Court Opinion

ID: 9885037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:28:07.943775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.424690
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge
(concurring specially).
I concur in the decision and analysis stated in the majority opinion. However, the law we apply begs further comment.
The practice here demonstrates circumvention of statutory privilege laws. How does one convert privileged statements to trial court testimony? As was demonstrated here, a second statement is taken, a step facilitated by suggesting to the patient that he has no privilege, either as to his prior statement or the requested second statement. Thus, that which is acquired in confidence is reacquired for public prosecution purposes.
This sabotage of statutory privilege is not my primary concern. It is an issue the legislature will have to consider and resolve. Of much greater concern is the constitutional implications when evidence is gathered by medical personnel.
*342The unscrutinized acquisition of a confession by medical personnel is another in an enlarging line of cases where statements are taken in a coercive environment, not in police custody, but where the statements are not deemed to be compelled under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, § 7, of the Minnesota Constitution. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn., 1986). The defendant here was not advised of his right to remain silent. In fact, he was given assurances suggesting he had no such right — that his prior remarks could be used against him and that his further remarks would also be reported. I view these circumstances to be like those in Murphy, involving required disclosures to a probation officer. Both cases involve a planned acquisition of admissions previously made in a confidential setting. In my opinion, the medical setting poses a danger of coercion at least as great as that presented by an interview with a probation officer.
Justice Wahl of the Minnesota Supreme Court has detailed the history of decisions under the Minnesota Constitution that put upon the prosecution a burden to show a confession is not the fruit of coercion, to show that the confessor has knowingly and voluntarily chosen to speak. Id. at 773 (Wahl, J., dissenting). Prevailing law, however, stated by the majority in Murphy, corresponds with the view of the United States Supreme Court in Minnesota v. Murphy; so long as police custody is not involved, coercion will normally be recognized only when the right of silence is asserted and overcome.
The majority relies on the absence of settled law on the defendant’s constitutional arguments. Indeed, the law on the issue is presently settled against the defendant’s point of view. I concur in the application of existing law, but question whether it takes from individuals their constitutional freedom from compelled statements.