Court Opinion

ID: 9699728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:49:35.643462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:56.437337
License: Public Domain

DODSON, Justice (Retired),
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the Court. The majority opinion concludes this case does not involve a health care liability claim subject to the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the Act), Tex.Rev.Civ.StatAnn. art. 4590i, § 13.01(e) (Vernon Supp.2001), and therefore reverses and remands the case to the trial court. I respectfully disagree and would overrule Bush’s second point of error in which she contends the Act does not apply. Likewise, I would overrule the remaining points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The Act applies to all health care liability claims. Id. § 1.03(4) (Vernon Supp. 2001). A health care liability claim includes a cause of action against a health care provider for a “claimed departure from accepted standards of ... safety which proximately results in injury to or death of the patient.” Id. (emphasis added). According to Bush, the Act does not apply to this case because “[t]he cause of action is not grounded in medical malpractice but in the negligence of staff personnel in permitting another patient whom the psychologist knew had a propensity for violence to be put in general population and assault [Bush].”
As aptly stated in the majority opinion, “[t]he effectiveness of the Act depends upon its vigilant enforcement.” In this context, claimants cannot simply recast a health care liability claim in terms of a general negligence or premises liability claim in order to avoid the Act’s statutory requirements. See Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex.1994); Williams v. Walker, 995 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1999, no pet.). I agree with the majority that in determining whether the Act is applicable in a particular case, we look to the underlying nature of the claim. See Sorokolit, 889 S.W.2d at 242. A factor in determining whether the Act is applicable is whether the challenged act was “an inseparable part of the rendition of medical services.” Walden v. Jeffery, 907 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex.1995).
The underlying nature of this claim is one for injuries that occurred when a psychiatric inpatient at Green Oaks, Jeffery Gouge, assaulted Bush who was also a psychiatric inpatient. In Bush’s original petition, she claimed Green Oaks knew or should have known of Gouge’s propensity for violence and failed to warn her or provide a reasonably safe environment. Bush asserted Green Oaks failed to main*674tain the premises in a safe manner. In alleging that Green Oaks knew Gouge had violent tendencies, Bush pleaded that Gouge was observed: (1) acting in a threatening manner to a guest at Green Oaks; (2) making threats to hurt a staff member; (3) slamming the phone down on his father; and (4) attempting to kick down a metal entry door the night before his attack on Bush. Bush further pleaded that Green Oaks should have placed Gouge in the “acute unit” of the hospital.
I conclude the above challenged acts regarding Green Oaks’ failure to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe environment were inseparable parts of the rendition of Bush’s medical services at Green Oaks. In the context of an inpatient psychiatric hospital, an integral aspect of the safety of patients must necessarily be keeping unstable or violent psychiatric patients separated from the nonviolent patients. Further, the claims in this case are of the type that would require expert testimony as to the appropriate standard of care in segregating patients in a psychiatric hospital and, specifically, whether segregation was warranted in this particular case.
The majority concludes Bush’s status as a patient at Green Oaks is not a controlling factor in her causes of action. I respectfully disagree. Bush’s medical treatment necessarily included her status as an inpatient at the hospital. She should not be able to circumvent the Act by simply taking her inpatient status out of the equation. I conclude Bush’s cause of action is one for a claimed departure from accepted standards of safety which proximately resulted in Bush’s injury and thus falls within the scope of the Act. See Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 4590i, § 1.03(4).
For these reasons, I would hold that Bush’s claim is governed by the Act and thus conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing Bush’s suit for failing to file an expert report. Therefore, I would overrule Bush’s second point of error. I would also overrule the remaining points of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.