Court Opinion

ID: 9899736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:10:28.699606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.765507
License: Public Domain

J-A17024-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 MARY DILORETO, INDIVIDUALLY         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE      :        PENNSYLVANIA
 OF RICHARD DILORETO AND CINDY       :
 RAUENZAHN, EXECUTRIX OF THE         :
 ESTATE OF FAITH PLATT AND           :
 KATHLEEN BOYER AND MARYELLEN        :
 BYRNE, CO-EXECUTRIXES OF THE        :
 ESTATE OF THERESA M. HASSINGER      :
 AND PATRICIA MARSINI AND IRENE      :   No. 2395 EDA 2022
 KALMAN AND FRANCES LAY AND          :
 STEPHANIA MOORE, EXECUTRIX OF       :
 THE ESTATE OF ROSALIE ZUBYK         :
 AND JANET MICHELS, EXECUTRIX OF     :
 THE ESTATE OF SUSAN F.              :
 BRODERICK AND JOAN L. LORGUS,       :
 INDIVIDUALLY AND AS EXECUTRIX       :
 OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT A.          :
 LORGUS                              :
                                     :
                                     :
              v.                     :
                                     :
                                     :
 BARCLAY FRIENDS AND JOHNSON         :
 CONTROLS FIRE PROTECTION, LP        :
 F/K/A SIMPLEX GRINNELL, LP          :
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: BARCLAY FRIENDS          :

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 30, 2022
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                   Civil Division at No(s): 191101072
J-A17024-23

  CINDY RAUENZAHN, INDIVIDUALLY                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  AND AS THE EXECUTRIX OF THE                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
  ESTATE OF FAITH PLATT                          :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  BARCLAY FRIENDS, THE KENDAL                    :   No. 2797 EDA 2022
  CORPORATION, AND JOHNSON                       :
  CONTROLS FIRE PROTECTION, LP                   :
  F/K/A SIMPLEX GRINNELL, LP                     :

                Appeal from the Order Entered October 20, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                       Civil Division at No(s): 220302711

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2023

       Barclay Friends (“Barclay”) takes these consolidated appeals from the

orders overruling its preliminary objections and refusing to compel arbitration

in the above captioned cases.1 We reverse in part, vacate the orders, and

remand these matters to the trial court.

       Barclay operates a senior living complex in West Chester, Pennsylvania.

In 2017, a fire (“the fire”) destroyed Barclay’s personal care annex known as

the Woolman Building (“the Woolman”). Appellees are former residents, or

representatives of the estates of former residents, of the Woolman

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Barclay takes these appeals as of right from the interlocutory orders refusing

to enforce or compel arbitration. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(8); see also 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7320(a)(1), 7321.29(a)(1), 7342(a) (discussing rights to appeal
order denying motions to compel arbitration).

                                           -2-
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(collectively, “appellees”). Appellee Mary DiLoreto (“DiLoreto”), individually

and as executrix of the estate of Richard DiLoreto, is the lead plaintiff at docket

191101072       (“the    DiLorteo      action”).   Appellee   Cindy    Rauenzahn

(“Rauenzahn”), individually and as executrix of the estate of Faith Platt, is the

plaintiff at docket 220302711 (“the Rauenzahn action”).2

       Appellees allege that the fire started on the back patio of the Woolman,

spread up the Woolman’s vinyl siding, and engulfed the building. See e.g.

Complaint, 191101072, 11/8/19 (“the DiLoreto complaint”), ¶¶ 21-27. The

fire, they assert, started and spread due to Barclay’s failures to enforce its no-

smoking policy, maintain a proper flow of water to the Woolman’s sprinkler

systems, and ensure the Woolman’s fire suppression systems were in working

condition. See id. ¶ 32.3 They claim the former residents suffered injuries

caused by the fire, smoke inhalation, and their evacuation from the Woolman.

See id. ¶¶ 65-69, 71. Those injuries, they continue, contributed to the deaths

of some of the former residents. See id. ¶¶ 65-69.

       The DiLoreto complaint, filed in November 2019, asserted counts

against Barclay for negligence (count I), reckless and outrageous conduct

____________________________________________

2 The DiLoreto action originally included a total of eight plaintiffs, including
Faith Platt, a former resident of the Woolman who subsequently passed away.
Rauenzahn then filed a separate complaint in her own right and on behalf of
Faith Platt’s estate.

3In their joint brief, appellees assert that the fire started when a Barclay
employee threw an unextinguished cigarette into a trash can outside of the
Woolman. See Appellees’ Brief at 1.

                                           -3-
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(count III), wrongful death (count V), survival (count VI), damages specific to

former residents or their estates (counts VII through XIV), and damages to

property (count XV). DiLoreto sought compensatory damages and punitive

damages due to Barclay’s reckless indifference to the health and safety of the

former residents. See id. ¶¶ 47, 65-69.

       Barclay filed preliminary objections in August 2022, and, among other

issues, moved to compel arbitration. See Preliminary Objections (DiLoreto

action), 8/2/22, ¶¶ 22-23, 35. Barclay asserted all former residents in the

DiLoreto action signed an admission agreement (“the Agreement”),4 which

contained the following provisions:

       This AGREEMENT is made as of [date] between [the resident]
       (“you” or “your”), currently residing at [address] and Barclay
       Friends (“we” or “us” or “Barclay”), a Pennsylvania nonprofit
       corporation, located at 700 N. Franklin Street, West Chester, PA,
       which owns and operates a licensed personal care facility
       known as “Woolman.” We agree to provide Personal Care
       services to you and you agree to pay for those services
       pursuant to the terms of this Agreement. Admission to
       Woolman does not assure admission to any other level of care at
       Barclay nor does admission confer to you the rights of a tenant
       under Pennsylvania law. . . .

                                         ****

____________________________________________

4 Barclay attached to its preliminary objections copies of the admissions
agreements signed by the former residents, except two, which it could not
locate and presumed had been destroyed in the fire. It appears that the
former residents signed one of several different admissions agreements, one
designated as form number 2142270v8. As used in this decision, the
Agreement refers to the first copy of form number 2142270v8 in Exhibit B to
Barclay’s preliminary objections to the DiLoreto complaint. We have redacted
the name and other identifying information contained on that copy.

                                           -4-
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     2. Description of Services and Rates

     (a) Accommodation. We will make available Room # ___
     in Woolman, commencing on [date].

     (b) Services. The following basic services are included in
     the daily rate:

        (i) Room.

                                   ****

        (iv) Housekeeping, maintenance of Barclay              Friends’
        property, utilities (except personal phone).

                                   ****

     17. Damage to Property

           You will pay us, or the appropriate party, for the cost of
     repair, restoration or replacement of any damage done to our
     property or that of any other person’s property by you, your
     guests, agents, invitees or anyone who is visiting you for any
     purpose. Only we may make repairs to our property.

     18. Release

           You agree that we shall not be liable for any loss, injury or
     damage to you or your property, not caused by our negligence,
     including without limitation, any loss, damage or injury to you or
     your property caused by your negligence or the negligence of your
     family, other residents, guests or agents, and any damage from
     fire or other casualty.

                                   ****

     29. Successors

           All rights and liabilities herein given to or imposed upon the
     respective parties hereto shall extend to and be binding upon the
     several heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns of the
     parties to this Agreement.

                                   ****

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      33. Choice of Law

             This Agreement shall be deemed to have been made and
      shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of
      the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

      34. Arbitration of Disputes

            Any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to,
      this Agreement, or the breach thereof, will be settled by
      arbitration, which will be binding upon both parties.

                                   ****

      39. Binding Upon Resident’s Estate

            This Agreement may be enforced as a claim against your
      estate, whether or not you resided with us at the time of your
      death.

See Agreement, Preamble & ¶¶ 2, 17-18, 29, 33, 34, 39 (emphases added).

The Agreement further provided that the former residents understood the

Agreement and the Agreement contained all terms and conditions governing

the relationship between Barclay and the former resident. See id. ¶ 42.

      Barclay argued the DiLoreto complaint stated claims that fell within the

broad language of the agreement to arbitrate. See Memorandum of Law in

Support of Preliminary Objections (DiLoreto action), 8/2/22, at 2; see also

Agreement, ¶ 34. Barclay further claimed that by signing the Agreement, the

former residents bound their estates, heirs, legal representatives, successors,

                                     -6-
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and assigns. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Preliminary Objections

(DiLoreto action), 8/2/22, at 2; see also Agreement, ¶¶ 29, 39.

        DiLoreto responded the former residents had not agreed to arbitrate

claims related to the fire because the Agreement lacked any express terms

discussing fire or fire safety.   See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to

Preliminary Objections (DiLoreto action), 8/16/22, at 31-34. DiLoreto also

asserted it would violate public policy to enforce an agreement to arbitrate

where a defendant acted recklessly. See id. at 35. DiLoreto generally denied,

but did not specifically respond to or argue against, Barclay’s assertion the

former residents bound their estates and heirs to the terms of the Agreement.

See Response in Opposition to Preliminary Objections (DiLoreto action),

8/16/22, at 13.

        On August 30, 2022, the trial court, with the Honorable Jacqueline Allen

presiding, overruled Barclay’s preliminary objections and denied Barclay’s

request to compel arbitration in the DiLoreto action. The court held that the

DiLoreto complaint stated claims which did not fall within the scope of the

Agreement.      See Trial Court Opinion (DiLoreto action), 10/17/22, at 4.

Barclay timely appealed. Barclay and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Meanwhile, in March 2022, Rauenzahn filed a separate complaint (“the

Rauenzahn complaint”), which was substantially similar to the DiLoreto

complaint. Barclay filed preliminary objections, including a request to compel

                                      -7-
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arbitration based on the Agreement. Rauenzahn filed a response similar to

DiLoreto’s. On October 20, 2022, the trial court, with the Honorable Linda

Carpenter presiding, overruled the preliminary objection to compel arbitration

and held that Judge Allen’s August 30, 2022 order established the law of the

case.5 Barclay timely appealed. The trial court did not order a Rule 1925(b)

statement.     This Court consolidated Barclay’s appeals in the DiLoreto and

Rauenzahn actions.

       Barclay raises the following issue for review:

       Whether the trial court erred by overruling Barclay[’s] preliminary
       objections to [DiLoreto’s and Rauenzahn’s c]omplaints, where
       those preliminary objections sought to transfer the case to private
       arbitration pursuant to the contractual agreement executed by the
       parties requiring that any controversy or claim arising out of, or
       relating to, the agreement be resolved by binding arbitration?

Barclay’s Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).

       This Court’s review of an order denying a request to compel arbitration

“is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion in

denying the petition.” Carvell v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 294 A.3d

1221, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal citation omitted). This Court applies

a two-part test to determine whether a party is entitled to compel arbitration:

____________________________________________

5 See Heart Care Consultants, LLC v. Albataineh, 239 A.3d 126, 132 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (noting that pursuant to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which
this Court has described as an aspect of the law of the case doctrine, “a trial
court judge may generally not alter the resolution of a legal question
previously decided by another judge of the court”) (internal citation omitted).

                                           -8-
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(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; and (2) whether the claims

fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id.

      Here, the parties do not dispute the validity of the Agreement or the

arbitration provision.   Therefore, we focus on the trial court’s ruling that

appellees’ claims did not fall within the scope of the agreements signed by the

former residents.

      The scope of an arbitration agreement is a matter of contract, which

implicates questions of law. See id. This Court’s standard of review is de

novo, and the scope of our review is plenary. See id.

      The following principles govern the interpretation of an arbitration

clause:

      (1) arbitration agreements are to be strictly construed and not
      extended by implication; and (2) when parties have agreed to
      arbitrate in a clear and unmistakable manner, every reasonable
      effort should be made to favor the agreement unless it may be
      said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause involved is
      not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted
      dispute. . . . [C]ourts should apply the rules of contractual
      construction, adopting an interpretation that gives paramount
      importance to the intent of the parties and ascribes the most
      reasonable, probable, and natural conduct to the parties. In
      interpreting a contract, the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give
      effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the
      language of their written agreement.

Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 263 A.3d 8, 13 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(internal citation omitted). “Courts do not assume that a contract’s language

was chosen carelessly, nor do they assume that the parties were ignorant of

the meaning of the language they employed.        When a writing is clear and

                                     -9-
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unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone.”

Maisano v. Avery, 204 A.3d 515, 520 (Pa. Super. 2019).

       Barclay contends that it was entitled to compel arbitration of all claims

against it because paragraph 34 of the Agreement contained broad language

requiring arbitration of “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of, or relating

to” the Agreement.         See Barclay’s Brief at 19 (citing Agreement, ¶ 34)

(emphasis added). Barclay notes that courts have construed similar language

as requiring parties submit all grievances, whether sounding in tort or

contract, to arbitration. See id. at 19-20.6

       Barclay acknowledges neither the Agreement nor the arbitration clause

explicitly referred to causes of action related to its negligence and gross

negligence or to fire safety and fire suppression systems at the Woolman.

Barclay notes that a contract need not detail all types of possible occurrences

causing damages to a party.               See id. at 19.     The Agreement, Barclay

contends,     included    terms     for    its   provision   of   residential   services,

accommodations, and maintenance of its property. See id. at 17. Barclay

further asserts Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of the Agreement

and thereby incorporates Barclay’s duties as a licensed personal care home to

comply with Pennsylvania regulations requiring fire safety training. See id.

____________________________________________

6 Barclay also extensively argues that public policy favors arbitration. See
Barclay’s Brief at 13-16. However, the mere existence of an arbitration clause
and the policy favoring arbitration does not require a finding that all disputes
are subject to arbitration. See Adams v. Mt. Lebanon Operations, LLC,
276 A.3d 1203, 1206 (Pa. Super. 2022).

                                            - 10 -
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at 18-19 (citing Agreement, ¶ 33; 55 Pa. Code §§ 2600.01-2600.270).

Barclay adds that other provisions in the Agreement required residents to

release Barclay from responsibility for certain damages and pay for damages

to Barclay’s property.   See id. at 17-18 (citing Agreement, ¶¶ 17-1818).

Barclay concludes that it “defie[d] logic” for the trial court to assert “that

claims arising out of a fire at the property which [was] the subject of the

Agreement [did] not fall under the scope” of the Agreement and its arbitration

clause. Id. at 18.

      The trial court explained it overruled Barclay’s request to enforce the

Agreement’s arbitration clause because “the facts of this case [were] outside

the scope of the [Agreement].”        Trial Court Opinion (DiLoreto action),

10/17/22, at 4. The court reasoned:

              While there are various statutes, ordinances, and
      regulations that mandate [Barclay’s] compliance with health and
      safety requirements, the arbitration provision [was] limited to
      “[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to this . . .
      Agreement.” There [was] nothing in the . . . Agreement that
      require[d Barclay] to provide a safe, fire-free environment. There
      [was] nothing in the . . . Agreement that [Barclay would] supply
      water to the sprinkler system. There [was] nothing in the . . .
      Agreement that the sprinkler system [would] be in working
      condition. There is nothing in the . . . Agreement that [Barclay]
      [was] responsible for providing a means of safe egress in case of
      a fire.

Id. at 4.   The court emphasized the Agreement’s release of responsibility

clause applied only to injuries and damages from fires not caused by Barclay’s

negligence and the Agreement did not create a landlord-tenant relationship

                                     - 11 -
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between Barclay and a resident. See id. at 1-2 (citing Agreement, Preamble

& ¶¶ 17-18).

      Following our review, we are constrained to conclude the trial court

erred when interpreting the Agreement and the scope of the arbitration clause.

The trial court construed the Agreement as limited solely to the provision of a

room and accommodations for a fee, without any requirement that Barclay

provide a “safe, fire-free environment.”     See id. at 4.    The Agreement

affirmatively established that Barclay owned and operated a “licensed

personal care facility known as ‘Woolman.’” Agreement, Preamble (emphasis

added). The Agreement clearly stated that the former residents agreed to

pay for services, including a room and accommodations at the Woolman, a

licensed personal care facility.   See Agreement, Preamble & ¶ 2(a)-(b)

(describing “[s]ervices and [r]ates” as including accommodations by making

available a room in the Woolman by a certain date and defining “services” as

including the provision of a room).    The Agreement further provided that

Barclay was solely responsible for the maintenance of its property. See id.

¶¶ 2(b)(iv) (noting that Barclay’s “services and rates” included its

maintenance of its property), 17 (stating only Barclay could make repairs to

its property).

      Licensure, as argued by Barclay, required the Woolman to meet

numerous requirements intended to protect the health, safety, and well-being

of residents, including requirements related to fire safety and emergency

                                    - 12 -
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planning.    See 62 P.S. § 1001-1088 (governing licensing); 55 Pa. Code §§

2600.1 (stating general purpose of regulations governing personal care

homes), 2600.14 (related to fire safety approval), 2600.107 (related to

emergency preparedness), 2600.121-2600.133 (related to fire safety).7

Barclay could not expressly waive these regulatory requirements by contract

with a resident; nor could the trial court ignore these requirements simply

because the Agreement did not expressly refer to each and every regulatory

provision.   Cf. Liss & Marion, P.C. v. Recordex Acquisition Corp., 937

A.2d 503, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting “[t]he laws that are in force at the

time the parties enter into a contract are merged with the other obligations

that are specifically set forth in the agreement”) (citations omitted). Indeed,

no person can maintain, operate or conduct a personal care facility without

having a license issued from the Department of Human Services, see 61 P.S.

§ 1002, and in order to obtain and maintain a license for a personal care

facility in Pennsylvania, a facility must meet over two hundred substantive

regulations. Twenty-eight of those regulations govern a personal care home’s

physical site, see 55 Pa. Code §§ 2600.81 -2600.109, twelve regulations deal

with fire safety, see 55 Pa. Code §§ 2600.121-133, and there are two catch-

all provisions requiring fire safety approval, see 55 Pa. Code. §§ 2600.14, and

____________________________________________

7 The regulations also discuss use of tobacco pursuant to a facility’s policies.

See 55 Pa. Code § 2600.144.

                                          - 13 -
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compliance with “applicable Federal, State and local law, ordinances, and

regulations.” 55 Pa. Code. § 2600.18.

       Thus, the trial court’s limited interpretation of the Agreement failed to

give effect to the term “licensed” as stated in the Agreement.         We cannot

conclude that parties carelessly chose or simply ignored this term.           See

Maisano v. Avery, 204 A.3d at 520. Giving the term “licensed” its natural

and probable meaning, we conclude the essence of the bargain between

Barclay and the former residents was for the provision of a room and

accommodations subject to the extensive safety regulations governing

licensed personal care facilities in Pennsylvania.8 The trial court’s reasoning

____________________________________________

8 We note the trial court’s reasoning in this case mirrored this Court’s decision

in Setlock v. Pinebrook Pers. Care & Ret. Ctr., 56 A.3d 904 (Pa. Super.
2012). In Setlock, this Court affirmed the denial of a personal care facility’s
request to compel arbitration of claims related to the facility’s negligence when
transporting a resident to an offsite appointment in a wheelchair. See
Setlock, 56 A.3d at 906, 912. The Setlock Court reasoned the resident
agreement contained a broad arbitration clause, but the clause “only applie[d]
to causes of actions arising from issues governed” by the resident agreement.
Id. at 912. The Setlock Court continued, “Nowhere in said agreement is
there a clause governing the standard of medical care to be provided by [the
facility’s] employees.” Id. Setlock, however, must be read according to the
facts of that case. See Lance v. Wyeth, 85 A.3d 434, 453 (Pa. 2014) (stating
that “it is axiomatic that the holding of a judicial decision is to be read against
its facts”) (citation omitted). In Setlock, the plaintiff’s claims involved alleged
breaches of standards of medical care when providing ancillary transportation
services to a resident. By contrast, in the present case, appellees’ claims
related directly to Barclay’s provision of accommodations, room, and
maintenance called for under the Agreement and the crux of the Agreement
was the offer and acceptance of those services at the Woolman, a licensed
personal care facility. Therefore, Setlock is distinguishable and does not
support the trial court’s ruling.

                                          - 14 -
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ignored a critical term and its interpretation of the Agreement, which would

have required a list of every safety provision the parties reasonably expected

a licensed personal care facility to meet, cannot stand.

      Moreover, the arbitration clause in paragraph 34 of the Agreement

stated: “Any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement,

or the breach thereof, will be settled by arbitration, which will be binding upon

both parties.”   Agreement, ¶ 34.      Our courts construe broadly the “any

controversy or claim” language in an arbitration clause.      See Borough of

Ambridge Water Auth. v. Columbia, 328 A.2d 498, 501 (Pa. 1974)

(describing the “any controversy or claim” language as the “broadest

conceivable language” which evidenced the parties’ intent that the scope of

arbitration was “unlimited”); Smay v. E.R. Stuebner, Inc., 864 A.2d 1266,

1276 (Pa. Super. 2004) (concluding similar language “must be read broadly

to include all claims arising from the contract regardless of whether the claim

sounds in tort or contract”); accord Waters v. Express Container Servs.

of Pittsburgh, LLC, 284 A.3d 1217, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that

personal injury claims arising out of work the plaintiff performed under an

equipment lease and transportation agreement fell within the broad scope of

a clause requiring arbitration of a “controversy or claim” related to

“operations” under the agreement). The arbitration clause here contained no

limiting or restricting language.     Compare Waters, 284 A.3d at 1225

(discussing a broad arbitration clause), with Midomo Co., Inc. v.

                                     - 15 -
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Presbyterian Hous. Dev. Co., 739 A.2d 180, 187, 189 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(interpreting an arbitration clause expressly limited to certain situations). The

arbitration clause in paragraph 34 is “unlimited” as to the subject matter set

forth in the Agreement.

      In sum, the arbitration clause in paragraph 34 broadly applied to claims

arising out of or relating to the Agreement. Appellees’ claims against Barclay

for failing to enforce its no-smoking policy, maintain a proper flow of water to

the Woolman’s sprinkler systems, and ensure the Woolman’s fire suppression

systems were in working condition fell within the terms of the Agreement to

provide a room and accommodations pursuant to the applicable governmental

regulations required to be licensed. Accordingly, we conclude that appellees’

claims arose out of or related to Barclay’s duties under the Agreement, and

we reverse the trial courts’ orders to the extent they held that appellees’

claims did not fall within the scope of the Agreement and the Agreement’s

arbitration clause.

      Lastly, we note that the trial courts in the DiLoreto and Rauenzahn

actions did not address Barclay’s remaining preliminary objections to compel

arbitration or appellees’ responses thereto. Accordingly, we vacate the orders

to the extent they overruled all preliminary objections. We remand for further

proceedings to consider the remaining issues raised by the parties in their

preliminary objections and responses thereto, including whether enforcement

of the arbitration clause on claims of reckless conduct would violate public

                                     - 16 -
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policy and whether the former residents bound their estates to arbitrate all

damages sought.    The trial courts are free to consider any further legal

arguments necessary to render an appropriate decision on these outstanding

issues.

      Orders reversed in part and vacated.   Cases remanded.     Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 11/17/2023

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