Court Opinion

ID: 9390015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 18:03:03.264118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:31.066732
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/26/23 P. v. Phillips CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079235

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FVA013693)

 CHRISTY CLINTON PHILLIPS,                                               OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Gregory S. Tavill,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Defendant and appellant Christy Clinton Phillips appeals the San Bernardino

County Superior Court’s denial of her motion made pursuant to Penal Code section 1170

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seeking a second hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, and its denial

of her section 1172.6 petition for resentencing.1 We will affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       In January 2002, when defendant was 16 years old, a jury convicted her of first

degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1) and torture (§ 206, count 2) of an elderly

woman, crimes defendant committed when she was 15. The jury also convicted

defendant of first degree burglary of the victim’s home (§ 459, count 3) and found true

the allegations she used deadly weapons when torturing and murdering the victim

(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced her to 25 years to life for the murder, a

consecutive term of life with the possibility of parole for the torture, and one year for one

of the weapon enhancements. It also imposed and stayed a one-year sentence on the

other enhancement and an upper term of six years for the burglary.

       On March 16, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section

1172.6. Two weeks later, she filed an amended petition (i) seeking resentencing pursuant

to section 1170 because, due to changes to the Penal Code made by Senate Bill 567

(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, eff. Jan. 1, 2022), the trial court was not permitted to impose the

upper term for the burglary conviction, and (ii) requesting a hearing pursuant to People v.

Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin hearing) on the grounds she had been talked

       1  Section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6 without change in the text,
effective June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For the sake of simplicity, we refer
to the provision by its new numbering. All further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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into waiving her appearance at her first Franklin hearing and her counsel’s assistance at

that hearing had been ineffective.

       The trial court denied defendant’s amended petition in a written order. It

explained it was not authorized to entertain resentencing relief for defendant because she

had been convicted and committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation for more than 120 days, and neither the Secretary, the

Board of Parole Hearings, or the district attorney of the county in which she was

convicted had recommended recall and resentencing of previously ordered sentence and

commitment.

       The court also found defendant is not entitled a second section 1203.01 Franklin

evidence preservation hearing. It noted a Franklin hearing had taken place in September

2019, which provided defendant the opportunity to supplement the record with

information relevant to her eventual youth offender parole hearing. Defendant had

waived her personal presence and the court found that, in all events, her lack of

attendance at the hearing did not have legal significance because (i) section 1203.01 does

not contemplate a defendant’s personal presence, and (ii) the hearing, which took place

nearly 20 years after defendant’s conviction, cannot be considered a critical stage of the

proceedings.

       Defendant timely noticed this appeal from the denial of her amended petition and

we appointed appellate counsel to represent her.

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                                       DISCUSSION

       Defendant’s counsel filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25

Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S 738. The brief sets forth

statements of the case and facts, and requests this court to independently review the entire

record on appeal. Counsel also suggests three potentially arguable issues:

       (i) Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for a new Franklin

hearing; (ii) whether the court erred in finding that defendant was not eligible for relief

under subdivision (d)(1) of section 1170; and (iii) whether the categorical exclusion from

resentencing relief violates equal protection.

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which

she has not done.

       Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, before the Supreme

Court’s opinion in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 became final. Because the

opening brief and our notice to defendant referred to Wende, we conducted independent

review of the record on appeal. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106.) We found no

arguable issues.

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                                 DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                               RAMIREZ
                                                         P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
                       J.

FIELDS
                       J.

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