Court Opinion

ID: 7820166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:51:25.336186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:43.122457
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, Justice, concurring. I join in the majority opinion, but I would also emphasize the last sentence in Rule 28.3 (e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (1976), which expressly excludes from the computation of time: (e) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant. A defendant shall be considered absent whenever his whereabouts are unknown. A defendant shall also be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for the trial cannot be obtained or he resists being returned to the state for trial. When the State knows where the defendant is, he is to be considered unavailable either (a) if his presence for the trial cannot be obtained or (b) if he resists being returned to the state for trial. The two impediments to trial are stated disjunctively; either is sufficient. Alternative (b) cannot mean if the defendant successfully resists being returned or as long as he successfully resists, for those possibilities are already covered by alternative (a). In that restricted view, alternative (b) would add nothing to (a) and would therefore be meaningless. Hence alternative (b) should be taken to mean just what it says, that the defendant is to be considered unavailable if he resists being returned for trial, as this appellant did. By that resistance he declared in a positive way that he did not want a speedy trial in Arkansas. Having taken that stand, he should not be in a position to complain of a delay in his trial without first putting himself on record as asking for a trial. Otherwise he enjoys the contradictory benefits of having avoided a trial by his resistance and at the same time of taking advantage of that resistance to seek a dismissal of the case for want of a speedy trial. Roy, J., joins in this concurrence.