Court Opinion

ID: 9765615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:10:29.327762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.251673
License: Public Domain

FLANDERS, Justice,
with whom Justice BOURCIER joins,
dissenting in part.
We respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion concerning an alleged violation of the defendant’s right to respond at a probation-violation hearing. In this case, the Superior Court gave the defendant the opportunity to be present at the probation-violation hearing and to respond to the charge that he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. This is all that G.L.1956 § 12-19-9 requires, especially in light of the fact that, as the Court recognizes, no constitutional right of allocution exists at probation-violation hearings.1 Moreover, after the hearing justice turned to the defendant’s lawyer at the conclusion of the evidence and *125stated, “I will hear you,” the court did not preclude defense counsel from addressing the appropriate disposition in the event that, notwithstanding the defendant’s arguments, the court found that the defendant had violated his probation. Although at this stage of the proceedings, the hearing justice had not yet made a finding of a probation violation, defense counsel could have taken this opportunity to address this issue, if only in the form of an alternative argument, should the court adjudge the defendant a probation violator. Such an alternative argument on liability and possible remedies is not unusual in other civil proceedings. For example, in civil cases where the parties seek damages, defense counsel in closing arguments frequently address not only liability issues, but also what damages, if any, would be appropriate if the fact finder should rule against the defendant(s) on the liability portion of the case. Indeed, unless the court bifurcates liability and remedies issues in civil cases, it typically requires and expects defense counsel(s) to address both issues during their final arguments to the court or to the jury. Probation-violation hearings usually follow this same practice for both the violation and disposition aspects of the proceeding. Thus, we see no reason in either Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure or in other applicable law why we should now impose a different interpretation on § 12-19-9, especially when no party gave the hearing justice the opportunity to consider this question in the first place.
For this last reason, we also do not believe that defendant properly preserved his right-to-a-sentence-execution-hearing/right-of-allocution argument for the purposes of this appeal, and therefore, he has waived his right to raise this issue in this Court for the first time. See State v. Lyons, 725 A.2d 271, 273 (R.I.1999). Neither defendant nor his counsel ever asked the hearing justice if he would hear one of them separately on the question of whether the court should execute all or a portion of the suspended sentences against defendant following the court’s finding of a probation violation. Similarly, defendant never objected to the hearing justice recessing the hearing without first determining in open court and in defendant’s presence what portion of defendant’s previously imposed, but suspended, sentences the court would execute against him and without first giving defendant an additional opportunity to address this specific issue in a separate hearing. Indeed, defendant never asked the hearing justice to consider this disposition issue at all: not before, during, or after the probation-violation hearing. Rather, after finding that defendant had violated his probation in connection with two previously imposed sentences, the hearing justice recessed the hearing without stating what action he intended to take with respect to executing all or a lesser portion of either one or both of the prior sentences in consequence of his finding defendant to be a probation violator. Thus, the hearing justice’s decision to require defendant to serve consecutively all of the years imposed by both of the previously suspended sentences did not occur until after the hearing when he memorialized his decision on this question by entering a judgment of conviction and commitment reflecting his determination.
Although the hearing justice’s failure to make this sentencing determination in open court in the presence of defendant was not in compliance with the prescribed statutory procedure (“Upon a determination that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation the court, in open court and in the presence of the defendant, may remove the suspension and order the defendant committed on the sentence previously imposed, or on a lesser sentence, or impose a sentence if one has not been previously imposed, or may continue the suspension of a sentence previously imposed, as to the court may seem just and proper.” Section 12-19-9 (emphasis added)), defendant never objected to the fact that the hearing justice’s disposition on the violation did not *126occur in open court in defendant’s presence, and thus, this issue is not properly before us on appeal. Moreover, the critical point for purposes of this appeal is that the hearing justice never learned that defendant wished to be heard separately on this sentence-execution issue, much less that defendant objected to any disposition on the probation-violation finding without the court first affording him or his counsel the chance to speak to this question separate and apart from defendant’s previous opportunity to be heard concerning why the court should not adjudge him a violator. Thus, under our well-settled raise-or-waive rule, defendant may not rely upon this issue on appeal without first having presented it to the hearing justice.2 Lyons, 725 A.2d at 273.
Further, on the merits of this question, we do not believe that the defendant enjoys any such right to a separate, post-finding-of-a-violation hearing to address exactly what previously imposed sentence(s) the court should execute against him after the hearing justice already has found the defendant to be a probation violator. The requirement in § 12-19-9 that the defendant “shall have the opportunity to be present and to respond” refers to the same statute’s requirement that “[t]he court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of his or her probation” and not to any subsequent determination by the court concerning what previously imposed sentences, if any, it should execute against the defendant. Indeed, neither Rule 32(f) nor applicable case law requires a separate hearing on this issue before the hearing justice determines “in open court and in the presence of the defendant” what portions of one or more previously imposed sentences, if any, shall be executed against the defendant in consequence of a probation-violation finding. Even if the better practice — let alone civility considerations — would be to give the defendant and/or his counsel a specific and discrete opportunity to address the court again (after the court has found a probation violation) on what previously imposed sentence(s), or portions thereof, it should execute against the defendant in the wake of the court’s finding of a probation violation, we think that if such a separate right is to be created, then it should occur in the context of an amendment to Rule 32(f) or to § 12-19-9 rather than emerging from this Court’s reading of such a new procedure into the “opportunity to be present and to respond” requirement of § 12-19-9.
For these reasons, we respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion which addresses the defendant’s right to respond to the issues pertaining to the execution-of-prior-sentences determination at a probation-violation hearing. However, we join in the rest of the Court’s opinion. As a result, rather than remand this case to the Superior Court for resen-tencing, we simply would affirm the judgment and dismiss the appeal.

. This interpretation of G.L.1956 § 12-19-9 is consistent with our prior holding that a probation-violation hearing "is not part of the criminal prosecution process 'and, thus, does not call for the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a criminal proceeding.' " State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I.1997) (quoting State v. Bourdeau, 448 A.2d 1247, 1248 (R.I.1982)); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 661-62 (1973).

. Even assuming that defendant’s lawyer was caught off-guard when the hearing justice abruptly ruled that defendant had violated his probation and immediately thereafter recessed the hearing, no reason exists why defendant could not have filed a post-hearing objection to this procedure or a motion asking to be heard separately on what disposition would be appropriate. But defendant never filed such a motion or otherwise attempted to alert the hearing justice that he objected to any disposition on the probation-violation finding until he or his counsel could be heard on this issue. Rather, defendant and his lawyer remained silent until August 18, 1997, at which time defendant finally moved to correct the sentences, but only on the grounds that the court should not have imposed them consecutively. In any event, defendant never claimed that he was entitled to a separate, post-violation hearing before the hearing justice memorialized his sentencing determination. Thus, he should not be allowed to raise this objection for the first time on appeal.