Court Opinion

ID: 9629770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:48:43.29552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:23.424208
License: Public Domain

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
The State has filed a petition for rehearing, contending that this Court erred in deciding it should reach the merits of the appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilty. The State’s argument is predicated upon the principle that the appellate courts should refrain from considering an issue which was not preserved for review due to the appellant’s failure to first seek a ruling from the trial court upon the issue in question. As a basis for this assertion, the State points out that Ashley did not move for an acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of guilt, either at the close of the state’s case, prior to submission of the case to the jury, or after the return of the jury’s verdict.
The Idaho Reports are replete with decisions by the Idaho Supreme Court that review criminal convictions from the perspective of sufficiency of the evidence. Reflective of the Supreme Court’s position is the following statement in State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752, 554 P.2d 684 (1976), where the court observed:
Upon an appeal from a conviction the function of the appellate court is to examine the record to determine if competent and substantial evidence exists to support the verdict. State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604 (1975). Where there is substantial and competent evidence to support the verdict such will not be disturbed. State v. Badger, 96 Idaho 168, 525 P.2d 363 (1974). However, where evidence is insufficient to *699support a verdict, the verdict and judgment of conviction must be set aside. State v. Snyder, 71 Idaho 454, 238 P.2d 802, 33 A.L.R.2d 358 (1951).
97 Idaho at 754, 554 P.2d at 686. It seems that the only prerequisite is that the appellant must specify the insufficiency of the evidence as an issue on appeal. In the context of criminal cases, we do not find any discussion in prior decisions of the Supreme Court requiring the question of sufficiency of the evidence to be raised in the trial court before it can be addressed on appeal.
The State argues that State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 587 P.2d 835 (1978), supports the position asserted by the State in the instant proceeding. We disagree. In Watson, the defendant had moved for a directed verdict of acquittal at the end of the prosecution’s case in chief, which was denied. The defendant then presented evidence on his own behalf, and did not renew his motion at the close of the entire case. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the presentation of evidence by the defendant waived the right to question the denial of his motion for acquittal based solely on the evidence presented in the state’s case in chief. However, the ease, does not otherwise stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court will refuse to entertain a contention of insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction unless the claim is first submitted to the trial court. Indeed, the Supreme Court quoted an Oregon decision, State v. Gardner, 231 Or. 193, 372 P.2d 783, 784 (1962), for the view that:
If a defendant elects not to stand on his motion and presents evidence in his defense, the appellate court must consider all the evidence and if it is sufficient to sustain the conviction, the defendant cannot complain that his motion for acquittal made at the close of the state’s ease was denied. (Emphasis supplied.)
This observation is consistent with the proposition that the appellate court may review the sufficiency of the totality of the evidence presented at trial, when raised as an issue on appeal, regardless of whether the defendant also sought review of that question in the trial court.
Prior to 1967, the rule seemed well established, both in criminal cases and civil actions, that:
This court has always maintained its authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict, when properly assigned, regardless of whether that issue was presented to the trial court by one of the motions mentioned. Our long-established rule that we will not upset a verdict which is supported by substantial and competent evidence, from which reasonable minds might draw conflicting conclusions, is a complete and adequate safeguard of the integrity of the jury verdict, and of a litigant’s constitutional right thereto. A verdict not so supported is an unjust verdict. No litigant has a right, constitutional or otherwise, to such a verdict. A fair jury trial is a prime requisite of due process.
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 509, 427 P.2d 278, 283 (1967) (Taylor, C.J., concurring and dissenting). In Christensen, the majority opinion overruled a long-standing principle followed by the court in civil actions, and held that the adoption of the civil rules of procedure required a motion for directed verdict or for new trial before the Supreme Court would review the record of a jury trial on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. This ruling was subsequently changed by amendment to I.R.C.P. 50(b) the next year, in 1968, by adding the language that: “The failure of a party to move for a directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial shall not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence when proper assignment of error is made in the appellate court.” It is our belief that this amendment reflected the immediate reaction of the practicing bar to the decision in Christensen which had altered the previous longstanding rule discussed in Chief Justice Taylor’s dissent. It appears that the circuitous route traced by Christensen and I.R.C.P. 50(b) left unchanged the well-established position coextensively existing with respect to criminal actions. We see no need to travel a parallel path in the development of the Idaho Criminal Rules and arrive at the same point *700expressed in the amendment to I.R.C.P. 50(b).
There is another aspect to the instant case that has a connection to the principle expressed in Christensen. After the amendment to Rule 50(b), the Supreme Court had occasion to review the implication of that amendment, in Stephens v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 537, 447 P.2d 14 (1968). Stephens was a civil action to recover damages to a potato cellar allegedly caused by a windstorm. On appeal, the appellant questioned whether the claim for the loss fell within the terms of an insurance policy, and whether the evidence at trial (particularly, the testimony of an expert witness) was sufficient to support the respondent’s theory that a windstorm caused the cellar to collapse. In response to the sufficiency of evidence issue, the respondent claimed that the appellant’s failure to renew a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence precluded the Supreme Court from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment, citing Christensen. Notwithstanding the respondent’s assertion, the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the argument on the sufficiency of the evidence. In this regard, after noting that the amendment to Rule 50(b) had been adopted subsequent to the decision in Christensen, the court said:
Should this court be precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and judgment, such would automatically result in an affirmance of the verdict and judgment which is in respondent’s favor; likewise the review of the evidence has the same result; hence respondent is not prejudiced by rejection of his contention on this issue.
92 Idaho at 542, 447 P.2d at 19.
Similarly, our review of the sufficiency of the evidence in the present case has resulted in the affirmance of the verdict — the same result as would occur if we applied the principle suggested by the State by not reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence question. Under this circumstance, we fail to see, as did the Supreme Court in Stephens, how the State as the respondent has been prejudiced by the rejection of its contention that we are precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
We note further the possibility of a disturbing result from adoption of the State’s position. As the State no doubt is aware, there has been an increased use of the Post-conviction Relief Act to raise numerous questions relating to the effective assistance of counsel. The specter of such claims flowing from defense counsels’ failure to seek review by the trial court of the sufficiency of evidence to support convictions may have a great impact on the courts. And yet, even where the trial court first reviews the sufficiency of the evidence either at trial or upon post-conviction proceedings, the trial court’s determination can be considered again on appeal, de novo. Appellate review can just as easily be conducted on the existing trial record on direct appeal from judgments of conviction, without first having to exhaust the limited time and resources of the trial courts through the post-conviction process under the guise of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, we decline to apply the rule suggested by the State. The State’s petition for rehearing is DENIED.