Court Opinion

ID: 9915870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 21:02:09.13986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:20.782807
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24

                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION TWO

 VINCENT GARCIA et al.,

          Plaintiffs and Appellants,                 E079859

 v.                                                  (Super.Ct.No. RIC1902570)

 TEMPUR-PEDIC NORTH AMERICA,                         OPINION
 LLC,

          Defendant and Respondent.

        APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Godofredo Magno, Judge.

Affirmed.

        Zeiler Law Group and Kerry P. Zeiler for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

        O’Hagan Meyer, Clint D. Robison, Vickie V. Grasu, and Angeli C. Aragon, for

Defendant and Respondent.

                                             1
       Consumers brought tort claims against a mattress retailer and manufacturer for

injuries allegedly suffered while sleeping on a mattress. While the parties were

conducting discovery, the plaintiffs settled with the retailer. The trial court then denied

them leave to amend their complaint against the manufacturer, and they voluntarily

dismissed those claims before filing a new lawsuit.

       The manufacturer moved for costs as the prevailing party in the dismissed lawsuit.

The trial court ordered the consumers to pay some of their costs, including the costs of

depositions and service of process. On appeal, the consumers argue it was improper to

award costs related to depositions that were noticed but did not occur. We hold there is

no such blanket exception, and the proper analysis focuses on whether costs were

reasonably necessary to litigating a case when incurred, not whether the costs could have

been avoided in retrospect. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding

the costs were reasonably necessary, we affirm.

                                              I

                                          FACTS

       On April 23, 2019, appellants Vincent and Esther Garcia sued Mattress Showroom

Inc. and respondent Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC (Tempur-Pedic), alleging the

Tempur-Pedic Contour Supreme Mattress they bought at the Mattress Showroom on

September 17, 2017 was defective.

                                              2
       The Garcias claimed the mattress sagged, and that sleeping on it caused or

exacerbated Vincent’s spine, back, neck, and jaw injuries. The complaint stated a

products liability cause of action for defective design and manufacture of the mattress,

violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.), and

claims for breach of express and implied warranties.

       After the trial court denied Tempur-Pedic’s motion for summary judgment, the

court set a trial readiness conference and trial date. But then the Garcias moved to amend

their complaint. They sought to add a new cause of action under state unfair competition

law or the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and they sought an

injunction requiring Tempur-Pedic to contact all consumers who bought their products.

The trial court denied the motion because the delay was unjustified, and the amendments

would expand the litigation by adding a new cause of action and seeking a new

“expansive, almost class action type remedy,” both requiring substantial new discovery.

This court denied a writ petition in which the Garcias challenged the decision to deny

leave to amend.

       After the trial readiness conference, the Garcias filed a request for dismissal. They

sought dismissal with prejudice of their claims against Mattress Showroom because they

had reached a settlement. They sought dismissal without prejudice of the claims against

Tempur-Pedic. The trial court dismissed the case as requested.

                                             3
       The Garcias next sued Tempur-Pedic afresh, including their previous claims and

alleging violations of the unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business practices statute (Code

Civ. Proc., § 17200 et seq.) and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et

seq.). In the new complaint, the Garcias sought to represent a class of Californians who

bought or owned similar mattresses since 2017.

       Before us in this appeal is the motion for costs Tempur-Pedic filed as a prevailing

party in the first lawsuit. Included in the memorandum of costs were requests for costs of

$5,174.34 for depositions and $2,491.24 for service of process. The depositions involved

medical professionals the Garcias had identified as Vincent Garcia’s treating physicians.

Tempur-Pedic claimed $527.80 for the deposition of Dr. Daniel McLarty and $818.45 for

the deposition of Dr. Carter Lane. Tempur-Pedic also requested costs for service of

process on McLarty ($222.35), Dr. Randall Tan ($306.82), Dr. Kathy Lin Chuang

($222.93), and Dr. Perry Sahagun ($222.93), and two service of process fees each for

Lane ($227.03 and $363.02) and Dr. James Slepski ($266.33 and $222.87).

       The Garcias moved to tax costs or strike Tempur-Pedic’s memorandum of costs.

They said Tempur-Pedic had deposed only three of the eight witnesses. The depositions

of McLarty, Lane, Tan, Chuang, and Sahagun did not go forward for diverse reasons.

Lane did not appear for his deposition, and Tempur-Pedic later identified him as a

nonretained expert whose testimony may be offered at trial. Tan died before he was

served. Tempur-Pedic chose to take McLarty’s deposition off the calendar. Chuang and

Sahagun were not deposed, but the Garcias provide no reason. Though the Garcias

                                             4
conceded the deposition of Slepski occurred, they argued Tempur-Pedic could not

recover service of process fees for his deposition because they served him twice due to

their own mistake and did not identify which fee was necessary. In total, the Garcias

contested $1,346.25 of the claimed costs of deposition and $2,054.28 of the claimed costs

of service of process.

       Tempur-Pedic responded that the costs of McLarty’s and Lane’s depositions were

justified. They sought $527.80 for McLarty’s deposition to recover a fee they paid to the

court reporter for late cancellation after the Garcias’ counsel last-minute indication that

the witness was unavailable. They sought $818.45 for a certificate of nonappearance after

Lane failed to show for his deposition. They argued they were entitled to recover costs

for service of process completed by a registered process server whether or not the witness

appeared, and they represented that Tan was identified as a treating physician and served

before they were aware he had died. They argued any duplication of service fees was due

to the Garcias changing the witnesses’ available dates.

       The trial court awarded all the costs outlined above. The court determined the

depositions of all the medical professionals were reasonably necessary because they were

Vincent Garcia’s treating physicians. The court explained it did not matter that the

depositions were not taken before the case was dismissed. As to Tan, the court awarded

the costs because there was no indication Tempur-Pedic was aware of his death when

they served him.

                                              5
                                             II

                                        ANALYSIS

       The Garcias argue the trial court erred by awarding costs for depositions that did

not occur. We disagree because there was a sound basis for finding the costs were

reasonably necessary to the litigation when incurred.

       Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 permits the recovery of costs for the

“[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions” as well as for

“[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(3)(A) & (a)(4)), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this

code.) Costs are allowable if they are “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the

litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation.” (§ 1033.5, subd.

(c)(2).) “To the extent the statute grants the court discretion in allowing or denying costs

or in determining amounts, we reverse only if there has been a ‘clear abuse of discretion’

and a ‘miscarriage of justice.’” (Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 49, 52

(Chaaban).)

       The nature of the case determines the necessity of discovery. (Chaaban, supra, at

p. 57.) The deponents served for deposition in this tort case were necessary witnesses.

The Garcias identified them as medical professionals who would know about the injuries

to Vincent Garcia, a required element of his claims. (Culbertson v. R.D. Werner Co., Inc.

(1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 704, 711-712.)

                                              6
       The Garcias rightly do not argue the witnesses themselves were not reasonably

necessary to litigating the case. Nor do they challenge the reasonableness of awarding a

prevailing party amounts they paid to court reporters or process servers, or the

reasonableness of the amounts Tempur-Pedic has shown they paid. Instead, they ask us to

hold it is always improper to award costs incurred for depositions that did not occur. We

agree with the trial court that it is legally proper to award such costs.

       The witnesses involved are medical professionals the Garcias identified as treating

Vincent Garcia for his injuries. Defense counsel of course was justified in pursuing the

depositions of these witnesses. Along the way, Tempur-Pedic incurred common costs of

conducting discovery, including fees for service of process and customary fees charged

by court reporters.

       When they incurred these charges in the ongoing case, nothing suggests Tempur-

Pedic or their counsel knew the case was especially likely to terminate without the

depositions occurring. Civil cases often settle before trial, at various stages. Depositions

themselves, as they occur, can clarify the strength of each parties’ case, and can foster a

settlement. There is no blanket reason to conclude that the costs for depositions that did

not occur were unwarranted when they were noticed. It is no importance to the award of

costs that the litigation terminated in Tempur-Pedic’s favor before the depositions were

completed. In this case, the Garcias’ dismissal of their claims against Tempur-Pedic does

not even appear as something that Tempur-Pedic should have predicted at any point,

much less at the time of noticing the depositions.

                                               7
       The trial court properly considered whether the costs were reasonably necessary to

litigating the case at the time they were incurred. Hindsight is no guide here. That is why

courts routinely refuse to tax costs on the ground that a deponent did not end up testifying

or providing useful testimony at trial. (E.g., Chaaban, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 57

[affirming award of deposition costs as reasonably necessary even though counsel was

unable at trial to introduce exhibits into evidence through the witness].) It is enough that

the Garcias identified the professionals as potential witnesses about a core litigation

topic, and nothing had occurred to make it appear they were not reasonably necessary

when Tempur-Pedic incurred the costs. (Ibid.)

       Some of the challenged costs arose because witnesses failed to appear for their

depositions, which is not a reason to deny Tempur-Pedic costs. McLarty’s deposition cost

was a fee paid to the court reporter for a late cancellation. Lane’s deposition cost was a

fee for a certificate of nonappearance when the witness failed to appear. The trial court

did not abuse its discretion by holding them responsible for these costs.

       The Garcias argue it does not matter whether the noticed depositions were

reasonably necessary because they read section 1033.5 as expressly limiting awards to

costs of depositions that were completed. Section 1033.5 subdivision (a) lists several

categories of allowable costs. Among those, subdivision (a)(3)(A) allows costs related to

“[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions, including an original

and one copy of those taken by the claimant and one copy of depositions taken by the

party against whom costs are allowed.” While that provision envisions the award of costs

                                              8
related to completed depositions, that is because its focus is on reimbursing the parties for

the costs of recording them. Subdivision (a)(4), by contrast, says nothing about “taken”

depositions; it allows costs for “[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process

server, or other means.” Thus, the statute does not limit the award of costs of service to

completed depositions as the Garcias claim.

       The only non-service costs the Garcias challenge are the expenses related to

obtaining the certificate of nonappearance related to Lane’s deposition and the late

cancellation fee related to McLarty’s deposition. At oral argument, the Garcias conceded

the cost of the certificate of nonappearance is recoverable under subdivision (a)(3)

because such a certificate is the equivalent of a deposition transcript where a witness fails

to appear. We conclude a late cancellation fee paid to a reporter may likewise be

recovered as an expense related to taking a deposition.

       The Garcias also object to paying the costs of Lane’s notice of nonappearance on

the ground that Tempur-Pedic identified him as a nonretained expert witness. Fees of

expert witnesses are not automatically recoverable. (Section 1033.5, subds. (a)(8), (b)(1).

Tempur-Pedic, though, did not name Lane as a retained expert, which it would do by

naming him “for the purpose of forming and expressing an opinion in anticipation of the

litigation or in preparation for the trial of the action.’” (Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser

(1999) 22 Cal.4th 32, 36, quoting former Code Civ. Proc., § 2034, subd. (a)(2).) Instead,

they named him as a fact witness, a “treating physician . . . [who] learns of the plaintiff’s

injuries and medical history because of the underlying physician-patient relationship.”

                                               9
(Ibid.) The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by concluding Tempur-Pedic

deposed him as a fact witness reasonably necessary to the litigation. Tempur-Pedic also

identified Slepski, Chuang, and Sahagun as nonretained experts, and allowing recovery of

costs related to serving them with process was reasonable for the same reasons.

       The Garcias find fault with Tempur-Pedic for seeking to recover the costs of

serving Tan because he had died before being served. Yet the Garcias had identified him

as a person with knowledge, and Tempur-Pedic represented they did not know of his

death until he had been served. Had the Garcias informed Tempur-Pedic of Tan’s death,

it would be unreasonable to serve him for a deposition. But until Tempur-Pedic had

reason to know of the death, it was reasonable for them to treat Tan as a necessary

witness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the costs of serving

him as prevailing party costs.

                                             III

                                      DISPOSITION

       We affirm the order awarding costs. Respondents are entitled to their costs on

appeal.

       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                RAPHAEL
                                                                                             J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.
MILLER
                           J.

                                             10