Court Opinion

ID: 9573534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:32.391407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:32.815694
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 24. (concurring). While I concur in the result, I cannot join the majority opinion because I believe the standard it sets for granting a guardianship is not responsive to the complex realities that demand the appointment of a guardian. By adopting a one-size-fits-all standard that exceeds what is constitutionally required, the majority hamstrings the usefulness and flexibility of guardian-ships.
¶ 25. On November 5, 2003, Robin K. filed a petition for permanent guardianship of a minor, James D.K. Robin K. was the child's great aunt. She alleged that three-year-old James had spent most of the past two-and-one-half years living with her.
¶ 26. The following day, November 6, the child's mother, Lamanda M., asked a police officer to remove James from Robin K.'s home and return him to her.
¶ 27. On November 13, Robin K. filed an amended petition, seeking temporary guardianship of James. The amended petition was supported by a sworn affidavit alleging that for the past two-and-one-half years Robin *350K. had borne the primary responsibility for the care of James; during that time the child had been primarily placed with her by the mother, and Robin K. had provided for the child's care and welfare; Robin K. had taken the child to California during business trips "on numerous occasions;" the mother had "refused to financially support" the child "at any point in the child's life;" the child referred to his great aunt Robin K. as "Mommy;" and until the time the guardianship petition was filed, Lamanda M. had no objection to the placement of James with Robin K.
¶ 28. Robin K.'s affidavit also stated that she feared for the emotional and physical welfare of James when he was at his mother's house. On one occasion when he was with Lamanda M., the child was in an automobile accident that involved drinking; on another occasion, the child was in the car when the driver was arrested for operating under the influence of an intoxicant. Robin K. claimed that multiple people lived at the mother's residence and that James did not have his own bedroom.
¶ 29. In response to Robin K.'s petition, the court scheduled a hearing for November 20, 2003. Lamanda M. objected. In a November 18 letter to the court, she wrote:
I need to postphon my coort date on Nov. 20th 2003 for 2 resons. 11 jest found out yesterday and I haven't found a lawer for my case. 2.1 have to go out of state for a funrul. I have to leave tonight and I proble won't be back in til Saterday. I hope you will understand. I reall haven't found time to get council. Thanks for your time.
¶ 30. The court rescheduled the hearing, and it took evidence on December 3, 2003. Lamanda M. appeared at the December hearing without an attorney.
*351THE CIRCUIT COURT HEARING
¶ 31. This court is at a disadvantage because it does not have a transcript of the evidentiary portion of the circuit court hearing. We know, however, that the case came before the court as a petition for a temporary guardianship of the person of a minor under Wis. Stat. § 880.15 and that the court assumed the truth of Robin K.'s allegations about the child's placement, commenting that "the child's obviously spent a great deal of time with [Robin K] over the two and a half years," a "placement" that ended "when the guardianship [proceeding] was commenced."
¶ 32. There is a transcript of the court's ruling and the arguments that preceded the ruling. In the arguments, the guardian ad litem recommended the requested guardianship based upon (a) "concerns that I see with regard to the parenting that is being provided," (b) the abandonment standard having somewhat been met "by the mere fact that the child has not been in the care of the mother for most of the time," (c) the apparent lack of stability in the mother's life, (d) some of the decisions the mother "makes are not necessarily in the best interests" of her children, (e) the absence of stability in maintaining work or having a regular income, (f) concern about the stability of the mother's relationships with men ("four children, three born/one unborn. .. and all of them have different fathers"), (g) concerns leading to the intervention of the Sauk County Department of Human Services, and (h) "the wellbeing and best interests of the child."
¶ 33. Counsel for Robin K. made legal arguments about guardianship and how the mother could terminate the guardianship if the mother could show that she had become a "suitable" parent. "This guardianship is *352not something that goes on indefinitely," counsel argued. "I have been involved in guardianships that have terminated and I think that all [that] has to be shown is that it's in the child's best interests to be with the mother."
¶ 34. "[T]he most telling evidence against the mother in this case," counsel added, "is the fact that she has allowed [Robin K] to have this child[,] and the Court then has to ask itself why. And I think the answer is clear. Because she didn't feel she could care for the child."
¶ 35. Lamanda M. fired back:
I never thought that I couldn't take care of my son.. .. I still don't understand why they think I'm not capable of taking care of my son, or stable enough to take care of my son, when I've had my girls and I'm stable enough to take care of them. And I know that I'm young and I know that I have some money problems and some problems with having my friends come over. But... I think everybody once in their life goes through money situations when they lose their job or they can't find new employment.
¶ 36. In its ruling, the court stated that it had difficulty with the guardianship statute "in a situation such as this." The court indicated there were no limitations on commencing the action and no apparent way to end the guardianship. "[W]hat is the standard to be applied?" the court asked. The court then answered its own question: "[T]he guardianship does not have a standard." Although the court expressed concern "with the situation as it[']s been described to exist in [the mother's] home," the number of people there, the number of children, the "somewhat chaotic" atmosphere, and the general allegations of neglect, it concluded: "I *353don't believe that the guardianship is appropriate in this case." The court then dismissed the petition.
¶ 37. The issue presented on review is what standard the circuit court should employ in determining whether to grant a temporary guardianship of the person of a minor child when the guardianship is opposed by the child's mother.
DISCUSSION
¶ 38. Chapter 880 is entitled "Guardians and Wards." Wisconsin Stat. § 880.03 provides in part that "[a]ll minors, incompetents, and spendthrifts are subject to guardianship." There may be a guardian of the "person" or a guardian of the "estate," or both. § 880.03. In each case, the circuit court makes the appointment.
¶ 39. A "guardian" is defined, in part, in Wis. Stat. § 880.01(3) as "one appointed by a court to have care, custody and control of the person of a minor ... or the management of the estate of a minor . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
¶ 40. In this case, Robin K. is seeking a new legal status — guardian of the person of a minor child. That status would give her "custody" of the child. She is attempting to secure this legal status over the opposition of the mother. In these specific circumstances, the standard appears to be governed by Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 568-69, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984):
We conclude that the rule to be followed in custody disputes between parents and third parties is that a parent is entitled to custody of his or her children unless the parent is either unfit or unable to care for the children or there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a third party. Compelling reasons include abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsi*354bilities, extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child. If the court finds such compelling reasons, it may award custody to a third party if the best interests of the children would be promoted thereby.
¶ 41. The court expanded its analysis in a footnote:
We are not... holding that parents may be deprived of custody of their children only if they are found to be unfit. ... A complete failure to assume any significant responsibility for the child... may well constitute compelling reasons warranting an award of custody to a non-parent.
Id. at 569 n.9 (emphasis added).
¶ 42. This court adhered to the Barstad standard as the proper standard when determining whether custody should be granted to a party who is not a minor's biological or adoptive parent. Holtzman v. Knott, 192 Wis. 2d 649, 664-65, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995). See also Sporleder v. Hermes, 162 Wis. 2d 1002, 1009, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991).
¶ 43. The standard set out in Barstad is a statement of "constitutional principles." Id. at 563. This means that when it applies, this standard prevails over any different statutory language. Nonetheless, the Barstad court tied the standard to the existing custody statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(l)(c) (1979-80):
If the interest of any child demands it, and if the court finds that neither party [parent] is able to care for the child adequately or that neither party [parent] is fit and proper to have the care and custody of the child, the court may declare any such child to be in need of protection or services and transfer legal custody of the child to a relative of the child ....
*355¶ 44. The substance of this quoted provision is now found in Wis. Stat. § 767.24(3)(a). Significantly, this same paragraph (a) also states: "If the court transfers legal custody of a child under this subsection [3], in its order the court shall notify the parents of any applicable grounds for termination of parental rights under s. 48.415."
¶ 45. If one were able to draw a clear distinction between the legal custody under presént § 767.24(3) and the guardianship custody implicated in § 880.03, then the Barstad standard might be relaxed. But the evidence here suggests that Robin K.'s ultimate goal was to obtain, through a permanent guardianship, the kind of legal custody, care, and control of the child contemplated in § 767.24(3). Absent a clear distinction between custody and guardianship, the court of appeals correctly applied the Barstad standard to this case. The court of appeals has also applied the Barstad standard in other guardianship cases, stating that the party petitioning for guardianship must first meet the Barstad standard — not the extraordinary circumstances standard — before a non-parent can be appointed guardian. See e.g., Elgin W. v. DHFS, 221 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 584 N.W.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1998); Howard M. v. Jean R., 196 Wis. 2d 16, 24, 539 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶ 46. At the December 3, 2003, hearing, Robin K. sought a temporary guardianship. A temporary guardianship is described in Wis. Stat. § 880.15:
If, after consideration of a petition for temporary guardianship, the court finds that the welfare of a minor, spendthrift or an alleged incompetent requires the immediate appointment of a guardian of the person ... it may appoint a temporary guardian for a period not to exceed 60 days unless further extended for *35660 days by order of the court. The court may extend the period only once. The authority of the temporary guardian shall be limited to the performance of duties respecting. . . the performance of particular acts, as stated in the order of appointment. All provisions of the statutes concerning the powers and duties of guardians shall apply to temporary guardians except as limited by the order of appointment.
¶ 47. Because the appointment of a temporary guardian is limited in time, the court may focus on the short-term welfare of the child in light of a parent's alleged inability to provide care or the presence of some immediate risk to the child as reflected in a need for protection or services. The statute appears to give the court power to set conditions in its order of appointment.
¶ 48. A temporary guardianship permits a troubled parent to stabilize her situation, addressing problems that might jeopardize her parental rights. A temporary guardianship permits the guardian or other person seeking a change of legal custody to determine whether to go forward, assuming the burden of proving parental "unfitness" or other grounds that will overcome parental opposition.
¶ 49. I part company with the majority opinion for three reasons.
¶ 50. First, the majority treats this case as a request for a permanent guardianship but declines to apply the Barstad standard. Majority op., ¶ 3 n.3. I disagree. The majority's standard, "extraordinary circumstances affecting the health or safety of the minor," is entirely consistent with the phrase in the Barstad standard: "extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the welfare of the child." Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 568.
*357¶ 51. Unless this court withdraws that language or successfully distinguishes the facts here from the facts in Barstad, the Barstad standard — which is not limited to "unfitness" — applies to a permanent, non-parental guardianship opposed by a mother.
¶ 52. Second, by turning to the language in § 880.03 for its "standard," the court is creating a quandary for future cases.1 The "extraordinary circumstances" language applies to all permanent guardian-ships. It applies to guardianships of the person for minors (regardless of whether a parent objects), spendthrifts, and incompetents, and it also applies to guard-ianships of their respective "estates."2
*358¶ 53. Frankly, the standard applied in these cases cannot be the same in all situations.3 The standard has to vary when a parent is not involved, when a guardianship is not contested, and perhaps when there is a contested guardianship of the "estate" as opposed to a contested guardianship of the "person." To illustrate, if Robin K. had retained actual custody of James and if the mother did not oppose Robin K.'s guardianship of the child's person, the standard would have to be different from "extraordinary circumstances affecting the health or safety of the minor," because there would be, on such facts, no threat to the health or safety of James. It is not clear, under the majority's analysis, whether it would insist on applying the same standard on such facts, relying on § 880.03.
¶ 54. Third, I recognize that this court does not have the full record and that the circuit court did not find facts to grant the petition for a temporary guardianship. But I completely disagree that the court could not have granted a temporary guardianship if the facts alleged were established at the hearing. I believe it could have.
¶ 55. The Barstad court took pains to explain that the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their own children *359does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents. Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 562. On the other hand, the assertion of parental rights is to some extent dependent upon the assumption of parental responsibilities. "A biological parent who has never borne any significant responsibility for the child and who has not functioned as a member of the child's family unit is not entitled to the full constitutional protections." Id. at 563.
¶ 56. Lamanda M. asserted her parental rights but substantially abdicated her parental responsibilities. A young mother who willingly places her child in the care, de facto custody, and control of a relative for the better part of two-and-one-half years is either not responsible or, conversely, sufficiently responsible to realize that she cannot properly care for her child. It is not likely that her situation changed abruptly overnight.
¶ 57. In addition, at the time of the hearing, Lamanda M. was a mother who allegedly had four non-marital children by four different fathers, who had never provided financial support for James, who was unemployed, who had no stable source of income, who had a chaotic household, who had drug and alcohol problems, who had lost her driving privileges, who was (on the basis of her letter to the court) poorly educated, and who had a lengthy history of law enforcement contact and prosecution.
¶ 58. This court should not deprive circuit courts of the legal authority to grant guardianships, especially temporary guardianships, when facts of this gravity are established.
¶ 59. I concur in the result here, first, because I am not prepared to say that the findings of the circuit court are clearly erroneous, and, second, because two- *360and-one-half years have passed since December 3,2003, and we do not know how the situation has changed. However, I urge authorities in Sauk County to assure themselves that James is not a child in need of protection or services. Unlike many contemporary children, James has a good alternative, if an alternative is necessary.

 As the majority indicates, 2005 Wisconsin Act 387 repeals and amends Chapter 880 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Majority op., ¶ 14 n.10. One such amendment is the repeal of the extraordinary circumstances standard. Since this standard will no longer apply, I urge the legislature to examine the standards it wishes to apply to guardianship cases when a parent is involved, as well as in other circumstances. The legislature is not free to disregard a constitutional standard for guardianship of a minor's person in cases involving the opposition of a parent. Additionally, I would encourage the legislature to examine the constitutionality of the "best interest of the minor" standard created by Act 387 in Wis. Stat. §§ 54.15(5) and 54.56(2) in light of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000).

 When determining guardianship, the circuit court must select one of five categories of residency under which the minor is classified. Despite this court's statutory interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 880.03, the Determination and Order for Guardianship of Minor form, created by the Judicial Conference Forms Committee, requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances only for a minor who is a nonresident of the county in which the petition for guardianship is filed. The form does not reference the standard for minors who are residents of the state and county, residents of the state and physically present in the *358county, nonresidents of the state whose person or property may be found in the county, or residents or nonresidents of the state with property located within the county. The forms committee would need to amend this form, in light of the majority opinion, so that it is consistent with the statutory interpretation that the extraordinary circumstances standard applies to all guardian-ships, except that 2005 Wis. Act 387 appears to leave the majority opinion without any prospective effect.

 Although the majority claims to limit its holding to the appointment of a guardian when a parent objects, there is no statutory basis for this limitation.