Court Opinion

ID: 9901710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 14:08:40.974035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:37.956201
License: Public Domain

J-S15007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SAMUEL W. MUFSON                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1453 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 19, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-60-CR-0000010-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

CONCURRING STATEMENT BY SULLIVAN, J.:               FILED: NOVEMBER 21, 2023

       While I join the majority memorandum’s grant of a remand for the

District Attorney of Union County to review and determine whether to admit

Mufson into the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (“ARD”) program, I

write separately to underscore the limited nature of the holding in this case

and to emphasize the broad discretion accorded the Commonwealth in

determining whether to grant ARD for Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”).1

       Consistent with this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Corson, 299

A.3d 172 (Pa. Super. 2023), the majority memorandum holds that a blanket

policy of refusing to nominate any DUI offenders for ARD is arbitrary and bears

no relation to the protection of society or the potential for successful

____________________________________________

1 The criteria of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3807 govern admission into ARD for a DUI.
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rehabilitation of the offender. See Majority at 5-7 (citing Corson, 299 A.3d

at 176).    The majority reasons that the recent en banc decisions in

Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022), and

Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) overrule

Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020), and permit

a prior acceptance into ARD for a DUI offense to be counted as a prior

conviction for sentencing on a subsequent DUI. The majority finds that the

overruling of Chichkin, which barred consideration of a prior grant of DUI in

sentencing for a subsequent DUI, “wholly undermined the basis of the trial

court’s conclusion that the DA’s blanket policy was a fair exercise of his

discretion.” See Corson, 299 A.3d at 178. Because Mufson was denied ARD

under this blanket policy, the majority remands this case for the prosecuting

authority to re-consider Mufson’s application for ARD. See Majority at 7.

      I agree with the result and the majority’s assertion that a blanket refusal

to review an ARD application in all instances of first-offense DUIs is an abuse

of the Commonwealth’s extensive discretion in this arena; however, the

holding here should be limited to that principle alone. That is, a county DA’s

office, as a policy, cannot refuse to review any and all first time DUI ARD

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applications because they disagree with the Chichkin holding or for any other

non-viable policy reason.2

       I am also mindful of the precepts the Supreme Court has set forth

concerning ARD, specifically that admission to an ARD program is not a matter

of right, but a privilege, a prosecuting attorney’s discretion concerning ARD is

“subject to few limitations,” a district attorney is not to be faulted if he errs

on the side of caution, and finally:

       [t]he decision to submit [a] case for ARD rests in the sound
       discretion of the district attorney, and absent an abuse of that
       discretion involving some criteria for admission to ARD
       wholly, patently and without doubt unrelated to the
       protection of society and/or the likelihood of a person’s success
       in rehabilitation, such as race, religion or other such obviously
       prohibited considerations, the attorney for the Commonwealth
       must be free to submit a case or not submit it for ARD
       consideration based on his view of what is most beneficial for
       society and the offender.

Commonwealth v. Lutz, 495 A.2d 928, 933, 935 (Pa. 1985).                 Accord

Commonwealth v. Corrigan, 992 A.2d 126, 130 (Pa. Super. 2010).3 I thus

concur with the remand in this case with the understanding that a county DA’s

____________________________________________

2 It bears mentioning that although the majority is correct that Moroz and
Richards are currently the controlling law in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Commonwealth v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d
360 (Pa. 2023) (upholding Chichkin), and their decision to grant review in
Richards clearly show the Richards and Moroz decisions are not necessarily
settled law.
3 In Corrigan, this Court noted that Lutz addresses prior versions of the Rules

of Criminal Procedure and the Motor Vehicle Code but concludes that its
analysis is “highly relevant and applicable to the presently constituted Rules
and Code.” Corrigan, 992 A.2d at 129, n.3.

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office may not adopt a blanket policy refusing review of ARD applications for

DUIs, which policy bears no logical relation to the protection or society or an

offender’s potential for rehabilitation. However, I note that appellate review

of a prosecuting attorney’s ARD decision is extremely deferential and will not

be reversed absent an exercise of that discretion patently unrelated to public

safety or an offender’s potential for successful rehabilitation.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/21/2023

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