Court Opinion

ID: 9571328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:51.070688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:12.161583
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(dissenting).
I deem it necessary to respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, not so much perhaps from the disposition of this particular case but because the majority opinion will, I believe, have an adverse and highly confusing effect upon the law of Idaho regarding conveyancing in the timber industry.
The majority fails to set forth amply the facts surrounding the execution of the deed in question herein. The evidence discloses that Ross and Marie Howard (both now deceased, Nelson Howard being their heir) and Madeline Walter began in the 1920’s to acquire large land holdings for the purpose of conducting a livestock operation. In 1942 they became interested in acquiring additional holdings and gaining *742better access to their ranch lands. They approached agents of the defendants proposing that the lands presently in controversy be purchased by themselves for their livestock operation, with Potlatch to provide the financing by way of purchasing the timber on the lands. Such a proposal would be beneficial to the plaintiffs since it would result in the lands being cleared as was necessary for grazing, and since access roads which were to be constructed for logging would also provide access to plaintiffs.
During the time of the negotiations Pot-latch was engaged in a sustained yield logging operation in which the larger trees were to be removed to allow smaller trees to achieve faster maturity on a projected thirty year cycle. Agreements were entered into whereby the plaintiffs acquired the land and which culminated in the execution of the timber deeds at question herein. No representations were made by the agents of the defendant as to the amount of timber then existent upon the lands nor did defendant make any representations that they were interested in or would cut only trees of a minimum size or that were “merchantable.” On the other hand the plaintiffs had sold timber from other lands and had specified in such sales that the only trees sold were to be “12" dbh,” i. e., a minimum diameter of 12" diameter at breast height. In the instant matter, however, no such minimum size was specified but rather the parties contracted for the sale of all timber “of every kind, size and species.”
The deed in question here was not of the “profit a prendre” type discussed in the M. & I.'Timber case, which gave only a privilege of removing timber, but was rather a bargain and sale deed conveying title to the timber. Also granted were easements and other rights for removal of the timber for an indefinite period of time. Those additional rights were granted for a period of thirty years without payment and additional years upon certain payments.
The opinion of the majority holds that Potlatch is entitled to remove those trees which have reached a certain merchantable size and further restricts the removal of those trees which had reached that size at the time the contract was executed in 1942, some thirty years ago. I do not believe that such a result can in any way be squared with the language of the deed. Therein the reference was to “every size.” The majority opinion suggests that Pot-latch desires to equate the word “timber” with the word “trees.” Such is not surprising since the plain meaning of the word “timber” is “growing trees or their wood.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Cases are numerous holding that timber need not necessarily have the primary meaning of “trees” if modified by terms specifying minimum sizes or terms such as “merchantable” or “suitable for building” etc. That is not the situation in the case at hand. It appears to me that the clear meaning of the deed was that the parties intended to convey and receive title to all the trees then growing upon the tract of land regardless of size, kind or specie. Indeed that is precisely what the conveyance stated. The cases are legion holding that the plain meaning of a contract or deed is to be preferred and utilized over a strained or esoteric construction.
The majority opinion in raching its conclusion relies primarily on two cases: M. & I. Timber Co. and Arbogast. I believe that M. & I. Timber is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case the Idaho court specifically set forth that Nash 'had conveyed land to another party and reserved to himself “the right and privilege to remove any and all timber” from the lands conveyed. The court therein denominated such right as a “profit a prendre,” defined such and stated:
“That language did not reserve to Nash the title to the timber but merely reserved to him a profit a prendre defined by the terms of the grant or reservation.”
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“The owner of a profit a prendre, even in 'any and all’ the timber on the land, does not possess the same rights he would have as owner of the timber, * * :¡c »
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“Since the Nashes did not have title to the timber when they subsequently purported to convey the same, plaintiff and its successors in interest could not acquire good title thereto.” (Emphasis added) 91 Idaho at 640-642, 428 P.2d at 959.
I suggest that the facts and the law announced in M. & I. Timber Co., are a far cry from the instant case. The Idaho court in M. & I. Timber relied heavily upon the Oregon case of Arbogast also cited by the majority herein. I suggest that Arbogast is even more remote. In that case the Oregon court had for construction a deed stating that there was conveyed, “All of the Timber and Logs now standing, laying and being upon the following described tract of land * * The Oregon court said:
“Ordinarily, timber deeds have more specific descriptions of the timber conveyed than we find in the instant deeds as, for example, the descriptions are qualified by more definite terms, such as ‘timber suitable for sawmill’ or limited to timber of certain species, size and dimensions. But there is little in the instruments on review which is helpful in defining the language * *
The court went on to state:
“In absence of modifying terms or expressions in the instrument * * * the general rule within the lumber industry is that the word ‘timber’ denotes trees of a size suitable for manufacture into lumber *' * (Emphasis added) 336 P.2d at 332.
The Oregon court also construed the intent of the parties to convey only that timber which had reached merchantability at the time of the execution of the conveyance. The reasoning of that court in reaching that result is as follows:
“Any doubt that the parties intended to include only those trees classifiable as ‘timber’ at the time of the execution in 1924 is dispelled by a further examination of the granting clause. It reads, in part: * * ‘hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey * * * all of the Timber and Logs now standing, laying and being.’ ” (Emphasis that of the Oregon court)
“The adverb ‘now’ is pivotal in that phrase, for it identified time. ‘Now’ denotes the present time or instant; here, it is October 6, 1924 * * *. The use of the word ‘now’ in the deeds indicates to us that it was the intention of these parties that only those trees constituting ‘timber and logs’ at the time of execution in 1924 were conveyed to defendants.” 336 P.2d at 333.
It is apparent that the instant case is dissimilar to Arbogast. Here there are modifying terms, just as suggested by the Oregon court, indicating that all sizes and species were conveyed. The “pivotal” adverb “now” is not used in the conveyances before us and the lack of such term must be equally “pivotal” and connotes an intent to convey those trees which reach maturity after the execution of the deed.
In short, I believe that the majority errs when it states that the intent of the parties cannot be gained from within the four corners of the conveyance.
It follows therefore that I believe the majority errors in suggesting that extrinsic evidence is necessary to discern the intent of the parties. However, I disagree that, in any event, the case should be remanded for a new trial and consideration of extrinsic evidence. Even assuming that extrinsic evidence was necessary, that evidence has already been taken and is before this court on the record. I disagree that such evidence was conflicting. As herebefore stated the parties who conducted the negotiations on the part of the plaintiffs are deceased and were deceased before this matter came to trial. The negotiators for the defendant *744testified at length and their testimony is before us. I can see no purpose for remand for a new trial since only the same testimony can be adduced. That testimony indicates to me that the parties intended to convey all the trees on the property regardless of what size they might be and that the defendant was entitled to remove any and all trees at whatever time it desired, conditioned only upon defendant complying with its duties as specified in the deed.
The question of what was or was not the construction or meaning of the word “timber” within the lumber industry is, I believe, completely irrelevant. As pointed out herein, this was not a dealing between two persons engaged in the lumber business. The plaintiffs were large property owners engaged in the livestock business who wished their lands to be cleared. Defendant, on the other hand, was engaged in a sustained yield timber growing and harvesting operation over long term growth cycles.