Court Opinion

ID: 9862517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:17:10.846487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:42.950201
License: Public Domain

MIHARA, Acting P. J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—Appellants are taxpayers who filed a complaint against the County of Santa Clara (the County) for declaratory and injunctive relief coupled with a petition for a writ of mandate or prohibition. Appellants sought a declaration that the County had violated Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 [130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1] (Stanson) and an injunction barring such conduct in the future. Appellants alleged that the County had illegally used public funds for partisan electoral purposes in connection with a proposed local ballot measure that would have mandated interest arbitration of labor disputes between the County and the unions representing the County’s employees.1 Although appellants obtained a preliminary injunction in October 2004, the County prevailed at the 2007 trial.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in (1) finding that the County was obliged to “meet and confer” with the unions about the proposed ballot measure, (2) concluding that the County had not offered a “quid pro quo” to the unions of better contracts in exchange for the unions not supporting the proposed ballot measure, and (3) determining that the actions of a County supervisor in sending out an e-mail regarding the ballot measure did not amount to the use of public funds for partisan electoral purposes.
Our standard of review is well settled. The trial court’s decision on the propriety of granting declaratory or injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of *277discretion (Hannula v. Hacienda Homes (1949) 34 Cal.2d 442, 448 [211 P.2d 302] [declaratory relief]; Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 850 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 21, 890 P.2d 43] [injunctive relief]), but its underlying factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 631]), and its resolution of legal issues is subject to de novo review (City of Los Angeles v. Los Olivos Mobile Home Park (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1427, 1431 [262 Cal.Rptr. 446]).
Appellants contend that the County violated Stanson by seeking during labor negotiations to obtain a commitment by the unions not to support the proposed ballot measure. Stanson does not support this contention. In Stanson, Mott was the Director of the Department of Parks and Recreation, and he allegedly authorized the expenditure of $5,000 to promote a bond measure that had been placed on the ballot by the Legislature. {Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 209.) Stanson sued Mott, but Stanson’s action was dismissed on demurrer. {Ibid.) On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that Stanson was entitled to pursue his allegations because, “at least in the absence of clear and explicit legislative authorization, a public agency may not expend public funds to promote a partisan position in an election campaign . . . .” {Stanson, at pp. 209-210.)
The County argues that Stanson did not prohibit it from negotiating with the unions regarding the proposed ballot measure because such negotiations were legislatively authorized by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (the MMBA) (Gov. Code, § 3500 et seq.). The MMBA required the County to “meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with” the public employee unions. (Gov. Code, § 3505.) Appellants concede that “[i]nterest arbitration measures” are a permissible subject of collective bargaining, but they contend that this subject matter was off-limits during the County’s negotiations with the unions because the proposed ballot measure was under consideration at that time. The trial court found that Stanson did not apply because the MMBA authorized the County to negotiate with the unions regarding the proposed ballot measure.
The question of whether the MMBA authorized the County to negotiate with the unions regarding the proposed interest arbitration ballot measure is a question of law, and I agree with the trial court that the MMBA provides such authorization. It is inconceivable that the County would be precluded from including in its labor negotiations with the unions the subject of a proposed ballot measure- on interest arbitration when the potential passage of such a measure could be expected to substantially impact the County’s future relationship with the employees represented by the unions. Where a public agency’s actions are legislatively authorized, the fact that the agency’s *278actions are related to a proposed ballot measure does not establish a violation of Stanson; such actions fall within the express exception to Stanson’s general rule. (Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 209-210.)
Appellants contend that, even if the County was authorized to discuss the proposed ballot measure with the unions, the County was prohibited from offering the unions a “quid pro quo” of better contracts in exchange for the unions not supporting the proposed ballot measure. The trial court made a factual finding that there was no quid pro quo as the County did not sweeten the terms of its proposals to the unions in order to obtain the unions’ agreements not to support the proposed ballot measure. Appellants acknowledge that we review this finding for substantial evidence, but they contend that it is not supported by substantial evidence because the testimony which supports it is implausible. Since the trial court’s finding is supported by trial testimony which was not inherently incredible, I agree with my colleagues that the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence that there was no quid pro quo and therefore must be upheld.
Finally, appellants maintain that the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail from County Supervisor Blanca Alvarado violated both Government Code section 8314 and Stanson.
Kristina Cunningham, Alvarado’s chief of staff, testified at trial that, a month before the election, Alvarado asked her to prepare the e-mail and attach to it an editorial urging voters to vote no on the interest arbitration ballot measure. Cunningham told Alvarado that she would “check with Ann [Ravel, the county counsel]” about the propriety of the e-mail. Cunningham telephoned Ravel and spoke to her for “just a few minutes” about the e-mail. Cunningham spent about 10 minutes preparing the e-mail. Cunningham then printed out the e-mail and the attachment and took them to Ravel’s office so that Ravel could review them before the e-mail was sent. Cunningham returned to her office and “put [the e-mail] out” during a period of time that “could be called my lunchtime.” She sent the e-mail to 1,500 recipients, most, if not all, of whom were County voters. The trial court found that Alvarado’s e-mail “was an incidental and minimal use of public resources, and did not constitute a violation of Government Code section 8314” and also did not violate Stanson.
Government Code section 8314 provides: “(a) It is unlawful for any elected state or local officer, including any state or local appointee, employee, or consultant, to use or permit others to use public resources for a campaign activity, or personal or other purposes which are not authorized by law. [f] (b) For purposes of this section: [f] (1) ‘Personal purpose’ means those activities the purpose of which is for personal enjoyment, private gain or *279advantage, or an outside endeavor not related to state business. ‘Personal purpose’ does not include the incidental and minimal use of public resources, such as equipment or office space, for personal purposes, including an occasional telephone call. H] (2) ‘Campaign activity’ means an activity constituting a contribution as defined in Section 82015 or an expenditure as defined in Section 82025. ‘Campaign activity’ does not include the incidental and minimal use of public resources, such as equipment or office space, for campaign purposes, including the referral of unsolicited political mail, telephone calls, and visitors to private political entities, [f] (3) ‘Public resources’ means any property or asset owned by the state or any local agency, including, but not limited to, land, buildings, facilities, funds, equipment, supplies, telephones, computers, vehicles, travel, and state-compensated time, [f] (4) ‘Use’ means a use of public resources which is substantial enough to result in a gain or advantage to the user or a loss to the state or any local agency for which a monetary value may be estimated.” (Gov. Code, § 8314.)
Because appellants contend that the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail was “campaign activity” within the meaning of Government Code section 8314, the validity of their contention necessarily rests on the premise that Alvarado “use[d] or permit[ted] others to use public resources for a campaign activity” within the very limited definition of “campaign activity” set forth in Government Code section 8314, subdivision (b)(2).2 “(b) For purposes of this section [Government Code section 8314]: [f] . . . [f] (2) ‘Campaign activity’ means an activity constituting a contribution as defined in Section 82015 or an expenditure as defined in Section 82025.” (Gov. Code, § 8314, subd. (b)(2), italics & underscoring added.) Government Code section 82015 provides: “ ‘Contribution’ means a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment except to the extent that full and adequate consideration is received, unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political purposes.” (Gov. Code, § 82015, subd. (a).) Government Code section 82025 provides: “ ‘Expenditure’ means a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment, unless it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political purposes.” (Gov. Code, § 82025.)
No evidence was produced at trial that the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail, which appellants claim was “campaign activity,” was a “payment” of any kind, a “forgiveness of a loan,” or a “promise to make a payment.” Hence, the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail did not fall within the very exclusive definition of “campaign activity” to which Government Code section 8314 applies. Consequently, the trial court did not *280err in rejecting appellants’ contention that the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail violated Government Code section 8314.
However, appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in finding no Stanson violation has merit.
Nothing in Stanson or its progeny permits the expenditure of even a minimal amount of public funds for campaign purposes. My colleagues assert that Stanson does not apply to de minimis expenditures, but the cases they cite do not support that proposition. “[The] uniform judicial reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns rests [on] an implicit recognition that such expenditures raise potentially serious constitutional questions. A fundamental precept of this nation’s democratic electoral process is that the government may not ‘take sides’ in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country’s founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office (see, e.g., Madison, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 52, 53; 10 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1899) pp. 98-99 (President Jefferson)); the selective use of public funds in election, campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process.” {Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 217.) “[T]he use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign which attempts to influence the resolution of issues which our Constitution leave to the ‘free election’ of the people (see Cal. Const., art. II, § 2) does present a serious threat to the integrity of the electoral process.” {Stanson, at p. 218.) Thus, any use of public funds to favor one side in an electoral contest is improper because it threatens the integrity of the process.
The trial court found that there was no Stanson violation because the style, tone, and timing of the e-mail reflected that the e-mail was primarily informational. The evidence does not support this finding. The e-mail stated the County’s opposition to the ballot measure and attached an editorial opposing the passage of the measure. The dissemination of an editorial opposing a ballot measure can hardly be deemed merely informational rather than advocative. Indeed, Stanson explicitly identified “dissemination, at public expense, of campaign literature prepared by private proponents or opponents of a ballot measure” as a “campaign” activity rather than an “informational” activity. {Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 221.)
Cunningham’s testimony established beyond dispute that some minimal level of public funds was expended on this e-mail. After discussing the e-mail with Alvarado, Cunningham spent 10 minutes of her worktime preparing the e-mail, and Ravel devoted at least a few minutes to discussing the e-mail with *281Cunningham and reviewing it after Cunningham had prepared it. While Cunningham testified that she actually “put it out” during her lunchtime, this was a reference to the time when she actually sent the e-mail. Her discussion with Alvarado, her preparation of the e-mail, and Ravel’s conversation with Cunningham and review of the e-mail clearly occurred during compensated worktime, and the e-mail was sent through the County’s computer system. While the public funds expended in connection with the e-mail might have been only a small amount, the undisputed evidence established that some amount of public funds was expended for the purpose of opposing the ballot measure. It follows that the preparation and dissemination of the e-mail violated Stanson, and, at the very least, appellants were entitled to declaratory relief to that effect. {Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 223.) Whether injunctive relief is merited because “similar expenses are threatened in the future” is an issue that I would have the trial court consider on remand. {Stanson, at p. 223.)
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with directions to the trial court to grant declaratory relief stating that the e-mail was a Stanson violation and to reconsider whether appellants are entitled to injunctive relief in regard to that claim.
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 18, 2010, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mihara, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 12, 2010, SI80673.

 “Interest arbitration involves an agreement between an employer and a union to submit disagreements about the proposed content of a new labor contract to an arbitrator or arbitration panel.” (City of Fresno v. People ex rel. Fresno Firefighters (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 82, 96 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 603].)

 Appellants do not contend on appeal that Alvarado used public resources for “personal or other purposes which are not authorized by law.” (Gov. Code, § 8314, subd. (a).)