Court Opinion

ID: 9573569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:52.124887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:37.311453
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 44. {concurring). I write separately (1) to set forth the issue presented and my answer thereto; and (2) to provide context for the case regarding claims of a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and claims of negligence.
I
¶ 45. The majority opinion begins by stating the issue of law presented in the instant case as "whether a claim for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty must be intentional, or whether it can also be based on negligence."1
¶ 46. The plaintiffs present the issue as follows: whether a claim for a negligent breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the two-year statute of limitations in Wis. Stat. § 893.57, or by the six-year statute of limitations in either Wis. Stat. § 893.52 or § 893.43.2 The *454defendants and the amicus briefs accept and respond to the issue as stated by the plaintiffs.
¶ 47. I agree with the issue as stated by the parties. The present case does not require this court to determine whether a claim for the Trustees' breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty must be intentional or may be based on negligence. We need determine only what statute of limitations applies to the claim for breach of fiduciary duty presented in the instant case.3
¶ 48. The circuit court determined that the Trustees breached their fiduciary duty and applied the six-year negligence statute of limitations. The circuit court reasoned as follows: The Trustees had a fiduciary duty of loyalty. Ordinarily self-dealing is a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The trust instrument allowed the Trustees as employees of Journal Communications to buy the plaintiffs' stock, which might be considered self-dealing. The circuit court concluded that, as a result, the Trustees were under a heightened duty to disclose information to the plaintiffs in order to fulfill the Trustees' fiduciary duty of loyalty. The Trustees did not inform the employees fully and correctly as required by their heightened duty to disclose. The Trustees' failure to inform the plaintiffs correctly was *455not intentional, just negligent, and, accordingly, ruled the circuit court, the six-year negligence statute of limitations applied.
¶ 49. In contrast, the majority opinion concludes that the two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, Wis. Stat. § 893.57, applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
¶ 50. Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, 270 Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298, appears to control the outcome of the instant case.4 See also Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co., 136 Wis. 2d 31, 34-35, 400 N.W.2d 923 (1987) (cause of action for insurer's bad faith; insurer's duty to insured analogized to fiduciary duty; breach of fiduciary duty is intentional tort under statute of limitations). In Beloit Liquidating, this court considered allegations that corporate officers and directors negligently allowed the corporation to enter into money-losing contracts, failed to keep adequate accounting systems, continued operations after prudent managers would have shut down the corporation, and failed to disclose corporate losses.5 These allegations fit within several fiduciary duties of officers and directors of corporations, including the duty to keep and render accounts and the duty to furnish information. It does not appear that the plaintiffs in Beloit Liquidating alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. This court held in Beloit Liquidating, despite the fact that the claim was that the officers and directors were negligent in performing fiduciary duties, that "a breach *456of fiduciary duty claim involves an intentional tort."6 The court therefore held that the two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, Wis. Stat. § 893.57, barred the claims in that case.7
¶ 51. As the court of appeals observed in the instant case, this court in Beloit Liquidating "described the breach of fiduciary duty claim as an intentional tort even though the conduct alleged in that case was negligently allowing certain contracts and failing to keep adequate accounts, act prudently and disclose losses, rather than the type of bad faith conduct or intentionally wrongful conduct the circuit court here considered essential to the application of § 893.57."8 Thus the court of appeals simply concluded that Beloit Liquidating controlled the outcome of the instant case.
¶ 52. Beloit Liquidating involved numerous issues that this court discussed at length. This court did not discuss how it reached its conclusion regarding the application of the two-year statute of limitations and cited no authority for its conclusion that breach of fiduciary duty is an intentional tort or that the two-year statute of limitations applied in that case.
¶ 53. The plaintiffs in the instant case distinguish Beloit Liquidating, asserting that it did not involve claims of negligent breach of fiduciary duties because the statutes and the business judgment rule prevented action for negligent breach. The plaintiffs assert that Beloit Liquidating simply found that the corporate officers and directors owed no duty to the creditors.
*457¶ 54. In the interest of stare decisis and relying on the text of Beloit Liquidating, I conclude that Beloit Liquidating controls the outcome of the instant case and creates a uniform, predictable rule that the statute of limitations applicable in all claims of any breach of fiduciary duty is the two-year statute. This conclusion should end the majority opinion in the instant case.
II
¶ 55. The majority opinion in this case, however, does not stop at deciding the statute of limitations issue in the instant case based on Beloit Liquidating. It has raised more complex issues than the application of the statute of limitations to all claims asserting a breach of fiduciary duty by a trustee of an express trust. Instead of explaining settled law, it appears that the majority opinion can he interpreted as making new law regarding the nature and content of fiduciary duty and the duty of care.
¶ 56. In some places, the majority opinion puts forth a novel view of fiduciary duty that the only fiduciary duty is a duty of loyalty.9 The majority opinion might be interpreted as herding some or all fiduciary duties into the pasture of the duty of loyalty.
¶ 57. The majority opinion concludes, for example, that the duty of confidentiality and the duty to furnish information are aspects of the duty of loyalty.10 *458Yet the authority cited by the majority opinion does not support this statement. On the contrary, the cited law review article makes clear that the duty of loyalty is one of the fiduciary duties, but that there are other duties as well.11
¶ 58. I am concerned whether the majority opinion is creating a new body of fiduciary law for trustees that is inconsistent with prior case law in this state and inconsistent with the view taken in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and well-known treatises on the law of trusts.
¶ 59. While broad in scope, a trustee's fiduciary duty of loyalty does not, in ordinary trust parlance, encompass every fiduciary duty.12 It is hornbook, black-letter law that a trustee has many fiduciary duties, one of which is the duty of loyalty.13 While a trustee's duty *459of loyalty may be described as "the most fundamental duty,"14 it is not the only one.
¶ 60. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 describes the duty of loyalty as the duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary:
(1) The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.
(2) The trustee in dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account is under a duty to the beneficiary to deal fairly with him and to communicate to him all material facts in connection with the transaction which the trustee knows or should know.15
¶ 61. The treatises and texts state that the fiduciary duties of a trustee include not only the duty of loyalty but also the duty to administer the trust,16 the *460duty to keep and render accounts,17 and the duty to furnish information.18 For example, a trustee might breach the duty to furnish information by accidentally providing incorrect or inaccurate information about the content of the trust corpus or the beneficiary's rights under the trust.
¶ 62. Another fiduciary duty of a trustee to the beneficiary is the duty to exercise care and skill in administering the trust. The trustee's fiduciary duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust with care and skill is described in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts:
The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment as trustee by representing that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to exercise such skill.19
*461¶ 63. According to the treatises, a trustee's breach of a fiduciary duty can be intentional or negligent, and in certain circumstances there may be liability without fault.20
¶ 64. As I have said, the majority opinion might be read to fit some or all the trustee's fiduciary duties within the fiduciary duty of loyalty. However, the majority opinion might also be read to say that the other duties normally thought of as a trustee's fiduciary duties are not fiduciary duties at all, hut are duties owed by many persons, such as the duty of ordinary care, and are not analyzed as breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the majority opinion addresses the relationship between a trustee's fiduciary duties and the non-fiduciary duty of ordinary care.
¶ 65. If this latter view is an accurate characterization of the majority opinion, it is making very broad statements about the nature and content of fiduciary duties.
¶ 66. The majority opinion relies on commentators and cases addressing the relationship between fiduciary duties and the non-fiduciary duty of care in the context of fiduciaries other than trustees. It appears that this literature is primarily in the context of the *462duties owed by an attorney to a client or the duty other agents owe to principals, such the duty of corporate officers and directors to shareholders.21 The literature cited by the majority opinion criticizes cases confusing an attorney's fiduciary duties to a client and an attorney's duty of due care in performance of services. According to the commentators, the latter is the basis for a malpractice negligence action, not an action for breach of fiduciary duty. The commentators suggest that these two types of breach of duty should be analyzed separately because of differences regarding proof of causation, proof of damages, and applicable statutes of limitations.
¶ 67. At first blush, it appears that in Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank of Wisconsin, 2005 WI 109, 283 Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15, this court created confusion regarding the relationship between a fiduciary duty and a non-fiduciary duty of ordinary care. In Hatleberg this court addressed claims relating to an irrevocable trust that did not include certain provisions necessary to avoid tax liability upon the settlor's death. The bank that was trustee was aware of the defect but did not reveal it to the settlor. The settlor's estate sued the bank trustee for erroneously informing the settlor, after creation of the trust, that she would avoid tax liability by annually depositing additional funds in the trust.22
*463¶ 68. This court held that the bank could be held liable for providing the incorrect information. The court concluded that the bank held itself out as an expert in financial planning and was liable for negligent performance of professional services when it provided false information.23
¶ 69. The court of appeals in the instant case points out that Hatleberg might be read to imply that a claim for negligence is indistinguishable from a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.24
¶ 70. However, the court of appeals also suggests a more appropriate reading of Hatleberg. In Hatleberg, this court addressed the negligence theories presented by the plaintiff and did not intend to opine on the relationship between a claim for the breach of a fiduciary duty and a claim for negligent performance of professional services, a relationship that was not an issue in the case before the court25 See the court of appeals decision, discussing the distinction between a fiduciary duty claim and a negligence claim.26
¶ 71. As I read Hatleberg, this court noted three distinct duties under which the bank might be liable to the settlor's estate, clearly distinguishing between breach of fiduciary duties and the breach of the duty of ordinary care.27 Hatleberg, then, can be explained by recognizing that the bank, in dealing with the settlor *464after the trust was established, owed her no fiduciary duty as a trustee of the trust.28 Although the bank was held to a professional standard of care, it was held to that standard because it held itself out to the settlor as an expert financial advisor, not because of a fiduciary relationship as trustee with the settlor.29
¶ 72. Thus, at least with respect to the law of trusts, it appears to me that the case law in this state has not confused a fiduciary duty of the trustee and the non-fiduciary duty of ordinary care. Indeed, in Hatleberg, when the duty of care was not the trustee's fiduciary duty of care, the court recognized this distinction and analyzed the claim as a negligence claim.
¶ 73. The principles of fiduciary duty apply with different force in different contexts involving different persons and relationships. None of the sources I have found, and none of the sources cited by the majority opinion, addresses the duties of a trustee. As Professor Deborah A. DeMott explains, the law of fiduciary duty *465is "situation-specific."30 Litigants and courts should therefore take care in identifying the fiduciary and the fiduciary duty at issue in each case because different fiduciaries may have different duties, including the duty of care.
¶ 74. In sum, I conclude that, as dictated by our precedent in Beloit Liquidating, the two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, Wis. Stat. § 893.57, applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duty. That analysis is sufficient to decide the instant case. I would go no further.
¶ 75. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion and Justice N. PATRICK CROOKS joins Part I of this opinion.

 Majority op., ¶ 1. Compare with a different statement of the issue at majority op., ¶ 23: "whether the breach of fiduciary duty claims the circuit court found the plaintiffs proved were properly dismissed because the two-year statute of limitations applies to them."

 The majority opinion further misstates the issue by limiting its holding to the "fiduciary duty of loyalty." As I discuss in *454Part II of this opinion, this case is not only a fiduciary duty of loyalty case. Rather, the plaintiffs allege breaches of other fiduciary duties.

 The majority opinion also states that because the plaintiffs' claims for breach of fiduciary duty "are focused solely on the actions and omissions of the Trustees ... we need analyze only the action of the Trustees in order to decide the questions presented by this review." Majority op., ¶ 21. The complaint in the instant case, however, also alleges breach of fiduciary duty by Journal Communications and the trust itself. The majority opinion is silent.

 See Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 2005 WI App 178, ¶ 2, 286 Wis. 2d 416, 703 N.W.2d 673.

 Beloit Liquidating Trust v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶ 10, 270 Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298.

 Beloit Liquidating, 270 Wis. 2d 356, ¶ 40.

 Id., ¶ 40; see also Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. Ins. Co., 136 Wis. 2d 31, 34-35, 400 N.W.2d 923 (1987).

 Zastrow, 286 Wis. 2d 416, ¶ 14.

 See majority op., ¶¶ 22-35, 41-42.

 Majority op., ¶ 29 ("[T]he duty of loyalty is broader than simply requiring the fiduciary to refrain from acting in his own self-interest. For example, it also may require keeping a beneficiary's information confidential and fully disclosing to the beneficiary all information relevant to the beneficiary's interest." (Citations omitted.)).

 See William A. Gregory, The Fiduciary Duty of Care: A Perversion of Words, 38 Akron L. Rev. 181, 183 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 379-384, 387-398 (1958)) ("An agent owes various duties to its principal. The duty of loyalty is the most significant of them. The courts have expanded the duties of an agent over the years by describing a duty to disclose and a duty of candor." (Footnote references omitted.)).

 See, e.g., Hammes v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Racine, 79 Wis. 2d 355, 369, 255 N.W.2d 555 (1977) (discussing fiduciary duty of loyalty, and then discussing separate fiduciary duty of full disclosure); Modern Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Tooling Specialists, Inc., 206 Wis. 2d 435, 442, 557 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Racine v. Weisflog, 165 Wis. 2d 184, 190, 477 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1991)) ("It is well established that a corporate officer or director is under a fiduciary duty of loyalty, good faith and fair dealing in the conduct of corporate business.").

 2A Austin Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, Scott on Trusts §§ 169-185 (4th ed. 1987) (listing 17 distinct fiduciary duties of a trustee); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 169-186 (1959) (fisting 17 distinct fiduciary duties of a trustee).
*459The duties listed in the Restatement and Scott on Trusts are substantially the same. Both clearly include the duty of loyalty as a fiduciary duty distinct from the other fiduciary duties listed.

 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 170; George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 543 at 217 (rey. 2d ed. replacement vol. 1993).

 Similarly, Scott on Trusts defines the fiduciary duty of loyalty as "the duty of a trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries. [A trustee] is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries." 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 170. For another discussion of the duty of loyalty, see Bogert & Bogert, supra note 14, §§ 543-543(V).

 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 169; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 169 (1959).

 Richards v. Barry, 39 Wis. 2d 437, 441-42, 159 N.W.2d 660 (1968) (duty to keep accounts); Leonard v. Ingram, 202 Wis. 117, 124-26, 230 N.W. 715 (1930) (same); 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 172; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 172 (1959).

 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 173 ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiaries to give them on their request at reasonable times complete and accurate information as to the administration of the trust."); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 (1959).
For another example of stating the trustee's duties, see Bogert & Bogert, supra note 14, §§ 541 (exercise reasonable care and skill), 582 (protect and preserve trust assets), 596 (earmark and separate trust property), 611 (make trust property productive), 975 (furnish information to beneficiary).

 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959); see also 3 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 174; Sensenbrenner v. *461Sensenbrenner, 76 Wis. 2d 625, 635, 252 N.W.2d 47 (1977) (trustees have duty to employ "diligence, prudence, and absolute fidelity").

 3 Scott & Fratcher, supra note 13, § 201 (breach of trust ordinarily by intentional or negligent conduct, but there may also be liability without fault); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 201 (1959) (same).
For example, where a trustee under a mistake of law makes payment to a person not entitled as beneficiary, he is liable to the beneficiary, even though his conduct was neither intentional nor negligent. Galard v. Winans, 74 A. 626 (Md. 1909).

 See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 11; Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 S.M.U. L. Rev. 235 (1994) (also comparing contract actions); Smith v. Mehaffy, 30 P.3d 727 (Col. Ct. App. 2000); Bristol & West Bldg. Soc'y v. Mothew, [1998] Ch. 1, at 17, 1996 WL 1092374 (British Court of Appeal).

 Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank of Wis., 2005 WI 109, ¶¶ 6-12, 283 Wis. 2d 234, 700 N.W.2d 15.

 Id., ¶¶ 34-39,42. The court also concluded that the bank committed negligent misrepresentation. Id., ¶¶ 40-41.

 Zastrow, 286 Wis. 2d 416, ¶ 22.

 Id., ¶ 23.

 Id., ¶¶ 23-24, 26.

 See Hatleberg, 283 Wis. 2d 234, ¶ 18 ("We have organized our analysis into three categories: (1) Duties arising in [the defendant's] undisputed capacity as trustee; (2) Duties arising *464in [the defendant's] disputed capacity as financial planner or advisor; and (3) Duty to avoid negligently providing inaccurate information.").

 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959) (trustee's duty of care owed to beneficiary).

 Hatleberg, 283 Wis. 2d 234, ¶¶ 38-39; see Zastrow, 286 Wis. 2d 416, ¶¶ 24-26.
In Hatleberg, 283 Wis. 2d 234, ¶ 32, the court noted that fiduciary duties may arise from the relationship between a financial advisor and a client. However, the court concluded that it need not address the existence of such duties because it found that the bank had violated the ordinary duty of care and could be held liable for negligence. The conclusion that the court did not need to address the fiduciary duty claim may be part of the cause for confusion surrounding the Hatleberg case.

 See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 Duke L.J. 879, 879 (1988).