Court Opinion

ID: 9474942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:13:01.406366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:25.095459
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court affirming the conviction, but write separately because I believe that the court need not have boldly reached out to examine the question whether third-party consent is a factual issue, subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. The court expressly concludes, after de novo review, that Williams had the authority to consent to the search of the vacation house. See ante at 758 n. 5. We therefore need not entertain this question of admitted difficulty, one which the parties did not address. I believe that some unnecessary conflict is creeping into our opinions following Miller v. Fenton, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985), see United States v. McGinnis, 783 F.2d 755, 759 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1986), and I would refrain from deciding more than we need to decide. Cf. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.1984) (pre-Fenton decision leaving this precise question unresolved because court would affirm under either standard). When the issue is squarely presented, and we have the benefit of counsels’ contributions, this difficult question can be given the careful attention and deliberate consideration it deserves.