Court Opinion

ID: 9385512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 00:00:33.391091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.464226
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-30522        Document: 00516703991           Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                      FILED
                                                                                   April 6, 2023
                                      No. 20-30522
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
   Carolyn D. Spears,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                           versus

   Louisiana College,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 1:18-CV-387

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Davis and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Carolyn Spears sued her former employer, Louisiana College (“LC”),
   alleging: (i) age discrimination, (ii) sex discrimination, (iii) disability
   discrimination, (iv) unlawful retaliation, (v) breach of contract and (vi)
   defamation. The district court denied Spears’s motion for partial summary
   judgment on her retaliation and breach of contract claims and granted

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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                                    No. 20-30522

   summary judgment in favor of LC on her age discrimination, sex
   discrimination, disability discrimination, retaliation, breach of contract, and
   defamation claims. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of her age
   discrimination, sex discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation
   claims and otherwise AFFIRM.
                                   I. Background
          LC is a nonprofit corporation which operates as a private, co-
   educational college of liberal arts and sciences. Carolyn Spears, born in 1941,
   became a full-time member of LC’s faculty in the Department of Health and
   Physical Education in 1977 and was tenured in 1984. On February 28, 2007,
   she executed a “Retirement Plan Options” agreement, in which she
   “elect[ed] to retire by July 31, 2007, and receive the benefits available to
   current retirees.” Retiring by this date allowed Spears to freeze her benefits
   and avoid future premium increases or other changes.
          Notwithstanding her retirement, Spears continued to teach, executing
   yearly contracts under the title of “Senior Professor.” These contracts
   expressly stated that they were “subject to non-renewal.” However, the
   parties disagree about whether executing this option affected Spears’s tenure
   status. The contracts also incorporated by reference “all college policies . . .
   set forth in the Faculty Handbook[.]” The Faculty Handbook, in turn,
   includes a “Definition of Tenure” which states, in relevant part, that
   “[t]enure is the reasonable expectation of continued employment by the
   College[.]”   In 2012, Spears was diagnosed with adenocarcinoma and
   underwent a full hysterectomy and radiation treatment.             Her cancer
   reoccurred in 2014, and she underwent treatment through summer 2016. In
   August 2016, although no longer in treatment at that point, Spears applied
   for and received long-term disability and sick leave from LC. The parties
   dispute whether Spears intended to return to teaching after this. Spears avers

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   that she had no intention of retiring and that other members of LC’s faculty
   and administrative team engaged in a harassment campaign against her to
   induce her to retire as a result of her involvement in filing a “whistleblower”
   complaint and Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC)
   complaints against LC.
          Shannon Tassin, the head of the Human Resources Department at
   LC, testified that Spears verbally told Tassin that she was “not returning.”
   But Spears denied that she ever told Tassin she would not come back. In an
   email sent from Spears to Tassin on March 16, 2017, Spears stated her
   recollection that, “I will be paid my full contract for this year. . . and then
   start next year[’]s contract when I start back August 1,” and asked Tassin
   whether that was correct. Tassin’s reply, sent almost two weeks later,
   declined to either confirm or deny that Spears would resume working on
   August 1.
          Beginning in the 2017–18 academic year, LC reorganized its
   Department of Health and Physical Education by moving it out of the School
   of Education and putting it under the Department of Nursing/Allied
   Healthcare. This resulted in Spears being “demoted” from her position as
   Chair of the Health and Physical Education Department and having her
   salary decreased by approximately $500 per month. Spears contends this was
   part of the campaign by LC to induce her to retire and that she was replaced
   in her administrative roles by a younger, male subordinate.
          In early 2017, Spears received a letter from Dr. Richard Brewer, then
   President of LC, informing her that LC was “mov[ing] in a different
   direction” and would not be renewing her contract as a Senior Professor for
   the 2017–18 school year. Although the letter was dated February 2, 2017,
   Spears claims she did not actually receive it until April 20, 2017. The date is
   significant because Spears filed an EEOC complaint against Brewer and

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   Cheryl Clark, another member of the LC administration, on January 25, 2017.
   LC received notice of this complaint “on or around March 17, 2017.”1
   Spears avers that LC did not in fact send her the termination letter until after
   it had received the EEOC complaint, and that this action thus constitutes
   retaliation. Spears had also been previously involved in another EEOC
   complaint against LC: she and Joe Aguillard, the former President of LC, had
   drafted an EEOC complaint and a whistleblower complaint in 2015, which
   were discovered and seized by LC via a private investigator. Aguillard was
   subsequently terminated in March 2016.
           Jason Tinsley and Sonia Tinsley, a younger couple, were hired by LC
   and ultimately took over Spears’s classes and faculty duties. The parties
   dispute whether the Tinsleys were hired to “replace” Spears. After Spears
   was terminated, Spears’s sister, Charlotte McIntosh posted to an LC alumni
   Facebook group complaining about this decision. Brewer responded in a post
   which Spears avers constituted defamation.
           Spears brought claims against LC for age, gender and disability
   discrimination2 and retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
   of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
   U.S.C. §623 (“ADEA”) and/or Title II of the Americans With Disabilities
   Act, 42 U.S.C. §1231, et seq. (“ADA”), as well as claims under Louisiana
   state law for defamation and breach of her employment contract. LC moved
   for summary judgment to dispose of all of Spears’s claims against it, and
   Spears moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted
   LC’s motion for summary judgment and denied Spears’s cross-motion for

           1
               The notice is dated March 9, 2017.
           2
             Spears also alleged religious discrimination below but does not appeal the district
   court’s dismissal of that claim here.

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   partial summary judgment, dismissing all of Spears’s claims on July 24th,
   2020. Spears now appeals to this court.
                               II. Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standard on appeal as was applied below. Tiblier v. Dlabal,
   743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the
   movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
   “[T]his court construes ‘all facts and inferences in the light most favorable
   to the nonmoving party.’” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir.
   2012) (quoting Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 266 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          The summary judgment movant bears the burden of proving that no
   genuine issue of material fact exists. Latimer v. SmithKline & French Labs.,
   919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir. 1990). However, if the non-movant ultimately
   bears the burden of proof at trial, the summary judgment movant need not
   support its motion with evidence negating the non-movant’s case. Celotex
   Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Rather, the summary judgment
   movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the mere absence of evidence
   supporting the non-movant’s case. Id.
          Once the summary judgment movant has met this burden, the non-
   movant must “go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing
   that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
   1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We must resolve factual controversies
   regarding the existence of a genuine issue for trial in favor of the non-movant.
   Id. But a factual dispute precludes summary judgment only if the evidence
   presented by the nonmovant is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact
   to find for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
   248 (1986). Unsupported, conclusory, or inadmissible evidence is

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   insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.; Clark v. Am.’s
   Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997).
                                   III. Discussion
                              A. Age Discrimination
          The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to
   hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
   individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §
   623(a)(1). “[L]iability depends on whether the protected trait actually
   motivated the employer’s decision.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
   Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). The individual’s age must have “actually
   played a role in [the employer’s decision making] process and had a
   determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. at 141. Therefore, the plaintiff
   must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the “but-for”
   cause of the challenged adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
   Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009).         This can be shown by direct or
   circumstantial evidence. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.
          Where, as here, a plaintiff relies crucially on circumstantial evidence,
   she must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she (1)
   was at least forty years old; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an
   adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone younger or
   treated less favorably than similarly situated younger employees. Smith v.
   City of Jackson, Miss., 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). If the plaintiff makes
   out this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to produce
   evidence that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reason. Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 395
   (5th Cir. 2002). If such a reason is produced, then the employee must
   provide evidence to rebut the reasons given as pretext for discrimination. Id.

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          Here, the district court held that Spears had failed to even make a
   prima facie case that she was replaced by someone younger, and thus that LC
   was entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Spears argues that the
   district court erred in finding that she had failed to present a prima facie case
   that she was replaced by someone younger.
          The district court found that Spears’s former courses had been spread
   among several teachers at LC, concluding that such an action does not
   constitute replacement. But Spears asserted that her classes were only
   distributed this way during her sick leave. After her termination, she was
   replaced in her chair position by Sonia Tinsley, and her classes were taken
   over by Jason Tinsley. Additionally, Spears argues that the district court
   erred at the outset in concluding that she was not “replaced” if her classes
   were in fact spread out between different teachers. We agree. Employers
   may not circumvent Title VII protections by “fractioning” an employee’s
   job. See, e.g., Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir.
   1997); Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 752 (6th Cir. 1992); Hardy v. Shell
   Chem. Company, 693 F.Supp.2d 611, 620, n.25 (E.D. La. 2010). Spears has
   made a prima facie case that she suffered age discrimination.
          Thus, the burden shifts to LC to produce evidence that the adverse
   action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Tyler v. Union
   Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2002). If such a reason is
   produced, then the employee must provide evidence to rebut the reasons
   given as pretext for discrimination. Id. Here, LC argues that Spears’s
   contract was not renewed for the 2017-18 school year because she informed
   the College that she would not be returning. But Spears asserts that she never
   told anyone that she was not coming back. And as Spears points out, the fact
   that she was “terminated” logically belies the argument that LC believed that
   she was not returning. Emails between Spears and the Director of Human
   Resources/Payroll at LC, which Spears introduced into the record, also

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   indicate that Spears did in fact intend to come back. Taking this evidence in
   the light most favorable to Spears, there is at minimum a genuine issue of fact
   as to whether Spears told LC that she would not be returning. If she did not,
   LC has failed to assert a plausible non-discriminatory reason for Spears’s
   termination. The district court erred in dismissing this claim at the summary
   judgment stage.
                              B. Sex Discrimination
          To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a
   plaintiff must show that (1) she was within the protected class; (2) she was
   qualified for the position sought; (3) she was subject to an adverse
   employment action; and (4) the position sought was filled with someone
   outside the protected class. Blow v. City of San Antonio, 236 F.3d 293, 296
   (5th Cir. 2001). Spears is a woman, was qualified for the position she held,
   and was terminated. The district court nevertheless held that Spears failed
   to make a prima facie case, accepting LC’s assertion that Spears was not
   replaced because her duties had been distributed between a number of
   employees. As discussed supra, we disagree. And while LC observes that
   some of the employees who took over Spears’s duties were female, Jason
   Tinsley, whom Spears asserts began teaching her classes after her
   termination, was not. Spears has thus at least made a prima facie case of
   gender discrimination.
          LC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Spears is
   that she said she would not return for the 2017–18 academic year. We have
   explained above, however, that there are at least an issue of fact as to whether
   this was mere pretext. The district court thus erred in dismissing Spears’s
   sex discrimination claim at the summary judgment stage.

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                           C. Disability Discrimination
          The ADA prohibits employers “from discriminating against a
   ‘qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that disability.’” Burton
   v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. 798 F.3d 222, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal
   quotation marks omitted) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688,
   694 (5th Cir. 2014)). In a termination action under the ADA, the employee
   may either present direct evidence that she was discriminated against
   because of her disability or make a prima facie case of discrimination. See
   McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Direct evidence “is
   evidence that if believed, proves the facts of discriminatory animus without
   inference or presumption.” Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 310
   n.6 (5th Cir. 2004). Absent direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must
   make a prima facie case of discrimination by showing she (1) has a disability;
   was regarded as disabled, or has a record of a disability; (2) was qualified for
   the job; and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment decision on account
   of her disability. Cannon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc., 813 F.
   3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 697). “If [s]he
   makes that showing, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the
   employer must ‘articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the
   adverse employment action.’” Id. at 590 (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips
   Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden then shifts to
   the plaintiff to produce evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
   employer’s articulated reason is pretextual.” Id. (citing Chevron Phillips
   Chem. Co., 570 F3d. at 615).
          As with Spears’s other discrimination claims, she has set forth a prima
   facie case of disability discrimination. It is undisputed that Spears had cancer
   and underwent treatment for cancer, that she was qualified for her job, and
   that Brewer explicitly stated that her contract was not renewed “because she
   was too ill to teach.” At the summary judgment stage, taken as true, these

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   facts present evidence of disability discrimination which set forth a prima
   facie case of disability discrimination. The burden thus shifts to LC to
   produce evidence that the adverse action was taken for a legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reason. Yet as explained above, a fact issue exists as to
   whether LC’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Spears—
   that she informed LC she would not return—was pretext. Spears’s disability
   discrimination claim should have been allowed to go forward as well.
                                     D. Retaliation
            To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff
   must show that: (1) she participated in a Title VII protected activity; (2) she
   suffered an adverse employment action by her employer; and (3) there is a
   causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
   Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing
   Aryain v. Walmart Stores Tex., LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008)). Spears
   argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
   LC on her retaliation claims, and in failing to grant summary judgment in her
   favor.
            There is no dispute as to the first two prongs: Spears participated in
   Title VII protected activity in her filing of EEOC complaints, and she was
   terminated. The district court held that Spears has established a prima facie
   case of retaliation, reasoning that LC had not presented evidence that it
   terminated Spears for a legitimate reason before learning of her EEOC
   complaint, creating an issue of fact as to whether her termination letter may
   have been backdated. Additionally, it is uncontested that LC knew about the
   drafts of EEOC complaints which were seized in February 2016. Thus, it
   found that Spears had established a prima facie argument that her termination
   had a causal connection with her filing of these EEOC complaints.

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            LC does not contest this holding, but argues that the district court was
   correct in finding that LC carried its burden in demonstrating a legitimate,
   non-retaliatory reason for her termination, and that Spears failed to show that
   this reason was pretextual. We disagree. As discussed supra, there is at
   minimum a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Spears told LC that
   she did not intend to return to work after her medical leave. LC did not carry
   its burden, and the district court erred in entering summary judgment on this
   claim.
                                E. Breach of Contract
            To state a breach of contract claim, Louisiana law requires a plaintiff
   to show that “(1) the parties consented to be bound through offer and
   acceptance; (2) the obligor failed to perform a conventional obligation; and
   (3) the failure to perform resulted in damages to the obligee.” Crescent City
   Surgical Centre v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co, No. 18-11385, 2020 WL
   1503534 (E.D. La. March 30, 2020) (citing La. Civ. Code arts. 1927 & 1944
   and Favrot v. Favrot, 2010-0986 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/9/2011); 68 So.3d 1099,
   1108–09)). The plaintiff must also “allege a breach of a specific provision of
   the contract.” Id.; Loque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2003).
            Spears moved for partial summary judgment on her breach of contract
   claim, contending that the non-renewal of her annual contracts violated her
   tenure. The district court denied her motion on two grounds. First, the
   district court held that Spears’s complaint did not assert a breach of contract
   claim in the first place. Second, the court held that Spears failed to show that
   there was no genuine dispute of fact as to whether she still had tenure when
   she was terminated.
            Initially, we disagree with the district court’s determination that
   Spears did not adequately plead a claim for breach of contract. The district
   court found that Spears failed to allege the elements of a breach of contract

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   claim with “sufficient particularity” and “failed to identify in her Complaint
   any specific contract provision LC allegedly breached.” But the basis of
   Spears’s breach of contract claim is that she had tenure when she was
   terminated, and therefore that she could be terminated only for cause.
   Although LC and the district court are correct that Spears’s complaint does
   not explicitly delineate a breach of contract claim, it is axiomatic that a
   plaintiff must plead facts, not legal theories. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of
   Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). Spears’s complaint adequately alleges
   facts stating the elements of a breach of contract claim. She alleged the
   existence of a contract under which she, as a tenured teacher, could be
   terminated only with cause, and alleged that she was terminated without
   adequate cause or for pretextual reasons. Thus, the district court erred in
   dismissing Spears’s breach of contract claim as failing to present a cause of
   action for breach of contract.
           However, we agree with the district court’s dismissal of the breach of
   contract claim because LC did not breach the adjunct professor contract in
   failing to renew it. Spears argues that LC breached the 2016-2017 adjunct
   professor contract by failing to renew it.3 However, the contract that Spears
   alleged LC breached expressly stated that it was (1) subject to nonrenewal,
   (2) limited to the period of time specified in the contract, and (3) offered no
   expectation of any future contracts.4 In contrast, the tenured faculty contract

           3
               Spears, however, does not dispute that LC paid her for the full term of the
   contract.
           4
             While Spears presented an email from Aguillard, LC’s former president, in which
   he told Spears to consider her tenure “ongoing” even after her retirement, such evidence
   cannot be proffered to change the interpretation of the “clear and explicit” terms of the
   adjunct professor contract, under which Spears was not entitled to continued employment
   on a yearly basis. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2046 (“When the words of a contract are clear
   and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in
   search of the parties’ intent.”).

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   Spears previously executed—which expired in 2007—notably did not
   include any language stating that it was subject to the same limitations as the
   adjunct professor contract. While Spears is correct that the adjunct professor
   contract incorporated the faculty handbook, the handbook merely defines
   tenure as the “the reasonable expectation of continued employment by the
   College on an annual contractual basis,” an expectation that the adjunct
   professor contract explicitly disclaimed. Moreover, Spears herself conceded
   that she understood that she was not guaranteed employment from year to
   year under the adjunct professor contract. The district court thus properly
   dismissed Spears’s claim for breach of contract because the adjunct professor
   contract expressly disclaimed any expectation of continued employment, and
   Spears has pointed to no other contract as forming the basis of her claim. We
   affirm the district court’s dismissal of her breach of contract claim.
                                      F. Defamation
          Defamation requires proof of five elements in Louisiana law: (1)
   defamatory words; (2) publication; (3) falsity; (4) actual or implied malice;
   and (5) injury. See Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So.2d 517, 521 (La. App. 2 Cir.
   1975); Tate v. Bradley, 837 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1988). If facts sufficient
   to establish even one element of the defamation tort are absent, a plaintiff’s
   cause of action fails. See Costello v. Hardy, 2003-1146 (La. 1/21/04); 864 So.
   2d 129, 139. Moore v. Cabaniss, 29,834 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/24/97); 699 So.2d
   1143, 1146, writ denied, 97-2667 (La. 1/0/ 98); 705 So.2d 1108 (“failure of any
   one of these elements of proof is fatal”). The question of whether a
   communication is capable of a particular meaning and whether that meaning
   is defamatory is a legal question for the court: it must determine “whether a
   listener could have reasonably understood the communication, taken in
   context, to have been intended in a defamatory sense.” Cooksey v. Stewart,
   41,336 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/23/06); 938 So.2d 1206, 1211, writ denied, 06-2348

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   (La. 12/8/06); 943 So.2d 1087 (citing Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345, 352
   (La. 1993)).
          Spears argues that the district court erred in granting summary
   judgment in favor of LC on her state law defamation claim. Spears asserted
   a claim against LC for defamation based on a Facebook posting by Dr. Brewer
   made in response to an online comment made by McIntosh, Spears’s sister,
   that was critical of LC’s termination of Spears.
          The district court held that the posting was not false or defamatory
   and that there was “no evidence to suggest that LC made the post with
   malice, actual or implied, or that it violated any confidentiality owed.” Spears
   argues that this letter contained multiple false statements; in particular, that
   1) she had retired from LC’s full time faculty in 2007; 2) she had served as a
   contract adjunct senior professor which constituted only a year-to-year
   engagement on an as-needed basis; and 3) that LC paid Spears “her full salary
   for two years without her ever teaching a single student, although it was not
   obligated to do so.” Spears argues that this is “defamatory because it
   impliedly accused her of being a ‘gold-digger’ or ‘free-loader’ and held her
   up to contempt and ridicule.”        She also argues that the language is
   defamatory per se. Id. The elements of injury and malice are presumed in
   cases of per se defamation. See Bell v. Rogers, 29,757 (La. App. 2 Cir.
   8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 749, 754.
          We agree with the district court that the letter’s language is not
   defamatory per se. “Words which expressly or implicitly accuse another of
   criminal conduct or by their very nature tend to injure one’s personal or
   professional reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts or
   surrounding circumstances, are considered defamatory per se.” Costello v.
   Hardy, 2003-1146 (La. 1/21/04); 864 So. 2d 129, 140. Spears argues that this
   letter tends to damage her personal or professional reputation. On its face,

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   the language in Brewer’s letter falls well short of language previously found
   to be per se defamatory in Louisiana. See, e.g., Maggio v. Liztech Jewelry, 912
   F. Supp. 216 (E.D. La. 1996) (per se defamatory to describe a competitor’s
   merchandise designs to have been ‘purloined’); Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So.2d
   355 (La. 1982) (false accusation of a lawyer’s lying to the court and
   attempting to suborn a new judge defamatory per se); Garrett v. Kneass, 482
   So.2d 876, 880 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1986) (false accusation of threats on a political
   candidate’s family defamatory per se); Goldsmith v. Unity Ind. Life Ins. & Sick
   Benefit Ass’n, 128 So. 182 (La. App. Orleans Par. 1930) (imputing loathsome
   disease or sexual misconduct is defamatory per se).
          If the language was not defamatory per se, it may still be capable of
   defamatory meaning. However, to prevail on such a claim Spears would then
   need to show, inter alia, actual or implied malice. Malice, or fault, “is a lack
   of reasonable belief in the truth of the statement giving rise to the
   defamation.” Bussie v. Lowenthal, 535 So.2d 378, 381 (La. 1988). Yet the
   district court found, “Spears’[s] only support for the assertion that the post
   was made in bad faith is her personal belief and feelings, and uncorroborated
   assertions are inadequate to support a defamation claim.” Spears thus fails
   to “provide the quality or quantity of evidence to establish a prima facie case”
   of defamation under Louisiana law. Esiverne v. Times Picayune, LLC, 950
   So.2d 858 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006); Roux v. Pflueger, 2009-0009 (La. App. 4
   Cir. 7/8/09), 16 So. 3d 590, 596, writ denied, 2009-1799 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.
   3d 309 (rejecting “[p]laintiffs[’] use [of] their personal beliefs and feelings to
   support their assertions that Defendants acted in alleged bad faith”).
          We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
   LC with respect to Spears’s defamation claim.
                                         ***

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Case: 20-30522   Document: 00516703991       Page: 16   Date Filed: 04/06/2023

                              No. 20-30522

         For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART; REVERSE IN
   PART; and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.

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