Court Opinion

ID: 9602680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:58:51.935398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:05.808867
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the holding that the principle of last clear chance is not applicable under the evidence in this case; but I dissent from the conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Whether he was or *90not is, in my opinion, a question of fact which should be decided by a jury and hence final judgment should not be entered here.
The defendant claimed that he did not see the plaintiff until he was within 15 or 20 feet of him. As his reason for not seeing him sooner he said Nee was in the shadow of the street light.
The defendant testified he was driving at “approximately” 35 miles an hour in a 35 mile zone, and was preparing to pass a bus ahead of him. There was no other' traffic then on the street. There were skid marks on the dry pavement extending 55 feet back of his car. A police officer had no difficulty in measuring the skid marks in the existing light. After the accident Nee was lying in the south-bound lane, one step from the west side of the street. The defendant testified he hit him with the left front of his car.
Rather clearly it would appear that there was at least a jury question whether the defendant was driving and looking with reasonable care when he struck the plaintiff under the circumstances shown by the evidence.
The defendant states in his brief that “Nee’s testimony, shows the accident occurred at an intersection, whereas defendant’s testimony shows the accident occurred at a white fence shown to be 100 feet from the intersection.”
That being the case, it was for the jury to say where the accident occurred, and if it occurred in the intersection, then to say whether the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, in view of the provisions of § 46-244 of the Code, giving the right of way to pedestrians under stated conditions, and requiring that drivers of vehicles entering intersections “shall change their course, slow down or come to a complete stop if necessary to permit *91pedestrians to safely and expeditiously cross such intersection.”
The plaintiff testified that he saw the car approaching but “so far away that I did not even think nothing about it,” and “I did not think I would have to worry about it.”
In Reese v. Snelson, 192 Va. 479, 65 S. E. (2d) 547, the plaintiff saw some vehicles approaching about half a block away and thought he would have ample time to cross the southern half of Broad street and reach the sidewalk before they arrived. He did not look again until he was two-thirds of the way across and then defendant’s car “was almost upon him.” He was struck and injured. We held that it was for the jury to say whether he was guilty of negligence.
In Bethea v. Virginia Elec., etc., Co., 183 Va. 873, 880, 33 S. E. (2d) 651, 653, when the plaintiff started across the street the bus was approximately 70 feet away. We said: “If he was crossing at a proper place, the plaintiff had the legal right to assume that the driver would give'him the right of way, a right which the drivers of motor vehicles too often overlook. Whether the plaintiff was exercising a reasonable lookout for his safety as he crossed the street was a question for the jury.”
See also Lucas v. Graft, 161 Va. 228, 170 S. E. 836; Overton v. Slaughter, 190 Va. 172, 56 S. E. (2d) 358; Danner v. Cunningham, post, p. 142, 72 S. E. (2d) 354.
I would remand the case for a new trial on the questions of the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
Miller, J., joins in this dissent.