Court Opinion

ID: 9649773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:09:11.661449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:14.896150
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(dissenting). On this appeal from the board of tax review, the trial referee had “power to grant such relief as to justice and equity appertains, upon such terms and in such manner and form as appear equitable.” General Statutes § 12-118. In my view, “justice and equity” have not been done in this case where the trial referee’s valuation of the plaintiff’s land and buildings on September 1, 1970, was only 36 percent of the sale price received by the plaintiff for that same realty on October 29, 1970.
The posture of the pleadings is important. The plaintiff’s appeal asserted that the town’s valuation of the subject buildings was too high, but it did not attack the validity of the valuation placed on the land. The town agreed in its answer that the valuation of the buildings was too high but asked the trial referee to do “justice and equity” under § 12-118 by increasing the valuation of the land so that the total valuation of the real estate remained the same. Thus, the ultimate issue before the trial referee was whether the defendant’s overall valuation of the plaintiff’s land and buildings at $300,610 was greater than their “present true and actual valuation” for the years 1967 through 1970. See General Statutes § 12-64.
“The expressions ‘actual valuation,’ ‘actual value,’ ‘market value,’ ‘market price’ and . . . ‘fair value’ *138are synonymous.” Sibley v. Middlefield, 143 Conn. 100, 106, 120 A.2d 77. -The “present true and actual value” of property is not its value at a forced auction or sale but is “to be the fair market value thereof.” General Statutes § 12-63. “A generally accepted definition of market value is ‘the price that would in all probability—the probability being based upon the evidence in the case—result from fair negotiations, where the seller is willing to sell and the buyer desires to buy.’ . . . [citations omitted]” Portland Silk Co. v. Middletown, 125 Conn. 172, 174, 4 A.2d 422; Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Stratford, 139 Conn. 388, 397, 94 A.2d 1. The process of valuation is at best one of approximation; National Folding Box Co. v. New Haven, 146 Conn. 578, 586, 153 A.2d 420; and, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the sale price of land is not the exclusive method of determining actual or fair value. Yet, it has been repeatedly stated that the best test for determining value is ordinarily that of market sales. See, e.g., Hutensky v. Avon, 163 Conn. 433, 437, 311 A.2d 92; Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review, 162 Conn. 77, 87, 291 A.2d 715; Burritt Mutual Savings Bank v. New Britain, 146 Conn. 669, 674, 154 A.2d 608; National Folding Box Co. v. New Haven, supra, 584; Sibley v. Middlefield, supra.
The evidence presented by the town’s assessor was that the plaintiff’s land and buildings were sold on October 29, 1970, for $630,000. That sale price was calculated from the real estate conveyance tax which was paid upon recordation of the deed. See General Statutes § 12-494. The majority opinion states that the “circumstances” relating to that sale were not received into evidence, implying that the sale price was not necessarily a valid measure of *139what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the land and buildings. That sale price, however, was based on the conveyance tax paid, which, by statute, is not to be “greater than the amount necessary to reflect the actual value of the property or interest conveyed.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 12-501. There should, therefore, be a presumption that the sale price calculated on the basis of the conveyance tax is equal to or less than the actual or fair value of the real estate. The plaintiff, as seller, is in possession of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale and it is he who should be required to rebut the presumption created by § 12-501 of the General Statutes. The lack of evidence regarding the “circumstances” surrounding the sale should not be used to justify the enormous discrepancy between the $630,000 sale price of the property and the trial referee’s conclusion that the fair value of that same property was only $229,000.
It is true that the isolated sale price of property, indeed a sale of the same property, may not be a valid measure of its fair value. And, it has been held that the actual or fair value of property may be far greater than a recent sale price of that property. See Thaw v. Fairfield, 132 Conn. 173, 180, 43 A.2d 65. That is not inconsistent, however, with the mandate of § 12-501 of the General Statutes that the sale price reflected by the conveyance tax must not be greater than the actual value of the property or interest conveyed.
In any event, the defendant was not claiming that the valuation of the plaintiff’s land and buildings should be increased to reflect the $630,000 sale price. Bather, the pleadings requested only that the trial *140referee determine that the city’s overall valuation of land and buildings at $300,610 for the years 1967 through 1970 was not excessive. Under the facts of this case, that is what should have been done.
I would find error, set aside the judgment and remand the case with direction to increase the valuation of the land for the years 1967 through 1970 so that the total valuation of the plaintiff’s land and buildings for each of those years is equal to the defendant’s overall valuation of $300,610.