Court Opinion

ID: 9713883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:59.746875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.189066
License: Public Domain

TRAPP, J., dissenting: As a dissenting view, the opinion of the court does not state valid reasons for reducing the minimum sentence imposed in this case. If it be concluded that the record reflects that the trial court commingled the original and subsequent offenses, as well as nonrecord matters in fixing the sentence, it should be vacated and the cause remanded for sentence upon a record which can be properly reviewed. The opinion states an hypothesis framed by penologists that a spread of years between the minimum and the maximum terms facilitates rehabilitation by extending the period of supervision after parole is authorized. The want of such “substantial spread” of years, standing alone and by itself, is not an adequate reason for reducing the minimum term of this sentence. In People v. Lillie, 79 Ill App2d 174, 223 NE2d 716, it is persuasively stated that adequacy of punishment should be the factor establishing the minimum sentence, while the maximum term is to be derived from the court’s estimate of the time required for successful rehabilitation. Upon this record, it would be difficult to argue that a sentence of 4 to 10 years was excessive under the established standards. The stated hypothesis is not a valid test here. In People v. Jones, 92 Ill App2d 124, 235 NE2d 379, cited in the opinion, and in Lillie quoted at length in Jones, the court was concerned with minimum sentences considered excessive in the light of the facts of the offense, and the background and record of the defendant. It is strained to project these opinions as authority for proceeding via the stated hypothesis in this case. Anent the citation of the tentative draft, Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, prepared by the American Bar Association Project, the views expressed therein are directed to a statutory structure of standards deemed desirable within which judicial discretion is to be exercised. While an informed view may recommend the suggested standards, our Legislature has not yet provided such statutory structure for the guidance of the trial courts. Further, it is proper to note that the “minimum term” referred to in the cited tentative draft differs in definition from the statutory definition in our Code, i. e., in the former it is used “. . . . to designate the earliest time when discretion can be exercised in favor of parole.”