Court Opinion

ID: 9583013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:57.656585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:48.896439
License: Public Domain

PLEICONES, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. Applying the five part test, enunciated in State v. Spann, 334 S.C. 618, 513 S.E.2d 98 (1999), a decision to grant petitioner a new trial rests upon the determination that Connie Hess’s confession “would probably change the result if a new trial were granted.” Id. at 619, 513 S.E.2d at 99. I believe the confession would probably change the result on retrial and, therefore, would grant petitioner’s motion for a new trial.
In support of the decision to deny petitioner’s new trial motion, the majority finds that, in light of her history of fabrications and her mental health status, Hess’s confession is not credible. They conclude that the new evidence would not likely change the result of a new trial because Hess’s confession is not consistent with the known facts of the crime, and *402because Curtis Harbert has consistently maintained that petitioner killed Trooper Smalls.
As support for its determination that Hess is not a credible witness, the majority cites her prior inconsistent statements. Comparing the circumstances under which the various statements were made convinces me that Hess’s confession is worthy of belief.8 When Hess’s 1985 statements were made, she was under investigation for the commission of a capital offense. It is not unlikely that her statements were motivated by expectations of reward and self-preservation. Our law recognizes, and common sense dictates, that self-serving statements are inherently less reliable than are self-inculpatory statements. See, e.g., Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE (providing exception to rule against hearsay where the statement, at the time of its making is against declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, the rationale being the assumption that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied that the statements are true).
When Hess signed the most recent Statement, confessing to the murder of Trooper Smalls, she did so only after consulting with counsel. Her attorney advised Hess of her right to remain silent and that it was not in her best interest to sign the statement. Counsel urged her not to sign the statement. Despite this advice, Hess confessed. In light of these facts, I cannot agree that Hess’s admission of guilt is incredible as a matter of law.9 Further, since it is uncontroverted that Hess is competent to testify, a jury should have the opportunity to *403determine the extent to which her testimony is colored by her mental problems, and to decide the relative weight her testimony is afforded.
Unlike the majority, I do not find Harbert’s statements a sufficient basis to say it is probable that a jury would not reach a different result. Although they are consistent in naming petitioner as the shooter, they do contain inconsistencies. Moreover, Harbert’s statements, like Hess’s previous statements, were obtained while he was a suspect in the state trooper’s murder.
The majority adopts the referee’s finding that Hess’s confession is not consistent with the known facts of the case. However, at trial the State presented no physical evidence to establish that petitioner, and not Harbert or Hess, killed Trooper Smalls. In fact, the record is devoid of any evidence which would exclude any of the three as Trooper Smalls’s murderer. While it is true that police found no gun powder residue on Harbert, or Hess, no tests for gun powder residue were performed on those two until after sufficient time had elapsed for any residue to dissipate. Tests conducted in a timely manner on petitioner revealed no gun powder residue.
I conclude by noting that our system of justice reveres the probative value of confessions. To echo the words of the United States Supreme Court,
[a] confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions can have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of its mind even if told to do so.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
Given the lack of physical evidence to indicate petitioner, and not Harbert or Hess, fired the shots which killed Trooper Smalls, it is my opinion that Hess’s confession would probably *404change the result if a new trial were granted, and therefore, I dissent.

. I agree that we must address Hess’s credibility in determining petitioner’s entitlement to a new trial. However, in my opinion, we need not be convinced as an absolute matter of the truth of the new evidence before granting a new trial. We need only find the new evidence worthy of belief. See State v. Fowler, 264 S.C. 149, 213 S.E.2d 447 (1975) (where newly discovered evidence is incredible and improbable under all the circumstances, motion for new trial will be denied); State v. Mayfield, 235 S.C. 11, 109 S.E.2d 716 (1959) (trial court's denial of defendant’s motion for new trial on basis of after-discovered evidence affirmed where trial court concluded new evidence was not worthy of belief). For the reasons stated in this dissent, I find the new evidence here worthy of belief and would therefore grant petitioner’s motion.

. The presence of the public defender, who notarized the statement and advised Hess of its damning nature, and of Liberty Center staff during its signing further demonstrate the statement’s reliability.