Court Opinion

ID: 9675686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:02:13.882883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:37.195913
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The Supreme Court of the United States has now made explicit the fact that Wither-spoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)1 and its progeny,2 have drawn the outer limit beyond which the State has no “valid” or “legitimate interest” in excluding prospective jurors for cause, on account of their “feelings,” “views,” “beliefs,” or “opinions” about the death penalty.3 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). [Hereinafter, Adams.]
According to the Court, “Witherspoon ... is a limitation on the State’s power to *941exclude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on ‘any broader basis’ than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death penalty cannot be carried out. Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, [391 U.S.] at 522, n. 21 [88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 21] ...” Adams, supra, 100 S.Ct. at 2527.
And on what basis has the Court drawn the “line of neutrality,” the point at which the State’s “legitimate interest” ends, and the point past which execution of the death penalty “cannot be carried out?” As seen by the Court, the constitutional stakes are high:
“In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.
It is, of course, settled that a State may not entrust the determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal ‘organized to convict.’ [Citations omitted] It requires but a short step from that principle to hold, as we do today, that a State may not entrust the determination of whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death. Specifically, we hold that a sentence of death cannot be carried out IF the jury that imposed or recommended it WAS CHOSEN BY excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. NO DEFENDANT can constitutionally be put to death at the hands of a tribunal SO SELECTED.” 4
Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521-523, 88 S.Ct. at 1776-1778.
In short, the State — having no “legitimate interest” beyond obtaining a capital jury which will follow the law and abide by the juror’s oath — is prohibited from employing any method of selection which operates to exclude jurors for cause on a broader criterion, because the Sixth Amendment forbids the result: “a tribunal, organized to return a verdict of death;” “a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die.”
The Supreme Court has provided a great deal of guidance to assist the states with their burden of implementing constitutional methods of juror selection in capital cases.5 But the burden of effectuating the Wither-spoon doctrine ultimately falls upon the states, including the legislatures and courts as well as those involved in prosecution. Not only the capital defendant has a great stake in the method of selection employed to obtain his jury:
“If the voir dire testimony in a given case indicates that veniremen were excluded on any broader basis than this, the death sentence cannot be carried out even if applicable statutory or case law in the relevant jurisdiction would appear to support only a narrower ground of exclusion.”
*942Witherspoon at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 21. Thus, in Texas, the death penalty is not only vacated, but by virtue of Article 37.07, § 3(c), V.A.C.C.P., a new trial is required in every case in which the “voir dire testimony. . . indicates that veniremen were excluded on any basis broader” than that delineated by Witherspoon.
In Witherspoon, the State’s jury selection method was condemned because prospective jurors who stated they did not believe in the death penalty were excused “without any attempt to determine whether they could nonetheless return a verdict of death;” those who admitted having conscientious scruples against the death penalty were excused “without any effort to find out whether their scruples would invariably compel them to vote against capital punishment.” Witherspoon at 514-515, 88 S.Ct. at 1772-1773.
The Witherspoon doctrine, said the Supreme Court in Adams, “is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror,” and it thought “this point may seem too obvious to bear repetition.” But, it did repeat the point because the Court had noted “frequent references to Witherspoon as a ground for ‘disqualifying prospective jurors,’ ” and it found that “the State, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, might have fallen into the error of assuming that Witherspoon and § 12.31(b) are both grounds for exclusion," explaining in the next paragraph how § 12.31(b) may lead to “exclusions forbidden by Witherspoon.6
Thus in my view, the burden on this State is clear: the voir dire examination of each juror must reflect an “inquiry which separates those who would never vote for the ultimate penalty from those who would reserve it for the direst cases,” 7 in order to show that “the jury-selection standards employed [have not] undermined ‘the very integrity of the .. . process.’ ” 8 Witherspoon at 523, n. 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n.22, quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1743, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).
There are those, however, who believe that the “serious prejudice” dealt capital defendants by a “State’s practice”9 which *943“crosse[s] the line of neutrality” and “produce[s] a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,” may be waived by the defendant should he fail to object. Anomalous as this notion is, insult is heaped on injury when the only justification cited for it is the Supreme Court’s vacating for further consideration in light of Adams two California Supreme Court judgments reversing capital murder convictions.
The majority implies that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the second question10 presented in both California v. Velasquez, 448 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 3042, 65 L.Ed.2d 1132 (1980) and California v. Lanphear, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 57, 66 L.Ed.2d 13 (1980), then remanded the causes for further consideration in light of Adams, because the latter, in laying the factual setting, stated jurors had been excused “over petitioner’s objection.” In the realm of speculation it is far more likely, however, that the Supreme Court’s concern with People v. Velasquez, 26 Cal.3d 425, 162 Cal.Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341 (1980) and People v. Lanphear, 26 Cal.3d 814, 163 Cal.Rptr. 601, 608 P.2d 689 (1980), focused on the excessively literal and dogmatic application of the Witherspoon doctrine insisted upon by the California Supreme Court, which not merely prejudices, but obliterates “the State’s legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally valid death penalty scheme.” 11 Adams, 100 S.Ct. 2529.
More than an asserted proposition of law, I sense in the conjectural resort to California v. Velasquez, supra and California v. Lanphear, supra, a touch of hostility toward the United States Supreme Court for its failure to draw a black and white pictograph telling the State courts of last resort that being given the death penalty by a “tribunal organized to return a verdict of death” constitutes harm to an accused per se, harm of such a fundamental nature that the presence or absence of an objection by the defense is inconsequential. This wait- and-see attitude is a sad departure from the care with which this Court meets its onerous responsibilities. How many more of capital murder convictions will ultimately be reversed as a direct result of such an untenable application of § 12.31(b), supra, vis-a-vis Witherspoon, recently rectified by Adams'! To what extent shall we go in adding to the list of decisions already faulted?
This Court is fully capable of an independent, dispassionate reading and analysis of the numerous authorities on the subject,12 *944motivated only by the welfare of the criminal justice process in this State and the integrity of the law. It requires no extraordinary insight to conclude that, given Witherspoon error cannot be “harmless,”13 neither can it be “waived” by a failure to object. But like one who stands with his back to the street because no one told him the parade is passing by, the majority indulges a delusion that liability for the barrage of reversals it énsures today lies elsewhere; in truth it lies only here.
I dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins.

. Hereinafter Witherspoon.

. Specifically, Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); and Adams v. Texas, infra.

. Indeed, the Supreme Court made short shrift of the argument that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.31(b), is a “separate” cause for exclusion, distinct from the interests advanced by the Witherspoon doctrine:
“Unlike grounds for exclusion having nothing to do with capital punishment, such as personal bias, ill-health, financial hardship, or peremptory challenges, § 12.31(b) focuses the inquiry directly on the prospective juror’s beliefs about the death penalty, and hence clearly falls within the scope of the Wither-spoon doctrine.”
Adams v. Texas, infra, 100 S.Ct. at 2528. (All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)

. Observing that Witherspoon’s jury had “not been shown” to be “biased” with respect to the verdict of guilt, the Supreme Court characterized as "self-evident ” the fact that “in its role as arbiter of the punishment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully short of that impartiality to which [Witherspoon] was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. [Citations omitted].” Witherspoon at 518, 88 S.Ct. at 1775.

. The State has a “valid interest” in excluding: (1) “prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.” Witherspoon at 513, 88 S.Ct. at 1772; (2) “those who say that they could never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse even to consider its imposition in the case before them.” Witherspoon at 514, 88 S.Ct. at 1772; (3) “veniremen who... made it unmistakably clear [a.] that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or [b.] that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt.” [Emphasis original] Witherspoon at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 21; Adams, 100 S.Ct. at 2525; (4) “those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths.” Adams, 100 S.Ct. at 2529; (5) those who are “so irrevocably opposed to capital punishment as to frustrate the State’s legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally valid death penalty scheme.” Adams, 100 S.Ct. at 2529.

. Hovila v. State, 532 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) reflects just such an understanding of the Witherspoon doctrine, whereas Boulware v. State, 542 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) in overruling Hovila, id. at 683, did not. Adams alludes to Hovila favorably; it is omitted from the list of seven opinions perceived by the Supreme Court to indicate the Court, as previously constituted, might have fallen into error. Adams, 100 S.Ct. at 2527, 2528, n.6. On the other hand, Boulware, supra, is relegated to a single mention in the solitary dissenting opinion of Justice REHNQUIST. This poetic justice is not lost on the writer.

. Witherspoon at 515, n.9, 88 S.Ct. at 1773, n.9.

. Judge Onion (now Presiding) fully grasped the import of Witherspoon as regards the burden placed thereby upon the State in Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) when he wrote:
“Before prematurely challenging for cause a prospective juror who has only affirmatively answered the so-called statutory question, prosecutors should go beyond such initial expression of ‘conscientious scruples’ or disclaimer of belief in capital punishment to clearly ascertain and establish that the prospective juror would automatically vote against the death penalty in any case regardless of the facts, could never vote for or consider its imposition in any case irrespective of the evidence, could not abide by the existing law and would not follow the trial court’s instructions, could not assess such penalty in the particular type of case at bar, etc.
If the defense counsel with or without interrogation indicates there are no further questions, it may be well for the court to inquire if such action means that the defense is not opposing the challenge for cause, or if the defendant personally and his counsel are affirmatively [satisfied that the juror is impartial], and make sure such colloquy is made part of the record.”
457 S.W.2d at 911-912. Accord: Grider v. State, 468 S.W.2d 393, 398-399 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
While the disposition in Harris, supra, was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 2291, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971), we are safe in assuming that the reversal did not implicate the language quoted above.

.In synopsizing its decision in Witherspoon, the Supreme Court observed that “[t]he State was held to have no valid interest in such a broad-based rule of exclusion.... * * * The defendant, on the other hand, was seriously prejudiced by the State's practice." Adams, 100 S.Ct. at 2525.

. In Velasquez, supra, the second question presented was,
“(2) was alleged Witherspoon error in this case waived by defense’s failure to object?” 27 CrL 4068.
In Lanphear, supra, the virtually identical second question presented:
“(2) was alleged Witherspoon error in this case waived by failure of defense to object?” 27 CrL 4155.

. In Velasquez and Lanphear, the first questions raised by the State of California in its petitions for writ of certiorari, respectively, were:
“(1) May prospective juror be removed for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois when he states that there might be hypothetical case in which crime was so heinous that death penalty could be considered but that he has not been able to think of hypothetical of that nature?”
27 CrL 4068.
“(1) May prospective juror be removed for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois if trial judge has described each of separate decisions regarding guilt, special circumstances, and penalty to be made by juror, and juror states that he does not think he could participate in deliberations which might lead to the death penalty.”
27 CrL 4155.
The Supreme Court of California had, of course, reversed the convictions in Velasquez and Lanphear because such jurors were excused, holding that Witherspoon permits exclusion only if “automatic opposition” to the death penalty is made “unmistakably clear.”
If obscured in the past, the opinion in Adams leaves no room for speculation as to the State’s “legitimate interest” in capital voir dire. See n. 5, ante.

.Of course, no objection .was voiced in Witherspoon itself, nor in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 90 S.Ct. 1578, 26 L.Ed.2d 221 (1970); and in Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 89 S.Ct. 1138, 22 L.Ed.2d 433 (1969) the defense actually assented to exclusions, as did the defense in State v. Wiggiesworth, 18 Ohio St.2d 171, 248 N.E.2d 607 (1969) [holding defendant waived Witherspoon error], reversed per curiam in Wiggiesworth v. Ohio, 403 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 2284, 29 L.Ed.2d 857 (1971). See also Harris v. State, 457 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) [holding that Witherspoon error was waived by failure of defense to object], re*944versed in Harris v. Texas, 403 U.S. 947, 91 S.Ct. 2291, 29 L.Ed.2d 859 (1971). In Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804, 225 S.E.2d 241, the objection was found “insufficient,” but still the voir dire examination was held constitutionally inadequate, id 225 S.E.2d at 244.

. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether “a venireman is improperly excluded,” and if so, “any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand].”
See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22, wherein the Supreme Court stated:
"... [W]e think it clear, .. . that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined ‘the very integrity of the ... process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate, ... and we have concluded that neither the reliance of law enforcement officials ... nor the impact of a retroactive holding on the administration of justice ... warrants a decision against the fully retroactive application of the holding we announce today.” [Citations omitted]