Court Opinion

ID: 9488246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:40:05.895244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:46.713383
License: Public Domain

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
In mid-1994, Stephen Wilbur, a physician, was indicted on one count of acquiring morphine “by misrepresentation, fraud, ... deception, or subterfuge.” See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). About four months later, a jury convicted him of that charge. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. We agree; we therefore reverse the conviction and remand for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
I.
To sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3), there must be evidence that “the defendant acquired ... the drugs in question by misrepresentation, fraud, ... deception or subterfuge ” (emphasis in original). United States v. Hill, 589 F.2d 1344, 1351 (8th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919, 99 S.Ct. 2843, 61 L.Ed.2d 287 (1979). The focus of the statute is on “how [the] defendant obtained the drugs” (emphasis supplied). Id.
In other words, for Dr. Wilbur’s conduct to be a violation of that particular statute, he must have made “a material misrepresentation, [or committed] fraud, deception, or subterfuge which [was] a cause in fact of the acquisition” of the morphine. United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 857 (5th Cir.1974); see also id. at 857 n. 11 (“[t]he statute explicitly includes an element of causation”). See also State v. Seifert, 354 N.W.2d 432, 432 (Minn. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1112, 105 S.Ct. 794, 83 L.Ed.2d 787 (1985), construing the identical language of Minn.Stat.Ann. § 152.025.2(2)(i) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction, since defendant obtained drugs “through intentional material misstatements and omissions of fact”) (emphasis supplied); Cronin v. State, 678 P.2d 370, 373 (Wyo.1984), construing the identical language of Wyo.Stat. § 35 — 7—103B(a)(iii) (defendant was “not charged with fraud here — she [was] charged with acquiring ... a controlled substance by means of fraud”) (emphasis supplied); State v. Basinow, 121 N.H. 815, 435 A.2d 829, 831 (1981) (per curiam), construing the identical language of N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 318-B:2.V(a) (“the clear object of the statute is to proscribe the obtaining of controlled drugs through untruthfulness or nondisclosure”) (emphasis supplied); State v. St. John, 544 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Mo.1976) (en banc), construing the identical language of Mo.Ann. Stat. § 195.204.1 (“[t]he intent and purpose” of the statute are to forbid “the obtaining of narcotic drugs through any form of untruthfulness, deception or nondisclosure”) (emphasis supplied); and State v. Livingston, 2 Or.App. 587, 469 P.2d 632, 634 (1970), construing the identical language of Or.Rev.Stat. § 475.994(l)(c) (“the object of the statute is to proscribe the obtaining of narcotic drugs through any untruthfulness or nondisclosure”) (emphasis supplied).
The indictment charged Dr. Wilbur with acquiring the morphine between October 17 and October 20, 1993. Dr. Wilbur admitted that he took morphine from one patient’s IV bag on “five separate occasions” between October 17 and October 20, 1993. He did not, however, state when those “specific times” were.
The evidence showed that on October 20, the patient’s family visited the patient but left about 8:00 p.m. A nurse hung an IV bag containing morphine solution for the patient shortly after the family left. Within an hour of that time, Dr. Wilbur (who was the patient’s treating physician) went into the patient’s room and closed the door. The evidence was further that at some point after Dr. Wilbur went into the patient’s room, a nurse knocked on the door and asked if there was anything she could help him with; he responded “[N]o” — that he “was just going to *1293visit with [the patient] for a while. The nurse then closed the door again. Sometime during that visit, Dr. Wilbur withdrew some of the morphine solution with a syringe. There was no testimony about whether Dr. Wilbur took the morphine solution before or after the nurse’s inquiry.
We agree with Dr. Wilbur that the evidence with respect to the events of October 20, 1993, is insufficient to sustain his conviction. The testimony was that the patient’s family had already left and that Dr. Wilbur spoke neither to the family nor to the nurse before he went into the patient’s room. After he went into the patient’s room, he told a nurse that he did not need any help. In short, he acquired the morphine on that occasion without having attempted to induce anyone to leave him alone in the patient’s room — i.e., without having resorted to any trickery in order to obtain the drug.
A nurse also testified that “a few days” before October 20, Dr. Wilbur was spending “a lot of time” with the patient. The nurse testified, with respect to that period, that on “another morning,” Dr. Wilbur suggested to the patient’s wife that she should “go have coffee” while he “checked over” the patient. At the time of that conversation, the patient’s wife was “in the hallway.” There was no testimony, however, either that Dr. Wilbur took morphine during that specific visit or, even, whether that specific day was October 17, 1993, or later.
“While reasonable inferences from the evidence weigh against the defendant, speculation does not.” United States v. Pace, 922 F.2d 451, 453 (8th Cir.1990). Even if we were to conclude that Dr. Wilbur induced the patient’s wife to leave him alone in the patient’s room at that time, our view is that it would require speculation to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, either that “a few days” before October 20 included October 17 or later, or that Dr. Wilbur took morphine from the patient during that particular visit.
II.
Dr. Wilbur did a reprehensible thing, from both a legal and a moral standpoint — let there be no doubt about that. The government charged him, however, not with theft, conversion, or embezzlement, but with acquiring drugs by misrepresentation, fraud, deception, or subterfuge. There is simply no evidence of trickery that allowed his acquisition of morphine during the period specified in the indictment. For that reason, we reverse his conviction and remand the case for the entry of a judgment of acquittal with respect to this charge.