Court Opinion

ID: 9717226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:00:20.952989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:52.090184
License: Public Domain

Wilkins, J.
(dissenting). In Markee v. Biasetti, ante 785 (1991), I concurred in the court’s conclusion that a new trial should be ordered, concluding that the extraneous informa*798tion gathered by certain jurors at the site of an accident prejudiced the losing party “in the sense that the jury might reasonably have reached a different result” if that information had not been before the jury. Ante at 790 (Wilkins, J., concurring). This case does not involve jurors conducting on-site investigations with an immeasurable impact on the verdict of a reasonable jury but rather it involves the presence of a home reference medical book in the jury room. Here the extraneous information is precisely known and its likely effect fully assessable.
The trial judge concluded that, if certain jurors had not read or heard the statement that the cause of cerebral palsy is unexplained in most cases, it is not likely that a reasonable jury would have come to a different verdict. The issue here was not what caused the infant’s cerebral palsy but rather whether the apneic event that all agreed caused the cerebral palsy was caused by the negligence of either or both of the defendant physicians. The medical book said nothing on this crucial topic.
The court says that active juror participation in an effort to resolve key issues by resort to material not in evidence, here as in the Markee case, is reversible error as a matter of law. I reject a rule calling for automatic reversal and favor an assessment of the extraneous material not in evidence to determine whether its presence was likely to have been prejudicial, even if one accepts the court’s view that the defendants must demonstrate the absence of prejudice. Normally such an assessment is the function of the trial judge in the first instance. Because the trial judge has retired, this court should have undertaken that function.
I conclude, in agreement with the experienced trial judge who heard the witnesses, that the plaintiffs have not met the burden of showing that, if the medical book had not been in the jury room, the jury might reasonably have reached a different result.1 I also conclude that, if the defendants must *799show an absence of prejudice (the standard the court says should be applied), they have done so.* 2

“Where, as here, the precise extraneous matter is known but direct evidence as to its effect on the deliberations is not permitted, a sound balance *799is struck by a rule which looks to the probability of prejudice from the face of the extraneous matter in relation to the circumstances of the particular case. It is the function of the trial judge when ruling on a motion for a new trial to evaluate the degree of probable prejudice and whether it justifies a new trial. That judgment will not be disturbed but for an abuse of discretion.” Wernsing v. General Motors Corp., 298 Md. 406, 419-420 (1984).

See United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 782-783 (2d Cir. 1985) (presumptive prejudice of extra-record information [here excerpt from textbook] may be rebutted by affirmative showing that information was harmless. “The court may properly conclude that such extra-record information was non-prejudicial if it determines that an abundance of properly admitted evidence relevant to this matter exists.” Id. at 783. In this case, everyone agreed on the cause of the infant’s cerebral palsy.)