Court Opinion

ID: 9802877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 15:01:14.518163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:48.609195
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13405      Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 08/31/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-13405
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        GREGORY JACK ALMOND,
        TERESA ROBERTS ALMOND,
                                                        Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,
        versus
        KEVIN WALKER,
        Deputy Sheriﬀ, in his individual capacity,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13405

                      D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00175-RAH-KFP
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               After police entered Gregory and Teresa Almond’s home in
        search of drugs, the Almonds sued. They brought many claims
        against many defendants, but only a narrow part of one claim is
        before this Court: Officer Kevin Walker’s appeal of the denial of
        summary judgment for a claim alleging that he violated the
        Almonds’ Fourth Amendment rights. We affirm the district court’s
        denial of summary judgment.
                                              I.
               On January 31, 2018, Randolph County Deputy Sheriﬀ
        Nathaniel Morrow went to the Almonds’ home to serve civil
        papers. 1 He claimed to have smelled unsmoked marijuana, and he
        relayed that information to members of the Randolph County
        Narcotics Unit, including Walker.
              The Narcotics Unit then sought a search warrant to enter
        the Almonds’ home. None of the members of the Narcotics Unit
        claimed to have obtained a written search warrant prior to

        1 Because we write only for the parties’ benefit, we describe only those

        portions of the facts and procedural history that are necessary to resolve this
        appeal and assume the parties’ basic familiarity with the undisputed elements
        of the qualified immunity analysis.
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        22-13405               Opinion of the Court                        3

        searching the Almonds’ home. Instead, the oﬃcers testiﬁed that
        Walker said he obtained a telephonic search warrant from
        Randolph County District Judge Amy Newsome. Walker himself
        testiﬁed that Judge Newsome said he had enough for a search
        warrant and that from “past experiences” he thought he had a
        telephonic search warrant, but that he did not speciﬁcally
        remember her stating that she was issuing him a search warrant.
        In a deposition, Judge Newsome said she did not recall this phone
        call, but she acknowledged that it’s possible that the call occurred,
        and even that it’s possible that she told him that he had suﬃcient
        probable cause to get a search warrant. That said, she emphatically
        denied having issued Walker a search warrant—or, for that matter,
        having ever issued a telephonic search warrant. At some point,
        Walker received a paper warrant from Judge Newsome, but some
        documents suggest it was obtained on the day of the search, while
        others suggest it was days later.
               Based on what they claim to have believed was a telephonic
        search warrant from Judge Newsome, the Narcotics Unit searched
        the Almonds’ home. The oﬃcers found marijuana, and charges
        were brought against the Almonds. These charges, however, were
        ultimately dismissed on the prosecution’s motion.
               The Almonds brought this lawsuit. Their now-operative
        third amended complaint includes a § 1983 claim against Walker
        for “Illegal Search and Seizure in Violation of the Fourth
        Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Prior to discovery,
        the Almonds appear to have believed that the search of their home
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13405

        was pursuant to a telephonic warrant; the “factual background”
        section of their complaint alleges that “[b]ased on Deputy
        Morrow’s alleged smell, a search warrant was obtained via
        telephone.” Even so, they qualiﬁed this statement in the body of
        their Fourth Amendment claim against Walker, which conceded
        that the defendants “claim to have obtained a search warrant
        telephonically prior to the raid” but also alleged that there was “no
        recorded transcript of a warrant being issued” and that the
        defendants had no “signed warrant or copy of any warrant at the
        time of the raid.”
              After discovery, Walker moved for summary judgment.
        Relying on information revealed in the depositions of Judge
        Newsome and the oﬃcers, the Almonds responded by explicitly
        arguing for the ﬁrst time that Walker never received a search
        warrant. But they never moved to amend their complaint to
        remove the statement that “a search warrant was obtained” or to
        more explicitly allege that the search of their home was
        warrantless. Walker cried foul, saying that the plaintiﬀs were
        contradicting the allegations in their own complaint and
        impermissibly seeking to amend their complaint through their
        opposition to his summary judgment motion. He also argued that
        he was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity either way.
               As to the Almonds’ Fourth Amendment claim, the district
        court denied Walker’s motion for summary judgment. It reasoned
        that the Almonds’ argument that there was no warrant was
        procedurally appropriate because they never changed the nature of
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        22-13405               Opinion of the Court                        5

        their claim, and that refusing to consider evidence that arose during
        discovery would be “single-sighted literalism.” On the merits, it
        determined that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
        whether there was a paper warrant prior to the search, that the
        existence of a telephonic warrant was not supported by the record,
        that neither the good-faith reliance exception nor the exigent
        circumstances exception applied, and that Walker was not entitled
        to qualiﬁed immunity. Walker appealed.
                                         II.
               Because Walker’s arguments that he was entitled to
        summary judgment go beyond the suﬃciency of the evidence, we
        have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial
        of qualiﬁed immunity. See English v. City of Gainesville, 72 F.4th
        1151, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 2023). We review orders denying qualiﬁed
        immunity at summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in
        favor of the non-moving party. Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274,
        1297 (11th Cir. 2022).
                                        III.
               As before the district court, Walker makes both a procedural
        and a merits argument. He ﬁrst argues that the district court erred
        by considering the possibility that he may not have had a warrant
        at all when the operative complaint alleged that the search was
        pursuant to a procedurally defective warrant. He then argues that,
        in any event, he was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity. We reject both
        arguments.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13405

                                          A.
               We begin with Walker’s procedural argument. He does not
        go so far as to argue that the Almonds are completely barred from
        contradicting their operative complaint in an opposition to
        summary judgment. Instead, he makes the narrower claim that
        “only claims and theories of liability that are actually pleaded in the
        complaint can be considered by the district courts and this Court.”
               His best case is Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir. 2017).
        Dukes brought a claim against an oﬃcer under a theory of
        supervisory liability for a Fourth Amendment violation primarily
        committed by the oﬃcer’s subordinate. Id. at 1045–46. In her
        complaint, Dukes alleged that the superior oﬃcer failed to train his
        employee, but at summary judgment, she introduced a new theory
        that the supervising oﬃcer also personally participated in the
        violation. Id. at 1046. We held that Dukes’s attempt to rely on an
        “alternative theory of supervisory liability” was “an improper
        attempt to amend her complaint.” Id.
               But the facts of this case are distinguishable from Dukes.
        That case’s holding was an application of the longstanding
        principle that a plaintiﬀ cannot introduce a new claim in a response
        to a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Gilmour v. Gates,
        McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004). In Dukes, the
        theories of liability—one based on a failure to train, and one based
        on personal participation in a tort—were fundamentally diﬀerent
        in kind, turning on a completely diﬀerent set of alleged facts.
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        22-13405               Opinion of the Court                        7

        Accordingly, it made sense to treat the two as if they were stating
        entirely distinct claims.
                In contrast, we agree with the district court that the nature
        of the Almonds’ claim against Walker did not fundamentally
        change. The Almonds consistently alleged that Walker violated
        their Fourth Amendment rights by entering their home
        unreasonably. To be sure, their claim became substantially
        stronger after discovery revealed a genuine dispute of material fact
        about whether a warrant existed. But it did not fundamentally shift
        their basic legal allegations against Walker. Indeed, the actual
        count of the Fourth Amendment claim against Walker—which
        does not even incorporate the background facts section—is
        consistent with both a theory that Walker’s warrant was not
        supported by probable cause and a theory that he had no warrant
        at all. The only ground on which we could possibly justify ignoring
        the evidence that there was no warrant is the stray reference to a
        warrant being obtained in the background facts section of the
        complaint. That goes well beyond Dukes, and we agree with the
        district court that it would amount to pointless literalism. So, like
        the district court, we will not close our eyes to evidence in the
        record that there may not have been a warrant prior to the search.
                                         B.
               On the merits, Walker’s appellate brieﬁng exclusively argues
        that he was entitled to qualiﬁed immunity because the good-faith
        reliance exception applied in light of his belief that Judge Newsome
        had given him a telephonic warrant. He insists that, regardless of
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13405

        whether there was a telephonic warrant, his belief that there was
        one was reasonable and in good faith.
                The fundamental ﬂaw with Walker’s argument is that it fails
        to apply the summary judgment standard. Walker asserts that he
        reasonably believed that he had a valid telephonic warrant. But at
        this stage in the litigation, we must make all reasonable inferences
        about what was said in any phone call between Walker and Judge
        Newsome against Walker. Doing so, a reasonable factﬁnder could
        make factual ﬁndings that require judgment against Walker in at
        least two distinct ways.
               First and most straightforwardly, a reasonable factﬁnder
        could simply disbelieve Walker’s statement that he thought he had
        a search warrant. If so, then Walker would be liable because he
        knowingly entered a home without a warrant, a good-faith belief
        that he had a warrant, or exigent circumstances—something that
        no one contends is protected by the good-faith reliance exception
        or qualiﬁed immunity. See, e.g., Hartsﬁeld v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950,
        954–55 (11th Cir. 1995). So on that ground alone, summary
        judgment for Walker is inappropriate at this stage in the
        proceedings.
               Additionally, a reasonable factﬁnder could conclude that,
        even if Walker had a good-faith belief that he had a valid warrant,
        that belief was objectively unreasonable. After all, Judge Newsome
        emphatically denied issuing a telephonic search warrant, Walker
        himself testiﬁed that he did not recall being explicitly told he had a
        warrant, and the record suggests that Walker took no steps
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        22-13405              Opinion of the Court                        9

        resembling Alabama’s procedures for receiving a telephonic search
        warrant. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 3.8(b). Indeed, Walker even says that
        he may have been systematically ignorant of the proper procedures
        for receiving telephonic warrants. But if that is true, a reasonable
        factﬁnder could certainly conclude that such disregard of a basic
        element of an oﬃcer’s constitutional duties was unreasonable.
               In that case, then —notwithstanding his good-faith belief
        that he had a valid warrant—Walker still would not be protected
        by the good-faith reliance exception. Even assuming (without
        deciding) that the good-faith reliance exception can ever apply when
        no warrant actually exists, the exception does not apply when a
        warrant is “so facially deﬁcient” that “the executing oﬃcers cannot
        reasonably presume it to be valid.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
        897, 923 (1984). So if the factﬁnder determines that, given the
        discrepancies between the phone call with Judge Newsome and the
        Alabama state procedures for telephonic warrants, the phone call
        was so far removed from a proper telephonic warrant that no
        reasonable oﬃcer could have presumed a valid warrant existed,
        then Leon would bar the application of the good-faith reliance
        exception, regardless of Walker’s subjective mental state.
                As should go without saying, if the good-faith reliance
        exception does not apply because Walker’s beliefs were objectively
        unreasonable, then any “good-faith” belief Walker may have had
        was legally irrelevant. Accordingly, the qualiﬁed immunity analysis
        is the same if the factﬁnder determines that Walker unreasonably
        believed that he had a warrant as if it determines that Walker did
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        10                   Opinion of the Court               22-13405

        not believe he had a warrant at all. In both cases, it is clearly
        established that an unreasonable, warrantless search of the home
        without exigent circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment.
        See Hartsﬁeld, 50 F.3d at 954–55.
                                 *     *      *
              At this stage of the proceedings, Walker is not entitled to
        qualiﬁed immunity. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of his
        motion for summary judgment.