Court Opinion

ID: 9372152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-18 00:03:02.01335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.353349
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/17/23 P. v. Zendejas CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                       CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                           DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                                 B315600

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Los Angeles County
                                                                            Super. Ct. No. KA122153)
           v.

GERARDO JESUS ZENDEJAS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mike Camacho, Judge. Affirmed.
     Mark S. Givens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and
Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      _________________________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION
      On August 12, 2021, a jury found defendant and
appellant Gerardo Jesus Zendejas guilty of the September 20,
2019, first degree murder of Phillip Pena. The jury found
true a special circumstance allegation that Zendejas
committed the murder by lying in wait. On October 7, 2021,
the trial court sentenced Zendejas to life in prison without
the possibility of parole.
      Zendejas contends the trial court made three
instructional errors, which Zendejas contends prejudiced
him both individually and cumulatively. The claimed errors
are: (1) the denial of a defense request for a jury instruction
on a heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter based
on his testimony that he learned the night before the murder
that Pena had raped Zendejas’s girlfriend; (2) the court’s
failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on the defense theory
of mistake of fact based on Zendejas’s testimony that he
mistakenly believed Pena’s car was unoccupied when
Zendejas and his accomplice fired multiple shots into the
vehicle and then set it ablaze; and (3) the court’s delivery of
the CALCRIM No. 361 instruction, which stated that the
jury could consider Zendejas’s failure, if any, to explain or
deny evidence against him in evaluating that evidence.

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Zendejas asks this court to reverse the judgment. Finding
no prejudicial error, we affirm.

     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Prosecution Case
      At about 4:00 a.m. on September 20, 2019, police
officers responded to a 911 call concerning gunshots and a
fire outside a house with a detached apartment in Pomona.
The officers found Pena’s car parked outside his apartment,
engulfed in flames. After the fire was extinguished, Pena’s
charred body was found in the driver’s seat. An autopsy
determined the cause of Pena’s death was two shotgun
wounds to his chest.
      Officers found five spent shotgun cartridges at the
crime scene, along with a striker cap used to ignite a road
flare. They also found a baseball hat inside Pena’s car.
Zendejas’s DNA was on the baseball hat and the striker cap.
      Police officers searched Zendejas’s La Habra apartment
and found a semiautomatic shotgun, which a criminalist
opined had fired the spent cartridges found at the scene.
Zendejas’s DNA was found on the shotgun’s trigger.
Handwritten notes found in Zendejas’s car indicated that
Zendejas had surveilled Pena’s apartment for several days
beginning on September 3, 2019, and that Zendejas had
noted Pena regularly arrived home from work after 2:30 a.m.
      Surveillance videos from the bar in Upland where Pena
worked and from a house across the street from Pena’s
apartment showed that, on September 20, 2019, Pena left

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work in his car around 3:22 a.m. and parked outside his
apartment at 3:42 a.m. The apartment surveillance video
showed that shortly before Pena arrived, Zendejas’s car
drove by Pena’s apartment three times. After Pena arrived,
Zendejas’s car drove by again, then made a U-turn and
pulled up next to Pena’s car, which was illuminated by
streetlights, at 3:53 a.m. The video then flashed repeatedly
in a manner consistent with muzzle flashes from at least
four gunshots. An occupant of Zendejas’s car then poured
liquid inside and on top of Pena’s car and set the car on fire
using an open flame. Zendejas’s car then drove away from
the scene.

      B. Defense Case
      Zendejas testified at his trial. He testified that he saw
extensive bruises on his then-girlfriend, Alexandria O. on
September 3, 2019, and that she told him Pena had beaten
her during a drug transaction and informed him where Pena
lived. Zendejas admitted he surveilled Pena’s apartment for
several days beginning on September 3, 2019, but claimed he
did so merely because he planned to expose Pena’s drug
activity to the police. Zendejas further testified that,
between 10:00 p.m. and midnight the night before Pena’s
death in the early morning of September 20, Alexandria told
him for the first time that Pena had raped her. According to
his testimony, this revelation made Zendejas angry and sad.
He consoled Alexandria and attempted to convince her to
report the rape, but she refused. He dropped her off at her

                              4
home in Pomona before midnight then returned to his own
home in La Habra.
       Zendejas testified that, when he arrived home, he
paused to “reflect” on what Alexandria had told him. He
snorted methamphetamine three or four times and
proceeded to “think” and “dwell on the situation” even more.
It was in this intoxicated state of mind that he decided to set
fire to Pena’s car. He prepared to carry out his plan by
readying gasoline, a road flare, and his shotgun, which he
testified he removed from a locked box and placed in the rear
seat of his car. He communicated his plan to a friend, who
he said tried and failed to dissuade him and ultimately
became his accomplice.
       Around 1:00 a.m., Zendejas drove with his accomplice
to Pomona, where Zendejas again paused to “reflect.” After
using more methamphetamine, Zendejas drove to Upland to
check on a security guard whose work he supervised.
Around 3:00 a.m., he drove to Pena’s apartment in Pomona.
On the way, he further considered his plan to throw gasoline
into Pena’s car after his accomplice shot out a window and
instructed his accomplice to load his shotgun with buckshot
rather than slugs so the window would “blow open.”
       After arriving at Pena’s street, Zendejas circled the
block several times until Pena arrived home, then passed by
Pena’s car before making a U-turn and pulling up alongside
it. As planned, his accomplice fired Zendejas’s shotgun,
blowing a hole in the driver’s window of Pena’s car. Zendejas
forced a can of gasoline through the hole. He then ignited a

                              5
road flare and threw it inside Pena’s car “without looking.”
He claimed he did not see Pena inside the car. After Pena’s
car went up in flames, Zendejas and his accomplice left and
returned to Zendejas’s apartment.
      During cross-examination, Zendejas repeatedly refused
to answer the prosecutor’s questions concerning the identity
of his accomplice, stating he did not want to “throw anybody
under the bus.” The prosecutor played portions of a recorded
police interview taken following Zendejas’s arrest on
September 26, 2019. At that time, after being advised of his
constitutional rights, Zendejas told police he had wanted to
“‘tune up’” Pena and also claimed Pena had pulled a gun
when Zendejas and his accomplice approached Pena’s car.

       C. Jury Instructions, Closing Arguments, and
          Judgment
       The court instructed the jury on four theories of first
degree murder, all except felony murder requiring a finding
by the jury that Zendejas acted with intent to kill or injure.
The court instructed the jury that, if it found Zendejas guilty
of first degree murder, it must also decide, inter alia,
whether the People had proved the special circumstance
allegation that Zendejas committed the murder by means of
lying in wait. The lying-in-wait special circumstance
instruction, CALCRIM No. 728, provided that the People
were required to prove, inter alia, that Zendejas waited and
watched for an opportunity to launch a surprise attack, in a
manner showing a state of mind equivalent to premeditation

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and deliberation. The instruction further provided: “The
defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the
considerations for and against his choice and, knowing the
consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted with
premeditation if he decided to kill before committing the act
that caused death.”
       The trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 361 based on
Zendejas’s refusal to disclose the identity of his accomplice.
The instruction stated that: “If the defendant failed in his
testimony to explain or deny evidence against him, and if he
could reasonably be expected to have done so based on what
he knew, you may consider his failure to explain or deny in
evaluating that evidence. Any such failure is not enough by
itself to prove guilt. The People must still prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] If the
defendant failed to explain or deny, it is up to you to decide
the meaning and importance of that failure.” The court
denied defense counsel’s request for an instruction on a heat
of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter. Defense
counsel did not request an instruction on a mistake theory.
       The prosecutor argued that Zendejas was guilty of first
degree murder under all four theories and that his conduct
in circling Pena’s apartment while waiting to ambush Pena
upon arrival constituted lying in wait. Defense counsel
urged the jury to believe Zendejas’s testimony that he
mistakenly believed Pena’s car was unoccupied, which she
argued showed he lacked intent to kill. In rebuttal, the

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prosecutor argued that Zendejas’s mistake claim was not
credible but acknowledged that if the jury believed his
testimony, it should find he lacked intent to kill. During
closing argument, the prosecutor neither mentioned
CALCRIM No. 361 nor argued that Zendejas had failed to
explain or deny adverse evidence.
      On August 12, 2021, the jury returned verdicts
convicting Zendejas of first degree murder and finding true,
inter alia, the lying-in-wait special circumstance allegation.
The jury separately convicted Zendejas of shooting at an
occupied motor vehicle. On October 7, 2021, the court
sentenced Zendejas to life in prison without possibility of
parole. Zendejas timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION
       Zendejas asks this court to reverse the judgment due to
the prejudicial effect of the following claimed instructional
errors: (1) the trial court’s denial of defense counsel’s request
for a jury instruction on the heat of passion theory of
voluntary manslaughter, based on Zendejas’s testimony that
he learned the night before the murder that Pena had raped
Zendejas’s girlfriend; (2) the court’s failure to instruct the
jury sua sponte on the defense theory of mistake of fact,
based on Zendejas’s testimony that he mistakenly believed
Pena’s car was unoccupied; and (3) the court’s delivery of
CALCRIM No. 361, which stated that the jury could consider
Zendejas’s failure, if any, to explain or deny evidence against

                               8
him in evaluating that evidence. For reasons discussed
below, we find no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.

      A. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defense
         Counsel’s Request for a Heat of Passion
         Instruction
      Pointing to his own testimony that he ambushed
Pena’s car within hours of learning Pena had raped
Alexandria, Zendejas contends that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a jury instruction on the heat of
passion theory of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included
offense of murder. A trial court is required to instruct the
jury on this theory only where there is substantial evidence
that the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter
rather than murder. (See People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th
793, 827.) “‘“[T]he factor which distinguishes the ‘heat of
passion’ form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is
provocation.”’ [Citation.] ‘To be adequate, the provocation
must be one that would cause an emotion so intense that an
ordinary person would simply react, without reflection. . . .
[T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the
defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought process to such an
extent that judgment could not and did not intervene.’”
(People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 649-650
(Beck).) A heat of passion killing is “‘manifestly
inconsistent’” with premeditation and deliberation. (People v.
Peau (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 823, 831 (Peau), quoting People
v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 572.)

                             9
      We conclude the trial court properly denied defense
counsel’s request for a heat of passion instruction because
there was not substantial evidence that Zendejas acted in a
heat of passion. The evidence at trial instead showed that
Zendejas began surveilling Pena’s apartment more than two
weeks before Pena’s death. He admitted that, shortly before
Pena’s death, he drove to Pena’s apartment and then circled
the block repeatedly until he saw Pena’s car parked out front.
Zendejas acknowledged that, in the hours leading up to
Pena’s death, he more than once paused to “reflect,” both
before and after he planned his ambush of Pena’s car. All of
this is inconsistent with a heat of passion as a matter of law.
(See Beck, supra, 8 Cal.5th at 650.)
      To the extent Zendejas claimed at trial to have acted in
an altered mental state, he attributed this state to his
voluntary intoxication from methamphetamine, not
provocation. Even in his intoxicated state, moreover, he
retained the presence of mind to adhere to his plan in the
face of his accomplice’s attempts to talk him out of it, and to
instruct his accomplice to use the type of shotgun
ammunition that would be most effective in executing his
plan. “[N]o principle of law required the trial judge below to
disregard the evidence in order to find that the jury should
consider whether defendant subjectively killed in the heat of
passion, when no substantial evidence supported that theory
of manslaughter, and the evidence actually introduced on
the point—the defendant’s own testimony—was to the
contrary.” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 554.)

                             10
      Moreover, even if the court had erred in denying
Zendejas’s request for a heat of passion instruction, it would
have been harmless. The jury here necessarily decided the
factual questions presented by a heat of passion defense
adversely to Zendejas under properly given instructions.
(Peau, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 830.) The jury’s finding of
lying in wait necessarily included a determination that
Zendejas acted with a state of mind equivalent to
premeditation and deliberation. Because this determination
is manifestly inconsistent with a heat of passion theory, any
error in the omission of a heat of passion instruction would
have been harmless. (See People v. Wang (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1071-1072 [omission of heat of passion
instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
jury found defendant premeditated and deliberated the
killing], review denied June 24, 2020; Peau, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at 830-832 [same].)

      B. The Trial Court Had No Sua Sponte Duty to
         Instruct the Jury on Mistake of Fact
      Zendejas points to his own testimony that he
mistakenly believed Pena’s car was unoccupied when he and
his accomplice shot the car and set it ablaze and contends
that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua
sponte on the defense theory of mistake of fact. We disagree.
Because defense counsel did not request a mistake of fact
instruction, the court had no duty to deliver one. (People v.
Speck (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 784, 791 [“The trial court does

                             11
not have a sua sponte duty to give a mistake of fact
instruction”].)
       In his reply brief, Zendejas contends for the first time
that defense counsel’s failure to request such an instruction
deprived him of his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel. Zendejas has forfeited this claim by
failing to raise it in his opening brief. (See People v. Silveria
and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 255.) Even if timely
raised, Zendejas’s ineffective assistance claim would be
without merit. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
an appellant bears the burden of showing prejudice,
meaning “‘“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.”’” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
958.)
       Both counsel indicated in closing arguments that, if the
jury believed Zendejas’s mistake claim, then it should find
he lacked intent to kill or injure Pena, an element of three of
the four theories of first degree murder on which the court
instructed the jury. Moreover, Zendejas’s claim that he
mistakenly believed Pena’s car was unoccupied was
contradicted by the evidence that he told police at the time of
his arrest that he had seen Pena draw a gun, that he had
been circling the block and therefore had reason to know
Pena had just arrived home, and that the car was in a well-
lit location and that Zendejas had to get very close to the car
to get the gas and flare inside. In light of all of this, it is not
reasonably probable that the outcome of the proceeding

                                12
would have been different had defense counsel requested a
mistake of fact instruction. (See People v. Hoyt, supra, 8
Cal.5th at 958.)

       C. Any Error in the Delivery of CALCRIM No. 361
          Was Harmless
       Zendejas contends that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 361, which provided
that the jury could consider Zendejas’s failure, if any, to
explain or deny evidence against him in evaluating that
evidence. “[T]he focus of CALCRIM No. 361, as its language
indicates, is not on the defendant’s credibility as a witness,
but on the role of a testifying defendant’s failure to explain
or deny incriminating evidence in how jurors ‘evaluat[e] that
evidence,’ i.e., the evidence the defendant has failed to
explain or deny.” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101,
118.) The instruction left it to the jury to determine whether
Zendejas had failed to explain or deny adverse evidence and,
if so, whether this failure had any significance. In closing
arguments, the prosecutor neither mentioned this
instruction nor argued that Zendejas had failed to explain or
deny adverse evidence. Because it is not reasonably
probable that the court’s delivery of CALCRIM No. 361
affected the outcome of the trial, we conclude that any error
by the trial court in delivering this instruction was harmless.
(See People v. Lamer (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471-
1473.)

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      Having rejected Zendejas’s other claims of error, we
reject his cumulative prejudice claim.

                      DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   SCADUTO, J. *

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P.J.

CURREY, J.

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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