Court Opinion

ID: 9535277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:47:38.136517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:12.611511
License: Public Domain

TUCKETT, Justice:
The defendant was found guilty of the crime of grand larceny in the court below. She appeals to this court from the trial court’s denial of her motions to quash the jury panel and to set aside her conviction.
No question is raised by the defendant concerning the proceedings or rulings of the court during the trial, except as noted above, nor does she contend that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. The sole claim of the defendant here is that the master jury list from which the petit jury was drawn for the trial of her case was improperly selected in violation of the Utah statute, and also in violation of the Constitutions of Utah and of the United States.1
It is the defendant’s contention that the Jury Commission of Weber County which selected and compiled the .master jury list for the year, 1968, failed to comply with the directions set forth in Section 78-46-17, U.C.A.1953, and was 'therefore prejudicial tc her. The record clearly shows that the Jury Commission failed to follow the pro-its selection of the master jury list for that visions of the statute in some respects in *425year. The statute sets out various standards which may he enumerated as follows: (1) To select from the names of the legal voters on the assessment roll of the county a list of names from which the grand and trial jurors shall be drawn to serve in the district court; (2) the Commission shall choose only those who are not exempt from jury service, who are in possession of their faculties, who are not infirm or decrepit, and who are well informed and free from legal exceptions; (3) so far as practicable persons who are not returned on the jury list of the next preceding year; (4) no person should be selected as a juror who is known to be interested in or has a cause pending before the court which may be tried by a jury; and (5) no person who personally or otherwise has solicited his selection on the jury list.
In addition to the foregoing provisions, Section 78-46-18, U.C.A.19S3, provides in part as follows:
* * * Names shall be selected as far as practicable from the several precincts of the county in proportion to the number of votes cast therein. * * *
The defendant contends that the Jury Commission failed to carry out the directions of the statute in the following particulars: (1) The master jury list was limited to those persons who actually voted in the prior general election and whose names appeared on the assessment roll of real property; (2) that the names of those persons who appeared-on the 1967 master jury list whose names were not drawn were placed upon the 1968 jury list; (3) that all areas of Weber County did not have proportional representation on the jury list; and (4) that persons of Spanish-American descent living within the county were grossly under-represented on the jury list.
From the record it would appear that there were deficiencies in the selection of the names to be placed on the master jury list by the Jury Commission. We are of the opinion that the names of those persons on the jury list for the prior year should not have been held over and included in the list for the year 1968. The Jury Commission should not have limited its selection of persons whose names appeared upon the assessment roll of real property, but rather the Commission should have made its selection from the assessment roll of both real and personal property. It should be noted that the Jury Commission did not set about excluding any group from the jury list based upon national origin, economic status, or religious affiliation. However, we are of the opinion that the legislature intended that the master list from which jury panels are drawn should be composed of persons whose names were selected at random from all areas of the county and so far as practicable in proportion to the population of the various areas. It is noted that the statute refers to precincts which the defendant would have us *426construe to mean voting districts. It would appear that the term ‘'precinct” as used in the Constitution and the statute was meant to apply to a political subdivision originally having to do with law enforcement and maintenance of the peace.2 The only elective officers of a precinct are the constable and the justice of the peace. However, the precinct is not synonymous with the voting district, and in fact the precinct may embrace two or more voting districts.
After an extensive hearing in the court below, the court, after reviewing the evidence before it, concluded that the defendant had failed to show that she had been prejudiced by the deficiencies3 in making up the master jury list and accordingly denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. It appears to us that the decision of the court, being based upon competent evidence, should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
• CROCKETT, C. J., and HENRIOD, J., concur. '

. United States Constitution, Amendments YI and XIV. Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 12. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599; Labat v. Bennett, 5 Cir., 365 F.2d 698. 80 Harvard Law Review 33

. Rich v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 511, 15 P.2d 641.

. Meyers et al. v. Second Judicial District Court et al., 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711; State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798.