Court Opinion

ID: 9656590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:51:56.109838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:33.579733
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse this case because there was no proof of physical injury, and defense counsel properly apprised the trial court that an essential element of the offense was missing.. Appellant was convicted of violating Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-103 (c)(2), and section 103(c)(2) requires proof of the element of physical injury. Counsel apprised the court that the element of physical injury was missing in his motion to dismiss. The majority does not address the fact that there was no evidence of physical injury in this case. The State argues, and the majority agrees, that appellant’s argument is not preserved for our review. The majority specifically finds that her argument at trial was directed at the elements of serious physical injury and purposeful intent, whereas, her argument on appeal is directed at the trial court’s finding that she acted negligently. Immediately following the portion of appellant’s brief quoted by the majority, appellant argues that the State failed to prove all of the elements of the offense, stating: Just as the due process clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the crime the defendant is charged with, so too must a trial judge find all the elements of a crime he or she decides an accused has committed. Because no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under the statutes the court relied upon, the Appellant’s conviction should be reversed and dismissed. (Citations omitted.) Appellant argued both at trial and on appeal that the State failed to prove the elements of the crime of which she was convicted. In refusing to address appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the majority relies upon Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003) and admonishes that a defendant must anticipate an instruction on lesser-included offenses and specifically address the elements of any lesser-included offense he wishes to challenge in his directed-verdict motion. However, appellant was not actually convicted of a lesser-included offense. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-110(b) (Repl. 1997) states that: An offense is so included [in another] if: (1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included within it; or (3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpable mental state suffices to establish its commission. Neglect is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-28-101(8) (Supp. 2001): “Neglect” means acts or omissions by an endangered adult; for example, self-neglect or intentional acts or omissions by a caregiver responsible for the care and supervision of an endangered or impaired adult constituting: (A) Negligently failing to provide necessary treatment, rehabilitation, care, food, clothing, shelter, supervision, or medical services to an endangered or impaired adult; (B) Negligently failing to report health problems or changes in health problems or changes in the health condition of an endangered or impaired adult to the appropriate medical personnel; or (C) Negligently failing to carry out a prescribed treatment plan. Neglect of an impaired adult does not fit the definition of a lesser-included offense of purposely abusing an impaired adult. Even if neglect of an impaired adult were a lesser-included offense of purposely abusing an impaired adult, appellant’s motion was sufficient to preserve the issue of whether the State proved the element of “physical injury” as to the misdemeanor offense. In Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001), our supreme court held that in order to preserve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for a lesser-included offense, a defendant is required to address the lesser-included offense, either by name or by apprising the trial court of the elements of the lesser-included offense in the motion for directed verdict. (Emphasis added.) As the majority notes, defense counsel’s motion stated that there was no proof of serious physical injury or purposeful intent. However, his motion further advanced the argument that there were “no types of discernable physical injury.” Appellant’s argument is well taken. Ms. Smith, the State’s sole witness, testified that there were no marks, bruising or abrasions on either Ms. Shaw or Mr. Lenox and that neither of them required medical treatment as a result of the incident. Without any proof of physical injury, there was insufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction. I would reverse.