Court Opinion

ID: 9424161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:10:33.362794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:48.494977
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
Respondent was convicted of murder and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on June 2, 1956, nearly 14 years ago. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed. *486Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614, 83 N. W. 2d 347, and we denied certiorari, 356 U. S. 933.
In 1962 respondent filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court which was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Parker v. State, 178 Neb. 1, 131 N. W. 2d 678.
In 1963 respondent sought post-conviction relief in the Nebraska court, alleging that the confessions obtained from him and used at the trial were involuntary and in violation of the Federal Constitution. The court after an evidentiary hearing denied relief and the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirmed. State v. Parker, 180 Neb. 707, 144 N. W. 2d 525.
In 1966 respondent filed the present petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District Court, again challenging the voluntariness of the confessions. Again a full evi-dentiary hearing was held and the petition was denied. That was on June 27, 1968. On July 18, 1969, the Court of Appeals reversed, 413 F. 2d 459, saying:
“The interest of justice would not be served by remanding this case for a hearing upon the volun-tariness of the confession [s] if the factual background in the present case is such that in event the state court again found the confession [s] voluntary, a determination that such finding was not warranted would be required. In both the state and federal post conviction hearings reliance was placed upon the extensive record made on voluntariness at the trial, and no additional evidence was introduced. Thus it would seem unlikely that either party has any additional substantial evidence on the volun-tariness issue.” Id., at 463.
The issue of voluntariness vel non of the confessions is a much-plowed field. If the federal courts were coming to this question without prior state opportunity to *487act, I would agree that the federal courts should not act until the state tribunal first had the opportunity to try the issue. Moreover, it would be more appropriate, as Mr. Justice Black says, to remand the case so that there might be a new trial before a jury. But if this issue is to be resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding, where traditionally a jury does not sit,* then we should affirm the Court of Appeals. The issue as to the voluntary character of the confessions has been hotly contested and the facts thoroughly exposed in the state proceedings. And the conclusion by the Court of Appeals that the confessions were not voluntary is a responsible one. Moreover, the observation of the Supreme Court of Nebraska that there is no evidence of “a real miscarriage of justice,” State v. Parker, 180 Neb., at 714, 144 N. W. 2d, at 529, though popular in some legal circles, is irrelevant. For under our presumably civilized constitutional procedures, a conviction on a coerced confession, even of one whom we despise, is intolerable.

The rule that there is no right to jury trial in habeas corpus cases has been codified in the federal statute, 28 U. S. C. §2243:
“The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”
Section 2243 does not preclude the use of an advisory jury pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 39 (c). See 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice 265-269 (1969); cf. W. Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus 256 (2d ed. 1893). Yet the use of an advisory jury is discretionary only. See Barry v. White, 62 App. D. C. 69, 70, 64 F. 2d 707, 708 (1933). “[T]he court should not utilize an advisory jury, if to do so would delay the hearing of the habeas corpus proceeding; and as a matter of sound practice the advisory jury should be used, if at all, only in the rare and exceptional case.” Moore, supra, at 268-269.