Court Opinion

ID: 9827048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:05:34.609362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:21.768318
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Plaintiffs in error, Mrs. Ogda De Proy and August De Proy, have filed a motion for rehearing in which it is stated that in the opinion of counsel representing them the questions discussed upon original hearing were correctly determined in every material respect. But in their motion for rehearing they now for the first time present new assignments of error, substantially to the effect that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, because, as alleged in the motion.: First, the defendant August De Proy was a minor, and was not personally served with citation to answer plaintiff’s petition; second, the court did not appoint a guardian ad litem to represent him prior to the trial of the cause; third, that no pleadings were filed by the plaintiff requesting a guardian ad litem to be appointed to represent him; fourth, that no appearance whatever of any character was made for the minor by any guardian ad litem until after final judgment was rendered.
None of those objections were presented in any assignment of error filed by counsel prior to the original hearing, hor referred tb or discussed in any manner in briefs filed in this court on behalf of plaintiffs in error, upon which the case was originally submitted. After mature consideration of the motion and of the authorities cited in support thereof, we have reached the conclusion that the new assignments now presented have been presented too late for determination on their merits.
The transcript filed does not contain any showing of the issuance of service of citation upon either of the defendants, but the judgment contains these recitals:
“On this the 27th day of June, A. D. 1922,. the above entitled and numbered cause came on for trial, and the plaintiff and defendants appeared in person and by attorney and all parties announced ready for jtrial”
Then follow recitals to the effect that a jury was impaneled who heard the pleadings, evidence, and argument of counsel, and returned findings on special issues submitted to them by the court. After setting out the verdict of the jury, the judgment contains these further recitals:
*625“Which said verdict and answer to said special issues were received by the court; it further appearing to the court that the defendant August De Proy is a minor under the age of 21 years; that necessity exists for the appointment of a. guardian ad litem, and the court appointed - Bennett to act as guardian ad litem for said minor in the trial of this cause, and who did so appear and represent said minor in the trial hereof.”
Article 2110, Rev. Statutes, reads as follows : ■
“If the pleadings or the judgment show an appearance of the defendant, in person or by attorney, the citation and returns shall not be copied into the transcript.”
Article 2113 reads as follows;
“The transcript shall, in all cases, contain a copy of the final judgment, notice of appeal, petition for writ of error and citation in error, with return of service thereon, bond on appeal or writ of error, or affidavit in lieu thereof, and assignments of error or such of them as there may be, and also a copy from the fee book of all the costs that have accrued in the cause.”
Ho supplemental transcript has been brought up by plaintiffs in error to prove the allegations contained in their motion for rehearing, and recited above; but it is insisted that, in order to sustain the judgment against the minor defendant, August De Proy, the record should affirmatively show personal service of citation on him, and that a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent him prior to the trial of the cause. In the absence of some showing to the contrary, it is incumbent upon plaintiffs in error to point out and show error in the judgment rendered. ■ The judgment itself is regular on its face, and even though the transcript does not show an order of the court appointing a guardian ad litem prior to the trial of the cause, that would be an irregularity only if, as recited in the judgment, a guardian ad litem had been appointed who did appear and represent the minor upon the trial of the cause. And the same may be said of the failure of plaintiff to allege in his petition the minority of August De Proy, coupled with a prayer for appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent him, if one was appointed. The recitals in the judgment must be taken as true in the absence of some showing to the contrary. The transcript is in conformity with statutory requirements, and it is not apparent on the face of the record that the minor defendant was not served with citation, nor that he was not represented by a guardian ad litem theretofore appointed, nor that manifest injustice was done him by the judgment rendered on the merits of' the case.
Several decisions are cited in the motion for rehearing, such as National Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 604; Cereal Co. v. Earnest (Tex. Civ. App.) 87 S. W. 734; Piano & Organ Co. v. Anderson, 97 Tex. 432, 79 S. W. 516; Kremer v. Haynie, 67 Tex. 450, 3 S. W. 676. In all of those cases it was made to appear affirmatively that service on the defendants was insufficient and judgments were reversed by reason of that holding, and the judgments in the first two cases were by default.
The ease of Sprague v. Haines, 68 Tex. 215, 4 S. W. 371, was a suit against a widow and her minor children, all of whom resided in the state of Pennsylvania, to specifically enforce a parol contract on the part of the decedent, through whom the defendants claimed, to convey interest in real estate, and it was held that the alleged contract could not be enforced because in contravention of the statute of frauds. In the concluding part of the opinion, the following is said:
“It is to be remarked that the petition prays citation against the defendants, but no writs or service appear in the record. The service of process upon the minors is essential in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court and to authorize the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The record upon appeal should show that they have been duly served.”
But it is apparent that that point was raised in appellant’s brief, and that that remark was made by way of suggestion in view of another trial, the judgment having been reversed for the reason that the contract sued on could not be enforced.
In Alston v. Emmerson, 83 Tex. 231, 18 S. W. 566, 29 Am. St. Rep. 639, and Wallis v. Stuart, 92 Tex. 568, 50 S. W. 567, it was held that a separate and independent action can be maintained to set aside a judgment by showing that a minor defendant, against whom a judgment was rendered, was not served with citation, or was not represented by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court, although it was further held that such a judgment would riot be void by reason of those facts, but voidable only. Both of those suits were of that character, and in the latter case it was further held that advantage may be taken of those facts by appeal if they appear upon the face of the record. In the Alston v. Emmerson Case, supra, the decisions in Kremer v. Haynie, 67 Tex. 451, 3 S. W. 676, and Sprague v. Haines, 68 Tex. 218, 4 S. W. 371, were construed as holding ’that the judgments in controversy were only voidable and not void as therein announced, for ’the reasons therein discussed.
In 3 Corpus Juris, p. 1335, par. 1468, the following is said:
“It has also been held that, in the absence of an assignment of error, the court will not notice a want of proper service of process or defects in process or in the service or return thereof.”
In the same work, page 1342, par. 1482, the following is said:
*626“In a number of jurisdictions, either by re'a-son of an express exception in the statute or rule of court, or because the court has discretion in the matter, the appellate court will notice plain errors, or errors which are fundamental and apparent upon the face of the record. It has been hold that the exception in the Texas statute in the case of ‘an error of law, apparent upon the face of the record,’ does not mean every' error which can be ascertained by looking into the record, but means that it must be ‘a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of the proceeding and affects the judgment necessarily,’ or, as otherwise expressed, ‘such manifest error as when removed destroys the foundation of the judgment’; and, as a rule, an alleged error which depends upon an examination of the evidence or upon a mixed question of law and fact, and which requires an examination of the whole record, including the pleadings and the evidence or statement of facts, is not a fundamental error of law apparent on the record which must be considered without being assigned.”
In a note to that text, a number of Texas decisions are cited, including Houston Oil Co., v. Kimball, 103 Tex. 94, 122 S. W. 533, 124 S. W. 85. In the opinion rendered in that case, the following is said:
“Article 1014, Revised Statutes, contains this provision: ‘In all cases of appeal or writ of error to the Court of Civil Appeals the trial shall be on statements of facts, * * * or on an error in law, either assigned or apparent on the face of the record.’ Does the assignment here presented come within the terms of the statute; that is, is it apparent upon the face of the record?
“Webster defines the word ‘apparent’ thus:
‘Clear, or manifest to the understanding; plain; evident, obvious; appearing to the eye or mind.’ This does not mean that an error which can be ascertained by looking into the record and considering the evidence may be considered without an assignment, for that would include every error which can be considered at all. Nothing can be considered as an érror which cannot be made apparent by an examination of the record; therefore, the language of the statute must be given that construction which will make it consistent^ with its requirements in other respects. The language, ‘apparent upon the face of the record,! indicates that it is to be seen upon looking at the face of the record, that is, the assignment itself, the fact pointed out by it must show a good and sufficient ground for the court to interfere to prevent injustice being done to one of the parties. Perhaps the best expression is that it must be a fundamental error, such error as being readily seen lies at the base and foundation of the proceeding and affects the judgment necessarily. Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272, 60 S. W. 242; Searcy v. Grant, 90 Tex. 97, 37 S. W. 320; Fuqua v. Brewing Co., 90 Tex. 298, 38 S. W. 29, 750, 35 L. R. A. 241; Harris v. Petty, 66 Tex. 514, 1 S. W. 525.”
-Applying the test laid down in that decision, we cannot say that the new assignments, on which the motion for rehearing is based, point out any fundamental error in the judgment.
In 3 Corpus Juris, p. 1404, the following is said:
“The general rule is well settled that errors operating against appellee or defendant in error will not be considered unless duly assigned; this is so, although appellee’s bill of exceptions is otherwise properly in the record, and although cross-errors not assigned are argued or discussed in the brief. By failing to assign cross-errors appellee or defendant in error is estopped from complaining thereof. * * * Nevertheless the rule is not of universal application. It has ‘been held that the rule does not apply where appellee is entitled to a judgment on the face of the record, or where an app,ellee has shown himself on the whole case entitled to an instructed verdict which was denied.”
It is also a general rule that in a motion for rehearing no new assignments can be urged which were not presented on the original hearing. 4 Corpus Juris, p. 629, par. 2495, reads:
“A party asking for a rehearing will not be permitted to set up new grounds in support of his petition different from those urged by him at the original hearing, and this rule will be departed from only in eases where the refusal of the application would work manifest injustice, where the circumstances are exceptional, wherfe the question presented is jurisdictional, or where the error appearing on the face of the appeal record is brought to the attention of the appellate court before its judgment has become final. Points which have been waived on the hearing, either expressly or by implication, will not be considered on a petition for a rehearing. The reasons against granting a rehearing in such cases apply with particular force where the matters suggested are such as might have been raised on the original hearing in the appellate court, or where they ought to have been urged in the trial court before the appeal was taken. The court will not consider whether the original judgment was appealable, whether the appeal was properly perfected, or whether the parties have complied with the rules of practice prescribed by the-court, where these questions are presented for the first time by the petition for a rehearing.”
Many authorities from different states, including decisions from this state, are cited to support the text. One of the cases cited, Micou v. Tallassee Bridge Co., 47 Ala. 652, expressly holds that the question of sufficiency of service of process on minor defendants could not be raised for the first time by motion for rehearing; and in O’Neil v. Sun Co., 58 Tex. Civ. App. 167, 123 S. W. 172, writ of error denied by the Supreme Court, the following is said in disposing of the motion for rehearing:
“The court, after a decision of the case on appeal, should not, and therefore it declines to, entertain cross-assignments of error not properly before the court for consideration prior to its decision.”
*627The following is taken from the syllabus in the decision of Autrey v. Collins (Tex. Civ. App.) 161 S. W. 413:
“An objection to an instruction, in an action for libel, that it erroneously submitted certain publications as a ground for recovery because the petition did not justify such submission cannot be first raised in a motion for rehearing on appeal.” ’
Other Texas decisions, and decisions from other states, are of like effect. And in Rik-hoff v. Brown’s Rotary Shuttle Machine Co., 68 Ind. 388, it is held that questions as to the sufficiency of the pleadings in the court below to support the judgment cannot be raised for the first time on motion for rehearing.
For the reasons noted, the motion for rehearing is overruled.