Court Opinion

ID: 9897565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:12.59013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.616346
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                 APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
     This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this
               opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                          SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                          APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                          DOCKET NO. A-2994-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

         Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MANTWAN J. THOMAS, a/k/a
MANTWAN THOMAS, and
ANTWOINE THOMPSON,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted October 24, 2023 – Decided November 14, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 21-08-0498.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

                   William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
                   for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Mantwan J. Thomas appeals from the January 25, 2022 Law

Division order denying his motion to suppress physical evidence seized during

a warrantless search of his vehicle following a motor vehicle stop. Having

considered the arguments in light of the record and applicable legal principles ,

we affirm.

      On August 12, 2021, a Union County grand jury indicted defendant on the

following charges: second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(b)(1); third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance

(CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-3(b)(4); and first-degree unlawful possession of a weapon by a person

previously convicted of a No Early Release Act offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j).

      On June 10, 2021, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during

the warrantless search of his vehicle. Judge Regina Caulfield conducted a

suppression hearing on September 21 and November 15, 2021. The State called

one witness, Linden Police Department (LPD) Officer Joshua Sheehy.

      Judge Caulfield issued an order and cogent eighteen-page written decision

denying defendant's motion to suppress. Thereafter, defendant pleaded guilty

to second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and was sentenced in

accordance with the plea agreement to five years with a forty-two-month period

of parole ineligibility. The judge dismissed all other charges.

                                        2                                 A-2994-21
     Defendant appeals, arguing in a single point:

           I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
           THAT THE OFFICERS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE
           TO SEARCH THE CAR.

                                      I.

     The salient facts established at the suppression hearing are as follows. On

January 30, 2021, LPD Officers Michael Mutz and Sheehy were on patrol in an

unmarked vehicle when they observed a vehicle traveling "at a high rate of

speed."   Mutz paced the vehicle and determined it was traveling at

approximately seventy miles per hour in a forty-five-mile-per-hour zone.

Sheehy observed the license plate was from Georgia and, upon running the

registration, learned the vehicle was registered to "EAN Holdings," which

Sheehy knew to be a rental company.

     Mutz activated the patrol vehicle overhead lights and sirens—which

activated the officers' body cameras—and effectuated a motor vehicle stop.

Mutz, as the lead officer at the stop, approached the driver side, and Sheehy

approached the passenger side. Mutz initiated communication with defendant

who began "using sign language and one-word phrases" to communicate with

the officers, relaying the words "wife, emergency, pregnant," and "hospital."

Sheehy retrieved a notepad and joined Mutz near the driver's side window to

better communicate with defendant. Sheehy requested that defendant write

                                      3                                  A-2994-21
down his name and date of birth. Defendant wrote on the notepad "Thomas Jerot

. . . 4-9-98" and communicated his identification was at a hotel. The name

yielded "no results" from the police database system, INFOCOP.

      Defendant, upon further inquiry, informed Sheehy he had a Pennsylvania

driver's license, but a follow-up search through INFOCOP and Central Dispatch

again found no match. Sheehy's body camera recording was at times muted

during the stop, as he muted his camera to conference with the other officers and

when contacting Central Dispatch. He did not always unmute the recording.

      When Sheehy reapproached the vehicle, defendant was on the phone with

his wife. She subsequently informed the officers that defendant was going to

the hospital to meet her because she was possibly suffering a miscarriage. She

then offered to go to the stop to "clear up any issues." Sheehy believed that

"[s]omething just wasn't right with that" assertion.

      At some point thereafter, multiple officers, including John Condora and

Michael Rizzo, arrived at the scene. Defendant's wife arrived at the stop shortly

after the other officers. Sheehy called an ambulance for her medical needs, but

she refused medical assistance.

      Rizzo    assumed    lead    of   the   communications    with   defendant.

Approximately forty-five minutes after the initial stop, Rizzo requested

defendant exit the vehicle and step toward the rear trunk area. Sheehy, who was

                                         4                                A-2994-21
wearing "a felt-lined . . . ski mask type face covering," and was approximately

two feet from defendant as he opened the door, "got a smell of marijuana coming

from the interior of the vehicle" and from defendant's body. He made eye

contact with Mutz to communicate that he smelled marijuana. When asked,

defendant denied smoking marijuana that day. Sheehy believed he smelled raw

marijuana.   Rizzo advised defendant he and the vehicle were going to be

searched. Defendant "spontaneously uttered that he was lying about his name,"

and revealed his name was Mantwan Thomas, which was confirmed through the

Central Dispatch.

      Rizzo searched defendant's person and uncovered "a cylindrical

marijuana grinder" containing marijuana residue, "a large sum of money," and

multiple sets of keys. Rizzo indicated he could smell the marijuana. Rizzo

relayed to the officers to search the entire vehicle because he believed there was

probable cause additional contraband was present. Mutz thereafter searched the

front driver's area of the vehicle, while Rizzo searched the front passenger area.

Both officers indicated they smelled marijuana inside the vehicle.          Rizzo

discovered a black backpack containing an unlabeled prescription bottle that

contained "seven-and-a-half white bars" stamped Xanax and approximately

                                        5                                  A-2994-21
eight Suboxone strips. 1 Mutz uncovered a New Jersey I.D. for defendant, as

well as $7,000 worth of suspected counterfeit $100 bills, wrapped with a note

that read, "[s]ee what you can get me for this much."

      Shortly after the items were recovered from the interior of the vehicle,

Condora conducted a search of the trunk and uncovered a black and blue

backpack, which contained a dismantled "22 [s]hort                 revolver" and

"approximately 100 22-caliber rounds." Defendant was arrested and officers

transported him to headquarters where it was learned he could speak English.

                                        II.

      The standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential, and we must

"uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those

findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v.

Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243

(2007)). We are bound to defer "to those findings in recognition of the trial

court's 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the

case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at

1
    Suboxone, generically known as Buprenorphine or Naloxone, "is a
combination of medications administered for the treatment of opiate agonist
dependence."       Merck       Manual:         Professional        Version,
https://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/Search
Results?query=suboxone+zubsolv&species= (last visited Oct. 25, 2023).
                                         6                                  A-2994-21
244). Therefore, we only reverse a decision when the trial court's determination

is "so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and

correction.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 398 (2022) (quoting State v.

Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014)). A trial court's interpretation of the law and

the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010). Thus, a trial court's legal

conclusions are reviewed de novo. Ibid.

      "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,

protect against unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smart, 253 N.J.

156, 164 (2023) (quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)).

"Warrantless seizures are presumptively invalid as contrary to the United States

and the New Jersey Constitutions." State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004). To

overcome the presumption of an unreasonable search and seizure, the State must

demonstrate by a "preponderance of the evidence that an exception to the

warrant requirement applies." State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 329 (2020). "To

justify a warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden of proving by

a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or seizure falls

within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'"

State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting State v.

                                        7                                  A-2994-21
Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019)).            Each exception to the warrant

requirement has their own essential elements that must be satisfied to justify a

warrantless search. State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 2023).

      "In assessing whether probable cause exists, 'courts must look to the

totality of the circumstances and view those circumstances . . . from the

standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" State v. Diaz, 470 N.J.

Super. 495, 529 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 293

(2014)). "[C]ourts are to give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience'

as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and

reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154

N.J. 272, 279 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)).

                                       A.

      Our Supreme Court has long recognized "under our State Constitution,

'when the police have probable cause to believe that [a] vehicle contains

contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise to

probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous,' law enforcement may search

the vehicle without first obtaining a warrant." State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308,

319-20 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447

(2014)).   Under the automobile exception, a police officer may conduct a

warrantless search of a motor vehicle during a lawful roadside stop "in situations

                                        8                                   A-2994-21
where: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains

evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances giving rise to probable

cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super.

13, 22 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Witt, 223 N.J. at 447-48). In Cohen, the

Supreme Court held that "[p]ursuant to the automobile exception, if an officer

has probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause

encompasses the entirety of the interior." 254 N.J. at 327.

      At the time defendant's motor vehicle was stopped on January 30, 2021,

"New Jersey courts . . . recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitute[d]

probable cause 'that a criminal offense had been committed and that additional

contraband might be present.'" State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013).

Specifically, "an odor of unburned marijuana create[d] an inference that

marijuana [was] physically present in the vehicle," and "the suspected marijuana

could reasonably have been located in the passenger compartment and/or on the

person of the occupants of the vehicle." State v. Judge, 275 N.J. Super. 194,

201 (App. Div. 1994).2

2
   On February 22, 2021, the New Jersey Cannabis Regulatory, Enforcement
Assistance, and Marketplace Modernization Act, N.J.S.A. 24:6I-31 to -56, came
into effect, stating, "the odor of cannabis or burnt cannabis" cannot "constitute
reasonable articulable suspicion of a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10c(a).
                                         9                                   A-2994-21
      Judge Caulfield found Sheehy was a credible witness because "[h]e was

calm [and] clear," "largely consistent," "maintained good eye contact with

counsel," and "answered each question posed to him without adding unsolicited

information." The judge credited Sheehy's "relevant training and experience" in

investigating controlled dangerous substances. Sheehy described the smell of

raw marijuana as "almost like a smell of . . . skunk, when a skunk sprays" and

stated it is "a very distinct smell." Sheehy further testified "there was no doubt

in [his] mind" that what he smelled was raw marijuana.

      Based on Sheehy's credible testimony, the judge found sufficient evidence

existed to support the search of defendant's person because the smell of

marijuana "emanating from defendant's person provided the investigating

officers with probable cause to search his person."

      Judge Caulfield reasoned that there was probable cause to search the

interior compartment because, in addition to the smell of marijuana on

defendant, he had: committed a motor vehicle violation by speeding; provided

limited verbal responses and communicated through sign language; provided no

credentials, and the name he gave was not found in the police database; alleged

his wife was having a miscarriage but she responded to the stop and then

declined medical care; provided further misidentification information which

                                       10                                   A-2994-21
yielded no results; responded that he had not smoked marijuana that day when

questioned; and had a marijuana grinder on his person.

      Defendant's argument that the officers did not meaningfully distinguish

between the smell emanating from defendant's person and a smell originating

from the vehicle, because the marijuana grinder was found on defendant's

person, is unavailing.   After defendant's evasive conduct, Sheehy smelled

marijuana emanating from both the vehicle and defendant's person. The judge

found Sheehy credibly testified he smelled raw marijuana. Sheehy found it

relevant that defendant had not provided his identification and was driving in a

suspected rental vehicle from Georgia. It was objectively reasonable based on

the evidence for the officers to determine probable cause existed. The judge's

factual findings, based on Sheehy's testimony and the corroborating body

camera footage, substantiated sufficient credible evidence to support probable

cause. Defendant's contention that "[t]he likely source of the odor of marijuana

coming from Thomas was the marijuana grinder found on his person" ignores

the totality of circumstances the officers confronted. See Judge 275 N.J. Super.

at 197, 202 (finding probable cause to search a vehicle despite the searching

officer having found drug paraphernalia on the vehicle's occupants' persons).

                                      B.

                                      11                                  A-2994-21
      Our Supreme Court has further recognized that permissive warrantless

searches   "that   extended     to   the    trunk   or   other   areas   beyond

the passenger compartment have involved facts indicating something more than

simply detecting the smell of marijuana from the interior of the car." Cohen,

254 N.J. at 324. Where an officer has "probable cause to believe that [a] vehicle

is carrying contraband . . . the search must be reasonable in scope." State v.

Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 10 (1980). "[T]he bare circumstance of a small amount of

marijuana does not constitute a self-evident proposition that more marijuana or

other contraband might be elsewhere in [an] automobile." Id. at 12.

      "The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is defined by the

object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe that

it may be found." State v. Esteves, 93 N.J. 498, 508 (1983). Probable cause

should not be viewed as "a technical concept but one having to do with 'the

factual and practical considerations of everyday life' on which reasonable and

prudent persons act."     Patino, 83 N.J. at 10 (citing Brinegar v. United

States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).

      Our Supreme Court has further recognized a distinction exists between

"generally detecting [a] smell of a prohibited substance and detecting a smell of

the substance of such a magnitude as to immediately suggest to officers that vast

quantities of the substance were present" which coupled with other observations

                                       12                                  A-2994-21
lends to probable cause. Cohen, 254 N.J. at 327. Additional factors that may

support probable cause include the commission of a motor vehicle violation,

failure to provide proper credentials, the defendant's demeanor and actions taken

during a motor vehicle stop, and other surrounding suspicious circumstances.

See State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 15-16 (2003).

      Judge Caulfield's finding of a permissive warrantless search of defendant's

vehicle's trunk under the automobile exception is also supported by sufficient

credible evidence in the record. She correctly recognized that "where there is

no basis to believe that an odor of marijuana is emanating from the trunk,

probable cause to search that area must be based on the existence of other

incriminating factors." The judge considered the totality of the circumstances

and found because additional suspicious contraband was discovered during the

search of the interior of the vehicle, the officers had probable cause to believe

further evidence of criminality would be found in the trunk.

      Defendant's argument that there was insufficient probable cause to search

the trunk based on defendant's providing "untruthful" credentials, "the

unremarkable amount of money," and "used marijuana grinder," is misplaced

because it ignores the other credible evidence. Specifically, the judge found the

following additional evidence sufficiently supported probable cause: $7,000 in

suspected counterfeit $100 bills wrapped with a note stating "[s]ee what you can

                                       13                                  A-2994-21
get me for this much," that was located in the driver's side of the vehicle; and

the label-less prescription bottle with "seven-and-a-half white bars" stamped

Xanax and approximately eight Suboxone strips, which were suspected CDS

located in the passenger compartment. Additionally, the officers found an I.D.

with defendant's name in the vehicle.      This evidence objectively provided

officers sufficient probable cause to search the trunk. We conclude Judge

Caulfield's finding that under the "totality of circumstances . . . there was

probable cause to believe that additional evidence of a crime would be found in

the trunk" was supported by sufficient credible evidence.

      Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

                                      14                                  A-2994-21