Court Opinion

ID: 9494288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:34:14.790977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:20.012995
License: Public Domain

ALAN E. NORRIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BATCHELDER, J., joined. CLAY, J. (PP. 623-37), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
OPINION
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
In this capital case, the State of Ohio, representing Warden Terry Collins, appeals from an order of the district court conditionally granting Jerome Henderson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to his death sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2264. For his part, petitioner cross-appeals from the denial of the writ with respect to his guilt.
After careful review of the many issues raised by petitioner in his cross-appeal, we conclude that the district court properly denied relief. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court as to the issues raised on cross-appeal. Henderson v. Collins, 101 F.Supp.2d 866 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Because the order of the district court was particularly thorough and well-reasoned, any opinion that we might issue concerning the issues raised by petitioner in his cross-appeal would be duplicative and serve no useful purpose.
At the same time, we must reverse the district court’s conditional grant of the writ with respect to petitioner’s sentence.
I.
The facts that gave rise to petitioner’s prosecution have been summarized by the Ohio Supreme Court and need not be repeated here. See State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 24-25, 528 N.E.2d 1237, 1238-40 (1988).
The only issue on which the district court granted relief concerns an Allen charge1 given to the jury by the trial court after it reported a deadlock. The jury began its deliberation in the penalty phase of the trial at 12:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 24, 1985. At 1:22 p.m. the next day, the jury sent the following message to the court: “We are deadlocked, period.” In response, the court instructed the jury in these terms:
You all know that for the purpose of returning a verdict at this time all twelve of you must agree. And you have a duty to agree, if it is at all possible.
Now when you talk to each other in that jury room, obviously each one of you should pay the proper respect to the other person’s opinion. And if you do have differences, you should examine those differences in the spirit of honesty and fairness.
I’m not suggesting by any stretch of the imagination that any one of you should give up a well-grounded opinion or to violate your oath. But it does mean that jurors should not refuse to agree because of mere stubbornness.
Each one of you should examine the facts from your own viewpoint and from the viewpoint of the other jurors.
Now the verdict of the jury obviously should represent the opinion of each of *618you. But this doesn’t mean that you can’t change your opinions, changing them by talking to each other, because the very object of this whole system is to reach an agreement by each one of you comparing your different views.
So I don’t think you’re deadlocked. You go back there and talk it over....
Defense counsel lodged no objection to this instruction. The jury resumed deliberations and returned a sentence of death some four hours later.
In his direct appeal, petitioner designated this instruction as an assignment of error. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected his argument in the following terms:
In his ninth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred in giving a supplemental instruction ordering the jury to continue its deliberations concerning the sentence after the jury reported to the court that it was deadlocked. Appellant states that when confronted by a deadlocked jury the court should instruct the jury to determine which life sentence to recommend, rather than giving the jury a supplemental charge to continue deliberating in the hope that unanimity will be achieved.
We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court’s charge conforms with the type approved in State v. Maupin (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 71 O.O.2d 485, 330 N.E.2d 708, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus, and Jenkins, [15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984)], and was not in error. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a similar supplemental charge did not impermissibly coerce the jury to return a death sentence in Lowenfield, supra, at [235-41], 108 S.Ct. at 550-552, 98 L.Ed.2d at 577-579.
State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio St.3d at 31-32, 528 N.E.2d at 1244-45 (footnote omitted).
As the Ohio Supreme Court recognized, Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), considered the constitutionality of an Allen charge given during jury deliberations in the penalty phase of a capital case. The State takes the position that Lowenfield cannot be distinguished from the case sub judice and therefore dictates our outcome.
In Lowenfield, during the second day of deliberations the jury indicated to the trial judge that it “was unable to reach a decision at that time, and request[ed] that the court again advise the jury as to its responsibilities.” Id. at 234, 108 S.Ct. 546. The trial judge responded by asking the individual jurors to respond in writing to the question whether “further deliberations would be helpful in obtaining a verdict.” Id. Eight of the twelve responded affirmatively. After a defense motion for a mistrial was overruled, the jury reconvened in the courtroom for further instructions, at which time a note was given to the judge stating that some of the jurors had misunderstood his original question. This time the judge asked each juror, “Do you feel that any further deliberations will enable you to arrive at a verdict?” Id. This time eleven jurors responded affirmatively. At this point the trial judge gave the jury an Allen charge. Defense counsel failed to object to either the polls of the jury or to the supplemental instruction. Thirty minutes after resuming deliberations, the jury returned a sentence of death. See id. at 236, 108 S.Ct. 546.
In Lowenfield, the Court began its substantive discussion by observing that an Allen charge must be reviewed “ ‘in its context and under all the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 546 (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965)); accord United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d *619984, 990 (6th Cir.1999). As Lowenfield and cases from this circuit suggest, see, e.g., Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847 (6th Cir.1984), the due process inquiry associated with an Allen charge focuses on the circumstances that triggered the charge, as well as the language of the charge itself. For example, in Lowenfield the Court considered the contents of the note from the jury, the manner in which the trial judge polled its members, and the length of deliberations that followed the Allen charge. In Williams, we considered similar issues, including whether the charge as given im-permissibly coerced minority jurors. Id. at 850. Nowhere, however, has the Supreme Court or this court extended the inquiry as broadly as the dissent would; while the cases cited by the dissent support the unremarkable proposition that an Allen charge, like any other jury instruction, cannot be viewed in artificial isolation, they do not support the position that review of the Allen charge sweeps all preliminary instructions — even those given without objection — into the inquiry.
After noting the context in which an Allen charge must be reviewed, the Court in Lowenfield quoted the following passage from Allen charge itself:
The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the ver-diet shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment; or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men who are equally honest and intelligent as himself.
Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 287, 108 S.Ct. 546 (quoting Allen, 164 U.S. at 501-502, 17 S.Ct. 154). Although the petitioner contended that an Allen charge presented a particular danger of coercion in his case because the Louisiana statute at issue called for the imposition of a life sentence in the event of a hung jury,2 the Court rejected that contention:
The difference between the division of function between the jury and judge in this case and the division in Allen obviously weighs in the constitutional calculus, but we do not find it dispositive. The State has in a capital sentencing proceeding a strong interest in having the jury “express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death.” Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1775, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Surely if the jury had returned from its deliberations after only one hour and informed the court that it had failed to achieve unanimity on the first ballot, the court would incontestably have had the authority to insist that they deliberate further. This is true even in capital cases such as this one and Allen, even though we are naturally mindful in such cases that the “qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978).
*620Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 238-39, 108 S.Ct. 546. Finally, the Court conceded that the jury’s relatively quick response to the Allen charge “suggests the possibility of coercion,” but nonetheless concluded that defense counsel’s failure to object “indicates that the potential for coercion ... was not apparent to one on the spot.” Id. at 240, 108 S.Ct. 546 (footnote omitted).
With these considerations in mind, we turn to the case before us. We begin by observing that neither party suggests that the language of the supplemental charge given by the trial court runs afoul of Allen. See State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975) (syllabus) (setting out preferred language of supplemental Allen charge). Rather, petitioner focuses upon the manner in which the charge potentially interacts with the Ohio sentencing statute. That statute provides as follows:
Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, the trial jury, if the offender was tried by a jury, shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. If the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding, the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty full years of imprisonment or to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.
Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(2) (Anderson 1982) (subsequently amended to include a sentence of life imprisonment without parole). The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently read the statute to require that both a sentence of death and a sentence of life with parole eligibility be unanimous. See State v. Jenkins, 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984) (syllabus); State v. Springer, 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 N.E.2d 96 (1992) (syllabus) (when jury unable to reach a unanimous verdict on either death or one of two statutorily prescribed life sentences, the statute requires the trial court to impose one of two life sentences). More recently, the Court explained, “Jenkins defines what the jury’s job is — to render a unanimous verdict. Springer simply explains what a trial court must do if a jury is deadlocked, that is, when the jury does not properly do its job.” State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148, 162, 661 N.E.2d 1030, 1042 (1996). In Brooks, the Court also clarified two other propositions: 1) a jury need not rule out the death penalty before considering a life sentence, and 2) “practically speaking, a lone juror could prevent the imposition of the death penalty.” Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 160-61, 661 N.E.2d at 1041-42.
The thrust of petitioner’s position is that, consistent with Springer, the trial court should have taken the matter from the jury at the time that it first reported a deadlock and imposed one of the two possible life sentences. According to petitioner, to do otherwise favors only those jurors supporting the death penalty because continued deliberation may result in a death verdict, while calling a halt to deliberation results in a statutorily mandated life sentence. Thus, an Allen charge is impermis-sibly coercive because it encourages a *621death sentence.3 In granting the writ on this issue, the district court concluded that “because the trial judge’s original charge to the jury in the penalty phase was not an accurate reflection of the language of § 2929.03(D)(2), the supplemental instruction to the jury resulted in coercion and prejudice to Petitioner....” Henderson, 101 F.Supp.2d at 916. The part of the original charge found objectionable reads as follows:
If the State of Ohio has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that either one of the aggravating circumstances of the murder outweighs any mitigating factor that may exist in this case, then it would be your duty to recommend the death penalty.
However, if you find from the evidence that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either one of the aggravating circumstances of the murder outweighs any mitigating factor that may exist, then it’s your duty to not recommend the death penalty.
[I]n the event that you do not recommend the death penalty, obviously you would continue your deliberations and you’ll recommend one of two other possible penalties.
Id. at 917. In the.view of the district court, “[tjhis language does not accurately reflect the language in § 2929.03(D)(2).” Id.
We are reluctant to accord this preliminary instruction significant weight in our consideration of the constitutionality of the subsequent Allen charge for three reasons. First, as already discussed, we read Jenkins as authorizing a review of the “facts and circumstances” surrounding the Allen charge itself and not as a carte blanche invitation to bootstrap every preliminary instruction into the inquiry. Second, the record reveals that counsel for petitioner did not advance that argument to the Ohio courts. Third, and most importantly, we are not convinced that the instruction did, in fact, misrepresent the statute. In fact, even the district court conceded, “We believe that the trial judge’s original charge to the jury correctly impressed upon them that they had to determine whether Petitioner would or would not receive the death penalty based on the weight of the aggravating factors before beginning deliberations on recommending either of the two life sentences.” Id. at 918. Moreover, the pattern jury instructions propounded by the Ohio Judicial Conference for the statute at issue provide, in part:
CONCLUSION. You shall recommend the sentence of death if you unanimously (all twelve) find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors.
If you do not so find, you shall unanimously (all twelve) recommend either life sentence with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment or life sentence with parole eligibility after serving thirty years of imprisonment.
Ohio Jury Instructions, Vol. 4, § 503.016(A) (Anderson) (2000). Like the instruction given by the trial court, the pattern instructions reflect the statutory assumption that a jury will first consider whether the death penalty represents an appropriate punishment before considering either of the two life sentences. Consis*622tent with Brooks, supra, however, neither instruction explicitly requires the jury to rule out death before considering a life sentence. See Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 873-76 (6th Cir.2000) (discussing sentencing charge in Ohio capital case); but see Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 416-17 (6th Cir.1999) (distinguished by Scott).
In State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d 107, 666 N.E.2d 1099 (1996), the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a challenge similar to the one advanced by petitioner respecting an acquittal first instruction. As in this case, the trial of defendant in Davis occurred prior to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Brooks. The Court rejected defendant’s claim because the jury instruction at issue adequately informed the jury that a recommendation of death required unanimity and the instruction made the jurors aware that any one of them could block the imposition of a death sentence. Id. at 76 Ohio St.3d at 117, 666 N.E.2d at 1109.
Davis requires that the challenged instruction be an acquittal first instruction similar to the one struck down in Brooks4, before reversal of a capital sentence is warranted. In the case now before us, the instruction at issue informed the jurors that their recommendation of death required unanimity: “[A]ll twelve of you must agree on whichever verdict you sign ... [Y]ou cannot have a recommendation or a verdict if it is seven to five, ten to two or eleven to one.” Although the trial court did not expressly state that a single juror could preclude a death sentence, in our view, the instruction challenged by petitioner and the one approved in Davis are indistinguishable with respect to Brooks.
Finally, the dissent appears to confuse an “acquittal first” instruction with a “consider first” instruction. While an instruction may not require that jurors first unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh those in mitigation before they may consider which life sentence to impose, the structure of the statute implies that the jurors may elect to consider the death penalty first. After all, the statute instructs the jury to consider the life sentences absent a finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Logically, the jury can only have reached, or failed to reach, such a “finding” if it has already considered the death penalty. We find nothing constitutionally impermissible with allowing jurors to consider whether death is appropriate so long as they are aware that they may consider possible life sentences before reaching a final decision with respect to death. The instruction given by the trial court comports with constitutional requirement.
In the end, then, we return to the question that we posed at the outset of our discussion: Can the case before us be materially distinguished from Lowenfield? We conclude that it cannot and we therefore must reverse the order of the district court granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Both the Louisiana statute at issue in Lowenfield and the Ohio statute before us have similar features despite differences in their language. Both require that the jury’s recommendation, whether for life or death, be unanimous. And, most significant in our eyes, each statute provides that, if the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court shall impose a life sentence. Consequently, petitioner’s argument that an Allen charge can only favor a verdict for death would apply with equal force in context of the Louisiana statute construed in Loioenfield and was, by implication, rejected by the Supreme *623Court. Finally, the circumstances surrounding the jury deliberations in Lowen-field imply an even greater danger of coercion than those in the case before us: the trial judge polled the jury twice and a verdict of death was returned within thirty minutes of the Allen charge. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict.
This court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. Where, as here, we are unable to perceive material distinctions between a decision of that Court and the case before us, we are obligated to defer to its lead regardless of our own inclinations. Because we detect no error in the Allen charge as given by the trial court and perceive nothing about the context of the charge that rendered it unduly coercive in light of Lowenfield, we must reverse the district court’s conditional grant of the writ.
II.
Accordingly, the order of the district court conditionally granting petitioner a writ of habeas corpus is hereby vacated and petitioner’s sentence is reinstated. In all other respects, the order of the district court is affirmed.

. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) (approving supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury under certain circumstances). An Allen charge is sometimes referred to as a "dynamite” charge.

. "The court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the recommendation of the jury. If the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.” La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 905.8 (1984).

. Petitioner also points out that the trial judge prefaced his Allen charge by reminding the jury that it should not "consider sympathy, bias or prejudice.” Even if that instruction passes constitutional muster, petitioner cites it as further proof that the Allen charge was given with an eye towards securing a death verdict.

. "You are now required to determine unanimously that the death penalty is inappropriate before you can consider a life sentence.” Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d at 159, 661 N.E.2d at 1040.