Court Opinion

ID: 9482264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:44:58.154596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:52.142486
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur with every other part of the majority’s opinion, I cannot agree that Chambers’ general consent to search the home he was occupying extended to the use of a sledgehammer to break a securely-boarded attic entranceway.
The district court “firmly and without hesitation [found] that [Chambers’ consent] could not reasonably have been interpreted by these agents to have included a structural dismantling of the secured closet eeil-*908ing-attic floor by use of a sledge hammering technique.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Defense Motions to Suppress Evidence, in Record Excerpt, United States v. Juan Ibarra, John Joe Guerrero, and Robert Franklin Chambers, No. 91-2922 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 9, 1991).
It is well-established that we review findings of fact on such a motion to suppress under the clearly erroneous standard: “ ‘the trial court's purely factual findings must be accepted unless clearly erroneous, or influenced by an incorrect view of the law_’” United States v. Lamas, 930 F.2d 1099, 1102 (5th Cir.1991), quoting United States v. Ervin, 907 F.2d 1534, 1537 (5th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Colin, 928 F.2d 676, 677-78 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Lanford, 838 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir.1988). We review questions of law — i.e., what constitutes “reasonableness” in the case before us — de novo. See Lamas, 930 F.2d at 1102; United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1957, 109 L.Ed.2d 319 (1990).
The district court’s finding that the entrance to the attic was securely boarded is not clearly erroneous; it is a finding supported by the Record on Appeal.1 The same is true regarding the district court’s finding that, “[assuming, without deciding, that conventional access to an attic may have been included within such a general consent, ... it could not reasonably have been interpreted by these agents to have included a structural dismantling of the secured closet ceiling-attic floor by use of a sledge[-]hammering technique.” Record at tab 4, p. 8 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Defense Motions to Suppress Evidence).2
When general consent to search a dwelling is given, coupled with subsequent silence, how far is it reasonable to assume such consent extends? — this is the core question of law.3 Conscious of the district court’s factual findings and this court’s standard of review, I cannot join the majority in holding that it is objectively reasonable4 for law enforcement officers to as*909sume that a general consent to search extends to picking up a sledgehammer and breaking an entrance securely boarded— especially when specific consent5 or a search warrant may have been easily procured.6
Today a general consent to search invites officers to sledge-hammer through a securely-boarded attic entrance. Tomorrow? 7 Although I join the majority’s implicit revulsion in suppressing evidence probative of Chambers’ guilt,8 it is not for this court to allow that sledgehammer to break through the limits of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, I CONCUR in part and respectfully DISSENT in part.

. See, e.g., Record on Appeal at 16, United States of America v. Juan Ibarra, John Joe Guerrero, and Robert Franklin Chambers, No. 91-2922 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 9, 1991) ["Record"] (direct examination of special agent Nigel Brooks) (emphasis added):
Do you recall either from your observations or what he may have told you concerning his discovery of that access to the attic?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Would you tell the Court about that?
A. He found an access to the attic in a closet in the bedroom, and it appeared to have been boarded up fairly securely.

. In light of the fact that the boards were securely fastened, this lack-of-consent finding is supported by the fact that no effort was made to obtain Chambers’ specific consent before, even though Chambers was sitting on a couch in the living room while the agents were breaking through boards in the bedroom closet:
—Record at 33 (cross-examination of agent Nigel Brooks):
Q. When you found the — by the way, no one ever specifically asked Mr. Chambers, if it was okay, if they took a sledgehammer to the attic and knocked the boards out and went up in the attic, did they?
A. No.
—Record at 71-72 (cross-examination of officer Tony Trumps):
Q. And I gather if nobody to your knowledge ever specifically mentioned or requested of Mr. Chambers if it was okay to go in the attic, obviously, nobody asked Mr. Chambers if it was okay to take a sledgehammer and physically knock boards away from the ceiling and clear the way to gain access to the attic, correct?
A. I don't believe that was a specific request, no.
In fact, as perceived by the district court, Chambers’ general consent was cushioned (if not limited) by hesitation. See Record at 76-77 (recross of Trumps) (emphasis added):
THE COURT: When you talked to Defendant Chambers, and he indicated that he didn’t own the house and he didn’t want to sign this paper, but you obtained an oral consent from him, I take it that you relied on that oral consent and, in fact, acted on it?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

. It should be noted that ”[t]he government has the burden of proving voluntary consent by clear and convincing evidence.” Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d at 1433; United States v. Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir.1988).

. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment standard for measuring the scope *909of consent is " ‘objective’ reasonableness — what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” See Florida v. Jimeno, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (citations omitted).

. See supra note 2.

. Record at 25 (cross-examination of Agent Nigel Brooks):
Q: But my question is: did you feel like you had probable cause to believe that?
A: I think that at that particular point, yes. I probably did have probable cause, but that would have been for a magistrate to decide. Q: But yet you made no effort whatsoever to take your findings to a magistrate and get a search warrant of any kind, did you?
A: That’s correct.

. See, e.g., Record at 77 (recross-examination of officer Tony Trumps):
THE COURT: All right. Given the fact that he had told you that he didn’t own the house, although he was staying there, and that he didn’t want to sign the form, did you realistically, as an officer with your experience and expertise, perceive any real life limitations on the scope of that search?
THE WITNESS: No, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this: On the basis of that oral [consent to] search, but his unwillingness to sign the consent, did you feel that if you wanted to, you had the right to bring fire axes in, for instance, and chop open the walls?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you feel that you had the right to disembowel the appliances and look into the minutia of the air conditioners or the stove, the refrigerator, that sort of thing?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In fact, bringing a backhoe or that sort of thing and dig up the backyard or underneath the foundation of the house.
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you felt that you had all of those rights on this consent that he gave you orally, even though he refused to sign the form?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

.The evidence in question consists of ledgers, a money-counting machine, and nearly $1,000,000 in cash.