Court Opinion

ID: 9687649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:41:07.426436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:29.595286
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I support Judge Poritsky’s grant of summary judgment to Polar. I believe the trial court should not have vacated Polar’s judgment because of the doctrine of finality of judgments. I also believe Polar’s judgment could not be vacated because, once it was satisfied, it ceased to exist. The question of subject matter jurisdiction was not raised by either party. That, however, is not controlling; lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised sua sponte by this court at any time.
Finality of Judgments. When this matter was originally before the trial court, the trial court found Polar could terminate the agreement only for cause and allowed the matter to go to a jury trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dorso for $321,302. After a set-off for Dorso’s unpaid accounts with Polar, judgment was entered in Dorso’s favor for $248,889.45. On appeal from that judgment, in Dorso I, this court reversed the trial court’s holding that Polar could not terminate the agreement without cause. Dorso I, 372 N.W.2d at 415. This court said:
The trial court erred in ruling that the dealership agreement provided for termination only for cause. The 1977 dealership agreement is not ambiguous and allows termination at the will of either party. The provision is not unconscionable.

Reversed.

Id. (emphasis added). In Dorso I, this court did not remand the case, it simply reversed it. The Minnesota Supreme Court denied review of Dorso I on October 18, 1985. The trial court then vacated the pre-appeal judgment in favor of Dorso, and entered judgment for Polar for $110,946.24. When the judgment for Polar was entered, there were no unresolved issues. The case was at an end except for Polar’s judgment.
The judgment entered in favor of Polar should be accorded finality. See Mattson v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 414 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn.1987) (when a judgment is reversed there is nothing left to litigate, and the case is completely concluded).
Satisfaction of Judgment. The judgment in favor of Polar was satisfied in full by Dorso on December 3, 1985, long before Dorso’s counsel asked the trial court for vacation. Once a judgment is satisfied, it ceases to exist. Boulevard Del, Inc. v. Stillman, 343 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Minn.App.1984). It cannot be revived, so there is nothing to vacate. Id. The court cannot give what it does not have. Id. Therefore, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to vacate Polar’s judgment. Id.
The supreme court limited the holding of Boulevard Del in Jorissen v. Miller, 399 N.W.2d 82, 84 (Minn.1987). Jorissen, however, is distinguishable on its facts and in any event applies only to conciliation court actions. Here the holding of Boulevard Del controls decision.
The claim that Polar’s initial trial counsel misled the courts with respect to the existence of chapter 80E, if true, in my opinion would not allow revival of a fully satisfied judgment by Dorso. Any alleged misconduct of counsel is a matter for the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board or a separate suit and does not revive a fully satisfied judgment.