Court Opinion

ID: 9718400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:22:39.261535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:41.158433
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
The majority correctly notes that no case has been cited by the litigants holding a defendant liable in circumstances identical to the instant case. But then, no case has been cited holding that there was no liability. As Mr. Chief Justice Stern so ably stated: “While no case is reported in Pennsylvania with the same factual situation as that which gave rise to the present litigation, there is not involved here the application of any new doctrine in the law of negligence. Human life is so complex that the circumstances attending the happening of different accidents are correspondingly varied, but the principle which determines the imposition of liability is simple and constant, being based on the proposition that one who, by sub-standard conduct, causes injury to another is legally responsible therefore if the harmful consequences of such conduct could reasonably have been foreseen.” Hudson, Admrx., v. Grace, 348 Pa. 175, 176-77, 34 A. 2d 498, 499-500 (1943).
I believe that it was for the jury to determine whether Greyhound’s conduct was negligent and the risk of accident foreseeable. There was testimony to the effect that the Greyhound Bus passed the Perry Bus going “at least” 60 m.p.h., ten miles in excess of the posted *400limit; that it had been snowing during the day; that the road conditions were “deplorable,” the road being coated with a combination of freezing rain and snow; and that there was more snow in the passing lane than in the right-hand lane.* People at all familiar with high-speed driving know the danger involved in passing under such conditions, and know that the visibility of other drivers may be temporarily impaired by slush thrown onto their windshields by high-speed passing vehicles, especially by large buses. It is certainly foreseeable that when a driver’s visibility is impaired by such conduct, even temporarily, a collision may occur. These are conclusions which reasonable men can draw from the present record and their common experience.
In my view the majority is incorrect in holding that reasonable men could not find this accident foreseeable, that this was not a question for the jury to decide. The majority forgets what Mr. Justice Holmes said over fifty years ago: “It was not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which an accident would occur, if the possibility of an accident was clear to the ordinarily prudent eye.” Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 156, 34 S. Ct. 44, 45 (1913). See Restatement, Torts (2d) §281, illustration 2, at 5 (1965). I think the possibility of an accident was clear in the instant case. The jury so found. I would not disturb its conclusion, and I must therefore dissent.

 The majority notes in its statement of the facts that at the time the accident took place, the Greyhound Bus was out of sight and therefore at least one-half mile away. I fail to see the relevance of this fact. Certainly Greyhound’s liability does not depend on how fast it was able to flee the scene. If it did, it would be rewarding the excessive speed which Greyhound’s driver displayed.