Court Opinion

ID: 9662031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:57:38.648634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.050847
License: Public Domain

Danhof, P. J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the result reached by the majority in holding that the testimony regarding the defendant’s arrest which showed an independent offense was part of the res gestae of the instant case and hence was admissible.
I must dissent, however, from the decision remanding this matter to the trial judge for examination of the dossiers prepared by the prosecutor on prospective jurors. It appears to me that under the guise of fundamental fairness the majority seeks to impose as substantive law a rule of discovery in criminal cases. If what the majority seeks to accomplish is to become the law of this state, it should be made uniform in its application by a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court under Const 1963, art 6, § 5. To do otherwise would lead to piecemeal application by the trial courts and confusion in the criminal practice in this state.
As a matter of substantive law I agree with the opinion of United States v Falange, 426 F2d 930, 932-933 (CA 2, 1970), wherein the Court stated:
"An investigation of prospective jurors pointedly directed toward uncovering possible bias against the government was made in United States v Costello, 255 F2d 876, 882 (2d Cir), cert den 357 US 937, 78 S Ct 1385, 2 L Ed 2d 1551, reh den, 358 US 858, 79 S Ct 16, 3 L Ed 2d 93 (1958). That was a case of a prosecution for income tax evasion, where an examination was made by the government of the income tax returns of many mem*653bers of the jury panel 'in an effort to find out whether [they] had income tax troubles of their own or had other reasons to be unfavorably disposed to the Government.’ Id. at 255 F2d 882. We held in Costello that the investigation furnished.
" 'utterly no basis for the contention that it resulted in a jury "specially conditioned” to convict or otherwise biased or prejudiced against the defendant. At most, the practice led to challenges of jurors who might have been unduly biased in favor of the defendant. The exercise of peremptory challenges is a rejective, rather than a selective, process of which the appellant has no right to complain.’ Id. at 884.
"The fact that some members of the panel were challenged does not mean that those who were not were biased or prejudiced.
"The defendants’ arguments that to permit such an investigation of prospective jurors as occurred here will discourage citizens from serving as jurors were dismissed in Costello as 'far fetched bogies.’ Id. at 883. The additional contention that it is fundamentally unfair to deprive defendants of a similar opportunity was rejected in Best v United States, 184 F2d 131, 141 (1st Cir 1950), cert den, 340 US 939, 71 S Ct 480, 95 L Ed 677 (1951), where Chief Judge Magruder upheld the denial of a defendant’s motion to be allowed to inspect and use an FBI report of its investigation of the veniremen. See also, Martin v United States, 266 F2d 97, 99 (5th Cir 1959); Christoffel v United States, 84 US App DC 132, 171 F2d 1004, 1006 (1948), rev’d on other grounds, 338 US 84, 69 S Ct 1447, 93 L Ed 1826 (1949).
"We conclude that the denial of the motion to withdraw the jury was not an abuse of discretion.”
I would affirm.