Court Opinion

ID: 9474149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:49:11.226371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:55.605789
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The origin of the adjudicative functions exception relied on here was dictum in Morgan, 309 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C.Cir.1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917, 83 S.Ct. 1306, 10 L.Ed.2d 416 (D.C.Cir.1963). The statement was “that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended the statute to include traditional trial tactics within the statutory terms ‘conceals or covers up.’ ” This statement has somehow flowered into the broad exception now being recognized, yet virtually none of the significant decisions has really defined the exception nor expounded a rationale.
The one decision which sets forth a rationale is United States v. D’Amato, 507 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1974). That opinion, however, dealt with a false affidavit in a civil action to which the government was not a party, and indicated it is at least arguable that § 1001 will apply to falsity submitted in a criminal case or a civil case to which the government is a party.
Because the decisions provide no policy or other reasons underlying the exception as applied to criminal cases, I see no compelling reason for extending the exception beyond the exact holdings of those cases. None of the decisions recognizing the exception has dealt with submission of documents to the court at the sentencing stage, or indeed at any stage subsequent to trial.
I do not agree with the view that this court’s opinion in United States v. Gonzales-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 3540, 87 L.Ed.2d 663 (1985) is consistent with a judicial proceedings exception to § 1001. Although Gonzales-Mares involved a false statement to a probation officer rather than the magistrate, the purpose of the statement was to influence sentencing, as in the present case. I see no reasoned basis to justify a difference in result because the false information in one case was furnished to an administrative functionary to influence his recommendation to the judge but in the other was furnished directly to the judge.
In the course of this panel’s consideration of the case I have supported affirm-*1393anee. I now concur in reversal only in deference to the very recent pronouncement of this court (although arguably dictum) “that application of section 1001 should be limited to matters arising in judicial proceedings that can be characterized as ‘administrative’ or ‘housekeeping’ functions of the court.” United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 768 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir.1985).