Court Opinion

ID: 9364370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 08:10:17.559049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.862128
License: Public Domain

In The
                                   Court of Appeals
                          Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                           No. 07-22-00016-CR

                          MIGUEL PAREDES-MALAGON, APPELLANT

                                                     V.

                                THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 20th District Court
                                     Milam County, Texas
              Trial Court No. CR25,775, Honorable John W. Youngblood, Presiding

                                            January 12, 2023
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

        Following a plea of not guilty, a jury convicted Appellant, Miguel Paredes-Malagon,

of indecency with a child and sentenced him to eighteen years’ confinement and

assessed a $10,000 fine.1 Appellant presents three issues challenging his conviction and

a fourth issue challenging the amount of court costs assessed.2 By his first three issues,

        1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1). As charged, the offense is a second degree felony.
§ 21.11(d).

        2  Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the
Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should
a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this
appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
he contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting (1) Ashley Lomas’s expert

testimony because her opinion was not shown to be reliable or relevant; (2) Cara Duong’s

testimony because her opinion was not shown to be reliable; and (3) excerpts from J.P.’s

forensic interview as prior consistent statements because the interview occurred after the

motive for fabrication arose. By his fourth issue, Appellant maintains the trial court

erroneously assessed court costs under statutes that apply only to convictions for

offenses committed after January 1, 2020, and he was convicted of an offense committed

in 2014. The State did not favor this Court with a brief. We reform the judgment and

affirm.

                                         BACKGROUND

          Appellant and his wife married in the late 1990s.       In April 2016, the parties

separated, and Appellant’s wife filed for divorce in July 2017.

          J.P., one of Appellant’s biological daughters who was nineteen at the time of trial,

alleged Appellant inappropriately touched her on several occasions when she was

approximately eleven years old. Following an investigation, J.P. was interviewed by

Ashley Lomas, a forensic examiner, on September 6, 2017. During that interview, J.P.

described various incidents of inappropriate touching by her father.

          Appellant was eventually arrested for indecency by contact and was indicted in

2017. His defensive theory was J.P. fabricated the allegations against him due to the

pending divorce and coaching from her mother.

                                               2
       Central to this appeal is the testimony of Lomas, whom the State proffered as an

expert, and the testimony of Cara Duong, a social worker and therapist who treated J.P.

and who was presented as a lay witness.

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       An appellate court reviews the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion and

will not disturb the decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Apolinar v. State, 155

S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on the

admissibility of scientific expert testimony is also reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery

v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Additionally, even if we find a trial

court abused its discretion, a judgment of conviction will not be reversed if the error was

harmless. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); McClellan v. State, 143 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2004, no pet.).

ISSUE ONE—EXPERT TESTIMONY OF ASHLEY LOMAS

       Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Lomas’s

testimony because her opinion was not reliable or relevant. We agree but find that the

erroneous admission of her testimony was harmless.

       The State proffered Lomas as an expert witness to testify about her forensic

interview with J.P. During a hearing outside the jury’s presence, Lomas was questioned

on her qualifications to testify as an expert. During direct examination, she testified about

her credentials and her extensive training in abuse, neglect, and forensic examination.

                                             3
During cross-examination, defense counsel inquired on the topics she intended to

address to which she responded that she would discuss forensic interviewing and, if

asked, offer her professional opinion on that subject. To expedite the hearing, defense

counsel requested that the State narrow the topics to be addressed. The State explained

its intention to question Lomas on the signs and symptoms commonly exhibited by a

victim of child abuse based on her review of J.P.’s interview and her medical records.

       Defense counsel continued his cross-examination by asking Lomas if she could

identify scientific literature regarding the signs and symptoms of abuse and her

observations for sensory details. She testified that she had read articles on the topic but

could not recall any specifics. She disputed that she was required to reference research

and literature to testify as an expert in forensic interviewing. She attested to being an

“expert in forensically interviewing children. I’m an expert in talking with them in a non-

leading, non-coercive manner gathering details.” When challenged that her testimony

regarding sensory details was outside the scope of her expertise, she replied, “[s]o it’s in

the Texas Penal Code or something like that. I have been to training where they said that

you’re an expert as part of forensic interviewing.”

       Defense counsel objected to Lomas offering an opinion based on unknown

literature and studies and claimed that her role as a forensic interviewer did not meet the

requirements of an expert. Counsel claimed that her testimony was unreliable and

irrelevant and could possibly mislead the jury.

       The trial court found that Lomas was “obviously an expert in interviewing and

extracting information.” The court noted that simply because she could not quote specific

pieces of literature did not mean that she could not describe the scientific principles in
                                             4
support of her opinion. The court announced, “I think she knows the general principles

of her practice” and ruled that Lomas could testify as an expert but could not conclude

that J.P.’s symptoms indicated she was abused by Appellant.

                                           ANALYSIS

       Here, Appellant asserts that Lomas’s testimony was rendered unreliable and

irrelevant because she could not identify any articles pertinent to forensic interviewing

and she conceded that the presence of certain signs and symptoms in a child did not

indicate sexual abuse. Rule 702 governs admission of expert testimony and provides

that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of

an opinion or otherwise.” TEX. R. EVID. 702. For scientific evidence to be admissible, its

proponent must establish to the trial court outside the jury’s presence the following

criteria: (1) the underlying scientific theory is valid; (2) the technique applying the theory

must be valid; and (3) the technique must have been properly applied. See Kelly v. State,

824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–93, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795–96, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).

       Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must determine that (1) the witness

qualifies as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education;

(2) the subject matter of the testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3)

admitting the expert testimony will actually assist the factfinder in deciding the case. Vela

v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525,

                                               5
527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).         These conditions are commonly referred to as (1)

qualifications, (2) reliability, and (3) relevance. Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 131.

       An expert’s inability to name studies or articles relied on to render an expert opinion

renders that opinion unreliable. See Sturgeon v. State, No. 14-04-00311-CR, 2005 Tex.

App. LEXIS 10904, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 23, 2005, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (citing Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542–43). When

defense counsel questioned Lomas on the scientific theory underlying her opinion, she

claimed to have read articles and attended training but could not provide any specifics for

testifying on sensory details on which she relied to determine if J.P. showed signs and

symptoms of sexual abuse. The State failed to provide the underlying scientific theory in

support of Lomas’s testimony. Thus, it did not satisfy the reliability prong of Kelly, one of

the mandatory requirements for testifying as an expert. We find the trial court abused its

discretion in allowing Lomas to testify as an expert witness.

       Our conclusion requires us to conduct a harm analysis to determine whether the

trial court’s error substantially affected Appellant’s rights. The erroneous admission of

evidence is non-constitutional error. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018). Pursuant to Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, “non-

constitutional error must be disregarded unless it affects the defendant’s substantial

rights,” i.e., the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Under this

standard, an appellate court will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional

error if “after examining the record as a whole” the court has a “fair assurance that the

error did not influence the jury or influenced the jury only slightly.” Id. In making this

                                              6
determination, we consider: (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be

considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting

the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4)

whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373.

       Despite Lomas’s testimony being unreliable, Duong’s lay opinion, discussed infra,

supports J.P.’s contention that she suffered trauma from sexual abuse.            Also, in a

conviction for sexual abuse under chapter 21 of the Texas Penal Code, the

uncorroborated testimony of a victim under age seventeen at the time of the offense is

sufficient to support a conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b); Alba

v. State, No. 03-16-00680-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1261, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb.

15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Other evidence in support

of the jury’s verdict included J.P.’s. testimony of various instances of Appellant committing

acts of indecency with her when she was eleven years old. J.P.’s older sister likewise

testified she was sexually abused by Appellant when she was in the seventh grade. The

mother testified both her daughters had revealed Appellant had sexually abused them.

       During opening arguments, the State’s only reference to expert testimony was as

follows: “[y]ou will hear experts who have spoken to one or both of these girls get [sic]

their opinion.” During closing arguments, although the State did reference Lomas’s

“impressive” background in interviewing thousands of victims of sexual abuse and

identifying signs and symptoms of abuse, the emphasis was on the testimony from J.P.

and her sister that their father had sexually abused them. Based on an examination of

the entire record, we cannot say that the error in admitting Lomas’s testimony affected

Appellant’s substantial rights. Issue one is overruled.

                                             7
ISSUE TWO—LAY TESTIMONY OF CARA DUONG

       Appellant contends that regardless of Duong’s presentation as a lay witness, she

testified as a de facto expert and her testimony was not shown to be reliable and was

therefore inadmissible. We disagree.

       Cara Duong, a clinical social worker and registered play therapist, testified about

her nineteen sessions with J.P. After testifying to her educational background and

experience, she was questioned about State’s Exhibit 2 which included her treatment plan

for J.P. and case notes from their sessions. Defense counsel objected to the exhibit on

hearsay and relevance grounds and asserted Duong was being proffered as an expert

witness. The State responded Duong was testifying as a lay witness only. Regarding

State’s Exhibit 2, the State claimed it was being offered as a business records exception

to the hearsay rule.3 The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and admitted

the exhibit.

       Duong’s testimony focused on her treatment of J.P. for trauma experienced from

sexual abuse. During direct examination, she was asked whether it was common for J.P.

to have loving feelings toward Appellant because he is her parent. Her affirmative

response triggered an objection from defense counsel that her testimony was outside the

scope of her expertise. The State responded that it was merely asking Duong to testify

from her common experiences and observations. The trial court agreed and overruled

defense counsel’s objection.

       3   See TEX. R. EVID. 803(6).
                                            8
       Duong continued her testimony and explained that she used “trauma focus

cognitive behavioral therapy” (TFCBT)4 to gradually expose J.P.’s trauma to help her

process it and teach her coping skills. During cross-examination, she was questioned

about whether TFCBT applied only to confirmed cases of abuse to which she responded

that it was also helpful in cases of unconfirmed abuse. She was then asked to name

scientific literature to support her testimony. Although she alluded to “numerous research

articles on [the] efficacy of TFCBT,” she could not specifically name any of them. She

also could not give specifics on the underlying theory of TFCBT.

       Appellant argues that Duong testified as an expert and that her inability to name

research studies to support her use of TFCBT rendered her opinions unreliable and

therefore inadmissible. Contrary to the situation with Lomas, Duong was presented solely

as a lay witness.

                                               ANALYSIS

       Initially, we note that during trial, Appellant’s objections to Duong’s testimony were

based on hearsay and relevance grounds. On appeal, however, Appellant focuses solely

on whether Duong’s testimony was reliable. A complaint on appeal must comport with a

trial court objection to avoid procedural default. Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). Appellant’s legal theory that Duong’s testimony was not reliable does

not correspond with the hearsay and relevance objections made at trial.

       Even if Appellant’s complaint was not procedurally defaulted, his argument Duong

testified as a de facto expert and that her testimony and State’s Exhibit 2 should not have

       4   She testified that TFCBT focuses on awareness of thought processes, behaviors, and emotions.
                                                   9
been admitted cannot prevail under the deference afforded the trial court under the

abuse-of-discretion standard. See Schmidt v. State, 612 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (noting that a trial court’s decision to permit a witness

to testify as an expert or a lay witness will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing

of an abuse of discretion).

       Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that if a witness is not testifying

as an expert, the testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those

opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and

(b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a

fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID. 701. Not all witnesses who are experts necessarily testify as

experts. Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 2 v. Speedy Stop Food Stores, Ltd., 337 S.W.3d

846, 850 (Tex. 2011). There is no bright line rule on who is a Rule 701 witness and who

is a Rule 702 witness.        Id. at 851. “A witness may have special knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education in a particular subject, but testify only to matters based

on personal perception and opinions.” Id. (citing John F. Sutton, Jr. & Cathleen C.

Herasimchuk, Article VII: Opinions and Expert Testimony, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 797, 826–27

(1993) (explaining that “[a] witness with specialized training or experience is not limited

to giving opinion testimony as a Rule 702 ‘expert’” and that if an “opinion rests on firsthand

knowledge . . . then testimony under Rule 701 is also permissible”)). A witness’s potential

qualifications as an expert does not prevent the witness from testifying within the narrower

confines of Rule 701. Reid Rd. Mun. Util. Dist. No. 2, 337 S.W.3d at 851.

       Duong’s lay opinion was based on firsthand knowledge and observations from her

nineteen sessions with J.P. and her testimony was based on her perception of J.P.’s

                                              10
trauma. Observations which do not require significant expertise to interpret may be

admitted as lay opinions if the requirements of Rule 701 are met. Osbourn v. State, 92

S.W.3d 531, 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). This applies even when the witness has

experience and training. Id.

      As a lay witness with sufficient experience and knowledge, Duong was capable,

without being qualified as an expert witness, to express her opinion on TFCBT, a subject

outside the realm of common knowledge. Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 537 (noting that even

events not normally encountered by most people in everyday life do not necessarily

require the testimony of an expert). Unlike the situation with Lomas being unable to

identify studies and articles underlying her expert opinion, Duong, as a lay witness, was

not required to name scientific research in support of her lay opinion. We find that

Duong’s testimony was admissible under Rule 701. The trial court’s admission of the

objected-to evidence was not outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Issue two is

overruled.

ISSUE THREE—PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS

      By his third issue, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

State’s Exhibit 1 which consists of seven excerpts from J.P.’s forensic interview with

Lomas. He contends the statements were not admissible as a hearsay exception under

Rule 801(e)(1)(B) because they were made after the alleged motive to fabricate arose

which was the turmoil associated with J.P.’s parents’ separation and resultant divorce

proceedings.

                                            11
       J.P.’s forensic interview occurred in September 2017, when she was

approximately fourteen years old. The video excerpts were played for the jury during

Lomas’s testimony and concerned the following statements made by J.P. to her during

the forensic interview:

       (1) J.P.’s description of the first time Appellant abused her on a couch in the
           living room;

       (2) an incident that occurred while J.P. was asleep in a bed with her older
           sister;

       (3) Appellant smelling of alcohol and marihuana during the incidents;

       (4) J.P.’s claim that Appellant touched her “down here”;

       (5) J.P. reporting to Lomas that the incidents happened on several
           occasions;

       (6) a clarification that on one occasion, J.P.’s nose was clogged but on other
           occasions she could smell Appellant; and

       (7) J.P.’s reference to her “middle spot” as her genitals and Lomas asking
           her if she had ever felt Appellant’s middle spot to which she responded
           that she felt it against her back.

       “Rule 801(e)(1)(B) gives substantive, non-hearsay status to prior consistent

statements of a witness ‘offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the

declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.’” Hammons v. State, 239

S.W.3d 798, 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Torres v. State, No. 03-19-00406-CR, 2021

Tex. App. LEXIS 3446, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin May 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).    For a prior consistent statement to be admissible the

following four elements must be met:

       (1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination;

                                             12
       (2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or
           improper influence or motive of the declarant’s testimony by the
           opponent;

       (3) the proponent must offer a prior statement that is consistent with the
           declarant’s challenged in-court testimony; and

       (4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the
           supposed motive to falsify arose.

Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804 (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156–58, 115

S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995)) (emphasis added).

       Here, the significant time periods applicable began in April 2016, when Appellant

and his wife separated. She filed for divorce in July 2017. In August 2017, the trial court

entered temporary orders in the divorce proceeding. Finally, J.P.’s forensic interview

occurred in September 2017.         Appellant claims that because J.P. fabricated the

allegations against him after he and his wife separated and she filed for divorce, the

excerpts do not fall within the hearsay exception of prior consistent statements.

       Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court improperly admitted hearsay excerpts from

J.P.’s forensic interview because all the elements for prior consistent statements to qualify

as a hearsay exception were not met, we nevertheless find against Appellant on the issue.

During J.P.’s direct testimony, she offered essentially the same evidence as the seven

objected-to excerpts but did so without objection. Erroneously admitted evidence will not

result in reversal when substantially similar evidence is admitted without objection, either

before or after the complained-of ruling. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010). Issue three is overruled.

                                             13
ISSUE FOUR—COURT COSTS

        Appellant contends the trial court erroneously assessed court costs of $290.00

under a newly added statute and amended statutes that apply to offenses committed on

or after January 1, 2020.5 Because the offense he was convicted of was committed in

2014, he asserts costs should have been assessed in accordance with statutes in effect

at that time. We agree.6

        Court costs are legislatively mandated obligations resulting from a criminal

conviction. Insco v. State, No. 03-20-00178-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7248, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The

imposition of court costs on a criminal defendant is a “nonpunitive recoupment of the costs

of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial court of the case.” Johnson v.

State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

        Appellant acknowledges he did not object to assessment of court costs in the trial

court but relying on London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), he

asserts that a challenge to court costs may be raised for the first time on appeal. Under

the circumstances of the underlying case, we agree.

        London holds that “an appellant may generally challenge the imposition of even

mandatory court costs for the first time on direct appeal when those costs are not imposed

        5   See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.05, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 3981, 3985.
        6 Some courts, including this Court, have held that when the State fails to file a brief, an appellate
court should conduct an independent analysis of the merits of an appellant’s claim of error, limited to the
arguments raised at trial by the State, to determine if error occurred. See generally Little v. State, 246
S.W.3d 391, 397–98 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 14, 2008, no pet.) (noting that the failure of the State to file
an appellee’s brief makes an appellate court’s task more time consuming and difficult). In the trial court,
court costs were not argued by either party and the State has not contested Appellant’s argument on appeal.
                                                     14
in open court and the judgment does not contain an itemization of the imposed court

costs. Id. London reaffirmed that “an appellant may not be faulted for failing to object

when he . . . was simply not given the opportunity to do so.” Id.

       Appellant was sentenced on November 12, 2021. The Bill of Costs, which itemizes

all court costs, was prepared on that same date. Unclear from the record, however, is

whether court costs were imposed in open court while Appellant and his counsel were

present to voice an objection. Without the record establishing that Appellant had an

opportunity to object to the imposition of court costs in the trial court, we agree that he

may present his complaint for the first time on direct appeal.

       The Bill of Costs reflects that Appellant was assessed felony court costs of $185.00

and $105.00 for a total of $290.00. Those amounts are applicable to offenses committed

on or after January 1, 2020.

       Costs in a criminal case in 2014 were authorized by statutes in the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, the Texas Local Government Code, and the Government Code. A

review of those statutes shows Appellant should have been assessed only $244.00 in

court costs.7 As he reflects in his brief, those costs are as follows:

       Jury fee8                                                 $ 20.00
       Juror services fee9                                       $ 4.00
       Clerk fee10                                               $ 40.00

       7 Appellant asserts the correct amount of court costs that should have been assessed is $264.00;

however, he mistakenly included a jury fee of $40.00 when it was only $20.00 in 2014. The statute was
amended in 2015, a year after commission of the offense, to increase the fee to $40.00. See Act of May
26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 654, § 2, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2095, 2095.

       8   See Act of May 30, 1999, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1545, § 64, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 5314, 5330.

       9   See Act of May 27, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 1360, § 5, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 4255, 4256.

       10   See Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 764, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3969, 3969.
                                                   15
        Records management fee11                                    $ 25.00
        Technology fee12                                            $ 4.00
        Security fee13                                              $ 5.00
        Consolidated court costs14                                  $ 133.00
        Judicial support fee15                                      $ 6.00
        Indigent defense fee16                                      $ 2.00
        Electronic filing fee17                                     $ 5.00

Based on the statutes in effect in 2014, Appellant was overcharged for court costs by

$46.00. His fourth issue is sustained.

                                       REFORMATION OF JUDGMENT

        This Court has the authority to modify judgments when the necessary information

is available to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993); Dunbar v. State, Nos. 03-18-00673-CR, 03-18-00674-CR, 2020 Tex.

App. LEXIS 3403, at *16 (Tex. App.—Austin April 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). Appellate courts have the power to reform whatever the trial

court could have corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary

to correct the judgment appears in the record. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.3d 526, 529

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Based on the inaccurate assessment of court costs,

        11   See Act of May 28, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 804, § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 2775, 2775–76.

        12   See Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1183, § 1, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3753, 3753.
        13   See Act of April 11, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 12, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 51, 51.

       14 See Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 209, § 62(a), sec. 133.102(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen.

Laws 979, 996.
        15   See Act of May 15, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1301, § 3, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4371, 4372.

        16   See Act of May 26, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 984, § 14, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2461, 2476.

       17 See Act of May 16, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 1290, § 2, sec. 51.851(d), 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws

3269, 3270.
                                                      16
the trial court clerk is ordered to prepare an amended Judgment of Conviction By Jury

and Bill of Costs reflecting the amount of court costs as $244 and forward copies of those

documents to Appellant, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and this Court.

                                      CONCLUSION

      As reformed, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                       Alex L. Yarbrough
                                                            Justice

Do not publish.

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