Court Opinion

ID: 9945186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 15:16:16.860463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:24.757345
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Athey, Friedman and Raphael

              TYSHA A. DAVENPORT
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1909-22-2                                       PER CURIAM
                                                                              FEBRUARY 27, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
                                          F. G. Rockwell, III, Judge Designate1

                              (Robert M. Lorey; Law Office of Robert Lorey, LLC, on brief), for
                              appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Jason D. Reed, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Tysha A. Davenport appeals her conviction for throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle

              in violation of Code § 18.2-154. Davenport argues that the Commonwealth failed to exclude the

              reasonable hypothesis of innocence that her passenger was the person who threw the object at the

              victim’s car, not Davenport. After examining the briefs and the record, the panel unanimously

              holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm Davenport’s conviction.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                     We recite the evidence “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

              prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

              (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). We thus “discard the evidence of

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                         The Honorable Jayne A. Pemberton presided at trial.
the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth,” and take “as true all the credible

evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn” from that

evidence. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).

       On May 18, 2021, Thomas Pleasants was driving his car on Midlothian Turnpike, on his

way home, when another car cut in front of him and tried to “run [him] off the road.” Pleasants

later identified the driver from a photo lineup as Davenport. Pleasants testified that he was a

“hundred percent” sure that Davenport was driving the other car. Davenport was 19 years old at

the time. She had a passenger in the car with her.

       Both Pleasants and Davenport rolled down their windows and exchanged insults.

Pleasants then turned onto another road. When he stopped at a red light in the left lane of the

two-lane road, Davenport drove in the bike lane to pull up close to him.

       When Pleasants drove forward after the light turned green, Davenport maneuvered her

car “right next” to the right side of his car, side by side next to him but slightly behind.

Davenport’s window was open. Pleasants then heard a “big thud” as an object struck his right

rear door after being thrown from Davenport’s car. Pleasants did not actually see Davenport

throw the object but testified that “she was right there, beside me.” He said, “I don’t know what

it was, but it was a big thud [that] hit the car. She threw something and hit my car.”

       When Pleasants pulled out his phone to call the police, Davenport turned in a different

direction and drove away. Pleasants reported the incident to police and provided the license-

plate number of Davenport’s car. The car was registered to Davenport’s father.

       After Pleasants identified Davenport from a photo lineup, Davenport was arrested and

charged with throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle, in violation of Code § 18.2-154. After

the trial court denied Davenport’s motion to strike, Davenport testified in her own defense. She

denied any involvement in the incident and claimed to have been at work at the time. Her

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mother testified that she drove Davenport to work that day. Davenport’s father testified that he

prohibited Davenport from driving his car two months before the incident because she kept

getting tickets. Although he was out of town on the day of the incident, he said he had left his

car at his cousin’s house.

       Davenport called one other witness, her stepfather, who testified that he sat behind

Pleasants at the preliminary hearing and claimed that he heard Pleasants say that he did not see

Davenport in the courtroom. On cross-examination, however, the stepfather admitted to nine

felony convictions. He also admitted that Pleasants was masked and had trouble speaking, that

he saw Pleasants only shaking his head, and that he never actually heard Pleasants say that he

didn’t see Davenport in the courtroom.

       The trial court denied Davenport’s renewed motion to strike and found her guilty. The

court suspended Davenport’s license for a year and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment

with all but three months suspended. Davenport noted a timely appeal.

                                              ANALYSIS

       “Any person who maliciously . . . throws any missile at or against . . . any motor vehicle

. . . when occupied by one or more persons, whereby the life of any person” in the vehicle “may

be put in peril, is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” Code § 18.2-154. Davenport does not dispute that

an object was thrown from her car at the victim’s car. And she concedes that the trial court

rejected her alibi that she was not driving her father’s car that day. Davenport Br. 7. She argues,

however, that the Commonwealth failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of innocence that

her passenger, not Davenport, threw the object. As between Davenport and her passenger, she

argues, it was a “coin flip” who did it. Id. at 6, 10, 11.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

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support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “[T]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is

whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v.

Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)).

       “When examining an alternate hypothesis of innocence, the question is not whether

‘some evidence’ supports the hypothesis, but whether a rational factfinder could have found that

the incriminating evidence renders the hypothesis of innocence unreasonable.” Id. at 250

(quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). And the “inquiry does not

distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, as the fact finder itself ‘is entitled to

consider all of the evidence, without distinction, in reaching its determination.’” Bagley v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 26-27 (2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455,

463 (2017)).

       The circumstantial evidence here permitted a rational factfinder to conclude that

Davenport threw the missile at Pleasants’s car. Pleasants testified that, after nearly being forced

off the road and harassed by Davenport, an object hurled from the driver’s side of Davenport’s

car struck the right side of his car and made a loud thud. Davenport at the time had pulled her

car nearly even with his, side by side to his right. The driver’s side window of Davenport’s car

was open. The trial court could reasonably conclude that Davenport’s passenger could not reach

across Davenport to successfully hurl an object from the driver’s side window to strike

Pleasants’s car. Moreover, the road rage displayed by Davenport during the incident

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corroborated that she was the one who retaliated against Pleasants by throwing the object at his

car.

       Davenport’s case was also weakened by her own testimony and that of her defense

witnesses. The witnesses she called were impeached, and the trial court did not believe them.

For her part, Davenport denied any involvement in the incident and attempted to present an alibi

defense. But the trial court did not believe her either. And “upon finding [her] testimony

unworthy of belief, the trial judge could draw the reasonable inference that [she] testified falsely

‘in an effort to conceal [her] guilt.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 127, 133 (2005)

(quoting Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696 (2004)).

                                            CONCLUSION

       In short, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that Davenport threw the object at the victim’s car.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

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