Court Opinion

ID: 9863395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 04:16:26.100438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:51.100598
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
This voluminous record, culminating in the trial court’s entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of defendant Provident, *80contains substantial evidence that Saye’s condition was the genetically derived sickness known as Dupuytren’s contracture, and not an occupationally induced injury. In light of this record, any error in the erroneous admission of one document containing Saye’s admission that he suffered from a “sickness” was cumulative and therefore harmless. Even if we were to consider the issue to be Saye’s admission concerning his condition rather than the condition itself, moreover, this was cumulative given other evidence that throughout the several years during which he collected over $16,000 a month in disability payments, he and Provident repeatedly agreed that his condition was indeed a “sickness.” I therefore respectfully dissent to Division 4 of the majority opinion and to its reversal of the trial court’s entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict.
As the majority itself states, the issue before this jury was a simple one: “whether Saye’s disability was caused by injury, sickness, or a combination of injury and sickness.” (p. 75). This jury was shown detailed evidence that (a) Dupuytren’s contracture is a genetic condition (Saye’s mother also suffered from it); (b) that it predominantly affects white men of Scandinavian or Northern European descent (like Saye); (c) it typically develops in the fifth decade of life (Saye was 53 or 54 years old when he first experienced symptoms); and (d) it affects either or both hands, without regard to which is dominant (Saye’s case began in his right hand but soon developed in his left as well). In short, there was abundant evidence before this jury, apart from any statement or admission Saye may have made to this effect, to support its determination that Saye’s disability was caused by a hereditary disease rather than a job injury.
In light of this extensive evidence that Saye suffered a sickness rather than an injury, a one-word confirmation of this conclusion in response to a telephone representative’s question was cumulative, and any error arising from its admission harmless. Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 601-602 (642 SE2d 28) (2007) (any error arising from admission of hearsay evidence was harmless because “cumulative of legally admissible evidence showing the same fact”). The majority’s assertion to the contrary — that the fact at issue here is whether “Saye himself admitted that his condition is a sickness” (p. 79) — wrongly conflates a lawyer’s dispute over the admissibility of a single piece of evidence into the ultimate factual issue properly before this jury.
Finally, and even if we were to accept the majority’s characterization of Saye’s admission as the critical issue, the record shows that throughout the years during which he collected over $16,000 a month in disability payments, either Saye or his physician denied that his condition was job-related, characterized it as the “disease” known as “Dupuytren’s contracture” and never objected to Provi*81dent’s characterization of it in the same way. Only on June 9, 2004, five days after he was notified that he had received his last check, did Saye claim for the first time that his condition was caused not by sickness, but by “repetitive hand motion, vibration, and muscle strain experienced during his career as a surgeon.”
Decided June 24, 2011
Reconsideration denied July 18, 2011
Harris, Penn & Lowry, Jeffrey R. Harris, Darren W. Penn, Stephen G. Lowry, Jed D. Mantón, for appellant.
Smith, Moore & Leatherwood, H. Sanders Carter, Jr., Nikole M. Crow, for appellee.
Because of any new trial’s risk and cost, our law has long insisted that a party seeking a new trial “must show harm as well as error to prevail on appeal.” Great Western Bank v. Davis, 203 Ga. App. 473, 475 (3) (416 SE2d 899) (1992) (no reversible error where contents of document put into evidence through testimony but document not allowed). There is no reasonable justification for the majority’s voiding of a jury’s verdict after a trial resulting in more than a thousand pages of transcript alone. I therefore dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Dillard joins in this dissent.