Court Opinion

ID: 9576690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:08.564607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:43.521259
License: Public Domain

*425Andrews, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
International Indemnity Company (IIC) provided workers’ compensation insurance to Regional Employer Service, Inc. (RES) under the assigned risk pool for employers unable to otherwise obtain insurance. In response to IIC’s suit against RES to collect insurance premiums claimed to be due, RES answered, denied owing the premiums, and counterclaimed against IIC seeking business damages allegedly caused by incorrectly calculated and excessive yearly premiums charged by IIC for a renewal insurance policy from September 1992 to September 1993. The counterclaim in tort was based on allegations that IIC negligently failed to comply with provisions of OCGA § 34-9-136 requiring that, before IIC was authorized to submit statistical data on RES to the licensed rating organization for purposes of calculating the premium to be charged, IIC was required to verify the accuracy of the data with RES. RES contended that, because IIC negligently failed to verify the data as required by OCGA § 34-9-136, IIC submitted incorrect data for calculation of the premium which caused an erroneous 400 percent increase in the yearly premium charged by IIC. RES alleged that, after it was unable to pay the increased premium, IIC cancelled the insurance policy for nonpayment of the premium, which forced RES out of business and caused the damages at issue.
RES also alleged in its counterclaim that IIC negligently failed to comply with the notification provisions of OCGA § 33-24-47 prior to cancellation of the policy for nonpayment of the charged premium. However, this claim was apparently abándoned, as no evidence was introduced to support it, nor was the jury charged on the claim. In any event, OCGA § 33-24-47 does not require notice when an insurer offers to renew a policy and coverage is cancelled because of nonpayment of the renewal premium. Riley v. Taylor Orchards, 226 Ga. App. 394, 395-396 (486 SE2d 617) (1997).
The case was tried before a jury. As to IIC’s claim for premiums due, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of RES. As to RES’ counterclaim for violation of OCGA § 34-9-136, the jury rendered a separate verdict in favor of RES and awarded business damages and attorney fees.
On appeal, IIC does not contest the jury verdict in favor of RES on IIC’s claim for unpaid premiums. Rather, IIC contests the separate verdict on RES’ counterclaim by contending in various enumerations of error that: (1) even if it violated the provisions of OCGA § 34-9-136, this would not support the tort claim brought by RES for damages to its business, and (2) even if such a tort claim existed, there was a lack of evidence to prove the amount and cause of the alleged business damages.
I agree in principle with IIC’s contention that, even if it violated *426OCGA § 34-9-136, RES was not entitled to bring the tort cause of action for damages to its business. Nothing in the language of OCGA § 34-9-136 evinces an intention by the legislature to create a cause of action for its violation. See Parris v. State Farm &c. Ins. Co., 229 Ga. App. 522, 524 (494 SE2d 244) (1997); Generali — US. Branch v. Southeastern Security Ins. Co., 229 Ga. App. 277, 280-281 (493 SE2d 731) (1997). Moreover, even assuming that the statute as enacted could support a cause of action to protect RES from the type of damages it sued to recover, the suit was premature. The information-gathering requirements of OCGA § 34-9-136 are part of a statutory scheme under which the Commissioner of Insurance is empowered to regulate insurance rates for workers’ compensation coverage. OCGA §§ 34-9-120 through 34-9-138; 33-9-1 through 33-9-44. Recognizing that regulation of insurance rates involves resolution of issues within the special knowledge and experience of the Commissioner, the legislature provided a statutory means to obtain a full hearing on these issues before the Commissioner along with the right of judicial review of actions taken by the Commissioner. OCGA §§ 33-9-26; 33-2-17 through 33-2-28; the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (OCGA § 50-13-1 et seq.); see Bailey v. Wilkes, 162 Ga. App. 410, 412-414 (291 SE2d 418) (1982). Furthermore, OCGA § 50-13-21 of the APA provides that: “The Commissioner of Insurance, when performing the duties as Commissioner of Insurance, may satisfy the procedure for conduct of hearings on contested cases required under this chapter by following Chapter 2 of Title 33.” Under the APA, “ ‘[contested case’ means a proceeding, including, but not restricted to, rate making, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 50-13-2 (2). Accordingly, RES would be required to pursue its claims before the Commissioner prior to institution of any suit for damages. Bailey, supra at 414; First Union Nat. Bank &c. v. Independent Ins. Agents &c., 197 Ga. App. 227 (398 SE2d 254) (1990); Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. James, 234 Ga. App. 403, 406-408 (506 SE2d 892) (1998).
Nevertheless, because IIC did not preserve the above issues for review on appeal, I am constrained to agree with the majority that the judgment in favor of RES’ counterclaim must be affirmed. IIC contends the trial court erred by denying its motion in limine and its motion for a directed verdict seeking rulings on the cause of action based on OCGA § 34-9-136. However, in both motions IIC sought rulings on the issue of damages, not the issue of whether RES was entitled to institute the cause of action for violation of OCGA § 34-9-136. Moreover, the record does not show that the trial court ruled on the motion in limine. I concur with the majority’s conclusions that there *427was sufficient evidence on the issue of damages to sustain the verdict on the counterclaim and no other error requiring reversal.
Decided July 8, 1999
Reconsideration denied July 29, 1999
Michael L. Wetzel, for appellant.
Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson & Davis, C. King Askew, Mark M. J Webb, for appellee.