Court Opinion

ID: 9732223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:12:17.285901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:13.170732
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm defendant’s conviction for first degree murder. I further agree that defendant’s death sentence must be vacated. However, I base this second conclusion on other grounds. The sole aggravating factor advanced by the State for defendant’s death penalty eligibility was that he had been convicted of murdering two or more individuals. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(3) (West 1996). Section 9 — 1(b)(3) of the Criminal Code authorizes the imposition of the death penalty when “the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section [first degree murder] or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(b)(3) (West 1996). Defendant contends that his conviction for manslaughter in New York cannot be used to find him eligible for the death penalty because section 9 — 1(b)(3) clearly states that a defendant must have been convicted of “murdering” two or more individuals. This court’s primary objective when construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996). An inquiry into the legislative intent behind a statute must necessarily begin with the language of the statute. People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233, 253 (1989). The statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where that language is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the statute without further aids of statutory construction. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d at 457. Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, this court’s review is de novo. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d at 457. In drafting section 9 — 1(b)(3), the General Assembly specifically chose to use the word “murder.” Murder is a term of art describing a specific crime. Had the General Assembly intended for homicides not resulting in murder convictions in other states to trigger death penalty eligibility, the legislature would have used a broader term such as “killing” or “homicide.” Instead, the General Assembly specifically required that a defendant be convicted of “murdering” two or more individuals. The legislature’s intent in section 9 — 1(b)(3) is clear and unambiguous: in order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, he must have been convicted of murdering, and not simply killing, two or more people. Defendant’s conviction from New York, upon which his death penalty eligibility was predicated, however, was not for murder but for manslaughter. Thus, defendant does not meet the death penalty eligibility requirements under section 9 — 1(b)(3) and is entitled to the vacation of his death sentence and a new sentencing hearing.