Court Opinion

ID: 9644975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:09:39.162227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:20.859165
License: Public Domain

*674DROWOTA, Justice,
dissenting.
The Chancellor in this cause granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and, in so doing, also overruled Plaintiffs motion to set aside a final judgment pursuant to Rule 60.02 TRCP. This was clearly error because the record shows that genuine issues as to numerous material facts were presented to the Chancellor for his consideration, and it was error, therefore, for him to grant summary judgment. See Jones v. Home Indemnity Insurance Co., 651 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn.1983).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges “that this settlement was procured through fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation of law and fact practiced upon Larry Wooley by the Defendant, CNA Insurance Company and Gould, Inc.” These allegations were denied by the Defendants in their affidavits and depositions filed in support of their motion for summary judgment.
We find in the record on appeal the affidavit and deposition of the claim representative who handled this claim for the Defendant CNA, the affidavit of the attorney who prepared the petition and order and submitted the matter for the Chancellor’s approval, and the deposition of the Manager of Industrial Relations for the Defendant Gould, Inc. These depositions and affidavits affirmatively deny any wrongdoing. Defendant also filed Larry Wooley’s deposition. In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed the affidavit of Larry Wooley. Hotly contested issues of material facts were raised by these depositions and affidavits.
The issue of fraud by its very nature, is one which requires for determination the actual hearing and viewing of witnesses whose credibility is of paramount concern for the trier of facts. Long v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 510 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tenn.App.1974). As the majority opinion states, “[I]n the various affidavits and depositions filed there are some discrepancies and controverted issues of fact, not easily resolved without an oral hearing and detailed findings of fact.” The majority opinion, however, affirmed the Chancellor’s denial of Rule 60.02 relief on the ground that the motion was not timely filed and that there had been no tender or offer to return the benefits received.
Plaintiff’s motion was filed within the time permitted in Rule 60.02, although, as pointed out in the majority opinion, it was “filed within the very maximum time limit permitted.”
I think it is important to note that Appellant has a limited education. He can barely read and is unable to write much more than his name. He was classified, by expert witnesses through affidavits, as functioning within the range of borderline retardation. He did not seek counsel until more than 11 months after the date of the settlement. His counsel then filed a Rule 60 motion within the one-year deadline. I do not feel we should dismiss one’s claim and deny him access to the courts under the facts and circumstances of this case. Equity and fairness entitles a disabled employee to have his day in court.
Neither do I believe that an indigent’s access to the courts should be denied for failure to tender. In this case, Appellant is proceeding as a pauper on appeal. He is 37 years old, married and has two children. He has not been gainfully employed since the date of his injury, April 18, 1979. He testified that he took the lump sum because he was “deep in debt ... I’d been off work so long.”
Courts must make sure that the rights of the employee are being upheld under the compensation laws. I, therefore, respectfully disagree with my colleagues, for this was not a proper case to dismiss on summary judgment. I would reverse the order granting summary judgment and remand for a full hearing on Appellant’s Rule 60.02 motion.
BROCK, J., concurs in this dissent.