Court Opinion

ID: 9858088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:14:23.285441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:25.419206
License: Public Domain

Tom GLAZE, Justice, dissenting in part. I disagree with that part of the majority opinion that holds the medical malpractice statute of limitations, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203 (Supp. 1995), bars Dorothy L. Howard’s negligence action. Section 16-114-203 provides as follows: (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues. (b) The date of the accrual the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time. However, where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such period, the action may be commenced within one (1) year from the date of the discovery or the date the foreign object reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is earlier. By its enactment of § 16-114-203(b),1 the General Assembly provided a foreign object exception to the general two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. Until provision (b) was enacted, a patient injured by a physician or medical provider had to bring his or her malpractice action within two years of the wrongful act and at no other time. With the foreign object exception, the General Assembly authorized a patient, injured by a medical provider leaving a foreign object in the patient’s body, one full year to bring suit from the date the object was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered. In other words, even if five years or ten years had passed before the foreign object was found, the injured person would have a full year to file suit. Clearly, the purpose of this legislation was to extend the time for filing suit for those injured patients who had foreign objects left hidden in their body after some type of intrusive procedure. The appellees here argue the two-year limitation should still apply in some instances when foreign objects are involved. They lay emphasis on the wording in provision (b), by underscoring the second sentence as follows: However, where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the injured person which is not discovered and could not have reasonably have been discovered within such two-year period, . . . They reason that the above language infers Mrs. Howard’s medical negligence action is barred because she discovered the foreign object, or barbed tip, in her breast, within the two-year limitation period. Therefore, appellees assert the two-year, rather than the one-yéar, limitation period applies. While one can certainly read the literal words out of context to apply the two-year limitation in this manner, absurd results can and will occur. Such a reading, in my view, completely aborts the legislative purpose of § 16-114-203(b). The rule of law is well settled that, although the plain language of a statute is often controlling, it is impermissible to follow a literal reading that engenders absurd consequences where there is an alternative interpretation that reasonably effects the statute’s purpose. Ashley, Drew & Northern Ry. Co. v. United Transp. U., 625 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1980). As Mrs. Howard points out, under the appellees’ construction of § 16-114-203(b), if the barbed tip had been discovered one year and 364 days after the alleged medical negligence, she would have had only one day to commence her action. Even an injured person discovering a foreign object a month or more before the two-year period ended would be effectively precluded from filing a suit that would pass ARCP 11 muster, especially considering the complexity of the subject matter and the research and preparation required in filing such an action. The only interpretation of § 16-114-203(b) that makes sense is to apply its one-year limitation provision to all cases involving foreign objects. Otherwise, situations can and will arise under provision (b) where injured patients with foreign objects hidden in them will continue to be barred by the more restrictive two-year limitation provision. As discussed above, that runs counter to the purpose of the one-year hidden foreign object exception granting such injured patients more time to file suit. I recognize this court’s decision in Thompson v. Dunn, 319 Ark. 6, 889 S.W.2d 31 (1994), supports appellees’ interpretation of § 16-114-203 (b), but with all due respect, that decision is clearly wrong, and we should say so now. It is no answer to place the burden on the General Assembly to correct this court’s mistake in statutory interpretation — it is this court’s responsibility to do so. In sum, this court’s opinion and result reached in Thompson encourages a medical provider’s tendency to withhold and conceal medical negligence until the strict two-year limitation bars that wrongful act. Provision (b) is remedial in nature and should be given an interpretation that would allow medically injured patients a reasonable time to file suit after they discover the foreign object negligently left in them. Any other construction of the statutory law merely licenses and protects medical malpractice.   Act 709 of 1979 was the first enactment providing a foreign object exception to the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations.