Court Opinion

ID: 9623836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:44:24.267448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:01.333953
License: Public Domain

WORKMAN, Justice,
dissenting:
On first glance, the majority opinion seems logically analyzed and well-written. One must look at the record in the case and actually read the cases relied upon, however, in order to see what a gloss job the majority has had to create in order to reach its desired result.
First, the opinion mischaracterizes the state’s position when it says that the state urges that the prior statement of witness Kelly should have been admitted as substantive evidence. It is clear that the state’s primary argument on this issue is that portions of the witness’ prior inconsistent statement were properly admitted for impeachment purposes, not as substantive evidence.1 It is equally clear that what transpired in this case was plain and simple impeachment of a witness through a prior inconsistent statement, a time-honored concept in the our judicial system.
Before discussing the law relating to use of prior inconsistent statements of witnesses as impeachment, it is necessary to expand on the facts, since the majority was skillfully selective in limiting the factual presentation to those which supported its desired result.
The majority implies that the state knew that witness Kelly was going to recant his prior statement and put him on the stand solely to get that statement in as substantive evidence under the guise of impeachment. Although the state may have known2 that the witness would recant that very limited portion of his statement concerning the defendant’s admission that he killed the victim, it is clear from a reading of Kelly’s entire testimony that he still gave a great deal of other perfectly proper and clearly admissible direct evidence on behalf of the state. His direct testimony went on for some nineteen pages before the inconsistency occurred and included a great deal of testimony concerning the defendant’s actions soon after the crime. The majority would suggest that the witness was placed on the stand for the sole purpose of permitting the jury to hear his recantation and then admitting the prior inconsistency as substantive evidence. The record shows otherwise.
Historically, a witness’ in-court testimony can be impeached by a prior inconsistent oral or written statement, State v. Price 92 W.Va. 542, 115 S.E. 393 (1922); State v. *16Hall, 174 W.Va. 787, 329 S.E.2d 860 (1985). Generally, a prior inconsistent statement is admissible only for impeachment purposes and not for the truth of the matter asserted, and is not substantive evidence unless it complies with West Virginia Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A). F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, § 4.2(B) (2d ed. Michie 1986).
A review of Kelly’s entire testimony demonstrates his prior statement was used for impeachment. The following portion of Kelly’s testimony illustrates the type of impeachment that occurred:
(By the prosecuting attorney):
Q: Now, you gave an affidavit up in New York, did you not, under oath concerning the events of the evening?
A: Yes.
Q: And isn’t it true in that affidavit you said, “A couple of days later on Friday evening on payday we were riding ten (10)-speed bicycles to a bar called the Silver Dollar in Tampa, Florida”?
A: Yes.
Q: You said, “when all of a sudden Collins said the cops would, ‘probably be after me.’ He then got real quiet. I didn’t press him for what he meant.” Is that true?
A: Yes.
Q: So it was on the bicycles going to the bar?
A: No.
Q: What you’re saying is, you lied in your affidavit?
A: That’s what I’m saying.
Q: Then it says that you spend about three (3) hours drinking. Is that true?
A: We spend many hours drinking, every night.
Q: And you said you was drinking beer and Art was drinking mixed drinks. Is that true?
A: Most of the time Art would have mixed drinks. I would drink beer.
Q: And the affidavit, under oath, “I was playing pool and Art got drunk.”
A: Right.
Q: ... And you said, “on the way home I asked him did he kill his girlfriend and he didn’t answer right away.” That’s what you told the police under oath in October of ’85, isn’t that correct?
A: That’s right.
Q: “And about five (5) minutes he finally said ‘Yea, I killed her. But the only reason I did was before someone else got her.’ ”
A: That’s right.
Q: “I also remember that Art told me that his girlfriend had left a hotel of motel with a couple of niggers in the van, but he did not go into details about this.” Is that correct?
A: That is correct.
Q: Then you went on to say you really didn’t believe it because he had been nice to you?
A: That’s right.
Q: And now today you are going to say to the jury what you told them in October was all a lie, aren’t you?
A: Yes, I am.
The same is true regarding witness Lana Workman. Witness Workman gave a statement to the police only three days after the victim’s body was discovered and prior to the police having any evidence implicating her brother in the murder. During her questioning, the police showed her the quilt which covered the victim’s body, and she stated she had observed the quilt earlier that day in Rick Marshall’s 1969 Chevrolet, the same car in which the appellant fled after allegedly murdering Sarah Marshall. Three years later, once she appreciated the gravity of her brother’s situation and the significance of the quilt’s placement at the crime scene, witness Workman suddenly “remembered” that Rick Marshall had brought the quilt into the apartment after repairing a flat tire.
Pertinent portions of Ms. Workman’s testimony demonstrate that impeachment was what transpired:
(By the prosecuting attorney)
*17Q: And what happened when you got back to the apartment then?
A: I believe that’s when Art and Danny and Sarah, we were all there; and Art asked Rick if he wanted — the tire that he had repaired, he wanted to put back on the car, or it was flat or something. And Art asked him if he want to — if he wanted him to help him, and he said, “No, I can do it myself.” And he used this blanket, this quilt here, to lay on the ground because he didn’t want to get dirty. And after he used the quilt, after they were through — I believe they did help him — but, after they were through, he brought it back into the apartment and threw it beside the kitchen table.
Q: Now Lana, you never told the police any such story, did you?
A: No, sir, I didn’t.
Q: And of course, nobody asked you .did they?
A: No, they did not.
Q: Now isn’t it the truth, that the blanket was used when the tire was taken off by Danny Workman, your now husband, and Rick Marshall, before you ever got there and took for repair—
Mr. Anderson: (interrupting) Your hon- or, I’m going to object. The question is leading, and it appears to be cross-examining his own witness.
Q: Let me ask you this: Did you give the State Police a statement about this case on the three (3) days after the body was discovered, on April 29th 1984?
A: I’m not sure of the date, sir.
Q: Can you dispute the fact that’s when you gave a statement to them [on 4-29-84]? You did give one, didn’t you? A: Yes, I guess I did.
Q: (interrupting) Listen to me: whether you told the State Police on that occasion right after you had made the statement, “Now that I see the blanket the State Police has that was found on Sarah’s body, it appears to be the same one I saw in Rick’s car while I was with him.” Did you say that?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And did you not then say, “we drove straight back to the apartment. I would say this was about 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, 4-14-84.” Did you not say that?
A: I guess I did say that.
Q: And did you not say, “when we arrived at the apartment no one was there”?
A: Well then, that’s the way it was then.
Q: Did you not also say, “After twenty minutes about twenty minutes after we arrived at the apartment Sarah, Art and Sarah’s two children arrived at the apartment"?
A: Okay, yes.
Q: “They had been at the apartment about fifteen (15) minutes when Sarah asked Rick, well, are you going to go to the market?’ Rick said, ‘Hell no, I’m not going to the’ ” — I’m sorry, “ ‘the laundry’ ”, “ ‘Hell, no, I’m not going to the laundry this late’ ”. Did you tell them that?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: That Sarah said, “well, I need to go to the store and get the baby some food, and I need some money”. Did you not tell them that?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Now where in this, anywhere, do you say anything about seeing Rick Lewis — Rick Marshall, Rick Weelas, whatever he is, bring the blanket back in the room after the tire has been changed?
A: I was under the influence of PCP, and I guess that I just — it didn’t cross my mind.
Q: You are telling me, at the time on the 29th when you talked to the State Police, that you were under the influence of some kind of drug when you gave this statement?
A: No — not when I gave the statement. I’m not telling you that. That’s not what I'm telling you.
*18A: When the State Police was questioning me, I had written down my statement on a legal pad, and I did go over my statement, and everything I said in there is true....
The court did state during the impeachment of Ms. Workman in the presence of the jury: “He has a right to Cross-Examine the witness because of her attitude, and he has a right to impeach the witness under Rule 607.”
Finally, after dismissing the jury the court gave the following explanation as to why he allowed the prosecutor to impeach his witness:
The Court: With respect to the objections that he was impeaching his own witness, Rule 607 says as follows: “Who may impeach the credibility of a witness, may be impeached by any party, including the party calling them.” And she clearly, under the old Rule prior to the Rules of Evidence, could have been impeached because she has shown her hostility to the State and could have been impeached and Cross-Examined in that basis.
When all of Lana Workman’s testimony is reviewed, it is obvious that the state was demonstrating the many inconsistencies between her prior statement and her testimony at trial in an attempt to impeach her credibility, to attack the integrity of her in-court-inconsistencies, and not solely to admit substantive evidence subversively.
The reasoning process the majority undertakes in order to determine this was not proper impeachment can only be characterized as mental gymnastics.
They first leap from the context of the impeachment of a witness by use of prior inconsistent statement into the context of a criminal defendant himself being impeached by use of prior crimes or wrongdoing. These are horses of a vastly different color.
The majority cites State v. McGee, 160 W.Va. 1, 230 S.E.2d 832 (1976), overruled on other grounds, State v. McAboy, 160 W.Va. 497, 236 S.E.2d 431 (1977) for the propositions that (1) a Rule 403 3 balancing test should be used to determine whether impeachment evidence should be barred because its prejudicial4 effect outweighs its impeachment value; and that (2) the trial court should instruct the jury sua sponte as to the limited purpose of the evidence, i.e. impeachment.
Using the McGee case as basis for its reasoning, however, is like comparing apples with oranges. In McGee, the defendant, appealing from his conviction for delivery of marijuana, argued that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant’s credibility to be impeached by previous convictions. 160 W.Va. at 8-9, 230 S.E.2d at 836-37. This Court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach the defendant in this manner. Further, this Court held in the syllabus that:
When the State seeks to cross-examine a defendant in a criminal case regarding previous convictions for the purpose of testing his credibility, the trial court is required to consider the probative value thereof measured against the risk of substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused and is further required to instruct the jury properly regarding the limited purpose of the question and the limited purpose for which the jury may consider it.
Id. 160 W.Va. at 9, 230 S.E.2d at 833.
Clearly, the impeachment of a criminal defendant himself through evidence of oth*19er crimes or wrong-doing must be viewed differently than the impeachment of a mere witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement. The rules and case law relating to impeachment of criminal defendants as opposed to ordinary witnesses have historically treated the right to impeach a criminal defendant using other crime evidence in a much more limited and cautious manner. By way of analogy, for example, West Virginia Rule of Evidence 609(a) differentiates between a criminal defendant and an ordinary witness with regard to impeachment by use of prior criminal convictions in general.
As we stated in McAboy, 160 W.Va. 497, 508, 236 S.E.2d 431, 437, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Kopa, 173 W.Va. 43, 311 S.E.2d 412 (1983).
The difference between the two rules is measured by ultimate penalty arising from the possible prejudice. With a witness, the use of a prior conviction to impeach credibility may result in some loss of credibility in the eyes of the jury and attendant personal embarrassment. With the defendant, the prejudicial effort of a prior conviction may result in an unwarranted conviction.
Certainly, impeachment of ordinary witnesses with prior inconsistent statements should not enjoy the same level of caution and protection as the impeachment of defendants themselves.
Next, as to the Rule 403 balancing test, it must be recognized that one of the realities of a trial that the majority seems not to understand is that a trial judge, unlike an appellate judge, must during the course of a trial make many decisions and rule on many evidentiary objections without benefit of extensive legal briefs and months to ponder deeply. The Rule 403 balancing test is routinely performed by trial judges throughout a trial. It is an instinctive part of making evidentiary rulings, a mental process that becomes second nature to an effective trial judge. There is nothing in the rule which requires a hearing or findings of fact on every Rule 403 determination.
There is also absolutely nothing in the record to support the majority’s conclusion that no such balancing test was performed. The trial judge had heard some nineteen pages worth of Kelly’s direct testimony before the recantation of the earlier statement occurred. In the context of that testimony, it is not difficult to mentally perform the balancing test and to determine that the state was clearly entitled to impeach the witness with his prior inconsistent statement. Likewise, the witness in cross-examination by the defense counsel, was given full opportunity to explain the inconsistency, and the matter of his credibility became a jury issue.
It smacks of an ivory tower outlook to suggest that each time a trial court must weigh the probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice of evidence, that its failure to stop the proceedings and hold a hearing thereon proves that such a balancing test was not done.
The next really incredible leap the majority makes is to impose the requirement upon the trial court that it sua sponte instruct the jury regarding the limited purpose for which it may consider evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. In all our cases dealing with impeachment of ordinary (non-defendant) witnesses through prior inconsistent statements, no such requirement has ever been imposed.
Professor Cleckley in his Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, supra § 3.9(F) at p. 137, points out that
If evidence is properly admissible for one purpose but not for another, or where testimony is admissible as to one party but not as to another, failure to ask for an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to its proper sphere waives the contention that the jury improperly considered the evidence.
In addition, Rule 105 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides
When evidence which is admissible as to ' one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence *20to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly, (emphasis added)
No request for such a limiting instruction was made in the instant case.
Furthermore, a general instruction regarding credibility and describing the nature of impeachment of witnesses was given by the court in its instructions at the close of the evidence, and a specific instruction was given at the time of Lana Workman’s testimony.5
In State v. Fellers, 165 W.Va. 253, 267 S.E.2d 738 (1980), the State called a witness who had given an unsworn, written statement to a state trooper following the defendant’s arrest and two weeks after the crime had been committed. The prosecutor moved to have the witness declared a hostile witness because her testimony at trial was inconsistent with the prior written statement. The prosecutor then asked the witness if she recalled making the written statement to the trooper, to which she indicated that she did not. The State then called the trooper to the stand and permitted the trooper, over the defendant’s hearsay objections, to read a portion of the witness’ prior statement to the jury. In upholding that decision, this Court held that the statements were not admitted as a ruse to introduce impermissible evidence, but instead were used only to contradict and neutralize the in-court statement made by the witness.
Later, in Kopa, 173 W.Va. at 43, 311 S.E.2d at 412, the Court addressed the propriety of allowing the prosecution to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement that was unsworn and which the prosecution knew would be refuted at trial. At the defendant’s trial, his girlfriend recanted a portion of a statement she had previously made to the police. The trial court then permitted the prosecution te impeach the witness’ testimony with her prior inconsistent statement over the defendant’s objection. The Court concluded that the trial court did not err when it allowed the prosecution to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement and limited the statement’s value to the credibility of the witness.
One must admire the skillful manner in which the majority makes subtle mischar-acterizations and then uses them as tiny little building blocks with which to construct major new principles of law. For example, the majority misstates the factual foundation of the Spadafore case. See State v. Spadafore, 159 W.Va. 236, 220 5.E.2d 655 (1975). From the majority opinion: “Prior to the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), we considered whether a prior inconsistent statement could be used as substantive evidence in State v. Spada-fore.” The reality: Spadafore dealt not with a prior inconsistent statement, but a prior statement which the witness claimed in court that he could not remember. In Spadafore, the witness did not testify in court in an inconsistent manner. He merely claimed he could not remember making the statement. The Court did go on to hold generally that trial judges should greatly circumscribe the extent to which such out-of-court statements are used, and concluded that there was an abuse of discretion because twenty-six separate statements incriminating the defendant were admitted into evidence.
Even under the Spadafore principles, however, the lower court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in the use it permitted of the witnesses’ prior statements. They were used sparingly to demonstrate the lack of integrity of the in-court testimony which was impeached.6
*21Since the majority focuses most of its attention on the issue of the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, that issue will also be examined briefly.
The modern weight of authority views cross-examination regarding prior inconsistent statements as being sufficient to overcome the dangers of hearsay. An instructive discussion of this issue appears in F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 4.2(B) (2nd ed. Michie 1986), at p. 166-167:
Research regarding human memory indicates several advantages prior inconsistent statements have over trial testimony. Studies show that the ability to remember an incident declines as time passes. Witnesses are more prone to forget facts supporting propositions with which they disagree. Prior inconsistent statements also may be made before a motive for perjury has arisen and perhaps are less likely to be untruthful.
An instruction to jurors to use a prior inconsistent statement only for assessing the declarant’s credibility but not for the truth of the matter asserted is, at best, confusing. The repetitive effect the instruction has of calling attention to the statement probably cannot do other than highlight the matter in the minds of jurors, thereby making them more inclined to rely on the statement than to disregard it.
The weight of authority appears to reject the orthodox rule and to view cross-examination of the declarant at trial as sufficient to combat the dangers of hearsay. The Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence both allow inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, the inconsistent statement must have been made under oath, in a proceeding, and subject to the penalty of perjury — has been criticized for disregarding both the benefits of allowing inconsistent statements to be considered as substantive evidence and the adequacy of cross-examination of the witnesses at trial.
Nineteen American jurisdictions allow prior inconsistent statements of a witness to be used substantively where the witness is available for cross-examination. Other jurisdictions admit prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence under other limitations. Only a handful now refuse to permit such statements to be used substantively. Experience in other jurisdictions has not taught that such practices result in abuse. When the declarant is available for cross-examination, enough of the dangers of hearsay and unreliability are absent to justify the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements in civil cases.
The law of evidence should not be a game to see how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, or a series of meaningless hoops that one must jump through while tossing all common sense to the wind. The principles governing evidence should be aimed at assuring that only evidence with indicia of reliability and integrity is heard by the trier of fact.
The United States Supreme Court took such a practical approach in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) where the defendant was convicted of furnishing marijuana to a minor on the basis of evidence of prior inconsistent statements made by the minor both at the time of the preliminary hearing and to a police officer after the minor claimed at trial that he couldn’t remember his previous statements. The Court was confronted with the issue of whether the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation was violated by use of the prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Id. at 152, 90 S.Ct. at 1932. Specifically the Court in addressing the issue of whether the prior statement was given under oath stated:
if the declarant is present and testifying at trial, the out-of-court statement for all practical purposes regains most of the lost protections. If the witness admits *22the prior statement is his, or if there is other evidence to show the statement is his, the danger of faulty reproduction is negligible and the jury can be confident that it has before it two conflicting statements by the same witness. Thus, as far as the oath is concerned, the witness must now affirm, deny, or qualify the truth of the prior statement under the penalty of perjury; indeed, the very fact that the prior statement was not given under a similar circumstance may become the witness’ explanation for its inaccuracy — an explanation a jury may be expected to understand and take into account in deciding which, if either of the statements represents the truth.
Id. at 158-59, 90 S.Ct. at 1935.7
In this case, however, the trial judge would have needed a crystal ball to comport with what the majority would require. The majority opinion is a boon to the criminal element. In the future, those individuals who fraternize with criminals — indeed even those who work in tandem with others in criminal pursuits — may safeguard against being called to offer testimony against a criminal defendant by doing two simple things: (1) give the police a true account of what you know about the crime and (2) be sure and let the prosecutor know you plan to recant before you take the stand. This decision will make honest criminal investigatory work more difficult than ever.
Based upon the foregoing, I dissent.

. It is only the state’s fallback position that West Virginia should join a growing number of jurisdictions which do allow a witness’ prior inconsistent statement to be used as substantive evidence when the witness is available for cross-examination.

. Although the majority states that the state “knew that Mr. Kelly was going to recant,’’ there is nothing in the record to indicate clearly what the state knew with regard to what the witness would say iri court or when they knew it.

. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 403 is identical to Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and provides:
Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

. Interestingly, the majority always makes reference to weighing the prejudicial effect, as opposed to the unfair prejudice which the rule envisions. Obviously, a great deal of proper evidence is prejudicial. The factor to be balanced under Rule 403 is the danger of unfair prejudice.

. The jury was instructed that:
You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. As used in these instructions, the ‘credibility of a witness’ means the truthfulness or lack of truthfulness of lack of truthfulness of the witness. ...
If you believe that any witness in this case has knowingly testified falsely as to any máte-rial fact, you may, after considering and weighing the testimony of such witness, disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness or give it or any part thereof, such weight and credit as you believe it to be entitled to receive.

. According to F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers, § 4.2(B) (2d ed. Michie 1986) at p. 163, evidence of prior *21inconsistent statements actually can be admitted extrinsically for impeachment purposes when a witness claims not to remember a prior statement.

. Specifically, the Court in Green upheld a California statute against an attack that the statute violated a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The statute provided that evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with the testimony of the witness at the hearing and the witness is given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement. The Green case has been widely cited in subsequent federal and state decisions. The holding in Green was restated in Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987), for example, in which case the Supreme Court of the United States said: “In California v. Green, supra, the Court concluded that the confrontation clause was not violated by admitting a declarant’s inconsistent out-of-court statement ‘as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination’ at the trial itself.” 482 U.S. at 737-738, 107 S.Ct. at 2662-2663.
Moreover, Green has been cited, generally, in several cases in this State. State v. James Edward S., 184 W.Va. 408, 400 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W.Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123, 157 (1990); State v. School-craft, 183 W.Va. 579, 396 S.E.2d 760, 764 (1990); State v. Mullens, 179 W.Va. 567, 371 S.E.2d 64, 67 (1988); State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 104, 358 S.E.2d 188, 198 (1987); Naum v. Halbritter, 172 W.Va. 610, 309 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1983). In Naum, this Court stated: “We are aware that subsequent cases have made clear that the rule against hearsay and the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to confrontation are not entirely coextensive.” 172 W.Va. at 615, 309 S.E.2d at 114.