Court Opinion

ID: 9735045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:58:42.877065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:54.792483
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Hoffman, P.J.
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion for the following reasons:
1. That no genuine issue as to any material fact exists.
2. An erroneous interpretation of Acts 1941, ch. 116, § 1, p. 328, Ind. Stat. Anno., § 2-627, Burns’ 1967 Replacement.
This appeal arises from a summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee.
The evidence presented upon which the summary judgment was entered included pleadings (complaint, answer, special answer and replies), plaintiff’s answer to interrogatories, defendant’s party examination, affidavit of defendant, a motion for summary judgment and a response thereto.
The plaintiff, in response, directs the court’s attention to certain statements made by defendant in his discovery deposition, answer of plaintiff in response to interrogatories, and certain statements in defendant’s affidavit. In so doing appellant is attacking the motion for summary judgment on two grounds 1) the unsoundness of mind of appellant, and 2) the showing that no doctor-patient relationship existed.
The first ground can present no question of fact because appellant admits that he was of unsound mind before, on and after May 7, 1958.
The second ground can present no question of fact because a doctor-patient relationship was not material to the application of the malpractice statute of limitations, § 2-627, supra. This Act makes no mention of such relationship. The application of the statute of limitations turns upon the un*627ambiguous phrase “based upon, professional services rendered.” A doctor-patient relationship is not required to bring the cause of action within a malpractice statute of limitations. Merchants National Bank v. Morriss, 269 F. 2d 363 (1st. Cir. 1959).
A physician may render professional services without the existence of a doctor-patient relationship. When a physician operates on the wrong person, he is rendering professional services, but no doctor-patient relationship is in existence.
No affidavits were filed by plaintiff in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. No facts were presented to the trial court to show that the defendant was not rendering professional services as a physician when the acts complained of were being performed. The only denial appears in the pleading.
Ind. Rules of Trial Procedure, TR 56(E), provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. Denial of summary judgment may be challenged by a motion to correct errors after a final judgment or order is entered.”
The record before us reveals that appellee was employed by Purdue University and his duties were “to see to such necessary hospitalization as the particular case, * * * for the protection of such student and all others with whom he had or might be expected to associate, appeared to require.” Fulfilling these duties defendant-appellee examined plaintiff-appellant, who was of unsound mind, and found that it was necessary to hospitalize him for his protection and the protection of others with whom he had or might be expected to associate.
*628The uncontradieted evidence discloses that in addition to being of unsound mind, plaintiff-appellant verbally threatened to shoot certain students and members of the faculty. The physician (appellee here) then caused plaintiff to be hospitalized. The facts or his stated reasons for doing so are not disputed. No reasonable inference can be drawn from such facts other than that the physician was rendering professional services and such action clearly falls within the malpractice statute of limitations.
The inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be reasonable inferences and not mere speculation or conjecture. The mere fact that a person’s counsel seems to be able to make a plausible argument, superficially worthy of belief, speaks well of counsel but forms no basis upon which to decide here whether or not a genuine issue of material fact exists. Counsel’s arguments are not evidence under TR 56, supra, to be considered when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record that the physician was acting in a capacity other than professional when he examined appellant and placed him in the hospital.
The majority opinion cites Sheets v. Burman (5th Cir. 1963), 322 F. 2d 277, which supports the well-known principle to be applied in a summary judgment case that “there must be no disputed questions of fact or conflicting inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts which, if settled against the moving party, would allow the plaintiff to recover.” With this I agree. However, the facts of Sheets clearly show that there was a genuine issue of fact as to when the statute of limitations (§ 2-627, supra) began to run. In the instant case there is no dispute as to when the statute of limitations, if applicable, began to run.
The majority opinion misconstrues the term “professional services” as used in § 2-627, supra. The statute only requires that the act in question be based upon professional services *629rendered or the failure to render such services. Professional services means that he is acting in his capacity as a duly licensed physician. The test is not whether some other person might render the same service. The statute extends to “physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospitals, sanitariums, or others.”
A physician rendering first aid is engaged in professional services although the same might be rendered by a fireman, policeman, boy scout, life guard, mother or any other person. A sick person may be confined in the home, as well as a hospital, and receive identical treatment, yet this does not mean that the hospital does not fall within the provisions of the statute because others might render a similar or comparable service.
The interpretation of the statute as set forth in the majority opinion, in effect, nullifies the statute with the exception of very specialized surgical procedures. Such action is not within the province of the judiciary but is vested solely in the Legislature.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Note. — Reported in 263 N. E. 2d 194.