Court Opinion

ID: 9789977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:48.369065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.525429
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
Mr. Justice Hall has very ably presented, in his dissenting opinion, views I entertain in respect to the problem confronting us. There are, however, additional reasons why I would hold careless driving and reckless driving to be matters of state concern not subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal court of Colorado Springs.
The State of Colorado, through its legislature, has spoken at length and in detail regarding the regulation of traffic in “The Uniform Safety Code of 1935.” C.R.S. ’53, 13-3 and 13-4. C.R.S. ’53, 13-4-6, is a part of “The Uniform Safety Code of 1935” and directs:
“The provisions of this article shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of this article unless expressly authorized herein. Local authorities may adopt additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions of this article.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Authorization to vary the statutory provisions in some particulars is granted in the Code to local authorities by Sections 13-4-7 and 13-4-34, neither of which affects reckless driving or careless driving as defined in said Code. The exceptions provided in the latter two sections are as follows:
“13-4-7. Powers of local authorities.— (1) The provisions of this article shall not be deemed to prevent lo*225cal authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power except those highways designated as connecting links in the state highway system; from
(a) Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles;
(b) Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic control signals;
(c) Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) Designating particular highways as one way highways and requiring that all vehicles thereon be moved in one specific direction;
(e) Regulating the speed of vehicles;
(f) Designating any highways as a through highway and requiring that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop at one or more entrances to such intersections;
(g) Restricting the use of highways as authorized in sections 13-4-120 to 13-4-131.
(2) No ordinance or regulation enacted under (c), (d), (e) or (f) of subsection (1) of this section shall be effective until signs giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may be most appropriate.”
“13-4-34. When localities may alter limits.— (1) Whenever local authorities within their respective jurisdictions determine upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that the prima facie speed permitted under sections 13-4-33 to 13-4-37 at any intersection is greater than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at such intersection, such local authority shall determine and declare a reasonable and safe prima facie speed limit thereat, which shall be effective when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection or upon the approaches thereto.
*226(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may in their discretion authorize by ordinance higher prima facie speed than those stated in section 13-4-33 upon through highways or upon highways or portions thereof where there are no intersections or between widely spaced intersections provided standard signs are erected giving notice of the authorized speed, but local authorities shall not have the authority to modify or alter the basic rule set forth in subsection (1) of section 13-4-33 or in any event to authorize by ordinance a speed in excess of sixty miles per hour.”
In my opinion, the majority has enervated People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P. (2d) 256. In that case the court construed the Uniform ¡Safety Code of 1935, and I believe indicated that those powers not excepted in the statute were matters of state concern. In the later case of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P. (2d) 614, the exceptions were to some extent mentioned as proper matters for municipal regulation.
Paraphrasing certain of the language in People v. Graham, supra, I would say: “The only question with which we are here concerned is whether the derelictions charged in the complaint are violations of regulations of motor vehicle traffic of a local and municipal nature over which a home rule city has exclusive jurisdiction. If not, the general laws of the state apply.”
There being no exception in favor of local authorities pertaining to reckless driving and careless driving, it seems clear that the mandate that the statutes “shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and in all * * * municipalities therein” effectually bars proceedings against Retallick based upon alleged violations of ordinances. The statutory provisions defining reckless driving and careless driving and providing for penalties are matters of state competence by express mandate of the statute and under the authority of People v. Graham, supra, and are part of the general law of the state.
That the state has adequately and preemptively cov*227ered these two phases of traffic law appears from the following quoted portions of statutory law, omitting penalty provisions:
“Any person who drives any motor vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.” C.R.S. ’53, 13-4-31 (1). 1957 Cum. Supp.
“Any person who drives any motor vehicle in a careless and imprudent manner, without due regard for the width, grade, curves, corner, traffic and use of the streets and highways and all other attendant circumstances is guilty of careless driving.” C.R.S. ’53, 13-4-32 (1). 1957 Cum. Supp.
It would appear that the legislature has enacted a very complete code regulating traffic in the state of Colorado, and with definitude has delineated the limited area in which local authorities may act because certain phases of traffic may present local and municipal problems. Both under the statutes and under the ordinances, reckless driving and careless driving have quite similar meanings.
When the state exercises the police power in an area proper to its exertion, every local authority, including a home rule city, must yield to the dominant authority and recognize that in such area the state occupies it to the exclusion of the local authority. Denver v. Tihen, 77 Colo. 212, 235 Pac. 777; People v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P. (2d) 266. This right to exercise the police power abides in the state, inviolable and inalienable. Idem.
“We must presume that the General Assembly, with full knowledge of the sentiment of all the people, intended to, as it did, declare it to be the public policy of the state that cemeteries not organized or maintained for profit, shall not be liable to assessments. The legislature of a state has sole power to say what the public policy of the state shall be. * * * Our General Assembly *228by statute, in the exercise of its unquestioned power, is the only body competent to say what the public policy of the state shall be, and in it resides the sovereign police power of the state, independent of constitutional or common law provisions. There was, as already stated, in existence at the time of the adoption of article XX, a constitutional exemption from general taxation of cemeteries not for profit, and a statutory exemption from local assessments. That public policy of the state applies to every portion of the state. It is just as applicable to the home rule cities now as it was and is to municipalities organized under general statutes.
“ * * * In making such declaration the General Assembly was exercising its sole right to declare for the entire state what the public policy shall be with reference to the exemption of cemeteries not for profit from all kinds of public burdens and charges. This right of the state to declare its own public policy is an exercise of its inherent, indefinable police power. Among the subjects to which this police power extends are the peace and good order of society, the general welfare, the security and quiet of the people. * * * We do not believe the people in adopting article XX, and the amendments thereto, ever intended to surrender or relinquish any portion of its police power to declare the public policy of the state; but, if it had so intended, it would have been an abortive effort. In no event should the courts hold that the legislature of a state is not supreme throughout its entire territory in the exercise of its sovereign police power, subject, of course, to constitutional restrictions, or that its right and authority to declare its public policy for the entire state has been divested, unless the sovereign people in explicit terms and by constitutional methods have otherwise declared.
“After the adoption of article XX this Court has decided that the state was not precluded thereby from unrestricted regulation of the liquor traffic. Walker v. *229People, 55 Colo. 402, 135 Pac. 794. In Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, we said, at page 325, 87 Pac. 791, that the state statute prohibiting any officer of a municipality from permitting any working man employed by it to work more than eight hours a day was as applicable to home rule, as to other classes of, municipalities. The court there held, and the ruling is peculiarly pertinent here, that the state, in enacting this statute declared what the public policy of the state shall be with respect to hours of labor, and that it still has the supreme power to enact general laws declaring what its public policy shall be. It was further held that while the matter of building and making a public sewer was in a sense a local matter, just as, in one sense, an assessment is, yet, in the full sense, it is of state and governmental import, and the power of the municipality to legislate with respect thereto is subordinate and subject to the police power of the state by which it declared what its public policy should be. This doctrine was approved in Glendinning v. Denver, 50 Colo. 240, 114 Pac. 652, where there was a conflict between a state statute and a municipal ordinance of the city regulating the sale of oleomargarine. In one sense such regulation is local, still legislation with respect to that matter involved the public health and the state law is supreme. The exemption here affects and directly concerns the public welfare, the peace and good order of society, the quiet and security of the people in preserving from profanation the burial places of their dead. In Mauff v. People, 52 Colo. 562, 123 Pac. 101, this court reiterated what it had said a number of times before in the cases just cited, and in other cases which might be referred to, that the purpose of the Home Rule Amendment was to give to the people of home rule cities exclusive control in matters of ‘local concern only,’ and that where the Constitution and general laws are not set aside by express words or necessary implication, they are as much in force in home rule cities as in other portions of the state. That *230if by the Home Rule Amendment it had been undertaken to free the home rule cities from the state Constitution, from statute law, and from the authority of the General Assembly respecting matters other than those of purely local concern, that amendment could not have been upheld. The same doctrine has been declared in People, ex rel. v. Cassiday, 50 Colo. 503, 117 Pac. 357. In the Mauff Case the specific ruling was that the people of the home rule cities cannot legislate in a matter which is one of general interest and that even a municipal election was of such general and public interest that the city could not legislate upon it. Applying the principle laid down in these decisions, we say that while the matter of the taxation and assessment of cemeteries in this state, not organized or maintained for private or corporate profit, is, in a sense, local to every city and county in the state, yet in the larger and fuller sense, considering the general sentiment of all civilized people that ground set apart for the burial place of the dead is sacred, it is a matter of statewide importance and of governmental import, and not merely of local or municipal concern. Certainly in the absence of a specific contrary provision on the subject, this court should not hold that the people of the state did or would consent that cemeteries in any part of the state should be subject to taxation or assessment.” Denver v. Tihen, supra.
Cases subsequent to the Tihen case adhering to the same doctrine are: City and County of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 266 Pac. 214; People v. Denver, 90 Colo. 598, 10 P. (2d) 1106; McCormick v. Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P. (2d) 969; People ex rel. v. Newton, 106 Colo. 61; 101 P. (2d) 21; Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P. (2d) 886; Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 (2d) 441.
In the Bossie case it was held that Denver was subject to a statute requiring the use of materials produced in Colorado in the construction of a court house, and laid down the guide by which to determine when a matter is of statewide concern in this language: “That the build*231ing and maintenance of a court house is of general public interest is manifest from the necessities of justice. That a court house and its usual incidents be maintained in Denver county is of nearly as great importance to the state at large as to Denver, and so of the court house of every other county.”
It is to be noted that under this test the determinative factor is whether the matter involved is of general public interest; the fact that it may have a greater significance to the local authority does not in that event derogate from its character as being of state-wide concern.
People v. Denver, supra, involved the state gasoline tax, and it was held that it was applicable to gasoline used in vehicles propelled on streets and highways in all counties and municipalities in the state, including home rule cities.
Slum clearance and proper housing facilities were held to be of public concern and a proper subject for the exercise of the police power under state sovereignty in the case of People v. Newton, supra.
In Ray v. Denver, supra, this court decided that the state had preempted small loans regulations by legislating upon it. And in Denver v. Sweet, supra, the imposition of income taxes was said to be within the exclusive power of the General Assembly, voiding thereby a city income tax.
It is the import of these cases that, even though a municipality has a concern in a matter, even an important concern, still it is a concern of the state where the matter is of general public interest, and in such event a statute involving policy supersedes a municipal ordinance 'on the same subject. Only where the matter enacted is purely of local and municipal concern is the home rule supreme. We upset firmly entrenched law if we rule otherwise; doctrine enunciated in the Tihen case, and in cases before and after it, is scuttled, as I see it, by the majority views in this case.
Here the state has attempted to effect a very desirable *232end: uniformity in the operation of vehicles over the streets and highways in this state in all phases of traffic movement in which there is a general public interest. It has sought to make such laws applicable to every part of the state, including every municipality. Obviously, the declared public policy of the state in so doing has as its objective doing away with confusing and conflicting laws regarding the traffic of the state. Citizens of this state and of other states would thus not be confronted with a mosaic of traffic laws which add to the hazards of driving and present pitfalls for the unknowing driver.
Actually, the Uniform Safety Code declares the policy of the state on matters of interest to the citizens of the state as a whole, and is a police measure because of its attempt to bring clarity and uniformity out of chaos resulting from diverse and conflicting traffic regulations, thereby reducing the hazards of the road.
This power is in the state and remains with the state until delegated. There is no invasion of the power of home rule cities in this matter, because as to those traffic problems which are essentially of a local and municipal nature, exceptions are made in the statute.
Careless driving depends upon circumstances. Careless driving is nothing more than common law negligence applied to the operation of a vehicle. It has a universal meaning and it can have no different meaning, whether the act is performed in or outside a city; in each instance, circumstances determine the character of the conduct. Reckless driving is in the same category, except that the transgression denotes a greater degree of fault.
For these reasons I am in complete disagreement with the majority.