Court Opinion

ID: 9445339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:25:29.014805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:12.803233
License: Public Domain

LEMMON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Because of the trial judge’s cavalier denial to the appellant of a reasonable opportunity to present his defense, I am forced to dissent.
On June 1, 1955, the appellee put on three witnesses. The District Judge announced that the matter would not yet stand submitted, but would await “the receipt of the blood and the report of the doctor,” after which “we will have to have the doctor here to testify what it means”.
On July 1, 1955, the appellant made a “Motion for Supplemental Order to Require Plaintiff [appellee] to Furnish Blood Sample”, whereby it was sought to require the appellee to appear at Hong Kong before a physician “or other persons to be designated by the Court, and there to furnish and permit such physician or other persons to take a sample or samples of his blood in sufficient quantities so that such blood may be transported to the United States of America and there be examined and tested by a physician, hematologist, serologist, or other person for blood grouping and type”.
On August 16, 1955, the Court announced that it was denying the appellant’s motion, and was ordering judgment for the appellee. At no time did the appellant formally close its case.
Thereupon counsel for the appellant made a formal offer of proof, declaring that “The government at this particular stage has actually obtained the results of a blood test of the parents.”
The Court replied that it had ruled. Counsel for the appellee then pleaded as follows:
“Mr. Dooley. If your Honor would just hold your opinion for the purpose of permitting the government to make an offer of proof of the result of the blood test, then the matter could go up to the Circuit and they could determine whether the results of the blood tests which have been obtained pursuant to an order — ”
The District Judge then interrupted counsel with the observation that “This is not a proper case”.
On September 9, 1955, the appellant filed a motion for a new trial.
On October 3, 1955, after considerable colloquy between Court and counsel, the latter elaborated on his offer of proof with much specificity:
“Mr. Dooley. Your Honor, in this case the plaintiff has been tested. The blood of his parents has been tested. We have the results set forth in the affidavit of the laboratory technician. Then I have the affidavit of Dr. Rubinstein who, from an examination of the experience he lists in his affidavit, is well qualified as a hematologist. He taught hematology for ten years at Columbia University and, as stated in his affidavit, he is willing to come and testify. The laboratory technician is willing to come and testify, *500and Dr. Rubinstein will testify it is impossibile for the alleged father to be the father, according to the affidavits. We have that evidence in the form of affidavits here that it is impossible for this plaintiff to be a citizen of the United States.” ******
“I can say, your Honor, from the literature I have read on the subject, I can be sure there will not be a disagreement among the experts as to the meaning of the blood tests in this case. We have the affidavit of Dr. Rubinstein that the father could not be the father of Quan Yoke Fong. We do not believe that there will be a dispute as to the meaning of this test.”
Near the close of dialogue, the District Judge gave counsel for the appellant a personal gibe:
“Mr. Dooley. * * * I think the real question, your Honor, since we have the evidence—
“The Court. The real question, Mr. Dooley, is you just don’t like to give up. You just don’t like to quit.”
In his brief, the appellee comments thus upon the offer of proof:
“Appellant’s argument to the court on August 16, 1955, at which time he urged the court to permit him to make an offer of proof, was directed solely to the results of the blood tests of the parents taken pursuant to the invalid order of the District Court of May 10, 1955, and the result of the blood test of the sample allegedly taken from the plaintiff on August 12, 1955, at the direction of the appellant and without court order.”
The brief then cites three pages of the transcript in support of the above statement. I have carefully scrutinized not only the three pages cited, but all the colloquies between Court and counsel, from which I have already copiously quoted. I can find no reference to an order of May 10, 1955, or to a “sample allegedly taken from the plaintiff on August 12, 1955.” No dates whatever relating to an order of the Court or to a blood sample were mentioned throughout the entire dialogues. For aught we know, counsel for the appellant might have been referring to an entirely different blood test. He was not permitted to make a formal offer of proof, and could slip in references thereto only “by the back door”, so to speak. The appellee’s statement is pure conjecture, so far as the cited record pages show.
In criminal cases, the Government labors under severe handicaps, such as the proscription against referring to the fact that the defendant has not taken the stand, or the inability to appeal after a trial on the facts. In a civil case, at least, even the sovereign should be permitted to put in its proof — a right accorded to the humblest citizen. Perhaps what is needed is a second Magna Charta or a second Bill of Rights — one to protect the interests of the Government.