Court Opinion

ID: 9862804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:12:01.955867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:34:49.639217
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The jury assessed punishment at confinement for fifty years after finding an allegation of a prior conviction to be true. Without that enhancement the maximum allowable for the primary offense is twenty years. What makes the situation in which applicant finds himself so troublesome is that the judgment of the prior conviction has since been set aside by the convicting court — just as applicant has been protesting since at least 1981 that it should have been.
The majority points out, however, that appellant (meaning his lawyer) did not object to use of the record of the prior conviction and, perforce, the ultimate opinion of this Court in Hill v. State, 633 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing) dictates that applicant be foreclosed from attacking utilization of that prior conviction. As one who reluctantly acceded to the shift in policy announced in Hill because “if the Court wills it, so be it,” id., at 525, I note that subsequent developments cast much doubt as to extent of its application, thereby implicating validity of its rationale.
Thus when the Tyler Court of Appeals followed Hill in Duplechin v. State, 654 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1983) and precluded an appellant from attacking a conviction used for enhancement on grounds that the indictment was invalid, this Court *513found that the court of appeals erred in concluding that nothing was presented for review, vacated its judgment and remanded the cause for reconsideration on the grounds of error presented. The per cu-riam opinion held that Hill was not controlling since there the contention was that Hill was without counsel at the time of conviction. Duplechin v. State, 652 S.W.2d 957 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Accord: Ex parte White, 659 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) {Hill distinguishable when charging instrument is void so that trial court never acquired jurisdiction). Obviously, already application of Hill had been limited.1
A considerable rationale espoused in Hill for its notion that a contemporaneous objection rule ought to be laid down is twofold: to allow attacks on a current conviction for defects in an old prior conviction “overburdens the courts and tends to lower the quality of justice dispensed by the courts.” Though the former may be imagined — just as the majority did, Hill, supra, at 525 — the latter is such an amorphous proposition that the majority did not even undertake to conjure up support for it. The “quality of justice” dispensed thus far in the instant case belies the proposition: applicant confronts confinement at thirty years more than the law actually allows. If that kind of “justice” does not shock, it must surely unsettle the conscience of all but the most calloused.
Its dubious rationale aside, Hill’s principal vice lies in the breadth of its stated holding, viz:
“Therefore, we hold that the failure to object at trial to the introduction of proof of an allegedly infirm prior conviction precludes a defendant from thereafter attacking a conviction that utilized the prior conviction.” Hill is thus at war with traditional habeas corpus authority. See, e.g., Millard v. State, 587 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). Contrary to Article I, § 12, Constitution of the State of Texas, Hill denies that the Great Writ is one of right and practically suspends it. The form of a contemporaneous objection rule is exalted over the substance of relief from confinement and restraint of liberty.
During the two years following the Hill opinion on rehearing this Court has been moved to “distinguish” it rather than adhere to the change of policy Hill pronounced.
If Hill is not squarely overruled, as it ought to be, at least we should extend the limitations already made as to its applicability. See Duplechin v. State and Ex parte White, both supra. Just as a judgment of conviction entered by a trial court on an invalid indictment is void, so is one rendered on a plea of guilty that is not made intelligently and voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711-1713, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979); see and compare North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-758, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1473-1474, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970).
On original submission we granted applicant the relief for which he prayed, with an opinion written by the author of Hill on rehearing. To a contrary disposition today, I respectfully dissent.

. On the other hand, though a prior judgment for conviction is admittedly invalid (in that the same jury that decided guilt also determined competency to stand trial), a majority of this court invoked Hill to reject a collateral attack on a subsequent assessment of punishment enhanced by the "infirm prior conviction.” Ex parte Ridley, 658 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Characterizing its own result as "paradoxical,” the majority faults "the view that one need not be in custody as a result of a conviction to collaterally attack that conviction” for the consequential effect that, while applicant may collaterally attack the prior infirm judgment in the convicting court that rendered it, "his failure to object to the introduction of this conviction in the subsequent ... case precludes him from obtaining any meaningful relief as a result of today’s action by this Court,” id., at 178, n. 1. The blame, it seems to me now, lies at the feet of Hill.