Court Opinion

ID: 9750463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:59:45.036164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:10.821367
License: Public Domain

WOODS (Fred), J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction of selling cocaine but dissent, with some misgiving, from the reversal of appellant’s admission of a state prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5).
Although reasonable minds could differ, I am persuaded by “the totality of the relevant circumstances . . . that defendant’s admission of the prior conviction was voluntary and intelligent despite the absence of an explicit admonition on the privilege against self-incrimination [and right of confrontation].” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1180 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315].) As set forth in the majority opinion (fn. 3, ante, p. 1664), the colloquy between appellant and both the trial court and prosecutor makes clear appellant knew he had a right not to admit the prior. As Howard observed, “when the record demonstrates that knowledge there is ‘no need to *1666go farther and attach to such knowledge the talismanic phrase “right not to incriminate himself.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Similarly, I believe the record demonstrates appellant knew he had a right to confront witnesses and voluntarily waived that right. Apposite are the following circumstances: the prosecutor explained to appellant that if there was a trial she would “present evidence” either to the jury or trial court; the jury or trial court would “listen to the evidence” and make a determination; appellant stated he understood this was what a trial meant; appellant had just finished participating in a jury trial where he was confronted by witnesses; appellant demonstrated legal sophistication in his cocaine sale: he obtained the cocaine out of the undercover officer’s sight and within seconds after the sale disposed of the prerecorded $20 bill without being detected; appellant was an adult with prior exposure to the criminal justice system.
A word about my misgiving. For over two decades the law in California had been unmistakable: a valid guilty plea or admission required express, on the record, admonitions and waivers of jury trial, confrontation, and self-incrimination. Prosecutors, who typically take guilty pleas and admissions, thus had the strongest motivation to make the admonitions explicit and complete. To err invalidated the plea or admission.
Now, under People v. Howard, although such advisements are still required pursuant to the court’s supervisory powers (People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1175), to err may or may not invalidate the plea or admission. Prosecutors, I fear, will have less motivation to make the admonitions explicit and complete. Appellate opinions, such as this dissent, which forgive such prosecutor error may induce rather than discourage such error.
Lest I be misunderstood: the district attorney and local prosecutor have a duty to train their attorneys in the proper taking of guilty pleas and admissions; since approximately 80 percent of criminal convictions are by guilty plea, there is no more important duty; a deputy district attorney or deputy city attorney who fails to take a valid guilty plea or admission has provided ineffective assistance of counsel to his/her client, the People; such failure should result in administrative sanction.
Criminal justice resources should not be squandered by needlessly flawed guilty pleas and admissions.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 22, 1994.