Court Opinion

ID: 9557679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:54:58.74008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:14.533729
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
I am forced to dissent in this case because the majority opinion upsets the holdings of this Court in replevin actions.
In the case at bar the evidence is uncon-tradicted that the defendant, if he ever had- possession of the pipe in question, dis*1098posed of it at least seven months before the commencement of this action.
Under 12 O.S.19S1 § 1571 et seq., replevin is an action to recover the possession of personal property wrongfully detained by another. The rule has long been extant in this State that replevin cannot be had against one who was not in the actual or constructive possession of the property in question at the time the action was commenced, unless the property was concealed or disposed of with the intention of avoiding the writ. Robb v. Dobrinski, 14 Okl. 563, 78 P. 101; Commercial Credit Co. v. Harjo, 178 Okl. 397, 63 P.2d 686; Bales v. Breedlove, 96 Okl. 280, 222 P. 542; General Finance Corp. v. Jackson, Okl., 296 P.2d 141.
In Bales v. Breedlove, supra, plaintiffs sought to replevy 70 head of cattle from defendant. The undisputed evidence was that at the time the replevin suit was filed only 29 head of cattle were in the possession of defendant, the remainder having been sold by defendant and shipped to mai'ket. Judgment was rendered on verdict for plaintiffs for the possession of the 29 head of cattle taken under the writ, and for $1,578.38, as the value of the remainder of the cattle which had been previously sold by defendant. In our opinion in that case we said:
“There is no evidence tending to show that the property was sold or disposed of by the defendant with the intent of avoiding the writ. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the defendant only the 29 head of cattle which were in the possession of the defendant at the time suit was commenced, and damages for the detention of the same, but were not entitled to recover in this action the value of the cattle which had previously been disposed of. * * *
“It is our opinion that the judgment should be reversed with directions to vacate that portion of the judgment awarding to the plaintiffs the sum of $1,578.38 for the value of the cattle not taken under the writ of replevin and to render judgment on the verdict of the jury for the cattle taken under the writ of replevin; and it [is] so ordered.” [96 Okl. 280, 222 P. 543.]
In Commercial Credit Co. v. Harjo, supra, plaintiff Harjo sought to replevy a certain automobile. The evidence indicated that on January 14, 1935, the automobile was in the possession of a motor company, as agent of defendant Commercial Credit Corp. Plaintiff commenced the action on January 19, 1935. The usual affidavit of replevin and bond were filed, and summons and order of replevin issued and served, but the car was not found or taken possession of. A representative of the motor company stated that the automobile had been sold and taken to Dallas on January 18th. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff for the value of the equity in the automobile. There we said:
“The only question to be determined in this case was whether the defendants were in possession of the car and whether they were wrongfully detaining the same, and whether plaintiff was entitled to possession of the car. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish those facts by preponderance of the evidence. If plaintiff fails to establish each of those propositions, then his case fails and the defendants are entitled to a judgment.” [178 Okl. 397, 63 P.2d 688.]
We also said further:
“The court is of the opinion that the plaintiff failed in his testimony to show that the defendants, or either of them, were in either actual or constructive possession of the car at the time this suit was filed, but that the entire evidence is to the contrary. The findings of the court are not sustained by any competent evidence showing the defendants were in possession of the car at the time this suit was filed.
“It is our opinion that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed *1099with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff in error.”
In General Finance Corp. v. Jackson, Okl., 296 P.2d 141, we affirmed the action of the trial court in sustaining demurrer to the evidence and entering judgment for defendant Jinks, where the undisputed evidence showed that he was not in possession of the property sought to be replevied at the time the action was commenced.
In Cobbery on Replevin, Second Edition, Section 61, the author says :
“To enable plaintiff to maintain an action for the recovery of specific personal property the defendant must be in possession thereof at the commencement of the action. Where the petition alleges that the defendant is in possession, and the proof shows the contrary, there is such a variance between the allegations and the proof as will defeat plaintiff’s recovery. A judgment for plaintiff cannot be rendered where it does not appear that defendant was in possession of the goods or claimed title thereto. * * * ”
And in Section 64, supra:
“Replevin will not lie against one who is not detaining the property when the writ is sued out. It is the condition of things when the suit is commenced which furnishes the ground for the action. Replevin is founded upon an unlawful detention, whether an unlawful taking has occurred or not. It is strictly a possessory action, and it lies only in behalf of one entitled to possession against one having, at the time the suit is begun, actual or constructive possession and control of the property. Replevin does not lie against one who is not unlawfully detaining the property at the time the affidavit for the writ is sworn to and the writ delivered to the officer. So held where the writ was sworn out and held until defendant could be caught in temporary possession. Replevin will not lie against one who, at the time the action was instituted, was neither in the actual nor constructive possession or control of the property, unless he has concealed, removed or disposed of the same for the purpose of avoiding the writ.”
I do not think we should adopt the rule set up in the majority opinion but if we do we should overrule our decisions in conflict therewith. Plaintiff’s relief here was one in damages and not replevin.
I dissent.