Court Opinion

ID: 9382451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 18:07:42.028197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.456987
License: Public Domain

J-A29011-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 TIMOTHY C. SMITH                         :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 574 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-33-CR-0000083-2009

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED: MARCH 27, 2023

      Appellant, Timothy C. Smith, appeals pro se from the post-conviction

court’s March 17, 2022 order denying, as untimely, his petition for relief under

the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful

review, we affirm.

      We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history of this case,

as follows. On January 5, 2009, Appellant was arrested and charged with

various offenses in connection with his repeatedly having sexual contact with

his minor step-daughter over the course of several years. Following a jury

trial on October 5th and 6th of 2009, Appellant was convicted of 23 counts of

aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(7); 29 counts of indecent

assault (victim less than 13 years of age), 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7); and 26

counts of endangering the welfare of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a)(1). He

was sentenced on June 23, 2010, to an aggregate term of 24 years’, 8
J-A29011-22

months’, and 1 day to 76 years’ incarceration.         This Court affirmed his

judgment of sentence on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 34

A.3d 225 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not

file a petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

       Over the ensuing years, Appellant litigated two unsuccessful PCRA

petitions, the denials of which were affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth

v. Smith, 120 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum),

appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Smith, 195

A.3d 1027 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 202

A.3d 683 (Pa. 2019).

       On November 12, 2021, Appellant filed the pro se PCRA petition

underlying his present appeal.         The Commonwealth summarizes the claim

Appellant raised in that petition, along with the context of his argument, as

follows:

       [Appellant] points to the testimony of Commonwealth witness
       [S.S.]…,[1] in which she described how she had relied upon
       expense reports and her work Outlook calendar to recall relevant
       details about her testimony.        Some context is needed to
       adequately understand this issue. The child victim of [Appellant’s]
       sexual abuse had testified to a time frame in which her mother,
       [S.S.], had been staying in a hotel suite in Pittsburgh while
       receiving nurse training. While [S.S.] was in Pittsburgh receiving
       this training, the victim was left alone at home with [Appellant].
       The victim testified that, during this time[-]frame, [Appellant]
       sexually assaulted her often.          See Notes of Testimony
       (hereinafter[,] “N.T.”), 10/5/2009, [at] 77-79.

____________________________________________

1[S.S.] is the victim’s mother and was married to Appellant during the years
he abused the victim.

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      [Appellant’s] present claim is based on a short excerpt of
      testimony given by [S.S.] on the first day of trial. [S.S.] testified
      after the victim had already testified.        During the relevant
      exchange, the prosecutor was seeking to establish the exact time
      frames surrounding the Pittsburgh training when the victim had
      been left alone with [Appellant]. [S.S.] testified that she attended
      the subject training in Pittsburgh from June 4, 2007[,] through
      July 11, 2007. Her daughter, the victim, had stayed … in
      Pittsburgh for portions of that time frame and, thus, [Appellant]
      would not have had access to her. This testimony was relevant
      for the purpose of corroborating the victim’s testimony as well as
      establishing the number of counts that were submitted to the jury.
      See N.T.[,] 10/6/2009[,] at … 214. [S.S.] testified that she had
      used expense reports and her Outlook calendar from her work to
      help her reconstruct this timeline. Those documents were not
      entered into evidence. Indeed, it is unclear whether [S.S.] had
      them with her while she was testifying or not. See N.T.[,]
      10/5/2009, [at] 191-93. [Appellant], 12 years later, now claims
      that the Commonwealth withheld these records in violation of their
      mandatory discovery obligations.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 1-2.

      On March 17, 2022, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing

Appellant’s petition as untimely.   Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of

appeal, and he complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, he presents two

issues for our review:

      I. Did the [Commonwealth] … commit misconduct when [it]
      knowingly violated the standards set[]forth in Brady v.
      Maryland[, 373 US 83 (1963),] and in doing so, violated
      [A]ppellant[’s] 5th, 6th and 14th [c]onstitutional rights as afforded
      him through the [a]mendments to the United States Constitution?

      II. Did the PCRA [c]ourt err in denying [A]ppellant merits review
      based on [the PCRA court’s] position that the [c]ourt lacks
      jurisdiction to do so?

Appellant’s Brief at vi.

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      We begin by recognizing that this Court’s standard of review regarding

an order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of

the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal

error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We

must begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the

PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or

disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. See Commonwealth

v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition

for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed

within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless

one of the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii)

applies:

      (b) Time for filing petition.--

           (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
           or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
           date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
           and the petitioner proves that:

             (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was      the
             result of interference by government officials with    the
             presentation of the claim in violation of              the
             Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or           the
             Constitution or laws of the United States;

             (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
             unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
             ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

             (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
             recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
             or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time

                                        -4-
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           period provided in this section and has been held by
           that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, section 9545(b)(2) requires that

any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.”            42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2).

      Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in 2011 and, thus,

his present petition, filed in 2021, is patently untimely. For this Court to have

jurisdiction to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that he meets

one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b).

      Appellant contends that he satisfies a timeliness exception based on the

Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the expense reports and Outlook calendar

relied upon by S.S. in her testimony. He maintains that the Commonwealth’s

withholding this evidence violated Brady because, had he been provided with

these reports, he could have impeached S.S.’s testimony and raised

reasonable doubt about the credibility of all the abuse allegations. Appellant

insists that the Commonwealth’s continued withholding of these reports meets

the governmental-interference exception of section 9545(b)(1)(i). He further

contends that he also has met the exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii) because

he did not discover the rule set forth in Brady, and realize the Commonwealth

had violated that rule, until September of 2021, when he came across a

newspaper article discussing Brady while “working with the legal committee”

                                      -5-
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in his prison. Appellant’s Brief at 12. He explains that he promptly filed his

pro se petition asserting the Brady violation after this discovery.

      Appellant’s arguments fail to satisfy either timeliness exception.

Appellant clearly was aware of S.S.’s at-issue testimony the moment she

spoke it, yet he never requested to see the reports or calendar she mentioned.

Nothing in the record indicates that the government withheld these documents

from Appellant or interfered with his ability to request them. There is also no

evidence that the Commonwealth restricted Appellant’s ability to assert his

Brady claim at the moment S.S. testified about the purportedly withheld

evidence. He also could have raised this Brady claim on direct appeal, or in

either of his two prior PCRA petitions. While Appellant attempts to argue that

he could not have raised his Brady claim earlier because the case was a ‘new

fact’ he did not discover until 2021, he fails to explain why he could not have

discovered the Brady decision sooner with the exercise of due diligence. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A

petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s) earlier

with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced.”) (internal

citations omitted).

      Thus, Appellant has not demonstrated that his untimely petition meets

either of the timeliness exceptions he cites. Accordingly, the PCRA court did

not err in dismissing his petition as untimely.

      Order affirmed.

                                     -6-
J-A29011-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2023

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