Court Opinion

ID: 9519716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:23:31.058377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:37.965920
License: Public Domain

White, C. J., and Carter and Newton, JJ.,
concurring in the result but dissenting in part.
We concur in the result reached in this case but dissent from that part of the majority opinion that purports to change and adopt a new rule in this state with reference to the running of the statute of limitations on an amended cause of action.
The general rule is that an amendment introducing a new cause of action does not relate back to the commencement of the action with respect to limitations but is the equivalent of a new suit, so that the statute of limitations continues to run until the time of the filing of the amendment. In all of the jurisdictions in this country passing upon the subject we can find no deviation from this statement of the general rule. The statement of the law above made is taken from 54 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions, § 281, p. 335. Several hundred cases are cited in support of this rule from almost all jurisdictions and the 1969 cumulative annual pocket part cites two full fine-printed columns of recent cases from 26 jurisdictions in support of this rule. In either the original text statement or in the recent cases no decisions are cited as being contrary to this general rule.
Our rule has always been the same. See, 54 C. J. S., Limitations of Actions, § 281, p. 336; Streight v. First Trust Co. of Omaha, 133 Neb. 340, 275 N. W. 278 (1937); Emel v. Standard Oil Co., 117 Neb. 418, 220 N. W. 685 (1928). More recently we have specifically affirmed *183the rule. Tennyson v. Werthman, 167 Neb. 208, 92 N. W. 2d 559 (1958); Blair v. Klein, 176 Neb. 245, 125 N. W. 2d 669 (1964); Horn’s Crane Service v. Prior, 182 Neb. 94, 152 N. W. 2d 421 (1967); May Plumbing Co. v. Shaver, 182 Neb. 251, 153 N. W. 2d 911 (1967); J. R. Watkins Co. v. Wiley, 182 Neb. 242, 153 N. W. 2d 871 (1967).
It is true that the authorities and the cases are diverse and vary in the application of this rule to a particular set of facts or a particular pleading situation. Nevertheless, the rule that we have and the undisputed general rule have furnished a specific guideline for the determination of cases.
We cannot accept the statement in the majority opinion that our time-honored rule, supported by the conclusive weight of authority, is objectionable “in the best modem view.” Further, the overruling of all of our previous cases in this matter and the adoption of a new rule is accomplished without discussion or analysis. It is a flat and arbitrary statement of a new rule. Only one California case is cited in support thereof. In the interest of brevity we will not discuss or attempt to analyze this one case except to state that it does lend some support to the rule stated. This ■ case cites only previous California decisions and a close reading of this case and its supporting California decisions leaves us in doubt that such rule is the law in California. We note that the annotator in Corpus Juris Secundum cited supra cites the siame case as supporting the general rule.
We further point out that the purported new statement of the rule depending upon a “general set of facts” is so vague in nature that it would furnish virtually no guideline at all for use in application to particular cases. In a matter which is essentially procedure and where certainty and definiteness are desired, we feel that this is a step backward. It is so general that the pressure, of equities in a particular case could easily lead thiseourt and the lower courts to a vicarious and irrecon*184cilable determination of individual cases. Above all, in practice we feel that it would leave the practicing lawyer without a suitable guide.
The Legislature has established, by statute, our law on the statute of limitations. The accrual of a “cause of action” is the statutory and universal guideline. Our past interpretations of this specific statutory language have met no. legislative changes or resistance, much less any overruling of our prior decisions.
For these reasons we dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which purports to change the part of the established law of the State of Nebraska without discussion and with only chimera of authority to support it. The result in this case should and could be reached under the established law and the application of the general rule.