Court Opinion

ID: 9865156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:25:31.074775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:39.037938
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard
dissenting.
I regard the reception of “defendant’s confession” in evidence under the circumstances presented, as gravely *40erroneous. The court opinion recites: “Counsel for defendant objected to the admission of the confession on the ground that it was involuntary, and requested a preliminary inquiry out of the presence of the jury with respect thereto.” The objection was overruled and the request denied. Thwarted below, defendant emphasizes the point on error.
In Osborn v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 29, 262 Pac. 892, 901, Mr. Justice Butler said: “This court, on repeated occasions, has said that, to be admissible, a confession must be voluntary, and that the question of admissibility is for the court.” In support of the doctrine thus stated, the distinguished jurist cited an array of Colorado cases, among them the early case of Fincher v. People, 26 Colo. 169, 56 Pac. 902, where, speaking through Mr. Justice Gabbert, we said: “It was the province of the court alone to determine whether the confession was made with that degree of freedom which would render it admissible as evidence * * *, the usual practice being to determine its admissibility as a preliminary question, by hearing all the evidence touching the subject of its being voluntary. This rule rests upon the proposition that the competency of evidence is a legal question, which must be determined by the court, and its credibility by the jury.” Addressing himself further to the point, Mr. Justice Gabbert quoted from Greenleaf as follows: “* * * The material inquiry, therefore, is, whether the confession has been obtained by the influence of hope or fear applied by a third person to the prisoner’s mind. The evidence to this point, being in its nature preliminary, is addressed to the judge, who admits the proof of the confession to the jury, or rejects it, as he may or may not find it to have been drawn from the prisoner, by the application of these motives. This matter resting wholly in the discretion of the judge, upon all the circumstances of the case, it is difficult to lay down particular rules a priori, for the government of that discretion. The rule of law, applicable to all cases, only demands that the *41confession shall have been made voluntarily, without the appliance of hope or fear by any other person, and whether it was so made, or not, is for him to determine, upon consideration of the age, situation, and character of the prisoner, and the circumstances under which it was made.” Fincher v. People, supra, has been cited with approval to the point in question, as have other Colorado cases announcing the same rule, in the late cases of Moss v. People, 92 Colo. 88, 97, 18 P. (2d) 316, 319, and Saiz v. People, 93 Colo. 291, 295, 25 P. (2d) 1114, 1116.
“The admissibility of a confession, where it is challenged, is a question solely for the court after hearing, in the absence of the jury, all the evidence on each side respecting the manner in which the confession was obtained; and the court is necessarily vested with a large discretion in determining the matter, a discretion, however, which should be exercised with great care to the end that the due and proper enforcement of the law on the one hand be not impeded, and that no injustice be done the defendant on the other.” Berry v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 202, 111 Pac. 676, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.), 849. See, 22 C.J.S., pp. 1458, 1468, §§834, 838. “The admissibility of a confession being dependent upon its voluntary character, the question of whether or not it is voluntary must be decided in the first instance, when the offer to introduce the testimony is made, provided and assuming that an objection to the effect that the confession is inadmissible because involuntary is properly interposed. The practice in most jurisdictions, upon such offer of introduction and objection timely and properly made, is to conduct á preliminary examination of the evidence of the prosecution and defense, in the absence of the jury, to determine the admissibility of the confession. This determination is made by the trial court, upon the recognized and accepted principle that the voluntary or involuntary character of the confession is a question of law, to be determined by the trial judge, from the facts *42as adduced. This is the prevailing and well-recognized rule in the United States, and in accordance with the elementary principles defining the functions of judge and jury. The sole question to be determined by the trial judge is whether the confession is admissible because voluntary, or inadmissible because involuntary. All other questions, including whether the confession was actually made, or the weight and credence to which it is entitled, are for the jury if the confession is found to be admissible.” Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (11th ed.), p. 981, §594. In support of the text, cases are cited from United States, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
In Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 3rd edition, page 309, section 217, the author states: “The preliminary question, was the confession voluntary? bearing directly upon its competency as evidence, must be, according to the majority of the cases, decided by the court, as a mixed question of law and fact. And the court may hear evidence from both sides to show the circumstances under which the confession was made.” See, also, page 313, section 219, where Underhill further says: “In any case it is his [defendant’s] right to show by preliminary evidence that the confession was not voluntary, and it is the duty of the court, in determining the competency of the confession, not only to consider the evidence for the state, showing the confession was voluntary, but the evidence elicited by the accused to prove the contrary in his favor as well. A refusal, before the confession is admitted, to allow counsel for the prisoner to cross-examine the witness as to the voluntary character of the *43confession; or to allow the accused to testify, and to explain his mental condition when it was made; or to show by the evidence of others that it was improperly obtained, is reversible error.” See, III Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.), page 345, section 861, where that great author, proceeding inimitably, and with compelling analysis, arrives at the same conclusion. I have been at pains to state and fortify the rule, not because the opinion of the court, in terms, declares against it, but, rather, that the ruling below, contrary to the rule, and tolerated here, may stand in relief. The weakness of the opinion is the conclusion indulged that the evidence as taken in the presence of the jury indicates that the alleged confession was voluntary, hence, as further speculated, the trial judge, had he observed'.the rule, would have admitted it, and, therefore the error is without prejudice. That, manifestly beyond our ken, is wholly unsound. Had the trial judge followed the rule, requested and moved in ample form, and heard the whole story in his chambers or other place of calm atmosphere, the revelations might well have caused him to give pause, and within reasonable possibilities convinced him that voluntariness did not obtain. The rule is invocable as of right. Speculation as to how the trial judge, proceeding in consonance therewith, would have decided the requisite preliminary question, is not permissible.
The quotation in the court opinion from section 817, 22 C.J.S., p. 1433, consists of discussions relative to the admissibility of confessions obtained or given under varying circumstances, and not as to the manner of the ascertainment thereof. So far as the cases cited in support of the quoted text make disclosure, there were preliminary inquiries by the trial judge, and the questions for decision on review did not have to do with the procedural rule involved here, but rather as to whether the judges, having proceeded to make preliminary inquiry in accordance with the rule for which defendant contends on this review, had rightly resolved in favor of the *44admission of the confessions. That it is the office of the trial judge, acting in the absence of the jury, to inquire preliminarily as to the voluntary qualities of any claimed confession, is discussed in sections 834 and 838, same volume and title. Colorado reports are replete with instances indicating that when the people have offered an alleged confession of a defendant on trial, and to which there was objection on the ground that it was involuntary, as here, preliminary inquiry by the judge, out of the presence of the jury, has been the procedure employed. In Mitchell v. People, 76 Colo. 346, 232 Pac. 685, Mr. Justice Burke, discussing in the opinion the question of whether a confession was voluntary, said: “The court heard conflicting evidence on this subject, in the absence of the jury, and held the confession voluntary. * * * . The question was primarily one for the court.” The case of Fincher v. People, supra, was cited there.
The case of Buschy v. People, 73 Colo. 472, 216 Pac. 519, examined in the light of its record, is only understandable on the theory then widely entertained that a “miserable bootlegger” is beyond the pale. It cites section 822, 1 Wigmore on Evidence (1st ed.), which, like section 817, 22 C.J.S., pp. 1424, et seq., referred to in the court opinion here, discusses the admissibility of confession in cases where the trial court, first proceeding preliminarily according to the rule, had found them to be voluntary. If the learned author of the opinion in the Buschy case had had his attention called to section 861, same volume of Wigmore, he would have found the rule that controls trial judges as they go about ascertaining the facts relative to confessions, offered and challenged, clearly, as here, and there, too, as I respectfully suggest. In the Buschy opinion the court cited O'Donnell v. People, 71 Colo. 113, 204 Pac. 330. But there, unlike the Buschy case and the one here, the opinion recites that, “When offered [the confession] in evidence the jury was excused and witnesses examined by the court as to the *45character of the confession.” The record proper in the O’Donnell case reveals with what care the trial judge there observed the rule that was scouted by the trial judge here.
Although I shall not pause to state the situation in detail, I call attention to the fact that in addition to refusing to determine in the absence of the jury the question of whether the alleged confession was voluntary, the restricted cross-examination imposed by the court on counsel as he sought to elicit full revelation from the officers who testified in chief with relation thereto, operated to prejudice defendant’s case before the jury. In short, the court would neither make investigation on its own account, nor permit reasonably full presentation to the jury. The first error, major in every particular, and not forgivable on review, should constitute unquestioned reason for reversal; and to correct the second error, born of the first, should add to the enthusiasm of reviewing well-doers. “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards.” McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 579.