Court Opinion

ID: 9515222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:54:40.369013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:26.251237
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(concurring and concurring in result).
[¶ 45.] I concur on Issues l,6 2, and 3.1 concur in result on Issue 4.
Issue 4 — Insanity Defense Instructions
[¶ 46.] I must concur in result on Issue 4 because I disagree with two points in the Court’s analysis. In ¶ 41, the Court justifies the failure to give Martin’s proposed definitional instruction on a “morally right” theory of insanity. This Court justifies the refusal because there was evidence from the State’s expert, Dr. Franks, “contrasting Martin’s claim that he believed killing Ludeman would be morally right.” Id. Relying upon this opposing evidence, the Court concludes that it was “plausible that the jury rejected [Martin’s] claim that under any definition, Martin knew his actions that evening were ‘wrongful.’ ” Further relying on the State’s evidence from Dr. Franks, this Court ultimately concludes that “the jury could properly determine defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the killing.” Id.
[¶ 47.] Although the Court is correct that in this case the State’s expert did offer evidence contrasting Martin’s legal theory of mental illness, courts may not decline to give defense instructions simply because the State has introduced “testimony directly contrasting [the defendant’s] claim[.]” See id. On the contrary, the well established rule for giving jury instructions does not look to the evidence opposing the evidence offered by the proponent of the instruction. Rather, the trial court should determine whether the proponent of the instruction has offered competent evidence to support the instruction. Our rule is clear that: “Criminal defendants are entitled to instructions on their theory of the case when evidence exists to support that theory.” State v. Bruder, 2004 SD 12, ¶8, 676 N.W.2d 112, 115 (citing State v. Charles, 2001 SD 67, ¶ 19, 628 N.W.2d 734, 738 (citing State v. Charger, 2000 SD 70, ¶40, 611 N.W.2d 221, 229)). “Denial of a defendant’s request for an instruction [ ] where such a request is properly submitted and supported by the evidence is reversible error because it infringes on a defendant’s constitutional right to due process.” Id. (citations omitted).
[¶ 48.] Therefore, I cannot join the Court’s extensive reliance upon the State’s expert’s testimony, see supra ¶41, as the basis to deny giving a defendant’s proposed instruction. Instead, the correct inquiry should be to determine whether Martin’s expert, Dr. Manlove, provided competent evidence to support Martin’s *414“morally approved by society” theory of insanity.7 If Dr. Manlove did, and if that theory was a correct statement of the law,8 the instruction should have been given.
[¶ 49.] However, I concur in result because contrary to the Court’s assertion, Martin did not present “expert opinion of insanity based upon Defendant’s alleged belief that the killing was not morally wrongful.” See supra ¶ 42. Instead, a review of Dr. Manlove’s testimony confirms that his opinion was only based upon the traditional “right versus wrong” theory of insanity. Indeed, when first asked to tell the jury his understanding of the insanity law that he would apply in this case, Dr. Manlove stated, “one needs to be unable to know the wrongfulness of their act”; or, if under a delusion, “something that was right ... but ... would otherwise be considered wrong.” (Emphasis added.) So also, when asked to express his ultimate opinion on insanity, Dr. Manlove incorporated no societal morality component. Instead, he specifically applied the traditional theory indicating that Martin “did not understand the wrongfulness of his acts because in the context of his delusional thinking, these acts were right acts.” (Emphasis added.) He further testified that Martin believed “what he was doing was right rather than wrong even though he recognized that it was against the law.” (Emphasis added.) Stated another way, Dr. Manlove indicated that Martin “understood the criminality of his act but didn’t understand that it was wrong.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Manlove opined that Martin “lacked the capacity to know the wrongfulness of what he did.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Martin’s psychiatric evidence was entirely phrased in terms of the traditional insanity theory incorporating the “wrongfulness” test. In fact, Martin never even asked Dr. Manlove if “wrongfulness” included some component of moral acceptance of his acts by others in society.
[¶ 50.] If anything, Martin’s own trial evidence actually refutes his theory of “moral acceptance by others in society.” Although Martin’s theory involved moral acceptance by others, Dr. Manlove first noted that Martin had not even discussed his theory of raising people from the dead with anyone. Thus, Martin introduced no evidence upon which a jury could have found that he had a basis to believe “others” in society would morally accept his act.
[¶ 51.] More importantly, Dr. Manlove specifically refuted the notion that Martin actually believed, his acts might be approved of by society. Instead, Dr. Man-love testified that “[Martin] recognized that people would think that this was an unusual theory and, you know — and that people wouldn’t accept it, accept his theory [.] ” (Emphasis added.) Dr. Manlove further conceded that Martin “recognized that if he were going to proceed with his— the idea that he could raise somebody from the dead and shoot — kill them and bring them back from the dead this would be shocking to people and he didn’t want to bring that to their attention.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, Dr. Manlove testified unequivocally that Martin himself knew that “others would think that what he was doing was wrong, but he hoped that if he could get away with it, his act would be helpful to the victim.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Martin’s own psychiatric evidence clearly negated the theory that Martin *415acted believing that the shooting would be morally accepted by others in society.
[¶ 52.] Because Martin failed to introduce competent evidence to support his “morality” instruction, I would affirm the conviction on that basis, and I concur in result.
[53.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this special writing.

. On the Batson issue, the Court observes that although not dispositive, "it is interesting to note that the empanelled jury consisted of six females and six males.” See supra ¶ 17. I write only to add that during the trial court hearing on the challenge, Martin also conceded that although the State struck 13 consecutive women, there were obvious, legitimate reasons for striking many of them. Martin's counsel told the trial court: "Now, of these previous 13, clearly a number of them [ ] are obvious strikes. For example, two women [ ] are wives of defense attorneys in town; another woman [ ] is a patient of Dr. Manlove, and there are obvious reasons for striking some of these people[.]” These facts also support the trial court's decision.

. See supra ¶ 35 for Martin's proposed instructions.

. We need not reach this legal issue because Martin’s instructions were not supported by competent evidence. See infra ¶¶ 49, 50, and 51.