Court Opinion

ID: 9530189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:02.256522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:01.215863
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
with whom Rose, J., agrees,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent. I conclude that the Nevada Board of Pardons Commissioners (Board) did not have jurisdiction to rescind the commutation of a sentence. Once the Board issued an order with an effective date, Kelch had a protected liberty interest in release and the Board lost jurisdiction to rescind the commutation.
*836The majority concedes that Kelch’s protected liberty interest vested on the effective date of the order. Once a liberty interest vests, the Board may only rescind the order of release in very limited circumstances.
[T]he parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole. The first step in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the parolee did violate the conditions does the second question arise: should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972). I submit that in this case the Board was divested of jurisdiction to rescind Kelch’s commuted sentence where he did not violate the conditions of release. Absent a violation, the Board lacked jurisdiction to recommit Kelch.
The Board may not revoke a release simply because additional information comes to light after the grant of commutation. Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 824 F.2d 937, 946 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1987). If this were not so, Kelch would conceivably be subject to revocation of his release indefinitely, through no fault of his own.
The majority contends that Kelch’s interest was protected by adequate procedural due process. Affording him the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner did not cure the fact that the Board did not have indefinite jurisdiction absent a violation of release conditions; the wording of the order “effective this date” undermines the rationale of the majority.
The majority cites McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004 (Conn. 1988) as a case similar to Kelch’s, wherein the Connecticut Board of Pardons revoked the prisoner’s commutation after rehearing. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated, “[W]e hold that the board may revoke an absolute commutation, prior to actual release of the prisoner, if the factual basis upon which the commutation was granted proves to be erroneous, and the justification for granting the commutation is thereby abrogated.” Id. at 1006. McLaughlin can be distinguished from the case at hand; there is no assertion here that Kelch made misrepresentations to the Board. This is a case of additional information coming to light after the Board commuted his sentence, which is a very different situation.
This case illustrates why Supreme Court Justices should not sit on the Board of Pardons. We grant early release with one hand *837and snatch it away with the other. A conflict of interest is inherent when this court is asked to review its own decisions while sitting in another capacity.
For these reasons, I conclude that the Board lost jurisdiction to revoke the early release once the order became effective, absent a violation of conditions by the parolee or misrepresentation to the Board. To retain jurisdiction violates the parolee’s substantive due process rights. I cannot join the majority in finding that the Board retained the right to revoke release indefinitely upon discovery of additional information.