Court Opinion

ID: 9746578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:28:03.993133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:15.041892
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I agree that Appellant produced insufficient evidence of retaliation to survive summary judgment in his action under the Whistleblower Law. However, I write separately to clarify that absent direct evidence of retaliation, circumstantial evidence may be used to prove a violation of the statute.
While there is little authority addressing the burdens of proof under the Whistleblower Law, 43 Pa.C.S. §§ 1421-1428, the Commonwealth Court has stated that the statute envisions a shifting burden of proof. Watson v. City of Philadelphia, 162 Pa. Commw. 340, 347, 638 A.2d 489, 492 (1994). An employee is obligated to show that he reported wrongdoing before being subjected to adverse action. Watson, 162 Pa. Commw. at 347, 638 A.2d at 492. See also 43 Pa.C.S. § 1424(b).1 The burden then shifts to the employer to estab*165lish that there was a legitimate reason for the adverse action. Watson, 162 Pa. Commw. at 347, 638 A.2d at 492. See also 43 Pa.C.S. § 1424(c).2 Once the employer offers such evidence, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that this reason was merely pretextual. Watson, 162 Pa. Commw. at 347, 638 A.2d at 492. The burden shifting under the Whistle-blower Law is similar to that found in cases involving claims of unlawful discrimination brought under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963 (PHRA). Id. See also Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 516 Pa. 124, 532 A.2d 315 (1987)(discussing shifting burdens of proof under the PHRA for discrimination claims).3
The Whistleblower Law does not explicitly require an employee to establish a causal connection between his report of wrongdoing and the alleged reprisal as part of his prima facie case. See 43 Pa.C.S. § 1424(b)(stating that an employee must show that before the alleged reprisal, he reported or was about to report wrongdoing). The Commonwealth Court has stated, however, that to make out a cause of action under the Whistleblower Law, an employee must make more than a general statement that a report was filed and he was subsequently fired. As recognized by the majority, in Gray v. Hafer, 168 Pa. Commw. 613, 620, 651 A.2d 221, 225 (1994), the Commonwealth Court stated that an employee must show that *166the report led to his dismissal.4 See also Robert Wholey Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 146 Pa. Commw. 702, 706, 606 A.2d 982, 983 (1992)(prima facie case of retaliation under the PHRA requires showing of a causal connection); Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3rd Cir.1997)(prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires showing of a causal connection).
Appellant correctly states that establishing a prima facie case in this context is not intended to be onerous. See Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 516 Pa. at 130, 532 A.2d at 319. To establish a causal connection, an employee must show by concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that the report led to his dismissal. Gray, 168 Pa. Commw. at 620, 651 A.2d at 225. The court’s examples of such facts or circumstances in Gray were evidence of a specific direction not to file the report or a statement that there would be adverse consequences because the report was filed. Id. In Title VII cases discussing the causal connection requirement, the Third Circuit has required evidence of intervening antagonism or retaliatory animus to survive summary judgment. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504; Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920-21 (3rd Cir.1997).
Appellant concedes that he has no direct evidence that his employer retaliated against him for reporting that he suspected illegal pirating of software in the office. Instead, he maintains that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support his claim and thus summary judgment is not warranted. Summary judgment may be granted where the material facts are not in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035. In reviewing a *167motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Borden, Inc. v. Advent Ink Co., 701 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa.Super.1997).
Viewing the record before this Court in the light most favorable to Appellant, it establishes the following. Between September 7, 1993, when Appellant began working for the Department of Environmental Resources, and December 20, 1993, when Appellant reported to his boss that he suspected illegal activity, Appellant had no difficulty with anyone at the Department. Appellant’s 2/13/96 deposition at 9. On December 20, 1993, Appellant’s boss, Paul Linnan, reacted angrily to the report of his suspicions of illegal activity. Appellant testified:
“And Paul got real angry, said that’s not what we hired you for____ He didn’t even want to know the details of the pirating thing. Of course, I only said I suspected it. But he brushed it off. He didn’t really want to hear about it.”
Appellant’s 2/27/96 deposition at 51-53. Appellant testified that the more he talked about it, the more agitated Linnan became and when Linnan abruptly ended the meeting, Appellant believed he had offended him. Id. at 54-55.
On January 13, 1994, Appellant met with Paul Linnan and his supervisor, Lynda Ronemus, for an interim performance evaluation. His overall rating was “Needs improvement.” See 1/13/94 Employe Performance Review. Appellant expressed that he disagreed with the evaluation. See id. This was Appellant’s first indication that there was dissatisfaction with his work. Appellant’s 2/13/96 deposition at 26; see also Appellant’s 2/27/96 deposition at 93, 224.
On the same day, Appellant was given three priority projects with deadlines. One project involved taking an inventory of computer equipment. Appellant testified that his co-workers did not cooperate with him and hampered his ability to complete the project. See Appellant’s 2/13/97 deposition at 165; Appellant’s 2/27/96 deposition at 112, 216. Appellant maintained that the lack of cooperatiofi he received at work was a change from how he was treated before January 13. *168Appellant’s 2/27/96 deposition at 194; Appellant’s 4/22/96 deposition at 44-45. Appellant stated that after January 13, Linnan and Ronemus interfered with his ability to do his job. Appellant’s 2/27/96 deposition at 111-12. He testified:
All of a sudden I started to be taking on this project, that project. I got less and less cooperation from the PC coordinators. A lot of things changed after January 13th that made it very difficult for me to do my job.
Id. at 112. Appellant sought help from Ronemus to get his coworkers to cooperate but she did not intervene. Id. at 113.
While Appellant received extensions of time to finish his assignments through the intervention of his union representative, he did not complete them. See id. at 131-33. Appellant’s second performance evaluation was on April 18, 1994. Linnan rated Appellant “Unsatisfactory.” See 4/15/94 Employe Performance Review. Appellant was suspended and ultimately terminated effective April 26,1994.
Considering this evidence in its entirety, I conclude that it is insufficient to allow a jury to reasonably find that Appellant’s employer engaged in antagonistic behavior against Appellant after his report of illegal activity, that led to his unsatisfactory performance evaluation and termination of employment. While in another case the circumstances may permit a jury to infer that a report of wrongdoing led to an employee’s dismissal, such a factual scenario is not present here. Thus, I would affirm the decision of the lower court.

. Section 1424(b) states:
*165Necessary showing of evidence. — An employee alleging a violation of this act must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the alleged reprisal, the employee or a person acting on behalf of the employee had reported or was about to report in good faith, verbally or in writing, an instance of wrongdoing or waste to the employer or an appropriate remedy.

. Section 1424(c) states:
Defense. — It shall be a defense to an action under this section if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the action by the employer occurred for separate and legitimate reasons, which are not merely pretextual.

. In Allegheny, 516 Pa. at 129-31, 532 A.2d at 318-19, the Court applied a burden shifting analysis similar to that employed in Title VII discrimination cases.

. Gray was before the court on preliminary objections. The court stated that the employee alleged in his complaint that he filed a report with his employer indicating that a third party had violated the law and that his employer was guilty of wrongdoing because he was then terminated. Id. The court found such allegations insufficient to state a claim under the statute and granted the employee leave to amend his complaint. Id. This Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order. 542 Pa. 607, 669 A.2d 335.