Court Opinion

ID: 9895531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 18:04:25.837914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:55.118622
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/7/23 P. v. Hernandez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085035
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. VCF342492)
                    v.

    CESAR BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ,                                                             OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Antonio A.
Reyes, Judge.
         William G. Holzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Paul E.
O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Meehan, J. and Snauffer, J.
       Defendant Cesar Benjamin Hernandez was convicted of three counts of lewd and
lascivious conduct with a child and was sentenced to the middle term sentence of six
years. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court violated Penal Code section 11701
by relying on aggravating factors to choose the middle term sentence where the
aggravating factors had not been found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. Defendant
also requests that we dismiss the lesser included offenses in the counts for which he was
acquitted because the jury was discharged without having rendered a verdict as to those
lesser included offenses.2 We remand the case and order the trial court to enter a
judgment of acquittal as to the lesser included offenses in the counts for which defendant
was acquitted but otherwise affirm the judgment.
                             PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The District Attorney of Tulare County filed an amended information on
February 11, 2020, charging defendant with engaging in sexual intercourse or sodomy
with a child 10 years of age or younger (§288.7, subd. (a); counts 1–6), engaging in oral
copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger (§288.7,
subd. (b); counts 7, 19), lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under 14 years of age (§ 288,
subd. (a); counts 8–18, 20, 22, 24), and lewd or lascivious acts by force or fear upon a
child under 14 years of age (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 21, 23).
       The amended information also alleged that defendant had substantial sexual
conduct with a child under the age of 14 years (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)) as to counts 8
through 17, 20, and 21 and the case involved multiple victims, a circumstance pursuant to
section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) of the alternate sentencing scheme known as the

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      Given the issues raised in defendant’s appeal, we will dispense with a recitation of the
underlying facts of defendant’s case.

                                                2.
“One Strike” law (§ 667.61) as to counts 8 through 18 and 20 through 24. Defendant
pleaded not guilty and denied all allegations.
       After a 12-day trial, a jury convicted defendant of three counts of lewd and
lascivious conduct (counts 20, 22, 24), found true that defendant engaged in substantial
sexual conduct as to count 20, but acquitted him of the remaining counts and found not
true the multiple victim allegation.3
       At sentencing, defense counsel requested that all factors in aggravation be stricken
because they had not been found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury and argued that
the trial court had no justification for imposing anything other than the low term. The
trial explained that it would select the middle term sentence because the nature of the
offense was very serious given defendant sexually assaulted a six-year-old child who was
particularly vulnerable and had suffered an emotional injury for 15 years since the crime,
the crime involved planning and sophistication, and defendant took advantage of a
position of trust, which indicates he is a serious danger to society (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(1), (a)(8), (a)(11) & (b)(1)). The court acknowledged defendant’s lack of a
prior record and exemplary conduct subsequent to the crime, noted that he had been
supporting his family and attending church, but concluded that such factors were offset
by the aggravating factors. The trial court further ordered concurrent sentences for
counts 22 and 24 because it had used the factors in aggravation to select the middle term
for count 20.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of six years as to count 20,
and one-third the middle term (two years) as to counts 22 and 24, to be served
concurrently to count 20, for total term of six years. In addition, the trial court ordered
defendant to pay a $350 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a suspended $350 parole

3      The trial court discharged the jury before noticing that the jury did not address any lesser
included offenses for the charges upon which it acquitted defendant.

                                                 3.
revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)), a $350 child abuse prevention
restitution fine (§ 294, subd. (b)), a $300 sexual offender fine (§ 290.3),4 a $120 court
operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a $ 90 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code,
§ 70373). The court ordered victim restitution to remain open (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(2)).
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 29, 2022.
                                         DISCUSSION

I.     The trial court did not err in relying on aggravating factors not proven to the
       jury to select a middle term sentence.
       Defendant argues that section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) should be interpreted to
preclude a trial court’s use of aggravating factors not found by a jury to select between
the low and middle term sentences. The People respond that defendant’s argument is
contrary to the plain language of section 1170, subdivision (b), and we agree.

       A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       We exercise de novo review in addressing this issue of statutory interpretation.
(People v. Brewer (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 457, 461.) “Statutory construction begins
with the plain, commonsense meaning of the words in the statute, ‘ “because it is
generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and purpose.” ’ [Citation.]
‘When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.’ ” (People v. Manzo
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 885 (Manzo) [interpreting the word “at” in section 246, which
penalizes shooting at a motor vehicle; the defendant was standing outside the vehicle, but
the gun was inside an open window].)
       Where the meaning is ambiguous, “ ‘[i]t is appropriate to consider evidence of the
intent of the enacting body in addition to the words of the measure, and to examine the
history and background of the provision, in an attempt to ascertain the most reasonable
interpretation.’ [Citation.] We may also consider extrinsic aids such as the ostensible

4      The abstract of judgment fails to include this fine.

                                                4.
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, and public policy. [Citation.] When
construing a statute, ‘our goal is “ ‘to ascertain the intent of the enacting legislative body
so that we may adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the law.’ ” ’ ”
(Manzo, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 886, first bracketed insertion in original.) The rule of
lenity requires a court to prefer the interpretation that is more favorable to the defendant
only if there is an egregious ambiguity and uncertainty and the court can do no more than
guess what the legislative body intended. (Manzo, at p. 889.)

       B.      Analysis
       Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part as follows: “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms,
the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).)
       Therefore, section 1170, subdivision (b) contemplates that a trial court will weigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances when selecting less than the upper term
without such circumstances having been found by a trier of fact. Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) provides for a presumptive lower term sentence if certain
circumstances contributed to the commission of the crime “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”5 Once again, the statute does

5      Prior to 2007, former section 1170, subdivision (b) set the middle term as the
presumptive prison term but authorized the trial court to impose the upper term if it found
circumstances in aggravation by a preponderance of evidence. (See Stats. 2004, ch. 747, § 1.) In

                                               5.
not require the circumstances used by the trial court for this decision to be proven to a
trier of fact based upon a certain standard of proof.
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(4) further provides that: “[E]ither party or the
victim, or the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, may submit a statement in
aggravation or mitigation to dispute facts in the record or the probation officer’s report,
or to present additional facts. The court may consider the record in the case, the
probation officer’s report, other reports, including reports received pursuant to Section
1203.03, and statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution, the
defendant, or the victim, or the family of the victim if the victim is deceased, and any
further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” Therefore, for sentencing
decisions other than a justification for the upper term, section 1170, subdivision (b)
clearly contemplates that the trial court will rely upon information from multiple services
that have not been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of fact based upon a
particular standard of proof.
       As defendant concedes, section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) requires only aggravating
factors to be supported by true findings beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulations, if the
upper term is imposed and “[t]he plain text suggests that this requirement only applies to
upper term sentences.” Defendant also recognizes that the Advisory Committee
comment, California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 states that the “ ‘requirements do not
apply to consideration of aggravating factors for the lower or middle term.’ ” “ ‘When
the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further.’ ” (Manzo, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 885.) Because the statute clearly provides that only aggravating factors used to

2007, the United States Supreme Court determined this sentencing scheme was unconstitutional
because any fact other than a prior conviction that exposes a defendant to a greater potential
sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cunningham v.
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.) In response, the Legislature amended section 1170,
subdivision (b) to eliminate the presumption for the middle term and to instead provide that “the
choice of the appropriate term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.” (Stats. 2007,
ch. 3, § 2, p. 5, eff. Mar. 30, 2007.)

                                                6.
sentence a defendant to an upper term need be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt and permits a court to use aggravating circumstances without being proven in
making other sentencing decisions, the plain text of the statute controls and we need not
examine the statute further.
       Defendant argues, that “this interpretation lends itself to absurd results that
conflict with the Legislature’s policy objectives.” “[A] fundamental principle of statutory
construction is that the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if
doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.”
(People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 927.) We agree with the People that the
legislative requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b) were intended to comport with
the United States Supreme Court’s and our Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence and do not lead to absurd results. The United States Supreme Court in
Cunningham explained that California could retain section 1170 without encountering a
Sixth Amendment violation by either (1) “calling upon the jury … to find any fact
necessary to the imposition of an elevated sentence” or (2) allowing judges to exercise
“ ‘broad discretion … within a statutory range.’ ” (Cunningham v. California, supra,
549 U.S. at p. 294.) Section 1170 reflects that the Legislature heeded the United States
Supreme Court’s guidance.
       We are also mindful of our “limited role in the process of interpreting enactments
from the political branches of our state government. In interpreting statutes, we follow
the Legislature’s intent, as exhibited by the plain meaning of the actual words of the law,
“ ‘ “whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act.” ’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9.) Section 1170, subdivision (b) complies with
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, but whether Sixth Amendment protections should also
be extended to a trial court’s discretion to sentence a defendant to a term within the
maximum sentence permitted by a jury’s guilty verdict is a matter of “policy not for this
court but for the Legislature. That body is entrusted with the task of enacting the laws for

                                              7.
our state, and, in performing that responsibility, considers the reasons or the need for a
particular statute. Our task is limited to interpreting the Legislature’s enactments, and we
have done so here.” (People v. Evans (2008) 44 Cal.4th 590, 599.)

II.    Defendant is entitled to a judgment of acquittal as to the lesser included
       offenses in the counts for which the jury acquitted him.

       A.      Background
       The jury acquitted defendant of all but three counts but failed to indicate any
verdict for the lesser included offenses in the counts for which it acquitted him. The trial
court discharged the jury before noticing that the jury’s verdict form failed to indicate any
verdict as to these lesser included offenses.6 Defendant argues that he is entitled to a
judgment of acquittal or dismissal as to the lesser included offenses for which the jury
failed to reach a verdict. The People concede that the lesser included charges cannot be
retried, and we agree that the trial court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to these
charges.

       B.      Applicable Law
       “The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution provide that a person
may not be twice placed ‘in jeopardy’ for the ‘same offense.’ ‘The double jeopardy bar
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or
conviction, and also protects against multiple punishment for the same offense.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] Although some differences in application arise, both federal and

6       The trial court instructed the jury as to the following lesser included offenses: attempted
commission of a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years of age (§§ 21a, 288;
counts 8–18, 20–24); attempted sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger
(§§ 21a, 288.7, subd. (b); count 19); battery (§ 242; counts 1–24); and assault (§ 240; counts 1–
24). The trial court further instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3517, which provided that
the jury should determine guilt on the lesser included offenses if it found defendant not guilty of
the greater offenses and to indicate their findings of guilty or not guilty as to the lesser included
offenses on the verdict form.

                                                  8.
California law generally treat greater and lesser included offenses as the ‘same offense’
for purposes of double jeopardy.” (People v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 103–104,
first bracketed insertion in original.) “ ‘The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.’ [Citation.] The
same is true when a conviction is reversed or set aside because of insufficient evidence.
[Citations.] The United States Supreme Court has held that an acquittal barring a second
prosecution may be implied where a jury convicts on a lesser included offense after
having ‘ “a full opportunity to return a verdict” ’ on the greater charge [citations], and
California law has long recognized that such an ‘implied acquittal’ bars retrial.” (Id. at
p. 104, third bracketed insertion in original.) “In general, if a jury is discharged without
returning a verdict, the double jeopardy bar applies unless manifest necessity required the
discharge, or the defendant consented to it.” (Ibid.)
       Section 1140 provides that “[e]xcept as provided by law, the jury cannot be
discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict
and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes,
or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily
appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.”
       “In California, legal necessity for a mistrial typically arises from an inability of the
jury to agree (Pen. Code, § 1140; [citation]) or from physical causes beyond the control
of the court (Pen.Code, § 1141; [citation]), such as the death, illness, or absence of judge
or juror (Pen.Code, §§ 1123, 1147; [citations]), or of the defendant (Pen.Code, § 1043;
[citation]). A mere error of law or procedure, however, does not constitute legal
necessity.” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713–714.)

       C.     Analysis
       In the instant case, the record establishes that the jury acquitted defendant on all
but three counts but did not return verdicts as to the lesser included offenses in the

                                              9.
acquitted counts. Neither the parties nor the trial court noticed the deficiency in the
verdict until after the jury had been discharged. Therefore, the trial court made no
finding as to whether the jury had been unable to agree on a disposition of the lesser
included offenses nor whether there was any reasonable probability as to whether the jury
could agree. The trial court’s discharge of the jury without ascertaining whether it had
been unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offenses is a mere error of law or
procedure that does not establish legal necessity for a mistrial, and no mistrial was
declared in any event. As our Supreme Court has recognized, “[o]nce jeopardy has
attached, discharge of the jury without a verdict is tantamount to an acquittal and
prevents a retrial” where a defendant has not consented to the jury’s discharge or legal
necessity did not require it. (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 516,
abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1086.)
       Therefore, we agree that double jeopardy prohibits retrying defendant on the lesser
included offenses in the counts for which he has been acquitted.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The trial court is directed to enter a judgment of acquittal as to the following:
(1) as to counts 1 through 7—battery (§ 242) and simple assault (§ 240); (2) as to counts
8 through 18, 21, and 23—attempted commission of a lewd and lascivious act on a child
under 14 years of age (§§ 21a, 288), battery (§ 242), and simple assault (§ 240); and
(3) as to count 19—attempted sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger
(§§ 21a, 288.7, subd. (b)), battery (§ 242), and simple assault (§ 240). The trial court is
further directed to amend the abstract of judgment to include the trial court’s order that
defendant pay a $300 sexual offender fine (§ 290.3) and forward the amended abstract of
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
       In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                             10.