Court Opinion

ID: 9653066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:38:11.938193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.237463
License: Public Domain

GARRISON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion reverses the conviction on the basis of Appellant’s first point relied on. That point alleges that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine by which it sought to exclude evidence of Appellant’s intoxication. A motion in limine, however, in and of itself, preserves nothing for appeal. State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Mo. banc 1992). Ordinarily, therefore, a point relied on which refers only to a ruling on a motion in limine, such as the point here, is fatally defective. State v. Rodgers, 899 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo.App. S.D.1995).
Additionally, a ruling on a motion in limine is interlocutory and subject to change during the course of the trial. Id. The proponent of evidence must attempt to present the excluded evidence at trial, and if an objection is then sustained, the proponent must make an offer of proof in order to preserve the matter for appellate review. State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d at 592; State v. Gateley, 907 S.W.2d *929212, 223 (Mo.App. S.D.1995). In the instant case, the State’s motion in limine was made prior to John Lacey being called as a witness. After the trial court sustained the motion, Appellant’s counsel made what he characterized an offer of proof. It was narrative in form and consisted of counsel’s statement that, if permitted to do so, Mr. Lacey would testify that at approximately nine o’clock on the evening of the victim’s death, he observed the victim and Appellant in an intoxicated condition. Appellant’s counsel also stated that if Appellant decided to take the stand, he would testify, if permitted to do so, that he drank from six o’clock that evening until the time of the “accident,” and that he was intoxicated.
Counsel informed the court that they were not offering the intoxication evidence to show that Appellant was incapable of having a knowing state of mind, but merely to explain his conduct after the “accident.” He said, “We’re still contending that what he did, it was, the death was the result of an accident. We’re not saying that his intoxication precluded him from acting knowingly.”
Assuming that this was an appropriate offer of proof,1 there was no indication that Appellant, if permitted to do so, would have testified that his drinking had any effect on his conduct following the victim’s death. Rather, his counsel informed the trial court that if he were permitted to show Appellant’s intoxication, he would then argue that this affected Appellant’s conduct following the death.
Appellant’s counsel explained that he would argue that the intoxication was the reason Appellant did not leave the premises when the victim made sexual advances, why he did not call an ambulance for the victim, why he did not call the police until much later, why he would have been holding the knife as he was when the victim fell against it, why he was unable to explain the injury to the dog, and his choice of words when he later gave a statement to the police.
No attempt was made during Appellant’s testimony to present evidence of intoxication. He did testify, however, that when the incident occurred, he was in the process of leaving when the victim grabbed his shoulder, causing Appellant to turn and kick the victim; that he thought about calling an ambulance but did not because the victim died very quickly and it would have done no good; that the reason he didn’t call the police sooner was because he was afraid he would be accused of murder; he explained how the incident occurred; and he testified that he had difficulty expressing himself because he was tired and was despondent over the death. He was unable to explain how the blade of the knife got into the dog. In summary, by his testimony, Appellant explained his actions to the jury. Except for the incident involving the dog, Appellant’s testimony indicated a thorough memory of his conduct and the events following the stabbing. He made no attempt to present evidence that intoxication affected that conduct.
Based on this record, I do not believe that Appellant preserved this issue for appellate review, either in the trial court or in his point relied on presented here. Under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe Appellant is entitled to relief on his direct appeal. This would be true even if we were to grant a plain error review. Pursuant to Rule 30.20, we are entitled to consider plain errors affecting substantial rights “when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has resulted therefrom.” Without indicating whether this case would otherwise present one of the “rare situations” referred to in State v. Erwin, 848 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Mo.banc), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826, 114 S.Ct. 88, 126 L.Ed.2d 56 (1993), where evidence of intoxication is relevant on some issue other than Appellant’s state of mind, I do not believe that plain error has been demonstrated in this case. I would affirm the conviction.

. An offer of proof must demonstrate the testimony's relevance, must be specific, and must be definite. State v. Jones, 919 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Mo.App. E.D.1996). The preferred procedure is to put the witness on the stand and elicit the testimony out of the hearing of the jury. Id. A narrative by counsel may be sufficient when it is clear that both the trial court and counsel know exactly what the proposed testimony would be. Id.