Court Opinion

ID: 9899216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 15:08:29.107184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:57.336166
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1709-21

ALEXA BAEZ ZUCCO and
ENZO ZUCCO, her spouse,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

WALGREEN EASTERN CO.,
INC., NUNNO & NUNNO, PTR.
LLC, BOROUGH OF LODI,
COUNTY OF BERGEN, STATE
OF NEW JERSEY,

          Defendants,

and

MERCER STREET LLC,

          Defendant-Respondent.

                   Argued October 10, 2023 – Decided November 16, 2023

                   Before Judges Sabatino and Marczyk.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-5482-19.
            Grace Elizabeth Robol argued the cause for appellants
            (Davis Saperstein & Salomon PC, attorneys; Lisa Ann
            Lehrer, of counsel and on the briefs; Grace Elizabeth
            Robol, on the brief).

            Edward Richard Nicholson argued the cause for
            respondent (Schiavetti, Corgan, DiEdwards, Weinberg
            & Nicholson LLP, attorneys; William Daniel Buckley,
            on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      This appeal involves the trial court's analysis of Rule 4:26-4 and Rule 4:9-

3 in the context of a personal injury action. Plaintiffs, Alexa Baez-Zucco and

her husband, Enzo Zucco, appeal the trial court's September 10, 2021 order

granting Mercer Street, LLC summary judgment and the January 18, 2022 order

denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Following our review of the

record and the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

                                         I.

      On May 23, 2018, Baez-Zucco was walking in the parking area at a

Walgreens store in Lodi, which was adjacent to other commercial businesses,

when she slipped on loose gravel and rolled her ankle due to a surface depression

in the parking lot pavement. Police responded to the scene, completed an

investigation report, and identified the location of the accident as 20 Arnot Street

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in Lodi.1 The property at 20 Arnot Street was owned by Walgreen Eastern, Co.

Inc.

       Plaintiffs retained counsel shortly after the incident, and on June 28, 2018,

plaintiffs and their engineering expert Kelly-Ann Kimiecik, P.E., visited the

scene of the fall. Kimiecik's July 7, 2018 report2 addressed to plaintiffs' law

firm indicates the incident occurred as plaintiff was walking toward Walgreens

"between the parking lot spaces and the adjacent building."3 Kimiecik opined

the depression in the asphalt was caused by "water surface runoff from the

adjacent building['s] downspout" coupled with poorly compacted subgrade and

"freeze thaw cycles" which caused the pavement to crack.

       While at the inspection of the fall site, Kimiecik encountered Tracie

Nunno-D'Amico. Kimiecik and Nunno-D'Amico were together earlier that day

at a different site inspection for one of Nunno-D'Amico's cases.            Nunno-

D'Amico is an attorney. Kimiecik informed Nunno-D'Amico there had been a

1
  A central issue in this case concerns the ownership of the portion of the parking
lot where plaintiff fell and surrounding properties.
2
  Kimiecik prepared two reports. The first was dated July 7, 2018. The second
report, dated February 4, 2021, was submitted in support of plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration.
3
    The adjacent building—2 Mercer Street—is owned by Mercer Street, LLC.
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                                         3
fall at Walgreens, and she was performing an inspection. Nunno-D'Amico

informed Kimiecik that her family "held ownership" of property in the area.

However, Kimiecik notes in her February 4, 2021 report she "did not indicate

the specific location of . . . plaintiff's incident" to Nunno-D'Amico.4 Kimiecik

reported this encounter with Nunno-D'Amico later that day to plaintiffs' law

firm.

        A year later, in July 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants,

Walgreen Eastern, Co., Inc., Nunno & Nunno PTR LLC ("Nunno & Nunno") a

real estate holding company for property located at 2 Arnot Street, the Borough

of Lodi, the County of Bergen, the State of New Jersey, and other fictitious

parties.5 Although plaintiffs named the Nunno & Nunno entity as a defendant,

4
   Nunno-D'Amico testified at her deposition Kimiecik advised her plaintiff's
fall occurred in the Walgreens parking lot. Nunno-D'Amico was concerned
because she had already retained Kimiecik, and she did not want there to be a
conflict because if plaintiff fell on the "other property" (2 Mercer Street, owned
by Mercer Street, LLC), there could be a conflict because her parents owned that
property and her father owned the law firm that retained Kimiecik in the case
Nunno-D'Amico and Kimiecik were working on together earlier that day.
5
  Stipulations of dismissal were subsequently filed as to defendants, County of
Bergen and the Borough of Lodi. The State of New Jersey was granted summary
judgment.

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                                          4
the true owners of the building with the downspout referenced in Kimiecik's

report was Mercer Street, LLC.6 Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery.

      William Nunno answered plaintiffs' interrogatories on behalf of Nunno &

Nunno. Plaintiffs assert Nunno & Nunno's responses to interrogatories were

inaccurate insofar as it responded it had no knowledge of Baez-Zucco's fall

despite Nunno-D'Amico's encounter with Kimiecik in the parking lot at the time

of the inspection. Further, plaintiffs contend Nunno & Nunno did not disclose

the location of plaintiff's fall was on a different property owned by a different

Nunno family holding company.

      Nunno-D'Amico was deposed on August 26, 2020. At her deposition,

plaintiffs assert they learned for the first time Mercer Street, LLC owned the 2

Mercer Street property in the area where plaintiff fell. Plaintiffs subsequently

moved for and obtained leave to amend the complaint to name Mercer Street,

LLC as a defendant. At the close of discovery, Mercer Street, LLC moved for

summary judgment based on plaintiffs' failure to comply with the statute of

6
  The principals of Mercer Street, LLC are Kathy Nunno and William Nunno
alone. The principals of Nunno & Nunno are Kathy Nunno, William Nunno,
Tracie Nunno-D'Amico, Lois Nunno, and Alisa Nunno DiChiara.

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                                       5
limitations. The trial court, as discussed more fully below, granted the motion,

and denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

                                        II.

      Plaintiffs contend Mercer Street, LLC was timely joined pursuant to Rule

4:26-4 and that their claims relate back to the date of the original complaint and

should not be barred by the statute of limitations under Rule 4:9-3. More

specifically, plaintiffs assert they "did not know the identity of the exact Nunno

entity responsible [for the] area of the fall prior to the defendant property owners

advising of same." Plaintiffs further allege Nunno & Nunno and Mercer Street,

LLC were the "same people," and despite this, Nunno & Nunno never identified

the proper owner of the relevant property in its answers to interrogatories.

      Defendant counters plaintiffs were aware of the building with the

downspout that purportedly caused the dangerous condition, and there is no

indication plaintiffs had difficulty in determining the address of the building

adjacent to the parking lot where the fall occurred. Defendant further argues

plaintiffs' expert reports, which described the dangerous downspout on the

adjacent building to Walgreens, "illustrate plaintiff[s'] lack of diligence in

searching for the owner of the site of the accident."

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      We review a grant of summary judgment by applying the same legal

standard as the motion judge. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015). We

must determine whether there is a "genuine issue as to any material fact" when

the evidence is "viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."

Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014) (first quoting

Rule 4:46-2(c); and then quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142

N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). The "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference" and are reviewed de novo. Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 382-83 (2010). Our review of an order dismissing a

complaint as barred by the statute of limitations is also de novo. See Est. of

Hainthaler v. Zurich Com. Ins., 387 N.J. Super. 318, 325 (App. Div. 2006). We

review a trial court's decision to grant or deny an ensuing motion for

reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super.

374, 389 (App. Div. 1996).

      N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a) requires an action for personal injuries to be filed

within two years after the accrual of the cause of action. 7 The principal

7
 The parties and the trial court agreed the two-year statute of limitation in this
matter was tolled for fifty-six days "due to the pandemic of COVID-19" and

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                                        7
consideration underlying the enactment of statutes of limitations is one of

fairness to defendants. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 274 (1973). Still, our

courts also recognize the significant policy interest favoring the resolution of

claims on their merits. Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 101 N.J. 538, 547-49 (1986)

(noting that "[j]ustice impels strongly towards affording the plaintiffs their day

in court on the merits of their claim" (quoting Farrell v. Votator Div. of

Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 122 (1973))). Therefore, certain procedural rules

aim at balancing these competing interests.

      One of those rules is the fictitious pleading rule, Rule 4:26-4, which

provides in pertinent part:

            In any action, irrespective of the amount in controversy,
            other than an action governed by R. 4:4-5 (affecting
            specific property or a res), if the defendant's true name
            is unknown to the plaintiff, process may issue against
            the defendant under a fictitious name, stating it to be
            fictitious and adding an appropriate description
            sufficient for identification.

            [R. 4:26-4.]

plaintiffs had until July 18, 2020, to file their complaint. We do not agree with
their assumption, since we previously concluded the Supreme Court did not toll
the statute of limitations in its June 11, 2020 Fourth Omnibus Order. Rather,
we noted, "the time period . . . [from] March 16, 2020, through May 10, 2020,
was deemed a legal holiday pursuant to the Court's constitutional rule-making
authority." See Barron v. Gersten, 472 N.J. Super. 572, 580 (App. Div. 2022).
Regardless, this does not impact our opinion as plaintiffs' amended complaint
was filed even beyond this date.
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                                        8
Our Supreme Court has construed Rule 4:26-4 to allow "a plaintiff who institutes

a timely action against a fictitious defendant to amend the complaint after the

expiration of the statute of limitations to identify the true defendant." Viviano,

101 N.J. at 548. When this procedure is properly used, "an amended complaint

identifying the defendant by its true name relates back to the time of filing of

the original complaint . . . ." Baez v. Paulo, 453 N.J. Super. 422, 437 (App. Div.

2018) (quoting Viviano, 101 N.J. at 548).

      Although the fictitious pleading rule allows a party to amend its complaint

after the expiration of the statute of limitations, "case law has emphasized the

need for plaintiffs and their counsel to act with due diligence in attempting to

identify and sue responsible parties within the statute of limitations period. " Id.

at 438; see, e.g., Matynska v. Fried, 175 N.J. 51, 52-54 (2002); Claypotch v.

Heller, Inc., 360 N.J. Super. 472, 479-80 (App. Div. 2003). Simply put, "Rule

4:26-4 may only be used by a plaintiff 'if a defendant's true name cannot be

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence prior to filing the complaint.'" Baez,

453 N.J. Super. at 438 (quoting Claypotch, 360 N.J. Super. at 479-80 ("To be

entitled to the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff must proceed with due diligence in

ascertaining the fictitiously identified defendant's true name and amending the

complaint to correctly identify that defendant.")).

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      As we stated in Baez, a plaintiff must satisfy two levels of diligence to be

accorded the tolling benefits of the rule:

            First, a plaintiff must exercise due diligence in
            endeavoring to identify the responsible defendants
            before filing the original complaint naming John Doe
            parties. Second, a plaintiff must act with due diligence
            in taking prompt steps to substitute the defendant's true
            name, after becoming aware of that defendant's
            identity.

            [453 N.J. Super. at 439 (citations omitted).]

      Here, in addressing plaintiffs' arguments under Rule 4:26–4, the trial court

noted,

            [p]laintiff did not demonstrate diligent pre-suit effort to
            investigate and identify the owner of 2 Mercer Street
            . . . . The factual record shows an absence of diligent
            effort. At oral argument counsel represented the firm
            had performed a property tax search using the Walgreen
            address and that search showed Nunno & Nunno as the
            owner of the Walgreen premises, and that is why that
            entity was sued. (None of that was in the paper record
            for the summary judgment motion. Further discussion
            at oral argument suggested the search disclosing Nunno
            & Nunno as a property owner . . . for the 2 Arnot Street
            address, while the search of the Walgreen store address,
            20 Arnot Street, identified Walgreen as the owner of
            that property.) Nothing was offered to demonstrate an
            effort to identify the address of the building on whose
            property plaintiff claimed she fell (2 Mercer Street), nor
            the owner of that building (Mercer Street, LLC).

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                                       10
      The court further noted plaintiffs' expert reported shortly after the accident

that Baez-Zucco had reported to her she was walking in an area adjacent to the

parking lot between the parking lot and the adjacent building. The expert also

noted runoff from an adjacent building contributed to the cause of the accident.

The court concluded plaintiffs' counsel was aware that Walgreens may not own

the walkway where plaintiff fell, and the downspout from an adjacent property

potentially caused the asphalt defect. The court stated:

            [p]laintiff provided no information to suggest any effort
            was made to identify the owner of 2 Mercer Street . . .
            although plaintiff, her expert, and counsel knew the
            alleged location of her fall before the lawsuit was filed.
            The court is hard-pressed to accept that as the diligence
            required to avail oneself of the fictitious party rule . . . .

      We find no error in the court's analysis.         Here, five weeks after the

incident, plaintiffs' engineer inspected the property. Plaintiffs' counsel received

Kimiecik's report—long before the filing of the complaint and the running of

the statute of limitations—regarding the downspout issue on the adjacent

property that caused or contributed to the dangerous asphalt depression that led

to Baez-Zucco's fall. A plaintiff cannot employ the fictitious party rule after

expiration of the statute of limitations unless it can demonstrate a party's

identification was not readily discoverable sooner. Here, there was no such

showing. There is nothing in the record to suggest plaintiffs conducted a title

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                                        11
search or tax record search of the property adjacent to 20 Arnot Street where

Walgreens was located. That is, plaintiffs did not utilize the information derived

from Kimiecik's report to ascertain, with due diligence, the owner of 2 Mercer

Street. Apparently, there was no other visit to the location of the fall to ascertain

the address or owners of the property. There is also no indication a tax search

or title search was conducted of 2 Mercer Street in order to identify Mercer

Street, LLC. Further, there is also no indication in the record plaintiffs served

interrogatories or requests for admissions on Nunno & Nunno with photos of the

building with the downspout requesting information as to who owned the

building.

      Plaintiffs assert they "did not know the identity of the exact Nunno entity

responsible [for the] area of the fall prior to the defendant property owners

advising of same." We are unpersuaded by this argument. The issue here was

not which Nunno entity to sue, but rather a matter of identifying the property

owner potentially liable for the fall, specifically 2 Mercer Street. Kimiecik's

report specifically identified the alleged dangerous condition, the downspout on

the building adjacent to the Walgreens parking lot near the area of the fall. The

expert acknowledged that Nunno-D'Amico advised her family owned one of the

nearby buildings, yet the record is bereft of any specific efforts to identify the

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                                        12
owner of the building with the downspout that purportedly contributed to the

depression on the pavement which caused the fall. Instead, it appears there was

only a general search of nearby properties owned by members of the Nunno

family. Nunno & Nunno, who was named as a defendant, was located at 2 Arnot

Street, which was not the building with the downspout at issue. Plaintiffs'

counsel notes, "Kimiecik provided plaintiffs with a deed and property detail for

2 Arnot Street" following her discussion with Nunno-D'Amico. However, that

is not the property with the alleged dangerous downspout condition nor is there

any discussion of what efforts were made to identify the address of that property.

      Plaintiffs assert they conducted a corporate search to "identify the Nunno

entity that owned the subject property" following Kimiecik's inspection.

However, plaintiffs do not identify the "subject property" for which they

searched. It is clear they did not search for the owner of the property (2 Mercer

Street) identified by Kimiecik with the downspout that allegedly caused the

asphalt depression. Rather, plaintiffs apparently searched instead for the owner

of 2 Arnot Street, which is not adjacent to the fall at issue. That is, plaintiffs

did not conduct a search focused upon the property described in their expert

report. After the engineer visited the property, there is no indication of any

further visits to the location of the fall by plaintiffs' representatives to determine

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                                         13
the owners of the adjacent properties. Nor was there any timely effort to identify

what property Nunno D'Amico was discussing when she advised Kimiecik that

her family "held ownership" of property in the area of the fall. We conclude

plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 4:26-4.

      Turning to the trial court's discussion of Rule 4:9-3, we note the relation

back rule provides an independent basis to permit the filing of an amended

complaint under the principle of fundamental fairness. R. 4:9-3. A plaintiff

adding a new party after the expiration of a statute of limitations must establish:

            (1) the claim asserted in the amended complaint arose
            out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged or
            sought to be alleged in the original complaint; (2) the
            new defendant had sufficient notice of the institution of
            the action [prior to the expiration of the statute of
            limitations] not to be prejudiced in maintaining his or
            her defense; and (3) the new defendant knew or should
            have known that, but for the misidentification of the
            proper party, the action would have been brought
            against him or her.

            [Viviano, 101 N.J. at 553 (citing Smelkinson v. Ethel
            & Mac Corp., 178 N.J. Super. 465, 471 (App. Div.
            1981)).]

      In addressing plaintiffs' relation back argument under Rule 4:9-3, the trial

judge noted:

            Similarly, the two defendant LLC's are separate legal
            entities, with separate insurance coverage. Other than
            establishing that William and Kathy Nunno are

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                                       14
            members of both LLC's, plaintiff has not offered any
            facts that would support a finding that Mercer Street
            LLC should have known, before it was sued, that
            plaintiff would have sued it instead of Nunno & Nunno
            but for a mistake in the identity of the correct party. (R.
            4:9-3).

The court observed that Nunno & Nunno certified, in answering interrogatories,

it did not own the premises where the accident was alleged to have occurred and

that "upon information and belief" Walgreens owned the parking lot. Recall,

plaintiffs' complaint identified the location of the fall as a "parking lot abutting

the premises, owned . . . by . . .Walgreen[s] . . . Nunno & Nunno . . . at or near

20 Arnot Street . . . ." The court noted the complaint did not give notice that

plaintiff fell on a walkway in an area near 2 Mercer Street. While plaintiffs

contend William Nunno withheld the identity of the true owner of Mercer Street,

LLC, the court noted plaintiff did not identify an interrogatory that requested

that information.

      We are unpersuaded by plaintiffs' arguments and affirm the trial court's

decision concluding plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they were entitled to relief

under Rule 4:9-3. Here, there was a question as to the owner of the property

                                                                              A-1709-21
                                        15
where the fall actually occurred throughout this case.8 Plaintiffs' complaint

identified the accident as occurring "at or near" 20 Arnot Street, the address of

Walgreens. Although Nunno-D'Amico encountered Kimiecik in the parking lot

during her inspection, Kimiecik noted in her report she never advised Nunno-

D'Amico about "the specific location" of plaintiff's fall. Therefore, we agree

with the trial court there was no indication in the record that "Mercer Street LLC

should have known, before it was sued, that plaintiff would have sued it instead

of Nunno & Nunno but for a mistake in the identity of the correct party."

8
  When Nunno-D'Amico was eventually deposed, she identified 2 Mercer Street
as belonging to Mercer Street, LLC, but testified plaintiff fell on an area owned
by Walgreens based on a photo presented to her at the deposition depicting
plaintiff in the area of the fall. Nunno-D'Amico was aware of the suit against
the Nunno & Nunno entity as she testified she attempted to twice call plaintiff s'
law firm to advise Nunno & Nunno was not the owner of the parking lot where
plaintiff fell. She also testified Nunno & Nunno's insurance carrier was
considering denying coverage because the accident did not occur on Nunno &
Nunno's property. Although the better practice would have been for Nunno-
D'Amico to have sent a letter or made some other effort to notify plaintiffs' firm,
Nunno & Nunno's answers to interrogatories clearly stated it did not own the
property where the fall occurred. Furthermore, the failure to identify Mercer
Street, LLC stemmed from plaintiffs' failure to follow up on the information
voluntarily provided by Nunno-D'Amico to Kimiecik and, more importantly, the
failure to further investigate Kimiecik's independent observation concerning the
downspout on 2 Mercer Street that caused the defect where plaintiff fell.

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      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiffs'

remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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