Court Opinion

ID: 9729051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:25:36.875043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:55.072456
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BILL VANCE, Justice.
Appellant Charlsie Northcutt Morrison appeals the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Appellees James Robinson and Charles Owen Robinson.
Background
Morrison and her sister-in-law, Barbara Evans, each owned an undivided one-half interest in 87.36 acres in Robertson County. They conveyed their interests in the surface estate to the Robinsons on July 9, 1998. The deed conveying the surface estate also contained separate mineral reservations for each of the grantors.
The deed was prepared by Morrison’s attorney. Prior to executing the deed, counsel for the Robinsons reviewed a draft and contacted the attorney about concerns with the language in the mineral reservations. However, he was assured that the *474language was consistent with the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract, and the parties executed the deed with this language. Thereafter, T-Bar-X Company leased the minerals under the 87.36 acres and a dispute arose between Morrison and the Robinsons as to what portion of the minerals each party owned.
On December 21, 2004, the Robinsons filed their original petition for declaratory judgment against Morrison, who answered and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment and to quiet title.1 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Robinsons and, on August 15, 2005, denied Morrison’s Motion for New Trial.
Morrison brings four issues on appeal. We will reverse on the first issue and need not address the other three.
Standard of Review
We review the decision to grant or deny a summary-judgment motion de novo. See Provident Life & Accident Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2003). The standards for reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment are well established. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). The mov-ant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex.1997); Ash v. Hack Branch Distributing Co., 54 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). The reviewing court must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and all doubts resolved in its favor. American Tobacco, 951 S.W.2d at 425; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413.
Deed Ambiguity
In her first issue, Morrison questions whether the deed is ambiguous. The question of ambiguity in a deed is a question of law. Cherokee Water Co. v. Freeman, 33 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (citing Reilly v. Rangers Mgmt., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 527, 529 (Tex.1987)). An instrument is not ambiguous if it can be given a definite or certain meaning as a matter of law. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.1983). However, if a deed is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996). An ambiguity creates a fact issue as to the parties’ intent. Id.
An ambiguity does not arise simply because the parties advance conflicting interpretations. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex.2000) (citing Columbia Gas, 940 S.W.2d at 589). For an ambiguity to exist, both interpretations must be reasonable. Id. Therefore, we must decide if there is more than one reasonable interpretation of Morrison’s mineral reservation in the deed.
At issue is. the following language:
SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is hereby reserved for Grantor, Charlsie Northcutt Morrison, and her heirs, administrators, successors or assigns, an undivided one-half (½) interest of the oil, gas and other minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by Charlsie Northcutt Morrison that are in and under the property and that may be produced from it[.]
Under the Robinsons’ interpretation, the express wording of the reservation operat*475ed to reserve unto Morrison an undivided one-quarter interest in the mineral estate. The reservation, as quoted above, states that Morrison reserved an undivided one-half of the minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by her. The words “now owned” are underlined in the deed. We find that it is reasonable to read the reservation with an emphasis on the words “now owned” and conclude that Morrison intended to convey one-half of her mineral interest (i.e. one-quarter of the total mineral interest).
Morrison argues, however, that her reservation must be harmonized with the Evans Reservation which contains the following language:
SAVE AND EXCEPT and there is hereby reserved for Grantor, Barbara Morrison Evans and her heirs, administrators, successors or assigns, for a period until June 11, 2000, an undivided one-half (½) interest of the oil and gas and other minerals produced with the oil and gas now owned by Barbara Morrison Evans, that are in and under the property and that may be produced from it[J
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On June 11, 2000, an undivided one-fourth (½) interest of the total mineral estate shall pass to and be owned by Grantees, their heirs and assigns. It is the intent of the Grantor Barbara Morrison Evans and the Grantee [sic ] James E. Robinson and Charles Owen Robinson, that as of June 11, 2000 that Barbara Morrison Evans, her heirs and assigns shall own an undivided one-fourth (¾) of the oil, gas and other minerals and James E. Robinson and Charles Owen Robinson and their heirs and assigns shall own an undivided one-fourth (½) of the total oil, gas and mineral estate.
Morrison claims that the meaning of the “now owned by” language in her reservation is revealed in the additional language. She argues that the last sentence of the Evans Reservation indicates that both reservations intended for the grantors to initially retain their undivided one-half interests in the minerals. She argues that because the language in the Evans Reservation makes clear that the parties intended for Evans to retain her undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate until June 11, 2000, the only reasonable construction for the language in the Morrison Reservation is that she would likewise retain her undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate.
Whether an instrument is ambiguous is a question of law that must be decided by examining it as a whole in light of the circumstances present when it was executed. See Enterprise Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex.2004). We must examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. See Forbau v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tex.1994). No single provision will control; rather, all provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument. Id.
Finding that the wording of the Morrison Reservation is substantially identical to the Evans Reservation, and considering the additional language, we find that both interpretations are reasonable. Because the deed is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous. This ambiguity creates a fact issue as to the parties’ intent and, therefore, summary judgment was not proper.
Conclusion
Having sustained Morrison’s first issue, we reverse the summary judgment and *476remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Chief Justice GRAY, Dissenting.

. Barbara Evans is not a party.