Court Opinion

ID: 9548018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:56:23.219949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:22.511949
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GROVES
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent for the reason that I regard the following portion of the statute as unconstitutional:
“[A] person is guilty of criminal solicitation if he . . . attempts to persuade another person to commit a felony . . . with intent to promote of facilitate the commission of that crime, and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent.” Section 18-2-301, C.R.S. 1973.
I can understand a solicitation “with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a certain crime.” I do not understand it with the addition: “and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent.”
Let us assume that the case has been tried and the jury has retired to consider its verdict. It finds that the defendant attempted to persuade another to commit a certain felony with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of that crime. It then perceives that it must also determine whether the acts of the defendant were “under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent.” It looks to the instructions to find the judge’s definition of “circumstances strongly corroborative.”
At that juncture, I imagine that I am the judge who submitted those instructions. What should I have written to define the additional element of “under circumstances strongly corroborative.” I finally conclude that I am unable to perceive just what the legislative intent may have been. Therefore, to me the statute is unconstitutionally vague. “It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON joins in this dissent.