Court Opinion

ID: 9553703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:35.357095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:06.397966
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the remand of this case to the Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar to promulgate findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, I do not agree that these findings of fact and conclusions of law are constitutionally mandated, as the majority opinion seems to state. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963), does not hold that findings of fact and conclusions of law are constitutionally mandated. Our own case of Cooper v. Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), held that where the board of county commissioners failed to provide notice of its second meeting regarding appellant’s application, and where no transcribable verbatim record of the proceed*794ings was kept, and where the board failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions upon which its decision was based, procedural due process was denied. However, that does not establish that the mere failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law alone would have been a constitutional due process violation. In the later case of Bowler v. Board of Trustees, 101 Idaho 537, 617 P.2d 841 (1980), a case relied on in the majority opinion, this Court said, “[D]ue process does not require a statement of reasons for every decision affecting a liberty or property interest.” 101 Idaho at 543, 617 P.2d at 847. Numerous examples exist in the judicial process in which decisions are made without the benefit of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and no violation of constitutional procedural due process results. This Court held in State v. Osburn, 104 Idaho 809, 663 P.2d 1111 (1983), that findings and reasons for the imposition of a particular sentence, although helpful, are not “mandatory.” In the area of awarding attorney fees, our own rules require written findings for an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2), but not when attorney fees are awarded pursuant to any other section of the Idaho Code. Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho 1, 4, 713 P.2d 437, 440 (Ct.App.1986) (“[Fjindings are required under Rule 54(e)(2) only when a court awards attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.”). Finally, juries decide cases involving some of the most critical decisions made in the entire judicial system, but they are not constitutionally required to make findings of fact.
The Board of Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar, when it processes and rules upon petitions for admission to take the bar examination, operates under rules promulgated and proposed by it which, when approved by this Court, are the standards by which applicants for admission to the bar of this Court are evaluated. If applicants meet the standards set out in the rules, they are admitted to practice law by order of this Court. The standard of review by this Court is whether or not the commission’s action is arbitrary and capricious.3 Bar Commission Rule 213(a). While the Bar Commission Rules do not expressly require the commission to make findings of fact in ruling upon a petition for permission to take the bar examination, the absence of such findings makes it difficult to make an arbitrary and capricious analysis. If the standard was merely whether there was substantial evidence to support the Bar Commission’s decision, as is the case in a review of a jury’s verdict, I would vote to affirm this case. There is substantial evidence to support the Bar Commission’s conclusion in this case. However, where the standard of review is arbitrary and capricious, a statement of reasons is necessary in order for this Court to properly carry out its appellate review.
Accordingly, I believe that under our ultimate supervisory authority for the admission to practice before the bar of this Court, it is appropriate for the Court to require findings of fact in order that we may better perform the evaluation of the Bar Commission’s actions required by Rule 213(a). Accordingly, I concur in the remand of this matter to the Bar Commission to set out the reasons for its decision.

. Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), defines arbitrary and capricious as the ”[c]haracterization of a decision or action taken by an administrative agency or inferior court meaning willful and unreasonable action without consideration or in disregard of facts or without determining principle.”