Court Opinion

ID: 9730163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:03:15.122724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.625095
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court. I disagree with the dicta which permits a defendant to collaterally attack a prior judgment in an enhancement proceeding.
In State v. Smith, 213 Neb. 446, 449, 329 N.W.2d 564, 566 (1983), we said: “We agree that in an enhancement proceeding, a defendant should not be able to relitigate the former conviction, and to that extent such conviction cannot be collaterally attacked.” In the Smith case we held that a transcript of a conviction which does not show on its face that counsel was afforded or the right waived cannot be used as proof of the prior conviction in accordance with the rule set forth in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980). Baldasar requires only that a prior conviction be shown to have been a counseled one. In the present case the dicta in the majority opinion exceeds the scope of the holding in Baldasar and permits a defendant to collaterally attack a former conviction on other grounds.
This permits a defendant to relitigate the former conviction *51by raising issues which should be raised only upon direct appeal or in a proceeding to set aside the judgment filed in the court where the prior judgment originated. This result places a great burden on the State in proving earlier convictions, particularly when the challenged conviction was rendered in a distant county or in another jurisdiction and witnesses have died, moved away, or otherwise have become unavailable.
Hastings and Caporale, JJ., join in this concurrence.