Court Opinion

ID: 9676116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:15:28.336738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:08.738036
License: Public Domain

EN BANC OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MIRABAL, Justice.
We grant the State’s motion for rehearing en banc, withdraw our opinion of April 20, 1995, and substitute this opinion in its stead. This is a case of first impression in which the sole issue is whether a facsimile transmission (fax) of a certified copy of a judgment is admissible in evidence. We hold that such a fax is admissible under the circumstances of this case. We affirm.
Appellant, Eric Ovio Englund, appeals from the revocation of his probation. On *938February 22, 1993, appellant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated. The trial court assessed punishment at 90 days confinement, probated for 12 months, plus a $1,200 fine. Nine months later, the State moved to revoke appellant’s probation, contending appellant (1) committed another DWI in Cameron County on March 18,1993; (2) faded to avoid injurious habits; and (3) failed to abstain from intoxicants.
A hearing was held on June 13,1994, eight months after the State filed its revocation motion. The State introduced a fax of a Cameron County judgment showing appellant’s November 1993 conviction for a DWI offense which occurred on March 18, 1993. The judgment incorporated appellant’s thumb print as an exhibit. The first page included a “fax transmittal memo” showing that five pages were transmitted from the Cameron County Clerk’s Office to the Brazo-ria County District Attorney’s Office. The top of each page included a machine notation showing the date, time, source telephone number, and source (“CAMERON CO CLERK”) of transmittal. A reproduction of the county clerk’s seal, attestation, and signature appears at the bottom right side of each page.
When the State offered the judgment, appellant objected on the bases of Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 802 and 803 (hearsay), 901 (need evidence of authentication), and 902 (self-authentication) “in that it is not an original certified copy.” The prosecutor argued that the exhibit was sufficiently authenticated and it was up to the discretion of the judge to determine whether it was sufficient. The trial court found that the document was a fax copy from the Clerk of Cameron County, and admitted the document into evidence.
The only witness at the revocation hearing was a peace officer who testified that the thumb print on the faxed document matched prints taken from appellant on the morning of the hearing. The trial court revoked appellant’s probation for commission of the Cameron County DWI and for failing to avoid injurious habits.1 Appellant was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail.
In his single point of error, appellant complains that the Cameron County judgment was inadmissible because it was a fax copy that did not contain an “original seal” but only a “faxed xerox copy” of a seal, and that it was not certified as “correct” as required by Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 902.
The controlling rules are Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 901(a), 901(b)(7), 1001(3) and (4), and 1005:
Rule 901(a) General Provision.
The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
Rule 901(b) Illustration.
By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
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(7) Public Records and Reports.
Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.
Rule 1001(3) Original.
An “original” of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it....
Rule 1001(4) Duplicate.
A “duplicate” is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photograph, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.
*939Rule 1003 Admissibility of Duplicates.
A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.
Rule 1005 Public Records.
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if otherwise admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence, then other evidence of the contents may be given.
In the present ease, each page of the Cameron County judgment contains a round seal stating “County Court at Law No. 2 of Cameron County, Texas.” The seal may have originally been raised, and appears to have been darkened for photocopying purposes. This round seal was placed over a stamp that states:
A CERTIFIED COPY
Attest: June 8th, 1994. JOE G. RIVERA, County Clerk Cameron County, Texas
By Irene Dlz Deputy
The underlined portions represent blank spaces that were filled by handwritten notations. It is not contested that this document, at the instant of its fax transmission, was a certified copy adhering to the requirements of rule 902(1). The State correctly points out that had it been picked up or mailed rather than transmitted via fax, its authentication would not have been an issue.
We conclude that the “certified copy” of the judgment was an “original” within the meaning of rule 1001(3), and the “fax copy” was a “duplicate” under rule 1001(4). The authentication or identification requirements of rules 901(a) and (b)(7) were complied with to the satisfaction of the trial court. In the circumstances of this case, there is no indication it would be “unfair” to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Therefore, under rule 1003, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded the fax copy (the duplicate) was admissible.
The dissent concludes that, as a matter of law, the State did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain the original certified copy of the judgment, and therefore, under rule 1005, the faxed copy was not admissible. We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s construction of rule 1005.
In this case, a certified copy of the judgment was created; there is no question that such a certified copy exists. Therefore, rule 1005 was complied with. Rule 1003 specifically allows a duplicate of that original certified copy to be admitted, under the circumstances of this ease. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s objection.
We overrule appellant’s sole point of error, and affirm the order revoking probation.
HUTSON-DUNN and WILSON, JJ., join in this opinion.
COHEN, J., concurs, with HEDGES, J., joining the concurring opinion.
TAFT, J., dissents, with OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and O’CONNOR and ANDELL, JJ., joining the dissenting opinion.

. The only evidence of "injurious habits” was the disputed Cameron County DWI judgment.