Court Opinion

ID: 9843809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:29.484735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:13.703484
License: Public Domain

*172SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 62] Because I believe the majority has exceeded the scope of appellate review permitted under N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-46 and 28-32-49,1 respectfully dissent.
[¶ 63] The majority concludes WSI’s findings of fact did not sufficiently address whether Huwe’s psychological and addiction problems were a substantial contributing factor to a change in his compensable medical condition. As the majority concedes, however, not only did Huwe not raise or rely upon this argument to support his claim for benefits, he expressly disavowed any such reliance. The majority concludes, at ¶ 26, that the decision of WSI and this Court must be governed by “what the record reflects and not what Huwe relied upon.” As this Court has noted, however, “judges are not ferrets, obligated to engage in unassisted searches of the record for evidence to support a [party’s] position.” Vandeberg v. State, 2003 ND 71, ¶ 7, 660 N.W.2d 568; see also Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 345 (N.D.1996). Administrative agencies and ALJs are not ferrets, either. Parties have the duty to raise appropriate issues, delineate their arguments, and draw the court’s or agency’s attention to supporting evidence in the record. When a party has failed to raise an issue, and particularly when the party has expressly disavowed the issue, a court exceeds the appropriate scope of appellate review when it relies upon that issue to reverse the decision of an administrative agency.
[¶ 64] In this case, the majority has gone one step further. Having determined that the ALJ and WSI should have considered whether Huwe’s psychological and addiction problems were a substantial contributing cause to a change in his com-pensable medical condition, the majority then reaches medical conclusions not drawn by any of the numerous medical experts who provided opinions in this case. Not a single doctor or health care provider indicated Huwe’s psychological or addiction problems were caused by or related to the 1992 work injury. Yet, at ¶¶ 23-24, the majority draws the conclusions that “[t]he evidence suggests Huwe’s narcotic dependency was a result of his medications for his neck and back pain and severe headaches” and that there was “considerable evidence” Huwe’s addiction and psychological problems “stem from and are related to the injury.” It is for the medical experts, not the courts, to “connect the dots” and determine whether a claimant’s psychological and addiction problems are the “result of’ or “stem from” a prior work injury. This record is devoid of any expert opinion making that connection.
[¶ 65] There was, of course, one medical expert who offered an opinion on the connection between Huwe’s psychological and addiction problems and his work injury. Dr. Cooper testified that Huwe’s psychologically based chronic pain syndrome was not caused by his work injury and that Huwe’s addiction and psychological problems were “nonwork-related.” The majority does not address Dr. Cooper’s testimony when it concludes WSI did not adequately address the evidence in the record about the causal connection between Huwe’s psychological and addiction problems and his prior work injury.
[¶ 66] The ALJ and WSI recognized that the psychological component of Huwe’s chronic pain may have been caused in part by his work injury, but found “the record does not adequately address that possibility.” As a claimant seeking reinstatement of disability benefits, Huwe had the burden of presenting evidence demonstrating a significant change in his com-pensable medical condition and a resulting wage loss. Aga v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2006 ND 254, ¶ 13, 725 N.W.2d 204; Sorlie v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2005 *173ND 83, ¶ 15, 695 N.W.2d 453. The ALJ and WSI correctly concluded that he failed to do so.
[¶ 67] Although acknowledging at ¶ 8 that “[cjourts exercise only a limited review in appeals from administrative agency decisions,” the majority has effectively usurped the function of claimant’s counsel by raising and deciding an issue expressly disavowed by counsel, usurped the function of the expert medical witnesses by drawing its own conclusions from the medical evidence, and usurped the function of the ALJ and the agency by ignoring the evidence presented by the one medical expert who actually provided an opinion on the issue and concluding the agency’s findings of fact did not adequately address the issue. Applying the limited scope of review authorized by N.D.C.C. §§ 28-32-46 and 28-32-49, I would affirm the district court judgment affirming WSI’s order denying Huwe’s reapplication for disability benefits.
[¶ 68] DALE V. SANDSTROM and DANIEL J. CROTHERS, JL, Concur.