Court Opinion

ID: 9406687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 10:08:17.212271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:32.513485
License: Public Domain

In the
           Court of Appeals
   Second Appellate District of Texas
            at Fort Worth
        ___________________________
             No. 02-23-00082-CV
        ___________________________

IN THE INTEREST OF K.W. AND K.W., CHILDREN

     On Appeal from the 324th District Court
             Tarrant County, Texas
         Trial Court No. 324-707636-21

   Before Sudderth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                 I. INTRODUCTION

       Appellant R.W. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental

rights to her children K.W. and K.W.1 The trial court also terminated the parental

rights of the children’s fathers, but neither father appealed.

       The trial court found that the Texas Department of Family and Protective

Services (the Department) had proved four conduct-based grounds for termination.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P). Additionally, the trial

court found that the Department had proved that Mother had an inability to care for

the children. See id. § 161.003(a)(2). Finally, the trial court found that termination was

in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2), .003(a)(5).

       The trial court awarded permanent managing conservatorship of the children

to the Department and possessory conservatorship to the intervenors, the foster

parents.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

       Mother’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief asserting that “the appeal

is frivolous and without merit.” See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct.

1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

       1
        We use aliases for the children and identify R.W. by her relationship to the
children, that is, as “Mother.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App.
P. 9.8(b)(2).

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2003, order) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination

cases). Counsel’s brief meets the Anders requirements by presenting a professional

evaluation of the record and showing why there are no arguable grounds to advance

on appeal.

      We provided Mother the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate record

and to file a pro se response, but she did not do so. The Department has responded

that it agrees with Mother’s counsel that the appeal is frivolous.

                                  III. DISCUSSION

      When an Anders brief is filed, we must independently examine the appellate

record to determine if any arguable grounds for appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-

00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.)

(mem. op.); see Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We also

consider the Anders brief itself and, if filed, any pro se response. In re K.M., No. 02-

18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.).

      We have carefully reviewed appointed appellate counsel’s Anders brief and the

appellate record. Having found no reversible error, we agree with counsel that this

appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App.

2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parent–child relationship

between Mother and the children.

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       Mother’s counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not

show good cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the

appeal is frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J.,

501 S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied).             Accordingly,

Mother’s counsel remains appointed through proceedings in the Texas Supreme

Court unless otherwise relieved. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28; see also Tex. Fam.

Code. Ann. § 107.016(2)(C).

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

       We agree with counsel that Mother’s appeal is frivolous; thus, we affirm the

trial court’s termination order.

                                                     /s/ Dana Womack
23082CV – K.W. (180)                                                  DMW/Dean

                                                     Dana Womack
                                                     Justice

Delivered: June 30, 2023

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