Court Opinion

ID: 9693046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:17:26.168333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:39.130949
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
For reasons more fully set out in my dissent in Lum v. Mattley, 208 Neb. 789, 305 N.W.2d 878 (1981), and my dissent in Auman v. Toorney, 220 Neb. 70, 368 N.W.2d 459 (1985), I must likewise dissent in this case.
The hazard which I feared for in Lum v. Mattley, supra, did in fact occur in some part in the instant case. The first couple to whom the child was given declined to adopt the child. Had there not been a second couple already in the wings, our decision would stand for the proposition that while the natural mother has lost her rights to the child, the child has acquired no adoptive parents and now becomes a ward of the state. In the case of a licensed agency we would not permit such a situation to arise. See Kellie v. Lutheran Family & Social Service, 208 Neb. 767, 305 N.W.2d 874 (1981). One may argue that the distinction between the licensed agency and the private placement is the language of the statute. Nevertheless, in Kellie v. Lutheran Family & Social Service, supra at 772, 305 N.W.2d at 877, we said, “Basic principles of offer and acceptance, as well as the statute, dictate that result.” I believe that basic principles of offer and acceptance, of mutuality, and of the law regarding contracts, generally, should apply in the case of private placement as well as that of licensed agencies.
In the instant case a near disaster was avoided only because another couple was available. For a host of reasons, that may *842not always be the case; yet the rule of law will prevail. I would have supported the action of the district court and affirmed its judgment.