Court Opinion

ID: 9905820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:05:14.564551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:59.488534
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                 SUMMARY
                                                          November 30, 2023

                               2023COA112

No. 20CA1153, People v. Poot-Baca — Crimes — Identity Theft
— Criminal Possession of a Financial Device; Criminal Law —
Prosecution of Multiple Counts for Same Act — Lesser Included
Offenses

     A division of the court of appeals concludes that criminal

possession of a financial device, § 18-5-903(1), C.R.S. 2023, is not a

lesser included offense of identity theft, § 18-5-902(1)(a), C.R.S.

2023, under either section 18-1-408(5)(a), C.R.S. 2023, or section

18-1-408(5)(c). Because the division also rejects the defendant’s

other claims, the division affirms the judgment and restitution

order.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                         2023COA112

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1153
City and County of Denver District Court No. 19CR1327
Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher F. Poot-Baca,

Defendant-Appellant.

                      JUDGMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED

                                  Division IV
                         Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
                          Grove and Lum, JJ., concur

                        Announced November 30, 2023

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Elyse Marie Maranjian, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Defendant, Christopher F. Poot-Baca, appeals the judgment of

 conviction imposed on jury verdicts finding him guilty of robbery of

 an at-risk person, identity theft, and criminal possession of a

 financial device. He also appeals the district court’s restitution

 order. We affirm the judgment and order. In doing so, we hold that

 criminal possession of a financial device is not a lesser included

 offense of identity theft.

                  I.    Factual and Procedural History

¶2    On the night of January 14, 2019, eighty-one-year-old Minnie

 Sheppard was waiting at a bus stop when a man pushed her to the

 ground, took her purse and bag, and ran away. Police and

 paramedics arrived at the scene and transported Sheppard to the

 hospital, where she was diagnosed with a knee fracture.

¶3    While at the crime scene, Sheppard described her assailant’s

 physical appearance to the officers and said he had been drinking

 out of a Coca-Cola (Coke) bottle, which he dropped before attacking

 her. At the hospital, she clarified that it was actually a Coke can.

 An officer collected a Coke can from the crime scene, and a DNA

 sample taken from it matched that of Poot-Baca.

                                    1
¶4    Sheppard’s credit card, a Discover Card, was in her purse

 when it was stolen. The following day, three unauthorized charges

 were made online with the credit card. A few hours later, two men

 shopped at a Foot Locker store, and one tried to use her card. The

 transactions were declined, and the interaction was recorded on

 surveillance video. Poot-Baca was later arrested wearing a

 sweatshirt very similar to the one worn by the man in the

 surveillance video — a purple sweatshirt bearing an image of

 Marilyn Monroe.

¶5    The prosecution charged Poot-Baca with robbery of an at-risk

 adult, a crime of violence, identity theft, and criminal possession of

 a financial device. A jury convicted him as charged.

¶6    On appeal, Poot-Baca contends that the district court erred by

 (1) admitting evidence of Sheppard’s pretrial identification of him

 and her identification of him during trial; (2) failing to merge the

 possession of a financial device conviction with the identity theft

 conviction because the former is a lesser included offense of the

 latter; and (3) ordering restitution for uncharged conduct.

                                    2
                      II.    Identification Evidence

¶7    Poot-Baca contends that the district court erroneously

 admitted into evidence Sheppard’s identifications of him as the

 robber because they were the unreliable products of an

 impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure. We

 conclude, however, that any error was harmless beyond a

 reasonable doubt.

              A.     Standard of Review and Preservation

¶8    Because the admission of an unreliable identification of the

 defendant violates due process, People v. Martinez, 2015 COA 37,

 ¶ 11, and because Poot-Baca preserved the issue, we apply the

 constitutional harmless error standard to determine whether any

 error requires reversal. See id. at ¶ 10. “Under this standard, the

 prosecution must show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

 doubt.” Id. “If there is a reasonable possibility the error

 contributed to the conviction, we will reverse.” Id.

                            B.   Relevant Facts

¶9    Sheppard provided a description of the robber shortly after the

 incident, but she did not identify anyone as the robber when

                                     3
  presented with two photographic arrays of potential suspects, one

  of which included a photograph of Poot-Baca.

¶ 10   Before trial, the parties appeared in court for a deposition of

  Sheppard under section 18-6.5-103.5, C.R.S. 2023, premised on

  her at-risk status. The prosecution wished to preserve her

  testimony for presentation at trial if she was not available at the

  time of trial. See § 18-6.5-103.5(4). Defense counsel sought to

  waive Poot-Baca’s appearance at the deposition, but the prosecutor

  objected. The district court ruled that Poot-Baca had to attend the

  deposition because Sheppard’s deposition testimony might become

  a substitute for her trial testimony.

¶ 11   The prosecutor did not ask Sheppard to identify her assailant

  during the deposition. Immediately afterward, however, Sheppard

  spontaneously told the prosecution’s investigator that she

  recognized Poot-Baca as her assailant. Defense counsel moved to

  suppress this identification and any subsequent in-court

  identification. The court denied the motion, finding there was no

  “impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification procedure arranged

  by law enforcement” and “[t]he inherent suggestiveness of the

  courtroom setting [did] not rise to the level that requires the Court

                                     4
  to assess the identification for reliability under [Neil v.] Biggers[, 409

  U.S. 188 (1972)].”

¶ 12   Sheppard testified during the trial. The prosecutor asked her

  about recognizing Poot-Baca as the robber during the deposition.

  Sheppard confirmed that she had recognized him then, and she

  again identified him during trial as the man who had robbed her.

  Defense counsel extensively cross-examined Sheppard about the

  circumstances surrounding her identification of Poot-Baca, calling

  its reliability into question in light of those circumstances.

                               C.    Analysis

¶ 13   Poot-Baca contends that the district court erred by (1) denying

  his request to waive his presence at the deposition; (2) admitting

  Sheppard’s pretrial identification of him following the deposition

  because it was unreliable under the circumstances; and

  (3) admitting her subsequent in-court identification. We need not

  decide whether the court erred because any error was harmless in

  light of the other identification evidence admitted at trial and not

  challenged on appeal.

¶ 14   Most significantly, the prosecution admitted DNA evidence

  that identified Poot-Baca as the robber. Sheppard told officers

                                      5
  immediately after the robbery that the robber had been drinking a

  Coke product and had thrown the can on the ground at the bus

  stop. Officers retrieved the Coke can approximately twenty minutes

  later and found no other Coke cans at the bus stop. According to

  other trial evidence, a match for the DNA profile obtained from the

  can was “estimated to be at least 2 octillion times more likely if the

  sample originated from Christopher Poot-Baca than if it originated

  from one unknown unrelated person.” Based on this data, and in

  the absence of a showing that Poot-Baca had an identical twin, the

  evidence showed that the probability was greater than 99.9 percent

  that Poot-Baca was the source of the DNA on the Coke can.

¶ 15   At trial, Poot-Baca argued that the DNA evidence established

  only that he was in the area some time before the robbery. He

  presented somewhat vague evidence that he had attended

  appointments in the area near the bus stop and that he did not

  show up at an appointment on the day of the robbery. But that

  evidence did not actually place him at the bus stop previously or

  show that he took the bus on prior occasions. In any event, the fact

  that Sheppard saw the robber drinking out of the Coke can

                                     6
  immediately before the robbery firmly connected Poot-Baca to the

  robbery given the DNA evidence.1

¶ 16   Moreover, a still photo from an officer’s body camera footage

  recorded when the officer first responded to the scene supported

  Sheppard’s account. That photo shows a Coke can on a sidewalk.

  Photos taken by officers when they returned to the scene twenty

  minutes later also show a Coke can on the sidewalk. None of the

  photos depicts any other Coke cans. If Poot-Baca’s theory that he

  might have left the Coke can at the bus stop before the robbery

  were true, however, there should have been two Coke cans left at

  the bus stop: the can with his DNA as well as the one the robber

  left. But the police discovered only the Coke can with Poot-Baca’s

  DNA. Hence, to believe the defense theory, the jury would have had

  to find that, in the twenty minutes between the police’s first

  response to the scene and their second, someone removed the Coke

  can the robber threw on the ground and replaced it with a Coke can

  bearing Poot-Baca’s DNA. We do not discern a reasonable

  1 As noted, Sheppard first said it was a Coke bottle but clarified

  shortly thereafter that it was actually a Coke can. She consistently
  maintained that the robber drank from a Coke container, and no
  other Coke container was found at the crime scene.

                                     7
  possibility that the jury would have made this finding if only

  Sheppard’s identifications of Poot-Baca had not been admitted at

  trial.

¶ 17       Furthermore, the prosecution presented evidence that the

  person who tried to use Sheppard’s credit card at Foot Locker

  shortly after the robbery wore the same distinctive sweatshirt as

  Poot-Baca wore when he was arrested a month later. That is, the

  evidence showed that Poot-Baca possessed Sheppard’s credit card

  taken during the robbery and attempted to use it the next day.

¶ 18       As a result, the prosecution presented overwhelming evidence

  that Poot-Baca was the robber, independent of Sheppard’s

  identifications of him. Given this other evidence identifying him as

  the culprit, we conclude that the guilty verdicts were surely

  unattributable to the alleged error in admitting Sheppard’s

  identifications. Therefore, the alleged error was harmless beyond a

  reasonable doubt. See Martinez, ¶ 15 (holding that, given the

  substantial evidence that the defendant was the person whom the

  victim saw trying to break into her home, which was independent of

  the victim’s identification of him during a show-up procedure, any

  error in admitting the identification evidence was harmless beyond

                                      8
  a reasonable doubt); see also People v. Singley, 2015 COA 78M,

  ¶ 34 (“[C]onsidering the extensive evidence of Singley’s guilt, we

  conclude that any error by the trial court in implicitly concluding

  that J.A.C.’s out-of-court identification was reliable under the

  totality of the circumstances was harmless beyond a reasonable

  doubt.”); People v. Houser, 2013 COA 11, ¶ 56 (“[W]e further

  conclude that overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt rendered

  this error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

                          III.   Double Jeopardy

¶ 19   Poot-Baca next contends that criminal possession of a

  financial device is a lesser included offense of identity theft. As a

  result, he says, the district court erred by not merging his

  conviction for criminal possession of a financial device with his

  conviction for identity theft. We disagree.

                         A.      General Principles

¶ 20   To the extent Poot-Baca’s claim presents a question of

  statutory construction, we review it de novo. People v. Kern, 2020

  COA 96, ¶ 31. In interpreting a statute, our task is “to ascertain

  and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent.” Id. We begin with

  the statute’s plain language, examining “the statutory design as a

                                      9
  whole” and “giving effect to the language of each provision and

  harmonizing apparent conflicts where possible.” Id. We read the

  statute’s language in context and construe the words and phrases

  according to their common usage. Id.

¶ 21   We also review de novo whether a conviction violates the

  constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. at ¶ 26.

  Because Poot-Baca did not preserve this claim, we may reverse only

  if plain error occurred. Id.

¶ 22   The United States and Colorado Constitutions forbid imposing

  multiple punishments for the same offense if the legislature has not

  authorized multiple punishments. Id. at ¶ 27. When a defendant’s

  conduct establishes the commission of more than one offense, the

  defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. Id.; see § 18-1-

  408(1), C.R.S. 2023. “If one offense is included in the other,

  however, the defendant may not be convicted of both.” Kern, ¶ 27;

  see § 18-1-408(1)(a).

                          B.   The Offenses at Issue

¶ 23   As relevant here, a person commits identity theft if the person

  “[k]nowingly uses the personal identifying information, financial

  identifying information, or financial device of another without

                                     10
  permission or lawful authority with the intent to obtain cash, credit,

  property, services, or any other thing of value or to make a financial

  payment.” § 18-5-902(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. As charged in this case,

  identity theft is a class 4 felony. § 18-5-902(2).

¶ 24   “A person commits criminal possession of a financial device if

  the person has in his or her possession or under his or her control

  any financial device that the person knows, or reasonably should

  know, to be lost, stolen, or delivered under mistake as to the

  identity or address of the account holder.” § 18-5-903(1), C.R.S.

  2023. As charged here, this offense is a class 2 misdemeanor.

  § 18-5-903(2)(a).

¶ 25   A “financial device” includes a credit card. § 18-5-901(6)(a),

  C.R.S. 2023.

                       C.    Section 18-1-408(5)(a)

¶ 26   Poot-Baca argues that criminal possession of a financial device

  is a lesser included offense of identity theft under section 18-1-

  408(5)(a) (subsection 408(5)(a)). Pursuant to that provision, one

  offense is included in another charged offense when “[i]t is

  established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required

  to establish the commission of the offense charged.” § 18-1-

                                     11
  408(5)(a); see also Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 51. This

  test requires a court to “compare the elements of the statutes rather

  than the specific evidence used to sustain the charges in a

  particular case.” People v. Welborne, 2018 COA 127, ¶ 8.

¶ 27   Under our supreme court’s interpretation of subsection

  408(5)(a), “an offense is a lesser included offense of another offense

  if the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of

  the greater offense, such that the lesser offense contains only

  elements that are also included in the elements of the greater

  offense.” Reyna-Abarca, ¶ 64. Our supreme court has since refined

  this “subset” test to clarify that there are two ways for an offense to

  be included in another for purposes of subsection 408(5)(a). See

  People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶ 16; Page v. People, 2017 CO 88,

  ¶¶ 10-11; see also Kern, ¶ 28; Welborne, ¶¶ 11-12.

¶ 28   First, a lesser offense is included in the greater offense when

  there are multiple ways to commit the greater and proof of the

  commission of at least one of those ways necessarily proves

  commission of the lesser. Kern, ¶ 28; Page, ¶ 10. Second, an

  offense may be included in another under the statutory elements

  test when there are multiple ways to commit the lesser, not all of

                                    12
  which are included within the greater. Kern, ¶ 28; Page, ¶ 11.

  Under those circumstances, “[a]ny set of elements sufficient for

  commission of that lesser offense that is necessarily established by

  establishing the statutory elements of a greater offense constitutes

  an included offense.” Welborne, ¶ 12 (quoting Rock, ¶ 16).

¶ 29   Criminal possession of a financial device does not qualify as a

  lesser included offense of identity theft under either test because

  criminal possession of a financial device has at least one element

  not included in identity theft. Specifically, the offense of criminal

  possession of a financial device requires proof that the defendant

  knew, or reasonably should have known, that the financial device

  was “lost, stolen, or delivered under mistake as to the identity or

  address of the account holder.” § 18-5-903(1). The offense of

  identity theft premised on use of a financial device does not include

  this element. See § 18-5-902(1). Hence, proving the elements of

  identity theft does not necessarily establish the elements of criminal

  possession of a financial device.

¶ 30   To elaborate, the offense of identity theft premised on the use

  of another person’s financial device requires proof that the

  defendant knowingly used the device “without permission or lawful

                                      13
  authority.” Id. Proof that the defendant knowingly used the

  financial device without permission or lawful authority does not

  necessarily prove that the defendant knew, or should have known,

  that the device was lost, stolen, or delivered under mistake. For

  instance, consider the following hypothetical: Person A asks

  Person B to hold onto their credit card but instructs them not to

  use it. Person B then uses the card to purchase something without

  receiving permission from Person A. Person B would know that the

  card was not lost, stolen, or misdelivered; so Person B could not be

  convicted of criminal possession of a financial device. See § 18-5-

  903(1)(a). But Person B could be guilty of identity theft because

  they used the credit card without permission or lawful authority.

  See § 18-5-902(1).

¶ 31   In sum, because proof of identity theft does not necessarily

  establish criminal possession of a financial device, criminal

  possession is not a lesser included offense under subsection

  408(5)(a). Cf. Kern, ¶ 35 (holding that, because a person could

  commit the offense of throwing a missile without also committing

  the offense of littering, littering was not a lesser included offense);

  Page, ¶ 19 (concluding that establishing the elements of sexual

                                     14
  assault by means of penetration necessarily established the

  elements of unlawful sexual contact because there was no way to

  commit sexual assault without also committing unlawful sexual

  contact).

                        D.   Section 18-1-408(5)(c)

¶ 32   Alternatively, Poot-Baca says the lesser offense was included

  in the greater under section 18-1-408(5)(c) (subsection 408(5)(c)).

  Under that provision, an offense is included in another if “[i]t differs

  from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious

  injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public

  interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its

  commission.” § 18-1-408(5)(c). Our supreme court has recently

  explained that an offense is included in another under this

  provision if it differs from the offense charged only in the respect

  that “(1) a less serious injury or risk of injury, a lesser kind of

  culpability, or both a less serious injury or risk of injury and a

  lesser kind of culpability suffice to establish its commission; and

  (2) no other distinctions exist.” Pellegrin v. People, 2023 CO 37,

  ¶ 34. If any other distinctions exist, subsection 408(5)(c) does not

  apply. Id.

                                     15
¶ 33   Poot-Baca contends that subsection 408(5)(c) applies because

  the only distinction between the two offenses is that there is a “less

  serious injury/risk of injury to the same cardholder” in criminal

  possession of a financial device. We disagree because other

  distinctions between the offenses exist.

¶ 34   First, the two offenses punish different conduct. Criminal

  possession of a financial device prohibits the possession itself, while

  identity theft prohibits the use of the financial device. See §§ 18-5-

  903(1), 18-5-902(1)(a). Although use necessarily includes

  possession, that does not mean the prohibited conduct is the same.

  To illustrate, we note that the supreme court in Pellegrin compared

  a stalking statute that prohibited repeatedly “following,

  approaching, contacting, surveilling, or communicating” to a

  harassment statute that prohibited only a single improper

  communication. Pellegrin, ¶ 40. The supreme court concluded that

  the statutes “punish different conduct.” Id. In doing so, the

  supreme court rejected application of the “subset test” to

  subsection 408(5)(c). See id. at ¶¶ 42-45.

¶ 35   Second, the statutes protect different things. Criminal

  possession of a financial device protects only financial devices, see

                                    16
  § 18-5-903(1), while identity theft is broader because it also

  protects personal identifying information and financial identifying

  information, see § 18-5-902(1)(a). Although a financial device is

  included in both statutes, the difference between the statutes

  matters for purposes of subsection 408(5)(c). See Pellegrin, ¶ 39

  (concluding that subsection 408(5)(c) did not apply because the

  stalking statute protected both a specific person and a member of

  that person’s immediate family, or someone with whom that person

  has or has had a continuing relationship, while the harassment

  statute protected only a single specific person).

¶ 36   Accordingly, we conclude that criminal possession of a

  financial device is not a lesser included offense of identity theft

  under subsection 408(5)(c). For all the reasons we have discussed,

  therefore, the district court did not err by failing to merge Poot-

  Baca’s convictions for those two offenses.

                             IV.   Restitution

¶ 37   Poot-Baca contends the district court erred by ordering him to

  pay restitution to Discover Card for losses resulting from

  transactions that he was not convicted of executing. Because

                                     17
  sufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that he was the

  proximate cause of those losses, we disagree.

                         A.   Standard of Review

¶ 38   We review de novo whether a court has the authority to

  impose restitution. People v. Roddy, 2021 CO 74, ¶ 23; see also

  People v. Moss, 2022 COA 92, ¶ 8. Some disagreement exists,

  however, as to the appropriate standard of review for assessing

  whether sufficient evidence supports a restitution order. See People

  v. Babcock, 2023 COA 49, ¶ 17 (“We note, however, that the

  appropriate standard of review is far from clear.”). Some divisions

  of this court have applied de novo review, while others have

  reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Moss, ¶ 9 (applying de

  novo review); People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 15 (applying de

  novo review); People v. Martinez, 2022 COA 28, ¶ 14 (applying abuse

  of discretion review) (cert. granted Oct. 24, 2022).

¶ 39   Even when reviewing de novo, however, our review is

  deferential to the district court’s finding that the defendant was the

  proximate cause of the claimed loss. Under that standard, an

  appellate court “review[s] the record de novo to determine whether

  the evidence was sufficient in both quantity and quality to support

                                    18
  a restitution award.” Babcock, ¶ 18. We evaluate whether the

  evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole

  and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, establishes by a

  preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the loss.

  Id.; see also Barbre, ¶ 25. “[W]e will not disturb a district court’s

  findings and conclusions if the record supports them, even though

  reasonable people might arrive at different conclusions based on the

  same facts.” Babcock, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). That is, our review is

  limited to “whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to

  convince a reasonable fact finder by a preponderance of the

  evidence of the amount of restitution owed.” Id. (citation omitted).

  Given the deferential nature of de novo review in this context and

  because the outcome here would be the same under any standard

  of review, we apply de novo review as Poot-Baca requests.2

                           B.    Relevant Facts

¶ 40   Poot-Baca was convicted of robbery for taking Sheppard’s

  purse and bag by force on January 14, 2019. He was convicted of

  committing identity theft and possession of a financial device based

  2 The People decline to take a position on the proper standard of

  review.

                                     19
  on actions on January 15 involving the Discover Card that had

  been in her purse. The prosecution sought restitution in the

  amount of $2,651.90 to reimburse the Crime Victims’

  Compensation Board and Discover Card. Poot-Baca objected to the

  $102.40 requested for Discover Card’s losses, which represented

  purchases from various vendors (none of which was Foot Locker).

¶ 41   At the restitution hearing, Poot-Baca argued that the losses

  incurred by Discover Card were not proximately caused by his

  conduct because the identity theft and criminal possession of a

  financial device convictions were based only on evidence that he

  used the credit card to attempt a purchase at Foot Locker, which

  was declined. His argument was rooted in defense counsel’s

  request during trial that the prosecutor elect which transaction

  formed the basis for the identity theft charge, given that the same

  credit card was affiliated with multiple transactions on the same

  day. The prosecutor elected to rely on the evidence related to Foot

  Locker to support the identity theft count. Although neither the

  jury instructions nor the verdict forms limited any count to the Foot

  Locker evidence, the prosecutor in closing argument relied on that

                                   20
  evidence to support both the identity theft and the criminal

  possession of a financial device counts.

¶ 42   The court rejected Poot-Baca’s argument and awarded the

  restitution amount requested by the prosecution. The court found

  as follows:

                [B]ut for [Poot-Baca] setting these wheels in
                motion there wouldn’t have been a loss, and
                there isn’t any real significant proof of any
                intervening cause that would offset that, and
                so I find that the People have met their burden
                of proving the restitution that is — is against
                Mr. Poot-Baca in the amount of two thousand
                six hundred and fifty-one dollars and ninety
                cents. That includes the Victims Comp Fund
                and the — the amount owed to Discover Card
                in this case . . . .

                              C.   Relevant Law

¶ 43   A person found guilty of criminal conduct must “make full

  restitution to those harmed by their misconduct.” § 18-1.3-

  601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023. Restitution “means any pecuniary loss

  suffered by a victim . . . proximately caused by an offender’s

  conduct . . . that can be reasonably calculated and recompensed in

  money.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 44   Proximate cause in the context of restitution is “a cause which

  in natural and probable sequence produced the claimed loss and

                                      21
  without which the claimed loss would not have been sustained.”

  Moss, ¶ 12. “The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the

  evidence that the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the

  victim’s loss and the amount of that loss.” Babcock, ¶ 19.

¶ 45   Generally, a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution

  for losses unless they stem from the conduct that was the basis of

  the conviction. Moss, ¶ 13. “Consequently, a district court may not

  award restitution for damages arising from criminal conduct (1) of

  which the defendant was acquitted; (2) for which the defendant was

  never criminally charged; or (3) which underlies a dismissed

  charge.” Id. (citations omitted).

                             D.   Application

¶ 46   Poot-Baca argues that he cannot be ordered to pay restitution

  to Discover Card because Discover Card’s losses did not result from

  his conduct underlying his convictions for identity theft or criminal

  possession of a financial device. Even if we accept the premise that

  Discover Card’s losses cannot be tied to those convictions, however,

  we reject Poot-Baca’s claim because those losses can be tied to his

  robbery conviction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

  to the prosecution, we conclude that it adequately supports the

                                      22
  district court’s finding that Poot-Baca’s robbery proximately caused

  $102.40 in losses to Discover Card.

¶ 47   As noted, the jury found that Poot-Baca robbed Sheppard by

  forcibly taking her purse, which contained her Discover card. The

  evidence of this robbery permitted the district court to reasonably

  find that his taking the credit card produced, in a natural and

  probable sequence, the unauthorized use of the card. This

  consequence was foreseeable even though the robbery offense itself

  did not require proof that Poot-Baca used the taken property to

  another’s financial detriment. See id. at ¶ 18 (rejecting the

  defendant’s claim that “restitution must be directly related to an

  element of the crimes for which she was convicted,” concluding

  instead that restitution “must be tied to unlawful conduct for which

  a defendant was convicted”).

¶ 48   Moreover, the evidence did not compel the court to find an

  intervening cause that interfered with the natural and probable

  sequence of events. See People v. Clay, 74 P.3d 473, 475 (Colo.

  App. 2003) (defining an intervening cause). The evidence permitted

  a finding that Poot-Baca took the card from Sheppard on

  January 14, and he possessed the card after the January 15 credit

                                    23
  card transactions at issue. His attempted purchase with the card

  at Foot Locker occurred around 2 p.m. on January 15. All three

  Discover transactions at issue were made on January 15 before

  2:00 p.m. The fact that Poot-Baca possessed the card shortly after

  those three transactions supported the court’s finding that there

  was not an intervening cause of the losses. That is, the evidence

  supported the finding that Poot-Baca took the credit card the night

  of January 14 and still had it around 2:00 p.m. on January 15.

  Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show that Poot-Baca’s

  conduct in robbing Sheppard of the credit card was the proximate

  cause of the unauthorized credit card purchases made within that

  timeframe. See People v. Jaeb, 2018 COA 179, ¶ 50 (“[E]ven if we

  assume that the trailer was damaged by the police, the damage was

  the natural and probable consequence of defendant’s theft and

  would not have occurred but for his actions.”).

¶ 49   Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that Poot-Baca

  was the proximate cause of Discover Card’s losses.

                            V.   Conclusion

¶ 50   The judgment and order are affirmed.

       JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE LUM concur.

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