Court Opinion

ID: 9490212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:36:11.904757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:57.072347
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that, as a general matter at least, the running of a term of supervised release continues after deportation, and because the special conditions contained in the order of supervised release at issue in this case are in accordance with this general rule, I respectfully dissent.
Although Congress has not indicated explicitly whether a district court can toll the running of á term of supervised release while a defendant is deported, the statutory framework governing supervised release suggests that Congress envisioned that supervised release would continue during deportation. According to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which governs the running of a term of supervised release, “[t]he term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment____”1 The only provision in this section providing for any type of tolling states that “[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in which the person is imprisoned in connection *432with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 30 consecutive days,” id, a provision that undisputedly does not apply in this case. The majority recognizes, in light of this statutory language, the potential application of the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” but it ultimately concludes that “[t]he force of the maxim is blunted here by the rest of the statutory scheme.”
I agree with the majority that district courts have broad discretion to set appropriate conditions of supervised release. But also within the statutory scheme of supervised release, and more relevant to the issues in this case, is 18 U.S.C. § 3583 — the primary statutory provision governing supervised release. It states in relevant part that “[i]f an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for such deportation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added). This provision suggests Congress envisioned that terms of supervised release would continue to run after deportation. Other circuits have interpreted § 3583(d) in this manner. See United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir.1995) (“Section 3583(d) authorizes] the court to permit the Attorney General to deport [a] defendant during his term of supervised release.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Brown, 54 F.3d 234, 239 (5th Cir.1995) (“[Sjeveral cases have incorporated [§ 3583(d) ] into their sentence of supervised release, i.e., that, if the defendant is deported, he remain outside of the United States during his term of supervised release. This is a clear indication that a term of supervised release remains in effect after the defendant is deported”). Although § 3583(d) does not answer the specific question whether a district court ever can toll the running of a term of supervised release during deportation, it certainly does not blunt Isong’s otherwise valid reliance on the fact that Congress did not include a tolling provision for deportation. And at the least, § 3583(d) indicates that if a court provides that a defendant be deported and remain outside the United States as a condition of his supervised release, the term of supervised release will continue to run during the time the defendant is deported.
The majority asserts that “a tolling order is an appropriate way to make supervised release meaningful for defendants who are going to be deported.” This may or may not be true. The purpose of supervised release “is to ease the defendant’s transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release.” S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 124 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307. In the case of a deported alien who returns to the United States after numerous years away, it is questionable whether the justifications for supervised release would apply. This policy discussion is largely academic, however. In my view, Congress has decided in § 3583(d) that, at least in the normal deportation scenario, a term of supervised release will continue to run after deportation.
Turning to the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court in the present case, it is apparent that the court utilized § 3583(d). The three special conditions imposed by the court provide:
1. Defendant shall comply with agreement on the record at sentencing hearing on 11/30/92. With the advice of counsel the defendant waives all proceedings, formalities, and any appeal with regard to pending deportation proceedings and agrees to leave the country in an expeditious fashion.
2. Should defendant be deported from the United States he shall not re-enter the United States illegally and shall obtain express permission and approval, in writing, of the Attorney General of the United States as a condition of reentry.
3. In the event defendant is permitted, at any time in the future, to re-enter the United States, defendant shall report *433to the nearest United States Probation Office within 48 hours of re-entry into this country, at which time, period of supervised release shall be resumed.
Because Isong was to leave and remain outside the United States as a condition of his supervised release, it stretches reason to conclude that the district court could have suspended his term of supervised release during this time. Although the majority is correct that the use of the term “resumed” in the third special condition evidences an intent on the part of the district court to suspend the running of the term of supervised release, I cannot agree that a term of supervised release can be suspended at the same time that certain conditions of that supervised release actively remain in effect. In other words, the majority’s conclusion allows time to stand still while various conditions of supervised release continue to operate upon a defendant. Because I believe that the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with § 3583(d) and with the wording of the supervised release order in this case, I respectfully dissent.

. Section 3624 differs from 18 U.S.C. § 3564(a), which governs the running of a term of probation. That provision provides that “[a] term of probation commences on the day that the sen*432tence of probation, is imposed, unless otherwise ordered by the court." Id. (emphasis added). This section adds further support to the proposition that Congress is well aware of how to vest district courts with discretion over the running of various time periods.