Court Opinion

ID: 9378982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 14:00:24.756139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.565278
License: Public Domain

21-2600-cv
Weng v. Kung Fu Little Steamed Buns Ramen, Inc.

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                              SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE
EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
14th day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
Present:
                   WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                   SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                         Circuit Judges,
                   GARY S. KATZMANN,
                         Judge. 1

_____________________________________
LIANHUA WENG, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, HAIHUA ZHAI, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, SHIMIN YUAN, ON BEHALF OF
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, CHENGBIN QIAN, WEN ZHANG
                            Plaintiffs-Appellees,
GUANGLI ZHANG,
                            Plaintiff,
                   v.                                                             21-2600-cv
KUNG FU LITTLE STEAMED BUNS RAMEN,
INC., DBA KUNG FU LITLE STEAMED BUNS
RAMEN, KUNG FU DELICACY, INC., DBA
KUNG FU LITTLE STEAMED BUNS RAMEN,
KUNG FU KITCHEN, INC., DBA KUNG FU

        1
            Judge Gary S. Katzmann, of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

                                                           1
LITTLE STEAMED BUNS RAMEN, ZHE SONG,
AKA PETER SONG,
                           Defendants-Appellants,
JOHN LIU, AKA ANDY LIU, ZHIMIN CHEN,
                           Defendants.
_____________________________________

 For Plaintiffs-Appellees:                          AARON B. SCHWEITZER (John Troy, Tiffany Troy, on
                                                    the brief), Troy Law, PLLC, Flushing, NY

 For Defendants-Appellants:                         JOSHUA HOROWITZ, Horowitz Tech Law P.C.,
                                                    Garden City, NY

       Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Loretta A. Preska, Judge).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

       Defendants-Appellants Kung Fu Little Steamed Buns Ramen, Inc., Kung Fu Delicacy, Inc.,

Kung Fu Kitchen, Inc., and Zhe Song (together, “Defendants”) appeal from a judgment of the

district court (Loretta A. Preska, Judge), entered September 28, 2021, awarding damages to

Plaintiffs-Appellees Lianhua Weng, Haihua Zhai, Shimin Yuan, Chengbin Qian, and Wen Zhang

(together, “Plaintiffs”), following a jury trial. 2            Plaintiffs, who are former employees of

Defendants, brought various claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201

et seq., and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Defendants assert that the district court erred

by (1) submitting prejudicial verdict forms to the jury; (2) granting judgment as a matter of law in

Plaintiffs’ favor as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses under NYLL § 198(1-b) and (1-d); and (3)

       2
           As discussed below, Wen Zhang was substituted for deceased plaintiff Guangli Zhang after trial.

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granting Plaintiffs’ post-trial motion to substitute for a plaintiff who died before the start of trial.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.

       First, Defendants argue that the district court erred by using verdict forms with special

interrogatories that, they argue, “precluded a finding” in Defendants’ favor. Defs.’ Br. at 11-12.

Specifically, they fault the verdict forms for asking the jury to make findings such as the number

of hours worked by Plaintiffs, without first being required to expressly note whether Plaintiffs’

testimony was credible and provided a reasonable approximation of the hours worked. By not

requiring the jury to make such a written predicate finding, Defendants argue, the verdict forms

misled the jury into thinking that it had to enter some number of hours worked, even if the jury did

not believe that Plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof with respect to that number. We

disagree and instead conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in using the verdict

forms in question. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Decisions as

to the format and language to be used in a special verdict form are committed to the trial court’s

discretion.”); see Emamian v. Rockefeller Univ., 971 F.3d 380, 390 (2d Cir. 2020) (reviewing

special verdict questions for abuse of discretion); Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a). The jury instructions here

correctly explained the burden of proof as to each essential element, and Defendants do not

challenge them on appeal. Reading the verdict forms together with those instructions, we discern

no danger that the jury would have been left with the misimpression that it could have made its

findings without reference to the correct burden of proof. Accordingly, the verdict forms properly

framed the issues and were not misleading. See Emamian, 971 F.3d at 390; Lore, 670 F.3d at 160.

       Second, Defendants argue that the district court erred by granting judgment as a matter of

law in favor of Plaintiffs as to Defendants’ affirmative defenses under the NYLL. Specifically,

the NYLL provides that “it shall be an affirmative defense” to claims of non-furnishing of wage

                                                   3
notices and wage statements that “the employer made complete and timely payment of all wages

due” to the employee. NYLL § 198(1-b)-(1-d). We review the grant of a Rule 50(a) motion for

judgment as a matter of law de novo, “consider[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the

party against whom the motion was made” and “giv[ing] that party the benefit of all reasonable

inferences that the jury might have drawn in [its] favor from the evidence.” Jones v. Treubig, 963

F.3d 214, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).

Upon our review of the record, we find no error. Defendants contend that the district court failed

to draw inferences in their favor when it rejected their argument that testimony indicating that

Defendants paid Plaintiffs “a few dollars” in tips could suffice to establish complete and timely

payment of all wages owed to Plaintiffs. App’x at 335-36. But such an inference would not have

been reasonable. Defendants also direct us to a portion of Defendant Song’s testimony that, they

argue, the district court overlooked: when Plaintiff Weng “worked more,” Song paid him more,

and Weng “would also ask for more.” App’x at 297. But again, such vague testimony cannot be

read as establishing that Defendants “made complete and timely payment of all wages due.”

NYLL § 198(1-b)-(1-d). We therefore agree with the district court that “a reasonable jury would

not have had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for” Defendants on their NYLL

affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).

       Third, Defendants argue that the district court erred by granting Plaintiffs’ post-trial motion

to substitute for a plaintiff who died about two years before the start of trial. Under Rule 25(a)(1),

“[i]f a party dies and his claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper

party,” and “[i]f the motion is not made within 90 days after service of a statement noting the

death, the action by or against the decedent must be dismissed.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1). Under

Rule 6, the court may, for good cause, extend such a time period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). We

                                                  4
review Rule 25 substitution for abuse of discretion. See Organic Cow, LLC v. Ctr. for New Eng.

Dairy Compact Research, 335 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2003); Saylor v. Bastedo, 623 F.2d 230, 237

(2d Cir. 1980). Here, Plaintiffs filed a suggestion of death shortly before trial, indicating that

Plaintiff Guangli Zhang had died about two years earlier. They then filed a timely motion for an

extension of the 90-day deadline set by Rule 25(a)(1) to file a motion to substitute Zhang’s estate,

for which no administrator had yet been appointed. After the conclusion of trial, the district court

allowed Plaintiffs to file their motion to substitute upon the issuance of letters of administration

for Zhang’s estate by the Queens County Surrogate’s Court, and the district court then granted that

motion. Because Plaintiffs’ motion to substitute was filed within the period allowed by Rules 6

and 25 after the filing of the suggestion of death, it was technically timely. Defendants complain

about the two-year gap between Zhang’s death and Plaintiffs’ filing of a suggestion of death. It is

indeed perplexing that Plaintiffs’ counsel remained unaware of a client’s death for such a long

period of time. 3 But Defendants have identified no evidence in the record to support their

arguments that Plaintiffs’ counsel had in fact become aware of Zhang’s death earlier than asserted,

or otherwise acted in bad faith, or that Defendants were prejudiced by the delay in the filing of the

suggestion of death. See Bastedo, 623 F.2d at 236-37. Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiffs’ post-trial motion to substitute.

                                               *        *        *

        3
          It is also surprising that counsel was able to act on Zhang’s behalf in this action without communicating
with Zhang for at least two years. New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct require counsel to “keep the client
reasonably informed about the status” of a case and to “promptly inform” a client of, among other things, any
settlement offers. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 22, § 1200.1.4(a)(1)(iii), (3).

                                                        5
       We have considered the remainder of Defendants’ arguments and find them to be

unpersuasive. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                                         FOR THE COURT:

                                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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