Court Opinion

ID: 9587952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:28:17.518187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:26.646896
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting:
I agree with the dissent of Donaldson, J., that the motion to set aside the judgment was properly denied because of failure to demonstrate excusable neglect under I.R. C.P. 60(b)(1). Apparently the majority opinion does not disagree with that conclusion.
As noted by the majority opinion, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest granted defendants an easement “exclusively for their use”. Thereafter defendants, at considerable expense, constructed and maintained a road across said easement. Plaintiff could have obtained the use of that road by contributing a share of the cost of the construction and maintenance of the road, but instead, he demanded his “right” to use the road and thus gain the benefit of defendant’s expenditures without any cost to himself.
The owner of a servient estate which is burdened with an easement ordinarily has a right to use the easement in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary. Reynolds Irr. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949); Hackendorn v. Mahan, 24 Del.Ch. 228, 8 A.2d 794 (1939); Tomchak v. Harris, 54 Idaho 448, 32 P.2d 1025 (1934); Jakobson v. Chestnut Hill Properties, Inc., 106 Misc.2d 918, 436 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Sup.Ct.1981); Titeca v. State Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, 634 P.2d 1156 (Mont.1981); Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450 (Okl.App.1980); George v. Coombes, 278 Or. 3, 562 P.2d 200 (1977); Bors v. McGowan, 158 Neb. 790, 68 N.W.2d 596 (Neb.1955). However, an exclusive easement, while a somewhat unusual device, creates in its owner the free and undisturbed use of the easement for the purposes for which it was created, even as against the owner of the fee. MGJ Corp. v. City of Houston, 544 S.W.2d 171 (Tex.Civ.App.1976); see MacPherson v. Smoyer, 622 P.2d 188 (Mont.1980).
However, the majority opinion argues that the term “exclusive” is susceptible of two interpretations, i.e., it may modify the type of use to which the owner of the dominant tenement may put the easement, or it may limit those who may use the easement. The majority then adopts the first alternative interpretation and therein errs.
Here the granted easement is limited to right of way or roadway purposes. The owner of the dominant tenement may not use the easement for purposes other than those for which it is created. The owner of an easement has no greater right to use than is reasonably necessary to enable him to adequately and conveniently make the intended use of his way. Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542 (1929); Donaghey v. Croteau, 119 N.H. 320, 401 A.2d 1081 (1979); Jakobson v. Chestnut Hill Properties, Inc., supra. Here the easement by operation of law prevents the owner of the easement from using the right of way for anything other than roadway purposes. Thus, under the rationale of the majority opinion, the term “exclusively” is totally superfluous, adds nothing to the easement document which is not already there, and has been effectively eliminated from the document. In my view, the majority’s unsupported conclusion that the term “exclusively for their use” does not *863mean “for their use exclusively,” is patently erroneous.
Even assuming the correctness of the majority opinion’s characterization of the term “exclusively for their use” as ambiguous, I must disagree with the majority’s statement “the trial court should have considered extrinsic evidence of the circumstances and intentions of the original parties to the easement.” To me at least it is clear that, as pointed out by Donaldson, J., the trial court did exactly what the majority directs, and then concluded as a matter of fact and upon the weight of the evidence, that as between the original parties to the agreement and their successors and assigns, the owners of the dominant tenement had the right to use the road to the exclusion of all others, including the owners of the servient tenement. If the term “exclusively for their use” is ambiguous, the interpretation of such ambiguous terminology is a question of fact, Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980), and it is well settled that the factual findings which are based on substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence, will not be disturbed upon appeal unless clearly erroneous. Cougar Bay Co., Inc. v. Bristol, 100 Idaho 380, 597 P.2d 1070 (1979); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973). Here, the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, are clearly supported by the weight of the evidence, and in my judgment, should be upheld.