Court Opinion

ID: 9537370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:16:48.936099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:32.360010
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.
— I concur only in the judgment. I am impelled to point out that the discussion, in the opinion by the court (ante, pp. 67-68), of purported interpretation of section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code by the 1953 proposal of legislation, expression of views by an assembly subcommittee, and adoption of section 11503 (former § 11502, enacted in 1953) by the Legislature, is neither necessary nor appropriate. The argument concerning these matters was not advanced either by defendant in proprio persona or by counsel appointed for him, but originated in this court. The notion that these matters which occurred in 1953 could evidence what the Legislature meant when it created the crime of offering to sell a contraband narcotic in 19091 appears to me so obviously lacking in merit as not to warrant inclusion in an appellate opinion; rather, such notion appears to be stated for no other purpose than to refute it.
The contention made by counsel appointed for defendant by this court — that the word “offer” in section 11501 means “attempt” as defined by the law of crimes — is in effect a more sophisticated version of the argument advanced by defendant in pro. per. before the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three. That court, speaking through Presiding Justice Shinn (People v. Brown (1960, Cal.App.), 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 204, 205), stated defendant’s contention as made in pro. per. as follows: “that the word ‘offer’ should be construed to mean 1 bring, bear, or carry, ’ and since it was not even shown there was a narcotic in existence which could have been the subject of an offer, commission of the *76charged offense was not proved.” Without in so many words rejecting defendant’s contention as to the meaning of “offer,” the District Court of Appeal correctly held that “Appellant’s [defendant’s] statement that he had ‘it’ was sufficient as proof that the heroin was in his possession and that he had the ability to perform his promise.”
Now this court, after lengthy consideration of this simple case, comes to the same conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence — the only possible conclusion under any normal theory of appellate review. The only contribution to the law in the opinion by the court is the decision that the Legislature, when it proscribed both “offers” and “attempts,” referred to two different sorts of criminal conduct.
In the circumstances it is obvious that the District Court of Appeal properly determined, on the basis of its own examination of the record, that “representation by counsel would be of no benefit to the appellant or to the court” and correctly held that “There is no merit in the appeal.” (People v. Brown (1960, Cal.App.), supra, 3 Cal.Rptr. 203, 204.)
It seems proper to note that the majority “By the Court” opinion states (ante, p. 65) that “Defendant requested the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, in which the appeal was pending, to appoint an attorney to represent him, claiming that he was without funds to employ counsel. The court made an independent investigation of the record, determined that representation by counsel would be of no benefit to defendant or to the court, and denied the request. (See People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154 [331 P.2d 42].) . . . We granted defendant’s petition for hearing in this court and appointed counsel to represent him.”
It appears proper to note also that the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Traynor states (ante, pp. 69-70), “I concur in the judgment. It is my opinion, however, that the holding in People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d 152, 154 [331 P.2d 42], should be expanded to require the appointment of counsel on appeal for all indigent defendants convicted of felonies.
“The question calls for resolution even though we appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court. The question cannot remain in abeyance. This very case illustrates the recurring practice of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, of referring the question of the appointment of counsel to the local bar association committee (see People v. Logan, 137 Cal.App.2d 331, 332 [290 P.2d 11]) and the consequent countervailing practice of this court to *77then grant a hearing, even on its own motion, whenever there has been no appointment of counsel. There would be no end to such wasteful procedure were the question deemed moot each time this court granted a hearing and appointed counsel. The question should be settled in the interest of effective appellate court administration.”
It seems appropriate further to note that the question was settled by the holding in People v. Hyde (1958), 51 Cal.2d 152, 154 [1] [331 P.2d 42], and that the District Court of Appeal in the present case complied with that holding.
Prom what has been quoted above from the opinions of the majority and of Justice Traynor it appears proper to infer that the granting of a hearing in the case at bench was influenced at least in part by the view of the specially concurring justice. If such inference is properly drawn it seems obviously appropriate to observe that although counsel appointed by this court performed his duties faithfully and ably, the appointment of an attorney for the defendant has not aided such defendant or furthered the proper administration of justice. The only thing which the granting of a hearing accomplished has been a delay in final determination of this case and additional expense to the state.
McComb, J., concurred.

Ply a 1909 amendment of section 8 of the 1907 Poison Act the Legislature for the first time made it unlawful to "offer to sell, furnish or give away” narcotics except under certain conditions. (Stats. 1909, oh. 279, §4.) Since then each of the series of acts which have denounced narcotics offenses has contained a provision similar to that of such amended section 8 or the comparable provision of the here pertinent section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code.