Court Opinion

ID: 9961075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 19:13:58.484732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:11.920610
License: Public Domain

04/17/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT JACKSON
                               January 9, 2024 Session

                    KERRY WRIGHT v. JOHN DOE ET AL.

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
                    No. CT-1541-19     Mary L. Wagner, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00084-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

Plaintiff alleged that actions of defendant tow truck driver led to John Doe driving into
plaintiff’s vehicle and causing injury. Towing company and driver moved for summary
judgment based on the lack of evidence as to the cause of John Doe’s actions. The trial
court agreed, granting summary judgment for lack of evidence that towing company or
driver was the cause in fact of plaintiff’s injury. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and
                                    Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.
GOLDIN, and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Kevin D. Bernstein, Albert G. McLean, and Thomas F. Preston, Memphis, Tennessee, for
the appellants, Travelers Insurance Company and John Doe.

Brandon S. Leslie, Memphis, Tennessee for the appellant, Kerry Wright.

Charles M. Weirich, Jr. Memphis, and Hayley E. Vos, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
appellees, Choice Towing, LLC, and Raul Valenzuela.

                                       OPINION

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On April 8, 2019, Plaintiff/Appellant Kerry Wright filed a complaint against
Defendant/Appellee Choice Towing, LLC (“Choice Towing”) and John Doe in the Shelby
County Circuit Court (“the trial court”). The complaint alleged that on April 8, 2018, Mr.
Wright and his son, Kerry Wright, Jr. (“Wright, Jr.”) were parked on the right-hand
shoulder of the interstate behind the broken-down vehicle of Wright, Jr.’s girlfriend (“Ms.
Rust”). A tow truck owned by Choice Towing and operated by a Choice Towing employee
arrived and parked in front of Ms. Rust’s vehicle. Part of the tow truck extended into the
right-hand lane of the interstate while the Choice Towing employee began the process of
securing the disabled vehicle onto the tow truck. According to the complaint, Mr. Wright
was injured when John Doe drove his vehicle into Mr. Wright’s vehicle and fled the scene.
The complaint raised claims of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring,
supervision, and training against Choice Towing, and claims of negligence and negligence
per se against John Doe.

       Unnamed Defendant Travelers Insurance Company (“Travelers”), filed an answer
on May 2, 2019, in its capacity as the uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier and without
electing to defend in its own name or the name of the uninsured driver. Travelers denied
the claims in the complaint and raised multiple affirmative defenses, including the
comparative fault of Mr. Wright and Choice Towing. Choice Towing filed an answer on
May 13, 2019.

      Over the opposition of Choice Towing and Travelers, Mr. Wright received leave to
amend his complaint on November 26, 2019. The amended complaint, filed January 31,
2020, added claims of negligence and negligence per se against the Choice Towing
employee operating the tow truck, Defendant/Appellee Raul Valenzuela (together with
Choice Towing, “Appellees”).

       Appellees filed an answer to the amended complaint on April 16, 2020, raising the
affirmative defense of the comparative fault against John Doe and Mr. Wright. Appellees
were granted leave to amend their answer on December 18, 2020, over the opposition of
Mr. Wright. The amended answer was filed March 4, 2021, and raised only the affirmative
defense of the statutory right to tend to a disable vehicle. By agreed order, Appellees
amended and corrected their amended answer in September 2021 to raise both the statutory
right and the comparative fault of John Doe and Mr. Wright as affirmative defenses.

      Appellees moved for summary judgment on May 10, 2022, asserting that no act or
omission of Appellees caused or contributed to Mr. Wright’s injuries. Appellees
emphasized that the tow truck was parked in front of Ms. Rust’s disabled vehicle, which
Mr. Wright testified in his deposition was parked twenty to forty feet in front of his vehicle.

      On August 16, 2022, Mr. Wright responded in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, arguing that a genuine dispute remained as to causation and a jury should
determine the percentage of the parties’ comparative fault. Mr. Wright admitted each of

                                             -2-
Appellees’ undisputed material facts1 and provided a statement of additional undisputed
material facts. Travelers filed a response opposing summary judgment on August 19, 2022,
arguing that genuine disputes remained as to whether the tow truck’s position created an
unreasonably dangerous condition and whether John Doe was negligent. Travelers
similarly admitted Appellees’ statement of undisputed material facts and adopted Mr.
Wright’s additional statement of undisputed material facts. In reply, Appellees argued that
no non-speculative evidence existed as to the rationale behind John Doe’s actions so any
assertions regarding the cause of the accident were based on inadmissible evidence.

      The trial court granted summary judgment for Appellees by order of December 13,
2022. Therein, the trial court specifically found the following facts to be undisputed:

        7. [Mr.] Valenzuela parked his tow truck on the right-hand shoulder, but
        partially in the right lane of traffic.
        8. [Mr.] Valenzuela’s tow truck was parked in front of the disabled vehicle
        and [Mr. Wright’s] vehicle was approximately forty feet behind the disabled
        vehicle.
        9. John Doe, an unknown third party, was traveling northbound on I-240 in
        the same area when he swerved off the roadway and rear-ended [Mr.
        Wright’s] vehicle.
        10. John Doe swerved from either the middle lane or the far left lane before
        striking [Mr. Wright’s] vehicle, crossing 2–3 lanes of traffic.
        11. The northbound lanes are flat and straight with no permanent
        obstructions.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that

        [Mr. Wright] and Travelers did not respond to the motion for summary
        judgment with evidence of what John Doe did or did not do that would allow
        a jury to make a finding that more likely than not, the defendant towing truck
        was the cause in fact of John Doe’s actions beyond mere conjecture and
        speculation and purely guessing what John Doe was doing or attempting to
        do. [Mr. Wright and Travelers] do not have evidence to establish that John
        Doe veered into [Mr. Wright’s] vehicle but for [Appellees’] conduct.

       On January 3, 2023, Mr. Wright and Travelers filed a joint motion to certify the trial
court’s order granting summary judgment as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 54.02, or, in the alternative, for permission to file an interlocutory appeal.
Instead of an order designating the grant of summary judgment as to Appellees as final, a
notice and order of voluntary nonsuit in relation to John Doe and Travelers was

1
  As to two facts put forth by Appellees, Mr. Wright included additional information after admitting the
fact itself was undisputed.

                                                  -3-
subsequently entered by the trial court on January 9, 2023. Mr. Wright and Travelers
(together, “Appellants”) filed a joint notice of appeal on January 13, 2023.

                                II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The question before us on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Appellees. We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis,
MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622
(Tenn. 1997); Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare-Memphis Hosp., 325 S.W.3d 98, 103
(Tenn. 2010)). As part of our review, we must “take the strongest legitimate view of
the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all reasonable inferences in favor of
that party, and discard all countervailing evidence.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 211
(Tenn. 1993) (citations omitted), holding modified by Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270
S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), holding modified by Rye, 477 S.W.3d 235. We similarly accept the
evidence presented by the non-moving party as true and resolve any doubts about the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact in its favor. TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton,
LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76,
84 (Tenn. 2008)).

        A party is entitled to summary judgment only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. When the party moving for summary
judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it “may satisfy its burden of production
either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
(2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage
is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at
264. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56,
the non-moving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in its pleadings. Id. at 265.
Instead, the non-moving party must respond with specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of material fact to be resolved at trial. Id. A fact is material “if it must be
decided in order to resolve the substantive claim or defense at which the motion is
directed.” Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215. A “genuine issue” exists if “a reasonable jury could
legitimately resolve that fact in favor of one side or the other.” Id. “Summary [j]udgment
is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn from the facts
reasonably permit only one conclusion.” Brooks Cotton Co. v. Williams, 381 S.W.3d 414,
418–19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Landry v. S. Cumberland
Amoco, No. E2009-01354-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 845390, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. March
10, 2010)).

                                      III. ANALYSIS

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       On appeal, Appellants argue that it was an error for the trial court to summarily
dismiss the claims against Appellees. In doing so, the trial court found that Appellees had
demonstrated that Mr. Wright’s evidence was insufficient to establish an essential element
of each of these claims. We begin, therefore, with a brief review of the necessary elements
of negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring, supervision, and training claims.

       Negligence involves “the failure to exercise reasonable care.” Giggers v. Memphis
Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009). To establish a claim for common law
negligence, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by
defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a
breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal,
cause.” Id. (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)).

         Mr. Wright’s other claims also originate in allegations of negligence. A negligence
per se claim is “a form of ordinary negligence that enables the courts to use a penal statute
to define a reasonably prudent person’s standard of care.” Rains v. Bend of the River, 124
S.W.3d 580, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). Although “[t]he effect of
declaring conduct negligent per se is to render the conduct negligent as a matter of law[,]
. . . [p]laintiffs in negligence per se cases must still establish causation in fact, legal cause,
and damages.” Id. at 590 (citations omitted). Similarly, to hold an employer liable for the
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee, a plaintiff must establish (1)
“the elements of a negligence claim” and (2) “that the employer had knowledge of the
employee’s unfitness for the job.” Gunter v. Est. of Armstrong, 600 S.W.3d 916, 928
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 306
S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008)). Thus, all three of the claims require proof of both
causation in fact and proximate cause.

        Causation in fact involves “the cause and effect relationship between the tortious
conduct and the injury.” King v. Anderson Cnty., 419 S.W.3d 232, 246 (Tenn. 2013)
(quoting Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn. 1993)). A plaintiff must show
that the defendant’s negligent conduct “more likely than not caused the injury.” Jenkins v.
Big City Remodeling, 515 S.W.3d 843, 852 (Tenn. 2017) (citing Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d
at 598–99;). In other words, the plaintiff must establish that “the injury would not have
occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (citing King, 419 S.W.3d at 246). In the
medical malpractice context, our Supreme Court has held that “proof of causation equating
to a ‘possibility,’ a ‘might have,’ ‘may have,’ ‘could have,’ is not sufficient, as a matter of
law, to establish the required nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s
tortious conduct by a preponderance of the evidence[.]” Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 602.
Indeed, “causation in fact is a matter of probability, not possibility[.]” Id. (citation omitted);
see also Jenkins, 515 S.W.3d at 851–52 (“It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that a
defendant’s conduct was a possible cause of the injury; the defendant’s conduct must be
shown to be the probable cause.” (emphasis added) (citing Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp.,
689 S.W.2d 856, 861–62 (Tenn. 1985))).

                                               -5-
        On the other hand, “[t]he doctrine of proximate cause encompasses the whole
panoply of rules that may deny liability for otherwise actionable causes of harm.”
Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 598 (quoting Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future
Consequences, 90 Yale L.J. 1353, 1355 n.7 (1981)). “Proximate cause thus focuses on the
nature and extent of the connection between a defendant’s unreasonable conduct and the
plaintiff’s injury[,]” cutting off liability “at the point where the harm that resulted from the
defendant’s negligence is so clearly outside the risks created that it would be unjust or at
least impractical to impose liability.” W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability the New
Vision of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 Vand.
L. Rev. 739, 747 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also King,
419 S.W.3d at 247 (noting the three elements of proximate cause, including that “the
tortfeasor’s conduct must have been a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the harm being
complained of” (quoting Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Tenn. 2005))).

       “Both causation in fact and proximate cause must be proven by the plaintiff by a
preponderance of the evidence.” King, 419 S.W.3d at 246 (citing Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d
at 598). And as “the mere occurrence of an injury does not prove negligence,” Kilpatrick,
868 S.W.2d at 599, “[p]roof of negligence is not a substitute for evidence of causation.”
Jenkins, 515 S.W.3d at 852; see also Doe v. Linder Const. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn.
1992) (“Proof of negligence without proof of causation is nothing” (citation omitted)).
“Though questions regarding . . . causation are ordinarily questions of fact for the jury,
‘these questions may be decided at the summary judgment stage if the evidence is
uncontroverted and if the facts and the inferences drawn reasonably from the facts permit
reasonable persons to draw only one conclusion.’” Jones v. Ray, No. M2004-02629-COA-
R3-CV, 2005 WL 3416296, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2005) (quoting Rains, 124
S.W.3d at 588).

       The trial court found that Appellees had successfully demonstrated that Mr.
Wright’s evidence was insufficient to establish that the positioning of the tow truck was
the cause in fact of his injuries. Appellants argue that the evidence in the record—excerpts
from the depositions of Mr. Wright, Wright, Jr., and Ms. Rust—creates a genuine dispute
of material fact to be presented to a jury.

      From our review, there is testimony regarding the effect of the tow truck on traffic
generally. Indeed, Mr. Wright explained that:

       The fact [was] that the tow truck . . . was blocking the outside lane. People
       that came over that hill had to jockey for a position and it was . . . somewhat
       like a parking lot because they were 18 wheelers. They were -- I mean,
       everybody was having to slow down because that lane is closed so everybody

                                              -6-
       that comes over the hill, they’ve got to get into the other two lanes, or in John
       Doe’s case, the emergency lane. So, there were vehicles everywhere.

Wright, Jr.’s description of the situation was that: “Traffic was messed up in that lane. Like
I said, nothing -- 90 percent of traffic would not pass that tow truck. Everything was moving
over to the middle lane if not stopping in that lane nearest us and then moving over.”
Especially when combined with Appellees’ concession for purposes of summary judgment
that the location of the tow truck created a “dangerous condition,” this testimony clearly
goes toward establishing a breach of duty by Appellees, one element of Mr. Wright’s
claims. But see Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 599 (noting that “an admittedly negligent act
does not necessarily entail liability”).

       However, the testimony as to the effect of the tow truck on John Doe, specifically,
is significantly less clear-cut. Appellants rely most heavily on Ms. Rust’s testimony to
establish a causal relationship between the position of the tow truck and John Doe’s actions.
Yet, after being asked when she first saw John Doe’s vehicle, Ms. Rust stated:

       When [he] was trying to -- I don’t know what [he] was trying to do, if he got
       cut off. I’m not sure what he was trying to do, but [the vehicle] was coming
       from the middle lane to the lane next to us and then hit [Wright, Jr.’s] dad
       from the back, in the back, and then acted like he was going to stop and then
       drove off.

        When asked if another car was in front of John Doe on the interstate prior to the
accident, Ms. Rust explained that: “I mean there was a lot of traffic at that time. You know,
at the time there was cars in both lanes, so I’m assuming that’s why [John Doe] went off
the road, was to avoid -- you know, it got kind of clustered right there, you know.” Then,
when Ms. Rust was asked if she knew “specifically what caused [John Doe] to cross
multiple lanes and leave the roadway[,]” the following exchange occurred:

       A. This got to be really congested. I mean cars were trying to get out of the
       lane closest to me to get out of the way, so I mean cars were -- it looked like
       it was getting dangerous.
       Q. Right. Did you see specifically something that caused [John Doe] to leave
       the middle lane?
       A. The cars in front of him trying to figure out where they were going, so
       maybe to avoid hitting a car that was in front of him.
       Q. What I’m interested in finding out is what specifically you saw. So did
       you see specifically another car interfering with the forward progress of
       [John Doe] or forcing [him] off the road?
       A. I saw lots of cars that were having to avoid hitting one another because
       they were moving in different directions trying to -- like I said, that had

                                             -7-
       gotten -- traffic had gotten pretty heavy. So yeah, it seemed to me as if he
       was trying to avoid hitting another vehicle.

But as to the car John Doe was attempting to avoid, Ms. Rust had “no idea what it looked
like. There were lots of vehicles that were trying to avoid hitting each other at this particular
time.” Ms. Rust also did not know which lane this other vehicle was in.

       When asked to “identify what specifically happened” with the other vehicle, Ms.
Rust stated:

       It just seemed like to me -- my impression was there was a car in front of
       [John Doe] that he was trying to avoid, so he got from -- the lane that I
       thought he was in originally was the middle lane. And when he got into the
       middle lane, there was cars in front of him swapping lanes also and slamming
       on their brakes, and then he didn’t have anywhere else to go. So maybe if he
       got off on the shoulder, he could avoid hitting the cars that were braking in
       front of him.

       When asked if “the position of the tow truck . . . caused [John Doe] to come across
four lanes and strike” Mr. Wright’s vehicle, Wright, Jr. explained: “No. I believe . . . the
position of the tow truck created a disruption in traffic . . . . The disruption in traffic by the
tow truck created him to make a maneuver.” Regarding John Doe’s behavior, Wright, Jr.
had the following exchange:

       Q. And you’re saying that [John Doe] was in the third or the far-left lane?
       A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
       Q. And he came all the way over --
       A. Yes, sir.
       Q: -- from the left lane to hit your dad?
       A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. That’s what I say, when his brakes locked up, it was like
       there was so much time from me hearing his brakes locked up, because traffic
       started -- when people started seeing him [Mr. Valenzuela], this lane started
       shooting over to the left, and people were stopping on this lane just like
       literally completely stopping to get over to clear him, and I don’t know why
       this guy [John Doe] did what he did, but his brakes locked up so far away,
       and we watched it happen.

Later, Wright, Jr. went on to say:

       I believe his decision was a clear lane of traffic. And then when -- again, the
       gentleman was older. Once he noticed, after he initially was taking an angled
       shot into a clear lane of traffic, okay, he seen a tow truck in traffic and just

                                               -8-
       kept correcting going the position he was going, and my dad just happened
       to be in the way.
       ....
       I believe he had control [of his truck] and his decision was altered because
       of a, you know, truck in the way. I believe he saw a lane clear, was making
       an adjustment from the far left to the far right, which was going over one lane
       of traffic at the time, which doesn’t seem that bad, and then he saw, you
       know, something in the way and kept merging over to get, you know, out of
       the way of the semi truck.
       ....
       My opinion is the reason the brakes were locked up was, again, because
       traffic was interrupted and he thought he -- I’m sure people stopping dead
       stopped over here in the far right and then merging over in the middle, I’m
       sure that created a disruption through all lanes. I mean that’s obvious. I mean
       humans panic on the interstate. Might have saw brake lights in his lane,
       locked them up, thought he was getting closer than what he was, went over
       to the middle, saw a clear lane in the right, jumped over to the right. I’d hit
       my dad before I hit a semi truck. You know, didn’t want to hit the truck, so
       he kept going over.

        Respectfully, this testimony constitutes more of the witnesses’ theory of events than
their direct perception of the events that took place. Although they do not agree on which
lane John Doe was in originally, both Ms. Rust and Wright, Jr. posit that John Doe’s initial
movement was toward the right-hand side of the interstate, i.e., toward the tow truck and
the congestion they assert it created, rather than away. As such, the witnesses begin their
narrative with the assumption that the positioning of the tow truck caused John Doe to
move in the direction of the obstruction. Moreover, Ms. Rust admits that she does not know
what John Doe was attempting to do prior to hitting Mr. Wright’s vehicle, that she is
assuming John Doe left the roadway to avoid hitting another vehicle that she cannot
describe, and that this theory is merely her impression of the events prior to the accident.
Wright, Jr.’s testimony is replete with expressions that his testimony is of his beliefs and
opinions, and he admits that he does not know why John Doe acted the way he did beyond
statements of “obvious” reactions to scenarios John Doe might have been presented with.
This sort of conjecture is simply not enough to establish causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.

        Of course, that is not to say that circumstantial evidence may not support a finding
of fact. In Hindman v. Doe, this Court affirmed a jury award even though it expressly
found the evidence of causation to be “largely circumstantial.” 241 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2007). There, the plaintiff’s vehicle entered a ditch and flipped over after striking
a large rock in the roadway. Id. at 466. Multiple witnesses provided testimony that there
was a disabled dump truck filled with rock and dirt on the side of the road near the accident
site in the week prior to the accident, that a pile of dirt and rock had been dumped out and

                                             -9-
was laying under the truck the day prior to the accident, and that there was a pile of dirt
and large rocks next to the roadway near the accident site the day prior to the accident. Id.
at 469. There was also expert testimony explaining how rocks could have rolled off the pile
of dirt into the road. Together, this was enough to establish “a chain of events between the
negligent actions of the unknown motorist—the operator of the [] dump truck—and the
accident.” Therefore, the defendant unknown motorist insurance carrier’s argument that
the evidence was too speculative to support the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff was
unsuccessful. Id. at 470.

       Similarly, in Fruge v. Doe, our Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of
causation to present the matter to the jury. 952 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1997). The plaintiffs
attempted to avoid a disabled vehicle left in their lane of traffic and instead struck the
retaining wall. Id. at 409. The responding police officer’s report explained that although
the abandoned vehicle was not struck, there were multiple accidents in the immediate area,
such that “the probable source of the resulting collisions” was the vehicle blocking the
roadway. Id. at 410. Thus, a jury “could find on the evidence in the record and on the
reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom that . . . the unknown motorist caused
the accident[,]” and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed. Id. at 412.

       However, the testimony as to causation in this case is decidedly less definite than
that in Hindman and Fruge. Those cases included evidence that both closely linked the
alleged negligence of the defendant to the injury suffered by the plaintiff and clearly
negated the possibility of other potential causes. In our view, the evidence here instead
more closely resembles that presented in Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling.

        In Jenkins, the plaintiffs argued that their partially-completed house was destroyed
by a fire on their back deck as a result of negligence by flooring subcontractors. 515 S.W.3d
at 845. In their motion for summary judgment, the subcontractors relied on deposition
testimony and statements from the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses that the cause of the fire
could not be determined and that arson and other possible causes of the fire including
improperly discarded cigarettes, electrical issues, and spontaneous combustion of rags
could not be ruled out. Id. at 846. The plaintiffs’ evidence included that the subcontractor
and his crew handled flammable substances and smoked cigarettes in the garage, smoked
cigarettes near the back deck, and were the last people in the house prior to the fire.
Additionally, there was testimony that the rags used by the subcontractors may have caused
the fire if not properly disposed of, and an arsonist would likely have been seen on a
neighbor’s surveillance camera. Id.

        Our Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment after finding that the
plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient evidence of causation in fact. Id. at 852–53.
Specifically, it found that the “expert witnesses could not rule out arson as a cause of the
fire and were not able to identify a possible cause for the fire that was more likely than any
other cause.” Id. at 852. Thus, the “subcontractors may have been negligent by improperly

                                            -10-
discarding cigarettes or by disposing of rags in the garage area, but the plaintiffs were not
able to link these alleged acts to the fire that started on the back deck.” Id. As such, the
plaintiffs were unable to “produce evidence that any negligent conduct by the
subcontractors was the cause in fact of the fire[,]” and the defendant subcontractors were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 853.

        We likewise found the evidence too speculative to avoid summary judgment in
Jones, 2005 WL 3416296. There, the plaintiff passenger alleged that the defendant
motorcycle driver negligently failed to pay adequate attention to be able to avoid a collision
with a deer, thus breaching his duty of care. Id. at *1. In opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, the passenger highlighted that there were no obstructions to the
driver’s vision on the relevant portion of the roadway and that the deer would have had to
cross 100 feet of clear area before reaching the motorcycle. She argued that these facts
supported the inference that if the driver had been properly paying attention, he could have
avoided the accident. Id. at *2. But, as “there [was] no evidence of where the deer came
from, how it got there, and hence, whether it was ever in the defendant driver’s reasonable
line of sight[,]” we did not agree that such an inference was possible without requiring that
the jury first speculate as to the deer’s whereabouts prior to hitting the motorcycle. And
simply put, “[s]uch speculation by the jury is not permissible.” Id.; see also Owings v.
Owings, 661 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (affirming summary judgment based
on lack of proof of breach where plaintiff passenger’s deposition testimony was that
defendant driver hit multiple parked cars after swerving to avoid hitting an animal in the
roadway, noting that “[t]he problem with Plaintiff’s argument [that this was a negligent
act] is that it is based entirely on speculation and points to no facts demonstrating that
Defendant’s actions were negligent except that an accident occurred and that Defendant
was driving” (quoting Jones, 2005 WL 3416296, at *3)), perm. app. denied (Jan. 11, 2023).

       Like in Jones, the testimony here requires a two-step analysis to connect the conduct
of Appellees to Mr. Wright’s injuries. The witnesses do not state that the tow truck alone
caused John Doe to hit Mr. Wright’s vehicle on the shoulder. Instead, they explain that the
tow truck created congestion that in turn caused John Doe to head toward the obstacle in
the right-hand lane, leave the roadway, and strike Mr. Wright’s vehicle. But even when we
take the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Wright and accept arguendo that the
tow truck caused congestion, we simply do not know “where [John Doe] came from, how
[he] got there,” Jones, 2005 WL 3416296, at *1, and hence, whether his conduct stemmed
from the location of the tow truck, or even from the congestion allegedly created by the
location of the tow truck. Thus, like in Jenkins, Appellants have failed to establish that
Appellees’ conduct was more likely than not the cause of John Doe entering the shoulder
and striking Mr. Wright’s vehicle.

       Because the evidence linking the accident to the tow truck’s position is so tenuous,
particularly given that the undisputed facts establish that John Doe’s actions involved him
moving toward the obstruction, rather than away from it, Mr. Wright’s proof does little to

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eliminate the possibility that other factors were the cause of John Doe’s decision to cross
at least one lane of traffic. And as Appellees pointed out at the summary judgment hearing,
there are other reasonable explanations for John Doe’s behavior: “Maybe it was a bee that
was in the car. Maybe he was on the phone with someone. Maybe he was high. Maybe he
was drunk. Maybe he was just going too fast[.]” The narrative the witnesses have created,
in which John Doe crossed at least one lane of traffic and then left the roadway to avoid
hitting another vehicle as a result of congestion caused by the positioning of the tow truck,
while plausible, is no more likely than these other possible rationales. In other words, Mr.
Wright has not only failed to establish that the tow truck’s position and any congestion it
caused was a probable cause of the accident, Jenkins, 515 S.W.3d at 851–52, or even a
substantial factor in the collision, see King, 419 S.W.3d at 247, he has failed to connect the
positioning of the tow truck to his injuries in any fashion.

        In sum, even if the positioning of the tow truck caused a dangerous condition and
therefore constituted a negligent act, the testimony in the record did not prove that this
condition was the probable cause of the accident rather than simply a possible cause.
Jenkins, 515 S.W.3d at 851–52. Testimony amounting to “a ‘possibility,’ a ‘might have,’
‘may have,’ ‘could have,’ is not sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish the required
nexus between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s tortious conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence[.]” Kilpatrick, 868 S.W.2d at 602. Thus, Appellees have
successfully “demonstrate[ed] that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary
judgment stage [was] insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense.”
Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264. Mr. Wright did not effectively show that a genuine dispute
remained for trial; because he was unable to negate other potential causes of John Doe’s
actions, no reasonable jury could have found, without speculating, that the positioning of
the tow truck more likely than not caused John Doe to cross at least one lane of traffic,
leave the roadway, and hit Mr. Wright’s vehicle. As Mr. Wright could not prove the cause
in fact element of his claims, Appellees were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See
Cox v. M.A. Primary & Urgent Care Clinic, 313 S.W.3d 240, 259 (Tenn. 2010) (“No
claim for negligence can succeed in the absence of any one of [the common law] elements.”
(quoting Kelley v. Middle Tenn. Emergency Physicians, 133 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tenn.
2004))); Naifeh v. Valley Forge Life Ins. Co., 204 S.W.3d 758, 772 (Tenn. 2006) (finding
no proximate cause and then stating that “[a]s a result of our holding on this element, we
need not discuss duty of care or any other elements of the negligence action”). The trial
court’s grant of summary judgment is therefore affirmed.

                                     IV. CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Shelby County Circuit Court is affirmed, and this matter is
remanded to the trial court for any proceedings necessary and consistent with this Opinion.
Costs of this appeal are taxed one-half to Appellant Kerry Wright and one-half to Appellant
Travelers Insurance Company, for which execution may issue if necessary.

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       S/ J. Steven Stafford
       J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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