Court Opinion

ID: 9893492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 14:07:31.462117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:17.016533
License: Public Domain

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22-P-551                                           Appeals Court

              COMMONWEALTH   vs.   WADE C. DEROSIER.

                          No. 22-P-551.

        Middlesex.     April 6, 2023. - October 27, 2023.

            Present:   Rubin, Shin, & Englander, JJ.1

Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Alcoholic
     Liquors, Motor vehicle. Evidence, Breathalyzer test,
     Videotape. Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury.

     Complaint received and sworn to in the Lowell Division of
the District Court Department on July 16, 2019.

    The case was tried before Stacey J. Fortes-White, J.

     Andrew Courossi for the defendant.
     Chia Chi Lee, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    1  This case was originally heard by a panel comprised of
Justices Rubin, Englander, and Brennan. After Justice Brennan
recused himself, the case was submitted on the record and briefs
to Justice Shin, who took part in the decision in accordance
with Mass. R. A. P. 24 (a) & (b), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654
(2009).
                                                                       2

     ENGLANDER, J.    A District Court jury found the defendant

guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

intoxicating liquor (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).2    On

appeal, the defendant claims the trial judge erred (1) by

admitting the video recording of his booking process (booking

video), in which a breathalyzer machine was visible in the

booking room, and (2) by giving an instruction regarding the

lack of breathalyzer evidence, in response to a question from

the jury.    We affirm.

     Background.   We summarize the facts as the jury could have

found them, reserving certain details for later discussion.       At

approximately 3:15 A.M. on July 14, 2019, State police troopers3

stopped the defendant's car for crossing over marked lanes while

driving on Route 495 in Lowell.    When informed of the reason for

the stop, the defendant stated that he was tired, but also

acknowledged having consumed three beers about three hours

earlier.    The troopers noticed that the defendant had bloodshot

and glassy eyes, slightly slurred speech, and a strong odor of

alcohol.

     2 The trial judge also found the defendant responsible for a
civil marked lanes violation, G. L. c. 89, § 4A.

     3 Trooper Matthew Devito, in his first year with the State
police, was accompanied by Trooper David Dumont, a seven-year
State police veteran, who acted as a "trooper coach" for this
arrest.
                                                                      3

    The troopers asked the defendant to exit the vehicle to

perform three field sobriety tests.     When the defendant stepped

out of the car, he was "a little unsteady on his feet."      Before

the tests, the defendant stated that he was able to recite the

English alphabet and had "some college" education.     He also

told the troopers that he had a knee injury, and they noticed

that the defendant had a brace on his right knee.      The

defendant failed the nine-step walk and turn test because he

did not take the steps heel to toe on all eighteen steps and

made an improper pivot.      The defendant's performance on the

one-leg stand test, which required him to raise one of his feet

six inches off the ground for thirty seconds, was described by

one trooper as "excellent."     The defendant failed the final

test, reciting the alphabet from letters B to Y, by "[skipping]

over multiple letters" and having to restart several times.

Both troopers concluded that the defendant was "drunk."      The

defendant was arrested and transported to the State police

barracks in Andover, where his booking was recorded by a video

camera.

    The defendant did not testify or offer any evidence. His

theory of defense, presented through cross-examination and

closing argument, was that he was tired as opposed to

intoxicated, and that the Commonwealth did not prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt.
                                                                    4

     Prior to trial, the defendant moved, in limine, to exclude

the booking video because the breathalyzer machine was visible

in the booking room.   He argued that admission of the booking

video would be unduly prejudicial because jurors might see the

machine and consequently assume that he refused the test.4    The

Commonwealth countered that the booking video was important

evidence of "the defendant's condition after arrest and you also

see him moving his injured knee and him walking, so it shows his

injured knee would not have affected his ability to perform

[field sobriety tests]."   The booking video could not be

redacted so that the breathalyzer machine was not visible;

notably, there were other machines visible on the booking desk

and in the room.   The judge watched the booking video and

concluded that "there is probative value to the video because

. . . the jury will be able to see [the defendant] stretching

his leg."   She determined that there was no "prejudice to the

defendant" and noted that, if anything, the booking video was

"more helpful to the defense" based on the defendant's

appearance and demeanor in the booking video.   The judge

     4 The defendant apparently took a breath test (defense
counsel so stated); however, the Commonwealth did not seek to
offer the result. According to the prosecutor, "the machine was
only certified two weeks after the [defendant's arrest], so the
certification was out of date."
                                                                   5

admitted the booking video into evidence over the defendant's

objection.

     During deliberations, the jury asked four questions,

including "[w]as the standard breathalyzer test offered or

refused?   The test equipment was visible in the booking room."5

After consulting with defense counsel and the Commonwealth, the

judge indicated that she intended to respond by reminding the

jury to decide the facts solely based on the evidence at trial,6

and asked defense counsel if he wanted an instruction pursuant

to Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 198-199 (2001)

(Downs instruction) on the absence of breathalyzer evidence.

Although defense counsel acknowledged that "the Downs

instruction is a normal course the way that the type of

instruction that would be given," he instead requested a "unique

instruction" that the "Commonwealth [was] not using

     5 The other three questions the jury asked, as read by the
judge, were:
     1. "[T]he state trooper indicated the defendant had three
drinks. . . . The defense attorney said, suggested, the
defendant had three beers. What was it?"
     2. "Were any containers of alcoholic beverages found in the
vehicle?"
     3. "Given his knee injury, was he on medication?"

     6 The judge told the jury to imagine all the trial evidence
in a box, that their verdict must be based on what was inside
the box, and that they must avoid speculation, conjecture, or
guesswork.
                                                                     6

[b]reathalyzer tests at all during that period of time."7    The

trial judge responded, "I don't think it's fair to say they

weren't using it at that -- I don't know that that's the case."

The judge indicated that the Downs instruction was "the

appropriate instruction to give, and it's what we typically

give.    If you're objecting to me giving that instruction and you

want to craft something else for me to give then -- I'm happy to

consider it."   The defendant did not suggest a different

instruction nor object to the Downs instruction at that time.

The judge delivered the Downs instruction as follows:

     "There is no evidence with regard to the [b]reathalyzer.
     You are not to mention it or consider in any way
     whatsoever, either for or against either side. There is no
     evidence of [b]reathalyzer. Do not consider it in any way.
     Do not mention it, and put it completely out of your mind."

After the jury were sent out to resume deliberations, the judge

asked defense counsel whether he was satisfied with the

instruction.    Defense counsel replied, "I'm not inclined to say

that I'm satisfied with that one, but I would just ask you to

note my concerns and I guess my objection for the record."

     Discussion.   1.   Admission of the booking video.   We first

address the defendant's contention that admission of the booking

     7 The period of presumptive exclusion of Draeger Alcotest
9510 breathalyzer results in OUI prosecutions ended April 18,
2019 – three months before the defendant's arrest. See
Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 738, 748 (2023). See
generally Commonwealth vs. Ananias, Mass. Dist. Ct., No. 142284
(Lowell Div. Jan. 9, 2019).
                                                                     7

video was prejudicial error.   "Because the defendant objected to

the evidentiary ruling below, we review the ruling for 'an abuse

of discretion, which requires a demonstration that the judge

made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant

to the decision such that the decision falls outside the range

of reasonable alternatives'" (quotation omitted).     Commonwealth

v. Babcock, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 527, 528 (2021), quoting

Commonwealth v. Driscoll, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 476 (2017).      We

discern no such error.

    Evidence is relevant and admissible when it has some

tendency to "make a consequential fact more or less probable

than it would be without that evidence."   Commonwealth v. Moore,

480 Mass. 799, 808 (2018)., In a typical OUI case, a defendant's

"driving performance, appearance, demeanor, execution of field

sobriety tests, and conduct at booking" are relevant "proof of

impaired operation." Commonwealth v. Hourican, 85 Mass. App. Ct.

408, 417 (2014).   A trial judge may exercise her discretion and

exclude relevant evidence where its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 (2014).    However,

"[b]y design, all evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is

only unfair prejudice which must be avoided."   Commonwealth v.

Kindell, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 188 (2013), quoting United

States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989).
                                                                    8

"Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it has 'an undue

tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,

though not necessarily, an emotional one'" (citations omitted).

Id., quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980).

    Here, the booking video was relevant to support (or to

refute) the Commonwealth's contention that the defendant's

inability to satisfactorily complete the walk and turn test

stemmed from his intoxication rather than his knee injury.     To

the extent the judge anticipated this would be a contested issue

at trial, her instincts were borne out by defense counsel's

cross-examination of Trooper Devito, in which he asked whether

"[the defendant] was having difficulty doing the pivot turn

because of his knee brace."   Here the booking video evidence of

the defendant from shortly after the roadside tests were

administered was highly relevant evidence of the defendant's

ability to walk and of any limitations due to injury.

    Furthermore, we agree with the trial judge's assessment

that the probative value of the booking video was not

substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice.

Having reviewed the booking video, we note that there is nothing

to indicate that one of the machines on the booking desk was a

breathalyzer (it looks like a copier or fax machine).   Although

"there is widespread public information and common knowledge

about breathalyzer testing," Commonwealth v. Cueva, 94 Mass.
                                                                    9

App. Ct. 780, 785 (2019), quoting Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. at

199, the judge's implicit reasoning that the jury would not

recognize the breathalyzer machine was not a "clear error of

judgment."   L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27

(2014), quoting Picciotto v. Continental Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9,

15 (1st Cir. 2008).   The fact that the jury did recognize the

breathalyzer machine in the booking video does not retroactively

render the trial judge's decision to admit the video an abuse of

discretion, especially when admission of the evidence was

combined with limiting instructions, discussed infra.     See

Commonwealth v. Peno, 485 Mass. 378, 395-396 (2020).    The judge

did not abuse her discretion by admitting the booking video into

evidence.    See Commonwealth v. Fan, 490 Mass. 433, 443 (2019),

quoting Commonwealth v. Sicari, 434 Mass. 732, 752 (2001), cert.

denied, 534 U.S. 1142 (2002) ("In weighing the probative value

of evidence against any prejudicial effect it might have on a

jury, we afford trial judges great latitude and discretion").

    2.   Supplemental jury instruction regarding breathalyzer.

The defendant also argues that it was prejudicial error for the

judge to give the Downs instruction over his objection.      In

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 149-150 (2017), the

Supreme Judicial Court held, as an exercise of its

superintendence power, that "the better practice is for a judge

to refrain from giving a Downs-type instruction absent a request
                                                                   10

by the defendant or some rare set of facts that specifically

directs the jury's attention to the absence of alcohol-test

evidence" (emphasis added).   The Wolfe court's concern was that

giving the Downs instruction could implicate the defendant's

protection against self-incrimination under art. 12 of the

Massachusetts Declaration of Rights by drawing the jury's

attention to the lack of alcohol-test evidence, and thereby

suggesting that the defendant may have refused a test or feared

an unfavorable result.   Id. at 145-146; Commonwealth v. Moreno,

102 Mass. App. Ct. 321, 327 (2023).   See also Opinion of the

Justices, 412 Mass. 1201, 1209, 1211 (1992) (refusal evidence

may be used to show defendant feared failing alcohol test and

thus held to violate privilege against self-incrimination under

art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights).

    The direction of the Wolfe court was not absolute, however.

It came with a caveat, and we can conceive of few circumstances

that fall more squarely in the category of a "rare set of facts

that specifically directs the jury's attention to the absence of

alcohol-test evidence," Wolfe, 478 Mass. at 150, than where the

jurors have noted the presence of a breathalyzer machine in a

video exhibit, and asked a specific question about whether "the

standard breathalyzer test" was "offered or refused."   In

unusual circumstances such as these, Wolfe left the question of
                                                                  11

the proper instruction to the judge's discretion.8   The judge

thus was not required by Wolfe to ignore the reality that here

the breathalyzer issue was squarely in the minds of the jury,

and that inasmuch as the booking video would necessarily remain

with the jurors in the deliberation room, the breathalyzer

question was not likely to leave their focus absent specific

instruction.   The judge's determination that a Downs-type

instruction was necessary in these circumstances was logical and

sensible.

     The defendant points to a footnote in Wolfe commenting

that, in response to a jury question about the absence of

alcohol test evidence, "it is the better practice to simply

reiterate the general instruction not to speculate about matters

not in evidence and, to the extent possible, refrain from

reinforcing the jury's focus on items not in evidence by

mentioning the lack of alcohol-test evidence."   Id. at 150 n.13.

The question from the jury in this case, however, was not just a

general question about the lack of alcohol test evidence, but a

specific question arising out of video evidence, which the jury

     8 At several points, the dissent overstates the holding of
Wolfe, contending that a trial judge cannot give the Downs
instruction unless defense counsel agrees. See, e.g., dissent
at 1 ("giving the Downs instruction . . . in the absence of a
request from the defendant is reversible error"). The dissent's
contention is manifestly at odds with the Wolfe court's carve-
out for a "rare set of facts" -- facts which are present here.
                                                                   12

saw and processed, that there was a breathalyzer machine in the

room with the defendant.   Moreover, as we recognized in Moreno,

"although the court in Wolfe stated that it is the better

practice to respond to a jury question with a general

instruction only, the court did not state that it is error to

deliver the Downs instruction as well."   Moreno, 102 Mass. App.

Ct. at 328.9

     Under the circumstances, the judge did not commit error by

exercising her discretion to forcefully respond to the jury's

question with instructions that included the more specific Downs

admonition "not to mention [the breathalyzer] or consider it in

any way whatsoever, either for or against either side.   There is

no evidence of a [b]reathalyzer.   Do not consider it in any way.

Do not mention it, and put it completely out of your mind."

     9 We note that contrary to the defendant's (and the
dissent's) assertions, it does not appear that the defendant
properly objected to the Downs instruction. As described above,
when the judge proposed the Downs instruction, defense counsel
asked for his own "unique" instruction instead. The judge
declined to give the defendant's proposed instruction (because
she was not satisfied that it was accurate), and then again
proposed Downs, stating "[i]f you're objecting to me giving that
instruction and you want to craft something else for me to give
the[m] -- I'm happy to consider it." The defendant did not then
object, and only asked that his objection be "note[d]" after the
Downs instruction had been given and the jury had returned to
deliberations. In Wolfe, the court held that the error was in
giving the Downs instruction, as part of the original charge,
over the defendant's objection. See Wolfe, 478 Mass. at 150.
The record here is quite different, and for this reason as well
we do not believe that it was error under Wolfe to give the
instruction.
                     13

Judgment affirmed.
    RUBIN, J., dissenting.      Although the court majority does

not say so explicitly, giving the Downs instruction, see

Commonwealth v. Downs, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 195, 198 (2001), in the

absence of a request from the defendant is reversible error

unless the Commonwealth can demonstrate no prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 478 Mass. 142, 146 (2017) (because a

Downs instruction may "unnecessarily introduce[] the specter of

refusal evidence into the jury room and . . . [may] cause the

jury specifically to focus on the absence of breathalyzer

evidence," giving that instruction "over the defendant's

objection . . . was error.").    "Animating the court's concern

[in Wolfe] was that the Downs instruction could implicate the

defendant's protection against self-incrimination under art. 12

of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because it draws the

jury's attention to the lack of alcohol-test evidence,

suggesting that the defendant may have refused a test or feared

an unfavorable result." Commonwealth v. Moreno, 102 Mass. App.

Ct. 321, 327 (2023).   This wasn't simply a matter of saying what

"the better practice" is.    The Supreme Judicial Court in Wolfe,

announcing a prospective rule, decided that, utilizing its

supervisory power, it would codify the "better practice" into

law, making it mandatory.    Wolfe, 478 Mass. at 149.

    Thus, in spelling out what is required, it said that "as an

exercise of our superintendence power, we conclude that, as a
                                                                      2

matter of procedure, the better practice is for a judge to

refrain from giving a Downs-type instruction absent a request by

the defendant or some rare set of facts that specifically

directs the jury's attention to the absence of alcohol-test

evidence."    Id. at 149-50.   In the footnote at the end of that

sentence, the court continued, "Further, when a jury ask a

question about the absence of alcohol-test evidence, as occurred

in the defendant's first trial, we think it is the better

practice to simply reiterate the general instruction not to

speculate about matters not in evidence and, to the extent

possible, refrain from reinforcing the jury's focus on items not

in evidence by mentioning the lack of alcohol-test evidence."

Id. at 150.    The reason defense counsel is permitted to make the

decision in each case is because, with the myriad possible facts

and circumstances involved in any trial, it is "difficult to

assess whether a Downs-type instruction 'is beneficial to a

particular defendant . . . .'"    Id. at 148.   The court concluded

that, despite the apparent point of its language, the Downs

instruction may "have the opposite of the intended effect, that

is, it will cause the jury specifically to focus on the absence

of breathalyzer evidence."     Id. at 146.   The court concluded,

given the double-edged nature of the instruction, that rather

than articulating a blanket prohibition, the "safer approach is
                                                                      3

to leave such an instruction to the defendant's choice."      Id. at

148.

       In this case, the judge improperly gave the Downs

instruction over the defendant's objection:    The jury,

recognizing the breathalyzer machine in the booking video –- and

I agree with the court majority's conclusion that there was no

error in the judge's ex ante decision to allow that video to be

shown –- asked "Was the standard [b]reathalyzer test offered or

refused?    The test equipment was visible in the booking room."

       In fact, if the representations of counsel at trial were

correct, the test was either offered and taken by the defendant

or never offered to him.    He did NOT refuse the test.    We don't

know the results, we couldn't in any event know whether they

were accurate, and they were not submitted to the jury.     This is

because, according to the prosecutor, the machine had not been

calibrated.1   The lack of calibration led the District Attorney

       The court majority may be read to suggest this has
       1

something to do with the grave problems with the Draeger
Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer device, see ante at         n.7, but
there is nothing in the record indicating that the Alcotest 9510
was the issue in this case. For some period of time, the
District Attorneys were not utilizing the results of tests
conducted with the Alcotest 9510 due to failures with respect to
the procedures for calibrating and certifying the machines, as
well as "egregious government conduct" by the State police
office of alcohol testing (OAT) in covering up hundreds of
failed calibration tests with respect to this machine. See
generally Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730, 748 (2023).
The court majority says that "[t]he period of presumptive
exclusion of Draeger Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer results in OUI
                                                                    4

properly to conclude the reliability of the breathalyzer test

results could not be known and thus they could not be introduced

in court.

    When the judge received the jury's question, she asked

defense counsel if he wanted the Downs instruction.   Although no

one mentioned or appeared aware of Wolfe, defense counsel said

he did not, and specified that "I'm concerned about the negative

inference that [the Downs instruction] would provide, that they

would infer that he refused it."   Counsel instead proposed an

alternative instruction, one that had, he said, been given in

another case in which the jury asked a similar question, that

"that [the] Commonwealth [was] not using [b]reathalyzer tests at

all during that period of time."   Again he stated, "I would

request that that instruction be given, given the circumstances

and the fact that they saw [the] machine because of the

inference that might be drawn even after your instruction that

he refused to test."   The proposed instruction would have

prosecutions ended April 18, 2019 –- three months before the
defendant's arrest," ante n.7, but that is only half true. This
refers only to the court order creating that presumption, and
the Superior Court lifted that presumption after the arrest in
this case, retroactively to April 18, 2019, see Hallinan, supra
at 743; there is nothing in the record about how the District
Attorney's Office for Middlesex County handled Alcotest 9510
test results, nor when it concluded that test results from the
Alcotest 9510 could be known to be reliable, and thus concluded
they could be introduced in court. In any event, none of this
has anything to do with when the particular device used in this
case was actually calibrated.
                                                                     5

informed the jury that the Commonwealth was not using

breathalyzer tests, at least from this machine, at the time the

defendant was arrested, and would have obviated any speculation

about whether he had refused a test.   The judge, however,

rejected the instruction, and overruled the objection, saying,

"I think [the Downs instruction is] the appropriate instruction

to give, and it's what we typically give."

     It was error for the judge to give the jury the Downs

instruction over the objection of the defendant.   See Wolfe, 478

Mass. at 150 ("In this case, the instruction regarding alcohol-

test evidence was given over the defendant's objection.      Based

on our analysis today, this was error.").2   Prejudice was shown

with about as much strength as it ever could be.   In assessing

prejudice, "we inquire[] whether there is a reasonable

     2 The Commonwealth states that "the defendant preserved the
issue." The court majority's sua sponte suggestion he did not
is incorrect. When the judge proposed the Downs instruction,
defense counsel said, "I'm concerned about the negative
inference that that would provide, that they would infer that he
refused it," which was an objection to the instruction. Defense
counsel proposed an instruction, and the judge rejected it,
saying "I think [the Downs instruction is] the appropriate
instruction to give. . . .[i]f you're objecting to me giving
that instruction and you want to craft something else for me to
give then -- I'm happy to consider it."
     The judge's subsequent statement that she would consider
some other instruction if proffered by the defendant cannot undo
the defendant's previous objection which was overruled; a judge
cannot condition the right to make an objection on counsel
providing a different instruction; nor can a judge give an
erroneous instruction because the objecting defendant has not
given the judge an alternative to which the judge agrees.
                                                                    6

possibility that the error might have contributed to the jury's

verdict" (citation omitted).   Id.   Here, the jury itself noted

the breathalyzer machine it saw and asked if the defendant had

refused to take a breathalyzer test.   Given that defense

counsel, given authority over the question by Wolfe, determined

(and explicitly stated) that there was a risk the jurors would

infer that the defendant refused the test if the Downs

instruction were given," as in Wolfe, "we cannot fairly say that

'the jury would have inevitably reached the same result if the

judge had omitted the challenged instruction.'"    Wolfe, 478

Mass. at 151, quoting Commonwealth v. Buiel, 391 Mass. 744, 747

(1984).

     The court majority seeks to shoehorn this case into the

language of the Wolfe opinion that the Downs instruction might

properly be given if there is "some rare set of facts that

specifically directs the jury's attention to the absence of

alcohol-test evidence."   Wolfe, 478 Mass. at 150.3   This is not

that rare case.   To begin with, the Wolfe opinion clearly did

not intend the "rare set of facts" exception to apply to a

question by the jury about whether there was an offer of, or a

     3 Given my lengthy discussion of this language here, I am
baffled by the majority's suggestions that I "overstate[] the
holding of Wolfe" by ignoring that language. See ante
at         n. 8. As the reader can see, I don't ignore it, I
explain why it is inapplicable here, something to which the
majority proffers no reply.
                                                                      7

refusal to take, a breathalyzer test.    It included a footnote

immediately after that phrase making clear that such "a question

about the absence of alcohol-test evidence" did not warrant

giving the Downs instruction over a defendant's objection.    See

id. at 150 n. 13.   In fact, the court in Wolfe said that it had

"trouble imagining" a case where giving a Downs instruction over

the defendant's objection could be justified, id. at 142 n.2.

Yet it clearly imagined, indeed it discussed, an example in

which a question like that at issue in this case was asked by

the jury, indicating that such a question cannot justify giving

a Downs instruction over objection.     Further, the "rare set of

facts" mentioned by the court must refer to the facts in

evidence, because what is being permitted is an instruction that

is designed to, and in some circumstances may, prophylactically

prevent speculation.   Once the jury has itself already asked

about whether a breathalyzer was offered or refused, the risk of

the Downs instruction is heightened, not reduced.     Contrary to

the majority's conclusion that "the judge's determination that a

Downs-type instruction was necessary in these circumstances was

logical and sensible," ante at           , the decision to give the

instruction contradicts the very legal premise of Wolfe and was

legal error under that decision.   Again, the court explained

that when such a question is asked, the Downs instruction should

not be given over the defendant's objection.     Moreno, 102 Mass.
                                                                   8

App. Ct. at 323, in which defense counsel agreed to the Downs

instruction, is not to the contrary.

    The court majority asserts that unlike this case, the jury

question discussed in Wolfe was not based on evidence that

included "the presence of a breathalyzer machine," as though

that distinction makes this a stronger case for giving the Downs

instruction.   To the contrary, it makes this a weaker case for

giving that instruction.   Here, the jury had not merely asked

about a breathalyzer test, they noted that they had seen the

breathalyzer machine!   The concern about the jury using Downs to

focus on the possibility of refusal thus is heightened, not

diminished, when compared with a generic question about

breathalyzer tests.

    The court majority, however, actually praises the

"forceful[]" use of "the more specific Downs admonition,"

apparently because "the breathalyzer issue was squarely in the

mind of the jury, and that inasmuch as the booking video would

necessarily remain with the jurors in the deliberation room,"

without the Downs instruction, "the breathalyzer question was

not likely to leave their focus."   Ante at        .

    But the entire point of Wolfe is that the presumption on

which the majority opinion rests, that the Downs instruction is

an admonition that will work to eliminate the jury's focus on

the absence of a breathalyzer test, does not always apply to the
                                                                       9

Downs instruction.   Wolfe, 478 Mass. at 147.   The court could

not have been clearer that the basis of its decision was that

the Downs instruction may "have the opposite of the intended

effect, that is, it will cause the jury specifically to focus on

the absence of breathalyzer evidence."   Wolfe, supra at 147-148.

In its reality-based decision, the Supreme Judicial Court gave

defense counsel the authority to determine when that was not a

problem, and held the Downs instruction may not be given over

defendant's objection.

    The defendant in this case did not refuse a breathalyzer,

but when the jury asked if he had, the judge improperly provided

them, over the defendant's objection, an instruction that

"suggest[s] that the defendant may have refused a test or feared

an unfavorable result."   Moreno, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 327.      He

is entitled to a new trial.   With respect, I dissent.