Court Opinion

ID: 9560361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:18.157994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:52.730553
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority holds that the defendant is entitled to conflict-free counsel, and therefore reverses and returns the case to the court of appeals for remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order denying Murphy’s 35(c) motion and to appoint conflict-free counsel to assist the defendant in the filing and presentation of a Crim.P. 35(c) motion.
My disagreement with the majority does not rest at the level of principle. I agree that a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel should be prudently protected. The majority believes under the facts of this case that remanding to the trial court to appoint conflict-free counsel is necessary. I disagree.
In my view, Murphy’s substantive rights were not adversely affected so that the trial court’s oversight in failing to appoint conflict-free counsel to assist Murphy is harmless error. In requiring the trial court to vacate its order denying Murphy’s 35(c) motion, the majority opinion does not address what facts establish that the trial judge abused his discretion in evaluating the merits of the post-conviction relief motion.
I dissent from the majority because I believe that the court of appeals correctly reasoned that the trial court’s ruling on the merits of Murphy’s motion rendered the question of defendant’s right to conflict-free representation moot. Even though the trial judge failed to appoint conflict-free counsel to represent Murphy at his 35(c) motion, the trial court’s denial of Murphy’s 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief *306without holding a hearing was not an abuse of discretion.
I.
The following review of the record is necessary to understand the issue.
Petitioner, Patrick S. Murphy (Murphy), was charged in an information with three counts of second-degree burglary,1 three counts of theft,2 and two counts of theft by receiving.3 One month later, in a second criminal proceeding, Murphy was additionally charged with one count of second-degree burglary and one count of theft. The district attorney also filed an amended information in each of the two pending criminal cases charging him with three habitual criminal counts.
Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the prosecution agreed to dismiss all the remaining counts in both cases, including the habitual criminal charges, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to one count of second-degree burglary in each case and to receive concurrent aggravated sentences of sixteen to twenty years on each count.4 In accordance with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Murphy on May 21, 1990, to serve two concurrent sixteen-year terms. The defendant avoided a potential mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.5 Throughout the proceedings, Murphy was represented by an attorney from the El Paso County Office of the Public Defender.
On February 5, 1991, Murphy, filed a pro se Crim.P. 35(c) motion and memorandum of points and authorities requesting the trial court to vacate his guilty plea and sentence in each case. In his motion for post-conviction relief, Murphy alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings and that he had entered his guilty plea involuntarily. To support his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Murphy claimed that the public defender made the following alleged errors:
(1) The public defender did not adequately advise him during the providency hearing of either the elements of burglary or of his rights under Crim.P. 11.
(2) The public defender was not prepared for trial.
(3) The public defender failed to investigate the facts of the case.
(4) The public defender failed to challenge the excessive sentence.
(5) The public defender failed to file for post-conviction relief.
Murphy further alleged that, had he proceeded to trial, he would have been found not guilty but, instead, he was “pressed” by his attorney to enter a plea of guilty. Murphy also requested the appointment of counsel other than the public defender’s office to assist with his 35(c) motion. In support of his request for appointment of counsel, Murphy filed an affidavit which stated, in relevant part:
Affiant will require the assistance of private counsel in this ... matter, as there is a conflict of interest between the affiant and the office of the Colorado State Public Defenders Office. The nature of this conflict surrounds the fact that the Public Defender will be ... [a] material witness during the hearing in this ... matter ... as they were involved in the entry of [the] guilty plea [by] the affiant and they were the attorney of *307record in those matters which are collaterally attacked.
On February 21, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying Murphy’s motion for reconsideration of sentence pursuant to Crim.P. 35(b).6 The trial court misconstrued Murphy’s motion as a Crim.P. 35(b) motion and appointed the same public defender who represented him throughout the proceedings to assist him in future proceedings. The trial court issued the following order:
This matter comes forward upon motion of the defendant for appointment of counsel to review and assist in preparation of a motion for relief from sentence. The court has denied a motion for reconsideration pursuant to C.R.C.P. [sic] 35(b) and that motion is not open for consideration.
The Public Defender is appointed to assist the Defendant.
On March 7,' 1991, the defendant, in a personal letter, notified the trial court that it had misinterpreted his Crim.P. Rule 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief as a Crim.P. Rule 35(b) motion for reconsideration. In his letter, Murphy noted that, even if he had wanted to file a 35(b) motion, it would have been time-barred since “1. It was past the 120 day limit. 2. It would serve no purpose on which I am trying to get the court to recognize. 3. Being that the guilty plea was entered under a plea bargain (AGAINST MY WISHES).” Murphy requested that the court reconsider his motion under the appropriate provision of the rule but failed to object to the trial court’s appointment of the public defender at any point in his letter.
On March 14, 1991, the same trial judge who had accepted the plea bargain, sentenced Murphy, and presided over the pro-vidency hearing denied the Crim.P. 35(c) motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, based on Murphy’s failure to provide a sufficient factual basis for the motion. The issued order states in relevant part as follows:
While the Defendant list[s] numerous case citations[,] his motion fails to allege any factual allegations in support of his motion. For instance, he was thoroughly advised by both reading of the information and a less formal explanation of the nature and elements of the crime to which a plea of guilty was entered. The defendant not only acknowledged his understanding, but affirmatively stated he had no questions.
On appeal, Murphy raised the same contentions concerning his right to conflict-free representation which he raises now. Murphy argued that the district court erred on February 21, 1991, in appointing the public defender to assist him in his motion for post-conviction relief who was also the subject of Murphy’s Crim.P. 35(c) ineffective assistance of counsel motion. Murphy asserted that the trial court’s appointment resulted in the public defender’s litigating the claim against himself, thus causing an incurable conflict of interest.
The court of appeals, in a 2-1 unpublished decision, affirmed the trial court’s order denying Murphy’s Crim.P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief. The court held that the trial court’s ruling on the merits of Murphy’s motion rendered the question of defendant’s right to conflict-free representation moot. People v. Murphy, No. 91CA0616 (Colo.App. Apr. 30, 1992). In its determination, the court of appeals relied on Kostal v. People, 167 Colo. 317, 447 P.2d 536 (1968), which held that, if a motion contains insufficient factual allegations, there is no requirement that an attorney be appointed to represent the defendant. The court of appeals, therefore, concluded that Murphy’s right to conflict-free representation was immaterial since the trial court correctly decided that Murphy’s motion was not supported by sufficient factual allegations to warrant his right to the assistance of appointed counsel.
*308The court of appeals also found unpersuasive Murphy’s contention that the trial court erred in ruling on his motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing. The court of appeals, agreeing with the trial court, concluded that Murphy’s motion was factually insufficient to require an eviden-tiary hearing since he “did not indicate what material facts would have been discovered by [an additional] investigation or trial preparation or how [Murphy] had been prejudiced by the alleged failure.” Murphy, No. 91CA0616, slip op. at 2. Finally, based on Murphy’s failure to provide the court of appeals with a transcript of the providency hearing, and given that the same trial court judge presided throughout all the proceedings, the court determined that Murphy had failed to establish that the trial court’s denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion.
We granted Murphy’s petition for certio-rari, in part, to review the court of appeals’ determination that a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel is rendered moot when the trial court properly rules on the merits of a Crim.P. rule 35(c) post-conviction motion.7
II.
I dissent from the majority because I believe that the court of appeals correctly reasoned that, where a defendant’s allegations are factually insufficient to require a hearing on a 35(c) motion, a defendant’s right to conflict-free representation is rendered moot since the defendant is not entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel in the first place. I further conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Murphy's Crim.P. 35(c) motion.
Criminal defendants are guaranteed a right to appointed counsel under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Martinez v. People, 173 Colo. 515, 519, 480 P.2d 843, 845 (1971). As the United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1994, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), has stated, however, “States have no obligation to provide [post-conviction] relief, ... and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well.” Thus, no sixth amendment right to counsel attaches for indigents seeking state post-conviction relief. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1994. This court has held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in “habeas corpus” actions. Brinklow v. Riveland, 773 P.2d 517, 521 (Colo.1989). In Brinklow, the court extended its vision beyond habeas corpus actions and held that the right to counsel also does not attach in Rule 35(c) post-conviction proceedings if the claim is “wholly unfounded.” Id. at 521; Kostal v. People, 167 Colo. 317, 318-19, 447 P.2d 536, 537 (1968) (“If the motion contains no allegations of facts upon which relief can be granted, there is no requirement that an evidentiary hearing be had or that an attorney be appointed to represent the defendant.”).
Murphy, consequently, had no right to counsel in his post-conviction proceedings. The majority opinion, in holding that Murphy is entitled to conflict-free representation adopts a construction which creates a result that is inconsistent with common sense and precedent, since, in effect, Murphy is not entitled to court-appointed representation.
I concede that, by appointing counsel, the trial court erred in failing to appoint conflict-free counsel. I find such error, however, harmless because Murphy’s substantive rights were not adversely affected since his claims were wholly unfounded. Any error in appointing an attorney with a conflict of interest, therefore, was rendered moot.
Murphy filed a 35(c) motion to set aside his plea of guilty based on inadequate assistance of counsel and insufficiency of his Crim.P. Rule 11 advisement. Murphy makes a blanket statement that counsel *309was ineffective but fails to provide any factual allegations that would satisfy an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He merely states that the “files, records and minutes” of the cases and the “[ojral testimony from an expert witness, who will have to be appointed by the court” contain the facts that support his allegations. The record, nevertheless, supports the finding of the trial court that his motion lacked any factual allegations to support his motion.
It is a well established principle of appellate review that “[the reviewing] court must presume that the trial court’s findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence where the appellant has failed to provide a complete record on appeal.” People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 242-43, 606 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1980); Kailey v. Colorado State Dep’t of Corrections, 807 P.2d 563, 567 (Colo.1991) (quoting Lamb v. People, 174 Colo. 441, 446, 484 P.2d 798, 800 (1971)) (“In a Crim.P. 35 proceeding, the [trial] court is the trier of fact.... [and] where the evidence presented to the court supports the findings and judgment ... ‘the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on review.’ ”). Since the transcript of the providency hearing was not included in the record certified to this court (Murphy failed to provide the transcript to the court of appeals), this court must presume that Murphy was properly advised by the trial court under Crim.P. 118 of the effects of the guilty plea prior to accepting it: It can be reasonably inferred that, given the defendant’s substantial experience with the criminal justice system, and the fact that Murphy had previously been convicted of three felonies, he was fully aware of the benefits of entering into the plea bargain.
Crim.P. 35(c)(3) enables a trial court to deny a defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief without holding a hearing “[w]here the motion and the record of the case show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the [defendant] is not entitled to relief.” People v. Velarde, 200 Colo. 374, 376, 616 P.2d 104, 105 (1980); People v. Hutton, 183 Colo. 388, 391, 517 P.2d 392, 394 (1973). The trial judge made his findings of fact without granting the defendant an evidentiary hearing. In denying relief under Crim.P. 35(c), the trial judge relied upon his own acceptance of the plea bargain and the providency advisement in which the defendant entered a plea of guilty.
Under these circumstances, I cannot say that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s Crim.P. 35 motion. I believe that the ■ issue of conflict-free counsel is rendered moot by virtue of the district court’s denial of the post-conviction motion. Since the trial court correctly determined that Murphy’s motion was factually insufficient, I find no error, therefore, in the court of appeals’ reasoning that Murphy’s right to conflict-free representation is rendered moot since the defendant was not entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel in the first place.
A trial court’s decision to deny a post-conviction motion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Miller v. People, 178 Colo. 397, 497 P.2d 992 (1972). An abuse of discretion occurs only when, under the circumstances, a ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104 (Colo.1990).
The majority’s conclusion in this case requires vacating an otherwise valid post-conviction order and requires the trial court *310to rehear the motion without finding that the trial court abused its discretion in its post-conviction order. Absent a demonstration that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion, I believe that the majority’s needless reversal of an otherwise valid post-conviction ruling serves no purported purpose. Although I recognize the need to deter conflicts of interest that threaten the right to effective assistance of counsel, I find that there was no actual or probable prejudice to Murphy’s rights engendered by that conflict in the trial court’s ruling and, therefore, no reversible error.
The majority’s argument that defendant is entitled to conflict-free counsel, whatever its merits, is beside the point. I cannot fashion a purpose in requiring the district court to reconsider a motion that has already been properly addressed. The fact remains that, even if Murphy is now provided with conflict-free assistance, further review is unlikely to produce a different result since the allegations of Murphy’s Crim.P. 35(c) motion still remain factually insufficient.
I am troubled by the majority opinion since, under the circumstances here, the trial judge properly disposed of the Crim.P. 35(c) motion before the appointed attorney had even an opportunity to assist Murphy in his post-conviction proceedings. It is not apparent, therefore, that the public defender labored under an actual conflict of interest since the public defender did not actively represent Murphy during the twenty-one day period from February 21, 1991, the date of the trial court’s original order denying the 35(b) motion, to March 14, 1991, the date the trial court denied Murphy’s 35(c) motion. I emphasize that my decision centers on the fact that, although the trial court appointed the public defender to assist the defendant, the public defender did nothing to assist or hurt Murphy during this time span.9
III.
Under the circumstances presented • in this case, I believe that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the issue of the defendant’s right to conflict-free representation became moot when the trial court denied Murphy’s Crim.P. 35(c) motion on the merits.
For the reasons set forth above, I disagree with the majority and, accordingly, respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA joins in this dissent.

. § 18-4-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. § 18-4-40l(2)(b), (c), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. § 18-4-410(4), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. The record on appeal does not include a transcript of this hearing. The minute orders, included within the record, show that, at the hearing, the defendant was present with counsel and was advised on the plea of guilty to second degree burglary, a class 4 felony, and a sentence from sixteen to twenty years if the court accepted his plea.

.At the present time, Murphy is thirty-two years old. If he were convicted on the habitual counts, parole eligibility would attach only after he served a minimum of forty calendar years. See § 16-13-101(2.5), 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1993 Supp.).

. Crim.P. 35(b) allows the court to reduce a defendant’s sentence on its own initiative or on defendant’s motion, provided that the motion is filed within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.

. This court denied certiorari review on the following issues: Whether the state and federal constitutions entitle defendants to conflict-free appointed counsel in a Crim.P. 35(c) proceeding; and, whether C.A.R. 35(f) requires a majority of judges at the court of appeals, and not a single panel, to consider publication of each case prior to the decision.

. Crim.P. 11 provides in pertinent part as follows:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty ... without first determining ...:
(1) That the defendant understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he is pleading and the effect of his plea;
(2) That the plea is voluntary on defendant’s part and is not the result of undue influence or coercion on the part of anyone;
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(4) That he understands the possible penalty or penalties;
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(6) That there is a factual basis for the plea. If the plea is entered as a result of a plea agreement, the court shall explain to the defendant, and satisfy itself that the defendant understands, the basis for the plea agreement, and the defendant may then waive the establishment of a factual basis for the particular charge to which he pleads[.]

. Murphy’s failure to object to the trial court's appointment of the public defender further reinforces that we are dealing with a "comedy of errors."
In response to the trial judge’s order on February 21, 1991, Murphy wrote to the trial judge notifying the court that its order was pursuant to the wrong subsection of the rule, Crim.P. 35(b). Murphy requested the court to reconsider his motion under the appropriate provision of the rule. The defendant further noted the procedural reasons for purposely not bringing a 35(b) motion.
In his letter, Murphy made sure to clarify that he had brought a post-conviction 35(c) motion. The defendant’s letter certainly demonstrates that he was aware of the law. Murphy, nevertheless, raised no objections to the trial court's appointment of the public defender even though at this time he was already aware of this appointment. It is ironic that, in his Crim.P. 35(c) motion and memorandum of points and authorities, Murphy specifically requested private counsel. Yet, after the trial court issued its original order denying the purported 35(b) motion, Murphy did not raise any objection to the court's purported mistake.