Court Opinion

ID: 9524987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:58.751531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:28.862667
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NASH, dissenting: The appeal in this case is not from a final order, and it should be dismissed. In addition to the facts noted in the opinion, other matters not there mentioned are necessary to the correct resolution of this appeal. On January 26, 1988, at the hearing of defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment entered against her, the trial court did vacate it for lack of proper service on defendant. The court also stated, however, that it treated defendant’s general appearance at that hearing as voluntary and gave her 21 days to respond to plaintiff’s complaint. At a subsequent hearing on March 7, 1988, of plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and to determine the status of the case, the court denied plaintiff’s motion, then noted defendant had not yet responded to the complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel stated he had no objection to giving defendant an additional 28 days to answer the complaint, and the court extended that time to April 6, 1988, and continued the case to 10 a.m. on that day. On March 14, 1988, plaintiff filed its notice of appeal, and on March 25, 1988, defendant filed her answer to plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s counsel did not appear at the April 6 setting of the case; defendant did appear and advised the court that her answer had been filed. The record further discloses that on April 6, 1988, the case was dismissed by the trial court for want of prosecution. In my view, defendant made a general appearance in the case on January 27, 1988, when she sought, and secured, the vacation of the void default judgment against her. The trial court found that to be evident and, after correctly vacating the judgment, gave defendant time to respond to the complaint. At the March 7 status hearing, plaintiff’s counsel tacitly acknowledged that too was his understanding when he agreed defendant should have additional time to file her answer. Defendant made no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over her in any of these proceedings and did file her responsive answer to the complaint within the additional time allowed. Plaintiff’s notice of appeal in these circumstances would not give jurisdiction to this court to review, at this time, plaintiff’s claims of error. The majority rely upon Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co. (1943), 383 Ill. 569, as authority for this court to hold that “in cases where the judgment is vacated due to improper service that the effect of that order is to quash the service of process and an appeal may be had from this order.” (183 Ill. App. 3d at 1103.) Brauer, however, must be distinguished from the present case, as there the defendant made a special and limited appearance to contest the jurisdiction of the court when the judgment was entered and did not otherwise submit to its jurisdiction. The majority recognizes here that defendant did not make a special appearance, but finds such is not required when a party seeks to set aside a void judgment which has been entered, citing Sullivan v. Bach (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1142. I do not agree with the majority’s understanding of the holding in Sullivan v. Bach, which only stands for the long-established proposition that a general appearance made after judgment to challenge the jurisdiction of the court to enter it will not act to retroactively validate a judgment void when entered. (100 Ill. App. 3d at 1141.) This court in Sullivan v. Bach also noted “[t]here is no need to file a special and limited appearance in challenging past jurisdiction unless one wishes to contest the court’s prospective jurisdiction as well.” 100 Ill. App. 3d at 1141-42; see Francisco v. Francisco (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 594, 597. There can be no question in the present case that the general appearance by defendant did not validate the prior void judgment against her, which was then correctly vacated, and, in my view, there is also no doubt that she submitted personal jurisdiction to the trial court for prospective proceedings in the case. Both of the parties, and the trial court, appear to acknowledge that status of the defendant in the case, and it apparently pends on plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s answer in the trial court and may not now be appealed for lack of a final order. The issue here may also be moot, as after plaintiff filed its premature notice of appeal, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed in the trial court for want of prosecution and no appeal has been taken from that judgment. On the record presented, I would dismiss plaintiff’s appeal.