Court Opinion

ID: 9568582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:23.2578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:45:29.916734
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
*479This appeal is before us on the briefs and without the benefit of oral argument, pursuant to Rule 29. The proposed majority opinion, in effect, decides, on the merits, a most important question of completely novel impression in this jurisdiction, without the benefit of all the facts; without the benefit of any finding of fact by either a court or jury below; without the benefit of any oral argument; without even attempting to pass upon all the asserted defenses, and without the benefit of an in point decision from a court of last resort of any other jurisdiction. Even the “disklegging” decisions from lower tribunals of other states, relied upon in the majority opinion, are not completely in point factually with the case at bar.
The reversal of the lower court under the circumstances of this case is, to my mind, a complete departure from the basic and fundamental principles which have heretofore guided this Court in appeals from the granting or refusal of temporary injunctions. The general rule in this State is that, with exceptions not here involved, a temporary injunction is not a matter of right but of grace, resting in the sound discretion of the judge. Pelzer v. Hughes, 27 S. C. 408, 3 S. E. 781; West’s South Carolina Digest, Injunction Key 135. Exceptions to the general rule are embodied within the following aptly stated language in the case of Alderman & Sons Co. v. Wilson, 69 S. C. 156, 48 S. E. 85,
“The authorities hold that where the action is for the sole purpose of an injunction, and a temporary injunction is essential to the assertion and preservation of a legal right, if established as alleged in the complaint, it would be error of law to refuse a temporary injunction. Strom v. Am. Mortg. Co., 42 S. C. 101, 20 S. E. 16; Seabrook v. Mostowitz, 51 S. C. 434, 29 S. E. 202; Cudd v. Calvert, 54 S. C. 457, 32 S. E. 503; Oil Co. v. Ice Co., 62 S. C. 196, 40 S. E. 169; Riley v. Charleston Union Sta. Co., 67 S. C. 84, 45 S. E. 149.” (Emphasis added.)
One essential condition to the granting of a temporary injunction is that it must appear that the injunction is rea*480sonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S. C. 566, 70 S. E. 296.
The instant case is to my mind one in which the matter of a temporary injunction was clearly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, it being clearly distinguishable from any case coming to my attention in which the lower court’s refusal of a temporary injunction has been held erroneous. The action is not for the sole purpose of an injunction and it is obvious that a temporary injunction is not essential to the assertion or preservation of any legal right alleged in the complaint of plaintiff; any rights it has remain fully preserved and may be and surely will be fully asserted in a trial upon the merits. Accordingly, the essentials whch would entitle the plaintiff to a temporary injunction, as a matter of law, are here entirely absent. I would, therefore, affirm.