Court Opinion

ID: 9789976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:48.366204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.522565
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution of the State of Colorado provides that:
“The legislative power of the state shall be vested in the general assembly * *
Thus we see that the people granted to the general assembly plenary powers to legislate, subject to the reservation to the people of the right of initiative and referendum and the inhibition against special legislation imposed by Section 25, Article Y.
The people, in adopting Article XX of the Constitution, invested home rule cities with plenary powers to legislate by charter or ordinance on local and municipal matters. To the extent that home rule cities were invested with such power, the legislature was stripped of its power. Decisions of this court have repeatedly held that home rule cities have exclusive jurisdiction over local and municipal matters and that the state has exclusive jurisdiction over matters not local or municipal, but of statewide concern.
There are areas in which all would agree the matter is of statewide concern, such as murder, rape, etc.; other areas in which all would agree the matter is purely local and municipal, such as a storekeeper using the sidewalk in front of his place of business to store or display his merchandise, running a red light at the corner of Sixteenth and Champa, etc. Between these extremes is a vast area in which it may be very difficult to characterize an act as local or statewide.
I conclude, contrary to the majority, that reckless driving is not local or municipal, but statewide, and that adoption of an ordinance dealing with the subject is an invasion of the constitutional powers of the general assembly.
*222Dealing with reckless driving, the state statute, C.R.S. ’53, 1957 Supp., 13-4-31, states:
“Any person who drives any motor vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The offense as defined by the statute consists of: (1) an act — driving (2) in a “manner” as to indicate wantonness, etc.
The real gravamen of the offense is the manner of driving. Without proof of the manner the offense of reckless driving cannot be established. Proof of the manner is just as essential as is proof of driving.
The word “reckless” is an adjective — it does not stand by itself, but is used to denote the quality of conduct in driving an automobile. Not in Denver or Colorado Springs, but anywhere, anytime. There are no local •standards for measuring recklessness; the tests are not only of statewide but of universal application.
Recklessness is the same on the ski run as in the swimming pool, in bidding a bridge hand or stroking a mountain lion, in Roggen or Rangoon.
We do not have geographical varieties of recklessness, such as the Denver and Colorado Springs variety, the mountain pass variety, the lake variety, etc. Nor do we have time varieties, such as the evening and morning hours of traffic congestion or the lull preceeding the same.
Recklessness is just that — -no more, no less; where and when does not change the quality of the act or the manner of its performance.
In Denver v. Henry, 95 Colo. 582, 38 P. (2d) 895, this court, by a four to three vote, held that an ordinance prescribing conduct to be pursued by drivers approaching a street intersection in Denver was valid in that it dealt with a local and municipal matter. The intersection approached in that case existed in Denver only; the offense charged could not have been committed else*223where. One can drive through a certain red light only at the location thereof. On the other hand, one can drive recklessly or carefully any place, and at any or all times.
In People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P. (2d) 256, this court held that each of the following acts or omissions were not local or municipal:
1. Leaving the scene of an accident;
2. Failure to give name, address and registration number of automobile;
3. Failure to render aid to persons injured in accident.
In People v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13 P. (2d) 266, we held that the matters of registration of births, deaths, burials, etc., were not matters of local or municipal concern.
In Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P. (2d) 886, we held that the permissible rate of interest to be charged on small loans was a matter of statewide concern and not subject to regulation by home rule cities.
In Spears Hospital v. State Board, 122 Colo. 147, 220 P. (2d) 872, we held that the licensing and regulation of hospitals was not a local or municipal matter.
In Davis v. Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P. (2d) 674, we held that driving an automobile by one whose license was suspended was of statewide concern and this while driving on the streets of Denver.
In City and County of Denver v. Palmer, 140 Colo. 27, 342 P. (2d) 687, we held that driving of an automobile by one whose license was revoked — in Denver — was a matter of statewide concern.
In Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P. (2d) 614, we held that driving a motor vehicle by one under the influence of intoxicating liquor was a matter of statewide concern as distinguished from local and municipal.
Such misconduct consists of (1) driving (2) while in a certain condition. The offense can be consummated anytime and at any place.
*224I fail to observe any distinction between driving in a condition, and driving in a manner, such as to warrant holding that one is local and municipal and the other not.
I am of the opinion that the rule should be made absolute.
I am at liberty to state that Mr. Justice Frantz concurs in this dissent.