Court Opinion

ID: 9886474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:57.625455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:50.154255
License: Public Domain

J-S12020-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TRAVIS WAYNE CHINERY                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1005 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-67-CR-0002550-2021

BEFORE:       KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED: OCTOBER 6, 2023

       Travis Wayne Chinery (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following his

jury convictions of, inter alia, driving under the influence (DUI) of the highest

rate of alcohol and marijuana.1 Appellant’s attorney, Garrison Crow, Esquire

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment), (c) (highest rate of alcohol),

(d)(1)(i) (marijuana), (iii) (metabolite). Each of Appellant’s four DUI counts
were his third offense.

      Appellant was also found guilty by the trial court of the summary offense
of restriction on alcoholic beverages. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3809(a) (operator of
motor vehicle may not be in possession of an open alcoholic beverage
container).
J-S12020-23

(Counsel), has filed an Anders2 brief and petition to withdraw from

representation.      He raises two issues: (1) the Commonwealth’s alleged

delayed disclosure of a police report; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence.

We grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation and affirm the

judgment of sentence.

                                        I. Facts

       We summarize the following undisputed evidence presented at trial.

Gregory Buchman testified that on October 9, 2020, around 8:30 to 8:45 a.m.,

he was working at a stone yard in York County, and he approached a car that

was parked on the property. N.T. Criminal Jury Trial, 1/20-21/22 (N.T. Trial),

at 130-31. The driver, who was Appellant, was sleeping. Id. at 131. The car

engine was running, the driver’s window was open three to four inches, and

the radio music “was blaring.” Id. at 131. Buchman rapped on the window,

and then the windshield, in an unsuccessful attempt to rouse Appellant. Id.

at 132. Buchman put his hand through the open window to “nudge his head,”

and    Appellant    woke     up.      Id.      Buchman   described   Appellant   as

“[e]xtraordinarily groggy,” and Appellant opened his eyes very slowly, sat up,

and put on his seatbelt, all “in extremely slow motion.” Id. at 132. Buchman

____________________________________________

2  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We note Appellant was represented at
trial by two assistant public defenders, Brittney Zeller, Esquire, and Matthew
Sembach, Esquire. His appellate counsel is also a member of the Public
Defender’s Office.

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informed Appellant he had called for an ambulance, but Appellant slowly put

the car in gear and drove away. Id. at 132-34.

       At this juncture, we summarize the affidavit of probable cause,

supporting the criminal complaint, stated that Pennsylvania State Trooper

Steven Galbraith was dispatched to respond to a call at 8:46 a.m., and that

he made contact with Appellant at his residence at 9:22 a.m.        Affidavit of

Probable Cause, 10/9/20, at 1.

       At trial, Pennsylvania State Trooper Steven Galbraith similarly testified

he was dispatched at 8:46 a.m. to respond to a call about Appellant, but before

the trooper arrived, he received information the driver “had fled.” N.T. Trial

at 145. Trooper Galbraith ran the car’s registration and learned the registered

owner was Appellant. Id. at 145-46. Trooper Galbraith additionally testified,

however, that he first arrived at Appellant’s home at 9:04 a.m.3 See id. at

146, 163. Appellant was not home, and the trooper talked with Appellant’s

father.   See id. at 163.        The trooper then left and attempted to locate

Appellant. Id. at 164. At 9:22, however, the trooper returned to the home

and met with Appellant, who was now there. See id. at 146, 164.

       Trooper Galbraith described Appellant as having slurred, “thick and

slow” speech and having an odor of alcohol on his person and breath. N.T.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant lived approximately six miles from the stone yard where he had

parked. N.T. Trial at 146.

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Trial at 152.    The Commonwealth played a video taken from Trooper

Galbraith’s dash cam video recorder, which showed Appellant telling the

trooper he returned home approximately 30 seconds before the trooper

arrived. Id. at 155. Appellant initially stated he did not drink alcohol after

9:00 p.m., then stated he had two shots of whiskey around 11:30 p.m., but

ultimately denied he had any alcohol. Id. at 152-53. Appellant also stated

he pulled his car over at 2:00 a.m. because he was tired. Id. at 148, 150.

Finally, we note Trooper Michael Graybill testified he also responded to

Appellant’s home, and he observed a “three-quarters empty” bottle of Jack

Daniels in Appellant’s vehicle. Id. at 169, 172-73.

      Trooper Galbraith placed Appellant under arrest for DUI, and Appellant

consented to a blood draw, which was taken at 10:27 a.m. N.T. Trial at 156-

57. The parties stipulated the blood test revealed a blood alcohol content

(BAC) of 0.202%. Order, 1/13/22, at 2. The test also revealed the presence

of marijuana. See N.T. Trial at 158.

                   II. Trial & Disclosure of CAD Report

      The DUI charges against Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on January

20, 2022.    Pertinent to the issues on appeal, defense counsel’s opening

statement argued the following: (1) Appellant arrived home “20 minutes

before the police came to his door, not 30 seconds as he initially told them[;]”

and (2) during those 20 minutes, Appellant drank and smoked. See N.T. Trial

at 95. Appellant’s defense would thus be that he was not intoxicated when

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he drove his car, and instead, he drank and smoked after he arrived home.

See id. at 95, 113. The proceedings then concluded for the day.

       The next day, Appellant informed the trial court that at 5:30 p.m. the

previous day, the Commonwealth provided, for the first time, a police

Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) report, which would show Appellant was not

at home at 9:04 a.m. (the first time Trooper Galbraith went to his home).4

See N.T. Trial at 108, 120. This evidence, in turn, would contradict defense

counsel’s opening argument and anticipated defense — that Appellant was

drinking at home just before his encounter with the state trooper. See id. at

102, 108, 113.

       Appellant argued the Commonwealth should have disclosed the CAD

report during pre-trial discovery, and the late disclosure — after opening

arguments at trial — was a “trial by ambush.”        See N.T. Trial at 109-10.

Appellant averred the CAD report was relevant to show the timeline of “when

he was actually driving” and when the State Troopers arrived on the call. Id.

at 114. Appellant claimed the Commonwealth’s failure to provide the CAD

____________________________________________

4 Trooper Galbraith explained a CAD report shows the precise time an officer

is en route to responding to a call, arrives on scene, and, if applicable “go[es]
anywhere else during that call[ or] run[s] a driver’s license[.]” N.T. Trial at
102.

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report was a violation of Brady,5 as well as Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D) (continuing

duty to disclose)6 and warranted a mistrial. See id. at 106

       The Commonwealth responded it cannot “anticipate every plausible or

possible defense,” it was not aware until the day prior that Appellant would

raise this defense, and it immediately disclosed the CAD report. N.T. Trial at

105, 107.       The Commonwealth further contended Brady requires the

disclosure of evidence that is exculpatory or favorable to the defense, but

here, the CAD report was not favorable to Appellant’s defense. Id. at 106.

Finally, the Commonwealth stated it would not introduce the CAD report in its

case in chief, but if the defense were to open the door to this evidence, the

Commonwealth would introduce it in rebuttal. Id. at 101, 104.

       The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth the CAD report was not

exculpatory, reasoning the evidence would not “put reasonable doubt into the

trier of fact’s mind as to [Appellant’s] culpability.” N.T. Trial at 119. The court

thus denied Appellant’s request for a mistrial. See id. at 127-28.

____________________________________________

5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  A Brady violation claim avers:
the Commonwealth suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, that
was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or
impeaching, and prejudice ensued. Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d
11, 25-26 (Pa. 2019).

6 Rule 573(D) provides: “If, prior to or during trial, either party discovers
additional evidence or material previously requested or ordered to be
disclosed by it . . . such party shall promptly notify the opposing party or the
court of the additional evidence . . . .” Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D).

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      The Commonwealth then presented the testimony of Buchman and

Troopers Galbraith and Graybill, as summarized above.          Appellant did not

testify in his own defense, but called his father, who testified, inter alia, that

he did not see Appellant drink alcohol or smoke marijuana when he arrived

home that morning. N.T. Trial at 214.

      The jury found Appellant guilty of four counts of DUI: incapable of safe

driving, highest rate of alcohol (0.16% or above), marijuana, and metabolite

of marijuana.   As noted above, this was Appellant’s third offense of both

DUI/highest rate of alcohol and DUI/marijuana.        Appellant was also found

guilty by the trial court of the summary offense of restriction on alcoholic

beverages.

      On February 28, 2022, the trial court imposed a sentence of 7 years’

restrictive probation, with the first six months to be served in York County

Prison, followed by six months’ electronically monitored house arrest.

      Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was denied on June

13, 2022.    He took this timely appeal, and present Counsel filed a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal,

raising claims of court error.

                     III. Anders Petition to Withdraw

      On appeal, Counsel has now filed with this Court an Anders brief and

petition to withdraw. Appellant has not filed any pro se or counseled response.

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     “This Court must first pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw before

reviewing the merits of the underlying issues[.]”        Commonwealth v.

Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879 (Pa. Super. 2014).       To withdraw pursuant to

Anders, counsel must:

     (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
     making a conscientious examination of the record and
     interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal
     would be frivolous, (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the
     record of arguable merit, and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to
     defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel or to
     raise any additional points that he deems worthy of the court’s
     attention. . . .

Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted). In addition, pursuant to Santiago, counsel’s brief must:

     (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
     citations to the record;

     (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
     supports the appeal;

     (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

     (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
     frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
     controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
     conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 165 A.3d 1002, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2017),

quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. If this Court determines that counsel has

satisfied the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, we then

conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there are non-

frivolous issues. Schmidt, 165 A.3d at 1006 (citation omitted).

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      First,   we   determine   Counsel   has   complied   with   the   technical

requirements of Anders and Santiago. His petition to withdraw averred he:

(1) undertook a “conscientious examination of the entire record, including all

notes of testimony;” (2) has determined that a direct appeal would be

frivolous; and (3) provided a copy of the Anders brief to Appellant, and

advised him he may retain new counsel or raise any additional points to this

Court.    Counsel’s Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 4/14/23, at 1-2

(unpaginated). Counsel attached copies of two letters sent to Appellant, which

advised him Counsel could not identify any issues of arguable merit and

therefore would file an Anders petition to withdraw from representation.

These letters did advise Appellant he could file a pro se response or retain

private counsel.

      In the Anders brief, Counsel presents two issues:

      I. Whether the Commonwealth’s delayed disclosure of a police
      report prejudiced [Appellant] and resulted in an unfair trial when
      the report directly contradicted assertions made in trial counsel’s
      opening statements?

      II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict [Appellant] of
      DUI where he was not pulled over in his vehicle while intoxicated?

Anders Brief at 5. Counsel reviews the relevant law for each issue and sets

forth his reasoning why they would be frivolous. See id. at 14-22.

      Accordingly, we now independently review the record to discern if there

are non-frivolous issues. See Schmidt, 165 A.3d at 1006.

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                        IV. Disclosure of Police CAD Report

       The      first   issue   raised   in    the     Anders   brief   is   whether   the

Commonwealth’s “delayed” disclosure of the CAD report caused prejudice and

an unfair trial, where “the report directly contradicted assertions made [in]

trial counsel’s opening statements[.]” Anders Brief at 14. The issue is not

whether the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence,7 but rather

whether the timing of the disclosure “severely damaged trial counsel’s

credibility.”     Id. at 16-17.     Counsel cites case authority that “ambushing

defense counsel with” previously undisclosed impeachment evidence may

cause an unfair trial. Id. at 15, citing Commonwealth v. Galloway, 771

A.2d 65, 68 (Pa. Super. 2001).            Counsel also avers, “Discovery decisions

predating the enactment of liberalized Rule [573] recognize that the

Commonwealth’s failure to disclose possible impeachment or rebuttal

evidence may highly prejudice the defendant’s case and lead to reversible

error when the evidence is sprung on the defendant unawares.” Anders Brief

at 15, quoting Commonwealth v. Thiel, 470 A.2d 145, 149 (Pa. Super.

1983). Counsel maintains, contrary to the trial court’s finding, there was a

discovery violation, but suggests, however, the issue is ultimately without

merit, as: (1) there was no evidence presented that Appellant consumed

____________________________________________

7 We note Counsel does not present any discussion of a Brady violation.

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alcohol or marijuana after he arrived home;8 (2) defense counsel’s opening

statement was therefore not belied by the CAD report; and thus (3) Appellant

did not suffer any prejudice. Id. at 17-18. We agree that no relief would be

due.

       As stated above, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a mistrial

based on this alleged discovery violation. We consider the applicable standard

of review:

       In criminal trials, declaration of a mistrial serves to eliminate the
       negative effect wrought upon a defendant when prejudicial
       elements are injected into the case or otherwise discovered at
       trial. . . . [T]he trial court is vested with discretion to grant a
       mistrial whenever the alleged prejudicial event may reasonably be
       said to deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. . . . Our
       review of the resulting order is constrained to determining
       whether the court abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Leaner, 202 A.3d 749, 778 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

       Pennsylvania Criminal Rule 573 governs pretrial discovery, and its

purpose is to prevent “trial by ambush.”           Commonwealth v. Lynch, 242

A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. Super. 2020). Subsection 573(B)(1), which addresses

mandatory disclosures by the Commonwealth, provides, in pertinent part:

       . . . In all court cases, on request by the defendant . . . the
       Commonwealth shall disclose to the defendant’s attorney all of the

____________________________________________

8  In fact, Counsel points out, Appellant’s father testified he did not see
Appellant consume any alcohol or drugs that morning. Anders Brief at 18,
citing N.T. Trial at 214.

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     following requested items or information, provided they are
     material to the instant case. . . .

               (a) Any evidence favorable to the accused that is material
          either to guilt or to punishment, and is within the possession
          or control of the attorney for the Commonwealth[.]

Pa.R.Crim.P.   573(B)(1)(a).         Subsection   573(D)   pertains   to    the

Commonwealth’s continuing duty to disclose:

     If, prior to or during trial, either party discovers additional
     evidence or material previously requested or ordered to be
     disclosed by it, which is subject to discovery or inspection under
     this rule, . . . such party shall promptly notify the opposing party
     or the court of the additional evidence, material, or witness.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(D).

     This Court has explained:

     Rule 573 applies equally to evidence used as part of the case in
     chief and evidence used in rebuttal against defense witnesses.
     [Thiel, 470 A.2d at 148.] The Rule implements the overall policy
     of the discovery rules aimed at preventing “trial by ambush” and
     the use of “last minute disclosures” to try cases, as such tactics
     have been declared fundamentally unfair.

                                 *      *     *

     The pertinent question when determining whether the
     Commonwealth acted improperly when it fails to disclose evidence
     is whether it could reasonably have predicted possible defense
     strategies. Thiel, [470 A.2d] at 148. If it could, then the
     prosecutor will be “held to reasonable anticipation of what
     evidence in his possession might be material.”

Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1100-01 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(footnote & some citations omitted).

     In its opinion, the trial court emphasized that Rule 573(B)(1)(a)’s

mandatory disclosure provision applies to “evidence favorable to the

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accused that is material . . . to guilt,” and that favorable evidence is material

when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed

. . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Trial Ct’s 1925(a)

Statement, 9/13/22, at 3. The court found the CAD report was not favorable

to Appellant, nor exculpatory, as it showed “he was home for a shorter period

than what Defense Counsel claimed in his opening statement.” Id. The court

further reasoned the CAD report showed Appellant “would have had less time

to drink enough alcohol (and smoke enough marijuana) for his BAC to rise to

the levels indicated.” Id.

      The trial court also found the defense had not disclosed this anticipated

defense before trial, and it was not foreseeable to the Commonwealth that

Appellant would raise it. Trial Ct.’s 1925(a) Statement at 4. The court noted

Trooper Galbraith’s affidavit of probable cause stated Appellant had told him

he just returned home 30 seconds prior to the trooper’s arrival, and

furthermore there was “an opened bottle of Jack Daniels” in the rear seat of

Appellant’s vehicle.    Id.   Upon learning of the defense, at trial, “the

Commonwealth promptly notified Defense Counsel of the CAD report[.]” Id.

Finally, the court also considered the CAD report would not have been material

or relevant unless Appellant first raised the issue as a possible defense. See

id. at 5.

      We agree with the trial court’s and Counsel’s reasoning. The affidavit

of probable cause clearly stated that Appellant told Trooper Galbraith he

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arrived home “approximately 30 seconds prior to [the trooper’s] arrival.”

Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1. There was no evidence Appellant refuted, at

any time before opening arguments at trial, the affidavit’s statement, nor the

witness Buchman’s descriptions of his earlier encounter with Appellant.

Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning that

the Commonwealth could not have anticipated Appellant’s defense theory.

      For the same reasons, we agree with the trial court and Counsel the

CAD report was not “favorable” to Appellant’s defense.          See Pa.R.Crim.P.

573(B)(1)(a). The CAD report would show Appellant was not home at 9:04

a.m., when Trooper Galbraith first arrived, but was home by 9:22 a.m. As

trial counsel acknowledged at the trial proceeding, the CAD report was

relevant to “establish when he was actually driving.” See N.T. Trial at 114.

Indeed, trial counsel argued the evidence was damaging because it would

contradict or undermine a claim that Appellant was home longer than the 30-

second timeframe he had initially given police. Finally, we note the trial court

pointed out the difference of, “say 15 minutes,” was not unduly prejudicial or

material. See N.T. Trial at 125-27 (trial court commenting, “20 minutes, 15

minutes, you know, arguing about how many angels can dance on the head

of a pin. . . . I don’t think it is fatal to your defense.”).

      For the foregoing reasons, we would find no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s denial of a mistrial, based on Appellant’s claim of a discovery

violation. We therefore agree with Counsel this issue would be frivolous.

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                      V. Sufficiency of the Evidence

     The second issue presented in the Anders brief is whether there was

sufficient evidence to support the DUI conviction. Counsel raises an argument

that “the only person who possibly observed [Appellant] driving intoxicated

was Gregory Buchman, the employee of Baldwin’s Stone Yard.” Anders Brief

at 19. Counsel then opines this sufficiency issue lacks arguable merit, “given

the strong evidence of consumption near the time of driving,” including

Buchman’s     description   of   Appellant,   along   with   Appellant’s   own

“uncontradicted disavowal of consuming any [alcohol or marijuana] at home

after driving.” Id. Counsel also cites the result of Appellant’s blood draw at

10:27 a.m., when he was observed driving at 8:45 a.m. Id. at 21. We agree

no relief would be due.

     We note the applicable standard of review:

     The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
     is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
     most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
     to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
     a reasonable doubt. [W]e may not weigh the evidence and
     substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. [T]he facts and
     circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
     preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
     defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
     evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
     probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
     circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
     proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
     means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
     the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
     evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder
     of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the

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     weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
     of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-41 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).

     Appellant was found guilty under the following four sub-sections of the

DUI statute:

            (a) General impairment.

                (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
            physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing
            a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
            rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
            actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

                                   *     *      *

         (c) Highest rate of alcohol.—An individual may not drive,
     operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
     vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the
     alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16%
     or higher within two hours after the individual has driven,
     operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of
     the vehicle.

         (d) Controlled substances.—An individual may not drive,
     operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
     vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

                (1) There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:

                     (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in . . .
                The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
                Act; [or]

                                   *     *      *

                     (iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph
                (i) or (ii).

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75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (c), (d)(1)(i), (iii).

      This Court has explained:

      In order to prove a violation of [general impairment under
      Subsection 3802(a)(1)], the Commonwealth must show: (1) that
      the defendant was the operator of a motor vehicle and (2) that
      while operating the vehicle, the defendant was under the influence
      of alcohol to such a degree as to render him incapable of safe
      driving. To establish the second element, the Commonwealth
      must show that alcohol has

           substantially impaired the normal mental and physical
           faculties required to safely operate the vehicle.
           Substantial impairment, in this context, means a
           diminution or enfeeblement in the ability to exercise
           judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently to changing
           circumstances and conditions. Evidence that the driver
           was not in control of himself, such as failing to pass a
           field sobriety test, may establish that the driver was
           under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered
           him incapable of safe driving, notwithstanding the
           absence of evidence of erratic or unsafe driving.

Gause, 164 A.3d at 541 (citations omitted).

      Additionally, “lay witnesses may testify to someone’s readily observable

physical condition or appearance that does not require medical training.”

Gause, 164 A.3d at 538 (citation omitted).          As stated above, “[t]he

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id.

at 541 (citation omitted).

      Preliminarily, we note Appellant’s post-sentence motion challenged only

the weight of the evidence.     Nevertheless, “a defendant can challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v.

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Gezovich, 7 A.3d 300, 302 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2010), citing, inter alia,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 606 (A)(7). In any event, the arguments presented in Counsel’s

discussion, that the witness Buchman was the only person to have observed

Appellant driving and that his testimony should not have been credited, go to

the weight of the evidence.

     Here, the trial court denied relief on Appellant’s weight claim.        See

Memorandum Order Denying Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion (Memo.

Order), 6/13/22, at 7-8.        It found Appellant’s argument, that the

Commonwealth failed to prove he was intoxicated while driving, was belied by

the record. See id. at 1. The Court reasoned the witness Buchman: observed

Appellant sleeping in his car, around 8:30 or 8:45 a.m., with the engine

running and music “blaring;” yelled and rapped on the car window and door

in an unsuccessful attempt to wake up Appellant; observed Appellant

eventually wake up, but in an “extraordinarily groggy” state; and observed

Appellant, in “extremely slow motion,” sit up and drive away.         Id. at 2-3.

Furthermore, the court recounted, Trooper Galbraith described Appellant, at

the time they spoke, as having slurred, thick, and slow speech, as well as an

odor of alcohol on his breath and person. Id. at 4. Appellant told the Trooper

he drank two shots of whiskey around 11:30 the previous night, he drove but

ultimately pulled over because he was tired, and he arrived home about 30

seconds prior to the Trooper’s arrival.      Id.   Finally, the parties stipulated

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Appellant’s blood draw established a BAC of 0.202% and the presence of

marijuana and a metabolite of marijuana. Id. at 4-5.

      In light of the foregoing, undisputed evidence, we agree the evidence at

trial supported a finding of guilt on Appellant’s four DUI counts. See Memo.

Order at 7-8. The testimony of Buchman and Trooper Galbraith were for the

jury to weigh. See Gause, 164 A.3d at 541. Accordingly, we would conclude

any challenge to the sufficiency or weight of the evidence would be frivolous.

      Additionally, following an independent review of the record, we have

found no possible meritorious issues that Counsel overlooked.

                              VI. Conclusion

      As we determine Counsel has complied with the technical requirements

of Anders and Santiago, and that the pursuit of the CAD report-disclosure

and sufficiency issues would be frivolous on appeal, we grant Counsel’s

petition to withdraw from representation and affirm Appellant’s judgment of

sentence.

      Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation granted. Judgment

of sentence affirmed.

Date: 10/06/2021

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