Court Opinion

ID: 9892251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-21 17:12:05.530104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:37.532644
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00388-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ALVIN MUMPHORD III
A/K/A ALVIN MUMPHORD,                                                      Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 24th District Court
                         of Victoria County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      Appellant Alvin Mumphord III a/k/a Alvin Mumphord appeals his convictions for:

(1) eight counts of indecency with a child, second-degree felonies, see TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 21.11; (2) three counts of online solicitation of a minor, second-degree felonies,

see id. § 33.021; and (3) six counts of improper relationship between an educator and a
student, second-degree felonies, see id. § 21.12. Mumphord was sentenced to five years’

imprisonment on each of the eight counts of indecency with a child, and four years’

imprisonment on each of the remaining counts. The trial court ordered the indecency with

a child sentences and the online solicitation of a minor sentences to all run consecutively,

and it ordered the improper relationship between an educator and a student sentences to

run concurrently.

       By six issues, which we have reorganized, Mumphord contends the trial court erred

by: (1) denying his motion for a continuance; (2) preventing him from conducting an

effective voir dire; (3) denying his motion seeking certain discovery from the State;

(4) denying his motion to set aside a bond forfeiture; and (5–6) denying his motion to

sever the counts in the indictment. We affirm.

                            I.      MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

       By his first issue, Mumphord contends that the trial court erred by denying his

second motion for continuance.

A.     Background

       Mumphord filed two requests for continuances based on his contraction of

COVID-19. Trial was originally scheduled to commence on July 25, 2022. However,

Mumphord filed a motion for continuance, which the trial court granted, and trial was reset

to August 1, 2022. The second motion for continuance was filed on August 1, 2022, and

the court heard evidence and argument on the motion the same day.

       Mumphord’s physician, Edward Ferrell, M.D., testified as a witness and sponsored

the admission of Mumphord’s medical records. According to these records, Dr. Ferrell

                                             2
initially diagnosed Mumphord with bronchitis on July 22, 2022. However, Mumphord then

sought emergency treatment at Citizens Medical Center on July 24, 2022. As a result of

this emergency visit, Mumphord was diagnosed with COVID-19. The notes from this visit

indicate that Mumphord suffered “a sore throat, fever[,] and muscle aches” and could

“[r]eturn to work in three days.”

           On July 29, 2022, Mumphord visited Dr. Ferrell again. The notes from this visit are

contradictory. At the beginning of the medical report, Dr. Ferrell noted that Mumphord’s

symptoms included a “[c]ough, congestion, . . . chest tightness, dizzy, weak, abdominal

pain, no appetite.” However, in a section of the report entitled review of systems, Dr.

Ferrell noted that Mumphord had no “fever, chills, weakness[,] or fatigue,” no “congestion,

runny nose[,] or sore throat,” no “chest pain, chest pressure[,] or chest discomfort,” and

no “shortness of breath, cough, or sputum.” Dr. Ferrell’s ultimate recommendation was

for Mumphord “to rest and stay in town until 08/08/2022.” On the stand, Dr. Ferrell

explained that Mumphord would likely have difficulty concentrating and recommended

Mumphord stay home to avoid worsening his symptoms and potentially putting the public

at risk.

           Defense counsel argued that he needed to be able to speak to his client.

Mumphord’s symptoms at the time of trial included laryngitis, which impeded his ability to

speak. Additionally, counsel argued that the jury may infer some bad character if his client

wore a mask during the trial. Counsel also contended that forcing Mumphord to appear

masked was a violation of the Confrontation Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Counsel

alternatively speculated that if Mumphord appeared without a mask, the jury might resent

                                                3
him for not complying with public health protocols. The trial court denied the motion for

continuance and made no explicit ruling on whether Mumphord was required to wear a

mask.

B.      Standard of Review & Applicable Law

        “A criminal action may be continued on the written motion of the State or of the

defendant, upon sufficient cause shown; which cause shall be fully set forth in the motion.

A continuance may be only for as long as is necessary.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

29.03. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance for abuse of

discretion.” Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “To establish an

abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the defendant was actually prejudiced

by the denial of his motion.” Id. “Speculation will not suffice to obtain reversal for a trial

court’s failure to grant a continuance.” Kinnett v. State, 623 S.W.3d 876, 906 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (quoting Nwosoucha v. State, 325 S.W.3d 816, 825

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)).

C.      Analysis

        Mumphord asserts that he was prejudiced by the denial of his motion for

continuance because: (1) he was forced to wear a mask and was therefore not afforded

the constitutional right to confront witnesses; and (2) his symptoms precluded him from

effectively communicating with his counsel during the proceedings. We will address these

assertions in turn.

        First, to the extent that Mumphord asserts his Sixth Amendment right was violated

because he was not allowed to appear unmasked, there is nothing in the record that

                                              4
reflects the trial court required Mumphord to wear a mask. We will not reverse the trial

court’s judgment based on an assigned error that is not supported by the record. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2 (discussing reversible error in criminal cases generally).

       Second, Mumphord argues that “evidence exists with no rebuttal that [Mumphord]

had laryngitis to the extent he could not plea[d] ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’ to the various counts,

and was thus also impacted in his ability to communicate with trial counsel.” The record

reflects that when the trial court read the indictments, Mumphord could not produce a

verbal plea of not guilty. To accommodate this, after reading each charged offense

alleged in the indictment, the trial court asked, “To which the Defendant pleads not guilty?”

In response, Mumphord nodded his head each time, indicating his desire to plead not

guilty to each count. Mumphord cites Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), to

support his assertion that his right to effective assistance of counsel was thwarted by the

trial court forcing him to appear while sick. In Geders, the Supreme Court of the United

States held that “an order preventing [a defendant] from consulting his counsel ‘about

anything’ during a 17-hour overnight recess between his direct-and cross-examination

impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment.” Id. at 91.

       That is not what occurred here. The record does not reflect that Mumphord was

ordered to not communicate with his attorney. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Nor does the

record reflect that Mumphord requested some accommodation in communicating with his

attorney that was denied by the trial court.1 See Ex parte Marez, 464 S.W.2d 866, 868

       1 We also note that after denying the motion for continuance, the following exchange occurred

between the trial court and Mumphord’s attorney:
                                                   5
THE COURT:           I was going to give you, and I still will give you, the opportunity to
                     choose between two things, and I can either let you appear by
                     Zoom, and you can talk to him whenever you want. If you want
                     him to park in the parking lot, you can do that. I will allow you to
                     communicate whenever you want, or if you don’t want that or are
                     saying you’re not going to do that, then I’ll order him to appear in
                     person, so you have your choice of that.

[Defense counsel]:   So, Judge, there’s really no choice.

THE COURT:           Oh, it is. It is a choice between two alternatives. One is you can
                     communicate with him any time you want, but he’s appearing by
                     Zoom; or, two, if you say, I am not going to do that, then the Court
                     is ordering him to be here.

[Defense counsel]:   Appearing by Zoom, I can’t talk to him.

THE COURT:           No, I just told you I will let you talk to him whenever you want.

[Defense counsel]:   That’s not feasible in the trial setting, Judge.

THE COURT:           What you’re saying is you’re not going to do it?

[Defense counsel]:   Not Zoom, no.

THE COURT:           Then fine. That’s all I need. That’s all I need. I was going to give
                     you that option, but if you don’t want to, that’s fine, but I just want
                     it on the record that I gave you the opportunity.

[Defense counsel]:   But, Judge, you won’t allow me to make a record as to why I am
                     saying that appearing by Zoom won’t be feasible in a trial setting
                     like this, Judge, for several reasons.

THE COURT:           We can disagree—we can disagree on that, okay?

[Defense counsel]:   But, Judge, you still have to let me make my record.

THE COURT:           You put it on the record.

[Defense counsel]:   I have not. You keep cutting me off. I don’t know why you hate me
                     so much.

THE COURT:           I don’t hate you, sir.

[Defense counsel]:   I have been so respectful to the Court.

THE COURT:           You are 100-percent wrong. I do not hate you. I am trying to move
                     this trial along. I did not [sic] tell you you had two options. I brought
                     you in here to give you the courtesy. You said, no, I don’t want to
                     do that, and therefore we’re not going to do it. You’ve already put
                     on the record all the reasons you don’t think it’s fair for him to have
                                          6
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971). The ability to communicate is a basic aspect of effective

assistance of counsel. Adams v. State, 749 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d) (citing Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 559 n.11 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1979)). But it is not unusual for there to be some sort of barrier to instant verbal

communication between an attorney and her client. See, e.g., Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d

493, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“‘[S]imultaneous interpretation is not always the gold

standard,’ especially when the defendant is, as in this case, linguistically deficient and in

need of having concepts explained to her. This explanative function belongs to the

attorney who normally explains legal concepts and the significance of the facts to his

client (whether impaired or not) before trial or during breaks.” (footnote omitted)). The

negative effects of these language barriers are sometimes, though not always, diminished

by employing an interpreter, passing notes, etc. See Matthew S. Compton, Fulfilling Your

Professional Responsibilities: Representing a Deaf Client in Texas, 39 ST. MARY’S L.J.

819, 894–900 (2008). Indeed, after the trial court’s ruling, Mumphord’s attorney stated, “I

                                 to come here, so I wanted to give you another option. You said
                                 no, and that’s fine.

        [Defense counsel]:       If I can’t be heard, I’ll just be quiet, Judge.

        THE COURT:               You can put anything on the record, [defense counsel], that you
                                 wish to do, as long as you’re not repeating yourself.

        [Defense counsel]:       Judge, I have health issues. I don’t want to fight. I don’t want to
                                 fight.

        THE COURT:               You’re choosing not to talk, that’s fine.

The main reason we detail this interaction is because it reflects the trial court gave Mumphord an option, at
least in theory, to appear via Zoom and communicate with his attorney “whenever [he] want[ed].” As an
aside, we are cognizant of the contemptuous interactions between the trial judge and Mumphord’s defense
attorney that pervaded the proceedings.
                                                       7
am going to do my best to talk with him with notes . . . .”

       Although it is possible that Mumphord’s laryngitis and his infection with a

communicable disease significantly impeded his ability to communicate with his attorney,

there is no evidence of this in the record. See Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 509 (“[T]he record

reflects that appellant understood the proceedings well enough to assist in her own

defense; moreover, whatever communication difficulties might have existed between

appellant and her trial counsel were not apparent in the record.”). Mumphord did not

discuss the denial of his second motion for continuance in his motion for new trial, and he

did not otherwise introduce evidence below to substantiate his assertion that he was

unable to effectively communicate with his attorney at trial because of his COVID-19

symptoms. We will not speculate that such evidence exists. See Kinnett, 623 S.W.3d at

906 (“Speculation will not suffice to obtain reversal for a trial court’s failure to grant a

continuance.” (quoting Nwosoucha, 325 S.W.3d at 825)). Because Mumphord has not

shown he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his second motion for continuance,

we overrule this issue. See id.; Cordova-Lopez v. State, No. 01-20-00724-CR, 2022 WL

17813762, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 20, 2022, pet. filed) (“Cordova-

Lopez has not articulated any specific instance in which COVID-19 precautions hampered

or impaired him. Furthermore, he did not file a motion for new trial or seek to obtain a

post-judgment hearing to produce evidence regarding any actual harm he suffered during

trial because of the denial of his motion for continuance.”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2.

                                     II.     VOIR DIRE

       By his second issue, Mumphord argues that, because the trial court prevented him

                                              8
from questioning the venire about any bias its members had as to the full range of

punishment, he was precluded from conducting voir dire in an effective manner.

A.    Background

      During the State’s portion of voir dire, the prosecutor stated,

      I need to talk to you about whether or not you can follow the law in assessing
      or considering the full range of punishment for allegations such as these.
      And each of these is second degree felonies carrying a range of punishment
      between two and 20 years in prison, up to a $10,000 fine, and it’s very likely
      the defendant would be eligible for probation if you saw fit.

      Is everyone that potentially could serve as a juror in this case open to the
      full range of punishment? A probated sentence all the way up to 20 years
      in prison and a fine up to $10,000?

In response, a venireperson admitted that they would be unable to consider the full range

of punishment. The trial court interrupted the proceedings as follows:

      THE COURT:           Let me—I want to say one thing about this full range of
                           punishment. In order to be qualified to sit on this jury,
                           you must be able to accept in a given circumstance the
                           full range of punishment. Now, that does not mean in
                           this case you would consider probation or all the way
                           up to 20 years. It means, can you think of a set of facts
                           that would allow you to give the minimum of probation
                           or the maximum of 20 years.

                           For example, here are examples of that. If you had a
                           17-year-old and a 19-year-old and they were madly in
                           love, nevertheless, it was sexual assault, could you
                           perhaps consider probation in that case. And in the
                           extreme, someone who, let’s say, has been to the
                           penitentiary 10 times for this type of offense, you might
                           give the max. What I want you to understand, it’s not
                           limited to these facts. It’s can you think of a set of facts
                           that would allow you to consider, not to give, to
                           consider the minimum or the maximum. That’s what—
                           I wanted to get that across because most jurors—
                           potential jurors think it means, would you give
                           probation in this case, or would you give the maximum?

                                             9
Defense counsel objected to the trial court’s question, and the trial court overruled the

objection. During the defense’s portion of voir dire, the following exchange occurred:

      [Defense counsel]:        By a show of hands—and this is a really, really
                                important question. As the DA stated,
                                [Mumphord] is quite possibly eligible for
                                probation, but if you . . . know in your heart of
                                hearts if you find a person guilty of indecency with
                                a child after you heard the evidence o[f] online
                                solicitation of a minor or improper relationship with
                                a student, can you truthfully consider the lowest
                                form of punishment to the highest form of
                                punishment[?] That is what the law requires, not
                                how you will vote, but just would you truthfully
                                consider probation or up to 20 years in prison?

      THE COURT:                And it’s in an appropriate case, right, Counselor?
                                In an appropriate case?

      [Defense counsel]:        In an appropriate case, correct.

      THE COURT:                In other words, it’s not this case. It’s in an
                                appropriate case, could you consider probation? I
                                gave you an example of maybe a 17 and a 19-
                                year-old lovers, and in an appropriate situation
                                would you consider the maximum, somebody has
                                committed this crime 10 times? I want you to
                                understand it’s not this case on these facts. It is
                                an appropriate case, could you consider
                                probation? In an appropriate case, could you
                                consider the maximum 20 years?

                                ....

      [Defense counsel]:        [The State] told you the three charges, okay? I am
                                not trying to confuse you. Everyone understands
                                what I am saying?

                                ....

                                This is a very important question. That’s why I’ve
                                got to go row by row.

                                           10
                     The second row, can you consider the lowest form
                     of punishment, probation, in a case like th[is]?

THE COURT:           In an appropriate case, not like this case.

                     ....

[Defense counsel]:   So, folks, this is a question—and, like I said, it’s
                     very important, and I am going to try to ask it the
                     way that I can.

                     In a case like these [sic], let’s go one by one.
                     Indecency with a child by contact, can you
                     consider—

THE COURT:           Sexual contact, please, Counselor.

[Defense counsel]:   By sexual contact,       can   you   consider an
                     appropriate—

THE COURT:           Set of facts.

[Defense counsel]:   –set of circumstances where you could consider,
                     not give it, but consider the minimum punishment,
                     which is probation in a sexual indecency with
                     sexual contact, if you find them guilty and you—
                     can you consider an appropriate situation where
                     you can consider probation, starting with row
                     number one?

VENIREPERSON 4:      (Shakes head side to side.)

[Defense counsel]:   No. 4 says she can’t. Thank you for your honesty.

THE COURT:           Let me—let me clarify it. He’s not giving you the
                     law. The law is very clear. He’s charged with 18
                     counts. I am just going to use one count to
                     illustrate the way that you’re supposed to ask the
                     question. You’re supposed to be asked this
                     question: The Defendant is charged with
                     indecency—these are different counts. I am just
                     going to use one of them—is charged with
                     indecency with a child [by] sexual contact. Can

                                11
                     you conjure up in your mind a set of facts that
                     would allow you to consider probation?

                     Now, that means not this case, but I gave the
                     example. It’s a 17-year-old and a 19-year-old.
                     That’s a set of facts that you might can consider
                     probation. Likewise, can you consider a set of
                     facts—a set of facts I use in this instance to give
                     the maximum. He’s been convicted 10 times
                     before. It’s not based on these facts. Can you in
                     your mind think of a situation which would allow
                     you to consider probation and which would allow
                     you to consider 20, then you are qualified to sit on
                     this jury. It’s not these facts because, truthfully,
                     you know nothing about these facts, and you
                     won’t unless you’re on this jury. That’s why to
                     qualify you, you have to be able to think of a set
                     of facts that would allow you to consider
                     probation. Can you think of a set of facts that
                     would allow you to give the maximum? If you can
                     do that, then you are qualified to set on this jury.

[Defense counsel]:   All right, folks. So I have not given you any set of
                     facts. I am not asking you for a set of facts; all
                     right? I can’t tell y’all what the evidence is in this
                     case. It’s not proper for me to do that here.

                     Can you consider in a case like indecency with a
                     child by sexual contact, can you think of a
                     situation where you would consider probation? If
                     you can’t think of a situation where you would ever
                     consider giving probation, we need to know, and
                     I am just asking for your total honesty, okay?

                     The question is also for online solicitation [of] a
                     minor. If you can’t think of a situation where you
                     could ever consider giving a defendant probation,
                     we need to know.

                     ....

                     Lastly, the count of improper relationship between
                     a student and a teacher, honest answers. If you,
                     after finding the defendant guilty, if you find him

                                12
                  guilty, if you cannot consider ever a situation
                  where you could consider the minimum of
                  probation for that particular count, please tell me.
                  Please tell me.

                  This row?

                  I know No. 4 cannot consider probation.

                  Row No. 2, honest answers, who can raise their
                  hand and say, I cannot consider giving probation
                  if I find him guilty on these particulars? I don’t care
                  what scenario, I don’t care what set of facts.

THE COURT:        But you see you’re not giving them what the law
                  is, Counselor. You didn’t then.

                  All right. For example, Juror No. 4, can I ask you
                  a question?

VENIREPESRON 4:   Yes.

THE COURT:        I want you to assume with me that you conjured
                  up a set of facts in which there was a 16-year-old
                  girl and an 18-year-old boy, and they had been
                  dating for some time, and there was sexual
                  contact between the two. Can you consider that
                  set of facts which might entitle you in your mind’s
                  eye to give probation? Consider it? Excuse me, to
                  consider probation?

VENIREPERSON 4:   No.

                  ....

THE COURT:        Okay. Well, then, you’re not qualified. That’s fine.
                  I just want everybody to understand. If you can
                  think of a set of facts where you would consider
                  probation, if they’re lovers, and they’re 18 and
                  they’re 16, and they love each other, then the only
                  appropriate punishment, if you can’t consider
                  probation, is penitentiary, that’s fine. If that’s how
                  you feel, then you need to let us know. Or if you
                  can think of any other situation in which probation

                              13
                     would be appropriate in your mind.

[Defense Counsel]:   So, folks, that’s where I am getting at. I don’t want
                     to give you a certain set of facts like that. You may
                     think of other facts in your own mind where you
                     can consider probation, so I don’t want to limit
                     that.

                     ....

                     Row No. 3, can you think of a scenario where you
                     could consider probation for these three offenses
                     if you saw appropriate? Who could not consider
                     probation—

THE COURT:           In an appropriate case.

[Defense Counsel]:   —in an appropriate case such as this?

THE COURT:           No, no, no, no. You just had to put that in there,
                     didn’t you?

                     (Laughing.)

THE COURT:           Do you see what I’ve been getting at, Counselor?
                     You can’t say, “as in this case,” because then
                     you’re limiting them to the facts of this case. That
                     is not appropriate.

                     Yes, ma’am. No. 46.

VENIREPERSON 46:     Can he just say if you can’t consider probation
                     raise your hand?

THE COURT:           No, that’s not appropriate because—

                     Well, let me explain why. Because it’s not can you
                     consider probation in this case. It’s can you think
                     of a case in which you would consider probation?
                     And can you think of a case in which you would
                     consider prison? That’s what it is. I can’t let you
                     get on the jury if you say, Well, I am thinking of
                     this case, because that’s not the law. You’re not
                     supposed to be able to say, Well, in this case I

                                14
                                 couldn’t consider probation. It’s can you think of a
                                 set of facts that would allow you to consider
                                 probation.

                                 Let me do this for the whole panel. If you can
                                 consider a set of facts in an indecency with a child
                                 [by] sexual contact [case], if you can think of a set
                                 of facts—I used one, but you can think of any set
                                 of facts—that would allow you not to give
                                 probation, but to consider it, then you’re qualified
                                 to sit.

                                 Is there anybody other than Juror No. 4 who can’t
                                 think of a set of facts, whatever that might be, that
                                 would allow you to consider—it doesn’t mean
                                 give—probation, then raise your hand and tell us
                                 that you would always give prison time?

                                 Vice versa, if you can think of a set of facts, been
                                 convicted 10 times of this offense that would be
                                 prison, then you’re qualified.

                                 Is there anybody other than Juror No. 4 who can’t
                                 think of a set of facts, whatever that might be, that
                                 would allow you to consider—it doesn’t mean
                                 give—probation, then raise your hand and tell us
                                 that you would always give prison time?

A venireperson then admitted that they could not consider the full range of punishment

when confronted with the charge of an improper relationship between a teacher and a

student. The trial court responded by pressing the venireperson to reexamine their

position when considering a sexual relationship between teenagers. The venireperson

again confirmed that they could not consider the full range of punishment. Defense

counsel further explored this topic with the venire and then moved on to a different line of

inquiry.

                                            15
B.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       When a party complains that they were precluded from questioning the venire on

a certain issue, the following two-pronged test applies: “(1) whether the complaining party

attempted to prolong the voir dire by asking questions that were irrelevant, immaterial, or

unnecessarily repetitious and (2) whether the questions the party was not permitted to

ask were proper voir-dire questions.” Wappler v. State, 183 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). “Both the State and the defense are entitled to jurors

who can consider the entire range of punishment for the particular statutory offense—i.e.,

from the maximum to the minimum and all points in between.” Cardenas v. State, 325

S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A juror that cannot consider the full range of

punishment can be challenged for cause. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(c)(2);

Cardenas, 325 S.W.3d at 185. “Therefore, both sides may question the panel on the

range of punishment and may commit jurors to consider the entire range of punishment

for the statutory offense.” Cardenas, 324 S.W.3d at 184 (footnote omitted).

       We review a trial court’s ruling on the propriety of a particular voir dire question for

an abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 191 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). And while trial courts have broad discretion over how voir dire is

conducted in any given case, “a trial judge must not exceed his discretion by denying a

proper question or allowing an improper question.” Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787, 790

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A question which seeks to “bind or commit a prospective juror to

a verdict based on a hypothetical set of facts” is improper unless “one of the possible

answers to that question . . . give[s] rise to a valid challenge for cause.” Standefer v.

                                             16
State, 59 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “In addition, a voir dire question that

is so vague or broad in nature as to constitute a global fishing expedition is not proper

and may be prevented by the trial judge.” Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002).

        A trial court’s refusal to allow counsel to ask proper questions of the venire can be

constitutional or non-constitutional error, depending on the nature of the question counsel

sought to ask. See Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding

that, while the error in the case before it constituted non-constitutional error, “[t]here may

be instances when a judge’s limitation on voir dire is so substantial as to warrant labeling

the error as constitutional error”); Quezada v. State, 553 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2018, no pet.) (“The trial judge denied [d]efense [c]ounsel the ability to discover

if any of the venire could not consider probation, and thus denied him the ability to

exercise his strikes intelligently. . . . This ultimately denied Appellant the constitutional

right to an impartial jury, and this error is analyzed under Rule 44.2(a)’s harmless-error

standard . . . .”).

C.      Analysis

        Mumphord contends that he was denied the right to properly voir dire the venire

as to the full range of punishment. The State represents that “[t]he [t]rial [c]ourt did not

disallow the question, so much as limited what, in its discretion, the [t]rial [c]ourt found to

be an improper commitment question.”

        The trial court seemed rankled that Mumphord’s attorney wanted to imply that “this

case” was an appropriate one for probation. Conversely, the trial court corrected

                                              17
Mumphord’s attorney and implied to the jury that “this case” was, in fact, not appropriate

for probation. We outline the following for the benefit of the trial judge, who claimed that

“the law hasn’t changed in . . . 31 years” and asked defense counsel whether he was

willing to “bet all the money in [his] pockets” that the trial court’s interpretation of the law

on this subject was incorrect. “Commitment questions are those that commit a prospective

juror to resolve, or to refrain from resolving, an issue a certain way after learning a

particular fact.” Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “[A]n

attorney cannot attempt to bind or commit a prospective juror to a verdict based on a

hypothetical set of facts.” Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

       “[A]lthough commitment questions are generally phrased to elicit a ‘yes’ or ‘no’

answer, an open-ended question can be a commitment question if the question asks the

prospective juror to set the hypothetical parameters for his decision-making.” Standefer,

59 S.W.3d at 180. For instance, the following is an improper commitment question: “If the

evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack

pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and

it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that?” Id. at

179. Other examples of improper commitment questions include, “What circumstances in

your opinion warrant the imposition of the death penalty?” or “Could you consider

probation in a case where the victim is a nun?” Id. at 180. A proper commitment question,

on the other hand, would be, “Can you consider probation in a murder case?” Id. at 181;

see Hernandez v. State, 390 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Where the law

requires a certain type of commitment from jurors, such as considering the full range of

                                              18
punishment, an attorney may ask prospective jurors to commit to following the law in that

regard.”).

        Here, defense counsel sought to determine whether the venire could commit to

considering the full range of punishment “in this case,” without providing the venire with

any facts of the case or any hypothetical scenarios.2 “[D]ue process does not require that

jurors be completely ignorant of the facts of the case.” Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715,

727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Rather, “[d]ue process requires only that a juror lay aside his

impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” Id.

Mumphord sought to ask this question during voir dire, when no evidence had yet been

presented in court. The only conceivable reason any potential juror would not be able to

consider the full range of punishment “in this case,” at this point in the proceedings is

bias, either for or against Mumphord or against a certain punishment, both of which would

be valid reasons to challenge the juror for cause. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

35.16(a)(9), (c)(2). We will assume without deciding that the question trial counsel sought

to ask was appropriate.

        However, ultimately, an equivalent question regarding the full range of punishment

was asked of the venire. Specifically, the trial court asked the jurors, “Is there

anybody . . . who can’t think of a set of facts, whatever that might be, that would allow you

         2 The trial judge, on the other hand, pressed the venire multiple times to imagine a sexual

relationship between two teenagers and asked whether members of the venire could consider probation
when confronted with that factual scenario. He also asked whether potential jurors could consider the
maximum punishment in a case where a defendant had been previously incarcerated on ten or so different
occasions. Although we have not been asked to address the propriety of the trial judge’s comments, the
case law cited above speaks for itself. See Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177, 179–80 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001); Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Weaver v. State, 355 S.W.3d
911, 913 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d) (“[A]sking a juror if he is able to ‘consider’ the full range of
punishment is a proper commitment question.”).
                                                     19
to consider . . . probation . . . ?” See Sadler v. State, 977 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998) (explaining that qualified prospective jurors “must be able, in a sense, to

conceive both of a situation in which the minimum penalty would be appropriate and of a

situation in which the maximum situation would be appropriate.” (citing Fuller v. State,

829 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), overruled on other grounds by Castillo v.

State, 913 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). Mumphord’s attorney was able to

continue exploring this concept with the venire. “There is no error in prohibiting duplicitous

questions where investigation into possibly proper or fruitful matters is not entirely

prevented.” Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 167. Because Mumphord’s attorney was not

prevented from exploring this specific issue with the venire, we conclude that no error

occurred. See id.

       We overrule Mumphord’s second issue.

                                     III.   DISCOVERY

       Mumphord argues by his third issue that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying his request to obtain the arrest records of all testifying witnesses.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       “[T]he state shall disclose to the defendant any exculpatory, impeachment, or

mitigating document, item, or information in the possession, custody, or control of the

state that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant or would tend to reduce the

punishment for the offense charged.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h). “Article

39.14 is a comprehensive discovery statute that provides limited authorization for a trial

court to order discovery, and a trial court abuses its discretion by ordering discovery

                                             20
outside its confines.” Branum v. State, 535 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2017, no pet.). “Thus, we review a trial court’s rulings regarding pretrial discovery for an

abuse of discretion.” Id.

        “The disclosure requirements of Article 39.14 are limited to pre-existing documents

and items already in the State’s possession, meaning that the trial court cannot order the

State to create a document that is not already in its possession, custody, or control, even

after the passage of the Michael Morton Act.” In re State, 659 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2020, orig. proceeding). We will not impose a burden on the State to produce

evidence which may not be available or might not even exist. Trinh v. State, 974 S.W.2d

872 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

B.      Analysis

        At a hearing on the defense’s requests for discovery, Mumphord’s trial counsel

requested the criminal record of all testifying witnesses. Mumphord’s attorney explained

that he thought the arrest records were relevant and necessary because “an alleged

victim could have lied to the police previously about an alleged sexual allegation.” The

trial court held that the State was required to turn over evidence of convictions, but not

arrests.3 Mumphord argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to order the

        3 In making this decision, the judge stated, “I’ve always been under the understanding, at least for

the 33 years I was a DA, that [defendants] weren’t entitled to arrest[ records].” The trial judge further
explained that because arrest records were likely inadmissible at trial, these records were not discoverable.
However, an item of evidence is not exempted from the requirements of Brady simply because it may be
later inadmissible at trial. See Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1005 n.14 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We agree that
the district court erred in concluding the undisclosed police reports were not material because they would
not have been admissible at Spence’s trial. The Fifth Circuit has held that inadmissible evidence may be
material under Brady.” (citing Sellers v. Estelle, 651 F.2d 1074, 1077 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981)).

                                                    21
State to disclose “juvenile arrest records.”4

        Mumphord asserts, without any citation to the record, that these records were “in

the possession of the State.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 (providing that an appellant’s brief

“must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record”); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239

(1983) (discussing the probative value of conclusory statements). In Taylor v. State, the

First Court of Appeals held that “[t]he denial of this type of request is never error if the

defendant has not shown that the State possessed the records (showing that its

witnesses had prior criminal records) or had ready access to the records.” 755 S.W.2d

548, 551 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d). Just as in Taylor, in this case,

        [t]he record does not reflect that appellant made any attempt to obtain
        records from the juvenile court system . . . , nor does the record reflect an
        attempt by appellant to determine if any records existed, nor does the record
        reflect an attempt to ascertain if the State had possession of any such
        records. Appellant did not even ask the complainant[s] on cross-
        examination whether [they] had a criminal record.

Id.; see also Gallegos v. State, No. 08-07-00104-CV, 2009 WL 2623356, at *10 (Tex.

App.—El Paso Aug. 26, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(applying Taylor v. State). We conclude that the record does not reflect that the State had

possession of these records, and therefore, the trial court did not err in denying

        4 It should be noted that the term “arrest” has a connotation in juvenile law that is distinct from its

ordinarily understood meaning as it relates to adults. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.01(b) (“The taking of
a child into custody is not an arrest except for the purpose of determining the validity of taking him into
custody or the validity of a search under the laws of this state or the United States.”); Vasquez v. State, 739
S.W.2d 37, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (“[W]e find that the Legislature has evinced its intent to distinguish
the ‘arrest’ of juveniles from that of adult offenders as shown by [§ 52.01].”). Nonetheless, we understand
Mumphord’s complaint to specifically encompass the complaining witnesses’ juvenile records that fall short
of convictions.

                                                     22
Mumphord’s request for discovery of juvenile criminal records. See In re State, 659

S.W.3d at 14. We overrule Mumphord’s third issue.

                                 IV.    BOND FORFEITURE

         Mumphord argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to set aside his

bond forfeiture. But the issue concerning Mumphord’s bond forfeiture has been rendered

moot by his conviction. See Ex parte Tucker, 3 S.W.3d 576, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

(per curiam); see also Lopez v. State, No. 13-22-00171-CR, 2023 WL 4355392, at *7

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 6, 2023, pet. filed) (“Because appellant has

been convicted of the underlying offense and is no longer subject to pretrial

confinement . . . . [t]here is no action this Court can now make regarding the trial court’s

decision on the amount of the bail that will cause any effect.”). We therefore overrule this

issue.

                                  V.    MOTION TO SEVER

         By his final two issues, Mumphord argues the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion to sever.

A.       Standard of Review & Applicable Law

         “Whenever two or more offenses have been consolidated or joined for trial under

[§] 3.02, the defendant shall have a right to a severance of the offenses.” TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 3.04(a). However, the right to severance does not apply to certain offenses

listed in § 3.03(b) and (c) of the penal code. Id. § 3.04(c). For those offenses, the trial

court has discretion to sever the cases only if “the court determines that the defendant or

the state would be unfairly prejudiced by a joinder of offenses. Id.

                                            23
       “A trial judge’s failure to grant a mandatory severance under [§] 3.04 is subject to

a harm analysis, and the error is harmless if it did not adversely affect the defendant’s

substantial rights.” Scott v. State, 235 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see TEX.

R. APP. P. 44.2. “Neither the defendant nor the State bears the burden of demonstrating

harm; instead, we assess harm after reviewing the entirety of the record, including the

evidence, jury charge, closing arguments, voir dire, and any other relevant information.”

Werner v. State, 412 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “[T]he overlap of evidence

is the most important factor” to consider when evaluating harm in this context. Id. at 549.

“When there is no overlap of evidence between the two charges, . . . the failure to sever

is most likely to be harmful.” Id. at 548. However, “[w]hen there is a substantial overlap of

evidence between the two charges, . . . the failure to sever is most likely to be harmless.”

Id. at 548–49.

B.     Analysis

       1.     Improper Relationship Charges

       An improper relationship between an educator and a student is not one of the

offenses listed in § 3.03(b) or (c); therefore, we must conclude the trial court erred by

failing to sever the improper relationship offenses from the other charged offenses. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04; Scott, 235 S.W.3d at 258. We analyze the record for harm.

       Mumphord was initially charged with seven counts of improper relationship with a

student; the State abandoned one of the counts at the close of testimony. 5 The

complainants for the remaining six counts were also named as complainants in the

       5 The complainant named in the abandoned improper relationship count did not testify.

                                                 24
indecency with a child charges, and four of these complainants were also associated with

online solicitation of a minor charges. To prove that Mumphord had an improper

relationship with his students, the State was required to show that: (1) he was an

employee of a public or private primary or secondary school; and (2) he “engage[d] in

sexual contact, sexual intercourse, or deviate sexual intercourse with a person who is

enrolled in a public or private primary or secondary school at which the employee works.”

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.12. Sexual contact, as defined by the statute, includes “any

touching by an employee of a public or private primary or secondary school of the anus,

breast, or any part of the genitals of” a student when “committed with the intent to arouse

or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” Id. § 21.12(e).

       Several of the elements of improper relationship with a student overlap with the

elements of indecency with a child. Compare id., with id. § 21.11(a), (c). In fact, once the

State met its burden to show that Mumphord committed indecency with a child with

respect to each complainant, the only additional elements the State was required to prove

to meet its burden with respect to the improper relationship charges were that Mumphord

was employed by a public or private primary or secondary school and that the sexual

contact involved a person enrolled at the school in which Mumphord worked. See id.

§ 21.12.

       The evidence showed that Mumphord was a coach at St. Joseph’s High School in

Victoria, Texas. Although he had no additional licensure, Mumphord would “stretch”

certain student athletes in the same manner as a sports therapist. However, several

young men testified that Mumphord would incorporate sexual contact into these stretching

                                             25
sessions. Most of the touching occurred on campus in an office Mumphord shared with a

co-worker. Other touching occurred on a school bus after a school-sponsored event. All

of the complainants testified that they were students at St. Joseph’s High School when

the touching occurred and that they were familiar with Mumphord through his employment

at their school.

       Because of the manner in which the offenses were committed, it is difficult to

imagine that Mumphord’s employment at St. Joseph’s High School and the young men’s

status as students of St. Joseph’s High School would not have come to light, even if the

charges had been severed. Overall, the evidence supporting the improper relationship

charges overwhelmingly overlapped with the evidence supporting the other charges.

Because “the overlap of evidence is the most important factor” to consider when

determining harm, we conclude that no harm occurred due to the trial’s refusal to sever

the improper relationship charges from the remaining charges. See Werner, 412 S.W.3d

at 549.

       2.     Remaining Charges

       Mumphord argues that he was also entitled to have the remaining charges,

indecency with a child and online solicitation of a minor, severed “so that each case

involved one victim.” Both of these offenses are listed in penal code § 3.03(b); therefore,

Mumphord was entitled to severance of these counts only if he showed that he would be

unfairly prejudiced by their joinder. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04(c). Mumphord contends

he was unfairly prejudiced both by the sheer volume of indicted offenses and because

three of the counts were ultimately dismissed by the State, and this “[e]vidence of

                                            26
extraneous offenses is . . . inherently prejudicial and carries the additional danger of

forcing a criminal defendant to defend himself against an implied charge of having a

propensity to commit crimes rather than the specific charge the State has brought against

him.”

        “[T]here is no presumption that the joinder of cases with different child victims is

unfairly prejudicial, see Matthews v. State, 152 S.W.3d 723, 730–31 (Tex. App.—Tyler

2004, no pet.), and the defendant bears the burden of showing how he would be unfairly

prejudiced through consolidation, see Lane v. State, 174 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).” Hodge v. State, 500 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2016, no pet.). Mumphord “does not explain how his trial strategy would have been

different; how voir dire was affected; or how his defense would have been different” had

the causes been severed. Lara v. State, 513 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2016, no pet.). We note that the legislature has explicitly permitted the admission

of other sexual offenses committed by the defendant against children “for any bearing the

evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts

performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.37, § 2(b). In other words, even if each count was severed “so that each case

involved one victim,” it is likely that the testimony of all the complaining witnesses who

were under seventeen when the offenses occurred would be admissible at every single

trial. See id.

        Regarding the three counts the State dismissed, “all evidence against a defendant

is, by its very nature, designed to be prejudicial.” Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811

                                             27
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We note that two of the counts that were dismissed by the State

were similar in nature to the retained counts (i.e., Mumphord initiated sexual contact with

the male complainants during a “massage” or “stretching” session that occurred when

they were students at St. Joseph’s High School). However, those two complainants either

explicitly testified or implied that they were at the age of majority when the sexual contact

occurred.6 Although this testimony would not be admissible under article 38.37, § 2(b) as

the complaining witnesses were likely seventeen or older when the sexual contact

occurred, it is nonetheless possible that the evidence would be admissible under rule 404

to prove Mumphord’s “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). Specifically, part of

Mumphord’s defense was that he did not have the requisite intent when he touched the

young men. Indeed, in closing argument, Mumphord’s counsel stated, “So it is

[Mumphord’s] intent, . . . I would agree with the State that this is really what this all boils

down to.” Therefore, evidence of other indecent assaults would likely have been

admissible to rebut this defensive theory even if the cases had been severed. See id.

        Accordingly, even if the district court had granted the motion to sever, it is likely

that all of the evidence relating to the other complaining witnesses would have been

introduced at the separate trials under either rule 404 or article 38.37. Therefore, we

conclude that Mumphord has failed to meet his burden to establish that he was unfairly

prejudiced by the joinder of the remaining causes. See Hodge, 500 S.W.3d at 624.

        6 For the third count that was abandoned, the complainant did not testify. Mumphord does not

provide any explanation as to how he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to sever this count. See
Hodge v. State, 500 S.W.3d 612, 621 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
                                                   28
                                  VI.    CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                      Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
19th day of October, 2023.

                                              29