Court Opinion

ID: 9525851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:08:54.442607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:14.428946
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: For the reasons explained in Hinnen v. Burnett, 144 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1046 (1986), the jury’s verdict is irreconcilably inconsistent and must be set aside. There is no dispute that plaintiff received physical therapy from Dr. Neri to treat her complaints of headache, dizziness, and neck pain. If she was entitled to recover for this pain-related medical treatment, as the jury found she was, she was also entitled to damages for the underlying pain and suffering that Dr. Neri was attempting to treat. There is no logical basis for allowing one without the other. Any pain severe enough to justify medical care is severe enough to warrant compensation. The soundness of this approach has been repeatedly recognized by the appellate court (see Urban v. Zeigler, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1099 (1994); Rice v. Merchants National Bank, 213 Ill. App. 3d 790, 802-03 (1991); Kumorek v. Moyers, 203 Ill. App. 3d 908, 912-13 (1990); Schranz v. Halley, 128 Ill. App. 3d 125, 126-27 (1984)), including the second district, which adopted an opinion written by the same justice who authored the majority’s disposition in this case and specifically followed Hinnen (see Healy v. Bearco Management, Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d 945, 954-55 (1991)). Although Hinnen has been distinguished on its facts (see Knight v. Lord, 271 Ill. App. 3d 581, 591 (1995); Butkewicz v. Chicago Transit Authority, 252 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919-20 (1993); Craigmiles v. Egan, 248 Ill. App. 3d 911, 928 (1993); Perry v. Storzbach, 206 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068-69 (1990); Griffin v. Rogers, 177 Ill. App. 3d 690, 694 (1988)), only one panel in one district has expressly refused to follow it (see Buttita v. Stenberg, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1012 (1993)), and its discussion was merely dicta. Disavowal of Hinnen was completely unnecessary to the court’s disposition of the case, for unlike Hinnen, the plaintiff had not been awarded all of her medical expenses and it was unclear whether the amount she did receive included any expenses related to her pain. Buttita, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 1022. In rejecting Hinnen and the virtually unbroken line of cases that have followed it, my colleagues rely on "the traditional deference to the jury’s role in determining damages.” 172 Ill. 2d at 448. That reliance is misplaced. As the majority itself acknowledges, the deference we afford jurors has never been understood to mean that they are free to disregard a proven element of damages. See Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 315 (1993). In the case before us, pain and suffering were clearly established. If they had not been, there would have been no basis for the jury’s award of damages for plaintiff’s pain-related therapy sessions. Some award for pain and suffering should therefore have been granted. My colleagues reason that even if plaintiff did experience pain and suffering as she claimed, the jury may have concluded that it was too insignificant to merit compensation. 172 Ill. 2d at 448. Again, however, the majority misses the basic inconsistency in the jury’s verdict. If the jury believed that plaintiff was not really suffering, why did it agree to award her damages for so many therapy sessions? If she was just malingering, the jury should not only have denied her damages for pain and suffering, it should also have limited her compensation to the cost of her initial care and diagnosis and disallowed the cost of all of the subsequent therapy sessions. It did not do so, and my colleagues’ appeal to notions of flexibility and realism cannot resolve this contradiction. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause for a new trial on the issue of damages. I therefore dissent. JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.