Court Opinion

ID: 9896622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 21:05:18.5265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:10.798741
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 Motley v. Lugo CA2/4
          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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   IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      DIVISION FOUR

ALEXIS MOTLEY,                                                     B318519
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
       v.                                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                                   21LBRO02086)
THOMAS LUGO,

       Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Reginald Neal, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Office of Kevin Lemieux and Kevin Lemieux for
Defendant and Appellant.
     Bare Law and Robert Bare for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Thomas Lugo (father) appeals from a two-year restraining
order, issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam.
Code § 6200, et seq.), prohibiting him from harassing his child.1
The trial court issued the restraining order at the request of the
child’s mother, respondent Alexis Motley (mother). Father
contends reversal is required for three reasons: (1) the trial court
denied mother’s application to be appointed the child’s guardian
ad litem, but purportedly permitted mother to act as though she
held that title in the restraining order proceedings; (2)
substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding
that abuse of the child occurred; and (3) the trial court abused its
discretion by granting the restraining order. For the reasons
discussed below, we reject father’s contentions and affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Mother and father are the parents of the child, who was
born in April 2016. They separated before the child was born. At
the time of the underlying proceedings, mother and father shared
joint legal and physical custody of the child.
       At some point after mother and father separated, father
began dating Sydney Coleman. They eventually moved in
together, became engaged, and had a child. Father and Coleman
separated on December 8, 2021.
       In November 2021, mother filed a request for a domestic
violence restraining order on behalf of the child. She requested

1     All further undesignated references are to the Family Code.
To protect the personal privacy interest of their child, we do not
use his name. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1).)

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personal conduct and stay-away-orders. She also requested sole
legal and physical custody of the child.
       In support of her request, mother submitted her own
declaration and the declaration of Coleman. Mother declared that
on October 27, 2021, Coleman called mother to inform her of an
incident involving the child that “resulted in a police visit to their
home.” She declared Coleman “indicated that there were several
other incidents surrounding homework time, wherein [father]
would yell at [the child], stand over him to physically intimidate
him, threaten to strangle him, and grab him by the back of the
neck to push his face into his homework[ ].” Mother further
declared the child informed her “that his father grabbed him by
the neck.” She concluded: “[The child] has begun having
behavioral issues, such as refusing to eat, stress-induced
vomiting, fear of going to his father’s house displayed by crying
and refusal to go.”
       Coleman declared she shared a residence with father,
which resulted in her forming a relationship with the child
during the child’s visitation periods with father. She stated she
“recently witnessed [father] being physically abusive towards [the
child], wherein he would tower over [the child] so as to physically
intimidate him, as well as grab him by the back of the neck to
push his face into his homework.” She also witnessed father
“yelling at the child and threatening to strangle him if he did not
do his homework correctly.” She further declared that the
daughter she has with father had recently been placed under the
custody of child protective services “as a result of [father’s]
actions.” (Bold text omitted.)
       The trial court granted a temporary restraining order until
the scheduled hearing. It denied mother’s application to be

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appointed guardian ad litem. It explained in the order that
appointing mother “presupposes the merits of the case,” but
“[m]other can pursue this restraining order on her own behalf
with [the child] as a protected person.”
       In opposition to mother’s request for a restraining order,
father submitted a declaration. He declared mother “has been
trying to impede my relationship with [the child] since the day he
was born.” In response to the allegations of physical abuse, he
declared: “I have never hit or choked my son [ ]. One time in April
or May 2021, [the child] was misbehaving and refusing to listen,
so I put him in timeout. [The child] refused to go to timeout, so I
moved him to timeout by his shoulder. [The child] served his
timeout and has never refused to serve a timeout since that day. I
was not forceful or abusive in any way with [the child] and this
has never happened on any other occasion.” Father also detailed
alleged physical abuse by Coleman against him, stating
Coleman’s “domestic violence against me has included hitting,
kicking, choking, use of weapons, and verbal abuse in front of the
children.” Because of this abuse, father “obtained a one year
restraining order protecting [him] from [ ] Coleman.”
       On January 6, 2022, the trial court held a hearing. Mother,
father, and Coleman testified consistent with their declarations.
For example, Mother testified the child “would tell me repeatedly
that he didn’t want to go to his dad’s house, and he would cry. He
began to act out. We had issues of vomiting due to stress, to
where we had to take him to the doctor to make sure that he was
okay.” Coleman testified she “witnessed physical abuse [of the
child] more than once.” She then recounted the most recent
incident: “It was during a lot of [the child’s] schoolwork time,
after school, [father] would lose his patience too quickly and

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would use his hands to, like, slap [the child’s] head, like, cock his
hand back and slap the top of his head. Using his hands to
manipulate forcefully [the child’s] head towards, like, his
paperwork or towards the alphabet that we had on our wall.” In
response, the child “would shake, cry. He would very visibly show
fear that he was scared and uncomfortable.” Another incident
involved teaching the alphabet and father told the child “‘You
better get it correct or, so help me God, I will strangle you.’”
Father testified he never hit or choked the child, and “all the
physical abuse and emotional abuse was [Coleman] toward
[him].”
       At the conclusion of testimony, the trial court made the
following findings: “I do find [ ] Coleman credible. I believe that
obviously she has a bias, a motivation to come in here and tell the
court some of the allegations that she’s made. But I do find that
she is credible to the point to where I believe some type of abuse
has happened.” The trial court, therefore, concluded: “[B]ased on
the evidence and the testimony presented and based on the
court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses that
[mother] has proven by [a] preponderance of the evidence that
[father’s] conduct as detailed at the hearing and in the evidence
submitted constitutes abuse as defined in Family Code section
6203 and 6320.”
       The court granted a two-year restraining order to expire at
midnight on January 6, 2024. The order prohibits father from
doing any of the following acts to the child: “Harass, attack,
strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk,
molest, destroy personal property, keep under surveillance,
impersonate . . . , block movements, annoy by phone or other

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electronic means . . . ., or disturb the peace.”2 The trial court also
attached to the restraining order a “Child Custody and Visitation
Order[.]” That order granted mother sole legal and physical
custody of the child, with professionally supervised visitation for
father. Father is not to travel with the child without mother’s
permission or court order. The court further ordered father to
attend 26 weeks of anger management.
      Father timely appeals.

                           DISCUSSION

A.     Guardian Ad Litem
       Father contends the trial court abused its discretion by
permitting mother to pursue the restraining order on the child’s
behalf despite denying her application to be appointed guardian
ad litem for the child. We disagree.
       Section 6301 provides that a domestic violence restraining
order may be granted under the DVPA “to any person
described in Section 6211, including a minor . . . .” Under
section 6211, subdivision (e), “‘[d]omestic violence’ is abuse
perpetrated against: . . . [a] child of a party . . . .” Mother
originally listed the child’s name under the “Name of Person
Asking for Order” on the notice of court hearing form. (Bold Text
Omitted.) The court crossed out the child’s name, however, and
inserted the mother’s name in its place because mother was the
person seeking the order on behalf of her child. Allowing mother
to bring the request for a restraining order on the child’s behalf is
not, as father contends, inconsistent with denying her application
to be appointed as a guardian ad litem. Such an appointment is

2      The restraining order does not include a “no-contact” order
or a “stay-away” order.

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unnecessary because “[a] petition can be brought by a parent as
the natural guardian of a minor child, by a guardian ad litem
appointed by the court, or perhaps in conjunction with the
parent’s own claim, if the petitioning party were himself [or
herself] a protected person under section 6211.” (Riehl v. Hauck
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 695, 701.) The trial court, therefore,
properly permitted mother to pursue her action under the DVPA
as the natural guardian of the child she sought to protect.

B.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
       Finding of Abuse
       Father next contends substantial evidence does not support
the court’s factual finding that “some type of abuse” of the child
occurred. In support of this assertion, father relies on the trial
court’s finding that Coleman “has a bias” and cites evidence in
the record supporting his view that Coleman was not an
impartial witness. We reject father’s argument because it
disregards the standard of review. As the reviewing court, “[w]e
do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses,
or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 212, 228.) Instead, we view the record in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s findings and determine
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. (In
re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.) As discussed below,
the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding of abuse.
       Under the DVPA, “‘abuse’” includes “intentionally or
recklessly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause bodily injury” or
“plac[ing] a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury to that person or to another.” (§ 6203, subds.
(a)(1) & (a)(3).) As noted above, Coleman testified she witnessed

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physical abuse “more than once” including when father “slap[ped]
the top of [the child’s] head.” She also testified she witnessed
father intentionally push the child off his bike. Father also,
according to Coleman, threatened to strangle the child if he did
not correctly recite the alphabet.
       Father argues Coleman’s testimony should not be credited
because she was not an objective witness based on the following
facts: Coleman lived with father for almost three years; an
incident occurred on October 17, 2021 where Coleman hit and
choked father, slammed his head into a wall, and threatened him
with a knife; after the October 2021 incident, father ended the
relationship with Coleman; on November 17, 2021, father
obtained a temporary restraining order protecting him against
Coleman; a one-year restraining order protecting father against
Coleman was granted on December 8, 2021; and Coleman
contacted mother about the alleged abuse of the child, and,
shortly after, Coleman lived with mother for approximately two
weeks. Based on father’s testimony, the trial court acknowledged
Coleman “obviously [ ] has a bias,” but ultimately found she was
“credible to the point where [the court] believe[d] [that] some type
of abuse has happened.” We will not disturb the trial court’s
credibility determination. (In re Dakota H., supra, 132
Cal.App.4th at p. 228.)
       Father also argues substantial evidence does not support
the trial court’s finding of abuse because the Department of
Children and Family Services (the Department) did not get
involved. Father relies on mother’s testimony that she made two
complaints to the Department of alleged abuse but, after an
investigation, the Department found mother’s allegations were
“inconclusive.” We reject father’s argument for two reasons. First,

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the record is devoid of evidence detailing the Department’s
investigation, including whether it interviewed mother’s key
witness, Coleman, about the alleged abuse. Second, different
standards apply in dependency proceedings and restraining order
proceedings. (Compare Welf. & Inst. Code § 300, subd. (a) [the
juvenile court may assume jurisdiction over a child when “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is substantial risk that the child will
suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the
child by the child’s parent or guardian”] with § 6300, subd. (a) [a
court may issue a restraining order under the DVPA “if an
affidavit or testimony or any additional information provided to
the court . . . shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse”].)
       The only issue before the trial court here was whether,
based on the totality of the circumstances (§ 6301, subd. (c)),
mother demonstrated “reasonable proof of a past act or acts of
abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) Although the Department did not
substantiate mother’s allegations, the trial court found Coleman’s
testimony of physical abuse credible. Under section 6300,
subdivision (a), that is sufficient to support the issuance of a
restraining order on the child’s behalf. We therefore conclude the
trial court’s finding of abuse is supported by substantial evidence.

C.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
      Granting the Restraining Order

      Father alternatively contends that even if the trial court’s
factual finding of abuse was supported by substantial evidence,
the court abused its discretion by granting the restraining order
because the court recognized the abuse was a mistake that would
be done differently if father were given the opportunity. As

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discussed below, this argument both mischaracterizes the record
and ignores the plain language of the DVPA.
       First, the trial court opined on the likelihood father would
handle things differently if given the opportunity, but did not, as
father contends, make any definitive statements. Specifically, at
the conclusion of testimony, the trial court addressed father and
stated: “So I do believe . . . that you did commit some type of
abuse towards your child. I think if you probably had a chance to
do it all over again, I’m sure you would probably handle it
differently. But I don’t believe that we should cut off
communication between [father] and [the child], but I do think
that we should probably consider some type of monitored
visitation.” (Italics added.)
       In any event, as noted above, the trial court may issue a
restraining order under the DVPA upon “reasonable proof of a
past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) Thus, a finding of
probability of future abuse is not required under the DVPA. (See
Nevarez v. Tonna (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 774, 783 [“the trial
court was not required to find a probability that [defendant]
would commit future abuse before issuing a restraining order
under section 6300”].)
       We acknowledge the trial court opined that father
“probably got emotional, lost his control, but just because he d[id]
that, doesn’t make him a bad father, he just made a mistake.”
But the trial court also found father did “commit some type of
abuse towards [his] child[,]” a finding which is supported by
substantial evidence as discussed above. Thus, the court properly
exercised its discretion by issuing a personal conduct restraining
order prohibiting father from, among other things, harassing or

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attacking the child, but declining to impose a no-contact order or
stay-away order.

                         DISPOSITION

       The Restraining Order After Hearing (Order of Protection),
filed January 6, 2022, is affirmed. Mother is awarded her costs on
appeal.
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                   CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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