Court Opinion

ID: 9744719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:13:53.086707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.149731
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Form should not triumph over substance.
I cannot agree that there is no appeal-able judgment in this case. Unlike the situation in which a master commissioner's findings are not adopted by a judicial officer, see, eg., Rivera v. State (1992), Ind.App., 601 N.E.2d 445, irregularities in the appointment of a judge do not affect the finality of a judgment.
In Powell v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 1114, our Supreme Court concluded that an improperly appointed judge is a judge de facto, even if not a judge de jure, and that any error in the appointment of a judge must be raised at trial or the issue is waived. See also Bivins v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 89; Hoy v. State (1983), Ind.App., 448 N.E.2d 31.
On appellate review, we presume that the trial court correctly followed the law and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate reversible error. Madison County Bank & Trust Co. v. Kreegar (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 279; Nesses v. Specialty Connectors Co. (1990), Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 322; Collins v. Thakkar (1990), Ind.App., 552 N.E.2d 507, trans. denied.
The trial court's minute entries show that Fogle appeared at Scruggs's trial and at sentencing as a judge pro tem.1 Record at 6-7. While the actual documents appointing Fogle as a judge pro tem do not appear in the record, Scruggs has made no effort to supplement the record or otherwise demonstrate that the documents do not exist in order to carry his burden of showing reversible error. Absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence.
"Incompleteness or inadequacy of the record shall not constitute a ground for dismissal of the appeal or preclude review on the merits." Ind. Appellate Rule 7.2(C). Appellate Rule 7.2(C) provides the proper procedure that must be followed when an incomplete record is submitted on appeal. It seems to me the majority disregards the express provisions of the rule by dismissing Seruggs's appeal because of a presumed inadequacy of the record.
I do not dispute that the record lacks the official appointment of Fogle to act as a judge pro tem at Seruggs's trial and sentencing hearing. Rather, I disagree with the majority's presumption that an official appointment does not exist. It is not my contention that the minute entries reflected in the Chronological Case Summary (CCS) constitute an official appointment of a judicial officer. The minute entries are, however, evidence that an appointment was made and that Scruggs's trial and sentencing hearing were conducted by an individual acting under the color of judicial authority. The entries also highlight the portions of the record which need to be supplemented.
*1152Rather than focusing on the prefatory information contained in the CCS entries, I consider that portion of the entry relating to Seruggs's sentencing hearing, which provides:
001 SENTENCING HEARING MINV-UTES 01/29/92
002 Pro Tem
Record at 7 (emphasis supplied).
As the minute entry denotes a pro tem judge presided at the hearing, the record should be supplemented to show the appointment of the judge pro tem, not dismissed in contravention of App.R. 7.2(C). If such an appointment was never made, then dismissal would be proper, but the majority's assumption that an appointment was not made is unwarranted and its dismissal of this appeal is premature. While I recognize that mistakes in minute entries and CCS entries can happen, I do not believe that we should presume a mistake has occurred without any further evidence.
The majority makes much of the fact that a request for the record of proceedings includes a request for a copy of the . order book entries, pursuant to App.R. 7.2(A), and that the order book is supposed to contain the orders appointing special judges, judge pro tempores and temporary judges, as well the oath and acceptance of any judge serving in the court, according to Ind. Trial Rule 77(D). From these rules, the majority reasons that Scruggs's request for the record of proceedings should have resulted in a copy of Fogle's appointment being included in the record, and that in its absence, it must be presumed that an appointment did not exist and dismissal is required. I can find no basis for such a presumption in the rules or the cases.
Because the record contains evidence that Seruggs's trial and sentencing hearing were conducted by a judicial officer, the record should be supplemented to establish whether Fogle was duly appointed, and if he was, this appeal should be considered on its merits.

. There is some inconsistency in the record regarding Fogle's designation as a special judge or a judge pro tem. The trial court's minute entries reflect that Fogle served as a judge pro tem at both trial and at the sentencing hearing, Record at 6-7, while he signed Scruggs's commitment and the judge's certificate of the sentencing hearing as a special judge.. Id. at 28, 125.