Court Opinion

ID: 9711985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:43:39.731017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.976243
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring: I agree with that part of the majority opinion that states that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment precludes us from reading section 5 — 9 of the Juvenile Court Act in such a way as to allow the termination of parental rights upon a showing of unfitness under a preponderance of the evidence standard. I also agree that this cause must be remanded, but the reason for this separate opinion is my disagreement with the conclusion that “section l(D)(f) does not satisfy the requirement of due process because it authorizes the termination of parental rights upon proof of physical abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” (121 Ill. 2d at 133). In short, I believe the majority opinion is correct in holding that an unconstitutional standard of proof was applied in this case, but the conclusion that section l(D)(f) is facially invalid is both unnecessary and incorrect. As I read section 5 — 9 of the Juvenile Court Act, it requires that the State, or other interested party, prove unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can be terminated and consent to adoption given. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 705 — 9.) Specifically, section 5 — 9(2) provides for the termination of parental rights “after [a] finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a non-consenting parent is an unfit person as defined in Section 1 of [the Illinois Adoption Act].” The majority appears to lose sight of the standard of proof explicitly stated in section 5 — 9 when it points out that section l(D)(f) of the Adoption Act provides for only a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Section 1 of the Adoption Act is purely definitional, section l(D)(f) defines an “unfit person” as “any person whom the court shall find to be unfit to have a child *** [because of] two or more findings of physical abuse to any children under Section 4 — 8 of the Juvenile Court Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(f). Properly read, section l(D)(f) of the Adoption Act is merely definitional: it defines the term “unfitness.” It provides that two or more findings of abuse constitute unfitness. Section 5 — 9 of the Juvenile Court Act articulates the applicable standard of proof — proof by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit. Taken together these sections require that a finding of unfitness for the purposes of section 5 — 9 be based on two incidents of abuse proved by clear and convincing evidence. Because the findings of abuse in this case were made only under the preponderance of the evidence standard, a remand is required to determine whether the proof is sufficient to establish abuse by clear and convincing evidence. I see no reason to invalidate section 5 — 9 of the Juvenile Court Act. In fact, I do not know how the legislature could have been more explicit than to expressly include the clear and convincing standard in section 5 — 9(2). The interpretation I propose flows naturally from the statute and is consistent with our previous rulings that favor statutory interpretations that assume the legislature intended to pass a constitutional statute. See, e.g., Braun v. Retirement Board (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 119, 127. JUSTICE MILLER joins in this special concurrence.