Court Opinion

ID: 9851083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:07:12.795992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.403802
License: Public Domain

Browning, President,
dissenting:
I dissent. I agree with all five of the syllabus points of the majority and in every case that is cited in the majority opinion. Not one, however, is applicable to the facts of this case. For example, the majority relies upon Preston County Light & Power Company v. Renick, 145 W.Va. 115, 113 S.E.2d *157378. In that case it was held that the utility company had not ceased to be such and was still bound by the Public Service Commission. The heart of the decision was this paragraph:
Under the quoted provisions of the statute and the decisions of this Court in the two above cited cases, the coke company, if it is a public utility, could not discontinue its generation and sale to the power company of the electricity which that company distributes and furnishes to the public or, by discontinuing such generation and sale, divest itself of its status of a public utility, unless the coke company obtains authority from the commission so to do. This the coke company has not done or attempted to do at any time.
In other words, that company had not complied with Code, 24-3-1, 1931, as amended, which provides in part that: “No railroad or other public utility shall discontinue any regular passenger train, or other public service facility . . . without first obtaining authority from the commission so to do, unless the same be done under uniform rules and regulations filed by such railroad or public utility with the public service commission and approved by said commission.”
Prior to 1935, the appellant’s predecessor, Ohio Valley Gas Company, served retail gas customers in portions of Spencer, West Virginia, from a distribution system, and a few rural customers in Roane and Calhoun counties from its transmission lines. The distribution portion of Ohio Valley’s business constituted only about six per cent of its entire enterprise. In view of that fact, Ohio Valley decided to abandon its distribution business and confine its activities wholly to the gathering and transmission of gas as a wholesaler and filed a petition, as provided by statute, with the Public Service Commission alleging it had entered into an agreement with Spencer Gas Company to convey to the latter all its distribution business and remain only in the transmission business thereby relieving it from supervision by the Public Service Commission. In its petition before the Commission in 1935 Ohio Valley alleged “that the proposed sale, if consented to *158and approved, will segregate that part of the petitioner’s business that is subject to regulation from its other business.” The Public Service Commission entered a formal order segregating the transmission and distribution systems of the petitioner and for almost thirty-five years it remained wholly in the transmission business with the Spencer Gas Company being one of its customers. Over that period the rate was raised several times without objection by anyone. On September 5, 1968, Spencer Gas Company filed a complaint against Boggs, successor to Ohio Valley, upon the ground that Boggs was still under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. The Public Service Commission so held and this Court granted this appeal.
It is true as stated in the majority opinion that some rural customers still get gas from the transmission line of Boggs, but Boggs sells no gas to anyone in that area but Spencer Gas Company, and it is through the latter’s meters that the consumers get their gas. In my opinion the instant case is directly in point with the recent case of Wilhite v. Public Service Commission, 150 W.Va. 747, 149 S.E.2d 273. In that case this Court held that the transportation by an individual of his own gas and the sale of such gas to two customers, there being no holding out to the public generally, does not bring an individual within the authority of the Public Service Commission. For a discussion of the Wilhite case, see Comment, 69 W. Va. L. Rev. 92 (1966). It is true that Boggs’ predecessor was once under the supervision of the Public Service Commission but in my opinion the order of the Commission of 1935 pursuant to the statute heretofore quoted clearly relieved Boggs’ predecessor of any control by the Public Service Commission. It became an independent wholesaler who could sell to whomever it chose, and even though in this instance the predecessor did agree to continue to supply the gas to the area, it was not under the control of the Public Service Commission and not subject to any rate other than that agreed to by the petitioner.
I would reverse the order of the Public Service Commission for the reasons stated herein.