Court Opinion

ID: 9565157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:15:56.151923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:26.199044
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(concurring in result):
I do not agree with the majority’s reading of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and more importantly I do not agree that the scope of the search warrant can be expanded beyond its own language by the language in the underlying affidavit. Nevertheless, I concur in the result because I believe the search warrant was on its face sufficiently broad to allow a search of the fenced enclosure.
I.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), infuse the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement with vitality by requiring that an affidavit in support of an application for a warrant reveal that there is a reasonably reliable basis in fact for a finding of probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. This requirement is the only real protection that citizens have against an agent of the state intruding on the privacy of their homes and effects on only the slightest pretext, or even no pretext at all. The basis of the affiant’s knowledge must be set forth in the affidavit together with some evidence supporting the veracity of the informant when the affidavit includes allegations of a confidential informant. Without such a foundation, a warrant becomes a mere charade, and the basic liberty protected by the Fourth Amendment would constitute an unenforceable right, or, more realistically stated, no right at all.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), dealt with a factual situation in which the technical re*1104quirements of Aguilar and Spinelli were not met, but the basic objective of requiring a degree of reliability for the allegations in support of the warrant was nonetheless established by a tight web of circumstantial evidence. The evidentiary reliability in establishing probable cause was so compelling as to demonstrate even greater reliability than often occurs by literal compliance with the Aguilar and Spi-nelli standards. For that reason, the United States Supreme Court in Gates observed that a magistrate could employ a “totality of the circumstances analysis” to assure an adequate basis for probable cause. That is not to say that the “common sense” approach to the “totality of the circumstances” standard can be justified to sap the requirement of reasonable reliability required by Aguilar and Spinelli. As we stated in State v. Bailey, Utah, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1984):
However, even under [the Gates] standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spi-nelli guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable cause. Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the person providing the information for a warrant may well be necessary to establish with a “fair probability” that the evidence sought actually exists and can be found where the informant states.
II.
Apart from the effect of Gates, I do not agree that the scope of a search warrant can be expanded by the language of the supporting affidavit, unless (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant at the time it is executed and (2) the magistrate uses suitable words of reference in the warrant to incorporate the affidavit.
A valid search warrant establishes the authority of officers to search in areas where they otherwise have no right to be, and the authority of the officer does not extend beyond that stated in the warrant. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 n. 7, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2004 N. 7, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). In Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96, 48 S.Ct. 74, 75-76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927), the Court stated:
General searches have long been deemed to violate fundamental rights.

The requirement [of the Fourth Amendment] that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.
In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), the Court held that “[w]hen an official search is properly authorized — whether by consent or by the issuance of a valid warrant — the scope of the search is limited by the terms of its authorization.” Likewise, in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1234, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948), the Court stated:
It is a mistake to assume that a search warrant in these circumstances would contribute nothing to the preservation of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. A search warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Without such a warrant, however, officers are free to determine for themselves the extent of their search and the precise objects to be seized. This is no small difference. It is a difference upon which depends much of the potency of the right of privacy. And it is a difference that must be preserved even where contraband articles are seized in connection with a valid arrest.
A lawfully issued warrant not only protects a citizen’s right of privacy as to areas not authorized to be searched, but it also tends to minimize confrontations between officers and citizens by specifically stating the limits of an officer’s authority to intrude into protected areas. A search that goes beyond the scope of the search autho*1105rized by the warrant itself has no legal authorization.
It follows from the principles just enunciated that, as a general rule, the lawful scope of an authorized search warrant may not be defined by reference to an affidavit submitted to a magistrate in support of the application for the warrant. “There is a fundamental distinction between the warrant and the underlying affidavit, and the affidavit is not necessarily either part of the warrant or available for defining the scope of the warrant.” Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C.Cir.1972). Accord United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir.1976). The only exception to this general rule occurs when (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant at the time of its execution, and (2) the warrant uses “suitable words of reference” which incorporate the affidavit by reference. All the federal courts of appeals that have considered this question have so held. Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d 1236, 1238-1239 (D.C.Cir.1972); United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.1980); United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Gusan, 549 F.2d 15, 16 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir.1976); United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Rael, 467 F.2d 333, 335 (10th Cir.1972). Several states have similarly held. People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 209 Cal.Rptr. 34 (1984); People v. Tockgo, 145 Cal.App.3d 635, 193 Cal.Rptr. 503 (1983); Harris v. State, 17 Md.App. 484, 302 A.2d 655 (1973); Phenix v. State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex.Crim.1973). See also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(a) at 73-74 (1978).
The requirement that the affidavit accompany the warrant is important, not only because it limits the discretion of the officer executing the warrant, but also because it notifies the person being searched of the places to be searched and the items to be seized. In re LaFayette Academy, 610 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir.1970); People v. MacAvoy, 162 Cal.3d 746, 209 Cal.Rptr. 34, 40 (1984).
It follows that when a magistrate authorizes a search narrower than sought or suggested in the affidavit, the officers executing the warrant may not ordinarily use the affidavit to expand the scope of the authorized search. Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d 1236 (D.C.Cir.1972) (dictum); State v. Fowler, 106 Idaho 3, 674 P.2d 432 (Idaho App.1983). This is so because the narrow wording of the warrant
may reflect a judicial determination to limit the search. At any rate, the officer executing the warrant must act on that assumption and we cannot expect or permit him to determine why or on what basis the language was narrowed when the judicial officer signed the document establishing [the officer’s] authority to intrude on the privacy of homes or other premises.
Moore v. United States, 461 F.2d at 1239.
The warrant in this case did not incorporate the affidavit or otherwise refer to the affidavit’s description of the place to be searched. The warrant’s only reference to the affidavit was in its first sentence, which stated: “Proof by affidavit having been made before me this 26th day of August 1982, that there is probable and reasonable cause to believe that there is presently located in the following described premises the property set forth_” Given this language, the majority errs, in my view, in referring to the affidavit to broaden the scope of the warrant. A passing reference to an affidavit to expand the scope of the warrant can only lead to subverting the fundamental values that the warrant is designed to protect. Commonwealth v. Todisco, 363 Mass. 445, 294 N.E.2d 860 (1973), is distinguishable because the affidavit in that case was relied on only to correct what was clearly an error in the address of the apartment to be searched, not to expand the scope of the search. Furthermore, it was the affiant who executed the warrant in that case and the affidavit was relied on only to correct *1106an obvious error in the warrant as to the correct location of the place to be searched. When the scope of the search is involved, the knowledge of the judge issuing the warrant is determinative.
III.
Nevertheless, the warrant in this case was sufficiently broad, in my view, to include the fenced area north of the defendant’s home. When the term “residence” is used in a search warrant as a general term describing the place to be searched, that term encompasses not only the dwelling house but also the curtilage as well. See Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983, 989 (8th Cir.1965); Griffith v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 386 So.2d 771 (1980). Compare Taylor v. State, 134 Miss. 110, 98 So. 459 (1924) (search of an outhouse invalid where the warrant authorized search of a “building used as a residence”). However, the term “residence” does not extend to outbuildings not associated with the residence. See United States v. Thomas, 216 F.Supp. 942, 945 (N.D.Cal.1963).
In this case, the search warrant described the property to be searched as “the residence located xk mile north of Maggie’s Bend on SR156 Spanish Fork, Utah County, Utah ... which the premises are described as a white frame home located on the West side of the road facing East, with a small pond on the North Side of the home....” (Emphasis added.) On this record, I believe that it can fairly be inferred that the place searched was within the curtilage.