Court Opinion

ID: 9959043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:06:17.515162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:24.018509
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0499
                               Filed April 10, 2024

ATIBA A. SPELLMAN,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Amy M. Moore, Judge.

      Atiba Spellman appeals the grant of summary judgment and dismissal of

his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

      Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

       Atiba Spellman appeals the grant of summary judgment and dismissal of

his application for postconviction relief (PCR). Spellman contends the court should

have reached the merits of his claim that his PCR counsel was ineffective for failing

to “timely depose trial counsel.” Upon our review, we affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       In 2009, a jury found Spellman guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.

This court previously set forth the following facts surrounding the incident leading

to Spellman’s charges as follows:

       On December 6, 2008, Spellman killed Shakena Varnell (also known
       as Amy) and Michael Odikra by stabbing them several times with a
       knife. Amy was Spellman’s common law wife, and they had been a
       couple for approximately eight years. She had two children from a
       previous relationship, and the children viewed Spellman as their
       stepfather. Amy was having an affair with Odikra. Evidence at trial
       indicated Spellman knew, or at least strongly suspected, that the
       affair was going on several months prior to the night of the murders.
       This evidence includes the testimony of various people who stated
       Spellman told them he thought Odikra and Amy were having an affair
       and that he wanted to harm Odikra.
               At 6:30 p.m. on December 5, Spellman called Amy’s uncle,
       David Varnell, and told David that Odikra and Amy were having an
       affair. At 9:00 p.m. Spellman picked up Amy’s son at the movies.
       They drove to Odikra’s residence, and Spellman told the boy to look
       under the garage door to confirm Amy’s car was there. They then
       waited outside the residence for approximately three hours, and
       around midnight, Spellman drove Amy’s son home. Phone records
       revealed Spellman called Amy’s phone approximately forty-one
       times that night. He also called several people in an attempt to
       contact Amy, and these witnesses testified Spellman seemed very
       agitated. When Amy called her son’s phone Spellman spoke with
       her and told her to “stop playing these games.”
               Phone records further revealed that at approximately 12:30
       a.m., Spellman called his supervisor at the Ames Tribune to report
       that he would not be able to deliver the morning paper due to car
       trouble and that he had broken down in Waterloo. At 2:07 a.m.,
       Spellman spoke with an old friend, Levarn Davis, and said he was
       driving to Waterloo. Davis then tried to reach Amy because he was
                                          3

         afraid for Amy’s safety, but he got no answer. The records showed
         Spellman was not truthful about his location and that he was actually
         in Ames.
                 At approximately 2:15 a.m., Odikra’s body was discovered
         outside Amy’s residence, and Amy was found inside the apartment
         door. Both were unclothed. Blood from the two victims and
         Spellman was found in the residence. Additionally, there were signs
         of forced entry—the door had been dead bolted shut but had been
         forced open, resulting in several splinters from the door frame
         throughout the entryway. An autopsy showed Amy had a total of
         thirteen stab wounds as well as blunt force trauma, and Odikra had
         seven stab wounds, defensive wounds, and blunt force trauma.
                 A warrant was issued for Spellman’s arrest. At 10:30 a.m. on
         December 6, Spellman called David, and David informed Spellman
         the victims were dead. At 11:30 a.m., Spellman called Davis and
         said that he was in Des Moines. Davis gave Spellman a phone
         number for the authorities and told him he should call. On
         December 7, Spellman called Special Agent Don Schnitker, who
         informed him warrants had been issued. Spellman stated he was in
         Des Moines and would turn himself in the following day; however, he
         never arrived at the police station.
                 Phone records indicated Spellman was traveling around the
         central and south eastern parts of United States during these two
         days, and on December 8, he was in Raleigh, North Carolina. Iowa
         authorities contacted the police in Wayne County, North Carolina
         and requested they be on the lookout for Spellman’s car. The
         morning of December 8, Spellman was apprehended by state police
         in Wayne County and transported back to Iowa. After searching his
         car, authorities discovered blood of both Amy and Odikra. It also
         appeared the floor board had been scrubbed clean.
                 On December 29, 2008, Spellman was charged with two
         counts of murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code
         sections 707.1 and .2 (2007). A jury trial was held, and while
         Spellman admitted he killed the victims, he argued he did so in the
         heat of passion; therefore, he was only guilty of voluntary
         manslaughter. On March 24, 2009, the jury returned a verdict of
         guilty as to both counts of first-degree murder.

State v. Spellman, No. 13-1670, 2015 WL 799538, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25,

2015).

         This court affirmed Spellman’s convictions on direct appeal.      Id. at *5.

Spellman filed his original pro se PCR application on December 15, 2015, which

was amended on March 24, 2018. The district court dismissed the petition, and
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Spellman appealed. This court found the sanction of dismissal was an abuse of

discretion under the facts and reinstated the case in 2019. Spellman v. State, No.

18-0852, 2019 WL 4302124, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). The State subsequently

filed a motion for summary judgment, which after arguments, was granted on

January 19, 2022. Spellman appeals.

II.    Standard of Review

       “We generally review a district court’s denial of an application for

postconviction relief for errors at law.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa

2021). However, “our review is de novo ‘[w]hen the basis for relief implicates a

violation of a constitutional dimension,” including claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 142

(Iowa 2018)); see Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021).

III.   Analysis

       A. Summary Judgment for Postconviction Relief. Iowa Code section 822.6

(2021) governs disposition of a PCR application without a trial on the merits.

Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559–60 (Iowa 2002). The goal “is to provide

a method of disposition once the case has been fully developed by both sides, but

before an actual trial.” Id. at 559 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). This “is

‘analogous to the summary judgment standard’ in Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure

237–40 (now rules 1.981–1.983).” Id. at 559–60 (citing Summage v. State, 579

N.W.2d 821, 822 (Iowa 1980)).

       Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record shows no genuine

issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). The State, as the moving party, bears the burden
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of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material facts. Sheffey v. State,

No. 22-1693, 2023 WL 5601836, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023). The court

views the record in the light most favorable to Spellman and draws all legitimate

inferences from the record in his favor. Id.

       When ruling, “the court does not weigh the evidence.” Linn v. State, 929

N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019) (citing Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 697 N.W.2d

836, 841 (Iowa 2005)). The court determines, faced with the evidence presented,

whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Clinkscales, 697 N.W.2d at 841. If, when taken as a whole, a rational trier of fact

could find for the nonmoving party, there is a genuine issue of material fact, and

the matter should proceed to trial. Linn, 929 N.W.2d at 730.

       Spellman claims there is a genuine issue of fact regarding the strategy used

by his trial counsel during his underlying criminal case.           He claims “[t]he

contradiction between [his] desires and the presentation made by his trial counsel

generates a genuine question of fact.” Spellman also argues he was “not properly

prepared for trial by his trial counsel.” As such he claims he “was not prepared to

answer the questions posed” and “his answers were not helpful to his defense.”

       As the State properly points out, “The law is clear that questions of trial

strategy, including the defense or defenses to raise, is for counsel so long as

counsel’s strategic decision is a reasonable one.” See Forsyth v. State, No. 03-

1378, 2004 WL 1161614, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2004) (noting counsel

breached no essential duty by electing to pursue a fact-based defense rather than

a psychiatric defense; defense counsel’s trial strategy was reasonable under the

facts of the case and was “justifiable”). Additionally, the State correctly points out,
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“[Spellman’s] affidavit merely asserts that he and his attorney disagreed on trial

strategy and alleged that, if his attorney had filed a notice of self-defense,

additional evidence would have been admitted regarding prior violence by one of

the victims against Spellman.”       The district court properly granted summary

judgment.

       B. Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel.           To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, Spellman must show (1) counsel breached an

essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984). “We may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking.” Anfinson v. State, 758

N.W.2d 496, 499 (Iowa 2008).

       Spellman argues his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to raise a

defense of justification to the charges of first-degree murder. He claims his PCR

attorney was ineffective for failing to depose trial counsel. However, as noted in

the State’s brief, this issue is being raised for the first time on appeal and “there is

no evidence in the record as to why Spellman’s postconviction attorney did not

dispose [his] trial attorney, Paul Rounds, or whether Mr. Rounds would have

testified that there was a conflict between Spellman and him on the issue of

whether to raise a justification defense.”

       As such, Spellman’s claim for ineffective assistance of PCR counsel cannot

be resolved due to an inadequate record. See Brown v. State, No. 22-0459, 2023

WL 3335384, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (noting in an appeal from the

denial of PCR, this court declined to reach the merits of Brown’s claim of ineffective

assistance of PCR counsel because the record was inadequate but also
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recognizing Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 2018) provides “a ‘narrow

exception’ allowing an appellate court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim

that PCR trial counsel was ineffective if the existing record is sufficiently developed

to allow resolution”). As explained in Goode and Brown, Spellman would need

additional evidence to support his claim he received ineffective assistance of PCR

counsel. As a result, we cannot resolve this matter.

       Spellman asks we remand the case for a new trial. He insists this remedy

is the only way he can receive the level of representation to which he is entitled.

But in Goode, our supreme court rejected the idea of a remand, finding it was

“contrary to the symmetry of our appellate process and our role as a court of

review.” See 920 N.W.2d at 526.

       We need not decide whether a remand would be proper to resolve a claim

of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel. It is enough to decide it is unnecessary

here. We only “preserve” claims of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel for future

proceedings when they meet the same standard of “stat[ing] the specific ways in

which counsel’s performance was inadequate and identify[ing] how competent

representation probably would have changed the outcome.” Dunbar v. State, 515

N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994). Spellman fails the Dunbar test. Spellman complains

about a failure to depose trial counsel regarding his claimed ongoing conflict about

his defense. Without more facts, we cannot determine if PCR counsel had a

material duty to depose trial counsel and what, if any, errors this caused. As in

Dunbar and Brown, Spellman’s claims are “too general in nature” to allow us to

preserve them for a second PCR proceeding. Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (finding

“[f]or example, Dunbar does not propose what an investigation would have
                                      8

revealed or how anything discovered would have affected the result obtained

below”). In the end, we can neither address nor preserve the claim PCR counsel

was ineffective.

       AFFIRMED.