Court Opinion

ID: 9637626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:12:48.575357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:58.011762
License: Public Domain

Levine, J.,

dissenting:

Finding myself in disagreement with the majority in this case regarding its views on the two-year probationary period, I respectfully dissent.
Initially, I agree that the statutory authority of the State Board is “ ‘a visitatorial power of the most comprehensive character.’ ” Wilson v. Board of Education, 234 Md. 561, 565, 200 A. 2d 67 (1964); and that “the totality of these statutory provisions [of Article 77] ‘invests the State Board with the last word on any matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public education. ’ ” (emphasis added).
As early as Shober v. Cochrane, 53 Md. 544 (1880), this Court affirmed the State Board’s power over local school employees. In that case, Cochrane had been the secretary, *576treasurer and examiner of the county school commissioners until they removed him and replaced him with Shober. Contrary to the decision of the local school commissioners, the State Board decided that the position belonged to Cochrane, and this Court upheld the State Board’s authority over the matter. A similar result was reached in Underwood v. School Board, 103 Md. 181, 63 A. 221 (1906), where our predecessors, in holding that the State Board had the power to determine which of two persons should be recognized as a teacher of a school, stated, “There can be no doubt that the State Board had power to advise the County Board, and that it was the duty of the latter to follow the advice of the State Board on the subject.” 103 Md. at 188 (emphasis in original).
This doctrine was followed in Zantzinger v. Manning, 123 Md. 169, 90 A. 839 (1914), a case in which the State Board had decided that a teacher was improperly dismissed and should be reinstated:
“. . . In the case at bar the dispute is ‘between functionaries of the department of public education’; the question to be determined is ‘which of two persons shall be recognized as a teacher of a school,’ and the issue is clearly one involving the proper administration of the public school system. The School Commissioners’ control of high schools, and their authority to appoint the principals of said schools is subject to the provisions of the public school law of the State, and to the summary and comprehensive visitatorial power conferred by that law upon the State Board.. . .” 123 Md. at 181-82.
Similarly, in School Com. of Car. Co. v. Breeding, 126 Md. 83, 90, 94 A. 328 (1915), this Court said:
“Cases may arise where a purely legal question is involved, as in Duer v. Dashiell [91 Md. 660 (1900)], and School Commissioners v. Henkel, 117 Md. 97, and which the Court has power to determine, but where the dispute is between ‘functionaries of the department of public education,’ or a question of *577school administration is involved this Court has refused to decide it. . . .”
Thus, the Court concluded in Wilson v. Board of Education, supra, 234 Md. at 565, that
“. . . [i]n any aspect the problem of screening employees is one of administrative policy, and the mere fact that the solution is initially within the scope of the County Board’s authority does not negative the power of the State Board to review it and set it aside, as the cases cited demonstrate. . . .” (emphasis added).
See also Metcalf v. Cook, 168 Md. 475, 178 A. 219 (1935); School Commissioners v. Morris, 123 Md. 398, 91 A. 718 (1914); Wiley v. School Comm’rs, 51 Md. 401 (1879). This established line of authority makes it abundantly clear, therefore, that where, as here, the “educational policy or the administration of the system of public schools” is involved, the State Board possesses the authority to issue orders which the County Board must follow.
In the present case, even though she was never observed, evaluated, or criticized, Mrs. Halsey’s contract was not renewed. The State Board, understandably concerned at this lack of proper personnel procedures, observed:
. . we are troubled by the fact that her failings were not properly brought to her attention, that no observation was made of Mrs. Halsey’s performance within the classroom, and that there was no written evaluation of the quality of her work. These defects in the procedures of dealing with a probationary teacher do not make an adequate teacher out of a teacher who is less than adequate, but they do make us believe that this teacher should be given another chance, under better supervision and guidance. In exercising our visitatorial power, we, therefore, call upon the Garrett County School System to offer Mrs. Halsey a new contract, which would take effect upon being signed by both parties and which would permit the probationary period to start running anew. . . .”
*578The State Board’s authority to regulate proper personnel procedures, and to enforce such regulations in appropriate cases, is unquestionably a matter of public-school system administration, and involves a dispute between functionaries of the Department of Public Education. Since the power is summary and exclusive, the State Board has “the last word” in this matter.
As the majority has noted, there are limitations on the State Board’s broad visitatorial powers, as in the case of pure questions of. law or the fraudulent exercise of that power. The present case, however, comes within neither of these limitations. There is not the remotest suggestion of fraud, bad faith, or breach of trust on the part of the State-Board. And, as noted, the issue here is one of proper administration of the public school system rather than a purely legal question.
Although I am also in agreement with the majority’s general statement that “the visitatorial power cannot be exercised in direct contravention of statute!,]” I part company on its application of this principle to the facts of this case. The statutory provision purportedly violated by the State Board’s order is Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.) Art. 77, § 114, which, in its concluding sentence, simply provides that “. . . Nothing in this section shall preclude the State Board of Education from adopting bylaws providing for a probationary period of employment not to exceed two years.” While this provision does not authorize the State Board to extend the probationary period beyond1 two years, it specifically empowers the State Board to provide for “a probationary period” of two years in accordance with its bylaws. Where, however, those bylaws have not been complied with, as was the case here, the teacher has not been given “a probationary period” at all. In short, the State Board is not extending Mrs. Halsey’s probationary period to four years in this case, but is merely insisting, fully in accord with its visitatorial power, that she be afforded a proper “probationary period” in the first instance, one that complies with the Board’s bylaws pertaining to correct personnel procedures.
*579Since the visitatorial power of the State Board encompasses this dispute, and since that visitatorial power has not been exercised in contravention of the statute, the judgment of the Circuit Court for Garrett County should be reversed, and the order of the State Board of Education reinstated. Judges Smith and O’Donnell authorize me to state that they concur in the views expressed herein.