Court Opinion

ID: 9643614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:35:41.718425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.945618
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
MORRISON, Judge.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing complains of that portion of our original opinion in which we discuss Dr. Mason’s testimony as follows:
“As a basis for his conclusion he testified, under cross-examition,. that the American Medical Association and the National Safety Council adopted standards of sobriety which he, as á scientist, accepts as being correct. He says if the concentration of alcohol in the fluid of the party from whom it is taken is greater than .15 per cent he is considered to be under the influence of alcohol.”
This, he says, is comparable to the use of medical textbooks as evidence, and he quotes many authorities, including our own Texas Supreme Court, as condemning the same. Bowles et al v. Bourbon et al, 219 S. W. 2d 779.
We do not so view the testimony. In 20 Am. Juris., Sec. 797, p. 669, we find the following:
*34“Experts, in giving opinion testimony may, however, refer to scientific authorities and state the result thereof. Such reference is not deemed an introduction of the books in evidence but as a corroboration of their own opinions.”
This, we think, disposes of appellant’s contentin.
Not as authority for this holding, but for the information of the legislature, we quote from the Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 129, No. 9, on page 631, the following:
“Since 1937 the committee created by the House (House of Delegates of the American Medical Association) to study problems of motor vehicle accident has studied carefully the relation of the action of alcohol to traffic accidents. In this study it has collaborated closely with the Committee on Tests for Intoxication of the National Safety Council. It has on several occasions recommended definite borderline limits for alcoholic influence in terms of amount of alcohol in the suspected drunken driver, and these limits have been approved by the House. In order to promote uniformity in state legislation in this field, the National Safety Council, through its Committee on Tests for Intoxication and with the active collaboration of the Bureau, has formulated a draft of a uniform bill which embodies the borderline limits approved by the House. .. . The draft, in form, is an amendment to section 54, act V, of the Uniform Vehicle Code, and reads (in part) as follows:
“Sec. 54.....
“(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subdivision (a) of this section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the amount of alcohol in the defendant’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant’s blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
“1. If there was at that time five-hundredths per cent or less by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
“2. If there was at that time in excess of five-hundredths per cent but less than fifteen-hundredths per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the defendant was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered *35with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant;
“3. If there was at that time fifteen-hundredths per cent or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
“4. The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”
The legislatures of the states of New York and Wisconsin have in recent years enacted statutes adopting the presumptions set out above.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this case in our original opinion herein, the appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.