Court Opinion

ID: 9900930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 19:03:36.001818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.567610
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 P. v. Apodaca CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                                 2d Crim. No. B322180
                                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 2021022675)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                                (Ventura County)

v.

JAMES LEWIS APODACA,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       James Lewis Apodaca appeals a judgment following
conviction of kidnapping with the intent to commit rape, second
degree robbery, assault with a deadly weapon upon a police
officer, exhibition of a deadly weapon to a police officer, and
possession of methamphetamine, with findings of two prior felony
strike convictions. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 209, subd. (b)(1), 211, 245,
subd. (c), 417.8, 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d); Health
& Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) We modify the judgment to

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.
reflect a total award of 393 days of presentence custody credit,
but otherwise affirm. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,
1094 [no errors found to cumulate].)
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       This appeal involves the kidnapping with the intent to rape
of a young woman and the theft of her cell telephone. Apodaca
shoved the woman into the trunk of his vehicle and drove several
miles away. A sheriff’s deputy on routine patrol responded to the
woman’s screams from the vehicle trunk and stopped the vehicle.
When confronted by the deputy, Apodaca brandished a four-foot
metal pipe or bar. On appeal, Apodaca raises arguments of
substantial evidence and claimed errors regarding pornography
evidence, self-defense jury instructions, and sentencing. We
reject his arguments except for the award of additional
presentence custody credit.
       In the late evening of August 28, 2021, 20-year-old T.W.
rode her bicycle to a liquor store in Ojai to see a friend. At the
same time, Apodaca drove to the liquor store and parked.
Apodaca saw T.W. and asked if she wanted to smoke marijuana.
She responded affirmatively and Apodaca invited her to sit inside
his vehicle. T.W. declined but suggested that he drive to the
parking lot behind the adjacent restaurant. She followed his
vehicle with her bicycle.
       T.W. entered the front passenger seat of Apodaca’s vehicle,
but kept the door open. Apodaca said he kept the marijuana
under the lining in the vehicle’s trunk. They walked to the trunk
to remove the lining. As T.W. was leaning into the trunk, using
her telephone as a flashlight, Apodaca took her telephone, pushed
her inside, and closed the trunk. He then played music loudly
over her cries and drove away.

                                2
      T.W. soon found the emergency release lever inside the
trunk and began yelling for help and waving her arms. Apodaca
drove past Deputy Sheriff Julian Fergerson who pursued
Apodaca’s vehicle. When Apodaca stopped his vehicle, T.W. ran
from the vehicle’s trunk to the deputy. She informed him that
Apodaca had taken her telephone and pushed her inside the
trunk.
      Apodaca refused Fergerson’s commands to stay inside his
vehicle and fled through a neighborhood. Fergerson pursued
Apodaca, deployed his taser three times, and sprayed him with
pepper spray. Apodaca picked up a four-foot metal bar or pipe
and swung it at Fergerson. A second sheriff’s deputy responded
and successfully deployed his taser to subdue Apodaca. Footage
from the deputies’ body cameras captured the pursuit and
Apodaca’s arrest and was played at trial.
      Deputies searched Apodaca’s vehicle and found
methamphetamine, T.W.’s cell telephone, and a second cell
telephone. A container of petroleum jelly was inside the center
console of the vehicle. The second telephone contained accounts
under Apodaca’s name, photographs of him, and text messages
between him and his girlfriend. The telephone also reflected that
pornographic Web sites had been accessed near the time of
Apodaca’s encounter with T.W. In addition, the telephone
contained two cached pornographic images of sexual assault that
were downloaded from a rape Web site.
      At trial, the parties stipulated that on July 26, 2006,
Apodaca was convicted of assault with intent to commit oral
copulation pursuant to section 220. That crime occurred in 2005.
      Apodaca testified at trial and denied that he kidnapped
T.W. or intended to rape her.

                                3
      Apodaca also testified that he allowed another woman to
use his telephone that day and that she provided him with
methamphetamine. He stated that he saw T.W. at the liquor
store and she recognized him because she knew his daughter.
Apodaca testified that T.W. asked him for marijuana and he
responded that he had marijuana in the trunk of his vehicle.
      Apodaca stated that T.W. looked for the marijuana in the
trunk but then entered the trunk, closed it, and refused to leave.
Apodaca saw two men looking in his direction and believed that
they intended to rob him. For that reason, he drove away with
T.W. inside the trunk. When he saw Deputy Fergerson, he
stopped and reported that he was being robbed. Apodaca stated
that T.W.’s complaints to Fergerson were false.
      Apodaca also testified that he used the metal pipe or bar
only to remove the taser wires from his body: “I took the wire off
with that [metal] bar.” He denied swinging the pipe or bar at
Fergerson.
      Apodaca stated that the telephone that he was using
belonged to his girlfriend and he had borrowed it. He denied
accessing pornography on the telephone and stated that an older
woman had used his telephone that day. The older woman also
left methamphetamine in his vehicle.
      The jury convicted Apodaca of kidnapping with the intent
to commit rape, second degree robbery, assault with a deadly
weapon upon a police officer, exhibition of a deadly weapon to a
police officer, and possession of methamphetamine. (§§ 209,
subd. (b)(1), 211, 245, subd. (c), 417.8; Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11377, subd. (a).) The jury also found a personal weapon use
allegation and aggravating circumstances true. In a separate

                                4
proceeding, Apodaca admitted suffering prior felony and strike
convictions and serving a prior prison term.
        The trial court sentenced Apodaca to a second-strike prison
term of six years plus a third strike consecutive term of 75 years
to life. The court imposed and stayed sentence regarding the
crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon to a police officer. It also
struck its findings regarding the remaining prior convictions and
prison term.
        Apodaca appeals and contends that: 1) insufficient
evidence supports his conviction of kidnapping with the intent to
rape; 2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of cached
pornographic images from his cell telephone; 3) the trial court
erred by not instructing sua sponte regarding self-defense; 4)
section 654 precludes a separate sentence for second degree
robbery; and 5) his presentence custody credit fails to include 15
percent conduct credit.
                            DISCUSSION
                                   I.
        Apodaca argues that his aggravated kidnapping conviction
violates his federal due process rights because insufficient
evidence exists that he intended to rape T.W. He points out that
there is no evidence of his sexual advances or sexual comments
toward T.W. or any attempts to remove her clothing. (E.g.,
People v. Greene (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 648-654 [insufficient
evidence that defendant assaulted victim with intent to rape].)
        In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a
conviction, we examine the entire record and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in favor of the judgment to determine
whether there is reasonable and credible evidence from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a

                                 5
reasonable doubt. (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 377;
People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.) We do not redetermine
the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. (People
v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60; People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [“Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in
the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact”].) We
must accept logical inferences that the trier of fact might have
drawn from the evidence although we may have concluded
otherwise. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 331.) “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (Albillar, at p. 60.) In our review, we focus
upon the evidence that was presented, rather than evidence that
might have been but was not presented. (People v. Story (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1282, 1299.)
       Sufficient evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
together establish that Apodaca kidnapped T.W. with the intent
to commit rape. Apodaca suffered a previous conviction for
assault with the intent to commit oral copulation, another
forcible sex offense. The telephone registered to him, which he
had been using shortly before T.W.’s abduction, contained two
cached images of sexual assault (one labeled “rapesection”) and a
rape video. Apodaca had also accessed Web site pornography for
several hours prior to the kidnapping, including “teen pussy”
pornography. T.W., a vulnerable victim, was 20 years old and
riding a bicycle when she encountered Apodaca at night.
Deputies also found a container of petroleum jelly in the center
console of Apodaca’s vehicle. We do not redetermine the
credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or substitute

                                 6
different reasonable inferences for those drawn by the trier of
fact. (People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th 327, 377-378.)
                                  II.
       Apodaca contends that the trial court abused its discretion
and committed prejudicial error by admitting photographic
evidence of two cached sexual assault images from his cell
telephone in addition to evidence of a cached rape pornography
video (itself not admitted). (The prosecutor also presented
evidence that Apodaca accessed Web site pornography on the
telephone for two and one-half hours before his crimes against
T.W.) Apodaca objected to admission of this evidence on grounds
of undue prejudice and foundation regarding telephone
ownership. He asserts that the evidence violated his
constitutional right to due process of law pursuant to the federal
Constitution and Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24-
26.
       We review a trial court’s ruling admitting evidence for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 864;
People v. Byers (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 447, 453 [no abuse of
discretion in permitting evidence that defendant viewed
pornographic videos prior to kidnapping victim].) A trial court’s
decision to admit photographs pursuant to Evidence Code section
352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such
photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. (People v.
Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th 327, 372.)
       Possession of pornography is properly admitted when its
relevance to motive or intent is not outweighed by its undue
prejudice. (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1100-1102
[evidence of titles of defendant’s pornographic magazines and
videotapes relevant to his intent and motive when he abducted

                                7
victim]; People v. Byers, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 447, 453-454
[evidence of “topics” in defendant’s pornographic videos relevant
to defendant’s motive and intent in kidnapping and sexually
assaulting victim].)
       Here the photographic evidence was relevant to Apodaca’s
motive and intent when he kidnapped T.W. Although there was
no evidence concerning if or when Apodaca personally saved or
viewed the cached images, he currently possessed the images on
a cell telephone registered to him. Arguments regarding other
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence concern the
weight, not the admissibility, of this evidence. (People v. Fauber
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 853.) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the two still photographs depicting sexual
assault.
       Moreover, admission of the evidence did not violate
Apodaca’s right to due process. “[T]he Due Process Clause
guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal
trial.” (Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 563-564.) Spencer
held that evidence of prior convictions did not violate due process
in light of state procedures to weigh the usefulness of the
evidence against its prejudicial effect. (Id. at pp. 562-563.) The
trial court here weighed the probative value of the evidence
against its prejudicial effect. It then admitted the evidence as
relevant to Apodaca’s motive and intent and concluded it was not
unduly prejudicial. This is not “one of those rare and unusual
occasions where the admission of evidence has violated federal
due process and rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally
unfair.” (People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 232.)

                                 8
                                  III.
       Apodaca argues that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct sua sponte regarding his right to use self-defense against
excessive force employed in his arrest. He contends that the
error violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, a
jury trial, and right to present a defense regarding the assault
and brandishing charges. Apodaca adds that the error is
prejudicial pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S.
18, 24-26.
       In criminal cases, the trial court must instruct sua sponte
on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by
the evidence. The court may refuse instructions, however, that
are argumentative, duplicative, confusing, or not supported by
substantial evidence. (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203,
246.)
       The trial court was not required to instruct regarding self-
defense against excessive force because there was insufficient
evidence that Apodaca brandished a metal pipe or bar at
Fergerson in self-defense. Apodaca testified that “[t]he only
purpose” of the metal bar was “to take out the taser:” “[T]hat
pipe saved my life. That’s all I used it for was to take out the
taser.” Apodaca denied threatening or swinging the bar at
Fergerson: “[E]very time he was tasing me, I was swinging it
trying to get the wire off.”
       We do not consider hypothetical factual scenarios raised for
the first time on appeal. (People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839,
896-897.) Apodaca has forfeited these factual arguments by
failing to present and develop the evidence and arguments at
trial regarding alleged excessive force and self-defense. The trial
court gave use-of-force and assault with a deadly weapon on a

                                 9
police officer instructions here (CALCRIM Nos. 900, 2670, 3145)
and correctly explained the applicable use-of-force law. The court
was not required to instruct sua sponte on “excessive force” that
did not exist in this case.
                                  IV.
                       Sentencing Contentions
      Apodaca asserts that the punishment for his second degree
robbery conviction is precluded by section 654 because the
forceful taking of T.W.’s telephone arose from a single course of
conduct, i.e., kidnapping with the intent to rape her. He asserts
that the claimed unauthorized sentence violates his
constitutional right to federal due process of law.
      Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and
therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of
section 654 depends upon the intent and objective of the actor.
(People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354.) If all the offenses
were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for
any one of such offenses but not for more than one. (Ibid.; People
v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 336.) Intent and objective are
factual questions for the trial court which must find evidence to
support the existence of a separate intent and objective for each
sentenced offense. (Jackson, at p. 354.)
      The evidence supports the trial court’s imposition of
separate punishment. Apodaca committed two distinct crimes of
violence against T.W. – kidnapping and robbery. The crimes
were accomplished through separate actions, not the same
physical action. The crimes also involved independent criminal
intents. Although Apodaca may have taken the telephone to
prevent T.W. from reporting the kidnapping, a reasonable
inference from the evidence is that he also took the telephone and

                               10
placed it inside his vehicle as an act of theft. (People v. Booth
(1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1502 [dual objectives of rape and
theft when entering the victims’ homes supported separate
punishment for burglaries and rapes].) This evidence is sufficient
to support the court’s express factual determination of
independent intents and objectives. (People v. Jones (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143 [substantial evidence review of trial
court’s section 654 determination].)
      Apodaca also argues that the trial court erred by not
awarding 51 days of presentence conduct credit pursuant to
sections 4019 and 2933.1. (People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th
485, 493-494.) The Attorney General correctly concedes.
Accordingly, we order Apodaca’s sentence modified to include an
additional 51 days of presentence credit.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified to reflect a total award of 393
days of presentence custody and conduct credit, but otherwise
affirmed. The trial court shall correct the sentencing minutes
and the abstract of judgment and forward the amended
documents to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             BALTODANO, J.          CODY, J.

                               11
                    Ryan J. Wright, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Michael J. Wise and
David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.