Court Opinion

ID: 9592332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:13:17.006572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:09.788901
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion herein appears to me to be sound except for Division. VII. With this I cannot agree, and must respectfully dissent therefrom.
It is the holding of the majority that there was a proper question for the consideration of the jury upon the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff. There is no dispute as to the facts which are important upon this point. The plaintiff, as a witness in his own behalf, said:
“I knew when I approached the highway it was my duty to be on the lookout and see if any cars were coming. * * * I didn’t look at the crossing, but when I approached the crossing I raised my head up and saw the car coming but I was too late to stop, then I thought he would let me get over the crossing.”
At another point he said that he did not look until he was about five feet from the crossing.
This failure to take the most elementary care for his own safety the majority forgives by holding that the plaintiff’s duties required him to inspect the track, and- consequently there was a diverting circumstance or an excuse for his neglect; at least to the extent that the question required submission to the jury. There is also some discussion of the difference between negligence and contributory negligence. While the matter does not seem to be of much importance, it should be pointed out that we said in Dreier v. McDermott, 157 Iowa 726, 730, 141 N.W. 315, 316, 50 L. R. A., N. S., 566, that: “Negligence charged against the defendant as a primary and moving cause of the injury is no different in its essential elements than is the negligence of the plaintiff which contributes to the injury complained of.” But in the last analysis the real question is whether the negligence of the plaintiff as a contributing factor so clearly appears that *818the minds of reasonably honest men could reach but one conclusion. If it does, then the matter is one for the court.
Before passing to consideration of the cases cited by the majority, let it be pointed out first, that this dissent is based solely upon the plaintiff’s own testimony, by which of course he is bound, and which is not contradicted, and second, that, in Iowa, the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish his freedom from negligence contributing to' his injixries by a preponderance of the evidence.
The majority’s chief contention apparently is that the plaintiff was, to an extent sufficient to generate a jury question, excused from care for his own safety by the fact that his duties required him to inspect the track as he rode along upon the gasoline-propelled car. Several cases are cited in support of this position. None of them seems to me to be factually in point; and some of the language used,- as will be pointed out, is in direct contravention of the theory which it is said to uphold.
In Barboza v. Pacific Portland Cement Co., 162 Cal. 36, 40, 120 P. 767, 769, the plaintiff’s intestate had been killed while working as an employee of a railroad company engaged in repairing track. Defendant’s train backed upon him. His work required him to be upon the track almost all of his time; and he was there, of course, subject to continual danger from trains. The California Supreme Court said:
“Knowing that trains are likely to pass, he must use the care which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise to avoid being struck by such train. * * * Obviously he could not perform his work properly if he were constantly looking to see whether a train was approaching.”
It need only be pointed-out that in the case at bar plaintiff was not required to keep a constant vigil, at least for the type of danger which he met. He knew .the track by long experience, in working over it, and he must have known where the crossings; were located. A glance every few miles, as he approached a,) crossing, would have advised him of any vehicular traffic ap-» proaching on the roads, and would have interfered with his dutiesj only to a most negligible extent. He testifies, as has been, pointed out, that he knew of his duty to look for cars at the crossings. *819There is no dispute that in this duty he failed; his own testimony makes this certain.
Ostertag v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 65 Cal. App.2d 795, 151 P.2d 647, 650, a majority authority, is a case in which the plaintiff was injured while installing electrical equipment in a building under construction. He was struck by a traveling crane operated by defendant’s employees. There is here a serious question whether he had any reason to anticipate or to be on his guard against any such injury as occurred; but at most it is merely another case where his duties kept him in some constant possibility of danger, for which his work made it difficult to keep always on the watch. The factual difference between that situation and the one prevailing in the instant case is readily apparent.
Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp., 233 Wis. 606, 290 N.W. 177, is not helpful to plaintiff’s case. The plaintiff, a construction worker, was injured by an electric shock coming from wires installed by defendant. The gist of the holding is contained in this language, 233 Wis. 616, 290 N.W. 181: “Criswell knew that the cable should not touch the wires, but neither he nor Sharkey knew that electric current could be transmitted when there was not as yet an actual contact between a wire. and the cable.” In other words, the plaintiff had no knowledge that he was threatened by the danger which overtook him, and no means of knowing, unless he were a skilled electrician, which he was not.
In Hodgson v. Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co., 188 Wis. 341, 206 N.W. 191, the plaintiff was a lineman for a telephone company who, while at work, came in contact with a charged wire belonging to the defendant. The court applied the rule which the majority thinks is appropriate here; but again it is to be pointed out that the plaintiff’s duties kept him in constant danger from near-by lines carrying electricity. The performance of his work did not permit him to maintain a constant vigil such as would have been necessary for complete protection.
The facts in Torok v. Stambaugh-Thompson Co., Ohio App., 43 N.E.2d 653, are not helpful here. Plaintiff, a customer, being taken to the rear of defendant’s store to look at paint, fell down a stairway which he did not know was there. There was no question of any duties which prevented him from observing his *820clanger, nor anything which seems to touch the facts with which we are dealing in the case at bar.
If plaintiff’s work had kept him constantly upon the crossing, as when he might have been reconstructing or repairing it, some of the above cases cited by the majority would be in point. Then it could fairly be said that he could not properly perform his duties if he were compelled to watch continually for vehicular traffic. But the actual fact is that he was at the crossing for an instant only; and a glance each way to ascertain whether danger approached would in no substantial manner have interfered with his performance of his track-watching duties.
We now reach the case which the majority thinks is very similar to the present one: Lee v. Molter, 227 Minn. 557, 35 N.W.2d 801. It is true that this case involved a grade-crossing collision between a railroad section gas motorcar and a motor vehicle; but- here the similarity ends, at least in so far as there is anything in the facts shown or the reasoning of the Minnesota Supreme Court which in any way helps the majority in the case at bar. It may be pointed out, as one clear distinction, that the Minnesota court held that the railroad gas car had the right of way at the crossing, basing this upon a statute of that state which required vehicles upon the highway to come to a stop before crossing the railroad tracks at this particular place; but there are other facts and other language in the case which not only do not aid plaintiff’s ease here, but, it seems to me, destroy it. There was evidence in the cited case that both plaintiff and his helper upon the gas car had looked to their right — the direction from which defendant’s truck approached — as they neared the crossing. The Minnesota Supreme Court said of this situation (227 Minn. 563, 35 N.W.2d 805) :
“Here, however, there was substantial evidence to indicate the exercise of reasonable care by both plaintiff and Kowalski. Due care, as well as safety regulations, required that they direct their observations to the tracks for obstructions or objects thereon ; to their rear, to observe the approach of an expected freight train; ahead, to gauge their distance from the crossing; and to the right and left, as well as to the near-by highway.
“Plaintiff had looked for vehicles approaching, from his right. A jury might conclude that at-the rate of speed defend*821ant was then traveling he was not yet within plaintiff’s range of vision at that time. Thereafter, plaintiff made other required observations: Of the highway to his left,' of the tracks below, of the tracks ahead, and of the tracks to his rear for the approaching freight train. All such observations were part of his responsibilities, and we cannot say that because he. failed to- keep watch only to the east for vehicles using the highway he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.” (Italics supplied.)
Due care, said the Minnesota court, required the plaintiff to look to his right and left and to the highway; and it is to me an inescapable conclusion that that court would have said, if the plaintiff had testified squarely that he made no- attempt to-observe the highway, which he knew he was approaching, until within five feet of the crossing, when it was too late to stop, that he had by his own words convicted himself of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
When the facts are undisputed and the existence of contributory negligence is sufficiently apparent to fair-minded and reasonable men so but one conclusion may fairly be drawn therefrom, there is no question to be submitted to the jury. Perkins v. Schmit Construction Co., 215 Iowa 350, 353, 354, 245 N.W. 343; Dreier v. McDermott, supra.
And it is said in 65 C. J. S., Negligence, section 120, pages 722, 723:
“The duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury includes the duty to exercise ordinary cafe to observe and appreciate danger or threatened danger. A person is required to make reasonable úse of his faculties of sight, hearing, and intelligence to discover dangers and conditions of danger to which he is or might become exposed, and one injured as a result of his failure to use his faculties to observe and discover a danger which would have been observed and discovered by an ordinarily prudent person is guilty of contributory negligence.” •
Much of this was quoted, with approval, from 45 C. J. 947, in Boles v. Hotel Maytag Co., 218 Iowa 306, 314, 253 N.W. 515.
The majority opinion, in effect, recognizes the rules last-quoted and attempts to excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with their requirements. I have attempted to demonstrate that the *822cases cited in the majority opinion are not in point, and that there was no logical or reasonable excuse for the plaintiff’s neglect to take simple and easily-used precautions for his own safety.
I would affirm upon plaintiff’s appeal, upon the ground that the defendant having been entitled to a directed verdict, any error in granting a new trial against plaintiff was nonprejudieial. I would reverse upon defendant’s appeal and would hold that defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict should have been sustained.
I am authorized to say that Justices Mulroney and Hays concur in this dissent.