Court Opinion

ID: 9573686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:45.870739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:19.750736
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I would hold that the trial judge admitted the juvenile’s statements in evidence in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
*498I.
One of the constitutional safeguards established by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), is the right of an accused person to have an attorney present at a custodial interrogation and to end the interrogation by invoking this right. Id. at 469, 474-75, 86 S.Ct. at 1625, 1628. See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485-86, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1881, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Supreme Court has held that “the rigid rule [of Miranda means] that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2568, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). Thus, if, in violation of these rights, “the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1765, n. 14, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)).
In order to “prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights” and to “protect the suspect’s ‘desire to deal with the police only through counsel,’ ” the United States Supreme Court established the “Edwards rule” as a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel.” Pursuant to Edwards and its progeny, once the defendant invokes his Miranda right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation regarding any criminal investigation must cease unless the defendant’s counsel is present at the time of questioning. If the police initiate interrogation of a defendant after he has invoked his Miranda right to counsel and before his counsel is present, “a valid waiver of this right cannot be established ... even if he has been advised of his rights.”
Quinn v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 702, 710-11, 492 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1997) (citations omitted).
*499The Supreme Court has also explained “that an accused ..., having expressed his desire to deal with the police only-through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. The rule in “Edwards focuses on the state of mind of the suspect and not of the police.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988).
Before Detective Molleen began interrogating Kevin Michael Potts, who was seventeen years old and lived with his parents, he was aware that Potts’ mother had refused permission for the police to interview Potts. The detective disregarded her express request. After he read Miranda warnings to Potts, the following colloquy occurred:
DET. MOLLEEN: I think some things kind of got out of hand a couple of weeks back, situation got out of control, maybe Dawain was in a little bit of trouble with a particular person, maybe you tried to help him out, it got out of hand, maybe somebody got hurt as a result of it, does that sound kind of familiar?
POTTS: I don’t know. I want to talk to a lawyer.
DET. MOLLEEN: You want to talk to a lawyer.
POTTS: And can I contact my mom?
DET. MOLLEEN: Nope.
POTTS: She can’t talk to me?
DET. MOLLEEN: Nope.
POTTS: Nope? What’s up with the lawyer, then?
DET. MOLLEEN: What’s up with the lawyer? You’ll get one when you get one.
POTTS: What’s that mean?
DET. MOLLEEN: I can’t put you on the phone to contact one right now, ‘cause they ain’t workin’ right now. Okay? You’re arrested, and you’ll be charged and we’ll just go from there.
*500POTTS: Well fuck it, then, I don’t want a damn lawyer. What do you want to know?
DET. MOLLEEN: Just the truth, Kevin, just the truth. Things get out of control?
Potts unambiguously requested to speak to an attorney. Mimicking Potts’ request, the detective gave no indication that it would be honored and, thus, effectively ignored that request. Potts next asked to contact his mother, which was a rational way for a juvenile to seek an adult’s assistance in obtaining an attorney. If we assume the detective intended to honor Potts’ request for an attorney, it would appear that the detective would have either permitted Potts to contact his parents or told him when contact would be permitted. Instead, by his blunt, terse refusal of Potts’ request to speak to his mother, an adult Potts trusted, the detective effectively and immediately denied Potts the right to an attorney. By telling Potts, “you’ll get [an attorney] when you get one,” the detective essentially communicated to Potts that he had to make those arrangements himself. Indeed, the detective testified at the hearing,' “it’s pretty much incumbent on his part to take care of that arrangement.” At no time did the detective indicate to Potts how his right to an attorney would be honored or when. The detective’s statement, “you’re arrested, and you’ll be charged and we’ll just go from there,” effectively communicated a rejection of Potts’ request for counsel.
“The concern of the Court in Miranda was that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). As the Court noted in Miranda: “If authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation ... is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.” 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. Miranda and Edwards were intended to “dispel the compulsion inherent in *501custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458, 86 S.Ct. at 1617. We ignore reality if we assume a juvenile, such as Potts, has the means, maturity, and capability to secure on his or her own initiative, while confined in jail, an attorney to assist him or her. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572 (including a juvenile’s age in the determination whether a waiver occurred).
In addition, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled that “custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning and words or action that ... the officer knows or reasonably should know are likely to ‘have ... the force of a question on the accused,’ and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (citation omitted). I believe the detective’s mimicking responses were designed to cause Potts to engage in additional conversation. They had the effect of stimulating conversation and were the functional equivalent of continuing interrogation. The rule in Edwards was not intended to give the law enforcement officers an opportunity to use interrogation tactics to snare unwary teenagers into asking questions about the means to effect their Miranda rights and then to use those inquiries as a guise to blatantly disregard constitutionally required procedures. When Potts asked to contact his mother, who was his obvious means of securing an attorney, the detective curtly denied that request. Following this denial, the detective’s further mimicking statements, “What’s up with the lawyer? You’ll get one when you get one,” effectively refused to honor Potts’ request. Seeking some explanation about his means of contacting an attorney, which the detective’s responses certainly made illusory, Potts was again rebuffed by the detective’s response that no attorneys were working. This response only served, as did the others,’ to eliminate Potts’ options for obtaining an attorney.
The officer’s technique manifestly raised the level of isolation and hostility imposed on this juvenile by denying him even the most basic assurance that his request for counsel would be honored. Indeed, the detective never told Potts that *502the police would honor his request for an attorney. His responses to Potts’ inquiries about an attorney conveyed the unmistakable message that the detective considered Potts’ request to be frivolous and that an attorney might arrive some day “when [Potts arranged to] get one.” Potts’ exasperated statement, “I don’t want ... a lawyer,” was the culmination of impermissible conduct by the detective. Thus, I would hold that the detective’s curt and mimicking responses constituted badgering that was a continuation of the interrogation in violation of Miranda. I would also hold that Potts’ inquiries were “so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire ... to ... ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).
II.
In addition to these violations of Miranda and Edwards, the record establishes that the Commonwealth failed to prove Potts’ statements were voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Even before Miranda, the Fifth Amendment required that confessions be found voluntary before they could be admitted as evidence. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). In making the determination whether a statement was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made, the trial judge must examine the totality of the circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused, and determine whether the accused’s will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2046-47, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne *503and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that it has “never abandoned this ... jurisprudence, and thus continue[s] to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434, 120 S.Ct. at 2330.
Even if we assume, contrary to the evidence, that Potts initiated the conversation that led to the confession, the Supreme Court has ruled as follows:
If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be “interrogation.” In that event, the question would be whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, n. 9. Furthermore, the principle is also well established that “even if a conversation taking place after the accused has ‘expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,’ is initiated by the accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at 2834. See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, n. 6, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (noting that the accused’s request for counsel is “an extremely important fact” in considering whether there was a valid subsequent waiver of the right to counsel).
Noting that special problems exist with respect to waivers by juveniles, the Supreme Court has ruled that “[i]f counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained [from a juvenile], the greatest care must be *504taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1458, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 S.Ct. 302, 303-04, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). Clearly, the detective who interrogated Potts did not use “the greatest care” to ensure that Potts’ “admission was voluntary.” Id. First, he ignored Potts’ request for counsel. He then flatly refused to allow Potts to consult with his parent, a trusted adult who had the wherewithal to secure counsel for Potts, and, indeed, who had requested the police not to question Potts in her absence. As if to ensure that Potts would feel the coercive nature of his detention, the officer next misrepresented to Potts that no lawyer could be secured at that hour. Lastly, he told Potts that the process would continue without informing Potts whether or when he would have an attorney. In short, this officer conveyed to Potts the unmistakable message that he was on his own in trying to secure an attorney and in dealing with the police.
Recognizing again the special problems of juveniles, the Supreme Court observed the following in a case where the juvenile failed to ask for a lawyer or parent:
[The period] — during which time the boy’s mother unsuccessfully tried to see him and he was cut off from contact with any lawyer or adult advisor — gives the case an ominous cast. The prosecution says that the boy was advised of his right to counsel, but that he did not ask either for a lawyer or for his parents. But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible only to the police. That is to say, we deal with a person who is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.
... He cannot be compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the consequences of *505his admissions. He would have no way of knowing what the consequences of his confession were without advice as to his rights — from someone concerned with securing him those rights — and without the aid of more mature judgment as to the steps he should take in the predicament in which he found himself. A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators. Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had. To allow this conviction to stand would, in effect, be to treat him as if he had no constitutional rights.
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 1212-13, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962).
III.
In summary, the record in this case establishes that the detective denied Potts’ express request for counsel; he denied Potts’ explicit request to speak to his mother, which was an implicit request for aid in the securing of his rights; and he refused those requests in such a fashion that Potts was given the unmistakable message that he had to fend for himself in dealing with the police. I would hold that the record established a violation of Miranda, a violation of Edwards, and a confession that was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress the confession, and I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.