Court Opinion

ID: 9458932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:05:50.116177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.118178
License: Public Domain

*32RIVES, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring) :
I concur in the result but for different reasons. My colleagues say that, looking only to the facts within the personal knowledge of Mullens, this case presents a close legal question as to Mullens’ probable cause to search, but they decline to decide that question, choosing instead to rely upon an unprecedented ground to sustain the reasonableness of the search. I feel that the totality of the circumstances known to Mullens: Rags-dale’s blurry eyes, his erratic and strange behavior, the unusually high rate of speed, the late hour, and especially Jones’ open frisking of Ragsdale after having had a better opportunity than Mullens to see inside the car; all combined to give Mullens probable cause to search the automobile for weapons.
After correctly emphasizing the significance of the “totality” of the encounter, my colleagues reject the obvious implications of the aggregate circumstances ; and, instead, fashion a new and unnecessary deviation from the exclusionary rule. They evidently hold that, when a police officer who is a member of a team conducts a warrantless search of an automobile with no personal knowledge capable of generating probable cause, his search is reasonable if his partner did possess sufficient knowledge to constitute probable cause, although that knowledge was never communicated to the searcher. Such an on-the-scene-team exception to the exclusionary rule is fraught with conceptual difficulties and may be stretched to uncertain limits. Such a weakening of the exclusionary rule is not necessary in light of the more orthodox holding available to the court.
In my opinion, it would not be “hyper-technical to insist on bifurcating the knowledge of the officers.” The mandate of the exclusionary rule is not directed to the collective intellect of an amorphous government entity, but to the individual searching officer. To be sure, the searching officer’s knowledge may be coupled with further, complementary information possessed by other officers, but he must be alerted to the existence of the necessary information in others. Under the ruling of this case, the team’s searching officer need have no reason to search, as long as his partner does, for the partner’s knowledge is imputed to the searcher.
I am not nearly so certain as are my colleagues that, “If Mullens had not commenced the search when he did, Jones would have commanded it, or would have put Ragsdale in Mullens’ custody and performed it himself.” Jones’ plain view of the pistol was probable cause for him to arrest Ragsdale on the charge of violating Article 483 of the Texas Penal Code. Such an arrest could have been made with safety after Jones’ pat-down search revealed that Ragsdale was unarmed, and certainly after Ragsdale had been seated in the patrol car and had been interrogated by Jones in the presence of Mullens “for about three minutes.” If Ragsdale had then been arrested for carrying the pistol partly concealed in the car, there would have been no doubt that the car could be validly searched as incident to that arrest. Instead, Jones chose merely to ticket Rags-dale for speeding. What Jones would have done if Mullens had not searched the car is, in my opinion, as unpredictable as what he did before the car was searched. I cannot, therefore, join my colleagues in holding that “Factually and practically the search at this precise point in time and space was mandated by Jones’ view of Ragsdale’s gun,” nor can I agree with my colleagues that the exclusion of the evidence would not meet the purpose of the exclusionary rule even if Mullens had no probable cause to search the car. They express that opinion upon the factual assumption that “Had the exclusionary rule been effective to deter Mullens from making the search it would have almost instantaneously gone forward under Jones’ lawful direction.” For the reasons already stated, I disagree with that assumption of fact. Further, if that be correct, I would nonetheless think that the exclu*33sion of evidence obtained by an unlawful search made by Mullens would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule to require respect for the guaranty of the fourth amendment.
Such a roundabout approach is not needed for a finding that Mullens’ search of the car was constitutionally reasonable. The existence of probable cause for the search is determined not solely by the state of mind to which Mullens testified, but also by an objective standard of reasonableness.
“And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”
Terry v. Ohio, 1968, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. See also Brinegar v. United States, 1949, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879. To the extent that there had been some order or communication of information passing from one officer to the other, probable cause should be evaluated on the basis of the collective information of the two officers rather than on the knowledge of only the officer who performed the search. Smith v. United States, 1966, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 358 F.2d 833, 835, 836; United States v. Trabucco, 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 1311, 1315; see also Wood v. Crouse, Warden, 10 Cir. 1971, 436 F.2d 1077, 1078; United States v. Tijerina, 10 Cir. 1971, 446 F.2d 675, 679; White v. United States, 8 Cir. 1971, 448 F.2d 250, 254.
Mullens did not hear Jones’ whispered warning. That much is clear. My colleagues find that when he made the search Mullens had knowledge of the following :
“This was not a minor or routine speeding violation — Ragsdale’s vehicle had been proceeding at a recklessly dangerous rate almost twice the allowable limit. Ragsdale, who could give no good reason for having been traveling at such a high rate of speed, also appeared to him. to be ‘blurry-eyed’ and acted in a fashion he described as ‘erratic and strange.’ Lastly, Mullens knew his partner had demonstrated sufficient concern about the degree of danger present to make a personal search of Ragsdale’s body before seating him in the patrol ear.”
I agree that Mullens knew of all these facts and circumstances, and to them I would add the following: Mullens knew that Jones had more opportunity than he to see inside Ragsdale’s car. He could reasonably infer that Jones had some reason to be apprehensive when he requested Ragsdale to return with him to the patrol car for the purpose of preparing a speeding ticket. Unless he judged his partner harshly, Mullens must have reasonably inferred that Jones had cause to apprehend danger when he conducted a pat-down search of Ragsdale’s person before permitting him to enter the patrol car, a greater indignity than the search of Ragsdale’s car. That conduct was more forceful than a spoken message to Mullens that Jones had reason to think that Ragsdale might be armed and dangerous.1 Under the totality of all of these facts, circumstances and inferences, it was reasonable for Mullens to want to “know that you [Ragsdale] didn’t have a pistol of any kind that would be within your reach after you were allowed to return to your car.” The facts and circumstances within Mullens’ personal knowledge, and those conveyed to him by Jones’ conduct and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts and circumstances, all added together meet the test of Terry v. Ohio, quoted in Judge Clark’s opinion.
For the reasons stated, I would avoid any holding based on imputation of *34knowledge between the team members or on an assumption that Jones would have searched the car if Mullens had not done so, and, instead, would decide the issue which my colleagues pretermit. I would hold that Mullens had probable cause to make a reasonable search of Ragsdale’s car for weapons. I therefore concur specially.

. Evidence of Jones' plain view of the partially concealed gun in the automobile was relevant and needed to prove the reasonableness of .Tones’ conduct, in frisking Ragsdale,