Court Opinion

ID: 9444083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:40:40.697809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:42.405939
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I concur in the opinion of the court in Numbers 4643 and 4645 but would reverse the judgment in Numbers 4644 and 4646. Some contrariety of view exists in the Texas decisions' with respect to the exact cause of action an injured'employee'may himself maintain where he has received benefits under the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Act. This is recognized by the court in Mitchell v. Dillingham, Tex.Civ.App., 22 S.W'.2d 97Í, where the court laid down the principle' that where an employee had received benefits under the Act his cause of action was limited to such damages, if any, as he suffered in excess of the amount of compensation insurance collected by him. But the principle announced in the Dillingham case has not been consistently followed by'the Texas courts. Thus- in 'Younger Bros., Inc., v. Moore, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 780, the insurance carrier was not joined as a party to the action. The action was maintained solely by the injured employee and he recovéred the full amount of damages suffered by him. ’ Thereafter, on appeal, the judgment was modified to provide that to the extent of the amount of the insurance payments made the recovery should inure to' the benefit of the insurance company, although not a party thereto.
Had this case been tried on the theory of the Dillingham case; had the trial court received evidence as to the amount of these payments as required thereunder- and instructed the jury that it should ascertain the total amount of recovery and then -return its verdict for any excess- remaining, I would have no difficulty in concluding there was no abuse of discretion in refusing Pacific the right to re-enter the case. But this was not the theory on which the case was considered or tried up to the time the jury returned its verdict. An analysis of the record, to me, warrants the conclusion that the case was tried on the theory that the question of subrogation and Pacific’s right to subrogation remained in the case, notwithstanding its withdrawal, and that the injured employee could maintain the action for the total amount of recovery and the court could then enter judgment for Pacific and the injured employee, as required.
That Judge Hill, who granted the motion to withdraw, was of this view would seem to flow from his remarks at the time he sustained the motion. Thus after a discussion apparently dealing with this question, he stated, “Well, I don’t think that would remove them. The motion to dismiss will be sustained.” That this was also the view of Chief Judge Mellott, who tried the case, would seem to follow from a discussion with counsel prior to a submission of the case to the jury. Thus the court in a discussion with counsel said, “Well, the Court will' endeavor to take care of the matter to which reference has just been made by instructing as I think it should instruct, that both of the parties plaintiff in this case were admittedly under the compensation act of the State of Texas and that certain amounts have been awarded and paid under the compensation act of Texas.” As pointed out, the court, however, gave no such instruction and tried the case on the theory that subrogation was still in the case and that Pacific was entitled to subrogation and that it could adjust the matter out of the total verdict by the jury. This appears from the court’s *677statement that, “Under the law of sub-rogation, a party making payment is subrogated to the rights of the one who is ultimately — who has ultimately caused the injury or damage. In other words * * * what it (the court) tried to say, it’s this: That I feel that the carrier who has paid workmen’s compensation under the law of Texas is entitled to be subrogated to any recovery had in this case, and the fact that the insurance company has seen fit to intervene in these cases, even though dismissing its complaint in intervention on the eve of the trial, doesn’t change the situation, in the Court’s opinion, that they are still entitled to subrogation under the Texas statute insofar as may be necessary, * * *Then referring to the Section of the Act in question, the court said, “That section provides, as I understand it, that only the excess is to be paid to the injured employee, in this case the widow and children of Jones, and Martin as the plaintiff. * * * Well, I suppose the Court can give full effect to the impingement, and probably should, of the compensation acts and the question of subrogation, and I don’t suppose it’s important that the Court instruct the jury that payments of compensation have been made.” That this was the court’s theory is also evidenced by the further fact that when it instructed the jury as to the amount of recovery in each case, it instructed the jury to find the total amount of damages suffered by each plaintiff, limited only to the amount prayed for in the complaint in the one case and to $15,000, the amount recoverable for death, in the other.
Had the trial court indicated that subrogation was an issue in the ease but that it could not be considered in the absence of Pacific, an application to reenter the case would no doubt have been made and under the theory of the court would have been granted. Since the case was tried on the theory that plaintiff could recover the full amount of damages and that subrogation and Pacific’s right to subrogation was in the case and could be taken care of by the court out of the total verdict returned, it was in my view error for the court to deny a re-entry of Pacific into the case after the trial, if thought necessary to effectuate the theory on which the case was tried. This would have been well within the doctrine of Younger Bros., Inc., v. Moore, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S.W.2d 780, where subrogation was granted even where the insurance company had not been in the case at any time and where the case apparently was tried on the theory that the injured employee could recover for himself the total amount of damages.