Court Opinion

ID: 9733639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:12:40.375792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.791882
License: Public Domain

Reilly, P.J.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from an order of the Oakland Circuit Court denying its motion for summary disposition, MCR 2.116(0(10), of plaintiffs complaint, which alleged wrongful discharge. We reverse.
Plaintiff was hired by defendant in October 1987 as a part-time general contract laborer. In July 1988, plaintiff became a full-time employee, and in *35October 1988, plaintiff was promoted to the position of evening supervisor.
On December 23, 1988, plaintiff and his immediate supervisor were suspended without pay for allegedly misappropriating company funds. However, on January 15, 1989, plaintiff’s immediate supervisor confessed that she, acting alone, misappropriated the funds in question. Despite plaintiff’s exoneration, he was fired on February 16, 1989, on the ground that he allegedly falsified company records.
Plaintiff filed his complaint alleging wrongful discharge on April 11, 1989. Plaintiff claimed he was entitled to be dismissed only for just cause because defendant promulgated a just-cause termination policy in the company handbook.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, inter alia, that plaintiff was an employee with seniority status. Defendant’s employee handbook contained a "discharge arbitration procedure” which stated that "discharge arbitration” was the sole remedy available to employees with seniority status. The arbitration procedure required a discharged regular employee with seniority status to file a grievance with defendant within thirty days after the discharge and a written request for arbitration within thirty days after defendant’s response to the employee’s grievance. Plaintiff did not file a grievance or a written request for arbitration. Thus, defendant argued, it was entitled to summary disposition dismissing plaintiff’s breach of employment contract claims on the ground that plaintiff failed to file a timely demand for arbitration under the mandatory "discharge arbitration” procedure set forth in the employee handbook.
In response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff argued that he never received an employee handbook and was unaware that his *36sole remedy- was arbitration. Defendant responded that plaintiff made explicit and sworn factual statements in his complaint regarding the employee handbook which demonstrated that plaintiff had knowledge of and familiarity with the provisions of the handbook.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition with respect to the breach of employment contract claims in counts i, ii, and m of plaintiffs complaint on the ground that "there are questions of material fact about whether or not plaintiff received the employee handbook.” Defendant appeals from that portion of the trial court’s decision.
A motion for summary disposition premised on MCR 2.116(0(10) tests the factual support for a claim. In ruling on the motion, the trial court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Dumas v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 168 Mich App 619, 626; 425 NW2d 480 (1988). Giving the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party, the test is whether the kind of record which might be developed will leave open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Id. This Court is liberal in finding a genuine issue of material fact. St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Quintana, 165 Mich App 719, 722; 419 NW2d 60 (1988). Nonetheless, where the opposing party fails to come forward with evidence, beyond the allegations or denials in the pleadings, to establish the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted. Morganroth v Whitall, 161 Mich App 785, 788; 411 NW2d 859 (1987); MCR 2.116(G)(4).
Defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10) should have been granted because there is no issue of material fact and *37defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff claims that he was entitled to be dismissed only for just cause because the employer promulgated a just-cause termination policy in the company handbook. Plaintiff was either an employee who could be terminated for just cause only or he was an at-will employee. If the plaintiff is entitled to rely on the handbook to support his claim that he is a just-cause employee rather than an at-will employee, then he must also be bound by the other terms of the just-cause policy in the handbook, i.e., that any claim of termination without just cause must be made by filing a grievance and a request for arbitration. Plaintiff may not claim only the benefits of a stated policy while rejecting the concomitant obligation to file a grievance and request arbitration in order to enforce those benefits.
Plaintiff further argues that he is entitled to the benefits of the company policy as expressed in the handbook, even though he did not receive a copy of the handbook. If plaintiff did not receive a copy of the handbook, and didn’t know its contents, how can he claim he is a just-cause employee? Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980), requires a communication of the policy, not just a subjective expectation. Plaintiff does not claim that the company’s just-cause policy was communicated to him other than through the handbook. He has not offered any basis, other than the handbook, for his claim that he is a just-cause employee. Either he is a just-cause employee because the company communicated that policy to him or he is simply an at-will employee with no remedy for his termination. If he is a just-cause employee, he is bound by the obligations as well as the benefits of that policy. *38The parties agree plaintiff filed neither a grievance nor a request for arbitration. Having failed to pursue his remedy as provided by the company policy, plaintiff cannot now pursue in circuit court a wrongful discharge claim based on that policy.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(0(10).
Doctoroff, J., concurred.