Court Opinion

ID: 9743756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:42:14.059811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:43.257362
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Shortly after 10:00 P.M. on May 27, Detectives Dorsey and Reagan approached and stopped the accused on the sidewalk and asked him to come to headquarters and to talk with Chief Pettiford. The accused was reluctant at *79first to go, but agreed upon being coaxed by a companion. He was then placed in a marked squad car and taken to police headquarters where he was lead to the detectives’ room. This room was described in the testimony as alway being locked. The accused was never left alone after his arrival. A warrant to search the accused’s home for the murder weapon had been issued earlier that day at about 1:00 p.m. Simultaneous with his detention in the detectives’ room, his home was being searched upon authority of the warrant issued earlier that day. The accused sat down at a desk with Detective Dorsey, and supplied him with his name, address, age, height, and weight, which the detective used to fill out an arrest report. The accused asked Dorsey what was going on. Dorsey told him that he would have to wait until Chief Pettiford came in to find out. Chief Quentin Pettiford described what occurred upon his entering the detectives’ room that evening to talk to the accused:
[Question by Prosecutor] “Excuse me, Quentin then go ahead if you would please.
I asked him where his 38 was at, he said he didn’t have it. He said, I know what you’re trying to do, you’re trying to get me for my fingerprints in the cab. He said I had his fingerprints in the cab and I said, what cab, Greg? He said the one the dude was murdered in. I told Sgt. Dorsey to get a waiver of rights form, I said Greg, you don’t have to say anymore to me; I said till your advised of your rights. I said, you have a chance for legal counsel and Sgt. Dorsey brought the waiver over and read it to him. He asked Greg to sign it. Greg said he wasn’t going to sign anything at this time. I said, well do you want to talk to us, Greg? He said, yes I’ll talk to you but I’m not going to sign my name to anything.”
The first advice of rights and refusal to sign occurred at 11:10 p.m. The testimony further establishes that the accused continued to converse with Chief Pettiford giving a somewhat confused and conflicting description of the events of the day of the killing and at about 11:52 p.m. gave Pettiford a short one page long-hand statement. Upon receiving this state*80ment, Pettiford called in a Captain Gross who was instructed to again read the advice of rights required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, and attempt to get a waiver. The accused again confirmed that he understood the rights but refused to sign a waiver. Both the oral conversations with Chief Pettiford and the written statement were admitted in evidence over constitutional objection of defense counsel.
While I agree that a valid waiver may be made in other than written form, I believe the trial court erred in admitting the oral and written statements made by the accused to Chief Pettiford in this case, because under the facts of this case, the State failed in its burden to show an implied waiver of rights by the accused. In Brown v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 558, 270 N. E. 2d 751, we held inadmissible a statement given after the accused refused to sign a proffered written waiver. Here, the refusal to sign is also followed by the giving of damaging statements by the accused. In the Brown case, the refusal to sign was preceded by a specific invocation by the suspect of the right to remain silent and to have counsel. Standing in its stead in this case, and having in my opinion the same legal effect when considered in conjunction with the later refusal to sign a waiver, is the questioning by Chief Pettiford with its damaging response by the accused, which interrogation is admitted by the State to have occurred prior to any attempt to advise the accused in accordance with the requirements of the Miranda case. The first question by Chief Pettiford was: Where is your .38? The second question was: What cab, Greg? This was clearly custodial interrogation prior to an advice of rights. Once the incriminating responses of the accused were made .to it, they became compelling influences to continue talking and to make further explanations. At the time the accused refused to sign the offered waiver of. right, his decision was burdened by the fact that he had already made incriminating comments. And he was not told that his answers to those questions could not *81be used against him. The subsequent statements made by this accused under these circumstances cannot be considered an express, knowing and voluntary waiver of rights.
I vote to reverse this judgment and order a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 300 N. E. 2d 94.