Court Opinion

ID: 9576926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:04.682842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:43.792340
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority has departed from the long-standing rule that this court will not disturb the findings of a habeas court if any evidence in the record supports the findings.4 *Here, the habeas court record is sufficient to satisfy both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington.5 Although the majority avoids deciding whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient, the record amply supports the finding that trial counsel’s performance fell well below the range of reasonable professional conduct.
Trial counsel testified that he considered the case against Cruz-Padillo a close one.6 He knew that the only defense was self-defense or justification. He interviewed several persons who could testify that the victim was a violent person. Specifically, trial counsel testified that he knew of individuals who would testify that the victim had beaten other workers at the restaurant. Because of the facts of this case — that Cruz-Padillo and the victim worked at the same restau*617rant and Cruz-Padillo shot the victim at the restaurant after the victim hit him — this evidence was relevant and highly favorable to Cruz-Padillo’s only defense. Following Chandler v. State 7 trial counsel notified the state that he intended to present this evidence. Yet he failed to subpoena the witnesses on this crucial element of the defense. Trial counsel believed he had a witness available, but when this witness became reluctant to testify, trial counsel was unable to compel his testimony because he had failed to subpoena him. Trial counsel compounded this error by failing to perfect the record with an offer of proof when the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible. On direct appeal, this court held that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence was not subject to reversal because he “made no offer of proof concerning what testimony he expected his witness or witnesses to give.”8 As the habeas court found, this failure of counsel to subpoena witnesses in support of his client’s only possible defense constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.9
The habeas court also found that trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed to investigate the facts in the case and failed to interview a majority of the state’s witnesses before trial. This finding was based in part on a credibility determination by the habeas court.
The majority glosses over these specific factual findings of the habeas court by holding that the habeas court was merely speculating on the prejudicial effect of trial counsel’s deficient performance. I strongly disagree. Trial counsel’s testimony regarding the substance of the uncalled witness’ testimony was specific enough to allow the habeas court to determine that the evidence would have been admissible and favorable.10 The proffered testimony here was much more substantial than in Ponder v. State,11 cited by the majority, in which *618there was no proffer at all of the uncalled witness’ testimony.
Decided June 29, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Michael M. Worth, for appellee.
The habeas court was not required to determine that trial counsel’s compound deficiencies would have resulted in an acquittal.12 Rather, the record before the habeas court was sufficient for that court to determine that “in the totality of this case with its potential for extenuation and justification” the deficient performance of trial counsel prejudiced Cruz-Padillo.13 The habeas court made this determination based on the entire trial record and the testimony of trial counsel. Because the record is sufficient to support the habeas court’s thorough order, I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunt and Justice Sears join in this dissent.

 See Williams v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 453 (192 SE2d 378) (1972); Balkcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345, 348 (138 SE2d 868) (1964).

 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); see also Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782 (325 SE2d 362) (1985).

 The jury’s verdict confirms this: the jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter on the malice murder charge and also convicted Cruz-Padillo of felony murder based on the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Cruz-Padillo v. State, 262 Ga. 629, n. 1 (422 SE2d 849) (1992).

 261 Ga. 402, 407 (405 SE2d 669) (1991).

 Cruz-Padillo, 262 Ga. at 631.

 See Code v. Montgomery, 799 F2d 1481, 1483-1484 (11th Cir. 1986) (failure to investigate or subpoena witnesses in support of sole defense of alibi was ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Zant v. Hamilton, 251 Ga. 553, 554 (307 SE2d 667) (1983) (affirming habeas court’s finding that counsel was ineffective in part because he failed to investigate victim’s known propensity for violence).

 See Holland v. Williams, 126 Ga. 617, 618 (55 SE 1023) (1906) (within judge’s discretion to receive offer of proof from counsel or from witness).

 201 Ga. App. 388, 389 (411 SE2d 119) (1991). The other cases cited by the majority are likewise inapplicable, because the evidence presented in those cases falls far short of the testimony before the habeas court. See Roberts v. State, 263 Ga. 807, 808 (439 SE2d 911) (1994) (no proffer as to one uncalled witness, and other uncalled witness’ testimony was not favorable to defense); Pless v. State, 260 Ga. 96, 99 (390 SE2d 40) (1990) (counsel’s decision not to pursue witnesses was a trial tactic); Brown v. State, 257 Ga. 277, 279 (357 SE2d 590) (1987) (no evidence of substance of uncalled witness’ testimony or how it might be relevant); Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F2d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 1985) (petitioner failed to provide either the subject matter of the expected testimony or the defense it might tend to establish).

 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

 See Code, 799 F2d at 1484 (showing of prejudice does not require determination that alibi testimony would have changed trial result; prejudice is shown where counsel’s failure to investigate and present defense deprived defendant of “fundamentally fair trial”).