Court Opinion

ID: 9688891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:11:01.179429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:42.831136
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). The facts and issues in this case have been *210ably set forth in the opinion of my Brother Levin. I fully concur in the reasoning and holdings in Parts II and III of his opinion. I respectfully disagree with his conclusion that the Legislature intended to introduce the common-law breach of contract theory of mitigation of damages into the teachers’ tenure act, MCLA 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq., the teachers’ Magna Charta.1 Mitigation of damages is a useful and honorable mechanism in its place. However, it is alien to, is not specifically mentioned in, and certainly does nothing for legislation dedicated to taking teachers out from under the thumb of arbitrary action by school boards.
There are two reasons for my conclusion. First, when the Legislature said in Art IV, § 3 of the teachers’ tenure act, MCLA 38.103; MSA 15.2003 "the teacher shall be entitled to all salary lost as a result of such [erroneous school board] suspension”, it meant what it said, "all salary lost as a result of such suspension” not "all salary lost less other income earned”. Second, the Legislature’s whole purpose in the teachers’ tenure act was to preserve the integrity of the teacher’s tenure, or right to continue in his job. The mitigation of damages principle does not strengthen that right but acts in derogation of it.
I. Plain Language
When the Legislature said in Art IV, § 3 of the *211teachers’ tenure act "the teacher shall be entitled to all salary lost as a result of such [erroneous school board] suspension”, it meant what it said, "all salary lost as a result of such suspension”.
Except for the doubt cast by my Brother Levin’s opinion, I would hold without question that the language of the Legislature in this section was both "plain and unambiguous in its terms, * * * [and we] have nothing to do but to obey it”. Nordman v Calhoun, 332 Mich 460, 465; 51 NW2d 906 (1952).
The plain language of the clause "the teacher shall be entitled to all salary lost as a result of such suspension” is reinforced by an analysis of the meaning of the word "lost” in the phrase "salary lost”. My Brother Levin finds that the word "lost” introduces ambiguity into the situation.
Without the word "lost” the phrase "the teacher shall be entitled to all salary * * * as a result of such suspension” is rendered meaningless. Obviously "salary [does not] result [from] such suspension”. Salary results from employment not suspension from employment. Reinsertion of the word "lost” restores sense to the phrase and makes the whole clause meaningful.
The Court of Appeals accurately stated the only possible interpretation of the passage in question when it held:
" 'shall be entitled to all salary * * * ’ can only refer to the salary that would be due to the teacher had the board seen fit to allow him to continue teaching. The statute does not say all damages or all salary minus, such other income as was or could reasonably be earned by other employment.” Shiffer v Board of Education of Gibraltar School Dist, 45 Mich App 190, 193-194; 206 NW2d 250 (1973).
*212II. Legislative Purpose
The Legislature’s whole purpose in the teachers’ tenure act was to preserve the integrity of the teacher’s tenure, or right to continue in his job and thus protect the vital instruction of teaching from arbitrary and political interference and from dismissals without just cause.
The first clause in the title of the teachers’ tenure act describes the Legislature’s purpose. It reads:
"An Act relative to continuing tenure of office of certified teachers in public educational institutions * # sjc >>
There is much history behind the teachers’ tenure act. Before that act some school boards for favoritism, politics or other invalid reasons hired and fired teachers in an arbitrary and capricious manner without real regard either to the education of the pupils involved or to the teachers concerned. This was equally injurious to the future of our children, the efficacy and dignity of the teaching profession and the welfare of our state. Only by establishing the right of the teacher during competence and good behavior to continue in his job once he had proven himself worthy and well qualified could parents and the state be assured their children would receive the education necessary to achieve fulfillment and to fit them to play their full roles in our society. The teachers’ tenure act assures that job right.2 See Rehberg v *213Board of Education of Melvindale, Ecorse Twp School Dist No. 11, Wayne County, 330 Mich 541, 545; 48 NW2d 142 (1951).
The entitlement "to all salary lost as a result of such suspension” on successfully winning an appeal is a strong weapon to enforce the teacher’s right to continue in his job. A school board that might be tempted to act arbitrarily and contemptuously in derogation of this right could well be persuaded to act otherwise knowing that the machinery of the teachers’ tenure act would not only eventually restore the teacher to his rights but that the school board would have to pay that teacher "all salary lost” as a result of such arbitrary and contemptuous action. The Legislature clearly intended to make the teachers’ tenure act work, and this intended provision would effectively help it to work.
On the other hand, the gratuitous judicial introduction of the common-law commercial doctrine of mitigation of damages would substitute a weak reed for a stout and just enforcement weapon.
The mandate of the teachers’ tenure act and the common-law principle of mitigation of damages are repugnant to one another and cannot stand together. It would be incongruent to conclude that a statute designed to protect teachers from harassment and to preserve their integrity would at the same time require teachers to burden themselves with the task of scrounging around for other employment while challenging an unjust suspension. Yet this is the very conclusion reached by my Brother Levin’s opinion.
III. Conclusion
The pláin meaning of the language used in the *214teachers’ tenure act and the legislative intent behind the passage of the act should govern; mitigation of damages should not be considered where it is neither specifically required nor intended by the Legislature. The Court of Appeals decision denying the applicability of the common-law principle of mitigation in this case should be affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, J., concurred with Williams, J.

 Had the plaintiff initiated his action in a court of law based upon strict breach of contract theory, mitigation of damages would not only be appropriate, it would be required. Edgecomb v Traverse City School Dist, 341 Mich 106; 67 NW2d 87 (1954). However, plaintiffs suit is not based upon a breach of contract theory, but is based upon a violation of rights created by the teacher tenure act, MCLA 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq.

 My Brother Levin makes learned reference to labor relations and labor mediation cases. Suffice it to say that in those cases there is no question of the same kind of tenure as the teachers’ tenure act guarantees teachers. Without considering whether language in the other state teachers’ tenure acts are dispositively similar, it is not considered that the results reached in the referenced case in other jurisdictions accurately reflect the intentions of the Michigan Legislature.