Court Opinion

ID: 9672942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:03:06.728213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.409605
License: Public Domain

WOMACK, Judge,
concurring.
I do not share Judge Meyers’ understanding of Jones v. State, — S.W.2d-, 1998 WL 618992 (Tex.Cr.App., No. 72,135, September 16, 1998). He says, “Per Jones, voir dire error that is not of constitutional magnitude is harmful only if the defendant can show he was deprived of a lawfully constituted jury as a result of the error.” Ante at -(slip op. at 1). This was not the holding of Jones.
Our Jones opinion said, “We return to our previous rule, that the erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the record shows that the error deprived the defendant of a lawfully constituted jury.” — S.W.2d at-(slip op. at 13). This rule does not apply to all “voir dire error that is not of constitutional magnitude,” much less to the other procedural statutes that are paraded in the concurring opinion.
Some of the statutes that Judge Meyers cites deal with assembling the jury array, one of which says, “Each party may challenge the array only on the ground that the officer summoning the jury has willfully summoned jurors with a view to securing a conviction or an acquittal.” Code of Criminal Procedure article 35.07. Because of the statute, a successful challenge to the jury array *583requires proof, not only of a violation of a statute that governs the assembling of the jury panel, but also that an officer of the state acted willfully with a view to securing a conviction or acquittal. Cooks v. State, 844 S.W.2d 697, 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
Other statutes that he cites deal with the qualifications of jurors, and the challenge for cause. It has long been our rule that the erroneous denial of a defendant’s challenge for cause is harmless if the defendant did not peremptorily challenge the juror, use all peremptory challenges, request an additional peremptory challenge which was denied, and state that an objectionable juror sat to whom peremptory challenge would have been made. See, e.g., Wolfe v. State, 147 Tex.Cr. 62, 178 S.W.2d 274 (1944).
I cite these cases to demonstrate that the concept of harmless error in jury selection is not new, and that it has not, and will not, cause “trial courts [to be] freed from the burden of complying with the slew of tedious voir dire rules and procedures promulgated by our legislature.” Ante at 581.
Jones does suggest that in deciding whether an error affects substantial rights,* an appellate court must remember that a party “has no right that any particular individual serve on the jury.” See — S.W.2d at-(slip op. at 12). It also mentioned that acquiring a “partisan” advantage is not a right that the jury selection statute was designed to advance. See id. at-(slip op. at 12). These considerations will doubtless inform the decision in this case. I concur in the Court’s opinion which remands the case to the court of appeals for that decision.
MANSFIELD, J., joins this opinion.

 "Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Tex.R.App. Proc. 44.2(b).