Court Opinion

ID: 9391589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 18:00:47.011381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.804626
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14694    Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 05/02/2023    Page: 1 of 15

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-14694
                           ____________________

        MATA CHORWADI, INC.,
        d.b.a. Homing Inn,
        KIRIT SHAH,
        DIPIKA SHAH,
                                                     Plaintiffs-Appellants,
        versus
        CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                20-14694

                      D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cv-81069-WPD
                           ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and GRANT,
        Circuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
                This appeal presents questions of third-party standing and
        alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
        owners of a hotel that the City of Boynton Beach declared a
        “chronic nuisance property” complain that they were deprived of
        property without due process and that the municipal chronic nui-
        sance property code violates their First Amendment rights and
        those of their hotel guests. The district court granted summary
        judgment in favor of the City because the City afforded the hotel
        owners due process and enforcing the municipal code did not vio-
        late rights protected by the First Amendment. Because the hotel
        owners lack prudential standing to bring a First Amendment claim
        based on the rights of hotel guests, failed to present any evidence
        that the City otherwise violated the First Amendment, and failed
        to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm.
                               I. BACKGROUND
                The City of Boynton Beach, Florida, enacted a Chronic Nui-
        sance Property Code “to address and reduce nuisance activities . . .
        that disrupt quality of life and repeatedly occur or exist at proper-
        ties.” BOYNTON BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 15, art. VIII,
        § 15-111 (Am. Legal Pub. Supp. 2022). The Code defines a
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        20-14694                Opinion of the Court                          3

        “nuisance activity” as “any activit[y] relating to” twenty-six viola-
        tions, “whenever engaged in by the property owner, operator,
        agent, tenant, or [their] invitee.” Id. § 15-112(d). Under the Code, a
        property exhibits a pattern of nuisance activity when the City “has
        responded to” three or more nuisance activities at that property
        within thirty days or to seven or more nuisance activities within six
        months. Id. § 15-112(h)(1)–(2).
               If a property exhibits a pattern of nuisance activities, the City
        may declare it a “chronic nuisance property.” Id. § 15-115(a). The
        City gives notice to the property owner of the declaration of
        chronic nuisance by hand delivery or certified mail and posts notice
        at the property. Id. § 15-115(a)–(b). The declaration is accompanied
        by a “proposed Nuisance Abatement Agreement [that] outlines the
        corrective action to be taken by the property owner.” Id. § 15-
        115(b)(5). The property owner then has fifteen days to sign the
        agreement. Id. § 15-115(b)(6).
               If a property owner refuses to sign the agreement or violates
        the terms of a signed agreement, “the City may prosecute its Dec-
        laration of Chronic Nuisance at a hearing before the City’s Special
        Magistrate.” Id. § 15-116(a). The special magistrate conducts a hear-
        ing that is limited to the evidence upon which the City based its
        decision and “any rebuttal offered by the property owner.” Id. § 15-
        116(c). Both the City and the property owner may call and cross-
        examine sworn witnesses. Id. § 15-116(c). After the hearing, the
        special magistrate issues a written decision that either upholds or
        rejects the City’s determination that the property owner violated
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14694

        the agreement. Id. § 15-116(d)–(e). If the special magistrate finds a
        violation, the special magistrate’s order authorizes the City to take
        remedial actions on the property at the property owner’s expense.
        Id. §§ 15-116(f), 15-112(b). Either party may appeal the special mag-
        istrate’s order to the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County. Id. § 15-
        117.
                Mata Chorwadi, Inc., owns the Homing Inn, a 103-room ho-
        tel in Boynton Beach. Kirit and Dipika Shah operate the hotel and
        are the majority owners of Mata Chorwadi, Inc. We refer to them
        collectively as the hotel owners. Between December 2017 and April
        2018, there were thirteen calls for emergency services at the hotel
        related to drug overdoses. All thirteen calls were placed by hotel
        guests. The Code defines “[t]wo (2) or more calls for service within
        a period of thirty (30) calendar days to the same property for . . .
        emergency personnel . . . to assist an individual who displays the
        symptoms of an overdose[] of a controlled substance” as a viola-
        tion. Id. § 15-112(d)(26). Six of the drug overdose-related calls for
        emergency services at the hotel occurred within a thirty-day period
        beginning on December 30, 2017. Because two calls within thirty
        days constitute one violation, those six calls within thirty days were
        three violations, which is a “pattern of nuisance activity.” Id. § 15-
        112(h).
                In July 2018, the City sent the hotel owners a declaration of
        chronic nuisance accompanied by a proposed nuisance abatement
        agreement. The proposed agreement required the hotel owners to
        install additional security cameras, post “no trespassing” signs,
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        20-14694               Opinion of the Court                        5

        improve lighting on the property, and trim shrubs. The hotel own-
        ers did not sign the agreement within the time specified in the let-
        ter. In November, the hotel owners received a notice of a public
        hearing to be held in December regarding a Code violation. The
        notice stated that if the special magistrate found a violation, the
        hotel owners could be fined $1,000 for each day that the violation
        continued.
               One day before the public hearing, the hotel owners’ coun-
        sel signed the agreement on behalf of her clients and wrote under
        the signature line, “[t]his Agreement was signed under duress, and
        my clients do not waive their right to appeal and/or any right to
        subject the City Ordinance to judicial review as it applies to my
        clients.” The hotel owners’ complaint alleges that the agreement
        was signed under duress because it was signed “[i]n fear of the hefty
        fine of $1,000.00 per day.” At the hearing, the City requested that
        the special magistrate reject the signed agreement because of the
        “under duress” notation, and the special magistrate did so. Later
        that month, counsel for the hotel owners signed an agreement
        without any notation. The hotel owners’ complaint alleges that
        this agreement was signed “[i]n fear” that the City would conduct
        remedial work at the hotel owners’ expense. The City accepted this
        signature.
               At a hearing on April 17, 2019, the special magistrate found
        that the hotel owners violated the agreement. The City posted a
        sign on the front window of the hotel’s office that stated that the
        property had been declared a chronic nuisance property as “a direct
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 20-14694

        result of continued activity by person(s) at this location requiring
        the attention of Police and/or Fire Department personnel.” The
        hotel owners appealed the special magistrate’s decision to the Cir-
        cuit Court of Palm Beach County on May 31, 2019.
               On July 29, 2019, while the hotel owners’ state-court appeal
        was pending, the hotel owners filed suit in the federal district court.
        The amended complaint alleged violations of the First Amendment
        and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The com-
        plaint requested injunctive and declaratory relief and compensa-
        tory damages.
                The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and
        the hotel owners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The
        district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and
        denied as moot the hotel owners’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
        tion. The hotel owners timely appealed.
                We ordered the parties to address the status of the state-
        court appeal at oral argument and the effect, if any, of the availa-
        bility and status of that appeal on the hotel owners’ due-process
        claim. We also ordered the parties to address whether abstention
        was proper in this litigation in the light of the state-court proceed-
        ings. See generally Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). At oral
        argument, the hotel owners stated that the Palm Beach County
        Circuit Court had affirmed the special magistrate’s order. Although
        further appellate review was available, the hotel owners did not
        appeal that judgment.
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        20-14694               Opinion of the Court                         7

                         II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                We review de novo a summary judgment. See Owen v. I.C.
        Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment
        is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
        terial fact” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a mat-
        ter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We may affirm the judgment on
        any ground supported by the record. See Powers v. United States,
        996 F.2d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir. 1993). “We review the decision to
        deny a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Scott v.
        Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010).
                                III. DISCUSSION
               We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain
        that the hotel owners’ First Amendment claim fails on the merits
        and fails for lack of prudential standing insofar as it asserts third-
        party rights. Second, we explain that the hotel owners failed to
        state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
        Amendment.
         A. The Hotel Owners’ First Amendment Rights Were Not Vio-
          lated and They Lack Prudential Standing to Assert Third-Party
                                     Rights.
               The hotel owners contend that the enforcement of the Code
        violates the First Amendment rights of the hotel’s owners, employ-
        ees, and guests. We conclude that the hotel owners’ First Amend-
        ment rights were not violated. And we conclude that the hotel
        owners lack prudential standing to assert the rights of hotel guests.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                20-14694

                     1. The Hotel Owners’ First Amendment
                           Rights Were Not Violated.
                The hotel owners argue that the Code violates the First
        Amendment “because it imposes punishment on hotel owners, like
        Appellants, when their guests exercise their First Amendment right
        to call 911.” But the enforcement of the Code based on calls placed
        by guests does not implicate the hotel owners’ First Amendment
        rights. And the hotel owners’ argument that the Code penalizes
        and chills their protected speech fails because the hotel owners’
        speech was never the basis of enforcement and there is no evidence
        that the hotel owners’ speech was chilled. No calls by the owners
        or employees of the Homing Inn counted toward the pattern of
        nuisance activity, so the hotel owners’ speech was not penalized.
        And there is no evidence that the Code had a chilling effect on the
        hotel owners’ speech or that of their employees. Kirit Shah and
        Dipika Shah testified in their depositions that they have never
        avoided calling 911 because of the Code, nor have they directed
        anyone to avoid calling 911 because of the Code. And although a
        hotel employee testified that she was initially confused by the sign
        the City placed in the window and was “scared” to call 911, when
        she asked Kirit Shah “if it was okay to call 911,” he replied that it
        was.
                2. The Hotel Owners Lack Prudential Standing to
                           Assert Third-Party Rights.
             The hotel owners also assert the rights of the hotel’s guests
        by maintaining that guests have a constitutional right to call 911
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        20-14694                Opinion of the Court                          9

        and that “[t]he enactment and enforcement of the [Code] directly
        penalizes and unduly chills the First Amendment rights of individ-
        uals, including . . . hotel guests, to seek assistance for illness.” The
        hotel owners contend that a 911 call is protected by the First
        Amendment as both free expression and a petition for redress of
        grievances. But whether the hotel’s guests could assert that their
        911 calls are protected by one clause of the First Amendment or by
        two is beside the point because the hotel owners lack prudential
        standing to assert the rights of hotel guests.
                With few exceptions, “a litigant may only assert his own
        constitutional rights or immunities.” United States v. Raines, 362
        U.S. 17, 22 (1960). The Supreme Court has explained that this pro-
        hibition of asserting third-party rights is a prudential limitation, not
        a jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article III. See United Food
        & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
        557 (1996); see also CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,
        451 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has rec-
        ognized several exceptions to the prohibition against asserting
        third-party rights. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Juris-
        diction § 2.3.4 (6th ed. 2012). Those exceptions, of course, do not
        alter the requirements of standing under Article III. See CAMP, 451
        F.3d at 1271.
               This appeal requires us to consider two exceptions to the
        prohibition of third-party standing. The hotel owners argue that
        the overbreadth doctrine, which allows a litigant to challenge a
        statute not because it is unconstitutional as applied to him but
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                20-14694

        because it may deter others from engaging in protected expression,
        see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973), applies here.
        The hotel owners also cite a separate exception, jus tertii standing,
        although they do not distinguish that theory from an overbreadth
        theory. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88
        HARV. L. REV. 423, 423–424 (1974) (explaining the “fundamental
        distinction” between overbreadth claims and jus tertii claims). Jus
        tertii standing allows litigants who challenge a statute in their own
        right to assert “concomitant” rights of third parties when those
        third parties’ rights would be violated by the enforcement of the
        challenged restriction against the litigant. See Craig v. Boren, 429
        U.S. 190, 195–97 (1976). Neither of those exceptions applies here.
         a. The Hotel Owners Cannot Rely on the Overbreadth Doctrine.
               The overbreadth doctrine allows litigants “to challenge a
        statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated,
        but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s
        very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
        from constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Broadrick,
        413 U.S. at 612. The overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine.” Id.
        at 613. So, “a law should not be invalidated for overbreadth unless
        it reaches a substantial number of impermissible applications.”
        New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771 (1982).
               The Code does not apply to guests, so there are no “imper-
        missible applications,” id., on which the hotel owners can rely. The
        hotel owners allege that the Code “penalizes” and “chills” hotel
        guests’ speech. But on its face, the Code imposes penalties only on
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        20-14694                 Opinion of the Court                          11

        the owners of nuisance properties. See Code §§ 15-115, 15-116.
        There is no evidence that the Code has been or could be enforced
        against hotel guests, so the hotel owners cannot rely on the over-
        breadth doctrine.
              b. The Hotel Owners Do Not Have Jus Tertii Standing.
                The hotel owners’ claim is closer to a jus tertii claim than to
        an overbreadth claim, but the hotel owners lack prudential stand-
        ing under a jus tertii theory as well. In a jus tertii case, a litigant is
        permitted to challenge the enforcement of a statute against himself
        and also assert that the legal duties imposed on the litigant operate
        to violate third parties’ rights. For example, a vendor of low-alco-
        hol beer who was prohibited from selling the beer to males under
        age 21 and to females under age 18 was allowed to claim that the
        prohibition—which caused the vendor financial injury by restrict-
        ing its market—violated the equal-protection rights of males aged
        18–20. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191–97. Similarly, medical providers who
        prescribed a contraceptive device and were convicted of aiding and
        abetting the prohibited use of contraceptives could assert the rights
        of the married couple with whom they had a professional relation-
        ship. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480–81 (1965). As the
        Supreme Court explained, “vendors and those in like positions
        have been uniformly permitted to resist efforts at restricting their
        operations by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who
        seek access to their market or function.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 195.
        “Otherwise, the threatened imposition of governmental sanctions
        might deter” vendors and those in like positions from allowing
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14694

        third parties to access their market or function, “result[ing] indi-
        rectly in the violation of third parties’ rights.” Id. (internal quota-
        tion marks omitted).
               The key to jus tertii standing is the causal connection be-
        tween the litigant’s injury and the violation of the third parties’
        constitutional rights. In Craig, the beer vendor’s compliance with
        the statute forbidding the sale of low-alcohol beer to young men
        but not to women of the same age is what caused the equal-protec-
        tion violation. Id. In other words, when the vendor complied with
        the legal duty imposed by the statute, the young men were denied
        their constitutional rights. Id. at 194. Likewise, in Griswold, the lit-
        igant was prohibited from distributing contraceptives to married
        couples, and compliance with that prohibition would have caused
        constitutional injury to those couples. See 381 U.S. at 480–81.
                The hotel owners’ claim lacks the causal connection be-
        tween their injury and the third parties’ injuries that must be pre-
        sent for jus tertii standing. The hotel owners’ theory is that their
        violation of the Code made the City put up signs that gave notice
        that the hotel is a chronic nuisance property, these signs confuse
        guests, and confused guests might be deterred from calling 911. So,
        the hotel owners suggest, the Code impermissibly chills the First
        Amendment rights of hotel guests. But this theory is a far cry from
        Craig, in which the statutory provision at issue imposed a duty on
        the litigant and the litigant’s compliance with that duty indirectly
        violated third parties’ rights. 429 U.S. at 194. Here, there is no legal
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        20-14694                Opinion of the Court                        13

        duty imposed on the hotel owners that indirectly violates third par-
        ties’ rights when the hotel owners comply.
               Instead, there is a misalignment between the hotel owners’
        interests and hotel guests’ interests. The hotel owners complained
        that they “reasonably fear that any future calls made by hotel
        guests for peace officer/emergency personnel assistance will cause
        further harm to the [hotel owners].” But that “further harm” to the
        hotel owners is predicated on guests’ choice to call 911. So, as the
        hotel owners acknowledged at oral argument, the hotel owners are
        injured under the Code only if guests’ First Amendment rights are
        not violated. If guests’ rights are violated, then the hotel owners
        are not injured. Any negative effect of the Code on third parties’
        rights benefits the hotel owners. That misalignment distinguishes
        this appeal from Craig and other jus tertii cases, in which litigants
        were permitted to assert “concomitant” rights of third parties. 429
        U.S. at 195.
               The hotel owners’ real objection to the sign is not that it de-
        terred guests from calling 911 but instead that potential guests
        might see the sign and not stay at the hotel. Indeed, the hotel own-
        ers’ counsel stated as much before the district court: “The sign is a
        deterrent. The only thing that the sign has done is . . . told good
        patrons not to stay here. . . . [T]he sign hasn’t done anything to pre-
        vent 911 calls. I mean, it hasn’t done anything to reduce the num-
        ber of 911 calls.” See Docket Entry 123 at 18–19. But as the hotel
        owners acknowledged before this Court, even if they could prove
        that potential guests were deterred by the sign from staying at the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14694

        hotel, such deterrence would not violate the constitutional rights
        of those potential guests.
         B. The Hotel Owners Failed to State a Fourteenth Amendment
                                   Claim.
               The hotel owners’ claim that they were deprived of property
        without due process also fails. The district court ruled on the merits
        that the hotel owners received constitutionally sufficient process.
        We do not reach the merits.
               The hotel owners’ complaint failed to state a cognizable
        claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As we have explained, “only when the
        state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the proce-
        dural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under
        section 1983 arise.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.
        1994) (en banc). Even if there is a procedural defect in an adminis-
        trative proceeding, “such a claim will not be cognizable under [sec-
        tion] 1983 if the state provides a means by which to remedy the
        alleged deprivation.” Foxy Lady, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 347 F.3d
        1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2003). So, a plaintiff who seeks relief under
        section 1983 must allege that there is no available state process. The
        hotel owners alleged that they were deprived of procedural protec-
        tions during the administrative proceeding, but they did not allege
        in their complaint that there was no state process to remedy these
        procedural defects. That failure is fatal under McKinney.
              For the sake of completeness, we ordered the parties to file
        supplemental briefing about the procedures available under state
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        20-14694                Opinion of the Court                        15

        law. And the hotel owners’ cited authority—which could not cure
        the pleading defect—goes against their argument on the merits be-
        cause it establishes that they could have raised their constitutional
        claims in state court. See Holiday Isle Resort & Marina Assocs. v.
        Monroe Cnty., 582 So.2d 721, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The
        hotel owners stated at oral argument before this Court that the
        county court to which they appealed the special magistrate’s order
        struck their constitutional claims as improper. The hotel owners
        had the opportunity to appeal the final judgment of that court but
        chose not to do so. Based on Holiday Isle Resort, the hotel owners
        could have argued in an appeal of the judgment that the order strik-
        ing their constitutional claims was erroneous because their consti-
        tutional claims were “properly cognizable on an appeal to the
        [county] circuit court from a final order of” a special magistrate. Id.
        at 722.
               That the hotel owners failed to take advantage of these state
        procedures does not mean that the state deprived them of property
        without due process. And the hotel owners’ complaint failed to al-
        lege a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim in any event be-
        cause it did not allege that state procedures were inadequate to
        cure any procedural defect. So, the City was entitled to summary
        judgment in its favor.
                               IV. CONCLUSION
               We AFFIRM the judgment in favor of the City.