Court Opinion

ID: 9748311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:59:27.921647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.266763
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice. Appellant Charles Harvest Davis appeals the order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court convicting him of the offense of sexual assault in the second degree and sentencing him to a term of twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict; (2) admitting hearsay evidence as an excited utterance; and (3) admitting evidence under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). This case was certified to us from the Arkansas Court of Appeals as involving an issue of first impression and an issue needing consistent development of the law; hence, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 1 — 2(b)(1) and (b)(5). We affirm. The record reveals that on October 27, 2002, S.P.B., the victim in this case, was practicing with the other members of her church’s praise dance team. While they were practicing, she noticed Appellant watching them. Then as the group was leaving the church, Appellant tried to get one of the members to return to the sanctuary to turn the lights off. After telling Appellant to turn the lights off himself, the group left. S.P.B. then got into her car and started traveling down Geyer Springs Road toward Lancaster Road when she noticed a silver car speeding up behind her. According to S.P.B., she stopped at a yellow light and the silver car almost rear-ended her. She then noticed Appellant was driving the silver car and that he was motioning her to pull her vehicle over. S.P.B. turned into the parking lot of an abandoned school, and Appellant asked her to return to the church with him because he had forgotten something. S.P.B. agreed and followed Appellant back to the church. Once at the church, the two parked in a rear parking lot and rode an elevator to an upstairs conference room. According to S.P.B, once they entered the conference room, Appellant shut the door, turned off the light, pushed her against a wall, and started trying to kiss her. She asked him what he was doing, and he told her that he knew she had been looking at him the same way he looked at her. S.P.B. asked Appellant to turn on the light, but he grabbed her again and shoved her against a table, but she pushed him off of her. She again asked him to turn on the light, and Appellant started apologizing to S.P.B. S.P.B. told Appellant that nothing was going to happen between them, and she reminded him that she was on the praise dance team with his wife. At that point, Appellant told S.P.B. that his wife knew about the attraction and wanted to have a threesome with S.P.B. He again tried to grab S.P.B., touching her buttocks and her breast during the struggle. S.P.B. told Appellant that he had three minutes to open the door. Before he finally opened the door, Appellant grabbed S.P.B.’s arm and asked if he could suck on her breast. She then heard him unzip his pants, and he then asked if he could masturbate in front of her. He also asked her to engage in oral sex. She refused and told him that she wanted out of the conference room. Appellant finally opened the door, and he and S.P.B. rode the elevator back down to the first floor of the church. S.P.B. stated that she did not show any emotion at the time because she knew she was in the church with him by herself and was afraid that he might attack her again. She simply walked out of the church and got into her car. Once Appellant left, S.P.B. called a friend, Jackie Seals, and told her what happened. Shortly thereafter, S.P.B. met the rest of her praise dance team at Faith Temple where they were scheduled to perform. S.P.B. explained what happened with Appellant, and the team members decided to meet with the church’s pastor after the performance. The next morning, the church pastor contacted Appellant and told him that he would no longer be the church’s youth minister. The next day, S.P.B. went to the police and reported what had occurred in the conference room. On February 19, 2003, Appellant was charged by felony information with one count of criminal attempt to commit rape. He was also charged as a habitual offender. Appellant was tried before a jury in Pulaski County Circuit Court on November 20-21, 2003. He was convicted of the lesser-included offense of sexual assault in the second degree. Appellant was sentenced, as a habitual offender, to a term of twenty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence For his first point on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on the charge of sexual assault in the second degree because the State failed to prove the element of forcible compulsion. The State counters that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for our review. Alternatively, the State argues that there was substantial evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction. Before turning to the merits of this point, this court must first determine whether the issue is preserved for appellate review. The State argues that Appellant failed to preserve his argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence because he did not specifically move for a directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault. In support of its argument the State relies on this court’s decision in Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 304-05, 107 S.W.3d 136, 142 (2003). In that case, this court stated: This court has held that, in order to preserve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions for lesser-included offenses, defendants must address the lesser-included offenses either by name or by apprising the trial court of the elements of the lesser-included offenses questioned by their motions for directed verdict. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001) (concluding that challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction was procedurally barred when the defendant was charged with capital murder and failed to move specifically for directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder); see also Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W3d 519 (2001). This court went on to conclude in Grillot that the appellant had failed to preserve his argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first-degree-murder conviction because at trial he only challenged the evidence supporting the greater offense of capital murder.  Here, however, Grillot is not applicable, because Appellant was charged with criminal attempt to commit rape by forcible compulsion. He was convicted of sexual assault in the second degree, which is prohibited under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125 (Supp. 2001). That section provides that a person commits the offense of sexual assault in the second degree by engaging in sexual contact with another person by forcible compulsion. At the conclusion of the State’s case in chief, Appellant moved for a directed verdict arguing: [T]he State has failed to make a prima facie case that Charles Harvest Davis is guilty of criminal attempt to commit rape, that he made a substantial step in the commission of the offense of rape, forcible compulsion, the sexual activity. This motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence when Appellant again argued that the State failed to make a prima facie case of attempted rape by forcible compulsion. Then, when the trial court instructed the jury on criminal attempt to commit rape and the lesser-included offense of sexual assault in the second degree, the court gave one instruction that stated: To sustain this charge, the State must prove the following things beyond a reasonable doubt: First: That Charles H. Davis engaged in sexual contact with the sex organs of S.P.B.; And second: That Charles H. Davis did so by forcible compulsion. Thus, when Appellant challenged the State’s case by arguing that it had failed to prove forcible compulsion, this was sufficient to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the lesser-included offense of sexual assault in the second degree. As this court recognized in Grillot, it is not necessary to specifically state the lesser-included offense by name, as long as the elements of that lesser-included offense are addressed in the directed-verdict motion. In this case, that element was forcible compulsion, and it was addressed in Appellant’s directed-verdict motion. Having determined that Appellant preserved this issue for our review, we now turn to the merits of Appellant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction. Appellant argues that the State failed to prove the element of forcible compulsion. Specifically, he argues that S.P.B.’s testimony that she did not consent to his advances was clearly unbelievable and should therefore be disregarded by this court. We disagree. The standard of review in cases challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well established. We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270 (2004); Reed v. State, 353 Ark. 22, 109 S.W.3d 665 (2003). This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002). We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Parker, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270. Section 5-14-125(a)(l) provides that a person commits sexual assault in the second degree by engaging in sexual contact with another person by forcible compulsion. Forcible compulsion is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101(2) (Supp. 2003) as “physical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person.” Section 5-14-101(9) defines “sexual contact” as “any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or anus of a person or the breast of a female.”  In the instant case, S.P.B. testified that Appellant followed her from the church, convinced her to pull her car over, and ultimately, follow him back to the church. Once at the church, Appellant shoved S.P.B. against a wall and tried to kiss her. S.P.B. demanded that Appellant open the door but he grabbed her again, pushing her against a table. She again told him to get off of her and to open the door. Appellant then grabbed S.P.B. a third time, touching her buttocks and breast. He also unzipped his pants and made a lewd request to masturbate in front of her and to engage in oral sex. Finally, when S.P.B. refused, Appellant let her go and opened the door to the conference room, allowing her to leave. S.P.B.’s testimony clearly established the element offorcible compulsion used by Appellant. This court has recognized that it is well-established law that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to support a conviction if the testimony satisfies the statutory elements of rape. Benson v. State, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004); Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002); Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998). Moreover, inconsistencies in the testimony of a rape victim are matters of credibility for the jury to resolve. Id. Thus, Appellant’s argument that this court should disregard the testimony of S.P.B. as improbable is without merit. Moreover, there was evidence introduced to support S.P.B.’s testimony about what occurred between her and Appellant. Tonya Cosey testified that she was present during the praise dance team’s practice on October 27, 2002, and noticed Appellant watching S.P.B. Cosey also testified that she was going to S.P.B.’s home with her after the practice and was in her car in front of S.P.B. on 65th Street when she noticed a silver car almost rear-end S.P.B. Shortly thereafter, Cosey received a call from S.P.B., telling her that she was turning around to return to the church with Appellant, who had forgotten something. Cosey went on to S.P.B.’s house. A short time later, when S.P.B. arrived at her house, she was very upset, nervous, and hysterical, according to Cosey. S.P.B. then told Cosey that Appellant had basically tried to rape her. Jacqueline Seals, another member of the praise dance team, testified that approximately thirty minutes after she left the church, she received a call from S.P.B., who was upset and crying.1 S.P.B. told Seals that Appellant had thrown her against a door and tried to kiss her and wanted to masturbate in front of her. She also told Seals that Appellant told her that his wife wanted to engage in a threesome with her. According to Seals, when she saw Appellant a short time later, she was still upset. Later, during a meeting at the church, Seals heard Appellant call S.P.B. In sum, the testimony of Cosey and Seals corroborates S.P.B.’s version of events and demonstrates that her testimony was not highly improbable, as Appellant suggests. II. Excited Utterance Next, Appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to admit the testimony of Jacqueline Seals about a phone call she received from S.P.B. because the testimony was hearsay, and did not fall within the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides in relevant part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. In analyzing Rule 803(2), this court has recognized that there are several factors to consider when determining if a statement falls under this exception: the lapse of time, the age of the declarant, the physical and mental condition of the declarant, the characteristics of the event, and the subject matter of the statement. Flores v. State, 348 Ark. 28, 69 S.W.3d 864 (2002); Moore v. State, 317 Ark. 630, 882 S.W.2d 667 (1994) (adopting these factors from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980)). For the exception to apply, there must be an event which excites the declarant. Flores, 348 Ark. 28, 69 S.W.3d 864. In addition, “[i]n order to find that 803(2) applies, it must appear that the declarant’s condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and deliberation.” Peterson v. State, 349 Ark. 195, 199, 76 S.W.3d 845, 847 (2002) (quoting Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 769, 20 S.W.3d 315, 320, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1020 (2000) (quoting Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86)). The statements must be uttered during the period of excitement and must express the declarant’s reaction to the event. Moore, 317 Ark. 630, 882 S.W.2d 667. It is for the trial court to determine whether the statement was made under the stress of excitement. Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 884 S.W.2d 947 (1994). In this case, the testimony challenged by Appellant is as follows: She told me that she had left and that Harvest had followed her and told her to come back to the church because he had some papers to give her. And she followed him into his office and, once they got in, he shut the door and he threw her up against the door and kissed her. And then he threw her on the desk, and she had to kick him. And he told her she made him so hot that he wanted to masturbate in front of her and pulled his penis out. And she said she was going to tell his wife, and he said she already knew and they both found S.P.B. attractive and they wanted to have a threesome with her. ... And that there was a window there and that he wanted to perform oral sex with her right there in front of the window. According to Seals, she received the call from S.P.B. approximately thirty minutes after Seals left the church. Seals also stated that S.P.B. was upset and crying during the conversation. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Seals’s testimony as hearsay. The State argued that it was an excited utterance and, thus, admissible under Rule 803(2). Appellant argued that it was not an excited utterance because the time frame between the events at the church and S.P.B.’s phone call to Seals could not be established. Appellant continues to argue that there was no definitive time frame established, and because the time element is a critical factor in the excited-utterance analysis, it was error for the trial court to admit Seals’s testimony. Thus, the only factor Appellant is challenging on appeal is the lapse of time. As we previously stated, for a statement to fall within the excited-utterance exception, it must appear that the declarant’s condition at the time was such that the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of reflection and deliberation. Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003); Flores, 348 Ark. 28, 69 S.W.3d 864. In the same vein, however, this court has recognized that the lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement, although relevant, is not dispositive of the application of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Peterson, 349 Ark. 195, 76 S.W.3d 845; Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392, 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992). In Peterson, 349 Ark. 195, 76 S.W.3d 845, we further explained that the general rule is that an utterance following an exciting event must be made soon enough thereafter that it can reasonably be considered a product of the stress of the excitement rather than of intervening reflection or deliberation. However, we have noted that the trend is toward expansion of the time interval after an exciting event. Id.  Here, Seals testified that she had been in the church earlier that morning, practicing with the other members of the praise dance team. According to Seals, the members all left at about the same time. Seals further stated that approximately thirty minutes after she left the church, she received the call from S.P.B. Moreover, Seals testified that S.P.B. was upset and crying during the phone conversation. In sum, this was ample evidence to satisfy the time-frame element of the excited-utterance exception. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Seals’s testimony. III. Rule 404(b) As his final point on appeal, Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to allow the testimony of Corla Ridout regarding an incident where Appellant made unwanted advances toward her. According to Appellant, this evidence was not permissible under Rule 404(b) because it did not have any independent relevance and was admitted only to demonstrate Appellant’s bad character and propensity to make advances toward women. The State counters that this evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) because it was independently relevant in proving that Appellant sexually assaulted S.P.B. Alternatively, the State argues that even if the evidence was improperly admitted, Appellant cannot show that he was prejudiced because there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt. We agree that the trial court did not err in admitting Ridout’s testimony. Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides: Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In analyzing the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), this court has stated that such evidence is not admissible simply to show a prior bad act. Pickens v. State, 347 Ark. 904, 69 S.W.3d 10 (2002); Haire v. State, 340 Ark. 11, 8 S.W.3d 468 (2000). To be admissible, the evidence must be independently relevant, which means it must have a tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination of the case more or less probable. Pickens, 347 Ark. 904, 69 S.W.3d 10; Bragg v. State, 328 Ark. 613, 946 S.W.2d 654 (1997) (citing Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 877 S.W.2d 570 (1994)). See also Ark. R. Evid. 401. This court has held that evidence is indisputably relevant if it proves a material point and is not introduced solely to prove that the defendant is a bad person. Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000). It is well settled that the admission or rejection of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004). Here, the evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) was testimony from Corla Ridout regarding an event that transpired between herself and Appellant. She testified as follows: We were leaving church and he, he followed me. I could see him in the back. We would always go the same way until we get to the light. And he lives closer to Central, and I hve closer to [the] west side of town, which is by Rodney Parham area. And so I usually go the back way because it’s easier to get there. Going down John Barrow is just easier. It’s quicker. And he had called me on my cell phone and said, Do you have a minute to talk to me? And I said, What is it about? You know, I was needing to get somewhere. And he said, I just need to talk to you for a minute. And I thought it was something serious, and I didn’t mind, you know, doing that. Sol stopped. I stopped over — we stopped in the Harvest Foods parking area. He got out. I got out. And I said,What’s the problem? You know, what do you want to talk about? And he was like — you know, he just started going over some things that he wanted to talk about with Marty. And I said, Those are things you need to talk about with Marty. Appellant continued to insist that he needed to talk to Ridout and asked her to get into his car. She complied, and the pair continued talking. Then, Appellant turned his car on and began to drive toward the Boyle Park area, eventually stopping in a park-like area. He continued to talk about his wife, but changed the subject, telling Ridout about how he remembered her from high school, but she denied remembering him from that time. According to Ridout, Appellant became upset that she did not remember him or that she was supposed to have kissed him in high school. Ridout then testified that: I was supposed to have kissed him, and he was supposed to be my first. I’m sitting there, going, okay, this is not the way I thought it was going to go, and I asked him to take me back to my car. ... He was ignoring me. And I asked, Okay I think we need to stop right here. So he decides that — he just reached in front of me as if, you know, he was going to touch, touch, you know, graze by me to see if, you know, I was going to respond. I’m sure that’s probably what it was, but that’s speculation on my part. But, still, he reached his arm right past me, right across here, right across my frame. I reached back. I was getting ready to defend myself right there because I was like, okay, that was a little much. I didn’t expect for him to do anything like that. I just wanted him to take me back to my car. That’s all I asked him to do because I knew I was about to get violent in the car because I felt unsafe at that point. Thus, according to the State, this testimony from Ridout that Appellant made an unwanted advance toward her was independently relevant to show that he sexually assaulted S.P.B. The State argues that the two situations were similar and contradicted Appellant’s claim that his interaction with S.P.B. was consensual. It is true that modus operandi evidence is admissible in rape cases to prove, a common plan. Burmingham, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351. Similarly, evidence of other crimes or bad acts are admissible to show intent. See Pickens, 347 Ark. 904, 69 S.W.3d 10. However, this court has recognized that to be probative under Ark. R. Evid. 403, the prior act must be similar to the crime charged. See Morgan v. State, 359 Ark. 168, 195 S.W.3d 889 (2004); Sasser v. State, 321 Ark. 438, 902 S.W.2d 773 (1995). This court further elaborated in Sasser, explaining: The degree of similarity between the circumstances of prior crimes and the present crime required for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is a determination that affords considerable leeway to the trial judge, and may vary with the purpose for which the evidence is admitted. See 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 112, n. 4 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1994) (“To be probative, prior criminal acts must require an intent similar to that required by the charged crime, although it is usually said that the prior crime need not closely resemble the charged crime.”); 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 190, n. 31 and accompanying text (4th ed. 1992) (“The similarities between the act charged and the extrinsic acts [admitted to show the act charged was not performed inadvertendy, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge] need not be as extensive and striking as is required ... [to show modus operandt\”). Id. at 447, 902 S.W.2d at 778-79.  Here, the incident between Appellant and Ridout bore enough similarities to the incident for which Appellant stood trial that we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b). In both instances, Appellant followed these women from the church and convinced them to pull their vehicles over. Once he convinced the women to pull over, he then persuaded them to go to a more isolated area with him. Then, once Appellant was alone with the women, he would make suggestive comments to them and unwanted sexual advances toward them. In sum, the evidence that Appellant had made such unwanted advances toward Ridout was independently relevant to rebut Appellant’s claim that his encounter with S.P.B. was consensual. Accordingly, this evidence was properly admitted at trial pursuant to Rule 404(b). Affirmed. Hannah, C.J., dissents.   In our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence even inadmissible evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See Hampton v. State, 357 Ark. 473, 183 S.W3d 148 (2004).