Court Opinion

ID: 9756911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:08:13.759456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:32.959141
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the government failed to establish that the stolen property received by appellant had a value in excess of $250. The only evidence describing the stolen vehicle was that it was a driveable, dirty Ford Taurus, which did not look new to appellant, and that the vehicle had been rented from Hertz.1 As the government concedes in its brief, “none of the witnesses actually described the Taurus to the jury as a brand new, 1989 model.” The year of the vehicle was not in evidence. Given this evidentiary record, I am constrained to dissent.
Under present case law, we adhere to the strict requirement that the government “produce evidence sufficient to eliminate the possibility of the jury’s verdict being based on surmise or conjecture.” Boone v. United States, 296 A.2d 449, 450 (D.C.1972). Physical presence of the items stolen and the owner’s statement of original cost are insufficient to prove value. Id.; United States v. Thweatt, 140 U.S.App. D.C. 120, 126-27, 433 F.2d 1226, 1232-33 (1970). Here, the jury was left to speculate impermissibly about the car’s value. “While it might be reasonable to presume that the ... value of the [car] was in excess of [$250], the standard of proof in this jurisdiction does not permit such conjecture.” Malloy v. United States, 483 A.2d 678, 681 (D.C.1984).
Nor can we rely upon our own personal knowledge of the kind of cars Hertz rents, the year of the car or its value. Facts which we know as individual observers outside of the courtroom cannot be substituted *53for evidence. See United States v. Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir.1987). Although the majority’s disposition of the case has practical appeal, it is not supported by current case law, in my opinion. Since the government failed to prove the essential element of value required for receiving stolen property under the felony statute,2 appellant’s conviction for that offense should be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing under the misdemeanor section of the receiving stolen property statute, D.C.Code § 22-3832(c)(2). See Malloy, supra, 483 A.2d at 681. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. Photographs of the vehicle were introduced into evidence, but the one transmitted adds nothing to the description given in testimony.

. D.C.Code § 22-3832(c)(l)(1989).