Court Opinion

ID: 9520488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:40:52.671481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:19.241598
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s holding in all respects other than its framework for determining whether the statement to child advocate Jacqueline Weber was testimonial. As set forth in my. dissent in Stechly, I believe the proper focus of the inquiry is whether a reasonable adult in the declarant’s position would anticipate that the statement likely would be used in a criminal prosecution. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 324-25 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Applying that standard to the facts of this case results in agreement with the majority’s conclusion that the statement to Weber was testimonial. Accordingly, I specially concur in the majority’s decision. In Stechly, the plurality devised a test for determining whether a statement is testimonial that shifts the focus from the declarant’s intent to that of the questioner depending on the circumstances of the case. See Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 284-92. The plurality held that the objective intent of the declarant is the focus of the inquiry when a statement is not produced by law enforcement interrogation. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 289. The standard is whether the objective circumstances would lead a reasonable person to anticipate that his or her statement likely would be used in a criminal prosecution. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 292. When a statement is produced by law enforcement interrogation, however, the focus is on the questioner’s objective intent in eliciting the statement. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 284-85. The shifting focus of the inquiry from Stechly was based on the plurality’s reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 267-68. The plurality acknowledged that, prior to Davis, many authorities had concluded that the focus of the inquiry was always on the declarant’s intent in giving the statement. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 290-91. According to the plurality, though, Davis modified the analysis by indicating that when a statement is the product of police questioning, the intent of the law enforcement officer in taking the statement is the focus. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 267. I continue to disagree with the plurality’s interpretation of Davis. As explained in my separate writing in Stechly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis did not change the focus of the inquiry for determining whether a statement is testimonial. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 324-25 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, Davis indicated that the perspective of the declarant remains the focus of the inquiry. As noted in Davis, “even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.l, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237 n.l, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.l. Further, the Stechly plurality acknowledged “ultimately it is the declarant’s intent to which the confrontation clause looks.” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 290. Thus, I continue to believe that the intent of the declarant is always the proper focus in determining whether a statement is testimonial. In Stechly, I also disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that a child’s age “is among the circumstances potentially relevant to evaluating whether the objective circumstances of the statement would have led a reasonable declarant to understand that his or her statement could be used in a subsequent prosecution of the defendant.” Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 296. In my view, the cases deciding that a child’s age should not be considered are persuasive. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 325 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing People v. Sisavath, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1402 n.3, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (2004), and State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 90-91, 867 A.2d 314, 329 (2005)). Specifically, the Snowden court recognized that the confrontation clause is designed to protect fundamental rights of the accused and the interest in shielding victims from testifying may never outweigh the explicit constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses at trial. Snowden, 385 Md. at 90, 867 A.2d at 329, citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-21, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857, 866-67, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988). Accordingly, the court concluded that an objective person standard, rather than an objective child of the witness’ age, should be used in determining whether a statement is testimonial and subject to the confrontation clause guarantee. Snowden, 385 Md. at 90-91, 867 A.2d at 329. As noted, the Stechly plurality held that a child’s age may be considered in deciding whether a reasonable declarant would comprehend that his or her statement could be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 295-96. Thus, under the plurality’s holding, the confrontation clause will not apply to certain out-of-court statements by children simply because they are incapable of anticipating that their statements could be used in a subsequent prosecution. The confrontation clause provides, however, that a criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. The plain language of the confrontation clause applies to all witnesses. The Stechly plurality’s framework for determining whether a statement is testimonial cannot be squared with the confrontation clause because it exempts an entire category of out-of-court statements from confrontation clause protections. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 326 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although testimonial out-of-court statements by child witnesses clearly may not be exempted from the protections of the confrontation clause, I emphasize that there are a number of ways to reduce any impact of testifying. See Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 326-27 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In particular, it may be appropriate to expand the use of closed-circuit television as a way to reduce or eliminate the impact of testifying. See 725 ILCS 5/106B — 5 (West 2006). There may also be other ways to eliminate any adverse effects of testifying in compliance with the confrontation clause. The interest in shielding a witness from testifying, however, may not outweigh a defendant’s constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses at trial. Snowden, 385 Md. at 90, 867 A.2d at 329, citing Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019-21, 101 L. Ed. 2d at 866-67, 108 S. Ct. at 2802-03. In sum, I contend the applicable standard for determining whether Von’s statement is testimonial is whether a reasonable adult in his position would expect that the statement likely would be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 327 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Under that standard, Von’s statement to Weber was testimonial. His statement was made in an interview at a child advocacy center. The circumstances of the interview were sufficiently formal and structured to result in a solemn statement. I agree with the majority that there is no indication that the primary purpose of the interview was for treatment or to protect Von from an ongoing emergency. The interview was focused on recounting past events. Thus, Von was acting in a manner analogous to a witness at trial by describing past events. Also, a reasonable adult may have recognized that the child advocate was a “mandated reporter” obligated to share information with law enforcement. See 55 ILCS 80/4(c) (West 2002). Given these objective circumstances, a reasonable adult in Von’s position would anticipate that his statement likely would be used in a criminal prosecution. Thus, although I disagree with the majority’s framework for determining whether a statement is testimonial, I agree that Von’s statement to Weber was testimonial and was admitted in violation of the confrontation clause. I also agree with the majority’s decision on forfeiture by wrongdoing and harmless error. Accordingly, I specially concur in the majority’s judgment.