Court Opinion

ID: 9687294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:22:21.10463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.547021
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
SIMON, Justice.
The plaintiff sued the Louisiana Board of Institutions and the State of Louisiana under the authority conferred upon him by Senate Bill No. 100 of 1956. Plaintiff’s suit is for the recovery of damages for the loss of twenty registered Aberdeen Angus breeding cows, which allegedly met their death by consuming a “sugared water” mixture, supposedly to be mill run black-strap molasses, purchased from the Louisiana State Penitentiary, an agency under the jurisdiction of the Board of Institutions.
It may be observed that this is the second suit instituted by plaintiff against these defendants. The first suit involved the identical factual issues which are presented in the instant suit. Originally plaintiff sued the defendants, without first obtaining the consent and authority of the State in the manner provided by the Constitution, *337on the professed conception that the State may be sued without its consent for a breach of contract when it is acting in a proprietary capacity. In support of this theory, plaintiff originally urged that the Louisiana State Penitentiary, having been authorized to sell its surplus farm products,1 the proceeds therefrom to be deposited in a revolving fund,2 it followed that the State was in the position of any other vendor and could be held liable for a breach of the warranty of fitness exacted by Articles 2475 and 2476 of the LSA-Civil Code. We refused to sustain this contention and held that since the consent of the Legislature for the institution of suit had not been obtained in the manner provided by Section 35 of Article 3 of the Constitution, as amended by Act 385 of 1946, adopted November 5, 1946, LSA, the courts were without jurisdiction to entertain it.3
Thereafter, at the next regular session of the Legislature in 1956, a bill was introduced in the Senate (Senate Bill No. 100), the title and parts of which are substantially as follows:
“An Act
“To authorize Lloyd J. Cobb to file suit against the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Board of Institutions upon a claim for damages arising from the death of his cattle alleged to have been caused by being fed material bought from the Louisiana Board of Institutions; to provide the method for citing the State therein, designating the Court in which said suit may be instituted; waiving any prescriptions which may have accrued in favor of the State against said claim and providing for the payment of any judgment which may be rendered in said proposed suit.”
Section 1 contains authorization for the plaintiff to prosecute his suit in his claim against the State for damages suffered as the result of the death of his cattle; Section 2 refers to the court in which the suit may be filed and the manner in which the State shall be served and cited; Section 3 prescribes the filing of suit within six months after this Act becomes law and waives any prescriptions which may have accrued in favor of the State and against said claim; Section 4 provides for the mandatory payment of the judgment which might be rendered and the source from which payment shall be made.
This bill was adopted by the Legislature without amendment and presented to the Governor, and in due course was vetoed and returned by him to the Senate, from which it originated, with his written objections attached thereto. Upon its receipt the bill, upon motion of its author, was re*339turned to the Senate calendar, subject to call. This bill was never reconsidered or acted upon by the Senate in an effort to override the veto of the Governor, and the Legislature subsequently adjourned sine die.
Thereupon, plaintiff filed the instant suit with the same allegations as were made in the first suit with the exception that in the instant suit, after alleging the creation by the Legislature (LSA-R.S. 51:692.9) of a revolving fund of $500,000 to be used by the Louisiana State Penitentiary in the conduct of its general farming and agricultural operations, thereupon proceeded to pray for judgment in the amount sued for “and that the same be paid out of the revolving fund established by [LSA-JR.S. 51:692.9 or by the Treasurer of the State of Louisiana out of any funds belonging to the State, not otherwise appropriated.”
The State and the Board of Institutions filed exceptions to the jurisdiction of the Court and that of no right and no cause of action, which were founded on constitutional governmental immunity from suit without valid legislative consent.
Faced with these exceptions, plaintiff thereupon filed a supplemental petition deleting that part of the prayer directing the manner in which the judgment shall be paid. The exceptions'were overruled, and 'a judgment on the merits was again rendered in plaintiff’s favor, with legal interest from February 1, 1954, until paid and all costs. The State and the Board of Institutions appealed from the adverse ruling.
On original hearing we reversed and set aside the judgment of the lower court and decreed that the bill relied upon as a waiver of immunity was constitutionally invalid. It is now before us on rehearing.
Pretermitting the justness of plaintiff’s claim for damages, the question presented is whether there has been granted a legal and valid waiver of the right of the State to immunity from this suit. Under its exceptions the State and the Board contend that:
(1) By virtue of the title of the bill and the mandatory provisions of Section 4, supra, it was a bill designed and intended to have the- effect of law, and which, under Article 5, Section 15, of the Constitution, must be presented to the Governor for his official action;
(2) That while in fact so presented it was vetoed, returned to the Senate, never called for reconsideration or the veto overridden, and consequently is ineffective and invalid.
On the other hand, plaintiff’s contentions are:
(1) That the bill is not a law,' nor must it be deemed as one having the effect of law within the meaning of the Constitution, hence the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Section 15 of Article 5 of the Constitution are not applicable;
*341(2) Not being a law or having the-effect of law, the signature or approval of the Governor was not necessary to its validity;
(3) That the Governor’s approval being unnecessary, his veto thereof and the absence of its reconsideration by the Senate was wholly ineffective, and that the bill as passed by the Legislature validly constitutes a full and complete grant of authority to the filing of this suit.
Under our system of government it is fundamental that a state is immune from suit in its own as well as in any other courts, unless it has expressly consented to and waived its immunity. We will assume that the bare statement of this rudimentary tenet of law finds unquestioned acceptance. State ex rel. Hart v. Burke, 33 La.Ann. 498; Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, supra, and authorities therein cited and reviewed. And it is a necessary corollary that the consent to be sued is a matter of grace and is in no sense a vested right.
As regard suits against the State, the Legislature may impose such limitations and restrictions as it pleases on the right of sidt which is authorized by Article 3, Section 35, of the Constitution, as amended by Act 385 of 1946, adopted November 5, 1946. This constitutional section specifically limits and circumscribes the method to be employed by the Legislature, in that, whenever it shall do so it shall: (1) provide the method for citing the State therein; (2) designate the Louisiana court or courts in which the suit or suits may be instituted; and (3) may waive any accrued prescription in favor of the State against the claim or claims on which the suit is so authorized. It is therein further declared that the procedure in such suits shall be the same as in suits between private litigants, but that no judgment for money against the State shall be satisfied except out of moneys appropriated by the Legist lature for the purpose. (Italics ours.) It; further provides that:
“Except as otherwise specially provided in this section, the effect of any authorization by the Legislature for a suit against the State shall be nothing more than a waiver of the State’s immunity from suit insofar as the suit so authorized is concerned.” (Italics ours.)
It is manifest that the foregoing provisions are limitations and restrictions, and though the Legislature in waiving its immunity may impose other conditions or additional restrictions, the latter cannot transcend or be inconsistent with the mandatory limitations therein prescribed.
It must be conceded that the constitutional article as amended, supra, does not contain any express reference making necessary any action, affirmative or otherwise, by the Governor. In recent cases we ex*343plicitly held that the Legislature alone, regardless of any action by the Governor, may grant such waiver of immunity. In Lewis v. State4 the Legislature, by Act 273 of 1942, authorized the plaintiff to file suit against the State upon her claim for damages. After suit was filed the State questioned the jurisdiction of the court ratione personae and ratione materiae on the ground that the bill was unconstitutional in that it failed to provide the method of procedure required by Section 35 of Article 3 of the Constitution. The State contended that the act in question is:
“ * * * a law within the meaning and contemplation of the constitutional provisions governing legislative enactments which * * * are intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general, instead of dealing as it does, with -a matter of special or temporary character.”
We said that:
“ * * * Notwithstanding a legislative act authorizing a suit to be brought against the State is of a special character, this Court has held that the waiving of immunity or exemption from suit * * * and the authorization by the Legislature to a person to sue the State is not a special or local law * * *. It is simply a special act authorizing a person to sue, needing no notice to be given to authorize its enactment and being uncontrolled as to its own course.”
We further said:
“Under the wording of Section 35 of Article 3 of the Constitution, the right is vested in the Legislature, and not in the Legislature with the approval of the Governor, to authorize the institution of a suit against the state. The constitutional provision reads in part: ‘Whenever the Legislature shall authorize suit to be filed against the State * * *.’ (Writer’s italics.) The provision does not declare that the Legislature shall, by a law formally adopted, permit suit to be brought against the State, but merely that the Legislature shall authorize such a suit, without specifying the manner in which such authorization may be given. In other words, the Legislature may, without attempting to pass a general or special law pursuant to the constitutional provision, pass a joint resolution, which, although not effective as a law, is effective as a consent of the State to subject itself to suit. Under Section 17 of Article 5 of the Constitution of 1921, such a resolution when passed by the Legislature would become effective without the approval of the Governor.”
*345In Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co. v. State, 213 La. 1, 34 So.2d 331, 336, we recognized plaintiff’s right to file suit and that in the event of a favorable judgment, its enforcement would be “subject to such action as may be taken by the Legislature and the Governor, if and when the legislation necessary to appropriate funds to pay siich judgment shall be introduced(Italics ours.)
In the instant case it is observed that the title of Senate Bill No. 100 contains in part the clause: * * and providing for the payment of any judgment which may be rendered in said proposed suit.” To avoid the title of the Act being broader than its provisions, after properly detailing in Sections 1, 2 and 3 the procedure called for by Section 35, Article 3 of the Constitution, Section 4 was inserted, and which reads:
“If judgment is rendered in favor of claimant and against the State of Louisiana, it shall be paid out of the revolving fund established pursuant to R.S. 51:629.9, or by the Treasurer of the State of Louisiana, out of any funds belonging to the State, not otherwise appropriated.” (Italics ours.)
These provisions, in their very nature and effect, constitute a mandatory order for the payment of a judgment against the State from the revolving fund of the State Penitentiary or out of any funds belonging to the State “not otherwise appropriated.” The use of the word “shall” must, under LSA-R.S. 1:3, be construed to be “mandatory” and not “permissive” in accord with its common approved usage.
It must be conceded that had the Legislature approved a bill in the nature of a joint resolution, in accord with Section 35 of Article 3, and had limited its provisions to Sections 1, 2 and 3, it would have been effective as a valid consent of the State to subject itself to suit without the approval of the Governor.
The obvious purpose of inserting Section 4 was not only an attempt to add to and to broaden the simple procedural method prescribed by Section 35 of Article 3, but was also an attempt to avoid the necessity of obtaining a subsequent appropriation from the Legislature, requiring the approval of the Governor, to pay any judgment which might have been obtained against the State: Being a component subdivision, Section 4 became an inseparable part of the whole act. Thus the bill lost its identity as a mere waiver of immunity from suit and became a legislative statute embracing one object with a title indicative of its object and clearly intended to have the force and effect of law.5
*347It is significant that 'the plaintiff so interpreted and construed the legal effect of Section 4 for in his original petition filed ‘herein he alleged and prayed that judgment “be paid out of the revolving fund * * * or by the Treasurer of the State of Louisiana out of any funds belonging to the State, not otherwise appropriated.”
Were we to conclude that the bill in question is a valid waiver of immunity from suit, we would have to first hold that the Legislature had the constitutional right to provide by mandate in the title and the body of the bill or resolution authorizing suit, the manner in which the judgment would be paid and the particular ■fund or source of revenue upon which levy ■for payment shall be made. To so hold ■would fall within the prohibition contained in Article 3, Section 35 which, as aforestated, not only expressly limits and re¡stricts the procedure to be observed in obtaining mere waiver of immunity, but which likewise provides that such an authorization shall be “nothing more than a waiver of 'the State’s immunity from suit * * and under which our jurisprudence requires the enactment of an act by the Legislature, with the approval of the Governor, appropriating the necessary funds to pay whatever judgment must have been rendered.
Were we to hold that no constitutional objections to the bill, by virtue of the inclusion of Section 4, can be validly urged under its explicit and mandatory language, it is manifest that plaintiff would be entitled to demand payment of his judgment out of the revolving fund of the penitentiary, and as aforestated, relieve him of the necessity of obtaining from the Legislature, at some future session, a specific appropriation for the payment thereof.
It is fundamental that every bill which is to have the force and effect of law must be passed by both Houses, and under Section 26 of Article 3 must be presented to the Governor. Upon its receipt, he is required by Section 15 of Article 5 to either: (1) Approve the bill as a whole as presented; (2) Allow the same to become law by failing to act upon it within the prescribed time limit;- or (3) Veto the whole bill and return the same with his objections to the House in which it originated. It is further required that should the bill be vetoed both Houses must, by a two-thirds vote, override the veto before it can be effective as a law.
As previously observed, upon receipt-of the bill with the attached veto message of the Governor, it was returned to the calendar on motion of its author, and was never thereafter called or presented for reconsideration during the remainder of the Legislative session. It neecssarily follows that being in an embryonic state, when the Legislature adjourned sine die, its potential legal force and effect perished.
*349Plaintiff contends that the conclusions reached by us in the Lewis case, supra [207 La. 194, 20 So.2d 919], are clearly analagous to and decisive of the case here. In that case the bill waiving immunity contained a subdivision (Section 4) authorizing and directing the State Treasurer to pay any judgment obtained by plaintiff, the payment to be made out of the General Fund or any other fund especially appropriated to pay the claim. The State urged the same objections as to the effect of such a provision as is here contended. We held that the Legislature, in granting a right to sue, had the unrestricted power to provide a method of procedure and the “effect of the judgment which may be rendered * *
We are in full accord with this holding. When the Lewis case, supra, was decided, January 15, 1945, Section 35 of Article 3 of the Constitution read as follows:
“Whenever the legislature shall authorize a suit to be filed against the. State, it shall provide a method of procedure and the effect of the judgments which may be rendered therein.” (Italics ours.)
This section was rewritten by the enactment of Act 385 of 1946, and adopted November 5, 1946. As rewritten the constitutional section spelled out in explicit language the simple procedure to be followed in obtaining a waiver of immunity, but struck out and omitted therefrom the clause providing for “the effect of the judgments which may be rendered therein.” Hence, we were fully justified in upholding the validity of the bill waiving immunity in the light of the then existing constitutional .provision granting to the Legislature the right of providing for the effect of judgment which might be rendered against the State. Such power no longer prevails nor is enjoyed by the Legislature by virtue of the amending Act No. 385 of 1946, approved by the electorate on November 6, 1946.
For these reasons and those set forth in our original opinion, it is ordered that that opinion and decree be reinstated as the final judgment in this case.
HAMITER, J., dissents, adhering to his previously assigned reasons.
HAWTHORNE and HAMLIN, JJ., dissent.

. LSA-R.S. 51:692.10.

. LSA-R.S. 51:692.9.

.Cobb v. Louisiana Board of Institutions, 229 La. 1, 85 So.2d 10.

. 207 La. 194, 20 So.2d 917, 919.

. Section 16 of Article 3: “Every statute enacted by the Legislature shall em.brace but one object, and shall have a title indicative of its object. * * * ”