Court Opinion

ID: 9752319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:57:49.01117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:13.965808
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Joslin,
concurring. My brothers and I agree that the record in this case contains no direct evidence of petitioners’ or anybody else’s guilt. We disagree, however, on that record’s inferential potential for determining who among those present at the scene when the police arrived can reasonably be said to have consciously possessed or intentionally controlled the contraband.
The majority say that it is conjectural or speculative, rather than reasonable or rational, to ascribe that possession or control to petitioners.1 My brother Kelleher rejects that view. In his opinion the evidence reasonably yields to the inference that all those present at the scene were joint constructive possessors. I agree with his conclusion, but go further. In my judgment it is equally as reasonable to infer that less than all those present were pos*328sessors, that some were innocent bystanders, and that the latter group could have included one or both of petitioners.
If I am correct in my view that the evidence is susceptible of inconsistent, but equally reasonable, inferences, application of the rule requiring direct and inferential evidence to be viewed most favorably to the state on a motion for judgment of acquittal would perforce dictate denial of that motion. But to adhere to that rule in this scenario would result in an anomaly. This is so because on the same record application of the so-called circumstantial evidence rule2 would require a conviction to be set aside on the ground that the facts and circumstances of the case, though consistent with guilt, fail to preclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.3 This anomaly and the consequent needless protraction of litigation can be avoided by following the rule of State v. Rose, 112 R. I. 402, 407-08, 311 A.2d 281, 284 (1973).4 In that case the *329inference most favorable to the state pointed to guilt. Notwithstanding, we held that the motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the evidence failed to exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The situation here is no different. Hence, the trial justice should have ordered the entry of a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged, but not for the reasons advanced by the majority.

The majority rely heavily for their conclusion on State v. Fortes, 110 R. I. 406, 293 A.2d 506 (1972). That case, however, is clearly distinguishable because (1) the inference which we refused to draw in that case did not relate to possession, but was concerned solely with whether the accused knew that the contraband pills were barbiturates; (2) the question of the appropriate rule to be applied on a motion for judgment of acquittal was not considered; and (3) the decisive issue was the appropriate test for determining what quantum and quality of circumstantial evidence is required in order to sustain a conviction.

State v. Fortes, 110 R. I. 406, 409, 293 A.2d 506, 508 (1972); State v. Franklin, 103 R. I. 715, 725, 241 A.2d 219, 225-26 (1968); State v. Montella, 88 R. I. 469, 476, 149 A.2d 919, 922-23 (1959); State v. Blood, 68 R. I. 160, 162, 26 A.2d 745, 746 (1942); State v. Di Noi, 59 R. I. 348, 368, 195 A. 497, 506 (1937).

The anomaly referred to is highlighted by State v. Montella, 88 R. I. 469, 149 A.2d 919 (1959). There, four polling officials were charged with conspiracy to violate the election laws. The evidence was circumstantial and like that in the instant case was susceptible of inferences that all or less than all of the defendants had participated. On that record the court held that (1) the defendants’ motions for directed verdicts should have been denied because the inferential evidence viewed most favorably lo the state would support a finding of guilt, and (2) their motions for new trials' should have been granted because the evidence was consistent, with a reasonable conclusion other than that of guilt.

An alternative method of avoiding the inconsistency would’ be to follow the lead of the federal courts which have rejected our rule for testing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a conviction. See State v. Fortes, 110 R. I. 406, 409 n.2, 293 A.2d 506, 508 n.2 (1972.)