Court Opinion

ID: 9853463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:49:17.865991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.363754
License: Public Domain

IKUTA, Circuit Judge,
with whom BYBEE and BEA, Circuit Judges, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In parts II and III of the majority’s opinion, the majority equates the undefined phrase “term of imprisonment” and the defined term “sentence of imprisonment.” Because this is contrary to the plain language of the Guidelines, I dissent.
I
In 2002, Emilio Gonzales was sentenced to thirty days in jail — which jail time was completely suspended — on a conviction for driving with a suspended license. At sentencing on the instant offense, the district court added a criminal-history point for this 2002 conviction, pursuant to § 4A1.1(c) of the Guidelines.
Section 4A1.1(c) instructs courts to “[a]dd 1 point for each prior sentence. ....” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c) (2002). Commentary to § 4A1.1(c) tells us that § 4A1.2(a) provides a definition of “prior sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), cmt. n. 3.1
In defining “prior sentence,” § 4A1.2(a) states, “[t]he term ‘prior sentence’ means any sentence previously imposed ... for conduct not part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Section *9484A1.2(a)(3) states that even totally suspended sentences fall under this definition of “prior sentence” for purposes of § 4A1.1(c) and thus require the addition of one criminal point. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(3) (“A conviction for which the imposition or execution of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior sentence under § 4A1.1(e).”).
There are, however, exceptions to this framework. Specifically, the commentary to § 4A1.1(e) notes an exception to the application of the one additional criminal-history point for certain non-felony offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), cmt. n. 3. This commentary instructs the court to turn to § 4A1.2(e)(1) for more information. Id. Section 4A1.2(c)(1) tells the court that for purposes of computing criminal history “[sentences for the following prior offenses and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, are counted only if ... the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.... ” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). “Driving ... with a suspended license” is on the list that follows. Id.
Applying this exception to the case at hand, we are asked to determine whether Gonzales’s 2002 thirty-day suspended sentence for driving with a suspended license was “a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). If yes, the sentence is counted toward his criminal history; if no, it is excluded.
II
“[Tjerm of imprisonment” is not defined in the Guidelines. “In the absence of controlling authority, we turn to the plain language of the guidelines.” United States v. Brownstein, 79 F.3d 121, 123 (9th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir.1998). We have customarily used “term of imprisonment” to mean the time period or length of the imprisonment imposed by the court when sentencing the defendant, even where the sentence imposed is suspended in whole or part. See, e.g., Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 915 (9th Cir.2006) (“After Hughes testified against Hovey, Meloling communicated with the San Francisco D.A.’s office, which then revised its offer to Hughes. He received a suspended sentence, but the term of imprisonment offered as part of the deal was actually increased from three years to four years and eight months.”); United States v. Carter, 827 F.2d 546, 546 (9th Cir.1987) (“On January 19,1981, the court sentenced Carter to a three-year term of imprisonment, all but twenty days of which was suspended.”); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir.1987) (“Berry was originally sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and a three-year special parole term; the district court suspended the execution of all but six months of the term of imprisonment.”).
Thus, under the plain meaning of the Guidelines, when a court sentences a defendant to 30-days jail time, it is a “term of imprisonment” that must be factored into a defendant’s criminal-history score, even if it was for a non-felony offense listed in § 4A1.1(e). In this context, it is irrelevant whether a term of imprisonment imposed by the court was totally suspended, because § 4A1.2(a)(3) states that “[a] conviction for which the imposition or execution of sentence was totally suspended or stayed shall be counted as a prior sentence under § 4A1.1(c).”
In this case, the term of imprisonment imposed by the court for Gonzales’s 2002 conviction for driving with a suspended license was 30 days. Accordingly, this non-felony conviction is not excepted by § 4A1.2(c)(l), and the district court was *949correct in assigning a criminal-history point for this prior sentence.
This plain language reading makes it clear that the phrase “term of imprisonment” as used in § 4A1.2(c)(l) is not ambiguous. Nor does the majority claim that it is. Accordingly,
[o]nce it recognized that the statute is unambiguous, the panel should have stopped, for it is a paramount principle of statutory construction that [wjhere [a statute’s] language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 448 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (quotation marks omitted); see also Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 878 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).
Ill
Instead of applying the plain language of the Guidelines as written, the majority concludes that context, grammatical structure, and a well-placed ellipsis require reading the phrase “term of imprisonment” as having the same meaning as the phrase “sentence of imprisonment.” See Maj. Op. at 944 (“[T]here is no meaningful distinction discernable between the phrase ‘the sentence was ... a term of imprisonment’ and the phrase ‘sentence of imprisonment. ...’”).
The majority is mistaken. According to “a well-established canon of statutory interpretation ... the use of different words or terms within a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different meaning for those words.”2 SEC v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir.2003) (collecting cases); see also Legacy Emanuel Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Shalala, 97 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.1996) (“Indeed, the use of different language by Congress creates a presumption that it intended the terms to have different meanings.”). A “decision to use one word over another ... is material,” and “is a decision that is imbued with legal significance and should not be presumed to be random or devoid of meaning.” McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656. Because the Sentencing Commission decided to use the undefined phrase “term of imprisonment” in § 4A1.2(c)(1), and a different, defined phrase, “sentence of imprisonment,” in § 4A1.2(b), we must presume that the Sentencing Commission intentionally used different phrases and gave them different meanings.
The fact that the Sentencing Commission created a separate definition for the phrase “sentence of imprisonment” supports this presumption. Courts typically use the phrase “term of imprisonment” and “sentence of imprisonment” interchangeably to refer to the period of confinement ordered by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135, 137 (3d Cir.2004) (“A sentence of imprisonment of 135 months was imposed on the convictions for carjacking and possession of a firearm by a drug user, to be followed by a mandatory 240 month term of imprisonment for use of a firearm during a crime of violence.”); United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427-28 (5th Cir.2003) (“The key to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is whether the defendant receives a sentence of imprisonment. ... A defendant who receives a suspended sentence is given a term of *950imprisonment, while a defendant who receives a stand-alone sentence of probation is not.”); Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir.2002) (“The statute that governs the manner in which multiple sentences of imprisonment may be imposed is 18 U.S.C. § 3584, which states in subsection (a): ... [‘]If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time.... [’]”).
In order to instruct courts to deviate from the common usage of “sentence of imprisonment,” the Guidelines give this phrase a distinct meaning under the “Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. As used in computing criminal history, “ ‘sentence of imprisonment’ means a sentence of incarceration and ... refers only to the portion that was not suspended.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(b)(1)-(2). In other words, a “sentence of imprisonment” for criminal-history purposes, is not the length of imprisonment imposed, but the length of the imprisonment imposed less any suspended portion.
There is nothing in the Guidelines that permits the usurpation of this definition for use in § 4A1.2(c)(1). If the Sentencing Commission had wanted to use the phrase “sentence of imprisonment” with its associated, non-obvious definition in § 4A1.2(c)(1), it could have done so. It did not, compelling the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission did not intend “term of imprisonment” to have the same meaning as “sentence of imprisonment.” Thus, the majority’s conclusion that “there is no meaningful distinction” between the phrases “the sentence was ... a term of imprisonment” and “sentence of imprisonment,” Maj. Op. at 944, requires a strained interpretation of these phrases.
The majority does not suggest the Sentencing Commission’s use of the undefined phrase “term of imprisonment” in § 4A1.2(c)(1) is unreasonable. Nor could it. The “purpose of § 4A1.2(c)(1) ... is to assign criminal-history points to defendants who have received substantial sentences for the otherwise minor offense listed in the provision.” United States v. Ramirez, 421 F.3d 159, 166 (9th Cir.2005). The Sentencing Commission could reasonably conclude that a crime is sufficiently serious to receive a criminal-history point when a court sentences a defendant to 30 days, even if that sentence is suspended. Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that suspended sentences should not be trivialized. Because a suspended sentence may “end[ ] up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty,” such a sentence is essentially equivalent to actual imprisonment for purposes of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 122 S.Ct. 1764, 152 L.Ed.2d 888 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). This precedent suggests that an offense can also be serious enough to count for criminal history purposes even when the defendant received a suspended sentence.
Moreover, although the majority notes that its interpretation of “term of imprisonment” is based in part on its context, see Maj. Op. at 944-45, a plain reading of § 4A1.2(c)(1) in context actually supports the conclusion that “term of imprisonment” refers to the term imposed. As noted above, § 4A1.2(c)(1) instructs courts to count certain offenses only if “the sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.” The parallel structure of this provision raises the inference that the Sentencing Commission intended to give the same meaning to the word “term” in “term of probation” and the word “term” in “term of imprisonment.” As recognized by two of our sister circuits, the plain meaning of the phrase “term of *951probation” means the time period or length of the probation imposed by the court when sentencing the defendant. See United States v. Boyd, 146 F.3d 499, 500-02 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that one year of court supervision and a fine amounts to a term of probation of at least one year for purposes of § 4A1.2 even where the supervision was vacated after six months and only a fine imposed); United States v. Baker, 116 F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that a defendant who had been sentenced to “one year or until the assessed fines and restitution were paid ” had received a “term of probation of at least one year” for purposes of § 4A1.2 (italics in original)). Unless we strain the language of the Guidelines still further to hold that the definition for “sentence of imprisonment” also applies to “term of probation,” and thus split from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, we will be left to read the word “term” in § 4A1.2(c)(1) as having different meanings when applied to prison terms as opposed to probation terms.
Finally, I give little weight to the fact that the government (and not just Gonzales) recently supported the majority’s interpretation. The government conceded at oral argument that it took the opposite position just a few years ago in United States v. Williams, 291 F.3d 1180, 1195 (9th Cir.2002). To the extent the government’s new position reflects different policy goals, we should not be persuaded to sidestep the plain language of the Guidelines to effectuate these goals. We must interpret the plain language of the Guidelines, and if the government thinks different language would make for better policy, it should take its case to the United States Sentencing Commission, not to this court. After all, “the courts’ role is to give effect to the statutes as ... enact[ed] ...; it is not the courts’ role to assess whether a statute is wise or logical.” Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309, 448 F.3d at 1096 (Bybee, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision on the treatment of Gonzales’s 2002 conviction under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). I concur, however, in the majority’s holding on Gonzales’s § 2K2.1(b)(5) argument.

. "Commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” United States v. Thornton, 444 F.3d 1163, 1165 n. 3 (9th Cir.2006) (quotations omitted).

. We use traditional canons of statutory construction to interpret the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Soberanes, 318 F.3d 959, 963 n. 4 (9th Cir.2003).