Court Opinion

ID: 9670760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:25:18.558492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.358101
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting in both cases). The prosecution argues that the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to hear prosecutorial appeals is governed by Const 1963, art 6, §10; MCL 600.308; MSA *43527A.308 (RJA § 308), and GCR 1963, 806.2(2), notwithstanding the provisions of MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109.1 agree.
It is clear that this Court has judicially interpreted the jurisdiction of the Michigan Court of Appeals to include appeals by prosecuting attorneys in matters such as those raised in the instant case. See, e.g., People v Pummer, 399 Mich 326; 249 NW2d 78 (1976); People v Blachura, 390 Mich 326; 212 NW2d 182 (1973). These decisions recognized that "there should remain little question that appeals by the prosecutor, like those of all other litigants, are governed by MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308, and rules formulated by our Court”. People v Pummer, supra, p 331.
I reject the argument that the legislative revision of either MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109, effectuated by 1977 PA 34, or MCL 770.3; MSA 28.1100, effectuated by 1980 PA 506, was intended to restrict the authority of this Court to promulgate and implement rules governing appellate practice and procedure for Michigan courts, or to resurrect limitations on the people’s right of appeal previously rejected by this Court.
The 1977 amendments of the Code of Criminal Procedure were part of a legislative effort to limit the right to post-conviction bond. In response to several "[w]ell publicized incidents in which a person convicted of a violent crime commit[ted] another serious crime while out on bail during appeal”,1 § 9a was added for the expressed pur*436poses of denying post-conviction bail to "defendants who have been convicted of an assaultive felony, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that these defendants are unlikely to pose a danger to others” and providing "for an expedited appeal of those defendants not admitted to bond”.2
The addition of § 9a to the statutory scheme necessitated amendment of other bail statutes to achieve conformity. Thus, § 12, which granted a right to bail upon appeal of the state, was amended to include reference to § 9a. The only other changes involved perfunctory substitution of "appeal” for the obsolete term "writ of error” and deletion of reference to "the Supreme Court” and substitution of the phrase "the court to which the appeal is taken”, in recognition of the creation of the Court of Appeals.
Interdepartmental legislative analyses indicate that the effect of the bail provisions was the exclusive focus of the 1977 amendments.3 Examination of the legislative history of this act reveals that there was no discussion of effect upon the appellate rights of the people.4 Indeed, the proposed bill was endorsed and supported by the Attorney General, the District Judges’ Association Legislative Committee, the Michigan Sheriffs’ Association, the *437Michigan State Bar, and the Michigan State Police.5
Analysis of legislative history also supports the argument that the 1980 amendment of MCL 770.3; MSA 28.1100 should not be interpreted as a legislative declaration of limitation upon the appellate rights of the people. The Michigan Law Revision Commission, in recommending the amendment, emphasized that the amendment merely "restates current law” and was intended to make "primarily technical changes” which included "remov[ing] references to abolished courts”, deletion of "clearly unconstitutional provisions”, "refining of current cross-references in the Code (see, e.g., MCL 770.12)”6 and updating "to take account of the current appellate structure”, to make provisions on appeal "consistent with the Court Rules” governing appeals.7 These documents reveal that the sponsors of the bill were emphatic that it was a "technical bill only” and that it was "not intended to” and indeed, "the representatives at the Legislature insisted that it must not, change * * * nor induce any procedural changes other than those required by presently existing legislation, court rules, and Supreme Court decisions, both Michigan and federal”.8 This technical revision was originally proposed in the 1975 annual report of the Michigan Law Revision Commission and was based on a committee draft prepared and included in its 1978 report. The "current state of the law” at those times accorded the people a broad right of appeal. There is simply no basis for concluding *438that the Legislature intended to alter that right by its "technical amendments” to the Code of Criminal Procedure.9
The majority’s reliance on the re-enactment of § 12 and revision of § 3 as indicative of legislative intention to limit the people’s right to appeal is misplaced. The majority fails to recognize that the Legislature also amended, clarified, and re-enacted the broad statutory jurisdictional provisions of § 308 after its 1980 amendments to § 3. 1981 PA 206, § 1, effective June 1, 1982 (amending MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308).10 Like its predecessor, the 1981 version of § 308 contains no language even suggesting that there are any special limitations upon the appellate rights of the people.
Correct application of well-recognized principles of statutory construction supports the conclusion that MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308 provides an independent basis for Court of Appeals jurisdiction to hear appeals brought by the people. These principles are summarized in Pryber v Marriott Corp, 98 Mich App 50, 56; 296 NW2d 597 (1980), which stated:
*439"Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same thing or which have a common purpose. * * * Where two statutes are in pari materia and are in irreconcilable conflict, the one last enacted will control or be regarded as an exception to or qualification of the earlier statute.”
The majority applied these principles correctly, but based its analysis upon the erroneous premise that the 1977 and 1980 amendments were the latest expression of legislative intent. If the provisions of §§ 3, 12, and 308 are construed to be in pari materia and in irreconcilable conflict, as the majority implies, then the last one enacted, the 1981 version of § 308, will control. However, this Court has already applied these principles to make the determination that MCL 770.12; MSA 28.1109, did not irreconcilably conflict with the more recently enacted MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308. People v Blachura, supra, pp 334-335. Thus, under either interpretation, if MCL 770.12 does anything, it may represent a grant of jurisdiction with respect to certain matters. There is absolutely no basis for interpreting the more specific provisions of this previously enacted statute as precluding an independent basis for appellate jurisdiction in another more recent statutory provision.
I do not suggest that a prosecutor has a right to appeal where a defendant has been placed in jeopardy by the decision below, or where there is no "final judgment” from which to appeal under MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308. However, neither of those limitations bar the appeals here at issue.
In Robinson, the appeal was taken from a mid-trial ruling dismissing the case on the basis of entrapment, an objective determination that public policy was offended by police instigation of the *440offense. Defendant suffers no double jeopardy injury where he obtains, at his own request, a favorable ruling on an issue unrelated to factual guilt or innocence and the government is then permitted to appeal that ruling. United States v Scott, 437 US 82; 98 S Ct 2187; 57 L Ed 2d 65 (1977). In Cooke, the state sought to appeal a post-trial ruling on the sufficiency of evidence that resulted in overturning a guilty verdict rendered by a jury. Reversal of such a ruling on appeal would not require retrial and, therefore, would not subject the defendant to the risk of being placed twice in jeopardy. United States v Wilson, 420 US 332; 95 S Ct 1013; 43 L Ed 2d 232 (1975). Both judgments were final and, therefore, appealable under MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308. Finding no statutory or constitutional bar to the bringing of these appeals, I would remand both cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration on the merits.

 House Legislative Analysis Section Bill Analysis — HB 4024, May 5, 1977.
See also Department of State Police Bill Analysis — HB 4024, from George L. Halverson, director, to Governor William G. Milliken, March 10, 1977, which stated:
"It is becoming quite common for defendants to commit crimes while on bond, perhaps the rationale behind these acts is that they have little to lose and much to gain monetarily. An example of this is *436a bank robbery which occurred in Ypsilanti, during which a police officer was shot and killed. One of the perpetrators was apprehended the next day in court, where he was being tried on a concealed weapons charge.”

 Department of Management and Budget, Office of Criminal Justice Programs Bill Analysis — HB 4024, from Noel C. Bufe to William G. Milliken, April 4, 1977. See also Department of Attorney General Bill Analysis — HB 4024, from Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, to Executive Office, July 15, 1977.

 References to HB 4024 can be found at 1977 Journal of the House, pp 93, 109, 1041, 1059, 1091, 1518, 1527; 1977 Journal of the Senate, pp 670, 671, 802, 860, 871.

 See bill analyses referred to in fns 1 and 2.

 See bill analyses referred to in fns 1 and 2.

 House analysis of HB 5315, February 27,1981, 1978 report.

 Michigan Law Revision Commission, 1978 Annual Report.

 Letter from the Honorable John T. Hammond, Chairperson, Criminal Law Section Council, to Michael Franck, Executive Director, State Bar of Michigan, dated March 24,1980, re HB 5315.

 It is also significant that the commission made extensive reference to MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308 (RJA § 308) and the court rules, GCR 1963, 806.2(2) in its discussion of the law governing appeals in criminal cases. Michigan Law Revision Commission, Thirteenth Annual Report (1978).
"Comment on Section 3 [770.3], This provision restates current law governing appeals in criminal cases. MCL 770.3-770.7 spell out a procedure for review that has been inapplicable since the creation of a court of appeals in 1964. New section 3 will replace those provisions. Subsection 1(a) is taken from GCR 801.3, 803.1, 806.1. See also MCL 600.308(1). Subsection 1(b) is taken from GCR 701, 701.3(1). Subsection 1(c) merely makes a cross-reference to the provisions on appeal by trial de novo in Chapter 14. See also GCR 806. Subsection (2) follows GCR 801.3(2), 803.2, 806.2(5). See also MCL 600.308(2), 600.8342. Subsection (3) follows GCR 803.3, 701.2. Subsection (4) follows GCR 801.3(1). Subsection (5) also follows GCR 853. Subsection (5) provides a cross-reference to the Supreme Court Rules, evidencing the purpose of the amendment to incorporate the rule provisions.” Id., p 86.

 The full text of both the original and revised versions of this statute is set forth at fn 7 of the majority opinion.