Court Opinion

ID: 9689867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:00.601133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.575119
License: Public Domain

TATE, Justice
(dissenting).
The writer concurs in that portion of Justice SANDERS’ dissent to the effect that, for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction, the present case must be classified as an original civil proceeding and, thus, appealable to the court of appeal. The majority errs, in my opinion, in holding otherwise
If, however, we reach the merits, I likewise cannot agree with the opinion of the *520majority of this court. Our reasoning overlooks the limited contempt power • granted by the legislature as a whole to this particular committee through the instant resolution.
As the majority opinion quotes, the resolution grants the committee (1) the authority to file contempt proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction for punishment in accordance with Article III, Section 11 of the Constitution and (2) “in addition to” this power, the power to invoke the provisions of La.R.S. 24:4 through 24:6 for punishment of contempts of the legislature.
The latter power may be briefly disposed of, as it was not used. The statute in question, quoted in footnote 2 of the majority opinion, authorizes the legislature to certify instances of contempt to the district attorney for criminal prosecution. A criminal proceeding of this nature, to be brought by the district attorney, is not at all involved here — instead, the legislative committee, through its own private counsel (not the district attorney), instituted a rule to show cause why Dr. Strain should not be held in contempt.
The legislative committee thus did not use the La.R.S. 24:4 remedy authorized by the resolution. (The cited statutory remedy for contempt is expressly declared “to be supplemental to the powers of the legislature and of the senate and of the house of representatives to punish for contempt.” La.R.S. 24:4, subd. C as quoted in footnote 2, majority opinion.)
Instead, the committee sought to avail itself, in the words of the resolution creating it, of “the power and authority to institute proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction1 for the punishment thereof [i. e., of a contempt] in accordance with the penalties fixed by Article III, Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution”. See resolution, quoted in majority opinion. However, Art. Ill, Section 11 authorizes the punishment only of “any person not a member” of the legislature.
Strain, a member of the legislature, cannot be held in contempt by reason of any authority emanating from this constitutional provision, it seems to me, for the provision expressly authorizes punishment for contempt only of persons not members of the legislature.
In failing to agree, the majority points out that the resolution additionally authorizes punishment by criminal prosecution under La.R.S. 24:4, which permits criminal punishment (but with the safeguards of criminal law) of “any” person. Nevertheless, the present contempt proceeding was not a criminal prosecution *522brought under the cited statute. With due respect, I find to be a non sequitur the conclusion that, because of this statute (prosecution under which was not here utilized and which is not here involved), the present contempt proceedings were properly brought against a legislator by virtue of authority derived from Article III, Section 11 (which authorizes contempt punishment only of wow-legislators).
I therefore join in Justice DIXON’s dissent as to this issue. The legislative intent expressed by the resolution, especially its reliance on Article III, Section 11, does not seem to contemplate summary punishment by rule of legislators.
Likewise, I should add, I cannot completely disregard Representative Strain’s defense 'that he was not required to attend the present'- committee’s hearing because, on the same date, he was required by his legislative status to attend a hearing of another legislative'committee (one which as chairman he had called for the same date at a different location in the state.)
.This contention seeks to raise the issue that one committee of the legislature cannot disrupt or prevent hearings of another, by subpoenaing as witnesses the legislatorfnembers of the latter. The majority, it seems to me, does not satisfactorily reject -this contention by simply stating one legislative committee can hold members of another in contempt (for failing to respond to subpoenas for a meeting conflicting with their own) because the legislature itself was not in session. If, for instance, Dr. Strain’s committee had subpoenaed the present committee’s members to appear before it on the same date as the present hearing, then they would be in contempt of Dr. Strain’s committee, under the majority reasoning — while, at the same time, Dr. Strain would remain in contempt of the present committee for failing to appear at its hearing of the same date.
Dr. Strain’s solemn assertion that this (self-created) legislative duty prevented his appearance as a witness at the present hearing previously called for the same time is somewhat ingenuous and jesuitical and may possibly lack merit (for reasons :not-yet discovered by the majority or me) under the facts of this case. The argument nevertheless points out a fundamental rea<son why our state constitution provides differently for contempt punishment of legislators (Art. Ill, Section 10) and of non-members of the legislature (Art. Ill, Section 11) — the overriding importance, despite possible abuses, of protecting the independence of legislators in their representation of their people, and of protecting members of the legislature from punishment or harassment by others of .the legislature (whether the latter be the majority or minority) because of differences of values and views in the performances of legislative duties.
*524I share the view of our majority that it is the unquestioned duty of all citizens, whether they be legislators or not, to cooperate in legitimate legislative investigations such as the present. I cannot, however, simply because I disapprove of the non-cooperative conduct in question, overlook the provisions of our state constitution and of the present legislative resolution which, in my view, forbid our sanctioning the present summary shortcuts in procedure and logic.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. (Italics the writer’s.) The present, being a civil proceeding for procedural purposes (since not regulated by Code of Criminal Procedure), tbe proper venue is the defendant’s domicile (Caddo Parish). La. Code Civil Procedure Art. 42.