Court Opinion

ID: 9909785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 01:02:49.945352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:54.811102
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Williams CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166888
 v.
 KRISTOFER MICHAEL                                                      (Solano County Super. Ct.
 WILLIAMS,                                                              No. FCR341032)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Kristofer Michael Williams was convicted by a jury of, among other
offenses, the murder of Jonathan Russell. His conviction was affirmed by
this court in August 2023. (People v. Williams (Aug. 17, 2023, A165264
[nonpub. opn.]).)1 The present appeal was filed from the trial court’s
restitution order, which awarded (1) $3,000 to Russell’s stepmother for
funeral expenses; (2) $354,000 to the mother of Russell’s daughter for her loss
of economic and child support plus nearly $40,000 in other expenses; and
(3) approximately $45,000 to the mother of Russell’s son, for her loss of child
support and various other economic losses, including money spent on security
cameras and a Ring camera doorbell device.

         1 We take judicial notice of the record on appeal filed in this court in the

prior appeal, as well as of this court’s unpublished opinion. (Evid. Code,
§§ 451, subd. (a), 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
      Williams’s appointed appellate counsel filed a no-issues brief asking
this court to independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979)
25 Cal.3d 436. As part of our review, we solicited supplemental briefing from
the parties on whether substantial evidence supports a finding that the
$470.30 for increased home security measures was incurred “as a result of
the defendant’s conduct” within the meaning of Penal Code2 section 1202.4,
subdivision (f) and was “related to” defendant’s crime within the meaning of
section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J). Having now considered that briefing, we
affirm the restitution order.3
                                 BACKGROUND
      Williams was convicted of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), kidnapping (§ 207,
subd. (a)), and three other felony charges. At trial, evidence established that
Williams entered the home of the 9-year-old kidnapping victim, stabbed her
father, and carried the child out of the house. Once outside, Williams was
confronted by the child’s “uncle,” Russell, whom Williams stabbed before
running away. Russell subsequently died from his injury. In his defense,
Williams testified that before the night of the incident, he had heard rumors
that the child was being molested by her dad and her “uncle.” He testified

      2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      3 We also requested briefing on whether Williams forfeited any

challenge to this portion of the restitution order by failing to object in the
trial court. In their supplemental briefing, the parties disputed both whether
Williams asserted a sufficient objection to this portion of the restitution order
and whether a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is subject to the
forfeiture rule. In addition, Williams argued that if the error was forfeited,
his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object. We do not
resolve the forfeiture issue because, as discussed post, whether reviewed
directly or via the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, substantial
evidence supports the restitution order and thus, Williams is not entitled to
relief.

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further that on the night of the crime he was outside of the home when he
saw through a window that Russell was “standing over” the child and
grabbing “his private area.” He claimed that he went to the child’s room in
order to protect her from molestation.
      Following Williams’s sentencing, the prosecutor filed a motion for
restitution. The prosecutor requested $3,000 for Russell’s stepmother to
reimburse her for funeral expenses. The prosecutor requested $354,000 for
the mother of Russell’s daughter as loss in economic and child support plus
$300 for the cost of food provided during the funeral; $2090 in crime victim
counseling costs; $35,370 in childcare costs since Russell often babysat while
she was working; and $1462.50 for the cost of gas to drive to and from court
during the criminal proceedings. Finally, the prosecutor requested
approximately $45,500 for the mother of Russell’s son, including $34,000 in
child support for her son; $330.46 for funeral-related expenses; $470.30 to
increase the security at her home; $10,278.34 for lost wages to attend the
criminal proceedings; and $435.24 for the cost of gas to drive to and from
court during the criminal proceedings.
      Williams objected to the prosecution’s motion and requested a hearing.
Counsel indicated that Williams “object[ed] to it all”—i.e., the entire
restitution award—but confined his arguments at the hearing to the child
support components of the motion for restitution. After hearing the evidence
and argument, the court ordered restitution for each victim in the full
amount requested by the prosecution.
                                DISCUSSION
      The California Constitution provides that crime victims have a right
to restitution when they suffer losses as a result of criminal activity. (Cal.

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Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b); People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652.)
This constitutional mandate is implemented by section 1202.4 (Giordano, at
pp. 654, 656), which “authorizes trial courts to order direct victim restitution
for those losses incurred as a result of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted.” (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1101.)
         As noted above, after our preliminary review we concluded that the
only arguable issue on appeal involved the approximately $470 awarded for
home security expenses. Having considered the supplemental briefing and
independently reviewed the trial court record, we find no error and affirm the
order.
         Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 provides, with certain exceptions not
applicable here, that “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic
loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the
defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established
by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims
or any other showing to the court.” Subdivision (f)(3) of section 1202.4 adds:
“To the extent possible, the restitution order . . . shall be of a dollar amount
that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined
economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct,
including, but not limited to, all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (J) Expenses to
install or increase residential security incurred related to . . . a violent felony,
as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, including, but not limited to, a
home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of
locks.”
         By requiring that losses be “incurred as the result of the defendant’s
criminal conduct,” the statute requires the victim to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence a causal relationship between the claimed

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“loss” and Williams’s violent crime. (People v. Holmberg (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1319, 1321–1322 [defendant’s criminal conduct must
be an actual and proximate cause of the victim’s economic loss]; see also
People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542 [“ ‘ “[T]he standard of
proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” ’ ”].) Likewise, the requirement that the security
expenses be “incurred related to” the violent crime mandates proof of some
nexus between the murder and the expenses. We therefore disagree with the
Attorney General’s suggestion that it is sufficient that the mother of Russell’s
son was a victim, as defined by section 1202.4, subdivision (k), of a violent
crime, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5. The express language of
section 1202.4 requires that the security-related expenses be incurred in
relation to and as a result of the defendant’s crime.
      A victim seeking restitution has the burden of presenting “an adequate
factual basis for the claim.” (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 664.)
“Section 1202.4 does not, by its terms, require any particular kind of
proof. . . . Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of economic losses
incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal acts, the burden shifts to the
defendant to disprove [that showing].” (People v. Gemelli, supra,
161 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1542–1543.) “ ‘ “[S]entencing judges are given
virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider
and the source from whence it comes.” ’ ” (People v. Foster (1993)
14 Cal.App.4th 939, 947, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 238–245.)
      “[W]e review the trial court’s restitution order for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.] The abuse of discretion standard is ‘deferential,’ but it ‘is not
empty.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]t asks in substance whether the ruling in question

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“falls outside the bounds of reason” under the applicable law and the relevant
facts.’ ” (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘ “When there is a factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution
ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the
reviewing court.” ’ ” (People v. Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
“In reviewing restitution orders, we do not reweigh the evidence or make
credibility decisions. Our review is to determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the inferences made by the trial court.” (People v.
Baudoin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1184, 1191.) Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.
(See, e.g., People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 563.)
      Here, the prosecutor’s memorandum requested approximately $470 in
restitution for home security expenses under section 1202.4,
subdivision (f)(3)(J) and explained that the victim increased security at her
home because “she lived in the same area as the defendant and his family
members and friends.” The prosecutor’s letter to defendant detailing the
restitution request, which was submitted to the court as an attachment to the
motion, adds that the victim lives in the same city as Williams and knew of
him and his friends “since they ran in similar social circles.”
      Had this been the only evidence in the record to support the security
expenses, we would question its sufficiency to establish a nexus between the
murder and the economic loss. Neither Russell’s son nor his mother were
direct victims of the crime, and it did not occur at her home. But our review
of the record persuades us that Williams is incorrect to characterize the
mother’s motivation as “an inchoate fear of other people unrelated to
appellant’s crime.” The pre-sentence report submitted by the probation
department includes the mother’s statement that the murder had “a ‘horrible’

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effect” on her son and that he “was afraid to leave home due to the
circumstances of the instant offense.” As noted above, Russell was murdered
while trying to prevent the kidnapping of another child. In addition, the
mother reported to the probation department that she had been “subjected to
harassment by others, who have portrayed [Russell] as a child molester,
which [is] based on the defendant’s perception of the instant offense.” The
pre-sentence report confirms that Williams asserted his claim that he was
protecting this child from Russell almost immediately upon his arrest.
Finally, as the Attorney General notes, some evidence in the record also
suggests that Williams associated with members of the Hell’s Angels gang.
From these facts, it would be reasonable to infer that the mother increased
security at her home because she believed that Williams or someone acting
on his behalf posed a danger to her and her son. Her decision to increase
security at her home was objectively reasonable and related to the charged
murder given the defense Williams asserted, the resulting harassment she
suffered, and her son’s fear.
      Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
                                DISPOSITION
      The restitution order is affirmed.
                                           GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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