Court Opinion

ID: 9710192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:08.723708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.018023
License: Public Domain

LEADBETTER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority because I find that the comprehensive nature of the Mental Health Procedures Act1 mandates a conclusion that the legislature intended to vest exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the courts of common pleas over all necessary steps in the commitment process. I also find it mandates the further conclusion that common pleas has ancillary personal jurisdiction over those government agencies charged with major roles in the statutory scheme set forth in the Act. Were we to accept the Department’s argument that the order and contempt proceedings at issue here should be deemed “proceedings against an officer of the Commonwealth government” within our sole original jurisdiction2, this statutory scheme would be disrupted in contravention of the legislature’s clear intent. *1119Consequently, I agree with the majority that the trial court need not have joined the Department and Mayview as indispensable parties in order to implement orders issued pursuant to the Act, and that it had subject matter jurisdiction to enforce those orders against Commonwealth parties statutorily involved in the commitment process.
KELLEY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, as amended, 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).