Court Opinion

ID: 9476656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:01:39.924313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:26.154769
License: Public Domain

SNEED, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), Justice Powell said:.
We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges.
Id. at 1724. In this case the majority has formulated such a procedure for this circuit. Its procedure is to require an adversary proceeding in which not only must the defendant’s counsel establish a prima facie case by Batson error, but also the prosecution’s “neutral explanation for challenging black jurors” must be presented and defended. The majority prefers this procedure to the in camera proceedings employed in this case, at least in part, because of the adversarial nature of our criminal justice system. The majority of the Supreme Court in Batson apparently did not recognize the compelling force of this characteristic.
Nor do I. My view is based on these considerations. First, contrary to the majority’s assertion, defense counsel’s utility after having established a prima facie case of Batson error would be quite limited. Principally it would consist of attempting to establish that the neutral explanations were false. This could be done only by showing that the facts set forth in neutral explanations were incorrect and that there was a pattern of these “mistakes.” For example, to show that Cynthia King was not a social worker, but rather was a secretary, would not establish Batson error. See ante, at 1256 n. 1. Alone it only indicates a wasted peremptory challenge. Only by also showing that Annie McMullen had the countenance of an angel and that Carlos Davis did not in fact sit on a jury that acquitted would an inference of Bat-son error arise. This pattern of “mistakes” and the somewhat ambiguous explanation of Marvin Young’s challenge would no doubt strongly suggest Batson error.
While I concede that a showing such as described could be facilitated by the presence of defense counsel, buttressed by ample investigation, I am by no means confident that it frequently would be. Indeed, it appears to me that defense counsel’s principal contribution in a Batson adversary hearing would be to charge, but not prove, incorrect assumptions by the prosecuting attorney and thus improper motions, while gleaning as much as possible about the prosecution’s trial strategy. A mere charge of improper motives may be entitled to more weight than a mere denial of such motives, which under Batson is entitled to no weight, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, but, it is doubtful that the excess is great.
This leads me to my second point. Assume for the moment that my estimate of defense counsel’s contribution to the Bat-son error search is too low. Is there any reason not to leave to the district court the decision whether the hearing should be in camera as in this case or adversarial as the majority would have it? The majority extols the wisdom of district judges in its prelude to its denial of their ability to determine which type of hearing would be proper. This denial is not comprehensive, however. Even the majority would permit an in camera hearing when the prosecutor claims that his reason relates to case strategy. In one sense all peremptory strikes relate to case strategy, but even if the majority has a narrower concept in mind, its concession is significant. Try as it might to eliminate trial court discretion, it was turned to by the majority to rescue it from the most troublesome aspect of its position. Grace would be better served if it were acknowledged that, with respect to Batson error, the trial court should determine whether, following the establishment *1263of the prima facie case by the defendant, its procedure should be wholly adversarial, wholly in camera, or a bit of both. This is true because, stripped of its rhetoric, the majority opinion tolerates each of these procedures.
Recognizing the trial court’s discretion as I suggest would substantially contribute to reducing the administrative burden that the majority asserts is the inescapable price of the adversary system of criminal justice. District judges appreciate the constitutional significance of the adversary system quite as much as appellate judges, and I am confident they can be trusted to use it when needed in the search for Batson error. When not needed it can be put aside in the interest of expediting the administration of justice. It must be remembered that, in any event, the trial court’s finding with respect to purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact which can be set aside only when clearly erroneous. Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 1.
Let me be more specific by addressing the neutral explanations offered by the prosecutor in this case. I cannot believe that a peremptory challenge based on the “glaring” by a potential juror suggests Batson error. See United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.1987) (prosecutor’s use of challenge to strike juror with “poor attitude” held proper). It does not amount to a mere assertion of good faith. See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Surely in the California of 1987 we have moved beyond the intense racism of earlier times and other places that possibly would justify the belief that a strike based on the glare of a prospective juror amounted to a challenge on the basis of race. The Marvin Young challenge more closely approaches Batson error than any other. Even it, however, does so only because the prosecutor mentioned race. I read that reference as being in support of the assertion that Marvin Young and the defendant were neighbors. Apparently the district court did also. Finally, even the majority can find no flaw in the Cynthia King and Carlos Davis challenges.
The findings in this case, thus, are not clearly erroneous to my way of thinking. The majority, in justifying its emphasis on an adversary hearing, sprinkles the dust of doubt over the prosecutor’s explanations. It suggests that the prosecutor could have dispelled this doubt had there been an ad-, versary hearing. See ante, at 1260-1261. There was no need to dispel such doubt. The prosecutor convinced the factfinder. To avoid facing the question whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, the majority erects a constitutional requirement, not imposed by Batson, that it asserts better would enable it and the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor acted with an improper motive. Neither the trial court nor I require such assistance.
Finally, it must be recognized that Bat-son, presumably, is not limited to peremptory challenge to blacks on the venire when the defendant is black. No doubt other groups, Asians, Hispanics, etc., are entitled to similar protection. Already there exist suggestions that Batson protection might be extended beyond race. See Brown v. North Carolina, — U.S. - — , 107 S.Ct. 423, 424, 93 L.Ed.2d 373 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The procedure required to respond to Bat-son challenges must remain not unduly burdensome. Should, as the majority makes more likely, it become encumbered with time-consuming hearings, it would be far better to eliminate peremptory challenges by the prosecution as Justice Marshall in Batson suggested.1 See 106 S.Ct. at 1726-30 (Marshall, J., concurring). This would be true even if it somewhat impaired prosecutorial power. This impairment would be preferable to the costs elaborate Batson litigation will impose. Sometimes it is wiser to develop rules that eliminate issues subject to adjudication, particularly when as in this case the costs of doing so can be diffused throughout the society, than it is to provide exquisitely for their determination. The majority, perhaps, are nudging us toward that resolution of the *1264Batson issue. For the moment, at least, I am resisting that nudge.

. Peremptory challenges by the defense based on racial grounds raise different issues.