Court Opinion

ID: 9596617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:44.888322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:27.584689
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BUSSEY, Judge:
Appellant, Steven Dupree, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was charged, tried, and convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Case No. CRF-69-2743, for the offense of Illegal Sale of Marijuana; his punishment was fixed at two (2) years imprisonment, and from said judgment and sentence, a timely appeal has been perfected to this Court.
At the trial, Jack Henry Kane testified that on September 12, 1969, he was employed by the Oklahoma City Police Department as an undercover agent. At approximately 5:15 p. m., he and a confidential informant went to the home of the defendant in Oklahoma City. The defendant answered the front door and Kane asked him if he had any marijuana for sale. The defendant stated that he did and invited them in. The defendant called to his roommate co-defendant James Andró, who was in the back of the house, asking him “if they had any weed left.” (Tr. 7) The defendant then stated to Kane that he was a “narc, which means a narcotics agent.” Kane advised the defendant that he was not an agent, whereupon the defendant walked toward the back of the house where Andró handed him a clear plastic bag. The defendant brought the bag to the living room and handed it to Kane. Kane examined the contents thereof and asked defendant the price. The defendant stated he wanted Ten Dollars. Prior to leaving, Kane asked the defendant if he could get him a kilo of marijuana. The defendant stated that he thought he could but that it would take him a couple or three weeks. Kane subsequently turned the baggie over to Detective Burns. On cross-examination, he testified that on one previous occasion, he attempted to buy marijuana from the defendant. The defendant advised him that “someone had walked off with his stash.” (Tr. 13) He further testified that he had seen the defendant over a period of several months prior to the day of the sale.
Detective Burns testified that on the afternoon in question he was conducting a surveillance of Officer Kane. He was working in an undercover capacity for the Narcotics Squad. He observed Kane and the confidential informant ring the doorbell at 1317 North Klein. He observed the defendant come to the front door of the residence and the officer and the informant entered the residence. Approximately 10 to 12 minutes later, they came out of the residence and drove to a prearranged location, whereupon Kane gave him a clear plastic baggie, containing a green leafy substance. Burns subsequently transported the baggie to the state chemist for chemical analysis. The party stipulated that the plastic baggie, which Officer Kane testified he obtained from the defendant, was in fact marijuana.
For the defense, several witnesses were called, who testified as to defendant’s good character and reputation. His mother and father testified that the defendant lived in the State of California until returning to Oklahoma around August the 1st.
The defendant testified that he was twenty-two (22) years old, and that on the day in question was employed by the Gold Cross Ambulance Company. He thought he was introduced to John Kane by the informant Don Stokes, whom he had known in high-school. He testified that he had *976been approached either by the informant alone or by the informant and Officer Kane on three prior occasions, trying to buy marijuana from him. On September 5, Don Stokes came up to him in a grocery store and asked him if he wanted to buy a tablet of LSD. He replied that he did not want to buy it, because he did not have any money. Stokes replied, “Well, I’ll just go ahead and give it to you, and you can pay me later.” (TR. 50) On September 12th, he heard the doorbell ring and his roommate, Jim Andró answered the door. He walked to the front of the house and observed John Kane and Stokes in the living room. Stokes stated that he was there to collect the Five Dollars ($5.00) for the LSD tablet. He testified that he paid Stokes Five Dollars, although he had flushed the tablet down the toilet. Stokes then asked him if he had any marijuana he wanted to sell. He informed Stokes that he did not, but that he would see if his roommate Andró had any. He went to the back bedroom and told Andró that “Don wants to buy some marijuana.” Andró replied that he had some and handed him a little bag of marijuana. He returned to the living room, and started to hand the marijuana to Stokes and said, “I heard you all were narcotics officers.” (Tr. 55) Stokes and Kane both stated that they did not have anything to do with law enforcement. Stokes then handed him a Ten Dollar bill for the marijuana. He testified that he had never participated in that type transaction before. He further testified that he had smoked marijuana on one occasion and that it made him sick. He denied telling Officer Kane that he could get him a kilo of marijuana.
The first proposition asserts that the court committed reversible error in giving Instruction Number Seven (7) to the jury and in refusing defendant’s requested Instruction Number One.
The defendant’s requested Instruction Number One reads as follows:
“The defendant has interposed as one of his defenses, the defense of Entrapment. And in this connection, you are instructed that if you believe from the evidence that the officers, or those acting under them, first suggested the commission of the criminal act, or did first lure the accused into the commission of such acts, then and in that event, it will be your duty to hold for the defendant and acquit him.
“However, if you believe from the evidence that the first suggestion for the commission of the crime came from the defendant and that all of the essential acts constituting the crime were done by him, then the fact that the officers, or those acting under them, furnished an opportunity and lent aid in the commission of the offense less than the performing of some essential act constituting the offense, then, and in that event, the defense of entrapment would not apply.”
The Court’s Instruction Number Seven (7) reads as follows:
“The defendant, as one of his defenses herein, has pled entrapment. In this connection you are instructed that one who is instigated, induced, or lured by an officer of the law or other person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing may avail himself of the defense of ‘entrapment.’ Therefore, if you find the defendant was induced or lured by an officer of the law or other person, for the purpose of prosecution, into the commission of a crime which he had otherwise no intention of committing, then in that event, it will be your duty to hold for the defendant and acquit him. Such defense is not available, however, where the officer or other person acted in good faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting a crime and merely furnished the opportunity for the commission thereof by one who had the requisite criminal intent. In other words, an officer may make himself available to one *977who intends to commit a crime. phasis Added.) (Em-
“Accordingly, entrapment is not available as a defense to a person who has the intent and design to commit a criminal offense and who in fact does commit the essential acts constituting it, merely because an officer of the law, in his effort to secure evidence against such person, affords him an opportunity to commit the criminal act, or purposely places facilities in his way or aids and encourages him in the perpetration thereof, particularly or at least where the doing of the particular act is a crime regardless of the consent of anyone. However, the officers cannot employ extraordinary temptations or inducement to commit the crime.
“The principle of entrapment places no limitation on the right of officers to obtain evidence of any crime originating in ■ the mind of another; and an officer may, when acting in good faith with a view to detecting crime, make use of deception, trickery, or artifice. It is perfectly legal and proper for an officer to work undercover in detecting crime. He is not required to advise the defendant at the time of the commission of the alleged offense that he is an undercover agent, nor is he required to tell defendant that if defendant does sell him marijuana, the facts leading up to the sale and the sale itself will be used against him in a court of law; nor is he required to make an immediate arrest, particularly if such an arrest would end a continuing undercover investigation, but a charge may be filed and an arrest made at the end of the undercover inves- _ tigation.” (Emphasis added.)
The defendant argues that the Court’s Instruction overstates the negative aspects of entrapment and further that it does not correctly and thoroughly state the law. We are of the opinion that this proposition is without merit. We are of the opinion that the trial court’s instruction contains a clear and correct statement of the laws of entrapment. In Owens v. State, Okl.Cr., 438 P.2d 21, we stated in the Fourth Syllabus:
“It is not error to refuse requested instructions which are proper statements of law when such requested instructions are substantially covered by the instructions given by the court.”
The second proposition contends that the evidence presented by the State is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty against the defendant. The defendant cites as authority Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 481 P.2d 169, wherein we stated:
“Although by statute in Oklahoma, one who ‘aids and abets’ is a principal in a crime, a conviction cannot be obtained if there is ‘no proof of a conspiracy or prearranged plan’ between the alleged abettor and the one who actually commits the crime.”
We are of the opinion that the facts in the instant case are thoroughly distinguishable from Jones, supra. In Jones, the defendant was not present when the money was exchanged and when the marijuana was transferred, nor was there any evidence that the defendant received any benefit from the sale. In the instant case, Officer Kane testified that when the defendant answered the front door he asked him if he had any marijuana to sell. The defendant advised him that he did and the officer entered the house. The defendant then called back to his roommate Andró, inquiring “if they had any weed left.” (Tr. 7) After the sale was consummated, the officer asked the defendant if he could get him a kilo of marijuana later on and the defendant advised him that he “thought he could.” In the recent case of Dean v. State, Okl.Cr., 43 O.B.A.J. 2905, A-16,793, we stated:
“With reference to defendant’s contention that there was no proof of a conspiracy or prearranged plan between George Edge and defendant to convict the defendant for the sale of LSD, we believe the circumstances testified to were sufficient to show an equal interest, as well as affirmative participation *978by defendant in the sale. It is well settled law that responsibility as an aider or abettor can be shown by circumstantial evidence. See: Love v. State, Okl.Cr., 449 P.2d 729 (1969) and Austin v. State, Okl.Cr., 418 P.2d 103 (1966).”
The defendant further argues under this proposition that the State failed to present satisfactory proof that a crime was in fact committed. The defendant states in his brief that “the only proof that the substance in question was marijuana was the stipulated statement of the court that the State Chemist, whose name wasn’t even furnished, ‘indicates that contents (of the baggie) was, in fact marijuana.’ ” The defendant further states that “no proof was presented as to the qualifications of the State Chemist. No proof was presented as to whether he conducted any scientific tests to determine the identification of the substance. No explanation was presented as to just what is meant by the word ‘indicates.’ ” We need only to observe that the court did not read the entire stipulation to the jury. The record reflects that prior to empaneling the jury the parties agreed to the following stipulation:
“That if Bryan L. Tipton were called as a witness for the State his testimony would he that he is the chief chemist for the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, that on 15th day of September, 1969, Police Officer G. A. Burns delivered to him one clear plastic bag containing a green leafy substance, seed, and stem; that he tested the contents of this bag, using the microscopic and du-quenois chemical test, and both such tests indicated that the material itself was marijuana. (Emphasis Added)
“BY MR. BAY: Let’s don’t use the word indicated; lets use—
“BY MR. MILLER: Which proved that it was marijuana. It. is further stipulated and agreed that if Bryan Tipton were present in Court he would produce the same marijuana and verify that it had been in his possession continuously from the time that it was delivered to him by Detective Burns until it was presented in court today. That’s all.
“BY MR. BAY: I’ll so stipulate. .
“BY THE COURT: Okay. Anything further we need to do, gentlemen ?
“BY MR. MILLER: And we need to further stipulate that this is the same marijuana that Officer John Kane purchased from Steve Dupree on the 12th day of September, 1969, and subsequently delivered to Detective Burns, who subsequently delivered it to Bryan L. Tipton.
“BY MR. BAY: I will so stipulate. (Tr. 3, 4)
The final proposition asserts that the prosecuting attorney committed reversible error in his closing argument. We have carefully examined the alleged improper argument and are of the opinion that the same is not so grossly improper and unwarranted as to be manifestly prejudicial to the defendant. We have previously held that it is only when argument by counsel for the State is so grossly improper and unwarranted as to affect defendants rights, that a reversal can be based on improper argument. See Pickens v. State, Okl.Cr., 450 P.2d 837. In view of the rather strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt and the jury’s relatively light verdict, we cannot find that the District Attorney’s remarks prejudiced the defendant. The judgment and sentence, is accordingly, affirmed.
BLISS, P. J., concurs.
BRETT, J., dissents.