Court Opinion

ID: 9583948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:14.727481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:02.172303
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority denies all motions in this death penalty case, which include one filed by Mr. Mears as well as those filed by Mr. Claxton. The majority bases its rulings upon the assumption that the request to change counsel is for the sole purpose of withdrawing the appeal. I agree that appellant Colwell cannot waive the statutorily required automatic appeal, so there would be no need to determine his competency for that purpose. In my opinion, however, the question of whether Mr. Mears or Mr. Claxton will represent appellant in his mandatory appeal is a separate issue. I believe that if Colwell is competent, he can change appellate counsel. While I agree that we *340should deny Mr. Mears’ motion, requesting that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine appellant’s competency to change appellate counsel, I would remand for the trial court to determine his competency for that purpose. Therefore, I dissent to the majority’s denial of Mr. Claxton’s motion in that regard.
Ordered January 19, 2001.
Michael Mears, Kenneth D. Driggs, for appellant.
John R. Parks, District Attorney, Daniel P. Bibler, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Patricia A. Burton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Ronald S. Honberg, Rex W. Cowdry, amici curiae.
Under certain circumstances, even an indigent defendant in a death penalty case is entitled to appointment of the defense counsel of his choosing. Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469, 470 (2) (384 SE2d 181) (1989). Appellant’s right to name his own legal representative is even stronger, since Mr. Claxton, as his new attorney, has agreed to represent him pro bono and is, therefore, the equivalent of retained counsel. “ ‘While the right to select a particular person as counsel is not an absolute right, the arbitrary dismissal of a defendant’s attorney of choice violates a defendant’s right to counsel!” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700, 703 (2) (267 SE2d 207) (1980). Thus, I believe that we should grant the motion for remand for the limited purpose of determining whether Colwell is competent to discharge Mr. Mears as his appointed appellate counsel and to substitute Mr. Claxton as his own retained attorney.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this opinion.