Court Opinion

ID: 9785865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:44:33.756551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:35.639826
License: Public Domain

*1105WERDEGAR, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision to remand this case for further proceedings. I do so with the understanding that the error in this case was a federal, not a state, constitutional error (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 1100). As the majority explains, the high court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712], having found a violation of the federal equal protection clause, ordered that case remanded for a new hearing. The lower federal courts, following Batson, have similarly ordered remand as a remedy for Batson violations.1 People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748], however, has a different origin. As we explained in that pre-Batson case, “the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.” (Wheeler, at pp. 276-277.) Because Wheeler was based on state law, nothing we decide today implicates the rule of automatic reversal this court has applied for state constitutional Wheeler error.2 Although some appellate courts have employed remand as a remedy for Wheeler error,3 we leave the correctness of those decisions for another day.
In addition, I write separately to underscore the majority’s holding that the trial court, on remand, retains the discretion to decide that an accurate reconstruction of the voir dire is impossible due to the passage of time, requiring that the conviction be reversed. We addressed the effect of the delay inherent in the remand remedy in People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d 216, where the voir dire proceeding had occurred six years earlier. Although our holding in Snow that the Wheeler error was reversible is inapplicable to this Batson violation case, our observations concerning the six-year delay in that case remain pertinent. We concluded in Snow that “it would be ‘unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor could now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenges in issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required, which would demand that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the prosecutor *1106examined the venire and exercised his other challenges.’ ” (Snow, at p. 227, quoting People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 171 [lapse of more than three years].) As the majority notes, the voir dire proceedings in this case took place between seven and eight years ago. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1101.) On remand, the trial court may well decide that neither it nor the parties can reliably reconstruct events from so long ago, notwithstanding the existence of the jury questionnaires and verbatim transcript of the jury selection proceeding. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1282 [“While we have every confidence in the good faith and professionalism of the parties, we have less confidence in their memories”].)
With these reservations, I concur.

 See, e.g., Paulino v. Castro (9th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 1083; Fernandez v. Roe (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3d 1073.

 People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at page 283 (Wheeler error “prejudicial per se”); People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 295, footnote 6 [152 Cal.Rptr. 454, 590 P.2d 30] (same); People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 170-171 [197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854] (same); People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 226-227 [242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452] (“reversible per se”); People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 721 [286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75] (reversal “compelled”).

 See, e.g., People v. McGee (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 571-572 [128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309], disapproved on another ground in People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 550 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1130 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 356]; People v. Garcia (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1282 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 339]; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1104-1110 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 308]; People v. Rodriguez (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023-1025 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 108]; People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 706 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435].