Court Opinion

ID: 9825469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:05:30.029364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:51.491888
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
It is insisted by appellant on rehearing that this court in affirming the decision of the lower court overlooked, or ignored, the rule as to the proof of the measure of damages. It is insisted that the plaintiff failed to meet the measure of proof necessary to sustain the verdict in favor of the plaintiff. To sustain this contention we are cited numerous authorities to support the contention that “the. measure of damages of one whose auto truck is damaged by a street railroad is the difference between the market value of the car and its contents immediately before and immediately after injury.” Mobile Light & R. Co. v. R. O. Harris Grocery Co., 17 Ala.App. 354, 84 So. 867.
This is the general rule adhered to in this State in many decisions, and it is recognized that the proper way of proving the damage to personal property is, first, to prove the value of the property immediately before, and, second, the value of the property immediately after an accident. But this is no Procrustean rule. The purpose of such proof is to ascertain the true damage to plaintiff’s property. And, when this fact can be ascertained from the evidence, a failure to make the proof, as above indicated, will not be reversible error. This principle is recognized in Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Gadik, 211 Ala. 582-585, 100 So. 837, where the Supreme Court, speaking through Bouldin, Judge, said [page 839] :
“In fixing the measure of damages it is the aim of the law to reimburse the actual loss. This loss is usually ascertained by finding the difference between the reasonable market value immediately before and immediately after the injury. This is generally declared to be the true measure of damages. Direct proof of values depends generally on opinion evidence. These opinions often differ widely, especially in case of injury to valuable machinery like an automobile. The uncertainty as to whether repairs will restore it to its original condition must often enter into the estimate of loss of value.
“When the injury may be fully repaired, the reasonable cost of repairs is the proper subject of inquiry. * * * No hard and fast rules should be imposed upon the trial court in the admission of evidence touching the elements upon which a fair judgment of the loss in market value may be ascertained.”
So it will be seen that our Supreme Court has somewhat relaxed the rigid rule as to proof of damages to personal property, and has based its decisions more in line with the decisions of other courts.
*339In the instant case John Lee Hayes, having been qualified as an expert mechanic, testified:
“Several months ago I was called to go to Mary Bythwood’s where I found her car parked in the back yard at Avenue F. and Ninth Street, to inspect her car to see what damage had been done to it. I estimated the damage at $90.00.
“The rear end of the car was damaged. The left rear frame was bent. Back panel was mashed in. Rear left fender was bent, and left rear tire was bursted.”
This testimony was admitted without objection and without denial on the part of the defendant. If this method of proof of damage to plaintiff’s car had been objected to, a different question might have arisen. However, the estimate of damages to personal property, whether proven in the accepted way, or as was done in this case, is a matter of opinion; the value of which is dependent upon the experience of the witnesses testifying.
The better rule, supported by numerous authorities, is that “where there is more than one method of estimating damages, that method which is most definite and certain must be adopted.” 17 C.J. 846.
Appellant’s counsel also insists that this court was in error in holding that “where refused charges stated correct propositions of law, the same principles had been given by the court in its oral charge or in written charges given at the request of the defendant.” And our attention is directed to that class of charges assuming that there were facts from which the jury could infer that the accident was “a pure accidental occurrence.” As was pointed out in the original opinion: “There can be no doubt, from the evidence in this case, that the damage to plaintiff’s car was the proximate result of a collision between defendant’s car and the Ford Truck without such intervening cause as would preclude recovery.” We now hold that the damage to plaintiff’s car was the result of negligence, either on the part of the automobile or the truck which were in collision and those charges requested by the defendant assuming unavoidable accident were abstract.
The opinion is extended.
The application for rehearing is overruled.
Application overruled.