Court Opinion

ID: 9942978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 16:02:05.969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:41.271849
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10332    Document: 69-1      Date Filed: 02/22/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10332
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        CHARLES HYDE,
        a.k.a Chuck,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00005-LGW-BWC-2
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10332

                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Appellant Charles Hyde appeals his convictions for drug and
        firearm-related offenses and the imposition of his 444-month sen-
        tence. Hyde raises several arguments on appeal: (1) that the district
        court erred by finding his waiver of counsel valid; (2) that the dis-
        trict court erred by failing to declare that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and
        (k) violated his Second Amendment rights; (3) that the district court
        erred by constructively amending his superseding indictment, war-
        ranting reversal of his conviction and sentence for brandishing a
        gun in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime; (4) that the evidence
        that he brandished a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
        crime was so insufficient as to render this conviction a manifest
        miscarriage of justice; (5) that the district court erred by sentencing
        him as an armed career criminal; and (6) that the district court
        plainly erred by enhancing his sentence without submitting his
        prior convictions to a jury. Having read the parties’ briefs and re-
        viewed the record, we affirm Hyde’s convictions and sentence.
                                          I.
                We review de novo whether a waiver of the right to counsel
        was knowing and voluntary, which is a mixed question of law and
        fact. United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008) (en
        banc). On appeal, it is the government’s burden to show the valid-
        ity of the waiver. United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir.
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        22-10332               Opinion of the Court                         3

        1995). We have not yet decided whether a Faretta challenge raised
        for the first time on appeal is reviewed de novo or for plain error.
        See United States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1048 n.5 (11th Cir. 2020).
                Under the Sixth Amendment, all criminal defendants are en-
        titled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. To
        waive the right to counsel, the defendant “must clearly and une-
        quivocally assert the right of self-representation,” and this waiver
        must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Owen, 963 F.3d at
        1048 (quotation marks omitted). When a defendant asks to repre-
        sent himself, the district court should ideally hold a hearing pursu-
        ant to Faretta v.California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) to inform him of
        the charges against him, the possible punishments, basic trial pro-
        cedure, and the hazards of self-representation. United States v. Kim-
        ball, 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2002). This hearing allows the dis-
        trict court to determine that the defendant understands the risks of
        self-representation and makes a fully informed choice. Id. “As long
        as the record establishes that the defendant understood the risks of
        self-representation and freely chose to face them, the waiver may
        be valid.” Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049 (quotation marks omitted).
              We consider eight factors in determining whether the de-
        fendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary:
              (1) the defendant’s age, health, and education; (2) the
              defendant’s contact with lawyers prior to trial; (3) the
              defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the charges
              and possible defenses and penalties; (4) the defend-
              ant’s understanding of the rules of evidence,
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10332

               procedure and courtroom decorum; (5) the defend-
               ant’s experience in criminal trials; (6) whether
               standby counsel was appointed and, if so, the extent
               to which standby counsel aided in the trial; (7) any
               mistreatment or coercion of the defendant; and
               (8) whether the defendant was attempting to manip-
               ulate the trial.
        Kimball, 291 F.3d at 730-31. A defendant’s waiver may be valid
        when most of these factors do not weigh in his favor. Id. at 731.
        Importantly, a defendant need not have the skill and experience of
        a lawyer to make a valid waiver. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
                Here, as an initial matter, although Hyde raises a Faretta
        challenge for the first time on appeal, we need not decide whether
        to review the claim de novo or for plain error because his claim fails
        even on de novo review. See Owen, 963 F.3d at 1048 n.5. Based on
        a review of the record and the Faretta inquiry, we conclude that the
        district court did not err in concluding that Hyde’s waiver of coun-
        sel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The magistrate judge
        covered most of the Kimball factors at two hearings, warning Hyde
        of the risks he faced by proceeding without counsel. The magis-
        trate judge informed Hyde of the nature of the charges against him
        by detailing each of the five counts in the superseding indictment;
        he addressed the statutory prison terms for each of the charges; he
        warned Hyde of the dangers of self-representation; and he ques-
        tioned Hyde about his knowledge of basic legal procedures. The
        magistrate judge appointed stand-by counsel, the same counsel
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        22-10332                Opinion of the Court                           5

        who had represented Hyde for 13 months at that time, and after
        Hyde insisted that his waiver was entirely voluntary, the magis-
        trate judge granted his motion to proceed pro se. “As long as the
        record establishes that the defendant understood the risks of self-
        representation and freely chose to face them, the waiver may be
        valid.” United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 645 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (“The ultimate test is not the trial court’s express advice, but rather
        the defendant’s understanding.”).
                The trial court also considered the information provided in
        the psychiatric evaluation requested by defense counsel, which in-
        cluded Hyde’s background and history of substance abuse. In the
        evaluation, Hyde denied any history of mental health symptoms.
        The psychologist concluded that Hyde was able to understand the
        nature and consequences of the criminal proceedings against him
        and assist in his defense and, thus, was competent to stand trial.
        Based on all these factors, the district court granted Hyde’s motion
        to proceed pro se. We conclude, based on this record, that the dis-
        trict court did not err in granting the motion, and we affirm as to
        this issue.
                                              II.
                Hyde argues that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (k) violate his
        Second Amendment rights. Generally, we review de novo the con-
        stitutionality of a statute, as it is a question of law. United States v.
        Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). However, if the issue is
        raised for the first time on appeal, as it is here, we review for plain
        error only. Id. Under plain-error review, we will reverse a district
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10332

        court’s decision only if “there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3)
        that affects substantial rights, and if (4) the error seriously affects
        the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
        United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2017) (quota-
        tion marks omitted). An error is plain if it is clear or obvious—if
        the explicit language of a statute, rule, or precedent from the Su-
        preme Court or this court directly resolves the issue. United States
        v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1085 (11th Cir. 2020).
                Under the prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by our
        prior published decisions unless and until they are overruled or un-
        dermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or this
        court sitting en banc. United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352
        (11th Cir. 2008). “While an intervening decision of the Supreme
        Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the
        Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” Id. (quotation
        marks omitted). “The prior panel precedent rule applies regardless
        of whether the later panel believes the prior panel’s opinion to be
        correct, and there is no exception to the rule where the prior panel
        failed to consider arguments raised before a later panel.” United
        States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Section 922(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits
        anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more
        than one year “to ship or transport in interstate or foreign com-
        merce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammu-
        nition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(k) of Title 18 of the
        United States Code makes it unlawful to “receive . . . any firearm
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        22-10332               Opinion of the Court                        7

        which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number re-
        moved, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped
        or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(k).
                The prior panel precedent rule bars Hyde’s challenge to the
        constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). Our conclusion in Rozier that §
        922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction on a defendant’s Second
        Amendment rights is still binding precedent, and we are bound to
        follow that panel’s decision. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768,
        772 (11th Cir. 2010); Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. Further, Hyde cannot
        establish plain error as to his § 922(k) argument. First, weapons
        with altered or obliterated serial numbers are not usually possessed
        by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and, thus, fall outside
        the protection of the Second Amendment. District of Columbia v.
        Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815-16 (2008). Second,
        neither we nor the Supreme Court have held that § 922(k) is un-
        constitutional under the Second Amendment. Innocent, 977 F.3d at
        1085. Thus, we affirm as to this issue.
                                        III.
               We review de novo whether a district court’s instructions
        constructively amended an indictment. United States v. Gutierrez,
        745 F.3d 463, 473 (11th Cir. 2014). Where a defendant did not ob-
        ject to jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error. United
        States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019). Similarly,
        when a defendant fails to object that the jury instructions
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10332

        constructively amended the indictment, we review for plain error.
        United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013).
               When reviewing a jury instruction for plain error, we will
        reverse only when the error is so fundamental that it results in a
        miscarriage of justice. Gutierrez, 745 F.3d at 471. The instruction
        must be an incorrect statement of law that was “probably respon-
        sible for an incorrect verdict, leading to substantial injustice.”
        Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1332. Finally, when reviewing an alleged con-
        structive amendment, the court’s instructions should be viewed in
        context. United States v. Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1453 (11th Cir. 1996).
               Here, because Hyde did not object at trial to the jury instruc-
        tions on the basis that they constructively amended the indictment,
        we review for plain error. Whyte, 928 F.3d at 1331; Madden, 733
        F.3d at 1322. At trial, the government had to show that Hyde either
        used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking
        crime or possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
        crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Hyde takes issue with the brandish-
        ing element, but the record shows that the government sufficiently
        proved this element, which can be a separate element of either
        method of a § 924 charge. We conclude that any error in the jury
        instruction relating to the wording of the charge was not so funda-
        mental that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. See Gutierrez, 745
        F.3d at 471. Thus, we affirm as to this issue.
                                         IV.
               We generally review de novo a sufficiency of the evidence
        challenge, asking whether a reasonable jury could have found the
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        22-10332               Opinion of the Court                          9

        defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. House,
        684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012). However, if the defendant did
        not move for a judgment of acquittal, or otherwise preserve a suf-
        ficiency of the evidence challenge below, we will only set aside his
        conviction if we find a manifest miscarriage of justice, which exists
        if the evidence on a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a
        conviction would be shocking. Id. Further, we will not upset a
        jury’s decision to credit a witness’s testimony unless in the rare cir-
        cumstance that the testimony is incredible as a matter of law.
        United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting
        that testimony “is incredible if it concerns facts that the witness
        physically could not have possibly observed or events that could
        not have occurred under the laws of nature”) (quotation marks
        omitted). Yet, “when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the
        risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite of his
        testimony is true.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th
        Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted).
               To obtain a conviction under the “in furtherance of” ele-
        ment requires proof that the firearm “helped, furthered, promoted,
        or advanced the drug trafficking.” United States v. Timmons, 283
        F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002). There must be some nexus be-
        tween the firearm and the drug-selling operation. Id. at 1253. Fac-
        tors that we consider include whether the gun is accessible, loaded,
        close in proximity to drugs, and the circumstances surrounding the
        gun’s discovery. Id.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10332

                Here, Hyde does not dispute that he possessed a gun or sold
        drugs, thus the government need only to have proved that Hyde
        brandished his gun to further his drug crimes. 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(c)(1)(A). The record shows that when the officers arrived at
        Hyde’s home, there were numerous weapons in the room where
        Hyde kept the drugs. The handgun Hyde possessed, along with
        another loaded semiautomatic pistol, two loaded magazines, spare
        pistol parts, ammunition, and a bulletproof vest, was in the same
        bedroom as 30 bags of methamphetamine, 4 bags of marijuana, and
        a digital scale. This evidence, along with Hyde’s testimony, was
        sufficient for a jury to determine that Hyde brandished a firearm in
        furtherance of his drug trafficking scheme and was not tenuous
        enough to make his conviction shocking. See House, 684 F.3d at
        1196. Thus, we affirm as to this issue.
                                         V.
               To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant “must raise an
        objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the oppos-
        ing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will
        later be sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th
        Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). However, “once a party has
        preserved an issue, it ‘may make any argument in support of that
        claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made
        below.’” United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1306-07 (11th Cir.
        2019) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534, 112 S. Ct.
        1522, 1532 (1992)).
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        22-10332                Opinion of the Court                         11

                Error that is plain must be “clear under current law” for this
        court to correct it. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.
        Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993). “Clear under current law” means that “at
        least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not spe-
        cifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is
        no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolv-
        ing it.” United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005)
        (quotation marks omitted). Further, we do not assign “preceden-
        tial significance” to grants of certiorari by the Supreme Court. See
        Thompson v. United States, 924 F.3d 1153, 1156 n.4 (11th Cir. 2019).
        Until the Supreme Court issues a decision that changes the law, we
        must follow binding precedent. Id.
               Federal law binds the construction of the Armed Career
        Criminal Act (“ACCA”), and state law governs the analysis of the
        elements of state-law crimes. United States v. Braun, 801 F.3d 1301,
        1303 (11th Cir. 2015). In United States v. Jackson, we held that the
        federal controlled-substances schedules, in effect at the time of a
        previous state conviction, govern whether a conviction qualifies as
        an ACCA predicate. 55 F.4th 846, 856 (11th Cir. 2022).
                Here, as an initial matter, we review the district court’s find-
        ing on this issue for plain error because Hyde’s objection that his
        cocaine charge was dismissed “because of entrapment” did not suf-
        ficiently put the trial court, and the government, on notice that he
        would later appeal his sentence under Jackson. See Straub, 508 F.3d
        at 1011. The record demonstrates that Hyde cannot show that the
        district court plainly erred because he has cited no binding
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10332

        precedent holding that his 2003 Florida cocaine conviction does not
        qualify as an ACCA predicate offense. Instead, Hyde argues that,
        if the Supreme Court overrules Jackson, his 2003 Florida cocaine
        conviction would no longer serve as an ACCA predicate offense.
        Although the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision might
        change our analysis in our earlier panel decision in Jackson, a grant
        of certiorari has no precedential value on this case before us. See
        Thompson, 924 F.3d at 1156 n.4. Thus, we conclude the district
        court did not plainly err in determining that Hyde’s 2003 Florida
        conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. Accordingly,
        we affirm as to this issue.
                                         VI.
               Facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be
        submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne
        v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). But
        the fact of a prior conviction is not an “element” of the crime that
        must be submitted to the jury. Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
        523 U.S. 224, 243-47, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1230-33 (1998); see Alleyne, 570
        U.S. at 111 n.1, 2159-60 n.1 (declining to revisit Almendarez-Torres).
        In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that the government
        need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had
        prior convictions, or allege those prior convictions in the indict-
        ment, to use those convictions to enhance a defendant’s sentence.
        523 U.S. at 243-47, 118 S. Ct. at 1230-33.
              As he concedes, Hyde’s argument is foreclosed by Al-
        mendarez-Torres. We are bound to follow Almendarez-Torres until it
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        22-10332               Opinion of the Court                        13

        is overturned by the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc.
        See Archer, 531 F.3d at 1352. Thus, the district court was entitled to
        apply the ACCA enhancement to Hyde’s sentence based on his
        prior convictions. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27.
              Based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Hyde’s
        convictions and sentence.
              AFFIRMED.