Court Opinion

ID: 9572234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:55.198538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:06.768862
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority regarding the issue resolved in part hi and join that holding. Yet, I would hold that MCL 388.553; MSA 15.1923 unconstitutionally abridges defendants’ right to direct the education of their children because it is an unreasonable regulation unrelated to the educational achievement of their children schooled at home. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding in part ii.
i
As noted by the majority, defendants John and Sandra Bennett taught their children, Scott, Erika, Krista, and Jason, at home in cooperation with Clonlara, Inc.’s home based education program. Ante at 321. The Bennetts’ performance as teachers is not criticized by the state, only their failure to utilize certified instructors. Indeed, any state contention that the Bennetts inadequately instructed their children would be unwarranted because the Bennetts appear to be at least as effectual educators as the local public school district. In fact, the majority recognizes that Jason’s educational achievement was at least satisfactory, while Erika’s and Krista’s were superior for their grade levels. Ante at 322, n 6. The excellence of the Bennetts’ teaching, however, was most cogently demonstrated by the educational improvement of Scott: he had fallen below grade level in public school, but under his parent’s instruction he steadily progressed and met the goals of his grade level. Id. Nevertheless, the state prosecuted and convicted the Bennetts for failing to utilize certified teachers.
*348II
As in all constitutional jurisprudence, an examination of the history and rationale underlying the right to educate one’s children is necessary to obtain the proper insight vital to the proper resolution of the instant case. Committee for Constitutional Reform v Secretary of State, 425 Mich 336, 340-342; 389 NW2d 430 (1986); Lockwood v Comm’r of Revenue, 357 Mich 517, 556-558; 98 NW2d 753 (1959).
A
American jurisprudence has historically recognized "Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.” Parham v J R, 442 US 584, 602; 99 S Ct 2493; 61 L Ed 2d 101 (1979).1 Indeed, "[t]his primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.” Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 232; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972). Society’s historical deference toward parental responsibility regarding their children has been in part motivated by the "presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions,” as well as the recognition that "bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.” Parham, supra at 602. Perhaps most important, this well-established protection of the "sanctity of the family” has occurred "precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through *349the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.” Moore v East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 503-504; 97 S Ct 1932; 52 L Ed 2d 531 (1977) (Powell, J.).2 "Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter.” Bellotti v Baird, 443 US 622, 638; 99 S Ct 3035; 61 L Ed 2d 797 (1979) (Powell, J.).3 The Supreme Court, therefore, has "consistently recognized that the parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society.” Ginsberg v New York, 390 US 629, 639; 88 S Ct 1274; 20 L Ed 2d 195 (1968). Accordingly, the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, *350which proclaims that "[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law,”4 has long been understood to protect the right "to marry [and] establish a home and bring up children . . . Meyer v Nebraska, 262 US 390, 399; 43 S Ct 625; 67 L Ed 1042 (1923).5
An essential corollary of the right to establish a *351home and raise children is the "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.” Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534-535; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925).6 Traditionally, American jurisprudence had "recognized that parents were solely responsible for the education of their children.” Lotzer, Texas homeschooling: An unresolved conñict between parents and educators, 39 Baylor L R 469, 475 (1987).7 Hence, "our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is 'the mere creature of the State’ and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally 'have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations.’ ” Parham, supra at 602, quoting Pierce, supra at 535.
B
The right, of course, is not. absolute. Pierce, supra at 534.8 This is true becáuse "[corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life . . . .” Meyer, supra at 400.9 Hence, the state’s substantial interest in education may, at times, override parents’ liberty interests. *352Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944) ("[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance”). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to strike down laws imposing on individuals’ rights to direct their children’s education when they are not reasonably related to legitimate educational goals. See, e.g., Pierce, supra at 534-535.10
*354Ill
The teacher certification requirement, as applied to the Bennetts’ home school, violates their constitutionally protected liberty to direct the education of their children because it is not reasonably related to education.
A
The state correctly maintains that it possesses a legitimate interest in ensuring the adequate education of all children. Brown v Bd of Ed, 347 US 483, 493; 74 S Ct 686; 98 L Ed 873 (1954). Indeed, the importance of compulsory education parallels that of family autonomy — both "prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system,” which is an indispensable prerequisite to the preservation of our democratic republic. Yoder, supra at 221. Similarly, both ready our youth "to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society.” Id. at 221. Again, like the family, our commitment to education is deeply rooted in our history: "The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.” Meyer, supra at 400.
Nevertheless, a careful examination of the state interest in the instant case reveals that it is not compulsory education per se, but the manner of education:
[T]he state’s interest is simply the certification requirement of the private school act, not the general objectives of compulsory education. The interest the state pursues is the manner of education, not its goals. [People v DeJonge (After Remand), 442 Mich 266, 290; 501 NW2d 127 (1993)].
See also Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass 324, 336; 504 NE2d 592 (1987); Ohio v Whisner, 47 *355Ohio St 2d 181, 216-217; 351 NE2d 750 (1976). Hence, the state possesses a legitimate interest in the manner of education only as long as it is reasonably related to educational achievement. Pierce, supra at 534-535.
B
The crux of the instant case is not "the legitimacy of the state ends,” but "rather, to determine whether the means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible.” Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 652; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972). Although deferential, the reasonableness standard "is not a toothless one . . . .” Mathews v Lucas, 427 US 495, 510; 96 S Ct 2755; 49 L Ed 2d 651 (1976).11 For instance, in Pierce, the Court declared unconstitutional a state law prohibiting private school education and compelling all children to attend public schools. The Court first noted that the parents and private educators
engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly there is nothing in the present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiar circumstances or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education. [Id. at 534.]
Hence, the Court held the statute unconstitutional because it
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. . . . The fun*356damental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. [Id. at 534-535.]
Utilizing parallel reasoning, courts have also struck down prohibitions of foreign language instruction, Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284, 298; 47 S Ct 406; 71 L Ed 646 (1927); Bartels v Iowa, 262 US 404, 411; 43 S Ct 628; 67 L Ed 1047 (1923); Meyer, supra at 403; as well as comprehensive standards so regulating private instruction that meaningful distinctions between public and private schools had been eliminated, Whisner, supra at 216-223.
Similarly, Michigan’s teacher certification requirement is not reasonably related to educational achievement, but is merely an attempt to standardize its children by forcing students to accept instruction only from state-approved teachers. Although the Court of Appeals found that "[t]he teacher certification requirement is a backbone in the protection of”12 state education, this contention is dubitable in the instant case. There is no dispute that the Bennett children are receiving an excellent education from their parents. Nor does the state argue that the Bennetts’ education of their children is not "meritorious” or poses "peculiar circumstances or presents] emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education.” Moreover, as recognized by this Court in DeJonge, the nearly universal consensus of our sister states is to authorize home schools without teacher certification.13 In fact, even Michi*357gan does not mandate that all students be taught by certified teachers.14 Furthermore, the state failed to provide any evidence proving a correlation between the teacher certification requirement and educational achievement,15 while the Bennetts have proven that their children have been adequately educated without certified teachers. Not unlike prohibiting foreign language instruction or private education, mandatory teacher certification in this home school is simply irrelevant to educational achievement.
The teacher certification requirement, therefore, is unconstitutional in the instant case because it "has but a tenuous relation to alleviation” of the state’s purported interest. Moore, supra at 500 (Powell, J.).16 Although the state possesses a legitimate interest in ensuring the adequate education of the Bennett children, it has failed to support the proposition that the certification requirement is reasonably related to that interest. Indeed, forcing the Bennetts to halt the education of their children merely "spites [the state’s] own articulated goals . . . .” Stanley, supra at 653. Instead, the teacher certification requirement attempts to standardize the education of the Bennett children to state-imposed dictates in derogation of parents’ constitutional rights. Pierce, supra at 534.17
*358IV
I would hold that MCL 388.553; MSA 15.1923 unconstitutionally abridges defendants’ right to direct the education of their children because it is an unreasonable regulation unrelated to the educational achievement of their children schooled at home. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding in part ii.

 The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. [Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 232; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972).]

 Professor Hafen elaborates:
[T]he cultural patterns of American family life have contributed enormously to the ultimate purposes of a democratic society by providing the stability and the structure that are essential to sustaining individual liberty over the long term. . . . Only in the master-apprentice relationship of parent and child, committed to one another by the bonds of kinship, can the skills, normative standards, and virtues that maintain our cultural bedrock be transmitted. [Hafen, The constitutional status of marriage, kinship, and sexual privacy — Balancing the individual and social interests, 81 Mich L R 463, 473, 478 (1983).]

 Professor Hafen explains that not only is family autonomy essential to the transmission of republican values, but that it is a strong hedge against tyranny:
Monolithic control of the value transmission system is "a hallmark of totalitarianism,” thus, "for obvious reasons, the state nursery is the paradigm for a totalitarian society.” An essential element in maintaining a system of limited government is to deny state control over childrearing, simply because childrearing has such power. Even if the system remains democratic, massive state involvement with childrearing would invest the government "with the capacity to influence powerfully, through socialization, the future outcomes of democratic political processes.” [Hafen, n 2 supra at 480-481. Citations omitted.]

 A similar provision in the Michigan Constitution also protects due process of law:
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. [Const 1963, art 1, § 17.]
Moreover, authorities have found that the First Amendment, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 488; 85 S Ct 1678; 14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965), and the Ninth Amendment, id. at 488-490 (Goldberg, J.), also protect the right to direct the education of one’s children. Michigan has corresponding constitutional guarantees. Const 1963, art 1, §§ 4-5 (protecting the freedoms of speech, press, as well as religious liberty); Const 1963, art 1, § 23 (protecting unenumerated rights).
Whether the Michigan Constitution affords greater protection of parental interests than the United States Constitution was not at issue in the instant case.

 The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and raise one’s children have been deemed "essential,” Meyer [supra at] 399 . . ., "basic civil rights of man,” Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541 [62 S Ct 1110; 86 L Ed 1655] (1942), and "[r]ights far more precious . . . than property rights,” May v Anderson, 345 US 528, 533 [73 S Ct 840; 97 L Ed 1221] (1953). [Stanley v Illinois, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208; 31 L Ed 2d 551 (1972). See also Cleveland Bd of Ed v LaFleur, 414 US 632, 639-640; 94 S Ct 791; 39 L Ed 2d 52 (1974); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 166; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944); Moore, supra at 499.]
Because of this historical recognition of the family as "perhaps the most fundamental social institution of our society,” Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762, 769; 97 S Ct 1459; 52 L Ed 2d 31 (1977), "[w]hen the Court in 1923 first recognized that the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children was part of the substantive liberty protected by the due process clause, it did not create a new legal right out of whole constitutional cloth. It merely acknowledged in constitutional language the traditions of Status and the civil legislation that predated the Constitution. In that sense, Meyer v Nebraska is a clear example of substantive due process as a search only for 'fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.’ ” Hafen, n 2 supra at 572, quoting Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 76; 25 S Ct 539; 49 L Ed 937 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

 See also Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources v Smith, 494 US 872, 881; 110 S Ct 1595; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990); Yoder, supra; Griswold, n 4 supra at 482-483; Farrington v Tokushige, 273 US 284, 298; 47 S Ct 406; 71 L Ed 646 (1927); Meyer, supra at 399-400.

 See also, e.g., Gordon v Los Angeles Bd of Ed, 78 Cal App 2d 464, 480; 178 P2d 488 (1947); School Bd Dist No 18 v Thompson, 24 Okla 1, 4; 103 P 578 (1909); Rulison v Post, 79 Ill 567, 573 (1875).

 While the parents contend, and we agree, that they possess a basic right in directing the education of their children, such a right is not absolute but must be reconciled with the substantial State interest in the education of its citizenry. [Care and Protection of Charles, 399 Mass 324, 336; 504 NE2d 592 (1987).]

 See also Lehr v Robertson, 463 US 248, 257; 103 S Ct 2985; 77 L Ed 2d 614 (1983) (parental interest in the upbringing of their children is "a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed”).

 Whether this liberty is fundamental, and therefore deserving of the most heightened constitutional protection, or is of lesser importance, thereby deserving a more deferential standard of protection, was energetically disputed by the parties.
The majority has found that parents do not possess a fundamental right to direct the education of their children deserving of strict scrutiny, but merely possess a right protected by a reasonable basis standard. Some recent United States Supreme Court dicta support this proposition. See, e.g., Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160, 178-179; 96 S Ct 2586; 49 L Ed 2d 415 (1975) ("[t]he Court has repeatedly stressed that . . . [parents] have no constitutional right to provide their children with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation”). Hence, some courts relying on that and earlier Supreme Court language have applied a reasonableness test. See, e.g., Hanson v Cushman, 490 F Supp 109, 114-115 (WD Mich, 1980) (applying a reasonableness standard in upholding Michigan’s teacher certification requirement as applied to home schools).
Yet, reliance on this dicta may be unwarranted because they appear to stem from the confusion arising from applying Supreme Court pronouncements of the 1920s and 1930s in modern cases. Earlier this century, the Supreme Court had yet to develop the varying degrees of scrutiny ubiquitously applied in the modern era. The recognition of a constitutional right did not necessarily result in a clear specification of the particular degree of scrutiny to be applied. In fact, the Court not only explicitly recognized "fundamental rights of the individual which [Meyer, supra; Bartels v Iowa, 262 US 404; 43 S Ct 628; 67 L Ed 1047 (1923); Pierce, supra] declared,” Farrington, n 6 supra at 299 (emphasis added), but at the same time articulated a reasonableness standard. Id. at 298. See also Pierce, supra at 534 and Meyer, supra at 399-401 (recognizing fundamental parental rights, while utilizing a reasonableness standard). Adding to the confusion was the Court’s practice to articulate a reasonableness standard, while the application of that standard often left no doubt that much stronger scrutiny was to be applied. See, e.g., Lochner, n 5 supra at 58 (striking down a maximum hour law for bakeries because there was "no reasonable foundation for holding [it] to be necessary or appropriate as a health law”). Later, the Supreme Court differentiated between constitutional rights, applying a low standard of review (now articulated as a reasonableness or rational basis test) to disfavored *353rights, while applying heightened review (now articulated as strict scrutiny) to "fundamental rights.”
As noted, the modern Supreme Court has cited the earlier Court opinions without much elaboration. Hence, modern Supreme Court dicta also support the proposition that the right to educate one’s children is deserving of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Smith, n 6 supra at 881 (equating the "right of parents ... to direct the education of their children” with "freedom of speech and of the press”); Kelley v Johnson, 425 US 238, 244; 96 S Ct 1440; 47 L Ed 2d 708 (1976) (equating the liberty protected in Meyer, supra, with the liberties protected in Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 [1973] [right of abortion], Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US 438; 92 S Ct 1029; 31 L Ed 2d 349 [1972] [right to obtain contraceptives], Stanley, n 5 supra [right of an unwed father to retain custody of children], and Griswold, n 4 supra [right of married couples to use contraceptives]); id. at 482 (referring to the right to direct the education of one’s children as if it were fundamental); id. at 498 (Goldberg, J.) (noting that the rights recognized in Pierce and Meyer are fundamental). Not surprisingly, some modern authorities have concluded that the right of parents to direct the education of their children is fundamental. See, e.g., Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanual Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 416; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (Cavanagh, J.) and Sheridan Rd Baptist Church v Dep’t of Ed, 426 Mich 462, 536-540; 396 NW2d 373 (1986) (Riley, J.), cert den 481 US 1050 (1987) (finding the right to direct the education of one’s children to be a fundamental right); Ohio v Whisner, 47 Ohio St 2d 181, 214; 351 NE2d 750 (1976) ("it has long been recognized that the right of a parent to guide the education, including the religious education, of his or her children is indeed a 'fundamental right’ guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Hafen, n 2 supra at 548 (concluding that the right to direct the education of one’s children is "almost beyond the reach of legislative regulation” and that "most of the Court’s opinions recognizing constitutional rights in the adjudication of family interests have subjected the legislation involved to more than minimal scrutiny”).
In any event, the divergent holdings arise because "[t]he Supreme Court has never addressed directly the full range of parental autonomy questions presented by the home education movement,” Lupu, Home education, religious liberty, and the separation of powers, 67 BULR 971, 975 (1987), but in fact "has continued to do its best to avoid the development of a consistent and understandable test for its family-related cases,” Hafen, n 2 supra at 468, n 15.
Because of the historical recognition of the vital importance of the autonomy, of the family, I am inclined to apply strict scrutiny in the private and home school context (as a government-provided benefit and subsidization of a right, public schools need not be subjected to such scrutiny, Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173; 111 S Ct 1759; 114 L Ed 2d 233 [1991]). Nevertheless, I do not rest this opinion upon such an analysis, but apply the reasonableness standard because I find that the requirement is not reasonably related to education, thereby negating the necessity of determining whether the higher standard of review is applicable.

 Although Mathews, applies the standard with regard to the rational basis test of equal protection, there is no difference in its application with regard to due process.

 People v DeJonge (On Rehearing), 179 Mich App 225, 236; 449 NW2d 899 (1989).

 Besides Michigan, only two states, California and Alabama, appear to require teacher certification in home' schools. Cal Ed Code 48224; Ala Code 16-28-1. Moreover, "many of our sister states have much less stringent supervisory' control over home schooling than does Michigan.” DeJonge at 293, n 50. For a thorough discussion of *357our sister states’ practices, as well as the actual practice of Michigan, see DeJonge at 292-296.

 DeJonge at 296.

 See DeJonge at 294-298.

 Murphy v Arkansas, 852 F2d 1039, 1042-1043 (CA 8, 1988) (finding that a state requirement that home schooling be accompanied by standardized achievement testing to be the least restrictive means, thereby implicitly recognizing that teacher certification is not the least restrictive means). Cf. Whisner, supra at 216-218 (striking down comprehensive school regulations as violating the right to direct the education of one’s children, as well as the free exercise of religion).

 The majority’s analysis is unconvincing and contrary to long-established Supreme Court authority. Although the majority purports to find that the teacher certification requirement is valid because it satisfies the "minimal scrutiny test,” ante at 336, in fact it applies no scrutiny at all. The majority, for instance, discards defendants’ argu*358ments without carefully examining the factual record, and then claims that defendants failed to meet their burden of proof. The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, carefully examines the state interest, the means the state utilizes to reach those ends, and the effectiveness of the parents’ instruction when examining state regulation of parents’ liberty to educate their children. Pierce, supra at 534-535; Farrington, supra at 298. If the means the state undertakes to meet a legitimate interest are unrelated to the interest it is attempting to further, the statute violates the liberty to direct the education of one’s children. See, e.g., Pierce, supra at 534-535. Extending the majority’s reasoning to its logical conclusions, however, a prohibition of private education would almost certainly be found to be reasonably related to educational achievement because that assertion is " 'at least debatable.’ ” Ante at 338 (citation omitted). Yet, the Supreme Court rejected such reasoning and declared those laws unconstitutional. Pierce, supra at 534-535. Similarly, the rationale of the majority would most likely find a state’s prohibition of foreign language instruction to be reasonable because parents could not disprove a state’s assertion that foreign language instruction threatens national security. Again, the Supreme Court has struck down such statutes. See, e.g., Farrington, supra at 298.
Pierce, Farrington, and their progeny are indistinguishable from the instant case. In each case the state asserted an interest that may have facially appeared reasonable, but that was disputed by the available evidence. Defendants have met their burden by showing that they adequately educate their children and that the state’s certification requirement is unrelated to educational achievement in home schools.