Court Opinion

ID: 9391887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 16:00:38.347182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.245191
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2538
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                     Plaintiff - Appellee

                                       v.

                               William Stevenson

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the District of South Dakota - Southern
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: March 21, 2023
                              Filed: May 3, 2023
                                ____________

Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

      Police observed William Stevenson leaving a hotel room just after they had
secured a search warrant for the room. Within minutes, they detained and arrested
him. They found methamphetamine on his person and more in the room. After the
district court1 refused to suppress the drugs found on his person, a jury convicted
Stevenson of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1), 846. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

                                         I.

      Investigating meth distribution in Sioux Falls, police stopped a car driven by
a suspected drug seller. They found 9.5 pounds of meth, a loaded gun, cash, and cell
phones. A passenger told police he had recently come from the Ramada Inn. In a
room there, he saw two other men with pounds of meth and firearms.

       At the Ramada Inn, Police Narcotics Detective Danijel Mihajlovic learned
that room 214 had been rented by occupants of the car. He began surveilling those
rooms while other officers sought search warrants. Detective Mihajlovic heard a
man in room 214 and waited in the hallway.

       A judge signed the warrant for the room and a related car. Ten minutes later,
Stevenson left room 214, giving Detective Mihajlovic a “hard stare” while clutching
the front of his waistband. The Detective thought he had a gun. Stevenson went to
a gas station across the street.

       When Stevenson returned to the hotel, officers apprehended him in the
parking lot. They exited their cars, guns drawn at their sides, commanding him to
get on the ground. Stevenson refused to comply. Drawing his taser, Detective
Mihajlovic told Stevenson he would deploy it on the count of five. When Detective
Mihajlovic got to five, Stevenson said “all right, all right,” and turned toward the
hotel as if to flee. The Detective tased him.

      1
       The Honorable Karen E. Schrier, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota, modifying and adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Honorable Veronica L. Duffy, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of
South Dakota.

                                        -2-
      Stevenson was handcuffed and searched. Officers found a wad of cash, a hotel
key, and 16 grams of meth. They did not find a firearm. Officers then executed the
search warrant of the hotel room and found additional meth.

       Stevenson moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person, claiming
that his detention and arrest were unlawful. See U.S. Const. Amend. IV. The
district court, modifying and adopting a magistrate judge recommendation, denied
the motion. It held Stevenson’s detention a proper exercise of the search warrant’s
implicit authorization to detain occupants during a search. See Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013);
United States v. Freeman, 964 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2020). The court alternatively
held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Stevenson under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and probable cause to arrest him when he tried to flee.

      A jury convicted Stevenson of conspiring to distribute meth.2 He appeals
denial of his motion to suppress, raising the same arguments as just outlined.

       This court applies a mixed standard of review to the denial of a motion to
suppress. United States v. Smith, 820 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 2016). This court
reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the denial of the
suppression motion de novo. Id.; United States v. Finley, 56 F.4th 1159, 1164 (8th
Cir. 2023). This court “may affirm the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
on any ground supported by the record.” United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 614
(8th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

      2
       Stevenson’s conviction for obstruction of justice by retaliating against a
witness in pretrial detention is not relevant to this appeal. See 18 U.S.C. §
1513(b)(2).
                                       -3-
                                         II.

       Stevenson argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for an
investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop. Even if officers had reasonable
suspicion, he says, their actions constituted an arrest, requiring probable cause.

      A valid Terry stop requires “specific and articulable facts” supporting a
reasonable conclusion that criminal activity is afoot. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 30–31.
Accord United States v. Johnson, 31 F.4th 618, 622 (8th Cir. 2022), citing Illinois
v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Officers may base a stop on information
from other officers on their team. Id. A Terry stop becomes an arrest if officers use
more force than reasonably necessary to facilitate the detention. Waters v. Madson,
921 F.3d 725, 737 (8th Cir. 2019). Officers may, however, use force “reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the
course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985).

       This court’s precedent establishes that the officers acted appropriately. See
United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1999). In Navarrete-
Barron, this court held that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain a man leaving
a motel room that officers believed contained drugs. Id. at 790–91. Officers had
earlier discovered cocaine, cash, and a motel key during a traffic stop. The driver
claimed that his friend, the car owner, was staying at the motel. Id. at 789. Police
found defendant in the suspected motel room, but he left before a warrant could be
secured. Id. Officers stopped the defendant’s pickup, approached it with guns
drawn, and handcuffed him while they searched his truck. Id. This court held that
the officers had “reasonable and articulable suspicion” for a Terry stop because the
earlier traffic stop, which uncovered cocaine and evidence of a co-conspirator at the
motel, “provided enough evidence to support an inference that others were engaged
in drug trafficking.” Id. at 790–91.

     Nearly identical evidence supported these officers’ inference that Stevenson
was engaged in drug trafficking. An earlier traffic stop uncovered significant
                                         -4-
quantities of illegal drugs, evidence of drug distribution, and statements that an
unidentified coconspirator was in room 214 of the Ramada Inn. Officers found
Stevenson in room 214. These facts created “reasonable and articulable suspicion”
sufficient for a Terry stop. Id. at 790.

       Stevenson argues that officers exceeded the limits of a Terry stop by using
unreasonable force to detain him. See Waters, 921 F.3d at 737. The officers engaged
Stevenson with their guns drawn and then, after he refused to comply and tried to
flee, subdued him with a taser.

       “It is well established that officers may reasonably draw weapons during a
Terry stop when the defendant is suspected of carrying a weapon.” Johnson, 31
F.4th at 623. The officers believed that Stevenson’s hotel room contained firearms,
had seen him giving a hard stare and clutching his waistband, and suspected him of
“engag[ing] in drug trafficking, which very often is accompanied by dangerous
weapons.” Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d at 791. Drawing guns before approaching
Stevenson was reasonable.

       Nor did officers err by deploying a taser because, by then, Stevenson’s acts
had provided probable cause for an arrest. The district court found that Stevenson’s
disobedience, shifty gaze, and pivot as if to run led the officers to reasonably believe
he was about to flee. See Finley, 56 F.4th at 1165 (“We will reverse a finding of
fact only if . . . the evidence as a whole leaves us with a definite and firm conviction
that the finding is a mistake.”). A suspect’s flight can provide probable cause for an
arrest, and deploying a taser is an appropriate way to effectuate such an arrest. See
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119 (flight can create reasonable suspicion for an arrest);
McKenney v. Harrison, 635 F.3d 354, 360 (8th Cir. 2011) (tasing a suspect was not
an unreasonably forceful means to prevent flight and ensure a successful arrest).

      The officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Stevenson and used
reasonable force to detain him. When Stevenson’s acts created probable cause for

                                          -5-
an arrest, they used appropriate force to arrest him. Their acts did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 3 The district court properly denied the motion to suppress.

                                   *******

      The judgment is affirmed.
                      ______________________________

      3
       Because police lawfully apprehended and searched Stevenson under Terry
v. Ohio and Illinois v. Wardlow, the parties’ detention-incident-to-search-warrant
arguments need not be addressed. See Summers, 452 U.S. 692; Bailey, 568 U.S.
186; Freeman, 964 F.3d 774.
                                         -6-