Court Opinion

ID: 9598150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:06:05.431993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:57.097726
License: Public Domain

CHAPEL, Judge,
Dissenting:
¶ 1 This case was argued before this Court almost two years ago and an opinion was issued deciding the case over a year ago.1 The decision affirming was a per cu-riam opinion with three judges concurring in result and two judges dissenting. The case was a difficult one for two reasons: (1) the facts are just horrible, and (2) the question of whether Fairchild was entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction was close. I voted to concur in result in the original opinion affirming this case. That vote was based upon a very, very narrow resolution of the intent issue. The majority on rehearing unnecessarily and erroneously expands the resolution of that issue. Consequently, I dissented to the majority’s decision to grant relief on Fairchild’s Petition for Rehearing and to withdraw the opinion handed down in this case on August 20,1998. I further dissent to the decision in the Opinion on Rehearing denying Fairchild relief.2 I have concluded our case law clearly holds that child abuse murder by willful use of unreasonable force3 is a specific intent crime. I would reverse and remand the case for the proper instructions on voluntary intoxication.
¶ 2 The majority appears to have withdrawn the original opinion in this case solely in order to revisit the issue of intent for the crime of child-abuse murder by willful use of unreasonable force. That proposition was not properly raised in Fairchild’s petition for rehearing and cannot serve as a basis to revisit that question. Our rules clearly limit relief on rehearing to (1) questions submitted on direct appeal which were overlooked in the original opinion, or (2)' decisions conflicting with express statutes or''controlling authority not brought to this Court’s attention during the pendency of the appeal.4 On the issue of intent, the original opinion discussed a previously uninterpreted section of the child abuse murder statute. I discuss the majority’s mistaken conclusion otherwise below. As the original opinion neither overlooked nor failed to apply controlling authority, there is no avenue through which this *637Court may properly reach the issue of intent on a petition for rehearing.
¶ 3 The narrow question raised in Fair-child is whether “willful use of unreasonable force” requires specific intent. If so, Fair-child was entitled to an instruction on voluntary intoxication and the case should be reversed. If not, this Court has held a general intent crime is eligible for the death penalty without any finding of intent to injure or kill, or any showing of reckless disregard or indifference to the value of human life.
¶ 4 The majority concludes that child abuse murder is a general intent crime. However, this conclusion creates not only a logical anomaly, but a serious constitutional error. This Court cannot and should not make a general intent crime eligible for the death penalty. The majority merely concludes that a defendant who actually kills may be death-eligible without any finding of intent to kill or even injure. This conclusion is constitutionally unsound. The Supreme Court has never upheld such a conclusion and has strongly indicated it -will not so rule.
¶ 5 The only legitimate analysis finding a general intent crime death-eligible rests on a comparison with the law of felony murder. Most capital punishment states provide the death penalty for certain murders occurring in the course of enumerated felonies, and the intent to commit the underlying felony is sufficient to support the conviction for murder. The Supreme Court has held that such convictions may result in death-eligibility only if there is a determination that (a) the defendant intended life be taken or contemplated that lethal force would be used,5 or (b) the defendant had substantial personal involvement in the underlying felony and exhibited reckless disregard or indifference to the value of human life.6 This Enmund/Ti-son formula is necessary before a felony murder defendant may be eligible for the death penalty.
¶ 6' The majority does not explicitly make the felony-murder analogy, but the opinion relies on Wisdom v. State.7 Wisdom beat his stepson to death and was convicted of child abuse murder by “use of unreasonable force.” We rejected Wisdom’s Enmund/Ti-son argument using a remarkably facile analysis. We noted that Enmund and Tison both involved defendants who aided and abetted and determined that, since Wisdom actually committed the murder himself, those cases did not apply. Thus this Court never reached the issue of intent necessary to support death-eligibility. This reasoning did not lead to Wisdom’s execution since we reversed-the death conviction and remanded the sentence on other grounds. Thus, the United States Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to review this dubious pronouncement.
¶ 7 The majority suggests Wisdom comports with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and cites Cabana v. Bullock.8 In fact Cabana does not support this holding. The issue in Cabana was at what point an Enmund finding of culpability must be made. The opinion relies on the Enmund formulation that somewhere in the process there must be a determination that the defendant is personally culpable and intentionally caused harm.9 As Enmund states, “It is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’”10 In the quote cited by the majority, Cabana describes Enmund as stating the categorical rule, imposing a substantive limit on the imposition of the death penalty, that “a person who has not in fact killed, attempted to kill, or intended that a killing take place or that lethal force be used may not be sentenced to death.”11 Cabana also notes Enmund is not concerned with *638guilt or innocence and establishes no elements of any particular capital crime.12 Cabana itself makes no comment on the level of intent assumed in the Enmund rule.
¶ 8 In Enmund, Tison, and Cabana, the Court was concerned with the choice between a defendant with no finding of personal culpability- for murder, and a defendant who had intentionally killed. Enmund refers to one who actually kills intentionally, noting that the death penalty “can serve as .a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation.”13 None of these cases contemplated the issue in Fairchild: a defendant who actually killed without any finding of specific intent to kill or injure. In Hopkins v. Reeves,14 the Supreme Court reiterated Cabana’s holding that state courts must at some point make an Enmund/Tison determination of personal culpability for a felony-murder defendant.15 The Supreme Court required this determination even though Hopkins was the actual killer.
¶9 In Loving v. United States,16 the Supreme Court held that, without the addition of aggravating factors, a Code of Military Justice article authorizing the death penalty for felony murder was not sufficiently narrow under Enmund where there was no determination that the defendant intended to kill or actually killed.17 Loving was the triggerman in that felony-murder case. Although Loving was not resolved on the issue of intent, this was clearly of concern to several Justices during oral argument. At one point Justice Scalia told petitioner’s counsel, “Enmund I think supports your position there, that you can’t automatically transpose the mens rea for a felony to a killing and still have capital punishment for it.”18 One Justice asked the Solicitor General, “Was it clear in this case that it was the felony aspect of the homicides committed with premeditation that were the aggravators?” Later a Justice asked:
[I]s there a — an intent to kill requirement in section 918?
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Accidental killing would be enough to impose the death penalty under [Art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918(4)]?
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Suppose I drop a gun during a holdup. The gun[ ] goes off and kills somebody. Is that enough to satisfy the requirements of 10 U.S.C. [§] 918(4)19
The Solicitor General argued that, although the felony-murder statute lacked sufficient intent to satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirements for death-eligibility, the Government relied on the aggravating factor that Loving was the triggerman. The Justice continued:
Yes, but that still doesn’t get you to intent and the aggravating factor isn’t an element. ...
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[I]t may limit [the imposition of the death penalty] but it doesn’t provide the missing element....
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The triggerman can do it accidentally.20
The Solicitor General replied that the introduction to the, statute said “unlawfully kills”,. *639and commented, “[TJhere would have to be presumably some level of culpability, recklessness or gross negligence or something like that.”21
¶ 10 Later Justice Scalia returned to the intent question and said it appeared, under the statute, “You can perpetrate the killing without intending to kill.”22 The Solicitor General agreed there was no statutory intent to kill requirement, and Justice Scalia said, “[A]s it now stands, I guess that means [§] 118(4) is invalid, constitutionally invalid [as to the death penalty].”23 Another Justice added,
... I’m, with Justice Scalia, somewhat confused because of the — [§] 118(4) does permit conviction of a person engaged in robbery who, let’s say, negligently and therefore unlawfully without excuse or justification kills someone else. And that, provided he’s.the person who did it negligently and therefore - unlawfully, would permit the imposition of the death penalty.24
• ¶ 11 This exchange suggests the Court will look with disfavor on any attempt to make a general intent crime death-eligible without at least an Enmund/Tison review of personal culpability. The majority provides for no such review and rejects Fairchild’s Enmund/Tison claim of error. Under the Court’s decision today, Fairchild is convicted of a general intent crime and unconstitutionally made eligible for-the death penalty without any finding of intent. I would avoid this problem completely by following our well-settled law holding child abuse murder is a specific intent crime. If properly convicted, Fairchild and any other child abuse murder defendant will not need Enmund/Tison instructions since the jury will already have made a determination regarding personal culpability.
¶ 12 The bulk of the majority discussion is devoted to proving that “willful use of unreasonable force” is. a general intent crime. This requires fourteen pages in which the majority selectively cites from general intent eases and attempts to distinguish or explain our prior, cases deciding this issue. The majority opinion also suggests the Legislature has deliberately kept redundant or unnecessary language in every amendment to the child- abuse murder statutes. We have consistently held the statutory language 'for the underlying statute of child abuse requires the specific intent to injure.25 The majority insists that our previous use of ihe phrase “intent to injure” does not mean what it says. The majority holds that the entire child abuse murder statute, even the provisions prohibiting malicious conduct, encompasses only general intent. In an unnecessarily sweeping pronouncement the majority of this Court now negates all our previous case law on this issue.
¶ 13 The majority “clarifies” our previous cases by suggesting that the “intent to injure” requirement in each means only that the State must prove a general intent to commit the act leading to the child’s injury or death. A brief, review .of the cases shows this is a fruitless enterprise. These extremely plain holdings need no clarification.
¶ 14 In Watkins v. State 26 the defendant was charged with injury to a minor child: the child was injured when the defendant fired a shotgun through a window and killed someone else. We held the evidence showed only reckless disregard for human life as directed to the child victim since there was no “intent to injure, torture; or maim as mandated by the statute. The statutory language being clear and readily understandable, we find the element of intent lacking in the present *640case.”27
¶ 15 Revilla v. State28 charged child abuse murder through “use of unreasonable force.” The majority inexplicably suggests Revilla held the State was not required to prove “intent to injure.” On the contrary, the Court cited Drew v. State,29 further discussed below, to support its holding that child abuse murder has a specific intent requirement of intent to injure.30 Revilla also specifically found the instructions were adequate to tell the jury the State was required to prove the victim’s death was intentional,31 and found other crimes evidence admissible to show the defendant’s intent to injure the victim.32
¶ 16 In Hockersmith v. State33 we held it was error to instruct that “willful” required no intent to injure where the jury was not also instructed on the “intent to injure” element of child abuse murder. Again, the Court cited Drew regarding the requirement of a specific intent to injure.34 Bannister v. State35 reemphasized the Hockersmith decision and specifically found, “As employed in [the child abuse and child abuse murder] statutes, the term willful — used interchangeably with malicious — must require an intent to injure if the mens rea element for those crimes is to make any sense.”36 Following Hockersmith, Grady v. State37 held that the child abuse murder statute required intent to injure and any instruction defining “willful” as requiring no intent to injure was confusing. However, the Court found where the jury was otherwise adequately instructed on the “intent to injure” element, the error in instruction did not automatically require reversal. These cases show an unbroken commitment to the legal interpretation that the legislature intended to made child abuse murder a specific intent crime.
¶ 17 The majority claims Workman v. State38 disposes of the issue of intent for child abuse murder. The entire Workman discussion of the mens rea requirement for child abuse murder follows:
Appellant also complains that § 701.7(C) lacks any mens rea. We again must disagree. The intent for § 701.7(C) is found in 21 O.S. § 843 under the general intent of ‘willfully’ or ‘maliciously’. See Drew v. State, 771 P.2d 224, 228 (Okl.Cr.1989). This assignment of error lacks merit.39
¶ 18 This brief discussion does not appear to use the phrase “general intent” as a term of art, but as an answer to the question whether the child abuse murder statute contains any intent element at all. Although Workman relies on it, the Fairchild majority neither cites nor discusses Drew. As cited in Workman, Drew stated:
Section 843 clearly provides that only those acts which are committed in a willful or malicious manner fall within the purview of the statute. Because the mens rea element of Section 701.7(C) is supplied by Section 843, we find that this argument lacks merit.40
Drew also states:
Where the prosecution attempts to utilize Section 701.7(C) for a murder conviction, it must first establish that all of the elements of child abuse under 21 O.S.1981, § 843 are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Included among those elements is the requirement that the acts be committed in a *641willful or malicious manner. Therefore, the adoption of the mens rea requirement of Section 843 does not alter the State’s ultimate burden of proving each element of Section 701.7(C) beyond a reasonable doubt.41
Drew does not support Workman’s broad statement that § 843 [now § 7115] is a general intent crime. In fact, it does not decide that issue and holds merely that § 843 and § 701.7(C) combined have an unspecified mens rea element. I submit the more reasonable reading is contained in Revilla and Hockersmith, which interpreted Drew to require a specific intent.
¶ 19 The defendant in Workman was convicted of first degree child abuse murder. From the opinion it is impossible to tell what particular prohibited act gave rise to the charge. However, on its face the opinion appears to refer to a specific intent crime. Our legislature has clearly defined “malicious” as denoting a specific intent crime.42 The majority attempts to get around this by reciting the definition of “malice” required for a first degree malice murder conviction under § 701.7(A). The opinion compares this definition with “malicious.” The majority suggests that either (a) the § 701.7(C) prohibition against child murder by malicious conduct incorporates the § 701.7(A) use of “malice” murder, or (b) the legislative definition of “malicious” does not apply to child abuse murder because § 701.7(A) uses “malice.” Not only is this incorrect, it is directly opposed to the majority’s thesis, since malice murder requires a specific intent to kill. Section 843, under which Workman and Fairchild were charged, prohibited willful or malicious injury, torture, maiming or use of unreasonable force.43 As Workman does not say whether the charged conduct was alleged to be “willful” or “malicious,” this Court must assume both statutory terms were used.
¶ 20 The majority apparently realizes the appearance of inconsistency in finding that some parts .of the child abuse murder statute require, specific intent (i.e., all our previous case - law) while one- portion requires only general intent. The majority solution is to insist that both “willful” and “malicious” de.note only general intent. Not surprisingly, none of the majority’s cited eases support this proposition. As I note above, our legislature has defined “malicious” as a specific intent crime.
1T21 The crux of the majority argument is that “willful” always denotes general intent.' The opinion tendentiously discusses general intent cases in which the term “willful” appears even peripherally, or may be inferred to appear. As the discussion below notes, all these cases collectively represent the unsurprising conclusion that, for a general intent crime, the word “willful” requires only a general intent.
¶22 In defending its conclusion regarding intent, the majority cites one of many cases in which this Court has distinguished between general and specific intent. In the syllabus, Vandiver v. State44 says:
4: Two general classes of “intent” exist in the criminal law, a so-called “general intent” which must exist in all crimes, and a further mental element known as the “specific intent” which is essential to particular crimes.
This sentence appears nowhere in the Vandi-ver opinion, which discusses only specific intent. The defendant in Vandiver was convicted of assault with intent to kidnap, and the issue at trial was whether the State showed he had the intent to secretly Confine the victim. We noted intent was an element of the crime of kidnapping, and determined-insufficient evidence existed because the Court would have to speculate on what the defendant might have done. “The law will *642not presume an intention beyond that realized by the act.”45
¶ 23 The majority uses the Vandiver syllabus to conclude that the child abuse murder statute has no further mental element requiring specific intent. To support this dubious conclusion the majority must find “willfully or maliciously” refers to general intent only, even in the context of murder. The majority cites Kreijanovsky v. State46 for the argument that “willful” and “malicious” denote general intent crimes and do not require proof of specific intent. Kreija-novsky was convicted of Second Degree Burglary and arson. This Court determined the trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on the issue of voluntary intoxication because
[Ajrson is not a specific intent crime, and voluntary intoxication is available as a defense only when the crime with which the defendant is charged has as its mens rea element a specific criminal intent or a special mental element. See 21 O.S.1981, § 1401 and Boyd v. State, 572 P.2d 276 (Okl.Cr.1977), respectively.47
There is no discussion suggesting that either “willful” or “malicious” refer only to general intent crimes. The only possible way to infer this from this case is that, a few paragraphs later, discussing a different proposition, the opinion cites the arson statutes, which prohibit a person from “willfully and maliciously” burning inhabited or uninhabited property. While this may be a reasonable inference (for the term “willful” only), it is exactly the kind of implied dicta on which we ought not to base sweeping pronouncements.
¶ 24 The majority argues it is “helpful” to look at the use of “willful” in cases dealing with general intent crimes, such as assault and manslaughter. On the contrary, those cases do not support the contention that the word “willful” automatically confers general intent status on an offense. In State v. Madden48 the issue was whether the phrase “great bodily injury” in the aggravated assault statute was void. This Court held it was not, and noted incidentally that specific intent was not an element of aggravated assault, as general intent was presumed from the act. The term “willful” is not an issue in the discussion of either the constitutional issue or the dicta on intent. Madden, and the majority, rely on Quinn v. State,49 in which we distinguished aggravated assault and battery from the greater offense of assault and battery with intent to do bodily harm. Quinn noted the well-settled law of intent:
“Generally speaking, to constitute a crime the act must, except as otherwise provided by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent on the part of the accused, or by such negligent and reckless conduct and indifference to the consequences of conduct as is regarded by the law as equivalent to a criminal intent.”50
We found sufficient evidence of general intent where Quinn “intentionally,” “willfully and deliberately” fired a gun.
¶ 25 In Tarver v. State51, this Court construed the meaning of “willful” in the manslaughter statute prohibiting willful killing of an “unborn quick child.” We said “willful” is equivalent to “knowing,” cited the statute defining “willful” as implying a purpose or willingness to commit the act,52 and concluded the term refers to the defendant’s subjective state of mind (intending to inflict injury with awareness that death of the child would likely result) and requires no specific intent to kill. We relied on .Lamb v. State,53 in which a defendant was charged with willful failure to provide. There we held “in this connection” willful was the same as know*643ing.54 The majority compares Tarver with Miller v. State55 Construing federal manslaughter law, this Court held the trial court properly instructed that “willfully” meant to intentionally, designedly or without lawful excuse commit the act causing an injury resulting in death.56 This, of course, merely restates the definition of manslaughter.
¶26 Turning to the child abuse murder statute itself, the majority compares “willful injury” with “willful use of unreasonable force” to suggest the preface “willful” denotes general intent. The majority argues “willful injury” is the same as “willful killing” in manslaughter, a crime which has no specific intent element. The majority relies on Holder v. State57 to suggest the “use of unreasonable force” equals battery (the willful and unlawful use of force).58 Holder compared battery with § 843 child abuse provisions and determined that under the circumstances of that ease the only differing element was the § 843 requirement that the victim be less than 18 years old.59 This says nothing beyond the facts of that case.
¶ 27 In an effort to support its claim that child abuse murder requires only general intent, the majority engages in ah irrelevant semantic exercise. The opinion examines various criminal statutes, apparently at random, and determines that several specific intent crimes contain the word “intent” in the statutory language, while several general intent crimes do not. The opinion concludes that neither § 843 nor § 701.7(C) contains the word “intent” so both must be general intent crimes. This attempt at quantitative analysis is neither legitimate statutory interpretation nor legal analysis. One might as well count the times the legislature used “the.”
¶ 28 The majority appears to rely on Morse v. State60 for its claim that voluntary intoxication instructions were not required here. The majority notes Morse held that intoxication was not a defense to the crime of child beating, and implies that Fairchild failed to cite the case in the vain,hope that the Court would overlook, it. It is far more likely that Fairchild failed to cite it because it is both irrelevant and an inaccurate statement of settled law. Morse was charged with child beating under the precursor to 21 O.S.1991, § 843. In denying his claim the Court stated, “Intoxication is no defense to any crime... .”61 The majority’s cited cases show that to be untrue; voluntary intoxication is certainly a defense to all crimes requiring a defendant to form a specific intent to commit an act. Further, the child abuse statute no longer contains the language under which Morse was charged. Finally, a case deciding whether intoxication is a defense to battery on a child is of remarkably little value in determining the appropriate mens rea where the issue is intent to injure and the victim is dead.
¶ 29 The majority disregarded our rules in order to grant Fairchild’s petition for rehearing, withdraw the opinion, and expand the narrow holding on the intent necessary for child abuse murder. In doing so, the majority rejects, settled law, recasts child abuse murder as a general intent crime, and makes a general intent crime death-eligible. I dissent.

. January 13, 1998 and August 20, 1998.

. I agree with Judge Strubhar that, as the original opinion was withdrawn, this constitutes the opinion in this case and both parties may pursue further review in accordance with our Rules.

. 21 O.S.1991, § 701.7(C).

. Rule 3.14, Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (1999).

. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982).

. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).

. 1996 OK CR 22, 918 P.2d 384.

. 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986).

. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 102 S.Ct. at 3377.

. Id. (quoting H. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 162 (1968)).

. Cabana, 474 U.S. at 386, 106 S.Ct. at 697.

. Id., 474 U.S. at 385, 106 S.Ct. at 696.

. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377.

. 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998). The issue in Hopkins was whether state courts must instruct on offenses which are not lesser-included offenses of the charged crime.

. Id., 524 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 1902.

. 517 U.S. 748, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996). The issue in Loving was whether the President could prescribe the necessary aggravating factors without violating the separation of powers doctrine. After this decision Loving sought mandamus relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. That court held the felony-murder provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 118(4) were constitutional only when combined with an aggravating factor sufficient to meet both the capital narrowing requirements and the Enmund/Tison culpability requirements. Loving v. Hart, 47 M.J. 438, 444 (U.S.Ct.App. Armed Forces 1998).

. Id., 517 U.S. at 756, 116 S.Ct. at 1742.

. Loving v. U.S., No. 94-1966, 1996 WL 13954, at *11 (U.S.Oral.Arg. Jan. 9, 1996).

. Id. at *34.

. Id. at *35.

. Id. at *36.

. Id. at *51.

. Id.

. Id. at *52-53.

. Grady v. State, 1997 OK CR 67, 947 P.2d 1069, 1070-71; Bannister v. State, 1996 OK CR 60, 930 P.2d 1176; Hockersmith v. State, 1996 OK CR 51, 926 P.2d 793, 795; Revilla v. State, 1994 OK CR 24, 877 P.2d 1143, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 115 S.Ct. 764, 130 L.Ed.2d 661 (1995); Watkins v. State, 1987 OK CR 215, 744 P.2d 967.

. 1987 OK CR 215, 744 P.2d 967.

. Id. at 970 (emphasis added).

. 1994 OK CR 24, 877 P.2d 1143, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 115 S.Ct. 764, 130 L.Ed.2d 661 (1995).

. 1989 OK CR 1, 771 P.2d 224, 228.

. Revilla, 877 P.2d at 1148.

. Id. at 1149.

. Id. at 1152.

.1996 OK CR 51, 926 P.2d 793.

. Id. at 795.

. 1996 OK CR 60, 930 P.2d 1176.

. Id. at 1178.

. 1997 OK CR 67, 947 P.2d 1069.

. 1991 OK CR 125, 824 P.2d 378, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 890, 113 S.Ct. 258, 121 L.Ed.2d 189 (1992).

. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).

.Drew, 777 P.2d at 228.

. Id.

. "The terms 'málice' and ‘maliciously,’ when so employed, import a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, established either by proof or presumption of law.” 21 O.S.1991, § 95. The majority cites no case in which this Court has held "malicious” denotes a general intent.

. The current statute, contains the same prohibition. 10 O.S.Supp.1995, § 7115.

. 97 Okl.Cr.217, 261 P.2d 617, 619 (1953), reversed in part on other grounds by Parker v. State, 1996 OK CR 19, 917 P.2d 980.

. Vandiver, 261 P.2d at 625.

. 1985 OK CR 120, 706 P.2d 541.

. Id. at 544 (emphasis added). Boyd held rape did not require a specific intent. Boyd, 572 P.2d at 278.

. 1977 OK CR 155, 562 P.2d 1177, 1180.

. 485 P.2d 474 (Okl.Cr.1971).

. Id. at 476.

. 1982 OK CR 156, 651 P.2d 1332, 1334-35.

. 21 O.S.1991, § 92.

. 1956 OK CR 17, 293 P.2d 624.

. Id. at 630.

. 9 Okla.Crim.55, 130 P. 813 (1913).

. Id. at 814.

. 1976 OK CR 288, 556 P.2d 1049.

. 21 O.S.1991, § 642.

. Holder, 556 P.2d at 1052.

. 1968 OK CR 51, 438 P.2d 309.

. Id. at 310. Not surprisingly, Morse has only been cited once since publication, and that was not for this, extremely, dubious discussion.