Court Opinion

ID: 9930701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:05:08.624301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:47.791561
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 7, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                              No. 3D23-776
                        Lower Tribunal No. 16-31-M
                           ________________

                      Robert Mowder, Jr., et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                             Jeremy Smith,
                                  Appellee.

     An appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark H. Jones,
Judge.

      Gulisano Law, PLLC, and Michael Gulisano (Boca Raton), for
appellants.

    Brown Robert, LLP, Connis O. Brown, III, and Seth P. Robert, and
Samantha Espada (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before MILLER, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellants, Robert Mowder, Jr. and Mowder Real Estate Holdings, Inc.

(“MREH”), challenge a final judgment divesting them of any ownership

interest in certain real property located in Monroe County, Florida, and

requiring the conveyance of the same to appellee, Jeremy Smith. The

primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in enforcing an oral

agreement to transfer real property on promissory estoppel grounds.

Reiterating the longstanding principle that the doctrine of part performance

operates as an exception to the proscriptions imposed by the statute of

frauds, we affirm the final judgment under review.

                               BACKGROUND

      This dispute revolves around a waterfront duplex known as

“Yellowtail.” The facts underlying this appeal are inextricably intertwined with

separate transactions involving the Blue Marlin, a motel located in Marathon,

Florida. The lower tribunal found in favor of Mowder on the motel-related

claims, and Smith did not file a cross-appeal.

      After the parties met through a mutual friend, Smith expressed an

interest in entering the commercial fishing industry. Mowder offered him

accommodations at Yellowtail.        The property was encumbered by a

considerable mortgage, and the parties initially discussed pooling funds to

satisfy the outstanding balance.

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     Mowder soon grew weary of the Florida Keys, however, due to a failed

romantic relationship and began spending substantial time abroad. He did

not produce any funds and instead told Smith he would convey the property

to him if Smith unilaterally satisfied the mortgage. Mowder provided Smith

with the pay-off information, and Smith satisfied the mortgage.        Smith

remained in possession of the property and paid all utilities and property

taxes. He also undertook substantial improvements.

     Mowder never quitclaimed the property and, instead, years later,

sought to evict Smith from Yellowtail. Smith filed suit in the circuit court.

Included in the operative, multi-count complaint was a claim for promissory

estoppel seeking specific performance. Citing the statute of frauds, Mowder

moved to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion, and Mowder raised the

same defense in his answer.

     The case proceeded to a nonjury trial, at the conclusion of which the

trial court found that Smith satisfied the mortgage in reliance upon the oral

agreement the property would be conveyed after payment was rendered. By

way of the final judgment, the court granted specific performance. The

instant appeal ensued.

                         STANDARD OF REVIEW

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      “Whether [an] oral agreement . . . is unenforceable under the statute of

frauds is a pure question of law” subject to de novo review. DK Arena, Inc.

v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85, 91 (Fla. 2013). “A trial court’s

decision to grant specific performance,” however, “is reviewed under an

abuse of discretion standard.” All Seasons Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Patrician

Hotel, LLC, 274 So. 3d 438, 445 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).

                                       ANALYSIS

      Tracing its origins to the common law, “[t]he statute of frauds grew out

of a purpose to intercept the frequency and success of actions based on

nothing more than loose verbal statements or mere innuendos.” Yates v.

Ball, 181 So. 341, 344 (Fla. 1937), receded from on other grounds by

Browning v. Poirier, 165 So. 3d 663 (Fla. 2015).               To accomplish this

objective, section 725.01, Florida Statutes (2023), provides, in relevant part:

      No action shall be brought . . . to charge any person . . . upon
      any contract for the sale of lands, . . . unless the agreement or
      promise upon which such action shall be brought, or some note
      or memorandum thereof shall be in writing and signed by the
      party to be charged therewith or by some other person by her or
      him thereunto lawfully authorized.

See also § 689.01, Fla. Stat. (“No estate or interest of freehold, or for a term

of more than 1 year . . . of any . . . lands . . . shall be . . . transferred . . . in

any manner other than by instrument in writing, signed in the presence of

two subscribing witnesses by the party . . . transferring . . . such estate,

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interest, or term of more than 1 year . . . .”). After the legislature codified this

provision, the Florida Supreme Court considered, in Tanenbaum v. Biscayne

Osteopathic Hosp., Inc, 190 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1966), whether to “adopt by

judicial action the doctrine of promissory estoppel as a sort of counteraction

to the legislatively created Statute of Frauds.” Id. at 779. The court declined

to do so, recognizing “the legislative prerogative of dealing with matters of

this nature.” Id.

      Nonetheless, a myriad of reported cases recognize that the doctrine of

part performance removes a contract from the statute of frauds. See e.g.,

LaRue v. Kalex Constr. & Dev., Inc., 97 So. 3d 251, 253 (Fla 3d DCA 2012)

(“Where the contract is for the sale of land and the relief sought is for specific

performance or other equitable relief, partial performance may remove an

oral agreement from the statute of frauds.”); Xanadu of Cocoa Beach, Inc. v.

Zetley, 822 F.2d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1987) (explaining parties are “entitled to

avail [themselves] of the doctrine of part performance . . . [to] prevent[] the

party who denies the contract’s existence from asserting the statute of

frauds”). Of course, this line of authority is not without limits. In cases

involving oral agreements to convey real property, delivery of possession is

required in order to prove part performance. See Goldman v. Citicorp Sav.

of Fla., 552 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (“In an action for specific

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performance where the doctrine of ‘part performance’ is raised; one

indispens[a]ble element of the doctrine is possession of the property by the

party seeking the specific performance.”)

     Applying these principles, appellate courts have found that where there

is proof of an oral contract for conveyance, payment of consideration,

possession, and improvements made to the property, the contract is

removed from the statute of frauds and specific performance may be

justified. Miller v. Murray, 68 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1953) (“In addition to

establishing the fact that an oral contract for sale was made, proof must be

submitted as to the following: payment of all or part of the consideration,

whether it be in money or in services; possession by the alleged vendee; and

the making by the vendee of valuable and permanent improvements upon

the land . . . .”); see also Futch v. Head, 511 So. 2d 314, 319 (Fla. 1st DCA

1987); W.B.D., Inc. v. Howard Johnson Co., 382 So. 2d 1323, 1327 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1980); Moraitis v. Galluzzo, 487 So. 2d 1151, 1152 (Fla. 4th DCA

1986); Eclipse Med., Inc. v. Am. Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc., 262

F.Supp. 2d 1334, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff'd sub nom. Eclipse Med., Inc. v.

Am. Hydro-Surgical, 235 F.3d 1344, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000); Ala v. Chesser,

5 So. 3d 715, 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); 27 Fla. Jur. 2d Frauds, Statute of §

20 (2023).

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      Against this legal landscape, we examine the instant case. Here,

although the parties sharply disputed the chronology of events, the court

found that Mowder orally agreed to convey Yellowtail to Smith upon

satisfaction of the mortgage.      Mowder provided Smith with the payoff

information, and Smith rendered payment. Critically, Smith continuously

remained in possession of Yellowtail. He also paid taxes when due, made

improvements to the property, and tendered additional consideration in the

form of investment in the Blue Marine motel. These factors are sufficient to

sustain the findings that part performance removed the oral agreement from

the statute of frauds and specific performance was warranted.

      Further, while we may have arrived at a different conclusion in the first

instance, it is not our role to reweigh the evidence. Instead, it is our duty to

affirm those factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial

evidence. See Citibank, N.A. v. Olsak, 208 So. 3d 227, 229 (Fla. 3d DCA

2016); see also Whitby v. Infinity Radio, Inc., 961 So. 2d 349, 354 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2007) (“An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings

when supported by competent substantial evidence.”); Markham v. Fogg,

458 So. 2d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 1984) (holding appellate court “should not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact” as long as there is

“competent, substantial evidence”); Dreyfuss v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437,

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440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (reiterating “appellate court has duty to affirm trial

court findings supported by competent, substantial evidence”); Zerquera v.

Centennial Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 721 So. 2d 751, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA

1998) (explaining in bench trial, judge's findings of fact will not be disturbed

unless totally unsupported by competent, substantial evidence).            Here,

ample testimony of record supports the findings accompanying the final

judgment, and it is scarcely debatable that, given the divergent rulings on the

competing claims, the trial court considered the holistic equities in arriving at

the decision below. Accordingly, we affirm in all respects.

      Affirmed.

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