Court Opinion

ID: 9939557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:48.525917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:27.257109
License: Public Domain

J-S42014-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 RAYMOND ANTHONY DANIELS                  :
                                          :
                   Appellant              :   No. 350 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 4, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-09-CR-0000832-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 9, 2024

      Raymond Anthony Daniels appeals the order denying his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.

      We glean the following background from the certified record. On August

15, 2017, Appellant and two other gunmen invaded a home in Bucks County,

wherein they threatened to shoot various members of the household and stole

more than $300,000 in property and cash. Appellant subsequently pled guilty

to one count each of robbery, burglary, and conspiracy, as well as several

other crimes arising from the incident.

      The trial court sentenced Appellant the same day.           During the

sentencing hearing, the prosecutor expressed her belief that Appellant had

not fully accepted responsibility for his actions, despite pleading guilty,

because he refused to identify other individuals involved with the burglary

beyond the three gunmen known to the police. Appellant’s counsel objected
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to the remark. In response, the trial court encouraged Appellant to disclose

the name of those co-conspirators, stating that “if he fails to do so, that will

be an aggravating circumstance that [the court] will consider in imposing

sentence.” N.T. Sentencing, 1/24/19, at 133. Appellant exercised his right

to allocution, and in so doing indicated that he did not want to identify anyone

because he feared retaliation against his family.      Id. at 163-65.    Before

imposing its sentence, the trial court opined that Appellant had shown a lack

of remorse for his role in the crimes. More particularly, the court stated:

            I think [the] most telling thing about the lack of remorse
      here is that you are willing to let this violence continue. You have
      made the decision to allow these people who are engaging in
      violent predatory behavior against our community to remain out
      there, to continue in that conduct, because you know and I know
      that that’s not going to stop unless and until [the prosecutor] is
      able, if she can, to stop them, that they will remain out there
      preying on people that live and work and love and suffer and have
      parents that aren’t there, money that’s not there, and your friends
      will go and prey on those people because they don’t care what
      problems they suffered. They just want to be excited. They want
      to text money bags with people showing muscles about how tough
      they are.

            By your silence, you have basically said to me “I am going
      to continue to conspire with the individuals who I committed these
      crimes with. I will continue to protect them, I will continue to
      agree, and I will continue that conspiracy and endanger – continue
      to endanger our community.”

            You talk about your friends being at risk. I’m sorry; your
      family. What that tells me is that you know your friends are so
      dangerous that they would prey not on you, because you
      cooperated, but prey on your – your brothers and sisters who have
      nothing to do with it. That they are so vicious, so violent, so
      controlling that they don’t want to just victimize somebody else’s
      community; they are going to victimize their own. . . .

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Id. at 188-90.      Ultimately, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of forty to eighty years of incarceration.

       Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence, arguing,

inter alia, that the court erred in conditioning the length of the sentence on

whether Appellant would identify additional co-conspirators.          The court

entertained the motion at a resentencing hearing on May 23, 2019. 1 At the

hearing, the trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge in the motion for

reconsideration, articulating thusly:

              The other point that you made is that it was an error to
       condition the length of sentence on the defendant’s ability and/or
       willingness to implicate his co-defendants.

             To the extent that you mean that I punished him for not
       agreeing to testify, I don’t disagree with you [defense counsel],
       but I don’t believe that’s what I was trying to articulate.

             What I was trying to articulate is there is – was whether or
       not [Appellant] understood what the nature of his criminal
       offenses truly were, whether he really believed that the people in
       that household were in danger, whether they could have died,
       whether they could have been shot and the daughter would have
       to watch the grandmother die or the grandmother watch a
       grandchild die, whether if these men were really, truly that violent
       or that outcome could have very well occurred – your client’s fear
       of them – that was articulated – made it very clear to me that he
       knew exactly the danger that he was involving himself in and the
       people – the kind of people he was involving himself with and I
       think that’s clearly an appropriate consideration.

            I also believe it’s an appropriate consideration about
       whether or not he actually has any remorse. I certainly would
____________________________________________

1 During the same hearing, the trial court also sentenced two of the other
gunmen present during the home invasion, both of whom were convicted after
a jury trial.

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      have reduced the sentenced imposed if he had – not that
      he was required to; but if he had testified, I certainly would
      have given him credit for that.

             So based on that – I hope that clarifies what I was trying to
      articulate at the time that sentence was imposed.

N.T. Sentencing, 5/23/19, at 57-59 (emphasis added). At the resentencing

hearing, the court also heard testimony from Appellant’s mother.        Defense

counsel reminded the court that Appellant had previously exercised his right

to allocution, noting that Appellant did not wish to add anything further at that

time. Id. at 33. Based on the testimony presented and the fact that Appellant

took some responsibility for the crimes, the court reduced Appellant’s

sentence to an aggregate term of thirty to sixty years in prison.

      Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion thereafter, though he did

file a direct appeal challenging the length of his sentence.     The trial court

entered an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, explaining its reasoning for

the sentence, and addressed one of Appellant’s arguments that “the court

erred in conditioning the length of [Appellant]’s sentence upon his ability

and/or willingness to implicate his co-defendants.”        Trial Court Opinion,

9/6/19, at 17. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 7, 2020,

finding that Appellant failed to articulate a substantial question regarding his

sentence.   See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 236 A.3d 1082, 2020 WL

1686493 at *2 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). Accordingly, we

did not reach the merits of Appellant’s arguments at that time. Id.

      On March 30, 2021, Appellant timely filed this PCRA petition, his first.

Therein, he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective when he did not argue

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at resentencing that Appellant’s refusal to testify against co-defendants was

not a legal basis in which to increase the sentence. The PCRA court appointed

counsel, who then filed a no merit letter and a petition to withdraw as counsel

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The

Commonwealth also filed a response to the petition, arguing that it should be

dismissed.    The PCRA court granted counsel leave to withdraw and sent

Appellant notice of its intention to dismiss the petition in accordance with

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. After Appellant submitted a letter to the court indicating

that the notice had been sent to an incorrect address, the court issued a

second Rule 907 notice. The court also gave Appellant a sixty-day extension

in which to respond, which Appellant did not do. The court then denied the

petition on January 3, 2023.

      Appellant subsequently retained counsel, and this timely appeal

followed.    Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise

statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises the following sole issue on appeal:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel. On page 212 of the guilty plea
      transcript, and 202-203 of the resentencing transcript[,] the judge
      specifically stated that [Appellant’s] failure to testify against the
      co-defendants was a factor she considered at [Appellant’s]
      sentencing[.] See also page 188. She did not state how much
      time she added to the sentence but she made it clear that some
      significant period of time was added. Trial counsel should have
      objected because it is settled that the refusal to testify against co-
      defendants at an unrelated trial is not a basis to increase a
      sentence. DiGiovanni v. United States, 596 F[.]2d 74 (2d Cir.

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      1978) (held that it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment for the
      judge to increase a sentence for failure to cooperate against co-
      defendants, United States v. Mitchell, 526 U.S. 314 (1999)).
      Here [Appellant] had a Fifth Amendment right not to testify since
      his testimony could have been used against him in a motion to
      withdraw the guilty plea or a motion for reconsideration of
      sentence.

Appellant’s brief at 1-2 (cleaned up).

      We begin with the legal tenets pertinent to our review. “On appeal from

the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls for us to determine

whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and free of

legal error. We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Wharton, 263 A.3d 561, 567 (Pa. 2021)

(citations omitted). Further, “[i]t is an appellant’s burden to persuade us that

the PCRA court erred and that relief is due.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,

270 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2022).

      Appellant’s issue relates to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the petitioner bears the burden of

proving otherwise.    See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 63, 68

(Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc). To do so, he must establish the following three

elements:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) the
      petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with
      prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability
      that the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. (citations omitted). Failure to prove any of the three elements will result

in dismissal of the ineffectiveness claim. Id. (citation omitted). Additionally,

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“[w]e are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in

any particular order.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa.

2019).

      This Court has stated that a claim “has arguable merit where the factual

averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v.

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa.Super. 2013) (cleaned up). “Whether the

facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.” Id.

      With regard to the prejudice prong, our Supreme Court has defined

actual prejudice as

      [a] reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s lapse, the result
      of the proceeding would have been different. In making this
      determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must
      consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.
      Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the
      record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with
      overwhelming record support. Ultimately, a reviewing court must
      question the reliability of the proceedings and ask whether the
      result of the particular proceeding was unreliable because of a
      breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on
      to produce just results.

      A reasonable probability is a probability that is sufficient to
      undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Such a
      determination necessarily requires an assessment of the trial
      evidence as a whole, measured along with what is proffered on
      collateral attack.

Commonwealth v. Crispell, 193 A.3d 919, 932 (Pa. 2018) (cleaned up).

      Appellant’s claim also requires us to look at the sentence imposed by

the trial court and its rationale for the same. It has been long established that

      [s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

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       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Salter, 290 A.3d 741, 748 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation

omitted). We have additionally determined that a “[l]ack of remorse is an

appropriate sentencing consideration[,]” and we must “give great weight to

the sentencing court’s discretion, as he or she is in the best position to

measure factors such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character,

and    the   defendant’s   display   of   remorse,   defiance,   or   indifference.”

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 695 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned

up).

       With this background in mind, we turn to Appellant’s claim. He argues

that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the legality of his

sentence, asserting that the trial court improperly considered his failure to

identify unknown co-conspirators at sentencing. See Appellant’s brief at 11-

12. He contends that despite pleading guilty, he still had a Fifth Amendment

right not to testify “since he retained the right to file a motion to withdraw the

plea and retained the right to file [a] motion to reduce the sentence.” Id. at

12. Appellant avers that his sentence is illegal pursuant to DiGiovanni v.

United States, 596 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1978), and United States v. Mitchell,

526 U.S. 314 (1999), which he cites for the proposition that a court may not

increase a sentence based on a refusal to testify against co-defendants. Id.

at 11-12.

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      We note that in conjunction with Appellant’s direct appeal, the trial court

rendered an opinion providing the rationale for the final sentence imposed.

With respect to Appellant’s decision not to provide the name of unknown co-

conspirators, the trial court stated as follows:

      [Appellant] had the opportunity to present evidence regarding his
      reasons [for not cooperating] and, in fact, did so. [Appellant]
      testified that he chose not to provide information about the crime
      of the individuals involved in its commission because he was
      “scared for his family’s life” and that he didn’t want them to have
      to “watch over their shoulders” because of what he did in a
      courtroom. [Appellant] stated that he did not want to put them
      in “harm’s way” when he would not “be there to protect them .
      . . .” This court considered this testimony but did not find
      [Appellant]’s explanation of sufficient weight to overcome other
      considerations. Specifically, this court noted that, while his
      cooperation would have been a mitigating factor for purposes of
      sentencing, his refusal to provide any information regarding the
      crimes or those involved in their commission and his reason for
      that decision was relevant and admissible to establish the
      dangerous nature of those with whom he chose to conspire, the
      degree of his professed remorse, the degree to which he was
      willing to accept responsibility[,] and his rehabilitative needs.
      Since the “other reasons” were presented and properly
      considered, [Appellant] suffered no prejudice as a result of this
      court’s ruling.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/19, at 17-18 (cleaned up).

      Additionally, regarding Appellant’s underlying claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the PCRA court entered a separate opinion explaining

why it denied relief. Therein, the PCRA court concluded that the trial court

properly considered Appellant’s failure to identify the unknown co-conspirators

pursuant to the sentencing code, in light of “protection of the public, the

impact on the community[,] and the rehabilitation of Appellant in forming

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Appellant’s overall sentence.”     PCRA Court Opinion, 4/3/23, at 16.          It

determined that the decision from the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit

in DiGiovanni was neither binding nor apposite to this matter, instead finding

that Pennsylvania law supported the trial court’s consideration of Appellant’s

lack of remorse. Id. at 17-19 (citing Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d

1120 (Pa.Super. 2009)). The court also found that any claim resting upon

Appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent would necessarily fail

because Appellant pled guilty and exercised his right to allocution at

sentencing, thereby waiving any such right. Id. at 19. The PCRA court finally

noted that Appellant’s sentence was, in fact, lenient as compared to that

imposed upon two of the co-defendants who were present during the burglary

and were convicted following a trial. Id. at 21.

      For its part, the Commonwealth maintains that trial counsel could not

have been ineffective in this matter since counsel did challenge the court’s

consideration of Appellant’s refusal to identify unknown co-conspirators, both

during the initial sentencing via objection and by filing a post-sentence motion.

See Commonwealth’s brief at 11. The Commonwealth then argues that this

issue lacks arguable merit, since Appellant did not invoke his right to remain

silent, and therefore Appellant’s reliance on cases discussing the Fifth

Amendment is inappropriate. Id. at 16-18. It also agrees that the trial court

properly considered Appellant’s lack of remorse and potential for rehabilitation

at the time of sentencing, and therefore any further objection lodged by

counsel would not have changed the proceedings. Id. at 18, 26.

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      On review, we find that the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the

record and free from legal error. Appellant has not demonstrated either that

his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has arguable merit or that his

counsel’s failure to object at the resentencing hearing prejudiced him. The

record makes clear that at the time of resentencing, the trial court did not

penalize Appellant based on refusal to identify co-conspirators.    Rather, in

crafting the reduced sentence, the court considered both Appellant’s

declination and allocution remarks together as demonstrative of Appellant’s

lack of remorse, along with other appropriate sentencing factors. This was

not improper.   See Commonwealth v. Begley, 780 A.2d 605, 641 (Pa.

2001) (finding that a defendant’s “lack of contrition” and “lack of cooperation

with the authorities” were signs of the defendant’s character, and a failure to

show remorse was an “indicia of [the defendant’s] social conscience”); see

also Roberts v. U.S., 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980) (concluding that a

defendant’s failure to cooperate “protected his former partners in crime” and

that “[f]ew facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to the

likelihood that a defendant will transgress no more” (cleaned up)). Since any

additional challenge from counsel at resentencing as to this issue would have

been unsuccessful, Appellant has not met his burden of proving either

arguable merit or prejudice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d

589, 596 (Pa.Super. 2021) (“Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to

pursue a baseless or meritless claim.”).

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      Further, we are not persuaded that the result should be any different

based upon the cases cited by Appellant in his brief.        As the PCRA court

correctly noted, the DiGiovanni decision from the Court of Appeals of the

Second Circuit, which Appellant primarily relies upon, is not binding upon this

Court.    See Commonwealth v. Carrera, 289 A.3d 1127, 1132 n.9

(Pa.Super. 2023) (“[F]ederal court decisions do not control the determinations

of the Superior Court. Our law clearly states that, absent a United States

Supreme Court pronouncement, the decisions of federal courts are not binding

on Pennsylvania state courts.” (cleaned up)).         Moreover, DiGiovanni is

distinguishable because it concerned the defendant’s refusal to testify against

co-defendants at trial, which ultimately led to the charges being dropped and

the defendant receiving a harsher punishment than he otherwise would have.

Indeed, the Second Circuit noted that although it would have been proper to

impose a more lenient sentence in exchange for cooperation, it was “quite

another thing to administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his

silence has committed no additional offense.” Id. at 75. As discussed above,

however, it is clear that in this case Appellant did not suffer additional

punishment for failing to name his co-conspirators. Rather, the trial court

expressly clarified that his refusal precluded further mitigation of the

sentence. See N.T. Sentencing, 5/23/19, at 58.

      Appellant also cites, without discussion, the United States Supreme

Court decision of Mitchell v. U.S., 526 U.S. 314 (1999). Presumably, he

relies on this case for its proposition that “[t]he normal rule in a criminal case

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is that no negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify is

permitted.” Id. at 327-28. There, the Supreme Court also went on to “decline

to adopt an exception [to this normal rule] for the sentencing phase of a

criminal   case    with    regard    to   factual   determinations   respecting   the

circumstances and details of the crime.” Id. at 328. However, we readily

conclude that Mitchell is inapposite since Appellant did not exercise his right

to remain silent at sentencing.2

       In sum, we determine that Appellant has not proven that his counsel’s

failure to object again at the resentencing hearing prejudiced him, nor has he

presented a claim of arguable merit. Since Appellant’s sole issue garners him

no relief, we have no cause to disturb the order denying his PCRA petition

without a hearing.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also cites in passing Commonwealth v. Scott, 860 A.2d 1029
(Pa.Super. 2004), arguing that based on this decision, a court “may not
increase a sentence based on [Appellant’s] refusal to testify against co-
defendants.” Appellant’s brief at 12. That case is distinguishable as it dealt
with the trial court’s improper consideration at sentencing of a defendant’s
refusal to cooperate on an unrelated criminal matter. See Scott, supra
at 1030. That was not the case here.

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Date: 2/9/2024

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