Court Opinion

ID: 9905014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 17:05:11.800682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.120645
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Nov 28 2023, 8:42 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita                                        FRANCISCAN ALLIANCE, INC.
Attorney General of Indiana                               Paul D. Vink
Frances Barrow                                            Seema R. Shah
Deputy Attorney General                                   Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
                                                          SCP 2010-C36-018
                                                          Nadine E. McSpadden
                                                          Andrielle M. Metzel
                                                          Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Ryan Simatic
                                                          Biersdorf & Associates, PA
                                                          Minneapolis, Minnesota

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana,                                         November 28, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-PL-2969
        v.                                                Appeal from the Johnson Superior
                                                          Court
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. f/k/a                           The Honorable Marla K. Clark,
Sisters of St. Francis Health                             Judge
Services, Inc.; The Market Place                          Trial Court Cause No.
at State Road 37, LLC; Hook                               41D04-1911-PL-181
SupeRX, LLC; SCP 2010-C36-

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023                            Page 1 of 12
      018 LLC; and Johnson County,
      Indiana,
      Appellee-Defendants

                                   Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                             Judge Riley and Senior Judge Robb concur.

      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   As part of the Interstate 69 construction project, the State seized 0.632 acres of

      land owned by Franciscan Alliance in Greenwood, Indiana. The seizure

      consequently altered the traffic flow to Franciscan’s remaining land, which was

      undeveloped, and to an adjacent CVS pharmacy owned by SCP. Franciscan

      and SCP (collectively “Owners”) convinced a jury that the State owed them

      compensation not just for the seized land but also for the impact from the less

      convenient access. The jury awarded $680,000 to Franciscan and $1.5 million

      to SCP.

[2]   The State appeals asking if inconvenience associated with traffic flow, as

      opposed to ingress-egress loss of access, is a compensable injury. The State

      maintains it is not, and accordingly asks this court to reduce the damage award

      entered against it to $47,400. The State’s argument relies on deep rooted

      Indiana Supreme Court precedent holding that damages associated with traffic

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023     Page 2 of 12
      flow variations are not compensable. Finding this precedent controlling, we

      reverse and remand for a reduction in the damages award.

      Facts
[3]   To transform State Road 37 into part of the I-69 corridor, the State needed to

      acquire a 0.632-acre commercial strip of land owned by Franciscan (the Strip).

      The Strip appears in red below. SCP’s CVS is located within the bottom-left

      block labeled “Marketplace”:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023   Page 3 of 12
      Exhs. Vol. VI, p. 92.

[4]   Originally, Owners had direct access to State Road 37 via Fairview Road. But

      after the construction project, Fairview Road will not connect to the new I-69

      and will instead be turned into a dead-end cul-de-sac. Consequently,

      northbound traffic needs to travel another mile to reach Owners’ properties, and

      southbound traffic just over three extra miles.

[5]   As part of the condemnation proceedings, multiple appraisers weighed in on

      what the State owed the owners for the seizure. The Strip was valued at either

      $40,500 or $47,400, and according to the State’s appraiser, this taking was the

      only compensable damage. But Owners’ appraisers found the inconvenient

      access changed the properties’ viable uses from commercial to residential—

      significantly reducing their values. Franciscan’s appraiser calculated a $3

      million loss. And SCP’s appraiser landed on a value of $4.4 million because the

      CVS’s income derives from “spontaneous buyers” who need the “quick, in and

      out” that access to a major roadway provides. Tr. Vol. III, p. 95. The appraiser

      testified that the loss of easy access would doom the store: “if you don’t have

      access . . . you really don’t survive.” Id. Additionally, a joint report from the

      appraisers calculated damages at about $1.9 million for both Franciscan and

      SCP. From these bases, the jury ultimately landed on compensation of

      $680,000 for Franciscan and $1.5 million for SCP.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023      Page 4 of 12
      Discussion and Decision
[6]   Both Article 1, § 21 of the Indiana Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to

      the United States Constitution prevent the taking of private property for public

      use without “just compensation.” These provisions “are textually

      indistinguishable and are to be analyzed identically.” State v. Kimco of Evansville,

      Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Ind. 2009).

[7]   At the heart of this dispute is whether Owners are entitled to compensation

      related to changes in their properties’ access. The resolution rests on whether

      this is merely a change in traffic flow or circuity of travel case, as in State v.

      Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960) and Kimco, 902 N.E.2d 206 (Ind. 2009), or

      an ingress-egress, loss-of-access case where the property’s highest and best use

      has changed, as in City of Hammond v. Marina Entertainment Complex, Inc., 733

      N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

      I.      Waiver
[8]   As a preliminary matter, Owners contend the State waived any challenge to the

      jury award by failing to properly object to their valuation evidence.1 We

      disagree.

      1
       At oral argument, SCP’s counsel likened the waiver arguments here to the invited error doctrine. Oral
      Arguments online, State of Indiana v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc. et al., at 30:20 (Oct. 4, 2023),
      https://mycourts.in.gov/arguments. The doctrine of invited error “forbids a party from taking ‘advantage of
      an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of her own neglect or misconduct.’”
      Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ind. 2005)).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023                           Page 5 of 12
[9]    At the outset of the jury trial, the State objected to a jury instruction that it

       argued improperly implied that increased travel times were compensable

       damages. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 10-12. The State even obtained the trial court’s

       permission, with no complaint from Owners, to view its objection as continuing

       throughout the trial. Id. at 13-14. Thus, the State properly objected.

[10]   Owners also complain that the State should have filed a motion to dismiss the

       case before the jury trial began, noting there was little point in holding a trial if

       the vast majority of damages turned out to be non-compensable. But Owners

       identify no requirement for the State to have done so to preserve its valuation

       argument. We also note that, prior to the trial, the State filed a motion in limine

       to prevent owners from presenting their valuation evidence relating to the loss

       of access. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 18.

[11]   Accordingly, we find no waiver of the State’s argument.

       II.     Damages
       Circuity of Travel or Traffic Flow Damages

[12]   A party may not obtain damages in an eminent domain action resulting from a

       claim that “traffic is diverted from [the] premises or made to travel a more

       circuitous route.” State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342, 350 (Ind. 1960). This general

       rule has been reaffirmed many times. See, e.g., State v. Kimco of Evansville, 902

       N.E.2d 206, 212-16 (Ind. 2009) (reaffirming Ensley in the context of a shopping

       mall whose traffic flow was negatively affected by street construction); AAA

       Fed. Credit Union v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 79 N.E.3d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023        Page 6 of 12
       2017) (holding “an abutting landowner has no cognizable property right in the

       free flow of traffic past his property (‘the traffic-flow rule’)”); State v. Dunn, 888

       N.E.2d 858, 864-66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting “our Supreme Court has made

       clear that a taking does not occur where ingress and egress is made more

       circuitous and difficult” (internal quotation omitted)).

[13]   The Indiana Supreme Court established the traffic flow rule in 1960 under

       similar facts as presented here. State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960).

       Though we must follow the precedent from Ensley, society has shifted

       dramatically since the first applications of the rule. In 1960, customers had no

       choice but to drive the more circuitous traffic route to obtain necessary goods

       and services. Today customers can, and often do, avoid inconvenient trips by

       shopping online. For instance, in State v. Kimco of Evansville, the shopping mall’S

       loss of easy access to its premises led to a 40% drop in tenants. 902 N.E.2d at

       209. Because of changing societal habits, the factual distinction between the

       legal concepts of a change in traffic flow versus ingress and egress has become a

       difficult basis on which to base a resolution. But the reevaluation of this

       decades-old rule is a role left for our Supreme Court. The policy justifications

       for this rule have long been recognized:

               The propriety of such an allowance in any case where only an
               indirect access is cut off, the landowner being left with other,
               although more circuitous, indirect ways of approaching the
               highway, seems doubtful, since obviously if the principle were
               extended to its logical limits almost every member of the public
               could claim compensation on the theory that the convenience of
               the highway was reduced by closing any means of access.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023        Page 7 of 12
       State v. Tolliver, 205 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 1965) (emphasis in original) (internal

       quotation omitted).

[14]   This case is a textbook illustration of the traffic flow rule. First and foremost,

       Owners still have access to the new I-69. AAA Fed. Credit Union, 79 N.E.3d at

       405-06 (collecting cases which denied compensation where “the points of

       ingress and egress over the land remain unaffected”). Granted, the construction

       project will add approximately 1 to 3 miles of travel distance to reach their

       property. But this Court has already held that the increase of 4 miles in travel

       distance is not severe enough to be considered an effective elimination of

       ingress and egress rights. Green River Motel Mgmt. of Dale, LLC v. State, 957

       N.E.2d 640, 645 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding a 4.5-mile increase in travel

       distance to a motel was not a compensable taking because motorists could still

       access the property, albeit through “a more circuitous route”).

[15]   More recently, in a related case concerning the Market Place property on which

       the CVS sits, a panel of this Court found that essentially the same factual

       scenario “falls squarely within the traffic-flow-rule cases.” State v. The Mkt. Place

       at State Road 37 LLC, No. 22A-PL-2765, 211 N.E.3d 539, *3 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (mem.), trans. denied. The State argued that the owner of the Market Place

       property could not introduce evidence of any damages from the closure of

       Fairview Road because “the closure of the intersection is not a ‘taking’ for

       which Market Place is entitled to compensation.” Id. at *1. This Court agreed

       that business would suffer from the I-69 traffic flow changes but found those

       damages non-compensable because “an abutting landowner has no cognizable

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023       Page 8 of 12
       property right in the free flow of traffic past his property.” Id. at *2 (citing AAA

       Fed. Credit Union, 79 N.E.3d at 405). Given that we are confronted here with

       essentially the same facts as the panel in Market Place, we see no justification for

       reaching a different result.

       Change in Highest and Best Use

[16]   Owners argue that this case is an exception to the traffic flow rule because there

       is a change in their property’s “highest and best use.” Owners support this

       argument with a decades old case, itself based on shaky precedent—City of

       Hammond v. Marina Entertainment Complex, 733 N.E.2d 958, 960 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2000).

[17]   In Marina Entertainment, this court ruled damages could be awarded where a

       city closed a road just north of the landowners’ property resulting in 1.7 miles of

       increased travel distance. In reaching this conclusion though, the Marina

       Entertainment panel ignored controlling precedent and relied instead on a 1945

       Indiana Supreme Court decision, State v. Ahaus, 63 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ind.

       1945). But our Supreme Court had already rejected the applicability of Ahaus to

       a case involving an impaired right to access land. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d at 349

       (emphasizing that Ahaus involved “interference in the use of appellees’

       property”). In doing so, the Indiana Supreme Court confirmed the “general rule

       . . . that there is no property right of an abutting property owner in the free flow

       of traffic past his property and thus no compensation can be claimed if traffic is

       diverted from his premises or made to travel a more circuitous route.” Id. at 350

       (collecting cases). As the Marina Entertainment decision appears to rest on a
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023       Page 9 of 12
       branch of eminent domain law pruned away over half a century ago, we decline

       to follow it today. See Wellman v. State, 210 N.E.3d 811, 816 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (“Indiana does not recognize horizontal stare decisis.”).

[18]   In summary, this case cleanly fits within the ambit of our existing caselaw on

       circuity of travel and traffic flow, and thus the $2.2 million judgment is

       erroneous.

       III. Attorney Fees
[19]   Next, the State raises an additional argument that the trial court erred in

       awarding attorney fees to both Owners because the relevant statute only

       contemplates awarding costs to one defendant. But our above analysis on

       compensable damages renders this point moot. As only the value of the Strip is

       compensable, and the Strip was solely owned by Franciscan, there are no longer

       any damages for SCP to recover. Thus, SCP may no longer recover attorney’s

       fees under Indiana Code § 32-24-1-14(b) as the recovery of a “defendant’s

       litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees” is limited to when “the

       amount of damages awarded to the defendant by the judgment . . . is greater

       than the amount specified in the last offer of settlement made by the plaintiff.”

       IV. Prejudgment Interest
[20]   Lastly, the State argues that the trial court applied the wrong statute in setting

       the amount of prejudgment interest. The trial court applied 8% interest as

       allowed by Indiana’s eminent domain statute. Ind Code § 32-24-1-11(d)(6). But

       the State argues the court should have applied 6% interest as set forth in the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023     Page 10 of 12
       more general statute governing government interest payments on final

       judgments. Ind. Code § 34-54-8-5.

[21]   “As a matter of interpretation, general statutes yield to more specific statutes.”

       State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022) (citing Grether v. Ind. State Bd.

       of Dental Exam’rs, 159 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind. 1959)). Thus, the fact that Indiana

       Code § 32-24-1-11 is located within the eminent domain article of the Indiana

       Code strongly implies that the Legislature intended for it to govern eminent

       domain matters.

[22]   The State cites no cases applying its chosen statute in the eminent domain

       context. In contrast, a panel of this Court has endorsed applying a more specific

       interest rate payment statute when two statutory frameworks conflict. Glick v.

       Dep’t of Com., 387 N.E.2d 74, 77-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (applying the Indiana

       Tort Claims Act’s then existing interest payment framework—instead of more

       general statutes—in part, because the statute was “the more specific and

       detailed treatment of” the relevant area of law).

[23]   Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying the prejudgment interest

       framework in Indiana Code § 32-24-1-11. But on remand, the amount of

       prejudgment interest owed will need to be recalculated due to the change in the

       underlying jury award.

       Conclusion
[24]   Given our earlier holding that the jury award given to Franciscan and SCP

       wrongly included non-compensable damages, we reverse and remand with
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023    Page 11 of 12
instructions that the trial court vacate the judgment in favor of SCP. The court

shall enter judgment for Franciscan and recalculate the prejudgment interest

consistent with this opinion.

Riley, J., and Robb, S.J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2969 | November 28, 2023   Page 12 of 12