Court Opinion

ID: 9571489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:09.258219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:29.013503
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring specially.
While I agree with the majority’s insightful analysis of the constitutionality of OCGA § 21-5-30.1, I write separately in order to closely scrutinize the statute and measure appellants’ actions against it. Upon review of the statutory scheme, I conclude that appellants’ actions did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b).
The State Ethics Commission was authorized to assess a fine for violation of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b) (see OCGA § 21-5-6 (14)), and did impose a fine of $250 on each appellant after finding they had violated the law. Inasmuch as the law does not favor forfeitures and penalties, we must strictly construe the statute. Bowen v. Griffith, 258 Ga. 162 (6) (366 SE2d 293) (1988).
There is no question that Gwinn was acting on behalf of Southern General, an insurer, when he placed the newspaper ad. The question is whether the placement of the ad constituted a forbidden “contribution,” as that term is defined in OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (2).
In construing the statute, I am mindful that the cardinal rule is to ascertain the legislative intent and purpose in enacting the statute, and then give that construction which will effectuate the legislative intent and purpose. City of Calhoun v. N. Ga. EMC, 233 Ga. 759 (1) (213 SE2d 596) (1975). The passage of OCGA § 21-5-30.1 and its subsequent amendment to include all elected constitutional officers in the executive branch (Ga. L. 1992, p. 1075; OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (a) (3)) evinces a legislative intent to do away with the possibility that a regulated entity might make campaign contributions in an effort to have influence with the elected official by whom it is regulated. The legislature also stated that the act in which the statute is found was passed *859in furtherance of the State’s responsibility “to protect the integrity of the democratic process and to ensure fair elections for constitutional offices....” OCGA § 21-5-2.
If there is a conflict between different sections of the same statute, the court has the duty to reconcile the conflicting parts so as to make them consistent and harmonious with one another, and to give a sensible and intelligent effect to each part. Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975); Williams v. Bear’s Den, 214 Ga. 240, 242 (104 SE2d 230) (1958). This task must be done without “reading out” any part of the statute as “mere surplusage,” unless there is a clear reason for doing so. Porter v. Food Giant, 198 Ga. App. 736 (1) (402 SE2d 766) (1991).
The statutory definition of “contribution” consists of two sentences: the first sentence covers
anything of value conveyed or transferred for the purpose of influencing the nomination ... or election of an individual to the office of Commissioner of Insurance or encouraging the holder of such office to seek reelection.
The second sentence defines “contribution” as including
the payment of a qualifying fee for and on behalf of a candidate for the office . . . and any other payment or purchase made for and on behalf of the holder of the office ... or on behalf of a candidate for that office when such payment or purchase is made for the purpose of influencing the nomination ... or election of the candidate and is made pursuant to the request or authority of the holder of such office, the candidate, the campaign committee of the candidate, or any other agent of the holder of such office or the candidate.
The first sentence prohibits the transfer or conveyance of anything of value to influence the election of a certain person as insurance commissioner, without limiting to whom or what the transfer or conveyance is prohibited. The second sentence forbids payments or purchases made on behalf of the commissioner or candidate to influence the election when that purchase or payment is made pursuant to the request or authority of the commissioner, candidate, campaign committee, or other agent. Thus, the first sentence covers a broad spectrum of conduct: a regulated entity may not transfer or convey anything of value to anyone in an effort to influence the election of a certain person as insurance commissioner. However, the second sentence immediately narrows the scope of the first sentence by prohibiting a regulated entity from making a payment or purchase to a third party on behalf of the candidate for something that will influence the *860election when the candidate or someone acting for the candidate requests or authorizes the payment or purchase. The necessary corollary to the inclusion of the second sentence is that a payment or purchase made by a regulated entity to a third party on behalf of a candidate but without the request or authorization of the candidate is permissible. This, however, conflicts with the broad coverage contained in the first sentence. Recalling the perceived legislative intent and in order to give effect to both sentences of the definition and to harmonize them with one another without concluding that one is mere surplusage, I must construe the first sentence as prohibiting anything of value conveyed or transferred to the commissioner, the candidate, or their campaign committees.
Decided March 15, 1993.
Jenkins & Eels, Frank E. Jenkins III, Steven J. Misner, for appellants.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Dennis R. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, C. Theodore Lee, for appellees.
The State Ethics Commission determined that Southern General’s placement of the ad constituted a prohibited contribution in that it was “for the benefit of the campaign of Commissioner Evans. . . .” However, the phrase “for the benefit of” nowhere appears in the statutory definition of “contribution.” Assuming that “for the benefit of” is synonymous with “on behalf of,” a phrase that is contained within the second sentence of the statutory definition, Southern General’s action would not constitute a violation because there is no evidence that Southern’s ad was placed pursuant to the request or authority of the commissioner, his campaign committee, or any other agent. Southern General’s act does not fall within the purview of my construction of the first sentence since the insurer did not transfer or convey anything of value to the commissioner or his campaign committee.
Since appellants’ act of placing a newspaper ad urging the reelection of the insurance commissioner did not violate OCGA § 21-5-30.1 (b), I believe the State Ethics Commission erred when it concluded that appellants’ act had violated OCGA § 21-5-30.1. Because appellants have never contested the finding that they were guilty of violating the statute, I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the judgment of the superior court.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.