Court Opinion

ID: 9498703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:25:35.722314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:01.027062
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I agree Weaver’s claims warrant habeas relief even if AEDPA’s strict standard of review applies. I write separately because I do not believe AEDPA applies.
When a claim raised in state court proceedings is ignored by the state courts “we apply a pre-AEDPA standard of review.” Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744, 756 n. 8 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Taylor v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 963, 967-68 (8th Cir.2003)); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (“In this case, our review is not circumscribed by a state court conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state courts below reached this prong of the Strickland analysis.”); Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir.2005) (‘When a state court is silent with respect to a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim, that claim has not been ‘adjudicated on the merits’ for purposes of § 2254(d) [and] a federal court cannot apply the deferential standard provided by § 2254(d).”); Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir.2003) (“Where, as here, the state court did not assess the merits of a claim properly raised in a habeas petition, the deference due under AEDPA does not apply.”).
A careful side-by side examination of the claims Weaver made in state court and the Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion addressing those claims convinces me the latter ignored what Weaver referred to then as his ‘War On Drugs” argument, and what the Court refers to now as categories (3) and (5) of Weaver’s claim, that is, the ‘War On Drugs” argument as well as the statements designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury.
Before the Missouri Supreme Court, Weaver made six separate arguments in a section entitled “Other Improper Arguments.” The six separate arguments were as follows: 1) the prosecutor’s statement that if Weaver had not run out of bullets, he would have shot a police officer; 2) the prosecutor’s statement that if Weaver had not run out of bullets, he would have shot witness Jean Hanson; 3) the prosecutor’s discussion of the death penalty as a deterrent to homicide in violation of a pre-trial motion in limine;2 4) the prosecutor’s opinion there were crimes other than first degree murder for which a sentence of life without parole would be appropriate; 5) the prosecutor’s claim he could have pre*843sented victim impact evidence through the victim’s wife, relatives, and friends; and 6) the “War On Drugs” argument, which identified and challenged the specific portions of the sentencing transcript containing the prosecutor’s statements that have been referred to as Claim 2M in the proceedings before our court.
The Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion discusses only the first three of the six arguments advanced by Weaver:
Lastly, Weaver puts forth a collection of allegedly improper arguments made by the state during the punishment phase, including the complaint that the prosecutor argued matters outside the evidence that lacked evidentiary support. The prosecutor argued that [1] had Weaver not run out of bullets he would have shot the arresting officer. [2] He argued that if a prosecution witness had been out jogging a short while after the crime Weaver would have also shot that witness. [3] Finally, he argued that, the death penalty would be a deterrent. Our review of the penalty phase arguments discloses that these arguments are reasonable. The fact that the crime had been planned for the purpose of killing a witness and for the purpose of advancing what was apparently a very, violent drug enterprise, permits an inference that the defendant had a high propensity for violent conduct in the future. The claim that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the argument is without merit. The point is denied.
State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 514 (Mo.1995).
In determining whether a claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purpose of applying AEDPA’s, strict standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), “[w]e must simply look at what a state court has said, case by case, and determine whether the federal constitutional claim was considered and rejected by that court.” Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir.2004). While I acknowledge the “summary nature of a state court’s decision does not affect the applicable standard of review,” Closs v. Weber, 238 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.2001) (citing James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir.1999)), I submit a distinction must be drawn between summarily disposing of a claim and wholly ignoring it.
Significantly, when I look at what the state court said in this case, it is clear the state court discusses and analyzes only three of the six arguments advanced by Weaver in his “Other Improper Arguments” section. Most notably, the state court identified the third of Weaver’s six arguments as his final argument, and nowhere discusses or analyzes Weaver’s last three arguments, including his War On Drugs” claim. I do not know what else to glean from what the state court said other than to conclude it ignored Weaver’s most compelling constitutional claim.
As the Court notes, the Eighth Amendment requires capital sentencing to be an individualized decision-making process. See ante at-. Not once, not twice, not thrice, but seven times the prosecutor urged the jury to ignore the individual offender, William Weaver. Instead of focusing the jurors’ attention upon Weaver’s character and record, and the-particular circumstances of Weaver’s offense, the prosecutor instead advised the jury “[t]he one thing you’ve got to get into your head, this is far more important than William Weaver. This case goes far beyond William Weaver.” He told the jury “drug dealers ... are taking our streets away from us.” He advised the jury to “send a message” to “all dope peddlers and murderers in the world [for the sake of] all of us, the community. They are our streets, *844our neighborhoods, our family.” He. said drug dealers were “society’s worst nightmare. If they could kill witnesses and we don’t execute them in exchange, • then there’s not deterrence. Then the whole system fails and then chaos reigns and our streets are never safe. The dope peddlers reign.”
These statements, as well as the other improper statements discussed by the Court, clearly violated Weaver’s constitutional rights. I have no trouble concluding such to be the case when reviewing the district court’s decision de novo or when applying the more demanding standard of review under AEDPA. I therefore concur in affirming the judgment of the district court.

. Specifically, the prosecutor argued:
The death penalty deters. I’m convinced of that. People can argue for a thousand years whether it does or not, but I'm convinced it does. It doesn’t deter passion killings. It doesn't deter crazed people who kill. But it deters business killings like this.
I set forth the specifics of this argument for the purpose of showing Weaver’s "deterrent” claim was distinct from his "war-on-drugs” claim in state court.