Court Opinion

ID: 9614501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:26:03.096259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:56.291795
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
After purchasing the Idaho Water Company system, the City of Coeur d’Alene (City) commenced operation of the water system on January 1, 1975. At that time, the water rates for all users were the same whether the user resided inside or outside the city limits. Subsequently, the City passed various resolutions which increased the rates charged to outside users. The outside city water users then organized the Equal Water Rights Association (EWRA). After attempts to get the City to equalize the water rates for inside and outside city users failed, EWRA filed an eight-count complaint on December 18, 1979. On October 10, 1980, the district court denied a partial summary judgment motion filed by EWRA and at the same time dismissed EWRA’s Counts V & VI. The district court then referred the rest of the case to a special master. After a five-day trial, the special master issued a lengthy decision on February 5, 1982 holding that the water rates charged by the City were unreasonable. The district judge reviewed various objections to the master’s report and permanently enjoined the City from charging inside and outside city users different rates. The district court’s “Judgment and Order” was filed on June 17, 1982 and contained the following final paragraph:
“The master’s report herein is hereby adopted in full other than as expressly stated otherwise in this order. The Court concludes thereon that the defendants should be enjoined from and after the first. day of July, 1982, charging, assessing or collecting from water users whose place of use is outside of the Co-eur d’Alene City Limits any higher or different rate for the water used than said defendant collects from water users whose place of use is located within the Coeur d’Alene City Limits. Plaintiffs’ request for money damages or reimbursement for any overcharge that may have heretofore been made is denied. Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees is denied but plaintiffs shall be awarded their costs of Court. This order, together with the Court’s order of October 14, 1980, and the master’s report, shall constitute the Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and final Judgment in all respects except as to an injunction order and taxing of costs. Plaintiffs’ counsel is instructed to prepare and submit a proposed injunction order together with a judgment for their costs supported by affidavit or other statement as required by I.R.C.P. 54. IT IS SO ORDERED.”
On June 23, 1982, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e), EWRA filed a motion to amend the judgment. That motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 3, 1982. Approximately one month later, EWRA submitted a “Final Judgment” ex parte to the district court which was issued by the district court on December 7, 1982. That judgment was a little over one page long and contained the following:
“IT IS HEREBY THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT that:
“1. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party, having prevailed on Count 3.
“2. The Permanent Injunction previously issued on June 21, 1982 shall continue in effect.
“3. Relief requested under Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 is denied.
“4. Plaintiffs’ request for damages, restitution or recoupment of overpayment is denied.
“5. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for Plaintiffs’ costs in the sum of $15,-396.94.
“6. Plaintiffs’ request for an award of attorney fees is denied.”
*249On January 17, 1983, EWRA filed a Notice of Appeal from the “Final Judgment” dated December 7, 1982. On February 9, 1983, the City filed their Notice of Cross-Appeal. On June 6, 1983, the City also filed a motion to dismiss EWRA’s appeal.
We reserved ruling on the City’s motion to dismiss until final oral argument during which each side presented argument on the motion as well as the substantive aspects of the case. We now grant the City’s Motion to Dismiss this appeal and therefore do not reach the substantive merits of the case.
The City contends that the June 17, 1982 Judgment and Order was the final judgment in the case. The City urges that under I.A.R. 14(a), that judgment started a 42-day statute of limitations within which EWRA had to file a Notice of Appeal. The City concedes that the limitation period was then tolled by EWRA’s motion to amend the judgment, but argues that it began running again on November 3, 1982, when that motion was denied. The City concludes its argument by pointing out that EWRA’s Notice of Appeal was not filed until January 17, 1983, more than 42 days later and thus was untimely.
On the other hand, EWRA urges that the December 7 judgment was the final judgment in the case. Since EWRA’s appeal was filed within 42 days of December 7, EWRA insists that the appeal was timely.
Since an appeal may only be taken from a final judgment, I.A.R. 14(a), we must begin our analysis with a determination of which order was the final judgment, the June 17, 1982 order or the December 7, 1982 order.
“Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be determined by its content and substance, and not by its title.... Thus if the instrument ‘ends the suit,’ ‘adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy,’ and represents a ‘final determination of the rights of the parties,’ the instrument constitutes a final judgment regardless of its title.” Idah-Best, Inc. v. First Sec. Bank, Etc., 99 Idaho 517, 519, 584 P.2d 1242, 1244 (1978) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, we perceive that the judgment and order signed by the district court on June 17, 1982 was intended to be the final judgment and order in the case. That order included a comprehensive adjudication of the subject matter in controversy and represented a final determination of the rights of the parties. It ended the suit. The December 7, “Final Judgment” was nothing more than a two-page summary of all orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law previously entered on the record in the case. It did not adjudicate any subject matter of the controversy, nor did it represent the final determination of the rights of the parties. Thus, the December 7 order was not a final judgment.
Having determined that the June 17, 1982, judgment and order was the final judgment, we must now determine whether EWRA’s appeal was timely. I.A.R. 14(a) requires the filing of the Notice of Appeal within 42 days from the date of final judgment. However,
“The time for an appeal from such judgment, order or decree is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect the findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment ... in which case the appeal period commences to run upon the date of the filing stamp on the order deciding such motion.” I.A.R. 14(a).
Subsequent to the June 17 judgment, EWRA timely filed a motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) to amend or alter the judgment. If granted, that would have affected the findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment previously entered. The district court denied the motion in its order dated November 3, 1982. Thus, under I.A.R. 14(a), the appeal period commenced to run on November 3, 1982. EWRA filed its Notice of Appeal on January 17, 1983, 75 days later. Since, EWRA’s notice was not timely filed, there can be no appeal from the judgment. Therefore, respondent’s motion to dismiss this appeal is granted.
*250Costs to respondents.
No attorney fees on appeal.
SHEPARD, BAKES, BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.