Court Opinion

ID: 9576694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:09.348043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:43.800207
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
joined by MATTHEWS, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s rejection of Walton’s due process claim as it relates to the applicable burden of proof in bar disciplinary matters. I further dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the Disciplinary Board’s findings of fact regarding Walton’s alleged violation of the various Disciplinary Rules involved in this proceeding. Employing a clear and convincing burden of proof, my review of the record persuades me that the Bar has only demonstrated that Walton’s conduct was both negligent and grossly negligent, thus viola-tive of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). I would therefore impose the sanction of a public censure.
I. Whether the “Preponderance of the Evidence” standard is violative of due process under the Alaska Constitution.
Walton’s position is that the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard called for by Alaska Bar Rule 11-15 violates due process under Alaska’s Constitution in disciplinary proceedings, particularly in those proceedings in which fraudulent conduct is charged. In my view, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) furnishes persuasive support for Walton’s position. In Santosky, the Court was called upon to determine whether the “preponderance of the evidence” or “clear and convincing” standard should be applied in parental rights termination proceedings. Applying the three factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 33 (1976), which govern a determination of what process is due under the Fourteenth Amendment in any given fact situation,1 the Santosky court concluded that the first factor, the importance of the individual interests at stake, dictated that a clear and convincing standard be applied:
This Court has mandated an intermediate standard of proof — “clear and convincing evidence” — when the individual interests at stake in a state proceeding are both “particularly important” and “more substantial than mere loss of money.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. [418] at 424, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 [at 1808]. Notwithstanding “the state’s ‘civil labels and good intentions,’ ” id., at 427, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 [at 1810], quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. [358] at 365-366, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 [at 1073], 51 Ohio Ops.2d 323, the Court has deemed this level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with “a significant deprivation of liberty” or “stigma.” 441 U.S. [418] *1090at 425, 426, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 [at 1809]. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, supra, (civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. [276] at 285, 17 L.Ed.2d 362, 87 S.Ct. 483 [at 487] (deportation); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353, 5 L.Ed.2d 120, 81 S.Ct. 147 [149] (1960) (denaturalization); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159, 87 L.Ed. 1796, 63 S.Ct. 1333 [1336] (1943) (denaturalization).
455 U.S. 745, 753-57, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-96, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 at 608-09. I think it apparent that the individual interests at stake in a bar disciplinary proceeding are “particularly important and more substantial that the mere loss of money” to the attorney involved. The proceedings stigmatize the attorney and threaten him with a significant deprivation of liberty.
The second Eldridge factor, whether the Bar Rule’s chosen standard creates a risk of error, again weighs in favor of adopting the clear and convincing evidence standard. This is evidenced by the facts of the instant case. If Walton is indeed innocent of the allegations made against him, the risk of wrongful discipline would be significantly reduced by using the clear and convincing evidence standard.
Concerning the third Eldridge factor, it is clear that the state has an interest in protecting society from attorneys who have violated bar disciplinary rules.2 The Supreme Court has characterized the preponderance of the evidence standard as placing the risk of error equally upon the parties. When adopting the clear and convincing evidence standard in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1810, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1978), the Supreme Court stated “[t]he individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.” The dispositive inquiry thus becomes whether the potential injury to the attorney from an incorrect determination of a violation of the disciplinary rules is “significantly greater” than the possible harm to the state caused by; (1) an incorrect determination that an attorney has not violated the rules, and (2) the increased burden on the state of meeting the higher standard of proof. In my view, the potential injury to the attorney is significantly greater, and therefore I would hold that due process under Alaska’s Constitution requires the use of the clear and convincing standard rather than the preponderance of the evidence standard.3
*1091II. Evidence of wrongdoing.
Review of the Disciplinary Board’s findings, pursuant to the standards articulated in In re Simpson, 645 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Alaska 1982), has convinced me that Walton did not intend to deceive. On the other hand, I conclude that the evidence in the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Walton’s conduct was both negligent and grossly negligent. . He should have known that the language used in the amended complaint — “a copy of a copy” — would be taken to mean a photocopy. He thus violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6)-4
Given my conclusion that Walton did not intend that the fabricated document would be taken to be a photocopy of an existing document, it follows that Walton did not violate DR 1-102(A)(4) (intentional misrepresentation); DR 1-102(A)(1) (asserting a position merely to harass); DR 7-102(A)(3) (concealing or knowingly failing to disclose that which should be revealed); or DR 7-102(A)(6) (creation of false evidence). In addition, I think the record demonstrates that Walton did believe he could prove that an alteration along the lines of the exhibit he prepared had been accomplished by Childs.
My reasons for the foregoing conclusions are the following:
1. Walton did not use the fabricated document in the deposition of Childs even though it was in existence at that time. If he had had any intent of using the document as evidence it would seem that he would have confronted Childs with it.
2. It is difficult to understand what Walton had to gain by foisting the fabricated copy off as an actual photocopy. It is undisputed that the document Childs recorded was materially different than the *1092document Childs signed. That is all that the fabricated document, if it were taken to be real, would demonstrate.
3. There was little chance of any deception succeeding. Walton did not surreptitiously fabricate the document but did so in the presence of Cowden and of Lee Holen, a contract law clerk. The record is not clear on whether other people were present, but is clear that opposing counsel, Wade, had heard that Walton had been using some white-out and a xerox machine in connection with the case, before Wade even received the fabricated document.
4. When ambiguous responses were given by Cowden at his deposition (which was taken only one day after the fabricated document had been filed with the court) Walton promptly elicited the truth of the matter on cross examination.5
5. The care exercised by Walton in preparing the exhibit says as much about Walton’s compulsive nature as about any intent to deceive.
6. Walton’s “decision to ignore the warnings of a colleague regarding the possible misinterpretation of the reference to the document” is again equally consistent with innocence as with guilt.
7. The “smoking gun” memorandum was a memo from Walton to Cowden to which the exhibit was attached. It stated, “Dear Frank: Guess what? Here’s the smoking gun. Either Childs falsely testified when he said he gave Lily a copy of his deed of trust on March 2nd, or he falsely testified when he said it hadn’t been altered after [executing] it. But in that case he will have difficulty explaining why he concealed the fact of its alteration. Cheers, Peter Walton.” The memo was not a communication to the court or opposing counsel. It was a communication to a client that could be clarified subsequently. It does not constitute evidence of any intent to mislead the court or opposing counsel.
8. The fabricated document was attached to the complaint and to a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss which was filed on the same day as the complaint. It appears that the motion to dismiss was of no particular consequence and that Walton was told by Wade before *1093the opposition was filed that Wade was going to withdraw the motion to dismiss.6
III. Sanction.
Given my conclusion that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Walton violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) and DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law), I would issue a public censure.

. The Eldridge court observed:
[(Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, 47 L.Ed.2d at 33.

. A principal purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is protection of the public and maintenance of the integrity of the judicial system. See, In re Kleindeinst, 132 Ariz. 95, 644 P.2d 249, 256 (1982) (en banc) ("[d]iscipline against an attorney has two purposes: (1) to protect the public from unethical attorneys; and (2) to deter other attorneys from engaging in unethical conduct”); District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindeinst, 345 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C.App.1975) (per curiam) (a purpose of disciplinary action is partly to maintain integrity of profession in eyes of public); State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 639 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1982) (per curiam) ("disciplinary proceedings ... are a species unto themselves which cannot be characterized as either a civil action or a criminal proceeding .... Although the errant attorney may receive punishment, the purpose of these proceedings is primarily for the protection of the courts, the legal profession, and the general public from those who have been lacking in professional responsibility.”).

. Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia use the clear and convincing standard. See, for example:
Alabama Hunt v. Disciplinary Board of Alabama State Bar, 381 So.2d 52 (Ala.1980).
Arizona Matter of Rubi, 133 Ariz. 491, 652 P.2d 1014 (1982).
California Price v. State Bar of California, 30 Cal.3d 537, 179 Cal.Rptr. 914, 638 P.2d 1311 (1982) ("convincing proof to a reasonable certainty”).
Colorado People v. Howard, 147 Colo. 501, 364 P.2d 380 (1961) (“substantial, clear, convincing and satisfactory”).
Delaware In re Morford, 46 Del. 144, 80 A.2d 429 (1951).
D.C. Matter of Thorup, 432 A.2d 1221 (D.C.1981).
Florida The Florida Bar v. Ragano, 403 So.2d 401 (Fla.1981).
Hawaii Disciplinary Board of Hawaii Supreme Court v. Kim, 59 Hawaii 449, 583 P.2d 333 (1978) (“and beyond reasonable doubt”),
Illinois In re Jafree, 93 Ill.2d 450, 67 Ill.Dec. 104, 444 N.E.2d 143 (1982).
Iowa Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Association v. Thompson, 328 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1983) ("convincing preponderance").
*1091Kansas State v. Scott, 230 Kan. 564, 639 P.2d 1131 (1982) (“substantial, clear, convincing and satisfactory").
Louisiana Louisiana State Bar Association v. Mitchell, 375 So.2d 1350 (La.1979).
Maine National Center for Professional Responsibility, State Disciplinary Enforcement Systems Structural Survey 61 (1980).
Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Kerpelman, 292 Md. 228, 438 A.2d 501 (1981).
Minnesota In re Gillard, 271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn.1978).
Mississippi Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878 (Miss.1981).
Montana Matter of Goldman, 179 Mont. 526, 588 P.2d 964 (1978) (attorney has burden “to show that charges are not sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty”).
Nevada Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 183 P.2d 833 (1947).
New Hampshire Edes Case, 118 N.H. 815, 395 A.2d 498 (1978).
New Jersey In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175, 364 A.2d 111 (1976).
New Mexico In re Sedillo, 84 N.M. 10, 498 P.2d 1353 (1972).
N. Carolina Matter of Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
North Dakota Matter of Lovell, 292 N.W.2d 76 (N.D.1980).
Oregon In re Conduct of Paauwe, 294 Or. 171, 654 P.2d 1117 (1982).
Rhode Island Carter v. Walsh, 406 A.2d 263 (R.I.1979).
S. Carolina In re Friday, 263 S.C. 156, 208 S.E.2d 535 (1974).
South Dakota In re Goodrich, 78 S.D. 8, 98 N.W.2d 125 (1959).
Utah In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939) ("convincing proof and fair preponderance”).
Virginia Tenth District Committee of Virginia State Bar v. Baum, 213 Va. 523, 193 S.E.2d 698 (1973).
W. Virginia Committee on Legal Ethics of West Virginia State Bar v. Pence, 240 S.E.2d 668 (W.Va.1977) ("full, clear, and preponderating evidence").
Wisconsin Matter of Sedor, 73 Wis.2d 629, 245 N.W.2d 895 (1976).
Wyoming State Board of Law Examiners v. Goppert, 66 Wyo. 117, 205 P.2d 124 (1949).
See also the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline and the National Center for Professional Responsibility (1979). Rule 17C of these model rules provides as follows:
Standard of Proof. Formal charges of misconduct, petitions for reinstatement, and petitions for transfer to and from disability inactive status shall be established by clear and convincing evidence.

. DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6) read as follows:

Misconduct

(A) A lawyer shall not:
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(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.

. Further, at the evidentiary hearing counsel for the Bar Association, while clearly leaving room for the local disciplinary board to find intentional conduct, suggested that what was involved was unintentional conduct: "Now I would suggest that the conduct of Mr. Walton was misrepresentation. Perhaps at the most generous an accidental misrepresentation, but it still amounted to a misrepresentation to the court.” [Tr. 220] "Now whether there was a specific intent to deceive the bar association doesn’t intend to say yes, there was a specific intent to deceive, though some of the allegations in the petition might be read to-say that.” [Tr. 222] ... "Now clearly as is reported and is responded to by the second trial brief from Mr. Boyko on behalf of Mr. Walton, the case of State v. Nicklaus is a far more serious case of misstatements to a court system but the principle still applies and is still approved by this court. The serious misleading in pleadings is disciplinary — is a basis for discipline — disciplinary matter and something for which the bar association has brought Mr. Walton to this proceeding and something for which I suggest that you should find is a basis for discipline of Mr. Walton. There is a spectrum of appropriate penalties based on the indication of intent to deceive in the case law. Clearly in the cases where there is a strong indication of an intent to deceive and a continuing pattern of deception both before a court and the hearing committee following it, it is a far stronger basis for suspension and disbarment. The evidence is not here clear that there is an intentional deception on the part of Mr. Walton, except that he intentionally included this document in his pleadings and intentionally used the language that he did. As to whether he intended to deceive the court there's very little evidence of that except that again he intentionally included it in the pleadings which were filed with the court. Obviously when faced with it or when the question about these documents became apparent, he took steps to clear up the matter, and whatever you believe about his other actions, this certainly should be considered in his behalf. But he placed in the court basket downstairs two pleadings which referred to 2 — 2 times to the same exhibit, and actually many more times but added the same exhibit twice. And that exhibit was a copy of a copy or an exhibit for which he talked about, which was not anything but what he’d built together out of his belief from Mr. Childs’ testimony but it’s something he added, pled and deceived if only by actual use of inept language, of mistaken language, of poor judgment language, but it amounted to deception and interference with justice and a basis for discipline. Thank you.”

. The foregoing paragraphs numbered 6 through 8 are in reference to the Disciplinary Board's findings of fact that:
Respondent intended that the fabricated document attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit B would be understood to be a copy of an existing photocopy of an actual Deed of Trust. This finding is based upon the care exercised by Respondent in the preparation of the fabricated Deed of Trust, the precise nature of the references in the pleadings referring to the exhibit, the repeated references in the Amended Complaint and the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent’s decision to ignore the warnings of a colleague regarding the possible misinterpretation of the references to the document, the text of “smoking gun” memorandum, Respondent’s failure to notify opposing counsel or the court that the document was a fabrication, the findings set forth above and the record herein.