Court Opinion

ID: 9684736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:09:49.732963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.219254
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that the oral vote constituted the rendition of the judgment regardless of the date when the action was spread upon the records of the board. For support it looks to rules governing appeals to this court from the district court. The analogy bares the sensitivity of the court to the need for a record entry in a case where the transcript is jurisdictional — the case of Michael W. Brown.
Prior to 1941 the transcript was jurisdictional. Although the statute measured the time from rendition of the judgment, this court repeatedly held that time commenced to run when the judgment was entered of record, “ * * so that it * * * (was) within the power of the appellant to comply with the statute regulating appeals, by filing in this court a certified transcript of the proceedings in the district court.’ ” Sloan v. Gibson, 156 Neb. 625, 57 N. W. 2d 167, quoting Bickel v. Dutcher, 35 Neb. 761, 53 N. W. 663.
In 1941 the transcript lost its jurisdictional feature, but the phrase “rendition of such judgment” was retained. Subsequently the court said that an announcement without a record entry could be a rendition. See Ricketts v. Continental Nat. Bank, 169 Neb. 809, 101 N. W. 2d 153. The new interpretation responded to the repeal of the jurisdictional requirement that a transcript be filed. See Sloan v. Gibson, supra. If we stretch the analogy a little further, we run into the present statutory provision that a notation on the trial *230docket is an integral part of the rendition. See § 25-1301, R. S. Supp., 1963.
Time did not commence to run against Brown before entry of the decision on the records of the board so that it was within his power to comply with the statute by filing the transcript in the district court. I respectfully dissent.
Spencer, J., joins in this dissent.