Court Opinion

ID: 9616155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:43:57.477512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:55.681575
License: Public Domain

Lovins, Judge,
dissenting:
For reasons hereinafter mentioned I respectfully dissent.
I have heretofore stated my reasons for dissenting in cases wherein a moral obligation is relied upon. See dissenting opinions in the cases of State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 46 S. E. 2d 90, 99; State ex rel. Catron v. Sims, 133 W. Va. 610, 57 S. E. 2d 465, 468; Saunders v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 163, 58 S. E. 2d 654, 656; Price v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 173, 58 S. E. 2d 657, 668.
I rely upon the constitutional grounds discussed in the dissenting opinions in State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, supra, and State ex rel. Catron v. Sims, supra. In addition, I think that the principle that the state is not liable for the negligent acts of its employees, servants, agents, and officers while engaged in the performance of a governmental function is so firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of this jurisdiction and so generally approved that we should not cast it aside. That principle is ably discussed in the dissenting opinion in Price v. Sims, supra.
*830I do not think that it is necessary to elaborate the reasons stated in the dissenting opinions by the writer and Judge Fox.
It seems to me that this Court, in requiring payments of a claim based on the negligence of an employee of the state, is opening a veritable Pandora’s box.
In the recent cases in which this Court has considered the questions here presented, this. Court’s conclusions stem from what I regard as an unsound principle stated in the fourth point of the syllabus in the case of State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S. E. 2d 805.
The law as established by the Court’s decision in this case recognizes a moral obligation of the state in negligence cases. In other words, it places the State of West Virginia in a position similar to that of a private litigant. The act of negligence here relied upon as a basis for a moral obligation occurred in 1944. The rule in this proceeding was awarded on November 19, 1951. See Code, 55-2-12, as amended by Chapter 2, Acts of the Legislature; 1949, for the applicable period of limitations. It would seem that if rules relating to private litigants may be invoked as a basis for a moral obligation, we should apply and enforce other rules relating to the limitation of actions.
I am authorized to say that Judge Fox concurs in this dissent on the ground that the negligent act of an officer, agent, servant, or employee of the state, performing a purely governmental function, is not a sound basis for a finding that a moral obligation exists.