Court Opinion

ID: 9788373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:47:11.883338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:09.474623
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, P. J.,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority’s disposition' of plaintiffs other claims, I do not agree with its decision to reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the retaliatory discharge claim. In my view, the trial court was correct in concluding that defendant is entitled to judgment on that claim as a matter of law.
As I understand the law, to establish a retaliatory discharge claim, a plaintiff must show that “he or she ‘would not have been fired but for the unlawful discriminatory motive of the employer.’ ”McCall v. Dynic USA Corp., 138 Or App 1, 8, 906 P2d 295 (1995) (quoting Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone, 289 Or 73, 92, 611 P2d 281 (1980)).
In this case, at most, the facts show that defendant contemplated terminating plaintiff near the time when her supervisors learned that she intended to file a workers’ compensation claim. It was then, in January 1996, that plaintiffs supervisors met to discuss a “Termination Plan” and, at that same meeting, also mentioned plaintiffs “Workers’ Compensation / Stress” claim. Plaintiff, however, must prove more *445than that defendant thought about terminating her position. Instead, a reasonable juror must be able to find that she “ ‘would not have been fired but for the unlawful discriminatory motive of the employer.’ ” McCall, 138 Or App at 8 (quoting Vaughn, 289 Or at 92) (emphasis added). That is the missing step in plaintiffs proof in this case. After the January 1996 meeting, defendant took no steps to fire plaintiff. On the contrary, plaintiff remained on leave with time loss pay until March, when defendant offered plaintiff a “light duty” position. Even after plaintiff worked only a day and a half at that position, before leaving because she experienced panic attacks, defendant still did not seek to terminate plaintiffs position.
On this record, the undisputed evidence is that, however defendant may have felt about plaintiff and about the fact that she had filed a workers’ compensation claim, defendant did not fire her or take any steps to fire her until her supervisors learned, in April 1996, that she had made an unauthorized purchase for which she never reimbursed defendant. That was some four months after plaintiff left her job and three months after she filed her workers’ compensation claim. Only then did defendant decide to fire her and terminate her job. On this evidence, no reasonable juror could find that plaintiff “would not have been fired but for the unlawful discriminatory motive of the employer,” if any. McCall, 138 Or App at 8. Indeed, the evidence is all to the contrary. For that reason, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs claim of retaliatory discrimination.
I respectfully dissent.