Court Opinion

ID: 9779719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:39:53.042516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:38.776006
License: Public Domain

CRONE, Judge,
dissenting.
"The polestar for construing trust provisions is the intent of the settlor." Matter of Walz, 423 N.E.2d at 733. The relevant intent "is that held by the settlor at the time the trust was executed. This is the basis of the following well established rule of trust construction: the settlor's intent must be determined from the facts and cireumstances surrounding the settlor at the time of the execution of the trust." Id. at 734. When Taggart executed his irrevocable inter vivos Trust in November 1953, the stranger to the adoption rule was in effect, and we must presume that he was familiar with that rule. Cf. Rocker v. Metzger, 171 Ind. 364, 370, 86 N.E. 403, 405 (1908) ("We must presume that the testator in this case made his will with a knowledge of [a longstanding rule regarding the disposition of real estate where a widow elects to take against the willl and in the light of the meaning of the words used therein."). To reiterate, the stranger to the adoption rule states that "when one makes provision in a [document] for a child or children of some person other than himself, he will be presumed not to have included an adopted child or children of such other person, unless there is something in the [document] or in the extraneous circumstances to rebut that presumption." Peirce, 222 Ind. at 121, 51 N.E.2d at 482. Here, nothing rebuts the presumption that when Taggart provided for the distribution of the Trust corpus to Henry's "surviving children" upon Henry's death, he intended for the corpus to be distributed only to Henry's surviving natural children.
In concluding otherwise, the majority has ignored this presumption, disregarded Taggart's intent, and rewritten the Trust, notwithstanding its acknowledgement that we are not at liberty to do so. See Malachowski, 590 N.E.2d at 565-66.10 Words *932used in a legal context have a very specific meaning, and a court's primary task is to recognize and honor that meaning. A court may not change that meaning decades after the fact, which is precisely what the majority has done here. Just as the legislature may not pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts,11 so must the judiciary refrain from frustrating the expectations of those who dispose of their property by trust, will, or deed.
It is important to note that the purpose of the stranger to the adoption rule was not to discriminate against adopted children, but rather to ensure that a settlor's intent could not be subverted by events outside his or her control-that is, by another person's adoption of one or more children for the purpose of redistributing the trust estate. It is also important to note that we are concerned here with the distribution of a private individual's personal property according to his stated intent, not with the distribution of public funds. In other words, it is not our task to carry out the public policy of the State of Indiana, but rather to carry out Taggart's intent as expressed in the 1953 Trust document. We must presume that Taggart was aware of the implications of the stranger to the adoption rule when he executed the Trust, and we must ensure that the corpus is distributed pursuant to his stated intent.
Unlike the majority, I believe that Tag-gart's intent is unaffected by the Trust Code's retroactivity provision, which states,
Except as provided elsewhere in this article, the rules of law contained in this article shall apply to all trusts created prior to September 2, 1971 unless to do so would:
(1) adversely affect a right given to any beneficiary;
(2) give a right to any beneficiary which he was not intended to have when the trust was created;
(8) impose a duty or liability on any person which was not intended to be imposed when the trust was created; or
(4) relieve any person from any duty or liability imposed by the terms of the trust or under prior law.
Ind.Code § 30-4-1-4.
The majority states that "[a] rebuttable presumption exists that Taggart intended to include the adopted children of Henry unless the natural children are able to prove that one of the exceptions delineated in the retroactivity statute applies." Op. at 929. This statement confuses the issue and stands the stranger to the adoption rule on its head. As I see it, the issue is simply whether Indiana Code Section 30-4-2.1-2(a) applies retroactively vis-u-vis the Trust pursuant to Indiana Code Seetion 30-4-1-4; the natural children bear the burden of proving that one of the exceptions in Indiana Code Section 30-4-1-4 applies.
In this case, applying Indiana Code Seetion 30-4-2.1-2(a) retroactively would adversely affect the rights given to the natural children under the Trust, in that it would diminish the amount of their bequests. The majority posits that
the natural children could not have been adversely affected by the retroactive application of [Indiana Code Section 30-4-2.1-2(2) ] giving the adopted children an *933interest in the trust because at [the time the Trust Code was amended in 2003] it was uncertain whether they would be "surviving children" of Henry and/or the share each child was to receive.
Op. at 980. The inclusion of any adopted children in 2008 adversely affected the rights of the natural children from that time forward; only the extent of the adverse effect was uncertain until Henry died in 2008. To read the statute otherwise would render Indiana Code Section 30-4-1-4(1) meaningless. On this basis alone, I would hold that Indiana Code Section 80-4-2.1-2(a) may not be applied retroactively and reverse the trial court's order stating that the adopted children are beneficiaries under the Trust.
With respect to the second exception listed in Indiana Code Section 30-4-1-4, I note that the entire class of adopted children, however many, exists as beneficiaries only as a result of the retroactive application of Indiana Code Section 30-4-2.1-2(a). Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.

. In my view, the majority's discussion of the "background" to the stranger to the adoption rule is an apparent attempt to justify its decision on public policy grounds. The majority neglects to mention that even today, public policy does not prohibit a person (in*932cluding a parent, much less a stranger) from favoring natural children over adopted children in a will or trust.

. See Inp. Constitution, art. 1, § 24 ("No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.").