Court Opinion

ID: 9374896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 16:01:36.755792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.929403
License: Public Domain

Rel: February 24, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0641
                                _________________________

  Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical
                            Center

                                                  v.

               Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc.

                         Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
                                  (CV-17-900403)

SHAW, Justice.

       Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical
SC-2022-0641

Center ("Mobile Infirmary"), the plaintiff seeking contractual indemnity

in the action below, appeals the Mobile Circuit Court's summary

judgment in favor of the defendant below, Quest Diagnostics Clinical

Laboratories, Inc. ("Quest"). We affirm.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     On March 17, 2014, Quest and Mobile Infirmary entered into a

Laboratory Management Agreement ("the LMA"), in which Quest agreed

to manage Mobile Infirmary's onsite clinical laboratory facilities and to

provide clinical testing services used by Mobile Infirmary's medical staff

to diagnose and treat patients. The LMA also contained indemnity

provisions. Specifically, Section 8.1 of the LMA stated, in pertinent part:

     "Quest Diagnostics hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and
     hold [Mobile Infirmary], and [Mobile Infirmary's] officers,
     directors, employees and agents (collectively, the 'Lab
     Indemnitees'), harmless from and against any and all
     liability, losses, damages, claims or causes of action ('Claims'),
     and expenses connected therewith, including reasonable
     attorneys' fees, that are caused by or a result of (i) any
     negligent or intentional act, error or omission by Quest
     Diagnostics,       its employees,      agents,    servants     or
     representatives with respect to its responsibilities and/or the
     performance of Services hereunder, to the extent such Claim
     does not arise from an act or omission or cause for which
     [Mobile Infirmary] is required to provide indemnity pursuant
     to Section 8.2 below … [or] (v) any personal injury (including
     death) or property damage caused by or arising from the
     negligence, acts or omissions of Quest Diagnostics or any
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     employee or agent of Quest Diagnostics …."

     Section 8.2 of the LMA addressed Mobile Infirmary's indemnity

obligations:

     "[Mobile Infirmary] hereby agrees to indemnify, defend and
     hold Quest Diagnostics and Quest Diagnostics Affiliates,
     officers, directors, employees and agents (collectively, the
     'Quest Indemnitees') harmless from and against any and all
     Claims, and expenses connected therewith, including
     reasonable attorneys' fees, (i) directly caused by or as a result
     of any negligent or intentional act, error or omission by
     [Mobile Infirmary], its employees, agents, servants,
     contractors or representatives with respect to its
     responsibilities hereunder, to the extent such Claim does not
     arise from an act or omission or cause for which Quest
     Diagnostics is required to provide indemnity pursuant to
     Section 8.1 above … [or] (v) any personal injury (including
     death) or property damage caused by or arising from the
     negligence, acts or omissions of [Mobile Infirmary] or any
     employee or agent of [Mobile Infirmary] …."

     On March 13, 2015, James A. Ward went to Mobile Infirmary's

emergency room after suffering weakness, dizziness, loss of fluids, a mild

cough, and severe body aches. While there, he was diagnosed with the

flu, and he was later discharged with a prescription for medication. Two

days later, Ward's symptoms worsened, and he returned to the

emergency room.      Ward was eventually diagnosed with diabetic

ketoacidosis.

     When his condition did not improve, Ward was moved into the
                                    3
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intensive-care unit, at which point his doctor ordered him to undergo

glucose finger-sticks and a basic metabolic panel every four hours to help

monitor his serum glucose, kidney function, acid/base status, and

electrolytes. According to Mobile Infirmary, those basic metabolic panels

were supposed to be performed by Quest, but they were allegedly

canceled by one of Quest's employees.

     Over the next several hours, Ward developed cardiac dysfunction

and lost consciousness. At some point, he suffered an "anoxic brain

injury" and later died "as a result of multisystem organ failure secondary

to severe sepsis and septic shock."

     In 2017, Ingrid Mia Ward ("Mia"), Ward's wife and the personal

representative of his estate, commenced a wrongful-death action against

Mobile Infirmary and other defendants, including Mobile Infirmary's

doctors and nurses who were responsible for Ward's treatment and care.

Mia alleged that the defendant medical-care providers had breached the

standard of care in several ways, including by "failing to obtain serial

basic metabolic panels every four hours" and by "failing to properly

monitor and report Mr. Ward's blood glucose levels on an hourly basis."

She also alleged that Mobile Infirmary was vicariously liable for those

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who "undertook to and did provide medical, diagnostic, nursing,

technical, and/or other health care services and treatment to [Ward]."

According to Mia, her husband died as a proximate result of the acts or

omissions of Mobile Infirmary and its staff in failing to properly diagnose

and treat his condition.

     Quest was not named as a party to Mia's action. Mobile Infirmary

informed Quest of the action and, as the case progressed, apprised Quest

of the status of the proceedings, including its negotiations with Mia for

potential settlement of the lawsuit. Mia and Mobile Infirmary ultimately

settled the wrongful-death action. Before Mia's claims against Mobile

Infirmary were dismissed pursuant to a joint motion of those parties,

Mobile Infirmary filed a third-party complaint against Quest in which it

sought contractual and equitable indemnity related to its defense and

settlement of Mia's action. Quest filed a motion to dismiss, which the

trial court granted in part by dismissing Mobile Infirmary's equitable-

indemnity claim.

     Mobile Infirmary later amended its complaint to more specifically

state its remaining claim of contractual indemnity against Quest. Mobile

Infirmary alleged:

                                    5
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          "4. The claims of [Mia] against Mobile Infirmary in this
    action were caused by and/or resulted from negligent acts,
    errors or omissions of Quest in its responsibilities under the
    [LMA] and/or the performance of services under [the LMA],
    and said claims did not arise from an act or omission or cause
    for which Mobile Infirmary is required to provide indemnity
    to Quest pursuant to Section 8.2 of the [LMA]. Such negligent
    acts, errors or omissions included the following:

               "a. Quest's failure to timely collect, test,
         diagnose and/or report the results of blood work
         ordered by doctors and other healthcare providers
         in connection with the care and treatment of the
         … Decedent, James Ward, on a timely basis, in
         breach of its duties under the [LMA] ….

               "b. Quest's unwarranted delay in collecting,
         testing, diagnosing and/or reporting the results of
         blood work ordered by physicians and other
         healthcare providers in connection with the care
         and treatment of … James Ward, in breach of its
         duties under the [LMA] ….

              "c. Quest's cancellation of physicians' and
         other healthcare providers' orders for blood work
         needed in the care and treatment of [Mia's]
         Decedent, James Ward, in breach of its duties
         under the [LMA] ….

         "5. As a proximate result of the aforesaid negligence, the
    physicians and other healthcare providers attending Mr.
    Ward lacked the information necessary to appropriately
    monitor and assess his condition on a timely basis and to
    administer the appropriate amounts of insulin and IV fluids,
    and take other action, in accordance with his on-going
    condition and, as a proximate result thereof, Mr. Ward died."

    Quest later served Mobile Infirmary with a set of requests for
                                  6
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admissions, to which Mobile Infirmary provided the following responses:

           "1. Admit that there were allegations of negligence in
     the Third Amended Complaint filed by Mia Ward, as personal
     representative of the Estate of James Ward, against Mobile
     Infirmary Medical Center that did not relate to the laboratory
     services provided by Quest Diagnostics pursuant to the [LMA]
     (hereinafter the 'non-lab allegations.').

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

           "2. Admit that the death of James A. Ward was caused,
     in part, by the negligence of Mobile Infirmary Medical Center.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

           "3. Admit that the death of James A. Ward was caused,
     in part, by the negligence of Mobile Infirmary Medical for non-
     lab allegations.

     "RESPONSE: Denied.

           "4. Admit that the death of James A. Ward was caused,
     in part, by the negligence of Mobile Infirmary Medical Center
     within the meaning of Section 8.2 of the [LMA] between Quest
     Diagnostics and Mobile Infirmary Medical Center dated
     March 17, 2014.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

           "5. Admit that Mobile Infirmary Medical Center is solely
     seeking indemnification in this matter from Quest for monies
     it spent in defending itself and for the confidential settlement
     with the Estate of James A. Ward.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

          "6. Admit that Mobile Infirmary Medical Center
                                    7
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     incurred legal defenses expenses in defending its conduct for
     those non-lab allegations referenced in Requests for
     Admission Nos. 1 and 3.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

           "7. Admit that Mobile Infirmary Medical Center settled
     the lawsuit filed by Mia Ward, as personal representative of
     the Estate of James A. Ward, based in part on allegations of
     Mobile Infirmary Medical Center's own negligent conduct in
     the care of James A. Ward.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted.

           "8. Admit that Mobile Infirmary Medical Center settled
     the lawsuit filed by Mia Ward, as personal representative of
     the Estate of James Ward, while claims based on allegations
     of Mobile Infirmary Medical Center's own negligent conduct
     were still pending.

     "RESPONSE: Admitted."

     Quest filed a motion for a summary judgment in which it argued in

its supporting brief that Mobile Infirmary's contractual-indemnity claim

failed as a matter of law. Relying on Mobile Infirmary's responses to its

requests for admissions, Quest argued that because Mobile Infirmary's

own negligence was at least a partial cause of Ward's death and because

the parties had not agreed under either Sections 8.1 or 8.2 in the LMA to

indemnify each other against losses caused by the indemnitee's own

negligence, it was not required to indemnify Mobile Infirmary for the

                                   8
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settlement of Mia's action. Quest further argued that, absent clear and

unequivocal language to the contrary, any argument by Mobile Infirmary

that the reciprocal indemnity provisions found in Sections 8.1 and 8.2 of

the LMA allowing each party to recover indemnification for the other's

negligence also permitted partial indemnification based on the

proportionate fault of the indemnitor was meritless.

     In response to Quest's motion, Mobile Infirmary filed a cross-motion

for a summary judgment in which it argued that, under the LMA and

upon proof that Quest's negligent acts or omissions in the performance of

its duties under the LMA caused Ward's death, it was entitled to full

indemnification from Quest. In the alternative, Mobile Infirmary argued

that it was entitled to indemnification for the portion of its losses that

were attributable to Quest's negligence under a comparative-fault

analysis.

     After a hearing, the trial court entered a summary judgment in

favor of Quest and denied Mobile Infirmary's cross-motion for a summary

judgment. In its judgment, the trial court explained:

           "At this stage, the Parties have not conducted discovery
     on [Mobile Infirmary's] allegations of negligence against
     Quest. However, this Court does not need such evidence or
     lack thereof to rule on the pending motions. Rather, given the
                                    9
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     foregoing indemnity provisions and [Mobile Infirmary's]
     admission of negligence, there are two threshold legal
     questions for this Court to decide at this juncture:

                 "(1) Is [Mobile Infirmary] precluded from
           seeking contractual indemnity from Quest when
           its own independent negligence contributed to the
           death of Mr. Ward?; and

                 "(2) Whether the indemnity provisions in
           Sections 8.1 and 8.2 are ambiguous, and if so,
           whether an agreement was reached as to
           comparative fault analysis despite the ambiguity?

           "As discussed below, the Court concludes the answer to
     the first question to be 'Yes', and thus [Mobile Infirmary]
     cannot recover here. The Court further concludes that the
     provisions are by [Mobile Infirmary's] own admission
     ambiguous and as such, the parties did not 'knowingly,
     clearly, and unequivocally' enter into a comparative fault
     indemnification contract. For either of these reasons,
     summary judgment on behalf of Quest is due to be granted."

In support of its conclusions, the trial court explained:

           "Section 8.2 of the LMA provides the various scenarios
     in which [Mobile Infirmary] must indemnify, defend, and hold
     Quest harmless from and against any and all liability, losses,
     damages, claims or causes of action. Specifically, Section
     8.2(v) requires [Mobile Infirmary] to defend, indemnify, and
     hold Quest harmless against a death 'caused by or arising
     from the negligence, acts or omissions of [Mobile Infirmary]
     or any employee or agent of [Mobile Infirmary].' Based on
     [Mobile Infirmary's] admission that the death of Mr. Ward
     was indeed caused, in part, by the negligence of Mobile
     Infirmary, the Court concludes that Section 8.2(v) is
     triggered.

                                    10
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          "The triggering of [Section] 8.2(v) is sufficient to end the
    Court's inquiry and dictates that Quest is entitled to
    summary judgment on [Mobile Infirmary's] third-party claim.
    Because Section 8.2(v) requires [Mobile Infirmary] to hold
    Quest harmless when [Mobile Infirmary] is negligent, [Mobile
    Infirmary] cannot advance a third-party claim against Quest
    while simultaneously conceding it [(Mobile Infirmary)] was
    negligent. Put another way, Section 8.2(v) imposes a duty on
    [Mobile Infirmary] to hold Quest harmless when [Mobile
    Infirmary] or its employees are negligent -- and there is no
    question they were negligent in this case. [Mobile Infirmary's]
    attempt here to recover damages from Quest while also
    admitting negligence defies the hold harmless nature of
    Section 8.2(v). [Mobile-Infirmary's] Third-Party Complaint is
    doing the opposite of holding Quest harmless. Accordingly,
    the Court need not look any further to determine that Quest
    does not owe [Mobile Infirmary] contractual indemnity in this
    case, and the Court's inquiry can end here.

          "[Mobile Infirmary] is essentially seeking indemnity
    from Quest for [Mobile Infirmary's] own negligence -- or at
    least in part for [Mobile Infirmary's] own negligence. See
    [Mobile Infirmary's] responses to Quest's Requests for
    Admission …. The Alabama Supreme Court has addressed
    the standard of review of agreements by one party to
    indemnify for another's wrongful conduct, stating:
    'Agreements by which one party agrees to indemnify [the
    other] for the consequences of the other's acts or omissions are
    carefully scrutinized .… An agreement by one person to
    indemnify the [other] for the other's negligence is enforceable
    only if the indemnity provisions are unambiguous and
    unequivocal.' Royal Ins. Co. v. Whitaker Contr. Corp., 824 So.
    2d 747, 752 (Ala. 2002), quoting Industrial Tile, Inc. v.
    Stewart, 388 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1980).

         "Quest further contends that the competing indemnity
    provisions of [Sections] 8.1(i) and 8.2(i) cancel each other out
    when there is mutual negligence. Quest argues that [Section]
                                   11
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    8.1(i) cannot be analyzed in a vacuum: if [Mobile Infirmary] is
    negligent -- as conceded in this case -- [Section] 8.2(i) must be
    read in conjunction with [Section] 8.1(i). The Court finds that
    when read together, [Sections] 8.1(i) and 8.2(i) establish that
    Quest and [Mobile Infirmary] agreed to indemnify the other
    for their own sole fault when the other is not also at fault.
    Under these circumstances, [Section] 8.2(i) is triggered
    because [Mobile Infirmary] has already admitted its own
    independent negligence. Thus, Quest cannot owe indemnity
    to [Mobile Infirmary] under [Section] 8.1(i), and the Court's
    inquiry could also end here.

           "In contrast, [Mobile Infirmary] wants the Court to
    interpret [Section] 8.1(i) independent of [Sections] 8.2(i) and
    8.2(v), and find that three (3) words, 'to the extent,' provides
    the framework for a comparative fault trial where [Mobile
    Infirmary] can ultimately recover partial indemnity from
    Quest in proportion to the Parties' respective comparative
    fault to the Estate of Mr. Ward. The Supreme Court of
    Alabama requires this Trial Court to find that any such
    purported agreement between [Mobile Infirmary] and Quest
    is clear and unequivocal with an agreed-upon formula for it to
    order a comparative fault trial. Holcim (US), Inc. v. Ohio Cas.
    Inc. Co., 38 So. 3d 722, 728 (Ala. 2009) (determining that 'if
    two parties knowingly, clearly, and unequivocally enter into
    an agreement whereby they agree that the respective liability
    of the parties will be determined by some type of agreed-upon
    formula, then Alabama law will permit the enforcement of
    that agreement as written'). Here, [Mobile Infirmary] and
    Quest did not 'knowingly, clearly, and unequivocally' craft
    Section 8.1(i) to create a comparative fault indemnification
    contract. This is further supported by the fact that Section
    8.1(i) lacks 'an agreed-upon formula' for a comparative fault
    trial.

         "Finally, the Court notes that under no circumstances
    should it grant [Mobile Infirmary's] Cross-Motion for Partial
    Summary Judgment against Quest because neither Party
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     suggest the record establishes negligence by Quest or
     proximate cause against Quest. The plain language of the
     agreement does not allow for [Mobile Infirmary] to recover
     against Quest for [Mobile Infirmary's] own negligence. Thus,
     the Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is due to be
     denied. As discussed above, the Court concludes [Section]
     8.1(i) is insufficient to compel a comparative fault trial."

(Emphasis in original.) Mobile Infirmary appeals.

                          Standard of Review

     The material issue at this stage of the case does not involve a

question of fact. "We review a summary judgment and all questions of

law de novo." Pinkerton Sec. & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Chamblee,

961 So. 2d 97, 101 (Ala. 2006).

                                  Discussion

     On appeal, Mobile Infirmary maintains that Quest was required to

indemnify it for the settlement of Mia's wrongful-death action.

Specifically, Mobile Infirmary argues that Quest's failure to perform the

basic metabolic panels ordered by Ward's doctor caused or contributed to

his death and, thus, triggered the indemnity provision found in Section

8.1 of the LMA, thereby entitling it to full indemnification from Quest

under that provision. To the extent, however, that its own admitted

negligence contributed, at least in part, to Ward's death, Mobile

                                     13
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Infirmary argues in the alternative that, under Section 8.1(v) of the LMA,

Quest was still required to indemnify it for Quest's proportionate share

of the fault in causing or contributing to Ward's death. For these reasons,

Mobile Infirmary argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary

judgment in Quest's favor.

     We address the alternative argument first. The decision in Holcim

(US), Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 38 So. 3d 722, 727 (Ala. 2009),

considered the following certified question, as rephrased by the Court:

"Whether, under Alabama law, an indemnitee may enforce an

indemnification provision calling for the allocation of an obligation or

damages based on the respective fault of the indemnitee and

indemnitor?"   The answer was "in the affirmative": "[I]f two parties

knowingly, clearly, and unequivocally enter into an agreement whereby

they agree that the respective liability of the parties will be determined

by some type of agreed-upon formula, then Alabama law will permit the

enforcement of that agreement as written." Holcim, 38 So. 3d at 729.

     In arriving at this answer, the Court first noted that, generally,

"joint tortfeasors are not entitled to common-law indemnity or

contribution." Id. at 727.

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     "In Vandiver v. Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 553, 19 So. 180, 182
     (1895), this Court explained that the basis of this prohibition
     is found in the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio:

                  " 'As a general principle of the common law it
           is often stated that indemnity or contribution will
           not be enforced as between joint wrong-doers. The
           reason underlying the principle is, that courts will
           not lend assistance to him who founds his cause of
           action on an immoral or illegal act -- "Ex turpi
           causa, oritur non actio." A trespasser confessing
           that he has injured or taken the property of
           another, is not entitled to the assistance of courts,
           instituted as well for the protection of property as
           for the protection of persons, to recover indemnity
           or contribution from his associates in the
           trespass.' "

38 So. 3d at 727. See also Sherman Concrete Pipe Mach., Inc. v. Gadsden

Concrete & Metal Pipe Co., 335 So. 2d 125, 127 (Ala. 1976) ("The general

rule in Alabama, subject to exceptions, prohibits one of several joint

tortfeasors from enforcing contribution from the others who participated

in the wrong. This is because of the maxim that no man can make his

own misconduct the ground for an action in his own favor.").

     Despite the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio, indemnity

agreements in which the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee

for the indemnitee's own negligence can be enforced:

           " 'The Court has, for many years, held that as
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           between private parties, indemnity contracts are
           enforceable if the contract clearly indicates an
           intention to indemnify against the consequences of
           the indemnitee's negligence, and such provision
           was clearly understood by the indemnitor, and
           there is not shown to be evidence of a
           disproportionate bargaining position in favor of
           the indemnitee.'

     "Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 171, 175 (Ala.
     1980). This rule includes the enforcement of a valid indemnity
     agreement that requires an indemnitor to indemnify an
     indemnitee for the indemnitee's own wrongdoing: '[I]f the
     parties knowingly, evenhandedly, and for valid consideration,
     intelligently enter into an agreement whereby one party
     agrees to indemnify the other, including indemnity against
     the indemnitee's own wrongs, if expressed in clear and
     unequivocal language, then such agreements will be upheld.'
     388 So. 2d at 176. See also Apel Mach. & Supply Co. v. J.E.
     O'Toole Eng'g Co., 548 So. 2d 445, 448 (Ala. 1989) ('Although
     the general rule in Alabama is that joint tort-feasors are not
     entitled to indemnity, when one joint tort-feasor agrees in
     writing to indemnify the other, even for claims based on the
     other's own negligence, the agreement, if it is a valid
     indemnity agreement, can be upheld, and the joint tort-feasor
     can receive indemnification.')."

38 So. 3d at 727-28.     That said, those agreements must be clear:

"However, 'the intention to indemnify the negligence of the indemnitee

must clearly appear from the wording of the instrument, but when that

intention is clear, the indemnity provisions will be read and construed so

as to give them the meaning the parties have expressed.' " Holcim, 38 So.

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3d at 728 (quoting Eley v. Brunner-Lay S. Corp., 289 Ala. 120, 124, 266

So. 2d 276, 280 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Goodyear Tire &

Rubber Co. v. J.M. Tull Metals Co., 629 So. 2d 633 (Ala. 1993)).

     Because parties may enter into agreements that allow an

indemnitee to recover from the indemnitor even for claims resulting

solely from the negligence of the indemnitee, this Court saw no legal

obstacle to an indemnification agreement calling for the allocation of an

obligation or damages based on the respective fault of the indemnitee and

the indemnitor, that is, a contractual agreement providing a form of

otherwise barred joint-tortfeasor contribution:

           "If, under Alabama law, the maxim ex turpi causa non
     oritur actio provides no barrier to a contractual agreement in
     which an indemnitor may obligate himself or herself to pay an
     indemnitee's obligation resulting from the indemnitee's own
     wrongs, then, a fortiori, we see no barrier to an agreement
     between parties for an indemnitor to provide indemnity where
     the indemnitor's own wrongs also contribute to the creation of
     the obligation. Similarly, we see no barrier to the freedom of
     parties to negotiate an agreement providing for the allocation
     of a proportionate part of the obligation or damages based on
     the parties' respective fault. As we have previously stated,
     when ' "dealing with an Alabama contract entered into by two
     competent contracting parties in this State, ... we are mindful
     of our duty to avoid, if at all possible, infringing upon the
     rights of either or both." ' Shoney's [LLC v. MAC East, LLC],
     27 So. 3d [1216,] 1223 [(Ala. 2009)] (quoting Summers v.
     Adams Motor Co., 34 Ala. App. 319, 324, 39 So. 2d 300, 304
     (1949))."
                                   17
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38 So. 3d at 728-29 (footnote omitted).

     This Court held that such agreements, 1 which, again, are contrary

to the general prohibition on indemnity or contribution between joint

wrongdoers, must themselves be clear: "[I]f two parties knowingly,

clearly, and unequivocally enter into an agreement whereby they agree

that the respective liability of the parties will be determined by some type

of agreed-upon formula, then Alabama law will permit the enforcement

of that agreement as written." Id. at 729 (emphasis added). 2

     As noted previously, in Section 8.1 of the LMA, Quest agreed to

indemnify and hold Mobile Infirmary harmless against

     "any and all liability, losses, damages, claims or causes of
     action … that are caused by or a result of (i) any negligent or
     intentional act, error or omission by Quest Diagnostics, its
     employees, agents, servants or representatives with respect
     to its responsibilities and/or the performance of Services
     hereunder, to the extent such Claim does not arise from an

     1In   Holcim, this Court specifically disclaimed "expressing an
opinion as to the proper interpretation" of the agreement in that case. 38
So. 3d at 727.

     2Given  the above, we reject the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc.,
589 F.3d 1361, 1363 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009), in which that court interpreted
our decision in Holcim as not requiring such agreements to have "clear
and unequivocal language."
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     act or omission or cause for which [Mobile Infirmary] is
     required to provide indemnity pursuant to Section 8.2 below
     … [or] (v) any personal injury (including death) or property
     damage caused by or arising from the negligence, acts or
     omissions of Quest Diagnostics or any employee or agent of
     Quest Diagnostics .…"

(Emphasis added.) Under Section 8.2, Mobile Infirmary in turn agreed

to indemnify Quest from and against

     "any and all Claims … (i) directly caused by or as a result of
     any negligent or intentional act, error or omission by [Mobile
     Infirmary] … with respect to its responsibilities [under the
     LMA], to the extent such Claim does not arise from an act or
     omission or cause for which Quest Diagnostics is required to
     provide indemnity pursuant to Section 8.1 above … [or] (v)
     any personal injury (including death) … caused by or arising
     from the negligence, acts or omissions of [Mobile Infirmary]
     or any employee or agent of [Mobile Infirmary] …."

(Emphasis added.)

     Under Section 8.1(v), Quest has agreed to indemnify and hold

Mobile Infirmary harmless for "any and all liability" caused by or that

was the result of "any personal injury (including death)" that arose out of

Quest's negligence, acts, or omissions. Likewise, under Section 8.2(v),

Mobile Infirmary has agreed to indemnify and hold Quest harmless for

"any and all" claims related to "any personal injury (including death)"

that arose from Mobile Infirmary's negligence, acts, or omissions.

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Together, these provisions may be read to mean that the parties have

agreed to indemnify each other for all liability that may arise from their

respective negligence, acts, or omissions.

     Mobile Infirmary admitted that Ward's death was caused in part

by its negligence within the meaning of Section 8.2; its acts formed a

basis for Mia's action (that is, Mia's action arose from Mobile Infirmary's

acts). Under Section 8.2(v), it would be required to hold Quest harmless

for all claims arising from such acts. If Quest's acts also contributed to

Ward's death (that is, if Mia's action also arose from Quest's acts), then,

under Section 8.1(v), Quest would hold Mobile Infirmary harmless from

all claims arising from such acts. If both of these provisions apply, they

could be read to require each party to hold the other harmless from all

claims asserted in Mia's wrongful-death action.

     Mobile Infirmary argues, however, that Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v)

instead require each party to indemnify the other for its own

proportionate share of fault. As stated previously, Holcim makes clear

that parties must "knowingly, clearly, and unequivocally enter into an

[indemnity] agreement whereby they agree that the respective liability

of the parties will be determined by some type of agreed-upon formula."

                                    20
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38 So. 3d at 729. In the present case, although Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v)

can be read to address when a claim arises from either party's acts, they

do not clearly and unequivocally address what happens when a claim

arises out of acts of both parties. The provisions require indemnification

for all liability; but, if both are at fault, it is unclear how both can be liable

in full. Nowhere in these provisions do the parties expressly agree or

clearly provide a formula that, in the event there is a claim that arises

out of partial liability or concurrent acts by both parties, indemnification

will be required for a proportionate share.            Without a "clear" and

"unequivocal"     agreement     addressing     indemnification      in   such   a

concurrent-fault situation, Mobile Infirmary's proposed reading of these

sections does not comply with Holcim.

      The same analysis applies to Section 8.1(i).           Mobile Infirmary

argues that this provision provides a proportionate-fault formula

pursuant to which Quest must indemnify it for the portion of the damages

resulting from its negligence that caused or contributed to Ward's death.

Under Section 8.1(i), Quest has agreed to indemnify Mobile Infirmary

against "any and all" claims that are caused by or are the result of "any

negligent or intentional act, error or omission by Quest … to the extent

                                       21
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such Claim does not arise from an act or omission or cause for which

[Mobile Infirmary] is required to provide indemnity pursuant to Section

8.2." (Emphasis added.) As noted above, Section 8.2(v) can be read to

require Mobile Infirmary to hold Quest harmless for all claims asserted

in Mia's wrongful-death action. Further, the phrase "to the extent" can

be read to mean that indemnity is required "if" the claim does not "arise"

from Mobile Infirmary's own conduct, which would be consistent with a

reading of Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v) requiring indemnity for "sole" fault.

However, Mobile Infirmary suggests that the phrase can also be read as

providing a quantity or proportion, meaning, "to the degree." If this

alternate reading is also viable, it only amplifies the ambiguity of these

indemnity provisions, demonstrating that they are not "clear" and

"unequivocal" as required by Holcim.

      In summary, the LMA could have specified that each party was

required to indemnify the other for any proportional share of fault in the

case of potential joint liability. The cited provisions do not clearly and

unequivocally do so. It might be implied, but so might other reasonable

and contrary implications. Thus, Mobile Infirmary's alternate argument

does not demonstrate reversible error.

                                    22
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      As to Mobile Infirmary's initial argument, it contends that, because

Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v) "cancel each other out," it would not be required

to provide any indemnity to Quest under Section 8.2. Thus, it asserts,

under Section 8.1(i), Quest would be required to indemnify it "in full" for

all damages in Mia's wrongful-death action because the limitation in that

part -- "to the extent such Claim does not arise from an act or omission

or cause for which [Mobile Infirmary] is required to provide indemnity

pursuant to Section 8.2" -- would not apply. (Emphasis added.) We

disagree.   As the trial court held, "[b]ased on [Mobile Infirmary's]

admission that the death of Mr. Ward was indeed caused, in part, by the

negligence of [Mobile Infirmary], the Court concludes that Section 8.2(v)

is triggered." In such a circumstance, the terms of Section 8.1(i) do not

require indemnification by Quest.         That Quest could be required to

indemnify Mobile Infirmary under Section 8.1(v) does not nullify the fact

that Section 8.2(v) was, as the trial court held, "triggered" under the facts

of this case.

                                Conclusion

      For the reasons stated above, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

      AFFIRMED.

                                     23
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    Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

    Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Mitchell, J., joins.

    Parker, C.J., dissents, with opinion.

                                  24
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COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

     I concur with the main opinion. I write specially to clarify my

understanding of our holding in this case.

     In Holcim (US), Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 38 So. 3d 722,

729 (Ala. 2009), this Court explained: "[I]f two parties knowingly, clearly,

and unequivocally enter into an agreement whereby they agree that the

respective liability of the parties will be determined by some type of

agreed-upon formula, then Alabama law will permit the enforcement of

that agreement as written." (Emphasis added.) Requiring that indemnity

agreements be "clear and unequivocal" is not confined solely to the fact

of indemnity but logically extends to the scope of that indemnity (that is,

it applies even if the parties are joint tortfeasors). After all, indemnity,

contribution among joint tortfeasors, and comparative negligence are all

departures from our normal liability rules.

     In this case, Mobile Infirmary contends that simply by including

the language "to the extent" in the Laboratory Management Agreement's

indemnity provisions, the allocation of fault among the parties to those

provisions was "clear and unequivocal." It was not. Although the parties

string-cited cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar "to the

                                    25
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extent" language in contracts, both sides admit that courts have reached

conflicting results on whether this language is ambiguous. In fact, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that this language was

ambiguous. See Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc., 548 F.3d 1352,

1356-58 (11th Cir. 2008); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc., 589 F.3d

1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2009). If a number of courts have found this

language to be "ambiguous," such language generally fails the

heightened requirement of being "clear and unequivocal."

     Although the main opinion alludes to the need for an "agreed-upon

formula" in such provisions, I do not understand our holding to require

specific, talismanic language or a mathematical formula expressed in

numbers or any heightened test of certainty in how a formula will work.

For instance, I do not understand our holding to decide whether the

words "to the degree" would have been sufficient. The problem here is

that the contract was not "clear and unequivocal" regarding whether

there would be any allocation if there was concurrent liability. What I

understand our holding to say is that such provisions should make clear

that some allocation of fault among the parties will occur. If necessary,

the court can then apply traditional contract-construction principles to

                                    26
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provisions regarding how to actually make that allocation. Clarity is

almost always a good thing, and the parties almost always understand

-- far better than a court after the fact -- what they truly intend.

     Mitchell, J., concurs.

                                     27
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).

     In my view, the issue presented in this case was not decided by

Holcim (US), Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 38 So. 3d 722 (Ala.

2009). And I believe that Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v) of the Laboratory

Management Agreement are best understood as requiring fault-based

apportionment of indemnity between the parties.

     First, Holcim did not hold that apportioned-indemnity provisions

must be unambiguous to be enforceable. In reading Holcim as so holding,

the main opinion overlooks the analytical frame within which that case

was decided.

     Holcim came to us on a certified question from the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The indemnity provision there

required indemnification of losses suffered by the indemnitee " ' " 'to the

extent such losses are attributable to the negligence or willful misconduct

of [the indemnitor]. ' " ' " Id. at 725 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

Before the Eleventh Circuit, the indemnitee argued that the phrase "to

the extent" required indemnification based on apportionment of fault

between the parties. Id. at 726. The indemnitor argued that the

indemnity provision's language was not specific enough to require

                                    28
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apportionment, partly because it did not provide a method for

apportionment. Id. The Eleventh Circuit thought both arguments were

reasonable. Id. But that court recognized that, if the indemnitee's

argument were right and the provision required apportionment, a

question would arise whether such a provision is enforceable under

Alabama law. That question is the essence of what the Eleventh Circuit

certified to us. See id. We rephrased the certified question, distilling it to

that essence. Id. at 727.

      Crucially for the present case, we then made clear that we would

answer the question "[w]ithout expressing an opinion as to the proper

interpretation of the actual agreement between [the indemnitee] and [the

indemnitor]." Id. In other words, we did not decide the issue disputed by

the parties in the Eleventh Circuit -- whether the indemnity provision's

language was specific enough to require apportionment. Rather, we did

the same thing the Eleventh Circuit had done in certifying the question:

We assumed for purposes of our analysis that the indemnitee's view was

correct -- that the provision's language was specific enough to require

apportionment. That assumption was necessary to the whole analysis

that followed, because if the provision did not require apportionment

                                     29
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because it was not specific enough, then the certified question --

essentially,   whether      apportioned-indemnity       provisions     are

unenforceable based on Alabama public policy -- was moot.

     In answering the (rephrased) certified question, we reviewed our

precedent on contractual indemnity for an indemnitee's own wrongdoing,

as discussed in today's main opinion. In summary, under common law,

joint tortfeasors were not entitled to indemnity because courts generally

will not assist a person whose claim is founded on his own wrongdoing.

Id. at 727. Despite that equity-based rationale, courts will enforce

contracts in which a party agrees to indemnify for the indemnitee's own

negligence. Id. However, to be enforceable, such provisions must be

written in clear and unequivocal language and must be entered into by

the indemnitor knowingly, evenhandedly, and without disproportionate

bargaining position of the indemnitee, id. at 727-28, presumably because

of those provisions' tension with equity. Next, we reviewed our precedent

on freedom of contract and its general applicability to indemnity. Id. at

728. Finally, we applied these principles by reasoning from the greater

to the lesser: If Alabama public policy did not prohibit an indemnitor from

contracting to indemnify an indemnitee for the indemnitee's own

                                    30
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wrongdoing, then Alabama public policy also did not prohibit an

indemnitor from contracting to indemnify an indemnitee for the

indemnitor's apportioned wrongdoing as to a jointly caused harm. Id. at

728. We then concluded: "Accordingly, if two parties knowingly, clearly,

and unequivocally enter into an agreement whereby they agree that the

respective liability of the parties will be determined by some type of

agreed-upon formula, then Alabama law will permit the enforcement of

that agreement as written." Id. at 729.

     Within that last sentence, the words "knowingly, clearly, and

unequivocally" and "by some type of agreed-upon formula" were

necessarily dicta. As explained above, the only question before this Court

was whether an indemnity provision whose language did require

apportionment would be unenforceable under Alabama public policy.

Clearly not before us was the question what language was necessary to

require apportionment. Both the Eleventh Circuit and this Court had

expressly declined to answer that question at that juncture, because both

courts were focused on the public-policy question that required assuming

that the subject provision required apportionment.

                                   31
SC-2022-0641

     Put another way, today's main opinion views Holcim as requiring

that apportioned-indemnity provisions be "clear and unequivocal" and

provide a "formula" for apportionment. If that view were correct, in

Holcim we would have held at the outset that the provision was

unenforceable (and declined to answer the certified question as moot)

because the Eleventh Circuit had already determined that the provision

was ambiguous. But we did not approach the provision that way, because

we were assuming that the provision was enforceable as a matter of

language and were examining only whether it was unenforceable as a

matter of policy.

     There is another reason why that surplus language in Holcim's

conclusion sentence should be understood as dicta: It does not flow from

the equitable, public-policy concerns that underlie our cases' "clear and

unequivocal" requirement for provisions that agree to indemnification for

an indemnitee's own wrongdoing. Such a provision does more than depart

from the common-law rule against indemnity among joint tortfeasors. It

goes further, requiring an indemnitor to indemnify against the

indemnitee's own fault, separate from the indemnitor's fault, thus

essentially requiring the indemnitor to act as an insurer. Cf. Industrial

                                   32
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Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 So. 2d 171, 175-76 (Ala. 1980) (" '[S]uch

provisions must be construed in favor of the indemnitor in instances

where the indemnity is not contracted for from an insurance company

engaged in the business of writing, for consideration, such coverage ….' "

(citation omitted)). Such an arrangement cuts so deeply against the grain

of ordinary principles of equity that, to be enforceable, it must have been

entered into with the clearest of notice to the indemnitor. See id. at 176

("The Court's insistence that such provisions be unambiguous and

unequivocal arises from its concern that, generally speaking, one should

not be able to contract against the consequences of his own wrong.").

     In contrast, a provision that calls for partial indemnity based on

apportionment of fault does not trigger that equitable concern. The

indemnitor is not indemnifying against the indemnitee's own fault, but

only against the indemnitor's fault. Even absent a contractual indemnity

provision, the common law itself would likely require that kind of

indemnification (via contribution), at least outside the context of joint

active tortfeasors. See American S. Ins. Co. v. Dime Taxi Serv., Inc., 275

Ala. 51, 55, 151 So. 2d 783, 785 (1963). An apportioned-indemnity

provision merely extends the common law's fault-based scheme of

                                    33
SC-2022-0641

indemnity/contribution to the joint-tortfeasor scenario. Hence, the

equitable justification for a "clear and unequivocal" requirement, so

necessary as to an indemnitee's-own-wrongdoing provision, is simply not

present when dealing with an apportioned-indemnity provision.

     In accord with this view was the Eleventh Circuit's follow-up

Holcim decision after we answered the certified question:

     "The Supreme Court of Alabama explicitly declined to express
     an opinion about the proper interpretation of the language at
     issue here. Moreover, our conclusion that the contract
     language is ambiguous does not require the ultimate finding
     that no valid agreement on this issue existed between the
     parties. Alabama's requirement for 'clear and unequivocal'
     language seems to us to apply to those agreements in which
     an indemnitor agrees to assume the burden of losses
     attributable to the fault of the indemnitee. Here, however,
     [the indemnitee] only seeks indemnification from [the
     indemnitor] to the extent of [the indemnitee's] losses that
     were caused by [the indemnitor], pursuant to an analysis of
     comparative fault."

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Holcim (US), Inc., 589 F.3d 1361, 1363 n.1 (11th Cir.

2009) (citations omitted). In my view, that part of the Eleventh Circuit's

decision correctly interpreted our Holcim opinion. That opinion did not

hold that apportioned-indemnity provisions must be clear and

unequivocal or that they must provide a formula for apportionment.

                                    34
SC-2022-0641

     Second, the indemnity provisions here are best interpreted as

requiring fault-based apportionment of indemnity between the parties.

Outside the context of provisions requiring indemnification for an

indemnitee's own wrongdoing, "[w]hen construing an indemnity

agreement, this Court has applied the general rules of contract

interpretation," Once Upon a Time, LLC v. Chappelle Props., LLC, 209

So. 3d 1094, 1096 (Ala. 2016). Specifically, when confronted with

ambiguous indemnity provisions, we have looked to principles of contract

interpretation that might resolve the ambiguity. See, e.g., FabArc Steel

Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr. Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 357-61 (Ala.

2005); Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1295,

1298-1301 (Ala. 1996).

     Thus, I would resolve the present provisions' ambiguity as we would

resolve any other, by applying principles of contract interpretation. There

are three possible interpretations of Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v) in a

situation when both parties are at fault: (1) The two parties can obtain

indemnification back and forth ad infinitum, (2) the provisions cancel

each other out and have no effect, or (3) the provisions require

apportionment of fault. " '[W]here there is a choice between a valid

                                    35
SC-2022-0641

construction and an invalid construction [of an indemnity provision,] the

court has a duty to accept the construction that will uphold, rather than

destroy, the contract and that will give effect and meaning to all of its

terms.' " Once Upon a Time, 209 So. 3d at 1097 (citation omitted). Only

option (3), apportionment, avoids both the absurdity of option (1) and the

destruction that would result from option (2). Other courts have

interpreted   similarly   dueling    indemnity    provisions   to   require

apportionment. See Joseph Francese, Inc. v. DOS Concrete Servs., Inc.,

47 Mass. App. Ct. 367, 713 N.E.2d 984 (1999); Bank One, N.A. v. Echo

Acceptance Corp., 522 F. Supp. 2d 959, 971-73 (S.D. Ohio 2007); Gap, Inc.

v. Apex Xpress, Inc., No. A146176, June 14, 2017 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)

(unpublished opinion).

     In addition to allowing Sections 8.1(v) and 8.2(v) to be enforceable,

this interpretation allows them to be read harmoniously with Sections

8.1(i) and 8.2(i). The (i) subsections require indemnification for "any

negligent or intentional act, error or omission by [the indemnitor] ... with

respect to its responsibilities ... hereunder, to the extent such Claim does

not arise from an act or omission or cause for which [the indemnitee] is

required to provide indemnity pursuant to [the corresponding indemnity

                                    36
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section] ...." (Emphasis added.) The (v) subsections are more specific,

requiring indemnification for "any personal injury (including death) or

property damage caused by or arising from the negligence, acts or

omissions of [the indemnitor]" (emphasis added) and do not contain the

"to the extent" caveat. Under the general/specific canon of construction,

specific provisions override general provisions in the specific situations

to which they apply. See ERA Commander Realty, Inc. v. Harrigan, 514

So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Ala. 1987); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,

Reading Law 183-88 (Thomson/West 2012). Thus, under the (i)

subsections, generally indemnity is not provided when both parties cause

an indivisible harm ("to the extent such Claim does not arise from an act

or omission or cause for which [the indemnitee] is required to provide

indemnity" (emphasis added)). However, under the (v) subsections, when

the harm is specifically personal injury, death, or property damage, there

is no prohibition of reciprocal indemnity, and the parties are liable to

indemnify each other based on their respective apportioned fault.

     Today's main opinion imposes new requirements that apportioned-

indemnity provisions be clear and unequivocal and provide a formula for

apportionment. Those requirements infringe on the parties' freedom of

                                   37
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contract (which we emphasized in Holcim, see 38 So. 3d at 727-28)

without any justification in either Holcim's holding or the equitable

principles underlying its analysis. Without such a justification, I would

not impose those new requirements.

                                   38