Court Opinion

ID: 9492282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:37:17.484032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:13.763062
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s opinion because I, too, recognize that United States *796v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502 (8th Cir.1995), is controlling precedent in the Eighth Circuit for this case. I write separately, however, to express my concern that, while not necessarily incorrect, Bell and the instant case nevertheless ignore important precedent relevant to whether state law should play a role in deciding if a custodial arrest is valid for Fourth Amendment purposes.
As we all agree, under the search incident to arrest exception, it is the fact of the lawful arrest that establishes an officer’s authority to search. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). To assess the lawfulness of the arrest, the Bell court concluded that “we do not think Fourth Amendment analysis requires reference to an arrest’s legality under state law.” 54 F.3d at 504. Rather, “the appropriate inquiry is whether the arrest ... violated the Federal Constitution, not whether the arrest ... violated state law.” Id. A strong line of cases from other circuits supports this conclusion. See United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1265 (10th Cir.1999) (rejecting the proposition that the validity of the arrest should be examined with reference to state law); United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1434-37 (6th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 415-16 (5th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 907 (7th Cir.1988) (same); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826 F.2d 200, 202-04 (2d Cir.1987) (same).
As Judge Heaney points out in his concurrence, however, there is countervailing precedent on the issue. Most importantly, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979), the Court stated that “[wjhether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance, on state law.” 443 U.S. at 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627; see also United States v. Mota, 982 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir.1993). And, although implicitly called into question, the Bell decision did not address United States v. Franklin, 728 F.2d 994 (8th Cir.1984), which looked to state law when it found that an arrest was valid. 728 F.2d at 997.
Upon review of the relevant precedent, it seems to me that DeFillippo at least suggests that state law should play an ancillary role (to federal constitutional law) in assessing whether an officer has made a lawful custodial arrest. Applying this framework to the facts of this case, Minnesota has explicitly authorized officers to arrest individuals in Lewis’s situation (rather than issue a citation) only when specific, enumerated exigencies warrant. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.01, subd. l(l)(a) (stating that “[ljaw enforcement officers acting without a warrant ... shall issue citations to persons subject to lawful arrest for misdemeanors, unless it reasonably appears to the officer that arrest or detention is necessary to prevent bodily harm to the accused or another or further criminal conduct, or that there is substantial likelihood that the accused will fail to respond to a citation”). Therefore, in my view, part of our Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis of Lewis’s arrest and subsequent search requires us to consider whether Officer Jindra arrested Lewis to prevent injury to himself or others, to prevent further criminal activity, or to ensure that Lewis would respond to the citation. Nevertheless, because I recognize Bell is controlling here, I concur in the majority’s judgment.