Court Opinion

ID: 9617577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:58:09.891832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:12.468560
License: Public Domain

Hunt, Justice,
concurring specially.
I write separately because the majority’s emphasis on the landlord’s conduct and the extent of the tenant’s injuries tends to obscure the central issue. The central issue is not the extent of the landlord’s negligence, which negligence is presupposed in a consideration of assumption of the risk as applied to Mrs. Thompson. Rather, the central issue is whether her admitted knowledge of the heater’s condition acts, under the doctrine of assumption of the risk, as a bar to any recovery. But for the “rule of necessity”3 I think it would.
Having said that, let me point out that certiorari was granted in this case to consider whether the “patent defect” rule bars recovery to the plaintiff in this case. Having implicitly decided that it does not, we should not then move into the fact-finding arena to determine whether the “rule of necessity” applies here — that is, whether, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff had a reasonable alternative to using the hazardous heater. In so doing, we are second-guessing both the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ determinations on that question.4 *131This is not our function on certiorari and I would not reach this issue.
Decided March 9, 1989
Reconsideration denied March 31, 1989.
Carr, Tabb & Pope, David H. Pope, for appellant.
Richard Eason, Jr., John C. Sumner, Rex T. Reeves, Morse & Ontal, Jack 0. Morse, for appellees.
Dennis A. Goldstein, Kay Y. Young, amici curiae.

 Explored by Judge Benham in his dissent joined by Judges Deen, McMurray and Pope.

 And, in so doing, we come no closer to reconciling the issue than did the Court of Appeals. What then does our involvement contribute to the general body of state law? See Supreme Court Rules 29 and 30 (1) regarding the criteria for the grant of certiorari.