Court Opinion

ID: 9797628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:26:26.93738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:41.217217
License: Public Domain

PARRISH, Justice,
concurring:
¶ 41 I join in both the reasoning and the holding of Associate Chief Justice Durrant’s lead opinion. I write separately to address the issue raised by the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Durham.
¶ 42 The Chief Justice agrees with the lead opinion’s conclusion that the criminal homicide statute permissibly defines killing an “unborn child” as a homicide, but dissents with respect to whether the defendant may be prosecuted for aggravated murder. The dissent is predicated on the notion that a fetus is not a full legal “person” under the laws of the United States or the laws of Utah. Accordingly, because the aggravated murder statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999), provides that homicide is aggravated murder if committed incident to a scheme or course of conduct during which two or more “persons” are killed, the dissent concludes *1179that the defendant may not be prosecuted for aggravated murder.
¶ 43 I disagree with the conclusion urged by the dissent for two reasons. First, when read in context, the term “person” as used in the aggravated murder statute is clearly intended to include an unborn child, and I do not believe this presents a constitutional problem because it does not infringe on any constitutionally protected rights. Second, the defendant would nevertheless be subject to prosecution for aggravated murder under a provision of the aggravated murder statute not addressed in the dissent.
¶ 44 The dissent is based on the premise that the word “person” in the aggravated murder statute was intended by the legislature to constitute a term of art with a meaning independent of the statutory scheme as a whole. In my view, however, the term “person” as used in the aggravated murder statute, constitutes only a generic reference back to the statutory provision defining the elements of criminal homicide, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201. In that section, the legislature unmistakably provided that causing the death of a human being, including an unborn child, constitutes homicide. The following section builds upon the criminal homicide statute by designating the circumstances under which “criminal homicide” constitutes “aggravated murder.” Accordingly, when considered in context, it is clear that the term “person” in the aggravated murder statute must be interpreted to include an unborn child.1
¶ 45 Interpreting the term “person” in light of the statutory context and clearly expressed legislative intent is consistent with long-established principles of statutory construction. “ ‘One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.’ ” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Payne, 782 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting Masich v. U.S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, 616 (1948)). Indeed, the dissent’s singular focus on the word “person” as a term of art is inconsistent with the fundamental principle that words are tó be determined in light of their association with surrounding words and phrases and in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592.
¶ 46 For similar reasons, I am not persuaded by the dissent’s concern that interpreting the term “person” to include an unborn child would raise federal constitutional issues. The dissent implies that any statute that defines the term “person” to include an “unborn child” would necessarily run afoul of the federal Constitution, without regard to the context in which that definition occurs or the consequences that flow from that definition. I do not agree with this principle.
¶ 47 Our interpretation of the term “person” in the context of the particular statutory scheme before the court neither implies that the rights of a fetus are equivalent to those of a person for purposes of federal constitutional analysis nor mandates the conclusion that the term “person” is used in an unconstitutional manner. I believe the legislature’s use of the word “person” to refer to a fetus would create a clear constitutional issue only if it carried with it a restriction of a constitutionally protected right, such 'as in the context of a statute restricting a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy. An entirely different context is presented where, as here, a third party is accused of attacking and killing a fetus against the will of the mother. See State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn.1990) (holding that a fetal homicide statute does not impinge directly or indirectly on a pregnant woman’s privacy rights); 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So.2d 104, 113-14 (Miss.2003) (holding that a wrongful death statute protects a fetus, and that the rights of a mother as outlined in Roe *1180v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), have no relation to the rights of a defendant accused of causing the death of a fetus); People v. Ford, 221 Ill.App.3d 354, 163 Ill.Dec. 766, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (1991) (holding that a pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy and a defendant who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly situated). This statute’s use of the term “person” to refer to a fetal victim defines the crime of aggravated murder. It does not declare a fetus to be a person entitled to equal protection, nor does it restrict a woman’s right to obtain an abortion. In fact, there is no possibility that the statute in question could undermine a woman’s right to obtain an abortion under the federal Constitution because the statute specifically provides that there “shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of an unborn child caused by an abortion.” Utah Code Ann. § 76 — 5—201(l)(b) (1999 & Supp.2003).
¶48 I am unpersuaded by the dissent’s conclusion that the defendant should not be subject to prosecution for aggravated murder for an independent reason as well. The dissent focuses on the portion of subsection (l)(b) of the aggravated murder statute that refers to homicides committed incident to one act, scheme, or course of conduct in which “two or more persons were killed.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(l)(b) (1999). However, even if we were to assume that the defendant could not be prosecuted under that portion of subsection (l)(b), it is my view that the defendant would be subject to prosecution under the second clause of that same subsection. Subsection (l)(b) reads in its entirety:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
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(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim who was killed [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1999) (emphasis added). In this case, the defendant has been charged with the criminal homicide of an unborn child pursuant to section 76-5-201. When the unborn child is understood to be the “victim” of the homicide, that unborn child was killed during an alleged criminal episode in which the defendant allegedly attempted to kill one or more persons, in this case Susan MacGuire, in addition to the unborn victim. Accordingly, the defendant may be tried for aggravated murder under section 76 — 5—202(l)(b).2
¶ 49 I believe that the statutory provisions addressing aggravated murder must be interpreted in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. Accordingly, I have no difficulty concluding that the term “person” as used in the aggravated murder statute includes an unborn child. I therefore concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant’s conclusion that the defendant may appropriately be prosecuted for aggravated murder.
¶ 50 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice WILKINS, and Judge NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH’s concurring opinion.
¶ 51 Justice RUSSON did not participate herein; then District Judge NEHRING sat.

. The dissent points out that, in a variety of contexts, the term “person” has been interpreted not to include a fetus or unborn child. While this is true, there is nothing that requires the term “person” in one context to be interpreted co-extensively with the term "person” when used in an entirely different context. In light of the clearly expressed legislative intent, I see no constitutional impediment to interpreting the term “person” to include an "unborn child” in the context of this particular statutory provision.

. The fact that subsection (l)(b) uses the terms "victim” and "person” in a seemingly interchangeable manner bolsters my conclusion that the term "person” as used in that subsection was not intended by the legislature to constitute a term of art, but rather a generic reference to a human being, including an unborn child, as used in the criminal homicide statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-201.