Court Opinion

ID: 9382747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 17:02:46.927883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.357271
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C., L.C., and
                          V.C.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0211
                                FILED 3-28-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD532019
                The Honorable Amanda M. Parker, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Amanda Adams
Co-Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

The Huff Law Firm PLLC, Tucson
By Daniel R. Huff, Laura J. Huff
Co-Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton joined. Judge D. Steven Williams dissented.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1             Daniel C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights to his three children. The children’s mother (“Mother”) is not a party
to this appeal. For the following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Father has three children; all are parties to this appeal: Devin,
born in 2011; Lawrence, born in 2012; and Vern, born in 2016 (collectively
“the Children”). We use pseudonyms to protect the children’s identities.

¶3            While living in New Jersey before 2018, Father was arrested
five to six times for domestic violence against Mother. Fearing Father,
Mother fled from New Jersey to Arizona in August 2018 with the Children
while Father was incarcerated. Shortly thereafter, Father also moved to
Arizona, claiming Mother had asked for his help because they were
homeless.

¶4            In August 2018, New Jersey Child Protective Services
requested a welfare check on Mother and the Children, and the Arizona
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) contacted Mother. Two months later,
DCS removed the Children from the parents’ care and filed a dependency
petition. The petition alleged Mother and Father were unable to parent due
to domestic violence, substance abuse, neglect, and Mother’s mental illness.
In December 2020, DCS dismissed the petition “based on Mother’s
continued progress with counseling and psychiatric treatment, as well as
her continued separation from Father and consistent negative drug tests.”

¶5            On May 1, 2021, police responded to another welfare check at
Mother’s apartment and contacted Father. Tempe police discovered
Father’s outstanding warrant for a failure to appear and a New Jersey
protective order prohibiting contact with Mother. The police took Father to
jail but released him on the condition that he not return to Mother’s
apartment, which would violate the protective order. Father returned to
Mother’s apartment. On May 5, police responded to another welfare check

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                       Decision of the Court
at Mother’s apartment and arrested Father for violating his release
conditions and assaulting Mother while intoxicated. One of the children,
Vern, witnessed the assault and attempted to intervene. The Children told
DCS they regularly witnessed Father’s domestic violence. Devin stated that
one time Father pushed him into a wall leaving a hole.

¶6           In late May 2021, DCS removed the children again and filed
another dependency petition. The new petition alleged Father was unable
to parent due to domestic violence, substance abuse, and incarceration.

¶7            Father remained incarcerated until August 2, 2021. Upon
release, Father had three years of probation. DCS offered Father substance
abuse testing and treatment, as well as supervised visitations, and domestic
violence counseling.

¶8             During the first dependency in 2018 to 2020, Father tested
positive for both alcohol and marijuana multiple times as well as once for
cocaine. During the second dependency initiated in 2021, he tested positive
for marijuana at almost every test, as well as once each for
methamphetamine and alcohol. The court found the Children dependent
as to Father for a second time in October 2021.

¶9           A substance abuse treatment agency closed out Father’s case
after he missed several sessions due to his work schedule. Father then
reenrolled in another program in April 2022. DCS filed its second
termination petition in May 2022. Between Father’s May 2021 incarceration
and the termination hearing in August 2022, Father only tested positive for
alcohol one time, in April 2022. But Father also missed three out of five
scheduled tests in March.

¶10            Since the April 2022 positive test, Father showed
improvement. He maintained sobriety and attended substance abuse
treatment sessions. He established stable housing and employment, and
DCS remarked at the termination hearing that his visitation sessions with
the Children were “going well.” But Father missed one test in July and two
in August before the termination hearing. Based on this progress, the
juvenile court concluded DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to
terminate Father’s parental rights due to a prior removal. In the context of
that ruling the court stated it “[could not] find that Father is currently unable
to discharge parental responsibilities.” But it terminated Father’s parental
rights to the Children on the chronic substance abuse ground.

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          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                        Decision of the Court
                                DISCUSSION

¶11           We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of
discretion. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 15 (App.
2018). On appeal, due process requires us to assess whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude, based on the record, that the state has met its
clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain the termination of
parental rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 769 (1982). We
will uphold the court’s findings of fact “if supported by adequate evidence
in the record.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52, ¶
19 (App. 2007) (cleaned up).

   I.      Statutory Ground for Termination

¶12           To terminate the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find parental unfitness based on at least one statutory ground under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B). See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005).
Here, the court found parental unfitness under the chronic substance abuse
ground. To terminate parental rights on this ground, DCS must offer clear
and convincing evidence that Father (1) has a “history of chronic abuse of
controlled substances,” (2) cannot discharge parental responsibilities
because of his chronic substance abuse, and (3) “there are reasonable
grounds to believe that [his] condition will continue for a prolonged and
indeterminate period.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373,
377, ¶ 15 (App. 2010). The court evaluates the circumstances at the time of
the termination hearing. Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶
12 (App. 2016).

¶13            Chronic substance abuse need not be constant but must be
long-lasting. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App.
2016). Importantly, a parent’s temporary abstinence from alcohol does not
outweigh his significant history of alcohol abuse. Id. See also Raymond F., 224
Ariz. at 379, ¶ 29; Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577
(App. 1994) (Parent’s successful efforts at recovery were “too little, too late”
at the time of termination).

¶14            The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights due to
the “uncertainty” regarding Father’s battle with alcohol. And the record
contains ample evidence to support that uncertainty. Father began drinking
in 1997 at age 15 and battled with addiction in his mid-twenties and early
thirties. His addiction resulted in numerous law enforcement engagements
including repeated arrests and incarceration for domestic violence in both
Arizona and New Jersey. The DCS case manager testified that “[a]lmost all
of the domestic violence incidents that the children have been witness to

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                       Decision of the Court
have been fueled by alcohol” and his current sobriety was insufficient to
demonstrate he had remedied his alcohol abuse.

¶15            To terminate on the substance abuse ground, the juvenile
court must find that Father is unable to parent due to substance abuse at
the time of the termination hearing. See Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at 377, ¶ 15
(“parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of his
chronic abuse of controlled substances or alcohol”) (citing A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(3)). While the juvenile court did not explicitly state Father is unable
to parent when it considered the chronic substance abuse ground, the court
reviewed the statutory factors in detail and “weigh[ed] heavily” Father’s
inability to demonstrate sobriety for longer than six or seven months. The
court also noted that the children “did not feel safe at home except for when
Father was in jail” due to the parents “always yelling and fighting when
Father was drinking alcohol.” And, after walking through each of the
Raymond F. factors, the court explicitly determined that DCS proved by
clear and convincing evidence that Father’s prolonged substance abuse
warranted termination of his parental rights.

¶16           But when considering the remaining statutory grounds for
termination, the juvenile court concluded DCS failed to meet its burden. In
doing so, the court stated:

       Father has been sober from alcohol since April 2022. At the
       time of the termination adjudication hearing, Father had
       stable housing and employment. He was still engaging in
       counseling and substance abuse treatment. His visits with the
       children were going well. He is not presently living with
       Mother. Although . . . the Court believes Father’s battle with
       alcohol remains uncertain and that there are valid,
       documented reasons to believe his alcohol abuse will
       continue, the Court cannot find that Father is currently unable
       to discharge parental responsibilities.

This conclusion conflicts with the court’s conclusion on the chronic
substance abuse ground, which necessarily included a determination that
Father is unable to discharge his parental duties. The two findings are
irreconcilable and “[w]e look to the record to resolve these inconsistent
findings.” Alyssa W. v. Justin G., 245 Ariz. 599, 602, ¶ 16 (App. 2018).

¶17           Father had an extensive history with substance abuse, no
significant periods of sobriety historically, and a recent relapse. The record
supports the court’s determination that his battle with substance abuse
would likely continue and thus warranted termination. When considering

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          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                        Decision of the Court
a parent’s drug addiction, we consider the treatment history and parent’s
ability to implement a system to maintain sobriety. Raymond F., 224 Ariz. at
378, ¶¶ 25, 27–29 (App. 2010).

¶18           To be sure, Father had made admirable progress at the time
of the August 2022 termination hearing. But our task is to evaluate whether
a reasonable factfinder could conclude, based on the record, that the state
has met its clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain the
termination of parental rights. The record shows Father endangered the
Children when he engaged in domestic violence while under the influence
of alcohol and they did not feel safe at home as a result. Father’s extended
history of alcohol abuse, recent relapse, missed tests before and after the
relapse, and lack of extended sobriety are sufficient to sustain the
termination.

   II.     Best Interests

¶19            Father also challenges the juvenile court’s best interests
conclusion. “[A] determination of the child’s best interest must include a
finding as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by
the continuation of the relationship.” Titus S., 244 Ariz. at 369,
¶ 17 (quoting Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990)).
Courts must consider a “child’s adoptability and the parent’s
rehabilitation.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018).

¶20           The juvenile court considered the Children’s adoptability and
their long tenure with DCS placement. The Children currently live with a
family that is willing to adopt them. The court indicated the Children
“deserve permanency and stability” and found it reasonably likely the
Children would end up back in foster care due to Father’s struggles with
substance abuse. The record shows that a continued relationship with
Father could be detrimental, as Father has engaged in domestic violence
when drinking. Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination is in the best interests of the Children.

                                CONCLUSION

¶21           We affirm.

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         IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.C. et al.
                      Williams, J., dissenting

W I L L I A M S, J., dissenting:

¶22           I respectfully part with the majority on how to remedy the
juvenile court’s “irreconcilable” findings, supra ¶ 16, pertaining to Father’s
ability to discharge his parental duties in light of his history of chronic
substance abuse.

¶23           The juvenile court took care to write an organized and
thorough termination order. That order addressed Father’s ability to
discharge his parental duties under more than one section. But the court
made only one express finding on the issue. The court wrote that it “cannot
find that Father is currently unable to discharge parental responsibilities.”

¶24           In other words, despite Father’s history of chronic substance
abuse, Father remained able to discharge his parental duties seemingly, in
part, because at the time of the termination trial he (1) had “been sober from
alcohol since April 2022”; (2) “had stable housing and employment”; (3)
“was still engaging in counseling and substance abuse treatment”; (4) “[h]is
visits with the children were going well”; and (5) he was “not presently
living with Mother.” Record evidence supports the court’s findings and
conclusion on this issue.

¶25           Because Father remained able to discharge his parental
duties, I would vacate the termination order and remand given the ongoing
dependency. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 15
(App. 2010) (holding that termination of parental rights on grounds of
history of chronic substance abuse also requires, inter alia, clear and
convincing evidence that a parent cannot discharge parental responsibilities
because of his chronic substance abuse.).

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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