Court Opinion

ID: 9773806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:59:55.149922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:58.214981
License: Public Domain

*369OPINION ON REHEARING
Each party filed a motion for rehearing. We will deny both motions, but will discuss some of our reasons.
John’s motion for rehearing states, in pertinent part: “The Court of Appeals erred ... in sustaining Defendant’s Point of Error No. 4 by reforming the trial court’s judgment based upon the doctrine of parental immunity.” He argues that parental immunity does not apply to gross negligence and, for the first time, that Michael, who is a stepparent, waived the doctrine by failing to obtain a jury finding that he was standing in loco parentis to John. Michael complains about our failure to address whether the evidence supports the finding of gross negligence.
In Loco Pabentis
Parental immunity is an affirmative defense that ordinarily must be pled to avoid waiver. Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 937 (Tex.1992). Michael pled parental immunity and objected to the negligence and gross negligence issues in the charge on the basis that the doctrine barred those claims as a matter of law.
In Shoemake, a biological mother recovered damages from the owners and manager of an apartment complex in a survivor’s action. Id. at 935. Her child, who nearly drowned in the apartment swimming pool, later died. Id. The defendants sought contribution from the mother individually alleging negligent “management, supervision and control” of the child. Id. at 936. Based on jury findings, the trial court reduced her recovery. The Supreme Court found that parental immunity barred contribution even though the mother had not specifically pled the doctrine. Id. at 937. The defendants alleged only ordinary negligence against the mother and asserted that the issues on appeal were “ones solely of law” as justification for not presenting a statement of facts. Id. at 936-37. The Court held: “Because the defense of parental immunity was apparent on the face of the pleadings, and its application was purely a matter of law, there was no need for a separate jury finding on immunity.” Id. at 937-38.
Obviously, natural parents and adoptive parents enjoy immunity because of then-legal relationship with their children. A stepparent, however, does not benefit from a legal relationship and may or may not act as a “parent” with respect to a given child.1 One who through kindness or charity or other motive has received into his family and treats a child as a member thereof stands in loco parentis2 (in the place of a parent) so long as the child remains in his family. Trotter v. Pollan, 311 S.W.2d 723, 729 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 158 Tex. 494, 313 S.W.2d 603 (1958). The inquiry should be made about the stepparent’s overall relationship to the child in question, rather than the specific conduct about which the child complains.
Michael is a stepparent, not John’s biological or adoptive parent. John urges us to hold that Michael waived the parental-immunity defense by failing to obtain a jury finding that he was acting in loco parentis. This assertion was not before us on original submission. We struggled with the question of when a stepparent might be protected by parental immunity, because we understand that not every stepparent stands in loco par-entis with every stepchild.
*370Although a jury finding about whether a stepparent stands in loco parentis may be required in some cases, none was required here. John’s biological father died two months before his birth. His mother, Diane, married Michael when John was eighteen months old; they divorced when he was seventeen years old. Diane testified that Michael was the only father figure John had ever known.
We reaffirm our original holding that the doctrine of parental immunity protects “a stepparent in Michael’s position.” McGee v. McGee, 936 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tex.App.-Waco 1996) (emphasis added).
GROSS Negligence
John argues that parental immunity covers only ordinary negligence and that the jury found Michael grossly negligent. Parental immunity does not protect a parent who commits wilful, malicious, or intentional wrongs against a child. Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930-31 (Tex.1971). The doctrine is restricted to “ordinary negligence and unintentional wrongs.” Id. at 931.3 The “real objective” of parental immunity is to “avoid undue judicial interference with parental discretion.” Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936.
The court charged the jury with the then-statutory definition of gross negligence:
“Gross negligence” means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission in question was the result of actual conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it.
Act of June 16, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2, § 2.12, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 44 (formerly Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 41.001(5)).4 Under the charge, the jury found gross negligence as an unintentional wrong.
Our Supreme Court has recognized only three exceptions to the doctrine of parental immunity: (1) intentional or malicious acts; (2) acts committed by parents in an employee-employer relationship with their child; and (3) the negligent operation of an automobile. Hoffmeyer v. Hoffmeyer, 869 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied). Although gross negligence could form the basis for another exception, we are not so inclined. Creating such an exception would not further the “real objective” of parental immunity, ie., avoiding undue judicial interference with parental discretion. Shoemake, 826 S.W.2d at 936. Thus, we hold that parental immunity bars recovery for gross negligence.5
Although not necessary to our disposition of the appeal, we would, were we called upon to address Michael’s points, find that some probative evidence supports the finding of gross negligence. We believe that the evidence that Michael provided alcohol and objectionable materials to John raised an issue about whether Michael acted with such an entire want of care as to establish that the act or omission in question was the result of actual conscious indifference to John’s rights, welfare, or safety.
*371The points asserting that the evidence does not support the award of actual damages were addressed in our original opinion.
The motions for rehearing are denied.

. We recognize that the Family Code contains a definition of “parent.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.024 (Vernon 1996). However, we do not believe that this definition controls the application of the doctrine of parental immunity. Sometimes the word "parent” in a statute includes one who merely occupies the position of a parent. Hendricks v. Curry, 401 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex.1966).

. The generally-accepted common law meaning of “in loco parentis” refers to a person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formalities necessary to legal adoption and embodies the two ideas of assuming the parental status and discharging the parental duties. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Smith, 64 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn.1954) (parental immunity extends to stepparent standing in loco parentis); Bricault v. Deveau, 21 Conn.Supp. 486, 157 A.2d 604, 605 (1960); see generally W.W. Allen, Annotation, Liability of Parent or Person in loco parentis for Personal Tort Against Minor Child, 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951, Later Case Service 1996).

. Parental immunity remains a defense to “alleged acts of ordinary negligence which involve a reasonable exercise of ordinary parental authority or the exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to provisions for the care and necessities of the child.” Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex.1971); Parental choices are not reviewable “in the absence of culpability beyond ordinary negligence.” Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex.1992).

. Gross negligence was eliminated as a basis for exemplary damages effective September 1, 1995. Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 41.001, 41.003 (Vernon Supp. 1997). Exemplary damages must now be based upon "clear and convincing evidence” of fraud, malice, or, in wrongful death cases, gross neglect. Id. § 41.003. However, the current definition of "malice” closely resembles the objective and subjective prongs of gross negligence. Id. § 41.001(7); Universal Serv. Co. Inc. v. Ung, 904 S.W.2d 638, 641 & n.2 (Tex.1995).

. The doctrine of parental immunity has been the subject of several annotations. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent's Negligence—Modern Cases, 6 A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981); Allan E. Korpela, Liability of Parent for Injury to Unemancipated Child Caused by Parent’s Negligence, 41 A.L.R.3d 904 (1972); W.W. Allen, Annotation, Liability of Parent or Person in loco parentis for Personal Tort Against Minor Child, 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).