Court Opinion

ID: 9846677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:45:22.706044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:43.407618
License: Public Domain

MELLOY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all of the majority’s thorough opinion except Section V, ante at 798-804. I would hold that several errors in the government’s penalty-phase closing arguments resulted in cumulative prejudice requiring a new penalty-phase trial.
I.
In reaching this conclusion, I do not take lightly the jury’s finding of several serious aggravating factors, the extreme violence of the crimes against Dru Sjodin, or the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. However, we must ensure that jurors have been allowed to serve their proper role with full consideration of all relevant factors and full opportunity to exercise the discretion vested solely in their hands. When assessing prejudice in this context we must keep in mind the unique nature of the discretion vested in the capital sentencing jury and the importance of this discretion in the weighing function the jury performs. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874-79, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).
The majority finds at least two penalty-phase errors but holds them, individually and cumulatively, to have been non-preju*817dicial. These errors include: the government’s mischaracterization of the law in its statement to the jury that the death penalty was required to punish the defendant for the murder because a life sentence punished only the kidnapping, ante at 799-800, and the government’s improper denigration of the defense as trying “to sell” something to the jury, ante at 801-02. I agree with the majority to the extent it found error as to these two issues.
I would hold these errors to be more serious than does the majority. In addition, I would hold that the government improperly appealed to passion and emotion through its “Golden Rule” argument in which it inappropriately claimed to speak for the victim and asked the jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim. Further, I would hold that the government improperly argued that mitigating factors were irrelevant in the absence of a nexus between the factors and either the seriousness of'the offense or the defendant’s ability to form the necessary mens rea. Finally, I would hold that the curative actions were insufficient to correct these errors such that the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in prejudice to the defendant.
II. Mischaracterization of the Law
Regarding the government’s mischaracterization of the law, I find the error more substantial than does the majority. The government argued to the jury that a death sentence was necessary to provide additional punishment beyond the penalty that would have resulted from a kidnapping alone. Initially, the government argued that the defendant “could” receive a life sentence for the kidnapping alone, ante at 799. After the district court sustained an objection to the statement cited by the majority, the government immediately continued in its improper line of argument, stating:
Prison is what Alfonso Rodriguez knows. Prison is what he’s asking for, but death row is what he has earned, and a sentence of death is what this defendant’s intentional aggravated crimes call for under the law of the United States. A prison sentence punishes the kidnapping alone.
(Emphasis added). The defense again objected, and the court again sustained the objection. In addition, in rebuttal, the government revisited this improper line of argument, stating:
Let the defendant know that these heinous, cruel, depraved torturous factors in this intentional murder will not be treated as a freebie for which there is no extra punishment on top of what he would have gotten, as [defense counsel] said at the end of the first phase of this trial. Tell Alfonso Rodriguez that no matter what he thought as Dru Sjodin desperately needed mercy, no matter what he thought, Dru Sjodin was not a freebie.
Taken in context with the other statements, I am left with the firm impression that the government misinformed the jury regarding the unavailability of a term of years for a non-fatal kidnapping offense, necessarily bolstering the impression that the death penalty was the only available means to impose a punishment for the murder. In fact, kidnapping alone could have resulted in “imprisonment for any term of years or for life.” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Punishment for a kidnapping resulting in the death of any person is “death or life imprisonment.” Id. The defendant’s murder of Sjodin, then, eliminated the possibility of a term of years and placed defendant in jeopardy for the death penalty. As such, it was a mischaracterization of the law to tell the jury that the death penalty was necessary to punish the *818defendant for the murder as contrasted with a non-fatal kidnapping.
Although I find it unnecessary to address the prejudice flowing from this single error, I note that the government returned repeatedly to a theme of duty throughout closing, telling the jury, effectively, that they would not be carrying out their duty if they failed to return a death penalty. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (holding that it is improper to lead the jury to believe that they lack discretion and to minimize the jury’s sense of responsibility for imposing the death sentence); see also Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir.2006) (“Describing jurors as soldiers with a duty eviscerates the concept of discretion afforded to a jury as required by the Eighth Amendment.”). In addition, the government referred repeatedly to claims that “the law” or “the law of the United States” required the jury to impose the death penalty. Coupled with such statements, a mischaracterization of the death penalty as the only potential way to distinguish between punishment for the kidnapping offense alone and punishment for the murder held great potential to mislead the jury.
III. Denigration of the Defense
Regarding the denigration of the defense, I would not apply mere plain error review to assess the propriety of the latter of the government’s statements. In closing arguments, the defense made at least twelve objections to statements by the government. The court clearly sustained eight of those objections, expressly overruled two of the objections, and made general statements of instruction to the jurors as to the remaining objections. Even as to the latter of these rulings, the court appeared to acknowledge the impropriety in the government’s statements, saying, “The intent factors have in fact been found, I suggest you move on” and instructing the jury to disregard statements inconsistent with the instructions and to apply the law as provided by the court.18 In addition, statements from the government at sidebar suggested that the court had admonished the attorneys prior to closing arguments, telling them to keep objections to a minimum. The government’s closing argument and rebuttal filled only about fifty-three pages, include several lengthy on-record sidebar discussions. In this context, I would hold that the defense more than adequately preserved its objections to the government’s statements as related to each issue raised herein, even if the defense failed to object as to every individual statement that it referenced in the motion for a new trial.
As quoted above, the government described the defense as trying to “sell” something to the jury. The government also referred to the “nature of the case in mitigation” as being “put it up, hope it sticks,” and referred specifically to an expert’s opinion as “utter nonsense in a court of law.” Finally, the government disparaged defense counsel’s integrity with reference to a particular argument, stating, “Why mention it then? Just another cloud to blast up into the air hoping that no one is going to notice.” As in United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir.2005), I would hold these statements to be improper because they “encourage the jury to *819focus on the conduct and role” of the defense team rather than the evidence, and because the inflammatory nature of the statements was designed to anger the jury through general denigration of the defense. Id. Such tactics improperly inject emotion into the deliberation process rather than aid the jury in its assessment of evidence. Further, reference generally to the “nature of the case in mitigation” suggests broader knowledge, experience and expertise by the government in such matters. Such an argument phrased in general term risks pulling the jury outside the facts of the case. It “carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
Again, I find it unnecessary to assess prejudice related to this error in isolation. Rather, I would view the impact of these improper statements in light of the several errors addressed herein.
IV. Golden Rule
Regarding the government’s claim to speak for the victim, I And more than an improper argument unsupported by evidence, ante at 38-40. I agree with the majority that “it is improper to ask jurors to put themselves in the place of the victim.” Roberts v. Delo, 205 F.3d 349, 351 (8th Cir.2000). I also agree with the majority’s statement that “a prosecutor’s brief claim to ‘speak for’ a victim is improper if, in the context of surrounding statements, the comment appeals excessively to jurors’ emotions.” Ante at 803. I depart with the majority, however, as to its view of the surrounding statements and the context as a whole in this case. The government’s surrounding statements directly solicited emotional response and appealed to jurors’ fears and prejudices. The context as a whole included all of the errors discussed herein, several designed to elicit emotional rather than deliberative consideration, and others to obfuscate the relevance and value of mitigating factors. I again find it unnecessary to assess this error in isolation; rather, I would take a broader view of the relevant context in assessing the extent to which such a statement appeals to jurors’ emotions, and I have difficulty discounting the impact of the government’s statements.
V. Nexus Requirement
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I would hold that the government improperly argued that there needed to be a nexus between mitigation evidence and the offense and that the instructions were insufficient to cure this error. This error resulted in a reasonable probability that one or more “jurors believed themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.” United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1000 (8th Cir.2000). Viewed cumulatively with the other errors, I would find prejudice sufficient to require the granting of the motion for a new penalty-phase trial.
Supreme Court precedent is clear: there is no nexus requirement between mitigating factors and the severity of the crime or the future dangerousness of the defendant, and it is reversible error to preclude the jury from considering a mitigating factor. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007) (“[SJentencing juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual, notwithstanding the severity of his crime or his potential to commit similar offenses in the future.”). That having been said, it is permissible for a prosecutor to argue to a jury that, in the jury’s weighing of factors, the jury may accord any given fac*820tor “little or no weight.” See United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 978 (8th Cir.2007) (“[A]s long as the jurors are not told to ignore or disregard mitigators, a prosecutor may argue, based on the circumstances of the case, that they are entitled to little or no weight.”); Paul, 217 F.3d at 1000 (“There is only a constitutional violation if there exists a reasonable likelihood that the jurors believed themselves precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.”).
Here, the government did more than merely tell the jury that it could elect to give mitigating factors little or no weight. The government, over strenuous objections from defense counsel and through a contentious instruction-selection process, obtained permission to argue the concept of mitigating factors as involving three distinct questions: (1) has the defendant proven the factor; (2) does the factor, in fact, mitigate in the present case, i.e., is it relevant in this case; and (3) what weight should the jurors give the factor. This framework, in the abstract, is unobjectionable, and the district court properly determined prior to the selection phase that the government could argue to the jury that any given factor was not relevant “in this case.”
The error arises because, against the backdrop of this framework, the government did not merely tell the jury that it could find factors not relevant or accord them little or no weight. Rather, the government gave the jury its own definition of relevancy in terms of a nexus between the factor and the severity of the offense or the defendant’s ability to formulate the necessary mens rea. In addition, the government went even further, obfuscating the court’s instructions by telling the jurors expressly that the court was not going to define relevancy. Simply put, it would have been permissible for the government to inform jurors that they need not find factors relevant, but the government in this case incorrectly defined relevancy for the jury and mischaracterized the instructions as failing to define relevancy.
To properly analyze arguments regarding the introduction of a nexus requirement, it is necessary to discuss the government’s statements, as set out in detail below. It is also necessary to consider the court’s response to objections concerning those statements, the relevant jury instructions, and the resultant effect that the instructions, the government’s statements, and the court’s curative actions, together, would have had on the jurors’ understanding of how they were to assess mitigating evidence.
The government stated in its selection-phase opening statement that “the issue of punishment for the defendant is not an issue of how it affects his family, not under the law.” The defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection, calling the statement argument and telling the jury that he had instructed them as to what mitigating factors are alleged and directing the jury to take counsel’s argument “in light of the instructions.” A defendant’s possible value to other human beings and the impact of the defendant’s execution on the defendant’s family members are without question valid mitigating factors. The jury should have been so instructed in light of the government’s improper statement. Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45, 125 S.Ct. 400, 160 L.Ed.2d 303 (2004) (vacating a death sentence where a jury was not permitted to fully consider mitigation evidence and stating, “Because petitioner’s proffered evidence was relevant, the Eighth Amendment required the trial court to empower the jury with a vehicle capable of giving effect to that evidence.”).
Later the government stated that the defendant had
the burden of proof ... the burden of relevance when it comes to these pro*821posed mitigators.... Also, the information has to be shown that the information mitigates in this case. Whether proven or not, does it mitigate, tend to lessen the severity in this case? A Defense proposal for mitigation or mitigation that you find is only qualified to go on the decision scale if you answer yes for both of those mitigation questions, and then there’s a third issue, what weight do you want to give it? If either of those first two is not proven, either factually or that it mitigates, then you don’t have to give further consideration to that proposed factor.
(Emphasis added). The government continued in its argument, the defendant objected, and the court correctly sustained the objection. As discussed below, I believe more corrective action was required because I find it impossible to interpret this statement as anything but a nexus requirement as prohibited by Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246, 127 S.Ct. 1654.
Soon thereafter, the following exchange took place in front of the jury:
Government: With regard to the test for what is and is not a mitigating factor, it is on this second determination, the matter of does it mitigate in this case, that the defendant’s mitigating factors fail most obviously right down the line. The decision on what is mitigation in this case is up to you, ladies and gentlemen. And tuhile the court will not tell you how to determine what is or is not mitigating in this case, the United States further submits that this can and should be one of your tests for what is mitigating. Does the factor explain what the defendant did to Dm Sjodin or reduce the defendant’s responsibility?
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I’m going to object. First part of that is incorrect.
Court: Once again, I will remind the jury that I have instructed you on the law that applies to this case. If there is any statement made by any party that is inconsistent with the statements that I have' given, you should disregard them and apply the law as I have given it to you.
(Emphasis added).
This exchange prompted a lengthy sidebar discussion during which defense counsel stated, “The court has to do more, frankly, than just saying, frankly, you’ve heard what I said. That isn’t correct, and that objection should have been sustained. I’m sorry. You can’t argue things that are not the law.” At the end of the lengthy sidebar discussion, the court ultimately sustained the objection, albeit outside of the presence of the jury. Again, it was correct to sustain the objection, but in this instance, the jury did not hear that the court sustained the objection. And again, I believe more curative action was needed.19
Later, notwithstanding the court’s comments during the sidebar, the government *822again argued that the jury had to find a nexus requirement, urging the jury not to find factors mitigating if they did not bear upon the offense. In reference to a series of factors that the defendant had alleged as mitigating factors, the government stated:
Perhaps these factors would mitigate the defendant getting into a fistfight with one of the people who wronged him long ago, but what could it have to do with a 22-year-old girl the defendant spotted in a mall, lusted after, kidnapped, assaulted and raped, and finally killed on November 22nd, 2003?
Finally, extending the theme that mitigating factors had to have some nexus to the crime, the defendant’s mens rea for the crime, or his ability to control his criminal urges, the prosecutor stated:
If you decide that some of the proposed factors are proven factually, they do not mitigate we argue to you in this case because they do not influence the defendant’s ability to choose, and therefore, choose differently. You get to choose if they mitigate.
(Emphasis added).
Regarding objections and curative actions, the defendant did not object after every one of the government’s statements quoted above. The defendant did, however, object to the government’s pursuit of this argument prior to the sentencing phase, after several government statements, and during the lengthy sidebar. In the context of the closing argument in this case, then, I would hold that the defendant more than adequately preserved and articulated his objection to the government’s attempt to impose a nexus requirement. As such, I consider it appropriate to consider all of the statements quoted above in assessing prejudice.
As noted, the district court’s repeated curative action following the defendant’s objections was an oral admonition telling the jury to disregard any statements contrary to the jury instructions. I view the instructions, while correct statements of law, as not sufficient to negate the government’s articulation of a nexus requirement. The final instruction regarding the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors required the jury to make findings as to whether mitigating factors had been proven and weigh any such mitigating factors to make a determination as to “whether or not the circumstances in this case justify a sentence of death.” See Sentence Selection Phase Final Instruction No. 4. This final instruction expressly referenced a preliminary instruction that provided, “A mitigating factor is any aspect of a defendant’s character or background, any circumstance of the offense in question, or any other relevant fact or circumstances that might indicate that the defendant should receive a sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole instead of a death sentence.” See Sentence Selection Phase Preliminary Instruction No. 2.20 In the absence of prosecutorial *823misstatements, then, the instructions properly provided a broad definition for mitigating factor.
The instructions, while sufficient in the abstract, were not sufficiently clear to aid the jury in properly rejecting a nexus requirement. The standard set forth by the Supreme Court requires relief if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could not consider a mitigator. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998) (“Our consistent concern has been that restrictions on the jury’s sentencing determination not preclude the jury from being able to give effect to mitigating evidence.... [T]he standard for determining whether jury instructions satisfy these principles [is] whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” (internal citation omitted)). I find in the present case more than “a reasonable likelihood” that the government’s statements effectively eliminated from the jury’s consideration those mitigators that did not satisfy an improper-nexus requirement as to the severity of the offense or the defendant’s ability to form the necessary mens rea. In effect, the government set up an artificial barrier limiting what the jury could consider to be relevant mitigation evidence, and at no time was the jury told that the government’s statements were incorrect statements of law.
VI. Cumulative Prejudice
Unlike a habeas case or other collateral attack where a defendant must use ineffective-assistance claims as gateway arguments to get claims before the federal court, this is a direct appeal. As such, we may consider the cumulative impact of the government’s statements, and there is no requirement that we consider each error or government misstatement separately when assessing impact on the jury. Compare Middleton v. Roper, 455 F.3d 838, 851 (8th Cir.2006) (“We repeatedly have recognized a habeas petitioner cannot build a showing of prejudice on a series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the prejudice test.” (internal quotation omitted)) with Holmes, 413 F.3d at 774-75 (8th Cir.2005) (remanding for a new trial based on cumulative error).
Here the nexus-requirement error, and to an extent the mischaracterization of the possible penalty for a non-fatal kidnapping, are qualitatively different than the Golden Rule and denigration errors. The former two may prejudice the defendant through obfuscation of the legal standards whereas the latter may prejudice the defendant by inflaming the jury. Still, I believe cumulative effect is apparent. As already noted, relief is warranted if there is a reasonable probability that one or more jurors believed themselves “precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence.” Paul, 217 F.3d at 1000. The nexus-requirement error, standing alone, provides the defendant with a strong argument for relief in this ease. To reject the defendant’s claims of prejudice as to this issue, it would be necessary to presume the application of a level of skill and analysis not typically demanded of jurors and not appropriate in the context a capital trial. When viewed in light of the inflammatory statements designed to steer the jurors away from reasoned deliberation and towards emotional reaction, and when viewed against the claims of duty and the statement that a life sentence would punish only the kidnapping and make the murder “a freebie,” I view the proper rejection of a nexus requirement to be a difficult, confusing, and likely unattainable task for jurors untrained in legal analysis. As such, I am firmly convinced of the reasonable probability that one or more jurors failed to appreciate the full spectrum of available *824mitigating factors and the full spectrum of discretion that they were entitled to exercise.
I would vacate the death sentence and remand for further proceedings.

. Twelve objections was the total number of objections, not merely objections directed at denigrating statements. Also, at least one of these overruled objections arguably should have been sustained. The government stated, "The issue of punishment for the defendant is not an issue of how it affects his family, not under the law.” Along with the other nexus-requirement arguments that the government asserted, as discussed below, I would interpret this statement to be a claim by the government that jurors were not to consider impact on the defendant’s family members as a mitigating factor.

. During the sidebar, the court provided a clear articulation of the error in the government’s argument and made a statement that, if made to the jury, would have gone a long way towards mitigating the impact of the government's error. Outside the presence of the jury the court stated:
As I read what was actually said, it does appear to me that the government has indicated that the appropriate test ought to be whether or not something explains or in some manner or fashion — I can't remember the exact word — the crime. It strikes me one of the problems is not all mitigating factors actually go — the mitigation may not lie in explaining the crime itself. I mean, some mitigation goes to explain the nature of the defendant's character. And if you look at what the statute provides for is that if they were to take this to some sort of a legal test and apply it to every one of the mitigators, it wouldn’t be appropriate. All right? And I think that's clear. Now I’ve told the jury what I believe they ought to *822do. I think you should leave this argument. I believe that as it lays in that it’s right on the edge and their are problems with [it].
(Emphasis added).

. I suggest a better instruction would inform the jury expressly that no nexus is required, i.e., that aspects of the defendant's character or background or any other relevant fact or circumstance need not be related in any manner to the crime. That having been said, this preliminary instruction, again, is consistent with the model instruction on this point and does not contain language affirmatively suggesting the presence of a nexus requirement. See Eighth Circuit Model Death Penalty Instruction No. 12.09. And the question before the court is not the sufficiency of the instruction in the articulation of the law, but the sufficiency of the instruction, standing alone, to serve as the sole curative statement against the government's repeated misstatements of the law.