Court Opinion

ID: 9579708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:57:45.790717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:42.741072
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Bobbitt
dissenting:
I concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Higgins. In addition to the views expressed therein, I direct attention to the matters discussed below.
On September 2, 1969, defendant tendered, and the court accepted, a plea of nolo contendere to (simple) assault on a female, he being a male person. Imprisonment for six months was the maximum (imprisonment) punishment for this offense. G.S. 14-33. The judgment pronounced imposed an indeterminate sentence of not less than three nor more than six months, which authorized the Commissioner of Correction to retain custody of defendant for the maximum term of six months. G.S. 148-42, as amended by Section 9, Chapter 996, of the Session Laws of 1967. Therefore, it appears affirmatively that the court did not take into consideration the time defendant was in custody (November 20, 1968, to February 4, 1969) pending his appeal from the (subsequently vacated) judgment based on the felony conviction. Indeed, the court denied defendant’s request that he receive credit for his confinement in jail during this period.
If defendant is required to serve the maximum term imposed by the judgment of September 2, 1969, in addition to his confinement in jail from November 20, 1968, to February 4, 1969, his term of imprisonment will exceed that permitted by G.S. 14-33. Cf. State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E. 2d 633. The majority ignore or disregard the hard fact of defendant’s actual confinement in jail from November 20, 1968, to February 4, 1969, on the ground he was not then serving a sentence but was in custody in default of bond pending the outcome of his appeal. For this reason, it is asserted that defendant’s involuntary confinement during this period should not be regarded as punishment.
Defendant had been at liberty under bond immediately preceding his conviction for the felony. When convicted, judgment was pronounced and defendant was ordered into custody. True, bond was set for his release pending appeal. Presumably he was unable to arrange for his release on bond until February 4, 1969. On appeal, the judgment under which he was confined *410pending appeal was vacated. This dissent relates solely to the time he spent in jail under authority of the invalid judgment. In my opinion, involuntary confinement under an invalid judgment should be considered punishment.
If defendant had pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to an offense punishable by imprisonment for a longer term, e.g., two years, it might well be assumed that his confinement in jail under the subsequently vacated felony conviction and judgment was taken into consideration when the court pronounced the three-six months sentence. Such is not the case here.
I agree that the 1969 Act now codified as G.S. 15-186.1 does not apply. When applicable, that statute requires that credit be given for the time spent in jail pending appeal when the judgment from which the appeal is taken is affirmed. It is anomalous indeed to allow credit for time spent in jail pending appeal under a conviction and judgment held to be valid and disregard time spent in jail pending appeal if the conviction and the judgment pronounced are held to be invalid.
Justice Sharp joins in this dissenting opinion.