Court Opinion

ID: 9408209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 19:08:52.197871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.759594
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Javier Perez-Diaz,                        :
                     Appellant            :   No. 474 C.D. 2021
                                          :
          v.                              :   Submitted: February 4, 2022
                                          :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,             :
Department of Transportation,             :
Bureau of Motor Vehicles                  :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                          FILED: July 11, 2023

               Javier Perez-Diaz (Perez-Diaz) appeals from the March 25, 2021 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (trial court) that denied and dismissed his
appeal from a cumulative six-month suspension of Perez Car Renew & Towing’s (the
Station) certificate of appointment as an official safety inspection station.     The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (Department), Bureau
of Motor Vehicles (Bureau), imposed the suspension pursuant to Section 4724 of the
Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724, based on an inspection performed on
November 1, 2018, by Perez-Diaz’s employee, Paul Velez (Velez). Upon review, we
affirm.
                I.    BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               Perez-Diaz owns and operates the Station in Temple, Pennsylvania.
Pursuant to certifications issued by the Bureau, the Station has performed vehicle
inspections as an official safety inspection station. On August 28, 2019, the Bureau
issued an order which suspended the Station’s certificate of appointment as an official
safety inspection station. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 14a-15a.) In this order, the
Bureau advised Perez-Diaz that the suspension was being imposed because on
November 1, 2018, the Station had passed a vehicle with the following items failing
inspection: “emergency brake cable mounts broken, hole in frame unibody, exhaust
leaking, struts leaking oil, fail bounce test, [and] no battery tie down, indicating vehicle
passed in MV[-]431.” (R.R. at 14a.) The Bureau cited violations of 67 Pa. Code §
175.51(a) for faulty inspection of equipment or parts, improper recordkeeping, and
improperly assigning certificate of inspection, and imposed three consecutive two-
month suspensions. The cumulative six-month suspension took effect on October 9,
2019. Id.
             On September 17, 2019, Perez-Diaz timely filed an appeal of the six-
month suspension of the Station’s certificate of appointment with the trial court. On
December 8, 2020, the trial court held a hearing de novo. At the hearing, the Bureau
presented the testimony of Brian Sweikert, a Quality Assurance Officer. Sweikert
testified that he received a complaint about issues with a 2004 Hyundai Elantra
(Vehicle) with a brand-new inspection sticker. (R.R. at 43a.) The purchaser took the
Vehicle to a garage, which found that there were “holes in the frame,” and “other major
issues and other concerns,” and that it should not have passed inspection. Id. Sweikert
spoke to the purchaser of the Vehicle, who agreed to take it to another business for
Sweikert to inspect it. Sweikert’s inspection took place on December 18, 2018, and
the original inspection was completed on November 1, 2018. (R.R. at 48a.) Sweikert
testified that “[t]he results of my inspection showed that the battery tie down was
missing, the struts were leaking and/or severely damaged. Holes in the frame. The e-
brake cables detached from the vehicle, and exhaust leak.” (R.R. at 49a.) Sweikert

                                             2
determined that the safety inspection sticker on the Vehicle had been issued by the
Station. (R.R. at 50a-52a.) Sweikert stated that with the specific deficiencies he found
during his inspection of the vehicle, the Vehicle should have failed inspection. (R.R.
at 54a-62a.) Sweikert stated the difference in the mileage listed on the inspection
sticker and the mileage on the day he performed the reinspection was within 93 to 97
miles. (R.R. at 64a.) Sweikert testified that it was not possible for the rust hole in the
Vehicle’s unibody to have become as large as it was “in 90-some miles or 43 days.”
(R.R. at 65a.) Sweikert further testified that each one of the deficiencies he found
would have required failure of the safety inspection. Id. Photos and documents from
Sweikert’s investigation of the Vehicle’s deficiencies were admitted into evidence
without objection. (R.R. at 81a, 114a-143a.)
             Sweikert visited Perez-Diaz’s Station on February 21, 2019, and viewed
the MV-341 vehicle inspection log, which showed none of the deficiencies found in
the reinspection for the Vehicle. (R.R. at 68a-89a.) Sweikert questioned Perez-Diaz
about the inspection, and he indicated that Velez, his employee at the time, performed
the inspection; however, Velez was no longer working at the Station as he had resigned
the week prior. (R.R. at 76a.) As to the Bureau’s decision to suspend Perez-Diaz’s
certification, Sweikert testified that after a Bureau meeting it was determined that
Perez-Diaz would not be offered points in lieu of suspension. (R.R. at 83a.)
             On March 25, 2021, the trial court denied and dismissed Perez-Diaz’s
appeal and directed the suspension to be reinstated. (R.R. at 192a.) The trial court
noted in its order that
              it is not within the [trial court’s] authority to levy what it may
              consider a more appropriate penalty absent a different finding
              than what the [Department] reached. The [trial court] is not
              privy to [the Department’s] reasoning for choosing to run
              three two-month suspensions consecutively rather than
              concurrently or offering the alternative point penalty as

                                             3
               permitted under 67 Pa. Code § 175.51. After hearing,
               however, the [trial court] finds the incident occurred (which
               resulted in three separate citations), and that the law now
               dictates this outcome.
Id. On April 26, 2021, Perez-Diaz timely appealed to this Court. The trial court
complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. In its opinion, the trial
court indicated that it determined the Department met its burden to demonstrate that
there were violations for faulty inspection of equipment or parts, improper record
keeping, and improper assignment of certificate of inspection. The trial court noted
that, although it found Perez-Diaz’s testimony credible that he was unaware of Velez’s
actions,
               67 Pa. Code §175.29(a)(6) creates strict liability for a station
               owner to be fully responsible for the actions of his
               employees “without or without actual knowledge” in
               regards to:
               (i)    Every inspection conducted by an employe of the
                      inspection station.
               (ii) Every inspection conducted on the premises.
               (iii) Every certificate of inspection issued to the
                      inspection station.
               (iv) Every certificate of inspection issued by the
                      inspection station.
               (v) A violation of the Vehicle Code[1] or this chapter
                      related to inspections committed by an employe of
                      the inspection station.
(Trial Court Opinion at 6; R.R. at 206a.)

      1
          75 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-9701.

                                              4
                                     II.   ISSUES
                           2
               On appeal, Perez-Diaz presents three issues for our review. First, Perez-
Diaz argues the trial court erred in determining that the Station’s certificate of
appointment should be suspended because Velez’s inspection of the Vehicle was
performed without his knowledge or consent. Second, Perez-Diaz contends the trial
court erred in determining the regulation found at 67 Pa. Code § 175.29(a)(6), which
was promulgated in accordance with 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724(a), are constitutional. Third,
Perez-Diaz asserts the trial court erred in determining he was not entitled to a point
assessment rather than the imposed suspension.

                                       III.    DISCUSSION
   A. Strict Liability
             Perez-Diaz contends that his employee, Velez, was acting outside the
scope of his employment when he committed the three inspection violations because
Velez was not hired “to perform insufficient or improper inspections.” (Appellant’s
Br. at 12).
               We begin with a review of the relevant law. Pursuant to the Vehicle Code,
the Department is required to license and regulate vehicle inspection stations. In
pertinent part, section 4724(a) states:
               The [D]epartment shall supervise and inspect official
               inspection stations and may suspend the certificate of
               appointment issued to a station which it finds is not properly
               equipped or conducted or which has violated or failed to
               comply with any of the provisions of this chapter or
               regulations adopted by the [D]epartment.

       2
         Our scope of review in an inspection certificate suspension case “is limited to determining
whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether the trial court’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence.” Fiore Auto Service v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, 735 A.2d 734 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), appeal denied, 739 A.2d 545 (Pa. 1999). Questions of
witness credibility are solely within the province of the trial court. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Karzenowski, 508 A.2d 618, 620 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).

                                                 5
75 Pa. C.S. § 4724(a). This provision of the Code “has been construed to impose strict
liability on a station owner for all acts of its employees conduct[ed] within the scope
of their employment.” McCarthy v. Department of Transportation, 7 A.3d 346, 350
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v.
Stahl, 460 A.2d 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)); 67 Pa. Code § 175.29 (relating to
obligations and responsibilities of stations).
             Section 175.51(a) of the Vehicle Code states that “[t]he complete
operation of an official inspection station is the responsibility of the owner.” 67
Pa. Code § 175.51(a) (emphasis added). To that end, the station owner’s obligations
and responsibilities as an official inspection station are set forth in 67 Pa. Code §
175.29. The station owner’s liability is set forth in Section 175.29(a), which states, in
pertinent part:
             (a) Personal liability. It is the responsibility of an inspection
                 station to do all of the following:
                 ....
                 (6) To assume full responsibility, with or without
                 actual knowledge, for:
                     (i)    Every inspection conducted by an employe of
                            the inspection station.
                     (ii) Every inspection conducted on the premises.
                     (iii) Every certificate of inspection issued to the
                            inspection station.
                     (iv) Every certificate of inspection issued by the
                            inspection station.
                     (v) A violation of the Vehicle Code or this chapter
                            related to inspections committed by an employe
                            of the inspection station.

67 Pa. Code § 175.29(a)(6) (emphasis added).
            For an act to fall within the “scope of employment,” the employee’s
conduct must: (1) be of the kind he was employed to perform; (2) occur within the

                                            6
authorized time and space limits; and (3) and be done at least in part to serve the
employer.      Stahl, 460 A.2d at 1225; see also Strickland v. Department of
Transportation, 574 A.2d 110 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (holding employer liable for his
employees’ actions in performing faulty vehicle inspections because the employees
were hired to perform vehicle inspections, the inspections occurred during regular
business hours, and the employer received financial remuneration for the employees
performing the inspections). The station owner can defend an enforcement action by
showing that the employee acted outside the scope of his employment. McCarthy, 7
A.3d at 351.
               Applying this three-pronged test to this case, Velez was acting within the
scope of his employment. First, Velez conducted the inspection of the Vehicle at the
Station. Second, the inspection occurred within the Station during normal work hours
while Velez was present and scheduled to be working at the Station. Last, the MV-431
sheet shows that the owner of the Vehicle paid the Station $259.30 for performing the
inspection and making repairs to the vehicle. By obtaining payment from the vehicle
owner for the inspection and repairs, Velez’s conduct was done at least in part to serve
Perez-Diaz and the Station. Strickland, 574 A.2d at 113; Shuman’s Estate v. Weber,
419 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super. 1980).
               Because Velez’s conduct was done within the scope of his employment,
the general law of agency has application here and Perez-Diaz does have strict liability
for the conduct of his employees relative to the inspection of motor vehicles.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Searer, 413 A.2d 1157, 1159
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Therefore, as the trial court stated, we conclude that “the
Department was entitled to hold [Perez-Diaz] responsible for Mr. Velez’s violations.”
(Trial Court Opinion at 7).

                                            7
   B. Constitutionality of Department’s Regulations
             Next, we address Perez-Diaz’s argument that the regulation at 67 Pa. Code
§ 175.29(a)(6), which was promulgated in accordance with 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724(a), is
unconstitutional as the implications of such regulation allow broad discretion to the
Department. (Appellant’s Br. at 13). Perez-Diaz argues that under section 4724(a),
the adoption of section 175.29(a)(6) provides the Department with “broad discretion in
the implementation of punishment” of the regulations. (Appellant’s Br. at 14). Perez-
Diaz argues that the regulation interferes with his right to run a business and earn
income, which he asserts are fundamental rights, and, therefore, we must utilize the
strict scrutiny test. (Appellant’s Br. at 13).
             In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court did not address this
argument as Perez-Diaz waived the issue by not raising it before the trial court. The
trial court further stated that even if Perez-Diaz properly preserved the issue, he did not
identify “the bases for his challenge or state how or why the statute is constitutionally
infirm,” and for that reason, the trial court did not address the issue. (Trial Court
Opinion at 7-8.) However, we conclude that Perez-Diaz did properly raise the issue in
his brief before the trial court. (R.R. at 149a.)
             From what this Court can surmise from Perez-Diaz’s brief, he argues that
the Department’s broad discretion in the implementation of punishment has interfered
with his ability to run a business and earn an income. (Appellant’s Br. at 14.) Perez-
Diaz cites to no authority to support the proposition that he has a fundamental right to
operate the Station or how 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724(a) is unconstitutional, and instead, he
merely cites to authority regarding the strict scrutiny test. (Appellant’s Br. at 13-14).
Previously, our Supreme Court has held that no one has a “fundamental right” to
operate an official safety inspection station. Commonwealth v. W.J. Harris and Son,
170 A.2d 591, 592 (Pa. 1961).         As an inspection station owner’s certificate of
appointment to conduct vehicle inspections is a privilege and not a fundamental

                                             8
right, legislation affecting it must be evaluated under a rational basis analysis. Cf.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Middaugh, 244 A.3d
426, 434 (Pa. 2021). Once a violation of the inspection provisions of the Code has
taken place, the Department has not only the power set by 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724, but the
duty to suspend the certificate of appointment. Searer, 413 A.2d at 1159. Thus, we
utilize the rational basis test, not strict scrutiny as Perez-Diaz argues, in reviewing his
constitutional claim.
             In Probst v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,
the Supreme Court set forth the following two-step analysis:
             First, we determine whether the challenged statute seeks to
             promote any legitimate interest or public value. If so, we then
             determine whether the classification adopted in the legislation
             is reasonably related to accomplishing that articulated stated
             interest or interests. In undertaking this analysis, we are free
             to hypothesize reasons the legislature might have had for the
             classification, and will not declare a genuine classification
             void even if we might question the soundness or wisdom of
             the distinction. Furthermore, we keep in mind that because a
             presumption of constitutionality attaches to any lawfully
             enacted legislation, the burden is upon the party attacking a
             statute to rebut the presumption of constitutionality by a clear,
             palpable, and plain demonstration that the rational basis test
             is not met.

849 A.2d 1135, 1133 (Pa. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Applying the first step,
the Bureau is protecting the public from unsafe vehicle inspections by imposing a
suspension of an inspection station’s certificate of appointment when that station has
committed a violation of inspection regulations. W.J. Harris, 170 A.2d at 592; Searer,
413 A.2d at 1159. As to the second step, imposing a suspension is “reasonably related
to accomplishing the articulated state interest” of protecting the public from unsafe
vehicle inspections because it encourages the station owner to perform all future
inspections in strict conformity with vehicle inspection regulations for the safety of the

                                            9
vehicle owner and public.      Probst, 849 A.2d at 1144.        There is no doubt that
encouraging a station owner to provide safe inspections to the station’s customers is a
“legitimate interest or public value.” Id. Therefore, we conclude that 67 Pa. Code §
175.29(a)(6) passes the two-step rational basis test.
             Lastly, regarding the constitutionality of 67 Pa. Code § 175.29(a)(6) as
promulgated by 75 Pa. C.S. § 4724(a), we note that there is “a presumption of
constitutionality attaching to any lawfully enacted legislation” and “[s]hould the
constitutionality of such legislation be challenged, the challenger must meet the burden
of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality by a clear, palpable, and plain
demonstration that the statute violated a constitutional provision.”        McKeown v.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 869 A.2d 556, 560 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2004) (citing James v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
477 A.2d 1302, 1304 (Pa. 1984)). For state police power to be exercised reasonably,
it must be in “the interests of the public generally,” “the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and must “not be unduly oppressive
upon individuals.”      George Washington Motor Lodge Co. v. Department of
Transportation, 545 A.2d 493, 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). The requirements contained
in § 175.29(a)(6) support the “interests of the [motoring] public generally,” are
“reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose” of protecting the public
from unsafe vehicle inspections, and are not “unduly oppressive upon individuals.” Id.
This is because the requirements of section 175.29(a)(6) are directed towards one
person, generally the inspection station owner who is also the holder of the certificate
of appointment, because he/she are in the best position to oversee vehicles inspections
and ensure that they are performed in accordance with the Department’s regulations.
Section 175.29(a)(6) necessitates the attentiveness of the station owner in overseeing
vehicles’ inspections performed by the station employees to effectuate the safety of not
only the vehicle owner but for anyone in the vicinity of the vehicle during its operation.

                                           10
               We conclude that Perez-Diaz failed to show that both 67 Pa. Code §
175.29(a)(6) is an unreasonable exercise of state police power, George Washington
Motor Lodge Co., 545 A.2d at 496, and that its promulgating statute 75 Pa. C.S. §
4724(a) is a “clear, palpable, and plain” violation of the constitution, McKeown, 869
A.2d at 560.
   C. Points v. Penalty
               Finally, Perez-Diaz argues that when the Department explained why the
point assessment was not offered, it set forth a “list of ambiguous charges,” which are
not applicable to the case. (Appellant’s Br. at 16). Perez-Diaz contends that the
testimony at the trial court’s hearing directly contradicted the Department’s reasons for
choosing suspension over points.
               In relevant part, 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(b)(1) provides:
                     (b) Assignment of points. The Department will permit
                    the station owner to consent to the acceptance of a point
                    assessment for the station in lieu of suspension, if the
                    station owner, manager, supervisor or other
                    management level employe was without knowledge of
                    the violation, and should not have known of the
                    violation.
                            (1) The station owner bears the burden of
                            proving that the station owner provided
                            proper supervision of the employe who
                            committed the violation, but that the owner’s
                            supervision could not have prevented the
                            violation.

67 Pa. Code § 175.51(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulation authorizes the
assessment of points in lieu of suspension, and it imposes a burden upon a station owner
to establish eligibility.
               In cases where the owner of a licensed inspection station has no
knowledge of an employee’s violation of state regulations, the Department must

                                            11
consider offering points in lieu of suspension of the owner’s certificate and provide
evidence of such consideration. McCarthy, 7 A.3d at 353; 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(b)(1)
(stating that if a station owner had no knowledge of an employee’s violation, the
Department may permit the acceptance of a point assessment in lieu of suspension).
The evidence must explain why the Department chose or declined to offer points in
lieu of suspension. Id. However, “the point system is only an option when an employee
performs a faulty inspection without the knowledge of the station manager despite the
station manager’s proper supervision.” Castagna v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 831 A.2d 156, 162 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (emphasis added).
The station owner bears the burden of proving that he properly supervised the employee
who committed the violation but that such supervision could not have prevented the
violation. McCarthy, 7 A.3d at 352; 67 Pa. Code § 175.51(b)(1). In Kerbeck v.
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, 459 A.2d 908, 909 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1983), we found that the station owner’s testimony, rather than proving
supervision of the employee, had instead established the lack of supervision of the
employee who committed the offense. There, the station owner testified that he “hired
what [he] believe[d] to be competent people, and that was [his] way to supervise [the
Station] by hiring competent people to do the job.” Id.
              Here, Perez-Diaz failed to explain what procedures, if any, he had in place
to supervise Velez’s performance of the vehicle inspections. Like the station owner in
Kerbeck, Perez-Diaz’s testimony established that he did not provide Velez with any
supervision, namely because “the reason [he] hired [Velez] was because he was a state
inspector.” (R.R. at 100a.) Perez-Diaz testified that he considered himself responsible
only for the inspections he performed, and not those performed by Velez. (R.R. at
109a-110a.)    He further testified that he did not spot check or supervise Velez

                                           12
performing inspections. (R.R. at 100a, 103a-104a.) Because Perez-Diaz offered no
evidence regarding his procedure for overseeing or reviewing Velez’s work, he failed
to satisfy his burden of proof regarding proper supervision.
              Moreover, the Bureau’s evidence at the hearing demonstrated that it
considered, but rejected, point assessment in this case. In a form titled, “Consideration
of Point Assessment in Lieu of Suspension,” a Department representative authorized
and signed on August 1, 2019, the Department’s reason for refusing to offer Perez-Diaz
a point assessment, which it described as the “Owner/Manager unable to establish if
supervision was provided at the time of the violation(s).” (R.R. at 4a.) This is the only
reason on the form that the Department representative authorized for suspending the
Station’s license in lieu of points.3          Because the record demonstrates that the
Department considered the point assessment option, and explained its reason for
declining it, the Department has satisfied its burden. See McCarthy, 7 A.3d at 353
(“[I]n all inspection certificate suspension cases, the Department must at least consider
the use of the points system and provide evidence of this consideration.”) (emphasis in
original). But see Strickland, 574 A.2d at 114 (vacating and remanding to the trial
court for reconsideration of penalty where the record was silent as to whether the
Department considered or offered the point-assessment option).
              Accordingly, we conclude that Perez-Diaz’s testimony established that he
did not provide Velez with supervision at the Station, and, therefore, did not satisfy his
burden of proof. Furthermore, we conclude that the record reflects that the Department
considered the assessment of points in lieu of suspension.

       3
          In his brief, Perez-Diaz argues the Department set forth numerous reasons why point
assessment was not offered in the list of “ambiguous charges” on its “Consideration of Point
Assessment in Lieu of Suspension.” (Appellant’s Br. at 16-17.) We note that the only reason selected
by the Department representative to authorize suspension over points was “Owner/Manager unable
to establish if supervision was provided at the time of the violation(s).” (R.R. at 4a.)

                                                13
                    IV.    CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

                              ________________________________
                              PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                             14
              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Javier Perez-Diaz,                      :
                     Appellant          :    No. 474 C.D. 2021
                                        :
         v.                             :
                                        :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
Department of Transportation,           :
Bureau of Motor Vehicles                :

                                    ORDER

              AND NOW, this 11th day of July, 2023, the March 25, 2021 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County is AFFIRMED.

                                            ________________________________
                                            PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge