Court Opinion

ID: 9721613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:03:16.985711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.692597
License: Public Domain

HOOVER, J.*
I must respectfully dissent.
It is a fundamental principle in California that the decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that the decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. (People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal.3d 156, 177 [127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843].) The trial court’s determination of the absence or existence of prejudice resulting from juror misconduct is a determination of fact. (People v. Cooper (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 844, 853 [157 Cal.Rptr. 348].)
The trial court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion for a new trial on October 16, 1984. In denying appellant’s motion for a new trial, the *858court reasoned that the actions of the particular juror did not amount to misconduct. The court noted that the “declaration filed, signed by Steven Dooley, the juror, is as notable for its lack of information as for the information it provides.” Since each juror indicated in voir dire some familiarity with the use of binoculars, the court analogized the situation to the one in Cooper. The court stated “based on the Cooper rationale that it would appear that this type of incident might have something to do with the subjective mental processes, this Court finds no error in the fact that the juror might have or did use the binoculars. . . . [f] . . . certainly wasn’t the generation of any new evidence, ...”
In a recent Court of Appeal decision, Second District, Locks ley v. Ungureanu (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 457 [223 Cal.Rptr. 737], the court held that a juror did not commit misconduct. In Locks ley, one of the issues concerned the peripheral vision of a driver blind in one eye. A juror in the case drove closing his left eye on two occasions and once drove all the way to the courthouse from his home with his left eye closed. He related this experience to the other jurors. The court stated, “At the outset, we note that it is not at all clear that Lang’s actions were an impermissible experiment and thus misconduct as the subject actions did not invade a new field but merely were an experiment on an issue within the evidence, to wit, the ability of a one-eyed individual to drive.” (Id., at p. 461.)
In the instant case it is important to note here that no evidence was presented to the effect that a person could not identify the defendant using binoculars.
The record further reflects that the verdict was rendered in open court on September 6. However, the foreman had signed and dated the form showing a guilty verdict on counts two (arson) and three (rioting) on September 5, 1984. The findings of guilt on the first count (destroying jail property) and the enhancement were signed and dated on September 6, 1984. The declaration indicates that the observations by Dooley took place after deliberations on September 5, 1984. While theoretically possible, the majority’s assertion that the verdicts could have been misdated is illogical given that the foreman nonetheless correctly dated the findings on the first count and the enhancement. The only reasonable inference is that the foreman dated and signed the form when the jury had agreed upon a verdict, i.e., September 5th as to counts two and three.
While I agree with the majority that there were no verdicts until they were announced in court and, further, that the jury could have changed its verdicts during deliberations on September 6, the plain facts indicate that nothing changed as a result of Dooley’s actions. Whatever he did, juror *859Dooley was apparently convinced beyond a reasonable doubt on September 5 and remained so even after looking through binoculars.
I do, however, support the majority in its suggestion that juries be preinstructed with an admonition identical or similar to BAJI No. 1.00.5 or CALJIC No. 1.03.

Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.