Court Opinion

ID: 9795845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:40:01.895248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:18.216054
License: Public Domain

KITE, J.,
specially concurring, in which BURKE, J., joins.
[¶ 12] I concur in the result reached by the majority that the appeal must be dismissed because it was not taken from a final order. I also agree the motion to reconsider was not an authorized post-trial motion under our rules. Nor was it the functional equivalent of an authorized post-trial motion under our rules. Therefore, had I authored the majority opinion, the result would be the same — dismissal of the appeal. I have concerns, however, that the majority goes further than is necessary to reach that result and, in doing so, fails to give proper regard *1026to stare decisis. I also have concerns that the majority does not state clearly enough that the holding is to have prospective application only.
[¶ 13] The issue in this case is whether a motion for reconsideration, a motion that is neither authorized nor recognized under our rules, can extend the time for appeal. This is the same issue we addressed in Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719 (Wyo.1997). We held a motion for reconsideration cannot extend the time for appeal unless the motion is the functional equivalent of a post-judgment motion authorized under our rules. In Morehouse v. Morehouse, 959 P.2d 179 (Wyo.1998), we reiterated our holding in Sherman and extended it to conclude that a motion identified as a motion to alter or amend the judgment, which was the functional equivalent of a motion to reconsider, could not extend the time for appeal. The rule of law established in those cases was that a post-trial motion, regardless of the name it is given, does not extend the time for appeal unless it articulates the grounds required for such a motion under our rules. As recently as 2004, we reiterated that under the limited circumstances identified in Sherman, this Court will consider an appeal from a motion to reconsider. Padilla v. State, 2004 WY 66, ¶ 6, 91 P.3d 920, 922 (Wyo.2004).
[¶ 14] In the present case, I agree dismissal is proper because the appeal was not taken from an order denying a motion that was the functional equivalent of an authorized post-judgment motion. However, the majority goes further and holds: “Henceforth, we will enforce the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure as written and consider post-judgment motions for reconsideration, so denominated, a nullity.” This holding suggests that any motion delineated as a motion for reconsideration will be automatically a nullity, even if the content of the motion is the functional equivalent of an authorized motion under our rules. To the extent that our prior cases held to the contrary, the majority concludes, they are overruled.
[¶ 15] I do not disagree that a bright line rule might be helpful. I also do not disagree that there are policy considerations that support such a bright line rule, including the difficulties inherent in deciphering whether a particular motion for reconsideration is the functional equivalent of an authorized motion for post-judgment relief. However, as a practical matter, when we are assessing the timeliness of an appeal and determining whether a post-judgment motion has tolled the time for appealing, we will still need to consider the substance of the motion. Even if a motion is denominated a Rule 59 motion, it must be a proper motion, stating new grounds and containing more than a recital or reference to the rule, in order to have a tolling effect. Thus, our emphasis must still be on substance, rather than form, and we should not be constrained by the name a party puts on a particular pleading. Consistent with our precedent, I believe this should be the rule for motions denominated “motion to reconsider,” just as it necessarily must be the rule for motions identified as Rule 59 motions.
[¶ 16] Additionally, I am of the view that the majority opinion should have prospective application only, meaning it should apply only to motions filed after publication of this opinion. To make it otherwise is unfair to litigants and attorneys who have relied upon Sherman and Morehouse. Giving the opinion prospective application does not change the result in this case for the reasons previously mentioned. Although the majority announces its ruling with the word “henceforth,” it is not clear whether that means the ruling applies to all future appeals or to motions filed after publication of this opinion. I believe the opinion should clearly state that it applies only to motions filed after publication of this opinion.