Court Opinion

ID: 9857840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:03:11.487492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:40.847762
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, Justice, dissenting. The majority, in following out-of-state decisions with respect to the weight to be given to the Attorney General’s approval of the ballot title, have attached more importance to that officer’s approval than we have, given to it in the past or, in my judgment, we should now give to it. The requirement that state-wide petitions be submitted to the Attorney General for approval is merely a statutory device intended to be of assistance to the sponsors of the petition. The Constitution contains no such provision. Instead, Amendment 7 declares that the sufficiency of state-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by this court. I do not think we ought to diminish our own constitutional responsibility by giving some sort of prima facie verity to tire Attorney General’s approval of tlie ballot title. Our decision should rest on the merits alone, without regard to the Attorney General’s conclusion. In my opinion the ballot title now in controversy is fatally defective in failing to inform the voter that the act is a temporary measure that will expire ip. two years unless re-enacted by the legislature. Beyond question that is the strongest single point in favor of the act. We all know from experience that both the legislature and the electorate are moré inclined to favor temporary measures, as tentative experiments in governmental regulation, than they are to favor similar statutes of a permanent nature. It cannot be doubted that many voters might be willing to try this venture in the touchy area of price control merely as a laboratory test, while those same voters would be wholly opposed to the measure as a permanent innovation. I cannot agree with the majority’s view that the opponents of the act have discharged their obligation to draft an impartial ballot title when it is plainly apparent that they have suppressed any reference to the most important single fact in favor of the statute. It seems hardly necessary to comment upon the court’s reliance upon cases having to do with the effective date of initiated or referred measures. Such cases have no real bearing upon the present question. Whether an act goes into effect upon its approval by the governor or ninety days after the legislative adjournment is not apt to affect any voter’s approval or disapproval of the measure. No comparable statement can be made about the inherently vital distinction between temporary and permanent legislation. BrowN, J., joins in this dissent.