Court Opinion

ID: 9452337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:37:36.567037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:10.475543
License: Public Domain

KILEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I think the record shows Zurita did not have a fair trial.
It is my view that Zurita was entitled to have the sketch made by the agent from the relatively fresh impressions of the identifying witnesses produced as a “written statement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e) (1) (1964).
There is a growing, and apparently beneficial, use of sketches drawn of suspects in criminal investigations by artistic government agents from the statements of witnesses. Contemporaneously there is the growing concern of courts for a dispassionate search for truth in protection of the right to a fair trial of defendants in criminal cases, which overrides a rigid adherence to the adversary method of developing the truth. This concern, shown in the concurring opinion in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 360, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959), and later Supreme Court cases, points to the necessity of producing the sketches for cross-examination purposes where witnesses have adopted the sketch as an accurate portrayal of the defendant. The choice of recording an interview visually rather than verbally does not reduce the reliability of that interview for impeachment purposes, where the witness has adopted the sketch and subsequently identifies the suspect at the trial. These considerations, in my opinion, direct a reasonably broad construction of section 3500(e) (1), so as not to preclude production of the sketch in this case. These facts and the novelty of the question presented make the majority decision an important, cf. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 349, 79 S.Ct. 1217, and I think erroneous precedent in the area of criminal procedure.
*479The question whether the drawing is a “written statement” under section 3500(e) (1) is one of the “gaps to be filled” by judicial construction. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 349, 79 S.Ct. 1217. In Palermo the Court discussed section 3500(e) (1) briefly:
Since the statutory procedures are exclusive they constitute the rule of law governing the production of the statement at issue in this case and it becomes necessary to determine the scope and meaning of the statutory definition of “statement” contained in (e). Clause (1) of (e) permits the production of “a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him. * * Although some situations may arise, creating peripheral problems of construction, its import is clear. Id. at 351, 79 S.Ct. at 1224.
The rest of the Palermo opinion dealing with subsection (e), including the portion quoted by the majority in this case, was devoted to clause (2), which deals with substantially verbatim reproductions of the statements of witnesses and does not require a signature or adoption by the person interviewed.
In Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 1356, 10 L.Ed.2d 501 (1963) (Campbell II), the trial court had found that a government agent had orally repeated the substance of the witness’s story from memory and notes he had taken only to refresh his recollection. He later transcribed the notes into an “Interview Report” and then destroyed the notes. The Supreme Court held that the trial court’s finding of adoption was not clearly erroneous and that the Interview Report, as a copy of the notes, was producible under subsection (e) (1), because the adoption of the oral presentation constituted “adoption of a written statement made by him, namely the notes.” Id. at 492, 83 S.Ct. at 1360. The Supreme Court specifically refused to consider the producibility of the Report under (e) (2), which, it should be noted, requires that the recording of a statement be “substantially verbatim.” The Court said “it is settled, of course, that a written statement, to be producible under § 3500(e) (1), need not be * * * a substantially verbatim recording of a prior oral statement.” Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 492, n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 1356, 1360 (1963) (Campbell II); see United States v. McCarthy, 301 F.2d 796 (3d Cir. 1962).
It is my view that this decision cannot rest on Palermo because the substantially verbatim requirement of subsection (e) (2) involved there does not apply to production sought under (e) (1) as in this case. Although not overruling Palermo’s strict construction of (e) (2), later decisions of the Supreme Court have interpreted (e) (1) in the light of the broad purpose of section 3500, i. e.r “the fair and just administration of criminal justice, a goal of which the judiciary is the special guardian.” Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92, 81 S.Ct. 421, 425, 5 L.Ed.2d 428 (1961) (Campbell I). In Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312, 81 S.Ct. 645, 5 L.Ed.2d 574 (1961), the Court quoted with approval the Senate Report on the then pending bill which recognized the constitutional implications of any limitation upon a defendant’s access to authenticated statements directly bearing upon the testimony of a government witness. Id. at 315, 81 S.Ct. 645. See also Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. at 360, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (concurring opinion).
The considerations which prompted the Palermo Court to construe the “substantially verbatim” requirement of subsection (e) (2) strictly are not relevant, to (e) (1). In so far as section 3500 maybe considered a limitation of the decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103 (1957), the rationale for the statute was that a defendant should not, in the interests of national security and the orderly enforcement of law, have the right to inspect all government files in his case. See S.Rep, No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) in 1957 — 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News,, *480p. 1861. This rationale is not relevant to Zurita’s request for production under subsection (e) (1) because production of the sketch would not have interfered with the government’s case or required the disclosure of confidential information. There is, on the other hand, the probability that he was, with respect to his constitutional right of cross-examination and confrontation, unduly restricted by the too-rigid construction of (e) (1).
The prejudice inherent in such strict construction is illustrated here, where the government witnesses were interviewed in 1961, shortly after the robbery, and gave the statements from which the composite picture was drawn. It was not until 1965, the time of the trial, that there was any face-to-face confrontation and eyewitness identification. The only other identification of Zurita was made by one of the codefendants.
Ahlstedt v. United States, 325 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1963), relied upon by the majority, does not stand in the way of my view of the question. The holding there was that the motion for production of all the photographs used by any government agency in the investigation— none of which was identified by the witnesses and some of which had already been voluntarily produced by government counsel — was neither timely nor appropriate. This was a “fishing expedition” and granting the motion would clearly have contravened the express statutory purpose of section 3500. S.Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) in 1957 — 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 1861, 1863.
The district court here refused to order production of the sketch because it was not a written statement. The court therefore did not determine whether the witnesses had adopted the sketch as representing their impressions truthfully. The evidence showed they did adopt the sketch. The artistic agent did not testify and there is no denial of the testimony of the identifying witnesses that the sketch looked very much like Zurita, substantially what the “robber looked like,” although the testimony was somewhat hedged the next day. It is clear to me that the sketch was an important instrument of cross-examination and failure to require its production was prejudicial error.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.