Court Opinion

ID: 9448688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:42:48.119762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:31.593021
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
The Government, in its Petition for Rehearing, disagrees with this Court’s holding that the 1954 Code applies because, among other things, of the exceptions contained in section 7851(a) (6) (B). It is argued that the present case relates to periods of limitations and not to claims for refunds, therefore the applicability of the limitations statute, section 6511(d) (2) (A), is the sole issue before us. The Government emphasizes the following language contained in the dissenting opinion:
“It should be noted that section 6511(d) (2) (A) is not in Chapter 65 but is in Chapter 66. Chapter 65 does not include the recovery of taxes based on a carryback loss.”
The Government seeks to construe the statutes on the basis of the chapters in which they are contained. This method of construction does not appear to conform to section 7806(b) of the 1954 Code, which provides:
“Arrangement and classification. —No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title * *
Appellant also cites the recent case of Kaltreider Construction, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 366 (C.A.3, 1962), wherein the Third Circuit held that the 1939 Code applied even though the claim for refund was filed when the 1954 Code was in effect. The cited case is distinguishable from the case herein for three reasons. First, in Kaltreider, the refund claim did not involve a carryback loss authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as does the present case. Second, all of the parties in __ Kaltreider agreed that section 322 of the 1939 Code *658applied,1 whereas in the instant case this is the very question in issue. Third, the questions raised in the cited case were when section 322 commences and whether it is tolled by pending litigation. The problem before this Court does not relate to the commencement and tolling of a statute of limitations, but is rather which of two different limitation statutes applies.
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing be denied.
CECIL, Circuit Judge, adheres to the views expressed in his dissenting opinion.

. The Court’s opinion states: “The facts are undisputed and both the taxpayer and the Government agree that the statute applicable to the case is section 322 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.”