Court Opinion

ID: 9891349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 14:04:13.230949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:06.865664
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed October 18, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-0760
                      Lower Tribunal No. F20-12699
                          ________________

                        Ron Orlando Figueroa,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ellen Sue
Venzer, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Susan S. Lerner, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.

    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, GORDO, and LOBREE, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
        Appellant, Ron Figueroa, appeals his conviction following a jury trial.

Figueroa was found guilty of abusing his minor stepdaughter. Pursuant to

section 92.54, Florida Statutes (2022), Appellee, the State, moved to allow

the eleven-year-old child to testify through closed-circuit television (“CCTV”)

rather than in open court. Figueroa objected, but the trial court granted the

motion after explaining its decision on the record. Figueroa argues that the

trial court’s on-the-record explanation for allowing CCTV testimony fell short

of the constitutional and statutory requirement that the trial court make case-

specific factual findings. We affirm because the trial court’s findings were

sufficient and supported by competent substantial evidence.

   I.      BACKGROUND

        Figueroa was charged with three counts of lewd and lascivious

molestation, one count of sexual battery, and one count of attempted sexual

battery. Before trial, the State filed a motion to allow the child to testify via

CCTV pursuant to section 92.54, which provides as follows:

        (1) Upon motion and hearing in camera and upon a finding that
        there is a substantial likelihood that a victim or witness under the
        age of 18 . . . will suffer at least moderate emotional or mental
        harm due to the presence of the defendant if such victim or
        witness is required to testify in open court, . . . the trial court may
        order that the testimony of the victim or witness be taken outside
        of the courtroom and shown by means of closed-circuit
        television.

        ....

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         (5) The court shall make specific findings of fact, on the record,
         as to the basis for its ruling under this section.

(Emphasis added).

         On March 28, 2022, the court held a hearing on the motion. Dr.

Vanessa Ramirez, a child psychologist who evaluated the child, testified at

the hearing as an expert. Dr. Ramirez concluded that the child would suffer

at least moderate emotional harm if she were made to testify in Figueroa’s

presence. Dr. Ramirez testified that she came to this conclusion because of

the child’s “very emotional” responses whenever the child was confronted

with discussing the alleged abuse or the possibility of seeing Figueroa in

court.

         Based on this evidence, the trial court concluded that the child should

testify via CCTV:

         [B]ased upon not only the testimony of the expert but also the
         evaluation that was done and provided to the Court . . . I believe
         that . . . there is significant likelihood of at least . . . moderate
         emotional harm. . . . [F]rom the report, the child seems to be
         scared of the Defendant and I am concerned for her emotional
         safety.

               I am distressed, frankly, that she’s only received one
         therapy session . . . .

(Emphasis added).

         Figueroa objected to allowing the CCTV testimony, arguing that the

child would not suffer emotional harm if made to testify in open court. The

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trial court acknowledged this objection before going on to explain why

Figueroa’s right to confront the victim was outweighed by the important public

policy interest in protecting the child in this case.

         The jury found Figueroa guilty on all five counts. This timely appeal

follows.

   II.     ANALYSIS

         Our standard of review is mixed when considering the trial court’s

ruling over an objection based on the Confrontation Clause. See Hernandez

v. State, 946 So. 2d 1270, 1277 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The trial court’s findings

of fact are “subject to reversal only if not supported by competent, substantial

evidence in the record.” Id. Meanwhile, legal conclusions are reviewed de

novo. Id.; see also Calloway v. State, 210 So. 3d 1160, 1187 (Fla. 2017)

(“We review challenges based on the Confrontation Clause de novo.”);

Murphy v. State, 317 So. 3d 1255, 1257-58 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (explaining

that although a trial court has wide latitude when ruling on evidentiary

matters, its discretion is constrained by the Sixth Amendment; therefore,

review of a trial court’s ruling over a Confrontation Clause objection is de

novo).

         The United State Supreme Court has long recognized that “the

Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with

                                        4
witnesses.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).1 This right, however,

is not absolute. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990). Indeed, the

right to confront “must occasionally give way to considerations of public

policy,” such as allowing minors to testify outside of the courtroom if the

minor’s “well-being” would be affected by testifying in the presence of the

defendant. Id. at 853, 856.

      In Craig, the United States Supreme Court set forth case-specific

findings that are required before a trial court permits a child witness to testify

via CCTV. Id. at 856-57. Our high Court has held that Florida courts must

comply with Craig:

             To satisfy Craig, the trial court must: (a) conduct an inquiry
      in which evidence is received on whether the closed-circuit
      procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular
      child; (b) find that the child witness will be traumatized, not by the
      courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defendant; and
      (c) find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness
      in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e.,
      more than mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance
      to testify.

Myles v. State, 602 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Fla. 1992) (footnote omitted). The

factual findings required by section 92.54 are necessarily related to the

1
  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.” Amend. VI, U.S. Const. This gives the
accused an opportunity to confront his accusers “face to face.” Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156
U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).

                                        5
findings required by Craig.2 Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1375 (Fla.

1994).

      There are two issues before us: (1) whether the trial court complied

with the constitutional and statutory requirements to make sufficient case-

specific findings on the record before allowing CCTV testimony, and (2) if the

trial court erred, whether that error constituted fundamental error or harmless

error.3

      Figueroa argues that the trial court did not have enough evidence to

conclude that the child should testify via CCTV and that the trial court failed

to make the required case-specific findings. Not so. The trial court’s findings

are supported by competent substantial evidence, and it complied with the

constitutional and statutory requirements to make the necessary case-

specific findings.

2
  In Myles, the Florida Supreme Court observed that the Craig findings were
not the precisely the same as those in a prior version of section 92.54. Myles,
602 So. 2d at 1281. For example, section 92.54(1), Florida Statutes (1991),
did not specify that the harm must be caused by the presence of the
defendant. Myles, 602 So. 2d at 1281. The current version of the statute,
however, includes this causation requirement. See § 92.54(1), Fla. Stat.
(2023) (requiring a finding that “that there is a substantial likelihood that a
victim or witness under the age of 18 . . . will suffer at least moderate
emotional or mental harm due to the presence of the defendant” (emphasis
added)).
3
   Because we conclude that the trial court did not err, we do not reach this
issue.

                                      6
      In arguing that there was insufficient evidence to justify CCTV

testimony, Figueroa claims that the child’s only expression of fear was about

having to sit next to Figueroa, a scenario that was never going to happen in

open court. But this ignores Dr. Ramirez’s testimony that she did not think

the child victim could testify in open court because “she expressed being

fearful of . . . seeing [Figueroa].” Moreover, when Dr. Ramirez was asked if

she clarified for the child that she would not be sitting next to [Figueroa], Dr.

Ramirez answered that the child understood “she would be able to see him.

That he would be in the room.”

      Dr. Ramirez specifically evaluated the child “to determine under what

conditions she could testify in court and provide recommendations.” Dr.

Ramirez learned the child became emotional during her deposition. Indeed,

the child became so upset that she had to take a break before continuing.

Dr. Ramirez further testified that “whenever [the child] talked about anything

related to the upcoming court, she would get emotional.” Moreover, Dr.

Ramirez testified that the child was “very distressed” and “very avoidant”

when discussing the possibility of testifying in open court such that Dr.

Ramirez determined “if [the child] sees [Figueroa] . . . she wouldn’t be able

to say what happened to her.”

      Based on the record before us, we conclude there was competent

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings that the child would

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suffer at least moderate emotional harm due to the presence of Figueroa if

made to testify in open court.

      Next, Figueroa argues that the trial court did not give adequate case-

specific findings on the record to explain why CCTV testimony was

necessary in accordance with section 92.54(5) and Craig. We disagree.

Figueroa compares the trial court’s on-the-record explanation to cases

involving insufficient explanations, but these cases are distinguishable.

      In Feller v. State, 637 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1994), the trial court made

the following general finding:

      I think I’m satisfied that [the psychologist’s] testimony comports
      to the statute, that there is at least a substantial likelihood of . . .
      moderate [harm], is sufficient to allow the videotaping of the child;
      and therefore, I'm going to grant the state’s motion to videotape
      the testimony of this child.

The Florida Supreme Court concluded that this “failed to satisfy the

requirement that the court make specific findings of fact on the record to

support the ruling.”4     Id.    Moreover, the Court noted that there were

“contradictions and conflicts regarding some of the psychologist’s factual

assertions.” Id.

4
  Feller involved section 92.53, which concerns videotaped testimony as
opposed to CCTV testimony. However, both sections 92.53(7) and 92.54(5),
the CCTV statute relevant here, require “specific findings of fact, on the
record, as to the basis for [the trial court’s] ruling.”

                                         8
      Figueroa also relies on Dennis v. State, 782 So. 2d 939, 941 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2001), where the trial court simply found “it is probable, from the

evidence available to me, that the child would be harmed by testifying before

the defendant . . .” The Fourth District held that this was insufficient because

“[t]he trial court merely adopted and ratified the hearing testimony of the

psychologist without specifying each evidentiary fact that supported its

ruling.” Id.

      Here, by contrast, the trial court did not merely adopt Dr. Ramirez’s

testimony but made specific findings as to the likelihood of moderate

emotional harm and the child’s fear of Figueroa and her emotional safety:

      [B]ased upon not only the testimony of the expert but also the
      evaluation that was done and provided to the Court . . . I believe
      that . . . there is significant likelihood of at least . . . moderate
      emotional harm. . . . [F]rom the report, the child seems to be
      scared of the Defendant and I am concerned for her emotional
      safety.

            I am distressed, frankly, that she’s only received one
      therapy session . . . .

(Emphasis added).5 And, unlike in Feller, Dr. Ramirez’s testimony did not

contain contradictions and conflicts. We therefore conclude that the trial

court did not err because its on-the-record explanation was sufficient. See

5
  After the court expressed concern about the child’s therapy, the State
explained that the child discontinued therapy because she was so
emotionally distressed by what happened that she didn’t want to talk to
anybody about it. The court responded, “Right. That’s harm to the child.”

                                       9
Feller, 637 So. 2d at 914 (explaining that the purpose of the statute’s

requirement that courts make case-specific findings on the record is to

ensure that a reviewing court can “determine which . . . facts the trial court

relied upon in reaching [its] ultimate conclusion”).

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the child

to testify via CCTV because there was competent substantial evidence in the

record, and the court made sufficient case-specific findings.

      Affirmed.

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