Court Opinion

ID: 9847302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:25.878903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:06.618127
License: Public Domain

Judge Britt
dissenting:
The effect of the majority opinion is to say that if at trial petitioner offers competent evidence commensurate with her showing at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, she would be entitled to go to the jury on her contention that E. C. Bryson holds the D. R. Bryson homeplace in trust for the benefit of petitioner and other tenants in common of the 12 acre tract. I respectfully disagree.
At the hearing, the following undisputed facts were shown: Petitioner and her cotenants regarded the homeplace as a parcel of land completely separate and apart from the 12 acre tract. In November 1958, petitioner recommended “that Edith be given a deed and title to her portion of Uncle Doc’s estate.” On 6 May 1961, petitioner and the other tenants in common (together with their spouses) executed a deed for the homeplace to Mrs. Franklin describing the same by courses and distances. Thereafter, a Mr. Cope contacted Mrs. Franklin about purchasing the home-*268place; she then contacted E. C. Bryson and advised him that she was seriously considering selling the homeplace. E. C. Bryson called Mrs. Franklin immediately and inquired if she would sell to him and the price she was demanding. She agreed to sell to E. C. Bryson for $10,000 and a few days thereafter she received a check from him in the amount of $10,000 together with a deed for the property for her to execute. The deed to E. C. Bryson was executed on 16 May 1962, duly filed for registration, and the check accepted in payment for the land.
Petitioner makes no allegation or showing that she has at any time made any offer to pay E. C. Bryson any part of the purchase price which he paid Mrs. Franklin for the property; she makes no allegation or showing that at any time prior to the filing of her petition herein on 19 January 1970 that she ever claimed any interest whatsoever in the homeplace. Petitioner alleges that E. C. Bryson holds the homeplace in trust for her and the other tenants in common of the 12 acre tract; the four tenants in common, other than petitioner and E. G. Bryson, deny that they own any interest in the homeplace. Petitioner’s contention that the 12 acre tract is “landlocked” and its sale value is greatly diminished by excluding the home tract is not borne out by the maps introduced by petitioner at the hearing. The maps disclose that the 12 acre tract is bordered on one end by a new highway and street; they also disclose that various other owners own considerable property between the 12 acre tract and Everett Street thereby making them prospective pur-chasérs.
Neither party has cited nor does our research disclose any case from this jurisdiction similar to the instant case. The case of Brickell v. Earley, 115 Pa. 473, 8 Atl. 623 (1887) appears to be somewhat similar and in denying relief as demanded by petitioner herein, the Pennsylvania court said: “In order to sustain a proposition of this kind, the plaintiffs are bound to show that [defendant] obtained his title in fraud of their right, or that their money was used in its acquisition.” The undisputed facts in the instant case do not meet this sound principle. To accept petitioner’s position would impose an unreasonable duty and burden on a tenant in common.
I vote to affirm the judgment appealed from.