Court Opinion

ID: 9745672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:17:04.74119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:33.521125
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STAMOS dissenting: When this case was originally argued and decided, I concurred with the majority on the question of whether the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to decide whether a contract to make an irrevocable will was made by Dominick Marcucci in 1950. Upon reconsidering the case on rehearing, however, it became apparent that the decision should not turn upon whether that court possessed the requisite jurisdiction to decide that issue, but rather upon a determination of whether the issue is relevant to a proceeding to admit a will to probate and whether an irrevocable will can exist under the law of Illinois. My resolution of these issues dictates that I respectfully dissent from the majority Supplemental Opinion. In this case, Dominick Marcucci executed three wills. The first, a joint and mutual will with his wife, Maria, was executed in 1950. The second was executed by Dominick in 1957, after his wife’s death. The third, executed by Dominick in 1958, specifically stated: “I, DOMINICK MARCUCCI * * * do hereby revoke any and all former wills or codicils by me made * * Section 46 of our Probate Act1 provides that: “A will may be revoked * * * (b) by the execution of a later will declaring this revocation # * Thus it readily appears that the testator fulfilled all the statutory requirements for the revocation of his previous wills. The majority opinion is based, however, on the premise that a joint and mutual will executed pursuant to a contract is irrevocable and that, if such a will was made by Dominick with his wife in 1950, then that will is the only one entitled to probate. This was the traditional rule in Illinois. However, in 1960 the Second District, in Estate of Briick, 1960, 24 Ill.App.2d 77, 164 N.E.2d 82, undertook a reconsideration of this rule. After a lengthy review of the rationale of the rule and the previously decided cases, the Court said at 24 Ill.App.2d 77, 99: “It has been stated that to make an irrevocable will would be the creation of an instrument unknown to the law. Under the authorities herein referred to and cited, the will of Mrs. Briick executed after her husband’s death, effectively revoked her previous joint will and the judgment of the Circuit Court directing that her will dated December 6, 1956, be admitted to probate should be affirmed. Whether she agreed and contracted with her husband not to change the disposition of the property made by the provisions of the joint will of March 16, 1955, could not be litigated in the probate court of Will County.” In a case decided the same year, In re Estate of Baughman, 1960, 20 Ill.2d 593, 170 N.E.2d 557, the Supreme Court expressly approved this decision. The Court quoted the above paragraph from Briick and said, at 20 Ill.2d 593, 599: “We concur with the analysis of cases, reasoning and logic, and the conclusion reached in the quotation from the opinion as above set forth, as is indicated by our prior order denying the petition for leave to appeal to this court in said case.” The Court further stated, at 20 Ill.2d 593, 562: “The difficulty which has given rise to the present litigation arises from the description in prior cases of joint or joint and mutual wills executed pursuant to a valid contract not to revoke, as being ‘irrevocable’. Such terminology, although generally descriptive of the net result achieved, is not an accurate statement of the nature of the will made pursuant to such contract. By virtue of the various statutory provisions concerning the execution of wills and the revocation thereof, and the decisions herein discussed, any will, whether it is a joint or joint and mutual will executed pursuant to an agreement not to revoke, is revocable at any time prior to death in any of the manners prescribed by statute.” Based upon the above cases, it seems apparent that our Supreme Court had the intention of settling the law in favor of the revocability of all wills, and indeed, neither party to this appeal nor the court in the majority opinion disputes that the Baughman case changed the law in Illinois as it existed at the time. The problem which has returned to plague us here arose with the adoption of the new Judicial Article 2 in 1964. That change in our constitution reformed the judicial system in Illinois, abolished all distinctions between courts of law and equity, and conferred all judicial power upon each court, regardless of its specialized function as a division within the Circuit Court of the county. This reorganization of judicial powers was first applied to the situation at bar in Estate of Weaver, 1966, 71 Ill.App.2d 232, 217 N.E.2d 326. In that case the court followed the old rule that wills executed pursuant to a contract not to revoke are irrevocable. The decision was justified by distinguishing Baughman in terms of the new Judicial Article. The Court said that Baughman held that the Probate had no jurisdiction to decide if such a contract had been made and that the case now had no applicability in view of the expanded jurisdiction of every court. Thus, Weaver held that a contract not to revoke could now be proved in a proceeding to admit a will to probate. Conversely, the Fifth District, in Estate of Lockwood, 1970, 124 Ill. App.2d 439, 260 N.E.2d 344, recently reached an opposite conclusion. When presented with the same argument as in Weaver and the case at bar, the Court held that the issue of whether a prior joint will was executed pursuant to a contract not to revoke was “not within the realm of inquiry” of a proceeding to admit a will to probate. That court relied upon Ruffing v. Glissendorf, 1969, 41 Ill.2d 412, 243 N.E.2d 236, where the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the new Judicial Article abolished the limitation on the character of evidence that may be introduced by a contestant at a hearing to admit a will to probate. Quoting Ruffing, the Court said, at 41 Ill.2d 412, 422: “* * * * it is not apparent to us why the original jurisdiction of all probate matters’ formerly possessed by the probate court and now possessed by the circuit court would change the manner of proving a will under Section 69.” I believe that this case is similar to that of Ruffing v. Glissendorf, supra, and that the same reasoning applies. The proceeding appealed from is statutorily created by Section 69 of the Probate Act.3 The purpose of the proceeding is to admit a valid will to probate, and appoint an executor to administer the estate. Thus, the only issue before the court at such a hearing is which is the last, valid, unrevoked will of the testator. Since the existence of a contract not to revoke can have no effect upon the testators power to revoke a prior will and is not among the statutorily specified grounds for attacking a will sought to be admitted to probate,4 evidence tending to establish such a contract has no relevance to such a proceeding. The Supreme Court held in Ruffing that the manner of proving a will under Section 69 was not changed by the adoption of the Judicial Article, and thus, even conceding the jurisdiction of the court to decide the eixstence of a prior contract, the question still has no relevance to the proceeding and such evidence should not be admitted. In my opinion, therefore, the will that Dominick executed in 1958 should have been admitted to probate. It should be pointed out, however, that, while wills should properly be considered revocable by the testator at any time prior to his death, a contract not to revoke may not be revocable. The revocation of a will executed pursuant to such a contract, even though completely within the power of the testator, may constitute a breach of contract. And even though such a revoked will should not be admitted to probate, the beneficiaries of the will are not without a remedy. Such a valid, breached contract should properly be considered a claim against the estate of the testator, and, as such, it is enforceable against the executor of the estate. The courts have repeatedly held that a valid contract to make a will may be enforced by means of an equitable action to impose a constructive trust on the executor, Keats v. Cates, 1968, 100 Ill.App.2d 177, 241 N.E.2d 645, or an action for specific performance of the terms of the contract. (Helms v. Darmstatter, 1965, 56 Ill.App.2d 176, 205 N.E.2d 478.) Thus, the remedy available to the beneficiaries of a prior revoked will executed pursuant to a contract is not in the proceeding to admit a will to probate, but by means of an equitable action against the executor if the claim based upon the contract is disapproved by him. It may be argued, however, that the above procedure would produce the same ultimate result as would probate of the joint and mutual will, and that it would be expeditious to allow the first will to probate. However, if the existence of a contract not to revoke is established in the initial proceeding, and that prior will is admitted, it would be tantamount to approving a claim against the estate before appointment of an executor. Since it is the function of the executor to protect the assets of the estate, the claim would have been approved in the absence of an indispensable party. Adequate protection of the estate could only be provided by adjudicating such a claim in an equitable action against the executor. In my opinion the protection of the assets of the estate and the maintenance of the essential character of a will as a transitory instrument, as intended by the Probate Act, would require that the will executed by Dominick Marcucci in 1958 be admitted to probate. Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.   Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 3, par. 1, et seq.    Ill. Const., Art. VI, § I, et seq. (1870).    Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 3, par. 69.    Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 3, par. 69.