Court Opinion

ID: 9543546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:25.07694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:34.213754
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in the reversal of the judgment below and the remand for further proceedings.
When we heard oral argument in this case I thought, ‘What a pity that not one other member of the Court utilized the opportunity to correct the law as Chief Justice Donaldson and myself undertook to do in the specially concurring opinion in Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980).’ Had one other justice taken the time to verify the mishappenstance of McNabb v. Brewster, 75 Idaho 313, 272 P.2d 298 (1954), the law would have been straightened out over six years ago.
At an early time after my appearance on the Court rather than before it, in Englesby v. Nisula, 99 Idaho 21, 576 P.2d 1055 (1978), I sensed that Justice Shepard had never been enchanted by the McNabb case:
However, McNabb was strongly criticized in Kelley v. Wheyland, 93 Idaho 735, 471 P.2d 590 (1970), and it was suggested that the McNabb ruling governing a shift of the burden of proof to the grantee only had validity under circumstances similar to those of McNabb. Id. [99 Idaho] at 23, 576 P.2d at 1057.
My thirst whetted, I turned to the Kelley opinion which Justice Shepard had also authored:
We point out initially that the case of McNabb v. Brewster, supra, is almost unique in Idaho jurisprudence for several reasons. First, there is no actual agreement of a majority of the *34court on disposition of the case, and secondly, we do not believe that the portion of Brewster relied upon by appellant herein was either necessary or appropriate to the decision in Brewster. In Brewster an elderly couple was infirm, senile, unable to care for themselves, and could neither read nor write. All of the property of the elderly couple was deeded to a daughter because she otherwise refused to care for them. The deed was conditioned upon here obligation to care for her parents for the remainder of then: lives. The opinion of the court in Brewster stated at 75 Idaho 317, 272 P.2d at 300:
‘The evidence is sufficient to justify cancellation of the deed on the ground of Mrs. Brewster’s neglect and refusal to care for the decedents [her parents].’
The court then, however, proceeded to discuss a rule indicating that the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the grantor and grantee, coupled with a lack of consideration for the conveyance, placed upon the grantee the burden of establishing that the transaction was fair, just and free from any taint of fraud or undue influence. Kelley, supra, 93 Idaho at 737-38, 471 P.2d at 592-93.
In authoring the Court’s opinion in Keenan, Justice Shepard again voiced dissatisfaction with McNabb, but reached the decision that the judgment below could be affirmed on the law of Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 592 P.2d 57, 63 (1979), that:
a close scrutiny of the entire record and an analysis of the result of the execution of the gift deed supports the findings and conclusions of the trial court that the evidence did not give rise to a presumption of undue influence. Keenan, supra, 100 Idaho at 826, 606 P.2d at 476.
It seemed to me that if McNabb was as inherently unreliable, as Justice Shepard wrote whenever the occasions arose, and with strong recollection of that which Justice Donaldson had written for the Court in Cole-Collister Fire Protection District v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970), then McNabb should be revisited, which was not a monumental effort. I explained in my Keenan opinion that McNabb’s fault was only in having applied California case law which was guilty of ‘interchangeably vising “burden of proof’ and “burden of producing evidence,” but in so doing they were aware that they were not shifting the burden of persuasion____’ and concluded that ‘McNabb should henceforth be read as standing for the proposition that it is the burden of going forward sufficiently to dispel the presumption which shifts— not the burden of persuasion.’ Keenan, supra, 100 Idaho at 828, 606 P.2d at 478.
Obviously, Justice Huntley would have joined that opinion. His today’s opinion primarily is based on the same authority, and it is a shame that he was not aboard the Court at an earlier date. Three votes six years ago would have narrowed McNabb to its proper confines, which Justice Shepard was clearly in favor of doing, but did not vote for when the opportunity was there.
Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho 734, 739-40, 718 P.2d 1172, 1177-78 (1986).
Justice Huntley correctly observed the function of a presumption, mainly the shifting of the burden of production. Id. at 738, 718 P.2d at 176. This had been previously explained in the Bistline, J., Keenan opinion (Donaldson, J. concurring), written five years earlier. Justice Huntley should not be overly faulted for not being aware of the views in Keenan which differed from the opinion of Justice Shepard, all of which took place long before he was on the Court. Any fault laid to Justice Huntley can only be attributed to his over-expansive statement after he had written correctly regarding the undue influence case which was before him, “This is how the presumptions should function in undue influence cases, as well as other civil cases in which presumptions are utilized.” Far better *35for Idaho jurisprudence that he had not added those wholly gratuitous eleven words. Obiter dicta and dictum are well-defined in Black’s Law Dictionary:
Dictum. A statement, remark, or observation. Gratis dictum; a gratuitous or voluntary representation; one which a party is not bound to make. Simplex dictum; a mere assertion; an assertion without proof.
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ‘a remark by the way;’ that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination; any statement of the law enunciated by the court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy, or suggestion. Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand or obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 98 Colo. 568, 58 P.2d 1223, 1226 [1936]. Dicta are opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself.
In old English law, Dictum meant an arbitrament, or the award of arbitrators.
In French law, the report of a judgment made by one of the judges who has given it.
Black’s Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990).
The problem encountered in this instant Smith v. Angelí case has much to do with Justice Huntley’s overly broad dictum as to all presumptions. He was dealing with only one of the many presumptions which may be encountered, that of undue influence. There is little doubting that if we could properly hear from him, he would be the first to regret the mistake made by throwing gratuitous dictum into an otherwise well written and well reasoned opinion.
Today it is readily seen that the Chief Justice has seized onto that dictum as the cornerstone of his opinion. As a prime example, the majority conclusion that the jury instruction on the presumption of due care, Instruction 23, resulted in reversible error is not sustainable as a matter of law. In particular, reference is made to his holding that the validity and usefulness of the presumption of due care (that which Chief Justice Bakes refers to as the dead man’s presumption)7 has been exterminated by Bongiovi v. Jamison, goes far afield and is completely erroneous. Although Bongiovi purported to construe I.R.E. 301, the facts of that case were such as to involve a presumption of undue influence by a beneficiary upon a grantor and such a broad reading of Bongiovi is not warranted. A presumption of undue influence operates differently than a presumption of due care. A presumption of due care’s function is and always has been to “fill in” a gap caused by a total lack of plaintiff’s evidence that a decedent may present on his or her behalf. On the other hand, a presumption of undue influence arises only after the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to show a confidential relationship between the grantor as well as grantee participation in procuring the gift.
For well over twelve years, and certainly long before Bongiovi, it has been understood that the effect of presumptions is to shift the burden of production rather than the burden of persuasion. I.R.E. 301; Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473 (1980) (specially concurring, Donaldson and Bistline, JJ.). Where a trial court sees that it is appropriate in a case to instruct the jury regarding an established presumption, it is well established that so doing does not result in a shifting of the ultimate *36burden of persuasion. Instead, it simply will inform the jury of the existence of the presumption and allow the jurors to give it due consideration in their resolution of the case.
Presumptions are the product of policy, and the policy considerations in favor of a presumption often persist despite the introduction of evidence rebutting the presumed fact. McCormick on Evidence § 344 (3d ed.).8 When the basic facts giving rise to a presumption do not create an inference that is naturally sufficient to make an impact on the jury, these policy rationales may be completely frustrated by not informing the jury of the existence of the presumption. This problem arises in the context of a decedent's due care presumption. Contrary to the undue influence presumption, which arises from known facts, a decedent’s due care presumption was bom out of the lack of any evidence which substantially explains the cause of an accident. The factors giving rise to the due care presumption are merely that a person has been killed in an accident, and insufficient evidence exists to establish the cause of the accident.
If the due care presumption is treated identically to the undue influence presumption which was applied in Bongiovi, then when a defendant introduces substantial evidence of a decedent’s negligence, the presumption would dissipate. At that point, the jury is left to weigh the evidence introduced by the defendant regarding the decedent’s negligence against the basic underlying facts which initially brought about the invocation of the presumption, which was a lack of evidence about what caused the fatality, as was the circumstance in Haman.
Essentially, in a wrongful death case such as is involved here, i.e., a collision involving two vehicles, where the driver of one, Kenneth Smith, perished, and the passenger riding with him is unable to recall the event, no one is able to present any of the underlying “facts” and circumstances to the jury. Hence the plaintiffs in seeking damages for Mr. Smith’s death, come before the court and jury faced with an evidentiary void. Over the years case law precedent has developed which fills that void. On the other hand, in an undue influence case, the jury will receive and consider evidence presented by both parties. Consequently, in order to effectuate the philosophy and purpose of the due care presumption, some instruction to the jury is necessary. Unless so informed by the court, the jury ordinarily will not be aware of the existence or objective of the presumption. A jury which is not fully informed as to the presumption will be functioning in a vacuum with only evidence presented by the party opposing the presumption.
The optimum manner of handling presumptions of due care was stated in an opinion issued by this Court in 1966, in Haman:
In Dept. of Finance v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 61 Idaho 484, 104 P.2d 1110 (1940), it was held that if reasonable minds might differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence opposing the presumption, the matter should be submitted to the jury, and the jury informed as to the presumption, quoting from Geist v. Moore, supra, as follows: *37and in the following cases this court had definitely committed itself to the doctrine that where there is a conflict between the presumption and contrary evidence, from which reasonable minds might draw different conclusions, it is proper to instruct the jury as to the presumptions, (citing cases.)’
Haman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 91 Idaho at 25, 415 P.2d at 311. This reasoning recognizes the potential for a situation where insufficient evidence has been introduced to conclusively establish a fact, yet some evidence has been introduced which, if not counterbalanced by the due care presumption, would result in unfairness to the plaintiff who has no evidence to introduce in favor of the decedent.
I also disagree that the giving of Instruction 28 was reversible error. I am in complete agreement with the view of Justice Boyle, expressed in his specially concurring opinion, that “a finding of prejudice based upon the specific circumstances of the case is required before reversal is warranted,” and believe no prejudice exists here.
For the above reasons, this case should not be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

. This presumption also is invoked if a person has not been fatally injured but is unable to testify due to loss of memory, Haman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 91 Idaho 19, 415 P.2d 305 (1966). Therefore, "presumption of due care” more accurately portrays the identity of what has been, in many instances, referred to as the "dead man’s" statute.

. The presumption that a decedent was exercising due care at the time of an accident causing his or her death is undoubtedly the most entrenched and well-established presumption in Idaho case law. See Smith v. Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 749 P.2d 1012 (Ct.App.1988); Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 599 P.2d 1012 (1979); Goodfellow v. Coggburn, 98 Idaho 202, 560 P.2d 873 (1977); Bradbury v. Voge, 93 Idaho 360, 461 P.2d 255 (1969); Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 448 P.2d 653 (1968); Domingo v. Phillips, 87 Idaho 55, 390 P.2d 297 (1964); Dewey v. Keller, 86 Idaho 506, 388 P.2d 988 (1964); Drury v. Palmer, 84 Idaho 558, 375 P.2d 125 (1962); Mundy v. Johnson, 84 Idaho 438, 373 P.2d 755 (1962); Van v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 83 Idaho 539, 366 P.2d 837 (1962); Lallatin v. Terry, 81 Idaho 238, 340 P.2d 112 (1959); Graham v. Milsap, 77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744 (1955); Larsen v. Jerome Cooperative Creamery, 76 Idaho 439, 283 P.2d 1096 (1955); Geist v. Moore, 58 Idaho 149, 70 P.2d 403 (1937); Fleenor v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 16 Idaho 781, 102 P. 897 (1909). This particular presumption "is justified by the natural instinct of self preservation and the disposition of mankind to avoid injury and personal harm.” Domingo v. Phillips, supra; see also Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U.S. 353 (1896).