Court Opinion

ID: 9855197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:20:52.767296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:43.372588
License: Public Domain

Benton, I,
dissenting.
I.
Facts set forth in an affidavit given to support the issuance of a search warrant must establish a nexus between the place to be searched and the criminal activity in question. United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988). The mere assertion that a person was present at a place on one occasion while possessing narcotics three days earlier does not establish the nexus for a search of that place. “The fourth amendment bars search warrants issued on less than probable cause, and there is no question that time is a crucial ele*393ment of probable cause.” United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1984). The magistrate who issued the search warrant in this case could not have made “a practical, common-sense decision . . . , given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . [that] there [was] a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found” in the motel room three days after the informant was in the room. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Thus, I dissent.
II.
When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the trial court, we are not at liberty to ignore uncontradicted evidence. Hankerson v. Moody, 229 Va. 270, 274, 329 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1985). We cannot do so because the trier of fact that first considered the evidence “may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence of unimpeached witnesses which is not inherently incredible and not inconsistent with facts in the record.” Cheatham v. Gregory, 221 Va. 1, 4, 313 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1984). Moreover, where no conflict in the evidence exists, we cannot engage in an analysis that assumes as its premise that a conflict does exist in the evidence.
No conflict existed in the evidence before the trial judge concerning the information that was presented to the issuing magistrate. In particular, all the parties agree, and the record is conclusive, that the affidavit provided a period of time in which the event was said to have occurred. The magistrate knew only that at some point within seventy-two hours prior to the informant’s report to the police the informant allegedly saw cocaine in the possession of a person in the motel room.
When the allegation is that an event occurred at one point in a period of time, the issue of probable cause becomes time sensitive from the first point in time that the event could have occurred. “[A] prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23, 172 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1970). “[I]t is manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.” Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). Therefore, for purposes of our analysis on appeal we must use three days (seventy-two hours) as the standard for determining whether the magistrate could have found probable cause or should have concluded that the application was so stale as to lack probable cause.
*394The trial judge in reviewing the facts presented to the magistrate was not at liberty to review the search warrant application and conclude that the events recounted in the affidavit occurred at a time prior to the presentation of the warrant application that is most favorable to the Commonwealth. It was not within the discretion of the trial judge, anymore than it was within the discretion of the magistrate, to conclude that the affidavit in support of the warrant described events that happened at any time less than seventy-two hours prior to the preparation of the affidavit. Although such a finding might have assisted the Commonwealth in making its case for probable cause, the magistrate is required to make a probable cause decision in a neutral detached manner. See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979). Moreover, a conclusion by either the trial judge or magistrate that the events happened less than seventy-two hours prior to their being reported would not be a reasonable inference drawn from the affidavit; rather, it would be rank speculation.
This is not an instance where one witness testified in the trial court that an event occurred seventy-two hours earlier and another witness testified that the same event occurred one hour earlier, requiring the trial judge to resolve the dispute between the two. In judging the magistrate’s determination, the trial judge could only have concluded that the magistrate was bound by the information attributed to the informant. The trial judge was further bound to find that the magistrate had no basis upon which the magistrate could have concluded that the events the informant observed occurred less than three days prior to the report. No evidence, or even an allegation, existed that would substantiate that conclusion. Thus, in determining whether probable cause existed, the magistrate had to consider the effect of the event occurring at the outside parameter of the reported time period — seventy-two hours (three days) prior to the warrant application — because on the facts before the magistrate that is when the event might have occurred. No facts in the affidavit made it more or less probable that the event did not occur three days before the preparation of the affidavit.
Thus, before issuing the warrant the magistrate had to determine whether probable cause existed based upon the informant’s report of having seen a person possessing cocaine three days earlier. Any assumption by the magistrate or the trial judge that the event in fact occurred less than three days prior to the preparation of the affidavit would have been speculative and made in disregard of the facts. When we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who pre*395vailed at the trial court, we cannot attribute to the fact finder an ability to create evidence or engage in conjecture.
III.
The affidavit stated only that two men were observed on one occasion in a motel room in possession of cocaine. That the event occurred in a motel room, a place generally used by transients, is significant. The affidavit does not allege, even by implication, that the two persons who possessed the cocaine were the occupants of the room, had any continuing connection to the room, or were expected to reenter the room. None of the circumstances alleged in the affidavit suggested a probable conclusion that the persons described in the affidavit as possessing cocaine still occupied the motel room or were expected to return to the room. No reasonably well-trained police officer could have had an objectively reasonable belief that, absent other facts, probable cause existed to search the room seventy-two hours later. The effect of today’s decisions is to expose every hotel or motel guest to the very real prospect that their room will be searched because, during the preceding seventy-two hour period, another guest who occupied the room may have been observed in possession of a controlled substance.
The Commonwealth does not suggest that Tart or the woman in the room when the warrant was executed had any connection to the events that were alleged to have occurred seventy-two hours earlier. The Commonwealth also does not suggest that Tart was one of the men seen in the room three days earlier or that he resembled the description of either of the two men. The police officer who signed the affidavit did not allege that the room was still occupied by the same persons who were seen by the informant. Rather, the officer merely alleged in a wholly conclusional fashion that he “believes that there is now being illegally stored a quantity of ‘crack’ cocaine in [the] room.” In my judgment, no reasonably well-trained officer could have believed that the informant’s observation, which only alleged presence in the room of a man possessing cocaine, was a sufficient basis to provide a nexus between the same man and the room seventy-two hours later.
Likewise, no facts in the affidavit reasonably support the magistrate’s conclusion that the person occupying the room seventy-two hours earlier was still occupying the room. Certainly, this Court has no basis to defer to the magistrate’s conclusion that seventy-two hours *396after cocaine was seen in the possession of a person in a motel room “a ‘substantial basis’ ” existed for concluding that the same person still occupied the motel room. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). The majority opinion concedes that the police did not even conduct a basic, rudimentary investigation to determine whether the same persons were registered in the room three days after the informant had been in the room. Indeed, the police did nothing except obtain a warrant to search a motel room three days after an informant reported being in the room. The majority opinion ignores these decisive circumstances because the affidavit alleged that cocaine was “stored” in the room.
The officer also alleged, in a wholly conclusional fashion, that cocaine was “stored” in the room. No facts alleged in the affidavit support that conclusion. The facts attributed to the informant did not include an allegation that a large quantity of narcotics had been seen in the room, that narcotics had been sold in the room, or that narcotics were “stored” in the room. Moreover, the affidavit did not contain an allegation that the room was rented for a long term or gave the appearance of being used as a storage place. Consequently, the informant’s observations provided no basis for a belief that narcotics were “stored” in the room. The informant merely reported seeing two people in possession of cocaine. The informant gave no facts that would lead any reasonable person to conclude that drugs were “stored” in the room.
Without any basis in the facts, the majority states that the affidavit asserts the existence of an “ongoing criminal enterprise.” Nothing in the affidavit provides a basis for that inference. No facts alleged on the affidavit provide a basis for a reasonable conclusion “that there was a ‘fair probability’ that drugs were being stored in these rooms,” that the persons occupying the rooms at any time “were involved in the sale of drugs,” or that there existed “an ongoing criminal enterprise.” These conclusions are unsupported by the affidavit and merely represent baseless speculations. Moreover, the facts alleged in the affidavit are consistent with the informant observing two people who used three pieces of “crack” cocaine in the motel room on the day the room was being vacated. Simply put, the affidavit lacked any semblance of probable cause to believe that criminal activity was occurring in that room three days later.
*397IV
Relying upon United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the majority opinion finds that, in any event, the evidence seized need not be suppressed. Although I disagree that Leon, if applied to the facts of this case, supports an affirmance, I believe that we need not reach that issue because the Virginia suppression statute does not contain a “good faith” exception.2
“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those [the United States Supreme] Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.” Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). Thus, the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant may be determined by the legislature as a matter of state law and may “impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required” under federal law. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
In Virginia, the issuance of search warrants is governed by statutes. See Code §§ 19.2-52 to -60. Nothing in our statutory law allows a search to be made pursuant to a warrant, absent probable cause. See Code §§ 19.2-52 to -54. If a search and seizure are made pursuant to a warrant and in the absence of probable cause, the legislature has provided a statutory right to suppress the seized evidence. See Code § 19.2-60. Thus, Virginia law provides an-adequate and independent ground for excluding the fruits of this search. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). In addition, federal case law does not control the interpretation or application of the Virginia suppression statute.
The Virginia warrant statute does not codify “good faith” as an exception to the probable cause requirement. In the absence of a legislative expression that “good faith” is an exception to the statutory command, decisions by the courts in Virginia that infuse the Leon good-faith exception into the statute constitute judicial legislation. See *398Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426, 429 (Ga. 1992). Absent probable cause, the search warrant should not have been issued and the search should not have been conducted. Searches that are conducted in the absence of probable cause are precisely the type of “unlawful search or seizure” that is contemplated by our statute. See Code § 19.2-60. See also State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992) (finding no “good faith” exception in the Idaho Constitution and statutes); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (finding no “good faith” exception in the Massachusetts suppression statute); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) (finding no “good faith” exception in the North Carolina suppression statute). Thus, because Code § 19.2-60 contains no “good faith” exception, I would hold that the trial judge erred in failing to suppress the fruits of the search.
V
The majority opinion’s application of Leon not only ignores the plain reading of the Virginia statute, but also is analytically unsound. Nothing is objectively reasonable about concluding that three days after a person was seen in a motel room possessing cocaine, the same person or the cocaine will still be in the room. Absent other facts and circumstances, the conclusion is purely speculative. Leon does not excuse all inadequacies and certainly does not apply if “a reasonably well-trained [police] officer . . . would have known that his affidavit failed to establish probable cause.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986).
In Leon, the police conducted a substantial investigation and supplemented the informant’s facts with the facts of their investigation. 468 U.S. at 902. Objective “good faith” presupposes that officers will conduct reasonable inquiry into an informant’s reports and presupposes at least minimal standards of police conduct. Id. at 922 n.23, 923 n.24. Leon itself states that exclusion is mandated when a warrant application is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 923.
[Where] a magistrate acts mistakenly in issuing a warrant but within the range of professional competence of a magistrate, the officer who requested the warrant cannot be held liable. But it is different if no officer of reasonable competence would have requested the warrant, i.e., his request is outside the range of the professional competence expected of an officer. If the magistrate issues the warrant in such a case, his action is not just a reason*399able mistake, but an unacceptable error indicating gross incompetence or neglect of duty. The officer then cannot excuse his own default by pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.
Briggs, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9. The indicia of probable cause must be considered with respect to the officer’s stated belief that narcotics were “stored” in the room. No facts were alleged in the affidavit to support that belief.
The affidavit contained no allegation of fact from the informant or the officer that would support an inference that the two men or the narcotics would ever again be found in the motel room. The facts alleged merely supported an inference that the two men had a casual connection to the room. Simply put, none of the facts stated in the affidavit support the affiant’s conclusion that drugs were “stored” in the room. Thus, the magistrate could not have reasonably concluded that probable cause existed to believe that drugs were “stored” in the room. The protections embodied in the Fourth Amendment require that “inferences [from facts in a search warrant affidavit] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (footnote omitted). Moreover, the majority opinion provides no logical basis to support its speculative inference that the facts attributed to the informant provide probable cause to believe drugs were “stored” in the room.
VI.
By authorizing the issuance of a search warrant based upon the circumstances as alleged by the affiant in this case, the majority sanctions searches of motel and hotel rooms and their occupants several days after a narcotics user has been in the motel room and without any suggestion that the current occupants of the room were the persons who occupied the room when the narcotics were present. The majority opinion sanctions such a search without requiring any facts that would provide a nexus between the person then occupying the room and the earlier sighting of narcotics. The Court has eliminated the necessity and, thus, the incentive for police to perform basic, rudimentary investigation to ascertain whether circumstances of a transient nature have a fair probability of continuing to be viable. The statutory and constitutional requirements of probable cause have been brushed aside in the haste to appear diligent in the search for narcotics.
*400It makes all the difference in the world whether one recognizes the central fact about the Fourth Amendment, namely, that it was a safeguard against recurrence of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution, or one thinks of it as merely a requirement for a piece of paper.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, X, dissenting). Today’s decision further erodes the guarantees of the constitutions of Virginia and the United States.
I dissent.

 The majority opinion correctly notes that Tart’s trial counsel did not specifically assert the absence of a “good faith” exception in the Virginia statute as the basis for suppressing the evidence. The written motion to suppress cited Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia, the foundational provision for the warrant statute. In addition, Tart’s counsel orally argued that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause and, for that reason, should have been suppressed. Although the argument failed to assert that the statute does not embrace good faith, 1 believe that the ends of justice should be invoked to consider that specific issue to prevent the denial of an essential right. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 888-90, 140 S.E.2d 688, 692-93 (1965).