Court Opinion

ID: 9840968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:57.278573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:08.732789
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 In re J.V. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re J.V.,                                                    B326747

 a Person Coming Under the                                      (Los Angeles County
 Juvenile Court Law.                                            Super. Ct. No. CK98783)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 ROCHELLE V.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
     Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________

      Rochelle V. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her child J.V. (born 2011).1
Mother’s sole assertion on appeal is that the juvenile court failed
to fulfill its duties under state law implementing the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). More
specifically, Mother claims the court failed to make necessary
findings regarding whether ICWA applied to J.V., and that we
should therefore reverse the termination of her parental rights
and remand for the court to make those findings.
       Mother disclaims any Indian ancestry.2 J.V.’s father A.H.
(Father) indicated he might have potential Cherokee ancestry.
The record shows proper ICWA inquiry was sent to the three
federally registered Cherokee tribes without any response
indicating J.V. was enrolled or was the child of a member of the
tribe and eligible for enrollment. We find no reason for reversal
or remand because the ICWA inquiries made regarding J.V. were
adequate, the record indicates no reason to believe J.V. was an

      1 Mother’s two other children, A.V. (born 2001) and A.C.
(born 2004), who have a different father than A.V., were also
involved in the dependency proceedings. Both have since reached
the age of majority and are not the subject of this appeal.
      2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same
for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such
as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In
re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                    2
Indian child, and the court made both express and implied
findings supported by substantial evidence regarding ICWA
compliance. Accordingly, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
A.    Summary of Case
      Apart from compliance with ICWA, Mother does not
challenge the merits of the juvenile court’s rulings. We thus
provide only a brief synopsis of them. Dependency proceedings
involving J.V. began in January 2013 in San Bernardino County;
jurisdiction was based on Mother’s abuse of alcohol and drugs,
and her leaving the minor unsupervised. Later in 2013, the
proceedings were transferred to Los Angeles County. J.V. was
placed for a time with paternal grandmother before paternal
grandmother passed away in August 2021. In August 2022, the
juvenile court terminated family reunification services for
Mother. A contested Welfare and Institutions Code3 section
366.26 hearing occurred on February 1, 2023, at which the
juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights and
designated J.V.’s paternal aunt and uncle as the prospective
adoptive parents.
B.    Factual Background Relevant to ICWA
      Mother was born in the Caribbean country of Trinidad and
emigrated to the United States when she was seven years old.
She reported her family was also born in Trinidad. Mother and
her relatives consistently denied any Native American ancestry
during the dependency proceedings.

      3 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                   3
       Father, who is not a party to this appeal, indicated at the
initial detention hearing on January 24, 2013, that he might have
Cherokee Indian ancestry. The San Bernardino County juvenile
court ordered notice to the Cherokee tribes. The San Bernardino
County Department of Children and Family Services (SBDCFS)
filed a report with the court in February 2013 providing details of
it having given ICWA inquiry notice to the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, the Cherokee Nation, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) along with proofs of service.
       BIA acknowledged receipt of SBDCFS’s inquiry and
directed SBDCFS to any responses received from the Cherokee
tribes. The United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians
responded on February 15, 2013 that J.V. was not descended
from anyone on the Keetoowah Roll and it would not intervene.
The Cherokee Nation requested additional information regarding
the middle initial of J.V.’s paternal grandfather.4 SBDCFS
replied to the Cherokee Nation on February 25, 2013, indicating
it “ha[d] contacted the parents/relatives” and that paternal
grandfather’s middle initial was unknown. The Cherokee Nation
did not further respond. The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
appears never to have responded.
       At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on March 14, 2013,
SBDCFS reported that it had initiated notice to the Cherokee
tribes but had not yet received confirmations. The court found
notice was initiated and that ICWA might apply.

      4 The Cherokee Nation also requested additional
information about the paternal grandmother of J.V.’s step-
siblings, which SBDCFS then supplied.

                                   4
       In April 2013, the case was transferred to Los Angeles
County. The Los Angeles County Superior Court accepted
jurisdiction in June 2013. A September 20, 2013 Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
status report stated ICWA did not apply; the juvenile court
nevertheless ordered a supplemental report to address possible
Indian heritage on Father’s side. At a November 14, 2013
hearing, DCFS informed the court that SBDCFS had sent notices
to the Cherokee tribes “so the notice is already done,” and that
prior to the case transfer the San Bernardino court “was just
waiting for the letters or return receipts, et cetera.” The juvenile
court stated that based on the information before it, the court
“has no reason to know the child would fall under the [ICWA]”
but ordered DCFS to check the file for any return receipts or
letters from the tribes, and if any existed to forward them to the
court.
       ICWA was next addressed in a status review report dated
April 25, 2014, in which DCFS said ICWA did not apply. DCFS
reports on June 5, 2014, June 23, 2014, and August 13, 2015
similarly stated ICWA did not apply. DCFS reports on
January 7, 2016 and February 28, 2022 erroneously stated the
San Bernardino court found on January 24, 2013 that ICWA did
not apply.
       The juvenile court addressed ICWA at an August 25, 2022
hearing where it ordered the section 366.26 report include ICWA
inquiries. On August 25, 2022, and again on November 1, 2022,
paternal aunt and uncle denied Indian ancestry. As of
November 3, 2022, Father stopped responding to requests for
further information and did not participate in the proceedings
thereafter.

                                    5
       The section 366.26 report, dated January 5, 2023, again
erroneously stated the San Bernardino court found on
January 24, 2013 that ICWA did not apply. The juvenile court
did not explicitly address ICWA at the February 1, 2023 hearing
when it terminated Mother’s parental rights. It began the
hearing, however, by stating that it was “considering all of the
contents of the court file” in connection with the rulings it would
make during the hearing, and that while it intended to focus on
some specific documents that it then named for the benefit of
counsel, “as I indicated, I will be considering the entire contents
of the court file.” The court then proceeded to terminate Mother’s
parental rights without applying the heightened standard that
would govern if J.V. was an Indian child. (See § 366.26, subd. (c);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.486.)
                         DISCUSSION
      Mother does not challenge the adequacy of the ICWA
inquiries made here or claim deficiencies in any particular
inquiry. She instead argues the court did not review or otherwise
make itself aware of those inquiries and any responses to them,
such that it did not discharge its obligation to confirm that DCFS
conducted an adequate investigation and to determine whether
ICWA applied to J.V.’s proceedings. Mother argues we should
remand for the court to review the record and make such
findings.
A.    Applicable Law
      “At the outset of a dependency case, the child welfare
agency and the juvenile court have a statutory initial duty to
inquire into whether a child is, or may be, an Indian child. ‘The
child welfare department’s initial duty of inquiry includes “asking

                                    6
the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended
family members, others who have an interest in the child, and
the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or
Indian custodian is domiciled.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re
Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, 507, fn. & italics omitted.)
State law further mandates that “[a]t the first appearance in
court of each party, the court shall ask each participant present
in the hearing whether the participant knows or has reason to
know that the child is an Indian child. The court shall instruct
the parties to inform the court if they subsequently receive
information that provides reason to know the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
       A juvenile court must make findings as to the applicability
of ICWA and its failure to do so is error. (In re Jennifer A. (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 692, 704-705, 709.) Such findings may be
express or implied. When they are implied, “the record must
reflect that the court considered the issue and decided whether
ICWA applies.” (In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506.)
We review juvenile court findings for substantial evidence. (In re
E.W. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 396, 404.) “All conflicts must be
resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences
indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.” (In re Katrina C.
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.)
B.    Analysis
      In the recent past, claims about the adequacy of ICWA
inquiry by county social services agencies have inundated
appellate courts statewide, and the issue is currently pending
before our Supreme Court. (E.g., In re Ja.O. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 672, review granted July 26, 2023, S280572; In re

                                    7
Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted Sept. 21, 2022,
S275578.) This is not one of those many cases. The court record
here contains the ICWA inquiries to the Cherokee tribes; there is
no dispute about the form of those inquiries, the associated proofs
of service, and that no response was received indicating J.V. was
an Indian child as described by ICWA.5
      Perhaps due to the transfer of the case between counties
early in the proceedings, DCFS erroneously reported more than
once that the San Bernardino court found on January 24, 2013,
that ICWA did not apply. Instead, on that date, the San
Bernardino court had ordered notice to the Cherokee tribes,
indicating ICWA could potentially apply. While DCFS on
occasion wrongly reported that the San Bernardino court
determined ICWA did not apply in 2013, that error is

      5 Mother’s reply brief argues for the first time that
“paternal grandfather’s middle name was not further
investigated.” We need not address this argument because it was
raised for the first time in the reply brief (In re Karla C. (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1269), but we note in any event that it is
factually inaccurate. After the Cherokee Nation requested the
information, the record shows SBDCFS contacted Father and his
relatives to identify any middle name or initial for paternal
grandfather and came up empty. SBDCFS thus provided the
Cherokee Nation with all available information. ICWA requires
“reasonable inquiries regarding a child’s possible Indian
ancestry” (In re Y.M. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 901, 909), and we
cannot fault SBDCFS for failing to supply information when it
conducted appropriate due diligence to attempt obtaining the
requested information but was unable to do so. (In re K.H. (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 566, 618 [“Not every defect in the agency’s inquiry
will be problematic, as the inquiry need not be perfect or
exhaustive” but instead “adequate, proper, and duly diligent”].)

                                    8
inconsequential. This is because ICWA did not in fact apply to
J.V. and the juvenile court so found in 2013, albeit on a different
date than the one cited by DCFS.
       In 2013, after the case was transferred to Los Angeles
County, the juvenile court (Commissioner Jacqueline Lewis)
found that ICWA did not apply. As of that time, the court file
showed that proper ICWA inquiry had been made, and had
resulted in no evidence suggesting J.V. was a member of any
Cherokee tribe or that his Father was a member such that J.V.
was eligible for enrollment. At the November 14, 2013 hearing,
the juvenile court was aware that SBDCFS had sent notices to
the Cherokee tribes, that not all the tribes had yet responded,
and that no tribe had yet identified J.V. as an Indian child.
Given that the inquiries were sent in March 2013—more than
seven months before the November 14, 2013 hearing—the
juvenile court properly found that based on the information
before it that the court “ha[d] no reason to know the child would
fall under the [ICWA].” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 15
[noting under prior version of statute, “After proper notice has
been given, . . . if neither the BIA nor any tribe provides a
determinative response within 60 days, then the court may find
that ICWA does not apply to the proceedings”]; In re M.W. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1047 [no reason to believe minor was Indian
child where “two tribes were given nearly two months within
which to provide a determinative response to the [d]epartment’s
ICWA inquiry” and did not respond].)
       Mother requests that we infer the court did not sufficiently
review the file for ICWA compliance because the court did not
state it had done so and because the court ordered DCFS to
forward any tribal return receipts or letters (suggesting the court

                                   9
was unaware they were already in the file). But we review the
entire record, not just any portions referred to by the juvenile
court, to assess whether the record discloses substantial evidence
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the order
appropriate. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Such
substantial record evidence exists here.6 Nor does the court’s
order to supplement the court file vitiate the substantial evidence
that was already in the file. The court’s supplementation order
was appropriate given that both the court and DCFS had a
“continuing duty to inquire whether” J.V. “is or may be an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       Nothing occurred after this November 14, 2013 hearing to
spur a re-evaluation of the court’s determination that ICWA did
not apply. After the November 14, 2013 hearing, Mother and
maternal grandfather denied Indian heritage, as did paternal
aunt. Father stopped participating in the proceedings and
supplied no further information. No further responses were
received from BIA or any of the Cherokee tribes. Thus, the court
had no impetus requiring it to revisit its determination that
ICWA did not apply.

      6 We find Mother’s reliance on In re Louis S. (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 622 inapposite. In that case, the social services
agency did not file the notices or return receipts with the juvenile
court, leading the Court of Appeal to hold it was impossible to
determine from such an incomplete record whether the notices
provided the tribes with relevant information and a meaningful
opportunity to evaluate whether the minor was an Indian child.
(Id. at pp. 628-629.) Here, in contrast, the record contains both
the correspondence with the tribes and any responses thereto.

                                    10
       In addition to its express finding in November 2013, on
February 1, 2023, the juvenile court (now Judge Daniel Zeke
Zeidler) impliedly found at the section 366.26 hearing that ICWA
did not apply. The court stated it was considering the entire file
(which included all the evidence regarding correspondence with
the tribes, proofs of service, and the like) and then proceeded to
terminate Mother’s parental rights without applying the
heightened standard that would have governed if J.V. was an
Indian child. (See § 366.26, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.486.)
       Contrary to Mother’s argument, the court’s ability to make
such an implied finding was not impacted by DCFS’s failure to
correct its error concerning when in 2013 the court found ICWA
did not apply, or by any DCFS failure to re-provide the court with
responses from the Cherokee tribes. The record reflects the court
considered the entire file, from which the DCFS error regarding
the 2013 date is apparent and which contains the documents that
Mother faults DCFS for not supplying a second time. In short,
nothing in the court file suggested its contents, when fully
considered, would have misled the court. Thus, nothing before us
suggests we should disregard the court’s implied finding that
ICWA did not apply by virtue of the legal criteria it applied when
terminating Mother’s parental rights after considering the entire
record. (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 506.)

                                  11
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is
affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                          WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             CHANEY, J.

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