Court Opinion

ID: 9693716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:58:07.055095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:17.689626
License: Public Domain

SIMPSON, Justice,
with whom
STAKELY, Justice, concurs (dissenting).
- This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Alabama, from a jury verdict and judgment thereon awarding appellee $4,000 as damages in a condemnation suit, instituted .by St. Clair County to acquire land for a public highway.
The subject property, was not served by any road and the proposed road is a limited access highway. The principle question to be determined is whether the trial court erred to a reversal in refusing cer*332tain charges requested by the appellant to the effect that no damages could be awarded to the landowner in restricting or limiting right of access to the new highway. Rulings on evidence raise the same point.
The requested charges of the appellant which were refused by the trial court, numbered two through eight, will be considered and are determinative of the appeal. In essence these charges enunciated the principle that where a new limited access highway is constructed on a new right of way, no access rights previously existing in the landowner, no access rights have been taken away. In other words, the condemnor asked that the jury be instructed that an abutter is not entitled to any damages or compensation for restriction or limitation of access to the proposed road since no access previously existed and no access is being taken away. I think these charges should have been given.
The question is new to this jurisdiction but as I read the cases from other jurisdictions they are practically unanimous in supporting the proposition sought to be enunciated by the stated charges.
In State v. Calkins, 50 Wash.2d 716, 314 P.2d 449, 450, an eminent domain proceeding by the state to condemn a right of way across premises of defendant for purpose of constructing a new limited access highway where no highway theretofore existed, was presented.
The court stated:
“ * * * where a new limited-access highway is established by condemnation in an area where no highway previously existed, there is no taking of an easement of access, because such an easement has never in fact existed.
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“Thus, since the property owner has no easement, i. e., no right of access to the highway itself, it follows that an allowance of damages for the loss of such a nonexistent easement or right of access is unrealistic, unjustified in fact, and improper.”
Repeating the same principle the Supreme Court of Idaho in State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60, 64, where the Highway Department brought condemnation proceedings to condemn part of a farm for highway purposes, said:
“Nor is the condemnee entitled to damages because he is not granted unrestricted access to the new part of the road being constructed. There is no inherent right of access to a newly relocated highway. The new highway not being in existence prior to the present construction, the landowner would suffer no compensable damages because his access to the new construction was denied him. The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement or access taken in the proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take.”
The Supreme Court of Oregon in State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk et al., 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783, 793, held similarly and in its opinion quoted with approval from People v. Thomas, 108 Cal.App.2d 832, 239 P.2d 914, where proceedings were instituted for acquisition of a limited access freeway where no highway had previously existed, as follows:
“ ‘The evidence shows no highway existed in the location of Parcel 4 prior to construction of the freeway and it is apparent that appellants never had an existing easement of access to state highway * * * or any other highway and since no property right was acquired, they have no supportable claim for damages.’ ”
And from City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 94 Cal.App.2d 180, 210 P.2d 717, 724:
*333“ ‘There can be no detriment to a right which never existed and no compensation for a loss not sustained. * * *"
The Court then quoted from an article in 3 Stanford Law Review, Freeways, p. 308, which the Supreme Court of Oregon noted “merits consideration by reason of the excellence of its reasoning”:
“ ‘As a final case, consider the situation where the right-of-way purchased runs right through B’s land. In the case of a normal, unrestricted-access highway, B will be paid for land actually taken and also “severance” damages for the separation of the property. If the highway is to be a limited-access design, with B having no right of access, the severance of the two parcels will be more complete. B should be, and is, paid for this more complete severance, but this is on the basis of severance damage alone and not on any theory of right of access being denied.’ ”
In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Clevenger, 365 Mo. 970, 291 S.W.2d 57, involving condemnation proceedings to acquire lands for relocation of a highway as a limited access highway, the Supreme Court approved the reasoning expressed in State, By and Through State Highway Commission v. Burk, supra; that there could be no taking of an easement of access to the new roadway, because no prior right of access existed. Thus, the supposed deprivation of a right of access to the road itself could not constitute a compensable element of damage.
The same principle was enunciated in the City of Santa Monica in the case of Schnider, et ux. v. State, 38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 1, 3, 43 A.L.R.2d 1068, where the trial court refused to allow plaintiff compensation for the loss of an asserted right of direct access. The court in its opinion concluded:
“Where a property owner has no right of direct access to a highway before it is converted into a freeway abutting upon his property, nothing is taken from him by the failure to give him such a right when the conversion takes place. The allowance of compensation in such a case would amount to a gift rather than payment for the destruction of a right.”
See also the case of Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383.
Thus is the rule announced in the foregoing cases: A property owner without prior highway access is not entitled to compensation for deprivation of access in the construction of a new limited access highway on a newly acquired right of way. Therefore, on the soundness of the principle that “there can be no compensation for a loss not sustained” it is clear to me that the learned trial court erred in refusing to give the appellant’s requested written charges which sought to charge out as an element of damages to be considered by the jury the denial of a right of access.
I do not read any of our cases, such as Blount County v. McPherson, 268 Ala. 133, 105 So.2d 117, and Blount County v. Campbell, 268 Ala. 548, 109 So.2d 678, to have enunciated a contrary principle. These cases presented different factual situations from the one at bar.
In the McPherson case the Court pointed out:
“This highway runs along the course of the ‘old’ highway, U. S. No. 31. Previously appellee could go directly from his property to U. S. 31 and he had considerable frontage on it. He has no frontage on the new access controlled route, and he could get to it or the old highway only by means of ‘service’ roads.” [268 Ala. 133, 105 So.2d 118],
The petition for condemnation also sought to condemn this existing right of access to the highway. It was, therefore, very cor*334rectly held that this valuable property right should form an element of damages to the landowner’s property. See 43 A.L.R.2d § 3, p. 1074 for supportive authorities.
In the Campbell case the following are the facts (quoted from the opinion) :
“The new proposed highway for which the appellee’s land was taken replaces [old] U. S. Highway 31 at the point where the land was taken. * * There were two roads passing through the appellee’s land which furnished two routes of indirect access to Highway 31. One of these roads was to be closed due to the taking of access rights along the new road. As to the other road, in order for respondent to go to Hanceville, which is north of respondent’s farm, he would have to travel 3J/2 miles more by the new road than he has to travel by the old Highway 31.” [268 Ala. 548, 109 So.2d 680],
The court held that loss to appellant of such “indirect access” was compensable in the condemnation proceedings. The cases also support this proposition. See 43 A.L.R.2d § 4, p. 1077.
But in the situation instantly presented, where the condemned property did not abut on any highway prior to construction and the landowner had no preexisting right of access, no damages could be claimed because after construction the owner was not provided with access to the new highway. As, of course, you should not be paid for a right you never had. There seems to be no contrariety of opinion on this question in any of the cases so far decided. And the sound reasoning of the above mentioned cases (and there are many others) impresses me as being unassailable. See 43 A.L.R.2d § 6, p. 1079 as supportive of this theory.
The majority opinion, for apparently two main reasons, holds that a landowner should be compensated for loss of access to a highway even though no such access existed before the highway construction. The first reason seems to be based upon the theory that the Alabama Constitution and Statutes are different from those in the states from which the cases cited in my opinion are taken. The majority opinion indicates that, therefore, these cases do not serve as valid authority in Alabama. I disagree. Section 235 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 states that no private property shall be taken, injured or destroyed for a public purpose without just compensation being first paid therefor.
The California case of Schnider v. State, 38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 1, 43 A.L.R.2d 1068, refers to a similar provision, viz.: Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of California, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made * * -Jf»
The Schnider case, supra, in language relevant to the instant case, declares the law in California to be as follows [38 Cal.2d 439, 241 P.2d 3]:
“The Streets and Highways Code furnishes ample authorization for the construction of a freeway on land where no public way existed before without creating rights of direct access in favor of other property which, prior to the new construction, had no such rights of access. Sts. & Hy.Code, §§ 100.1, 100.2, 100.3. The provision of section 100.3 that a declaration creating a freeway ‘shall not affect private property rights of access, and any such rights taken or damaged within the meaning of Article I, section 14, of the State Constitution * * * shall be acquired in a manner provided by law’, plainly refers to rights of access •which exist prior to the establishment of the freeway and not to claimed rights which have had no previous existence and which could come into being, if at all, only by virtue of the new construction.
“Where a property owner has no right of direct access to a highway be*335fore it is converted into a freeway abutting upon his property, nothing is taken from him by the failure to give him such a right when the conversion takes place. The allowance of compensation in such a case would amount to a gift rather than payment for the destruction of a right. Some analogy may be afforded by cases holding that a property owner has no right to compensation on the basis of enhancement of value resulting from the proposed public improvement for which the property is taken or damaged. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 377-380, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 74, 20 P. 372, 3 L.R.A. 83.”
(It is noted here that California allows enhancement to be deducted from damages.) People, By and Through Department of Public Works v. Thompson, 43 Cal.2d 13, 271 P.2d 507.
The Alabama Constitution also clearly refers to the taking or the damaging of a property right which was in existence at the time of the taking. Section 235, supra.
Courts throughout the United States have logically held, that where a new highway is constructed as a limited access facility, no right of access arises in the abutting owner. For other cases not cited supra, see also Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208, 71 N.W.2d 276; Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, Iowa 1959, 99 N.W.2d 404; Medearis v. State, Okl.1959, 341 P.2d 607; Smick v. Commonwealth, Ky. 1954, 268 S.W.2d 424.
The principle of restricted dedications has long been known to the common law. Home Laundry Co. v. City of Louisville, 168 Ky. 499, 182 S.W. 645. The limited access highway would seem to be but a modern application of this doctrine. Any other rule would result in the Highway Department having to condemn a right which was created by their own action. Such a result is not a logical one, nor would it be fair and equitable to the condemning authority.
The majority opinion argues that since enhancement resulting after the taking may be set off against damages, then loss of access resulting after the highway is opened for traffic should be added to damages. This reasoning impresses me as falacious and is not consistent with previous holdings of this Court. Alabama strictly follows the before and after rule in determining the valuation of property in arriving at the compensation to which an owner is entitled in eminent domain proceedings. Morgan County v. Griffith, 257 Ala. 401, 59 So.2d 804; Rountree Farm Co. v. Morgan County, 249 Ala. 472, 31 So.2d 346; Coffee County v. Spurlin, 245 Ala. 99, 16 So.2d 12; Bates v. Chilton County, 244 Ala. 297, 13 So.2d 186; Pickens County v. Jordan, 239 Ala. 589, 196 So. 121; Conecuh County v. Carter, 220 Ala. 668, 126 So. 132; Rudder v. Limestone County, 220 Ala. 485, 125 So. 670, 68 A.L.R. 776.
We have consistently held that the landowner is entitled to the difference, if any, between the value of his property before the taking and the value of his property after the taking. If no access exists immediately before the taking, then, clearly, loss of access could not affect the difference between the before and after values. This is readily distinguished from enhancement since in order to deduct enhancement from damages, the land must, in some respect, be worth more after the taking than it was before. Thus, enhancement does actually affect the difference between the before and after values.
To allow a landowner to be compensated for loss of access when he did not have access before the highway was constructed would be to permit the landowner to recover for enhancement which was created by the highway itself. This Court has consistently followed the vast majority of cases throughout the United States in holding that a landowner must not be compensated for an increased value which is created by the proposed improvement.
*336In our recent case of Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Lance, 1959, 269 Ala. 25, 110 So.2d 627, 633, we hold:
“We further observe that the trial court correctly gave five written charges requested by appellant to the effect that Lance [landowner] was not entitled to any increased value for his land on account of the proposed improvements * *
In Southern Electric Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 269 Ala. 9, 110 So.2d 308, 318, this Court further observed, "An owner is not entitled to show the valuation of the property as enhanced by the contemplated improvement”
In Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist. v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243 Ala. 157, 8 So.2d 835, 838, this Court declared:
“Nor does it require any argument or citation of authority to demonstrate the inadmissibility of testimony tending to show the valuation of the property as enhanced by the contemplated improvement * * (Emphasis added.)
See also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336, 147 A.L.R. 55; State of Texas v. Vaughan, Tex.Civ.App., 319 S.W.2d 349; United States v. First National Bank, D.C.Ala, 250 F. 299; Cole v. Boston Edison Co., 338 Mass. 661, 157 N.E.2d 209.
Clearly, a landowner should not be entitled to an increased award if his property is located at an interchange of a limited access facility and thereby changing the highest and best use of the property from farm land to commercial property. Similarly, a condemnor should not have to pay for access when such access is in fact created by the highway itself.
Of course the severance may be more complete when a highway is a limited access facility. This damage is properly reflected, however, in the before and after valuations of the whole property and the owner should not be compensated for loss of access per se where no such access existed prior to the highway. He should not be paid for a right he never had nor for a loss he never sustained. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, Iowa 1959, 99 N.W.2d 404; 3 Stanford Law Review, p. 308.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
STAKELY, J., concurs.