Court Opinion

ID: 9949397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 16:09:39.363893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.632952
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Schobelock v. Schobelock, 2024-Ohio-879.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                         FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               SCIOTO COUNTY

KAYLEE SCHOBELOCK,              :
                                :
     Petitioner-Appellee,       :   Case No. 23CA4028
                                :
     v.                         :
                                :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
JAMES SCHOBELOCK,               :   ENTRY
                                :
    Respondent-Appellant.       :   RELEASED 3/06/2024
_____________________________________________________________
                          APPEARANCES:

Justin R. Blume, Wheelersburg, Ohio, for Appellant.

Robert T. Trujillo, Rick L. Faulkner, The Faulkner Law Office,
Wheelersburg, Ohio, for Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

        {¶1} James Schobelock appeals the March 31, 2023 Domestic

Violence Civil Protection Order issued by the Scioto County Common Pleas

Court - Domestic Relations Division, along with the May 12, 2023

Judgment Entry of the same court denying his Motion for New Trial. Mr.

Schoebelock, “Appellant,” contends that the trial court’s decision to enter

the civil protection order is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant also contends the trial court erred in denying his Motion for New

Trial based on newly discovered evidence. However, upon review, we find
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                       2

no merit to the arguments raised under Appellant’s assignments of error.

Accordingly, they are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

                                 FACTS

        {¶2} Appellee Kaylee Schobelock, “Appellee,” is a nurse

practitioner. Appellant is a supervisor at United Parcel Service (UPS). He

also has training in law enforcement. Appellee has three minor children

from a prior marriage, B.C., P.C., and C.C. The parties also have one minor

child together, R.S., who was 15 months old at the time of the underlying

proceedings.

        {¶3} On March 2, 2023, Appellee, pro se, filed a petition for

Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order (DVCPO). The petition alleged

an incident of domestic violence occurring on March 1, 2023, and threats of

violence to her three older children. Appellee requested an ex parte order

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Section 3113.31, and sought protection for

Appellee and all her minor children. The trial court granted the ex parte

petition the same day it was filed and scheduled a full hearing for March 7,

2023.

        {¶4} On March 7, 2023, the parties, with counsel, reached an
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                       3

agreement to modify the terms of the ex parte order so as to allow parenting

time between Appellant and R.S. The full hearing was continued to March

30, 2023. On March 17, 2023, Appellee filed an amended petition alleging

multiple additional incidents of domestic violence and threats.

      {¶5} On March 30, 2023, the trial court conducted a full hearing on

Appellee’s amended petition. The court heard testimony from Sergeant

Brian Nolen, Appellant, and Appellee. Several exhibits were admitted into

evidence.

      {¶6} On March 31, 2023, the trial court issued an order granting the

amended petition for DVCPO for one year. Appellee and her three older

minor children were named as the protected parties. R.S. was not added as a

protected party.

      {¶7} On April 20, 2023, Appellant filed, pursuant to Civil R.

59(A)(8), a Motion for New Trial. Appellee subsequently filed a

Memorandum Contra Motion for New Trial. The trial court denied

Appellant’s motion by entry dated May 12, 2023.

      {¶8} This timely appeal followed. Where pertinent, we will set forth

below additional facts adduced through the testimony of the witnesses at the

full hearing.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                        4

                           ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
             PETITIONER/APPELLEE AN EX PARTE
             DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION
             ORDER IN THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT
             EVIDENCE     TO    ESTABLISH    THAT
             PETITIONER/APPELLEE OR ANY OF THE
             OTHER    PROTECTED    PARTIES  WERE
             VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS
             DEFINED IN OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION
             3113.31.

      II.    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
             THE      DOMESTIC   VIOLENCE    CIVIL
             PROTECTION ORDER IN THAT THERE WAS
             INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
             THAT PETITIONER/APPELLEE OR ANY OF
             THE OTHER PROTECTED PARTIES WERE
             VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS
             DEFINED IN OHIO REVISED CODE SECTION
             3113.31.

      III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
             LAW            IN           DENYING
             RESPONDENT/APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
             NEW TRIAL.

             FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR - EX PARTE
                           ORDER

      {¶9} Appellant’s first assignment of error challenges the trial court’s

issuance of the ex parte protection order. This court, however, has observed

that an ex parte order is not final and appealable, pursuant to R.C.

3113.31(G). Furthermore, the court’s final order of protection supersedes
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                         5

the ex parte order, rendering any claim of error with regard to the ex parte

order moot. See Daugherty v. Daugherty, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 2012-Ohio-

1520, at ¶ 15, citing In re J.R. R., 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA17, 2009-

Ohio-5812, at ¶ 29 (explaining that in domestic relations actions, final order

supersedes temporary orders, rendering possible errors in the temporary

orders moot). See also J.J. v. Kilgore, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-401, 2021-Ohio-

928, at ¶ 7. The ex parte order herein merged into the order granting the

DVCPO, and any possible error contained therein is now moot. Therefore,

we overrule the first assignment of error.

              SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR - DVCPO

      {¶10} Within the second assignment of error, Appellant argues the

trial court’s decision granting the amended petition and issuing a DVCPO

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant contends that

Appellee initiated the argument and physical altercation that gave rise to the

filing of the original petition, and that Appellee caused her own injuries.

Appellant contends that the evidence before the trial court demonstrated that

his own conduct was neither intentional nor reckless. In granting the

petition and order, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

      Petitioner and/or Petitioner’s family members are victims
      of domestic violence as alleged in the Petition and as
      defined in R.C. 3113.31. The Court gives greater weight
      and credibility to the testimony of the Petitioner than the
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      6

      testimony of the Respondent. The Court finds that the
      protected persons herein are in immediate and present
      danger of domestic violence and for good cause shown,
      the following temporary orders are necessary to protect the
      persons named in this Order from domestic violence.

We begin by setting forth the appropriate standard of review of the trial

court’s order.

         STANDARD OF REVIEW ON PROTECTION ORDERS

      {¶11} “ ‘ “Our standard of review upon a challenge to a CPO

depends upon the nature of the challenge to the CPO.” ’ ” Dietrich v.

Dietrich, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 22CA15, 2023-Ohio-4822, at ¶53, quoting

York v. York, 2022-Ohio-4733, 203 N.E.3d 866, at ¶ 46 (4th Dist.), quoting

Wootten v. Culp, 2017-Ohio-665, 85 N.E.3d 198, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.) (Internal

citation omitted.) As in Appellant's case,

             When the issue is whether a CPO should have been
      issued at all, we must determine whether the trial court's
      finding that the petitioner has shown by the preponderance
      of the evidence that the petitioner or petitioner's family or
      household members are in danger of the domestic violence
      is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Martindale v. Martindale, 2017-Ohio-9266, 102 N.E.3d 19, ¶15 (4th Dist.),

citing Wootten at ¶ 18.

      {¶12} In undertaking a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review,

“[w]e are guided by the presumption that the trial court's factual findings are
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                          7

correct because of the knowledge that the trial judge ‘is best able to view the

witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and

use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered

testimony.’ ” Henry v. Henry, 4th Dist. Ross No. 4CA2781, 2005-Ohio-67,

¶ 14, quoting Seasons Coal. Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 461

N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “[W]e thus defer to the trier of fact on these issues[.]”

Wootten at ¶ 20, citing State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-

1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 132. And the trier of fact is free to believe all, part,

or none of any witnesses’ testimony. Id., citing State v. West, 4th Dist.

Scioto No. 12CA3507, 2014-Ohio-1941, at ¶ 23.

      {¶13} “Under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence review, ‘[a]n

appellate court will not reverse a trial court's judgment so long as it is

supported by any competent, credible evidence going to all of the essential

elements of the case.’ ” Dietrich, supra, at ¶ 55, quoting Bugg v. Fancher,

4th Dist. Highland No. 6CA12, 2007-Ohio-2019, ¶ 9, citing C.E. Morris

Constr. Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280, 376 N.E.2d 578

(1978). Under this highly deferential standard of review, a reviewing court

does not decide whether it would have come to the same conclusion as the

trial court. Rather, we are required to uphold the judgment so long as the

record as a whole contains some evidence from which the trier of fact could
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                        8

have reached its ultimate factual conclusions. Bugg, supra, citing Seasons

Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 79, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

Ultimately, a reviewing court should find a trial court's decision is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the decision. Wootten at ¶ 21, citing State

v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 330.

                           LEGAL ANALYSIS

      {¶14} A person seeking a civil protection order must prove domestic

violence or the threat of domestic violence by a preponderance of the

evidence. Henry, supra, at ¶15, citing Felton v. Felton,79 Ohio St.3d 34,

1997-Ohio-302, 679 N.E.2d 672, paragraph two of the syllabus. R.C.

3113.31(A)(1) defines domestic violence:

      “Domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more
      of the following acts against a family or household
      member: (a) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing
      bodily injury; (b) Placing another person by the threat of
      force in fear of imminent serious physical harm or
      committing a violation of section 2903.211 or 2911.211 of
      the Revised Code.

Martinez v. Martinez, 12th Dist. Butler No. 2023-Ohio-4783, at ¶ 17. R.C.

3113.31 does not define “bodily injury,” but “for purposes of the offense of

domestic violence under R.C. 2901.01(A)(3), ‘physical harm’ to a person

means 'any injury, regardless of its gravity or duration.’ ” McGrady v.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                         9

Muench, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2018-122-145, 2019-Ohio-2677 at ¶ 13,

quoting J.R. v. E.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP-431, 2017-Ohio-516, ¶

13; State v. Reynolds, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-701, 2004-Ohio-3692, ¶

14.

      {¶15} “Imminent” means “on the point of happening.” Henry, at ¶

19; Black's Law Dictionary (6Ed.) at 750; Ohio Domestic Violence Law

(2004), Section 8.4, at 212; State v. Collie, 108 Ohio App.3d 580, 583, 671

N.E.2d 338 (1st Dist.1996) (defining “imminent” as “threatening to occur

immediately”). In Strong v. Bauman, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 17256 and

17414, 1999 WL 317432 (May 21, 1999), at *4, the court defined

“imminent” as “ready to take place,” “near at hand,” “impending,” “hanging

threateningly over one's head,” or “menacingly near.” “Imminent” does not

mean that “the offender carry out the threat immediately or be in the process

of carrying it out.” Id. Rather, the critical inquiry is “whether a reasonable

person would be placed in fear of imminent (in the sense of unconditional,

non-contingent), serious physical harm * * * [which] necessarily involves

both subjective and objective elements.” Id.

      {¶16} Appellee set forth these allegations of physical abuse and

threatening behavior in her amended petition:
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      10

      1. The March 1, 2023 incident over washing dishes where
         Appellee was struck with a cup and scratched with
         keys;

      2. A November 2022 incident at the kitchen table
         wherein Appellant bent Appellee’s arm behind her
         back until it hurt;

      3. Appellant’s threat to “put a bullet” in Appellee’s
         daughter’s head;

      4. Appellant             exhibited          “extreme
         anger/jealousy/resentment” towards Appellee’s ex-
         husband;

      5. A December 28, 2022 incident when Appellant
         threatened to scare B.C.’s friend;

      6. Appellant’s threats to kill Appellee and himself if she
         ever cheated on him.

      {¶17} Regarding the first allegation, Sergeant Brian Nolen testified

that he responded to a call at the parties’ residence on March 1, 2023.

According to Sergeant Nolen:

             [Appellee’s] complaint was there had been an
      argument between her and her husband over doing dishes.
      He had thrown a cup that hit her in the head. I asked her
      if that was intentional, she said she didn’t think so. She
      then went on to explain that she had been scratched in the
      arm with car keys and showed me her forearm, which I
      could see a visible scratch.

      {¶18} Sergeant Nolen also testified to his interaction with Appellant

as follows:
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                       11

             Later I spoke with James inside. James had told me
      the same story, there had been an argument, it was over
      something silly. He was trying to take the baby and leave
      to go to his mother’s so that things could calm down. He
      told me, and admitted the same thing that Kaylee had told
      me, he turned to leave, she tried to grab the baby from him
      and Kaylee got scratched. He told me it was an accident,
      caused by him twisting his body, turning, trying to keep
      her from getting the baby from him.

      {¶19} According to Sergeant Nolen, Appellee was adamant that

Appellant scratched her intentionally. Sergeant Nolen arrested Appellant

and filed a domestic violence charge.

      {¶20}Sergeant Nolen further testified he was subsequently contacted

by Appellee on March 28, 2023 to report a Facebook message from

Appellant. The message was sent despite the ex parte order in effect.

Sergeant Nolen investigated the matter but did not ultimately file a charge.

      {¶21}On direct examination, Appellee testified to two acts of physical

violence and to multiple threats. Appellee first testified that on March 1,

2023, she had been gone all day. When she returned home, Appellant had

been drinking and there were four or five beer cans in the trash can.

             I had just gotten home from work, there were dishes
      in the sink. I was trying to load them in the dishwasher. I
      put a bowl, a plastic mix, mixing bowl on the top rack of
      the dishwasher um James then told me that that should go
      on the bottom rack of the dishwasher. I told him, I do the
      dishes the majority of the time, I don’t need you critiquing
      me. At that point, he became very angry by my statement.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      12

      * * * He had a plastic cup in his hand, he threw it in the
      sink, it bounced out and hit the floor. He picked it up a
      second time, threw it in the sink, it bounced out and hit me
      in the head. At that point we started arguing further
      because he had hit me with the cup. He picked up a
      vacuum cleaner, threw it on the ground, um it broke apart
      into a couple pieces. He picked it back up and threw it a
      second time.

      {¶22} Appellee further testified that when Appellant decided to

leave with the baby, she was concerned because he had been drinking all day

and he was impaired. She testified that when she tried to take R.S. from

Appellant, “he had the keys in his hand and scraped them down my arm.

And it wasn’t an accident.” Appellee identified Exhibits 8A, B, and C,

pictures of her right forearm after the incident.

      {¶23} Appellee testified to a prior incident of violence. Appellant

and she were at the kitchen table arguing. The three older children were

there. Appellant was yelling at the older children and Appellee told him to

“knock it off.” Appellee pointed a fork 8-12 inches away from Appellant’s

face. Appellant then pulled her out of her seat and put her arm behind her

back. Appellee told Appellant he was hurting her. Appellee did not contact

law enforcement because she had no physical marks and did not think she

could prove domestic violence.

      {¶24} Appellee also testified to several threats. Appellee explained

that Appellant tried to limit her older children’s interactions with R.S.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                       13

Appellee was sitting on the couch and they had been arguing. Appellant

“got in her face, nose to nose, and told her, ‘I’m just telling you right now if

any of those other kids would hurt [R.S.], I will put a bullet in their head.’ ”

      {¶25} Appellee also testified that Appellant threatened to scare

B.C.’s friend. Appellee testified that Appellant intimidates her and her

family. Appellant previously threatened that “if I were to ever cheat on him

that he would kill me and kill whoever I was with.” Appellee did not reach

out to law enforcement because the threats were conditional.

      {¶26} Appellee testified she experienced emotional distress due to

Appellant’s words and actions. She was also concerned about his “jealousy

and control issues.” Appellee knows Appellant owns guns and has harmed

others in “romantic relationships.”

      {¶27} On cross-examination, Appellee admitted she didn’t tell

Sergeant Nolen that she feared her husband was impaired. She admitted she

did not document the beer cans in the trash can although she documented her

injuries. Appellee admitted she tried to forcibly remove R.S. from his

hands. Appellee testified her husband had threatened to kill her multiple

times although she couldn’t remember dates. Appellee believes Appellant

has mental health issues. Appellee admitted that Sergeant Nolen asked her if
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                     14

she wanted to file charges as a result of the March 28 message from

Appellant and she declined.

      {¶28} On direct, Appellant testified Appellee is often stressed over

work and she drinks every evening. Appellant testified that on March 1 he

and R.S. were in the kitchen. R.S. was in her high chair. Appellee arrived

home and he could tell she was in a bad mood. She had her backpack, purse,

and beers in her arm. Appellee started doing the dishes. Appellant told her

she had done something wrong with the dishes and they started arguing.

      {¶29} Appellant explained that he had a shaker cup of popcorn in his

hand and he threw it in the kitchen sink. The popcorn spilled “all over.”

Appellant retrieved the cup, threw it in the sink again, and this time it

bounced out and hit Appellee. Appellant attempted to use the vacuum to

sweep up the popcorn. He threw the vacuum down and picked it back up in

“agitation.”

      {¶30} Appellant then walked into the living room to decide what to

do. They were still arguing. Appellant decided to take R.S. and go to his

mother’s house to “get out of” the situation. As he held R.S., he told

Appellee that he was leaving for his mother’s home and reached to get his

keys. Appellee got mad and tried to take R.S., but he “clinches onto” the
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      15

baby. Appellant was holding onto R.S. and Appellee’s hands were over top

of his arms.

      {¶31} Appellant testified he did not intend to hurt Appellee and she

was accidentally scratched in the process of the struggle over R.S. He

denied “dragging” the keys down her arm. Appellant took R.S. out to the

car to make sure he had a diaper bag. As he opened the car door, Appellee

said she was going to call the sheriff. He walked back into the house and

Appellee was on the phone with 911. Appellant then called his sister and

waited with R.S. on the couch until the officer arrived. The officer talked to

Appellee outside. When Appellee and the officer came inside, Appellant

was arrested.

      {¶32} Appellant described Appellee during the incident as “upset but

not scared.” She did not seem concerned for her safety or that of the kids.

Appellant admitted he is a “loud talker” especially if he gets excited. He

admitted he was angry and upset, but he was not screaming or yelling and

did not intend to harm Appellee. Appellant testified he thinks “the whole

thing” is to “get control” in the parties’ divorce proceedings. Appellant

denied drinking beer before Appellee got home. The beer cans in the trash

were from the prior evening.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                                               16

           {¶33} Appellant testified he is in anger management. He denied

mental health issues or alcohol issues.1

           {¶34} Regarding the March 28 message, Appellant testified he texted

Appellee accidentally when he was trying to get in touch with his mother-in-

law to arrange a visit. Appellant testified the accident happened because he

was trying to find a place to live, arrange the visit, and “doing too many

things at one time.” Aside from the accidental message, he has complied

with the court orders. Appellant identified Exhibit 13 as the message he

meant to send to his mother-in-law, not Appellee.

           {¶35} Regarding the fork incident, Appellant could not recall why

they were arguing. Appellee stuck a fork about three inches from his face

and he thought it was dangerous. Appellee and the older children were

laughing at him. Appellant moved Appellee’s hand out of the way, grabbed

R.S., and went into the bedroom.

           {¶36} As to the alleged threats to the kids, Appellant testified

Appellee and he were having a “what if” conversation about what would

happen if someone purposely hurt or killed R.S. Appellant testified his

reaction was to say he would “kill them.” Appellant asked Appellee the

1
    Appellee testified she registered Appellant for anger management the day after the key incident.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                       17

same question and she gave the same answer as his. He later admitted he

had no proof of this alleged statement of Appellee.

      {¶37} Appellant testified Appellee’s oldest daughter B.C. causes

problems and is argumentative and undisciplined. Appellant testified he

shuts himself in the bedroom with R.S. to avoid B.C. As to the alleged

threat to B.C.’s friend, Appellant testified B.C. had been disrespectful and

Appellant changed his mind about permission to have the friend over.

      {¶38} Appellant admitted calling B.C. a bitch “because of how she

acts and how she treats myself and her mother.” He denied bending his

wife’s arm behind her back with the children at the table. He denied being

jealous but testified he did not like Appellee’s ex-husband “because he’s not

kind to her and not good to his kids.”

      {¶39} Appellant admitted throwing things could have an intimidating

effect. He admitted cussing around the children.

      {¶40} Melissa Yates, Appellant’s sister, also testified on his behalf.

Yates was on the phone with Appellant on March 1, 2023. She overheard

Appellee yelling and cussing in the background. Appellant told her about

the incident and that he was going to leave to get away from the situation.

On cross-examination, Yates admitted that she did not see the scratching

incident. She also acknowledged a prior conversation with Appellee during
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                                                   18

which she told Appellee “I don’t understand how you put up with some

things.” On redirect, Yates described “some things” as “nitpicking.”2

         {¶41} Upon our review of the testimony, we find that the trial court’s

finding that Appellee and her family members are victims of domestic

violence as alleged in the amended petition and pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 is

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court also noted in

the order that it gave greater weight and credibility to the testimony of

Appellee. Here, we are mindful that it is the fact-finder who is best able to

weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses by viewing the

demeanor, voice inflections, eye movements, and gestures of the witnesses.

See Dietrich, supra, at ¶57; Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 80; State v.

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). As a

consequence, when there are two fairly reasonable views of the evidence or

two conflicting versions of events, neither of which is unbelievable, it is not

our province to choose which one should be believed. See State v. Gore,

131 Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist.1999). See also

Rupeka v. Mokros, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2022-T-0097, 2023-Ohio-2542,

at ¶11; McCloud v. Baker, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 21CA3, 2022-Ohio-1307,

2
  At the conclusion of the full hearing, the trial court admitted Appellee’s exhibits including text messages,
Facebook messages, photographs of her forearm after the March 1 incident, Sergeant Nolen’s narrative, and
the Scioto County Sheriff’s Department report with supplements. The court also admitted one undated text
message offered by Appellant.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                     19

at ¶8, quoting Seasons Coal, supra, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 81 (“A reviewing

court should not reverse a decision simply because it holds a different

opinion concerning the credibility of the witnesses and evidence submitted

before the trial court.”)

      {¶42} Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant has not

demonstrated that the court’s finding of domestic violence was against the

weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is

without merit and is hereby overruled.

    THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR - MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

      {¶43} The third assignment of error concerns Appellant’s Motion for

New Trial brought pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(8) based on “newly discovered

evidence.” “ ‘A trial court's decision denying a new trial pursuant to Civ.R.

59(A)(8) will not be disturbed, absent an abuse of discretion.’ ” Lawless v.

Board of Education of Lawrence County Educational Service Center, 2020-

Ohio-117, 141 N.E.3d 267, at ¶68 (4th Dist.), quoting Gregory v. Kottman-

Gregory, 12th Dist. Madison Nos. CA2004-11-039, 2005-Ohio-6558, ¶ 25.

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court “acts in an unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable manner.” State ex rel. Charvat v. Frye, 114

Ohio St.3d 76, 2007-Ohio-2882, 868 N.E.2d 270, at ¶ 16.
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      20

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

      {¶44} In the motion before the trial court, Appellant informed that

Appellee failed to appear at a scheduled pretrial hearing in the criminal case

related to the alleged domestic violence herein, despite being properly

subpoenaed. This omission occurred after the parties’ full hearing and

issuance of the DVCPO. Appellant contended that Appellee’s conduct

therefore was “inconsistent” with that of a legitimate victim of domestic

violence. Appellant further contends that Appellee’s failure to appear is

relevant evidence going directly to Appellee’s credibility and evidence he

was unable to procure prior to the full hearing.

      {¶45} Civ.R. 59(A)(8) states that a court may grant a new trial based

on “[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party applying, which

with reasonable diligence [the party] could not have discovered and

produced at trial[.]” “A trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling

a Civ.R. 59 motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence

where the events constituting the newly discovered evidence occurred after

trial and subsequent to the court decision but prior to entry of judgment.”

Ewing v. Ewing, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 368, 1986 WL 6049, *3 (May 20,

1986). For purposes of Civ.R. 59(A)(8), the phrase “newly discovered

evidence” “refers to evidence of facts in existence at the time of trial of
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                      21

which the aggrieved party was excusably ignorant.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

The principle that facts that come into existence after trial are not newly

discovered evidence that would justify granting a new trial “is well grounded

in the basic concept of finality of judgments.” In re S.S., 9th Dist. Wayne

No. 04CA0032, 2004-Ohio-5371, ¶ 14. As the Ninth District Court of

Appeals has stated:

              To permit parties to bring up issues and facts that
      occurred after the trial would only serve to leave
      judgments unsettled and open to challenge at any time.
      Hails v. Hails (Sept. 30, 1993), 11th Dist. No. 92-L-182,
      1993 WL 407258. There must be a reasonable end to
      litigation. Id. To allow otherwise would mean the potential
      perpetual continuation of all trials in derogation of the
      notion of finality. Fink, Greenbaum, & Wilson, Guide to
      the Ohio Civil Rules of Procedure (2003) § 59:14.

      {¶46} Based upon the foregoing principles, Appellee’s failure to

appear at the criminal pretrial may not be considered newly discovered

evidence pursuant to Civil Rule 59(A)(8). Consequently, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial. This

assignment of error is also without merit and is hereby overruled.

      {¶47} Having found no merit to any of Appellant’s assignments of

error, we hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                        JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

                           JUDGMENT ENTRY
Scioto App. No. 23CA4028                                                        22

      It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be
assessed to Appellant.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Scioto County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, to
carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

      Hess, J., & Wilkin, J., Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                 For the Court,

                                 ___________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge

                           NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.