Court Opinion

ID: 9535987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:52:44.138771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:24.683048
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion but write separately to venture the opinion that rarely, if ever, can a lawyer represent both spouses in a marital dissolution proceeding. DR 5-105(E) and (F) currently provide:
“(E) Except as provided in DR 5-105(F), a lawyer shall not represent multiple current clients in any matters when such representation would result in an actual or likely conflict.
“(F) A lawyer may represent multiple current clients in instances otherwise prohibited by DR 5-105(E) when such representation would not result in an actual conflict and when each client consents to the multiple representation after full disclosure.”1
*134DR 10-101(B) defines “full disclosure” as follows:
“(1) ‘Full disclosure’ means an explanation sufficient to apprise the recipient of the potential adverse impact on the recipient, of the matter to which the recipient is asked to consent.
“(2) As used in DR 5-101, DR 5-104, DR 5-105, DR 5-107, DR 5-109, or when a conflict of interest may be present in DR 4-101, ‘full disclosure’ shall also include a recommendation that the recipient seek independent legal advice to determine if consent should be given and shall be contemporaneously confirmed in writing.”
A “likely conflict,” DR 5-105(A)(2), always is present between spouses in a marital dissolution proceeding. One reason, perhaps the main reason, for my concern about joint representation of spouses who want to dissolve their marriage is this: When the spouses meet with the lawyer, it is almost certain that one or the other will have some questions. Who is the lawyer representing in answering the question? The operative verb in DR 5-105(F) is “represent.” The truth is, the lawyer cannot represent either spouse against the other. The lawyer cannot zealously represent either of them. Representation of both really means representation of neither. Multiple representation nearly extinguishes the lawyer’s ability to exercise independent judgment.
The law, and the Disciplinary Rules, should be sensitive to the all too common situation in which neither spouse can afford one lawyer, much less two. Perhaps allowing the lawyer to “represent” both is preferable to having one spouse go unrepresented because, in most cases, things will go well and both sides will be satisfied with the result. I fear, however, that a compelled consequence of joint representation of both spouses is that neither spouse receives the minimum information necessary to make informed decisions.2
*135Gillette, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 The words “actual or” in DR 5-105(E) are surplusage in light of the prohibition of DR 5-105(F) against representing multiple clients with an actual conflict, even with “full disclosure.”

 Further on this subject, see In re Jans, 295 Or 289, 295 n 7, 666 P2d 830 (1983) (counseling restraint in representing both sides in amicable dissolution), and Moore, Conflict of Interest in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients, 61 Tex L Rev 211, 245-58, 286-87 (1982) (suggesting that permissibility of joint representation turns on whether lawyer “reasonably believes that each client is capable of giving informed and voluntary consent”). Other articles on this subject include: Crouch, How to Handle Conflicts of Interest, 9 Fam Advoc 4 (Winter 1987), and Young and Bienstock, Every Lawyer’s Danger Zone, 6 Fam Advoc 8 (Fall 1983).
I note Oregon State Bar Formal Opinion No. 1991-86, which states:
*135“At a minimum, the following factors must be present before it can be said that the proposed [joint] representation may not result in an actual conflict that would prohibit joint representation:
“1. Both parties must agree that the marriage be dissolved;
“2. There must be no minor children born or adopted during the term of the marriage, and the wife must not be pregnant;
“3. The marital estate must not contain substantial assets or liabilities;
“4. The parties must have fully agreed upon the disposition of all assets and liabilities prior to consulting the lawyer;
“5. The lawyer must be in a position to conclude that each party has provided full disclosure of all assets, as is mandated by ORS 107.105(l)(f);
“6. Based upon the lawyer’s independent professional judgment, the distribution of assets and liabilities agreed upon by the parties must he supported by law and must approximate what would probably be awarded should the parties proceed to trial;
“7. The parties must agree that neither shall make support payments pursuant to ORS 107.105(l)(d), and the lawyer must independently conclude, after full consideration of relevant case law and the factors set forth in ORS 107.105(l)(d), that neither party would be justified in seeking such an award;
“8. After a reasonable investigation of the facts, the lawyer must conclude that neither party would be justified in seeking any pendente lite or other interim order under ORS 107.095;
“9. It must reasonably appear to the lawyer that both spouses are competent to handle their affairs and that neither spouse is acting under duress or undue domination by the other; and
“10. As required by DR 5-105(A)(l) and Dr 10-10KB), the lawyer must make full disclosure of the potential for conflicts that exist between the spouses, and the spouses must consent.
“If all of the above factors are present, dual representation may be permissible. It should be emphasized, however, that in any particular case, there may also be disputes between the parties on other issues that could lead to the conclusion that dual representation is inappropriate. In addition, a situation in which dual representation is permissible at the outset may turn into one in which dual representation is impermissible.”