Court Opinion

ID: 9644462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:57:02.469692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.873617
License: Public Domain

UTTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the amounts of damages awarded for loss of society and mental anguish are excessive, and I would order a remittitur or that the case be reversed and remanded for new trial.
In points of error six through thirteen, appellants complained of the inadequacy of the evidence to support the award of damages for loss of society and mental anguish and additionally claimed that if there is evidence to support the award, the amounts found by the jury are excessive. *513In Larson v. Cactus Utility Co., 730 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1987) and Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1986) our Supreme Court clarified the standard of review for actual damages. The amount of actual damages is a fact question and the remit-titur of an actual damage award is proper only where the evidence is factually insufficient to support the award. In Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641, and Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 624, the Supreme Court stated that a court of appeals should examine all the evidence in the record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the award; if remitting, the Court of Appeals should state clearly why the jury’s award is so factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). Therefore, as far as actual damages are concerned, we are not concerned with evidence of passion, prejudice, or other improper motive by the jury in determining remittitur of actual damages. Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 624.
While the above-stated standards are clear cut and a logical extension of the standard for review which has been in place for almost 100 years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. IAllebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986), has made the application of this test to damages for loss of society and mental anguish in wrongful death cases difficult, if not impossible. In Moore, the Supreme Court held that mental anguish is to be defined “as the emotional pain, torment, and suffering that the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience from the death of a family member.” The court then went on to define loss of society “as the positive benefits flowing from the love, comfort, companionship, and society the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience if the decedent lived.” The Court then went on to hold that:
“in awarding damages for mental anguish and loss of society and companionship in a wrongful death case, the trier of facts shall be instructed that it may consider (1) the relationship between the husband and wife; or a parent and child; (2) the living arrangements of the parties; (3) any absence of the deceased from the plaintiff for an extended period; (4) the harmony of the family relation; and (5) interest in activities.”
Reduced to a more discernible definition the Supreme Court said in Moore that if proof of a family relationship establishes some evidence of mental anguish and loss of companionship in a wrongful death case. This was a departure from the previous policy which required some actual physical manifestation of injury accompanying claims for mental anguish and loss of society. Such claims frequently involve the testimony of physicians and psychiatrists concerning actual physical and mental illness resulting from the loss. This was the so called “physical manifestation” requirement for mental anguish recovery. Recognizing the Moore evidentiary requirements, I will now review the evidence of damages in this case.
First, I turn to the testimony of Lydia Castro. She testified she was at home when a little boy told her that something had happened to her son Wally and that they had taken him to the hospital. She stated that she just grabbed the keys and took off. “I don’t know how I got there.” She stated that when she got to the hospital, she saw her son lying straight, she opened the door and started crying, then he saw her and started crying. Then she heard her son screaming. There was no other testimony from her or any other lay witness concerning any emotional pain, torment, or suffering that she may have suffered in the past, present, or future.
Approximately one month before trial, her attorney sent her to Dr. Ramirez, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Ramirez spent approximately two hours in an evaluation conference with Lydia Castro, Ofelia Castro, Wally’s grandmother, Eduardo Guajar-do, Wally’s father, and Simon Garcia, Lydia’s present husband. Dr. Ramirez testified that the family was very defensive and that his results were gained more from feelings he had after interviewing Lydia. In answer to counsel’s question of whether or not the attributes or symptoms which *514Lydia displayed might have been exhibited prior to the accident, Dr. Ramirez replied:
I feel very strongly, in all psychological probability, that even if these conditions did exist, I don’t feel they existed at this level. The type of individual that almost like a histrionic personality but not quite, where she felt everything revolved around here. She brought a lot of attention to herself.
However, when I specifically asked questions about her son, she would change; her son, she would say to me, is my whole life, is my whole world, which I don’t know how true that would be, but outraged with the fact that the son did not exist anymore.
Now, whether it was out of guilt of not being able to be a better guardian or better provider, I don’t know. But I do believe that this incident has brought whatever was brewing in there previously, just brought it up to the surface. She is a very intensified, very angry individual.
In answers to counsel’s question, Dr. Ramirez further testified:
The prognosis, as I wrote here in the report, is poor to fair. I feel that psychotherapy would be very beneficial, but she is very resistant, she’s very angry, she has intensified feelings of frustration with this whole case, this whole matter. I don’t know how good of a candidate she would be for psychotherapy. Her lack of sophistication, intellectual ability, I don’t know how good of a candidate she would be for that.
The prognosis, I guess, poor or poor to fair. It’s not as good as the grandmother, and even I don’t think it’s as good as her ex-husband’s.
The testimony of Lydia regarding her reactions when she first heard of Wally’s injuries and at the hospital plus Dr. Ramirez’ testimony of her frustrations apparent in her evaluation interview is the only testimony in this record to support an award of $200,000 for past mental anguish and $200,000 for future mental anguish. There was no testimony from Lydia’s mother, her present husband, Wally’s father, friends, relatives, or priests to show any emotional pain, torment, or suffering, past, present, or future. I believe the awards for past and future mental anguish are not supported by the evidence and, are excessive. I would require a remittitur of $150,-000 for past mental anguish. I would order a remittitur of $100,000 for future mental anguish.
Additionally, the jury awarded the sum of $100,000 for past loss of society and $300,000 for future loss of society. Lydia’s testimony showed that Wally was born on September 5, 1978 and that she, Wally and his father lived together for about one year. In 1979, she and Wally’s father separated and she and Wally lived with her mother Ofelia. In 1981, Lydia, Wally and her present husband moved to Dallas where they stayed for approximately two years. They then moved to Edna and in May 1985 they moved back to Weslaco. At that time, Wally moved in with his grandmother, Ofelia. Lydia testified that Wally was only supposed to stay with her mother until school started in September, 1985. Wally was still living with his grandmother when school opened on September 5th, the day he was killed. On direct-examination, Lydia testified:
Q. And even though school had started, you up to that day had not any discussion with your mother about living with you again?
A. No.
When asked about Wally’s living with his grandmother, Dr. Ramirez testified:
Q. When did they indicate that the little [boy] had started living with Ofelia?
A. In ’85. Moved back to Weslaco from Dallas, wanted to stay with grandmother, the little boy wanted to live with his grandmother.
# * * # * #
Q. Did they talk to you about the fact that this little boy was living at the time with his grandmother?
A. Yes, I think they were saying that . the little boy was living with his grandmother.
*515Q. Did you ask them about that situation, why that was?
A. I think what the response was, in the mother’s case, that the little boy felt very comfortable with his grandmother — his grandmother would take him in. That arrangement was an arrangement that everyone seemed to be agreed.
In referring to Wally and his living with her, Ofelia Castro referred to Wally as “my son” or “my child.” In addition, Ofelia Castro never testified that Wally was only going to stay with her until school started.
The only other evidence offered to support Lydia’s claim for damages for loss companionship and society was a group of pictures taken at different birthday parties Lydia had given for Wally. Other than these pictures, there was no testimony or evidence of love, affection, nurture, caring, the harmony of family relationships, or common interest and activities in the past. Except for the natural society and companionship which the evidence showed existed in the past and a presumption that some type of relationship would continue in the future, there is absolutely no evidence of loss of companionship and society in the future. I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence in the record of this case to sustain the amounts awarded to Lydia Castro for the loss of companionship and society of her son. I would require a remittitur of $50,000 for past loss of society and companionship. I would require a remit-titur of $200,000 for loss of society and companionship in the future.
The jury also awarded Wally’s father Eduardo Guajardo the sum of $60,000.00 for future loss of society and $100,000.00 for future mental anguish. Eduardo Gua-jardo did not testify at trial or by deposition. Lydia Castro, when asked whether Eduardo saw Wally after she separated from him and was living with her mother presumably from 1979 until 1981 when she moved to Dallas with Simon Garcia, testified:
Q. What about before you went to Dallas, I believe you said you lived — you and Wally lived with your mother there in Weslaco.
A. Yes.
Q. All right. And that was for a couple of years?
A. Yes.
Q. During that time did Wally’s father have an opportunity to see Wally?
A. He used to see Wally, yes.
Q. Okay. Would that be when you or your mother would take Wally to see him?
A. Right.
Q. He didn’t some (sic) pick him up at your house?
A. No.
Lydia further testified:
Q. Did Wally ever talk about his father?
A. Not to me.
The only other testimony concerning the relationship between Wally and his father, Eduardo Guajardo came from Dr. Ramirez. The sum of Dr. Ramirez’ testimony was best stated as follows:
The feeling that I got is that — and the feeling they wanted to give me was that they had a good relationship. The father had a very good relationship with the boy. Seeing the intensified negative feelings that the father and the mother had, there was some doubt in my understanding that the father could really get that close to the little boy, because the mother refused to even speak to the father and care for the father.
But what was shared with me — what was shared with me, with the father when I talked to him individually, with the uncle of the little boy, that it was positive, it was good, it was as close as could be, considering the circumstances.
Q. How often did they indicate that he was seeing the little boy?
A. I think towards the latter part, maybe one (sic) a month. I think something like that. For the first year is when the parents lived together on a daily basis.
*516I have searched the entire record and the above testimony is the only testimony regarding the love, comfort, companionship and society between Wally and his father, Eduardo Guajardo. Other than the the love, comfort, companionship and society which would ordinarily flow between a father and son, there is no other testimony which would support such an award. I believe the evidence in this case is not sufficient to sustain the award of $60,-000.00 for loss of companionship and society to Eduardo Guajardo. I would require a remittitur of $30,000 for loss of companionship and society in the past.
Additionally, the jury awarded Eduardo Guajardo the sum of $100,000.00 for future mental anguish. Once again, Eduardo did not testify to any emotional pain, torment, or suffering nor did any relative or friend on his behalf. The only testimony in this record was again given by Dr. Ramirez, taken at the time of the evaluation examination, when he stated:
But again, according to the evaluation, the evaluation results, the kinds of things that I asked him, I felt that he was under a great deal of distress at the moment, he apparently seemed to be very uncomfortable in that evaluation session with his ex there and the family there. But according to my results, I felt that he was very disturbed over the accident of his son, and a fully, major— and a full-blown major depression like his wife, or Lydia, was exhibiting, was not seen.
Once again, there was only a showing of the natural grief and mental anguish that one parent would be expected to suffer from the death of a son. There was no other evidence of emotional pain, torment or suffering, sufficient to justify an award of $100,000.00. I would require a remit-titur of $50,000 for loss of society and companionship in the future.
Appellee, in its reply brief, refers to the testimony of a Dr. Everett Dillman as some evidence of the amount of loss of love and society suffered by the parties. Dr. Dill-man testified that the amount of $157,000 was a benchmark figure for loss of love and society in a generic situation for a family similarly situated to the family involved herein. However, no attempt was made by the appellee to connect any of Dr. Dillman's testimony to the facts of this ease. No hypothetical questions were asked of Dr. Dillman, and no expert opinion was given to the facts applicable to Wally’s relationship to his parents or theirs to him, to sustain Dr. Dillman’s opinion on loss of society. In addition, there was no evidence introduced to show that Wally ever helped his mother with household chores, therefore, Dr. Dillman’s estimate of $86,000 for the loss of Wally’s household services is without foundation in this record. Dr. Dill-man’s testimony constitutes no evidence of the amount of loss of love and society suffered by the parties in this case.
The last item of damages which concerns me is the award of $600,000 for the conscious pain and mental anguish suffered by the deceased immediately before his death. The time sequence after the accident is from 6:08 p.m. until 6:15 p.m. Upon her arrival at the hospital Lydia testified that she saw her son and heard him screaming. When asked how long she was at the hospital, Lydia stated she didn’t know. She was not asked to estimate the amount of time she was in the hospital, nor were any hospital records introduced to show the time of death. Other than showing that the accident happened at approximately 6:05 p.m. and Lydia was called to the hospital at 6:15 p.m., there was no showing of the amount of time that Wally suffered physical pain.
Appellee’s brief refers to the testimony of one of the witnesses to the accident that he saw the child awake and moaning in pain after he was struck by the truck. One witness did testify that the child was moaning softly but also testified that the child was not moving as if he was in pain. Nothing in the record attempts to frame this testimony with the time sequence of the accident and the child’s death. Lydia also testified that after the accident, she saw the deceased and that his eyes were open and that he was in pain. There is no reference to the point in time of this observation and the child’s death in the record either. *517No death certificate showing the time of death was offered into evidence. There was no testimony from a doctor, nurse, or other hospital personnel to show any conscious pain or mental anguish sustained by Wally. Under the testimony presented, I believe the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the award of $600,000 for conscious pain and mental anguish. I would require a remittitur of $400,000.
It appears to me the majority opinion misconstrues the holding of our Supreme Court in Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986). In Moore, the Supreme Court simply held that it is not necessary to prove a physical manifestation of mental anguish damages. Nowhere in the opinion does the Supreme Court hold, as the majority does, that the role of review of such damages by the Court is no longer the sufficiency of the evidence. Taken to its illogical conclu-sory extreme, the majority’s review standard would mean that a $50 million award for a broken finger would have to be upheld if someone testified that a broken finger caused mental anguish and the jury found $50 million in damages. There is simply no basis for such a rationale in the current common law of this state. In both Larson and Pope, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that the standard of review for all actual damages is sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence must be sufficient to support the amount of the award of damages. In neither of these cases nor Moore was any exception carved to the general rule for mental anguish damages. In applying the appropriate standard of review to the mental anguish damages in this case, I would find the evidence was not sufficient to support the amount of damages awarded in this case.
I would order a remittitur in the total amount of $980,000.00. If the remittitur is not offered by the appellee, I would order the case reversed and remanded for a new trial.