Court Opinion

ID: 9641808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:40:47.477719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:39.884370
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment must be reversed and remanded, but write separately to address the two errors which I believe compel this result: the improper admission of hearsay evidence and the improper allowance of the State to argue on matters not in evidence.
A singularly critical fact issue at trial was whether Ray Norton had surprised the two men burglarizing the warehouse, as he claimed, or whether he had requested that they come to the warehouse, then killed them. The testimony by Paula Bailey that her husband told her that Ray Norton telephoned him about 3:30 a.m. and directed that he and the other victim come help Norton at the shop may well have been devastating to the defense in the jurors’ minds. The defense objected to Paula Bailey’s testimony relating to what her husband told her because it was hearsay. The court overruled the objection, ruling that the testimony was admissible “only to show the state of mind” of Bill Bailey.
The trial court erred in ruling that the testimony was admissible to show Bill Bailey’s state of mind. If the testimony was evidence of his state of mind, it was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove its truth, only that Bill Bailey believed it. The testimony that Bill Bailey said that he received a telephone call from Ray Norton in which Norton asked him to help him with some work at the shop, clearly was presented to prove the truth of the matters stated. Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 803(3), while codifying the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, in no manner broadens the exception. The type of state of mind ordinarily in issue is emotion, ill will, mental suffering, intent, and so forth. Most commonly, the rule is applied to declaration as to hatred or affection. See 1A R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal § 861, et seq. (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980 & Supp.1986). Rule 803(3) refers to a few types of the state of mind contemplated, such as emotion, sensation or physical condition. It seems apparent that Paula Bailey’s testimony relating to the matters told her by Bill Bailey is not about the type of matters generally considered to be admissible as declarations as to state of mind.
Hearsay statements allegedly made by a deceased about a defendant are not lightly admitted as evidence in our courts. See, e.g., Van Byrd v. State, 605 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Fazzino v. State, 531 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Crim.App.*1691976). In Jones v. State, 515 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1974), the trial court allowed a witness to testify about certain accusations of sexual misconduct which the then-deceased victim made about the defendant who was accused of killing him. The State urged on appeal that this testimony was admissible as a state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. In rejecting this contention, the court held that the evidence “could not have been offered to prove only the state of mind, but had to imply the truth of the matter asserted. This exception to the hearsay rule does not allow admission of this testimony in this case.” 515 S.W.2d at 129. So, too, must we hold that the state of mind exception does not allow the types of declarations by Bill Bailey placed in evidence through Paula Bailey.
The additional basis of my concurrence is that, while I agree with the majority that the trial court improperly allowed argument on matters not in evidence, I am unwilling to join in holding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error did not contribute to the conviction. There was no evidence concerning fingerprints on Thomas’ weapon found near his body. Nevertheless, the trial court allowed the State, over objection, to emphatically argue that there were no fingerprints on that weapon and that the deduction from this “evidence” was that Norton wiped the fingerprints off.
This case primarily involved the intent of Norton, which was shown from the circumstances. This fact is worth bearing in mind in our harm analysis. The test for harmless error is in Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2). Given the existence of error, the first of three progressive steps is taken; the second step obligates an appellate court to reverse the judgment; the third obviates the necessity of reversing the judgment only if the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or punishment. Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566, 569, 570 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). We thus find ourselves facing errors that require reversal unless we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the errors did not contribute to Norton’s conviction or punishment. In light of the entire record, I am unable to determine that the errors beyond a reasonable doubt made no contribution to the conviction or the punishment as required by Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(2).