Court Opinion

ID: 9474165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:49:45.79718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:56.305874
License: Public Domain

JAMES HARVEY, Senior District Judge,
concurring. •
While I concur in the majority opinion, I write separately to express my concern with the posture in which this case comes before us. Following a nonjury trial, the District Court issued a four sentence decision holding that “[t]he Court is of the opinion that judgment should be in favor of plaintiff [Pentec] and against defendant [Graphic Controls].” The Court, however, gave no indication as to the basis for its holding and noted that it would consider any proposed findings submitted by Pentec. Pentec submitted its proposed findings on November 14, 1984. On November 15, 1984, the District Court adopted without change Pentec’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as the opinion of the Court. The Court did this by simply scratching the word “proposed” off of the document submitted by Pentec and by then filing it. Similarly, the proposed judgment was adopted without change on November 15, 1984. Nowhere in the record does it appear that Graphic Controls had any opportunity to respond or object to the proposed findings submitted by Pentec.
In requiring a District Court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,” Rule 52(a) serves a threefold purpose. It ensures care in the preparation of an opinion, defines the res judicata limitations of a decision for future cases and provides appellate courts with the benefit of the District Court’s insights into a case. See Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 751-52 (3rd Cir.1965); Fed.R.Evid. 52 advisory committee note; J. Wright, The Nonjury Trial — Preparing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Opinions, Seminar for Newly Appointed United States District Judges (1962); and Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2571 at 679-80.
The purposes served by Rule 52(a) are largely defeated in cases in which the find*319ings of fact and conclusions of law more accurately reflect the thinking of the prevailing attorney than that of the Court. For only in struggling through the various factual and legal issues itself can a Court he certain that the result which is reached is the result that it would have intended. When this function is instead delegated to the prevailing attorney, factual inconsistencies and difficult legal issues are often improperly minimized. See Roberts v. Ross, supra.
The Supreme Court has recognized the various problems which are created when a District Court adopts proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without change. Nevertheless, as the majority notes, the Supreme Court has indicated that such findings are not' to be rejected out of hand and are still subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Anderson v. Bessemer City, - U.S. -, -, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518, 527 (1985); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 615 n. 13, 94 S.Ct. 2856, 2866 n. 13, 41 L.Ed.2d 978 (1974); and United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1964). Notably, however, Anderson is factually distinguishable from the case at bar. The Court in Anderson specifically found that the trial judge had issued a preliminary opinion, that the judge had not “uncritically accepted the [proposed] findings” and that the opposing party had been given an opportunity to respond to the proposed findings. — U.S. at-, 105 S.Ct. at 1510, 84 L.Ed.2d at 527. Similarly, the Court in Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1544 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.1984), found that the District Court issued a memorandum decision. Finally, it is worth noting that although the Supreme Court has “suggested] that even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and may be reversed only if clearly erroneous,” it has at the same time strongly criticized the practice. Anderson, - U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 1510, 84 L.Ed.2d at 527. See also, Marine Bancorporation, and El Paso Natural Gas Co., supra.
I concur in the majority opinion because I find that although the Supreme Court has criticized the practice of adopting proposed findings verbatim, it has held that the clearly erroneous standard is not thereby rendered inapplicable. I agree with the majority that the findings of fact in this case withstand scrutiny under such a standard of review. Nevertheless, I feel that several very close factual questions were presented in this case and wonder whether the District Court would have reached the same result had it separately prepared the findings.
Although I feel constrained to agree that this Court must decide this case as it has, I believe that an alternative exists which would more effectively protect the procedures set forth in Rule 52(a). That alternative would be to simply remand cases such as the one now before this Court to the District Court for its reconsideration. Such a rule would have two beneficial effects. First, it would ensure proper consideration of a case by a District Court. Second, it would leave intact the clearly erroneous standard of review; a standard which appears to have been undermined sub silencio in some cases on appeal in an effort by the Courts of Appeal to compensate for inadequate consideration by a District Court.
By this suggestion, I do not denigrate the value and importance of having the parties assist the Court in its task by submitting proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Moreover, I do not envision this procedure to be one that will be used frequently. When, however, the record contains no indication of the District Court’s own reasoning for its holding, and when the proposed findings have been adopted verbatim by a District Court without any opportunity for the opposing party to file objections, the better course of action would be to remand the case to the District Court for its reconsideration. Nevertheless, while I believe that such a practice would be in keeping with the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 52, it has not yet been approved by the Supreme Court *320and I therefore concur in the majority opinion.