Court Opinion

ID: 9740452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:35:55.053351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.334501
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion.
Arterburn, C. J.
— Barzilla M. Hutchinson died on the 7th day of January, 1960, age 73. He left a brief will which stated that he had no living father,- mother, brothers, sisters or children, and that he left all of his property, after the payment of his debts, to the Winona Lake School of Theology, Incorporated. The estate of the decedent amounted to approximately $43,500.00, of which approximately $8,500.00 was real estate. The appellant in this case filed a claim for services rendered in the amount of $36,000.00 and a judgment was rendered in her favor after trial in the amount of $23,000.00.
The administrator with the will annexed filed a petition to sell the real estate involved. The judg*359ment claimant filed objections to such sale and a bond to prevent the sale of such real estate as an interested party. Over the objections the trial court granted the petition to sell real estate, from which interlocutory decree this appeal is now taken by the appellant, the judgment creditor. The Probate Code (Burns’ §7-904) provides:
“An order authorizing a personal representative to sell, mortgage or lease real or personal property for the payment of obligations of the estate shall not be granted if any of the persons interested in the estate shall execute and file in the court a bond in such sum and with such sureties as the court may approve, conditioned to pay all obligations of the estate to the extent that the other property of the estate is insufficient therefor, within such time as the court shall direct.”
We may assume that the provisions of this section (the Probate Code) are to prevent unnecessary commissions and expenses in the sale of property when a person “interested in the estate” is willing to put up a bond to prevent such sale and save such expenses, the bond being conditioned to pay any damages resulting. The interested party, whether an heir or a creditor, may be entitled to all or practically all the estate or may desire to use the creditor claim in the purchase of such estate.
Whatever the reason may be, one who has an interest in an estate certainly should be entitled to avoid unnecessary expenses wherever possible. With a claim of fixed amount due one in an estate, it might even be used in bidding for the property at a sale.
The point is made, however, by the appellee that a motion for a new trial has been filed on the judgment claim of the appellant and therefore the judgment is not final. Appellant says this may be all the *360greater reason, why the sale should be delayed until the judgment is finally determined one way or the other, and if determined favorably to the appellant, she would have a large item of credit which could be used in bidding at any sale for the property, when otherwise she may not be a bidder at all.
Regardless of what the policy of the law may be, we think the statute definitely fixes the appellant’s rights. The Probate Code (Burns’ §6-103) defines an interested person as follows:
“ ‘Interested persons’ means heirs, devisees, spouses, creditors or any others having a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent being administered. This meaning may vary at different stages and different parts of a proceeding and must be determined according to the particular purpose and matter involved.”
The statute is so plain that it is amazing that there could be any argument about its meaning. We can find no logical reason why the claimant in this case should be deprived of the right given by this statute. To say, as the majority opinion does, that because the appellant is “general creditor” she does not come within the term “creditor” or one having a “claim” under the statute, is a non-sequitur, to put it mildly. The majority opinion is a plain refusal to follow a plain statute.
I think the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, with directions to deny the petition for sale of the property involved.
Achor, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 185 N. E. 2d 521.