Court Opinion

ID: 9739257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:17.088045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.126309
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 49. (concurring). Because I believe that the admission of Michael's statement sub silencio overrules precedent, lacks foundation, and violates Weed's constitutional right to confrontation, I cannot join the majority. Nevertheless, I concur because I agree with the majority that the error in admitting the statement is harmless in this case. What is not harmless, however, is that the majority broadens a hearsay exception to such an extent that its foundational requirements are rendered meaningless.
¶ 50. Wisconsin is one of only a few states that has adopted the exception for statements of recent perception. Of those few that have adopted it, Wyoming's exception applies only in civil cases and New Mexico's exception has since been repealed altogether. Wyo. Stat. R. Evid. Rule 804(b)(5) (2003); State v. Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1086-87 (N.M. 1996). Thus, Wisconsin stands only with Hawaii and Kansas in applying this exception in criminal cases.
¶ 51. When adopting the federal rules of evidence, Congress rejected the proposal to include the new exception because of "great potential breadth" and its inadequate guarantees of trustworthiness:
The [House Judiciary] Committee eliminated [the proposed statement of recent perception exception] as creating a new and unwarranted hearsay exception of great potential breadth. The Committee did not believe that statements of the type referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify admissibility. ■
*468H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7080.
¶ 52. I share the concern of overbreadth in the application of this exception. It must be narrowly applied.
¶ 53. The exception is unlike other hearsay exceptions where the declarant is unavailable, such as statements under belief of impending death (§ 908.045(3)) and statements against interest (§ 908.045(4)), in which the circumstances and type of statements inherently contain strong guarantees of trustworthiness. The lack of trustworthiness involved with the exception for statements of recent perception is evident from the reluctance of other jurisdictions to adopt it.
¶ 54. Apparently, it is this same reluctance that caused the court in State v. Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d 106, 119, 490 N.W.2d 753 (1992), to declare that corroboration is necessary when evaluating whether to admit hearsay under the exception for statements of recent perception:
Corroboration is the key to reliability of a statement coming under [the exception for statements of recent perception]. . .. Reliability depends on the possibility of corroborating the declarant's statement.
According to one treatise on Wisconsin evidence, corroboration poses a special problem for the introduction of hearsay testimony. Ralph Adam Fine, Fine's Wisconsin Evidence, § 908.045(2), at 319 (2002). The treatise notes that" 'Corroboration is the key to reliability of a statement coming under' Rule 908.045(2)." Id. (quoting Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d at 119).
¶ 55. The majority ignores the language in Stevens regarding the requirement that there be corroboration. It allows for the admission of the statement *469without any corroboration whatsoever, and in doing so, sub silencio overrules Stevens.
¶ 56. In this case, the hearsay involved the testimony of the Fuerbringers that Michael made a statement to the effect that he had removed the bullets from his gun. The majority notes Weed's argument that the statement should be excluded because there was no corroborating evidence, but then fails to address it. Majority op., ¶ 5. The failure to do so is not surprising because it appears that the State did not offer any evidence to corroborate the hearsay statement. Under Stevens, this lack of corroboration in and of itself makes the statement inadmissible. See Stevens, 171 Wis. 2d at 119.
¶ 57. In addition, it is not admissible because it fails to meet the foundational requirements. The requirements necessary to satisfy the exception for statements of recent perception are correctly set forth in ¶ 14 of the majority opinion: the statement must (1) be made in good faith with no contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation, (2) relate to a recently perceived event, and (3) be made while the declarant's recollection is clear.
¶ 58. The precise statement at issue is: "that's the reason I took the bullets out of the .357." I conclude that the statement is ambiguous in meaning and uncertain in time.
¶ 59. Michael did not tell the Fuerbringers when or what even caused him to remove the bullets and it is not clear from the circumstances when the alleged removal took place. Because the timing of the event is uncertain, the State failed to demonstrate that the statement describes a recent perception.
¶ 60. The majority discusses the testimony of the Fuerbringers in which they state their assumption that *470Michael took the bullets out of the gun because of Weed's suicide attempt eight days prior to the statement being made. According to the majority it therefore "appears" that the event described in the statement occurred within eight days. However, the assumptions of the Fuerbringers are insufficient to justify a conclusion that the State demonstrated recency.
¶ 61. This case is similar to Tim Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Linscott, 142 Wis. 2d 56, 78, 416 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1987), which involved the introduction of hearsay under the exception for statements of recent perception. The court of appeals determined that the party who sought to introduce the hearsay failed to reliably demonstrate when the perceived event occurred. Id. The court therefore concluded that the statement did not qualify for the hearsay exception. Id.
¶ 62. Similarly, in this case, the majority acknowledges that the Fuerbringers did not know when the alleged removal of the bullets occurred. According to the majority, the Fuerbringers made a "reasonable" assumption that the removal was in response to Weed's suicide attempt eight days before. Majority op., ¶ 18. There are, however, other assumptions which are also reasonable.
¶ 63. Weed notes other things that Michael could have been referring to when he stated "that's the reason I took the bullets out of the .357": he could have been referring to Patricia's angry state of mind, to her consumption of alcohol, or to their argumentative history, any of which may have provided a reason to unload the gun. As a result of this ambiguity, the assumptions of the Fuerbringers do not reliably meet the required foundation that the event be recently perceived.
¶ 64. Further, given that the purpose of his statement was to criticize his wife and that it was made in *471response to her humiliating comments, it is doubtful whether it meets the "good faith" necessary to establish the foundation for admission. Likewise, it is questionable whether the statement was made under circumstances which meet that foundational requirement that the declarant's recollection must be clear. The majority acknowledges that "Michael's mental state might have been affected by having a few beers." Majority op., ¶ 27.
¶ 65. Although it is unfortunate that the majority sub silencio overrules Stevens and incorrectly applies these facts to the foundational requirements for admissibility, the most problematic part of the majority's evidentiary analysis is that it broadens the exception to such an extent as to render the foundational requirements meaningless.
¶ 66. As noted above, Congress rejected this proposed new rule of evidence not only because it lacked sufficient reliability, but also out of a fear of its "great potential breadth." The majority employs an ardently criticized standard of admissibility and in doing so, not only unwisely broadens the exception, but essentially blows it wide open. In describing this standard, a treatise observes that "[n] early any articulated thought meets the test." Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 8045.2, at 711.
¶ 67. The majority in ¶ 19 applies the Kluever standard of admissibility. The declarant in that case suffered a severe head injury and was rendered unconscious for a substantial period of time but for "islets of memory." Kluever v. Evangelical Reformed Immanuels Congregation, 143 Wis. 2d 806, 810-811, 422 N.W.2d 874 (1988). Since the declarant possessed an "amorphous" concept of time, the court determined that the "mere passage of time" is not controlling and that "a *472determination regarding recency of perception depends on the particular circumstances of the case . .. Id. at 813.
¶ 68. In- discussing the standard set forth in Kluever, one commentator warns that if broadly applied, the foundational requirements are rendered meaningless:
As a standard of admissibility, this formulation fails to provide any meaningful yardstick for determining "recent perception." Nearly any articulated thought meets the test. The holding should be understood as applying only to cases where expert medical testimony supports a finding that the declarant has "islets" of accurate memory.
Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 8045.2, at 711.
¶ 69. Based on the above analysis, I conclude that the hearsay does not meet the exception for statements of recent perception. There is no corroboration of the statement pursuant to Stevens and it fails to meet the foundational requirements. Therefore, it should not have been admitted under the rules of evidence.
¶ 70. In addition, the admission of the hearsay violated Weed's constitutional right to confrontation. The hearsay rule and the confrontation clause protect similar values and stem from the same roots. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992). Yet, they are distinct doctrines and the confrontation clause prohibits the use of statements that would be permitted under the hearsay rule:
Although the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule are designed to protect similar values, they are not identical. More to the point, the hearsay rule generally permits a wider array of statements than the confrontation clause.
*473Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence, § 802.3, at 575.
¶ 71. Analysis under the confrontation clause includes an examination of the totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement to determine whether the evidence is so trustworthy that cross-examination would have added little to its reliability. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820-821 (1990). This case does not meet that test.
¶ 72. As noted above, it is unclear when the alleged removal of the bullets occurred. The majority accepts the assumptions of the Fuerbringers that Michael was referring to Weed's suicide attempt. However, this is not clear and cross-examination would be helpful to clarify the reason for and the timing of the removal.
¶ 73. In addition to clarifying the ambiguities that exist, cross-examination in this case would test Michael's candor and accuracy in making the statement. The fact that the purpose of Michael's statement was to criticize his wife and not to recount an event calls into question its accuracy. This is especially true because the statement was made during an argument and after he had consumed the proverbial "few beers." Because cross-examination would have meaningfully tested the reliability of the statement, it fails the test under the confrontation clause enunciated in Idaho v. Wright.
¶ 74. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the statement was inadmissible both under the rules of evidence and under the confrontation clause. I concur in the mandate because, for the reasons set forth by the majority, I conclude that the admission of the hearsay was harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 *474U.S. 18, 20-26 (1967) (the court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict).
¶ 75. The majority's conclusion of harmless error makes the expansion of the exception for statements of recent perception unnecessary. Additionally, it seems unwarranted because the statement is one that the majority describes as having Tow probative value." Majority op., ¶ 32.
¶ 76. Nevertheless, for whatever reasons, the majority apparently feels compelled to admit a statement which fails the foundational requirements, violates Weed's right to confrontation, and sub silencio overrules Stevens. Most problematic, however, is that for the future it broadens the exception to such an extent that "nearly any articulated thought meets the test." Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
¶ 77. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence.