Court Opinion

ID: 9499334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:45:01.696946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:25.875850
License: Public Domain

LUCERO, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Following my careful review of my respected colleagues’ separate expressions in this case, as well as the record, the legislative history, and the pertinent cases, I join the opinion of Judge Hartz, save for Part 11(A)(3). I do not disagree with much of what Judge McConnell has said, but ultimately conclude that the language of the statute is so clear and unambiguous that it does not allow resort to the legislative history. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) unequivocally reaches a myriad of crimes— burglary, arson, extortion, the use of explosives, “or [a crime that] othenvise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” (emphasis added). In agreeing with Judge Hartz, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and a panel of the Seventh Circuit, I conclude that a conviction for felony driving while under the influence falls within the ambit of the quoted statutory text.
Judge McConnell is right to highlight the dramatic increase in sentence that results from application of the Armed Career Criminal Act to Larry Begay’s case. I agree that driving while under the influence may not .have been in the minds of the 1986 amendment’s sponsors when they drafted the residual language in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Nevertheless, the wording that Congress chose is clear. If a change is to be made, it is for Congress, not the courts, to make.