Court Opinion

ID: 9947263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 15:06:49.849805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:17.921225
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-773

                               COFFEESHOP, LLC 1

                                       vs.

          ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES CONTROL COMMISSION & another. 2

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The plaintiff, formerly a Cambridge wine bar owned by

 Kimberly Courtney and Xavier Dietrich (owners), appeals from a

 Superior Court judgment affirming the decision of the alcoholic

 beverages control commission (ABCC or commission) to uphold a

 three-day suspension of the plaintiff's liquor license.               Because

 the commission's decision was premised on error of law, we

 reverse.

        Background.    "We summarize the facts as found by the

 commission."     Craft Beer Guild, LLC v. Alcoholic Beverages

 Control Comm'n, 481 Mass. 506, 509 (2019).

        At 7:10 P.M. on Saturday, September 29, 2018, members of

 the Cambridge police and fire departments arrived at the

 1   Doing business as UpperWest.
 2   Cambridge Board of License Commissioners, intervener.
plaintiff's business for an enforcement matter regarding its use

of candles.    After observing five to ten lighted votive candles

in glass on the bar and tables, the officials spoke with

Courtney and Dietrich, who each recorded most of the

interaction.

     The officials instructed Courtney and Dietrich to

extinguish the candles.    Courtney refused and demanded that the

men show her the text of the laws that the plaintiff's use of

candles violated.   The officials attempted to read aloud a law

purportedly governing the use of the candles; Courtney

interrupted them and said that the law in question was

inapplicable, which as discussed below is correct.

     As the conversation continued, the group moved outside.

One of the officials then called a supervisor, who arrived at

the premises at 7:35 P.M.    While Courtney spoke to two of the

officials, the other officials returned inside the premises to

shut down the establishment.    Once an official asked an employee

to turn the music off, Courtney relented and extinguished the

candles "under protest."    After she extinguished the candles,

Courtney asked the officials for their business cards or

identification.   As they were leaving, at approximately

7:53 P.M., Courtney stated "you will live to regret this."

     On October 12, 2018, the Cambridge Licensing Commission

(board) issued a notice of disciplinary hearing regarding the

                                  2
incident, charging the plaintiff with (1) a fire safety

violation, (2) hindering an investigation, (3) intimidating a

witness and (4) threatening a public official. 3   The board found

the plaintiff in violation of all the charges against it and

ultimately imposed a five-day suspension.   The plaintiff

appealed.

     After a hearing that spanned six days, featured testimony

from nine witnesses, and included a total of seventy-five

exhibits, the ABCC reversed the finding of a violation on the

first charge.   It ruled that the board had charged and violated

the plaintiff for "a section of law pertaining to the use of

candles with portable cooking equipment," and it was "undisputed

the candles at the [plaintiff's] establishment were not used for

portable cooking equipment."   Accordingly, such a violation

3 Specifically, the charges included: count 1, failure to comply
with Massachusetts Comprehensive Fire Safety Code,
§ 20.1.5.2.4(2), in violation of G. L. c. 148, § 28, G. L.
c. 238, §§ 23 and 64, and the Rules and Regulations of the City
of Cambridge Board of License Commissioners (2016), Rules 2.2-
2.3, 2.5-2.6, 5.1-5.2, and 13.1; count 2, refusal to cooperate
with agents of the fire department or hindering an investigation
or enforcement of the law, in violation of G. L. c. 138, §§ 23,
63-64A and 64, and the Rules and Regulations of the City of
Cambridge Board of License Commissioners (2016), Rules 2.2-2.3,
2.5-2.6, 5.1-5.2, 13.1, 13.3, and 13.5; count 3, intimidating a
witness, specifically a public official, in violation of G. L.
c. 268, § 13B; and count 4, threatening a public official, in
violation of G. L. c. 275, §§ 2-4, G. L. c. 138, §§ 23 and 64,
and the Rules and Regulations of the City of Cambridge Board of
License Commissioners (2016), Rules 2.3, 2.5, 5.1-5.2, 13.1, and
13.5.

                                 3
could not stand.   However, the ABCC affirmed the board's

findings as to the violations of interfering with an

investigation or enforcement of the law, intimidation of a

witness, and threatening an official, ultimately upholding a

three-day suspension as related to those violations.     A judge of

the Superior Court affirmed.

     Discussion.   1.   Mootness.   The defendants argue that the

appeal is moot because the plaintiff failed to renew its liquor

license in 2019 and also ceased to exist as an entity when it

was administratively dissolved in 2022.     "[L]itigation is

considered moot when the party who claimed to be aggrieved

ceases to have a personal stake in its outcome."     Seney v.

Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 61 (2017), quoting Blake v. Massachusetts

Parole Bd., 369 Mass. 701, 703 (1976).     The ABCC moved to

dismiss this matter in the Superior Court partially on these

grounds, which a different judge declined to do.     As that judge

noted, the suspension may affect the owners in the future as the

suspension against the plaintiff, a business owned by Courtney

and Dietrich, may be considered and could negatively impact any

application that Courtney or Dietrich file for a new license in

the future.   See, e.g., Solimeno v. State Racing Comm'n, 400

Mass. 397, 400-401 (1987) (issue not moot where no relevant

license suspension was still in effect because suspension could

affect plaintiffs' future endeavors).

                                    4
     The defendants both essentially concede this point in

acknowledging the owners' ongoing interest in these "collateral

consequences."   As the ABCC writes in its brief, "[i]f Ms.

Courtney were to form a new entity and apply for a new liquor

license, the licensing authority could consider the suspension

of the plaintiff's license."    See Ballarin, Inc. v. Licensing

Bd. of Boston, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 506, 511 (2000) (application

consideration encompasses "wide range of factors" including "the

reputation of the applicant").    We decline the defendants'

invitation to speculate that the owners will never again attempt

to open a business like the one at issue here.

     2.   Standard of review.   "The scope of review of the

[ABCC]'s decision, both in the Superior Court and in [the

appellate courts], is defined by G. L. c. 30A, § 14."     Howard

Johnson Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 24 Mass. App.

Ct. 487, 490 (1987), quoting Burlington v. Labor Relations

Comm'n, 390 Mass. 157, 161 (1983).     Accordingly, our "review of

the ABCC's decision is limited to determining whether the

decision was arbitrary and capricious or whether the ABCC made

an error of law."   RK&E Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control

Comm'n, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 337, 340 (2020).     See Craft Beer

Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. at 511-512.     See also G. L. c. 30A,

§ 14 (7) (g).    We "give due weight to the experience, technical

competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency, as well as

                                  5
to the discretionary authority conferred upon it."      G. L.

c. 30A, § 14 (7).      Additionally, "[w]e are not bound by the

Superior Court judge's conclusions . . . and must independently

review the commission's decision."      J.C. Hillary's v.

Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 27 Mass. App. Ct.

204, 207 (1989).

     3.   Hindering.    The hindering charge was premised on the

owners' discussion with the officials concerning the validity of

the enforcement action. 4    The ABCC found that the substantial

evidence supported the assertion that Courtney specifically

hindered an "authorized agent of [the] local licensing

authorities in the performance of his duties," in violation of

G. L. c. 138, § 63A, and a corresponding local board rule.        The

ABCC noted that the officials were "undoubtedly hindered and

delayed [in their] investigation . . . into the use of candles"

for at least thirty-five minutes as Courtney and Dietrich

"argued" with them.

4 The ABCC construed the actions as violations of G. L. c. 138,
§ 63A, which prohibits any licensee from "hinder[ing] or
delay[ing] any authorized investigator of the commission or any
investigator, inspector or any other authorized agent of local
licensing authorities in the performance of his duties." The
corresponding board rule -- Rules and Regulations of the City of
Cambridge Board of License Commissioners (2016), Rule 13.5 --
prohibits the "refus[al] to cooperate with the License
Commission or its agents, hinder[ing] an investigation, or
fail[ure] to respond to a request for documents or information
from the License Commission or its agents."

                                    6
     While we "give due weight to the commission's experience,

technical competence and specialized knowledge," our "deference

does not suggest abdication" and we do not accord deference to

"[a]n incorrect interpretation of a statute" (quotations and

citations omitted).   Craft Beer Guild, LLC, 481 Mass. at 512.

Although the owners of the establishment challenged the

officials' basis for the enforcement order, there is no evidence

that they impeded any official's entry into the business or

denied them requested information.    See Lion Distributors, Inc.

v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 988,

989 (1983) (hindering investigation includes refusal of entry to

conduct investigation as well as delay in providing information

necessary to investigation).   Compare Commonwealth v. Adams, 482

Mass. 514, 527-529 (2019) (obstructing police action requires

physical act or threat of violence in order to avoid violating

constitutional protections).   In fact, during the exchange, the

officials were not seeking any "information as may be required

for the proper enforcement of" G. L. c. 138, § 63A; to the

contrary, the owners were seeking information from the officials

relating to the law that they claimed to be enforcing.    The

charge of hindering cannot be sustained.

     4.   Intimidation and threats.   The charges of intimidation

and threats were premised on Courtney's statement to the

                                 7
officials, "you will live to regret this." 5   The ABCC found that

this constituted intimidation in the sense that it implied that

Courtney would make a complaint against the officials, which in

turn would cause them economic injury because it would

jeopardize their professional careers. 6   Likewise, the ABCC found

that the statement also constituted a threat to commit a crime,

specifically witness intimidation, in the sense that it implied

that Courtney would retaliate against the officials for their

enforcement action by filing a complaint, thereby causing them

economic injury by jeopardizing their careers. 7   The ABCC further

noted that Courtney "followed through with her threat of

retaliation against their employment by filing a complaint

5 On the video, Courtney states, "[Y]ou guys are gonna regret
behaving this way; this is not how this works." Nevertheless,
the ABCC credited the officials' testimony that Courtney said,
"you will live to regret this," even though not found in any
recording, because "[t]here is nothing to indicate that every
word spoken was captured by the recordings." We note, however,
that nothing in the record indicates that witnesses heard
Courtney express such a sentiment more than once and that the
video recording conforms with the witness testimony as to the
time when the officials heard Courtney make the statement.

6 Specifically, the commission analyzed the actions as pertaining
to G. L. c. 268, § 13B (criminal statute prohibiting witness
intimidation), and Rules and Regulations of the City of
Cambridge Board of License Commissioners (2016), Rule 5.1, which
provides that "[n]o licensee shall permit any disorder,
disturbance or illegality of any kind to take place in or on the
licensed premises."

7 The commission found the charges to be in violation of G. L.
c. 275, § 2, and Rules and Regulations of the City of Cambridge
Board of License Commissioners (2016), Rule 5.1.

                                 8
against them in part arising out of their investigation . . . ,

which only gives credence to the fact she intended her statement

to mean that she . . . [planned] to retaliate."

     There is no dispute that Courtney's statement was taken as

nothing other than an intention to file a complaint against the

conduct of government officials.       No matter how aggressive the

tone, the statement does not constitute a "true threat" which

may deprive it of First Amendment protection.       See Van Liew v.

Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 38-39 (2016) (insults, however loudly

delivered, did not constitute true threats where, in context,

they would not cause someone to fear imminent physical harm);

Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 690-691 (2015) (true

threats are statements in which speaker intends to relay a

"serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful

violence to a particular individual").       An individual's right to

complain against its government cannot be denied under a theory

that the lawful complaint somehow threatens or intimidates a

government official; the statement at issue here is a classic

example of protected speech.   See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,

461 (1987) ("First Amendment protects a significant amount of

verbal criticism and challenge directed at" government

officials); Van Liew, 474 Mass. at 38 ("remarks about a local

public official constituted political speech and were at the

core of the speech that the First Amendment" was intended to

                                   9
protect).    Cf. Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635,

648 (2003) (generally, threat to use lawful means to reach

intended result not actionable under statute prohibiting

"threats, intimidation, coercion").    The charges of intimidation

and threats cannot be sustained.

       The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the

Superior Court, where a new judgment shall enter reversing the

decision of the ABCC.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Meade, Singh &
                                        Smyth, JJ. 8),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 4, 2024.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 10