Court Opinion

ID: 9605055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:29:49.703521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:25.796786
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
My review of this case has convinced me that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the imposition of the death penalty or to support appellant’s convictions for cruelty to children. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent to Divisions 7 and 11 of the majority opinion and the judgment insofar as it affirms the death penalty and the convictions for cruelty to children.
1. The aggravating circumstance on which the State relied in seeking the death penalty was that found in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7), that the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involves torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery.” The State conceded that no aggravated battery was involved, and the jury was only charged on the other two elements, torture and depravity of mind.
There is no question that appellant’s conduct in this matter was abhorrent and is justly condemned. However, terrible as it was, the evidence in this case does not establish that his conduct was so “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” as to distinguish this killing from “ordinary murders for which the penalty of death is not appropriate. . . .” Hance v. State, 245 Ga. 856 (3) (268 SE2d 339) (1980).
To illustrate the difference between this case and those in which the death penalty has been judged to be appropriate under § (b) (7), it is instructive to review the cases cited in the Appendix to the majority opinion. Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206 (327 SE2d 168) (1985), is a later appearance of Alderman v. State, 241 Ga. 496 (246 SE2d 642) (1978), also cited in the Appendix. There, the evidence showed that the defendant developed a scheme to kill his wife and to share the proceeds of her life insurance with another. After forcing his accomplice to strike the victim on the head with a large wrench, the defendant and the accomplice strangled the victim, then held her under water in the bathtub. In Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113 (303 SE2d 266) (1983), the defendant chased the victim into a barbed wire fence, dragged the victim back to a ditch where he beat the victim with a whiskey bottle and a stick, then stomped the victim with his feet before leaving the victim lying in water in the ditch. The defendant in Smith v. State, 249 Ga. 228 (290 SE2d 43) (1982), stabbed the victim 17 times and hit him in the head with a hammer, after which the victim lived for almost a full day. This court took note in its review of the aggravating circumstances that this was not a domestic murder. The victim in Krier v. State, 249 Ga. 80 (287 SE2d 531) (1982), was subjected to a serious, vicious beating with a telephone receiver, then cut at least 12 times, producing near decapitation. This *787court noted in Cunningham v. State, 248 Ga. 558 (284 SE2d 390) (1981), that the victim was not killed instantaneously, but was beaten with a- large wrench, breaking both forearms and producing eight skull fractures. As in Smith, supra, it was noted that this was not a domestic murder. Brown v. State, 247 Ga. 298 (275 SE2d 52) (1981), and High v. State, 247 Ga. 289 (276 SE2d 5) (1981), were the appeals of two defendants in the same case. They kidnapped the young victim and his stepfather during a robbery, taunted the boy with his impending death on the way to the execution site, then forced him to lie on the ground next to his stepfather, where both victims were killed. This court took note of the deliberate and prolonged psychological torture to which the boy was subjected during the drive. The murder for which the defendant in Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219 (275 SE2d 29) (1981), was sentenced to death was one of three killings in a single shooting spree. The defendant killed three members of his former girl friend’s family, wounded two others, and shot his former girl friend 12 times in an apparent attempt to render her unattractive to others. In the first killing in the spree, the defendant shot the former girl friend’s sister in the face four or five times with hollow point bullets, making the crime gruesome in order to punish his former girl friend. In Tyler v. State, 247 Ga. 119 (274 SE2d 549) (1981), the defendant killed her husband by poisoning him with rat poison containing the chemical parathion. The actual killing was the culmination of a month-long effort in which the defendant caused the victim agonizing pain in the course of three poisonings. The victim in Cape v. State, 246 Ga. 520 (272 SE2d 487) (1980), was a 15-year-old female whose body showed signs of serious sexual abuse and exhibited multiple skull fractures from a beating with an iron pipe. This court noted again that this was not a domestic murder. “[T]orture of the most sadistic kind . . .” was this court’s characterization of the brutal strangulation of a nine-year-old boy in Thomas v. State, 245 Ga. 688 (266 SE2d 499) (1980). Evidence of blood on the front of the defendant’s pants on the day of the murder, coupled with his prior record of child molestation and the fact that the victim’s pants had been pulled down, suggested that the victim was also subjected to a violent sexual assault. The evidence in Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272 (264 SE2d 209) (1980), showed that the victim was beaten, partially disrobed, cut with a knife, and threatened with immolation in an effort to get him to reveal where his money was kept. After that torture, the victim was methodically executed. The rape of a 13-year-old girl and her subsequent killing by means of multiple stabbings was found to satisfy the aggravating circumstance in Bowen v. State, 244 Ga. 495 (260 SE2d 855) (1979). The victim in Hamilton v. State, 244 Ga. 145 (259 SE2d 81) (1979), was beaten with a blunt object, then stabbed four times, three times in the head and once in the heart. In Johnson v. State, *788242 Ga. 649 (250 SE2d 394) (1978), the defendant committed an execution-style killing of a young woman whom he had abducted at gunpoint, bound, disrobed, and raped. The defendant in Morgan v. State, 241 Ga. 485 (246 SE2d 198) (1978), also kidnapped the victim at gunpoint, then transported him to a deserted spot in the trunk of a car, robbed him, blindfolded him, and then killed him with a shotgun blast to his face. After an argument with his girl friend, the defendant in Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 (236 SE2d 637) (1977), went to the girl friend’s house and abducted the girl friend’s two-year-old daughter. For revenge against the child’s mother, the defendant took her to a bridge and dropped her from a place 100 feet above water, causing “severe mechanical trauma . . . and damage to the internal organs,” and killing the child. The evidence in Dix v. State, 238 Ga. 209 (232 SE2d 47) (1977), showed that the victim was struck in the face with a blunt instrument, had her mouth taped shut, was tortured with one or more knives, receiving at least 11 cuts, and was then strangled with such force as to cause facial hemorrhaging. Finally, the defendant in Harris v. State, 237 Ga. 718 (230 SE2d 1) (1976), abducted a stranger, forced her at gunpoint to drive to a relatively private part of the shopping center parking lot where he abducted her, then put a coat over her head and shot her twice, all because she reminded him of his stepmother whom he hated.
The cited cases demonstrate a commonality of horror, a sustained brutality or complete indifference to the pain and even the lives of others, without even the motivating force of anger to explain, though not excuse, the cruelty of the defendants’ conduct. The present case does not belong in that company. What the evidence in this case shows is that the defendant, after consuming alcohol for an extended period of time, became angered at what he perceived as his son’s disobedience, took up his shotgun, walked up to the boy and, without a further word, fired a single fatal shot. By contrast with the cited cases, there was no torture, either physical or mental, over an extended period, no mutilation, no sexual abuse. There was, as has become woefully common, only an angry domestic confrontation ending in a fatal shooting.
Recognizing that the § (b) (7) aggravating circumstance might be abused, this court cautioned in Harris v. State, 237 Ga. at 732, that it had
no intention of permitting this statutory aggravating circumstance to become a “catch all” for cases simply because no other statutory aggravating circumstance is raised by the evidence.
In the present case, the jury indicated that it had found the nec*789essary components of torture and depravity of mind. Those elements were also found by the fact finder in Phillips v. State, 250 Ga. 336 (297 SE2d 217) (1982), but. this court found the evidence there insufficient to support those findings. There, as here, there were none of the elements of serious physical, sexual or psychological abuse before death which establish torture, and there was no evidence in either case that the victim was “subjected to serious psychological abuse before death, or to mutilation, serious disfigurement, or sexual abuse after death” (id.) which would establish depravity of mind. The court rejected the notion that pain and the anticipation of death alone constitute
serious physical and psychological abuse before death. Such an interpretation of § (b) (7) would allow the trier of fact to find § (b) (7) in almost every murder case. We cannot so broadly construe “physical” or “psychological” abuse. [Id.]
This court clearly held in Phillips that the mere apprehension of death, immediately before the fatal wound is inflicted, does not amount to serious psychological abuse before death, and that shooting alone, even multiple shots, is not sufficient to show torture. In concluding the sentence review in Phillips, this court made an observation equally applicable to the present case:
The evidence in this case is undeniably sufficient to demonstrate that a murder was committed. For this heinous offense, [Hall] must be punished. [I] cannot agree, however, that this murder was “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman in that it involved torture to the victim and depravity of mind on the part of the defendant.” [Id. at 342.]
Also applicable to this case is the following observation from my dissent in Wade v. State, 261 Ga. 105, 111 (401 SE2d 701) (1991):
A life has been taken. When such a loss has resulted from a criminal act, society is justifiably outraged, and when the death involves one of tender years, society’s outrage is magnified. In affirming the conviction of a defendant charged with a death-producing act, this court reaffirms society’s outrage. However, our obligation as a court goes beyond expressing outrage. Our duty also imposes upon us an obligation to assure that the substantive rules of law and of criminal procedure are observed. It is in pursuit of that duty that I must respectfully dissent to the [affirmance of the death penalty in the] majority opinion.
*7902. Appellant’s conviction for cruelty to children was based solely on the fact that his two daughters were present and saw him murder his son. It is apparent, therefore, that the applicable part of the definition of the offense is in subsection (b) of OCGA § 16-5-70: “Any person commits the offense of cruelty to children when he maliciously causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain.” There being no issue of physical pain in this case, we need be concerned only with evidence of mental pain. Neither of the children nor appellant’s wife testified concerning any pain suffered by the murder victim’s sisters. The only witnesses on the issue, as noted by the majority, were two social workers. One of those witnesses, who saw the children three days after their brother’s death, testified that they exhibited no signs of trauma resulting from the violence in their home. That witness, and another social worker who never interviewed the children at all, testified that many children who have witnessed such events exhibit no signs of trauma immediately, but it may emerge years later. They did not testify, however, that these children suffered pain or that they would certainly do so in the future. As the majority notes, the testimony of these witnesses was not offered to establish that the two children had suffered cruel and excessive mental pain, but to counter an expected defense strategy. The only evidence, then, which was pertinent to the alleged suffering of those' children from the conduct of their father was the defense testimony that the children showed great affection to their father at their brother’s funeral.
The majority’s holding in this case sets a dangerous precedent. It stands for the proposition that violent crime committed in the presence of a child constitutes cruel treatment of that child even if the conduct involved is in no way aimed at that child. It is apparent from the language of the statute that the legislature intended to protect children from cruel conduct directed at them. The conduct in this case was not directed at appellant’s daughters; they were not victims but bystanders.
The majority’s interpretation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b) in this case is overbroad. The statute was not enacted for the protection of witnesses to crime, but for the protection of victims. While appellant’s conduct was itself abhorrent, and was exacerbated by his indifference to the possible impact of that conduct on others than the murder victim, the fact that the conduct occurred in the presence of children did not constitute a separate crime. I must, therefore, dissent also to the affirmance of appellant’s convictions for cruelty to children.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent, and that Justice Bell joins in Division 1 of this dissent.
*791Decided December 3, 1991 —
Reconsideration denied December 18, 1991.
Larry L. Duttweiler, Melodie L. Snell, Charlotta Norby, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Jeffery G. Morrow, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, C. A. Benjamin Woolf, Staff Attorney, for appellee.