Court Opinion

ID: 9790100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:46:08.146357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:26.082807
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I concur in the judgment.
The trial court in this death penalty case took the understandable position that, because of the serious nature of the charges facing defendant, he should not be permitted to represent himself. Such a solicitous approach, however, evidently violated Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525], which limits the trial court’s inquiry to the issue whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and was “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . .” (P. 835 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582].) It is not, however, essential that defendant be competent to serve as counsel in a criminal case. (P. 836 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 582].) It is enough that he intelligently waive his right to an attorney and that he understand the risks. This formulation may be dubious but it is the law, even in a capital case. (See ibid.; People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 113 [151 Cal.Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773]; Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891 [144 Cal.Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93].) The record herein indicates that defendant was competent to waive his right to counsel and that he understood the consequences of his awesome decision.
Could an erroneous denial of defendant’s self-representation right ever be deemed a harmless error? The majority concludes not, holding that an improper denial of a Faretta right is reversible per se. I acknowledge that several state and federal cases (cited by the majority) so hold. Nevertheless, I observe that the United States Supreme Court has not yet expressly decided the point (see Faretta, supra, at p. 852 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp.591-592] [dis. opn. of Blackmun, J.]).
It is certainly arguable that a harmless error standard should be employed in some cases. If, for example, the record demonstrated that the defendant *951was adequately represented by competent counsel, that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and that no tactical conflicts arose between attorney and client, we might well conclude that denial of self-representation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; cf. Wiggins v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 266, 273-274 [applying a harmless error standard where the appointment of assistant counsel interfered with defendant’s self-representation right]).
Accordingly, although I concur in the present judgment, I do so with considerable reservations regarding the appropriate harmless error standard, and I await further instruction on the point from the high court which originated the Faretta principle.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 22, 1983.