Court Opinion

ID: 9940964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:02:45.158786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:04.850606
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
           FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
             __________________

                              BAP No. MB 99-102

                        ___________________________

                       IN RE: CHRISTOPHER PILAVIS
                                   Debtor.
                         ___________________________

                          CHRISTOPHER PILAVIS,
                                Appellant,

                                       v.

                            RICHARD CAMPANA,
                                 Appellee.
                        ________________________

                Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                        for the District of Massachusetts
               (Hon. William C. Hillman, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge)
                       _____________________________

                                     Before

      VOTOLATO, GOODMAN, AND HAINES, U.S. Bankruptcy Judges

                       _____________________________

  Evan James Pilavis, on brief for Appellant.

  Frederic D. Grant, Jr., and Grant & Roddy on brief for Appellee.
                       _____________________________

                                March 31, 2000
                       _________________________
Per Curiam.

      The Debtor, Christopher Pilavis, (“Pilavis”) appeals from

the November 17, 1999 bankruptcy court order that overruled his
objection to the proof of claim filed by Richard Campana.

(“Campana”).   For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the

decision of the bankruptcy court.
                            BACKGROUND

      On June 15, 1995 the Middlesex Superior Court entered

judgment in favor of Campana and against Pilavis.       Appellant’s

Brief, Exhibit A.   On March 30, 1998, Pilavis filed a Chapter 7

petition.   On July 26, 1999, Campana filed a proof of claim

asserting an unsecured claim in the amount of $1,057,147.30.

Appellant’s Brief, Exhibit A.   Campana’s claim arose from the

final judgment of the Middlesex Superior Court, a copy of which

was attached to his proof of claim.       Pilavis objected to

Campana’s proof of claim and sought to have the bankruptcy court

determine that the state court “had no basis to impose M.G.L.A.

c223 sec 51 interest and/or 93A damages and attorney’s fees.”

Debtor’s Opposition to Campana’s Proof of Claim at 5, attached to

Appellant’s Brief as Exhibit B.       On November 17, 1999, the

bankruptcy court overruled Pilavis’s objection.       Pilavis filed
this appeal.

      Pilavis seeks review of “the findings, ruling and the order
of the Superior Court which is attached to [sic] Debtor’s Exhibit

E.”   Appellant’s Brief at 3.   Pilavis’s statement of the issues

identifies two specific issues on this appeal:

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          “Issue I. Where the judgment issued by the
          Superior Court against the Debtor is not supported
          by that Court’s Findings, Rulings and Orders as a
          matter of fact and law should the Bankruptcy Court
          look only to the findings, rulings and order to
          determine the damages to be assessed against the
          Debtor.” Appellant’s Brief at 3.

          “Issue II: Can Campana apply C.221 §51 interest on the
          judgment.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.

                         STANDARD OF REVIEW

     The bankruptcy’s court’s decision to overrule Pilavis’s

objection and give full faith and credit to the state court

judgment that supports Campana’s proof of claim is a conclusion

of law, and as such, it is reviewed de novo by this panel.       In re

Leicht, 222 B.R. 670, 671 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998).

                            JURISDICTION

     The bankruptcy appellate panel has jurisdiction of the

appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §158(b).

                            DISCUSSION

     Pilavis fully and completely litigated his defenses to

Campana’s claim in state court, all appeals related to the state

court judgment have terminated and the judgment has become final.

Appellee’s Brief at 2.   Pilavis does not deny that he litigated

his defenses to Campana’s claim in state court.     He now claims

that the state court ruled incorrectly.    He argues that this

panel should reverse the bankruptcy court; modify the state court

judgment by applying a rate of interest different than that

applied by the state court; strike the award of attorney’s fees

from the state court judgment; and reduce the state court

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judgment.    Appellant’s Brief at 6.   Pilavis appears to be asking

for the opportunity to re-litigate the state court judgment in

the bankruptcy court, and he appears to be asking the bankruptcy
court to exercise appellate review of the state court judgment.

     The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738, provides, in

relevant part, as follows:
     Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies
     thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full
     faith and credit in every court within the United
     States and its Territories and Possessions as they have
     by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
     or Possession from which they are taken.

The bankruptcy court is required to give a state court decision

the same preclusive effect the decision would be afforded in any

state court of the rendering state.    In the case In re Abijoe

Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 121, 126 (1st Cir. 1991), the First

Circuit noted that “[e]ven though the [debtor] has challenged the

allowability of the claim, there can be no doubt that a judgment,

in all respects regular on its face, cannot be considered

meritless on its face.    Indeed formidable obstacles confront any
challenge to the ‘full faith and credit’ of a state court

judgment.”    See also In re Singleton, 230 B.R. 533, 537 (B.A.P.

6th Cir. 1999).   We reject Pilavis’s unsupported argument that he

is entitled to relitigate the merits of his defenses to Campana’s

claim.

     We also reject Pilavis’s argument that he can seek appellate

review of the final judgment of the Middlesex Superior Court in

the bankruptcy court.    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a doctrine

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drawn from two Supreme Court cases, prevents a lower federal

court from reviewing a state court judgment.    Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); see also In re Audre,

Inc., 216 B.R. 19, 26 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997).   Contrary to

Pilavis’s arguments, the bankruptcy court cannot recalculate the

penalty interest or damages imposed by the state court; it cannot

reduce the award of attorney’s fees; and it cannot otherwise

modify the state court judgment.
                           CONCLUSION

     The bankruptcy court properly overruled Pilavis’s objection
to Campana’s proof of claim.   The bankruptcy court’s November 17,
1999 order is AFFIRMED.

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