Court Opinion

ID: 9931694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 18:02:56.445165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:18.718973
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 P. v. Fernandez CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A167245
 v.
 OBED FERNANDEZ,                                                        (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 17CR018424)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2017, defendant Obed Fernandez, a lawful permanent resident of
the United States, pled no contest to one count of assault with a deadly
weapon and one count of domestic violence with injury. He was placed on
probation for three years with a condition that he serve 364 days in jail.
         Five years later, Fernandez moved to vacate his convictions under
Penal Code1 section 1473.7, claiming he did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of his plea when he entered it. He now appeals
from the denial of the motion, a ruling based on the trial court’s
determination that his supporting declaration contained “an obvious
falsehood.” Applying the independent standard of review as required
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527 (Vivar)), we also conclude that

         1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
Fernandez failed to prove that he did not understand the plea’s immigration
consequences. As a result, we affirm.
                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
       In late May 2017, Fernandez’s ex-wife was with her boyfriend at her
Oakland apartment.2 As the boyfriend was leaving, he noticed that her car’s
rear window was broken. He then returned to the apartment to tell her
about the damage. While they were talking inside, Fernandez “pounded on
the front door of the residence and demanded entry.” Receiving no response,
he used a three-foot-long metal pipe “to puncture the metal gate to give him
access to the front door” and entered the apartment. Fernandez swung the
metal pipe at the boyfriend, but Fernandez’s ex-wife stepped in front of the
boyfriend and the pipe hit her hand. The boyfriend called 911, at which point
Fernandez exited the apartment and broke every window in the boyfriend’s
car.
       About two weeks later, in mid-June 2017, Fernandez’s ex-wife left her
apartment and saw Fernandez in his car, which was parked behind hers and
blocking her from leaving. She “was able to maneuver her vehicle around
[Fernandez’s] vehicle,” but her car was damaged as she drove away. Soon
after, her boyfriend also left the apartment. Fernandez got out of his car,
holding “a metal ‘The Club’ steering wheel lock,” and threatened to “beat [the
boyfriend’s] ass” and “kill” him. Fernandez separated the lock into two parts,
threw one part at the boyfriend but missed, and used the other part “to strike

       2 We draw the underlying facts from the probation report. No
preliminary hearing was held, and the stipulated factual basis for the plea
was Fernandez’s “conversations and review of the evidence” with his trial
counsel.

                                        2
[the boyfriend] in the head repeatedly.” The boyfriend was able to subdue
Fernandez, and the police arrested him.
      Later that month, Fernandez was charged by complaint with five
felonies and six misdemeanors. Based on the May incident, Fernandez was
charged with one count of first degree residential burglary and two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon, all felonies. He was also charged with three
counts of vandalism and one count of disobeying a domestic relations court
order, all misdemeanors. Based on the June incident, he was charged with
felony counts of assault with a deadly weapon and criminal threats and
misdemeanor counts of vandalism and disobeying a domestic relations court
order.3
      On July 14, 2017, under a plea agreement, Fernandez pled no contest
to two counts stemming from the May incident: (1) assault with a deadly
weapon against his ex-wife’s boyfriend and (2) willful infliction of corporal
injury under section 273.5, subdivision (a) (domestic violence with injury), “as
a lesser included offense” of the count of assault with a deadly weapon
against his ex-wife.4 In exchange, the remaining counts were dismissed, and

      3 The felony charges were brought under sections 459 (burglary), 245,

subdivision (a)(1) (assault), and 422 (criminal threats). Also, under
section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21), the burglary was alleged to be a violent
felony on the basis that a non-accomplice was present during its commission.
The misdemeanor charges were brought under sections 594, subdivision (a)
(vandalism), and 273.6, subdivision (a) (disobeying court order).
      4 In fact, a violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), is not a lesser

included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. The former offense
requires that the victim sustained “corporal injury resulting in a traumatic
condition” (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), but the latter offense “ ‘does not require proof
that an injury occurred.’ ” (People v. Griggs (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 734, 740.)
We also note that section 273.5, subdivision (a), is a “wobbler.” (See People v.
Vessell (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 285, 288.) It was not specified at the plea

                                         3
in September 2017 he was placed on probation for three years with the
condition that he serve 364 days in jail.
      Before accepting Fernandez’s plea, the trial court asked his public
defender whether the attorney “had the opportunity to address with
[Fernandez] this plea, the consequences of the plea, his constitutional rights,
and immigration status.” The public defender responded, “Yes, your Honor.”5
The court then asked the attorney whether he “need[ed] any more time,” and
he responded, “No, your Honor.”
      The trial court questioned Fernandez similarly. The court asked him,
“[D]id you have sufficient time to speak with [the public defender] about this
plea, the consequences of the plea, your constitutional rights, and
immigration status?” Fernandez responded, “Yes.” The court then asked
whether he “need[ed] any more time to speak with [his attorney],” and he
responded, “No.” Finally, the court asked, “Do you also understand if you are
not a citizen of the United States this conviction will likely result in your
deportation or denial of residency and/or citizenship?” Fernandez responded,
“Yes.”6
      In July 2022, now represented by retained counsel who also represents
him in this appeal, Fernandez moved under section 1473.7 to vacate his

hearing whether Fernandez was admitting to a felony or a misdemeanor, but
his plea form states he was pleading no contest to “felony 273.5.”
      5 The public defender also signed a statement on the plea form that he

discussed with Fernandez “the possible consequences of a plea of guilty or no
contest, including immigration consequences if applicable.”
      6 Fernandez also initialed a box on his plea form indicating he

“underst[oo]d that if [he] is not a citizen of the United States, this conviction
may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization.” He was assisted by a Spanish
interpreter for purposes of signing the plea form, as well at all the relevant
hearings.

                                        4
convictions because “he did not meaningfully understand the lifetime
immigration consequences of his plea.” The motion argued that neither the
plea form nor the immigration advisement the trial court gave before
accepting his plea was sufficient to inform him that he faced “mandatory
removal.” The motion did not mention Fernandez’s public defender, and
Fernandez disavowed any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
      In support of the motion, Fernandez filed a declaration in which he
stated that he was not a United States citizen, came to this country “many
years ago,” and had “permanent resident status.”7 He also detailed his
“strong family, community ties, obligations, and opportunities in [the] United
States”—including because he had two citizen children—and stated he feared
returning to Mexico because “[i]t is overrun with gang and cartel violence.”8
      Fernandez averred that when he entered the plea, he “did not
meaningfully understand that this conviction is considered an aggravated
felony and it is a lifetime bar to obtain immigration benefits.” He continued,
“I was never asked about my immigration status and pled guilty based on my
attorney’s advice that [the] district attorney offered a good plea. [¶] . . . [¶] I
did not ask questions because I wanted to put this case behind me and move
on with my life and be with my family.” He also stated that he “would not
have accepted this plea if [he] knew that this conviction could result in
permanent mandatory removal and denial of benefits or relief for life.”

      7 At oral argument, Fernandez’s counsel indicated that Fernandez may

have since lost his green card, but there is no evidence of that in the record
before us.
      8 According to the probation report, Fernandez was born in Mexico in

1965 and raised there. His children were born in California in 1998 and
2003, but it is unclear from the record when he moved to the United States.

                                          5
      The prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court held a hearing
on it in January 2023. At the prosecution’s request, the court took judicial
notice “of its own file in this matter,” including the complaint, the transcript
of the plea hearing, and the probation report.9 It also took judicial notice of
the fact that Fernandez’s previous attorney was still a practicing Alameda
County public defender. No witnesses testified, and no other evidence was
introduced. Thus, as the court later made clear, its ruling was “based on the
papers” and counsel’s arguments.
      Fernandez’s counsel began by acknowledging that it was “very clear in
this case that immigration consequences were considered to some degree,”
since Fernandez received 364 days in jail instead of 365. Counsel explained
that “by negotiating for 364 days, for some [California criminal] statutes that
would take [the offense] out of the aggravated felony category” under federal
law. He argued that the lesser term “didn’t do [Fernandez] any good,”
however. Regardless of whether the crimes were aggravated felonies,
subsequent cases clarified that under federal law, domestic violence with
injury is a “crime of domestic violence,” and assault with a deadly weapon is
“a crime involving moral turpitude.” According to counsel, the fact that
Fernandez’s convictions fell into these categories subjected him to
“permanent” immigration consequences, including losing his green card and
being unable to return to this country were he deported.
      The prosecutor responded that Fernandez’s declaration was “self-
serving” and not independently corroborated. In particular, the prosecutor
questioned the declaration’s statement that Fernandez “was never asked

      9 The trial judge who considered the section 1473.7 motion happened to

be the same judge who sentenced Fernandez. A different judge took
Fernandez’s plea.

                                        6
about his immigration status,” given the evidence that the immigration issue
was “on the mind of everybody” at the plea hearing. The prosecutor also
argued that Fernandez could not establish prejudice because if he were
permitted to withdraw his plea, he would be “back facing five serious
felon[ies], one of them violent,” exposing him to over a decade in custody were
he convicted.
      The trial court denied the motion. The court found not credible the
statement that Fernandez was never asked about his immigration status,
because it did not “believe that a competent criminal defense attorney would
negotiate for 364 days in jail” without talking to Fernandez about his status.
In turn, the falsehood “color[ed] the rest of the facts asserted in the
declaration,” leaving the court unconvinced that Fernandez did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. Thus,
the court did not reach the issue of prejudice.
                                        II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      A.    General Legal Standards
      By statute, before accepting a plea, a trial court must inform a
defendant as follows: “If you are not a citizen, you are hereby advised that
conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States,
or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.”
(§ 1016.5, subd. (a).) In addition, over a decade ago, the United States
Supreme Court held that it constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under
the Sixth Amendment to fail to advise a client whether a plea “carries a risk
of deportation.” (Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 374 (Padilla).) Our
state Legislature responded by enacting section 1016.3, “which essentially
codified the holding of Padilla by requiring defense counsel to ‘provide

                                        7
accurate and affirmative advice about the immigration consequences of a
proposed disposition.’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301, 308
(Rodriguez), quoting § 1016.3, subd. (a).) The statute also requires the
prosecution to “consider the avoidance of adverse immigration consequences
in the plea negotiation process as one factor in an effort to reach a just
resolution.” (§ 1016.3, subd. (b).)
      Effective January 1, 2017, section 1473.7 was enacted “ ‘to “fill a gap in
California criminal procedure” ’ ” that existed because (1) Padilla was not
retroactive and (2) a writ of habeas corpus is not available to those who are
no longer in custody. (Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 308–309.) The
current version of the statute provides that “[a] person who is no longer in
criminal custody may file a motion to vacate a conviction” for specified
reasons, including that “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to
prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. A finding of
legal invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective assistance
of counsel.” (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).)
      To establish entitlement to relief under section 1473.7, a defendant
must prove two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) an error
occurred damaging the defendant’s ability to meaningfully understand or
accept the immigration consequences of the plea and (2) the error was
prejudicial. (People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1172.) Given that
ineffective assistance of counsel is not required, courts have held that “the
focus of the inquiry in a section 1473.7 motion is on the ‘defendant’s own
error’ ” in misunderstanding the plea’s consequences. (People v. Mejia (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871; accord Rodriguez, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.)

                                         8
As for the prejudice element, it “does not require a showing that, if the
[defendant] had rejected the plea and gone to trial, there is a reasonable
probability [the defendant] would have obtained a more favorable result.”
(Rodriguez, at p. 311.) Instead, the required showing is “a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant
had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 529.)
      We independently review a trial court’s ruling denying a motion under
section 1473.7. (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 527.) Under this standard,
“ ‘an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine
whether the facts satisfy the rule of law.’ ” (Ibid.) Independent review is not
equivalent to de novo review, in that we “may not simply second-guess
factual findings that are based on the trial court’s own observations.” (Ibid.)
But where, as here, “the trial court’s factual findings ‘derive entirely from
written declarations and other documents,’ the trial court and the reviewing
court ‘ “are in the same position,” ’ and no deference is owed.” (People v.
Curiel, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173, quoting Vivar, at p. 528.)
      B.    Fernandez Has Not Proven that He Failed to Meaningfully
            Understand the Immigration Consequences of His Plea.
            1.    The immigration consequences of Fernandez’s plea
      To establish that a plea had adverse immigration consequences, a
defendant must show “that the conviction or sentence being challenged is
currently causing or has the potential to cause removal or the denial of an
application for an immigration benefit, lawful status, or naturalization.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (e)(1).) Fernandez clearly made this showing because his
convictions render him deportable, but he fails to support a key premise of
his request for relief: that he is subject to mandatory immigration
consequences. (See In re Marriage of Marshall (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 477,

                                        9
486 [appellate court does not have burden to develop parties’ arguments for
them].)
      Under federal law, a noncitizen is “deportable” if convicted of specified
crimes. (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2); Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013) 569 U.S. 184, 187.)
These include (1) “a crime of moral turpitude” committed within 10 years of
being admitted as a lawful permanent resident, if “a sentence of one year or
longer may be imposed”; and (2) “a crime of domestic violence.” (8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (E)(i).) It is undisputed that Fernandez’s conviction of
domestic violence with injury is categorically “a crime of domestic violence”
under 8 United States Code section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). (Carrillo v. Holder (9th
Cir. 2015) 781 F.3d 1155, 1159.) It is also undisputed that his conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon is categorically “a crime of moral turpitude”
under 8 United States Code section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). (Safaryan v. Barr (9th
Cir. 2020) 975 F.3d 976, 979.) Thus, both convictions rendered Fernandez
deportable, meaning they have “the potential to cause removal” under
section 1473.7.
      Fernandez claims that his convictions also have other potential adverse
immigration consequences, but he fails to provide supporting legal authority.
For example, he claims he is “ineligible for adjustment of status” because the
assault conviction made him an “inadmissible” immigrant. True, as a crime
of moral turpitude, the assault conviction renders Fernandez “inadmissible.”
(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).) But adjustment of status under the provision
he cites allows the government to adjust a noncitizen’s status “to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” a status the record reflects
he already has. (Id., § 1255, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, although a
noncitizen is ineligible for adjustment of status unless “admissible to the

                                       10
United States for permanent residence” (ibid.), Fernandez fails to show that
this provision applies to him.
      In addition, Fernandez contends the other immigration consequences of
his plea include “losing his permanent resident status and be[ing] barred
[from] receiv[ing] any immigration benefits for life.” He also states that the
convictions “bar him from ever becoming a naturalized citizen.” But he does
not cite any authority to show these are necessary consequences of his
convictions. Importantly, although both convictions render him deportable,
on appeal he does not claim that they subject him to mandatory deportation
(as would be the case if either crime constituted an “aggravated felony”).10
(See Moncrieffe v. Holder, supra, 569 U.S. at p. 187; People v. Lopez (2022)
83 Cal.App.5th 698, 710.) Although we are willing to assume the identified
consequences would result if he were deported, he fails to demonstrate that
the convictions are an absolute “bar” to naturalization or other immigration
benefits.
            2.    There is no credible evidence that Fernandez did not
                  meaningfully understand his plea’s actual consequences.
      With this understanding of the adverse immigration consequences of
Fernandez’s plea in mind, we turn to whether Fernandez has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not meaningfully understand those
consequences. We conclude he has not.
      To begin with, Fernandez’s declaration is premised on his failure to
understand the supposed mandatory consequences of his plea. Fernandez

      10 In the section 1473.7 motion, Fernandez claimed that he was subject

to “mandatory deportation,” and he stated in his declaration that he did not
realize one of his convictions was for “an aggravated felony.” At the hearing
on the motion, however, his counsel did not argue that either conviction was
for an aggravated felony or offer any legal support for the claim that
Fernandez was subject to mandatory deportation.

                                      11
averred that when entering the plea he “did not meaningfully understand
that this conviction is considered an aggravated felony and it is a lifetime bar
to obtain immigration benefits.” He also stated that he “would not have
accepted this plea if [he] knew that this conviction could result in permanent
mandatory removal and denial of benefits or relief for life” and “[t]here was
little to gain” by accepting a shorter sentence “when this conviction can be
[the] basis of . . . mandatory deportation afterwards.” But Fernandez has not
demonstrated that either conviction actually has such consequences, and his
failure to understand nonexistent consequences is obviously not a basis for
relief.
          Even if the declaration could be read as stating that Fernandez did not
understand that the convictions rendered him deportable or exposed him to
other non-mandatory consequences, any such claim would not withstand
scrutiny. Both Fernandez and his public defender affirmatively indicated at
the plea hearing that they had a sufficient opportunity to discuss Fernandez’s
“immigration status” with each other, directly contradicting the declaration
on this point. In addition, we agree with the trial court that Fernandez’s
statement that he “was never asked about [his] immigration status” is not
credible, given that he received only 364 days in jail. “[A] crime of violence
. . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year” constitutes an
aggravated felony. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).) Thus, by receiving a term of
less than a year, Fernandez avoided having his conviction for domestic
violence with injury subject him to mandatory deportation. He fails to offer
any plausible reason the shorter term would be negotiated had the parties
been unaware he is not a citizen.
          Moreover, Fernandez agreed at the plea hearing that he understood
that if he was “not a citizen of the United States this conviction [would] likely

                                         12
result in [his] deportation or denial of residency and/or citizenship.” Relying
on decisions holding that a general advisement under section 1016.5 does not
inform a defendant that deportation is mandatory, Fernandez argues that he
was not informed “that a mandatory immigration consequence was loss of
permanent resident status and the denial of naturalization.” (E.g., People v.
Patterson (2017) 2 Cal.5th 885, 895–896; People v. Lopez, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 712.) These decisions are inapposite. Not only has
Fernandez failed to show that his convictions have such mandatory
immigration consequences, he was also advised that his convictions were
likely to result in deportation and denial of citizenship, not just that they may
have those consequences as required by section 1016.5. He does not even
acknowledge the advisement he actually received, much less explain why it
was inadequate to inform him that he was deportable and faced other
possible consequences.
      In short, Fernandez has not carried his burden to show that he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea. As a
result, the trial court properly denied his motion to vacate his convictions.
                                      III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The January 5, 2023 order denying Fernandez’s motion for relief under
Penal Code section 1473.7 is affirmed.

                                       13
                                           _________________________
                                           Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Castro, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Alameda, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

People v. Fernandez A167245

                                      14