Court Opinion

ID: 9727855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:51:17.485035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:43.609584
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
{concurring). I agree with the majority in the result reached in this case; however, I disagree with the reasoning. Specifically, I would hold that maintenance should not be based on a percentage *546of income of the paying ex-spouse for the reasons stated below.
First, we have long recognized that divorce and proceedings thereon are entirely statutory. See, e.g., Towns v. Towns, 171 Wis. 32, 176 N.W. 216 (1920). While sec. 767.26, Stats., the statutory scheme governing maintenance awards, does not expressly prohibit percentage awards, neither does it expressly permit such awards. The legislature was obviously cognizant of such awards; percentage awards are expressly authorized elsewhere in family law, in the statute governing child support, sec. 767.25. However, the legislature apparently saw fit not to provide for percentage based maintenance awards, and this court should not question the legislative scheme by condoning a judicially created percentage based maintenance award.
Secondly, a percentage award should not be permitted because it allows the obligor spouse exclusive control of the award by diminishing his or her income. That is, a percentage award permits the obligor spouse to minimize maintenance payments through various means. There is an appearance of such action in this case even though the trial judge did not make a finding of fraud on the part of the obligated ex-husband. At the very least, a percentage award provides an incentive for the obligor spouse to circumvent maintenance. A percentage award presents too much of an opportunity for conniving, deceit and contrived income to affect the dollar amount of maintenance.
Thirdly, if the obligor spouse does attempt to avoid maintenance through property transfers, retirement or other means, the burden is shifted to the spouse receiving the maintenance to come back into *547court and continually relitigate the amount of income to which a percentage is properly applied. Conversely, if a fixed sum of maintenance is awarded, the obligor spouse properly carries the burden of coming back into court to prove changed circumstances justifying a reduction of maintenance. The burden of who comes forward into court to seek a review may be critical as to attorney fees and costs.
I realize the majority has stated in limitation that it concludes that a percentage maintenance award is, under very unusual circumstances, within a circuit court’s discretion. The percentage award is an interesting approach and superficially would appear to minimize the number of times the parties return to court to litigate maintenance; however, I believe it may have the opposite effect. Moreover, the question of whether it is a desirable approach should be decided by the legislature.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding that "there has been a distinct reduction in the ability of Dr. Poindexter to generate income,” it was not his ability to produce income that was reduced but rather his desire to produce income. His ability or capacity to produce income remained constant, and if he had to meet a monthly dollar award of maintenance, he would have to continue to fulfill this capacity to earn income. While Dr. Poindexter’s decision to "retire” (if he has in fact done so) may well constitute a changed circumstances justifying a modification of maintenance, the majority opinion ignores, as did the circuit court, that this decision was wholly voluntary. There is a recognizable difference between one’s ability to generate income and one’s desire or choice to do so. This choice may indeed lead to a diminished capacity *548to generate income. However, this concept is quite different than the concept of one’s "ability” to earn.
I concur in the judgment of the court.