Court Opinion

ID: 9739627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:18:44.195723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.264778
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, J.
¶ 19. (concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that Martinez is not entitled to credit against his Wisconsin sentence for the time he served on his federal sentence. I also agree with the majority that this case is governed by State v. Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991), not State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708. However, I disagree with the majority's attempt to distinguish this case from Brown. Instead, I would hold that Brown was incorrectly decided and, as a result, Rohl is the controlling law on the question.
¶ 20. The majority says that this is not a Brown case because, although Brown's Wisconsin probation had been revoked, he was turned over to the federal authorities to serve his federal sentence before commencing his Wisconsin sentence, whereas Martinez was already serving his Wisconsin sentence and then paroled directly to the federal authorities. Majority, ¶ 13. Because it was "purely speculative" whether Martinez would ever be called upon to serve the remainder of his sentence, the majority concludes that this is not a Brown case. Majority, ¶ 13.
¶ 21. I appreciate the majority's distinction between the two cases, but I fail to grasp why this has any bearing on the question of sentence credit. The inescapable fact is that both Brown and Martinez were subject to Wisconsin prison sentences (contingent or actual) when they were turned over to the federal authorities to serve their federal sentences. Brown clearly holds that Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) is the more specific statute and controls over Wis. Stat. § 973.155, resulting in an award of sentence credit. Brown, 289 Wis. 2d 823, ¶ 11.
*764¶ 22. I would hold that Brown was incorrectly decided. The debate in Brown as to which statute was more specific was a false issue because Wis. Stat. § 973.15(5) expressly references Wis. Stat. § 973.155. Section 973.15(5) says, in relevant part, that when a convicted offender is made available to another jurisdiction, the offender "shall be credited with service of his or her Wisconsin sentence .. . under the terms of s. 973.155 . ..." (Emphasis added.) And § 973.155(l)(a), in turn, says that such credit is limited to "all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Thus, the two statutes stand comfortably alongside each other. Section 973.15(5) allows for sentence credit when the offender is turned over to another jurisdiction to serve a sentence there, but § 973.155(l)(a) limits that credit when the latter sentence is linked to the course of conduct that produced the Wisconsin sentence. The Brown court should have applied the clear language of the two complementary statutes instead of erecting a barrier between the two and deciding which one prevailed.
¶ 23. Brown also falters on another front by failing to discuss Rohl, an earlier case relevant to the issue in Brown. As the majority correctly holds, this case is akin to Rohl because a grant of sentence credit to Martinez would constitute impermissible double credit against two nonconcurrent sentences. Majority, ¶ 18. See also State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 93-96, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), and Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d at 327. Brown was wrongly decided because it conferred dual credit contrary to Wis. Stat. § 973.155(l)(a) and Rohl. Where two court of appeals decisions conflict, the first decision governs. State v. Swiams, 2004 WI App 217, ¶ 23, 277 Wis. 2d 400, 690 N.W.2d 452. Moreover, the award of *765dual credit in Brown conflicts with Boettcher, a prior supreme court decision that clearly controls.
¶ 24. On this different basis, I concur with the majority's holding denying Martinez's request for sentence credit.