Court Opinion

ID: 9735716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:28:33.937241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.713830
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Bell:
The majority opinion, it seems to me, makes a mockery of four well established legal principles — (1) a store is not an insurer; (2) plaintiff has the burden of proving that defendant had actual notice of the dangerous condition or that it existed for such a length of time that defendant had constructive notice of it, i.e., could and should have discovered and remedied it by the exercise of reasonable inspection and reasonable care: Parker v. McCrory Stores, 376 Pa. 122, 101 A. 2d 377; Sheridan v. Horn & Hardart, 366 Pa. 485, 77 A. 2d 362. See also: Lanni v. P.R.R., 371 Pa. 106, 88 A. 2d 887; Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 81 A. 2d 910; Lentz v. Allentown Bobbin Works, 291 Pa. 526, 140 A. 541; (3) a'jury is hot permitted to guess, and guess, conjecture or suspicion do not take the place of or amount to. proof: Freund v. Hyman, 377 Pa. 35, 37, 103 *485A. 2d 658; and (4) plaintiff has the burden of proving her ease by a fair preponderance of the evidence and if her own testimony leaves in doubt how the accident happened or whether it resulted from defendant’s negligence, she cannot recover.
Where the burden of proof is upon plaintiff to establish negligence or any other facts, he cannot recover if his testimony or evidence is so uncertain or inadequate or equivocal or ambiguous or contradictory as to make findings or legitimate inferences therefrom a mere conjecture: Wagner v. Somerset Park, Inc., 372 Pa. 338, 341, 93 A. 2d 440; Musleva v. Patton C. M. Co., 338 Pa. 249, 12 A. 2d 554; Natvig v. P.R.T. Co., 293 Pa. 355, 143 A. 18; Lithgow v. Lithgow, 334 Pa. 262, 5 A. 2d 573; Goater v. Klotz, 279 Pa. 392, 124 A. 83.
Plaintiff, who was carrying a coat and two lampshades, testified on direct examination: “A..... I started to walk down the stairs . . ., my foot went under me and shot out; .... Q. ... I asked you . . . can you tell us just what it was that caused you to fall? A. Well, the only thing I can remember is that my foot shot out.*” Then follows what I consider an improper suggestive and leading question: “Q. . . . Did you slip on the step or did you misjudge the step, what was it that caused your foot to shoot out?” Then the following questions and answers on cross-examination: “Q. . . . Was it slippery? . . . Q. What was your answer? They were muddy? A. They were wet. . . . Q. Was it slippery as you walked from the main' floor to: the'gallery? A. I couldn’t tell-you. . . . Q. Were they [the steps] slippery? A. Wo, I can’t say they were slippery. '. . . Q. Were they slippery? A. I don’t lenoio if they were slippery. ... A. ... I am speaking of those stairs that I fell down. Q. What about them? A. . , . I saw they *486were wet, there were footsteps. Q. Was there any mud on them? ... A. But the footsteps looked like they were muddy. Q. Looked like they were muddy? A. They were dark footsteps — water.”
It is clear that plaintiff’s own testimony failed to prove, but on the contrary, left in a state of uncertainty, “what caused her to fall” and consequently she failed to satisfy her burden of proof that it was defendant’s negligence that caused her to fall.
Furthermore, if plaintiff, whose view was unobstructed, could not see that the condition of the stairs was dangerous and could not even say that the stairs on which she fell were slippery, and could not tell whether the marble floor as she walked from the main floor to the gallery was slippery — how could defendant?
We have held that a plaintiff who slipped on steps in a restaurant that were slightly wet was properly nonsuited: Burton v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 371 Pa. 60, 88 A. 2d 873. It is not clear just what the specific (and supposedly) dangerous condition was in the instant case, but assuming arguendo that a dangerous condition existed on the stairway, and assuming arguendo that this condition caused the plaintiff to fall, there is no evidence to prove how long such condition existed, and guess or conjecture that it — whatever it was — existed an hour cannot satisfy plaintiff’s burden of proof.
For each and all of these reasons, as well as for the reasons which are more fully and forcefully set forth in Stais v. Sears-Roebuck & Company, 378 Pa. 289, (particularly pages 292-29.4), 106 A. 2d 216, and the cases cited therein, I dissent.

 Italics throughout, ours.