Court Opinion

ID: 9524323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:51:48.099054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:32.917928
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: I agree with the majority that the failure of the respondent to fulfill his duties as an attorney to his clients can be enough to warrant discipline. However, I believe the conduct of the respondent was not so egregious that it warranted the penalty of a one-year suspension. The majority opinion cites to In re Chapman (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 494, 501, in support of the proposition that in a case where an attorney has neglected the responsibilities as a representative of his client “ ‘[suspension is a proper punishment “where a corrupt motive and moral turpitude are not clearly shown.” (In re Ahern (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 69, 74 ***.)’ ” Chapman involved an attorney who, like the respondent in the instant case, had not been previously charged with unprofessional conduct. In Chapman this court concluded that a three-month suspension was appropriate when the attorney had failed to prosecute three appeals. There was no clear showing in Chapman that two of the respondent’s clients had suffered any substantial harm. However, because of the attorney’s failure to act, one client was denied an appeal. It was recommended by the Hearing Board that the respondent in Chapman be suspended for a period of three years. While the Review Board had agreed, this court, in considering the circumstances of the case, concluded that a three-month suspension was an appropriate sanction. It is important that this court be uniform in sanctioning attorneys for similar misconduct. The respondent’s clients here did not suffer any substantial harm. I, therefore, do not believe this respondent should be penalized more severely than the respondent in Chapman. In In re Kink (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 293, an attorney negligently handled three estates which caused a delay in the receipt of estate funds. We concluded there that the respondent should be censured. I do not see a significant difference in the respondent’s conduct in the instant case. I feel a suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months would be more consistent with our prior orders in similar cases and, given the facts and circumstances here, I believe a three-month suspension would be a sufficient punishment. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.