Court Opinion

ID: 9579132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:50.59299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:27.688628
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
I most respectfully dissent as to the disposition of the first stated question in the majority opinion. The answer to this question, which this Court has not heretofore needed to expressly decide, depends upon the meaning and intent of the several sections of our Constitution dealing with ad valorem property taxes. It is elementary law that in constructon of constitutional provisions words are presumed to be used *17in their ordinary and peculiar meaning. It is further elementary that where the language of such is plain, clear and unambiguous, there is neither room nor need for construction. Applying these elementary rules to the constitutional provisions which here control, we must inevitably reach the conclusion that all property, real and personal, must be taxed alike within the jurisdiction in which the tax is imposed. It follows that the taxation of tangible personal property at twice the rate imposed upon real property in the same jurisdiction is a patent violation of the ad valorem property tax provisions of our Constitution.
It is not even asserted that there is anything unclear or ambiguous about these constitutional provisions, but even if there were any ambiguity and any need for construction, the authorities relied upon by the lower court and in the majority opinion are not in point and simply do not support the conclusion reached. The case of Morgan v. Watts, 255 S. C. 212, 178 S. E. (2d) 147 (1970), is cited and the lower court was swayed by a quotation in that case from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, 215 F. (2d) 542 (4th Cir. 1954), which opinion, in turn, cited and relied upon Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156 S. C. 299, 152 S. E. 865. None of these decisions is at all in point on the instant issue. In each instance the court was concerned with property, exempted by law for “municipal * * * purposes”, from the imposition of ad valorem taxes, pursuant to the literal language of Article X, Section 1 of the Constitution. An examination of these cases clearly shows that in speaking of the “classification of property for tax purposes” the Court was not considering whether the ad val-orem property tax provisions of our Constitution permitted such classification but rather whether the exemptions permitted under such were in conflict with the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. It follows that neither Morgan nor its progenitors throw any light upon the present controversy.
Reliance is also had upon the language quoted from 84 C. J. S. Taxation § 36, p. 112. While at first glance such *18language would appear to have some possible bearing upon the present issue, a sampling of the cases cited in support of the text, to my mind, completely destroys any persuasiveness that the text might otherwise have. Cited are cases such as Carolina Music Co. v. Query, 192 S. C. 308, 6 S. E. (2d) 473, dealing not with ad valorem property taxes, but license taxes instead.
The precise issue with which we are concerned is, however, specifically dealt with in 84 C. J. S. Taxation, § 26 p. 89, from which I quote:
“§ 26. Discrimination between Realty and Personalty.
“Under constitutional provisions requiring all property to be taxed by a uniform rule or that all property taxes shall be proportional and reasonable, it has been held that there can be no discrimination between real and personal property and that a tax levied on either class alone is invalid;”
An examination of the cases cited in support of the text of this section shows that without any exception whatsoever all states, wherein the constitutional language governing the imposition of ad valorem taxes on property is at all similar to the constitutional language of this State, have held that real and tangible personal property must be taxed alike and may not be treated differently. The States of North Carolina, Georgia, Massachusetts, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Nebraska and Colorado have so held. Redmond v. Town of Tarboro, 106 N. C. 122, 10 S. E. 845; Wiley v. Salisbury, 111 N. C. 397, 16 S. E. 542; Pocomoke Guano v. Biddle, 158 N. C. 212, 73 S. E. 996; Jamison v. City of Charlotte, 239 N. C. 682, 80 S. E. (2d) 904; Colvard v. Ridley, 218 Ga. 490, 128 S. E. (2d) 732; Hutchins v. Howard, 211 Ga. 830, 89 S. E. (2d) 183; Georgia State B. & L. Assoc, v. Mayor, etc. of Savannah, 109 Ga. 63, 35 S. E. 67; In re Opinion of Justices, 208 Mass. 616, 94 N. E. 1043 (1911) ; People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill. (2d) 360, 235 N. E. (2d) 589 (1968); Appeal of General Motors Corp., 376 Mich. 373, 137 N. W. (2d) 161 (1965); State ex rel. *19Baker Mfg. Co. v. City of Evansville, 261 Wis. 599, 53 N. W. (2d) 795 (1952); Grainger Bros. v. County Board of Equalisation, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N. W. (2d) 161 (1966) ; Ochs v. Town of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 407 P. (2d) 677 (1965).
It appears that in Ohio, New Jersey and Maryland real property and personal property may now be treated differently for the purpose of ad valorem taxes by virtue of constitutional amendments. Prior to the several constitutional amendments in these States, all of them like the other States hereinabove mentioned, held that then existing constitutional provisions quite similar to ours with respect to ad valorem property taxes precluded real and personal property being treated differently for tax purposes. National Can Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 220 Md. 418, 153 A (2d) 287; Continental Can Co. v. Donahue, 5 Ohio St. (2d) 224, 215 N. E. (2d) 400; State ex rel. Struble v. Davis, 132 Ohio St. 555, 9 N. E. (2d) 684; Swits v. Kingsley, 37 N. J. 566, 182 A. (2d) 841, 850.
In view of what I consider to be the patent, clear language of our several constitutional provisions, it is to me quite understandable that this Court has not heretofore been called upon to expressly decide the precise issue. There are, however, several cases, not directly in point, which throw at least some light upon the matter. See: Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 166 S. C. 117, 164 S. E. 588, aff. 286 U. S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232, 84 A. L. R. 831; Thomas v. Town Council of Moultrieville, 52 S. C. 181, 29 S. E. 647; State v. Tucker, 56 S. C. 516, 35 S. E. 215. In each of these cases the Court held that the particular statute involved imposed no ad valorem tax on property. The clear import or holding of each of those cases, however, was to the effect that had the particular statutes in fact imposed an ad valorem tax on property, such would have been unconstitutional under the ad valorem property tax provisions of our Constitution with which we are here concerned.
*20In brief summary, it is my view that the language of our Constitution is clear, unambiguous and compelling that real and tangible personal property have to be treated equally and alike for the purposes of ad valorem property taxes. And, if there were any need for construction, there is a complete absence of any authority whatsoever from this or any other jurisdiction to support the conclusion reached below and sustained by the majority opinion, all authority being to the contrary.
The foregoing is to my mind conclusive of the matter. But there is, to say the least, a most grave question as to whether the discrimination here involved is or is not in violation of the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. In my view of the matter, however, it is unnecessary to discuss or decide this quite serious and complex question. I would reverse the judgment of the lower court as to the issue hereinabove discussed.
Brailsford, J., concurs.