Court Opinion

ID: 9631513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:40:51.923116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:27.251735
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur that defendants may be convicted of both carjacking and robbery or grand theft. Neither grand theft nor robbery is a necessarily included offense of carjacking. Nor is carjacking necessarily included in grand theft or robbery.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendants were improperly convicted of both grand theft and robbery. The majority is correct that theft *704is necessarily included in robbery. A person may not commit robbery without committing theft. But the defendants were not convicted of simple theft. They were convicted of grand theft, specifically, theft of a vehicle. A person can easily commit robbery without committing grand theft. Accordingly, under settled legal principles, defendants were properly convicted of both grand theft and robbery even if they may not be punished for both.
I. Conviction of Robbery and Grand Theft
A. General Legal Principles
The majority correctly states most of the applicable legal principles, which have been settled for decades and are grounded largely in California’s Penal Code.1
A person may be convicted of, even if not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. “Section 954 sets forth the general rule that defendants may be charged with and convicted of multiple offenses based on a single act or an indivisible course of conduct. It provides in relevant part: ‘An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense .... The prosecution is not required to elect between the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading, but the defendant may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged, . . .’ (Italics added.)” (People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 354 [228 Cal.Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d 595].) Section 954, which permits multiple conviction, meshes neatly with section 654, which prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or omission.” When multiple conviction is permitted under section 954, but multiple punishment is prohibited under section 654, the court, as in this case, simply stays execution of the sentence for the excess convictions. (See People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 359-360.)
An exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction is at issue here. “Although the reason for the rule is unclear, this court has long held that multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 355, original italics.) “ ‘The test in this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included offense.’ ” (Ibid.) We have reiterated this definition, sometimes using different but equivalent language, continually for over half a century, as recently as our decision in People v. *705Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 195, 965 P.2d 713] (using the term “lesser included offense” rather than the equivalent “necessarily included offense”). “This definition may be traced to People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 596 [184 P.2d 512], and People v. Krupa (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [149 P.2d 416].” (People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 369 [173 Cal.Rptr. 453, 627 P.2d 183].)
This test for included offenses applies to the statutory elements of the crimes or to the specific allegations of the accusatory pleading if different from the statutory language. “Under the accusatory pleading test, a lesser offense is included within the greater charged offense ‘ “if the charging allegations of the accusatory pleading include language describing the offense in such a way that if committed as specified the lesser offense is necessarily committed.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 288-289; see People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d 394 [309 P.2d 456].)
We have never clearly stated the reason for the rule prohibiting conviction of both a greater offense and a necessarily included offense. However, the rule is logical. If a defendant cannot commit the greater offense without committing the lesser, conviction of the greater is also conviction of the lesser. To permit conviction of both the greater and the lesser offense “ ' “would be to convict twice of the lesser.” ’ ” (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 306 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832].) There is no reason to permit two convictions for the lesser offense.
B. Application to This Case
We should have no difficulty applying these principles to this case. Multiple conviction of robbery and grand theft is prohibited only if either offense is necessarily included in the other, i.e., if it is impossible to commit one without committing the other. Robbery requires a taking of property “by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) Theft, whether grand or petty, need not involve force or fear. (§§ 484, 487.) Therefore, a defendant can commit theft without committing robbery, and robbery is not a necessarily included offense of theft.
I agree that simple theft is a necessarily included offense of robbery. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544].) A defendant cannot commit robbery without committing theft. Robbery requires a taking of personal property. (§ 211.)
A defendant may, however, commit robbery without committing grand theft. There are many types of grand theft. The most common are theft of *706specified kinds of property, of property worth over $400, or from the person. (§ 487.) The sections of the Penal Code that define grand theft include elements that, other than the taking of property with intent to deprive, are not elements of robbery. Robbery may be of any personal property and may be from the person or immediate presence. (§ 211.) “Although ‘personal property’ must have ‘some intrinsic value’ [citation], it need not be of any particular kind or worth. [Citation.] A pack of cigarettes [citation], an empty wallet, even if immediately discarded [citation] or returned [citation], a one-dollar bill [citation], and even an empty ripped-off pants pocket [citation] all constitute ‘personal property.’ ” (People v. Rush (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 20, 35 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 15] (dis. opn. of Woods (Fred), J.).) Courts have long recognized the difference between the narrow from-the-person requirement for theft and the broader from-the-person-or-immediatepresence requirement for robbery. (People v. McElroy (1897) 116 Cal. 583, 586-587 [48 P. 718] [reversing a grand theft conviction because the taking was from the immediate presence but not person; contrasting the robbery requirement]; People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1471-1472 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 243] [same]; In re George B. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1088, 1091-1092 [279 Cal.Rptr. 388].)
To commit robbery but not grand theft, a defendant merely has to take, by force or fear, from the victim’s immediate presence but not person, property not of a specified type and worth less than $400. As one court summarized, “while petty theft is a necessarily included offense in robbery, grand theft is not necessarily included for the reason that robbery can be committed without necessarily committing grand theft.” (People v. Goins (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 923, 926 [173 Cal.Rptr. 655].) If a defendant commits a robbery that includes the additional elements of grand theft, the prosecution should not have to choose between robbery and grand theft, and the jury should be allowed to convict the defendant of both crimes. Conviction of both crimes is exactly what section 954 expressly permits.
C. The Majority’s Reasons
The majority recognizes that, except for necessarily included offenses, multiple conviction is permitted even if multiple punishment is not. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 692.) It states, and purports to apply, the settled definition of a necessarily included offense. (Ibid.) It also appears not to dispute that one may commit robbery without committing grand theft.
Nevertheless, the majority concludes that grand theft is a necessarily included offense of robbery. It claims a “long, unbroken line of authority,” beginning in 1878, holds that grand, as well as petty, theft is necessarily *707included in robbery. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 694.) As I show, this authority either supports my position or is inconclusive. The issue of this case is far from “well settled.” (Ibid.)
The first case the majority cites, People v. Jones (1878) 53 Cal. 58, is not a grand theft case at all. It merely involves “larceny” (or, in modem parlance, theft). (Id. at p. 59.) I fully agree that theft is necessarily included in robbery. That is not the issue here. The issue is whether grand theft is necessarily included in robbery.
In People v. Nelson (1880) 56 Cal. 77, the information charged the defendants with robbery of property “from” the victim. (Id. at p. 78.) They were found guilty of grand larceny. We affirmed, noting that when, as the information alleged, “the property is taken from the person of another, the offense is grand larceny . . . .” (Id. at p. 80.) Similarly, in People v. Church (1897) 116 Cal. 300, 301 [48 P. 125], the defendant was charged with robbery “from the person.” We said, “Force or fear are the essential elements that differentiate [robbery and grand larceny], when the property is taken from the person, as is charged in the present instance.” (Id. at p. 304, italics added.) These two cases merely indicate that grand larceny was an included offense under the specific accusatory pleadings. They do not suggest grand theft is always necessarily included in robbery.
In People v. Covington (1934) 1 Cal.2d 316, 318 [34 P.2d 1019], the defendants were charged with robbery “from” the victim. We concluded that “proof of essential elements of robbery is lacking, but that the appellants are, under the evidence, guilty of petty theft.” (Id. at p. 317, italics added.) The property taken included a diamond ring. The defendants had requested the trial court to instruct the jury on petty and grand theft. We said the court should have given the instruction. (Id. at p. 320.) The opinion does not explain why the defendants requested an instruction on grand as well as petty theft, but a simple statement that the court should have acquiesced in that request certainly does not suggest grand theft is a lesser included offense of robbery.
People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394, supports my position, not the majority’s. In Marshall, the information charged the defendant with robbery of specified property, including “an automobile.” (Id. at p. 396.) He was convicted of taking a vehicle. (Veh. Code, former § 503, now § 10851.) We affirmed, holding that the taking a vehicle charge was necessarily included in the robbery charge under the specific language of the accusatory pleading. “The offense of robbery as defined by section 211 of the Penal Code does not include all the elements of violation of [former] section 503 of the *708Vehicle Code. The property taken in robbery may be any kind of personal property, whereas only the taking of ‘a vehicle’ is denounced by [former] section 503 of the Vehicle Code. A person charged simply with robbery ‘in the words of the statute describing the offense’ would not be charged with and could not be properly convicted of the offense defined by [former] section 503 because the accusatory pleading would not inform the defendant that he must be prepared, at the trial, to contravene evidence that he took a particular kind of personal property, a vehicle. [Citation.] fl[] Although the statutory definition of robbery does not necessarily include the offense denounced by [former] section 503 of the Vehicle Code, the particular robbery specifically pleaded in the information here includes all the elements of a violation of [former] section 503. It is particularly alleged that the property taken was ‘an automobile.’ The allegations of the information that the automobile was taken by robbery necessarily import the elements of theft, including the taking of the personal property of one other than defendant, with intent to steal [citations].” (People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 399-400, italics added, fns. omitted.)
This language from Marshall makes clear that, but for the specific accusatory language of that case, theft of a vehicle would not be necessarily included in robbery for the simple reason that robbery may be of any property, while theft of a vehicle must be of a vehicle. The taking charge was necessarily included in the robbery charge only because of the accusatory language. Marshall would aid the majority if the information of this case, like the information in Marshall, charged defendants with robbery of “an automobile.” It did not. It charged defendants, in the language of section 211, with robbery of “personal property.” The majority does not claim otherwise.
People v. Cole (1982) 31 Cal.3d 568 [183 Cal.Rptr. 350, 645 P.2d 1182] arguably does support the majority. Its entire relevant discussion follows: “Finally, appellant argues, and the Attorney General concedes, that the grand theft conviction must be reversed because it is a lesser necessarily included offense of the crime of robbery. (People v. Miller (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 77, 81 [117 Cal.Rptr. 491].)” (Id. at p. 582.) The case of People v. Miller (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 77, 81 [117 Cal.Rptr. 491], cited in Cole, involved only theft, not grand theft. Our opinion in Cole does not state the language of the accusatory pleading, so we cannot tell whether the Attorney General’s concession was correct under People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d 394. But our summary acceptance of the concession is hardly a reasoned application of the test for necessarily included offenses.
The most recent case from this court, People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273], does not involve this issue. In *709Webster, we stated, correctly, “Theft is a lesser included offense of robbery . . . (Id. at p. 443.) In rejecting the defendant’s argument that the court erred in not instructing on theft, we also noted the trial court instructed on what it considered to be the lesser included offenses of grand and petty theft. (Ibid.) Whether grand theft actually was an included offense of the robbery charge under the accusatory pleading or otherwise was not at issue, and we did not decide the question.
We thus see that, of the cases from this court the majority cites, one (Jones) does not involve grand theft at all, one (Marshall) supports my position, two (Nelson and Church) involve specific pleading allegations that made grand theft included in the robbery as charged, one (Covington) involves a defense-requested instruction, one (Cole) contains an unexamined acquiescence in a concession that may or may not have been correct, and one (Webster) merely described the trial court’s actual instructions. Except for a recent trio of cases, the Court of Appeal decisions the majority cites contain no relevant analysis. Three recent decisions, two from the same court, held, over strong dissents, that grand theft is a necessarily included offense of robbery. (People v. Gamble (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 450-452 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 451]; cf. id. at pp. 455-456 (dis. opn. of Woods (Fred), J.); People v. Rush, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pp. 23-27; cf. id. at pp. 27-38 (dis. opn. of Woods (Fred), J.); People v. Irvin (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 180, 184-186 [281 Cal.Rptr. 195]; cf. id. at pp. 193-196 (dis. opn. of Turner, P. J.).) The court attempted to provide a rationale in these cases.
Even the majority is forced to admit that the rationale offered in those cases—essentially, that one looks to the facts of each case rather than the statutory elements or charging document to determine whether a lesser crime was included in the greater—is erroneous. As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 697-698), a fact-based test is incompatible with California’s definition of necessarily included offenses and a defendant’s right to notice of the charges. “Limiting consideration to the elements of the offenses and the language of the accusatory pleading informs a defendant, prior to trial, of what included offenses he or she must be prepared to defend against.” (Id. at p. 698.)2 As we explained in People v. Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at page 368, “ ‘ “Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable *710opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial.” [Citation.]’ (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 612 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].)” Only when an uncharged lesser offense is necessarily included in a charged offense does the defendant receive this required notice. (Id. at pp. 368-369.)
The majority also invokes a leading treatise on criminal law that states, “a single taking of property will obviously not support a conviction of larceny as a separate offense in addition to the conviction of robbery.” (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 350.) I agree. Theft is a necessarily included offense of robbery. However, the issue here involves grand theft. The majority relies on a footnote in Perkins citing an intermediate appellate decision in Florida indicating the grand larceny charge of that case was a lesser included offense of robbery. (Id. at p. 350, fn. 47, citing McClendon v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979) 372 So.2d 1161, 1162.) The Florida opinion does not specify the exact charging allegation or the elements of the crimes under Florida law. But neither the facts of that cáse nor Florida law has any bearing on the correct application of California 3
Recognizing that the rationale of the recent appellate decisions supporting its conclusion is erroneous, the majority attempts a new rationale. The attempt fails. The majority says that theft is theft, and if any form or degree of theft is necessarily included in robbery, all forms and degrees are. “Because theft is a necessarily included offense of robbery,” the majority insists, “it follows that both degrees of theft, grand and petty, are necessarily included offenses of robbery.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 697.) However, it does not “follow” at all. I see no logical connection between the majority’s discussion of degrees of crime, or its history lesson on grand and petty larceny (id. at pp. 693-694), and California’s test for necessarily included offenses. The inescapable circumstance remains that a defendant can commit robbery without committing grand theft. A charge of robbery necessarily includes theft, but not grand theft.
D. Anomalies of the Majority Holding
A finding that one offense is necessarily included in another has several ramifications. The whole structure of the law of included offenses functions *711smoothly if the lesser offense is truly included in the greater. It does not work if the lesser offense is necessarily included only by judicial decree, which is now the case with robbery and grand theft.
By statute, the charging allegation must “give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.” (§ 952.) Also by statute, a person may be convicted of a charged offense or any other offense that is “necessarily included” in a charged offense. (§ 1159.) These statutory provisions, and the defendant’s due process right to notice of the charges (People v. Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368-369), may be reconciled if, but only if, the lesser offense is truly included in the greater, i.e., if charging the greater charges all the elements of the lesser. By finding that grand theft is included in robbery, the majority has decreed that a person charged with robbery may be convicted instead of grand theft, not merely theft. Charging robbery puts a person on notice of the need to defend against theft. It does not, however, inform a person that the nature or amount of the property taken, or whether it is taken from the person rather than immediate presence, is at issue. It does not place a person on notice of grand theft.
If the evidence warrants, a court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a necessarily included offense. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) If doubt exists that a defendant used force or fear in committing a robbery, but the evidence would support a conviction of theft, the court might have to instruct on that necessarily included offense. But now the majority has decreed that grand theft is also necessarily included in robbery; the trial court now apparently has a sua sponte duty also to instruct on grand theft if the evidence warrants. This might surprise a defendant who was defending solely against the robbery charge and did not litigate the nature or value of the property taken. Defense attorneys will have to take note. Now a robbery charge also charges grand theft.4
By statute, when the verdict “is contrary to law or evidence,” the trial court may reduce the conviction to a lesser included offense. (§ 1181, subd. 6.) Similarly, an appellate court may reduce a conviction to a necessarily included offense. (Ibid.; see also § 1260; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) These rules are logical, and they comport with a person’s right to a jury trial, only if the lesser offense is *712truly included in the greater, i.e., if the jury verdict of guilt of the greater offense also necessarily finds guilt of all the elements of the lesser offense. Now the majority has decreed that a jury may not convict of both robbery and grand theft because grand theft is necessarily included in robbery. Accordingly, sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260 would seem to allow a trial or appellate court to reduce a robbery conviction to grand theft. But a jury finding of robbery does not necessarily find all the elements of grand theft. If, on the other hand, the majority should find it improper to reduce robbery to grand theft (because grand theft is not really included in robbery), that would mean a court could only reduce robbery to simple theft, even if the jury would have found the defendant guilty of grand theft if given the option.
The majority argues that a charge of a crime divided into degrees need not specify the degree. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 696.) However, to convict the defendant of the greater degree, the verdict must specify that degree. (§ 1157.) “Upon the failure of the jury or the court to [determine the degree], the degree of the crime ... of which the defendant is guilty, shall be deemed to be of the lesser degree.” (Ibid.) The majority has now decreed that a jury convicting the defendant of robbery may not also convict of grand theft. The majority thus precludes the jury from determining the degree of theft if it convicts of robbery. That being the case, I find it hard to see how section 1157 would permit a robbery conviction to be reduced to grand theft despite sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260. But this logic would mean that the court would prohibit the jury from determining the degree of theft and then conclude that, because the jury failed to make that determination, the theft was petty, not grand. Thus, a grand theft conviction would be forever lost, even though the jury believed the defendant guilty of that crime.
If the evidence supports a finding that the defendant has committed both robbery and grand theft, but triable issues exist regarding the use of force or fear (i.e., whether the defendant is guilty of robbery) and regarding the amount or nature of the property stolen or whether it was taken from the person (i.e., whether the defendant is guilty of grand theft), the jury should be able to return a verdict of guilty of robbery, or of grand theft, or of both, or of neither. The majority precludes these choices. If the jury finds the defendant guilty of robbery, the majority prohibits it from additionally choosing between petty and grand theft. I see no reason or statutory basis for this prohibition.5
The conclusion that grand theft is necessarily included in robbery despite the fact robbery can be committed without committing grand theft creates *713too many anomalies and is inconsistent with too many statutory provisions (§§ 952, 954, 1157, 1159, 1181, subd. 6, 1260) for me to agree.
II. Conviction of Robbery and Carjacking
As noted, I agree with the majority that defendants were properly convicted of both robbery and carjacking. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 700.) The specific language of section 215, subdivision (c), that the majority invokes supports this conclusion, but it is not the sole reason for it. The result would be the same even without that language.
Neither carjacking nor robbery is necessarily included in the other. It is possible to commit robbery without committing carjacking because robbery can be of any property, but carjacking requires the taking of a “motor vehicle.” (§ 215, subd. (a).) Robbery of a wallet, for example, is not carjacking. It is possible to commit carjacking without committing robbery for the same reason it is possible to commit carjacking without committing theft. (See maj. opn., ante, at. p. 693.) Robbery, like theft, requires the intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently. (2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against Property, § 645, p. 726.) Carjacking requires only the intent to take a vehicle “either permanently or temporarily.” (§ 215, subd. (a).) One may commit carjacking without committing robbery by taking a motor vehicle temporarily. Accordingly, conviction of both robbery and carjacking is proper. (People v. Green (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1083-1084 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 259]; People v. Antoine (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 489, 498 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 530]; People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 410, 419 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 153].)
Baxter, L, concurred.

 All statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

 Because the majority correctly rejects a fact-based test for included offenses, its quotation from People v. Marshall, supra, 48 Cal.2d at page 400, makes no sense. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 695 [“ ‘[T]he theft of an automobile ... is included in the offense of robbery by the taking of an automobile . . . .’”].) Given the right facts, one could say the same about almost any pair of crimes. One could say, for example, that insurance fraud is included in murder by means of insurance fraud. (Cf. the facts of People v. Superior Court (Shamis) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 833 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 388].) But grand theft is no more included in robbery than *710insurance fraud is included in murder unless, as in Marshall (and unlike this case), the charging document makes it so.

 Ironically, the paragraph in the Perkins text the majority cites also states, “The act of violence relied upon for conviction of robbery will not support a separate conviction of assault, or assault with a deadly weapon.” (Perkins, Criminal Law, supra, at p. 350.) This court has emphatically, and unanimously, rejected the argument that assault is necessarily included in robbery or that assault with a deadly weapon is necessarily included in robbery with a firearm use allegation. (People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 99-102 [192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520]; see also id. at pp. 112-113 (conc, and dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.).)

 My application of the rules of included offenses would create no “anomaly.” (Conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 703.) If the evidence warrants in a robbery case, the court would instruct the jury on the included offense of theft. The jury would not be forced to an all-or-nothing choice. The court would not also instruct on the related but not included offense of grand theft unless the prosecution charged it separately. This result is no more anomalous than that in People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073], where we held the court may refuse to instruct on the related but not included offense of trespass in addition to the charged offense of burglary.

 Justice Werdegar interprets the majority opinion as permitting a properly instructed jury to convict of both robbery and grand theft, with the grand theft conviction to be “set aside.” (Conc. opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 703.) I am not sure where that conviction would go when it is set aside—perhaps in limbo somewhere to be resurrected if the robbery conviction *713is later also set aside. While such a procedure seems awkward, to say the least, it would be preferable to allowing no grand theft conviction at all. Future courts will have to decide whether Justice Werdegar is correct.