Court Opinion

ID: 9491430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:14:01.040716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:44.302308
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Accepting the majority’s statement of issues and its recitation of the standards of review, it is my view that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Guinness was improper. I disagree with the majority opinion with respect to (1) its analysis of Mark VII’s tor-tious interference claim, (2) its application of the Minnesota Beer Brewers Act, and (3) its application of Minnesota’s long-arm statute.
First, Mark VII presented material evidence showing that Guinness PLC (hereinafter “Guinness”), parent of appellee Guinness Import Company (hereinafter “GIC”), purchased D & G in 1993. Mark VII also presented evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Guinness and its subsidiaries, D & G and GIC, concocted a scheme by which GIC would gain the right to distribute Red Stripe and Dragon Stout. There is no doubt, given such reasonable findings, that a contract existed; that Guin*616ness, GIC, and D & G knew of the contract; that they intentionally interfered with the contract to acquire the importation rights to Red Stripe and Dragon Stout in Minnesota; that their actions to take advantage of the market Mark VII created for Red Stripe and Dragon Stout without triggering the provisions of the Act were not justified; and that Mark VII sustained damages as a result. Consequently, summary judgment on Mark VII’s tortious interference claim was improper.
Second, although I have no quarrel with the majority’s interpretation of the Minneso: ta Beer Brewers and Wholesalers Act, I disagree with its application of the Act as it relates to the evidence presented by Mark VII. Mark VII provided evidence showing that D & G, upon ending its relationship with Labatt, paid Labatt $600,000. Shortly thereafter, GIC paid D & G a similar amount to obtain the right to sell Red Stripe and Dragon Stout. Within a short time, GIC also relinquished its right to import the Dos Equis brands, brewed by a Mexican brewer, and Labatt coincidentally obtained the right to import the Dos Equis brands. Based on these events, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the arrangement between La-batt and GIC actually constituted a “purchase” of Labatt’s importation contract by GIC, placing GIC in Labatt’s position as it related to Mark VII. As such, GIC would be compelled to follow the strictures of the Act relating to Labatt’s contract with Mark VII. Without a trial, I do not believe that we can determine whether GIC is obligated under the Act or whether it met the Act’s requirements. The district court’s grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
Third, the majority’s application of Minnesota’s long-arm statute is simply wrong. D & G did not merely place its beer “into the stream of commerce, without more” as the majority suggests. Rather, D & G contracted with a series of importers to sell D & G’s beer in the United States.8 The rule in our circuit is clear that when a foreign producer “ ‘pour[s] its products’ into a regional distributor with the expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-State trade area, the manufacturer has ‘purposefully reaped the benefits’ of the laws of each State in that trade area for due process purposes.” Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components, Unlimited., 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th Cir.1994)). D & G specifically provided Red Stripe and Dragon Stout for importation to the United States, clearly knowing that some of its beer would be sold in Minnesota. D & G purposefully reaped the benefits of the laws of Minnesota and is consequently subject to service of process under Minnesota’s long-arm statute. The majority’s errant application makes Minnesota’s long-arm statute a mere road bump for foreign producers who need only create a shadow corporation for distribution of its products in the United States to avoid liability under any state’s law. This is not the law of our circuit and should not be permitted to stand.

. I am convinced that a trial would produce evidence showing that D & G’s importers were required to meet certain marketing and sales levels in their respective markets to maintain their importation rights.