Court Opinion

ID: 9632466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:15:52.045061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:16.956793
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
The facts are clear. Parkford owned a Plymouth automobile. His public liability insurance carrier is Pacific Indemnity Company, called Pacific. The policy issued by Pacific insured, as required by law (Veh. Code, § 415(a) (2)) in addition to Parkford “any other person using or responsible for the use of [the car] . . . with the express or implied permission of [Parkford].” Parkford permitted his son, Geof*427frey, to use the ear but instructed him not to permit anyone else to use it. Geoffrey permitted Irvin Norris to use it, and in the course thereof, an injury was caused to the Phillipsons, allegedly through Irvin’s negligence. Irvin would be liable as the driver of the car and the question is whether he was operating it with the implied consent or permission of Park-ford and hence was covered by the insurance policy extending coverage to persons using the car with Parkford’s consent. That he was covered should be clear. In order to give meaning and effect to this court’s decision in Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal.2d 454 [139 P.2d 645, 147 A.L.R. 861], that result is imperative. We there considered section 402 of the Vehicle Code, which imposes liability upon the owner of a vehicle for an injury caused by the negligence of one operating it with the owner’s “express or implied” permission. We there held, as the majority opinion here concedes, that the owner was liable for an injury caused by a person driving with the permission of the owner’s permittee even though the owner had expressly forbidden his permittee to let another operate the ear. As stated in the majority opinion, we held that “the liability pursuant to section 402 must be imputed to the owner whenever it appeared that there was an initial permission for its use although restrictions on delegation of that use were violated.” To the same effect are Burgess v. Cahill, 26 Cal.2d 320 [158 P.2d 393, 159 A.L.R. 1304] ; Herbert v. Cassinelli, 73 Cal.App.2d 277 [166 P.2d 377], and Haggard v. Frick, 6 Cal.App.2d 392 [44 P.2d 447].
I have heretofore stated the terms of the clause of the policy here involved. It will be noted that the language is identical with that in section 402 considered in the Souza and other cases, supra. It should therefore be given the same meaning, and if there is liability on the owner under section 402, there should likewise be liability under the policy. The policy was written to meet certain conditions of liability and should be interpreted in the light of those conditions. The purpose of the policy was to protect another who was operating the car where he was made responsible by law. Persons who could make the owner liable because they operated the car with implied permission under section 402, must necessarily be other persons who, under the policy, are driving with the implied permission of the owner. If the operator is said to have implied permission in one case he also has it in the other. The law stated in the Souza and other cases, *428supra, construing section 402 is read into and becomes a part of the policy—the contract for “. . . all applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms. Section 1656 of the Civil Code states that ‘All things that in law or usage are considered as incidental to a contract, or as necessary to carry it into effect, are implied therefrom, unless some of them are expressly mentioned therein, when all other things of the same class are deemed to be excluded.’ Section 1646 of the Civil Code reads as follows: ‘A contract is to be interpreted according to the law.and usage bf the place where it is to be performed; or, if it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the law and usage of the place where it is made.’ Hence, the courts must read as a part of a contract the laws of the state existing at the time it was made. It is to be construed according to the lex loci rei sitae as to the sufficiency of its formal execution and as to the interpretation of its parts. It would be idle for the parties to say, expressly, that they incorporate into their agreement the law then existing. The parties are presumed to have had the law in view, although sometimes the terms of the contract will rebut this presumption. This rule, of course, applies as well to constitutional provisions as to statutes.” (6 Cal.Jur. 310.)
It should further be noted that the clause of the policy involved is one required by statute to present. It commands that the policy must “insure the person named therein and any other person using or responsible for the use of said motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of said assured.” (Veh. Code, § 415(a) (2).) That section and section 402 are all part of division VII of the Vehicle Code, the first chapter of which declares the civil liability including that of the owner (§402), the second, financial responsbility, and the third, security following the accident. All of those provisions should be read together and harmonized. Thus, when the first chapter imposes liability on the owner for the negligent operation of a car by the one to whom he has given implied permission to use it, and this court interprets that to extend to the operation by a permittee of the permittee, although the latter permission is forbidden by the owner, the second chapter which requires an insurance policy to cover persons who operate the ear with the owner’s implied consent, should be similarly inter*429preted. Otherwise the policy requirement does not give the coverage demanded by the second chapter (§415).
It is my opinion that this case was correctly decided by the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice Moore and concurred in by Mr. Justice MeComb when this case was before the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Two (Cal.App.), 237 P.2d 666, and would therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied September 4, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.