Court Opinion

ID: 9836859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:14.677241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.074504
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
The majority reaches an absurd conclusion in trying to support its decision in United States v. Harwood, 46 MJ 26 (1997). The majority states that paragraph 59c of the Manual does not say that an accused can violate both Article 133 and Article 134 for the same conduct. They cite specifically to a provision of paragraph 59c which provides, by way of example: “Thus, a commissioned officer who steals property violates both this article and Article 121.” The clear import of this language, to me at-least, is that an accused can be charged with both an Article 133 offense and a substantive offense like Article 121. In fact, appellant could have been charged with violating Article 128 by indecently assaulting his victims, but he was instead charged with indecently assaulting them under Article 134. Either choice is equally acceptable under the provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial, yet the majority would have us believe that appellant could violate both Articles 128 and Article 133 for assaulting his victims, but could not violate both Articles 134 and 133 for assaulting his victims.
Moreover, paragraph 59c states: “This article includes acts made punishable by any other article.” (Emphasis added). By its plain language, paragraph 59c does not apply solely to findings but provides that Article 133 is also separate for sentencing. The Government does not even gain an increase in sentence by charging the indecent assault under Article 134 rather than under Article 128, under either provision the maximum sentence is the same.
That is why I must agree with the trial judge who, in commenting on the defense multiplicity motion, stated:
*75[T]he gravamen of the conduct unbecoming an officer offense appears to be, that over a period of time, the accused took advantage of trust given him as a medical doctor, to enable him to indecently assault the four individuals. Whereas, the gravamen, if you will, of the indecent assault[s], were the actual wrongful touchings. I do see there to be separate elements, and more importantly, a separate gravamen of this offense, separately distinct from that of the indecent assaults.
Thus, as I said in my dissent in Harwood, 46 MJ at 30, and for almost precisely the same reasons, ‘‘[A]pplying a ‘statutory’ elements approach or a pleading-elements approach, these offenses are not multiplicious.” See also United States v. Neblock, 45 MJ 191, 202 (1996) (Crawford, J., concurring in the result).
If we are going to continue down this path, let us clearly tell the field that charging offenses under both Article 133 and under the substantive articles will have a very different result than charging the very same conduct under the provisions of Articles 133 and 134. While the Manual for Courts-Martial does not appear to favor one method over another, it is clear that the majority does.