Court Opinion

ID: 9362921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:05.26949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.759940
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                        Court of Appeals

                           NO. 2021-CA-1304-MR

MICHAEL GONTERMAN AND                                         APPELLANTS
JEANA GONTERMAN

                 APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE JERRY CROSBY, II, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 18-CI-00221

WOOSTER MOTOR WAYS, INC.;
TEDDY SEERY; EC DELIVERY,
LLC; JAMES BAUMHOWER;
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
AND KENTUCKY SELF-INSURED
AUTO PROGRAM-STATE RISK &
INSURANCE SERVICES DIVISION                                     APPELLEES

                             OPINION
                     REVERSING AND REMANDING

                               ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Michael Gonterman and his wife, Jeana

Gonterman, appeal from orders granting summary judgment to Appellees. The
trial court found that the Firefighter’s Rule1 prevented Appellants from recovering

from Appellees. The Firefighter’s Rule, under certain circumstances, prohibits

emergency personnel from recovering for injuries sustained while performing their

duties. The court held that Appellees could not be held liable for Mr. Gonterman’s

injuries and granted them all summary judgment. We disagree and reverse and

remand.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                On April 25, 2018, John Crawford was driving on Interstate 71 in

Henry County. While driving, he saw two dogs on the side of the interstate. In

response, he pulled over onto the right shoulder, parked off the roadway, and

called 911 to ask for assistance. He then attempted to corral the dogs on his own.

Numerous other people had called 911 that day to report the dogs being near the

interstate.

                Mr. Gonterman, a Kentucky State Police trooper, was dispatched to

respond to the dogs. When he arrived, the dogs and Mr. Crawford were on a

bridge. Trooper Gonterman pulled over onto the shoulder of the interstate, just

before the entrance of the bridge, turned on his emergency lights, and exited the

vehicle. He then proceeded along the shoulder and onto the bridge in order to

assist Mr. Crawford.

1
    Also known as the Fireman’s Rule.

                                          -2-
              Trooper Gonterman and Mr. Crawford were walking along the

shoulder of the bridge with the dogs when two commercial vehicles operated by

Teddy Serry, an employee of Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., and James Baumhower,

an employee of EC Delivery, Inc., were involved in a collision. As a result of the

collision, Mr. Baumhower’s truck killed Mr. Crawford and pushed Trooper

Gonterman off the bridge. Trooper Gonterman suffered severe injuries, but

survived.

              Sergeant Dusty Corbin of the Kentucky State Police then began an

investigation of the accident. According to Sergeant Corbin’s report, when Mr.

Baumhower and Mr. Serry saw the police vehicle with emergency lights flashing,

they both moved into the left lane. Mr. Baumhower then had to abruptly move

back into the right lane to avoid a car that had almost completely stopped in front

of him in the left lane. It was at this time that Mr. Baumhower saw the pedestrians

and dogs on the bridge. He then immediately swerved back into the left lane to

avoid them.

              When Mr. Baumhower swerved into the right lane, Mr. Seery then

saw the slow-moving car in the left lane. He too then swerved into the right lane to

avoid colliding with the car. As Mr. Seery moved into the right lane, he collided

with Mr. Baumhower’s truck. This collision caused Mr. Baumhower’s truck to

fishtail into the bridge railing and hit Trooper Gonterman and Mr. Crawford.

                                         -3-
                 Sergeant Corbin concluded that Mr. Seery was following too closely

to Mr. Baumhower just prior to the collision. He also believed Mr. Seery was

driving too fast and unable to come to a safe stop when he came upon the slow-

moving car. Sergeant Corbin also believed that Mr. Baumhower was inattentive to

traffic, following the car in front of him too closely, and driving too fast.

                 Appellants then brought suit against the truck drivers, their employers,

and the relevant insurance carriers.2 Appellants’ claims against Mr. Baumhower

and Mr. Seery were for negligence, gross negligence, and loss of spousal

consortium. Appellants brought those same claims against Wooster and EC

Delivery and also included claims for respondeat superior and negligent hiring,

training, supervision, and retention.

                 After some discovery, Appellees all moved for summary judgment.

They argued that the Firefighter’s Rule barred Appellants’ claims. The trial court

agreed and granted summary judgment to Appellees. This appeal followed.

                                            ANALYSIS

                 On appeal, Appellants argue that the Firefighter’s Rule does not apply

to Trooper Gonterman and his injuries.

                 The Firefighter’s Rule is a “common law rule of
                 longstanding,” judicially created as a “public policy”
                 exception to the liability for negligence which might
                 otherwise exist. We narrowly circumscribe the

2
    Appellants sued other individuals, but they are irrelevant for our purposes.

                                                  -4-
             application of such exceptions so as to protect no one
             from responsibility for the consequences of their
             wrongdoing except where protecting the public makes it
             essential to do so.

Sallee v. GTE South, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Ky. 1992) (citation omitted).

             The Firefighter’s Rule was first adopted by our courts in Buren v.

Midwest Industries, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96 (Ky. 1964). The Court in that case stated

that

             as a general rule the owner or occupant is not liable for
             having negligently created the condition necessitating the
             fireman’s presence (that is, the fire itself), but may be
             liable for failure to warn of unusual or hidden hazards,
             for actively negligent conduct and, in some jurisdictions,
             for statutory violations creating undue risks of injury
             beyond those inevitably involved in fire fighting.

Id. at 97-98 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

             [F]or reasons of public policy, our rule is that firemen are
             required to assume the ordinary risks of their
             employment, a dangerous occupation, to the extent
             necessary to serve the public purpose of fire control, and
             this means providing the Fireman’s Rule as a defense for
             those who are the owners or occupiers of the property he
             is employed to protect.

Hawkins v. Sunmark Industries, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Ky. 1986). This rule

was expanded to include police officers in the case of Fletcher v. Illinois Cent.

Gulf R.R. Co., 679 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. App. 1984).

             Under the Firefighter’s Rule, a first responder may not recover for any

negligence that created the situation to which the responder responds. In Sallee,

                                         -5-
supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court listed three factors a court is to consider when

trying to determine if the Firefighter’s Rule should apply.

             1) The purpose of the policy is to encourage owners and
             occupiers, and others similarly situated, in a situation
             where it is important to themselves and to the general
             public to call a public protection agency, and to do so
             free from any concern that by so doing they may
             encounter legal liability based on their negligence in
             creating the risk.

             2) The policy bars public employees (firefighters, police
             officers, and the like) who, as an incident of their
             occupation, come to a given location to engage a specific
             risk; and

             3) The policy extends only to that risk.

Sallee, 839 S.W.2d at 279 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

             As this case revolves around a legal question and summary judgment,

we review de novo. Lewis v. B & R Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App.

2001). The trial court in the case at hand found that all three of the above factors

were present. We disagree. We believe factors one and three are not applicable.

The trial court found that the first factor was met by the truck drivers because, as

drivers on the interstate, they were people who would benefit from the police

officer’s presence. The court believed that all drivers on that stretch of road would

benefit from Trooper Gonterman attempting to remove the dogs from the road;

therefore, they were considered “others similarly situated.” The trial court found

that the third factor was present because Trooper Gonterman was dispatched to

                                         -6-
Interstate 71 to mitigate a road hazard and prevent an accident. He was then struck

by a car accident. The trial court believed that Trooper Gonterman was injured by

the situation to which he responded.

             We will first discuss the first Sallee factor. The Firefighter’s Rule is a

judicially created public policy exception to negligence liability. It is used to

prevent emergency personnel from suing people who cause or are involved in a

public safety hazard if the emergency responder is injured by said hazard. The

reasoning is that emergency responders are paid to deal with dangerous hazards;

therefore, they cannot complain about the hazards they encounter as part of their

employment. Sallee, 839 S.W.2d at 278; Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d at 400; Buren, 380

S.W.2d at 98.

             “[B]y accepting employment as a police officer [an officer] must be

deemed to have assumed the personal risk inherent in dealing with the emergency

which necessitated his presence.” Fletcher, 679 S.W.2d at 243. Decisions by the

courts of Kentucky regarding the Firefighter’s Rule

             should not be construed to mean that policemen and
             firemen are precluded from recovering for any injury
             incurred in the performance of their duties. On the
             contrary, our decision is limited in scope. It applies only
             to those situations where officers in the performance of
             their duties are required to subject themselves to an
             unreasonable risk of harm negligently created by a party
             and are injured. In such instances, they may not maintain
             a negligence action against the party who created the risk
             to recover damages for any injuries they may have

                                          -7-
             sustained as a result of their exposure to that particular
             risk.

Id.

             We do not believe the truck drivers in this case fit into the categories

described by Sallee factor one. First, the truck drivers are not owners or occupiers

of the land where the accident took place. This was a public highway owned and

operated by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The truck drivers had no ownership,

leasehold, or other legal authority over the land. We also do not believe they fit

into the definition of “others similarly situated.” The truck drivers had nothing to

do with the road hazard that Trooper Gonterman was responding to. The dogs did

not belong to the truck drivers and neither of the truck drivers called 911 to report

the dogs being in the road. Because they had no connection to the road hazard at

issue, they are not the type of people who the Firefighter’s Rule was created to

protect. In other words, they are not people who needed to be concerned over

being sued by emergency personnel responding to the dogs in the road because

they did not create the risk to Trooper Gonterman. The trial court erred in finding

Sallee factor one was met.

             We now move on to Sallee factor three, that Trooper Gonterman was

injured by the risk he was called to remedy. The Firefighter’s Rule bars recovery

for negligence which created the emergency or flows from the emergency. For

example, in Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Johnson, 554 S.W.3d 315 (Ky.

                                          -8-
2018), a police officer was injured when she fell down an embankment while

pursuing a suspect. The embankment was on Norfolk’s property. The officer sued

Norfolk and claimed that the embankment was a dangerous condition and

negligently maintained by Norfolk. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the

Firefighter’s Rule applied because the officer was called to the area to investigate

the suspect and a foot chase ensued. During the chase was when she fell down the

embankment. The Court reasoned that her injury was caused by the emergency

she was there to investigate as chasing a suspect is part of her job. Id. at 318-19.

             On the other hand, it does not bar recovery for injuries sustained by

negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct separate from the emergency. For

example, in Sallee, supra, two paramedics were sent to treat and transport an

assault victim. An underground utility cable had recently been installed on the

property where the assault victim was located. Upon arrival, one of the paramedics

tripped and fell because the trench in which the underground cable was installed

had not been filled in properly. The paramedic then sued the utility company for

damages due to his injuries. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the

Firefighter’s Rule did not apply because the injury was not due to the emergency

he was called upon to deal with, i.e., the injured assault victim.

             We believe that the injuries sustained by Trooper Gonterman were not

the result of the situation he was sent to Interstate 71 to remedy. Trooper

                                          -9-
Gonterman was sent to remove traffic hazards in the form of two dogs and Mr.

Crawford. He was to remove the hazards in order to prevent an accident.

Although an accident did occur, it occurred due to the alleged active and

independent negligence3 of Mr. Seery and Mr. Baumhower. Both were traveling

too fast and were too close to the vehicle in front of them. The accident did not

occur because of the dogs or Mr. Crawford. Had one of the dogs or Mr. Crawford

accidentally pushed Trooper Gonterman into the road, causing him to be struck by

a vehicle, then the Firefighter’s Rule would probably apply. Had one of the dogs

darted into the road, causing a vehicle to swerve and strike Trooper Gonterman,

then the Firefighter’s Rule would likely have applied. The accident in this case

was caused by the alleged intervening and active negligence of the two truck

drivers, not the dogs or Mr. Crawford. As the accident and subsequent injuries

were not caused by the emergency Trooper Gonterman was sent to remedy, the

third factor of the Firefighter’s Rule does not apply and Trooper Gonterman’s

claims are not barred.

              Further supporting our conclusion is a hypothetical situation discussed

by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Sallee, supra. The Court in Sallee stated that if

a police officer were investigating a drunk driver and during the investigation, he

3
 Active negligence has been defined as new, subsequent conduct that has occurred after the
emergency responder has arrived. Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d at 399 n.1.

                                             -10-
began directing traffic and was struck by another motorist, the Firefighter’s Rule

would apply to the drunk driver, but not to the other driver who struck the officer.

Sallee, 839 S.W.2d at 279. A similar situation to the Sallee hypothetical occurred

in this case. Trooper Gonterman was involved in removing the dogs and Mr.

Crawford from the interstate4 when the truck drivers caused an accident and

injured him.5

                  Appellants raise other issues on appeal; however, they are moot now

that we have determined that the Firefighter’s Rule does not apply in this case.

                                          CONCLUSION

                  Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand. The trial court erred

when it determined that the Firefighter’s Rule applied in this case. It does not.

Trooper Gonterman’s injuries were not caused by the emergency he was called out

to mitigate and the truck drivers were not the type of people the Firefighter’s Rule

was created to protect.

                  ALL CONCUR.

4
    This would be comparable to the drunk driver investigation.
5
    This is comparable to the other motorist striking the officer while he was directing traffic.

                                                  -11-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES EC
                           DELIVERY, LLC AND JAMES
Tyler S. Thompson          BAUMHOWER:
Liz J. Shepherd
Marshall J. Rowland        Lynsie Gaddis Rust
Louisville, Kentucky       Andrew Bokeno
                           Louisville, Kentucky
Edward Bourne
Courtney Bourne            ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
Owenton, Kentucky          APPELLEES EC DELIVERY, LLC
                           AND JAMES BAUMHOWER:
Chad O. Propst
Louisville, Kentucky       Lynsie Gaddis Rust
                           Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:                BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
                           FOR APPELLEES WOOSTER
Chad O. Propst             MOTOR WAYS, INC. AND TEDDY
Louisville, Kentucky       SEERY:

                           Christina R. L. Norris
                           Louisville, Kentucky

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                           KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
                           MUTUAL INSURANCE
                           COMPANY:

                           James M. Crawford
                           Jake A. Thompson
                           Carrollton, Kentucky

                           ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                           APPELLEE KENTUCKY FARM
                           BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE
                           COMPANY:

                           Jake A. Thompson
                           Carrollton, Kentucky

                         -12-