Court Opinion

ID: 9587316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:20:57.232918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:12.809578
License: Public Domain

HINES, Justice,
dissenting.
As I believe that this Court should address the issue which prompted it to grant the writ of certiorari in this case, I respectfully dissent.
This Court is entrusted by the Constitution of this State with the power to review opinions of the Court of Appeals when they involve matters of gravity or great public importance. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V. This is a power that should be approached solemnly, as the opinions of the Court of Appeals bind all courts of this State, excepting this Court. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. III. When this Court exercises this solemn duty and grants a writ of certiorari, it poses one or more questions to the parties, and they are directed to address only that singular question or those questions in their briefs. Supreme Court Rule 45. In this case, this Court identified only one issue of gravity, and the only question directed to the parties was:
Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment during a traffic stop by asking Appellant for consent to search prior to concluding the detention? See Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840 (2004).
Nonetheless, the majority has gone outside this question, outside the holding below, and outside the briefs, to avoid answering it.
The issue is an important one. Whether it is constitutional for a law enforcement officer to request permission to conduct a search of a vehicle when a driver is being detained is a question that, having *286been posed, deserves an answer. The majority describes the act of answering this question as issuing an advisory opinion. But, the fact is that the trial court granted the motion to suppress based upon what was placed before it, and the Court of Appeals ruled, and reversed the trial court. Despite the majority’s side-stepping the question, it remains, and the Court of Appeals continues to decide cases involving facts similar to those of State v. Bibbins, 271 Ga. App. 90 (609 SE2d 362) (2004). See, e.g., Rosas v. State, 276 Ga. App. 513, 517-518 (1) (c) (624 SE2d 142) (2005); Barnett v. State, 275 Ga. App. 464 (620 SE2d 663) (2005); Salmerón v. State, 273 Ga. App. 55 (614 SE2d 177) (2005); Goodman v. State, 272 Ga. App. 639 (613 SE2d 190) (2005). And, that Court, and trial courts, will continue to do so, but without any guidance from this Court.
The majority writes as though this Court was not aware of the state of the record when it granted the writ of certiorari, only discovering it lately. But that is not so; the matter was fully addressed by Judge Adams in his dissent to the Court of Appeals opinion. This Court’s decision to grant certiorari was made in that context but the majority now casts aside this earlier decision as though it was a mere frivolity.
As “authority” for discarding this Court’s grant of certiorari, the majority asserts that we should do so on a basis outside that encompassed in our certiorari question because we have previously recognized that
the posing of questions in no way limits this Court in its decision-making authority. Having the case before us, in its discretion this [C]ourt can consider any matter presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals. On certiorari, the case comes before us, not an isolated issue in the case.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Security Life Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire &c. Co., 278 Ga. 800, 801-802 (2) (606 SE2d 855) (2004). But, the majority ignores the very precedent upon which it claims to rely; it is stated that “this [C]ourt can consider any matter presented to or decided by the Court of Appeals.” Id. No question concerning the procedural posture of the case was presented to the Court of Appeals, and no such question was decided by that Court. Further, in Security Life Ins. Co., this Court fulfilled its constitutional duty, answered the question posed on certiorari, and only then addressed other issues raised by the parties. Here, the majority completely ignores the question posed, discarding the appeal on an issue that was not raised or briefed by either party. No doubt the parties will be surprised to learn that, after following this Court’s direction to limit their arguments to a specific question, the appeal is “decided” on a separate *287ground, one only now raised by the majority and one that completely fails to review anything contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Decided February 27, 2006.
VirgilL. Brown & Associates, Ronald J. Ellington, EricD. Hearn, for appellant.
Even on the ground the majority chooses, it does not correctly treat the appeal. A stipulation is “ ‘any agreement made by attorneys respecting business before the court.’ ” McDaniel v. Oliver, 172 Ga. App. 109, 110 (322 SE2d 1) (1984). Although counsel for the parties never formally announced a stipulation, examination of the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress reveals that counsel for each party was in complete agreement as to the facts, with the exception of whether Bibbins consented to a search.1 The agreement as to the facts lacks only the inclusion of the word “stipulate,” but the majority nonetheless rejects it, despite the legal definition. And having abandoned the existing definition, the majority gives no guidance regarding what it will allow to be considered a “stipulation” in the future.
The issue properly before this Court is whether, during a lawful detention, an officer may ask for permission to search a stopped driver’s vehicle. The officer can. Bibbins was validly detained for a traffic violation. The law enforcement officer, before writing a citation and while still holding Bibbins’s driver’s license, asked him if he would consent to a search of his car for any contraband.2 Doing so did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The issue is controlled by Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93 (125 SC 1465, 161 LE2d 299) (2005). That opinion specifically notes that police officers may ask a lawfully detained person for consent to search. Thus, as Bibbins was lawfully detained, the request to search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling, and this Court should affirm that decision.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Melton join in this dissent.
*288Scott L. Ballard, District Attorney, Thomas J. Ison, Jr., Cindy L. Spindler, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

 As counsel recited the facts to the court, first one attorney would speak, then the other. Although they would at times speak over one another’s words, the agreement on the facts is clear, and their recitation is peppered with comments such as: “Right”; “Okay?”; “... he’s right up to that point” (i.e., whether consent was given); and “. . . at that point [the officer] had not written the ticket yet. . .,” eliciting the response “No, he hadn’t.”

 More detailed facts of the case can be found in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.