Court Opinion

ID: 9685133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:23:36.367564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:02.578762
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns,
(dissenting). I agree that the issue raised in this appeal is one of first impression, and that the statutory language is not as clear as it could have been. However, my reading of the entire statute convinces me that it was not the legislative intent to prevent persons such as plaintiff in this case from recovering and I, therefore, dissent.
*216Under § 31051 of the act, an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle "subject to the provisions of this chapter”. Section 3105(3) makes it clear that bodily injury includes death.
Because the injury resulted in death in this case, plaintiff is claiming survivor’s loss benefits under § 3108.2 Although the statutory measure of this loss is essentially the same as if the decedent had lived and was claiming benefits in his own name, I cannot conclude from that fact, as does the majority, that the survivor’s claim can be called derivative.3 The fact that the survivor’s loss is distinct is shown by § 3110(4)4 which provides that the survivor’s loss accrues when it is incurred, rather than at the time of the accident, and the language of § 3108 itself. Plaintiff is claiming a loss she incurred herself, she is not attempting to recover a loss her son incurred personally, and she seeks to recover only in a representative capacity.
Plaintiff made her claim for survivor’s loss to the assigned claims facility under § 31725 which provides in part:
"A person entitled to claim because of accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle in this state may obtain personal protection insurance benefits through an assigned claims plan if no personal protection insurance is applicable to the injury * * *
*217The real question, and the focus of the dispute between the parties, is whether plaintiff is a "person entitled to claim”. I would hold that she is.
Plaintiff is a dependent6 of a person who suffered accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, as those terms are defined in the act. This is all that must be shown to make plaintiff "a person entitled to claim”. If she is not a person entitled to claim, it must be because of a specific exclusion found in the statute. The exclusions and limitations of § 3105 to § 3116 apply to claims made to the assigned claims facility. MCL 500.3173; MSA 24.13173.
The defendant relies solely upon the exclusion contained in § 3113(b).7 This section provides in relevant part:
"A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:
"(b) The person was the owner or. registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by subsections (3) and (4) of section 3101 was not in effect.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Although "person” is not defined in the no-fault chapter, it is defined in § 1148 of the Insurance Code and includes "an individual”. The majority *218has expanded the statutory definition to include not only the individual, but his dependents as well. If the act is applied as written, the exclusion applies only to the individual who was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle involved in the accident and had not acquired the appropriate security.
The exclusions are personal and should not be expanded. Under MCL 500.3101; MSA 24.13101, it is only the owner or registrant who is required to maintain security for the payment of benefits. MCL 500.3102(2); MSA 24.13102(2) imposes criminal liability only on the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle who operates it without security, or someone who operates the vehicle with knowledge that there is no security in force. The whole tenor of the act shows that it applies to persons, i.e., individuals; not individuals and their dependents.
This interpretation, that only the person who violates the act should go without benefits, is further supported by § 3177.9 That section provides:
"An insurer obligated to pay personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury * * * to the spouse or relative resident in the household of the owner or registrant of an uninsured motor vehicle may recover such benefits paid and appropriate loss adjustment costs incurred from the owner or registrant of the uninsured motor vehicle or from his estate. Failure of such a person to make payment within 30 days is a ground for suspension or revocation of his motor vehicle registration and operator’s license. An uninsured motor vehicle for the purpose of. this section is a motor vehicle with respect to which security as required by sections 3101 and 3102 is not in effect at the time of the accident.”
*219Unless persons such as the plaintiff are persons "entitled to claim” under § 3172, the repayment provisions of § 3177 are meaningless. We should not presume that the Legislature created meaningless legislation.
There is no statutory exclusion which would bar plaintiff’s claim and the summary judgment should be reversed.

 MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105.

 MCL 500.3108; MSA 24.13108.

 Compare the wrongful death act, MCL 600.2922; MSA 27A.2922, which specifically allows suit only if the decedent could have brought the suit had he survived.

 MCL 500.3110(4); MSA 24.13110(4).

 MCL 500.3172; MSA 24.13172.

 This fact is taken as true on our review of the grant of summary judgment. Since plaintiff is not within the class of persons who are conclusively presumed to be dependent in MCL 500.3110; MSA 24.13110, she must prove her dependency under § 3110(2).
Survivor’s loss under § 3108 is geared to dependency on the deceased at the time of the accident.

 MCL 500.3113; MSA 24.13113.

 MCL 500.114; MSA 24.1114.

 MCL 500.3177; MSA 24.13177.