Court Opinion

ID: 9931515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 14:00:48.322158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:38.478601
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2248    Document: 37     Page: 1   Filed: 02/09/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

   UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF
                 TRUSTEES,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-2248
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:15-cv-01549-PEC, Judge Patricia E. Campbell-
 Smith.
                 ______________________

                Decided: February 9, 2024
                 ______________________

    STEVEN B. KELBER, The Kelber Law Group, Bethesda,
 MD, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
 JERRY STOUCK, North Bethesda, MD.

     WALTER W. BROWN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also repre-
 sented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, GARY LEE HAUSKEN,
 KAVYASRI NAGUMOTU, CARRIE ROSATO.
                   ______________________
Case: 22-2248    Document: 37      Page: 2    Filed: 02/09/2024

 2     UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

     Before REYNA, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 TARANTO, Circuit Judge.
     University of South Florida Board of Trustees (USF)
 owns now-expired United States Patent No. 5,898,094,
 which was issued in 1999 and is titled “Transgenic Mice
 Expressing APPK670N,M671L and a Mutant Presenilin
 Transgenes.” In 2015, USF sued the United States in the
 Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1498(a), alleging that the United States was liable for in-
 fringement of the ʼ094 patent because, as is undisputed be-
 fore us, The Jackson Laboratory, with the government’s
 authorization and consent, had been producing and using
 mice covered by the patent for the government. As a de-
 fense, the government argued that the United States had a
 license to practice the patent, and have the patent prac-
 ticed on its behalf, under 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4), a provision
 of the Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat.
 3019–28 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
 12), which addresses patent rights in work funded by the
 federal government. After summary-judgment proceed-
 ings and a trial, the Claims Court agreed with the govern-
 ment and entered final judgment of noninfringement.
 University of South Florida, Board of Trustees v. United
 States, 162 Fed. Cl. 59 (2022) (Claims Court Decision).
     USF timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). There is no dispute that the judgment
 must be affirmed if § 202(c)(4) applies. We conclude that
 the provision does apply. We therefore affirm.
                               I
                              A
     The ʼ094 patent describes and claims doubly trans-
 genic mice with accelerated pathology for Alzheimer’s Dis-
 ease, produced by the mice’s expression of both a mutant
 Swedish amyloid precursor protein transgene and a
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US         3

 mutant presenilin transgene. See ʼ094 patent, Abstract
 and col. 14, line 26 through col. 16, line 59. Claim 1 states:
     1. A transgenic mouse with enhanced Alzheimer’s
     Disease related amyloid accumulation in its brain
     produced by:
         producing an F1 generation mouse by cross-
         ing a first transgenic mouse whose genome
         comprises at least one transgene compris-
         ing a DNA sequence encoding mutant pre-
         senilin M146L operably linked to a
         promoter with a second transgenic mouse
         whose genome comprises at least one
         transgene comprising a DNA sequence en-
         coding APP K670N,M671L operably linked
         to a promoter, wherein the first transgenic
         mouse expresses the DNA sequence encod-
         ing the mutant presenilin and wherein the
         second transgenic mouse expresses the
         DNA sequence encoding the APP; and
         selecting from the offspring of the cross,
         those transgenic mice whose genome com-
         prises at least one DNA sequence encoding
         mutant presenilin M146L operably linked
         to a promoter and at least one transgene
         comprising a DNA sequence encoding APP
         K670N,M671L operably linked to a pro-
         moter, and identifying an F1 mouse which
         express both transgenes such that the F1
         mouse develops accelerated deposition of
         Aβ in its brain as compared to non-trans-
         genic mice or either parental mouse.
 Id., col. 14, lines 26–49 (emphasis added).
     The application that issued as the ʼ094 patent was filed
 on July 30, 1997, but it claims priority to a provisional ap-
 plication filed on October 21, 1996. Drs. Karen Duff and
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 4     UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 John Hardy are the inventors named on the ʼ094 patent.
 In October 1996, just before the filing of the October 21,
 1996 provisional application, the two inventors assigned to
 USF the patent rights for inventions described in that pro-
 visional application.
                              B
     The invention of the ʼ094 patent involves doubly trans-
 genic mice having a particular property of developing an
 identified symptom of Alzheimer’s Disease on an “acceler-
 ated” basis. The invention was conceived by Drs. Duff and
 Hardy while both were professors employed by USF. J.A.
 3762. At USF, Drs. Duff and Hardy worked with Dr. David
 Morgan and Dr. Marcia Gordon, both of whom were also
 professors at USF. The role of the latter two scientists, as
 relevant here, was to conduct (with assistance within their
 laboratory) the tissue analysis needed to determine, for
 mice resulting from two gene modifications, when in their
 aging process the mice developed the claimed symptom.
     The first litter of mice expressing both of the two
 transgenes at issue—a mutant Swedish amyloid precursor
 protein transgene and a mutant presenilin transgene—was
 born at USF on August 21, 1996. J.A. 631–32, 3890–91.
 But time was needed to determine if those mice would ac-
 tually develop Alzheimer’s Disease pathology at an accel-
 erated rate.
     During that period of mouse aging, Dr. Hardy changed
 his employer from USF to Mayo, and Dr. Duff did the same,
 in December 1996, shortly after Dr. Hardy. The doubly
 transgenic mice remained at USF after Drs. Duff and
 Hardy moved to Mayo. While at Mayo, Dr. Duff continued
 to oversee the doubly transgenic mouse project. J.A. 152–
 54. The day-to-day work of caring for the mice, however,
 became the responsibility of Dr. Gordon in Dr. Morgan’s la-
 boratory. J.A. 529. Additionally, Dr. Gordon, at her USF
 lab, performed immunohistochemistry, or tissue-examina-
 tion, work on the brains of sacrificed doubly transgenic
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US          5

 mice to identify whether and when the mice developed Alz-
 heimer’s Disease pathology. J.A. 152–54, 148–50.
      An actual reduction to practice of the invention claimed
 the ’094 patent required construction of an embodiment
 and recognition that the embodiment worked for its in-
 tended purpose. See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321,
 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Estee Lauder Inc. v. L’Oreal, S.A.,
 129 F.3d 588, 594–95 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hahn v. Wong, 892
 F.2d 1028, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d
 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d
 1368, 1375 (CCPA 1982). Here, the first document record-
 ing the actual reduction to practice of the doubly transgenic
 mice—the fact and recognition of the sooner-than-other-
 wise development of the specified Alzheimer’s Disease pa-
 thology in those mice—is a facsimile sent on April 25, 1997,
 by Dr. Duff, then at Mayo, to William Coppola, at USF’s
 office for technology transfer. J.A. 1271–74, 142–45, 148.
 The parties accept, for present purposes, that the first ac-
 tual reduction to practice occurred shortly before that
 promptly sent communication. Claims Court Decision, 162
 Fed. Cl. at 64 (“The parties agree, and the evidence demon-
 strates, that the invention described in the ’094 patent was
 first reduced to practice in April 1997.”). We therefore refer
 to the first actual reduction to practice as occurring in April
 1997.
      Dr. Duff marked the facsimile “urgent” because “[t]his
 was the first time we [the researchers] had seen . . . this
 pathology developing so rapidly in these mice.” J.A. 148.
 To show the pathology developing, the facsimile included
 two figures demonstrating that the doubly transgenic mice
 had amyloid plaques, which play a role in Alzheimer’s Dis-
 ease, at an age lower than the age at which previously iden-
 tified mice had such plaques. J.A. 1272–74, 143–44. Dr.
 Duff noted on the figures in the facsimile: “N.B. [nota bene]
 work performed by D[avid] Morgan at USF, in collabora-
 tion.” J.A. 1273, 4233–34. The tissue analysis (immuno-
 histochemistry testing) that identified the premature
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 6     UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 development of amyloid plaques was performed within the
 Morgan-Gordon laboratory at USF. J.A. 151–54, 1273,
 4233–34; see USF’s Opening Br. at 6–7, 21.
     In July 1997, Dr. Duff, along with Dr. Hardy, Dr. Mor-
 gan, Dr. Gordon, and others, submitted a paper to Nature
 Medicine, describing the doubly transgenic mice and their
 accelerated development of the Alzheimer’s Disease-re-
 lated property. The paper was accepted in November 1997
 and published in January 1998. Leigh Holcomb et al., Ac-
 celerated Alzheimer-type phenotype in transgenic mice car-
 rying both mutant amyloid precursor protein and
 presenilin 1 transgenes, 4 Nature Medicine 97 (1998) (Na-
 ture Medicine Article). The article notes that “[t]his work
 was supported by the Mayo/USF Program Project on the
 presenilins,” Nature Medicine Article, at 100, citing,
 though with a typographical error, the government grant
 described next.
                              C
     In September 1995, Dr. Hardy, while still employed by
 USF, submitted a grant application to the National Insti-
 tute of Aging, one of the institutes within the National In-
 stitutes of Health (NIH). The application, titled “The Role
 of the Presenilins in Alzheimer’s Disease,” proposed “five[]
 mutually interlinking projects aimed at elucidating the
 role of the presenilins in Alzheimer’s [D]isease.” J.A. 1793,
 1795; see J.A. 1793–2044. Key personnel on the project, as
 stated in the grant application, included Dr. Hardy, Dr.
 Duff, Dr. Morgan, and Dr. Gordon, then all employed by
 USF. J.A. 1795, 2001–04 (addressing tissue-analysis work
 involving presenilins). The proposed period of government
 support ran from July 1, 1996, to June 30, 2001. J.A. 1793.
     The scientists’ already-begun research continued dur-
 ing the year that consideration of the grant application was
 underway. Just as the 1996 fiscal year was ending, NIH
 awarded the applied-for grant, which had a project start
 date of September 30, 1996. J.A. 3237; see also J.A. 2089,
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US      7

 3235–44. The findings and record before us make clear
 that the grant-covered project included the specific doubly
 transgenic mice that were the subject of what became the
 ’094 patent (for which the provisional patent application
 was in preparation, J.A. 1162–63). See J.A. 2631–36,
 2645–50 (Stephen Snyder, the relevant NIH administrator,
 testifying that the creation and study of the doubly trans-
 genic mice expressing both a mutant Swedish amyloid pre-
 cursor protein transgene and a mutant presenilin
 transgene were within the program project grant); see also
 J.A. 4080. Just before the award was made, the grantee
 designated in the application was changed from USF to
 Mayo, to which Dr. Hardy was in process of switching his
 employment. J.A. 3237; see also J.A. 2089. The grant
 therefore was made to Mayo, and funds from the NIH grant
 were available to Mayo as of October 1, 1996. J.A. 2603–
 04.
     Because Mayo was the grantee, but some grant-covered
 work was to take place at USF, government policies imple-
 menting the Bayh-Dole Act required that Mayo and USF
 would in due course enter into a subcontract with each
 other in order for grant money received by Mayo to be paid
 to USF for the grant-covered work of individuals remaining
 there, such as Drs. Morgan and Gordon. See J.A. 2607–11
 (NIH official Stephen Snyder); J.A. 567 (Dr. Morgan); see
 also U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Re-
 vised NIH Grant Policies and Procedures, 14 NIH Guide for
 Grants and Contracts, No. 7, June 21, 1985, at 23 (attached
 document 4820—Establishing and Operating Consortium
 Grants, at 2–3) (NIH Grant Policies).
     In November 1997, more than a year after the NIH
 grant was awarded, Mayo and USF executed a written sub-
 contract (“Consortium Agreement”), J.A. 1265–70, which
 states that the agreement was executed to comply with the
 just cited NIH Guidelines, J.A. 1265. The November 1997
 agreement states that the start of its “effective period”—
 when its obligations took effect—was September 1, 1997.
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 8     UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 J.A. 1266. And it expressly provides for treatment of pa-
 tents and inventions in accordance with the Bayh-Dole Act
 (and implementing regulations, 45 C.F.R. chs. VI, VIII
 (1997)), thus supplying USF’s agreement to the Act’s gov-
 ernment-license provision. J.A. 1268.
                              II
     In the present action by USF, the Claims Court
 granted judgment for the government on the ground that it
 had a license, under the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C.
 § 202(c)(4), to have The Jackson Laboratory practice the
 patent by creating and using patent-covered mice (with the
 two transgenes and accelerated plaque development re-
 quired by the ’094 patent). As relevant here, it is not dis-
 puted that The Jackson Laboratory was so practicing the
 patent and that it was doing so for the government and
 with the government’s authorization and consent. The dis-
 pute that is before us is whether the invention was a “sub-
 ject invention” within § 202(c)(4), which gives the
 government a license (to practice or have practiced for it)
 certain federally funded inventions.
                              A
     Before 1980, federal agencies followed a variety of pol-
 icies, implemented in provisions of grants or contracts for
 the furnishing of government funding for research, to ad-
 dress the disposition of patent rights in inventions result-
 ing from the government-funded research. See, e.g., H.R.
 Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3, 5 (1980); S. Rep. No. 96-480,
 at 2–3 (1979); Technical Development Corp. v. United
 States, 597 F.2d 733, 745–46 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Mine Safety
 Appliances Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 385, 387–93 (Ct.
 Cl. 1966). Some of the government patent policies required
 government-fund recipients to allow the government to
 own these patent rights. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 96-480, at 2
 (1979). In the Bayh-Dole Act, with a particular focus on
 government-funded research by universities and small
 businesses, Congress sought to reduce the disuniformity of
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        9

 government policies and also to strengthen the patent
 rights of government-fund recipients, under conditions
 that protected government interests, in order to incentivize
 commercial development of patentable inventions into use-
 ful products. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3; S. REP.
 NO. 96-480, at 2–3, 15–30. The Act itself declares its “pol-
 icy and objective.” 35 U.S.C. § 200. The Supreme Court
 noted key purposes: “In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-
 Dole Act to ‘promote the utilization of inventions arising
 from federally supported research,’ ‘promote collaboration
 between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations,’
 and ‘ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights
 in federally supported inventions.’” Board of Trustees of
 the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular
 Systems, Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 782 (2011) (quoting 35 U.S.C.
 § 200) (Stanford v. Roche).
     “To achieve these aims, the Act allocates rights in fed-
 erally funded ‘subject invention[s]’ between the Federal
 Government and federal contractors.” Id. (alteration by
 Stanford v. Roche Court) (quoting § 201(e)). The Act “pro-
 vides that contractors may ‘elect to retain title to any sub-
 ject invention.’” Id. (quoting § 202(a)). A “contractor” is
 “any person, small business firm, or nonprofit organization
 that is a party to a funding agreement.” § 201(c). A “fund-
 ing agreement” is
     any contract, grant, or cooperative agreement en-
     tered into between any Federal agency, other than
     the Tennessee Valley Authority, and any contrac-
     tor for the performance of experimental, develop-
     mental, or research work funded in whole or in part
     by the Federal Government. Such term includes
     any assignment, substitution of parties, or subcon-
     tract of any type entered into for the performance
     of experimental, developmental, or research work
     under a funding agreement as herein defined.
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 10       UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 § 201(b). And an “invention” includes “any invention or
 discovery which is or may be patentable or otherwise pro-
 tectable under this title,” and a “subject invention” is “any
 invention of the contractor conceived or first actually re-
 duced to practice in the performance of work under a fund-
 ing agreement.” § 201(d), (e). 1
     In light of all of those definitions set out, the key provi-
 sion of the Bayh-Dole Act for this case states:
      (c) Each funding agreement with a small business
      firm or nonprofit organization shall contain appro-
      priate provisions to effectuate the following: . . .
      (4) With respect to any invention in which the con-
      tractor elects rights, the Federal agency shall have
      a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable,
      paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or
      on behalf of the United States any subject inven-
      tion throughout the world[.]
 § 202(c)(4).
                                B
      In this case, on the § 202(c)(4) issue in dispute before
 us, the Claims Court, before trial, denied USF’s motion for
 summary judgment that § 202(c)(4) was inapplicable. Uni-
 versity of South Florida, Board of Trustees v. United States,
 146 Fed. Cl. 274, 285–89 (2019) (Summary Judgment Rul-
 ing). The Claims Court subsequently denied USF’s motion
 in limine to exclude testimony of Drs. Gordon and Morgan
 on that issue. University of South Florida, Board of Trus-
 tees v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 145, 147–48 (2021). The
 Claims Court then held a trial, which addressed several

      1   The definitions of “invention” and “subject inven-
 tion” also address plant varieties that may be protected by
 the Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2321 et seq.
 That language is not applicable here.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        11

 issues, including the license issue. After trial, the Claims
 Court determined that § 202(c)(4) applied, giving the gov-
 ernment a license, and on that basis the court entered judg-
 ment for the government. Claims Court Decision, 162 Fed.
 Cl. at 60.
     The Claims Court made findings of fact confirming the
 events and actions described supra. See id. at 60–63. The
 Claims Court also described certain documents indicating
 that USF set up internal accounts associated with the NIH
 grant project and expected money from that grant partially
 to fund at least Dr. Gordon’s salary. Id. at 62–63; see, e.g.,
 J.A. 2050–58, 2086, 3860. Relatedly, the Claims Court re-
 cited testimony from Dr. Morgan and Dr. Gordon about
 when USF actually received grant money, which included
 testimony about the difficulty of recalling precisely what
 occurred two decades earlier and testimony about the sys-
 tem of USF “‘underwriting’” salary and other expenses and
 getting reimbursed for the “‘advance’” once grant money
 covering the earlier work eventually arrived. Claims Court
 Decision, 162 Fed. Cl. at 62–63; see, e.g., J.A. 521–26, 545–
 54, 565–69, 592–98 (Dr. Morgan); J.A. 623–29 (Dr. Gor-
 don).
     With respect to USF’s receipt of grant money from
 Mayo, the Claims Court clearly found that Mayo “paid for
 the work done by Dr. Gordon at USF with the NIH grant
 funds,” including (what is crucial here) the April 1997
 work. Claims Court Decision, 162 Fed. Cl. at 65. USF no-
 where disputes that finding on appeal to the extent it
 means that grant funds eventually went from Mayo to USF
 to pay for the April 1997 work, though not necessarily at
 the time of the work or, indeed, before Mayo and USF en-
 tered into the formal contract later that year. Given the
 evidence recited thereafter in support, the Claims Court’s
 finding may mean no more than that. Id. The Claims
 Court went on to say that “[t]he greater weight of the trial
 testimony also established that [USF] was using NIH
 funds by December 1996 to pay for costs associated with
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 12    UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 conducting the immunohistochemistry work that was a key
 part of the research that led to the ’094 patent.” Id. (em-
 phasis added). That statement suggests a finding that
 USF received money from Mayo by December 1996, but the
 correctness of that interpretation of the statement is less
 than clear, at least because of the two citations immedi-
 ately following it—which suggest the scenario in which
 USF was “using NIH funds” in an accounting sense, i.e.,
 itself paying for the work in the expectation of being reim-
 bursed eventually by NIH money from Mayo, which in fact
 occurred. Id.
      Timing of funds transfer aside, the Claims Court’s key
 finding was that “beginning in October 1996, [USF] oper-
 ated [in the relevant work on the invention] pursuant to an
 implied contract with the Mayo Clinic for grant funds un-
 der the” NIH grant. Id. The Claims Court found that the
 evidence established an implied-in-fact contract (a meeting
 of the minds inferred from the surrounding circumstances),
 stating: “Regardless of whether [USF] underwrote those
 funds for a time before money flowed from the Mayo Clinic,
 it is clear in the record that [USF] had a ‘tacit understand-
 ing’ with Mayo that the funds would eventually arrive.” Id.
 at 66 (quoting Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745,
 754 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Although the government argued in
 the alternative that there was an implied-in-law contract
 between Mayo and USF, see Summary Judgment Ruling,
 146 Fed. Cl. at 287 (noting the government’s argument);
 Def.’s Post-Trial Br. at 10–11, Claims Court Decision
 (March 31, 2022), ECF No. 279, the Claims Court had no
 need to address, and did not address, that argument (which
 the government has not renewed on appeal).
     Based on its findings, the Claims Court determined
 that USF was a “contractor” having an implied-in-fact sub-
 contract that was a “funding agreement”; the invention
 was an “invention of the contractor,” given the assignment
 to USF; and the invention was a “subject invention” in that
 it was “first actually reduced to practice” in April 1997 “in
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        13

 the performance of” the funding agreement. Claims Court
 Decision, 162 Fed. Cl. at 66–67. The government therefore
 had a license under § 202(c)(4) to practice the ’094 patent,
 or have the patent practiced for or on behalf of it by The
 Jackson Laboratory, as asserted by USF. Id. at 67. That
 conclusion required judgment for the government against
 the claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
                              III
     We decide legal issues presented by the Claims Court
 decision de novo, and we review its factual findings for
 clear error. Gaylord v. United States, 777 F.3d 1363, 1367
 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when alt-
 hough there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court
 on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm con-
 viction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
 v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see
 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74
 (1985); Bitmanagement Software GmBH v. United States,
 989 F.3d 938, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2021); Oliveira v. United
 States, 827 F.2d 735, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
                               A
      We proceed on the basis of the following facts, reflected
 in findings of fact by the Claims Court that are not clearly
 erroneous based on the record. The April 1997 work that
 first actually reduced the ’094 patent invention to practice
 was covered by the NIH grant. Mayo and USF entered into
 an express subcontract in November 1997 whereby Mayo
 would pay USF money received from NIH under the grant
 for work covered by the grant. USF in fact accepted pay-
 ment from Mayo, using funds from the NIH grant, for the
 April 1997 work at issue. See, e.g., Claims Court Decision,
 162 Fed. Cl. at 64. On appeal, USF presents no substantial
 challenge to any of those findings of fact.
    USF does present a factual challenge regarding when
 Mayo paid NIH money to USF for the April 1997 work.
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 14    UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 USF argues that the record makes it clear that USF did not
 receive such money from Mayo at the time of the April 1997
 work, or at any time before Mayo and USF entered into the
 express subcontract in November 1997. The government
 insists that the Claims Court found otherwise and had ad-
 equate evidentiary support to do so.
     We do not resolve this dispute. Specifically, we do not
 decide whether the Claims Court even made such a find-
 ing—or whether, instead, it is best understood as having
 found only (what is not disputed on appeal) that the April
 1997 work was paid for by Mayo with NIH funds at some
 time, e.g., after Mayo and USF signed the November 1997
 subcontract. Nor do we decide whether any such finding
 would be sustainable under the clear-error standard of re-
 view applied to the record as a whole—or whether, instead,
 the record must be read as showing simply that USF ad-
 vanced the funding at issue (e.g., for salaries) and only later
 received what amounted to reimbursement for those ad-
 vances when it received NIH money from Mayo upon the
 signing of the November 1997 express subcontract.
     Besides accepting the above-identified facts clearly es-
 tablished in the trial court, we proceed by accepting, for
 purposes of this appeal, USF’s position on the timing-of-
 payment issue. That is, we accept that USF received NIH
 money from Mayo—including money for the April 1997
 work—when the November 1997 express subcontract was
 in place and not earlier.
                               B
     The question to be decided, on that basis, is whether
 the April 1997 work (the first actual reduction to prac-
 tice)—for which USF in fact received government funds
 supplied, through Mayo, by the NIH grant—was “in the
 performance of work under a funding agreement.” 35
 U.S.C. § 201(e). If so, the government had the license, un-
 der § 202(c)(4), that defeats USF’s infringement claim here.
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        15

 The Claims Court answered the question in the affirma-
 tive.
     USF’s argument for reversal of the Claims Court’s
 judgment has two necessary premises. The first is that any
 “funding agreement” adequate to trigger § 202(c)(4) must
 be in place at the time of the relevant work (here, a first
 actual reduction to practice in April 1997), so that the No-
 vember 1997 subcontract (whose execution and effective
 date were later than April 1997) does not suffice to trigger
 § 202(c)(4). The second is that there was no legally ade-
 quate implied agreement at the time of the April 1997 work
 (indeed, at all), and the Claims Court’s contrary determi-
 nation must be reversed.
      We conclude that USF’s first premise is legally incor-
 rect in the circumstances presented here, so the November
 1997 subcontract is adequate to give the government a
 § 202(c)(4) license. Although the Claims Court decided the
 case on the implied-contract ground, and the parties have
 accordingly focused their arguments on that ground, the
 underlying premise of a requirement of a contract in effect
 at the time of the relevant work is logically necessary to the
 bottom-line result of no license that USF urges. The valid-
 ity of this premise presents a legal issue requiring determi-
 nation of no facts in this case other than the ones identified
 above that are beyond reasonable dispute here. In these
 circumstances, we may address this legal premise, the re-
 jection of which is a ground for affirmance, without further
 examining the extent to which the government has briefed
 the issue. See, e.g., United States National Bank of Oregon
 v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S.
 439, 447 (1993); Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77
 (1990); United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S.
 159, 166 n.8 (1977); In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497
 F.3d 1360, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated in
 a different respect by Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Elec-
 tronics, Inc., 579 U.S. 93, 104–10 (2016); Granite
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 16    UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 Management Corp. v. United States, 416 F.3d 1373, 1378
 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
     On the factual premises stated above, USF accepted
 (received) NIH funds from Mayo, pursuant to the Novem-
 ber 1997 subcontract to the NIH grant, to pay for the April
 1997 work, as well as ongoing work. We conclude that the
 April 1997 work, i.e., the first actual reduction to practice,
 was “in the performance of work under a funding agree-
 ment,” § 201(e)—a subcontract between Mayo and USF to
 the NIH grant (the latter a funding agreement of NIH with
 Mayo). The statutory terms are broad enough to cover the
 facts on which we decide this appeal.
     The November 1997 agreement between Mayo and
 USF was a “funding agreement,” § 201(b). The original
 NIH grant awarded to Mayo was itself a funding agree-
 ment because it was a grant entered into between NIH and
 Mayo for the performance of experimental, developmental,
 or research work funded in whole or in part by the federal
 government, id. The November 1997 agreement, then, was
 a funding agreement because it was an express “subcon-
 tract” entered into for the performance of experimental, de-
 velopmental, or research work under the 1996 NIH grant,
 id.
     The work of tissue analysis (constituting the first ac-
 tual reduction to practice in April 1997) was covered by the
 1996 NIH grant. The November 1997 agreement signed by
 USF and Mayo did not limit the scope of the NIH grant.
 See J.A. 1265–70. The April 1997 work was in “the perfor-
 mance of work under [those] funding agreement[s]” pursu-
 ant to a recognized meaning of “under” applicable to the
 statutory phrase, § 201(e): It was substantively covered by
 both, and (on the facts we accept) both provided money to
 pay for it. See Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dic-
 tionary 2059 (2d ed. 2001) (defining “under” as “14. in ac-
 cordance with”); Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Dictionary of
 Legal Usage 910, 737–38 (3d ed. 2011) (stating that “under
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        17

 is preferable to *pursuant to when the noun that follows
 refers to a . . . contractual provision,” and defining “pursu-
 ant to” as “(1) in accordance with; (2) under; (3) as author-
 ized by; or (4) in carrying out”).
      USF opposes this conclusion on the basis of a time-
 based limitation it urges is present in the Bayh-Dole Act
 provisions. USF argues that the November 1997 agree-
 ment is legally insufficient, even if it provided funds to pay
 for the pre-agreement, April 1997 work, because it was en-
 tered into in November 1997 and had an effective date in
 September 1997, after the April 1997 work. We reject this
 suggested temporal limitation on the scope of the relevant
 Bayh-Dole Act language.
       The Act says that “funding agreement” includes “any
 . . . subcontract of any type” for the performance of work
 under a funding agreement. § 201(b). That breadth-indi-
 cating language supports inclusion within the provision of
 a subcontract that provides for, among other things, pay-
 ment for work already performed before the subcontract is
 executed or its “effective” date (when its obligations take
 effect, see Date, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (de-
 fining “effective date”)). A contract may provide for pay-
 ment for work previously done at least where, as here, the
 contract also pays for work yet to be done. Restatement
 (Second) of Contracts § 80 (American Law Institute 1981)
 (“(1) There is consideration for a set of promises if what is
 bargained for and given in exchange would have been con-
 sideration for each promise in the set if exchanged for that
 promise alone. (2) The fact that part of what is bargained
 for would not have been consideration if that part alone
 had been bargained for does not prevent the whole from
 being consideration.”); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 174 (2023) (“A
 promise founded on consideration which is partly past and
 partly present or executory is enforceable, although in a
 sense no resort to the past consideration need be had as the
 new or executory consideration is conceptually adequate to
 support enforceability of the contract.”); 17A Am. Jur. 2d
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 Contracts § 147 (2023) (“Where the consideration is partly
 past and partly future, a single promise as to both will be
 sustained.”); see also Hackin v. Pioneer Plumbing Supply
 Co., 457 P.2d 312, 318 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969); Jim Murphy
 & Associates, Inc. v. LeBleu, 511 So. 2d 886, 891 (Miss.
 1987); Johnson v. Hazaleus, 338 P.2d 345, 347 (Okla. 1959);
 Kahn v. Lischner, 275 P.2d 539, 543 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
 1954); W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Miller, 73 P.2d 552, 554 (Mont.
 1937).
     USF’s own position that Mayo paid for the April 1997
 work with the relevant NIH grant funds after the Novem-
 ber 1997 contract was executed or took effect confirms that
 such backward-reaching payment is a recognized contract
 practice. And it confirms that the November 1997 contract
 included Mayo’s promise to pay for the April 1997 work
 with the NIH funds. USF nowhere suggests that Mayo did
 or properly could pay for that work with the NIH grant
 funds outside a subcontract, as Mayo was obligated to en-
 ter into subcontracts for funded work with its consortium
 partners.
     This understanding of the November 1997 agreement,
 and of its meaning for the Bayh-Dole Act, is consistent with
 the agreement’s provision stating that the “effective period
 of this Agreement shall be from September 1, 1997,
 through August 31, 1998, unless otherwise provided for by
 modification in this Agreement.” J.A. 1266. The “effective
 period” merely identifies when the obligations (specified
 elsewhere in the contract) are binding. See, e.g., 17A Am.
 Jur. 2d Contracts § 323 (2023) (equating “effective date”
 with the date on which “a written contract becomes bind-
 ing”); 1 Albert H. Kritzer et al., International Contract
 Manual § 19:23 (2023) (“[T]he effective date of the contract
 will ordinarily be the date on which the contract first cre-
 ates a legal obligation on both parties.”); cf. Hamilton v.
 Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 518 (2010) (explaining that “effec-
 tive date” of plan of reorganization is when plan is adopted
 “and becomes binding”). When one party’s work performed
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US       19

 before the contract took effect is included in what the other
 party agrees to pay for (along with yet-to-be-performed
 work from the first party), that recognized type of contract
 does not turn already-completed pre-effective-date work
 into work the first party was obligated to perform, when
 there had been no obligation to perform it when it was per-
 formed—as USF insists is the case for the April 1997 work.
 Of course, such a contract does create an obligation relating
 to that work—at least the second party’s voluntarily under-
 taken obligation to pay for that work (or do other things
 because of that work)—but the already-completed perfor-
 mance of the first party’s work remains not obligatory.
 Thus, the start of the “effective period” on September 1,
 1997—for a one-year period to align with NIH’s designa-
 tion of the second year of the NIH grant—does not exclude
 the April 1997 work from being under the formal agree-
 ment, in that it was part of what Mayo undertook to pay
 for and did pay for with the NIH grant funds through the
 formal contract.
     Understanding the Bayh-Dole Act language to embrace
 such past-work funding fits the statutory context. To begin
 with, consistent with the Act, our understanding respects,
 rather than overrides, the patent owner’s choice whether
 to enter into a subcontract and on what terms, including
 what work will be paid for under it. Here, on the facts that
 are the basis for our decision, and against the well-known
 background of the Bayh-Dole Act regime, USF entered into
 the November 1997 agreement (which expressly provides
 for application of the Act) and accepted the NIH funding
 from Mayo for the April 1997 work under that agreement.
     The statutory interpretation we adopt fits the statu-
 tory context more generally. It reflects the stated statutory
 policy to “ensure that the Government obtains sufficient
 rights in federally supported inventions,” § 200, where the
 patent owner accepts federal funds under an agreement
 that invokes the Act. Even before enactment of the Bayh-
 Dole Act, this court’s predecessor had given a “liberal
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 20    UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 construction” to “the general phrase ‘in the performance
 of’” used in some government funding contracts, explaining
 that the construction ensures that, in such circumstances,
 the public, having paid for an invention, would “‘not again
 be taxed for its use, nor excluded from its use[,] nor permit-
 ted to use it upon restrictive conditions advantageous to no
 one but the patent owner.’” Technical Development, 597
 F.2d at 745 (quoting Mine Safety Appliances, 364 F.2d at
 392). This policy applies even when the agreement pro-
 vides for payment of government funds for pre-agreement
 work having the defined relationship to the invention
 (here, that the government-funded work includes the first
 actual reduction to practice of the invention).
     This conclusion is strongly bolstered by the record in
 this case, which suggests that what occurred here is not an
 uncommon fact pattern in government funding of research
 conducted in part by non-grantee members of a consortium
 called for in a government grant. Specifically, the record
 makes clear that subcontracts are commonly not executed
 until sometime after the grant is awarded, yet the grant-
 covered work proceeds without waiting for the inking of a
 subcontract. The commonplace nature of this scenario sug-
 gests that, if USF’s time-restrictive view of the Act were
 adopted, one or more policies of the Act might be im-
 paired—e.g., by the government insisting, in order to pro-
 tect its rights, that research by a consortium member be
 postponed until a subcontract was executed. Our under-
 standing of the statute avoids such impairment by focusing
 on the facts of agreement, coverage, and actual funding,
 whether forward-looking or backward-looking.
     Several witnesses testified, without contradiction, that
 it was common for there to be a delay in subcontracting af-
 ter award of a government grant. J.A. 136 (Dr. Duff, stat-
 ing that subcontracts are “very often delayed”); J.A. 523
 (Dr. Morgan, stating that subcontracting “usually does not
 occur immediately upon the award of the grant itself”); see
 also J.A. 624–25 (Dr. Gordon stating “[u]niversity
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 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US        21

 bureaucracy” slowed down the agreement between USF
 and Mayo); J.A. 2607–11 (Mr. Snyder discussing post-
 award subcontracting); NIH Grant Policies, supra (contem-
 plating the same). Other aspects of the record—e.g., the
 absence in the record of any written subcontract for more
 than a year after the NIH grant award, Dr. Morgan’s own
 uncertainty about when money actually flowed from Mayo
 to USF, the evident expectation by USF that it would re-
 ceive grant funds—tend to confirm that, in practice, grant-
 ees and their consortium institutions often do not place
 high priority on speedily getting a formal subcontract exe-
 cuted after a grant is awarded.
      At the same time, it is of great significance for the ad-
 vancement of useful knowledge (here, in medicine) and for
 many particular grant projects that research continue
 without interruption, suggesting that all persons con-
 cerned, including the government, would expect the grant-
 covered work to proceed immediately upon award of the
 grant, without awaiting a formal subcontract. Notably, the
 record in this case indicates that it was clear from the out-
 set of the NIH grant project that the USF work that was
 part of it would have to proceed without delay. The first
 litter of the doubly transgenic mice was born in August
 1996, just before the late-September NIH award. The re-
 sponsibility for the colony remained at USF, even after Dr.
 Duff moved to Mayo in December. J.A. 529. Dr. Gordon
 and her USF colleagues could not have waited to complete
 the work of caring for the mice. Dr. Gordon was also re-
 sponsible for the immunohistochemistry work on the
 brains of sacrificed mice in the colony to identify the devel-
 opment of Alzheimer’s Disease pathology. J.A. 152–54,
 148–50. This work was highly time sensitive: A core objec-
 tive was to determine the timing of such development, and
 the immunohistochemistry testing therefore had to begin,
 and it did begin, no more than a few months after the birth
 of the mice. See Nature Medicine Article at 97–98; J.A.
 3231–32 (comparing deposits in the brains of sacrificed 13-
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 22     UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. US

 to 16-week-old singly transgenic mice, which express only
 a presenilin transgene, with those in the brains of sacri-
 ficed 13- to 16-week-old doubly transgenic mice and com-
 paring deposits in the brains of sacrificed 24- to 32-week-
 old singly transgenic mice with those in the brains of sac-
 rificed 24- to 32-week-old doubly transgenic mice). Such
 immediate performance of the work, beyond being neces-
 sary as a scientific matter, was also important for grant
 administration, as NIH had to decide each year whether to
 renew the funding of the grant, requiring an evaluation of
 progress in the project. See J.A. 2616.
     For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject USF’s reli-
 ance on the November 1997 agreement’s effective date and
 execution date as a basis for not recognizing it as a funding
 agreement sufficient to give rise to the license rights of the
 government under § 202(c)(4). The Claims Court’s judg-
 ment of non-infringement is correct on this ground. Given
 this conclusion, it is not necessary that we address whether
 the Claims Court’s finding of an implied-in-fact contract
 was correct.
                              IV
     The judgment of no liability for infringement by reason
 of a license is affirmed.
      The parties shall bear their own costs.
                         AFFIRMED