Court Opinion

ID: 9948859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 05:07:31.275945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:10.710953
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

MICHIGAN REPUBLICAN PARTY and                                          FOR PUBLICATION
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,                                         March 7, 2024
                                                                       9:10 a.m.
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v                                                                      No. 364048
                                                                       Genesee Circuit Court
DAVINA DONAHUE, WILLIAM KIM, and                                       LC No. 22-118123-AV
STACEY KAAKE,

                Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and GARRETT, JJ.

M. J. KELLY, P.J.

        In this case under the Michigan Election Law, MCL 168.1 et seq.,1 plaintiffs, the Michigan
Republican Party and the Republican National Committee, appeal by right the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Davina Donahue, William Kim, and Stacie
Kaake,2 under MCR 2.116(I), on the basis that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. For
the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

                                          I. BASIC FACTS

        Plaintiffs initiated this action for declaratory relief and mandamus based upon their
allegations that, before the August 2, 2022 primary and the November 8, 2022 general election,

1
  Sections of the Michigan Election Law were recently amended by our Legislature. See 2024 PA
259. Because the amendments do no substantively alter the statutory provisions at issue in this
case, for ease of reference, citations to the pertinent statutory sections are to the current version of
the statute.
2
  During the dispute in this case, Donahue was the interim Flint city clerk, Kim was the Flint city
attorney, and Kaake was the Flint city assessor. All defendants were members of the Flint board
of election commissioners.

                                                  -1-
the city of Flint’s board of election commissioners violated the requirements stated in MCL
168.674 and MCL 168.765a, which require that a city’s board of election commissioners shall
appoint, “as nearly as possible,” the same number of election inspectors3 from each major political
party to work each in-person-voting election precinct and absent voter counting board.

        According to plaintiffs’ verified complaint, on May 12, 2022, they provided to the then-
Flint city clerk (Donahue’s predecessor) the applications of 122 Republicans who sought
appointment to work as election inspectors in the August 2, 2022 primary election. The board of
election commissioners, however, appointed 442 Democrat election inspectors and only 27
Republican election inspectors. After plaintiffs complained about how few Republicans had been
appointed, the board of election commissioners appointed an additional 22 Republicans to work
as election inspectors in the primary election.

        Thereafter, on September 9, 2022, plaintiffs sent a letter to the then-city clerk with a list of
61 Republicans interested in working as election inspectors for the November 8, 2022 general
election and asking for the clerk’s written assurance that the clerk would contact and seek to
appoint each of the 61 people listed. On October 15, 2022, the board of election commissioners
appointed 562 election inspectors, but only 57 were Republicans. Plaintiffs also received
anecdotal reports that city election officials were turning away Republicans who inquired about
serving as election inspectors. On October 21, 2022, plaintiffs sent a letter to defendants asking
the board of election commissioners to fulfill its statutory duty to appoint, as nearly as possible,
an equal number of election inspectors from each major political party. Plaintiffs also requested
that the board of election commissioners take affirmative steps to recruit Republican election
inspectors and facilitate their appointments. In response, on October 25, 2022, the Flint city
attorney stated that the board of election commissioners had, at that time, appointed over 120
Republican election inspectors and that the board intended to continue contacting the potential
Republican election inspectors that plaintiffs had previously identified.

        Three days later, on October 28, 2022, plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendants,
alleging violations of MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a. In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs sought
a declaratory judgment determining that the board of election commissioners was violating its
statutory duties regarding the partisan appointment of election inspectors. Plaintiffs also asked the
trial court to require the board of election inspectors to take several affirmative steps that plaintiffs
identified to recruit Republican election inspectors. Plaintiffs sought expedited proceedings and
requested an ex parte show-cause order requiring defendants to file an answer to plaintiffs’
complaint by noon on November 1, 2022. On October 31, 2022, the trial court entered a show-
cause order directing defendants to file an answer by 5:00 p.m. on November 1, 2022, and the
court scheduled the hearing for 12:30 p.m. on November 2, 2022.

        On November 1, 2022, defendants answered the trial court’s show-cause order and filed a
brief in opposition to plaintiffs’ request for writs of mandamus. As relevant to the issues raised
on appeal, defendants argued that they were entitled to summary disposition of plaintiffs’ claims
because plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the partisan composition of election-inspector

3
    Election inspectors are the poll workers who administer in-person voting and count ballots.

                                                  -2-
appointees. Following the show-cause hearing, the trial court agreed, and entered an order
dismissing plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice. This appeal follows.

                                          II. MOOTNESS

         We must first address defendants’ assertion that the issues raised on appeal are moot. “The
applicability of a legal doctrine, such as mootness, is a question of law which this Court reviews
de novo.” Can IV Packard Square v Packard Square LLC, 328 Mich App 656, 661; 939 NW2d
454 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether a case is moot is an issue that may be
raised by a party at any time, and it is a threshold question that a court must address before
considering the substantive issues of the case. Equity Funding Inc v Milford, 342 Mich App 342,
349; 994 NW2d 859 (2022). “As a general rule, this Court does not decide moot issues.” Can IV
Packard Square, 328 Mich App at 661. “An issue is moot if an event has occurred that renders it
impossible for the court to grant relief.” Gen Motors Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 290 Mich App
355, 386; 803 NW2d 698 (2010). “An issue is also moot when a judgment, if entered, cannot for
any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy.” Id. This case arises from an
alleged violation of election laws before the November 8, 2022 general election, which has already
occurred. Consequently, this case is moot regarding the 2022 general election because there is no
relief that this Court can provide to remedy any breach of election laws during that election.

        “However, a moot issue will be reviewed if it is publicly significant, likely to recur, and
yet likely to evade judicial review.” Barrow v Detroit Election Comm, 305 Mich App 649, 660;
854 NW2d 489 (2014). An election-law issue is typically one of public significance when the
“interpretation and application of Michigan’s election laws extend beyond” a particular election
and affect “future candidates and the public.” Gleason v Kincaid, 323 Mich App 308, 315-316;
917 NW2d 685 (2018). Here, the question regarding who can seek enforcement of MCL 168.674
and MCL 168.765a extends beyond the 2022 general election. The issue is not confined to the
circumstances of a particular elected office or ballot question in a single election. Election
inspectors must be appointed to work at every election. MCL 168.672. Boards of election
commissioners are required to appoint election inspectors from each major political party in equal-
as-possible numbers for each election, and major county party chairpersons are entitled to
challenge the appointment of individual election inspectors in every election in which a state or
federal office appears on the ballot. MCL 168.674(2)—(3). Therefore, whether a major political
party has standing to enforce the partisan-composition requirements of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL
168.765a(2) is a question of public significance.

        The issue of who has standing to enforce the partisan-composition requirements is also
likely to recur. An issue is likely to recur when a statute at issue is expected to be implemented
again in the future. T & V Assoc, Inc v Dir of Health & Human Servs, ___ Mich App ___, ___;
___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 361727); slip op at 4, lv pending. Regarding election law, an
issue is considered likely to recur when it is expected that the same controversy will arise in future
elections. Barrow, 305 Mich App at 660. Unless the partisan-composition requirements of MCL
168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) are repealed, they will be implemented in every election.
Moreover, the fact that MCL 168.674 sets forth a process by which the county chair of a major
political party may challenge election-inspector appointments shows that partisan challenges to
election-inspector appointments are expected. Consequently, challenges to the partisan

                                                 -3-
composition of slates of election-inspector appointees—and who has standing to enforce the
requirements—are likely to recur.

        Finally, election inspectors are appointed at least 21 days before an election. MCL
168.674(1).4 Even if this Court expeditiously considered an appeal in a similar challenge, it is
unlikely any relief could be implemented before an election. If this Court ordered a board of
election commissioners to recruit and appoint more election inspectors from a particular party, the
board would then have to actually recruit people and make the appointments. From the time
appointments are made, the process for major party county chairpersons to challenge the
qualifications of individual election inspectors can last up to eight days. MCL 168.674(3) and (4).
Further, the election inspectors must be trained before election day. MCL 168.683. In light of
“the strict time constraints” necessitated by the election process, “in all likelihood, such challenges
often will not be completed before a given election occurs, rendering the discussion, as in this case,
moot before appellate review.” Gleason, 323 Mich App at 316. Therefore, the issue is likely to
evade judicial review.

       In sum, although the issues raised in this case are moot as to the 2022 general election,
because the case involves a matter of public significance that is likely to recur, yet evade judicial
review, we will reach the merits of the appeal.

                                 III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition under MCR
2.116(I)(1) because, contrary to the trial court’s determination, they have standing to bring their
claims. This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition. Sobiecki
v Dep’t of Corrections, 271 Mich App 139, 140; 721 NW2d 229 (2006). Under MCR 2.116(I)(1),
“[i]f the pleadings show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if the affidavits
or other proofs show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court shall render judgment
without delay.” Whether a party has standing is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
Connell v Lima Twp, 336 Mich App 263, 281; 970 NW2d 354 (2021). Likewise, we review de
novo questions of statutory interpretation. Id.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

        The appointment of election inspectors is partisan in nature. Those applying to be election
inspectors must designate their political party affiliation. MCL 168.677(2). On or before May 15
of each year, “the county chair of a major political party may submit to the city or township clerks
in that county a list of individuals who are interested in serving as an election inspector in that

4
  Under the version of the statute in effect at the time of the 2022 general election, MCL 168.674(a)
provided that election inspectors had to be appointed between 21 and 40 days before each election.
See 2018 PA 120. Because the issues related to the 2022 primary are moot, we rely upon the time
limits that will, likely, be present during future disputes.

                                                 -4-
county.” MCL 168.673a.5 Each voting precinct must have at least three election inspectors. MCL
168.672. A city’s board of election commissioners is required to appoint at least three election
inspectors to each precinct and may appoint as many election inspectors as, in the board’s opinion,
are “required for the efficient, speedy, and proper conduct of the election.” MCL 168.674(1).
“The board of election commissioners shall appoint at least 1 election inspector from each major
political party and shall appoint an equal number, as nearly as possible, of election inspectors in
each election precinct from each major political party.” MCL 168.674(2). “The board of election
commissioners may appoint as election inspector an individual on the list submitted by a major
political party . . . .” MCL 168.674(1). Election-inspector appointments must be made at least 21
days before election day. MCL 168.674(1). Within two days of appointing election inspectors, a
board of election commissioners must, in writing, notify “the county chair of each major political
party of the names and political party affiliations of appointed election inspectors and the precincts
to which those inspectors were appointed.” MCL 168.674(2).

        Under MCL 168.764d, a city clerk may enter into an agreement with other cities to create
an absent voter counting board that counts all the absentee votes from each participating city. The
same rules regarding the process for appointing partisan election inspectors for in-person voting
at precincts apply to the appointment of election inspectors to an absent voter counting board.
MCL 168.765a(2) and (4). There must always be at least one election inspector from each major
political party present at an absent voter counting board. MCL 168.765a(8).

        The county chairperson of a major political party has a statutory right to challenge an
individual’s appointment to serve as an election inspector. MCL 168.674(3). Within four days of
receiving the list of appointed election inspectors from a board of election commissioners, a major
political party county chairperson may challenge an individual election inspector’s appointment
on the basis of the “qualifications of the election inspector, the legitimacy of the election
inspector’s political party affiliation, or whether there is a properly completed declaration of
political party affiliation in the application for that election inspector on file in the clerk’s office.”
MCL 168.674(3). A major party county chairperson’s challenge to an election inspector’s
appointment is brought to the city’s board of election commissioners. MCL 168.674(3). If the
challenge is to the appointee’s political affiliation, the appointee is given two business days to
respond to the challenge, and the appointment is revoked if the appointee does not respond. MCL
168.674(4). The board must decide the partisan challenge and notify the county chairperson of
the decision within two business days of receiving the appointee’s response. MCL 168.674(4).

        MCL 168.674 does not explicitly grant a major party county chairperson a right to
challenge the requirement that the board must appoint, as nearly as possible, an equal number of
election inspectors from each major political party to each election precinct. See MCL 168.674.
Indeed, MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) are silent regarding who, if anyone, has standing

5
 The Republican party is a major political party. See MCL 168.16 (stating that the major political
parties are “the 2 political parties whose candidate for the office of secretary of state received the
highest and second highest number of votes at the immediately preceding general election in which
a secretary of state was elected.”).

                                                   -5-
to enforce the partisan-composition. On appeal, plaintiffs argue that, under Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n
v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), they have standing.

        In Lansing Sch, the Supreme Court explained that, historically, “[t]he purpose of the
standing doctrine is to assess whether a litigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ensure sincere
and vigorous advocacy.” Id. at 355 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the doctrine,
“the standing inquiry focuses on whether a litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of a
particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). In Lansing Sch, the Court held that

        a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action. Further, whenever
        a litigant meets the requirements of MCR 2.605, it is sufficient to establish standing
        to seek a declaratory judgment. Where a cause of action is not provided at law,
        then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A
        litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right,
        or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from
        the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended
        to confer standing on the litigant. [Id.]

        Plaintiffs concede that they do not have a legal cause of action because MCL 168.674 and
MCL 168.765a do not create an explicit statutory right for a major political party to sue to enforce
the partisan-composition provisions.6 Plaintiffs argue instead that they have standing to enforce
the partisan-composition provisions because (1) they meet the requirements for seeking a
declaratory judgment under MCR 2.605, (2) they have a special right, a special injury, or a
substantial interest, which is detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at
large, and (3) the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing upon
the major political parties to enforce the partisan-composition requirements.

         We first address plaintiffs’ argument that the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature
intended to confer standing upon them to enforce the partisan-composition requirements.
Generally, “ordinary citizens have standing to enforce the law in election cases.” Deleeuw v State
Bd of Canvassers, 263 Mich App 497, 506; 688 NW2d 847 (2004). That is “because without the
process of elections, citizens lack their ordinary recourse.” Id. at 505-506. However, when there
is a “statute to the contrary,” a private person may not seek mandamus to enforce an election law
“without showing a special interest distinct from the interest of the public.” League of Women
Voters of Mich v Secretary of State, 506 Mich 561, 587; 957 NW2d 731 (2020).

        In White v Highland Park Election Comm, 312 Mich App 571, 573; 878 NW2d 491 (2015),
this Court held that the provisions of MCL 168.674(3) and (4) that allow major party chairpersons
to challenge the appointment of individual election inspectors strips the right to seek enforcement

6
  It is worth noting that, because MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a do not create an explicit
statutory right for the chair of a major political party to sue to enforce the partisan-composition
provisions, such an individual also lacks a legal cause of action and would have to rely upon the
alternative methods set forth in Lansing Sch in order to establish standing to enforce the partisan-
composition requirements.

                                                  -6-
of the partisan-composition provision of MCL 168.674(2) from citizens who do not have a special
interest in the enforcement of the statute. This Court’s decision in White indicates that major party
county chairpersons are essentially delegated the responsibility to enforce the partisan-
composition provision of MCL 168.674(2) on behalf of the major political parties. Id. Plaintiffs
argue that, nevertheless, the statutory framework implies that the Legislature intended for major
political party state and national organizations to enforce the partisan-composition provisions of
MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2).

        Plaintiffs’ central contention is that MCL 168.674(2) confers a right to partisan parity of
election-inspector appointments to major political parties’ state and national organizations,
whereas MCL 168.674(3) and (4) create a separate and distinct right for major party county
chairpersons regarding challenges to individual election-inspector appointments. In support of
their positions, both plaintiffs and defendants invoke the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius, which means “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” See Mich
Ambulatory Surgical Ctr v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 334 Mich App 622, 632; 965 NW2d
650 (2020). Under the expressio-unius doctrine, it is presumed that, when the Legislature employs
a list or series in a statute, the Legislature intended to exclude all items that are not listed. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that by expressly granting major party county chairpersons the authority to
challenge the qualifications of individual election-inspector appointees, the Legislature intended
to exclude from county chairpersons the authority to challenge the overall partisan composition of
election-inspector appointees. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that by expressly giving
authority to only county chairpersons regarding partisan challenges to election-inspector
appointees, the Legislature intended to exclude all others from making partisan challenges to the
appointment of election inspectors.

       Given that it appears that the expressio-unius doctrine could be invoked by both parties,
we conclude that the more appropriate canon of statutory construction to employ is casus omissus
pro omisso habendus est (nothing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies). See
Id. Under casus-omissus doctrine, a court is prohibited “from supplying provisions omitted by the
Legislature.” Id.

        Here, considering the Michigan Election Law as a whole, it can be properly concluded that
the Legislature intended to omit a right for major political party state and national organizations to
challenge the partisan composition of a slate of election-inspector appointees. Indeed, the
Legislature has shown that it knows how to give authority to a major political party’s statewide
organization when it chooses to do so. Under the Michigan Election Law, the state board of
canvassers is responsible for receiving the election results from across the state, determining the
outcome of each election and ballot question, and certifying the results. MCL 168.841(1). The
Legislature has given the state central committee of each major political party the ability to
nominate three of its members for appointment to the state board of canvassers and submit those
nominees to the governor. MCL 168.22a(1).7 In addition, the Legislature has (recently) directed
that the majority leaders and minority leaders shall also submit the names of one individual to

7
 Under the recently amended version of MCL 168.22a, a nominating role is also given to the
majority and minority leaders in the senate and house. See MCL 168.22a(1)(b).

                                                 -7-
serve as nominee for each position that is up for reappointment of that major political party. MCL
168.22a(1)(a). Further, under the recently amended version of MCL 168.22a, a nominating role
is also given to the majority and minority leaders in the senate and house. See MCL 168.22a(1)(b).
The governor is then required to appoint one of the nominated individuals to the state board of
canvassers. MCL 168.22a(1). If a state central committee of a major political party or the majority
or minority leaders of the same major political party fail to provide nominees to the governor, the
governor is, nevertheless, required to nominate a member of that major political party to the state
board of canvassers. MCL 168.22a(5).

        The Legislature has also given state and national parties the ability to have direct control
over who may monitor election inspectors’ administration of polling and ballot counting. Poll
inspectors are not the only volunteers the major parties rely upon to promote the integrity of
elections at polling and ballot-counting facilities. Political parties and other interested
organizations have a statutory right to appoint election challengers and coordinate election
challengers’ activities. MCL 168.730(1) and (3). Election challengers have the right to raise
challenges to a person’s right to vote, perceived election process violations by election inspectors,
and perceived violations of ballot-counting procedures. MCL 168.733(1). State or local officials
must approve a party or organization’s eligibility to appoint election challengers. MCL
168.731(1).

        In contrast, MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a do not provide any role directly to the state
or national organizations of major political parties. A board of election commissioners’ duty to
make partisan appointments is independent of the actions of a major political party’s state and
national organizations. The statutes only give a role to major political party county chairpersons,
and that role is limited. Major party county chairpersons may submit lists of prospective election-
inspector appointees to city clerks. MCL 168.673a. However, prospective election inspectors
must apply for the position directly to a city clerk. MCL 168.677(1). Boards of election
commissioners may, but are not required to appoint candidates from a county chairperson’s list.
MCL 168.674(1). Thus, MCL 168.674(1) anticipates that a board of election commissioners will
not rely exclusively on the major party county chairpersons, or the efforts of state and national
organizations, to fulfill the partisan-composition requirements. Moreover, after making election-
inspector appointments, a board of election commissioners is required to send a list of appointees
and their party affiliations to major party county chairpersons, not the major political parties’ state
or national organizations. MCL 168.674(2).

        To construe MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a as granting to major political parties’ state
and national organizations a right to enforce the partisan-composition provisions would read into
the statutes provisions that the Legislature did not include. The Legislature has shown in other
statutes that it knows how to give authority to major political parties’ state or national
organizations. The responsibility for appointing as-equal-as-possible numbers of election
inspectors from the two major political parties rests with boards of election commissioners. The
statutes at issue in this case only offer a role to county chairpersons to assist boards of election
commissioners in locating prospective election inspectors to meet the partisan-composition
requirements. The Legislature has not given state or national political party organizations a role
in that process. Therefore, major political party county chairpersons, not plaintiffs, are the proper
parties to litigate the responsibilities of boards of election commissioners to fulfill their statutory
obligations. See White, 312 Mich App at 573.

                                                 -8-
        In conclusion, the statutory schemes of MCL 168.674 and MCL 168.765a do not imply
that the Legislature intended to confer standing upon major political parties to enforce the partisan-
composition requirements of the statutes. Plaintiffs do not have standing on that basis to bring
their claims in this case.

        We next address plaintiffs’ argument that they have standing to enforce the partisan-
composition requirements of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) on the basis that they have
a special injury, right, or substantial interest regarding the enforcement of the statutes. Although
this Court has not addressed whether major political parties have standing to enforce the partisan-
composition provisions of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a, this Court has addressed the issue
as it pertains to an individual. See White, 312 Mich App at 572. In White, the plaintiff, an
individual, brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment against the Highland Park Election
Commission and a writ of mandamus to require the commission to appoint Republican election
inspectors when no Republicans had applied for the position or been appointed. Id. The trial court
ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the claims. Id. This Court agreed, reasoning as
follows:

               . . . MCL 168.674(2) provides no legal cause of action, neither to White nor
       to any other member of the public, to enforce its provisions. Nor does White, who
       as to this issue is no different than all other members of the public (and she did not
       even allege that she was a resident of Highland Park, where the electors would have
       been working), have a substantial interest in seeing the statute enforced. See
       Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372. Indeed, the statute explicitly gives the
       right to enforce the political party designations to the major political party county
       chairs, MCL 168.674(3), which is consistent with other parts of the statute that
       allow those same county chairs to submit names on behalf of their parties to city
       election officials for use as election inspectors. See MCL 168.673a and MCL
       168.674(1). As noted, the statute does not provide for a civil cause of action, but
       instead provides county chairs with the ability to file administrative appeals to
       challenge certain inspector appointments. MCL 168.674(3) and (4). In essence,
       the Legislature has created a form of public enforcement through an administrative
       appeal process, and has made that process available only to county chairs of the
       major political parties. White does not have standing to sue to enforce the
       provisions of MCL 168.674. [Id. at 573.]

        Plaintiffs do not argue that White was incorrectly decided. Rather, they argue that the trial
court erred by applying White to this case without separately considering the test for standing
articulated in Lansing Sch. According to plaintiffs, the holding in White only applied to the specific
facts of that case. We agree because, although the White Court applied the standing test from
Lansing Sch to an individual, it did not address whether the standing analysis would be different
for a major political party. Id. at 572-573. Therefore, the decision in White is instructive, but not
dispositive. We must, therefore, consider whether plaintiffs have shown under the analysis from
Lansing Sch that they have a special injury, right, or a substantial interest regarding the
enforcement of the partisan-composition provisions that is different from the interest of the public
at large.

                                                 -9-
        In Lansing Sch, the Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring
claims on the basis that the statute at issue conferred upon them a substantial interest or a special
right that, if violated, would injure them in a way that was different from the injury suffered by the
public at large. Lansing Sch, 487 Mich at 373. The plaintiffs were four Lansing School District
teachers, the Lansing Schools Education Association, the Michigan Education Association, and
the National Education Association. Id. at 353. The teachers alleged that they were physically
assaulted by students in a school and the students were suspended, but not expelled. Id. The
plaintiffs filed suit against the Lansing School District and the Lansing Board of Education seeking
a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus to force the defendants to enforce
MCL 380.1311a(1), which requires a school district to expel a student who physically assaults a
school employee at school. Id. at 353-354. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing
“because they have a substantial interest in the enforcement of MCL 380.1311a(1) that will be
detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large if the statute is not
enforced.” Id. at 373. The Court observed that “the purpose of the section is to create a safer
school environment and, even more specifically, a safer and more effective working environment
for teachers.” Id. at 374. The teachers’ interest in enforcing that right was different from the
citizenry at large because members of the public are generally not inside schools and only an
assault against a school employee led to the mandatory expulsion of the offending student. Id.
Therefore, the statute conferred upon the teachers a right to be protected from physical assault and
the plaintiffs had standing to seek enforcement of that statutory right. Id. at 376.8

        In Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629; 537 NW2d 436 (1995), the
Supreme Court considered another case involving whether the plaintiffs had an interest that was
different from the public at large. In that case, the Detroit city council had appropriated funds for
the city to hire more firefighters, and the mayor of Detroit refused to spend the appropriated funds
for that purpose. Id. at 632. The Detroit Fire Fighters Association and several of its firefighter-
members sought a writ of mandamus to require the mayor to spend the funds that the city council
had appropriated and hire more firefighters. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the firefighters suffered
a unique injury because the failure of the city to hire more firefighters caused the existing

8
  The Court held that the professional organization plaintiffs had standing in the case because it
was undisputed that the teacher-plaintiffs were members of the professional organizations and an
organization has standing to litigate the interests of its members when the members personally
have standing. Lansing Sch, 487 Mich at 373 n 21. Plaintiffs briefly contend that they have
organizational standing based upon the interests and rights of the individual Republican election
inspectors that allegedly lost their opportunity to serve as election inspectors due to the actions of
defendants. We disagree. Plaintiffs have not shown that their individual members would have
standing to challenge a board of election commissioners’ decision to not appoint them to an
election inspector position. In general, individuals do not have a right to hold an appointed
governmental position. Aguirre v Michigan, 315 Mich App 706, 717; 891 NW2d 516 (2016).
Moreover, MCL 168.674(1) and (2) do not require that any person in particular be appointed.
Plaintiffs argument, therefore, lacks merit.
       A closer question, and one not raised on appeal, is whether plaintiffs would have
organizational standing based upon the rights and interests of the Republican chair for Genesee
County. Because the issue has not been raised, we decline to consider it.

                                                -10-
firefighters to incur greater risks of physical harm, emotional distress, and a loss of morale, as well
as alleging that the department would lose efficiency of operations. Id. at 635. The Court held
that the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury unique from the general public. Id. at 638. The Court
noted that a firefighter who fights 200 fires a year is at greater risk of injury than a firefighter who
fights 100 fires a year. Id. However, the Court concluded that having fewer firefighters in the fire
department increased the risk of physical harm for both the firefighters and the residents of the city
who were at danger during fires. Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs lacked standing because the interest
in having more firefighters employed by the city was shared between the members of the fire
department and the members of the public at large. Id.

        This case is more similar to Detroit Fire Fighters than it is to Lansing Sch. In Lansing Sch,
the statute at issue was designed to protect school employees from physical harm and to help
teachers better educate students. Lansing Sch, 487 Mich at 374. There was a benefit conferred
directly upon school employees that was in service to the broader goal of providing a better
education to students. The benefit to the public at large was attenuated from the primary purpose
of the statute. Here, the benefit of the statute is not as directly conferred upon major political
parties as it was upon the teachers in Lansing Sch. Rather, the partisan-composition requirements
of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) create a right for major political parties insofar as they
make it easier for the major political parties to help protect the integrity of elections. However,
the statutes at issue in this case cannot be interpreted as providing some benefit or assistance to a
major political party toward having its candidates elected. The Michigan Constitution requires the
Legislature to preserve the “purity” of elections. 1963 Const, art II, § 4. Statutes must be construed
in a manner that is constitutional when possible. Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault v Mich
Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 317 Mich App 1, 24; 894 NW2d 758 (2016). Although the Michigan
Election Law gives the major political parties a role in the administration of elections, the statutes
must be read as a means of preserving the purity of elections. The benefit to a major political party
of having its candidate elected is ancillary to the goal of ensuring the proper outcome of an election.
The benefit of the partisan-composition provisions of MCL 168.764(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) is
conferred upon the public at large. Having equal numbers of election inspectors from both major
political parties serves a checks-and-balances function in the administration of elections. When
an equal number of election inspectors are members of each major political party, there is a reduced
chance that a party’s members will commit improprieties. In that regard, partisan balance also
offers to the public some assurance of propriety in polling and ballot counting because the public
knows that one major political party has not been allowed to administer an election unchecked.
That is, like in Detroit Fire Fighters, the intent behind the legislation at issue is to provide a benefit
to the public at large. See Detroit Fire Fighters, 449 Mich at 638. In Detroit Fire Fighters, the
plaintiffs had the most to gain from the hiring of new firefighters, but that interest was secondary
to the primary goal behind the legislation, which was to provide greater safety to the public.
Similarly, in this case, the legislation at issue is helpful to major political parties. But the overall
benefit of the statutes falls upon the public at large. The benefit of election integrity is shared by
each member of the public, rather than benefiting major political parties more than the public.
Therefore, plaintiffs do not have a special right or a substantial interest in the enforcement of MCL
168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2) that is different from the public and do not have standing to
enforce the statutes on that basis.

       Plaintiffs also contend that they suffered a special injury because they expended time and
resources to recruit Republican election-inspector candidates and they were injured when the board

                                                  -11-
of election commissioners did not appoint those candidates. Plaintiffs were not injured in a unique
way on the basis of any violations of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2). The statutes do not
give a direct role to the major political parties’ state or national organizations in the appointment
of partisan election inspectors and a board of election commissioners is not required to appoint
election-inspector candidates that are identified by major political parties. MCL 168.674(2) and
MCL 168.765a(2) did not require defendants to act in response to plaintiffs’ efforts. Therefore,
any alleged injury plaintiffs suffered regarding unrequited efforts to have Republican election-
inspector candidates appointed was not a result of noncompliance with MCL 168.674(2) and MCL
168.765a(2). Stated differently, defendants’ actions (or inactions) did not injure plaintiffs because
defendants were not required to act in any particular way in response to plaintiffs’ recruitment
activities. Thus, plaintiffs have not shown that they suffer a special injury when the partisan-
composition provisions of the statutes are violated.

       In conclusion, plaintiffs have not shown special injury, right, or a substantial interest in the
enforcement of the partisan-composition provisions of MCL 168.674(2) or MCL 168.765a(2).
Therefore, plaintiffs do not have standing to enforce the statutes on that basis.

      Finally, plaintiffs argue that they have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment pursuant
to MCR 2.605. Under MCR 2.605(A)(1):

                In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of
        record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking
        a declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.

In Rose v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 274 Mich App 291, 294; 732 NW2d 160 (2006), this Court
explained:

                The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to enable the parties to obtain
        adjudication of rights before an actual injury occurs, to settle a matter before it
        ripens into a violation of the law or a breach of contract, or to avoid multiplicity of
        actions by affording a remedy for declaring in expedient action the rights and
        obligations of all litigants.

“[T]o assert a claim for declaratory judgment under MCR 2.605, the plaintiff (1) must allege a
‘case of actual controversy’ within the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) the claimant must be an
‘interested party seeking a declaratory judgment.’ ” T & V Assoc, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op
at 6.

        We first consider whether plaintiffs are interested parties under MCR 2.605. “Generally,
a party has standing if the party has a real interest in the cause of action or the subject matter of
the cause of action.” Id. at ___; slip op at 7. When considering standing in the context of MCR
2.605, “a party’s interest is sufficient if the party has a legally protected interest that is in jeopardy
of being adversely affected . . . .” Id. at ___; slip op at 6.

        Although it does not appear that this Court or the Supreme Court has offered a definitive
statement, this Court’s post-Lansing-Sch decisions indicate that the inquiry into whether a plaintiff
has a sufficient interest to seek a declaratory judgment is not substantively different from the
inquiry into whether a plaintiff can establish standing by showing a special injury, right, or

                                                  -12-
substantial interest created by the statute. In Lansing Sch, the Court did not analyze whether the
plaintiffs could fulfill the requirements to obtain a declaratory judgment and remanded the case to
this Court for consideration of that issue. Lansing Sch, 487 Mich at 373. On remand, the Lansing
Sch Court determined that the plaintiffs had an interest to seek a declaratory judgment on the basis
that the Supreme Court had held that the plaintiffs had established a substantial interest in the
enforcement of the statute at issue, without further inquiry. Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of
Ed (On Remand), 293 Mich App 506, 517; 810 NW2d 95 (2011). In another case, employees of
Central Michigan University (CMU) sought a declaratory judgment to stop a university policy
from being implemented that would have restricted employees’ rights to run for public office.
UAW v Central Mich Univ Trustees, 295 Mich App 486, 489-493; 815 NW2d 132 (2012). This
Court held that the employees had standing to seek a declaratory judgment regarding the policy
“because the university employees have a special and substantial interest in ensuring that the CMU
officials’ policies do not violate their statutory rights under the Act, and that interest is different
from any rights or interests of the public at large.” Id. at 497, citing Lansing Sch, 487 Mich at 372.
Thus, this Court has used substantively the same language for determining whether a party has a
sufficient interest to pursue a declaratory judgment as it uses to determine whether a party has
standing to bring an action on the basis of having a special injury, right, or a substantial interest in
the enforcement of a statute. Without deciding that one cannot show an interest sufficient to seek
a declaratory judgment without also meeting the requirements to show a special injury, right, or a
substantial interest, it can be concluded that the inquiries are, at least, very similar.

        Here, plaintiffs cannot show that they are interested parties who are entitled to a declaratory
judgment. Plaintiffs do not have a legally protected interest in the enforcement of MCL 168.674(2)
and MCL 168.765a(2) that is in jeopardy of being adversely affected that is different from the
interest of the public at large. See T & V Assoc, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6. Plaintiffs offer
only cursory treatment regarding whether they have a sufficient interest to seek a declaratory
judgment, and plaintiffs make a much more in-depth argument regarding standing on the basis of
a special injury, right, or a substantial interest. Given the similarity of the inquiries regarding the
two theories of standing, and given that we have already concluded that plaintiffs cannot establish
that they have standing on the basis of a special injury, right, or a substantial interest, we conclude
that plaintiffs are not interested persons for purposes of a declaratory judgement.9

        In conclusion, plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment regarding
the enforcement of MCL 168.674(2) and MCL 168.765a(2).

       Affirmed. Defendants may tax costs as the prevailing parties. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

9
  In light of our conclusion that plaintiffs are unentitled to seek a declaratory judgment because
they are not “interested parties,” we need not determine whether there is an actual controversy in
this case.

                                                 -13-