Court Opinion

ID: 9836771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:00.853126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:20.519513
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result as to Issue I and concurring as to Issue II):
I disagree that admission of the polygraph evidence to support the background cheek of an informant was error. The majority seeks to avoid admission of the “P” word where a party opponent aims in bad faith to draw an inference that can be shown to be untrue based on evidence that a polygraph was administered. Certainly the opponent is allowed to rebut the improper inferences.
The defense theory of the case was to attack the investigation conducted by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), specifically the reliability of the informant. Of the three controlled buys of drugs from appellant, only the last buy was recorded because the informant was wired. On cross-examination and in response to a question by defense counsel, the informant testified that he was given a polygraph before becoming an informant, as part of his background check. There was no objection or motion to strike. Trial defense counsel also called Mr. Stephen Saunders, as the defense expert, to show that the OSI conducted an inadequate background investigation. During the cross-examination of Mr. Saunders, trial counsel elicited the fact that the informant was given a polygraph as part of his background check. Special Agent Dana P. Otis was called to talk about the methods employed to establish credibility of informants before they are used by the OSI. Later, during defense counsel’s cross-examination, Agent Otis mentioned use of polygraphs to establish an informant’s credibility. Again, there was no objection or motion to strike.
By not objecting or moving to strike the initial answer by the informant, the defense opened the door for additional questions by trial counsel. “[W]e have consistently declined to support a rule which would permit the defense to induce the error and then take advantage of it on appeal.” United States v. Catt, 1 MJ 41, 47 (CMA 1975).
Professor Imwinkelried sets forth an example of opening
the door for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Suppose, for example, that on cross-examination of a police officer, the defense challenges the thoroughness of the investigation that led to the accused’s arrest. On redirect to meet that challenge, the prosecution may elicit the officer’s testimony that she saw no need for further investigation because she learned that the accused had failed two polygraph tests about the crime. The prosecution may do so even if polygraph evidence is ordinarily inadmissible in the jurisdiction.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Paul C. Giannelli, Francis A. Gilligan, & Frederic I. Lederer, Courtroom, Criminal Evidence § 304 at 80 (3d ed.1998)(footnotes omitted).
The defense could have used the discovery process to determine whether various investigative techniques were used, including polygraph examinations of the informants or victims. See United States v. Simmons, 38 MJ 376 (CMA 1993)(prosecution had a duty to disclose statements made during polygraph examination of victim). Instead, the defense chose to raise in bad faith an inference it knew to be untrue hiding behind what they hoped to be inadmissible evidence, e.g., a polygraph. See Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir.1999)(prosecution argued in bad faith knowing that exculpatory polygraph evidence was not admissible). We cannot sanction this conduct by permitting *418such inferences to go unrebutted just because polygraph evidence is at issue; to do so would provide a “safe harbor” for improper trial tactics.
Even if the door is not opened by the defense when the defense attacks the background check of an informant, the Government must be able to respond without one hand tied behind its back. It is a common investigative technique to employ polygraphs to ensure the reliability of informants before they are used. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). Without this evidence to rebut the inference of an inadequate background check, court members would be presented with an incomplete picture. See, e.g., Paxton, 199 F.3d at 1216-17.
Likewise in United States v. Baron, 94 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1047, 117 S.Ct. 624, 136 L.Ed.2d 546 (1996), the defendant opened the door on cross-examination to the inference that the defendant was not a typical drug courier. The court held that while profile evidence is normally inadmissible, the prosecution may use profile evidence on redirect examination to rebut this defense inference. Id. at 1321. Also, in Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 629 A.2d 1239 (1993), the court indicated that the judge has the discretion to permit inadmissible evidence to be admitted if prejudicial inadmissible evidence was admitted without timely objection or timely motion to strike. Maryland Rule 5-611(a) allows the judge to admit inadmissible evidence to “make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.”
This is not an instance where the prosecution is seeking to introduce a polygraph of a party-opponent related to the charges in the case. Rather, the purpose of the polygraph is solely to determine whether investigators performed an adequate background investigation on an informant before the informant was involved in the case. The federal courts have held that while polygraphs are not admissible except in limited circumstances, a polygraph examination may be used to establish the reliability of the informant. Cf. United States v. Light, 48 MJ 187 (1998). Likewise, where a confession is obtained from a suspect as a result of a polygraph examination, we would not exclude the evidence that the polygraph partially induced the confession. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1244 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954, 100 S.Ct. 2923, 64 L.Ed.2d 812 (1980). The majority would apparently allow the defense a safe harbor anytime the “P” word is used.
As to Issue II this Court has dealt with this issue on a case-by-case basis. Now, however, this opinion, as well as United States v. Rosendahl, 53 MJ 344 (2000), and United States v. Rock, 52 MJ 154 (1999), provide additional guidance and hopefully some uniformity and certainty.
This Court' has been diligent in ensuring that servicemembers are provided credit for pretrial confinement,1 restriction tantamount to confinement,2 Article 13 violations, and prior non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, 10 USC § 815.3
Credit may also be given for failure to provide: counsel, RCM 305(f); a review by the commander, RCM 305(h); a 48-hour review, or a 7-day review, RCM 305(i); and a review by the military judge, RCM 305(j). But we should encourage defense counsel to seek credit in the first instance at the court-martial. If I were advising defense counsel today, I would recommend that they not raise the issue at trial where the Government would have a chance to present a case but rather raise the issue on appeal on the basis of affidavits after memories have grown stale, individuals have moved, and the Government has greater difficulty rebutting the allegations. See United States v. Branch, No. 9801790 (Army Ct.Crim.App., March 7, 2000), pet pending, No. 00-0381 (2000)(peti-tion to obtain additional credit for an alleged violation of Article 13 — issue not raised at court-martial or before Court of Criminal Appeals).
*419The accused serves as the gatekeeper in deciding who should apply the credit. Where the allegations of the onerous conditions are presented to the sentencing authority prior to sentencing, including Article 13 violations and prior non-judicial punishment, those factors will be taken into consideration when the sentence is adjudged and are not required to be applied against the approved sentence. The convening authority has the option to grant clemency or otherwise reduce the sentence for any or no reason.
As this Court stated in United States v. Rock, supra, whenever there is a trial by judge alone, the judge can announce on the record that the credit was given for any of the areas mentioned above.
Thus, credit against confinement awarded by a military judge always applies against the sentence adjudged — unless the pretrial agreement itself dictates otherwise.
52 MJ at 156-57 (emphasis in original).
The judge in Rock refused to treat various restrictions on pretrial liberties as restriction tantamount to confinement or a violation of Article 13. However, the judge found that not allowing an infantryman to train in his military specialty and to perform normal basic details was a violation of Article 13 and awarded 1.5 days credit per day of punishment. The only issue in Rock was whether the credit should be applied against the adjudged or approved sentence. After listing the various credits mentioned earlier, including United States v. Allen, 17 MJ 126 (CMA 1984); United States v. Pierce, 27 MJ 367 (CMA 1989); United States v. Suzuki, 14 MJ 491 (CMA 1983); and RCM 305(k), the Rock Court stated:
Where there is no pretrial agreement ... the credit can only be applied against the adjudged sentence; ... The adjudged sentence becomes a maximum punishment____ Here, of course, the military judge did just that.
52 MJ at 157.
Where the adjudged sentence is less than the maximum provided in the agreement, the adjudged sentence establishes the maximum confinement.
Where portions of that confinement have already been served, actually or constructively, the credit applies against the agreement; otherwise the accused’s sentence will exceed the maximum lawful limit.
This Court said that the “time credited by the military judge, however, did not involve confinement, nor was it tantamount to confinement.” Thus, no action was required by the convening authority in approving the sentence. “Servicemembers are not entitled to sentence credit against confinement for any and all time during the pendency of court-martial charges, even if restraints on liberty which are not tantamount to confinement are imposed.” 52 MJ at 157.
However, in any trial by members, the accused is the gatekeeper as to Article 13 violations, prior non-judicial punishment, and restrictions on liberty that have not been determined tantamount to confinement. This may be part of the extenuation and mitigation presented to the members. In any event, the members may be instructed based on a request of a party that the accused will get credit for pretrial confinement of day-for-day for a certain period of time. This allows the members to decide what the sentence might be in any particular case. Where the instruction is given in a trial before members, the day-for-day credit for pretrial confinement and restriction tantamount to confinement will not be applied to the approved sentence where the accused as a gatekeeper decides to present the information as to Article 13 violations, unduly rigorous circumstances, or prior non-judicial pun-' ishment to the members.
For this reason I concur in the result as to Issue I and concur as to Issue II.

. United. States v. Allen, 17 MJ 126 (CMA 1984).

. United States v. Mason, 19 MJ 274 (CMA 1985).

. United States v. Gammons, 51 MJ 169 (1999).