Court Opinion

ID: 9896406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-10 19:00:32.986523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:52.108800
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40582    Document: 00516963626      Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/10/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                              ____________                                 FILED
                                                                   November 10, 2023
                               No. 23-40582                           Lyle W. Cayce
                              ____________                                 Clerk

   Honorable Terry Petteway; Honorable Derrick Rose;
   Honorable Penny Pope,

                                                       Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                   versus

   Galveston County, Texas; Mark Henry, in his official capacity
   as Galveston County Judge; Dwight D. Sullivan, in his official capacity
   as Galveston County Clerk,

                                                   Defendants—Appellants,

   ______________________________

   United States of America,

                                                        Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

   Galveston County, Texas; Galveston County
   Commissioners Court; Mark Henry, in his official capacity as
   Galveston County Judge,

                                                   Defendants—Appellants,

   ______________________________
Case: 23-40582     Document: 00516963626            Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/10/2023

   Dickinson Bay Area Branch NAACP; Galveston Branch
   NAACP; Mainland Branch NAACP; Galveston LULAC
   Council 151; Edna Courville; Joe A. Compian; Leon
   Phillips,

                                                              Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                       versus

   Galveston County, Texas; Mark Henry, in his official capacity
   as Galveston County Judge; Dwight D. Sullivan, in his official capacity
   as Galveston County Clerk,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                    USDC Nos. 3:22-CV-117, 3:22-CV-57,
                                  3:22-CV-93
                  ______________________________

   Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          The Galveston County Commissioners Court is composed of four
   county commissioners, elected from single-member precincts, and one
   county judge, elected by the entire county. From 1991 to 2021, one of the
   four commissioner precincts had a majority-minority population, with blacks
   and Hispanics together accounting for 58 percent of the precinct’s total
   population as of 2020. In 2021, the Galveston County Commissioners Court
   enacted a new districting plan for county commissioner elections. The
   enacted plan does not contain a majority-minority precinct. Following a
   bench trial, the district court found that the enacted plan dilutes the voting
   power of the county’s black and Hispanic voters in violation of Section 2 of
   the Voting Rights Act. Galveston County appealed.

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                                     No. 23-40582

                            I. Coalition Claims
          The primary issue this case presents is whether distinct minority
   groups like blacks and Hispanics may be aggregated for purposes of vote-
   dilution claims under Section 2. The parties agree that neither the black
   population nor the Hispanic population of Galveston County is large enough
   to be protected, individually, by Section 2. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
   30, 50, 106 S. Ct. 2752, 2766 (1986) (explaining that, as a precondition to
   establishing a vote-dilution claim under Section 2, “the minority group must
   be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact
   to constitute a majority in a single-member district”). But precedent in this
   circuit permits distinct minority groups to be aggregated under Section 2. See
   Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (1988) (“There is nothing in
   the law that prevents the plaintiffs from identifying the protected aggrieved
   minority to include both Blacks and Hispanics.”); LULAC v. Clements,
   999 F.2d 831, 864 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (noting that this circuit “allow[s]
   aggregation of different minority groups where the evidence suggests that
   they are politically cohesive”). That precedent establishes the validity of so-
   called minority-coalition claims like those brought in this case. And this
   panel is bound by it under the rule of orderliness.
          But the court’s decisions in this respect are wrong as a matter of law.
   The text of Section 2 does not support the conclusion that distinct minority
   groups may be aggregated for purposes of vote-dilution claims. Subsection
   (b), for instance, requires a showing that “the political processes . . . are not
   equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens” protected by
   the statute. It again mentions “a protected class”—singular—in the next
   sentence. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). “Had Congress chosen explicitly to protect
   minority coalitions it could have done so by [using the phrase] classes of
   citizens. It did not.” Clements, 999 F.2d at 894 (Jones, J., concurring). In
   addition, subsection (a) prohibits states or political subdivisions from

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                                    No. 23-40582

   adopting voting practices that result “in a denial or abridgement of the right
   of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race[,] color,” or language-minority
   status. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). This language ties Section 2’s protection of
   voting rights to the particular race, color, or language-minority status of
   individual citizens, not to their membership in a broader coalition of races,
   colors, or language minorities. As the Sixth Circuit put it, “[Subsection (a)]
   protects a citizen’s right to vote from infringement because of, or ‘on account
   of,’ that individual’s race or color or membership in a protected language
   minority.” Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
          In dissenting and concurring opinions in Campos and Clements,
   Judge Higginbotham and Judge Jones identified additional problems with
   minority-coalition claims beyond their inconsistency with the text of
   Section 2. Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943, 944–46 (5th Cir. 1988)
   (Higginbotham, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Clements,
   999 F.2d at 894–98 (Jones, J., concurring); see also LULAC v. Midland Indep.
   Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494, 1503–09 (5th Cir.) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting),
   majority opinion vacated on reh’g, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987). These
   opinions demonstrate that minority-coalition claims are in tension both with
   the framework the Supreme Court established for analyzing vote-dilution
   claims in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752, and with the
   prohibition on proportional representation codified in Section 2 itself. See
   Midland, 812 F.2d at 1504 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); Clements, 999 F.2d
   at 895–96 (Jones, J., concurring).
          A circuit split has also developed since this court decided Campos and
   Clements. For example, the Sixth Circuit has expressly rejected minority-
   coalition claims, Nixon, 76 F.3d 1381, while the Eleventh Circuit—following
   the holdings of this court—has expressly authorized them, Concerned
   Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526
   (11th Cir. 1990). In addition, decisions of the Supreme Court over the past

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                                     No. 23-40582

   two decades have undermined the validity of minority-coalition claims. The
   most notable is Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
   Bartlett held that Section 2 does not require the creation of crossover
   districts, i.e., districts in which the minority population “make[s] up less than
   a majority of the voting-age population” but “is large enough to elect the
   candidate of its choice with help from voters who are members of the majority
   and who cross over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id. at 13,
   129 S. Ct. at 1242 (plurality opinion). The plurality wrote, “Nothing in § 2
   grants special protection to a minority group’s right to form political
   coalitions.” Id. at 15, 129 S. Ct. at 1243.
          The district court appropriately applied precedent when it permitted
   the black and Hispanic populations of Galveston County to be aggregated for
   purposes of assessing compliance with Section 2. But the members of this
   panel agree that this court’s precedent permitting aggregation should be
   overturned. We therefore call for this case to be reheard en banc.
                            II. Remaining Issues
          Apart from challenging minority-coalition claims, Galveston County
   raises three issues on appeal. The first two relate to the district court’s
   findings under the three preconditions minority groups are required to prove
   in Section 2 cases under Gingles. See 478 U.S. 50–51, 106 S. Ct. at 2766–67.
   This court has held that a district court’s Gingles findings are reviewed for
   clear error. E. Jefferson Coal. for Leadership & Dev. v. Par. of Jefferson,
   926 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1991). After reviewing the district court’s
   findings in this case, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction
   that a mistake has been committed.” See N.A.A.C.P. v. Fordice, 252 F.3d 361,
   365 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573,
   105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985)). The district court thus did not clearly err. The
   final issue concerns the constitutionality of Section 2. Galveston County has

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   failed to show that Section 2 is unconstitutional under existing precedent,
   especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Allen v. Milligan,
   143 S. Ct. 1487, 1516–17 (2023).              We therefore reject the County’s
   constitutional challenge.
                                    III. Conclusion
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We request a poll
   on whether this case should be reheard en banc at the earliest possible date.1

          _____________________
          1
              Galveston County’s petition for initial hearing en banc is DENIED as moot.

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