Court Opinion

ID: 9919483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:33.780161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.670394
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                               RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0487-MR

MICHAEL LEHMAN                                                       APPELLANT

                 ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                HONORABLE KELLY M. EASTON, JUDGE
                            NO. 21-CR-00271

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

        A Hardin County jury found Appellant Michael Lehman (Lehman) guilty

of first-degree sodomy, victim under twelve years old, and first-degree sexual

abuse, victim under twelve years old. Lehman was sentenced to a total of

twenty years in prison. On appeal, he claims that the jury instructions violated

his right to a unanimous verdict and that the trial court erred when it allowed

impermissible expert and veracity testimony from the investigating detective.

Upon review, we affirm the trial court.

                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In the fall of 2020, eleven-year-old J.A. disclosed to Vicky, her paternal

grandmother, that Lehman, her step-grandfather, had been touching her

inappropriately. J.A.; her father, Steven; and a sibling had moved into

Lehman’s and Vicky’s home after J.A.’s parents separated. A family meeting
was held to confront Lehman with the allegations. Vicky told Lehman to move

out and Lehman abided. A few months later, another family member reported

the allegations to the police. Detective Jones investigated the allegations. After

J.A.’s forensic interview, Lehman was charged with first-degree sexual abuse.

About a week later, J.A. made additional allegations, and Lehman was also

charged with first-degree sodomy.

      J.A., Steven, Vicky, Detective Jones, and Ruthie, Steven’s girlfriend,

testified at trial. J.A. testified that Lehman touched her with his hands and

penis. She testified specifically that he touched her private parts with his

hands and put his penis inside her butt. J.A. testified that the touching

occurred in the basement, that Lehman touched her a few times a week from

the time she was seven until she was eleven, that the last time Lehman

touched her private parts was October 30, 2020, and the last time he put his

penis in her butt was a couple of weeks before that. She also testified that she

told her grandmother about these assaults after J.A.’s half-sister was born; she

was worried that Lehman would assault her sister, too.

      Steven testified that Lehman admitted that he touched J.A. and that’s

why Vicky told Lehman to leave. Ruthie testified that J.A. came to her in

August 2020 and told her that her butt hurt, but she thought J.A. was

constipated and because she had not been dating Steven very long, she did not

think it was her place to take J.A. to the doctor. Vicky testified that J.A. did

not tell her Lehman was doing anything other than touching J.A.

                                         2
      Vicky’s interview with Detective Jones was recorded on his body camera

and played for the jury. She told Detective Jones about confronting Lehman

and that Lehman said it did not go further than touching, said that he was a

monster, and said that he wanted to kill himself. At trial, however, Vicky

testified that Lehman had not admitted to touching J.A. Vicky testified that

she was mad and made her statements up to hurt Lehman because she

thought he had hurt J.A., but she no longer believed J.A. 1 Vicky also testified

that later she and Lehman began living together in an apartment and he

resided with her until the trial.

      Detective Jones testified that he spoke to Lehman during his

investigation. He testified that Lehman admitted that Vicky confronted him

about the allegations and that Vicky told him that he must have been drunk

when he touched J.A.

      Detective Jones also testified that he has many years of law enforcement

experience, which included investigating sex crimes. Detective Jones further

testified that he did not have J.A. medically evaluated after J.A. reported being

sodomized. He explained that with J.A.’s statement being taken in January

and the last alleged incident occurring in October, given his experience working

with children that age who “heal pretty quickly,” physical evidence of the crime

would not be picked up by the exam.

      1 The trial court admonished the jury to “disregard the statement of belief then

or now.”

                                           3
      In regard to his conversation with Vicky in the cruiser, when the

Commonwealth asked Detective Jones if he felt the things Vicky said to him at

the time were truthful, he answered, “I have no doubt she was telling the

truth.” He stated that she wasn’t making it up because “she didn’t hesitate

and gave quick responses.”

      A jury found Lehman guilty as charged. For first-degree sodomy, victim

under twelve years old, Lehman was sentenced to twenty years in prison. For

first-degree sexual abuse, victim under twelve years old, Lehman was

sentenced to five years in prison. As recommended by the jury, the trial court

adjudicated the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.

      Lehman brings two unpreserved issues on appeal. First, Lehman claims

that the jury instructions violated both his right to a unanimous verdict and

against double jeopardy. Second, he claims that the trial court erred when it

allowed impermissible expert and veracity testimony from Detective Jones.

                                     ANALYSIS

      Because Lehman’s claims for relief are unpreserved, he requests palpable

error review. Under RCr 10.26, 2 if an unpreserved error is found to be palpable

and if it affects the substantial rights of the defendant, the appellate court may

grant appropriate relief if manifest injustice has resulted from the error. An

      2 RCr 10.26 states:

              A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
      may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
      appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved
      for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
      that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

                                          4
error is palpable when it is “easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily

noticeable.” 3 The error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous

that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” 4 Manifest injustice is

found only where, after consideration of the record, the defect alleged was

“shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable” and where “the error seriously

affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” 5

      Lehman’s arguments are addressed in turn.

I.    The jury instructions did not present a unanimous jury verdict
      violation.

      Lehman argues that because neither the sodomy or sexual abuse jury

instructions contained a description of Lehman’s specific criminal acts, the

instructions’ reliance on the statutory definitions alone did not distinguish

between his criminal acts, resulting in unanimous verdict 6 and double

jeopardy 7 violations.

      3 Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Burns v.

Level, 957 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1997)).
      4 Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2006).

      5 Id. at 4 (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)).

      6 Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the

right to unanimous jury verdicts. Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky.
1978).
      7 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person

shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.
Const. amend. V.

                                            5
      The first-degree sodomy instruction stated:

      You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Sodomy under
      this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
      beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

   A. That in this county before the finding of the indictment herein and
      between June 25, 2016 and October 30, 2020 he engaged in a
      continuing course of conduct resulting in his having deviate
      sexual intercourse with [J.A.] no less than two times;

      AND

   B. That at the time of each such occurrence [J.A.] was less than
      twelve years old.[8]

Pursuant to KRS 510.010(1), “deviate sexual intercourse” was defined as “any

act of sexual gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth

or anus of another.”

      The first-degree sexual abuse instruction stated:

      You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Sexual Abuse
      under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence
      beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

   A. That in this county before the finding of the indictment herein and
      between June 25, 2016 and October 30, 2020 he engaged in a
      continuing course of conduct resulting in his subjecting [J.A.] to
      sexual contact no less than two times;

      AND

   B. That at the time of each such contact [J.A.] was less than twelve
      years old.[9]

      8 Emphasis added.

      9 Emphasis added.

                                        6
Pursuant to KRS 510.010(7), “sexual contact” was defined as “any touching of

the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying

the sexual desire of either party.” 10

      Although unanimous verdict violations may occur in different ways, “as a

general principle . . . a violation occurs when a verdict is returned based upon

jury instructions and verdict forms that provide no assurance that all of the

jurors based their finding of guilt on the same event.” 11 Here, Lehman argues

that the “multiple acts” unanimous jury verdict violation is applicable to his

case, and that violation also resulted in a double jeopardy violation.

      Justice v. Commonwealth 12 recently explained the “multiple acts”

unanimous jury verdict violation and the double jeopardy violation that is often

present with the unanimity violation as follows:

             A unanimous jury verdict problem often arises when a jury
      instruction is satisfied by multiple criminal acts. When multiple
      acts of conduct for which the defendant could be convicted are not
      sufficiently distinguished in the jury instructions, it becomes
      unclear on which conduct the jury is convicting the defendant. As
      a result, when a conviction is returned, we cannot be assured that
      12 jurors all agreed that the same conduct warranted a conviction.
      This violates a defendant’s right to an unanimous verdict. . . .
             Further, jury instructions that fail to meet the unanimity
      requirement are usually accompanied by a double-jeopardy
      violation. If the conduct is not distinguished in the jury
      instructions, but evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find the
      defendant guilty of two different crimes, there is no way to know

      10 The definition for “sexual contact” was subsequently amended in 2023.   See
2023 Ky. Acts ch. 34, § 2 (eff. June 29, 2023).
      11 Elam v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.3d 818, 826 (Ky. 2016) (citing Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 405 S.W.3d 439, 449 (Ky. 2013); Ruiz v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d
675, 678 (Ky. 2015)).
      12 636 S.W.3d 407, 416 (Ky. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Sexton v.

Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 227 (Ky. 2022) (internal citations omitted).
                                           7
      the jury did not use the same conduct to satisfy both convictions.
      So, the jury instructions must require the jury to distinguish the
      conduct forming the basis of conviction to ensure that all twelve
      jurors agree that a specific act warrants a conviction and so that
      the jury does not punish the defendant for the same conduct twice.

      In regard to the unanimous jury verdict violation, Lehman argues

specifically that when the jury determined that he engaged in deviate sexual

intercourse, i.e., touched J.A.’s anus with his penis, that conduct also fell

within the definition for sexual contact. Therefore, one cannot be sure from the

verdicts that all twelve jurors agreed Lehman’s conviction for sodomy was not

based on the same conduct that supported the conviction for sexual abuse. In

terms of double jeopardy, Lehman similarly argues that there is no means to

ensure that the jury did not use the same conduct in order to find Lehman

guilty of both sodomy and sexual abuse and therefore convict him twice for the

same behavior.

      While citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 477 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Ky. 2015),

for the premise that the first step in palpable error review is to determine

whether an error occurred, the Commonwealth asserts that there is no need for

this Court to decide whether the jury instructions in this case created a

unanimity or double-jeopardy error, because even assuming the instructions

created an error, palpable error relief is not warranted. In Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 13 as to unpreserved unanimity questions, this Court recently

explained:

           In all cases presenting an unpreserved error regarding a
      unanimous jury, the courts must “plumb the depths of the

      13 676 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Ky. 2023) (internal citations omitted).

                                          8
      proceeding” and scrutinize the factual idiosyncrasies of the
      individual case. That includes a consideration of the weight of the
      evidence. Only if, upon review, a court can conclude “the error is
      so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the
      integrity of the judicial process,” will reversal be warranted. “It
      should be so egregious that it jumps off the page . . . and cries out
      for relief.”

      The Commonwealth argues that the weight of the evidence shows that no

palpable error occurred in regard to either the alleged unanimity or double

jeopardy issues. The Commonwealth points out that J.A. testified to two types

of touching, two different types of attacks Lehman perpetrated against her, and

that the Commonwealth distinguished between the sexual abuse instruction

(when Lehman touched J.A. with his hands) and the sodomy instruction (when

Lehman touched J.A.’s anus with his penis) during closing argument. Citing

Johnson, 14 the Commonwealth asserts that because none of the evidence is

“confusing or complex,” it is impossible for a court to determine “that but for

the instructional error, there is a substantial possibility of a different result,” so

no palpable error occurred.

      While we agree with the Commonwealth that none of the evidence is

confusing or complex, we note in regard to the role the Commonwealth asserts

its closing argument may play in remedying an instructional error, this Court

previously explained in Dixon v. Commonwealth 15 that “the arguments of

counsel are not sufficient to rehabilitate otherwise erroneous or imprecise jury

instructions” because the arguments of counsel are not evidence.

      14 676 S.W.3d at 418.

      15 263 S.W.3d 583, 593 (Ky. 2008).

                                           9
Nevertheless, because we conclude that the instructions did not present a

“multiple acts” unanimous verdict violation or a double jeopardy problem

because the instructions adequately differentiated the two offenses, we agree

with the Commonwealth that palpable error relief is not warranted.

      As a starting point, it has long been understood, as this Court explained

in Miller v. Commonwealth, 16 that “a trial court errs in a case involving multiple

charges if its instructions to the jury fail to factually differentiate between the

separate offenses according to the evidence.” 17 In Miller, based upon that

premise, the Court concluded palpable error occurred when the trial court used

identical jury instructions for the six (6) counts of third-degree rape and two (2)

counts of third-degree sodomy, making none of the counts distinguishable from

the others as to what factually distinct crime each applied to. 18

      Soon thereafter, in Banks v. Commonwealth, 19 a case in which the

appellant was convicted of the nine counts of first-degree sodomy, 20 the Court

applied Miller to the appellant’s claim that “the jury instructions pertaining to

the sodomy counts insufficiently distinguished the incidents so as to assure a

unanimous verdict as to the convictions” 21 The Court agreed that two of the

      16 283 S.W.3d 690 (Ky. 2009).

      17 Id. at 695 (citing Combs v. Commonwealth, 198 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Ky. 2006)).

      18 Id. at 694, 695-96.

      19 313 S.W.3d 567 (Ky. 2010).

      20 Id. at 570. Banks was also found guilty of five counts of incest, and four
counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Id.
      21 Id. at 571.

                                          10
instructions used terms which created an overlap in time and conduct and

violated the distinguishment requirements of Miller. 22

      This Court further explained:

             An examination of Miller discloses that its principal purpose
      is to ensure that the instructions for each count are
      distinguishable enough to permit the jury to relate each verdict to
      a specific crime shown by the evidence. Clearly, simply varying the
      words of the instruction for each count, without any substantive
      difference in meaning, does not satisfy Miller. However, the test is
      not simply one of mutual exclusivity. So long as the instruction for
      each count enables the jury to identify the instruction with a
      specific crime established by the evidence and avoids the likelihood
      of confusion with other offenses presented against defendant in the
      same trial, then the instructions are adequately differentiated.[23]

      Here, there were two types of conduct at issue: Lehman inserting his

penis in J.A.’s anus and Lehman touching J.A.’s private parts, and two

instructions. The sodomy instruction, which itself contained the term

“sodomy” and defined “deviate sexual intercourse” as “any act of sexual

gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus

of another,” 24 enabled the jury to identify this instruction with the evidence

that Lehman put his penis in J.A.’s anus. The sexual abuse instruction,

defining “sexual contact” as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate

parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either

      22 Id. at 573.

      23 Id. at 573.

      24 Emphasis added.

                                        11
party,” 25 enabled the jury to identify this instruction with the evidence that

Lehman touched J.A.’s private parts.

      Although Lehman’s specific acts were not incorporated into the text of

the instructions, as prescribed in Banks, the instruction for each count

enabled the jury to identify the instruction with a specific crime established by

the evidence, avoiding likelihood of confusion for which instruction went the

alleged criminal conduct. A reasonable jury undoubtedly understood the

sodomy instruction related to Lehman inserting his penis in J.A.’s anus and

the sexual abuse instruction related to Lehman touching J.A.’s sexual parts,

referred to as her “private area” at trial. Neither the facts nor the instructions

were confusing. In light of the differentiation between the two instructions and

the ease of pairing each of Lehman’s two types of criminal conduct with the

instructions, the instructions did not present unanimous verdict or double

jeopardy violations. 26

      25 Emphasis added.

      26 See also Benet v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 528, 536-37 (Ky. 2008).

Comparable to Lehman’s argument here, Benet contended that his convictions fell
within the double jeopardy prohibition because the sexual abuse conviction was a
lesser included offense of the sodomy conviction in that a person cannot commit
sodomy without also committing the offense of sexual abuse. This Court explained
that Benet’s argument ignored the fact that his touching of the victim’s genitals
through the victim’s clothing is an entirely separate act and offense than his orally
sodomizing the victim and rejected Benet’s double-jeopardy argument.

                                           12
II.   If the trial court erred when allowing Detective Jones to testify
      about the reason he did not seek a medical evaluation of J.A. or
      about Vicky’s veracity during her interview, the error did not result
      in manifest injustice.

      Lehman complains that Detective Jones’s testimony related to reasons he

did not seek a medical exam of J.A. constituted impermissible expert testimony

and his testimony related to the truth of Vicky’s statements constituted

impermissible veracity testimony. The Commonwealth argues that even if the

admissions of both statements were in error, the admissions do not constitute

palpable error.

      Under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 701, a lay witness may provide

opinion testimony only if their opinion is (1) based on their perception; (2)

helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination

of a fact at issue; and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or specialized

knowledge. 27 In the context of law enforcement officers providing opinions, we

have stated that officers “may provide lay opinion testimony as to their

experience-based interpretations of certain facts which they personally

observed.” 28

      Lehman, citing Whaley v. Commonwealth, 29 argues that testimony about

identifying and explaining medical evidence and the presence or absence of

injuries in child sexual assault cases requires specialized knowledge and does

      27 Carson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Ky. 2021).

      28 Id. at 447 (citing Iraola-Lovaco v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 241, 247 (Ky.

2019); Burton v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W.3d 126, 140 (Ky. 2009)).
      29 567 S.W.3d 576, 589 (Ky. 2019).

                                           13
not fall within lay opinion testimony. In Whaley, this Court concluded that the

victim’s examining physician was qualified under KRE 702 as an expert due to

her knowledge, experience and training and consequently the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing the physician to testify to her opinion that

she would not necessarily expect to see injury with anal sodomy. 30

      Lehman argues that unlike the Whaley witness, Detective Jones was not

qualified as an expert, pointing out that he did not testify about how many

sexual abuse or sexual assault cases he worked in his career which would

provide a sufficient experiential basis for understanding medical data and

whether a physical exam would yield any evidence, making the admission of

his testimony erroneous. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, views

Whaley as supporting the admission of Detective Jones’s testimony because

the Court did not hold that this type of testimony requires exact medical

credentials, but that the Whaley witness was qualified to give her opinion

because of her “knowledge, experience, and training.” Here, the

Commonwealth asserts that Detective Jones qualified as an expert, even if the

court did not certify him as one, because he has sufficient experience in law

enforcement — working in law enforcement since 1980 and investigating sex

crimes while serving as a military police investigator — to explain whether he

expected to find any physical evidence or not.

      30 Id.

                                       14
      As to evidence of manifest injustice resulting from the trial court allowing

Detective Jones’s testimony into evidence, Lehman contends that there was

minimal evidence supporting A.J.’s allegations; for example, there was no

physical evidence or eyewitness corroboration. Lehman further argues that the

fact that A.J. was not medically evaluated was significant and the

Commonwealth being allowed to explain that circumstance away through an

officer’s nonexpert testimony amounted to significant prejudice to Lehman.

      We view Whaley as supporting Lehman’s argument that Detective

Jones’s opinion testimony, without foundational testimony, went beyond lay

testimony and fell more within the realm of scientific, technical, or specialized

knowledge. However, we do not conclude that any error warrants palpable

error relief. As the Commonwealth points out, the jury heard J.A.’s testimony

that Lehman sodomized her, Ruthie’s testimony that J.A. came to her after

August 2020 and told her that her butt hurt, and that Lehman had confessed

to touching J.A. Given the evidence, the inclusion of Detective Jones’s

testimony did not result in manifest injustice.

      Finally, Lehman also argues that it was inappropriate for the

Commonwealth to ask Detective Jones his opinion about the truthfulness of

Vicky’s recorded statement. In Moss v. Commonwealth, 31 and again recently in

Carson, 32 we explained that neither lay nor expert testimony is appropriate

regarding the veracity of a witness.

      31 949 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Ky. 1997).

      32 621 S.W.3d at 447.

                                           15
      “With few exceptions, it is improper to require a witness to
      comment on the credibility of another witness. A witness’s opinion
      about the truth of the testimony of another witness is not
      permitted. Neither expert nor lay witnesses may testify that
      another witness or a defendant is lying or faking. That
      determination is within the exclusive province of the jury.”[33]

      While the Commonwealth’s question may be viewed as improper under

Moss, we conclude that the error did not result in manifest injustice. The jury

had the opportunity to both watch Vicky’s recorded statements to Detective

Jones, when she stated that Lehman called himself a “monster” and wanted to

kill himself, and to weigh her credibility when testifying at trial. Furthermore,

the Commonwealth reminded the jury during closing argument that either

Vicky lied to Detective Jones or lied during her testimony, but that was for the

jury to decide.

                                    CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the Hardin Circuit Court’s judgment is

affirmed.

          All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

      33 Moss, 949 S.W.2d at 583 (quoting State v. James, 557 A.2d 471, 473 (R.I.

1989)).

                                          16
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Sarah Dickerson Dailey
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General

                               17