Court Opinion

ID: 9818964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:16:19.971592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:28.564032
License: Public Domain

Balkin, J.,
dissents and votes to reverse the judgment, on the law, to vacate the plea of guilty, to vacate the amended decision and order dated January 10, 2012, and to remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings, with the following memorandum: As noted by the majority, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, in its entirety, on the ground that the defendant had been denied a speedy trial. The next day, however, the court, sua sponte, issued an amended decision and order, in which it granted the defendant’s speedy trial mó*899tion only as to the first six counts of the indictment. It denied the motion as to the remaining three counts, and did so on a ground that the People had never asserted. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Supreme Court’s sua sponte “do-over” of its order was within the court’s inherent power to correct its own mistake. Accordingly, I find that the defendant’s plea of guilty rests on a jurisdictional defect.
On June 29, 2010, the defendant pointed a gun at Darryl Reid and accused him of not intending to pay a debt. After a brief struggle, the defendant shot Reid in the back of the head, seriously injuring him. On July 1, 2010, two days later, the defendant, once again armed, broke into the home of Reid’s brother, Dwan, and robbed Dwan at gunpoint. On July 19, 2010, a felony complaint was filed with respect to the first incident and, six months later, in February 2011, an entirely separate felony complaint was filed with respect to the second incident. An indictment filed in April 2011 charged the defendant with crimes arising from both incidents.
In October 2011, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he had been denied his statutory right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. In opposition to the motion, the People argued that, although the criminal action had commenced on July 19, 2010, with the filing of the first felony complaint, the defendant’s motion should have been denied because less than six months of delay was chargeable to them under CPL 30.30. In its decision directing a hearing, the Supreme Court agreed with the People that, for the purposes of CPL 30.30, the action had been commenced on July 19, 2010. After the hearing was held, the People submitted another memorandum of law. Again, they unequivocally took the position that the action had commenced on July 19, 2010, stating: “As set forth in the People’s opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the felony complaint in this matter was filed on July 19, 2010. The People had until January 19, 2011, or 184 days, to announce readiness for trial. . . . [S]ince at least 138 days are excludable . . . the People stayed well within the 184 day limit.”
The Supreme Court issued its decision and order on January 9, 2012. The court again held that, for the purposes of CPL 30.30, the action had commenced on July 19, 2010: “[a]t the outset, the Court finds that the instant criminal action commenced on July 19, 2010, upon the filing of a felony complaint in the Yonkers City Court which charged the conduct which is the subject of the instant indictment.” It also held that more than six months of delay was chargeable to the People. *900Therefore, it granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The clerk entered the dismissal order that day.
The next day, however, the Supreme Court issued an amended decision and order. Rather than dismissing the indictment in its entirety, the court, in the amended decision and order, granted the defendant’s motion only with respect to the crimes alleged to have taken place on June 29, 2010. It denied the motion with respect to the crimes alleged to have taken place on July 1, 2010. The court held that, although the criminal action with respect to the incident on June 29, 2010, had commenced on July 19, 2010, with the filing of the first felony complaint, the criminal action with respect to the incident on July 1, 2010, had commenced six months later, in February 2011, with the filing of the second felony complaint. Thus, the court held that, although more than six months were chargeable to the People with respect to the crimes related to the incident on June 29, the People had announced their readiness for trial within six months as to the crimes related to the incident on July 1. The record is silent as to what prompted the amended decision and order.
In November 2012, the defendant pleaded guilty. His primary contention on this appeal is that the Supreme Court no longer had jurisdiction over the case once it dismissed the entire indictment on January 9, 2012. Accordingly, he contends that the amended decision and order dated January 10, 2012, was a nullity, and that he had pleaded guilty when no accusatory instrument was pending.
Preliminarily, as my colleagues implicitly agree, the defendant’s jurisdictional claim survives his otherwise valid waiver of his right to appeal (see People v Zanghi, 79 NY2d 815, 817 [1991]; People v Sze, 113 AD3d 795, 796 [2014]; People v Siminions, 112 AD3d 974, 975 [2013]). That is because a “valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution” (People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99 [1977]; see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227, 230 [2000]; People v David, 95 AD3d 1031, 1031 [2012]; People v Long, 56 AD3d 685, 685 [2008]; People v Flores, 43 AD3d 955, 955 [2007]).
A court has the inherent power to correct its own mistakes, but the extent of that power depends on whether the case is still pending. As the Court of Appeals said in Matter of Van Leer-Greenberg v Massaro (87 NY2d 996 [1996]), “[b]efore sentence is imposed, trial courts in criminal cases have the general inherent authority to correct their own mistakes” (id. at 998; see People v Bartley, 47 NY2d 965 [1979]; People v *901Cimino, 163 App Div 217, 218-219 [1914]). Thus, a court may, in the exercise of its inherent power, rethink a ruling and change its mind, so long as at least part of the case is still pending (see Matter of Lionel F., 76 NY2d 747, 749 [1990]). In People v Lemmons (270 App Div 828 [1946]), for example, the trial court dismissed one of the counts in the indictment during trial, but changed its mind and reinstated that count before the trial ended. On appeal, we held that the court was within its power to rethink its ruling because it had done so while the case was still pending: “It was a proper exercise of the inherent power of the court to correct any errors in its own rulings, provided such correction be made before the termination of the trial or the proceedings” (id. at 828 [emphasis added]; see People v Cimino, 163 App Div at 218-219).
A court’s power to rethink a ruling is much narrower after the case is no longer pending. As the Court of Appeals said long ago in Bohlen v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co. (121 NY 546, 550-551 [1890]), courts “should not, after the final judgment, by amendment, change a ruling upon the law, or alter the decision upon the merits, for, by so doing, the substantial rights of the adverse party would be really affected” (id. at 551 [emphasis added]; see People v Wright, 56 NY2d 613, 614 [1982]; People v Minaya, 54 NY2d 360, 365 [1981]; Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY 323, 327 [1919]). The Court was more categorical in Matter of Campbell v Pesce (60 NY2d 165 [1983]), in which it rejected the contention that a court had the inherent power to vacate a plea after the defendant had already been sentenced: “[i]n no instance have we recognized a court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record and where the proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment” (id. at 169; see Matter of Kisloff v Covington, 73 NY2d 445, 452 [1989]). Further, the law is settled that “a trial court has no revisory or appellate jurisdiction, sua sponte, to vacate its own order or judgment” (Adams v Fellingham, 52 AD3d 443, 444 [2008]; see Carter v Johnson, 110 AD3d 656, 659 [2013]; JSO Assoc., Inc. v Price, 104 AD3d 737, 738 [2013]; People v Brown, 6 AD3d 1210, 1210 [2004]; Osamwonyi v Grigorian, 220 AD2d 400, 401 [1995]; cf. Matter of Shawn H. v Kimberly F., 115 AD3d 744, 745 [2014]).
A “criminal action . . . terminates with the imposition of sentence or some other final disposition in a criminal court of the last accusatory instrument filed in the case” (CPL 1.20 [16] [emphasis added]; see CPL 210.20 [4]). The dismissal of an indictment under CPL 30.30 bars reprosecution of the charges *902in it and constitutes a final disposition of the action (see CPL 1.20 [16]; 210.20 [4]). Thus, when the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion in its entirety on January 9, 2012, its inherent power to rethink its rulings terminated (cf. People v Lemmons, 270 App Div at 828; People v Cimino, 163 App Div at 218-219).
The majority concludes that the Supreme Court had the inherent power to change its mind, even sua sponte, because it did so when a motion for leave to reargue would have been permissible. In support of its conclusion, my colleagues rely on cases from the other Departments (see People v Bigwarfe, 128 AD3d 1170 [2015]; People v Russ, 292 AD2d 862 [2002]; People v Rosa, 265 AD2d 167 [1999]; People v Lynch, 162 AD2d 134 [1990]), but all four cases are distinguishable from what happened here. First, and most important, none of the trial courts in those cases acted sua sponte. In Lynch and Russ, the People moved for leave to reargue. In Bigwarfe, the People made a “letter request to reconsider,” and the court, before ruling on the request, conducted a hearing in which the defendant was given a full opportunity to be heard (People v Bigwarfe, 128 AD3d at 1171). In Rosa, the court had already granted the People leave to re-present the case to the grand jury when the defendant withdrew his dismissal motion and asked the court to reinstate the indictment as part of a plea agreement (People v Rosa, 265 AD2d at 167). Thus, none of those cases supports the proposition that a court may, sua sponte, reinstate an accusatory instrument that it has already dismissed in its entirety.
Second, the issue in Lynch, Russ, and Rosa involved dismissals for defects in the grand jury proceeding, not final dismissals of the actions pursuant to CPL 30.30. Indeed, unlike CPL 30.30 dismissals, which are final, the particular defects in those cases were of the sort that, by statute, may be remedied with leave of the court. Specifically, the Criminal Procedure Law expressly provides that a court may grant the People leave to re-present the case to the grand jury after certain types of dismissals (see CPL 210.20 [4]). In other words, the dismissal of an indictment for certain defects in grand jury proceedings is not necessarily a “final disposition” (CPL 1.20 [16]). The court’s inherent power, accordingly, has not terminated after those dismissals. Indeed, as the First Department has held, when the court, upon review of the grand jury minutes, has dismissed an indictment with leave to re-present, the felony complaint remains pending to form the foundation of the new charges (see People v Wiltshire, 23 AD3d 86, 89 [2005]; People v *903Lopez, 10 AD3d 264, 266-267 [2004], lv granted 3 NY3d 758 [2004]; affd 4 NY3d 686 [2005]). Thus, the action has not terminated at all. The dismissal of an indictment under CPL 30.30, by contrast, is, undeniably, a final disposition.
My colleagues assert that so long as the court has the power to hear reargument, it may change its ruling sua sponte, even where the action has “terminate[d]” (CPL 1.20 [16]). The majority, however, cites no case in which such a sua sponte change of ruling was upheld.
Moreover, as to the majority’s point that the Supreme Court issued its order before the People even had a reasonable opportunity to make a motion for leave to reargue, I note that re-argument would not have been proper in any event because re-argument is not available as a “do-over” for a party that has made the wrong arguments or neglected to present available evidence the first time (People v Kevin W., 22 NY3d 287, 296 [2013], lv granted 19 NY3d 1027 [2012], affd 22 NY3d 287 [2013]; see Matter of Anthony J. Carter, DDS, P.C. v Carter, 81 AD3d 819, 820 [2011]; V. Veeraswamy Realty v Yenom Corp., 71 AD3d 874, 874 [2010]; Woody’s Lbr. Co., Inc. v Jayram Realty Corp., 30 AD3d 590, 593 [2006]; McGill v Goldman, 261 AD2d 593, 594 [1999]). The People argued, before and after the CPL 30.30 hearing, that the action commenced on July 19, 2010, with the filing of the first felony complaint, but that there was sufficient excludable time to bring them within the six-month limit. In its written orders both before and after the CPL 30.30 hearing, the court did not overlook the People’s argument as to the commencement date, but agreed with it. Thus, the court’s change of result was based on a ground that had never been asserted. In other words, what happened here is not even remotely akin to reargument (cf. Matter of Lionel F., 76 NY2d at 749).
Rejection of the majority’s conclusion would not change settled law. It would merely accord with the settled doctrine that a trial court has no “revisory or appellate jurisdiction to vacate its own order, sua sponte” (People v Brown, 6 AD3d at 1210; see Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY at 327; Reisman v Coleman, 226 AD2d 693, 693 [1996]), and certainly has no inherent power to do so after the case has terminated with a final disposition {see CPL 1.20 [16]; Matter of Campbell v Pesce, 60 NY2d at 169; Matter of Kisloff v Covington, 73 NY2d at 452).
In sum, I conclude that the Supreme Court acted in excess of its power when, after terminating the action, it sua sponte issued the amended order (see Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY at 327; People v Brown, 6 AD3d at 1210). Inasmuch as the amended *904order was a nullity, the defendant’s plea of guilty rests on a jurisdictional defect and must be vacated.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.