Court Opinion

ID: 9778313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:00:23.172754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.580166
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Justice. This appeal comes from a Chancery Court order setting aside the Commissioner’s sale of land in a foreclosure suit. Miles Guy and his wife (appellees) executed a note for $550 to Lucie Lee Robbins (appellant), and to secure payment they also executed a deed of trust on Lot 4 in Block 6 in Waters’ Addition to the City of Pine Bluff. Upon default, appellant filed suit against appel-lees, securing a judgment for $537.14 (including costs) and also an order to sell the security. At the Commissioner’s sale, appellant bought the property for the amount of the judgment. The trial court confirmed the sale, and ordered the property turned over to appellant, who later sold it to a third party. At the same term of the Chancery Court appellees filed a Motion to set aside the sale on the ground that the price paid by appellant was inadequate. After hearing testimony on behalf of both parties the court granted appellees’ Motion, holding “that the property herein sold for an inadequate price”. The court then canceled the sale to appellant and ordered a resale of the property by the Commissioner after giving proper notice, hence this appeal. Appellant now seeks a reversal on the ground of insufficient evidexice to sustain the action of the trial court in setting aside the sale, and we agree. There is no contention by appellees that there was any irregularity, any mistake, or any fraudulent conduct in the entire proceedings. That being the state of the record before us, the trial court erred in setting the sale aside. In Free v. Harris, 181 Ark. 644, 27. S. W. 2d 510, the Court, on facts similar to those in this case, said: “Mere inadequacy of consideration, however gross, unaccompanied by fraud, unfairness or other inequitable conduct in connection with the sale, is of itself insufficient to justify the court in setting the sale aside and refusing confirmation.” # # # “It is of the greatest importance to encourage bidding by giving to every bidder the benefit of bids made in good faith and without collusion or misconduct, and at least when the price offered is not unconscionably below the market value of the property. ’ ’ In Union & Planters’ Bank & Trust Company v. Pope, 176 Ark. 1023, 5 S. W. 2d 330, there appears this language : “'While this court has held that mere inadequacy of price will not justify a chancery court in refusing to approve a sale and deprive a purchaser of the benefits of his purchase, yet, if a purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness or has taken any undue advantage, the sale will be regarded as fraudulent, and the party injured will be permitted to set aside the sale.” The above cited cases have never been overruled. Our attention has been called to the case of The Security Bank of Branson, Missouri v. Speer, 203 Ark. 562, 157 S. W. 2d 775, where this Court held that during the same term, at which a judgment or order is rendered, it remains subject to the plenary control of the court, and may be vacated, set aside, modified or annulled. However, in the case of Summars v. Wilson, 205 Ark. 923, 171 S. W. 2d 944 where the Speer case was cited, this Court either interpreted the Speer decision to hold or reversed it to hold that while the trial court had the power to set aside its judgments or orders (in term time) it could do so only by exercising sound discretion. There we said: “Judicial sales are not to be treated lightly. The courts should not reject a sale and refuse a confirmation for captious reasons, hut only in the exercise of sound discretion. The trial court is vested with sound judicial discretion in these matters; and the appellate court, in reviewing the action of a trial court to see if there has been an abuse of discretion, does not substitute its own decision for that of the trial court, but merely reviews the case to see whether the decision was within the latitude of decisions which a judge or court could make in a case like the one being reviewed. Just as the law’s standard of conduct is the ordinary, reasonable, prudent man, so in reviewing the exercise of discretion, the test is whether the ordinary, reasonable, prudent judge, under all the facts and circumstances before him would have reached the conclusion that was reached. ’ ’ In any event, we now choose to follow the rule announced in the Summars case. We cannot agree with appellees’ contention that the low price paid for the property ($537.14) was unconscionable and therefore justified the court in setting the sale aside. This is on the basis that the property was worth $1,000, but the testimony does not justify that figure. It is true that appellees’ attorney testified (over strenuous objections) that he believed the property was worth $1,000. Another witness, who was contacted by appellees to secure a loan and who examined the property, stated that he would advance $1,000 provided it would be used to pay off the judgment and the balance used to improve the house. Another witness, who had recently inspected the property, valued the property at not more than $575. Appellees say the trial court should be affirmed because appellant failed to comply with Rule 9 (d) of this Court. We do not find this to be the case. Appellant’s brief contains an abstract of all material parts of the pleadings, the testimony and the decree. The Rule requires only such matters that “are necessary to an understanding of all questions presented to the court for decision”. This requirement has been met by appellant. It is our opinion that the trial court erred in setting aside the sale and in ordering a resale. The decree of the trial court is therefore reversed. Smith, J., concurs. Fogleman, J., dissents.