Court Opinion

ID: 9692796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:05:57.732855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:37.007792
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s affirmative answer to the third question certified, which asks whether Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-358 (Reissue 1984) is inapplicable to an automobile liability insurance policy.
Section 44-358 was first enacted in 1913 as part of an extensive revision of insurance statutes, and has never been amended, except for grammatical corrections. It reads:
No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation for a contract or policy of insurance by the insured, or in his behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy, or prevent its attaching, unless such misrepresentation or warranty deceived the company to its injury. The breach of a warranty or condition in any contract or policy of insurance shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid liability, unless such breach shall exist at the time of the loss and contribute to the loss, anything in the policy or contract of insurance to the contrary notwithstanding.
In short, the “contribute to the loss” standard of the statute imposes on an insurer who wishes to defeat or avoid coverage the burden of proving not only that the risk of loss from some *233potential cause was increased but also that one of those increased risks actually caused the loss.
In what appears to be the first consideration of the effect of other enactments on § 44-358, this court, in Zimmerman v. Continental Cas. Co., 181 Neb. 654, 150 N.W.2d 268 (1967), held that § 44-358 was a general statute which applied to all insurance policies and must be read in pari materia with the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-710.14 (Reissue 1984), which was adopted in 1957 and applied only to sickness and accident insurance policies. Section 44-710.14 provides that a false statement made in an application will bar recovery only when it materially affects either acceptance of thé risk or the hazard assumed. The Zimmerman court found no conflict between the two statutes and concluded that a sickness and accident insurer had to meet the requirements of both statutes in order to defeat recovery. Zimmerman further held that the older statute, § 44-358, required both that the statements be “made knowingly by the insured with the intent to deceive” and that the insurer be “deceived by them to its injury.” Id. at 659, 150 N.W.2d at 272. White v. Medico Life Ins. Co., 212 Neb. 901, 327 N.W.2d 606 (1982), applied the Zimmerman rule to another sickness and accident policy, and Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Luebbe, 218 Neb. 694, 358 N.W.2d 754 (1984), in determining that a life insurer did not have a basis for defeating coverage, again stated that § 44-358 applied to all policies.
I see nothing in Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-514 through 44-521 (Reissue 1984), inclusive, which conflicts with § 44-358. Those statutes specify particular methods of accomplishing the termination of coverage once extended by certain specified policies, and in some instances further limit the bases upon which coverage may be terminated, as well as limit the effective date of the termination.
Accordingly, I would have answered the third question in the negative, No, § 44-358 is not inapplicable to the policies of automobile liability insurance which come within the purview of§§ 44-514 through 44-521, inclusive; that is to say, § 44-358 is applicable to such policies.
Krivosha, C. J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.