Court Opinion

ID: 9916452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 01:00:41.023162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:27.523109
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10401         Document: 00517027032             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/09/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-10401
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                                January 9, 2024
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                           Clerk

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Jimmie Lee Walton,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:22-CR-273-1
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         A jury found Jimmie Lee Walton guilty of bank robbery, in violation of
   18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court sentenced him to 84 months of
   imprisonment and three years of supervised release. On appeal, he presents
   three arguments: (1) the magistrate judge erred when she granted his
   appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw due to a conflict of interest; (2) the

         _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10401      Document: 00517027032           Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/09/2024

                                     No. 23-10401

   district court erred when it gave an Allen charge instead of declaring a mistrial
   after the jury indicated that it was deadlocked; and (3) the district court erred
   when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the
   Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because the evidence was legally
   insufficient to support his conviction.
          Regarding Walton’s first claim, the record reflects that Walton failed
   to appeal the magistrate judge’s order granting appointed counsel’s motion
   to withdraw to the district court. His failure to appeal the magistrate judge’s
   ruling is fatal to his claim because it deprives this court of jurisdiction. See
   United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Fed. R.
   Crim. P. 59(a).       Because this court lacks jurisdiction to review the
   magistrate judge’s order, the appeal is DISMISSED IN PART.
          As for Walton’s claim that the district court erred in its use of an Allen
   charge, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Andaverde-
   Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 515 (5th Cir. 2013). The term “Allen charge,” which is
   derived from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), generally refers to
   “‘supplemental instructions urging a jury to forego their differences and
   come to a unanimous decision.’” United States v. Eghobor, 812 F.3d 352, 357
   n.2 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bottom, 638 F.2d 781, 786 n.4
   (5th Cir. 1981)). “[T]he relevant inquiry on appeal is whether: (1) any
   semantic deviation from approved Allen-charge language was so prejudicial
   that it requires reversal and (2) the circumstances surrounding the use of the
   charge were coercive.” Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 515.
          In evaluating an Allen charge’s coercive effect, this court considers the
   totality of the circumstances. Id. at 517. “Factors that weigh against finding
   coercion include where: (1) the time lapse between the charge and the jury’s
   decision was not unduly short; (2) the charge was not given prematurely; and
   (3) the jurors were not required to deliberate for an unreasonable length of

                                             2
Case: 23-10401      Document: 00517027032          Page: 3   Date Filed: 01/09/2024

                                    No. 23-10401

   time before the charge was given.” Eghobor, 812 F.3d at 359 (internal
   quotation marks and citations omitted).
          Here, the record reflects that any deviation was not so prejudicial to
   require reversal. Furthermore, the one-hour difference between the charge
   being given and the jury reaching its verdict was not unduly short, see United
   States v. Clayton, 172 F.3d 347, 351–52 (5th Cir. 1999), the charge was not
   prematurely given as the jury deliberated for approximately six hours, see
   Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 517–18, and the jurors were not required to
   deliberate for an unreasonable length of time before the charge was given, see
   Eghobor, 812 F.3d at 359. Given the totality of the circumstances, the district
   court did not abuse its discretion. See Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d at 517.
          Lastly, we review Walton’s insufficiency of the evidence argument de
   novo, although granting “substantial deference to the jury verdict.” United
   States v. Suarez, 879 F.3d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted). Under this rubric, “[i]t is not necessary that the
   evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
   inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v.
   Cannon, 750 F.3d 492, 506 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Instead, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable
   to the verdict, accepting all credibility choices and reasonable inferences
   made by the jury” which support the verdict, United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d
   140, 147 (5th Cir. 2000), this court will affirm if “a reasonable trier of fact
   could conclude . . . the elements of the offense were established beyond a
   reasonable doubt,” Suarez, 879 F.3d at 630 (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          At Walton’s trial, the Government presented (1) testimonial evidence
   from the robbed bank teller and her coworker, (2) testimonial evidence from
   a Dallas Police Department detective, and (3) surveillance footage from the

                                         3
Case: 23-10401      Document: 00517027032          Page: 4    Date Filed: 01/09/2024

                                    No. 23-10401

   bank and surrounding businesses.          Given the “substantial deference”
   afforded to the jury’s verdict, the evidence presented at trial supports the
   conclusion that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the elements of the
   offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted); see United States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 186 (5th
   Cir. 2016). Thus, this argument does not merit reversal.
          Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART and
   DISMISSED IN PART.

                                         4