Court Opinion

ID: 9655895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:24:43.82393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:23.055266
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
It is the duty of the trial court, whether requested to do so or not, to instruct upon all of the material issues presented by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. This rule is so fundamental as to not require any citation of authority. As the majority opinion points *136out, the plaintiff specifically alleged a violation of the general rule that it is negligence for a motorist to drive an automobile on a highway in such a manner that he cannot stop or turn aside in time to avoid a collision with an object within the range of his vision. This is familiarly called “the range of vision” rule. As the majority opinion points out, this allegation was traversed by the defendant in which he specifically alleged facts within the exceptions to the general rule. The crucial issue, if not the only issue in the case, was the visibility or discernibility, under the circumstances, of the plaintiff’s tractor and wagon. It may be said that the whole case revolved around the determination of this issue. Whatever may be the language in some of our cases attempting to generalize the exceptions, the rule with reference to! the application of the exceptions in this case is clearly stated in Guynan v. Olson, 178 Neb. 335, 133 N. W. 2d 571, as follows: “In the application of this rule (the range of vision rule), we have applied the exceptions to the situations where the object, obstruction, or depression is of the same color as the roadway, and for that reason, or for other sufficient reasons, cannot be observed by the exercise of ordinary care in time to avoid a collision.” (Emphasis supplied.) The issue as to visibility or discernibility of the tractor and the wagon in this case was in hot dispute. The majority opinion does not challenge the conclusion that the question was for jury determination. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether the tractor and wagon could be observed by the exercise of ordinary care in time to- avoid a collision. The parties pleaded the rule and the exceptions thereto, and there was evidence to support a finding either way by the jury. It was, therefore, the court’s duty irrespective of any request to. properly instruct the jury as to the rule and as to the exceptions thereto, as applicable to this case. And yet the court, by a circuitous method of reasoning, comes to the conclusion that' although the rule and the exceptions, are pleaded by the *137parties and supported by the evidence that it is not necessary to instruct the jury as to the applicable rules pertaining thereto.
The plaintiff in this case requested an instruction which consisted of a statement of the general rule without including therein the applicable rule with reference to the exceptions. There was evidence, of course, supporting the existence of the exceptions. Conceding, therefore, that it would have been error to give the requested instruction, this would in no way have absolved the trial court from the duty to instruct as to the law upon material issues pleaded and supported by the evidence and which in fact were submitted to the jury for consideration. Surely, if an erroneous instruction was requested as to the elements of lookout or control in a negligence case, it could not be contended that such an erroneous request would absolve the court from the duty of properly instructing upon the issues of lookout or control.
The majority opinion states: “Where an exception clearly applies, the general rule does not apply.” The point is that this question is for the jury to determine under all of the circumstances of the case. This court has no right or power, as a matter of law, to determine that an exception “clearly applies” in this case. The evidence was conflicting. There was evidence to1 support the existence of the exceptions and to support a finding that the object was not visible or discernible by the use of ordinary care. Surely the jury was entitled to determine this essential fact of the case. The majority opinion holds, in effect, that as a matter of law this case comes within the exceptions to- the rule. Although submitting the case to the jury, the effect of the holding is to determine, as a matter of law, that the tractor and wagon could not be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances. This is clearly an invasion of the province of the jury. The range of vision rule is certainly not merely an abstract formula *138for the technical application of this court in the determination of whether a case should be submitted to the jury or not. In Guerin v. Forburger, 161 Neb. 824, 74 N. W. 2d 870, it is stated as follows: “ ‘The basis- of this rule is that a driver of an automobile is legally obligated to keep such a lookout that he can see what is plainly visible before him and that he cannot relieve himself of that duty. And, in conjunction therewith, he must so drive his automobile that when he sees the object he can stop his automobile in time to avoid it.’ Buresh v. George, 149 Neb. 340, 31 N. W. 2d 106.” The rule is one of substantive law governing the degree of lookout, control, and speed of drivers on highways-. It is as much a part of the law as any statute. Could it be argued that if this rule happened to be enacted into statute, that the court would not be required to inform the jury of its application when the issues as- raised by the pleadings and the evidence supported its application?
The majority opinion states, “Under such circumstances, the exception involving visibility of the object clearly applied rather than the general rule.” With this statement, I disagree. The evidence as to visibility was conflicting. There was evidence supporting a determination by the jury that the facts came within the exceptions and that the tractor and wagon were not discernible by the exercise of ordinary care and there was evidence to the contrary. The jury had a right to determine that the object was- visible and a right to know what the applicable law was in the event that it determined that the rule applied rather than the exceptions.
It would seem that the range of vision rule, by the holding in this- case, is now withdrawn from jury consideration in the State of Nebraska. If any evidence is introduced supporting the exceptions the rule is destroyed as far as the jury’s consideration of it is concerned. Moreover, the confusion that will result is apparent from this case. This court in this case specifically holds that the range of vision rule was submitted to the *139jury and that this was proper. And yet, at the same time, this court holds that it was not necessary or proper for the court to instruct the jury as to the rules of law applicable. The “range of vision” rule was adopted in 1928 in the case of Roth v. Blomquist, 117 Neb. 444, 220 N. W. 572, 58 A. L. R. 1473. Since that time there appears to be no question in the cases where the evidence is conflicting that the issues should be submitted to the jury together with appropriate instructions covering the rule and the exceptions. See Plumb v. Burnham, 151 Neb. 129, 36 N. W. 2d 612. The case presented here is a typical rear-end accident case. Whether the rule applied or not depended upon the visibility of the object. This issue was submitted to the jury and the jury was entitled to know the applicable law pertaining thereto.
Brower, J., concurs in this dissent.