Court Opinion

ID: 9964475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 11:10:18.122778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.558760
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                       NO. 03-24-00068-CV

                                   T. C. and X. M., Appellants

                                                 v.

                Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

         FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY
     NO. 23-0010-CPSC1, THE HONORABLE BRANDY HALLFORD, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

               T.C. (Mother) and X.M. (Father) appeal from the trial court’s order terminating

their parental rights to their child (Child) following a jury trial.1 The jury found by clear and

convincing evidence that statutory grounds for terminating their parental rights existed and that

termination was in Child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2).

For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

       1
         We refer to the parents, their child, and other family by their initials or their relation to
Child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App. P. 9.8.
                                         BACKGROUND2

               In January 2023, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed an

original petition for protection of Child, for conservatorship, and for termination in a suit

affecting the parent-child relationship and sought emergency removal of Child from Mother and

Father. Mother, Father, and seven-week-old Child were living in a hotel, and Mother and Father

were Child’s sole caregivers. After seeing Child’s “legs go limp,” Mother delayed taking Child

to the doctor for several days. When she did take him to the doctor, the doctor told Mother to

take Child to the hospital right away. At the hospital, Child was found to have over forty

discrete injuries at different stages of healing, including a lacerated liver, skull fracture, and bone

fractures all over his body. Among the treatments that he received, an “NG Tube” was placed

through Child’s nose to feed him,3 and he required a blood transfusion.

               The trial court granted the Department’s request for emergency removal and

appointed the Department as the temporary managing conservator of Child. In the middle of

February, Child was released from the hospital and placed with the attorney ad litem’s legal

assistant, who had been visiting Child in the hospital, had connected and bonded with Child, and

had received training for how to feed Child through the NG Tube.4 Around that time, the trial

court substituted a different attorney as Child’s attorney ad litem.

       2
           Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the case, its procedural history, and
the evidence adduced at trial, we do not recite them in the opinion except as necessary to advise
the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for it. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
       3
         A pediatrician testified that an “NG Tube” is a “nasogastric tube,” “a feeding tube that
goes through the nose and into the stomach.”
       4
           During Child’s hospitalization and after the emergency removal, no family visited
Child or received training as to the NG Tube.
                                                  2
                During the case, both parents were subject to court-ordered family service plans

and pending criminal charges stemming from Child’s injuries. Father did not comply with his

plan and remained incarcerated on the pending charge of injury to a child. Mother took steps to

comply with her plan and was released from incarceration after posting bond as to the charge of

injury to a child by omission, but she was arrested on a different charge—criminal mischief—

and incarcerated until that charge was dismissed.5 Neither parent was allowed to visit with Child

after the Department was appointed temporary managing conservator, and Child remained in the

same placement. A home study had been done on Mother’s sister and her husband, and after

they informed the Department that they did not want to be considered as the primary placement

but a possible back-up placement, a home study was done on Mother’s father (Grandfather) and

his partner. The home studies were approved pending training as to the NG Tube, but at the time

of trial, the Department had been unable to set up the necessary training.

                Trial occurred in January 2024. The trial court granted in part the attorneys ad

litem’s6 motion in limine as to “[a]ny attempt to elicit testimony regarding where permanent

placement should be.” The trial court ordered that “[t]he parties may elicit testimony regarding

possible placement(s) options for the child as it applies to the best interest of the child and not to

conservatorship determination.” The trial court also granted the motion in limine as to “any

mention or request to change Child’s placement” or “any references to any statements or

opinions that [Child] was wrongfully placed with current placement.” The trial court ordered

that regarding any request to change Child’s placement, “the parties may elicit testimony

       5
           The evidence at trial showed that Mother was arrested for criminal mischief after she
intentionally rammed or hit her vehicle into another vehicle three times. Mother testified at trial
that this charge had been dismissed.
       6
           By the time of trial, the trial court had appointed two attorneys to represent Child.
                                                  3
regarding possible placement(s) options for [Child] as it applies to the best interest of [Child] and

not to [the] conservatorship determination.” The trial court further granted in part the motion in

limine as to “[c]onduct or statements that indicate [Child’s] family being a better placement.”

The trial court ordered that “[t]he parties may elicit testimony regarding possible

placement(s) options for [Child] as it applies to the best interest of [Child] and not to [the]

conservatorship determination.”

               The Department’s witnesses at trial included detectives from the Austin Police

Department who investigated Child’s injuries; Department investigators, caseworkers, and

supervisors involved with Child; a child abuse pediatrician who examined Child when he was in

the hospital, testified about Child’s injuries7 and the hospital’s treatment of those injuries, and

opined that Child had been abused; a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) volunteer;

Mother’s therapist; Mother; and Father. The Department’s employees and the CASA volunteer

testified consistently that termination of parental rights was in Child’s best interest. If the

parental rights were terminated, the Department’s plan for Child was placement with and relative

adoption by Grandfather and his partner.

               The evidence established that Mother and Father were Child’s sole caregivers

when Child was injured; that they delayed seeking medical care for Child after he was injured;

that against court order they continued to communicate with each other during the case; that the

criminal charges arising from Child’s injuries against Mother and Father remained pending; and

that Mother had been arrested and incarcerated during the case after she intentionally rammed or

       7
           The pediatrician testified that Child’s injuries included a skull fracture; swelling in his
neck tissues; bruising; “a liver laceration”; “nine broken ribs on the right side and seven on the
left”; fractures of “his left radius and ulna,” “his right scapula,” “both of his femurs,” “one of the
bones in his pelvis,” and “his left and right distal tibia and fibula”; and “several fractures in his
feet on both sides.”
                                                  4
hit her vehicle into another vehicle multiple times. As to the cause of Child’s injuries, Father

testified about his actions that might have caused Child’s injuries and Mother’s presence when

he took those actions.8 Mother testified that she did not know Child was injured before taking

him to the doctor. Neither parent was asking for Child to come home with them but requested

that he be placed with family. Mother also testified that if her rights were not terminated, she

would accept limited access to Child and that some type of relationship between her and Child,

even if limited, was in Child’s best interest.

               Mother’s witnesses were a CASA supervisor, family members including

Grandfather and his partner, and a friend. Grandfather and his partner testified about their efforts

to obtain the training as to the NG Tube and their willingness and ability to care for Child and to

put his needs first. Grandfather and his partner also testified that if Mother’s rights were not

terminated and the court limited Mother’s contact with Child, they would abide by the court’s

order if they were Child’s placement.

               Relevant to Mother’s appeal, in a bench conference during the testimony of the

Department’s supervisor assigned to Child in February, Mother’s attorney advised the trial court

that he “wanted to ask this witness potentially about options as conservatorship options for

family,” but the trial court responded “[t]hat would be going outside” the motion in limine order.

In a subsequent bench conference, Mother’s attorney asked the trial court if he could “talk about

my client being named as a possessory conservator,” and the trial court responded, “You can talk

about best interest, about likely outcomes if there is termination” and “what the possible

       8
            When asked if he recklessly caused injury to Child, Father answered, “Not
intentionally, but I guess recklessly.” He also answered, “Yeah, I guess so,” when asked if
Mother was present in the room when he was doing “all these reckless actions to this [seven]-
week-old child.”
                                                 5
outcomes are if the jury does not terminate” but “we’re not going to talk about conservatorship.”

In response to the trial court’s ruling, Mother’s attorney made an offer of proof outside the

presence of the jury by providing the substance of expected testimony from Mother, Grandfather,

and the CASA supervisor and in question-and-answer form from the Department supervisor and

the CASA supervisor.

               The jury found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents had knowingly

placed or knowingly allowed Child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered

Child’s physical or emotional well-being, that they had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

Child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered Child’s physical or emotional

well-being, that they had failed to comply with the court-ordered service plans, and that

termination of the parent-child relationship was in Child’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2). In accordance with the jury’s verdict, the trial court signed the

order terminating the parents’ rights to Child and appointing the Department as Child’s

managing conservator. See id. § 161.207 (requiring court to appoint “suitable, competent adult”;

the Department; or licensed child-placing agency as managing conservator of child when court

terminates parent-child relationship with respect to both parents). The parents’ appeals followed.

                                           ANALYSIS

Father’s Appeal

               On appeal, Father’s court-appointed attorney has filed a brief concluding that his

appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967);

Taylor v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646–47 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied) (applying Anders procedure in appeal from termination of parental

                                                 6
rights). The brief meets the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of

the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See

386 U.S. at 744; Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 646–47. Father’s attorney has certified to this Court that

he provided a copy of the Anders brief to Father and informed him of his right to examine the

appellate record and to file a pro se brief. To date, Father has not filed a pro se brief.

                 Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the

proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, including the Anders brief submitted on Father’s

behalf, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Our review included the

evidence to support the jury’s endangerment findings, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D),

(E), and we have found no issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to these findings,

see In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019). We agree that Father’s appeal is frivolous and

without merit.

Mother’s Appeal

                 In her sole appellate issue, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by excluding evidence concerning conservatorship and that this abuse of discretion resulted in

harm to Mother and an incorrect judgment.

       Standard of Review

                 “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” A.B. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-17-00658-CV, 2018 Tex.

App. LEXIS 1790, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005)). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an

                                                   7
arbitrary or unreasonable manner ‘without reference to any guiding rules and principles.’” Id.

(quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)); accord

J.A.B. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-13-00273-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS

10110, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

               Further, when the trial court abuses its discretion by excluding evidence, the

complaining party also must show that this exclusion was harmful. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a).

Evidentiary error requires reversal when it “probably caused the rendition of an improper

judgment.” Id. R. 44.1(a)(1). In deciding whether an evidentiary error was harmful, we “review

the entire record.” B.S. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00279-CV,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8324, at *12 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing In re E.A.G., 373 S.W.3d 129, 145 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied)); see Kia

Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 883 (Tex. 2014) (describing appellate court’s analysis in

determining whether trial court’s error was harmful). To support reversal based on evidentiary

error, a complaining party generally must show that the judgment turns on the excluded

evidence. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000) (citing City of

Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995)).

       Trial Court’s Exclusion of Evidence and Mother’s Offer of Proof

               The trial court’s order granting the attorneys ad litem’s motion in limine

prohibited the parties from eliciting testimony regarding where permanent placement should be

without first approaching the bench and ordered that “[t]he parties may elicit testimony regarding

possible placement(s) options for the child as it applies to the best interest of the child and not to

conservatorship determination.” During trial, the court ruled consistently with its order on the

                                                  8
motion in limine. In the bench conferences, when asked by Mother’s attorney if he could “talk

about [Mother] being named as a possessory conservator,” the trial court responded, “You can

talk about best interest, about likely outcomes if there is termination” and “what the possible

outcomes are if the jury does not terminate,” but the trial court explained to Mother’s attorney

that he was not allowed to ask about possessory conservatorship.

               Mother’s offer of proof was through her attorney’s informing the trial court of the

substance of testimony he would have elicited from Mother, Grandfather, and the CASA

supervisor and in question-and-answer form from the Department supervisor and the CASA

supervisor. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(c) (allowing offer of proof in question-and-answer form).

Mother’s attorney informed the trial court that he would have asked Mother:

       if conservatorship issues were going to go to the jury, whether she potentially
       would ask for possessory conservatorship as opposed to being named as
       managing conservator or joint managing conservator. And potentially, if family
       managing conservatorship was on the table, ask if she would like for
       [Grandfather] to be named as managing conservator. And I believe her answers
       to those would be, yes, those are potential options that she would like the jury to
       know about.

The attorney also informed the trial court that he would have asked similar questions of

Grandfather and the CASA supervisor.9

               As to the question-and-answer part of the offer of proof, in response to questions

from Mother’s attorney, the Department supervisor agreed that it was possible and that it

happened frequently that a family member is appointed as the managing conservator of a child

and that in those situations, a parent can be named a possessory conservator with limited visits or
       9
          Mother’s attorney also informed the trial court about the expected substance of the
CASA supervisor’s answers to questions about Child’s current placement, but Mother does not
rely on the substance of that testimony on appeal, and it is not relevant to our resolution of
Mother’s issue on appeal.
                                                9
no contact or only supervised visits.      The supervisor also agreed that sometimes in those

situations, the parent also can continue to work services to alleviate concerns about their ability

to be safe with their child.

                Concerning Child’s particular circumstances, the supervisor testified in the offer

of proof:

        Q.      In this case, why is it not appropriate for, say, a family member like
        [Grandfather] to be named as a managing conservator and [Mother] to be named
        as a possessory conservator?

        A.      In this case, it would all depend on what access the possessor would have.

        Q.     Okay. So in a situation where—like we talked about, a possessory
        conservator—their visitation or their possession and access is controlled by the
        judge. You understand that. Right?

        A.      Yes.

        Q.      It’s not controlled by the jury. You understand that. Right?

        A.      Yes.

        Q.      So you said it depends on the access. So if this Court in this situation
        granted [Mother] either no visitation or only supervised visitation, would that
        alleviate some of those safety and protective concerns the Department has?

        A.      Yes.

        Q.      And that could potentially be—or could be a way to resolve the case if that
        alleviates those concerns that you would have with [Mother]. Would you agree
        with that?

        A.      Correct.

                On cross-examination as part of the offer of proof, the supervisor testified that the

Department was not in favor of possible alternative conservatorship for either parent and

explained why:

                                                 10
            It is felt that it is in [Child’s] best interest that the parents’ rights be terminated
            due to the injuries he sustained and the Department not knowing how those
            occurred. He is doing well. He is thriving in his environment. He has not had
            any fractures, any broken bones, any incidents. Although he is in a placement,
            we feel that, [after] termination, first possible would be to place with
            family members.

The supervisor also agreed that supervised visitation would alleviate concerns if that “route was

ordered at some point in time” and that the Department as the current managing conservator

“would make recommendations for visitation and access and all of those matters if it came

to it.”10

            Did the trial court abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of conservatorship?

                   Mother argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence “concerning

conservatorship,” specifically that the jury was deprived of “an understanding of what

conservatorship entails” and that “a juror that is not provided an understanding of what

conservatorship entails cannot properly make a best interest analysis.”11

                   The controlling question in this case was whether the parents’ rights should be

terminated. See J.A.B., 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10110, at *4–5 (explaining that controlling

question in termination case was whether parent’s rights should be terminated).                  The jury

            10
           Mother’s attorney also questioned the CASA supervisor as part of the offer of proof,
but his testimony did not support Mother. The supervisor testified that CASA would not favor
the option of naming a family member as managing conservator and Mother as possessory
conservator and answered, “No,” when asked if he thought there could be “a scenario where
Mother could be named as a possessory conservator with limited rights and access.”
            11
           To the extent that Mother relies on the substance of evidence that was excluded but
not raised or elicited in the offer of proof, she has not preserved the issue for our review. See
Tex. R. Evid. 103 (generally requiring party to inform court of substance of evidence by offer of
proof when court’s ruling excludes evidence). Thus, our analysis of the excluded evidence is
confined to the substance of the evidence that was raised or elicited during Mother’s offer
of proof.
                                                      11
questions concerned the Department’s asserted predicate grounds for termination and the best

interest of Child, and Mother has not raised an issue asserting charge error. In this context, we

cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the testimony about Child’s

placement to testimony relevant to the best-interest determination and not allowing further

testimony about conservatorship as raised or elicited in the offer of proof. See Holley v. Adams,

544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (stating that relevant factors in assessing best interest of

child include stability of proposed placement and plans for child by individual or agency seeking

custody); see also, e.g., J.A.B., 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10110, at *4–5 (concluding that trial

court “did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit additional questions concerning

conservatorship” because controlling question was whether parent’s rights should be terminated).

                  Further, even if we were to assume without deciding that the trial court erred in

excluding the testimony concerning conservatorship as raised or elicited in the offer of proof, we

cannot conclude based on our review of the entire record that Mother has shown that the

exclusion of this evidence probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R.

App. P. 44.1(a)(1); B.S., 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 8324, at *12 (requiring appellate court to review

entire record).

                  Mother has not raised an issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the jury’s endangerment and best-interest findings, and the evidence of endangerment

was overwhelming.        See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002) (stating that evidence

presented to satisfy predicate-ground finding may also be probative of child’s best interest);

Pruitt v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-10-00089-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS

10272, at *22–23 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that

Department need not prove all Holley factors, “especially when there is undisputed evidence that

                                                 12
the parental relationship endangered the child”); see also J.T. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., No. 03-15-00725-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 2164, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin

Mar. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that exclusion of evidence is harmless if “the rest

of the evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference in the judgment”

(quoting State v. Central Expressway Sign Assocs., 302 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. 2009))). The

evidence also showed that during the case, Mother communicated with Father against court order

and that she was arrested and incarcerated after she intentionally rammed or hit her vehicle into

another vehicle three times. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (stating relevant factors in best-

interest determination to include parental abilities, emotional and physical danger to child in

future, and acts by parent showing parent-child relationship was not proper).

               The evidence also established that if the parents’ rights were terminated, the

Department’s plan for Child was adoption by Grandfather and his partner; Mother was allowed

to testify that she was asking for Child to be placed with Grandfather and his partner and for her

rights not to be terminated, which would allow her to have some legal possession and access as

ordered by the trial court;12 Father testified that his preference was for Child to be placed with

       12
          Mother asked for her rights not to be terminated and for access and possession as
determined by the trial court and testified about her desire for Child to be placed with family:

        Q.      … [Y]ou’re not asking for reunification today with [Child]. Is that right?
        A.      Correct.
        Q.      You are not asking for [Child] to come home with you today. Right?
        A.      Correct.
        Q.      Or at the end of this trial. Correct?
        A.      Correct. I know that is not feasible.
        Q.      What you are asking for is family to be placement. Is that correct?
        A.      Yes.
        Q.      And as long as you have some parental rights—whatever possession and access
that the judge decides?
        A.      Ask it again.
                                               13
family and that he had no concerns with Child being placed with Grandfather and his partner;

and Grandfather testified that he would abide by the court’s order to limit Child’s contact with

Mother if her rights were not terminated and Child was placed with them. Thus, although

Mother was not allowed to present the substance of the evidence concerning conservatorship as

raised or elicited in the offer of proof, the jury was presented with evidence concerning the

placement and plans for Child if parental rights were terminated or if they were not. See Able,

35 S.W.3d at 617 (stating that appellate courts ordinarily will not reverse judgment for erroneous

evidentiary ruling “when the evidence in question is cumulative and not controlling on a material

issue dispositive to the case”); see also Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (stating relevant factors in

best-interest determination).

               For these reasons, we conclude that Mother has not established that the trial

court’s exclusion of the evidence concerning conservatorship as raised or elicited in the offer of

proof was reversible error and, thus, overrule her appellate issue.

                                         CONCLUSION

               Having found that Father’s appeal is frivolous and without merit and having

overruled Mother’s appellate issue, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.13

       Q.      As long as your rights aren’t terminated, whatever possession and access the
judge decides for you to have?
       A.      Yes.
       13
             We also deny the pending motion to withdraw by Father’s attorney. See In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If Father, after consulting with counsel, desires to
file a petition for review, his counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition
for review that satisfies the standards of an Anders brief.” See id. at 27–28.
                                                 14
                                           __________________________________________
                                           Rosa Lopez Theofanis, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Smith and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: April 25, 2024

                                              15