Court Opinion

ID: 9783713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:04:05.150051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:33.932508
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot join the majority opinion for several reasons. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s statements that
even assuming that the infractions that led to these conditions of community supervision [periods of incarceration] serve in part as the same foundation that supports the State’s petition for revocation, we conclude that there is no double jeopardy issue. Indeed, under Texas law a trial court can impose jail-time conditions “for any reason and perhaps for no reason” at “any time during the supervision period” and not credit that time to a sentence suspension that is eventually revoked; thus, we hold that a trial court does not err by imposing conditions of jail time for violations of community supervision and also finding true that these violations occurred for revocation purposes.1
I do not understand what this means. Does it mean that it is permissible to confine a probationer for no reason because she will not get credit against her sentence anyway? When a person is placed on community supervision, that person does not remove herself from constitutional protections to become a person subject to the whims and caprices of the trial judge.2 In determining whether a person previously placed on community supervision will suffer incarceration through revocation, a trial court is bound by constitutional guarantees of due process:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes procedural and substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation. Probationers have an obvious interest in retaining their conditional liberty. The State also has an interest in ensuring that revocation proceedings are based on accurate findings of fact and the informed exercise of discretion, which avoid the unnecessary interruption of a successful effort at rehabilitation and provide for the safety of the community. In Morrissey v. Brewer [408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ], the United States Supreme Court held that due process applies to parole revocations. Commenting on the condition of one on parole, the Court noted:
Though the State properly subjects him to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens, his condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. He may have been on parole for a number of years and may be living a relatively normal life at the time he is faced with revocation. The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. In many cases, the parolee faces lengthy incarceration if his parole is revoked.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court held that the procedures outlined in Morrissey for parole revocation should also apply to probation proceedings.
To meet the requirements of due process, the final revocation of probation must be preceded by a hearing, where the probationer is entitled to written notice of the claimed violations of his *537probation, disclosure of the evidence against him, an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, a neutral hearing body, and a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. As we said in Ex parte Hale [117 S.W.3d 866 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) ], “the Constitution of our country has been interpreted to protect persons who are released (on community supervision), from rein-carceration without due process of law.”
Accordingly, due process requires that reincarceration occur only after the disclosure of evidence against the defendant. Within this right to disclosure of evidence afforded by due process, we can infer the requirement that revocation may not occur when it is based solely on perjured testimony. Because habeas review is appropriate for denials of fundamental or constitutional rights, the applicant’s claim that his community supervision was revoked solely on perjured evidence, and therefore without due process of law, is cognizable under the habeas jurisdiction of this court.3
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”4 The touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.5 Accordingly, no State may deprive any person of the conditional liberty created by community supervision unless the State employs procedures that are fundamentally fair.6 In particular, where, as in Texas, the factfinder, if it finds a violation of the conditions of community supervision, nevertheless has discretion to continue the community supervision, the probationer “is entitled [by due process] to an opportunity to show not only that he did not violate the conditions [of his probation], but also that there was a justifiable excuse for any violation or that revocation is not the appropriate disposition.” 7
It is well established that
Texas law gives a trial court “broad discretion” in creating community supervision conditions. Specifically, “[t]he judge may impose any reasonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant.” But the court’s discretion is limited. If a trial court imposes an invalid condition, an appellate court may delete it from the trial court’s judgment.
A condition of probation is invalid if it has all three of the following characteristics:
(1) it has no relationship to the crime;
(2) it relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal; and
(3) it forbids or requires conduct that is not reasonably related to the future criminality of the defendant or does not serve the statutory ends of probation.
A community supervision “condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects [the defendant’s] ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights.” A condition that is “reasonably related to the purposes of probation” is permis*538sible. “Reasonably related” hinges on three factors: “(1) the purposes sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to which constitutional rights enjoyed by law-abiding citizens should be accorded to probationers; and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”8
As this court has explained, “[T]he trial court’s broad authority to create community supervision terms does not extend to imposing terms that violate a defendant’s constitutional rights as balanced with the goals of the defendant’s probation.”9 Surely liberty is a fundamental constitutionally protected right. When a trial court amends a defendant’s conditions of community supervision, the trial court must act within constitutional boundaries. When a trial court orders incarceration as a condition of community supervision, the record must show that the condition is reasonably based on the conduct of the defendant and the aims of community supervision and that the defendant’s constitutional rights of notice, rebuttal and explanation, objection, and representation by counsel were not abridged.
When a trial court imposes conditions of community supervision, whether as original conditions or pursuant to amendment, a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to challenge them. If the defendant is not given an opportunity to object when the condition is imposed, there is no forfeiture of the complaint, and the defendant may raise that complaint for the first time on appeal.10
A defendant is entitled to be represent ed by counsel at sentencing because substantial rights of a defendant can be affected at sentencing.11 It follows, then, that a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel when conditions of community supervision are amended to make them more onerous because the defendant’s substantial rights of liberty, payment of restitution, or preservation of a complaint that may invalidate the amendment or affect the trial court’s ability to revoke community supervision are affected.12
This court has previously addressed the issue of revocation of community supervision on a ground already heard and ruled on by the trial court before the revocation hearing. In Rains v. State, we held that it was a denial of due process to hear an allegation of a violation of community supervision and continue the defendant on community supervision but later revoke the community supervision on the basis of the violation previously considered.13 We quoted Rogers v. State,14 an opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
The probationer who has been returned to probation after a hearing regardless of the procedural label, retains the valuable liberty of probation and the due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment (of the United States Constitution) and (article I) Section 19 (of the Texas Constitution).
This protection includes the fundamental requirement that the probation, recently returned, not be taken away *539arbitrarily ... [.] It would be the epitome of arbitrariness for a court first to conduct a hearing on alleged violations and exercise its discretion to return the probationer to probation (whether by a ‘continuance of the hearing ’ or by a ‘continuance of the probation ’), and then decide several months later to exercise its discretion in the opposite fashion by revoking the probation without any determination of a new violation. (Emphasis added.)15
The Rogers court had held
that by his actions and oral instructions modifying the conditions of probation, the trial judge exercised his discretion and determined to continue appellant’s probation on June 26,1980; having done so, he was without authority to revoke appellant’s probation on September 26, 1980 in the absence of allegations and proof of a subsequent violation. Appellant was therefore denied his right to due process of law. The order revoking his probation is set aside and the cause is remanded.16
Since article 42.12, section 21(b) of the code of criminal procedure was clarified, it is undisputed that when a violation of a condition of community supervision is alleged and heard by the trial court, there are only four things a trial court can do. Article 42.12, section (21)(b) provides,
At any time during the period of community supervision the judge may issue a warrant for violation of any of the conditions of the community supervision and cause the defendant to be arrested. Any supervision officer, police officer or other officer with power of arrest may arrest such defendant with or without a warrant upon the order of the judge to be noted on the docket of the court. A defendant so arrested may be detained in the county jail or other appropriate place of confinement until he can be taken before the judge. Such officer shall forthwith report such arrest and detention to such judge. If the defendant has not been released on bail, on motion by the defendant the judge shall cause the defendant to be brought before the judge for a hearing within 20 days of filing of said motion, and after a hearing without a jury, may either continue, extend, modify, or revoke the community supervision,17
Once the trial court has either continued, extended, modified, or revoked the community supervision, the trial court is precluded from further action regarding that allegation. The trial court may not subsequently revoke community supervision based on the allegation that previously resulted in the trial court’s continuing, extending, or modifying community supervision.
In the case now before this court, although we do not know why the trial court imposed the jail-time conditions in October and December 2008, the majority bases its holding on the trial court’s discretion to amend the conditions of probation to impose jail time at any time during the supervision period “for any reason and perhaps for no reason.”18 And, according to the majority, it is of no import that Appellant was revoked for the very reasons for which she was incarcerated in October and December because she is not entitled to credit for the time that she was incarcerated as a condition of community supervi*540sion. Apparently it is also of no import that Appellant’s community supervision was revoked while she was in jail for the December incarceration condition. What new violation did she commit while she was in jail? Apparently, that also is of no import because under the majority’s holding, despite contrary and controlling precedent, the trial court can act as arbitrarily and capriciously as the trial court chooses.
Respectfully, I suggest that the majority misunderstands the concept of due process. A defendant is entitled to due process whenever his or her liberty is in jeopardy. Did the trial court afford Appellant a hearing before the October and December incarcerations? Did she have notice of the accusations against her? Was she given notice of the hearings so that she could be present at any hearings? Did she have counsel?
In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her community supervision, Appellant has couched her arguments as double jeopardy violations and insufficiency claims. If the majority bases its decision on the fact that Appellant calls her argument a double jeopardy as opposed to a due process violation, the majority allows form to triumph over substance and, additionally, sets the stage for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant also raises a sufficiency claim, and she argues here, as she did below, that she was unable to pay the November community supervision fees because she had lost her job when she was incarcerated in October. The law is well established in Texas that
[a]t a community supervision revocation hearing, the inability to pay restitution is an affirmative defense for a defendant to prove. Once the issue of inability to pay is raised, the burden of proof shifts to the State to prove that appellant’s failure to pay was intentional.19
The State' offered no evidence to challenge Appellant’s testimony of inability to pay. The State must prove its allegations, including ability to pay, by a preponderance of the evidence.
Additionally, the majority states that Appellant cannot claim credit for the time that she was in jail as a condition of community supervision because the trial court is not required to award the credit, relying on article 42.03, section (2)(a) of the code of criminal procedure.20 But the trial court gave her credit for time served: “They do run concurrently, and you get credit on the sentences for the time that you have already served in custody.” It is well established that in a criminal case, unlike a civil case, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the written judgment:
A trial court’s pronouncement of sentence is oral, while the judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment of that oral pronouncement. When the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls.21
For all the reasons discussed above, I must respectfully dissent.

. Majority op. at 533.

. See Ex parte Dangelo, 339 S.W.3d 143, 148— 49 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g).

.Ex parte Carmona, 185 S.W.3d 492, 495-96 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (citations omitted).

. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1763, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Webb v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 442, 278 S.W.2d 158, 160 (1955).

. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 610, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985).

. Id. at 612, 105 S.Ct. at 2258.

. Briseño v. State, 293 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (citations omitted).

. Dangelo, 339 S.W.3d at 148-49 (citations omitted).

. Rickels v. State, 108 S.W.3d 900, 902 (Tex. Crim.App.2003).

. Casey v. State, 924 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Tex. Crim.App.1996).

. See id.

. Rains v. State, 678 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, pet. ref’d).

. 640 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).

. Rains, 678 S.W.2d at 310 (quoting Rogers, 640 S.W.2d at 252).

. Rogers, 640 S.W.2d at 251.

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(b) (Vernon Supp.2010) (emphasis added).

. Majority op. at 533.

. Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (citations omitted).

. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 2(a) (Vernon Supp.2010).

.Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (citation omitted).