Court Opinion

ID: 9897425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:24.079155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.249137
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Apr 14 2023, 8:40 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Patrick B. McEuen                                           Matthew Miller
Portage, Indiana                                            Coots Henke & Wheeler, P.C.
                                                            Carmel, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tiffance Fields,                                            April 14, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CT-2687
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Lake Superior
                                                            Court
Constance Gaw,                                              The Honorable Bruce D. Parent,
Appellee-Defendant.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            45D11-2101-CT-67

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                         Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023                               Page 1 of 11
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Plaintiff, Tiffance Fields (Fields), appeals the trial court’s summary

      judgment in favor of Appellee-Defendant, Constance Gaw (Gaw).

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   Fields presents this court with two issues, which we consolidate and restate as

      the following: Whether any genuine issue of material fact exists that landlord

      Gaw was an “owner” of her tenants’ dogs for purposes of establishing liability

      under Indiana’s Liability for Dog Bites Statute (Dog Bite Statute).

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   The following facts are undisputed. At all relevant times, Fields was a mail

      carrier employed by the United States Postal Service. Jason McClurg (Jason)

      and Jill Fields 1 (Jill) resided at a home on 176th Street in Hammond, Indiana,

      that Jason had rented from the home’s owner, Gaw, since at least 2009.

      Jason’s lease provided that he could have up to two dogs or cats in the rental

      home. Jason and Jill owned two pit bull dogs that lived with them in the rental

      home. On June 1, 2019, Fields was delivering mail and was attacked by Jason

      and Jill’s dogs.

      1
          Jill is not related to the plaintiff, Fields.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023       Page 2 of 11
[5]   On January 19, 2021, Fields filed her Complaint for damages, which she

      amended on March 3, 2021, alleging that Jason, Jill, and Gaw were “owners”

      of the dogs that attacked and bit her, such that they were all liable for her

      claimed injuries, lost wages, medical bills, and emotional trauma pursuant to

      the Dog Bite Statute, which defines a dog’s “owner” in relevant part as one

      who “possesses, keeps, or harbors” a dog.

[6]   On August 26, 2022, Gaw filed her motion for summary judgment with

      memorandum and designation of evidence in support, arguing that, as a mere

      landlord, she had no common law duty of care to Fields concerning the dogs.

      In Gaw’s Affidavit, she averred that since the beginning of their

      landlord/tenant relationship, Jason, not she, has had full possession or control

      of the rental property, she was not present at the property on June 1, 2019, and

      that she was not the owner of, nor did she control, any dog located at or near

      the rental property on June 1, 2019. Gaw also designated Jason’s lease

      agreement for the rental property. On September 12, 2022, Fields filed her

      responsive materials in opposition to Gaw’s summary judgment, and on

      September 14, 2022, Fields filed her cross-motion for summary judgment on

      liability as to all three defendants with a memorandum of law and designation

      of evidence in support, arguing that because Gaw’s rental agreement with Jason

      had permitted Jason to have two dogs at the rental home, Gaw had harbored

      the dogs at issue, making her an “owner” of the dogs for purposes of the Dog

      Bite Statute. Neither party requested a hearing on its summary judgment

      motion, and none was held.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023         Page 3 of 11
[7]   On October 20, 2022, the trial court issued its summary judgment, granting

      Gaw’s motion for summary judgment and denying Fields’ motion. The trial

      court found that the Dog Bite Statute did not apply to Gaw and only applied to

      “the owner of the dog at issue, who was absolutely not Gaw[,]” as “not even an

      inference was provided that supported [Fields’] argument that Gaw possessed,

      kept, or harbored the dog at issue.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 14). The trial

      court also found that Gaw owed no common law duty of care to Fields. 2

[8]   Fields now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

      DISCUSSION AND DECISION
                                              I. Standard of Review

[9]   Fields appeals the trial court’s grant of Gaw’s motion for summary judgment.

      Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence “shows that there

      is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

      to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We review both the

      grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and apply the same standard as

      the trial court. Kerr v. City of South Bend, 48 N.E.3d 348, 352 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2015). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of

      making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact

      and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d

      2
       The trial court also denied Fields’ motion for summary judgment as to Jason and Jill. Fields does not
      appeal that portion of the trial court’s judgment.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023                              Page 4 of 11
       729, 731 (Ind. 2015). “Summary judgment is improper if the movant fails to

       carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come

       forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material

       fact.” Id. at 731-32. “All disputed facts and doubts as to the existence of

       material facts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party.” Kerr, 48

       N.E.3d at 352. If the facts are undisputed, we determine the law applicable to

       those facts, and whether the trial court correctly applied it. King v. Ebrens, 804

       N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We may affirm the trial court’s

       summary judgment based on any theory supported by the designated evidence.

       Haggerty v. Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 988 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2013). Inasmuch as resolution of Fields’ claims call upon us to

       interpret the Dog Bite Statute, those are matters which we also review de novo.

       Service Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 182 N.E.3d 840, 842 (Ind.

       2022).

[10]   Before proceeding to the merits of Fields’ claims, we observe that the trial court

       entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Special findings are not

       required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal.

       AutoXchange.com. Inc. v. Dreyer and Reinbold, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 40, 48 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2004). However, such findings offer this court valuable insight into the

       trial court’s rationale for its review and facilitate appellate review. Id.

                         II. Landlord as Owner for Purposes of the Dog Bite Statute

[11]   Fields contends, as she did below, that Gaw is an “owner” of Jason and Jill’s

       dogs for purposes of establishing liability under the Dog Bite Statute and that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023             Page 5 of 11
the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded otherwise. 3 Therefore,

we are called upon to construe the Dog Bite Statute. When we engage in

statutory construction, our goal is to discern and give effect to the legislature’s

intent in enacting the statute. Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1285 (Ind.

2022). “We examine the statute as a whole, avoiding interpretations that

depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and

disharmonizing results.” Lake Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 182

N.E.3d 203, 207 (Ind. 2022) (quotation omitted). Our starting point is the

language of the statute itself, and we first determine whether a statute is clear

and unambiguous. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1285. A statute is only ambiguous

if it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. Hopkins v. Indianapolis Pub.

Schs., 183 N.E.3d 308, 312 (Ind. 2022). When faced with an unambiguous

statute, we need not apply any rules of construction, and we simply accord

words their plain meaning. Ind. Off. of Utility Consumer Counselor v. S. Ind. Gas &

Elec. Co., 200 N.E.3d 915, 919 (Ind. 2023). “In determining the plain and

ordinary meaning of a term, courts may use English language dictionaries as

well as consider the relationship with other words and phrases.” 600 Land, Inc.

v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cnty., 889 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind. 2008)

(quotation omitted).

3
  Fields does not challenge the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Gaw based on common law
liability principles.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023                           Page 6 of 11
[12]   For our purposes, the Dog Bite Statute provides that the “owner” of a dog is

       liable for all damages suffered by a person who is bitten by the dog if the dog

       bites without provocation, the person is acting peaceably, and the person is in a

       location where the person is required to be in order to discharge a duty imposed

       on the person by the postal regulations of the United States. I.C. § 15-20-1-3(a).

       The owner is liable even if the dog has not previously behaved in a vicious

       manner or even if the owner has no knowledge of any prior vicious behavior by

       the dog. I.C. § 15-20-1-3(b). Our supreme court has recognized that in enacting

       the Dog Bite Statute, the legislature “clearly intended to change the common

       law and did so by explicitly removing the common law presumption that a dog

       is harmless unless it acts otherwise” and that “the effect of this statute is to

       render dog owners strictly liable if their dogs bite the described public servants

       without provocation.” Cook v. Whitesell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273, 275

       (Ind. 2003). The court concluded that “the statute reflects a policy choice that

       the dog’s owner and keeper should bear the loss rather than the injured public

       employee.” Id. at 276. Thus, under the Statute, a bitten postal worker has only

       to prove the identity of the dog’s owner and that the dog bit without

       provocation. See id. at 276-77 (applying the Statute which was previously

       codified at I.C. § 15-5-12 and which defined “owner” in relevant part as

       including “a possessor, keeper, or harborer of a dog”).

[13]   The term “owner” is defined in the Dog Bite Statute as “the owner of a dog.

       The term includes a person who possesses, keeps, or harbors a dog.” I.C. § 15-

       20-1-2. The terms “possesses, keeps, or harbors” are not further defined within

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023          Page 7 of 11
       the Statute itself. Fields does not contend that there is any factual dispute that

       Gaw owned, possessed, or kept the dogs at issue. Rather, Fields argues that the

       undisputed facts show that Gaw, through entering into a lease which permitted

       Jason to have dogs at the rental property, harbored the dogs, rendering her an

       “owner.”

[14]   In addressing Fields’ claim, we initially observe that statutes in derogation of

       the common law are to be strictly construed because we assume that “the

       legislature does not intend by a statute to make any change in the common law

       beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable

       implication.” L.N.K. ex rel. Kavanaugh v. St. Mary’s Med. Ctr., 785 N.E.2d 303,

       306-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Neither party has directed us to any

       Indiana authority construing the term “harbors” in the context of the Dog Bite

       Statute. Therefore, we will begin our analysis by determining whether the term

       is clear and unambiguous. Holcomb, 187 N.E.3d at 1285. Gaw argues that the

       term “harbors” is unambiguous, while Fields takes no position and offers us

       alternate arguments regarding whether the term is ambiguous. However, we

       note that in Cook, our supreme court considered who is an “owner” while

       addressing Cook’s argument that she was not an owner under the Statute

       because she was not in possession of her dog at the time it bit a postal worker.

       Id. at 274-75. Although the precise issue before us was not addressed by the

       court, the Cook court did not find the part of the Statute defining “owner” to be

       ambiguous; rather, it simply applied its terms and rejected Cook’s argument.

       Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023        Page 8 of 11
[15]   We hold that the word “harbors” as used in the Statute is unambiguous and

       that it has a specific meaning within the context of a statute that concerns dogs.

       See Carter v. Carolina Tobacco Co., Inc., 873 N.E.2d 611, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

       (noting that, when interpreting a statute, it is necessary to consider the context

       of the words “because words that have one meaning in a particular context

       frequently have a different significance in another”). This court has resorted to

       the Corpus Juris Secundum to define the meaning of the term “keeper” for

       purposes of discerning liability in a general, common law dog bite case. See

       Williams v. Pohlman, 146 Ind. App. 523, 526, 257 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1970). We do so here as well. “A person “harboring” a dog . . . is a

       person who affords lodging, shelters, or gives refuge to a dog for a limited

       purpose or time[.]” C.J.S. Animals § 379. In Cook, our supreme court noted

       that the then-current version of the Statute, Indiana Code section 15-5-12-2,

       expanded the definition of “owner” to include those who possess, keep, and

       harbor a dog, a class of people to whom the court referred as “custodians” of

       the animal, which indicates to us that something more than a mere rental

       agreement allowing pets must exist for a landlord to be a harborer of a dog for

       purposes of the Statute. Cook, 796 N.E.2d 274.

[16]   We conclude that it is a person who directly lodges, shelters, or gives refuge to a

       dog who is harboring the dog, as opposed to a person who merely owns and

       rents out the place where the dog is lodged, sheltered, or provided refuge. Our

       reading of the Statute finds support in the law of other districts that have

       construed the term “harbor” or “harboring” in animal injury liability statutes

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023        Page 9 of 11
       similarly defining “owner”. See, e.g., Whitten v. Luck, 6 N.E.3d 866, 868-69 (Ill.

       App. Ct. 2014) (holding that landlords did not harbor tenant’s dog and were

       thus not “owners” for purposes of the Illinois strict liability statute for damages

       caused by an animal defining “owner” in part as one who “harbors” an animal,

       where there was no evidence landlords provided food and shelter on at least a

       semipermanent basis, even where the lease allowed pets on the rental property

       and landlords knew tenants owned a dog), trans. denied; see also Anderson v.

       Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Minn. 2012) (holding that for purposes of

       Minnesota’s strict liability dog injury statute defining “owner” as including

       “any person harboring” the dog, a person “harboring” a dog is one who

       “affords lodging, shelters, or gives refuge to a dog for a limited purpose or time”

       and noting that, under prior decisions, neither the mere right to exclude nor the

       possession of the land on which an animal is kept, even where coupled with

       permission given to a third person to keep it, is sufficient to convert a landlord

       into a “harborer” of the animal).

[17]   In light of Cook, we agree with Fields that our Dog Bite Statute clearly is

       intended to ease the burden of proof for those who are bitten in the execution of

       their mail carrying duties, but we find nothing in the wording of the Statute

       indicating through its “express terms or by unmistakable implication” that the

       legislature intended to expand the class of individuals liable for dog bites in the

       manner proposed by Fields. L.N.K. ex rel. Kavanaugh, 785 N.E.2d at 306-07.

       Therefore, we reject Fields’ contention that, as a matter of law, the mere

       existence of the landlord/tenant relationship brought Gaw within the definition

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023        Page 10 of 11
       of an “owner” for purposes of the Dog Bite Statute. There is no factual dispute

       that Gaw provided housing to Jason through the rental agreement and allowed

       Jason to keep up to two dogs. However, there was no evidence designated

       creating a factual issue that Gaw had any interaction or contact with Jason’s

       and Jill’s dogs, let alone that she personally afforded their dogs lodging, shelter,

       or refuge. Accordingly, we do not disturb the trial court’s summary judgment.

       CONCLUSION
[18]   We hold that no genuine issue of material fact exists precluding summary

       judgment as to whether Gaw was an “owner” of the dogs at issue pursuant to

       the Dog Bite Statute.

[19]   Affirmed.

[20]   Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2687 | April 14, 2023        Page 11 of 11