Court Opinion

ID: 9844329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:58.88862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:32.877427
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
I concur in the holding of the majority that this is a proper case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. However, I most respectfully disagree with, the holding of the majority that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the subject of res ipsa loquitur.
The sole reason for that holding by the majority is that the so-called “general” allegation of negligence in the complaint, upon which an instruction on res ipsa loquitur would normally have been based, had been stricken by the trial court, without objection by plaintiff, and that no assignment of error was taken by plaintiff from that ruling. On the other hand, if the majority opinion is correct in holding that this is a proper case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and I agree that it is, then it follows that it was error for the trial court to strike that allegation from the complaint.
In my opinion, the fact that no objection was taken or error assigned to that improper ruling should not prevent this plaintiff from an opportunity for a new trial, under proper instructions from the court, since the primary error of the trial court was its refusal to give the requested instruction on res ipsa loquitur and proper assignment of error was taken from the refusal to give that instruction. This is particularly true in this case, in my opinion, for the reason that respondent has not urged on this appeal the contention that the instruction was properly refused because of the previous striking of that allegation from the complaint and thus waived that contention on this appeal. It may *352be proper to affirm a trial court for refusing to give an instruction when the instruction was defective for some reason not urged either in the trial court or by the respondent on appeal. In this case, however, the instruction requested was defective only because of the improper action of the trial judge in striking the “general” allegation of negligence from the complaint.
For these reasons I most respectfully dissent.