Court Opinion

ID: 9646588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:03:48.294462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:39.568200
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
Michael Hippert, while residing in the home of a relative, Judith Hippert, was driving Mrs. Hippert’s uninsured Dodge pickup truck when it was involved in an accident. Pursuant to the assigned claims plan, No-fault § 108, INA paid basic loss benefits to or on behalf of Michael Hippert. INA brought suit against Mrs. Hippert under § 501 of the Act, which provides that an insurance company shall be entitled to recover from the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle when the company has been obligated to pay basic loss benefits to a relative of the owner of the uninsured motor vehicle when the relative, while residing with the owner, is injured while occupying the owner’s uninsured motor vehicle. Mrs. Hippert joined Allstate as an additional defendant, along with the owner’s insurance agent, under the theory that lack of coverage was due to the agent’s failure to notify Allstate of the owner’s desire to add the uninsured motor vehicle to the owner’s existing policy, which covered the owner’s other automobile (a 1977 Oldsmobile). Realizing that under § 204(a)(2) of the Act another insurance company, Allstate, was the security liable for the payment of basic loss benefits to Michael Hippert, INA filed a motion for summary judgment against Allstate for reimbursement of the basic loss benefits paid, which motion was granted by the trial court. (Allstate filed its own motion for summary judgment, which was denied). Allstate appealed judgment for INA, arguing that an exclusion clause *344in its policy covering the Oldsmobile precluded recovery of basic loss benefits from Allstate by Michael Hippert (or, to be more precise, precluded reimbursement of INA by Allstate for benefits previously paid by INA to Michael Hip-pert).
It is clear, as the majority notes, that the exclusionary clause in question cannot prevail if contrary to the No-fault Act. It also appears clear, as the majority concedes, that Michael Hippert, the injured party to whom basic loss benefits were paid, comes within the definition of “insured” contained in § 103 of the No-fault Act, since Mr. Hippert is a relative residing in the same household as an individual, Judith Hippert, who is named as an insured in a contract of basic loss insurance (the Allstate policy covering Mrs. Hip-pert’s 1977 Oldsmobile). Since § 204(a)(2) of the Act provides that “[t]he security for the payment of basic loss benefits applicable to an injury to ... an insured is the security under which the victim ... is insured ...,” the security applicable to this accident is therefore clearly the Allstate policy covering the Oldsmobile, notwithstanding the exclusionary clause of the policy. What is not clear is how the majority is able to find that INA, the company that paid basic loss benefits under the assigned claims plan to Michael Hippert, should find itself obligated to pay benefits, rather than Allstate, the insurer of the 1977 Oldsmobile. Under § 204(a)(5) of the Act, the assigned claims plan only comes into play when there is no other security applicable to the accident.
The majority concludes that setting aside the exclusionary clause in the Allstate policy could result in Judith Hippert escaping economic liability for the accident and being “rewarded” for violating the requirement that all motor vehicles be insured. In connection with this discussion, the majority cites § 301(a)(1) of the Act which abolishes tort liability, with certain enumerated exceptions including for owners of unsecured vehicles involved in accidents. Since Judith Hippert did not provide security for the Dodge pickup in accordance with § 104 of the Act, the vehicle is *345not a “secured vehicle” and § 301(a)(1) would not relieve Mrs. Hippert of tort liability should she be involved in an accident while driving her Dodge pickup. The concern of the majority that a result different from the majority’s would have untoward effects in a future case involving tort liability is therefore totally unwarranted. As for the majority’s concern that Mrs. Hippert will be “rewarded” for failing to insure her vehicle, it should be noted that § 501 of the Act provides for suspension or revocation of both the motor vehicle registration and the operator’s license for failure of the owner of an uninsured motor vehicle to reimburse the appropriate obligor.
The majority states that giving effect to the exclusionary clause of the Allstate policy would result in placing the risk on the intended party, the party that neglected to insure a vehicle, in this case, Mrs. Hippert. The majority’s desire to place the ultimate burden on the party failing to insure a vehicle is entirely in keeping with the Act, but this result is achieved regardless of whether INA or Allstate is obligated to initially bear the expense of Michael Hippert’s basic loss benefits. Either insurance company may attempt to recover this expense from Judith Hippert under § 501 of the Act. The obvious intent of this section is to permit any obligor paying basic loss benefits to recover its expenses from the party who violates the Act by failing to insure his motor vehicle. The majority recognizes this, but finds that it would be “absurd and circuitous” to force Allstate to reimburse INA and then seek reimbursement from Mrs. Hip-pert. Certainly INA will not find such a result to be absurd and circuitous if it is forced to try a prolonged case against Mrs. Hippert and prevails, only to find that Mrs. Hippert is judgment-proof.
The intent of § 204 of the Act is to set forth which of various insurers potentially at risk in a particular situation will be obligated initially to pay basic loss benefits to parties injured in motor vehicle accidents. According to the scheme set forth in § 204, under the facts of the case before us, Allstate, as opposed to INA, should be obligated *346to provide the basic loss benefits, then bear the burden of attempting to recover from the owner of the uninsured vehicle. The trial court acted properly in granting summary judgment against Allstate in favor of INA. The judgment should be affirmed, and the case should be returned to the trial court to permit a determination of: (1) whether Allstate will be permitted to recover from Judith Hippert the basic loss benefits initially paid by INA and reimbursed to INA by Allstate (assuming that this claim has been properly raised by Allstate), or (2) whether Judith Hippert will prevail on the theory that Allstate’s agent failed to list the Dodge pickup on the existing policy. Although the majority believes that this result will cause excess litigation, I fail to see how this result will cause any more litigation than the majority’s reversal, which will return the case for further action by INA against Judith Hippert, who will in turn pursue her claim against Allstate under the agency theory.
I respectfully dissent.