Court Opinion

ID: 9606978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:54:41.489273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.704585
License: Public Domain

WREN, Judge
(dissents).
I would agree with the majority that A. R. S. § 23-1045 (A) (2) is impractical in its application today. However, it was just as impractical in 1939 when applied to families where both parents worked. The point is that the legislature at the time it enacted § 23-1045 was not unaware of the situation of families with two working parents. The legislature considered it and chose not to specially provide for it. If today, due to the increase in the number of families with two working parents, either public policy has changed, or the wisdom of providing for this situation has been made more evident, it is the function of the legislature, and not this Court, to change the law. The Court’s function is to construe and enforce laws as they are, and not to legislate social policy on the basis of personal inclinations. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189 (1974); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 90 S. Ct. 628, 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970) ; Lueck v. *47Superior Court, County of Cochise, 105 Ariz. 583, 469 P.2d 68 (1970); Tovrea Packing Co. v. Tapia, 63 Ariz. 503, 163 P. 2d 852 (1945) ; State v. Harpham, 2 Ariz. App. 478, 410 P.2d 100 (1966).
The majority has amended § 23-1045 under the guise of statutory construction. Specifically they have amended the phrase in subsection (A)(2), totally dependent for support upon the employee to read totally dependent for support upon the employee or his family. In my opinion, the majority’s claimed statutory construction contravenes the express language and intent of § 23-1045(A) (2). The majority has imported a meaning to a statute devoid of language capable of expressing it.
To justify its action, the majority states that construing the language of the statute according to its plain meaning would frustrate the purpose of the statute. So caught up is the majority with the purpose of this particular section, that they ignore the purpose of legislation, which is of course, designed for communication to the public at large. As the majority’s opinion illustrates, the danger in interpreting the terms of a statute substantially different from their meaning in common parlance, is that public confidence and trust in written enactments is undermined. As pointed in Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 422, 466 P.2d 18, 27 (1970), “[I]f the sense of a word is not to be taken in its usual and commonly understood meaning . . . it becomes impossible for men to mean what is said or say what they mean and purposeful communications is unattainable.” It is for this reason there exists the cardinal rule that unless the context of a statute indicates otherwise, words of a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning. State Tax Commission v. Peck, 106 Ariz. 394, 476 P.2d 849 (1970); Huerta v. Flood, 103 Ariz. 608, 447 P.2d 866 (1968) ; State v. Curry, 97 Ariz. 191, 398 P.2d 899 (1965). As stated in Kilpatrick, supra:
“There is no magic in statutory construction and no legal legerdemain should be used to change the meaning of simple English words so that the resulting interpretation conforms the statute to the sociological and economic views of judges or lawyers. Words are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning unless it is plain or clear that a different meaning was intended.” 105 Ariz. at 421, 466 P.2d at 26.
The language of § 23-1045 (A) (2) is not used in any technical sense, and as acknowledged by the majority, no ambiguity exists therein. The meaning of the language is clear. Totally dependent for support upon the employee means exactly what it says. The majority’s construction of this language, to wit, that a person does not have to be totally dependent on the injured employee, as long as he is totally dependent upon the family unit, is simply untenable.
The majority further asserts that its construction of the statute comports with the legislative intent. Yet they ignore the rule that intent of the enacting body must be found in the language of the statute. Marquez v. Rapid Harvest Co., 89 Ariz. 62, 358 P.2d 168 (1960); Barlow v. Jones, 37 Ariz. 396, 294 P. 1106 (1930). Instead, the majority attempts to ascertain the legislature’s intent through surmise and speculation. They delve into a historic comparison of the number of working women in the labor market between 1939 and present day. They conclude that if the legislature in 1939 had been aware of economic and social conditions as they exist today, they would have, no doubt, provided for it in the same way as the majority has done here.
The majority’s opinion thus provides another illustration. In ascertaining legislative intent, one can conceivably follow the majority’s approach and consider the legislature’s subjective intent, and thus, reach a conclusion supportable only by conjecture. On the other hand, one can ascertain intent by looking to the language of the statute as the most true and accurate guide. Certainly, the latter is the only practical *48and realistic method, for in examining the language of the statute, one has before him an objective manifestation of intent.
The majority has not ascertained the legislature’s intent here. Instead, they have ascribed an intent to the enacting body, based solely on their own personal beliefs. In doing so, the majority disregards the following proscription enunciated in Kilpatrick, supra:
“Courts are not at liberty to impose their views of the way things ought to be simply because that’s what must have been intended, otherwise no statute, contract or recorded word, no matter how explicit, could be saved from judicial tinkering.” 105 Ariz. 422, 466 P.2d at 27.
Finally, the majority acknowledges that there are no constitutional infirmities with § 23-1045 (A) (2) as applied pursuant to its plain meaning. I find no justification for the Court’s ignoring that plain meaning and attributing to the statute a different meaning that the words of the statute are incapable of bearing. The change in § 23-1045 that the majority’s decision effectuates should have been left to the legislative branch of our government.
I would affirm the award.