Court Opinion

ID: 9702692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:21:16.91505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.687130
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. By the sleight-of-hand of reducing the constitutional provision prohibiting suits against the State to a “common-law doctrine” the majority arrogates to itself the authority to set aside the North Dakota Constitution because “that doctrine no longer meets the needs of the time.”
I shudder when I think of how many other Constitutional provisions (protections?) are rooted in “common-law doctrine” and are now subject to being summarily dismissed by the courts as “common-law doctrines” which “no longer meet the needs of the time”, or are, in the opinion of a few judges, “outdated [and] no longer warranted.”
Article I, Section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution straightforwardly gives the Legislature the power to permit suits against the State. I do not analyze all the decisions which hold that sovereign immunity is a part of the North Dakota Constitution and recognize the legislative — not judicial — power to abrogate that immunity. Those decisions, cited in the majority opinion, are neither few in number, obscure, nor ancient. See, e.g., Leadbetter v. Rose, 467 N.W.2d 481 (N.D.1991). Those decisions expressly reject the theory the majority today espouses. Those decisions and their rationale are summarily dismissed under the guise that they “elevated the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity to a constitutional prohibition of suits against the State.” A better characterization is that the electors of this State did so on October 1, 1889, when they adopted the Constitution of North Dakota. The decision of those electors has stood until today, when the majority “judicially abolishes” a provision of the Constitution.
Sovereign immunity may have its roots in the common law. Nothing ordains that a constitution must be brand new theory. Except as an excuse for judges to ignore constitutional provisions they find personally unacceptable, it makes little difference that the provision had its roots in common law. Once it is embedded in our Constitution, its status is the same as any other provision of the North Dakota Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D.1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 1525, 75 L.Ed.2d 948 (1983) [State constitutional provisions have equal standing].
The majority, following the grammatical contortions in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), concludes that the second sentence of Article I, § 9, N.D. Const., “merely authorizes the Legislature to waive or modify that common-law doctrine if it saw fit.” That is indeed a surprise. Are we to now assume that the Legislature has the authority to set aside common-law doctrines or judicially adopted doctrines only when expressly authorized by the Constitution? Such a conclusion is contrary to the separation of powers we have recognized as inherent in our Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Kainz, 321 N.W.2d 478 (N.D.1982) [Legislature has pie-*642nary authority except as limited by the Constitution]. The conclusion that the Constitution must specifically authorize the abrogation of a common-law doctrine is also contrary to reality. See section 1-01-06, NDCC, “[i]n this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Code.”
It seems to me the majority’s rationale is self-defeating. It takes no specific constitutional provision to authorize the Legislature to abrogate the common law. Thus, the reason the second sentence of Article I, § 9, is included is to give immunity to the State, not to authorize the Legislature to abrogate what it already had the authority to abrogate, but for the constitutional immunity provision. Indeed, without the second sentence, the first sentence of section 9 would be a powerful weapon against sovereign immunity notwithstanding our decisions that it eventually establishes the right of access to courts for the redress of wrongs. Andrews v. O’Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D.1986). It is clear that the second sentence of the section is an exception to the first sentence. I suggest that the repeal of the second sentence of section 9 by constitutional amendment would be viewed as repealing sovereign immunity without further action by the judiciary or the Legislature.
Equally ill conceived is the idea that the provision somehow gives both the legislative and judicial branches the authority to abrogate sovereign immunity. See, e.g., State ex rel. Spaeth v. Meiers, 403 N.W.2d 392 (N.D.1987) [creation of three branches of government by State Constitution implies exclusion of each branch from the exercise of the functions of the others].
The flimsy theory upon which the majority relies is perhaps best illustrated by the suggestion in footnote 4, relying on a law review article on the Pennsylvania Constitution, that the use of the sword “suits” in Article I, Section 9, refers to “suits in equity.” I fail to see how, as the majority states, that conclusion has support in North Dakota law. As the majority notes, prior to the adoption of the Constitution in 1889, the Dakota Territory had abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity at least some 27 years earlier in 1862. It is illogical to attribute a stylized meaning to the word “suits” in view of that action.
I agree stare decisis should not perpetuate outmoded judicial doctrines.1 But that agreement has no application to constitutional provisions. The authority of the judiciary does not extend to setting aside an express constitutional provision. Indeed, if there is a place for stare decisis it should be to adhere to well established precedent construing the meaning of a constitutional provision. Stare decisis is of greatest importance where the construction of a provision of the Constitution itself is concerned. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 197. Some courts hold to the contrary because errors in construing the constitution cannot be corrected by the Legislature, only by the court. Id. In this instance, however, the Legislature is specifically authorized to abrogate constitutional immunity. Indeed, for whatever it matters, my personal belief is that the Legislature should allow suits against the State with certain limitations. However, to my knowledge there has been no substantial effort in the Legislature to enact such legislation nor have the electors used their initiative powers under Article III of the North Dakota Constitution, a power which the electors readily use when they feel strongly on an issue, to authorize such actions.
In Dickinson Public School Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 911 (N.D.1988), Justice Meschke, concurring, referred to sovereign immunity as a “hallmark of totalitarianism ... contrary to our constitutions.” If that be so, and I do not understand how the constitution can be contrary to the constitution, even more totalitarian and infinitely more dangerous is an unprincipled judiciary who contrives theories to overrule precedent and set aside constitutional provisions with which it does not agree.
I would affirm the entire judgment of the district court.

. Some might argue that judicial immunity, which, if found in the Constitution, is not nearly as specific as sovereign immunity, might be a better candidate for judicial activism.