Court Opinion

ID: 9678644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:26:38.971287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.456558
License: Public Domain

Justice OWEN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot readily distinguish the statute at issue in this case from the city ordinance at issue in City of Ladue v. Gilleo.1 The reasoning in that and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have dealt with restrictions on signage lead me to conclude that the Texas Highway Beautification Act is infirm.
I
The Court presumes that the sign at issue is not commercial speech, and the *107Texas Department of Transportation does not contend otherwise. I therefore presume that the speech at issue is noncommercial.
I question, though, whether the restrictions on speech that the Act imposes are content neutral. The Act permits on-site commercial speech and some noncommercial speech, but prohibits an owner of property from expressing a broad range of noncommercial speech. Neither the legislative history nor the record in this case suggests that the secondary effects of signs like Barber’s distinguish them from speech that is permissible under the Act.
On rural property, the Act bans “outdoor advertising,” which includes signs “designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform if any part of the advertising or information is visible from the main-traveled way of the interstate or primary system.” 2 There are a number of exceptions to this ban, including a broad exemption for “outdoor advertising solely for activities conducted on the property on which it is located.”3 Other exceptions permit directional advertising for a natural wonder or scenic or historic attraction, signs indicating that the property is for sale or lease, signs that have the purpose of protecting life or property, historical markers,4 and election signs for ninety days preceding an election and ten days thereafter.5
In City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,6 a city was “[m]otivated by its interest in the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks” to ban commercial publications on freestanding newsracks located on public property.7 Other newsracks containing newspapers were permitted. Two distributors of commercial publications challenged the ordinance. One of them, Discovery Network, had 38 newsracks through which about one-third of its magazines were distributed.8 The magazines promoted adult educational, recreational, and social programs offered by Discovery Network, along with some information about current events of general interest.9 The other distributor, Harmon Publishing, had 24 newsracks through which about 15% of its magazines were distributed.10 These magazines contained real estate listings and photographs of residential property and some information about interest rates and other real estate matters.11 Because the banned publications were commercial speech, the Court held that the City’s burden was at least12 “to establish a ‘reasonable fit’ between its legitimate interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition of newsracks as the means chosen to serve those interests.” 13 The City failed to meet this burden.
The Supreme Court’s rationale in Discovery Network is instructive. The City’s failure “to address its recently developed *108concern about newsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it has not ‘carefully calculated’ the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speech imposed by its prohibition.” 14 The Court characterized “the removal of 62 newsracks while about 1,500-2,000 remain[ed] in place” as “ ‘minute’ ” and “ ‘paltry,’ ” indicating the lack of “ ‘fit’ ” between the City’s goal and its method.15
The Supreme Court said the City’s basis for discrimination had not been justified: “We accept the validity of the city’s proposition, but consider it an insufficient justification for the discrimination against respondents’ use of newsracks that are no more harmful than the permitted news-racks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number of newsracks on the city’s sidewalks.”16 The Court continued:
Not only does Cincinnati’s categorical ban on commercial newsracks place too much importance on the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible means of responding to the city’s admittedly legitimate interests.17
In the case before us today, I do not see how Barber’s sign is any more harmful than the signs that are permitted by the Texas Act.
With regard to whether the Texas Act is content neutral, the United States Supreme Court said in Discovery Network that “government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in protected speech provided that they are adequately justified ‘ “without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” ’ ”18 The Supreme Court held that the restrictions in Discovery Network were not content neutral. The City had “enacted a sweeping ban on the use of newsracks that distribute ‘commercial handbills,’ but not ‘newspapers.’ ”19 Accordingly, “whether any particular news-rack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content based.’ ”20 The same is true of the Texas Act. Whether a sign is prohibited can only be determined by examining its content.
The secondary effects attributable to the newsracks at issue in Discovery Network did not distinguish them from permitted newsracks. The Supreme Court said: “In contrast to the speech at issue in Renton, there are no secondary effects attributable to respondent publishers’ newsracks that distinguish them from the newsracks Cincinnati permits to remain on its sidewalks.”21 The secondary effects of noncommercial speech that is banned by the Texas Act are no greater or different than those of the speech that is permitted.
*109The ordinance in Discovery Network was neither content neutral nor narrowly tailored.22 The Supreme Court held that “regardless of whether or not it leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, it cannot be justified as a legitimate time, place, or manner restriction ....”23 And “because the ban is predicated on the content of the publications distributed by the subject news-racks, it is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.”24 The Texas Act, like the Discovery Network ordinance, is neither content neutral nor narrowly tailored, and therefore is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction on protected speech.
This Court incorrectly analyzes the reach of the Texas Act’s ban in attempting to distinguish Discovery Network. The Court says that the Texas Act permits all commercial and noncommercial speech in rural areas as long as “the speech relates to an activity on the premises.” 25 But the Act looks at the content of speech to determine whether signage that is unrelated to on-site activities is permitted. The Act permits “directional or other official outdoor advertising ... pertaining to a natural wonder or a scenic or historic attraction.”26 This type of signage is not required to be on-site. Nor are election signs required to have anything to do with on-site activities. But election signs are permitted.27
This Court fails to apply the “commonsense” approach that Discovery Network applied in determining whether a ban on speech is content based. The ban imposed by the Texas Act is content based “by any commonsense understanding of the term”28 because the content of speech must be examined to determine whether it relates to on-site activities or is otherwise permissible under the Act. Its content determines whether it is permitted or prohibited.
The Supreme Court also said in Discovery Network: “Cincinnati has enacted a sweeping ban that bars from its sidewalks a whole class of constitutionally protected speech.”29 The Texas Act contains a sweeping ban of all political speech, unless it relates to on-site activities or is contained in an election sign that is restricted by size and the dates on which it may be displayed. The Texas Act sweeps too broadly.
II
Even if the Texas Act were content neutral, the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in City of Ladue30 leads me to conclude that the Texas Act does not pass constitutional muster. In Ladue, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the restrictions on speech in that case were not content based.31 The Court nevertheless struck down the ordinance.32 Applying the rationale articulated by a unanimous Court in City of Ladue, with Justice O’ConnoR concurring only to raise questions about whether the Court should *110have assumed that the ordinance was not content based,33 I am not prepared to say that the facts in this case distinguish it from City of Ladue.
In City of Ladue, the owner of a residence displayed an 8-inch by 11-inch sign in a window of her residence that said, “Say No to War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.”34 The sign at issue in the case before us today is larger than the sign at issue in City of Ladue and was erected on private property that was not the residence of the owner. But I cannot read the United States Supreme Court’s decision so narrowly as to turn entirely on the size of the sign, or more importantly, whether the owner of private property resided on that property.
The stated purpose of the ordinance at issue in City of Ladue is similar to one of the purposes of the Texas Act at issue today. In Ladue, the Court noted:
Thus, according to the Declaration of Findings, Policies, Interests, and Purposes supporting the ordinance, the permitted signs, unlike the prohibited signs, are unlikely to contribute to the dangers of “unlimited proliferation” associated with categories of signs that are not inherently limited in number.35
The Court in Ladue said that the exemptions in the ordinance at issue in that case shed light on whether too much speech was prohibited and diminished the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting some types of speech but not others:
Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.... In this case, at the very least, the exemptions from Ladue’s ordinance demonstrate that Ladue has concluded that the interest in allowing certain messages to be conveyed by means of residential signs outweighs the City’s esthetic interest in eliminating outdoor signs. Ladue has not imposed a flat ban on signs because it has determined that at least some of them are too vital to be banned.36
The credibility of the Texas Act is diminished by the exemptions that it permits. The exemptions in City of Ladue were not enough, however, standing alone, to persuade the Supreme Court that the prohibition at issue was unconstitutional. The Court said that it would first “ask whether Ladue may properly prohibit [the property owner] from displaying her sign, and then, only if necessary, consider the separate question whether it was improper for the City simultaneously to permit certain other signs.”37
The Supreme Court noted that Ladue’s ordinance, like the Texas Act, “covers even such absolutely pivotal speech as a sign protesting an imminent governmental decision to go to war.”38 And, the Ladue ordinance, like the Texas Act, foreclosed a “venerable means” of communication, which is displaying a sign on private property expressing the owner’s political views:
Ladue has almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication *111that is both unique and important. It has totally foreclosed that medium to political, religious, or personal messages. Signs that react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial issue both reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during which they are displayed to signal the resident’s support for particular candidates, parties, or causes. They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression.39
The Supreme Court then noted that “[o]ur prior decisions have voiced particular concern with laws that foreclose an entire medium of expression,” and that “by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.”40 Placing a sign on one’s own property is a common means of speaking, even if the property is not the owner’s residence.
The City of Ladue argued, like the State argues in this case, that it was merely regulating the time, place and manner of speech, and the property owner remained free to communicate by other means.41 The Supreme Court was unpersuaded: “[W]e are not persuaded that adequate substitutes exist for the important medium of speech that Ladue has closed off.”42 Similarly, the Supreme Court said in Discovery Network that “even if we assume, arguendo, that the city might entirely prohibit the use of newsracks on public property, as long as this avenue of communication remains open, these devices continue to play a significant role in the dissemination of protected speech.”43 Signs on private property expressing the owner’s viewpoint play a significant role in the dissemination of protected speech.
In City of Ladue, the Supreme Court discussed the unique impact that a small residential sign could have and noted that residential signs are “an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication.”44 But the Court also recognized that even for those of means, the cost of taking out a newspaper advertisement or handing out leaflets “may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate.”45 The Supreme Court said:
Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one’s house with a handheld sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate. Furthermore, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach neighbors, an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means.46
In the case before us today, the Court distinguishes City of Ladue in part on the basis that Barber was attempting to reach *112those traveling on a highway rather than residents in a neighborhood.47 But I cannot read the decision in Ladue so narrowly. Barber could not express his views about the searches occurring on the highway “nearly as well by other m,eans.”48 As the United States Supreme Court said: “The elimination of a cheap and handy medium of expression is especially apt to deter individuals from communicating their views to the public, for unlike businesses (and even political organizations) individuals generally realize few tangible benefits from such communication.”49
Barber is an attorney, and the content of his sign could arguably lead clients who had been subjected to a search to retain him. But again, the State has not contended that the speech at issue was commercial, and if Barber’s sign had contained other speech, such as: “Protect a woman’s right to choose, make your voice heard,” or: “A child is created at conception,” or encouraging a visit to a place of worship of a particular faith or denomination, such a sign would have been unlawful under the Act.
The United States Supreme Court did emphasize in City of Ladue that “[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been a part of our culture and our law,” and that “[mjost Americans would be understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their window an 8-inch by 11-inch sign expressing their political views.”50 But I think that owners of rural property, even if they do not live on the property, would be dismayed to learn that they cannot place even a single sign on that property expressing their political views, although they would be permitted to display a sign that said, “Watermelons for sale” if they erected a fruit stand on the property. Preserving scenic beauty and promoting public safety are legitimate aims, but the State could have limited the number or density of signs that an owner may display on property abutting highways and achieved the same end. Or the State could have regulated the size of signage, as it has done with election signs that are permitted.51 Instead, it prohibited a broad range of noncommercial speech while permitting other noncommercial and commercial speech, and during certain times of the year, other political speech. The- Texas Act permits some political speech, such as election signs, but broadly bans all other political speech and a broad range of other noncommercial signage, unless it relates to an on-site activity. The distinctions drawn by the Act are not justified by its laudable purposes.
Accordingly, I must dissent.

. 512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994).

. Tex. Transp. Code § 391.001(10).

. Id. § 391.031(b).

. Id.

. Id. § 391.005.

. 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993).

. Id. at 412, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id. at 413, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id. at 412-13, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id. at 416 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (stating that the Court need not decide whether the City's policy should be subjected to more exacting review).

. Id. at 416, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id. at 418, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id.

. Id. at 424, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (emphasis in original).

. Id. at 428, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984))).

. Id. at 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id.

. Id. at 430, 113 S.Ct. 1505 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)).

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Ill S.W.3dat99.

. Tex. Transp. Code § 391.031(b).

. Id. § 391.005.

. 507 U.S. at 429, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. Id. at 430, 113 S.Ct. 1505.

. 512 U.S. 43, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994).

. Id. at 53, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 58, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 59, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 45, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 52, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 52-53, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

.Id. at 53, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (emphasis in original).

.Id. at 54, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 54-55, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 55, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id. at 56, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id.

. 507 U.S. 410, 427-28, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993).

. City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 57, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. Id.

.Id. (emphasis in original).

. Ill S.W.3dat98.

. City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 57, 114 S.Ct. ' 2038.

. Id. at n. 15, 114 S.Ct. 2038 (emphasis in original).

. Id. at 58, 114 S.Ct. 2038.

. See Tex. Transp. Code § 391.005 (limiting the surface area of election signs to 50 square feet).