Court Opinion

ID: 9543661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:51.421561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:50.152284
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Justice
(dissenting).
The questions presented for determination in this case are: Can an action of this, nature be maintained against a sovereign state, and do the constitution and laws of the State waive the immunity of the State from such suit?
It is a general proposition of law that a state by reason of its sovereignty is immune from suit, and it cannot be sued without its consent in its own courts, the courts of a sister state, or by an individual in the Federal Courts. 59 C.J. 300.
This principle was recognized by this court in Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho 8, 71 P. 541, 542, in which the court said:
“That a people in their collective capacity, exercising the rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of sovereignty, cannot be sued except by their consent, is a principle too well established to require *180discussion. If the authority to maintain this action cannot be found either in our constitution or statutes, then the action must fail.”
Appellants contend that the facts alleged constitute a taking of the property which is prohibited by Secs. 13 and 14, Art. 1 of the State Constitution, and further cites Amendments V and XIV of the Constitution of the United States. The parts of the constitutional provisions relied on, and particularly emphasized are:
“No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Sec. 13, Art. 1, Idaho Constitution.
“Private property may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor.” Sec. 14, Art. 1, Idaho Constitution.
“No person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Amendment V, Constitution of the United States.
“ * * * nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; * * *.” Sec. 1, Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States.
It is not contended by appellants that the State by any legislative act, has waived its immunity from suits of this nature, and appellants do not question the general principle that a suit against a sovereignty cannot be maintained without such sovereignty’s consent; but contend that the provisions of the constitution, supra, are self-executing, and may be enforced by the courts independently of any legislative act.
On the question of what provisions of the constitution of a state are self-executing and which are not, the courts of the country are not in accord.
Actions have frequently been brought against governmental bodies based on the theory that injury to private property caused by acts of governmental agents constitute a taking, damage, or use for public purposes, and that under the eminent domain provision of various constitutions, compensation should be paid.
If a recovery is to be allowed, the immunity of a state from suit must be circumvented, and the eminent domain theory is one way of attempting so to do.
In this case it is contended that the act complained of constitutes a taking of private property for a public use, and that, therefore, the provision of the constitution prohibiting the taking of property without compensation is, in effect, a consent to the bringing of an action of this nature.
In some states immunity from suits against a sovereignty has, in certain instances, been waived and permission granted by legislatures for the prosecuting of such claims. Suits brought by express legislative consent are not in point here.
*181Some courts have interpreted similar provisions of state constitutions to be a waiver of the sovereignty from immunity from suit. See Rose v. State, Cal., 105 P.2d 302, 306; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Department, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S. E. 842; Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814; Lage v. Pottawattamie County, 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161.
Courts have held that the total destruction of the value of real property as a necessary result in improving navigation because of the flooding of such land is a taking. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 23 S.Ct. 349, 47 L.Ed. 539; Morrison v. Clackamas County, supra; Clifford v. State, 20 Wash.2d 527, 148 P.2d 302.
A distinction, however, should be made between the damaging of property and the actual taking, and courts have held that the immunity from suit of a sovereign state cannot be circumvented by an eminent domain theory; and where the performance of some public function unrelated to a deliberate taking, damages another’s property, such acts are mere tortious acts, and a suit against the sovereignty cannot be maintained. Hughes v. United States, 230 U.S. 24, 33 S.Ct. 1019, 57 L.Ed. 1374, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 624. Incidental or consequential damages to private property by a sovereign state or its agents acting in a governmental capacity have been held not to be a taking of property and no recovery can be had against the sovereignty. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 125, 43 S.Ct. 37, 67 L.Ed. 165.
In Gearin v. Marion Co., 110 Or. 390, 223 P. 929, it was held that the destruction of a part of plaintiff’s property through the washing away of his building by reason of a flow of logs, trees and stumps across his land caused by their release by defendant county from piers to which they were swept by a freshet, was not a taking of plaintiff’s property.
“To entitle a person to compensation * * * prohibiting the taking of private property for public use * * * there must be an actual taking of property for public use, and not a mere injury to property without a taking.” United States v. Louisville Bridge Co., D.C.Ky., 233 F. 270, 271, 277.
In Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 44 S.Ct. 264, 265, 68 L.Ed. 608, the Supreme Court of the United States held:
“ * * * to create an enforceable liability against the government, it is at least necessary that the overflow be the direct result of the structure, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropriation of and not merely an injury to the property. * * * If the case were one against a private individual, his liability, if any, would be a tort. There is no remedy in such case against the United States.” See also, Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231, 84 L.Ed. 240.
*182In the case of Dougherty v. Vidal, 37 N. Mex. 256, 21 P.2d 90, 92, the Supreme Court said:
“Both legally and practically we consider the state’s immunity from suit too important a matter to be trifled with. ‘A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception of obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.’ ”
In the case of Davis v. State, 30 Idaho 137, 163 P. 373, 374, an irrigation ditch, under the control of the State allowed “large quantities of water to run on and across the plaintiff’s land, doing the damage alleged.” A general demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The court held the complaint did not state a cause of action against the State, and that in the absence of a statute or constitutional provision making the state as a proprietor liable for the acts of its servants, employees or agents, this court is without jurisdiction to grant any relief.
In the case of State v. Twin Falls-Salmon River Land and Water Company, 30 Idaho 41, 75, 166 P. 220, 233, this court said:
“ * * * that the state in dealing with a Carey Act [43 U.S.C.A. §§ 641, 642], project acts by virtue of its sovereignty and not in the capacity of a private owner, and that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be invoked against a sovereign state.”
In the case of Nordby v. Department of Public Works, 60 Idaho 475, 92 P.2d 789, 790, damages were claimed due to the destruction of crops and other property belonging to the plaintiff due to the burning of grass and weeds along the highway from-, which place it spread to the plaintiff’s land. In sustaining a general demurrer, this court, said:
“Is the State liable in damages for alleged negligent acts of its officers and employees performed while in the discharge of a mandatory, governmental duty?
“It is settled law in this state, in the absence of an express statute (as in Idaho) to-that effect, the State is not liable for damages for negligent acts of its officers and employees performed in the discharge of a-mandatory, governmental duty.”
In Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321, 2 A.L.R.2d 666, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
“Destruction of property by fire originating from the negligent operation of disinfecting apparatus by agents of the state department of agriculture is not a taking or damaging for public purposes for which suit may be maintained against the state without legislative consent.”
In the case before us for determination, it may be noted that the Department of Public Works in the construction of the bridge in question had no intention of appropriating any part of plaintiffs’ land for a public use, and it is doubtful if the use for which plaintiffs contend their land was *183taken is a use for which condemnation pro-' ceediugs could be maintained.
The State has not used any part of plaintiffs’ land for any purpose. Plaintiffs’ right to the land was not invaded by any intentional act performed by one of the governmental agencies. Whatever the rule may be elsewhere, it has been held by this court that no recovery can be had for consequential damages. Idaho-Western Railway Co. v. Columbia Conference of Evangelical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60, 38 L.R.A., N.S., 497; Crane v. City of Plarrison, 40 Idaho 229, 232 P. 578, 38 A.L.R. 15.
The method by which private property can be taken for a public use has been provided for by the legislature. Sec. 7-707, I. C. An assessment of damages is provided for by Sec. 7-711, I.C.
These sections necessarily contemplate the ousting of the owner from his possession, and the method is provided for determining the value of the land so taken and the damages to the remainder where that taken is part of a whole tract. Adjacent land, not a part of that taken under a condemnation proceedings and not owned by the person whose land is being condemned, might suffer consequential damages; but where the State or one of the governmental agencies of the State is condemning the land, no provision is provided for paying for such consequential damages.
There was no intention in this case to subject the property of the plaintiffs, or any part of it, to a public use, and no taking of the property resulted from the acts alleged. The acts done by the Department of Public Works were done without any intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. Unintentional damage by said agents, in this case the Department of Public Works, in carrying out a mere public function imposed by law is not a taking under the eminent domain constitutional provision.
The State Constitution expressly negatives the theory that a suit of this nature can be prosecuted in the district court. Sec. 10, of Art. 5 confers on the Supreme Court the power to grant recommendatory judgments for legislative action; and Sec. 18, of Art. 4, confers on the Board of Examiners the power to examine claims against the State and confers on the legislature the power to pass on claims rejected by the Board of Examiners. This remedy, if any, is exclusive.
In whatever form or on whatever theory the action may be based, the fact remains it is an action against the State, for which no constitutional or legislative consent has been given, and therefore the same cannot be maintained in the district court for lack of jurisdiction, and the State has not consented to be so sued.
The damages claimed in this case arise from no intentional act or acts of the State’s agents, but were predicated on a trespass which depreciates or damages the value of the land and the remainder. If the claimants in this case are thus deprived of *184their property, they would have a claim against the State specifically provided for by Sec. 10, Art. 5 of the Constitution for recommendatory judgment, but nowhere in the constitution or laws of the State is the district court, in which this action is brought, given jurisdiction to determine any such a matter. In the absence of a legislative act, the constitutional provision, supra, is exclusive. Davis v. State, supra; State ex rel. Hansen v. Parsons, 57 Idaho 775, 69 P.2d 788.
District courts of the State have neither inherent nor presumptive jurisdiction over the State of Idaho.
In order to hear and determine this matter jurisdiction must be conferred by constitutional or legislative act, and any court, in order to hear and determine a matter, must in the first instance, not only have jurisdiction of the parties, but of the subject matter of the action. District courts have been created and jurisdiction defined by constitutional and legislative act and such district courts cannot have jurisdiction over their creator.
In order to conclude, that the district court has jurisdiction the sovereignty rule supra must of necessity be annulled and set aside. Such a change in concept of governmental immunity would set a precedent of far reaching and now unforeseen claims against the State.
Further, a court cannot of its own motion assume jurisdiction, and cannot hear or determine claims over which it has no jurisdiction. Banbury v. Brailsford, 66 Idaho 262, 158 P.2d 826.
The judgment o-f the district court should be affirmed.