Court Opinion

ID: 9380211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:01:04.210548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.424814
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2000    Document: 010110828134   Date Filed: 03/17/2023   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Tenth Circuit
                                     PUBLISH
                                                                       March 17, 2023
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                    No. 22-2000

  STEVEN O’NEIL,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                     _________________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the District of New Mexico
                     (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-01832-JCH-1)
                    _________________________________

 Jason Bowles of Bowles Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
 Defendant – Appellant.

 Tiffany L. Walters, Assistant United States Attorney (Alexander M.M.
 Uballez, United States Attorney, with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New
 Mexico, for Plaintiff – Appellee.
                        _________________________________

 Before CARSON, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.

                          _________________________________

 ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.
                  _________________________________

       After the government charged Mr. Steven O’Neil with violating the

 federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he moved to
Appellate Case: 22-2000   Document: 010110828134    Date Filed: 03/17/2023   Page: 2

 suppress eyewitness identification evidence and a gun seized from his

 backpack. The district court denied the motions. Mr. O’Neil now appeals,

 making two arguments. First, he contends the identifications should have

 been excluded because they were unreliable. Second, he contends the district

 court erred in concluding the gun would have been inevitably discovered

 during an inventory search. We disagree with Mr. O’Neil on both issues.

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.1

   I.    Background2

    A.       Factual History

         On December 1, 2018, a little after 9 p.m., college student Matthew

 Salmon and his friend Cagsu Caglar planned to have dinner at a dining hall

 on the University of New Mexico (“UNM”) campus. Mr. Salmon drove them to

 campus in his two-door coupe and parked at a UNM parking lot. Mr. Salmon

 then got out of the car to pay for parking; Ms. Caglar stayed in the passenger

 seat. Although it was dark, the parking lot was illuminated.

         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel
         1

 unanimously determined to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the
 briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case was
 therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

       We derive the background facts from the district court’s
         2

 comprehensive factual recitation in its memorandum and order on the
 motions to suppress. ROA, vol. I at 153-92.
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       While Ms. Caglar waited in the car, she saw a man a few parking

 spaces away looking into vehicles and carrying what she thought was a black

 handgun. After a minute and a half, the person approached and put his face

 about two inches from the passenger window. Ms. Caglar looked at the man’s

 face for ten to fifteen seconds.

       When Mr. Salmon returned, the man was still standing at the

 passenger-side door. The two locked eyes across the roof of the car for thirty

 seconds to one minute. During this period of “hard eye contact,” the man

 pointed a gun at Mr. Salmon and removed the magazine, demonstrating the

 clip was loaded. ROA, vol. I at 154. Mr. Salmon later testified he was familiar

 with guns and thought the weapon “looked like a 9-millimeter.” ROA, vol. III

 at 15. Mr. Salmon then got back into the car and exited the parking lot.

       As Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar drove away from campus, Ms. Caglar

 called 911 and was transferred to the UNM Police Department. During the

 call, Mr. Salmon turned the car around and headed toward the university

 police station—about a one-minute drive from the parking lot where the

 confrontation had just occurred. At the station, Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar

 described the person they had just encountered as a man with a slender build

 and facial hair wearing a black hoodie and carrying a black handgun.

       Several officers from the UNM Police Department, including Officer

 Nathan Lerner and Officer Tim Delgado, then drove to the scene of the

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 encounter. Once at the UNM parking lot, Officer Lerner saw a man who

 matched the descriptions provided by Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar. The man

 sat on a bench, wearing a hoodie, and holding a black object, which Officer

 Lerner thought “was the black Glock.” ROA, vol. III at 46, 63; ROA, vol. I at

 155. There was a backpack on the bench.3

       Officer Lerner told the suspect to put his hands up, but he did not

 comply. Instead, he stood and walked toward Officer Lerner. On the third

 command, the man put his hands up and then got on the ground. Officer

 Lerner, helped by Officer Delgado, placed him in handcuffs. The object Officer

 Lerner suspected was a gun was actually a shoe. Officer Delgado then went

 looking for the handgun Ms. Caglar and Mr. Salmon had reported seeing.

       Around this time, Officer Camacho drove Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar

 back to the UNM parking lot for an in-field identification. When they arrived

 at the scene, the man (later identified as Mr. O’Neil) was handcuffed and

 standing near several officers. Police cruisers with their lights on were

 parked nearby. Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar drove within fifteen to twenty

 feet of the suspect, who was visible in the squad car’s headlights. From inside

       3Officer Delgado testified the backpack “was there on the bench,”
 ROA, vol. III at 85, while Ms. Caglar testified the backpack “wasn’t sitting
 on a bench. It was on the ground.” Id. at 109. The district court found the
 backpack was “on the bench,” ROA, vol. I at 155, and neither party
 disputes this fact on appeal. We accept the district court’s finding.
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 the squad car, Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar identified Mr. O’Neil as the man

 they had encountered in the parking lot earlier that evening. Approximately

 15 to 20 minutes had elapsed since the initial encounter. ROA, vol. III at 20;

 ROA, vol. I at 154-55.

         Meanwhile, as Officer Delgado was searching for the unaccounted-for

 gun, he heard over his police radio that the witnesses had made a positive in-

 field identification. A few minutes later, Officer Delgado located a backpack

 on a bench about twenty feet from where Mr. O’Neil was standing while he

 was detained. Officer Delgado searched the backpack and found a black

 handgun inside.4

    B.       Procedural History

         In a single-count indictment, the government charged Mr. O’Neil with

 possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

 § 922(g)(1).5 Mr. O’Neil filed two suppression motions. First, he sought to

        Mr. O’Neil contends his backpack was searched before Officer
         4

 Delgado learned of the positive witness identifications. Aplt. Br. at 16-17.
 As we will explain, this argument is waived, and even if we reached it, we
 would not conclude the district court’s contrary finding was clearly
 erroneous.

         Mr. O’Neil was first prosecuted in state court for violating New
         5

 Mexico’s felon-in-possession statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-16. Mr. O’Neil
 filed similar motions to suppress in state court. After an evidentiary
 hearing, the state court granted Mr. O’Neil’s motion to suppress the gun,
 and the state case was dismissed without prejudice.

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 suppress the in-field identifications by Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar, which he

 claimed were infected by improper police influence and unreliable, in

 violation of the Due Process Clause. Second, he sought to suppress the gun

 seized from his backpack in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

       In January 2021, after full briefing, the district court conducted an

 evidentiary hearing on the motions to suppress.6 Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar

 testified for the prosecution, as did Officers Lerner and Delgado. The defense

 did not put on any evidence. On direct examination, Mr. Salmon described

 Mr. O’Neil’s appearance at the time of their initial encounter in the parking

 lot. “I could tell that he was white, a little bit taller than me,” Mr. Salmon

 stated. “He had a beard at the time, and a hoody [with] the hood on.” ROA,

 vol. III at 16. When questioned about the in-field identification, Mr. Salmon

 testified, “[t]here was no doubt in my mind that he was the same man” as the

 person encountered in the UNM parking lot earlier that night. Id. at 21. “I

 just noticed that he had the same stature,” Mr. Salmon said. “He had the

 same sweatshirt on. The same facial hair. The same skin tone. It was pretty

 obvious that it was the same guy.” Id.

       According to Ms. Caglar, she could identify Mr. O’Neil at the scene

 because, during the confrontation in the parking lot, she had focused on his

       6Mr. O’Neil waived an in-person hearing, so the proceedings took
 place with all participants appearing by video conference.
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 race, “Caucasian,” and “his hair color; his beard color; his clothes; his hoody,

 which was black.” Id. at 103. Ms. Caglar testified that, during the encounter,

 Mr. O’Neil “was actually wearing a backpack . . . I couldn’t see the back side

 of his backpack, but I could see the arm strings around his arm.” Id. at 98. In

 response to being asked if she was “absolutely clear” about the identification,

 Ms. Caglar answered, “Yes.” Id. at 102.

       Officer Lerner then testified about detaining Mr. O’Neil and the in-field

 identification that followed. Officer Delgado’s testimony focused on his hunt

 for the gun after Mr. O’Neil was detained and the eventual search of Mr.

 O’Neil’s backpack and seizure of the handgun inside. Both officers testified

 about the UNM Police Department’s inventory procedures.

       In a written order, the district court denied Mr. O’Neil’s motions to

 suppress. The district court first agreed with Mr. O’Neil that the in-field

 identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Law enforcement had

 conducted a “show-up,” the district court explained, which “by definition

 occurs when ‘the police present only one suspect to the identifying

 witness[es].’” ROA, vol. I at 159 (citation omitted). Here, Mr. O’Neil was

 singly presented, in handcuffs, surrounded by police officers, and at the scene

 of the crime. The district court emphasized courts have endorsed less-

 suggestive identification procedures, but here, the witnesses made their

 identifications in each other’s presence while sitting together in the police

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 cruiser and after law enforcement asked, “We need you to ID him . . . is that

 the man?” Id. at 160.

        Although it found the show-up unnecessarily suggestive, the district

 court concluded the identifications were “highly reliable.” Id. at 160-61. The

 district court considered the factors in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), to

 assess the reliability of the identifications. Based on the totality of the

 circumstances, the district court determined there was “very little likelihood

 of misidentification” by Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar, and thus no due process

 violation that would require suppression of the identification evidence. Id. at

 160.

        The district court next considered Mr. O’Neil’s claim that the

 warrantless search of his backpack, and the seizure of the gun found inside,

 violated the Fourth Amendment. The government maintained the exigent

 circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applied because the

 gun—which the witnesses had reported seeing but was still unaccounted

 for—posed a risk to officers and the public. The district court rejected the

 government’s exigency argument but refused to suppress the gun, concluding

 it would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to the UNM Police

 Department’s standardized inventory procedures.

        On August 26, 2021, Mr. O’Neil entered a conditional guilty plea to the

 single-count indictment, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s

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 order denying his motions to suppress. Mr. O’Neil was sentenced to 27

 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. This timely

 appeal followed.

  II.   Discussion

        Mr. O’Neil argues the district court erred in denying his motions to

 suppress the eyewitness identifications and the gun.7 We review a district

 court’s denial of a motion to suppress by “view[ing] the evidence in the light

 most favorable to the determination of the district court.” United States v.

 Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The

 ultimate question of whether an individual’s constitutional rights have been

 violated is reviewed de novo. See id. (Fourth Amendment); United States v.

 Thody, 978 F.2d 625, 628 (10th Cir. 1992) (Due Process Clause). “The ‘clearly

 erroneous’ standard applies with respect to the trial court’s factual findings

 ‘even when those findings relate to a constitutional issue.’” Thody, 978 F.2d

 at 629 (citations omitted). As we explain, we affirm the district court’s well-

 reasoned suppression rulings.

        7Mr. O’Neil also sought to exclude “the expected in-court
 identification by both Cagsu Caglar and Matthew Salmon.” ROA, vol. I at
 33. The district court correctly found this argument premature because
 “[a]n in-court identification is technically one that is ‘made for the first
 time in court[ ]’ before a jury, which has not yet occurred in this case.” Id.
 at 162 (citation omitted). Mr. O’Neil was convicted after pleading guilty
 pursuant to a plea agreement, so he makes no appellate argument about
 in-court identifications.
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     A.       The district court did not err in denying the motion to
              suppress the eyewitness identifications because they were
              reliable.
          Typically, “juries are assigned the task of determining the reliability

  of the evidence presented at trial.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228,

  237 (2012). When evidence “‘is so extremely unfair that its admission

  violates fundamental conceptions of justice,’” the Supreme Court has

  “imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause.” Id. (quoting

  Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). The admission of

  eyewitness identification evidence raises due process concerns “only when

  law enforcement officers use an identification procedure that is both

  suggestive and unnecessary.” Id. at 238-39 (citations omitted).8

          Unnecessary suggestiveness alone does not require exclusion of

  identification evidence. “It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates

  a defendant’s right to due process,” so “the central question [is] whether

  under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was reliable.”

          As the Supreme Court has acknowledged, “The vagaries of
          8

  eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are
  rife with instances of mistaken identification.” United States v. Wade, 388
  U.S. 218, 228 (1967). But absent unnecessarily suggestive procedures, the
  reliability of eyewitness identifications is ensured through traditional trial
  protections. Perry, 565 U.S. at 233; see also United States v. Thomas, 849
  F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[E]videntiary reliability is traditionally a
  question for the jury . . . and . . . other due-process protections are in place
  that limit the weight the jury attributes to evidence that may be
  unreliable.”).
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  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-99. This makes “reliability [] the linchpin in

  determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” Manson v.

  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).

        Courts assess reliability—or put differently, “evaluat[e] the likelihood

  of misidentification”—by examining the totality of the circumstances,

  including (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the defendant at the time

  of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of any prior

  description given by the witness, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by

  the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime

  and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; see also Archuleta v.

  Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 710-12 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Biggers factors to

  conclude a suggestive show-up identification—where the suspect was

  presented alone and handcuffed at the scene of the crime approximately

  thirty minutes after the witnesses’ initial encounter—was nevertheless

  reliable); United States v. Bredy, 209 F.3d 1193, 1195-97 (10th Cir. 2000)

  (same). “[I]f the indicia of reliability are strong enough to outweigh the

  corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the

  identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will

  ultimately determine its worth.” Perry, 565 U.S. at 232.

        Here, the district court concluded law enforcement used an

  unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. The government has not

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  contended otherwise.9 We thus consider only Mr. O’Neil’s argument that the

  district court erred in concluding the witnesses “made highly reliable

  identifications.” ROA, vol. I at 161. The district court recited all the Biggers

  factors in assessing reliability, but on appeal, Mr. O’Neil focuses primarily on

  challenging the first three: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the

  defendant at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, and

  (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness. His arguments

  are unavailing.

        First, Mr. O’Neil maintains that “neither witness had a very good

  opportunity to view the suspect” because the “encounter lasted only a matter

  of minutes at night.” Aplt. Br. at 23. The record shows otherwise. As the

  district court correctly determined, the witnesses’ opportunity to view Mr.

        9 Although we need not address this first step, we briefly observe the
  record amply supports the district court’s conclusion. Suggestive
  procedures are those which convey “intentionally or unintentionally, that
  [police officers] expect the witness to identify the accused,” Moore v.
  Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 224 (1977), or are “so arranged as to make the
  resulting identifications virtually inevitable,” Foster v. California, 394
  U.S. 440, 443 (1969). Here, the district court concluded the procedure was
  unnecessarily suggestive because Mr. O’Neil was “the only suspect shown
  [and] was handcuffed, surrounded by police officers [] at the scene of the
  crime,” and “the witnesses made their identifications in each other’s
  presence.” ROA, vol. I at 160. These circumstances, the district court
  determined, “gave the impression that the police had their man.” Id.
  (citation omitted).
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  O’Neil during the confrontation—before the in-field identification—indicates

  the identification was reliable.

        The witnesses saw Mr. O’Neil up close during their encounter with him

  in the UNM parking lot. Ms. Caglar observed Mr. O’Neil in the parking lot

  for a minute and a half as he approached the car and then “put his face two

  inches from the car’s passenger window” where she was seated. ROA, vol. I at

  161. When Mr. Salmon returned to the car after paying for parking, he had

  an independent opportunity to look at Mr. O’Neil. The two men stared at

  each other over the roof of Mr. Salmon’s car “for about thirty seconds to one

  minute.” Id. Mr. Salmon was close enough to Mr. O’Neil to identify the

  firearm he carried. And though the encounter occurred on a December

  evening (at approximately 9:20 p.m.), the parking lot was illuminated. Under

  the circumstances, Mr. O’Neil has not demonstrated error, let alone clear

  error. See Johnson, 43 F.4th at 1107 (“A district court’s factual finding is

  clearly erroneous when it is without factual support in the record or if, after

  reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that

  a mistake has been made.”); see also United States v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809,

  815 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The judge decided [the witness] had a good opportunity

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  to view Mr. Patterson before and after the hijacking. No evidence has been

  presented to show the district court’s determination is clearly erroneous.”).10

        Second, Mr. O’Neil contends the witnesses paid insufficient attention to

  his appearance during the encounter and thus could only offer vague and

  unreliable descriptions. We disagree. Both witnesses paid close attention to

  Mr. O’Neil’s appearance when they saw him in the UNM parking lot. Mr.

  Salmon and Mr. O’Neil “stared into each other’s faces” for almost a minute.

  ROA, vol. I at 161. Likewise, while waiting in the passenger seat, Ms. Caglar

  observed Mr. O’Neil in the parking lot and then got a closer look at him when

  he put his face to the passenger window. As the district court put it, “there is

  a good reason to believe” Ms. Caglar knew what Mr. O’Neil looked like. Id.

  The record thus does not support Mr. O’Neil’s argument that the

  identifications are unreliable because the witnesses solely “focused on looking

  into [his] eyes or the gun” during the encounter. Aplt. Br. at 23.

        10 To the extent Mr. O’Neil contends an encounter of short duration in
  dark conditions is inherently unreliable, we disagree. Mr. O’Neil has provided
  no authority for such a blanket proposition, which would be inconsistent with
  the general rule that the reliability of an eyewitness identification must be
  considered on a “case-by-case basis,” Perry, 565 U.S. at 239, and under the
  “totality of the circumstances,” see, e.g., Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; United States
  v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir. 1979).

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        Finally, Mr. O’Neil contends the witnesses did not accurately describe

  him before positively identifying him in the field. He emphasizes that, after

  the encounter in the parking lot, Mr. Salmon and Ms. Caglar did not provide

  enough details to law enforcement about his height or the color and cut of his

  clothing. Neither witness mentioned he had a backpack or a dog, which Mr.

  O’Neil claims are “highly distinctive” characteristics “that would stick out in

  a recollection, particularly a recent recollection.” Id. at 24. Mr. O’Neil also

  points out he weighed 237 pounds on the date of the incident, so it was

  inaccurate to describe his build as “slender.” Id. at 23-24.11 We are not

  persuaded.

        The district court correctly acknowledged the existence of some

  differences between the witnesses’ descriptions of Mr. O’Neil and his actual

  appearance. “For example,” the district court said, “Salmon described

  Defendant as slender when he was large; Caglar believed he had ginger

  colored hair when his was darker; and apparently Defendant had a small dog

        11 The government disputes the 237-pound figure, stating “[t]he
  record does not contain any evidence verifying that O’Neil weighed 237
  pounds.” Appl. Br. at 19 n.9. The government points to Mr. O’Neil’s
  driver’s license which states he is 6’1” tall and weighs 220 pounds. The
  district court credited the 237-pound figure in its factual findings, and we
  see no clear error.

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  with him that the witnesses did not report seeing.” ROA, vol. I at 162.12 As

  the government correctly contends, a witness’s “description [can be] accurate

  even where it contained minor errors.” Appl. Br. at 21 (citing Archuleta, 864

  F.2d at 712). But errors, even slight ones, must be considered case-by-case

  when evaluating the reliability of the eyewitness identification under the

  totality of the circumstances. Here, the record supports the district court’s

  conclusion that the discrepancies in this case “do not detract from the fact

  that the witnesses’ descriptions, given over numerous occasions, are largely

  consistent with one another and with [Mr. O’Neil’s] actual appearance.” ROA,

  vol. I at 162.

        Moreover, the final two Biggers factors—the level of certainty

  demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time

  between the crime and the confrontation—are unchallenged by Mr. O’Neil

  and do not undermine the district court’s reliability determination. The

  district court correctly observed that the witnesses “expressed complete

  certainty in their identifications.” Id.13 Mr. Salmon testified there was “no

         Although the backpack was not mentioned in the description
        12

  provided to police, Ms. Caglar testified at the suppression hearing she saw
  that Mr. O’Neil “was actually wearing a backpack.” ROA, vol. III at 98.
  The record does not resolve whether Mr. O’Neil had a dog with him that
  night.

        13We have no reason to question the district court’s reliance in this
  case on the witnesses’ own level of certainty in their identifications. But
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  doubt” Mr. O’Neil was the man they had encountered. Ms. Caglar likewise

  maintained she was “absolutely clear” during the in-field identification that

  Mr. O’Neil was the individual in the parking lot. And the record shows the

  positive in-field identifications occurred only about twenty minutes after the

  incident.

          We thus affirm the district court’s conclusion that the identifications

  were “highly reliable,” and need not be suppressed, even though the

  identification procedure used by law enforcement was unnecessarily

  suggestive.

     B.       The district court did not err in denying the motion to
              suppress the gun found in Mr. O’Neil’s backpack because it
              would have been inevitably discovered.

          Mr. O’Neil’s second motion to suppress concerned the gun, which he

  claimed was seized pursuant to an illegal search of his backpack. The

  government originally invoked the exigent circumstances exception to justify

  the warrantless search, contending “an unattended gun in a heavily

  trafficked area” made for “a clear instance of exigency.” Id. at 40. The district

  court rejected this argument, finding no exigency because the scene was

  there will not always be clear correlation between witness confidence and
  accuracy. See, e.g., 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 7.4(c)
  (4th ed. 2015) (“The level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation
  by the witness . . . is not a valid indicator of the accuracy of the
  recollection.”) (collecting cases).
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  secure, a pat-down search revealed no weapons, and Mr. O’Neil was

  handcuffed and separated from his backpack by about twenty feet when he

  was detained. “[W]hile the record contains some facts supporting a conclusion

  that the risk to the public’s safety or third persons was present,” the district

  court reasoned, “those facts are not so overwhelming to dispense with the

  warrant requirement before conducting a search or seizure.” Id. at 166.

        The government offered no other basis for finding the warrantless

  search satisfied the Fourth Amendment. Notwithstanding the constitutional

  violation, however, the government maintained the gun should not be

  suppressed because it would have been inevitably discovered during an

  inventory search by the UNM police. The district court agreed with the

  government. As soon as the witnesses positively identified Mr. O’Neil in the

  field, the district court explained, law enforcement had probable cause to

  arrest him. The district court concluded that, once Mr. O’Neil was arrested,

  his backpack was “necessarily going to be searched and inventoried under the

  university police department’s inventory policy.” Id. at 168.

        On appeal, Mr. O’Neil challenges the district court’s decision to deny

  suppression of the gun on inevitable discovery grounds. We begin by reciting

  the legal foundation for the inevitable discovery exception before explaining

  why the district court correctly applied it here to deny Mr. O’Neil’s motion to

  suppress.

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        1.    Inevitable Discovery

        The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure

  in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

  and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Searches conducted without a warrant

  are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few

  specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Roska ex rel. Roska

  v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Evidence

  obtained through an unconstitutional search will be inadmissible under the

  exclusionary rule unless the government proves an exception applies. United

  States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 931-32 (10th Cir. 2020).

        The Supreme Court has recognized “the ultimate or inevitable

  discovery exception to the exclusionary rule,” which applies when “the

  prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the

  information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful

  means . . . .” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). “Those lawful means

  include an inventory search.” United States v. Tueller, 349 F.3d 1239, 1243

  (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th

  Cir. 1992) (“[I]f evidence seized unlawfully would have been inevitably

  discovered in a subsequent inventory search, such evidence would be

  admissible.”)); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)

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  (“[I]nventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant

  requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”).

        The inevitable discovery exception is not a windfall device. It is not

  intended to put police in a better position but only “in the same, not a worse,

  position [than] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had

  occurred.” Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. In assessing the government’s burden, we are

  mindful “inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on

  demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification.” Id. at 444 n.5.

        2.    Analysis

        Mr. O’Neil challenges the application of the inevitable discovery

  exception to the exclusionary rule on two grounds; neither is availing.14

        First, Mr. O’Neil contends there was no probable cause to arrest him

  before the gun was discovered. The government faults Mr. O’Neil for failing

        14 Mr. O’Neil also seems to contend his arrest was not justified, even
  if the eyewitness identifications are admissible, because illegally carrying
  a firearm on university premises is only a misdemeanor under New
  Mexico law. This argument is advanced only in the Summary of Argument
  section of Mr. O’Neil’s opening brief and not otherwise developed; it is
  therefore waived. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.
  2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not
  raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”);
  Ewing v. Doubletree DTWC, LLC, 673 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2016)
  (unpublished) (“[Plaintiff] dedicates less than one page to this issue in the
  Summary of Argument section of her brief and then never discusses this
  issue in the actual Argument section. Such a flimsy and deficient legal
  analysis is inadequate to preserve an issue for appeal.”).
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  to address the district court’s finding that probable cause to arrest would

  have existed even without the subsequent seizure of the gun, just based on

  the witness identifications. We agree with the government.

        “[A] government official must have probable cause to arrest an

  individual.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007).

  “Probable cause is measured at the moment the arrest occurs and must

  derive from facts and circumstances based on reasonably trustworthy

  information.” Id. at 1121. Courts generally deem a victim’s identification of

  their assailant reasonably trustworthy to support probable cause to arrest.

  See id. (“[O]rdinarily, the statement of a victim of a crime to police may

  establish probable cause absent some reason to think the statement not

  trustworthy.”); see also Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013)

  (“[A]bsent circumstances that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity, a

  victim’s identification is typically sufficient to provide probable cause.”)

  (citation omitted); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (“A law

  enforcement officer is entitled to rely on an eyewitness identification to

  establish adequate probable cause with which to sustain an arrest.”).

        Mr. O’Neil focuses on the unconstitutionality of the backpack search,

  but he offers no argument to explain why the district court erred in its

  probable cause assessment when analyzing the applicability of the inevitable

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  discovery exception.15 Under the circumstances, and particularly given no

  contrary argument, the district court did not err in concluding the witness

  identifications would have given law enforcement probable cause to arrest

  Mr. O’Neil.

        Second, Mr. O’Neil claims the government failed to carry its burden of

  establishing that the inventory search was conducted according to

  standardized procedures. The government offered no written policy of UNM’s

  inventory protocols, Mr. O’Neil contends, but provided only a “general

  reference to some undescribed inventory search process Officer Delgado

  would have undertaken.” Aplt. Br. at 22. The government concedes no

        15 Mr. O’Neil suggests in his Summary of Argument that the district
  court clearly erred in finding the backpack was searched after the in-field
  identifications, but he does not develop this argument in his opening brief
  and has therefore waived it. Aplt. Br. at 16-17; see Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104.
  Even if we reached the merits, we would reject the argument. The district
  court acknowledged that, in the federal case, Officer Lerner testified the
  backpack search was done after the in-field identification, but in state court,
  he testified to the opposite chronology of events. According to the district
  court, however, “[t]hese differing accounts do not render Lerner’s testimony
  unreliable, but instead highlight gaps in Lerner’s recollection of events.
  Those gaps were filled by Officer Delgado, however, who testified that he
  personally searched the backpack and consistently maintained that he did so
  after the witnesses identified [Mr. O’Neil].” ROA, vol. I at 156 n.1. We discern
  no clear error in the district court’s decision to credit Officer Delgado’s
  rendition of events and on that basis, to find the backpack was searched after
  the witnesses positively identified Mr. O’Neil. See United States v. Souza, 223
  F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he district court’s factual
  determinations are reviewed only for clear error.”); see also United States v.
  Long, 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The credibility of witnesses . . .
  fall[s] within the province of the district court.”).
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  written inventory procedures were introduced into evidence. According to the

  government, “standard inventory procedures and practices can be proven by

  testimonial evidence.” Appl. Br. at 31. The government points to the

  testimony of Officers Lerner and Delgado at the suppression hearing as

  sufficient to satisfy its burden of establishing standardized inventory

  procedures. We discern no error.

        “A so-called inventory search is not an independent legal concept but

  rather an incidental administrative step following arrest and preceding

  incarceration.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644 (1983). Inventory

  searches are “not treated as investigative searches because they serve three

  administrative purposes: ‘the protection of the owner’s property while it

  remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or

  disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police from

  potential danger.’” Tueller, 349 F.3d at 1243 (quoting South Dakota v.

  Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)).

        An inventory search is unconstitutional unless conducted “according to

  standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of

  evidence of criminal activity.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) (quoting

  Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375); United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769, 772

  (10th Cir.1997) (inventory searches “are reasonable only if conducted

  according to standardized procedures”). “[R]easonable police . . . inventory

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  procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”

  United States v. Taylor, 592 F.3d 1104, 1108 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting

  Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374). The government carries the burden of

  demonstrating reasonableness. Id. at 1107.

        Our precedent does not require the government to produce standard

  inventory procedures in writing. See United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713,

  717 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The record reflects no written regulation . . . but the

  testimony of Agent Blanton established that it is the customary and standard

  practice [to perform an inventory] when a vehicle is impounded.”). What is

  required is that the government prove “[t]he policy or practice governing

  inventory searches [is] designed to produce an inventory” and is not a “ruse

  for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Wells,

  495 U.S. at 4.

        Officer Lerner testified at the suppression hearing that “[e]verybody we

  arrest, we take their stuff and we don’t tag it into evidence. We tag it in for

  safekeeping.” ROA, vol. III at 56. Likewise, Officer Delgado testified “by our

  policy, we needed to go through the backpack to make sure [because] we’re

  responsible for any belongings belonging to a person that’s placed in custody.”

  Id. at 79. On cross-examination, Officer Delgado was asked why he searched

  the backpack, and he said, “our policy is any time we place anybody in

  custody their possessions [are] our responsibility. . . . [W]e have to make sure

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  there’s no narcotics, weapon, alcohol, food, or anything in there before we can

  place them in safekeeping. So we have to search them.” Id. at 86.

        Here, Officer Lerner’s and Officer Delgado’s testimony suffices to show

  UNM police had a policy to take and inventory for safekeeping the

  possessions of anyone they arrest.16 We thus affirm the district court’s

  conclusion that suppression was not warranted because the gun would have

  been inevitably discovered under the standard inventory procedures used by

  UNM police.

 III.   Conclusion

        We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. O’Neil’s motions to suppress

  the eyewitness identifications and the gun.

        16 We note that, when the government seeks to demonstrate the
  existence of standardized procedures to establish the reasonableness of an
  inventory search under the Fourth Amendment, the better practice would
  be to introduce the written inventory procedures, if they are available.
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