Court Opinion

ID: 9408112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 16:08:21.243959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.828181
License: Public Domain

J-S17012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TOBIAS ALEXANDER MITCHELL                  :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1001 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 18, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-26-CR-0001563-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                               FILED: July 11, 2023

        Tobias Alexander Mitchell appeals from the judgment of sentence,

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, after a jury convicted

him of one count each of rape by forcible compulsion,1 indecent assault,2

unlawful restraint,3 aggravated assault,4 criminal mischief,5 and harassment,6

and two counts of simple assault.7 After review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1).

2   Id. at § 3126(a)(1).

3   Id. at § 2902(a)(1).

4   Id. at § 2702(a)(4).

5   Id. at § 3304.

6   Id. at § 2709.

7   Id. at § 2701(a)(1), (3).
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      The victim, J.A., had known of Mitchell when they were children, but

was reintroduced to him at a party held by J.A.’s sister in February 2021. That

night, J.A. and Mitchell used heroin, went to Mitchell’s house to get more

heroin, returned to the party, and subsequently fell asleep. When J.A. woke

up, her phone, keys, and medication were missing.         See N.T. Jury Trial,

3/17/22, at 9. J.A. then returned to Mitchell’s home to find him sleeping and

her belongings on a nearby table. Id. at 11. Mitchell woke up and told J.A.

that he took her belongings because “[Mitchell] knew that it [was] the only

way [J.A.] would see [him] or talk to [him] again.” Id. Mitchell twice asked

J.A. to lie down with him before she obliged. Id. at 12. J.A. testified that she

stayed at Mitchell’s house for one or two days until she “could leave

peacefully.” Id. at 13. J.A. then returned to her home at 6 Dixon Boulevard.

Id. at 14.

      Two nights later, at 1:00 a.m., Mitchell began banging on J.A.’s front

door. J.A. asked Mitchell to leave. Mitchell replied that he was going to kick

her door down, and that he had already kicked down the door of J.A.’s eighty-

year-old neighbor. Id. Ultimately, J.A. acquiesced and let Mitchell into the

house. Mitchell stated he wanted to “snuggle.” Id. at 15. For the next several

weeks, Mitchell continued to reside in J.A.’s home. J.A. testified, “[Mitchell]

would get high every day . . . would get crack and then come home and

immediately make me do ridiculous things. . . . He [would] make me

repeatedly give him oral sex, take a hit of the crack pipe and [give him oral

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sex], repeatedly, over and over, nonstop. . . . He would do that every day,

all day.” Id. at 21.

      On Mitchell’s third day in J.A.’s house, J.A. informed him that she did

not want to smoke any more crack.        Id. at 16.    Mitchell became angry,

threatened to slit his wrists and flipped over the bed J.A. had been sitting on.

Id. (J.A. testifying she believed Mitchell threatened to slit his wrists for

attention and J.A. was not providing him attention). Mitchell proceeded to

choke J.A. and punch her in the face. Id. at 19.

      On another occasion, J.A. fell asleep, and Mitchell picked her up, choked

her until she was unconscious, and then made her perform oral sex. Id. at

22; id. at 23 (J.A. explaining, “[Mitchell] just put his penis in your mouth, he

doesn’t care if you don’t do it, you will get hit. He is a large man compared

to me and he’d beat the crap out of you.”); id. (J.A. testifying Mitchell would

make her gag, choke, and throw up). After this incident, J.A. had a black eye.

Id. at 20.

      The next day, J.A. went to a women’s shelter and returned to her home

during the day only to take care of her dogs. Id. at 24.

      Um, I can’t have kids and I have my two dogs and I love my dogs
      a lot [and] I had nowhere to go. I could not take my dogs
      anywhere. And my dogs were there and [that] is why I kept
      returning because my dogs were there. I wasn’t going to leave
      them. My Coco has been with me through so much, they both
      have. I really love my dogs and I felt stuck. I will not leave my
      dogs. I will die for them[,] and I mean that and I almost did.”

Id. at 20.

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      J.A. had texted her landlord requesting assistance removing Mitchell

from her house. Upon seeing these messages, Mitchell threatened to injure

J.A.’s dogs. J.A. testified, “I remember [Mitchell] picking the bat up and like,

bouncing it on the floor [] saying, these dogs are going to get it. The dogs

are going to f—king die tonight.”      Id.; id. at 26 (J.A. testifying Mitchell

threatened to “beat [the dog’s] heads in”).

      J.A. testified that she left the house daily, without protest from Mitchell,

taking the Fayette Area Coordinated Bus Transportation (FACT Bus) to the

methadone clinic. Id. at 55; see also id. at 88 (J.A. testifying she goes to

the methadone clinic “because I want help[,] I don’t want to be a drug user”).

Although the methadone clinic is approximately a quarter of a mile from the

state police station, J.A. testified that she did not report Mitchell’s abuse to

the police because she “was not letting [her] dogs get killed whenever [the

police] knocked on the door and [Mitchell] sliced their throats [] because [he]

was mad.” Id. at 55.

      J.A. testified that a friend, who rides the FACT bus with her to the

methadone clinic, was “afraid [she] was not going to get on the bus one day.”

Id. at 26. At one point, the friend texted J.A., “if you don’t answer, I am

going to call the cops.” Id. Mitchell saw this message, took J.A.’s phone,

“smacked [her hard] with the bat [on the left side under her arm],” and

prevented her from going back to the shelter. Id. at 27. During this incident,

Mitchell was also concerned J.A. had been hiding crack from him. J.A. testified

that Mitchell made her remove her clothes, searched her, raped her, and then

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searched her anal cavity for crack. Id. at 28 (J.A. explaining he was “digging”

[into her anus] trying to see if [she] was hiding crack”). When J.A. said “ow,”

Mitchell “smashed [one of the dogs’] paws with the bat.” Id.

      Thereafter, Mitchell hit J.A. with the bat and “started going through the

reasons why he couldn’t let [her] leave[. Mitchell] was telling [J.A.] all of the

charges that he had accumulated and that is why he had to kill [her].” Id. at

30. At one point, Mitchell picked up the bat, attempted to hit J.A. in the head,

but missed and hit a small dresser. Id. at 31; id. at 45 (J.A. testifying Mitchell

made no other attempts to kill her because “[Mitchell] made [her] do

whatever[,] and [she] did whatever [Mitchell] said, because [she] was scared

for [her] life and [her] dogs’ li[ves,] so [she] listened”). J.A. testified that

Mitchell also hit her foot with the baseball bat. Id. at 36 (J.A. testifying, “there

is a bone sticking out of my foot now and it hurts real[ly] bad and it was black

and blue”).

      Mitchell then stopped and said that,

      “he just wanted to make love to [J.A.] and, if [she] didn’t want to
      . . . just do it. [She] just had to pretend like [she] liked it and tell
      him that [she] loved him and [she] was in love with him while he
      did it. And that is how it went. [She] had to stay there and get
      raped again and tell him that [she] enjoyed it and [she] love[s] it
      and [she is] in with love him.”

Id. at 33. J.A. testified that Mitchell explained to her his system: “He would

videotape girls and make them say that they loved him[,] and they want to

do the things that he makes them do and they enjoy it. Because as long as

they say that [and] he has the video, he will never go to jail.” Id. at 33. J.A.

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finally returned to the shelter, had her dogs stay with a friend, and then called

the police. Id. at 35.

      J.A. testified that she also left the house to walk her dogs and that

behind her home is a fire department and a magistrate office where state

police, city police, and a constable are on duty during business hours. Id. at

68. On cross-examination, she conceded that did not report the abuse to

these agencies. Id. at 78.

      Mitchell testified, in his own defense, that he and J.A. met at a party

and J.A.’s sister made him take J.A. on a drive to find more heroin. N.T. Jury

Trial, 3/17/22, at 206. The following day, J.A. texted Mitchell asking for drugs,

which Mitchell ignored because he knew she did not have money. Id. Mitchell

testified that J.A. sent him a text saying, “You need [oral sex] and I need to

get high. Come over.” Id.; id. at 207 (Mitchell testifying this type of trade

common in drug community). Mitchell testified he had an arrangement with

J.A., according to which Mitchell would help pay her bills and he could stay at

her house.    Id. at 207-08.   The arrangement changed when the landlord

attempted to evict J.A. due to lack of rent payments. Mitchell testified that

he spoke to the landlord and, ultimately, Mitchell was permitted to stay in the

house. Id. at 208; id. at 209, 222 (Mitchell testifying although he did not

have written lease for apartment because he was arrested before he was able

to do so, “it was not her apartment [any]more”).         On cross-examination,

Mitchell conceded that his name was never on a lease and that he never paid

rent or put utilities in his name. Id. at 222, 226.

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      Mitchell also testified that throughout these few weeks, the previous

arrangements regarding oral sex continued, he never prevented J.A. from

leaving her home, he helped care for the dogs, and that J.A. would “hoot and

holler” if Mitchell did not provide drugs. Id. at 209, 212; id. at 210 (Mitchell

testifying he continued to interact with J.A. because he had no choice, and she

knew how to break into the home). Mitchell also testified that the reason J.A.

went to the shelter was because after staying at the shelter for a few days,

J.A. would be provided with $700.00 per month for 7 months to help pay his

rent. Id. at 222.

      Mitchell testified that the bruise on J.A.’s eye was caused by J.A.’s sister.

Id. at 227 (Mitchell testifying J.A.’s sister punched J.A. repeatedly). Mitchell

stated that J.A.’s sister became angry with J.A. because Mitchell, with whom

J.A.’s sister previously had a relationship, was at J.A.’s house. Id. at 228.

Mitchell also testified that, “I never had sex with [J.A.], I put it in, ow, it’s

to[o] big. I’m tired of this sh-t.” Id. at 233.

      During cross-examination, Mitchell testified that he wanted to kill

himself because he was not permitted to see his son, not because of anything

drug related. Id. at 236. During this exchange, Mitchell had an outburst in

which he referred to the Assistant District Attorney inappropriately and he

apologized during re-direct. Id. at 235.

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       On December 7, 2021, Mark Mehalov, Esquire was appointed as

counsel.8 On January 24, 2022, Attorney Mehalov sought leave to withdraw

as counsel, which request the trial court granted the following day. However,

upon Mitchell’s pro se request for assistance of counsel, Attorney Mehalov was

reappointed on February 20, 2022 and then, on February 22, 2022, his status

was changed to standby counsel.

       Thereafter, Mitchell represented himself at a jury trial on March 16-17,

2022, with Attorney Mehalov acting as stand-by counsel. Mitchell was found

guilty of the above-mentioned offenses and on March 18, 2022, the trial court

sentenced him to an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’ incarceration.9

Mitchell, through Attorney Mehalov, filed a post-sentence motion on March 28,

2022, which was denied by operation of law on July 26, 2022.10, 11 However,

____________________________________________

8 Mitchell had also been represented by James Natale, Esquire, Benjamin
Franklin Goodwin, Esquire, and Amanda Como, Esquire, who had all previously
been granted leave to withdraw.

9 Mitchell received the statutory maximum sentences for his aggravated
assault, unlawful restraint, and indecent assault convictions. No further
penalty was imposed for the remaining convictions.

10  On May 5, 2022, Attorney Mehalov filed a motion to withdraw because
Mitchell advised that he wished to raise, in his post-sentence motion, a claim
of ineffective assistance of all counsel who represented him prior to proceeding
pro se at trial. Attorney Mehalov’s request was denied on May 10, 2022.

11 Upon the trial court’s failure to decide a post-sentence motion within 120
days, it is deemed denied by the operation of law.            See Pa.R.A.P.
720(B)(3)(a). When motion denied by operation of law, clerk of courts shall
enter order deeming motion denied and serve copies of order to parties). See
id. at 720(B)(3)(c).

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the clerk of courts failed to enter an order deeming the motion denied on that

date. On August 8, 2022, one-hundred and thirty-three days after Mitchell’s

motion was filed, the trial court entered an opinion and order denying

Mitchell’s post-sentence motion.           Accordingly, Mitchell’s appeal, filed on

September 2, 2022, was timely filed.12           The trial court and Mitchell have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Mitchell raises the following questions for our review:

       1. Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to
          prove forcible compulsion to sustain the [r]ape and [i]ndecent
          [a]ssault [c]onvictions[,] thus, warranting the entry of
          judgments of acquittal[.]

       2. Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to
          prove that [Mitchell] caused or attempted to cause bodily injury
          with a deadly weapon or otherwise caused or attempted to
          cause bodily injury to sustain [a]ggravated [a]ssault and
          [s]imple [a]ssault convictions[,] thus, warranting the entry of
          judgments of acquittal[.]

       3. Whether the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to
          prove that [Mitchell] restrained the victim unlawfully in
          circumstances exposing her to risk of serious bodily injury to
          sustain the [u]nlawful [r]estraint conviction[,] thus, warranting
          the entry of judgment[] of acquittal[.]

       4. Whether all verdicts at all counts were against the weight of
          the evidence[.]

____________________________________________

12 See Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(appeal not quashed as untimely where clerk of court failed to enter order
denying defendant’s post-sentence motion following motion’s denial by
operation of law and failed to notify defendant of the same). See Pa.R.A.P.
720(A)(2)(b) (notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days of order denying
motion by operation of law).

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       5. Whether [the trial] court abused its discretion in sentencing
          [Mitchell] to an aggregate minimum sentence of twenty [] to
          forty years[’ incarceration,] consisting of consecutive statutory
          maximum sentences at each count which discounts the
          possibility of rehabilitation, removes the defendant from
          society for the majority of the rest of his working and adult life
          based upon his age, and precludes the possibility that he will
          ever become a contributing member of society[.]

Appellant’s Brief, at 7-8 (reordered for ease of disposition).

       Mitchell’s first three claims challenge the sufficiency of evidence to

support his convictions.       This Court’s review of sufficiency claims is well-

settled:

       When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, [this
       Court] evaluates the record in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth as verdict winner, giving the prosecution the
       benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
       Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it
       establishes each material element beyond a reasonable doubt.
       However, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a
       mathematical certainty, and it may sustain its burden by means
       of wholly circumstantial evidence. In addition, the court may not
       substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder, and where the
       record contains support for the convictions, they may not be
       disturbed. Lastly, the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or
       none of the evidence presented.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(quotations and citations omitted).

       Mitchell contends that his convictions of rape by forcible compulsion and

indecent assault should be vacated because the evidence was insufficient to

establish forcible compulsion.13 Specifically, he claims that the relationship
____________________________________________

13 Mitchell incorrectly believes he was convicted under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
3126(a)(2), which includes an element of forcible compulsion. Rather he was
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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between him and J.A. was consensual and based upon a trade of sex for drugs.

See Appellant’s Brief, at 19.

       A person is guilty of rape when he engages in sexual intercourse with a

complainant by forcible compulsion. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1). In order

to prove forcible compulsion, the Commonwealth must establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant used either physical force, a threat of

physical force, or psychological coercion. See Commonwealth v. Eckrote,

12 A.3d 383, 388 (Pa. Super. 2010). The mere showing of a lack of consent

does not support a conviction for rape by forcible compulsion. Id.; see also

Commonwealth           v.   Rhodes,       510      A.2d   1217,   1226   (Pa.   1986)

(forcible compulsion includes “not only physical force or violence, but also

moral, psychological[,] or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage

in sexual intercourse against that person’s will”).

       A person is guilty of indecent assault if he has indecent contact with the

complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the

person, or intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with

seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the

person or the complainant and the person does so without the complainant’s

consent. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1).

____________________________________________

convicted of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3126(a)(1) (indecent assault “without the
complainant’s consent.”).

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      Regarding forcible compulsion, in Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510

A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986), our Supreme Court opined,

      a determination will be made in each case based upon the totality
      of the circumstances that have been presented to the fact finder.
      Significant factors weighed in that determination would include
      the respective ages of the victim and the accused, the respective
      mental and physical conditions of the victim and the accused, the
      atmosphere and physical setting in which the incident was alleged
      to have taken place, the extent to which the accused may have
      been in a position of authority, domination or custodial control
      over the victim, and whether the victim was under duress.

Id. at 1226.

      Instantly, the testimony established that Mitchell forced himself into

J.A.’s house, refused her requests that he leave, and ultimately, stayed for

several weeks. During the course of his stay, Mitchell threated to kill himself,

J.A., and J.A.’s dogs. Mitchell forced J.A. to do drugs and forced her to perform

oral sex until she choked and gagged.         On one specific occasion, Mitchell

choked J.A. until she was unconscious, and when she came to, Mitchell was

picking her up off the floor and taking her to the living room where he made

her perform oral sex.

      On another occasion, Mitchell believed that J.A. had stolen heroin from

him, so he made her remove her clothes, have intercourse with him, and then

he searched her anal cavity for hidden and/or “stolen” heroin. J.A. testified

she did not consent to removing her clothes and that she was not able to

escape. J.A. also testified that she complied with Mitchell’s requests because

Mitchell is larger than she is and had previously been physical towards her.

N.T. Jury Trial, 2/16/22, at 27; id. at 12 (J.A. testifying she weighed

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approximately 120-125 pounds at the time); id., 2/17/22, at 211 (Mitchell

testifying he weighed approximately 250 pounds at the time).

      In light of the foregoing, including testimony regarding the atmosphere

and physical setting of the rape and assaults, and J.A.’s knowledge of

Mitchell’s past physically aggressive outbursts, the evidence adduced at trial

was sufficient to support Mitchell’s convictions for rape by forcible compulsion

and indecent assault.

      Next, Mitchell asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

aggravated assault and simple assault convictions.          Specifically, Mitchell

argues that the investigating officer conceded that J.A. had no visible injuries

or bruising and that J.A.’s claim that Mitchell used or possessed a baseball bat

is uncorroborated. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19.

      A person is guilty of simple assault if he attempts by physical menace

to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. at

§ 2701(a)(3). A person is also guilty of simple assault if he attempts to cause

or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Id.

at § 2701(a)(1). A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he attempts to

cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a

deadly weapon. Id. at § 2702(a)(4).

      Instantly, J.A. testified that Mitchell swung a bat her. Prior to swinging

the bat at her face, J.A. testified that Mitchell listed the various crimes he had

committed and, ultimately, concluded that he would have to kill her. N.T. Jury

Trial, 3/16/22, 30-31. J.A. believes the small dresser is the only reason she

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is alive. Id. This evidence is sufficient to prove that Mitchell attempted, by

physical menace, to put J.A. in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3).

      Additionally, J.A. testified that Mitchell then swung the bat at her, but

missed her and, instead, hit a small dresser. N.T. Jury Trial, 3/16/22, at 31.

J.A. testified that Mitchell, was “amazed” that the bat hit the stand instead of

her face, stated, “my G-d bit-h, you are so lucky.”      Id.   This evidence is

sufficient to show Mitchell either intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause

injury to J.A. with a deadly weapon.     18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4); Id. at §

2701(a)(1).

      Mitchell next contends that evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for unlawful restraint, as J.A. was never restrained in her home.

Specifically, he points to the following facts:    J.A. took daily trips to the

methadone clinic on the FACT Bus, which is near the Pennsylvania State Police

barracks; and J.A. walked her dogs almost daily without Mitchell’s supervision

or control and having her dogs with her, which meant that she could report

Mitchell while knowing her dogs were safe.        See Appellant’s Brief, at 21.

Mitchell is entitled to no relief.

      A person is guilty of unlawful restraint if he knowingly restrains another

unlawfully in circumstances exposing him to risk of serious bodily injury. See

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a).

      Instantly, Mitchell’s physical threats and abuse prevented J.A. from

leaving her residence. J.A., after seeing Mitchell “smash” her dog’s paw with

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a bat, was concerned he would kill her and her dogs if the police showed up

at the door. N.T. Jury Trial, 3/16/22, at 28. Additionally, J.A. testified that

after Mitchell saw that her friend from the FACT Bus was concerned for her

safety, Mitchell prevented her from going to the shelter.      N.T. Jury Trial,

3/16/22, at 27. This evidence is sufficient to support Mitchell’s conviction for

unlawful restraint.

      Next, Mitchell claims that each of his convictions were against the weight

of the evidence. This Court reviews weight of the evidence claims for an abuse

of discretion:

      The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,]
      who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses. [This Court] cannot
      substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
      may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to
      the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where
      the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, [this Court’s]
      role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate
      review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its
      discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506-07 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, “[a] motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.”

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

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      Mitchell argues that the jury failed to consider that J.A. did not report

the alleged rapes and assaults to: the Pennsylvania State Police which she

passed daily on the way to her Suboxone clinic; the Magisterial District Judge’s

office, the volunteer fire department, or the EMS station, all located within

yards of her apartment, while she walked her dogs; the Women’s Shelter in

which she stayed on several occasions; or the State or local police, while

Mitchell was incarcerated for three days. See Appellant’s Brief, at 17. Mitchell

is afforded no relief.

      The trial court determined that Mitchell’s convictions did not shock its

conscience.    Specifically, the jury credited J.A.’s testimony that Mitchell

“repeatedly forced [her] to perform oral sex, [] hit her with a baseball bat on

her foot and side, and attempted to strike her on the head with the bat but

missed[, and concluded that there was a sound basis] for the [jury’s verdict

of] rape, indecent assault, and aggravated assault charges.”        Trial Court

Opinion, 10/24/22, at 8. Regarding Mitchell’s assault convictions, the court

determined the jury’s guilty verdicts were also sound where the fact-finder

“heard that at times the victim left the residence, and at times, [Mitchell]

refused to allow her to leave, physically assaulted her, [and] threatened her

and her dogs when she did leave for a short time.” Id. Finally, the trial court

determined that Mitchell’s unlawful restraint conviction did not shock its

conscience because the jury heard J.A.’s testimony regarding the reasons for

her actions (i.e., not contacting the police or leaving the house). Id.

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      The trial court’s determination is supported by the record. Throughout

the trial, J.A. consistently explained her reasons for failing to report Mitchell’s

abuse. J.A. testified she did not go to the state police because “[she] was not

letting [her] dogs get killed.”    N.T. Jury Trial, 3/16/22, at 55.      J.A. was

concerned that if police showed up at the door, Mitchell would kill her and her

dogs. Id. at 28. J.A. testified that Mitchell prevented her from going to the

shelter. Id. at 27. Further, J.A. testified that she complied with Mitchell’s

“ridiculous” requests because she was concerned for her life. Id. at 21, 45.

      Because the trial court’s determination is supported by the record, it did

not abuse its discretion in its determination that Mitchell’s convictions did not

shock its sense of justice. Hunzer, supra.

      Finally, Mitchell challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

from which there is no automatic right to appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-08 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, when an appellant

raises such a challenge, we must consider his brief on this issue as a petition

for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267

(Pa. Super. 1997). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of

sentencing issue,

      [this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
      whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there
      is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [see] 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
      9781(b).

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J-S17012-23

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

      Presently, Mitchell filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved his

claims in a post-sentence motion for reconsideration. Additionally, Mitchell’s

brief includes a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief, at

12. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Accordingly, we consider whether Mitchell has

raised a substantial question.

      A substantial question exists when “the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Austin, 66 A.3d 789, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013). Additionally, “we cannot look

beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule 2119(f)

statement    to   determine      whether   a   substantial   question   exists.”

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Instantly, Mitchell’s Rule 2119(f) statement outlines the requirements

an appellant must meet before a challenge to his judgment of sentence will

be heard and concludes, “[Mitchell] satisfies these requirements.” Appellant’s

Brief, at 12. In his statement of questions presented, Mitchell claims that the

consecutive sentence imposed, an aggregate term of 20 to 40 years’

incarceration, discounts his possibility of rehabilitation, removes him from

society for the majority of the remainder of his working life, and precludes the

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J-S17012-23

possibility that he will ever become a contributing member of society. See

Appellant’s Brief, at 7.

      “The imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences will

present a substantial question in only the most extreme circumstances, such

as where the aggregate sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of

the crimes and the length of imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell,

117 A.3d 73, 769 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “The key to resolving

the preliminary substantial question injury is whether the decision to sentence

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears on its face to

be,   an   excessive   level   in   light   of   the   criminal   conduct   at   issue.”

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 587 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Mitchell only argues that the consecutive nature of his sentence removes

him from society for the remainder of his working life. He fails to set forth the

reasons that his sentence is unduly harsh considering the nature of the crimes

and length of imprisonment, Caldwell, supra, or is excessive in light of the

criminal conduct at issue. Mastromarino, supra. As the trial court aptly

stated, “the mere fact that [Mitchell committed] multiple crimes [] does not

mean he is entitled to receive concurrent sentences.” Trial Court Opinion,

10/24/22, at 5; see also Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 808 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (defendant not entitled to “volume discount” for crimes by

having sentences run concurrently).

      Because Mitchell has failed to raise a substantial question, we may not

proceed to the merits of his discretionary aspect of sentencing claim.

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J-S17012-23

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

     King, J., Joins the Memorandum.

     Olson, J., Concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/11/2023

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