Court Opinion

ID: 9695976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:32:53.891286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:17.726595
License: Public Domain

Hallows, C. J.
(concurring). The trip referred to in the dissent has been even longer along the mainline than stated. This court in the first Lewis Case 1 in which this author dissented held to the traditional view that a father *319of a child born out of wedlock had no natural parental rights. That trip was down a sidetrack because Stanley 2 took the position of the dissent and. sent Lewis back for reconsideration. The court then had to reverse itself and then in the second Lewis Case 3 under the mandate of Stanley recognized the natural rights of a father to a child born out of wedlock and undertook to provide a due process procedure for putative fathers to establish those rights. This case goes no further than Lewis.
No amount of discussion can dilute the holding of Stanley. While it might be hard for some people to accept, its holding cannot be eroded by constant criticism.
A decision is to be interpreted in the light of facts which form its background. I can see no implication in this case or in Lewis why a rapist should have rights as a natural father. In Lewis, Stanley, and in this case there was consent to the intercourse. The parties were willing to become parents or at least take the chance — not so in a rape. When a rape issue is presented to this court, it will be appropriate for this court to then decide the case, and not now intimate what it is going to hold. I reject both the trip and the flavor of the dissent.

 State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N. W. 2d 56.

 Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U. S. 645, 92 Sup. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551.

 State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N. W. 2d 826.