Court Opinion

ID: 9543598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:56.487759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:39.761210
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge,
dissenting:
Because I do not think the plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing substantial prejudice, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse and remand.
Even if I were persuaded that the trial court’s action in excluding Dr. Shroder from testifying was an abuse of discretion,1 the plaintiffs still must establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result at trial would have been different without his testimony. Batt v. State, 28 Utah 2d 417, 503 P.2d 855, 859 (1972); Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2d 240, 244 (1955). “No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Utah R.Civ.P. 61. Absent any showing by plaintiffs that the outcome would have differed, every reasonable presumption as to the validity of the verdict below must be taken as true upon appeal. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982). The majority opinion ignores the language of Rule 61 and the cases which have interpreted that rule as placing the burden on the complaining party to establish substantial prejudice, and instead relies upon a 1957 case for the proposition that if we cannot decide that there was prejudice, we must reverse the decision of the trial court and order a new trial.2
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the jury was deprived of hearing relevant information because the trial court excluded Shroder’s testimony. Plaintiffs further allege that Shroder should have, at a minimum, been allowed to testify as a rebuttal witness.3 Plaintiffs’ only mention of the ■ prejudice *299suffered by them is the mere assertion that Shroder’s testimony was “crucial to plaintiffs’ case.” Plaintiffs did not petition for an extraordinary writ and chose instead to take their chances and proceed to trial. They made no attempt to offer the Shroder testimony on rebuttal.4 It was only after they lost at trial, that plaintiff objected to the exclusion of the Shroder testimony.
Plaintiffs in this case have failed to provide this court with any basis for declaring that the trial court’s exclusion of Shroder’s testimony was prejudicial to the extent that without the exclusion, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different.5 Because plaintiffs fail to meet this burden, their contention is without merit. See Ashton, 733 P.2d at 154. I would affirm the trial court, and thus dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial.

. However, the majority’s reliance upon Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in reaching this conclusion is misplaced. I agree with the majority that the trial court had not entered an order regarding discovery, and that therefore, no discovery order was violated. See Henderson v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 114 Ill.App.3d 754, 70 Ill.Dec. 595, 597, 449 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1983) (no order for discovery so court could not sanction for discovery violation). But the trial court did not cite Rule 37(b) as justification for excluding the Shroder testimony. The trial court stated that because plaintiffs admitted having known about the witnesses "a long time ago” and had failed to designate who they were, those witnesses would be excluded from testifying.
It is just as conceivable that the trial court decided to exclude the testimony because it felt plaintiffs had consistently proceeded in bad faith in preparing for trial. On August 1, fourteen days before the twelve-day trial was to commence, plaintiffs disclosed they intended to call an additional seventy-eight witnesses (through live testimony or deposition). The trial court excluded the testimony of only three of these witnesses. The trial court then ordered plaintiffs to designate what portions of the 75 depositions they intended to read, but did not exclude this testimony.

. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330, 333 (1957), upon which the majority opinion relies, held that because the trial court allowed certain notes to be admitted into evidence, it should also have allowed counsel to ‘‘elaborate] for the benefit of those uninitiated in the mysteries of medical terminology.” Instead, the trial court had sustained defendant's objection to allowing plaintiff to read and use the notes in his argument. The case was remanded for a new trial, and the jury again returned a verdict of no cause of action. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935, 936 (1960). When the case was appealed for a second time, the supreme court stated firmly that "[t]he burden is upon the appellant not only to show that there was error, but that it was prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.” Id. 348 P.2d at 938. This is the same burden which I recognize as being on plaintiffs in the instant case.

.Plaintiffs offered no rebuttal witnesses at trial and the record does not support plaintiffs’ contention that they were precluded from introducing Shroder as a rebuttal witness. The trial court in fact, at the August 3rd hearing, told counsel for plaintiffs that while the excluded evidence could not be used as part of the casein-chief, the court was not foreclosing the possibility of using the testimony "to impeach or for some other purpose, if there is a dispute in testimony.”

. Plonkey, the Arizona case cited by the majority opinion, involved facts much different than those before us. There, the plaintiff, whose witness had been excluded by the trial court for similar reasons, did petition for review of that decision before the trial commenced, utilizing a writ of mandamus. We do not suggest that had the plaintiffs petitioned the trial court for a similar writ, a new trial would then be appropriate. We simply point out that plaintiffs did not exhaust all remedies available to them, nor did they attempt to introduce Shroder’s testimony on rebuttal.
Further, the trial court’s ruling in this case could not have been as unexpected as plaintiffs would have us believe. At a hearing on June 27, the trial court warned the parties that if they did not disclose their witnesses, it would make an order that they could not testify.

. See Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Utah 1988) (Zimmermann, J. concurring) (any error by trial court in excluding evidence was not shown to have "sufficiently undermined the outcome”); Redevelopment Agency v. Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App.1987) (even if it is determined on appeal that a trial court erred, "we must also consider whether or not the error was prejudicial”); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987) (appellant must establish "not only that an error occurred, but that it was substantial and prejudicial in that appellant was deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the disputed issues by the jury”); Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 529 (Utah App.1990) ("Even if we assume that the admission of [the expert's] testimony constituted error, plaintiff fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Any error in the admission of evidence must be disregarded unless it substantially affects the substantial rights of the parties.’’); cf. Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990) (cumulative effect of trial court’s errors in excluding evidence substantially prejudiced defendants’ rights); Kott v. City of Phoenix, 158 Ariz. 415, 763 P.2d 235 (1988) (trial court’s decision to allow officer to testify who had been unidentified to other side before trial was reversible error since admission of evidence was erroneous and error not harmless).