Court Opinion

ID: 9561900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:18:21.924469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:13.836529
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that a plea agreement providing that the “State takes no position on sentence” is not violated by the state’s motion to change the sentencing judge, when that judge becomes known to the parties.
To adequately understand this issue, it must be pointed out that during the period of time that the defendant was involved in the criminal process in Maricopa County (September and October, 1976), the Maricopa County Superior Court, Criminal Division, was operating under a centralized calendar. This simply meant that more than one judge would be involved in the procedural steps culminating in termination of the criminal prosecution. Thus, the defendant might have Judge A handling his arraignment, Judge B handling his suppression hearing, Judge C handling his change of plea and Judge D handling his sentencing. Apparently, the judges themselves rotated in and out of the various procedural functions on a monthly basis.
Under this system, the defendant appeared in September, 1976 before Judge Heineman for his change of plea. Following acceptance of his change of plea and determination of guilt, Judge Heineman set sentencing for October 18, 1976. Judge Doyle had the sentencing duty for October. The majority is correct that the record is silent as to whether on September 16, 1976, when the plea agreement was entered into, the parties were aware that Judge Doyle would be the sentencing judge in October. I am unable, however, to indulge in the same presumption as that of the majority, that is, that the state had no knowledge that Judge Doyle would be the sentencing judge in October. In view of the apparent regularity of rotation of judges among the various procedural functions, if presumptions are going to be made, I would have to presume that the parties in September knew who the sentencing judge would be in October.
However, this prior knowledge or lack thereof is not, in my opinion, material. What is material is whether upon learning the identity of the sentencing judge, the state by exercising its admitted right to change the sentencing judge thereby took a “position on sentence.”
In this regard, I likewise deem immaterial whether in fact Judge Doyle’s sentencing practices were lenient. Again, what is material, is whether the state so conceived them. The majority has passed over this important aspect by concluding that “nor can we assume that the disqualification of Judge Doyle related solely to the sentencing practices.” However, the allegation is made and supported that the state removed Judge Doyle because of these sentencing practices. The state does not deny this allegation or contend that Judge Doyle was removed for any other reason. In fact, the *204state concedes as much by arguing that “the state could only be charged with violating the terms of the plea agreement here with regard to sentencing recommendations if it had agreed not to exercise its right to a peremptory challenge.”
I therefore must conclude from the record and argument before this court that the sole reason the state sought removal of Judge Doyle from his sentencing duties in this case is because of the state’s conception of Judge Doyle’s sentencing practices.
As previously indicated, the question then becomes whether the state “takes a position on sentencing” when it causes the judge to be removed because of his sentencing practices. To state the proposition is to give its answer. However, the majority apparently buys the state’s “Please Don’t Eat the Daisies” argument, that is, that since the state did not specifically agree not to change the judge, and since, at time of sentencing, no recommendation was voiced, “the prosecution did not renege on its sentencing agreement.”
In my opinion, this approach ignores the realities of the sentencing process. If I, as a prosecutor, have Judge Roy Bean as the sentencing judge, I don’t need to take a position or make recommendations as to sentencing. Conversely, if I, as a prosecutor, take overt action to assure that a Judge whom I view as having lenient sentencing philosophies, does not pass sentence, I have, in my opinion, taken a position on sentencing.
In my opinion, where the state for no other given reason than the sentencing practices of a particular judge, seeks his removal, it has effectively taken a position on sentencing. I would therefore hold that the state’s agreement to not take such a position has been breached and consequently the defendant must be relieved of his obligations under that agreement, that is, his plea of guilty.
I .would set aside the guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.