Court Opinion

ID: 9770509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:07:09.159665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:17.268639
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority’s basic construction of article 5236e, I do not believe that the record of this case negates implication of a finding of “bad faith” under rule 299 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court’s holding is that the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the trial court reflect that its judgment is “obviously” based upon an erroneous construction of article 5236e, namely that imposition of the $100 penalty and treble damages is mandatory when the landlord withholds the deposit longer than thirty days. By this analysis, the court concludes that the issue of bad faith was not considered by the trial court and, thus, cannot be implied under rule 299. I cannot agree.
According to the majority opinion, the alleged “erroneous theory” is shown by the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings of fact were made, and although they recite particular facts and circumstances, there is no express finding that these preliminary findings reflect “bad faith” on the part of the landlord. Supposedly, implication of this ultimate finding is precluded by the court’s erroneous construction of article 5236e, as manifested by its conclusions of law. These conclusions are:
(1)That article 5236e requires that the landlord must refund a tenant’s security deposit or provide an itemized list of charges deducted for damages above and beyond ordinary wear and tear within thirty days after a tenant vacates the premises, subject to the tenant providing the landlord with thirty days’ written notice;
(2) That article 5236e requires failure to so refund tenant’s security deposit or to itemize deductions within the thirty-day period to be considered prima facie evidence of bad faith;
(3) That article 5236e requires or provides for no automatic extension of this thirty-day period for the convenience of the landlord;
(4) “Therefore, I have found that the defendant landlord . . . did not act in compliance with . . . article 5236e . as regards the return of plaintiff’s security deposit ...”
Although conclusions two, three, and four are heavily emphasized in the majority’s analysis, no amount of emphasis can justify their holding that these findings and conclusions demonstrate that the trial court “obviously” based its judgment upon an erroneous construction of article 5236e. The evidentiary findings are not challenged in this case, and conclusions of law one and two merely paraphrase the language of the statute. Conclusion three is clearly a correct statement of the law, for even the majority recognizes that extensions of the thirty-day period are not “automatic,” but rather are conditioned upon a landlord’s good-faith belief that retention of the deposit was necessary to cover reasonable charges and damages. Finally, conclusion four simply recites that the defendant “did not act in compliance” with the statute and concludes liability without expressing the precise relationship of that liability to the other conclusions. In its opinion, the majority does not specify any error in these conclusions; yet they hold that the trial court “obviously” tried the case on the wrong theory. Although the court states that appellee has argued that the landlord’s retention of the deposit past the thirty days constitutes bad faith as a matter of law, I cannot recall any oral or written argument to that effect. Indeed, appellee’s brief sets forth the very same test of liability as is *783stated in the majority opinion. Throughout appellee’s brief, he emphasizes that the landlord’s liability rests upon failure to rebut the presumption of bad faith raised by extended retention of the deposit, stating that “under the language of the statute, the landlord must show that his actions were not in bad faith or be subject to the penalties required by the act,” and that [t]he Trial Court correctly held that there is a presumption of bad faith, and that this presumption was not rebutted.” Thus, the majority not only presumes that the trial court based its decision on an “erroneous theory,” but also justifies that presumption by imputing that theory to appellee in the face of directly contrary arguments in his brief.
By failing to specify the errors in this case, the court exercises its discretion in reviewing the findings and conclusions and misinterprets the very authorities it cites to support its departure from the implied-finding rule. At best, these cases can only be cited to support the position that presumption of omitted findings is improper only when the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court rested its judgment on a different basis. See Burford v. Pounders, 145 Tex. 460, 199 S.W.2d 141, 145 (1947) (implied finding would be improper since findings and conclusions disclosed that trial court carefully avoided finding the proffered omission); Stretcher v. Gregg, 542 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1976, no writ) (no implied finding of written notice allowed when it was evident from record that trial court’s holding was based upon finding of oral notice); Reid v. Gulf Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1959), aff’d, 161 Tex. 51, 337 S.W.2d 267 (1960) (no implied finding when finding would be inconsistent with any correct legal theory of the case); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 299 S.W.2d 181, 182 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1957, no writ) (implied finding disallowed when the conclusions of law manifested that the case was tried under the wrong legal theory). Finally, in E. F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Fox, 518 S.W.2d 849, 855-56 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.), this very court stated:
[R]ule 299 does not authorize us to imply a finding on the correct measure of damages when the record clearly shows that the amount awarded by the court was determined by applying an erroneous measure of damages. [Emphasis added.]
Under these authorities, appellate courts are not authorized to disregard the rule of implied findings under rule 299 unless they can point to specific sections of the record which negate the implication. The majority has not specified any portion of the record which is even arguably erroneous. I can only construe this holding as establishing a new principle of appellate review, namely that when the record raises some suspicion of error, the appellate court may, in its discretion, presume that error has been committed. Error is never presumed, and if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are susceptible to different constructions, they must be construed to support the trial court’s judgment. Brown v. Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1963); Heard v. City of Dallas, 456 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.); In Interest of Anglin, 542 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ). Although the majority notes that appellee has not urged that we should affirm under rule 299, this statement erroneously assumes that it was appellee’s burden to do so. Rule 299 is one of the various presumptions inherent in the nature of appellate review, and we must make those presumptions in favor of the judgment even if they are not urged. The burden rests upon the complaining party to show affirmatively by the record that error was committed, Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.1968), and the appellee is not bound to contest the points raised on appeal. Gill v. Willis, 282 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1955, no writ); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Blanchard, 73 S.W. 88 (Tex.Civ.App.—1903, no writ).
Even if the majority’s principle is accepted, the findings and conclusions in this case do not raise any “suspicion” of error. Since none of the trial court’s legal conclusions *784are erroneous, and the erroneous theory has not been urged here by appellee, the only possible source of “suspicion” is the absence of an express finding of bad faith. The majority concedes that a fact issue was presented on bad faith, and the trial court was empowered to resolve this issue according to its view of the evidence. Since appellant requested the findings from the trial court and did not request additional findings or take exceptions thereto, the facts found by the trial court bind the parties on appeal, Pope v. American Nat’l Ins. Co., 443 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1969, writ ref’d n. r. e.), and we must presume that any necessary facts not covered by the express findings were found in support of the judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 299; Wisdom v. Smith, 146 Tex. 420, 209 S.W.2d 164 (1948); Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W.2d 562 (1943); Waters v. Yockey, 193 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1945, no writ). With all deference to the majority, I cannot refuse to recognize this rule by presuming that such a finding was not made.
For these reasons, I am unable to concur in the opinion of the court.