Court Opinion

ID: 9687195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:18:27.482411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.761764
License: Public Domain

T. K. Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Defendant appeals from his conviction for second-degree murder, and the majority affirms his conviction. I concur. The majority, however, purportedly declares a state statute unconstitutional, but holds that the error involved in applying the statute was harmless. I disagree that the statute is unconstitutional, but I concur in the result because I deem such declaration dicta in light of the holding of the majority.
I disagree with the majority’s declaration of unconstitutionality for several reasons. First, the application of the Equal Protection Clause to the statute is seriously flawed.
Second, the articulation of the disadvantage suffered by defendant, the loss of his right to trial by ambush or surprise, is a curious interpretation of equal protection at best and a perverse interpretation at worst. In the proper case, with the issue squarely before us, I would support a trial judge’s authority to require discovery from the defense with or without a statute.
Third, the majority factually errs in assuming *127that MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252, is the only means by which indigent defendants may obtain payment of subpoena and witness fees for their witnesses.
Finally, this state’s proud history of providing counsel, transcripts, witness fees, and other services for indigents, long before such terms were constitutionally compelled, is simply overlooked. MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 is one part of a broader statutory scheme, with a history dating at least to 1927, in which this state ordered services for indigent defendants. It seems inappropriate to condemn as "invidiously discriminatory” that which was clearly intended to provide a benefit for indigents.
Before these four specific points are addressed, a few general observations on the record in this case should be noted. The trial judge supplied defendant with approximately all he requested. Virtually open file discovery from the state was ordered. The trial judge ordered the taking of depositions from nine witnesses. The state police were involved in assisting the defense prior to the hearing giving rise to the claim of error. In my opinion, the record, properly characterized, supports the conclusion that defendant was in fact attempting to shift to the state the responsibility of locating and transporting the witnesses in question to the court for trial.
In other words, the burden of production and the responsibility for nonproduction of these witnesses under current Michigan law at the time of trial was being shifted to the state. It is difficult to understand how the state can be responsible for locating a witness, the identity of whom is not revealed.
On the record of the hearing, defense counsel specifically requested the use of the Secretary of State’s records, lein records, and whatever other *128computer-assisted means were available to locate the missing witnesses. Moreover, MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252, in its own terms, does not require the defendant or defense counsel to reveal the testimony of proposed witnesses. Further, the statute provides for the presence of the prosecutor when the trial judge issues his order, not necessarily when defendant’s showing of need is made.
Finally, as to preliminary matters, the majority states that the purpose of the statute is to protect public funds by assuring that no frivolous use of compulsory process by indigents occurs. That is one purpose of the statute. A second purpose is to insure that the county’s or state’s chief law enforcement officer, the prosecuting attorney or Attorney General, respectively, is aware of his or her obligation to require state or county agents to use due diligence to locate and produce the witnesses.
The majority also reasons as though the statutorily created res gestae witness rule with its judicially created interpretation did not exist. At the time of this trial, under Michigan case law, a failure to locate and produce an approved witness might well be excused only by a showing of due diligence.
While these points may be regarded as minor, they set the tone for the analysis of the four major issues as I see them.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION
It may seem undeniable to the majority that a defendant who is required to identify witnesses and make a showing of need in order to shift to the state the responsibility for locating and producing them is denied equal protection of the law, but, if it is so, more authority for that legal conclusion than Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12; 76 S *129Ct 585; 100 L Ed 891 (1956), is necessary. With one quote, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has,” 351 US 19, the majority declares the statute unconstitutional.
The majority appears to suggest that whatever advantage a defendant may obtain by adequate funding, the state must supply to the indigent defendant. That has never been the law, federally or in Michigan, and there is not a single case the majority can cite in Michigan and in the United States Supreme Court which so holds.
Given the limited holding of the majority, a lengthy recitation of "equality principle” cases is not justified. Let it suffice to point out some obvious limitations on the principle.
Compare Douglas v California, 372 US 353; 83 S Ct 814; 9 L ED 2d 811 (1963) (right to appointed counsel on first appeal of right), with Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600; 94 S Ct 2437; 41 L Ed 2d 341 (1974) (no right to appointed counsel on discretionary appeal to State Supreme Court).
Compare Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (right to appointed counsel at trial), with Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25; 92 S Ct 2006; 32 L Ed 2d 530 (1972) (right to appointed counsel at misdemeanor trial if incarceration is imposed as a penalty), and Scott v Illinois, 440 US 367; 99 S Ct 1158; 59 L Ed 2d 383 (1979) (no right to appointed counsel for trial of offense with maximum penalty of one year if punishment of incarceration has not been imposed).
Compare Griffin v Illinois, supra (right to transcript at state expense), with United States v MacCollom, 426 US 317; 96 S Ct 2086; 48 L Ed 2d 666 (1976) (denial of trial transcript for a collateral review is proper unless defendant makes a show*130ing that the claim is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed).
The more recent cases argued before the United States Supreme Court on an equal protection claim have been decided by an analysis sounding in due process.
In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660; 103 S CT 2064; 76 L Ed 2d 221 (1983) (wherein the Court holds that it is error to automatically revoke probation because the defendant could not pay his fine absent a determination that the defendant failed to make bona fide efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist), the Court cites the Douglas-Griffin line of cases and opts for a due process analysis of the issue, stating:
Whether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as "the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose . . . .” [461 US 666-667.]
Again, in Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68; 105 S Ct 1087; 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), wherein the Court held that, once a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the federal constitution requires that a state provide access to a psychiatrist’s assistance on the issue if the defendant is indigent (death penalty case), the Court discussed the Griffin-Douglas line of cases and stated that the common theme is meaningful access to justice, an adequate opportunity to present claims fairly within the adversary system, and *131the provision of the basic tools of an adequate defense. The Court announced a three-factor standard for analysis:
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. [470 US 77.]
The Court, in ruling, rested squarely on due process and declined to consider the applicability of the equal protection clause. 470 US 86-87.
Under the first factor of the Ake test, the private interest is the defendant’s strategic and tactical advantage in surprise. The majority treats as a judicially cognizable interest the defendant’s advantage in trial by ambush.
With regard to the second factor, the governmental interest is economy as well as defending against claims of failure of due diligence.
The third factor is inapposite on the facts of this case, a suggestion that pigeonholing this case into equal protection or due process analysis is probably incorrect. The obvious claim more readily available is the right to compulsory process already expressed in the Bill of Rights. See Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 Mich L Rev 191, 268-271 (1975). However, case law under such analysis will not support the majority’s finding of unconstitutionality.
Under Bearden, the analysis is similar. The indi-vidual interest is the defendant’s right to surprise, and the governmental interest is as indicated above.
The point of all this is to demonstrate that equal *132protection analysis simply will not support an application of the doctrine to the facts of this case. It is clear that in both Ake and Bearden, the test articulated is a classic due process balancing test. Just as clearly the articulation of a private or individual interest alone does not suffice. That interest or right must be legitimate in order to invoke a due process (or equal protection) analysis. See United States v Kahan, 415 US 239; 94 S Ct 1179; 39 L Ed 2d 297 (1974) (defendant’s pretrial false statements concerning indigency in seeking appointment of counsel used by government during the trial as evidence of consciousness of guilt; and, against a claim of violation of the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause and Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel clause, the majority refused to judicially recognize a right to lie with impunity). I would hold, simply, that defendant had no judicially cognizable claim to trial by surprise or ambush.
Moreover, the majority alludes to the change in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to provide for an ex parte application on facts similar to our facts. In United States v Eskridge, 456 F2d 1202 (CA 9, 1972), cert den 409 US 883 (1972), a federal trial judge ordered the fbi to secure statements from the defense witnesses listed prior to granting the application. The witnesses were cross-examined at trial by the government with use of their statements. The ninth circuit held that the error, if any, was harmless because of the absence of a showing of prejudice or that defendant’s substantial rights were in any way affected by that process.
Eskridge occurs in a federal system wherein discovery is still largely a matter of governmental grace as compared to the system in the state which provides in large part for virtually open-file *133discovery and, until recently, had a res gestae witness rule, unique in the legal universe, which required the state to endorse and produce all witnesses to any element of the offense, or, as alternatively stated by some opinions, necessary to provide the whole of the transaction and to prevent any false charge or miscarriage of justice. 1A Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 343, p 111.
Finally, it is clear that a defendant can be required to make a showing of particularized need in order to support his request for the production of witnesses, Westen, supra, p 266.
II. THE TRIAL JUDICIARY
Our Supreme Court, in People v Maranian, 359 Mich 361, 368; 102 NW2d 568 (1960), stated:
Discovery will be ordered in all criminal cases, when, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, the thing to be inspected is admissible in evidence and a failure of justice may result from its suppression.
Further, in People v Johnson, 356 Mich 619, 628; 97 NW2d 739 (1959), the Court stated:
We are aware, of course, that appellant’s claim in the instant case is founded upon no Michigan rule or statute. We believe the discretion we speak of [to compel discovery] is found in the inherent power of the trial court to control the admission of evidence so as to promote the interests of justice. [Emphasis added.]
There is simply no principled analysis by which such trial court discretion and inherent power can be limited to be of service only to the defendant.
*134A committee appointed by the Michigan Supreme Court has worked for several years in the formulation of proposed rules of criminal procedure. Those rules have been published and are before the Supreme Court for adoption. Subchapter 6.200 deals with discovery, and rules 6.201 through 6.214 basically provide for virtual open-file discovery for the defense and a broad form of discovery for the prosecution.
In my view, there is no reasonable argument that can be made against granting the state all discovery not prohibited by the United States Constitution. The proposed rules fall short under such standard, but they are a reasonable accommodation of competing interests. Proposed MCR 6.205 would cover the facts of the instant case and make all information supplied by defendant in this case a subject of mandatory disclosure.
Clearly no constitutional right is implicated in requiring such disclosure. See, in general, Williams v Florida, 399 US 78; 90 S Ct 1893; 26 L Ed 2d 446 (1970), United States v Nobles, 422 US 225; 95 S Ct 2160; 45 L Ed 2d 141 (1975), Fisher v United States, 425 US 391; 96 S Ct 1569; 48 L Ed 2d 39 (1976), and United States v Doe, 465 US 605; 104 S Ct 1237; 79 L Ed 2d 552 (1984).
The primary purpose for the criminal trial is the search for truth. Accuracy in fact-finding is critical. Fairness is an objective, as well, along with the timely, expeditious disposition of cases. The avoidance of surprise is a factor.
The creation of rules to insure that the judicial system in its handling of criminal cases assures that all these objectives are most likely to be realized is an advance in criminal justice. A system of reciprocal discovery which facilitates the full presentation of all material factual and legal claims in an expeditious manner while according *135the defendant all that fundamental fairness requires and more likely leads to the fair ascertainment of truth cannot be opposed on the basis of any rational principle known to this writer.
The argument opposed is well articulated in the majority opinion. The majority apparently believes in the sporting theory of justice — that a defendant ought to be given a fair opportunity to beat the case even if he can do this only by surprise or ambush.
Clearly, the United States Constitution does not require this result. Why should it be the policy of this state?
In Taylor v Illinois, 484 US —; 108 S Ct 646; 98 L Ed 2d 798 (1988), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the preclusion of the testimony of a defense witness on the grounds of a violation of the discovery order was not a violation of the right of compulsory process at least where the discovery violation was wilful and motivated by the desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence. The Court stated:
The integrity of the adversary process, which depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable evidence; the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice; and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process must also weigh in the balance ....
After all, the court, as well as the prosecutor, has a vital interest in protecting the trial process from the pollution of perjured testimony. [108 S Ct 655-657.]
The Court was unanimous in approving discov*136ery for the prosecution. A three-justice dissent, authored by Justice Brennan, would hold that
absent evidence of defendant’s personal involvement in a discovery violation, the Compulsory Process Clause per se bars discovery sanctions that exclude criminal defense evidence. [108 S Ct 658.]
The flaw of the majority opinion in this case is the legitimization of surprise. Surprise, in fact, may offer a strategic or tactical advantage, but it ought not be recognized as legitimate in any enlightened system of jurisprudence. Surprise used to perpetrate a lie on an unprepared adversary ought to be condemned as a practice, and trial courts have, or ought to have, the inherent power to prevent it.
To base a claim of equal protection upon the refusal to allow an indigent defendant to surprise his adversary simply because a person of means might be able to do so is an insult to the constitution. The gravamen of the argument is that there is a judicially cognizable right to trial by ambush. I would not so hold, and no case from this state or from the United States Supreme Court ever has.
III. MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 — THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The majority treats MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 as the exclusive means by which an indigent defendant can procure state payment of subpoena and witness fees. This is simply factually incorrect. MCL 767.32; MSA 28.972 provides:
The clerk of any county in which an indictment shall be found, upon the application of the defendant, and without requiring any fees, shall issue subpoenas as well during the sitting of any court as in vacation, for such witnesses as the defendant *137may require, whether residing in or out of the county.
MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 and MCL 767.32; MSA 28.972 have existed simultaneously in the compiled laws since 1929. Both statutes have legislative forerunners at least as old as 1897.
As long ago as 1908, our Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require that service and witness fees, as well as mileage, need not be paid in advance in criminal cases, but only after trial. Chase v Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 154 Mich 271; 117 NW 660 (1908).
Clearly, relief for an indigent from the costs of service and witness fees is obtainable without any required disclosure at all.
The proper interpretation of MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 would be that it has several purposes, the safeguarding of the treasury being only one. The statute contemplates the shifting of the responsibility for location and service of witnesses onto the state, even though such witnesses are not res gestae witnesses under the old law. There is a clearly legitimate state objective in requiring the court to issue the order for service in the presence of the prosecuting attorney since such officer, under the law in existence until recently, would bear the burden of production in court or be required to explain nonproduction by a standard of due diligence.
Such a contest about burdens and responsibilities was exactly what was being debated at the pretrial hearing.
IV. MICHIGAN HISTORY
Before the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to counsel as fundamental, Powell *138v Alabama, 287 US 45; 53 S Ct 55; 77 L Ed 158 (1932) (at least in death penalty cases with special circumstances), and guaranteed it in federal trials, Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938), and later denied it as a fundamental part of due process, Betts v Brady, 316 US 455; 62 S Ct 1252; 86 L Ed 1595 (1942) (only overruled by Gideon, supra, in 1963), the state legislature had provided for such right in Michigan. MCL 775.16; MSA 28.1253, and see 1927 PA 175.
Judges in this state were appointing lawyers for indigent defendants charged with serious felonies as early as 1850, see Bacon v Wayne Co, 1 Mich 461 (1850).
The clear legislative forerunner for MCL 775.16; MSA 28.1253 dates back at least to 1893 PA 96, authorizing trial judges to appoint counsel in felony cases and fixing the compensation.
Michigan does not stand out only for appointment of counsel for indigents. It was the first jurisdiction in the world to prohibit the death penalty. It occupied a unique position in its res gestae witness rule rejected by all other jurisdictions. 7 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), §§2079-2080 pp 536-544; 23 CJS, Criminal Law, § 1017, p 1094. Without regard to the wisdom in these and other policies, it appears clear that this state, through its constitution, its Legislature, and its courts, has always adopted an extremely sensitive approach to the rights of criminal defendants in general and indigent defendants in particular.
There is no justification for declaring unconstitutional a statute intended to facilitate services for indigent defendants at least on the basis of the record in this case.
V. SUMMARY
There is no authority to support the majority’s *139finding that MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 is unconstitutional. Moreover, the disadvantage allegedly suffered by defendant, the inability to surprise the state with his unidentified witnesses, is not a judicially cognizable right subject to equal protection.
In my opinion, the trial judiciary in this state has inherent power to order discovery in favor of the state so long as neither the Constitution of the United States nor the State of Michigan is offended. The action of the trial judge would have been proper without the authorization of MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252.
A system of reciprocal discovery which facilitates the full presentation of all material factual and legal claims in an expeditious manner while according the defendant all that fundamental fairness requires and more likely leads to the fair ascertainment of truth and the prevention of perjury and surprise, if it is not presently the judicial policy of the State of Michigan, ought to be so.
Parallel provisions in the law, such as the clerk’s statute, make the claim of unconstitutionality frivolous. There simply is nothing in this particular statute, the statutory scheme of which it is a part, or the history of recognition of equal protection rights for indigent defendants in this state which justifies the majority’s opinion today.
The trial judge’s interpretation and application of MCL 775.15; MSA 28.1252 was not erroneous.