Court Opinion

ID: 9900325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:02.148811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.355492
License: Public Domain

No. 557              October 25, 2023                733

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  In the Matter of J. R. S.,
          a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.
                   STATE OF OREGON,
                        Respondent,
                             v.
                          J. R. S.,
                         Appellant.
               Marion County Circuit Court
                   22CC05320; A179630

  Jennifer J. Brown, Judge Pro Tempore.
  Submitted September 13, 2023.
   Joseph R. DeBin and Multnomah Defenders, Inc., filed
the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kistler, Senior Judge.
  TOOKEY, P. J.
  Affirmed.
734   State v. J. R. S.
Cite as 328 Or App 733 (2023)                                           735

          TOOKEY, P. J.
         Appellant appeals a trial court judgment involun-
tarily committing him to the Oregon Health Authority for a
period not to exceed 180 days and an order prohibiting him
from possessing or purchasing firearms. Appellant contends
that the trial court plainly erred in failing to advise him of
the potential for a firearm prohibition order. For the reasons
explained below, we conclude that the asserted error does
not constitute plain error, and we affirm the judgment and
order.
         The parties agree that appellant’s assignment
of error is not preserved. “We may review an unpreserved
assignment of error as one apparent on the record under
ORAP 5.45(1) if certain conditions are met: (1) the error is
one of law; (2) the error is apparent, in that the legal point is
obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the error appears
on the face of the record[.]” State v. Reynolds, 250 Or App 516,
519-20, 280 P3d 1046, rev den, 352 Or 666, 293 P3d 1045
(2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). An error
that is not obvious or that is reasonably in dispute is not a
plain error and is therefore not reviewable by this court.
         Appellant argues that, in failing to advise him of
the possible firearm prohibition, the trial court violated
ORS 426.100(1)(c). ORS 426.100(1)(c) requires that “[a]t the
time [a] person alleged to have a mental illness is brought
before the court, the court shall advise the person of * * * the
possible results of the proceedings[.]”1 As appellant points
out, we have held that “failure to provide a person with all of the
information required by ORS 426.100(1) constitutes an egre-
gious error that justifies plain error review.” State v. M. L. R.,
256 Or App 566, 570-71, 303 P3d 954 (2013) (internal
   1
     In full, ORS 426.100(1) requires that:
       “(1) At the time the person alleged to have a mental illness is brought
   before the court, the court shall advise the person of the following:
       “(a) The reason for being brought before the court;
       “(b) The nature of the proceedings;
       “(c) The possible results of the proceedings;
       “(d) The right to subpoena witnesses; and
       “(e) The person’s rights regarding representation by or appointment of
   counsel.”
736                                                          State v. J. R. S.

citations omitted). Appellant asserts that the firearm prohi-
bition is one of the “possible results” of his civil commitment
proceeding of which he must have received notice.
        ORS 426.100(1)(c) does not specify what constitutes
a “possible result” of a civil commitment proceeding. And
we have not previously addressed the issue presented here:
whether the firearm prohibition in ORS 426.130(1)(a)(D)2
is among the “possible results” of a civil commitment pro-
ceeding of which a person alleged to have a mental illness
must be notified at the outset of the proceeding under ORS
426.100(1)(c).
   2
     ORS 426.130(1) provides, in pertinent part:
        “(1) After hearing all of the evidence, and reviewing the findings of the
   examiners, the court shall determine whether the person has a mental ill-
   ness and is in need of treatment. If, in the opinion of the court, the person:
        “(a) Is a person with mental illness based upon clear and convincing evi-
   dence, the court:
        “(A) Shall order the release of the person and dismiss the case if:
        “(i) The person is willing and able to participate in treatment on a volun-
   tary basis; and
        “(ii) The court finds that the person will probably do so.
        “(B) May order conditional release under this subparagraph subject to
   the qualifications and requirements under ORS 426.125. If the court orders
   conditional release under this subparagraph, the court shall establish a
   period of commitment for the conditional release.
        “(C) May order commitment of the person with mental illness to the
   Oregon Health Authority for treatment if, in the opinion of the court, sub-
   paragraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph is not in the best interest of the person.
   If the court orders commitment under this subparagraph:
        “(i) The court shall establish a period of commitment.
        “(ii) The authority may place the committed person in outpatient com-
   mitment under ORS 426.127.
        “(D) Shall order that the person be prohibited from purchasing or pos-
   sessing a firearm if, in the opinion of the court, there is a reasonable like-
   lihood the person would constitute a danger to self or others or to the com-
   munity at large as a result of the person’s mental or psychological state as
   demonstrated by past behavior or participation in incidents involving unlaw-
   ful violence or threats of unlawful violence, or by reason of a single incident
   of extreme, violent, unlawful conduct. * * *
        “(b) Is not a person with mental illness, the court shall release the per-
   son from custody if the person has been detained * * * and:
        “(A) Dismiss the case; or
        “(B) Order the person to participate in assisted outpatient treatment in
   accordance with ORS 426.133. The court may continue the proceeding for no
   more than seven days to allow time for the community mental health pro-
   gram director to develop the person’s assisted outpatient treatment plan.”
Cite as 328 Or App 733 (2023)                                             737

         In State v. J. R. B., we identified “five possible results
of a civil commitment hearing”: (1) release, dismissal, and
voluntary treatment; (2) conditional release; (3) commitment
to the Oregon Health Authority; (4) dismissal; or (5) assisted
outpatient treatment. 290 Or App 858, 859-60, 418 P3d 38
(2018) (citing ORS 426.130(1)). In that case, we determined
that the trial court plainly erred when it advised the appel-
lant, a person alleged to have a mental illness, of only three
of those possible results and failed to advise the appellant of
the other two. Id. at 862.
         It seems to us that a firearm prohibition is a col-
lateral result of mental commitment, as opposed to a direct
result, and is thus different in kind from the five “possible
results” that we identified in J. R. B. as results of which a
court must notify a person alleged to have a mental illness
under ORS 426.100(1)(c). That is, the five “possible results”
that we identified in J. R. B. relate to the court’s determi-
nation of whether a person has a mental illness, whether
treatment is necessary, and how the court determines it is
best to effectuate that treatment. On the other hand, a fire-
arm prohibition is an indirect result of such determinations
by the trial court; it is secondary to the first determinations
that the trial court makes. Cf. State v. King, 361 Or 646,
650-51, 398 P3d 336 (2017) (characterizing “the inability to
own or possess firearms” as a “collateral consequence” of a
felony conviction, which defendant acknowledged by sign-
ing a plea petition pleading guilty to second-degree assault
and no contest to first degree robbery); Wayne R. LaFave, 5
Criminal Procedure § 21.4(d), n 143 (4th ed 2021) (explain-
ing a “responsibility of the judge is to advise the defendant
of certain consequences which could follow if the plea is
accepted” and that “the conventional wisdom is that this
obligation extends to those consequences which are ‘direct’
but not to those which are only ‘collateral’ in nature,” such
as a prohibition on owning firearms). We conclude, therefore,
that it is not obvious and is reasonably in dispute whether
the trial court violated ORS 426.100(1)(c) in failing to advise
appellant of a possible firearm prohibition order.3
    3
      We further reject appellant’s contention that the trial court’s failure to
advise him of the possible firearm prohibition plainly violated due process and
the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.
738                                        State v. J. R. S.

         Because the asserted error was not obvious and
is reasonably in dispute, we conclude that it was not plain
error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of commitment
and the order prohibiting appellant from purchasing or pos-
sessing firearms.
        Affirmed.