Court Opinion

ID: 9599783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:29.296185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:21.051295
License: Public Domain

*794Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur entirely with the majority, I believe that several important legal factors should also be addressed.
1. The legal significance under OCGA § 51-3-1 of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 or the Georgia Access To & Use of Public Facilities By Persons With Disabilities Act2 is that the owner/occupier has actual or constructive knowledge of any static condition or the absence of any safety device mandated or prohibited under such Acts. Thus, any owner/occupier of premises subject to such Acts has satisfied as to them the first prong of liability “that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the [condition]” and that such knowledge is “superior” to the invitee’s knowledge, because such Acts put them on notice of the dangers and possible risk of injury to those individuals within the ambit of the Acts as to the requirements for the premises. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736 (493 SE2d 403) (1997); Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980). However, once the owner/ occupier has knowledge for purpose of the Acts, the owner/occupier has knowledge as to all invitees that come on the premises. See OCGA § 51-3-1. The mandates of the Acts make the owner/occupier have superior knowledge to the invitee as to mandated or prohibited conditions on the premises and approaches.
2. The foregoing is separate and apart from negligence per se, which is dependent upon the purpose of the law and of coverage of the Act’s protection, although it satisfies part of plaintiff’s legal burden of proof. Keith v. Beard, 219 Ga. App. 190 (464 SE2d 633) (1995); Bradley v. Custom Sprinkler Systems, 218 Ga. App. 431 (461 SE2d 592) (1995); Central Anesthesia Assoc. v. Worthy, 173 Ga. App. 150 (325 SE2d 819) (1984); Potts v. Fidelity Fruit &c. Co., 165 Ga. App. 546 (301 SE2d 903) (1983). Thus, if the plaintiff can prove that he comes within the statutory definition of “disabled,” then he may be able to prove negligence per se and show that safety was the purpose of the Acts. Thompson v. Crownover, 259 Ga. 126, 129 (4) (381 SE2d 283) (1989); Biggs v. Long, 212 Ga. App. 195, 199 (3) (441 SE2d 677) (1994).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this special concurrence.
*795Decided June 5, 1998.
Nelson & Lord, Ellis M. Nelson, for appellant.
Harman, Owen, Saunders & Sweeney, David C. Will, for appellee.

 Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 USCS § 12101 et seq., Pub. L. No. 101-336 (104 Stat. 327) (1990); the Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings & Facilities, 36 CFR § 1191.1, App. A, pp. 648,674; 56 FR 45518; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 USCS § 701 et seq.; 42 USCS § 12201 (a); 59 FR 17446.

 OCGA § 30-3-9 requiring compliance with American National Standards Institute (“ANSI”) specifications A117.1-1986 or A117.1-1980.