Court Opinion

ID: 9695268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:14:09.287002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:10.574365
License: Public Domain

QUILLEN, Justice,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the majority. The result is in accord with the present state of Delaware law. Roland International Corporation v. Najjar, Del.Supr., 407 A.2d 1032 (1979). Given the overlay of Singer v. Magnavox Co., Del.Supr., 380 A.2d 969 (1977) and its progeny on the corporate statutory merger scheme, the result is also consistent with the policy as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery as expressed by the General Assembly. Compare 8 Del. Laws § 262 and Roland, supra, 407 A.2d at 1037 — 1040 (Quillen, Justice, dissenting); compare also 8 Del.C. § 220 as amended by 56 Del.Laws Ch. 50 eff. July 3,1967. Finally, the monetary cause of action here against the corporate defendants is sufficiently akin to an accounting for the breach of a fiduciary duty to historically justify the exercise of substantive equitable jurisdiction as an analogy from trust law. 4 Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed.) § 1088, § 1421. See also Singer, supra, 380 A.2d at 982 (McNeilly, Justice, concurring).
As to laches and the claim for rescission, given the history of the New York cause of action noted in the majority opinion, I agree it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del.Supr., 180 A.2d 467 (1962).