Court Opinion

ID: 9528836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:44:35.986677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:23.444928
License: Public Domain

Braucher, J.
(concurring in the result). I agree with the court that the rape-shield law, G. L. c. 233, § 21B, does not abridge the right of a criminal defendant to show that a rape victim had a motive to accuse the defendant falsely. A contrary conclusion would raise a serious constitutional question. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-318 (1974). See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 93 n.3 (1978), and cases cited; Burnim, Massachusetts Rape-Shield Law — An Over-Step in the Right Direction, 64 Mass. L. Rev. 61, 65-72 (1979). But I think the judge should adhere to the policy of the rape-shield law and conduct a preliminary hearing to determine whether the weight and relevance of the evidence offered outweigh its prejudicial effect on the *233victim. In the present case the fact of prior criminal complaints against the victim for prostitution provided a very slender basis for inferring a motive for false accusation, particularly in view of the conceded fact that she ran, naked and bleeding, from the defendant’s car to a police cruiser. But the judge did not hold a preliminary hearing and did not permit the defendant to make an appropriate offer of proof. I therefore agree that the conviction must be reversed.