Court Opinion

ID: 9957137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 19:01:16.088203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.233129
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10061   Document: 29-1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 1 of 31

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-10061
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        CARLOS MONTEMAYOR,
        a.k.a. Fox,
        a.k.a. The Director,
        a.k.a. Licenciado,
                                                  Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                Respondent-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10061

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03555-LMM
                            ____________________

        Before GRANT, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Carlos Montemayor, a federal prisoner, appeals the district
        court’s denial of his counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate,
        correct, or set aside his conviction and sentence. In Montemayor’s
        underlying criminal case, Montemayor’s retained counsel was
        Richard Rice, who as an Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) had
        participated in the investigation that led to Montemayor’s
        indictment. Because of that participation, the district court granted
        the government’s motion to disqualify Rice as Montemayor’s
        counsel. Later, the district court, at Montemayor’s request,
        appointed new counsel, Paul Cognac. Montemayor entered a
        guilty plea to six drug-related charges and was sentenced to 411
        months of imprisonment.
               Montemayor’s § 2255 motion alleged, in relevant part, that
        his appointed counsel Cognac was constitutionally ineffective for
        failing to preserve for direct appeal the issue of Rice’s
        disqualification. The district court denied Montemayor’s § 2255
        motion, concluding he had not established ineffective counsel.
        After review, we affirm.
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                         3

                          I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
        A.     Indictment
               In 2004, the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) began a
        wiretap investigation of a drug trafficking organization led by
        Edwar Valencia-Gonzalez (“the Valencia investigation”). Through
        wiretap conversations, agents learned Montemayor was a source
        of Valencia’s cocaine in Atlanta, Georgia.
               As a result of the Valencia investigation, in 2009 a federal
        grand jury indicted Montemayor for: (1) conspiracy to possess with
        intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation
        of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), and 18 U.S.C § 2 (“Count
        One”); (2) conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of cocaine,
        in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 963 and 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C.
        § 2 (“Count Two”); (3) three counts of possession with intent to
        distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine, in violation of § 841(a)
        & (b)(1)(A)(ii) (“Counts Four, Five, and Eight”); and (4) conspiracy
        to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)
        (“Count Nine”).
               In 2010, Montemayor was arrested in Mexico, but not
        extradited to the United States until 2015. Initially, other attorneys
        represented Montemayor. By 2016, Montemayor had retained
        former AUSA Rice, who had left the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 2008.
               While representing Montemayor, Rice filed a preliminary
        motion to suppress all communications and other evidence
        intercepted by all wiretaps. The motion to suppress argued, inter
        alia, that (1) the wiretaps failed to establish necessity, (2) the
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10061

        wiretaps were used as an investigative tool, (3) information from
        illegal wiretaps was used to obtain the wiretaps, and (4) GPS
        information from target telephones was also unlawfully obtained.
        B.     Motion to Disqualify Retained Counsel Rice
               Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), the government moved to
        disqualify Rice from representing Montemayor. Under that
        statute, a former AUSA is restricted from representing a criminal
        defendant “in connection with a particular matter . . . in which the
        [former AUSA] participated personally and substantially” during
        his time as a government attorney. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(B).
               The government’s disqualification motion contended Rice,
        while an AUSA in the Narcotics Section, had led a wiretap
        investigation into a drug trafficking organization headed by Javier
        Alvarez-Lopez a.k.a. “Gotti” (“the Gotti investigation”). At the
        time, investigators believed that Gotti’s organization was doing
        business with the Valencia organization to which Montemayor
        belonged. As a result, in 2005, agents and AUSAs for both the Gotti
        and Valencia investigations coordinated and communicated with
        each other. During 2005, the AUSAs included in the “necessity”
        section of their wiretap applications information about both
        investigations and their connections to each other. And in wiretap
        applications for the Gotti investigation, Valencia was identified as
        a target. Likewise, Gotti was identified as a target in wiretap
        applications for the Valencia investigation.
               Further, in July and August 2005, Rice, assigned to the Gotti
        investigation, assisted his counterpart in the Valencia investigation,
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                        5

        then-AUSA John Horn, by working on three pen register
        applications for call and cell site data for certain phones when Horn
        was unavailable. Rice certified that he had discussed the
        applications with an investigating agent in the Valencia
        investigation. From the pen registers, agents in the Valencia
        investigation received information about intercepted calls in which
        Montemayor discussed drug trafficking activities with an
        intermediary between the Gotti and Valencia drug trafficking
        organizations.
                Ultimately, investigators concluded that, while the two drug
        trafficking organizations sometimes shared sources of supply in
        Mexico and communicated with each other, they largely operated
        independently, and Montemayor’s indictment did not cover the
        Gotti organization. That said, the government represented that it
        might introduce the recorded calls from the Valencia investigation
        as evidence against Montemayor at trial.
        C.    Attachments to Disqualification Motion
               The government attached to its disqualification motion
        copies of (1) wiretap applications and affidavits from June through
        November 2005 associated with the Valencia investigation,
        (2) wiretap applications and affidavits from May through
        September 2005 associated with the Gotti investigation, and (3) the
        pen register applications then-AUSA Rice handled for AUSA Horn
        in July and August 2005.
             As just one example, in a July 15, 2005 wiretap application
        Horn submitted as part of the Valencia investigation, Gotti was
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10061

        identified as a target. The background section of DEA agent Renita
        Foster’s affidavit supporting the application, described the
        investigations into the Valencia and Gotti organizations. Agent
        Foster averred that the Valencia and Gotti organizations were cells
        of a Mexican drug trafficking organization that each appeared to
        have their own sources of supply and distribution challenges, and
        stated:
              However, conversations intercepted on Title III
              wiretaps to date show that VALENCIA-GONZALEZ
              communicates with GOTTI regarding the
              distribution of illegal drugs, and they appear to use
              some of the same resources, such as warehouses to
              unload truckloads of drugs and stash houses to store
              drugs and/or currency. The wiretaps also show that
              several Target Subjects, such as JOHN DOE, a.k.a.
              “ULYSSES,” JOHN DOE, a.k.a. “OSCAR,” and FNU
              LNU, a.k.a. “GORDO,” have participated in illegal
              activities for both cells. Based on the investigation to
              date, it appears that VALENCIA-GONZALEZ and
              GOTTI have used at least one common source of
              supply, although they also use different sources of
              supply as well. In addition, I believe that a loose
              connection exists between VALENCIA-GONZALEZ
              and GOTTI based on the conversations and
              overlapping co-conspirators.         Nevertheless, the
              investigation indicates that VALENCIA-GONZALEZ
              are [sic] operating independently. During the next 30
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        23-10061              Opinion of the Court                         7

              days, agents hope to explore more fully the extent of
              their relationship.
        Similar descriptions of, and references to, the Valencia
        organization were included in affidavits supporting wiretap
        applications submitted by Rice for the Gotti investigation.
               The “necessity” section of DEA agent Foster’s Valencia-
        investigation affidavit stated the following about the Gotti
        investigation:
                     In addition to the residences identified in this
              investigation, agents participating in the wiretap
              investigation of FNU LNU, a.k.a. “GOTTI,” and his
              drug distribution organization have identified four
              other locations associated with that cell . . . . Agents
              in Enforcement Group I continue to evaluate the
              feasibility of performing searches of these locations.
              However, even if searches are performed, I believe
              that the evidence obtained would be more useful in
              prosecuting GOTTI and members of his drug
              distribution organization. As stated earlier, while
              there appears to be a relationship between GOTTI
              and EDWAR VALENCIA-GONZALEZ, they use
              different sources of supply and distribution networks.
              Consequently, searches of these locations likely
              would be of only minimal assistance in the
              investigation of the VALENCIA-GONZALEZ
              organization.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-10061

        Agent Foster’s affidavit further stated about the Gotti organization:
              As noted earlier, the two investigations have not
              conclusively identified the nature of this relationship
              [between the Valencia and Gotti organizations], but
              at a minimum it appears that VALENCIA-
              GONZALEZ communicates with the manager of the
              other cell, FNU LNU, a.k.a. “GOTTI,” and they use
              some common resources, including warehouses and
              stash houses. There also appears to be at least one
              individual, JOHN DOE, a.k.a. “ULYSSES,” who has
              performed services for both cells. Notwithstanding
              these commonalities, it also appears that VALENCIA-
              GONZELEZ and GOTTI use different sources of
              supply to obtain their drugs, and they also rely upon
              different distribution chains.           Under these
              circumstances, although the wiretap investigation
              focusing on GOTTI may yield intercepted
              conversations with VALENCIA-GONZALEZ and,
              perhaps, other members of VALENCIA-
              GONZALEZ’s organization, I do not believe that the
              conversations intercepted pursuant to the GOTTI
              investigation will yield evidence showing
              VALENCIA-GONZALEZ’s sources of supply,
              distributors, and methods of laundering his drug
              proceeds.      Consequently, I believe that the
              interception of Target Telephones #1-4 is necessary
              to achieve the objectives of this investigation.
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                         9

                Of the three pen register applications attached to the
        government’s disqualification motion, one, dated July 27, 2005,
        was prepared by Horn, but signed and submitted on Horn’s behalf
        by then-AUSA Rice. Another, dated August 4, 2005, seeking
        information on a telephone used by Valencia-Gonzalez, was
        prepared and signed by then-AUSA Rice, but was not presented to
        the district court. For both of these applications, Rice signed a
        declaration under penalty of perjury stating that he had discussed
        the applications with DEA agents involved in the Valencia
        investigation.
                The third pen register application, dated July 28, 2005, was
        fully prepared, signed, and submitted by then-AUSA Rice, and was
        authorized by the court. In that July 28 application, Rice stated that
        based on the Valencia investigation to date, it was believed the user
        of the target telephone, referred to as Cache, had used and
        continued to use the target telephone “to facilitate the receipt and
        distribution of illegal drugs and financial proceeds arising from
        such unlawful drug trafficking activity.” Rice further stated that
        pursuant to a court-authorized wiretap, agents had “intercepted
        calls in which CACHE discussed the distribution of illegal drugs
        and the collection of drug proceeds.”
                Rice certified that there were reasonable grounds to believe
        the requested records and information were relevant and material
        to the DEA’s ongoing criminal investigation of the Valencia drug
        trafficking organization and would assist “agents in identifying both
        co-conspirators in the drug trafficking activity and locations used
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                 23-10061

        by these persons in connection with such activity.” Rice also
        declared under penalty of perjury that he had discussed the
        application with DEA agent Renita Foster, the same agent involved
        in Horn’s wiretap applications.
               Montemayor opposed the government’s disqualification
        motion, contending the two investigations were not related and
        did not coordinate prosecution strategy. Montemayor conceded,
        however, that then-AUSA Rice had “signed one Pen App on behalf
        of AUSA Horn and then prepared one Pen App and Order for
        agents conducting the Valencia investigation while AUSA Horn was
        on vacation,” but maintained that these activities did not
        “constitute personal and substantial involvement” required for
        disqualification under § 207(a). (Emphasis added.) Montemayor
        also attached copies of the pen register requests Rice handled while
        Horn was on vacation.
        D.    Parties Waive Evidentiary Hearing and Agree to Submit
              Declarations
              Initially, a magistrate judge determined that Montemayor
        was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the government’s
        disqualification motion. The magistrate judge set the evidentiary
        hearing for January 2017. However, the parties then notified the
        magistrate judge that they agreed additional evidence, necessary
        for the court to rule on the disqualification motion, could be
        presented by sworn declarations of Horn and Rice. The magistrate
        judge allowed the parties to proceed in this manner and cancelled
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        23-10061              Opinion of the Court                      11

        the evidentiary hearing. The parties then submitted dueling
        declarations from Horn and Rice.
               In their declarations, Horn and Rice did not agree on the
        extent to which the Gotti and Valencia investigations overlapped
        and shared information and the extent to which the two AUSAs
        conferred and coordinated with each other. We do not include all
        of Horn’s allegations, but provide a brief overview of Horn’s
        description of the extensive overlap and coordination between his
        Valencia investigation and Rice’s Gotti investigation.
        E.    AUSA Horn’s Declaration
               Consistent with the wiretap applications attached to the
        government’s motion, Horn’s declaration stated that between
        April and July 2005, investigators learned through phone data and
        wiretaps that Gotti and Valencia frequently communicated with
        each other, bought and sold drugs from each other, appeared to
        share some of the same warehouses and stash houses to store drugs
        and currency, and sometimes purchased drugs from a common
        source of supply. There also appeared to be one individual, called
        Ulysses, whom agents initially believed participated in both the
        Gotti and the Valencia organizations.
              According to Horn, this overlap between the Gotti and
        Valencia investigations caused some tension and required the
        agents and AUSAs within the two investigative groups to
        communicate and coordinate with each other on an ongoing basis.
        The “fruits of this coordination are memorialized in the facts and
        necessity sections of the agents’ wiretap affidavits, including the
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10061

        July 27, 2005 wiretap affidavit submitted by Mr. Rice in the Gotti
        investigation.” Through the fall of 2005, Gotti and Valencia
        continued to have interactions with each other that had “to be
        analyzed and discussed in the ongoing wiretap affidavits’ necessity
        sections” of both investigations and the “wiretap materials
        submitted in each investigation therefore continued to reference
        the other investigation.”
                Horn also said that as an AUSA in the Narcotics Section, he
        attended mandatory weekly meetings with other AUSAs, including
        Rice, at which he “openly shared” information about the Valencia
        investigation. Horn also recalled: (1) speaking and exchanging
        information with Rice about their respective investigations “in
        connection with resolving the relationship between Valencia and
        Gotti”; (2) discussing “the facts of [their] respective investigations .
        . . on multiple occasions”; (3) “coordinat[ing] with each other in the
        drafting and submitting of the wiretap pleadings described in the
        government’s Motion to Disqualify”; and (4) at least one meeting
        with Rice and DEA agents from both the Gotti and Valencia
        investigations to discuss the tensions between the two investigative
        groups caused by overlaps in the two investigations. Finally, Horn
        explained that he would have “review[ed] with [Rice] the language
        to be included in the necessity sections of the wiretaps to ensure
        that they were accurate and consistent,” before including any
        information about the Gotti investigation in his wiretap
        applications for the Valencia investigation.
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        23-10061              Opinion of the Court                      13

        F.    Rice’s Declaration
               Next, we outline what Rice’s declaration said about his
        interactions with Horn and the Valencia investigation. Because
        Rice’s admissions alone show his substantial and personal
        involvement in the Valencia investigation, we recount them also
        in detail.
               According to Rice, he was generally aware of the Valencia
        investigation. For a time, the DEA case agent for Rice’s Gotti
        investigation suspected that an individual named Ulysses was
        involved in both the Gotti organization and the Valencia
        organization. It later turned out they were separate individuals
        with the same name.
               But while Rice was involved as an AUSA, the two
        investigations needed to be identified in wiretap applications and
        affidavits for each investigation, including in the “necessity” and
        “prior applications” sections of wiretap affidavits. As a result,
        AUSA Horn and AUSA Rice each prepared and provided to the
        other text about their respective investigations to be “cut and
        pasted” into wiretap applications and affidavits. Rice told the DEA
        case agent for the Gotti investigation to “stay away from” the
        Valencia investigation, and from that point on, Rice’s only
        discussions about the Valencia investigation were to confirm that
        the Gotti investigation was steering clear of the Valencia
        investigation.
               Rice recalled one joint meeting of the two groups of
        investigators, and possibly Horn, “to discuss and ensure there was
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                23-10061

        no overlapping investigation.” However, Rice left the meeting
        before any substantive discussions of the two investigations began.
        Rice admitted that he attended most weekly meetings of the DEA
        agents involved in his Gotti investigation and weekly meetings of
        AUSAs in the Drug Section. Yet Rice did not recall having any
        substantive discussions about the Valencia investigation with DEA
        agents or AUSA Horn.
               Rice acknowledged, however, that in late summer 2005,
        AUSA Horn went on vacation. Prior to leaving, Horn asked Rice
        to prepare pen register applications for the Valencia investigation,
        which Rice called “Pens Apps,” that would be needed during
        Horn’s absence, and Rice agreed. Rice prepared two pen register
        applications while Horn was absent. Rice sent the DEA agents
        involved in the Valencia investigation his template for pen register
        applications, the DEA agents for the Valencia investigation used
        the template and drafted a paragraph of “particularized language”
        stating the factual basis justifying obtaining the phone data, and
        then the DEA agents submitted the two pen register applications
        to Rice, who revised them, as needed. Rice could not recall what
        revisions, if any, he made to the particularized language in these
        two pen register applications for the Valencia investigation.
               For the July 27, 2005 pen register application, Rice certified
        that he had discussed the application with the investigating agent.
        Rice said that during his process of preparing a pen register
        application, his “discussions with the agent who sought the Pen
        App would be limited to the particularized paragraph providing the
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        23-10061                   Opinion of the Court                                 15

        factual basis justifying obtaining the information pursuant to the
        order.” Consistent with this process, Rice did not discuss the
        Valencia investigation with the DEA agents “other than reviewing
        the particularized paragraph in the Pen App and Order.”
               One of the pen register applications Rice prepared and
        signed while Horn was on vacation was taken by the DEA agents
        in the Valencia investigation to a magistrate judge for review and
        signature. The other pen register application was not, “although
        AUSA Horn prepared a Pen App for the telephone that was the
        subject of the second Pen App after AUSA Horn returned.” Apart
        from this activity, Rice denied participating in or assisting the
        Valencia investigation and the criminal cases that resulted from it.
               Rice maintained that he had no knowledge of the defendants
        in the criminal cases resulting from the Valencia investigation until
        he became Montemayor’s defense counsel.
        G.      Montemayor Waives Conflict-Free Counsel
              While the disqualification motion was pending, the
        magistrate judge held a Garcia hearing, at which Montemayor
        waived any potential conflict of interest Rice had due to an overlap
        between the Gotti and Valencia investigations. 1 By this time,

        1 United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds

        by Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984). “Garcia provides that, in the
        case of a potential conflict of interest, the court should conduct an inquiry,
        akin to a plea colloquy under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, to
        determine whether a defendant wishes to waive the conflict.” United States v.
        Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 727 (11th Cir. 2019).
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   23-10061

        another attorney, W. Coleman Sylvan, had joined Rice as retained
        co-counsel for Montemayor, and Montemayor had obtained
        independent advice from Sylvan before entering the waiver.
        Montemayor signed a written waiver, and the magistrate judge
        found the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
        made.
        H.     Magistrate Judge Disqualifies Rice
               In a 45-page order, the magistrate judge acknowledged that
        Montemayor’s waiver of conflict-free counsel gave rise to a
        presumption in favor of counsel of choice. But the magistrate
        judge found that the government had carried its burden to show
        retained counsel Rice must be disqualified under § 207(a)(1). The
        magistrate judge initially credited Horn’s recollection over Rice’s
        as to “how he and Mr. Rice satisfied their responsibilities, that is,
        before including any information about the other AUSA’s
        investigation” in wiretap applications and affidavits and that Horn
        and Rice “discussed the information to be included . . . in order to
        draft the applications and affidavits.” The magistrate judge found
        that, although Rice was not the lead AUSA in the Valencia
        investigation and did not participate in every decision made about
        that investigation or prosecution, “he did participate sufficiently to
        trigger application of § 207(a)(1).”
               Alternatively, the magistrate judge found that, “even if the
        court relies on Mr. Rice’s statement as to how the information was
        exchanged for inclusion in the wiretap affidavits, his involvement
        in the Valencia . . . investigation is just as, if not more, personal and
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                       17

        substantial.” After analyzing Rice’s declaration, the magistrate
        judge concluded it alone was enough to establish that Rice’s
        participation in the Valencia investigation was “substantial and
        personal,” as he had conversations with the investigating agents,
        reviewed the information available for both investigations,
        determined what information was required to satisfy the necessity
        finding, crafted that language, and sent it to Horn for inclusion in
        the Valencia wiretap affidavits.
               The magistrate judge also found that, even if there was no
        actual conflict of interest, there was an appearance of a conflict of
        interest because Rice, then representing Montemayor, had “filed a
        motion to suppress the wiretap authorizations, attacking the
        necessity for the wiretaps, which relied in part on the language that
        [Rice] claims he supplied for the very same wiretap affidavits.”
        Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that the court would reach
        the same conclusion whether Rice’s participation was as described
        by Rice or Horn.
        I.    District Court Affirms Disqualification Order
                The district court overruled Montemayor’s objections and
        affirmed the magistrate judge’s order disqualifying Rice. The
        district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s findings about
        Rice’s involvement in the Valencia investigation based on Horn’s
        declaration.
              The district court also agreed with the magistrate judge that,
        “[e]ven if the Court relies on Mr. Rice’s statements describing his
        claimed limited involvement” Rice’s admitted participation in the
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                23-10061

        Valencia investigation—preparing text about the Gotti
        investigation for Horn to include in his wiretap applications and
        affidavits and working with agents at Horn’s request to prepare and
        submit pen register and cell site requests for the Valencia
        investigation—was substantial and personal. The district court
        further found that Rice’s sworn certifications in support of the pen
        register requests “severely undercut[]” his later claim, in response
        to the government’s motion to disqualify, that he had not received
        any information about the Valencia organization beyond what was
        included in the wiretap application and affidavit. The district court
        concluded that Rice’s involvement in the Valencia wiretap
        applications and pen register requests constituted personal and
        substantial participation in the Valencia investigation. Thus, the
        district court found that Rice was properly disqualified under
        § 207(a)(1), and it affirmed the magistrate judge’s order and
        disqualified Rice from the case.
        J.    Montemayor’s Unconditional Guilty Plea
              After Rice’s disqualification, Montemayor filed a pro se
        motion to “disqualify” his retained co-counsel Sylvan and
        requested appointed counsel. At a hearing, Montemayor
        confirmed that he wished to terminate Sylvan as his retained
        attorney and he did not have funds to retain new counsel. On
        December 7, 2017, the district court appointed attorney Cognac to
        represent Montemayor.
              Almost a year later, in November 2018, Montemayor
        entered a non-negotiated, unconditional guilty plea. During the
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                         19

        plea hearing, the district court informed Montemayor (1) of his
        right to proceed to trial, (2) of the rights he was waiving by pleading
        guilty, and (3) that after pleading guilty, the only rights he would
        keep were “the right to have a lawyer represent you, advise you
        about the case, argue on your behalf at sentencing, and to appeal
        any legal defect in your plea or your sentence.”
               The district court confirmed: (1) the government had
        offered Montemayor a plea bargain, which Montemayor discussed
        with his attorney Cognac; (2) Montemayor had decided not to
        accept the government’s offer; and (3) Montemayor still wanted to
        plead guilty. After a colloquy, Montemayor admitted guilt to all
        six counts against him in the indictment. The district court found
        Montemayor’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
        made on the advice of competent counsel.
        K.     Sentencing and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
               At a May 16, 2019 sentencing hearing, the district court
        imposed terms of 411 months on Counts One, Two, Four, Five and
        Eight and a term of 240 months on Count Nine, all to run
        concurrently. The sentencing was held open for resolution of the
        amount of forfeiture. Approximately two weeks later, new
        retained counsel, Stephen Reba, entered an appearance as counsel
        for Montemayor, and Cognac filed a motion to withdraw, which
        the district court granted.
              Montemayor, through retained counsel Reba, moved to
        withdraw his guilty plea. Montemayor argued that Cognac had
        given him constitutionally deficient advice to reject the
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                    23-10061

        government’s plea deal of approximately 25 years in prison and to
        enter a non-negotiated plea that Cognac predicted would likely
        result in a sentence of 10 to 15 years. The district court denied
        Montemayor’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 7,
        2019, the district court entered the final judgment of conviction and
        sentence.
        L.     Direct Appeal
                On direct appeal, Montemayor challenged, among other
        things, the order disqualifying Rice. See United States v. Montemayor,
        815 F. App’x 406, 407 (11th Cir. 2020). Montemayor argued the
        district court committed a fundamental error when it disqualified
        Rice without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 408. This Court
        concluded that by entering an unconditional guilty plea that was
        knowing and voluntary, Montemayor had waived his challenge to
        Rice’s disqualification and affirmed Montemayor’s convictions. Id.
        at 409-10. 2
                           II. SECTION 2255 MOTION
              In August 2021, Montemayor filed this counseled § 2255
        motion. In Ground One, Montemayor claimed that during plea
        proceedings counsel Cognac was ineffective for failing to raise and
        preserve properly for direct appeal the issue of Rice’s

        2 On direct appeal, Montemayor challenged the district court’s forfeiture

        order, but not his 411-month prison sentence. See Montemayor, 815 F. App’x
        at 407.
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        23-10061                   Opinion of the Court                               21

        disqualification.3 Montemayor asserted Cognac’s ineffective
        assistance amounted to structural error. Montemayor pointed out
        that he had waived any conflict that Rice might have had, giving
        rise to a presumption in favor of Rice representing him.
        Montemayor contended the district court had reversibly erred in
        concluding that the government had overcome the presumption
        by demonstrating an actual conflict of interest or a serious potential
        conflict of interest.
               A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
        (“R&R”), recommending that Montemayor’s § 2255 motion be
        denied. As to Montemayor’s ineffective counsel claim regarding
        disqualification of Rice, the R&R concluded Montemayor failed to
        establish that his counsel Cognac was ineffective under the two-
        pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). On
        the R&R record, the magistrate judge concluded any basis for
        challenging on appeal the district court’s disqualification of Rice
        was “patently meritless.” Thus, counsel Cognac’s performance
        was not ineffective and did not prejudice Montemayor in any
        event. In this regard, the magistrate judge first pointed out that
        Montemayor could have preserved the disqualification issue only
        by either entering a conditional plea or proceeding to trial. But
        Montemayor had proffered no evidence that the government

        3 Montemayor’s § 2255 motion raised two other ineffective-assistance-of-
        counsel claims that we do not discuss because they fall outside the scope of
        the certificate of appealability. See McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195
        (11th Cir. 2011).
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                23-10061

        would have agreed to (and the district court would have accepted)
        a conditional plea or that Montemayor was prepared to go to trial.
               Alternatively, the magistrate judge concluded there was “no
        reasonable probability” that on direct appeal Montemayor would
        have prevailed on the disqualification issue. In that regard, the
        magistrate judge determined that any appeal arguing, as
        Montemayor did in his § 2255 motion, that the district court erred
        by weighing the credibility of Horn and Rice without holding an
        evidentiary hearing would be dismissed under the invited error
        doctrine because Montemayor had waived the hearing and agreed
        to proceed by sworn declarations.
               The magistrate judge determined that “even without
        weighing the relative credibility of” the two competing
        declarations, the rest of the record, including “sworn documents
        that Rice himself certified and submitted to the Court” plainly
        showed that the Gotti and Valencia investigations “overlapped and
        that Rice had personal and substantial involvement and knowledge
        regarding both (including when he stepped into Horn’s role in the
        Valencia . . . investigation while Horn was on vacation).” In short,
        the magistrate judge concluded “Montemayor’s counsel could not
        have been ineffective for having ‘failed’ to preserve that meritless
        issue for appeal.”
               Over Montemayor’s objections, the district court adopted
        the R&R and denied Montemayor’s § 2255 motion. Among other
        things, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge that even
        if counsel Cognac had properly preserved the issue for direct
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                        23

        appeal: (1) “the Eleventh Circuit would not have granted relief
        because Movant invited the error [of making credibility
        determinations without a hearing] by agreeing to (and later failing
        to object to) the use of the declarations”; (2) “evidence beyond the
        declarations showed that Rice had been involved in an
        investigation of a drug trafficking organization whose operations
        overlapped with the organization with which Movant was
        associated”; and (3) as a result, there was “no reasonable probability
        that Movant would have prevailed on that issue before the
        Eleventh Circuit.”
                          III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               In considering a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we
        review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.
        McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
        Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims present mixed questions of
        law and fact that we review de novo. Osley v. United States, 751 F.3d
        1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2014).
                                IV. DISCUSSION
        A.    Certificate of Appealability
               This Court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as
        to “[w]hether the district court erred in determining that
        Montemayor could not establish prejudice, as to his ineffective
        assistance claim, based on his counsels’ failure to preserve the issue
        of his predecessor counsel’s disqualification.”
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                   23-10061

        B.     General Principles: Ineffective Assistance
               A movant under § 2255 bears the burden to prove he is
        entitled to relief. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th
        Cir. 2017). To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
        a § 2255 movant must show both that: (1) his counsel’s performance
        was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of
        reasonableness; and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result of that
        deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
        88 (1984). Because both prongs must be met, a court need not
        determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient if the
        movant failed to show sufficient prejudice. Id. at 697. Generally,
        prejudice occurs when there is a “reasonable probability that, but
        for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
        would have been different.” Id. at 694.
                When a movant asserts “the unusual claim” that his counsel
        ultimately failed to preserve for appeal an issue that was raised and
        rejected in the trial court, “the appropriate prejudice inquiry asks
        whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
        outcome on appeal had the claim been preserved.” Davis v. Sec’y
        for Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (involving trial
        counsel’s failure to renew a Batson objection at the conclusion of
        voir dire). In other words, in the “peculiar circumstances” where
        “the only effect of trial counsel’s negligence” is on the defendant’s
        appeal, we “must consider how [the movant] would have fared on
        [direct] appeal had counsel preserved [the neglected] claim for
        review.” Id. at 1315, 1316.
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        23-10061               Opinion of the Court                         25

                We recognize that the government contends that to
        demonstrate prejudice, Montemayor must show a reasonable
        probability that, but for counsel Cognac’s errors, Montemayor
        would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
        trial. That is the prejudice standard generally applicable to
        ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in the guilty plea context.
        See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Montemayor cannot
        satisfy this prejudice standard articulated in Hill, as he did not aver
        that he would have insisted on going to trial had Cognac performed
        differently.
               Nonetheless, the gravamen of Montemayor’s ineffective-
        assistance-of-counsel claim is that counsel Cognac’s alleged error
        affected his direct appeal, i.e., Cognac failed to advise him to enter
        a conditional plea that preserved his right to appeal the
        disqualification order. Thus, the more appropriate prejudice
        standard for Montemayor’s particular claim here is the one
        articulated in Davis, which is whether there is a reasonable
        likelihood of a more favorable outcome on direct appeal if the
        claim had been preserved See Purvis v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 734, 739
        (11th Cir. 2006).
        C.     Montemayor’s Ineffective Counsel Claim
              Here, in the § 2255 proceedings, the district court did not err
        in determining that Montemayor could not establish prejudice.
        Montemayor has not shown a reasonable likelihood that he would
        have succeeded on the disqualification issue on direct appeal had it
        been properly preserved. That is because the magistrate judge in
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10061

        Montemayor’s underlying criminal case correctly concluded Rice
        was prohibited from representing Montemayor under § 207(a), and
        the district court properly affirmed that order.
                A criminal defendant has the Sixth Amendment right to
        counsel, which includes the right to counsel of his choice. United
        States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006). While a
        defendant has “a presumptive right to counsel of choice,” the right
        “is not absolute” because in addition to the defendant’s right to an
        effective advocate, there is “the judiciary’s interest in ensuring and
        maintaining the integrity of our judicial system.” United States v.
        Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
        omitted). To overcome the presumption in favor of a defendant’s
        counsel of choice where the defendant has waived potential
        conflicts, the government must show either an “actual conflict . . .
        [or] a serious potential for conflict.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
        153, 164 (1988).
              In addition, a former AUSA is restricted from representing a
        criminal defendant “in connection with a particular matter . . . in
        which the [former AUSA] participated personally and
        substantially” during their time as a government attorney. See 18
        U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(B).
               Here, in Montemayor’s underlying criminal case, the
        magistrate judge found, and the district court affirmed, that Rice,
        while an AUSA, “personally and substantially” participated in the
        Valencia investigation even when Rice’s declaration was fully
        credited. There is no clear error in this finding. In particular, Rice
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        23-10061                Opinion of the Court                          27

        admitted participating in the Valencia investigation by:
        (1) preparing text about his Gotti investigation that Horn used in
        his wiretap affidavits and applications, including in the “necessity”
        sections of the affidavits; and (2) preparing, reviewing, revising, and
        signing two pen register requests for call and cell site data for target
        phones. Moreover, in preparing the pen register requests, Rice
        conceded that he discussed with an investigating DEA agent the
        “particularized paragraph” containing the factual basis for
        obtaining the phone data.
               The magistrate judge also properly concluded that Rice’s
        representation of Montemayor presented at least the appearance of
        a conflict of interest, if not an actual conflict of interest, given that
        Rice had filed on Montemayor’s behalf a motion to suppress all
        wiretap evidence. As the magistrate judge pointed out, Rice’s
        motion to suppress explicitly attacked the necessity for the
        wiretaps, and Rice admitted preparing some of the language in the
        “necessity” sections of those wiretap applications. Further, the
        government contemplated using at trial recorded conversations
        intercepted pursuant to the Valencia investigation wiretaps, and at
        least one of those recorded conversations was of Montemayor
        discussing drug trafficking activities with an intermediary between
        the Valencia and Gotti organizations. In other words, at the time
        of the disqualification motion, it was already apparent that Rice, on
        behalf of Montemayor, was now arguing that the wiretap
        applications and pen register requests he had helped prepare while
        an AUSA were unlawful and that evidence obtained from them
        could not be used against Montemayor.
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        28                    Opinion of the Court                23-10061

               In short, Rice’s own admissions in his declaration about his
        involvement in the Valencia investigation, along with the
        undisputed portions of the record, such as the wiretap applications
        and pen register requests, were sufficient to overcome the
        presumption in favor of Rice representing Montemayor. Under
        these circumstances, we readily conclude Montemayor would not
        have prevailed on this disqualification issue on direct appeal, even
        if appointed counsel Cognac had advised Montemayor to enter a
        conditional plea that properly preserved it.
              Montemayor argues that he would have prevailed on the
        disqualification issue on direct appeal because the magistrate judge
        improperly credited Horn’s declaration without holding an
        evidentiary hearing, thereby shifting the burden from the
        government to overcome the presumption in favor of Rice’s
        representation. According to Montemayor, the magistrate judge
        was “unable to make credibility determinations” in ruling on the
        disqualification motion because the government, which had the
        burden, declined an evidentiary hearing.
              However, Montemayor does not dispute that, after the
        magistrate judge scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the
        disqualification motion, he and the government agreed to forgo an
        evidentiary hearing and asked the magistrate judge instead to
        consider the parties’ declarations in determining whether the
        government had overcome the presumption in favor of Rice’s
        representation. In other words, Montemayor invited any alleged
        error by the magistrate judge in making credibility findings and
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        23-10061                 Opinion of the Court                             29

        resolving factual disputes without holding an evidentiary hearing.
        Accordingly, on direct appeal, this Court could have affirmed the
        magistrate judge’s disqualification of Rice without addressing the
        merits of Montemayor’s arguments based on the invited error
        doctrine. See United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir.
        2009) (stating that this Court is “precluded . . . from reviewing an
        issue raised on appeal if it has been waived through the doctrine of
        invited error”). 4
               In any event, Montemayor’s argument ignores the
        magistrate judge’s alternative ruling, affirmed by the district court,
        that Rice’s own declaration showed he had personally and
        substantially participated in the Valencia investigation and
        presented a serious potential conflict of interest. Therefore, any
        alleged error—arising from crediting Horn’s declaration over
        Rice’s declaration without holding a hearing—would not have
        prevented this Court from affirming the disqualification order on
        this independent, alternative ground. See United States v. Campbell,
        26 F.4th 860, 879 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (explaining that despite

        4 Nothing herein should imply that the magistrate judge or the district court

        was required to hold an evidentiary hearing and could not accept the parties’
        agreement to proceed by written declarations. The fact that any alleged error
        was invited removes any need to address that issue. Further, we note that
        there may have been little for Montemayor to gain from an evidentiary
        hearing, at which the government could have brought out more detailed
        information about Rice’s involvement in, and knowledge of, the Valencia
        investigation than was covered by his declaration. For example, the
        government not only could have cross-examined Rice but also called DEA
        agents who had worked with Rice on both investigations.
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10061

        an error in the district court’s analysis, this Court may affirm a
        district court’s “ultimately correct” ruling on any ground
        supported by the law and the record); United States v. Maher, 955
        F.3d 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To obtain reversal of a district court
        judgment that is based on multiple, independent grounds, [an
        appellant] must convince us that every stated ground for the
        judgment against him is incorrect.” (quotation marks omitted)).
               Montemayor argues that on direct appeal he nonetheless
        would have prevailed because Rice’s disqualification was
        “structural error” not subject to harmless error analysis. It is true
        that the erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s right to counsel of
        his choice is structural error not subject to review for harmlessness.
        Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148-50. But in Montemayor’s case, the
        decision to disqualify Rice was correct for the reasons already
        discussed and there was no erroneous deprivation of
        Montemayor’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.
               Because on direct appeal this Court would have affirmed
        Rice’s disqualification had Cognac preserved the issue for review,
        Montemayor cannot show prejudice under Strickland. See Davis,
        341 F.3d at 1316.
                                V. CONCLUSION
               The district court did not err in determining that
        Montemayor could not establish prejudice as to his ineffective
        assistance claim based on his counsel’s failure to preserve the issue
        of former retained counsel’s disqualification. For this reason, we
        affirm the district court’s denial of Montemayor’s § 2255 motion.
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        23-10061           Opinion of the Court                    31

              AFFIRMED.