Court Opinion

ID: 9775153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:45:56.584274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:21.522382
License: Public Domain

OVERSTREET, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s discussion in disposing of appellant’s point of error number five regarding the “nexus” jury argument. The records clearly show that such jury argument was not a summation of the evidence, a reasonable deduction from the evidence, an answer to opposing counsel’s jury argument, nor a plea for law enforcement. The law as to mitigation and otherwise comes from the jury charge rather than from argument of counsel. Nevertheless, in light of Tex.R.App.Pro. 81(b)(2) I concur in overruling the point.
I also dissent to the discussion of points one through four involving not allowing the jury to be informed that if sentenced to life appellant was statutorily mandatorily required to serve 35 years in prison before becoming eligible for parole. Points one and two claim constitutional error in the trial court denying his requested punishment jury charge instruction informing the jury that pursuant to Article 42.18, § 8(b)(2), *650V.A.C.C.P., a prisoner serving a life sentence for capital murder is not parole eligible until the actual calendar time served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals 35 calendar years. Point three claims reversible error in precluding him from presenting testimony about that parole eligibility requirement. Point four likewise claims reversible error in denying him the right to question prospective jurors about their ability to consider the 35-year minimum calendar years he would have to serve on a life sentence before becoming parole eligible.
These complaints occurred at punishment, and thus had no effect upon guilt/innocence. I continue to voice my disagreement with the majority’s continued refusal to acknowledge the constitutional infirmities in depriving the jury of information relevant to the special issues as to the statutorily required mandatory serving of 35 calendar years before becoming eligible for parole on a life sentence for capital murder. For the reasons stated in my dissents in Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Cr.App.1996); Anderson v. State, 932 S.W.2d 502 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), and Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), I dissent to the majority’s treatment and discussion of points one through four.
Additionally, in this case, I point out that appellant elicited testimony from an expert witness about studies indicating that the defendant who serves 35 calendar years in the Texas Department of Corrections before becoming parole eligible is less violent than the inmate who is paroled sooner; i.e. “the probability of subsequent activity would be low.” He even opined that in a situation of 70 years before parole eligibility, there would be no probability because he suspected that the individual would be dead by then. The State then cross-examined this witness about several death row prisoners committing subsequent violent crimes, and two, including the infamous and notorious Kenneth McDuff, getting out on parole and committing murders. The State mentioned the 35-year period that defense counsel had talked about and asked the witness about the jury’s concerns being not about what’s going to happen 35 years from now but rather “what’s going to happen in the next day, the next week, the next month, the next year.” In light of that questioning mentioning situations of capital murder defendants, including Kenneth McDuff, being paroled and committing murders, it was even more critical that the jury be informed of the law, i.e. the Art. 42.18, § 8(b)(2), Y.A.C.C.P., provision requiring a prisoner serving a life sentence for capital murder to serve 35 calendar years, without consideration of good conduct time, before becoming eligible for parole. The vague references to 35 years in questioning the above-discussed witness were certainly not sufficient to inform the jury of the law. The law should be provided by the trial court in the jury charge, not by questioning the witnesses. See, Article 36.14, Y.A.C.C.P. — The trial court shall deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case [.]” (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, such error is subject to a harm analysis. See, Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 923 n. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Overstreet, J., dissenting). In light of the record as a whole, the error in precluding the jury from being informed about the parole ineligibility provision was no doubt harmless. Accordingly, I continue to dissent to the majority’s continued analysis of this issue and treatment of points one through four, but concur in the result.