Court Opinion

ID: 9492236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:35:54.376987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:11.980394
License: Public Domain

KING, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Because I am convinced that the district court properly applied the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate and remand the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.
Gros and Sikes based their claim for municipal liability on the theory that their injuries were proximately caused by the City’s policy of (1) failing to adequately screen, train, supervise, and discipline police officers, including Rogers; (2) failing to adequately investigate complaints against officers, including Rogers; and (3) permitting officers to violate citizens’ constitutional rights. It is well-settled that a local governmental body such as the City of Grand Prairie is liable for damages under § 1983 for constitutional violations resulting from official city policy. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). This circuit has defined an official policy for whose execution a local government may be found liable as:
1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or. decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
2. A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, *618although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to whom that body had delegated policymaking authority.
Johnson v. Moore, 958 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc)). Under this framework, a city is liable only if the policy or practice of which the plaintiffs complain is attributable to an entity with policymaking authority. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Whether a particular official has final poli-cymaking authority is a question of state law, and the identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989); see also Committee on PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FlFTH CIRCUIT, Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases), Instruction 10.3, at 120 (1997) (“The [may- or/city council] is an official whose acts constitute final official policy of the City of _Therefore, if you find that the acts of the [mayor/city council] deprived the plaintiff of constitutional rights, the City of _ is liable for such deprivations.”). Moreover, state law, which includes valid local ordinances and regulations, will “always direct a court to some official or body that has the responsibility for making law or setting policies in any given area of a local government’s business.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Consequently, a federal court “would not be justified in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it.” Id. at 126,108 S.Ct. 915.
The district court applied the correct legal standards. The majority first faults the district court for asserting that “[a]b-sent contrary evidence, the court must assume that policymaking authority resides with the City’s governing body.” At the same time, however, the district court explicitly recognized that state law will always direct the court to an official or body responsible for making law or setting policy, see Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125-26, 108 S.Ct. 915. And, although it said that “[t]o survive summary judgment, Gros and Sikes must establish that there is an issue of material fact whether policymaking authority has been delegated to Chief Crum,” it also acknowledged that the identification of a municipal policymaker is a question of law to be decided by the trial judge, see Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the district court “analyze[d] whether Chief Crum had been delegated final poli-cymaking authority as a question of fact for the jury,” the district court never suggested that delegation is a question “for the jury.” I interpret the district court as simply holding that under Texas law, final policymaking authority rests with the City’s governing body and that, on this record, such authority had not been delegated to Chief Crum.
This conclusion that Chief Crum was not the City’s policymaking authority with respect to the hiring, training, and disciplining of police officers, the investigation of complaints against officers, and the protection of citizens’ constitutional rights is correct. That an official possesses decision-making authority does not necessarily mean that he also has policymaking authority. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 1241, 1246 (5th Cir.1993). Rather, as we have recognized,
policymaking authority is more than discretion, and it is far more than the final say-so, as a matter of practice, on what water main will be replaced today and whether a building meets city construe*619tion standards. City policymakers not only govern conduct; they decide the goals for a particular city function and devise the means of achieving those goals. Policymakers act in the place of the governing body in the area of their responsibility; they are not supervised except as to the totality of their performance. ■ i
Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 769 (5th Cir.1984)(en banc). Although policymaking authority may be shared, an entity whose decisions are reviewable is not a policymaker whose acts can subject the municipality to liability. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 108 S.Ct. 915 (“Assuming that applicable law does not make the decisions of the Commission reviewable by the Mayor and Aldermen, or vice versa, one would have to conclude that policy decisions made either by the Mayor and Aldermen or by the Commission would be attributable to the city itself.”).
Far from showing that he was a policymaker, Chief Crum’s deposition testimony conclusively negates that possibility. Chief Crum testified that the city manager, whom he described as his “boss,” was the ultimate policymaking authority with respect to officer hiring and grievance procedures, that the city civil service commission could overrule him on matters of officer discipline, and that he was not the final policymaking authority for the City in regard to investigating complaints against officers. Although he stated that he was the final policymaking authority with respect to training officers, he admitted in a deposition in another case, which Gros and Sikes attached as an exhibit to their response to the Municipal Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, that the city manager and civil service commission were the ultimate authorities with respect to the policies of the GPPD:
Q. So with regard to the issuance of the policies that govern and control the Grand Prairie Police Department you are the individual with the responsibility and duty to issue those policies, correct?
A. Not the ultimate, ma’am.
Q. Who is the ultimate, sir?
A. Well, they’re subject to review by the city manager; they are subject to review by the Civil Service Commission. I assume that they could be reviewed by the council but' that typically to my knowledge has never happened. It could but it never has that I’m aware of.
The following colloquy between Chief Crum and plaintiffs counsel took place at the same deposition:
Q. And as far as approving the policies that are in effect at the Grand Prairie Police Department, even after you sign off on a policy does the council still have the authority to negate or disapprove of that policy?
A. Yes, they do.
Because the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that Chief Crum was not the City’s policymaking authority with respect to the GPPD, municipal, liability may not be premised upon any policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision adopted or promulgated by him or upon a custom of which he had actual or constructive knowledge. Gros and Sikes point to no other potential policymaker that adopted some policy or knew of a custom that caused them harm. Accordingly, I would hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment on, their § 1983 claims against the City.