Court Opinion

ID: 9713567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:17:49.029463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.319112
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
Under Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03, summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to resolve issues of fact, but only to determine if they exist. Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.1981). If any doubt exists as to the presence of a genuine fact issue, that doubt must be resolved in favor of a finding that a fact issue exists. Rathbun v. W. T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 219 N.W.2d 641 (1974).
This court has consistently recognized that if the terms of a contract are at issue or any of its provisions are ambiguous or uncertain, summary judgment is not appropriate. Matter of Turners Crossroad Development Co., 277 N.W.2d 364 (Minn.1979). The purpose for this rule is “to guarantee that the parties to a contract have a full opportunity to present evidence that will clarify or explain the unclear term.” Id. at 369. Ambiguity exists if a contract is re a-*322sonably susceptible to more than one construction. Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Lorraine Realty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn.1979).
I am persuaded that the contract, as a whole, can reasonably be read to require payment of the balloon on October 21,1979, unless the payment thereof would necessitate borrowing funds from a lending institution at a rate of interest exceeding 8%. Because the reading given force by the trial court — that the payment of the balloon on October 21, 1979, was required only if 8% financing from a lending institution could be obtained — is also reasonable, the agreement is ambiguous. Conflicting evidence of intent having been submitted to the trial court, the summary judgments must be reversed.
The Blattners originally sold the property in 1974 by contract for deed to the Forsters for a total price of $36,000, with $5,000 in cash as a down payment and the balance due in monthly installments of $220, including 8% interest on the unpaid balance. On October 21, 1979, the remaining balance was to come due if financing could be found. In October 1978, or approximately 1 year before the balloon payment was due, the Forsters entered into a new contract, this time as vendors, selling the land to Van Keulen for $73,000. Of this new purchase price, $36,000 was to be paid in cash and the balance of $37,000 to be paid in monthly installments of $280, including 8% interest on unpaid balances until October 2, 1988, when the entire balance is due.
Thus, the Forsters received a down payment equal to their entire original purchase price for the land. They continue to receive $280 a month from the Van Keulens while paying only $220 to the Blattners. Not only have they recouped their original purchase price, for which they made a $5,000 down payment, they also are retaining $36,-000 in cash while continuing to draw monthly installments. I find this unconscionable and would hold that the fact that the Forsters got a $36,000 down payment on their sale indicates an ability to refinance and pay the balance due the Blattners in 1979. If the Forsters were to pay off the Blattners in full, the Forsters would be left with more than their original cash payment and still have $30,000 to be collected in monthly installments. Moreover, by entering into this new contract for deed arrangement, the Forsters have severely restricted, to their advantage, the opportunities to secure timely institutional financing.
It appears that the three lending institution refusals provided for in the original contract were to serve as evidence of an inability to finance. This inability to finance was more than cured by the acquisition of private financing through a buyer willing to pay more than twice the original purchase price and able to make a down payment in the amount of the original sales price. I would reverse.