Court Opinion

ID: 2964454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:57.833448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:59.077114
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                              __________________________

        Nos.  96-1015
              96-1068

                   ROLAND C. DUBOIS and RESTORE:  THE NORTH WOODS,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                  DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
                      and LOON MOUNTAIN RECREATION CORPORATION,

                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET

             The opinion of this Court is amended as follows:

             Cover sheet:  Replace case number "96-1086" with "96-1068".

                            United States Court Of Appeals
                            United States Court Of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                ______________________

        Nos.  96-1015
              96-1068

                   ROLAND C. DUBOIS and RESTORE:  THE NORTH WOODS,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                   UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, ET AL.,
                      and LOON MOUNTAIN RECREATION CORPORATION,

                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                    [Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                      Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                         _____________________
                                 ____________________

            Roland C. Dubois pro se.
                             ___ __
            Cindy Ellen Hill for appellant RESTORE:  The North Woods.
            ________________
            Jeffrey  P. Kehne, Attorney, with whom Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant
            _________________                      ________________
        Attorney General, Sylvia Quast, John A. Bryson, Attorneys, Environment
                          ____________  ______________
        & Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice,  Washington,
        DC,  Paul  M.  Gagnon,  United  States  Attorney,  T.  David  Plourde,
             ________________                              __________________
        Assistant United States  Attorney, Concord, NH, Wendy  M. John, Stuart
                                                        ______________  ______
        L.  Shelton,  Office  of  the  General  Counsel,  U.S.  Department  of
        ___________
        Agriculture,  Washington, DC,  and Leslie M.  Auriemmo, Office  of the
                                           ___________________
        General Counsel,  U.S. Department of Agriculture,  Milwaukee, WI, were
        on  brief  for  appellees  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture;   Daniel
        Glickman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture; Jack Ward Thomas,
        Chief, U.S. Forest Service; Robert Jacobs, Regional Forester,  Eastern
        Region, U.S. Forest Service; Donna Hepp, Forest Supervisor, White 

        Mountain National Forest.
            James  L. Kruse with  whom Gallagher,  Callahan &  Gartrell, P.A.,
            _______________            ______________________________________
        were on brief for appellee Loon Mountain Recreation Corporation.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 19, 1996
                                 ____________________

                                        - 3 -

                      BOWNES,  Senior  Circuit  Judge.    The  defendant-
                      BOWNES,  Senior  Circuit  Judge.
                               ______________________

            intervenor  Loon  Mountain   Recreation  Corporation   ("Loon

            Corp.") operates a ski resort  in the White Mountain National

            Forest in Lincoln,  New Hampshire.   In order  to expand  its

            skiing facilities, Loon Corp. sought and received a permit to

            do  so from  the  United States  Forest Service.1   Appellant

            Roland Dubois sued the  Forest Service alleging violations of

            the National  Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),  42 U.S.C.  

            4321, et seq., the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C.   1251,
                  _______

            et seq., the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.   501, et
            _______                                                    __

            seq. ("APA"), and Executive Order 11,990, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,961
            ____

            (1977),  reprinted as  amended in  42 U.S.C.A.    4321  (West
                     ________________________

            1994).    Appellant  RESTORE:  The  North  Woods  ("RESTORE")

            intervened  as a  plaintiff claiming  violations of  the same

            statutes, and appellee Loon  Corp. intervened as a defendant.

            Dubois and RESTORE (collectively referred to as "plaintiffs")

            and  the  Forest  Service  filed  cross-motions  for  summary

            judgment, and  Loon moved  to dismiss.    The district  court

            granted the Forest Service's  motion for summary judgment and

            denied  the other  motions.   We affirm  in part,  reverse in

            part, and remand.

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The  Forest Service, its  parent organization, the United
            States Department  of Agriculture,  and their agents  will be
            collectively referred  to as "the  Forest Service" throughout
            this opinion.

                                         -4-

                              I.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                              I.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                                   _____________________

                      A. Facts
                      A. Facts
                         _____

                      The White  Mountain National Forest  ("WMNF") is  a

            public resource  managed by the United  States Forest Service

            for  a wide  range  of competing  public  uses and  purposes,

            including "outdoor recreation, range,  timber, watershed, . .

            .  wildlife and fish purposes,"  16 U.S.C.    528 (1994), and

            skiing,  16 U.S.C.   497(b) (1994).  Pursuant to the National

            Forest Management Act of 1976, the Forest Service makes long-

            term  plans to  coordinate  these competing  uses, 16  U.S.C.

              1604(e)(1)   (1994),  and  issues   "special  use"  permits

            authorizing private recreational  services on national forest

            land, 36  C.F.R.    251.50-.65 (1995).   The Forest Service's

            exercise of  its permitting authority is  legally constrained

            by environmental  considerations emanating, inter  alia, from
                                                        ___________

            NEPA, the CWA, and Executive Order 11,990.

                      Loon Pond is located in the WMNF at an elevation of

            2,400 feet.  It has a  surface area of 19 acres, with shallow

            areas around the perimeter  and a central bowl 65  feet deep.

            It is unusual for  its relatively pristine nature.   There is

            virtually no human activity within  the land it drains except

            skiing  at the privately owned  Loon Mountain Ski  Area.  New

            Hampshire  Department  of  Environmental  Services  ("NHDES")

            regulations  classify  Loon  Pond  as a  Class  A  waterbody,

            protected  by  demanding  water  quality  standards  under  a

                                         -5-

            variety of criteria, see  N.H. Code Admin. R.  Env-Ws 432.03,
                                 ___

            and  as  an  Outstanding  Resource  Water ("ORW"),  protected

            against any  measurable long-term degradation  by the State's

            anti-degradation   rules,  see   id.  437.06;  40   C.F.R.   
                                       ___   ___

            131.12(a)(3) (1995).   It ranks in the  upper 95th percentile

            of all lakes and ponds in northern New England for low levels

            of  phosphorus, which  results  in limited  plant growth  and

            therefore  high  water clarity  and  higher  total biological

            production.  The pond supports a rich variety  of life in its

            ecosystem.    Loon Pond  also constitutes  a major  source of

            drinking water for the  town of Lincoln 1,600 feet  below it.

            A dam  across the outlet  of the Pond  regulates the  flow of

            water from the Pond to Lincoln's municipal reservoir.

                      Loon Corp., defendant-intervenor  herein, owns  the

            Loon Mountain  Ski Area, which  has operated since  the 1960s

            not far from  Loon Pond.  Prior  to the permit  revision that

            gave rise to this  litigation, Loon Corp. held a  special use

            permit  to operate on  785 acres of  WMNF land.   That permit

            allowed Loon Corp. to  draw water ("drawdown") for snowmaking

            from Loon  Pond,  as well  as  from the  East Branch  of  the

            Pemigewasset  River ("East  Branch")  and  from nearby  Boyle

            Brook.  In order to use water from Loon Pond, Loon Corp. also

            needed authorization from  the Town of Lincoln  and the State

            of  New  Hampshire.    Beginning  in  1974,  Loon  Corp.  was

            authorized to pump snowmaking water from Loon Pond down to 18

                                         -6-

            inches below full level.2  A 1988 amendment to this agreement

            permitted drawdown below the  18-inch level on a case-by-case

            basis.   Combined uses by  Lincoln and Loon  Corp. during the

            period governed by these agreements typically caused four- to

            six-foot fluctuations in the level of Loon Pond.

                      In  addition to being used as a source of water for

            snowmaking, Loon Pond has been the repository for disposal of

            water  after it  is  pumped through  the snowmaking  system.3

            This includes water that  originally came from Loon Pond,  as

            well  as water that originated in the East Branch or in Boyle

            Brook.   Approximately 250,000  gallons of East  Branch water

            have  been  transferred into  Loon  Pond  each year  in  this

            manner.    Obviously  the  water discharged  into  Loon  Pond

            contains at  least the same  pollutants that were  present in

            the  intake water.    Evidence in  the record  indicates that

            intake water  taken from  the East Branch  contains bacteria,

            other aquatic  organisms such as  Giardia lambia, phosphorus,

            turbidity and heat.   Evidence was also introduced in  court,

            but not available prior to the  issuance of the Environmental

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The level of Loon Pond drops when Pond water  is used for
            snowmaking, because  the Pond  does not receive  much natural
            water through precipitation during the winter.

            3.  In  order for  Loon  Corp. to  make  snow, it  must  pump
            significantly more water through  the system than is actually
            made into snow.   Passing this extra water through  the pipes
            keeps them from freezing.  It also provides the pressure that
            forces the artificial snow out through snowmaking jets.

                                         -7-

            Impact Statement ("EIS"), that oil and grease were present in

            the discharge water, although their source was disputed.  

                      In 1986,  Loon Corp. applied to  the Forest Service

            for an amendment to its special use permit to allow expansion

            of  its facilities  within the  WMNF.   Pursuant to  NEPA, 42

            U.S.C.     4332, the  Service developed  a  draft EIS,  and a

            supplement  to the  draft.   Responding to  criticism  of the

            adequacy  of those  documents,  the Forest  Service issued  a

            revised draft  EIS ("RDEIS"), which was  published for public

            comment.  The RDEIS  set forth five alternatives to  meet the

            perceived demand for additional alpine skiing.  All five were

            located at the Loon Mountain site.4  

                      Many   individuals   and  groups,   including  both

            plaintiffs, filed comments pointing out various environmental

            problems with each  alternative that  involved expanding  the

            ski area.   One lengthy comment  from the U.S.  Environmental

            Protection Agency ("EPA") expressed  its concern that the use

            of  Loon Pond  for snowmaking  purposes would "use  Loon Pond

            like a cistern" instead of treating it "with care" because it

            is "acknowledged to be one of the rare high altitude ponds of

            its size  in the  White Mountains."   Joint  Appendix ("JA"),

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The Forest  Service's ten-year plan for  the WMNF, issued
            in 1986, included  plans for  accommodating increased  demand
            for downhill skiing.   It determined that it would  meet this
            demand through  expansion of  existing ski areas  rather than
            through the creation  of new ones.   It did  not discuss  the
            possibility of  meeting the demand  through alternative sites
            outside the national forest.

                                         -8-

            vol. II, Response to Public Comment on RDEIS at  A-78.  Other

            commenters  suggested that  Loon Corp.  be required  to build

            artificial  water storage  ponds, in  order to  eliminate the

            problem  of depleting  Loon Pond  when withdrawing  water for

            snowmaking as  well as  the problem  of adding  pollutants to

            Loon Pond when discharging water into the Pond after use.

                      During the EIS process, Ron Buso, a hydrologist for

            the  WMNF,  expressed  concern  to   another  Forest  Service

            hydrologist that the proposed drawdown of Loon Pond by twenty

            feet  was likely  to have a  severe impact  on the  Pond.  He

            explained that natural snowmelt in New Hampshire is extremely

            acidic  and  that, as  a result  of  the planned  drawdown, a

            substantial amount  of acidic  snowmelt would remain  in Loon

            Pond, increasing the  Pond's acidity  by a factor  of two  to

            three times  what it would  be without the  planned drawdown.

            Without  the drawdown, Loon Pond  would be relatively full in

            the spring, and much of the snowmelt  from surrounding higher

            elevations  would glide over the surface of the Pond and down

            the  mountain without  significantly mixing  with  other Loon

            Pond water.   According to  Buso and a  number of  scientists

            whose affidavits  were submitted  to the district  court, the

            increase in the  Pond's acidity due  to the planned  drawdown

            would change the chemistry of the Pond, cause toxic metals to

                                         -9-

            be released  from the sediment, and  kill naturally occurring

            organisms.

                      Without addressing  the issues raised  in the  Buso

            memorandum or in  the comments suggesting  artificial storage

            ponds, the Forest Service prepared a Final EIS ("FEIS").  The

            FEIS added  a sixth alternative,  also on  the Loon  Mountain

            site.   The new  alternative provided  for expansion of  Loon

            Corp.'s  permit area by 581 acres and for the construction of

            one  new lift and approximately  70 acres of  new ski trails,

            changes designed  to accommodate 3,200  additional skiers per

            day (from  the current 5,800 per  day).   The  Forest Service

            deemed Alternative 6 as the preferred alternative.  Under it,

            Loon  Corp. would more than  double the amount  of water used

            for  snowmaking, from  67  million gallons  per  year to  138

            million gallons.   Seventeen million gallons  of the increase

            would be drawn from  the East Branch, and 54  million gallons

            from  Loon Pond.  In  addition, Loon Corp.  was authorized to

            draw the Pond down  for snowmaking by fifteen feet,  compared

            to the current eighteen  inches.  The Forest  Service assumed

            that the Town of Lincoln would need up  to an additional five

            feet  of Pond water, making  a total of  twenty feet that the

            Pond was  expected to be  drawn down  each year.   This would

            constitute approximately 63%  of the Pond's water.   In March

            1993, the Forest Service published a Record of Decision (ROD)

            adopting Alternative 6.

                                         -10-

                      As  a  mitigation  measure  to  blunt  the  adverse

            environmental  impact  on  Loon  Pond,  the   Forest  Service

            required Loon Corp.  to pump  water from the  East Branch  to

            Loon Pond  in December and May  of each year if  the Pond was

            not otherwise full at those times.   In its FEIS, the  Forest

            Service  recognized  that the  East  Branch  is a  relatively

            unprotected  Class B  waterway under  New Hampshire  law, and

            that  transfer of East Branch water to Loon Pond, a protected

            Class A waterbody and  Outstanding Resource Water under state

            and federal  law, would  introduce pollutants into  the Pond.

            Accordingly, it  specified that this transfer  of East Branch

            water  could  not occur  if  it  exceeded certain  levels  of

            turbidity, bacteria, or oil and grease.  Neither the FEIS nor

            the  ROD  set  any limits,  however,  on  the  level of  non-

            bacterial organisms  such as Giardia lambia  or on pollutants

            such as  phosphorus that  may be  present in the  transferred

            water.  Nor  did the  FEIS indicate an  alternative means  of

            refilling Loon Pond -- with clean water -- if conditions were

            such  that the transfer of East Branch water would exceed the

            specified  levels.5   It did,  however,  provide a  series of

            restrictions and monitoring requirements for water levels and

                                
            ____________________

            5.  As noted  supra, absent  some other method  of refilling,
                          _____
            the Pond would be refilled by the melting of acidic snow.

                                         -11-

            water  quality,  including daily  testing of  the transferred

            water for turbidity, bacteria, and oil and grease.6

                      Dubois and RESTORE appealed the ROD to the Regional

            Forester and, thereafter, to the Chief of the Forest Service.

            These appeals were  denied.   On March 16,  1994, the  Forest

            Service  issued   a  special   use  permit  to   Loon  Corp.,

            implementing the decision described in the ROD.

                      B. Proceedings Below
                      B. Proceedings Below
                         _________________

                      Plaintiff  Dubois filed a  complaint in  the United

            States  District   Court  for  the   District  of  Columbia,7

            challenging   the  Forest  Service's  approval  of  the  Loon

            Mountain  expansion  project.    He  made  three  arguments.8

            First, he argued that the Forest Service actions violated the

            CWA  because they  would lead  to violations  of state  water

            quality  standards which,  he  asserted, have  the effect  of

            federal law because  they were approved  by the federal  EPA.

            Second, he argued that the Forest Service  violated both NEPA

                                
            ____________________

            6.  In  response  to  an  earlier  draft  EIS,  the  EPA  had
            expressed the  following concern:    "While monitoring  plans
            have  merit, they should not be considered a substitute for a
            thorough evaluation  of a  project and its  potential impacts
            prior  to action  approval."   JA, vol.  I, at  97; see  also
                                                                _________
            Massachusetts  v. Watt, 716 F.2d  946, 951-52 (1st Cir. 1983)
            ______________________
            (NEPA "requires  an EIS according  to its terms,"  before the
            agency becomes "committed to  [a] previously chosen course of
            action").

            7.  The  case  was later  transferred  to  the United  States
            District Court for the District of New Hampshire.

            8.  Plaintiffs  made  other  arguments  below,  but  have not
            pursued them on appeal.

                                         -12-

            and   Executive   Order  11,990   by   failing   to  consider

            alternatives to the use  of Loon Pond and failing  to develop

            adequate mitigation  measures.   Finally, he argued  that the

            Forest Service violated the CWA, 33 U.S.C.   1311, by failing

            to obtain a National  Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System

            ("NPDES")  permit  before  approving Loon  Corp.'s  expansion

            plans, which  entailed removing  water from the  East Branch,

            using it to pressurize and prevent freezing in its snowmaking

            equipment,  and then  discharging  the used  water into  Loon

            Pond.  According to  Dubois, an NPDES permit was  required in

            order  for Loon Corp. to discharge pollutants into Loon Pond,

            including   the  discharge   from  Loon   Corp.'s  snowmaking

            equipment.     Plaintiff RESTORE,  a membership organization,

            intervened on behalf of its members to challenge the project.

            RESTORE first  reiterated Dubois' claim that  an NPDES permit

            was  required.  In addition,  RESTORE claimed that the Forest

            Service violated  NEPA by  failing to prepare  a Supplemental

            EIS  after  it  developed  Alternative  6  as  the  preferred

            alternative.  According to RESTORE, this new alternative, not

            specifically mentioned in the  previously published draft EIS

            or  RDEIS,  contained  substantial changes  to  the  proposed

            action  that  are relevant  to environmental  concerns, which

            required   a  supplemental  EIS   under  NEPA   and  relevant

            implementing regulations.   Finally, RESTORE  claimed that  a

            supplemental  EIS was  required because the  Forest Service's

                                         -13-

            Final  EIS  failed  to  "rigorously explore  and  objectively

            evaluate all  reasonable  alternatives" that  are capable  of

            meeting  the stated goals of  the project, as  required by 40

            C.F.R.   1502.14 (1995).  According to RESTORE, the  asserted

            goal of meeting skier demand could have been met by expanding

            ski  areas other than Loon, in  particular, ski areas located

            outside the White Mountain National Forest.

                      The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.  Loon

            Corp.  intervened, and  moved to  dismiss on the  ground that

            both plaintiffs  lacked standing.  The  district court denied

            Loon Corp.'s motion to  dismiss, granted summary judgment for

            the Forest  Service, and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motions

            for summary judgment.

                               II.   DUBOIS' STANDING9
                               II.   DUBOIS' STANDING
                                     ________________

                      The ingredients of  standing are imprecise and  not

            easily  susceptible to  concrete  definitions  or  mechanical

            applications.  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  In
                           _______________

            order to have standing to sue, a plaintiff must have "such  a

            personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure

            that concrete adverseness which  sharpens the presentation of

            issues  upon   which  the   court  so  largely   depends  for

            illumination of difficult .  . . questions."  Baker  v. Carr,
                                                          ______________

            369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  

                                
            ____________________

            9.  Defendants  have abandoned  their challenge  to RESTORE's
            standing.

                                         -14-

                      Standing consists of  both a constitutional  aspect

            and  a  prudential  aspect.    The  constitutional  dimension

            derives from the requirement that federal courts can act only

            upon  a justiciable  case or controversy.   U.S.  Const. art.

            III.  If a party lacks Article III standing to bring a matter

            before the court, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

            to decide the merits of the underlying case.  FW/PBS, Inc. v.
                                                          _______________

            City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990).
            ______________

                      To   satisfy   the   constitutional  component   of

            standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact,"

            i.e.,  an invasion of a legally protected interest.  Lujan v.
            ____                                                 ________

            Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  That injury
            _____________________

            must be "concrete and  particularized"; the latter term means

            the injury must be personal  to the plaintiff.  Id. at  560 &
                                                            ___

            n.1.   It may  be  shared by  many others,  United States  v.
                                                        _________________

            Students  Challenging  Regulatory Agency  Procedures (SCRAP),
            ____________________________________________________________

            412  U.S.  669,  687-88 (1973),  but  may  not  be common  to

            everyone, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).  The
                      ___ _______________

            injury must also be  "actual or imminent, not  conjectural or

            hypothetical,"  Defenders  of  Wildlife,   504  U.S.  at  560
                            _______________________

            (quotation omitted), and it  must be "distinct and palpable,"

            Warth,  422 U.S.  at  501.   The  latter requirement  may  be
            _____

            satisfied by environmental or aesthetic injuries.  See SCRAP,
                                                               ___ _____

            412  U.S. at  686; Sierra Club  v. Morton, 405  U.S. 727, 734
                               ______________________

            (1972).   The  injury need  not be  "significant";  a "small"

                                         -15-

            stake in the outcome will suffice, if it is "direct."  SCRAP,
                                                                   _____

            412 U.S. at 689 n.14.  In addition, the injury must be fairly

            traceable to  the defendant's allegedly  unlawful conduct and

            likely to be redressed by the requested relief.10   Defenders
                                                                _________

            of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
            ___________

                      The doctrine  of standing also  includes prudential

            concerns  relating   to  the   proper  exercise   of  federal

            jurisdiction.   Among these concerns is  the requirement that

            "a plaintiff's  complaint fall  within the zone  of interests

            protected  by the law invoked."  Allen,  468 U.S. at 751.  In
                                             _____

            addition, as a general rule, a plaintiff "must assert his own

            legal  rights and  interests, and  cannot rest  his claim  to

            relief on the  legal rights or  interests of third  parties."

            Warth,  422   U.S.  at   499.    A   membership  organization
            _____

            constitutes an exception to this general rule: it  may assert

            the claims of its members, provided  that one or more of  its

            members   would  satisfy  the   individual  requirements  for

                                
            ____________________

            10.  Violations of procedural  rights, such as  those created
            by NEPA and CWA, receive "special" treatment when it comes to
            standing.   "The person who  has been  accorded a  procedural
            right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right
            without meeting  all the normal standards  for redressability
            and  immediacy."  Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
                              _____________________
            As  an example, the  Supreme Court points  to "the procedural
            requirement  for an  environmental impact statement  before a
            federal facility is constructed next door" to the plaintiffs.
            Id. at 572.   The contrasting example -- where  the disregard
            ___
            of procedural requirements  would be held  not to impair  the
                                                       ___
            plaintiffs' concrete  interests -- is "persons  who live (and
            propose  to live) at the  other end of  the country" from the
            project.  Id. at 572 n.7.
                      ___

                                         -16-

            standing in  his or her own  right.11  See UAW  v. Brock, 477
                                                   ___ _____________

            U.S. 274, 281-82 (1986).

                      The  burden  falls  on  the  plaintiff  "clearly to

            allege  facts  demonstrating that  he  is a  proper  party to

            invoke" federal jurisdiction.   Warth, 422 U.S. at 518.   The
                                            _____

            plaintiff  must   "set  forth  reasonably   definite  factual

            allegations,  either  direct or  inferential,  regarding each

            material element needed to  sustain standing."  United States
                                                            _____________

            v.  AVX Corp., 962  F.2d 108, 115  (1st Cir.  1992).  "[E]ach
            _____________

            element must be supported in the same way as any other matter

            on  which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with
                                                               ____

            the manner and degree of  evidence required at the successive

            stages of  the litigation."  Defenders of  Wildlife, 504 U.S.
                                         ______________________

            at 561.  At the  pleading stage, "general factual allegations

            of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice,

            for  on  a motion  to  dismiss  we  'presum[e]  that  general

            allegations embrace  those specific facts  that are necessary

            to  support the  claim.'"   Id.  (quoting  Lujan v.  National
                                        ___            __________________

            Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
            ___________________

                      The district  court denied  Loon Corp.'s  motion to

            dismiss Dubois'  claims on  standing grounds, relying  on our

                                
            ____________________

            11.  An association must meet two other requirements in order
            to  have standing to sue:  the  interests that the suit seeks
            to  vindicate must be germane to the objectives for which the
            organization was  formed; and neither the  claim asserted nor
            the relief  requested requires the personal  participation of
            affected  individuals.   UAW  v.  Brock,  477  U.S. 274,  282
                                     ______________
            (1986).

                                         -17-

            precedent  in  Washington Legal  Found. v.  Massachusetts Bar
                           ______________________________________________

            Found., 993  F.2d 962, 971-72 (1st Cir. 1993).  In that case,
            ______

            we held that the court need not determine the standing of all

            plaintiffs if at least one plaintiff has standing to maintain

            each  claim.   The  district  court  found that  RESTORE  had

            standing to bring all the claims at  issue in this case, and,

            therefore,  that  the court  could  reach the  merits  of all

            claims without  first addressing Dubois' standing.   We agree

            that RESTORE would have  standing to raise, on behalf  of its

            members, all the issues  in dispute in this litigation.   But

            the  district  court  erred   in  concluding  that  it  could

            therefore  reach  the  merits  of  all  claims,  because  the

            district  court's premise  was incorrect:   RESTORE  did not,

            even at the  district court level, raise  the issues relating

            to  Executive  Order  11,990  and  the  state  water  quality

            standards, which only Dubois is pursuing here.  The situation

            is not, therefore, analogous to Washington Legal  Foundation;
                                            ____________________________

            if  Dubois has  no  standing, we  cannot  decide issues  that

            RESTORE has never raised.

                      We  find, however,  that  Dubois  does satisfy  all

            requirements for standing to litigate  the claims he seeks to

                                         -18-

            pursue  on appeal.   His  second amended  complaint12 alleged

            that

                      [his] principal  residence from 1959-1977
                      was in Lincoln, New  Hampshire.  [He] has
                      returned  to  the Lincoln  area  at least
                      once per year  -- and occasionally up  to
                      twelve or  more times  per year --  since
                      1977.    During  these  trips,  [he]  has
                      visited relatives  and friends, collected
                      botanical    samples    for    scientific
                      analysis,  and  engaged  in  recreational
                      activities in and around the WMNF and the
                      Loon  Mountain  Ski  Area.    Plaintiff's
                      interest     in     the    environmental,
                      recreational and aesthetic quality of the
                      WMNF  are and will  be adversely affected
                      by the Defendants' actions  challenged in
                      this Complaint. 

            Second Amended Complaint,    5.  The last sentence  is rather

            conclusory, but  the  entire complaint,  taken together  with

            inferences  reasonably drawn  from its  allegations, contains

            sufficient  "reasonably  definite factual  allegations," AVX,
                                                                     ___

            962 F.2d at 115, to survive a motion to dismiss.  

                      "We  are mindful  that, under  the notice  pleading

            requirements  of the  federal rules,  the allegations  of the

                                
            ____________________

            12.  Dubois moved for leave to file a third amended complaint
            and a reply brief.  The district court failed to rule on this
            motion until after the court's jurisdiction was terminated by
            the docketing of  RESTORE's appeal.  Dubois asked  this court
            to clarify the status of this motion in light of the district
            court's  order granting  Dubois'  post-judgment motion  under
            Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) for clarification;  the court indicated
            that it had intended to allow the third amended complaint and
            the  reply brief,  but  did not,  due  to clerical  mistakes.
            Docket Entry 79-b.  We need not decide Dubois' motion because
            of  our decision on the  merits.  Resolving  the motion would
            not, in any event, affect our decision on the standing issue,
            because   the  third  amended   complaint  contains  language
            identical to the second regarding standing.

                                         -19-

            complaint should be construed favorably to the complainant on

            a motion to dismiss."  Papex Int'l Brokers v. Chase Manhattan
                                   ______________________________________

            Bank, 821 F.2d 883, 886 (1st  Cir. 1987).  Moreover, as noted
            ____

            supra,  at the  pleading  stage, "we  presum[e] that  general
            _____

            allegations embrace those specific  facts that are  necessary

            to  support the claim."   Defenders of Wildlife,  504 U.S. at
                                      _____________________

            561 (quotation  omitted).   Further, the record  reveals that

            the district court had adduced  additional information during

            its consideration of the  standing issue.  See AVX,  962 F.2d
                                                       ___ ___

            at 114  n.6 (appellate court considering  standing issue went

            beyond  the  complaint "in  a  record-wide  search for  facts

            supporting" the  claim of  standing).  Dubois'  local counsel

            represented  to the  court  that Dubois  continues to  return

            "regularly,"  at  least annually,  to  his  parents' home  in

            Lincoln; that he drinks  the water from the "Town  of Lincoln

            water  supply that comes down from Loon Pond"; that he "walks

            those  mountains" in the  WMNF.  Transcript  of Hearing, June

            14, 1995, at 7-9.   The court expressed its  understanding of

            Dubois' standing allegations as follows:

                      Mr.   Dubois'  injury   in  fact   is  he
                      periodically comes back  to the area  and
                      enjoys  its natural  beauty  and will  be
                      injured  by not being  able to experience
                      its  natural beauty  if  the  project  is
                      allowed  to go forward? . . .  It's not a
                      case  of someone who's  simply saying I'm
                      an environmentalist and I want to protect
                      the    environment,    which    everybody
                      presumably  has  an  interest  in  doing.
                      It's somebody who  says I'm back  there a
                      lot,  I drink  the  water a  lot, I'm  up

                                         -20-

                      there  in the  woods a  lot, and  this is
                      going to hurt me.

            Id. at 8, 12.
            ___

                      We think it useful to  compare the facts here  with

            those  alleged in  AVX,  962 F.2d  at  116-17.   In  AVX, the
                               ___                               ___

            plaintiff organization had simply made conclusory allegations

            that its "members have been and will continue to be harmed by

            the releases  that [were] the subject  of [that] litigation";

            its  "averment  [had]  no   substance:  the  members   [were]

            unidentified; their  places of  abode [were] not  stated; the

            extent and  frequency of any  individual use of  the affected

            resources [was] left  open to surmise."   Id.  This court  in
                                                      ___

            AVX pointed to  the allegations  in SCRAP, 412  U.S. 669,  as
            ___                                 _____

            attenuated  as they  were, in  which "there was  a geographic

            nexus;  all the  association's members  resided in  a single,

            defined  metropolitan   area,   directly  affected   by   the

            challenged action. . . .  In SCRAP, unlike [AVX], the claimed
                                         _____          ___

            environmental injury  was tied to the  particular pursuits of

            particular persons."  AVX, 962 F.2d at 117.
                                  ___

                      The instant case, in  contrast with AVX, presents a
                                                          ___

            particular  person, whose  family  home is  located  squarely

            within the geographical  area allegedly directly  affected by

            the  proposed project,  who  visits the  area regularly,  who

            drinks  the   water  which  will  allegedly   be  tainted  by

            pollutants,  and  who  will  allegedly  be  deprived  of  his

            environmental,  aesthetic and  scientific  interests in  ways

                                         -21-

            directly  tied to the project  he challenges.   These are the

            types of interests which  the Supreme Court has held  -- when

            asserted  by an organization such as RESTORE on behalf of its

            members   --  satisfy  the  constitutional  requirements  for

            standing.   See  SCRAP, 412  U.S. at  685-87; Sierra  Club v.
                        ___  _____                        _______________

            Morton, 405 U.S.  at 734-35 & n.8;  see also supra, note  10.
            ______                              ________ _____

            There  is certainly no reason  why an organization would have

            standing to raise these interests  on behalf of its  members,

            but an individual such  as Dubois would not have  standing to

            raise the same interests on his own behalf.

                      Thus, with the  degree of specificity  necessary at

            the pleading stage, Dubois has articulated -- directly and by

            inference  -- how  his personal  interests will  be adversely

            affected  by the  Loon  expansion proposal.13   Finally,  his

            injuries  are "likely to be  redressed" by the  relief he has

            requested  in  the  complaint:   inter  alia,  an  injunction
                                             ___________

            against the project's proceeding.  See Defenders of Wildlife,
                                               ___ _____________________

            504 U.S. at 560-61.

                                
            ____________________

            13.  Our analysis is not altered by the fact that three of
            the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The
            standing issue was raised only in Loon Corp.'s motion to
            dismiss.  Where, as here, the defendants have not
            contradicted the factual allegations concerning standing that
            we deem adequate at the motion to dismiss stage, we will not
            subject those allegations to a summary judgment level of
            scrutiny in the absence of a motion for summary judgment on
            the issue.  In these circumstances, "[t]he standing analysis
            is no different, as a result of the case having proceeded to
            summary judgment, than it would have been at the pleading
            stage."  Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
                     ________________________________________
            26, 37 n.15 (1976).

                                         -22-

                      As  for the prudential standing requirements, there

            is no dispute that the violations and injuries alleged in the

            complaint  are the sort that NEPA, the CWA, and the Executive

            Order were "specifically designed" to protect.  See Lujan  v.
                                                            ___ _________

            National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. at 886.  Moreover, our
            ____________________________

            discussion above related only to Dubois' own legal rights and

            interests, not those  of third parties.  Accordingly, we find

            that Dubois has standing  to litigate the claims he  seeks to

            pursue on appeal.

                              III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
                              III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
                                     __________________

                      The   district   court's  order   granting  summary

            judgment  is subject to de  novo review.   Borschow Hosp. and
                                    ________           __________________

            Medical Supplies v. Cesar Castillo, Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 14 (1st
            ________________________________________

            Cir. 1996);  Lawrence v. Northrop Corp., 980 F.2d 66, 68 (1st
                         __________________________

            Cir. 1992).  We independently weigh the merits of the summary

            judgment motions  "without deference to the  reasoning of the

            district court."   Hughes v.  Boston Mut. Life  Ins. Co.,  26
                               _____________________________________

            F.3d  264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994).  Accordingly, we must reverse

            the court's grant  of summary  judgment unless  "there is  no

            genuine issue  as to any material  fact and . .  . the moving

            party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R.

            Civ. P. 56(c).   In analyzing the issues, we  will review the

            record in  the light most  favorable to the  non-movants, and

            make all inferences in their favor.  Borschow, 96 F.3d at 14;
                                                 ________

                                         -23-

            Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 909 F.2d  28, 31 (1st
            ______________________________________

            Cir. 1990).

                      It is  well established that a  reviewing court may

            not  set aside  administrative decisions "simply  because the

            court is unhappy with  the result reached."  Baltimore  Gas &
                                                         ________________

            Elec.  Co.   v.  Natural  Resources  Defense   Council,  Inc.
            _____________________________________________________________

            ("NRDC"),  462 U.S.  87,  97 (1983)  (quoting Vermont  Yankee
            ________                                      _______________

            Nuclear Power Corp. v.  NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).  The
            ____________________________

            fundamental policy  questions are "appropriately  resolved in

            Congress  and  in  the  state legislatures";  they  "are  not
                                                                      ___

            subject  to reexamination  in  the federal  courts under  the

            guise  of  judicial  review  of agency  action."14    Vermont
                                                                  _______

            Yankee,  435  U.S.  at 558.    Courts  may  set aside  agency
            ______

            decisions "only  for  substantial procedural  or  substantive

            reasons as mandated by statute."  Id.
                                              ___

                      The applicable statutes here  are NEPA and the CWA.

            NEPA  requires  that the  agency take  a  "hard look"  at the

            environmental consequences of a project before taking a major

            action.  Baltimore  Gas, 462  U.S. at 97  (quoting Kleppe  v.
                     ______________                            __________

            Sierra Club,  427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).  It is the role
            ___________

            of the courts on  judicial review to ensure "that  this legal

                                
            ____________________

            14.  For example,  in Vermont  Yankee, Congress had  made the
                                  _______________
            policy decision that the nation would try nuclear  power; the
            Court refused  to second-guess that decision  in reviewing an
            EIS pursuant to NEPA.  435 U.S. at 557-58.

                                         -24-

            duty  is  fulfilled."    Foundation  on  Economic  Trends  v.
                                     ____________________________________

            Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985).  
            _______

                      Congress,  in enacting  NEPA,  meant "to  insure  a

            fully   informed  and  well-considered  decision."    Vermont
                                                                  _______

            Yankee,  435 U.S.  at  558.    But  NEPA  "does  not  mandate
            ______

            particular  results";  it  "simply prescribes  the  necessary

            process."   Robertson v. Methow Valley  Citizens Council, 490
                        ____________________________________________

            U.S. 332, 350 (1989).  "If the  adverse environmental effects

            of   the  proposed  action   are  adequately  identified  and

            evaluated,  the  agency  is  not  constrained  by  NEPA  from

            deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs."

            Id.; see  also Baltimore Gas,  462 U.S. at 97.   Thus, "[t]he
            ___  _________ _____________

            role of  the courts is simply  to ensure that  the agency has

            adequately considered and disclosed the  environmental impact

            of  its actions  and that  its decision  is not  arbitrary or
                             ___

            capricious."   Baltimore  Gas,  462 U.S.  at 97-98  (emphasis
                           ______________

            added).  

                      Like  NEPA, the  CWA  does not  articulate its  own

            standard of review; therefore the appropriate scope of review

            for both NEPA claims and CWA claims is the standard set forth

            in the APA.  5 U.S.C.   706(2)(A) (1994); see Town of Norfolk
                                                      ___ _______________

            v. U.S. Army  Corps of  Engineers, 968 F.2d  1438, 1445  (1st
            _________________________________

            Cir. 1992);  Oregon Natural Resources Council  v. U.S. Forest
                         ________________________________________________

            Service, 834 F.2d 842, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1987).
            _______

                                         -25-

                      Under the APA, "[t]he  reviewing court shall .  . .

            hold  unlawful and  set  aside agency  action, findings,  and

            conclusions found  to be  arbitrary, capricious, an  abuse of

            discretion, or  otherwise not  in  accordance with  law."   5

            U.S.C.   706(2)(A).   Errors of law are reviewed by the court

            de novo.  5  U.S.C.   706 (1994) ("the reviewing  court shall
            _______

            decide all  relevant questions  of law");  Howard v. FAA,  17
                                                       _____________

            F.3d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994).

                      On the  other hand, the  task of a  court reviewing

            agency  action under  the  APA's "arbitrary  and  capricious"

            standard, 5  U.S.C.    706(2), is "to  determine whether  the

            [agency] has  considered the relevant factors and articulated
                          _______________________________     ___________

            a rational connection between the facts found and the  choice
            _____________________

            made."   Baltimore  Gas,  462 U.S.  at  105 (emphasis  added)
                     ______________

            (citations omitted);  see also  Motor Vehicle Mfrs.  Ass'n v.
                                  ________  _____________________________

            State  Farm  Mut. Auto.  Ins. Co.,  463  U.S. 29,  43 (1983);
            _________________________________

            Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
            ________________________________________________________

            U.S. 281,  285-86 (1974); Citizens to  Preserve Overton Park,
                                      ___________________________________

            Inc. v. Volpe, 401  U.S. 402, 415-17 (1971).   If the  agency
            _____________

            decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors

            and  there has not been "a clear error of judgment," then the
            ___

            agency  decision was  not arbitrary  or capricious.   Overton
                                                                  _______

            Park,  401 U.S.  at 416;  Marsh v.  Oregon Natural  Resources
            ____                      ___________________________________

            Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).  
            _______

                                         -26-

                      In State Farm,  the Supreme  Court offered  several
                         __________

            examples   of  circumstances  in   which  an   agency  action

            "normally"  would  be  considered arbitrary  and  capricious:

            situations  where "the  agency  has relied  on factors  which

            Congress has not intended it  to consider, entirely failed to

            consider  an  important aspect  of  the  problem, offered  an

            explanation  for  its  decision  that  runs  counter  to  the

            evidence before  the  agency, or  is so  implausible that  it

            could not be ascribed to a difference in  view or the product

            of agency expertise."  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.  These are
                                   __________

            merely "examples," Puerto  Rico Sun  Oil Co. v.  U.S. EPA,  8
                               ______________________________________

            F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993); others could be recited as well.

            Whether  reviewing an  EIS  or a  rulemaking proceeding,  the

            "reviewing court  should not  attempt itself  to make  up for

            such deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the

            agency's action that the agency itself has not given."  State
                                                                    _____

            Farm, 463 U.S. at  43 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp.,  332 U.S.
            ____                          ____________________

            194, 196 (1947)).

                      "While  this is  a highly  deferential  standard of

            review,  it  is not  a  rubber  stamp."   Citizens  Awareness
                                                      ___________________

            Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 59 F.3d 284,
            _______________________________________________

            290 (1st  Cir. 1995).    Although "the  ultimate standard  of

            review  is  a  narrow  one,"   the  court  must  undertake  a

            "thorough,  probing, in-depth  review"  and a  "searching and

                                         -27-

            careful" inquiry into the  record.15  Overton Park,  401 U.S.
                                                  ____________

            at 415-16.   In order for  an agency decision  to pass muster

            under  the   APA's  "arbitrary  and   capricious"  test,  the

            reviewing court  must  determine  that  the  decision  "makes

            sense."    Puerto Rico  Sun  Oil,  8 F.3d  at  77.   Only  by
                       _____________________

            "carefully reviewing the record  and satisfying [itself] that

            the agency  has  made  a reasoned  decision"  can  the  court

            "ensure  that  agency decisions  are  founded  on a  reasoned

            evaluation  of the relevant factors."  Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378
                                                   _____

            (internal quotation omitted).

                               IV.   THE NEPA/EIS ISSUE
                               IV.   THE NEPA/EIS ISSUE
                                     __________________

                      The  National Environmental  Policy Act  (NEPA), 42

            U.S.C.    4321 et seq., declares a  broad national commitment
                           __ ____

            to   protecting   and   promoting    environmental   quality.

            Robertson, 490 U.S.  at 348; 42  U.S.C.   4331  (1994).   The
            _________

            primary mechanism for implementing NEPA is  the Environmental

            Impact Statement (EIS).  42 U.S.C.   4332 (1994).  The EIS is

            an  "action-forcing" procedure,  designed  "[t]o ensure  that

            this  commitment is  infused  into the  ongoing programs  and

            actions of the  Federal Government."  Robertson, 490  U.S. at
                                                  _________

            348 (quotation omitted).

                                
            ____________________

            15.  We note that the two-step process articulated in Chevron
                                                                  _______
            U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467  U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984), does  not apply
            ______________
            here, because we are not reviewing an agency's interpretation
            of the statute that it was directed to enforce.

                                         -28-

                      NEPA requires that an agency considering any action

            that  would  have a  significant  impact  on the  environment

            prepare  an EIS.  The EIS must contain a "detailed statement"
                                                      ________

            including, inter  alia,  the  environmental  impacts  of  the
                       ___________

            proposed  project,  and  all reasonable  alternatives  to the

            project.    42  U.S.C.     4332(C)  (emphasis  added).     We

            previously  emphasized  the   word  "detailed"  because   "it

            connotes the careful,  reasoned and fully explained  analysis

            which we think Congress  intended."  Silva v. Lynn,  482 F.2d
                                                 _____________

            1282,  1284 n.2 (1st Cir. 1973).  Thus, the EIS helps satisfy

            NEPA's "twin aims":  to ensure  that the agency takes a "hard

            look"  at the  environmental  consequences  of  its  proposed

            action,  and   to  make  information  on   the  environmental

            consequences available  to the  public, which may  then offer

            its insight to  assist the  agency's decision-making  through

            the  comment process.  See  Robertson, 490 U.S.  at 350, 356;
                                   ___  _________

            Baltimore Gas, 462  U.S. at 97.   The EIS thus "helps  insure
            _____________

            the integrity  of the process of decision," providing a basis

            for  comparing  the  environmental  problems  raised  by  the

            proposed  project  with  the  difficulties  involved  in  the

            alternatives.  Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d at 1285.
                           _____________

                      A.  Consideration of Environmental Impacts
                      A.  Consideration of Environmental Impacts
                          ______________________________________

                      In  its  EIS,  the  agency  must   "consider  every

            significant aspect of the  environmental impact of a proposed

            action,"  Baltimore  Gas, 462  U.S.  at  97 (quoting  Vermont
                      ______________                              _______

                                         -29-

            Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553), and  "evaluate different courses of
            ______

            action,"  Kleppe, 427 U.S. at  410.  The  EIS's discussion of
                      ______

            environmental  impacts  "forms  the scientific  and  analytic

            basis  for  the comparisons"  of  alternatives,  40 C.F.R.   

            1502.16 (1995), which  are "the heart" of  the EIS, id.  at  
                                                                ___

            1502.14; see  Part IV(B), infra.   The discussion  of impacts
                     ___              _____

            must  include both  "direct and  indirect effects  (secondary

            impacts) of a proposed  project."  Sierra Club v.  Marsh, 976
                                               _____________________

            F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir.  1992); 40 C.F.R.   1502.16(b).   The

            agency need not speculate  about all conceivable impacts, but

            it  must  evaluate  the  reasonably  foreseeable  significant

            effects  of the proposed action.   Sierra Club  v. Marsh, 976
                                               _____________________

            F.2d  at 767.    In this  context, reasonable  foreseeability

            means that "the impact is sufficiently likely to occur that a

            person of  ordinary prudence would  take it  into account  in

            reaching  a decision."  Id.  An environmental effect would be
                                    ___

            considered "too speculative" for inclusion  in the EIS if  it

            cannot  be  described at  the time  the  EIS is  drafted with

            sufficient specificity to make  its consideration useful to a

            reasonable  decision-maker.    Id.  at  768.    Nevertheless,
                                           ___

            "[r]easonable  forecasting . . .  is . .  . implicit in NEPA,

            and we must  reject any  attempt by agencies  to shirk  their

            responsibilities   under  NEPA  by   labeling  any   and  all

            discussion of  future environmental effects  as 'crystal ball

                                         -30-

            inquiry.'"  Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy
                        _________________________________________________

            Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
            ______

                      Plaintiffs contended in the district court that the

            Forest Service failed to adequately assess the impact of Loon

            Corp.'s planned expansion on Loon  Pond.  Plaintiffs listed a

            number  of specific  areas  of concern.   The  district court

            found  the  Forest Service's  consideration  of environmental

            impacts to be adequate, and plaintiffs have not appealed this

            point.  Accordingly, we need not pursue this issue here.  

                          B.  Consideration of Alternatives
                          B.  Consideration of Alternatives
                              _____________________________

                      "[O]ne  important  ingredient  of  an  EIS  is  the

            discussion of  steps that  can be  taken to  mitigate adverse

            environmental consequences" of a proposed action.  Robertson,
                                                               _________

            490 U.S.  at 351.   As  one aspect  of evaluating  a proposed

            course of action under NEPA, the agency has a duty  "to study

            all  alternatives that appear  reasonable and appropriate for

            study . . .  , as well as significant  alternatives suggested

            by other agencies or  the public during the comment  period."

            Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park  Comm'n v. United States EPA,
            ____________________________________________________________

            684  F.2d 1041,  1047 (1st  Cir. 1982)  (quotations omitted);

            Valley Citizens for a  Safe Env't v. Aldridge, 886  F.2d 458,
            _____________________________________________

            462 (1st Cir. 1989); City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S.  Dept.
                                 ________________________________________

            of Transp., 95 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 1996).
            __________

                      As stated  in the Council  on Environmental Quality

            ("CEQ") regulations implementing  NEPA, the consideration  of

                                         -31-

            alternatives  is  "the  heart  of  the  environmental  impact

            statement."    40  C.F.R.     1502.14.    These  implementing

            regulations   are   entitled   to    substantial   deference.

            Robertson, 490 U.S. at 355 (citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442
            _________                          _____________________

            U.S.  347, 358 (1979)).  The regulations require that the EIS

            "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable

            alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from

            detailed study, briefly discuss  the reasons for their having

            been eliminated."  40 C.F.R.   1502.14(a).  It is "absolutely

            essential  to  the NEPA  process  that  the decisionmaker  be

            provided with a detailed and careful analysis of the relative

            environmental merits and demerits  of the proposed action and

            possible   alternatives,   a   requirement   that   we   have

            characterized  as   'the  linchpin   of  the   entire  impact

            statement.'"   NRDC  v. Callaway,  524 F.2d  79, 92  (2d Cir.
                           _________________

            1975)  (citation omitted);  see Silva  v. Lynn,  482  F.2d at
                                        ___ ______________

            1285;  All Indian Pueblo  Council v. United  States, 975 F.2d
                   ____________________________________________

            1437,  1444  (10th  Cir.   1992)  (holding  that  a  thorough

            discussion  of  the  alternatives  is  "imperative").    "The

            'existence of a viable  but unexamined alternative renders an

            environmental impact statement  inadequate.'"  Resources Ltd.
                                                           ______________

            v.  Robertson, 35  F.3d 1300, 1307  (9th Cir.  1993) (quoting
            _____________

            Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma,  956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th
            __________________________________

            Cir. 1992)); see Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d
                         ___ __________________________________

            1068, 1072 (1st  Cir. 1980) (Even the existence of supportive

                                         -32-

            studies and memoranda contained in  the administrative record

            but not incorporated in the EIS cannot "bring into compliance

            with NEPA an EIS that by itself is inadequate.").  Because of

            the  importance  of   NEPA's  procedural  and   informational

            aspects,  if  the  agency  fails to  properly  circulate  the

            required issues  for review  by interested parties,  then the

            EIS is insufficient  even if the agency's actual decision was

            informed and well-reasoned.  Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at
                                         ___________________

            1072;  see Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 951 (1st Cir.
                   ___ _____________________

            1983).

                          C.   The Requisite Level of Detail
                          C.   The Requisite Level of Detail
                               _____________________________

                      One purpose  of the EIS requirement  is to "provide

            decisionmakers  with sufficiently detailed information to aid

            in determining whether to proceed with the action in light of

            its  environmental consequences."   Northwest  Resource Info.
                                                _________________________

            Ctr., Inc. v.  National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060,
            ______________________________________________

            1064 (9th Cir.  1995).   What level of  detail is  sufficient

            depends  on the  nature  and scope  of  the proposed  action.

            Valley  Citizens, 886 F.2d at  463; Mumma, 956  F.2d at 1520.
            ________________                    _____

            The discussion of environmental  effects of alternatives need

            not  be  exhaustive.    "[W]hat is  required  is  information

            sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives as far

            as  environmental aspects are  concerned," All  Indian Pueblo
                                                       __________________

            Council, 975 F.2d at  1444 (quoting NRDC v. Morton,  458 F.2d
            _______                             ______________

            827, 836  (D.C. Cir.  1972)); see also  Carmel-By-The-Sea, 95
                                          ________  _________________

                                         -33-

            F.3d  at  903,  information  sufficient  for  the  agency  to

            "[r]igorously   explore   and   objectively   evaluate"   all

            reasonable alternatives.  40  C.F.R.   1502.14(a); All Indian
                                                               __________

            Pueblo Council, 975 F.2d at 1444.
            ______________

                      The  courts  have  applied  "a rule  of  reason  in

            determining  whether an  EIS contains  a reasonably  thorough

            discussion  of  the  significant   aspects  of  the  probable

            environmental  consequences."  Carmel-By-The-Sea,  95 F.3d at
                                           _________________

            899 (quotation  omitted); see  also Grazing Fields  Farm, 626
                                      _________ ____________________

            F.2d at 1074; Massachusetts v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 884 (1st
                          _______________________

            Cir.  1979); cf. Marsh,  490 U.S. at  373 (supplemental EIS).
                         ___ _____

            One aspect  of this determination  is whether the  agency has

            gone "beyond  mere assertions  and indicate[d] its  basis for

            them."   Silva v. Lynn, 482  F.2d at 1287.   The agency "must
                     _____________

            'explicate fully its course of inquiry, its analysis  and its

            reasoning.'"    Massachusetts  v.  Andrus, 594  F.2d  at  883
                            _________________________

            (quoting Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d at 1284-85).  The court must
                     _____________

            determine whether, in the context of the record, the agency's

            decision  -- and the analysis on which  it is based -- is too

            unreasonable for the law to  permit it to stand.  See  Sierra
                                                              ___  ______

            Club v.  Marsh, 976 F.2d at  769.  We apply a  rule of reason
            ______________

            because  courts should  not "fly  speck" an  EIS and  hold it

            insufficient   based   on   inconsequential    or   technical

            deficiencies.   Swanson v. U.S. Forest  Service, 87 F.3d 339,
                            _______________________________

            343 (9th Cir.  1996).  "The statute must be  construed in the

                                         -34-

            light  of reason  if  it is  not  to demand  what is,  fairly

            speaking, not meaningfully possible.  . . .  But  implicit in

            this  rule of  reason  is the  overriding  statutory duty  of

            compliance  with impact  statement procedures to  the fullest

            extent  possible."    Scientists'  Inst., 481  F.2d  at  1092
                                  __________________

            (quotations omitted).  The  agency must "squarely turn[]" all

            "procedural corners" in its EIS.  Citizens Awareness Network,
                                              __________________________

            59 F.3d  at 290 (quoting Adams, 38 F.3d at 49).  The question
                                     _____

            whether a particular deficiency or combination  is sufficient

            to  warrant holding  it  legally inadequate,  or  constitutes

            merely  a  "fly  speck,"  is essentially  a  legal  question,

            reviewable de novo.  Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman,
                       _______   _______________________________________

            817 F.2d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 1987).  

                      Applying these  standards to  the instant  case, we

            conclude that the Forest  Service has not rigorously explored

            all  reasonable alternatives,  in particular  the alternative

            that Loon Corp. be required to build artificial water storage

            ponds, instead of withdrawing  water for snowmaking from, and

            discharging water  into, an "outstanding resource water" like

            Loon Pond.   The adverse environmental impacts of  using Loon

            Pond  were before  the agency,  and more  than one  commenter

            proposed building artificial water storage  ponds, a proposal

            that would, on its face, avoid some of those adverse impacts.

            One such commenter, Paul Beaudin of the Lincoln  Committee of

            Concerned  Citizens  (LCCC), enclosed  clippings  pointing up

                                         -35-

            "the  wisdom  of  [Loon Corp.'s]  need  to  enact the  LCCC's
                                              ____

            proposal for water  containment pond[s] high up on  the Boyle

            Brook."  JA, vol. II, Response  to Public Comment on RDEIS at

            A-12.   The  LCCC proposal itself,  made two  months earlier,

            referred  to  a letter  from  the  National Ecology  Research

            Center   recommending   consideration   of    water   storage

            alternatives  other  than  Loon  Pond,  and  enclosed  a  map

            indicating  where  up to  three  containment  ponds could  be

            installed.   LCCC listed some nine  advantages, including the

            cost-saving factor of  servicing two-thirds to  three-fourths

            of Loon Corp.'s snowmaking system by gravity feed.16

                      Instead of "rigorously explor[ing]" the alternative

            of using artificial water storage units instead of Loon Pond,

            the  Forest Service's  Final  EIS did  not  respond to  these

            comments at all.   The agency did not in  any way explain its

            reasoning  or  provide a  factual  basis for  its  refusal to

            consider,  in general,  the  possibility of  alternatives  to

            using  Loon  Pond   for  snowmaking,  or   LCCC's  reasonably

                                
            ____________________

            16.  In addition to the Beaudin/LCCC proposal, plaintiff
            Dubois' comments also suggested that Loon Corp. build
            artificial water storage units, in his case underground. 
            This suggestion, requiring costly subterranean construction,
            may be more facially vulnerable than Beaudin/LCCC's; it may
            or may not alone have required an explicit response, however
            brief.  But we need not address this question because we
            reverse based on the Beaudin/LCCC proposal.

                                         -36-

            thoughtful proposal in  particular.17  This failure  violated

            the Forest  Service's  EIS obligation  under  NEPA.   See  40
                                                                  ___

            C.F.R.   1502.9(b) (1995); 42 U.S.C.   4332(C)(iii) (1994).

                      The  use  of artificial  storage  ponds  is not  so

            facially implausible  that it can  be dismissed out  of hand.

            The  Forest  Service,  on   another  occasion,  required  the

            Sugarbush  Ski   Area  in  Vermont  to   construct,  for  its

            snowmaking  operations, three artificial  water storage ponds

            capable  of holding  123.5 million  gallons of water  on 22.9

            acres of private land.  JA, vol. I, at 457, 465.  This is 73%

            more  than the  71  million gallons  of  water that  the  ROD

            estimates  would  be  withdrawn  from  Loon  Pond  under  the

            approved  Loon  Mountain  expansion  project.    Beaudin/LCCC

            proposed constructing three similar  ponds in the Boyle Brook

            area high up Loon Mountain.  In addition, the record contains

            evidence  that Loon Corp. owns  365 acres of  private land at

            the base of the  ski area, where similar storage  ponds could

            be constructed,  and that  such ponds  could  be filled  with

            water from the East Branch, which is typically high enough in

            the spring to contribute to flooding in downstream areas.

                                
            ____________________

            17.  Aside from its preservation argument, see Part IV(D),
                                                       ___
            infra, the Forest Service merely argues that the LCCC
            _____
            proposal was made to Loon Corp. before the RDEIS was
            published.  However, the Forest Service does not suggest that
            Beaudin's comment letter -- responding to the Forest
            Service's RDEIS -- did not fairly refer to the prior LCCC
            proposal, or that this proposal was unknown to the Service.

                                         -37-

                      Our  conclusion is buttressed by NEPA's requirement

            that an agency consider and an EIS discuss "steps that can be

            taken to mitigate the adverse environmental consequences"  of

            a proposed project.   See Robertson,  490 U.S. at 351.   Even
                                  ___ _________

            though  there  is no  requirement  that  the agency  reach  a

            particular substantive  result, such as  actually formulating

            and  adopting a  complete  mitigation plan,  the agency  must

            discuss "the extent to which adverse effects can be avoided,"

            i.e., by mitigation measures, "in sufficient detail to ensure
            ____

            that  environmental consequences have been fairly evaluated."

            Id. at 352.  This duty  -- coupled with the comments alerting
            ___

            the agency  to the  environmental consequences of  using Loon

            Pond  for  snowmaking  and suggesting  the  containment  pond

            solution -- required the Forest Service to seriously consider

            this alternative and to explain its reasoning if  it rejected

            the proposal.

                      Nor can  the Forest Service claim  that its failure

            to consider  an alternative to using Loon Pond for snowmaking

            was a de minimis  or "fly speck" issue.  The record indicates
                  __________

            serious adverse consequences to Loon Pond if it is used "as a

            cistern,"  to use  EPA's  words, and  at  least a  reasonable

            probability that  the use  of artificial storage  ponds could

            avoid  those  consequences.   The  existence  of this  non-de
                                                                       __

            minimis "viable but unexamined alternative renders [the  Loon
            _______

            EIS] inadequate."  See Resources, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1307.
                               ___ _______________

                                         -38-

                      After the matter  had proceeded  to court,  counsel

            for  the Forest Service  argued that  constructing artificial

            storage  ponds large  enough to  serve as  an alternative  to

            using Loon Pond would not be a viable alternative for reasons

            that were  conclusorily stated.  The  district court accepted

            this  argument.    But  this  "post  hoc  rationalization  of
                                           _________

            counsel" cannot overcome the agency's failure to consider and

            address in  its FEIS the alternative  proposed by commenters.

            State  Farm, 463 U.S. at 50; see Burlington Truck Lines, Inc.
            ___________                  ___ ____________________________

            v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); NRDC v. U.S. EPA,
            ________________                            ________________

            824 F.2d  1258, 1286  n.19 (1st  Cir. 1987).   Such  post hoc
                                                                 ________

            rationalizations are inherently suspect, and in any event are

            no substitute for the agency's following statutorily mandated

            procedures.   As  noted supra,  even if  the agency's  actual
                                    _____

            decision  was a reasoned one,  the EIS is  insufficient if it

            does  not  properly discuss  the  required  issues.   Grazing
                                                                  _______

            Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at 1072.
            ___________

                      In  sum,   how  "probing"  an   investigation  NEPA

            requires   of  alternatives  depends  on  the  circumstances,

            including  the  nature  of  the  action  at  issue.    Valley
                                                                   ______

            Citizens, 886 F.2d at 463.  Thus, the reviewing court must be
            ________

            flexible in evaluating the depth of analysis to require in an

            EIS,  because,  while  NEPA  "does  not   mandate  particular

            results,"  it does  require that  the agency  have adequately

            identified   and   evaluated   a    project's   environmental

                                         -39-

            consequences.  Robertson, 490  U.S. at 350.   "NEPA's success
                           _________

            in large part arises from the use of legal concepts [that are

            flexible] such as 'reasonableness' and 'adequacy' that permit

            courts to adapt it successfully to so many different kinds of

            circumstances   surrounding  so   many  different   kinds  of

            governmental decisions."  Valley Citizens, 886 F.2d at 463.
                                      _______________

                      Although in  Valley Citizens we found  the agency's
                                   _______________

            analysis of alternatives "brief but  adequate,"  886 F.2d  at

            462, the contrast with  the instant case is instructive.   In

            Valley  Citizens, we found that  nothing in the  record or in
            ________________

            comments on the  draft "point[ed] out any inaccuracy"  in the

            agency's cost "descriptions" or in its "discussions" of other

            non-environmental considerations.   Id.  In  contrast, in the
                                                ___

            instant  case, the  final  EIS contains  no "description"  or
                                                     __

            "discussion" whatsoever  as to  why an alternative  source of

            water  such as an artificially  created storage pond would be

            impractical.  The agency  has discretion to balance competing

            concerns  and  to  choose  among alternatives,  but  it  must

            legitimately  assess  the   relative  merits  of   reasonable

            alternatives before making its decision.  

                      After a searching and  careful review of the record

            in the instant  case, we  are not convinced  that the  Forest

            Service's decision  was founded  on a reasoned  evaluation of

            the  relevant factors,  Marsh, 490  U.S. at  378, or  that it
                                    _____

            articulated a rational connection between the facts found and

                                         -40-

            the  choice made, Baltimore Gas, 462  U.S. at 105.  Hence, it
                              _____________

            acted  arbitrarily and capriciously  in granting Loon Corp.'s

            special use  permit for the  expanded ski resort.   Moreover,

            because the  Forest Service  did not satisfy  the requirement

            that  it "rigorously  explore and  objectively  evaluate" all

            reasonable  alternatives,18  40   C.F.R.     1502.14(a),  its

            decision was not in  accordance with law.19   See 5 U.S.C.   
                                                          ___

            706(2)(A).

                             D.   The Preservation Issue
                             D.   The Preservation Issue
                                  ______________________

                      The Forest Service argues that plaintiffs have  not

            preserved  their argument  that the  agency should  have more

            seriously considered,  as an  alternative to Loon  Pond, some

            other source  for water and some other  location to discharge

                                
            ____________________

            18.  In addition to  the question of  an alternative to  Loon
            Pond as a source of water or  as a discharge point, plaintiff
            RESTORE  has  raised a  second issue  regarding alternatives.
            RESTORE  asserts   that  the   Forest  Service  should   have
            considered alternative sites for the entire  project, outside
            of the White Mountain  National Forest.   The  district court
            found that  such alternative  sites were not  appropriate for
            study because  some draw from different markets and others do
            not offer the same type of skiing experience as the  WMNF ski
            areas which have more terrain, higher mountains, more natural
            snow, and better facilities  than their counterparts  outside
            the WMNF.  We agree.

            19.  Dubois also notes that the  FEIS failed to disclose what
            he  claims are  numerous  violations of  state water  quality
            standards,  which "renders the FEIS unacceptable under NEPA."
            Dubois  Brief  at  16  n.11; see  Northwest  Indian  Cemetery
                                         ___  ___________________________
            Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764  F.2d 581, 587-88 (9th Cir.
            ____________________________
            1985),  rev'd  on other  grounds sub  nom. Lyng  v. Northwest
                    __________________________________ __________________
            Indian  Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S.  439 (1988).  For
            _________________________________
            discussion of the issue of state water quality standards, see
                                                                      ___
            Part VII(C), infra.
                         _____

                                         -41-

            the effluent from Loon Corp.'s snowmaking pipes.  It contends

            that plaintiffs failed adequately to raise  their contentions

            during the public comment period,  so they waived their right

            to  pursue  these challenges  on  their merits.    The Forest

            Service argues  that, "[i]f commenters could require agencies

            to   undertake  detailed   comparative  analyses   merely  by

            asserting   the   superiority   of   an   alternative   site,

            configuration  or  method, only  the imaginations  of project

            opponents  would limit the length of EISs and the duration of

            the  NEPA process."  Forest Service Brief at 53.  Raising the

            specter of catastrophe only  obfuscates the real issues here:

            whether the Forest Service adequately considered alternatives

            to  using Loon Pond as a vehicle for Loon Corp.'s snowmaking,

            with adequacy based on the reasonableness and practicality of

            the alternatives, and  whether the Forest Service  adequately

            explained   in  its   FEIS  why   it  decided   against  such

            alternatives.

                      The Forest Service  relies on Roosevelt Campobello:
                                                    ____________________

            "In order to preserve an alternatives issue for review, it is

            not enough  simply to  make a facially  plausible suggestion;

            rather, an  intervenor must  offer tangible evidence  that an
                                                                       __

            alternative  site  might  offer  a   substantial  measure  of
            _________________

            superiority  as a site."   684 F.2d at  1047 (emphasis added)

            (quotation  omitted).    The  Forest  Service's  reliance  on

            Roosevelt  Campobello  is  misplaced.   That  case,  and  the
            _____________________

                                         -42-

            precedents it relied on,  dealt with a claim that  the agency

            had not considered all appropriate alternative sites on which
                                                           _____

            to locate  a particular  project.   Obviously, the  number of

            potential  locations  for any  project  is  infinite, and  an

            agency  cannot   be  expected  to  consider  seriously  every

            possible  location before  approving  a project.   In  such a

            context,  the  agency  is  only  required  to  consider  "all

            alternatives which were  feasible and reasonably apparent  at

            the time of drafting the EIS."  Id.;  see also Seacoast Anti-
                                            ___   ________ ______________

            Pollution League v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 1221,
            _____________________________________________

            1229 (1st  Cir.  1979) (Agency  need  not "ferret  out  every

            possible   alternative,  regardless   of   how  uncommon   or

            unknown.") (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551).   
                                ______________

                      The  situation  in  the   instant  case  is  wholly

            different.  It is one thing to ask whether there are "known,"

            "feasible," alternative  sites on which to  locate a project,
                                     _____

            and a different matter  to ask whether the Forest  Service in

            the instant case should  have considered an alternative means
                                                                    _____

            of implementing the expansion of the Loon Mountain Ski Area -

            -  a  particular  means  of  operation  that  would  do  less

            environmental damage -- without  changing the site to another

            state or  another mountain.    Here, the  Forest Service  was

            alerted by commenters to  the alternative of using artificial

            storage  ponds instead of Loon Pond for snowmaking;  but even

            without  such  comments,  it  should  have  been  "reasonably

                                         -43-

            apparent" to the  Forest Service,  Roosevelt Campobello,  684
                                               ____________________

            F.2d at 1047, not "unknown," Seacoast  Anti-Pollution League,
                                         _______________________________

            598 F.2d at 1229, that such an alternative existed.

                      In the instant case,  at least two commenters, Paul

            Beaudin of LCCC and plaintiff  Dubois, provided notice to the

            Forest  Service,  informing  it  of the  substance  of  their

            proposed alternative.   Though  not detailed,  these comments

            submitted  in response  to  the Forest  Service's RDEIS  made

            clear that the commenters  thought the agency should consider

            some alternative source  of water  other than  Loon Pond  and

            some  alternative place to  discharge the water  after it had

            gone  through the snowmaking pipes.  They argued that such an

            alternative would reduce the negative environmental impact on

            Loon Pond from depleting the  pond's water and from refilling

            the pond with polluted  water either from the East  Branch or

            from  acidic  snowmelt.   Dubois  explicitly  and Beaudin  by

            reference suggested  the possibility of  new man-made storage

            units  to accomplish  these goals.   These  comments provided

            sufficient notice to "alert[]  the agency" to the alternative

            being proposed and the  environmental concern the alternative

                                         -44-

            might  address.20   See  Seacoast Anti-Pollution  League, 598
                                ___  _______________________________

            F.2d at 1229 (quoting Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 553).  
                                  ______________

                      Because the comments to  the EIS were sufficient to

            notify the agency of the potential alternatives, see Adams v.
                                                             ___ ________

            U.S. EPA, 38  F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1994), the district court
            ________

            erred in concluding that plaintiffs were required to "offer[]

            specifics  as to  how  to implement  a suggested  alternative

            water storage system."   Memorandum  and Order at  31.   Such

            "specifics" are not required.   As we reasoned in  Adams, the
                                                               _____

            purpose  of public  participation  regulations is  simply "to

            provide notice" to  the agency, not to "present  technical or

            precise   scientific   or   legal  challenges   to   specific

            provisions" of the document  in question.  Adams, 38  F.3d at
                                                       _____

            52.   "It would be  inconsistent with the  general purpose of

            public participation regulations  to construe the regulations

            strictly."  Id. 
                        ___

                      Moreover, NEPA  requires the  agency to try  on its

            own to  develop alternatives that will  "mitigate the adverse

            environmental   consequences"   of   a    proposed   project.

                                
            ____________________

            20.  In Adams v.  U.S. EPA, 38  F.3d 43  (1st Cir. 1994),  we
                    __________________
            held that a plaintiff had sufficiently raised his proposal at
            the agency level by stating in his comment:  "The EPA has not
            carried out the intent of Congress in relation to the [Act in
            question, citing specific statutory provisions]."   Adams, 38
                                                                _____
            F.3d at 52.  This court  held that that reference -- together
            with other comments discussing  the detrimental impact of the
            proposed project on beaches and marine life -- was sufficient
            to "alert[]  the EPA to  [his] concern that  the EPA had  not
            adequately complied with the [statutory] mandates."  Id. 
                                                                 ___

                                         -45-

            Robertson,  490 U.S. at 351.  "In respect to alternatives, an
            _________

            agency must on its own initiative study all alternatives that
                        _____________________

            appear reasonable and appropriate for  study at the time, and

            must also  look into other significant  alternatives that are

            called to its attention  by other agencies, or by  the public

            during  the  comment  period   afforded  for  that  purpose."

            Seacoast Anti-Pollution  League, 598  F.2d at  1230 (emphasis
            _______________________________

            added).21    Particularly  given  this directive,  the  alert

            furnished by  Beaudin  and Dubois  required  exploration  and

            discussion   by  the   Forest  Service   of  the   idea  that

            environmental  damage   might  be  reduced  by   the  use  of

            artificial storage ponds instead  of Loon Pond for snowmaking

            purposes.  Therefore, the district court should have rejected

            the  Forest   Service's  argument   that  Dubois   failed  to

            adequately preserve the issue of alternatives.

                                V.   SUPPLEMENTAL EIS
                                V.   SUPPLEMENTAL EIS
                                     ________________

                      Plaintiffs   also   appeal  the   district  court's

            conclusion that  the Forest  Service was not  required, under

            NEPA,  to  prepare a  supplemental EIS.    The question  of a

            supplemental EIS is premised on the dual purposes of the EIS:

                                
            ____________________

            21.  In deciding whether an agency has adequately studied all
            reasonable alternatives, a reviewing  court may consider "the
            extent   and  sincerity  of  the  opponents'  participation."
            Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, 598  F.2d at 1231.  Here,  it
            ______________________________
            is  apparent from  the record  that Dubois  has treated  this
            matter  seriously, not as  "a game," id. at  1229; he has not
                                                 ___
            "played dog  in  the  manger  with respect  to  alerting  the
            agency"  to  his views  regarding  alternatives,  id., in  an
                                                              ___
            effort to "scuttle" the project, id. at 1231.
                                             ___

                                         -46-

            to  assure that  the  public who  might  be affected  by  the

            proposed  project  be fully  informed  of  the proposal,  its

            impacts and all major points of  view; and to give the agency

            the benefit of informed comments and suggestions as it  takes

            a "hard look" at  the consequences of proposed actions.   See
                                                                      ___

            Robertson,  490  U.S.  at  349,  356;  40  C.F.R.     1502.1,
            _________

            1502.9(a) (1995).  

                      An agency "shall"  prepare a  supplemental EIS  if,

            after  issuing  its latest  draft  EIS,  "[t]he agency  makes

            substantial changes in the  proposed action that are relevant

            to  environmental  concerns."   40  C.F.R.    1502.9(c)(1)(i)

            (1995).   The  use  of the  word  "shall" is  mandatory,  not

            precatory.   It creates a duty  on the part of  the agency to

            prepare a supplemental EIS if substantial changes from any of

            the  proposed  alternatives  are  made and  the  changes  are

            relevant  to environmental concerns.   See Marsh, 490 U.S. at
                                                   ___ _____

            372.   Thus,  as explained by CEQ, an  additional alternative

            that  has not been disseminated previously in a draft EIS may

            be adopted in  a final EIS,  without further public  comment,

            only  if   it  is  "qualitatively  within   the  spectrum  of

            alternatives  that  were  discussed"   in  the  prior  draft;

            otherwise  a supplemental  draft is needed.   See  Forty Most
                                                          ___

            Asked  Questions Concerning CEQ's  NEPA Regulations,  46 Fed.

            Reg. 18026, # 29b (1981). 

                                         -47-

                      Plaintiffs  argue  that  the  project  proposed  as

            Alternative 6, appearing for the first time in the Final EIS,

            embodies "substantial  changes" from any  of the alternatives

            proposed  in  the prior  drafts of  the  EIS, and  that those

            changes  are "relevant  to environmental  concerns."   See 40
                                                                   ___

            C.F.R.   1502.9(c)(1)(i).  Therefore, plaintiffs assert that,

            by  not describing  Alternative 6  in a  supplemental  EIS --

            which would give the  public an opportunity to comment  on it

            and  give the Forest Service the benefit of those comments in

            its consideration of the environmental impact of  Alternative

            6 --  the  Forest  Service  collided  with  both  the  public

            information and the  agency guidance objectives of  NEPA.  In

            response, defendants argue that plaintiffs' interpretation of

            the  previously discussed alternatives  is incorrect, because

            Alternative  6  is  merely  a   scaled-down  modification  of

            Alternative  2 which, as proposed in two phases in the RDEIS,

            would  have been  far larger  and far  more intrusive  on the

            environment than the new preferred Alternative 6.  Plaintiffs

            reply that only Phase I and not Phase II of Alternative 2 was

            seriously considered and analyzed prior to the development of

            Alternative  6 in  the  final EIS.22    Defendants deny  this

            assertion.

                                
            ____________________

            22.  Plaintiffs point  to  several instances  where the  FEIS
            stated that further environmental analysis would be conducted
            in the future  if and  when Loon Corp.  sought permission  to
            proceed with Phase II.

                                         -48-

                      We conclude, based on the record in this case, that

            a supplemental  EIS was required.   The scope of  review of a

            reviewing  court  is  the  APA's  "arbitrary  and capricious"

            standard.   Marsh, 490 U.S.  at 375-76; see  Part III, supra.
                        _____                       ___            _____

            The  Court  in  Marsh   was  especially  deferential  to  the
                            _____

            "informed  discretion of  the responsible  federal agencies,"

            due to the  "high level of  technical expertise" required  in

            that case  to analyze  the relevant documents  regarding soil

            composition  and  a  dam's  impact  on downstream  turbidity.

            Marsh, 490 U.S. at  377, 379.  In the  instant case, however,
            _____

            nothing  in  the FEIS  indicates  that  any such  technically

            complex scientific  analysis would  be required in  order for

            this  court  to  determine  that  Alternative  6  involves  a

            "substantial  change"  from  the   prior  proposals  at  Loon

            Mountain.

                      Alternative 6, adopted by the Forest Service as its

            preferred alternative in the final EIS, does not fall "within

            the   spectrum  of  alternatives"  that  were  considered  in

            previous drafts, even if  Phase II of Alternative 2  had been

            adequately analyzed prior to the FEIS.  Alternative 6 entails

            a different  configuration of  activities and  locations, not

            merely   a   reduced  version   of   a  previously-considered

            alternative.   Phase II  of Alternative 2  proposed expanding

            the ski area primarily on land that is not within the current

            permit area; in  contrast, Alternative 6 squeezes much of its

                                         -49-

            expansion into that current permit area.  To accomplish this,

            Alternative  6  widens existing  trails  so  as to  eliminate

            buffers  that  currently  separate   the  trails.    It  also

            envisions a 28,500-square-foot base lodge facility within the

            existing permit  area.   And it  develops ski  trails, access

            roads  and lifts on land that the prior alternatives had left

            as  a  woodland  buffer between  the  old  ski  area and  the

            proposed expansion area.   These are substantial changes from

            the previously-discussed alternatives, not mere modifications

            "within the spectrum" of those prior  alternatives.  It would

            be  one thing  if  the  Forest  Service  had  adopted  a  new

            alternative that was actually  within the range of previously

            considered alternatives,  e.g., simply reducing the  scale of
                                      ____

            every  relevant particular.   It  is quite  another thing  to

            adopt  a proposal  that is  configured differently,  in which

            case  public commenters might have  pointed out, if given the

            opportunity --  and the  Forest Service might  have seriously

            considered  --   wholly  new   problems  posed  by   the  new

            configuration  (even if  some of  the  environmental problems

            present in the prior alternatives have been eliminated).

                      Nor  can it  be  said that  these  changes are  not

            "relevant to  environmental concerns."  They  could very well

            have environmental  impacts that  the Forest Service  has not

            yet considered,  simply based on their  more compact physical

            location.   Indeed,  the RDEIS  said the  Forest  Service had

                                         -50-

            considered    expansion    alternatives   such    as   "other

            configurations  on  the  existing  permit  area,"  but  these

            alternatives "were eliminated  from detailed analysis because

            they were not reasonable or feasible alternatives."  JA, vol.

            I,  at 145-46.  Moreover, the plan selected, Alternative 6 in

            the FEIS, would require that four million gallons  more water

            be  withdrawn  annually  for snowmaking,  compared  with  the

            closest alternative among the five  previously given detailed

            consideration.   Whether or not  viewed in the  graphic terms

            described  by  plaintiff  RESTORE  --  four  million  gallons

            annually is  enough water  "to create  a lake  the size  of a

            football field more than eleven  feet deep," RESTORE Brief at

            33  --  this change  can be  expected  to have  a significant

            enough  effect on  the environment  that additional  analysis

            through a supplemental EIS would be required.   Cf. Roosevelt
                                                            ___ _________

            Campobello, 684 F.2d at 1055 (requiring a supplemental EIS to
            __________

            consider newly completed studies  regarding the small risk of

            a major oil spill).  We conclude, based on the record in this

            case, that Alternative 6 entails substantial changes from the

            previously   proposed   actions   that   are    relevant   to

            environmental concerns, and that   the Forest Service did not

            present  those changes to the  public in its  FEIS for review

            and comment.   Accordingly,  the Forest Service's  failure to

            prepare a supplemental EIS was arbitrary and capricious. 

                            VI.   EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,990 
                            VI.   EXECUTIVE ORDER 11,990 
                                  ______________________

                                         -51-

                      Plaintiffs  contend  that   the  Forest   Service's

            failure  to adequately  consider alternatives  to the  use of

            Loon Pond and failure to develop adequate mitigation measures

            violates  Executive Order  11,990,  as  well  as NEPA.    The

            district court rejected this argument on essentially the same

            grounds as the NEPA argument.  

                      On  appeal,  the   government  contends  that   the

            Executive  Order  is not  enforceable,  at  least by  private

            parties, because NEPA did  not confer rulemaking authority on

            the President.  Plaintiffs argue that  the Executive Order is

            accorded  the  full   force  and  effect  of  a   statute  or

            regulation,  enforceable   under  the  APA.     We  have  not

            previously decided this precise issue, nor need we decide  it

            now.

                      Even   assuming  that   the   Executive  Order   is

            enforceable  under  the   APA,  it  does  not  apply  to  the

            circumstances of this case.  The Executive  Order states that

            federal agencies,

                      to  the  extent permitted  by  law, shall
                      avoid undertaking or providing assistance
                      for new construction located  in wetlands
                      unless the  head of the  agency finds (1)
                      that there is no  practicable alternative
                      to  such construction,  and (2)  that the
                      proposed action  includes all practicable
                      measures  to  minimize  harm to  wetlands
                      which may result from such use.

            Exec. Order No.  11,990,   2.  There is  no dispute that Loon

            Pond  is a "wetland."   The Forest Service, however, contends

                                         -52-

            that the Loon Corp.  expansion plan does not  constitute "new

            construction."      The   Executive   Order    defines   "new

            construction" to include  "draining, dredging,  channelizing,

            filling, diking, impounding, and related activities."  Id.,  
                                                                   ___

            7(b).  Dubois claims that the use of Loon Pond as a source of

            water for snowmaking and the discharge of used water from the

            snowmaking  pipes into  Loon Pond  constitute "draining"  and

            "filling" within the meaning of   7(b).

                      We  agree with  the  Forest Service  that the  mere

            expansion of a previously ongoing withdrawal of water from or

            addition of  water to  a reservoir ordinarily  does not  fall

            within the ambit of  the Executive Order's "new construction"

            requirement.23   This  conclusion  is dictated  by the  plain

            meaning  of the  phrase  "new construction,"  which does  not

            ordinarily  encompass  the  mere  expansion   of  an  ongoing

            activity,   unless  that  activity  itself  constituted  "new

            construction."     Likewise,  in  common   usage,  the  words

            "draining" and "filling"  generally refer to  activities that

            eliminate a wetland to  convert it to another use, not to the

            expansion  of  an activity  that  already  adds  water to  or

                                
            ____________________

            23.  It  is conceivable, of  course, that an  expansion of an
            already existing activity could fall within the ambit of  the
                                      _____
            Executive Order's "new construction" requirement.  This could
            occur if  the expansion  effectuated a qualitative  change in
            the nature of the  activity, rather than a  mere quantitative
            enlargement of that activity.  On the record before us in the
            instant case, we cannot say that plaintiffs have demonstrated
            such a qualitative change.

                                         -53-

            withdraws  water  from  an existing  pond.    Our reading  is

            buttressed  by common sense:  one would not ordinarily think,

            without  more,  that a  federal  agency  operating a  dam  on

            federal land would  be required, by  the Executive Order,  to

            issue  notices and make findings every time water is added to

            or  withdrawn from the dam (assuming that the dam has already

            met all legal requirements to begin operation).

                      Applying  the foregoing  analysis of  the Executive

            Order to the record in the instant case, we conclude that the

            situation  here  is  more akin  to  an  expansion of  ongoing

            activities than to  "new construction."  The town  of Lincoln

            is already  using Loon Pond as  a source of town  water.  And

            Loon  Corp. has been using the Pond  as a source of water for

            snowmaking, to  a depth of four  to six feet on  the average.

            It is true  that the extent  of this intrusion  is less  than

            would  be  the  case  under  the  proposed  expansion.    But

            plaintiffs   did   not  challenge   these  currently-existing

            intrusions, and  they have  not demonstrated a  factual basis

            for their  conclusion that  there is something  qualitatively

            "new" about the  proposed drawdown.  Thus, the  proposed Loon

            Corp.  expansion project  --  by drawing  down a  substantial

            additional amount of  water from Loon  Pond and refilling  it

            with  East Branch  water or  with acidic  runoff --  does not

            satisfy  the  definition  of  "new  construction"  within the

            meaning of Executive Order 11,990, even though it constitutes

                                         -54-

            a major  action with  significant impact on  the environment,

            triggering NEPA's EIS requirements.

                          VII.   THE CLEAN WATER ACT ISSUES
                          VII.   THE CLEAN WATER ACT ISSUES
                                 __________________________

                      The Clean Water Act (CWA) was "a bold and  sweeping

            legislative initiative,"  United  States v.  Commonwealth  of
                                      ___________________________________

            P.R.,  721 F.2d 832, 834 (1st Cir. 1983), enacted to "restore
            ____

            and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity

            of the Nation's waters."   33 U.S.C.   1251(a) (1994).  "This

            objective incorporated  a broad, systemic view of the goal of

            maintaining and improving water quality:  as the House Report

            on the legislation put it, 'the word "integrity" . . . refers

            to a condition in which the natural structure and function of

            ecosystems [are]  maintained.'"   United States  v. Riverside
                                              ___________________________

            Bayview Homes, Inc.,  474 U.S. 121, 132  (1985) (quoting H.R.
            ___________________

            Rep. No. 92-911, at 76 (1972)).  In contrast to  NEPA's focus

            on  process,  the  CWA  is  substantive,  focusing  upon  the

            "integrity of  the Nation's Waters, not  the permit process."

            Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d at 952 (quoting Weinberger v.
            _____________________                           _____________

            Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 314). 
            ______________

                      The  most important  component  of the  Act is  the

            requirement that an NPDES permit be obtained, Commonwealth of
                                                          _______________

            P.R., 721 F.2d at 834; see 33 U.S.C.   1342  (1994), which we
            ____                   ___

            discuss in Part VII(B), infra.  In addition, the CWA requires
                                    _____

            states to adopt water quality standards which protect against

            degradation   of  the   physical,  chemical,   or  biological

                                         -55-

            attributes  of  the state's  waters.   33 U.S.C.     1251(a),

            1313(d)(4)(B) (1994);  40 C.F.R.    131.12 (1995).   This  is

            discussed in  Part VII(C),  infra.24   Before turning  to the
                                        _____

            merits of these  issues, however, we  must first address  the

            defendants' jurisdictional arguments.

                      A.   Jurisdictional Issues
                      A.   Jurisdictional Issues
                           _____________________

                      As  a threshold  matter, defendants  argue that  we

            need not  address  the merits  of plaintiffs'  claim that  an

            NPDES permit  was required,  because the court  lacks subject

            matter jurisdiction.  Defendants  argue that the NPDES permit

            issue  is not  properly raised  because plaintiffs  failed to

            provide  notice  of  their  intentions to  sue  Loon  Corp.25

            Defendants contend that Section  505(b) of the CWA "prohibits

            citizen  plaintiffs from  filing [suit  to enforce  the CWA's

            NPDES  permit requirement] until at least  60 days after they

            have provided notice of their intent  to sue" to EPA, to  the

            State  in which the  alleged violation occurred,  and to "any

                                
            ____________________

            24.  The  third major  aspect  of  the  CWA  is  the  use  of
            industry-specific  effluent standards to  control the quality
            of effluent  that can  be attained using  available pollution
            control technology.  33 U.S.C.    1311, et seq.  This  aspect
                                                    _______
            of the CWA is not in issue in this litigation.

            25.  The Forest Service also asserts  that no claim can stand
            against it as a defendant  because EPA regulations place  the
            responsibility   for  obtaining   an  NPDES  permit   on  the
            "operator"  of  a covered  activity;  the  Forest Service  is
            merely  the owner  of the  land on  which the  activity takes
            place.  This argument is unavailing:  if an NPDES permit were
            required,  as plaintiffs  contend,  then  the Forest  Service
            should  not have granted a  special use permit  to Loon Corp.
            until the NPDES permit had been obtained.

                                         -56-

            alleged  violator"  of the  standard,  limitation,  or order.

            Forest  Service  Brief at  37; see  33  U.S.C.    1365 (b)(1)
                                           ___

            (1994).  It is undisputed, however, that Dubois, the original

            plaintiff, did provide  notice to the  Forest Service of  his

            intent to sue.   The  Forest Service was  the only  defendant

            that he did sue; and he alleged only that the Forest Service,

            not Loon Corp., had  violated federal statutes, including the

            CWA, in approving Loon Corp.'s expansion plan.   The district

            court therefore  had jurisdiction to hear  Dubois' claim that

            the Forest Service had approved the  project illegally by not

            ensuring that  an NPDES  permit was obtained.   His  properly

            raised NEPA claim subsumed the CWA claim.26

                      Thus,  even  if Loon  Corp.'s  lack  of notice  did

            deprive us  of jurisdiction  to hear  Dubois' claim  that the

            Forest  Service violated  the  CWA by  failing to  require an

            NPDES permit  before approving  the special use  permit, this

                                
            ____________________

            26.  Thereafter, Loon Corp. chose to intervene in the action
            in order to protect its business interests.  When Loon Corp.
            voluntarily intervened in an ongoing action, it "step[ped]
            into the shoes" of the original defendants -- who were
            properly before the court -- insofar as the 60-day notice is
            concerned.  Kitlutsisti v. ARCO Alaska, Inc., 592 F. Supp.
                        ________________________________
            832, 842 (D. Alaska 1984), vacated as moot, 782 F.2d 800 (9th
                                       _______________
            Cir. 1986); cf. E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm
                        ___ ______________________________________
            Servs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1277 (1st Cir. 1990) (When insurer, as
            ______
            subrogee, steps into shoes of insured, insurer "has no
            greater rights against a third party" than the insured had;
            insurer "was on constructive notice of the provisions of
            [insured's] contract [with third party] because it occupies
            the shoes of its insured.").

                                         -57-

            would  not  remove the  NPDES permit  issue from  the case.27

            Regardless of whether any of the remedies provided in the CWA

            would be available to Dubois in light of his asserted failure

            to provide proper  notice of  his intent to  sue, this  court

            would still have the authority  and the obligation to decide,

            under NEPA, whether an NPDES permit is required in this case.

            See  Keating v.  FERC, 927  F.2d 616,  624 (D.C.  Cir. 1991).
            ___  ________________

            This  is because, as  noted supra,  NEPA requires  the Forest
                                        _____

            Service to identify in  its EIS all federal permits  that the

                                
            ____________________

            27.  Nor is RESTORE precluded from pursuing its claims on the
            ground that it  did not  notify defendants of  its intent  to
            bring suit.  RESTORE was an intervenor, merely joining a suit
            that was already  in esse; it did not  bring a new suit.   As
                              _______
            such,  RESTORE was not required  to notify Loon  Corp. of its
            intent to  bring suit.    We need  look no  further than  the
            statutory  language itself:    "No action  may be  commenced"
                                                               _________
            without  the requisite notice.  33 U.S.C.   1365(b).  RESTORE
            did not "commence" this action; it  intervened in an existing
            action.   Moreover, the purpose of  the notice requirement --
            to give  the parties  an opportunity to  resolve the  problem
            administratively or  to settle  the matter without  resort to
            the  courts,  before  the  parties  have assumed  adversarial
            positions brought about by litigation -- no longer applied at
            the  time RESTORE intervened in the ongoing suit.  Hence, the
            purpose of  the notice  requirement would  not  be served  by
            applying it to an intervenor like RESTORE.

                        Nor  are  we faced  with  the  kind of  equitable
            considerations  discussed in  Hallstrom v.  Tillamook County,
                                          ______________________________
            493  U.S. 20,  29 (1989),  in holding  an  original plaintiff
            strictly  to the  notice  requirement.   Unlike the  original
            plaintiff, who has full  control over when to file  the suit,
            an  intervenor like RESTORE has no control over the timing of
            the initial  action.  Because  this action was  already being
            litigated on  an expedited schedule, RESTORE  could well have
            lost  the  opportunity to  protect  its interests  if  it had
            served  a notice  of intent to  sue and  then waited  60 days
            before intervening  in the  expedited case.   The balance  of
            equities here favors permitting RESTORE to pursue its claims.

                                         -58-

            project  needed in  order to  comply with  applicable federal

            law.   40 C.F.R.    1502.25(b).   There is  no question  that

            plaintiffs  have properly  invoked  the jurisdiction  of this

            court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.   1331 (general federal question

            jurisdiction), to  challenge  defendants' failure  to  comply

            with  NEPA  in this  regard.   For  these reasons,  we reject

            defendants' jurisdictional argument and turn to the merits.

                      B.   NPDES Permit
                      B.   NPDES Permit
                           ____________

                      Section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act prohibits the

            "discharge of  any pollutant" into navigable  waters from any

            "point  source" without an NPDES permit.  33 U.S.C.   1311(a)

            (1994).   Plaintiffs argue  that the Forest  Service violated

            Section 301(a) by  failing to obtain  an NPDES permit  before

            approving Loon's plan  to remove water from  the East Branch,

            use  it to pressurize and prevent  freezing in its snowmaking

            equipment, and then  discharge the used water into Loon Pond.

            Section 301(a)  prohibits the "discharge of  any pollutant by

            any person"  except as authorized pursuant to a permit issued

            under the  Act.   Id.; see  33 U.S.C.     1342, 1344  (1994);
                              ___  ___

            Commonwealth of P.R., 721  F.2d at 835.  The  term "discharge
            ____________________

            of  a pollutant" is defined as "any addition of any pollutant

            to  navigable waters  from any  point source."   33  U.S.C.  

            1362(12)(A) (1994).  The definition of a "pollutant" includes

            "dredged  spoil, solid  waste, . .  . sewage, garbage,  . . .

            biological materials, .  . .  heat,  . .  . sand, .  . .  and

                                         -59-

            agricultural waste."  33 U.S.C.   1362(6) (1994).  "Navigable

            waters" is  defined as "the waters of the United States."  33

            U.S.C.    1362(7) (1994).   The district court  found and the

            parties agree that Loon Pond is a water of the United States,

            that  the  East Branch  water  discharged  from Loon  Corp.'s

            snowmaking pipes  into Loon Pond  is a  pollutant within  the

            meaning of the CWA,28 and that the pipe discharging the water

            into Loon Pond  is a  point source.   The question, then,  is

            whether  there is  an "addition"  of pollutants to  Loon Pond

            when  water containing  pollutants  is discharged  from  Loon

            Corp.'s snowmaking equipment into Loon Pond.

                      The district  court answered  this question in  the

            negative.   The court reasoned that the intake water from the

            East Branch of the  Pemigewasset River and the water  in Loon

            Pond are  all part of "a singular  entity, 'the waters of the
                                                        ___

            United States,'" and  therefore that "the bodies of water are

            not  to   be  considered  individually   in  this   context."

            Memorandum  and Order at 13.  Because it interpreted the East

            Branch  and  Loon  Pond to  be  part  of  the same  "singular

            entity,"  the court concluded that the transfer of water from

            the  East  Branch into  Loon  Pond  would not  constitute  an

                                
            ____________________

            28.  It  contains  at least  the  same  pollutants that  were
            present  in the water from the East Branch before intake into
            the pipes.

                                         -60-

            "addition" into the Pond, at least if the pipes  added no new

            pollutants.29  Id.
                           ___

                      There is no basis  in law or fact for  the district

            court's "singular  entity" theory.  The error  in the court's

            reasoning  is highlighted by an  analogy the court  drew:  it

            hypothesized a pond in  which "we place a  pipe . . .  and we

            pump  the pond water from the bottom  to the surface.  No one

            would  reasonably  contend that  internal  pumping  causes an

            'addition' of  pollutants to  the pond.    Instead, we  would

            consider  the pumping  to be  a redistribution  of pollutants

            from one  part of the pond to  another."  Id. at  12.  Such a
                                                      ___

            situation is not at all analogous to the instant case.  There

            is no barrier separating the water at the top of  a pond from

            the  water  at  the  bottom  of  the  same  pond;  chemicals,

                                
            ____________________

            29.  This premise is a disputed issue.  Plaintiffs argue that
            allowing the water from  the East Branch to flow  through the
            pipes before discharge into Loon Pond results in the addition
            of not insignificant  amounts of oil and  grease.  Defendants
            dispute this, which ordinarily would result in a reversal of
            summary judgment on  this issue.  See Fed. R.  Civ. P. 56(c).
                                              ___
            Defendants argue,  however, that  plaintiffs failed  to raise
            this factual dispute before the  agency in timely fashion, so
            it  is not preserved for our review.  Plaintiffs respond that
            they  could  not  have  raised  this  dispute  prior  to  the
            publication  of the FEIS  because the Forest  Service did not
            even collect the  data regarding oil  and grease until  after
            issuing its decision  (the ROD).   We need  not resolve  this
            dispute;  we hold infra  that, even if  the pipes add  no new
                              _____
            pollutants, the  transfer of  East Branch water  through Loon
            Corp.'s  privately owned  pipes and  its discharge  into Loon
            Pond constitutes  a point source  discharge of at  least some
            pollutants into the Pond,  thereby requiring an NPDES permit.
            Upon remand,  the parties are not  foreclosed from presenting
            their factual disputes to  the EPA if they decide  to contest
            the issuance of that permit.

                                         -61-

            organisms, and even heat are able to pass from the top to the

            bottom or vice versa, at rates determined only by the laws of
                      __________

            science.  

                      In contrast, the transfer  of water or its contents

            from  the East Branch to Loon Pond would not occur naturally.

            This is more analogous to the example the district court gave

            from the opposite end of the spectrum:  where water is  added

            "from an external source"  to the pond and an NPDES permit is

            required.  Id.  As in this converse  example, the East Branch
                       ___

            and Loon Pond are not the same body of water; the East Branch

            is indeed  a source  "external" to  Loon Pond.   We  can take

            judicial notice that the Pemigewasset River was for years one

            of the most  polluted rivers in  New England, the  repository

            for  raw  sewage from  factories and  towns.   It  emitted an

            overwhelming  odor  and  was  known  to  peel  the paint  off

            buildings  located on  its banks.   Yet,  under  the district

            court's theory,  even if  such conditions still  prevailed, a

            proposal to withdraw water from the Pemigewasset to discharge

            it into Loon Pond would be analogous to moving water from the

            top to the bottom of  a single pond; it would not  constitute

            an "addition" of pollutants "from an external source" because

            both the East Branch and Loon Pond are part of the "singular"

            waters of the United States.30  The district court apparently

                                
            ____________________

            30.  Again,  we  leave  to  one  side  the  possibility  that
            additional pollutants, such as oil and grease, would be added
            when the water flowed through the  system of pipes.  If  that

                                         -62-

            would reach  the same  conclusion regardless of  how polluted

            the Pemigewasset  was or how pristine  Loon Pond was.   We do

            not believe Congress intended such an irrational result.

                      The district court's analysis also ignores the fact

            that water  would pass  through Loon Corp.'s  privately owned

            pipes on  its way from the  East Branch to Loon  Pond.  Thus,

            nature  would not regulate --  and neither the Forest Service

            nor the court could know in advance -- whether any pollutants

            would be added to the  water as it passes through the  pipes.

            The district court concluded that the  East Branch water does

            not "lose[] its  status as  navigable waters" even  if it  is

            "commercially exploited," Memorandum and Order at 18, as long

            as  Loon  Corp.  does  not  "plan[]  to  add  any  additional

            pollutants  to  the East  Branch  water  that it  intends  to

            discharge into  Loon Pond."  Id.  at 10.  The  court does not
                                         ___

            indicate  whether anyone assures  compliance with  the "plan"

            that   no  pollutants   be   added  during   the   commercial

            exploitation, or if so  who makes that determination and  how

            it is  made, at  a  time when  the project  is  still just  a

            proposal and not yet  a fait accompli.  Cf.  Massachusetts v.
                                                    ___  ________________

            Watt, 716 F.2d at  952.  The district court's  analysis would
            ____

            apply equally if the water passed through a paper mill on its

            way to Loon Pond,  instead of through snowmaking pipes.   And

            the analysis is equally unpersuasive in either  circumstance.

                                
            ____________________

            were true, that alone would require an NPDES permit.

                                         -63-

            Either  way, the  water leaves  the domain  of nature  and is

            subject  to  private  control  rather  than   purely  natural

            processes.  As such, it has  lost its status as waters of the

            United States.  

                      Other  courts have  held  that an  NPDES permit  is

            required  before pollutants  may  be moved  from one  body of

            water of the United States to another.  See Dague  v. City of
                                                    ___ _________________

            Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354-55  (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd  in
            __________                                          _________

            part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557 (1992); Committee to Save
            _____________________                       _________________

            Mokelumne  River v. East Bay  Mun. Util. Dist.,  13 F.3d 305,
            ______________________________________________

            308-09  (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 198 (1994).
                                     ____________

            The  Eleventh Circuit has held that such a permit is required

            in  order to move dredge  materials by a  point source within
                                                                   ______

            the same water  body.   United States v.  M.C.C. of  Florida,
            ________                _____________________________________

            Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985).
            ____

                      Even  the  Forest  Service  does  not  support  the

            district court's conclusion that mere transfers of water from

            one water body to  another, without more, never result  in an

            addition of pollutants to  waters of the United States.   The

            Forest Service  recognizes that "[i]t is  possible that water

            transferred between unrelated water bodies of different water

            quality would properly  be regarded as  losing its status  as

            'water [sic] of the United  States,'" requiring a Section 402

            permit.  Forest  Service Brief at 47.  We  agree.  The Forest

            Service qualifies this insight, however.  It argues that Loon

                                         -64-

            Corp.  "moves  water between  hydrologically  connected water

            bodies  containing water of  like quality"  which, therefore,

            does not "introduce pollutants  'from the outside world' into

            the receiving waters."  Id.  Accordingly, the Forest  Service
                                    ___

            argues  no permit is required.   We disagree  with the Forest

            Service's qualification.

                      First, there  is nothing in the  statute evincing a

            Congressional intent to distinguish between "unrelated" water

            bodies  and  related   or  "hydrologically  connected"  water

            bodies.    The  CWA simply  addresses  "any  addition of  any

            pollutant to  navigable waters  from any point  source."   33

            U.S.C.   1362(12)(A).  Nor  is the purpose of the  CWA served

            by means of  such a  distinction.  If  anything, the  purpose

            would be  better served by  a distinction between  de minimis
                                                               __ _______

            transfers  of   water  and  transfers  which   add  some  not

            insignificant  amount of pollutants  to the  transferee water

            body.  But no such distinction appears in the statute, and to

            imply  one would  thrust some  agencies with no  expertise on

            environmental issues  into the  role of deciding  whether the

            CWA's environmental protections should even be considered.31

                                
            ____________________

            31.  As discussed in Part  VII(C), infra, in another context,
                                               _____
            the Forest Service argues that it is the EPA, not the  Forest
            Service, that has the expertise and the congressional mandate
            to  determine whether  a proposed  project meets  state water
            quality standards.   We agree.   The availability  of EPA  to
            perform  this  task is  another  reason why  an  NPDES permit
            should  be obtained  before the  Forest Service  approves the
            Loon  Corp. expansion  plan.   See  note 32  and accompanying
                                           ___
            text, infra.
                  _____

                                         -65-

                      More    compellingly,    the    Forest    Service's

            "hydrological connectedness" proposal  ignores a  fundamental

            fact about  water:  the direction  of flow.  It  is true that

            Loon Pond and the  East Branch of the Pemigewasset  River are

            "hydrologically connected"  in the sense that  water from the

            Pond flows down and  eventually empties into the River.   But
                       ____

            water from  the East  Branch certainly  does not flow  uphill
                                                                   ______

            into  Loon Pond, carrying  with it  the pollutants  that have

            undisputedly accumulated  in the East Branch  water from some

            of the other sources  of water entering the East  Branch from

            upstream.    Under  such  circumstances,   defendants  cannot

            credibly argue  that these water  bodies are so  related that

            the transfer  of water from the  East Branch to  Loon Pond is
                                   ____                  __

            not an  "addition" of water  from one  of the "waters  of the

            United States"  to another.   We therefore reject  the Forest

            Service's "hydrological connectedness" proposal.

                      Likewise,  we reject its  assertion, unsupported by

            the  record, that  in some  general sense  the two  bodies of

            water are  "of like  quality."   First, this  is the kind  of

            substantive  question  to  which  the  EPA  would  apply  its

            technical  expertise in  deciding whether  to issue  an NPDES

            permit  and what  conditions to  attach to  such a  permit in

            order  to protect  water  quality.   It  is not  the kind  of

            threshold  question that  the  Forest Service  or this  court

                                         -66-

            should address in deciding whether to  subject the Loon Corp.

            expansion proposal to the NPDES permitting process.  

                      Second,  the   Forest  Service  does   not  contest

            plaintiffs' assertion that there are at least some pollutants

            in the East  Branch that do not exist naturally in Loon Pond.

            The  Final EIS  itself noted  that the  East Branch  has been

            designated  by the  New Hampshire  legislature as  a  Class B

            Waterway,  a  lower  quality  designation than  the  Class  A

            quality rating  of Loon Pond.  JA, vol. II,  FEIS at 91.  The

            difference in classifications -- the East Branch as a Class B

            waterway,  Loon Pond as Class  A -- evinces  a higher quality

            level for the Pond than for the River, and  belies the Forest

            Service's assertion that the two bodies of water are "of like

            quality."

                      Even  if the  East  Branch were  rated in  the same

            general class as Loon Pond (Class A), that would not mean the

            two bodies of water  were identical in quality, such  that an

            NPDES permit  would be unnecessary.  The East Branch contains

            different  organisms than  Loon  Pond,  inter  alia,  Giardia
                                                    ___________

            lambia.    Loon Pond  is also  colder  overall than  the East

            Branch, and its  lower depths are significantly  colder.  The

            two  bodies  of   water  also  have  different   chemistries,

            especially the  low level of  phosphorus in Loon  Pond, which

            affects  its  biological composition.    Nor  has the  Forest

            Service argued  that all such pollutants  would be eliminated
                                 ___

                                         -67-

            before any East  Branch water  would be pumped  up to  refill

            Loon  Pond after depletion  by Loon Corp.'s  snowmaking.  The

            Service  cannot say,  therefore, that  the discharge  of East

            Branch  water  into  Loon  Pond  would  not  result  in  "any

            pollutants"  being   added  to  the   Pond.    33   U.S.C.   

            1362(12)(A).

                      Aside  from the  difficulty of  defining a  general

            concept  such  as  "of  like quality,"  it  would  defeat the

            purpose  of  the  CWA's   permit  process  to  interpret  the

            statutory language "discharge of  any pollutant," 33 U.S.C.  
                                              ___

            1311(a),  to be  implicitly qualified  by the  phrase "except

            when  the transferee body of water  is of like quality."  The

            Forest  Service  is simply  wrong  to  analogize the  present

            situation to  a dam that  merely accumulates the  same water,
                                                              ____

            see National  Wildlife Fed'n v.  Gorsuch, 693  F.2d 156,  175
            ___ ____________________________________

            (D.C.  Cir. 1982),  or a  pump storage  facility  that stores

            water from  one  source in  a different  place, see  National
                                                            ___  ________

            Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers  Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,  589-90
            ______________________________________

            (6th Cir. 1988), as distinguished from moving different water

            from one  flowing water body into  another stationary, colder

            body.   We  cannot allow  such a  watering down  of Congress'

            clear statutory protections.

                      We hold  that the Pemigewasset River  and Loon Pond

            are  two distinct "waters of the United States," and that the

            proposed transfer of  water from one to the other constitutes

                                         -68-

            an "addition."  Where,  as is undisputed here,  the discharge

            is through  a  point source  and  the intake  water  contains

            pollutants,  an  NPDES  permit   is  required.    The  Forest

            Service's determination  to the  contrary  was arbitrary  and

            capricious and not  in accordance with law.   See 5  U.S.C.  
                                                          ___

            706(2)(A).

                      C.   Violation of State Water Quality Standards
                      C.   Violation of State Water Quality Standards
                           __________________________________________

                      Plaintiff  Dubois claims  that state  water quality

            standards are violated because  of the quality of water  that

            would enter Loon Pond.  This water would come from one of two

            sources:  some of  it would come from snowmelt  that replaces

            the water that Loon Corp. has pumped out of Loon Pond to make

            snow; and  some would be water that Loon Corp. has taken from

            the East Branch for snowmaking  and then discharged into Loon

            Pond.    Dubois   contends  that   Loon  Corp.'s   snowmaking

            operations pose an impermissible  threat to Loon Pond because

            influxes  of  East  Branch  water  and  snowmelt --  the  two

            principal  sources of water to refill the Pond -- could alter

            the Pond's naturally occurring  pH, bacteria, oil and grease,

            and turbidity levels.

                      On the merits of the water quality standards issue,

            Dubois  argues that  the CWA requires  states to  adopt water

            quality  standards which protect  against degradation  of the

            physical, chemical,  or biological attributes  of the state's

            waters.   33 U.S.C.     1251(a),  1313(d)(4)(B); 40 C.F.R.   

                                         -69-

            131.12.   The greatest protection is  afforded to Outstanding

            Resource  Waters,  including  Loon   Pond,  as  to  which  no

            degradation  is permitted.   40  C.F.R.    131.12(a)(3); N.H.

            Code Admin. R. Env-Ws  437.06.  Dubois contends that  the ski

            resort's proposal to draw down  a significant amount of water

            changes the  physical structure of Loon  Pond; that refilling

            it with East Branch  water containing phosphorus (and through

            pipes that  might  contain oil  and  grease) or  with  acidic

            runoff would change the Pond's chemical composition; and that

            the  transfer  of  organisms   such  as  Giardia  lambia  and

            chemicals  such as phosphorus  into the Pond  would alter its

            biological  attributes.   Because we  hold infra  that Dubois
                                                       _____

            cannot,  in  a  challenge   to  the  Forest  Service's  FEIS,

            collaterally  attack the state's  certification of compliance

            with state  water quality standards,  we need  not reach  the

            merits of the state water quality standards issue.

                      Defendants  argued  in  the  district   court  that

            Dubois'  CWA claim  was not  properly presented,  that Dubois

            should  have raised  his  objections  by  exhausting  various

            administrative remedies and filing a timely appeal in the New

            Hampshire Supreme Court.  They argued that the federal agency

            (Forest Service) and the federal court lack the authority  to

            review   independently   and   determine   the   validity  of

            requirements  imposed under state law  or in a  state's   401

            certification, see 33 U.S.C.   1371(c)(2)(A) (1994), and that
                           ___

                                         -70-

            such  authority  is expressly  delegated  to  the states,  33

            U.S.C.   1341(a) (1994).  

                      The district court agreed.  It held that, "[i]f the

            plaintiffs in this case were dissatisfied with the state's   

            1341   certification,   they   could   have   challenged  the

            certification by exhausting state administrative remedies and

            filing  a  timely  challenge  in the  New  Hampshire  Supreme

            Court."  Memorandum and Order at 21-23.  That is true insofar

            as it goes.  The question, however, is  whether a state court

            action is the plaintiffs'  only recourse, or whether,  in the
                                       ____

            alternative, they had  a right to challenge in  federal court

            the federal agency's issuance of a federal permit in reliance

            on  the  state  certification,  where  the  basis  for  their

            challenge  is that  the  project fails  to  meet the  minimum

            standards of the federal Clean Water Act.

                      Defendants may be correct  that the cases they rely

            upon hold that the state courts are the only fora in which to

            challenge  whatever requirements  the state adds,  beyond the
                                                        ____   ______

            minimum  required by the CWA.   Those cases  do not, however,

            deprive  the federal courts  of jurisdiction to  hear a claim

            that defendants have violated the  floor level of clean water
                                               _____

            requirements imposed by the CWA, i.e., the requirements which
                                             ____

            the state regulations share with the federal CWA.
                                  _____

                                         -71-

                      The cases relied upon by the  defendants and by the

            district  court32  dealt  with  challenges  to   the  state's

            imposition of  more stringent  controls on a  project's water
                           ______________

            pollution effluent.  Such cases relied on the language of the

            CWA itself,  as well  as basic  principles of  federalism, to

            support their  holdings that the CWA  "empower[s]" the states

            "to set more stringent water quality standards than those set

            by the Act and its  attendant requirements" to prevent  water

            pollution.    Marathon  Dev.  Corp.,  867  F.2d  at  99;  see
                          _____________________                       ___

            Commonwealth  of  P.R.,  721   F.2d  at  834  n.3;  Roosevelt
            ______________________                              _________

            Campobello,  684 F.2d at 1056.   However, the  states may not
            __________

            set  standards that are less  stringent than the  CWA's.  See
                                                                      ___

            Marathon  Dev. Corp.,  867 F.2d at  99.  Simply  put, the CWA
            ____________________

            provides  a federal  floor, not  a ceiling,  on environmental

            protection.   If a state seeks to  approve a standard that is

            less  stringent than  the federal  CWA's floor,  or  seeks to

            apply a standard  in a  way that is  otherwise invalid  under

            federal  law, then  federal agencies  and federal  courts are
            _______

            obligated to resolve  the application of  the federal CWA  in

                                
            ____________________

            32.  They  rely  particularly  on  our  Roosevelt  Campobello
                                                    _____________________
            decision, 684 F.2d at 1056, but also on Puerto Rico Sun  Oil,
                                                    ____________________
            8 F.3d  at 81; United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d
                           ____________________________________
            96, 102 (1st Cir. 1989); Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of
                                     ____________________________________
            Coastal Corridor v. U.S.  Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526  F. Supp.
            ______________________________________________
            1063,  1074  (W.D.Pa. 1981),  aff'd mem.,  707 F.2d  1392 (3d
                                          __________
            Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).  All of these cases
                   ____________
            involved  states imposing  more  stringent controls  on water
            pollution than required by federal law.

                                         -72-

            any case that  properly comes  before them.   See Keating  v.
                                                          ___ ___________

            FERC, 927 F.2d at 624.
            ____

                      The  Forest Service  asserts another  defense, also

            relied on by  the district court,  which carries more  force.

            Section 511(c)(2)(A)  of the  CWA precludes federal  agencies

            from invoking NEPA to authorize their review of "the adequacy

            of  any  certification under  section  [401]."   33  U.S.C.  

            1371(c)(2)(A).  Dubois points  out that, in the circumstances

            of this  case, Section 511(c)(2)(A)  does not apply  when the

            discharge  of  pollutants in  question  is  not regulated  by

            effluent  limitations established  under CWA  Sections 301(b)

            and 302,  33 U.S.C.     1311(b) & 1312,  or by  an applicable

            standard of performance  under CWA Sections  306 and 307,  33

            U.S.C.    1316 & 1317.  Dubois  Brief at 27; see 33 U.S.C.   
                                                         ___

            1341(a).    Such  effluent  limitations   and  standards  are

            established  in NPDES permits  for point  source dischargers.

            33  U.S.C.    1311(b),  1312, 1316,  1317, 1362(11).   Dubois

            then tries  to bootstrap  the fact  that  the Forest  Service

            failed  to apply for an NPDES permit into a circumstance that

            renders Section  511(c)(2)(A) inapplicable.  Dubois  Brief at

            27-28.  His argument is without merit.  

                      It is true that the Forest Service was obligated to

            obtain an NPDES permit before permitting Loon Corp. to expand

            its  ski resort.    See Part  VII(B),  supra.   However,  the
                                ___                _____

            violation of  that statutory  obligation is a  separate issue

                                         -73-

            from the state water  quality standards issue.   For purposes

            of the  latter, the  fact  is that  there  do not  exist  any

            effluent limitations under CWA Sections 301(b) or 302 nor any

            standards of  performance under CWA Sections 306  or 307 that

            apply to  the discharge of  East Branch water  and pollutants

            into Loon Pond.  Therefore, whether or not the Forest Service

            actually   obtained  the   required  NPDES   permit,  Section

            511(c)(2)(A) applies, and  Dubois' challenge to the  adequacy

            of the state's Section  401 certification may not proceed  in

            this court.  

                      As the federal defendants argued in their brief and

            as we held in Roosevelt Campobello, 684 F.2d at 1056, Dubois'
                          ____________________

            challenge  must be  addressed as  part of  EPA's "independent

            obligation to ensure that EPA-issued NPDES permits meet state

            water quality standards."  Forest Service Brief at 29; see 33
                                                                   ___

            U.S.C.     1311(b)(1)(C)  (1994).33   If,  upon  remand,  EPA

            determines  that a  permit  is appropriate,  with or  without

                                
            ____________________

            33.  The availability of  EPA to perform this task is another
            reason supporting our holding in  Part VII(B), supra, that an
                                                           _____
            NPDES permit is required.   See supra  note 30.  The  federal
                                        ___ _____
            CWA  requires that  any state  certification ensure  that the
            minimal  federal  standards  have   been  adhered  to.    The
            government  is correct  that  the  Forest  Service  possesses
            neither  the  congressional  mandate  nor  the  expertise  to
            second-guess  state water  quality certifications.   But  EPA
            does; and the CWA envisions that EPA make those assurances in
            the context of deciding whether to issue an NPDES permit.

                                         -74-

            conditions or limitations,34 and if  plaintiffs disagree with

            EPA's  decision, then they may challenge such decision in any

            manner that is  available to them at the time.   But EPA, not

            the  Forest  Service,  is   the  proper  entity  to  evaluate

            compliance with state water quality standards.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      We affirm the district  court's denial of defendant

            Loon's  motion  to dismiss  plaintiff  Dubois'  complaint for

            failure to  meet his burden  of establishing his  standing to

            sue.

                      We  reverse the  district court's grant  of summary

            judgment  in favor  of  defendants and  reverse the  district

            court's denial  of summary  judgment in favor  of plaintiffs,

            with 

                                
            ____________________

            34.  Whether  or not  the  NHDES certifies  that state  water
            quality  standards have  been  met, EPA  would  be "bound  to
            include in the federal permit 'any more stringent limitations
            .  . . established pursuant  to any State  law or regulations
            (under  authority preserved  by  section  510).'"   Roosevelt
                                                                _________
            Campobello,   684  F.2d   at  1056   (quoting  33   U.S.C.   
            __________
            1311(b)(1)(C)).

                                         -75-

            respect to 

                      (1) the NEPA/EIS issue relating to consideration of

            alternatives, 

                      (2) the supplemental EIS issue, and 

                      (3) the NPDES permit issue. 

                      We  affirm the  district court's  grant of  summary

            judgment  in  favor of  defendants  and  affirm the  district

            court's  denial of  summary  judgment in  favor of  plaintiff

            Dubois, with respect to the alleged violations of 

                      (1) Executive Order 11,990, and 

                      (2) state water quality standards under the CWA.

                      Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded; costs
                      Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded; costs
                      ___________________________________________________

            on appeal awarded to plaintiffs.
            on appeal awarded to plaintiffs.
            _______________________________

                                         -76-