Court Opinion

ID: 9407870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 17:09:19.046902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.508964
License: Public Domain

J-A13004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DREW H. MILLETT                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :     No. 505 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 16, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0002626-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILED: JULY 10, 2023

        Drew H. Millet appeals from the judgment of sentence of five and one-

half to eleven years of incarceration following his convictions for two counts

of aggravated assault and one count of simple assault. We affirm.

        We set forth the relevant facts from the trial court’s opinion:

        The case arises out of an altercation between Appellant and a man
        named Paul Myers (hereinafter “victim”), which occurred during
        the early morning hours of July 19, 2020[, in the trailer park
        where they both lived]. At trial, both Appellant and victim testified
        and provided their respective versions of the events that occurred
        on the date in question.

              ....

        Victim, who was [seventy-seven] years old at the time of the
        incident, testified that at around 1:00 a.m. on July 19, 2020, he
        decided to take his dog for a walk, as he often does at that time
        of the night. Victim left his home, turned left on a sidewalk in
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A13004-23

     front of his home, and began his walk with his dog. In so doing,
     victim walked past the home of Appellant, who lives two homes
     down from victim. As victim was proceeding past Appellant’s
     home, Appellant, who appeared “boisterous” and “perturbed,”
     emerged from his home, stood on the walkway between his home
     and the sidewalk, and began yelling at victim. Appellant accused
     victim’s dog of urinating on his yard and threatened to kill the dog.
     Victim started walking backwards towards his car, which was
     about [twenty] feet from Appellant’s home. Because he believed
     he did not have enough time to call the police, victim retrieved a
     can of pepper spray from the glove compartment of his car, all the
     while Appellant continued yelling “kill me, kill me, kill me.”

     Once he retrieved the pepper spray, victim and his dog proceeded
     again towards Appellant’s home. Victim testified that he thought
     he was in imminent danger, and he believed that he could protect
     himself, his wife [who was not outside], and his dog by either
     pepper spraying Appellant or sending Appellant’s attention “in a
     different direction.” Victim, who remained on the sidewalk,
     attempted to talk to Appellant, but Appellant remained agitated
     and continued to make threatening remarks, and victim was
     unable to have a productive conversation with Appellant. This
     conversation attempt culminated with victim spraying Appellant
     with pepper spray, as Appellant was standing approximately two
     feet from where victim was on the sidewalk. After being sprayed,
     Appellant kicked victim’s dog towards a nearby tree. As victim
     proceeded towards the tree where his dog was located, victim was
     struck over the head with something hollow, causing him to fall to
     the ground on top of his dog. As victim remained on the ground,
     Appellant continued to strike him about seven or eight times.
     Victim eventually emerged from the ground, feeling dizzy and
     wobbly, and as he took a step towards Appellant’s home,
     Appellant appeared “from out of nowhere” and pushed victim into
     the ground in the middle of the street. Victim, whose glasses had
     been broken and who had lost a shoe, picked up his dog and went
     back to his home to call the police. Once police arrived, they
     dispatched an ambulance to take victim to the hospital.

           ....

     Appellant chose to testify in his defense. Appellant stated that
     during the time he lived in the trailer park, he had recurring issues
     with victim’s and other residents’ dogs walking on and relieving
     themselves on his property. This upset Appellant because it

                                     -2-
J-A13004-23

     destroyed his bushes and grass, his yard smelled strongly of urine,
     and his home was beginning to smell like his yard.

     On the morning in question, Appellant observed on his
     surveillance camera that victim was approaching his home, and
     he decided to go out and confront victim about his dog. Appellant
     went outside his house and told victim to get his dog off
     Appellant’s property and to stop walking the dog on Appellant’s
     yard. Appellant and victim walked down the street a bit and
     argued back and forth. Appellant recalled that victim walked
     further down the street and retrieved something from his car. At
     this point, Appellant was concerned that victim may have been
     retrieving a gun, so he walked back towards his home and sat in
     a chair on his porch.

     Later, victim returned to [the sidewalk in front of] Appellant’s
     home, and Appellant left his porch and walked towards victim
     again. Shortly thereafter, victim sprayed Appellant with pepper
     spray. After Appellant was sprayed, he went to the top of his
     porch steps, which were about six to eight feet from victim and
     threw a garden tool and one or two flowerpots toward victim. At
     this point victim began moving forward towards a nearby tree.
     Victim began picking up the objects that were thrown at him,
     which prompted Appellant to believe that he needed to defend
     himself. At this point, which was about [thirty] seconds after he
     was initially pepper-sprayed, Appellant grabbed a metal-handled
     broom that was located by his front door, left his porch, and struck
     victim several times with the broom’s handle. Appellant said after
     he noticed that the broom handle was bent, he threw it to the
     ground because he did not want to cut himself on the sharp metal
     edges.

     After he had been struck with the broom, victim ran into a dark
     area between Appellant’s tree and the trailer of Appellant’s next-
     door neighbor. Appellant and victim squared up, and victim kicked
     Appellant in the leg. Appellant then hit victim in the body several
     times, and victim kicked Appellant’s leg and “ran through” him
     towards the street. Once there, victim squared towards Appellant,
     who took two steps and punched victim. Appellant then landed
     on victim in the street. Appellant claimed that he fell on victim
     not because he leaped at him, but because his injured leg gave
     out. Once victim was down on the ground in the street, Appellant
     stated that he no longer felt threatened. Therefore, he got up,

                                    -3-
J-A13004-23

       retreated into his home, showered, changed his t-shirt, and sent
       an email to the Susquehanna Township Police to file a complaint.

       On cross-examination, it was elicited that Appellant had observed
       victim and his dog walking on his property several times
       previously, but on those previous occasions, he was not in the
       mood to get dressed and go outside to confront victim. Appellant
       admitted that on the night of the pertinent incident, he was
       irritated and that he became increasingly angered by some of the
       “disrespectful” and “hurtful” things that victim said to him during
       the confrontation. Appellant admitted that victim never walked
       onto Appellant’s private walkway, nor did he attempt to enter
       Appellant’s porch or trailer. Appellant also admitted that he never
       saw victim with a gun or knife.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/22, at 2-5 (cleaned up).

       Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with one count of

aggravated assault and one count of terroristic threats and proceeded to a

jury trial.1 On January 2, 2022, amid trial, Appellant filed a motion requesting

the trial court instruct the jury regarding self-defense, which the court denied.

       Appellant was convicted and sentenced as indicated hereinabove. This

timely appeal followed. Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. Appellant raises the following issue on appeal: “Whether the trial court

erred in denying the defense’s request for self-defense jury instructions, when

[Appellant] made out a prima facie case for self-defense, and the trial court

erroneously denied the giving of the instruction despite [Appellant] meeting

____________________________________________

1 The docket reflects that sometime prior to trial, the charges were amended
to add additional counts of aggravated assault and simple assault and to
remove the count of terroristic threats. This appears to have occurred with
the filing of an amended information on May 12, 2021, but that filing is not
included within the certified record. At trial, the jury considered in total two
counts of aggravated assault and one count of simple assault.

                                           -4-
J-A13004-23

his burden, thereby displacing the jury from its right to determine facts?”

Appellant’s brief at 6.

       In reviewing a challenge based on the trial court’s refusal to give a

specific jury instruction,

       it is the function of this Court to determine whether the record
       supports the trial court’s decision. In examining the propriety of
       the instructions a trial court presents to a jury, our scope of review
       is to determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
       discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the
       case. A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge
       as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead
       or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is
       considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what
       the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to
       fundamental error.        Consequently, the trial court has wide
       discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not
       required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and
       its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal
       unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa.Super. 2013) (cleaned

up).

       Section 505 of Crimes Code provides the following concerning use of

force in self-protection:

       (a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.—
       The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when
       the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
       purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
       such other person on the present occasion.

       (b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.—

             ....

             (2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
             section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary

                                       -5-
J-A13004-23

            to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury,
            kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or
            threat; nor is it justifiable if:

                    (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or
                    serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force
                    against himself in the same encounter; or

                    (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
                    using such force with complete safety by retreating,
                    except the actor is not obliged to retreat from his
                    dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial
                    aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another
                    person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505.

      Thus, in order to successfully claim self-defense warranting a jury

instruction, a defendant must point to evidence that would allow the jury to

find three elements: (1) the defendant reasonably believed that he was in

imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that the use of deadly

force was necessary to prevent such harm; (2) the defendant did not provoke

the incident which resulted in the use of force; and (3) the defendant did not

violate any duty to retreat. See Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738,

740 (Pa. 2012). Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-defense,

before the defense is properly at issue, there must be some evidence to justify

such a finding. Id. at 740. “[A] valid claim of self-defense must be made out

as a matter of law, and this determination must be made by the trial judge.”

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 420 (Pa.Super. 2011). The claim

may consist of evidence from whatever source, including evidence adduced

by the defendant as part of his case.        See id. at 420-21.    However, the

                                       -6-
J-A13004-23

evidence must speak to all three elements of self-defense to be placed in issue

for a jury’s consideration. See id. at 421.

      In denying Appellant’s request for a self-defense instruction, the trial

court determined that Appellant failed to establish two of the three elements

articulated in Mouzon, supra. First, it found that no evidence showed that

Appellant “was free from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which

resulted in victim’s injury.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/24/22, at 9. Second, it

maintained that the evidence evinced that Appellant violated a duty to retreat

or avoid the danger that ultimately prompted Appellant to strike victim with

the broom handle. See id. at 10. Appellant challenges both of the trial court’s

determinations on appeal.

      Concerning the provocation of force, the court summarized the relevant

evidence as follows:

      [T]he initial altercation began when Appellant emerged from his
      home at 1:00 a.m. and began yelling at victim, who was merely
      walking his dog past Appellant’s property. Moreover, the evidence
      establishes that after victim returned to Appellant’s property after
      retrieving the pepper spray from his car, Appellant, instead of
      remaining on his porch, walked out towards the victim. Finally,
      even after he had been pepper-sprayed, instead of choosing to
      cease the confrontation, Appellant began to throw objects at
      victim, which continued the difficulty that ultimately led to victim
      being repeatedly struck with the broom handle that caused his
      injuries.

Id. at 9-10.   From the above, the court concluded that based on all the

evidence, Appellant either was not free from fault in provoking the incident,

                                     -7-
J-A13004-23

or that he continued the difficulty that resulted in victim’s injuries. See id. at

9-10.

        In his brief, Appellant argues that “[t]he trial court erroneously

assign[ed] fault and displaced the jury in determining whether [Appellant] was

in fact free from fault.” Appellant’s brief at 22. He states that the court erred

in making factual findings that “[Appellant] was yelling, that there was no

reason for the altercation, and [Appellant]’s subsequent walking down of his

porch and subsequent pepper-spraying was his own fault.” Id. at 22-23. He

also avers that the source of the conflict was the pepper-spraying by victim,

which the court failed to address. Id. at 24-25. Appellant characterizes the

evidence as showing that when he confronted victim, he was only speaking in

a forceful, nonthreatening manner, which would not constitute sufficient

provocation to be attacked. See id. at 23. As such, Appellant believes he

met his burden and that the provoking party was a question of fact to be

determined by the jury.2 See id. at 25.

____________________________________________

2  As part of this argument, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Young, 412
A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 1979) for the proposition that “[w]hether an actor is the
instigator is a question of fact for the factfinder.” See Appellant’s brief at 22.
We do not agree with Appellant’s interpretation of Young. There, this Court
addressed whether a trial court’s instruction to the jury concerning use of force
for protection of property pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 507 was adequate and
correct as given. We did not consider whether a justification defense was
sufficiently presented for a jury’s consideration. Additionally, the facts of
Young are materially distinguishable from the instant matter. See Young,
supra at 160-61 (defendant shot a trespasser, wherein testimony from
various individuals on scene differed in how the altercation began and the
circumstances of the fatal shot, as well as the extent of prior interactions and
threats exchanged between the defendant and the victim).

                                           -8-
J-A13004-23

      After review, we find that the trial court did not commit either a clear

abuse of discretion or an error of law in denying Appellant’s request for a self-

defense jury instruction. We are mindful that Appellant need only show “any

evidence from whatever source” to support the self-defense element that he

was   “free   from    fault   in   provoking    or   continuing    the   difficulty.”

Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 585 A.2d 1069, 1071 (Pa.Super. 1991) (en

banc) (cleaned up). Although this is a low burden of production, the court

correctly determined that there was no evidence at trial supporting a finding

that Appellant was faultless in initiating or aggravating the encounter.

      The uncontradicted testimony was that victim was walking his dog in

the early morning hours until accosted by Appellant. Appellant emerged from

his house and proceeded to the sidewalk, where victim was standing, to

confront him. Appellant and victim had never spoken to each other before.

Then, the two began arguing with each other, with Appellant following victim

down the street. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 249-52. It was only after this

occurrence that victim backed away from Appellant’s house toward his car to

retrieve the pepper spray. There was no evidence suggesting that anything

other than Appellant’s acts of arguing with and following victim is what caused

victim to take further action. It is irrelevant that Appellant classifies the initial

engagement as “arguing,” as opposed to the “yelling” described by the trial

court, because there was simply no evidence that could have supported a jury

determination that Appellant’s decision to confront the victim at 1:00 a.m.

was not the but-for cause of the difficulty.

                                        -9-
J-A13004-23

       Moreover, even assuming that the encounter in question began with the

victim pepper-spraying Appellant, as he contends, this does not afford him

relief. Appellant testified that he believed victim may have retrieved a firearm

from the vehicle, so Appellant went back to his porch to sit in a chair. He

conceded that the spraying occurred only after he left his porch a second

time to confront victim, who was again standing on the sidewalk. Based on

Appellant’s own version of events, he voluntarily intensified the situation by

walking into his yard to within two feet of victim and confronting him, instead

of ending the encounter by remaining on the porch or entering into his home. 3

In sum, we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that there was no

evidence before the jury that would have allowed it to conclude that Appellant

was not the provoking agent. The court’s decision to deny the self-defense

instruction was not an omission “tantamount to fundamental error,” nor did

this refusal prejudice Appellant. See Sandusky, supra at 667.

       Appellant further argues that the trial court improperly usurped the

jury’s fact-finding function in deciding whether he satisfied the threshold

inquiry of raising self-defense. We disagree. Appellant neglects the fact that

as a matter of law, the court was required to determine whether the elements

of self-defense were properly asserted. See Hansley, supra at 420. In doing

so, the court considered testimony from all of the witnesses. Our review does
____________________________________________

3  We note that Appellant testified that while he was “concerned” victim was
retrieving a gun from his car, Appellant did not feel “threatened” at any point
during the encounter until he was pepper-sprayed. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at
257-58.

                                          - 10 -
J-A13004-23

not reveal that the court assessed Appellant’s credibility or otherwise

disbelieved his testimony as a matter of denying Appellant’s request. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1221 (Pa. 2009)

(determining that the burden of disproving self-defense cannot be met solely

through a fact finder’s disbelief of the defendant’s testimony).        Moreover,

Appellant does not articulate any findings by the court predicated on its

disbelief of Appellant’s testimony. Rather, as summarized above, there was

simply “no evidence from any source” demonstrating that Appellant did not

provoke victim’s use of force against him.          Mayfield, supra at 1071.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s request for a self-

defense jury instruction for that reason.4

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/10/2023

____________________________________________

4 Since we affirm the trial court’s denial of a self-defense jury instruction on
the basis that the evidence demonstrated Appellant provoked the use of force
against himself, we do not address Appellant’s challenge to the court’s
contention that Appellant violated a duty to retreat.

                                          - 11 -