Court Opinion

ID: 9534392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:39:07.016053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:30.174943
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the opinion prepared for the court by Justice Baxter, being persuaded of the soundness of its reasoning and the correctness of its result.
*370I write separately to address the question that the Chief Justice raises in his concurring opinion, viz., whether evidence of a prior conviction suffered by a defendant for a felony involving force or violence is inadmissible hearsay when offered at the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial to prove that he actually engaged in conduct involving force or violence.
I
Before we consider the question with which we are here concerned, we must set out at some length the history of the death penalty law and also its outline.
Under the Penal Code as enacted in 1872, the death penalty law was simple. Section 190 of the code under that law provided that “[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death . . . .” (1872 Pen. Code, § 190.)
In 1874, the 1872 death penalty law was changed. Section 190 of the Penal Code was amended to provide that “[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the State Prison for life, at the discretion of’ the trier of fact. (Code Amends. 1873-1874 (Pen. Code) ch. 508, § 1, p. 457.)
So stood the 1874 death penalty law in pertinent part until it was changed in 1957. (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, §§ 1-2, pp. 3509-3510.) Section 190 of the Penal Code continued to provide that “[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of’ the trier of fact. (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 1, p. 3509.) Section 190.1 was added to state: “The guilt or innocence of every person charged with an offense for which the penalty is in the alternative death or imprisonment for life shall first be determined, without a finding as to penalty. If such person has been found guilty of [such] an offense . . . , there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant’s background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. The determination of the penalty . . . shall be in the discretion of the [trier of fact] on the evidence presented . . . .” (Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, §2, pp. 3509-3510.)
Thus, the 1957 death penalty law bifurcated the capital trial into guilt and penalty phases. It also defined the issues that were material at the penalty phase. It did not, however, adopt any rules of evidence peculiar thereto. *371Rather, it simply allowed the generally applicable evidentiary rules to govern. In People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 636 [343 P.2d 577] (hereafter sometimes Jones), we stated in dictum that “[i]t would appear that” section 190.1 of the Penal Code under the 1957 law “embodies the broad, liberal rule on admission of evidence that has always existed where a defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues being tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed.” (People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 647.) This language barely survived the filing of the opinion. In People v. Purvis (1959) 52 Cal.2d 871 [346 P.2d 22] (hereafter sometimes Purvis), disapproved on another point by People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 648-649 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], we held, albeit without mention of Jones, that, if evidence is inadmissible at the guilt phase, it is also inadmissible at the penalty phase; and that section 190.1 did not render evidence that was inadmissible at the guilt phase admissible at the penalty phase, but merely “broadenfed] the scope of relevant evidence admissible on the issue of penalty . . . .” (People v. Purvis, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 883.) Subsequently, in People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412] (hereafter sometimes Hamilton), disapproved on another point by People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pages 648-649, we held to the same effect in the very face of Jones: If evidence is inadmissible at the guilt phase, it is also inadmissible at the penalty phase (People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 128-131); section 190.1 did not render evidence that was inadmissible at the guilt phase admissible at the penalty phase—it did not “relax[] the manner in which the relevant facts may be proved” (60 Cal.2d at p. 128, fn. 9)—but merely “broaden[ed] and enlarge[d] the permissible range of inquiry” {ibid..). Among the rules of evidence applicable at the penalty phase as well as at the guilt phase, as we expressly recognized in Purvis, is the one that declares that hearsay—an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated—is generally inadmissible. (People v. Purvis, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 883.) Hence, our conclusion in People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 372 [78 Cal.Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395] (hereafter sometimes Nye), expressly based on our holding in Hamilton: “Objectionable hearsay evidence is no more admissible at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.”
In People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880] (hereafter Anderson), we declared the 1957 death penalty law to be invalid under the cruel or unusual punishment clause of former section 6, present section 17, of article I of the California Constitution. Later that year, in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726] (hereafter Furman), the United States Supreme Court raised a question whether state death penalty laws then in operation were invalid under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the *372United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least insofar as such laws provided for the discretionary imposition of capital punishment. Still later that year, our decision in Anderson was overruled by popular initiative (Prop. 17, approved by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972)), which added section 27 to article I of the California Constitution, stating that the 1957 law was in “full force and effect” and did not authorize a punishment that was “cruel or unusual . . . within the meaning of’ the state charter.
In 1973, in evident response to Furman and its questioning of the discretionary imposition of capital punishment, the 1957 death penalty law was replaced with one similar to that of 1872, which provided for the mandatory imposition of capital punishment without a penalty phase. (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, §§ 1-15, pp. 1297-1302.)
Under the 1973 death penalty law, a new section 190 was added to the Penal Code (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, §2, p. 1297) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1957 counterpart (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 1, p. 1297), stating that “[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death if any one or more of’ certain enumerated “special circumstances” were found true (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 2, p. 1297).
So too a new section 190.1 was added to the Penal Code under the 1973 death penalty law (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 4, p. 1298) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1957 counterpart (Stats. 1973, ch. 719, § 3, p. 1298): the repealed provision had established the penalty phase and had defined the issues that were material thereat; the new one did not reestablish such a phase or redefine such issues.
In Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101] (hereafter sometimes Rockwell), we declared the 1973 death penalty law to be invalid under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as construed in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909], Proffitt v. Florida (1976) 428 U.S. 242 [49 L.Ed.2d 913, 96 S.Ct. 2960], Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262 [49 L.Ed.2d 929, 96 S.Ct. 2950], Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978], and Roberts v. Louisiana (1976) 428 U.S. 325 [49 L.Ed.2d 974, 96 S.Ct. 3001], because it provided for the mandatory imposition of capital punishment without allowing the trier of fact to consider “evidence of mitigating circumstances as to the offense or in the personal characteristics of the defendant,” and without affording it “specific detailed guidelines as to the relevance of such evidence in determining whether death is an appropriate punishment” (Rockwell v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 445).
*373In 1977, in response to Rockwell, the 1973 deáth penalty law was replaced with one similar to that of 1957, which provided for the discretionary imposition of capital punishment after a penalty phase. (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §§ 1-26, pp. 1255-1266.)
Under the 1977 death penalty law, a new section 190 was added to the Penal Code (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 5, p. 1256) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1973 counterpart (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §4, p. 1256), stating that “[e]very person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole, or confinement in state prison for life” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 5, p. 1256).
So too, a new section 190.1 was added to the Penal Code under the 1977 death penalty law (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, §7, p. 1257) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1973 counterpart (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 6, p. 1257), again establishing a penalty phase.
Likewise, a new section 190.2 was added to the Penal Code under the 1977 death penalty law (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1257) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1973 counterpart (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 8, p. 1257) , stating that “[t]he penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of’ certain enumerated “special circumstances” was found true (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1257).
Then, a new section 190.3 was added to the Penal Code under the 1977 death penalty law (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1260) in place of its contemporaneously repealed 1973 counterpart (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 10, p. 1258) , again defining issues that were material at the penalty phase. It bears close scrutiny.
In its Penal Code section 190.3, evidently in response to Rockwell’s implicit requirement to allow the trier of fact to consider “evidence of mitigating circumstances as to the offense or in the personal characteristics of the defendant” (Rockwell v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 445), the 1977 death penalty law defined the issues that were material at the penalty phase: “In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the expressed or implied threat to *374use force or violence, and the defendant’s character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. [00 However, no evidence shall be admitted regarding other criminal activity by the defendant which did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or which did not involve the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. As used in this section, criminal activity does not require a conviction. [00 However, in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and was acquitted.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1259.)
Also in its Penal Code section 190.3, evidently in response to Rockwell's implicit requirement to afford the trier of fact “specific detailed guidelines as to the relevance of [the] evidence [in question] in determining whether death is an appropriate punishment” (Rockwell v. Superior Court, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 445), the 1977 death penalty law for the first time articulated the factors that were to inform the determination of penalty: “In determining the penalty the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant: [<JD (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true . . . . [H (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. [<][| (c) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. [00 (d) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. [00 (e) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. [00 (f) Whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. [00 (g) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or the affects [sic] of intoxication. [00 (h) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. [00 (i) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. [00 (j) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1259-1260.)
Thus, like its predecessor in 1957, the 1977 death penalty law bifurcated the capital trial into guilt and penalty phases. Also like that of 1957, the 1977 law defined the issues that were material at the latter phase, although in addition it articulated the factors that were to inform the underlying determination. Finally, like that of 1957, the 1977 law did not adopt any rules of *375evidence peculiar to the penalty phase. Rather, it simply allowed the generally applicable evidentiary rules to govern. As a result, we implicitly concluded in People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433], what we had explicitly concluded in Nye: “Objectionable hearsay evidence is no more admissible at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.” (People v. Nye, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 372; see People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 68-71 (plur. opn. by Broussard, J.); id. at p. 75 (dis. opn. of Kaus, J.).)
Lastly, in 1978, the 1977 death penalty law was replaced, by popular initiative, with the present law, which continues to provide for the discretionary imposition of capital punishment after a penalty phase. (Prop. 7, approved by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978), as amended.)
The 1978 death penalty law is substantially similar to the 1977 law. In its Penal Code section 190.2, however, it adds to and expands the enumerated special circumstances. In its Penal Code section 190.3, it includes in the list of issues that are material at the penalty phase “any prior felony conviction or convictions whether or not such conviction or convictions involved a crime of violence.” In the same provision, for purpose of conformity, it includes in the list of factors that are to inform the underlying determination “(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.” The presence or absence of a prior felony conviction “reflects on the relative contributions of character and situation”—its presence “suggests that the capital offense is the product more of the defendant’s basic character than of the accidents of his situation, whereas its absence suggests the opposite.” (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 208-209, fn. 1 [276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Its presence also “reveals that the defendant had been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that criminal conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson.” (Id. at p. 209, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
Thus, like its predecessor in 1977, the 1978 death penalty law bifurcates the capital trial into guilt and penalty phases. Also like that of 1977, the 1978 law defines the issues that are material at the penalty phase—including all felony convictions1—and articulates the factors that are to inform the underlying determination—including such convictions. Finally, like that of 1977, the 1978 law does not adopt any rules of evidence peculiar to the penalty phase. Rather, it simply allows the generally applicable evidentiary *376rules to govern. As a result, we explicitly concluded in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436] (hereafter sometimes Edwards), what we had explicitly concluded in Nye: “ ‘Objectionable hearsay evidence is no more admissible at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 838, quoting People v. Nye, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 372.)
II
Having set out the history and outline of the death penalty law at some length, we may now turn to the question whether a defendant’s prior conviction of a felony involving force or violence is, indeed, inadmissible hearsay when offered at the penalty phase to prove that he actually engaged in conduct involving force or violence. The analysis is simple. Let us take the steps together.
First, the 1978 death penalty law, like each of its predecessors providing for a penalty phase, does not adopt any rules of evidence peculiar thereto, but simply allows the generally applicable evidentiary rules to govern.
Second, as we held in Purvis and Hamilton, if evidence is inadmissible at the guilt phase, it is also inadmissible at the penalty phase. (People v. Purvis, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 883; People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 128-131.)
Third, hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.
Fourth, at the penalty phase as well as at the guilt phase, hearsay is generally inadmissible. To quote Edwards, which in turn quotes Nye: “ ‘Objectionable hearsay evidence is no more admissible at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 838, quoting People v. Nye, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 372.)
Fifth, hearsay encompasses a prior felony conviction when offered to prove that the defendant actually engaged in the underlying conduct. Such a conviction is in substance a statement by a previous court that the defendant did in truth engage in the conduct in question. We so held in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297-298 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938] (hereafter sometimes Wheeler).
Sixth, hearsay encompasses a prior felony conviction involving force or violence when offered at the penalty phase to prove that the defendant actually engaged in conduct involving force or violence.
*377Seventh, a prior felony conviction is not inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant actually engaged in the underlying conduct if it comes within an exception for use in a civil action. (Evid. Code, § 1300.) In Wheeler, we explained that, “despite its hearsay character, ‘[such a conviction] is peculiarly reliable.’ The ‘seriousness of the chargef]’ . . . encourages its full litigation, and the reasonable doubt standard of conviction ensures ‘that the question of guilt will be thoroughly considered.’ ” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 298.) Likewise, a prior felony conviction is not inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant actually engaged in the underlying conduct if it comes within an exception for use, apparently in any action, to attack his credibility as a witness. (Evid. Code, § 788.) But unless it comes within at least one of these exceptions, a prior felony conviction is, indeed, inadmissible hearsay when offered to prove that the defendant actually engaged in the underlying conduct.
Therefore, to the question with which we are here concerned, the answer is yes. A defendant’s prior conviction of a felony involving force or violence is, indeed, inadmissible hearsay when offered at the penalty phase to prove that he actually engaged in conduct involving force or violence. By its very terms, the civil action exception is inapplicable. So too the credibility exception.
Ill
In what can only be called a novel discussion, the Chief Justice gives a negative answer to our question, saying that a defendant’s prior conviction of a felony involving force or violence is not inadmissible hearsay when offered at the penalty phase to prove that he actually engaged in conduct involving force or violence. He errs thereby. Such is the lesson of the analysis presented above. In an effort to prevent the mischief that would otherwise be sure to follow, I shall attempt to expose the source and substance of his error.
As his foundation, the Chief Justice chooses the Jones dictum that “[i]t would appear that” section 190.1 of the Penal Code under the 1957 death penalty law “embodies the broad, liberal rule on admission of evidence that has always existed where a defendant has pleaded guilty and the only issues being tried relate to the degree of the crime and the penalty to be imposed.” (People v. Jones, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 647.) He builds on sand. That is because, in Purvis and Hamilton, we effectively disapproved that language. In Purvis and Hamilton, we held: If evidence is inadmissible at the guilt phase, it is also inadmissible at the penalty phase; section 190.1 did not render evidence that was inadmissible at the guilt phase admissible at the *378penalty phase, but merely, in Purvis's words, “broaden[ed] the scope of relevant evidence admissible on the issue of penalty” (People v. Purvis, supra, 52 Cal.2d at p. 883) or, in Hamilton's words, “broaden[ed] and enlarge[d] the permissible range of inquiry” (People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Cal.2d at p. 128, fn. 9).
The Chief Justice asserts reason supports his position that prior felony convictions involving force or violence are excepted from the hearsay rule when offered at the penalty phase to prove force or violence. It does not. He seems to base his argument on the declaration in Penal Code section 190.3 that, for purposes of criminal activity involving force or violence, “criminal activity does not require a conviction.” He draws the expected and reasonable inference that such criminal activity is admissible whether or not it resulted in a conviction. But he then purports to draw an inference of an altogether different sort, to the effect that the conviction itself is admissible. That is a non sequitur.
The Chief Justice then says that authority supports his position that prior felony convictions involving force or violence are excepted from the hearsay rule when offered at the penalty phase to prove force or violence. It does not. None of the cases on which he relies even considers the proposition whether such convictions are hearsay; at most, some merely assume that they are admissible. (See People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 [280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620 [274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262 [266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 38-84 [222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423] (plur. opn. by Reynoso, J.); People v. McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 812-819 [80 Cal.Rptr. 31, 457 P.2d 871] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.); People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]; People v. Pike (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086], disapproved on another point, People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pp. 648-649.) “ ‘It is axiomatic,’ of course, ‘that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.’” (People v. Jones (1995) 11 Cal.4th 118, 123, fn. 2 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 899 P.2d 1358], quoting People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7 [82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].) It may be natural to assume that a prior felony conviction is admissible. *379(See, e.g., People v. McClellan, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 818 (conc. and dis.opn. of Mosk, J.).) As we explained in Wheeler, “despite its hearsay character, ‘[such a conviction] is peculiarly reliable.’ ” (People v. Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 298.) The fact remains, however, that a conviction of this sort is indeed hearsay and, as such, generally inadmissible.
The Chief Justice finally marshals a parade of horribles: Unless prior felony convictions involving force or violence are excepted from the hearsay rule when offered at the penalty phase to prove force or violence, the People would be required to “retry” the prior felonies and may sometimes be unable to do so successfully.
One may doubt that the People would be required to “retry” prior felonies involving force or violence. Our experience teaches us that the record of conviction is often replete with evidence of force or violence that comes comfortably within established exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as admissions by the defendant himself (Evid. Code, § 1220) and former testimony by witnesses at the earlier proceedings (id., § 1291). (See, e.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 589-590 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290] [former testimony]; People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 632-633 [admission].)
One may also doubt that the People would complain of any requirement to “retry” prior felonies involving force or violence. Our decisions demonstrate that they freely shoulder the burden, much to the chagrin of defendants, in order to display the bloody deeds themselves instead of relying on a bloodless piece of paper evidencing a conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 230-231 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 787-789 [276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638-641 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 445 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 754-757; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1201-1203.)
But one cannot doubt that, in some isolated case, the People might be unable to “retry” a prior felony successfully. That may be a fact, yet it is of no consequence. In Edwards we held that a defendant’s right under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to present “all ‘relevant mitigating evidence’ . . .” does not “entitle[] him to present any evidence” of this sort “in any form he desires,” including hearsay. (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 837.) Out of simple fairness, we should hold that whatever right the People may have under any source of law to present all *380aggravating evidence does not entitle them to present any evidence of this sort in any form they desire, including hearsay.
IV
With all that said, because I am persuaded of the soundness of its reasoning and the correctness of its result, I concur in the opinion prepared for the court by Justice Baxter.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 26, 1996.

It is of course at least arguable that, in Penal Code section 190.3, the 1977 death penalty law impliedly included all prior felony convictions in its list of issues that were material at the penalty phase. Recall that the law provided that, “[i]n the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented” generally “as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence . . . .” (Stats. 1977, ch. 316, § 11, pp. 1258-1259, italics added.) As explained in the text, a prior felony conviction is such a matter.