Court Opinion

ID: 2964826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:43.342257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.183689
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                              _________________________
          No. 96-1534
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                      Appellee,
                                         v.
                                CECILIO F. MCDONALD,
                                Defendant, Appellant.
                              _________________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
                [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                              _________________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                            Hill,* Senior Circuit Judge,
                             and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                              _________________________
               Robert D. Dimler
                              , by appointment of the court, for appellant.
               Margaret 
                        E. 
                           Curran, Assistant United States Attorney, with
          whom Sheldon 
                       Whitehouse, United States Attorney, and    Zechariah
          Chafee, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for
          appellee.
                              _________________________
                                   August 20, 1997
                              _________________________
          _______________

          *Of the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA, Circuit 
                                   Judge. In this proceeding, defendant-
          appellant Cecilio F. McDonald asks in the alternative (1) that we
          vacate his guilty plea because the district court failed to advise
          him of the applicable mandatory minimum sentence during the plea
          colloquy, or (2) that we set aside his sentence due to an alleged
          error in the calculation of his adjusted offense level. Taking
          second things first, we find no computational error. And while
          McDonald's first point is well-taken _ we agree that the district
          court erred in failing to apprise the appellant of the mandatory
          minimum sentence, 
                           see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) _ we find that this
          error was benign. Consequently, we affirm the appellant's
          conviction and sentence.
                                         I.
                                     Background
                    On September 18, 1995, the authorities searched the
          appellant's one-bedroom apartment in Providence, Rhode Island,
          pursuant to a warrant. They found a cornucopia of drugs, money,
          and drug-related paraphernalia hidden in the parlor: 160.32 grams
          of crack cocaine, 2,656.47 grams of marijuana, $16,050 in cash,
          three digital scales, and two dust masks. They also found a 9mm
          semi-automatic pistol and a plastic bag containing several live
          rounds in a secret compartment in the bathroom vanity.
                    A federal grand jury subsequently returned an indictment
          charging the appellant with possessing fifty grams or more of
          cocaine base (crack), intending to distribute it, in violation of
          21 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (1994). In due course, the
                                          3

          appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. During the plea colloquy,
          the district court questioned him extensively in order to ascertain
          that his guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Yet
          the court neglected to mention that, due to the amount of crack
          involved, the offense carried a mandatory minimum ten-year
          sentence.
                    Following standard practice, the district court
          commissioned the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report
          (PSI Report). In it, the probation department reported that the
          amount of crack involved called for a base offense level (BOL) of
          36; recommended a series of adjustments to the BOL; hypothesized
          that the appellant belonged in criminal history category III; and
          forecast a guideline sentencing range of 210-262 months. In two
          places, the PSI Report unambiguously declared that a mandatory
          minimum sentence of ten years applied. The appellant (who told the
          court at sentencing that he had been afforded an ample opportunity
          to read and digest the PSI Report) filed a covey of objections, but
          he neither took issue with the applicability of the mandatory
          minimum sentence nor complained that its existence had previously
          been withheld from him.
                    At the disposition hearing, the district judge determined
          that the BOL was 34, not 36. He made two adjustments, subtracting
          three levels for acceptance of responsibility,   see USSG S3E1.1
          (1995), and adding two levels for possession of a firearm, 
                                                                   see USSG
          S2D1.1(b)(1) (1995). The court then concluded that the appellant
          belonged in criminal history category I. These determinations
                                          4

          yielded a sentencing range of 135-168 months.  See USSG Ch.5, Pt.
          A (Sentencing Table) (adjusted offense level 33, criminal history
          category I). The judge thereupon imposed a 135-month incarcerative
          sentence. This appeal ensued.
                                         II.
                                     Discussion
                    We begin with the weapons enhancement, cognizant that the
          propriety vel non of that ruling may affect the harmless error
          analysis which the appellant's principal assignment of error
          entails.
                                         A.
                               The Weapons Enhancement
                    We review factual determinations made in the course of
          sentencing for clear error, mindful that such determinations need
          only be supported by preponderant evidence.  See United States v.
          Lagasse, 87 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1996). Moreover, the district
          court's application of a relevant guideline to the facts of a given
          case is a fact-sensitive matter that engenders clear-error review.
          See United 
                     States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir.
          1994). Under these standards, we must uphold the weapons
          enhancement in this case.
                    There is no cause to tarry. A firearm is a "dangerous
                              
               This is to be distinguished from questions anent the
          interpretation or overall applicability of particular guidelines to
          particular situations. Such questions are questions of law and are
          therefore subject to de novo review.  See United States v. Muniz,
          49 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 1995).
                                          5

          weapon," and the relevant guideline instructs the sentencing court
          to increase the BOL by two levels if the defendant possessed "a
          dangerous weapon." USSG S2D1.1(b)(1). The Sentencing Commission's
          commentary and application notes weigh heavily in construing the
          guidelines, see  Stinson v.  United  
                                              States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-46
          (1993); 
                 United States
                               v. 
                                  Fiore, 983 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1992), and,
          in regard to this guideline, the Commission tells us that "the
          adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it
          is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
          offense." USSG S2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n.3). We have consistently
          honored this advisory, 
                                see, 
                                     e.g., 
                                           Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d at 24;
          United States v. Jackson, 3 F.3d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1993); United
          States v.  Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 507 (1st Cir. 1990), and the
          appellant has offered us no persuasive reason to repudiate it
          today.
                    Of course, a certain nexus between the weapon and the
          offense must be shown in order for the enhancement to lie.    See
          Lagasse, 87 F.3d at 22. But to establish the link the prosecution
          need only prove that the defendant possessed the weapon during the
          currency of the offense, not necessarily that he actually used it
          in perpetrating the crime or that he intended to do so.  See  id.
          Furthermore, a defendant need not have had the weapon on his person
          for the enhancement to apply; any possession _ actual or
          constructive _ can trigger the two-level increase.    See  United
          States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, "when
          the weapon's location makes it readily available to protect either
                                          6

          the participants themselves during the commission of the illegal
          activity or the drugs and cash involved in the drug business, there
          will be sufficient evidence to connect the weapons to the offense
          conduct."  United 
                            States v.  Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727 (1st
          Cir. 1992); 
                     accord 
                            Lagasse, 87 F.3d at 22; 
                                                   United States
                                                                 v. 
                                                                    Ovalle-
          Marquez, 36 F.3d 212, 225 (1st Cir. 1994).
                    Here, the government satisfied its entry-level burden.
          It showed that the appellant constructively possessed a weapon _
          after all, the gun was found in the bathroom vanity of the home
          that he alone occupied _ and a reasonable factfinder could infer
          from the apartment's contents that the premises served as the
          command post for the appellant's drug-trafficking activities. In
          short, the weapon, though hidden, was readily available to protect
          the appellant, the cash, and the drugs that he kept on the
          premises.
                    Where, as here, the government has shown that a firearm
          possessed by the defendant was present during the commission of the
          offense, the burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the
          factfinder that a connection between the weapon and the crime is
          clearly improbable.  See Jackson, 3 F.3d at 509. On this record,
          we cannot fault the lower court for holding that the appellant
          failed to carry this burden. To be sure, the appellant denied all
          knowledge of the gun. But he neither adduced any evidentiary
          support for this denial nor suggested an innocent explanation for
          the gun's presence. Credibility calls are for the trier,     see,
          e.g., 
               United States
                             v. 
                                St. Cyr
                                       , 977 F.2d 698, 706 (1st Cir. 1992),
                                          7

          and Judge Pettine was not obliged to credit the appellant's
          unsupported disclaimer of guilty knowledge.
                    To summarize, we discern no clear error in the court's
          imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to USSG
          S2D1.1(b)(1).
                                         B.
                                The Rule 11 Colloquy
                    We turn now to the appellant's principal claim _ a claim
          that makes its debut on appeal. In many instances, we will decline
          to entertain issues that were not seasonably advanced in the nisi
          prius court. However, a different rule sometimes obtains when a
          defendant seeks for the first time to set aside his guilty plea in
          the court of appeals.  See, e.g., United 
                                                   States v.  Parra-Ibanez,
          936 F.2d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 1991); see generally Fed. R. Crim. P.
          32(e). Here, the defendant's allegation implicates a core concern
          of Rule 11 and the record on appeal is adequately developed to
          permit direct review.  See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69
          F.3d 1215, 1219 (1st Cir. 1995),  cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1343
          (1996). Hence, we consider the appellant's argument.
                              
               When a defendant moves in the district court to withdraw a
          guilty plea, we usually test that motion by means of a set multi-
          part analysis. See 
                             United States
                                           v. 
                                              Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d 19,
          22-23 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
                                        States v. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d
          368, 371 (1st Cir. 1994). We have on occasion used this same
          analytic tool as a guide in cases in which a defendant alleges for
          the first time on appeal that the district court violated Criminal
          Rule 11.  See, e.g., United 
                                      States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d 693,
          696 (1st Cir. 1995). The multi-part test is not obligatory. Here,
          where both the trial court's error and the harmlessness of that
          error are manifest, we need not perform the multi-part test.
                                          8

                    By entering a guilty plea, a defendant effectively waives
          a myriad of important constitutional rights. Thus, due process
          demands that such a plea be made voluntarily, knowingly,
          intelligently, and with an awareness of the overall circumstances
          and probable consequences.  See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,
          243 n.5 (1969). To this end, Rule 11 has a predominantly
          prophylactic purpose. The main thrust of the rule is to ensure
          that a defendant who pleads guilty does so with full comprehension
          of the specific attributes of the charge and the possible
          consequences of the plea.  See United 
                                                States v. Lopez-Pineda, 55
          F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1995).
                    In neglecting to apprise the appellant of the mandatory
          minimum sentence applicable to the offense of conviction, the
          district court tarnished an otherwise irreproachable plea colloquy
          and violated Rule 11.   See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1) (stating,
          among other things, that "before accepting a plea of guilty . . .
          the court must address the defendant personally in open court and
          inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
          understands, . . . the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law").
          It follows that the appellant's claim of error is well founded.
                    This determination does not end our inquiry. Not every
          violation of Rule 11 invalidates a guilty plea, and the Criminal
          Rules specifically instruct courts to disregard any defect in a
          Rule 11 proceeding that does not affect the defendant's substantial
          rights. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). In other words, even an error
          implicating Rule 11's core concerns will not require vacating a
                                          9

          guilty plea if the error, in context, is harmless.
                    In the case at hand, the error did not impair the
          appellant's substantial rights. The court imposed a sentence of
          135 months _ fifteen months longer than the mandatory minimum _ and
          calculated that sentence without any reference to the mandatory
          minimum. It is, therefore, readily apparent that because the
          guideline sentencing range (at its nadir) outstripped the mandatory
          minimum, the latter had no relevance to, and no actual effect upon,
          the appellant's sentence. Consequently, the district court's
          failure to apprise the appellant of the mandatory minimum was an
          error that did no discernible harm.  See Lopez-Pineda, 55 F.3d at
          696; United States v. Johnson, 1 F.3d 296, 303 (5th Cir. 1993).
                    The appellant's fallback position is that, as a result of
          the court's failure to inform him of the mandatory minimum
          sentence, he was deprived of the benefit of his bargain. This
          argument rests on the notion that, without the mandatory minimum,
          the appellant had a chance to obtain a sentence less than 120
          months; and, while this prospect induced him to change his plea,
          the undisclosed mandatory minimum rendered the prospect illusory.
                    The short answer is that this notion does not comport
          with the facts: any chance that the appellant had to obtain a
          sentence of less than 120 months depended, at least in part, on
          avoiding the two-level upward adjustment for possession of a
          firearm. Since that enhancement was properly awarded, without any
                              
               Indeed, the existence of the mandatory minimum presented the
          appellant with an opportunity, through the operation of the so-
                                         10

          reference to the mandatory minimum, the court's omission could not
          have affected the appellant's substantial rights.
                    We need go no further.
                                          The purpose of insisting that the
          judge inform a defendant of the existence and potential
          applicability of a mandatory minimum sentence is to ensure that the
          defendant is not induced to change his plea because of a totally
          unrealistic expectation as to how mild a sentence he might receive.
          That purpose was not in any way frustrated by the omission that
          occurred here. Since the district court's bevue did not harm or
          prejudice the appellant in any cognizable way, the appeal founders.
          Affirmed.
                              
          called "safety valve" provision, see 18 U.S.C. S 3553(f) (1994);
          USSG S5C1.2, to obtain an appreciably lower sentence. In the final
          analysis, however, the weapons enhancement blocked this avenue too.
          See USSG S5C1.2(2).
               We note in passing that the evidence strongly suggests that
          the appellant, notwithstanding the district court's omission, knew
          of the mandatory minimum sentence all along. For instance, he
          confirmed at the disposition hearing that he enjoyed ample
          opportunity to read the PSI Report and discuss it with his counsel
          _ and that report states in two places that the offense carries a
          ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Furthermore, the possible
          application of the "safety valve" provision was discussed in open
          court at the change-of-plea hearing _ and that provision only comes
          into play where a mandatory minimum sentence is in effect.
                                         11