Court Opinion

ID: 9560743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:54:52.045949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:09.411828
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
“Wiretapping and surveillance are the subjects of federal and state law and both must be complied with where applicable.” Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 179 (2a) (223 SE2d 61) (1976). “[F]or evidence obtained through state-authorized wire taps to be admissible in a state criminal proceeding, it must have been obtained in a manner not inconsistent with the requirements of both the federal and state laws. On the other hand, such evidence must be excluded if it was obtained in a manner inconsistent with . . . either the federal or the state law. [Cit.]” Cox v. State, 152 Ga. App. 453, 455-456 (1) (263 *32SE2d 238) (1979). Under the authority of King v. State, 262 Ga. 147 (414 SE2d 206) (1992), the state must make a showing of strict compliance, rather than mere substantial compliance, with the prompt judicial “sealing” requirement established by 18 USC § 2518 (8) (a). That statute requires timely transmission of wiretap evidence to the presiding judge for sealing as a prerequisite to the admissibility of such evidence. Compare Morrow v. State, 147 Ga. App. 395, 407 (8) (249 SE2d 110) (1978). (Substantial compliance with minimization of interception required by 18 USC § 2518 (5), based upon “objective reasonableness” standard, is sufficient.)
The state offered no valid reason at the motion hearing to explain satisfactorily the three-week delay in presenting the tapes to the presiding judge. Instead, the state relied upon an erroneous standard of compliance and upon proof of non-tampering.
Although King v. State, supra, was not decided until March 11 1992, one month after the hearing on appellants’ motion in this case, the trial court did have the benefit of a citation to United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U. S. 257 (110 SC 1845, 109 LE2d 224) (1990), decided two years before the hearing. The majority properly finds that case applicable to this appeal.
Had the trial court merely relied upon an erroneous legal standard, I would recommend a remand in order to apply the correct standard of strict compliance with 18 USC § 2518 (8) (a). Likewise, had the state offered some reason for delay, the adequacy of which was not determined by the trial court, a remand would be appropriate. United States v. Ojeda Rios, supra. However the state did not seek to present additional evidence or argument as to any reason or satisfactory excuse for the three-week delay. I therefore agree that the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion.
The actions .of law enforcement officers in rendering the tapes incapable of further recording and then placing them in sealed bags in a vault were appropriate. That is a customary and prudent practice to preserve the chain of custody. I do agree, however, that these actions alone were not sufficient to establish strict compliance with the plain meaning of the statute. It requires immediate presentation to the judge for sealing, or a satisfactory explanation at trial for the absence of the seal or any delay in obtaining it. Since strict compliance with this particular requirement is mandatory for admission into evidence of the electronic communication derived from a wiretap, the accused bears no onus to show harm or prejudice from any delay in obtaining the judicial seal. King v. State, supra at 148; United States v. Ojeda Rios, supra.
The requirement that judicial sealing is to be obtained immediately is not satisfied through storage of tamper-proof tapes sealed by the investigators themselves. Moreover, such steps, standing alone, do *33not reasonably explain the three-week delay in this case. Mere “proof of non-tampering [is] not [a] substitute for a satisfactory explanation of the delay in [transmitting the tapes to the court for judicial sealing.]” King v. State, supra at 148 (quoting Ojeda Rios, supra, 495 U. S. at 264).
Decided June 11, 1993.
Troy R. Millikan, for appellants (case no. A93A0151).
Robert L. Waller III, Leslie J. Cardin, for appellant (case no. A93A0152).
Thomas C. Lawler III, District Attorney, Dan W. Mayfield, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the taped conversations, and a new trial is demanded.