Court Opinion

ID: 9632984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:30:29.944006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:26.436906
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.
I respectfully dissent. I find nothing in the record of this case or the case law of this State mandating reversal of the sentence imposed on drunk driver Michael Teer (“Defendant”) for cutting short the lives of four innocent persons and injuring a fifth.
The majority and concurring opinions correctly highlight that Defendant’s sentences require reversal if he can show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to permit the State to untimely amend its information to charge him as a prior offender. But I disagree with the majority and concurring opinions’ findings that Defendant was prejudiced because the State failed to expressly follow the provisions of section 558.021.2, RSMo 2000.1 And, because I believe that Defendant did not meet the burden of showing the requisite prejudice, I would affirm.
Everyone agrees that the trial court should have followed section 558.021.2’s directive that Defendant be found a prior offender before his ease was submitted to the jury. But contrary to the majority’s view, I do not believe that the provisions of section 558.021.2 are mandatory, as nothing in the statute provides a remedy for a defendant who is sentenced as a prior offender subsequent to a trial court error related to this statute.2
*266The majority’s contention that this statute is mandatory and that violations of it equate to reversible error may create an unintended slippery slope, as many statutes outline administrative directives with which the trial court is expected to comply. The majority’s holding could be read wrongly to declare that all failures to follow these statutory schemes necessitate reversal regardless of whether a defendant’s substantive rights are prejudiced.3 Because I believe section 558.021.2 is not mandatory, I would find that the trial court’s failure to adhere to its directives does not equate to an automatic reversible error, unless prejudice occurs.
The test for reversible prejudice is not simply a test of whether the challenged error produced an unfavorable result for the defendant. Reversal of trial court error is required only if an error “more-likely-than-not prejudice^] the entire proceeding against the defendant.”4 State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 592 (Mo. banc 1997) (emphasis added). Reversible prejudice must cause “[djamage or detriment to one’s legal rights or claims.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 545 (2d. Pocket Ed.2001) (defining “prejudice”). An error in the process of Defendant’s case does not require reversal unless it prejudiced his substantive rights.5 See Tate v. State, 752 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Mo.App.1988) (finding that a defendant’s “substantive rights were not violated by the tardy adjudication of his prior offender status” under section 558.021.2).
Testing for substantively prejudicial errors is consistent with Missouri’s “no harm, no foul” statute, section 545.030.1(18), which outlines that a judgment should not be affected by a “defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.” Missouri has a longstanding rule that judgments against criminal defendants should not be affected by errors committed in their favor. See State v. Leisure, 796 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Mo. banc 1990) (“[Section 545.030.1(16) ] has been the law in this state for more than one hundred years. It provides, in part, that no criminal trial, judgment or other proceedings be ... in any manner affected [by] any error committed at the instance or in favor of the defendant.” (internal footnote, quotations, citations, and added emphasis omitted)).6
*267Considering these standards, I disagree with the majority’s finding that the trial court’s failure to follow section 558.021.2 resulted in reversible error, as I do not believe the error caused substantive prejudice to Defendant.
Further, I see no reason to use Defendant’s case to overturn the numerous Missouri cases that have determined that it is harmless error to permit the State to prove belatedly prior or persistent offender status under section 558.021.2. See, e.g., State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 64 (Mo. banc 1989) (finding that a hearing on prior offenses held untimely was harmless error and did not affect substantial rights); State v. Jordan, 978 S.W.2d 36, 41-42 (Mo.App.1998); State v. Jennings, 815 S.W.2d 434, 446-47 (Mo.App.1991); State v. Tincher, 797 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Mo.App.1990); Tate, 752 S.W.2d at 394; State v. Umphfrey, 694 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Mo.App.1985); State v. Wynn, 666 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Mo.App.1984).
In Wynn, the court of appeals addressed a similar case in which the court belatedly determined that a defendant was a persistent offender. 666 S.W.2d at 864-65. Wynn concluded that the trial court’s error in following section 558.021.2 was not a prejudicial reversible error because “it did not affect the [defendant’s] substantial rights” and was “harmless error.” Id. at 864.
Wynn wisely noted:
It is difficult to see how defendant suffered any actual prejudice by reason of the fact that the persistent offender hearing was conducted after instead of prior to submission to the jury. The central fact of importance and substance is that defendant is a persistent offender, as was amply demonstrated, in which case the Court, not the jury, determines punishment upon a finding of guilt.... The State, by failing to introduce the persistent offender evidence at the prescribed time did not thereby waive its right to make proof thereof before sentencing. Nor was the State estopped to do so by reason of the manner in which the matter was handled. Defendant ac*268quired no vested right to have the jury assess the punishment by reason of the failure to conduct the hearing at the prescribed time. It is true that if the proof had never been made the conviction would have to be set aside; in that event the failure to submit the question of punishment to the jury would have been fatal to the verdict; but it was made, even if tardily.
Id. at 864-65.
Like the defendant in Wynn, Defendant does not contest that he is a prior offender but in effect asserts that he cannot be sentenced as a prior offender if errors are made pursuant to section 558.021.2. The legislature cannot have intended its scheme of extended term sentencing for prior offenders be rendered a nullity by trial court mistakes that do not prejudice the defendant. This must be particularly true where, as here, the trial court’s mistake was made after Defendant’s suggestion that he otherwise would be prejudiced.
Defendant cannot assert persuasively that he was sentenced unfairly because his sentence ultimately was imposed by the court instead of the jury. He had no right to be sentenced by the jury.7 Considering that Defendant is a prior offender, he was sentenced in conformance with what the legislature intended when he was sentenced by the trial court after findings were made as to his prior offender status.8
Because I do not believe that Defendant has suffered substantive prejudice requiring reversal, I would affirm his sentences.

. All statutory references in this opinion are to RSMo 2000.

. Generally a statute is held to be directory and not mandatory where it specifies a time within which an official act is to be performed with a view merely to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of the business and where it does not provide what results follow a failure to comply with its terms. State v. Wynn, 666 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Mo.App.1984) (finding section 558.021.2 is merely directory); see also State ex inf. Gentry v. Lamar, 316 Mo. 721, 291 S.W. 457, 458 (banc 1927) (noting that a statute specifying a time within which a public officer is to perform an official act regarding the rights and duties of others can be considered merely directory “unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the phraseology of the statute is such, that *266the designation of time must be considered as a limitation of the power of the officer”).

.In the past, this Court has stated that remedying violations of mandatory directives usually should be left in the hands of the trial court. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 66 (Mo. banc 1989) (“Where counsel is surprised by opposing evidence at trial, however, but deals with that evidence in precisely the same manner as if he had been fully prepared, there is no reason to exclude that evidence, however significant, based on a discovery violation. A lack of disclosure in such a case has no effect on the result of trial."). And, comparatively, this Court has stated that a violation of mandatory discovery rules is not reversible error without the additional factor of fundamental unfairness or prejudice to substantial rights. See State v. Smothers, 605 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Mo. banc 1980); State v. Cook, 5 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Mo.App.1999).

. This big-picture determination of prejudicial error is beneficial in limiting this Court's power to undo or replicate the work of the lower courts, which are capable of crafting fair and workable solutions to potential issues and errors before they yield reversible prejudice.

. "Substantive law” addresses ”[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties." Black's Law Dictionary 676 (2d Pocket Ed.2001).

. In this case, Defendant essentially invited the alleged error about which he now complains, as he urged the court against permitting the State to timely amend its information.
*267Before Defendant's case was submitted to the jury, the State sought to amend its information to include his prior offender status. Defendant's counsel, however, complained that it would be unfair to permit an amendment to the information because the jury was impaneled under the impression that it would determine the punishment. His counsel suggested that the jury's belief that it was assessing punishment might cause it to reach a compromise verdict trading guilt and punishment outcomes, which would differ from the verdict it might reach if it was unaware of the range of punishment. In response to these concerns, the trial court decided that it would be best to delay amending the information to include Defendant's prior offender status until after the case was submitted to the jury. The court reasoned that this would minimize the issue and avoid confusion by the jurors, and it noted that it would treat the jury’s sentence as advisory.
Defendant's counsel also complained that the State should not be permitted to amend the information because he would have employed a different trial strategy had he known that prior offender status would be an issue. Nothing in section 558.021.2, however, indicates that prior offender status must be pleaded and proved before evidence is introduced at trial, as the statute merely provides that the offender's status should be established before submitting the case to the juiy.
Under this Court’s Rule 23.08, which allows amendment of an information at any time prior to a verdict or finding, the test for whether a defendant’s substantial rights wrongly are prejudiced by the amendment looks at (1) whether a defense to the charge as originally made is equally available post-amendment and (2) whether the defendant’s evidence would be equally applicable after the amendment. State v. Messa, 914 S.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Mo.App.1996). In this case, however, Defendant cannot show that his defenses to the original charges were impacted by the State’s amendment to the information.

. Sentencing authority in the hands of judges, rather than juries, is important to reduce sentence disparity for prior offenders. See Hon. Randall R. Jackson, Missouri's Jury Sentencing Law: A Relic The Legislature Should Lay To Rest, 55 J. Mo. B. 14, 16-17 (Jan./Feb. 1999) (urging judge sentencing in all non-capital criminal cases).

. The concurring opinion relies on State v. Emery, a case in which this Court found that a prior offender was entitled to be sentenced by a jury where the State had failed to prove his alleged prior offenses as required by section 558.021.2. 95 S.W.3d 98, 100-02 (Mo. banc 2003). Emery, however, is easily distinguishable from Defendant's case. In Emery, the State failed to offer evidence proving Emery’s prior and persistent offender status prior to submission of his case to the jury. Id. at 100. The Emery court highlighted the "prose-cutorial laxity” in the prosecution's failure to comply with section 558.021.2. Id. at 101— 02. In contrast to Emery, the State here attempted to comply timely with section 558.021.2, but Defendant objected to timely amending the information and, in the process, invited the error at issue in this case.