Court Opinion

ID: 9522388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:24:30.255555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:41.960106
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE concurring in part, dissenting in part: I concur with the majority opinion on all issues except for the fifth issue. I do not believe the jury’s finding of involuntary manslaughter negates a finding of the required mental state for murder. Therefore, I dissent. It must be noted at the outset that the cases cited in the majority opinion on this issue stand for two separate propositions, only one of which is directly relevant to the fifth issue. In People v. Keith (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 93, the jury was instructed on both the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter and the greater offense of murder, but returned a verdict of guilty only on the lesser offense. Under such circumstances, courts recognize the silence of the jury concerning the greater offense as an implicit acquittal of the greater offense. Consequently, double jeopardy bars a retrial on the greater offense. (See Green v. United States (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199, 78 S. Ct. 221.) The above-cited cases do not apply to the instant case. Here, the jury was instructed on both the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter and the greater offense of murder. However, the jury returned a finding of guilty on both the lesser and greater offense. There was no silence concerning the greater offense, and, thus, no implied acquittal of the greater offense. The majority opinion also cites People v. Fox (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 593, and People v. Stutter (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 118. These cases do deal with the question of negation of mental state. However, in Fox and Stutter the defendant was convicted of both voluntary manslaughter and murder. The instant case is distinguishable because the defendant was convicted of both involuntary manslaughter and murder. In Stutter, the jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which is defined in subsection (b) of section 9 — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1978, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(b).) Subsection (b) manslaughter occurs where a defendant knowingly kills an individual and, at the time of the killing, the defendant believed the killing was justified, yet that belief was unreasonable. The jury was also instructed on murder. The appellate court found error because the murder instruction was incomplete. The instruction did not include the element “that the defendant did not believe that circumstances existed which justified the use of force.” Obviously, there is a direct conflict between a finding that the defendant believed the killing was justified (voluntary manslaughter), and a finding that the defendant did not believe the use of force was justified (murder). Consequently, the omission in the murder instruction mandated a reversal of the murder conviction. In Fox, the jury was instructed on the elements of the crime of voluntary manslaughter, which is defined in subsection (a) of section 9 — 2. Subsection (a) manslaughter occurs where a defendant kills while acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. The jury was also instructed on murder. Citing Stuller, the Fox court held that the murder conviction must be reversed. The Fox court noted that “the offense of voluntary manslaughter is an acknowledgment by the law of the mitigating effect of human weakness and intense passion in an otherwise unjustified homicide.” (People v. Fox (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 593, 595.) In a sense, then, the law recognizes an exception to a murder conviction where passion and provocation, or an unreasonable belief that the killing was justified, can be proved. Consequently, where a jury finds a defendant committed voluntary manslaughter and murder, a court may rectify any legal inconsistency resulting from the multiple convictions by setting aside the murder conviction. A finding of involuntary manslaughter, however, does not, likewise, preclude a murder conviction. In the instant case, the jury was instructed on murder as follows: “A person commits the offense of murder when he kills an individual if, in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.” The instructions on involuntary manslaughter provided that: “A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter when he unintentionally causes the death of an individual by acts which are performed recklessly and are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another.” Recklessness was defined as a conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. A comparison of the elements of the murder and involuntary manslaughter instructions above reveals that the two crimes are very similar. Indeed, involuntary manslaughter is considered a lesser included offense of murder. (See People v. Ortiz (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 525, 531.) The essential difference between the crimes, as charged here, is that the lesser crime is based upon recklessness, while the greater offense requires knowledge of a strong probability. Yet, the difference between recklessness and knowledge of a strong probability has been recognized as having no sharp dividing line and is one of degree. (See People v. Davis (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 55, 60.) A person can knowingly create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (murder), and at the same time consciously disregard a risk (reckless conduct) that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm (involuntary manslaughter). Thus, the jury could have reviewed the facts of the instant case and consistently and reasonably found that the defendant’s acts were sufficient to satisfy their instructions on murder and also sufficient to satisfy their instructions on involuntary manslaughter. The defendant was protected from any legal prejudice resulting from multiple convictions by the supreme court’s holding in People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566. King held that a defendant cannot be subject to multiple convictions based on the same act, or based on separate acts where an offense is a lesser-included offense of the other. The King court did not state which conviction, the lesser or the greater, must be set aside. Courts have set aside the lesser offense. (See People v. Harris (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 833, 841; People v. Dandridge (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1027.) The trial judge, in the instant case, was apparently aware of the King holding because he only entered the murder conviction against the defendant. I believe the jury’s findings were factually consistent and the trial court’s decision not to enter the involuntary manslaughter verdict eliminated any legal inconsistencies. A finding of involuntary manslaughter does not preclude a conviction for murder. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the murder conviction.