Court Opinion

ID: 9915214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-04 21:01:00.92181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:59.152210
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1279      Doc: 36        Filed: 01/03/2024    Pg: 1 of 5

                                           UNPUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-1279

        JACQUELINE PELT; DON CARZELL PELT; SYRIA PELT,

                            Plaintiffs - Appellees,

                     v.

        PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND,

                            Defendant - Appellant,

                     and

        UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; MARYLAND
        DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE; JOHN DOE MARYLAND STATE
        POLICE TROOPERS 1-5, in their individual capacities; JOHN DOE PRINCE
        GEORGE’S COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS 6-10,

                            Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:22-cv-00429-PX; 8:22-cv-00690-PX)

        Submitted: December 5, 2023                                   Decided: January 3, 2024

        Before NIEMEYER, KING, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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        ON BRIEF: Rhonda Weaver, County Attorney, Shelley L. Johnson, Acting Deputy
        County Attorney, Guy Saint Pol Maydieu, Associate County Attorney, PRINCE
        GEORGE’S COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Largo, Maryland, for Appellant. Timothy F.
        Maloney, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAAKE, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Prince George’s County, Maryland, seeks to appeal the district court’s order

        granting the County’s motion to dismiss in part and denying it in part. Specifically, the

        County appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim of negligence during

        the execution of a search warrant by the County’s police department. On appeal, the

        County avers that it is protected by governmental immunity on this claim.

        Plaintiffs-Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.

               We may exercise jurisdiction only over final decisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and

        certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b);

        Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). “[T]he collateral order

        doctrine extends our jurisdiction to a small class of collateral rulings that, although they do

        not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed final.” Davis v. City of Greensboro, 770

        F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This small class

        includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from

        the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the

        underlying action.”      Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).           Decisions denying

        governmental immunity from suit qualify for collateral review if they turn on an issue of

        law. Id. at 281-82 (holding that denial of governmental immunity because plaintiffs

        sufficiently plead factual basis for liability constitutes a final order subject to interlocutory

        review); see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (“[T]he denial of a

        substantial claim of absolute immunity is an order appealable before final judgment, for

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        the essence of absolute immunity is its possessor’s entitlement not to have to answer for

        his conduct in a civil damages action.”).

               Here, however, the County waived its claim to governmental immunity (at least at

        this juncture) by failing to raise it in its motion to dismiss. See In re Venoco, 998 F.3d 94,

        109 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that state-created immunity defense is not jurisdictional and,

        therefore, is waived by the failure to raise it). The claim was first raised in the County’s

        reply brief and then only briefly alluded to at oral argument. See Grayson O Co. v. Agadir

        Int’l, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument by failing to present

        it in its opening brief or by failing to develop its argument—even if its brief takes a passing

        shot at the issue.”) (cleaned up). At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court

        did not address the issue and instead clearly denied the motion on the basis that the

        allegations of malice or gross negligence were plausible. Thus, the court concluded that,

        absent further development of the record, it was unclear whether the County was immune

        from suit. The court noted that the motion to dismiss could be revisited after discovery.

               However, the County argues that the existence of malice or gross negligence is not

        relevant to the County’s claim of governmental immunity and, instead, is applicable only

        to claims of public official immunity by the individual Defendants. Nonetheless, the

        correctness of the district court’s ruling is only relevant to the merits of this appeal. The

        preliminary question is whether the order is interlocutory. Because the district court made

        clear that the issues were factual in nature and that the County was free to file another

        motion to dismiss on the same grounds after discovery, the order in this case was not

        conclusive and, as such, is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Al Shimari v.

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        CACI Int’l, 679 F.3d 205, 220 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that an order is not final if disputed

        issues of fact exist and if the district court states that it might change its mind after further

        proceedings).

               Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss the County’s appeal. We dispense with

        oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                           DISMISSED

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