Court Opinion

ID: 9478355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:47:21.454711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:23.588781
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join in Judge Hutchinson’s conclusion that the consent of the driver Morales to a search of the vehicle constituted, under the circumstances, a valid third party consent thereby allowing the fruits of the search to be used against Viera.1 I write separately to make clear the straight forward basis upon which I reach this conclusion.
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a third party who possesses “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected” may validly consent to a search of the premises or effects. Id. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. The *402Court noted that: “The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property ... but rather rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” Id. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7 (citations omitted). I think the quoted language has even more compelling application in a motor vehicle context, particularly where the consent is given by the driver. Cf. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion).
In this case, Morales was the driver of a vehicle rented to Viera, the passenger. The car was stopped for speeding and the driver was asked to produce his license and registration. Morales thereafter produced his own driver’s license and the car rental agreement which Viera obtained from the glove compartment. The trooper did not know Viera’s identity. Thereafter, Morales accompanied the trooper to the patrol ear. While seated in the front seat Morales was asked if there were any guns, fireworks or untaxed cigarettes in the car. Morales responded, “no, you can look if you want”. Officer Durnan then presented Morales with a consent to search form authorizing a “complete search” of the vehicle. Morales signed the consent form.
Officer Durnan returned to the vehicle and asked Viera to step out. Officer Dur-nan then searched the vehicle and found two packages behind the backrest of the rear seat. These packages were later found to contain cocaine.2 During the entire process, Viera did not complain nor did he seek to prevent the search based on his rental interest.
I believe that Morales, as the driver, can be said to have access to or control over the entire vehicle, in this case, notwithstanding the fact that the passenger, Viera, had a superior property interest in the vehicle. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. Viera, by allowing Morales to drive the vehicle, relinquished his unique sphere of control over all areas of the vehicle over which Morales had ready access, whether such access was exercised or not. Had Viera taken some special step to deny Morales access, such as withholding the key to the trunk from Morales, a different case would be presented over which I express no opinion. In this case, Viera cannot be said to have taken any special step to deny Morales access to part of the vehicle. I must therefore conclude that Morales had access to the entire vehicle. It seems unrealistic to conclude that Morales had access to the trunk, glove box and rear seating area of the vehicle, as Viera admits, while lacking access to the area behind the rear seat, as this would force this court to engage in the type of “metaphysical subtleties” which the Supreme Court has warned against. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969).
I, therefore, reject the notion that Morales did not have access to or control over the “hidden” compartment behind the back seat. See United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir.1978). Although the notion of discrete and secret compartments within a house, as was the case in Block, may have validity in that context, I find that it has no application in the automotive context absent a showing of special circumstances. It has long been recognized, that persons have a “lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle” as contrasted with a house; the decision of this Court is consistent with this principle. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986).
It was reasonable to recognize that Morales had the right to permit the inspection of the vehicle and that Viera, by allowing *403Morales to drive, assumed the risk that Morales might allow the vehicle to be searched. Under my reading of Matlock, therefore, Morales can properly be considered to have given a valid third party consent to the car search.
For all the foregoing reasons, I join with Judge Hutchinson’s judgment that the order of the district court, suppressing the evidence as to Viera, be reversed and remanded.

. The district court determined that Morales lacked standing to object to the validity of the search and admitted the evidence against him. Morales is not a party to this appeal.

. Viera does not contend that Officer Durnan exceeded the scope of the consent in searching behind the backrest of the vehicle but instead contends that Morales’ consent should not be held to permit the search as to Viera.