Court Opinion

ID: 9664759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:28:40.657516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:09.752157
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
It is undisputed that Mrs. Myrtle Mc-Dougall paid $3,000 to discharge a vendor’s lien against the land and made valuable improvements thereon. See Linz v. Bower, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 63, 66; Hacker v. Hacker, Tex.Civ.App., 4 S.W.2d 218; 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 66, p. 441. There was no demand for possession by plaintiffs until about the time suit was filed. Since her first husband’s death Myrtle McDougall has occupied the land, 200 acres of which is her homestead, and, during part of that time, leased some of it to others and retained the proceeds. See 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 69, p. 459.
The judgment directs the commissioners of partition to value the timber land, the grass land and the improvements (made by Myrtle McDougall) separately and to award to Myrtle McDougall an amount of land equal in value to three-fourths of the total thereof and one-fourth to Phillip McDougall and Freeman. The homestead 200 acres was awarded to Myrtle only in the event the commissioners found it did not exceed in value three-fourths of that total. Myrtle testified that she spent about $15,000 improving the homestead. Although she paid $3,000 to discharge said vendor’s lien, made said improvements and paid the taxes, the judgment allows her no credit therefor. The only money received by her was that which she collected from leasing some of the. land. Ordinarily, Myrtle would not be liable for her use of the property until after a demand for possession by plaintiffs and a refusal by her. The value of her use of the land is immaterial unless it is considered in an adjustment of the equities between the parties. See Schluter v. Sell, Tex.Civ.App., 194 S.W.2d 125, 132; 11 Tex.Jur. 457; Roberts v. Roberts, 136 Tex. 255, 150 S.W.2d 236, 238, 136 A.L.R. 1019; Sargeant v. Sargeant, 118 Tex. 343, 15 S.W.2d 589; Roberts v. Roberts, 136 Tex. 255, 150 S.W.2d 236, 136 A.L.R. 1019.
Although Myrtle paid for the improvements the judgment, in effect, requires her to pay for three-fourths of the value of the improvements again upon partition.
“A cotenant who had made improvements on a portion of the common property occupied by him as a homestead, and to whom such portion is allotted on partition, will be entitled to receive the same without accounting to his cotenant for the value of such improvements. Lewis v. Sellick, 1887, 69 Tex. 379, 7 S.W. 673; Wentworth v. Wentworth, Tex.Civ.App.1911, 142 S.W. 141; Tucker v. Dodson, Tex. Civ.App.1922, 245 S.W. 728; Gose v. Burnett, Tex.Civ.App.1933, 60 S.W.2d 886; Atkins v. Schmid, Tex.Civ.App. 1939, 129 S.W.2d 412.” 140 A.L.R. 1174.
See also 1 A.L.R. 1193 and Sparks v. Robertson, Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W.2d 622 (Writ Ref.). We have concluded that this constitutes reversible error. That part of the judgment is reversed for an adjustment of the equities upon partition. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. Gutheridge v. Gutheridge, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W. 892, 895; Porter v. Rogers, Tex.Civ.App., 293 S.W. 577, 580 (Writ Ref.); Burrell v. Adams, 104 Tex. 183, 135 S.W. 1156, 1158; 3 Tex.Jur. 1150; 3-B Tex.Jur. 534; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 434; Scott v. Motler, Tex.Civ.App., 119 S.W.2d 603; Garcia v. Garza, Tex.Civ.App., 161 S.W.2d 297, 301. Myrtle McDougall’s motion for rehearing is granted to said extent. Otherwise it is overruled. The bank’s motion is *302overruled, One-fourth of the costs of appeal are adjudged against Myrtle McDoug-all and husband, one-fourth against the bank and two-fourths against Phillip Mc-Dougall and Freeman.