Court Opinion

ID: 9761901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:58:54.179306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.615279
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s treatment of Faerman’s first four points of error, but I believe Faerman’s appeal should be abated to *849allow the trial court to correct the error on his fifth point.
Faerman’s right to bond pending an appeal is set out in article 44.04(c) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in pertinent part,
[p]ending the appeal from any felony conviction other than a conviction described in Subsection (b) of this section (where the punishment does not exceed 15 years confinement), the trial court may deny bad and commit the defendant to custody if there then exists good cause to believe that the defendant would not appear when his conviction became final or is likely to commit another offense while on bad, permit the defendant to remain at large on the existing bail, or, if not then on bail, admit him to reasonable bail until his conviction becomes final.
Tex.Code CRIM. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c) (Vernon Supp.1997). In Ex parte Byers, the Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted this provision to mean “[t]he trial court has a non-discretionary duty to consider ... [the] application for bail.” See 612 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (emphasis added).1
While I agree in principle with the observation that an appellant should ordinarily proceed, under Rule 44 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,2 with an accelerated appeal, I dissent from the majority’s dispensation of this matter for two reasons. First, Faerman gave every opportunity to the trial court to correct itself, and, as a result, was limited in his ability to proceed as the majority holds he should have. Faerman twice filed motions to set bail and also applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. Most of Faerman’s actions occurred after he filed his notice of appeal, and he was unable to supplement the record with demonstrations of the trial court’s failure to consider his request.3
Second, the denial of bail pending appeal without consideration violates due process. See Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d at 922, 925-26 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (Miller, J. concurring). While the concept of due process does not require a specific vindication of an individual’s rights, Faermaris “interest in retaining liberty while his appeal is pending cannot be dismissed as insignificant ... [it is] a ‘substantial right.’ ” See id. at 926. This may be especially true should we decide to affirm Faerman’s conviction because the potential period of liberty enables a defendant to order his affairs for the ensuing time of confinement.4
*850The trial court denied Faerman’s request for bond pending appeal -without granting him an opportunity to be heard or showing “good cause” for its denial. Because Faer-man was denied due process, the unique posture of the case, and his difficulty in perfecting an appeal of the bail pending appeal issue to this court, I would find error in the trial court’s failure to consider Faerman’s request to set bond, abate the remainder of Faerman’s appeal, and remand the case to the trial court to permit it to evaluate his request.

.The trial court possesses the right to deny Faer-man’s request for bond, but it must first show it considered his request. See Ex parte Byers, 612 S.W.2d at 537; Valles v. State, 689 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1985, pet. ref'd); cf. Shockley v. State, 717 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. Crim.App.1986) (noting, in an appendix included with the concurring opinion, "that due process requires that the trial court give notice and hold a hearing prior to the denial of bail pending appeal"). If the trial court thereafter desires to deny his request it must find "good cause to believe that ... [Faerman] would not appear when his conviction becomes final or is likely to commit another offense while on bail.” See Tex Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.04(c); Ex parte Byers, 612 S.W.2d at 537.
The review of a trial court’s failure to consider bond pending appeal may be by an appeal or a writ of habeas corpus application. See Ex parte Spaulding, 612 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); cf. Ex parte Reese, 666 S.W.2d 675, 677 n. 2 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1984, pet ref'd) (explaining that Spaulding establishes three methods for appealing a determination of bail pending appeal: (1) appeal of a denial of writ of habeas corpus; (2) direct appeal of a denial of a motion to reduce bail; and (3) by original habeas corpus application to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).

. Rule 44 is now Rule 31 under the new Rules of Appellate Procedure, promulgated this year and effective September 1, 1997. Compare TexR.App. P. 31 with TexR.App. P. 44, 707-08 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) xxix, lvi-lvii (1986).

. This court denied, unfortunately, a motion for leave to file supplemental transcript by Faerman. Faerman explains in his brief that the request was for supplementing the record with the court’s response on his motion for appeal bond, which came subsequent to his notice of appeal.

. In addition, Faerman may subsequently seek review of our decision in the Court of Criminal Appeals. The majority believes such action should spur the trial court to consideration of Faerman’s request, but given the repeated requests already made by Faerman, and the trial court’s failure to respond to these requests, I would not leave the issue to the discretion of the trial court.