Court Opinion

ID: 9379120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 18:06:50.137074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.656152
License: Public Domain

J-S27037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    YUWSHA I. ALWAN                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2448 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 28, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0012299-2011

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                             FILED MARCH 14, 2023

        Yuwsha I. Alwan (“Alwan”) appeals from the order dismissing his serial

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1

Additionally, Alwan has filed an Application for Remand.            We deny his

application and affirm the order.

        The PCRA court provided the following factual and procedural history:

               [I]n March [] 2008, Nicholas Pisano was shot in his
        apartment at 356 N. Front Street in Philadelphia. Emergency
        personnel took him to Hahnemann University Hospital, where he
        died on that same day. He was twenty-five years old at the time
        of his death.

               Philadelphia Police Officer Quinten White was the first police
        officer to arrive at the scene of the shooting, where he observed
        a small quantity of marijuana on a living room table and a MAC-
        10 automatic weapon in the bedroom, on the bed, partially
        covered by a sheet. Officer White spoke to Joshua McDonald, who
        was in the apartment at the time of the shooting, and who told
____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S27037-22

     him that two black men in their thirties wearing dark clothing
     came to the door purporting to be making a pizza delivery, and
     that the men shot Pisano and then fled the scene. As Officer White
     was pulling up to the scene, he inadvertently drove over a pizza
     box.

           McDonald came to visit Pisano in the afternoon on the day
     of the shooting. He and Pisano watched a movie and played video
     games together. While the movie was playing, an African-
     American man with what McDonald described as a “Muslim-
     sounding name” came to the door and spoke with Pisano for about
     five minutes. Pisano briefly introduced him to McDonald, but
     McDonald could not recall his name or identify him.

           Later that night, McDonald heard a knock on the door and a
     male voice saying[,] “[P]izza delivery.” Pisano replied[,] “[W]e
     already got our food,” as the two men had ordered delivery earlier.
     The voice said, “[W]ell, just open the door.” Pisano said, “[I]t
     must be around back. It happens all the time.” Again, the voice
     said[,] “[J]ust open the door.”

            McDonald did not feel comfortable with the interaction,
     which did not feel “right” to him, so he retrieved the gun that
     Pisano had shown him earlier in the evening, which was hidden in
     the couch where he was sitting. As McDonald reached down for
     the gun, he heard a shot. When he looked up, Pisano had fallen.
     He saw someone coming through the doorway and he pointed the
     gun toward them and tried to shoot. When he pulled the trigger,
     nothing happened, but the intruder ran. He saw a second man,
     but did not get a good look at him. He gave a statement to
     homicide detectives a few hours after the shooting, in which he
     identified the shooter as Joseph Harville.

           Homicide detectives found approximately seven pounds of
     marijuana in Pisano’s apartment, which they estimated to have a
     street value of $31,728. They also obtained surveillance video
     from a security camera located outside of Pisano’s apartment
     building. Clyde Frazier, an officer with the Philadelphia Police
     Department’s Crime Scene Unit, recovered fingerprints from the
     pizza box found outside of Pisano's apartment and matched those
     prints to Robert Gray, Harville’s life-long friend. At the time of the
     shooting, Gray had known [Alwan] through Harville for
     approximately three or four years.

                                     -2-
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           After finding out that his fingerprints had been identified on
     the pizza box and that the police had video footage of him with
     Harville outside of Pisano’s apartment building on the night of the
     shooting, Gray gave a full confession to his involvement in the
     shooting. The surveillance video depicts Gray and Harville walking
     back and forth outside of Pisano’s building, with Gray holding a
     pizza box and Harville with his hands in his pockets.

           In his statement of April 4, 2008, Gray said the following
     about what happened four days earlier on the night of the
     shooting:

        We just hung out for a little while, that’s when [Alwan] starts
        talking about this dude that had all this weed. He said he
        just left the boy’s house and the guy had like ten pounds of
        weed in the dryer and some on his countertop. He said the
        boy had a lot of money in a Nike box under the table in the
        back room where the dog was. [Alwan] was like[, “W]we
        should roll on the boy.[”] He said the guy was a punk and
        that we wouldn’t have to do nothing but scare the boy. We
        all agreed[,] and then [Alwan] gave Harville the gun.

            Gray explained that, after ordering a pizza and driving to
     pick it up, the three defendants proceeded as follows:

        I parked the car under the bridge around the comer from
        the boy’s house, then me and Harville and [Alwan] walked
        around to the house. [Alwan] walked a little bit behind us
        and showed us where the house was at. Then he stayed
        back while me and Harville went to the dude’s house. I
        walked up the steps first and Harville was behind me. I still
        had the pizza with me. And when Harville rang the doorbell,
        he says[,] [“D]elivery.[”] The guy inside opens the door
        and says[, “W]rong bell. You want the back.[”] He had a
        Bible in his hands and said like two more times[, “Y]ou want
        the back.[”] He's like, [“]I’m telling you, you got the wrong
        apartment. It happens all the time. You want the back
        door.[”] I said, [“N]o I want some weed.[”] He was like,
        [“Y]ou definitely got the wrong house.[”] That’s when
        Harville come up behind and he pushes past me. He
        knocked the pizza out of my hand when he pushed me. As
        Harville pushed past me, the guy must have seen the gun[,]
        because he looked shocked. That’s when I noticed there
        was another guy inside on the couch. . . . The guy on the

                                     -3-
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        couch grabs a gun from under a pillow. He stood up pointing
        at us. At that point I ducked and started to run. That’s
        when Harville shot. I was already down the steps by the
        time Harville shot then I was gone. I ran to the car and
        [Alwan] was already in the driver’s seat. I got in the
        backseat and Harville came up behind me and got into the
        front passenger seat. He still had the gun in his hand. Then
        we just took off.

            William Shute, a special agent with the Federal Bureau of
     Investigation, analyzed [Alwan’s] cellular phone records from
     March 31, 2008 through April 10, 2008. Special Agent Shute’s
     analysis revealed that [Alwan] and Gray had exchanged seventy-
     five calls during that period. Twenty-nine of those calls took place
     on the day of the shooting and twenty-three of them occurred on
     the following day. [Alwan] also made an outgoing call at 9:33
     p.m. on March 31, 2008; approximately two minutes before
     Pisano was murdered. Based upon the location of the cellular
     tower that [Alwan’s] phone used to place that call, Special Agent
     Shute determined that it was made within several blocks of the
     shooting.

            Police arrested Gray and Harville in connection with Pisano’s
     murder. [I]n June [] 2011, Gray pleaded guilty to third-degree
     murder, conspiracy to commit murder, possession of an
     instrument of crime, and robbery. As a condition of Gray’s guilty
     plea, he agreed to assist the Commonwealth with the ongoing
     investigation and, if necessary, to testify against his co[-
     ]defendants. On June 30, 2011, Gray testified at Harville’s murder
     trial. Gray took the stand and presented an account of the
     shooting that conflicted with his statement to the police on April
     4, 2008. Specifically, Gray testified that it was [Alwan], not
     Harville, who shot Pisano. Gray also testified that Harville told
     [Alwan] that he did not want to participate in the robbery. [In
     July 2011, a jury convicted Harville of second-degree murder,
     conspiracy to commit murder, carrying a firearm without a license,
     carrying a firearm in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of
     crime, and burglary.]

            On August 30, 2011, [Alwan] was arrested and charged with
     murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit robbery,
     possession of an instrument of crime, carrying a firearm without
     a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets or property. On
     August 12, 2013, [Alwan] proceeded to a jury trial. On the third

                                    -4-
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     day of [Alwan’s] trial[,] the Commonwealth called Gray as a
     witness, whereupon he offered a third mutually exclusive
     description of the shooting. This time, Gray testified that he and
     Harville planned and executed the failed robbery without any
     assistance from [Alwan]. When the prosecutor confronted Gray
     with his conflicting statement to police shortly after the murder
     and the contradictory testimony that he gave at Harville’s trial,
     Gray explained that he “had to put it on someone.” [Additionally,
     the jury heard testimony during Alwan’s trial about Gray’s plea
     agreement; Alwan’s counsel also cross-examined and impeached
     Gray about his motives for giving inculpatory statements against
     Harville and Alwan.]

            [Alwan] testified in his own defense and denied any
     involvement in the shooting. During cross-examination, [Alwan]
     became irate and commenced what the trial court described as
     “an extended, animated, and profanity-laced speech in the
     presence of the jury in which he accused the prosecutor of lying
     and spoke at great length about his reputation as a businessman
     and contributor to the community.” After [Alwan’s] outburst, the
     trial court excused the jury. Defense counsel then moved for a
     mistrial, which the trial court denied.       Because both the
     prosecution and the defense wanted to continue questioning
     [Alwan], the court permitted [Alwan] to retake the stand. [Alwan]
     answered the remainder of the questions posed to him without
     incident.

                                    ****

           [I]n August [] 2013, . . . a jury convicted [Alwan] of
     [s]econd-[d]egree [m]urder, [c]onspiracy, and [r]obbery. This
     Court immediately imposed a mandatory life sentence of
     imprisonment as to [s]econd-[d]egree [m]urder, and a concurrent
     term of ten to twenty years of imprisonment as to [c]onspiracy.
     [I]n November [] 2014, Superior Court affirmed his judgment of
     sentence. On October 22, 2015, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
     denied his [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal.

            [I]n June [] 2016, [Alwan] filed a timely . . . [PCRA p]etition,
     his first. [The PCRA c]ourt dismissed the petition. [I]n April []
     2017[, Alwan] filed a subsequent pro se PCRA [p]etition, which
     th[e PCRA c]ourt dismissed . . . because [Alwan] was still
     represented by counsel. [Alwan appealed the dismissal of his first
     petition, and i]n June [] 2018, the Superior Court . . . affirmed

                                      -5-
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      [the] dismissal.  [I]n December [] 2018, the Pennsylvania
      Supreme Court denied his [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal.
      [Alwan did not appeal the dismissal of his second pro se PCRA
      petition.]

           On March 31, 2021, [Alwan] filed the instant, counseled
      PCRA petition, his third. . . .

                                    ****
            [Alwan] present[ed] two claims for review. First, [that] trial
      counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate co-defendant . . .
      Gray and discover a [previously proposed, but ultimately
      rejected,] cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth, in
      which it would recommend a more favorable sentence in exchange
      for Gray’s cooperation as an eyewitness [against Matthew Bundy]
      in another [unrelated] homicide [(“the Bundy matter”)]. And
      second, that the Commonwealth withheld its [proposed]
      agreement with Gray from [Alwan] in violation of Brady v.
      Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405
      U.S. 150 (1972).

                                     ****

            [A]fter hearing argument, th[e PCRA c]ourt issued its
      [n]otice of [i]ntent to [d]ismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907[, in
      which it concluded, inter alia, that Alwan’s issues are meritless
      and also that his petition is untimely]. . . . [Alwan] filed objections
      to th[e PCRA c]ourt’s 907 [n]otice.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 1-6 (internal citation and indentation

omitted; paragraphs re-ordered for clarity; some emphasis added). The PCRA

court dismissed Alwan’s petition on October 28, 2021. Alwan timely appealed.

The PCRA court did not order Alwan to file a concise statement of errors

complained of pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The PCRA court nevertheless

filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion in support of its order.

      Alwan raises the following issues for our review:

                                       -6-
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       1. Is the PCRA court’s dismissal of the properly filed PCRA petition
          free from legal error and supported by the record?

       2. Does PCRA counsel’s demonstrable ineffectiveness require
          remand to the PCRA court, where [Alwan] will be afforded
          effective assistance of counsel in PCRA proceedings, including
          but not limited to, PCRA amendment in accordance with
          Pa.R.Crim.P. 905 et seq[.]?

Alwan’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and italics omitted).2

       Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

              Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
       whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
       record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
       error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
       prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any
       credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
       supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s
       legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citation

and quotations omitted). Further, “there is no absolute right to an evidentiary

hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the

record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not

necessary.” Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2 Alwan’s Pa.R.A.P. 2116 statement of questions involved includes two issues,
one of which is a boilerplate invocation of this Court’s standard of review, and
the other which is a vague assertion that PCRA counsel for his most recent
petition (“prior PCRA counsel”), who differs from Alwan’s present counsel on
PCRA appeal, was ineffective.        While we disapprove of Alwan’s vague
statement of questions involved, we are nevertheless able to discern the
substance of his arguments. Because this deficiency does not impede our
ability to review his issues, we decline to find waiver.

                                           -7-
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2008) (internal citation, quotations, and brackets omitted).             The PCRA

petitioner “has the burden to persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred

and that such error requires relief.”          Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177

A.3d 136, 144–45 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations omitted). Further, “it is well

settled that this Court may affirm a valid judgment or order for any reason

appearing as of record.” Id. at 145 (internal citation omitted).

       We must initially determine whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction

over Alwan’s petition. Under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final[.]”       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).3         The PCRA’s timeliness

requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not address the

merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely filed.          See

Commonwealth           v.   Albrecht,      994   A.2d   1091,   1093   (Pa.   2010).

Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA petition if

the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth in section

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).    To establish the governmental interference exception,

pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(i), a petitioner must plead and prove: (1) the

failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by

____________________________________________

3 A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

                                           -8-
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government officials, and (2) the petitioner could not have obtained the

information earlier with the exercise of due diligence. See Commonwealth

v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021). Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)

also provides an exception to the jurisdictional time-bar if “the facts upon

which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not

have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]”       42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1)(ii).4     Any PCRA petition invoking an exception under section

9545(b)(1) “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Here, our Supreme Court denied Alwan’s petition for allowance of appeal

on October 22, 2015, and he did not petition the United States Supreme Court

for a writ of certiorari.     Therefore, his judgment of sentence became final

ninety days later, i.e., on January 20, 2016.     Accordingly, Alwan had until

January 20, 2017 to file a timely PCRA petition.            See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3); see also Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1247

(Pa. Super. 2019); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Alwan’s present petition was thus

facially untimely, as he concedes. See Alwan’s Brief at 9. Alwan, however,

alleged exceptions to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement pursuant to section

9545(b)(1)(i) and (ii), i.e., the governmental interference and newly

____________________________________________

4 The focus of this exception is on newly discovered facts, not on a newly
discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.        See
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 249 A.3d 993, 1000 (Pa. 2021).

                                           -9-
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discovered fact exceptions.            See, e.g., Alwan’s Brief at 10.      The

Commonwealth conceded that Alwan’s Brady/Giglio claim satisfied the newly

discovered fact exception, and the PCRA court concluded the same.           See

Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, 6/9/21, at 9; see also PCRA Court

Opinion, 10/28/21, at 9.5         As there is no dispute that Alwan successfully

pleaded a timeliness exception vis-à-vis his Brady claim, we will review this

issue on the merits.

       The PCRA court, however, determined that Alwan failed to allege a

timeliness exception for his ineffectiveness claim, apparently because it did

not perceive a nexus between the newly discovered fact and the claim of

ineffectiveness, given its conclusion that Alwan’s trial counsel could not,

through the exercise of due diligence, have learned about this newly

discovered fact, since it was contained solely in the Commonwealth’s files.

____________________________________________

5 In Brady, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violated due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. See Brady, 373
U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court subsequently held that the duty to disclose
such evidence is applicable even if there has been no request by the accused,
see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), and that the duty
encompasses impeachment evidence as well as directly exculpatory evidence,
see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).

In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 155 (1972), the United States
Supreme Court held that “evidence of any understanding or agreement as
to a future prosecution would be relevant to [a governmental witness’s]
credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it” (emphasis added).

                                          - 10 -
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See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 7, 8-9.              The Commonwealth

additionally argues that an assertion of ineffectiveness does not constitute a

newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 15 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Gamboa-

Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000)). Alwan, however, maintains that his

newly discovered fact is not trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, but rather Gray’s

“involvement in the . . . Bundy matter” (emphasis added) and trial counsel’s

knowledge that Gray was involved in the Bundy matter. See Alwan’s Brief at

12.

      While it is true that “a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does

not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits,” see

Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 785, a successfully pleaded newly discovered

fact exception can invoke the PCRA court’s jurisdiction over a variety of claims

eligible for relief under the PCRA, including ineffective assistance of counsel.

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 226, 229, 230-31 (Pa.

2016) (holding that a newly discovered fact exception could be a basis for

invoking the PCRA court’s jurisdiction over an ineffectiveness claim in an

otherwise untimely second PCRA petition, but ultimately concluding that the

petitioner there failed to establish due diligence, and thereby failed to show

                                     - 11 -
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that the exception applied).6 As Alwan argues that his ineffectiveness claim

is predicated on what the PCRA court already concluded was an unknown fact,

i.e., Gray’s involvement in the Bundy matter—and because Alwan further

asserts that he only subsequently learned that trial counsel knew of Gray’s

involvement in the Bundy matter—we conclude the PCRA court committed an

error of law in determining this claim was untimely. However, the PCRA court

provided an alternative analysis on the merits.     See PCRA Court Opinion,

10/28/21, at 13-15. Further, as noted above, “this Court may affirm a valid

judgment or order for any reason appearing as of record,” Wholaver, 177

A.3d at 144–45. Accord Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (providing that “this Court may affirm a PCRA court’s order on

any legal basis”) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, we review this issue

on the merits, as well.

       Our Supreme Court has stated the “well-settled” standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims as follows:

              [C]ounsel is presumed to have been effective and that the
       petitioner bears the burden of proving counsel’s alleged
       ineffectiveness. To overcome this presumption, a petitioner must
       establish that: (1) the underlying substantive claim has arguable
       merit; (2) counsel did not have a reasonable basis for his or her
____________________________________________

6 In Cox, the petitioner raised several claims in an untimely second PCRA
petition, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to seek
independent ballistics testing. See 146 A.3d at 225-226. Cox, recognizing
his petition was untimely, attempted to invoke the newly discovered facts
exception. Our Supreme Court did not hold that the ineffectiveness claim was
barred in a subsequent and untimely PCRA petition; instead, it concluded that
Cox had failed to plead diligence. See id. at 231.

                                          - 12 -
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      act or omission; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a
      result of counsel’s deficient performance, that is, a reasonable
      probability that but for counsel’s act or omission, the outcome of
      the proceeding would have been different. A PCRA petitioner must
      address each of these prongs on appeal. [A p]etitioner’s failure
      to satisfy any prong of this test is fatal to the claim.

Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has set forth the relevant Brady principles as

follows:

            The crux of the Brady rule is that due process is offended
      when the prosecution withholds material evidence favorable to the
      accused. The Brady rule extends to impeachment evidence
      including any potential understanding between the prosecution
      and a witness, because such information is relevant to the witness’
      credibility. To establish his alleged Brady violations, [a petitioner
      must] prove that the Commonwealth willfully or inadvertently
      suppressed impeachment evidence and that prejudice ensued.

             Regarding the prejudice prong of this standard, favorable
      evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its
      suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable
      probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
      the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
      reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
      confidence in the outcome. In determining if a reasonable
      probability of a different outcome has been demonstrated, the
      question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not
      have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether
      in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
      resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. The mere possibility
      that an item of undisclosed information might have helped
      the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the
      trial, does not establish materiality in the constitutional
      sense.

Id. at 158–59 (internal citations, quotations, and brackets omitted; emphasis

added).

                                     - 13 -
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      Despite Alwan’s vagueness in his statement of questions involved, we

discern that the substance of his argument is as follows:       The PCRA court

erred in dismissing his petition because, having properly pleaded timeliness

exceptions pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), thereby invoking the

PCRA court’s jurisdiction over his petition, Alwan was entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on his meritorious issues, namely, that the Commonwealth committed

a Brady/Giglio violation, and that trial counsel was ineffective. Both of these

issues arise from a common fact, namely, a negotiated plea offer that Gray

had rejected, which was twenty-five to fifty years of incarceration, contingent

on his cooperation with the Commonwealth, not just against Harville and

Alwan, but also in the Bundy matter. The Commonwealth declined to disclose

this rejected offer prior to Alwan’s trial (giving rise to Alwan’s Brady issue),

and trial counsel did not impeach Gray with the rejected offer at Alwan’s trial

(giving rise to Alwan’s ineffectiveness issue).   See Alwan’s Brief at 12-15.

Alwan further maintains this Court should remand this case based on prior

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, because the PCRA court “summarily dismissed

as meritless” his petition on account of PCRA counsel’s failure to attach witness

certifications required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1). See Alwan’s Brief at 15-

17.

      The PCRA court considered Alwan’s issues and concluded they merit no

relief because his Brady claim, while timely, is meritless, and his trial counsel

                                     - 14 -
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claim of ineffectiveness is untimely, but, even if timely, it is also meritless

because he has failed to demonstrate prejudice:

            The factual predicate for [Alwan’s] Giglio claim extends
      from his review of the Commonwealth’s [file], which yielded
      documentation of the extent of the Commonwealth’s negotiations
      with Gray. Gray was the Commonwealth’s witness in an unrelated
      homicide matter, Commonwealth v. Bundy . . . in addition to
      being a cooperating co-defendant in the instant matter.
      Prosecutors also placed a wanted poster for Matthew Bundy, one
      of the defendants in Commonwealth v. Bundy . . ., in the
      homicide file. Gray rejected that offer and the Commonwealth did
      not disclose this previous offer to [Alwan]. Initially, the
      Commonwealth extended a recommended sentencing offer of
      twenty-five to fifty years imprisonment in exchange for Gray's
      cooperation in both the instant homicide and the Bundy matter,
      which Gray rejected. [Alwan] did not discover this offer until he
      reviewed the [Commonwealth’s] file on October 30, 2020. . . ..

             . . . Despite the timeliness of [Alwan’s] claim that the
      Commonwealth violated Brady and Giglio, it is meritless. . . .
      For a petitioner to prove a Brady violation, [he] must show: (1)
      the prosecution was in possession of favorable evidence to the
      petitioner, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the prosecution
      suppressed that evidence; and[] (3) the petitioner was prejudiced
      by this suppression. Commonwealth v. Donoughe, 243 A.3d
      980 (Pa. Super. 2020).

                                     ****

            Ultimately, Gray entered into an open plea of guilty to third-
      degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, [possessing an
      instrument of crime], and robbery in exchange for testifying
      against his co-defendants in the underlying matter sub judice, not
      [in the] Bundy [matter]. Gray’s sentencing was deferred until
      after the trial of [Alwan] and co-defendant Harville, pending
      Gray’s testimony. However, despite his negotiations with the
      Commonwealth, Gray reneged on his bargain and gave
      contradictory testimony at both trials, which differed from his
      statements to police officers. At [Gray’s] sentencing, . . . the [trial
      court] sentenced Gray to an aggregate term of imprisonment of

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      thirty-five to seventy years, finding his “cooperation” as having
      limited effect on mitigation.

            . . . [F]or a promise or agreement to warrant a Brady
      disclosure such an arrangement must actually exist, as mere
      conjecture of an agreement is not sufficient. . . ..

              The earlier communicated offer of twenty-five to fifty years
      of imprisonment in exchange for Gray’s cooperation did not need
      to be disclosed pursuant to Giglio, because there was no
      agreement to disclose. The Commonwealth’s offer is not a promise
      triggering a Brady disclosure until the witness accepts; otherwise,
      it is just what it purports to be—an offer. The Commonwealth did
      disclose its eventual agreement with Gray to [Alwan] in this
      matter, and Gray was thoroughly cross-examined by trial
      [counsel] on this subject. Accordingly, [Alwan’s] claim fails.

                                    ****

             [Regarding Alwan’s trial counsel ineffectiveness claim:]
      There was no deal in the Bundy matter on which trial counsel
      could cross-examine Gray. For that reason alone, trial counsel
      would be unable to question Gray on that basis, and such
      questions would be irrelevant. . . . Because there is no basis on
      which trial counsel could cross-examine Gray, [Alwan’s] claim
      fails.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 7-13 (some quotations, italics, and

unnecessary capitalization omitted; some emphasis added).

      Following our review, we conclude the PCRA court’s findings are

supported by the record and its legal conclusions are free from error. The

gravamen of both Alwan’s trial counsel ineffectiveness and Brady claims is

that he suffered prejudice because evidence of the failed negotiations between

Gray and the Commonwealth, relating to the Bundy matter, were not

presented to the jury. See PCRA Petition, 4/8/22, at 15; accord Alwan’s Brief

at 13 (stating that the evidence of “extensive negotiations with Gray. . . [was]

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potentially exculpatory information . . ..               Had Gray’s involvement in an

additional investigation . . . and [his] secretive negotiations with the

Commonwealth come to light at trial, the credibility of his statements would

have been further called into question”). While Alwan presents conclusory

allegations of prejudice, he fails to show anything more than the mere

possibility that this information might have helped the defense. We explain:

The PCRA court astutely pointed out that there was no agreement between

the Commonwealth and Gray for his testimony in the Bundy matter. The

Commonwealth offered Gray a negotiated sentence of twenty-five to fifty

years     of   incarceration,     contingent        on    his       cooperation   with    the

Commonwealth’s prosecution of Harville and Alwan, as well as with the Bundy

matter.        See    PCRA     Petition,   4/8/22,        at    9    (reproducing   internal

communications between prosecutors about the terms of the offer).                        It is

uncontested that Gray did not accept this offer.7                    Instead, Gray and the

Commonwealth negotiated an agreement as to the charges to which Gray

would plead guilty. See N.T., 8/14/13, at 164. There was no agreement for

a recommendation as to his sentence. See id. at 166.                        The agreement

required Gray’s cooperation against Harville and Alwan. See id. at 181. See

also PCRA Petition, 4/8/22, at Ex. 1 (Gray’s Memorandum of Agreement

memorializing the plea agreement, executed by the Commonwealth and

____________________________________________

7Alwan conceded in his PCRA petition that Gray refused to testify in the
Bundy matter. See PCRA Petition, 4/8/22, at 11-12.

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J-S27037-22

Gray). The terms of this agreement were presented to the jury. See N.T.,

8/14/13, at 164, 166, 181.           Further, on cross-examination, Alwan’s trial

counsel impeached Gray by eliciting the latter’s agreement that “the more

people you give up, the better you’re going to do for yourself,” and that “the

more people you stick in it, whether they did it or not, the better of you’re

going to be, right?” N.T., 8/14/13, at 268. Notwithstanding Gray’s perception

that he would benefit from cooperating with the Commonwealth, it is

undisputed that Gray “reneged on his bargain and gave contradictory

testimony at both trials, [i.e., at Harville’s and Alwan’s trials,] which differed

from his statements to police officers.” PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 11.

       In sum: while the Commonwealth proposed a twenty-five to fifty year

negotiated plea offer which would require Gray to cooperate in the Bundy

matter, Gray declined that offer.8         At Alwan’s trial, Gray agreed on cross-

examination that he understood he would benefit from “giv[ing] up” others;

however, there is no evidence that Gray ever accepted an offer requiring his

cooperation in the Bundy matter; moreover, the jury was presented with the

terms of the negotiated plea agreement Gray actually accepted, which he

nevertheless failed to abide by. Alwan has thus failed to show there was a

____________________________________________

8 Gray rejected the twenty-five to fifty-year offer that would have required his
cooperation in the Bundy matter. There was, therefore, no understanding or
agreement between the Commonwealth and Gray vis-à-vis the Bundy matter.
Therefore, Giglio is inapplicable. Contra Alwan’s Brief at 15. We further
observe that Gray received a sentence of thirty-five to seventy years of
incarceration. See, e.g., PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 11.

                                          - 18 -
J-S27037-22

promise, agreement, or expectation between Gray and the Commonwealth

involving the Bundy matter, and, accordingly, there was nothing, in this

respect, about which trial counsel could cross-examine Gray.           Thus, for

purposes of Alwan’s ineffectiveness issue, he has failed to show that there is

a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different

had trial counsel cross-examined Gray about the negotiations surrounding this

rejected plea offer. See Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 144 (stating that a PCRA

petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must show prejudice and

that failure to do so is fatal to the claim). For purposes of Alwan’s Brady

issue, Alwan has failed to show that the undisclosed information about Gray’s

rejected plea offer was material and that he did not receive a fair trial in its

absence.   See Wholaver, 177 A.3d at 158–59 (providing that, for Brady

claims, the question relevant question is whether, in the absence of the

undisclosed evidence, the petitioner “received a fair trial, understood as a trial

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. The mere possibility that an item

of undisclosed information might have helped the defense . . ., does not

establish materiality in the constitutional sense”) (internal citations and

quotations omitted). Alwan has thus failed to show there was a genuine issue

of material fact requiring an evidentiary hearing, and, therefore, the PCRA

court properly dismissed his petition. Accordingly, Alwan is due no relief.

      Lastly, Alwan filed an application with this Court for a remand of this

case to the PCRA court based on his allegation that prior PCRA counsel was

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ineffective for failing to provide witness certifications, which, Alwan alleges,

led to the dismissal of his meritorious petition.   See Application, 3/16/22;

accord Alwan’s Brief at 13, 16-17 (presenting argument in support of a

remand).9 Alwan cites our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

       PCRA petitioners may raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA

counsel “for the first time during an appeal from the denial of a timely filed

first PCRA petition where the PCRA counsel in question represented the

defendant until the appeal.” Commonwealth v. Stahl, --- A.3d ----, 2023

PA Super 17, 2023 WL 1793571 at *3 (Pa. Super. Feb. 7, 2023) (citing

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401-05) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has

provided that, “[i]n some instances, the record before the appellate court will

be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised ineffectiveness

claims,” though, “in other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to

the PCRA court for further development of the record and for the PCRA court

to consider such claims as an initial matter.”      Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402

(internal citation omitted).

       Following our review, we conclude Alwan is due no relief. As this Court

has recently stated: pursuant to Bradley, PCRA petitioners may raise claims

____________________________________________

9 We previously deferred a decision on Alwan’s application.        See Order,
4/25/22.

                                          - 20 -
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of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel “for the first time during an appeal

from the denial of a timely filed first PCRA petition where the PCRA counsel

in question represented the defendant until the appeal.”      Stahl, 2023 PA

Super 17, 2023 WL 1793571 at *3 (emphasis added). However, Bradley is

inapplicable because the instant petition was not a timely-filed first PCRA

petition.   We further observe that, even if Bradley applied, Alwan’s issue

merits no relief.10 The PCRA court explained that, while prior PCRA counsel

failed to include witness certifications, ultimately, it concluded that Alwan’s

petition failed “to allege any issues of material fact,” and, therefore, any

certifications in support thereof would not entitle Alwan to an evidentiary

hearing. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/28/21, at 11. Thus, Alwan has failed

to show prejudice resulting from prior PCRA counsel’s failure to obtain witness

certifications, and therefore prior PCRA counsel was not ineffective, and a

remand is unnecessary.

       Application denied. Order affirmed.

       Judge Nichols joins this memorandum.

       Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

10 As noted above, we need not remand a Bradley claim if the record is
sufficient for us to dispose of the newly asserted claim. See Bradley, 261
A.3d at 402.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/14/2023

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