Mich 89; 378 NW2d 472 (1985), and Breish v Ring Screw Works, 397 Mich 586; 248 *440NW2d 526 (1976), for its holding that the arbitral decision in this case was contractually unenforceable because the arbitration hearing lacked procedural "fairness,” is misplaced. Furthermore, I would hold that plaintiffs volitional participation in the arbitration hearing, and failure to object to the procedural "fairness” of that hearing, precluded her from challenging the enforcement of the resulting adverse decision on broad procedural "fairness” grounds.
i
The defendant hospital discharged plaintiff, a registered nurse, for "deliberate restriction of work” productivity on June 23, 1980. Plaintiff chose to avail herself of the contractual grievance procedure offered by the defendant, filing a written grievance challenging the propriety of her termination on June 25, 1980. After being fully informed about the procedure, plaintiff agreed to submit to the "final and binding” arbitration of her grievance by an employee grievance board, the members of which would be selected by plaintiff from a list of employee volunteers. Plaintiffs grievance was heard by the employee grievance board on July 1, 1980. Plaintiff did not object to the grievance procedure or the conduct of the hearing prior to the board’s rendering of its decision upholding her discharge for "deliberate restriction of work” productivity. After the board rendered its adverse decision, plaintiff commenced this action for wrongful discharge.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of its assertion that the decision of the employee arbitration panel was, by mutual agreement, "final and binding,” and entitled to judicial enforcement. The trial *441court ruled that whether the arbitral decision was "final and binding” was to be submitted to the jury along with the merits of plaintiff’s breach of contract action. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor and awarded her $100,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals rejected each of the defendant’s allegations of error, on appeal by right, affirmed each of the challenged rulings of the trial court, and upheld the jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor.
n
Defendant argues first, as it did in the Court of Appeals, that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment on the basis of the contractually enforceable decision of the employee grievance board and, instead, in ruling that the enforcement of that decision as the "final and binding” resolution of plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was a factual determination to be submitted to the jury.1 The Court of Appeals held that the contractual enforcement of the grievance board decision was properly submitted to the jury. The Court reasoned that the jury was required to determine whether the grievance board procedure, to which plaintiff and the defendant had consented in the submission of their dispute, was "fair” as a factual matter in order to determine whether the decision was "final and binding.” The Court of Appeals relied on Breish v Ring Screw Works, supra, and Fulghum v United Parcel Service, 130 Mich App 375; 343 NW2d 559 (1983), to support its analysis. I am persuaded that the Court of Appeals *442reliance on Breish and Fulghum was misplaced and that its decision for affirmance was erroneous.
In Breish, we noted in the context of federal labor law that " '[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes . . .’ ” and that this policy " 'can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.’ ” Id., 597 (quoting United Steelworkers of America v American Mfg Co, 363 US 564, 566; 80 S Ct 1343; 4 L Ed 2d 1403 [I960]). We held, however, that an exception to the "finality rule” exists in cases in which a union breaches its duty of fair representation or when the final step of the contractual grievance procedure is inadequate to provide the individual employee a procedurally fair decision on the merits of his claim. The "final” step of the grievance procedure in Breish was the decision of the individual employee’s fellow union members to strike over his grievance. We held that a "strike vote” decision as the final adjudication of the substance of the plaintiffs claim was unsatisfactory "for the essential reason that such a procedure placed those 'adjudging’ the substance of plaintiffs claim in a legally unacceptable conflict of interest position.” Id., 603. Because the final decision of whether plaintiff was wrongfully discharged was adjudged by persons "in a conflict of interest position,” we held that such a procedure was "inadequate to provide . . . any kind of fair merits decision.” Id., 604.
Unlike Breish, the present case does not involve a union’s duty of fair representation, or anything even remotely analogous to a "strike vote” decision as the final adjudication of the substance of plaintiffs grievance.
*443In Fulghum v United Parcel Service, supra, 424 Mich 92-93, we held that the decision of an employee grievance board is to be given the same judicial deference as that afforded an independent arbiter, expressing our general acceptance of the federal policy in that regard:
"Where a collective-bargaining agreement provides a method by which disputes are to be resolved, there is a strong policy in favor of deference to that method of resolution. Hines v Anchor Motor Freight, Inc, 424 US 554; 96 S Ct 1048; 47 L Ed 2d 231 (1976). This policy can only be effectuated 'if the means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play.’ United Steelworkers of America v American Mfg Co, 363 US 564, 566; 80 S Ct 1343; 4 L Ed 2d 1403 (1960). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the decisions of joint management-labor grievance committees, such as was employed in this case, are entitled to the same deference as the decisions of independent arbitrators. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union No 89 v Riss & Co, Inc, 372 US 517; 83 S Ct 789; 9 L Ed 2d 918 (1963).
"Although the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the rule of finality in the context of a Title VII employment discrimination claim in Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36; 94 S Ct 1011; 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974), it has no application to this case. Here, the finding of the grievance committees that plaintiffs seek to avoid is not one of constitutional magnitude or statutory construction; rather, it is a simple question of fact clearly within the competence of the grievance committees. See, also, Ivery v United States, 686 F2d 410 (CA 6, 1982), especially Jones, J., concurring.” [Quoting 130 Mich App 377-378.]
In Fulghum, we concluded that the "final and binding” decision of the joint management-labor *444grievance committees was entitled to judicial enforcement on the issue of whether the grievants were discharged for cause. We held, additionally, that the final decision of the grievance committee precluded the employees’ common-law actions for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
"It is well-settled that arbitration is a favored means of resolving labor disputes and that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitration award when considering its enforcement.” Port Huron Area School Dist v PHEA, 426 Mich 143, 150; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). The legal basis for this policy of judicial deference is "grounded in contract: the contractual agreement to arbitrate and to accept the arbitral decision as 'final and binding.’ ” Id., 150. In the present case, plaintiff has not alleged corruption, partiality, or any other impropriety on the part of the employee arbitration panel.2 Whether a broad assertion of procedural "unfairness” is a recognized ground for vacating an arbitral decision, as opposed to assertions that the decision was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, or that there was evident partiality, corruption, or misconduct, on the part of the arbitration panel, is questionable. Unlike the limited exception to the "finality rule” in Breish, the final step in the contractual grievance procedure in the present case was not inadequate to provide a "fair” decision on the merits of plaintiffs grievance.
In Port Huron Area School Dist, supra, 161, we *445noted that "[a] party who voluntarily agrees to submit a specific grievance to arbitration may be precluded from later challenging the 'arbitrability’ of that grievance.”3 In the present case, plaintiff voluntarily agreed to submit her grievance to the final and binding decision of the employee grievance board after having been fully informed of the procedure. The issue submitted concerned whether she was properly discharged consistent with her contract of employment with the defendant. By mutual consent, the employee grievance board had jurisdiction to determine that issue which involved the factual determination of whether plaintiff was discharged for "deliberate restriction of work.”
The finding of the grievance board which plaintiff sought to avoid did not involve any established exception to the rule of finality.41 would hold that her agreement to participate in the contractual grievance procedure, and her participation through the final decision of the board, without objecting to any of the procedures of which she was fully informed, precluded plaintiff from challenging the "fairness” of the proceeding after receiving an unfavorable decision. I would emphasize that plaintiff originally consented to the grievance procedure and has not alleged that the procedure deviated to any extent from that to which she had consented.
The majority’s analysis undermines this state’s policy of encouraging the private resolution of labor disputes. Employers would not be inclined to *446agree to arbitration if the resulting awards are binding on them, but not on their employees. In the present case, plaintiff was not contractually compelled to submit her grievance to final and binding arbitration; she voluntarily contracted to do so. The majority’s discussion of "elementary fairness” within the context of "claim and issue preclusion” is unrelated to the issue in this case of whether plaintiff was contractually bound by the arbitral decision to which she and the defendant mutually agreed to be bound.
I would conclude that the circuit court erred in not enforcing the grievance board decision as a matter of law. The parties contractually agreed to be bound by that decision and plaintiff was precluded from later challenging the grievance procedure to which she contractually agreed as "unfair.” Thus, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this action for dismissal. My disposition of this issue would make it unnecessary to address the remaining issues.
Brickley and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.

 The majority, following the format reflected in the brief of plaintiff-appellee, addresses the issues presented in reverse chronological order. Because my resolution of the first issue — whether the arbitration decision was contractually enforceable — would be dispositive of this appeal, I do not address the remaining issues.

 Additionally, I would note that it has not been argued that the contractual procedure violated public policy because it required plaintiff to forego her judicial remedies or that the contract was entered into under duress. 14 Williston, Contracts (3d ed), § 1725, pp 910-916. Lafayette Dramatic Productions, Inc v Ferentz, 305 Mich 193; 9 NW2d 57 (1943).

 See American Motorists Ins Co v Llanes, 396 Mich 113; 240 NW2d 203 (1976). See also Anno: Participation in arbitration proceedings as waiver of objections to arbitrability, 33 ALR3d 1242.

 Plaintiffs wrongful-discharge action involved the same issues which were decided by the employee grievance board; it did not involve any independent statutory claim, and, because the defendant expressly reserved the right to discharge plaintiff for "deliberate restriction of work,” no contrary "just cause” requirement could be implied.