Court Opinion

ID: 9540795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:19:52.932374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:58.163829
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel at the pretrial suppression hearing was constitutionally invalid and that the trial court erred in allowing defendant to proceed without representation. However, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s error in accepting defendant’s waiver of counsel was harmless. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The harmless error rule arises from Article VII (amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, which states, in part, that if the court is of the opinion
“that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial[.]”
As construed by the Supreme Court, the harmless error rule requires affirmance despite error if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 56, 828 P2d 1006, cert den 506 US _, 113 S Ct 171 (1992).1
*652In this case, defendant’s conviction hinged entirely on the outcome of the suppression hearing at which he was unrepresented. The weapon found during Officer Cash’s war-rantless search of the vehicle, the subject of defendant’s motion to suppress, was vital to the state’s case. The remaining evidence would not have supported a guilty verdict.2 Notably, the state does not argue on appeal that the evidence in this case was so substantial that it could have obtained a conviction even if the court had granted defendant’s motion to suppress. See State v. Kirkpatrick, 117 Or App 614, 844 P2d 283 (1993) (presumed error harmless because independent of the evidence that defendant sought to suppress, there was substantial evidence of guilt). Instead, the state contends, and the majority agrees, that the motion was correctly decided and that the verdict would not have changed had defendant been represented by counsel at the pretrial hearing.
Unlike the majority, I am not willing to speculate on the propriety of the trial court’s ruling when the only basis on which to make that decision is the record of the proceeding that occurred immediately after defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to counsel. I do not believe that the record, as it currently exists, accurately reflects the issues and arguments that might have been developed at the suppression hearing had defendant been represented by counsel.
Defendant’s sole strategy at the hearing was to attack Cash’s credibility by challenging his factual rendition of the events surrounding the stop and warrantless search of the vehicle in which defendant was riding. Defendant did not testify, nor did he present any other witnesses, such as the driver of the vehicle, who might have contradicted Cash’s testimony. Such testimony certainly may have influenced the court’s decision, particularly on the issue of whether Cash had consent to search the vehicle.3 For instance, even though *653defendant acknowledged and Cash testified that the driver gave “consent,” the court did not seem to rely much on their statements. Rather, the court expressly noted that, because the driver of the car did not testify and because neither party raised the issue of whether the driver actually consented, it would have to “assume” that consent was given. To me, that statement reflects uncertainty surrounding the court’s conclusion and casts doubt on the majority’s proposition that the court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress was a virtual certainty regardless of whether defendant was represented by counsel.
The majority also attaches significance to the fact that defendant’s counsel, appointed after the suppression hearing, failed to challenge at trial the court’s ruling on the motion to suppress:
“[Defendant’s] counsel never argued that defendant had failed to advance all of the plausible bases for suppression that competent counsel would have, or had failed to argue the bases that were raised as effectively or persuasively as defense counsel would have.” 135 Or App at 650.
I fail to understand how, if defendant’s counsel was “not required to revisit the suppression issue [at trial],” 135 Or App at 647 n 2, as the majority claims, that counsel’s failure to do so can later become fatal to defendant’s case. But the majority opinion does, in fact, hold counsel to that higher standard.4
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that had defendant been represented, the motion to suppress would not have turned out differently. Because the state’s conviction was so dependent on the outcome of the suppression hearing, I cannot say that there is little likelihood that the error in accepting defendant’s invalid waiver of counsel at *654that hearing affected the verdict. Therefore, I would conclude that the error is not harmless and would reverse defendant’s conviction.5 See State v. Fiala, 107 Or App 193, 810 P2d 1344 (1991) (reversing conviction after trial court accepted invalid waiver of counsel); State v. Carter, 107 Or App 48, 810 P2d 872 (1991) (same).
I respectfully dissent.

 The harmless error analysis has traditionally been cast as a two-part inquiry of whether (1) there is substantial and convincing evidence of guilt, and (2) little, if any, likelihood that the error affected the verdict. See State v. Walton, 311 Or 223, 230-31, 809 P2d 81 (1991). Since Williams, the court has continued to apply the two-part test, but has nevertheless recognized that it is “equally possible” to collapse the analysis to the single inquiry that both the majority and I have set forth in our opinions. State v. Parker, 317 Or 225, 234 n 10, 855 P2d 636 (1993).

 Cash noted that defendant twice made furtive gestures, as if placing something beneath the passenger seat. Cash also testified that defendant appeared to be “extremely agitated, verbally abusive, perspiring and * * * nervous” during the course of the stop.

 The court denied defendant’s motion on the ground that Cash had consent to search the vehicle:
“As far as the motion to suppress!,] after the consent came in, [the officer] had authority to go ahead and search that car. He finds that gun there.”

 Furthermore, unlike the majority, I do not consider defendant’s failure on appeal to challenge the court’s ruling on the motion to be of much significance, either. Had defendant attempted to raise new grounds in support of his motion to suppress, we likely would have declined to consider them, because they were not presented to the trial court. ORAP 5.45(2); see State v. Hickman, 273 Or 358, 540 P2d 1406 (1975). Aside from presenting his original arguments again, the only other argument defendant could have possibly raised in challenging the court’s ruling on the motion to suppress is the same argument that has been presented in this appeal; i.e. that the court’s erroneous deprivation of his right to counsel tainted the entire proceeding and requires reversal of the court’s ruling on the motion to suppress.

 Because I resolve this issue on state constitutional grounds, I need not address whether defendant’s right to counsel under the federal constitution was violated.