Court Opinion

ID: 9517650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:25:41.64045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:38.217809
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 31. {concurring). I agree that the records at issue in the instant case are "treatment records" and are subject to the confidentiality and privilege provisions of Wis. Stat. § 51.30(4).1
¶ 32. The majority opinion purports to reach this result by relying on the "plain language" of the statutory definition of treatment records in § 51.30(l)(b). It does not. The holding in the majority opinion is at odds with the text of § 51.30(1) (b).
¶ 33. "Treatment records" are defined in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(l)(b) by how they are created and by whom they are maintained. The statutory definition of treatment records is as follows:
"Treatment records" include the registration and all other records that are created in the course of providing services to individuals for mental illness .. . and that are maintained by the [Department of Health Services], by county departments under s. 51.42 or 51.437 and their staffs, and by treatment facilities (emphasis added).
¶ 34. In the instant case, the original record at issue undisputedly was maintained by a treatment *79facility. Consequently, the original record fits the statutory definition of a "treatment record."
¶ 35. Watton, however, sought a copy of that treatment record from the police department. No treatment facility (or other entity enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 51.30(l)(b)) "maintained" the copy of the treatment record that was in the possession of the police department. The copy was just on file with the police department for police department administrative purposes.
¶ 36. Confusingly, the majority opinion appears to conclude at ¶ 24 that the copy of the treatment record on file with the police department is "maintained" by the treatment facility, because treatment facility directors or their designees are charged by statute with supplementing the original record that the treatment facility possesses. The majority opinion's reasoning is odd. The obligation of treatment facility directors or their designees to supplement the original record on file with the treatment facility shows only what Watton already concedes — that the original record on file with the treatment facility is "maintained" by the treatment facility. The question in the instant case is whether the copy of the record on file with the police department also is "maintained" by the treatment facility. The majority opinion concedes, as it must, that treatment facility directors or their designees are not statutorily required to supplement copies of treatment records that happen to be on file with the police department or any other entity.2
¶ 37. Consequently, the copy of the treatment record filed with the police department was not in the possession of, or supplemented or in any other sense "maintained" by, a treatment facility. The copy of the *80treatment record thus does not fall within the text of § 51.30(l)(b); the copy was not maintained by any of the statutorily enumerated persons or entities. The majority opinion errs in concluding that copies of statements of emergency detention in the possession of the police department are records "maintained" by a treatment facility.
¶ 38. The majority opinion's repeated statements that it relies on the plain language of the statute to hold that a copy of a treatment record filed with the police department is maintained by the treatment facility3 make no sense in light of the text of the statute.
¶ 39. Indeed, the majority opinion implicitly concedes as much when it acknowledges that it must lean on the "absurd results" doctrine in deciding the present case.4 The doctrine that a statute will not be interpreted to reach an absurd result is used to avoid interpreting a statute in accordance with its plain language or is used when a statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.5
*81¶ 40. The majority opinion need not stretch either the text of Wis. Stat. § 51.30(b) or logic to arrive at the correct interpretation of the statute at issue. The majority opinion should be relying (as it sometimes does) on the purpose of the statute derived from its context and legislative history6 and the consequences of various interpretations,7 without deceptively characterizing its analysis as a "plain language" analysis.
¶ 41. I agree that in determining the meaning of a statute, a court turns first to the text of the statute. However, the court's inquiry is not limited to the text of the statutory provision. A court considers the statute's purpose,8 any related provisions or statutes,9 prior case *82law interpreting the statute,10 statutory history,11 legislative history,12 rules (also known as maxims or canons) of statutory interpretation,13 and other available persuasive material. In doing so, a court aims to give effect to the legislative intent, as the majority opinion recognizes.14
¶ 42. As I see this case, Wis. Stat. § 51.30(l)(b) defining treatment records cannot be read in a way that defeats the purpose of § 51.30(4), which is to maintain the confidentiality of certain records. The legislature could not have intended that § 51.30(l)(b) be interpreted in a way that undermines or circumvents the *83carefully drafted legislative provisions set forth in § 51.30(4) limiting access to treatment records.15 Because the record at issue in the instant case is a copy of another record that indisputably falls within § 51.30(l)(b)'s definition of "treatment records," and is in the police department solely for administrative cost-accounting purposes relating to transportation of persons, the copy must fall within the scope of § 51.30(4), limiting access to "treatment records."
¶ 43. I write separately to set forth a more forthright statutory interpretation.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 51.30(4)(a) provides that except as otherwise stated, "all treatment records shall remain confidential and are privileged to the subject individual...." The record at issue does not fall within any of the excepted provisions set forth in § 51.30(4).

 Majority op., ¶ 24 n.14.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶ 22, 25, 26 & n.16.

 See id., ¶ 22.

 See Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89, ¶ 32, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 ("Although the meaning of the statute appears to be plain, a literal application of the language would be absurd."); Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 32, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659 ("As a general rule, courts apply the ordinary and accepted meaning of language in statutes, unless it leads to an absurd result.") (internal citation omitted); State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶ 15, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 ("[W]e may construe a clear and unambiguous statute if a literal application would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Rice v. Ashland County, 108 Wis. 189, 192, 84 N.W. 189 (1900) ("[I]f, viewing a statute from the standpoint of the literal sense of its language, it is *81unreasonable or absurd, an obscurity of meaning exists, calling for judicial construction.").
See also 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th ed. 2007) § 45:12, at 101,107) ("It is fundamental, however, that departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and would clearly be inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act in question.... If one reasonable interpretation of a statute yields absurd results while the other interpretation yields no such absurdities, the latter interpretation is preferred.") (footnotes omitted).

 See majority op., ¶ 25.

 See id., ¶ 22.

 See, e.g., Racine Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. State Div. of Hearings & Appeals, 2006 WI 86, ¶ 92, 292 Wis. 2d 549, 717 N.W.2d 184 (2006) (construing the statute's terms to be consistent with its express purpose); State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, ¶ 39, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203 (2004) ("We therefore turn to an analysis of the purpose[ ] ... of the statute to determine the interpretation that gives the statute its intended effect.").

 See, e.g., State v. Robert K., 2005 WI 152, ¶ 30, 286 Wis. 2d 143, 706 N.W.2d 257 (2005) (considering case law as relevant in interpreting a statute).

 See, e.g., Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶ 22; 309 Wis. 2d 541, 749 N.W.2d 581 (strangely viewing statutory history as part of the plain meaning statutory analysis).

 See, e.g., Racine Harley-Davidson, 292 Wis. 2d 549, ¶ 81 (Wis. 2006) (examining the legislative history of the statute to determine its meaning); Robert K., 286 Wis. 2d 143, ¶ 29 (discussing the legislative history, including the drafting records, of a statute to determine its meaning).

 State v. Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 42, 309 Wis. 2d 601 749 N.W.2d 611 (applying three rules of statutory interpretation).

 See majority op., ¶ 16.
State v. Hayes, 273 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 16 (2004) ("Additional sources of legislative intent such as the context, history, scope, and objective of the statute, including the consequences of alternative interpretations, illuminate the intent of the legislature.").

 See Popenhagen, 2008 WI 55, ¶ 87 ("The legislature could not have intended that the statute would be interpreted in such a way to allow circumvention of the carefully drafted legislative requirements and safeguards . . . .").