Court Opinion

ID: 9863097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:05:22.811468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:56.113659
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the starting point for statutory analysis is the text of the provision at issue and that extratextual factors, like legislative history, should be examined only if the plain meaning of the statute would lead to absurd consequences, that the legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the language is ambiguous. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). However, I part company with the majority when it holds that the plain meaning of Article 42.08(b), V.A.C.C.P., leads to absurd consequences.
When a defendant has multiple convictions, Art. 42.08(a) gives the trial court discretion to order the sentences to run consecutively or concurrently, limited only by sections (b) and (c). Article 42.08(b) states that if a prisoner in the Texas Department of Corrections (TDCJ) commits an offense while incarcerated and he has not completed “the sentence he was serving at the time of the offense,” the judge shall order the new sentence to be served consecutive with the “sentence for the original offense.” The meaning of Art. 42.08(b) is clear based on a plain reading of the text. The sentence for a “prison offense,” an offense which is committed while one is serving time in prison, must begin to run when the sentence that was being served when that prison offense occurred is completed. Section (b) focuses on *323the date of the commission of the new offense and that date determines what sentence is the “sentence for the original offense.” Section (b) is to be read as a whole: the “sentence for the original offense” necessarily refers to the first part of section (b) — the sentence being served at the time of the offense. Therefore, Basden’s sentence for the aggravated assault conviction should have been ordered to run consecutively with his aggravated robbery sentence rather than cumulated with the sentence for attempted capital murder, because Basden had not yet begun serving time on the attempted capital murder sentence. Likewise, Coleman’s sentence for the aggravated assault conviction should have been ordered to run consecutively with his aggravated robbery sentence rather than cumulated with the sentence for escape because Coleman had not yet begun serving time on the escape sentence.
The majority does not disagree that this is indeed the plain meaning of Art. 42.08(b). The majority argues, however, that to construe the provision according to its plain terms leads to an absurd result — “consecutive sentence” deterrence for the first prison offense but no such deterrence for subsequent prison offenses. The majority argues that it is “absurd” to construe the statute to provide anything other than the maximum deterrent effect imaginable, notwithstanding its plain terms.
I would point out, first of all, that this construction of Art. 42.08(b), according to its plain terms, is in keeping with the description of the “Problem that the bill addresses” that the majority quotes from the bill analysis, viz:
“If inmates can serve subsequent sentences at the same time as the sentence they are already in TDC for, there is little effective deterrence from continued criminal behavior beyond loss of good time.”
(Emphasis added.) Notice that nothing is said of the dire consequences of allowing subsequent sentences to be served “at the same time” as each other. Secondly, just because Art. 42.08(b) does not reach as far as the majority might like or punish as severely as the majority thinks fit or as the majority thinks the legislature intended does not render it “absurd.” What the legislature meant to do is not the issue. It is what the legislature did through the plain meaning of the statute that must be determined. “[TJhis Court does not have an option to rescue the Texas Legislature from the inexorable consequences of its own unambiguous language.” Moore v. State, 868 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex.Cr. App.1993). That the provision could have been worded to punish more severely does not authorize this Court to ignore the plain meaning of the statute.
Finally, who is to say that the scheme that the majority envisions as the most deterrent imaginable necessarily is? According to the plain terms of Art. 42.08(b), an inmate serving a lengthy sentence who commits a prison offense will serve the new sentence consecutively to the service of the original sentence. If the sentence for the prison offense is also a lengthy one, the inmate is now looking at a substantial period of incarceration. Stacking a further sentence for yet another prison offense onto the first prison offense, as the majority advocates, will not likely serve as much of a deterrent under these circumstances. An inmate with substantial prison time ahead of him is simply not likely to be deterred by the prospect of more. As subsequent prison offenses accumulate, the scheme will eventually remove any disincentive whatsoever for the inmate to refrain from prison mischief, since he will eventually be facing consecutive sentences that, even with good time, far exceed his expected lifespan. Such an inmate could prove wholly unmanageable. In short, in some instances the majority’s idea of maximum deterrence could result in maximum chaos. Thus, the majority not only legislates improperly, it legislates badly. If the Legislature wants to make such a mistake, that is its prerogative — it can amend the provision. But we should not construe them, by fiat, to have made such a mistake when there is nothing remotely “absurd” about giving Art. 42.08(b) the meaning it plainly imparts.
I would hold that the Courts of Appeals erred in upholding the cumulation orders in the instant cases and would reform the cu-mulation orders so that the sentences for the aggravated assault convictions be ordered to *324run consecutive with the sentence which each appellant was serving at the time he committed the assault. Because the majority opinion does not do so, I respectfully dissent.
OVERSTREET and MEYERS, JJ., join.