Court Opinion

ID: 9556435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 14:00:24.159069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:25.831350
License: Public Domain

21-2995-cv; 22-298-cv
Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., Coe v. Eastport Union Free Sch. Dist.

                      United States Court of Appeals
                                     for the Second Circuit
                           _____________________________________

                                           August Term 2022

          (Argued in Tandem: March 8, 2023                       Decided: August 17, 2023)

                           _____________________________________

                                       MR. CHRISTOPHER KANE,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                   — v. —                        21-2995-cv

 MOUNT PLEASANT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, SUSAN GUINEY, FRANK VITERITTI,
          BRUCE FERGUSON, NICOLE SCHIMPF, RICHARD HENNESSY,

                                          Defendants-Appellees,

                                             PHILIP CICCONE,

                                         Defendant.
                           _____________________________________

                                       JANE COE, a pseudonym,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                                    — v. —                        22-298-cv

  EASTPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, SOUTH MANOR UNION FREE SCHOOL
 DISTRICT, EASTPORT-SOUTH MANOR CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, EASTPORT-
  SOUTH MANOR CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, as successor in interest, JOSEPH P.
    GAGLIANO, PETER C. SCORDO, EDWARD BRODERICK, GARY H. SCHNEIDER,
BENEDICT MERENDINO, B. ALLEN MANNELLA, WILLIAM BURGER, BRUCE KRONMAN,
   CHARLES TESTA, RICHARD SCHMIDT, MARILYN DORSA, MARION D IENER, NEIL
   MIRANDA, and all the superintendents, administrators, principals and their
             employees and/or agents, from 1997 through 2002,

                                 Defendants-Appellees,

                                CHARLES REGAN,
                                   Defendant.
                     _____________________________________

Before:             CABRANES, BIANCO, Circuit Judges∗

       These two appeals, heard in tandem and consolidated for disposition, raise
the same legal question with respect to New York’s Child Victims Act, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 214-g, which revives the time to commence civil actions based upon
certain sexual offenses that were committed against children less than eighteen
years of age. In particular, we must determine whether Section 214-g can revive
or toll a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., that is
otherwise time barred, but is based upon alleged sexual abuse that falls within the
contours of Section 214-g. We conclude that it cannot. Under well-settled law,
claims under Section 1983 and Title IX are governed by New York’s general statute
of limitations for personal injury actions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is
three years. We hold that Section 214-g has no impact on the limitations period
for such federal claims. Therefore, the district courts correctly dismissed the
federal claims as time barred under Section 214(5), and Kane’s leave to amend his
operative complaint was properly denied.

∗ Judge Rosemary S. Pooler, originally a member of the panel, died on August 10, 2023.
The two remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the
matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457,
458–59 (2d Cir. 1998).

                                           2
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district courts.

                                    KEVIN T. MULHEARN, P.C., Orangeburg,
                                    NY for Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher
                                    Kane.

                                    JOSEPH GALLO, McGivney Kluger Clark
                                    & Intoccia, P.C., New York, NY (Gary
                                    Intoccia, on the brief), for Defendants-
                                    Appellees Mount Pleasant Central School
                                    District, Susan Guiney, Frank Viteritti,
                                    Bruce Ferguson, Nicole Schimpf, and
                                    Richard Hennessy.

                                    John Ray, John Ray & Associates, Miller
                                    Place, NY for Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Coe.

                                    JOSHUA S. SHTEIERMAN, Volz &
                                    Vigliotta, PLLC, Nesconset, NY, for
                                    Defendants-Appellees Eastport Union Free
                                    School District, South Manor Union Free
                                    School District, Eastport-South Manor
                                    Central High School District, and
                                    Eastport-South Manor Central School
                                    District as successor in interest, Joseph P.
                                    Gagliano, Peter C. Scordo, Edward
                                    Broderick, Gary H. Schneider, Benedict
                                    Merendino, B. Allen Mannella, William
                                    Burger, Bruce Kronman, Charles Testa,
                                    Richard Schmidt, Marilyn Dorsa, Marion
                                    Diener, Neil Miranda, and all the
                                    superintendents,            administrators,
                                    principals, and their employees and/or
                                    agents, from 1997 through 2002.

                                3
JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judge:

      These appeals in two different cases, heard in tandem and consolidated for

disposition, challenge two separate judgments dismissing their respective federal

claims. Plaintiff-appellant Christopher Kane appeals from a judgment, entered in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.),

dismissing as time barred his claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments

of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and denying his motion

for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint as futile. Plaintiff-appellant Jane

Coe appeals from a judgment, entered in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Vitaliano, J.), dismissing her claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Title IX as time barred.

      These two appeals raise the same legal question with respect to New York’s

Child Victims Act, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g, which revives the time to commence civil

actions based upon certain sexual offenses that were committed against children

less than eighteen years of age. In particular, we must determine whether Section

214-g can revive or toll a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX that is

otherwise time barred, but is based upon alleged sexual abuse that falls within the

contours of Section 214-g. We conclude that it cannot. Under well-settled law,

                                         4
claims under Section 1983 and Title IX are governed by New York’s general statute

of limitations for personal injury actions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is

three years. We hold that Section 214-g has no impact on the limitations period

for such federal claims. Therefore, the district courts correctly dismissed the

federal claims as time barred under Section 214(5), and Kane’s leave to amend his

operative complaint was properly denied.

          Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district courts.

                                  BACKGROUND 1

    I.     Kane, 21-2995

         Christopher Kane brought this action against the Mount Pleasant Central

School District (“MPCSD”), several former school district employees, and one of

his alleged abusers, based on bullying and physical and sexual assaults that

occurred in 2008 and 2009 when he was a high school freshman at Westlake High

School, a school operated by defendant MPCSD. According to the First Amended

Complaint (the “FAC”), in August 2008, Kane attended football practices with the

varsity football team as an incoming freshman. At the time, Kane was thirteen

1
  The factual allegations are taken from the operative complaints in each case, which we
must accept as true in reviewing a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).

                                            5
years old, but was required to practice and share the locker room with students

who were seventeen and eighteen years old. The older teammates bullied Kane,

“mocked him for his then not-yet-fully-developed sexual organs, questioned his

sexual preference, and taunted him, and threatened” to continue the harsh

treatment “for the rest of the 2008 football season.” Joint App’x at 41–42. Kane

also was allegedly physically bullied and sexually assaulted by some of his

teammates.

      According to the FAC, Kane’s football coaches witnessed some of these

incidents but failed to intervene. In late August 2008, Kane told his parents about

the harassment, without providing specifics. His parents spoke with the head

football coach, who assured Kane’s parents “he would take care of it.” Joint App’x

at 44 (internal quotation marks omitted). The head coach warned the team that he

would not tolerate hazing and threatened to throw off the team any player

credibly accused of hazing, but he made no changes to prevent or mitigate hazing,

took no action to discipline any individuals, and never attempted to identify the

parties involved.

      On January 9, 2009, Kane informed his mother about the specific incidents

of physical and sexual assault involving his teammates. That same evening,

                                        6
Kane’s mother reported the allegations to the Westlake Principal.       And, the

following day, she reported the sexual assault to the local police. On January 12,

2009, Kane’s parents met with the Principal and the MPCSD Superintendent to

discuss the incidents.

      Ultimately, the Principal and Superintendent directed MPCSD’s Title IX

Compliance Officer and Westlake’s Assistant Principal to investigate Kane’s

allegations. According to the FAC, however, the investigation was a “sham,” and

the school’s goals were to shield the accused older students from real punishment

and to protect the school’s reputation. Joint App’x at 53. On or about January 21,

2009, the school suspended Kane for five days because of a threat Kane allegedly

made to the teammate who was physically assaulting him.

      On January 23, 2009, an attorney hired by Kane’s parents faxed the school a

letter demanding that the school revoke Kane’s suspension and threatening legal

action against MPCSD and various employees if they did not take corrective

measures.   Kane’s parents ultimately entered a stipulation of settlement with the

MPCSD, and MPCSD reinstated Kane.

      Kane filed the initial Complaint on September 25, 2020. On February 3, 2021,

Kane filed his FAC alleging, inter alia, that MPCSD and other high-ranking

                                        7
administrators: (1) had actual knowledge but were deliberately indifferent to the

sexual misconduct and harassment inflicted upon him by his teammates; and (2)

retaliated against him in violation of Title IX, as well as various New York state

common law claims against the individual defendants.

      On March 17, 2021, MPCSD filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground that the applicable statute

of limitations had expired on his Title IX claim. Kane opposed the motion and

sought leave to amend the FAC. The proposed Second Amended Complaint

added two full paragraphs where Kane more specifically pled the element of

“sexual gratification” in connection with the alleged sexual abuse as required by

Article 130 of the New York Penal Law and deleted certain paragraphs in

connection with his now withdrawn arguments related to delayed accrual and/or

equitable estoppel in connection with his Title IX retaliation claim against MPCSD.

      The district court dismissed, with prejudice, Kane’s Title IX claims on

timeliness grounds, opining that the applicable statute of limitations had passed.

Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 20-cv-7936, 2021 WL 5112981 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

3, 2021). It rejected Kane’s argument that Section 214-g tolled his Title IX claims

because it held that Section 214-g was not a generally applicable tolling provision,

                                         8
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Kane’s state law claims, and

denied his cross-motion for leave to amend because it would be futile given that

his claims were time barred. Id. at *8.

    II.     Coe, 22-298

          Jane Coe brought this action against the Eastport-South Manor Central

School District (“Eastport”),2 the Eastport girls’ basketball coach, along with

various other employees, agents and officials acting on behalf of Eastport, alleging

that they are liable for the coach’s alleged sexual abuse and harassment of Coe

while she was a minor student at Eastport.

          According to the Complaint, Coe attended middle school at Eastport from

September 1997 through June 1999 and then attended the high school from

September 1999 through June 2002. Coe was a member of the girls’ basketball

team. The Complaint alleges that, in 2001, the coach enticed Coe to accompany

him to a New York Knicks basketball game at Madison Square Garden. At the

game, the coach purchased alcoholic beverages, and persuaded Coe to drink them,

2
 Also named as defendants in this action are Eastport Union Free School District, South
Manor Union Free School District, and Eastport-South Manor Central High School
District. These districts merged to become Eastport in 2004.
                                          9
causing her to become intoxicated. After the game, the coach drove Coe to his

home and manipulated her into performing oral sex on him.

      Eastport initiated an investigation, but, at the coach’s urging, Coe and the

coach lied to school authorities about what transpired during and after the game.

Eastport did not conduct any further investigation. Coe alleges that the coach

engaged in sexual intercourse with her on at least three discrete occasions.

      Coe sued Eastport and the coach seventeen years later. Coe argues that

Eastport is liable for the coach’s alleged sexual abuse and harassment of her while

she was a minor student pursuant to Title IX, Section 1983, and various state laws.

      Eastport filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

Eastport argued that Coe’s claims were time barred. The district court agreed and

granted Eastport’s motion to dismiss the federal claims as time barred. Coe v.

Regan, 19-cv-05327, 2022 WL 467053 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2022). The district court

rejected Coe’s argument that Section 214-g revived her federal claims. Id. at *3–*5.

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law

claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Id. at *6.

                                         10
                                     DISCUSSION

       The district courts in Kane’s and Coe’s respective cases dismissed their

federal claims as time barred. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), including legal

conclusions concerning the court’s “interpretation and application of a statute of

limitations.” City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc., 637 F.3d 169, 173

(2d Cir. 2011). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In reviewing the complaint, “we accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Bruce Katz, M.D., P.C. v. Focus

Forward, LLC, 22 F.4th 368, 370 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

       In Kane’s case, the district court also denied him leave to amend his

complaint because it held that it would be futile given that the federal claims were

time barred. We review de novo the denial of leave to amend where the district

court determined that the proposed amendments would be futile. IBEW Loc.

Union No. 58 Pension Tr. Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., 783

                                            11
F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015); Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d

114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012). “Proposed amendments are futile if they would fail to cure

prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.” Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., 783 F.3d at 389 (internal quotation

marks omitted). To evaluate whether a proposed amended complaint would state

a claim, we rely on “the same standards as those governing the adequacy of a filed

pleading.” Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).

   I.      New York’s General Statute of Limitations for Personal Injury Actions
           Applies to Section 1983 and Title IX Claims
        Neither Section 1983 nor Title IX contains a statute of limitations, and thus

courts must borrow a state statute of limitations. Curto v. Edmundson, 392 F.3d 502,

504 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Courts “must apply the most appropriate or

analogous statute of limitations,” so long as it is not inconsistent with federal law

or policy. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Bd. of Regents

v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1989). Previously, courts attempted to determine

which state statute of limitations was most appropriate or most analogous to the

various types of federal claims before them. However, this led to “uncertainty,

confusion, and lack of uniformity.” Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir.

1994) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 n.25 (1985) and Owens v. Okure, 488

                                          12
U.S. 235, 240 (1989)).

      In Wilson, the Supreme Court recognized that “[a]lmost every § 1983 claim

can be favorably analogized to more than one of the ancient common-law forms

of action, each of which may be governed by a different statute of limitations.” 471

U.S. at 272–73. The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he federal interests in

uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation” required a

single statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. Id. at 275. More specifically,

the Court explained:

      If the choice of the statute of limitations were to depend upon the
      particular facts or the precise legal theory of each claim, counsel could
      almost always argue, with considerable force, that two or more
      periods of limitations should apply to each § 1983 claim. Moreover,
      under such an approach different statutes of limitations would be
      applied to the various § 1983 claims arising in the same State, and
      multiple periods of limitations would often apply to the same case.
      There is no reason to believe that Congress would have sanctioned
      this interpretation of its statute.
Id. at 273–75. The Court concluded that Section 1983 claims are best described as

personal injury claims, and thus, the corresponding state statute of limitations for

those claims was the one to be applied to all Section 1983 claims. Id. at 280.

      In Owens, the Supreme Court addressed the question of which state statute

of limitations is applicable when a state has more than one personal injury statute

of limitations. The appellant in Owens argued that the Court must apply the

                                         13
statute of limitations for personal injury that was specific to intentional torts while

appellee argued that the state’s general or residual personal injury statute of

limitations was applicable. 488 U.S. 242–43. The Court in Owens wanted “a rule

for determining the appropriate personal injury limitations statute that can be

applied with ease and predictability in all 50 states.” Id. at 243. The Court held

that where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury

actions, courts should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury

actions because applying the statute of limitations to the limited category of

intentional torts would be inconsistent with Section 1983’s broad scope. Id. at 249–

50. Therefore, in New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is

New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 214(5), which is three years. See Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 308 (2d

Cir. 2020) (citing Owens, 488 U.S. at 250–51).

      The Wilson and Owens analysis applies with equal force to actions under

Title IX. See Curto, 392 F.3d at 504 (noting that its conclusion that Title IX claims

borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury actions “accords with our own

practice of borrowing the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions for

analogous federal discrimination actions brought pursuant to . . . [Section] 1983”).

                                          14
   II.     The Child Victims Act Does Not Revive or Toll Section 1983 or Title
           IX Claims
         Kane and Coe do not dispute that New York’s general statute of limitations

for personal injury actions applies to their claims. Instead, they argue that Section

214-g, which was enacted as part of the Child Victims Act, also applies to the facts

of their respective cases. Section 214-g “revive[s] the time to commence civil

actions based upon certain conduct which would constitute a sexual offense

committed against children less than 18 years of age.” Fenton v. State, 213 A.D.3d

737, 739 (2d Dep’t 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It states

that:

         Notwithstanding any provision of law which imposes a period of
         limitation to the contrary . . . every civil claim or cause of action
         brought against any party alleging intentional or negligent acts . . .
         which would constitute a sexual offense . . . committed against a child
         less than eighteen years of age . . . is hereby revived, and action
         thereon may be commenced not earlier than six months after, and not
         later than two years and six months after the effective date of this
         section.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-g. Kane and Coe contend that their federal claims were revived

and tolled under Section 214-g, and therefore, are timely.

         Based on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Wilson and Owens, every United

States Court of Appeals to address this issue thus far has determined that a

specialized statute for sexual abuse claims does not render an otherwise untimely

                                           15
Section 1983 or Title IX claim timely. See Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d

1208, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that New Mexico’s special statute for child

sexual abuse did not toll plaintiff’s Section 1983 and Title IX claims because it is

not generally applicable); Bonneau v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 666 F.3d 577, 580

(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Oregon’s specialized abuse statute was not closely

related to two-year residual statute of limitations, as required to borrow tolling

provision from state law for plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim); King-White v. Humble

Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 759–61 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the general

statute of limitations applied to plaintiff’s Title IX and Section 1983 claims rather

than Texas’s specific limitations period for sexual assault claims); Woods v. Ill. Dep’t

of Child. and Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 765–68 (7th Cir. 2013) (declining to apply

Illinois’ child sexual abuse statute to revive plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim).

      Kane and Coe argue, nevertheless, that Section 214-g revived their federal

claims and tolled the general statute of limitations. To be sure, federal courts are

obligated to apply a state’s revival and tolling provisions. Johnson v. Ry. Express

Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463–64 (1975); see also Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 484 (“In § 1983

actions . . . a state statute of limitations and the coordinate tolling rules are more

than a technical obstacle to be circumvented if possible. In most cases, they are

                                          16
binding rules of law.”); Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 540–44 (1989) (holding that

a Section 1983 claim was tolled by state’s provision tolling the onset of limitations

periods for prisoners and others suffering from legal disabilities). However, the

revival or tolling provision must be “closely related” to the borrowed statute of

limitation. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269 (“Only the length of the limitations period,

and closely related questions of tolling and application, are to be governed by state

law.” (internal footnote omitted)). A revival or tolling provision is closely related

when it applies to all claims contained within a general statute of limitations for

personal injury actions, such that there is no need to analyze the nature of the

underlying claims. Therefore, “generally applicable tolling provisions—such as

those based on minority, incapacity, and equitable grounds—should be

incorporated for use under § 1983” and Title IX. Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1213. Those

types of tolling provisions, which are unrelated to any particular legal theory

underlying the individual claims, do not frustrate Wilson’s desire to avoid time

consuming litigation and uncertainty caused by “an analysis of the particular

facts” for each claim to determine the applicable statute of limitations. 471 U.S. at

272.

       However, application of tort-specific revival or tolling provisions, such as

                                         17
Section 214-g, would require federal courts to engage in the type of analysis Wilson

forbids. It would strain credulity that the Supreme Court would require federal

courts to abstain from a factual analysis for purposes of determining the

appropriate statute of limitations, only to allow courts to engage in that same

analysis to determine if a revival or tolling provision applies. “Such a holding

would succeed only in transferring the confusion over the choice among multiple

statutes of limitations to a choice among multiple tolling provisions.” Bonneau,

666 F.3d at 580 (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1213 (“The same reasoning that governed the

selection of the applicable statute of limitations should also apply to the selection

of tolling statutes. Thus, the state tolling provisions adopted for actions under §

1983 should not depend on the particular facts or the precise legal theory of the

claim.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

      Our holding is consistent with the reasoning of numerous district court

decisions in the Second Circuit that have considered whether Section 214-g affects

the timeliness of Section 1983 and Title IX claims. See, e.g., FL v. Hilton Cent. Sch.

Dist., No. 21-cv-06551, 2022 WL 1665160, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022) (holding

that Section 214-g does not apply to Section 1983 claims); Boyle v. North Salem Cent.

                                         18
Sch. Dist., No. 19-cv-8577, 2020 WL 2319116, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2020)

(“Although Section 214-g extends the statute of limitations for state law claims

respecting child sexual abuse, it does not extend the statute of limitations for

Section 1983 claims. This is because where state law provides multiple statutes of

limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should

borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)); accord Caldwell v. City of New York, 21-cv-

6560, 2021 WL 3887678, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2021); Doe v. NYS Off. Of Child. &

Fam. Servs., 21-cv-4332, 2023 WL 2574741, at *6–7 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2021).

      Kane and Coe argue that these federal cases incorrectly rely on Wilson and

Owens, which they contend are not relevant because a court is not compelled to

make a binary choice between competing statutes of limitations. We disagree.

Although Wilson and Owens focus on choices between different statutes of

limitations, the overarching purpose of both decisions is to create uniformity

within the context of these federal claims because the types of claims brought

under them can be quite broad. That uniformity would be frustrated if federal

courts were required to conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether a state tort-

specific tolling provision applies to a party’s federal claims.

                                          19
      Indeed, New York state courts interpreting these same statute of limitations

provisions have reached the same conclusion we do in dismissing Section 1983

and Title IX claims brought in state court as time barred. In BL Doe 3 v. Female

Acad. of the Sacred Heart, 199 A.D. 3d 1419 (4th Dep’t 2021), the plaintiff, like Kane

and Coe, did not dispute that New York’s three-year statute of limitations for non-

specified personal injury claims applied to the claims brought under Section 1983

and Title IX. Id. at 1421. Just like here, the BL Doe 3 plaintiff argued that Section

214-g tolled her federal claims. The Fourth Department rejected this argument

because it held that Section 214-g was “not a revival statute related to the residual

personal injury statute of limitations.” Id. The court distinguished Section 214-g

from tolling provisions based on a plaintiff’s infancy or incarceration because

determining whether Section 214-g applies to toll plaintiff’s claims here would

require it to consider the particular facts of the case. Id. at 1422.

      More recently, in Dolgas v. Wales, 215 A.D.3d 51 (3d Dep’t 2023), the Third

Department agreed with the decision in BL Doe 3 and held that Section 214-g does

not revive claims under Section 1983 or Title IX that are otherwise barred by the

three-year statute of limitations contained in Section 214(5). Id. at 57–59. In doing

so, the court specifically rejected the contention plaintiffs assert here, namely, that

                                           20
it should not be a binary choice between competing limitations periods and that

Section 214-g is a revival or tolling statute that is “related to” Section 214(5):

      Plaintiffs also contend that CPLR 214–g and CPLR 214(5) are related
      because “CPLR 214–g was placed within a subdivision of the same
      CPLR section governing residual personal injury actions.” Even
      accepting plaintiffs’ characterization of these two separate statutes,
      however, they are at most similar in that they both set forth a
      limitations period within which to commence an action. Other than
      this, there is no relationship between the two statutes. Because
      plaintiffs’ arguments as to whether CPLR 214–g revived the 42 USC §
      1983 claim are unavailing, [the lower court] correctly dismissed such
      claim as barred by the statute of limitations. For similar reasons,
      plaintiffs’ claim under Title IX was also correctly dismissed as time-
      barred.

Id. at 58 (alteration adopted) (internal footnote omitted).

       In sum, we hold that Section 214-g, as a tort-specific provision, is not a

revival or tolling statute closely related to the residual personal injury statute of

limitations applicable to a Section 1983 or Title IX claim. Accordingly, the district

courts correctly concluded that the federal claims brought by Kane and Coe, which

had accrued more than three years prior to the filing of their respective lawsuits,

were time barred under Section 214(5) and properly dismissed those claims.3

3
  We emphasize that our holding does not impact a plaintiff’s ability to utilize Section
214-g to attempt to revive his or her state law claims that are governed by the revival
statute but would otherwise be time barred under the applicable New York statute of
limitations. In particular, in Kane’s case, the district court declined to exercise

                                           21
   III.    Kane’s Proposed Amendment to His Claim Would Be Futile

         Kane cross-moved for leave to amend his complaint if the district court

concluded that he had not sufficiently pled that defendant Ciccone’s sexual assault

was done for his own sexual gratification. Such an amendment would not cure

the fact that Kane’s claims are time barred. See Grace v. Rosenstock, 228 F.3d 40, 53

(2d Cir. 2000) (“Amendment would likely be futile if, for example, the claims the

plaintiff sought to add would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.”).

Thus, the district court did not err in declining to give Kane leave to amend his

claim.

                                    CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district courts are

AFFIRMED.

supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims against all defendants under the New
York Human Rights Law, as well as claims against all defendants for intentional infliction
of emotional distress and against the MPCSD for ”negligent security and supervision”
and ”breach of duty of care,” and dismissed those claims without prejudice. Joint App’x
at 17. The district court in Coe’s case likewise declined supplemental jurisdiction and
dismissed without prejudice her state law claims for negligent failure to investigate and
supervise, sexual abuse and harassment, sexual assault, sexual battery, intentional
infliction of emotion distress, prima facie tort, breach of fiduciary duties, and negligent
hiring and retention. Therefore, both Kane and Coe may re-file these claims in state court.
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