Court Opinion

ID: 9476389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:54:52.706493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:24.291282
License: Public Domain

TACHA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is not a case about the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe. This is a case about who decides the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe. In my opinion the majority has incorrectly concluded that a claim of sovereign immunity satisfies the removal jurisdiction requirement that a federal question appear in the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. I would find that the federal courts do not have jurisdiction and that this case should not have been removed from state court.
I.
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborer’s Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a suit filed in state court can be removed to federal court only if the suit could have been filed originally in federal court. “If it appears before final judgment that a case was not properly removed, because it was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed.” Id. at 8, 103 S.Ct. at 2845. Thus, we must decide whether the federal courts would have original jurisdiction over the state’s tax suit against the tribe.
Federal question jurisdiction exists only if the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint establishes that the case arises under federal law. Id. at 9-10, 103 S.Ct. at 2846; see *958also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). It is “settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense”. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 14, 103 S.Ct. at 2848. The Franchise Tax Board Court recognized that:
The [well-pleaded complaint] rule ... may produce awkward results, especially in cases in which neither the obligation created by state law nor the defendant's factual failure to comply are in dispute, and both parties admit that the only question for decision is raised by a federal ... defense. Nevertheless, it has been correctly understood to apply in such situations.
Id. at 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2847-48 (footnote omitted).
It is not disputed that the face of the state’s complaint in this case raises only state tax questions. The majority, however, finds that the state’s attempt “to enforce an essential element of its sovereignty, the power to tax, over an Indian tribe ... underscores the implicit federal question lodged in the state’s complaint.” Maj. op. at 954. I disagree. This is not a case in which the plaintiff has couched a “necessarily federal cause of action solely in state law terms.” 14A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3722 (1985). There are no questions of federal law in the state’s well-pleaded complaint.
“The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2402, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has adopted a per se rule precluding state taxation of Indian tribes and tribal members. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1091 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). Congress, however, can authorize a state to tax an Indian tribe if the congressional intention to do so is unmistakably clear. Montana, 471 U.S. at 765, 105 S.Ct. at 2403. Thus, the tribe argues that because it is necessary for the state to rely upon a grant of congressional authority to tax the tribe, the state has raised a federal question in its complaint.
Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 57 S.Ct. 96, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936), instructs otherwise. In Gully, the state of Mississippi filed suit in state court to collect state taxes from a national bank. The lower courts granted the bank’s petition to remove the action to federal court because “the power to lay a tax upon the shares of national banks has its origin and measure in the provisions of a federal statute, and that by necessary implication a plaintiff counts upon the statute in suing for the tax.” Id. at 112, 57 S.Ct. at 97 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court held that removal was improper. Justice Cardozo wrote:
Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit. The tax here in controversy if valid as a tax at all, was imposed under the authority of a statute of Mississippi. The federal law did not attempt to impose it or to confer upon the tax collector authority to sue for it. True, the tax, though assessed through the action of the state, must be consistent with the federal statute consenting, subject to restrictions, that such assessments may be made. It must also be consistent with the Constitution of the United States. If there were no federal law permitting the taxation of shares in national banks, a suit to recover such a tax would not be one arising under the Constitution of the United States, though the bank would have the aid of the Constitution when it came to its defense. That there is a federal law permitting such taxation does not change the basis of the suit, which is still the statute of the state, though the federal law is evidence to prove the statute valid.
Id. at 115, 57 S.Ct. at 90 (emphasis original) (citations omitted).
Gully establishes that although a state must rely upon federal authorization to tax a particular institution, a suit to collect such taxes does not necessarily raise a *959federal question in the well-pleaded complaint. The majority attempts to distinguish the state tax action in this case from Gully by arguing that a waiver of tribal immunity is part of a well-pleaded complaint. Maj. op. at 954. The case relied upon by the majority, Ramey Construction Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero, 673 F.2d 315 (10th Cir.1982), involved an action brought against an Indian tribe in federal court.1 There was no question of removal jurisdiction in Ramey. Instead, the only question was the sovereign immunity of the tribe. It is true that the tribe is immune from suit in any court unless it has waived its immunity. Such a waiver must be express and clear; it cannot be implied. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 821 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir.1987). It is doubtful that “a tribe can waive its immunity to suit in a state or federal court without congressional authority.” F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 325 (1982 ed.) But Gully makes clear that the need for federal authority to sue a party does not raise a federal question for the purposes of a well-pleaded complaint.
Ramey also acknowledged that “[t]he Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity is co-extensive with that of the United States.” 673 F.2d at 319-20. The determination of federal question removal jurisdiction thus should be the same in cases involving Indian tribes and in cases involving the United States. While federal officials are allowed to remove all suits brought against them to federal court, the basis of removal in those instances is a separate statute rather than a pervasive federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 allows for the removal of actions brought in state court against federal officials acting in their official capacity. The right to remove a case from state court in that instance is absolute; removal takes place even if the action could not have been brought originally in federal court. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 1815, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). That Congress found it necessary to enact a special removal statute authorizing federal court jurisdiction in all cases involving federal officials acting in their official capacities implies that the status of a federal official is not in itself sufficient to create federal jurisdiction. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1819 (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. can remove suits brought against it in state court except in specified situations where the FDIC is the receiver of a state bank). There is no such statute conferring federal jurisdiction in all cases in which an Indian tribe is a party.
Suits against foreign sovereigns are treated similarly to suits against federal officials. In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983), a Dutch corporation sued a Nigerian state bank in federal court for breach of contract. The bank moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because of the state bank’s sovereign status. The Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, expressly provided for suits against foreign sovereigns in federal court. Id. at 489-91, 103 S.Ct. at 1969-70. The Court also observed:
Prior to passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which Congress *960clearly intended to govern all actions against foreign sovereigns, state courts on occasion had exercised jurisdiction over suits between foreign plaintiffs and foreign sovereigns____ Congress did not prohibit such actions when it enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, but sought to ensure that any action that might be brought against a foreign sovereign in state court could also be brought in or removed to federal court.
Id. at 491 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 1970 n. 16 (citations omitted). Congress has not enacted an equivalent provision that would allow the removal of actions brought against an Indian tribe in state court.
II.
Tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional. Ramey, 673 F.2d at 318; see also Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 1058, 1058 (1982) (“The judicial doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity traditionally has protected Indian tribes from suit in state and federal courts.”) (footnotes omitted). The question here is which court decides the question of sovereign immunity. Either the state court or the federal court must have jurisdiction to decide whether sovereign immunity applies in this case. See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 739, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1013, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947) (a court has jurisdiction to determine if it has jurisdiction). As the majority properly recognizes, the federal district court did not acquire the threshold jurisdiction to determine the sovereign immunity of the Chickasaw Nation until the court found that removal from state court was proper. Maj. op. at 954, 955. For the reasons I have described, I conclude that removal was improper in this case. Therefore, I would not reach the question of the sovereign immunity of the tribe.
The implication of the majority’s position is that federal court removal jurisdiction exists whenever “the defendants are asserting the absence of jurisdiction.” Maj. op. at 955. A challenge to state court jurisdiction cannot be sufficient to invoke removal jurisdiction. A federal court obtains removal jurisdiction only when it would have original jurisdiction. Federal law may well determine the result in a state court case, but a showing that a federal question very likely will be dispositive of a case falls short of a showing that the plaintiff’s original cause of action arises under federal law.
III.
This court must afford “proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions presented in state court litigation.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1527, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). The state court is constitutionally obligated to follow the commands of federal law regarding Indian tribal sovereignty. Should the state court fail to do so, the Supreme Court can review that decision on appeal. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2848 n. 12.
Because the state of Oklahoma’s complaint in this case does not raise a federal question, there would be no original jurisdiction in the federal courts, and thus there is no removal jurisdiction. I would hold that this action was improperly removed to federal court and that it should now be remanded to state court.

. Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing Authority, 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.1986), another case cited by the majority, actually undermines the position that the presence of an Indian tribe as a defendant creates a federal question. In Weeks, a tribal housing authority was sued in federal court. The Eighth Circuit held there was no federal question jurisdiction:
[T]he fact that the Housing Authority is created by and operates on behalf of an Indian tribe is not alone sufficient to find the existence of a federal question. See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 249 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir.1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960, 78 S.Ct. 998, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958) (federal question jurisdiction does not exist merely because an Indian is a party or because the suit involves Indian property or contracts). Rather, the rights which Weeks seeks to enforce are based on its construction contract with the Housing Authority, interpretation of which is governed by local, not federal, law____ Because Weeks’ breach of contract claim does not require interpretation of the validity, construction or effect of federal law, no subject matter jurisdiction over the Housing Authority based on a federal question exists here.
Weeks, 797 F.2d at 672 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the state of Oklahoma’s state tax claim does not require a determination of federal law.