Court Opinion

ID: 9949451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 18:01:04.710765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:13.312681
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-3021    Document: 010111013297   Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                      PUBLISH                           Tenth Circuit

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   March 11, 2024

                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  SHIELDS LAW GROUP, LLC; PAUL
  BYRD LAW FIRM, PLLC,

        Attorneys - Appellants,

  v.                                                     No. 21-3021

  STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP;
  GUSTAFSON GLUEK, PLLC; WATTS
  GUERRA LLP; HENINGER GARRISON
  DAVIS, LLC; SEEGER WEISS LLP;
  SHAMBERG JOHNSON & BERGMAN;
  WEXLER WALLACE LLP; CARELLA
  BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
  AGNELLO, P.C.; CLARK, LOVE &
  HUTSON, GP; HARE, WYNN, NEWELL
  & NEWTON, LLP,

        Attorneys - Appellees.

  –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

  HOSSLEY-EMBRY, LLP,

        Attorney - Appellant,

  v.                                                     No. 21-3022

  STUEVE SIEGEL HANSON LLP;
  GUSTAFSON GLUEK PLLC; WATTS
  GUERRA LLP; HENINGER GARRISON
  DAVIS, LLC; SEEGER WEISS LLP;
  SHAMBERG JOHNSON & BERGMAN;
  WEXLER WALLACE LLP; CARELLA
  BYRNE CECCHI OLSTEIN BRODY &
  AGNELLO, P.C.; CLARK, LOVE &
Appellate Case: 21-3021    Document: 010111013297       Date Filed: 03/11/2024    Page: 2

  HUTSON, GP; HARE, WYNN, NEWELL
  & NEWTON, LLP,

        Attorneys - Appellees.
                        _________________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Kansas
                        (D.C. No. 2:14-MD-02591-JWL-JPO)
                       _________________________________

 Submitted on the motions:*

 Jeffrey A. Lamken and Eric R. Nitz, Mololamken LLP, Washington, D.C., on the motion
 to dismiss for Watts Guerra, LLP.

 Patrick J. Stueve and Bradley T. Wilders, Stueve Siegel Hanson LLP, Kansas City
 Missouri, Christopher A. Seeger, Seeger Weiss LLP Ridgefield Park, New Jersey, Daniel
 E. Gustafson, Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on the motion to dismiss
 for Settlement Class Counsel.

 Christopher B. Hood, Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, Birmingham, Alabama, on the
 response in support of motions to dismiss for Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC.

 Christina J. Nielsen, Nielsen Law Firm, Lorain, Ohio for Shields Law Group, LLC, and
 Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, and Daniel Allen Hossley, Tyler, Texas for Hossley-Embry,
 LLP, on the Joint Suggestions in Opposition to Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss.

                          _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

 HOLMES, Chief Judge.
                    _________________________________

       *
               After examining the motions to dismiss, the responses, and appellate
 record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
 materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2);
 10TH CIR. R. 34.1(G). These cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral
 argument.
                                            2
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         After Syngenta AG (“Syngenta”), an agricultural company, commercialized

 and released genetically modified corn seeds without obtaining regulatory approval

 for its seeds to be imported into China, thousands of corn producers (as well as others

 in the corn industry) filed lawsuits against Syngenta. Ultimately, in 2018, Syngenta

 settled with class action plaintiffs for $1.51 billion. Out of that $1.51 billion, one-

 third of the total amount—$503,333,333.33—was set aside as attorneys’ fees. But

 that was only the beginning of a different litigation saga that has now spanned years:

 litigation over the apportionment and allocation of the $503 million in attorneys’

 fees.

         The district court, with the aid of a special master, crafted a two-stage

 approach to allocating the $503 million. At the first stage, the $503 million was

 divided into four pools: 49% for the common benefit pool for firms that litigated in

 Kansas, 23.5% for the common benefit pool for firms that litigated in Minnesota,

 15.5% for the common benefit pool for firms that litigated in Illinois, and 12% for

 the pool for individually retained private attorneys (“IRPAs”). At the second stage,

 the money was awarded to individual firms and attorneys within each pool. Through

 a series of separate orders, the district court allocated most of these fees.

         Participating law firms from a variety of states challenged this allocation

 scheme on multiple levels, and various firms filed a tidal wave of appeals and cross-

 appeals from the district court’s orders. On February 28, 2023, we resolved most of

 the pending appeals related to the allocation of attorneys’ fees in In re Syngenta AG

 MIR 162 Corn Litigation (“In re Syngenta I”), 61 F.4th 1126 (10th Cir. 2023).

                                              3
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 Specifically, we concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in

 devising the four-pool allocation system, determining the amount to be allocated to

 each pool, awarding money to firms in the three geographic common benefit pools,

 and making an award of expenses. See id. at 1170. However, our opinion in In re

 Syngenta I did not fully resolve every appeal related to the allocation of attorneys’

 fees; some remain pending.

       Among the appeals that remain pending are what we will refer to as the Watts

 Guerra Settlement Appeals. In these appeals, two sets of firms challenge the district

 court’s approval of a discrete settlement agreement (“the Watts Guerra Settlement

 Agreement”) between Watts Guerra LLP—one of the firms that originally challenged

 the district court’s fee allocation orders—and the firms who were not appealing the

 district court’s fee allocation orders (“the Appellee Parties”).1

       1
                The terminology for the appellees in the Watts Guerra Settlement
 Appeals can be confusing. In particular, differently named—but overlapping in
 membership—groups of appellees have played distinct roles in these appeals and in
 the proceedings before the district court. One group of appellees are the “Joint
 Appellees,” which consist of several leadership firms and attorneys that defended the
 district court’s decisions in the earlier In re Syngenta I fee allocation appeals. See 61
 F.4th at 1138 n.1 (listing the Joint Appellees). And another subset of appellees is
 “Settlement Class Counsel,” which includes attorneys Patrick Stueve, Daniel
 Gustafson, and Christopher Seeger. See Settlement Class Counsel’s Mot. to Dismiss,
 Nos. 21-3021 et al., at *1 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 17, 2021) (defining “Settlement Class
 Counsel”). In the interest of precision, we use these terms as the appellees
 themselves use them and remain faithful to their usage.

        We also use the term “Appellee Parties.” For purposes of this opinion, that
 term has the same meaning as that term is defined in the Watts Guerra Settlement
 Agreement—to refer to Patrick Stueve and Daniel Gustafson on behalf of themselves
 and all of the firms and attorneys who received money from the Kansas and
 Minnesota Common Benefit Pools who did not appeal the district court’s fee
                                             4
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       The two sets of firms also challenge the district court’s disbursement of funds

 in a manner that incorporated the terms of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

 The first appeal, numbered 21-3021, is brought by Shields Law Group, LLC,

 Plaintiffs’ Counsel, and Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, Plaintiffs’ Counsel

 (collectively, “Byrd/Shields”).2 The second appeal, numbered 21-3022, is brought by

 Hossley-Embry LLP. The two appeals present identical legal issues, and we will

 refer to Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry collectively as “the Objecting Firms.”

       Watts Guerra and Settlement Class Counsel, see supra note 1, moved to

 dismiss the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, arguing that we lack jurisdiction.

 Shortly thereafter, we abated the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals. After we issued

 our opinion in In re Syngenta I, the Objecting Firms moved to lift the abatement and

 enter a scheduling order. Watts Guerra and the Joint Appellees, see supra note 1,

 oppose this request, arguing that while the abatement should be lifted, the appeals

 should be summarily dismissed for the reasons stated in the earlier motions to

 dismiss.

 allocation orders, as well as Lew Garrison on behalf of himself and Heninger
 Garrison Davis LLC. See Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, Ex. A. to Jt. Mot. for
 Indicative Ruling, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4485-1, at *1–2 (D. Kan., filed
 Nov. 3, 2020) (defining “Appellee Parties”). Again, there is substantial overlap
 between the attorneys and firms who make up the Appellee Parties, the Joint
 Appellees, and Settlement Class Counsel.
       2
               Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC Plaintiffs’ Counsel consists of Paul Byrd, of
 the Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC; Clark W. Mason, of the Clark Mason Attorneys;
 Jerry Kelly, of the Kelly Law Firm, P.A.; James J. Thompson, Jr.; and Nolan
 Awbrey, of Awbrey Law.
                                           5
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       For the reasons that follow, we agree with the Joint Appellees and Watts

 Guerra. We thus lift the abatement of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals (Nos.

 21-3021 and 21-3022), grant Settlement Class Counsel’s and Watts Guerra’s

 motions to dismiss these appeals for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismiss

 the appeals.3

                                  I.     BACKGROUND

       We described the long and complex background of the attorneys’ fees dispute

 in In re Syngenta I. See 61 F.4th at 1138–70. We thus confine our discussion of the

 background to only the broad strokes and the events necessary to understanding the

 Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals.4

 A.    The Historic Settlement

       Syngenta is an agricultural company that marketed and commercialized

 genetically modified corn seed products, Agrisure Viptera and Agrisure Duracade,

       3
               As articulated in more detail below, see infra Part III, with respect to
 the Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the abatement and enter a scheduling order, we
 (1) grant it in part to the extent that it requests that we lift the abatement of the
 Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals; (2) deny it in part (as moot) to the extent that it
 requests that we enter a scheduling order in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals;
 and (3) defer ruling on it in part insofar as it requests that we take any action on the
 IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals (Nos. 21-3110 and 21-3111). We take no action on
 any aspect of the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals or the Contingent Cross-Appeal.
       4
              In addition to the discussion of the background in In re Syngenta I, 61
 F.4th at 1138–70, we take judicial notice of documents appearing on the district
 court’s docket and on our own docket. See FED. R. EVID. 201; Bunn v. Perdue, 966
 F.3d 1094, 1096 n.4 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Mendoza, 698 F.3d 1303, 1307
 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Griffin v. United States, 109 F.3d 1217, 1218 n.1 (7th Cir.
 1997).
                                            6
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 and allowed them to be imported into China without obtaining China’s regulatory

 approval to do so. When China discovered the genetically modified seeds in

 American import shipments, China closed its markets to American corn, which led to

 a fall in corn prices and financial injury to corn farmers and producers. As a result,

 corn farmers and producers filed thousands of lawsuits against Syngenta in multiple

 jurisdictions—including class actions, mass tort actions, and individual actions.5

       The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated hundreds of these

 suits into a multi-district litigation (“MDL”) in Kansas federal court; additionally,

 thousands of suits were consolidated in a Minnesota state court, and other suits were

 litigated in Illinois federal court. The Kansas district court (hereinafter referred to as

 “the district court”) appointed several attorneys as co-lead counsel for the Kansas

 MDL (“Kansas Co-Lead Counsel”); these attorneys would play a substantial role in

 the development of the original litigation and the fees dispute.6 In Minnesota, the

       5
                Completely separate from the fee dispute at issue here, a number of corn
 producers sued Watts Guerra—their lawyers—for failing to disclose the benefits of
 participating as class members rather than as individual plaintiffs. See Kellogg v.
 Watts Guerra LLP, 41 F.4th 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2022). The district court
 dismissed all of the producers’ claims against Watts Guerra, concluding, among other
 things, that the producers had not suffered an economic injury because they were
 permitted to participate in the Syngenta settlement. See id. We affirmed the district
 court’s judgment (and concluded that we lacked appellate jurisdiction over some of
 the decisions that the producers purported to challenge). See id. at 1271.
       6
            These included attorneys from Stueve Siegel Hanson, LLP; Gray, Ritter,
 & Graham, P.C.; Hare Wynn Newell & Newton L.L.P.; and Gray Reed & McGraw
 P.C.
                                             7
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 firms involved in coordinating the litigation included Watts Guerra and the Paul Byrd

 Law Firm, PLLC of Byrd/Shields.

       After a jury trial in Kansas resulted in a substantial award for the Kansas class,

 Syngenta expressed interest in pursuing a global settlement. In February 2018,

 Syngenta and a class of corn producers reached a nationwide settlement agreement

 that resolved the claims against Syngenta. As part of the settlement, Syngenta agreed

 to pay $1.51 billion in exchange for the release of all claims arising out of the

 debacle over the genetically modified seeds. The district court preliminarily

 approved the settlement, and, in an order issued on December 7, 2018 (“the

 December 2018 Aggregate Fee Order”), it finalized its approval of the settlement and

 awarded one-third of the total settlement amount ($503,333,333.33) as attorneys’

 fees. See Jt. App., Vol. XXII, at 5088–89 (Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order, filed Dec. 7,

 2018). But the question of how to allocate that sum among the myriad firms involved

 in the litigation remained.7

 B.    The Four Pool System for Allocation of Attorneys’ Fees

       1.     The December 2018 Fee Allocation Order

       On November 21, 2018, the special master issued a report and

 recommendation that, among other things, set forth a detailed recommendation for

       7
              A number of corn producers challenged the district court’s approval of
 the Settlement Agreement and the division of the $503 million award between the
 producers (who received two-thirds) and their attorneys (who received one-third).
 However, the corn producers ultimately settled, and their appeals were dismissed.
                                             8
Appellate Case: 21-3021    Document: 010111013297        Date Filed: 03/11/2024       Page: 9

 how to allocate the $503 million. Various firms, including the Objecting Firms, filed

 objections to the report and recommendation.

       On December 31, 2018, the district court issued a fee allocation order (“the

 December 2018 Fee Allocation Order”) that largely accepted the special master’s

 recommendation. See Jt. App., Vol. XXIII, at 5348–49 (Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order,

 filed Dec. 31, 2018). Based on the recommendation of the special master, the district

 court ultimately created a four-pool allocation scheme to divide the $503 million.8

 This four-pool allocation system is critical to understanding the instant appeals.

       To begin, three “common benefit pools” were created, corresponding with the

 litigation in Kansas, Minnesota, and Illinois, which we refer to as the Kansas

 Common Benefit Pool, the Minnesota Common Benefit Pool, and the Illinois

 Common Benefit Pool, respectively. For these three pools, each attorney was placed

 in the pool corresponding to the state in which they performed the bulk of their work.

 Each attorney could seek a fee award from their designated pool for any work they

 performed that benefited the settlement class as a whole or the settlement negotiation

 process (referred to as common benefit work)—regardless of where that work was

 actually performed.

       The fourth pool, the IRPA Pool, was different. That pool was designed so that

 attorneys could receive a portion of the $503 million for work that they performed

 that did not benefit the class as a whole—in other words, for work that was done on

       8
              The district court also awarded $48,842,866.12 in expenses in addition
 to the $503 million award of attorneys fees.
                                            9
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  behalf of individual clients. For the IRPA Pool, “attorneys’ recoveries would be

  dictated by their clients’ claim recoveries from the Settlement” with Syngenta. In re

  Syngenta I, 61 F.4th at 1141. Thus, the amount received by each attorney in the

  IRPA pool would be proportionate to the amount that their corn producer clients

  received as part of the Syngenta settlement. Attorneys could recover fees both from

  one of the common benefit pools (for any work that benefitted the common good)

  and from the IRPA pool (for any work that did not benefit the common good).

        To effectuate this four-pool allocation scheme, the district court had to

  confront the reality that existing fee agreements were already in place.

  Consequently, the district court abrogated (1) existing contingent fee agreements

  between corn producer clients and their attorneys and (2) joint prosecution

  agreements between various attorneys.

        In terms of apportionment between the pools, after weighing the contributions

  of the attorneys in the various fora and the work done by the IRPAs, the district court

  allocated (1) 49% of the total fee award to the Kansas Common Benefit Pool; (2)

  23.5% to the Minnesota Common Benefit Pool; (3) 15.5% to the Illinois Common

  Benefit Pool; and (4) 12% to the IRPA pool.9

        9
               These percentages were slightly different from those originally
  recommended by the special master in her report and recommendation, to which a
  number of firms objected. Specifically, the special master originally recommended
  (1) 50% for the Kansas Common Benefit Pool; (2) 24% for the Minnesota Common
  Benefit Pool; (3) 16% for the Illinois Common Benefit Pool; and (4) 10% for the
  IRPA Pool. In recognition of the substantial time put in by the IRPAs, the district
  court increased the portion of the total allocated to IRPAs and, by extension, slightly
  decreased the portion allocated to the other pools.
                                            10
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        2.     Allocation Within the Common Benefit Pools

        After the issuance of the December 2018 Fee Allocation Order, the next

  question was how to allocate each pool’s share of the $503 million within that pool.

  For example, the 49% of the $503 million award—which totaled to

  $246,633,333.33—had to be allocated among the various firms in the Kansas

  Common Benefit Pool. To do this, the district court (which was located in Kansas)

  would allocate the funds in the Kansas Common Benefit Pool. Courts in Minnesota

  and Illinois would recommend how to allocate the funds in the Minnesota Common

  Benefit Pool and the Illinois Common Benefit Pool, respectively, and the district

  court would give great deference to those recommendations—though it retained the

  official power to allocate fees in those pools.

        As discussed below, the district court issued separate orders allocating

  attorneys’ fees within the Kansas Common Benefit Pool, the Minnesota Common

  Benefit Pool, and the Illinois Common Benefit Pool. Additionally, the district court

  entered an order making awards of expenses. Importantly, though, the district court

  did not actually disburse any of the funds it awarded in these orders; the awarded

  funds remained in escrow after the awards were made.

        With respect to the Kansas Common Benefit Pool, the district court issued an

  order on March 20, 2019 (“the March 2019 Kansas Pool Order”) accepting a

  recommended system of allocation prepared by Kansas Co-Lead Counsel. See Jt.

  App., Vol. XXV, at 5859 (Dist. Ct. Order on Kan. Pool Allocation, filed Mar. 20,

  2019). Two firms immediately filed notices of appeal of the March 2019 Kansas

                                             11
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  Pool Order. Specifically, Watts Guerra and another group of firms led by Weller,

  Green, Toups & Terrell, LLP, and Richard L. Coffman, P.C. (“Toups/Coffman”) filed

  notices of appeal with respect to this order.10 Additionally, a number of other firms,

  including Hossley-Embry, named the March 2019 Kansas Pool Order as one of the

  orders they were challenging in later-filed notices of appeal. Notably, some of these

  firms recognized that these notices of appeal might be premature because a final

  judgment had not yet been issued. For example, Watts Guerra noted that it

  “recognize[d] that this notice of appeal may be premature . . . [because] the district

  court’s fee allocation likely is not final for purposes of appeal, at least until the

  district court has issued orders concerning the allocation of the Kansas, Illinois, and

  Minnesota common-benefit pools.” Jt. App., Vol. XXVIII, at 6449–50 (Watts

  Guerra’s Notice of Appeal, filed Apr. 19, 2019).

         With respect to the Minnesota Common Benefit Pool, the Minnesota state

  court issued an order on May 29, 2019, that recommended the adoption of (with some

  modifications) the allocation methodology presented by Minnesota Co-Lead Counsel.

  In an order dated July 16, 2019 (“the July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order”), the district

  court adopted this approach over the objections of several firms, including

  Byrd/Shields. See Jt. App., Vol. XXIX, at 6864–65 (Dist. Ct. Order on Minn. Pool

         10
               Both Toups/Coffman and Watts Guerra also raised challenges to the
  earlier December 2018 Fee Allocation Order in their notices of appeal.

                                              12
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  Allocation, filed July 16, 2019). Byrd/Shields, among others, filed a notice of appeal

  with respect to the July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order.11

         With respect to the Illinois Common Benefit Pool, the federal court in Illinois

  issued its recommended allocation in August 2019. In an order issued on November

  19, 2019 (“the November 2019 Illinois Pool Order”), the district court adopted this

  approach over the objections of multiple firms. See Jt. App., Vol. XXXII, at 7434–

  35 (Dist. Ct. Order on Ill. Pool Allocation, filed Nov. 19, 2019). Several firms,

  including Watts Guerra and Toups/Coffman, filed notices of appeal with respect to

  this order.

         In July 2019, the district court issued an order (“the July 2019 Expense

  Order”) that—over the objection of Byrd/Shields—adopted the special master’s

  report and recommendation concerning expense awards. See Jt. App., Vol. XXIX, at

  6889 (Dist. Ct. Order on Expenses, filed July 19, 2019). Byrd/Shields filed a notice

  of appeal challenging this order.12

         11
              Byrd/Shields’s notice of appeal also challenged the December 2018 Fee
  Allocation Order and the March 2019 Kansas Pool Order.
         12
                 Long after the relevant orders had issued, the Objecting Firms moved
  for reconsideration of the district court’s December 2018 Fee Allocation Order and
  its July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order. But the district court denied this request,
  concluding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion for reconsideration
  because the orders at issue had since been appealed, (2) even if the district court had
  jurisdiction, it would deny the motions as untimely, and (3) the motions also failed
  on their merits.
                                             13
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        We refer to the appeals taken from these orders—as well as appeals from the

  district court’s December 2018 Fee Allocation Order and the December 2018

  Aggregate Fee Order—as the “Fee Allocation Appeals.”13

        3.     Early History of the Fee Allocation Appeals

        Initially, we abated the Fee Allocation Appeals. However, we lifted the

  abatement on March 11, 2020—after expenses had been allocated and fees had been

  allocated from the Kansas Common Benefit Pool, the Minnesota Common Benefit

  Pool, and the Illinois Common Benefit Pool. After receiving copious briefs from the

  parties, we held oral argument a year later, on March 10, 2021.

  C.    The Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

        As noted above, Watts Guerra, a Minnesota law firm that was heavily involved

  in the litigation, was an appellant in the Fee Allocation Appeals. While these appeals

  were pending, and after months of negotiations moderated by the Tenth Circuit Chief

  Mediator, Watts Guerra and the Appellee Parties—the firms in the litigation who

  were not appealing any orders (with the exception of contingent cross-appeals), see

  supra note 1—reached an agreement to end the litigation over Watts Guerra’s fees.

  See Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4485, at *4 (D.

  Kan., filed Nov. 3, 2020). The settlement between the parties was memorialized in

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. See Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement,

        13
              The Fee Allocation Appeals included Nos. 19-3008, 19-3022, 19-3032,
  19-3079, 19-3174, 19-3175, 19-3176, 19-3178, 19-3279, 19-3280, 19-3284, and
  20-3002.
                                           14
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  Ex. A. to Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4485-1,

  at *1–2 (D. Kan., filed Nov. 3, 2020).

        The Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement contemplated the modification of

  some of the attorney fees’ apportionment that had been made in the December 2018

  Fee Allocation Order, the March 2019 Kansas Pool Order, the July 2019 Minnesota

  Pool Order, and the November 2019 Illinois Pool Order. Specifically, in exchange

  for the release of its claims, Watts Guerra would receive an additional $7 million

  “from the Appellee Parties’ share of the Aggregate Fee Award to be paid to Watts

  [Guerra] from the Appellee Parties’ fees awarded from the Kansas, Minnesota, and

  Illinois Common Benefit Pools.” Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, ECF No.

  4485-1, at *2.14

        The Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement defined the “Appellee Parties” as (1)

  Patrick Stueve on behalf of himself and all firms that were receiving fees from the

  Kansas Common Benefit Pool, except those firms who were appealing the district

  court’s fee allocation orders; (2) Daniel Gustafson on behalf of himself and all firms

  that were receiving fees from the Minnesota Common Benefit Pool, except Watts

  Guerra and those firms who were appealing the district court’s fee allocation orders;

  and (3) Lew Garrison on behalf of himself and Henninger Garrison Davis LLC,

        14
                 Originally, the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement provided that Watts
  Guerra would receive an additional $7.5 million from the Appellee Parties. The
  settling parties later amended this amount to be $7,048,667, which is the $7 million
  amount that we discuss here. The Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement also provided
  that a sum from a separate settlement, the Mensik Settlement, would be transferred to
  Watts Guerra.
                                            15
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  which received funds from the Illinois Common Benefit Pool. See id. at *1–2. Thus,

  the additional $7 million to be added to Watts Guerra’s share of the $503 million

  would be funded by decreases in the amount received by many other firms in the

  common benefit pool except those firms that were appealing the district court’s fee

  allocation orders—viz., Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, and Byrd/Shields, among

  others. With respect to the latter firms, their portions of the $503 million would be

  unchanged.

        Watts Guerra would be responsible for distributing the $7 million fee increase

  to firms in the sub-group with which it had litigated. Moreover,

               [f]or purposes of dividing the Fee Increase among members of the
               Watts Guerra Group, Watts [Guerra] shall treat the Fee Increase as
               if it were an award from the IRPA Pool; in other words, Watts
               [Guerra] shall have the same rights and obligations to the Watts
               Guerra Group with respect to the Fee Increase as Watts [Guerra]
               already has with respect to its anticipated IRPA Pool award, for
               which it petitioned on behalf of itself and the entire Watts Guerra
               Group.

  Id. at *3. Thus, although the $7 million would not actually become part of the IRPA

  Pool, it would be treated as if it had been for purposes of distribution. In other

  words, the $7 million reallocated to Watts Guerra would be distributed by Watts

  Guerra to the other firms in the Watts Guerra Group in the same fashion that a lump

  sum award from the IRPA Pool to Watts Guerra would be distributed.15

        15
                Distributing a lump sum award to their associated firms was one of the
  responsibilities of the law firms, including Watts Guerra, who sought an award from
  the IRPA Pool. In a report and recommendation issued by the special master—which
  was later accepted by the district court—the special master observed that “many
  IRPA Submissions were made by one IRPA Submitting Firm on behalf of itself and
                                             16
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        Several other aspects of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement bear

  mentioning. First, the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement provided that “Interested

  Parties” would have the opportunity to object. See id. at *6. The Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement defined “Interested Parties” as, in relevant part, “any . . .

  person or entity with a purported interest in the Aggregate Fee Award [of $503

  million], Expense Award, or Fee Allocation Orders.” Id. at *2. Thus, among others,

  Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, and Byrd/Shields qualify as “Interested Parties.”

        Second, with respect to interest on the fee and expense awards, the Watts

  Guerra Settlement Agreement provided:

               The Settling Parties agree that any earned interest they believe they
               are entitled to on their fee or expense awards under the [$503
               million] Aggregate Fee Award may be used by the Appellee Parties
               to resolve the appeals, and they agree that if any earned interest
               remains after the Appellee Parties exhaust all settlement
               discussions in connection with the Appeals, such earned interest
               shall be allocated as determined by the MDL Court [i.e., the district
               court] following briefing by the Parties.

  other associated law firms,” so there were many instances in which one firm would
  be responsible for distributing portions of their slice of the IRPA Pool to other firms.
  See Suppl. Jt. App., Vol. I, at 54 (Special Master’s R&R on IRPA Pool Allocation,
  filed May 14, 2021). The special master thus recommended requiring each group of
  firms to certify in writing that they had reached agreement on how their portion of
  the IRPA pool would be divided within that group. See id. (“Each IRPA Submitting
  Firm and their co-counsel . . . must certify in writing . . . that they have reached
  agreement regarding the appropriate allocation of the IRPA award with all co-counsel
  and/or referring counsel on whose behalf the IRPA Submitting Firm made IRPA
  Submissions.”). And in Watts Guerra’s revised petition for an award from the IRPA
  pool, it noted that “the Court should calculate and make a single award to Watts
  Guerra itself—with Watts Guerra responsible for dividing that award among itself
  and its associate counsel consistent with fee-sharing provisions in the underlying fee
  agreements.” Revised Pet. for IRPA Pool Award by Watts Guerra LLP, No. 2:14-
  md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4116, at *3 (D. Kan., filed Mar. 4, 2019).
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  Id. at *2.

         Third, the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement included a “most favored

  nation clause.” Pursuant to this clause, the Appellee Parties—which, again, did not

  include Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, or Byrd/Shields—agreed not to resolve any

  of the other pending appeals for “an amount equal to or greater than the [$7 million]

  Fee Increase, provided that, where multiple appeals were filed by the same

  appellant(s), such appeals shall be treated as ‘one’ appeal.” Id. at *3. These pending

  appeals included, inter alia, appeals of the December 2018 Fee Allocation Order, the

  March 2019 Kansas Pool Order, the July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order, and the

  November 2019 Illinois Pool Order filed by Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, and

  Byrd/Shields. See id. at *3 n.3.

         Fourth, because the IRPA Pool allocation was still pending, the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement provided that “[a]ll Parties” would be “entitled to pursue their

  pending petitions for an award from the IRPA Pool.” Id. at *3. This included the

  right to appeal any IRPA Pool allocation orders, “provided that no Party is entitled to

  argue that the aggregate IRPA Pool should be increased or reduced, or otherwise for

  reversal or modification of the [District] Court’s prior Fee Allocation Orders.” Id.

         The Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement was subject to several conditions

  precedent, including that the Appellee Parties must receive authorization from their

  own firms, Interested Parties must have an opportunity to object, and the district

  court must agree to approve the agreement.

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  D.    The District Court’s Approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

        1.     The Request for an Indicative Ruling

        Recognizing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify its earlier fee

  allocation orders because those orders had been appealed (and cross-appealed) by

  various firms, Watts Guerra and the Appellee Parties moved for an indicative ruling

  pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1.16 Specifically, they requested that

  the district court make “an indicative ruling that the [District] Court would approve

  the modifications to the fee allocation orders requested pursuant to the settlement,

  upon remand from the Tenth Circuit for that purpose.” Jt. Mot. for an Indicative

  Ruling, ECF No. 4485, at *2. According to the movants, they “request[ed] these

  modifications to resolve their dispute, to avoid additional expense and delay, and in

  furtherance of judicial economy.” Id. at *8.

        Watts Guerra and the Joint Appellees requested that “the Fee Allocation

  Orders be modified to increase the award of attorneys’ fees to Watts Guerra by a total

  of $7,048,667.” Id. at *5. The motion described in detail how Watts Guerra’s fee

  increase would be funded:

               The Fee Increase shall be funded by a proposed reduction of the
               Kansas Pool, the Minnesota Pool, and the [Heninger Garrison
               Davis] fee award from the Illinois Pool in the following manner:

        16
                 According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a), “[i]f a timely
  motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal
  that has been docketed and is pending, the court may” defer considering the motion,
  deny the motion, or “state either that it would grant the motion if the court of appeals
  remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” And “[t]he
  district court may decide the motion if the court of appeals remands for that
  purpose.” FED. R. CIV. P. 62.1(c).
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               (1) The Kansas Pool shall be reduced by $2,966,333.67, with
               corresponding pro rata reductions to each of the Kansas Firms
               (which by definition excludes the law firms awarded fees from the
               Kansas Allocation that have appealed the Court’s Fee Allocation
               Orders[] . . .). (2) The Minnesota Pool shall be reduced by
               $1,582,333.33, with corresponding pro rata reductions to each of
               the Minnesota Firms (which by definition excludes Watts Guerra
               and the Watts Guerra Group as well as all other firms awarded fees
               from the Minnesota Allocation that appealed the Court’s Fee
               Allocation Orders[] . . .). And, (3) the [Heninger Garrison Davis]
               fee award from the Illinois Pool shall be reduced by $2,500,00.00,
               with the Illinois Pool reduced by that same amount to account for
               this reduction in the [Heninger Garrison Davis] fee award.

  Id. at *5–6. The movants repeatedly observed that the proposed modification would

  not impact the share of the funds received by the firms who were otherwise appealing

  the district court’s orders, including Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, and

  Byrd/Shields. See id. at *6 (“The Settling Parties propose no reductions to any firm

  that has appealed the Fee Allocation Orders . . . .”); id. at *8–9 (“[T]he modification

  would make no changes to the fee awards to the other firms who have appealed the

  fee allocation. The Fee Increase thus does not impact the other law firms that have

  appealed the Fee Allocation Orders.”).

        Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry—which, again, we will at times refer to as

  the Objecting Firms—filed a response in opposition to the motion for an indicative

  ruling. See Byrd/Shields’s and Hossley-Embry’s Am. Objs. & Suggestions in Opp’n

  to the Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4492, at *1

  (D. Kan, filed Nov. 18, 2020). According to the Objecting Firms, Watts Guerra and

  the Appellee Parties “reached a private settlement agreement to divvy up the

  aggregate attorneys’ fee award and ask this Court to bless the private agreement by

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  ordering money be shaved from each of the three jurisdictional pools and that money

  handed over to Watts Guerra,” and the Objecting Firms urged the district court to

  “decline this invitation.” Id. at *2. Primarily, the Objecting Firms argued that (1) the

  Settlement Agreement would in fact generate additional litigation; (2) the request for

  modification of the district court’s fee orders showed that the original four-pool

  allocation was unreasonable; (3) the request for modification evinced backroom-

  dealing that was a reason to set aside the earlier fee allocation orders; and (4) if it

  approved the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, the district court would be

  shirking its responsibility to closely scrutinize the fee award.

         In reply, Watts Guerra and the Appellee Parties argued that the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement “has no financial impact on the fees [Byrd/Shields and

  Hossley-Embry] will receive,” and that, as a result, those firms lacked standing to

  object. Reply in Support of Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL,

  ECF No. 4496, at *1–4 (D. Kan., filed Nov. 19, 2020) (citing Tennille v. W. Union

  Co., 809 F.3d 555, 560 (10th Cir. 2015)). Additionally, Watts Guerra and the

  Appellee Parties disputed the way that Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry had framed

  the settlement, noting that the agreement “d[id] not request—and cannot support—

  reconsideration of the entirety of . . . [the] award of attorneys’ fees.” Id. at *2. And

  they argued that Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry had not provided adequate reasons

  for the district court to reject the settlement.

         The district court held a hearing on the motion for an indicative ruling on

  December 11, 2020. See Minute Entry, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4521 (D.

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  Kan., entered Dec. 11, 2020). At the hearing, the district court noted its reluctance to

  grant the motion for an indicative ruling, reasoning that if the settling parties were

  requesting an actual reshuffling of the fee allocation award, the district court would

  decline to do so because “the fee award was the result of a thorough and careful

  process,” the award “was fair and reasonable,” and “[n]o basis has been presented . . .

  by the movants here to find otherwise, and to modify the fee order that was

  predicated on that finding.” Tr. of Mot. Hr’g, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No.

  4526, at *5:6–10 (D. Kan., dated Dec. 11, 2020). But, on the other hand, the district

  court noted, if this was simply a matter of “the parties want[ing] to resolve their

  differences by a payment to Watts Guerra,” the district court did not object and

  “nothing in the rules . . . would require court approval for such a settlement of the

  appeal.” Id. at *5:11–15.

        The district court then heard from the Appellee Parties, who noted that they

  “[we]re not in any way seeking to modify the court’s prior finding[s]” regarding the

  fee award. Id. at *5:19–20; see also id. at *6:16–17 (“[W]e tried to make clear in our

  motion, we were not seeking in any way to call into question the appropriateness of

  [the original fee allocation].”). But even though they were not seeking to actually

  modify the prior fee allocation orders, the Appellee Parties and Watts Guerra wanted

  to seek the district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

  Although their reasons for doing so are not entirely pellucid, the reasons appeared to

  be that (1) they believed it was required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h); (2)

  the Settlement Agreement involved the entire Watts Guerra group; (3) the standpoint

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  of comity weighed in favor of it because some funds were being moved around; and

  (4) the parties wanted an enforceable settlement agreement. When the district court

  inquired as to whether it would be required to make findings of fact and conclusions

  of law pursuant to Rule 23(h), the Appellee Parties responded that those findings

  would be that “judicial efficiency” and “public policy” weighed in favor of resolving

  Watts Guerra’s pending appeals by settlement. Id. at *7:14–25.

        2.     The December 2020 Indicative Ruling

        On December 14, 2020, the district court entered an order (“the December

  2020 Indicative Ruling”) overruling the Objecting Firms’ objections, granting the

  motion for an indicative ruling, and noting that “[u]pon limited remand by the Tenth

  Circuit, the Court will issue an order as proposed by movants.” Dist. Ct. Mem. &

  Order, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4524, at *1 (D. Kan., filed Dec. 14, 2020).

  The district court reasoned that “[c]ourts always favor the settlement of disputes,”

  and the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement improves judicial economy because it

  will “effectuate the resolution of all appeals involving Watts [Guerra].” Id. at *3. It

  further noted that no party that would be actually affected opposed the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement.

        The district court took pains to clarify, though, that it was not making a

  substantive modification to its prior fee allocation orders:

               The Court makes clear that, by this ruling and by its subsequent
               order after remand, it is not modifying or reconsidering its findings
               and conclusions regarding the reasonableness and propriety of the
               method and amounts of [the] Court’s previous allocation of fees
               among the four pools or its previous awards of fees from those

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               pools. Movants have not challenged the reasonableness of the
               prior allocation and awards, and the Court reaffirms those findings
               and conclusions. By these present actions, the Court is only
               intending to modify its prior orders to the extent necessary to
               change the eventual distribution of money from the attorney fee
               fund to particular law firms to give effect to the settlement
               agreement between Watts [Guerra] and the other parties to the
               contract. The Court is not intending to affect in any way its prior
               awards to firms who are prosecuting appeals from the Court’s
               allocation and award orders.

  Id. at *3–4. The district court reiterated its doubt that it even needed to modify the

  orders for the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement to be consummated, because, after

  all, “the other parties could simply agree to make payments to Watts [Guerra] after

  they receive their fee awards from the common benefit pools.” Id. at *4. But the

  district court noted that it was persuaded that “the requested rulings would serve the

  interests of judicial economy” because “by altering at the front end the amounts

  distributed by the appointed administrator overseeing the attorney fee fund, the Court

  will allow the agreed redistribution of fees to be accomplished in the most efficient

  manner, while decreasing the likelihood of later delays or disputes concerning the

  payments.” Id.

        The district court overruled Byrd/Shields’s and Hossley-Embry’s objections to

  the Settlement Agreement. The district court first concluded that those firms “are not

  included in the agreement . . . and their fee awards would not be affected in any way;

  therefore, objectors have no interest in this issue, and thus they lack standing to

  oppose the requested approval and modifications.” Id. at *2 (citing Tennille, 809

  F.3d at 560). Additionally, the district court disagreed that the Watts Guerra

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  Settlement Agreement called into question the reasonableness of the prior fee

  allocation orders, observing that the “[m]ovants have not argued that the prior orders

  were unreasonable or incorrect, and it is clear that the modifications to those orders

  are requested only to effectuate the settlement with Watts [Guerra].” Id. at *2–3.

        3.     The January 2021 Settlement Order

        In the wake of the December 2020 Indicative Ruling, Watts Guerra and the

  Joint Appellees filed a motion in this Court requesting a limited remand so that the

  district court could approve the settlement agreement.

        The Objecting Firms and Toups/Coffman filed responses opposing the request

  for a limited remand. The Objecting Firms also bootstrapped to their response a

  request to resolve all of the pending Fee Allocation Appeals and vacate all of the

  relevant fee allocation orders. In reply, the movants contended that the Objecting

  Firms lacked standing to object and that they raised no actual argument against a

  limited remand (or against approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement).

        In a summary order, we granted the movants’ request and remanded all of

  Watts Guerra’s pending appeals to the district court “for the limited purpose of

  entering an order approving the settlement agreement between the Movants.” Order,

  Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *1 (10th Cir., filed Jan. 4, 2021). We also denied the requests

  made by the Objecting Firms to vacate all of the fee allocation orders.

        On the following day, January 5, 2021, the district court issued an order (“the

  January 2021 Settlement Order”) approving the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

  See Suppl. Jt. App., Vol. I, at 4 (Dist. Ct. Order Approving the Watts Guerra

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  Settlement Agreement, filed Jan. 5, 2021). The district court’s order noted that it

  “effects modification” of the December 2018 Fee Allocation Order, the March 2019

  Kansas Pool Order, the July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order, and the November 2019

  Illinois Pool Order in the limited manner set forth in the December 2020 Indicative

  Ruling. Id. at 5.

        Much of the January 2021 Settlement Order tracked the earlier December 2020

  Indicative Ruling word-for-word. As an example, the district court again reiterated

  that it was not substantively modifying its earlier fee allocation orders. See id. at 4

  n.1 (“The Court reiterates that by this ruling it is not modifying or reconsidering its

  findings and conclusions regarding the reasonableness and propriety of the method

  and amounts of [the] Court’s previous allocation of fees among the four pools or its

  previous awards of fees from those pools, and that the Court, for the sake of

  efficiency, is only intending to modify its prior orders to the extent necessary to

  change the eventual distribution of money from the attorney fee fund to particular

  law firms to give effect to the settlement agreement.”).

  D.    The District Court’s Disbursement of Funds

        1.     The Request for Disbursement of Funds

        While the motion for an indicative ruling was pending, Watts Guerra and

  Settlement Class Counsel filed a motion requesting disbursement of most of the $503

  million attorneys’ fees award. See Mot. for Disbursement of Funds, No. 2:14-md-

  02591-JWL, ECF No. 4497, at *1, *5 (D. Kan., filed Nov. 20, 2020). Specifically,

  the movants requested that the court disburse, minus a $30 million holdback, the

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  amounts awarded to the recipient firms in the March 2019 Kansas Pool Order, the

  July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order, and the November 2019 Illinois Pool Order. Under

  the proposed disbursement, $30 million of the awards made in those orders would

  remain held back in escrow. According to the movants, this $30 million holdback

  was “more than any legitimate estimate of what” the parties challenging the various

  fee allocation orders—including the Objecting Firms and Toups/Coffman—“[we]re

  seeking through their appeals.” Id. at *4. This holdback seems to have been

  proposed with the goal of streamlining the reallocation process in case any of those

  parties prevailed on appeal. All of the law firms involved in the attorneys’ fees

  dispute would receive the monies awarded to them by the fee allocation orders,

  including the Objecting Firms. The requested disbursement also included the amount

  awarded in the July 2019 Expense Order, though it did not include the funds

  allocated to the IRPA Pool, which had not yet been awarded to specific firms.17

        The disbursement request was contingent on approval of the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement and the resulting modifications to the earlier fee allocation

  orders. See id. at *2 (“Subject to and provided the Court grants the requested

  modifications pursuant to [the Watts Guerra] settlement agreement, Settlement Class

  Counsel now seek an order for disbursement . . . .”). Thus, if the motion to disburse

  was granted, the funds would be disbursed in a manner that comported with the Watts

        17
               The movants did request that when the IRPA pool was awarded, the
  funds be disbursed within two weeks. Ultimately, the district court denied this
  request without prejudice.
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  Guerra Settlement Agreement. See id. at *5 (requesting that “the fees be distributed

  in accordance with [the district court’s] Common Benefit Fee Awards, as modified

  by the proposed order approving the settlement with Watts Guerra, reduced pro rata

  to account for the $30 million holdback”). All told, the requested disbursement

  amounted to $412,714,426.35—about eighty-two percent of the $503 million—along

  with an additional $31 million in expenses.

        2.     The Objecting Firms’ Opposition

        The Objecting Firms, as well as Toups/Coffman, opposed the distribution of

  any funds while their appeals of the fee allocation orders were pending. Initially,

  their briefing focused on the difficulty of clawing back the distributed funds if they

  or the other firms were to prevail on their appeals of the fee allocation orders. After

  the district court issued the December 2020 Indicative Ruling, the Objecting Firms

  escalated their opposition to the request for disbursement. In addition to requesting

  either supplemental briefing or a hearing on whether the district court lacked

  jurisdiction, the Objecting Firms asked the district court to issue an order “staying

  any ruling [on] the Motion for Disbursement of Funds . . . until the Tenth Circuit

  Court of Appeals has issued a mandate in the appeals taken from this Court’s Orders

  allocating attorneys’ fees and expenses.” Jt. Mot. to Stay, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL,

  ECF No. 4535, at *1 (D. Kan, filed Dec. 18, 2020).

        In support of their motion to stay, the Objecting Firms argued that the

  requested disbursement would include the changes to the fee allocation orders

  implemented by the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement and that these changes

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  “reallocate $7 million by taking it away from the three common benefit pools and

  putting it into the IRPA fund, but [the district court] will not allow all IRPAs to share

  in the now $67 million IRPA pool.” Id. at *11; see also id. at *12 (“This

  ‘reshuffling’ of money among the four pools and giving Watts [Guerra] a dedicated

  bonus of $7 million from the money shaved from the other three pools financially

  harms [the Objecting Firms] because, if the IRPA fund was underfunded by $7

  million, that money should be put into the IRPA fund for all IRPA to share pro rata,

  including the Movants, and not for the exclusive benefit of Watts Guerra, particularly

  where this Court has stated it will not make any findings or conclusions to justify

  such a windfall to Watts Guerra.”). They further argued that the disbursement would

  disburse funds that had been improperly reallocated between the various pools by the

  Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement and that the district court had failed to make

  findings of fact or conclusions of law.18

        The district court denied the motion to stay—as well as the request for

  supplemental briefing and a hearing—in an order issued on December 31, 2020. See

  Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order, No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4546, at *1 (D. Kan.,

  filed Dec. 31, 2020). It noted that there would be no utility in granting a stay because

  the relief sought in the motion to stay was also what the Objecting Firms “s[ought] in

        18
                 Additionally, Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry filed a motion in this
  Court requesting that we enjoin the district court from granting the motion for
  disbursement. See Mot. to Enjoin the Dist. Ct., Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *1 (10th Cir.,
  filed Dec. 16, 2020). We denied that motion. See Order, Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *1
  (10th Cir., filed Jan. 6, 2021).
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  opposing the motion for disbursement,” and the district court would consider the

  arguments made by the Objecting Firms in support of their motion to stay when it

  ruled on the merits of the motion to disburse. Id. at *4.

        3.     The January 2021 Disbursement Orders

        On January 12, 2021, the District Court issued a pair of orders (“the January

  2021 Disbursement Orders”) granting the motion to disburse the funds and ordering

  the funds to be immediately made available to the various firms. See Suppl. Jt. App.,

  Vol. I, at 9–22 (Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order, filed Jan. 12, 2021); id. at 23–24 (Dist. Ct.

  Order Granting Mot. for Disbursement of Funds, filed Jan. 12, 2021). In the more

  substantive of the two orders, the district court—after concluding that it had

  jurisdiction to disburse the funds—provided its reasons for granting the motion to

  disburse. The district court rejected the Objecting Firms’ argument that the money

  would be too difficult to claw back—largely because of the $30 million that was held

  back in escrow—and noted that, as a matter of course, fees were often disbursed

  when appeals of the fee awards were pending.

        In the more substantive order, the district court also rejected the Objecting

  Firms’ “many arguments relating to the Watts Guerra settlement and the Court’s

  orders concerning that settlement.” Id. at 18. In particular, the district court

  concluded that it did not violate Rule 23(h) in approving the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement because “the Court did not disturb its [prior] fee awards, but rather it

  altered the eventual distribution of those awards by the administrator to effect the

  Watts Guerra settlement, for the sake of efficiency,” so additional findings of fact

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  and conclusions of law under Rule 23(h) were not required. Id. at 19; see also id.

  (reiterating that “[t]he Court did not make any substantive modification of its prior

  fee awards”).19 Additionally, the district court rejected the argument that the Watts

  Guerra Settlement Agreement had added funds to the IRPA Pool that the Objecting

  Firms would not be allowed to share in. Specifically, it concluded:

               Shields argues that the agreement sanctioned by the Court adds $7
               million to the IRPA pool, but that only Watts Guerra may receive
               that amount, with other firms denied the opportunity to share in
               that addition to the pool. That argument is frivolous, based on a
               blatant misreading of the agreement. The agreement and the
               Court’s orders make clear that the only modifications are to the
               common benefit pools, not the IRPA pool, and the agreement
               provides that Watts Guerra shall treat the additional funds as if they
               had come from the IRPA pool for the purpose of distributing those
               fund[s] to associated counsel.

  Id at 19–20.20 In the second, summary order, the district court ordered the immediate

  disbursement of the funds by Settlement Class Counsel.

        19
                 In its earlier order denying the Objecting Firms’ request for a stay, the
  district court foreshadowed this conclusion, noting that “Shields appears to have
  willfully misrepresented what the Court did in the indicative ruling. The Court made
  clear in that ruling that it was not disturbing its findings regarding the reasonable
  allocations and awards of attorney fees . . . and that it was merely agreeing to alter
  the distribution of fees . . . in accordance with the private settlement agreement for
  the sake of efficiency.” Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order, ECF No. 4546, at *5 n.5.
        20
                The district court also rejected an argument advanced by the Objecting
  Firms that a letter sent to one of their component firms showed that all firms were
  being forced to fund the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, regardless of whether
  they were a party to that agreement. Specifically, the district court noted that the
  letter was concededly sent in error, and its sending did not indicate that non-parties to
  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement would be financially impacted.
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        Shortly thereafter, Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry filed amended notices of

  appeal challenging the January 2021 Settlement Order and the January 2021

  Disbursement Orders. Their appeals were docketed as No. 21-3021 and No. 21-3022,

  respectively. Additionally, Toups/Coffman amended earlier notices of appeal to

  include challenges to the January 2021 Settlement Order and the January 2021

  Disbursement Orders. Their appeal was docketed as No. 21-3020.

  E.    Early History of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals

        After the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals were docketed, Watts Guerra and

  Settlement Class Counsel moved to dismiss these appeals. See Watts Guerra’s Mot.

  to Dismiss, Nos. 21-3021 et al., at *1 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 17, 2021); Settlement

  Class Counsel’s Mot. to Dismiss, Nos. 21-3021 et al., at *1 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 17,

  2021). These motions remain pending.

        As explained in more detail below, Watts Guerra’s motion primarily argues

  that the Objecting Firms lack standing to appeal the January 2021 Settlement Order

  in which the district court approved the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. And in

  their motion to dismiss, Settlement Class Counsel (1) joined Watts Guerra’s standing

  argument; (2) argued that the Objecting Firms lack standing to object to the January

  2021 Disbursement Orders; and (3) argued that even if the Objecting Firms had

  standing, their challenge to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders would necessarily

  be mooted by resolution of the Fee Allocation Appeals, so the Watts Guerra

                                            32
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  Settlement Appeals should be abated.21 Heninger Garrison Davis, LLC, one of the

  leadership firms from Illinois and one of the Appellee Parties, filed a response in

  support of the motions to dismiss.

        The Objecting Firms opposed the motions to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that

  their “interest in the amount of attorneys’ fees they receive confer[s] Article III

  standing to challenge the District Court’s fee-allocation process and its results,”

  including the January 2021 Settlement Order and the January 2021 Disbursement

  Orders. Jt. Suggestions in Opp’n to Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss, Nos. 21-3021 et al.,

  at *9 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 3, 2021).

        Without resolving the motions to dismiss, we abated the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals pending further order of this Court. See Order, Nos. 21-3021 et

  al., at *2 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 5, 2021). We required that “[w]ithin 5 days of a

  decision in the fee allocation appeals or any other development that affects the

  abatement of these appeals, the appellants shall file a written report(s) addressing the

  impact of the decision or other development on these appeals.” Id. (bold typeface

  omitted).

  F.    The IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals and the Contingent Cross-Appeal

        Not long after we abated the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, and while the

  original Fee Allocation Appeals were still pending, the district court allocated the

        21
               Settlement Class Counsel also moved to dismiss Toups/Coffman’s
  separate appeal, No. 21-3020, but that appeal has since been resolved. See infra note
  24.
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  funds within the IRPA pool. Specifically, the district court issued an order on June 4,

  2021 (“the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order”) that adopted an earlier report

  and recommendation filed by the special master and awarded $60 million within the

  IRPA Pool. See Suppl. Jt. App., Vol. XIII, at 3561–3570 (Dist. Ct. Mem. & Order on

  IRPA Pool Allocation, filed June 4, 2021).

        A number of firms, including Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry, filed notices

  of appeal challenging the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order. Their appeals

  were docketed as No. 21-3111 and No. 21-3110, respectively, and we refer to these

  as the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals. Additionally, Kansas Co-Lead Counsel filed a

  “conditional or contingent cross-appeal” of the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation

  Order, which was docketed as No. 21-3121.

        After the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals were filed, Watts Guerra and

  Settlement Class Counsel separately moved to dismiss the appeals filed by the

  Objecting Firms.22 Before the Objecting Firms could respond to the motions to

  dismiss, we issued an order procedurally consolidating the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals and the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals and noting that any challenges to the

  January 2021 Settlement Order or the January 2021 Disbursement Orders “shall

  remain abated.” Order, Nos. 21-3111 et al., at *2 (10th Cir., filed July 1, 2021). We

  subsequently issued an order providing that “[a]ny challenges to the district court’s

        22
             Settlement Class Counsel also sought to dismiss a separate appeal filed
  by Toups/Coffman, No. 21-3106, but that appeal has since been resolved. See infra
  note 24.
                                            34
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  allocation of the IRPA pool itself will be addressed in” the IRPA Pool Allocation

  Appeals, and that “briefing as to the merits of the IRPA pool allocation is hereby

  abated pending further order of this [C]ourt.” Order, Nos. 21-3111 et al., at *1–2

  (10th Cir., filed July 12, 2021). We also procedurally consolidated the contingent

  cross-appeal with the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals and the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals.

        Additionally, because the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order was issued

  after we held oral argument on the Fee Allocation Appeals, we requested that the

  parties file “supplemental briefing as to the effect of the district court’s June 4, 2021,

  order allocating the IRPA pool on the substantive issues raised in the . . . [F]ee

  [A]llocation [A]ppeals.” Order, Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *1 (10th Cir., filed July 12,

  2021). We noted that the supplemental briefs “shall not raise any challenge to the

  district court’s allocation of the IRPA pool itself”—instead, “the merits of the IRPA

  pool allocation” would be separately addressed in the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals.

  Id.

        The parties subsequently submitted their supplemental briefs: in particular,

  Byrd/Shields’s briefing focused on the deleterious impacts of the Watts Guerra

  Settlement and the “meager” twelve percent of the total attorneys’ fees award that

  was allocated to the IRPA Pool. See Supp. Br. of Aplts. Shields Law Group, LLC

  and Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *1–8 (10th Cir., filed July

  26, 2021); accord Suppl. Br. of Aplt. Hossley-Embry, LLP, Nos. 19-3008 et al., at *2

                                              35
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  (10th Cir., filed July 26, 2021) (incorporating by reference the arguments made by

  Byrd/Shields).

  G.     Resolution of the Fee Allocation Appeals by In re Syngenta I

         On February 28, 2023, we issued In re Syngenta I, which affirmed the various

  orders of the district court with respect to the Fee Allocation Appeals including,

  notably, the district court’s December 2018 Fee Allocation Order, March 2019

  Kansas Pool Order, July 2019 Minnesota Pool Order, November 2019 Illinois Pool

  Order, and July 2019 Expense Order. See 61 F.4th at 1138.

            1.     Issues Decided in In re Syngenta I

         After laying out the tortuous procedural history of the case, we had to decide

  the issue of finality: specifically, given the fact that the district court did not

  complete allocation of the $503 million until the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation

  Order, did we lack jurisdiction over appeals that were filed before that date? We

  concluded that “all proceedings after the Kansas district court’s Aggregate Fee Order

  and corresponding Final Order and Judgment constitute one, post-judgment litigation

  that only concluded with the filing of the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order,”

  and, consequently, “all appeals challenging the Kansas district court’s various

  allocation orders . . . before the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order were not

  appeals from final orders as required for our jurisdictional purposes.” Id. at 1173–74.

  However, we concluded that the appellants’ notices of appeal—though prematurely

  filed—ripened when the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order was issued, so we

  had jurisdiction over the Fee Allocation Appeals. See id. at 1176–77.

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        Once assured of our own jurisdiction, we then addressed the various

  challenges that the appellants—including the Objecting Firms—had made to the

  district court’s fee allocation process. Ultimately, we rejected all challenges to the

  district court’s decisions, concluding, among other things, that (1) the district court

  acted within its discretion in modifying the appellants’ contingent-fee contracts; (2)

  the district court acted within its discretion in devising the four-pool system and in

  determining the appropriate percentages for each pool; (3) the district court acted

  within its discretion in allocating the funds within the Kansas Common Benefit Pool

  and the Minnesota Common Benefit Pool; (4) the district court did not err in

  determining that the joint prosecution agreements did not govern the fee allocation

  after the Syngenta settlement; (5) the district court acted within its discretion in

  allotting twelve percent of the aggregate fee award to the IRPA pool; (6) the district

  court’s July 2019 Expense Order was reasonable; and (7) the district court’s

  deferential review of the allocation decisions made by the Illinois federal court did

  not prejudice the appellants challenging the November 2019 Illinois Pool Order. We

  also dismissed one of the cross-appeals raised by Kansas Co-Lead Counsel as moot.

        Finally, we also rejected Byrd/Shields’s and Hossley-Embry’s attempts to file

  additional briefing to challenge the district court’s denial of their motions for

  reconsideration, see supra note 12. We concluded that Byrd/Shields and Hossley-

  Embry had “effectively waived their arguments” on the motion for reconsideration by

  failing to raise them in their opening briefs, and, in any event, their arguments were

  “meritless and irrelevant to our review.” Id. at 1223–24.

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        Accordingly, we affirmed the judgment of the district court in full.23

             2.    Issues Not Decided in In re Syngenta I

        Although we resolved the vast majority of the outstanding issues in In re

  Syngenta I, we did not purport to resolve all of the issues raised in connection with

  the attorneys’ fees dispute.

        First, with respect to the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, we acknowledged

  the existence of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement and observed that “[b]y

  design, the Watts Guerra Settlement would not affect the fee awards of firms that

  were not party to the agreement.” Id. at 1169. But we declined to reach

  Byrd/Shields’s argument that “the district court abused its discretion when, [in]

  January 2021, it re-allocated the amounts awarded to the four pools ‘without

  complying with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23(h).’” Id. at 1208 n.51 (second

  alteration in original). In declining to reach this argument, we reasoned that “[a]fter

  reviewing the record, we find Byrd and Shields’s Rule 23(h) argument better

  described as a challenge to the Watts Guerra Settlement and, therefore, outside the

  scope of our review in the instant appeal.” Id.; see also id. at 1208 n.52 (“Reflecting

  the directions of our Supplemental Briefing Order, we confine our discussion of the

  Kansas district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement to its implications for

  the court’s alleged disregard of the [joint prosecution agreements].”).

        23
              Several parties, including Toups/Coffman, Hossley-Embry, and
  Byrd/Shields, sought rehearing en banc. We denied these requests.
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        Second, with respect to the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals, we noted that we

  had previously “prohibited the parties from ‘rais[ing] any challenge to the district

  court’s allocation of the IRPA pool itself’ and limited the supplemental briefing ‘to

  arguments regarding whether, and to what extent, the [June 2021 IRPA Pool

  Allocation Order] . . . affect[ed] the fee allocation issues already briefed by the

  parties.’” Id. at 1169 n.26 (alterations and omission in original). We further noted

  that although the parties had properly filed separate notices of appeal with respect to

  the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order—as they were required to do under our

  precedent—“the merits issues in the appeals now before us focus exclusively on the

  Kansas district court’s orders before June 2021, and we have abated the appeals filed

  with respect to the court’s June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order pending our

  resolution of these appeals.” Id. at 1177 n.32.

        Thus, we declined to decide either the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals or the

  IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals.

  H.    Subsequent Proceedings in the Pending Appeals

        Notwithstanding their defeat in the Fee Allocation Appeals, on March 15,

  2023, the Objecting Firms filed a “Motion to Lift Stay and to Enter a Scheduling

  Order” in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals and the IRPA Pool Allocation

  Appeals. See Mot. to Lift Stay & to Enter a Scheduling Order, Nos. 21-3021 et al., at

  *1–2 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 15, 2023). According to the Objecting Firms, because we

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  resolved the Fee Allocation Appeals, their remaining appeals are “ripe for

  consideration.” Id. at *4–5.24

         Both the Joint Appellees and Watts Guerra filed responses. In their response,

  the Joint Appellees agree that the abatement should be lifted, but they “strongly

  disagree[] . . . that these appeals warrant ‘full briefing.’” Jt. Aplees.’ Resp. to

  Shields Aplts.’ Mot. to Lift Stay & Enter a Scheduling Order, Nos. 21-3021 et al., at

  *2 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 27, 2023). They instead suggest that the remaining appeals

  should be dismissed or summarily affirmed. With respect to the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals, they argue that the already-filed motions to dismiss should be

  granted. And with respect to the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals, they argue that the

  district court’s judgment should be “summarily affirmed.” Id. at *16.

         Watts Guerra opposes the Objecting Firms’ request in part, also agreeing that

  the abatement should be lifted but arguing that its motion to dismiss the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals should be resolved before reaching the merits of those appeals.

  See Watts Guerra’s Opp’n to Shields Aplts.’ Mot. to Enter a Scheduling Order, Nos.

  21-3021 et al., at *2, *8 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 27, 2023). Watts Guerra also noted

  that to the extent the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals “challenge only the allocation

  within the IRPA pool, Watts Guerra does not consider itself to be an appellee,” but

         24
               The Objecting Firms also sought to re-open Toups/Coffman’s appeals of
  the Watts Guerra Settlement Order and the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order.
  But Toups/Coffman themselves asserted that they “d[id] not believe that further
  proceedings [were] necessary” in either of their remaining appeals. Resp. to May 9,
  2023 Order, Nos. 21-3020 et al., at *2 (10th Cir., filed May 22, 2023). We
  accordingly dismissed both of Toups/Coffman’s appeals.
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  that it “agrees with Joint Appellees that those appeals should be resolved without

  further briefing.” Id. at *6 n.3.25

         We issued an order on May 9, 2023 (“the May 2023 Briefing Order”), that

  took the Objecting Firms’ motion under advisement. See Order, Nos. 21-3021 et al.,

  at *1 (10th Cir., filed May 9, 2023). In the May 2023 Briefing Order, we also, inter

  alia, required the Objecting Firms to show cause as to why the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals should not be dismissed as moot. In response, Byrd/Shields and

  Hossley-Embry filed identical memoranda asserting that the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals are not moot. See Aplts.’ Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by

  Byrd/Shields, No. 21-3021, at *1 (10th Cir., filed May 22, 2023); Aplt.’s Mem.

  Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Hossley-Embry, No. 21-3022, at *1 (10th Cir.,

  filed May 22, 2023).

         25
                Both the Joint Appellees and Watts Guerra also contend that the
  Objecting Firms filed their motion to lift the stay without complying with 10TH CIR.
  R. 27.1 or our earlier order requiring the appellants to file, within five days of a
  decision on the Fee Allocation Appeals, a report explaining the impact of that
  decision on the pending appeals. The Joint Appellees further suggest that the very
  fact that the Objecting Firms seek to reopen the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals and
  the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals “should subject [the Objecting Firms] to
  sanctions.” Jt. Aplees.’ Resp. to Shields Aplts.’ Mot. to Lift Stay & Enter a
  Scheduling Order, at *14. Because we dismiss the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals
  for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we decline to take action on—or opine on the
  merits of—these perfunctory arguments and requests.

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  I.     The December 2023 Disbursement Order26

         Finally, on November 9, 2023, Settlement Class Counsel, as well as a number

  of other attorneys, filed a motion in the district court requesting that the district court

  disburse most of the funds remaining in escrow. The movants asserted that almost

  $93 million—consisting of the $30 million holdback from the common benefit pools,

  the entire $60.2 million allocation to the IRPA pool, and over $2 million in funds

  approved for disbursement but not yet claimed by firms—remained in escrow. The

  movants contended that (1) the $30 million that was originally held back from the

  common benefit pools should be disbursed in light of our resolution of the various

  fee allocation appeals in In re Syngenta I; and (2) the $60 million in the IRPA Pool

  should also be disbursed even though the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals remained

  pending.

         26
                Pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 28(j), the Joint Appellees wrote to us on
  December 15, 2023, to apprise us of these recent developments in the district court.
  We have the discretion to take judicial notice of filings on the district court docket.
  See, e.g., United States v. Smalls, 605 F.3d 765, 768 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010). To be
  clear, we recognize that “standing is determined at the time the action is brought.”
  Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir. 2007). We do not rely on the district
  court’s December 2023 Disbursement Order—issued after these appeals were
  brought—in our determination infra regarding whether the Objecting Firms have
  standing. Rather, we notice the order merely to provide a more complete historical
  picture of the Objecting Firms’ arguments concerning the Watts Guerra Settlement
  Agreement and the court’s response to them. See, e.g., 21B Charles Alan Wright, et
  al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5106.4 (2d ed.), Westlaw (database
  updated Apr. 2023) (noting that “[j]udicial records are a source of ‘reasonably
  indisputable accuracy’ when they record some judicial action” and that “[j]udicial
  records may sometimes be properly noticed to show the acts of the parties or other
  actors in the litigation”).

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        Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry filed a response in opposition to the motion

  to disburse. With respect to the $30 million holdback, the Objecting Firms asserted

  that those funds should not be disbursed because there were still remaining appeals

  that implicated the four-pool allocation scheme and the $30 million could be used to

  reach a settlement with the opposing parties. And with respect to the $60 million

  allocation to the IRPA Pool, the Objecting Firms contended that those monies should

  not be disbursed in light of their pending challenges on appeal to the IRPA Pool.

  They also asserted—again—that an additional $7 million was added to that pool by

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

        On December 13, 2023, the district court issued an order granting the motion

  for disbursement (“the December 2023 Disbursement Order”). See Mem. & Order,

  No. 2:14-md-02591-JWL, ECF No. 4713 (D. Kan., filed Dec. 13, 2023). After

  concluding that it had jurisdiction to grant the movants’ request, the district court

  concluded that the monies at issue should be disbursed. As to the $30 million

  holdback, the district court noted that in In re Syngenta I, we affirmed the district

  court’s fee allocation orders, so the awards from the common benefit pools have now

  been affirmed and, consequently, there is no need for the holdback at this point. And

  as to the over $60 million in the IRPA pool, the district court observed that the total

  allocation to that pool was affirmed in In re Syngenta I, and the Objecting Firms had

  little likelihood of success in the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals.27

        27
              This conclusion was based in part on the district court’s conclusion that
  Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry “did not preserve (by raising in [the district court])
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        The district court also opined on the Objecting Firms’ likelihood of success in

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, noting that it had rejected the Objecting Firms’

  arguments “on multiple occasions and in the strongest terms.” December 2023

  Disbursement Order, ECF No. 4713, at *7. The district court also stated that

  “because objectors’ fee awards would not be affected (as the payment to Watts

  Guerra was being made only by certain firms who agreed to the settlement), objectors

  lacked standing to object to the settlement.” Id. at *8. The district court chastised

  the Objecting Firms for their failure to address their lack of standing despite the issue

  having been repeatedly raised.

                                     II.    DISCUSSION

        In In re Syngenta I, we did not—and could not—resolve all of the myriad and

  long-percolating disputes related to attorneys’ fees from the Syngenta class action

  settlement. Nor do we bring those disputes to an end today. But we can close the

  door on one aspect of this protracted litigation by resolving the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals, which challenge the district court’s January 2021 Settlement

  Order and January 2021 Disbursement Orders.

        Although the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals—Nos. 21-3021 and 21-3022—

  remain abated at this time, multiple sets of motions are now fully briefed and ready

  for decision: Watts Guerra’s motion to dismiss, Settlement Class Counsel’s motion to

  dismiss, and the Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the abatement and enter a scheduling

  any specific objection to the IRPA award and recommendation that the Court
  adopted.” December 2023 Disbursement Order, ECF No. 4713, at *7.
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  order. For the following reasons, we grant in part, deny in part, and defer ruling

  on in part the Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the abatement and enter a scheduling

  order, and we lift the abatement. We grant Watts Guerra’s motion to dismiss,

  grant Settlement Class Counsel’s motion to dismiss, and dismiss these appeals.

         We will first discuss the general contours of Article III’s case-or-controversy

  requirement, focusing on two doctrines particularly germane to this case: standing

  and mootness. Next, we will lay out the various arguments made by the parties about

  our subject-matter jurisdiction. Finally, we will explain how we lack subject-matter

  jurisdiction over the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals because (1) the Objecting

  Firms lack standing to challenge the January 2021 Settlement Order and (2)

  principles of mootness and standing make clear that we lack subject-matter

  jurisdiction over any challenge to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders.

  A.     Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement

         Because federal courts—including appellate courts—are “courts of limited

  subject-matter jurisdiction,” “we ‘may only hear cases when empowered to do so by

  the Constitution and by act of Congress.’” Gad v. Kan. State Univ., 787 F.3d 1032,

  1035 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220,

  1225 (10th Cir. 2004)). “Our subject-matter jurisdiction is a constitutional

  prerequisite to hearing a case,” and we have an obligation to ensure that we have

  jurisdiction before reaching the merits of an appeal. Id.; see also Rio Grande Found.

  v. Oliver, 57 F.4th 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e have an independent duty to

  ensure ourselves of our own jurisdiction . . . .”).

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        One fundamental principle of our subject-matter jurisdiction is the

  “constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or

  controversies.” Brown v. Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting

  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013)). “Two related doctrines,

  standing and mootness, keep federal courts within their constitutional bounds.” Id.

  The Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals implicate both doctrines.28

        1.     Standing

        “Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

  ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Defs. of Wildlife v. Everson, 984 F.3d 918, 944–45

  (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). As such, “[a] challenge to

  standing presents the ‘threshold jurisdictional question of whether a court may

  consider the merits of a dispute.’” Tennille, 809 F.3d at 559 (quoting S. Utah

        28
               Another aspect of our jurisdiction is the requirement that appeals be
  taken from a final decision of the district court—an issue that we analyzed in depth in
  In re Syngenta I. See 61 F.4th at 1171–77 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). In that case, we
  concluded that most of the appellants’ notices of appeal were prematurely filed
  because a final decision was not present until the district court issued the June 2021
  IRPA Pool Allocation Order. See id. at 1173–74. Nevertheless, we concluded that
  we had jurisdiction over the various Fee Allocation Appeals because the premature
  notices of appeal ripened when the June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order was
  issued. See id. at 1177.

         Although no party raises the issue of finality with respect to the Watts Guerra
  Settlement Appeals, we have an independent obligation to ensure our own appellate
  jurisdiction. See Rio Grande Found., 57 F.4th at 1165. We conclude that—as with
  the Fee Allocation Appeals—the Objecting Firms’ premature notices of appeal
  challenging the district court’s January 2021 Settlement Order and January 2021
  Disbursement Orders ripened when the district court issued its June 2021 IRPA Pool
  Allocation Order. See In re Syngenta I, 61 F.4th at 1176–77.
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  Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143, 1152 (10th Cir. 2013)). “The standing

  Article III requires must be met by persons seeking appellate review, just as it must

  be met by persons appearing in courts of first instance.” Id. (quoting Arizonans for

  Off. English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). Thus, “[i]f we conclude a party

  lacks standing to appeal from a district court’s order, we lack jurisdiction over the

  appeal and must dismiss it.” Id. We review the issue of standing de novo. See id.

         “To establish the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing,” a party

  must make three showings: “‘(1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete

  and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the

  injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely,

  as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable

  decision.’” Everson, 984 F.3d at 945 (first quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

  U.S. 555, 560 (1992); then quoting New Eng. Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v.

  Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008)). The party invoking federal

  jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements. See id.

         For purposes of standing, “a party’s injury may be a procedural one ‘so long as

  the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest

  of [the party] that is the ultimate basis of [its] standing.’” New Mexico v. Dep’t of

  Interior, 854 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2017) (alterations in original) (quoting

  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8). “To establish standing in such circumstances, a plaintiff

  ‘need only show that compliance with the procedural requirements could have better

  protected its concrete interests,’ and thus that the procedural violation created a ‘risk

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  of real harm . . . .’” Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting WildEarth Guardians v.

  EPA, 759 F.3d 1196, 1205 (10th Cir. 2014); then quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578

  U.S. 330, 341 (2016)). But a party cannot “allege a bare procedural violation,

  divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of

  Article III.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.

        2.     Mootness

        Article III’s case-and-controversy requirement is also the basis for our

  mootness doctrine. See Unified Sch. Dist. No. 259 v. Disability Rights Ctr. of Kan.,

  491 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). Mootness is essentially “standing set in a time

  frame” and ensures that “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the

  commencement of the litigation . . . continue[s] throughout its existence.” Prison

  Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 879 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting

  Brown, 822 F.3d at 1164).

        “A ‘suit becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the

  parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Brown, 822 F.3d at 1165

  (quoting Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013)). “An action becomes moot ‘[i]f

  an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake’” in the

  outcome. Prison Legal News, 944 F.3d at 880 (alteration in original) (quoting

  Brown, 822 F.3d at 1165). Thus, “[t]he crucial question is whether granting a present

  determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world.” Brown,

  822 F.3d at 1165–66 (quoting Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d 1207, 1212

  (10th Cir. 2005)). “Put another way, a case becomes moot when a plaintiff no longer

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  suffers actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at

  1166 (quoting Ind v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015)).

        “Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or

  controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” Rio Grande

  Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010)

  (quoting Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 428 F.3d 992, 996 (10th Cir.

  2005)). “Without a live, concrete controversy, we lack jurisdiction to consider

  claims no matter how meritorious.” Id. (quoting Habecker v. Town of Estes Park,

  518 F.3d 1217, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008)). And “[t]he controversy must exist not only at

  the time the complaint is filed but at all stages of appellate review.” Lucero v.

  Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011); see also

  United States v. Fisher, 805 F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Th[e] case-or-

  controversy limitation requires that parties continue to have a personal stake in the

  outcome of a lawsuit during all stages of litigation, including appellate review.”).

  B.    Parties’ Arguments

        Because of the complexity of this case, and the fact that the parties’ discussion

  of our subject-matter jurisdiction has proceeded in a nontraditional matter—viz.,

  throughout a variety of different documents—it is helpful to expressly lay out the

  parties’ various arguments. These arguments can be found in the briefing on the

  motions to dismiss the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, in the responses in

  opposition to the Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the stay, and in the Objecting Firms’

  memoranda on mootness. We discuss the arguments in each set of filings in turn.

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         1.     The Motions to Dismiss

         The most fulsome discussion of our subject-matter jurisdiction exists in the

  briefing on Watts Guerra’s and Settlement Class Counsel’s motions to dismiss. But

  there is a caveat to taking that briefing at face value: it pre-dates our decision in In re

  Syngenta I, which resolved the related Fee Allocation Appeals. Thus, we must bear

  in mind that the landscape of subject-matter jurisdiction—particularly with regard to

  mootness—has shifted since the motions were briefed.

                a.     Watts Guerra’s Motion to Dismiss

         Watts Guerra argues that the Objecting Firms “have no standing to challenge”

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement because “[t]hey were not required to

  contribute to the settlement payment, their own attorneys’ fees were not reduced, and

  their own appeals were not affected.” Watts Guerra’s Mot. to Dismiss at *2. Watts

  Guerra repeatedly points to language in both the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

  itself and the district court’s orders indicating that the attorneys’ fees received by the

  Objecting Firms would be unaffected.

         Watts Guerra cites the general rule that “a non-settling party does not have

  standing to object to a settlement between other parties.” Id. at *12 (quoting Agretti

  v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 242, 246 (7th Cir. 1992)). They also compare

  this situation to Tennille, arguing that, like the defendant in Tennille, the Objecting

  Firms are not paying the attorneys’ fees at issue here—instead, all money will come

  from the coffers of the settling parties.

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        With respect to the January 2021 Disbursement orders, Watts Guerra observes

  that resolving the Fee Allocation Appeals—which, again, at the time the motion to

  dismiss was filed, had not yet been resolved—“could moot any challenge” to those

  orders. Id. at *14 n.9.

               b.     Settlement Class Counsel’s Motion to Dismiss

        In their motion to dismiss, Settlement Class Counsel expressly join Watts

  Guerra’s motion to dismiss the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals insofar as they

  relate to the January 2021 Settlement Order. And with respect to the January 2021

  Disbursement Orders,29 they raise two distinct arguments.

        First, Settlement Class Counsel argue that the Objecting Firms lack standing to

  challenge the January 2021 Disbursement Orders because they cannot show “any

  concrete injury arising from” the January 2021 Disbursement Orders. Settlement

  Class Counsel’s Mot. to Dismiss at *8. According to Settlement Class Counsel, the

  Objecting Firms lack standing because they are “beneficiaries of [those] order[s],

  which permit[] them to receive reimbursement of all their approved expenses and the

        29
                Settlement Class Counsel also apparently intended their arguments to
  relate to any challenge to the district court’s December 31, 2020, denial of
  Byrd/Shields’s motion to stay. See Settlement Class Counsel’s Mot. to Dismiss at *1
  (“Settlement Class Counsel further move to dismiss the three appeals to the extent
  that [appellants] seek review of the district court’s December 31, 2021 [sic] or
  January 12, 2021 orders denying a motion to stay and granting in part Settlement
  Class Counsel’s request for a partial distribution . . . .”). However, there is no
  indication that Byrd/Shields or Hossley-Embry challenge that order, which was not
  named in their notices of appeal. And to the extent that they originally intended to do
  so, any challenge to that order would now be moot because the movants asked for
  any ruling on disbursement to be stayed until after the Fee Allocation Appeals were
  decided—a condition that has now occurred.
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  same share of their presently awarded attorneys’ fees, from the common benefit

  pools, as other recipients.” Id. Furthermore, they argue that the $30 million

  holdback is sufficient to cover any amount that could possibly be shifted around as a

  result of the Fee Allocation Appeals.

        Second, Settlement Class Counsel argue that we should abate the appeals with

  respect to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders because a decision on the Fee

  Allocation Appeals would “almost certainly moot any challenge to the disbursement

  orders.” Id. at *7. Given that we did, in fact, abate the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals and have since resolved the Fee Allocation Appeals, this argument is stale.

  But it could still bear on the question of whether the appeals are now moot;

  specifically, Settlement Class Counsel originally argued that the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals should be abated pending a final decision on the Fee Allocation

  Appeals because “[o]ne way or another, the resolution of the fee allocation appeals

  will moot the appeals to the” January 2021 Disbursement Orders. Id. at *11. On this

  point, Settlement Class Counsel argue that if the Objecting Firms “lose their fee

  allocation appeals, they could not articulate any basis to challenge the disbursement

  order[s] because the district court’s allocation of attorneys’ fees [was] affirmed.” Id.

               c.     The Combined Response to the Motions to Dismiss

        In response, the Objecting Firms argue that they have standing because

  “standing emanates directly from the existence of the attorney fee fund, the District

  Court’s allocation Orders, its reallocation Order, its rejection of Appellant’s Motion

  to Reconsider the District Court’s allocations, and from the Watts Guerra settlement

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  agreement which the District Court incorporated into the reallocation Order.” Jt.

  Suggestions in Opp’n to Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss at *2. Although their specific

  arguments as to why they have standing are overlapping and difficult to tease apart,

  they appear to fall into six broad categories.30

         First, they seemingly contend that the terms of the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement itself gives them standing because the Settlement Agreement denominates

  them as “Interested Parties.” See id. at *8.

         Second, they argue that their “interest in the amount of attorneys’ fees they

  receive” confers Article III standing. Id. at *9. According to Byrd/Shields and

  Hossley-Embry, they have a property interest in the $503 million, which suffices to

  give them standing to challenge the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement insofar as

  that agreement changes the ultimate destination of some of those monies.

         Third, they argue that the district court in fact reallocated money among the

  pools. Specifically, they contend that despite its earlier findings of fact and

  conclusions of law about the propriety of the carefully calculated four-pool allocation

  (and despite its refusal to grant their motion for reconsideration), the district court

         30
               In a footnote, the Objecting Firms cite to a case from our sister circuit,
  In re High Sulfur Gasoline Products Liability Litigation, 517 F.3d 220, 231 (5th Cir.
  2008), noting that, in that case, an immediate disbursement order violated the
  automatic stay provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a). But they do not
  develop an argument that the automatic stay provision of Rule 62(a) has, in fact, been
  violated here or describe how this argument relates to standing. As such, we treat
  this argument as waived, and we do not count it as a seventh separate argument. See
  United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[A]rguments may be
  deemed waived when they are advanced . . . only ‘in a perfunctory manner.’”
  (quoting United States v. Wooten, 377 F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004))).
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  “[i]nexplicably . . . increased the IRPA [Pool] fund by $7 million and awarded that

  increase to Watts Guerra.” Id. at *13.

        Fourth, they argue that the provision of the Settlement Agreement requiring

  that the Appellee Parties not settle for any amount equal to or greater than the $7

  million received by Watts Guerra—a “most favored nation clause”—confers

  standing.

        Fifth, they very briefly mention that the $503 million, including the funds

  shifted around by the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, were “in escrow earning

  interest which would have been shared among plaintiffs’ counsel, including

  Appellants.” Id. at *10. Watts Guerra and Settlement Class Counsel construe this

  sentence as attempting to argue that the Objecting Firms’ entitlement to a share of the

  interest on the funds shifted around by the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

  suffices to give the Objecting Firms standing.

        Sixth, the Objecting Firms argue that they have suffered a procedural injury

  because the district court failed to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

  23(h), 54(d)(2), and 52(a) when it reallocated $7 million to the IRPA Pool. They

  contend that this procedural injury is sufficient to confer standing and, in particular,

  to satisfy the requirement of causation.

               d.     Replies to the Motions to Dismiss

        In reply, Watts Guerra observes that most of the Objecting Firms’ arguments

  as to why they have standing are based on incorrect assertions about the Watts

  Guerra Settlement Agreement—which did not affect the attorneys’ fees received by

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  Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry and did not result in an additional $7 million being

  added to the IRPA pool. And with respect to the arguments about a procedural

  injury, Watts Guerra emphasizes that “[a]n appellant cannot ‘allege a bare procedural

  violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement

  of Article III.’” Watts Guerra’s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Nos. 21-3021

  et al., at *7 (10th Cir., filed Mar. 10, 2021) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Watts

  Guerra also asserts that the district court complied with the required procedures.

         In a separate reply, Settlement Class Counsel note, among other things, that

  Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry did little—if anything—to rebut their arguments

  that there is no standing to challenge the January 2021 Disbursement Orders. They

  repeatedly argue that, particularly in light of the $30 million holdback, the Objecting

  Firms had no legal interest in the monies disbursed by the January 2021

  Disbursement Orders except for the monies disbursed to them.

         2.     The Motion to Lift Stay

         In their motion to lift the stay on the abated appeals, the Objecting Firms again

  characterize the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement as an effort by the settling

  parties to “in effect, change the District Court’s allocations to the four pools . . . and

  to then divvy up among themselves the money reallocated to the four pools.” Mot. to

  Lift Stay & Enter a Scheduling Order at *3. They also assert that the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Appeals are “ripe for consideration.” Id. at *4–5.

         In response, the Joint Appellees argue that the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals should be dismissed because “[m]otions to dismiss have already been fully

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  briefed and show that Appellants[] lack Article III standing because they were not

  injured by the orders they appealed.” Jt. Aplees.’ Resp. to Shields Aplts.’ Mot. to

  Lift Stay & Enter a Scheduling Order at *3. They further argue that although we

  should lift the abatement, we should also grant the motions and dismiss the appeals.

  Similarly, Watts Guerra argues that we should not request additional briefing and

  should resolve the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals by granting the motions to

  dismiss for lack of standing.

        3.         Mootness Memoranda

        Finally, in response to our May 9, 2023, order, Byrd/Shields and Hossley-

  Embry each filed near-identical memoranda as to why the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals were not moot in light of In re Syngenta I. In particular, they argue that we

  expressly declined to resolve the challenges to the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement, and consequently, the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals cannot be

  considered moot. They further argue that the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals are

  not moot because our previous opinion in In re Syngenta I did not have any practical

  effect. Specifically, they note:

               In its February 28, 2023 Opinion, [this] Court further found that
               the district court’s December 2018 allocation to the four pools
               “reflected an extensive—and arguably exhaustive—fee allocation
               process overseen by numerous courts and numerous individuals,
               judges, and experts alike.” Until that is, January 2021 when the
               district court abandoned that fee allocation and decreased three
               pools (Minnesota, Kansas, and Illinois) and effectively increased
               the IRPA pool so that it could award an additional $7 million to
               one firm without providing any legal or factual justification for
               doing so in violation of Rule 23(h).

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               The pool allocation the Court upheld in its February 28, 2023
               Opinion is not the present pool allocation . . . thereby effectively
               rendering the February 28, 2023 Opinion an advisory one, but it
               does not render the present appeal . . . moot.

  Aplts.’ Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Byrd/Shields at *3–4 (citations

  omitted); Aplt.’s Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Hossley-Embry at *3–

  4. Finally, they argue that our opinion in In re Syngenta I did not address some of

  their specific arguments raised in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, including

  issues of equal protection and due process.31

  C.    Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in this Case

        After a review of the parties’ filings and the record from the district court, we

  conclude that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Appeals, so the appeals must be dismissed. Specifically, we conclude that (1) the

  Objecting Firms lack standing to challenge the January 2021 Settlement Order and

  (2) to the extent the Objecting Firms still challenge the January 2021 Disbursement

  Orders, principles of standing and mootness make clear that we lack subject-matter

        31
                Although we did not ask Byrd/Shields or Hossley-Embry to discuss
  whether the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals were moot, they both asserted that the
  IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals were not moot in part because, although the special
  master relied on the original 12% allocation to the IRPA Pool, the district court
  “effectively reallocated” additional funds to the IRPA Pool by approving the Watts
  Guerra Settlement Agreement. See Aplts.’ Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed
  by Byrd/Shields at *2 n.1; Aplt.’s Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by
  Hossley-Embry at *1 n.1. Accordingly, the Objecting Firms contend, the IRPA Pool
  Allocation Appeals are not moot because “the June 04, 2021 Order awarding IRPA
  fees cannot withstand scrutiny because it is based on pre-reallocation numbers.”
  Aplts.’ Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Byrd/Shields at *2 n.1; Aplt.’s
  Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Hossley-Embry at *2 n.1.
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  jurisdiction over those challenges. Consequently, we lift the abatement of the

  appeals and grant the motions to dismiss filed by Watts Guerra and Settlement Class

  Counsel.

        1.     The January 2021 Settlement Order

        The parties’ filings make clear that the core of the Objecting Firms’ challenge

  is to the January 2021 Settlement Order, which—following the lines set out by the

  district court’s earlier December 2020 Indicative Ruling—approved the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement and approved the transfer of approximately $7 million from

  the Appellee Parties to Watts Guerra. However, despite their vigorous opposition to

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, the Objecting Firms lack Article III standing

  to appeal the district court’s approval of that agreement.32

        We first explain why—in light of our standing precedents—the Objecting

  Firms lack standing. We then explain why the Objecting Firms’ numerous arguments

  to the contrary are unpersuasive. Notably, there is no suggestion in the parties’

  filings that the standing analysis differs between Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry.

        32
                As discussed above, Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement also
  requires that a case not be moot. But although we have previously expressed concern
  that the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals may have been mooted by In re Syngenta I,
  because we conclude that the Objecting Firms lack standing, we need not decide
  whether their challenges to the January 2021 Settlement Order are, in fact, moot. See
  Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[A] federal court
  has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the
  merits.” (quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S.
  422, 431 (2007))).
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  Nor can we find any reason why it would. Consequently, we will discuss the

  standing of the Objecting Firms together.

               a.     The Objecting Firms Lack Standing

        The general principles of Article III standing discussed above apply with equal

  force in the context of class action settlements and attorneys’ fees awards. Thus,

  whether a party has standing to challenge an attorneys’ fees award (including in the

  class action context) depends on whether they were actually aggrieved by the award.

  See Tennille, 809 F.3d at 559; Glasser v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 645 F.3d 1084,

  1088–89 (9th Cir. 2011).

        For example, in Tennille, we recognized that, “[g]enerally, a settling defendant

  in a class action has no interest in the amount of attorney fees awarded when those

  fees are to be paid from the class recovery rather than the defendant’s coffers.” 809

  F.3d at 559. Thus, in that case, we concluded that a defendant lacked standing to

  challenge how the monies in a common settlement fund (that had already been

  funded by the defendant) were allocated between class claimants and class counsel.

  See id. at 557, 560; accord Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1027–28

  (E.D. Mich. 2020) (noting that a defendant in a class action had no standing to object

  to an “incentive award” that class counsel agreed to pay to a plaintiff).

        In Tennille, we also rejected the defendant’s argument that it had a

  “reversionary interest” in the funds because any amount of the common settlement

  fund that remained after the awards of attorneys’ fees and the payments to the class

  could—if it was not released to states who released the defendant from liability under

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  their unclaimed-property laws—be used to satisfy outstanding claims or judgments

  against the defendant. 809 F.3d at 560–61. We reasoned that any injury to this

  purported reversionary interest would be “too attenuated from the award of attorney

  fees” to support standing. Id. at 560.33

        Further illustrating the proposition that the party asserting standing must

  actually be aggrieved, it has been persuasively held that while class members have

  standing to appeal an attorneys’ fees award if the class recovery and attorneys’ fees

  are paid from a common fund, see Glasser, 645 F.3d at 1088; In re Synthroid Mktg.

  Litig., 325 F.3d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 2003), they generally do not have standing to

  appeal an attorneys’ fees award when the award comes from a separate fund, see

  Glasser, 645 F.3d at 1088–89.34 As the Ninth Circuit explained in Glasser when

  considering whether a class member had standing to appeal an attorneys’ fees award

  paid directly by the class action defendant, “[i]f modifying the fee award would not

  ‘actually benefit the objecting class member,’ the class member lacks standing

  because his challenge to the fee award cannot result in redressing any injury.” 645

        33
                In contrast, a panel of this Court concluded in an unpublished case that
  the State of Utah had standing to appeal from the approval of a class action
  settlement agreement when the agreement changed the beneficiary of a fund for
  unclaimed monies from the State of Utah to the federal government. See Allred v.
  ReconTrust Co., N.A., 787 F. App’x 994, 996 n.3 (10th Cir. 2019). We rely on this
  decision and other unpublished decisions in our analysis only for their persuasive
  value. See, e.g., United States v. Engles, 779 F.3d 1161, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2015).
        34
               Although it is not relevant here, some courts have recognized a potential
  exception to this general rule when it is alleged that class counsel obtained an
  excessive fee in exchange for accepting an inadequate settlement for the class. See
  Glasser, 645 F.3d at 1088 (describing the “constructive common fund” doctrine).
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  F.3d at 1088 (quoting Knisley v. Network Assocs., Inc., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.

  2002)). Along the same lines, those who object to a class action settlement have no

  standing to challenge an attorneys’ fees award if, due to their status as objectors, they

  would receive no pecuniary benefit from a decrease in the amount of attorneys’ fees

  awarded. See Hill v. State Street Corp., 794 F.3d 227, 231 (1st Cir. 2015); Silverman

  v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 957 (7th Cir. 2013).

        Likewise—and as particularly relevant here—attorneys have standing to

  challenge attorneys’ fees awards only if the fees that they would be entitled to would

  be affected. To be sure, ordinarily the question of whether attorneys have standing to

  challenge orders on attorneys’ fees is relatively straightforward. That is because the

  district court’s decision on attorneys’ fees usually would directly impact the fees that

  the appellant-attorneys are entitled to receive; consequently, they would have

  standing. See In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods.

  Liability Litig., 914 F.3d 623, 640 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that law firms whose

  requests for attorneys’ fees had been denied had “the most compelling case for

  standing because they suffered an injury (deprivation of attorneys’ fees) that was

  caused by the conduct complained of (the Fee Order) and would be redressed by

  judicial relief”). In such cases—as in the challenge to the various fee allocation

  orders in In re Syngenta I—the issue of standing is unlikely to come up.

        But if, due to the unique circumstances of the case, an award of attorneys’ fees

  would have no impact on the fees that a particular attorney could receive, that

  attorney has no standing to challenge the award. For example, in Uselton v.

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  Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 853 (10th Cir. 1993), the

  district court awarded $507,500—29% of the common settlement fund—to class

  counsel, and later awarded $14,427.49 to a separate counsel. Class counsel

  challenged both decisions, and we concluded that they lacked standing to object to

  the award to separate counsel. See id. at 854–55. We reasoned that the fee awarded

  to the separate counsel “came out of the common fund remaining after payment of

  class counsel’s fee. Only the plaintiff class, none of whose members is a party to this

  appeal, could be considered aggrieved by that award.” Id. at 855.

        The unifying strand throughout these cases is that an appellant—whether a

  defendant, class member, objector, or attorney—must be actually aggrieved to

  challenge an award of attorneys’ fees. In other words, they must receive a benefit if

  the award would be vacated. Those principles control the outcome here. The

  approximately $7 million “reallocated” by the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

  went directly from the coffers of the Appellee Parties to the coffers of Watts Guerra.

  As the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement itself and the various orders of the

  district court made clear, firms that had pending appeals and did not agree to the

  Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement were not required to contribute to the fund at

  all.35 See December 2020 Indicative Ruling, ECF No. 4524, at *2 (“[O]bjectors are

        35
               At times, the Objecting Firms’ briefing—whether intentionally or
  carelessly—elides this critically important fact. For example, in their joint response
  to the motions to dismiss, the Objecting Firms quote the district court’s January 2021
  Settlement Order as: “[t]he Court reduces the awards to the Kansas Pool, the
  Minnesota Pool, and Illinois Pool in the following amounts: . . . The Kansas Pool is
  reduced by $2,966,333.67 . . . The Minnesota Pool is reduced by $1,582,333.33 . . [.]
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  not included in the agreement . . ., and their fee awards would not be affected in any

  way[] . . . .”); Suppl. Jt. App., Vol. I, at 5–6; see also Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement, ECF No. 4485-1 at *1–2.36

  the Illinois Pool is reduced by $2,500,000.” Jt. Suggestions in Opp’n to Aplees.’
  Mots. to Dismiss at *6 (omissions in original). The omitted language, though, is
  crucial. The relevant portion of the January 2021 Settlement Order actually reads:

               (a) The Kansas Pool is reduced by $2,966,333.67, said reduction
               to be shared pro rata according to awards from the Kansas Pool
               among all firms awarded fees from the Pool except the law firms
               of [Toups/Coffman] and Hossley-Embry LLP. (b) The Minnesota
               Pool is reduced by $1,582,333.33, said reduction to be shared pro
               rata according to awards from the Minnesota pool among all firms
               awarded fees from the Minnesota Pool except the law firms of
               Watts Guerra LLP; the Watts Guerra Group as that term is defined
               in § 2 b.1 of the Agreement; the Shields Law Group; the Paul Byrd
               Law Firm, PLLC; and Johnson Becker PLLC. And (c) the Illinois
               Pool is reduced by $2,500,000, said reduction to be made from the
               award to [Heninger Garrison Davis] . . . .

  Suppl. Jt. App, Vol. I, at 5–6 (footnote omitted). The omitted language makes clear
  that the fees received by Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry are entirely unchanged by
  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.
        36
                The district court emphasized this fact yet again in its recent December
  2023 Disbursement Order, underscoring that because “the payment to Watts Guerra
  was being made only by certain firms who agreed to the settlement,” the “objectors’
  fee awards would not be affected” and they “lacked standing to object.” December
  2023 Disbursement Order, ECF No. 4713, at *8. Again, although this order has not
  been appealed, we may take judicial notice of it. See, e.g., United States v. Ahidley,
  486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). And as we have underscored before, see
  supra note 26, we are fully aware that “[s]tanding is determined as of the time the
  action is brought.” Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir.
  2005). As such, we do not rely on the district court’s December 2023 Disbursement
  Order as proof—in whole or part—that the Objecting Firms lack standing. Rather,
  we exercise our discretion to take judicial notice of this decision because it illustrates
  (applying a broader historical lens) how the Objecting Firms’ arguments about the
  Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement have been repeatedly rejected.
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        Thus, although the Objecting Firms undoubtedly have an interest in their

  shares of the $503 million award of attorneys’ fees, those shares remain unchanged

  by the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. This puts the Objecting Firms in the

  same position as the class counsel in Uselton, the defendant in Tennille, and the class

  members in Glasser: rescinding the award of additional attorneys’ fees to Watts

  Guerra would have no impact on their ultimate fee award.37 In other words, the

  Objecting Firms have suffered no injury-in-fact and any redress that this Court could

  offer by vacating the district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement would have no impact whatsoever on the financial interests of

  Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry.

        This conclusion also accords with the general rule about standing to challenge

  settlements, which is that “non-settling parties have no standing to challenge a

  settlement.” New Mexico ex rel. State Eng’r v. Carson, 908 F.3d 659, 665 (10th Cir.

  2018); see also In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 872 F.3d 1094,

  1110 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that non-settling defendants generally lack standing to

  challenge a settlement agreement because “they lack ‘a legally protected interest in

  the settlement’ and therefore can’t satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement”

  (quoting Weinman v. Fid. Cap. Appreciation Fund (In re Integra Realty Res., Inc.),

        37
                 The Objecting Firms try to limit Tennille to its facts, observing that this
  case involved an objecting defendant rather than an objecting attorney. See Jt.
  Suggestions in Opp’n to Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss at *8. But the general principle of
  Tennille—that a party whose financial interests are unaffected by an award of
  attorneys’ fees has no standing to appeal that award—does not depend on the identity
  of that party.
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  262 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001))). Here, that is precisely what the Objecting

  Firms are—non-settling parties.

        And although there is a “limited exception” to this general rule “for non-

  settling parties who can demonstrate that they will suffer ‘plain legal prejudice’ as a

  result of the settlement,” Carson, 908 F.3d at 665 (quoting Weinman, 262 F.3d at

  1102), that exception is irrelevant here. To fall within that exception, a party cannot

  “show merely the loss of some practical or strategic advantage in litigating their

  case”; they must instead show a more concrete prejudice, such as the loss of a legal

  claim or cause of action. Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1102; see also In re Motor Fuel

  Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 872 F.3d at 1110 (concluding that a non-party had

  failed to show that it would suffer plain legal prejudice from a settlement agreement

  when it averred only that the settlement agreement prejudiced its right to do business

  as it historically had done and burdened its free-speech rights). Here, the Objecting

  Firms have identified no concrete prejudice that they will suffer as a result of the

  Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. Nor do they suggest that they fall within this

  limited exception to the general rule.

        Thus, we conclude that the Objecting Firms lack standing to challenge the

  district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

               b.     The Objecting Firms’ Counterarguments

        As outlined above, the Objecting Firms have raised a number of overlapping

  arguments as to why they do have standing to challenge the Watts Guerra Settlement

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  Agreement and the district court’s January 2021 Settlement Order. We are

  unpersuaded.

        First, the Objecting Firms contend that they have standing because the Watts

  Guerra Settlement Agreement denominates them as “Interested Parties.” But the

  Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement merely gives Interested Parties the right to

  object—it does not mean that approval of the agreement suffices as a concrete and

  particularized injury to the Interested Parties for purposes of Article III. And the

  Objecting Firms cite no authority supporting their argument that this provision could

  give them standing.

        Second, the Objecting Firms argue that they have an interest in the $503

  million aggregate fee award, which suffices to give them standing. But any interest

  that they have in the $503 million is necessarily limited to their share of the $503

  million—which, as described above, would not be impacted by the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement. See Uselton, 9 F.3d at 854–55. They have no concrete

  interest in funds that they are not entitled to receive. See id. And the Objecting

  Firms’ reliance on In re Nineteen Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza

  Hotel Fire, 982 F.2d 603, 612 (1st Cir. 1992) is misplaced. Although the court in

  that case noted that the appellant-attorneys had a “property interest in escrowed

  funds,” that was because the appellant-attorneys would be “deprived . . . of money”

  by the order at issue, which “invaded” the attorneys’ fees fund to make awards to the

  steering committee. Id. Here, the approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement

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  Agreement did not deprive the Objecting Firms of money in any way; they have no

  claim to the diverted funds.

           Third, the Objecting Firms argue that the district court’s January 2021

  Settlement Order did more than just facilitate a settlement by diverting monies from

  the Joint Appellees to Watts Guerra—they contend that it changed the district court’s

  previous allocation among the four pools and resulted in an increase to the IRPA

  Pool of $7 million that they could not share in. But, as the district court recognized,

  this argument is based on a clear misreading of both the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement and the district court’s orders. The district court has repeatedly

  emphasized that it was not modifying its earlier allocation among the pools, and that

  it was not adding an additional $7 million to the IRPA pool; instead, the district

  court—and the terms of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement—made clear that

  certain firms’ awards from the geographic pools would be reduced and given to

  Watts Guerra, which would treat its increase as if it had come from the IRPA Pool for

  purposes of distribution. That is not the same as the district court adding an

  additional $7 million to the IRPA pool or reworking the four-way split among the

  pools.

           On this point, the district court’s discussion of whether it even needed to

  approve the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement is illuminating. The district court

  vacillated on whether it was necessary for it to weigh in on the settlement agreement,

  before ultimately deciding that approving the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement

  was proper because “by altering at the front end the amounts distributed by the

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  appointed administrator overseeing the attorney fee fund, the Court will be allowing

  the agreed redistribution of fees to be accomplished in the most efficient manner,

  while decreasing the likelihood of later delays or disputes concerning the payments.”

  December 2020 Indicative Ruling, ECF No. 4524, at *4. This makes clear that all the

  district court did in approving the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement was to shift

  money from the Appellee Parties to Watts Guerra for administrative purposes—not to

  redraw the lines demarcated by the December 2018 Fee Allocation Order.

        Fourth, the Objecting Firms seem to suggest that a “most favored nation

  clause” in the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement confers standing. The provision

  at issue provides that the “Appellee Parties agree not to resolve any of the other

  pending appeals for an amount equal to or greater than the” approximately seven

  million received by Watts Guerra. Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, ECF No.

  4485-1, at *3 (footnote omitted). The “pending appeals” referred to in that provision

  include, inter alia, the Fee Allocation Appeals numbered Nos. 19-3174 and 19-3178,

  in which Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry, respectively, challenged various aspects

  of the four-pool allocation system. See id. at *3 & n.3. According to the Objecting

  Firms, the most favored nation clause “affects an interest [they] have in the

  attorneys’ fee fund by limiting the amount they can recover in settlement” on those

  appeals—in other words, the most favored nation clause effectively caps the amount

  that they could receive in settlement on their Fee Allocation Appeals. Jt. Suggestions

  in Opp’n to Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss at *12.

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        There is, however, a substantial redressability problem with the Objecting

  Firms’ argument. In particular, the relevant appeals are no longer “pending”—the

  Objecting Firms lost the Fee Allocation Appeals mentioned in the most favored

  nation clause (Nos. 19-3174 and 19-3178) in In re Syngenta I. Judgment in both of

  those appeals has become final with the issuance of the mandate. Thus, even if the

  most favored nation clause did theoretically impact the Objecting Firms’ ability to

  settle those appeals when they were still ongoing, a decision at this stage reversing

  the district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement could not

  redress any of the alleged harm. Put differently, because it is now impossible for the

  Objecting Firms to settle their Fee Allocation Appeals, any purported injury to their

  ability to settle those appeals could not now confer standing on them—and thus could

  not open the door (absent other jurisdictional hurdles) to our exercise of subject-

  matter jurisdiction. See Brown, 822 F.3d at 1165–66.

        Furthermore, we are doubtful in any event that the alleged injury—viz., the

  effect that the most favored nation clause might have on a hypothetical settlement

  agreement between the Objecting Firms and the Joint Appellees—could constitute

  the necessary “concrete and imminent” injury-in-fact required to confer standing. It

  is entirely speculative how an effective cap on the amount that the Objecting Firms

  could receive in settlement could impact settlement negotiations. The speculative

  nature of the injury is underscored in this case where, in fact, no settlement was

  reached, and the Objecting Firms lost the appeals at issue.

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        Although no circuit court has squarely addressed this question,38 a number of

  district courts—albeit largely in unpublished opinions—have concluded that such a

  clause is insufficient to confer constitutional standing. See Brown v. Esmor Corr.

  Servs., No. Civ. 98-1282DRD, 2005 WL 1917869, at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2005)

  (unpublished); In re VMS Ltd. P’ship Secs. Litig., No. 90 C 2412, 1991 WL 134262,

  at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1991) (unpublished); cf. In re Brand Name Prescription

  Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, 1996 WL 351180, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 24,

  1996) (unpublished) (suggesting, but not deciding, that a most favored nation clause

  that purportedly made it more difficult to obtain a favorable settlement agreement

  was insufficient to confer standing). Thus, even though we need not finally resolve

  this issue in light of the redressability problem mentioned above, the conclusion

  suggested by these courts—that the “injury” that such a clause inflicts on non-parties

  to the agreement is too hypothetical and speculative to confer standing—is, at least at

  first blush, persuasive. It also accords with our own precedents on when non-parties

  can challenge settlement agreements, which require non-parties to show “plain legal

  prejudice” from a settlement agreement. Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1102 (quoting

        38
                Watts Guerra cites a case from our sister circuit, In re Vitamins
  Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2000), as rejecting the argument
  that a most-favored nation clause can support standing. But the court in that case
  concluded that the appellants lacked prudential standing—a distinct doctrine from
  the constitutional standing issues present in this case. See In re Vitamins Antitrust
  Class Actions, 215 F.3d at 29; see also Hill v. Warsewa, 947 F.3d 1305, 1309–10
  (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing prudential standing). Prudential standing has not been
  raised by any party in this appeal and, unlike constitutional standing, it is not
  jurisdictional, see VR Acquisitions, LLC v. Wasatch Cnty., 853 F.3d 1142, 1146 n.4
  (10th Cir. 2017), so we need not inquire into it sua sponte.
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  Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); In re Motor Fuel

  Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 872 F.3d at 1110. That standard would seemingly

  not be met by the speculative harm that the most favored nation clause purportedly

  caused to the Objecting Firms.

        Fifth, if the Objecting Firms intended to make an argument that they have

  standing because of the impact that the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement would

  have on their entitlement to interest, they have waived that argument. Reading the

  record generously, the Objecting Firms seemed to make this argument to the district

  court. See Byrd/Shields’ and Hossley-Embry’s Am. Objs. & Suggestions in Opp’n to

  the Jt. Mot. for Indicative Ruling, ECF No. 4492, at *8 (“[T]he Joint-Movants . . .

  now have exerted authority to disburse the interest earned on the aggregate attorneys’

  fee (interest which belongs to all law firms who were awarded common benefit,

  including [Shields], [Byrd] and [Hossley-Embry]).”). But they do not develop—and

  barely mention—that argument in their response to the motions to dismiss, only

  briefly referencing the fact that the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement affects the

  $503 million, which was “in escrow earning interest.” Jt. Suggestions in Opp’n to

  Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss at *10. Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry do not explain

  how the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement—which, on its face, only has the

  potential to affect the earned interest to which the settling parties would be entitled—

  could impact their share of the earned interest.

        At bottom, the Objecting Firms bear the burden of showing that we have

  jurisdiction over the appeals, and we are not obliged to take up their mantle. As

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  such, we conclude that the issue is waived and decline to reach it. See Colo.

  Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 552 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he

  plaintiffs don’t argue they satisfied the elements of constitutional standing. And we

  decline to make that argument for them.”); Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 642

  F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where an appellant fails to lead, we have no duty

  to follow. It is the appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible theories to

  invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal.”); cf. United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d

  1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[A]rguments may be deemed waived when they are

  advanced . . . only ‘in a perfunctory manner.’” (quoting United States v. Wooten, 377

  F.3d 1134, 1145 (10th Cir. 2004))).

        Sixth, the Objecting Firms’ argument that they have suffered a procedural

  injury that suffices to give them standing is unavailing. To begin, the very premise

  of their argument is unsound: as explained above, the district court did not

  contravene its earlier allocation system by reallocating $7 million to the IRPA Pool

  or redrawing the lines of the four pools. Instead, it simply altered the ultimate

  distribution of funds to effectuate the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. Thus,

  there was no need for the district court to make additional findings as the Objecting

  Firms contend were required under Rules 23(h), 52(a), and 54(d)(2). Nor, then, did

  the district court violate its obligation to ensure that the attorneys’ fees award was

  reasonable, as the Objecting Firms contend.

        Moreover, even assuming that the procedural requirements of Rules 23(h),

  52(a), and 54(d)(2) were violated, that alone is not enough to confer standing. A

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  procedural injury must, in fact, be related to a concrete injury; “a bare procedural

  violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” is insufficient. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at

  341; see also id. at 342 (“Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging

  a bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the [Fair Credit Reporting Act’s]

  procedural requirements may result in no harm.”). But because the Objecting Firms’

  share of the attorneys’ fees awards was entirely unaffected by the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement, a “bare procedural violation” is all the Objecting Firms can

  allege.

            Finally, despite bearing the burden to show standing, the Objecting Firms cite

  no authority whatsoever for the assertion that bare violations of the procedural

  requirements of Rules 23(h), 52(a), and 54(d)(2) are sufficient to give rise to standing

  under a “procedural injury” theory even when an appellant is not actually impacted

  by the district court’s ruling at issue.

            For those reasons, we reject the Objecting Firms’ counterarguments and

  conclude that the Objecting Firms lack standing to challenge the district court’s

  January 2021 Settlement Order.

            2.    Challenge to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders

            With the Objecting Firms’ challenge to the January 2021 Settlement Order

  resolved, all that remains of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals is the Objecting

  Firms’ challenge to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders.39 We must determine,

            39
              It is unclear whether the Objecting Firms intend in the Watts Guerra
  Settlement Appeals to challenge the district court’s denial of their motions for
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  then, if the latter challenge presents any justiciable issues. Although the parties have

  focused on the approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement itself rather than

  the disbursement of funds, logic as well as principles of standing and mootness

  dictate that the answer is no.

        This conclusion follows from the nature of the January 2021 Disbursement

  Orders and the scope of the Objecting Firms’ challenge to them. Those orders simply

  disbursed the funds previously allocated by the previous fee allocation orders—

  specifically, the March 2019 Kansas Pool Allocation Order, the July 2019 Minnesota

  Pool Allocation Order, the July 2019 Expense Order, and the November 2019 Illinois

  Pool Allocation Order—as modified by the January 2021 Settlement Order approving

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. In the district court, the Objecting Firms

  had opposed this disbursement, arguing (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction to

  reconsideration, see supra note 12. To the extent that they do so, we reject that
  attempt. In In re Syngenta I, we concluded that (1) the Objecting Firms had
  “effectively waived” their argument as to why the district court erred in denying their
  motions for reconsideration by failing to include the issue in their opening briefs and
  (2) noted that their arguments on the motion-for-reconsideration issue are “meritless
  and irrelevant to our review, and they do nothing to cast doubt on the Kansas district
  court’s fee allocation decisions.” 61 F.4th at 1223–24. The Objecting Firms have
  not indicated that they believe their challenge to the denial of their motions for
  reconsideration remains live after In re Syngenta I; they did not mention the issue at
  all in any of their filings made after In re Syngenta I, including in their memoranda
  on mootness. In fact, the only time that the Objecting Firms have mentioned the
  motions for reconsideration at all in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals is when the
  Objecting Firms mentioned the contrast between the denial of their motions for
  reconsideration and the approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement. See Jt.
  Suggestions in Opp’n to Aplees.’ Mots. to Dismiss at *3–5, *9. Particularly in light
  of the fact that it is the Objecting Firms’ burden to assure us that we have
  jurisdiction, we conclude that they may not raise a challenge to the denial of their
  motions for reconsideration in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals.
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  distribute the funds because there were pending appeals of the fee allocation orders;

  (2) it would be difficult to claw back the distributed funds if the fee allocation

  appeals were resolved in favor of the appellants; and (3) the disbursement was

  predicated on approval of the improper Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

        But since the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals were filed, we affirmed all of

  the fee allocation orders. See In re Syngenta I, 61 F.4th at 1170. As such, many of

  the arguments that the Objecting Firms made against the January 2021 Disbursement

  Orders—viz., that it would be difficult to claw back the distributed funds if the

  Objecting Firms were successful in the Fee Allocation Appeals—are now stale. In

  other words, we do not see how there can be a live controversy with respect to the

  distribution of funds allocated by fee allocation orders when we have already

  affirmed those orders. Any relief that we would grant in vacating the January 2021

  Distribution Orders would thus not have any “effect in the real world” because those

  orders merely effectuated the fee allocation orders which are final. Brown, 822 F.3d

  at 1165–66 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 414 F.3d at 1212). Therefore, the

  challenge to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders is, at least in part, moot.

        This conclusion is supported by the Objecting Firms’ memoranda concerning

  mootness. Recall that we required Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry to explain why

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals were not moot in light of our resolution of the

  Fee Allocation Appeals in In re Syngenta I. Their responsive memoranda explained

  that the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals were not moot because the challenge to the

  reallocation of $7 million from the Appellee Parties to Watts Guerra was outside the

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  scope of the Fee Allocation Appeals that we decided in In re Syngenta I. But even

  though it is their burden to show that we have jurisdiction, the Objecting Firms did

  not make any distinct argument that a live challenge remained to any other aspect of

  the January 2021 Disbursement Orders. In fact, the only time that the Objecting

  Firms’ mootness memoranda referred to the January 2021 Disbursement Orders at all

  is when they were describing the orders being appealed from—and even there, those

  orders were discussed only in the context of the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement.

  Specifically, the memoranda noted that the Objecting Firms appealed from the

               District court’s Order/Judgment overruling the Shields/Byrd
               Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s objections to the Motion for Disbursement
               and Order/Judgment disbursing $444 million to pay attorney fees
               and expenses where the disbursement occurred after the district
               court rearranged money among the four pools, but without any
               findings that its previous allocation among the four pools was
               unreasonable and without any new findings as required by FED. R.
               CIV. P. 23(h) that the reallocation (which awarded one law firm an
               additional $7 million) was fair or equitable.

  Aplts.’ Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Byrd/Shields at *2; Aplt.’s

  Mem. Concerning Lack of Mootness filed by Hossley-Embry at *2. Thus, the only

  aspect of the January 2021 Disbursement Orders that the Objecting Firms themselves

  mention is the fact that those orders incorporate the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement. They do not argue at all that any other aspect of their challenge to the

  January 2021 Disbursement Orders is still viable.40 Again, we have no obligation to

  follow where the appellants do not lead. See Raley, 642 F.3d at 1275.

        40
               One of the other arguments that the Objecting Firms originally made in
  opposition to the disbursement of funds was that the district court lacked jurisdiction
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         And as discussed above, Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry lack standing to

  pursue their challenge to the underlying issue—the approval of the Watts Guerra

  Settlement Agreement. Thus, to the extent that the appeal of the January 2021

  Disbursement Orders challenges the disbursement of the $7 million shifted around by

  the Watts Guerra Settlement Agreement, the Objecting Firms lack standing to bring

  that challenge. When that reality is combined with the fact that there is no live

  controversy about any other aspect of the January 2021 Disbursement Orders, it

  becomes evident that the Objecting Firms’ challenge to those orders does not present

  the current case or controversy that Article III requires. Thus, we lack subject-matter

  jurisdiction.

  because the fee allocation appeals were pending, so the district court should instead
  have issued an indicative ruling under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1. The
  district court rejected this argument, concluding that it had jurisdiction. Byrd/Shields
  and Hossley-Embry do not mention this aspect of the district court’s order in the
  memoranda they filed in response to our order to show cause as to why the Watts
  Guerra Settlement Appeals were not moot—instead, they argue only that the Watts
  Guerra Settlement Agreement was outside the scope of our review in In re Syngenta
  I. Thus, Byrd/Shields and Hossley-Embry have failed to argue that the jurisdictional
  issue they raised is still viable, and we will not make that argument for them. See
  Raley, 642 F.3d at 1275 (“Where an appellant fails to lead, we have no duty to
  follow. It is the appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible theories to
  invoke our legal authority to hear her appeal.”); Patrick G. by and through Stephanie
  G. v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 2, 40 F.4th 1186, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[The
  plaintiffs] make no meaningful argument—supported by authority or even logic—for
  why this claim is viable (i.e., not moot) . . . . At the end of the day, [the plaintiffs]
  must convince us that jurisdiction is present, and we will not make arguments in this
  respect for them.”).
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                                     III.   CONCLUSION

        In sum, it is clear from the existing record that the Objecting Firms lack

  standing to challenge the district court’s approval of the Watts Guerra Settlement

  Agreement, which did not rework the attorneys’ fees allocation system and did not in

  any way affect the Objecting Firms’ share of the funds. Moreover, there is no live

  controversy with respect to any other aspect of the district court’s January 2021

  Disbursement Orders. As such, we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the entirety

  of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals (Nos. 21-3021 and 21-3022).

        In light of that conclusion, we agree with the Joint Appellees and Watts Guerra

  that we must dismiss the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals (Nos. 21-3021 and 21-

  3022). We thus lift the abatement of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals, grant

  the motions to dismiss filed by Watts Guerra and Settlement Class Counsel, and

  dismiss these appeals.

        More specifically, as to the Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the abatement and

  enter a scheduling order, we grant it in part, deny it in part, and defer ruling on it

  in part:

              We grant the motion to the extent that it requests that we lift the abatement

                of the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals.

              We deny (as moot) the motion insofar as it requests that we enter

                scheduling orders in the Watts Guerra Settlement Appeals.

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Appellate Case: 21-3021     Document: 010111013297        Date Filed: 03/11/2024     Page: 79

              And we defer ruling on the motion insofar as it requests that we lift the

                abatement or take any other action in the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals.41

        41
               To be clear, we do not today decide any aspect of the IRPA Pool
  Allocation Appeals (Nos. 21-3110 and 21-3111) or the Contingent Cross-Appeal (No.
  21-3121), including any pending motions in those appeals. Briefing in the IRPA
  Pool Allocation Appeals and the Contingent Cross-Appeal remains abated, and the
  Objecting Firms’ motion to lift the abatement and enter a scheduling order remains
  under advisement with respect to the IRPA Pool Allocation Appeals. Nor do we
  directly opine on the district court’s December 2023 Disbursement Order, which is
  not the subject of any pending appeal.
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