Court Opinion

ID: 9930739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:05:35.84307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:54.989472
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1994
                             Filed February 7, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

ELIJAH DANIEL DAVIS,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Adair County, Scott J. Beattie,

Judge.

      Elijah Daniel Davis appeals his conviction for homicide by vehicle and his

sentence for child endangerment.       CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

        Elijah Daniel Davis appeals his conviction and sentence, contending that

there is insufficient evidence supporting his conviction for homicide by vehicle and

the district court abused its discretion when sentencing him for child

endangerment. Because substantial evidence supports the verdict, we affirm his

conviction for homicide by vehicle. But because the district court abused its

discretion when imposing the fine for child endangerment, we vacate this portion

of the sentence and remand for resentencing on this issue.

   I.      Background Facts and Proceedings.

        On May 8, 2020, bystanders came upon a gruesome scene: a smoking van,

a mangled, custom-built hot rod, and a bloody body lying partially in the road. One

couple stopped their vehicle and approached the crash, where they found a crying,

bleeding six-year-old and Davis rummaging through the smoking van. Davis was

“hobbling” because a bone was protruding out of his leg, and he told the couple, “I

got to go.” He handed off his son to them, took his backpack, and limped to another

vehicle that had just stopped at the crash site. Davis demanded that the driver of

the vehicle take him to his father’s house, and the driver complied. During their

short drive, Davis was yelling erratically on the phone and acting “agitated, angry,

anxious, in a hurry.” The driver also noticed the odor of “skunk” that he compared

to marijuana emitting from the backpack. Eventually, the driver dropped Davis off

at a house he indicated and returned to the accident.

        Meanwhile, emergency services had responded to the scene in Davis’s

absence. The couple had attempted to clean up the child and reported their

concerns to police that Davis may be impaired. The other man involved in the
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collision was identified and found to be dead. An autopsy later revealed he had

injuries consistent with being ejected from his vehicle during the crash.

         Davis returned to the scene soon after without the backpack, where he was

treated for his injuries before being taken to the hospital. Based on concerns that

Davis was driving impaired, a drug recognition expert interviewed him at the

hospital. His findings were that Davis was under the influence of both marijuana

and methamphetamine. Samples of Davis’s blood and urine were tested and

showed positive for marijuana, amphetamine, and methamphetamine. Davis was

charged with homicide by vehicle and child endangerment.

         After trial, a jury found Davis guilty as charged. The district court sentenced

Davis to consecutive prison terms, for a total of twenty-seven years, and a

suspended fine of $855. Davis appeals.

   II.      Sufficiency of the Evidence.

         Davis first contends that insufficient evidence supports his homicide-by-

vehicle conviction. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims for correction of

errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In conducting

that review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,” which is binding on our

court if “supported by substantial evidence.” Id. To determine if a verdict is

supported by substantial evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that

may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (quoting

State v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017)).

         Because Davis concedes he was driving with controlled substances in his

system, the State only had to prove that his “act or acts unintentionally caused the
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death of [the victim].” Namely, it was required to establish that Davis’s own

impairment caused the crash and subsequently the victim’s death. Viewing the

evidence in the State’s favor, substantial evidence supports Davis’s conviction.

The State provided ample evidence that established Davis was impaired and

caused the victim’s death. The testimony of multiple expert witnesses established

that the controlled substances in Davis’s system were enough to cause

impairment; in fact, the toxicologist testified that the amount of methamphetamine

was typical of “levels we see in a driving impairment case” and even potentially

“toxic.” He also testified that Davis’s high level of pain tolerance despite sustaining

a compound fracture was consistent with impairment.                 Further, several

eyewitnesses described Davis’s strange and erratic behavior following the crash.

He left his young child with near-strangers, fled the scene of a death he caused,

managed to function while deeply injured, and acted angry and animated. His

concern was not for his own bleeding son nor the victim lying in the road but for

retrieving his “skunk”-scented backpack and taking it to a relative’s house.

Similarly, the State also provided ample evidence explaining that Davis’s

impairment caused the victim’s death, including photos of the wreckage and victim,

with accompanying explanations by crash analysts and medical experts. These

experts described the extent of the victim’s injuries and their cause. These injuries

were consistent with Davis driving while impaired and causing a fatal crash.

       While Davis argues that distracted driving was more likely to have caused

the death than his impairment, this is not the standard we use. Instead, the crime

“doesn’t require that the intoxicated operation alone cause the harm; the State

need only prove it was one of potentially many causes of the death.” State v.
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Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 232, 238 (Iowa 2020) (emphasis added). Moreover, while

Davis provided some evidence to suggest that distracted driving may have been a

factor, the jury was free to ignore this in favor of the overwhelming evidence of

Davis’s impairment. See State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1990) (“Even

if the testimony of a witness as to a fact is not controverted by other testimony, the

finder of fact may reject the testimony if found not to be credible.”); see also State

v. Noll, No. 12-0166, 2013 WL 85932, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013) (“It is the

jury’s function to determine credibility and resolve discrepancies in the evidence.”).

Because there is sufficient evidence to establish guilt, the district court did not err

in convicting Davis.

   III.      Sentencing Discretion.

          Finally, Davis argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing

the $855 fine. We review sentencing decisions for correction of errors at law, but

“we reverse a sentence only if there was an abuse of discretion or defect in the

sentencing procedure.” State v. Gay, No. 19-1354, 2021 WL 4889239, at *3 (Iowa

Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021). “A district court’s failure to exercise sentencing discretion

requires resentencing” and is considered an abuse of discretion. Id. at *3–4. In

determining if a court exercised such discretion, we consider “whether the court

knew of its discretion” under the applicable code sections. Id. at *4.

          When sentencing Davis, the district court noted, “There is no fine or crime

services surcharge on [Count 1], but there is a fine associated with the child

endangerment section, and that is a fine in the amount of $855.” The minimum

fine for child endangerment, an aggravated misdemeanor, was increased from

$625 to $855 on July 15, 2020. 2020 Iowa Acts ch. 1074 §§ 46(2), 93. We apply
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the statute in effect at the time of the offense itself to prevent constitutional

implications. See State v. Lopez, 907 N.W.2d 112, 122–23 (Iowa 2018) (finding

the imposition of a surcharge effective post-offense date violated both the U.S. and

Iowa Constitutions’ ban on ex post facto punishments). Because the act of child

endangerment occurred on May 8, 2020, the minimum fine was $625. Although

the court had discretion to impose a higher fine, its explanation does not reflect an

exercise of discretion in choosing the amount.        Instead, it shows the court

incorrectly believed the minimum fine was $855. We therefore vacate this portion

of the sentence and remand for resentencing.            See State v. Ayers, 590

N.W.2d 25, 27 (Iowa 1999) (“Failure to exercise that discretion calls for a vacation

of the sentence and a remand for resentencing.”).

   IV.      Disposition.

         Because sufficient evidence supports the verdict, we affirm Davis’s

conviction. But because the district court abused its discretion when imposing the

fine, we vacate that portion of the child-endangerment sentence and remand for

resentencing.

         CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.