Court Opinion

ID: 9790417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:40.729346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.418913
License: Public Domain

EAGLESON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in part B of the majority opinion and the disposition thereunder: reverse and remand for the trial court to exercise discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the juror misconduct claim and, if so, whether jurors should be subpoenaed to testify at such a hearing. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 411-421.)
1 respectfully dissent from the analysis and conclusions reached in part A of the majority opinion, which holds that the materiality element of the offense of perjury, when prosecuted pursuant to the Political Reform Act of 1974 (hereafter the Act), must be determined by the jury. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 403-411.)
*424Materiality as an “Element” of Perjury
The majority opinion asks: “in a perjury prosecution based on errors or omissions in disclosure statements required by the Act, is the materiality of the errors or omissions an element of the offense to be determined by the jury?” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 399.) The majority then endeavors to demonstrate, assertedly as a question of first impression, why “materiality” is in fact an “element” of the offense of perjury when authorized under the Act.1 An entire section of the opinion is devoted to the resolution of this question. (Id., at pp. 407-409.) The majority states that “[t]he Attorney General argues that materiality is a legal question that the trial court must resolve” (id., at p. 407), and asserts: “the critical question here is whether materiality is an element of the offense of perjury in the context of the Act.” (Id., at p. 407.)
With all due respect, insofar as the word “material” is found in the language of the statute defining the crime of perjury (Pen. Code, § 118) under which these offenses were charged, it is plainly, in a definitional, threshold sense, an “element” or “requirement”2 of the offense of perjury.
Our order granting review in this case acknowledged as much in designating one of the issues on review: “Is the materiality element of the crime of perjury a legal question for the court or a factual question for the jury?” (Italics added.) As the majority notes, at oral argument the Attorney General agreed that “materiality” is an element of the offense of perjury in this case. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 407-408.) However, he relied upon a long line of federal authority in support of his position that “the materiality element in a perjury case is ‘one for the court.’ ” (Italics added.) This is the nub of the issue.
It is not a function of this or any other court to establish what is or is not an “element” of a Penal Code offense. Defining crimes and their elements is fundamentally a legislative function. We may, of course, seek to “clarify” the element or requirement of “materiality” in the statutory language defining the offense of perjury—by construing the legislative intent underlying use of that term or, arguably, by looking to the provisions of the Act which authorize perjury prosecutions based on violations of the Act. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 81002, subds. (a) & (c).) Such clarification, however, does not “somehow become an ‘element’ of [the offense] on which the jury *425must be instructed in all cases regardless of whether the evidence supports such an instruction.” (People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501 [244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803], italics in original [rejecting the “novel suggestion” that this court’s clarification of the scope of the felony-murder special circumstance created or established a new “element,” and citing a long line of authority commencing with People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139-1140 [80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677], which explains that the mere act of “clarifying” the scope of an element of a crime or a special circumstance does not create a new and separate element of that crime or special circumstance].)
I believe the majority overstates its function by purporting to “hold,” as a matter of first impression, that materiality is an element of a limited category of perjury prosecutions: those brought pursuant to the Act.
Who Determines Materiality—Judge or Jury?
In People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714 [224 Cal.Rptr. 719, 715 P.2d 680], defendant was convicted of selling unqualified securities in violation of Corporations Code section 25110. We held in that case that by instructing the jury that certain corporate promissory notes were “securities” within the meaning of the statute, the trial court had improperly removed an element of the crime from the jury’s consideration. With respect to a long line of California appellate court decisions holding that the question of what constitutes a security was one of law to be determined by the trial court, we observed that those decisions could not withstand scrutiny “under more modern concepts of due process and the right to a jury trial.” (Id., at p. 731.)
In reaching this conclusion in Figueroa we further observed, in dictum relegated to a footnote, that although there is a well-recognized “historical exception” for perjury prosecutions—in which the determination of the materiality requirement has long been deemed a question of law reserved exclusively for the trial court—“the continuing validity of [this rule] may be doubtful in light of In re Winship [(1970)] 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068], and Connecticut v. Johnson [(1983)] 460 U.S. 73 [74 L.Ed.2d 823, 103 S.Ct. 969].” (Figueroa, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 733, fn. 22.)
As early as 1929, however, the United States Supreme Court held that the materiality requirement in a prosecution for perjury was a question of law to be determined by the trial court. (Sinclair v. United States (1929) 279 U.S. 263, 298 [73 L.Ed. 692, 699-700, 49 S.Ct. 268] [materially false statement made to a governmental agency].) The rationale of Sinclair became *426the basis for numerous state court decisions adopting the rule that materiality in a perjury prosecution is a question of law for the court.
The decisions of this court that are in accord with the general rule include People v. Pierce (1967) 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [56 Cal.Rptr. 817, 423 P.2d 969], and People v. Matula (1959) 52 Cal.2d 591 [342 P.2d 252]. Indeed, 36 years prior to the high court’s decision in Sinclair, this court wrote: “The question of materiality of evidence, no matter when or how it may arise, is always one of law for the court, and not of fact for the jury. It usually arises in the ordinary trial of a cause, where one party offers evidence, and the other objects to it as immaterial; and in that case it would be clear to every one that the question was for the court. But the question is exactly the same when, on a trial for perjury, the materiality of the alleged false testimony arises. Of course, a jury, in rendering a general verdict in a criminal case, necessarily has the naked power to decide all the questions arising on the general issue of not guilty; but it only has the right to find the facts, and apply to them the law as given by the court. And on a trial for perjury, it is the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to what facts would show material testimony.” (People v. Lem You (1893) 97 Cal. 224, 228 [32 P. 11]; see also People v. Bradbury (1909) 155 Cal. 808 [103 P. 215]; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, § 1188, at p. 1369.)
The decisions of this state’s Court of Appeal have also long been in accord with this general rule. (See, e.g., People v. McRae (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 95 [63 Cal.Rptr. 854]; People v. Sagehorn (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 138 [294 P.2d 1062]; People v. Brophy (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 15 [120 P.2d 946]; People v. Curtis (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d 306 [98 P.2d 228]; People v. Macken (1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 31 [89 P.2d 173]; People v. Phillips (1922) 56 Cal.App. 291 [205 P. 40]; People v. Senegram (1915) 27 Cal.App. 301 [149 P. 786]; People v. Chadwick (1906) 4 Cal.App. 63 [87 P. 384].)
And, as the majority has recognized, “the great majority of other states” adhere to the rule that the question of materiality is one of law for the court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 408; see, e.g., Jaffe v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 438 So.2d 72, 75-76; People v. Powell (1987)160 Ill.App.3d 689 [513 N.E.2d 1162, 1166]; People v. Hoag (1982) 113 Mich.App. 789 [318 N.W.2d 579, 583]; State v. Sands (1983) 123 N.H. 570 [467 A.2d 202, 215-216]; State v. Gallegos (1982) 98 N.M. 31 [644 P.2d 545, 546]; State v. Hanson (N.D. 1981) 302 N.W.2d 399, 401; Yarbrough v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) 617 S.W.2d 221, 228; State v. Strand (Utah 1986) 720 P.2d 425, 431; see also Annot., Materiality of Testimony Forming Basis of Perjury Charge as *427Question for Court or Jury in State Trial (1985) 37 A.L.R.4th 948, 953-958.)3
The Ninth Circuit has followed the general rule in United States v. Dipp (9th Cir. 1979) 581 F.2d 1323, 1328. And one federal circuit court has observed: “The unanimous verdict of the federal courts has been that materiality is a question of law to be determined by the trial judge.” (See United States v. Bridges (D.C. Cir. 1983) 717 F.2d 1444, 1448.)4
In Russell v. United States (1962) 369 U.S. 749, 755-759 [8 L.Ed.2d 240, 245-248, 82 S.Ct. 1038], and Braden v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 431, 435-438, and footnote 6 [5 L.Ed.2d 653, 655-656, 81 S.Ct. 584], the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that the element of materiality in a perjury prosecution is “one for the court,” announced over 50 years ago in Sinclair.
But most significantly, very recently, in Kungys v. United States (1988) 485 U.S. 759 [99 L.Ed.2d 839, 108 S.Ct. 1537], a case decided well after In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068], and Connecticut v. Johnson (1983) 460 U.S. 73 [74 L.Ed.2d 823, 103 S.Ct. 969], the high court yet again reaffirmed the continuing validity of the “historical exception” recognized for perjury prosecutions. (Sinclair v. United States, supra, 279 U.S. at p. 298 [73 L.Ed. at pp. 699-700].) In adopting the reasoning of a Sixth Circuit case construing the element of “materiality” found in 18 United States Code section 1001 (see, ante, this page, fn. 4), the high court explained:
“ ‘[Although the materiality of a statement rests upon a factual evidentiary showing, the ultimate finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive law. Since it is the court’s responsibility to interpret substantive law, we believe [it is proper to treat] the issue of materiality as a legal question.’ United States v. Abadi [(6th Cir. 1983)] 706 F.2d 178, 180, cert, denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).” (Kungys v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 772 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 854].)
*428Nor can it be concluded that the high court, when reaffirming the rule of Sinclair v. United States in Kungys v. United States, was unmindful of its prior holdings in In re Winship and Connecticut v. Johnson. Several years before Kungys was decided, challenges on grounds that the materiality determination is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury were rejected in United States v. Greber (3d Cir. 1985) 760 F.2d 68, and United States v. Falco (2d Cir. 1982) 697 F.2d 299. The high court denied certiorari in those cases. (Greber v. United States (1985) 474 U.S. 988 [88 L.Ed.2d 348, 106 S.Ct. 396]; Falco v. United States (1983) 460 U.S. 1068 [75 L.Ed.2d 945, 103 S.Ct. 1521].) In Greber v. United States, Justice White issued a written dissent from the denial of certiorari, urging his brethren to grant certiorari on the materiality issue. (474 U.S. at p. 988 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 348].)
Likewise, in People v. Powell, supra, 513 N.E.2d 1162, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected a Winship-groxmded challenge to the general rule that materiality in a perjury case is a question of law for the court, reasoning: “. . . the determination of materiality involves the relationship between an allegedly false statement and the nature of the proceedings at which it is made. We conclude that this determination is one best suited for a court with its legal expertise and is therefore a question of law.” (Id., at p. 1166; accord State v. Sands, supra, 467 A.2d 202, 215-216.)
Turning to the case at bench, it is difficult to discern from the majority opinion the analytical basis, or compelling rationale, for parting company with the long-settled rule that the determination of the materiality requirement in a perjury prosecution is a question of law for the court.
The majority asserts: “Figueroa did not abrogate the question-of-law/question-of-fact distinction in determining whether issues should be submitted to the jury.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 407.) I agree.
But the majority then states: “[Figueroa] did suggest, however, that this distinction plays a relatively limited role in view of a defendant’s constitutional right to have a jury determine the existence of all elements of the offense charged.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 407.) I submit that, in the unique context of perjury prosecutions, this further proposition finds precious little support.
As the relevant authorities reviewed demonstrate, the question-of-law versus question-of-fact distinction is indeed at the very heart of the “historical exception” for perjury prosecutions. Just two years ago the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that the materiality element of perjury is a “legal question” for the court. (Kungys v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 772 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 854].) The high court has impliedly held that the *429due process concerns of In re Winship have little or no application to a determination of the materiality requirement in a perjury prosecution. Indeed, the high court in Kungys v. United States expressly recognized that a determination of materiality in a perjury prosecution does involve “factual evidentiary showing[s],” but the court nevertheless concluded that because “ ‘the ultimate finding of materiality turns on an interpretation of substantive law ... we believe [it is proper to treat] the issue of materiality as a legal question.’ [Citation].” (Kungys v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 772 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 854].) Unlike the majority, I would rely on the decisions of the high court as they interpret and reaffirm that court’s prior holdings.
The majority also concludes that “the definition of materiality in prosecutions under the Act necessarily differs from its definition in other perjury cases.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 409.) I find the majority’s analysis less than convincing in this regard as well. The crux of this holding appears to be the following passage: “Although we have in past decisions defined materiality in the context of perjury prosecutions based on false statements at trials and at legislative hearings (Pen. Code, § 118), those definitions are inappropriate here because they turn on whether the false statement could have ‘influenced the outcome of the proceedings.’ (People v. Pierce [, supra,] 66 Cal.2d 53, 61 [perjury in a judicial proceeding]; People v. Matula [, supra,] 52 Cal.2d 591, 595 [perjury at a legislative hearing].) In a perjury prosecution based on the filing of a false SEI [statement of economic interests] or CDS [campaign disclosure statement], on the other hand, there is no ‘proceeding’ the outcome of which could be influenced by the false verification.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 405, italics added.)
However, as the majority recognizes elsewhere in its opinion, a traditional perjury prosecution under Penal Code section 118 need not necessarily involve peijurious testimony uttered under oath at a judicial or legislative proceeding that stands to influence the outcome of that proceeding. Under the statute’s express provisions, the “peijury” can be committed in a false, signed declaration or other writing, as was the case here. There is no further explicit requirement that it “influence the proceedings.” (See CALJIC No. 7.21 (1982 rev.) (4th ed. pocket pt.) [given in this case]; maj. opn., ante, at p. 404, fn. 1.) To be sure, many if not most of the cases surveyed above— holding that a determination of materiality is a question of law for the court—did arise in the context of perjurious statements made under oath at a judicial or legislative “proceeding.” That may be the usual case. But the rationale behind the legion of cases and authorities recognizing that materiality is a question of law does not rely on the assumption that an act of perjury will always, of necessity, “influence the outcome” of a judicial or legislative “proceeding.” If this has been a prerequisite for application of the *430long-standing rule that materiality is a question for the court, it has escaped the very formidable body of case law on the subject.
Conversely, even if it need be shown that the perjury was material in the sense that it “influenced the outcome of the proceedings” in order for the general “question of law” rule to apply, the majority wholly fails to explain or substantiate its conclusion that “[i]n a perjury prosecution based on the filing of a false SEI or CDS . . . there is no ‘proceeding’ the outcome of which could be influenced by the false verification.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 405.)
The Act’s reporting requirements are designed to expose improper financial practices such as might give rise to conflicts of interest. Other provisions of the Act expressly prohibit such practices. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 87100 [“[n]o public official . . . shall ... in any way attempt to use his official position to influence a governmental decision in which he knows or has reason to know he has a financial interest”]; see also id.., § 87101 et seq.) Manifestly, the statutory scheme of the Act envisions a myriad of “proceedings”—public elections, governmental functions and political events—the outcomes of which would stand to be unduly influenced or compromised by false and perjured reporting statements filed under the Act.
The majority’s analysis is unorthodox in at least one further respect. The majority states: “We are persuaded that [the Act] was intended to permit prosecution for perjury, a felony punishable by imprisonment for up to four years, only in cases involving more serious violations of the Act.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 405.) It is stated immediately thereafter that: “The United States Supreme Court’s decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. (1976) 426 U.S. 438 (TSC) is instructive on the issue at hand.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 405.) The majority then discusses the definition of materiality at issue in TSC and concludes: “Although TSC pertained to shareholder elections and this case involves elections to public office, in both contexts the statutory schemes specify the information that must be disclosed to the voters. Moreover, the statutory schemes have similar objectives.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 406, italics added.)
The majority’s reliance on the holding in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. (1986) 426 U.S. 438 [48 L.Ed.2d 757, 96 S.Ct. 2126] (TSC) is troubling. There is much at stake here; the definition of “materiality” that the majority adopts today will bear directly upon future criminal felony prosecutions for perjury authorized by the Act but charged under the express language of Penal Code section 118. I therefore question the majority’s determination to place such heavy reliance on the assertedly analogous holding in TSC. The defendant in TSC was not being criminally prosecuted; that case involved a suit for money damages, restitution and other equitable *431relief. The precise legal issue there at hand was judicial construction of the materiality requirement of a rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, upon which civil liability was being alleged. (TSC, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 443, 449, fn. 10 [48 L.Ed.2d at pp. 762, 766].) The high court in TSC considered only whether summary judgment on the issue of materiality was warranted under the facts of that case. (Id., at p. 450 [48 L.Ed.2d at pp. 766-767].) The underlying general rule—that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to a jury determination of all the elements of the criminal offense with which he is charged—was not in issue in TSC. I also think it noteworthy that we did not even cite or rely on TSC in Figueroa, supra, 41 Cal.3d 714—itself a securities case which this court decided 10 years after the high court’s holding in TSC.
In contrast, the critical question here is whether the “materiality requirement” or “element” of a Penal Code section 118 charge brought pursuant to the Act presents a question of law for the court, or a question of fact for the jury. The answer to that inquiry is what ultimately must determine whether the principles of In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 358, Sandstrom v. Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510 [61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450], and Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, 460 U.S. 73, are to be applied here. The long-settled line of authority reviewed above inferentially supports the conclusion that the question of “materiality” in a perjury prosecution brought pursuant to the Act, like all other perjury prosecutions, is a question of law for the court, not one of “fact” for the jury. The high court which decided In re Winship and Sandstrom v. Montana has, subsequent to those holdings, reaffirmed the vitality of the “historical exception” for the “materiality requirement” in peijury prosecutions. (Kungys v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. at p. 772 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 854].)
I would place far greater emphasis on the holding in Kungys v. United States, supra, 485 U.S. 759, the earlier decisions of the high court which that opinion reaffirmed, and the numerous prior decisions of this court, our state Court of Appeal, and the majority of sister state jurisdictions—all of which are virtually unanimous in following the historical rule: that “materiality” in a perjury prosecution is a question of law for the court, not one of fact for the jury.
In short, the majority has failed to identify any valid distinguishing factors between “garden variety” perjury prosecutions on the one hand, and perjury prosecutions authorized under the Act (but charged under the statutory language of Penal Code section 118) on the other, such as would justify excluding the latter category of prosecutions from the long-standing rule that materiality is a question of law for the court. As the authorities *432reviewed clearly indicate, the exception for materiality determinations in perjury prosecutions is indeed grounded on the question-of-law versus question-of-fact distinction. The majority’s analysis fails to “explain away” this historical reality. Given the formidable and unbroken line of authorities, including controlling decisions of the high court, establishing that the materiality determination is a question of law in perjury prosecutions, any attempt to distinguish or abolish this “historical exception” is no easy task. In my view the majority’s analysis does not withstand scrutiny, and furnishes inadequate grounds for this court to part company with the formidable body of precedent to the contrary. Figueroa involved a prosecution for securities law violations, not perjury. I submit that the holding and footnoted dictum in that case should be limited to the legal issue there at hand.
Prejudice
Assuming arguendo the correctness of the majority’s holding—that the “materiality requirement” in a prosecution for perjury brought under the Act is a determination for submission, along with proper instructions, to the jury—I nonetheless cannot join in the majority’s analysis and conclusions respecting prejudice.
The majority opinion states: “Generally, when a trial court instructs the jury that an element of the offense charged is conclusively presumed, the effect of the error appears to be measured by the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. (Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 470, 106 S.Ct. 3101]; Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265 [105 S.Ct. 218, 221-222, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420-2421].) But when the error renders the trial ‘fundamentally unfair,’ the error is reversible per se. (Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 577-578 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471]; People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194, 210-211 [249 Cal.Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013].) Here, regardless of which test we apply, reversal is required. The factual questions presented to the jury were complex, the defense did not concede the issue of materiality, and the trial court’s instruction completely deprived the jury of an opportunity to consider the materiality of defendant’s omissions. Under these circumstances, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instruction had no effect on the jury’s verdict on the perjury offenses.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 410.)
I would apply the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” Chapman standard, which I believe is clearly the correct standard of review applicable here. As in Figueroa, the majority’s analysis is rooted in the constitutional principle that a jury must determine whether the prosecution has estab*433lished each element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 368].) As such, it is tempting to view the rule we announce today as central to the trial’s “truth-finding function.” (See Ivan v. City of New York (1972) 407 U.S. 203, 204 [32 L.Ed.2d 659, 661, 92 S.Ct. 1951].) But the matter bears closer scrutiny in light of recent high court decisions.
“In Rose, the high court found that a jury instruction that a homicide is presumed to be malicious violated Sandstrom, supra, 442 U.S. 510, in that it effectively eliminated one of the elements of murder, thereby unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof on such element to the defendant. The Supreme Court went on to conclude that the Chapman harmless error standard was applicable to Sandstrom error. (Rose v. Clark supra, 478 U.S. at p. 583.) [][] Rose draws a distinction between fundamental trial errors that áre reversible per se, and other federal constitutional errors which are subject to a harmless error analysis under Chapman, the former being the exception: ‘We have emphasized . . . that while there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule. [Citation.] Accordingly, if the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis. The thrust of the many constitutional rules governing the conduct of criminal trials is to ensure that those trials lead to fair and correct judgments. Where a reviewing court can find that the record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the interest in fairness has been satisfied and the judgment should be affirmed.’ (Rose, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 579.)” (People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 62-63 [246 Cal.Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1] [applying Chapman test to Beeman error (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318])]; see People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666 [238 Cal.Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752] [conflicting implied-malice instructions in attempted murder prosecution analyzed under Chapman].)
In my view the rule the majority announces today has little to do with the standard by which determinations of guilt or innocence are made in perjury prosecutions under the Act. Instead, the central issue is who should make the requisite determination respecting “materiality”: judge or jury? Transferring the responsibility for determining the “materiality” of perjured statements does not, in my view, “raise[ ] serious questions about the accuracy of [the] guilty verdicts. . . .” (Williams v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 646, 653 [28 L.Ed.2d 388, 395, 91 S.Ct. 1148].) Stated otherwise, the difference between a judge and a jury as decision maker on the issue of materiality in this perjury prosecution is not likely to have caused a different result. For this reason the Chapman harmless-error test clearly applies here. *434As I next explain, review of the evidentiary record leads me to conclude that any instructional error was harmless in this case.
Under the Act, public officials running for office are required to file two different sets of disclosure forms. Generally, all public officials must file annual SEI’s (statements of economic interests) disclosing financial interests such as income investments, loans, gifts, etc. (See Gov. Code, §§ 87200, 87203.) In addition, candidates, campaign committees and elected officials are required to file periodic CDS’s (campaign disclosure statements) detailing a variety of information regarding contributions received and expenditures made by the filer. (See Gov. Code, §§ 4200, 84211.)
The central element in the prosecution’s case is found in count l’s allegation of a single overall conspiracy between defendant Roger Hedgecock, Tom Shepard, Nancy Hoover and Jerry Dominelli by which Nancy Hoover and Dominelli would funnel large amounts of money to Hedgecock for personal as well as political purposes, in violation of both local campaign finance laws and state disclosure laws. Of the remaining twelve perjury counts of which Hedgecock was found guilty, seven involve allegedly incomplete CDS’s and the remaining five involve alleged omissions from SEI’s.
The first two CDS counts (counts 4 and 5) involve statements which include periods of time (before Aug. 1982) during which there was no contract in existence between Tom Shepard and Associates (TS&A) and the Hedgecock for Mayor Committee. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 400-401.) During this period, the prosecution alleged that TS&A employees performed numerous services for Hedgecock’s nascent mayoral campaign for which they were compensated by TS&A. As a result, these services are considered to be in-kind contributions made by TS&A to Hedgecock’s campaign committee which were never reported on the relevant CDS’s. In addition during this period, TS&A paid for the printing of the Hedgecock endorsement cards and for the Tom Lawrence video consulting sessions which also constituted unreported contributions. As with all the perjury counts, the prosecution’s theory was that Hedgecock intentionally failed to disclose these amounts knowing they constituted reportable contributions under the law.
The remaining CDS counts (counts 6, 7, 8, 10 and 12) all involve time periods during which there was some contract in force between TS&A and the Hedgecock for Mayor Committee. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 400-401.) The prosecution argued that both the original contract in August and the oral modification in December were sham agreements supported by inadequate consideration used as a device to camouflage Hoover and Dominelli’s campaign contributions made in the form of capital contributions to TS&A which covered the firm’s enormous losses on the Hedgecock account. In *435addition, count 6 is based on the direct payment by TS&A of the installation and repair bills on Hedgecock’s car telephone.
Hedgecock also filed annual SEI’s for 1981 and 1982 while he was still a member of the board of supervisors. The 1981 perjury count (count 3) was based on Hedgecock’s failure to disclose Harvey Schuster’s $500 payment for legal services rendered to Hedgecock (maj. opn., ante, at p. 402) and the $3,000 check received from Jerry Dominelli in December 1981. (Id., at p. 401.) The 1982 perjury count (count 9) was based on Hedgecock’s failure to disclose the $16,000 Hedgecock received from Hoover in payment for the David and Linda Inabinett promissory note and Hedgecock’s subsequent $10,000 investment in a J. David and Company interbank account. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 402.)
Hedgecock filed three SEI’s in 1983. The first covered the period through May 19 and was required because he was leaving office as a county supervisor. (See Gov. Code, § 87204.) The prosecution alleged in count 11 that the statement was false because Hedgecock failed to disclose the interest income he continued to receive from the Inabinetts even after he purportedly sold the note to Hoover. Count 14 involves the SEI which covers the full year 1983 filed by Hedgecock on March 6, 1984. It was alleged to be false because of Hedgecock’s failure to disclose the Inabinett interest payments. In addition, although Hedgecock disclosed a loan from Nancy Hoover for the renovation of his residence, the prosecution argued the statement was false because it failed to include Jerry Dominelli and/or J. David and Company as an additional source of the loan. On March 9, 1984, Hedge-cock amended his 1983 SEI, making corrections on items not relevant for the purposes of this case. Count 15, which is based on this amended SEI, alleges the statement was false for the identical reasons as count 14.
In sum, under the prosecution’s version of the case, Hedgecock was part of a conspiracy to secretly enhance his political career objectives. One of the central goals of the conspiracy was to secretly fund Hedgecock’s mayoral campaign. The prosecution theorized that the perjurious disclosure filings under the Act were a planned portion of the conspiracy. According to the prosecution’s theory of the case, there was no possibility of mistake or forgetfulness; Hedgecock’s actions were deliberate and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Hedgecock presented no defense witnesses to the jury, but argued strenuously that he was guilty of no crime. He asserted that the prosecution had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. He argued that there was no conspiracy, that he had no knowledge of Hoover and Dominelli’s funding of TS&A, and that he believed the contract he had with Shepard’s firm was for full value, thus requiring no reporting under the Act.
*436The jury’s verdict of guilt on the conspiracy count alone—which conviction the majority itself concludes was unaffected by the “Winship-Sandstrom” instructional error—establishes that the jury rejected Hedgecock’s defense. The jury’s verdict of guilt on the conspiracy charge further reflects its determination that Hedgecock acted with specific intent in failing to disclose campaign contributions and sources of incomes over the limits prescribed by the Act.
My review of the totality of facts convinces me that removal of the materiality requirement from the jury’s determination in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709].) Whatever refined definition of “materiality” we apply here, under these facts, my conclusion would remain the same.
Conclusion
I would reverse and direct the Court of Appeal to remand with directions to the trial court to reentertain defendant Hedgecock’s motion for a new trial consistent with the dictates of our opinion, and in the event the motion for a new trial is again denied, to enter judgment on all convictions. I join in the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal’s disposition to issue an alternative writ returnable before the superior court in No. D005661, to be heard concurrently with the motion for a new trial.

 The majority “express[es] no view” on whether the materiality requirement in all other perjury prosecutions brought under Penal Code section 118 is a “jury issue.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 409.)

Witkin refers to the “materiality requirement” of the offense of perjury. (See 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) § 1186, at p. 1367.)

 My research has uncovered only three jurisdictions in which the materiality element of perjury has been held a jury question. (See, e.g., Com. v. McDuffee (1979) 379 Mass. 353 [398 N.E.2d 463] [Mass.]; Pope v. State (1931) 43 Ga.App. 175 [158 S.E. 350] [Ga.]; and People v. Clemente (1955) 309 N.Y. 890 [131 N.E.2d 294] [N.Y.]; see Annot., supra, 37 A.L.R.4th at pp. 960-964.)

The suggestion that there is “unanimity” amongst the federal circuit courts on this issue is not entirely accurate. Our research uncovered two circuits which have held that materiality under 18 United States Code section 1001, making unlawful the willful concealment of material facts in any matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States, is a question of fact which should be submitted to the jury. (See United States v. Irwin (10th Cir. 1981) 654 F.2d 671, 677, fn. 8; United States v. Valdez (9th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2d 725, 729; but see United States v. Dipp, supra, 581 F.2d at p. 1328 [in which the Ninth Circuit followed the majority rule].)