Court Opinion

ID: 9838245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 20:05:47.329668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:45:21.247017
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220338-U
                                       No. 2-22-0338
                               Order filed September 5, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                          IN THE

                           APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE CITY OF LAKE FOREST,               ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                       ) of Lake County.
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) Nos. 20-DT-895, 20-TR-29723
                                       )       20-CM-1509
                                       )
DESTINY C. BURGIN,                     ) Honorable
                                       ) Bolling W. Haxall III,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

      JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Hutchinson and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

                                          ORDER

¶1    Held: Defendant was properly convicted of driving under the influence of cannabis based
            on the strong smell of burnt cannabis emanating from her car, her admission that
            she smoked two “blunts” 45 minutes earlier and was currently “high,” her poor
            performance on the walk-and-turn test, and her general lethargy during the stop and
            arrest, suggesting she lacked the proper awareness and reflexes to drive safely.

¶2    After a bench trial, defendant, Destiny C. Burgin, was found guilty of driving under the

influence of drugs (DUI), namely cannabis (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2020)), and child

endangerment predicated on DUI (720 ILCS 5/12C-5(a)(2) (West 2020)). The trial court placed
2023 IL App (2d) 220338-U

defendant on 18 months’ court supervision. On appeal, defendant contends that she was not proved

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of either charge. We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Plaintiff, the City of Lake Forest, charged defendant with one count of DUI (cannabis) and

two counts of child endangerment for committing DUI and thereby placing the lives of her

passengers, D.B. and L.D., in danger.

¶5     At trial, the sole witness was Lake Forest police officer Tyler Saieg. On direct examination,

he testified as follows. He had been an officer since early 2018. His training at the police academy

and in the field included traffic enforcement, e.g., DUI detection and administering field sobriety

tests (FSTs). He was also trained in Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE),

which covered the standard FSTs and other drug tests.

¶6     Saieg testified that, on July 19, 2020, at about 1 a.m., he was parked in a fully marked

squad car on the right (east) shoulder of northbound Route 41 in Lake Forest. He saw a car pass.

It had no visible rear license plate. He followed the car for about 20 seconds and saw no other

violations. Saieg activated his emergency lights, and the driver, defendant, pulled over onto the

shoulder. Saieg exited his squad car and approached defendant. An adult female was in the front

passenger seat. Two small children were buckled properly in child-safety seats in the back. As

defendant rolled down her window, Saieg smelled the odor of burnt cannabis. He requested

defendant’s driver’s license and proof of insurance. Defendant was “lethargic” but produced the

requested information.

¶7     Saieg recorded the encounter on his squad-car camera and microphone. The video was

admitted into evidence and played in court. We summarize the pertinent contents.

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¶8        After pulling defendant over, Saieg approached her, explained the basis of the stop, and

requested her driver’s license and proof of insurance. Defendant said that her license was in the

middle console; she took it from there and handed it to Saieg. He asked her about her insurance;

she said her policy was new, so she gave him a policy number instead of a card. At this point,

Saieg asked her to roll her window down further. She did so. He asked her to exit the car. She

did so.

¶9        Outside, Saieg asked defendant, “How much weed did you smoke tonight?”                She

responded, “Two blunts.” He asked her, “How long ago?” She responded, “Maybe about 45

minutes.” Saieg told defendant that the car “reek[ed] of weed” and that she was “very lethargic.”

Defendant responded, “Yes.” Saieg asked her, “Do you think you’re high right now?” She said,

“Yes.” He asked, “Do you think you should be driving that car?” Defendant responded, “I think

I’m not impaired,” adding that she took her child’s safety seriously.

¶ 10      Saieg returned to his car to process the stop. Defendant spoke to a backup officer. Saieg

returned and asked defendant to face him, which she did. He asked her several questions, to which

she responded appropriately. She disclosed that, in April, she had been in a car accident in which

she suffered a concussion and some leg injuries, but she had since recovered.

¶ 11      Saieg next administered several FSTs to defendant. The first was the horizontal gaze

nystagmus (HGN) test, in which defendant followed Saieg’s finger with her eyes. The second was

the walk-and-turn test, in which defendant took nine heel-to-toe steps down the fog line, pivoted,

and took nine more heel-to-toe steps back. The third was the one-leg-stand test. In the fourth test,

defendant followed instructions to close her eyes, tilt her head back, count to 30 “in [her] head,”

and say “stop” when she reached 30.

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¶ 12   After defendant completed the FSTs, Saieg arrested her. As he handcuffed her and

explained the arrest, she became agitated. She cried and shouted, “Please.” She asked where her

daughter would go; Saieg told her there was still an adult in the car and the occupants were not

going anywhere. Defendant calmed down somewhat. She asked how she could get her bank

information if she were jailed. Saieg assured her that she would be released. The recording ended.

¶ 13   Saieg testified that the HGN test showed that defendant did not have nystagmus in her eyes.

He explained that a person under the influence of cannabis will not display nystagmus, but “the

other things that [he] observed could be indicative of being under the influence of cannabis.”

Specifically, during the test, defendant’s eyelids were drooping, and she frequently flicked her

eyes in the direction opposite his finger.

¶ 14   Saieg testified that, during the walk-and-turn test, he observed six “clues”: “breaking the

instructional position, raising her arms more than six inches from her sides to maintain balance,

[stepping] off the line, [stopping], [breaking] heel-to-toe, and [making] an improper turn.” Based

on his training, two clues are sufficient to indicate impairment. Defendant’s overall demeanor

during the test was “[l]ethargic.”

¶ 15   Saieg testified that, after he arrested defendant, he drove her to the police station, where he

picked up some documents, and then to a hospital to have her provide blood and urine samples.

When he parked in the hospital’s parking lot, he explained the documents to defendant, then asked

her whether she wanted to provide blood and urine samples. His testimony continued:

               “A. *** [W]hen asked if she wanted to provide blood and urine, she proceeded to

       have some form of a monologue with herself about the legal limit being a rather low

       threshold; and she made the decision eventually to not [provides samples], after some time

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       deliberating it [sic] with herself. During that deliberation, she was frequently closing her

       eyes, she was smiling to herself, and just in general kind of just talking to herself out loud.

               Q. And how was her demeanor there in the back of the squad car then?

               A. A mix of lethargic and what I might describe as like slap happy I guess, if that’s

       a [sic].”

¶ 16   Saieg testified that, after defendant declined testing, he drove her to the police station. They

spent about two hours there. As time passed, defendant’s demeanor became “less lethargic[,]’ and

she became “more easily irritated.” It appeared to Saieg that she was “sobering up.”

¶ 17   Saieg testified that he had made approximately 50 arrests for DUI based on either alcohol

or cannabis and had assisted other officers with 25 or 30 such arrests. He had also made somewhat

fewer than 50 arrests for possessing or using cannabis. While in college, Saieg had seen people

under the influence of cannabis 50 to 100 times. Based on his observation and training, Saieg

opined that defendant was under the influence of cannabis when he stopped her vehicle.

¶ 18   Saieg testified that defendant told him that one of the children in the backseat was hers.

The passenger identified the other child as hers.

¶ 19   On cross-examination, Saieg testified as follows. The National Transportation Highway

Safety Administration (NHTSA) field manual sets out three phases of detecting a DUI. The first

is “vehicle in motion.” In this phase, there are several sets of clues for impaired driving. The first

set relates to problems maintaining proper lane position. The second set relates to braking and

speeding problems, such as unnecessary acceleration or deceleration and driving well under the

speed limit. The third set includes “vigilance problems,” such as driving at night with the

headlights off and failing to signal properly. The final category is “judgment problems,” such as

tailgating and driving off the designated roadway. According to Saieg, defendant’s driving did

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not show clues in any of these categories. Moreover, in general, he saw nothing in defendant’s

driving to suggest that she was under the influence.

¶ 20   Saieg testified that defendant did not fumble with her license or drop it during the stop, but

she was “lethargic.” He did not see smoke or anything burning inside the car. As defendant

opened her door and exited, she did not lean on the car. As she walked over to where Saieg had

asked her to stand, she did so without stumbling or requiring assistance.

¶ 21   Saieg testified that he asked defendant when she had smoked the two blunts but not when

she started smoking. He did not ask whether she had shared the cannabis with anyone or finished

the blunts. Saieg conceded that the amount of cannabis in a blunt “[d]epends on the person.” It

could be “a small amount.”

¶ 22   Saieg stated that, before administering the FSTs, he told defendant to face him; she

complied. In administering the HGN test, he told defendant to put her feet together; she complied.

Saieg did not need to remind defendant to follow his finger with her eyes or to keep her head still.

Saieg noted that bloodshot eyes “could be” a clue for DUI but that defendant’s eyes were not

bloodshot during the test.

¶ 23   Saieg testified that, for the walk-and-turn test, he told defendant to turn around, place her

left foot on the line, and place her right foot in front of it. She complied with these directions. She

did not start the test until Saieg told her to start. Defendant took the correct number of steps down

the line. On the return walk, her arms came up briefly, but she put them back down by her sides.

¶ 24   Saieg testified that, during the one-leg-stand test, he observed zero clues for impairment.

Defendant did not sway, use her arms for balance, hop, or put her foot down.

¶ 25   Saieg testified that the final test he administered was the “modified Romberg balance test,”

which is a divided-attention test for signs of impairment by drugs. Defendant complied with

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Saieg’s directions, including to “[e]stimate 30 seconds in her head.” Saieg testified that cannabis

alters a person’s perception of time and that people who are under the influence of cannabis “can”

have trouble passing the test. However, defendant’s estimate, 33 seconds, was within the five-

second margin for not indicating impairment. Saieg did not observe tremors in defendant’s body

or eyelids, and she did not lose her balance during the test.

¶ 26   Saieg testified that he knew of the “lack of convergence test,” which relies on observing a

person’s eyes to determine possible impairment due to drugs. He did not perform this test on

defendant. He also could have given defendant the finger-to-nose test to detect drug impairment

but did not do so. Saieg explained that the stop occurred before his ARIDE training, “so all those

tests that [defense counsel was] describing [he] had not learned technically at that point.”

¶ 27   Saieg testified that the arrest occurred early in the COVID-19 pandemic, when no vaccines

existed. He acknowledged that a drug recognition expert (DRE) is a police officer trained to

determine whether someone is under the influence of a drug and which drug is the cause. Saieg

was not a DRE. While defendant was in custody, Saieg could have called in a DRE to examine

her, but he did not. He admitted that the NHTSA manual suggests consulting a DRE when an

officer suspects cannabis use.

¶ 28   Saieg reiterated that bloodshot eyes “could be” a clue for impairment by drugs but that

defendant’s eyes were not bloodshot. At the station, defendant’s demeanor changed near the end,

when she was preparing to be released. He saw this as a sign that the effect of the cannabis was

wearing off.

¶ 29   On redirect examination, Saieg testified that not all the various clues for impairment are

present in every case that results in an arrest. While at the hospital, defendant never expressed

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concern about COVID-19; the only reason she gave for declining testing was that it might reveal

how much cannabis she had used.

¶ 30   After hearing arguments, the trial court stated as follows. First, Saieg saw “absolutely no

bad driving visible in the relatively brief period” he observed defendant driving. Defendant

responded properly to Saieg’s activation of his emergency lights. Thus, nothing about defendant’s

driving indicated that she was under the influence. The court continued:

              “The [FSTs], overall she does well. There are certainly some issues with the walk

       and turn, but her one legged stand is excellent. Her—the 30 second counting in the head

       she nails, so there’s very little from the [FSTs] to indicate that she is under the influence.

              The issue for me is the [d]efendant’s statements, and it is a 20 second conversation

       where [Saieg] indicates to the [d]efendant that he could smell a strong odor of *** cannabis.

       The [d]efendant really doesn’t dispute that.        He asks how much cannabis *** the

       [d]efendant has had to smoke. She replies tonight ***.

              Now, tonight could go back multiple hours. I mean this is one in the morning, but

       *** there’s no indication from that statement that the two blunts she referred to were

       smoked, you know, that afternoon or that morning.

              In fact, if you’re going to be really technical, I guess there’s an argument that she

       limited the smoking time to that evening or that night.

              The [d]efendant is asked do you think you are high right now, and she replies yes.

       She then responds that she is not *** impaired, and [her] argument is essentially that the

       term high is not really quantified, and that’s certainly true.

              I think that the argument for the phrase, *** are you drunk right now, I think there’s

       a popular perception among the public that would relate that to probably a .08, the point

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      that most people view as being impaired; but what’s relevant here is that while maybe high

      is not quantified, the [d]efendant indicated that she believed she was high at the moment

      the question was posed; and the [d]efendant, her view of the term high, is particularly

      relevant here.

             Again, the defense argument that what one person means by high is different than

      what another person means, that’s true, but ultimately the question is whether or not this

      defendant was impaired by the use of cannabis.

             *** [A]lcohol can affect people differently based on what you have consumed, ***

      over what period of time, how large you are. ***.

             That’s true for cannabis as well. *** [T]he question here is whether or not this

      defendant at that time was impaired.

             Now, the term high has a meaning; *** the meaning of the term high is [‘]is the

      cannabis having a physical effect on a person?[’] And whether the term is high versus

      drunk or buzzed, I think it is a common enough time [sic], whether or not cannabis has

      been legal for a period of time, the term high is one that has been around for decades; and

      at that moment, the [d]efendant believed she was high.

             And I do think combined with the rest of the evidence in this case, which is the

      refusal to complete testing at the hospital, which I am considering for consciousness of

      guilt, *** I do think it is some evidence that the [d]efendant believed that she was likely to

      test positive for cannabis at a limit that would be problematic for her.

             Ultimately, the [d]efendant smoked cannabis in about the hour before she drove.

      Now that doesn’t in itself indicate that she was impaired; but given she believed she was

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       high at the time she was driving, combined with all the other evidence, I do believe [that

       plaintiff met its burden of proof].”

The court found defendant guilty of all three charges.

¶ 31   Defendant moved to reconsider the judgment. At the hearing on the motion, she contended

that a person could use the term “high” to mean as little as a “head rush” from one “puff,” which

would not prove impairment to drive. She contended further that, although she had admitted being

high, she had denied being impaired and had performed well on the FSTs. She argued that there

was insufficient evidence that she was impaired and “a bunch of evidence that suggest[ed] that she

was sober.”

¶ 32   In response, plaintiff argued that the evidence proved more than trivial cannabis

consumption: defendant admitted to smoking two blunts only 45 minutes before the stop. Further,

her refusal to take blood and urine tests showed her consciousness of guilt. And, although

defendant’s driving was not suspicious, Saieg followed her for less than two miles. In the walk-

and-turn test, defendant provided more than the two clues needed to indicate impairment.

¶ 33   Defendant replied that Saieg never obtained specific information about the amount of

cannabis in the blunts, when defendant started smoking them, or whether she shared them with

anyone. Further, defendant’s refusal to provide blood and urine samples did not necessarily

indicate consciousness of guilt given that consumption of marijuana was no longer strictly

prohibited. Moreover, the blood concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) necessary to

support a DUI conviction had not reached the same level of “cultural understanding” as the blood

concentration of alcohol required to support a DUI conviction.

¶ 34   The trial court denied the motion. The court noted that defendant had admitted not merely

smoking cannabis but being “high.” Thus, “[defendant] felt at that time there was a physical effect

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of *** cannabis on her.” She also admitted to using cannabis only 45 minutes earlier. The court

continued:

              “There was evidence [of] some balance issues. More significantly, [Saieg] testified

       that [defendant] was moving lethargically.

              I think *** I referred to it as deliberate; but anyway, it appeared to be a slower,

       more conscious movement than normal, something noticeable, perceptible.

              I think really when I consider the statements regarding being high, *** the

       admission to using relatively recently[, and] *** what the officer testified he observed,

       both in the performance on the test and just movements generally, I think it was sufficient.

                                                    ***

              Driving is a skill that requires a lot of attention. *** [W]hat’s particularly relevant

       here, a person be able [sic] to respond quickly to what happens when they are driving in

       order to be able to drive safely. A car cuts you off. It’s a sudden turn. There’s, *** any

       number of things that can happen when you are driving that requires [sic] you to react

       quickly.

              If [defendant] was unable to respond or act as quickly as she normally would due

       to consumption of cannabis, I do believe that renders her unsafe; and, *** there was no bad

       driving that I saw. It is a limited period of time; and *** it is a fairly straight and easy

       road. ***.

              *** It’s not being able to maintain the vehicle in the middle of the lane. It’s being

       able to respond quickly to anything that would have required her to do so.

       ***

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                  Just for purposes of appeal, I’m going to be very clear. Her statement was

       significant evidence. It was not the only evidence. *** [B]ut if I’m being absolutely

       honest, had she not said that she was high, I think I very likely would have returned a

       different verdict.”

¶ 35   This timely appeal followed.

¶ 36                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 37   On appeal, defendant contends that she was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of DUI. She also contends that, because DUI was an element of both child endangerment charges,

she also was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of those charges.

¶ 38   In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask only whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hopkins, 201

Ill. 2d 26, 40 (2002). Assessing the credibility of the witnesses and determining the weight to be

given the evidence are matters within the prerogative of the fact finder. People v. Holmes, 141 Ill.

2d 204, 243 (1990). Moreover, we must allow all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor

of the State. People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 31.

¶ 39   To obtain a conviction of DUI as charged, the State had to prove that defendant drove or

was in actual physical control of her vehicle while she was under the influence of cannabis to a

degree that rendered her incapable of safely driving. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2020).

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that her cannabis use made her incapable of

safely driving.

¶ 40   Defendant attacks the inculpatory evidence in several specific regards. We note that her

argument is based entirely on separate analyses of specific portions of the evidence; she does not

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include an overall assessment of the cumulative impact of these analyses on the evidence as a

whole. In addressing defendant’s argument, we shall initially consider her specific contentions

and then provide an overall assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole.

¶ 41   First, defendant contends that Saieg was not qualified to give opinion testimony on whether

she was under the influence of cannabis. She notes that Saieg was relatively inexperienced when

he stopped her and had yet to complete his training in FSTs. Plaintiff responds that it did not move

to qualify Saieg as an expert but relied on the established principle that a police officer’s opinion

that the accused was under the influence of drugs is admissible and can be sufficient evidence of

DUI if the officer had the relevant skills, experience, or training to render such an opinion. See

People v. Ciborowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 143352, ¶ 79.

¶ 42   Here, Saieg testified that, on July 19, 2020, he had been a police officer for somewhat more

than two years, had been trained in detecting DUI, had made or assisted in many arrests for

cannabis-based DUI, and for the use of cannabis, and, as a college student, had seen people under

the influence of cannabis 50 to 100 times. The trial court had the prerogative to decide that these

qualifications sufficed to make Saieg’s opinion probative of whether defendant was under the

influence of cannabis to the extent that it would impair her driving. See id. ¶¶ 43, 45, 79 (the trial

court properly credited the opinion of an officer who had been involved in two or three drug-based-

DUI investigations and who, though not a DRE, was trained in drug detection and had observed

hundreds of people who were under the influence of drugs).

¶ 43   Further, as the State notes, defendant never objected to Saieg’s qualifications to provide an

opinion. Thus, to the extent that the trial court must qualify an officer as an expert to testify as to

whether the accused was under the influence of drugs (see People v. Jacquith, 129 Ill. App. 3d

107, 114-15 (1984)), defendant forfeited any error based on this rule. See Ciborowski, 2016 IL

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App (1st) 143352, ¶ 99. Instead of moving to bar Saieg’s opinion testimony, defendant sought

through cross-examination to attack his qualifications and thus persuade the court to give little

weight to his opinion. She pursues the same course here: she requests that we redecide Saieg’s

credibility and reweigh his opinion evidence. We may not and shall not do so. We note further

that the court did not stress Saieg’s opinion and apparently would have reached the same result

without it.

¶ 44   Second, defendant contends that her performance on the FSTs did not support a finding

that she was intoxicated at the time. To a degree, this argument is beside the point: in pronouncing

defendant guilty, the trial court specifically stated that “very little” from the FSTs indicated that

she was under the influence of cannabis. However, in denying defendant’s posttrial motion, the

court did place some weight on the walk-and-turn test and the “balance issues” she displayed on

the video. Thus, we consider the results of the FSTs and their bearing on the finding of guilt.

¶ 45   As with defendant’s first challenge to the evidence, she essentially requests that we reweigh

the evidence of the FSTs. Again, we decline to supplant the trial court as finder of fact. Although

defendant’s performance on the FSTs cut both ways, the court properly considered that she

provided six clues on the walk-and-turn test, four more than needed to indicate intoxication. While

defendant opines that her failures were slight and her performance was affected by wind and the

traffic, these possible inferences were for the trial court to consider, and we may not disturb its

resolution of these issues.

¶ 46   Third, defendant contends that neither her driving nor her interaction with Saieg was

probative of impairment or intoxication. We disagree. Certainly, the trial court concurred with

defendant that nothing was amiss with her driving, and our review of the squad-car video confirms

the characterization. However, the court also noted that Saieg witnessed defendant drive for only

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a very short time. Thus, the court found it of lesser importance that defendant’s driving was not

suspicious. We will not disturb this assessment.

¶ 47   As for defendant’s interaction with Saieg, he commented to defendant during the stop that

she was “lethargic,” and he described her the same way in his testimony. Our review of the video

confirms his account: although defendant answered Saieg appropriately, her demeanor from the

stop to her arrest was consistently sluggish. The court was within its prerogative in agreeing with

Saieg here. It noted that defendant’s slow and tired-sounding responses to Saieg were probative

of impairment, as safe driving requires alertness to sudden dangerous developments and the ability

to respond quickly to those developments. Although defendant now speculates that her lethargy

might have resulted from the timing of the stop and her distrust of the police in the wake of the

recent murder of George Floyd, the court was not required to draw these dubious inferences.

¶ 48   Defendant fails to address Saieg’s testimony that, after he asked defendant about testing,

she responded with a lengthy dialogue with herself, which was not entirely normal or appropriate.

Further, near the end of her detention at the police station, her affect changed, indicating to Saieg

that she was “sobering up.” The trial court could credit this testimony, which defendant also does

not address, as evidence that she was intoxicated when she drove.

¶ 49   Ultimately, defendant’s challenge on these matters is an argument that the evidence could

have been stronger, which does not bear on whether the evidence was sufficient.

¶ 50   Fourth, defendant attacks the probative value of her admission to Saieg that she was “high.”

She contends that the trial court should have considered her “yes” as admitting only that she had

been using cannabis. She argues that Saieg asked her a leading question; that “high” is a term with

no fixed meaning; that she followed up her admission with a statement that she was not impaired

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and was fit to drive; and that she made the admission only because she was “acquiesc[ing] to a

show of authority informed by her racial, social, and female position in society.”

¶ 51   Once again, defendant insists that we disregard the trial court’s weighing of the evidence

and drawing of reasonable inferences therefrom and substitute our own conclusions—or, more

accurately, her conclusions. We decline.

¶ 52   It defies common sense to argue that an admission to being “high” merely established

consumption: the term is not as vague as defendant suggests, and the common understanding of it

is that something, here cannabis, has produced “an excited, euphoric, or stupefied state” in a

person. High, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 546 (10th ed. 1993). Thus, by admitting

that she was high, defendant conveyed that the functioning of her mind and senses had been

significantly affected by her use of cannabis.

¶ 53   Further, we note that, even if Saieg’s question were leading, defendant was at liberty to

simply answer, “No.” Thus, the trial court could reasonably conclude that defendant would not

have made a serious admission against her interest had she not believed it. Further, the court could

reasonably give little weight to her statement that she considered herself fit to drive; the court

could see it as an attempt to undo the damage from her admission that she was high, and also

reason that a person who is high on cannabis might not be the best judge of her own ability to

drive. Finally, it is the sheerest speculation that defendant made such a damaging admission only

because of her racial or gender identity or current social conditions. Rather, the court could

reasonably find that she made the admission simply because it was true. Finally, defendant’s

admission that she was high was well corroborated by the strong odor of cannabis coming from

her car, her admission that she had smoked two blunts 45 minutes earlier, and—as noted—her

general languor. We note that, although Saieg did not ask defendant how much cannabis she

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actually consumed, she volunteered that she had smoked “two blunts” without qualifying or

minimizing the import of those words.

¶ 54   Fifth, and finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving weight to her refusal

to submit to chemical testing, because that refusal proved only that she had consumed cannabis, a

fact that she had already admitted. Again, we decline defendant’s invitation to substitute our

conclusions (or hers) for those that the court drew. Based on what defendant said in refusing the

request, the court reasonably inferred that defendant believed that the testing would reveal that she

had consumed a substantial amount of cannabis. In this respect, what was important was not what

the law actually provided as to the “legal limit,” but what defendant subjectively believed about

the applicable law. The court could reasonably infer that, in refusing testing, defendant feared that

the results would show that she had been driving with a level of THC in her system that the law

recognized as showing unfitness to drive. Thus, the court properly considered defendant’s refusal

to undergo testing.

¶ 55   In sum, defendant’s challenges to the evidence either rely on factors that the trial court

properly did not consider crucial or invite us to substitute our judgment for that of the court on the

weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to draw therefrom.

¶ 56   We now summarize the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.

After observing an equipment violation on defendant’s car and following her for a short distance,

Saieg stopped her. Defendant’s car smelled strongly of burnt cannabis, and she admitted to having

smoked two blunts 45 minutes before the stop. Moreover, she admitted that she was now “high,”

allowing an inference that she had been no less affected while driving, at least for the previous

three-quarters of an hour or so. Defendant was coherent and able to respond to Saieg’s questions

and requests, but she was slow, subdued, and lacking energy to an extent inconsistent with safe

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driving. She passed several FSTs, one of which (the HGN test) had little relevance to cannabis

intoxication, but even there she displayed lethargy and some distraction. She failed one highly

pertinent test—namely, the walk-and-turn test—by a substantial margin (six clues with only two

needed to indicate intoxication). While in custody, defendant was still lethargic but became less

so over time, indicating that, in Saieg’s opinion, she was “sobering up.” While in custody,

defendant refused chemical testing after engaging in a confused conversation with herself,

suggesting that she believed the results would be unfavorable. Saieg, who had basic training and

personal experience in detecting when people were under the influence of cannabis, testified that,

in his opinion, defendant was under the influence on July 19, 2020.

¶ 57   We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that defendant drove while under the influence of cannabis to an extent that

rendered her driving unsafe. The court rightly concluded that defendant’s recent consumption of

a substantial quantity of cannabis, to the point where she admitted that she was “high,” seriously

affected her ability to drive safely, in part by dulling her senses and slowing her reaction time.

¶ 58                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 59   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 60   Affirmed.

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