Court Opinion

ID: 9750234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:38:36.390116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:04.916099
License: Public Domain

SILLS, P. J.
I wholeheartedly concur with the majority opinion, but write separately to express some thoughts which result from having served in municipal government and having conducted innumerable settlement conferences both as a trial judge and as a member of this court.
City councils, school boards, special districts and other government bodies simply must pay more attention to the litigation process. They must understand that a settlement conference in the trial court is an extremely important *675and integral phase of a lawsuit and in the vast majority of cases, the final phase. Prior to a settlement conference, the government body should analyze its position with counsel and designate at least one of its members or high-ranking executives to attend the conference with authority to discuss settlement, conditional, of course, on final approval of any proposed settlement by the governing body.
If, on the other hand, the decision of a board is to litigate—to fight to the bitter final judgment—a high-ranking staff member of the body should attend the conference and be prepared to discuss this position with the court. The cry to battle is so alien to a civil court judge’s thinking, and so counterproductive to the management of today’s burgeoning case load, that there must be some explanation for it. Common sense and common courtesy demand no less.
Of course, I do not wish to imply that a court may or should require any party to make a settlement offer. There are, indeed, cases which should not be settled. They are rare, but they do exist. Morals and principles sometimes preclude settlement. Obviously, refusal to make an offer is not in and of itself synonymous with failure to participate in settlement discussions in good faith. However, refusal even to attend a settlement conference to discuss a “no settlement” position with the court may constitute bad faith. (Cf. City of El Monte v. Takei (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 244, 249-250 [204 Cal.Rptr. 559].)
The easiest thing to do in an era of automobile telephones is for the busy and overburdened board member or executive to simply say, “Lawyer, you handle the problem and don’t bother me until it’s resolved.” The beleaguered trial judge, on the other hand, frequently wants to discuss the case directly with a board member or other officer of the body involved in the litigation. Not confident that the attorney has been able to candidly communicate with the client, the settlement judge frequently wants to explain the exposure which, in the judge’s opinion, the government (or corporate) entity faces.
Judges experienced in conducting settlement conferences have all too frequently encountered the busy CEO (chief executive officer) who has never grasped the risks inherent in the litigation until literally forced to do so by a judge. And, all too frequently, the CEO tells the judge, “I didn’t understand the problem we had—I should have looked at this more closely a long time ago—thanks for your help.” Indeed, there may even be times when it is important for the settlement judge to speak directly to the entire governing board of a government or corporate body to explain the wisdom of reanalyzing a “no settlement” position. Many judges have seen nominal *676settlement offers changed to substantial settlement offers once a board has had the benefit of the judge’s experience.
At oral argument in this case, appellants contended the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code, § 54950 et seq.), which generally forbids secret meetings of governing boards of public bodies, prohibits a local government from complying with court rules requiring parties to attend settlement conferences. Their argument goes something like this: since a settlement can be approved only by a majority vote of the school district board of directors and since a majority vote can only be taken during a duly noticed meeting, it is impermissible for a board to meet and discuss settlement at a settlement conference, which is, after all, not an “official” meeting duly noticed to the public. This argument disintegrates upon careful analysis.
Under the appellants’ theory, board members of a government entity in litigation can never attend a settlement conference—or any other court proceeding. The law does not contemplate absurd results. (E.g., People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 213 [841 P.2d 159]; Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 191 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 208, 832 P.2d 924].) Public policy in favor of settlement and the Brown Act are hardly mutually exclusive. The Legislature never intended the Brown Act to become an excuse to thwart the orderly disposition of public litigation (Gov. Code, § 54956.9 [procedures allowing government entity to hold closed session with legal counsel regarding pending litigation].)
More to the point, the suggestion that all or a majority of a board is prohibited by the Brown Act from attending a settlement conference is simply wrong. Ample authority for a majority to attend a settlement conference is found in Government Code section 54956.9.
A government body subject to the Brown Act is functionally no different than a private corporation, a body of the federal government or a quasi-government body such as the Resolution Trust Company. In each instance proposed settlements must be submitted to a governing board for formal approval. The usual means by which such bodies cope with the problem of the need for collective approval of settlements is to give guidelines to one of their members or high-ranking executives in advance of a settlement conference.
Advance preparation for a settlement conference should alleviate any concerns about findings or required notices. There is nothing incompatible between the Brown Act and the court rules once it is recognized that any *677final settlement is always subject to full board approval. When a settlement is reached which is contingent on board approval, the judge normally continues the settlement conference or simply retains jurisdiction so that in the event approval of the final settlement is not forthcoming, negotiations can begin anew. In the case of a government entity, it is always understood that any final settlement necessitates formal action by the board at a meeting held in accordance with the provisions of the Brown Act. Such deliberations may be held in executive session. (See Gov. Code, § 54956.9 [authority to hold closed session to discuss pending litigation]; see also § 54956 [authority to call special meetings].)
With the power of governance comes responsibility, and that responsibility may mean being required to attend settlement conferences. Members of governing boards of public entities must recognize the importance of these conferences to the orderly administration of justice. In this extreme case, the public entity flouted court rules and totally frustrated the settlement judge’s attempts to communicate with anyone in a position of responsibility.
Crosby, J., and Sonenshine, J., concurred.