Court Opinion

ID: 9418343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:22:06.668023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:01.324554
License: Public Domain

*263Mr. Justice Brandéis,
dissenting.
This suit was begun October 24, 1907. The Hitchman Coal & Coke Company, plaintiff below, is the owner of a coal mine in West Virginia. John Mitchell and nine others, defendants below, were then the chief executive officers of the United Mine Workers of America and of its district and sub-district organizations having “jurisdiction” over the territory in which plaintiff’s mine is situated; and were sued both individually and as such officers. The mine had been “unionized” about three years prior to April 16th, 1906; and until about that date was operated as a “union” mine, under a collective agreement with a local union of the United Mine Workers of America. Then a strike was declared, by the union; and a short shut-down followed. While the strike so declared was still in force, as the bill alleges, the company re-opened the mine as a closed non-union mine. Thereafter persons applying for work were required as a condition of obtaining employment to agree that they would not, while in the service of the company, be a member of the union, and if they joined the union.would withdraw from the company’s employ.1’
*264Alleging that efforts were being made illegally to unionize its mine “without its consent,” the company brought in the United States Circuit (now District) Court for the Northern District of West Virginia this suit to enjoin such efforts. District Judge Dayton granted a restraining order upon the filing of the bill. An order was entered May 26, 1908, continuing it as a temporary injunction. A motion to modify the same was denied, September 21, 1909. 172 Fed. Rep. 963. An appeal from this order was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, March 11, 1910. 176 Fed. Rep. 549. The case was then heard on the merits; defendants having denied in their answer all the charges of unlawful conduct set forth in the bill; and on January 18, 1913, a decree was entered for a perpetual injunction substantially in the form of the restraining order. 202 Fed. Rep. 512. This decree was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on June 1, 1914 (214 Fed. Rep. 685); but a stay was granted pending an application to this court for a writ of certiorari. The company appealed to this court and also applied for a writ of certiorari. The appeal was dismissed, as the jurisdiction of *265the Circuit (District) Court was rested wholly upon diversity of citizenship, plaintiff being a corporation organized under the laws of West Virginia and all the defendants citizens and residents of other States. 241 U. S. 644. A writ of certiorari was granted, however, March 13, 1916. The case was argued at that term and a reargument was ordered.
The District Court held that the United Mine Workers of America with its subordinate branches constitutes an unlawful organization — illegal both under the law of West Virginia and under the Federal Anti-Trust Act; that its long continued effort to unionize the' mines of West Virginia had not been “in the interest either of the betterment of mine labor in the State or of upholding that free commerce in coal between the States guaranteed by Federal law,” but to restrain if not destroy it for the benefit of “rival operators and producers in Ohio, Western Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana, competitive fields” in which the mines had been unionized; and that “in pursuit of its unlawful purposes” the union “have sought and still seek to compel the plaintiff ... to submit to contractual relations with it as an organization relating to the employment of labor and production contrary to the will and wish of said company; that its officers, in pursuance of such unlawful effort to monopolize labor and restrain trade, and with knowledge of the express contracts existing between this plaintiff and its employees, have unlawfully sought to cause the breach of the said contracts on the part of its said employees.”
The decree, besides the usual injunction against threat, intimidation, force or violence, and against inducing breaches of employees’ contracts or trespassing upon plaintiff’s property, enjoined defendants (and others hereinafter described), among other things, from—
1. “Representing [“for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff’s mine without plaintiff’s consent”] ... to *266any of plaintiff’s employees, or to any person who might become an employee of plaintiff, that such person . . . is likely to suffer some loss or trouble in continuing in or in entering the employment of plaintiff, . . . representing . . o to such employee . . . that such loss or trouble . . . may come by reason of plaintiff not recognizing the United Mine Workers of America, or because plaintiff runs a non-union mine.”
2. “ . . . knowingly and wilfully enticing [“for the'purpose of unionizing plaintiff’s mine without plaintiff’s consent”] plaintiff’s employees, present or future, . . . to leave plaintiff’s service, giving or assigning ... as a reason for . . . leaving of plaintiff’s service, that plaintiff does not recognize the United Mine Workers of America, or that plaintiff runs a nonunion mine.”
3. “ . . . knowingly and wilfully enticing plaintiff’s employees, present or future, ... to leave plaintiff’s service, without plaintiff’s consent, against plaintiff’s will, and to plaintiff’s injury.”
4. “ . . . establishing a picket ... for the purpose of inducing . . . by . . . persuasion . . . any person ; . . coming to plaintiff’s mine to accept employment ... to refuse ... to accept service with plaintiff.”
5. “ . .. . interfering in any manner whatsoever, either by . . . persuasion or entreaty with any person in the employ of plaintiff who has contracted with and is in the actual service of plaintiff to . . . induce him to quit the service of plaintiff ... or assisting, or abetting in any manner” his doing so.
Three of the defendants — Mitchell, Wilson and Hughes —were never served with process and did not enter any appearance except to object to the jurisdiction of the court over them. Of the remaining seven all but two had, prior to the entry of the final decree, ceased to hold *267any office either in the United Mine Workers of America or in any of the district or sub-district organizations. Nevertheless the decree directed that the injunction issue against each of the ten original defendants, “individually”; and also in their official capacities against their successors in office (who were named in the decree) although these had not been served with process or been named in the bill; the court declaring such persons to be “before the court by representation through service having been made upon their said predecessors in office, sued as such officers and as members of the United Mine Workers of America.” The decree extended the injunction, among others, also to “all persons now members.of said United Mine Workers of America, and all persons who though not now members do become members of said United Mine Workers of America.”
The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the decree of the District Court, held that the United Mine Workers of America was not an unlawful organization under the laws of West Virginia, that its validity under the Federal Anti-Trust Act could not be considered in this proceeding; that so long as defendants “refrained from resorting to unlawful measures to effectuate” their purpose “they could not be said to be engaged in a conspiracy to unionize plaintiff’s mine”; that “the evidence fails to show that any unlawful methods were resorted to by these defendants in this instance”; and specifically that there was nothing in the individual contracts which barred defendants from inducing the employees to join the union. With these conclusions I agree substantially.

First: The alleged illegality of the United Mine Workers of America under the law of West Virginia.

The United Mine Workers of America does not appear to differ essentially in character and purpose from other international unions which, like it, are affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Its membership is said *268to be larger than that of any othér; and it may be more powerful. But the common law does not limit the size of unions or the degree to which individual workmen may by union increase their bargaining power. As stated in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 439: “The law, therefore, recognizes the right of workingmen to unite and to invite others to join their ranks, thereby making available the strength, influence and power that come from such association.” We do not find either in the decisions or the statutes of West Virginia anything inconsistent with the law as declared by this court. The union is not an unlawful organization, and is not in itself an unlawful conspiracy. We have no occasion to consider the legality of the specific provisions contained in its constitution or by-laws.

Second: The alleged illegality of the United Mine Workers of America- under the Federal Anti-Trust Act.

The District Judge undertook to pass upon the legality of the United Mine Workers of America under the Federal Anti-Trust Act; but the question was not in issue in the case. It had not been raised in the bill or by answer. Evidence bearing upon the issue was properly objected to by defendants and should have been excluded.

Third: The alleged conspiracy against the West Virginia Mines.

It was doubtless the desire of the United Mine Workers to unionize every mine on the American continent and especially those in' West Virginia which compete directly with the mines of Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and other States already unionized. That desire and the purpose to effect it were not unlawful. They were part of a reasonable effort to improve the condition of workingmen engaged in the industry by strengthening their bargaining power through unions; and extending the field of union power. No conspiracy to shut down or otherwise injure West Virginia-was proved, nor was there *269any averment in the bill of such conspiracy, or any issue otherwise raised by the pleadings which justified the consideration of that question by the District Court.1

Fourth: “ Unionizing plaintiff’s mine urithout plaintiff’s consent.”

The fundamental prohibition of the injunction is against acts done “for the purpose of unionizing plaintiff’s mine without plaintiff’s consent.” Unionizing a shop does not mean inducing the employees to become members of the union.2 It means inducing the employer *270to enter into a collective agreement with the union governing the relations of the.employer to the employees. Unionizing implies, therefore; at least formal consent of the employer. Both plaintiff and defendants insisted upon exercising the right to secure contracts for a closed shop. The plaintiff sought to secure the closed non-union-shop through individual agreements with employees. The defendants sought to secure the closed union shop through a collective agreement with the union. Since collective bargaining is legal, the fact that the workingmen’s agreement is made not by individuals directly with the employer, but by the employees with the union and by it, on their behalf, with the employer, is of no significance in this connection. The end being lawful, defendant’s efforts to unionize the mine can be illegal, only if the methods or means pursued were unlawful; unless indeed there is some special significance in the expression “unionizing without plaintiff’s consent.”
It is urged that a union agreement curtails the liberty of the operator. Every agreement curtails the liberty of those who enter into it* The test of legality is not whether an agreement curtails liberty, but whether the parties have agreed upon some thing which the law prohibits or declares otherwise to be inconsistent with the public welfare. The operator by the union agreement *271binds himself: (1) to employ only members of the union; (2) to negotiate with union officers instead of with employees individually the scale of wages and the hours of work; (3) to treat with the duly constituted representatives of the union to settle disputes concerning the discharge of men and other controversies arising out of the employment. These are the chief features of a “unionizing” by which the employer’s liberty is curtailed. Each of them is legal. To obtain any of them or all of them men may lawfully strive and even strike. And, if the union may legally strike to obtain each of the things for which the agreement provides, why may it not strike or use equivalent economic pressure to secure an agreement to provide them?
It is also urged that defendants are seeking to “coerce” .plaintiff .to “unionize” its mine. But coercion, in a legal sense, is not exerted when a union merely endeavors to induce employees to join a union with the intention thereafter to order a strike unless the employer consents to unionize his shop. Such pressure is not coercion in a legal sense. The employer is free either to accept the agreement or the disadvantage. Indeed, the plaintiff’s whole case is rested upon agreements secured under similar pressure of economic necessity or disadvantage. If it is coercion to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a closed union shop, it is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless the applicant will consent to a closed non-union, shop. The employer may sign the union agreement for fear that labor may not be otherwise obtainable; the workman may sign the individual agreement for fear that employment may not be otherwise obtainable. But such fear does not imply coercion in a legal sense..
In other words an employer, in order to effectuate the closing of his shop to union labor, may exact an agreement to that effect from his employees. The agreement *272itself being a lawful one, the employer may withhold from the men an economic need — employment—until they assent to make it. Likewise an agreement closing a shop to non-union labor being lawful, the union may withhold from an employer an economic need — labor—until he assents to make it. In a legal sense an agreement entered into, under such circumstances, is voluntarily entered into; and as the agreement is in itself legal, no reason appears why the general rule that a legal end may be pursued by legal means should not be applied. Or, putting it in other words, there is nothing in the character of the agreement which should make unlawful means used to attain it, which in other connections are recognized as lawful.

Fifth: There was no attempt to induce employees to violate, their contracts.

The contract created an employment at will; and the employee was free to leave at any time. The contract did not bind the employee not to join the union; and he was free to join it at any time. The contract merely' bound him to withdraw from plaintiff’s employ, if he joined the union. There is evidence of an attempt to induce plaintiff’s employees to agree to join the union; but none whatever of any attempt to induce them to violate their contract. • Until an employee actually joined the union he was not, under the contract, called upon to leave plaintiff’s employ. There consequently would be no breach of contract until the employee both joined the union and failed to withdraw from plaintiff’s employ. There was no evidence that any employee was persuaded to do that or that such a course was contemplated. What perhaps was intended was to secure agreements or assurances from individual employees that they would join the union when a large number of them should have consented to do so; with the purpose, when such time arrived, to have them join the union *273together and strike — unless plaintiff consented to unionize the mine. Such a course would have been clearly permissible under the contract.

Sixth: Merely persuading employees to leave plaintiff’s employ or others not to enter it was not unlawful.

To induce third persons to leave an employment is actionable if done maliciously and without justifiable cause although such persons are free to leave at their own will. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 38;. Thacker Coal Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va. 253. It is equally actionable so to induce others not to enter the service. The individual contracts of plaintiff with its employees added nothing to its right- in this connection, since the employment was terminable at will.
As persuasion, considered merely as a means, is clearly legal, defendants were within their rights if, and only if, their interference with the relation of plaintiff to its employees was for justifiable cause. The purpose of interfering was confessedly in order to strengthen the union, in the belief that thereby the condition of workmen engaged in mining would be improved; the bargaining power of the individual workingman was to be strengthened by collective bargaining; and collective bárgaining was to be ensured bjr obtaining the union agreement. It should not, at this day, be doubted that to induce workingmen to leave or not to enter an employment in order to advance such a purpose is justifiable when the workmen are not bound by contract to remain in such employment.

Seventh: There was no “threat, violence or intimidation.”

The decree enjoined “threats, violence or intimidation.” Such action would, of course, be unlawful though employed in a justifiable cause. But there is no evidence that any of the defendants have resorted to such means. The propaganda among plaintiff’s employees was conducted almost entirely by one man, the defendant Hughes, a District No. 6 organizer. His actions were orderly and *274peaceable, consisting of informal talks with the men, and a few quietly conducted public meetings,1 in which he argued the benefits of organization and pointed out to the men that, although the company was then paying them according to the union scale, there would be nothing to prevent a later reduction of wages unless the men united. He also urged upon the men that if they lost their present jobs, membership in the union was requisite to obtaining employment in the union mines of the neighboring States. But there is no suggestion that he exceeded the moderate bounds of peaceful persuasion, and indeed, if plaintiff’s witnesses are to be believed, men with whom Hughes had talked, his argument made no impression on them, and they expressed to him their satisfaction with existing conditions at the mine.
When this suit was filed no right of the plaintiff had been infringed and there was no reasonable ground to believe that any of its rights would be interfered with; and, in my opinion, the Circuit Court of Appeals properly reversed the decree of the District Court, and directed that the bill be dismissed.
Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Clarke concur in this dissent.

 About two months after the restraining order was issued in this case the plaintiff company began the practice of requiring applicants for work to sign employment cards, in the following terms:
“I am employed by and work for the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company with the express understanding that I am not a member of the United Mine Workers of America, and .will not become so while an employee of the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company; that the Hitch-man Coal & Coke Company is run non-union and agrees with me that it will run non-union while I am writs employ. If at any time I am employed by the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company I want to become connected with the United Mine Workers of America, or any affiliated organization, I agree to withdraw from the employment of said company, and agree that while I am in the employ of that company I will not make any efforts amongst its employees to bring about the union*264izing of that mine against the company’s wish. I have either read the above or heard the same read.”
Prior to that time, the agreement rested in oral understanding merely, and is sufficiently indicated in the following excerpts from the testimony of the mine superintendent as to what he told the men applying for employment:
“I also told them that any man who wahted to become a member of the United Mine Workers — that that was his business — but he could not be a member of the United Mine Workers and be affiliated with the United Mine Workers and be under the employ of the Hitchman Coal & Coke Company, or be under the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers; that the mine was run non-union so far as the United Mine Workers of America were concerned.
“Q. You mean you made every man understand that while he worked for the Hitchman Company he must keep out of the union?
“A. Yes, sir; or at least they said they understood it.”

 This alleged conspiracy not being in issue, the District Court improperly allowed the introduction of, and considered, a mass of documents referring to various mine workers’ conventions, and joint conventions of miners and operators held years previous to the filing of the bill. Judge Dayton laid great stress on reported declarations of the delegates to these conventions, although the declarations of alleged co-conspirators were obviously inadmissible, there being no foundation for the conspiracy charge.

 A witness for' the defendants testified as follows:
“There is a difference between unionizing a mine and unionizing the employees in a mine; unionizing the employees is having the men join the organization; unionizing a mine is creating joint relations between the employers and employees; a mine cannot be unionized unless the employer enters into contractual relations with the union; it is not the policy or purpose of the United Mine Workers as an organization to coerce a man into doing a thing against his will; this distinction between unionizing a mine and unionizing the employees of a mine has existed since the organization came about, and this method of unionizing a mine existed in 1906 and 1907.”
A witness for the plaintiff testified that “the term ‘union,’ when applied to mining, means the United Mine Workers, and a union mine is a mine that is under their jurisdiction and so recognized . . .” The contrary is “non-union or open shop.” And further, “The men might be unionized at a mine and the mine owners not recognize the union. That would in effect be an open shop. When I said ‘unionize the employees’ I meant practically all of the employees; but a union mine, as I understand, it, is one wherein the closed shop is practically enforced.” In such case, the witness explained, the operator would be practically in contract relation with the organization.
It was also testified: “The difference between organizing the men at *270the mine and organizing the mine is that when the miners aré organized the work of organizing the mine is only just started. They next proceed to meet with the operator who owns the mine, or operates it, for the purpose of making contracts or agreements. Under the constitution and methods of the United Mine Workers a mine cannot be organized'without the consent of the owner, and it is not the object or purpose of the United Mine Workers to do so, and never has been; it has never been attempted as-far as witness knows. After a mine has been organized, the agreement between the employer and the organization is paramount. The constitution of the organization has nothing to do with the workings afterwards; that agreement does, not take away from the operator the control of his men.”

 Following is a notice of one of Hughes’ meetings which was torn from a telegraph pole in the street by the plaintiff’s mine superintendent:
“Notice to the miners of the Hitchman mine. There will be a mass meeting Friday evening at 6.30 P. M. at Nick Heil’s Base Ball Grounds, for the purpose of discussing the principáis of organization. President' William Green will be present. All miners aré cordially invited to attend.”