Court Opinion

ID: 9830762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:27:23.986488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.476527
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Our attention is called to the fact that the request of the defendant to with-' draw his announcement closing the case and for permission to offer further testimony was made after the court announced its decision. We find, on further inspection of the record, that we were in error in stating that such request was made before the court made its announcement. The request was made after argument of the parties and after the announcement of the court of its final decision. We-think, however, such does not -change the rule as announced in our original opinion. The request was a reasonable one, the granting of it by the trial court would have caused no delay, and the proffered testimony evidently supplied an omission which clearly appears necessary to the due administration of justice. It would be harsh, indeed, for a judgment to stand against appellant for the debt of “J. H. Taylor, Broker,” if, in fact, he was not the owner of the business, and let the real owner go free.
The judgment in the court below is predicated, which we did not state in the original opinion, on pleadings and uncon-troverted testimony that the transaction between the appellee and “J. H. Taylor, Broker,” was tainted with usury, in that, on August 15, 1931, appellee borrowed of J. H. Taylor, Broker, the sum of $35, paid to it in the course of ten months installment interest on that loan to the sum of $57, and executed the note sued upon for the sum of $38.50, the note representing a claim for the balance due on the original indebtedness. Manifestly, such reported facts makes the transaction usury and the appellant, whether he be the owner of J. H. Taylor, Broker, or a mere employee of the real owner thereof, should not be permitted to molest, harass, or annoy the appellee and *401his associates in furtherance of the collection of such unlawful debt. The trial court restrained the appellant from harassing and annoying the appellee, his wife and employers, in further demanding payment of the note. In this, we think the trial court was correct. It makes no difference whether appellant was the lender or a mere employee of the lender; he has no legal or equitable right to molest, harass, or annoy the aggrieved parties, in demanding payment of such an unlawful claim. So, the injunctive order of the court, restraining the .appellant, should be affirmed; therefore, our original opinion is corrected in the particulars above stated, the conclusion reached is reformed, affirming the injunc-tive order of the lower court, and reversing and remanding the cause as to the other features of the judgment.
As reformed, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.