Court Opinion

ID: 9883824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:21:03.791136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.777555
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which reverses the conviction because of the decision of the trial judge to overrule challenges for cause because I do not believe the action of the trial judge constituted reversible error.
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge as to whether a juror should be excused for cause and the decision of the trial judge should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988). The trial judge has the best opportunity to determine the capacity of a juror to serve and a reviewing court should not interfere in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Clearly the trial judge always has an advantage by actually viewing the jurors to determine their competency. An examination of the record indicates that there is no reason to disturb the decision of the trial judge here. This Court should not substitute its view of the credibility of jurors for that of the trial judge.
RCr 9.36(1) provides that when there are reasonable grounds to believe that a prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, the juror shall be excused as not qualified. See Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 530 at 532 (1970) where this Court recognized the broad discretion of the trial judge in challenges for cause. Certain language found in Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 737 S.W.2d 466 at 467 (1987) can be instructive in a realistic approach to juror qualifications:
Although jurors sworn to try a case clearly must not communicate with anyone else regarding any subjects connected with the trial, RCr 9.70, members of a jury panel from which the petit jury is chosen, certainly do not live in a vacuum and they cannot be expected always to be devoid of any knowledge of any case upon which they might be selected to sit. Despite the fact that they may have acquaintance with or knowledge about participants or possible testimony in a pending case, prospective jurors can still qualify to sit on the case so long as reasonable grounds exist to believe that they can render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence adduced.
It is reasonable to fear that an extension of the decision and philosophy expressed in the majority opinion could make it very difficult to ever select a jury to a defendant’s satisfaction in a small rural county where an escape occurs from a prison located there. In this case, the trial judge clearly believed the prospective jurors and appropriately determined their credibility. The record does not establish any abuse of discretion that requires reversal of the defendants’ conviction. They were not denied their right to a fair and impartial jury. Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 405 (1978); Tayloe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 556 (1960).
I would affirm the conviction and remand this matter to the trial court only in regard to the persistent felony offender proceedings.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.