Court Opinion

ID: 9698396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:49:24.944207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:40.681507
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 45. (dissenting). I agree with the court of appeals that the circuit court did not apply the proper legal standard and therefore erred in prohibiting the defendant from presenting his evidence. I also agree with the majority opinion's interpretation of our decision in State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913, that circuit courts are not required to admit Richard A.P. evidence but may exercise their discretion in deciding whether to admit such evidence.1
¶ 46. I dissent because I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion with respect to the proffered evidence in this case.
¶ 47. The appropriate standard of review in evaluating whether a circuit court properly excluded *163evidence is whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. This court has often said that "a discretionary determination must be the product of a rational mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable determination."2 An appellate court will affirm a circuit court's discretionary decision as long as the circuit court "examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach."3 Therefore, the record on appeal must "reflect the circuit court's reasoned application of the appropriate legal standard to the relevant facts in the case."4 "If a judge bases the exercise of his discretion upon an error of law, his conduct is beyond the limits of discretion."5
¶ 48. In making the decision to exclude the proffered Richard A.P. evidence in this case, the circuit court made the following statements on the record when excluding the evidence:
*164I've heard [the expert] testimony, and in my opinion, it invades the province of the jury. That is the function of the jury to weigh the testimony and the probabilities. And to suggest that statistical analyses of people in prison with psychological disorders and their personality profiles would make it less likely that the defendant would offend is of minimal probative value.
I'm not saying it doesn't have any probative value. Minimal probative value in comparison to — Well, I'm employing 904.03. Relevant evidence can be excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or the fact that it might be misleading to the jury. I think all of those would apply here.
I think the probative value is slight, from just my own experience as a judge, seeing that all types of people can be involved in sexual assaults, whether they have a psychological profile of a sexual offender or not, and also from the studies which have been submitted in the briefs. I think in that regard, John — I'm not sure if that cite is correct. It says 1 John E.B. Meyer, evidence in child abuse and neglect cases, Section 5.54 ed. 2d. I would say third edition 1997. Just says that it's not reliable. Profile testimony is not reliable.
And I heard — I heard the lengthy testimony that these witnesses gave, and I think it would just — it would be — it would obscure the real issues here of credibility of witnesses and the jury function of weighing that credibility to have substantial evidence about this wandering — I just have to admit they went all over. Your outline summary even takes two, three pages. Would be substantially confusing to the jury and it would cause them to, in this case and in future cases, to have a battle of experts on a matter that is of slight probative value. And I think that could confuse the jury and mislead the jury.
*165So I'm rejecting the use of these expert witnesses to get into the issue of profile evidence for the reasons I've stated.6
¶ 49. As I understand the circuit court's ruling on this issue, it provided eight justifications for its decision to exclude the Richard A.P. evidence. Those justifications are as follows:
(1) Richard A.R evidence is relevant but of minimal probative value.
(2) The judge's own "experience" suggested that all sorts of people can be involved in sexual assaults.
(3) Profile testimony is not reliable.
(4) The Richard A.P. evidence would obscure the real issue of credibility.
(5) The circuit court was concerned that the evidence "wander[ed]" and "went all over."
(6) The Richard A.P. evidence would be substantially confusing to the jury.
(7) The evidence would cause unfair prejudice to the State because of the battle of experts on a matter of slight probative value.
(8) The evidence might confuse and mislead the jury.
¶ 50. I address each of circuit court's reasons in turn. Upon examining these reasons, I cannot conclude *166that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in the present case. A number of the circuit court's conclusions, as pointed out by the majority opinion,7 are based on misstatements of the applicable law. Others appear to invade the province of the jury, to give the jury too little credit with regard to its ability to understand legal questions, or to fail to appreciate the significance of the evidence for the defense.
(1)
¶ 51. The circuit court concluded in this case that the evidence was relevant but of minimal probative value. Richard A.P. testimony is a combination of character evidence and expert testimony that is relevant to an accused's likelihood to commit a sexual assault.8 This evidence not only is probative but also may be "extremely important," particularly in "he said, she said" cases.9 We explained the probative value of the evidence as follows:
[T]his evidence has probative value in sexual assault cases, where there is often no neutral witness to the assault and there is seldom any physical evidence implicating the defendant. Such profile evidence may be extremely important to the defense. Such testimony may also be useful to the trier of fact, helping it to determine a fact in issue, that is, whether the defen*167dant committed the crime, by showing circumstantial evidence of the defendant's innocence.10
This is a "he said, they said" case. The evidence is of more than minimal probative value. The circuit court erred in evaluating the probative value of the evidence.
(2)
¶ 52. Second, the circuit court judge claimed that his personal experience suggested that all sorts of people can be involved in sexual assaults. Although the circuit court does not clearly set forth its reasoning, the circuit court seems to be arguing that because the various individuals the judge had seen in sexual assault cases did not appear to him to be of a similar profile, such profile evidence was not reliable.
¶ 53. This argument is quite similar to the arguments set forth by numerous courts that have chosen to exclude such evidence. Indeed the circuit court referred to a treatise11 that in turn referred to a number of non-Wisconsin cases that have ruled that this type of *168"[pjrofile testimony is not reliable."12 The circuit court should have relied on State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998), a published precedential decision, not on a treatise or other state court decisions. Richard A.R did not follow these other state courts, and this court has explicitly rejected their views.13 The circuit court misinterpreted the applicable law.
¶ 54. The judge's own personal experiences about whether the evidence is reliable invades the province of the jury. The jury also has personal experiences and is capable of making a determination as to the reliability of profile evidence.14
(3)
¶ 55. The third reason is like the second. The reliability of the evidence is a question for the jury, not the judge.
(4)
¶ 56. The fourth reason proffered by the circuit court is that profile evidence will obscure the real issue in the case, namely, the credibility of the accusers and the defendant. On the contrary, this evidence attacks the credibility of the accusers and supports the credibil*169ity of the defendant.15 "[T]he expert's testimony in [Richard A.E's] case was admissible because it would have assisted the jury in determining whether Richard committed the charged offense by providing expert opinion on the likelihood that Richard committed the crime in light of his psychological profile."16 The credibility of both the accusers and the defendant is a question for the jury.17
(5), (6), and (8)
¶ 57. The fifth, sixth, and eighth reasons are essentially the same: that the proffered evidence would be a waste of time and might confuse the jury. It is true that introducing profile evidence would require additional time and would require thoughtful evaluation by the jury. Nevertheless, the fact that introducing such evidence might require additional time is not a sufficient reason to exclude it.
¶ 58. The test under Wis. Stat. § 904.03 is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by "considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The circuit court did not evaluate the defendant's need for the Richard A.P. evidence against the amount of time required to introduce such evidence.
¶ 59. The circuit court accepted and the majority opinion accepts without question the State's argument that introducing such evidence would add to the length *170of the trial.18 While it is true that defense counsel initially thought that the introduction of the expert testimony would take some time, he also argued that the trial could be substantially shortened over the time consumed by the offer-of-proof hearing.19 Also, had the circuit court admitted the proffered evidence but later concluded that it was needlessly cumulative or unduly long, it could have limited the testimony at that point.
¶ 60. Furthermore, these arguments were expressly rejected by this court in Davis when the court remarked as follows:
The State also asserts that such expert testimony wastes the jury's time and may mislead the jury into thinking that reasonable doubt is present because the defendant lacks the character traits of a sexual offender. However, the fact that the defendant may not possess the relevant character traits of a sexual offender will not necessarily lead to an impermissible inference of reasonable doubt.20
Other actions by the circuit court, such as giving limiting instructions or excluding evidence when appropriate, will prevent juries from reaching impermissible inferences in specific cases.
*171¶ 61. The circuit court did not carefully scrutinize the evidence. The circuit court recited some of the "magic" words but did not demonstrate a thought process sufficient to support the permissible exercise of discretion.
(7)
¶ 62. Finally, the seventh factor, expressing the circuit court's concern that introduction of such evidence might lead to a "battle of the experts" has been rejected. This problem is present in every case involving expert testimony.21 The court has not found this reasoning persuasive.22
‡ * * *
¶ 63. I cannot conclude, as the majority opinion does, that in spite of the circuit court's incorrect understanding of the law and the limited rationale, the circuit court nevertheless properly exercised its discretion.
¶ 64. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 Majority op., ¶ 2. Although the State latches onto the court of appeals' use of the word "compels," State v. Walters, 2003 WI App 24, ¶ 17, 260 Wis. 2d 210, 659 N.W.2d 151, the decision of the court of appeals carefully and frequently recognizes that the admission of evidence is a discretionary decision for the circuit court. See Walters, 260 Wis. 2d 210, ¶¶ 14, 19, 21.

 Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).

 Long v. Long, 196 Wis. 2d 691, 695, 539 N.W.2d 462 (Ct. App. 1995). See also State ex rel. M.L.B. v. D.G.H., 122 Wis. 2d 536, 541, 363 N.W.2d 419 (1985); Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 177-78, 325 N.W.2d 321 (1982).

 State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 281, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999).

 State v. Hutnik 39 Wis. 2d 754, 763, 159 N.W.2d 733 (1968); see also In re Settlement for Personal Injuries of Konicki 186 Wis. 2d 140, 150, 519 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] trial court erroneously exercises its discretion when its decision is based on a misapplication or erroneous view of the law.").

 Transcript of proceedings held before the Honorable James L. Carlson, Circuit Court, Branch 2, on Nov. 8, 2000, at 9-10 (No. 98-CF-390).

 Majority op., ¶¶ 34-35.

 State v. Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d 777, 792-93, 589 N.W.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, ¶ 19, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913.

 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 18.

 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 18 (emphasis added). See also Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d at 792 (character "testimony may well have assisted the jury in determining whether [the defendant], who maintained that the child had misinterpreted his actions, committed the charged offense"); State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 657-58, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990) (suggesting that evidence of battering syndrome to demonstrate propensity of defendant to engage in acts consistent with that profile requires testimony of an expert); King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 38-39, 248 N.W.2d 458 (1977) (testimony of psychologist admissible to demonstrate defendant's character for nonhostility and nonaggressiveness in first-degree murder case).

 John E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, § 554, at 587 (3d ed. 1997).

 See, e.g., State v. Floray, 715 A.2d 855 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); Wyatt v. State, 578 So. 2d 811 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991); Jennette v. State, 398 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1992).

 See Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 14-15.

 Whether the heterogeneity of sexual offenders makes profile evidence less reliable is a question for the jury. Id., ¶ 17.

 Richard A.P., 223 Wis. 2d at 792.

 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 12.

 Kohlhoff v. State , 85 Wis.2d 148, 155, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978); State v. Hines, 173 Wis. 2d 850, 861, 496 N.W.2d 720 (Ct. App. 1993).

 Majority op., ¶ 40:
Without this expert testimony, the testimonial portion of Walters's trial lasted one day. In contrast, the offer of proof hearing consumed approximately 165 pages of transcript over three days of hearing. Additionally, the defense counsel initially informed Judge Carlson that he had anticipated the experts' testimony would add another three days to the trial. In sum, the admission of this evidence potentially would have increased significantly the length of trial.

 Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 21.

 Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 21.

 State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 163, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977).

 "[A] battle between experts is a frequent occurrence in criminal cases where specialized knowledge on a relevant issue is required. In such cases, Richard A.P. evidence may be highly relevant." Davis, 254 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 20.