Court Opinion

ID: 9549342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:16:36.727521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:10.424290
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
specially concurring:
Although I agree the judgment of dismissal should be reversed, I do not agree with the majority’s construction of section 18-l-405(6)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), and the counterpart rule of criminal proce*1363dure, Crim.P. 48(b)(6)(V).1 I read the majority opinion to hold that, once a mistrial is declared, section 18-l-405(6)(e) requires that there be excluded from the statutory speedy trial period of six months, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), a reasonable period of time up to three months. The effect of this holding is that the defendant’s statutory speedy trial right is now measured by a reasonable period of delay within the three month post-mistrial term plus any unexpired amount of time remaining on the initial six month statutory term. I believe this construction results not only in substantial uncertainty in the computation of the defendant’s statutory speedy trial right but also unnecessarily complicates the administration of already overburdened criminal dockets in many trial courts throughout the state. I therefore would read section 18-l-405(6)(e) to grant the state a flat three month period within which to retry a defendant following a mistrial, and to require a dismissal of the pending charges if the retrial is not held within this period.2
The trial court’s judgment of dismissal and the majority opinion are based upon a construction of the statutory speedy trial provisions of section 18-1-405. We are not dealing, therefore, with an interpretation or application of the constitutional right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the United States and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const. Amend. VI and XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 16.3 Subsection (1) of section 18-1-405 states, in pertinent part:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a defendant is not brought to trial ... within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, ... the pending charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense, or for another offense *1364based upon the same act or series of acts arising out of the same criminal episode.”
Subsection (6)(e) of section 18-1-405 provides as follows:
“(6) In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the following periods of time shall be excluded:
* * * * * *
(e) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial.”
Although the statutory language of subsection (6)(e) might be susceptible at first glance to a construction which treats a reasonable post-mistrial delay not in excess of three months as a temporary tolling of the six month statutory period in subsection (1), I believe such construction gives rise to adverse consequences of uncertainty and administrative complexity which militate against grafting on to the speedy trial statute the construction adopted by the majority. Instead of interpreting subsection (6)(e) as excluding a reasonable period of delay from the six month statutory term in subsection (1), I would read subsection (6)(e) as excluding the three month mistrial period from the statutory speedy trial bar of subsection (1). This construction is in accord with what I perceive to be the overriding legislative intent in enacting subsection (6)(e): to create a new speedy trial period of three months upon the occasion of a mistrial. A number of reasons justify this construction.
A statutory construction which results in the creation of a new three month period for retrial after a mistrial permits an application of speedy trial standards in a manner consistent with the overriding statutory scheme. Where a case is set for trial within six months from arraignment, as required by section 18-1-405(1), and the case is thereafter continued over the defendant’s objection to a later date within the six month statutory term, it is unnecessary to consider the reasonableness of the delay caused by the continuance in resolving whether the defendant has been accorded his statutory right to a speedy trial. As long as the trial commences within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not guilty, no statutory violation occurs. So too, here, consistency in statutory interpretation requires that the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial following a mistrial should be measured by whether the retrial commences within a period “not to exceed three months” following the mistrial. Section 18-l-405(6)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8).4
Furthermore, the statute itself does not qualify the three month post-mistrial period with the “reasonable delay” concept adopted by the majority. That the statute does not do so is some evidence, in my opinion, that the legislature perceived a mistrial as a critical event which creates a new statutory period of time within which the defendant must be retried or the charges against him dismissed.
Finally, the creation of a new post-mistrial period of three months is simply a recognition of the practical impossibility involved in attempting to determine what reasonable nexus, if any, there might be between a mistrial and a period of ensuing delay, for purposes of excluding this period from the initial six month statutory speedy trial term. Generally, delays following a mistrial are not so much the result of the mistrial as they are the product of complexities incident to rescheduling a trial within the busy schedules of trial courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and witnesses. Granting the state a new three month period of time after a mistrial to retry a defendant puts the court, the prosecution and the defense on notice of their respective *1365rights and responsibilities. The majority’s “reasonable delay” standard and its reversion to the initial six month term as the measure of the defendant’s speedy trial rights only create additional uncertainty in those cases where the retrial cannot be commenced on the first scheduled date within the post-mistrial period. This is precisely the uncertainty which confronted the trial court in this particular case in its efforts to resolve the defendant’s motion to dismiss. A categorical three month period would eliminate this uncertainty and, additionally, would provide trial courts with needed flexibility in the administration of their busy dockets.
Because the defendant’s rescheduled trial date of September 28, 1981, was within three months of the declaration of a mistrial on July 1, 1981, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case to the trial court with directions to commence a trial with all speed necessary to comply with the three month term of section 18-l-405(6)(e).
Justices ROVIRA and DUBOFSKY have authorized me to state that they join in this special concurrence.

. Crim.P. 48(b)(6) provides as follows:
“In computing the time within which a defendant shall be brought to trial as provided in subsection (b)(1) of this Rule, the following periods of time shall be excluded:
* * * * * *
“(V) The period of delay caused by any mistrial, not to exceed three months for each mistrial.”
The rule was promulgated after the legislature enacted section 18-l-405(6)(e), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8), and is identical in all respects with the statute. Because the terms of the statute and the rule are identical, the resolution of the speedy trial issue in this case is the same whether the analysis proceeds from the statute, the rule, or both.

. There may be some circumstances, not present here, where the three month period may be extended, such as where the defendant requests a continuance.

. Among the interests underlying the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial are the defendant’s right to be free from the anxiety accompanying a public accusation and society’s need for a speedy and final determination of criminal charges. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 86 S.Ct. 773, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966); Simakis v. District Court, 194 Colo. 436, 577 P.2d 3 (1978); Jaramillo v. District Court, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P.2d 1219 (1971). The constitutional right to a speedy trial is not limited in scope to compliance with the speedy trial statute. Rather, even if the defendant is brought to trial within the statutory term, he may still assert a constitutional violation, upon which he bears the burden of proof. Gelfand v. People, 196 Colo. 487, 586 P.2d 1331 (1978); Potter v. District Court, 186 Colo. 1, 525 P.2d 429 (1974); Casias v. People, 160 Colo. 152, 415 P.2d 344 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 979, 87 S.Ct. 523, 17 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966). Because the constitutional right to a speedy trial is “a more vague concept than other procedural rights,” the United States Supreme Court has balanced the following four factors in determining whether the right has been violated in a particular case: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, supra; see also People v. Small, 631 P.2d 148 (Colo.1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1101, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1982). The Supreme Court in Barker v. Win-go, supra, recognized that the states are free to prescribe a more precise method of resolving the speedy trial issue. Section 18-1-405 is designed to render the constitutional guarantee effective and to provide a method of enforcement. E.g., Sweet v. Myers, Colo., 612 P.2d 75 (1980); P.V. v. District Court, Colo., 609 P.2d 110 (1980).

. In each instance, notwithstanding the commencement of the trial within the statutory period of time, the defendant may assert that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, and that issue will be resolved on the basis of the balancing test promulgated in Barker v. Wingo, supra n. 3, a determination quite independent of the consideration in measuring the defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial under section 18-1 — 405.