Court Opinion

ID: 9369935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 08:20:36.162825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.155531
License: Public Domain

In The

                          Court of Appeals

               Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                          __________________

                         NO. 09-20-00293-CV
                          __________________

 GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
                    Appellant

                                  V.

  NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 284th District Court
                  Montgomery County, Texas
                 Trial Cause No. 20-02-02039-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                              OPINION

     At issue in this appeal is whether the Uniform Condominium Act

makes an agreement to settle a subrogation claim, which the Act requires

to be waived, enforceable. 1 On cross-motion for summary judgment, the

     1Tex.  Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(d) (requiring the insurer to waive
its right to subrogation under the policy against a unit owner); id. §
82.004 (prohibiting persons from varying the requirements of Chapter 82
by agreement “[e]xcept as expressly provided by this chapter”[]).
                                   1
trial court refused to enforce the agreement and rendered a take-nothing

judgment against the plaintiff who sued the defendant to enforce a

settlement agreement of an insurance subrogation claim the Act required

the insurance company that brought the suit to waive.

     Finding no error, we affirm.

                              Background

                                The Fire

     Dana and Donna Evans own a unit at The Shore, a high-rise

condominium in Austin, Texas. In May 2019, an accidental fire, which

investigators determined originated in the Evanses’ unit, damaged

property in several units and in the common areas on several floors of

The Shore. 2

     The duties of the entity responsible for managing The Shore, duties

that include obtaining insurance against risks of loss like fires, are

     2In general, the Declaration filed of record for The Shore created a
separate ownership interest for the property that each unit owner kept
inside the walls of the owner’s unit. That said, the owner of a unit also
owns an undivided interest in the Common Elements. The Declaration
defined the Common Elements broadly to mean “[a]ll portions of the
Condominium, including both the General Common Elements and
Limited Common Elements, and including the Residential Unit’s interest
in the Master Common Elements but excluding the Units.”
                                    2
created by filing a document referred to as a declaration in the real

property records of the county where the condominium is built. 3 A limited

partnership formed The Shore in 2006, dedicating the property to be used

as a condominium by filing a “Condominium Declaration” (the

Declaration) in the real-property records of Travis County, Texas. Under

the Declaration, the purchasers of units at The Shore became members

of The Shore Condominium Association, Inc. (the Association). Under the

Declaration, the      Association is    responsible for   managing the

Association’s affairs. The owners of the units must pay Association dues,

which are used among other things to purchase insurance to cover the

property at The Shore. To comply with that obligation, the Association

bought an insurance policy from Great American Insurance Company of

New York, which insured the property The Shore was required to insure

under the Uniform Condominium Act against the risk of loss from fires,

less the policy’s deductible.

     After the May 2019 fire, Great American paid the claims presented

to it that were covered under its policy from the fire. The claims Great

American paid came from owners of units who had property damaged in

     3Id.   §§ 82.051(a), .111.
                                    3
their units, including the Evanses. Great American also paid to repair

damages that occurred to property in the common areas of the floors

damaged in the fire. In the areas outside the units, the owners of the

units hold an undivided interest, which The Shore’s Declaration defines

as Common Elements. 4

     The Declaration also required the Evanses to obtain insurance on

the property in their unit. And the Declaration required them to obtain

“insurance covering damage to other Units or property located therein,

the cause of which originates from such Owner’s Unit.” To comply with

their obligations under the Declaration, the Evanses bought a

condominium policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.

Nationwide’s policy covered the Evanses for up to $300,000 per

occurrence for their negligent “ownership, maintenance or use of real or

personal property[.]”

                            The Settlement

     Great American’s settlement is tied to an email dated December 16,

2019, that its attorney Chris Surber, sent Nationwide’s adjuster, Ross

Ver Helst. In the email, Great American offered “to resolve any and all

     4See   n.2.
                                   4
claims and causes of action it has or may have against Dana and Donna

Evans arising out of and related to the [May 2019] fire for the total

amount of $373,212.93 or Dana and Donna Evans’ insurance policy

liability limit, whichever is less.” 5 On January 16, 2020, Ver Helst

sent Surber an email and responded to his settlement demand:

     Chris, this is confirmation that we are accepting your demand
     for the damages to The [Shore] Condominium Association for
     the remainder of our insured’s liability limit. We have
     previously settled subrogation claims for two of the condo unit
     owners and have remaining liability limit[s] of $266,540.25 of
     our insured’s $300,000 liability policy limit. 6

     5See  Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(a) (requiring the unit owners
association, to maintain property insurance on the insurable common
elements if that insurance is reasonably available); § 82.111(b) (when the
building contains units with “horizontal boundaries described in the
declaration,” the unit owners association must maintain insurance when
it is reasonably available that “include[s] the units,” but the insurance
“need not include improvement and betterments installed by unit
owners”).
       6Surber’s demand letter and Ver Helst’s emails refer to the

condominium association responsible for managing The Shore as “The
Waterfront Master Condominium Association.” The Clerk’s Record,
however, shows that as of May 2019 the correct legal name for the
condominium where the fire occurred is The Shore’s Condominium
Owner’s Association, Inc. The Clerk’s Record includes a corrective
amendment, which shows The Waterfront Master Condominium
Association, Inc. became The Shore Condominium Association, Inc. in
2006. In August 2019, an endorsement was added to Great American’s
policy naming “The Shore Condominium Association” as a named insured
under Great American’s policy, with the name change retroactive to the
policy’s inception. For clarity and to avoid confusion, we have chosen to

                                    5
On receiving Ver Helst’s email, Surber sent Ver Helst the following

email:

     My client accepts your offer of $266,540.25. Please make the
     check payable to “Gauntt, Koen, Binney & Kidd LLP as
     trustee for Great American Insurance Company of New York”
     and mail the same to my attention at the below address. A
     copy of my firm’s W9 is attached. If you require a release,
     please send the same as soon as you can.

     Finally, can you tell me if you paid the other condo owners
     100% of their claim, based on a pro rata basis, etc?

     On January 17, 2019, Dana Evans sent Ver Helst the following

email:

     I do not believe that the Great American Insurance Co.
     of New York has the right to a claim against my policy.

     The Texas Property Code Sec. 82.111 requires
     condominium associations to maintain an insurance
     policy covering the building, common elements and the
     units, except for improvements and betterments in the
     individual units. The Code also requires that each unit
     owner must be insured by the policy against liability
     arising out of the person’s ownership of the common
     elements or membership in the association as required
     by the association declarations (subsection (d)(1)). This
     would appear to limit any liability that I would have

use The Shore Condominium Association when referring to the entity in
charge of the condominium based on the documents in the Clerk’s Record
that show that was the entity’s legal name of record when the fire
occurred in May 2019.

                                   6
relating to damages to common elements of the building.
In addition, the Association insurance policy must waive
the right to subrogation against a unit owner (subsecti on
(d)(2)). Finally, if the unit owner has insurance coverin g
the same loss, the association insurance is primary
(subsection (d)(4)). If a unit owner is partly or wholly
responsible for a loss, the association may assess the
owner for the amount of the association insurance policy
deductible and any costs exceeding the insurance limits
(section (l)). This recovery is not available to the
insurance company.

The Shore Condominium Declarations Section VI,
subsection 6.1.c. requires that insurance purchased by
the Association or an Owner must waive the right to
subrogation against any member or owner of the
association.

The Great American Insurance Co. of New York
insurance     policy   for The Shore      Condomini u m
Association complies with the requirements of the Texas
Property Code. It provides coverage for the building
except for improvements        and betterments and
appliances installed in individual units (Building and
Personal Property Coverage Form page 36, and Texas
Condominium Association Coverage Amendment page
100). Under the Texas Condominium Associati on
Coverage Amendment, the policy specifically waives the
right to recover against any unit owner (page 101). The
deductible for any loss is $25,000 (page 109). This
amount     would     be recoverable   by The Shore
Condominium Association, through their trustee, and
not by Great American Insurance Co. of New York.
Based on this information, I do not see how Great
American Insurance Company of New York can make a
claim against me for any losses that they insure under
the Association policy. My liability for the deducti ble
amount should be paid to the Association Trustee. I am
responsible for damage to property of other owners not

                            7
     covered under the Association policy, and I expect that
     to be covered under liability section of my policy with
     Nationwide Mutual.

     Please explain to me how I have this wrong. 7

     After Northwestern received Dana’s email, it didn’t fund the

settlement or send Great American any releases. In February 2020,

Great American sued Nationwide alleging that Nationwide accepted and

then breached the agreement it made with Great American to settle

Great American’s subrogation claim. Nationwide answered and filed a

counterclaim. In its counterclaim, Nationwide alleged that assuming an

agreement to settle did occur, which it denied, the agreement was illegal

and unenforceable as a matter of public policy under the Uniform

Condominium Act. In the alternative, Nationwide claimed the settlement

resulted from a mutual mistake. It asked the court based on its claims of

mistake to set the settlement aside.

     The parties sought to resolve the claims and defenses raised in their

pleadings in a series of six dispositive motions: (1) Great American’s

     7Dana Evans learned in a telephone call with Ver Helst on January

16 that Great American had threatened to sue the Evanses if
Northwestern refused to pay the amount Great American demanded to
settle the subrogation claim that it represented to Ver Helst it had
against the Evanses.
                                  8
Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (Nationwide’s Breach of

Contract Claim); (2) Great American’s Traditional Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment (Nationwide’s Counterclaim for Declaratory

Judgment and       Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction); (3) Nationwide’s Traditional Motion for Summary

Judgment (Great American’s Breach of Contract Claim); (4) Nationwide’s

Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment (Great American’s Claims for

Declaratory Relief); (5) Great American’s Amended Traditional Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Nationwide’s Breach of Contract Claim);

and (6) Great American’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss.

In October 2020, the trial court ruled on these motions, incorporating its

rulings in a Final Judgment.

     Great American complains the trial court erred in granting

Nationwide’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment on its breach of

contract claim. Based on that ruling, the trial court ordered Great

American to “take nothing on its claims and causes of action against

Defendant Nationwide[.]” The trial court made its take-nothing judgment

final by including language of finality in its judgment. The last two

                                    9
sentences of the judgment state: “All relief not granted is denied. This

Judgment is final as to all claims and parties and is appealable.” 8

      After the trial court signed the judgment, Great American moved

for a new trial. The trial court later overruled the motion and Great

American appealed.

                            Standard of Review

      We review summary judgments de novo. 9 “To prevail on a

traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must show no

material fact issues exist and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” 10 We take as true all evidence favorable to the respondent, and

we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in favor of

the non-movant. 11 “When both parties move for summary judgment and

the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, . . . we review both

      8See  Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020)
(“A trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by
describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties,
and (3) appealable.”).
      9Rosetta Res. Operating, LP v. Martin, 645 S.W.3d 212, 218 (Tex.

2022).
      10Id.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
      11Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215

(Tex. 2003).
                                       10
sides’ summary judgment evidence and render the judgment the trial

court should have rendered.” 12

     In its motion for summary judgment, Northwestern relied on more

than one theory to support its claim that it was entitled to summary

judgment. When the trial court ruled on Northwestern’s motion, it did

not explain the theory on which it decided to grant Northwestern’s

motion. Since the court did not specify the grounds on which it granted

the motion, we must affirm the trial court’s “summary judgment if any of

the grounds asserted are meritorious.” 13

                                  Analysis

     Great American raises three issues in its brief. In issue one, Great

American argues that its settlement with Northwestern doesn’t violate

public policy under the Uniform Condominium Act because the

legislature didn’t intend to prevent parties from settling disputes under

Chapter 82. In issue two, Great American argues the trial court erred in

granting Northwestern’s motion because the evidence conclusively

     12Endeavor Energy Res., L.P.   v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144,
147-48 (Tex. 2020).
     13Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39,

45 (Tex. 2017).
                                  11
proved the parties agreed to settle and their agreement is enforceable

under Texas law. In issue three, Great American argues the trial court

erred in granting the motion based on Northwestern’s argument that

Great American failed to comply with a condition precedent to

Northwestern’s policy before Great American filed suit.

     We note that both parties have cited the Uniform Condominium Act

throughout their briefs. 14 For convenience, we will address Great

American’s argument that the settlement doesn’t violate public policy

first. And when addressing this argument, which Great American relied

on in the first two issues of its brief, we will assume without deciding that

the representatives of Northwestern and Great American had full

knowledge of all the facts needed to reach a binding agreement when they

exchanged the emails that resulted in the settlement that led to the

dispute. 15 With these assumptions, we are left with two questions of law:

  14Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 82.001-.164 (West 2014 & Supp. 2022) (the
Uniform Condominium Act or the UCA). Although the legislature has
amended various sections of the UCA after the May 2019 fire, there are
no changes in the statute relevant to Great American’s appeal. For that
reason, we cite the current version of the statute in the opinion.
     15Northwestern disputes that Ver Helst had full knowledge of all

the relevant facts. But his knowledge is not relevant if the Uniform
Condominium Act prevents the courts from enforcing the agreement even

                                     12
(1) Does the Uniform Condominium Act apply to a condominium owners

association’s insurance company? (2) If so, did the Texas legislature

intend to prevent parties from using settlement agreements under

circumstances that involve the insurance the Uniform Condominium Act

requires condominiums to carry as a device to avoid the limitations and

prohibitions in Property Code section 82.111? 16

                   Does the Uniform Condominium Act
                        Apply to Great American?

      Just like any other individual or entity, insurance companies are

free to settle doubtful and disputed claims and “may contract as they

wish so long as the agreement reached does not violate positive law or

offend public policy.” 17 Still, the “freedom of contract is not unbounded.”18

“When a contractual arrangement is inconsonant with public policy

expressed in a regulatory statute, preservation of contractual freedom

and its ‘indispensable partner’—contract enforcement—must yield.” 19

when the parties know all the relevant facts needed to allow parties to
reach a binding settlement.
     16Id. § 81.111 (Insurance).
     17Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. White, 490 S.W.3d 468, 475 (Tex. 2016).
     18Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP, 246 S.W.3d 653,

664 (Tex. 2008).
     19White, 490 S.W.3d at 490.

                                    13
     Great American argues that nothing in the Act prohibited Great

American “from making a subrogation claim against Nationwide” or

Northwestern from “accepting Great American’s” demand. Great

American also claims the Uniform Condominium Act doesn’t apply to

insurers who sell insurance to condominium associations, suggesting its

reach is limited to condominium owners’ associations and to the owners

of the units in condominiums. As Great American sees it, its settlement

with Northwestern “conferred a new, independent right to Great

American upon which Great American could recover without aid, or

assistance of the allegedly illegal policy or right/claim, especially

considering the fact that the settlement included the Association’s

deductible.” In response to Northwestern’s argument claiming Great

American waived its rights of subrogation under Chapter 82 and its

policy, Great American suggests that Northwestern should have raised

that claim in response to Great American’s settlement demand. Great

American concludes Northwestern lost its right to raise that claim after

agreeing to the settlement.

                                  14
     Starting with the Act, we note the Act regulates how condominiums

created since January 1, 1994, are regulated and managed. 20 Given the

inherent complexities involved in carving real estate up into separately

and commonly owned parts, the UCA establishes baseline rules that

apply the creation, development, and management of condominiums.21

The insurance coverage condominiums must carry is just one of the areas

where the legislature became involved in the business of regulating and

managing condominiums under the Act. 22 And when a condominium

includes units with horizontal boundaries described in the declaration

filed of record, the legislature said the condominium owner’s association

must obtain a policy, if reasonably available, that includes the property

in an owner’s unit, except for the “improvements and betterments” that

the unit owner installed. 23

     20Tex.   Prop. Code Ann. §§ 82.001, .051, .055, .101-.116.
     21Id.  §§ 82.001-.164.
      22Id. § 82.111(d).
      23Id. § 82.111(b). The Declaration for The Shore states the physical

boundaries of the units are “depicted on the “Map[.]” The Declaration
defines “Map” as “the plats and plans described as Exhibit ‘B’ attached to
the Declarations.” However, the Clerk’s Record does not contain the plats
and plans exhibit that the documents filed of record in Travis County
reference as an attachment to the Declaration, Exhibit B. Still, the
definition of “Map” in The Shore’s Declaration states Exhibit B incudes a

                                   15
      In addition to the above, the Uniform Condominium Act contains

additional requirements obligating the Association to obtain insurance

coverage for the property of The Shore. Under Property Code section

82.111(d), the Association had to obtain a policy (1) naming each unit

owner as an insured, (2) waiving the carrier’s right to subrogation against

each unit owner, (3) providing that no act or omission of a unit owner—

unless acting within the unit owner’s authority for the Association—

would void the Association’s policy, and (4) making the Association’s

policy the primary policy should a unit owner obtain insurance that also

covered their loss. 24

      No one has argued that a policy meeting the requirements of

Property Code section 82.111 wasn’t reasonably available when the

Association bought the policy insuring The Shore against the losses that

were caused by the May 2019 fire. Indeed, the evidence shows Great

American treated the individual unit owners, including the Evanses, as

insureds under its policy as it paid claims as they were presented by unit

“survey plat of the Property and dimensional drawings that horizontally
and vertically identity and describe the Units and the Common
Elements.”
     24Id. § 82.111(d).

                                   16
owners for the property covered by the policy in the units damaged by the

fire.

        While Great American argues the legislature didn’t intend Chapter

82 to apply to insurance companies, the language of the statute shows its

argument lacks merit. For instance, Property Code section 82.111(g)

provides that “[t]he insurer issuing the policy may not cancel or refuse to

renew it less than 30 days after written notice of the proposed

cancellation or nonrenewal has been mailed to the association.” 25 And

when a claim is submitted that is payable for damages to the Common

Elements of the condominium under a policy purchased by the

Association, “[t]he insurance proceeds for that loss shall be payable to an

insurance trustee designated by the association for that purpose[.]” 26 All

in all, Property Code section 82.111 represents a tightly regulated

scheme that designates the insurance condominiums built after January

1, 1994, must carry. 27

        Thus, it’s clear from the language in the statute that the legislature

intended section 82.111 to apply to insurers that sell condominium

        25Id. § 82.111(g).
        26Id. § 82.111(e).
        27Id. §§ 82.111, .111(d).

                                      17
policies to condominium associations subject to Chapter 82. 28 When a

“statute is clear and unambiguous, we must read the language according

to its common meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic

aids.” 29 We reject Great American’s argument that Chapter 82 doesn’t

apply to Great American. The summary-judgment evidence shows Great

American sold an insurance policy to a condominium owner’s association

that is required to carry a policy that contains the coverage required by

Property Code section 82.111(d). 30 Great American concedes its coverage

did comply with the Act, and based on our review of the policy, we agree

the provisions in the policy include a waiver of subrogation against those

who own units in The Shore. 31

        Does Chapter 82 Render the Settlement Unenforceable?

     Great American argues Chapter 82 doesn’t reach its agreement.

But the language of Chapter 82 prohibits parties from using any device

     28Id. § 82.111.
     29State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).
      30Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(d).
      31See Great American Policy Endorsement SB 87 66 Texas —

Condominium Association Coverage Amendments, IV. Select Business
Policy Conditions, Loss Conditions[—Amendments, Waiver of Rights of
Recovery]; Condominium Declaration For The Shore, A Condominium,
Article VI, Insurance, Section 6.1(c).

                                   18
except as expressly provided by Chapter 82 from evading the Chapter’s

limitations or prohibitions. 32 The section of the Property Code restricting

the freedom of parties to freely contract around the provisions in Chapter

82 states:

         Except as expressly provided by this chapter, provisions of
      this chapter may not be varied by agreement, and rights
      conferred by this chapter may not be waived. A person may
      not act under a power of attorney or use any other device to
      evade the limitations or prohibitions of this chapter or the
      declaration [filed of record for the condominium]. 33

To be sure, the legislature used “except as provided” in many of the

sections of Chapter 82. 34 But we find it significant that it didn’t provide

for any exceptions in Property Code section 82.111(a)-(d), the subsections

of Chapter 82 that create the rules prescribing the insurance coverage for

condominium owners associations like the one responsible for managing

The Shore. 35

      To be sure, section 82.004 applies to persons and that term isn’t

defined in the Uniform Condominium Act. 36 Still, we must assume that

      32Id.   § 82.004.
      33Id.
      34Id. §§ 82.102(f), .103(a), .107(a)-(d), .170, .111(i), .112(d), .113(d),
.114(j), .117, .151(a), .152(a), .157(a), .007(b), .067(a), .068(f).
      35Id. § 82.111(a)-(d).
      36See id. § 82.003 (Definitions).

                                       19
the legislature intended for courts to interpret the word person to include

corporations since the legislature defined person to include corporations

in the Code Construction Act, an Act that applies to defining the words

the legislature didn’t specifically define in the Uniform Condominium

Act. 37 A careful examination of the Act’s structure reveals that if

insurance coverage is reasonably available to a condominium required to

cover the risks listed in section 82.111(a)-(d), the condominium owners

association and its insurer cannot waive the requirements. No one has

claimed that insurance covering those risks was not reasonably available

to The Shore. Thus, as a person subject to restrictions and prohibitions of

section 82.111 and 82.004, Great American could not use any “device to

evade the limitations or prohibitions” of the waiver of subrogation

required in section 82.111(d). 38

     Faced with the language of the statute, Great American still argues

that enforcing its arm’s-length agreement with Northwestern outweighs

Northwestern’s public policy argument that its settlement should be

declared void as a matter of public policy despite the policy preference

     37Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 311.002, 311.005(2) (“‘Person’ includes
corporation, organization, . . . and any other legal entity.”).
     38Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 82.004, .111, .111(d).

                                     20
the legislature expressed prohibiting parties from using any device to

evade the limitations of Chapter 82. According to Great American,

enforcing settlements and allowing parties to settle claims is more

important than allowing it to use the settlement in the manner they used

it here. Northwestern responds that enforcing the settlement offends

public policy because enforcing the agreement would allow Great

American to collect on a subrogation claim that both doesn’t exist under

its policy and to collect on a subrogation claim the legislature required it

to waive. 39

      Great American cites several cases to support its argument that the

trial court erred in holding its settlement with Northwestern was

unenforceable. The cases it cites, however, may be distinguished on their

facts. For example, Great American relies heavily on Jistel v. Tiffany

Trail Owners Association, Incorporated, 215 S.W.3d 474, 482 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.) to support its claim that Nationwide can’t

rely on section 82.004 to avoid the terms of its agreement to fund the

settlement based on the $266,540 term on which the parties agreed. 40

      39See n.31.
      40Jistel v. Tiffany Trail Owners Ass’n, Inc., 215 S.W.3d 474, 477-78

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2006, no pet.).
                                    21
     But unlike here, the parties involved in the lawsuit in Jistel were

the unit owner and the condominium association. The question before the

Eastland Court of Appeals was whether Chapter 82 allowed the parties

to settle a claim Larry Jistel, as the plaintiff, filed after suing Tiffany

Trail to repair his unit on a claim against Tiffany Trail Condominium

Association under Property Code section 82.107. 41 Under section 82.107,

a condominium owner’s association is “responsible for maintenance,

repair, and replacement of the common elements” of the condominium.42

In section 82.107, the legislature provided room for a condominium

association to alter the maintenance, repair, and replacement

requirements. But in section 82.111, the provision that mandates the

insurance coverage condominiums must carry, the legislature did not

provide room allowing condominiums to alter the insurance coverage the

legislature required. 43

     To boil it down, the Eastland Court of Appeals didn’t address a

settlement based on a claim waived under section 82.111, a section where

the legislature didn’t allow variances from the insurance coverage the

     41Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107(a).
     42Jistel, 215 S.W.3d at 482; Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107(a).
     43Compare Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107(a)-(d), with § 82.111.

                                   22
legislature required condominiums to have. 44 And unlike section 82.107,

which applies to the maintenance and repair obligations of condominium

associations, section 82.111, which governs a condominium association’s

insurance obligations, doesn’t allow the association or its insurer the

right to vary or waive the rights conferred on unit owners in section

82.111 including the       waiver of subrogation provision, section

82.111(d)(2). 45

      The other cases Great American relies on in its brief are also

distinguishable. None of them involve statutory provisions like the ones

in Property Code sections 82.004 and 82.111. 46

      44Jistel,215 S.W.3d at 482-83; Compare Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §
82.107, with id. § 82.111.
      45Compare Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.107, with id. §§ 82.111,

.111(d)(2).
      46(1) Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. Co., 239 S.W.

919, 923 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, holding approved, judgm’t adopted);
(2) Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 230 S.W. 397, 399 (1921); (3) De Leon v.
Trevino & Bros., 49 Tex. 88, 91-92 (1878); (4) Plano Parkway Office
Condos. v. Bever Props., LLC, 246 S.W.3d 188, 195 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2007, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); (5) Beyers v. Roberts, 199 S.W.3d 354,
358 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); (6) Associated
Milk Producers v. Nelson, 624 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.); (7) Markman v. Gaitz, 499 S.W.2d 692, 696
(Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.); (8) Castilleja
v. Camero, 402 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. App.―Corpus Christi 1966), aff’d,
414 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1967); (9) City of Garland v. Tex. Power & Light

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     Since the text in section 82.004 and 82.111 is clear, it “is

determinative of legislative intent unless the plain meaning of the

statute’s words would produce an absurd result.” 47 The text of the statute

required Great American to waive its subrogation rights, which left it

with no right to sue the Evanses in an effort to shift the losses that fell

on its policy to the Evanses and their insurer, Northwestern. For that

reason, voiding Great American’s settlement with Northwestern doesn’t

strike us as absurd or unfair.

                                 Conclusion

     We hold the trial court did not err in granting Northwestern’s

motion for summary judgment. The summary-judgment evidence

conclusively established that Great American waived its subrogation

claim against the Evanses, 48 and that under an endorsement to Great

American’s policy, Great American’s policy is the primary policy that was

Co., 295 S.W.2d 925, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1956, no writ); (10) Fred
Miller Brewing Co. v. Coonrod, 230 S.W. 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1921, writ ref’d).
      47Tex. Workforce Comm’n v. Wichita Cty., 548 S.W.3d 498, 492 (Tex.

2018).
      48See n.31.

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required to respond to the damages that resulted from the fire at The

Shore. 49 We overrule Great American’s first two issues. 50 The trial court’s

judgment is

     AFFIRMED.

                                               _________________________
                                                    HOLLIS HORTON
                                                         Justice

Submitted on May 12, 2022
Opinion Delivered February 9, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

     49See  Great American Policy Endorsement SB 87 66 Texas —
Condominium Association Coverage Amendments, IV. Select Business
Policy Conditions, Loss Conditions (making Great American’s policy
primary when a unit owner has other insurance that covers the loss);
Condominium Declaration For The Shore, A Condominium, Article VI,
Insurance, Section 6.2(a)(iii); see also Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 82.111(d)(4).
      50We need not reach Great American’s third issue since we have

affirmed the summary judgment on Northwestern’s claim the settlement
is unenforceable against it under Chapter 82. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
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