Court Opinion

ID: 9640039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:56:00.180472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:25.590287
License: Public Domain

HOLCOMB, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is with lamentable frequency that we are asked to correct the shortcomings of our fellow attorneys. This is such a case.
Appellee brought suit and was successful before a jury. Appellant allowed Appellee to introduce evidence of “good cause” even though it was not pled. Appellant objected to the charge containing an instruction on “good cause” when it was not in the pleadings. The trial court correctly allowed Ap-pellee to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. However, at this point, the orderly observance of the rules broke down and nobody bothered to insure that the amended pleadings were filed, in writing, before the charge was submitted to the jury, or even before the judgment was entered.
Appellant asked for judgment n.o.v. and for a new trial. In both motions, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s answer to the issue of “good cause.” However, Appellant argued based on the question in the charge to the jury, not that the question should not have been in the charge. For the first time, on appeal, Appellant argues that the charge to the jury was deficient because it did not conform to the pleadings. I am left -with the impression that had Appellee not submitted his very late-filed amendment, we would not have been asked to review this case for error in the failure of the charge to conform to the pleadings.
While there are many rules that require very strict observance, such as Rules 166a and 166b, I believe this case calls for a liberal interpretation of the rules. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 1. We must decide if the observance of Rules 66 and 276-79 is more critical than the observance of Appellate Rule 52. I believe the purpose of the rules is to fairly try a case with all parties on notice of the issues to be resolved. There is also a need to put an end to the litigation. The rules at issue here are all pointed at reaching an end of the case; an *833end which will be clearly defined so that all parties will have fair notice of the bounds of the decision. In this case, I find that everyone knew what the issues were after the trial court permitted Appellee to amend the petition. Also, during the plenary power of the court there was ample opportunity and procedural devices for both parties to correct the formal error that existed in the pleadings. I am also aware of the danger of creating a new “trap” for a practitioner who after making a proper objection finds that he must renew the same objection or waive error on appeal under Appellate Rule 52.
I am reinforced in my belief by dicta in one of the cases relied upon by Appellant: “we have found no case permitting the filing of a trial amendment after judgment unless permission to file the same was granted during the trial of the case.” Warren, 87 S.W.2d at 502 (emphasis added). Permission was granted and an amendment would have been proper if made during the plenary power of the court. While I agree with Appellant that the court had no power to accept the amendment after losing plenary power, I do not agree that the failure to amend was harmful to Appellant.
I would rule that when a party correctly objects to a charge, and after the trial court allows the other party to make a trial amendment but none is made, in order to preserve error, the complaining party would have to renew the objection. The objection could be made before the charge is submitted to the jury, Texas Rule of Civil PROCEDURE 66, or by “Motion for judgment n.o.v. pointing out the failure of the charge to conform to the pleadings.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 277, 279, 301.
I believe Appellant has waived his right to complain of the failure to amend the pleadings, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.