Court Opinion

ID: 9807817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:16:38.713655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:15.662014
License: Public Domain

Coos, J.,
dissenting.
It is with hesitancy that I dissent from the decision of the Court; but nay views differ so' widely that I feel it my duty to do so'. Had deceased been an accused person, the reasoning expressed by the Chief Justice would be applicable and forceful. Every person is presumed to be innocent of crime until legally tried and convicted. Therefore the law protects its citizens in the enjoyment of liberty, and prescribes the mode and manner by which they may be arrested and brought to trial, entrusting the execution of the same to its officers, who are required to take a solemn oath in the performance of their duties.
Arrests can be made by no one for alleged offences, unless upon a warrant based upon an affidavit issued by a judicial officer, except those enumerated in sections 1124, 1126, 1126 and 1129 of The Code, in which cases the alleged offenders must be taken immediately before such magistrate, who, on proper proof, shall issue a warrant and thereon proceed to act as prescribed by law. In authorizing the arrest of one who is in the legal enjoyment of his liberty, the law, presuming his innocence, protects him from, imposition of those not known to be officers, by requiring such to make known their legal authority before he is obliged to surrender.
In State v. Garrett, 60 N. C., 144, at page 150, it is held: “One who is not a known officer ought to show his warrant, and read it if required, but it would seem that this duty is not so imperative as that a neglect of it will make him a trespasser ab initio, where there is proof that the party, subject to be arrested, had notice of the warrant and was fully aware of its contents,” etc.
*612So careful is the law to. protect those who have not been tried and convicted, that the “outlaws” are entitled to be “called upon and warned to surrender” before they are allowed to be slain. Code 1131. But they belong to the same class — “accused”—with those to whom the authorities cited in the opinion of the Court refer, and relate to the conduct and power of officers in making the arrest in limine. After an arrest has been made, it is the duty of the officer to hold him, even if it becomes necessary to -take his life in doing so. In State v. Sigman, 106 N. C., 732, it is held that “after an accused person has been arrested, an officer is justified in using the amount of force necessary to detain him in custody, and he may kill his prisoner to prevent his escape, provided it becomes necessary, whether he be charged with a felony or misdemeanor.” 1 Bishop Cr. Pr., sec. 618. Why should the escaped convict be entitled to any more protection than while escaping? He can not fall within the protection of those sections of The Code which are made for the benefit of those having a legal right to control their time and conduct before a conviction. No machinery of the law is provided for the capture of an escaped felon under sentence. Warrants are provided for the arrest of the accused, to the end that the truth may be inquired into — not for the convicted. After conviction and sentence, 'the felon has. no. liberty. By his own wilful conduct he has forfeited it, and it has been so adjudged. Having escaped the prison to which he was consigned, the law owes him no protection. None owe him succor or comfort. He is the prisoner of the State, and should be captured wherever and by whomsoever found. While the law imposes no obligation upon citizens generally to capture him, yet they are forbidden to receive, relieve, comfort or assist him. Tet it is the legal duty of those officers, who were encharged with the custody of such convict, to go and take him wherever he is known to be; for his personal liberty *613is not within the pale of any jurisdiction. He has no right to question the authority of his captor, or to require the reading of a warrant or capias, for the law has made no such provision in his behalf.
When the deceased undertook to make his escapo, he well knew, or ought to have known, that it was the duty of his custodians to stop his flight, by taking his life, if it could not be accomplished otherwise. Code, sec. 3443. Having gotten beyond their reach, his liberty still belonged to the State, to which he had forfeited it, and a duty rested upon those charged with his confinement to reduce him to their custody again, and in doing so he was entitled to no duty other than humane treatment after being reduced to custody, and not to be wantonly or wilfully killed, if his capture could otherwise be accomplished. The length of time intervening had not made him oblivious to the fact that the custody of his body belonged to the prison whence he had fled, and upon the sight of the strangers and bearing the words, “ Hold up,” “You are my prisoner,” he recognized the presence of legal authority for his capture, and resumed the same risk which ho took when he first made his escape. What else could the officer have done ? Should he have been required to use only those means necessary to arrest an unconvicted citizen, which, if insufficient to arrest, to allow him to escape, or should he have used those means required to prevent the original escape ? It appears to me that the officer did all in his power to capture him without taking his life. He gave him the same warning that the law allows to an unconvicted “outlaw.” First, he ordered him to stop, and told him that he was his prisoner, then pursued, hallooing “Halt” at every jump, then firing his pistol to warn, and lastly, firing to hit. To have done less would not have been the utmost effort of the officer.
In retaking him, the same force was permissible that was *614allowable in keeping and detaining in custody an “accused” person after arrest.
Considering the law, as I view it in tbis case, the prisoner was justified and ought to have been acquitted.
Quark, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.