Court Opinion

ID: 9927078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 06:04:51.87141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:47.039586
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD AARON MANN,                                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       January 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                      No. 359342
                                                                       Oakland Circuit Court
MARGARET CLARK WHITFIELD,                                              LC No. 2019-874512-DM

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this divorce action, defendant Margaret Clark Whitfield appeals as of right the trial
court’s judgment of divorce confirming an arbitration award. Before issuing the judgment of
divorce, the trial court denied Whitfield’s motion to vacate portions of the arbitration award and
granted plaintiff Richard Aaron Mann’s motion to confirm the award. We affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        Mann and Whitfield were married in 2003 and had two children together. In July 2019,
Mann filed for divorce. During an early intervention conference in early September 2019, the
parties informed the trial court that there were disputes related to property distribution, child
support, and spousal support. The trial court entered an order regarding the early intervention,
stating, in relevant part: “An inquiry was made as to domestic violence and no hearing prior to
mediation is recommended at this time.”

        The parties initially attempted to mediate their disputes related to property, spousal support,
child support, and attorney fees. From March 2020 to September 2020, they attended three
mediation sessions but were unable to reach an agreement during those sessions. In late January
2021, Whitfield sought a restraining order from the trial court to prevent Mann from disseminating
her private journals, which she alleged he did in the past and had threatened to do again. The trial
court granted the motion, and also ordered Mann to return any copies of the journals he had and
any documents or e-mails discussing the journals. Mann testified he did not have those items.

                                                 -1-
        When mediation failed, the parties agreed to arbitrate.1 In a written, stipulated order
entered by the trial court, Whitfield agreed that she read and understood the required disclosures
under MCL 600.5072(1) and (2), and was voluntarily waiving the domestic violence exclusion
under MCL 600.5072(2). By signing the order, the trial court indicated it found Whitfield’s waiver
of the domestic violence exclusion to be informed and voluntary under MCL 600.5072(3). The
parties also signed an arbitration agreement, which gave the arbitrator the power to decide an array
of issues related to the divorce proceedings.

        Arbitration occurred in June 2021. As related to this appeal, the issues to be decided by
the arbitrator included (1) child support; (2) spousal support; (3) division of Mann’s Hilliard Lyons
Baird (HLB) individual retirement account (IRA), which was identified as account “#8224;” (4)
division of Whitfield’s HLB IRA, which was identified as account “#9330;”2 (5) costs related to
the children’s extracurricular activities; and (6) attorney fees. With respect to child and spousal
support, the arbitrator calculated Whitfield’s income presuming she could receive $900 per month
from a trust fund. The arbitrator denied Whitfield’s request for spousal support because he found
that she could support herself with her significant separate assets, including her trust fund, which
was valued at nearly $1 million, her own income from employment of $74,880 per year, and her
half of the marital estate. With respect to child support, the arbitrator used the Michigan Child
Support Formula (MCSF) and his calculations of the parties’ income to determine that Mann
would pay Whitfield $312 per month.

        Based on evidence Mann submitted, the arbitrator also concluded that he could determine
the premarital interest and appreciation of Mann’s IRA, and thus awarded Mann 47.92% of his
IRA as a separate asset. The parties were to split the remaining 52.08% as a marital asset.
Regarding Whitfield’s IRA, the arbitrator found that Whitfield had not submitted sufficient
evidence to establish the portion of the IRA that was a separate or premarital asset. The arbitrator
therefore deemed Whitfield’s IRA to be a marital asset, which the parties would split equally.
Regarding the children’s extracurricular activities, the arbitrator decided the children should
continue to participate in dance, cross country, basketball, and skiing. Mann would be responsible
for 57.5% of the costs of those activities, and Whitfield would cover the remaining portion. For
any other extracurricular activities, the parties would have to agree on the activity before having
to split costs. If there was no agreement, the party seeking to have the child participate in the
activity would bear the cost. Lastly, as related to attorney fees, the arbitrator determined the
“[a]ttorney fees through entry of judgment will be equalized and paid from marital funds.”

       Whitfield moved the arbitrator to correct certain errors and omissions in the arbitration
award. Relevant to this appeal, she asserted that the arbitrator miscalculated her income for
purposes of establishing child and spousal support because she no longer received the $900-per-
month disbursement from her trust fund. Whitfield claimed the arbitrator should have deemed all
of Mann’s IRA to be a marital asset because he commingled premarital and marital assets in the

1
    The individual who served as the mediator also served as the arbitrator.
2
 Both parties have other retirement accounts, including additional IRAs with HLB. The numbered
IRAs cited above are, however, the only two in dispute here. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the
relevant IRAs as Mann’s IRA and Whitfield’s IRA.

                                                  -2-
IRA. As for her IRA, Whitfield asserted that she funded it entirely with her trust fund, a separate
asset, and therefore, her IRA should also be a separate asset. Whitfield also contended that the
arbitrator only ruled on some of the children’s extracurricular activities but not others. Lastly,
Whitfield argued that the arbitrator erred by failing to award her additional attorney fees because
of Mann’s misconduct related to her journals.

       The arbitrator refused to correct any of those alleged errors, explaining that Whitfield was
improperly attempting to use the errors-and-omissions procedure to relitigate her factual and legal
claims. The arbitrator therefore declined to amend the award except some minor changes not
relevant here.

        Mann moved the trial court to confirm the arbitration award and issue a judgment of
divorce. Whitfield, on the other hand, moved the trial court to vacate portions of the award.
Relevant here, Whitfield raised the same claims of error as those in her motion for the arbitrator
to correct the alleged errors and omissions. Like the arbitrator, the trial court determined that
Whitfield was trying to relitigate factual and legal issues. The trial court refused to consider
Whitfield’s factual challenges. The court also reviewed the arbitration award and found no clear
legal errors evident on the face of the award. As a result, the trial court confirmed the award and
issued the judgment of divorce. This appeal followed.3

                      II. PRESERVATION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

       “In general, courts have a limited role in reviewing arbitration awards. This Court reviews
de novo a circuit court’s decision whether to vacate an arbitration award.” TSP Servs, Inc v Nat’l-
Std, LLC, 329 Mich App 615, 619-620; 944 NW2d 148 (2019). “In addition, this Court also
reviews de novo issues of law involving statutory construction, as well as the proper interpretation
and application of a court rule . . . .” Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co v Kent Co Treasurer,
308 Mich App 498, 532; 866 NW2d 817 (2014) (citations omitted).

        An issue must be raised in or decided by the trial court for it to be preserved for appeal.
Glasker-Davis v Auvenshire, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). “[I]ssue
preservation requirements only impose a general prohibition against raising an issue for the first
time on appeal.” Id. “Consistent[] with that principle, a party . . . need not preserve an objection
to a ‘finding or decision’ made by the trial court . . . .” Id., quoting MCR 2.517(A)(7).
Nevertheless, “so long as the issue itself is not novel, a party is generally free to make a more
sophisticated or fully developed argument on appeal than was made in the trial court.” Id. at 228.
“This Court also has the power to consider an issue when necessary, even if unpreserved or not
properly presented.” Id.

       Whitfield did not raise below her arguments related to the domestic violence exclusion and
screening, or extracurricular activities as related to child support, so those issues are unpreserved.
See Glasker-Davis, 333 Mich App at 227. This Court has historically applied two different
standards to unpreserved issues in the civil context: plain-error, see, e.g., Mr Sunshine v Delta
College of Trustees, 343 Mich App 597, 601; ___ NW2d ___ (2022); Demski v Petlick, 309 Mich

3
    The trial court stayed division of the challenged IRAs pending the outcome of this appeal.

                                                 -3-
App 404, 426-427, 873 NW2d 596 (2015); Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 336; 612
NW2d 838 (2000), and the so-called “raise-or-waive” rule, see, e.g., In re Conservatorship of
Murray, 336 Mich App 234, 240-242; 970 NW2d 372 (2021); Jawad A Shah, MD, PC v State
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 324 Mich App 182, 192-194; 920 NW2d 148 (2018) (applying the so-
called raise-or-waive standard, but “acknowledg[ing] that decisions of our Supreme Court and this
Court have applied the plain-error standard of review to certain unpreserved issues in the civil
context”). Our Supreme Court has yet to state definitively which standard is the appropriate
standard for the civil context. See Shah, 324 Mich App at 194 n 5 (noting that our Supreme Court
has applied plain-error in certain civil contexts and declining to decide “under what circumstances
the plain-error standard of review should be applied in the civil context”). But see Tolas Oil &
Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 359090); slip op at 2-5 (holding that our Supreme Court requires application of the
so-called raise-or-waive standard).

        But recently, a panel of this Court resolved this apparent conflict, holding that the plain-
error test does not apply in civil cases, and appellate courts instead apply the raise-or-waive rule.
See Tolas, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 2-5. Regardless, this Court may still “overlook
preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if
consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question
of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3
(quotation marks and citations omitted). As a published decision, this Court is bound by Tolas.
See MCR 7.215(C)(2). As required by Tolas, these issues are waived. See id. at ___; slip op at 2-
5.

        Of course, the so-called raise-or-waive rule has myriad exceptions. See Tolas, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 3. Though this issue is waived, there are sufficient facts in the record for us
to overlook the preservation requirements and address the issue Whitfield now raises. See id.

 III. LAW GOVERNING ARBITRATION AWARDS IN DOMESTIC-RELATIONS CASES

        Whitfield’s preserved claims assert that the trial court should have vacated specific portions
of the arbitration award for various reasons. “Judicial review of an arbitrator’s decision is narrowly
circumscribed.” City of Ann Arbor v AFSCME Local 369, 284 Mich App 126, 144; 771 NW2d
843 (2009). Such limited judicial review “certainly is the case with respect to domestic relations
arbitration awards.” Washington v Washington, 283 Mich App 667, 671; 770 NW2d 908 (2009).
“[A]rbitration in domestic relations matters,” like this one, is “provide[d] for” and “govern[ed]”
by statute. MCL 600.5070(1). See also Cipriano v Cipriano, 289 Mich App 361, 367; 808 NW2d
230 (2010) (stating that “[d]omestic-relations arbitration is governed by the specific statutory
scheme set forth in the domestic relations arbitration act (DRAA).”). Nevertheless, “[a]rbitration
proceedings under this chapter are also governed by court rule except to the extent those provisions
are modified by the arbitration agreement or this chapter.” MCL 600.5070(1).

       There are specific circumstances under which a trial court may vacate an arbitration award.
Those circumstances are provided in MCL 600.5081(2), which states:

               (2) If a party applies under this section, the court shall vacate an award under
       any of the following circumstances:

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               (a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.

              (b) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral,
       corruption of an arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing a party’s rights.

               (c) The arbitrator exceeded his or her powers.

               (d) The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing on a showing of sufficient
       cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted
       the hearing to prejudice substantially a party’s rights. [MCL 600.5081(2).]

Substantially identical language exists in MCR 3.602(J)(2), which applies to arbitration generally,
not just arbitration in domestic relations actions. Whitfield challenged the arbitration award under
MCR 3.602(J)(2)(c), which states “the court shall vacate an award if . . . the arbitrator exceeded
his or her powers[.]”

        The language of MCL 600.5081(2)(c) and MCR 3.602(J)(2)(c) “is the codification of a
phrase used for many years in common-law and statutory arbitrations.” Washington, 283 Mich
App at 672. “[O]ur Court has repeatedly stated that arbitrators have exceeded their powers
whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they primarily draw their
authority, or in contravention of controlling principles of law.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Pursuant to MCL 600.5081(2)(c), then, a party seeking to prove that a domestic
relations arbitrator exceeded his or her authority must show that the arbitrator either (1) acted
beyond the material terms of the arbitration agreement or (2) acted contrary to controlling law.”
Id.

        Regarding the first prong, “this Court has consistently held that arbitration is a matter of
contract and that the arbitration agreement is the agreement that dictates the authority of the
arbitrators.” Cipriano, 289 Mich App at 376 (citations omitted). Regarding the second prong, for
a court to “vacate an arbitration award because of an error of law, the error must have been so
substantial that, but for the error, the award would have been substantially different.” Id. at 368
(citation omitted). “[A]ny error of law must be discernible on the face of the award itself . . . .”
Washington, 283 Mich App at 672 (citation omitted). “By on its face we mean that only a legal
error that is evident without scrutiny of intermediate mental indicia[] will suffice to overturn an
arbitration award.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[c]ourts will not
engage in a review of an arbitrator’s mental path leading to [the] award.” Id. (quotation marks and
citations omitted; second alteration in original).

        Though there are certain circumstances in which a court can vacate an arbitration award,
there are also circumstances in which it cannot. “A reviewing court may not review the arbitrator’s
findings of fact . . . .” Washington, 283 Mich App at 672 (citations omitted). “[E]ven if the
[arbitration] award was against the great weight of evidence or was not supported by substantial
evidence, this Court would be precluded from vacating the award.” Fette v Peters Constr Co, 310
Mich App 535, 544-545; 871 NW2d 877 (2015). Thus, “[i]t is simply outside the province of the
courts to engage in a fact-intensive review of how an arbitrator calculated values, and whether the
evidence he relied on was the most reliable or credible evidence presented.” Washington, 283
Mich App at 675. And although a reviewing court may consider whether an arbitrator acted

                                                -5-
contrary to controlling law, it may not review the legal merits of an arbitrator’s decision. TSP
Servs, 329 Mich App at 620 (“A court may not review an arbitrator’s factual findings or decision
on the merits.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Considering that distinction, “once we
have recognized that the arbitrator utilized controlling law, we cannot review the legal soundness
of the arbitrator’s application of Michigan law.” Washington, 283 Mich App at 674. “[A]n
allegation that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers must” therefore “be carefully evaluated
in order to assure that this claim is not used as a ruse to induce the court to review the merits of
the arbitrator’s decision.” Id. at 675, quoting Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich
488, 497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991).

                                IV. ALLEGED LEGAL ERRORS

      Whitfield first argues that the trial court refused to consider her claims that the arbitrator
committed errors of law discernible on the face of the award. We disagree.

       At the late October 2021 hearing regarding the arbitration award, the trial court stated:

               All right. Well, it’s clear by case law that a Court may not review an[]
       arbitrator’s findings of facts, as it’s limited—extremely limited in the review of any
       allegations of errors or of law. And, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for
       the arbitrator’s judgment and in—by vacating or modifying an award.

               So, I don’t—I’m not required or authorized—I’m not required to review, I
       mean, to—I’m not authorized to review the arbitrator’s findings of facts. I can’t do
       it and neither can the Court of Appeals. And, any error of law must be evident on
       the face of the award itself. I don’t find that there is any error of law that’s evidence
       [sic] on the face of the award itself. I think there—it was extremely thorough, there
       were corrections, and so I have to deny your motion [Whitfield]. And, in doing so,
       I am going to confirm the arbitrator’s award. [Emphasis added.]

        The trial court acknowledged it could not review the arbitrator’s findings of fact. See
Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. As for legal error, the trial court correctly stated the law: it
could only vacate the arbitration award if there was an error of law evident on the face of the award
itself. See id. at 674-675. After stating the applicable law, the trial court then determined there
were no such legal errors in the arbitration award. As a result, the trial court determined there was
no reason to vacate the arbitration award.

        An appellant generally “bears the burden of furnishing the reviewing court with a record
that verifies the basis of any argument on which reversal or other claim for appellate relief is
predicated.” Kilian v TCF Nat’l Bank, 343 Mich App 621, 638; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Whitfield has not met her burden here. The record she provided
establishes that the trial court considered her claims that the arbitrator committed legal errors
evident on the face of the arbitration award and found that no such legal errors occurred. Kilian,
343 Mich App at 638. The court therefore denied Whitfield’s motion to vacate portions of the
arbitration award. This was not erroneous. See Washington, 283 Mich App at 672, 674-675
(regarding courts’ inability to review an arbitrator’s factual findings and legal reasoning). Because

                                                 -6-
Whitfield failed to present a factually-sound argument supported by the record, this argument fails.
Kilian, 343 Mich App at 638.

                                     V. THE PARTIES’ IRAS

        Whitfield next argues that the trial court erred when it confirmed the portion of the
arbitration award regarding the division of the parties’ IRAs. She contends that the arbitrator’s
decision to consider her IRA a marital asset, while allowing a portion of Mann’s IRA to remain as
a separate asset, was a clear legal error requiring that portion of the arbitration award to be vacated.
We disagree.

         “The goal behind dividing marital property is to reach an equitable distribution in light of
all the circumstances.” Washington, 283 Mich App at 673. “Although marital property need not
be divided equally, it must be divided equitably in light of a court’s evaluation of the parties’
contributions, faults and needs.” Richards v Richards, 310 Mich App 683, 694; 874 NW2d 704
(2015). When dividing marital property, the question is “what property is marital and what
property is separate.” Cunningham v Cunningham, 289 Mich App 195, 200-201; 795 NW2d 826
(2010). “Generally, marital property is that which is acquired or earned during the marriage,
whereas separate property is that which is obtained or earned before the marriage.” Id. at 201. But
“separate assets may lose their character as separate property and transform into marital property
if they are commingled with marital assets and treated by the parties as marital property.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Whitfield challenges the arbitrator’s decision to award 47.92% of Mann’s IRA to him as a
separate asset. The arbitration award indicates, however, that Mann proved that a portion of his
IRA was a premarital asset. The arbitrator relied on Mann’s testimony and documentary evidence
showing the appreciation of the premarital portion of his IRA. On the basis of the evidence, the
arbitrator concluded 47.92% of Mann’s IRA was a separate asset, which was awarded to him
entirely. The remaining 52.08% was a marital asset, which was to be divided equally between the
parties. Whitfield claims Mann’s IRA contained commingled premarital and marital funds that
should not have been separated by the arbitrator.

        Whitfield portrays her argument about Mann’s IRA as one of law, but it is a fact issue. See
Woodington v Shokoohi, 288 Mich App 352, 357; 792 NW2d 63 (2010) (stating that “whether a
particular asset qualifies as marital or separate property” is a “finding[] of fact . . . .”). Mann
presented evidence of the separate nature of a portion of his IRA. Whitfield, on the other hand,
argued that Mann’s IRA contained premarital and marital assets, which had been commingled,
resulting in the entire IRA becoming a marital asset. The arbitrator considered the evidence and
applicable law, and found that a portion of Mann’s IRA was a separate asset. Whitfield’s challenge
to the arbitrator’s factual findings on this issue is not permitted. Washington, 283 Mich App at
672. Instead of arguing that the arbitrator cited erroneous law, Whitfield challenges the arbitrator’s
legal reasoning when evaluating Mann’s IRA. As stated, however, such a challenge to an
arbitration award is improper. “[O]nce we have recognized that the arbitrator utilized controlling
law, we cannot review the legal soundness of the arbitrator’s application of Michigan law.”
Washington, 283 Mich App at 674. We cannot revisit the arbitrator’s factual findings and legal
reasoning related to his decision on Mann’s IRA. See id. at 672, 674.

                                                  -7-
         Whitfield also challenges the arbitrator’s determination that her IRA was a marital asset.
She testified that her IRA was funded entirely from her trust fund, a separate asset. She stated that
because her IRA was funded by a separate asset, it should remain a separate asset. Mann testified
that Whitfield funded the IRA during their marriage, though he was unclear how she did so. He
stated it was possible she funded it with her trust fund income, but also noted that her trust income
supplemented the family’s finances during the marriage. The arbitrator considered the evidence
and decided that Whitfield’s IRA was a marital asset. In doing so, the arbitrator noted that
Whitfield failed to prove how her IRA was funded, meaning the record could not support her claim
that the asset was entirely premarital. The arbitrator’s finding that Whitfield’s IRA was a marital
asset was factual in nature, and we will not disturb it. Woodington, 288 Mich App at 357. To
vacate this portion of the award, the trial court would have been required to evaluate the evidence
and determine whether the arbitrator erred in its factual findings. The court properly determined
it could not do so. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. As with her argument about the arbitrator’s
decision related to Mann’s IRA, Whitfield challenges the arbitrator’s legal reasoning when
deciding her IRA was a marital asset. But, as stated, if the arbitrator relies on controlling law
(which he did), we are unable to “review the legal soundness of the arbitrator’s application of
Michigan law.” Id. at 674. We therefore reject Whitfield’s invitation to revisit the arbitrator’s
factual findings and legal reasoning related to his decision on her IRA. Id. at 672, 674.

                              VI. CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT

       Whitfield argues the trial court should have corrected the arbitrator’s erroneous calculation
of her income with respect to child and spousal support. She asserts that applicable caselaw
required determination of her actual income, which no longer included $900-per-month
disbursements from her trust fund. We disagree.

        “A trial court must presumptively follow the MCSF when determining the child support
obligation of parents.” Ewald v Ewald, 292 Mich App 706, 714; 810 NW2d 396 (2011). “[T]he
court shall order child support in an amount determined by application of the child support formula
developed by the state friend of the court bureau as required in section 19 of the friend of the court
act, MCL 552.519.” MCL 552.605(2). “A trial court must strictly comply with the requirements
of the MCSF in calculating the parents’ support obligations unless it ‘determines from the facts of
the case that application of the child support formula would be unjust or inappropriate . . . .’ ”
Borowsky v Borowsky, 273 Mich App 666, 673; 733 NW2d 71 (2007), quoting MCL 552.605(2).
“[C]ourts must comply with the plain language of the MCSF, and may not read language into the
MCSF that is not present.” Clarke v Clarke, 297 Mich App 172, 179; 823 NW2d 318 (2012).

        “The first step in determining the parents’ support obligation under the MCSF is to
determine each parent’s net income in order to establish, as accurately as possible, the monies
available to support the children.” Borowsky, 273 Mich App at 673 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The term ‘net income’ means all income minus the deductions and adjustments
permitted by this manual.” 2021 MCSF 2.01(A). Under 2021 MCSF 2.01(C)(3), “[i]ncome
includes, but is not limited to . . . [d]istributed profits or payments from . . . [a] trust fund . . . .”
When deciding income, “[t]he objective . . . is to establish, as accurately as possible, how much
money a parent should have available for support.” 2021 MCSF 2.01(B). In reaching this
objective, “[a]ll relevant aspects of a parent’s financial status are open for consideration when
determining support.” Id.

                                                   -8-
       In Michigan, spousal support is governed by MCL 552.23(1) and requires a case-by-case
analysis. Loutts v Loutts, 298 Mich App 21, 29-30; 826 NW2d 152 (2012). “The object in
awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties so that neither will be
impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable under the
circumstances of the case.” Id. at 26 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether to award
spousal support in a given case is discretionary. Id. at 30.

         Here, the arbitrator summarized the parties’ testimony in his arbitration award. Whitfield
testified that she used to receive $900 per month as a disbursement from her trust fund but stopped
doing so in June 2020, on the advice of her financial advisor. Mann testified that, during the
marriage, Whitfield took the $900-per-month disbursement each month and used it to supplement
the family’s income. Mann believed the trust fund was still available to her to supplement her
income. The arbitrator believed the trust fund was available to supplement Whitfield’s income at
the historical rate of $900 per month. Thus, the arbitrator considered Whitfield’s trust fund when
calculating Whitfield’s income and when deciding child and spousal support.

        Whitfield portrays the arbitrator’s decision as a legal decision, claiming that this was a
legal error evident on the face of the award. She is again incorrect: the arbitrator made a factual
finding when it determined that Whitfield earned $900 a month from her trust fund. We cannot
review an arbitrator’s factual findings. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. There was also no
evident error of law in the arbitration award. Whitfield does not contend that a disbursement from
a trust cannot be considered income, nor does she challenge the arbitrator’s reliance on any
caselaw, statute, or section of the MCSF. She instead insists that the trust fund disbursements she
alleges she stopped receiving in June 2020 should not have counted as income. This relates to the
arbitrator’s application of the law, which is also not reviewable by us. See Washington, 283 Mich
App at 674.

         As related to child support, 2021 MCSF 2.01(C)(3) specifically requires disbursement from
a trust fund to be counted as income. The MCSF also notes that when calculating a parent’s income
“[a]ll relevant aspects of a parent’s financial status are open for consideration . . . .” 2021 MCSF
2.01(B). A parent’s access to a trust fund and historical monthly disbursement from it are “relevant
aspect[s]” of that parent’s financial status, even if the parent stopped actively taking the
disbursement. Id. The arbitrator determined that Whitfield still had access to the funds. We
cannot review the arbitrator’s legal reasoning for arriving at that decision when the reasoning was
not evident from the face of the award, and we cannot review the arbitrator’s factual finding
regarding Whitfield’s access to those funds. See Washington, 283 Mich App at 672, 674.

        We also cannot review the arbitrator’s decision declining to award spousal support. As
noted, “[t]he object in awarding spousal support is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties
so that neither will be impoverished; spousal support is to be based on what is just and reasonable
under the circumstances of the case.” Loutts, 298 Mich App at 26 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Here, the arbitrator considered the circumstances of the case, including Whitfield’s $900
monthly disbursement from her trust fund. Given the circumstances, the arbitrator concluded
spousal support would not be just and reasonable, and therefore, did not award it. This was a
factual decision and is therefore unreviewable. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. The
arbitrator’s application of relevant authority in deciding the spousal-support issue constitutes legal
reasoning, which is also unreviewable. Id. at 674.

                                                 -9-
        Whitfield contends that the arbitrator violated Zecchin v Zecchin, 149 Mich App 723; 386
NW2d 652 (1986),4 by requiring her to dissipate her assets to support herself. Her reliance on
Zecchin is misplaced. In Zecchin, this Court determined that an award of spousal support was too
low when it would require one party “to dissipate her marital assets and become
impoverished . . . .” Id. at 734-735. Here, Whitfield argues that the arbitrator effectively required
her to dissipate her trust fund by calculating spousal support on the basis of a disbursement from
the fund that, she says, she could no longer afford. The Zecchin Court specifically stated, however,
that a party must not be required to dissipate their marital assets awarded to them in the divorce.
Id. Here, Whitfield’s trust fund was a separate asset awarded solely to her. She has not claimed,
and the record does not support, that she had to dissipate a marital asset to support herself. Zecchin
is therefore inapplicable and Whitfield has failed to identify a legal error evident on the face of the
arbitration award. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. The arbitrator’s decision contained a
finding, at least inferentially, that the trust fund had sufficient funds to support Whitfield’s
historical disbursement of $900 per month. Although Whitfield disagreed with the arbitrator’s
finding, this issue is simply outside our purview. Id.

                                  VII. UNPRESERVED ISSUES

                            A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCLUSION

        Whitfield argues that the trial court should have vacated the entire arbitration award
because it accepted her waiver of the domestic violence exclusion without finding on the record
that her waiver was informed and voluntary. Though waived, we elect to review this issue because
it involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented. See
Tolas, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. On review, we disagree with Whitfield.

       In support of her argument, Whitfield relies on MCL 600.5072(2) and (3).                 Those
provisions state:

       (2) If either party is subject to a personal protection order involving domestic
       violence or if, in the pending domestic relations matter, there are allegations of
       domestic violence or child abuse, the court shall not refer the case to arbitration
       unless each party to the domestic relations matter waives this exclusion. A party
       cannot waive this exclusion from arbitration unless the party is represented by an
       attorney throughout the action, including the arbitration process, and the party is
       informed on the record concerning all of the following:

               (a) The arbitration process.

               (b) The suspension of the formal rules of evidence.

4
  Although Zecchin is not strictly binding pursuant to MCR 7.215(J)(1) because it was issued
before November 1, 1990, as a published opinion, it nevertheless “has precedential effect under
the rule of stare decisis” pursuant to MCR 7.215(C)(2). See Wells Fargo Rail Corp v Dep’t of
Treasury, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 359399); slip op at 10 n 2.

                                                 -10-
               (c) The binding nature of arbitration.

       (3) If, after receiving the information required under subsection (2), a party decides
       to waive the domestic violence exclusion from arbitration, the court and the party’s
       attorney shall ensure that the party’s waiver is informed and voluntary. If the court
       finds a party’s waiver is informed and voluntary, the court shall place those
       findings and the waiver on the record. [Emphases added.]

        Here, the parties, their attorney, and the trial court signed a stipulated, written order that
adhered to MCL 600.5072. By signing the document, the parties agreed they read the entire order,
which contained the required disclosures in MCL 600.5072(2)(a) through (c). Their signatures
also established that they understood the entire order, including the waiver of the domestic violence
exclusion, and that they were voluntarily agreeing to waive the exclusion. The stipulated order
also stated the trial court “hereby finds that by their signatures below each party acknowledges
receiving the information required under MCL 600.5072(2), and that each party’s waiver of the
domestic violence exclusion from arbitration is informed and voluntary as required by MCL 600.
5072(3)[.]”

        Mann argues that MCL 600.5072(2) and (3) are not applicable because there were no
allegations of domestic violence. Though MCL 600.5072(2) applies when there is a personal
protection order involving domestic violence, or there are allegations of domestic violence or child
abuse, none of those circumstances are present here. Whitfield contends, however, that she made
allegations of domestic violence when she moved for a restraining order against Mann related to
her private journals. Mann insists this was not an allegation of domestic violence.

        The dispute between the parties appears to be two-fold. Specifically, they disagree whether
wife’s allegations regarding her journals constituted an allegation of domestic violence under MCL
600.5072(2), and whether the required actions took place “on the record” as required by MCL
600.5072(2) and (3). The parties have not provided any caselaw defining those terms as used in
the DRAA,5 nor has our review of the caselaw provided any guidance from previous appellate
decisions. To the extent this issue involves the review of a circuit court’s decision whether to
vacate an arbitration award and statutory interpretation, we review it de novo. TSP Servs, Inc, 329
Mich App at 619-620; Rental Props Owners Ass’n of Kent Co, 308 Mich App at 532. See Mr
Sunshine, 343 Mich App at 620 (M. J. KELLY, J., concurring) (overlooking preservation
requirements and reviewing de novo an unpreserved issue regarding the trial court’s decision to
grant summary disposition). Further, the harmless-error rule, MCR 2.613(A), generally applies in
civil proceedings. In re Miller, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No.

5
 Whitfield urges us to rely on the definition of “domestic violence” adopted by this Court in Brown
v Brown, 332 Mich App 1, 10-12; 955 NW2d 515 (2020). Brown involved the Child Custody Act,
MCL 722.21 et seq., but we borrowed the definition of “domestic violence” found in the domestic
violence prevention and treatment act, MCL 400.1501 et seq. See Brown, 332 Mich App at 10-
12. We need not decide this issue here. Even if Mann’s conduct constituted domestic violence,
and even if the trial court did not address the waiver of the domestic violence exclusion on the
record, Whitfield has failed to prove that her substantial rights were affected by this unpreserved
error, as will be discussed later in this opinion.

                                                -11-
364195); slip op at 5. “To overcome this rule, a party must show that an error was prejudicial
such that a failure to grant relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice, i.e., that it is more
likely than not the error affected the case’s outcome.” Id. at ___; slip op at 5, citing Barnett v
Hidalgo, 478 Mich 151, 172; 732 NW2d 472 (2007).

       Given the lack of caselaw regarding whether a written order qualifies as “on the record”
for application of MCL 600.5072(2) and (3), or providing a definition of “domestic violence”
under the DRAA, we fail to see how Whitfield can establish that it was more likely than not that
any error by the trial court was outcome determinative. In re Miller, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 5. Whitfield is therefore not entitled to reversal of the judgment of divorce or arbitration
award because she has failed to prove an outcome-determinative error. Id. at ___; slip op at 5.

        Even if the trial court erred because there was an allegation of domestic violence and the
proceedings involving Whitfield’s waiver of the domestic violence exclusion were not on the
record, Whitfield failed to show that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. In re
Miller, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. To do so, she had to establish that that any “error was
prejudicial such that a failure to grant relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice, i.e., that
it is more likely than not the error affected the case’s outcome. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. It appears
to us that, to warrant reversal, Whitfield had to show that she was coerced into agreeing to arbitrate
the divorce, and that, had the trial court performed its alleged statutory duties, such coercion would
not have been successful.

        Whitfield has failed to prove that the trial court’s alleged error affected the outcome of this
case. She has not presented any evidence that she was coerced into arbitrating. Whitfield contends
that the trial court’s failure to conduct waiver proceedings on the record allowed possible coercion
to occur, but she has not alleged that actual coercion happened. In her reply brief on appeal,
Whitfield asserts that the trial court’s “failure to comply with [MCL 600.5072(2) and (3)] is plain
legal error and resulted in manifest injustice in allowing [wife] to be coerced into a restrictive form
of [alternative dispute resolution (ADR)] without the protections granted by statute.” Though she
alleges that the trial court’s purported error allowed her to be coerced, she presents no evidence or
argument she actually was coerced. Thus, in effect, Whitfield has not argued or presented evidence
supporting a claim that her waiver of the domestic violence exclusion to arbitration was
involuntary. She also does not claim that she misunderstood the stipulated order, or that her waiver
was uninformed. Whitfield has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s alleged error under MCL
600.5072(2) and (3) was outcome determinative. Accordingly, she is not entitled to reversal, even
assuming that the trial court erred.

                             B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SCREENING

        Whitfield also argues that the arbitrator erred by failing to conduct a screening for domestic
violence during the arbitration proceedings. Although this issue is also waived, we elect to address
it because it involves a question of law and the necessary facts are present. See Tolas, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 3. Upon review, we disagree with Whitfield.

        In support of this argument, Whitfield relies on MCR 3.216(H)(2). That court rule states:

                                                  -12-
               The mediator must make reasonable inquiry as to whether either party has
       a history of a coercive or violent relationship with the other party. Throughout the
       mediation process, the mediator must make reasonable efforts to screen for the
       presence of coercion or violence that would make mediation physically or
       emotionally unsafe for any participant or that would impede achieving a voluntary
       and safe resolution of issues. A reasonable inquiry includes the use of the domestic
       violence screening protocol for mediators provided by the state court administrative
       office as directed by the supreme court.

We note that MCR 3.216 relates to “Domestic Relations Mediation,” and subsection (H) of that
court rule is entitled, “Mediation Procedure.” See MCR 3.216(H). When the language of a court
rule is unambiguous, we enforce its plain meaning. Tyler v Findling, 508 Mich 364, 369-370; 972
NW2d 833 (2021).

        The plain language of MCR 3.216(H)(2) indicates that it applies to mediators during
mediation, not arbitrators during arbitration. Whitfield directs us to Dick v Dick, 210 Mich App
576; 534 NW2d 185 (1995), which, she asserts, stands for the proposition that the screening
requirement for mediators in MCR 3.216(H)(2) also applies to arbitrators. We disagree with this
reading of Dick. There, this Court simply noted that although MCR 3.216 explicitly states that it
applies to mediation, it also states that it does not bar a trial court from using other forms of
mediation or settlement procedures. Dick, 210 Mich App at 581. In Dick, we relied on this broad
statement from MCR 3.216 to determine that arbitration in a domestic-relations action was
permissible on the basis of the parties’ stipulation. The Dick Court did not discuss domestic-
violence screenings in any manner, nor did it state that all procedures applicable to mediators also
apply to arbitrators. We note, however, that the Legislature codified the trial court’s ability to
allow arbitration in a domestic-relations matter in the DRAA. We are not persuaded that Dick
applies here.

        Whitfield has not cited any authority stating that an arbitrator has the same duty to screen
for domestic violence issues during arbitration as does a mediator. In Miller v Miller, 264 Mich
App 497, 503 n 8; 691 NW2d 788 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted), rev’d on other
grounds 474 Mich 27 (2005), this Court recognized, by citing to the legislative analysis of the
DRAA, that while MCR 3.216 “allows a court to order arbitration,” it did not “provide standards
or guidelines for such arbitration.” In other words, MCR 3.216 permitted arbitration but did not
regulate it. Miller, 264 Mich App at 503 n 8. We found no authority applying the domestic
violence screening requirement of a mediator under MCR 3.216(H)(2) to arbitrators. This makes
sense given the difference between mediation and arbitration. Mediation often results in a binding
settlement agreement, which would allow a domestic abuser to exert control over a victim of the
abuse to obtain a beneficial settlement. Arbitration, on the other hand, involves an impartial
decisionmaker considering the evidence and arguments of the parties and deciding the case
irrespective of their agreement. The same concern in mediation about a coercive party using
implied threats to force a settlement overly beneficial to the abuser does not exist to the same
extent in arbitration. We therefore decline to extend MCR 3.216(H)(2) to arbitrators.

                            C. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES

                                               -13-
         Whitfield also argues that the trial court should have vacated the portion of the arbitration
award related to the children’s extracurricular activities because requiring her to pay for all of the
activities other than those specifically determined by the arbitrator amounted to an extraordinary
expense warranting a deviation from the MCSF. As with the other two unpreserved issues, we
address this issue because it involves a legal question and the facts necessary to its resolution were
presented. We again disagree with Whitfield.

        Whitfield argues that the arbitrator ordered her to pay all of the fees for the children’s
extracurricular activities not specifically addressed in the arbitration award, which should have
been accounted for in the child-support calculation but was not. She appears to rely on a
misstatement of both the arbitrator’s decision and the law. First, Whitfield claims that the
arbitrator ordered the parties to keep the children enrolled in all of their extracurricular activities,
but that Mann only had to share the costs of a few of those activities (dance, cross country,
basketball, and skiing). In combining these two rulings, Whitfield believes she was ordered to
keep the children enrolled in all of their other extracurricular activities—cello lessons, scouts,
golfing, martial arts, horse camp, piano lessons, and YMCA—at her expense. On this belief,
Whitfield argues that the arbitrator should have deviated from the MCSF because she was
responsible for an extraordinary portion of the children’s extracurricular activities. In support, she
cites to 2021 MCSF 1.04(E), which lists 20 separate situations where “[s]trict application of the
formula may produce an unjust or inappropriate result . . . .” Whitfield does not identify which
situation she believes exists here. She instead cites Edwards v Edwards, 192 Mich App 559; 481
NW2d 769 (1992), arguing it held that extraordinary extracurricular expenses were a valid reason
to deviate from the MCSF.

        Whitfield misconstrues the arbitration award. The parties disputed the number of
extracurricular activities in which the children should remain enrolled. Mann contended that
maintaining all of them was too expensive, but Whitfield disagreed and believed they should split
the costs. The arbitrator found, generally, that it was “in the children’[s] best interests that they
continue to participate in extracurricular activities.” In light of Mann’s argument about excessive
cost, however, the arbitrator determined that “certain current activities in which the children are
engaged are not excessive and are consistent with their activities in the past and the financial
contributions of the parties to those activities.” The arbitrator identified those particular activities
(dance, cross country, basketball, and skiing) and split the cost of those activities, with Mann
responsible for 57.5% of the cost and Whitfield the other 42.5%. The arbitrator then determined
that any activities beyond those four would “have to be agreed upon before either parent is required
to share in the expenses of the activity.”

         Considering the language in the arbitration award, Whitfield was not ordered to pay for all
of the fees associated with any extracurricular activity not addressed in the award. Instead, if she
wanted the children enrolled in any of the activities not specifically addressed, she had three
options: obtain Mann’s agreement to the activity, pay for it herself, or remove the child from the
challenged activity. Whitfield will therefore only have to pay for all of the children’s additional
extracurricular activities if she chooses to do so after failing to obtain Mann’s agreement. The
arbitration award cannot be read to require Whitfield to keep the children engaged in all of the
activities and to pay for them herself. We therefore reject this argument.

                                                 -14-
        Whitfield’s extracurricular argument fails for another reason: she has not shown a legal
error evident on the face of the award. As stated, our review of an arbitration decision is narrowly
circumscribed. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672. Relevant here, we may only vacate an
arbitration award if an error of law is discernible on the face of the award. Id. This standard does
not allow us to revisit the arbitrator’s legal analysis, only to determine whether the arbitrator relied
on the correct law. Id.

     Whitfield argues that 2021 MCSF 1.04(E) required the arbitrator to deviate from the
MCSF, and his failure to do so was an error of law evident on face of the award. We disagree.

        Under 2021 MCSF 1.04(A), “[w]hen applying the formula would lead to an unjust or
inappropriate result, the court may exercise its discretion, and, on a case-by-case basis, deviate
from the formula and determine a more appropriate support amount.” When deciding whether to
deviate from the formula, the decision-maker “may consider any factor that it determines is
relevant.” 2021 MCSF 1.04(D). As noted above, 2021 MCSF 1.04(E) contains a list of 20 such
“factors,” though they more accurately describe situations where the formula may result in an
unjust outcome. They include situations where “[t]he child has special needs,” 2021 MCSF
1.04(E)(1), “[a] parent is a minor,” 2021 MCSF 1.04(E)(3), and “[a] parent has incurred, or is
likely to incur, extraordinary medical expenses for either that parent or a dependent,” 2021 MCSF
1.04(E)(7). The one possibly relevant situation here is 2021 MCSF 1.04(E)(2), which allows a
deviation when “[t]he child has extraordinary educational expenses.”

        Rather than cite a specific factor and make her argument, Whitfield cites Edwards, 192
Mich App at 564. That case is inapplicable to the present dispute. In Edwards, this Court
considered a trial court order requiring the defendant to pay $240 per week in child support, despite
“the child support guidelines set[ting] support at $295 a week . . . .” Id. at 561. On appeal, this
Court determined the trial court’s deviation below the guidelines was erroneous, and noted that,
among several of other factors, the children’s “educational and extracurricular activities alone cost
more than $100 a week.” Id. at 563-564. We did not, however, determine that a deviation from
the MCSF was warranted where there were extraordinary fees for extracurricular activities. Id.
Consequently, Whitfield has not identified any specific law requiring the arbitrator to deviate from
the MCSF. We therefore conclude that the arbitrator’s apparent decision not to do so was not an
error of law evident on the face of the award. Washington, 283 Mich App at 672.

     VIII. WHITFIELD WAIVED HER ARGUMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES

        Finally, Whitfield argues that the trial court should have vacated the arbitrator’s decision
regarding attorney fees because he wrongfully concluded that Mann did not commit misconduct
and she was therefore entitled to additional attorney fees at Mann’s expense. Whitfield has waived
this issue.

       “Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Varran v
Granneman (On Remand), 312 Mich App 591, 623; 880 NW2d 242 (2015). A party may waive
an issue by implication. Reed Estate v Reed, 293 Mich App 168, 177; 810 NW2d 284 (2011).
This Court has previously described implied waiver as follows:

                                                 -15-
       An implied waiver may arise where a person has pursued such a course of conduct
       as to evidence an intention to waive a right, or where his conduct is inconsistent
       with any other intention than to waive it. Waiver may be inferred from conduct or
       acts putting one off his guard and leading him to believe that a right has been
       waived. Mere silence, however, is no waiver unless there is an obligation to speak.

                                               * * *

       Waiver is a matter of fact to be shown by the evidence. It may be shown by express
       declarations, or by acts and declarations manifesting an intent and purpose not to
       claim the supposed advantage; or it may be shown by a course of acts and conduct,
       and in some cases will be implied therefrom. It may also be shown by so neglecting
       and failing to act as to induce a belief that there is an intention or purpose to waive.
       Proof of express words is not necessary, but the waiver may be shown by
       circumstances or by a course of acts and conduct which amounts to an estoppel.
       [Id. (citations omitted).]

In other words, an implied waiver is a “waiver evidenced by a party’s decisive, unequivocal
conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Here, one of the issues submitted to the arbitrator was payment of attorney fees. Mann,
citing Whitfield’s significant separate assets, sought an award requiring both parties to pay their
own attorney fees, without equalizing the attorney fees paid from marital funds. Whitfield, on the
other hand, requested “payment of attorney fees be equalized from the parties’ marital bank
accounts before the[y] are divided equally between the parties.” Stated differently, Whitfield did
not ask the arbitrator to determine that she expended additional attorney fees as a result of Mann’s
misconduct, and to order him to pay that share of her attorney fees. The arbitrator ruled: “Attorney
fees through entry of judgment will be equalized and paid from marital funds.” Whitfield received
exactly what she requested—the attorney fees were equalized and paid from marital funds. By
specifically advocating for this decision by the arbitrator, she has waived any error. See Reed
Estate, 293 Mich App at 177.6

       We affirm.

                                                               /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                               /s/ Noah P. Hood

6
  Even if not waived, the arbitrator’s finding that Mann did not commit misconduct causing
Whitfield to expend additional attorney fees was a factual finding. Again, we may not review an
arbitrator’s factual findings and we reject Whitfield’s invitation to do so. Washington, 283 Mich
App at 672.

                                                -16-