Court Opinion

ID: 9688451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:47:51.030265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:38.894444
License: Public Domain

Hughes, J.
{dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority that the testimony in this case is sufficient to establish negligence on the part of Englebert immediately preceding the accident.
The plaintiff’s testimony clearly discloses a high speed on his part and lack of control, as evidenced by the fact that his car came back off the shoulder, in spite of his intention to keep it on the shoulder, and crossed at least the north half of the highway.
The only testimony that would justify a conclusion that the Englebert car was on the left side of the road concerned the skid marks near the scene of the accident, which I do not deem to be conclusive. There was no means of establishing the point of impact. The fact that glass was on the plaintiff’s side of the road is not conclusive. There was also glass on the opposite side of the road.
Plaintiff’s testimony that the light of the Englebert car flashed in his face is not, in my opinion, sufficient to establish that Englebert was making a turn into his driveway. The point of impact was at least one hundred twenty-five feet southwest of the Englebert driveway, and to assume that he was turning there is pure speculation and does not overcome the presumption that Englebert was exercising due care in the operation of his automobile.
If Englebert were negligent in turning onto the plaintiff’s side of the road, then it is difficult to justify a twenty per cent finding of negligence on the part of the plaintiff who would *424then have been confronted with an emergency. I do not, however, base my dissent on this point, but purely on the ground that the finding that Englebert was on the wrong side of the road is speculative.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Broadfoot and Mr. Justice Gehl concur in this dissent.