Court Opinion

ID: 9777141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:00:32.814603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:49.418835
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing appellee contends that we erred in rendering judgment for appellant rather than remanding for a new trial because the hearing on the merits was a nullity, as were also the *932court’s findings and conclusions, since the cause was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We do not agree that the hearing or the findings were ineffective.
The record shows that the trial court did not observe section 2 of rule 120a, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: “Any motion to the jurisdiction . shall be heard and determined before a plea of privilege or any other plea or pleading may be heard.” After a conference in chambers and before proceeding with the hearing, the judge announced that the court would first take up the special-appearance plea of lack of jurisdiction and would “withhold its ruling in connection with that matter and go ahead and hear the evidence with reference to the motion for modification of support.” No objection to this procedure was offered by appellee. Counsel for appellee presented evidence in support of his plea to the jurisdiction and called both appellant and appellee as witnesses. After both parties announced that they had no further evidence on the plea, the judge directed counsel for appellant to proceed on his motion for additional child support. Again counsel for appellee made no objection, and he cross-examined witnesses called by appellant.
On the merits, appellant testified concerning the child’s needs and the increased expenses of caring for her. She asked for an increase in the payments from $300 to $600 per month. Appellee, called as a witness by appellant, testified that he was making $21,000 a year as an airline pilot in 1971 and that in 1975 his income from all sources had increased to $45,000. He anticipated making at least that much in 1976. He had an itemized list of his monthly income and expenses, which was offered in evidence. He testified that he owned a new $14,000 Cadillac automobile on which he was making payments and also owned an airplane and an interest in a hunting and fishing venture in Alaska. Appellant’s counsel testified on his claim for attorney’s fee. Appellee’s counsel cross-examined and called appellant to the stand for testimony that she had money to pay her attorney. After close of all the evidence, the judge heard arguments on the jurisdiction question as well as on the merits. He then announced that he would make his decision later in the week.
There is no record of the actual pronouncement of the judge’s decision except his order dismissing the cause on September 29, 1976, and his findings and conclusions, dated October 4,1976, to the effect that the parties did not have such “recent minimal contacts” as to meet the due-process requirement of in-personam jurisdiction. On October 11 he made additional findings to the effect that the circumstances of the child and of appellee had materially and substantially changed since the entry of the decree providing for support in amount of $300 per month and that appellee “should be required to pay the sum of $400 per month for the support of Paula Paige Zeis-ler.”
In this state of the record we see no reason for another hearing to determine the amount of the support payments. The trial judge apparently recognized that the plea to the jurisdiction raised a legal question of some difficulty, and, accordingly, he proceeded to hear the evidence on both matters at the same hearing, apparently for the convenience of the parties, both of whom had come from other states. If appellee had objected to this procedure, the judge would have been required under rule 120a to rule on the plea to the jurisdiction before hearing evidence on the merits, and if he had proceeded over appellee’s objection, a different question would now be presented. No such objection was made. Appellee, therefore, must be presumed to have consented to this procedure, which was calculated to serve his convenience as well as appellant’s because it would obviate another trip to Dallas in the event the plea to the jurisdiction should be overruled, either by the trial court or on appeal.
The trial court’s fact findings concerning the amount of support appear entirely rea*933sonable under the evidence in this record. Appellee has presented no cross-point attacking these findings, although appellant prayed in her brief for rendition of judgment “declaring child support in the amount of $400.” Even now, he does not attack them for lack of evidence. If we should remand the case to the trial court with instructions that the judge should review the evidence he has already heard and make new findings, we would have no reason to believe that the new findings would be different. Appellee does not suggest that additional evidence would be available that might be expected to change the result. Appellee’s sole contention is that since the trial court ultimately dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction, even though that dismissal is now determined to' be erroneous, the hearing on the merits and the fact findings are now “nullities.” We conclude that the law does not require an empty formality unrelated to the merits of the action and manifestly contrary to the interests and convenience of all parties.
Appellee relies on Touchy v. Houston Legal Foundation, 432 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.1968), in which the defendant filed both a plea in abatement on the ground that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue and a motion for summary judgment on that ground and others. The trial court heard both at the same hearing and entered an order granting both. The supreme court observed that after sustaining the plea in abatement and dismissing the suit, the court’s action in granting the summary judgment was meaningless, and, consequently, the only question on appeal was whether the plea in abatement was properly sustained. We do not regard that case as controlling here because in this case the trial court did not, as in Touchy, enter an order granting two inconsistent remedies. The court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction of the person, but nevertheless, having heard the evidence presented by both parties on the merits, without objection, made fact findings for the benefit of the parties and the appellate court in the event the order of dismissal should be held improper. We conclude that this was an appropriate exercise of the court’s fact-finding function.
Our attention has been called to the fact that our judgment purports to raise the payments from $200 to $400 per month, rather than from $300 to $400 per month. This correction is now made, although it does not change the effect of the judgment.
Motion for rehearing overruled.