Court Opinion

ID: 9352353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 21:00:31.711043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:23.123652
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4576

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TERRELL ANDERSON,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:20−cr−00033−IMK−MJA−1)

        Submitted: October 5, 2022                                        Decided: January 4, 2023

        Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: L. Richard Walker, First Assistant Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Zoey Vilasuso, Law
        Student Intern, United States Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, WEST VIRGINIA
        UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellant. William
        Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, David J. Perri, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               In response to a disturbance at a local motel, Bridgeport West Virginia Police

        Department (“BPD”) officers searched and ultimately arrested Terrell Anderson, who was

        later convicted of one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). Anderson appeals the district court’s denial of his

        motion to suppress evidence seized during his encounter with the officers, including

        thousands of dollars of cash and his cell phone. He argues that the officers detained him

        without evidence that he had committed or was committing a crime. We hold that the

        officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they detained Anderson, and

        that the district court properly denied his motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the

        district court’s judgment.

                                                     I.

               On January 4, 2020, BPD received a 911 call about a disturbance at a local motel.

        Samantha Hoover, the caller, reported that her friend, Anderson, was banging on Hoover’s

        motel door and that Hoover wanted him to leave. After receiving this information from

        dispatch, Officer Aaron Lantz went to the motel and found Anderson in the parking lot.

        Officer Lantz asked Anderson, who appeared visibly agitated, “what was going on.”

        Anderson responded that he wanted his belongings from Hoover’s car, but that Hoover

        refused to unlock it. Anderson thought that, with the officer’s assistance, he would be able

        to get his items from the car and leave.

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                Officer Cameron Turner arrived at the motel a few minutes after Officer Lantz.

        When Officer Turner arrived, Anderson was yelling and cursing in the parking lot. Officer

        Lantz asked Officer Turner to speak with Anderson while Officer Lantz talked to Hoover.

        Officer Turner guided Anderson, who was still visibly upset, away from Hoover’s motel

        door.   Anderson then repeatedly asked Officer Turner if Anderson could approach

        Hoover’s car. Officer Turner denied each of Anderson’s requests and ordered Anderson

        to stay near him. Anderson complied.

                Other uniformed officers also responded to Hoover’s 911 call. During the officers’

        investigation, Anderson threatened to break Hoover’s car window, and told Hoover that he

        would “see [her] at the house.” After Hoover arrived at the parking lot and opened her car

        door, the officers smelled marijuana. The officers received from Hoover consent to search

        her car and observed a marijuana paraphernalia device. During the officers’ interview with

        Hoover, she told the officers that Anderson had sold her and her family members

        marijuana.    The officers also interviewed a minor girl who had spent the night in

        Anderson’s motel room and who was holding marijuana that Anderson had given her.

        Finally, the officers found about $3,120 in cash in Anderson’s sock. Although none of the

        officers physically restrained Anderson, each testified that Anderson was not free to leave

        during any part of the encounter.

                After the officers completed their investigation, the officers arrested Anderson for

        possession with intent to deliver marijuana. During the search incident to arrest, the

        officers seized Anderson’s cell phone. Later, BPD officers searched Anderson’s cell phone

        and found sexually explicit photographs and videos of the minor girl who had spent the

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        night in Anderson’s motel room. On August 5, 2020, a grand jury returned a one-count

        indictment against Anderson for possession of child pornography.

               Anderson moved to suppress evidence of the cash and evidence from the officers’

        later search of his cell phone, arguing in relevant part that the officers lacked reasonable

        articulable suspicion to detain him. The district court denied Anderson’s motion. 1 The

        court concluded that Anderson consented to part of the initial interaction with the officers,

        and that the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The court

        also found that the prolonged investigative detention was supported by the officers’

        reasonable suspicion. After a jury found Anderson guilty, the district court sentenced him

        to 60 months’ imprisonment. Anderson appealed the court’s denial of his motion to

        suppress.

                                                     II.

               On appeal, Anderson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

        suppress the cash seized and the evidence from his phone because the officers lacked

        reasonable suspicion to detain him. We disagree.

               1
                The district court referred Anderson’s motion to suppress to a magistrate judge
        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The magistrate judge held a suppression hearing and
        issued a report and recommendation (R&R), recommending that the district court deny
        Anderson’s motion. Anderson objected to the R&R. Following briefing on Anderson’s
        objection, the district court adopted the R&R, overruled Anderson’s objections, and denied
        his motion to suppress.

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               In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual

        findings for clear error and the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, including the

        court’s determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed. United States v. Pulley,

        987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021); United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 410 (4th Cir.

        2008). We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before

        the district court, here, the government, and give weight to permissible inferences drawn

        by the law enforcement officers. United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.

        2020); Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376. We will not reverse a lower court’s factual findings “simply

        because [we] would have decided the case differently.” Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376. Rather,

        we consider “whether, on the entire evidence, [we are] left with the definite and firm

        conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wooden, 693

        F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 2012)).

               Anderson contends that the officers detained him without reasonable suspicion of

        criminal activity, and argues that the district court did not identify any criminal activity

        that was occurring or had occurred before his detention. The government counters that the

        officers’ initial interaction with Anderson was consensual, and that Anderson was not

        detained until Officer Turner told Anderson to sit on the walkway of the motel. The

        government also argues that, even if the officers detained Anderson at the beginning of the

        encounter, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring or had

        occurred based on Anderson’s loud behavior and “potential for domestic violence.” We

        agree with the government that the officers did not immediately detain Anderson, and

        conclude that Officer Turner detained Anderson at the point that he prevented Anderson

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        from approaching Hoover’s car. We nevertheless hold that the detention was lawful

        because Officer Turner had reasonable suspicion that Anderson was engaging in criminal

        activity when Officer Turner detained him.

               The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and

        seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure occurs when an officer uses physical force or

        a show of authority to restrain or terminate an individual’s freedom of movement through

        means intentionally applied. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007); Brower v.

        Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). If an officer “do[es] not show an unambiguous

        intent to restrain or when an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority

        takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we consider whether “in view of all [of] the

        circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he

        was not free to leave.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2013)

        (alteration in original) (first quoting United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir.

        1989) and then quoting Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255).

               When an individual is detained pursuant to a Terry 2 stop, the detention is lawful if

        the officer has a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person

        stopped of criminal activity,” based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together

        with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Black, 707

        F.3d at 539 (first quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009) and

        then quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Reasonable suspicion requires less proof than a

               2
                   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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        preponderance of the evidence and is a less demanding standard than probable cause.

        United States v. Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2022). We consider an officer’s

        determination that reasonable suspicion exists by evaluating the totality of the

        circumstances, and “give due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in

        light of their experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th

        Cir. 2004).

               Here, Anderson was not immediately detained when the officers arrived. When

        Officer Lantz arrived at the motel, he parked in the middle of the parking lot, got out of his

        car, and asked Anderson “what was going on.” Anderson responded and explained that he

        wanted to get his belongings from Hoover’s car. During this initial interaction, Officer

        Lantz did not tell Anderson he was not free to leave, nor did Officer Lantz demonstrate an

        intent to restrain Anderson through physical force or show of authority. Although Officer

        Lantz arrived in his police car and was in uniform, the remaining evidence before us

        demonstrates that this initial encounter was consensual. See United States v. Jones, 678

        F.3d 293, 302 (4th Cir. 2012).

               Nonetheless, some encounters with police “that start out as constitutional may . . .

        at some unspecified point, cross the line and become an unconstitutional seizure.” Santos

        v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 725 F.3d 451, 462 (4th Cir. 2013) (omission and

        alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).

        In this case, the consensual encounter became a seizure when Officer Turner denied

        Anderson’s requests to walk away from the officer to go to Hoover’s car. Officer Turner

        told Anderson that he had to stay with him, and Anderson complied. See id. (finding that

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        “the consensual encounter became a Fourth Amendment seizure when [the deputy sheriff]

        gestured for [the defendant] to remain seated” and the defendant complied).

               We hold, however, that this seizure was lawful. Officer Turner had encountered a

        “disturbance in progress” at a motel where “an irate male [had been] banging on the doors

        and windows trying to get in.” Officer Turner also knew that the female guest in that motel

        room, later identified as Hoover, wanted the irate male, Anderson, to leave. When Officer

        Turner arrived at the motel, Anderson was in the parking lot and “was extremely upset,”

        “was yelling [and] cursing,” and “would[ not] listen to commands.” Because Anderson

        “was visibly upset towards” Hoover, Officer Turner guided Anderson away from Hoover’s

        door and later, in response to Anderson’s requests to move toward Hoover’s car, ordered

        Anderson to stay near him instead. Based on the information Officer Turner received

        before he got to the motel and the behavior he observed when he arrived, he was justified

        in concluding that Anderson had committed or may have been committing the crime of

        disorderly conduct. See W. Va. Code § 61-6-1b(a) (outlining criminal penalties for anyone

        who “in a . . . public parking area, . . . disturbs the peace of others by . . . profane, indecent

        or boisterous conduct or language”). 3

               3
                  Anderson argues that, as a motel guest, he could lawfully “stand outside the door
        of a [m]otel room in an agitated state.” But Officer Turner found Anderson in the parking
        lot of the motel. Regardless of whether the motel parking lot constitutes a “public parking
        area” within the meaning of West Virginia’s disorderly conduct statute, see W. Va. Code
        § 61-6-1b(b)(3), it was objectively reasonable for Officer Turner to determine that
        Anderson, who was swearing and yelling in the motel parking lot about a nearby guest who
        had called 911 to report Anderson’s behavior, was subject to and was violating that law.
        See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61, 66 (2014) (holding that an objectively
        reasonable mistake of law can justify an investigatory stop).

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               In addition, after Anderson’s initial detention, the officers found other evidence that

        raised suspicion of criminal activity and, thus, supported Anderson’s continued detention.

        Anderson made statements about “see[ing Hoover] at the house” and breaking Hoover’s

        car window, which the officers perceived as threats. And the officers smelled marijuana

        inside Hoover’s car. After receiving Hoover’s consent to search her car, the officers found

        marijuana paraphernalia and learned from Hoover that Anderson had sold marijuana to

        Hoover and her family members.

               Meanwhile, other officers had interviewed the minor girl. The minor told the

        officers that she was fifteen, that she had spent the night with Anderson, that Anderson had

        asked her to hold and to hide a bag of his marijuana, and that Anderson sold marijuana.

        Because the officers had particularized information that Anderson had engaged in criminal

        activity, namely, possession with intent to distribute marijuana and contributing to the

        delinquency of a minor, the prolonged detention of Anderson was lawful. See United

        States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 338 (4th Cir. 2008).

               Based on the totality of these circumstances, we hold that Officer Turner had

        reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify Anderson’s initial detention, and that

        the officers did not exceed the permissible scope of the stop.

                                                     III.

               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Anderson’s motion to

        suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                  AFFIRMED

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