Court Opinion

ID: 9645195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:16:05.69937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:24.703355
License: Public Domain

DALLY, Judge, dissenting on motions for rehearing.
The majority holds that when a judgment is reversed because of non-compliance with Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., retrial of the defendant would place him twice in jeopardy for the same offense, violating his rights accorded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The majority say this is required by the recent Supreme Court decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). I disagree.
There is no claim here that the appellant’s guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and understandingly. The United States constitutional guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), was met. In that opinion Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the majority said: “A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” However, in Texas the Legislature in its wisdom had made an additional requirement that:
“No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless in felony cases less than capital, the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce *349evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of the cause.” Art. 1.15, V.A.C. C.P.
So, in the constitutional sense, the appellant in his plea of guilty, which it is uncon-troverted was voluntarily and knowingly made, admitted that he did the acts of which he was accused, and the plea of guilty was itself a conviction. Boykin v. Alabama, supra. The appellant’s plea of guilty, in the constitutional sense, was sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction. Therefore the appellant’s conviction is not being reversed because there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, but it is being reversed because the trial court incorrectly accepted, in attempting to comply with Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., a stipulation of evidence that was not sufficient to support the plea. When the stipulation of evidence was offered i. e., the stipulation that the appellant had forged the instrument which did not support the allegation that he passed the forged instrument, the court clearly committed a trial error. This judgment should be reversed because of that trial error of the court in accepting the stipulated evidence offered, which did not comply with the requirements of Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P.
Moreover, the holding of the majority here cannot be satisfactorily reconciled with the holding of a panel of this Court in Ex parte Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In that case a judgment had been reversed on appeal because there was a failure to comply with Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. Duran v. State, 552 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.Cr. App.1977). The panel held that a subsequent trial and conviction on a plea of guilty for the same offense did not place the petitioner twice in jeopardy. The panel held that the reversal was caused by trial error, not insufficiency of evidence.
Duran entered a plea of guilty and the State, to meet the requirements of Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., relied on a stipulation of evidence which was entered into by the petitioner’s attorney but to which the petitioner had not personally agreed in writing as required by Art. 1.13, V.A.C.C.P. The panel held that the trial judge should not have accepted the stipulation of evidence, and if the trial judge had properly refused to accept the stipulation the State quite likely would have obtained from the petitioner his written agreement to the stipulation or would have offered other evidence to support the plea as required by Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. The same reasoning is certainly applicable here. It was alleged that the appellant passed a forged instrument. The stipulation offered was that the appellant had forged the instrument. Since the stipulation offered to meet the requirements of Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., did not properly support the plea, the trial court should not have accepted the stipulation in evidence. Thereafter, the State would not have rested, but would have obtained a proper stipulation or would have offered other evidence to support the plea as required by Art. 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. If the State did not offer proper evidence, of course, the court should not have accepted the plea of guilty.
The majority leaves many questions. Is the State barred from seeking an indictment of the appellant for forgery — the offense to which appellant confessed in open court? If an indictment for forgery were returned could the appellant be prosecuted for that offense? Would the appellant’s *350judicial confession then be admissible against him in the prosecution for forgery?
If the majority interprets Burks v. United States, supra, and Greene v. Massey, supra, as they do here, they will, in my opinion, needlessly and without lawful reason require the acquittal of many criminals who have entered pleas of guilty.
I dissent to the majority opinion; the State’s Motion for Rehearing should be granted.
ONION, P. J., and DOUGLAS and TOM G. DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.