Court Opinion

ID: 9543839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:49:43.350063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:17.975533
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge:
dissenting.
Once again, this Court instead of sawing the wood which is in front of it seeks to deforest an area of law not at issue in this appeal. I dissent. The following series of events explains why.
1.On August 31, 1993, Appellant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to knowingly concealing stolen property. In exchange for his plea, the prosecution agreed to dismiss a supplemental information previously filed in the case which alleged Appellant had been convicted of two prior felonies. Because the second page was dropped, the court sentenced Appellant to five years imprisonment, then suspended the time to be served. Appellant agreed to abide by certain rules of probation.
2. On Feb. 8, 1995, the prosecution filed an application to revoke the suspended sentence based on a violation of the rules of probation. A hearing on that application was held on September 27, 1995. The probation officer and Appellant testified. Based on the evidence presented, the court found Appellant was in violation of certain rules and conditions of probation and ordered his suspended sentence revoked in full.
3. On March 15, 1996, Appellant filed his “Application for Accelerated Docket — Fast Track.” In that application, he alleged as his sole proposition of error that the trial court’s revocation of his suspended sentence in full “was excessive under the facts of this case and should be modified.” The State filed its Response on April 2, 1996, responding to Appellant’s sole proposition of error.
4. Also on March 15, 1996, Appellant’s counsel filed a “Motion to Determine Validity of Appeal and Brief in Support” in which counsel asked this Court “to determine the validity of this appeal.” In that document, counsel acknowledges the appeal can challenge “only the propriety of the revocation hearing,” asking this Court “to determine the validity of this appeal, given that the law did not allow Mr. Bum-pus a suspended sentence in the first place.” In his request, counsel asked this Court to issue “an Order determining whether or not Appellant’s appeal from this revocation of his suspended sentence is valid and/or whether it should proceed or be dismissed.” In its response, the State observed it found nowhere in the record that Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; that Appellant admitted at his revocation hearing he had *1213two prior felonies; that as a matter of law he was ineligible for a suspended sentence; that as a result, even if the court erred in its conclusions revoking the suspended sentence, Appellant was not eligible for one anyway, and therefore the appeal was frivolous. The State urged this Court to interpret Appellant’s motion as a motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. Appellant did not respond to the State’s interpretation of his motion.
The point of this procedural history is this: nowhere in this motion does counsel request the relief granted by this Court. Appellant does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, nor does he contest the law holding he was ineligible for a suspended sentence. As appellate counsel phrased it, he merely “recogniz[ed] his ethical duty to this Court as co-extensive with the duty to his client.” I can in no way interpret this as containing any hidden propositions asking the Court for the relief it has granted.
The Rules of this Court require that the propositions of error in a fast track case be specific and not general in nature. Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 22 O.S.Supp. 1995, Ch. 18, App., Rule 11.5(B)(1). Here, appellate counsel specifically alleged that the sentence should not have been revoked in full; he asked for modification of this order. That is clear and concise. That he realized such modification is not possible is to his credit; hence, the motion to determine the validity of his appeal was not general in nature.
In other words, appellate counsel wanted this Court either to (1) rule on his proposition advanced in his Application for Accelerated Docket, or (2) order the appeal dismissed.
In view of this conclusion, the discussion of the difference between “void” and “voidable” is unnecessary and amounts to nothing more than a semantic shell game. In a similar vein, the discussion of whether the trial court had knowledge of Appellant’s prior convictions merely seeks to justify the results this Court has reached. However, a review of the record reveals the trial court had notice of the prior convictions as alleged in the second page of the information filed in the case prior to the plea of guilty. Based on these facts, the result proposed in the order cannot be upheld based on the analysis in the order itself. A trial judge is not just a “potted palm” waiting to receive only the water and sunlight counsel for the parties may want to agree the judge can consider when it is obvious the judge has been put on notice by the record a defendant is not eligible to receive a sentence being suggested by the parties. This Court should never condone such a disregard of the law. The sentencing powers of the court are set out by the statute. The statute specifically prohibits the suspending of a sentence when a person has been previously convicted of two or more prior felony offenses. The order suspending was void from inception in that the trial court had no authority to enter the order.
This Court should rule on the issues as presented by the Appellant. It should not reformat those issues into questions it would like to answer, but was not asked. Based on the record before the Court, and the sole proposition of error presented, the Judgment and Sentence of the District Court should simply be affirmed.