Court Opinion

ID: 9612902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:12:09.938389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:23.406556
License: Public Domain

R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Smith’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable. While the advisory Sentencing Guidelines prescribed a range of 46 to 57 months of incarceration for Smith’s crime, the district court issued a 132-month sentence. In United States v. Davis, this Court characterized a 99.89% downward deviation from the Guidelines as an “extraordinary variance.” 458 F.3d 491, 496 (6th Cir.2006). In the present case, we nod1 face a deviation even greater in magnitude in the opposite direction, approximately 158 percent. Thus, it is irrefutable that the case at hand also constitutes “an extraordinary variance.” As in Davis, the question before us is “whether extraordinary circumstances justify the full amount of the variance.” Id. at 496-97. For the reasons set forth below, I believe the record fails to evidence such extraordinary circumstances.
A.
18 U.S.C. section 3553(a) instructs district courts to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in the provision.” Compliance with section 3553(a) is mandatory. Specifically, section 3553(a) mandates that the district court consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the appropriate advisory guideline range; (5) any other pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
Once a district court imposes a sentence it deems appropriate under the factors delineated above, we must then consider whether the district court’s sentence is a reasonable application of section 3553(a). See United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir.2005) (noting that “when a defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing determination, we are instructed to determine “whether [the] sentence is unreasonable.” ”) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). As the majority *473correctly explains, our review of sentencing decisions for reasonableness contains both procedural and substantive components. In assessing the procedural reasonableness of a sentence,2 we examine the record to determine whether the district judge properly acknowledged the advisory nature of the Guidelines, considered the applicable Guidelines range, and weighed the factors set forth above and enumerated in section 3553(a). Davis, 458 F.3d at 495. Additionally, when a defendant raises a particular argument, procedural reasonableness requires the record to reflect “both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.” United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir.2006) (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court failed to review sufficiently on the record the section 3553(a) factors. While the district court properly acknowledged the advisory nature of the Guidelines and considered the applicable Guidelines range, the record does not reflect that the court weighed, as required, the factors set forth in section 3553(a). The court did weigh defendants’ lengthy criminal history, lack of employment, longstanding substance abuse problem, and his commission of the instant crime while on supervised release; however, the record is silent on the district court’s consideration of the nature and circumstances of this offense [§ 3553(a)(1)]; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense [§ 3553(a)(2)]; and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct [§ 3553(a)(6)]. While this Court has “ ‘never required ‘ritual in-eantation’ of the [section 3553(a)] factors to affirm a sentence’ ” and has indicated that “the district court need not explicitly reference each of the [section] 3553(a) factors in its sentencing determination,” I still find the district court’s inattention to the three factors above, especially the nature and circumstance of Smith’s offense and the seriousness of the offense, precludes meaningful appellate review. United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 543 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 626 (6th Cir.2005)); United States v. Jones, 445 F.3d 865, 869 (6th Cir.2006).
Additionally, while the district court heard Smith’s argument that his unarmed robbery of a bank was a plea for help and that he had reached a turning point in life, the record is silent as to whether the district court took these arguments into consideration in sentencing Smith well above the top of the Guidelines. The majority contends that the district court fully considered and rejected Smith’s argument when the judge noted that Smith had committed this crime while on supervised release. Majority Op. at 468. Even if we were to assume that the court’s colloquy evidenced its consideration of Smith’s argument, the record is nevertheless devoid of the court’s basis for rejecting it. At a minimum, the court should explain its reasons for doubting Smith’s credibility. See generally Rita v. United States, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (stating that “[w]here the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence ... the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments”). All the court said is, “All right. Well, the Court has considered this.” (JA *47442). Thus, even though the court may have complied with Richardson’s first dictate — that the judge consider the defendant’s non-frivolous argument, the court failed to comport with Richardson’s second dictate-that the judge set forth a basis for rejecting the argument. Consequently, I find the 132-month sentence procedurally unreasonable.
B.
In addition, I part ways with the majority’s conclusion that Smith’s sentence was substantively reasonable. As we have noted, “[ejven if a sentence is calculated properly, i.e., the Guidelines were properly applied and the district court clearly considered the [section] 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning, a sentence can yet be [substantively] unreasonable.” United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 332 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 591 (10th Cir.2006)). More specifically, a substantively unreasonable sentence arises when the district court “ “select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent [section] 3553(a) factors, or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” ” United States v. Lion, 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Richardson, 437 F.3d at 553).
In my view, the instant sentence falls short on the penultimate prong of this reasonableness analysis; that is, the district court failed to consider on record, among other factors, the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” the first-listed factor under section 3553(a)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (authorizing the sentencing court to account for “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”). In arriving at a 132-month sentence, the district court thoroughly considered Smith’s extensive criminal history, including his “three prior federal convictions” and at least “22 prior state convictions.” (JA 42). Taken together, the court believed that these convictions supported a score considerably above that recommended by the Guidelines. Id. Likewise, the majority replicates the district court’s unilateral focus on the defendant’s criminal history, and recites the record of defendants’ prior federal and state convictions. Majority Op. at 469-71.
What is absent from the district court’s analysis, however, is a consideration of the nature and circumstances of the specific crime for which Smith was being sentenced, namely bank robbery. While not discounting the severity and extent of defendant’s many prior encounters with the law, a sentencing court must not lose sight of the particular offense at issue. While defendant’s criminal history is undoubtedly relevant to the sentencing decision, the defendant has already received punishment for his prior crimes. Therefore, the nature of the conviction at issue is paramount.
According to the undisputed facts, Smith walked into a small branch bank during the middle of the morning without any weapons, display of force, or disguise, and absconded with the sum of $5,132. The record simply does not evidence any consideration by the district court of the details of the particular crime; the focus is almost entirely on the severity of Smith’s criminal past. Although section 3553(a)(1) authorizes a district court to account for the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” it also requires the court to balance this factor against “the nature and circumstances of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court’s near singular focus on Smith’s criminal history *475thus resulted in an inadequate focus on the unarmed bank robbery.
In affirming Smith’s sentence as substantively reasonable, the majority relies on a line of cases in which this Court has previously affirmed above-the-Guidelines sentences. Majority Op. at 472. In most of these cases, however, the crimes directly at issue were of a violent nature. In United States v. Williams, for example, this Court affirmed an upward departure from the Guidelines when the defendant violated his supervised release by allegedly committing kidnapping, assault, and battery. 214 Fed.Appx. 552 (6th Cir.2007). The central factor the Court pointed to in finding the heightened sentence reasonable was “defendant’s evident continuing propensity for violence.” Id. at 556 (emphasis added). Likewise, in affirming the upward departure in United States v. Wells, this Court focused on the “lengthy history of escalating violent behavior by defendant in his relatively short life.” 473 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir.2007) (emphasis added).
The present case is readily distinguishable, however, because Smith’s bank robbery lacked any indicia of violence. Smith neither carried a weapon nor relied on any violent measures in committing the robbery. The cases the majority marshals thus make clear that above-the-Guidelines sentences are justifiable in certain situations, especially those involving violent crimes; what these cases do not support, however, is that an above-the-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in the case of a non-violent offense where the variance is of this magnitude and the explanation therefore is scant.
Taken together, these reasons suggest to me that, in affirming the district court’s sentence as reasonable, the majority has departed from our central task in reviewing sentences-to ensure “ ‘a sentence [is] sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in’ ” section 3553(a). See Davis, 458 F.3d at 495 (quoting § 3553(a)). Under our “proportionality review,” the record simply does not permit this Court to conduct a meaningful review as to whether an upward variance of 158 percent is proportionate to the instant offense or offender. Had there been a fuller explanation from the characteristically thorough, experienced, and competent judge who sentenced the defendant-a defendant who clearly has an extensive criminal past-then my review might have come to a different result.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. This number was calculated by averaging the percent change between the actual 132-month sentence and the lower end of the Guidelines range, 46 months, and the percent change between the actual 132-month sentence and the upper end of the Guidelines range, 57 months.

. This Court recently took up the issue of procedural reasonableness under en banc review in United States v. Vonner, 05-5295 (heard en banc September 12, 2007). Since the opinion has not yet been issued, I draw on the existing standards of procedural reasonableness in setting forth my analysis.