Court Opinion

ID: 9491368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:12:00.115335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:41.466775
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I fully concur with the majority’s well-reasoned disposition of the issues relating to Brown’s conviction and sentence, I cannot agree with its dismissal of Meadows’s conviction for aiding and abetting, and for conspiracy. I dissent in this regard for two reasons: (1) there was more than sufficient evidence presented at trial for any rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Meadows knew that the waiting list was a necessary requirement for obtaining Section 8 public housing, and (2) Meadows waived any challenge to her conspiracy conviction by not mentioning, much less arguing, the issue in her appellate brief.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The majority claims that none of the evidence the government produced at trial demonstrated that Meadows “had any understanding of the waiting list’s function or purpose or proper use.” I respectfully disagree. The evidence presented at trial and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom were more than sufficient for a rational fact-finder to conclude that Meadows knew that the waiting list was a requirement for obtaining Section 8 housing. Such evidence can be summarized as follows:
Meadows worked as one of four “housing-eligibility investigators” in the Detroit Section 8 office. Her job duties included certifying tenants as being eligible to participate in the Section 8 program. Meadows was thus intimately involved in the process of moving people into Section 8 public housing. Ms. Walsh, a housing management specialist for HUD who monitored and provided training to the Detroit office, testified that she discussed the waiting list with members of the Detroit Section 8 staff “at least a dozen times.” One of these staff members testified that the use of the waiting list was common knowledge in the office.
As part of her job duties as a housing eligibility investigator, Meadows would from time to time answer calls at the front lobby switchboard. A copy of the actual waiting list was kept nearby as a ready reference for those who manned the switchboard. Numerous telephone calls were received every day from individuals who were either on the waiting list and wanted to know where they stood on the list, or who were not on the waiting list and wanted to know if it was going to open up soon. Staff members manning the switchboard, including Meadows, would respond to these calls by looking to see where the person’s name was on the waiting list, or by telling them that the list was closed if their name was not on the list. Unless one were to assume that the staff members were engaging in a completely useless or pointless enterprise, the most reasonable inference to draw from this activity is that only those at the top of the waiting list were in line to receive Section 8. housing. Reenforcing this assessment of the realities in the Section 8 office was the fact that a sign was placed prominently on the front door stating that the waiting list was closed. Indeed, for the period of time that Meadows worked at the Section 8 office, HUD had placed a freeze on anyone new being placed on the list.
From all of this evidence concerning the day-to-day activities in the Section 8 office, it would seem obvious to anyone working there that the waiting list was a key component in obtaining Section 8 housing. What else would explain all the telephone calls from the public inquiring about the waiting list, or the need to inform the public that the list was closed? Surely people would not make inquiries on a daily basis concerning something that was unimportant or irrelevant to obtaining Section 8 public housing.
To the majority, however, the above-mentioned evidence only indicates that Meadows was aware of the existence of the waiting list; not that being on the list was a legal precon*491dition to obtaining Section 8 public housing. Such a waiting list, however, does not exist in a vacuum. It has an' obvious, commonly understood purpose of serving as a fair “first come-first served” method of gaining access to public housing. There is no indication that Meadows was mentally impaired or was so lacking in common sense that she was incapable of making this obvious connection.
Based on all the above, I believe it is naive to conclude that Meadows did not fully understand that the waiting list was a requirement to receive Section 8 housing. Indeed, Meadows herself noted that her prior boss, Mr. Bush, offered public housing “giveaways” for friends and family of employees at the Section 8 housing office. Far from indicating that the waiting list was not a requirement, this evidence shows that the various members of the Section 8 office devised methods of getting around the requirement. If Meadows did not know that the waiting list was a requirement to receive public housing, then why would Mr. Bush arrange such “giveaways”as a bonus for the Detroit staff?
As an alternative basis for reversing Meadows’s convictions on Counts 47-50, the majority argues that the government introduced no evidence indicating that Meadows “played any sort of active role” in “aiding and abetting the filing of the documents.” Again I respectfully disagree. Despite the fact that the law requires a person to be on the waiting list in order to obtain Section 8 housing, Meadows was able to induce Brown to provide such housing for her children, her mother, her brother, and her sister, even though none of them had ever been on the waiting list. In addition, Meadows also helped a number of her friends and acquaintances get into contact with Brown, which eventually led to them receiving Section 8 public housing despite having never been on the waiting list. For example, Meadows’s hairdresser, Kit Martin, testified that he asked Meadows to help his wife’s nieces get into Section 8 housing. Meadows replied that she could not guarantee that the nieces could get in because of the waiting list, but that she would talk to Brown about it.
On a number of occasions, Meadows served as a courier for the documents and forms her friends and family needed to get into public housing. Evidence was introduced that on at least one occasion a friend of Meadows got into Section 8 housing after a joint meeting with Meadows and Brown. A week later, Meadows brought application papers to the friend and then returned the completed forms to the Section 8 office. Within a few weeks, the friend was placed in public housing. In addition, Meadows brought to her mother the forms she needed to obtain Section 8 public housing. Although the persons Brown assisted in his “public-housing-for-money” scheme paid substantial sums for his help, Meadows’s relatives and friends were never required to make such payments. The reason for this notable difference is that Meadows had a “personal relationship” with Brown.
The majority believes that none of this evidence indicates that Meadows “did any act to bring the § 1001 offenses about.” In order to be guilty of aiding and abetting, however, an individual need only engage in acts designed to facilitate the commission of the unlawful act. United States v. Evans, 883 F.2d 496, 501 (6th Cir.1989). The government is not required to prove that Meadows actually filled out or submitted the false documents to HUD. Cf. United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832, 834-35 (6th Cir.1982) (“it is not necessary that appellant actually touched or possessed the cocaine.”). By arranging meetings between Brown and her friends and family, by physically carrying the necessary forms and documents for her friends and family to fill out, and by using her “personal relationship” with' Brown to assure the processing of the Section 8 applications, Meadows facilitated in the filing of false documents with HUD.
Given that there was more than sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Meadows knew that the waiting list was a requirement to gain Section 8 public housing, and that she aided and abetted Brown in filing false documents, I would affirm Meadows’s conviction on counts 47-50. See United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 265 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the jury’s verdict should be *492upheld when, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Procedural Waiver
The other issue on which I differ with the majority is its handling of Meadows’s conspiracy conviction under Count 46. While noting the belatedness of Meadows’s request at the conclusion of oral argument for her conspiracy conviction to be reversed, the majority nonetheless • reverses the conviction. Rather than granting Meadows’s request, I firmly believe that the majority should instead have refrained from even considering the issue because of Meadows’s failure to challenge her conspiracy conviction in her appellate brief.
Rule 28(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party’s brief contain “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” Commenting on this rule, the Third Circuit in United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050 (3d Cir.1996), deemed the defendant to' have waived any issue that was raised for the first time at oral argument because “consideration of that [argument] would vitiate the requirement of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.” . Id. at 1064 n. 4; see also United States v. Still, 102 F.3d 118, 122 n. 7 (5th Cir.1996) (declining to address defendant’s challenge to all six counts on which he was convicted because “[a]n appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.”); United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1544-45 (9th Cir.1995) (declining to reach the merits of the defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument because his brief failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 28); United States v. Zarmino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (“It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”).
Meadows’s brief never made, much less hinted at, any challenge to her conviction on Count 46 for conspiracy. Instead, Meadows’s brief does not go beyond requesting that “this Honorable Court ... vacate her conviction on Counts 47-50.” The provisions of Rule 28 are not simply a technical nicety; they have a direct impact on the functioning of the adversary system. The government in this case, for example, never had an opportunity either in its appellate brief or at oral argument to respond to Meadows’s request to reverse her conspiracy conviction.
The majority’s insistence on using the last minute plea of Meadows’s counsel to reverse her conspiracy conviction is not only unwarranted (because the evidence is more than sufficient to support the conviction), but is also bad precedent (because it disregards Rule 28(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure). Needless to say, I believe that the majority’s invocation of Fed. R.App. P. 2 to override Rule 28 is unjustified in light of my conclusion that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Meadows’s conviction by the jury. Furthermore, the discretion provided for in Rule 2 should only be exercised “in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the appellee.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 66, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412, 417 (9th Cir.1993) (recognizing that application of Rule 2 is prohibited where the government has suffered prejudice from the defendant’s failure to raise the issue on appeal). Noticeably absent from the majority’s invocation of Rule 2 is any discussion of prejudice to the government. The prejudice caused by the summary reversal of Meadows’s conspiracy conviction without providing the government an opportunity to respond should be readily apparent.
For all the above reasons, I would hold that Meadows has waived her right to challenge her conviction for conspiracy under Count 46.