Court Opinion

ID: 9945776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 16:04:42.595283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.987664
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-0039
                  _____________________________

JENNIFER M. MATTINGLY and
CHARLES T. MATTINGLY,

    Appellants,

    v.

LISA HATFIELD,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Barbara K. Hobbs, Judge.

                         February 28, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

     This appeal arises out of the parents’ attempt to block a
grandparent’s visitation with their minor child. The parents
challenge several trial court rulings in five issues raised on appeal.
We reject each of these challenges, but write to explain why we are
affirming the judgment dismissing the petition to modify
grandparent visitation.

                                  I

   Appellants Jennifer M. Mattingly (“Mother”) and Charles T.
Mattingly (“Father”) are the biological parents of E.M.M, born in
Kentucky, where all parties lived in February 2009. Appellee Lisa
Hatfield (“Grandmother”) is the maternal grandmother of E.M.M.
The litigation began in Kentucky.

     The relationship between the Mother and Grandmother was
deteriorating by 2013. At that time, the family still lived in
Kentucky and recognized a “tradition” of Wednesday evening
visitations between the Grandmother and E.M.M. When the
Mother stopped allowing these visits, the Grandmother petitioned
for grandparent visitation in Kentucky.

     In 2014, the Kentucky trial court granted the Grandmother’s
petition and ordered visitation for several specific time periods. To
support its order, the Kentucky court found by clear and
convincing evidence that grandparent visitation was in E.M.M.’s
best interests because the Grandmother was E.M.M.’s primary
babysitter and they spent a substantial amount of time together.
However, the court noted that the case was filled with
manipulation on both sides and expressed concerns for the mental
health of both the Mother and Grandmother. The Kentucky
appellate court held that the trial court acted within its discretion
and affirmed the order.

     In 2016, the Mother and Father moved to Florida with E.M.M.
In response to the relocation, the parties entered into an “Agreed
Supplemental Judgment” (“2016 Kentucky visitation order”) that
amended grandparent visitation to the Grandmother to reflect the
changed circumstances.

     The Grandmother continued litigating the visitation order in
Kentucky after the parents moved to Florida with the child.
Eventually, the Kentucky court held the parents in contempt for
failing to comply with certain terms of the modified visitation
order, culminating in the parents’ incarceration.

     While the allegations that led to multiple contempt orders
were being litigated in Kentucky, the parents attempted to register
the 2016 Kentucky visitation order; however, the Second Judicial
Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida, refused to register the
foreign judgment because the Kentucky court was continuing to

                                 2
exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over E.M.M. 1 The Florida court
found that the Kentucky court had rejected the parents’ claim that
Kentucky was an inconvenient forum. Though the Grandmother
initially opposed the parents’ petition to register the 2016
Kentucky visitation order, she eventually filed her own request for
registration. Shortly thereafter, the Grandmother filed another
petition to enforce the 2016 Kentucky visitation order in Florida
court, which included a request that the trial court direct the Leon
County Jail to relinquish jurisdiction of the Mother to the Nelson
County Sheriff’s Office in Kentucky.

     In 2018, the Kentucky court entered an “Agreed Order” (“2018
Kentucky visitation order”). This order did not substantially
change the Grandmother’s visitation schedule. Instead, the 2018
Kentucky visitation order incorporated the grandparent visitation
schedule set out in the 2016 Kentucky visitation order and
awarded make-up time-sharing to the Grandmother. The order
further stated the parties’ agreement that any party could
domesticate the 2018 Kentucky visitation order in Florida. On that
same day, the Grandmother filed a request to register the 2018
Kentucky visitation order in Florida.

     Approximately one year later, the parents filed a petition for
dissolution of marriage. When the parents entered into a marital
settlement agreement that divested the Grandmother of visitation,
The Grandmother moved to intervene. She claimed a direct
interest in the proceeding because she had been actively involved
in E.M.M.’s life and exercised time-sharing pursuant to the
Kentucky visitation orders. She further argued that the petition
for dissolution of marriage was a “sham” action.

     Around this time, the parents moved to establish exclusive
jurisdiction in Florida. The court ruled that “[a]ny visitation rights
that the grandparent had in the Kentucky order can be enforced in
Florida. . . .” The court also granted the Grandmother’s motion to
intervene.

    1 The parties often use the term “domesticate” to describe the

efforts to file the Kentucky order in a Florida court, but “register”
is a more appropriate term. See § 61.528, Fla. Stat.

                                  3
    A final judgment of dissolution was entered in October 2020,
and a parenting plan between the Mother and Father was
established. By amended judgment, the trial court further ordered
that the Grandmother’s visitation rights would continue to be
enforced until modified by the court.

     The parents immediately sought complete elimination of the
Grandmother’s court-ordered visitation, by filing a petition to
“modify” the visitation, alleging multiple substantial, material,
and unanticipated changes in circumstances in support of
modification. The Grandmother filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, in which she argued that the parents failed to
demonstrate such a change.

     In June 2021, the 2018 Kentucky visitation order was
registered, and the parents filed an “Amended Supplemental
Petition for Modification of Grandparent Visitation.” The parents
alleged ten substantial, material, and unanticipated changes in
circumstances.

     A final hearing was held in December 2021. In their case-in-
chief, the parents testified to their divorce and resulting time-
sharing arrangement. The Mother submitted that the divorce was
substantial and material because the parents now live in separate
households. While the Mother was a stay-at-home parent prior to
the divorce, by the time of the hearing, she maintained a full-time
job outside of the home.

     The Mother further stated that she did not anticipate the
parents’ divorce “until right around the time [she] filed for it.” She
explained that her earlier comments, which may have implied that
the parents were going to get divorced, were made out of anger.
When asked if she “repeatedly told the Kentucky court that [the
parents] were getting divorced,” the Mother answered: “No.” She
stated that she felt that her marriage “was going well” when the
2018 Kentucky visitation order was entered. The Father, on the
other hand, never mentioned a divorce. He stated that he was not
even aware that the Mother made such comments. However, the
parents admitted to fighting over the financial burden and the
stress caused by the overall litigation.

                                  4
     As for the parents’ post-divorce time-sharing arrangement,
the parents testified to their separate households and the
diminished time that each parent gets to spend with E.M.M. as a
result. The Mother has custody of E.M.M. during the week and the
Father has custody during the weekends. The Father attempted to
rectify the visitation issues between the Mother and the
Grandmother by allowing the Grandmother to visit with E.M.M.
during his parenting time. However, the Grandmother was not
satisfied because the Father’s parenting time alone did not allow
for the total amount of visitation to which the Grandmother was
entitled.

     After the parents rested, the Grandmother moved for
involuntary dismissal. She argued that the parents had not met
their burden of showing a substantial, material, and unanticipated
change in circumstances. The parents countered that, while the
Grandmother’s interference in their parenting has been ongoing
for years, their parenting decisions have evolved as E.M.M. grew
older. They also submitted that a divorce and resulting time-
sharing arrangement was “as good [of a substantial change] as it
gets.”

     The trial court dismissed the parents’ petition for modification
of grandparent visitation. In the final judgment, the trial court
explained its reasoning as follows:

         Although the parents now live separate lives and the
    minor child rotates between their two houses pursuant to
    a parenting plan, the mother has previously advised the
    Court in Kentucky, prior to 2018, that the stress of
    grandparent visitation would likely lead to the parents’
    divorce. The divorce of the parents was not unanticipated
    and is not material in nature. The court finds that there
    is no reason why the parents’ divorce should impact the
    grandmother’s court-ordered visitation.

This appeal follows.

                                 5
                                  II

                                  A

     The right to grandparent visitation is far broader in Kentucky
than it is in Florida. Compare Ky. Rev. Stat. § 405.021, with
§ 752.011, Fla. Stat. In Kentucky a grandparent may be granted
visitation rights as long as a court “determines that it is in the best
interest of the child to do so.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 405.021(1)(a). This
statute apparently permits a grandparent to obtain an order
forcing even married parents who both live with their child to
surrender the child to the grandparent against their wishes, as
happened here. This procedure appears to have made a strained
relationship worse, resulting in court orders defied by the parents,
which in turn resulted in the Grandmother having her own
daughter and son-in-law thrown in jail.

     The Kentucky policy regarding grandparent visitation rights
plainly conflicts with Florida’s. 2 Florida’s supreme court has
interpreted our state constitution to include “a natural parent’s
right to rear his or her own child” without “unwarranted
governmental interference.” Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d
1036, 1043 (Fla. 2000). Applying this principle, the supreme court
repeatedly has invalidated statutory provisions that give some
preference to grandparent visitation rights that interfere with a
parent’s “longstanding and fundamental liberty interest of parents
in determining the care and upbringing of their children free from
the heavy hand of government paternalism.” Beagle v. Beagle, 678
So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996) (citing Padgett v. Dep’t of Health &
Rehab. Serv., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)). The supreme court

    2   There was a time when Florida’s law was similar to
Kentucky’s, allowing a court to “award the grandparents visitation
rights of a minor child if it is deemed to be in the child’s best
interest.” § 61.13(2)(b)2.c., Fla. Stat. (2004). But over time, as
noted herein, grandparent visitation laws have been curtailed.
Like the other statutory provisions regarding grandparent
visitation noted herein, this specific statutory provision was
declared unconstitutional. Sullivan v. Sapp, 866 So. 2d 28 (Fla.
2004).

                                  6
has enforced this interest through the Florida Constitution’s
privacy guarantee.

      Accordingly, a statute permitting a court to award visitation
rights to a grandparent, even when the minor is living with both
natural parents who are still married, and based only on the best
interest of the minor child, has been held unconstitutional. Beagle,
678 So. 2d at 1276; see also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla.
1998) (holding another provision permitting grandparent
visitation when one or both parents are deceased, based solely on
the best interest of the minor child, without first requiring proof of
demonstrable harm to child, was unconstitutional); Saul v.
Brunetti, 753 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2000) (reaching the same conclusion
with respect to a provision permitting grandparent visitation when
the child was born out of wedlock). In Richardson our supreme
court struck down a statute that permitted a court to “recognize
the grandparents as having the same standing as parents for
evaluating what custody arrangements are in the best interest of
the child,” finding it a violation of parents’ state constitutional
right to rear their children. Richardson, 766 So. 2d at 1038. But in
spite of this recognized right, it is not for us to question the wisdom
of either the Kentucky grandparent visitation law or the Kentucky
court orders granting it to the Grandmother. This is a consequence
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution. Specifically, the supreme court has recognized that
the out-of-state orders awarding grandparents child visitation are
entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Ledoux-Nottingham v. Downs, 210 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. 2017). This
brings us to the case before us.

                                  B

     The parents argue that the trial court committed several
errors in dismissing their petition to modify the 2018 Kentucky
visitation order. In spite of any concerns we may have about
enforcement of Kentucky’s grandparent visitation policy, or any
errors the trial court may have committed, we cannot address the
parents’ claims because the court had no authority to modify the
order. As such, we cannot say that the court erred in dismissing
the parents’ petition.

                                  7
    Section 61.516, Florida Statutes, reads as follows:

    Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this
    state may not modify a child custody determination made
    by a court of another state unless a court of this state has
    jurisdiction to make an initial determination under s.
    61.514(1)(a) or (b) and:

        (1) The court of the other state determines it no
    longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under s.
    61.515 or that a court of this state would be a more
    convenient forum under s. 61.520; or

        (2) A court of this state or a court of the other state
    determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any
    person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the
    other state.

    A “child custody determination,” for the purpose of section
61.516, is defined in section 61.503(3), Florida Statutes, as follows:

        “Child custody determination” means a judgment,
    decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal
    custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation
    with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent,
    temporary, initial, and modification order. . . .

     Because they provide for visitation with respect to a child, the
Kentucky orders granting the Grandmother visitation constitute a
“child custody determination” under section 61.516, which a court
of this state may not modify without a statutory exception
applying. The first exception noted, section 61.517, Florida
Statutes—concerning temporary emergency jurisdiction—does not
apply. The next exception available, described in subsection (1),
does not apply because the Kentucky court neither determined
that it no longer has jurisdiction nor that a court of this state would
be a more convenient forum.

     Finally, the applicability of subsection (2) depends on whether
“the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent
do not presently reside in” Kentucky. “Person acting as a parent”

                                  8
includes a person, other than a parent, who “[h]as been awarded a
child-custody determination by a court.” § 61.503(13)(b), Fla. Stat.
Because the Kentucky order granting the Grandmother visitation
constitutes a “child custody determination,” the Grandmother is a
“person acting as a parent” under section 61.516(2). And because
the Grandmother lives in Kentucky, the subsection (2) exception
does not apply. Because no exception to section 61.516’s preclusion
of modification exists, the Florida trial court here had no authority
to grant the parents relief under their current petition in any
event. 3

     We in turn also reject the trial court’s conclusion to the
contrary in its “Order on Motion for Exclusive Jurisdiction.” That
order indicated that “there is no person ‘acting as a parent’ in
Kentucky as per Chapter 61.516(2) Fl. St. and Fl. St. 61.503(13).”
As stated above, this conclusion is inaccurate, because the
Grandmother is a person “acting as a parent,” as section 61.503(13)
defines that term. We note that, despite this error, the Order only
grants Florida courts the right to enforce the Kentucky order, not
to modify it (or in this case, to rescind it). 4

     In short, under section 61.516, the court was prohibited from
modifying the Kentucky visitation order. For this reason, the court
did not err in dismissing the petition for modification, albeit for a
different reason than it announced. We are therefore obligated to
affirm the order on review here.

    AFFIRMED.

    3 See also § 61.529(2), Fla. Stat. (“A court of this state shall

recognize and enforce but may not modify, except in accordance
with ss. 61.514–61.523, a registered child custody determination
of another state.”).
    4 We further note that the court’s statement in the Amended

Final Judgment of Dissolution that it had authority to modify the
grandparent visitation rights if the parents requested
modification, was also inaccurate, as it likewise conflicts with
section 61.516.

                                 9
TANENBAUM, J., concurs; ROBERTS, J., dissents without opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Susan J. Silverman, Sarasota, for Appellants.

Linda A. Bailey of the Law Office of Linda A. Bailey, P.A.,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                               10