Court Opinion

ID: 9793148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:43:36.932928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:47.401845
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
The petitioner appellant Raymond Allen Roles filed a petition for post conviction relief after a judgment of conviction on a felony charge of receiving stolen property. In a subsequent prosecution, this conviction was used to establish persistent violation status on petitioner appellant.
In the challenged conviction a co-defendant, Marineau, was charged with burglary. Both defendants were represented by the same court-appointed attorney. Roles contended in his petition for post conviction relief that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as a result of the trial court’s appointment of a single attorney for both himself and his co-defendant.
The record in this case indicates that Roles and his co-defendant were charged in a criminal information in July, 1973. On August 21, 1973, Roles’ co-defendant entered a plea of guilty to the burglary charge. On the same date Roles attempted to plead guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property. However, the trial court was not satisfied that Roles sufficiently understood the nature of the charge to which he was pleading, declined to accept the proffered guilty plea, and entered a plea of not guilty. A trial date was set for January 7, 1974. On September 11, 1973, Roles’ co-defendant was sentenced to probation for his burglary conviction.
On January 7, 1974, Roles once again sought to plead guilty, and his plea was then accepted. Upon questioning by the court following Roles’ offer to plead guilty, the defendant stated that he believed he was fairly and adequately represented by his attorney, that he had discussed the charge, his defenses, and the guilty plea and its consequences with his attorney. Upon questioning by the court, Roles stated that he understood that his guilty plea constituted a waiver of jury trial, the right to confront witnesses against him, and the privilege against self incrimination. The question that a possible conflict of interest was faced by Roles’ counsel as a result of the attorney’s representing both Roles and the co-defendant was not raised by the trial court, by Roles, or by his attorney prior to Roles’ petitioning for post conviction relief from the judgment of conviction in September, 1977.
A single court appointed attorney cannot represent conflicting interests of multiple defendants charged with the same crime. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968). The Supreme Court of the United States recently held that a criminal conviction is subject to reversal where the trial court improperly required joint representation over timely objection of the defendant. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). The court in Holloway, however, stated that “[Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent *719codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” 435 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d at 433.
In Holloway the trial court persisted in requiring the public defender to represent three co-defendants despite the counsel’s objection that a multiple defense confronted him with conflicting interests, making it impossible for him to provide effective assistance for each client at trial. The defense counsel in Holloway moved prior to trial for appointment of separate counsel “on the grounds that one or two of the defendants may testify and if they do, then I will not be able to cross examine them because I have received confidential information from them.” The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that where the defense counsel properly raised the problem of a conflict of interest, the trial court erred in failing to make inquiry to determine whether the appointment of separate counsel was necessary in the case to assure that the defendants received adequate representation.
Defendant Roles asserts here that because it was likely that his co-defendant would testify against him at trial if he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him, there was a conflict of interest between Roles and his co-defendant, making the joint representation of the two co-defendants a basis for reversal of Roles’ conviction. However, while an actual conflict of interest might have occurred if Roles had proceeded to trial with his original court appointed counsel, his guilty plea prevented that conflict from ever materializing. Joint representation of co-defendants does not of itself constitute denial of a criminal defendant’s right to effective counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, supra.
The trial court found, in denying Roles post conviction relief, that Roles’ plea of guilty made on January 7, 1974, was knowingly and voluntarily made and that Roles undérstood the consequences of the plea. As a result, the court found that the plea was valid. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 557 P.2d 626 (1976); State v. Monneyham, 96 Idaho 145, 525 P.2d 340 (1974); I.C.R. 11. There was no showing that Roles’ trial counsel recommended a guilty plea to the charge in order to avoid a conflict of interest problem which would have been presented had Roles proceeded to trial and the state called Roles’ co-defendant as a witness in its case in chief. Absent a showing that there was at least a possible conflict of interest between the co-defendants at the time the joint representation existed which may have inhibited the attorney’s ability to act for the best interests of each co-defendant at all times during that representation, there is no basis for the defendant’s claim that his sixth amendment right to effective counsel was abridged. Under the circumstances of this case, defendant Roles has not shown that his trial counsel faced a conflict of interest as a result of his joint representation of the two co-defendants.1
Affirmed.

. Both counsel and the trial court must be sensitive to the problems presented by joint representation of co-defendants and take an active role to assure that the joint representation does not deprive a defendant of his or her constitutional right to effective counsel. The American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice place responsibility on both the trial court and counsel to assure that a defendant’s right to counsel is not impaired by a conflict of interest.
The ABA Standards Relating to the Defense Function, § 3.5(b) (Approved Draft, 1971), provides as follows:
“Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to defend more than one defendant in the same criminal case if the duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several co-defendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop and when the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation. In some instances, as defined in the Code of Professional Responsibility, accepting or continuing employment by more than one defendant in the same *720criminal case will constitute unprofessional conduct.”
The ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 3.4(b) (Approved Draft, 1972), provides:
“Whenever two or more defendants who have been jointly charged, or whose cases have been consolidated, are represented by the same attorney, the trial judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel.”