Court Opinion

ID: 9787147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:11:28.346571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:52.704306
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting:
Whatever the merits of the trial court's decision to strike information it considered recklessly inaccurate, in my opinion the resulting affidavit nevertheless established probable cause to believe that the defendants were illegally manufacturing methamphetamine and that items connected to their criminal activity would be discovered at the time and place for which the search was authorized. Because I would reverse the suppression order without regard to the question of good faith reliance, I respectfully dissent.
Even after challenged portions of the affidavit were excised, it still contained reliable information that the defendants, individually and together, had bought three necessary ingredients for the manufacture of methamphetamine, on at least five separate occasions, from a pharmacy, a feed store, and a chemical supply store. In June, defendant Kazmierski bought pseudoephedrine, a direct precursor to methamphetamine, from a Walgreen's drug store, in sufficient quantity to require identification, from which the police were later able to obtain his arrest record and eventually his current address. Three different times between July and October, the police were given notice that defendant Knafla purchased iodine erystals from a feed store, and when she called ahead to pick up the last of these purchases, the police were notified and were able to follow her from the store back to her residence, at the same address as defendant Kazmierski, and watch her smoke something from a small, clear glass pipe of the type often used to smoke methamphetamine. Finally, the police were notified by a DEA Agent that in August, defendant Knafla had ordered two pints of hypophosphorous acid, another necessary ingredient in the manufacture of methamphetamine, and that it was picked up by defendant Kazmierski, again identifying himself by his driver's license.
A search is an investigative tool. Although a search, and especially a search of the home, is invasive of personal privacy, in light of competing interests in public safety and the detection of crime, a search is permitted when a neutral, judicial magistrate determines that there is probable cause to believe it will result in evidence of criminal activity. Probable cause does not require the degree of proof necessary for conviction of a crime. See People v. Washington, 865 *1215P.2d 145, 148 (Colo.1994). Similarly, probable cause does not require the exelusion of innocent explanations or even an inference that eriminal behavior is more likely than not. See United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir.1985) ("The fact that innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged does not negate probable cause."); Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Sei-gure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §§ 3.2(e) at 69-70 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001) ("The mere fact that "innocent explanations for the activity may be imagined is not enough to defeat the probable cause showing.") (citations omitted); see also People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1171 (Colo.1998) ("A combination of otherwise lawful cireum-stances may well lead to a legitimate inference of criminal activity."). Probable cause is a flexible standard, merely insuring that there is a fair probability, based on practical, commonsense considerations, that a search will discover items connected with criminal conduct. People v. MacCallum, 925 P.2d 758, 762 (Colo.1996); Banks v. People, 696 P.2d 293, 296 (Colo.1985); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).
To my mind, there can be no serious question that reasonable people, after learning about the manufacture of methamphetamine, would conclude that there was a fair probability that the defendants were engaged in doing just that. I believe that common sense dictates a likelihood that the accumulation of these three separate ingredients, over a period of months, in the manner and quantities reported, was for the purpose of making methamphetamine. The ongoing purchases and the nature of the suspected criminal activity strongly suggest the need for a private location and some kind of equipment. Especially where independent evidence indicated that each defendant resided at the searched address and where one of the defendants was followed after purchasing a key ingredient, not to another location, but back to that address, I believe there was enough to infer that evidence of eriminal conduct related to the manufacture of methamphetamine, whether the equipment or contraband itself, or merely evidence of further purchases of ingredients, other locations used for manufacturing or storage, or actual ree-ords or evidence of distribution or sale, would be discovered in a search of the couple's modular home. Cf. United States v. Rambis, 686 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir.1982) (reasonable to infer that assembly of arson device would require simple tools and materials found in defendant's home, especially where accomplice had purchased necessary materials just prior to stopping at defendant's home, and government agents, through surveillance, saw no indication that materials had been stored elsewhere).
It would be unrealistic and impose far too great a burden on the detection of erime to require actual first-hand observations by the police of criminal activity before permitting the search of a specific residence. See People v. Hakel, 870 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Colo.1994) ("However, the link between suspected erimi-nal activity and a specific location to be searched may be established by cireumstan-tial evidence and proper inferences drawn therefrom."). The affidavit in this case relied on information from reliable sources, including reports from commercial establishments and actual police records and surveillance, rather than uncorroborated rumors, anonymous tips, or information from criminal informants. Cf. People v. Randolph, 4 P.3d 477, 482, 484 (Colo.2000) (finding inadequate information from unnamed informant, with no history of providing accurate tips or sufficient details to infer personal knowledge). The police in this case did not act precipitously but systematically acquired information from a number of reliable sources, over a significant period of time, and corroborated that information through official records and other law enforcement agencies.
I would find that the search in this case did not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and therefore I would reverse the district court's suppression order.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE joins in this dissent.