Court Opinion

ID: 9745507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:05:16.032788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:02.096228
License: Public Domain

*248ROBIE, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I

Adjudication of These Cases Would Not Interfere with the Commission’s Exercise of Its Regulatory Authority

My colleagues conclude that adjudication of these cases by the superior court would interfere with California’s Public Utilities Commission’s (the commission) exercise of its regulatory authority over vegetation management1 around power lines. They are wrong. Let me explain why.
A

What Plaintiffs Seek

First, we need to focus on what plaintiffs seek in these actions. The first appeal (case No. C059873) is from a judgment of dismissal in San Joaquin County Superior Court case No. CV033900. Plaintiffs are William R. Sarale (as an individual) and Julie Ann S arale (as an individual and as the trustee of two trusts). We will refer to this case as the Sarale case and to these plaintiffs as the Sarales. The second appeal (case No. C060515) is from a judgment of dismissal in Yuba County Superior Court case No. YCSCCVCV080000252. Plaintiff is Richard G. Wilbur, as a trustee. We will refer to this case as the Wilbur case and to this plaintiff as Wilbur. We will refer to the Sarales and Wilbur collectively as plaintiffs. Essentially, Wilbur and the Sarales each seek a determination by the superior court that the extent to which Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) has been trimming, or wants to trim, the walnut trees under and around its power lines exceeds the scope of the utility’s easements over plaintiffs’ orchards.2 Stated another way, Wilbur and the Sarales seek a determination that PG&E does not have a property right to trim as much of the trees as the utility has been trimming or wants to trim.
Both Wilbur and the Sarales admit, however, that they are not challenging any trimming by PG&E that is consistent with the minimum distances the commission has established in rule 35. In other words, they admit that the *249terms of PG&E’s easements (if any) over their property allow PG&E to trim at least as much of the trees as the commission has determined must or should be trimmed.3
To that end, in their complaint the Sarales specifically seek an injunction preventing PG&E from “destroying vegetation or trimming crops under cultivation ... to the extent that such activity exceeds acts authorized, regulated or controlled within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [commission].” (Italics added.) Similarly, at oral argument before this court, Wilbur conceded he does not seek to challenge any trimming by PG&E that complies with the minimum distances the commission has established.
What is at issue here, then, is whether any trimming beyond what the commission has mandated or recommended in rule 35 and its guidelines is within the scope of PG&E’s easements, and if so, how much.
The question of whether an activity by an easement holder is within or without the scope of the easement is one that has traditionally been for the courts to decide, even when the easement holder is a public utility. For example, in Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137 [173 Cal.Rptr. 751], a landowner sued PG&E for damages and a permanent injunction to prevent PG&E from lining with gunite a section of a ditch that crossed the landowner’s property. (Id. at p. 141.) The “essential controversy” in that case was whether PG&E’s “easement rights to [the] ditch . . . encompasse[d] the right to line the earthen ditch with the concrete-like gunite.” (Ibid.)
Here, the essential controversy is whether PG&E’s easement rights over plaintiffs’ walnut orchards encompass the right to trim vegetation around and underneath the utility’s power lines beyond the minimum distances the commission has established. It is the adjudication of this controversy that my colleagues wrongly believe will interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority.
B

What the Commission Has Done

Having identified what plaintiffs seek in these actions, the next step in understanding why my colleagues are wrong is to focus on exactly how the *250commission has exercised its regulatory authority over vegetation management around power lines. As the majority agrees, what the commission has done in this area is promulgate rule 35 (and its accompanying guidelines). (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 237-239.) As I have explained, and as the majority opinion acknowledges, through that rule the commission has mandated certain minimum clearances that must be maintained between power lines and surrounding vegetation at all times and has recommended certain greater clearances that should be established at the time of trimming. (Id. at pp. 237-240.) What the rule does not do, however, is recommend or mandate any maximum clearances. (Id. at p. 239.) In other words, the commission has told public utilities like PG&E that they should trim surrounding vegetation a certain distance away from their power lines at the time of trimming and that they must maintain a certain, lesser clearance at all times, but the commission has not told the utilities when they should or must stop trimming.
It is also worth noting that the requirements of rule 35—including the supposedly “mandatory” minimum clearance that is to be maintained at all times—“do not apply where the utility has made a ‘good faith’ effort to obtain permission to trim or remove vegetation but permission was refused or unobtainable.” Thus, even the commission itself recognizes that it does not have the power to endow a utility with the property right to trim vegetation and that, in certain instances, the power of the property owner to control his or her own property may trump the commission’s power to regulate vegetation management around power lines.
C

Why Giving Plaintiffs What They Seek Would Not Interfere with What the Commission Has Done

With this understanding of what the commission has done in mind, the question for us is whether superior court action in these cases would “ ‘hinder’ or ‘frustrate’ or ‘interfere with’ or ‘obstruct’ ” (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 918 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 724, 920 P.2d 669] (Covalt)) this particular “exercise of regulatory authority” (Koponen v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 345, 351 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 22]) by the commission. My colleagues conclude the answer to that question is yes, but their explanation for that answer is no explanation at all.
The majority opinion first asserts that “[s]ection 1759 saves the commission and utility companies from defending against myriad lawsuits every time adjustments are made to protocols for vegetation management around power lines” because “[allowing owners of land containing overhead power lines to *251seek individualized judicial determinations of what might be ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ vegetation would cause a regulatory nightmare for the commission that [Public Utilities Code4] section 1759 was intended to prevent.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 242.) There are multiple problems with this assertion.
First, the issue presented by these cases does not raise any specter of litigation against the commission', the issue is only whether landowners should be allowed to bring legal actions against utility companies based on the allegation that the companies are acting beyond the scope of their easements. How such suits would pose “a regulatory nightmare for the commission” is far from clear.
Second, given the majority opinion’s reference to the commission’s supposed “revision]” of “clearances for vegetation management surrounding power lines” numerous times between 1948 and 2005 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 242), I understand the opinion’s reference to “adjustments” to “protocols” to be a reference to those supposed revisions. Thus, my colleagues appear to be attributing the present lawsuits to recent “adjustments” or “revisions” the commission made to “clearances for vegetation management surrounding power lines,” and they appear to be saying that it is the potential proliferation of such lawsuits every time the commission makes such adjustments that would interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority. Ignoring the fact that the commission has not repeatedly revised or adjusted “clearances for vegetation management surrounding power lines,” as the majority suggests,5 the majority’s assertion is based on a false premise. Moreover, even assuming it were not, the majority still fails to explain just how allowing these lawsuits, or other lawsuits like them, to go forward would interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority.
On the first point, there is no evidence of which I am aware, nor does the majority cite any, to suggest that these lawsuits were, in fact, triggered by any action the commission took in “adjusting” or “revising” the “protocols” or “clearances” “for vegetation management surrounding power lines.” As I have explained, and as my colleagues elsewhere agree, the only regulatory *252action the commission has taken with respect to vegetation management around power lines is in its promulgation of rule 35, which prescribes the minimum trimming a utility must or should do. As the majority opinion explains, the “ ‘final standards for trimming trees ... in proximity to overhead electric lines’ ” were adopted in January 1997. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 238.) Thereafter, up until 2009, they remained unchanged.6 It defies logic to suggest, without evidence, that it was the adoption of the minimum clearances in 1997—which, as previously explained, these plaintiffs do not challenge—that led to these lawsuits. What led to these lawsuits (according to plaintiffs) was that (1) in 2004 PG&E began trimming more from the Sarales’ walnut trees than the utility was mandated to trim and more than it had ever trimmed historically; and (2) in 2008, Wilbur learned that PG&E’s intended trimming of his walnut trees “would be much greater than ever occurred throughout the history of the Wilbur farming operation going back to 1957.” In neither case was it the commission’s “adjustment” of “clearances” that led to litigation.
Even assuming there was evidence these cases were triggered by some “adjustment” the commission made to the minimum clearances the commission established in rule 35 and its guidelines, the majority still fails to explain how allowing these lawsuits to go forward will interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority—given that the plaintiffs in both cases do not challenge any trimming that falls within the minimum clearances the commission has established. This is the fundamental flaw in the majority opinion and the point at which I most clearly part company with my colleagues.
The majority’s explanation on this point is found (if at all) in the following paragraph: “The commission’s adoption of a minimum trimming standard reflects its determination that, in every situation, trimming clearance must meet the minimum standard in order to sufficiently ensure the safety of the electric system, surrounding property, and the public. Such a standard necessarily recognizes that, in certain situations, safety considerations will demand that trimming exceed the minimum. The question of whether trimming must *253exceed the minimum standards on any particular section of the overhead power line is a factual issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission to decide. (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 918.)” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 242-243.)
I have no quarrel with the assertion in the first sentence; undoubtedly, public safety is the overriding purpose for which the commission adopted minimum clearances.
I do not agree with the assertion in the second sentence, however. The commission’s determination that certain minimum clearances must be maintained at all times to ensure public safety does not “recognizeQ that, in certain situations, safety considerations will demand that trimming exceed the minimum.” On the contrary, presumably the commission chose minimum clearance thresholds that are sufficient, in all circumstances to which they apply, to provide the level of public safety the commission deems sufficient. Of course, if a certain minimum distance is sufficient to provide the level of public safety the commission deems appropriate, then a greater distance obviously would provide a greater level of safety, but that assertion is not the same as the one the majority makes. And, in any event, the proposition that greater distance means greater safety casts no light on the issue of whether allowing the superior courts to adjudicate these cases would interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority over vegetation management around power lines. The fact remains that in exercising its regulatory authority in this area, all the commission has chosen to do is establish minimum clearances; the commission has not spoken on the issue of maximum clearances.
And why would it? Since greater distance means greater safety, and the commission’s primary interest in this area is ensuring public safety, what interest would the commission have in telling utilities where to stop trimming? With public safety as their lodestar, presumably the commission and the utilities would prefer that all vegetation underneath the utilities’ power lines be razed completely, as this would provide the maximum level of public safety. The commission has not mandated such drastic action, however. What the commission has mandated is certain minimum clearances that must be maintained at all times and others that should be established at the time of trimming. And, as I have explained, the question here is whether it would interfere with this exercise of the commission’s regulatory authority over vegetation management around power lines if the superior courts were allowed to determine whether trimming beyond these minimum clearances is within the scope of PG&E’s easements. Nothing in the majority’s opinion adequately explains why it would, and this is particularly true with respect to the third sentence in the majority’s central paragraph, to which I now turn.
*254The heart of the majority’s analysis (or lack thereof) appears to rest on the ipse dixit assertion that “[t]he question of whether trimming must exceed the minimum standards on any particular section of the overhead power line is a factual issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission to decide.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 243.) Under the legal principles on which we all agree (maj. opn., ante, at p. 236), section 1759 operates to give the commission exclusive jurisdiction over an issue only if superior court action on that issue would interfere with the commission’s exercise of regulatory authority. Thus, the commission has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the “factual issue” “of whether trimming must exceed the minimum standards on any particular section of an overhead power line” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 243) only if superior court action on that issue would interfere with the commission’s exercise of regulatory authority relating to that issue. What appears to be the assertion at the heart of the majority’s analysis only begs the question we are called on to decide—would giving plaintiffs what they seek interfere with what the commission has done? Unfortunately, the majority’s cite to Covalt, by which it purports to support its ipse dixit assertion, is of no assistance on this point because at that point the Covalt decision does no more than state the applicable rule which frames the question. (See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 918 [“an action for damages against a public utility pursuant to section 2106 is barred by section 1759 not only when an award of damages would directly contravene a specific order or decision of the commission, i.e., when it would ‘reverse, correct, or annul’ that order or decision, but also when an award of damages would simply have the effect of undermining a general supervisory or regulatory policy of the commission, i.e., when it would ‘hinder’ or ‘frustrate’ or ‘interfere with’ or ‘obstruct’ that policy”].)
In the end, then, the majority opinion never explains how or why superior court action in these cases would interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority over vegetation management around power lines, when the commission’s exercise of its authority has been limited to prescribing the minimum trimming a utility must or should do but has not addressed when that trimming should stop, and where plaintiffs do not challenge any trimming that is consistent with the minimum clearances the commission has established.
To me, it appears self-evident that where the commission’s mínimums will remain inviolate, there can be no interference with what the commission has done, since all it has done is establish those mínimums, and conditionally at *255that.7 Nevertheless, let me drive the point home by a brief comparison of this case to some of the other cases in which interference was or was not found.
In Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 1 [114 Cal.Rptr. 753, 523 P.2d 1161], the plaintiff sued a telephone company for damages for failing to furnish her with adequate telephone service, as required by section 451. (Waters, at p. 4.) The commission, however, had “adopted a policy of limiting the liability of telephone utilities ... for acts of ordinary negligence to a specified credit allowance, as set forth in approved tariff schedules which form a contract with telephone service customers,” and the Supreme Court concluded that “[s]ince an award of substantial damages to plaintiff would be contrary to the policy adopted by the commission and would interfere with the commission’s regulation of telephone utilities, . . . section 1759 bars the instant action.” (Ibid.)
It is readily apparent how allowing the lawsuit to go forward in Waters would have interfered with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority—because an award of damages for providing inadequate telephone service would have directly contradicted the limitation on such liability the commission had adopted.
In Covalt, the plaintiffs brought a nuisance action against the utility that ran electric currents through power lines adjacent to their property on the theory that electric and magnetic fields arising from the power lines “impaired their use and enjoyment of the property simply because they assertedly feared that the fields would cause them physical harm.” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 939.) The commission had concluded, however, following a significant amount of investigation (id. at pp. 926-934), “that the available evidence d[id] not support a reasonable belief that 60 Hz electric and magnetic fields present a substantial risk of physical harm,” and the Supreme Court decided that an award of damages for nuisance on the theory presented by plaintiffs “would be inconsistent with the commission’s conclusion” (id. at p. 939).
Again, it is readily apparent how allowing the lawsuit to go forward in Covalt would have interfered with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority—because an award of damages for nuisance based on the theory that the plaintiffs reasonably feared harm from the electric and magnetic fields arising from the power lines would have directly contradicted the commission’s conclusion that, based on the available evidence, any such fear was not reasonable.
*256A suitable case in contrast to Waters and Covalt is Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1224 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 308], which the Supreme Court cited and discussed with approval in Covalt. (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 919.) In Cellular Plus, Cellular Plus (and others) sued “the two licensed providers of cellular telephone service in San Diego County” “for wholesale price fixing and retail price fixing under the Cartwright Act.” (Cellular Plus, at p. 1229.) The defendant providers argued that the commission had “exclusive jurisdiction by statute to determine whether rates for cellular telephone service in California are reasonable, and the price fixing claims . . . amounted] to no more than claims that the prices charged by [the providers were] unreasonable.” (Id. at p. 1244.) The appellate court rejected this argument, stating, “[w]e cannot conceive how a price fixing claim under the Cartwright Act could ‘hinder or frustrate’ the [commission]’s supervisory or regulatory policies. The only apparent policy of the [commission] that could be affected is its regulation of rates charged by cellular telephone service providers. However, Cellular Plus does not dispute that the [commission] has jurisdiction over rates, nor does it seek any relief requiring the [commission] to change any rates it has approved. Cellular Plus is merely seeking treble damages and injunctive relief for alleged price fixing under the Cartwright Act.” (Cellular Plus, at p. 1246.)
Much like Cellular Plus in the foregoing case, plaintiffs here do not dispute that the commission has jurisdiction over vegetation management around power lines, and they do not seek any relief that would require the commission to change the minimum clearances the commission has established in the exercise of that jurisdiction. What they are seeking is a judicial determination that PG&E, in trimming beyond the minimum clearances the commission has mandated or recommended, has exceeded the scope of its easements over plaintiffs’ walnut orchards. Unlike in Waters and Covalt, such a determination would not directly contradict any regulatory action the commission has taken. On the contrary, like the appellate court in Cellular Plus, I cannot conceive how plaintiffs’ actions here could in any way hinder, frustrate, or interfere with the commission’s regulatory policies regarding vegetation management around power lines.
D

The Commission Does Not Disagree

My conclusion that allowing these cases to go forward would not interfere with the commission’s exercise of its regulatory authority is actually supported *257by the amicus curiae brief the commission filed in this court at our request. In its brief, the commission acknowledges that it “has traditionally left matters of easement construction and interpretation to the Courts, and it would continue to do so here,” and “it is within the Court’s jurisdiction to order injunctive or other relief’ where “the Court finds that the easements preclude the action complained of.” Elsewhere, the commission states more bluntly that “a determination of property rights under any easement is properly an issue for the Courts.” The commission does contend that only it may determine whether “the degree of trimming exceeded or violated any established rules” of the commission, but that contention is of no consequence because neither Wilbur nor the Sarales allege that PG&E violated any commission rule. Instead, both cases involve the issue of what property right PG&E has to trim walnut trees on plaintiffs’ properties under PG&E’s easements over those properties (if any). And the commission expressly admits that this “is properly an issue for the Courts.”
Through their action, the Sarales seek to establish that by trimming more than the commission requires or recommends, and more than it has historically trimmed,8 PG&E has exceeded its property rights under its easement (assuming it has any easement at all) by trimming more than is “necessary or proper for the convenient use and enjoyment of the . . . line of towers and wires and right of way.” As for Wilbur, the right-of-way over his property requires PG&E to “avoid, so far as it reasonably can, interfering with the use by [Wilbur] of [the easement] for . . . agricultural . . . purposes.” Thus, through his action, Wilbur seeks to establish that by trimming the walnut trees within the easement beyond what the commission requires or recommends, and beyond what PG&E has historically trimmed, PG&E will be exceeding its property rights under its easement by unreasonably interfering with Wilbur’s use of the land for agricultural purposes. In both cases, then, the issue raised is the extent of PG&E’s property rights under its easements and not whether PG&E has violated any rule or decision of the commission. Accordingly, the commission itself has essentially admitted that the superior court is the proper place for both of these cases to be and to proceed.
*258E

The Majority’s Consolation Prize Is No Prize at All

I also must take issue with the consolation prize the majority opinion purports to give plaintiffs in asserting that they are not left “without a remedy for excessive tree trimming by PG&E.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 244.) Essentially, my colleagues assert that plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief before the commission to remedy the problem. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 243-244.) While they may seek it, the commission will not grant it. Accordingly, the alternate remedy my colleagues suggest is chimerical, and Wilbur and the Sarales are actually left with no means of establishing that PG&E is trampling on their property rights by exercising competing property rights that the utility does not actually have.
In its amicus curiae brief, the commission contends that it provides “a forum for a landowner to seek a determination whether a utility’s vegetation management activities were unreasonable or unlawful in connection [with] the Public Utilities Code and/or Commission orders, rules and decisions.” Elsewhere, the commission asserts it has exclusive jurisdiction over “whether the degree of trimming exceeded or violated any applicable Commission-approved rules.” The commission also notes that while it cannot award damages, it can grant injunctive relief “should the Commission determine that the utility has violated the law.”
Neither of these cases, however, presents a question of whether PG&E’s trimming of the walnut trees on plaintiffs’ properties violated a provision of the Public Utilities Code, or a commission order, rule, or decision. Indeed, no such claim would be viable because, as I have explained, the commission’s regulatory action with respect to vegetation management around power lines has been limited to setting minimum clearances, and the commission has not spoken on the issue of where trimming should stop. Indeed, the commission has already rejected at least two complaints by landowners who sought redress for excessive tree trimming because the commission does not regulate maximum limits on trimming.
In Morgan v. PG&E (1987) 25 Cal.P.U.C.2d 393, a landowner filed a complaint with the commission alleging that PG&E had allowed its tree trimming contractor to “ ‘mutilate’ ” trees in the Russian River area by “cut[ting] away too much foliage, producing clearances which are much greater than necessary for safety.” (Id. at p. 394.) The landowner relied on a commission staff guideline that he asserted established maximum distances *259for trimming. (Ibid.) The commission rejected his argument, noting that the guideline was “merely a staff interpretation of the more general provisions of [general order No.] 95,” which at that time did not prescribe specific distances, and that “the [staff guideline] specifies minimum, not maximum, separation distances.” (Ibid.) As one of its conclusions of law, the commission concluded that “[e]xcessive trimming if proven would not violate any Commission order.” (Id. at p. 396.)
This conclusion—that the commission’s rules and orders do not regulate the maximum trimming a utility can do—was reiterated nine years later in Bereczky v. Southern California Edison Co. (1996) 65 Cal.P.U.C.2d 145. There, a landowner complained for money damages and other relief on the ground that the utility had “ ‘excessively trimmed spruce and pine trees’ on [his] property.” (Id. at p. 146.) The landowner argued that general order No. 95 “ ‘requires and/or implies’ reasonable and consistent practices and action by the utilities.” (Bereczky, at p. 147.) The commission dismissed the complaint, noting that because its rules do “not fix a maximum limit on the amount of trimming which a utility is permitted to do on easements under its power lines,” “even if proven, the conduct alleged does not constitute the basis for a complaint . . .” in front of the commission. (Ibid.) As one of its conclusions of law, the commission concluded that “[t]he complaint does not set forth acts by [the utility] which are in violation, or could be claimed to be in violation of any provision of law, or of any order or rule of the Commission, which we are empowered to enforce.” (Id. at p. 148.)
Nothing has changed since 1996 to suggest the commission would, or could, reach a different result in the cases now before us. While the commission’s adoption of specific minimum clearances postdates its decision in Bereczky by a year, it remains true to this day that commission rules do not fix a maximum limit on the amount of trimming a utility may do on easements under its power lines. Absent any pertinent rule, the commission is not going to get involved in a dispute over excessive trimming where, as here, the only limitation on which plaintiffs rely is a limitation in the easements the utility claims over their properties, because—as the commission itself admits—“a determination of property rights under any easement is properly an issue for the Courts.” Accordingly, the remedy my colleagues purport to leave plaintiffs to in this case is, in fact, no remedy.
Indeed, by relegating landowners like Wilbur and the Sarales to a remedy that does not exist, the majority opinion creates a serious anomaly. In effect, what the decision does is turn the commission’s creation of minimum *260clearances that are, by the very terms of the commission’s own rule, conditional on obtaining permission to trim from the landowner, into an absolute right for a utility to trim as much vegetation as it wants to trim, permission or not, no matter whose property rights are involved, and no matter what the scope of the utility’s right-of-way may be, assuming it has one. In the world my colleagues create, even if a utility has an easement that specifically limits the amount of vegetation it can trim to a fixed distance from its power lines, and that distance is less than the minimum clearance the commission requires, the utility can nonetheless trim to the commission’s minimum clearance, or even more, and section 1759 would foreclose the landowner from seeking relief in court for the utility’s acts in excess of its easement rights.
At oral argument, however, PG&E admitted that in such a scenario it would have to either purchase or condemn a more extensive easement; the commission could not simply regulate a more extensive easement into existence. This is entirely consistent with the principle that “the commission has no regulatory authority or interest in private disputes over property rights between PG&E and private landowners.” (Koponen v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) Nevertheless, that is where the majority opinion leaves us—PG&E has the power (if not the right) to trim as much vegetation as it wants, and there is nothing Wilbur and the Sarales can do about it. I simply cannot go along with such an absurd result.
II

The 1915 “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY" Attached to the Sarales’ Complaint Does Not Contradict Their Denial 92 Years Later That PG&E Does Not Have Any Easement

I also disagree with the majority’s determination that the Sarales are not entitled to proceed with their case to obtain a determination of whether PG&E has any easement over their property. According to the majority opinion, “the grant of a right-of-way in favor of [PG&E] attached by the Sarales to their first amended complaint conclusively refutes their denial of the easement.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 244.) Again, my colleagues are wrong.
At the threshold, I acknowledge we can take judicial notice of the 1915 “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” the Sarales attached as exhibit B to their first amended complaint—even though the Sarales may have attached it only “for purposes of describing [PG&E]’s contentions as to the existence and terms of [the claimed] easement[]”—because a recorded deed is subject to *261judicial notice either under subdivision (g) of Evidence Code section 452, which allows a court to take judicial notice of “[fjacts and propositions that are of such common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute” (see Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549 [33 Cal.Rptr.2d 646]), or under subdivision (h) of that statute, which allows a court to take judicial notice of “[fjacts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy" (see Satchmed Plaza Owners Assn. v. UWMC Hospital Corp. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1034, 1040-1041 [84 Cal.Rptr.3d 585]).
Applying the provisions of Evidence Code section 452 to the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY,” this court can take judicial notice of the “fact” that in October 1915, C.H. Howland and Rose E. Howland granted a right-of-way over certain land in San Joaquin County to PG&E for an electric transmission line. Beyond that, however, the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” does not establish anything that needs to be established to prove that the easement created by this document continues to exist to this date, burdens the property now owned by the Sarales, and is owned by PG&E.
First, the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” does not establish that the land over which the Howlands gave PG&E a power line easement in 1915 is the land the Sarales own and which is the subject of the present action. Perhaps a comparison of exhibit A to the Sarales’ first amended complaint (which, according to paragraph one of that complaint, contains a description of the Sarales’ property) to the legal description contained in the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” would resolve this question. The “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” alone, however, does not establish this “fact.”
Second, even assuming we can determine that the land at issue in this case is the same land over which the Howlands gave PG&E a power line easement in 1915, the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” does not establish anything about what may have happened between October 1915 and December 2007, when the Sarales filed their first amended complaint, to alter the easement granted under the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY.” In other words, the “fact” that in 1915 PG&E had a power line easement over what was to become the Sarales’ property does not establish that 92 years later, in 2007, when the Sarales filed their first amended complaint, PG&E still owned that easement. The only “fact” the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” establishes is that PG&E had a power line easement back in 1915.
*262Because the only “fact” the “GRANT OF RIGHT OF WAY” establishes does not necessarily contradict the Sarales’ allegation that the easement established in that document 92 years earlier does not burden their land today, the exhibit does not “conclusively negate[] an allegation of the Sarales’ complaint.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 245.) Accordingly, the majority opinion is wrong on this point as well.
Ill

The Rest of the Issues

Because they reach incorrect conclusions on the two main questions discussed above, my colleagues do not have to reach a number of other arguments presented in these cases.
A

The Sarale Case

In its brief in the Sarale case, PG&E argues that granting the relief the Sarales seek would interfere with the ongoing supervision of the utility by state and federal regulators other than the commission which protect the public’s interest in safe and reliable transmission of electricity. PG&E did not make this argument in the trial court.9 Nevertheless, even if this court exercises its discretion to consider this argument made for the first time on appeal (see Koch v. Rodlin Enterprises (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1595 [273 Cal.Rptr. 438]), the argument is without merit.
After spending six pages of its brief purporting to detail its supervision by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, the Western Electricity Coordinating Council, and the California Independent System Operator corporation, PG&E summarizes that it “has complex and interwoven layers of regulators and must comply with extensive federal and state regulations regarding vegetation management that are intended to ensure the safe and reliable delivery of electric power.” PG&E then asserts the bare conclusion that “[p]ursuant to . . . section 1759, the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address [the Sarales’] claims.”
*263By its terms, section 1759 limits the power of the superior court to review or otherwise interfere with actions by the commission only; the statute does not deal with any other regulatory body. Even assuming for the sake of argument that granting relief in the Sarale case would interfere with PG&E’s regulation by one of the other entities it identifies, section 1759 does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction based on that fact.
In addition to challenging the trial court’s ruling on PG&E’s demurrer, the Sarales contend the trial court erred in granting PG&E’s motion to strike because that ruling was “irreconcilable and inconsistent with its denial of jurisdiction.” We agree. Once the trial court determined that section 1759 barred it from exercising jurisdiction in the Sarale case, the motion to strike was moot, and the court had no business ruling on it. If the judgment of dismissal were reversed, however, the motion to strike would be ripe for decision, and the trial court could reconsider that motion on remand.
B

The Wilbur Case

In its order preceding the judgment of dismissal, the trial court in the Wilbur case concluded PG&E is “not limited to ‘historical use’ of the easement, but may comply with the [commission] requirements, even to the event that compliance exceeds ‘historical use.’ ” To the extent this conclusion can be understood as an alternate basis for sustaining PG&E’s demurrer—because the trial court concluded Wilbur was not entitled to the judicial declaration he sought—I agree with Wilbur that the trial court erred.
“The basic rule is that, if an actual controversy appears from the complaint (as it does here), the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of rights that he seeks, whether that declaration is in his favor or is adverse to his position.” (Los Angeles County Democratic Central Committee v. County of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 335, 338 [132 Cal.Rptr. 43].)
Here, it cannot be determined from the face of the complaint, or materials subject to judicial notice, whether PG&E’s proposed additional trimming of Wilbur’s walnut trees exceeds the scope of PG&E’s easement over Wilbur’s property—which is the substance of Wilbur’s complaint. Thus, Wilbur’s complaint was not subject to resolution on demurrer.
*264IV

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal in each case and would remand each case to the trial court with directions to vacate the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and enter a new order overruling the demurrer. Additionally, in the Sarale case, I would direct the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to strike and to reconsider that motion.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 9, 2010, and the petitions of all appellants for review by the Supreme Court were denied January 26, 2011, S188401. Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., did not participate therein. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.

 I use the term “vegetation management” rather than “tree trimming” because the commission recently revised rule 35 of general order No. 95 to make that same change. The commission’s general order No. 95 provides rules governing the construction of overhead electric lines. Rule 35 of general order No. 95 (rule 35) specifically governs tree trimming.

 As a threshold matter, the Sarales also seek a determination of whether PG&E has any easement at all. I discuss that issue later.

 I say “must or should” because rule 35 mandates the minimum distance that “shall be maintained” between power lines (“line conductors”) and surrounding vegetation at all times, but the guidelines to the rule only recommend the minimum distance that “should be established, at time of trimming.” Obviously, the latter distance is greater than the former to allow for growth of the vegetation.

 All further section references are to the Public Utilities Code.

 Elsewhere, the majority correctly notes that “[bjefore 1996, rule 35 provided only in ‘very general terms’ ” for “ ‘ “a reasonable amount of tree trimming” ’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 237), and it was only in 1996 that the commission first adopted specific minimum clearances, which became final in 1997 (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 238-239). The majority’s mistaken belief that the commission adopted “clearances for vegetation management surrounding power lines” before 1996 appears to be based on the fact that the table that contains the earlier dates to which the majority refer encompasses clearances not only from “tree branches or foliage,” but also clearances from railroads, thoroughfares, buildings, and other objects. It was revisions to the clearances from these objects other than vegetation that were presumably made between 1948 and 1996.

 As previously noted, the majority opinion refers to the commission’s supposed revision of “clearances for vegetation management surrounding power lines” numerous times up until 2005. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 242.) The action the commission took in 2005 to which the majority refers, however, had nothing to do with clearances for vegetation management. The majority relies on a “Note” listing revision dates to table 1 of general order No. 95 (of which rule 35 is a part). The last revision date in that “Note” is “January 13, 2005 by Decision No. 0501030.” Review of that decision, which appears as exhibit 13 in volume I of the appendix to PG&E’s request for judicial notice, reveals it had nothing to do with the minimum clearances for vegetation around power lines and did not change those clearances.
In August 2009, the commission adopted “interim revisions to Appendix E to General Order 95” to “increase the minimum clearance at the time of trim for ‘Extreme and Very High Fire Threat Zones’ in Southern California.”

 The minimum clearances are conditional because, as I have noted, they do not apply where the utility has made a good faith effort to obtain permission to trim or remove vegetation but permission was refused or unobtainable.

 PG&E’s historic use of the easements in both cases is relevant to the scope of those easements because “ *[w]here the grant is general as to the extent of the burden to be imposed on the servient tenement, an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to that particular course or manner.’ ” (San Joaquin & Kings etc. Co. v. Egenhoff (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 82, 86 [141 P.2d 939].)

 PG&E did make a similar argument in the Wilbur case relating to Wilbur’s claim for injunctive relief, but PG&E has not renewed that argument in the appeal in that case.