Court Opinion

ID: 9897225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:56.255083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.459619
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Nov 14 2023, 8:35 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Theodore E. Rokita                                        Jacob M. O’Brien
Attorney General of Indiana                               Scott L. Starr
                                                          Starr Austen & Miller, LLP
Frances Barrow                                            Logansport, Indiana
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marion Superior Court                                     November 14, 2023
Probation Department,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant,                                      23A-CT-61
                                                          Appeal from the Marion Superior
        v.                                                Court
                                                          The Honorable Bruce E. Petit,
Cheryl Trapuzzano and Jennifer                            Special Judge
Trapuzzano, as Co-Personal                                Trial Court Cause No.
Representatives of the Estate of                          49D12-1603-CT-9812
Nathan Trapuzzano, Deceased,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.

                                Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                           Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023                              Page 1 of 16
      Case Summary
[1]   In this interlocutory appeal, the Marion Superior Court Probation Department

      (“Probation Department”) appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for

      summary judgment regarding claims brought by Cheryl Trapuzzano and

      Jennifer Trapuzzano, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Nathan

      Trapuzzano (“Trapuzzano”) (collectively, “the Estate”). The Estate brought

      claims against the Probation Department after a probationer shot and killed

      Trapuzzano during an apparent robbery. On appeal, the Probation Department

      argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment

      because: (1) the Probation Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2)

      the Probation Department has common law immunity and immunity under the

      Indiana Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”) from liability for the Estate’s claims; and (3)

      the Probation Department was not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death.

      We find one issue dispositive and hold that the Probation Department has

      quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims. Accordingly, we

      reverse and remand.

      Issue
[2]   The Probation Department raises three issues. We find one issue dispositive,

      which we restate as whether the trial court erred by determining that genuine

      issues of material fact existed regarding whether the Probation Department has

      quasi-judicial immunity from liability for the Estate’s claims.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023     Page 2 of 16
      Facts
[3]   S.A. had an extensive juvenile history, which included offenses involving

      handguns. In December 2013, the State alleged that S.A. committed acts that

      would be auto theft, carrying a handgun without a license, possession of

      marijuana, operating a vehicle without a license, fleeing law enforcement,

      resisting law enforcement, and dangerous possession of a firearm if committed

      by an adult. The juvenile court found the auto theft and resisting law

      enforcement allegations to be true and dismissed the other charges. On

      February 10, 2014, S.A. was given a suspended commitment to the Department

      of Correction; placed on probation; placed on home confinement with his

      uncle; ordered to attend school; submit to a substance abuse evaluation; and

      attend counseling and the Restoring Excellence Program.

[4]   Between February 11, 2014, and March 9, 2014, S.A. was in non-compliance

      with the terms of his probation on at least fifteen occasions because he was not

      at home during checks, was suspended from school, attended neither the

      Restoring Excellence Program nor counseling, and failed to submit to a

      substance abuse evaluation. Probation Department policy required S.A.’s

      probation officer, Tracy McDonald, to file a notice with the juvenile court after

      the third violation, but McDonald did not do so. On March 5, 2014,

      McDonald’s supervisor, Christina Gibson, addressed the violations with

      McDonald in an email and asked why they “shouldn’t go ahead and do a

      [petition to modify] on [S.A.].” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 218.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023      Page 3 of 16
[5]   On March 5, 2014, the Probation Department filed a petition for modification

      of the dispositional decree. The Probation Department alleged that S.A.

      received a five-day out of school suspension, failed to participate in the

      Restoring Excellence Program, and had unauthorized leaves from his residence

      on nine occasions. The Probation Department requested that the juvenile court

      schedule a hearing on the matter but did not request any emergency relief or

      request a change in S.A.’s placement. The juvenile court set the matter for a

      hearing on April 7, 2014. While waiting on the April 7 hearing, S.A. continued

      to violate the terms of his probation, burglarized a gun shop, shot a man outside

      of a restaurant, and on April 1, 2014, shot and killed Trapuzzano during an

      apparent robbery.

[6]   In March 2016, the Estate filed a complaint against Marion County, the

      Probation Department, the Marion Superior Court Executive Committee,

      Christine Kerl, Tracy McDonald, and Marion County Community Corrections

      Agency. 1 The complaint was amended twice, and the second amended

      complaint alleged:

              38. Defendants were negligent in many ways, including, without
              limitation, by:

      1
       The parties do not mention whether the Estate filed a notice of tort claim pursuant to Indiana Code Section
      34-13-3-8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023                             Page 4 of 16
                 a. Failing to exercise reasonable care in the operation and
                 administration of the Marion County Superior Court
                 Probation Department;

                 b. Failing to exercise reasonable care in carrying out the
                 responsibilities of probation officers in the Marion County
                 Superior Court Probation Department;

                 c. Failing to follow the policies and procedures of the
                 Marion County Superior Court Probation Department;

                 d. Failing to fulfill the mandatory duties of probation
                 officers as prescribed by Indiana Code 11-13-1-3;

                 e. Failing to fulfill the duties of probation officers as
                 required by the policies and procedures of the Marion
                 County Superior Court Probation Department;

                 f. Failing to properly supervise Tracy McDonald and/or
                 other probation officers;

                 g. Failing to properly hire, retain, train, oversee, and
                 employ Tracy McDonald and/or other probation officers;

                 h. Failing to properly monitor and/or supervise [S.A.] per
                 the terms of his probation; and

                 i. Failing to properly record, track, supervise, and notify
                 authorities of violations of [S.A.’s] home detention.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 41-42.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023            Page 5 of 16
[7]   The trial court dismissed all of the defendants except the Probation

      Department, and the Probation Department filed a motion for summary

      judgment. The Probation Department alleged that: (1) the Probation

      Department did not owe a duty to Trapuzzano; (2) the Probation Department

      had immunity from the Estate’s claims; and (3) the Probation Department was

      not the proximate cause of Trapuzzano’s death. The Estate filed a response,

      and the trial court conducted a hearing in July 2022.

[8]   In November 2022, the trial court denied the Probation Department’s motion.

      The trial court concluded that: (1) the Probation Department owed a duty to

      Trapuzzano; (2) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate quasi-

      judicial immunity; (3) genuine issues of material fact exist which may negate

      discretionary function immunity under the ITCA; (4) law enforcement

      immunity under the ITCA is inapplicable; and (5) genuine issues of material

      fact exist regarding whether the Probation Department was the proximate cause

      of Trapuzzano’s death. Regarding quasi-judicial immunity, the trial court

      found:

              13. Courts are reluctant to apply quasi-judicial immunity too
              broadly and if the acts do not involve the judicial process so that
              a fear exists that freedom of judicial decision making may be
              stifled, then the person or act should not be shielded by
              immunity. Lake County Juvenile Court v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429
              (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). While it is true that the filing of a notice of
              probation violation should be considered an arm of the judicial
              officer who is immune and entitled to quasi judicial immunity,
              that may not be the case if the actor knowingly filed a false
              probation violation. Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139 (Ind.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023         Page 6 of 16
        Ct. App. 2019). In this cause, there is evidence that not only did
        [the Probation Department] omit information in the Petition filed
        with the Court which would be vital to the Court in determining
        appropriate action to take, but they also made recommendations
        contrary to their own belief and mandatory policies. I.C. 11-13-
        1-1(C) creates a mandatory duty to notify the Court when a
        violation of conditions or probation occurs and to keep accurate
        records of cases investigated by Probation Department and make
        these records available to the Court. Id. at 1144 ([e]mphasis
        added). If the facts alleged by the [the Estate] as set out in the
        depositions and emails from [Probation Department] employees
        are true, then the trier-of-fact could find that not only was the
        Petition filed by the [Probation Department] not in furtherance of
        a judicial determination, but an actual deterrence to that process.
        The [Estate] cites evidence that presiding Juvenile Judge Moores
        was extremely angry and upset to not have been provided with
        accurate information in the Violation of Probation Petition as
        filed. This could further support a finding that Probation’s
        actions were outside the protection of quasi-judicial immunity.
        Based upon depositions of Christina Gibson, the trier-of-fact
        could find that the probation officer intentionally withheld vital
        information in the Petition filed which would negate the granting
        of immunity. Parke City v. Ropak, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct.
        App. 1988).

        14. The Court believes that there is also an issue of fact as to
        whether Probation was carrying out a Court Order. In order for
        judicial immunity to apply, the [d]efendant must be carrying out
        an order of the Court. Preparing reports for the Court’s review to
        assist the Court in making a judicial determination is closely tied
        to a judicial proceeding. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct.
        App. 2012). However, to omit vital information as is alleged in
        the [Estate’s] cause of action may be found to be actions not
        enforcing the Court’s Order, but rather a direct violation of that
        Order. This is a question of fact for the trier and not appropriate
        for summary judgment.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023       Page 7 of 16
               15. The Court finds that there are sufficient questions of fact
               which may negate the protection afforded through quasi-judicial
               immunity and [the Probation Department’s] Motion for
               Summary Judgment is denied on that ground.

                                                     *****

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 30-31. This Court then granted the Probation

       Department permission to bring this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Indiana

       Appellate Rule 14(B).

       Discussion and Decision
[9]    The Probation Department appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for

       summary judgment. “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion

       for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v.

       DeKalb Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

       (quoting Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary

       judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is

       no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

       a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs.,

       128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[10]   The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie

       showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment

       as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden then shifts to the

       non-moving party, which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023       Page 8 of 16
       material fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts

       or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[11]   We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo,

       and we take “care to ensure that no party is denied his day in court.” Schoettmer

       v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. 2013). “We limit our review to the

       materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res.,

       90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied. Because the trial court entered

       findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also reiterate that findings of fact

       and conclusions of law entered by the trial court aid our review, but they do not

       bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).

[12]   In Benton v. City of Oakland City, 721 N.E.2d 224, 232 (Ind. 1999), our Supreme

       Court held: “In general, it is only after a determination is made that a

       governmental defendant is not immune . . . that a court undertakes the analysis

       of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances.” Accordingly,

       we begin by addressing the parties’ immunity arguments. “More than forty

       years ago, a series of judicial decisions almost entirely abolished common law

       immunity for government entities and activities in this state.” F.D. v. Ind. Dep’t

       of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131, 135-36 (Ind. 2013). “Under Indiana common law,

       with very limited exception, governmental entities are thus subject to liability

       under traditional tort theories.” Id. at 136. The three limited exceptions are

       “crime prevention, appointments to public office, and judicial decision-

       making.” Id. (citing Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 227) (emphasis added). In

       response, the Indiana General Assembly passed the ITCA. “This statute
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023          Page 9 of 16
       granted absolute immunity to governmental entities in a number of specific

       circumstances, and codified rules of liability for other areas of governmental

       activity.” Id.

[13]   Whether immunity applies is a question of law for the court, and the party

       seeking immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that immunity applies. Id.

       “The negligence of a defendant ‘is not relevant if it is immune. Immunity

       assumes negligence but denies liability.’” Id. (quoting Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of

       Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2002)).

[14]   Although the parties discuss both common law quasi-judicial immunity and

       immunity under the ITCA, we resolve this matter on the basis of common law

       quasi-judicial immunity. “It is well-settled that judges are entitled to absolute

       judicial immunity from suits for money damages for all actions taken in the

       judge’s judicial capacity, unless those actions are taken in the complete absence

       of any jurisdiction.” H.B. v. Indiana-Elkhart Div. of Fam. & Child., 713 N.E.2d

       300, 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. “The underlying purpose of the

       immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making process.”

       Id. “[T]he same policies that underlie the grant of absolute judicial immunity to

       judges justify the grant of immunity to non-judicial officers who perform quasi-

       judicial functions.” Id. “Absolute judicial immunity therefore extends to

       persons performing tasks so integral or intertwined with the judicial process that

       these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer who is immune.” Id.

       “In determining whether a person is entitled to judicial immunity, the United

       States Supreme Court has established a functional approach, where the court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023      Page 10 of 16
       looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who

       performed it.” Id. (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S. Ct. 538

       (1988)).

[15]   “Probation in Indiana is a court function, and probation officers are trained,

       tested, hired, and supervised directly by the judiciary.” Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d

       320, 324 (Ind. 2005); see also Ind. Code Chapter 11-13-1 (discussing probation

       administration); Ind. Admin. Rule 18 (discussing the governance of county

       probation departments). Probation officers “serve at the pleasure of the

       appointing court and are directly responsible to and subject to the orders of the

       court.” Ind. Code § 11-13-1-1(c).

[16]   This Court has held that individual probation officers were entitled to quasi-

       judicial immunity where the plaintiff alleged that the probation officers

       “exceeded the scope of their authority as probation officers by failing to

       maintain accurate records and providing the sentencing court . . . with

       knowingly false information.” Thornton v. Pietrzak, 120 N.E.3d 1139, 1143 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The plaintiff in Thornton alleged that probation

       officers erroneously filed a petition to revoke probation where he was not on

       probation. We noted that, “[p]ursuant to statute, probation officers have

       mandatory duties, including, to ‘notify the court when a violation of a

       condition of probation occurs’ and to ‘keep accurate records of cases

       investigated by [them] and of all cases assigned to [them] by the court and make

       these records available to the court upon request.’” Id. at 1143-44 (citing Ind.

       Code § 11-13-1-3(7), (9)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023       Page 11 of 16
[17]   In Thornton, the probation officers “followed their statutory duty to notify the

       court when a violation of a condition of probation occurred pursuant to the

       original sentencing order . . . and their belief that Thornton was still on

       probation at the time he committed new offenses because his probation had

       been tolled when he served an executed sentence in an unrelated case.” Id. at

       1144-45. We concluded that, “in filing the notice of probation violation, [the

       probation officers] were ‘performing [a task] so integral or intertwined with the

       judicial process’ that they should be ‘considered an arm of the judicial officer

       who is immune.’” Id. at 1145. Accordingly, we held that the probation officers

       were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and that the trial court properly

       granted summary judgment to the probation officers. See also J.A.W. v. State,

       650 N.E.2d 1142, 1151-53 (holding that a probation officer had quasi-judicial

       immunity despite the claims that the probation officer was “derelict in the

       performance of his duties”), vacated in part and summarily aff’d in relevant part by

       687 N.E.2d 1202, 1203 n.3 (Ind. 1997).

[18]   Here, as in Thornton, the Estate alleges that the Probation Department withheld

       vital information from the petition for modification and intentionally provided

       false information. We find little to distinguish the actions at issue here from the

       actions at issue in Thornton. The Estate, however, argues that Thornton is

       inapplicable because quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to governmental

       entities. In support of this argument, the Estate cites federal cases addressing

       Section 1983 claims. Our Court, however, has applied quasi-judicial immunity

       to governmental entities in connection with other types of claims. In

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023        Page 12 of 16
       Mendenhall v. City of Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999),

       trans. denied, a property owner brought an inverse condemnation action against

       several governmental entities, including the Indianapolis Police Department

       (“IPD”) after IPD executed a trial court’s order to seize the property owner’s

       bookstore. We held that IPD was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity because

       IPD’s actions were in furtherance of the trial court’s order. Accordingly, we

       held that the City of Indianapolis could “not be held liable for protected actions

       by IPD . . . .” Mendenhall, 717 N.E.2d at 1227.

[19]   Similarly, in H.B., 713 N.E.2d at 302, children filed a complaint against the

       State of Indiana—Elkhart County Office Division of Family and Children

       (“DFC”). While the children were removed from their mother and her

       boyfriend and placed in foster care, DFC became aware that the boyfriend

       molested one of the children on a weekend visit. DFC did not report the abuse

       to law enforcement and later recommended to the trial court that the children

       be reunited with mother, who was still living with the boyfriend. The trial court

       took the recommendation and reunited the children with their mother, and the

       boyfriend later molested the children again. The complaint alleged that DFC

       was negligent in recommending that the children be reunited with their mother

       and by failing to report the first molestation to law enforcement.

[20]   We held that DFC was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as follows:

               [T]he case workers employed by the DFC were acting to assist
               the juvenile court judge in his decisions regarding the care and
               custody of the Children. The DFC and its employees were acting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023     Page 13 of 16
           under the direction of Ind. Code § 31-6-11-11 (1988)[ 2], which
           states that case workers from the DFC “shall assist the juvenile
           court . . . during all stages of the proceedings in accordance with
           the purposes of [the chapter regarding reporting and investigation
           of child abuse and neglect].” Specifically, after the Children were
           adjudicated Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”), the case
           workers were required to complete a case plan for the Children,
           Ind. Code § 31-6-4-6.6 (1988)[ 3], and to prepare a predispositional
           report that included a recommendation for the care, treatment,
           and rehabilitation of the Children. Ind. Code § 31-6-4-15
           (1988).[ 4] The case workers, in addition to acting under the
           statutes, were acting in accordance with the juvenile court’s order
           to monitor the progress made by the Children, Mother and
           Boyfriend. Further, the DFC’s recommendation to reunify the
           Children with Mother was made during a judicial proceeding.
           Thus, the case workers were acting as an arm of the juvenile
           court judge by implementing the court’s order, and ultimately
           recommending that the Children be returned to Mother. We
           hold that . . . these were acts intimately associated with a judicial
           proceeding and entitled the DFC to absolute immunity from suit.
           Too, because the initial molestation took place after the Children
           were adjudicated CHINS and came under the supervision of the
           DFC, we hold that the failure of the DFC to report the 1989
           molestation to law enforcement officials occurred in the course of
           the DFC’s court-ordered duties[] and falls within the scope of the
           DFC’s judicial immunity. Thus, the trial court did not err by
           entering summary judgment for the State on its claim for judicial
           immunity.

2
    Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
3
    Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.
4
    Repealed by P.L. 1-1997, § 157.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023           Page 14 of 16
       Id. at 302-03 (footnotes omitted); cf. D.L. v. Huck, 978 N.E.2d 429, 433-34 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2012) (distinguishing H.B. and holding that the Department of Child

       Services (“DCS”) was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity where DCS’s

       removal of the child was not at the direction of a court and occurred after the

       CHINS proceedings had been closed), aff’d on reh’g by 978 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2012). Given our holdings in Mendenhall and H.B., we disagree with the

       Estate’s contention that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to the

       Probation Department.

[21]   Finally, we note that the trial court focused on what it described as genuine

       issues of material fact as to whether the probation officer intentionally withheld

       vital information. Quasi-judicial immunity, like judicial immunity, is

       “absolute.” Melton v. Ind. Athletic Trainers Bd., 156 N.E.3d 633, 652 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020), trans. denied. “Such immunity totally insulates officials from

       liability for actions taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial capacity; the shield of

       absolute immunity cannot be pierced even if the official acts in error,

       maliciously, or corruptly.” Id. at 655. Regardless of whether the probation

       officer’s conduct was intentional or negligent, quasi-judicial immunity applies.

       Because the Probation Department has immunity from the Estate’s claims, we

       need not address the parties’ other arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that

       the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion for

       summary judgment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023         Page 15 of 16
       Conclusion
[22]   The Probation Department is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for the Estate’s

       claims, and the trial court erred by denying the Probation Department’s motion

       for summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

[23]   Reversed and remanded.

       Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-61 | November 14, 2023   Page 16 of 16