Court Opinion

ID: 9883849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:22:24.996291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.198199
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
concurring on rehearing on court’s motion.
I join the en banc majority opinion, but also write separately to address Justice Cohen’s dissenting opinion that raises two important issues: (1) whether the doctrine of fundamental error may be applied to excuse the failure to object to erroneous statements of a trial court; and (2) whether the standard for reviewing harm is that applicable to “constitutional” or “other” error.
Fundamental Error
The dissenting opinion apparently relies on a split of authority, between three Court of Criminal Appeals eases decided prior to 1980 and one decided after 1980, to allow it the freedom of choice on the issue of whether the trial court’s comments constituted fundamental error. The dissenting opinion relies on the recent reenactment of rule of evidence 103(d) by the Court of Criminal Appeals to tip the scales in favor of applying fundamen*815tal error in this case. I respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion’s conclusion based on: (1) the reason for the doctrine of fundamental error; (2) post-1980 developments in appellate review, making fundamental error no longer necessary; (3) the irrelevance of the reenactment of rule 103(d) to the issue presented here; and (4) the recent trend to abolish fundamental error in several areas.
A. Rationale
Fundamental error is error that an appellate court reviews in the absence of a trial objection. The rationale for this practice is the concern that an accused has been denied a fair trial by error to which defense counsel at trial did not timely and properly object.
B. No Longer Necessary
With the advent of the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel in the early 1980’s, and its escalating use since, there is no longer a need for the doctrine of fundamental error. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) firmly established ineffective assistance of counsel as a means for appellate defense attorneys to circumvent the lack of a trial objection to obtain review of errors that deprived an accused of a fair trial.
C. Rule 103(d)
The dissenting opinion disregards the State’s reliance on Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) as not controlling this case because Cockrell dealt with improper jury argument error. Here, the error stems from the trial court’s statements during jury selection. Nevertheless, the majority opinion relies on a rule of evidence which applies only to erroneous rulings on evidence. Texas Rule of Evidence 103 is titled “Rulings on Evidence.”
D. Recent Trend
During the 1970’s, Texas criminal jurisprudence experienced a marked rise in the application of the doctrine of fundamental error. There was abundant fundamental error found in the indictment, in the jury charge, and elsewhere. A combination of legislation and judicial correction has largely eliminated the doctrine. The fact that the dissenting opinion’s reliance on pre-1980 opinions from the court of criminal appeals, while post-1980 authority from that court is to the contrary, illustrates the recent trend against application of the doctrine of fundamental error.
E.Summary
Having considered the rationale for fundamental error, and the wane in its application concurrent with the rise of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, I am convinced that the majority opinion is correct in following the recent trend and not applying the doctrine of fundamental error to this case.
Standard for Reviewing Harm
Based on the statement that the error in this case is of constitutional magnitude, involving the right to be tried before an impartial tribunal, the dissenting opinion concludes that the standard of reviewing the error in this case is that in rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. I respectfully disagree from the dissenting opinion’s conclusion based on an analysis of the new rules of appellate procedure and the nature of appellant’s complaint before this Court.
A. The New Rules
The new rules of appellate procedure set out two alternative standards for determining if error is reversible:
(a) Constitutional Error. If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.
(b) Other Errors. Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.
Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a), (b). No case appears yet to have analyzed thoroughly what constitutes constitutional, as opposed to other, er*816ror. I suggest that constitutional error is a direct violation of a constitutional mandate; anything else is “other error.” Ineffective assistance of counsel illustrates the distinction.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the accused in all criminal prosecutions the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Thus, to deny an accused the right to counsel is a direct violation of the constitutional mandate, or constitutional error. Rule 44.2(a) would govern the determination of whether such error was reversible.
On the other hand, ineffective assistance of counsel certainly involves the constitutional right to counsel, i.e., it is of constitutional magnitude. Yet, the United States Supreme Court has established that such error is reviewed under a standard more similar to our rule 44.2(b) (other error) than to our rule 44.2(a) (constitutional error). The denial of the effective assistance of counsel is reversible only where the accused establishes there is a probability that the result of the trial would have been different absent the deficient conduct of trial counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
To construe “constitutional” error as any error involving a constitutional right, or any error of constitutional magnitude, encompasses every error imaginable. For example, there is a constitutional right to due process of law. Any violation of a rule or statute could be viewed as violating due process. Hence, all error would be “constitutional” error.
Rule 44.2(a) is taken directly from former rule 81(b)(2) which was the standard imposed by the United States Supreme Court for violations of federal constitutional law. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). It is, therefore, appropriate to limit the application of rule 44.2(a) to direct violations of constitutional provisions.
B. Nature of Appellate Complaint
Here, appellant’s brief raised the issue, not in terms of a violation of a constitutional mandate to be tried by an impartial tribunal, but in terms of the trial court making improper comments that, because of the trial court’s authoritative position, prejudiced the jurors against appellant and his counsel. While the manner in which an appellant raises the issue on appeal should not be determinative, it is revealing where, as here, the point of error is not expressly stated in terms of a direct violation of a constitutional provision.
Like violations of due process, a great many alleged errors on appeal can be articulated in terms that they caused the jury to be prejudiced and, thus, not impartial. Any distinction between constitutional error and other error would vanish because all error would be constitutional error.
C. Summary
Having analyzed the difference between constitutional error and other error in the new rules of appellate procedure’s standards for determining reversible error, I would narrowly define constitutional error as a direct violation of a constitutional provision. I would hold the error in this case is other error. Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the dissenting opinion’s conclusion that the error in this case was constitutional.
Conclusion
With this additional explanation, I join the en bane majority opinion.