Court Opinion

ID: 9536703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:05:30.699037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:04.307982
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
*128Dick & Dick, The Dalles, for the petition.
On Respondent’s Petition for Rehearing
Before Warner, Chief Justice, and Tooze, Lusk, Brand and Perry, Justices.
LUSK, J.
The defendant’s petition for rehearing criticizes our opinion for its failure to discuss one of the contentions urged by the defendant in his brief and on the argument. It was contended, and is now reiterated, that the case became moot after payment to the plaintiff of the amount tendered into court by the defendant, as an attempted offer of compromise under ORS 17.055; that no judgment was ever entered; that costs are allowable only as incident to a judgment; and that for these reasons the court was without jurisdiction to allow costs to the plaintiff and the controverted attorney’s fee as a part of such costs.
The record shows that on January 14,1954, defendant filed an offer in writing to allow judgment to be given against him for $372.59; that on August 31, 1954, *129plaintiff tendered findings of fact and conclusions of law and a judgment against the defendant for $372.59, together with his costs and disbursements, taxed at $ ; that included among the findings thus proposed was one to the effect that more than ten days prior to the commencement of the action plaintiff made written demand on the defendant for payment of his damages in the sum of $372.59, and, among the conclusions of law, that plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee under ORS 20.080. The defendant on September 9, 1954, filed objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, and moved for an order directing the clerk to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $372.59, deposited with him by defendant, and for a dismissal of the action on the ground that “the cause tendered by the plaintiff’s complaint is moot.” On November 9,1954, after a hearing, the court entered an order disallowing the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, and adjudged the cause moot. Said order also contained the following:
“NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of this Court be and he is hereby directed to pay over to the plaintiff the sum of $372.59 paid into Court by the defendant and deposited with said Clerk.”
ORS 20.080, which we have held governs this case, applies “where the amount recovered is $500 or less.” The judgment of the court directing the clerk to pay the deposited money to the plaintiff was a “recovery” within the meaning of this statute. To “recover” means, among other things, to “obtain by course of law.” Leslie v. York, 112 Ky 712 66 SW 751; Cordes v. Harding, 27 Cal App 474, 150 P 650; Covert v. Randles, 53 Ariz 225, 87 P2d 488. It was through a *130legal proceeding and the order and judgment of a court that the plaintiff obtained the damages for which he sued. He was therefore entitled to his costs. The cause' was not moot, and the court’s declaration that it was did not make it so because there remained the power, jurisdiction, and duty of the court under the statute to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee and allow it to the plaintiff, together with his other costs and disbursements.
The petition for rehearing is denied.