Court Opinion

ID: 9722030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:53.836795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.106124
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: John and Jane Doe filed a petition to adopt a newborn baby boy. The baby’s biological mother, Daniella Janikova, executed a consent to have the baby adopted four days after his birth without informing his biological father, Otakar Kirchner, to whom she was not yet married. The mother told the father that the baby had died, and he did not find out otherwise until 57 days after the birth. The trial court ruled that the father’s consent was unnecessary because he did not show sufficient interest in the child during the first 30 days of the child’s life. The appellate court affirmed with one justice dissenting. (254 Ill. App. 3d 405.) We granted leave to appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse. Otakar and Daniella began living together in the fall of 1989, and Daniella became pregnant in June of 1990. For the first eight months of her pregnancy, Otakar provided for all of her expenses. In late January 1991, Otakar went to his native Czechoslovakia to attend to his gravely ill grandmother for two weeks. During this time, Daniella received a phone call from Otakar’s aunt saying that Otakar had resumed a former romantic relationship with another woman. Because of this unsettling news, Daniella left their shared apartment, refused to talk with Otakar on his return, and gave birth to the child at a different hospital than where they had originally planned. She gave her consent to the adoption of the child by the Does, telling them and their attorney that she knew who the father was but would not furnish his name. Damella and her uncle warded off Otakar’s persistent inquiries about the child by telling him that the child had died shortly after birth. Otakar found out that the child was alive and had been placed for adoption 57 days after the child was born. He then began the instant proceedings by filing an appearance contesting the Does’ adoption of his son. As already noted, the trial court ruled that Otakar was an unfit parent under section 1 of the Adoption Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 50/1 (West 1992)) because he had not shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 30 days of his life. Therefore, the father’s consent was unnecessary under section 8 of the Act (750 ILCS 50/8 (West 1992)). The finding that the father had not shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child is not supported by the evidence. In fact, he made various attempts to locate the child, all of which were either frustrated or blocked by the actions of the mother. Further, the mother was aided by the attorney for the adoptive parents, who failed to make any effort to ascertain the name or address of the father despite the fact that the mother indicated she knew who he was. Under the circumstances, the father had no opportunity to discharge any familial duty. In the opinion below, the appellate court, wholly missing the threshold issue in this case, dwelt on the best interests of the child. Since, however, the father’s parental interest was improperly terminated, there was no occasion to reach the factor of the child’s best interests. That point should never have been reached and need never have been discussed. Unfortunately, over three years have elapsed since the birth of the baby who is the subject of these proceedings. To the extent that it is relevant to assign fault in this case, the fault here lies initially with the mother, who fraudulently tried to deprive the father of his rights, and secondly, with the adoptive parents and their attorney, who proceeded with the adoption when they knew that a real father was out there who had been denied knowledge of his baby’s existence. When the father entered his appearance in the adoption proceedings 57 days after the baby’s birth and demanded his rights as a father, the petitioners should have relinquished the baby at that time. It was their decision to prolong this litigation through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless, appeal. The adoption laws of Illinois are neither complex nor difficult of application. Those laws intentionally place the burden of proof on the adoptive parents in establishing both the relinquishment and/or unfitness of the natural parents and, coincidentally, the fitness and the right to adopt of the adoptive parents. In addition, Illinois law requires a good-faith effort to notify the natural parents of the adoption proceedings. These laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called best interests of the child. If it were otherwise, few parents would be secure in the custody of their own children. If best interests of the child were a sufficient qualification to determine child custody, anyone with superior income, intelligence, education, etc., might challenge and deprive the parents of their right to their own children. The law is otherwise and was not complied with in this case. Accordingly, we reverse. Appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed.