Court Opinion

ID: 9644938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:09:00.365041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:20.280093
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
WHITE, Judge.
On rehearing, the State Prosecuting Attorney argues that our opinion on original submission erroneously evaluated *287the State’s controverting affidavits in the instant case. The majority held the State’s affidavits failed for lack of specificity (“the Legislature, however, has been very specific as to the manner in which the State is to controvert the defendant’s affidavits.”). The majority concluded that, as a result, the appellant should have been granted a change of venue as a matter of law. Lundstrom v. State (No. 898-84 delivered April 23, 1986).
We now conclude that the dissenting opinion was correct on original submission and we adopt it. See Dingier v. State, 705 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
In accordance with the decisions of Dunn v. State, 7 Tex.App. 600 (1880), Pierson v. State, 21 Tex.App. 14, 17 S.W. 468 (1885), and Meuly v. State, 26 Tex.App. 274, 9 S.W. 563 (1888), we find that affidavits, such as those filed by the State in the instant case, substantially controverted those filed by the appellant and therefore complied with Article 31.04, V.A.C.C.P., in order to join the issue of the defendant’s entitlement to a change of venue. To the extent they are in conflict, Davis v. State, 19 Tex.App. 201 (1885), Carr v. State, 19 Tex.App. 635 (1885), and their progeny are overruled.
We hold that appellant was not entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law. The trial court did not err in overruling the appellant’s motion.
The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
CLINTON, DUNCAN and TEAGUE, JJ., dissent.
MILLER, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion on original submission.