Court Opinion

ID: 9947353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:10:19.684568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:22.166928
License: Public Domain

J-A22045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    THOMAS PAUL HICKS                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1271 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000895-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                 FILED: MARCH 4, 2024

       Appellant, Thomas Paul Hicks, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Armstrong County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury

trial convictions for rape of a child, statutory sexual assault, involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse with a child, incest of a minor, corruption of minors,

indecent assault, and endangering welfare of children.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

Appellant is the biological uncle of O.H. (“Victim”).2 At approximately 7:00

a.m. on August 17, 2019, Appellant drove to the residence where nine-year-

____________________________________________

118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3122.1(b), 3123(b), 4302(b)(1), 6301(a)(1)(i),
3126(a)(7), and 4304(a)(1), respectively.

2Appellant is the brother of Victim’s mother, S.H. (“Mother”).        Mother is
married to Victim’s father, C.H. (“Father”).
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old Victim lived with his parents and younger brother. Appellant entered the

residence through the garage and found Victim sleeping on a rocking chair in

the living room. Appellant woke Victim, lifted him out of the rocking chair,

and led him down a flight of steps into the basement.       In the basement,

Appellant pulled down Victim’s pants and performed oral sex on Victim.

      The assault ended a few minutes later when Father called for the boy

from upstairs. Victim came up the stairs, returned to the rocking chair, and

did not say anything.     Appellant came up the stairs shortly thereafter.

Appellant told Father that he was in the basement to fix the furnace. Father

explained that Appellant should not have come to the house unannounced,

and he asked Appellant to leave. Once Appellant left the residence, Father

asked Victim why he was in the basement with Appellant. Victim told Father

that Appellant “carried me downstairs and was sucking on my penis.” (N.T.

Trial, 6/9/22, at 72). After discussing the matter with Mother, Father reported

the incident to police on August 19, 2019. During a forensic interview on

August 20, 2019, Victim recounted the incident from three days earlier. Victim

also told investigators that Appellant had been taking him to the basement

“for years,” and Appellant “does the same thing every time.”      (Affidavit of

Probable Cause, dated 8/22/19, at 1).

      On December 3, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information

charging Appellant with various sex offenses. Appellant proceeded to a jury

trial on June 9, 2022. At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

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Victim, Mother, Father, the forensic interviewer, and an investigating officer.

Appellant testified in his own defense, and he presented testimony from his

parents (Victim’s grandparents). After closing arguments, defense counsel

made an oral motion for mistrial.         (See N.T. Trial, 6/10/22, at 175-80).

Specifically,   defense     counsel   claimed   that   the   prosecutor   committed

misconduct by making unduly prejudicial remarks during his closing

argument. The court denied the motion for mistrial before providing its charge

and sending the jury to deliberate. (Id. at 185-206). Ultimately, the jury

convicted Appellant on all counts.

      On September 26, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of fifteen (15) to thirty (30) years’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file

post-sentence motions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October

25, 2022. On October 26, 2022, the court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.               Appellant

timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on November 15, 2022.

      Appellant now raises one issue for this Court’s review:

         Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied
         Appellant’s motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth
         engaged in repeated prosecutorial misconduct during its
         closing arguments, which included statements offering facts
         not in evidence and injecting issues broader than the guilt
         or innocence of Appellant under the controlling law?

(Appellant’s Brief at 7).

      On appeal, Appellant contends that the court should have granted his

motion for a mistrial based upon certain statements the prosecutor made

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during his closing argument.     Specifically, Appellant complains about the

prosecutor’s references to: 1) Appellant’s parents providing information to

Appellant’s attorney; 2) Appellant’s parents’ purported duty to protect Victim;

3) a “big family secret” that Appellant molested children; 4) a “family rule”

that Appellant should not be left alone with children; and 5) the amount of

time it should have taken for Appellant to fix the furnace.       Appellant also

alleges that the prosecutor should not have called him “creepy Uncle Tom”

throughout the closing argument.     Appellant maintains that the prosecutor

made these statements to introduce facts that were not in evidence, and the

statements had the unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jury.        Appellant

concludes the prosecutor committed misconduct, and the trial court abused

its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial. We disagree.

      Our standard of review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during

closing arguments to the jury is whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2018).

         [W]ith specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial
         misconduct in a closing statement, it is well settled that any
         challenged prosecutorial comment must not be viewed in
         isolation, but rather must be considered in the context in
         which it was offered. Our review of a prosecutor’s comment
         and an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to
         evaluate whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a
         perfect trial. Thus, it is well settled that statements made
         by the prosecutor to the jury during closing argument will
         not form the basis for granting a new trial unless the
         unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice
         the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
         toward the defendant so they could not weigh the evidence
         objectively and render a true verdict. The appellate courts

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        have recognized that not every unwise remark by an
        attorney amounts to misconduct or warrants the grant of a
        new trial. Additionally, like the defense, the prosecution is
        accorded reasonable latitude, may employ oratorical flair in
        arguing its version of the case to the jury, and may advance
        arguments supported by the evidence or use inferences that
        can reasonably be derived therefrom.           Moreover, the
        prosecutor is permitted to fairly respond to points made in
        the defense’s closing, and therefore, a proper examination
        of a prosecutor’s comments in closing requires review of the
        arguments advanced by the defense in summation.

Id. at 835-36 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615

(Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 636 Pa. 672, 145 A.3d 724 (2016)). “A

prosecutor has great discretion during closing argument.      Indeed, closing

‘argument’ is just that: argument.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d

576, 580 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 722, 920 A.2d 830 (2007).

     Instantly, the trial court evaluated each of the prosecutor’s statements

that Appellant now challenges on appeal.      The court observed that each

statement was based on trial evidence or a proper inference therefrom.

Regarding the prosecutor’s remark about Appellant’s parents providing

information to Appellant’s attorney (see N.T. Trial, 6/10/22, at 156-57), the

court noted that Appellant’s father admitted to such conduct during the

following exchange on cross-examination:

        [PROSECUTOR]:       …   Did you ever tell [Appellant’s]
        attorneys about [Victim] being on medication, about the
        medicine that you would pick up at Walmart?

        [WITNESS]:           It might have came up.

        [PROSECUTOR]:       Why would     you  need to    tell
        [Appellant’s] attorneys about your grandson being on

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         medicine?

         [WITNESS]:              Why?

         [PROSECUTOR]:           Yes.

         [WITNESS]:          I felt it was important that he knows
         that … when [Victim] doesn’t get his medicine, he can get a
         little radical.

(Id. at 73).

      Regarding the prosecutor’s statement about Appellant’s parents’ duty to

protect Victim (see id. at 167), the court referenced Victim’s direct

examination testimony about other instances of abuse that occurred on

Appellant’s parents’ property:

         [PROSECUTOR]:       … Did [Appellant] always touch you
         the same way or did he do anything else?

         [VICTIM]:               The same way.

         [PROSECUTOR]:           It was always he put your private part
         in his mouth?

         [VICTIM]:               Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR]:       Did that happen in any other places
         other than the basement of your house?

         [VICTIM]:               Grandma’s,   outside—Grandma’s,     in
         the basement.

         [PROSECUTOR]:           What grandma?

         [VICTIM]:               My mom’s mom.

(N.T. Trial, 6/9/22, at 137). The court explained that “if child abuse happened

at the grandparents’ house on multiple occasions, and the grandparents had

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reason to know about it, then that would arguably give them an additional

reason to side with their son, rather than their grandson, the victim.” (Trial

Court Opinion, filed 12/16/22, at 6).

      Regarding the prosecutor’s references to a family secret about

Appellant’s behavior (see N.T. Trial, 6/10/22, at 156, 157, 160, 166, 174),

the court noted Father’s cross-examination testimony about his in-law’s

penchant for keeping secrets:

         [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:      … You had some doubt about
         whether you should, in fact, go to the police that day,
         correct?

         [FATHER]:                   There was no doubt in my mind
         that I should have went to the police earlier, but I didn’t
         because I got a lot of heat from my family about it knowing
         that they wanted to keep the police out of the matter
         because everything is a secret in the family.

(N.T. Trial, 6/9/22, at 109).

      Regarding the prosecutor’s statement about a “family rule” that

Appellant should not be left alone with children (see N.T. Trial, 6/10/22, at

166), the court cited Mother’s direct examination testimony about a 2015

incident where Victim informed her that Appellant had touched him

inappropriately.   (See N.T. Trial, 6/9/22, at 32-35).   Significantly, Mother

confirmed that the family had an understanding about keeping Appellant away

from her children:

         [PROSECUTOR]:       Did your parents know about what was
         brought up back in 2015?

         [MOTHER]:              Yes.

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         [PROSECUTOR]:         Did they, to your knowledge, know
         basically the rule of “[Appellant] is not allowed to be alone
         with the boys?”

         [MOTHER]:            Yes.

         [PROSECUTOR]:        Did they follow it?

         [MOTHER]:            As far as I am aware, yes.

(N.T. Trial, 6/9/22, at 33-34).

      Regarding the prosecutor’s discussion about furnace repairs (see N.T.

Trial, 6/10/22, at 150-51, 169-70), the court emphasized Appellant’s direct

examination testimony that Victim went to the basement, on his own, to watch

Appellant repair the furnace. On cross-examination, Appellant explained that

he “removed the screws and … was in the process of pulling the panels off”

when Father yelled out to Victim. (Id. at 120). Appellant estimated that he

was in the basement for “15 to 20 minutes” before Father came calling, and

Victim was there for “[m]aybe ten minutes.”         (Id. at 119, 120).   Defense

counsel subsequently referenced the amount of time Appellant spent in the

basement during his closing argument:

         Again, we are limited to August 17, 2019 in the morning,
         Saturday morning at the house in the basement. How you
         would do that, disassemble the furnace and then in the
         course of that go upstairs and get a little boy and sexually
         molest him and then just basically act as if nothing had
         happened. The Commonwealth needs to—the prosecution
         needs to address that.

(Id. at 133-34).

      In response, the prosecutor addressed the timing issue as follows:

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          It took 10 or 15 minutes to take the panels off an air
          conditioner? Not the air conditioner, the furnace. … Anyone
          who has one in your basement, you know what it looks like.
          There is a couple of panels. They usually each have a couple
          of bolts or screws in the corners. It is not a big job. It
          doesn’t take much time to pull the panels off and take a
          look.

(Id. at 169). The trial court correctly characterized the prosecutor’s comment

as an appeal “to the jurors’ life experience and common sense in evaluating

[Appellant’s] testimony about how long the work took.” (Trial Court Opinion

at 10).    When viewed in context, we conclude that the comment also

amounted to nothing more than a fair response to the points made in defense

counsel’s closing. See Jones, supra.

      Finally, regarding the prosecutor’s use of the word “creepy” (see N.T.

Trial, 6/10/22, at 153, 167), Appellant failed to raise any objection to the

prosecutor’s use of this word in his oral motion for mistrial. (See N.T. Trial,

6/10/22, at 175-80). Thus, this argument is waived. See Commonwealth

v. Sasse, 921 A.2d 1229, 1238 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 595 Pa.

706, 938 A.2d 1052 (2007) (reiterating that “[i]n order to preserve a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a defendant must make an objection and

move for a mistrial”).

      Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the remarks at

issue constituted comments based on the evidence and fair response to

defense counsel’s arguments. See Jones, supra. Moreover, we agree with

the trial court’s determination that the prosecutor’s language did not have the

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unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jury.3 Id. Therefore, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on his prosecutorial misconduct claim, and we affirm the

judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

FILED: 3/4/2024

____________________________________________

3 The court also instructed the jury that closing arguments “are not themselves

part of the evidence and you should not consider the attorneys’ speeches as
evidence.” (N.T. Trial, 6/10/22, at 196). We presume the jury followed this
instruction.   See Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 828-29
(Pa.Super. 2023) (reiterating that jury is presumed to follow trial court’s
instruction).

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