Court Opinion

ID: 9695793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:29:28.063237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.593420
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I agree with Chief Justice Riley that the Age of Majority Act, MCL 722.51 et seq.; MSA 25.244(51) et seq., "renders nugatory” the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a of the divorce statute,1 governing the support of the minor children of divorced parents. MCL 552.17a; MSA 25.97(1). I write separately, however, to iden*634tify the legal foundation upon which I believe we must base this clearly exceptional conclusion.
The defendant in this case argues that the reduction in the age of majority from age twenty-one to age eighteen by the Age of Majority Act has called into question the effect of the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a. That clause, by its terms, authorizes the circuit courts to grant support for a child even after the child has attained the age of eighteen; however, the clause has been consistently read by this Court not to allow such support after the child has reached the age of majority. Since the age of majority has been lowered to eighteen, the defendant argues, the exceptional-circumstances clause can no longer be given any practical effect.
Although the defendant has not specifically identified it as such, his fundamental legal argument, in my view, and as stated by both Justice Cavanagh and the Court of Appeals, is essentially that the Age of Majority Act repeals the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a by necessary implication. Try as I might, I am unable to disagree with the defendant. I reach this conclusion despite my understanding that, as Justice Cavanagh observes, the repeal of statutes by implication is strongly disfavored:
"Repeal by implication is not permitted if it can be avoided by any reasonable construction of the statutes. Couvelis v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 281 Mich 223 [274 NW 771 (1937)]; People v Hanrahan, 75 Mich 611 (4 LRA 751) [42 NW 1124 (1889)]. If by any reasonable construction 2 statutes can be reconciled and a purpose found to be served by each, both must stand, Garfield Twp v A B Klise Lumber Co, 219 Mich 31 [188 NW 459 (1922)]; Edwards v Auditor General, 161 Mich 639 [126 NW 853 (1910)]; People v Harrison, 194 Mich *635363 [160 NW 623 (1916)]. The duty of the courts is to reconcile statutes if possible and to enforce them, Bd of Control of the Michigan State Prison v Auditor General, 197 Mich 377 [163 NW 921 (1917)]. The courts will regard all statutes on the same general subject as part of 1 system and later statutes should be construed as supplementary to those preceding them, Wayne Co v Auditor General, 250 Mich 227 [229 NW 911 (1930)]. See, also, Rathbun v State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521 [280 NW 35 (1938)].” People v Buckley, 302 Mich 12, 22 [4 NW2d 448 (1942)].
"This court has held that only, when 2 acts are so incompatible that both cannot stand, does a later act repeal a former.” In re Estate of Reynolds, 274 Mich 354, 360 [264 NW 399 (1936)]. [Valentine v Redford Twp Supervisor, 371 Mich 138, 144; 123 NW2d 227 (1963).]
See also Council No 23 v Recorder’s Court Judges, 399 Mich 1, 8; 248 NW2d 220 (1976) (opinion of Williams, J.), Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist, 393 Mich 616; 277 NW2d 736 (1975) (opinion of Williams, J.), Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44; 214 NW2d 803 (1974), and 1A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 23.10, pp 346-347.
Put simply, I agree with the defendant that these two provisions of law simply cannot stand together. As interpreted by this Court in Johnson v Johnson, 346 Mich 418; 78 NW2d 216 (1956), the exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a allows a circuit court to award support for a child after he attains the age of eighteen, but only until he reaches the age of majority. The Age of Majority Act states that the age of majority is eighteen. The conflict between these two acts is thus clear and unavoidable. Given the reduction in the age of majority to eighteen, there can be no time during which support can be awarded after a child attains *636the age of eighteen, but before he reaches majority.
It is, of course, very tempting to follow the course taken by Justice Cavanagh in his dissent, of simply overturning the decision in Johnson, along with the earlier decisions upon which it relied,2 and finding that under the literal language of the clause support can be awarded after the child reaches the age of eighteen and for as long as the exceptional circumstances exist. Were it not for the actions of the Legislature itself following these decisions, Justice Cavanagh’s position might be persuasive. However, while I believe that Justice Cavanagh’s admonition against relying too heavily on legislative silence when construing statutory provisions applies with some force here, post, pp 652-653,1 find myself unable to accept his solution in light of the subsequent reenactment of § 17a in 1970, only shortly before the Age of Majority Act, but long after the limited construction had, without fail, been given to the exceptional-circumstances clause by this Court.
The Legislature is presumed to know of existing interpretations of legislation. Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675, 691; 377 NW2d 804 (1985); Smith v Detroit, 388 Mich 637, 650; 202 NW2d 300 (1972); Jeruzal v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 350 Mich 527, 534; 87 NW2d 122 (1957). Thus, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that when the Legislature, with this presumed knowledge of prior judicial interpretation, reenacts a statute or provision in substantially the same form as that interpreted, it is deemed to have adopted the interpretation into the language of the statute or provision. As stated in Jeruzal, supra, p 534:_
*637In passing this legislation, the legislature is presumed to have known of the [prior] judicial interpretation of this Court [of the language of the statute], . . . and, also, to have known that when a statute, clause or provision thereof, has been construed by the court of last resort of this State and the same is substantially re-enacted the legislature adopts such construction, unless the contrary is clearly shown by the language of the act. See People v Powell, 280 Mich 699 (111 ALR 721) [274 NW 372 (1937)]. [Emphasis added.]
See also Melia v Employment Security Comm, 346 Mich 544; 78 NW2d 273 (1956); Wood v Detroit Edison Co, 409 Mich 279, 293-294; 294 NW2d 571 (1980) (opinion of Moody, J.); Breckon v Franklin Fuel Co, 383 Mich 251, 295; 174 NW2d 836 (1970) (Adams, J., dissenting); Smith v Detroit, supra, pp 650-651.3
In this case, we must presume that the Legislature knew, when it amended § 17a in 1970, of the limited construction given the exceptional-circum*638stances clause of that section by this Court in Johnson and its predecessors. Since the Legislature failed to make any substantive change in the language of the clause,4 we must conclude that it intended to adopt the construction of the clause found in those cases. This is true even though we are unable to conclude that the Legislature actually reconsidered that language in light of our judicial interpretations when it amended and reenacted the provision, leaving the exceptional-circumstances clause substantially intact as interpreted. The purpose of the presumption, obviously, is to recognize precisely that fact.
Were we construing the exceptional-circumstances clause for the first time today, I think a persuasive case could clearly be made for the interpretation given it by Justice Cavanagh. The language of the statute, after all, does appear to be open-ended. However, the consistent, limited construction of the exceptional-circumstances clause over the years by this Court, including that in Johnson, supra, along with the Legislature’s reenactment of § 17a without any truly substantive changes in the language of the clause despite that limited construction, in my view requires us to conclude that the open-ended interpretation sought by Justice Cavanagh is simply no longer available to this Court.5_
*639CONCLUSION
I am well aware that today’s decision by the majority to declare that these two provisions are in irreconcilable conflict, and that the earlier exceptional-circumstances clause of § 17a must therefore be seen as repealed by necessary implication by the later Age of Majority Act, is, as Justice Cavanagh states, an "extraordinary step.” I am not convinced, however, that this result is any more extraordinary than that which Justice Cavanagh himself proposes.
It is not our function in this case to determine what the "best” rule regarding the payment of child support by a noncustodial divorced parent is or properly should be. Such a decision, as both the Chief Justice and Justice Archer point out, is the province of our state Legislature.6 Nor should we in this case merely take our best guess as to what the Legislature intended to do when it enacted the Age of Majority Act, or as to what it might do in response to this decision. If that were true, the analysis would have to focus heavily, as that of the Chief Justice in some respects does, upon the action of the Legislature in amending in 1980 the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq.; MSA 25.312(1) et seq., specifically, § 7(1) of that act, to delete the exceptional-circumstances clause providing support for children between the age of eighteen and the age of majority, once the conflict *640between it and the Age of Majority Act was noticed.7
Rather, we are left in this case, in the absence of any specific indication of legislative intent with respect to the effect of the Age of Majority Act upon § 17a, with the task of determining that intent in light of established principles of statutory construction and interpretation. In this case, those principles require us to conclude that since we cannot reasonably reconcile these two provisions, the earlier exceptional-circumstances clause must be the one to fall.

 MCL 522.1 et seq.; MSA 25.81 et seq.

 See, e.g., Rybinski v Rybinski, 333 Mich 592; 53 NW2d 386 (1952); Titus v Titus, 311 Mich 434; 18 NW2d 883 (1945).

 As stated in 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 49.09, p 400:
Where reenactment of a statute includes a contemporaneous and practical interpretation, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, as it is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule has special force where the construction was made by the judiciary. Thus where the legislature adopts an expression which has received judicial interpretation, interpretation is prima facie evidence of legislative intent.
This rule is based upon the theory that the legislature is familiar with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing that statute. Therefore it impliedly adopts the interpretation upon reenactment.
See also § 49.10, p 408 ("Likewise, legislative action by amendment . . . with respect to other parts of a law which have received a contemporaneous and practical construction may indicate approval of interpretations pertaining to the unchanged and unaffected parts of the law”).

 I do not consider the removal of the word "such” from the phrase "any such child” to be a substantive change. Undoubtedly, the removal reflects only a legislative desire to edit an old statute to a more readable form. Note that this change is not identified among the "substantive changes” in the "Historical Note” following the statutory language.

 In my view, Justice Cavanagh’s contention that there was no settled interpretation of the exceptional-circumstances clause in which the Legislature can be said to have acquiesced fails to address the Legislature’s inaction in the face of the settled interpretation of § 17a by this Court at the very latest in Johnson and well before the adoption of the Age of Majority Act. More important, however, is the *639fact that the apparent confusion in the courts following the adoption of the Age of Majority Act has little bearing on the argument that the reenactment of § 17a in 1970 served to in effect incorporate this Court’s contemporaneous interpretation of the clause in Johnson into the language of that provision.

 I join, however, in the sentiments of both the Chief Justice and Justice Archer in stating that this is a matter which the Legislature will surely want to reconsider in light of our ruling today.

 One could argue, it seems to me, that an even stronger argument could be made for repeal by implication of the exceptional-circumstances clause in § 17a by this change in the Child Custody Act, given its status as the "latest thinking” of the Legislature with respect to the support of children of divorced parents.