Court Opinion

ID: 9375896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 14:06:37.061599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.929097
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Dixon, 2023-Ohio-587.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                            :      APPEAL NO. C-220234
                                                  TRIAL NO. B-0803781
         Plaintiff-Appellee,               :

   VS.                                     :        O P I N I O N.

 MYRA DIXON,                               :

       Defendant-Appellant.                :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 1. 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, Judge.

       {¶1}    Myra Dixon appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Court of

Common Pleas denying her motion to seal the record of her conviction for child

endangering. Because Dixon has failed to demonstrate any error in the proceedings

below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                      I. Background Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}      In 2008, Dixon pleaded guilty to child endangering in violation of R.C.

2919.22(A), a first-degree misdemeanor that contains as an element that the victim

was under the age of 18. In February 2022, Dixon applied for the sealing of the record

of that conviction and did not indicate the age of her child victim in her application.

       {¶3}    The state filed an objection to Dixon’s application to seal on the ground

that the victim of the offense was under one year of age. R.C. 2953.36(A)(7) in relevant

part prohibits record sealing where the victim of the first-degree misdemeanor offense

in question was under the age of 16.

       {¶4}    After a hearing, the trial court denied the application to seal. In its

entry, the trial court relayed that it had reviewed “the defendant’s application for

expungement, objections of [the state], the arguments of the parties, and the report of

the probation department.” The court further indicated that, “[i]f Ohio law were to

change in a manner that would render [Dixon] eligible for the sought after relief, then

this denial is without prejudice to refiling.”

       {¶5}    Dixon now appeals, arguing in her sole assignment of error that the trial

court erred by denying her motion to seal. She does not dispute that she would be

statutory ineligible if the state demonstrated that the victim of her offense was under

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the age of 16. She contends the record does not demonstrate that she was ineligible

based on the age of the victim.

                                     II. Analysis

       {¶6}   The sealing of records of a conviction is a privilege not a right. State v.

Sager, 2019-Ohio-135, 131 N.E.3d 335, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). The proceedings following the

filing of the application to seal are designed to elicit the facts. See State v. Hamilton,

75 Ohio St.3d 636, 640, 665 N.E.2d 669 (1996) (“[T]he essential purpose of an

expungement hearing is to provide a reviewing court with all relevant information

bearing on an applicant’s eligibility for expungement. Advocacy is subordinated to

information gathering.”); State v. Simon, 87 Ohio St.3d 531, 533, 721 N.E.2d 1041

(2000).

       {¶7}   Whether an offender is statutorily eligible is a threshold question of law

that depends upon the particular facts of the case. State v. Patterson, 128 Ohio App.3d

174, 177, 714 N.E.2d 409 (1st Dist.1998). This appeal involves that threshold issue.

       {¶8}   The indictment and other documents from the proceedings resulting in

the child-endangering conviction do not specify the age of the child. But the state

asserted in its objection to Dixon’s application to seal that Dixon was not eligible

because the victim was under the age of one. The trial court was required to consider

that objection along with other information presented at the hearing on Dixon’s

application. See R.C. 2953.32(C)(1)(d). The record in this appeal, however, does not

contain a transcript from the hearing on Dixon’s application to seal.

       {¶9}   “Upon appeal of an adverse judgment, it is the duty of the appellant to

ensure that the record, or whatever portions thereof are necessary for the

determination of the appeal, are filed with the court in which [the appellant] seeks
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

review.” Rose Chevrolet v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 19, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988). If

there was no recording of the hearing or no transcript is available, an appellant may

file an appropriate substitute of the proceedings in accordance with App.R. 9. See

App.R. 9(C) and (D); Rose at 19. Dixon claims there was no recording of the hearing.

Despite this claim, the record reveals no attempt to take advantage of these provisions

affording an alternative to a transcript.

        {¶10} Generally, when the appellant has failed her in duty to ensure that this

court has the record necessary to the resolution of assigned errors, this court must

presume the regularity of the lower court’s proceedings and affirm the judgment of the

trial court. See, e.g., Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400

N.E.2d 384 (1980); Patterson, 128 Ohio App.3d at 177-178, 714 N.E.2d 409.

        {¶11} We presume regularity in the trial court proceedings and conclude

based on the record presented that Dixon was ineligible for sealing because her victim

was under the age of 16. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly denied Dixon’s

application to seal. Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                   III. Conclusion

        {¶12} We overrule Dixon’s assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

ZAYAS, P.J., and BERGERON, J., concur.
Please note:

        The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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