Court Opinion

ID: 9964367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 19:12:05.240922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:21.173984
License: Public Domain

04/29/2024

        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                           Assigned on Briefs April 2, 2024

           KEVIN LAWRENCE v. KEVIN GENOVESE, WARDEN

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County
                     No. 21-CR-10814 Mark L. Hayes, Judge

                            No. W2023-00607-CCA-R3-HC

The Petitioner, Kevin Lawrence, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner argues his judgment is void and illegal
because his sentence does not reflect any parole eligibility. Based on our review, we affirm
the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER
and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

M. Todd Ridley (on appeal), Assistant Public Defender—Appellate Division, Franklin,
Tennessee; and Sean P. Day, District Public Defender, Dyersburg, Tennessee, for the
appellant, Kevin Lawrence.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Richard D. Douglas, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; and Danny Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General, for the appellee,
State of Tennessee.

                                        OPINION

                     I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        The Petitioner, along with two codefendants, was indicted by a Shelby County grand
jury for first degree premeditated murder and felony murder following a robbery and killing
on December 28, 1998, in Memphis, Tennessee. At trial, the Petitioner was convicted of
first degree felony murder and second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first
degree premeditated murder. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction
with the felony murder conviction and sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment.
       On direct appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Lawrence,
No. W2001-02638-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22318461, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9,
2003) (“Lawrence I”), perm. app. granted (Tenn. Mar. 8, 2004). On discretionary review,
our supreme court also affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction. State v. Lawrence, 154 S.W.3d
71, 73 (Tenn. 2005) (“Lawrence II”).

       The Petitioner timely petitioned for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction
court denied the petition, and this court affirmed this denial. Lawrence v. State, No.
W2007-02021-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 1034508, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2009),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 5, 2009).

       On December 28, 2021, the Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus in which he alleged his judgment was void and illegal because (1) his sentence of
life imprisonment does not permit the possibility of parole in violation of Tennessee Code
Annotated sections 40-35-501 and 40-28-115; (2) his indictment for felony murder was
defective; (3) his conviction violated double jeopardy; and (4) Tennessee’s first degree
murder statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202, is unconstitutional.

        After counsel was appointed, the habeas corpus court entered an order in which it
stated, “Counsel for [the Petitioner] shall file an amended petition or a declaration that he
is not amending the petition by February 24, 2022.” The Petitioner, through counsel, filed
a notice stating that the petition would not be amended.

       Thereafter, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus,
arguing the petition failed on procedural and substantive grounds. On July 11, 2022, the
habeas corpus court entered an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss the petition.
The habeas corpus court found the petition was procedurally defective because the
Petitioner failed to sign his petition and failed to verify it by affidavit as required by
Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(a). Further, the habeas corpus court found
the petition did not state a cognizable claim for relief.

        On October 4, 2022, the Petitioner, through counsel, filed an unopposed motion to
vacate the order of dismissal and amend the petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas
corpus court granted the motion, vacated the July 11, 2022 order, and allowed the Petitioner
to file an amended petition.

      On March 15, 2023, the Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The amended petition did not raise any additional claims but incorporated all

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claims raised in the original petition. Additionally, the amended petition cured the
procedural defects of the original petition. The habeas corpus court dismissed the amended
petition, finding that the Petitioner was not entitled to relief under any of his four
substantive arguments. On the Petitioner’s first ground, the habeas corpus court found that
the Petitioner’s sentence was not in contradiction to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-35-501 as the supreme court in Brown v. Jordan, 563 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2018)
held that there was no conflict between sections 40-35-501(h) and (i), and a defendant
convicted of first degree murder on or after July 1, 1995, and sentenced to life in prison
may be released, at the earliest, after fifty-one years of imprisonment. Further, the
Petitioner’s sentence was not in contradiction to Tennessee Code Annotated
section 40-28-115 because this statute applies only to persons who committed crimes prior
to July 1, 1982, by virtue of the provisions in the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1982. On the Petitioner’s additional grounds for relief, the habeas corpus court
found that (1) the indictment appeared to meet the requirements of Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-13-202 and properly charged the Petitioner with first degree felony
murder; (2) no double jeopardy issues appear in the judgment as the Petitioner’s
convictions were merged and no separate or additional sentence was imposed; and (3) no
authority supports the Petitioner’s proposition that Tennessee’s first degree murder statute
is unconstitutional. This timely appeal followed.

                                     II.    ANALYSIS

        The Petitioner contends on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing
his petition for failure to state a claim. The Tennessee Constitution guarantees a convicted
criminal defendant the right to seek habeas corpus relief. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15.
While the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus is a constitutional right, it is regulated by
statute in Tennessee. See Ussery v. Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tenn. 1968). The statute
provides, with certain limited exceptions, that “[a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of
liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, . . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to
inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint.”                     Tenn. Code
Ann. § 29-21-101(a). However, the “grounds upon which habeas corpus relief will be
granted are very narrow.” Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). The writ will
issue only where the petitioner has established on the face of the judgment or the record of
the proceeding upon which the judgment was rendered that: (1) the convicting court was
without jurisdiction to sentence the petitioner; or (2) the petitioner’s sentence has expired
and he is entitled to immediate release. See State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn.
2000); Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). The purpose of the habeas
corpus petition is to contest a void, not merely a voidable, judgment. State ex rel. Newsom
v. Henderson, 424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tenn. 1968).

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        A void judgment is “one that is facially invalid because the court did not have the
statutory authority to render such judgment.” Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 256
(Tenn. 2007). A sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute is illegal and, thus,
void. Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910, 911 (Tenn. 2000). A petitioner bears the
burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). A habeas corpus court
may summarily dismiss a petition without a hearing when the petition “fails to demonstrate
that the judgment is void.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 16, 20 (Tenn. 2004); see Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-21-109. The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a
question of law, and our review is de novo. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255.

        We begin by addressing a procedural irregularity in this case. As noted above, the
habeas corpus court, upon the Petitioner’s motion, set aside its order dismissing the
Petitioner’s original petition. The legal basis for this order of vacation is unclear. In his
motion, the Petitioner did not move the habeas corpus court to vacate pursuant to any
particular rule or law. In turn, the habeas corpus court did not grant the motion pursuant
to any particular rule or law. See Grooms v. State, No. E2014-01228-CCA-R3-HC, 2015
WL 1396474, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2015) (holding that an order denying
habeas corpus relief becomes final thirty days after its entry, and a habeas corpus court
lacks jurisdiction to issue additional orders on the petition after that time). Despite this
ambiguity, the amended petition is procedurally sound to serve as a separate, original
petition. First, the amended petition cured the procedural deficiencies of the original
petition. Specifically, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(a), the
Petitioner signed the petition and verified it by affidavit. Second, under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4), the amended petition noted that a previous application
for writ of habeas corpus had been made and attached a copy of the original petition.
Therefore, we will review the amended petition as a new petition for writ of habeas corpus
rather than an amendment to the previously-denied petition.

       On appeal, the Petitioner’s sole argument is that the habeas corpus court erred in its
denial of the Petitioner’s claim that his judgment was void and illegal because the
Petitioner’s sentence does not reflect parole eligibility. The State alleges this argument has
been waived due to the Petitioner’s reliance on a new theory on appeal. We begin by
addressing this waiver argument.

        A petitioner cannot change theories of relief from the habeas corpus court to the
appellate court. Pittman v. Steward, No. W2011-01632-CCA-R3-HC, 2012 WL 2514909,
at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 2, 2012). In Pittman, the petitioner argued, both in his petition

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and on appeal, that the indictment in his case was defective. Id. However, the petitioner
changed his underlying theory as to this proposition from the habeas corpus court to the
appellate court. Id. In his petition, the petitioner asserted that the indictment was defective
due to missing elements; on appeal, the petitioner asserted the indictment was defective
because alternative bases for the elements were alleged. Id. This court held that the new
theory was waived on appeal. Id. (citing State v. Dooley, 29 S.W.3d 542, 549 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2000)).

       Here, the Petitioner argues both in his petition and on appeal that his judgment is
void and illegal because his sentence of life imprisonment deprives him of the possibility
of parole. However, like in Pittman, the Petitioner’s theory underlying this argument
changed from the habeas corpus court to this court. In his petition, and the issue addressed
by the habeas corpus court, the Petitioner argued his judgment was void and illegal because
his sentence of life imprisonment does not permit the possibility of parole in contravention
of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-501 and 40-28-115. On appeal, the Petitioner
argues that his sentence of life imprisonment is illegal because it does not permit the
possibility of parole despite this court’s and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s finding that
the Petitioner’s sentence included the possibility of parole by operation of law.
Specifically, the Petitioner relies on the law of the case doctrine to advance this latter
argument, stating the issue of the Petitioner’s parole eligibility is settled and cannot be
reconsidered. Due to the Petitioner’s change in theory on appeal, this issue is waived.

       Notwithstanding waiver, we conclude the Petitioner failed to establish a cognizable
claim for habeas corpus relief. As explained above, the Petitioner argues on appeal that,
under the law of the case doctrine, his sentence of life imprisonment is void and illegal.
His argument relies on language in Lawrence I and II describing his sentence as including
the possibility of parole.

        Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court’s decision on an issue of
law is binding in later trials and appeals of the same case if the facts on the second trial or
appeal are substantially the same as the facts in the first trial or appeal. State v. Jefferson,
31 S.W.3d 558, 560-61 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Memphis Publ’g. Co. v. Tennessee
Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tenn. 1998)).
Furthermore, “[t]he doctrine applies to issues that were actually before the appellate court
in the first appeal and to issues that were necessarily decided by implication.” Id. “There
are limited circumstances which may justify reconsideration of an issue which was [an]
issue decided in a prior appeal: (1) the evidence offered at a trial or hearing after remand
was substantially different from the evidence in the initial proceeding; (2) the prior ruling
was clearly erroneous and would result in a manifest injustice if allowed to stand; or (3)

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the prior decision is contrary to a change in the controlling law which has occurred between
the first and second appeal.” Id. (quoting Memphis Publ’g. Co., 975 S.W.2d at 306).
Notably, the doctrine does not apply to dicta. Id.

        The issue of the Petitioner’s parole eligibility was not before this court or the
supreme court on direct appeal. See Lawrence I, 2003 WL 22318461, at *1; Lawrence II,
154 S.W.3d at 73. The Petitioner argues, however, that the issue of his parole eligibility
was necessarily decided by implication, stating that in the courts’ affirmation of the
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, the courts found his sentence included parole
eligibility. Specifically, Petitioner cites to the courts’ statements that the Petitioner was
sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. While this court and the supreme court did
state that the Petitioner was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole, the purpose of
these statements was factual recitation, not a holding on a presented issue. See Lawrence
I, 2003 WL 22318461, at *1, *7; Lawrence II, 154 S.W.3d at 75. Further, none of the
issues decided by this court or the supreme court on prior appeals implicates the
Petitioner’s sentence or parole eligibility. Lawrence I, 2003 WL 22318461, at *1;
Lawrence II, 154 S.W.3d at 73. This court and the supreme court made no determination,
either explicitly or implicitly, that would serve as the law of the case concerning the
Petitioner’s parole eligibility. The courts’ affirmation of the trial court’s judgment on
separate issues does not extend to a decision on the Petitioner’s parole eligibility.
Therefore, the Petitioner’s claim that his sentence includes parole eligibility under the law
of the case doctrine such that habeas corpus relief should be granted to reflect this eligibility
is meritless.

        Furthermore, we recognize that the phrase “life with the possibility of parole” does
not describe a legally available sentence for first degree murder in Tennessee, even though
it has been used colloquially to differentiate between two of the available sentences for that
offense—i.e., “imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole” and “imprisonment
for life.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a); see also Penley v. State, No. E2004-00129-
CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 2439287, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 1, 2004) (“The term ‘life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole’ is inaccurate and is mistakenly used to
differentiate between the more severe sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.”). Here, for a defendant committing first degree murder, “a sentence of life in
prison entitles the defendant to be released, as opposed to paroled, after serving 100% of
sixty years less any eligible credits, so long as they do not operate to reduce the sentence
by more than 15%, or nine years, which would result in a total sentence of fifty-one years.”
Penley, 2004 WL 2439287, at *3; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(h)(2). The usage of
“life with the possibility of parole” in Lawrence I and II was likely to differentiate the
Petitioner’s sentence from the more severe sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

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See id. In any instance, the use of the phrase “life with the possibility of parole” in prior
appellate decisions does not render the Petitioner’s judgment void. See Williams v. State,
No. W2013-00555-CCA-R3-HC, 2013 WL 5493568, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 30,
2013) (stating that use of the phrase “Life with Parole” on petitioner’s judgment would not
render the petitioner’s judgment void); Rose v. Lindamood, No. M2017-00928-CCA-R3-
HC, 2018 WL 3116609, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2018) (stating that the trial
court’s use of the phrase “life imprisonment with the possibility of parole” at the sentencing
hearing does not cause petitioner’s judgment to be void). As a result, and notwithstanding
waiver, the Petitioner would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief.

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

       Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court dismissing
the petition.

                                                  ______________________________
                                                  KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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