Court Opinion

ID: 9732810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:36:32.935293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:34.055309
License: Public Domain

Eran oís, J.
(dissenting). Defendant Harvey is a resident of the State of New York. He was a resident of that state at all times pertinent to these proceedings.
Edmund Newton Harvey, defendant’s father, a resident of New Jersey, died in 1959 (the exact date does not appear in the record), leaving a last will which was admitted to probate in Mercer County on August 3, 1959. Real property, out of which this negligence action arose, was devised to defendant and his brother, Richard Bennet Harvey, subject to a life estate in decedent’s wife, Ethel Browne Harvey. Defendant was named executor in the will and he applied to the surrogate for appointment as such.
By virtue of N. J. S. 3A:13-14 Harvey could not act as executor unless he agreed to file and did file a power of attorney designating the surrogate his agent for the purpose of receiving process in any action against the estate. The statute provides:
“Every fiduciary, whether or not a resident within this state, who is granted letters testamentary * * * within this state * * * and power to act within this state in his fiduciary capacity shall, at the time of the grant, or before he undertakes to perform his duties under said authority or power, file a power of attorney with the surrogate of the county or clerk of the court granting such letters or authority and power. The power of attorney shall be duly executed in writing, shall set forth the post-office address, street and number, of the fiduciary and, by sufficient language, constitute the surrogate or clerk with whom the same is filed, and his successors in office, his true and lawful attorney to receive process affecting the estate in charge of the fiduciary, or any interest therein, with the same force *289and effect as if the process were duly served on the fiduciary within this state.”
Process as used therein is defined, among other things, as any summons “that may lawfully be issued out of any court of this state against such fiduciary in any proceeding affecting the estate which he may represent * * N. J. S. 3A:12-13; 6 N. J. Practice (Clapp, Wills and Administration), § 792, pp. 395-397 (1962).
At the time of appointment as executor Harvey signed the form of power of attorney prepared and presented to him by the surrogate. He thereby appointed the surrogate his “attorney, upon whom may be served all process affecting the aforesaid estate, or any interest therein, whereof I am the executor. And [he further agreed] that any process against the aforesaid estate, so served, shall be of the same effect as if duly served upon me within this state.” The form is the one customarily provided for the purpose by the various surrogates. See 8 N. J. Practice (Clapp, Wills and Administration), § 2072, p. 21 (1962); Kocher, New Jersey Probate Law, pp. 944-945 (1916).
This power of attorney created a limited agency. It constituted the surrogate a special agent of Harvey as executor. It made Harvey, as a nonresident executor, amenable to substituted service of process issuing out of the New Jersey courts in suits brought against the estate he represented. It did not render him in his individual capacity subject to the jurisdiction of our courts or their process in any cause of action against him personally.
Plaintiff’s first suit was against the decedent’s estate. Harvey was named defendant in his capacity as executor and process was served on the surrogate as his special agent for the purpose. He was thus involuntarily brought into the New Jersey Superior Court to defend a charge against the estate that plaintiff was injured because of the negligence of the estate while she was on its property in New Jersey as an invitee. Upon being served in the fashion indicated, defendant, in his official capacity, could not ignore the proceeding. *290He was under a duty to the estate to defend the action, and seek exoneration of the estate, particularly because title to the real estate involved had passed under the will immediately on his father’s death to his brother and himself, subject to their mother’s life estate.
When Harvey appeared in the Superior Court on October 16, 1962 for the trial of the action against the estate, he did not do so as a voluntary suitor seeking the use of New Jersey judicial facilities. He was there involuntarily and solely in a representative capacitjq an unwilling suitor brought there by substituted compulsory process served upon his agent specially authorized for the purpose. Por as long as Hew Jersey has had a judicial system it has been the rule that a nonresident brought into this State involuntarily as a defendant or as a witness in a judicial proceeding is immune from service of process in any other suit here while going to the place of trial of the case, during the trial and while returning home. Halsey v. Stewart, 4 N. J. L. 366 [Reprint 426] (Sup. Ct. 1817). It was said that “[c]ourts of justice ought, everywhere, to be open, accessible, free from interruption, and to cast'a perfect protection around every man who necessarily approaches them.” Id., at p. 427.
The omnibus character of the immunity has been criticized as being unfair to a local resident suffering tortious injury in this State at the hands of a nonresident who then returns home leaving the injured person remediless unless he pursues the wrongdoer into the foreign jurisdiction and institutes suit there. Korff v. G. & G. Corp., 21 N. J. 558 (1956). See, Keefe & Roscia, “Immunity and Sentimentality,” 32 Cornell L. Q. 471 (1947); Hote, “Immunity of Hon-Resident Participants in a Judicial Proceeding from Service of Process— A Proposal for Renovation,” 26 Ind. L. J. 459 (1951). The suggestion frequently made is that if a nonresident tortfeasor returns to the local scene of his wrongdoing, he ought to be regarded as subject to service of local process at the hands of the injured resident (unless his return is induced by fraud in order to accomplish the service), regardless of whether he *291is present to attend a judicial proceeding as a party or as a witness.
Partially in response to that suggestion, our courts have declared that when nonresident plaintiffs come here voluntarily, avail themselves of our judicial facilities and seek some affirmative relief, they have no immunity against the filing of related counterclaims or cross-claims in the proceeding. Korff v. G. & G. Corp., supra. But no case has gone so far as to sanction service of process in a personal tort action on a nonresident defendant who has been brought here involuntarily and solely in a representative capacity to defend a suit instituted against his principal. In fact, in Korf, this Court declared the principal cases relied rrpon to defeat the service of the counter-claims and cross-claims were “readily distinguishable” since the plaintiffs entered New Jersey voluntarily and sought affirmative judicial remedies here as contrasted with nonresidents who were in our courts as unwilling suitors under compulsory process. 21 N. J., at pp. 570-572.
There is much to be said, of course, in favor of opening the doors of our courts as wide as the United States Constitution will permit to enable New Jersey residents who are injured here by nonresident visitors to prosecute their claims in this jurisdiction. The Legislature has moved beneficially in that direction with respect to nonresident motorists who cause injuries while using our highways. N. J. 8. A. 39 :7-3. This Court, by rule, has authorized substituted service upon nonresident corporations, partnerships or associations to aid residents in the prosecution of causes of action arising here, if, when the cause of action arose, the nonresident had the necessary contacts in this State to satisfy the requirements of due process. B. B. 4:4-4(d), (e) and (f). But as to nonresident individuals as distinguished from business entities, a much more restrictive provision was adopted. See, R. R. 4:4-4(h).
Subsection (h) of R. B. 4:4r-4 authorizes service:
“Upon an individual engaged in a business within the State in an action arising out of the conduct of such business, by serving, in the *292manner prescribed in paragraph (a) [personal service or “by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on his behalf;”] the individual, or a managing or general agent of the individual employed in such business; or if service cannot be made upon any of the foregoing, by serving any servant of the individual within this State acting in the discharge of his duties in connection with suck business.” (Insertion added)
Although it does not say so expressly, this subsection was probably designed to subject a nonresident who is engaged in business in this State to conventional personal service in suits on causes of action arising here, or to service on a local agent or employee working here in the business, or to service on a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive process on his behalf. There is no real indication that the purpose of this rule was to authorize substituted service of process in the home state of a nonresident in a cause of action arising from an isolated tort committed in New Jersey. In some jurisdictions such service may be made (and its constitutionality has been sustained) on a nonresident who has caused an event to occur in the state out of which the claim arose. See, Executive Properties, Inc. v. Sherman, 223 F. Supp. 1011 (D. C. Ariz. 1963).1
In spite of the failure of this Court to adopt a specific rule of practice to permit the kind of service made in this ease, *293or to furnish any substantial indication in previous cases of an intention to overrule or to depart from the controlling eentury-and-a-quarter-old immunity doctrine applicable here, the majority of my colleagues suddenly cast aside the immunity and visit a new rule retrospectively upon this defendant.
If the Court wishes to wipe out a nonresident’s freedom from service of process whenever he is in this State as a party litigant or as a witness in a judicial proceeding in order to enable residents to prosecute their local tort claims in our tribunals, ample justification exists for such a course. I agree also that use of the new procedure in a given case should be sanctioned only after a consideration of all the facts and weighing the inconvenience to the nonresident in terms of fair play and substantial justice. In other words, the propriety of the service should be tested by all the considerations that underlie the forum non conveniens doctrine.
But, in my judgment the overruling of the immunity principle should be done prospectively and not applied to this case. To subject this defendant to loss of his immunity is to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. He was brought into New Jersey by a form of substituted service which was the quid pro quo he gave for his appointment as executor. That quid pro quo was a consent to be amenable to our courts in his representative capacity whenever his special agent was served with process on a claim against the estate. When served in that fashion he came here as executor to perform the duty he owed, i. e., to defend the estate. Ho other choice was fairly open to him. In fact it was against his personal interest to perform that duty because presentation of proof to exonerate the estate under the facts relating to the claim might reveal his own possible liability.
The problem of liability to the plaintiff for a fall on the premises involved has a number of aspects. Under the decedent’s will his widow was given a life estate in the property. Generally a life tenant has the duty to make repairs thereto which become necessary because of ordinary wear and tear. Green v. Green, 134 N. J. Eq. 479 (Ch. 1944); Mulford v. *294Mulford, 42 N. J. Eq. 68 (Ch. 1886); Dey v. Codman, 39 N. J. Eq. 258 (Prerog. 1884); 5 N. J. Practice (Clapp, Wills and Administration), § 446, pp. 706-707 (1962); 5 Page, Wills (Rev. Ed. 1962), § 39.3, pp. 53—61. The fee in remainder was devised to defendant and his brother, and it passed to them immediately on the testator’s death. If the ownership presents a basis for liability under the circumstances of the case, the responsibility would probably rest on both brothers as joint tortfeasors. Or the liability, if any, might be against the life tenant and remaindermen jointly. In view of these contingencies, it seems unfair to me to deprive defendant of an age-old immunity from service of process and in effect impose on him the burden of seeking contribution or indemnity from his mother or brother or both, if the plaintiff recovers against him. When defendant accepted appointment as executor he agreed to be subject to service of process against the estate. He honored that agreement and came here to defend a suit brought against it. The decision of the majority in effect now adds retroactively an additional clause to his agreement, i. e., if his agent is served and Harvey responds by entering our courts to defend in his representative capacity, he opens himself to service of process in a cause of action which may exist against him personally. But for more than 125 years, we have been telling nonresidents they make no such commitment. The defendant in good faith made and kept his agreement with New Jersey. We can keep ours by giving only prospective scope to the new rule being announced, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U. S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932); Johnson v. Stoveken, 52 N. J. Super. 460 (App. Div. 1958); City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Board of Com’rs of Jersey City, 134 N. J. L. 180, 188 (E. & A. 1946) (dictum); cf. Arrow Builders Supply Corp. v. Hudson Terrace Apartments, Inc., 16 N. J. 47 (1954); “Retroactive Operation of Decisions,” 18 Colum. L. Rev. 230, 251 (1918), or by holding under the circumstances of the case *295that the interests of substantial justice are not advanced by enforcing the new rule against him.
Accordingly, I vote to affirm the order of the trial court. Justice Haneman joins in this dissent.
Proctor, J., concurring in result.
For reversal — Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Jacobs, Proctor, Hall and Schettisto—5.
For affirmance—Justices Prancis and Haneman—2.