Court Opinion

ID: 9892623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 17:02:51.465936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:34.306187
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 24 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL EVAN KELLEY,                            No.    22-16775

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:21-cv-08016-SMB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Susan M. Brnovich, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted October 20, 2023**
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: IKUTA, BADE, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Michael Evan Kelley appeals the district court’s order affirming the

Commissioner’s final decision, as set forth in the Administrative Law Judge’s

(“ALJ”) decision and affirmed by the Appeals Council, denying Kelley’s

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act,

42 U.S.C. § 423. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de

novo the district court’s order affirming the agency’s denial of Social Security

disability benefits. Miskey v. Kijakazi, 33 F.4th 565, 570 (9th Cir. 2022). We must

“affirm the ALJ’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence and

if the ALJ’s decision was free of legal error.” Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102,

1108 (9th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). Because the ALJ’s decision satisfies this

standard, we affirm.

      1.     Kelley argues that the ALJ erred at step two by finding that his mental

health impairments were not severe. Even if the ALJ erred at step two, it was

harmless. Step two is “merely a threshold determination meant to screen out weak

claims.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). If a claimant is

found to have a single severe impairment at step two, the ALJ proceeds to step

three. McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1074 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002). An

additional severe impairment has no impact on an ALJ’s residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) analysis because the ALJ is required to consider all the

claimant’s impairments, regardless of severity. Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049. Because

the ALJ determined that Kelley had the severe impairments of degenerative disc

disease with nerve root impingement and gout at step two, Kelley was not

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prejudiced by the ALJ’s finding that his mental health impairments were non-

severe. See id. Therefore, even if the ALJ erred, it was harmless error.

      2.     The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial

evidence for discounting Kelley’s symptom testimony. See Smith v. Kijakazi, 14

F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021). The ALJ explained how the evidence conflicted

with Kelley’s testimony on the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his

symptoms. This evidence included Kelley’s substantial daily activities, prior

inconsistent statements, and objective medical evidence that showed unremarkable

and normal findings. See Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022)

(“When objective medical evidence in the record is inconsistent with the

claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as undercutting such

testimony.”); see also Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006

(9th Cir. 2015) (“To assess a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ may consider . . .

‘ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,’ ‘inadequately explained failure to

seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment,’ and ‘the claimant’s

daily activities.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, the ALJ supported his decision

to discount Kelley’s subjective testimony with specific, clear, and convincing

reasons.

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      3.    The ALJ’s RFC analysis articulates why he found medical opinions

persuasive and why he rejected certain evidence, and these conclusions were

supported by substantial evidence.

      Kelley first argues that the ALJ failed to adequately consider the medical

opinions of state agency psychological consultants who assigned him a more

limited RFC. This argument is without merit. The ALJ found that these opinions

failed to consider a substantial amount of subsequently developed evidence and

that these opinions were inconsistent with other evidence, such as Kelley’s

numerous normal mental status examinations and frequent denials of limited

functions. This analysis, considering supportability and consistency, was sufficient

under the regulations. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022).

      The ALJ also found persuasive two state agency medical consultants who

opined that Kelley had a medium RFC. This conclusion was also supported by

substantial evidence. The ALJ reasonably found that Kelley’s substantial activities

and normal consultative examination were consistent with these medical opinions

and noted that both doctors considered more (and more recent) objective medical

evidence than that considered by state agency medical consultants who assessed a

more restrictive RFC. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014)

(“An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement by setting out a detailed

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

                                         4
interpretation thereof, and making findings.” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)).

      Kelley also argues that the ALJ failed to discuss probative evidence in his

RFC analysis. The ALJ did not err. While Kelley identifies certain impairments

the ALJ did not expressly mention in his RFC analysis, he fails to explain how

these impairments “correspond to limitations on [his] ability to perform basic work

activities.” See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1229 (9th Cir.

2009). As to other evidence identified by Kelley, such as his record of pain

management, the ALJ provided a sufficient explanation for rejecting it. See

Kilpatrick v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2022) (An ALJ “must explain

why significant probative evidence has been rejected.” (citation omitted)).

      4.     Finally, Kelley argues that an award of SSI benefits in a subsequent

application, finding Kelley disabled with an onset date of March 6, 2020, is

inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding that the claimant was not disabled as of

December 31, 2019, as to his application for Disability Insurance Benefits.1 There

is no inconsistency. The date that Kelley was found disabled in the subsequent

application was three months after the date the ALJ found Kelley not disabled.

Kelley’s subsequent application included new evidence that was not relevant to the

      1
       Kelley’s motion to take judicial notice of an award of SSI benefits and the
Commissioner’s motion to take judicial notice of the agency’s disability
determination explanation for that award are both granted.

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period of disability considered in the prior application, which explains the different

findings of disability. Therefore, remand is not warranted. See Booz v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., 734 F.2d 1378, 1380–81 (9th Cir. 1984).

      AFFIRMED.

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