Court Opinion

ID: 9449088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:55:54.304809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:41.524161
License: Public Domain

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I think the judgment of the District. Court should be affirmed, as the trial court was not at any time asked to try-the issue of the voluntariness of the confession, out of the presence of the jury- or otherwise. The facts are these:
Defendant, on February 17, 1961, filed' a motion to suppress the following, allegedly obtained from him in the District, of Columbia “without a warrant”:
“1. Confession
2. Fingerprints
3. Line-up Identification”
As grounds for the motion, defendant-alleged that his arrest and his detention-, pursuant thereto were illegal, and that the property obtained from him was taken by unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourthi Amendment to the Constitution.
*241At the hearing on the motion to suppress, before District Judge Tamm, defendant’s counsel stated his position as follows:
“My position is that all these procedures which took place without the officers having an arrest warrant or a search warrant and knowing for some period of time that the defendant was in the Metropolitan Area, did not afford themselves the opportunity to apply for a search warrant or an arrest warrant and that the officer who made the arrest was a long-experienced officer of the Metropolitan Police Force.”
The entire argument of counsel on this motion had to do with the existence or nonexistence of a warrant. The hearing was continued to a later date, at which time the defendant’s counsel admitted that an arrest warrant was issued on December 20, 1960, and was outstanding on the day of the arrest, January 23, 1961. At the conclusion of testimony, Judge Tamm said:
“The witness Samen testified he had the warrant with him; that he, Samen, had the warrant with him. * *• *»
Finding that an arrest warrant was outstanding at the time of the arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress.
Not one word in the m’otion had to do with suppression of the confession on the ground of alleged coercion. There was some testimony at the hearing, clearly irrelevant to the motion, to the effect that defendant was beaten at the time of his arrest. This was denied by the police officers.
The case came on for trial before another judge. The first witness called was the man who had been stabbed and robbed. While he was on the stand, he was asked to identify the robber, and he pointed to defendant. Thereupon the following occurred:
“[Counsel for defendant]: Your Honor, I wish to make a motion on the ground of illegal arrest.
“The Court: Wait until it comes around. There has been no arrest shown here yet. This man testified that he sees the man in court who committed the crime. And the record will show he identified him.”
There then was testimony that, after defendant’s arrest, the complaining witness identified him in a line-up. Addressing the court when the matter of the confession came up, counsel for defendant said:
“Your Honor, I think I am bound in behalf of the defendant to have the jurors excluded.
“The Court: For what?
“[Counsel]: Because the arrest was illegal.” [Emphasis supplied.]
On being asked how the arrest was illegal, defense counsel said:
“Your Honor, [the officer] did not have the warrant in his possession.”
Again not one word was said about having the jury excluded, to hear testimony before the court on the question of coercion.
On cross-examination of one of the arresting officers, counsel for defendant said:
“There was a confession, and I think the confession was coerced and that that is part of the coercion.”
At that time, also, no application was made for testimony out of the hearing of the jury.
When the confession was offered in evidence, the following occurred:
“The Court: You can make any objection you have to it.
“ [Counsel for defendant]: I object on the ground that the arrest was illegal.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Not one word was said to indicate that the objection was made on the ground that the confession was coerced. Nor was any request made to have the question of coercion heard out of the presence of the jury.
Defendant rested his case after the Government closed, and no attempt whatsoever was made, nor was there any of*242fer, to show that the confession was coerced.
We do not know, of course, the strategy of trial counsel in this matter. It might well be he believed that any evidence he had on the question of coercion was unreliable and the point of illegal arrest was the stronger, and that he did not wish to raise an issue which might prejudice defendant’s case. However that may be, the fact is that counsel made no request to be heard on the question of coercion.
In my opinion, this case should not be reversed. There was absolutely no indication to the trial judge, or to the Government, that a hearing on the question of coercion was desired, and the fact that present counsel believes the strategy of the trial lawyer was wrong should not cause reversal, particularly where, as here, there was such overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence of guilt.