Court Opinion

ID: 9931397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 22:02:36.74297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:11.958803
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/2024
            CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION TWO

In re LILIANNA C., a Person            B324755
Coming Under the Juvenile              (Los Angeles County Super.
Court Law.                             Ct. No. 18CCJP05147B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

       Plaintiff and Respondent,

       v.

TORI C.,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed
in part.

*     Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and
8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication as to all parts
except Parts I.B. and II. of the Discussion.
      Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
       In this juvenile dependency case, Tori C. (mother) attacks
aspects of the three-year restraining order issued when the
juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over her then four-year-old
daughter, Lilianna C. (Lilianna). In resolving this attack, we
necessarily confront a question of statutory construction—
namely, does Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5,1 which
is the statute that authorizes a juvenile court to issue a
restraining order protecting “the child or any other child in the
household,” grant that authority only in cases where a petition
has been filed by a parent’s probation officer or, instead, in any
case where a petition is filed? The literal text of section 213.5—
through its cross-reference to section 311—would appear to limit
that authority to cases where the petition is filed by a probation
officer. We reject the literal interpretation, both because it leads
to an absurd result and because our dive into the legislative
history reveals that the insertion of section “311” was a drafting
error. Indeed, for just over 27 years, courts applying section
213.5 have implicitly come to the same conclusion. We partially
publish to make our rejection of the literal interpretation explicit,

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                  2
and hold that a juvenile court’s authority under section 213.5 to
issue a restraining order protecting the “child or any other child
in the household” applies whenever a dependency petition has
been filed. We accordingly reject mother’s argument that the
restraining order in this case cannot reach Lilianna (who is the
“child”) or Lilianna’s cousin (who is “[an]other child in the
household”), but agree with her that section 213.5 does not
authorize the issuance of an order protecting the maternal
grandmother. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.
           FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.      The Family
        Mother gave birth to Lilianna in August 2018. At the time
of her birth, Lilianna had methamphetamine and amphetamines
in her bloodstream, and thereafter suffered withdrawal
symptoms.2
II.     Prior Juvenile Dependency Case
        In October 2018, the juvenile court exerted dependency
jurisdiction over Lilianna on the basis of (1) the drugs in
Lilianna’s body at the time of her birth, and (2) mother’s history
of illicit drug use. The court initially removed Lilianna from
mother, but later returned her to mother’s custody and, in
October 2019, terminated jurisdiction over Lilianna.
III. Facts Underlying the Current Dependency Case
        By January 2022, Lilianna was three years old. Mother
regularly screamed at Lilianna and threatened to hit her, with
her voice so loud that mother’s neighbors could hear the
commotion through the walls of their apartment complex. On
several occasions, mother made good on her threats and actually

2     Lilianna’s alleged father is Jerome T., but he has not been
involved in the case.

                                3
did strike Lilianna with her hand. In late March 2022, mother
took Lilianna to an alleyway; while under the influence or
mentally ill, mother yelled that she needed a break, that people
“want to lock her up and kill her,” and that she needed someone
to take Lilianna. On prior occasions, mother had yelled at cars
and acted in a manner that evinced some mental instability. A
concerned neighbor took Lilianna into her custody, and called the
authorities. Lilianna is scared of mother.
IV. Current Dependency Case
      A.     The petition
      On March 29, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition
asking the juvenile court to exert dependency jurisdiction over
Lilianna due to (1) mother’s “history of substance abuse” that
“renders [her] unable to provide regular care and supervision” of
Lilianna, as evidenced by the prior juvenile dependency case; and
(2) mother’s “fail[ure] to make an appropriate plan for
[Lilianna’s] ongoing care and supervision,” as evidenced by
mother’s attempt to find anyone else to take custody of Lilianna.3
The Department further alleged that mother’s conduct placed
Lilianna at substantial risk of serious physical harm, thereby
warranting the exercise of jurisdiction under subdivision (b) of
section 300.
      B.     Mother’s threats and interim temporary
restraining order
      Soon after the Department filed its petition, the juvenile
court detained Lilianna from mother and placed her with

3      The Department also alleged that mother maintained a
“filthy and unsanitary home,” but the juvenile court dismissed
that allegation.

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mother’s sister (maternal aunt), who lived with her husband
(maternal uncle) and their toddler child (maternal cousin).
      On May 10, 2022, mother called maternal aunt and left a
voicemail. In the voicemail, mother said, “Here’s the deal. I am
going to fucking murder you because you let [Lilianna] go
around” Lilianna’s grandmother (maternal grandmother), whom
mother believed—without any foundation—was a “child
molester.” In the same voicemail, mother accused maternal aunt
of being in a cult and being mentally ill. The same day, mother
also called and left a voicemail for maternal grandmother, in
which mother “rambled on” while accusing maternal
grandmother of being a child molester and being a cult member.
Mother additionally made three attempts to call maternal uncle
that day.
      On May 19, 2022, the juvenile court issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) prohibiting mother from harassing and
contacting Lilianna, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, maternal
cousin, and maternal grandmother, and ordered her to stay 100
yards away from them—except for scheduled visitation with
Lilianna. The court granted multiple extensions, keeping the
TRO in effect until the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing.
      While the TRO was in place, mother did not make any
more threatening communications.
      C.     Jurisdictional and dispositional hearing
      On August 10, 2022, the juvenile court exerted dependency
jurisdiction over Lilianna on the basis of mother’s substance
abuse and her failure to make an appropriate plan. The court
removed Lilianna from mother’s custody, and ordered the
Department to provide mother with reunification services. The
court ordered that Lilianna be placed with maternal aunt,

                                5
maternal uncle, and maternal cousin. Simultaneously, the court
issued a three-year permanent restraining order enjoining
mother from harassing or contacting—and also ordering her to
stay away from—Lilianna, maternal aunt, maternal uncle,
maternal cousin, and maternal grandmother (except for
authorized visits with Lilianna). Mother did not object to the
inclusion of maternal cousin or maternal grandmother in the
restraining order.
      D.     Appeal
      Mother filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
juvenile court’s “Jurisdiction and Disposition Orders of Suitable
Placement . . . .” The notice did not list the restraining order.
                           DISCUSSION
      In this appeal, mother does not contest the juvenile court’s
exercise of dependency jurisdiction over Lilianna or its
dispositional order removing Lilianna from her custody. Instead,
she argues that the juvenile court erred by issuing a restraining
order that (1) protects Lilianna, because there is insufficient
evidence to support any order against mother; and (2) protects
maternal cousin and maternal grandmother, because the statute
authorizing restraining orders—section 213.5—does not permit a
court to issue a restraining order protecting persons with such an
attenuated relationship to the dependent child. The Department
objects that we cannot decide these issues because mother’s
notice of appeal does not list the restraining order and because
mother did not object to the inclusion of these individuals at the
hearing; we construe the notice of appeal to encompass mother’s
challenge, and exercise our discretion to overlook any forfeiture of
the issue by mother.

                                 6
       Under section 213.5, and as pertinent here, a juvenile court
has the authority to issue a restraining order lasting up to three
years that protects a dependent “child,” “any other child in the
household,” as well as “any parent, legal guardian, or current
caretaker of the child” from harassment by a parent. (§ 213.5,
subds. (a) & (d); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.630(a).) A court may
issue such an order if it finds that the person to be restrained has
“‘disturbed the peace’”—that is, engaged in conduct that destroys
a person’s mental or emotional calm—of the person to be
protected. (In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990, 997 (Bruno
M.).) Neither “evidence” of prior physical abuse nor “a reasonable
apprehension of future physical abuse” is required. (Ibid.; In re
B.S. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 183, 193-194.)
I.     Lilianna as a Protected Person
       Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support
issuing a restraining order that protects Lilianna.
       A.    Construction of section 213.5
       Before addressing mother’s substantial evidence challenge,
we must confront a precursor question of statutory construction:
Does section 213.5 authorize a juvenile court to issue a
restraining order that protects the “child” at issue in the
dependency proceeding? We independently analyze statutes.
(Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857.)
       In pertinent part, subdivision (a) of section 213.5 provides:

            “After a petition has been filed pursuant to
      Section 311 to declare a child a dependent child of the
      juvenile court, and until the time that the petition is
      dismissed or dependency is terminated, . . . the
      juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to issue ex
      parte orders (1) enjoining a person from molesting,

                                 7
      attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually
      assaulting, battering, harassing, telephoning, . . .
      destroying the personal property, contacting, . . .
      coming within a specific distance of, or disturbing the
      peace of the child or any other child in the household.”
      (§ 213.5, subd. (a), italics added.)

Subdivision (d) then empowers a juvenile court to issue a
restraining order lasting up to three years on any ground in
subdivision (a) as long as the enjoined party receives notice and a
hearing. (§ 213.5, subd. (d).)
       Here is the problem: Section 311 refers to petitions filed by
a parent’s “probation officer.” (§ 311.) Thus, the text of section
213.5—if read literally—appears to limit a juvenile court’s power
to issue both temporary and permanent restraining orders that
protect the child at issue in the dependent case to situations in
which the petition was filed by a probation officer, but not in the
vast majority of cases where the petition is filed by a social
worker.
       We reject this literal reading of section 213.5, and we do so
for three reasons.
       First and foremost, it leads to what we view as an absurd
result. If the above-quoted text is read literally, a juvenile court
would lack the power—in the vast majority of dependency cases
where petitions are filed by social workers pursuant to section
325—to issue a restraining order protecting the very child from
the parent whom the court has just determined has inflicted
physical harm, emotional abuse, or sexual abuse upon the child
or has otherwise placed the child at substantial risk of such harm
or abuse. (See generally § 300.) A literal reading would
accordingly leave the vast majority of children most in need of

                                 8
protection with less protection. This result is diametrically
contrary to the core purpose of the dependency statutes—namely,
to provide the “maximum safety and protection” for abused and
neglected children. (§ 300.2, subd. (a).) Because the “‘“‘language
of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so
would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did
not intend’”’” (Commission on Peace Officer Standards &
Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 290), we are
disinclined to read section 213.5’s reference to section 311
literally.
       Second, our review of the legislative history of section 213.5
indicates that the statute’s reference to “[s]ection 311”—and
hence, the possible limitation of a juvenile court’s power to issue
restraining orders to dependency cases initiated by a parent’s
probation officer—was a drafting error. Prior to 1996, section
213.5 authorized a juvenile court to issue restraining orders
“[d]uring the pendency of any proceeding to declare a minor child
a dependent child of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 1409, §
2.) This language did not make a juvenile court’s power to issue
restraining orders contingent on who filed the petition invoking
the court’s jurisdiction. In 1996, an Assembly Member
introduced a bill to amend section 213.5 to state that a juvenile
court could issue a restraining order “[a]fter a petition has been
filed pursuant to Section 300 to declare a minor child a
dependent.” (Italics added.) (Assem. Bill. No. 2154 (1995-1996
Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 6, 1996.) After the Assembly
passed this bill, the Senate expressed concern over the bill’s
reference to section 300 because that statute enumerates the
substantive grounds for filing a petition but “does not [itself]
authorize the filing of a petition.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary,

                                  9
Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2154 (1995-1996 Reg Sess.) as
amended June 4, 1996.) To cure what it perceived as this
technical inaccuracy, the Senate replaced “[s]ection 300” with
“[s]ection 311,” which, as noted above, authorizes probation
officers to file dependency petitions. The Senate overlooked that
section 325 specifically authorizes “social worker[s]” to file
petitions as well. (§ 325, italics added.) Because neither the
Assembly nor the Senate ever expressed or even hinted at any
intent to limit section 213.5’s reach to petitions filed by probation
officers, the insertion of “[s]ection 311” appears to be a drafting
error that we may disregard. (See Arnall v. Superior Court
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 360, 368.)
       Third and lastly, the dependency statutes as a whole
reinforce our conclusion that section 213.5 empowers juvenile
courts to issue restraining orders to protect the dependent child
even when it is a social worker who files the initial petition. To
begin, section 213.5 supports this conclusion. The language we
have been analyzing is the first sentence in subdivision (a) of
section 213.5. The second sentence empowers a juvenile court to
issue a restraining order to protect “any parent, legal guardian,
or current caretaker of the child,” but contains no reference to
section 311 and thus does not limit the court’s power to cases in
which the petition was filed by a probation officer. (§ 213.5, subd.
(a).) We see no logical reason for granting a juvenile court more
authority to protect a parent, legal guardian, or current caretaker
than the court has to protect the dependent child who is the
subject of the case. What is more, our Legislature seemed to
make the same drafting error when amending section 304 in
1996. Section 304 provides that no other division of a superior
court shall hear proceedings regarding a child in juvenile

                                 10
dependency proceedings, but—like section 213.5—limits its reach
to situations where “a petition has been filed pursuant to
[s]ection 311.” (§ 304.) Yet it makes no sense to bar parallel
proceedings regarding a child when a parent’s probation officer
files a dependency petition, but to allow such parallel proceedings
in the vast majority of cases when the petition is filed by a social
worker. The absurdity of this result hammers home that, in the
broader context of the dependency statutes, the Legislature in
both section 213.5 and in section 304 really meant to refer to
“section 325” or “sections 325 and 311”—not solely “[s]ection 311.”
       To be sure, this drafting error is now 27 years old. In the
intervening 27 years, countless judicial decisions have upheld
restraining orders protecting the dependent child in cases where
the social worker filed the petition, implicitly adopting the
analysis we set forth here. We publish to provide a usable
citation to justify this longstanding and consistent reading of
section 213.5.
       B.    Substantial evidence analysis
       Because, as we have concluded, section 213.5 empowers the
juvenile court to issue a restraining order to protect Lilianna, the
question becomes whether the evidence in this case supports such
an order. In resolving this question, we review for substantial
evidence or an abuse of discretion; either way, the question is the
same—namely, does the record, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the ruling, support a finding that mother engaged in
conduct that disturbed Lilianna’s peace? (Bruno M., supra, 28
Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997; In re L.W. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 44,
51; In re N.L. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1465-1466 (N.L.).)
       Lilianna is properly listed as a protected party because
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit finding

                                11
that mother previously disturbed Lilianna’s peace. Mother
regularly yelled at Lilianna and sometimes struck her, which
Lilianna admitted caused her to fear mother. This certainly
destroyed Lilianna’s mental or emotional calm.
       Mother resists this conclusion with three arguments.
       First, she argues that In re C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
355 and N.L., supra, 236 Cal.App.4th 1460 dictate a result in her
favor. They do not, as they are inapt. Neither case involves a
situation in which the parent directed her actions at the child—as
mother did here. (C.Q., at pp. 364-365 [no basis to list children as
protected persons when they were not present when father
engaged in domestic violence against mother]; N.L., at pp. 1467-
1468 [no basis to list child as protected person when mother’s
drug use and practice of making false allegations that father
committed sexual abuse did not indicate that mother had
“engaged in any violent or dangerous conduct toward” the child].)
       Second, mother urges that the “primary basis” for the
restraining order was the threatening voicemails she left in May
2022, and which did not threaten Lilianna. This is of no
consequence because, as noted above, the record elsewhere
supports the finding that mother on other occasions disturbed
Lilianna’s peace. The fact that mother did not also threaten to
kill her daughter on the voicemail does not somehow negate all
other evidence that supports naming Lilianna as a protected
person.
       Third and lastly, mother urges that she did not make any
further threats after her May 2022 calls (and, implicitly, did not
yell at or strike Lilianna since May 2022). This is also of no
consequence because the TRO explicitly prohibiting that behavior
had been in place since those threats were made, and mother’s

                                12
contact with Lilianna has been limited to monitored visits where
the opportunity to yell at or strike Lilianna is greatly reduced.
Under these circumstances, the absence of further harm does not
mean that Lilianna is not in continued danger of abuse from
mother should no restraining order at all be in place.
II.    Maternal Cousin and Maternal Grandmother as
Protected Persons
       Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in listing
maternal cousin and maternal grandmother as protected persons
because they fall outside the ambit of section 213.5.
       Mother is incorrect as to maternal cousin. That is because,
as noted above, the statute reaches the child and “other children
in the household.” Because maternal cousin is the child of
maternal aunt and maternal uncle, and because maternal aunt is
the current caregiver of Lilianna, maternal cousin was a child in
the household with Lilianna at the time the restraining order
issued.
       But mother is correct as to maternal grandmother. Section
213.5 specifically lists the universe of persons in whose favor a
restraining order may issue, and that list does not include a
maternal grandmother unless that person happens to be the
“legal guardian” or “current caretaker” of the child—neither of
which reaches maternal grandmother in this case. This is not to
say that maternal grandmother might not be entitled to a
restraining order in her favor due to mother’s threats under some
other statute aside from section 213.5.

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                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court is ordered to modify the restraining
order to exclude maternal grandmother as a protected person. In
all other respects, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders are affirmed.
       CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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