Court Opinion

ID: 9460933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:02:47.191559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:49.869979
License: Public Domain

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Somewhat startling for me, the majority opinion by-passes what has for decades been doctrine in this court, and so far not doubted by the Supreme Court. It is this:
“Sentencing is within sole province and discretion of trial judge, and unless an imposed sentence exceeds statutory maximum, or is otherwise illegal, appellate courts are without authority to act. Even if we considered the sentences in this case unduly harsh or severe, which we do not, we would be powerless to review under innumerable decisions of this and other appellate courts which have held consistently that there is no power in an appellate court to review sentence imposed, so long as it is within statutory limit. . . .” (Accents added.)
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“This view is unquestionably followed by the overwhelming weight of au*988thority, and unless or until the Congress or the Supreme Court has spoken to the contrary we are disposed to follow our established precedent.” Judge Simons in United States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700, 703, 705 (4 Cir. 1965).
Almost 50 years ago the late eminent jurist, Judge John J. Parker, addressed the point for this circuit in Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4 Cir. 1926):
“The judge who tries the case and hears the testimony is the best, as he is the sole judge of the merits, and if he acts within the boundaries prescribed by law his decision is final and unreviewable in an appellate court. . . . ”
See also, United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495, 498 (4 Cir. 1971).
As late as June 26, 1974, the Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. U. S., 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 reaffirmed this tenet:
“We begin with the general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.” At 431, 94 S.Ct. at 3047 (Citations omitted.)
Reciting the legislative history of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, the Court reiterated:
“The intent of Congress was in accord with long-established authority in the United States vesting the sentencing function exclusively in the trial court.
‘If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute.’ Gurrera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340 (C.A.8 1930).” At 440, 94 S.Ct. at 3051. (Other citations omitted.)
However, accepting arguendo the majority’s entitlement to disregard precedent, I perceive no warrant for its decision here. Indisputably the corrections imposed were not beyond the limit of the penal statute. Next, the majority mistakenly reads the District Court’s pronouncement as resting upon sex exclusively. The opinion is so prefaced:
“Since sex, alone, is an impermissible basis for a disparity in sentence, we vacate Maples’ sentence and direct that he be resentenced.” (Emphasis added.)
To start with, the trial judge’s articulation of the girl’s sentence first and foremost pointed to her “age”. This consideration is now apparently no longer deemed of consequence. That the girl’s age was the predominant factor in fixing her sentence appears in the statements of the Court at the time of his sentencing. Counsel for Maples adverted to the difference in his sentence and hers, saying:
“I realize you took into consideration her age by putting the youthful offender status on it, but to give her a lesser sentence I believe is, first of all, not carrying out the intent of the court in making all three of them equal.”
In answer the Court, emphasizing age as the overriding consideration, said: “Mr. Tepper, do you think the Court must treat a 17-year old the same way as a 21-year old? She was 17 when the crime was committed; he’s 22 now, I assume he was 21. Yet the Court must treat a 17-year old on the same basis as a 21-year old in the commission of a crime ?”
Additionally, thereafter Maples moved for reduction of his sentence because the girl had received 10 years and another co-defendant, Edward Rivers, 12 years, but he was given 15 years for complicity in the same crime. He pressed upon the Court that “in fairness, all sentences should be the same and that his sentence should be reduced to 10 years”. In his denial the Judge remarked on Maples’ age of 21 years at the time of the bank robbery, that he “had at least one prior constitutional conviction, and had served a prison term”. Again manifesting his occupation with age, he observed that *989the girl “was only 17 years old at the time of offense”. He commented, too, that she “had no prior criminal record”. This was at the least a triphammer af-firmance of her age as controlling.
Refusal of the motion was “based upon the various acts committed by the respective defendants, their ages, and their prior criminal records, or lack of records, [justifying] the differences in the sentences”. (Emphasis added.) This is conclusive to me that the apportionment of the girl’s and Maples’ punishments was reckoned with legal and meet elements in mind.
Precedents cited by the majority as well as those of the appellant are not apposite here. They entailed the application of enactments fixedly differentiating between persons according to their gender. Quite obviously legislation is not comparable to a court’s judgment permissibly embodying other considerations than sex.
Finally, the decision now proposed will be but another of our intrusions upon the trial court’s sphere and prerogatives. I would affirm the District Court without qualification.