Court Opinion

ID: 9672172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:14.753555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:15.240273
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I concur in the opinion of Justice Adams because plaintiffs have failed to sustain the burden of proving the zoning ordinance invalid.
This Court said, by way of summary, in Hammond v. Bloomfield Hills Building Inspector, 331 Mich 551, at 555:
“Each zoning case must be determined upon its •own facts and circumstances. Senefsky v. City of Huntington Woods, 307 Mich 728 (149 ALR 1433); and Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 Mich 331. There is nevertheless a presumption in favor ■of the constitutionality of zoning regulations, and plaintiffs must sustain the burden of showing that such regulations have no real substantial relation to public health,' morals, safety, or general welfare. Fass v. City of Highland Park, 321 Mich 156; Northwood Properties Co. v. Royal Oak City Inspector, 325 Mich 419; and Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, supra. Furthermore, such an ordinance may not be held invalid unless the constitutional objections urged against it are supported by competent evidence or appear on the face of the enactment in question. Portage Township v. Full Salvation Union, 318 Mich 693, and Northwood Properties Co. v. Royal Oak City Inspector, supra.” (Emphasis supplied.) ,i
*641' To say that plaintiffs had the burden of proof means that plaintiffs had the duty of affirmatively proving facts on the issues by a preponderance of evidence. The duty was not upon defendant township. Although obviously elementary, recent zoning cases in this Court seem to suggest that this elemental rule may not have been in the forepart of the Court’s thinking as it approached decision. Of particular reference are the Troy Cases.1 In both cases, the writer was on the prevailing side which found the zoning invalid, yet upon added reflection it would seem that a contrary result might have been reached had we not'tended to discredit what appeared to be the speculative nature of population projections (and community needs predicated thereupon) by Troy’s witnesses. Certainly plaintiffs’ proofs of confiscation were much less than overpowering. Even had the Troy Cases shown a more acute awareness of plaintiffs’ burden, the results might have been the same. In any event; the instant case presents a special opportunity for vigorously reasserting this first principle of zoning law: that he who attacks a zoning’ regulation has a real and substantial burden of proving the invalidity thereof, and that, at the outset, such regulation bears the presumption of validity. I concur with Justice Adams, therefore, because he has treated this first principle with due respect, as did the trial court.
To this concurrence we might add a short addendum. Any survey of recent cases from the several jurisdictions reveals that zoning decisions exemplify most dramatically the need for sharpening the legal tools which the courts use in resolving zoning appeals. Most decisions fail to recognize the enormous differences between zoning regulations enacted in *642built-up '-communities, on the one hand, and zoning regulations for new suburban developments, on the other. Although the aims of zoning are substantially the .same in both cases, the usual zoning ordinance in built-up areas occurs after the fact, that is, of building and development, while in suburban com-múhities zoning regulations often come before the fact.’’ For this reason alone, the character of proofs may differ radically, depending upon the kind of zoning under attack. If courts in resolving such disputes are unable to interpret classical zoning principles in terms of present-day necessities, then the law fails both itself and those whom it serves.2
With reference to suburban zoning in new communities where undeveloped land is zoned based upon population projections and future needs, both the law and the planning profession need to improve tools and techniques. This is the area in which the Court has become too dogmatic in its insistence that the test of reasonableness be based alone upon present existing conditions. See Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich 436; and Christine Building Company v. City of Troy, 367 Mich 508.
If this Court is to remain dogmatic in its insistence upon proofs of validity having an absolute relevance to existing conditions, then all planning and zoning based upon projections for future needs could logically be thwarted. Zoning in a new community where land uses have not already been determined is always prospective in nature. There is the need to plan for expectant population densities so that community needs may be based thereupon: such things as adequate sewerage, streets capable of handling anticipated traffic, recreation areas, schools, and other community facilities are merely some of *643the items which must he anticipated.3 Few of these facilities may be in construction when a new community’s zoning is adopted but a community, like a homebuilder, starts with a plan. The presumption is that if the plan is sound then the structure will also be sound. It takes time, however, for things to take shape. Community planners like homebuild-ers require this initial indulgence. If plans and projections fail to develop then validity may be challenged.
The obligation to review tools and techniques is not alone that of the courts. Community planners and municipal officials also have a duty to plan within established principles of zoning law, and their projections must be realistic not fanciful.4 Valid postulates of the several professional disciplines involved in planning must be not only asserted but convincingly proved, where the occasion demands.
O’Hara and Adams, JJ., concurred with Smith, J.

 Christine Building Company v. City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, and Roll v. Cily of Troy, 370 Mich 94.

 See NIMLO Municipal Law Review (1964 ed), pp 464-489; 60 Yale LJ 506; and 62 Mich L Rev 131, especially footnotes in the law journal articles.

 See Justice Schaefer’s discussion in the Illinois supreme court case of Camboni’s, Inc., v. County of DuPage, 26 Ill 2d 427 (187 NE2d 212).

 See discussion in 60 Yale LJ 506, at pp 512 and 516.