Court Opinion

ID: 9553717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:49.397486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:07.251673
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDONOUGH,
concurring and dissenting:
I dissent to the remand to the District Court to determine the fair market value of the property at the time of the sheriffs sale, and the use of that value for the determination of a deficiency judgment. I concur with the balance of the majority opinion.
Section 71-1-222, MCA (1987), governs as to such proceedings in foreclosure suits. The section is as follows:
“(1) There is but one action for the recovery of debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate, which ac*270tion must be in accordance with the provisions of this part. In such action the court may, by its judgment, direct:
“(a) a sale of the encumbered property (or so much thereof as may be necessary);
“(b) the application of the proceeds of the sale; and “(c) the payment of the costs of the court, the expenses of the sale, and the amount due the plaintiff.
“(2) If it appears from the sheriff’s return that the proceeds are insufficient and a balance still remains due, judgment can then be docketed for such balance against the defendant or defendants personally liable for the debt, and it becomes a lien upon the real estate of such judgment debtor, as in other cases on which execution may be issued.
“(3) No person holding a conveyance from or under the mortgagor of the property mortgaged or having a lien thereon, which conveyance or lien does not appear of record in the proper office at the time of the commencement of the action, need be made a party to such action. The judgment therein rendered and the proceedings therein had are as conclusive against the party holding such unrecorded conveyance or lien as if he had been made a party to the action.”
It is noted in Subsection (1) that the court directs the sale of the encumbered property, applies the proceeds, and directs payment of the costs. This section does not prescribe the details of the sale itself, notice thereof, etc.; these details are to be set forth in the decree or judgment of foreclosure and are governed by rules of equity. Montana has no statutory requirement of an appraisement of the property to be sold, either before or after the sale.
However, in Subsection (2) of said section, it does provide for a deficiency judgment in specific terms. If the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt due, and a balance still remains, judgment can then be docketed for such balance against the defendants personally. The statute does not provide for the calculation of a deficiency judgment by applying a fair market value, as determined by the court, to the amount due. Rather, it directs that a deficiency judgment should be calculated by applying the proceeds of the sale to the amount due. This statute clearly sets forth how a deficiency is to be calculated. The statute prevails over any common law, see § 1-1-108, MCA, and § 1-2-103, MCA (1987).
Even if the statute did not cover the calculation of the deficiency, it would be inequitable to require such a determination on the state *271of this record. The defendants have never raised the issue in the lower court or in this Court, although they could have done so. They were represented by competent counsel at all stages of the suit, three of the defendants are attorneys at law, and all appear to be knowledgeable investors. If the defendants were dissatisfied with the proceeds of the sheriff’s sale they could have petitioned the District Court to set aside the sale on grounds of unfairness and inadequacy, and asked to have it appraised for guidance of the court in determining whether or not to set aside the sale and order a new sheriff’s sale. Other equitable options might have been available. The defendants chose not to avail themselves of any of these options. I would affirm in toto.
JUSTICE GULBRANDSON concurs in the foregoing dissent.