Court Opinion

ID: 9370396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 11:08:15.035843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.114376
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued February 7, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00369-CV
                           ———————————
                         RENEE JACKSON, Appellant
                                        V.
  DR. BILLY PUCKETT, BILLY PUCKETT, D.D.S. D/B/A PEARLAND
FAMILY DENTISTRY, GRISELDA AVILES, AND SYEDA SHAW, D.D.S.,
                         Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 61st District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2021-74149

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Pro se appellant Renee Jackson appeals the dismissal of her dental malpractice

action against appellees Dr. Billy Puckett, Billy Puckett, D.D.S. d/b/a Pearland

Family Dentistry, Griselda Aviles, and Syeda Shaw, D.D.S. On appeal, Jackson
contends the trial court committed procedural errors that require rendition of

judgment in her favor or, at minimum, reinstatement of her claims. We affirm.

                                     Background

      On November 11, 2021, Jackson filed her original petition alleging that she

received negligent dental treatment when Dr. Billy Puckett administered an injection

that caused a “blunt trauma/hematoma” on her lip and then failed to “stitch [her]

gums to prevent infection and dry socket.” Appellees answered Jackson’s lawsuit

on December 13, 2021, generally denying the allegations against them.

      Two days after appellees answered, Jackson moved for a default judgment on

the ground that appellees’ answer was not timely filed. Appellees responded that

the trial court had no authority to enter a default judgment once an answer was on

file. The trial court denied Jackson’s motion.

      Not long after the trial court refused to enter a default judgment, Jackson

moved to recuse the presiding judge. Jackson asserted that she could not receive a

“fair and impartial” adjudication of her claims because the presiding judge “ha[d]

deliberately violated other litigant’s personal liberties and/or . . . refused to provide

due process and equal protection to . . . litigants in the past.” Jackson also asserted

in an unsworn “testimonial” that the trial proceedings were unfair because she did

not have equal access to the case information and form documents available online.

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The presiding judge declined to recuse herself and referred the motion to the regional

presiding judge, who denied it.

       Appellees ultimately moved to dismiss Jackson’s lawsuit under Chapter 74 of

the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§§ 74.001–.507. Appellees argued that Jackson’s dental malpractice action was ripe

for dismissal because it alleged health care liability claims subject to Chapter 74’s

procedural requirements and Jackson had failed to file the statutorily required expert

reports. See id. §§ 74.351(a) (“In a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not

later than the 120th day after the date each defendant’s original answer is filed or a

later date required under Section 74.353, serve on that party or the party’s attorney

one or more expert reports[.]”), 74.351(b) (allowing health care liability defendant

to move for dismissal if expert report has not been served within statutory period).

In response, Jackson pointed to photographs of her injury as evidence of appellees’

negligence, but she did not provide any expert reports. The trial court granted

appellee’s motion and dismissed Jackson’s lawsuit with prejudice.

       Jackson moved unsuccessfully to reinstate her claims before filing this appeal

of the trial court’s final order.

                                    Issues on Appeal

       Jackson’s briefing on appeal fails to “state concisely all issues or points

presented for review.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f). In addition, Jackson’s briefs do not

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contain any “clear and concise argument” to support her contentions or “appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record,” as required by the Texas Rules of

Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). However, as our supreme court

has instructed, “[w]e ‘generally hesitate to turn away claims based on waiver or

failure to preserve the issue[, and] we . . . construe briefing “reasonably, yet liberally,

so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver.”’ ‘Simply stated, appellate

courts should reach the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.’” Weekley

Homes, LLC, v. Paniagua, 646 S.W.3d 821, 826–27 (Tex. 2022) (internal citations

omitted).

      Construing Jackson’s briefing liberally, we understand her to be challenging

the following rulings by the trial court:

      1.     The denial of her motion for default judgment;

      2.     The denial of her motion to recuse; and
      3.     The dismissal of her lawsuit under Chapter 74.
      We address these issues in turn as necessary to the disposition of this appeal.

                                   Default Judgment

      Jackson claims, without authority, that the trial court erred by failing to grant

her a default judgment once appellees failed to answer “on or before 10:00 a.m. on

the Monday next after the expiration of twenty days after the date of service [of her

original petition].” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 99(b). We review the trial court’s denial of a

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motion for default judgment for an abuse of discretion.1 See Davis v. West, 433

S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). We conclude

there is no abuse of discretion.

      At any time after a defendant is required to answer, the plaintiff may take a

default judgment if the defendant has not previously filed an answer, and the citation

with the officer’s return has been on file with the clerk for ten days. TEX. R. CIV. P.

107(h), 239. Here, the relief Jackson requested could not be granted because she did

not move for a default judgment until two days after appellees filed their answer.

Once an answer is on file, even if it is filed after the due date, the trial court may not

render a no-answer default judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 239; see also Davis v.

Jefferies, 764 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. 1989); Davis, 433 S.W.3d at 109; Aguilar v.

Alvarado, 39 S.W.3d 244, 247–48 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied). By

following the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and well-settled case law, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion. Aguilar, 39 S.W.3d at 248.

      We overrule Jackson’s first issue.

1
      Ordinarily, the denial of a default judgment is an interlocutory order not subject to
      appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014; see also Aguilar v. Livingston,
      154 S.W.3d 832, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). However,
      appellate courts have considered the denial of a default judgment when, as here, the
      denial is challenged in an appeal from a final judgment or order. See, e.g., Davis v.
      West, 433 S.W.3d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied);
      Aguilar, 154 S.W.3d at 833; Aguilar v. Alvarado, 39 S.W.3d 244, 247–48 (Tex.
      App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied).
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                                       Recusal

      Jackson next asserts error in the denial of her motion to recuse the presiding

judge. We review the denial of Jackson’s recusal motion for an abuse of discretion.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A) (“An order denying a motion to recuse may be

reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”). We

conclude there was no abuse of discretion here.

      “To recuse a judge, a party must comply with the procedural requirements

prescribed by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a.” Rammah v. Abdeljaber, 235

S.W.3d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). One such requirement is that

the recusal motion be verified. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(a)(1). Jackson’s motion was not

verified. Although she attached a statement labeled as a “testimonial” to her recusal

motion, which set out her complaints about the presiding judge, the statement was

not sworn. See Verify, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“1. To prove to

be true; to confirm or establish the truth or truthfulness of; to authenticate. 2. To

confirm or substantiate by oath or affidavit; to swear the truth of.”). Because an

unsworn motion to recuse does not comply with the procedural requirements of Rule

18a and is defective on its face, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion.

See, e.g., Sheldon v. Unknown Nurse/Staff of Trinity Mother Frances Hosp., No.

06-10-00097-CV, 2011 WL 1990645, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 18,

2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

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unsworn recusal motion); Wirtz v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 898 S.W.2d 414, 422–

23 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ) (same); see also Gill v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim.

Just., 3 S.W.3d 576, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (movant

waived right to complain of denial of recusal motion because he did not file verified

motion).

      We overrule Jackson’s second issue.

                                     Chapter 74

      Finally, Jackson complains about the dismissal of her claims under Chapter

74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE §§ 74.001–.507.

      Chapter 74 provides a comprehensive statutory framework governing health

care liability claims. Randol Mill Pharmacy v. Miller, 465 S.W.3d 612, 615 (Tex.

2015). It is intended to strike “a careful balance between eradicating frivolous

[health care liability] claims and preserving meritorious ones.” Leland v. Brandal,

257 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. 2008). A key component of the statute’s framework is

its requirement that the plaintiff serve expert reports early in the litigation process

for each “health care provider against whom a [health care] liability claim is

asserted.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351(a). Specifically, the statute

requires service of expert reports “not later than the 120th day after the date each

defendant’s original answer is filed.” Id. Failure to comply with this requirement

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results in dismissal of the claim with prejudice upon the health care provider’s

motion. Id. § 74.351(b).

      It is undisputed that Jackson’s dental malpractice action asserts health care

liability claims against appellees that are subject to Chapter 74’s requirements.

Jackson’s claim that she suffered physical injuries during dental treatment when

appellees negligently administered an injection and failed to “stitch [her] gums to

prevent infection and dry socket” satisfies the statutory definition of a “health care

liability claim” as “a cause of action against a health care provider . . . for treatment,

lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical

care, or health care, . . . which proximately result[ed] in injury[.]”2 Id.

§ 74.001(a)(13).

      It is also undisputed that Jackson did not file any expert report within 120 days

of appellees’ answer, as required by Chapter 74. See id. § 74.351(a). Although she

argues that her claims should not have been dismissed because she submitted

photographs proving her injuries, such photographs are not a substitute for an expert

report under Chapter 74. See id. §§ 74.351(r)(5) (defining “expert” to mean person

2
      Relevant here, a “health care provider” is “any person, partnership, professional
      association, corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed, certified, registered,
      or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care, including . . . a dentist.”
      TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.001(a)(12)(A)(ii). Employees, independent
      contractors, and agents of health care providers who are acting within the scope of
      their employment or contractual relationship also qualify as health care providers.
      Id. § 74.001(a)(12)(B)(ii).
                                             8
qualified to testify under certain statute- and rules-based requirements), 74.351(r)(6)

(defining “expert report” to mean “a written report by an expert that provides a fair

summary of the expert’s opinions . . . regarding applicable standards of care, the

manner in which the care rendered by the . . . health care provider failed to meet the

standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or

damages claimed”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it dismissed

Jackson’s claims for failure to file an expert report.

      We therefore also overrule Jackson’s third issue.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Terry Adams
                                               Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Terry Adams and Justices Kelly and Farris.

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