Court Opinion

ID: 9544008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:18.423522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:47.551561
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON
concurring in the result only:
In my view, the facts in this case do not support establishing new standards or rules relating to the admission of DNA evidence. The result in this case is controlled by Fishback v. People, 851 P.2d 884 (Colo.1993).
We granted certiorari to review whether the techniques employed to calculate the statistical frequency of a declared match in a DNA typing case related to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility. As the majority notes, the evidentiary time frame of Fishback and the present case is almost identical. See maj. op. at 291. In Fishback, the evidentiary hearing was conducted in October 1989. See Fishback, 851 P.2d at 891. The most recent evidentiary hearing in Lindsey occurred in February 1990. In Fish-back, we assessed the general acceptance of the underlying theory and techniques utilized in DNA typing with a time stamp of October of 1989. See id.
We held “that the techniques employed in ... [.Fishback ] to calculate the statistical frequency of a declared match were, as of the date this evidence was admitted at trial, generally accepted in the relevant scientific communities.” Id. at 893. But, as the majority recognizes, “the debate [regarding statistical analysis] did not crystallize until late 1991, over one year after the evidentiary rulings in [Lindsey]_” Maj. op. at 291. We legitimized the statistical analysis methods used in Lindsey by our decision in Fishback. The unchanged state of scientific evidence between Lindsey’s motion in limine hearing and Fishback’s evidentiary hearing causes most of the majority opinion to extend beyond the scope of the issues in this case.
In Fishback, we left “to the trial courts the initial determination of whether ... the method for calculating the statistical frequency of a declared match remains generally accepted.” Fishback, 851 P.2d at 895. However, this determination was limited to a consideration of “events which have occurred subsequent to the trial [in Fishback ]....” Id. (emphasis added). The time lines of both cases establish that evidentiary findings were made almost simultaneously, so no subsequent scientific debate developed in time to cast a shadow on our decision in Fishback or a reason to change our analysis. Because the context of this case presents no subsequent information to consider, the result should be determined, purely and simply, on the application of Fishback to the facts of this case.
LOHR, J., joins in this concurrence.