Court Opinion

ID: 9690827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:47:00.137046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:05.088658
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice KELLER.
Appellant did not exhibit the sort of behavior that constitutes “special” or “extraordinary” circumstances sufficient to have been left in shackles in the presence of the jury. For example, in Tunget v. Commonwealth,1 to which the . majority makes only fleeting reference, our predecessor court noted that the defendant “was a man of demonstrated desperation.”2 The court then elaborated extensively on this point:
He had already been convicted of murder and had been given a life sentence. Before he had served a year of the time necessary to qualify him for parole, he had procured a gun from the outside and in nerveless fashion had herded four stalwart guards into his own cell. Thereafter, he had shot and killed the associate warden and had then shot at or through two other guards in pursuing his raging, reckless intent to escape, regardless of the resulting consequences. Confinement had not curbed him, courtroom solemnity had not cowed him, armed guards had neither daunted nor discouraged him.3
Only after recounting such extreme facts did the court admit that the defendant’s case was “exceptional,” thus allowing a deviation from the rule that a defendant is not to be shackled in the presence of the jury. We have repeatedly limited this practice to instances where there is danger of violence from the defendant,4 where the defendant has tried to escape,5 or both.6
There is no evidence of either of these factors in this case. Instead, Appellant only grew mildly upset, “threw a little fit,” stated that he wanted to be tried in absen-tia rather than be tried in shackles, and, when questioned about what his behavior would be upon his return to the courtroom, stated that he was not sure. Appellant’s mildly contentious behavior arose only because the bailiff intended — -from the beginning and before any of the behavior cited in the majority opinion — to leave Appel*736lant in shackles for the jury to see. The majority admits that shackling a defendant in front of the jury implicates his constitutional right to a presumption of innocence, and that this right may only be infringed in certain circumstances. Yet the majority opinion amounts to an approval of a practice whereby a defendant is penalized for growing upset at an unnecessary proposed violation of this constitutional right and the punishment is the same action that would have otherwise violated the constitutional right. In effect, the majority opinion bootstraps away Appellant’s admittedly limited right not to be seen in shackles by the jury simply because he grew understandably upset when he was informed that he was to be forced to wear shackles in the presence of the jury before he had done anything to warrant such treatment. It is hard to imagine a more absurd situation.
“Our predecessor court noted that shackles would be justified in less than ‘one murder case out of an average hundred coming to trial.” ’7 Surely this is not such a case. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
JOHNSTONE, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W,2d 785 (1947)

. Id. at 786.

. Id.

. See, e.g., Marion v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W.2d 721, 724 (1937) (allowing shackles where the defendant was "a confessed desperado, who had shown no regard for the property or life of others”).

. See, e.g., Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221 (Ky.2004) (allowing shackles where the defendant had repeatedly from prison); Commonwealth v. Conley, 959 S.W.2d 77 (Ky.1997) (allowing shackles on defendant who had fled courtroom and escaped during arraignment).

. See, e.g., Tunget, 303 Ky. at 837, 198 S.W.2d at 786.

. Hillv. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233 (Ky.2004) (quoting Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785, 786 (1946)).