Court Opinion

ID: 9830187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:57:45.53553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:15.359067
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In Floyd v. Fidelity Union Casualty Co., 24 S.W.(2d) 363, opinion by the Commission of Appeals, which was cited in our opinion on original hearing, it was said in part: “Improper argument injecting into the case matters de hors record that are inflammatory, and calculated to prejudice rights of losing party before jury, may, in proper case, be complained of on appeal, although objection was urged for first time in motion for new trial.”
But the argument there complained of was objected to at the time it was made, and, upon objection thereto, it was excluded from the jury by an instruction from the court; the'objection was not made for the first time in motion for new trial. Hence the announcement just quoted was not really called for in that ease, and was overlooked by us on original hearing. The improper argument there referred to was a comment on evidence which had been offered and excluded by the trial court. Hence that decision is clearly distinguishable from this case.
In Robbins v. Wynne, 44 S.W.(2d) 946, 949, an opinion written by Justice Critz of the Commission of Appeals, with express approval by the Supreme Court, presents an extended and instructive discussion of many prior decisions with respect to improper ai'gument. In that case the court sustained an assignment to an argument made by counsel as to what a witness would have testified if she had been permitted to do so. It was held that, as a matter of law, that argument was calculated to injure the other side and was misconduct which would necessarily result in a reversal for the same reason as would govern where the jury hears evidence outside of the record while it is deliberating on a verdict.
In discussing assignments to other arguments alleged to be improper, it was held that it is not always necessary for the complaining party to object to an improper argument at the time it is made in order to reserve the right to complain of the same on motion for new trial and'on appeal, as error, following the decision in Willis & Bro. v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465.- But in that connection the court said: “We hold that the correct rule is that, if the argument be such, or is made under such circumstances that, if objection is made at the time counsel 'making the argument can offer explanation therefor which will render such argument proper, or can make such amends as will render the same undoubtedly harmless, or,' if the argument be of such a nature that its proper withdrawal by counsel or instructions by the court to the jury to disregard will cure the error, and render its harmful effect free from doubt, then the objections should be made at the time, and failure to do so waives the error. On the other hand, if the argument be' such that the converse of the above propositions is true, then it would be idle to say that opposing- counsel should object at the time, when the objection might do nothing more than render the improper remarks more damaging than they would be if he remained silent.”
The statement made in our original opinion that we had found no decision holding that objection to improper argument can be made for the first time in a motion for new trial, and that failure to object to the arguments complained of in this case prior to the hearing of the motion for new trial was a waiver of right to complain of the argument here is withdrawn. But those arguments complained of which were not provoked by arguments of like kind from appellant’s counsel did not refer to facts not introduced in evidence, and were not of such character that any probable injurious effect therefrom could not have been removed and avoided by a withdrawal thereof by counsel or by an instruction from the court; and therefore the failure of appellant to object thereto at the time was a waiver of right to complain of same here, under the last quotation from Robbins v. Wynne, supra, even though it could be said that they were improper.
Appellant insists that the rule that an assignment of error to the admission of testimony as a whole will not be sustained if a part of the testimony is admissible, even though another portion is subject to the objection, .is not applicable to arguments of counsel which are complained of as improper. Appellant insists that our holding on that point is not sustained by any decision in this state. Whether or not that be true, we perceive no valid reason for changing our conclusion, since we believe that the same basic reason for the rule just referred to, applicable to the admission of evidence, applies and should apply to such arguments.
With the correction noted, the motion for rehearing is overruled.