Court Opinion

ID: 9965558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 18:16:16.301199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:12.177488
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          MAY 2, 2024
                                                                 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )
                                              )         No. 38916-2-III
                     Respondent,              )
                                              )
       v.                                     )
                                              )
JOSHUA Q. GERALD,                             )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                              )
                     Appellant.               )

       COONEY, J. — Joshua Q. Gerald was found guilty by a jury of second degree

murder for the killing of Leroy Scott III. Prior to Mr. Gerald’s trial, his codefendant,

Raylin James, was found guilty of first degree murder for the killing of Mr. Scott. Mr.

Gerald appeals arguing that his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution were violated because his jury did not represent a fair cross section of the

community and because the court failed to take steps to ensure there was no racial

discrimination affecting the composition of the jury. He also contends that there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of second degree murder as an accomplice and that

the prosecutor committed misconduct that was prejudicial.

       We disagree with each of Mr. Gerald’s arguments and affirm.
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

                                      BACKGROUND

       Mr. Gerald and Mr. James were charged with first degree murder for the killing of

Mr. Scott. The two were tried separately. Mr. James was convicted of first degree

murder and his judgment and sentence were affirmed on appeal.1 Mr. Gerald and Mr.

James are both Black, as was the victim, Mr. Scott.

       PRETRIAL MOTIONS AND VOIR DIRE

       Prior to trial, Mr. Gerald filed a motion to “Ensure Jury Diversity.” Clerk’s Papers

(CP) at 292-98 (boldface and some capitalization omitted). In advance of the filing,

Judge Scott Sparks opined that “[i]t is likely that there’ll be no one of color on this jury.

It’s pretty⎯that’s kind of the population of this county.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 184. At

the hearing on the motion, Judge Candace Hooper recalled that she could “think of

several trials . . . where there were . . . [a]t least two” people of color on the jury. RP at

230.

       Mr. Gerald’s requested relief was to waive persons of color on the venire to the

front of the venire or, possibly, to change venue to King County. The court stated it

could not “grant a motion to ensure it. But I can grant a motion to⎯do our best to

       1
         State v. James, No. 38782-8-III (June 1, 2023 Wash. Ct. App.) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa .gov/opinions/pdf/387828_unp.pdf.

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State v. Gerald

encourage it . . . [w]ithin the law.” RP at 237. The court added it was “absolutely

committed to not perpetuating any systemic⎯racism.” RP at 242.

       Defense counsel also explained that he had reached out to the county clerk and she

“didn’t seem to be familiar with anything on file with her that would⎯that would

summarize the process of how jurors are called.” RP at 243. The court responded that

the court administrator would have that information and if she did not, the court would

make sure that files regarding the jury selection process were properly stored with her.

Ultimately, the court declined to rule on Mr. Gerald’s motion to Ensure Jury Diversity

until “such time as I need to.” RP at 252. Defense counsel did not raise the issue again

before trial.

       During voir dire, after some jurors in the venire were released for hardship or

cause, 53 jurors remained. Defense counsel asked if any of the jurors identified “as

people of color” and only one juror, juror 56, raised her hand. RP at 446. Juror 56 stated

that she identified as Hispanic. After the venire was excused for lunch, defense counsel

renewed the motion to Ensure Jury Diversity. Given the makeup of the venire, defense

counsel requested a mistrial, a change of venue to King County, or that juror 56 be

moved to the front of the venire. The court considered the motion and declined to grant

it. A jury was empaneled and the case proceeded to trial.

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No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

      EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL

      Mr. Gerald, Mr. James, and Mr. Scott became friends while stationed together at

Joint Base Lewis-McChord. All three were in the military and lived on base. However,

according to Mr. Scott’s ex-girlfriend Jazmyn Kelly, Mr. Gerald and Mr. James appeared

to be better friends with each other while Mr. Scott seemed “separate” he “just kind of

like tagged along with them.” RP at 1225.

      Sometime in November or December 2019, marijuana was found in Mr. Scott’s

room. Mr. Scott pointed to Mr. James and Mr. Gerald as the individuals who had put the

marijuana in his room. Mr. Gerald insisted to detectives that he did not feel “animosity

toward[ Mr. Scott] about” Mr. Scott pointing the finger at them for the marijuana

incident, but that Mr. James did. RP at 1140. Ms. Kelly testified that Mr. Scott was

discharged from the military two weeks after the marijuana was found in his room.

Following his discharge, Mr. Scott struggled to get his car keys back from Mr. James and

Mr. Gerald and, when he eventually did, he and Ms. Kelly discovered his car had been

filled with “garbage bags worth of shredded paper.” RP at 1231.

      A few months later, in April 2020, Mr. Scott made plans to celebrate his birthday

in Ellensburg, Washington, at Hadassah Fisch’s apartment. Mr. Scott and Ms. Fisch were

friends and their birthdays were one day apart. Mr. Scott planned to have his birthday

celebration at Ms. Fisch’s apartment on Friday, April 24, the day of his birthday. Mr.

                                            4
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

Scott invited both Mr. Gerald and Mr. James to the party. Another friend of Mr. Scott’s,

Erica Key, testified that Mr. Scott expressed some anxiety about the party because he did

not “want . . . anything bad to happen” like “any fighting or . . . disagreements.” RP at

889.

       Mr. Gerald and Mr. James arrived at Ms. Fisch’s apartment on Friday evening for

the party. Around 1:00 a.m., Mr. Gerald, Mr. James, and Mr. Scott all suddenly left Ms.

Fisch’s apartment. About an hour later, Mr. Gerald and Mr. James returned to Ms.

Fisch’s apartment “covered in dirt and blood” and without Mr. Scott. RP at 916. The

next morning, Ms. Fisch observed blood on Mr. James’s white car. Ms. Fisch wanted to

search for Mr. Scott so she asked Mr. James if he was willing to “drive and look” for

him. RP at 918. Before Mr. James would agree to search for Mr. Scott, he wanted to go

to a car wash to clean his car. After cleaning his car, Mr. James, Ms. Fisch, and Ms.

Fisch’s roommate looked for Mr. Scott “in ditches” off of rural roads outside of

Ellensburg but to no avail. RP at 920.

       On Sunday, Mr. Gerald and Mr. James departed Ms. Fisch’s apartment. Mr.

James drove his own vehicle and Mr. Gerald drove Mr. Scott’s vehicle. The two

abandoned Mr. Scott’s vehicle on the side of Interstate 90 near Thorp, Washington, and

then continued their trek home together in Mr. James’s vehicle.

                                           5
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       On Sunday night, Mr. Gerald met up with his girlfriend, Tianna Brooks. Ms.

Brooks observed that Mr. Gerald’s right hand was injured and bruised. She testified that

when she saw Mr. Gerald on Thursday night, the day before he traveled to Ellensburg for

Mr. Scott’s birthday party, his hand was uninjured. Detective Andrea Blume also

observed “scabs on his knuckles and some bruising.” RP at 1008.

       On Sunday, April 26, 2020, Mr. Scott’s badly beaten body was discovered in a

drainage ditch off of Smithson Road and Highway 97 near Ellensburg. The investigation

revealed that Mr. Gerald’s and Mr. James’s cellphones traveled to the site where Mr.

Scott’s body was found and remained there from 1:27 a.m. until 1:53 a.m. on the night

the trio exited the birthday party. Mr. Scott’s cellphone also traveled to the murder scene

but it “never leaves” and was found near his body. RP at 1475. During an interview with

Detective Blume, Mr. Gerald admitted to “being at the scene and seeing Scott killed.”

RP at 1175.

       CLOSING ARGUMENT, DELIBERATIONS, AND VERDICT

       During closing argument, the prosecutor quoted a Court of Appeals case to which

defense counsel objected:

       [PROSECUTOR]: . . . A person who is present at the scene and ready to
       assist⎯And these are my words, not [ ]his⎯even if no action takes
       place⎯is ready to assist, his or her presence is aiding in the commission of
       the crime.
              I went to the Court of Appeals, and I pulled this quote: An
       accomplice of first degree murder need only know that they are facilitating

                                           6
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

      a homicide. The accomplice need not have known the level⎯known the⎯
      need not have known that the principal, the other person, the person that
      they are being the accomplice of, had the kind of culpability required for
      any particular degree of murder.
      [MR. GERALD’S COUNSEL]: I would object, your Honor. It’s for you
      to instruct the [jury]. This is improper. It’s not correct law. I move for a
      mistrial.
      THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection but the jury will disregard⎯
      statements of law that are given by the prosecutor. The jury will⎯base
      their verdict on the evidence provided in the court and on the law that has
      been given to you by the court⎯which are in the instructions of the court.
              I’m not granting⎯[a mistrial.]

RP at 1596-97.

      Once closing arguments concluded, the jurors were excused to deliberate.

Thereafter, defense counsel acknowledged that:

      I know that when motion for a mistrial isn’t granted that defense counsel is
      bound to ask[ ] for a curative instruction. Your Honor read my mind, and I
      couldn’t think of any better way to cure it. If I have a better idea now I
      think adding it would just compound the problem by drawing further
      attention to it.

RP at 1607.

      During deliberations, the jury asked the court: “Regarding [jury instructions]

#9/#16⎯is Raylin [James] considered to be Joshua’s accomplice? Can Joshua be the

defendant and be considered an accomplice at the same time? Is Joshua the defendant

and the accomplice?” CP at 390. The court, prosecutor, and defense counsel discussed

how to answer the question. The prosecutor opined that the jury was simply confused

                                          7
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

about the terminology and that they may be conflating the words “‘defendant’ and

‘principal.’” RP at 1614-15. On the other hand, defense counsel felt that it was the

prosecutor’s improper comments made during closing argument that confused the jury.

The court responded that the jury was “told to disregard that.” RP at 1616. Ultimately,

the court advised the jury to “re-read your instructions.” RP at 1618.

       The jury acquitted Mr. Gerald of first degree murder but found him guilty

of second degree murder.2

       Mr. Gerald appeals.3

                                        ANALYSIS

       Mr. Gerald appeals arguing that his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution were violated because his jury did not represent a fair cross

section of the community and because the court failed to take steps to ensure there was no

racial discrimination affecting the composition of the jury. Mr. Gerald further asserts that

       2
         During the jury instruction conference among the court and counsel, defense
counsel requested an instruction on the lesser included offense of second degree murder.
The prosecutor and the court agreed that Mr. Gerald was entitled to the instruction and
the jury was given two verdict forms, one for first degree murder and one for second
degree murder.
       3
         The State filed a cross appeal but it was rejected as the State was not seeking
“‘affirmative relief’” and their issue could be raised in their response brief. Letter from
Tristen Worthen, Clerk of Court Wash. Court of Appeals to Gregory Zempel, Kittitas
County Prosecuting Attorney (May 25, 2022) at 1. The State raises no issues in its
response brief.

                                           8
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second degree murder as an accomplice

and that the prosecutor committed misconduct.

       WHETHER MR. GERALD WAS DEPRIVED OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY

       Mr. Gerald argues that, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, he was deprived of a

trial by an impartial jury because his jury did not represent a fair cross section of the

community and because the trial court failed to take steps to ensure there was no racial

discrimination affecting the composition of the jury. We disagree.

       Constitutional issues are questions of law this court reviews de novo. State v.

Rivers, 1 Wn.3d 834, 850, 533 P.3d 410 (2023). “A criminal defendant is entitled to a

trial by an impartial jury, and this constitutional right includes the right to have jury

panels drawn from a fair cross section of the community.” Id. at 851. Mr. Gerald argues

his fair cross section right was violated when Kittitas County’s jury selection system

produced a venire containing no Black jurors.

       To prevail on a fair cross section claim under the Sixth Amendment, the Duren

test requires a defendant prove: “(1) a distinctive group (2) is unreasonably

underrepresented in his own venire and in jury venires generally, (3) as a result of

systematic exclusion in the jury selection process.” Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439

U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979)).

                                             9
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       Mr. Gerald meets the first element of the Duren test as Black people form a

distinctive group.4 Rivers, 1 Wn.3d at 863. However, Mr. Gerald cannot satisfy the

second and third elements of the Duren test.

       Mr. Gerald can show underrepresentation of Black people in his own venire (since

there were none) but he produced no evidence, other than passing remarks from the court

and census data, of an unreasonable underrepresentation of Black people and people of

color in Kittitas County juries generally.

       “‘[M]ere ‘underrepresentation,’ in the sense that a group’s representation is not at

least equal to its proportion of the community, is not sufficient to show that the

representation is not ‘fair and reasonable.’’” In re Pers. Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1,

       4
          If Mr. Gerald’s claim is that the “distinctive group” is people of color generally,
he may not even be able to satisfy the first element of the Duren test. In In re Pers.
Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 20, 296 P.3d 872 (2013), the Supreme Court held the
defendant satisfied the first element of the Duren test when he identified African-
Americans and Latinos as the “distinctive group.” Similarly, the court in Rivers found
the defendant “easily” met element one of the Duren test where the “distinctive group”
was Black people. Rivers, 1 Wn.3d at 863. However, the term “person of color” is
defined as “a person whose skin pigmentation is other than and especially darker than
what is considered characteristic of people typically defined as white” or “a person who
is of a race other than white or who is of mixed race.” MERRIAM-WESTER ONLINE
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/person%20of%20color (last
visited Apr. 25, 2024). Who identifies as a person of color may, occasionally, be
subjective, both to the observer, and to the individual. It is unlikely that “people of
color” can form a “distinctive group” for purposes of the Duren test. It is hard to say
exactly what “distinctive group” Mr. Gerald claims because he does not address the
Duren test in his brief. See Br. of Appellant at 16 (Mr. Gerald’s only reference to
Duren).

                                             10
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

20, 296 P.3d 872 (2013) (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). Moreover, Mr. Gerald is “not

entitled to exact cross-representation in the jury pool, nor need the jury selected for his

trial be of any particular composition.” State v. Hilliard, 89 Wn.2d 430, 442, 573 P.2d 22

(1977).

       Mr. Gerald posits in his brief that Kittitas County’s census data suggests that the

county is 83.7 percent white while the remaining 16.3 percent of people in Kittitas

County are “people of color.” CP at 293 n.2. He also points to the court’s comment that

“[i]t is likely there’ll be no one of color on this jury. It’s pretty⎯that’s kind of the

population of this county.”5 RP at 184. He contends that there is “no reason (or excuse)

why juries in Kittitas County should always predictably be white.” Br. of Appellant at 3-

4, 20. Mr. Gerald’s citation to census data and a passing remark from the court are not

enough to show that Black people are generally underrepresented in juries in Kittitas

County. Thus, he fails to meet element two of the Duren test.

       5
       Contrast the comment made by Judge Sparks with this comment made by Judge
Hooper at a different hearing:
       I suppose in the last 34 years full of jury trials that I’ve seen [in] this
       county, the number of trials where there are⎯three persons on jury panel
       who would be considered diverse would be fairly low. Frequently one or
       two, but three⎯because the county, the makeup of the county⎯is not as
       diverse as it could be. It really isn’t.
RP at 229 (emphasis added).

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No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       Mr. Gerald also fails to satisfy element three. He points to a violation of

RCW 2.36.065, which states:

       It shall be the duty of the judges of the superior court to ensure continued
       random selection of the master jury list and jury panels, which shall be
       done without regard to whether a person’s name originally appeared on the
       list of registered voters, or on the list of licensed drivers and identicard
       holders, or both. The judges shall review the process from time to time and
       shall cause to be kept on file with the county clerk a description of the jury
       selection process. Any person who desires may inspect this description in
       said office.

(Emphasis added.)

       Mr. Gerald speculates that Kittitas County’s jury selection process is

discriminatory. Mr. Gerald’s only evidence of this is that there was allegedly no

description of the jury selection process on file when defense counsel attempted to review

it at the county clerk’s office and that the judge appeared unfamiliar with the exact

process the county used for selecting juries. When the record is reviewed in its entirety

and in context, Mr. Gerald’s claim that RCW 2.36.065 was not complied with fails.

       First, when defense counsel expressed to the court that it could not find a

description of the jury selection process with the county clerk, the court advised that “the

court administrator probably has a description of how things work” and if they did not

“the presiding judge will⎯will direct her to make sure it gets there. Or myself in the

absence of the presiding judge.” RP at 244-45. Defense counsel appeared satisfied with

the court’s answer and never pursued the issue.

                                           12
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       Mr. Gerald speculates, based on a passing comment from the court, that Kittitas

County fails to adhere to the mandates of RCW 2.36.065. But even if the judges in

Kittitas County fail to “review the process from time to time” as RCW 2.36.065 requires,

Mr. Gerald does not explain how a violation of the statute amounts to prima facie

evidence of systematic discrimination. Indeed, Mr. Gerald produced no evidence of

systematic discrimination in Kittitas County’s jury selection process and does not even

attempt to show how he was prejudiced. “Where the selection process is in substantial

compliance with the statutes, the defendant must show prejudice from the selection

process; however, prejudice will be presumed if there is a material departure from the

statutes.”6 State v. Clark, 167 Wn. App. 667, 674, 274 P.3d 1058 (2012) (emphasis

added), aff’d, 178 Wn.2d 19, 308 P.3d 1058 (2013). In the absence of evidence that

Kittitas County’s jury selection process systematically excludes Black people, Mr. Gerald

fails to meet element three of the Duren test.

       Mr. Gerald also argues that the court’s alleged failure to take steps to ensure no

racial discrimination affected the jury composition was error. As a threshold issue, Mr.

Gerald fails to provide evidence that there was discrimination affecting the jury pool. As

       6
         Chapter 2.36 RCW is Washington’s statutory scheme pertaining to juries and
jury selection. RCW 2.36.054 mandates that juries in Washington be drawn from a
master list comprised of all registered voters and holders of driver’s licenses residing in
the county. Mr. Gerald does not argue that this process was not complied with, he simply
speculates that the judges in Kittitas County do not regularly review the process.

                                           13
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

discussed above, there is no evidence that Kittitas County’s jury selection process was

discriminatory or that discrimination affected the jury in his case. Mr. Gerald simply

argues that the trial court should have ensured there were Black people or people of color

on his jury.

       We review a trial court’s ruling on challenges to the venire process for abuse of

discretion. State v. Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d 595, 600, 817 P.2d 850 (1991). A trial court

abuses its discretion when it exercises it on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.

State v. Dye, 178 Wn.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). When the jury selection

process substantially complies with the jury selection statute, the defendant must show

prejudice. Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d at 600.

       Prior to trial, Mr. Gerald filed a motion to Ensure Jury Diversity requesting that

the court take steps to ensure a racially diverse jury, including that the court only empanel

a jury if there were at least three people of color seated on it. The court took Mr.

Gerald’s motion seriously and asked if “extra peremptory challenges” would assist in

ensuring jury diversity. RP at 229. The court was otherwise unsure of how to implement

Mr. Gerald’s motion within the confines of the law. The court ultimately stated that it

could not “grant a motion to ensure it. But I can grant a motion to⎯do our best to

encourage it . . . [w]ithin the law.” RP at 237.

                                           14
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       During jury selection, Mr. Gerald renewed his motion to ensure jury diversity.

Mr. Gerald requested a mistrial due to the makeup of the jury venire, a change of venue

to King County, or, if those two requests were denied, that juror 56 be moved to the front

of the panel to ensure she would be seated on the jury. The court administrator informed

the court that 400 people had been summoned and only 69 jurors appeared.

       The court ruled that a mistrial would not be appropriate simply because there were

too few people on the jury panel who identified as persons of color. The court noted that

the composition of the jury venire was not due to “bad faith” but that it was a “random

selection of people and it was a random selection of people that showed up today.” RP at

459. As to Mr. Gerald’s request that juror 56, the Hispanic juror, be moved to the front

of the venire, the court researched the issue and correctly concluded that it would destroy

the statutory mandate of random selection if the court were to move juror 56 to the front

of the panel. The court denied Mr. Gerald’s motions.

       The court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Gerald’s motions. Mr.

Gerald fails to show how Kittitas County substantially failed to comply with chapter 2.36

RCW and how he was prejudiced. Contrary to Mr. Gerald’s assertion, the court was

committed to diversity during jury selection and even granted Mr. Gerald’s motion to

play a video on implicit bias for the jury venire. Further, the jury acquitted Mr. Gerald of

the more serious offense of first degree murder. The court’s reasons for denying Mr.

                                           15
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

Gerald’s motions were tenable, based in law, and Mr. Gerald has failed to establish he

was prejudiced.

       Mr. Gerald’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violated.

       SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       Mr. Gerald argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second degree

murder as an accomplice. We disagree.

       The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law this court reviews de novo.

State v. Rich, 184 Wn.2d 897, 903, 365 P.3d 746 (2016). “The test for determining the

sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). When

analyzing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in

favor of the State. Id. “[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable

and cannot be based on speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318

(2013).

       A person commits the crime of second degree murder when:

              (a) With intent to cause the death of another person but without
       premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third
       person; or
              (b) He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony, including
       assault, other than those enumerated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the
       course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom,

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No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one
       of the participants . . . .

RCW 9A.32.050. Further, RCW 9A.08.020 (Washington’s accomplice liability statute)

states in relevant part:

               (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission
       of a crime if:
               (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission
       of the crime, he or she:
               (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to
       commit it; or
               (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or
       committing it.

       “[I]t is not necessary that jurors be unanimous as to the manner of an accomplice’s

and a principal’s participation as long as all agree that they did participate in the crime.”

State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 104, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). Accomplice liability is not

an element of, or alternative means of, committing a crime. State v. Teal, 152 Wn.2d

333, 338, 96 P.3d 974 (2004).

       Mr. Gerald contends there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second

degree murder as an accomplice. However, it is unclear whether the jury found Mr.

Gerald guilty of second degree murder as a principal or an accomplice, and Mr. Gerald

does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him as a principal. Because

there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Gerald as a principal, there was necessarily

sufficient evidence to convict him as an accomplice.

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No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       The to-convict instructions for second degree murder correctly stated:

              To convict the defendant of the crime of murder in the second
       degree each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond
       a reasonable doubt:
             One, that on or about April 24th, 2020 through April 25th, 2020 the
       defendant or an accomplice acted with intent to cause the death of . . .
       Leroy Joseph Scott;
             Two, that Leroy Joseph Scott died as a result of the defendant’s or
       an accomplice’s acts; and
                Three, that any of these acts occurred in the state of Washington.

RP at 1561.

       Mr. Gerald argues that there was no evidence of Mr. Gerald’s DNA on Mr. Scott

and no evidence of Mr. Gerald’s fingerprints or DNA on any murder weapon. Fatal to

Mr. Gerald’s argument, the State presented evidence that Mr. Gerald and Mr. James were

both present where Mr. Scott’s body was later found between 1:27 a.m. and 1:53 a.m. on

the night of the murder. Ms. Fisch testified that after Mr. James and Mr. Gerald left her

apartment with Mr. Scott, both men returned to her apartment muddy and bloody and

without Mr. Scott. Mr. Gerald was also observed by Detective Blume and Mr. Gerald’s

girlfriend, Ms. Brooks, to have scabs and bruising on the knuckles of his right hand.7 Ms.

Brooks testified that the injuries to Mr. Gerald’s hand were not present on the day before

       7
           Mr. Gerald is right handed.

                                            18
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

Mr. Scott’s murder. Finally, Mr. Gerald admitted to being present at the scene when Mr.

Scott was killed.

       Based on the State’s evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a

reasonable doubt that Mr. Gerald intended to cause the death of Mr. Scott and did just

that. The fact that Mr. Gerald’s DNA was not found on Mr. Scott’s body, or vice versa,

is not dispositive. Because there was sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Gerald as a

principal, there was sufficient evidence to convict him as an accomplice.

       STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS (SAG)

       Mr. Gerald argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

argument by “creat[ing] an environment susceptible to an extreme miscarriage of

justice,” and that the improper comments affected the jury’s verdict. SAG at 1. We

disagree that Mr. Gerald was prejudiced.

       Prosecutorial misconduct is grounds for reversal if “‘the prosecuting attorney’s

conduct was both improper and prejudicial.’” State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257

P.3d 551 (2011) (quoting State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d 727, 747, 202 P.3d 937 (2009)).

Mr. Gerald bears the burden of proving that the prosecutor’s conduct was both improper

and prejudicial. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). A

prosecutor’s argument must be confined to the law stated in the trial court’s instructions.

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No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

State v. Walker, 164 Wn. App. 724, 736, 265 P.3d 191 (2011). When the prosecutor

mischaracterizes the law, the prosecutor’s actions are considered improper. Id.

       “Once a defendant establishes that a prosecutor’s statements are improper, we

determine whether the defendant was prejudiced.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760. “If the

defendant objected at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s misconduct

resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.” Id.

       The prosecutor made the following statements during closing:

       A person who is present at the scene and ready to assist⎯a]nd these are
       my words, not his⎯even if no action takes place⎯is ready to assist, his or
       her presence is aiding in the commission of the crime.
               I went to the Court of Appeals, and I pulled this quote: An
       accomplice of first degree murder need only know that they are facilitating
       a homicide. The accomplice need not have known the level⎯known
       the⎯need not have known that the principal, the other person, the person
       that they are being the accomplice of, had the kind of culpability required
       for any particular degree of murder.

RP at 1596-97.8 Counsel for Mr. Gerald objected to these statements and moved for a

mistrial. The court denied the motion for a mistrial but provided a curative instruction to

the jury:

       8
        The prosecutor’s statement appears to have been pulled from In re Pers.
Restraint of Sarausad, 109 Wn. App. 824, 836, 39 P.3d 308 (2001) (“[W]e conclude that
the law of accomplice liability in Washington requires the State to prove that an accused
who is charged as an accomplice with murder in the first degree, second degree or
manslaughter knew generally that he was facilitating a homicide, but need not have
known that the principal had the kind of culpability required for any particular degree of
murder.”).

                                            20
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

       THE COURT: I’ll sustain the objection but the jury will disregard⎯
       statements of law that are given by the prosecutor. The jury will⎯base
       their verdict on the evidence provided in the court and on the law that has
       been given to you by the court⎯which are in the instructions of the court.
              I’m not granting⎯[a mistrial.]

RP at 1597.

       Later, the jury asked the court, “Regarding [jury instructions] #9/#16⎯is Raylin

[James] considered to be Joshua’s accomplice? Can Joshua be the defendant and be

considered an accomplice at the same time? Is Joshua the defendant and the

accomplice?” CP at 390. The court advised the jury to “re-read your instructions.”

RP at 1618.

       Mr. Gerald points to the prosecutor’s comment during closing and the jury’s

question during deliberations and argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s

improper statement. Though the prosecutor’s comment was improper because it stated

law outside of the court’s instructions, the court provided a curative instruction to the jury

and there is no evidence that the prosecutor’s comment had a substantial likelihood of

affecting the jury’s verdict.

       “Juries are presumed to follow instructions absent evidence to the contrary.” Dye,

178 Wn.2d at 556. The jury’s question during deliberations appeared unrelated to the

prosecutor’s improper comment and instead seemed to be a misunderstanding of the

difference among the terms “defendant,” “principal,” and “accomplice.” RP at 1614.

                                           21
No. 38916-2-III
State v. Gerald

Indeed, whether Mr. Gerald can be the “defendant and be considered an accomplice at the

same time” has nothing to do with whether Mr. Gerald knew he was facilitating a

homicide. CP at 390; see In re Personal Restraint of Sarausad, 109 Wn. App. 824,

836,39 P.3d 308 (2001).

       There is no evidence that the prosecutor’s improper comment during closing

argument resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s

verdict.

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                                  Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Pennell, J.

Staab, A.C.J.

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