Court Opinion

ID: 9575144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:02.130722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:04.109435
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
Bond Supply Company, Inc., as plaintiff, sued Ben L. O’Callaghan, as defendant, on contract, in Civil Court of Fulton County. Defendant answered, denied being *189indebted, and filed a counterclaim. A material part of the counterclaim is set forth in paragraph 7 (R. 17) wherein defendant alleges that plaintiff has damaged it by "undermining its financial position and its credit standing. . .” This is an allegation of damage to reputation.
The Civil Court of Fulton County has no jurisdiction of claims involving injuries to person or reputation. Georgia Laws 1956, Vol. II, pages 3271-3277; Funk v. Baldwin, 80 Ga. App. 177 (2) (55 SE2d 733); Cantrell v. Davis, 176 Ga. 745 (169 SE 38); McQueen v. Wilson, 117 Ga. App. 488 (2), 490 (161 SE2d 63).
The counterclaim in paragraphs 13 and 14 (R. 18) alleges damages because of defendant’s wrongful acts in the amount of $200,000, and for punitive damages in the amount of $500,000. It is not stated how much of the above amounts results from damage to defendant’s reputation, but all damages are lumped together, thus leaving it for the jury to determine the amounts due for the various items of damages. Actually, the counterclaim can only be construed as damaging defendant by undermining his reputation. All of the acts alleged lead to the final act of damages to reputation.
Plaintiff contends the Civil Court of Fulton County can not entertain the counterclaim because it has no jurisdiction of claims involving injuries to reputation.
The majority opinion points out that under the Civil Practice Act a tort action may be asserted in a counterclaim against an action on contract. With that I agree.
But the Civil Practice Act does not enlarge the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction, and any set-off ineuch court of limited jurisdiction must be within the limitations on that court’s jurisdiction. There is no dispute on that principle.
But the majority opinion asserts (p. 188): "While some of the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendant conspirators in the counterclaim may have been objectionable as being on the subject matter of injury to reputation of which the Civil Court of Fulton County had no jurisdiction . . . all of the acts alleged can not be so categorized. Accordingly, the counterclaim, being good in *190part was not subject to dismissal on that ground.” (Emphasis supplied.) It would have been very helpful if the majority opinion had pointed out which — if any — of the acts do not involve damage to the reputation. I find none. In other words, the majority opinion is following the principle that a demurrer or motion to strike an entire pleading will not be sustained if a part of the pleading is not subject to such motion to strike. See A. E. Speer, Inc. v. McCorvey, 77 Ga. App. 715, 718 (49 SE2d 677); Peters v. Peters, 84 Ga. App. 14 (2a) (65 SE2d 439); Hines v. Wilson, 164 Ga. 888 (1) (139 SE 802); Barber v. Wells, 213 Ga. 1, 3 (96 SE2d 595).
But this premise adopted by the majority overlooks the well-known principle that although jurisdiction of the person may be waived, jurisdiction of the subject-matter can not be waived; and it is the duty and obligation of a litigant to show that the court in which he litigates has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of his claim. The failure of plaintiff to properly demur or move to strike certain portions of the counterclaim can not help the defendant, because it is defendant’s duty, not the duty of the plaintiffs, to show that the court in which he litigates has jurisdiction of the subject-matter. This is plainly pronounced in Sweatman v. Roberts, 213 Ga. 112, 113 (97 SE2d 320), as follows: " 'Parties by consent express or implied, may not give jurisdiction to the court as to the person or subject-matter of the suit. It may, however, be waived, in so far as the rights of the parties are concerned, but not so as to prejudice third persons.’ 'Consent of parties, however, can not give a court jurisdiction of a subject-matter when it has none by law; and when this court discovers from the record that a judgment has been rendered by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the case is brought here for review upon writ of error, this court will of its own motion reverse the judgment.’ Smith v. Ferrario, 105 Ga. 51, 53 (31 SE 38). 'Where the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, parties can not confer jurisdiction by agreement. Although this question was not argued by counsel for either side before this court, and we presume it was waived for the purpose of obtaining a final adjudication as to the right of the plaintiff in error to sell *191liquors, yet we can not, even upon such consent and waiver, sustain the judgment of the court granting an injunction when no jurisdiction has been conferred upon it by law. The judgment in such a case is void, and no consent or waiver of the parties litigant can make it a legal judgment of a court of law or equity.’ O’Brien v. Harris, 105 Ga. 732, 736 (31 SE 745).” Also see Gray v. Gray, 229 Ga. 460 (2) (192 SE2d 334).
Thus, as held by the foregoing authority, even without any objection by the plaintiff, it would have been the duty of this court to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter. Suppose for instance, this had been a suit for divorce in a justice of the peace court. It would have been the duty of this court to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction of the subject-matter and dismiss it.
Further, in the case sub judice, if there are any allegations in the counterclaim of which the Civil Court of Fulton County had jurisdiction, the prayer is for one lump-sum judgment and there would be no way for the court to separate the good from the bad.
The majority opinion in this case would allow the Civil Court of Fulton County to try the entire case, including the counterclaim and its prayer for damages to reputation, when it is all too plain that no jurisdiction of such a right of action inheres in that court.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judge Stolz concur in this dissent.