Court Opinion

ID: 9697152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:07:14.576772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:29.674381
License: Public Domain

*454Ryan, J.
(concurring). I agree that the Legislature did not unconstitutionally delegate its lawmaking power when it conferred limited authority on the Natural Resources Commission to promulgate rules in order to fulfill its statutory duties and responsibilities under MCLA 299.1 et seq.; MSA 13.1 et seq. I write separately because I do not fully agree with Justice Williams’ analysis.
Justice Williams finds that the delegation doctrine is grounded not only in the constitutional separation of powers but also in constitutional due process. I do not agree with the latter premise.
Any legislative grant of authority to an agency may be challenged under the "standards test” to determine whether the Legislature has attempted to vest its lawmaking power in that agency contrary to the constitutional separation of powers. When a grant of authority has been determined to be lawful, the authorizing legislation may be tested further to ascertain whether adequate procedural safeguards have been provided to assure the protection of the due process rights of any party affected by the agency’s exercise of its authority. These are separate and distinct constitutional inquiries.
*455I have always understood the delegation doctrine to be grounded solely in the constitutional provision for the separation of the powers of government into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. Const 1963, art 3, § 2.1 This provision expressly prohibits the exercise by one branch of government of the powers properly belonging to another branch. Thus, our Constitution prohibits the Legislature from delegating its lawmaking powers to an administrative agency in the executive branch.
However, this Court has recognized that the Legislature can constitutionally authorize an administrative agency to exercise certain powers when fulfilling its legislatively created duties and responsibilities. See, for example, Michigan CR Co v Michigan Railroad Comm, 160 Mich 355, 361-368; 125 NW 549 (1910); GF Redmond & Co v Michigan Securities Comm, 222 Mich 1; 192 NW 688 (1923), and People v Soule, 238 Mich 130, 138-139; 213 NW 195 (1927). The judicial test for determining whether the Legislature has acted properly in authorizing such agency action has emerged as the so-called "standards test”. This test requires the Legislature to prescribe "standards * * * as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits”, Osius v St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 (1956), when conferring regulatory and rule-making authority on an administrative agency. When so constrained by legislative fiat, an agency may properly promulgate rules, and it is not unconstitutionally exercising lawmaking powers when it does so.
*456Although this "standards” test has borne the brunt of vigorous criticism,2 it has retained its essential validity and is dispositive of the first issue in this appeal.
The Legislature vested the general administration of MCLA 299.1 et seq.; MSA 13.1 et seq., in the Natural Resources Commission and conferred power on the commission both to promulgate rules to govern the administration of that act and to promulgate rules concerning the use and occupancy of the lands and property under its control. MCLA 299.2; MSA 13.2. The standards guiding the commission in promulgating these rules include, inter alia, the duties imposed on the Department of Natural Resources, under MCLA 299.3; MSA 13.3, of "protecting] and conserving] the natural resources of the state”; "preventing] and guarding] against the pollution of lakes and streams within the state”; and "foster[ing] and encouraging] the protecting and propogation of game and fish”. Additional standards are found in the legislative mandate given the commission to make those "rules for protection of the lands and property under its control against wrongful use or occupancy as will insure the carrying out of the intent of this act to protect the same from depredations and to preserve such lands and property from molestation, spoilation, destruction or any other improper use or occupancy”. MCLA 299.3a; MSA 13.4. The intent of this act as expressed in the first line of its title, includes "providing] for the protection and conservation of the natural resources of the state”.
The protection and conservation of our natural resources requires a high level of expertise. The *457"various” and "varying” detail associated with managing the natural resources has led us to recognize that it is normally impractical for the Legislature to establish rules and regulations of requisite specificity and that this function must be performed by the designated administrative officials. Dep’t of Natural Resources v Seaman, 396 Mich 299, 309; 240 NW2d 206 (1976).
The standards enunciated by the Legislature to govern the Natural Resources Commission in the exercise of its rule-making authority are "as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits,” Osius, supra. I agree that the Legislature did not unconstitutionally delegate its lawmaking power to the Commission in violation of the separation of powers when this legislation was enacted. No further analysis is necessary to determine there has been legislative compliance with the delegation doctrine.
I share Justice Williams’ concern with insuring that constitutional due process is afforded to any party affected by an agency’s action. Const 1963, art 1, § 17. However, I do not agree with his analysis of due process as a second facet of the "standards test” for the purpose of determining compliance with the delegation doctrine.
Justice Williams cites cases which he finds stand for the proposition, or "hint” at the proposition, that a legislative body has unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking power, on due process grounds, when it authorizes an agency or public official to act, but fails to articulate standards to insure that the agency or official does not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner.3 In my opinion, *458this interpretation unnecessarily confuses the delegation issue with the due process issue. In each of the cases cited by him, the delegation question could have been answered by a determination whether there existed standards "as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits”, Osius, supra, to govern the exercise of the legislatively created powers. Judicial inquiry into the delegation doctrine should be concerned solely with this question.
Inquiry into the due process question involves a separate and distinct issue and must focus on the procedural safeguards provided to govern the exercise of the agency’s authorized powers. Consequently, there is no need to address the due process issue until it has first been established that the Legislature has not violated the delegation doctrine, but has properly authorized an agency to act under "standards ** * * as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits”. That having been done, the due process inquiry should then focus on the actual, or potential for, abuse of discretion in the agency’s exercise of its power.
In evaluating whether there is potential for abuse in the agency’s exercise of its discretion, a court may look to a number of sources including the legislative declaration of policy made in the act which authorizes the agency actions; the procedural safeguards that govern the agency in the exercise of its powers; the provisions for legislative supervision of the agency’s actions; and the provisions for judicial review.4 Of them all, the procedural safeguards will provide the greatest assurance of due process protection. These may be *459found in the very legislation which authorizes the agency action; in other legislation which is incorporated by reference into the authorizing legislation, Pleasant Ridge v Governor, 382 Mich 225, 243; 169 NW2d 625 (1969); in the procedures defined in the Administrative Procedures Act, MCLA 24.201 et seq.; MSA 3.560(101) et seq., or in any combination of the foregoing.
The legislation presently under consideration requires the Natural Resources Commission to follow the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act when promulgating any rules. MCLA 299.3a; MSA 13.4. The procedures there prescribed are suificient to insure the proper protection of the due process rights of any person who might be affected by the agency’s action, if the procedures are followed by the agency.
I agree with Justice Williams that the record before us on this appeal is inadequate to determine whether the DNR was acting within the scope of its properly delegated authority when it adopted these river use rules and whether, in fact, it afforded all affected parties suificient due process safeguards when it exercised that authority. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by him.
Kavanagh, C.J., and Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.
Blair Moody, Jr., J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 "The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution.” Const 1963, art 3, § 2.

 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, ch. 2, and Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1970 Supplement, ch 2, and Cum Supp, 1977, ch 2.

 Devereaux v Genesee Twp Board, 211 Mich 38; 177 NW 967 (1920); GF Redmond & Co v Mich Securities Commission, 222 Mich 1; 192 NW 688 (1923); Harrigan & Reid Co v Burton, 224 Mich 564; 195 NW 60 (1923); Postal v Village of Grosse Pointe, 239 Mich 286; 214 *458NW 148 (1927); Hoyt Bros, Inc v Grand Rapids, 260 Mich 447; 245 NW 509 (1932).

 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, ch 2, § 2.08.