Court Opinion

ID: 9898454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:48.837858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.301639
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of:
                                                              No. 84155-6-I
CHRISTINE CRABTREE,
                                                              DIVISION ONE
                          Respondent,
                                                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                 and

DONALD CLINTON CRABTREE,

                          Appellant.

        HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — In his third post-dissolution appeal to this court,

Donald Crabtree appeals the superior court’s orders on revision that affirmed the

commissioner’s orders on cross motions for adequate cause to modify the existing

parenting plan, entry of a temporary parenting plan, and denial of his motions for

contempt and to appoint a guardian ad litem.1 The challenged rulings were all

within the superior court’s discretion, and no abuse of that discretion has been

demonstrated. Accordingly, we affirm.

          1 In his prior appeals, the father challenged trial court orders finding him in contempt for the

failure to pay support obligations. See Crabtree v. Crabtree, No. 81164-9-I (Wash. Ct. App. Aug.
2, 2021) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/811649.pdf; see also
In re the Marriage of Crabtree, No. 80165-1-I, (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2020) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/801651.pdf.
No. 84155-6-I/2

                                               FACTS

        Donald and Christine Crabtree2 dissolved their marriage in 2018. A South

Carolina court entered a final custody order that provided for the parties’ four

dependent children to live primarily with Christine and to reside with Clint every

other weekend.         Soon after the entry of this order, both parties relocated to

Washington State.

        In 2020, based on Clint’s acknowledged use of physical discipline against

the parties’ oldest child, in violation of an express provision of the 2018 South

Carolina custody order, the superior court entered a restraining order suspending

his visitation with the children, who were then between the ages of 6 and 12, and

also found him to be in contempt.3 The restraining order provided that Clint could

petition the court to resume his residential time after he completed a court-

approved parenting class, and submitted a declaration to the court acknowledging

that physical discipline constitutes corporal punishment and stating that he will not

administer corporal punishment to the children (consistent with the terms of the

2018 South Carolina order).             In the interim, the 2020 order allowed him two

telephone or video calls per week with the children, during specific one-hour

windows. A year later, when Clint still had not submitted the required declaration,

the court reissued a protection order that included the same provisions.4

        2 Because the parties share the same last name, we refer to the parties by their first names

for clarity. No disrespect is intended. Further, as the record establishes that Donald Crabtree uses
his middle name, we address him as Clint, the form of his middle name used by the parties in the
trial court.
          3 The 2018 custody order specifically prohibits the father from administering “corporal

punishment on the children.”
          4 The 2021 protection order is not in the record, but the parties do not dispute that the court

reissued the order and included the same provision as the 2020 order.

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No. 84155-6-I/3

      In 2022, when the second restraining order was about to expire, Christine

filed a motion for adequate cause to modify the parenting plan. She sought entry

of a Washington parenting plan that reflected the provisions of the prior South

Carolina court order and also incorporated the provisions of the 2020 and 2021

restraining orders that suspended Clint’s in-person visitation.     Christine also

requested that she no longer be required to consult with Clint on certain major

issues involving the children, as required under the 2018 order.

      Clint then filed his own motion for an adequate cause determination that

sought to modify the parenting plan and motions for contempt, a restraining order,

and to appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL). After a hearing, a superior court

commissioner granted Christine’s motion for adequate cause and entered her

proposed temporary parenting plan. At the same time, the commissioner denied

Clint’s motion for adequate cause and his other motions, and specifically found

that even if Christine violated provisions of the South Carolina custody order, her

violations were not intentional or willfully contemptuous. Clint sought revision of

the commissioner’s orders. After a hearing, the superior court denied revision.

      Clint timely appealed.

                                   ANALYSIS

      At the outset, we note that Clint represents himself on appeal, as he did in

the trial court. Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and

are bound by the same rules of procedure and substantive law. In re Marriage of

Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). To comply with the Rules of

Appellate Procedure, an appellant’s brief must contain “argument in support of the

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No. 84155-6-I/4

issues presented for review, together with citations to legal authority and

references to relevant parts of the record.”       RAP 10.3(a)(6).   Here, with few

exceptions, Clint’s recitation of facts is unsupported by proper references to the

record on appeal and, to a large extent, is not relevant to the orders on review. He

fails to provide the standard of review, acknowledge that he appeals from the

superior court’s order on revision, and, for the most part, fails to address the

applicable legal standards. With these limitations in mind, we address the essence

of Clint’s claims on appeal to the extent it is possible to do so.

       Parenting plan modifications are governed by RCW 26.09.260 and .270. A

parent who petitions for modification must submit sworn statements establishing

adequate cause to justify a full modification hearing. RCW 26.09.270. In making

an adequate cause determination, the “trial court considers and weighs the facts

alleged by the parties in the affidavits, the evidence, and other factors on a case-

by-case basis.” In re Marriage of MacLaren, 8 Wn. App. 2d 751, 774, 440 P.3d

1055 (2019). If the adequate cause burden is not met, the court cannot proceed

to a full hearing on the merits of a petition. In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d

123, 124, 65 P.3d 664 (2003).

       A trial court’s decision on adequate cause is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Id. at 128. A trial court decision on a motion for contempt is likewise

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d

39, 53, 509 P.3d 832 (2022). A court abuses its discretion when its order is based

on untenable grounds or reasons, or is otherwise manifestly unreasonable. Gildon

v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 158 Wn.2d 483, 494, 145 P.3d 1196 (2006). Where, as

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No. 84155-6-I/5

here, a party appeals from an order on revision, we review “the decision of the

superior court judge, not the commissioner.” In re Marriage of Lyle, 199 Wn. App.

629, 633, 398 P.3d 1225 (2017). A denial of revision “constitutes an adoption of

the commissioner’s decision.” In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27-28,

232 P.3d 573 (2010).

I.      Adequate Cause

        Clint challenges the determination that Christine established adequate

cause to modify the parenting plan. To support her petition to modify, Christine

relied on RCW 26.09.260(4), which allows the court to reduce or restrict contact

between child and the parent if such reduction or restriction would serve and

protect the best interests of the child under the criteria in RCW 26.09.191, and on

RCW 26.09.260(8)(a), which authorizes adjustment of a residential schedule if a

parent “voluntarily fails to exercise residential time for an extended period, that is,

one year or longer.” Clint asserts that Christine failed to establish adequate cause

for modification under either of these provisions because his lack of in-person

contact with his children cannot be considered willful. Instead, he claims the

court’s ruling took advantage of his “religious convictions against forced speech.”5

        But, as noted, Clint does not identify or apply any standard of review. And

Clint’s subjective view of the court-imposed declaration requirement does not

        5 Insofar as Clint’s brief suggests that the declaration provision in the prior restraining

orders that was incorporated into the temporary parenting plan violates his right to free speech, he
did not appeal the restraining orders and provides no legal authority or cogent argument to support
his position. See Holland v. City of Tacoma, 90 Wn. App. 533, 538, 954 P.2d 290 (1998) (“Passing
treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”);
see also RAP 5.2(a) (establishing that notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the
decision); see also RAP 2.4(a) (explaining that this court generally reviews only those decisions
that are designated in the notice of appeal).

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No. 84155-6-I/6

change the fact that the decision about whether or not to comply with the

requirements was wholly within Clint’s control. It is uncontroverted that, during the

two-year period the restraining orders were in effect, Clint had the ability to

complete both requirements and petition the court to reinstate his residential time.

The court had a tenable basis for concluding that his failure to do so was a

deliberate choice, and therefore, his lack of contact with the children was willful

and not inadvertent or somehow beyond his control. Clint fails to establish that the

court abused its discretion in finding the evidence sufficient to warrant a full hearing

on Christine’s modification petition.

II.    Misrepresentation of Proposed Changes

       Clint appears to challenge the temporary parenting plan by an assertion that

Christine misrepresented the provisions she proposed. Specifically, he claims that

Christine misled the court when her attorney characterized her primary objectives

as seeking entry of a Washington parenting plan, because both parties had resided

in Washington for nearly four years, and incorporating the provisions of the 2020

and 2021 restraining orders into the new permanent parenting plan.

       Counsel’s statement was not misleading or inconsistent with Christine’s

proposed parenting plan. Her proposed plan included provisions for residential

time with Clint, for both parents to attend their children’s events, and for liberal

telephone and electronic communication with both parents, but suspended those

provisions in accordance with the 2020 and 2021 restraining orders, until Clint

completed the court-ordered requirements. Clint points to no provisions in the

temporary plan that were not included in the proposed plan filed by Christine a

                                             -6-
No. 84155-6-I/7

month earlier. The record simply does not support his assertion that Christine

“snuck” provisions into the temporary parenting plan that she later verbally

disavowed.

III.   Contempt and Other Motions

       Clint next challenges the superior court’s order that declined to find

Christine to be in contempt. He argues that Christine, in fact, violated the 2018

custody order by:

       (1) refusing to disclose her home address;

       (2) failing to provide notice of overnight travel with the children;

       (3) violating a condition of the custody order relating to a “paramour

       presence”;

       (4) requiring his telephone calls to be on speakerphone and limiting the

       duration and frequency of those calls;

       (5) failing to share information about counselors;

       (6) failing to timely provide information about a medical emergency;

       (7) failing to consult Clint about COVID-196 vaccination and counseling for

       two of the children; and

       (8) instructing one of the children to hang up the phone on him.

Clint relies on the evidence he presented in support of his contempt motion to

argue that Christine intentionally and willfully violated the 2018 custody order.

       To the extent that he mentions Christine’s testimony in response to his

allegations, he contends she was not credible and/or her interpretation of the court

       6 2019 novel corona virus infectious disease.

                                                 -7-
No. 84155-6-I/8

orders in effect were unreasonable. Here again, Clint’s arguments fail to address

the deferential standard of review. Contrary to his apparent belief, this court does

not find facts, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reweigh the evidence to

determine if we would reach a different conclusion from the trial court. See In re

Marriage of McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 561, 359 P.3d 811 (2015). The trial

court was entitled to give credit to Christine’s testimony. Substantial evidence in

the record supports the court’s determination that, to the extent Christine violated

the custody order, she did not intentionally or willfully do so. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion in declining to find Christine in contempt.7

        Finally, Clint also challenges the denial of his motion for adequate cause,

refusal to enter his proposed temporary parenting plan, and the denial of his motion

to appoint a GAL. The premise of the assignments of error on these various issues

is that Christine contemptuously violated provisions of the custody order. Because

Clint establishes no error with regard to the motion for contempt, these claims

likewise fail.

IV.     Attorney Fees

        Christine requests an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs on

appeal under RAP 18.9. “RAP 18.9(a) permits an appellate court to award a party

attorney fees as sanctions, terms, or compensatory damages when the opposing

party files a frivolous appellate action.” Advoc. for Responsible Dev. v. W. Wash.

         7 Clint further alleges “[u]nequal application of the [l]aw” because the court previously found

him to be in contempt for violating the custody order, and failed to make the same finding as to
Christine. But there is no uneven application of the law when the court considered different
allegations involving Christine, and different evidence, and reached a different conclusion.

                                                     -8-
No. 84155-6-I/9

Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 170 Wn.2d 577, 580, 245 P.3d 764 (2010). An appeal is

frivolous when, considering the entire record, it “presents no debatable issues

upon which reasonable minds might differ” and “is so devoid of merit that there is

no possibility of reversal.” Id. Clint’s appeal was critically deficient because he

failed to apply the standard of review or address the evidentiary standard the trial

court applies when addressing a petition to modify a parenting plan. Further, he

devoted the majority of his briefing to rearguing the facts when this court must

defer to the superior court on factual issues. We conclude that Clint’s appeal

raised no debatable issues and we therefore award reasonable attorney fees and

costs to Christine, pursuant to her compliance with the applicable RAPs.8

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

       8 Because we conclude that an award of fees is warranted under RAP 18.9, we need not

address Christine’s request under RCW 26.09.140.

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