Court Opinion

ID: 9671190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:32:33.493768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.508334
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the first ground for review. Ante, at 74-76.1 However, for the following reasons, I dissent to the majority’s treatment of appellant’s second ground for review. Ante, at 76-77.2
*78I.
The majority holds the mere exhibition of a deadly weapon to an accomplice during a solicitation transaction may be sufficient to support a deadly weapon finding for the offense of solicitation. Ante, at 77. However, the majority does not apply that holding to the facts of the instant case. Instead the majority uses a footnote to hold the issue is not before us because it was not raised in the Court of Appeals, addressed by the Court of Appeals, or raised by appellant in his petition for discretionary review. Ante, at 76-77, n. 6. If the footnote is correct, the second ground for review should be dismissed as improvidently granted because it does not impact the decision of the Court of Appeals. See, Tex.R.App.P. 200 (Court of Criminal Appeals reviews “decisions” of the courts of appeals.) Consequently, the majority’s discussion of the second ground for review is nothing more than obiter dictum.
However, contrary to footnote 6, the issue was addressed by the Court of Appeals. Specifically, the State, in responding to the points of error challenging the deadly weapon finding, relied on Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), contending: “In order to ‘exhibit’ a deadly weapon it need only be consciously displayed during the commission of the required felony offense.” State’s brief on direct appeal, pg. 7.3 The Court of Appeals agreed and held: “A shotgun and handgun were given to Williamson and Williams in the course of the solicitation.” Whatley v. State, slip op. pg. 10,1994 WL 699077 (Tex.App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 1994). Therefore, the second ground for review does impact the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the majority should apply its holding to the instant case and decide if appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the solicitation or in immediate flight therefrom.
II.
A.
Most offenses are complete when each of their elements have occurred. Barnes v. State, 824 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1991)(citing United States v. Smith, 740 F.2d 734, at 736 (9th Cir.1984)). However, some offenses are “continuing in nature.” To determine whether an offense is continuing we utilize the rationale employed by the United States Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 860, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970), where the Court stated:
... the doctrine of continuing offenses should be applied in only limited circumstances ... such a result should not be reached unless the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion or the nature of the crime is such that Congress must assuredly have intended that it be treated os a continuing one.
In Barnes, the State contended theft should be treated as a continuing offense. Id., 824 S.W.2d at 561. Specifically, the State asked us to construe the statute so that every day a defendant exercised control over stolen property would constitute a separate offense. We refused because the explicit language of the statute did not compel such a conclusion and the nature of the offense was not such that the legislature must have intended for theft to be treated as a continuing offense. Id., at 562 (citing Toussie). Such a judicial construction would have usurped “the authority of the legislature in an area controlled exclusively by it.” Ibid.4
B.
Appellant was convicted of solicitation of capital murder pursuant to Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 15.03, which provides:
*79A person commits an offense if, with intent that a capital felony or felony of the first degree be committed, he requests, commands, or attempts to induce another to engage in specific conduct that, under the circumstances surrounding his conduct as the actor believes them to be, would constitute the felony or make the other a party to its commission.
The legislature has not designated § 15.03 as a continuing offense. Therefore, the offense of solicitation is complete when the defendant has intent and acts to induce another to engage in felonious conduct. State v. Brinkley, 764 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989); and, Majid v. State, 713 S.W.2d 405, 407-408 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986).
III.
A
Because solicitation is not a continuing offense, for an affirmative finding to be appropriate, the State must prove either the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense or in the immediate flight therefrom. Art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2). In Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 940-941 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), we held a deadly weapon finding is appropriate if a deadly weapon is used or exhibited to facilitate the commission of the charged offense. Id., at 940. We explained:
... [U]sed ... a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense means that the deadly weapon was employed or utilized in order to achieve its purpose. ... [and] exhibited a deadly weapon means that the weapon was consciously shown or displayed during the commission of the offense.
Id, at 941 (internal quotations omitted). In other words, it is impossible for the deadly weapon to be used or exhibited in a manner to facilitate an already completed offense. Therefore, in the instant case, if the appellant did not use or exhibit a deadly weapon during the commission of the solicitation or in immediate flight therefrom, a deadly weapon finding is not authorized.
B.
The record established that on November 1, 1991, appellant met his accomplices, paid them $700.00 on a murder contract, and gave them a photograph of the intended victim and a map. Appellant had the intent to have the victim murdered and used money to induce his accomplices to carry out the murder. During this meeting each of the elements of solicitation occurred; therefore, the offense was complete. However, appellant did not use or exhibit a deadly weapon during the November 1, 1991, meeting or in immediate flight therefrom.
After the solicitation was complete, two additional meetings occurred. On November 4, 1991, appellant met and gave the accomplices a handgun. On December 11, 1991, appellant met with one of the accomplices and gave him a shotgun. Only at these subsequent meetings is there evidence of a deadly weapon. Because the solicitation was complete before appellant provided the firearms, a deadly weapon finding is not authorized.
Accordingly, I dissent to the resolution of appellant’s second ground for review.

. Appellant’s second ground for review asks:
In the prosecution for an inchoate offense, such as solicitation of murder, under Tex. Penal *78Code Ann. § 15.03, is the "use or exhibition” of a deadly weapon allowable, where no eventual attempt to "use" weapons against the complaining witness was ever made, and where the only place that weapons were "exhibited” was between appellant and his accomplices during the solicitation transaction?

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. In Barnes we noted the Legislature explicitly designated the offense of Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity, Tex. Penal Code § 71.03(4), as a continuing offense. Barnes, 824 S.W.2d at 562. Cf., Lawhorn v. State, 898 S.W.2d 886, 889-890 (Tex.Cr.App.1995)(Legislature did not intend for escape statute to be construed as a continuing offense.).