Court Opinion

ID: 9364570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 17:08:52.263206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.062813
License: Public Domain

J-S28043-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    DONALD CHARLES BURRELL                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1334 MDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 16, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000178-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED JANUARY 19, 2023

        Appellant, Donald Charles Burrell, appeals from the order entered in the

Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

        A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of this appeal as follows:

           In 2013, [Appellant] was charged with sexually assaulting
           his daughter consistently over a 20-year period. He had
           previously been charged with many of the same crimes in
           2002, but after his daughter had recanted, the
           Commonwealth nolle prossed the charges. The charges
           were filed again in 2013, alongside charges arising from
           conduct occurring between 2002 and 2013.

           In pre-trial motions, [Appellant] raised the issue of his
           competency to stand trial, whether double jeopardy barred
           the prosecution of the crimes he had been charged with in
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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         2002, and whether the search warrant for his computer was
         overbroad. After the trial court denied all three motions,
         the case proceeded to a jury trial.

         At trial, the victim testified that [Appellant] kept a calendar
         that memorialized the abuse, as well as assorted other
         evidence. The calendar recorded over 200 incidents of
         sexual intercourse between [Appellant] and his daughter.
         The jury found him guilty on all charges.

         The trial court subsequently sentenced [Appellant] to an
         aggregate sentence of 1,031 to 2,546 years of
         imprisonment. It accomplished this sentence by running the
         sentences for all non-merged convictions consecutively.
         [Appellant] filed post-sentence motions, which the trial
         court denied.

Commonwealth v. Burrell, No. 660 MDA 2016, unpublished memorandum

at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed June 28, 2017), appeal denied, 644 Pa. 518, 177 A.3d

820 (2017).

      This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on June 28, 2017, and

our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on

December 27, 2017. On December 7, 2018, Appellant timely filed a pro se

PCRA petition.   The court appointed counsel (“first PCRA counsel”), and it

provided sixty (60) days for the filing of an amended petition. Appellant did

not file an amended petition within that period, and the court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing

on July 11, 2019. Appellant filed a pro se response to the Rule 907 notice and

claimed that first PCRA counsel had abandoned him. Consequently, the court

removed first PCRA counsel on August 8, 2019. In a separate order entered

that same day, the court appointed current counsel.

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       Following the grant of several extensions, current counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf on February 12, 2021. In it,

Appellant raised various claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On May 27,

2021, the Commonwealth filed an answer to the amended petition. By order

and opinion entered September 16, 2021, the court denied PCRA relief.

       Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 15, 2021.         On

October 20, 2021, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed

his Rule 1925(b) statement on November 8, 2021.

       Appellant now presents the following issues for this Court’s review:

          Did the PCRA court commit an abuse of discretion and error
          as a matter of law by dismissing Appellant’s amended PCRA
          without proper notice of the court’s intent to dismiss the
          amended PCRA Petition.

          Did the PCRA court commit an abuse of discretion and errors
          as a matter of law in determining that Appellant’s PCRA
          claims lacked merit when trial counsel did not properly make
          a viable Rule 600 claim, allowed inflammatory statements
          to be made by the district attorney during the
          Commonwealth’s        closing   argument,     and    allowed
          inadmissible electronic evidence to be admitted into
          evidence    at    the    time   of  trial   without    proper
          authentication? [2]

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

       “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

____________________________________________

2  In his second issue, Appellant raises three (3) discrete claims of
ineffectiveness. Appellant’s brief provides separate argument sections for
each claim. Consequently, we elect to address each claim individually.

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the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

      In his first issue, Appellant relies on Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) for the

proposition that a PCRA court must “give notice to the defendant of its

intention to dismiss the petition and provide the defendant with the reasons

for the dismissal.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). Appellant acknowledges that the

court provided Rule 907 notice after he filed his initial, pro se petition, but

Appellant emphasizes that he subsequently filed a counseled, amended

petition.   Appellant maintains that his amended PCRA petition “was

substantially different in both form and substance than the initial pro se PCRA

petition.” (Id. at 9). Consequently, Appellant argues that the court should

have provided a second Rule 907 notice of its intention to dismiss the

amended PCRA petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Appellant

concludes that the PCRA court abused its discretion by failing to issue Rule

907 notice prior to the dismissal of the amended PCRA petition. We disagree.

      Rule 907 governs the consideration of PCRA petitions as follows:

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         Rule 907. Disposition Without Hearing

            Except as provided in Rule 909 for death penalty cases,

            (1) the judge shall promptly review the petition, any
         answer by the attorney for the Commonwealth, and other
         matters of record relating to the defendant’s claim(s). If the
         judge is satisfied from this review that there are no genuine
         issues concerning any material fact and that the defendant
         is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no
         purpose would be served by any further proceedings, the
         judge shall give notice to the parties of the intention to
         dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice the reasons
         for the dismissal. The defendant may respond to the
         proposed dismissal within 20 days of the date of the notice.
         The judge thereafter shall order the petition dismissed,
         grant leave to file an amended petition, or direct that the
         proceedings continue.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

      Instantly, the PCRA court did not summarily dismiss the petition upon

initial review. Rather, the court: 1) appointed counsel and provided sixty days

for the filing of an amended petition; 2) issued Rule 907 notice when Appellant

did not file an amended petition within sixty days; 3) considered Appellant’s

pro se response to the Rule 907 notice, wherein Appellant claimed that counsel

had abandoned him; 4) removed first PCRA counsel and appointed current

counsel; 5) permitted Appellant to file a counseled, amended petition; and 6)

permitted the Commonwealth to file an answer to the amended petition. The

court’s actions afforded Appellant multiple opportunities to present arguments

in support of the original pro se petition, which is all that Rule 907 requires.

See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 63-64, 720 A.2d 693, 709-10

(1998) (analyzing Rule 1507(a), which was later renumbered Rule 907;

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holding Rule 1507 was inapplicable where PCRA court did not summarily

dismiss petition upon initial review, but rather ordered appointment of

counsel, filing of amended petition, and briefing of legal issues presented;

appellant could not demonstrate Rule 1507 violation where he was afforded

further proceedings and opportunity to present arguments in support of

petition). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first issue.

      In his second issue, Appellant complains about trial counsel’s failure to

object to certain prosecutorial tactics. Initially, Appellant notes that the victim

“was permitted to testify that Appellant never remarried and that he never

had another romantic relationship following Appellant becoming divorced from

[the victim’s] mother.”    (Appellant’s Brief at 11).    Appellant contends that

such testimony possessed no probative value, it caused him to suffer

prejudice, and trial counsel should have objected. Appellant also asserts that

the district attorney improperly referred to this testimony during his closing

argument.

      Specifically, the district attorney mentioned that the week of trial began

with Father’s Day, and he used this fact as a segue to emphasize the testimony

regarding Appellant’s abuse of his daughter. Appellant argues that the district

attorney “referenced Father’s Day to unfairly evoke the jury’s emotions such

that the jury would disregard the evidence that was actually presented at

trial.” (Id. at 14). Appellant concludes that “[t]rial counsel’s failure to object

to these remarks and questions … amounted to ineffective assistance of

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counsel,” which “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.” (Id. at 15). We

disagree.

     “Counsel   is   presumed   to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

        [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
        defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
        ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
        of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
        process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
        could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
        prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
        claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
        reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
        and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
        a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
        proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).   The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

     “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

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645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).          “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

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as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      The following principles inform our review of a prosecutorial misconduct

claim:

         In considering this claim, our attention is focused on
         whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a
         perfect one.

         Not every unwise remark on a prosecutor’s part constitutes
         reversible error. Indeed, the test is a relatively stringent
         one. Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s comments do not
         constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of
         such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in
         their minds fixed bias and hostility toward [the defendant]
         so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and
         render a true verdict. Prosecutorial misconduct, however,
         will not be found where comments … were only oratorical
         flair.   In order to evaluate whether comments were
         improper, we must look to the context in which they were
         made.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 927 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal

denied, 593 Pa. 726, 928 A.2d 1289 (2007).          “A prosecutor has great

discretion during closing argument. Indeed, closing ‘argument’ is just that:

argument.”    Commonwealth v. Brown, 911 A.2d 576, 580 (Pa.Super.

2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 722, 920 A.2d 830 (2007).

      Instantly, the prosecutor questioned the victim as follows:

         [PROSECUTOR:]         Okay. When you were young, five and
         six years old, did you enjoy time with your father?

         [WITNESS:]           Yes.

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         [PROSECUTOR:]        The, uh, … did your father ever
         remarry?

         [WITNESS:]           No.

         [PROSECUTOR:]       Did he ever have another relationship
         as far as you know?

         [WITNESS:]           No.

(N.T. Trial, 6/23/15 (afternoon session), at 4-5).    Contrary to Appellant’s

assertions, we do not agree that this testimony lacked probative value. In a

case involving allegations of sexual abuse over the course of decades,

Appellant’s decision not to remarry tended to explain why the abuse went on

for so long. See Commonwealth v. Hairston, 624 Pa. 143, 166, 84 A.3d

657, 670 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 863, 135 S.Ct. 164, 190 L.Ed.2d 118

(2014) (reiterating that evidence of motive is admissible); Commonwealth

v. Danzey, 210 A.3d 333, 342 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 656 Pa. 9,

219 A.3d 597 (2019) (explaining evidence is relevant if it logically tends to

establish material fact, tends to make fact at issue more or less probable, or

tends to support reasonable inference or proposition regarding material fact).

      Later, the prosecutor referenced this testimony during his closing

argument:

         Believe it or not this week began with Father’s Day, didn’t
         it. Yet, we spent an entire week dealing with one of the
         most pathetic fathers you could ever see; and by pathetic I
         mean to be pitied. This is the most selfish person one would
         ever run into…. He has no other woman in his life, his
         daughter is his place for sex but more important than for
         sex, it’s for sex that he can control, sex that he can
         dominate, sex that he can humiliate.

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                                   *     *      *

         We talked about the [text and instant] messages
         [exchanged between Appellant and the victim] and what
         they said. The message, there is only one, one thing and
         one thing only. You have to be my bitch slave 24/7. Is that
         the way somebody talks to his daughter in a normal
         situation? I tend to doubt it. Is it the way somebody that’s
         in a dominant position over another person might talk? Yes,
         if they can get away with it. That’s another thing about this
         case isn’t it, hard for a guy like [Appellant] to find another
         woman that he can do to what he can do to this woman
         who’s tied to him by family love, tied to him by a lifelong
         attachment, tied to him by the fact that she doesn’t have
         much else….

(N.T. Trial 6/25/15 (afternoon session), at 25-26, 37).

      The PCRA court reviewed this portion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument and concluded that the comments at issue “cannot be said to have

been of such a character as to inflame the passions of the jury or to have

seriously [misled] or distracted the jurors.”       (PCRA Court Opinion, filed

9/16/21, at 8). We cannot say that the PCRA court erred in reaching this

conclusion. The prosecutor’s remark about Father’s Day amounts to mere

oratorical flair. See Harris, supra. The prosecutor’s remark about the lack

of other women in Appellant’s life was a permissible comment about the

evidence of record. See Commonwealth v. Burno, 626 Pa. 30, 60, 94 A.3d

956, 974 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1193, 135 S.Ct. 1493, 191 L.Ed.2d

435 (2015) (providing prosecutor may make fair comment on admitted

evidence). Based upon the foregoing, there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s

claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s

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tactics. See Smith, supra; Poplawski, supra. Therefore, Appellant is not

entitled to relief on his second issue.

       In his third issue, Appellant reiterates that the Commonwealth initially

brought criminal charges against him in 2002, but those charges were

withdrawn due to the victim’s recantation.         Although the Commonwealth

refiled many of the same charges approximately ten years later, Appellant

complains that “[t]here is no indication that the Commonwealth acted with

due diligence to investigate the claims of [the victim] that Appellant sexually

abused her for nearly ten (10) years until Appellant was charged in the

matter[.]” (Appellant’s Brief at 16). Appellant maintains that trial counsel

should have challenged the refiling of the charges via a Pa.R.Crim.P. 600

motion.    Had counsel filed such a motion, Appellant argues that the court

would have conducted a hearing “where Appellant would have been granted

the opportunity to build a record that the Commonwealth had not acted with

due diligence in investigating [the victim’s] claims and charging Appellant with

any criminal charges stemming from that investigation.”3 (Id.) Moreover,

under the circumstances of this case, Appellant asserts “that the Rule 600 run

date should have begun to run when Appellant was initially charged.” (Id. at

____________________________________________

3 Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel challenged the refiling of the
charges in a pretrial motion alleging that prosecution was barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellant insists, however, that Rule 600
presented a distinct, meritorious theory of relief, which counsel had no
reasonable basis for failing to pursue.

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17). Appellant concludes that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

Rule 600 motion, and counsel’s error constituted a gross miscarriage of

justice. We disagree.

      The following principles apply to our review of a speedy trial claim:

         [T]his Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose
         behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important
         functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial
         rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining
         whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been
         violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to
         effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
         those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
         However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not
         designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
         prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

         So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
         Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
         speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be
         construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to
         punish and deter crime. In considering these matters …,
         courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not
         only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the
         collective right of the community to vigorous law
         enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 809-10 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in

pertinent part:

         Rule 600. Prompt Trial

            (A)   Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

                                  *     *      *

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           (2) Trial shall commence within the following time
        periods.

                  (a) Trial in a court case in which a written
           complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence
           within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is
           filed.

                                 *     *      *

           (C)   Computation of Time

            (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at
        any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth
        when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due
        diligence shall be included in the computation of the time
        within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
        delay shall be excluded from the computation.

                                 *     *      *

        In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal
        complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second
        complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit
        of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes
        of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-
        filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its
        control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence,
        and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time
        limitation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Meadius,
        582 Pa. 174, 870 A.2d 802 (2005).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a), (C)(1), and Comment.

        Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be
        determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not
        require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a
        showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has
        been put forth. Due diligence includes, inter alia, listing a
        case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness for trial
        within the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure
        compliance with Rule 600. Periods of delay caused by the
        Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence must be
        included in the computation of time within which trial must

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         commence.

Martz, supra at 810-11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moore, 214 A.3d 244,

248-49 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 224 A.3d 360 (2020))

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, the 2014 affidavit of probable cause provides insight into law

enforcement’s multi-year investigations into Appellant’s criminal conduct. The

affiant, Detective Al Ogden, explained that his investigation revealed that

Appellant began his sexual abuse of the victim in 1991, and it continued until

2002. The Commonwealth first charged Appellant in October 2002. After his

arrest, however, Appellant “got to” the victim, and she recanted her abuse

allegations. (Affidavit of Probable Cause, dated 1/17/14, at 2). The affidavit

noted that Appellant employed several methods to control the victim and

prevent her from disclosing the abuse:

         [Appellant] has used [the victim’s] religious beliefs against
         her, he has threatened to make public sexually explicit
         videos of the victim, pain and compliance methods such as
         a stun gun, clothes pins on her nipples or striking her with
         an electrical cord, as well as threatening physical harm to
         her, her siblings and eventually her boyfriend.

(Id. at 1).

      After the dismissal of the 2002 charges, Appellant resumed his sexual

abuse of the victim. The second round of abuse commenced in 2005 and

continued until March 2012, when the victim “finally was able to stand up to

[Appellant] and end it.” (Id. at 2). The victim, however, did not immediately

come forward to report Appellant to law enforcement. Rather, on July 22,

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2013, Detective Ogden was interviewing the victim “regarding a different

investigation[.]” (Id. at 1). At that time, Detective Ogden brought up the

victim’s prior allegations of abuse.     The victim “stated that the original

reported abuse did in fact occur and that the abuse began again in 2005 and

continued until 2012.”    (Id.)   The victim also agreed to submit to further

interviews. On July 23, 2013, the victim participated in a forensic interview

where she “recounted years of sexual, emotional, and psychological abuse at

the hands of [Appellant].”    (Id.)   Thereafter, Detective Ogden obtained a

warrant to search Appellant’s residence.       Upon executing the warrant, the

detective recovered several pieces of evidence that corroborated the victim’s

allegations.

      The PCRA court evaluated this record and determined that there was no

arguable merit to Appellant’s claim regarding the failure to file a Rule 600

motion:

          [Appellant’s amended PCRA petition] asserts that it is
          believed and therefore averred that the Commonwealth
          never took any steps whatsoever to investigate [the
          victim’s] claims of sexual abuse allegedly committed by
          [Appellant]. [Appellant] does not elaborate or set forth any
          facts as to what the Commonwealth failed to do. [Appellant]
          does admit that the charges were nolle prossed in 2004 due
          to victim’s recantation.     This would be beyond the
          Commonwealth’s control. [Appellant] offers no allegations
          to support a claim that the Commonwealth attempted to
          circumvent the limitations of Rule 600. Therefore, the run
          date is calculated from the second filing. This claim is
          without merit.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 2-3) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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      Here, the record confirms the court’s conclusions. The victim recanted

her abuse allegations shortly after the charges were filed in 2002, and she did

not “stand up” to Appellant to break the cycle of abuse until 2012. When the

victim happened to cross paths with Detective Ogden as part of an unrelated

investigation in 2013, the detective did not pass up the opportunity to revisit

the victim’s prior allegations of abuse. At that point, the victim was finally

ready to advance her allegations, which resulted in the refiling of charges in

2014. Under these circumstances, the victim’s recantation was beyond the

Commonwealth’s control, and it occurred despite the exercise of due diligence.

See Martz, supra; Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 Comment. Thus, the PCRA court did not

err in concluding that there was no arguable merit to Appellant’s claim

regarding the need for a Rule 600 motion. See Smith, supra; Poplawski,

supra. As such, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his third issue.

      Finally, Appellant raises related claims concerning evidence that the

police seized from his residence. Appellant notes that police obtained a search

warrant for his residence and subsequently seized a computer and cell phone.

Appellant contends that “the evidence garnered from these electronic devices

was extensively cited [at trial] to show that Appellant was guilty of the crimes

charged in this matter.” (Appellant’s Brief at 19). Appellant cites a portion of

the warrant, which permitted police to search for instant messages relating to

the abuse of the victim, as well as any other files depicting child pornography.

Appellant insists, however, that the warrant did not expressly authorize the

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seizure of a computer and cell phone, and trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the seizure of these items on this basis.

      Appellant asserts that the digital evidence recovered from the computer

and cell phone included instant messages, emails, and text messages.

Although     the    victim   repeatedly    testified   that   she    exchanged      the

communications       at   issue   with   Appellant,    Appellant    argues   that   the

Commonwealth did not provide “any more information as to how [the victim]

knew that Appellant had been the person who sent the messages.” (Id. at

22). Appellant emphasizes:

           [T]he evidence was never properly authenticated in that the
           only evidence that was submitted to show that the
           messages were sent by Appellant was the messages came
           from devices that were purportedly Appellant’s and that the
           names and screennames in the devices and applications
           used to send the messages were purportedly names that
           reflected that Appellant had sent the messages.

(Id. at 27).       Absent proper authentication, Appellant contends that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the digital

evidence.      We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions related to the

procurement and presentation of the digital evidence.

      The following principles apply to our review of claims involving search

warrants:

           Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution ensures
           that citizens of this Commonwealth are protected from
           unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring that
           warrants: (1) describe the place to be searched and the
           items to be seized with specificity and (2) be supported by
           probable cause to believe that the items sought will provide

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        evidence of a crime. Regarding the former requirement, we
        have interpreted the phrase “as nearly as may be” in Article
        I, Section 8 as requiring more specificity in the description
        of items to be seized than the federal particularity
        requirement.     This more stringent requirement makes
        general searches impossible and prevents the seizure of one
        thing under a warrant describing another.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 240 A.3d 575, 584 (2020)

(internal citations, footnote, and some quotation marks omitted).

        However, search warrants should be read in a common
        sense fashion and should not be invalidated by
        hypertechnical interpretations.      This may mean, for
        instance, that when an exact description of a particular item
        is not possible, a generic description will suffice. It is
        permissible to seize things other than those described in the
        search warrant if they have a reasonable relation to the
        purpose of the search. For example, police could seize a
        kitchen knife during a warranted search for “one pocket
        knife.”

Commonwealth v. Moser, 283 A.3d 850, 857 (Pa.Super. 2022) (internal

citations and some quotation marks omitted).

     Additionally,   Pennsylvania   Rule     of   Evidence   901   governs   the

authentication of evidence as follows:

        Rule 901. Authenticating or Identifying Evidence

           (a) In General. Unless stipulated, to satisfy the
        requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of
        evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient
        to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
        claims it is.

           (b) Examples. The following are examples only—not
        a complete list—of evidence that satisfies the requirement:

           (1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge.
        Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.

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                                       *       *    *

              (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like.        The
          appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
          distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with
          all the circumstances.

Pa.R.E. 901(a), (b)(1), (4).4

       “[E]-mails and text messages are documents and subject to the same

requirements for authenticity as non-electronic documents generally.”

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2011), affirmed,

____________________________________________

4 After Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final, on May 20, 2020, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced the amendment of Rule 901(b) to
include the following language:

             (11) Digital Evidence. To connect digital evidence with
          a person or entity:

                    (A) direct evidence such as testimony of a person
              with personal knowledge; or

                     (B)    circumstantial evidence such as:

                            (i)    identifying content; or

                           (ii)  proof   of  ownership,    possession,
                     control, or access to a device or account at the
                     relevant time when corroborated by circumstances
                     indicating authorship.

In Re: Order Approving the Amendment of Pa. Rule of Evid. 901, No.
841, Supreme Court Rules Docket (Pa. May 20, 2020) (effective Oct. 1, 2020)
(per curiam). The amended comment explains that “Digital evidence” includes
emails, and: “The proponent of digital evidence is not required to prove that
no one else could be the author. Rather, the proponent must produce
sufficient evidence to support a finding that a particular person or entity was
the author.” Id.

                                           - 20 -
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630 Pa. 374, 106 A.3d 705 (2014).            See also Danzey, supra at 337-38

(explaining Pennsylvania appellate courts have also considered authentication

of computerized instant messages and communications made on social media

platforms).

         A document may be authenticated by direct proof, such as
         the testimony of a witness who saw the author sign the
         document, acknowledgment of execution by the signer,
         admission of authenticity by an adverse party, or proof that
         the document or its signature is in the purported author’s
         handwriting. A document also may be authenticated by
         circumstantial evidence, a practice which is uniformly
         recognized as permissible.

                                   *     *      *

         [T]he difficulty that frequently arises in e-mail and text
         message cases is establishing authorship. Often more than
         one person uses an e-mail address and accounts can be
         accessed without permission. In the majority of courts to
         have considered the question, the mere fact that an e-mail
         bears a particular e-mail address is inadequate to
         authenticate the identity of the author; typically, courts
         demand additional evidence.

Koch, supra at 1004 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant concedes that law enforcement obtained a search

warrant to seize

         [i]nstant messages relating to the sexual abuse of [the
         victim], … video files, still image files, documents and other
         files relating to the sexual abuse of [the victim]. Video files,
         still image files and any other file depicting [c]hild
         [p]ornography….

(Appellant’s Brief at 20) (quoting Application for Search Warrant and

Authorization, dated 8/7/13). Although this portion of the application did not

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expressly mention the computer and cell phone, the warrant effectively

permitted law enforcement to seize the electronic devices where the relevant

data files might reside.    Any other interpretation of the language at issue

would constitute a hyper technical interpretation that would have frustrated

law enforcement’s ability to seize the relevant computer files. See Moser,

supra. Moreover, the computer and cell phone were reasonably related to a

search for instant messages and computer files.          Id.   Consequently, the

portion of the application at issue adequately described the items to be seized.

See Johnson, supra.

      Regarding the authentication of the digital evidence at trial, the

Commonwealth provided ample circumstantial evidence to establish that

Appellant sent the messages at issue. Specifically, Detective Ogden testified

regarding the recovery of the evidence from Appellant’s residence and the

subsequent delivery of the evidence to the state police computer lab for

further examination. (See N.T. Trial, 6/23/15 (morning session), at 67-70).

The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Russell Houseknecht, the

computer crimes analyst who extracted the relevant files from Appellant’s

devices. (Id. at 53-56).

      Thereafter, the victim testified that she communicated with Appellant

using text messages on her cell phone and instant messages on her computer.

(See N.T. Trial, 6/23/15 (afternoon session), at 55). When utilizing instant

messages,    the   victim   used   the   screen   name    “Moochiesmom80”     or

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“Pineberry68.”       (Id.    at 94-95).        Appellant   used     the    screen name

“Moparrunner74.” (Id. at 95). The victim “created that [screen] name for

[Appellant] when [she] set up his e-mail.”                  (Id.)        Thereafter, the

Commonwealth introduced voluminous transcripts of messages and emails

exchanged between these accounts.5

       In addition to the victim’s familiarity with Appellant’s various accounts

and devices, her testimony demonstrated that Appellant took a domineering,

authoritarian tone when communicating with her. Appellant would tell the

victim that she “was to do what [she] was told, not to ever say no or question

what [Appellant] wanted, to never hesitate to just do it or [she] would be

punished for it.” (Id. at 8). For example, the victim testified that Appellant

forced her to write and sign an agreement pledging total obedience to

Appellant:

          [PROSECUTOR:]     Okay.      The—all              right,        what’s
          [Commonwealth’s exhibit] number 14?

          [WITNESS:]          An agreement             giving       my     total
          obedience to the holder of this paper.

          [PROSECUTOR:]            Does—did you write that?

          [WITNESS:]               Yes.

          [PROSECUTOR:]            Did you sign it?
____________________________________________

5 Some of the messages appear as a dialogue between “Moparrunner74” and
“Big Titted Bitch.” (See Commonwealth’s Trial Exhibit 44; R.R. at 737a). The
victim explained that “Big Titted Bitch” was the name linked to the victim’s
phone number in the contact list of Appellant’s cell phone. (See N.T. Trial,
6/23/15 (afternoon session), at 96).

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        [WITNESS:]            Yes.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         Did you compose it?

        [WITNESS:]            No.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         How did you get the words for it?

        [WITNESS:]            My father.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         When did he give it to you?

        [WITNESS:]            Sometime before it was written.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         Did you want to do that?

        [WITNESS:]            No.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         Why did you do it?

        [WITNESS:]            Because I was told to.

        [PROSECUTOR:]        You said on that—that            letter   is
        generally just a promise of obedience?

        [WITNESS:]            Yes.

        [PROSECUTOR:]         Can you read it to us?

        [WITNESS:]           It says, “I, [C.B.], give the holder of
        this paper my complete and total obedience. I shall do
        whatever I am told with no exceptions, trouble, or
        objections of any type.”

(Id. at 60-61).   In addition to this obedience pledge, the Commonwealth

offered similar “agreements” wherein Appellant forced the victim to give him

“ownership” over her hair, breasts, and various nude photos of her.

     Significantly,   the   same    themes    that   appear   in   these    written

agreements—Appellant’s need for dominance over the victim and his desire

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for her unquestioned fealty—appear throughout the text and instant message

transcripts offered by the Commonwealth. Therefore, sufficient circumstantial

evidence demonstrated that the Commonwealth properly authenticated the

text and instant messages where: 1) the victim’s testimony revealed that the

tone of the digital messages matched the tone Appellant used for other forms

of communication with her; 2) the victim’s testimony linked Appellant to the

screen names and accounts at issue; and 3) police connected the digital

messages to the devices seized from Appellant’s residence. Compare Koch,

supra at 1005 (emphasizing detective’s testimony regarding his transcription

of text messages from defendant’s cell phone was insufficient to authenticate

defendant as author; Commonwealth did not present testimony from persons

who received messages, and messages did not include context clues tending

to reveal sender’s identity). Under these circumstances, there is no arguable

merit to Appellant’s claims of ineffectiveness for failing to object to the

procurement and presentation of the digital evidence. See Smith, supra;

Poplawski, supra. Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claim, and

we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Order affirmed.6

____________________________________________

6On August 25, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se “motion for appointment of new
counsel due to ineffectiveness” in this Court. In his motion, Appellant
essentially claims that current counsel is ineffective for failing to raise an
additional issue on appeal. Specifically, Appellant claims that current counsel
should have argued that “trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 25 -
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____________________________________________

charges being refiled after the Commonwealth nolle prossed them in 2004.”
(Motion, filed 8/25/22, at Exhibit A).

On December 1, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se “amended motion for
appointment of new counsel due to ineffectiveness.” In it, Appellant raises an
additional claim of ineffectiveness, arguing that current counsel failed “to clear
up the confusion as to how and when the computer in Appellant’s case was
seized.” (Motion, filed 12/1/22, at 1).

In disposing of these motions, we recognize our Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 261 A.3d 381,
401 (2021), holding “that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies
relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA
counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.”
Assuming without deciding that Bradley permits Appellant to raise a pro se
challenge to PCRA counsel’s effectiveness after the filing of an appellate brief
while the appeal remains pending, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled
to relief on his current claims. Significantly, the pro se motions filed in this
Court focus on the arguable merit prong of the test for ineffectiveness while
providing little-to-no analysis of the rational basis and prejudice prongs. Thus,
the failure of the pro se motions to develop a meaningful argument for all
three parts of the test for ineffectiveness is fatal to Appellant’s request for
relief. See Sandusky, supra at 1044 (stating that boilerplate allegations and
bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy
petitioner’s burden to prove that counsel was ineffective). Accordingly, we
deny Appellant’s pro se motions for appointment of new counsel.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/19/2023

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