Court Opinion

ID: 9762111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:10:50.402156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.197535
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
I feel compelled to dissent as vigorously as I know how to the continuing efforts of the majority to lower the standards applicable to revocation of probation hearings when the trend should be in the opposite direction in this day and age of continuing improvement in criminal procedure and fairness in all criminal proceedings. See this writer’s dissent in Casarez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 468 S.W.2d 414.
When a probationer is accused of having violated his probationary conditions by committing a penal offense, he is not entitled to require that prior to revocation that there be a trial and conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction for the offense which is the basis of the revocation. Dunn v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.App. 520, 265 S.W.2d 589; Ex parte Gomez, Tex.Cr.App., 241 S.W.2d 153; Ex parte Bruinsma, 164 Tex.Cr. R. 358, 298 S.W.2d 838, cert. den., Bruinsma v. Ellis, 354 U.S. 927, 77 S.Ct. 1386, 1 L. Ed.2d 1439; Gorman v. State, 166 Tex.Cr. R. 633, 317 S.W.2d 744; Hulsey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 165. This was a requirement of the former Suspended Sentence Law (Articles 776-781, V.A.C.C.P., 1925), but not of the Adult Probation Law (Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P.).
And such probationer is not entitled to a jury trial to determine if his probation should be revoked. Article 42.12, Sec. 8, V.A.C.C.P.; Hulsey v. State, supra; Dunn v. State, supra; Ex parte Gomez, supra. Further, probation may be revoked for violation of any penal offense; it is not restricted to a violation of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Jackson v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 380, 307 S.W. 2d 809.
Having granted probation, however, the court is not authorized to revoke without having found that the probationer has violated conditions of his probation. Wozencraft v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 388 S.W.2d 426. Probation cannot be arbitrarily withdrawn by the court. And the burden of proof in revocation proceedings to show a violation is upon the State. Zane v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 420 S.W.2d 953; Campbell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 456 SW.2d 918; Perry v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 459 S.W.2d 865; Hulsey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 165.
It is also clear that while a state is not constitutionally required to provide for probation and revocation proceedings as a part of its criminal process anymore than it is required to provide for appellate review, when it does, then due process and equal protection of the law is applicable hereto. See Crawford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 435 S. W.2d 148, and this writer’s dissent in Casarez v. State, supra, which cites authorities.
And certainly it is now well established that revocation of probation hearings are a part of the criminal law process “where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected,” and to which federal constitutional standards are applicable. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed.2d 336; McConnell v. Rhay and Stiltner v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 89 S.Ct. 32, 21 L.Ed. 2d 2; Crawford v. State, supra; Eiland v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 437 S.W.2d 551.
In the instant case the State in the first count of its motion to revoke alleged that *442the appellant had violated his conditions of probation not to commit a penal offense by committing the offense of theft of corporeal personal property over the value of $50.00, a felony. See Articles 1410 and 1421, V.A.P.C. In the second count the State alleged, apparently to prevent a variance, the offense of driving without the owner’s consent a motor vehicle over the value of $200.00, a felony. See Article 1341, V.A.P.C.
It was upon these allegations the appellant was called to defend.
The record reflects that when the State rested its case at the revocation hearing the appellant moved that the court deny the motion to revoke since the State had failed to establish value as alleged under either paragraph of the motion to revoke, had failed to call Johnny Baird, the alleged owner, or show lack of consent, had failed to show that appellant was the individual placed on probation, and had relied solely upon the testimony of an accomplice witness.
Thereafter the State was permitted to re-open its case and offered proof that the appellant was the same individual previously placed on probation.
At the conclusion of the hearing the court announced:
“The court is of the opinion and so finds that the testimony is sufficient to show that the defendant has violated his probation and that he is guilty as charged in the first paragraph — subparagraph 1 of paragraph five, except that the value is not shown to exceed $50.00, and further that he’s guilty as charged in the second subparagraph of paragraph five, except that the testimony does not show the value to be over the value of $50.-00.” 1
Despite such statement by the court, the formal order revoking probation “found that the defendant failed to comply with the conditions of his probation, as set forth in said motion” to revoke.
It appears the State alleged two offenses growing out of the same transaction to prevent a variance, but the court found the appellant guilty of both.
Article 1411, V.A.P.C., provides:
“The property must be such as has some specific value capable of being ascertained. It embraces every species of perspnal-property capable of being taken.”
And it has been held that proof of value is essential to sustain a conviction for theft under this article. McCollum v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 235, 247 S.W. 283. See also Moore v. State, 17 Tex.App. 176.
In Franco v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 312 S. W.2d 638, 639, this court said:
“It is axiomatic that in theft cases there must be some proof of the value of the stolen property. Keenan v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 616, 48 S.W.2d 264, and Givens v. State, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 277, 158 S.W.2d 535.”
As pointed out in Johnson v. State, 57 Tex.Cr.R. 308, 122 S.W. 877, whenever the punishment is affixed by law to the theft of a particular kind of property, it is unnecessary to either allege or prove the value thereof, the offense being made per se a felony; but with respect to all other classes of property, value must be alleged and proved as the value determines the grade of the offense and the punishment. See Malazzo v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 308 S.W.2d 29.
The Legislature has not seen fit to make the theft of a motorcycle a felony without regard to its value, and a prosecution for the theft of a motorcycle must therefore be brought under the general theft statutes.
Under the general theft statutes, the grade of the offense and the punishment applicable depend upon the value of the *443property stolen and the same must be alleged and proved. See Price v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 308 S.W.2d 47.
The same would be true of a prosecution brought under the provisions of Article 1341, V.A.P.C. (driving vehicle without owner’s consent). See Garza v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 420, 351 S.W.2d 248.
The record before us clearly reflects that there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, to support the allegations -of the motion to revoke as to the value of the motorcycle allegedly stolen. This fact is supported by the trial judge’s own statement, and the majority agrees. Thus it is agreed that all agree that the State failed to sustain its burden of proof.
Nevertheless, the majority, despite “poor pleading” or “poor proving,” concludes an offense has been shown and that the motorcycle “had some value.” For support of its position the majority cites Morris v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 615, which clearly states that this court will not take judicial knowledge of the value of a motor vehicle; Branch v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 465 S.W.2d 160, which involved an offense unlike those here alleged and which does not require allegation and proof of value (Article 1350, V.A.P.C.); and Hulsey v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 165, for the proposition simply that revocation proceedings are not criminal trials in the constitutional sense, as if that will suffice as a cover-all for any defects in such proceedings.
I cannot agree.
Still further, Johnny Baird, the alleged owner of the motorcycle, was not called as a witness, nor was his absence accounted for. Thus a serious question is raised as to whether the evidence is sufficient to show a lack of consent on the part of the alleged owner.
In 55 Tex.Jur.2d, Theft, Sec. 185, p. 445, it is written:
“Where positive and direct proof is available, want of consent cannot ordinarily be shown by circumstantial evidence. The best evidence of want of consent is the testimony of the owner, and circumstantial evidence is inadmissible to show want of consent unless it appears that the owner is inaccessible by the use of ordinary diligence or is beyond the reach of legal process. Thus where the owner is present and has failed to give direct and positive testimony as to his want of consent to the taking, such want of consent will not be inferred from other circumstances in the evidence. But want of consent may be proved by circumstantial evidence when the owner is dead or is incompetent to testify, or where without fault on the part of the state direct testimony cannot be produced, or where it is alleged that the owner is unknown, or where no objection is made when the evidence is offered.”
The majority candidly acknowledges that the evidence would not be sufficient in a theft case, but acknowledges the circumstances developed (without recitation) “at this hearing” were sufficient to show ownership and lack of consent. In support thereof the majority cites Casarez v. State, supra, which was recently and erroneously decided.
Dorsey v. State, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 311, 356 S.W.2d 943; Smith v. State, 123 Tex.Cr.R. 47, 57 S.W.2d 132, and Lynch v. State, 70 Tex.Cr.R. 449, 156 S.W. 1182 are also cited. These cases do not support the proposition advanced by the majority. In Dorsey and Lynch the alleged owner was shown to be ill and unable to testify for the State. In Smith the alleged owner was dead. It was only after such showing that the court permitted circumstantial evidence as to lack of consent.
By the decision today, the majority has, despite its disclaimer, put the stamp of approval on “poor pleadings” or “poor proving” in revocation proceedings. I predict *444that we shall now see more of the same in the future.
Believing that the State has not sustained its proper burden and that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation, I vigorously dissent.

. The court probably meant $200.00 instead of $50.00. See Article 1341, V.A.P.C.