Court Opinion

ID: 9670756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:25:12.082579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.336649
License: Public Domain

*431Krivosha, C. J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I concur with all of the majority opinion in this case except for that portion which determined that an attorney fee should not be allowed. By continually adhering to a rule that we will “ ‘allow the recovery of attorneys’ fees only in such cases as are provided for by law, or where the uniform course of procedure has been to allow such recovery...’ ” (City of Gering v. Smith Co., 215 Neb. 174, 181, 337 N.W.2d 747, 751 (1983)) is, in reality, to say we shall allow such fees only where provided for by law. For, obviously, a uniform course of procedure can never come about if we refuse to permit even the first case. While the rule regarding uniform course of procedure has been regularly repeated by this court since our holding first in Higgins v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 95 Neb. 3, 144 N.W. 1037 (1914), a reading of Higgins fails to disclose either the origin of that rule or its need. The lesson, however, is that if between 1914 and 1984, one has been unable to discover how to develop a uniform course of procedure, it is not likely that such procedure will ever come about.
In the instant case we have an anomalous situation where, if the parties were married and the custodial parent sought support, attorney fees would be allowed. But where, as here, the parties are not married and the need for the funds is even greater, attorney fees are disallowed.
While we refuse to recognize the reality of the matter in this case, we had less difficulty with it recently in Holt County Co-op Assn. v. Corkle’s, Inc., 214 Neb. 762, 336 N.W.2d 312 (1983), where, for the first time, we recognized “a uniform course of procedure” and allowed attorney fees, noting that although there was neither a statute nor a uniform course of procedure, that “courts of general jurisdiction have inherent power to do all things necessary for the proper administration of justice and equity within the scope of their jurisdiction.” Id. at 767, 336 N.W.2d at 315.
It occurs to me that in cases brought under Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 13 (Reissue 1983), awarding attorney fees under circumstances similar to these presented here is necessary to do “all things necessary for the proper administration of justice and equity” and should have been allowed. I would affirm the trial court’s awarding attorney fees.