Court Opinion

ID: 9407669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 21:01:20.805093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.509242
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1175         Doc: 96         Filed: 07/06/2023    Pg: 1 of 10

                                                UNPUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                  No. 22-1175

        BISHOP OF CHARLESTON, d/b/a Roman Catholic Diocese of Charleston, a
        Corporation Sole; SOUTH CAROLINA INDEPENDENT COLLEGES AND
        UNIVERSITIES, INC.,

                                Plaintiffs - Appellants,
                        v.

        MARCIA ADAMS, in her official capacity as the Executive Director of the South
        Carolina Department of Administration; BRIAN GAINES, in his official capacity
        as budget director for the South Carolina Department of Administration; HENRY
        DARGAN MCMASTER, in his official capacity as Governor of South Carolina,

                                Defendants - Appellees,

                        and

        STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

                                Intervenor/Defendant – Appellee.

        ------------------------------

        AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BEND
        THE ARC: A JEWISH PARTNERSHIP FOR JUSTICE; CENTRAL
        CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN RABBIS; DISCIPLES CENTER FOR PUBLIC
        WITNESS; DISCIPLES JUSTICE ACTION NETWORK; EQUAL PARTNERS
        IN FAITH; GLOBAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY
        CHURCHES; HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION; INTERFAITH ALLIANCE
        FOUNDATION; MEN OF REFORM JUDAISM; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
        JEWISH WOMEN; WOMEN OF REFORM JUDAISM; UNION FOR REFORM
        JUDAISM; ORANGEBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT; SOUTH CAROLINA STATE
        CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION;
        THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; PUBLIC FUNDS
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        PUBLIC SCHOOLS;   SOUTHERN    EDUCATION                           FOUNDATION;
        ADVANCEMENT PROJECT NATIONAL OFFICE,

                            Amici Supporting Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:21-cv-01093-BHH)

        Argued: December 7, 2022                                          Decided: July 6, 2023

        Before THACKER, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Daniel Robert Suhr, LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, Illinois, for
        Appellants. Thomas T. Hydrick, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH
        CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina; William Grayson Lambert, OFFICE OF THE
        GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON
        BRIEF: Jeffrey D. Jennings, LIBERTY JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, Illinois; Richard
        S. Dukes, Jr., TURNER PADGET GRAHAM & LANEY, P.A., Charleston, South
        Carolina, for Appellants. Christopher E. Mills, SPERO LAW LLC, Charleston, South
        Carolina; Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III, ROBINSON GRAY STEPP & LAFFITTE,
        LLC, Columbia, South Carolina; Thomas A. Limehouse Jr., Chief Legal Counsel, Michael
        G. Shedd, Deputy Legal Counsel, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF SOUTH
        CAROLINA, for Appellee Governor McMaster. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, J. Emory
        Smith, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORENY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
        Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee State of South Carolina. Eugene H. Matthews,
        RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for
        Appellees Marcia Adams and Brian Gaines.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               The Bishop of Charleston and South Carolina Independent Colleges and

        Universities (“Appellants”) challenge Article XI, Section 4 of the South Carolina

        Constitution (“Section 4”), which prohibits the use of public funds “for the direct benefit

        of any religious or other private educational institution.” In their view, Section 4 violates

        the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause

        of the First Amendment because, although it is facially neutral, its enactment was

        motivated by both racial and religious discriminatory intent. Appellants’ challenge arose

        after the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that Section 4 prevented the Governor of

        South Carolina from awarding certain COVID-19 relief funds to private and religious

        schools, including Appellants. Additionally, after the South Carolina Supreme Court’s

        ruling, the state’s Department of Administration refused to disperse other COVID-19 relief

        funds to private and religious schools pending further judicial direction.

               Because all of the funds at issue have been otherwise allocated and are no longer

        available, this case is moot. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the district court’s

        decision and remand with instructions to dismiss the case.

                                                     I.

               “Our jurisdiction under Article III is limited to cases and controversies.” Holloway

        v. City of Virginia Beach, 42 F.4th 266, 273 (4th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). The

        doctrine of mootness prevents us “from advising on legal questions ‘when the issues

        presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the

        outcome.’” Eden, LLC v. Justice, 36 F. 4th 166, 169 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fleet Feet,

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        Inc. v. NIKE, Inc., 986 F.3d 458, 463 (4th Cir. 2021)). In other words, “federal courts may

        not opine on the merits of a case when doing so would have no practical effect on the

        outcome of the matter.” Holloway, 42 F.4th at 275 (internal quotation marks omitted)

        (citation omitted). This limit applies “throughout the course of litigation, to the moment

        of final appellate disposition.” Catawba Riverkeep Found. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 843

        F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “a case may

        become moot after entry of a district court’s judgment and while an appeal is pending.”

        Eden, LLC, 36 F.4th at 169–70 (citation omitted).

               Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have routinely deemed cases to be moot when there

        are no longer funds available from which the court could provide relief. See, e.g., Cnty. of

        Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 778 F.3d 412, 417 (2d Cir. 2015)

        (dismissing as moot claims regarding funds that had since been reallocated); Cnty. of

        Suffolk, N.Y. v. Sebelius, 605 F.3d 135, 140–42 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that case had

        become moot when federal agency had exhausted the congressional appropriations for the

        relevant grant program and sovereign immunity barred federal court from ordering that the

        contested amounts be paid from another source of funds); City of Houston, Tex. v. Dep’t of

        Hous. & Urb. Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1426–27 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that case was

        moot when federal agency had contractually obligated its entire congressional

        appropriation, either through initial allocations or reallocations, and observing that “once

        the relevant funds have been obligated, a court cannot reach them in order to award relief”);

        W. Va. Ass’n of Comty. Health Cntrs., Inc. v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1576–77 (D.C. Cir.

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        1984) (holding that claims were moot as to funds that had previously been awarded and

        thus were no longer were an available source for relief).

                                                     II.

               In March 2020, as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act

        (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No. 116–136, 134 Stat. 281 (Mar. 27, 2020), Congress established

        the Governor’s Emergency Education Relief (“GEER”) Fund and authorized the Secretary

        of Education to award emergency education relief grants to state governors with an

        approved application. See CARES Act §§ 18002–18008. The CARES Act also imposed

        a use-it-or-lose-it deadline, requiring states to allocate all funds, known as “GEER I” funds,

        within one year or return the funds to the federal government. See id. § 18002(d).

               South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster applied for and received $48,467,924 in

        GEER I funds.      In July 2020, Governor McMaster announced his plan to allocate

        approximately $32 million of the GEER I funds to assist the state’s public and independent

        historically black colleges and universities, and to establish the Safe Access to Flexible

        Education (“SAFE”) Grants Program, which would have provided need based grants for

        eligible students to attend participating private and independent schools. But after a

        challenge to Governor McMaster’s plan, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the

        proposed SAFE Grants Program violated Section 4 because it would have used public

        funds to provide a direct benefit to private schools. See Adams v. McMaster, 851 S.E.2d

        703, 706 (S.C. 2020). Therefore, Governor McMaster reallocated the available GEER I

        funds to other programs prior to the state’s May 11, 2021 one year deadline.

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               In December 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Response and Relief

        Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2021 (“CRRSAA”), Pub. L. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182

        (Dec. 27, 2020), which appropriated additional monies to the GEER Fund (“GEER II

        funds”). The CRRSAA required that GEER II funds be allocated by state governors by

        January 2022. Governor McMaster allocated all of the more than $21 million in GEER II

        funds he was awarded before that deadline.

               In the midst of the GEER Fund allocation, in September 2020, the South Carolina

        General Assembly passed legislation to direct how other CARES Act funds that South

        Carolina had received would be allocated. See 2020 S.C. Act No. 154 (“Act 154”). Among

        other things, Act 154 authorized the South Carolina Department of Administration to

        oversee the distribution of $25 million for a nonprofit relief program, id. § 3(E), and

        $115 million for state and local governments and independent college and university

        expenditures, id. § 3(G). Importantly, the General Assembly directed that the expenditures

        Act 154 authorized were to come from “the remaining portion of the CARES Act funds

        that remain on deposit in the Coronavirus Relief Fund.” Id.at § 1. Though Act 154 would

        have allowed independent colleges and universities to apply for funds, the Department of

        Administration “refrain[ed] from disbursing money to independent colleges and

        universities under the Act without further judicial direction,” J.A. 307 1, as a result of the

        South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in Adams.

               1
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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               Because they were not permitted to apply for or receive GEER funds or Act 154

        funds, Appellants filed this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Section 4.

        Appellants sought a declaration that Section 4 was unconstitutional, injunctive relief

        allowing them the opportunity to apply for GEER funds and Act 154 funds, and nominal

        and compensatory damages. In their Amended Complaint, Appellants named Marcia

        Adams, in her official capacity as the executive director of the South Carolina Department

        of Administration; Brian Gaines, in his official capacity as budget director for the South

        Carolina Department of Administration; and Governor McMaster, in his official capacity

        as Governor of South Carolina; and the State of South Carolina later intervened

        (collectively, “Appellees”).

               After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Appellants

        argued that Section 4 was unconstitutional because it was the result of or motivated by

        racial and religious animus. For their part, Appellees disagreed that Section 4 was the

        result of racial or religious animus, and they asserted that Appellants had failed to

        demonstrate otherwise. In considering the motions for summary judgment, the district

        court first held that insofar as Appellants sought damages against Adams, Gaines, and

        Governor McMaster in their official capacities, sovereign immunity pursuant to the

        Eleventh Amendment barred relief. Additionally, the district court determined that it

        lacked jurisdiction over Appellants’ GEER fund claims for a number of reasons, including

        that the issue was moot because Governor McMaster has fully allocated all GEER I and II

        funds. But because there was not evidence that the Act 154 funds had been exhausted

        when the district court issued its order in February 2022, the district court considered the

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        merits of Appellants’ claims. Ultimately, the district court upheld Section 4, finding that

        Appellants could not demonstrate that Section 4 was motivated by racial or religious

        discriminatory intent. The district court thus granted summary judgment in favor of

        Appellees and dismissed the case.

               In their opening brief in this appeal, Appellants argued that the district court erred

        in upholding the constitutionality of Section 4. Of note, however, Appellants did not

        challenge the district court’s ruling as to sovereign immunity or its determination that

        Appellants’ claims as to the GEER funds were moot. In their Response, Appellees not

        only argued the merits with respect to Section 4, but also argued that the entire case is now

        moot because in June 2021, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted the 2021–2022

        Appropriations Act (the “Appropriations Act”), 2021 S.C. Act No. 94, Part

        1.B, 118.18(A)(5). The Appropriations Act reallocated all monies remaining in South

        Carolina’s Coronavirus Relief Fund, including all Act 154 funds. In reply, Appellants only

        disputed whether Appellees had sufficiently demonstrated that there were no Act 154 funds

        remaining. Indeed, Appellants noted that if this court were to determine that “the case is

        in fact moot because the Act 154 and GEER I and II funds are all irretrievably gone, the

        proper response [would be] to vacate the judgment below and remand for dismissal of the

        case as moot.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4–5.

               After briefing was complete, Appellees filed a “Suggestion of Mootness,” further

        advising the court that all of the Act 154 funds have been not only reallocated but “have

        actually already been dispersed.” See ECF No. 80, Suggestion of Mootness at 5. In

        support, Appellees attached a Declaration of Brian Gaines, in his official capacity as the

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        Director of the Executive Budget Office in the South Carolina Department of

        Administration, which confirmed that there are no funds remaining in South Carolina’s

        Coronavirus Relief Fund. In response to the Suggestion of Mootness, Appellants did not

        contend that their Act 154 claims continue to present a live controversy.              Instead,

        Appellants argued, for the first time, that their claims for nominal and compensatory

        damages were not barred by sovereign immunity, such that this court can continue to

        address the merits of Section 4’s constitutionality.

                                                      III.

               As an initial matter, Appellants’ have missed the opportunity to argue that they are

        entitled to compensatory and nominal damages. “[A] party waives an argument by failing

        to present it in its opening brief or failing to ‘develop [its] argument’ -- even if [its] brief

        takes a passing shot at the issue.” Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC., 856 F.3d 307, 316

        (4th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (alterations in original)). The district court held that

        sovereign immunity barred monetary relief and Appellants did not challenge that ruling in

        their opening brief. Therefore, it is waived.

               As to Appellants’ claims for injunctive relief, this case has clearly become moot.

        Appellees have sufficiently demonstrated that all of the GEER I and II funds, as well as

        the Act 154 funds, 2 have been allocated. Therefore, even if we were to rule in Appellants’

        favor on the merits, we could not provide meaningful injunctive relief because there are no

               2
                Appellee’s Suggestion of Mootness was sufficient to satisfy the court that all Act
        154 funds have been otherwise allocated. By virtue of our decision in this case, the pending
        motion to dismiss, ECF No. 80, is granted.

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        longer any funds for which Appellants could apply. Indeed, Appellants conceded this point

        at oral argument. See Oral Argument 7:15–7:25, Bishop of Charleston v. Adams, No. 22-

        1175 (4th Cir. Dec. 7, 2022) https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/22-1175-

        20221207.mp3 (Q: “there is no dispute . . . that [Appellants’] claim for injunctive relief is

        moot now?” A: “Yes, I believe that’d be right.”).

                                                       IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s decision and remand this

        case with instructions that it be dismissed.

                                            VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

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