Court Opinion

ID: 9661440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:39:16.760902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:28.208437
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam
(on motion for rehearing). The briefs on motion for rehearing have convinced the court that certain portions of the opinion erroneously stated the applicable law as to the determination of “unlawful speed” on the part of a right-hand driver, which will result in the forfeiture of his directional right-of-way as provided by sec. 346.18 (1), Stats. Accordingly, we withdraw the last six paragraphs of the opinion and the mandate, and substitute the following therefor:
What is the standard for determining whether a right-hand driver approaching an uncontrolled intersection is traveling at an appropriately reduced speed in the light of actual or potential hazards? We have often held that the right-of-way is not an absolute license to the right-hand driver to proceed through an intersection, unconcerned with the conduct of the left-hand driver. The right-hand driver has the general duty to operate his vehicle with due care to avoid a collision.1
With respect to speed, the right-hand driver, when approaching and crossing an intersection must, as prescribed by the quoted sec. 346.57 (2) and (3), Stats., “drive at an appropriate reduced speed.” What may be an “appropriate reduced speed” in one case may well differ from another and the determination in each case must be made by the trier of fact based on the factual circumstances present in that case. No specific rate of speed can be deemed lawful or unlawful within the meaning of “unlawful speed” in sec. 346.18 (1), or of “appropriate reduced speed” in sec. 346.57 (3).
Applying the speed standard to the facts of this case, we concur with the trial court that there was no credible evidence *66bon the basis of which a jury could reasonably find that Drake was not operating his vehicle at an appropriately reduced speed when he approached and crossed the intersection.
The only credible evidence in the record as to Drake’s speed was Drake’s own testimony. He testified that when he was 25 feet north of the intersection he was traveling about 20 to 25 miles per hour. Taking into account the nature of the intersection (at right angles and essentially level), the surface of the road (hard-top), the unobstructed view of the other road that Drake had from the crest of the hill located on his road about 450 feet from the intersection, there is no reasonable basis on which the jury could find “unlawful speed” on the part of Drake. Accordingly, the trial court was correct both in the instructions given to the jury on the question of Drake’s speed and in its conclusion that there was no evidence of unlawful speed on the part of Drake.
Both drivers were negligent as to lookout and Miss Hole-winski was also negligent in failing to yield the directional right-of-way to Drake. We now pass to a consideration of the apportionment of negligence between the two drivers.
Under the circumstances of this case, we must conclude as a matter of law that there is no basis for finding either party less negligent than the other. Each driver proceeded with total blindness as to the other and neither had any excuse nor the benefit of any mitigating circumstances. Although this court is particularly loath to overturn a jury on the comparison of negligence between a plaintiff and a defendant,2 this is a situation where the jury apportionment should not stand.3
*66cAccordingly, the judgment in the Holewinski Case must be affirmed, and the order in the Drake Case set aside and judgment entered in that case dismissing the Drake complaint.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. 83; order reversed in Case No. 82 and cause remanded for entry of judgment dismissing the complaint of Drake. No costs on appeal or motion for rehearing allowed to any party in either Case No. 82 or Case No. 83.

 Lind v. Lund (1954), 266 Wis. 232, 63 N. W. (2d) 313; Johnson v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. (1953), 264 Wis. 358, 59 N. W. (2d) 660; Hamm v. Miller (1949), 256 Wis. 192, 40 N. W. (2d) 387.

 Davis v. Skille (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 482, 489, 107 N. W. (2d) 458.

 Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1956), 274 Wis. 210, 214, 215, 79 N. W. (2d) 834.