Court Opinion

ID: 9469992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:54:19.895618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:40.060047
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
While I agree with the balance of the opinion of the majority, I respectfully dissent from the result and from part III of its opinion in which it affirms the district court’s holding that the testimony of the defendants’ expert witness was inadmissible.
The witness in question was David Par-cell, an independent consulting economist. His qualifications were beyond reproach. He was a graduate of VPI with a master’s degree in economies, had written several articles for learned journals, and on more than a hundred occasions had been called upon to define market areas. The market area and an analysis of the bids of Portsmouth Paving would have been the subject of his testimony. ' There was no more relevant evidence in the case.
' Parcell had analyzed each bid in question which Portsmouth Paving had made, and, in consideration of variable and fixed costs, had formed an opinion on whether the bids were within the market area of Portsmouth Paving. Parcell defined market area as the area in which Portsmouth Paving had a cost advantage and in which it would be expected to be the successful bidder the vast majority of the time. He would have testified that Portsmouth Paving made the vast majority of its bids within its market area.
The theory of the government’s case was that the alleged conspirators had refrained from bidding in some instances to lessen competition and had made complimentary bids in other instances to feign competition. The refraining from bidding on the one hand and complimentary bidding on the other, the government contends, was pursuant to an agreement to rig the paving bids in the area involved which consisted generally of the Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Portsmouth, Hampton Roads tidewater area of Virginia.
As noted, the testimony of Parcell would have tended to show that the vast majority of the bids of Portsmouth Paving were within its market area, which he would have defined, and that they were justified by economic considerations in all events. Thus, if the jury had believed his testimony, it could have concluded that the bids, sub*326mitted or which Portsmouth Paving refrained from submitting, were due to legitimate economic considerations and not pursuant to an agreement entered into in violation of the Sherman Act. At the very least, the jury could have given Parcell’s testimony sufficient weight so that it believed the government’s case was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court refused to admit the testimony of Parcell for the stated reason that “... it seems to me that the testimony of the expert boils down to, in very simple phrases, that you have a competitive advantage if you are near home and that how far you want to go from your home base depends upon your willingness or necessity to shave profits.” The court gave as a further reason that lay witnesses had described the natural trading area of Portsmouth Paving and the expert testimony did not add to it.
I agree that the admissibility of expert testimony is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and that its discretion should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. See Salem v. United States Lines, 370 U.S. 31, 35, 82 S.Ct. 1119, 1122, 8 L.Ed.2d 313 (1962). I believe, however, that the action of the trial court complained of in this case was manifestly erroneous. We are dealing here with FRE 702 which provides for the admissibility of expert testimony when it “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” It is enough that the evidence would assist the trier of fact. United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 516 (3d Cir.1981); United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th Cir.1979). Weinstein notes that “[e]ven when jurors are well equipped to make judgments on the basis of their common knowledge and experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to bear on the same issue which would be helpful.” 3 Weinstein on Evidence 1702[02] at 702-10. The text further states that “[bjecause of the Federal Rules emphasis on liberalizing expert testimony, doubts about whether an expert’s testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors such as time or surprise favoring exclusions. The jury is intelligent enough, aided by counsel, to ignore what is unhelpful in its deliberations.” Weinstein at 702-14-15. And Wigmore states the proposition in these words: “But the only true criterion is: On this subject can a jury receive from this person appreciable help?” (Italics are Wigmore’s.) 7 Wigmore Evidence II1923 at p. 29.
With these thoughts in mind, Parcell’s proffered testimony, that of an acknowledged expert, which would have compared the economical bidding area of Portsmouth Paving with those of the other paving contractors involved in the conspiracy, was testimony which could only have aided the jury in its consideration. It went to the heart of the very question at hand: Were the defendants’ actions the result of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act, or were they the result of everyday economic factors faced by every contractor who bids on any job anywhere?
I do not contend that the jury necessarily could not comprehend the basic concept that costs increase the further a paving contractor must travel to perform a job. But how far he may travel and do the job economically is a matter in which expert opinion certainly is helpful, even if not necessary. Indeed a strong argument can be made that it is necessary. The old saw in the contracting business that one who makes low bids on all jobs soon goes broke is not without foundation. So the cost factors involved in Portsmouth’s bidding about which Parcell would have testified were most relevant to the question at hand. Portsmouth was left with its naked denial, supported, it is true, by the testimony of its employees and officers. But it was entitled, I think, to corroborate their testimony which was bound to be considered in the light of their respective positions. The court, for example, properly and explicitly charged the jury to “[cjonsider also any relation each witness may bear to either side of the case; the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict ft
*327By depriving the defendants of the testimony of Parcell, the court deprived them of valuable corroborating evidence by an independent expert. It thus prevented them from presenting their side of the case.
A decision with similar facts, and with the same issue, as the case at hand is Continental Baking Company v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir.1960). In that case the defendants were charged with criminal antitrust violations, that of the fixing of prices on bakery products in the Memphis, Tennessee area. The government’s proof tended to show that the prices charged by the defendants were the same and that preceding each price increase the defendants met and discussed prices. The defense was that the price increases were not the result of any agreement but were merely the result of economically dictated conscious parallelism. Thus, the issue in the case was whether the similar prices were the result of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act or whether they were the result of economic factors which would not have been a crime, precisely the same issue which is presented in this case. The defendants offered expert testimony as to the economic considerations which brought about the pricing which the court excluded, reversing a previous ruling on the question, because it considered the evidence offered as tending to justify a price fixing agreement which was per se illegal. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, stating that “the supplementary economic evidence offered by defendants can be considered only in relation to their defenses, that the pnce changes were not the result of any agreements.” p. 146. (Italics added.) The defense here is the same, that the bidding of Portsmouth Paving was not the result of any agreement.
One further thing deserves mention. The first trial ended in a hung jury. At that trial, Parcell was permitted to testify. When the retrial came around, the same witness was not permitted to give the same evidence which the same court had held admissible in the first trial. I submit the action of the district court was correct in the first instance and erroneous in the second. By its actions it deprived the defendants of the only corroborating independent evidence they had.
I would grant a new trial.