Court Opinion

ID: 9953665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:09:34.166096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:40.050566
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. 347A23

                                 Filed 22 March 2024

IN RE INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, NOS. 22-073 & 22-395

ANGELA C. FOSTER, Respondent

      This matter is before the Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-376 and -377 upon

a recommendation by the Judicial Standards Commission entered on 21 December

2023. The Commission recommends that respondent Angela C. Foster, a Judge of

the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Judicial District 18, be

suspended for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 3C of

the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and for conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of

N.C.G.S. § 7A-376. This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court

on 15 February 2024 but determined on the record without briefs or oral argument

pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule

2(c) of the Rules of Supreme Court Review of Recommendations of the Judicial

Standards Commission.

      No counsel for Judicial Standards Commission or respondent.

      PER CURIAM.

      The issue before the Court is whether District Court Judge Angela C. Foster,
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respondent, should be suspended for violations of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5),

3B(1), and 3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct—violations which

amounted to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the

judicial office into disrepute in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b). Respondent entered

a stipulation pursuant to Rule 18 of the Rules of the Judicial Standards Commission

(Stipulation) in which respondent stipulated to the facts surrounding her conduct and

the disciplinary recommendation that she be suspended for 120 days without

compensation.

      On 7 July 2022, Commission Counsel filed a Statement of Charges against

respondent in Inquiry No. 22-073. The charges alleged that respondent had engaged

in conduct inappropriate to her office when she called the Wake County Magistrate’s

Office on 3 March 2022. During the call, respondent utilized her judicial title to

inquire about the custody status of her son without disclosing the familial

relationship. Further, respondent yelled at the magistrate and demanded a bond

reduction based upon inaccurate and incomplete information.

      Before Inquiry No. 22-073 was resolved, Commission Counsel filed another

Statement of Charges against respondent in Inquiry No. 22-395 on 23 February 2023.

The charges alleged that respondent had demanded, without notifying her chief

district court judge, that an assistant district attorney (ADA) and a presiding

magistrate close their administrative courtroom for her own use, despite an active

administrative order mandating that it stay open. The conduct resulted in over one

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hundred cases being continued.

        Respondent filed her answer to Inquiry No. 22-073 on 8 August 2022 and her

answer to Inquiry No. 22-395 on 29 March 2023. On 27 July 2023, Commission

Counsel and respondent entered into the Stipulation containing joint evidentiary,

factual, and disciplinary stipulations as permitted by Rule 18 of the Rules of Judicial

Standards Commission that tend to support the decision to suspend respondent. The

Commission heard the matter on 11 August 2023, and the Stipulation was entered

into the record without objection. The Commission initially rejected the Stipulation

on 11 August 2023, but the Commission later accepted the Stipulation on 12 October

2023.

        I.   Recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission

A. Findings of Fact

        The recommendation of the Commission contains the following stipulated

findings of fact:

              1. In Inquiry Number 22-073, the parties stipulate to the
                 following facts:

                    a. On 3 March 2022, at 10:48pm, the Wake County
                       Magistrates’ Office received a phone call from an
                       individual listed as “Foster, Angela” on the caller
                       identification. At the time, Magistrate Lauren May
                       was on duty along with three other magistrates.

                    b. Magistrate May answered this phone call. The
                       person on the other end of the line identified herself
                       as Respondent, indicated that she was a Guilford
                       County District Court Judge, and inquired if a
                       defendant named Alexander Pinnix was in Wake

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   County custody. Respondent appeared annoyed but
   did not seem to be directing it at Magistrate May at
   the time. At no point during this introduction did
   Respondent identify her relationship with Mr.
   Pinnix.

c. After looking in their system, Magistrate May was
   able to confirm for Respondent that Mr. Pinnix was
   in Wake County custody on a $1000 secured bond.
   In response, Respondent began speaking loudly at
   Magistrate May and requested that she change Mr.
   Pinnix’s bond to a written promise to appear.

d. Magistrate May was confused by Respondent’s
   response given that Respondent was not a Wake
   County judge but did not want to come across as
   rude, so she requested to put Respondent on a brief
   hold to look at Mr. Pinnix’s file. After reviewing the
   file, Magistrate May found that Mr. Pinnix was
   being held on Wake County charges of resisting a
   public officer and misdemeanor breaking or entering
   that had been sworn out before a Wake County
   magistrate with a bond set by a different Wake
   County magistrate.

e. Before returning to the call, Magistrate May
   enlisted the assistance of her three colleagues who
   had been nearby her cubicle for an unrelated reason.
   All four magistrates concluded that based on their
   training and experience that Respondent had no
   reason to be involved with the case as an out of
   county judge and that the situation sounded
   strange.

f. When Magistrate May returned to the call, she
   asked Respondent to explain her involvement with
   Mr. Pinnix’s case and provide a basis for changing
   the bond. As a result of Respondent’s response,
   Magistrate May explained that since she had not
   issued the charges or set the bond, she did not feel
   comfortable altering the bond of another magistrate.

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g. Respondent then requested the telephone numbers
   of the magistrates who had been involved with Mr.
   Pinnix’s case so that she could call them at home and
   ask them to change the bond. Magistrate May
   declined to provide this information but suggested
   that Respondent could call Wake County Chief
   District Court Judge Ned Mangum to discuss the
   situation. Respondent became extremely angry at
   this suggestion, indicated that she would never
   dream of calling a district court judge at that time of
   night, and again demanded Magistrate May alter
   the bond.       Magistrate May suggested that
   Respondent could wait until morning to call Judge
   Mangum, however this suggestion caused
   Respondent to become even more upset. By this
   point, Magistrate May’s three co-workers could hear
   Respondent yelling through the phone receiver at
   her.

h. Respondent continued requesting Magistrate May to
   change Mr. Pinnix’s bond by saying that Mr. Pinnix
   had court in Guilford County the following morning
   on 4 March 2022, for a child custody case and that
   he needed to be present because the court was going
   to take away his children if he was not. She
   explained that Mr. Pinnix could not miss this court
   appearance, that calling Judge Mangum in the
   morning would already be too late, and stressed that
   the bond need to be changed that evening.

i. Magistrate May then muted the phone and again
   requested the assistance of the other magistrates.
   At their suggestion, Magistrate May offered
   Respondent her Chief Magistrate’s phone number.
   The phone call ended shortly thereafter.
   Respondent never contacted the Chief Magistrate
   regarding Mr. Pinnix’s bond that evening.

j. Due to the strange nature of the phone call, the
   amount of personal information Respondent had
   about Mr. Pinnix, and how upset Respondent had
   become, Magistrate May and her colleagues decided

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      to look up Respondent on the internet. After a brief
      search, they learned that Respondent was Mr.
      Pinnix’s mother. At no point during the phone
      conversation did Respondent identify her familial
      relationship with Mr. Pinnix, but instead led
      Magistrate May to believe that Mr. Pinnix was a
      litigant in her courtroom.      After making this
      discovery, Magistrate May wrote down her
      recollection of the phone call with Respondent and
      reported the incident to her Chief Magistrate.

   k. After investigating these claims, court documents
      showed that Mr. Pinnix did not have a history of
      failures to appear, nor did he have a Guilford County
      child custody case (or any other case) pending.

   l. The next morning, [4] March 2022, Magistrate
      Jordan Fly received a call from Respondent
      inquiring whether Mr. Pinnix was in the Wake
      County Detention Center. Magistrate Fly confirmed
      Mr. Pinnix was in the detention center under a
      $1000 secured bond, to which Respondent expressed
      surprise, stated she arranged for the bond to be
      posted, wondered why it was taking so long, and
      asked whether it was possible he was already
      released. Magistrate Fly again stated he was sure
      Mr. Pinnix was still in the Detention Center. During
      this call, Respondent did not identify herself as a
      judge or disclose the nature of her relationship to
      Mr. Pinnix.

2. In Inquiry Number 22-395, the parties stipulate to the
   following facts:

   a. Chief District Court Judge Teresa H. Vincent issued
      an Administrative Order on 22 July 2022, stating,
      “In High Point, administrative traffic court and 3B
      waiver court will be combined into courtroom 3B.
      The Courtroom 3B shall be open Mondays and
      Fridays from 8:30am until 12:30pm.”            This
      Administrative Order was distributed to all High
      Point Courthouse employees, including judges,

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   when it went into effect.

b. On 1 November 2022, Respondent alerted Judge
   Vincent by text that her assigned courtroom for 7
   November 2022, would not meet the needs of her
   Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Court session.
   Respondent was scheduled to address a case on this
   date where both parents were charged with the
   murder of their child. The parents, both in custody,
   could not be in the courtroom at the same time,
   which in turn required extra security and staff to
   conduct this hearing.      Additionally, recording
   capability was required, which only some of the
   courtrooms in High Point were equipped with.

c. In response to Respondent’s request, Judge Vincent
   provided the option for her to take over Courtroom
   3B once Administrative Court concluded as this
   courtroom could meet the needs of the hearing in
   question.     Respondent replied expressing her
   concern that the courtroom would not be run “with
   the goal of finishing in an efficient manner.” Judge
   Vincent replied, “I am sure they will finish court as
   soon as they can in order to handle other tasks.” No
   other contingency plans were discussed.

d. Before court began on 7 November 2022, at
   approximately 8:30am, Respondent came to
   Courtroom 3B and informed the assigned ADA that
   she might need his courtroom. In response, the ADA
   informed her of the number of cases on his docket
   and reminded her of Judge Vincent’s Administrative
   Order. During this conversation, the courtroom
   bailiff was nearby. Once Respondent left, the ADA
   made the magistrate presiding aware of the
   conversation then conducted the business of
   Administrative Court as usual.

e. After this conversation, Respondent returned to her
   assigned courtroom, 201, and informed everyone
   there that they would be moving to Courtroom 4C, a
   superior court courtroom.      This was done by

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   Respondent without first getting approval from
   Judge Vincent and the Senior Resident Superior
   Court Judge.

f. While Respondent was holding her district court
   session in Courtroom 4C, the Superior Court Trial
   Court Administrator (“the TCA”) walked past and
   heard voices. When the TCA entered and realized
   what Respondent was doing, she asked why
   Respondent was there, to which Respondent replied,
   “Oh they didn’t tell you either. . . I needed to use this
   courtroom.” The TCA informed Respondent that she
   was not aware that anyone would be using the
   superior court courtroom then went to her office to
   call her supervisor, who in turn, informed Judge
   Vincent.

g. At 9:37am, Judge Vincent confronted Respondent
   via text about her use of the superior court
   courtroom without permission, how that was not the
   plan they discussed, and ordered Respondent to
   vacate. Respondent responded claiming the bailiffs
   gave her permission to use this courtroom. When
   Judge Vincent asked the Sheriff’s Office about this,
   they denied providing Respondent with such
   permission.

h. Respondent left Courtroom 4C and returned to
   Courtroom 3B at approximately 10:00am to inform
   the ADA she needed his courtroom. The ADA told
   Respondent that he still had a full courtroom, but
   she told him to vacate. The courtroom bailiff was
   nearby during this conversation. As a result, the
   ADA informed the presiding magistrate of his
   conversation with Respondent and they proceeded to
   close down Administrative Court. This consisted of
   handling any case the ADA had already begun
   addressing and informing the remaining citizens
   that their cases would be continued, which the ADA
   notated on his docket. This resulted in more than
   one hundred cases being continued without being
   addressed which caused frustration to many

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                      members of the public.

                i. After Administrative Court closed, the presiding
                   magistrate went directly to speak with Judge
                   Vincent to advise her of the incident because he did
                   not want to get in trouble for closing court early in
                   violation of the Administrative Order.

                j. After speaking with the presiding magistrate, Judge
                   Vincent confronted Respondent via text at 10:57am
                   about her directing Administrative Court to shut
                   down without Judge Vincent’s permission and in
                   violation of her Administrative Order. Respondent
                   denied this via text and stated that she only spoke
                   to the clerk regarding the possibility of
                   Administrative Court moving to Courtroom 4C, the
                   superior court courtroom she did not have the
                   authority to use, because they did not need the
                   recording equipment.         This allegation by
                   Respondent could not be confirmed.

             3. In mitigation, the Commission found Respondent is
                remorseful for her actions in these matters and has
                accepted responsibility for her Code violations.

             4. In aggravation, the Commission found Respondent (1)
                was previously issued a censure by the North Carolina
                Supreme Court, In re Foster, 373 N.C. 29 . . . (2019), and
                (2) while on notice for Inquiry Number 22-073,
                Respondent engaged in the conduct outlined in Inquiry
                Number 22-395.

B. Conclusions of Law

      Based upon the foregoing findings of fact, the Commission made the following

conclusions of law:

             1. Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct sets forth the
                broad principle that “[a] judge should uphold the
                integrity and independence of the judiciary.” To do so,
                Canon 1 requires that a “judge should participate in
                establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should

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                     Opinion of the Court

   personally observe, appropriate standards of conduct to
   ensure that the integrity and independence of the
   judiciary shall be preserved.”

2. Canon 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct generally
   mandates that “[a] judge should respect and comply
   with the law and should conduct [herself] at all times in
   a manner that promotes public confidence in the
   integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”

3. Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct instructs that
   “[a] judge should not allow the judge’s family, social or
   other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial
   conduct or judgment. The judge should not lend the
   prestige of the judge’s office to advance the private
   interest of others except as permitted by [the] Code; nor
   should the judge convey or permit others to convey the
   impression that they are in a special position to
   influence the judge.”

4. Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct governs a
   judge’s discharge of his or her official duties.

5. Canon 3A relates to judges’ adjudicative duties, with
   Canon 3A(3) requiring that a judge be “patient,
   dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
   lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in the
   judge’s official capacity. . .” and Canon 3A(5) requiring
   that a judge “dispose promptly of the business of the
   court.”

6. Canon 3B pertains to judges’ administrative duties,
   with Canon 3B(1) requiring a judge to “diligently
   discharge the judge’s administrative responsibilities,
   maintain professional      competence in judicial
   administration, and facilitate the performance of the
   administrative responsibilities of other judges and
   court officials.”

7. Canon 3C concerns a judge’s duty to “disqualify him or
   herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
   may reasonably be questioned. . .”

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8. Upon the Commission’s independent review of the
   stipulated facts in Inquiry Number 23-073 concerning
   Respondent’s conduct towards Magistrate May relating
   to her son’s bond, the Commission, by a unanimous 5-0
   vote of the hearing panel concludes Respondent:

   a. failed [to] conduct herself at all times in a manner
      that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
      impartiality of the judiciary in violation of Canons 1
      and 2A of the Code;

   b. allowed her family relationships to influence her
      judicial conduct or judgment in violation of Canon
      2B of the Code;

   c. failed to remain patient, dignified, and courteous to
      all individuals she deals with in her judicial capacity
      in violation of Canon 3A(3) of the Code; and

   d. involved herself in a matter in which her
      impartiality could be reasonably questioned in
      violation of Canon 3C of the Code.

   The Commission notes that Respondent conceded in the
Stipulation these facts were sufficient to support the
conclusions.

9. Upon the Commission’s independent review of the
   stipulated facts in Inquiry Number 23-395 concerning
   Respondent’s conduct towards the ADA and presiding
   magistrate in Administrative Court, forcing the
   continuances of over one-hundred cases before they
   were able to be addressed, the Commission, by a
   unanimous 5-0 vote of the hearing panel concludes
   Respondent:

   a. failed to conduct herself at all times in a manner
      that promotes public confidence in the integrity of
      the judiciary and impartiality of the judiciary in
      violation of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code;

   b. prevented another judicial official from disposing
      promptly of the business of the court in violation of

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      Canon 3A(5) of the Code; and

   c. failed to diligently discharge her administrative
      responsibilities,    maintain     her    professional
      competence in judicial administration, and facilitate
      the     performance       of   the    administrative
      responsibilities of other judges and court officials in
      violation of Canon 3B(1) of the Code.

   The Commission notes that Respondent conceded in the
Stipulation these facts were sufficient to support the
conclusions.

10. The Commission further concludes, and accepts
    Respondent’s admission, that the facts establish
    Respondent engaged in willful misconduct in office and
    conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that
    brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of
    N.C.[G.S.] § 7A-376(b). See also Code of Judicial
    Conduct, Preamble (“[a] violation of this Code of
    Judicial Conduct may be deemed conduct prejudicial to
    the administration of justice that brings the judicial
    office into disrepute.”).

11. The North Carolina Supreme Court defined “willful
    misconduct in office” as “improper and wrong conduct of
    a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally,
    knowingly and, generally in bad faith. It is more than
    a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence.” In re
    Edens[,] 290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976). The Supreme Court
    further held in In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235 (1977), while
    willful misconduct in office necessarily encompasses
    “conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
    corruption,” it can also be found based upon “any
    knowing misuse of the office, whatever the motive.” Id.
    at 248. . . . “[T]hese elements are not necessary to a
    finding of bad faith. A specific intent to use the powers
    of the judicial office to accomplish a purpose which the
    judge knew or should have known was beyond the
    legitimate exercise of his authority constitutes bad
    faith.” Id.

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12. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission weighed
    Respondent’s pattern of abusing her power, the
    guidance provided by precedent set by the North
    Carolina Supreme Court, and Respondent’s willingness
    to accept responsibility for her actions.

13. The Commission stressed that Respondent was
    censured for abusing her power in the courtroom in In
    re Foster, 373 N.C. 29 . . . (2019), then proceeded to
    abuse her power again by misleading and bullying a
    magistrate in an attempt to have her son released from
    custody notwithstanding her previous public discipline.
    Then, after being put on notice and charged by the
    Commission in that matter, Respondent again abused
    her power by disregarding instructions from her chief
    district court judge and a valid administrative order,
    forcing more than one hundred cases to be continued
    without being addressed so that she could use a
    courtroom for her own purposes.

14. The Commission compared the facts at hand with those
    in In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, [431–32] (2012), where
    the respondent judge was issued the longest suspension
    (75-days) in the Commission’s history for engaging in a
    pattern of transferring traffic tickets onto her dockets
    with the understanding that the tickets (issued to
    individuals including her friends, church members, law
    students, etc.) would be resolved by her with favorable
    outcomes. Similarly to Respondent, the respondent
    judge in that matter was also charged with engaging in
    a pattern of misconduct, entered a factual
    stipulation . . . . Id. [at 426.] . . . In conducting this
    weighing, the Commission determined that although
    the facts addressed in In re Hartsfield were arguably
    more severe than any of those in Respondent’s current
    or former matters to be addressed by the Court,
    Respondent’s repeated course of conduct over time
    called for a more severe sanction.

15. However, similar to the comparative analysis the Court
    conducted in In re Hartsfield, the Commission also
    compared Respondent’s conduct to that addressed by

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   cases resulting in judges’ removals from office and
   found that Respondent’s conduct did not seem to rise to
   that level. See In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109 . . . (1978)
   (where the respondent judge (1) engaged in a pattern of
   addressing criminal cases without calendaring them,
   noticing the district attorney, or entering judgment in
   open court and (2) on several occasions, accepted money
   from defendants to “take care of” traffic citations); In re
   Martin[,] 302 N.C. 299 . . . (1981) (where the respondent
   judge (1) initiated ex parte communications with two
   twenty-one year old female defendants and attempted
   to force himself on them and (2) heard his own failure
   to stop at a stop sign case[ ]); In re Kivett, 309 N.C.
   635 . . . (1983) (where the respondent judge allowed his
   relationship with a bail bondsman, who provided the
   respondent judge with gifts and the use of his home for
   illicit sexual relations, to influence multiple court
   decisions); In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 482 . . . (2008) (where,
   after being censured and suspended in a prior case, the
   respondent judge made a defendant proceed pro se in a
   juvenile court hearing and ordered that defendant to
   pay spousal support despite the complaint not seeking
   it and turn over the keys of his truck to the Sheriff’s
   Office, after which the respondent judge lied to
   investigators and tried to suggest to a Sheriff’s deputy
   that they also lie); and In re Belk, 364 N.C. 114 . . .
   (2010) (where the respondent judge continued to serve
   on the board of directors for two companies despite
   receiving contrary ethics advice and, after his request
   to be relieved of his judicial duties to attend a board
   meeting was denied, confronted and yelled at his chief
   district court judge[ ]).

16. The Commission also acknowledged that prior to
    legislative changes in 2006, the Court only had the
    authority to censure or remove a judge. N.C.[G. S.] §
    7A-377(b). Further, the Court has made it clear that
    the discipline imposed in any given case “will be decided
    upon its own facts.” In re Hardy, 294 N.C. 90, 98 . . .
    (1978).

17. As a result, the Commission concludes, and Respondent

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                 agrees that a suspension of 120 days without
                 compensation    is    appropriate balancing the
                 aforementioned factors.

             18. The North Carolina Supreme Court in In re Crutchfield,
                 289 N.C. 597 (1975)[,] first addressed sanctions under
                 the Judicial Standards Act and stated that the purpose
                 of judicial discipline proceedings “is not primarily to
                 punish any individual but to maintain due and proper
                 administration of justice in our State’s courts, public
                 confidence in its judicial system, and in the honor and
                 integrity of is judges.” Id. at 602.

             19. The Commission and Respondent acknowledge the
                 ultimate jurisdiction for the discipline of judges is
                 vested in the North Carolina Supreme Court pursuant
                 to Chapter 7A, Article 30 of the North Carolina General
                 Statutes, which may either accept, reject, or modify any
                 disciplinary recommendations from the Commission.

C. Recommendation

      Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Commission,

by unanimous vote of the five Commission members that comprised this matter’s

hearing panel, concurred in the recommendation to suspend respondent for a period

of 120 days without compensation.

                                   II.   Analysis

      The Court, upon recommendation of the Judicial Standards Commission, has

the authority and responsibility to discipline judges by issuing a public reprimand,

censure, suspension, or removal of a judge “for willful misconduct in office, willful and

persistent failure to perform the judges’ duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of

a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of

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justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b) (2023).

The purpose of our judicial standards system is “to maintain due and proper

administration of justice in our State’s courts, public confidence in its judicial system,

and the honor and integrity of . . . judges.” In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 602 (1975).

      To that end, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice includes

“conduct which a judge undertakes in good faith but which nevertheless would appear

to an objective observer to be, not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to

public esteem for the judicial office.” In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 305 (1976) (quoting

Geiler v. Comm’n on Jud. Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284 (1973)). Further,

conduct is prejudicial and constitutes willful misconduct when a judge intentionally,

improperly, or wrongfully uses the power of the office with gross unconcern for his or

her conduct and in bad faith. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 301–02 (1978).

      In reviewing recommendations of the Commission, the Court “acts as a court

of original jurisdiction” and exercises independent judgment as to the disciplinary

measures imposed on a judge. In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202, 207 (2008) (quoting In re

Daisy, 359 N.C. 622, 623 (2005)). Each case is decided solely on its own facts, In re

Martin, 302 N.C. 299, 315–16 (1981), and the recommendation of the Commission is

not binding on this Court, In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. 418, 428 (2012). This Court may

adopt the Commission’s findings of fact if they are supported by clear and convincing

evidence or may make its own findings. Id. In the same vein, this Court may adopt

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the Commission’s recommendation or exercise independent judgment as to the

appropriate sanction. In re Martin, 295 N.C. at 301.

      In this matter, we agree that the Commission’s findings are supported by clear

and convincing evidence, and we adopt them as our own. By extension, we agree with

the Commission’s conclusions that respondent’s conduct violates Canons 1, 2A, 2B,

3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and 3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct, and is

prejudicial to the administration of justice and brings the judicial office into disrepute

in violation of N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).

      Our guidepost in determining the appropriate sanctions is the impact of the

conduct on public confidence in our judicial system and ensuring the honor and

integrity of judges who serve the people of this state. In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. at

602. The stipulations in this matter establish judicial conduct troubling enough to

warrant suspension, and this Court has suspended judges where a pattern of

problematic conduct has been identified. See, e.g., In re Hartsfield, 365 N.C. at 426–

27, 431–32 (suspending a judge engaged in a pattern of transferring traffic tickets of

friends and family to her docket with the understanding the tickets would be resolved

with a favorable outcome). Here, respondent was also previously sanctioned for her

conduct. In re Foster, 373 N.C. 29, 31-33, 40 (2019) (censuring respondent for holding

a hearing without notice, placing a mother in jail without cause and then lecturing

the mother’s fifteen-year-old children in an effort to convince them to exercise

visitation with their father). Further, while on notice of Inquiry No. 22-073, she

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                                     IN RE FOSTER

                                   Opinion of the Court

engaged in the conduct described in Inquiry No. 22-395. The stipulated conduct

justifies the recommended discipline.

       We appreciate respondent’s cooperation with the Commission during the

pendency of these proceedings, her candor, her acknowledgment of responsibility for

her conduct, and her completion of additional training on ethics and professionalism.

Respondent recognizes that her conduct warrants disciplinary consequences and

agreed to accept the recommended disciplinary action. Weighing the severity and

extent of respondent’s misconduct against her acknowledgement and cooperation, we

conclude that the Commission’s recommendation of a 120-day suspension is

appropriate and supported by the Commission’s findings of fact and conclusions of

law.

       It is hereby ordered by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in conference that

respondent Angela C. Foster be SUSPENDED for a term of 120 days without

compensation for conduct in violation of Canons 1, 2A, 2B, 3A(3), 3A(5), 3B(1), and

3C of the North Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct and conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of

N.C.G.S. § 7A-376(b).

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