Court Opinion

ID: 9517325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:13:22.836095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:22.205461
License: Public Domain

OPINION CONCURRING IN RESULT AND DISSENTING IN PART
Chipman, J.
I concur in the conclusion of Judge Staton that the trial court did not err in granting Defendant Miller’s TR. 41(B) motion and that the appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Since the defendant was called as a witness by the plaintiff and testified as to the events of August 2,1975 it is difficult to imagine what additional evidence could have been presented by the defendant that would have bolstered the plaintiff’s case and thus altered the final judgment, had the court denied the defendant’s TR. 41(B) motion.
The Court of Appeals has had this similar issue before it on several previous occasions.1 The most recent case was Fielitz v. Allred (1977), 173 Ind.App. 540, 364 N.E.2d 786 and was commented upon by Dean William F. Harvey in his works INDIANA PRACTICE2 in which he stated, *182“it is submitted that the Court of Appeals erred in Fielitz, and in the line of cases it represents.”3 Obviously Dean Harvey is urging that Indiana follow the various Circuit Courts of Appeal that have interpreted the comparable Federal Rule as giving the trial court the right to weigh the evidence in a trial to the court in deciding a TR. 41(B) motion.
Since comparisons have frequently been made between the Indiana and Federal Trial Rules, it behooves us to examine these two rules [41(B)]. The pertinent part of the Federal Rule reads as follows:
... the Defendant,... may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the Plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The Court, as trier of the facts, may then determine them and render judgment against the Plaintiff. . .4
The similar portion of the Indiana Trial Rule states:
... the opposing party... may move for dismissal on the ground that considering all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the party to whom the motion is directed to be true, there is no substantial evidence of probative value to sustain the material allegation of the party against whom the motion is directed. The Court as the trier of the fact may then determine them and render judgment against the Plaintiff . . .5 (emphasis added).
In order to gain an insight as to the discussions held by the Civil Code Study Commission when drafting the Indiana Trial Rules an examination was made of Professor R. Bruce Townsend’s book on INDIANA Rules of Civil Procedure.6 It is interesting to note that the proposed draft of TR. 41(B) by the Indiana Civil Code Study Commission in pertinent part is identical to the Federal Rule and not the rule finally adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court on July 29,1969 after enactment by the 1969 General Assembly.7
The comments of the Civil Code Study Commission with regards to *183TR. 41(B) states, “This fulfills the function of a motion for a directed verdict in a jury case (a motion for judgment on the evidence under Rule 50). It will not modify present Indiana practice to any degree8 (emphasis added). The commission then cites the case of Garrett v. Estate of Hoctel (1957), 128 Ind.App. 23, 142 N.E.2d 449 (transfer denied) as setting forth the standard to guide the trial court when a motion is made for a judgment at the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case.
That decision states:
... in determining upon such motion, the court must not weigh the evidence and it must exclude all conflicting evidence that is favorable to the plaintiff9 (emphasis added).
In Garrett the trial court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s case and the Court of Appeals, after reviewing the evidence most favorable to the Plaintiff, reversed and remanded on the grounds that the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient against the Motion for Judgment which had been made by the Defendant at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s case.
Perhaps the better rule in a trial without the intervention of a jury would be to permit the trial judge to weigh the evidence, as is now permitted in the majority of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal, but when we consider the previous decisions in Indiana prior to the adoption of the rules of Civil Procedure, combined with the comments of the Civil Code Study Commission and the specific language of TR. 41(B) as it is presently written, it would lead to the conclusion that until TR. 41(B) is properly amended the only interpretation that can be given is that the trial court cannot weigh the evidence at the conclusion of the Plaintiff’s case but must treat it in the same light as it would a motion for a directed verdict (now judgment on the evidence) at the same stage of the trial proceedings as set forth in TR. 50. I do not feel that it is the function of the Indiana Court of Appeals to either legislate or attempt to amend the existing Trial Rules.

. Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Verzele (1971), 148 Ind.App. 429, 267 N.E.2d 193; Clark v. Melody Bar, Inc. (1971), 149 Ind.App. 245, 271 N.E.2d 481; Miller v. Griesel (1973), Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 463; Powell v. Powell (1974), 160 Ind.App. 132, 310 N.E.2d 898; Building Systems, Inc. v. Rochester Metal Products, Inc. (1976), 168 Ind.App. 12, 340 N.E.2d 791; Fielitz v. Allred (1977), 173 Ind.App. 540, 364 N.E.2d 786.

. W. Harvey, Indiana Practice, 1970.

. 3 W. Harvey, Indiana Practice, 217-218 (1978 Supp.)

. Federal Rules, TR. 41(B).

. Indiana TR. 41(B).

. Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure, 1968.

. IC 1971, 34-5-1-1.

. Townsend, Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure, 169.

. Garrett, supra p. 453.