Court Opinion

ID: 9892804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 21:01:24.30789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:27.691581
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13355   Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 10/24/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 22-13355
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        MITCHELL MARBURY,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CYNTHIA STEWART,
        WARDEN, ST. CLAIR CF,
        J. BULLARD,
        Correctional Oﬃcer,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13355

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Alabama
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01103-JB-B
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Mitchell Marbury, an inmate proceeding pro se in this 42
        U.S.C. § 1983 case, appeals the district court’s judgments in favor
        of Cynthia Stewart, William Streeter, and Jermaine Bullard (the
        “Defendants”). He argues that the district court abused its discre-
        tion in denying him the opportunity to dismiss court-appointed
        counsel for failing to seek a continuance on the last day of trial, that
        the district court erred in denying his discovery motions, and that
        he was denied material evidence in violation of the Due Process
        Clause. He also asks us to reverse a jury verdict in favor of one
        defendant. For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                           I.
               In response to gang violence at Holman Correctional Facil-
        ity (“Holman”), then-correctional warden Cynthia Stewart asked
        an Alabama Department of Corrections Emergency Response
        Team (“CERT team”) to perform a shakedown of different housing
        units on December 3, 2018, and to confiscate any contraband. Mar-
        bury, incarcerated at Holman, claimed that William Streeter, a
        CERT team commander, struck him in the face during the shake-
        down. Marbury said that this resulted in injuries to his face and
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        22-13355                  Opinion of the Court                                3

        nose and required multiple trips to the infirmary. He also alleged
        that Jermaine Bullard, a CERT team member, was aware of
        Streeter’s actions but failed to do anything to stop him. And he
        alleged that he informed Stewart about the incident and submitted
        complaints to her, but that she refused to investigate or take action
        to protect him.
               Based on this alleged string of events, Marbury filed a com-
        plaint under § 1983 against the Defendants. He claimed that the
        Defendants used excessive force against him, failed to protect him,
        and exhibited a deliberate indifference to his constitutional right to
        be free from excessive force, all in violation of the Eighth Amend-
        ment. He sued the Defendants in both their individual and official
        capacities1 and sought both monetary damages, and declaratory
        and injunctive relief.2
               The Defendants filed an answer and a “special report” deny-
        ing Marbury’s claims. While not disputing that Marbury was in-
        jured at some point in December 2018, 3 the Defendants stated that

        1 Marbury, in one part of his complaint, alleged that he was suing only Streeter

        in his official capacity, but he later indicated that he was suing all three De-
        fendants in their official capacities.
        2 In the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the magistrate judge

        concluded that Marbury’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are
        moot because he has since been transferred to a new facility. The district court
        adopted this conclusion.
        3 Medical records from Holman documented that Marbury went to the infir-

        mary two days after the CERT team sweep, on December 5, 2018, but
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13355

        Marbury’s injuries were not a result of any anything they had done
        or failed to do. In an affidavit, Streeter stated that he never attacked
        Marbury, nor did he use abusive or excessive force against him.
        Bullard stated in his affidavit that he did not abuse any inmate, nor
        did he witness any CERT team member abuse Marbury. And
        Stewart stated in her affidavit that Marbury’s files did not docu-
        ment any incident involving Marbury, or a trip to the infirmary, on
        December 3, 2018. She also said that she did not recall Marbury
        submitting a complaint to her.
                The magistrate judge assigned to the case converted the spe-
        cial report into a motion for summary judgment. Marbury filed a
        response, submitted supporting documents, including a sworn af-
        fidavit, dated over two years after the alleged incident, from an-
        other inmate who said that he witnessed Streeter hit Marbury, and
        filed a motion for discovery seeking the production of certain doc-
        uments. The magistrate judge granted this motion with respect to
        Marbury’s medical file from December 3, 2018, to December 16,
        2019, any written complaints the Defendants received from Mar-
        bury related to the alleged incident, any investigative files, incident
        reports, use of force documents, or disciplinary records related to
        Marbury and the CERT team search, and the relevant administra-
        tive regulations. The Defendants provided Marbury’s medical file
        and the regulations in response but stated that they found no other
        responsive documents.

        Marbury maintained at trial that he went on December 3. An x-ray performed
        on December 12, 2018, revealed that Marbury’s nose had a mild fracture.
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        22-13355                  Opinion of the Court                               5

               The magistrate judge, in her report and recommendation,
        recommended granting the motion as to Marbury’s official capac-
        ity claims against the Defendants on Eleventh Amendment
        grounds, but recommended denying the motion as to the individ-
        ual capacity claims. 4 The district court adopted the report and rec-
        ommendation.
                 The district court later appointed counsel to represent Mar-
        bury. Despite this, Marbury himself filed multiple requests for a
        subpoena seeking, among other things, video evidence related to
        his claims, and he requested funds to hire a video expert technician
        to assist in his case. The magistrate judge struck these motions on
        the basis that Marbury’s counsel needed to file them. Counsel did
        file a request for, among other things: any video footage of the area
        at the time of the alleged incident; Marbury’s medical records; any
        complaints or grievances Marbury submitted to the Defendants re-
        lated to the CERT team shakedown on December 3, 2018, and in-
        juries he allegedly sustained; and reports or other records related
        to how Marbury suffered his injuries and the CERT team shake-
        down. Notably, the Defendants maintained that they were not
        aware of any surveillance video documenting the events 5 and

        4 The magistrate judge construed Marbury’s complaint as raising an excessive

        force claim against Streeter, an excessive force claim against Stewart based on
        supervisor liability, and a failure to protect claim against Bullard. And these
        were the claims listed in the joint pretrial report.
        5 In their amended responses to Marbury’s discovery requests, the Defendants

        “admit[ted] that at the time of the incident, security cameras may have cap-
        tured these events, but the video has since been recorded over.” However,
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13355

        argued that they had otherwise already produced the relevant doc-
        uments in their possession.
                Counsel subsequently filed a motion to compel. The mag-
        istrate judge granted in part and denied in part this motion, direct-
        ing the Defendants to produce, among other things, documents
        that discuss or explain how Marbury sustained the injuries docu-
        mented by medical records from December 2018 and all docu-
        ments Stewart wrote regarding the CERT team search on Decem-
        ber 3, 2018. 6 Counsel also received permission to take the deposi-
        tion of another inmate, Anders Washington, who was a possible
        witness to what allegedly happened, and subsequently added him
        to the pretrial witness list.
              The case then proceeded to trial. Marbury testified to his
        version of events, and Washington testified that he witnessed

        Streeter later testified that while cameras were later installed, there were no
        cameras inside the dorms at Holman on December 3, 2018.
        6 The magistrate judge also said that Marbury could subpoena the Alabama

        Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) for certain pieces of evidence, includ-
        ing any video recordings of the CERT team shakedown on December 3, 2018.
        Marbury issued a subpoena duces tecum to ADOC for, among other things,
        all video from Holman and body cams of CERT team members from Decem-
        ber 3, 2018, Marbury’s entire inmate file, and reports and documents related
        to the source of Marbury’s injuries. In response, ADOC stated that there was
        no surveillance or body cam footage from December 3, 2018, and that there
        was no investigation reports related to Marbury from December 2018, but
        agreed to provide, among other things, his entire inmate file and other medical
        records as long as they existed and Marbury paid the fees required by regula-
        tion.
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        22-13355               Opinion of the Court                          7

        Streeter assault Marbury. After Marbury rested, the district court
        granted a motion for a judgment as a matter of law in favor of Stew-
        art and Bullard. The defense presented the testimony of a nurse
        that treated Marbury, who testified based on her records that Mar-
        bury came to see her on December 5, 2018, and said he was hit in
        the head. However, according to her records, Marbury first men-
        tioned an altercation with a correctional officer during a December
        11 visit and subsequently, on January 4, 2019, mentioned that he
        was hit in the face on December 3. Each Defendant also testified
        and again denied Marbury’s claims. A jury verdict and judgment
        were subsequently entered in favor of Streeter.
               This appeal followed.
                                          II.
                We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decisions
        as to court-appointed counsel in a civil case, see Dean v. Barber, 951
        F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992), and a district court’s discovery de-
        cisions, Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir.
        1999). When a party challenges a jury’s verdict, we will not disturb
        it unless “there is no material conflict in the evidence, such that no
        reasonable person could agree to the verdict reached.” Bhogaita v.
        Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (citing Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1275 (11th Cir.
        2008)).
                                         III.
               On appeal, Marbury argues that the district court abused its
        discretion in denying him the opportunity to dismiss counsel for
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13355

        failing to seek a continuance on the last day of trial until certain
        evidence, such as surveillance footage, could be obtained, and so
        Marbury could have another inmate come to testify. Marbury also
        argues that ADOC and the Defendants improperly denied him dis-
        covery of relevant material and that the magistrate judge should
        have granted his motions for a subpoena. He asserts that this re-
        sulted in a denial of due process and argues that he was denied the
        right to present material evidence at trial, which he claims would
        have changed the outcome of the case. Marbury asks us to “con-
        sider the motion for discovery and motion to subpoena in the man-
        ner the law demands” and seeks reversal of the jury verdict and a
        remand for further proceedings. 7
               We turn first to Marbury’s arguments with respect to ap-
        pointed counsel. Like any civil litigant, a prisoner pursuing a § 1983
        action “has no absolute constitutional right to the appointment of
        counsel.” Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th Cir. 1987). In-
        stead, appointment of counsel is a privilege that is “justified only
        by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal is-
        sues are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained
        practitioner.” Id. Below, the magistrate judge determined that
        such circumstances existed in this case and appointed counsel to

        7 While the exact contours of most of Marbury’s arguments are unclear, “we

        read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
        874 (11th Cir. 2008).
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        22-13355                Opinion of the Court                           9

        represent Marbury. Now, Marbury alleges that the district court
        erred by failing to allow him to remove appointed counsel.
               This argument immediately runs into obstacles, both factual
        and legal. As for the facts, our review of the record reveals no in-
        dication that Marbury asked the district court to allow him to dis-
        miss counsel. And Marbury does not point us to evidence that he
        ever made this request. Therefore, Marbury is asking us to reverse
        and remand on a basis that he never presented below. But “[a]rgu-
        ments raised for the first time on appeal are not properly before
        this Court.” Hurley v. Moore, 233 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2000).
        “If we were to regularly address questions—particularly fact-bound
        issues—that districts court never had a chance to examine, we
        would not only waste our resources, but also deviate from the es-
        sential nature, purpose, and competence of an appellate court.” Ac-
        cess Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
               Marbury’s claim also fails on the law. First, he fails to iden-
        tify any legal basis for the argument that a district court must sua
        sponte provide a civil litigant with the opportunity to dismiss ap-
        pointed counsel. And second, because a civil litigant has no consti-
        tutional right to counsel, it follows that there is no right to effective
        assistance of counsel in a civil case. See Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdeci v.
        Merrell Nat’l Lab’ys, 711 F.2d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1983). Therefore,
        even if Marbury is right that appointed counsel erred by failing to
        seek a continuance, he does not have a right to a new trial on this
        basis. See id. In all, Marbury fails to explain how the district court
        abused its discretion with respect to appointed counsel and fails to
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13355

        provide any legal basis for this claim. Thus, he is not entitled to
        reversal on this issue.
                As for the discovery issues, Marbury has not demonstrated
        that the district court’s decisions resulted in “substantial harm to
        [his] case,” see Carmical v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 117 F.3d 490,
        493 (11th Cir. 1997), especially in light of the repeated contentions
        of the Defendants and ADOC that they turned over the requested
        material in their possession and that no video evidence existed.
        Moreover, while Marbury is correct that the district court denied
        his motions for a subpoena on the basis that his counsel should file
        them, his counsel later sought similar material, and thus there is no
        cause for reversal on this basis either.
               Marbury’s due process argument is similarly flawed. He
        cites Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985), and Harris v.
        MacDonald, 555 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Ill. 1982), in support of his argu-
        ment. Other than the fact that these cases are not precedent to
        which we are bound, they are also irrelevant here. Marbury cites
        to portions of those opinions that concern the due process require-
        ments in prison discipline hearings. In Mendoza, the Seventh Cir-
        cuit applied one of its previous decisions, where the court held
        “that the Due Process Clause required disclosure of exculpatory ev-
        idence or its substance to the defendant in prison disciplinary hear-
        ings.” 779 F.2d at 1296 (citing Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1286
        (7th Cir. 1981)). And Harris concerned, among other things, a
        § 1983 action raising due process arguments based on the failure to
        turn over favorable evidence to a prisoner during a disciplinary
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        22-13355                   Opinion of the Court                                11

        proceeding. 555 F. Supp. 3d at 140. Here, however, Marbury’s
        claims do not arise from a prison disciplinary proceeding. Moreo-
        ver, as noted with respect to the previous issue, while Marbury ar-
        gues that the Defendants and ADOC failed to turn over material
        evidence, he fails to rebut their response, i.e., that they turned over
        what they possessed and that there was no video recording of the
        alleged incident. Therefore, Marbury’s due process argument fails.
                Finally, while Marbury points to the evidence he presented
        below and asks us to reverse “the trial jury verdict,” he did not seek
        this relief below by filing a post-verdict motion under either Rule
        50(b) or Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 The Su-
        preme Court has made clear that “a party is not entitled to pursue
        a new trial on appeal unless that party makes an appropriate post-
        verdict motion in the district court.” Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v.
        Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 404 (2006). Therefore, Marbury
        has “forfeited [his] right to [seek a new trial] on appeal,” and we are
        “powerless” to grant his requested relief. Id. at 404–05.
                For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
                AFFIRMED.

        8 Rule 50(b) “sets forth the procedural requirements for renewing a sufficiency

        of the evidence challenge after the jury verdict and entry of judgment.”
        Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 400 (2006). Rule 59
        allows a district court, on motion, to grant a new trial “after a jury trial, for
        any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at
        law in federal court.” Fed R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A).