Court Opinion

ID: 9964584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:16:00.171915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:36.059254
License: Public Domain

2024 WI 18

                  SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2022AP1334

COMPLETE TITLE:        In the matter of the adoption of M. M. C.:

                       A. M. B.,
                                    Petitioner-Appellant,
                       T. G.,
                                 Appellant,
                            v.
                       Circuit Court for Ashland County, the Honorable
                       Kelly J. McKnight, presiding,
                                 Respondent.

                                ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

OPINION FILED:         April 30, 2024
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         September 11, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Ashland
   JUDGE:              Kelly J. McKnight

JUSTICES:
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined.
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which ANN WALSH
BRADLEY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.   KAROFSKY, J., filed a
concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the petitioner-appellant, there were briefs filed by
John R. Carlson, Carla J. Smith, Linda I. Coleman, and Spears,
Carlson & Coleman, S.C., Washburn. There was an oral argument by
Carla Jean Smith and John R. Carlson.
    For the respondent, there was a brief filed by Lynn K.
Lodahl, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was
Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral argument by
Lynn K. Lodahl, assistant attorney general.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel R. Suhr, and
Hughes & Suhr LLC, Chicago, IL, on behalf of Wisconsin Family
Council.

                                2
                                                                        2024 WI 18
                                                              NOTICE
                                                This opinion is subject to further
                                                editing and modification.   The final
                                                version will appear in the bound
                                                volume of the official reports.
No.      2022AP1334
(L.C. No.   22AD2)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                         :             IN SUPREME COURT

In the matter of the adoption of M. M. C.:

A. M. B.,
            Petitioner-Appellant,

T. G.,
                                                                  FILED
            Appellant,
                                                             APR 30, 2024
      v.
                                                              Samuel A. Christensen
                                                             Clerk of Supreme Court
Circuit Court for Ashland County, the Honorable
Kelly J. McKnight, presiding,

            Respondent.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion for a
unanimous Court. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and HAGEDORN, J., joined.
DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion in which ANN WALSH
BRADLEY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ., joined.   KAROFSKY, J., filed a
concurring opinion.

      APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court

for Ashland County, Kelly J. McKnight, Judge. Affirmed.

      ¶1     REBECCA   GRASSL   BRADLEY,   J.   A   creature       of    statute,
adoption confers legal rights and duties on adopted children and
                                                                           No.    2022AP1334

their adoptive parents.              The legislature has made policy choices

regarding the circumstances under which children may be adopted

and by whom.           A.M.B. is the biological mother of M.M.C. and

wishes to have her nonmarital partner, T.G., adopt M.M.C.                             Under

the adoption statutes, T.G. is not eligible to adopt M.M.C.

because T.G. is not A.M.B.'s spouse.                      A.M.B. and T.G. allege the

legislatively drawn classifications violate the Equal Protection

Clause     of   the     Fourteenth          Amendment          to    the   United    States

Constitution in denying T.G. the right to adopt M.M.C. and in

denying M.M.C. the right to be adopted by T.G.                                 Because the

adoption     statutes        do     not     restrict       a     fundamental      right   or

regulate a protected class, we consider whether any rational

basis exists for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt

a   child.      Among       other    legitimate          state      interests,    promoting

stability       for     adoptive          children       through       marital      families

suffices     for      the   statutes        to       survive   this    equal     protection

challenge; therefore, we affirm the circuit court.1

                                     I.     BACKGROUND
                             A.     The Adoption Statutes

      ¶2     Wisconsin Stat. ch. 48, subchapter XIX, establishes

legal adoption and specifies the circumstances under which a

child may be adopted as well as who is eligible to adopt.                              Under

Wis. Stat. § 48.81 (2021-22),2 a child who is present in the

      1The      Honorable           Kelly        J.     McKnight,       Ashland     County,
presiding.
      2All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.

                                                 2
                                                                  No.   2022AP1334

State of Wisconsin when the adoption petition is filed may be

adopted under any of the following four scenarios:                         (1) the

parental rights of both parents have been legally terminated;

(2) both parents are deceased; (3) the parental rights of one

parent have been terminated and the other parent is deceased; or

(4) "[t]he person filing the petition for adoption is the spouse

of the child's parent with whom the child and the child's parent

reside."3       § 48.81(1)-(4); Rosecky v. Schissel, 2013 WI 66, ¶44,

349 Wis. 2d 84, 833 N.W.2d 634.               Subsection (4) applies only if

the child's other parent is deceased or his parental rights have

been terminated.           § 48.81(4)(a)-(b).        Colloquially called the

"stepparent" exception, this provision permits a stepparent to

adopt    his    spouse's    child   while     the   spouse's    parental    rights

remain intact.       See Wis. Stat. § 48.92(2).

     ¶3        The   adoption   statutes       additionally     identify     three

classifications of individuals who may adopt an eligible child:

"A husband and wife jointly," "either the husband or wife if the

other spouse is a parent of the minor," or "an unmarried adult."
Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a)-(b).                The statutes do not allow two

unmarried adults to jointly adopt a minor.               Nor do the statutes

permit    a    nonmarital     partner    to    adopt   his     partner's    child.

Omitting those categories of unmarried individuals from the list

of eligible persons who may adopt means the law does not qualify

them as adoptive parents.               "Under the doctrine of          expressio

     3 Two additional statutory criteria apply only to children
who are born in, or citizens of, foreign jurisdictions, and are
not relevant in this case. Wis. Stat. § 48.81(5)-(6).

                                         3
                                                                                  No.    2022AP1334

unius est exclusio alterius, the 'express mention of one matter

excludes     other    similar          matters      [that       are]     not       mentioned.'"

James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶18, 397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d

350 (alteration in original) (quoting FAS, LLC v. Town of Bass

Lake, 2007 WI 73, ¶27, 301 Wis. 2d 321, 733 N.W.2d 287); see

also    Antonin      Scalia      &     Bryan       A.    Garner,       Reading           Law:     The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 107 (2012) ("[T]he principle that

specification of the one implies exclusion of the other validly

describes how people express themselves and understand verbal

expression.").

       ¶4    The     adoption        subchapter          also     describes             the     legal

effect of adoption on the child, the child's birth parents, and

the child's adoptive parents.                  Wis. Stat. § 48.92.                      Upon entry

of an order of adoption, all legal rights, duties, and "other

legal   consequences"           of     the    relationships         between             the     birth

parents and the child are forever altered and "cease to exist."

§ 48.92(2).        If, however, the adoptive parent is married to the

child's      birth        parent,       the        adoption       by      the           stepparent
extinguishes        the     legal       rights,         duties,        and        "other        legal

consequences" only with respect to the birth parent who is not

the spouse of the adoptive parent.                      § 48.92(2).

                      B.       Facts and Procedural History

       ¶5    A.M.B.       is     the       biological       mother           of     M.M.C.        and

maintains a cohabitating, nonmarital relationship with her male

partner, T.G.        After more than a decade in a relationship with
A.M.B.,     T.G.   has     become      a     father      figure    for       M.M.C.       and    has

assumed a variety of parental duties for her.                                     The parental
                                               4
                                                                    No.    2022AP1334

rights    of       M.M.C.'s   biological       father    have    been    terminated.

Based on T.G.'s fatherly bond and relationship with M.M.C., T.G.

filed a joint petition with A.M.B. to adopt M.M.C.

     ¶6        Prior to the adoption hearing, the county department

of   human         services   generated    a    "Home    Study     Report,"    which

included       a    background   check     of    T.G.,    a     review    of   T.G.'s

relationship with M.M.C., and an interview with M.M.C.                            The

interview with M.M.C. revealed she did not have a meaningful

relationship with her biological father and views T.G. as her

father.      The report concluded with a recommendation to grant the

adoption.

     ¶7        On June 20, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on

the adoption petition.           At the outset, the court raised concerns

over its authority to grant the petition given the criteria for

adoption under Wis. Stat. § 48.81, despite having determined the

adoption would be in the best interests of the child, M.M.C.

The circuit court cited this court's decision in Georgina G. v.

Terry M., 184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994), which the
circuit court summarized as precluding "an adoption to a third

party who is not the spouse of the parent."                      Because T.G. was

not married to A.M.B., the circuit court determined T.G. was not

statutorily eligible to adopt M.M.C. and denied the adoption

petition.
     ¶8        A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the circuit court's decision,

arguing that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 and 48.92(2) violate the equal

protection rights of M.M.C. and T.G.                The state asked the court
of appeals to affirm the denial of the adoption petition under
                                           5
                                                                       No.   2022AP1334

Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d 492, in which this court decided an

earlier      but     substantially       similar     version     of    the   governing

statute4 did not violate the equal protection clause.                          Because

the   court     of    appeals     cannot       "overrule,     modify    or   withdraw

language from a previous supreme court case[,]" Cook v. Cook,

208 Wis. 2d 166, 189, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997), A.M.B. and T.G.

petitioned this court for bypass of the court of appeals, which

this court granted.5

      ¶9      The adoption statutes do not implicate a fundamental

right under the United States or Wisconsin Constitutions, nor do

the       statutes     affect     a      protected     class      of     individuals.

Accordingly,          the     statutory         classifications          establishing

eligibility to adopt or to be adopted must be rationally related

to a legitimate state interest in order to withstand A.M.B.'s

challenge.            Because     a      rational     basis      exists      for    the

legislature's        policy     choice    to    preclude    an    adoption     by   the

nonmarital partner of a birth parent, we hold the statutes do

      4After this court's decision in Georgina G. v. Terry M.,
184 Wis. 2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (1994), the legislature amended
Wis. Stat. § 48.81 to explicitly state that the parental rights
of only one biological parent must be terminated for a
stepparent to adopt.    1997 Wis. Act 104, § 9.  The applicable
statutes in this case are otherwise identical to the statutes
analyzed in Georgina G.
      5In their briefing, petitioners argued the circuit court
erred in applying the statutory limits on adoption despite the
legislative directive in Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) that "the best
interests of the child or unborn child shall always be of
paramount consideration."     During oral argument, petitioners
abandoned their statutory claim.
                                            6
                                                                     No.     2022AP1334

not violate the Equal Protection Clause and we therefore affirm

the circuit court's denial of the adoption petition.

                                II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶10       A.M.B.   and    T.G.    bring    a   facial     challenge    to    the

constitutionality of the adoption statutes on equal protection

grounds.         The constitutionality of a statute is a question of

law this court reviews de novo.                  Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57,

¶26,       370   Wis. 2d 1,      884    N.W.2d 484      (citing    Aicher    ex    rel.

LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, ¶18, 237 Wis.

2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849).               A party bringing a facial challenge to

the constitutionality of a statute must show that the "State

cannot enforce the law under any circumstances."                         Id. (citing

State v. Wood, 2010 WI 17, ¶13, 323 Wis. 2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63).

                                      III.   ANALYSIS

       ¶11       The   Equal      Protection      Clause    of     the     Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "No state

shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."                U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.6             A.M.B.

       Although petitioners bring their claims under the Equal
       6

Protection Clause and Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution, they do not provide an independent argument under
the Wisconsin Constitution. Instead, petitioners treat the two
constitutional provisions as providing the same protections.
"As a general principle, this court treats these provisions of
the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions as consistent with
each   other   in  their  due   process  and   equal  protection
guarantees." Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶28, 370 Wis. 2d 1,
884 N.W.2d 484; accord Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams.
Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶35, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678. We
do   not   address  petitioners'   claim  under   the  Wisconsin
Constitution further.
                                             7
                                                                     No.    2022AP1334

and       T.G.     allege      the     adoption       statutes    are       facially7

unconstitutional because Wis. Stat. § 48.81 treats the children

of single parents differently than children with two married

parents and treats unmarried romantic partners differently than

spouses.         Petitioners claim these classifications are arbitrary

and not rationally related to a valid state interest.

      ¶12    In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute under

an equal protection analysis, the court first identifies the

appropriate level of scrutiny.                  State v. Alger, 2015 WI 3, ¶39,

360   Wis. 2d 193,       858       N.W.2d 346.       We   consider    whether      the

statute      implicates        a     fundamental     constitutional        right    or

"whether     a    suspect     class    is   disadvantaged    by   the      challenged

legislation."        State v. Smith, 2010 WI 16, ¶12, 323 Wis. 2d 377,

780 N.W.2d 90.        If either is true, the court generally8 applies

strict scrutiny.        Id.

      7During oral argument, counsel for A.M.B. and T.G.
described their challenge to the statutes' constitutionality as
a hybrid claim comprising both as-applied and facial equal
protection challenges. She later argued the statutes could not
be constitutionally applied under any circumstances.    Because
A.M.B. and T.G. narrowed their claim to a facial challenge, we
confine our analysis to the facial constitutionality of the
challenged statutes.
      8The   existence  of   a   fundamental  right   does   not
automatically trigger strict scrutiny. "A law that implicates a
fundamental right is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.
Whether strict scrutiny applies sometimes depends on the degree
to which the law burdens a fundamental right." State v. Alger,
2015 WI 3, ¶39 n.16, 360 Wis. 2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346 (citation
omitted).

                                            8
                                                                  No.    2022AP1334

    ¶13    If a fundamental constitutional right is not at stake

and a protected class is not disadvantaged by the statute, the

court   applies    rational     basis   review.       A   "relatively     relaxed

standard," rational basis review reflects the court's respect

for the separation of powers and recognizes "the drawing of

lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task

and an unavoidable one."            Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427

U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam).              In applying rational basis

review,    the     court    will    uphold     the    statute     provided     the

classification      bears   a   rational     relationship    to   a     legitimate

government interest.        Blake, 370 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32.

                   A.   Strict Scrutiny Does Not Apply

    ¶14    The     adoption     "legislative    scheme    does    not    affect   a

fundamental right and is not based on a suspect classification."

Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d at 518.               In Georgina G., this court

resolved   a     similar    constitutional     challenge     to   the     adoption

statutes, holding that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81 and 48.92 did not

violate the equal protection rights of a woman who wished to
adopt her same-sex partner's child.                  Id. at 519.        The court

explained:

    The adoption statutes do not violate Annette's right
    to equal protection.   Annette is eligible to adopt a
    child "whose parental rights have been terminated."
    That is not the case here.    In addition, if Annette
    were married, she would be eligible to adopt the
    child(ren) of her spouse. Again, that is not the case
    here.     The Wisconsin legislature has enacted a
    statutory scheme for adoption that balances society's
    interest in promoting stable, legally recognized
    families with its interest in promoting the best

                                        9
                                                                  No.   2022AP1334

      interests of the children involved.    The adoption
      proposed in this case does not fall within the
      confines of this constitutionally valid legislative
      scheme.

Id. at 518-19.       T.G. is ineligible to adopt M.M.C. for the same

reason    Annette    was    ineligible    to   adopt   her   partner's    child:

T.G. is not married to M.M.C.'s mother.                The court's reasoning

in   Georgina   G.    was   sound,   and      we   decline   to   overturn   that

precedent.9

      ¶15   The statutes do not implicate a fundamental right of

either T.G. or M.M.C.         A fundamental right is "deeply rooted in

this Nation's history and tradition."               Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted).                    Petitioners

      9Petitioners ask this court to overturn Georgina G., which
involved a same-sex couple legally prohibited from marrying at
the time the opinion was issued. 184 Wis. 2d at 504 n.1. This
court has repeatedly recognized the importance of stare decisis
to the rule of law; for this reason, we require a special
justification to overturn precedent.   State v. Stephenson, 2020
WI 92, ¶¶32-33, 394 Wis. 2d 703, 951 N.W.2d 819.      This court
commonly considers whether a prior decision is "unsound in
principle" when asked to overturn it.       Bartholomew v. Wis.
Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp., 2006 WI
91, ¶33, 293 Wis. 2d 38, 717 N.W.2d 216.        After this court
decided Georgina G., the United States Supreme Court declared a
constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry.            See
generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).         That
change in the law does not undermine this court's reasoning in
Georgina G., which did not turn on the couple's sexual
orientation.    As   the   court  in   Georgina   G.   explained,
"Wisconsin's adoption statutes do not discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation or gender. Annette may not adopt Angel
because Annette and Georgina are not married." 184 Wis. 2d at
518. Petitioners in this case fail to identify any developments
in the law that undermine the court's decision in Georgina G.

                                         10
                                                                          No.     2022AP1334

fail    to    identify    any    right       deeply    rooted    in     our     history   or

tradition upon which the statutes intrude.

       ¶16     As a preliminary matter, petitioners concede there is

no fundamental right to adopt.                      "Adoption proceedings, unknown

at    common    law,     are     of   statutory        origin    and     the     essential

statutory requirements must be substantially met to validate the

proceedings."           Tennessen       v.   Topel,     32    Wis. 2d 223,       229,     145

N.W.2d 162 (1966); Eugene M. Haertle, Wisconsin Adoption Law and

Procedure,       33     Marq.    L.     Rev.    37,     37    (1949).         This     court

previously recognized adoption as a "relatively recent statutory

development," and not a practice traditionally protected by our

society.       Georgina G., 184 Wis. 2d at 516.                  The federal circuit

courts that have addressed this question have uniformly held

adoption is not a fundamental right.                       E.g., Adar v. Smith, 639

F.3d 146, 162 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Lofton v. Sec'y of

Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 811-12 (11th Cir.

2004); Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989).

       ¶17     A.M.B.    and     T.G.      argue     the     adoption    statutes       must
withstand strict scrutiny because they implicate the fundamental

right to marriage.             While marriage is undoubtedly a fundamental

right, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), these statutes

do not implicate that right.                 The statutes do not compel10 A.M.B.

and    T.G.    to     marry,    nor   do     the     statutes    prohibit       them    from

       In their briefing, petitioners suggest the circuit court
       10

tried to force them to marry so that T.G. could adopt M.M.C.
That is not accurate.    In denying the adoption petition, the
court noted that if T.G. married A.M.B., T.G. would qualify to
adopt M.M.C. because the statutory criteria would be met.

                                               11
                                                                            No.     2022AP1334

marrying.       The adoption statutes do not impose any impediment to

marriage,       unlike      laws   at     issue   in      other    cases    in     which   the

United States Supreme Court has declared statutory restrictions

on marriage unconstitutional.                 See, e.g., id. at 2 (holding a

"scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages

between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications

violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment");             Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375-

77     (1978)      (Wisconsin       law     barring        marriage,       without       court

approval, for individual "'having minor issue not in his custody

and which he is under obligation to support by any court order

or judgment'" violated the Fourteenth Amendment).                            In contrast,

the    adoption       statutes     challenged        by    A.M.B.    and     T.G.    do    not

"control      the     selection      of    one's     spouse."         Roberts       v.     U.S.

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).

       ¶18    Far     from     impeding      marriage,       the     adoption       statutes

privilege the institution.                 Historically, states have provided

benefits      to     married    couples      while     denying      them     to    unmarried
individuals.          "Indeed, while the States are in general free to

vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have

throughout our history made marriage the basis for an expanding

list    of    governmental         rights,    benefits,       and     responsibilities.

These aspects of marital status include:                          taxation; inheritance

and property rights; . . . [and] adoption rights . . . ."

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669-70 (2015); Glucksberg,
521    U.S.     at    721    (internal      citation        omitted)       ("Our    Nation's

history,      legal      traditions,        and    practices        thus     provide       the
                                             12
                                                                         No.    2022AP1334

crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking' that direct

and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause.").                               As

the United States Supreme Court has explained, the right to

marry is fundamental——at least in part——because the state has

historically provided benefits to married couples:                         "The States

have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage

right       by   placing      that    institution    at    the   center    of   so    many

facets of the legal and social order."                     Obergefell, 576 U.S. at

670.     Privileging a married spouse with the opportunity to adopt

a child does not in any way infringe the right to marry.

       ¶19       Because adoption is not a fundamental right under our

nation's         history    and      tradition,   and     Wis.   Stat.    §§ 48.81     and

48.92(2) do not infringe the right to marry, we next consider

whether the statutes implicate a suspect classification.                               The

United States Supreme Court has identified distinctions based on

race, national origin, and alienage as suspect classifications

subject to strict scrutiny.                Milwaukee Cnty. v. Mary F.-R., 2013

WI 92,       ¶35,     351   Wis. 2d 273,     839    N.W.2d 581       (citing    City    of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).11

The classifications established under Wis. Stat. § 48.81 do not

fit    any       of   those    categories.         "The    Supreme    Court     has    not

recognized any new constitutionally protected classes in over

four decades, and instead has repeatedly declined to do so."

       In Obergefell, the United States Supreme Court did not
       11

make marital status a protected class; rather, it extended the
fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples.   576 U.S. at
672.

                                             13
                                                                     No.   2022AP1334

Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 609 (6th Cir. 2015).

Nothing in the Constitution supports elevating marital status to

a   protected   class.     A     legislative      classification           based   on

marital status simply does not rise to the level of a suspect

classification.     See   Califano        v.    Jobst,   434    U.S. 47,       53-54

(1977); Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993).

      ¶20   Wisconsin     Stat.      § 48.81         constructs             distinct

classifications    for    whom     may     be    adopted       and     establishes

eligibility based on the child's parental status.                      The statute

in pertinent part provides:

      Who may be adopted. Any child who is present in this
      state at the time the petition for adoption is filed
      may be adopted if any of the following criteria are
      met:

            (1) Both of the child's parents are deceased.

            (2) The parental rights of both of the child's
            parents with respect to the child have been
            terminated under subch. VIII or in another state
            or a foreign jurisdiction.

            (3) The parental rights of one of the child's
            parents with respect to the child have been
            terminated under subch. VIII or in another state
            or a foreign jurisdiction and the child's other
            parent is deceased.

            (4) The person filing the petition for adoption
            is the spouse of the child's parent with whom the
            child and the child's parent reside and either of
            the following applies:

                 (a) The child's other parent is deceased.

                 (b) The parental rights of the child's other
                 parent with respect to the child have been
                 terminated under subch. VIII or in another
                 state or a foreign jurisdiction.

                                     14
                                                                        No.       2022AP1334

Wis. Stat. § 48.81(1)-(4).

      ¶21    A child is not eligible for adoption if she has an

existing     legal     relationship         with   one   of     her    parents.         The

statute provides but one exception to this rule:                         a stepparent

may adopt the child of his spouse if the child's other parent is

either      deceased    or     his    parental        rights    have    been       legally

terminated.          Wis.    Stat.    § 48.81(4)(a)-(b).               M.M.C.      is   not

eligible for adoption because her legal relationship with A.M.B.

remains intact and T.G. is not M.M.C.'s stepparent because he is

not married to A.M.B.

      ¶22    Wisconsin       Stat.     § 48.82(1)        conditions          a    person's

eligibility      to    adopt     a    child      on    the     prospective        adoptive

parent's marital status.             The statute provides in full:

             (1) The following persons are eligible to adopt
             a minor if they are residents of this state:

                     (a) A husband and wife jointly, or either
                     the husband or wife if the other spouse is a
                     parent of the minor.

                     (b) An unmarried adult.

Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a)-(b).                 T.G. is an unmarried adult and

M.M.C. is a minor child with one unmarried legal parent, A.M.B.

As an unmarried adult, T.G. may not adopt M.M.C. because he is

not   married     to     A.M.B.       and     therefore        does    not       meet   the

requirements of eligibility under Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(a).

      ¶23    If T.G. adopted M.M.C., Wis. Stat. § 48.92(2) would

extinguish A.M.B.'s parental rights.                     Section 48.92 is titled

"Effect of adoption" and subsection (2) states as follows:

                                            15
                                                                No.    2022AP1334

      After    the   order   of  adoption   is   entered   the
      relationship of parent and child between the adopted
      person and the adopted person's birth parents and the
      relationship between the adopted person and all
      persons whose relationship to the adopted person is
      derived    through   those  birth   parents   shall   be
      completely altered and all the rights, duties, and
      other legal consequences of those relationships shall
      cease to exist, unless the birth parent is the spouse
      of   the    adoptive  parent,  in   which   case   those
      relationships shall be completely altered and those
      rights, duties, and other legal consequences shall
      cease to exist only with respect to the birth parent
      who is not the spouse of the adoptive parent and all
      persons whose relationship to the adopted person is
      derived through that birth parent.

(Emphasis added).          Allowing the unmarried partner of a birth

parent to adopt his partner's child with the parental rights of

the   birth       parent    intact    would     flout   § 48.92(2),         which

permanently ends all rights and duties belonging to a birth

parent——unless      the    adoptive   parent    is   married    to    the   birth

parent.

      ¶24   The    statutory    criteria      establishing     eligibility     to

adopt or to be adopted do not involve any protected classes.

Instead, Wis. Stat. § 48.81 conditions eligibility for adoption

on whether a child retains a legal relationship with one of the

child's parents, while Wis. Stat. § 48.82 conditions eligibility

to adopt on an individual's marital status.                  Neither of these

classifications are suspect under an equal protection analysis,

and the state retains broad discretion to establish legislative

classifications provided they have a reasonable basis.                 State v.

Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶32, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851
(citing State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654

                                      16
                                                                            No.     2022AP1334

(1989)).            Wisconsin        Stat.       §§ 48.81,    48.82,        and     48.92(2)

collectively balance the interests of the state in ensuring a

child eligible for adoption enjoys the stability of a marital

family.          Because the statutes do not implicate a fundamental

right       or   create       a   suspect      classification,       we    apply    rational

basis review to the challenged statutes.12

 B. The Statutory Classifications Have a Rational Relationship
  to the State's Interest in Promoting Stability for Adoptive
                           Children.
       ¶25       Under rational basis review, this court will uphold

legislatively           chosen     classifications         provided       the    legislature

has "reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications

that    it       draws."          State   v.     Quintana,   2008     WI 33,        ¶79,     308

Wis. 2d 615,           748    N.W.2d 447        (citing   McManus,        152    Wis.   2d    at

130).       A classification "does not offend the Constitution simply

because the classification 'is not made with mathematical nicety

or     because         in     practice     it    results     in   some          inequality.'"

Dandridge         v.        Williams,     397    U.S. 471,     485        (1970)    (quoting

Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).                                  In

ascertaining the existence of a rational basis, the court is not

        The
       12    adoption  statutes  do   not   infringe  A.M.B.'s
fundamental liberty interest in raising M.M.C.   See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).    A.M.B. may maintain her
nonmarital relationship with T.G., and may allow T.G. to
continue serving as a father figure for M.M.C.    The adoption
statutes do not affect how A.M.B. chooses to raise her child,
nor do they intrude on her constitutional right to direct the
upbringing of M.M.C. free of governmental interference.    See
Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 567-68, 348 N.W.2d 479
(1984).

                                                 17
                                                                         No.    2022AP1334

limited to those grounds the legislature may have identified;

rather, "it is the court's obligation to locate or to construct,

if    possible,    a    rationale        that     might     have     influenced        the

legislature       and    that      reasonably         upholds      the      legislative

determination."         Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356,

371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).

      ¶26   The United States Supreme Court has long recognized

the     significant         societal       benefits          marriage           provides.

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669.               The Obergefell Court explicitly

acknowledged      the    significance        of     marriage       for     children     in

declaring,        "[m]arriage . . . affords                the      permanency         and

stability important to children's best interests."                         Id. at 668.

Because marriage supplies these advantages, the state has long

conferred benefits on married couples in return:                         "[J]ust as a

couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to

support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material

benefits    to    protect    and    nourish        the    union."        Id.     at   669.

Individual states "have throughout our history made marriage the
basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits,

and   responsibilities."           Id.    at      670.      The    Obergefell         Court

specifically included adoption rights among those a state may

regulate based on marital status.               Id.

      ¶27   The    adoption        statutory       scheme        creates       reasonable

eligibility      criteria    to    promote      the      government's      interest      in

children being adopted into stable, permanent home environments.
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.81(1) permits a minor child to be adopted

if both of her biological parents are deceased, while § 48.81(2)
                                          18
                                                                                No.       2022AP1334

permits adoption if the parental rights of both parents have

been terminated.             A child with one living parent may be adopted

by the spouse of the child's parent.                             § 48.81(4).             The state

presented        several           justifications             establishing           a     rational

relationship          between       this        legislative         scheme     and       legitimate

government        interests,              including       the       state's      interest          in

promoting financial stability for adoptive children.

      ¶28       The    state        has     a    legitimate         interest     in        ensuring

children are adopted into "safe and stable families."                                            Wis.

Stat.    § 48.01(1)(gg).                  The    state    may       achieve     this       goal   by

encouraging           married        couples        to        adopt    children           and     the

legislature recognized the essential link between marriage and

the   welfare         of    children        in   "The     Family      Code."          Wis.      Stat.

§ 765.001(1).              Marriage in the State of Wisconsin creates a

legal bond between two persons who "owe to each other mutual

responsibility and support."                       § 765.001(2).             This legal bond

creates     a    series       of     rights      and     obligations         between       the    two

individuals, dissolvable only by death or divorce.                                        Wisconsin
law imposes on each spouse "an equal obligation" in accordance

with financial ability "to contribute money or services or both

which are necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of"

the     couple's           "minor     children          and    of     the     other       spouse."

§ 765.001(2).               The     state       deems    "[t]he       consequences          of    the

marriage contract" to be "more significant to society than those

of    other      contracts."               § 765.001(2).              Unlike    a        nonmarital
relationship, the legal union between two individuals through

marriage cannot be terminated impulsively or spontaneously; the
                                                  19
                                                                         No.     2022AP1334

law requires a court proceeding to terminate the contractual

relationship.         If a child already has a legal parent, the state

reasonably concludes it would be more beneficial for that child

to be adopted into a marital family, rather than by an unmarried

partner of the child's legal parent.                     As the state argued in its

brief,    the    fact       that   marriage        requires    legal    proceedings     to

terminate       provides       "some    level       of    assurance"      the    adoptive

stepparent "will remain committed to the family unit and the

child’s upbringing."

       ¶29     A child joining a family with married parents enjoys a

greater likelihood of a financially stable upbringing compared

to a household with two unmarried parents.                        In the event of a

divorce, Wisconsin statutes create a presumption guaranteeing

both    marital      partners      leave      the    relationship       on   financially

equivalent footing.            Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3).                 This presumption

"effectuates         the    policy     that      each    spouse   makes      a   valuable

contribution to            the marriage and that each spouse should be

compensated for his or her respective contributions."                             Steinke
v.   Steinke,        126    Wis. 2d 372,      380-81,      376    N.W.2d 839      (1985).

Nothing      comparable        exists      for      unmarried     couples.         If   an

unmarried       partner      decides    to    sever      the   relationship,      he    may

freely leave without an equal division of financial assets, to

the financial detriment of the remaining parent and the adoptive

child.       Rational basis review is a "low bar" for the government

to     clear    in     an     equal     protection        challenge.           Tiwari    v.
Friedlander, 26 F.4th 355, 362 (6th Cir. 2022).                          In this case,

the state has met this burden because it is reasonable for the
                                              20
                                                                          No.     2022AP1334

legislature      to    have     concluded      that    a     married      couple       would

provide a more secure and financially stable home environment

for adoptive children than an unmarried couple.

       ¶30     While   A.M.B.    and    T.G.    may    provide       a   safe,     stable,

healthy, and loving home for M.M.C., the judiciary is powerless

to craft an exception to the adoption law on a case-by-case

basis.       "A legislative classification satisfies rational basis

review    if    any    conceivable      state     of       facts   could        provide    a

rational basis for the classification."                    Alger, 360 Wis. 2d 193,

¶50   (cleaned     up).       Petitioners       cannot       overcome     the     rational

basis    for     the   classifications          established        in     the     adoption

statutes.       Wisconsin has a legitimate interest in preferring the

stability and security of a marital household for the upbringing

of    adopted    children.        See    Lofton,       358    F.3d       at     819.      The

statute's classifications for whom may adopt a child reflects

the state's interest in preferring stable and financially secure

households for adoptive children.

       ¶31     Petitioners    argue     the    state     draws     an     arbitrary       and
irrational distinction by permitting a single, unmarried adult

to adopt a child but not a cohabitating, unmarried partner.

Compare Wis. Stat. § 48.82(1)(b) with Wis. Stat. § 48.81(4).                               We

disagree.       The legislative classifications bear a rational basis

because the state may reasonably prefer a child to be adopted by

a single, unmarried adult rather than be placed in foster care

or    another    impermanent      living       arrangement.          See      Wis.     Stat.
§ 48.01(1)(ag) (recognizing "that children have certain basic

needs which must be provided for, including . . . the need for a
                                          21
                                                                              No.    2022AP1334

safe and permanent family").                    Because a child with one parent

has   permanency,        the      state         has    a      legitimate       interest     in

restricting       adoption     to    the    child's        stepparent,        who    is   more

likely to provide a stable family and better outcomes for the

child.      Allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried

couples is consistent with the "public policy" of the state "to

promote the stability of marriage and family."                             County of Dane

v. Norman, 174 Wis. 2d 683, 689, 497 N.W.2d 714 (1993).

      ¶32    By allowing married couples to adopt but not unmarried

couples, the state provides a benefit to married couples not

afforded    to     unmarried      couples.            States       "have   throughout       our

history     made      marriage      the    basis        for    an    expanding       list    of

governmental           rights,       benefits,             and        responsibilities."

Obergefell, 576 U.S.             at 670.             Precluding an individual from

adopting his nonmarital partner's child merely makes marriage a

basis for the adoption right, a classification rooted in our

nation's    history.         Limiting       adoption          to    married    couples      and

single adults is neither irrational nor arbitrary because the
state has legitimate reasons for the legislative classifications

established under Wis. Stat. § 48.81.

      ¶33    Under rational basis review, the court does not judge

the   wisdom     of    the   legislative             classifications.           Tomczak      v.

Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 265, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).                                 Instead,

we must uphold the statute's classification if there exists some

rationale to justify it.                  Id.        In establishing eligibility to
adopt or to be adopted, the legislature chose to prioritize the

stability    of     marriage      for     adopted       children       with    one    parent,
                                                22
                                                                   No.   2022AP1334

while preferring an unmarried adoptive parent to impermanency

for a child with no parents.             A rational basis exists for these

legislative policy choices.             We hold that Wis. Stat. §§ 48.81

and 48.92(2) do not violate the Equal Protection Clause because

they   serve    the   legitimate        state    interest    in   promoting      the

adoption of children into stable, marital families.

                                 IV.    CONCLUSION

       ¶34   The Supreme Court has declared, "equal protection is

not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic

of legislative choices."           F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508

U.S. 307, 313 (1993).            Because the legislative classifications

restricting     adoption   do     not    infringe     a   fundamental    right    or

affect a protected class, we consider only whether any rational

basis exists for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt

a   child.      Because    the    state    has    a   legitimate    interest      in

promoting      stability    for     adoptive      children     through    marital

families, petitioners' equal protection challenge to Wisconsin's

adoption statutes fails.
       By the Court.——The judgment and order of the circuit court

are affirmed.

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                                                                     No.    2022AP1334.rgb

       ¶35    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                   (concurring).          For most

of    the    history    of    the     United      States,     constitutional-rights

litigation occurred predominantly in state courts and centered

on state constitutional rights.                  Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect

Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law

13 (2018).      It's no wonder why.              The individual rights protected

by the United States Constitution did not originally apply to

the states.       Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7

Pet.   243,    250-51       (1833).     Regardless,         all   individual        rights

protected under the Constitution originated from the guarantees

of liberty embodied in state constitutional provisions.                            Sutton,

supra, at 11.          Even the practice of judicial review——the main

vehicle by which citizens vindicate their liberties——originated

in state courts.         Id. at 13.

       ¶36    Invoking       state    constitutional         rights,       however,      has

been out of vogue for some time.                     Such claims have sometimes

been    relegated      to    "second-tier         status,"     id.     at    9,    and    an
afterthought in legal briefs.                Many commentators have noted the

decline in the centrality of state constitutional claims as the

United States Supreme Court federalized constitutional rights

during the Warren Court era.                 E.g., Clint Bolick, Principles of

State Constitutional Interpretation, 53 Ariz. St. L.J. 771, 774-

75 (2021); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus——Constitutional Theory and

State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 174-75 (1984).                                  Over the

course of the twentieth century, and especially in the 1960s,
the    Court    incorporated          most       federal     constitutional         rights

                                             1
                                                                               No.    2022AP1334.rgb

against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.                                            Sutton,

supra,       at    13.       As        incorporation          occurred,        the    Court        also

developed              expansive——and           novel——interpretations                     of       the

Constitution.              As Justice William Brennan put it, the Court

"fundamentally              reshaped           the        law        of    this           land"      by

"nationaliz[ing] civil rights."                           William J. Brennan Jr., The

Bill     of        Rights        and     the        States:       The     Revival          of     State

Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.

Rev. 535, 540 (1986) [hereinafter The Bill of Rights and the

States].           As a result, the relevance of state constitutions

appeared to fade.                Litigants stopped arguing their cases under

state constitutions.                   See Bolick, supra, at 778 (noting state

courts cannot "address constitutional issues if litigators do

not    raise,          preserve,       and   meaningfully            develop    them").            Some

state courts interpreted their state constitutions in lockstep

with     the           federal     courts'          interpretation         of        the        Federal

Constitution.             See generally, Sutton, supra, at 174 (defining

"lockstepping" as "the tendency of some state courts to diminish
their constitutions by interpreting them in reflexive imitation

of     the        federal        courts'        interpretation             of        the        Federal

Constitution").

       ¶37        In    recent     years,       a    newfound        interest        in    asserting

state    constitutional                rights       has   emerged,        which,      in        theory,

should benefit individual liberty.                          State constitutional rights

are    just       as     important       and    worthy          of   protection       as        federal

constitutional rights.                  And this court has a duty to enforce the
rights protected under the Wisconsin Constitution.                                         State v.

                                                     2
                                                                   No.   2022AP1334.rgb

Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶23, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d 847

(citing State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶¶18, 38, 252 Wis. 2d

228, 647 N.W.2d 142) ("While we must follow the United States

Supreme Court on matters of federal law, we have an independent

responsibility        to     interpret       and        apply      the      Wisconsin

Constitution."); King v. Vill. of Waunakee, 185 Wis. 2d 25, 59-

60, 517 N.W.2d 671 (1994) (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).

      ¶38     Not all arguments for enforcing state constitutional

rights are rooted in text, history, and tradition; some stem

from disappointment with the outcomes in certain United States

Supreme      Court   decisions.      Negative       reaction       to    the   Burger,

Rehnquist,     and   Roberts    Courts'      reluctance       to    "innovate"      new

federal constitutional rights, Sutton, supra, at 15, triggered a

resurgence of interest by litigants and legal commentators in

asking state courts to fill the gap.               For example, in two famous

law review articles, Justice William Brennan urged state courts

to   "step    into   the   breach"   created       by   the     Court,    William   J.

Brennan      Jr.,    State     Constitutions        and    the      Protection       of
Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 503 (1977), and argued

that "activist intervention[s]" into democratic governance are

less problematic when done by state courts.                     Brennan, The Bill

of Rights and the States, supra, at 551.                  The pressure on state

courts to intrude on the democratic process has intensified with

the Court's landmark decisions in Rucho v. Common Cause, 588

U.S. 684 (2019) (political gerrymandering), and Dobbs v. Jackson

Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022) (abortion).

                                         3
                                                                         No.   2022AP1334.rgb

       ¶39   Channeling        the   spirit       of    Justice         William      Brennan,

Justice Rebecca Dallet argues this court should abandon its past

practice of construing Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin

Constitution to provide substantially identical protections as

the Fourteenth Amendment.                 Blake v. Jossart, 2016 WI 57, ¶28,

370 Wis. 2d 1, 884 N.W.2d 484 ("As a general principle, this

court treats these provisions of the United States and Wisconsin

Constitutions as consistent with each other in their due process

and    equal    protection        guarantees.").              Instead,         she    invites

litigants to ask this court to invent constitutional rights:

"[T]he lack of settled case law [discussing Article I, Section

1] should be encouraging to litigants.                       It is up to us——judges,

lawyers,       and     citizens——to        give    effect          to    the    fundamental

guarantees       of     Article      I,    Section          1."         Justice      Dallet's

concurrence, ¶59.            As a pivotal part of her call for activism,

Justice Dallet claims this court has embraced a "pluralistic

approach" to constitutional interpretation in which this court

"balance[s] the majority's values against the values that should
be protected from society's majorities."                            Id., ¶53 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v.

Wis. Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶117, 407 Wis. 2d 87, 990

N.W.2d 122 (Dallet, J., concurring)).                       Nothing could be further

from   the     truth    or   more    corrosive         to    our    democratic       form   of

government.

       ¶40   It is not for judges to superimpose their values on

the constitution.            The Wisconsin Constitution's text "is the
very product of an interest balancing by the people," which

                                             4
                                                                            No.    2022AP1334.rgb

judges cannot "conduct for them anew" in each case.                                    District of

Columbia       v.    Heller,       554     U.S.      570,   635    (2008).         The     balance

struck        by    the     people       of     Wisconsin,         as     embodied        in        the

constitution,            "demands     our     unqualified         deference."            New    York

State    Rifle       &     Pistol    Ass'n,       Inc.      v.   Bruen,     597    U.S.        1,    26

(2022).        What the constitution does not say is as important as

what     it    says.          If     the      constitution         itself      does      not        bar

majorities from passing certain laws, there is no lawful basis

for    judges       to     say     otherwise.          Nothing      in    the      constitution

authorizes judges to void laws that violate some judges' sense

of what ought to be.                  There is a good reason jurists "seldom

endorse[]" the views espoused by Justice Dallet openly:                                         They

contradict          "the    basic     democratic         theory     of    our      government."

John Hart Ely,              Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial

Review 44-45 (1980).

       ¶41     Justice Dallet attempts to conceal her call for an

antidemocratic             power     grab      with      the      illusion        of     inclusive

language.           She     intimates         that    future      generations           must    each
decide for themselves what the constitution means in their time:

"It is up to us——judges, lawyers, and citizens——to give effect

to"     the        constitution's           words        today.           Justice         Dallet's

concurrence,          ¶59    (emphasis         added).           When    the      president          of

Wisconsin's           1848         convention         said        "the      pages        of         our

constitution . . . abound[] in the declaration of those great

principles which characterize the age in which we live," The

Attainment of Statehood 883 (Milo M. Quaife ed., 1928), he did
not mean to characterize the constitution as an empty vessel

                                                  5
                                                                  No.   2022AP1334.rgb

into    which   each       generation     may     pour    its     prejudices      and

aspirations.          He   meant    exactly      what    he     said.       The   new

constitution embodied the values and principles of that time,

and those principles were to remain fixed and endure throughout

the    ages:       "[The      Wisconsin       Constitution]      abounds     in   the

declaration of those great principles which characterize the age

in which we live, and which, under the protection of Heaven,

will——nay, must——guard the honor, promote the prosperity, and

secure the permanent welfare of our beloved country."                     Id.

       ¶42   Justice       Dallet     ultimately         advocates         for    the

discredited "practice of constitutional revision" by a committee

of four lawyers who happen to form a majority on the court.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 714 (2015) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).       Should a majority of this court——four lawyers——

decide to imbue the constitution with modern meanings divorced

from the constitutional text and the history and traditions of

this state, they will rob the people of Wisconsin of their most

important liberty:            "the freedom to govern themselves."                 Id.
Although     living    constitutionalism          is    often    couched     in   the

rhetoric of flexibility and a purported need to adjust for a

changing society, in practice it presents a grave threat to

democracy by thwarting the people from passing legislation to

accommodate changing views.               Living constitutionalism invites

lawyers donning robes to decide all the important issues of the

day,    removing      their    resolution       from    the     political    process

altogether and depriving the people of any say in such matters.
"In practice, the Living Constitution would better be called the

                                          6
                                                                No.   2022AP1334.rgb

Dead Democracy."        Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 410 (2012).1

     ¶43      Justice       Dallet's       invitation      to   reimagine       the

constitution's       text    with    a   so-called      "pluralistic    approach"2

flies    in    the   face     of    this    court's     established    method    of

constitutional interpretation and should be rejected.3                     As with

statutory       interpretation,            the   goal      of     constitutional

interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the constitutional

text as it would have been understood by those who adopted it.

Wis. Just. Initiative 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21; State ex rel. Weiss

v. Dist. Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 195-96, 44 N.W. 967 (1890); State ex

rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 184, 204 N.W. 803 (1925);

B.F. Sturtevant Co. v. O'Brien, 186 Wis. 10, 19, 202 N.W. 324

(1925); State ex rel. Bond v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 184 (Wis.

1849); State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI

58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                       Judges lack any

     1 If nothing else, the idea of the living constitution is
self-defeating. A constitutional right that can be "redefined"
by a majority of the court from time to time is a "guarantee
that guarantees nothing at all."    Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.
Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 407
(2012). What the court gives, the court can just as easily take
away.
     2   Justice Dallet's concurrence, ¶53.
     3 Although Justice Dallet implies her approach is the
traditional interpretive method of this court, id., just last
term this court rebutted that assertion and conclusively
rejected her approach.    Wis. Just. Initiative, Inc. v. Wis.
Elections Comm'n, 2023 WI 38, ¶¶22 n.6, 23 n.7, 407 Wis. 2d 87,
990 N.W.2d 122 ("The concurrence's open pining for the freedom
to go beyond the meaning of constitutional language must be and
is rejected.").

                                           7
                                                                 No.   2022AP1334.rgb

authority to "rewrite the Constitution to reflect the[ir] views

and values."       State v. C. G., 2022 WI 60, ¶87, 403 Wis. 2d 229,

976 N.W.2d 318; Wis. Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21;

State v. Hoyle, 2023 WI 24, ¶88, 406 Wis. 2d 373, 987 N.W.2d 732

(Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("Our founders did not establish a

system of government where judges in our highest courts are

unconstrained by the meaning of the law the people have enacted,

free to import their own values into the Constitution.").                         As

stated by Justice Cassoday in 1890:

      It is no part of the duty of this court to make or
      unmake, but simply to construe this provision of the
      constitution.     All   questions  of   political  and
      governmental ethics, all questions of policy, must be
      regarded as having been fully considered by the
      convention which framed, and conclusively determined
      by the people who adopted, the constitution, more than
      40 years ago. The oath of every official in the state
      is to support that constitution as it is, and not as
      it might have been.
Weiss, 76 Wis. at 208 (Cassoday, J., concurring).

      ¶44   Constitutional interpretation focuses on the text of

the     constitution:      "The     authoritative,         and   usually     final,
indicator of the meaning of a provision is the text——the actual

words used."        Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶57, 320

Wis. 2d 275, 768 N.W.2d 868.          Accordingly, "we look first to the

plain    meaning    of   the   word[s]       [of    the   constitution]     in   the

context in which [they are] used."                  Bd. of Ed. v. Sinclair, 65

Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974).                   This court has often

consulted dictionaries contemporaneous with the text's adoption

to help ascertain its meaning.           E.g., id.; Weiss, 76 Wis. at 212
(Cassoday,    J.,    concurring).        As    in    statutory   interpretation,

                                         8
                                                                     No.   2022AP1334.rgb

this court does not engage in a "hyper-literal approach."                            Brey

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d

417, 970 N.W.2d 1.            Instead, the text is "read[] [] reasonably,

in context, and with a view of the provision's place within the

constitutional structure."               Wis. Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d

87, ¶21 (citing Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI

67, ¶28, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35).

       ¶45    The debates over a constitutional provision and the

practices at the time of the provision's adoption also serve as

guides in ascertaining the text's original public meaning.                           Wis.

Just. Initiative, 407 Wis. 2d 87, ¶21; Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d at

182-83.      As explained in State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, "we must

strive by all means within our jurisdiction to put ourselves in

the     place      the     constitution     makers       occupied,——look        at   the

situation they had in view through the same vista they observed

it, and then read out of the term the meaning they sought to

embody in it."           160 Wis. 21, 81, 151 N.W. 331 (1915).

       ¶46    Post-enactment          construction        of     a     constitutional
provision by the other branches of government may also shed

light on a provision's original public meaning.                            Sinclair, 65

Wis. 2d at 184; Thompson v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546

N.W.2d 123 (1996); State ex rel. Kaul v. Prehn, 2022 WI 50, ¶49,

402 Wis. 2d 539, 976 N.W.2d 821 (statutes enacted "immediately

after       the     1848     constitution       was     ratified[]     reveal[ed]      a

circumscribed            understanding    of      the     Governor's        appointment

power").          Legislative or executive action is given more weight
if    the    action        occurred   shortly     after    the   adoption       of   the

                                            9
                                                                          No.    2022AP1334.rgb

constitutional provision.                See Prehn, 402 Wis. 2d 539, ¶49.

Moreover, an "uninterrupted practice . . . prevailing through a

long series of years" provides additional evidence as to the

text's meaning.           Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. 237, 246 (1872).

"Lawbreaking        is    none     the    less     lawbreaking            because       it    is

grayheaded with age, but when the meaning of a doubtful clause

is in question, the construction placed upon it by the fathers,

and     concurred    in     through       long     years     without            question,     is

strongly     persuasive          and     frequently         will     be         held    to    be

controlling."        In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 602-

03, 124 N.W. 670 (1910) (citing State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear,

138 Wis. 536, 120 N.W. 216 (1909)).                        Failure to present this

court    with     historical      research       may   be    "fatal"        to     a    party's

position.       Prehn, 402 Wis. 539, ¶44; Halverson, 395 Wis. 2d 385,

¶26 (rejecting a claim under the Wisconsin Constitution because

the party "provide[d] no textual or historical basis" for his

argument).

      ¶47   Any argument construing Article I, Section 1 of the
Wisconsin    Constitution         to     protect    an     asserted        right       must   be

grounded     in     the     constitution's          actual         text     and        history.

"Certainly, states have the power to afford greater protection

to    citizens      under        their     constitutions           than         the     federal

constitution does."           State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶56, 389

Wis. 2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813 (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S.

117, 125 (1945)).            But it cannot simply be assumed that the

Wisconsin Constitution provides more protection for an asserted
right than the Federal Constitution:                        "[T]he question for a

                                            10
                                                               No.   2022AP1334.rgb

state court is whether its state constitution actually affords

greater protection.        A state court does not have the power to

write into its state constitution additional protection that is

not supported by its text or historical meaning."                     Id.; Linde,

supra, at 179.         This court has stated many times that "[i]n

interpreting     a    constitutional       provision,   the    court    turns      to

three sources in determining the provision's meaning:                   the plain

meaning of the words in the context used; the constitutional

debates   and   the    practices     in    existence    at    the    time    of   the

writing of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of

the provision by the legislature as manifested in the first law

passed following adoption."           Craney, 199 Wis. 2d at 680 (first

citing Polk Cnty. v. State Pub. Def., 188 Wis. 2d 665, 674, 524

N.W.2d 389 (1994); and then citing State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d

122, 136–37, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984)); see also Thomas ex rel.

Gramling v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, ¶122, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701

N.W.2d 523 (citing State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, ¶64 n.29, 264

Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785); Vincent v. Voight, 2000 WI 93,
¶30, 236 Wis. 2d 588, 614 N.W.2d 388 (citation omitted); Wagner

v. Milwaukee Cnty. Election Comm'n, 2003 WI 103, ¶18, 263 Wis.

2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816 (citing State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000

WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526); Koschkee v. Taylor,

2019 WI 76, ¶23, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (citation

omitted); State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, ¶19, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913

N.W.2d 787 (citing State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, ¶15, 341 Wis.

2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460).             Litigants asserting a right under
Article   I,    Section   1   must    ground    their    arguments      in    those

                                          11
                                                         No.   2022AP1334.rgb

considerations——not policy or subjective moral judgments.                 Our

constitution   and     our    commitment   to   a   democratic     form    of

government demand nothing less.

    ¶48     I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE

KINGSLAND    ZIEGLER    and    Justice     BRIAN    HAGEDORN    join      this

concurrence.

                                    12
                                                                    No.    2022AP1334.rfd

    ¶49     REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.                (concurring).         I agree with

the majority's conclusion that the adoption statutes, Wis. Stat.

§§ 48.81 and 48.92(2), are rationally related to a legitimate

state interest, and therefore do not violate M.M.C.'s or T.G.'s

rights   under    the    Equal   Protection          Clause   of     the    Fourteenth

Amendment.    For that reason, I join the majority opinion.

    ¶50     I write separately to address petitioners' alternative

equal protection challenge under Article I, Section 1 of the

Wisconsin     Constitution.             Our        constitution           was     written

independently     of    the   United    States       Constitution         and    we     must

interpret it as such, based on its own language and our state's

unique identity.        When we do so, there are several compelling

reasons why we should read Article I, Section 1 as providing

broader protections for individual liberties than the Fourteenth

Amendment.       We cannot simply assume——as petitioners seemingly

did in this case——that these different constitutional provisions

mean the same thing.

                                               I
    ¶51     Since the earliest days of our state's history, we

have embraced our role as the principal interpreters of our

state constitution.           In Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v.

Barstow, 4 Wis. 567, 785 (1855), Justice Abram Smith said "The

people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their

primary law.       The people of other states made for themselves

respectively,     constitutions        which       are   construed    by        their    own

appropriate    functionaries.          Let     them      construe    theirs——let          us
construe, and stand by ours."             And we have repeatedly declared

                                         1
                                                               No.    2022AP1334.rfd

that it is our duty to interpret our constitution independently

of the United States Constitution.               See, e.g., State v. Ward,

2000 WI 3, ¶59, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 N.W.2d 517;                            State v.

Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶38, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142;

State v. Halverson, 2021 WI 7, ¶23, 395 Wis. 2d 385, 953 N.W.2d

847.       "Fulfilling our duty to uphold the Wisconsin Constitution

as written could yield conclusions affording greater protections

than those provided by the federal Constitution."                       Halverson,

395 Wis. 2d 385, ¶23.

       ¶52    In fact, we have a long history of interpreting our

constitution to provide greater protections for the individual

liberties of Wisconsinites than those mandated by the federal

Constitution.         For   example,   we     concluded   that    the    Wisconsin

Constitution      guarantees     the   right    to   counsel     at   the    state's

expense in criminal cases more than 100 years before the United

States Supreme Court recognized the same right in                       Gideon v.

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).              See Carpenter v. Dane County,

9 Wis. 274, 278 (1859).          More than 40 years before Mapp v. Ohio,
367    U.S.     643    (1961),   we    held     that   suppression          was   the

appropriate remedy for unlawful searches and seizures under our

constitution.         See Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415, 193 N.W.

89 (1923).      And we have also said that when police deliberately

violate a criminal defendant's Miranda1 rights, our constitution

requires that the evidence be suppressed, even if the Fourth

Amendment doesn't require the same.             See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI

127, ¶2, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.               More recently, we have

       1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

                                        2
                                                                        No.    2022AP1334.rfd

endorsed the view that "[t]he Wisconsin Constitution, with its

specific     and        expansive          language,       provides        much       broader

protections       for   religious         liberty       than    the    First    Amendment."

Coulee Cath. Schs. v. LIRC, 2009 WI 88, ¶66, 320 Wis. 2d 275,

768 N.W.2d 868.

     ¶53     As    these      examples        illustrate,         we    have     recognized

greater protections for individual liberties in our constitution

because     it     is     meaningfully               different     than       the     federal

Constitution.            "All        of     the       differences        in     our        state

constitutions are not accidents of draftsmanship.                             Some of these

differences reflect differences in our tradition."                              Shirley S.

Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 966

(1982).     The Wisconsin Constitution reflects the unique features

of our state and its laws, our history, and the "distinctive

attitudes of [our] state's citizenry."                         See Developments in the

Law——The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harv.

L.   Rev.    1324,       1359-61          (1982).         We     must     consider         these

differences——both          textual         and       contextual——as        part       of     the
pluralistic approach to state constitutional interpretation we

have applied previously.                  See Wis. Justice Initiative v. Wis.

Elections     Comm'n,         2023    WI     38,       ¶117,     407    Wis. 2d 87,          990

N.W.2d 122        (Dallet,      J.,        concurring)          ("We     should       analyze

the . . . Wisconsin constitution['s] text and history carefully,

but we should also be guided by precedent, context, historical

practice and tradition, and the need to balance 'the majority's

values     against      the     values       that       should     be     protected         from
society's majorities'" (quoting another source)).

                                                 3
                                                                   No.    2022AP1334.rfd

                                               II

       ¶54   Even a cursory review of Article I, Section 1 of our

constitution    and    the   Fourteenth        Amendment     indicates       that   the

clauses have different meanings.                Article I, Section 1 states,

in its entirety:

       All people are born equally free and independent, and
       have certain inherent rights: among these are life,
       liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these
       rights, governments are instituted, deriving their
       just powers from the consent of the governed.
Wis.   Const.   art.    I,   § 1.        Compare    this    with    the    Fourteenth

Amendment     which    provides     in    pertinent        part    that    "No    State

shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."                           U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1.

       ¶55   Aside from two shared words——"life" and "liberty"——

Article I, Section 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment are worded in

dramatically different ways.             Article I, Section 1 protects more

than the enumerated rights of "life, liberty, or property."                          It

declares     unequivocally    that       all    Wisconsinites       have     "inherent

rights," a phrase that was written "to be broad enough to cover

every principle of natural right, of abstract justice."                           Black

v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 226, 89 N.W. 522 (1902) (Marshall, J.,

concurring).      Whereas     the    Fourteenth       Amendment's         protections

extend only to those rights "so rooted in the traditions and

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," the

inherent rights contemplated by Article I, Section 1 are not so
limited.     Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).                       Moreover,

                                          4
                                                                  No.   2022AP1334.rfd

Article    I,    Section    1    begins   with    the     clear     and    expansive

declaration      that     all    people    are    "born     equally       free     and

independent."         Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.             As we said over a

century ago, "[t]oo much dignity cannot well be given to that

declaration."         State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89, 101, 114 N.W. 137

(1907).     By    contrast,      the    Fourteenth      Amendment       contains    a

narrower guarantee of "equal protection of the laws."                            U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

     ¶56    These      textual   differences     are    unsurprising        when   we

consider the divergent historical contexts in which the clauses

were developed and adopted.             The language of Article I, Section

1 is derived from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which

stated:

     That all men are by nature equally free and
     independent and have certain inherent rights, of
     which, when they enter into a state of society, they
     cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
     posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty,
     with the means of acquiring and possessing property,
     and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

     Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 1 (1776).
     ¶57    That language, and the language it also inspired in

the overwhelming majority of other states' constitutions,2 was "a

statement        of       revolutionary,         republican,            egalitarian

ideology . . . [b]ut        it    did     not    concern     itself       with     the

     2 See, e.g., Vermont Const. ch. I, art. 1; Mass. Const. art.
I; N.H. Const. art. I; see also Steven G. Calabresi, et al.,
Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights
Are Deeply Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94
Notre Dame L. Rev. 49, 125 (2018) (noting that "[t]hirty-nine of
the states——representing 78% of the states" have similar
language in their state constitutions).
                                5
                                                                     No.    2022AP1334.rfd

Fourteenth Amendment era problems of the people being denied the

equal protection of the laws[.]"               Robert F. Williams, A "Row of

Shadows":      Pennsylvania's      Misguided        Lockstep     Approach        to    Its

State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 Widener J. Pub. L.

343, 349 (1993).         The Fourteenth Amendment wasn't ratified until

twenty years after Wisconsin achieved statehood and nearly a

century after virtually identical language first appeared in the

Virginia Declaration of Rights.                Far from the "revolutionary"

ideals that our Wisconsin Constitution protects, the Fourteenth

Amendment was a pragmatic step in the aftermath of the Civil War

to protect the rights of African Americans who had been freed

from slavery.           See Jonathan F. Mitchell,              Textualism and the

Fourteenth Amendment, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1237, 1248 (2017).                              The

politics of 1868 would have been unrecognizable to the delegates

to the 1848 Wisconsin constitutional convention, let alone the

drafters of the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776.                                 In

short,   the     leaders   of    different      sovereigns      adopted        different

language    at    different      times   in    history    to    address        different
problems.         And    for    that     reason,     we   should           refrain    from

reflexively treating the language similarly.

                                              III

    ¶58     Notwithstanding        the    many      reasons     to     interpret       our

state constitution differently than the federal Constitution,

litigants often overlook state constitutional claims, or fail to

develop them fully.            This case is a perfect example.                  Although

petitioners argued that the adoption statutes at issue violate
Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, they offered

                                          6
                                                                          No.    2022AP1334.rfd

little    more    than    a     citation          to   that     section         as    support.

Otherwise, the parties' briefs focused solely on the Fourteenth

Amendment   and       federal    precedent,            and    ignored       the      Wisconsin

Constitution entirely.

    ¶59     That omission is somewhat understandable.                            Lawyers are

surely more familiar with the extensive case law interpreting

the Fourteenth Amendment.          By comparison, our case law regarding

Article I, Section 1 is sparse.                    But we must break this self-

perpetuating      cycle       whereby        lawyers         fail    to    develop         state

constitutional        arguments         because         they        lack        clear      legal

standards, which further prevents courts from developing clear

legal standards.         In a way, the lack of settled case law should

be encouraging to litigants.                 It is up to us——judges, lawyers,

and citizens——to give effect to the fundamental guarantees of

Article I, Section 1.             And in doing so, I agree with what

Justice Dodge wrote more than 100 years ago, when he said that

Article I, Section 1, should "not receive an unduly limited

construction."        State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis.
530, 533-34, 90 N.W. 1098 (1902) (internal quotations omitted).

    ¶60     For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

    ¶61     I    am   authorized        to    state      that       Justices         ANN   WALSH

BRADLEY and PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence.

                                              7
                                                                           No.     2022AP1334.jjk

       ¶62    JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.                  (concurring).          I agree with the

majority that A.M.B.'s constitutional challenge merits rational

basis review and that the challenged adoption statutes have a

rational basis under the law.                   Rational basis review presents a

low bar for the state to clear.                      We need only to conceive of a

single rational connection between the statutes and a legitimate

state      interest       in    order     for       us   to    uphold        the      statutes'

constitutionality.              Here it is rational for the legislature to

connect marriage to relationship longevity, then relationship

longevity       to       household      stability,            and        finally      household

stability to the child's best interest.1                             Because there is a

conceivable logic behind those connections, the statutes have a

rational basis.

       ¶63    But in this case, the logical threads begin to shred

under the weight of any sincere scrutiny.                                Here, we are left

with the inescapable fact that the legally rational statutes

prevented an adoption that all agree would have been in A.M.B.'s

best       interest.           This   incongruent         outcome          exemplifies       the
specious connection between the statutes and their stated goal

of   promoting       a   child's      best    interest.             At    first     glance   the

connection      may      seem    neatly      knitted     together;         however,      closer

inspection reveals nothing more than a fraying tangle of dubious

assumptions, circular reasoning, and outdated values that fail

to reflect the practical realities of modern family life.                                      I

write separately to call out these three fraying threads that

       See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1) ("In construing this chapter,
       1

the best interests of the child or unborn child shall always be
of paramount consideration.").

                                                1
                                                                       No.    2022AP1334.jjk

form an ever weakening connection between our adoption statutes

and the goal of a child's best interest.                      I urge the legislature

to reform the adoption restrictions so that they truly support

the best interest of every child.

     ¶64   The       first     fraying       thread     connecting           the     adoption

statutes to the best interest of a child is a set of dubious

assumptions regarding the stability of marital families compared

to   non-marital       families.         To      be    clear,        the     state    has    a

legitimate     interest        in     making       sure      that     legal        decisions

involving a child are made based on the best interest of that

child.     And there is no doubt that it is in a child's best

interest to grow up in a safe and stable household.                                  However,

conditioning        adoption    on    the     marital        status    of     the    child's

parent   and   prospective          adoptive       parent     reflects        questionable

assumptions    about     which       types    of      households      are     stable,       and

which are unstable.          There are many different family structures

that create stability for children, and the statute's one-size-

fits-all approach can actively work against the benefit of a
child, as it did in this case.

     ¶65   Children can and do thrive in families with single,

unmarried,     or    married     parents.2            This    case    is     an    excellent

example of the second category.                       T.G. has, by all accounts,

demonstrated dedication and commitment to A.M.B. over the past

     2 These former two categories are not rare, with 41% of
children born to unmarried or single households between 2015 and
2021. Robert Schoen, A Multistate Analysis of United States
Marriage, Divorce, and Fertility, 2005-2010 and 2015-20: The
Retreat from Marriage Continues, The Demography of Transforming
Families 119, 119 (2023).

                                             2
                                                                        No.    2022AP1334.jjk

decade, and for her part A.M.B. reports that she views T.G. as a

father figure.           There is no dispute that adoption would be in

A.M.B.'s best interest.

      ¶66     Moreover, children can and do struggle in households

with married parents.                 Married couples may, on average, stay

together in the same household longer than unmarried parents,

and that may look like stability from a thousand-foot-view.                                But

inside the home, the legal pressure for a married couple to stay

together, the very thing that makes the household appear stable

in a superficial sense, may sometimes lead to worse outcomes for

children.         More than 20% of children have witnessed domestic

violence within their lifetime, often resulting in long term

harm to their development.                     David Finkelhor et al. Violence,

Abuse and Crime Exposure in a National Sample of Children and

Youth,      124    Pediatrics        1,   5    (2009).        Even    short    of    domestic

violence, legally "stable" marriages may be rife with stressors

for the children in those homes.                         Bali Ram & Feng Hou, Changes

in Family Structure and Child Outcomes: Roles of Economic and
Familial Resources, 31 Pol'y Stud. J. 309, 312 ("[A] large body

of    research      now      exists       that       finds    that    children       are   not

necessarily better off living with two biological parents who

are    in    constant        marital          conflict.").           Even     ignoring     the

challenges        that    may        arise     when       a   married       couple    remains

together,         marriage      is     hardly        a    guarantee     of     relationship

stability given that divorce rates have continued to rise in the

United States since the Civil War.                        Lisa D. Pearce et al., The

                                                 3
                                                                          No.    2022AP1334.jjk

Increasing     Diversity        and    Complexity       of     Family      Structures       for

Adolescents, 23 J. Rsch. on Adolescence 565, 592 (2018).

      ¶67    In    short,       using       marriage      as    a     litmus       test     for

household     stability         reflects     suspect      assumptions           about     which

family structures create stability, and what it means for a

household to be stable in the first place.                          Marriage is treated

as   binary,      where    married       parents        check    the      stability        box,

unmarried     parents      do    not,     and     all   nuance       is    disregarded       as

insignificant.        In cases such as this where unmarried parents

provide     stability,         there   is    no    tolerance        for    any    exception.

And, as a result, children suffer.

      ¶68    The second frayed thread linking the adoption statutes

to the best interest of the child goal is little more than tail-

wagging-the-dog       circular         reasoning.         It    goes      like     this:    The

state grants a "constellation of benefits" to married couples

related to "taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of

intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence;

hospital access; medical decision making authority," and more.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669-70 (2015).                                      The

state then uses those benefits as justification to grant yet

another     benefit       to    married      couples——here,          adoption        rights——

reasoning      that   because          married      couples         are    already        well-

supported by the state, they are in a better position to receive

the new benefit.           The connection between the granting of the

benefit and the state's goals is thus substantially manufactured

by the state, resulting in a spiral of ever-expanding benefits
to   married      couples,        leaving         alternative        family       structures

                                              4
                                                                      No.   2022AP1334.jjk

further and further behind.              Perhaps the answer then is not to

limit adoption benefits to married couples on the basis that the

other benefits they receive make them "safe and stable,"3 but for

the     legislature      to     expand    support          for    alternative     family

structures, making them even more "safe and stable," and (from

the state's point of view) suitable for adopting children.

      ¶69       The   third   unraveling          thread   is    an   outdated    set    of

values positioning marriage as the moral center of family and

society.        These values sometimes lurk beneath other seemingly

neutral     rationales        for   marital         benefits      (such     as   ensuring

household stability), only surfacing occasionally as a reminder

to us that they are still there.                        Sometimes these values are

front     and    center,      serving    as       the   main     justification     for   a

marriage-based distinction under the law.

      ¶70       To explain what is fundamentally wrong with using this

set of values to justify marriage-based laws, I turn to an 1888

U.S. Supreme Court case, cited by the Court in Obergefell, that

expounded on marriage as "the foundation of the family and of
society, without which there would be neither civilization or

progress."        Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).                      At the

time those words were written, the following was true about the

institution of marriage.                Coverture laws subordinated married

women to their husbands' legal control, eliminating their legal

and economic identities.            Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from

History: The False Narratives of the Obergefell Dissents, 92

Ind. L.J. 1007, 1014 (2017).                  As a result, a married woman's

      3   See Wis. Stat. § 48.01(1)(gg).

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property,    earnings,    and    labor       automatically       belonged      to   her

husband.     Id.   In addition, there was no legal recourse for a

married woman whose husband had sexually assaulted her, which

would be true well into the 1970s in many states.                      Id. at 1015.

And neither married women nor unmarried women had the right to

vote,   to   exercise    civic    influence       in    order    to    right    these

wrongs.       Furthermore,      marriage       was     limited    exclusively       to

heterosexual relationships.          And, marriages between people of

differing races and ethnicities were widely banned.                      In short,

if marriage was the foundation of the family and of society in

1888, there was something rotten at the core of that foundation.

    ¶71      Times have changed, of course, but the justification

that marriage is the moral core of society and the family is as

weak as it ever was.        With only about half of U.S. adults in a

marriage,     first     marriages    beginning          later     in    life,       and

increasing divorce rates over time, Americans are spending more

and more of their adult lives unmarried.4                  Unsurprisingly then,

    4  See Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried
Parents,     Pew    Research    Center    (Apr.     25,    2018),
https://perma.cc/RC6T-NFGE ("The growth in unmarried parenthood
overall has been driven by several demographic trends. Perhaps
most important has been the decline in the share of people
overall who are married.      In 1970, about seven-in-ten U.S.
adults ages 18 and older were married; in 2016, that share stood
at 50%. Both delays in marriage and long-term increases in
divorce have fueled this trend.     In 1968, the median age at
first marriage for men was 23 and for women it was 21. In 2017,
the median age at first marriage was 30 for men and 27 for
women.   At the same time, marriages are more likely to end in
divorce now than they were almost half a century ago.         For
instance, among men whose first marriage began in the late
1980s, about 76% were still in those marriages 10 years later,
while this figure was 88% for men whose marriages began in the
late 1950s.").

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nearly      one   third   of   children       live      in   a   single-parent        home.

Pearce et al., supra, at 592.                 Yet many Americans still desire

to create families.             Functional, stable families continue to

form   as    alternative       family   structures           proliferate      and    garner

greater societal acceptance.                See Frank F. Furstenberg et al.,

Kinship      Practices    Among    Alternative          Family      Forms    in     Western

Industrialized Societies, 82 J. Marriage Fam. 1403 (2020).                              The

notion that marriage serves as the foundation of society is at

best outdated, and at worst misogynistic.                           It provides scant

justification for laws that distinguish based on marital status.

       ¶72    In sum, I agree that the adoption statutes have a

rational      basis   given     the     low       bar   that     the   legal      analysis

requires.         But upon closer inspection, the connection between

the    adoption     statutes      and   a     child's        best    interest       appears

increasingly threadbare.           Remove the outdated, the questionable,

and the merely self-perpetuating, and soon you are left with

very little connection at all.

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