Court Opinion

ID: 9616147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:43:50.644272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:55.625762
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Day
dissenting:
Although I concurred in the original opinion in this case, on rehearing, which was granted, I now dissent to the adherence by the court to the original opinion. It is my contention on reflection, made after the filing of the petition for rehearing, that this court has substituted its judgment for the judgment of the trial court in an area which I believe rests solely with the trier of the facts. '
The matter of the property settlement and alimony was tried before two district court judges in the City and County of Denver. Both arrived at the same result. Both determined that there were two issues before the court: (a) the question whether a property settlement had been reached between the parties prior to the filing of the complaint in divorce and (b) whether the agreement reached by the parties also included alimony. Both trial judges found the issues on the question of property settlement in favor of Mr. Newey. Both found that the agreement did not cover alimony and that in the discretion vested in the trial court alimony should have been awarded to the limit of $40,000. One judge *406ordered that it be paid at the rate of $1000 a month; the other reduced the payments to $300 a month. Both awards of alimony were to terminate if Mrs. Newey remarried or when $40,000 had been paid, whichever occurred first.
It is my opinion that the sole question in this case is whether the record supports the judgment of the trial court. I think it does.
I, therefore, assert that this case presents no new problems. It is the typical dispute which we have heretofore left with the trial court. I believe the majority has invaded the trial court’s prerogative.
Mr. Justice Frantz joins in this dissent.