Court Opinion

ID: 9644421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:55:43.616429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.388467
License: Public Domain

Handler, J.,
concurring. I concur in the result reached by the Court. The Court is eminently correct in emphasizing that the trial judge in this case should have pursued other alternatives in extirpating possible jury taint before resorting to the interrogation of the attorney with his conviction for contempt as the unfortunate sequel. The Court finds in the circumstances of this case a privilege applicable to the identity of the attorney’s client. It lays considerable stress upon the strength and pervasiveness of this privilege in adjuring the trial court to pursue ‘less intrusive” means for ascertaining the truth of the matter. Ante at 244; see In re Farber, 78 N. J. 259, 276-277 (1978), cert. den. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, - U. S.---, 99 S. Ct. 598, 58 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1978). While I agree that the trial court should have explored other, more obvious ways of getting to the root of the controversy, I would not counsel this course of action because of tíie existence of an attorney-client privilege. Rather, I deem such action to be preferred as a sound and reasonable exercise of discretion.
The majority of the Court seems to say that the attorney-client privilege covers identity wholly apart from communications, relying in part upon the reasoning of In re Kaplan, 8 N. Y. 2d 214, 203 N. Y. S. 2d 836, 168 N. E. 2d 660 (1960), Ante at 241-243. I have serious reservations as to whether the attorney-client privilege applies to the identity of the client. The privilege emanating from the professional and confidential relationship between an attorney and client has to do with “communications”. It does not in terms protect against the revelation of the existence of the relationship or the identity of the parties. As codified in Evid. B. 26 and N. J. 8. A. 2A :84A-20, the traditional attorney-client privilege focuses upon protection of communications, viz:
*247* * [C]ommunications between lawyer and bis client in the course of that relationship and in professional confidence, are privileged * * *. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus expressed, it may be compared instructively to the informant’s privilege which deals explicitly with “identity”, Evid. B. 36 and N. J. 8. A. 2A:84A-28, as well as the “shield law” which grants newspapermen a specific privilege of confidentiality with respect to “[t]he source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any information was procured * * Evid. B. 27 and N. J. 8. A. 2A: 84A-21(a).
There has been general recognition in different contexts that the traditional attorney-client privilege does not cloak identity per se. State v. Toscano, 13 N. J. 418, 424 (1953) noted that “[m]ost of the authorities hold that while the privilege protects against the disclosure of confidential communications from the client to his attorney, it is not intended to permit concealment by the attorney of the identity of his client”. See Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F. 2d 627 (4 Cir. 1948); United States v. Pape, 144 F. 2d 778 (2 Cir.), cert. den. 323 U. S. 752, 65 S. Ct. 86, 89 L. Ed. 602 (1944); Tomlinson v. United States, 68 App. D. C. 106, 93 F. 2d 652 (D. C. Cir. 1937), cert. den. sub nom. Pratt v. United States, 303 U. S. 642, 58 S. Ct. 645, 82 L. Ed. 1107 (1938); People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N. Y. S. 362 (Sup. Ct.), aff’d 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N. Y. S. 1059 (1934); 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2313; Annot, “Disclosure of Name, Identity, Address, Occupation, or Business of Client as Violation of Attorney-Client Privilege”, 16 A. L. R. 3d 1047 (1967). Where identity has been accorded the protections of the attorney-client privilege, it is usually when that identity is interrelated with the communication itself so that the revelation of the party would jeopardize the confidentiality of the underlying communication. 156 N. J. Super. 316, 322-323 (App. Div. 1978), citing as illustrative cases, N. L. R. B. v. Harvey, 349 F. 2d 900 (4 Cir. *2481965); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d 623 (9 Cir. 1960); In re Kaplan, supra,. It can hardly be claimed in this case, however, that, the communication having been divulged, there is any lingering need to preserve the anonymity of its author.
In addition, doubts as to the breadth of the attorney-client privilege ought to be settled by narrowing, rather than widening, its scope. It has been reiterated in many eases that privileges interfere with the search for truth and should be construed restrictively. E. g., State v. Jamison, 64 N. J. 363, 375 (1974); State v. Briley, 53 N. J. 498, 506 (1969); In re Selser, 15 N. J. 393, 405-407 (1954); also, In re Farber, supra, 78 N. J. at 295, 301 (Handler, J., dissenting). The matter was aptly expressed in In re Richardson, 31 N. J. 391, 396 (1960) :
Since the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence it runs counter to the widely held view “that the fullest disclosure of the facts will best lead to the truth and ultimately to the triumph of justice.” See In re Selser, 15 N. J. 393, 405 (1954).
This healthy policy does not justify an expansive construction of the attorney-client privilege to encompass not only confidential communications as such but the identity of the parties to such communications.
While there is no legal impediment grounded upon a privilege which would prevent the disclosure of the client’s identity, it does not follow that such disclosure would come about in every ease as a matter of course. It would be wrong to. assume that the revelation of a party’s identity, even in the absence of a privilege, would be automatic regardless of circumstances. Whether disclosure occurs must be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. As with all demands for the production of evidence or for discovery to find evidence, the court must weigh the need for such evidence or discovery with the countervailing concerns of individuals resisting such demands. It must determine under the circumstances of the particular controversy whether such *249resistance is reasonable and -whether safeguards should be erected to protect against unnecessary harassment, unfairness, or oppression. Consider generally, Evid. B. 4 and B. 4:10-3 as well as State v. Mingo, 77 N. J. 576 (1978); Schlossberg v. Jersey City Sewerage Authority, 15 N. J. 360 (1954); State v. Cooper, 2 N. J. 540 (1949); Wasserstein v. Swern and Co., 84 N. J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1964).
At this juncture in the present case, it would appear entirely reasonable to require the pursuit of evidence of jury impropriety through alternative means other than compelling disclosure of the client’s identity. The Court’s opinion explains the reasons for this choice, Ante at 235-236 and even though couched in the terminology of privilege, they nevertheless reflect salutary considerations which should guide a court in the exercise of a sound discretion. In the event there is a continued demand to reveal the client even after the production of other evidence, the trial court should then balance the impact and the intrusiveness upon the client-witness of requiring such disclosure with the adequacy of the available evidence in terms of arriving at the truth. Although a witness’ sincere desire for anonymity to avoid personal embarrassment, inconvenience and the like does not in a criminal case weigh as heavily as it might in a civil case, it should nonetheless invite conscientious consideration by the court. The court should look down the road and, if possible, avoid following the route leading to contempt. Cf. In re Contempt of Carton, 48 N. J. 9 (1966). Moreover, while the client’s wish for anonymity may not count for much against the needs of a defendant or the State in the context of criminal proceedings, such anxieties may be entitled to greater solicitude in civil controversies involving only private litigants. While the search for truth is always a paramount value, the struggle between contending private interests in a civil action, whether involving a privilege or not, is more evenly balanced.
The Court, in holding that there is in the circumstances of this case an attorney-client privilege which serves to secrete *250the client’s identity, as well as his communications, emphasizes that the privilege, if invoked in later proceedings, might well have to yield to the importunities of the criminal justice system, e. g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 33 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1972), and a criminal defendant’s constitutional claims for a trial at the hands of a fair and impartial jury, cf. In re Farber, supra. The Court is correct in pointing out that the privilege is less than absolute and the values which it seeks to protect would give way in a collision with those which inhere in the constitutional and fair administration of criminal justice. In that context, a client’s fear of embarrassment and the possible quenching of useful, though anonymous, information relevant to the cause of law enforcement would not surmount the need to disclose his identity where he is shown to be an important witness. Believing as I do, however, that identity is not shrouded by any privilege, I would have even less difficulty in determining how the balance should be struck between the conflicting interests of the client-witness and those of the defendant and the State in a criminal proceeding.
Eor these reasons, I concur separately in the disposition of the Court.
Handler, J., concurring in the result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clieeord, Schreiber and Handler — 7.
For affirmance — Hone.