Court Opinion

ID: 9408848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 21:00:33.487553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.288554
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023    Pg: 1 of 11

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4073

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        MATTHEW JASON HUTTON,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Greenville. Donald C. Coggins, Jr., District Judge. (6:20-cr-00115-DCC-1)

        Submitted: December 7, 2022                                       Decided: July 12, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Derek J. Enderlin, ROSS & ENDERLIN, PA, Greenville, South Carolina,
        for Appellant. M. Rhett DeHart, Acting United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, Jr.,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 2 of 11

        PER CURIAM:

               Matthew Jason Hutton appeals his Guidelines range sentence of 200 months in

        prison and lifetime supervised release for using a minor to produce child pornography in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). In the district court, Hutton argued for a mandatory

        minimum prison sentence of 180 months, and he objected to two special conditions of

        supervision. In arguing for a mandatory minimum prison term, he suggested that lifetime

        supervision was appropriate and did not argue for a shorter term. On appeal, he challenges

        his lifetime supervised release term, four special conditions, including three that he did not

        challenge in the district court and one that he did, and his prison sentence.

               “We ‘review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

        Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v.

        Barronette, 46 F.4th 177, 208 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

        41 (2007)). “First, we ‘ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural

        error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating

        the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting

        a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen

        sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” United

        States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). If we

        find no significant procedural error, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the

        sentence imposed. United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2020).

               “This standard applies when considering a defendant’s term of imprisonment, his

        term of supervised release, and any condition of that release.” Id. We presume that a

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 3 of 11

        sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is substantively

        reasonable. United States v. Devine, 40 F.4th 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2022). A defendant can

        only rebut the presumption by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured

        against the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).

               “As is well understood, to meet the procedural reasonableness standard, a district

        court must conduct an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and

        impose an appropriate sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” United States

        v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “Specifically, a district court’s explanation should provide some indication [] that the court

        considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied them to the particular defendant, and also that

        it considered a defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence.” Id. at 212-13

        (internal quotation marks omitted). “But a court need not ‘address every argument a

        defendant makes,’ focusing instead on the whole of defendant’s argument.” United States

        v. Hardin, 998 F.3d 582, 592 (4th Cir. 2021). Moreover, “where the district court imposes

        a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate or lengthy.” Id.

        (internal quotation marks omitted). To be procedurally adequate, we must “find sufficient

        explanation to allow this Court to conduct meaningful appellate review.” United States v.

        Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019).

               “District courts have ‘broad latitude’ to impose discretionary conditions of

        supervised release.” United States v. Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2021). “Under 18

        U.S.C. § 3583(d), a court may only impose conditions that (1) are ‘reasonably related’ to

        the goals of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation; (2) affect ‘no greater

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073       Doc: 30        Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 4 of 11

        deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve those goals; and (3) are

        ‘consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’”

        Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). “[A]s with other parts of a sentence, the district court

        must adequately explain any special conditions of supervised release.” Arbaugh, 951 F.3d

        at 178. “Unless a district court explains why particular special conditions are being

        imposed, ‘we have no basis for determining whether they are reasonably related to [the

        § 3583(d)] factors.’” United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 676 (4th Cir. 2020).

               However, “in some cases ‘the reason for [a post-release condition is] so self-evident

        and unassailable’ that no remand is required.” United States v. Arce, 49 F.4th 382, 397

        (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting McMiller, 954 F.3d at 677). Moreover, “if the reasons for a given

        condition are ‘self-evident,’ and a defendant fails to raise nonfrivolous objections, a

        ‘sentence-as-a-whole’ explanation can suffice.” Boyd, 5 F.4th at 559 (quoting McMiller,

        954 F.3d at 677).

               In the district court, Hutton argued for a mandatory minimum prison sentence of

        180 months, at the bottom of his Guidelines range; and he objected to special conditions 3

        and 8. In arguing for the minimum prison sentence, he suggested the court could impose

        a lifetime supervised release term to ensure the safety of the community, monitor his

        readjustment to society, and make sure he is complying with the rules of supervised release.

        In response to his objections, the district court modified special conditions 3 and 8. On

        appeal, Hutton contends the court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose a

        lifetime supervised release term; and he challenges special conditions 1, 2, 7, and 8. He

        also contends that his within-Guidelines range prison sentence is unreasonable.

                                                     4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073       Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023      Pg: 5 of 11

               Because Hutton did not argue for a shorter supervised release term or object to

        special conditions 1, 2, and 7 in the district court, we review his challenges to the court’s

        explanation for its supervised release term and to special conditions 1, 2, and 7 for plain

        error. See United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 611-13 (4th Cir. 2022); McMiller, 954 F.3d

        at 675; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576-80 (4th Cir. 2010). To establish plain

        error, Hutton must show that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his

        substantial rights. See McMiller, 954 F.3d at 674. Even if he does so, we will exercise our

        discretion to correct the error only if it “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public

        reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. After reviewing Hutton’s arguments, and in light

        of our recent decision in United States v. Cohen, 63 F.4th 250, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2023), we

        conclude that there is plain error in clause one of special condition 7 affecting Hutton’s

        substantial rights, but we conclude that Hutton fails to show any other plain error.

               The district court explained that it imposed lifetime supervised release because of

        the nature and circumstances of the offense and Hutton’s characteristics as set out in the

        presentence report. In explaining its sentence-as-a-whole, the court also found his offense

        and characteristics involved manipulation and deception, rendering others unable to protect

        the victim; if he had not been arrested in this case, he would have continued his criminal

        conduct; and there was a significant need to deter him and protect others from his future

        conduct. Given that a lifetime supervised release term is recommended for sex offenses,

        see USSG § 5D1.2, and Hutton did not argue for a shorter supervised release term, we

        conclude that he has not shown any plain error affecting his substantial rights.

                                                       5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023      Pg: 6 of 11

               We further conclude that he fails to show the district court plainly erred in imposing

        special conditions 1 and 2. Hutton first contends that the court failed to explain why it

        imposed these special conditions, which limit his unapproved contact with minors. We

        disagree. When it imposed the conditions, it explained they were imposed to protect the

        public due to the nature and circumstances of the offense. Moreover, since the reasons for

        the conditions were self-evident, and he did not object in the district court, we conclude

        the court’s explanation for its sentence-as-a-whole was sufficient to explain the conditions.

               As for Hutton’s other challenges to special conditions 1 and 2, we find no plain error

        by the district court. We have determined that “conditions implementing a prohibition on

        unapproved contact with minors are reasonable to protect the public”; and we have rejected

        arguments that they were overly broad and impermissibly vague. Arce, 49 F.4th at 397;

        United States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 423 (4th Cir. 2021). Although there must be “a

        reasonably direct relationship between [a] defendant’s conduct relevant to the offense of

        conviction and the occupation being restricted,” restrictions on “jobs that involve regular

        or private contact with minors, or to occupations that would provide [a defendant] ready

        opportunity to ply his proclivities for child sexual abuse” are reasonable. Hamilton, 986

        F.3d at 420 (internal quotation marks omitted); Arce, 49 F.4th at 397.

               As for special condition 7, Hutton contends that the district court’s explanation was

        inadequate; and the condition is vague, overbroad, and unsupported by a nexus between

        pornography and his crime or treatment. With one exception based on our recent decision

        in Cohen, we conclude that Hutton fails to show any plain error by the district court.

                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 7 of 11

               “Restrictions on otherwise legal pornography are permissible under § 3583(d)

        where the district court adequately explains why they are appropriate, and the record

        supports such a finding.” United States v. Van Donk, 961 F.3d 314, 322 (4th Cir. 2020).

        “For example, other circuits have upheld bans on adult pornography where a treatment

        provider testified that sexually stimulating images could cause the defendant to revert to

        accessing child pornography, where the defendant had often videotaped his sexual assaults,

        leading the district court to find a connection between pornography and his criminal

        behavior, and where a probation officer believed that such a ban was needed to address the

        defendant’s deviant sexual behavior triggered by his alcohol abuse.”         Id. at 322-23

        (citations omitted). “In contrast, appellate courts have struck down such conditions when

        they were unaccompanied by individualized explanations for their broad sweep.” Id. at

        323; United States v. Ellis, 984 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding pornography

        restriction “inadequately supported and explained”).

               Here, Hutton created nude videos and pictures of his 14-year-old stepdaughter; and

        he sent those pictures to others using the internet, in exchange for more child pornography.

        He admitted that the pictures and videos were for sexual purposes. He also disclosed that

        he and his wife were involved in swinging; he found the people that he traded pictures with

        in chat rooms geared toward daughters and swinging; he used testosterone to enhance his

        sexual performance; and he suggested that his testosterone treatment may have been

        responsible for his offense of using his stepdaughter to create child pornography.

               The probation officer recommended a special condition prohibiting Hutton not only

        from possessing materials depicting or describing child pornography, as defined in 18

                                                     7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 8 of 11

        U.S.C. § 2256, but also possessing or accessing materials or web sites depicting children

        or adults in the nude and/or engaged in sexual activity; and it further prohibited him from

        patronizing businesses or places whose primary purpose is to provide sexually-oriented

        material or entertainment. Hutton did not object to the recommended condition.

               When imposing the condition, the district court not only explained that it imposed

        the special conditions to protect the public due to the nature and circumstances of the

        offense, but it also explained why it restricted adult pornography. Specifically, the court

        explained: “With respect to the prohibition on adult pornography, I find that that is

        reasonably related to your conduct in this case, because you have disclosed that this

        testosterone treatment and certain activities that you and your wife were engaging in may

        have played a role in your desire or decision to engage in this conduct, and so I do find that

        it is related.” (J.A. 103). The court also explained that although a convenience store may

        have inappropriate magazines, the prohibition on entry into businesses only applies to those

        places whose primary purpose is to provide sexually oriented material or entertainment;

        and if he has a question about a particular place, he should ask his probation officer.

               We conclude that the district court adequately explained why a restriction on adult

        pornography was appropriate in Hutton’s case and that the record supports the finding. As

        for his overbreadth and vagueness challenges to special condition 7, we conclude that the

        first clause is plainly overbroad in light of our recent decision in Cohen, 63 F.4th at 256-

        57. We further conclude that the error affected Hutton’s substantial rights, and we should

        exercise our discretion to correct the error. As we did in Cohen, we therefore vacate the

        first clause of the special condition and remand for entry of a modified judgment striking

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073        Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023      Pg: 9 of 11

        that clause. * But, we find no plain error in the remaining parts of the condition. See Cohen,

        63 F.4th at 257 (rejecting the appellant’s overbreadth and vagueness challenges to other

        clauses); Van Donk, 961 F.3d at 323-26 (condition forbidding defendant from viewing

        materials that gave him an erection was not impermissibly vague); Hamilton, 986 F.3d at

        423-24 (movement restriction was not impermissibly vague or overbroad).

               Hutton next challenges special condition 8, which prohibits possession of a personal

        device linked to the internet unless approved by the probation officer, which approval shall

        not be unreasonably withheld. The condition does not apply to devices maintained at his

        workplace, school, or library. Moreover, the condition is accompanied by other conditions

        regarding the monitoring of approved devices; and as explained by the district court at

        sentencing, it is clear from the conditions that special condition 8 is not an outright internet

        ban but a process to apply the monitoring conditions for personal devices, to which Hutton

        did not object. In the district court, Hutton objected that the condition was overbroad, and

        it gave the probation officer unguided discretion. The court overruled the objection based

        on Hamilton, but it added language providing that such approval shall not be unreasonably

        withheld to address Hutton’s concerns about the probation officer’s discretion; and it

        explained that the intent of the condition was not to prohibit him from using the internet

        but to prohibit him from obtaining any such device without prior notification to his

        probation officer.

               *
                The first clause begins with the second word in special condition 7, i.e., “must,”
        and ends with the phrase “engaged in sexual activity[], and.” Cohen, 63 F.4th at 256.

                                                       9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30          Filed: 07/12/2023     Pg: 10 of 11

               On appeal, Hutton repeats his arguments that the condition is overbroad and gives

        the probation officer unlimited discretion. Since he asserted these arguments in the district

        court, we review them for abuse of discretion. See Boyd, 5 F.4th at 556-57. We conclude

        that Hutton’s arguments are without merit. See Hamilton, 986 F.3d at 420-23. Here, there

        was not only internet criminality, but there was also contact with a minor victim when

        Hutton took nude videos and pictures of his 14-year-old stepdaughter in her family’s

        bathroom and placed her pictures on the internet. Moreover, in light of the court’s

        modification to the condition and explanation of its intent, we conclude there are sufficient

        parameters on the probation officer’s discretion in this case. See id. at 420.

               Hutton also conclusorily contends this condition is impermissibly vague because it

        “will most likely include a host of every-day items we take for granted.” (Appellant’s Br.

        at 22). Even assuming that his objection in the district court made his vagueness argument

        obvious and he thus preserved the argument, see Boyd, 5 F.4th at 556-57, we conclude he

        fails to show the condition does not give him “fair notice of the conduct that it punishes or

        is so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement,” see Van Donk, 961 F.3d at 323-24

        (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore find this argument without merit.

               Finally, Hutton contends his prison sentence is procedurally unreasonable, because

        the district court failed to adequately address his arguments for a lower sentence; and his

        sentence is substantively unreasonable, because it is greater than necessary to accomplish

        the goals of sentencing under § 3553(a). We have reviewed the record and Hutton’s appeal

        arguments, and we conclude that his Guidelines range prison sentence is procedurally and

        substantively reasonable. The district court conducted an individualized assessment of the

                                                     10
USCA4 Appeal: 21-4073      Doc: 30         Filed: 07/12/2023      Pg: 11 of 11

        facts and arguments presented at sentencing, considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied

        them to Hutton’s case, and considered his nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence;

        and the court’s explanation was sufficient for our meaningful review. We further conclude

        that Hutton fails to rebut the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable.

               Accordingly, we vacate the first clause of special condition 7 and remand for entry

        of a modified judgment striking that clause, but we affirm the district court’s judgment in

        all other respects and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We

        dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

        presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

        process.

                                                                             AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                              VACATED IN PART,
                                                                               AND REMANDED

                                                    11