Court Opinion

ID: 9678790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:32:32.622044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:07.918537
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss the State’s appeal. We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the State may appeal the trial court’s assessment of punishment when it was unauthorized by Article 37.07, Section 2(b), V.A.C.C.P. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning and would therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals chose not to exercise jurisdiction in this case because it decided that the State had failed to satisfy the indicia of an illegal sentence. The Court of Appeals concluded that “an illegal sentence is, at the very least, one which the court had no jurisdiction to levy or one which violates a fundamental constitutional right.” State v. Baize, 947 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, pet. granted). The Court of Appeals cited to numerous cases supporting its decision that an “illegal sentence” involves more than procedural error and that an “illegal sentence” must either trammel jurisdictional limitations or fundamental constitutional principles. Id. at 310. In this ease, the Court of Appeals has narrowly construed the scope of Article 44.01(b), and has therefore failed to realize fully the legislative intent behind the statute. The issue before us is to decide whether the State may appeal, pursuant to Article 44.01(b), V.AC.C.P., the trial court’s assessment of punishment based upon the ground that the sentence is illegal.
In State v. Ross, 953 S.W.2d 748, this Court claims to have applied the plain meaning to the term “sentence.” The majority in that case elected to rely upon the definition of “sentence” as defined in Article 42.02, V.AC.C.P. which states, “The sentence is that part of the judgment, or order revoking a suspension of the imposition of a sentence, that orders that the punishment be carried into execution in the manner prescribed by law.” This Court held that a sentence only includes facts regarding length of punishment and assessment of a fine. However, a “sentence” would not include other aspects of the judgment which merely affect the terms of punishment (i.e. the jury verdict, the offense for which defendant is convicted and any affirmative findings). Id. at 750. The majority in Ross established that a “sentence” would not incorporate an affirmative deadly weapon finding, and that the trial court’s failure to make the deadly weapon finding in the judgment was therefore unap-pealable by the State under Section 44.01(b). As a result, a narrow interpretation of the statute was created contrary to legislative intent. The majority’s decision did nothing more than to define a “sentence” to be only that “portion of the criminal judgment setting out the terms of punishment.” Id. at 750-51.
It is incumbent upon this Court to discover and effectuate the legislative intent or purpose of an underlying statute. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). In doing so, we must focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. Id. at 785. Under Boykin, we must apply the “plain meaning” to the statute unless application of the statute’s literal text would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended. Id. at 785. When reviewing the literal text of the statute, this Court will read the words and phrases of the statute in context and construe them “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., Section 311.011(a). And where the statute is “clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.” Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The plain meaning of the terms in Article 44.01(b) permits the State to appeal this sentence because the sentence imposed by the trial court is illegal. The dictionary defines “illegal” as “not authorized *208by law; illicit; unlawful; contrary to law.” Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.) 882 (1951).1 The sentence in this case is illegal because it is not authorized by law, namely in accordance with Article 37.07, Section 2(b), V.A.C.C.P., which provides:
“Except as provided in Article 37.071, if a finding of guilt is returned, it shall then be the responsibility of the judge to assess the punishment applicable to the offense; provided, however, that (1) in any criminal action where the jury may recommend probation and the defendant filed his sworn motion for probation before the trial began, and (2) in other eases where the defendant so elects in writing before the commencement of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, the punishment shall be assessed by the same jury, except as provided in Article 44.29. If a finding of guilty is returned, the defendant may, with the consent of the attorney for the state, change his election of one who assesses the punishment.” (Emphasis added).
In the case at bar, the State did not consent to appellee changing his election of who assessed punishment. The trial court dismissed the jury and assessed a sentence without the consent of the State. This violated Article 37.07, Section 2(b), and is therefore an illegal sentence which is appealable by the State.
The majority in the instant case fails to apply the plain meaning to the statute, but rather continues to follow the narrow construction of Article 44.01 established in Ross. This Court should overrule the holding in Ross. It is for these reasons briefly mentioned that I respectfully dissent.
MANSFIELD and WOMACK, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. See Fairow v. State, 943 S.W.2d 895, 904-05 (Tex.Cr.App.l997)(Meyers, J-, cites to the Webster Dictionary definition of "opinion” to resolve issue presented regarding lay witness opinion testimony); State v. Johnson, 939 S.W.2d 586, 587 (Tex.Cr.App.l996)(Meyers, J., cites to the New Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition of "other” to address exclusionary statute prohibiting admission of evidence illegally obtained by an officer or other person); and Bingham v. State, 915 S.W.2d 9, 10 (Tex.Cr.App.1994)(Meyers, J., applies the New MerriamWebster Dictionary definition of "testimony” for purposes of corroboration requirement for testimony by accomplice).