Court Opinion

ID: 2964292
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:22.420907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:53.350850
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1297
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                             JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ-BARRETO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1299
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                              JACKSON QUINTERO-FIGUEROA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1300
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                JORGE L. PEREZ-GARCIA,
                                 a/k/a PITO CABALLO,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1303
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                  LUIS GARCIA-CRUZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1306
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 ELIGIO LOPEZ-AYALA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 95-1404
                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                              JUAN CARLOS ARROYO-REYES,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Jos  Antonio Fust , U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                            Selya and Cyr, Circuit Judges,
                                           ______________

                            and Gertner,* District Judge.
                                          ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

             *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                                          2

             Jos  A. Pagan Nieves, with whom Jos  A. Pagan Nieves Law Offices
             ____________________            ________________________________
        was on brief for appellant Sanchez Barreto.
             Carmen R. De J sus for appellant Quintero Figueroa.
             __________________
             Rafael F. Castro Lang for appellant Perez Garcia.
             _____________________
             Lydia Lizarribar-Masini on brief for appellant Garcia Cruz.
             _______________________
             Eduardo Caballero Reyes for appellant Lopez Ayala.
             _______________________
             Victor P. Miranda Corrada for appellant Arroyo Reyes.
             _________________________
             Miguel A. Pereira, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
             _________________
        Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jos  A. Quiles-Espinosa,
        _____________                              _______________________
        Senior Litigation Counsel, were on brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   August 21, 1996
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                          3

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   Appellants  Juan  Carlos Arroyo-
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge
                          _____________

          Reyes ("Arroyo"), Luis Garcia-Cruz ("Garcia"), Eligio Lopez-Ayala

          ("Lopez"),  Jorge   Perez-Garcia  ("Perez"),   Jackson  Quintero-

          Figueroa  ("Quintero"),  and   Juan  Sanchez-Barreto  ("Sanchez")

          contend,  among other  things, that  the district court  erred in

          denying their requests to withdraw  their guilty pleas.  See Fed.
                                                                   ___

          R. Crim. P. 32(e).  We remand the Sixth Amendment claim presented

          by  Perez and  affirm the  district court  judgments against  the

          remaining appellants.

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    On March 9,  1994, a federal grand jury  in Puerto Rico

          returned a five-count indictment charging appellants with,  inter
                                                                      _____

          alia,  conspiracy to  distribute  not less  than  fifty grams  of
          ____

          cocaine  base,  five kilograms  of cocaine,  and one  kilogram of

          heroin, in violation  of 21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1),  846 (1994), and

          with  using  or  carrying  firearms in  connection  with  a  drug

          offense,  in  violation of  18  U.S.C.     924(c)(1) (1994).    A

          superseding indictment  alleged  that appellants  belonged  to  a

          twenty-six member gang that operated  a "drug point" in Toa Baja,

          Puerto Rico, and used firearms  to defend against rival gangs and

          discourage honest citizens from informing the police.

                    Appellants initially  pled not  guilty to  the charges.

          Just  before  trial,   however,  with  the  advice   of  counsel,

          appellants  entered guilty  pleas  to  the  drug  conspiracy  and

          firearms   counts  and  the  government  agreed  to  dismiss  the

                                          4

          remaining counts.  After the district court accepted their guilty

          pleas, and before  sentencing, see Appendix A,  appellants sought
                                         ___

          to withdraw  their pleas.   See  Fed. R.  Crim. P.  32(e) ("If  a
                                      ___

          motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence

          is imposed, the  court may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the

          defendant shows any fair and  just reason.").  The district court

          denied  their motions and imposed sentences consistent with their

          respective plea agreements.  

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

           A.  The Perez Appeal
           A.  The Perez Appeal
               ________________

                    Perez claims that he was denied effective assistance of

          counsel  at the  hearing on  his pro  se motion  to withdraw  his
                                           ___  __

          guilty plea.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The government responds
                        ___

          that Perez (1) did not ask the  court to appoint new counsel, and

          (2) has  not  shown  that  appointed  counsel,  Jos   R.  Aguayo,

          Esquire, labored under an actual  conflict of interest within the

          meaning  of United  States v. Soldevila-Lopez,  17 F.3d  480 (1st
                      ______________    _______________

          Cir. 1994).  

                    1.  Waiver
                    1.  Waiver
                        ______

                    The  Sixth Amendment  right to effective  assistance of

          counsel inheres at all "critical stages" of a criminal proceeding

          unless competently waived.  United  States v. Mateo, 950 F.2d 44,
                                      ______________    _____

          47 (1st  Cir. 1991).   A plea  withdrawal hearing is  a "critical

          stage" in the criminal proceeding.  United States v. Crowley, 529
                                              _____________    _______

          F.2d 1066,  1069 (3d  Cir.), cert. denied,  425 U.S.  995 (1976).
                                       _____ ______

                                          5

          The right  to counsel  is not  contingent upon a  request by  the

          defendant;  rather, "we presume  that the defendant  requests the

          lawyer's  services at every  critical stage of  the prosecution."

          Michigan v.  Jackson, 475  U.S. 625, 633  & n.6  (1986).   In all
          ________     _______

          events, Perez requested counsel  at the outset, and the  district

          court appointed  Jos  R. Aguayo, Esquire. 
                          _

                    Thus, contrary to  the government's suggestion, nothing

          in  the  record  remotely  indicates  that  Perez  knowingly  and

          voluntarily waived his  Sixth Amendment right  to counsel at  the

          plea withdrawal hearing.  Compare  United States v. Saccoccia, 58
                                    _______  _____________    _________

          F.3d 754,  771-72 (1st  Cir. 1995)  (defendant repeatedly  waived

          representation  by conflict-free counsel),  cert. denied,  116 S.
                                                      _____ ______

          Ct.  1322 (1996); see also United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche,
                            ___ ____ _____________    ____________________

          933 F.2d  89, 92 (1st  Cir.) (discussing waiver  elements), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 502 U.S. 959 (1991).  Finding no waiver, we next consider
          ______

          whether  Perez  has  demonstrated  that  court-appointed  counsel

          failed  to afford  effective assistance  at  the plea  withdrawal

          hearing.

                    2.  Conflict of Interest
                    2.  Conflict of Interest
                        ____________________

                    The government contends that Perez must demonstrate "an

          actual  conflict of  interest adversely affect[ing]  his lawyer's

          performance."  Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 486 (quoting Cuyler v.
                         _______________                          ______

          Sullivan, 446 U.S.  335, 348 (1980)).  Thus,  the government says
          ________

          Perez was  required to  show that  court-appointed counsel  could

          have pursued a  plausible alternative tactic or strategy  were it

          not for an inherent conflict  of interest or other loyalties that

                                          6

          caused him  not to do so.  Id.;  Guaraldi v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d
                                     ___   ________    __________

          15, 17 (1st Cir. 1987).  

                                          7

                    We noted  in Soldevila-Lopez that "[c]ourts have recog-
                                 _______________

          nized actual  conflicts of interest  between an attorney  and his

          client  when  pursuit of  a  client's  interests  would  lead  to

          evidence of an attorney's malpractice."  Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d
                                                   _______________

          at 486 (citing  United States v. Ellison, 798  F.2d 1102, 1106-08
                          _____________    _______

          (7th Cir. 1986),  cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038  (1987), and Mathis
                            _____ ______                             ______

          v. Hood,  937 F.2d 790, 795 (2d Cir. 1991)).   The absence of any
             ____

          malpractice or  ethics complaint  in Soldevila-Lopez  nonetheless
                                               _______________

          led us to conclude that a conflict-of-interest finding should not

          be  based solely  on  an  inference that  the  client might  have

          benefited  had  defense   counsel  raised  the  client's   mental

          incompetency claim prior to trial.  Id. at 486-87.  
                                              ___

                    The government's contention that Perez' Sixth Amendment

          claim  is  indistinguishable  from  that  in  Soldevila-Lopez  is
                                                        _______________

          untenable,  since   Perez  plainly  alleged  facts  amounting  to

          malpractice, if  found to be true.  That  is, the Perez motion to

          withdraw his  guilty plea alleged  that Aguayo had  pressured him

          into  pleading guilty  at  the  earlier  Rule  11  change-of-plea

          hearing in  order to  "hide [Aguayo's]  lack of  preparation" for

          trial.   Perez  further alleged  that  Aguayo had  not made  even

          "minimum" efforts  to "act  as his counsel  or defender"  and was

          only interested  in a fee, but see infra  note 1, thus leaving no
                                     ___ ___ _____

          doubt that Perez wanted replacement counsel.
                           ______

                    In United States  v. Ellison, 798  F.2d 1102 (7th  Cir.
                       _____________     _______

          1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987), the district court was
                 _____ ______

          presented  with  a  virtually identical  situation  in  which the

                                          8

          defendant had  filed a pro se  motion to withdraw  a guilty plea,
                                 ___ __

          alleging  that court-appointed counsel had persuaded him to forgo

          trial (despite Ellison's assertions of innocence) because counsel

          "did not  want to  make waves with  the federal  prosecutors with

          whom he  would  be working  in the  future." Id.  at  1106.   The
                                                       ___

          district  court  neither  appointed new  counsel  nor  obtained a

          competent waiver, but instead rejected the plea-withdrawal motion

          because defense counsel denied Ellison's accusations at the plea-

          withdrawal hearing.  

                    The Seventh Circuit held that defense counsel's "repre-

          sentation" at the plea-withdrawal hearing did not meet  the Sixth

          Amendment minima: 

                    First,  counsel was  not  able to  pursue his
                    client's best interests free  from the influ-
                    ence of  his concern about  possible self-in-
                    crimination. . .  . [I]f  the allegations  in
                    defendant's  motion  were true,  his  actions
                    would be  tantamount  to  malpractice.    Any
                    contention   by   counsel   that  defendant's
                    allegations  were  not true  would  (and did)
                    contradict his client.  In testifying against
                    his client,  counsel acted as  both counselor
                    and witness for the prosecution.  These roles
                    are inherently inconsistent.   

          Id. at 1107 (citation omitted); see also Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d
          ___                             ___ ____ _____    ______

          38, 41 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a pro se motion to withdraw a
                                                ___ __

          guilty plea based on alleged  attorney coercion created an actual

          conflict of interest).   The identical  logic fully warrants  the

          conclusion that  Aguayo may  have been  laboring under  an actual

          conflict of interest at the hearing on the pro se plea-withdrawal
                                                     ___ __

          motion, which alleged  that Aguayo had coerced Perez' guilty plea

          in order to conceal his unpreparedness for  trial.  Nevertheless,

                                          9

          we  think the  appropriate course in  this case is  to remand for

          further  factfinding on  the  merits  of  the  Perez  allegations

          against Aguayo.          As we recognized  in Soldevila-Lopez, 17
                                                        _______________

          F.3d at  486, a  claim that  counsel was  disabled  by an  actual

          conflict  of  interest  at  a  critical  stage  in  the  criminal

          proceeding  amounts  to  an  ineffective  assistance  claim   not

          normally appropriate  for consideration  on direct  appeal.   See
                                                                        ___

          United  States v.  Natanel, 938  F.2d 302,  309 (1st  Cir. 1991),
          ______________     _______

          cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1079 (1992).  Moreover, the district court
          _____ ______

          record is not "sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consider-

          ation" of the merits of the pro se plea-withdrawal motion itself,
                                      ___ __

          Soldevila-Lopez, 17  F.3d at  486 (quoting  Natanel, 938 F.2d  at
          _______________                             _______

          309),  since  its   underlying  conflict-of-interest  allegations

          against  Aguayo  were  never  subjected  to  factfinding  in  the

          district court. 

                    The  district court failed  to determine, in  the first

          instance,  whether Perez had  made "an intelligent  and competent

          waiver" of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel before proceeding

          to hear the plea-withdrawal motion with Perez acting pro se.  See
                                                               ___ __   ___

          Mateo, 950  F.2d at 47.   Instead, it opened  the plea-withdrawal
          _____

          hearing with questions to Aguayo about the pro se plea-withdrawal
                                                     ___ __

          motion.   Whereupon  Aguayo extolled  the  benefits of  the  plea

          agreement, stated that  there were no errors in  the earlier Rule

          11 plea colloquy  conducted by the district court,  nor any basis

          in  law for  Perez' pro  se plea-withdrawal  motion, and,  in all
                              ___  __

          events, that  Perez was better  off with the plea  bargain, given

                                          10

          the  unlikelihood the  he could  prevail at  trial.   Summing up,

          Aguayo stated:   "I really don't understand why  [Perez] wants to

          withdraw [the plea agreement]."  Compare United States v. Daniel,
                                           _______ _____________    ______

          962 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1992) (attorney argued vigorously and

          successfully  for  client  after  raising  potential   conflict).

          Whatever  their independent merit,1 the views expressed by Aguayo

          at the plea-withdrawal hearing directly contradicted the position

          advocated  by Perez in  the pro se motion  to withdraw his guilty
                                      ___ __

          plea.  Thus, the  Rule 32(e) hearing record leaves  no doubt that

          Perez was  left to  fend for  himself, without  representation by
                                                 _______

          counsel.   But  see Crowley,  529 F.2d  at 1069  (plea withdrawal
                     ___  ___ _______

          hearing  is "critical  stage" in  criminal  proceeding).   Conse-

          quently,  Perez  was  denied effective  assistance  at  the plea-

          withdrawal  hearing.    See  Soldevila-Lopez,  17  F.3d  at  486;
                                  ___  _______________

          Ellison, 798 F.2d at 1106-08.
          _______

                    In many instances  a trial court may have  no reason to

          question  whether counsel's  personal  or professional  interests

          might preclude "effective assistance" to the defendant.  In  such

          circumstances,  fair and efficient criminal justice may depend in

          significant part upon  the ethical obligation of  defense counsel

          to inform the court whenever a conflict of interest arises in the

                              
          ____________________

               1The  record discloses cause  for Aguayo's concerns  for his
          client (and for the district  court's concern as well) since upon
          conviction  Perez  would  face  a  ninety-year  minimum  term  of
                                                          _______
          imprisonment,  rather   than  the  seventeen-year   maximum  term
                                                              _______
          negotiated for him under the plea agreement.

                                          11

          course of the  proceedings.  Guaraldi, 819  F.2d at 18.2   On the
                                       ________

          other hand,  when the trial  court learns  or has reason  to know

          that  there  is a  colorable  conflict,  it  should  initiate  an

          appropriate inquiry to  safeguard the  accused's Sixth  Amendment

          rights.  Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d at 487; United States v. Allen,
                   _______________                  _____________    _____

          789 F.2d 90,  92 (1st Cir.) ("Where the  accused voices objection

          to appointed  counsel, the  trial court should  inquire into  the

          reasons  for the dissatisfaction."),  cert. denied, 479  U.S. 846
                                                _____ ______

          (1986);  see generally  2 Wayne  R.  LaFave &  Jerold H.  Israel,
                   ___ _________

          Criminal Procedure   11.4(b), at pp. 36-37 (1984) (replacement of
          __________________

          appointed counsel); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c) (mandating inquiry
                              ___

          into joint representation).

                    Given the  clarity and specificity  of the  malpractice

          allegations in  the pro se plea-withdrawal motion filed by Perez,
                              ___ __

          and Aguayo's sua  sponte attempt to terminate  his representation
                       ___  ______

          at the  outset of  the plea-withdrawal  hearing, the  appropriate

          course for the district court  was to resolve the factual dispute
                              
          ____________________

               2Were  there  any  substance to  Perez'  allegations against
          Aguayo,  a matter  yet to  be  addressed by  the district  court,
          D.P.R. Loc.  R. 211.4 would  appear to have required  that Aguayo
          observe Model  Rule of Professional  Conduct 1.7(b),  prohibiting
                  ____________________________________
          represent-ation   where   personal  or   professional   interests
          materially  restrict counsel's freedom of  action in support of a
          client's interests.  See also  id. Rule 1.16(a)(1) (imposing duty
                               ___ ____  ___
          to terminate  representation).  In  all events, at the  outset of
          the  plea-withdrawal hearing, Aguayo  promptly indicated  that he
          intended to  withdraw as counsel.  The district court nonetheless
          proceeded with the hearing, took no action on Aguayo's withdrawal
          suggestion and, for all intents and  purposes, continued to treat
          Aguayo  as Perez' counsel, without first determining the disputed
          facts underlying the Perez allegations against Aguayo.  Thus, the
          factual linchpin to  the ineffective assistance claim     whether
          Aguayo in fact labored under a conflict of interest    has yet to
          be subjected to factfinding. 

                                          12

          in keeping  with the  adversarial nature  of the  plea-withdrawal

          request.  Moreover, absent a proper waiver of the Sixth Amendment

          right to counsel, and a knowing and voluntary election to proceed

          pro se on the Rule 32(e)  motion, see Ellison, 798 F.2d  1108-09;
          ___ __                            ___ _______

          United States  v. Wadsworth,  830 F.2d  1500,  1510-11 (9th  Cir.
          _____________     _________

          1987),  appointment of replacement counsel was the only appropri-

          ate  course.  As the hearing transcript plainly demonstrates, the

          failure to  conduct the required  factual inquiry resulted  in an

          unconstitutional  breakdown  in  the  adversarial process,  which

          compels a remand  for further proceedings.  See  Cuyler, 446 U.S.
                                                      ___  ______

          at 349-50 (rejecting harmless error analysis).

                    On remand, the district court shall appoint replacement

          counsel for  Perez at  a plea-withdrawal  hearing reconvened  for

          factfinding  purposes   to  determine   the   merits  of   Perez'

          allegations   against  Aguayo,  so  as  to  enable  its  ultimate

          determination  whether  the  guilty   plea  itself  was  rendered

          involuntary by  a violation  of Perez'  Sixth Amendment  right to

          counsel at all critical  stages of the proceeding.   See Hill  v.
                                                               ___ ____

          Lockhart, 474 U.S.  52, 56 (1985) (ineffective  assistance during
          ________

          bargaining may render plea involuntary).  

          B.   The Plea Withdrawal Motions
          B.   The Plea Withdrawal Motions
               ___________________________
               by the Remaining Defendants 
               by the Remaining Defendants 
               ___________________________

                    We  now turn  to the claims  advanced by  the remaining

          defendants.  Under the well-established framework for  evaluating

          plea-withdrawal motions,  the district  court  considers all  the

          circumstances, with particular attentionto four prominentfactors:

                    (1) the plausibility of the reasons prompting

                                          13

                    the requested  change of plea; (2) the timing
                    of the defendant's motion;  (3) the existence
                    or nonexistence of an assertion of innocence;
                    and  (4) whether, when viewed in the light of
                    emergent circumstances, the  defendant's plea
                    appropriately   may   be   characterized   as
                    involuntary,    in    derogation    of    the
                    requirements imposed  by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11,
                    or otherwise legally suspect.

          United  States  v. Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d  368, 371  (1st Cir.
          ______________     _______________

          1994) (footnote omitted).  If the defendant carries the burden of

          persuasion on these  four criteria, the district  court may still

          decline  to allow the plea  to be withdrawn  if it would unfairly

          prejudice the government.  United  States v. Doyle, 981 F.2d 591,
                                     ______________    _____

          594 (1st  Cir. 1992).   Moreover, absent a demonstrable  abuse of

          discretion,  we  will  not  reverse  a  district  court  decision

          granting or  denying a  request to withdraw  a guilty  plea filed

          before sentencing.   United  States v.  Martinez-Molina, 64  F.3d
                               ______________     _______________

          719, 732 (1st Cir. 1995).

                    1.  Voluntariness
                    1.  Voluntariness
                        _____________

                    The most prominent single factor    whether these pleas

          were knowing, voluntary,  and intelligent, within the  meaning of

          Criminal Rule 11(d), United States  v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3
                               _____________     ____________

          (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 116 S. Ct. 94 (1995)    does not favor
                      _____  ______

          these  appellants.   We  have  found no  abuse  of discretion  in

          disallowing plea withdrawal motions where Rule 11 safeguards were

          scrupulously followed by the  district court.  See, e.g.,  United
                                                         ___  ____   ______

          States  v. Austin,  948 F.2d  783, 787  (1st Cir.  1991).   These
          ______     ______

          appellants  uniformly have failed to identify any defect in their

          Rule 11 plea  colloquies.  Rather, appellants  contend that their

                                          14

          pleas   were    rendered   involuntary   by    their   attorneys'

          recommendations  to accept  the  plea  bargains  offered  by  the

          government on  the morning trial  was scheduled to begin.   Their

          contentions are meritless. 

                    Special Rule  11  requirements have  been  designed  to

          minimize the significant risk that "involuntary" guilty pleas may

          be tendered in response to "package plea bargain" offers from the

          government.   See Martinez-Molina, 64  F.3d 732-34.  The  Rule 11
                        ___ _______________

          hearing transcripts  in this  case disclose  that each  appellant

          repeatedly informed the  district court that his  guilty plea had

          not  been coerced by anyone, thereby substantiating the threshold
                               ______

          voluntariness determination  for  Rule 11(d)  purposes.    United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Martinez-Martinez, 69 F.3d  1215, 1223 (1st Cir.  1995)
          ______    _________________

          (inquiring whether  anyone has  coerced the  plea satisfies  Rule
                              ______

          11),  cert.  denied, 116  S. Ct.  1343 (1996);  compare Martinez-
                _____  ______                             _______ _________

          Molina,  64 F.3d at  733-34 (inquiry restricted  to prosecutorial
          ______                                              _____________

          coercion  insufficient).    Consequently,  without  more,   their

          general allegations of coercion, based on the imminence of  trial

          or conflict-free defense counsel's enthusiasm for  the negotiated

          plea  bargain, are insufficient to establish  an abuse of discre-

          tion.    Austin,  948  F.2d  at 786-87  (noting  that  court  has
                   ______

          discretion to refuse withdrawal of "eleventh hour" plea). 

                    2.  Timing
                    2.  Timing
                        ______

                    The  delays in filing their Rule 32(e) motions likewise

          handicap appellants' challenges.  See Appendix A.  Even a request
                                            ___

          filed prior  to sentencing, United  States v. Isom, 85  F.3d 831,
                                      ______________    ____

                                          15

          838-39 (1st Cir. 1996), must  meet the challenge that "the longer

          a defendant  waits before moving  to withdraw his plea,  the more

          potency his motion must have in order to gain favorable consider-

          ation."  Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d at 373.   These appellants, on
                   _______________

          the other hand,  offer neither plausible grounds  for withdrawing

          their pleas, nor explanations for their extended delays in filing

          Rule 32(e) motions.  See Doyle, 981 F.2d at 595 ("the timing of a
                               ___ _____

          defendant's  attempted  plea  withdrawal is  highly  probative of

          motive"); United  States v.  Ramos, 810 F.2d  308, 312  (1st Cir.
                    ______________     _____

          1987) (contemplating change of heart within days of plea).  Thus,
                                               ______ ____

          the district  court soundly  concluded that  their belated  plea-

          withdrawal motions substantially weakened appellants' claims that

          their guilty pleas resulted from confusion or coercion.

                    3.  Claims of Innocence
                    3.  Claims of Innocence
                        ___________________

                    Their belated claims of innocence likewise fail to tilt

          the  balance.    The  district  judge  is  better  positioned  to

          determine   whether  claims  of  innocence  are  credible.    See
                                                                        ___

          Parrilla-Tirado,  22 F.3d  at 371.    Defendants freely  admitted
          _______________

          their guilt  during the  flawless Rule  11 proceedings  conducted

          below, and the subsequent Rule 32(e) hearing record  evinces only

          weak  and implausible  assertions of  innocence.3   The  district
                              
          ____________________

               3See Ramos, 810 F.2d at 313 (rejecting "self-serving, unsup-
                ___ _____
          ported claim  of innocence raised  judicially for the  first time
          after  the  Rule 11  hearing").    Here, Sanchez  admitted  using
          firearms, but denied  the drug charge, whereas  Quintero admitted
          selling  a small  quantity  of cocaine,  but  denied the  firearm
          charge.  Lopez sought to withdraw his plea to the firearm charge.
          Garcia asserted no  claim of innocence.  Confronted  with a group
          photograph,   in  which   several   codefendants  were   depicted
          brandishing firearms, Arroyo claimed the guns were toys.  

                                          16

          court  need not  credit bare  protestations  of legal  innocence.

          Isom, 85 F.3d at 839.4
          ____

                    Once again we emphasize:  there is no absolute right to

          withdraw a guilty  plea, Austin, 948 F.2d at 786; the decision is
                                   ______

          left  to the  sound discretion  of  the trial  court.   Parrilla-
                                                                  _________

          Tirado,  22  F.3d at  371  (noting that  district  judges possess
          ______

          special insight  into the  dynamics of their  cases).   Thus, the

          totality of  the circumstances  fully supports  the rulings  that

          these appellants  presented no  fair  and just  reason to  vacate

          their pleas.    No more  was  required.   Isom,  85 F.3d  at  839
                                                    ____

          (failure to show good cause for withdrawal obviates prejudice-to-

          government inquiry). 

          C.  The Arroyo Sentence
          C.  The Arroyo Sentence
              ___________________

                    For the first  time, Arroyo contends that  the district

          court  violated  U.S.S.G.    6B1.1(c)  by allowing  him  to plead
                                                                      _____

          guilty  before it considered his presentence report ("PSR").5  As

                              
          ____________________

               4Although our cases  occasionally list an additional  factor
          to be  considered     whether the parties  reached or  breached a
          plea agreement, Isom, 85 F.3d at 834; United States v. Pellerito,
                          ____                  _____________    _________
          878 F.2d  1535, 1537 (1st Cir. 1989),  cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862
                                                 _____ ______
          (1991)    as a general rule we do not conduct the typical Rule 32
          analysis  in cases  involving  alleged  plea agreement  breaches.
          See, e.g., United  States v. Velez-Carrero, 77 F.3d  11 (1st Cir.
          ___  ____  ______________    _____________
          1996).  In all events, the government kept its end of the bargain
          with appellants. 

               5Unless it finds  a PSR unnecessary, see U.S.S.G.    6A1.1 &
                                                    ___
          Fed.  R. Crim.  P. 32(b)(1),  the district  court is  expected to
          "defer its decision to accept or reject  . . . any plea agreement
                                                             ____ _________
          pursuant to  Rules 11(e)(1)(A)  and 11(e)(1)(C)  until there  has
          been  an opportunity to  consider the [PSR].  . . ."   U.S.S.G.  
          6B1.1(c)  (emphasis added).  Arroyo  and the government reached a
          plea agreement under  Criminal Rule 11(e)(1)(C), providing  for a
          specific sentence.

                                          17

          Arroyo concedes, however,  the failure to raise  this claim below

          mandates "plain error"  review.  See Fed. R. Crim.  P. 52(b); see
                                           ___                          ___

          also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
          ____ _____________    _____

                    The flaw  in  Arroyo's position  is that  he offers  no

          reason for equating acceptance of his guilty plea with the accep-
                                                ______ ____

          tance of a plea agreement under   6B1.1(c).  See United States v.
                     ____ _________                    ___ _____________

          Ewing, 957 F.2d 115, 118 (4th Cir.) (rejecting similar argument),
          _____

          cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1210 (1992).  Arroyo entered a guilty plea
          _____ ______

          on  September 7, 1994, and,  in accordance with  Fed. R. Crim. P.

          11(e)(2) (permitting district  court to defer decision  to accept

          or reject Rule  11(e)(1)(C) plea agreements), the  district court

          announced  that  its   acceptance  of  the  plea   agreement  was

          conditioned upon  its review of  the PSR.   See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

          Johnson, 53 F.3d 831, 832-33 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding, on similar
          _______

          facts, that defendant had not been sentenced at Rule 11 hearing).

          A PSR was submitted to the district court in timely fashion prior

          to  sentencing on  February 13,  1995.   At  the sentencing,  the

          district court  found that  the  agreed sentence  was within  the

          applicable  guideline range, see  U.S.S.G   6B1.2(c)(1), accepted
                                       ___

          the plea agreement, see  Ewing, 957 F.2d at 118,  and imposed the
                              ___  _____

          sentence prescribed in the plea agreement.

                    Moreover, Arroyo has not squared his view of   6B1.1(c)

          with Fed. R.  Crim. P. 32(b)(3), which prohibits  submission of a

          PSR until the defendant has  pleaded or been found guilty, unless

          the  defendant  consents  in writing.    The  overarching purpose

          served by the  PSR is to assist the district court at sentencing.
                                                                __________

                                          18

          See  U.S.S.G.    6A1.1 &  Fed.  R. Crim.  P. 32(b)(1)  (requiring
          ___

          completed  PSR "before  the sentence  is imposed").   Nor  are we

          persuaded that the district court erred.  But see Olano, 507 U.S.
                                                    ___ ___ _____

          at 732-33 (appellant must establish "error" under Rule 52(b)).6 

                    Finally, we  reject  the frivolous  argument  that  the

          indictment barred  Arroyo from  stipulating to  the base  offense

          level  specified in  the plea  bargain.   Arroyo  pled guilty  to

          conspiring to distribute  "not less" than fifty  grams of cocaine

          base,  five kilograms of cocaine, and one kilogram of heroin.  By

          its plain  language, the  indictment set no  upper limit  on drug

          quantity.   See United States  v. Lindia, 82 F.3d  1154, 1159 n.3
                      ___ _____________     ______

          (1st Cir. 1996)  (indictment alleging drug dealing "in excess" of

          50 kilograms did not bar  sentence based on quantity greater than

          50  kilograms).   Although Arroyo  and  several other  appellants

          challenge  the  factual  bases  for  the  district  court's  drug

          quantity determinations as well, their stipulations to their base

          offense  levels  constitute  admissions to  the  subsidiary  drug

          quantities,  see  U.S.S.G.    2D1.1(c) (determining  base offense
                       ___

          level according to drug quantity).  See Lindia,  82 F.3d at 1159-
                                              ___ ______

          60, & 1160  n.3 (suggesting that guilty plea  might preclude drug

                              
          ____________________

               6Although  Arroyo offers  no  authority  for  the  suggested
          interpretation of  U.S.S.G.    6B1.1(c),  our research  indicates
          that some courts  of appeals recommend, but do  not require, that
          PSRs be  made available to  defendants prior to Rule  11 hearings
          when  the  applicable guideline  range  is unclear.    See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          United States v.  Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 838-39  (D.C. Cir.), cert.
          _____________     _____                                     _____
          denied, 510 U.S.  852 (1993).   We discern no  reason to  suggest
          ______                                                    _______
          such   a  course  in  these  circumstances,  however,  where  the
          defendant knew the  precise sentence he was to  receive under the
          plea agreement.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C).          
                           ___

                                          19

          quantity  challenge).  As the record otherwise discloses adequate

          factual  support for the agreed-upon sentence,  see Fed. R. Crim.
                                                          ___

          P. 11(f)  (accuracy of  plea), and  Arroyo's remaining  arguments

          merit  no discussion,  we  affirm  the  district  court  judgment

          against him. 

                                          20

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    The   case   is  remanded   for   further  proceedings,

          consistent with this opinion, see  supra pp. 11-12, on the merits
                                        ___  _____

          of the pro se plea-withdrawal motion filed  by Perez, as to which
                 ___ __

          we express no  opinion.   Notwithstanding our  confidence in  the

          district judge who presided over these proceedings, whose conduct

          of the other plea-withdrawal proceedings was exemplary, we direct

          that the Perez matter be assigned to a different judge on remand.

          Mateo, 950  F.2d at 50  n.10.   As the five  remaining appellants
          _____

          have demonstrated no error in  their plea-withdrawal proceedings,

          and their remaining  arguments are meritless, the  district court

          judgments relating to those defendants are affirmed.  

                    SO ORDERED.
                    SO ORDERED.
                    __________

                                          21

                                      APPENDIX A
                                      APPENDIX A

           Appellant       Guilty Plea     Withdrawal       Reasons
           Appellant       Guilty Plea     Withdrawal       Reasons
                                           Motion
                                           Motion
           Arroyo          9/07/94         12/27/94, sup-   Didn't under-
                                           plemented on     stand plea
                                           1/09/95 and      agreement;
                                           2/13/95.         Rule 11 viola-
                                                            tions; claimed
                                                            innocence.

           Garcia          9/07/94         11/28/94         Attorney coer-
                                                            cion; thought
                                                            it was all or
                                                            none package
                                                            deal; limited
                                                            education.

           Lopez           9/07/94         2/02/95          Mistakenly
                                                            thought he had
                                                            to plead
                                                            guilty to both
                                                            counts; inno-
                                                            cent of fire-
                                                            arms charge.

           Quintero        9/07/94         11/08/94         Attorney and
                                                            familial coer-
                                                            cion; innocent
                                                            of firearms
                                                            charge.

           Sanchez         9/08/94         12/09/94         Attorney coer-
                                                            cion; 18 years
                                                            of age; preoc-
                                                            cupied with
                                                            federal
                                                            carjacking
                                                            trial; inno-
                                                            cent of drug
                                                            charge.

                                          22