Court Opinion

ID: 9570478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:23:33.823882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:54.472548
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the holding by the majority that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict based upon its contention that the crossing was not extrahazardous as a matter of law. I also concur in the holding by the majority that “the use of extrahazardousness as a criterion for determining the extent of the railroad’s duty of care” in railroad crossing accident cases should now be abandoned by this court and replaced with “the rule of reasonable care under the attendant circumstances,” as in other negligence cases.
I dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the trial court erred in admitting the opinion testimony of expert witnesses upon the issue whether the railroad crossing was extrahazardous and that, as a result, this case must be remanded for a new trial.
In my view, that the fallacy of the reasoning by the majority in arriving at this conclusion is exposed by its concession that the test to be applied in determining whether the opinion testimony of an expert “can be of appreciable help to the jury,” and therefore admissible, is “whether the subject is such that the expertise of the witness gives him a special insight superior to that of the average juror” and by the further concession that “there is no doubt that the experts who testified in the present ease had superior knowledge and training concerning railroad crossings and those circumstances which make them dangerous.”
*357The majority also quotes with approval from 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) 10, § 9, as follows:
“* * * an expert’s opinion is received because and whenever his skill is greater than the jury’s * * (Emphasis added)
Because the majority concedes that plaintiff’s expert witnesses possessed “skill greater than the jury’s” it necessarily follows that the opinion of such experts was admissible.
1. The purported distinction between “extrahazardous railroad crossing” and “unsafe” stairway or ramp in building.
The majority seeks to escape that conclusion by making a distinction, without support by any cited legal authority, between the opinion of an expert witness that a stairway or ramp in a building is “unsafe” (held by this court to be admissible in Naney v. Lane, 247 Or 367, 371, 428 P2d 722 (1967), and Ritter v. Beals et al, 225 Or 504, 525, 358 P2d 1080 (1961)), and the opinion of an expert witness that a railroad crossing is “extrahazardous,” which the majority would hold to be inadmissible.
The majority would support such a distinction by using the term “extrahazardous” in the context of its legal definition and from the standpoint of the “user,” i.e., that an “extrahazardous railroad crossing” is one which a reasonably prudent automobile driver cannot use safely, rather than in the context of “what is considered to be acceptable conduct by [the railroad] industry.” At the same time, the majority would use the term “unsafe,” as applied to the stairway or ramp in a building, not in terms of the legal definition of “unsafe,” much less from the standpoint of the *358“user,” but in tbe context of “what is considered acceptable conduct by [the] industry” which designs and constructs stairways and ramps in buildings.
After thus using the terms “unsafe” and “ex-trahazardous” in two different contexts, the majority would say that a skilled and experienced railroad safety engineer who expresses the opinion that a railroad crossing is “extrahazardons” is making a “moral community judgment” about the ability of a reasonably prudent automobile driver, whereas a skilled and experienced building architect who expresses the opinion that the stairway or ramp is “unsafe” is “not making a moral judgment,” but is expressing no more than a “professional appraisal of what is considered acceptable by an industry.”
In my view, to make such a purported distinction, and on such a basis, is to engage in legal legerdemain in an attempt to distinguish two concepts which, when viewed in terms of reality, have no substantial difference, at least for the purposes of determining whether the opinion of an expert witness “can be of appreciable help to the jury,” so as to recjuire its admission.
It is true, of course, that because this court has previously defined the term “extrahazardons railroad crossing” in terms of whether a reasonably prudent automobile driver could use it safely, the result has been that in designing and constructing a railroad crossing a railroad company could satisfy the duty imposed by that definition by considering the question of its safety solely from the standpoint of the user—- and a reasonably prudent user.
By contrast, the duty imposed by law upon one who designs and constructs a stairway or ramp in a *359building (and tbe duty now imposed by this court upon railroads in the planning and construction of railroad crossings) is the duty to use reasonable care under all of the circumstances, without limitation to the anticipation of conduct by users, much less the conduct only of reasonably prudent users. See Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed) 170-76, § 33.
It does not follow, however, that an expert cannot properly express the opinion that a railroad crossing is “extrahazardous,” but can properly express the opinion that a stairway or ramp in a building is “unsafe.” Indeed, the term “safe” is usually defined to mean “reasonably safe.” 38 Words and Phrases (perm ed) 7 ff. For that reason and because, as previously stated, the duty imposed upon one who designs or builds a stairway or ramp in a building is a duty to use “reasonable care” under all of the circumstances, the opinion of an expert that such a stairway or ramp is “unsafe” is as much, if not more, the expression of a “moral community judgment” relating to what the majority refer to as “that legal abstraction”—the reasonably prudent man. In such a case, however, that “abstraction” is used with reference to the man who designs or constructs such a stairway or ramp, rather than the man who uses the stairway or ramp.
In my opinion, however, the controlling question in deciding the admissibility of the expert opinion testimony in this case is not whether the “legal abstraction” of the “reasonably prudent man” is necessarily involved in both of these two situations. Instead, the controlling question is whether, assuming that it is necessary to consider such a “legal abstraction” in a case involving design and construction of a railroad crossing, any such “abstraction” is of such a nature that the opinion of an expert could not be of any *360“appreciable help” to a jury in such a case because the duty of the railroad under the now-abandoned definition of “extrahazardous” was limited under that definition to a consideration of whether a reasonably prudent automobile driver could safely use the crossing.
The majority says that the question asked of this expert witness in this' case was “similar to asking a traffic engineer whether 30 miles per hour in a time and place and under certain conditions was a speed which a reasonably prudent person would drive.” The majority also says that because “everyone drives an automobile,” the question whether a railroad crossing can be used safely by a reasonably prudent driver is not “the subject of expertise not known to the average juror,” so as to be a subject on which “the expertise of the witness gives him a special insight superior to that of the average juror.”
It is my opinion, however, that even in this age of the automobile, “everyone” has not only had the experience of driving an automobile, but also, and at least occasionally, has had the experience of walking, including the experience of walking on stairways and ramps in buildings. As a result, the “average juror” is just as likely to know whether a stairway or ramp in a building is “safe” or “unsafe” for use by those who enter the building as he is to know whether a railroad crossing can be used safely by reasonably prudent drivers.
The very purpose of the various standards developed by architects in the design of stairways and ramps in buildings is to provide facilities that can be used safely by persons who enter such buildings. Thus, in Naney v. Lane, supra, a stairway had been con*361strueted with a metal strip along the edge of the steps with an edge about 1/8 or 3/16 of an inch higher than the rubber matting on the steps. An architect was permitted to express the opinion that this was not a “safe design” because a person might catch his shoe on that protruding edge. That testimony by an expert witness with “superior knowledge” was held to be of such possible “help” to the jury as to be properly admissible.
To the same effect, in Ritter v. Beals et al, supra, the question whether a ramp constructed in a building for wheelchairs was too steep to be safe for use by persons in wheelchairs was held to be a proper subject for expert opinion testimony that the ramp was “unsafe.”
Likewise, in this case, when plaintiff’s expert witnesses expressed the opinion that this railroad crossing was “extrahazardous,” they were necessarily stating the opinion that the crossing was unsafe for use by reasonably prudent persons. But because they were required to assume the use of the crossing by reasonably prudent persons was no more of a reason to conclude that such testimony by an expert with superior knowledge would not be of “appreciable help” to a jury, so as to exclude such opinion testimony, that it would have been a valid reason to exclude the opinion testimony in Naney and Ritter.
The reason why the testimony of a person with special training “can be of appreciable help to the jury” in both cases is illustrated by the opinion of the court in Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., 105 RI 13, 249 A2d 48, 51 (1969), in which the doors at the entrance of a bank were designed to swing outward and. over a vestibule or platform and plaintiff, *362on entering the bank, fell when she “pulled” on one of these doors. In holding that the testimony of an architect was admissible in that case the court said (at p 51):
“From the pictures which are in evidence, the entranceway to defendant’s bank appears to the untutored eye to be perfectly safe. It is only when a trained individual such as plaintiff’s architect compares the outward swing of the new doors with the depth of the platform, and when he explains the difficulty encountered by a person of short stature in reaching up and pulling open the door that the hazards that may surround entry into the bank become apparent. * *
Similarly, the admission of expert opinion testimony in Naney v. Lane, supra, that the raised metal “strip” on the edge of the steps of a stairway was not a “safe design,” together with an explanation of the reasons why it was an unsafe design, was consistent with the holdings of the court in Morgan and in numerous similar cases.
Because the “untutored eye” of “the average juror” might not have fully understood why persons could not safely use the entranceway to the bank in Morgan, the stairway in Naney, or the ramp in Bitter, the opinions of qualified expert witnesses were held to be admissible in those cases because such opinion testimony was considered by the courts to be “appreciable help” to the “average jurors” in those cases.
In Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or 247, 486 P2d 553 (1971), this court quoted with approval from 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed) 21, § 1923, as follows:
“ ‘But the only true criterion is: On this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable help? In other words, the test is a relative one, *363depending on the particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that subject * * *.’ ” (259 Or at 258)
The court in Yundt then held that:
“There are situations, such as Sandow, where a jury clearly is not equally well qualified and needs help to find the truth. There are also situations where a jury clearly is equally qualified without help from opinion testimony such as offered here. It is the area between the clearly qualified and the clearly unqualified where the trial judge should be granted a certain latitude of decision in excluding or receiving expert opinion testimony.” (259 Or at 260)
This case was tried before an able and experienced trial judge. The majority has expressly conceded that “[t]here is no doubt that the experts who testified in the present case had superior knowledge and training concerning railroad crossings and those circumstances which make them dangerous.” The trial judge held, in effect, that under all of the circumstances of this case, including, among other things, the controversy between the parties relating to the extent to which the view of a motorist approaching the crossing was obstructed, the testimony of these well-qualified experts “can be of appreciable help to the jury” in deciding 'whether this railroad crossing was one which could be used safely by reasonably prudent automobile drivers. In both Naney v. Lane, supra, and Ritter v. Beals et al, supra, we affirmed trial judges in their exercise of discretion under similar circumstances.
In my opinion, this cannot properly be said to be a case in which “a jury clearly is equally well qualified without help from expert testimony such as of*364fered here.” Instead, this is a case in which it should at least be held that the question whether the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witnesses “can be of appreciable help to the jury” was “in the area between the clearly qualified and the clearly unqualified,” with the result that the exercise of discretion by the trial judge upon that question in this case should be also affirmed.
2. Any error in receiving expert opinion testimony that the railroad crossing was “ extrahasardous” was not prejudicial upon the abandonment of that rule.
After concluding that it was error to receive in evidence the opinions of expert witnesses upon the question whether this railroad crossing was “extra-hazardous,” so as to require a new trial, the majority then abandons “the use of extrahazardousness as a criterion for determining the extent of the railroad’s duty of care” and holds that:
“* * * courts should not treat railroad crossing cases in any different manner than any other negligent case. The duty of both railroad and motorist should be that of reasonable care under the attendant circumstances. * * *”
and that:
“* * * Under the duty of reasonable care now placed upon railroads, the circumstances in which expert testimony will be admissible concerning the condition of a crossing will be determined by whether the condition concerning which the expert testified involves an expertise which will be of help to the jury.”
What this appears to say, in a somewhat indirect and ambiguous manner, is that upon the retrial *365of this case the admissibility of expert opinion testimony upon the issue whether a railroad crossing is “safe” or “unsafe” will be determined on the same basis as the admissibility of expert testimony whether a stairway or ramp in a building is “safe” or “unsafe.”
Tliis court has previously held, in Naney v. Lane, 247 Or 367, 371, 428 P2d 722 (1967); Ritter v. Beals et al, 225 Or 504, 525, 358 P2d 1080 (1961); and Tundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or 247, 486 P2d 553 (1971), that a trial court may, in its discretion, permit an expert witness with “superior knowledge and training” to express, the opinion that a stairway or ramp in a building is either “unsafe” or not designed and built in accordance with good construction practices and safety standards. It must necessarily follow, although not expressly so stated by the majority, that if upon retrial of this ease the plaintiff produces the same expert witnesses who, according to the majority, “had superior knowledge and training concerning railroad crossings and those circumstances which make them dangerous” the trial court may properly permit those witnesses to express the opinion that at the time of the accident this railroad crossing was “unsafe” or not constructed in accordance with good construction practices and safety standards.①
What I fail to understand, however, is why, this being so, there was any prejudicial error in the receiving of the testimony of these expert witnesses on the trial of this case, so as to make it necessary to send the case back for a new trial. These witnesses *366testified that, in their opinion, this railroad crossing was not only “unsafe,” but that it was “extrahazardous,” in accordance with that more rigorous standard now abandoned by this court. In my opinion it necessarily follows that if the. crossing was “extrahazardous” it was also “unsafe,” in accordance with the far less rigorons standard now adopted by this court.
The majority answers this contention by stating that:
“* * * Assuming the dissent’s premise concerning future admissibility to be correct, if the admission of the evidence was erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant under the rules used to get the judgment, the prejudice does not disappear because other rules will be used upon retrial under which substantially similar evidence would be admissible.”
Aside from the fact that, in my opinion, there was no prejudice to the defendant, for reasons previously stated, it is also my opinion that this problem, as presented in this ease, is essentially the same as the problem not infrequently presented in appeals to this court in cases in which evidence was either admitted or excluded on a ground which, on appeal, we hold to have been improper. If, upon application of the correct rule, such evidence would have been correctly admitted or excluded, we do not reverse the judgment in such a case and remand it for a new trial on the ground that there was prejudice to the party who had objected to the evidence because of the fact that in ruling upon the objection to that evidence, the trial court had acted under a mistaken impression as to the applicable rule of law.
Indeed, such a result is no more than a corollary of the usual rule that if evidence is admissible for *367any purpose a trial court will not ordinarily be reversed for overruling an objection to such evidence even if, in admitting such evidence, the trial court did so for the wrong reason. This result is also consistent with the general rule that where a trial judge makes a proper ruling, but on an improper ground, he will ordinarily be affirmed. See Bither v. Baker Rock Crushing, 249 Or 640, 438 P2d 988, 440 P2d 368 (1968). Cf. Riley v. Good, 142 Or 155, 158, 18 P2d 222 (1933).
For all of these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and therefore must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority insofar as it would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

 As stated in Morris, The Role of Expert Testimony in the Trial of Negligence Issues, 26 Tex L Rev 1, 17 (1947):
“* * * [t]he company that undertakes the business of rail transportation has the duty of acquiring and applying adequate technical knowledge to its enterprise. * * ■■■”