Court Opinion

ID: 9748375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:00:51.550767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.961417
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
While I agree with the majority that Judge Field did not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule when she overruled Judge Gordon’s decision by granting Appellees’ renewed mo*163tion to amend their answers to the complaint, I disagree with the majority’s analysis in reaching that result. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s primary reliance on this Court’s decision in Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 550 Pa. 254, 705 A.2d 422 (1997).
In Riccio, this Court held only that the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not “bar a substituted judge hearing post-trial motions from correcting a mistake made by the trial judge during the trial process.” Id. at 426. We grounded that decision on the simple fact that the entire purpose of the post-trial motion process is to permit the trial court to correct its own errors prior to review by an appellate court. As we explained: “To not allow a judge deciding post-trial motions to overrule legal errors made during the trial process ... would render the post-trial motion rules meaningless and the post-trial motion process would become nothing more than an exercise in futility.” Id.
Unlike Riccio, the instant case does not involve the reconsideration of an issue on post-trial motions. The majority nevertheless believes Riccio to be applicable, apparently understanding it to stand for the broader proposition that departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is appropriate any time the procedural posture of the case has changed and a subsequent judge is in a “superior position to reevaluate” the motion. Majority Op. at 795. However, in Riccio, we gave no consideration to whether the post-trial motions judge had superior information from which to ascertain the correct resolution of the issue before him and I would not extend the rule in that case to incorporate such considerations. In addition, I do not read Riccio to in any way bar the application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule when two motions of the same kind are filed prior to post-trial proceedings. Rather, under those circumstances, I believe that the court must apply the standard set forth in Goldey v. Trustees of University of Pennsylvania, and consider whether an “intervening change in facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question.” 544 Pa. 150, 675 A.2d 264, 267 (1996). That said, in my view, the *164“change in facts” exception set forth in Goldey clearly applies here.1
In Goldey, this Court specifically stated that under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “a later motion should not be entertained or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless intervening changes in facts or the lato clearly warrant a new look at the question.” 675 A.2d at 267 (emphasis added.) Where, as here, the “later motion” was a renewed motion to amend, any changes in the underlying facts are of particular significance because a change in facts is precisely what triggers a party’s right to amend. See Pa. R.Civ. P. 1033. Moreover, a change in facts sufficient to trigger the right to amend can occur “at any time” in the proceedings, based on new evidence either “offered or admitted.” 2 Id. (emphasis added). When such a change of facts occurs, “the right to amend should be liberally granted ... unless there is an error of law or resulting prejudice to an adverse party.” Connor v. Allegheny General Hosp., 501 Pa. 306, 461 A.2d 600, 602 (1983)(quoting Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 189 A.2d 267, 270 (1963)). Under the “error of law” exception, “a court is not required to allow amendment of a pleading if a party will be unable to state a claim on which relief could be granted.” Werner v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 681 A.2d 1331, 1338 (1996).
Here, the first trial judge, without explanation, denied Appellees’ motion to amend on the eve of trial, before he had heard any testimony. At the same time that he did so, the *165judge issued an order denying a motion for summary judgment that Appellees had filed based on the release “on the basis that there exist genuine issues of material fact as stated in Pa. R.C.P. 1035.” 6/2/92 Summary Judgment Order. This second order strongly suggests that the court was not ruling out the possibility that future factual developments might provide the justification necessary for both amendment of the pleadings and entry of judgment in Appellees’ favor based on that release.3 However, when the second trial judge subsequently granted the motion to amend, it was again on the eve of trial, before the court had heard any testimony and, thus, the factual record was unchanged. Under these circumstances, the second judge had no factual or legal basis on which to overrule the first judge, and the Superior Court properly reversed and remanded under the coordinate jurisdiction rule.
When the parties returned to the trial court, with a third trial judge now presiding, Appellees again moved to amend, arguing that they were “now at a different stage of trial,” and, thus, were entitled to relief. N.T., 9/4/98, at 2. Given that the parties were once again at the very same point in the proceedings as they had been the first two times that they moved to amend, and the underlying record facts had not changed in any way, Judge Field rightly refused to grant the renewed motion, explaining on the first day of trial that:
You [the Appellees] don’t like this case. You don’t like Judge Gordon’s ruling. There’s nothing I can do to change it. You don’t have any changed circumstances.
N.T., 9/4/98, at 10. Shortly thereafter, Judge Field reiterated her rationale and invited the parties to renew their motion “at a more appropriate time,” after evidence had been presented to flesh out the issues presented in the motion:
I feel at this time we are basically where Judge Gordon was when he made his decision, and I do not see any way that I could do anything different at this time. That is not to *166preclude you from making a similar motion at a more appropriate time. And I think that there are enough sufficient reasons to consider a hearing, at least a portion of the evidence in this case, too. I think there are some questions in there that at least would require some hearing. So we may come back and reexamine it, but I wanted to be very up [front] with you on it.... [T]he timing of the case leads me to believe that at least some evidence should be heard in this case.
N.T., 9/8/98, at 3-4.
In the days of trial that followed, the facts in support of Appellees’ release defense and the motion to amend were developed and refined. In particular, Appellees developed persuasive record evidence that Appellant sought to collect damages in the medical malpractice action that had, in fact, resulted from her work injury and, thus, were barred by the plain language of the release.4 Appellant described at some length the work-related accident, explaining that a rack had fallen on her in a Pathmark supermarket bakery, causing serious injuries to her head, neck, back, arm, and shoulder. N.T., 9/14/98, at 186-88; N.T., 9/14/98, at 272-77. She testified that she was admitted into the hospital as a result of the accident and that she had not been able to work since that time. N.T., 9/14/98, at 199, 270-71; N.T., 9/15/98, at 68. Appellant also acknowledged at trial that she had instituted a products liability action in connection with her work injury, and that in that action, she alleged that the accident had caused, inter alia, injuries to her head, face, neck, back, shoulders, arms, joints, bones, and skin, as well as disfigurement, poor health, emotional distress, depression, and discomfort. N.T., 9/15/98, at 119-23. Meanwhile, in the medical malpractice action, Appellant sought to collect damages for the *167“symptoms of Cushing’s Syndrome,” including certain weight gain, a so-called “moon face,” skin discolorations, weakness, bone pain, a hump on her back, and facial hair.5 Not only did Appellant admit at trial that these “Cushing’s Syndrome symptoms” did not surface until after her work-related accident, N.T., 9/15/98, at 68-70; N.T., 9/14/98, at 196; N.T., 9/14/98, at 293, but given the breadth of her damages claim in the products liability action, they were clearly subsumed in that claim. As the release in the products liability action covered all injuries, known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, which had resulted from, or might result from the work-related accident, see supra n. 3, like the complaint, it was broad enough to encompass at least some of the injuries for which Appellant sought to recover in the medical malpractice action.
Accordingly, there was more than ample new, enhanced and clarified evidence pursuant to which Judge Field could apply the changed facts exception in Goldey, and conclude that the evidence now established that Appellees could state a cognizable release defense.6 Judge Field was therefore free to overrule the first trial judge and grant Appellees’ motion to amend their answers to assert the release defense. Importantly, Judge Field also considered Appellant’s oral arguments regarding prejudice, see Connor, 461 A.2d at 602 (no right to amend if prejudice results to adverse party), and concluded that no prejudice would result given that Appellant’s “counsel in the prior matter and the instant matter was the same *168attorney” and “[t]here could be no surprise.” 9/30/99 Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.7
Thus, without extending this Court’s limited holding in Riccio, I reach the same result as the majority.

. In addition, as I believe that Goldey's "change in facts” exception applies, I would not resort to reliance on ihe purported "manifest injustice” exception to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which is questionably grounded in dicta in Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (1995). See Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons, J-124-2001 (Nigro, J, dissenting).

. Specifically, Rule 1033 provides:
A party, either by consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at arty time ... amend his pleading. The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new cause of action or defense. An amendment may he made to conform the pleading to the evidence offered or admitted.
Pa. R.Civ. P. 1033 (emphases added).

. In response to the motion to amend. Appellant Barbara Ann Marie Ryan argued, inter alia, that the release did not provide a valid defense and, thus, the proposed amendment would be futile.

. The release provided that:
IT IS A FULL AND FINAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS and shall apply to ALL KNOWN AND UNKNOWN INJURIES and anticipated and unanticipated injuries and damages resulting, or to result, or which might result from said accident, casualty or event, as well as to those now known or disclosed.
Release, at 1 (emphasis in original).

. In her initial pretrial memo in the instant case, Appellant alleged that "Defendants' negligence caused these symptoms [of Cushing’s Syndrome] to become progressively worse.... In consequence, [Appellant] became obese, moon-faced with blotchy skin and striae, buffalo-humped and otherwise disfigured, with resulting humiliation and embarrassment causing her to become reclusive, depressed and anxious. Her endocrine system was thrown into disorder, causing ... aggravated injuries in work accident....” 4/16/90 Plaintiff's Pre-trial Conference Memorandum at 7-8.

. As the majority acknowledges, Judge Field "was in a superior position to reevaluate the question of the products liability release and its relation to the medical malpractice case than was the pretrial judge who made the initial decision.” Maj. Op. at 795.

. In no way should this opinion be read to suggest that a litigant is required to prove a defense in order to establish its right to amend the pleadings to add the defense. As our prior case law makes clear, the right to amend should be "liberally granted," Schaffer, 189 A.2d al 270, and absent prejudice to the adverse party, a court should only deny a motion to amend when the party seeking amendment “will be unable to state a claim on which relief could be granted.” Werner, 681A.2d at 1338. This standard is similar to that of a demurrer and does not require proof of the facts underlying the claim or defense asserted. However, where, as here, a trial judge apparently erred by holding a party seeking amendment to too high of a standard, and facts subsequently developed at trial .make clear that the proposed claim or defense is viable, a succeeding trial judge may use those facts to support the reversal of the first judge, so long as the judge also properly concludes that no prejudice will result to the opposing party.