Court Opinion

ID: 9712401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:08.584794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.919476
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE POPE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Although the majority attempts to distinguish this case from M.F., in my opinion it is virtually indistinguishable. In M.F., the police were executing a search warrant for narcotics at an upstairs apartment while Officer Brown secured the front of the residence. After hearing the other officers knock at the door of the apartment and announce their presence, Brown saw M.F. come out onto the roof and toss what turned out to be narcotics toward the street behind Brown. M.F. did not simply drop the items, nor did he simply abandon them. He threw them off the roof — clearly to avoid detection by the officers executing the search warrant. The Second District found M.F.’s conduct did not constitute obstructing justice based on concealment of evidence, because he threw the drugs from a rooftop in the vicinity of a police officer and the drugs were recovered within seconds. “Under the circumstances, it does not appear that this act was likely to either destroy the evidence or make recovery less likely. Therefore, even though respondent may have intended to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of himself for the possession charge, throwing the drugs to the ground was not an act of concealment that will sustain the additional obstructing[-]justice offense.” M.F., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 650, 734 N.E.2d at 178-79. In the case sub judice, the officers were only a short distance behind defendant, saw him throw the objects, and recovered the same, in an open, well-lit area within seconds. Defendant simply did not conceal anything. The Florida cases cited by the majority, Hayes and Jennings, are clearly distinguishable. In Hayes, the defendant did not merely throw the items in the presence of police officers — he stuffed them into a drainage outlet. Hayes, 634 So. 2d at 1154. In Jennings, the defendant swallowed the crack cocaine, resulting in the destruction of the evidence. Jennings, 666 So. 2d at 132. Jennings is quite similar to the Second District’s decision in People v. Brake, 336 Ill. App. 3d 464, 465, 783 N.E.2d 1084, 1085 (2003), where the court affirmed a defendant’s conviction for obstruction when he swallowed a bag of drugs in the presence of a police officer. I agree with the reasoning in Hayes, Jennings, and Brake. The acts in those cases amounted to concealment. However, other out-of-state cases with similar facts to the case sub judice support a determination defendant here did not conceal evidence. See Vigue v. State, 987 P.2d 204, 205 (Alaska App. 1999) (overturned the defendant’s tampering-with-evidence conviction, which was based on defendant dropping cocaine to the ground when a police officer approached him); Commonwealth v. Delgado, 544 Pa. 591, 592-93, 679 A.2d 223, 224 (1996) (overturned the defendant’s conviction, finding act of discarding contraband in plain view of police (the defendant threw a bag of cocaine on the roof of a small garage while being pursued by police officers who (1) saw the defendant throw the object and (2) quickly recovered the object) does not constitute destruction or concealment of evidence); State v. Fuqua, 303 N.J. Super. 40, 47, 696 A.2d 44, 48 (1997) (held the New Jersey hindering statute was “sensibly construed to refer to evidence of a completed criminal act, not a current possessory crime” and did not apply where defendant had cocaine concealed in his socks); State v. Sharpless, 314 N.J. Super. 440, 459, 715 A.2d 333, 343 (1998) (act of discarding contraband in plain view of the police does not rise to a level of conduct that constitutes destruction or concealment of evidence); State v. Patton, 898 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (affirmed dismissal of evidence-tampering indictment that alleged the defendant abandoned a bag of cannabis by tossing it aside while being pursued by police officers); Hollingsworth v. State, 15 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Tex. App. 2000) (reversed evidence-tampering conviction, that was based on the defendant spitting out cocaine he had in his mouth in front of police officers, where evidence showed defendant was transporting crack cocaine in a customary manner and was not trying to impair its availability as evidence); Boice, 560 So. 2d 1384 (held the defendant’s act of tossing away a bag of crack cocaine in the presence of police officers amounted only to abandonment and not concealment sufficient to convict the defendant). In Anderson v. State, 123 P.3d 1110, 1111 (Alaska App. 2005), which was decided subsequent to M.F., the defendant was involved in a car chase with police after he had broken into a house and shot and robbed one of the occupants. During the chase, the defendant tossed items out of the car, including a handgun, magazine for the handgun, and ammunition. Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1111-12. The State charged the defendant with a variety of offenses, including tampering with evidence, of which he was convicted. Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1112. On review, the Alaskan appellate court “conclude[d] that [the defendant’s] conduct of tossing the articles from the car did not constitute the crime of evidence tampering.” Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1112. According to the court: “[I]f we were to give a broad interpretation to the words ‘remove’, ‘conceal’, and ‘alter’, then a person who shoplifted a candy bar would commit three separate acts of evidence tampering — three separate felonies — when they (1) walked away from the store with the candy, (2) unwrapped the candy and deposited the wrapper in a trash receptacle, and then (3) ate the candy. It seems implausible that the legislature intended the statute to be applied in this manner.” Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1118. However, the Alaskan appellate court stated it was not holding the “act of tossing away evidence can never constitute evidence tampering.” Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1119. According to the court, “[t]he test appears to be whether the defendant disposed of the evidence in a manner that destroyed it or that made its recovery substantially more difficult or impossible.” Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1119. While defendant here clearly did not want to have the items in his possession when the police eventually apprehended him, his act of throwing the items did not conceal, alter, or destroy them. The police officers saw him throw the items, knew the area where the items were thrown, even though the items were temporarily out of their sight, and were able to easily recover the items within seconds. Defendant’s actions neither destroyed nor disguised the crack pipe and push rod nor made the recovery of those items either difficult or impossible. If the items had been destroyed or their recovery made substantially more difficult or impossible, then an obstruction conviction would have been proper. See Anderson, 123 P.3d at 1119. As in M.F., the evidence of concealment in this case was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for obstruction of justice. Lastly, I note a jury found defendant not guilty of possession of the very paraphernalia that forms the basis for his conviction for obstruction. At most, defendant here was guilty of attempt (obstruction of justice).