Court Opinion

ID: 9466820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:29:06.443856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:58.931204
License: Public Domain

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the majority’s holding that plaintiff’s claims do not state a cause of action under clauses A, C, and D of Section 1985(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decision that a cognizable claim is presented under clause B of Section 1985(2).
The wording of clause B forbids two or more persons from conspiring to “injure [a] party or witness in his person or property on account of his having . . . attended or testified” in a court of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). As the majority properly recognizes, plaintiffs did not allege any injury by virtue of having attended or testified in federal court. Instead, plaintiffs alleged that they were injured because they filed workmen’s compensation claims in federal and state courts or before state and federal administrative tribunals. In the district court, Judge Rubin held that such allegations did not state a cause of action under clause B. Specifically, he wrote that:
The Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice Act does not create a claim for every conspiracy entered into with intent to deny a citizen access to a court, or to retaliate against a citizen for his utilization of the federal court system. If they are to come within the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs must allege that they were injured on account of having attended or testified in federal court. This they have not done. They allege that they suffered injury on account of having filed claims in federal court, or in state court, or with workmen’s compensation boards created under federal or state law. Nowhere do they contend that defendants discriminated against them — “blacklisted” them — on account of their attendance or testimony in federal court. They reiterate, indeed, that such discrimination was causally related to the filing of claims. At most, the conspiracy charged was aimed at injuring the plaintiffs on account of their having asserted a claim or filed a lawsuit. Congress did not undertake to make that behavior actionable.
[ 7 ] It can be argued with some cogency that the Congress ought to protect access to all federal courts, and make it tortious for anyone to retaliate against a person for using those courts. But Section 1985(2) does not, in its broadest possible reading, prohibit such conduct. Because the action is based on a statute, we *1071need not consider the extent to which the Constitution may implicitly compel the government to provide unrestricted access to federal courts or the question whether the denial of any such right would create a cause of action for damages in tort. See United States v. Kras, 1973, 409 U.S. 434, 93 S.Ct. 631, 34 L.Ed.2d 626, involving an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality of exacting a filing fee before bankruptcy proceedings could be commenced where the constitutional nexus (the Bankruptcy Clause) was held insufficient to ground an individual right.
There is little doubt that the Constitution grants authority to the Congress to enact legislation that would prohibit retaliation against a person for resorting to federal court. In the Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice Act it has undertaken to make actionable conduct aimed at deterrence of, or retaliation for, attendance or testimony in federal court; it might go further and forbid retaliatory conduct aimed at the filing of a federal lawsuit or assertion of a federal claim. Whether or not it has the power to make it a federal tort to retaliate against a person for resorting to state legal procedures is an issue that need not be faced here. There is no federal tort law. Nor does the plaintiffs’ suit rely upon general tort law. State law may — or may not — make tor-tious the kind of conduct alleged. Plaintiffs cause of action in this court, however, rests on Section 1985(2), and that statute does not extend to the action complained of.
Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 445 F.Supp. 269, 276-77 (E.D.La.1978) (footnotes omitted).
The majority rejects Judge Rubin’s reading of the “attended or testified” language of the statute finding it unnecessarily narrow. Instead, the majority interprets “attendance” to include the initial act of filing a lawsuit since “Congress undoubtedly intended to protect the whole course of justice, not just one segment of the system, the trial process.” The majority adopts this expansive reading in light of the need “to protect the sanctity of federal court proceedings.”
As Judge Rubin noted, the question presented in this case is not whether Congress possesses the power to enact legislation forbidding retaliatory conduct against a party for filing suit in federal courts. Rather, the issue is limited to determining whether the existing language of Section 1985(2) achieves that result. In my view, the language of the statute does not reach the allegations contained in the present suit. Accordingly, I would affirm Judge Rubin's opinion in its entirety.
Section 1985(2) has not generated much litigation. See Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1976) (construing the “perfidious syntax of § 1985(2) with some reserve” given the “dearth of authority to light our way”). The majority of decisions arising under Section 1985 have involved Section 1985(3). In this regard, the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971) is instructive. In Griffin, the Court for the first time held that Section 1985(3) reached conspiracies by private parties to deny others the equal protection of the laws. Yet, the Court carefully delineated the cause of action cognizable under Section 1985(3). “The constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting Section 1985(3) as a general federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the congressional purpose — by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed by the sponsors of the limiting amendment. . . . [Tjhere must be some racial, or perhaps, otherwise class-based, animus behind the conspiratorial actions.” Griffin, supra, 403 U.S. at 101-02, 91 S.Ct. 1798.
In accordance with Griffin, this court has limited cases brought under Section 1985(3) to those alleging racial or class-based animus. In McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), we considered a claim by an employee that he was discharged for filing a peti*1072tion in bankruptcy in contradiction of company rules. Relying on Griffin, the en banc court held that the plaintiff’s allegations did not state a cause of action under Section 1985(3). We stated that:
The Ku Klux Act1 was passed amid the lawless conditions existing in the South after the Civil War. A major aim of the legislation ‘was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.’ It is readily apparent from the title of the bill itself, ‘An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . .,’ that the key concern of the legislators was to put force behind the Civil War Amendments by providing an avenue for the redress of injuries suffered by the class of newly emancipated slaves. Nowhere have we seen it suggested that Congress was concerned about discrimination being practiced against insolvents.
McLellan, supra, 545 F.2d at 932 (footnotes omitted). Ironically, under today’s majority opinion, the plaintiff in McLellan could have avoided dismissal of his lawsuit simply by adding an allegation asserting jurisdiction under Section 1985(2) since the alleged discrimination in that case arose from the filing of a federal bankruptcy action.
To be sure, both Griffin and McLellan involved cases arising under Section 1985(3) and not Section 1985(2). This fact, however, does not render the cases inapplicable to the present dispute. Indeed, this court has held that Griffin’s racial or class-based animus requirement is fully applicable to claims brought pursuant to the clauses C and D of Section 1985(2). Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1262, modified, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978). See Dacey v. Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1978); Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 469 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 54 (1976). Furthermore, in Jones v. United States, 401 F.Supp. 168 (E.D.Ark. 1975), aff’d, 536 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 735, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977), the district court held that Griffin’s requirements also applied to actions brought under the first part of Section 1985(2). The court reasoned that since the Congressional history relied on by the Supreme Court in Griffin was generally applicable to all of Section 1985, the concern evidenced by the limitation to racial and class-based animus should apply in all cases brought under Section 1985(2) as well as in Section 1985(3). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding.
The majority rejects the view that actions brought under clause B require racial or class-based animus since that clause does not contain language paralleling Section 1985(3)’s proscription of a conspiracy denying others the equal protection of the laws. Since Congress failed to include the equal protection language in clause B of Section 1985(2), Congress must have intended to protect the entire process of litigation without any racial or class-based animus requirement. The majority’s reasoning is unpersuasive. Even assuming that the difference in language between clause B of Section 1985(2) and Section 1985(3) compels a holding that clause B does not necessitate a racial or class-based animus requirement, the majority’s ultimate conclusion that clause B protects persons who file lawsuits in federal courts does not follow. Griffin evidenced a general concern that actions brought under Section 1985 must be carefully delineated in accordance with the statutory purposes of the Act. The specific limitations applied in Griffin for Section 1985(3) suits may not be applicable to clause B of Section 1985(2), but Griffin’s general concern for carefully defining the contours of Section 1985 litigation in order to avoid the creation of generalized federal tort law is fully applicable. In my view, Judge Rubin’s construction of the language in clause *1073B is precisely the carefully balanced interpretation required by Griffin.
The need to limit actions brought under the first part2 of Section 1985(2) is aptly demonstrated by the Third Circuit’s opinion in Brawer. In that case, the court considered a claim that the defendants conspired to use perjured testimony and to conceal exculpatory evidence in order to influence the verdict of the jury. Jurisdiction was alleged under the first part of Section 1985(2). After holding that racial or class-based animus was not required, the Third Circuit found that other limitations existed to define the cause of action under Section 1985(2). “We understand the first part of § 1985(2) to concern itself with conspiratorial conduct that directly affects or seeks to affect parties, witnesses or grand or petit jurors. The allegations of this complaint are different in kind. At best, the allegation is that the conspiracy ‘influenced’ the jurors by precluding them from considering fully accurate evidence. We deem this ‘influence’ to be too remote to fit within the intended ambit of § 1985(2).” Brawer, supra, 535 F.2d at 840. See Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1979). When applied to the allegations in this case, Brawer supports Judge Rubin’s interpretation of clause B.
It is axiomatic that our analysis of statutory law “must begin with the language of the statute itself.” Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977). The plain meaning of the word “attend” supports Judge Rubin's interpretation. Attend, simply put, means “to be present at.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 140 (3d Ed. 1961).
Also, consideration of the legislative history supports the view that Congress intended the word “attend” to be given its ordinary meaning. Passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act was “motivated by a desire to prevent and punish acts of terror or intimidation that threatened the attempt to create a political environment hospitable to equality.” Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 405 (1979). In light of the actual acts of violence that threatened the sanctity of federal courts, Congress meant Section 1985(2) to protect a party based on his physical presence while attending or testifying in court. In this case, no allegations were made that plaintiffs were injured because they attended or testified in federal court. Given the background of violence and direct intimidation prevalent at the time of the original passage of Section 1985(2) the majority nevertheless and without any specific reference to Congressional history, finds that Congress intended to create a federal tort remedy for an employer’s economic use of public information relating to the filing of federal lawsuits. Section 1985(2) was not designed as a vehicle to remedy such allegedly tortious acts of employers against employees pursuing workmen’s compensation claims. Rather, it was intended to protect against direct violations of a party’s right to attend or testify in federal court. This clear Congressional purpose is best served by construing the statutory language in its ordinary meaning so that only direct interference with the federal courts is prohibited in accordance with the general concerns enunciated by Griffin. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s construction of clause B of Section 1985(2).

. The present language and structure of Section 1985(2) evolved from Section 2 of the Ku Klux Act of 1871. See B. Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States: Civil Rights (Part 1) 591 (1970). Minor grammatical changes and restructuring were made in 1874.

. While the majority and Judge Rubin separated Section 1985(2) into four subparts, other courts and commentators have considered Section 1985(2) as being divided into two parts separated by the semi-colon appearing in the middle of the Section. The first part, encompassing clauses A and B in the majority’s structure, concern conspiracies against persons with respect to federal courts, whereas the second part, involving clauses C and D in the majority’s analysis, concerns conspiracies in relation to state courts. See generally Comment, Private Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(b) for Conspiracies to Impede the Due Course of Justice, 27 Kansas L.Rev. 621, 625 (1979).