Court Opinion

ID: 9827327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:25:08.247451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:29.323597
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee very earnestly and cogently contends, as grounds for the granting of his motion for rehearing, that we erred in our construction of article 1995, subdivision 4, R. 0. S. 1925, and subdivision 29a, added to our venue statute, title 42, chapter 1, subdivision 4, R. O. S. 1925 by Acts 40th Legislature (1st Called Sess.), c. 72 page 197, § 2 (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 1995, subd. 29a). In support of this contention, appellee places great stress upon article 6251, R. C. S. 1925, viz.:.
*185“No surety shall be sued, unless bis principal is joined with bim, or unless a judgment bas previously been rendered against bis principal, except in tbe cases otherwise provided for in tbe laws relating to parties to suits.” And upon article 6252, Id., viz.: “Tbe remedy provided for sureties by tbis title extends to endorsers, guarantors, drawers of bills wbich bave been accepted, and every other suretyship, whether created by express contract, or by operation of law.”
Predicated upon said articles 6251 and 6252, appellee reasons that, as appellant, under the provisions of said articles, was a necessary party in order for bis suit to be maintained against McGraw, as guarantor, “appellant was properly sued in tbe county where McGraw resides.” Let it be conceded •that, under tbe facts of this case (it not being a case “otherwise provided for in tbe laws relating to parties to suits”) that appel-lee could not maintain his suit against Mc-Graw on bis guaranty, unless appellant, bis principal, was joined with him, on tbe ground that appellant was an indispensable party to tbe suit, what would be tbe effect of said articles 6251 and 6252 on a suit brought only against McGraw as guarantor? To cause tbe suit to be abated on tbe filing of a proper plea supported by tbe record or requisite proof; only tbis and nothing more. Said articles could not alone support a plea in bar or one of privilege, even if McGraw was so sued out of tbe county of bis residence. To sustain appellee’s position anent the effect of said articles 6251 and 6252 would be to bold that same required a suit against a guarantor and bis principal to be filed in tbe county of guarantor’s residence, although suit against both could be properly brought in tbe county where tbe contract was payable, either by its express terms or tbe manner in which it was executed, viz., as under the facts in tbe instant case, tbe county where executed and where tbe maker resided, no place of payment being specifically named therein. Appellant, prior to and on tbe date tbe contract sued upon and tbe mineral or oil leases were executed, resided in Knox county, and from that date continued to so reside up to tbe trial of tbis cause. No one of tbe mineral leases alleged by appellee to bave been executed by McGraw to, and accepted by, appellant were introduced in evidence. McGraw testified as follows: “Tbe contract read in evidence bas on this back of it tbis endorsement: ‘July 20th, 1929. For consideration of one $1.00 Dollar cash, and other valuable considerations, I assign all my right, title and interest of inclosed contract to A. F. Boyer, and guarantee payment of same. [Signed] T. W. McGraw.’ ”
Tbe only contract disclosed by the statement of facts that said witness McGraw could bave referred to was a contract created by tbe following letters:
“Munday, Texas, February 3t 1927.
“Mr. T. W. McGraw,
“Munday, Texas.
“Dear Sir:
“I hereby agree to lease from you tbe following land: 400 acres out of Sur. 136, and 127½ acres out Sur. 139 and 138 in Block 45, H. & T. G. Ry. Co., and 289 acres out of tbe Elias Gilpin Survey, all in Haskell County, Texas, and Sub. Sur. No. 3 out of Orig. No. 6, D. G. Burnett land, and 209 acres out of Sur. No. 128, Blk. 45, H. & T. C. Ry. .Co. survey in Knox County, Texas, aggregating 1185 acres of land, at tbe following terms: $2.00 an acre and $1.00 an acre rental per year for tbe period of 5 years, and you to allow me thirty days in which to prepare leases and titles,, etc., you to sign as requested until all of said leases are perfected.
“Yours very truly
“[Signed] E. Duval.”
“Munday, Texas, Feby. 3rd, 1927.
“Mr. E. Duval,
“Munday, Texas.
“Dear Sir:
“I hereby agree to lease to you tbe following lands for oil and gas purposes: 400 acres out Sur. No. 136 and 127½ acres out of Sur. No. 138 & 139, and 289 acres out of tbe Elias ’ Gilpin Survey, all in Haskell County, Texas; Sub. Sur. 3 out of Orig. No. 6, D. G. Burnett land and 209 acres out of Sur. 128 in Blk No. 45 H. & T. C. Ry. Co. survey in Knox County, Texas,- at tbe price of $2.00 an acre bonus and $1.00 an acre rental per year for five years' on Form 88 Commercial lease. You to bave thirty days to prepare lease and title thereto, and I will sign lease for all or any part as you may request on tbe above terms.
“Yours very truly,
“[Signed] T. W. McGraw.”
Therefore, we are to assume that said indorsement so testified to by said witness was made on one of said letters as a component part of said alleged contract in which no place of payment was specifically stated. Under this state of facts, Suit to enforce the payment of rents alleged to be due under said “contract” could only be brought against appellant in Knox county, tbe county of bis residence, and the one embracing tbe town of Munday, tbe place where said contract was dated. Brown et al. v. Guaranty Security Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 265 S. W. 547. That appellee, under said articles 6251 and 6252, could not maintain tbis suit against McGraw unless appellant was joined with bim, and by subdivision 4 of article 1995, supra, was required to file, said suit in tbe county where tbe contract sued on was, as above determined, to be performed as to tbe payment of rents, could not create or cause *186a conflict to exist between tbe terms of said statutory provisions; that said MeGraw, as guarantor of the performance of the covenants to be kept by appellant, as to payment of rents under the involved contract, is properly suable in Knox county, where the rents sued for are payable because of the environ-' ments under which said contract was executed, as above stated, we think is sustained by the following authorities: Looney v. Le Geirse & .Co., 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 477; Yett v. Green, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 184, 86 S. W. 787; McCauley v. Cross et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 111 S. W. 799; Citizens’ State Bank of Alice v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 268 S. W. 1008. That subdivision 29a, supra, was not enacted as an amendment but as an addition to said article 1995, in that it was not intended by the Legislature that said subdivision 29a should repeal or be in conflict with any of the then existing sections of said article 1995, we think is quite manifest from the following language of the act creating said subdivision 29a, especially as to subdivision 4 of said article, as amended by the 33d Legislature, p. 424: “That a new Subdivision be added to Article 1995, to be designated as Subdivision 29a, reading as follows: * * * and such suit is lawfully maintainable therein under the provisions of Article 1995 as to any of such defendants. * * * ”
The amendment of said subdivision 4, supra, by the 33d Legislature, we think was enacted in quite a measure as a special provision to apply to a particular class of litigation, and that its existence was intended to be preserved by the above language quoted from said act of the 40th Legislature.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.