Court Opinion

ID: 9531850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:15:22.592956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:36.088175
License: Public Domain

SHENK, J.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance but I dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that the accusatory statements were inadmissible. In the first place that question is not properly before the court on this appeal. It is conceded that on the trial defendant’s counsel made no objection to the admission of the statements in evidence and no motion to strike or limit its effect was made. It is the rule that unless objection to it is made at the trial such evidence is beyond attack on appeal and may be considered in support of the judgment. (People v. Lawrence, 143 Cal. 148 [76 P. 893, 68 L.R.A. 193]; People v. Peterson, 66 Cal.App.2d 240 [152 P.2d 347]; 2 Cal.Jur. § 82, p. 263; 8 Cal.Jur. § 516, p. 500; 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.) 909.)
Moreover, there was no error in the admission of the accusatory statements. Section 1870, subdivision 3', of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the admission in evidence of “An act or declaration of another, in the presence and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto.” It is the general rule in California, as elsewhere, that when a statement tending to incriminate one accused of committing a crime is made in his presence and hearing, and is not denied, contradicted, or objected to by him, both the statement and the fact of Ms failure to deny are admissible in a *724criminal prosecution against him, as indicative of a consciousness of guilt, or as evidence of his acquiescence in its truth. (People v. Yeager, 194 Cal. 452 [229 P. 40] ; People v. Lew Fat, 189 Cal. 242 [207 P. 881]; People v. Ong Mon Foo, 182 Cal. 697 [180 P. 690]; People v. Lapara, 181 Cal. 66 [183 P. 545] ; People v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531 [66 P. 794] ; People v. Teshara, 134 Cal. 542 [66 P. 798]; People v. McCrea, 32 Cal. 98; People v. Egan, 133 Cal.App. 152 [23 P.2d 1042]; People v. Bisbines, 132 Cal.App. 239 [22 P.2d 762]; 8 Cal.Jur. § 196, p. 101; 20 Am.Jur. §§ 570-577, pp. 483 et seq.; 4 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1069-1072, pp. 68 et seq.; 2 Whar•ton’s Crim. Evidence (11th ed. 1935) §§ 656-665, pp. 1089 et seq.; 115 A.L.R 1510 et seq.; 80 A.L.R. 1235 et seq.; Fricke on California Criminal Evidence, pp. 5 et seq.) Such a statement is accepted in evidence not as proof of the truth of the matters therein contained, but because it serves as a basis for the showing of the reaction of the accused to it. As has been commented, “The crystallization of the experience of men shows it to be contrary to their nature and habits to permit statements tending to connect them with actions for which they may suffer punishment to be made in their presence without objection or denial by them unless they are repressed by the fact that the statement is true. Consequently, silence under accusation is some evidence from which the jury may infer that the accused acquiesces in the statement and admits its truth. But silence or failure to deny, of itself, unaccompanied by the statement in the face of which the accused remained silent or which he failed to deny, cannot well be testified to so as to convey meaning. The witness might testify that an incriminating statement was made without stating what it consisted of, but such testimony would be objectionable as a mere conclusion. . . . An evasive answer or one unresponsive to the declaration is tantamount to absolute silence and, when not amounting to a denial or an express admission, renders admissible both the statement and the reply under the rule as to tacit admissions.” (2 Wharton’s Crim. Evidence (11th ed. 1935) §§ 656, 657, pp.1092-1093.)'
The California rule, which is in harmony with the general rule, is stated in the following language in People v. Yeager, supra, 194 Cal. at page 486: "The admission of such evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence of conduct is receivable if it tends to show a consciousness of guilt or intent. ... (8 Cal.Jur. see. 157, p. 42.) Such evidence is not *725admissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the accusatory statements, but rather as indicating a consciousness of guilt on the part of the accused by allowing an imputation opposed to the presumption of innocence to pass unchallenged. It is for the court in the first instance to determine whether the import of the statements is such that it would furnish a foundation for proof of conduct, and it is then for the jury to decide whether the accused was aware the statements were made, whether, under all the circumstances shown, they called for a disclaimer, whether the accused did reply to them, and whether if he did not do so, such failure showed criminal intent or a consciousness of guilt. If these propositions of fact are resolved in favor of the prosecution the item of conduct should be given the effect to which upon the entire case it is entitled. ’ ’
Here, had the defendant promptly denied the accusations, there would have been no reaction to show or admission to introduce, and the statements could not properly have been received in evidence. But the defendant’s remarks did not constitute a full and prompt denial. In response to one accusation he said, “I have told you all I am going to tell you. Somebody stole my car, and that is all I have to say. ’ ’ With respect to the Woods statement he commented in part, “Well, she told enough ... I have nothing more to say,” and in response to the Webb statement, he said in part, “It looks like he told, it all and about everybody. ’ ’
The equivocal remarks, such as, “Well, she told enough,” were stronger against defendant than if he had stood mute or said he had no reply to make. A comment such as, “I have nothing more to say, ’ ’ is not a denial of an accusation. (People v. Edwards, 72 Cal.App. 102, 123 [236 P. 944].) In People v. Egan, 77 Cal.App. 279, 282-3 [246 P. 337], where the defendant’s reply to an accusatory statement was that he “had nothing to say, ’ ’ it was held that the statement was properly received in evidence. The court said: ‘ ‘ The accusatory statement in the instant case was read to appellant in the presence of Wright, and appellant, being asked if he had anything to say, was fairly afforded an opportunity to make a reply. If, under, those conditions,- he made no reply to the accusatory statements, the circumstance of his silence was proper evidence to be considered by the jury as indicating an admission of guilt." (See, also, People v. Egan, 133 Cal.App. 152, 156, *726158 [23 P.2d 1042]; People v. Marineau, 55 Cal.App.2d 893, 905 [132 P.2d 22].)
It is argued that because the defendant was represented by the public defender the rule requiring timely objection in the trial court to the introduction of evidence should not be applied. The majority opinion does not meet this issue squarely, but states: “Assuming this to be so, none of the matters urged by present counsel appear to have prejudiced defendant. ’ ’
The assumption may not be indulged. The public defender is subject to the same rules as any other counsel, as is also his client; hence failure of the public defender to object to the questioned evidence when it was offered should foreclose the consideration of the point on appeal. The argument here made with respect to the status of the public defender was considered in the recent case of In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522, 528-529 [150 P.2d 448], and this court there said:
“. . . When the public defender is appointed to represent a defendant accused of a crime, he becomes the attorney for said defendant for all purposes of the case and to the same extent as if regularly retained and employed by the defendant. The judge of the trial court has no more authority or control of him than he has of any other attorney practicing before his court. The public defender is free from any restraint or domination by the district attorney or of the prosecuting authorities. He is as free to act in behalf of his client as if he had been regularly employed and retained by the defendant whom he represents. Were it not so his client would not be afforded the full right ‘to have assistance of counsel for his defense’ which the Constitutions, both state and federal, give to one accused of crime. With such plenary powers given a public defender when appointed to defend one accused of crime, it necessarily follows that no act of his in advising his client or in defending the latter upon the charge against him can be considered in any different light than if such act were performed by an attorney regularly employed and retained by the defendant. In no sense can it be held that the prosecuting officers of the county are in any respect charged with the consequences of such an act. The contention therefore that the petitioner is not bound by his pleas of guilty, on the ground that in so pleading he was misled by the advice of the public defender acting as his attorney, is not well taken. ’ ’
The record fails to show any error in the trial of the case.
Spence, J., concurred.