Court Opinion

ID: 9927196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:07:09.61693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.802125
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1475-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RASHAWN BOND,
a/k/a RASHAWN BILLUPS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

                   Argued January 16, 2024 – Decided January 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-03-0288.

                   Roy B. Greenman argued the cause for appellant
                   (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Roy B.
                   Greenman, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

                   Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton Samuel Leibowitz,
                   of counsel and on the brief).

                   Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM

       Defendant Rashawn Bond appeals from a December 15, 2021 order

denying his motion for a new trial on grounds of alleged Brady1 violations by

the State. We affirm.

       The parties are familiar with the facts, which we need not recite in detail

here, and which were described in our prior opinions, including: State v. Bond

(Bond I), No. A-2317-14 (App. Div. Oct. 18, 2017) (slip op. at 18), where we

affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded for resentencing; and State v.

Bond (Bond II), No. A-3597-18 (App. Div. May 27, 2021) (slip op. at 29), in

which we affirmed in part and remanded in part the trial court's denial of

defendant's motion for a new trial that asserted Brady violations. However, to

summarize,

             defendant, Jamel Lewis, Robert Harris, Titus Lowery,
             and Sharif Torres planned to rob Raheem Jackson, who
             was a drug dealer and the boyfriend of Tanya Worthy.
             They planned to stage a robbery and kidnap Worthy
             while she was with defendant.

                   On the evening of October 28, 2008, Worthy
             ordered dinner at a restaurant in Newark, and
             afterwards she went to defendant's home. Lewis,
             Harris, Torres, and Lowery arrived there. They
             pretended to rob defendant and then kidnapped Worthy.

1
    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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                                        2
            Lewis and Lowery drove Worthy to Jackson's home in
            Green Brook. Defendant was supposed to follow them.
            He borrowed a car from his girlfriend, Jasmine
            Campbell. Defendant, Harris, and Torres drove to
            Green Brook.

                  Lewis and Lowery arrived at Jackson's home.
            When Jackson opened the door to his garage, he saw a
            masked man with a gun exit Worthy's car. The man
            told Jackson not to move. Jackson closed and locked
            the garage door.

                  Defendant and the other perpetrators left
            Jackson's home. Defendant drove to Elizabeth, where
            Worthy's car was set on fire. She was in the back seat.
            She had previously been shot and killed. Defendant
            then traveled back to Newark, went to his girlfriend's
            home, returned her car, and handed her a Gucci
            handbag that belonged to Worthy.

            [Bond II, slip op. at 2-3.]

A jury convicted defendant of kidnapping, robbery, felony murder, and

receiving stolen property. Id. at 8-9.

      In Bond II, we remanded and directed the trial court to explore letters

written by Shawn Williams, a cooperating State's witness, to: Detective Joe

Vendas, the lead investigator in defendant's case; an investigator in the Union

County jail in gang intelligence; and the prosecutor trying defendant's case. Id.

at 3. The letters discussed Williams's cooperation with federal law enforcement

in the prosecution of cases against the South Side Cartel (SSC) and MS-13

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                                          3
gangs, and Lewis's contact with Williams telling him to retract his statements

implicating Lewis and defendant in the underlying crimes. Id. at 3-4. Central

to the defense trial strategy was the claim that Lewis was a member of the SSC,

had masterminded the scheme to rob Jackson, and defendant cooperated out of

duress because Lewis had killed defendant's brother and would do the same to

him if he did not cooperate. Ibid.

      Defendant argued the failure to produce Detective Vendas's notes,

Williams's letters, and Williams's federal grand jury testimony constituted

discovery violations, which warranted a new trial. Id. at 24. We rejected

defendant's arguments except for those related to the letters. Id. at 24-27. We

remanded because the trial court made no findings about whether the State

committed Brady violations by failing to provide all of Williams's letters in

discovery. Id. at 28-29.

      On remand, defendant reiterated his claim Williams's letters and

cooperation in federal gang cases should have been disclosed because it was

central to his duress defense. He argued the letters were critical to impeach

Williams's testimony that Lewis asked to steal a car to use in the robbery and

said defendant would pay him for the vehicle because this testimony implicated

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                                      4
defendant as the mastermind, rather than a participant under duress, of Lewis's

scheme.

      On December 15, 2021, the motion judge rendered a detailed written

opinion denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The judge found the federal

gang investigation was known to the defense prior to the trial because

"authorities had been speaking to [defendant] about his knowledge of the SSC

at the time of his arrest . . . [and] later . . . , [defendant] participated in a proffer

session [including] with the U.S. Attorney, the Union County Prosecutor,

[defendant's attorney], Detective[] Vendas[,]" and others. The judge concluded

the defense knew about the federal "investigation into the SSC . . . through

[d]efendant's personal experiences." Further, "the [d]efense also had a letter

where . . . Williams stated that he had information pertaining to the SSC and

argued to the court that . . . Williams may be cooperating with the federal

government."

      The motion judge found the State did not commit a Brady violation

because it was the trial judge who ruled "Williams'[s] federal cooperation was

irrelevant and protected" when he reviewed the letters in camera and ex parte.

However, "[t]he material's existence, or . . . Williams'[s] cooperation . . . appears

never to have been disclosed to the [d]efense." The motion judge found the in

                                                                                  A-1475-21
                                           5
camera review was "problematic" because "it did not result in an order or

decision that provided the defense with a general understanding of what was

[given to] the trial court or the court's basis for its decision." Furthermore, the

trial judge did not review all the letters in the State's possession and did not

make a record of the fact there were letters in the State's possession that were

not given to the court. The motion judge also found the trial judge's decision

"to redact information regarding . . . Williams'[s] federal cooperation, in its

entirety, was erroneous" because "the fact of his cooperation in multiple matters

was highly probative as to his credibility" by showing "Williams would say

anything against anybody to obtain a benefit for himself."

      However, the motion judge concluded the withheld evidence "was not

material as there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would

have been different if it had been disclosed."       The judge noted there was

"overwhelming evidence" of defendant's guilt. Moreover, defendant was a

"poor" trial witness. His "testimony put him at the heart of the criminal events."

Although he "claimed he was intimidated into participating, his actions pre- and

post-incident reveal he was not." The judge pointed to the fact defendant did

not adhere to Lewis's alleged plan to use a stolen car to commit the crime and

instead "abandon[ed] the stolen vehicle, call[ed] . . . Campbell to use her car ,

                                                                             A-1475-21
                                        6
expos[ed] her to co-defendant(s), [and then] us[ed] her car . . . ." He also noted

even though Worthy left her purse at defendant's apartment, defendant brought

it into the stolen car, Torres put a handgun inside it, and after Worthy was killed

"[d]efendant then took the purse from Torres (with the gun in it) and gave it

to . . . Campbell.   This was a purported attempt to discard the gun."

Furthermore, the trial evidence showed that "for an individual who was not at

the center of the plan, [d]efendant was involved in a number of calls with those

involved" the day of the incident.

      The judge found defendant's testimony "severely damaged" his credibility

because there was no evidence supporting the theory Lewis was a threat to

defendant. "Lewis went to work the [day after Worthy's murder] and [d]efendant

drove two of the co-defendants back to [their home] after they spent the night at

his house." After reviewing the State's cross-examination of defendant, the

judge concluded "[t]he idea that [d]efendant was kept alive by a group of

hardened killers when he was the only connection to them and the crime defies

credulity."

      The motion judge pointed out defendant admitted on cross-examination

"that he consciously lied to the police in his statement." The State also adduced

recordings showing defendant called his girlfriends from jail to find out who

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                                        7
had spoken with police when police confronted him with the fact that he gave

Worthy's purse to Campbell.

      At trial, defendant claimed Lewis had a .357 handgun before Worthy's

murder and that after the murder, Lewis took out the weapon placed it on his lap

and threatened defendant with it to keep him silent. The motion judge noted the

State impeached defendant's credibility when it pointed out for the jury that

defendant never mentioned the type of weapon Lewis had until the State's

ballistics expert testified .357 caliber bullets were found in Worthy's body.

Likewise, for the first time at trial, defendant testified Lewis was friends with

the SSC's leader.    However, the State impeached his credibility when he

admitted during cross-examination that he never previously mentioned the

leader of SSC prior to seeing the State's organizational chart bearing the gang

leader's name at trial. The State impeached defendant further by pointing out he

testified on direct that Harris, Torres, and Lowery were Lewis's friends, yet on

cross-examination, he admitted they were his friends through his cousin.

      Aside from the evidence of defendant's guilt and impeachment of his

credibility, the motion judge also reviewed the letters that were not provided to

the trial judge and concluded "they provide[d] only general references to the

SSC . . . ." The letters were not dispositive because "[t]he SSC was known to

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                                       8
[d]efendant, and he testified about same at trial.       Defense counsel closed

extensively upon the SSC and its purported influence over [d]efendant." The

"[s]ame [was] true for the dangerous propensities the defense attributed to Lewi s

and him being known to carry a .357 handgun."

      The judge concluded "[t]hese arguments were rejected by the jury.

Accordingly, the letters themselves would have been of little value at trial."

      Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

            POINT I THE STATE'S BRADY VIOLATIONS
            REGARDING A KEY WITNESS' MOTIVATION TO
            TESTIFY AGAINST DEFENDANT AND WHOSE
            TESTIMONY   UNDERMINED      DEFENDANT'S
            DURESS DEFENSE, DENIED DEFENDANT HIS
            RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. IN ADDITION, THE
            MOTION COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
            DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL BASED ON "NEWLY
            DISCOVERED    EVIDENCE"    THAT   ALSO
            CONCERNED THIS WITNESS' MOTIVATION TO
            TESTIFY.

                  A.    The Motion Court Erred Because It Did
                  Not Apply The Correct Standard, Whether There
                  Was A "Reasonable Probability" That The Result
                  Of Defendant's Trial Would Have Been
                  Different.  Additionally, The Motion Court
                  Should Have Found That The Trial Court's Initial
                  Decision To Withhold Brady Materials Was
                  Wrong.

                  B.   The Withheld Brady Material And The
                  "Newly Discovered Evidence" Was "Favorable"
                  Impeachment Information That Was "Material"

                                                                            A-1475-21
                                        9
            In Defendant's Trial, Warranting A New Trial.
            This Court Should Reverse The Motion Court's
            Denial Of A New Trial Because The Court's
            Factual Findings Were "Clearly Erroneous" And
            Its Legal Conclusions Were Wrong.

            C.    Williams'[s] Agreement To Testify, And
            His Actual Testimony, In Two Federal Cases
            Was Brady Evidence And "Newly Discovered
            Evidence" That Warranted A New Trial. The
            Motion Court's Rejection Based On The Factual
            Finding That The Federal Cooperation Did Not
            Relate To His Cooperation In This Case Was
            "Clearly Erroneous."

            D.   The Jury's Inconsistent Verdict, Which
            Was Also Of "Questionable Validity, "Further
            Demonstrated That The Withheld And Newly
            Discovered Information Related To Williams'[s]
            Cooperation Was Material In Defendant's Trial.

            E.    The Motion Court Should Have
            Considered All Of The Brady Violations,
            Including Vendas'[s] Notes, Cumulatively, And
            Found That A New Trial Was Warranted.

Defendant raises the following points in his pro se brief:

      POINT I THE MOTION COURT IN ITS OPINION
      ERRED IN DECIDING DEFENDANT'S BRADY
      CLAIMS FOCUS SOLELY ON WILLIAMS'[S]
      FEDERAL   COOPERATION,     AND    NEVER
      CONSIDER[ED]       THE       ADDITIONAL
      UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE FROM WILLIAMS'[S]
      WRITTEN LETTERS IN ITS BRADY ANALYSIS.

            A.   The    Prosecution  Knowingly
            Allowed Its Key Witness Williams to

                                                             A-1475-21
                                10
    Falsely Testify. Specifically, Vendas Did
    Not Make Any Promises to him in Return
    for his Cooperation Against the Defendant,
    and Knowingly Allowed This False
    Testimony to Go Uncorrected in Violation
    of Defendant's Fourteenth Amendment.

    B.    The     Prosecution      Knowingly
    Withheld Impeachment Evidence of State's
    Key Witness Williams Attempting to
    Obtain a Cooperation Agreement to Serve
    his New Jersey State Sentence Out of State,
    to be Placed Into the Witness Protection
    Program, and a Federal Cooperation K1
    Letter in Return for his Cooperation
    Against the Defendant and his Federal
    Cooperation. In Doing So, the Defendant
    was Misle[]d During his Cross-
    Examination of the True Facts and
    Williams'[s] Motivation in Testifying
    Against the Defendant Denying the Jury
    the Right to Make a Fair Evaluation of his
    Credibility.

    C.    The Motion Court Erred by Failing
    to Consider Defendant's Brady Claims
    Cumulatively Instead of Isolation in
    Accordance with Kyles v. Whitley, 514
    U.S. 419, 441 (1995).

POINT II THE MOTION COURT VIOLATED
COURT RULE 2:9-1 BY FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE APPELLATE DIVISION DIRECTIVE ON
REMAND TO MAKE FINDING OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW REQUIRED BY COURT
RULE 1:7-4 OF AND RULE 3:22-11 IN
ACCORDANCE WITH STATE V. CARTER, 85 N.J.
300, 314 (1981); IN DOING SO THE MOTION

                                                  A-1475-21
                       11
            COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS THE
            WRITTEN LETTERS CONTAINED LITTLE VALUE
            DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
            TRIAL.

            POINT III DURING THE SEPTEMBER 28, 2012
            PROFFER SESSION DONNELLY WAS AN
            ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR OF THE UNION
            COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE WHEN HE
            MADE THE PROMISES TO STATE'S KEY
            WITNESS . . . WILLIAMS, WHICH IS CONTRARY
            TO THE MOTION COURT FACTUAL FINDINGS
            OF DONNELLY BEING AN ASSISTANT UNITED
            STATES ATTORNEY DURING THE SEPTEMBER
            28, 2012 PROFFER SESSION.

                                       I.

      A judge's determination whether evidence is subject to disclosure under

Brady presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89,

185 (1997). Under this standard of review, we defer to the judge's supported

factual findings but review de novo the application of legal rules to the factual

findings. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 577 (2015).

      A Brady violation requires: "(1) the evidence at issue must be favorable

to the accused, either as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; (2) the State

must have suppressed the evidence, either purposely or inadvertently; and (3)

the evidence must be material to the defendant's case." State v. Brown, 236 N.J.

497, 518 (2019). "Nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the accused violates

                                                                           A-1475-21
                                      12
the constitutional right of due process only 'where the evidence is material to

guilt or punishment.'" Carter, 91 N.J. at 112 (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).

Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.

667, 682 (1985)). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

      "A motion for a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence

is not favored and should be granted with caution by a trial court since it disrupts

the judicial process." State v. Conway, 193 N.J. Super. 133, 171 (App. Div.

1984) (citing State v. Haines, 20 N.J. 438, 443 (1956)). "[T]he test to be

satisfied under a newly discovered evidence approach is more stringent" than a

motion for new trial under Brady. Carter, 85 N.J. at 314. A defendant must

show the evidence is: "(1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or

impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable

by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably

change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted." Ibid.

      "A jury verdict rendered after a fair trial should not be disturbed except

for the clearest of reasons." State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 187 (2004). Therefore,

                                                                              A-1475-21
                                        13
"[i]f the undisclosed evidence was merely cumulative or repetitious as to the

purpose for which it could have been used, then the verdict need not be

reversed." Conway, 193 N.J. Super. at 174 (citing Carter, 85 N.J. at 313).

                                       II.

      In point I.A. of his counseled brief, defendant argues the motion judge

erred because he failed to assess, as required by Brady, whether the undisclosed

letters demonstrated a reasonable probability that the result of defendant's trial

would have been different. Instead, defendant argues the judge applied "a

harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard" because he cited State v.

Bass, 224 N.J. 285 (2016).

      As we recounted, the motion judge's opinion clearly reflects that he

analyzed the undisclosed evidence by applying the Brady materiality standard.

The judge found the letters should have been disclosed under Brady, but they

were not material because there was no reasonable probability they would have

affected the outcome.

      The reference to Bass and the harmless error standard related to his

finding that the trial judge's decision to redact Williams's federal cooperation

was error. The motion judge explained:

            While . . . Williams'[s] presentation is distinct from the
            defendants in State v. Jackson, 243 N.J. 52 (2020) and

                                                                            A-1475-21
                                       14
            [Bass], as his federal cooperation did not relate to
            charges against . . . Williams personally, the fact of his
            cooperation in multiple matters was highly probative as
            to his credibility.

He then reasoned as follows:       "Assuming error in the disclosure of . . .

Williams'[s] federal cooperation, the issue becomes whether that error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bass, 224 N.J. at 307." Notwithstanding

the motion judge's analysis of the evidentiary issue, he explained that "given

[his] findings regarding the materiality of the information, the question of

whether the in-camera process should have been addressed on appeal is moot."

      It is clear the motion judge was explaining, from an evidentiary

perspective, why the trial judge's in camera redaction was erroneous. The Brady

issue and whether it warranted a new trial was an entirely separate analysis.

      In this regard, the motion judge examined defendant's arguments by

applying the correct legal standard under Carter.        Indeed, he found "the

information [in Williams's letters] was not material as there is no reasonable

probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if [they] had

been disclosed." This was because: the letters made only a general reference to

the SSC and MS-13 gangs; and the SSC was known to defendant, he testified

about it at trial, and the defense summation addressed the SSC's alleged specter

on defendant and the danger posed by Lewis. Furthermore, the record reveals

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                                       15
defense counsel questioned Williams extensively about his motive to lie—his

desire to exchange his testimony for a better deal for himself—and his prior

convictions. For these reasons, the undisclosed letters were cumulative, and the

motion judge correctly found they held little value at trial.

                                        III.

      Point I.B. of defendant's counseled brief and, as far as we can glean from

points I.B., II., and III. of his pro se brief, challenge the motion judge's factual

findings related to the duress defense. He argues the Brady material withheld

by the State constituted newly discovered evidence that was favorable to the

duress defense and could have been used for impeachment purposes. He claims

the judge's finding the letters were cumulative and would have little value at

trial was wrong because "defendant's testimony was the primary support of

duress and his testimony was not corroborated by another witness." Therefore,

the letters would have been valuable corroborative evidence. Defendant also

argues the motion judge incorrectly concluded Williams's credibility was

sufficiently impeached at trial. He asserts Williams's testimony was the only

evidence presented by the State to contradict the duress defense and he should

have been able to use his letters to thoroughly impeach Williams. Defendant

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                                        16
also asserts the judge made independent factual findings, acted like a thirteenth

juror, and failed to follow our remand instructions.

      It is clear the jury rejected the duress defense when it found defendant

guilty of second-degree robbery, kidnapping, felony murder, and receiving

stolen property. As the motion judge noted, there was "overwhelming" evidence

of defendant's guilt in the record beyond Williams's testimony to contradict

defendant's claim that he was under duress. Indeed, defendant admitted his

participation in the crimes and the direct and circumstantial evidence presented

by the State and its cross-examination of defendant undermined both his

credibility and the theory he participated against his will. The judge's factual

findings were derived from the trial transcripts and the evidence he reviewed

was the same evidence presented to the jury. That evidence showed the duress

defense was contrary to the weight of the evidence.

      We reject defendant's argument the undisclosed letters showing

Williams's cooperation with federal authorities warrant a new trial. The defense

and the jury knew Williams was testifying pursuant to a plea deal. Williams

testified he contacted the prosecution to offer his testimony in exchange for a

favorable plea deal and he wrote over twenty letters to the prosecutor attempting

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                                      17
to negotiate a better deal for himself. Moreover, Williams never spoke to

defendant and did not participate in the crime.

      During summation, defense counsel argued at length to the jury about why

it should not believe Williams, including that his letters were evidence he was

motivated to lie to get a lighter sentence and that his testimony "sa[id] nothing."

Under these circumstances, the motion judge correctly found Williams's

undisclosed letters, which did not contain specific information to support the

duress defense or impeachment evidence, but disclosed cooperation with federal

authorities, were cumulative and therefore not material Brady evidence.

                                       IV.

      In point I.C. of his counseled brief, defendant contends the motion judge

erred because he found Williams's federal cooperation was unrelated to his

testimony in defendant's case, and the attempt to draw a connection between the

two was "supposition" rather than newly discovered evidence. Defendant argues

the matters were related because when Williams was discussing his cooperation

in the MS-13 case and attempting to secure federal witness protection, the MS-

13 case was still being prosecuted by the Union County Prosecutor's Office,

"and there was thus a joint incentive to successfully resolve all three cases in

which Williams was ultimately involved."

                                                                             A-1475-21
                                       18
      The judge did not err. There was no connection between the federal cases

and defendant's case.    The cases were not factually related and there was

insufficient evidence that any of the defendants were members of the SSC. Prior

to trial, the State gave the defense an organizational chart of the SSC

membership, but Lewis was not listed on the chart. The only evidence defendant

offered to support his claim Lewis was a member of the SSC was his own

testimony and Williams's testimony from a separate 2016 trial that he heard

Lewis was a gang member, but that Lewis "kinda hasn't come out and said

it . . . ." Williams said Lewis belonged to a subset of the Bloods gang called

"793, also known as the [SSC]." However, defendant testified there was a

distinction between 793 and the SSC, and that members of 793 are not

necessarily members of the SSC. Moreover, at defendant's trial, Williams was

never asked, and in turn did not testify, that Lewis was a member of the SSC.

However, Williams did say the SSC had nothing to do with defendant's case,

and that a reference to the SSC in one of his letters was "[s]omething completely

different."

      For these reasons, even if the motion judge's finding the defense argument

was supposition was an inaccurate characterization, we are unconvinced the

                                                                           A-1475-21
                                      19
letters constituted newly discovered evidence because they would not have

changed the jury's verdict. The letters were cumulative and were not material.

                                        V.

      In point I.D. of his counseled brief, defendant claims the jury's

inconsistent verdict is proof the newly discovered information about Williams's

federal cooperation was material to his trial. He argues the jury convicted him

of second-degree robbery, kidnapping, and felony murder of Worthy, but

acquitted him of first-degree robbery, the weapons offenses, and second-degree

robbery of Jackson. He claims this verdict shows there were probably jurors

who believed he was innocent based on the duress defense and the verdict would

have been different if the jury had Williams's letters.

      "Consistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment

is regarded as if it was a separate indictment." State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J.

551, 578 (2005) (quoting State v. Banko, 182 N.J. 44, 53 (2004)). Inconsistent

verdicts are permitted "so long as the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt

on the substantive offenses beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Petties, 139

N.J. 310, 319 (1995) (quoting State v. Kamienski, 254 N.J. Super. 75, 95 (App.

Div. 1992)). The Supreme Court has instructed us not to "conjecture regarding

the nature of the deliberations in the jury room." Muhammad, 182 N.J. at 578

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                                       20
(citing State v. Grey, 147 N.J. 4, 11 (1996)). We do not "speculate whether

verdicts resulted from jury lenity, mistake, or compromise . . . ." Ibid.

      The jury verdict was not inconsistent. Defendant was convicted of the

second-degree robbery of Worthy, kidnapping, felony murder, and receiving

stolen property. He was acquitted of the first-degree robbery of Worthy, robbery

of Jackson, and weapons offenses. The verdict shows the jury followed the

evidence presented by the State, which showed defendant played a central role

in the interactions involving Worthy, whereas Lewis and Lowery were the ones

who interacted with Jackson.       Indeed, the jury acquitted defendant of the

weapons offenses because there was no evidence he possessed a firearm during

the commission of the crimes, and the evidence showed he did not make it to

Green Brook to rob Jackson. While the acquitted offenses could have been

convictions if the jury decided defendant was guilty as an accomplice or had

constructive possession of the weapon, it is clear the jury exercised its discretion

not to make such a finding.

      Moreover, as we explained, Williams's letters were not material. We are

unpersuaded that, had they been disclosed, the jury would have acquitted

defendant in any respect, because defendant's testimony showed his involvement

in each of the crimes of which he was convicted.

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                                        21
                                       VI.

      In point I.E. of his counseled brief, and point I.C. of his pro se brief,

defendant contends the motion judge erred because he failed to consider his

claim that the State's delayed production of Detective Vendas's investigatory

notes was a Brady violation. In point I.A. of his pro se brief, defendant also

contends the judge erred by failing to consider his claim the State suborned

perjury and false testimony by allowing Williams to testify that Detective

Vendas did not make any promises to him in return for his cooperation against

defendant. We decline to consider these arguments because they fall outside the

scope of the remand. Moreover, we previously considered and rejected these

arguments. Bond II, slip op. at 20-21, 24, 29.

                                      VII.

      Finally, to the extent we have not addressed an argument raised in either

the counseled or pro se briefs on appeal, it is because they lack sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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                                       22