Court Opinion

ID: 9448988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:51:26.959823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:38.073699
License: Public Domain

SETH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting as to defendant Maestas).
I dissent on the ground that the conviction of Maestas was based upon the statutory presumptions which can only arise from possession of narcotics, and such possession was not established. This conclusion is reached reluctantly and with full appreciation for the serious nature of the charges, and the revulsion we all have for traffic in narcotics, and for all those in any way associated with such activities.
The meaning of the word “possession” in the statute and as it has been construed by other courts requires a much stronger showing of dominion and control by Maestas than was made in this case. Under 21 U.S.C. § 174, it is of course required that the heroin be imported into the United States illegally and that the defendant have knowledge that it was so imported. Provision is also made that if it be shown the defendant had possession of the narcotics, such possession shall be sufficient for conviction unless it is satisfactorily explained to the jury. There is no evidence of any knowledge as to the importation; consequently reliance is placed by the government on the statutory presumptions arising from possession. Necessarily before these presumptions arise, a showing must be made that the defendant either had constructive or actual possession of the heroin. The only basis to support the conviction of Maestas was that he was an aider and abettor. The same elements of the offense must be proved as to an aider and abettor as any principal, and it must be proved that he shared the criminal intent of a principal. Johnson v. United States, 195 F.2d 673 (8th Cir.); Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.). In the absence of any evidence of knowledge of unlawful importation, it must be shown that the aider and abettor had “possession” of the drug. Also in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, this possession is sufficient evidence to authorize conviction (21 U.S.C. § 174). How may possession in the aider and abettor Maestas be shown to support a conviction in the absence of his actual or physical' possession? The only contention that can be made by the government is that Maestas had constructive possession or possession was somehow imputed to him by the actual possession shown to have been in his co-defendant. There was no charge of conspiracy.
To constitute constructive possession, the party charged must have the drug in his control or under his dominion. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306 (9th Cir.). Thus if the evidence shows that Maestas was able to control the drug or cause it to be produced, he would have constructive possession although a third person might have physical possession, Rodella v. United States, supra, but this was not shown. This control or dominion could be shared with others and not destroy the constructive possession, Gallegos v. United States, 237 F.2d 694 (10th Cir.), and further such constructive possession may be established by circumstantial evidence, Hernandez v. United States, supra, but again this was not shown. The actual relationship or connection between the co-defendants Maestas and Lucero was not established; an inference can be easily drawn that there was some connection between them. However, the most that was shown as to Maestas on count one was that he and Lucero were together in a tavern when the agent arrived, that they talked to the agent together, that Maestas told the agent the price of heroin, the quality, *461and that the deal could not be made in the tavern. Lucero told the agent to pay Maestas but the agent refused until he saw the “stuff.” Lucero and the agent left the tavern and Lucero later delivered the drugs and took the money. As to count two, Maestas was shown to be in the vicinity, knew Lucero was in a nearby cocktail lounge, indicated everything was all right, and after the sale by Lucero, out of Maestas’ presence, had some conversation with Lucero and left with him (Lucero here again made the delivery and received the money). There is no evidence that Maestas had such dominion or control over the drugs that he could cause them to be produced through or by Lucero or anyone else, nor did he arrange the sale. Further there was no evidence that Lucero and Maestas jointly had control or dominion. The evidence does demonstrate that Lucero could and did produce the drugs for each sale and was paid. It must be concluded that Maestas did not have constructive possession of the drugs within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 174.
Since Maestas did not have constructive possession but his co-defendant Lucero had actual possession, may this be somehow imputed to Maestas? No conspiracy was charged and there was no proof of any other type of joint undertaking whereby Maestas was shown to have dominion or control over the drug solely or jointly with Lucero or others. The control is the ultimate test and the legal tag on the relationship between these co-defendants is not particularly helpful. The court in Hernandez v. United States, supra, said:
“We are convinced, on the other hand, that an interpretation of the term ‘possession’ in Section 174, which would include the possession of a third person, not on trial, with whom defendant has entered into a common scheme or plan or whom he has aided or abetted, but whose possession of narcotic drugs he has neither shared nor controlled, would be inconsistent with the language, the structure, and the purposes of the statute.”
The court then said:
“As we have seen, a definition of ‘possession’ in terms of dominion and control is amply supported by authority; constructive possession is as much a form of legal possession as is physical custody. But ‘possession’ of a third person ‘imputed’ to the defendant is not, in legal terminology, ‘possession’ of the person to whom it is attributed at all. It is instead the physical or constructive possession of another, for which the defendant is to be made liable. Thus the use of the phrase ‘imputed possession’ begs the question at issue, which is precisely whether the defendant is to be made liable for the possession of the third person in the circumstances of this case.”
Thus there is no basis to impute the possession of Lucero to Maestas by reason of some association between them which the proof does not disclose.
The Second Circuit considered this general problem in United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.), but the court was evenly divided. Later in Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 26 (2 Cir.), the problem was again considered by the same court en banc. The facts briefly were that the agent met Jones who took him to a person named Charlie. Jones in the absence of the agent talked to Charlie and then told the agent he would be able to get the heroin at $150.00 an ounce. Shortly thereafter in the presence of Jones, Charlie handed the heroin to the agent and received the money, Charlie then told the agent to deal with him and not anyone else. The court held that Jones did not have possession, and said:
“Nothing in the record indicates that Jones had any independent control over the narcotics, or over Moore, or that he was able to assure to Brown that he could produce narcotics. And, unless we are to read the statutory phrase ‘possession of the narcotic drug’ to mean merely *462‘participation in a transaction involving the narcotic drug’ we cannot rely on constructive possession here to affirm the conviction below.”
The facts of the case at bar may be somewhat stronger than Jones but not sufficiently so to bring about a different result nor to make the reasoning less applicable.
This court has recently considered a similar situation arising from the association of several persons charged with narcotic violations in Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir.), and held that the proof as to participation by Glover was not sufficient. There the facts as to Glover’s participation are quite similar to the case at bar.
The evidence did not show possession in Maestas either directly or by circumstantial evidence, and I would reverse as to Maestas.