Court Opinion

ID: 9675425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:53:10.643386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:34.432435
License: Public Domain

HOLLINGSWORTH, J.
(concurring).
I concur in the result of the opinion of Lozier, C., because it is a step in the right direction and because, for reasons hereinafter stated, it probably is as far as we can go under present statutory provisions for the disposition of persons acquitted of criminal charges on the ground of insanity.
But, I think it is still wrong, morally wrong, to'require an insane person to establish his innocence on that ground by a preponderance of the evidence. To so require violates a basic concept of American and English jurisprudence: the presumption of the innocence of every person charged with crime. This is no mere procedural presumption. It is substantive, basic; there is no exception. We give great voice to its guaranty. No case is ever submitted, none could lawfully be submitted, without a charge that the defendant in law is presumed to be innocent and the state must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be found guilty. Now, everyone knows that when a legally insane person, that is, one who, because of insanity, does not know it is wrong to do an otherwise criminal act, yet, nevertheless, does it, no crime has been committed. Yet, under the law as stated in said opinion, and a multitude of others, every such person is required to prove by at least a preponderance of the evidence the fact that no crime has been committed; else, he will be punished as though it had. In the meantime, what has become of the presumption of innocence? Gan there be greater inconsistency?
I would not abolish the presumption of sanity. But it is a procedural presumption only. When there is evidence of insanity, the presumption takes flight. Neither would I abolish the requirement that insanity be an affirmative defense. A plea of self-defense is an affirmative defense. It must be raised and supported *790by evidence at some stage of the trial. So, likewise, is' a plea of insanity. But, in the instance of self-defense, the defendant is required only to create in the mind of the jury a reasonable doubt to authorize an acquittal on that ground. I can see no justification for placing a greater burden on an insane person to absolve himself from a charge of crime on that ground than is placed on a sane person to free himself from a charge of crime on the ground of self-defense. And, as every person experienced in weighing testimony so well knows, there is a very appreciable difference in the degree of proof that raises a reasonable doubt and the degree of proof that convinces by a preponderance of the evidence. '
This is written with the thought that Section 546.510, Mo. R. S. 1949, makes it impossible to adopt the rule for which [603] I contend. This section requires a jury that has acquitted a defendant on the sole ground of insanity to further determine whether he has recovered from his insanity and that if he has not so recovered then it provides for his commitment to a,state hospital. No procedure is prescribed for the disposition of a person acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt of his sanity. It is, therefore, clearly implied that a person is not to be acquitted on the ground of insanity unless factually found to he insane. But, procedural statutes have been changed 'when they were found to defeat the enforcement of a substantive right.
I will not further pursue the matter. It was ably discussed by Ellison, J., in State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S. W. 2d 103. I commend a study of his analysis.