Court Opinion

ID: 9723768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:30:26.664989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:19.796634
License: Public Domain

SIMS, J.
I concur in parts I and II, and in the result in part III of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent from part IV, however, because the issue there addressed by the majority was not tendered by the State of California (State) in its motion for summary judgment and may not be resolved sua sponte in this court in favor of the moving party.
In part IV the majority consider and reject plaintiff’s contention, as pleaded in her complaint, that poor lighting at the Dunnigan rest stop was a proximate cause of the assault and her resulting injuries. However a careful reading of the State’s motion for summary judgment shows the State nowhere challenged plaintiff’s pleaded contention that poor lighting was a contributing cause of this unfortunate incident. Instead, in its moving papers the State relied solely on the theory it was not liable as a matter of law because the alleged injury “was not caused by a condition of the property that was within the intended scope of a public entity’s duty as contemplated by the Governmental [sz'c] Tort Claims Act.”
The State’s argument on the motion first contended inadequate lighting was not a dangerous condition of public property as a matter of law and the State had no duty to warn of possible criminal attacks. The State argued the criminal assault was a superceding cause of injury to plaintiff as a matter of *213law. For these propositions the State cited Hayes v. State of California (1974) 11 Cal.3d 469 [113 Cal.Rptr. 599, 521 P.2d 855], 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 901 [172 Cal.Rptr. 528], Sykes v. County of Marin (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 158 [117 Cal.Rptr. 466], and the then-extant opinion of the Court of Appeal in Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District. The State also argued it could not be held liable unless it was aware of a prior history of crimes at the rest-stop.
The trial court granted the motion in 1983 on the grounds asserted by the State. The court emphasized the rest stop had not been the scene of repeated criminal activity of the kind involved in this case. The court relied extensively on the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District. However, our Supreme Court granted a hearing in Peterson and later decided the case adversely to the position of the State here. (See Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799 [205 Cal.Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193].) While the instant case was on appeal, our Supreme Court also decided Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112 [211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653], Peterson and Isaacs make clear that inadequate lighting can constitute a dangerous condition of public property. (Isaacs, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 130; Peterson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 812.) Isaacs also held “foreseeability is determined in light of all the circumstances and not by a rigid application of a mechanical ‘prior similars’ rule. [Citations.]” (Isaacs, supra, at pp. 126-127.)
Peterson and Isaacs—both decided after the trial court granted summary judgment—therefore cut the legs out from under the trial court’s ruling that the State could not be liable as a matter of law for inadequate lighting. More to the point, however, is that the motion was made and adjudicated on grounds having nothing to do with whether inadequate lighting was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries in this case. Thus, for example, the State made no argument to the effect that plaintiff’s assailant was not concealed in shadows. Plaintiff therefore had no reason to present evidence in opposition to a theory not tendered.
Where a defendant brings a motion for summary judgment, “the initial duty to define the issues presented by the complaint and to challenge them factually is on the defendant who seeks a summary judgment.” (Conn v. National Can Corp. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-640 [177 Cal.Rptr. 445], italics added.) This is so irrespective of the fact the plaintiff will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. (Ibid.; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Proceedings Without Trial, § 290, p. 589.) Defendant’s mo*214tion must define the issues tendered by the complaint, and upon which summary judgment is sought, with sufficient particularity so that plaintiff will be put on reasonable notice a response is due.1 Here, the State in its motion stood on the sole assertion it was immune from liability as a matter of law for the reasons previously noted. The State never went beyond its threshold argument to tender the issue whether, because of facts peculiar to this case, inadequate lighting was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff. An attorney reading the State’s moving papers would not reasonably conclude the State was asserting that inadequate lighting did not cause plaintiff’s injuries because, for example, plaintiff’s assailant was visible from the parking lot. The State is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of inadequate lighting.
I wholly fail to understand why the majority’s unfair rush to judgment is necessary. If, in fact, inadequate lighting was not a legal cause of this incident, the State can move for summary judgment in the trial court on that theory. If the motion is meritorious, it should be granted. But it should be granted only after plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to make a factual response to the State’s theory of summary judgment.
Even assuming arguendo the question of causation in this case was tendered as an issue, the majority err in upholding summary judgment on the question of inadequate lighting. “The summary judgment procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution. (Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Prentice (1942) 19 Cal.2d 553, 556 [122 P.2d 264].) Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no issue of fact to be tried. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; Lipson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374 [182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822].) [¶] ‘The moving party bears the burden of furnishing supporting documents that establish that the claims of the adverse party are entirely without merit on any legal theory.’ (Lipson v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 374.) ‘The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion.’ (Slobojan v. Western Travelers Life Ins. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 432, 436-439 [74 Cal.Rptr. 895, 450 P.2d 271].” (Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18, 35-36 [210 Cal.Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134].)
*215Presumably because the State did not assert in its motion a failure of proximate cause between the lighting and this accident, plaintiff herself did not submit a declaration detailing the position of her assailant with respect to the lighting. However, as noted by the majority, plaintiff submitted a declaration by an ex-police officer who was an expert in the prevention of crime by the design of structures. The expert stated, inter alia, he had performed tests of illumination values of lights at the rest stop. The tests showed the lighting did not meet nationally-recognized standards. Moreover, placement of a high pressure sodium light “in an alcove setting creates a broad band of darkness and shadow in the areas just in front of the approach to the women’s restroom.” The expert opined the rest stop was in a dangerous condition due to inadequate lighting at the time of the attack on plaintiff.
The majority rely on facts taken from the police report of the incident which is attached as exhibit B to the State’s motion for summary judgment.2 The police report states that “vict. states that she (vict.) then walked to the restroom building at said rest stop. Vict. stated that as she was entering said women’s restroom she observed a male subject standing at far (N/E) corner of building (outside) Vict. stated that said male subject stared at vict. as she approached the entrance.” The report also notes that “The interior of restroom and outside walls of building are well illuminated.”
The majority infer from the police report’s assertions that the male subject was standing “at far (N/E) corner” and that the “outside walls of building are well illuminated” that the subject was standing in bright light, i.e., that he was “bold enough to lurk in the open in the light.” (Majority opn. at p. 211.) With respect, this inference does not comport with a strict construction of affidavits supporting motions for summary judgment. Properly construed, the police report admits of nothing more than that the assailant stood in enough light to let the victim see, at close range, that he was staring at her. The police report cannot be used to infer plaintiff was standing in bright light. The degree of illumination sufficient to allow plaintiff to observe her assailant at close range is not necessarily the degree of illumination required to serve the obvious deterrent function of lighting. Nor does such illumination constitute a reasonably safe design as a matter of law. Consequently, the fact that plaintiff could see her assailant is insufficient to entitle the State to summary judgment.
*216I would reverse the summary judgment with directions to enter a summary adjudication of issues as to the matters discussed in part III of the majority opinion.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 22, 1986. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Subdivision (b) of section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure now provides in pertinent part: “The supporting papers shall include a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed.” Had this specified procedure been followed, there would be no uncertainty as to the aim of the motion in the instant case. However, this procedure was added by amendment of the statute in 1983 (Stats. 1983, ch. 490) and was not in effect when the instant motion was adjudicated.

No objection to the veracity of facts set forth in the report was made in the trial court. “Evidentiary objections not made either in writing or orally at the hearing shall be deemed waived.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).)