Court Opinion

ID: 9659069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:31:28.525406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.008175
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority’s holding that McIntosh may recover under the no-fault portion of her automobile policy. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis and result which bars recovery under the uninsured liability portion of her policy. The majority opinion improperly changes the focus for recovery of first-party insurance benefits by attempting to define “accident” depending on the type of coverage sought. This distinction is without merit, and I would permit the plaintiff to recover under both the uninsured liability and the no-fault portions of her policy. The majority’s distinction needlessly and unfairly confounds an already complicated area of insurance law.
In Klug, on facts almost identical to those in this case, we held that the injury arose out of the use and maintenance of a motor vehicle. We have crossed that bridge and do not need to address the issue further. Indeed, the majority recognizes that Klug disposes of the “use and maintenance” issue in this case. In Klug’s wake, the only issue remaining is whether the injury was caused by an “accident” under the statute and the policy so that it is covered under the insured’s no-fault and uninsured motorist liability protection.
The majority begins by distinguishing between liability and no-fault coverage for purposes of defining “accident.” I agree that the insured here “collects under her own policy the compensation that the liability carrier would have paid if the uninsured motorist had been insured.” Majority Op. at 479. However, I think it is disingenuous to claim that, in defining the word “accident” for uninsured motorist coverage, the focus must “be on the conduct of the uninsured motorist.” Id. In my view, the conduct of the uninsured motorist is wholly irrelevant to the determination of an insured’s coverage for first-party benefits bought and paid for by the insured. The majority’s holding will create a whole host of unforeseen difficulties by basing coverage on the state of mind of the uninsured motorist.
In focusing on the uninsured motorist’s conduct, the majority ignores its holding, required by Klug, that the incident here involved the “use and maintenance” of a motor vehicle. Under the majority’s analysis, any time an uninsured motorist acts intentionally to cause harm, the insured is barred from recovery of first-party bene*481fits. Thus, in this case, if Taylor had intentionally driven his automobile into McIntosh’s or had forced her or a third party’s automobile off the road, neither the third party nor McIntosh could recover under the uninsured liability portion of their automobile policies because, from Taylor’s perspective, there was no “accident.” Under the majority’s analysis, I have difficulty conceptualizing any incident which, from the intentional tortfeasor’s perspective, will be an “accident” for purposes of uninsured motorist liability coverage. This stroke is much too broad; it blindly eliminates recovery based on the uninsured motorist’s conduct regardless of the role an automobile plays in the insured’s injury.
The majority notes that uninsured motorist coverage is not no-fault coverage. While this is true, it does not follow that an insured is completely barred from recovery simply because contributory or comparative negligence may reduce an insured’s recovery. This analysis punishes and blames the victim/insured for what, to her, are accidental injuries. The insured’s injuries and expenses arising from them are no less compensable because they are intentionally caused. In fact, comparative-negligence principles are not even applicable in the intentional-tort setting.
Moreover, the purchase of uninsured coverage is an independent act; the coverage attaches to any injury that is caused by an uninsured motorist and arises out of the use and maintenance of a motor vehicle. The insured legitimately expects this coverage whether the injuries are intentionally or negligently caused. I see no great underwriting risk as a result of cases like the present one unless we become a lawless country. Certainly occurrences like the present case are rare. This is precisely the sort of situation that uninsured and no-fault coverage is intended to serve. See Dyer v. American Family Ins. Co., 159 Ill.App.3d 766, 111 Ill.Dec. 530, 512 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (1987) (uninsured motorist coverage “designed for the protection of injured persons, not for the benefit of insurance companies or motorists who cause damage to others”).
In addition, I note that a majority of states agree with this analysis.1 For example, one court noted:
To look through the eyes of the uninsured rather than the insured in [an intentional assault] situation would require an unconscionable twisting of the obvious purpose of purchasing insurance coverage.
All reason and logic would require a construction and interpretation that intent of mind should be taken from the viewpoint of the insured. * * *
Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Saylor, 35 Ohio Misc. 81, 301 N.E.2d 721, 723 (1973); see also Cannon v. Commerce Ins. Co., 18 Mass.App. 984, 470 N.E.2d 805, 806 (1984) (compulsory uninsured motorist coverage designed to protect injured party, not willful operator); Keeler v. Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo.App.1987) (“accident” determined from insured’s perspective); Stucky v. Long, 783 P.2d 500, 503 (Okla.App.1989) (intentional acts of an uninsured tortfeasor may be considered an accident for purposes of uninsured motorists protection when viewed from the perspective of the injured person). Another commentator noted:
While the injury may be intentionally inflicted by the aggressor, to the extent that the assault is unprovoked and/or unexpected from the injured person’s standpoint the damages are just as accidental as if he had been negligently struck. Therefore, there is almost no reason (with the possible exception of the determination of the premium rates, which should be of minimal importance in light of the incidence of such intentional assaults with an automobile) to consider the accident from any viewpoint but that of the injured person, except in the event the claimant provoked the assault.
*482A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, § 2.47 at p. 95 (1969).
Thus, I agree with the amicus in this case and would hold that, in this type of situation, uninsured motorist coverage must focus on the injured party, not on the tortfeasor’s state of mind. It is the injured party who paid a premium for protection against injuries caused by uninsured motorists. Intentional acts are excluded from liability policies so that an insured cannot perform a deliberate act and expect protection from suits by third parties. There is simply no danger of this kind of manipulation when it is the injured party who has purchased the insurance coverage. Thus, the public policy precluding liability coverage to persons who intentionally cause harm does not apply in this type of suit.
For all of these reasons, I would reverse the court of appeals and allow recovery under both the liability and no-fault portions of the policy.

. In fact, except for Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation v. McCarthy, 16 A.D.2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y.App.1962), nearly all the cases I have found from other jurisdictions hold that, with respect to the "accident” issue, the victim’s perspective is controlling. The cases are not as uniform on the "use and maintenance” issue.