Court Opinion

ID: 9687287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:22:19.003114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:25.506122
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 99. (dissenting). "There is no there there." Gertrude Stein, commenting on the city of Oakland.1
¶ 100. Two years ago, a majority of this court upheld the same stop and frisk at issue here. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999). (Bablitch, J. dissenting) (hereinafter Williams I). Williams appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court sent this case back for reconsideration in light of its decision in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
¶ 101. In a yeoman-like effort to once again uphold this stop and frisk, the majority finds reasonable suspicion from three factors: (1) an anonymous tip *683placed over a 9-1-1 line; (2) an observation by the police that 57-year-old Williams, sitting in a parked Chevy Blazer with a female passenger, had his hand behind the Blazer's passenger seat; and (3) an observation by the police that the vehicle had no license plates. I disagree. When closely examined, these facts do not add up to a constitutionally permissible basis for conducting either an investigatory stop or a limited search for weapons. As with Gertrude Stein's memorable quip, so too with the majority's factors: there is no there there. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I — I
¶ 102. Turning first to the anonymous tip, I conclude that it has none of the indicia of reliability that may provide a basis for an investigatory stop that is compatible with the Fourth Amendment. An informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are relevant factors to be considered in determining the value of the tipster's report for the purposes of applying the reasonable suspicion standard. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328-29 (1990). Importantly, in J.L. the Supreme Court emphasized that reasonable suspicion requires that the tip be "reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. Analyzing the tip in this case with these factors in mind, the only reasonable conclusion to draw is that this tip is indistinguishable from the unknown, unaccountable informant in J.L.
¶ 103. Here, the majority asserts that the anonymous caller's basis of knowledge adds reliability to the tip. What is the caller's basis of knowledge in this case?
¶ 104. The majority repeatedly asserts that this tipster is an eyewitness to criminal activity. The major*684ity asserts that "the anonymous tipster explains exactly how she knows about the criminal activity she is reporting: she is observing it." Majority op. at ¶ 33. "Quite simply. . .the tipster here has made plain that she is an eyewitness." Id.
¶ 105. The majority's assertions are incorrect and are not borne out by the record of the call. The anonymous caller described the car, but there is absolutely nothing else in the caller's statement to lead to the conclusion that she actually witnessed criminal activity. Instead, the caller's statement provides only a conclusory assertion of illegal conduct. For all we can tell from the record, her allegation of criminal wrongdoing is based upon nothing more than " 'idle rumor or irresponsible conjecture.'" United States v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392, 397 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238 (5th Cir. 1972)).
¶ 106. Professor LaFave's commentary is noteworthy:
It makes no sense to require some "indicia of reliability" that the informer is personally reliable but nothing at all concerning the source of his information, considering that one possible source would be another person who was totally unreliable. It may be argued, of course, that most informers report personal observations, and thus such should be assumed to be the case when the lesser standard for a stop rather than the arrest standard is being considered. But there is simply no established need to go to this extreme; as Justice White once observed, "if it may be so easily inferred * * * that the informant has himself observed the facts or has them from an actor in the event, no possible harm could come from requiring a statement to that effect."
*6854 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h) 221 (3d ed. 1996) (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (White, J. concurring) (footnotes omitted)).
¶ 107. The anonymous caller in this case is no more reliable than the anonymous caller in J.L., "who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L." J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
¶ 108. The majority also concludes that the tipster was reliable because, unlike the unknown caller at an unknown location in J.L., this caller revealed self-identifying information by giving her address. Majority op. at ¶ 34. In this instance, that information revealed little because the address was for an apartment building. The record does not tell us if 50 people or 500 lived at this address. As a result, no greater veracity or reliability can be attributed to the caller in this case than to any other nameless, unknown informant.
¶ 109. There is little support for the majority's contention that the caller's information is reliable because she put her anonymity at risk. Majority op. at ¶ 35. All of the evidence points to the conclusion that the caller thought she was placing an anonymous call. She started the call by saying she did not want to get involved. She did not provide her name, her telephone number, or her apartment number at 4261 North Teutonia. Despite this absence of meaningful identifying information, the majority opinion attempts to bolster the tip's reliability by characterizing the caller as a citizen informant, and accordingly more reliable than an anonymous tipster. Majority op. at ¶ 36. However, there is no basis in the record from which to conclude that the caller was what could be viewed as the classic citizen informant, an identified informant *686who either actually witnessed a crime or was the victim of a crime.
¶ 110. This classic citizen informant case was presented in State v. Doyle, 96 Wis. 2d 272, 291 N.W.2d 545 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. Swanson, 164 Wis. 2d 437, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991). In Doyle, two named informants — Mark and Leigh Livermore — contacted police and reported witnessing drug dealing. Id. at 286. This court characterized the Livermores as "two knowledgeable citizen eyewitnesses," and distinguished citizen informers from " 'police contacts or informers who usually themselves are criminals.'" Id. at 286-87 (quoting State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 630, 184 N.W.2d 836 (1971)).
¶ 111. The majority's reliance upon the citizen informant analysis in Doyle, and in State v. Boggess, 110 Wis. 2d 309, 316, 328 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1982), must be approached cautiously. Majority op. at ¶ 36. Categorization of a tip as one from a "citizen" informant, as opposed to an "anonymous" informant, may be relevant to assessing an informant's reliability under the totality of the circumstances analysis. However, both Doyle and Boggess were decided before the Supreme Court abrogated Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).2 Accordingly, it is questionable whether a tip labeled as one from a citizen informant should receive a "relaxed test of reliability," majority op. at ¶ 36, when the issue before the court is an assessment of reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances.
¶ 112. In a further attempt to distinguish the present case from J.L., the majority points out that in J.L. there was no audio recording of the anonymous *687call, while in the present case a recording was made of the call. But the recording of the 9-1-1 conversation does nothing to establish the reliability of the caller. Majority op. at ¶ 37. The recording merely supports the officers' testimony that the call actually occurred and eliminates any speculation that the anonymous tip was fabricated by the police.
¶ 113. Again attempting to distinguish J.L., the majority relies upon the fact that the anonymous call was placed over the 9-1-1 system. It is argued that Milwaukee may have developed a "sophisticated emergency phone system" that contains an "automatic location identification and automatic number identification." According to the majority, the caller exposed herself to risk of prosecution for making a false report because the 9-1-1 system may assist the police in tracing the anonymous caller. This is total speculation. The majority concedes, as it must, that there is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that Milwaukee actually had in place such a system at the time the call in this case occurred. Majority op. at ¶ 38. Instead, it relies upon the fragile inference that because the operator said "um hmm" after the caller volunteered her address that the caller's address was in fact automatically identified in the 9-1-1 system. Majority op. at n. 14. This analysis illustrates the lengths the majority must stretch to find anything in the record that would support a contention that Milwaukee had an operating "sophisticated emergency phone system" at the time the events in this case took place; it is simply unpersuasive.
¶ 114. In Williams I the argument was also made that a tip over the 9-1-1 system has a higher degree of reliability. Professor LaFave, commenting upon this court's decision in Williams I, pointed out that there is *688no reason to conclude that the caller was aware she had put her identity at risk.
[I]t seems that the Williams concurrence ends one step short; it stresses that the police were aware of these characteristics of their 911 system, but surely that in and of itself is unimportant, for if the Williams caller deserves to be viewed as not anonymous and thus more reliable than the White informant, then surely the question is the informer's perception that his or her identity could easily be determined by the police and that false information might lead to criminal prosecution. And thus the ultimate question, at best alluded to only indirectly in Williams, is whether in the locale in question there exists such widespread public awareness of the characteristics of the 911 system and of criminal sanctions for false information that it is permissible for the police to presume that each 911 caller possesses such information.
4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h) (Supp. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
¶ 115. In short, the majority's assertion that the caller is reliable because she put her identity at risk is incorrect because there is no reason to believe that she knowingly did so. And on that point, it is more reasonable to assume that the caller was unaware that her identity would possibly be at risk, for she began the conversation by stating that she did not "want to get involved." It is essential to keep in mind that our analysis here is whether or not the officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, and not simply whether or not the police should investigate anonymous calls reporting ongoing criminal activity. Because the caller did not knowingly or intentionally risk her anonymity, her assertion of criminal activity is *689less reliable and the officers were accordingly required to obtain more information to establish reasonable suspicion.
¶ 116. Finally, the majority contends that the tip's assertion of criminal activity is reliable because the police corroborated the innocent details provided in the tip. Majority op. at ¶¶ 40-41. However, corroboration of innocent details relayed by an anonymous tipster only gives rise to an inference that the caller is telling the truth about the alleged criminal activity when the detail from the tip establishes that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 142, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990). For example, in White, the quintessential anonymous tip case, a tipster reported that Vanessa White would leave a specific apartment, at a particular time, in a particular vehicle, and would proceed to a specific location. White, 496 U.S. at 327. The caller also alleged that she would be carrying cocaine. Id. A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that police corroboration of the tip information established that the tip was reliable and that the anonymous caller's ability to predict White's behavior established the caller's basis of knowledge. Id. at 332. The Court concluded that "[b]ecause only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individuals illegal activities." Id. In J.L., the Court restated this principle: "The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person." J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
*690¶ 117. This court followed the reasoning of White, in Richardson, where an anonymous caller provided police with a highly detailed tip containing unique and specific facts. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 142. The corroboration of this cumulative detail, along with reasonable inferences, supplied reasonable suspicion to justify a stop. Id. In other words, in Richardson, it was not the mere fact that the caller provided innocent details that were subsequently corroborated that made the tip reliable. The tip was reliable because the details provided by the caller would be known by someone intimate with the suspect's affairs; therefore, because the tipster knew these intimate details he or she likely was correct in asserting criminal conduct.
¶ 118. In contrast, the case at hand presents precisely the type of corroboration of the innocent aspects of a tip that the Supreme Court has indicated are not sufficient. As J.L. has instructed, information about readily observable details alone does not make a tip reliable in its assertion of illegality. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. The only detail provided by the caller in this case is a description of a parked vehicle that she observed through her apartment window. Corroboration of these few facts does not bring reliability to the caller's allegation of criminal activity. Thus, on the one hand the majority contends that the caller is reliable because it construes her report to be one in which the caller is observing criminal activity first hand. On the other hand, the majority asserts that the caller is reliable because police corroboration of innocent aspects of the tip lends credibility to the tip's assertion of criminal conduct, even though the tip reports only what could ostensibly be observed through a window and, therefore, neither establishes that the caller had any intimate knowledge of the suspect's affairs nor that *691that caller had any inside information concerning illegal conduct. This tipster is apparently both an eyewitness and, pursuant to White and Richardson, in a confidential relationship with the suspect.
¶ 119. In fact, however, the tip in this case does not satisfy the test set forth in J.L., for the caller neither explained how she knew about the alleged criminal activity nor did her tip supply any basis for believing that she had inside information. J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. As a result, this tip adds no weight to the reasonable suspicion calculation. Despite the sound and fury, these facts signify nothing.
HH 1 — I
¶ 120. "[I]f a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable." White, 496 U.S. at 330. The tip here, in my opinion, is unreliable for the purposes of providing a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop Williams. In its analysis of the totality of the circumstances the majority relies upon two additional facts which, it argues, combine with the tip to create reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. The first of these is that the officers had reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot because Williams' hand was extended behind the passenger seat. The second was the officers' observation that the car had no license plates. Neither of these facts, alone or together, sustains its conclusion.
¶ 121. In finding the placement of Williams' arm behind the passenger seat a reason to be suspicious, the majority notes, as it must, that Williams did not make a furtive gesture. Accordingly, it is unreasonable to conclude that Williams may have been reaching for a *692weapon or concealing evidence as he saw the officers approach the vehicle. Majority op. at ¶ 43. The circuit court did not reach a definitive conclusion as to when Williams placed his hand behind the seat. Officer Nor-red testified that when the officers pulled up to the Blazer, he "observed the driver's hand was behind the passenger seat." During cross-examination by defense counsel the following exchange occurred:
Q: [I]t would not be accurate to say that you observed him move his hand from-say from his lap to his right or reaching over behind the seat, it was already there, true?
A: As I recall, it was already back there; I mean, from the point that I first observed him.
When I first noticed him, he had his hand there already, and we were right up in front of him at this point.
¶ 122. The position of Williams' arm is only an innocent detail that adds no weight to the reasonable suspicion calculation. It is likely that in a significant percentage of cases, when an individual is sitting in a parked truck, perhaps elevated slightly higher that one would be in a car, his or her hand may not be in view. Furthermore, contrary to the inference in the majority opinion, Williams was not "reaching" because he saw the officers. Officer Norred testified that Williams' hand was already behind the seat when the officers arrived at the scene.
¶ 123. Then there is the license plate issue. The majority notes that the lack of license plates on the vehicle was not a fact specifically developed or relied upon by the circuit court. Majority op. at ¶ 45. The lack *693of license plates on a vehicle is indicative of nothing more than a lack of license plates. It certainly provides no independent corroboration of the reliability of the tip, for the lack of license plates was not mentioned by the caller. Neither the officers nor the circuit court relied on the lack of plates to justify the stop, and as a result, the issue was not explored at the suppression hearing. We should not rely on it either for it does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of drug dealing; any argument that the officers were investigating a traffic violation is simply post hoc reasoning.
¶ 124. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the officers had a basis for conducting an investigatory stop. However, even if the stop were proper based solely upon the vehicle's alleged lack of license plates, the subsequent frisk was not.
[T]he search of a passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). The majority justifies the frisk primarily on the basis of the position of Williams' arm and the close quarters in which the stop occurred. As has already been discussed, these events took place during broad daylight. Williams did not make a furtive move or engage in any other evasive or suspicious actions. There is no allegation that this was a high crime neighborhood. The anonymous caller *694did not allege that the suspect had a gun. Because the record is devoid of facts that would support a suspicion that Williams was dangerous or may have access to weapons, the majority's conclusion on this point seems to be that, when there is an allegation of drug dealing, officers may reasonably believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. This conclusion, however, is simply a reconstitution of the type of per se, blanket reasoning that the Supreme Court has so thoroughly and explicitly held to be impermissible. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
¶ 125. In sum, the facts of this case relied upon by the majority do not satisfy even the minimal constitutional standards required for a lawful stop or frisk. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 126. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.

 John Bartlett, Bartlett's Familiar Quotations 627 (Justin Kaplan, ed., 16th ed. 1992).

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) was abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).