Court Opinion

ID: 9715083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:53:50.643044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:31.369003
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While concurring with the majority opinion as to Issues I and II, I respectfully dissent with respect to Issue III.
This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment applying the open and obvious danger rule. As the proponent of the motion, Suzuki had the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact relevant thereto.
Whether a danger is open and obvious depends upon "how broadly one construes the word 'danger' in the 'open and obvious danger rule. " (emphasis in original) Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co. (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 277, 285. In Corbin v. Coleco Industries, Inc. (7th Cir.1984), 748 F.2d 411, 417-18, Judge Eschbach correctly observed:
Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on
what people can see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about what they see. In particular, if people generally believe that there is a danger associated with the use of a product, but that there is a safe way to use it, any danger there may be in using the product in the way generally believed to be safe is not open and obvious.
See also Kroger Co. Sa-von Store v. Presnell (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 538, 544. The rule cannot be invoked upon the mere openness of a danger. The additional element of obviousness is an additional prerequisite. Openness implies unobstructed visibility. Obviousness connotes being subject to easy perception, cognition, and appreciation.
Whether the absence of the passenger leg crash bars would constitute an open and obvious danger to anticipated motorcycle passengers requires an evaluation of the ordinary knowledge common to the community of such anticipated users. To prevail on its motion for summary judgment on this issue, Suzuki must show that there is no issue of material fact regarding the openness and the obviousness of the danger created by the lack of rear passenger leg crash bars. In its briefs to this Court and the Court of Appeals, Suzuki states that there are only three relevant facts with respect to the issues raised in the motion for summary judgment: 1) that Todd was the owner of the motorcycle; 2) Todd installed the front erash bars; and 3) Miller had ridden this motorcycle on twelve previous occasions.
Suzuki does not direct us to any evidence to obviate the factual issue of obviousness. It fails to show that it was reasonable for the manufacturer and seller to assume that the foreseeable passengers on its motorcycle would include only persons familiar with motorcycle riding dangers, especially those risks against which leg crash bars are intended to protect. Common sense and experience would suggest otherwise. There is simply no showing that, considering the ordinary knowledge common to the community of anticipated passenger-users, the absence of rear crash bars would necessarily be observed and perceived let alone be recognized as an obvious danger.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that a motorcycle rider is not required to expect that the cyele may be involved in an injury-producing accident. v. Schroyer (1983), Ind.App., 449 N.E.2d 291. If not required to expect an accident, a motorcycle rider should not be held to anticipate injuries which would likely result from the absence of leg erash bars in the event of such unexpected accident.
Because of the presence of issues of material fact regarding the openness and obviousness of the danger, summary judgement was erroneously entered. Of course, if Miller proceeds to trial on her product negligence claim, the evidence at trial may well call for application of the open and obvious danger rule.