Court Opinion

ID: 996836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:56:17.590056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:41.923169
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                   No. 98-4081

KEVIN E. GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(CR-97-467-A)

Submitted: September 22, 1998

Decided: November 2, 1998

Before WILKINS and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
HALL, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Joseph J. McCarthy, DELANEY, MCCARTHY, COLTON &
BOTZIN, P.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,
United States Attorney, Jonathan R. Barr, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Kevin E. Green was charged with reentering a military installation
(Count I), unlawful stalking (Count II), disregarding the signal of a
law enforcement officer (Count III), reckless driving (Count IV),
operating on a revoked permit (Count V), and degradation of govern-
ment property (Count VI). Green moved to dismiss all charges under
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) (the "Act"), and
argued that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it unconstitutionally created two classes of
defendants. Specifically, the Speedy Trial Act expressly excludes
petty offense prosecutions involving Class B and Class C misdemea-
nors from the Act's seventy-day time limit for commencement of
trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2). The magistrate judge dismissed with-
out prejudice the Class A misdemeanors (Counts III, IV and VI)
because the trial was not timely commenced under the Act, but denied
the motion to dismiss on the Class B misdemeanors (Counts I, II, and
V). Green pled guilty to Count I, preserving his right to challenge the
constitutionality of the Act on appeal. Counts II and V were dis-
missed. The district court denied relief, finding the Act constitutional
under either strict scrutiny review or rational basis review.

Green timely noted an appeal from the district court's order. He
contends that § 3172 unconstitutionally exempts Class B and Class C
misdemeanors and infractions from the speedy trial protections of 18
U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Thus, he contends that his conviction on Count I was obtained in vio-
lation of his statutory right to a speedy trial.*

We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. See
_________________________________________________________________
*Green does not contend that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial.

                    2
United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 540 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1239 (1996). When a statute is challenged on equal protection
grounds, we "generally will presume the legislation at issue to be
valid and will uphold the statute if the classification it draws is ratio-
nally related to a legitimate purpose." Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365,
373 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3825
(U.S. June 16, 1997) (No. 96-8596) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).

As the district court recognized, the Act classifies defendants dif-
ferently based on whether the charges against them are serious or
petty. Defendants charged with serious crimes are entitled to trial
within the statutory period, while those charged with petty crimes are
not afforded a statutory time limit. This classification is based on the
severity of the defendant's conduct and not, as Green asserts, on a
fundamental right (namely, the right to a speedy trial). The decision
to treat differently those who have acted differently surely cannot be
considered a suspect classification. Finally, statutes that neither bur-
den a fundamental right nor employ a suspect class are presumed
valid and "`must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there
is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a ratio-
nal basis for the classification.'" Id. (quoting FCC v. Beach Commu-
nications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)). Once this court determines
"that there exists a plausible reason for the congressional action--and
regardless of whether that reasoning actually motivated Congress--
our inquiry is at an end." Moore, 100 F.3d at 373 (citing United States
R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)). Congress has
a legitimate interest in ensuring the efficient operation of the federal
courts and preserving federal resources for more serious civil and
criminal matters. Thus, because there is a plausible reason for the
classification, the Speedy Trial Act does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.

We affirm Green's conviction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

                    3