Court Opinion

ID: 9955087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 17:01:33.2579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.832051
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 27 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

T.A., a Disabled Adult, by and through her      No.    23-55332
Guardian Ad Litem, Liana Harmandjian,
                                                D.C. No.
                Plaintiff-Appellant,            2:21-cv-09757-SB-PD

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, by and
through The LA County Department of
Children and Family Services; ADRIENNE
M. ZACHERY, an individual,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                 Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 25, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and FORREST, Circuit Judges.

      T. A., a disabled adult, brings this action through her mother as her guardian

ad litem, alleging that her constitutional rights were violated when she was removed

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
from her mother’s custody when she was a minor. T.A. appeals the district court’s

denial of her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion seeking relief from that

court’s final order dismissing her claim against Los Angeles County (the County).1

She argues that the district court erred by dismissing her Monell2 claim, without

considering its merits, because her counsel failed to file an opposition to the

County’s motion for summary judgment. As discussed below, we have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review both the district court’s order denying T.A.’s Rule

60(b) motion and its order granting the County’s summary judgment motion. See

also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi). We affirm.

      1.     Rule 60(b) Motion. Under Rule 60(b)(1), a court may relieve a party

from final judgment based on, among other things, excusable neglect. Casey v.

Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2004). We review for abuse of

discretion the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion. Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co.,

452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). Contrary to T.A.’s assertions, the district court

applied the correct law and made no clearly erroneous findings of material fact in

concluding that T.A.’s counsel’s failure to comply with the district court’s standing

      1
        In the same order dismissing T.A.’s claim against the County, the district
court also dismissed her claims against Adrienne Zachary for lack of prosecution,
but T.A. did not appear to seek reconsideration of that portion of the order.
      2
        Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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order was not due to excusable neglect that would warrant reconsideration under

Rule 60(b). See Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 231 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000).

      2.     Jurisdiction Over Summary Judgment. We disagree with the County’s

assertion that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s summary judgment

order because T.A.’s notice of appeal was untimely. Although T.A. did not file her

notice of appeal within 30 days of the district court’s entry of its order granting

summary judgment, she filed her Rule 60(b) motion within 28 days of the district

court’s order, which is what was required when T.A. filed her Rule 60 motion. See

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi) (amended Dec. 1, 2023). Accordingly, the time for

appeal ran from the district court’s entry of the order denying T.A.’s Rule 60(b)

motion, see id., and T.A. filed her notice of appeal within 30 days of that order.

      To the extent that the County argues we lack jurisdiction to review the

summary judgment order because the notice of appeal referenced only the order

resolving the Rule 60(b) motion, we disagree. Fed. R. App. P. 3 specifies that a

notice of appeal must “designate the judgment—or the appealable order—from

which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). We have instructed that “a

mistake in designating the judgment appealed from should not bar appeal as long as

the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred and the appellee is not

prejudiced or misled by the mistake.” See United States v. $84,740.00 Currency, 981

F.2d 1110, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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Here, where the district court’s denial of T.A.’s Rule 60(b) motion denied

reconsideration of its summary judgment order, T.A.’s intent to appeal both the Rule

60(b) ruling and the underlying summary judgment ruling is “fairly inferred.” Id.

And we conclude that there is no prejudice to the County that warrants limiting the

notice of appeal to only the Rule 60(b) ruling.

      3.     Summary Judgment Motion. T.A. argues that the district court erred

by granting the County’s motion for summary judgment on her Monell claim solely

on procedural grounds without considering the merits. This argument

mischaracterizes the district court’s order. The district court clearly considered the

merits of T.A.’s Monell claim. On appeal, T.A. does not make any specific argument

that the County’s summary judgment papers were themselves insufficient to support

its motion or that they revealed a genuine issue of material fact. See United States v.

Real Prop. Located at Incline Vill., 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d on

other grounds sub nom. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). Accordingly,

we conclude that the district court did not err in granting the County’s motion.3

      AFFIRMED.4

      3
        T.A.’s request for judicial notice [Dkt. 18] is DENIED, and the County’s
motion to strike the request [Dkt. 20] is DENIED as moot.
      4
        Counsel is ordered to pay the costs taxed against the appellant, if any, and
not pass them to T.A. See Fed. R. App. P. 39.

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