Court Opinion

ID: 9382038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 17:02:35.152227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.607153
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/24/23 In re K.W. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re K.W., a Person Coming                                     B321524
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
______________________________                                  Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP07954A
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

P.W.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Reversed.
     William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Amir Pichvai, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
      A mother appeals the termination of parental rights over
her daughter, K.W., on the basis of improper inquiry and notice
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code § 224 et seq.) (the Act).
We reverse due to improper further inquiry.
      Section citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
                                  I
      The mother has diagnoses of schizophrenia and psychosis.
She was in a psychiatric hospital during the final months of her
pregnancy. K.W. was born in December 2018. Shortly after, a
juvenile court granted an expedited removal order. The
Department then filed a section 300 petition that alleged K.W.
was at risk of serious harm due to the mother’s mental and
emotional problems.
      The Department’s detention report said the Department
did not know whether the Act applied because the mother was
not capable of providing a statement. The Department
interviewed a maternal aunt and the maternal grandmother in
December 2018, but there is no evidence it asked them about
Indian ancestry. The Department identified the maternal
grandfather as one T.W. The Department tried to call him three
times, but the line would disconnect and the calls would fail.
      The mother said she did not know the identity of K.W.’s
father. She also told a social worker the father was a celebrity
musician and told a therapist the father was a different celebrity
musician.
      The court held a detention hearing on December 17, 2018.
No one mentioned the Act.
      The Department interviewed the maternal grandmother
again in January 2019. The Department later said in a report:

                                 2
“The [maternal grandmother] denied Native American Ancestry.”
That report then cited a May 7, 2015 order from a case involving
the mother and her sister when they were minors. That order
found the Act did not apply. In its appellate briefing, the
Department concedes “there was no initial inquiry,” so this
notation about the maternal grandmother denying ancestry
apparently is from the earlier case.
       The maternal grandmother has a sister, C.B., who lives in
Indiana. On January 10, 2019, C.B. spoke to the Department.
There is no evidence the Department asked about Indian
ancestry at that time.
       On March 18, 2019, the court held a jurisdiction hearing.
The mother was present. The court addressed the issue of
whether the mother needed a guardian ad litem. The mother’s
counsel said a guardian ad litem was unnecessary because the
mother understood the nature of the proceedings and could assist
counsel. Counsel said the mother was able to discuss potential
placement options for her daughter. The court asked the mother
several questions and found the mother was competent to
participate without a guardian ad litem.
       The court sustained the petition. No one mentioned the Act
or asked the mother about Indian ancestry.
       After one foster placement, the Department placed the
child with the child’s maternal great-aunt, C.B., and C.B.’s
husband, who are the prospective adoptive parents.
       On July 14, 2021, the Department asked C.B. about Indian
ancestry. C.B. said her great-grandmother, F.B., “was Cherokee
tribe, from Louisiana.” According to C.B., F.B. was not a
registered member.

                               3
      On August 12, 2021, the court said there was “sufficient
information to put the court on notice” of an issue under the Act
and the court told the Department to send notices. On August
30, 2021, the Department sent written notices to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior, and three tribes: the
Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.
      Although the Department identified the maternal
grandfather as T.W., the notices listed someone named U.G.G. as
the maternal grandfather. This name is not in other parts of the
record. The mother noted this discrepancy on appeal, but the
Department did not explain it.
      The notices correctly listed F.B.’s name, but she was listed
as the child’s maternal great-grandfather. The notices said the
maternal grandmother’s birth date and address were unknown.
An earlier record in this case lists her birth date and a mailing
address. The notices did not include the father because his
identity is unknown.
      The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians responded and said,
based on its tribal registry and the information the Department
sent, K.W. was neither registered nor eligible to register as a
member.
      The Cherokee Nation responded and said, “with the limited
information provided,” it could only say that the names in the
notice were not registered citizens of the tribe. The tribe noted
that the father was unknown and said it could not make a
determination about whether K.W. was an Indian child without
information on one of the biological parents.
      The third tribe did not respond.

                                 4
       On November 19, 2021, the court ordered the Department
to contact C.B. and the maternal grandmother to verify the
Department had contacted all the potentially relevant tribes.
       On March 7, 2022, C.B. said she had given all the
information she knew and she did not know of any other family
members to ask.
       On April 13, 2022, the court asked the Department to make
sure no one had F.B.’s birth date because that information was
not on the notices.
       In a June 13, 2022 report, the Department said a social
worker followed up with C.B. on March 9, 2022. (As explained,
the Department earlier reported a March 7, 2022 conversation
with C.B. It is unclear if the Department had a new conversation
on March 9 or whether this date is incorrect.)
       The report says C.B. did not know F.B.’s birth date. Nor
did C.B. have contact information for the maternal grandmother,
who was homeless and did not communicate with the family. The
report also repeats C.B.’s July 2021 statements that F.B. was
related to the Cherokee tribe but was not a registered member.
Then it says (we have not edited this sentence other than using
initials for the name), “After further investigation the Cherokee
Nation did confirmed that [F.B.] a member.” No one discussed
this confusing sentence in the trial court or in the appellate
briefs. The sentence appears to mean F.B. was a member.
Maybe it is a typo.
       On June 28, 2022, the court found there was no reason to
know the child was an Indian child and terminated the mother’s
parental rights.

                               5
                                  II
       The Department concedes and we agree that it did not
make an initial inquiry. In the first months of this case, the
Department spoke to the mother, the maternal aunt, the
maternal grandmother, and C.B., but it did not ask about
ancestry. (§ 224.2, subds. (a) [Department and court have an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire] & (b) [initial inquiry
duty includes asking parents and extended family members].)
       The Department’s duties went beyond initial inquiry. If
there is reason to believe a child is an Indian child, the
Department must make further inquiry. There is reason to
believe if information suggests a parent or the child is a member
or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e).) As the Department correctly concedes, C.B.’s
statement gave it an “attenuated reason to believe the child could
be an Indian child.” The Department therefore needed to make
further inquiry.
       Further inquiry helps to determine whether there is reason
to know a child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) Having a
reason to know then triggers formal notice requirements to
tribes. (Id., subd. (f).)
       Further inquiry requires particular communications with
three main groups: the family, government agencies, and tribes.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
       Further inquiry of family means interviewing the parents
and extended family members to gather additional information.
(§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This additional information is the child’s
name, birthdate, and birthplace; the name of the tribe in which
the child is a member or may be eligible for membership; the
names, addresses, and dates and places of birth and death of the

                                6
child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents;
and “tribal enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors
of the child, and any other identifying information . . . .” (§ 224.3,
subd. (a)(5).)
       Further inquiry also involves contacting the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the State Department of Social Services for
assistance in identifying the names and contact information of
the tribes in which the child may be a member, or eligible for
membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
       Further inquiry of tribes means contacting the tribes and
any other person that may reasonably be expected to have
information about the child’s membership, citizen status, or
eligibility. At a minimum, contact with a tribe must include
phone, fax, or email contact with the tribe’s designated agent for
receipt of notices under the Act. Contact must include sharing
information that the tribe says is necessary to make a
membership or eligibility determination, as well as information
on the current status of the child and the case. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e).)
       The Department’s further inquiry was deficient.
       The Department’s inquiry was insufficient as to the family.
It could and should have asked the mother and the maternal
aunt. It also should have gotten information about family
members’ names, birth dates, and places of birth and death.
Even when the Department inquired of C.B., there is no evidence
it asked for this information for all relevant family members as
the statute requires.
       The Department incorrectly says the mother’s mental
illness means it did not need to inquire of her. The mother spoke
to the Department and attended hearings throughout the case.

                                  7
She answered the court’s questions about her competency and
could communicate with her attorney. After questioning the
mother, the court made an express finding she was competent to
participate. On this record, it appears the mother could have
answered inquiry questions. The mother’s mental health may
have affected the weight of her responses, but it did not negate
the duty to inquire.
       Furthermore, in light of the Department’s position that the
mother could not competently answer questions about ancestry, it
was essential to inquire of extended family. This family included
the maternal aunt and maternal grandmother, whom the
Department interviewed. The Department incorrectly says its
failure to inquire was justifiable because, “[n]o relatives ever
appeared in court.” Inquiry duties do not turn on extended
family members’ presence in court.
       The Department’s further inquiry of tribes was also faulty.
The statute contemplates something less than formal notice to
tribes as the method of further inquiry. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)
[listing telephone, fax, and email as potential contact methods].)
But the Department’s effort at further inquiry here was formal
notices. If the notices were correct, they could have satisfied
further inquiry. But they had incorrect and missing information.
They included the wrong name for the maternal grandfather.
This unexplained issue is prejudicial, for if ancestry flowed
through the maternal grandfather, the tribes were not given
necessary information they would need to determine eligibility.
       The notices had other issues that should be corrected,
including listing the wrong relationship between F.B. and the
child and omitting known information like the maternal
grandmother’s birth date.

                                8
       The Department does not deny its errors or explain them,
but instead disclaims responsibility for providing accurate
information to tribes. The Department is correct that it lacked
“reason to know,” which is the standard that requires formal
notices. But the Department is incorrect that this means the
notice errors here were insubstantial. Further inquiry requires
contact with the tribes. When the Department makes this
further inquiry through formal notices, this contact is meaningful
only if the Department provides tribes with accurate and
complete information. It failed to do so here.
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment is conditionally reversed. On remand, the
Department must comply with its further inquiry obligations
under section 224.2. If further inquiry does not give reason to
know the child is an Indian child, the judgment shall be
reinstated.

                                          WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

                                9