Court Opinion

ID: 9955930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:10:32.757933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:39.367471
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re B.M.B., 2024-Ohio-1214.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:                                CASE NO. 2023-P-0099

B.M.B., DEPENDENT CHILD
                                                 Civil Appeal from the
                                                 Court of Common Pleas,
                                                 Juvenile Division

                                                 Trial Court No. 2021 JCC 00513

                                           OPINION

                                      Decided: March 26, 2024
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Alisa Boles, 35 East 202nd Street, Euclid, OH 44123 (For Appellant, Michael Blakeman).

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna,
OH 44266 (For Appellee, Portage County Department of Job and Family Services).

Benjamin J. Plough, 221 South Freedom Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (Guardian Ad
Litem).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}    Appellant, Michael Blakeman, appeals from the judgment of the Portage

 County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of his

 daughter, B.M.B., to appellee, the Portage County Department of Job and Family

 Services (PCDJFS). For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the lower court.

        {¶2}    Blakeman is the biological father of B.M.B., born October 28, 2011. The

 child’s biological mother is Nickole Ormiston.

        {¶3}    On September 1, 2021, a complaint was filed alleging that B.M.B. was
abused and dependent. It alleged that B.M.B. had been running away from her home

and going to strangers’ houses in her neighborhood, has behavioral issues, and her legal

custodian, Rebecca Blake, was unable to continue providing care for her. B.M.B. was

placed in the interim predispositional temporary custody of PCDJFS.        Following a

hearing, B.M.B. was adjudicated dependent.       A dispositional hearing was held on

November 16, 2021, at which the parents were not present, and temporary custody was

granted to PCDJFS. Subsequently, two motions to extend temporary custody were

granted. The parents were not present at these hearings.

        {¶4}   PCDJFS filed a Motion for Permanent Custody on August 1, 2023. It

requested termination of parental rights and argued that B.M.B. could not be placed with

either parent in a reasonable time.

        {¶5}   A hearing on the motion for permanent custody was held on November 15,

2023.    B.M.B.’s legal custodian, Blake, and her mother, Ormiston, stipulated that

permanent custody be granted to PCDJFS. Blakeman’s counsel indicated that he had

sent correspondence to Blakeman in September and October 2021, and April, July, and

September 2022, regarding dates of hearings and decisions issued in this matter. The

last letter he sent in December 2022, which included a magistrate’s decision, came back

as undeliverable. Counsel indicated that he had not received responses or otherwise

engaged in communication with his client since he was assigned to the case in September

2021, he was certain that a number of his letters were delivered to Blakeman, and his

letterhead contained his contact information.   Counsel indicated that Blakeman had

recently sent a letter to the Portage County prosecutor’s office asking for custody and

moved for a continuance of the hearing based on this letter. PCDJFS indicated that the

                                           2

Case No. 2023-P-0099
letter had been received the previous day, it was the first communication they had

received from Blakeman, and he had properly been served notice of the hearing while

incarcerated. The court denied the request for a continuance, finding that Blakeman was

properly served in August, “has not ever attended a hearing since 2021, and it’s my

understanding * * * that he will not be released until sometime in 2024.” Blakeman’s

counsel moved to have the letter admitted into the record, which the court granted.

       {¶6}   Ormiston testified that she had last seen B.M.B. in 2018, at which time Blake

received custody because Ormiston was using drugs. She testified that Blakeman had

been abusive to her, which led to his incarceration. She testified that Blakeman had a

relationship with B.M.B. “for the couple months here and there that he was out of jail * * *

but he was in jail often for domestic violence.” She indicated B.M.B. had last seen

Blakeman around 2016 or 2017.

       {¶7}   Rachel Magrell, a PCDJFS caseworker, testified that PCDJFS became

involved with B.M.B. in 2021 when her legal custodians, the Blakes, had difficulty caring

for her due to dangerous behaviors that put B.M.B.’s sister at risk. Prior to that time,

beginning in 2018, Blake had legal custody through a Cuyahoga County case. Magrell

indicated that attempts to locate B.M.B.’s biological parents at that time had been

unsuccessful. Letters were sent to various family members to find a placement for B.M.B.

but were also unsuccessful. Magrell indicated that, while in the temporary custody of

PCDJFS, B.M.B. has been in several foster placements as well as residential facilities

due to behavioral concerns. She testified that Blakeman had not had contact with B.M.B.

since the case was opened in 2021 and B.M.B. did not have a bond with her parents.

       {¶8}   The guardian ad litem, Benjamin Plough, recommended that permanent

                                             3

Case No. 2023-P-0099
custody be granted to PCDJFS.

      {¶9}   On November 17, 2023, the trial court issued a Journal Entry granting

permanent custody of B.M.B. to PCDJFS. The court found that B.M.B had been in the

custody of children’s services for 21 consecutive months of the prior 22 months and had

been abandoned by both of her parents. It found that reunification was unlikely since they

had failed to engage in contact with the child and Blakeman was incarcerated. It granted

permanent custody of B.M.B. to PCDJFS.

      {¶10} Blakeman timely appeals and raises the following assignments of error:

      {¶11} “[1.] The trial court erred when it denied incarcerated Father’s request for a

continuance where Father was not present, had not been provided call-in information,

had not had contact with his attorney, had not been deposed, had not attested his position

via affidavit, nor otherwise been provided a meaningful opportunity to participate in the

hearing, and a letter from Father received by Father’s attorney on the day of trial was

entered into evidence without addressing the explicit and tacit requests by Father therein

such as requests to be contacted, to have contact with his daughter, to attend court via

video and for legal advice.

      {¶12} “[2.]      Father’s Trial Attorney erred by neglecting to orally convey the

contents of Father’s letter, or otherwise secure for Father more meaningful participation

in the proceedings.”

      {¶13} In his first assignment of error, Blakeman argues that a continuance of the

trial should have been granted given that, despite the caseworker not making contact with

him, he was still able to communicate his desire for a continuance to the court and he

was entitled to be present during the permanent custody hearing.

                                             4

Case No. 2023-P-0099
       {¶14} “It is well established that a parent’s right to raise a child is an essential and

basic civil right.” (Citation omitted.) In re T.B., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-055, 2008-

Ohio-4415, ¶ 29. However, “[t]he rights of a parent to his or her child, while fundamental,

‘are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.’” (Citation omitted.) In re L.M.R.,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2016-L-096, 2017-Ohio-158, ¶ 33, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio

St.2d 100, 105, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979) (“the termination of the rights of a natural parent

should be an alternative of ‘last resort’” but is authorized “when it is necessary for the

‘welfare’ of the child”).

       {¶15} Given the foregoing, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that parents “must

be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.”             (Citation

omitted.) In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997). “[G]reat care must

be taken to ensure that due process is used in parental-termination proceedings.” In re

K.S.W., 11th Dist. Portage Nos. 2023-P-0046 and 2023-P-0047, 2023-Ohio-3763, ¶ 32,

citing In re Q.G., 170 Ohio App.3d 609, 2007-Ohio-1312, 868 N.E.2d 713, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

       {¶16} Juvenile Rule 23 provides: “Continuances shall be granted only when

imperative to secure fair treatment for the parties.” “The grant or denial of a continuance

is a matter that is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.” State v.

Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), syllabus. “[A]n appellate court will not

interfere with the exercise of this discretion unless the action of the court is plainly

erroneous and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” In re M.A.S., 11th Dist. Portage

No. 2019-P-0093, 2019-Ohio-5190, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Buck v. McCabe, 140 Ohio

St. 535, 45 N.E.2d 763 (1942), paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶17} “In evaluating a motion for a continuance, a court should note, inter alia: the

                                              5

Case No. 2023-P-0099
length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and

received; the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;

whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful,

or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to

the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts

of each case.” Unger at 67-68. “Weighed against any potential prejudice to a [party] are

concerns such as a court’s right to control its own docket and the public’s interest in the

prompt and efficient dispatch of justice.” Id. at 67. In permanent custody hearings, a

court weighs the delay of proceedings to accommodate the parent’s participating in the

hearing with the needs of the child “to find resolution and permanency.” In re J.C., 2023-

Ohio-778, 210 N.E.3d 972, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.).

       {¶18} In the present matter, Blakeman’s request for a continuance was not

received until the day prior to the trial on November 15, although the lower court found,

and the record demonstrates, that he was served with notice of the permanent custody

hearing on August 10. A grant of the continuance would cause an inconvenience to the

various parties involved. Further, this court has found that a delay of two weeks in seeking

counsel in permanent custody proceedings leading to a request for a continuance could

be “considered dilatory” and justified denial of a continuance. M.A.S. at ¶ 18. See also

In re B.G.W., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-181, 2008-Ohio-3693, ¶ 26 (court may

construe a parent’s last-minute attempt at case plan compliance as dilatory). Although

Blakeman had been sent various notices of proceedings during the pendency of this

matter, he did not make contact with any relevant party regarding the custody of B.M.B.

until the day prior to the permanent custody hearing.

                                             6

Case No. 2023-P-0099
       {¶19} Courts have further emphasized in permanent custody proceedings the

impact of continuances on delaying the goal of achieving permanency for the child. See

In re K.J., 2018-Ohio-471, 107 N.E.3d 50, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.) (“by the time of the PCC

hearing, the children had been in FCCS’s custody for more than two years, and granting

a continuance on the day of the hearing would have presented an inconvenience to

opposing counsel * * * as well as prolonging the accomplishment of the ultimate goal of

establishing permanency for the children”); In re E.C., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-01-

014, 2016-Ohio-2774, ¶ 14 (“[i]n light of the duration of the case, E.C.’s need for

permanency, Father’s failure to complete any of the services recommended by the

agency, and Father’s lack of involvement with E.C., we find the juvenile court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for a continuance”). Here, the record

indicates B.M.B. was in Blake’s legal custody from 2018 to 2021, and then in PCDJFS’

temporary custody since September 2021, where she has been in multiple placements

due to her behavioral concerns. During both periods of time, she had no contact with

Blakeman. The need for permanency in these circumstances was a factor of particular

significance for the trial court’s consideration in denying the continuance given B.M.B.’s

biological parents’ lack of a relationship with her for a period of several years.

       {¶20} Significantly, Blakeman is also unable to demonstrate prejudice resulting

from the failure to grant his request for a continuance. “Denials of continuances have

been repeatedly affirmed in permanent custody hearings where there is no showing that

a grant of the continuance likely would have changed the outcome of the case.” K.S.W.,

2023-Ohio-3763, at ¶ 41 (upholding denial of a continuance where the appellant “failed

to put forth any offer of proof of the evidence and/or testimony she would have presented

                                              7

Case No. 2023-P-0099
had she been at the hearing or how the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different had she attended”).

       {¶21} In In re S.I.M., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2019-P-0100, 2020-Ohio-162, this

court considered whether the trial court erred by denying an incarcerated parent’s motion

to continue proceedings so he could be transported to the permanent custody hearing. It

found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion where the evidence supported

the findings that the child had been abandoned by him and could not be placed with him

in a reasonable time due to his incarceration since his appearance at the hearing would

not have changed the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at ¶ 30. Similarly, there is no

evidence of how Blakeman’s participation at the hearing would have changed the

outcome in any manner. The testimony indicated that Blakeman had not seen his

daughter for a number of years, with Magrell indicating he had not seen her during

PCDJFS’s custody and Ormiston testifying he had not seen her since 2016 or 2017. It is

difficult to determine what insight Blakeman could have provided in the proceedings given

his lack of a relationship with B.M.B. Further, Blakeman was incarcerated at the time of

trial and was not in position to have B.M.B. placed in his custody in the foreseeable future,

particularly given his lack of a relationship and a bond with her and her significant

behavioral problems that had resulted in the inability of several foster care givers and

other facilities to care for her. Under these circumstances, we do not find an abuse of

discretion in the denial of Blakeman’s motion for a continuance.

       {¶22} To the extent that Blakeman argues that it was error for the court not to

review the entirety of his letter to the prosecutor, the letter was not filed by Blakeman with

the court as a motion seeking relief. His attorney moved on his behalf for a continuance

                                              8

Case No. 2023-P-0099
based on the letter but no other motion was pending before the court. Insofar as this

issue relates to whether counsel should have moved for further relief on behalf of his

client based upon this letter, it will be addressed in the second assignment of error.

       {¶23} The first assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶24} In his second assignment of error, Blakeman argues that trial counsel was

deficient for the failure to “orally convey the contents of Father’s letter, especially his

desire to be present at the hearing” and should have elaborated on its contents. He

further argues that counsel should have ensured Blakeman was given a meaningful

opportunity to participate in the proceedings since he could have served to “clarify the

extent of his relationship with his daughter and provide further insight as to her needs.”

       {¶25} “[W]hen the state initiates a permanent custody proceeding, parents must

be provided with fundamentally fair procedures in accordance with the due process

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Section

16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution” which “includes effective assistance of counsel.” In

re Roque, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0138, 2006-Ohio-7007, ¶ 7. “When presented

with ineffective assistance of counsel claims in proceedings to terminate parental rights,

Ohio courts apply the two-prong Strickland test.” Id. at ¶ 11. To demonstrate ineffective

assistance, a party must prove “(1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.”

State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 388-389, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

       {¶26} Counsel did not discuss the entirety of the contents of the letter when

                                             9

Case No. 2023-P-0099
arguing that a continuance should be granted. Instead, the court stated, “I’m assuming

based on the letter that he sent to the prosecutor asking for custody, I guess the Court

could construe that as a Motion to Continue.” Counsel responded that he would “move *

* * for a continuance of this hearing because of this letter.” The letter expressed that

Blakeman would like to gain custody of his daughter and have contact with her, had been

battling addiction but was committed to being sober, would be released from jail in a few

months, and “might have to schedule a video court on this matter” due to his current

incarceration. Even presuming that counsel should have raised and discussed the

additional arguments set forth in the letter, such as a request to have custody of B.M.B.,

we do not find that it would have impacted the outcome of the proceedings. For the

reasons discussed in our analysis on the preceding assignment of error, granting

additional relief requested by Blakeman would not have changed the outcome of this

matter given the delay in the proceedings, how long B.M.B. had been in the custody of

PCDJFS and her need for permanency, Blakeman’s failure to see B.M.B. for several

years, and his inability to provide her a home within a reasonable time frame.

      {¶27} In support of the argument that counsel was ineffective by not ensuring

Blakeman’s participation in the proceedings, he cites Roque, 2006-Ohio-7007. In Roque,

this court reversed an award of permanent custody and held that the mother was denied

effective assistance of counsel and the integrity of the proceedings was impacted where

she was not present at the hearing and her interests were not adequately represented.

We find that this is distinguishable from the present matter. In Roque, counsel had a lack

of communication with his client but counsel also failed to attend review hearings,

participate in discovery, challenge hearsay, and effectively conduct cross-examination.

                                           10

Case No. 2023-P-0099
Here, Blakeman does not argue that counsel failed to attend necessary hearings or

participate in the proceedings and he did conduct cross-examination of the witnesses,

although it was not extensive. To the extent that Blakeman argues counsel failed to

ensure his participation by seeking alternate means such as submitting an affidavit or

requesting his remote appearance, Blakeman’s failure to communicate with counsel

made it difficult for counsel to request such relief and his delayed letter received the day

before the permanent custody hearing impacted the court’s decision on whether any

accommodations would be made. Further, as noted above, given the circumstances of

this case, we do not find Blakeman’s participation in the proceedings would have changed

the outcome.

       {¶28} Blakeman also argues that failure to ensure his participation constituted a

violation of his due process rights.        While parents are entitled to due process in

proceedings involving termination of parental rights, these “rights may not be absolute”

as they apply to incarcerated individuals. S.I.M., 2020-Ohio-162, at ¶ 16; K.J., 2018-

Ohio-471, at ¶ 28 (“[a]n incarcerated parent does not have ‘an absolute due process right

to attend the trial of a civil action to which he is a party’”) (citation omitted).

       {¶29} To determine whether due process was denied in not allowing an

incarcerated defendant to appear at the permanent custody hearing, this court has

applied the test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

S.I.M. at ¶ 19. Under Mathews, the reviewing court considers “[1] the private interest that

will be affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such

interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] the Government’s interest, including the

                                                11

Case No. 2023-P-0099
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews at 335.

       {¶30} There is no question, under the first factor, that a parent has the

fundamental right to raise his child and has an interest affected by permanent custody

proceedings. S.I.M. at ¶ 20.

       {¶31} As to the second factor, the deprivation of the individual’s interest, this court

has considered, as weighing against the parent, the fact that he will continue to be

incarcerated following the permanent custody hearing, that there was not a reasonable

possibility of placing the child with him in a reasonable time frame, and the fact that the

parent was represented by counsel at the hearing. Id. at ¶ 21. Similarly, in the present

matter, as addressed above, Blakeman was not going to be released from incarceration

until the following year and it is not reasonable to conclude that B.M.B., particularly with

her behavioral concerns and her lack of a relationship with Blakeman over the previous

several years, could be placed with him in the near future. Further, Blakeman was

represented by counsel who argued in favor of a continuance and cross-examined the

witnesses at the hearing.

       {¶32} Finally, as to the third factor, this court has considered the significant

interest in ensuring that the child receives a permanent home without further delay. Id.

at ¶ 22 and 23. The same concerns are applicable here, as addressed above.

       {¶33} A lack of a due process violation has also been found by other districts in

similar situations.   In K.J., 2018-Ohio-471, the Tenth District found no due process

violation occurred when the father did not attend the hearing due to his incarceration, was

represented by counsel, the father had not seen the child or attempted to comply with the

                                             12

Case No. 2023-P-0099
case plan for more than one year and demonstrated an inability to be physically present

in his children’s lives, and the record did not show that his presence would have changed

the outcome of the trial. Id. at ¶ 29-30. The court held that “father’s potential loss of rights

‘pale when measured against the best interests of’ the children.” (Citation omitted.) Id.

at ¶ 29. See also In re M.M., 4th Dist. Meigs No. 14CA6, 2014-Ohio-5111, ¶ 51 (the trial

court did not deprive the parent of her due process right to a fair permanent custody

hearing when it proceeded with the hearing while she was incarcerated because

“[c]ounsel meaningfully represented appellant at the hearing, a complete record was

made, and appellant has failed to show what additional testimony or evidence she would

have offered that would have changed the outcome of the case”); In re A.C.H., 4th Dist.

Gallia No. 11CA2, 2011-Ohio-5595, ¶ 55.

       {¶34} The second assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶35} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Portage County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of B.M.B. to PCDJFS, is

affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

                                              13

Case No. 2023-P-0099