Court Opinion

ID: 9927858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 15:07:21.149435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:27:49.988986
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NO. A-1414-21

SHELLEY PRITCHETT,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                     APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

v.                                          January 30, 2024

                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Defendant-Appellant.

           Argued October 18, 2023 – Decided January 30, 2024

           Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.

           On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
           Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2189-13.

           Peter G. Verniero argued the cause for appellant (Sills
           Cummis & Gross, PC, attorneys; Peter G. Verniero and
           Michael S. Carucci, of counsel and on the briefs).

           Deborah Lynn Mains argued the cause for respondent
           (Costello & Mains, LLC, attorneys; Deborah Lynn
           Mains and Miriam S. Edelstein, on the brief).

     The opinion of the court was delivered by

CURRIER, P.J.A.D.

     This case, arising out of a failure to accommodate and discrimination

action under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-
1 to -50, returns to us after remand. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff

awarding her compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. On

appeal, we affirmed the finding of liability and the compensatory damage award

but remanded for further proceedings on the amount of punitive damages, and

specifically, for substantial consideration of the factors discussed by our

Supreme Court in Baker v. National State Bank, 161 N.J. 220 (1999), and the

United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.

559 (1996). Pritchett v. State, No. A-1956-17 (App. Div. Apr. 24, 2020) (slip

op. at 1-2, 79-84), modified and aff'd, 248 N.J. 85 (2021).

      Our Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification and

modified this court's remand instructions. The Court held that when reviewi ng

a punitive damages award against a public entity, a trial court must not only

consider the Baker/BMW factors, but also needs to apply heightened scrutiny as

required under Lockley v. State, Department of Corrections, 177 N.J. 413

(2003). Pritchett v. State (Pritchett I), 248 N.J. 85, 88 (2021).

      Following remand from the Supreme Court, the trial court considered the

parties' briefs and oral arguments and determined the punitive damages verdict

was "reasonable" and "comport[ed] with due process" even when examined with

"heightened scrutiny." In employing a de novo review and applying heightened

                                                                       A-1414-21
                                        2
scrutiny to the BMW/Baker factors, we conclude the amount of the punitive

damages award was not unreasonable. We affirm.

                                        I.

      The facts were thoroughly detailed in our prior opinion and Pritchett I.

For the reader's ease and context for our decision, we reproduce the facts set

forth in Pritchett I.

                   Pritchett was hired by the Juvenile Justice Center
             (JJC) in 2006. The JJC runs the state's juvenile
             correctional facilities and has approximately 400
             employees at any given time. Pritchett worked as a
             corrections officer in a JJC facility, and, by 2011, she
             held the title of Senior Corrections Officer [(SCO)].
             Her duties included the responsibility to intervene when
             violence broke out among inmates.

                  On June 8, 2011, Pritchett broke up a fight
             between two inmates. As a result, she suffered injuries
             to her back, knee, and neck, went on Workers'
             Compensation leave, and sought medical assistance.

                    In the fall of that year, Pritchett's physician
             noticed that an MRI of Pritchett's spine revealed
             abnormalities unrelated to her workplace injuries.
             Because of those abnormalities and Pritchett's physical
             complaints, her physician suspected that Pritchett was
             suffering from the early stages of multiple sclerosis
             (MS). In a note dated September 17, 2011, her
             physician wrote that Pritchett had recovered from her
             workplace injuries and could return to work with no
             restrictions on their account, but the doctor
             recommended that Pritchett ask for additional leave
             time to seek a diagnosis and treatment for her
             underlying health issues and referred her to a
             neurologist.
                                                                        A-1414-21
                                        3
       Consistent with the physician's recommendation,
Pritchett submitted a request for unpaid leave from her
JJC position. Two days later, human resources (HR)
officers forwarded the request to the Acting Director of
the JJC, Captain Kelly Gibson, and to Pritchett's direct
supervisor, Lisa Quinto. An internal email to Gibson
indicates that HR had planned to approve the request;
however, Captain Gibson was against it. HR then
turned for support to Quinto, who, on September 27,
emailed Gibson, telling him that Pritchett's "diagnosis
is rather serious." She went on, "[y]ou may wish to
consider approving this leave through November 1,
2011. This way we can write to her now and advise her
no further leave will be approved beyond November 1
and if she is not medically cleared to return to work,
she must resign." Quinto explained to Captain Gibson,

      If you determine she must return to work
      now, based on the medical, there will be no
      way she can return and we really have not
      given her warning that management will
      not approve further leave beyond a request
      to extend.      If she cannot return in
      November and does not resign, you will
      have a stronger case to take steps to remove
      her and be more readily able to defend the
      removal in an appeal setting. Since [it's]
      only one plus month, we can give her fair
      warning she must return and then if she
      does not, you stand a much better chance
      of winning an appeal.

     Nonetheless,    Captain    Gibson    remained
committed to denying Pritchett's request. HR then
sought out the JJC's Deputy Executive Director for
Operations, Felix Mickens, forwarding him Quinto's
exchange with Gibson and adding that

      [t]o deny leave at this point will surely
      result in a removal (she has a very serious
                                                           A-1414-21
                           4
      diagnosis) which will be appealed and not
      upheld. She will not be able to return to
      work (she incurred a work-related injury
      which resulted in the discovery of an
      unrelated personal medical condition) and
      we have not advised her management will
      not approve further leave. With removals
      we have established a winning defense
      ....

      November is right around the corner—
      management should approve leave through
      this date as the medical states—we will
      write to her and say no further leave—if
      she does not, or cannot return, she can
      resign [or] we can initiate removal for
      failure to return from an approved leave of
      absence.

      Pritchett's request was ultimately approved on
October 11, granting her unpaid leave through
November 1, 2011, but the approval came with the
caveat that no further requests would be granted. She
was informed that if she did not return to work on
November 2, she would be expected to resign.

      On October 19, Pritchett was diagnosed with MS.
She requested additional leave time through February
29, 2012, with an expected return-to-work date of
March 1. Gibson and Quinto both denied the request in
internal emails. Upon receiving word of the denial,
Pritchett telephoned Quinto, who would not provide an
explanation as to why the JJC denied Pritchett's request.
Instead, she told Pritchett that the JJC was not obligated
to give her a reason, and then declined to put the denial
in writing.

      When November 1 came, Pritchett wrote to the
JJC's HR manager, stating that she was not able to
return to work, but that she did not want to resign.
                                                             A-1414-21
                            5
Mickens answered the letter through Pritchett's union
representative, telling her that Pritchett would be
subject to disciplinary proceedings—which would
result in her termination without a pension—if she did
not resign by the end of the week. Pritchett submitted
an application for retirement disability benefits on
November 4.

       Thereafter, on November 21, Pritchett's union
representative contacted the JJC's Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) coordinator, informing the
coordinator that Pritchett believed she was forced into
retirement against her will. The coordinator answered
that since Pritchett had already resigned, it was too late
to engage in the ADA's interactive process and advised
Pritchett to contact the JJC's Equal Opportunity Office.
When it responded to Pritchett's request for
reinstatement, that Office expressed its opinion that the
JJC "failed to engage in the interactive process . . . .
This failure to engage in the interactive process resulted
in a violation of the State Anti-Discrimination Policy."
However, the Office agreed with the ADA coordinator
that Pritchett's "request for reinstatement [was] mooted
by [her] approval for disability retirement."

      ....

       In October 2013, Pritchett filed a complaint
against the State of New Jersey and unnamed John
Does, alleging that the State violated the LAD by
failing to accommodate her disability and
discriminating based on the perception of disability.
Following the State's unsuccessful attempts to end the
matter through motion practice, the trial court
conducted a jury trial in June 2017.

      The trial resulted in the jury's return of a liability
verdict in favor of Pritchett. The jury awarded
compensatory damages totaling $1,824,911, which
consisted of $575,000 for emotional distress; $343,789
                                                               A-1414-21
                             6
            in back pay; $472,639 in front pay; and $433,483 in
            future pension benefits.

                  The next day, the court reconvened the jury for a
            proceeding on punitive damages, during which the
            parties presented no new evidence.           The jury's
            deliberations were brief, lasting from shortly after 2:00
            p.m. until about 3:00 p.m.

                  The jury awarded Pritchett $10 million in
            punitive damages. All totaled, the trial court entered a
            judgment of $12,015,384.44 for Pritchett. That amount
            encompassed $78,367.65 in pre-judgment interest;
            $22,235.79 in costs; $11,824,911 in compensatory and
            punitive damages; and $89,870 in attorneys' fees.

            [Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 89-92 (alterations in original).]

      We include additional facts elicited during trial that are important to our

analysis of the issue on appeal. On November 1, 2013, the JJC revised its Leave

of Absence policy to state that leaves would be subject to the approval of

management and possible reasonable accommodation through the ADA

coordinator. During the trial, Dr. Mark Lazar, an expert in neurology and MS,

testified that plaintiff was "stable," "completely normal," and able to return to

her SCO job without any restrictions.

      Mickens testified that plaintiff was always welcome to return to her

position as an SCO, if she received medical clearance. On the July 27, 2012

separation form, Gibson recommended plaintiff for reemployment with the JJC.

                                                                          A-1414-21
                                        7
At the time of trial in June 2017, plaintiff was working two jobs, one at a Home

Depot and another working with children in the foster care system.

                                     II.

        As stated, we affirmed the jury's verdict on liability and its award of

compensatory damages. We remanded for the trial court to review the punitive

damages award applying the Baker/BMW factors. The Supreme Court's review

of the matter was limited solely to "the standards to be applied by a trial court

when reviewing a jury award of punitive damages against a public-sector

defendant." Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 96.

        On November 30, 2021, the trial court issued an oral decision, concluding

"the $10 million punitive damages award is reasonable and consistent with due

process even when viewed under . . . the Lockley/Green1 heightened scrutiny."

The trial court discussed the Supreme Court's remand instructions to "apply a

heightened scrutiny analysis to" the Baker/BMW factors, that is, (1) "the degree

of reprehensibility of" defendant's conduct; (2) "the disparity between the harm

or potential harm suffered by . . . plaintiff . . . and the . . . punitive damages

award"; and (3) "the difference between th[e punitive damages award] and the

civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Baker, 161 N.J. at

220 (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).

1
    Green v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 177 N.J. 434 (2003).
                                                                           A-1414-21
                                           8
         As for the first factor, the trial court noted we had "affirmed the jury's

findings that the defendant's conduct, specifically that of Mickens, Gibson, and

Bell was especially egregious and that this was shown by clear and convincing

evidence"; therefore, whether there was sufficient evidence to support punitive

damages had "already been determined in plaintiff's favor." The question then,

according to the trial court, was "not whether there was especially egregious

conduct . . . but how especially egregious was the conduct." The court concluded

"based on the evidence considered by the jury . . . the degree of reprehensibility

of the defendant's conduct was high" because "as the jury concluded, defendant

forced a compromised law enforcement official who was unable to safely

perform her job duties to resign or retire and, unlike plaintiff, other [corrections

officers] had been granted leave in excess of the FMLA 2 time." The court also

emphasized that "[t]he defenses raised by defendant were all rejected by the

jury."

         As for the second factor, the court referred to its findings regarding the

first factor, concluding: "the degree of reprehensibility is high and the harm of

discrimination suffered by Pritchett is certainly in line with the punitive

damages awarded."

2
    Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654.
                                                                             A-1414-21
                                          9
      In addressing the third factor, the court recognized that the "difference

between this remedy and the maximum civil penalty of $50,000" is a "significant

difference." Nevertheless, the court found this factor was "not significant in

light of the great weight given to factors one and two," which "weigh heavily in

plaintiff's favor." The court reasoned:

                   The parties in their briefs and oral argument go
            through various ratios for the [c]ourt to consider. No
            matter what ratio is considered, it is a single digit and
            does not offend due process even when viewed through
            Lockley's heightened standard. Nonetheless, including
            attorneys' fees and emotional distress damages which
            this [c]ourt concludes is the proper way to consider the
            ratio analysis, then the entire judgment would be just
            over $2 million and puts the ratio just below five. Even
            excluding emotional distress and attorneys' fees only
            moves the ratio to 7.4, also a number that is reasonable
            and satisfies due process using the heightened standard
            based on the high degree of reprehensible conduct of
            the defendant[] and harm of discrimination.

      Therefore, the court concluded that its analysis of the factors required a

determination that the punitive damages award in this case was "reasonable" and

"comport[ed] with due process" even when examined under "heightened

scrutiny." The court stated:

            [I]t is clear that the jury did not render its award based
            on passion, confusion, bias judgment or bias prejudice,
            or was inflamed in any way. As I stated in the post-
            judgment motions, this jury was intelligent, one that
            took notes, was deliberative, impartial and
            dispassionate and rendered an award consistent with the
            reprehensible conduct and harm to the plaintiff.
                                                                         A-1414-21
                                          10
                  In all the rigorous analysis and heightened
            scrutiny and due process analysis, we can't lose sight of
            the jury's reasoned judgment. But, as I said, their
            reasoned judgment does, in fact, comport with due
            process and is reasonable under the heightened review.

The court executed an order the same day memorializing its oral decision.

                                      III.

      On appeal, defendant asserts the $10 million punitive damages award

violates due process because the trial court did not apply the "heightened

scrutiny" standard in reviewing the reasonableness of the award and did not

consider whether the award served as a deterrent for future misconduct, a

punishment for the bad behavior, and its proportionality to the bad behavior.

Defendant also raises arguments regarding the appropriate standard this court

should use in its review of a punitive damages award imposed against a public

entity.

      The purpose of punitive damages is "the deterrence of egregious

misconduct and the punishment of the offender." Herman v. Sunshine Chem.

Specialties, Inc., 133 N.J. 329, 337 (1993) (citing Leimgruber v. Claridge

Assocs., 73 N.J. 450, 454 (1977)). The New Jersey Punitive Damages Act

(PDA), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17, permits recovery of punitive damages

            only if the plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing
            evidence, that the harm suffered was the result of the
            defendant's acts or omissions, and such acts or
                                                                        A-1414-21
                                       11
            omissions were actuated by actual malice or
            accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of
            persons who foreseeably might be harmed by those acts
            or omissions.

            [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(a).]

However, punitive damages may only be awarded if compensatory damages

were awarded in the first stage of the trial. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13(c); Longo v.

Pleasure Prods., Inc., 215 N.J. 48, 58 (2013). The PDA caps the amount of

punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant to the greater of five

times the sum of the compensatory damages or $350,000. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-

5.14(b).

      The decision to award or deny punitive damages "rests within the sound

discretion of the trier of fact." Leimgruber, 73 N.J. at 456; Accord Maudsley v.

State, 357 N.J. Super. 560, 590 (App. Div. 2003).       However, "[t]he PDA

envisions an active role for the trial court in reviewing the jury's

determinations." Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 109. Thus, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)

provides:

            Before entering judgment for an award of punitive
            damages, the trial judge shall ascertain that the award
            is reasonable in its amount and justified in the
            circumstances of the case, in light of the purpose to
            punish the defendant and to deter that defendant from
            repeating such conduct. If necessary to satisfy the
            requirements of this section, the judge may reduce the
            amount of or eliminate the award of punitive damages.

                                                                         A-1414-21
                                        12
      The PDA requires juries to consider the following factors:

               (1) The likelihood, at the relevant time, that serious
               harm would arise from the defendant's conduct;

               (2) The defendant's awareness [or] reckless disregard
               of the likelihood that the serious harm at issue would
               arise from the defendant's conduct;

               (3) The conduct of the defendant upon learning that its
               initial conduct would likely cause harm; and

               (4) The duration of the conduct or any concealment of
               it by the defendant.

               [N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12(b).]

      The PDA governs punitive damages in LAD cases. Saffos v. Avaya Inc.,

419 N.J. Super. 244, 264 (App. Div. 2011). However, actions under the LAD

are excluded from the PDA's statutory cap. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(c); Baker, 161

N.J. at 231.

      "[P]unitive damages are only to be awarded in exceptional cases even

where the LAD has been violated." Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 263 (alteration in

original) (quoting Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 271 N.J. Super. 476,

500-01 (App. Div. 1994)). "To be exceptional, the defendant's conduct must

'ris[e] to the level of wanton or reckless conduct.'" Ibid. (alteration in original)

(quoting Catalane, 271 N.J. Super. at 501).

      "In addition, there are substantive constitutional limits on the amount of

punitive damages that a jury may award." Baker, 161 N.J. at 229. Those limits
                                                                             A-1414-21
                                           13
are imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and serve

"to ensure that punitive damages awards are made through a fair process that

includes judicial review of awards." Ibid.

       "[C]ourts must examine the substantive basis of the punitive damages

award to determine whether it is so excessive as to violate due process." Id. at

230.    As noted, courts must consider the following three factors when

conducting its review:

            [(1)] the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct that
            formed the basis of the civil suit; [(2)] the disparity
            between the harm or potential harm suffered by the
            injured party who was the plaintiff in the civil case and
            the plaintiff's punitive damages award; and [(3)] the
            difference between this remedy and the civil penalties
            authorized or imposed in comparable cases.

            [Ibid. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575).]

"[T]he award of punitive damages '"must bear some reasonable relation to the

injury inflicted and the cause of the injury."'" Ibid. (quoting Herman, 133 N.J.

at 338 (quoting Leimgruber, 73 N.J. at 457)).

       In addition, special consideration is given in cases involving public

entities. In Lockley, the Court stated that "the court's responsibility to review

awards of punitive damages for reasonableness is heightened." 177 N.J. at 433.

            The judge in the ordinary case acts as a check on the
            jury's calculation of punitive damages; in the case of a
            governmental entity, when public monies are the source
            of the award, the judge must scrutinize with great care
                                                                          A-1414-21
                                       14
            the amount of the award to determine whether it is
            proportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.

            [Ibid.]

      In the case of public entities,

            concepts of wealth and ability to pay are irrelevant . . .
            because public entities do not create their own wealth
            and are not driven by a profit motive. The State cannot
            be deterred by an award based on its "bottom line"
            because it does not have one in the private sector sense.

            [Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).]

That is not to say, "however, that the deterrent effect is absent in actions against

a public entity." Ibid. "[P]unitive damages . . . constitute a stringent corrective

and potent deterrent against egregious wrongdoing by upper-level supervisory

government officials." Ibid. (quoting Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of

Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 429 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds,

N.J.S.A. 34:19-5). But because "'"public monies are the source of the award,"'"

there are "'rigorous standards for the calculation of punitive damages against a

public entity.'" Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 106-07 (quoting Green, 177 N.J. at 444

(quoting Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433)).

      Defendant urges this court to adopt a de novo standard of review when

considering both the reasonableness and substantive due process of a punitive

damages award imposed against a public entity. We decline to do so.

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                                        15
      We use a hybrid standard of review when considering an award of punitive

damages. We accord a deferential standard of review to a judge's determination

of whether the jury's punitive damages award is "reasonable" and "justified in

the circumstances of the case" under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a). See Saffos, 419

N.J. Super. at 264 (affirming a judge's decision to reduce, but not elimin ate, a

punitive damages award under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)); Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli's

Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 390 N.J. Super. 557, 565 (App. Div. 2007) (affirming a

judge's decision not to reduce an award under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(a)), aff'd,

194 N.J. 212 (2008). Cf. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532

U.S. 424, 433 (2001) (noting that in the absence of a constitutional issue, a

federal appellate court applies "an abuse-of-discretion standard" when

reviewing a trial court's scrutiny of jury award of punitive damages (quoting

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279

(1989))).

      However, when a party challenges the punitive damage award on

constitutional due process grounds, we review the trial court's decision as to the

amount of the punitive damage award de novo because the determination is "not

really a 'fact tried by the jury.'" Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 353 N.J. Super. 145,

152 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437). The purpose of

de novo review in such cases is to ensure that an award is not "so excessive as

                                                                            A-1414-21
                                        16
to violate substantive due process." Id. at 153. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-

86). We accord no special deference "to a trial court's findings of fact and

conclusions of law." Ibid.

      Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the amount of the punitive

damages award. Therefore, we apply a de novo standard. Id. at 152.

      Defendant is a public entity. Thus, as our Supreme Court explained in its

remand instructions to the trial court, "a more rigorous application" of the

Baker/BMW factors is required. Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 110. That is not to say

that additional steps need to be taken in the analysis; rather, defendant's status

as a public entity is but one consideration in the "holistic assessment." Id. at

110-11. Because "'public monies are the source of the award,'" trial courts need

to "be vigilant in their review of such awards." Green, 177 N.J. at 444 (quoting

Lockley, 177 N.J. at 433).

      Against this framework we consider each of the Baker/BMW factors. In

discussing the first factor, the United States Supreme Court has explained,

"[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages

award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (alteration in

original) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 575). Courts evaluate

            the reprehensibility of a defendant by considering
            whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to
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                                       17
             economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference
             to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of
             others; the target of the conduct had financial
             vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or
             was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
             intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

             [Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 266 (quoting State Farm, 538
             U.S. at 419).]

      It should be presumed, however that "a plaintiff has been made whole for

[their] injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages should only be

awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory damages,

is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve

punishment or deterrence." Ibid. (quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419).

      As we previously stated, "[P]laintiff presented a case from which the jury

could have found especially egregious conduct by clear and convincing

evidence."    Pritchett, slip op. at 79 (emphasis added).           The evidence

demonstrated that defendant was aware of plaintiff's MS diagnosis in November

2011, but failed to notify its ADA coordinator, resulting in the denial of

plaintiff's opportunity "to engage in the interactive process" required in a request

for accommodation situation. Plaintiff was forced to retire early as a result of

defendant's actions, suffering economic harm.          Given plaintiff's medical

condition, she was also financially vulnerable. Upper management made the

decision to deny plaintiff's leave requests and ignored the advice of HR

                                                                             A-1414-21
                                        18
personnel. After plaintiff instituted litigation, defendant revised the JJC's Leave

of Absence policy to state that leaves would be subject to the approval of

management and possible reasonable accommodation through the ADA

coordinator.    There is ample evidence to find defendant's conduct was

reprehensible and warranted a substantial punitive damages award.

      As to the second Baker/BMW factor, in reviewing "the disparity between

the actual . . . harm suffered by . . . plaintiff and the punitive damages award,"

"[t]he measure of punishment [must be] both reasonable and proportionate to

the amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages recovered."

Saffos, 419 N.J. Super. at 266, 268-69 (second alteration in original) (quoting

State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418, 426). To evaluate if an award is reasonable and

proportionate, courts "must recognize that emotional distress damages often

contain a punitive element." Id. at 269 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426). The

risk that an emotional damages award contains a punitive aspect is greater where

physical harm or psychological treatment is absent. Ibid.

      Here, plaintiff presented little evidence regarding her emotional distress.

She was not receiving psychological treatment and she did not present any

evidence that her emotional distress resulted in any medical diagnoses.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the jury's award of $575,000 in

emotional distress damages contained a punitive aspect. As a result, and guided

                                                                            A-1414-21
                                        19
by Saffos, we deem it appropriate on these facts to subtract the emotional

distress award from the total compensatory award, leaving a compensatory-

damage base of $1,249,911. The punitive damages award of $10 million is

approximately seven times greater than that amount. While we acknowledge

this is a high ratio, we also recognize that sole reliance on a bright-line ratio or

cap is "impermissible," as the ratio is only considered as part of the holistic

assessment. See Pritchett I, 248 N.J. at 113. As stated, the PDA's limitation on

the amount of punitive damages is not applicable here. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(c);

Baker, 161 N.J. at 231.

      Finally, as to the third Baker/BMW factor, "the difference between the

punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized" under the LAD,

the LAD provides for a civil fine not to exceed $50,000. Saffos, 419 N.J. Super.

at 269 (citing State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418); N.J.S.A. 10:5-14.1a. As we stated

in Saffos, we find the comparison between the punitive damage award and the

authorized civil penalty is "not particularly helpful in determining the propriety

of the amount of punitive damages." 419 N.J. Super. at 269.

      In sum, after a de novo review, we have considered the Baker/BMW

factors using the heightened scrutiny required under Lockley. Defendant's

behavior was especially egregious. Upper management behaved reprehensibly

in blithely dismissing plaintiff's request for an unpaid leave of absence to

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accommodate treatment for her newly diagnosed MS.           Upper management

ignored the advice of defendant's HR personnel. As noted in BMW and Pritchett

I, this factor is the dominant factor and "[p]erhaps the most important." 517

U.S. at 575; 248 N.J. at 112.

      Although the ratio of the compensatory damages award to the punitive

damages award (after subtracting the emotional distress damages component) is

substantial, we cannot conclude the award is unreasonable or disproportionate

to the inflicted injury. Punitive damages are available in an LAD action against

a public entity. The Legislature expressly chose not to impose a cap on such

damages when it exempted the LAD from the limits imposed on other actions

under the PDA. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.14(b) to (c). Where defendant acted with

such disregard for the LAD, the ratio is not dispositive.

      After having reviewed the award with great care in light of defendant's

status as a public entity, we find the award appropriate to deter future unlawful

conduct. We are mindful the source of the damages award is public funds, but

nevertheless have considered the remedial nature of the LAD statute and the

expectation "that public officials will be motivated to avoid misconduct that

exposes the State to financial sanction in the form of punitive damages if only

because of the stigma attached to the judgment." Lockley, 177 N.J. at 431. This

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award serves the purpose of encouraging high-level officials to conform their

behavior.

     Therefore, we reject defendant's challenge of the punitive damages award

on substantive due process grounds.

     Affirmed.

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