Court Opinion

ID: 9641800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:40:42.680736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:39.581934
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I believe the order of summary judgment should be affirmed. The trial court held 1) that the line with which the plaintiff came in contact belonged to the City of Plumerville and was well beyond (by some 300 feet) the ownership and control of the appellee, and 2) that an alleged statement by an employee of the appellee that the lines were deenergized, even if made, lacked a causal connection with the injury because it was the duty of the City of Plumerville to inspect and maintain its lines in a safe condition. The first point is undisputed and the second point has not been shown by the appellant to be incorrect. Appellant cites only two cases, both for the general rule that summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should not be granted where issues of material fact exist. Hunt v. Brewer, 266 Ark. 182, 585 S.W.2d 12 (1979); Talley v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 620 S.W.2d 260 (1981). If the appellant is to prevail on appeal it must be on the strength of the affidavit of the mayor of Plumerville,1 2that sometime after he was elected in 1979 he was told by someone at the Morrilton office of Arkansas Power and Light that “the power had long been turned off from the well house to the well f 2 (my emphasis.) The affidavit is notably vague — it appears to have been a telephone conversation, is nonspecific as to time, does not identify the other party, and refers not to facilities of AP&L, but to facilities of the City of Plumerville. Finally, the mayor’s affidavit makes it clear he was not calling to determine that the lines were safely de-energized, but to see if power could be restored to the facilities of the city.3 Such a conversation could hardly afford a legal basis for thrusting liability elsewhere for the city’s failure to maintain its own facilities in a safe condition. Arkansas General Utilities Co. v. Shipman, 188 Ark. 580, 67 S.W.2d 178 (1934); Decatur v. Parham, 109 So.2d 692 (Ala. 1948); White v. Orlando Utilities Commission, 156 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1963); Kelley v. Public Service Company, 300 Ill. App. 354, 21 N.E.2d 43 (1939); Memphis Consolidated Gas and Electric Company v. Speers, 113 Tenn. 83, 81 S.W. 595 (1904). Hickman, J., joins this dissent.   The affidavit is in direct conflict with an affidavit of the superintendent of the Plumerville Water Department.    This describes facilities belonging entirely to the City of Plumerville.    The affidavit states, “I had called to see how hard it would be to have the power turned on again.”