Court Opinion

ID: 9686060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:22:25.334358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:13.871107
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
FOURNET, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal by the State of Louisiana from the ruling of the judge of Division “A” of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court dated December 16, 1955, dismissing the prosecution of the accused for illegal possession of narcotics under Bill of Information No. 23,051 on his motion to quash, which is based on the ground that the judgment of Division “B” rendered on March 4, 1955, upholding the defendant’s plea of prescription, was a bar to any further prosecution for this same offense.
The record shows the defendant was arrested on October 8, 1953, for possession of marijuana and was formally charged on April 2, 1954, by Bill of Information No, 22,407, with having violated “Title 40, Section 962 et seq., Revised Statutes of Louisiana, in that he unlawfully had in his possession certain quantities of narcotic drugs * * * ” on October 8, 1953. After the district attorney had been permitted to amend this bill by inserting the underscored word “unlawfully,” the bill was, on February 23, 1955 (the date set for trial), nolle prossed at the district attorney’s request.1
On the same day — February 23, 1955— the district attorney filed Bill of Information No. 23,777, charging the defendant with the same offense. On March 4, 1955, the accused, availing himself of the provisions of Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,2 filed a plea of prescription in *561bar of his prosecution on the information. This plea was based on the fact the information had been returned on February 23, 1955, more than one year after the offense was alleged to have been committed, i. e., on October 8, 1953. Following argument on this plea, the state requested permission to amend the information so as to negative prescription. This permission was denied by the trial judge, who thereupon sustained the plea of prescription. The state neither reserved bills to the rulings refusing permission to amend and sustaining the plea of prescription; nor did the state appeal.
On April 7, 1955, a third information, bearing No. 24,051, was filed. Therein the accused was charged for the third time with the identical offense contained in the two previous bills. However, in this new bill prescription was negatived by alleging that it had been interrupted upon the filing of Bill of Information No. 22,407 on April 2, 1954. This third bill was quashed and the defendant ordered discharged on his motion which pleaded the judgment of March 4, 1955, as a bar to further prosecution for this same offense, the trial judge observing: "The plea of prescription having previotisly been sustained by Judge Herget, in the opinion of the court, the district attorney had no legal right to file another information charging the same offense * * This is the ruling from which the state now prosecutes this appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)
As pointed out in American Jurisprudence, generally “In the absence of statutes of limitation specially applicable to criminal cases, a prosecution may be instituted at any time, however long after the commission of the criminal act. In most jurisdictions, however, statutes have been enacted to limit *563the time for the commencement of criminal proceedings.” Vol. 15, p. 31, Section 342. Such statutes are regarded as “acts of grace, and as a surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty. * * * jn contradistinction to statutes of limitations applicable to civil actions which * * * are ordinarily statutes of repose going to the remedy only, criminal statutes are usually regarded as creating a bar to the right of prosecution; however, according to some authorities statutes of limita-' tion applicable to criminal proceedings are held to be statutes of repose.” 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 223, p. 350.
Louisiana has had such a provision in its law since the adoption of Section 10 of Act 121 of 1855. As subsequently amended (Section 986 of the Revised Statutes of 1870, Acts 50 of 1894, 73 of 1898, 67 of 1926, and 2 of 1928, the latter being the Code of Criminal Procedure), this provision is now incorporated in our law as R.S. 15 :8,3 and discloses by its very language it was intended to be a complete bar to the right of the state to bring any subsequent prosecution, for it declares in clear and unmistakable language that "no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense * * * unless the indictment, information, or affidavit for the sanne be found or filed within one year after the offense shall have been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand jury having jurisdiction * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The defendant having tendered the plea of prescription of one year in limine during his prosecution under Bill of Information No. 23,777, he had a right to have this plea disposed of prior to trial. State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327; State v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332. The judgment sustaining such .a plea is a complete bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Anderson, 51 La.Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990; State v. Crawford, 83 W.Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615; State v. Soucie, 234 Ind. 98, 123 N.E.2d 888; State v. Porter, Mont., 300 P.2d 952; 15 Am.Jur. 45, Section 367; note to In re Begerow, 56 L.R.A. 513; annotation at 3 A.L.R. 519; United States v. De Angelo, 3 Cir., 138 F.2d 466; Wilson v. U. S., 8 Cir., 166 F.2d 527; Cosgrove v. U. S., 9 Cir., 224 F.2d 146; and United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161. So much is this so that a valid prescriptive plea has the effect of not only protecting the accused against conviction and punishment, but also of relieving him of ever being tried for the same offense. State v. Sullivan, 159 La. 589, 105 S. 631; State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327; State *565v. Gendusa, 193 La. 59, 190 So. 332; and State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819. The same obtains regardless whether the plea of prescription is tendered in limine (State v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869; State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Hayes, supra; State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433; and State v. Gendusa, supra), to the jury (State v. Anderson, 51 La.Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990; State v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869; State v. Hayes, supra; State v. Beale, 163 La. 1093, 113 So. 546; and State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433), or after conviction. State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41; State v. Block, 179 La. 426, 154 So. 46; State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725; State v. Guillot, 200 La. 935, 9 So.2d 235. The plea may be an effective bar even after trial and conviction and appeal, while the case is pending in the superior court. State v. Forrest, 23 La. Ann. 433; State v. Pierre, 49 La.Ann. 1159, 22 So. 373; State v. Davis, 44 La.Ann. 972, 973, 11 So. 580; and State v. Foley, 113 La. 206, 36 So. 940.
 As was very aptly stated in United States v. Oppenheimer, supra [242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 69], which is the leading case on the subject and was handed down in 1916 by the United States Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Holmes as the organ of the court, “Of course, the quashing of a bad indictment is no bar to a prosecution upon a good one, but a judgment for the defendant upon the ground that the prosecution is barred goes to his liability as a matter of substantive law, and.one judgment that he is free as matter of substantive law is as good as another. A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits (United States v. Barber, 219 U.S. 72, 78, 31 S.Ct. 209, 55 L.Ed. 99, 101, and however the issue was raised in the former case, after judgment upon it, it could not be reopened in a later prosecution.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The argument advanced by the state is somewhat vague on this phase of the case. It would appear counsel labor under the impression there was-no trial of the plea of prescription because, as stated in brief, “no testimony had been taken;” consequently, that the state was not required to perfect a bill of exceptions to the ruling of the trial judge, or to appeal therefrom. In fact, as the brief further reflects, “the state’s position was that the error complained of was patent on the face of the record.” Under these circumstances, it is argued, the plea interposed by the accused in the instant case ■cannot be a plea of former jeopardy or autrefois acquit since the defendant has never been brought to trial; that the plea is, at best, one of res judicata, a doctrine that does not apply to criminal prosecutions. (For a discussion of the distinction between the plea of autrefois acquit and one of res judicata, see United States v. Carlisi, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 479.)
This argument is .without merit. Of course, had the state, after it was alerted to *567the defect in the second information by the filing of the plea of prescription on behalf of the accused, moved to nolle prosequi this information also, there might be substance to the argument. See, State v. Murray, 222 La. 950, 64 So.2d 230. But the record clearly shows that the plea of prescription was submitted in limine by counsel for the accused, that the trial judge had a hearing thereon, that this point was argued at the hearing, and that the trial judge sustained the plea, thereby terminating the prosecution. All of this was had contradictorily with the district attorney. The fact that the trial judge erroneously overruled the state’s motion to amend the information so as to negative prescription is immaterial. It was then the duty of the state to reserve a bill to this ruling, to introduce and attach to this bill evidence to support its contention that the offense charged was not prescribed, and, since the judgment had the effect of terminating the prosecution, to appeal within 10 days. State v. Shushan, 204 La. 672, 16 So.2d 227; State v. Lecompte, 214 La. 117, 36 So.2d 695, and the authorities therein cited. See State v. Stanton, 209 La. 457, 24 So.2d 819 and State v. Murray, 222 La. 950, 64 So.2d 230, where this procedure was followed.
A rule universally obtaining is that the doctrine of res judicata — by which a fact or matter distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot thereafter be disputed between the same parties — is applicable to judgments in criminal prosecutions. See the annotations at 3 A.L.R. 519 and 147 A.L.R. 992. See, also, 15 Am.Jur. 45, Section 367, and particularly the additions thereto in the pocket supplement; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 223-237, p. 349; and the note at 56 L.R.A. 513. As stated by Mr. Justice Hawkins, an English jurist of great experience in the criminal law, in Reg. v. Miles, L.R. 24 Q.B.Div. 423, “Where a criminal charge has been adjudicated upon by a court having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, the adjudication, whether it takes the form of an acquittal or conviction, is final as to the matter so adjudicated upon, and may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. * * * In this respect the criminal law is in unison with that which prevails in civil proceedings.” Mr. Justice Holmes, quoting this statement with approval in the Oppenheimer case, supra [242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 69], adds: “The finality of a previous adjudication as to the matters determined by it is the ground of decision in Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25, the criminal and civil law agreeing.” (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a “so-called” minority view that is, as pointed out by the annotator at 147 A.L.R. 994, based on “some dicta, but very little real authority, denying the applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to judgments in criminal cases.” Among the authorities supporting such a minority view is *569listed the case of Town of St. Martinville v. Dugas, 158 La. 262, 103 So. 761, 763, which is the source of the statement that in Louisiana “the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to criminal prosecutions.” A study and analysis of this decision, however, discloses the statement was made without further discussion or elaboration and without citation of authority. Additionally, it clearly has no application in the instant case since the accused in the St. Martinville case was being prosecuted for a second and distinct offense, not for the same offense.4 (
It is obvious, therefore, that whether you label defendant’s motion a plea in bar, a plea of res judicata, or an estoppel (see United States v. Carlisi, D.C., 32 F.Supp. 481; United States v. Halbrook, D.C., 36 F.Supp. 345; United States v. Morse, D.C., 24 F.2d 1001; United States v. Simon, 3 Cir., 225 F.2d 260), as was so aptly stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Oppenheimer case, “one judgment that he is free as a matter of substantive law is as good as another. A plea of the statute of limitations is a plea to the merits * * *, and however the issue was raised in the former case, after judgment upon it, it could not be reopened in a later prosecution. * * * The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to give the impression that when it did not ap-. ply in terms, there was no other principle that could. But the 5th Amendment was not intended to do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice (Jeter v. Hewitt, 22 How. 352, 364, 16 L.Ed. 345, 348) in order, when a man once has been acquitted on the merits, to enable the government to prosecute him a second time.” [242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 69.]
For the reasons assigned, the judgment is affirmed.

. The minutes of the court do not reflect the reason for the nolle prosequi, but the district attorney, in a third bill, alleged this was because the original had been lost or misplaced. During oral argument he stated the original was later found.

. Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended and incorporated in K.S. 15:8, reads as follows :
“No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for any offense, murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, and treason excepted, unless the indictment, information, or affidavit for the same be found or fi'ed within one year after the offense shall have been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand jury having jurisdiction; hut this prescription shall not apply to prosecution and conviction for a lesser offense under an indictment or information for murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or treason. Nor shall any person be prosecuted for any fine or forfeiture unless the prosecution for the same shall be insti*561tuted within six months of the time of incurring such fine or forfeiture.
“Provided, that in all criminal prosecutions an indictment found, or an information filed, or an affidavit filed where prosecution may be by affidavit, before the above prescription has accrued, shall have the effect of interrupting such prescription; and if any such indictment, information or affidavit be quashed, annulled or set aside, or a nolle prosequi be entered, prescription of one year and six months, respectively, as above provided, shall begin to run against another indictment, information or affidavit based on the same facts, only from the time that said original indictment, information or affidavit was quashed, set aside, annulled or nolle prosequied.
“In felony cases when three years elapse from the date of finding an indictment, or filing an information, and in all other cases when two years elapse from the date of finding an indictment, or filing an information or affidavit, it shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi if the accused has not been tried, and if the district attorney fail or neglect to do so, the court may on motion of the defendant or his attorney cause such nolle prosequi to be entered the same as if entered by the district attorney.
“Nothing in this article shall apply or extend to an accused person who has absconded, or who is a fugitive from justice or who has escaped trial through dilatory pleas, or continuances obtained by him or in his behalf.”

. This section is quoted in full in the first note, supra.

. The annotator at 147 A.L.R. 994 recognizes the statement to be purely obiter, for it is pointed out that “the actual holding seems to have been merely that this doctrine would not conclude the question of . the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance, in a subsequent prosecution.”